


FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND SOUTH-SOUTH
COOPERATION: NEGOTIATING SPACE, PLACE AND POWER
WITHIN CHINESE FDI IN SOUTH AFRICA

Liam Michael O'Brien

A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD
at the
University of St Andrews



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
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Foreign Direct Investment and South-South
Cooperation: Negotiating Space, Place and Power
within Chinese FDI in South Africa

Liam Michael O'Brien



University of
St Andrews

This thesis is submitted in partial fulfilment for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
at the University of St Andrews

January 2019

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Abstract

Chinese Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in South Africa is indicative of a two-fold transformation in the contemporary development landscape: the rise of South-South Cooperation (SSC) and a re-centering of economic growth as a driver of development. However, to attract investment, and accrue developmental opportunities, hosts must first offer an enabling environment. Where an enabling environment does not presently exist, it must be actively produced. This is undertaken by a range of actors and against multiple and contested priorities. FDI, therefore, cannot be understood without an appreciation of the intimate, yet understudied, negotiations over space and place.

Through the use of semi-structured interviews, field observations, and documentary analysis at the location of three differing Chinese investments in South Africa – including a Chinese SOE within an economic zone, a mining partnership with a traditional rural community, and a ‘new city’ development led by a private Chinese investor – the thesis asks how space and place is produced to support investment, the location of agency, and the limits realities place upon the role of FDI in SSC.

Findings show that, whilst space and place were often co-produced and actively negotiated between host and investors, motivations and priorities were aligned to a need to provide spaces of comparative and competitive difference within wider international political economy. The structural production of space and place in this way created new dependencies and further uneven development. This had implications for a host ability to develop in accordance with their own values and objectives. Conclusions suggest FDI in the development landscape limits the radical potential of SSC.

The thesis applies geographic theory in a context not yet seen and, through bringing together Chinese and South African voices in a single study, contributes original empirical data from underrepresented voices in scholarship on China-Africa relations.

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Acronyms

ANC	African National Congress
B-BBEE	Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
CADFund	China-Africa Development Fund
COO	Chief Operating Officer
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Unions
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DFID	Department for International Development
EITI	Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FfD	Finance for Development
FOCAC	Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
GEAR	Growth, Employment, and Redistribution Plan
IDZ	Industrial Development Zone
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JSE	Johannesburg Stock Exchange
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MNE	Multi National Enterprise
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PE	Port Elizabeth
PEF	Political Economy of Finance
PRC	People's Republic of China
RDP	Reconstruction and Development Plan
RSA	Republic of South Africa
SEZ	Special Economic Zone
SLAG	Settlement and Land Acquisition Grant
SOE	State-Owned Enterprise/s
SSC	South-South Cooperation
TNC	Transnational Corporation
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
US	United States
WB	World Bank



'There is a politics of space because space is political' (Lefebvre, 2009a, p. 174).

1.0 A Changing Development Landscape

The growth of South-South Cooperation (SSC) and the role of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) represents the continued transformation of the global development landscape (Lall and Narula, 2004; Moran, 2006; DeHart, 2012; Mawdsley, 2012; Raghuram, Noxolo and Madge, 2014; Morvaridi and Hughes, 2018). In the context of development, SSC draws upon a narrative that seeks to challenge a development discourse that sees local identities, environments, knowledges, priorities, and ideologies shaped by singular, top-down, expert-led externalities, and promotes a narrative of win-win partnership, mutual gain, and the protection of national sovereignties (Hoogvelt, 1997; Sylvester, 1999; Escobar, 2008; Alvares, 2010; DeHart, 2012; UNOSSC, 2016; Morvaridi and Hughes, 2018). Actors attributed to SSC, explored later, seek to counter the legacies of inequality, exploitation, and dependency that have come to be associated with post-1945 Western-led¹ development ideologies (DeHart, 2012; Richey and Ponte, 2014; Morvaridi and Hughes, 2018). It is suggested, therefore, that SSC promotes development partnerships that are qualitatively different to policies and practices associated with so-called ‘traditional’ actors from (although not exclusively) Europe and North America.

However, in the knowledge that development revolves around a series of power relations, there are calls to assess the realities of SSC, including, the validation of FDI as a driver of development within it (see Davies 2017; Mawdsley et al. 2014). Of particular concern in this thesis is the notion that FDI, that re-centres economic growth as a driver of development, is not an automatic process and requires hosts (the state, region, or community in receipt of investment) to undergo various geographical transformations in order to attract investment and accrue developmental benefits (see Moran 2006). These changes, in their myriad forms, have implications for those communities and environments at sites of investment.

¹ US and European based governments, agencies, and international regulatory institutions such as the United Nations, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund.

Insights from postcolonial, Marxist, and economic geography highlight a dialectical relationship between economic growth and socio-environmental change (Brenner & Elden 2009; Hall 2011, 2017; Lefebvre 1991; Mudimbe 1988). The thesis therefore suggests that if development is to be achieved, and measured, via strategies of economic growth, then relations of power (between hosts and investors) cannot be removed from what is known of the material and imagined consequence of capitalist growth: namely, spaces of subordination, uneven development, and dependency.

To attract and support investment, various space- and place- making strategies must be employed to, firstly, create the material pre-requisites to support the movement of capital (including infrastructure, utilities, labour, stable governance, and the adoption favourable economic policies) and, secondly, to appeal to host communities (both public and private) to support and enact spatial change in line with expectations and priorities of the investor. FDI is thus dependent upon intimate negotiations over the production of *space* and *place*. Space and place have long been essential components to conceptions of development and, in the context of FDI, represent the holding ground and sites through which capital passes (see Sidaway 2007; Soja 1971). Lefebvre (2009b) suggests, furthermore, that the capitalist mode of production (the structural underpinnings of FDI) no longer simply occurs *in* space, but space is itself produced through capitalist development.

It was, therefore, the aim of this thesis to assess the human and structural agencies operating within the production of space and place in the context of FDI to recognise, if any, the limits realities place on locating FDI within a narrative of SSC. Motivations within the thesis recognise that revisiting questions of development should always speak to notions of agency (see Gumede 2018; Mkandawire 2011; Sen 1999). Importantly, questions of agency lie at the very foundations of SSC. These foundations can be traced back to the 1955 Bandung Conference² at which participants pledged to promote economic and cultural cooperation in order to challenge legacies of colonial and imperial inferiority.

² A meeting of Asian and African states in Bandung, Indonesia, on the 18-24 April 1955.

Brenner and Elden (2009, p.36) suggest that space and place are the ‘dynamic containers of political action’. It is therefore important to understand how the production of space and place in the context of FDI alters the ability for various actors to develop in accordance with their own values and objectives.

The case of Chinese FDI in South Africa is used to explore these concerns. Chinese and South African investment partnerships (in their myriad forms) are regularly framed by the narrative of SSC and FDI is promoted by both governments as a driver of economic cooperation (Gelb and Black, 2004). The Chinese Ambassador to South Africa has, himself, suggested that relations between China and South Africa have become ‘an exemplary model for South-South cooperation’ (Xinhua, 2018, para. 1).

The case of Chinese and South African investment partnerships, framed within their respective domestic contexts, represents a critical case to measure the issues raised in this thesis. Firstly, within the context of a search by Chinese actors for new resources, markets, and labour to address their country’s own crisis of capital and, secondly, against efforts underway in South Africa by politicians, academics, and individuals to challenge historical legacies of imperialism, colonialism, and apartheid. Gumede (2018) suggests that South Africans, informed by their historical experiences, must now determine their own development pathway. Furthermore, Cheru (2009, p.276) wrote that:

‘Whilst the conditions for Africa’s growth and development are much more favourable today than 15 years ago, the fact remains that the ability of African countries to chart their own independent path remains very limited. [...] The challenge to all of us is how to sit through the different narratives and roadmaps on Africa’s future to identify the line of balance of social forces that are shaping the trajectory of Africa’s development’.

It is the juxtaposition of South African and Chinese priorities in the context of SSC that is of interest in this thesis. The thesis therefore asks how space and place is produced within Chinese FDI in South Africa and whether South African identities, environments, and values (however differing and multiple these may be) are subordinated to the priorities and motivations of investors.

Three questions supported a response this question:

1. What space- and place- making strategies are employed in Chinese FDI in South Africa?
2. Where is agency located within the production of space and place in Chinese FDI to South Africa?
3. Are narratives of SSC challenged by the realities of space- and place-making strategies at sites of Chinese FDI in South Africa?

These research questions support an understanding of how space and place is produced in both its material and imagined form, the relationship between actors and structural forces, and how realities can be located within the context of SSC.

These questions were answered with an emphasis on the lived experiences of those at sites of investment. Semi-structure interviews, field observations, and documentary analysis were undertaken during an extended period of fieldwork in South Africa over five months. These methods were undertaken at the site of three differing Chinese-led investments including: a Chinese State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) in a South African Industrial Development Zone (IDZ); a Chinese financed mining partnership with a traditional South African community; and the construction of a 'new city' within a Johannesburg suburb supported by a private Chinese developer. Data was collected from both Chinese and South African community members in South Africa, investment managers and Chief Executives, trade union representatives, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), regional development agencies, and national government representatives. Maps, corporate literature, photographs, figures, and policy documents were also studied to understand how investments and spatial changes were represented, reproduced, and circulated.

Whilst Hoogvelt (1997) suggests that an investigation into the contemporary development landscape is challenged by an evolving political economy that is not yet known, with few tools to measure it, data within this study was analysed in reference to postcolonial theory. Postcolonial theory has a proven utility towards interpreting the relationship between space, place, and power and the apparatus

that shapes how spaces and places become known. Postcolonial theory supported analysis of interconnecting processes, the identification of clashing priorities and perspectives, and an assessment of the implications of power and privilege upon marginalised groups (Young, 2003; McEwan, 2009; Pollard *et al.*, 2009). McEwan (2009, p.250; see also Blunt & McEwan 2002) wrote that postcolonial theory ‘offers new ways of thinking about development – of what it is, what it does, and what it might do’. Importantly, postcolonial theory aligns closely to the interests of SSC – including holding a mutual interest in the material and cultural well-being of all peoples. The constituent parts informing the study will now be addressed in turn.

1.1 South-South Cooperation

South-South Cooperation – described as ‘a broad framework [of] collaboration among countries of the South in the political, economic, social, cultural, environmental, and technical domains’ (UNOSSC, 2016, para. 2) – represents a constituent part of the contemporary development landscape (Morvaridi and Hughes, 2018). Various actors responsible for national development (in whatever form their citizens seek or measure this) are increasingly re-orienting their domestic and foreign policies, practices, and alliances to seek alternative sources of development finance and political will beyond Europe and America³ (DeHart, 2012; Mawdsley, 2012; Raghuram, Noxolo and Madge, 2014). Governments, agencies, institutions, and private enterprises from countries such as Russia, India, and China (to name just a few) are now gaining favoured status amongst countries seeking material, financial, and ideological development support.

Against these geographical reorientations, development can no longer be chartered on a linear trajectory (within a Rostovian fashion⁴) nor can action and consequence be cited as a simple extrapolation of Western cultural, political, and economic ideals upon the rest of the world. From a geopolitical perspective these reformed

³ These actors may be referred to as ‘Traditional’ or ‘Western’ partners and could be viewed as the once leaders in development ideology and contributions; explained further on page 3.

⁴ A model of economic growth charting the pathway from traditional society to mass consumption (see Potter *et al.* 2008, p.89).

partnerships characterise a supposed rebalancing of the development landscape towards a new multipolar order (Culp 2016; Muchapondwa et al. 2016; Ogunnubi & Akinola 2017; Pickup 2018; Raghuram et al. 2014). These changes also coincide with the perceived retrenchment of ‘Western’ partners whose aid programmes and development initiatives are being cut, frozen, or redirected in response to domestic austerity measures, shifting values, and differing priorities for overseas aid. The contested closure of the U.K.’s bilateral aid programme to South Africa is one example (BBC, 2013; Wallis Simons, 2013; International Development Committee, 2014; Landale, 2017; Asthana, 2018). These shifting priorities were also recently reinforced in a speech by Theresa May, the UK Prime Minister, on a trip to South Africa where she declared: ‘I see no distinction between national self-interest and global co-operation’ (May, 2018, para. 47).

The growth of SSC as a dominant paradigm in development studies (remembering that SSC is not necessarily new) can be situated within a broader critique of development that takes aim at the one-size-fits-all ideologies, practices, and ways of knowing that once covered almost 80 percent of the world’s population at the direction of US based Bretton Woods⁵ institutions – such as the World Bank (WB), World Trade Organisation (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other Washington-based think-tanks (Escobar 2007; Sachs 2010a). Within such a critique, development is viewed as a powerful discourse and an imperial project to hold in place the social, cultural, and economic conditions of post-independent nations (Cheru, 2009; Sachs, 2010). To access development finance or project aid recipients were subject to donor conditionalities and were required to undergo vast political and economic transformation. As a result of these policies it had been suggested that governments of the so-called ‘Global South’ had become ‘increasingly accountable to external forces rather than their own citizens’ (Cheru, 2009, pp. 275–276). It has been suggested, therefore, that ‘Development’ has little improved the lives of many and caused irreversible damage to identities, environments, autonomy, and equality (Bond, 2000; Briggs and Yeboah, 2001).

⁵ Institutions set up following a meeting of 43 countries in Bretton Woods, USA, in 1944, aimed at rebuilding the global post-war economy and promote cooperation.

It is this history of developmental relations and prevailing concerns, stemming from ‘North-South’ relations, that SSC seeks to challenge. The juxtaposition of the global ‘North’ and ‘South’ has been fundamental to the history of aid and development practice. This continues within the narrative of SSC with the ‘North’ represented as exploitative whilst cooperation between countries of the ‘South’ being viewed as ‘democratic and emancipatory’ (Morvaridi and Hughes, 2018, p. 868).

The narrative of SSC, informed by the 1955 Bandung Conference⁶, is shaped by the participants’ (perceived) sense of shared histories, identities, aspirations, and challenges as developing nations. Additionally, countries of the so-called ‘Global South’ came together towards the end of European colonial rule across much of the globe (in a political wisdom at least). There is, therefore, a sense of post-colonial solidarity shared by those countries that had experienced the worst of colonial and imperial exploitation – and continue to face the legacies of political, cultural, and economic inferiority today. Even those countries that had not been subjected to colonial rule adopt an anti-colonial rhetoric to draw out difference and distance between former colonial powers.

SSC is informally shaped around *Five Principles of Co-existence*⁷. These principles include motivations to respect the sovereignty of partners, to promote economic and technical cooperation, to ensure mutual benefit, to support peaceful co-existence, and to respect the (self-identified) rights associated with identifying as ‘developing’ countries (Mawdsley, 2012). These principles of cooperation have been viewed as ‘distinct from and superior to “Western” models’ (Berger, 1995, p. 717) of engagement.

The BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) grouping of nations is one set of countries which take form around the narrative of SSC (DeHart, 2012; Mawdsley, 2012; Richey and Ponte, 2014; Taylor, 2014). Whilst not all of these countries are located in the geographic ‘South’, the term has become a qualitative

⁶ At this conference attendees sought an alternative framework towards a new political and economic order.

⁷ Principles originally established between China and India in 1953.

and discursive term of reference used by those within and outside of the group (MOFA, 2015b, para. 2). The BRICS operate on a variety of fronts: from the establishment of new development banks (see Vazquez et al. 2017), new political forums such as the annual BRICS summit, infrastructure development, and trade and investment cooperation; to softer relations of volunteerism (see Baillie Smith et al. 2018; Devereux 2008), educational exchanges (see King 2013), and language training (to suggest just a few). Actors (*e.g.* government officials, civil society organisations, and private enterprises) within these countries, more-than-ever, are contributing to the delivery of hospitals, schools, universities, infrastructure projects, technological exchange, and skills training.

Whilst cooperation amongst the BRICS is nothing new, interest lies in the increased financial, political, and rhetorical engagements between them, including, how their growing economic and political agency bears upon others. Interest in the BRICS stems from an understanding that constituent governments have tended to operate outside of formal forums and institutions: such as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the Development Assistance Committees (DAC). Governments, such as China’s, have also resisted calls to join these organisations on the grounds that their cooperation is ‘qualitatively different’ to traditional partners (see Table 1) and they should therefore not be measured by, supposedly, old and failing principles (Mawdsley, 2012; Muchapondwa *et al.*, 2016).

Table 1: The narrative framing ‘North’/‘South’ development cooperation; adapted from Mawdsley, 2012. p.153

Western ‘donors’	Southern ‘partners’
Charity.	Opportunity.
Moral obligation to the unfortunate.	Solidarity with other Third World countries.
Expertise based on superior knowledge, institutions, science and technology.	Expertise based on direct experience of pursuing development in poor-country circumstances.
Sympathy for different and distant others.	Empathy based on a shared identity and experience.
The virtue of suspended obligation, a lack of reciprocation.	The virtue of mutual benefit and recognition of reciprocity.

Principles attributed to SSC have been applied in a variety of contexts (from trade and finance, to foreign policy and cultural exchanges) and have evolved over time. In the context of development, SSC is informed by the need to allow countries to take ownership over their own poverty reduction strategies and a recognition that self-determination can only be achieved if States cooperate as equals free from exploitative political and economic systems (Mawdsley et al. 2014; Morvaridi & Hughes 2018). Academics and policy makers have sought to interpret how these principles should take form in a development-specific context⁸ (Table 2). These principles include the need to ensure partners are free to exercise leadership over their own development priorities, that contributions are aligned to host capacities, that non-state and state actors are mutually accountable, and that development cooperation respects and supports the full intersectionality of partner societies – particularly with respect to race, gender, and other marginalised groups (see Morvaridi & Hughes 2018; Pickup 2018). It is these principles that are taken forward, in this study, when considering the role and location of FDI in the contemporary development context.

With SSC increasingly juxtaposed against ‘traditional’ development partners, there is a theoretical gap in the knowledge about these alternative actors, including, their policies, practices, and effects (Sarvananthan, 2017). Critically, whilst ‘Southern’ actors promote a rhetoric of solidarity, concerns have been raised regarding unseen implications of their partnerships and cooperation (Muchapondwa *et al.*, 2016). Whilst alternative sources of finance and high-level summits add a certain level of opportunity towards meeting development objectives (including the ability to shop-around and obtain a louder voice in diplomatic forums), it has been suggested that the BRICS find themselves in competition rather than in partnership. Far from offering an *alternative* or *challenge* to the status quo, it has been suggested that actors may do little more than reify relations of dependency within the global capitalist system. Morvaridi

⁸ Informed by conferences and declarations such as the 2005 Paris Declaration and the 2005 Busan Conference on effective international cooperation, respectively.

and Hughes (2018) have suggested that contemporary ideas of SSC no longer live up to their radical origins.

Table 2: Principles of SSC in a development context, adapted from Pickup 2018, pp.4–5.

Principle	Characteristic
Ownership	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Partners should be able to exercise leadership over their development policies and priorities. - Processes of consultation should be widespread and include a range of citizens and stakeholders.
Alignment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Investors should base their investment and support on partner's needs and wants. - Investments should be offered that match host financial capabilities including monitoring and exchange capacity.
Harmonisation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Investment should be coordinated via mutual arrangement to avoid overlap or competition.
Accountability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Investors are accountable for results and outcomes and mutually assess progress in meeting commitments. - Continuous improvement and engagement.
Coherence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Foreign, domestic, and economic policy should be designed and implemented in line with each other's development and training goals.
Efficiency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Removal of bureaucracy for both investors and hosts. - Joint monitoring and assessment accessible to and carried out by locals. - Clear understanding of outputs and expectations.
Empowerment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Investments acknowledge intersectionality through engaging with issues of gender, race, and other marginalised groups. - Investments must be accessible to traditional groups/communities.
Sustainability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Investors should engage in capacity development through knowledge exchange, learning programmes, and support full participation at every stage of the process.
Mutual benefit	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Both hosts and investors must gain and exchange knowledge in both directions with evidence of horizontal take up of benefits.

It is these concerns that this thesis seeks to address. Individuals, communities, regional actors, and governments continue to adopt, negotiate, and resist changes in the contemporary development landscape. The thesis responds to the need to further explore the conflicts and contestations between states, sectors, and institutions within the frame of SSC (see Mawdsley et al. 2014).

1.2 Foreign Direct Investment for Development

One way in which SSC takes form is through FDI (Davies, 2017). The growing role of FDI in the development landscape broadly represents, albeit not exclusively, a shift from *public* to *private* flows of development assistance (see Clarke 2018; Hühne et al. 2014; Mawdsley et al. 2014; Richey & Ponte 2014).

Whilst the ‘giving’ of material resources and the ‘doing’ of development projects continue to represent substantial contributions to the development landscape, *aid* is no longer necessarily normal policy (Berthoud, 2010). The OECD (2002, p.5) reports that ‘[d]eveloping countries, emerging economies and countries in transition have increasingly come to see FDI as a source of economic development, income growth and employment’. During the present period of neoliberal globalisation, FDI has been described as both a major catalyst for development and an integral constituent of an open and effective international political and economic system (Cai, 1999; OECD, 2002).

Whilst FDI to developing countries, specifically, remains relatively small (representing around 20% of the global share of FDI), FDI contributions are significant in relation to the size of national economies in developing countries. Furthermore, FDI now regularly overshadows other sources of development assistance (OECD 2002, p.6). As a result of these changes, governments, regional development agencies, city administrators, and private individuals are increasingly prioritising a search for partners to invest in industry, infrastructure, and service provision towards meeting a range of development objectives.

Locating FDI within wider development theory and practice is complex. The term *development* is itself a contested term of reference and represents, at once, a concept, a process, an academic discipline, and a measure of social change (Sylvester, 1999). Thomas (2000, p.774) wrote that it ‘is impossible to avoid the contradictions behind the idea of development [when] laying down a single, simple, definition of one’s own’. Multiple definitions stem from there being many ‘developers’ (Cowen and Shenton, 1996): from government departments, NGOs, and financial institutions, to farmers, scientists, and social movements. The scope of development also continues to grow – from basic needs to climate change, security, trade, and energy – and the contribution of this thesis in areas of manufacturing, resource mining, and property development is representative of this.

Development, as a process, can refer to a child’s transition to adult-hood or measurable ‘progress’ via ‘industrialisation, rationalisation, [and] technological

improvement' (Dahl & Megerssa 1997, p.52; see also Esteva 2010; Mkandawire 2011). Thomas (2000, p.777) has outlined three useful interpretations of development:

'(i) as a vision, description or measure of the state of being a desirable society; (ii) as a historical project of social change in which societies are transformed over long periods; (iii) as consisting of deliberate efforts aimed at improvement on the various agencies, including governments, all kinds of organisations and social movements'.

From this interpretation it is possible to suggest that development takes form around two key factors: *immanent* and *intentional* development. Immanent development refers to spill-overs from 'naturally' occurring processes (such as capitalism) whilst intentional development refers to direct intervention by an external trustee or government to trigger development (see Cowen & Shenton 1996; Maiava & King 2007). These can be also referred to as little 'd' and big 'D' development respectively.

In the context of FDI, it is suggested that development occurs via spill-overs and linkages from naturally occurring processes. These spill-overs including the exchange of skills, technology, tax revenues, infrastructural development, and the opening-up of access to international trade and production networks (Davies 2017; Jindra et al. 2009; Lall & Narula 2004; Lipsey & Sjöholm 2005; Song 2011; Steger & Roy 2010). FDI could therefore be identified as a form of immanent, or little d, development (although, as will be seen, the lines often blur).

To study the logic of development a range of theoretical viewpoints have been adopted: from classical perspectives (*e.g.* modernisation theory), alternative and bottom-up approaches (*e.g.* basic needs and sustainable development), radical political economy and dependency theories (*e.g.* dependency, Marxist, and world system theories), and historical-empirical approaches (*e.g.* mercantile and core-periphery models) (see Potter et al. 2008, p.82). In the context of theorising FDI in the development landscape, Davies has explored two key perspectives: firstly, a *Financing for Development* (FfD) perspective that sees underdevelopment as a lack of resources and FDI is therefore used as a mechanisms to address a material

and financial gap within a State's economy⁹; secondly, the *Political Economy of Finance* (PEF) perspective which sees FDI as part of a complex financial network that supports the opening up of national economies for entry into international trade and production networks.

It is the PEF perspective that is taken forward in this thesis on the hypothesis that the ability to accrue developmental opportunities from FDI depends upon a structural relationship between transnational hosts and investors to facilitate the movement of capital, knowledge, resources, and technology. The adoption of this perspective therefore positions this work within the political economy and dependency approaches to theorising development. This approach has been adopted by many (see Hart 2002; Harvey 1995; Lefebvre 1991; Rodney 2012) to explore the links between capitalist processes, development, and issues of power and agency.

Stemming from these perspective, and alongside the growth of FDI in the development landscape, there has been a range of concerns raised regarding FDI as a tool for development. It has been suggested, for example, that developmental spill-overs are not inevitable, may be indirect, and distributed unevenly across regions, sectors and communities (OECD, 2002; Lall and Narula, 2004). There is also the potential that FDI may undermine local production capabilities and that structural relationships between hosts and investors may preserve relations of power that leave control over development (its pace and direction) to extra-territorial forces (Moran, 2006; Hühne, Meyer and Nunnenkamp, 2014; Davies, 2017; Sarvananthan, 2017).

These identified issues are particularly important when framed within the narrative of SSC and the continuing effort by scholars, practitioners, and governments to challenge unequal relations of power within the development nexus. As within wider assessments of the *post-aid* development landscape, it is important to understand, as Mawdsley *et al.* (2014, p.30) suggests, how to secure developmental benefits without 'without opening up a race to the bottom [or]

⁹ This idea can be linked to that of Jeffery Sachs (2005) who suggests poverty can be addressed through an adequate injection of capital.

sacrificing wellbeing, environmental sustainability, and social and political justice’.

1.3 Capital, Space, and Place

Through adopting a *Political Economy of Finance* perspective to the study of FDI it is suggested that the ability to attract foreign investment and accrue developmental opportunities is not an automatic process (see Christophers 2014). To attract investment, for example, the OECD (2002, p.21) suggests a host must provide an ‘enabling environment’ to support the movement of capital and resources from one location to another. An enabling environment includes material resources, skilled labour, infrastructure provision, a stable governance regime, and subsidiary support services. Where this environment does not presently exist, it must be actively produced and/or promoted.

To achieve an enabling environment hosts may have to undergo, to varying degrees, various geographical transformations to attract and hold investments in-place. Strategies to support investment could include the altering of the physical landscape and built environment (including new ports, roads, utilities provisions, and warehouses), the liberalisation of economic policy, or imaginative strategies to change host aspirations, values, perceptions, and tolerances of foreign investment through performance or visual representations (Mkandawire, 2011). These strategies can be undertaken by a State (*i.e.* government institutions) or non-state actors (*i.e.* private enterprises and civil society). This identified logic behind FDI and the production of space and place adopts an understanding that, whilst capital and markets can be self-regulating, they can also be ‘socially constructed and maintained’ (Hess 2004, p.491; see also Mkandawire 2011).

Space and place has been organised and shaped throughout history to produce, regulate, and reproduce economic spaces (including imperialism, colonialism, and empire). Contributions from theoretical work in postcolonial geography (explored in Chapter 3) have highlighted various strategies employed within colonial and imperial apparatus to support the expansion of the capitalist mode of production across the globe, including, but not limited to, strategies of surveillance,

aestheticisation, appropriation, naturalisation, and negation (see Cesaire 1955; Gregory 2004; Mudimbe 1988; Spurr 1993). Brenner and Elden (2009, p.33) note that ‘because patterns of spatial organisation have such a strategic significance to capital [...] concerted political strategies are mobilized to reshape them’.

Political and economic geographers have sought to understand the implications of various geographical changes – enacted to support the movement of capital – upon host communities and their environments (see Brenner & Elden 2009; Cox 1998; Hall 2017; Harvey 1981; Lefebvre 2009c). It has been suggested, for example, that FDI can have ‘destructive consequence for social space, everyday life, and the natural environment’ (Brenner & Elden 2009, p.3; see also Amin 2002; Davies 2017; Harvey 2010, 2015). Motivations, shaped by capital investment, may alter identities, knowledge production, governance structures, environmental value, mobilities and aspirations.

However, it is noted that the production of space and place in response to FDI is more complex than one actor simply imposing change upon another. Spatial change is increasingly negotiated, co-produced, and resisted. Hall (2017, p.491) suggests that FDI is a process where ‘global and local processes intermesh and run into each other in a variety of ways’. This understanding highlights the complex interplay of power between investors and hosts over development priorities, ideologies, and opportunities (Lall and Narula, 2004). A politics of space emerges between these competing interests (Granovetter, 1985; Taylor and Flint, 2000; Elden, 2010; Buchanan and Marques, 2018).

FDI is an inherently geographical process linking hosts and investors across differing scales and environments (*i.e.* linking individuals, communities, cities, regions and countries). Amin (2002, p.392; see also Cai 1999; Meyer 2004) suggests, therefore, that FDI materialises through a ‘string of place-based economies’ and hence it is important to understand the spaces in which investment is located and the places through which skills, technology, jobs, and ideologies are shared. It is important to understand the power and politics behind differing actors, institutions, and structural forces within the production of space and place by asking who makes decisions, how meaning is ascribed to space and place, what

knowledge is used, where they are formed, why, and how that makes certain causes of action possible (Kothari and Wilkinson 2010; Lefebvre 2009d).

The politics of space is an important, yet understudied, aspect of FDI within the context of SSC. Amin (2002, p.389) suggests that being in a position to reconfigure space and place (both physically and within the imagination) is a 'central determinant of what goes on in place (localities, cities, regions), how places coalesce or not as entities, how social relations in place are constructed, and how a politics of space matters'. It is suggested therefore that understanding the structures and conditions that produce space and place is important for 'defining and delimiting the terrain or practical action' (Hart 2002, p.12). It is important that hosts play a mutual and participatory role in their production of space and place. As Cox (1998, p.7) suggested: 'what is at stake is local interests. The ability to realise them is critical condition for the ability to exercise territorial power'.

Amin (2002, p.385) argues that 'processes associated with globalisation mark a new ontology of place/space relations that need to be theorised'. Through the case of Chinese FDI in South Africa, this thesis analyses the structural influences acting upon the production of space and place, by whom or what, and against what priorities. It is important, first, however, to contextualise FDI in the respective context of South African and Chinese development trajectories.

1.4 Chinese FDI and South African development

SSC represents cooperation by a broad range of countries with multiple and complex identities. The case of China and South Africa represents only one example. However, Chinese FDI in South Africa could be viewed as a critical case towards understanding changes in the contemporary development landscape. Chinese investment partnerships in South Africa represent both an example of SSC and a relationship where FDI has grown faster than aid flows (Mitchell, 2007; Wang, 2007; DeHart, 2012). An understanding of Chinese and South African independent development trajectories, here, highlights how their relationship (at varying levels) dovetails, as well as the possible conflicts, contradictions, and unsettling priorities that this study sought to engage.

In the case of China, it is predicted that its economy will become the world's largest (twice that of the United States) and, by consequence, the driver of the new world (Arrighi, 2008; Jacques, 2009; Halper, 2012). In line with these expectations there has been an intensified scholarship around the motivations of various Chinese actors and their contributions on the African continent. Hirono and Suzuki (2014, p.444) note that '[n]o topic of China's international relations in recent years has captured the imagination of both popular and academic audiences more than China's relations with the African continent'. Interest in the growth of China's economic and political role in international relations has been shown by both progressives and neoliberals alike (Hart-Landsberg and Burkett, 2006): the former celebrate China's economic, political, and cultural encroachment upon the 'West', whilst the latter are encouraged by the prospect of new markets and access to resources. It is this, somewhat dichotomous, enthusiasm that demonstrates the confusion, appetite, and relevance of a study into Chinese FDI in South Africa.

Chinese engagements on the African continent is not a recent or new phenomenon, however. The Chinese government, for example, had long supported anti-colonial struggles, made regular contributions to infrastructure projects whilst Europe and the United States were engaged in World Wars, and, importantly, China did not colonise African countries. It is on top of these engagements, and China's self-identified role as the world's 'largest developing country' (MOFA 2006, p.2; see also Brautigam 2009; Chu 2013; Fenby 2013; Jacques 2009; Vukovich 2013; Xinhua 2018) that Chinese actors might be portrayed as putatively equal and natural development partners.

Out of the BRICS grouping of nations China holds one of the most extensive¹⁰ relationships with the African continent. Chinese FDI has brought Chinese agents (government agencies, businesses, and private individuals) into contractual relationship with over 40 African countries. FDI is also considered to be one of the Chinese government's main modes of diplomatic leverage over African domestic and foreign policy engagements (Wang, 2007; Cheru and Modi, 2013; Taylor, 2014). Halper (2012, p.97) wrote:

¹⁰ Cultural, economic, political, and environmental relations.

‘From railways and bridges to hospitals, schools, roads, electricity grids, and telephone networks, these [Chinese] companies have been instrumental in bringing modern infrastructure to parts of the world that the West had chosen to overlook’.

Evident within the Chinese government’s latest *Africa Policy* paper, which highlights an estimated \$60 billion worth of commitments, this trajectory of engagement is set to continue (Wekesa 2015, para.2; see also Bräutigam & Xiaoyang 2011; MOFA 2015a).

The role of FDI within the Chinese government’s foreign and economic policy followed its own ‘Go-out’ policies in the late 1970s. As well as welcoming foreign investment to the Country’s domestic markets, the opening-up policy supported Chinese enterprises in accessing new markets, resources, and opportunities overseas (Cai, 1999; Wang, 2007; Kernén and Lam, 2014). Whilst this support was initially offered to State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), this has now been expanded to include public-private partnerships, and wholly private enterprises (see MOC 2000). This state-guided opening-up has been seen to have helped the Chinese government avoid the ‘shock-therapy¹¹’ and crippling loans that many African nations had been subjected to on behalf of ‘Western’ institutions such as the WB and IMF (Briggs and Yeboah, 2001; Hart-Landsberg and Burkett, 2006). This strategy – labelled as the *Beijing Consensus* (see Halper 2012) – has therefore appealed to African nations and it has been described as a ‘refreshing alternative to the traditional engagement models of the West [and a] point of departure from Western neo-colonialism and political conditions’ (Naidu and Davies, 2006, p. 80). Importantly, it has been suggested that the South African government favoured the ‘China model’ of state-directed capitalism in what the media represented as a ‘mutual love founded on state control’(de Wet 2015, para.1; see also Hsu 2015).

The Chinese government’s changing policy orientations dovetailed with South Africa’s own historical and contemporary development trajectory. Following a period of geopolitical isolation during the Apartheid era, South Africa’s ruling

¹¹ Sudden withdrawal of the State and immediate trade liberalization.

ANC government suggested its future would be cross-border and SSC was central to this agenda. This agenda married with the adoption of neoliberal political economy – at the behest of the national government and driven by elites and multilateral companies – during the 1990s (Bond, 2000; Hart, 2002). These policies promoted free enterprise and private property rights and were enacted through South Africa's 1996 *Growth, Employment and Redistribution* (GEAR) policy and the *Reconstruction and Development Plan* (RDP).

The foreign and economic policies adopted by the ANC government has, however, been criticised by trade unions, politicians, and poorer sectors of South African society (Didier, Morange and Peyroux, 2013). Hart (2002, pp.1–2) suggested that the ending of Apartheid, and the release of Nelson Mandela, represented a kaleidoscopic moment:

‘For the local councillors this moment of assuming formal power was one of fulfilment of long years of struggle and enormous promise for the future, as well as a moment of profound danger; of being thrust into an arena of power strewn with the detritus of the apartheid past, and sharply circumscribed by the negotiated settlement. It also coincided with the ANC national government's announcement of a package of conservative neoliberal economic policies. Many South Africans closely allied with the ANC were shocked and dismayed not only by this apparent retreat from redistributive social change, but also the arbitrary manner in which key officials handed it down as *a fait accompli*.’

The neoliberal turn in South Africa's history raised question over the ability to address historical legacies of inequality and uneven development (concerns at the crux of this thesis and within the narrative of SSC).

Although South African and Chinese political and economic policy orientations dovetail, concerns have been raised regarding the juxtaposition of differing motivations and priorities. China (*i.e.* the country's economic profile), for example, can be described as a resource-hungry civilisation. This has led many to question the government's true agenda or its unintended consequences. Whilst the Chinese government promotes its own growth as ‘peaceful’ (Information Office

of the State Council 2011, para.2) observers have raised concerns over neo-colonial ideology (Halper, 2012; Wang and Zou, 2014).

Motivations behind Chinese engagement (representing myriad actors) in South Africa include the need for new resources and access to consumer markets to address an issues of over-accumulation of capital¹² within its domestic economy (OECD, 2002; Jacques, 2009; Cheru and Modi, 2013; Freemantle and Stevens, 2013; Taylor, 2014). For Chinese investors, South Africa's liberation of its economy provided unexplored markets, offered little competition, and provided opportunities to acquire suitably cheap and abundant land and labour for comparatively instant economic gains (Schoneveld and German, 2014; Wang and Zou, 2014). Concerns can therefore be raised, as a result of these dynamics, that there is potential for an imbalance in trading relations that lead to South Africa's land, communities, and priorities becoming shaped by the needs and demands of Chinese investors.

These concerns were exemplified during a meeting of academics in Cape Town, South Africa, in which the theme of 'Afrasian Encounters: Changing Realities, New Concepts'¹³ was under discussion. The meeting held a remit to think through some of the cultural, environmental, and political transformations taking place as a result of Chinese and East Asian actors operating on the African continent. One particular notion discussed was that of *Afrasian Space*. A phrase that stems from the work of Mazrui and Adem (2013) who recognise the growing trans-national and trans-cultural nature of the African-Asian relationship. A noted concern was the changing spatial arrangements and resulting reconfigured social, cultural, and political spatial imaginaries. Changes discussed included new transport corridors, security bases, production networks, economic and industrial development zones, training and education institutes, and a plethora of intergovernmental summits and diplomatic ceremonies. These changes, arguably, brought into view for African communities new environments, identities, routines, prospects, and possibilities.

¹² The notion that Investment domestically is no longer producing value due to overaccumulation of capital.

¹³ International Conference jointly organised by the Centre for Chinese Studies at Stellenbosch University and the Research Program "Africa's Asian Options (AFRASO)" at Goethe University Frankfurt/Main, 24th March-26th March 2015.

Dr Ross Anthony¹⁴ suggested that relations between Africa and China signify a theoretically underdeveloped and somewhat different form of globalisation.

A series of satirical art pieces by Kenyan artist Michael Soi (Figure 1) demonstrates how many, including Africans themselves, see China's engagements with African countries: a power-play of complex relationships with underhand and discursive associations as Chinese actors come to seduce African elites (Mbowa, 2014). It is possible that South African development comes to hold new dependencies shaped by changing networks of finance, cooperation, and politico-economic alignment with Chinese actors.



Figure 1: Art series by Kenyan artist Michael Soi depicting China-Africa relations (Source: (Source: Mbowa 2014))

The identified concerns, contextualised against Chinese motivations and priorities, are even more significant in South Africa where efforts are made daily – in classrooms, boardrooms, corner shops, government offices, and at overseas summits – to challenge what South Africa's former president, Jacob Zuma, described as the 'colonial shackles' (AFP, 2014, para. 1) and relations of dependency still holding the country in a subordinate position vis-a-vis the rest of the world.

¹⁴ Acting Director, Centre for Chinese Studies, Stellenbosch University.

The production of space and place (its control, organisation, and representation) is particularly pertinent in the context of South Africa. History texts on South Africa's development – from its founding as the Cape Colony in the 18th Century – highlight how the country has been transformed by external actors (Cox, 1998; Mkandawire, 2011; Fourie and Swanepoel, 2018): from the Church, to Colonial Administrators. Continuing into the Apartheid era, land was appropriated and communities were organised and relocated for the benefit of capital owning classes. International finance and neoliberal political economy may further work to exacerbate the alienation of land and the marginalisation of various communities. David Harvey (2005a, p. 116) wrote that '[e]merging in the midst of all the hopes generated out of the collapse of apartheid and desperate to reintegrate into the global economy [...] economic apartheid now confirms the racial apartheid that preceded it'.

Questions over the ownership and production of space and place – at the centre of this thesis – are critical for working towards a fairer future for South Africa (Moyo, 2013). Whilst the South African government has sought to put in place programmes and policies to address social issues and concerns over land rights – such as the Settlement and Land Acquisition Grant (SLAG) and Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (B-BBEE) – these are arguably being challenged and undone by new trade and investment partnerships. Understanding South African development, and the location of agency within it, is also important due to the country's (hegemonic) leadership position on the African continent (Ogunnubi and Akinola, 2017).

It is the motivations of Chinese investors, and their alignment to host expectations and concerns, where a conflict may arise that unsettles the narrative of SSC in the context of FDI. Davies (2017, p.10) suggested that rather than a new cooperative approach, the South African government is 'building up large amounts of debt and linking [its] economy inextricably to the health of the Chinese economy'. Taylor (2014, p.126) also warned that 'the historic relationship between Africa and the world is being reified'. This thesis suggests that Chinese FDI challenges assumptions about development and there is a significant gap between China's future development agenda and the expectations of South African communities.

1.5 Summary

This thesis explores the production of space and place in the context of Chinese FDI in South Africa. The case of Chinese and South African investment partnerships represents a two-fold transformation in the contemporary development landscape – the rise of SSC and the re-centring of economic growth as a driver of development through FDI. Through engaging with political and economic theory, the thesis raises questions over the limits of FDI within SSC. It has been suggested that, to attract FDI, and accrue developmental spill-overs, hosts (in their myriad forms) must undergo various geographical transformations. These transformations have the potential to threaten identities, knowledges, values, environments, and securities at sites of investment. The study therefore seeks to understand the values and priorities shaping sites of investment, implications upon hosts' ability to develop in accordance with their own values and priorities, and what this means for FDI in SSC.

Hoogvelt (1997, p.xi) wrote that 'development studies has been scattered by the winds of change'. This statement continues to be relevant when placed in the context of the contemporary development landscape. The thesis will therefore make several timely theoretical and empirical contributions. Firstly, the thesis meets calls for a continued assessment of agency in the changing development landscape, including, how the power of differing actors and practices bear upon others (see Escobar 2008; Gumede 2018; Mkandawire 2011). Secondly, the study of FDI, in the context of development, is currently limited to quantitative assessments of its value and direction (*i.e.* how much is invested and where) (see Anderson 1992; Hall 2017). Qualitative aspects of FDI, including its spatial form, remain understudied. This thesis makes an important contribution in respect to this. Finally, the thesis contributes empirical data from understudied and underrepresented voices within China-Africa scholarship, including, Chinese Executives (at both private and State-Owned enterprises), rural South African township communities, and high-level government representatives from both China and South Africa. Furthermore, the study's in-depth qualitative data addresses a shortcoming in present theory on China-Africa scholarship that is, at

present, abstract, partial, and based on broad generalisations rather than empirical enquiry (see Mkandawire 2011; Pickup 2018).

Following this introduction, chapter two provides an overview of the links between FDI, development, and concerns regarding power, agency, and the transformation of host operating environments. Chapter three locates FDI and spatial change within theoretical understandings of capital, space, and place. This chapter also references work in postcolonial geography to understand the various spatial strategies employed in the historical development of capitalist growth across the globe. Chapter four provides an overview of the methodology employed as well as statements on positionality, ethics, and the validity of findings. Chapters five, six, and seven work through the empirical studies to identify the space- and place- making strategies employed across the chosen case studies. Chapter eight draws a thread through the three case studies to assess their similarities and differences and engages broader geographic theory to interpret the structural relationship between the context of investments and the place- and place- making strategies identified. This chapter also locates findings back within the narrative of SSC. The final chapter concludes the study by providing a substantive response to the research questions and makes statements on contribution and recommendations for further work.

2.0 FDI for Development

This chapter outlines the theoretical relationship between FDI and development. As well as outlining its structural logic (the ways in which development may occur), the chapter highlights the broad criticisms of FDI relating to the necessary social and environmental changes to support and sustain it. The chapter opens up a range of concerns against which Chinese FDI in South Africa are situated and assessed.

2.1 Theory and Practice

The role of FDI in contribution to a nation's development agenda has increased as other forms of development finance and assistance has become scarcer and/or more volatile (Lall and Narula, 2004). Those individuals, businesses, and governments seeking development (in whatever form or measure this takes) are increasingly putting their faith in investment and trade agreements on a scale comparable to their confidence in state or public-funded development assistance (Thomas, 2000). FDI has been used to construct factories, fund critical infrastructure (*e.g.* roads, ports, mines, and utilities), and develop national (economic and political) institutions. It has been suggested that FDI also provides, for developing countries, access to superior and cleaner technologies¹⁵, improves social responsibilities, offers greater consumer choice, cheaper goods, and more employment opportunities. The OECD (2002, p.5) confirms that 'Developing countries, emerging economies and countries in transition have come increasingly to see FDI as a source of economic development and modernisation, income growth and employment'.

Enthusiasm for FDI for development has been boosted by the perceived success of other 'export-orientated economies' such as Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and China who invited investment from the US, Europe and Japan to support their own economic development (Lall and Narula, 2004; Moran, 2006).

¹⁵ Although in the case of some Chinese investments this has been questioned (see Balambaras 2014)

Thomas (2000, p.778) suggests that examples of Chinese and other East Asian countries who are developing ‘but not simply in response to the practices of international development agencies’ offer important lessons for developing countries.

Whilst FDI to developing countries remains relatively small (representing around 20% of the global share), FDI to developing countries is significant in relation to the size of their national economies. Additionally, FDI contributions now overshadow other forms of Official Development Assistance (ODA) that a country may receive (OECD, 2002, p. 6). Against these changes, Berthoud (2010, p.7) wrote that ‘our time is characterised by the deep belief in the power of the market to solve the world’s development problems’. Development scholars have sought to understand how FDI contributes to national welfare and how, it at all, investment practices can address concerns of those who are critical of other forms of project-led and aid-driven development assistance.

The role of FDI towards meeting a nation’s development objectives is not unique to SSC. FDI has been promoted by a range of governments and international institutions for many years: including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund through the so-called ‘Washington Consensus’¹⁶ (see Halper 2012; Harvey 2005a). In a development context, FDI has been described as an efficient tool for the exchange of material and financial resources and supports the integration of developing countries into international trade and production networks (Fourie & Swanepoel 2018; Lall & Narula 2004; Moran 2006). The World Trade Organisation (WTO 2018, para.5; see also Fung 2017) advised governments that ‘the opening of national markets to international trade [...] will encourage sustainable development, raise people’s welfare, reduce poverty, and foster peace and stability’. FDI is also suggested to offer long-term development contributions in contrast to short-term funding cycles that may be associated with public funding bodies.

¹⁶ A set of reform packages promoting the economic opening up with respect to both trade and investment, and the expansion of market forces within the domestic economies.

As with neoliberal political economy (see Harvey 2005a; Steger & Roy 2010), it is suggested that FDI supports the elimination of poverty through free trade and private ownership (Wang, 2007). Host countries should minimise state intervention, privatise state-owned industries, remove bureaucracy, and promote entrepreneurship. Logic suggests that if native and international industries are allowed to benefit from free trade and improved market access then there will be an increase in employment and tax intake for host authorities. The classic, yet contested, premise that ‘a rising tide lifts all boats applies here’ (see Harvey 2005a, p.64). Following independence, most newly independent countries saw FDI as a tool to support national development, economic growth, and the provision of other welfare-enhancing commitments and adopted (sometimes coerced by conditionalities attached to loans) neoliberal economic policies (Wainwright, 2008).

Beyond the adoption of neoliberal policies, development occurs directly through the structural logic of capitalist markets – described by the OECD (2002, p 5) as ‘the most potent tool for alleviating poverty in developing countries’ – to drive economic growth and distribute benefits to host communities, businesses, and governments. These benefits are transferred to hosts through three key structures: spill-overs, linkages, and trade flows (Figure 2). These structures support the movement of capital, skills, technology, and ideologies across borders and connect international production and trade networks (OECD, 2002; Lall and Narula, 2004; Meyer, 2004; Moran, 2006; Jindra, Giroud and Scott-Kennel, 2009).

It is the structure of the spill-overs and linkages that give FDI spatial form through linking differing spaces and places. The nature of spill-overs and linkages are of particular importance when considering relations of power in the context of SSC. Linkages between hosts and investors can take vertical form (exchanges within existing networks and internal supply chains) and/or horizontal form (exchanges across differing sectors, actors, and industries) (Jindra, Giroud and Scott-Kennel, 2009). In relation to SSC, it would be expected that spill-overs and linkages centre on the promotion of increased horizontal relationships.




Figure 2: Spill-overs, trade flows, and linkages (Source: Meyer 2004, p.261).

The structural form that develops between hosts and investors is where a politics of space emerges. The nature of linkages and spill-overs established through FDI – representing intermeshing priorities between hosts and investors – have been a key focus of economic and political geographers (Meyer, 2004; Hall, 2017). Development from FDI is not enacted by a single government or development agency, but the relations of exchange between people, spaces, and places are multiple and complex. The success of development and power relations involved is shaped by the manner in which investors interact with host communities, the differing institutional arrangements supporting exchanges, and the belief values that underpin the contractual relationships (Lall and Narula, 2004). Actors within differing sectors, for example, may have differing priorities.

It is important to understand how differing actors enact investment, competing priorities, and consequences for individuals, communities, and industries at sites of investment. This thesis focuses on identifying how Chinese FDI in South Africa takes form and the potential clashing priorities and motivations.

2.2 Criticism and Concern

Various studies, within a broad range of disciplines (including economics, business and management studies, geography and anthropology), have been undertaken to understand the role and consequence of FDI in the development landscape. These studies have predominantly sought to understand how to enhance

and create more efficient spill-overs and exchanges between investors and hosts (Lall and Narula, 2004; Meyer, 2004; Moran, 2006; Jindra, Giroud and Scott-Kennel, 2009). These interests stem from the recognition that spill-overs, linkages, and exchange are not automatic. To accrue developmental benefits hosts (whether this be at the local, regional, or national level) must undergo various geographical transformations to attract and facilitate investment (see OECD 2002). Lall and Narula (2004) suggest that where a high quality local operating environment does not exist, then investment and associated benefits will not be available. Moran (2006, p.28; see also Wang 2007) identifies an exhaustive list of requirements indicative of a high-quality operating environment, including:

‘...low inflation, equilibrium exchange rates, steady economic growth, reliable infrastructure, high literacy rates, liberalized trade, little ethnic tension, minimal corruption, stable and transparent political institutions and procedures, independent and capable judicial systems, and more recently, low incidence of HIV-AIDS, malaria, and other infectious diseases and extensive access to the Internet’.

These characteristics of a host operating environment is seen to be necessary to support the free flow of goods, services, and capital.

However, beyond the financial aspects of an operating environment, hosts are required to go much further than simply reducing red tape or opening borders to free trade. The success of FDI and the ability to accrue developmental benefits depends also upon considerable, understudied, non-market aspects including social, cultural, and environmental reforms (Davies 2017; Jindra et al. 2009; Hall 2017; Lall & Narula 2004; Meyer 2004). Berthoud (2010, p.75) suggests, for example, that hosts can only attract and extract benefits from FDI if they are ‘ready to rid themselves entirely of their traditions, and devote themselves to making profit, at the expense of the whole gamut of social and moral obligations’. It has been suggested that the linking of development to international capital flows damages local and traditional livelihoods and leads to environmental destruction (Berthoud 2010; Cai 1999; De Vries 2007; Steger & Roy 2010). Harvey (2005a, p.118) has argued that a failure for hosts to change to market conditions may leave

communities behind, give no social protections, and ‘continue to face deteriorating issues of poverty, hunger, disease, [and] the dull fate of increasing marginalisation’.

Concerns are also raised around what, or whose, priorities are valued within decision making regarding environmental change and the execution of national development goals. It has been suggested that hosts (from governments to individuals) are increasingly putting their faith in economists and Chief Executives to deliver development in areas such as health, education, basic services (including energy and water), and human rights (Barnett 2005; Cheru, 2009; Chouliaraki 2013; Hühne et al. 2014; Mirowski 2013). Questions have also been raised around who should absorb the costs of necessary environmental, infrastructural, and skills provisions (*i.e.* who should pay for ports and/or to educate the workforce). Meyer (2004, p.260) suggested that foreign investors tend to be profit maximising and are therefore not naturally ‘interested in creating benefits for others without being paid for it’. In a similar tone, profit motivations may lead investors to transfer technologies and production techniques that are three to ten years behind frontier industries, exploit existing networks rather than establish new ones, and only pursue high environmental and labour standards if profit margins allow (Moran, 2006).

As a consequence of investors holding a level of control over development priorities that ‘often rivals that of state and international agencies’ (Thomas 2000, p.785; see also Davies 2017; Moran 2006) it is suggested that FDI may also become politically motivated. Proposed commitments (such as skills training, job quotas, or infrastructure development) could be withdrawn or used as negotiating tools to access markets and resources (Gamu and Dauvergne, 2018). Development opportunities may therefore be tied to the circumstance of the investor. FDI, located within the frame of capitalist political economy, also leads to the privileging of private interest (Davies, 2017). Within popular media (newspapers, online commentaries, and television reports), for example, fears have been raised that private interest has prioritised the development of gated communities, shopping centres, luxury property, and the oil sector (see Provost 2014; Ross 2016).

Interpreting FDI through PEF paradigm (refer back to section 1.2), for example, may also suggest that host values, priorities, expectations, and capacities become inextricably linked to cross-border processes and the realisation of external interests (Polanyi, 2001; Lipsey and Sjöholm, 2005; Brown, 2015). Whilst historically FDI has been used as a mere overdraft facility to cover day-to-day government balances and exchanges, today FDI takes the form of long term capital investment. The long-term intermeshing of host communities to the world economy generates greater risk and insecurities (Fourie and Swanepoel, 2018). The result of these concerns is that structures may simply preserve and reproduce relations of inequality, uneven development, and dependency that SSC seeks to address (Cowen and Shenton, 1996; Thomas, 2000; Wang, 2007; Cheru, 2009; Gumede, 2018).

Structural linkages between hosts and investors, shaped by international political economy, may undermine local production capabilities and promote a race-to-the-bottom as hosts are encouraged to offer an operating environment with lower wages, reduced safety standards, and weaker environmental regulations (OECD, 2002; Wang, 2007). Moran (2006) cites the case of the Japanese and South Korean governments, for example, who pressured the Bangladesh government to restrict trade union representation within its export zones.

It is the potential privileging of interests within investor-host relations and the valuing of voice, agency, knowledge, environments and identities within the development landscape that leads to questions over the ability for FDI to meet concerns of SSC. FDI represents a complex interplay between hosts and investors and understanding these relationships are important.

2.4 Summary

This chapter has situated FDI within the broader context of development, in terms of both theory and practice. Principally, FDI for development re-centres economic growth as a driver of development. Host development, whether this be a nation, city, community or individual, then occurs from various spill-overs and linkages that support the exchange of knowledge, technology, labour, capital, as well as

supporting subsidiary businesses and entry to international trade and production networks.

Concerns stemming from the use of FDI, towards the meeting of development objectives, have also been highlighted to show why FDI may be problematic if/when attributed to SSC: firstly, development from FDI is not automatic process and hosts must undergo various geographical transformations to attract investment and support spill-overs and linkages; secondly, the linking of development to private interest and dependencies of the market may have implications for developmental priorities, value systems, environmental degradation, and the security of native industries.

The nature of change required to support FDI – how change is manifested, by whom, and on what priorities – is of interest in this study. In line with principles attributed to SSC, the required changes may have implications for identity, knowledge, solidarity, equality, self-determination, leadership over development priorities, and the alignment of investments to host needs and capacities.

The following chapter explores, in reference to postcolonial theory, the importance of space and place to FDI, the various space- and place- making strategies employed to shape capital flows, and the power relations involved.

3.0 Space, Place, and Power

Following the previous overview of the link between FDI and Development, this chapter works to identify the specific role of space and place in attracting, sustaining, and accruing developmental spill-overs and linkages. This is achieved through bringing forward insights from work within postcolonial geography. Through acknowledging potential lineages between capitalism (the main driver of FDI) and its historical and geographical expression in the form of imperialism, colonialism, and International Development, it is possible to understand the various strategies which have been employed by actors to secure the movement of capital across space and place. The chapter ends by identifying a range of space- and place- making strategies that formed an indicative framework to assess the production of space and place in the context of Chinese FDI in South Africa.

3.1 Postcolonial Geography

One way in which to assess both the structural relationship between FDI and development and resulting implications upon various actors is through the use of postcolonial theory. Postcolonial theory is not a single coherent theory, but a collective of theoretical propositions to reveal various power relationships within transnational systems and processes. Postcolonial theory has been applied in a variety of contexts, including, Marxism, feminist theory, development, and linguistics. In this study, postcolonial theory is used to interpret FDI as an extension of capitalist political economy. Postcolonial theory is not only valuable towards revealing the structural relationships between space, place, and capital, but also in assessing relations in respect to power and privilege and the conflicts between them (see Young 2003).

Postcolonial theory emerged as a field of criticism towards the end of the 1980s during a period of increased economic growth and globalisation. During this period contact and contestations between differing cultures, customs, and economies intensified. Whilst the term ‘postcolonial’ can refer to the temporal

period *after* colonialism¹⁷, often hyphenated as ‘post-colonialism’, it also refers to a critical challenge to the continuing legacies of colonial and imperial relations of power (see Bhabha 1994; Blunt & McEwan 2002; Lazarus 2011; Strongman 2014; Williams & Chrisman 1994). In this light, postcolonial theory, as a frame of analysis, dovetails with concerns attributed to SSC. Both seek, or propose, that actors within a relationship should hold equal rights to cultural and material well-being (see Young 2003, p.2).

Postcolonial geography, representing a sub-discipline within postcolonial studies, focuses in particular on the spatiality of power relations: involving an assessment of the connections and disconnections between differing spaces and places, clashing priorities and perspectives, and the consequences of these upon subordinate groups in differing social, environmental and political contexts (Blunt and McEwan, 2002; Strongman, 2014). Through the study of differing actors, their practices, and motivations, postcolonial geography seeks to understand the role of geography in the domination of people and places: how local geographical change is shaped by globalising processes and practices (Crush 1994). In this study, this takes the form of understanding and assessing the clashing or complimentary perspectives of Chinese investors and South African hosts.

From a methodological perspective, postcolonial theory seeks to interrogate the way in which the world is known, how various actors produce, represent, and circulate knowledge about differing spaces and places, how they seek to alter various material forms, and to ask what purpose or effect of these strategies have. Such an approach is valuable towards understanding how intervention by various actors transform the identities and environments of differing groups. McEwan (2009, p.23) wrote that postcolonial geography focuses on ‘who creates knowledge about other places and people and consequences of this knowledge, be that in the form of colonisation in the past or developmental and geopolitical interventions in the present’. As with the principle aim of this thesis, postcolonial geography seeks to understand the various strategies and practices employed to

¹⁷ A contested distinction that suggests ‘colonisation’ is over.

shape differing environments and communities and consider these in respect to power, privilege, and agency (Young, 2003; McEwan, 2009).

Whilst postcolonial criticism has often been situated outside of development scholarship – postcolonialism dealing with historical, textual, and cultural concerns, and development focusing on global inequality and political economy (MCFARLANE, 2006; Sharp and Briggs, 2006) – the two fields are increasingly viewed as offering productive insights into power relations within the development landscape (MCFARLANE, 2006; Sharp and Briggs, 2006; McEwan, 2009; Strongman, 2014; Radcliffe, 2015). McEwan (2009, p.250) suggests that postcolonial theory offers ‘new ways of thinking about development – of what it is, what it does, and what it might do’

Postcolonial theory recognises that relations of development are shaped by both material transactions and the flow of knowledge, ideas, and ideals. Postcolonial theory also acknowledges the diversity of actors, practices, and beliefs that constitute development, rather than, wholesale criticism or rejection (see Blaikie 2000; Corbridge 1998; Lempert 2014; Pieterse 2000; Simon 1997; Strongman 2014; Wainwright 2008). A postcolonial approach to the study of the contemporary development landscape also places a spotlight on the role of alternative voices, experiences, and practices. McEwan (2009, p.212) writes that postcolonial theory prioritises questions such as:

‘...who voices development concerns, what power relations are played out, how do participants’ identities and structural roles in local and global societies shape their priorities, and which voices are excluded as a result’.

Through the study of differing transnational actors, institutions, and practices postcolonial theory supports an assessment of how places and spaces are produced in a development context and their effect. In the context of Chinese FDI in South Africa, postcolonial theory supports an assessment of how host environments were being changed, and for what ends, by asking *who* is doing *what*, *where*, and *why*.

Whilst caution is raised regarding the use of postcolonial theory to interpret contemporary relations (using historical constructs to explain the contemporary

experiences of others) (see Chibber 2013; Chakrabarty 2008; Lazarus 2011; Noxolo et al. 2012; Raghuram & Madge 2006; Raghuram et al. 2014), the value of postcolonial theory to the study stems from the ability to bring into sight the structures and practices that produce space and place and interpret the implications with respect to concerns of identity, knowledge, voice, and agency as aligned with expectations of SSC. Furthermore, a postcolonial methodology supports the augmentation of both imagined and material transformations of the South African development landscape, including, strategies of mapping, bordering, representing, and translating space and place.

The following section brings forward insights from postcolonial geography to draw out the structural lineages between Capitalism and FDI and the various space and place making strategies attributed to supporting the movement of capital.

3.2 Lineages: Capitalism, Colonialism, Development, and FDI

Developmental opportunities from FDI can be linked to the structural logic of capitalist political economy. Capitalist political economy (from a Marxist perspective) represents a system of political and economic relations that support the production and distribution of capital. At its simplest, the capitalist mode of production prioritises the private ownership of the assets required to support the production of goods and services. Capitalist relations are driven by the need to generate maximum value (see Harvey 2010, 2013; Marx 1990, 1992). To achieve this, capitalist relations place a price (*i.e.* value) on people (as labour) and land (as a resource) to control and extract the maximum profit from the production process. Within the capitalist mode of production, land and labour is not framed as *free* or *common* (owned by all) but must be owned and controlled for the success of the capitalist economy.

Importantly, however, across a geographical area (*i.e.* a city, country, or continent) the value of land and labour may vary. This difference drives the movement of capital, and its production, from one place to another in order for the capitalist (or investor) to accrue maximum profit. A consequence of this movement is that the capitalist mode of production has now spread from one corner of the globe to

another. Hoogvelt (1997, p.14) wrote that '[b]y the end of the nineteenth century the project of a single capitalist world economy had been completed in the sense that the grid of exchange relationships now covered practically all geographical areas of the world'.

Value within the capitalist mode of production can only be sustained through the reinvestment of surplus capital (profit) in new geographical locations where there is less competition, more resources, and new consumers (Lefebvre, 2009e). China's growing international trade and investment activities are representative of this need. The Chinese economy is currently facing a *crisis of capital* in the sense that rising wages, increased domestic competition, resource shortages, and technological constraints are straining the value that can be extracted from the production process (see Choonara & Harvey 2009, para.5; Kai 2012). Chinese actors (both private and state enterprises) have therefore sought to invest in differing geographical areas to access less competitive markets, lower wages, and cheaper resources (these are often found in developing countries). In this study, South Africa represents one country that may hold the necessary *difference* to sustain economic growth for Chinese businesses and enterprises. It is this reinvestment of capital in differing geographical areas that give FDI spatial form.

The ability to sustain capitalist growth therefore relies on the movement and settlement of capitalist enterprises in differing spaces and places. Work within postcolonial geography has sought to contribute to understanding the link between capitalist growth, its geographical expansion, and the implications of these for those brought into the capitalist relations (see Hewitt 2009; Mkandawire 2011; Wainwright 2008). One way this is achieved is through reference to capitalism's historical development. The capitalist mode of production has long shaped the political, economic, and environmental conditions of the spaces in which it came into contact. This occurred as various actors sought to access and control new geographical spaces to stabilise capitalist growth (Harvey, 1981). These processes have taken the form of imperialism, colonialism, and empire. Some now attribute contemporary development politics as an extension of this lineage (Escobar, 2008; Hewitt, 2009; Kothari and Wilkinson, 2010).

In explanation, imperialism represented (and continues to do so) the geographical extension of the capitalist mode of production. This often took the form of a dominant central force (*e.g.* a metropole in the form of a State or Corporation) over a peripheral territory or State (Hoogvelt, 1997; Harvey, 2005b; Rodney, 2012). Imperialism was motivated by a search for resources, labour, and new markets to support economic growth at the metropole. Imperialism was a process that brought differing and diverse people and environments into capitalist relations. Colonialism was/is an inherent part of imperialist relations. Colonisation involves the control and settlement of physical territory to support, and protect, the imposition of capitalist relations (Said, 1994; Wainwright, 2008). Williams and Chrisman (1994, p.2) wrote:

‘[C]olonialism, the conquest and direct control of other people’s land, is a particular phase in the history of imperialism, which is now best understood as the globalisation of the capitalist mode of production, its penetration of previously non-capitalist regions of the world, and destruction of pre- or non-capitalist forms of social organisation’.

Arrighi (2008, p.211) explained that imperialism and colonialism represented ‘an extension or imposition of power, authority or influence of a state over other states, or stateless communities’. Imperialism and colonialism can therefore be seen as the necessary revolutions for the internal contradictions of capital that renders economic growth unsustainable in a domestic context (Williams and Chrisman, 1994).

Imperialism and colonisation represent a search for new ‘territorial fixes’ outside of a State in the search for higher levels of profit (Cox 1998; Harvey 1981; Jessop 2000). As a result, imperialism and colonialism brought differing people and places into a structural relationship. However, of interest in this thesis, these relationships often held asymmetric qualities with the ‘wealth and well-being of particular territories augmented at the expense of others’ (Harvey, 2005b, pp. 31–22). The spread of the capitalist mode of production created networks that removed resources, labour, and capital from peripheral territories. It is possible to view the

spread of capitalist relations in competitive terms with the rise of one nation at the expense of another.

Colonial and imperial relationships have also been theorised in respect to dependency and uneven development as communities on the periphery become dependent on the metropole as their economies become intrinsically linked to overseas actors (Lefebvre 2009b; Rodney 2012; Smith 2010; Taylor 2014). Harvey (2015, p.147) wrote that, '[w]ithout uneven geographical development and its contradictions, capital would long ago have ossified and fallen into disarray'.

When colonisation came to an end across much of the world, it has been suggested that actors of the metropole sought alternative means to sustain expansion of capitalist growth. Development, in its differing guises, was seen by some (Escobar 1995; Hewitt 2009; Mawdsley 2012; Rahema 1997; Strongman 2014) as a tool to facilitate this and secure the ongoing accumulation of capital. Rahnema (1997, p.384) wrote that development was a tool that helped 'a dying and obsolete colonialism transform into an aggressive – even sometimes attractive – instrument able to recapture lost ground'.

Development practices and policies supported the interest of private capital through the employment of a range of ideologies and practices – from the building of trade infrastructure to production of needs based iconography – to ensure counties kept open to trade (Duffield and Hewitt, 2009). As FDI is now increasingly part and parcel of development discourse it can be suggested that similar motivations may still apply.

It is within these lineages, and the necessary geographical movement of capital, that the capitalist mode of production can be described as a *spatial-cultural* project. Territories brought into capitalist relations were required to undergo vast changes of space and place at the behest of the dominant mode of production (Lefebvre, 2009b). Christophers (2014, p.755) wrote:

‘...one of the principal ways in which capitalism has historically been able to “fix” (at least temporarily) crisis of overaccumulation, and hence to

enable ongoing capital accumulation, is through geographical reconfigurations and recompositions of various kinds’.

Notions of space and place, and their production, are therefore constituent parts of a system that gives energy to economic growth (Amin, 2002; Elden, 2005, 2010; Hall, 2017). Brenner and Elden (2009, p.25; see also Marston 2000) have suggested that *space* and *place* are constituent parts for the maintenance, coordination, and shaping of capital accumulation.

At various times, the dominant mode of production may change or there may be competing interest from differing actors. Against this logic, a conflict arises between mobile aspects of the capitalist mode of production and immobile holding grounds (*i.e.* host environments) (Hoogvelt, 1997; Cox, 1998). Harvey (2005b, p.116) wrote that ‘geographical expansions, reorganisations, and reconstructions often threaten [...] the values already fixed in place (embedded in the land)’. The analogy of Mercury – traveling at speed, pooling in particular localities, and being potentially poisonous – is often used to explain the consequences upon areas where capital lands (Clark, 2005; Hall, 2011).

In the context of this study, as an investor moves into new geographical areas, local cultures, identities, knowledges, and economies are transformed and local territorial power is threatened (Cox, 1998; Thomas, 2000; Hall, 2017). The expansion of capitalism, via the influence of a dominant external force, alters the environment and disrupts social organisation (Harvey 2010; Lange 2009). It is these issues that SSC seeks to address but the lineages of FDI within capitalist processes raise important questions around how, if at all, this can occur.

The thesis contributes to understanding how space and place is being altered by contemporary development relations as the production of space and place in response to FDI is little explored (see OECD 2002). It is important to understand the structural forces and location of agency attributed to FDI as, Gumede (2018, p.124) promotes, to ensure the social and economic inclusion of those who should be benefitting from FDI in a development context. The specific space- and place-making strategies that have been employed to support capitalist relations – and

sought to be identified in the case of Chinese FDI in South Africa – are discussed next.

3.3 Space- and Place- making

By understanding the logic of FDI in the development landscape, and its lineages with historical forms of capital accumulation, it is possible to highlight the critical importance of space and place for the movement of capital. In the context of FDI, it was identified (Chapter 2) that to attract investment, and accrue developmental opportunities, hosts must firstly offer an enabling environment (Hess, 2004; Hall, 2017). Importantly, when this environment does not pre-exist, it must be actively produced. The production of space and place, and the methods to achieve this, are therefore critical components to the successful exchange of capital, resources, and knowledge. The nature of its production, by whom, and under what priorities is of interest in this thesis.

Notions of *space* and *place* are critical concepts when it comes to interpreting human activity. Reference to space and place is often made when defining relations between activities, things, contexts, and people (Harvey, 1989; Hoogvelt, 1997). Tuan (2001, p.3) suggests, however, that whilst space and place are ‘basic components of the lived world’, the two concepts are not easily defined. *Space*, for example, is shaped by abstract principles, rationality, science, and top-down political processes, whilst *place* is shaped by feelings, emotions, and lived realities (Lefebvre, 1991; Taylor, 1999; Tuan, 2001; Amin, 2002). The two concepts can be linked, however, by the fact that they are both socially produced with no clear ontological status (Marston 2000).

The production of space and place for FDI is important. It is necessary for investors and hosts to forge links between local sites of operation, economic centres, and global trade and production networks (Cox, 1998). This is achieved through both material and imagined forms: from the construction of roads, ports, and factories, to a performative appeal to decision makers in order to facilitate landscape change, or an aesthetic representation of investment ends (Amin 2002; Brenner & Elden 2009; Cox 1998; Harvey 2015; Rincón & Fernandes 2018). The

production of space and place can take the form of maps, reports, architecture, photographs, or performance (Agostino 2007; Hart 2002; Myers 2003; Said 2003). This emphasises the view that cooperation between actors involves both the exchange and development of material assets, as well as cultural and symbolic productions (Said, 1994; Mawdsley, 2012).

Imaginative representations of space and place (also referenced as imaginative geographies) are increasingly important when direct change (in the form of colonisation) is no longer necessarily possible (Gregory 2004; Harvey 2005b). Imaginative geography sees space and place as constructed out of cross-border signs, symbols, and practices to shape the way spaces and places are viewed by, and represented for, different people (see Gregory 2004; Said 2003). The imaginative production of space and place is valuable to investors as they work to project values, possibilities, opportunities, and, as Yeh (2013, p.12) suggests, make 'certain kinds of conduct intelligible and compelling, whilst others are seen as irrational and nonsensical'.

It is important to understand imaginative productions of space and place as they affect what goes on in places (localities, cities, regions), how places coalesce or not as entities, how social relations in place are constructed, and how a politics of place matters' (Amin 2002, p.380; see also Kothari & Wilkinson 2010). However, imaginative representations of space and place can be problematic as 'representations are never merely mirrors held up to the world [...] but enter fully into its formation' (Gregory, 2004, p. xiii). Neil Smith (see Smith 2010) suggests that imaginative space has an elasticity that physical space cannot and this is where problems may arise.

The strategies employed to produce space and place have implications for those already in-place. The production of space and place, for example, introduces new infrastructures, new divisions of labour, differing governance regimes, and a revaluation of land and livelihoods. In regard to shaping space for the need of capitalist growth, Escobar (1995, p.40) provides an exhaustive list of possible interventions, including, into:

‘...technology, population and resources, monetary and fiscal policies, industrialisation and agricultural development, commerce and trade. There are also a series of factors linked to cultural considerations, such as education and the need to foster modern cultural values’.

Against these broad engagements, Yeh (2013, p.32; see also Shields 2013) describes the production of space and place as a ‘privileged instrument’ to facilitate and shape environments and community action for particular ends.

Importantly, the production of space and place is not a privilege held solely by the State (Cox, 1998; Brenner and Elden, 2009). Just as states engage in the production of their own territorial spaces, they can, at the same time, be shaped by competing States and a range of non-State actors. In the contemporary development landscape this could take the form of private corporations or State-Owned Enterprises. Of concern in this thesis is the knowledge that differing actors (in the form of, both, hosts and investors) may hold competing priorities, expectations, and motivations. A conflict may arise in the locations where actors meet, interact, and seek to influence each other (Therborn, 1998; Amin, 2002). A politics of space emerges between the ‘producers of space’ and the ‘makers of place’ (Taylor, 1999, p. 12). These tensions have been exacerbated by the intensification of world-level forces – of which the growth of SSC is one aspect (see Amin 2002; Held et al. 1999).

Geographers, including David Harvey, Gillian Hart, and Neil Smith (to name just a few)¹⁸ have made critical contributions towards understanding the relationship between capital, space, place, and power. Spatial strategies work to shape priorities, alter mobilities, assign securities, alienate communities, and form ways of knowing. Taylor (1999; see also Clayton 2011; Elden 2005; Rincón & Fernandes 2018) suggests that if space and place is where material life is produced and reproduced, then spatial strategies can disrupt this and create inequality, subordination, and new dependencies. The production of space and place can create issues over intersectionality with struggles over voice, knowledge, identity, citizenship, and ownership within communities already in-place (Granovetter, 1985; Harvey 2005b; Lefebvre 1991; Wainwright 2008). Lefebvre (1991, p.26),

¹⁸ See Hart 2002; Harvey 1981; Smith 2010

therefore, wrote that strategies that can be a ‘means of production’ can also be a ‘means of control, and hence domination’. Power within the production of space and place rests in the hands of those that are in a position to make statement about it, authorise views of it, describe it, teach it, settle it, and rule over it (Said 2003).

Insights from postcolonial geography, again, provides valuable insights into the way in which space and place has been produce in the context of capitalist expansion across the world – and the implications upon differing communities and environments. The term *Colonialism* itself derives from the Latin *Colere* which means to cultivate or design and was achieved through the employment of various socio-material strategies (see Gregory 1994; Mudimbe 1988; Radcliffe 2015; Rodney 2012; Yarrow 2011). In the context of Africa, for example, Mudimbe (2003, pp.22–25) wrote that colonialism was about ‘writing on the ground a new set of social and spatial relations’. This was achieved through the setting of boundaries, the altering of property relations, the classification of people into new categories, and the production of new cultural imaginaries which linked the colonised and the colonisers.

Through reference to works such as Mudimbe’s (1988) *The Invention of Africa*, Cesaire’s (1955) *Discourse on Colonialism*, Spurr’s (1993) *The Rhetoric of Empire*, Wainwrights’ (2008) *Decolonising Development*, Thomas’ (1994) *Colonialism’s Culture*, and Garth Myers’ (2003) *Verandas of Power* (to name just a few) it is possible to collate an inventory of spatial strategies that have been used to produce space and place to meet certain ends (Table 3). Whilst not all of these texts speak of explicit strategies, a reading of them draws out how the production of space and place – its imagined and material production – was an important tool for the control and maintenance of peripheral spaces in relation to colonial, imperial, or capitalist powers. The texts demonstrate how the production of space and place was achieved through the role of knowledge production (Mudimbe, 1988; Wainwright, 2008), language and representation (Spurr, 1993), and the built environment and urban planning (Myers, 2003).

Table 3: Inventory of spatial strategies employed within colonial discourse (Adapted from Cesaire 1955; Gregory 1994; Lazarus 2011; Lefebvre 1991; Mudimbe 1988; Myers 2003; Said 1994; Thomas 1994)

Strategy	Description
Surveillance	The observation, examination, inspection, and objectification of land and people. Often conducted from the privileged position of those with an encompassing view. In an economic register, this can also be cited as prospecting.
Classification	A process of ordering, grouping, and identifying. This could involve processes of labelling and naming: such as 'backwards' or 'savage'. A result of classification could delimit who is inside and outside of processes or interventions. This may also involve setting of standards, benchmarks, and indicators to aid comparison.
Aestheticisation	The visual representation of space: taking the form of charts, maps, and pictures. Questions are asked about the arrangement of images, the content of representations, their form, and authenticity. Form is also important, from the media used, to the websites, brochures, or television.
Representation and Performance	The ability to represent people, systems, practices, and places. Representing their value, connections, and disconnections. Often used to promote certain systems or processes as right, wrong. Interest is also taken in how different representations of the same place are understood. Linked to surveillance, a study of performance and representation seeks to understand how knowledge is presented, translated, and communicated.
Appropriation	The process, and ability, to claim ownership over land, individuals, knowledges, and practices. Seeing land and property as belonging to civilisation and not the sole claim of local people. Can be supported through strategies such as representation and surveillance.
Authorisation	The privileged position to claim ownership and righteousness over land, people, knowledge, and rights. Space and place is viewed as inherited and waiting to be transformed by the hand of the expert.
Idealisation	Linked to appropriation this strategy centres on interpreting and translating space and place within the ideals of the coloniser in regard to their wants, needs, expectations, and values. Taking decisions in relation to their own needs and cultures.
Debasement	The representation of space and place as underutilised and underused. This includes the lowering of land value to promote the need for change or intervention. Reducing spaces and places to the negative.
Negation	Linked to debasement, this strategy links absence with desire, an open space to be filled with an ideological imperative. Negation supports the clearing and erasure of an environment to be developed.
Affirmation	Authorising views on land and people through knowledge production by employing further maps, plans, ideas to confirm views or agendas. Meeting findings with a solution or prescribed change to shore up narratives and stop others.
Insubstantialisation	This is a construction from the imagination: disconnected from material reality. There is no, or little, factual reference to people or place. Linked to aestheticisation: an immaterial counterpart to dissolving consciousness of a subject. Also linked to desire.
Naturalisation	A question of ownership: land belonging to those who can best make use of it. Whether nature commands the human or vis-à-vis. The human domination and control of the environment. Writing about what is natural from 'text' rather from the 'environment'.
Resistance	This recognises that all the processes above are always restructuring. All these processes can be supported, accepted, rejected, adopted, and negotiated and the same processes used to resist.

From this source material, it was possible to take forward an indicative framework to understand how space and place was valued, disciplined, represented, performed, and shaped to support certain ends. Although this is developed through reference to historical circumstance, Radcliffe (2015, p.71) has suggested that, ‘in continuity with colonial governmentality, development is embedded within a routinisation of control, boundary making, and uneven political processes’. The strategies have utility beyond postcolonial theory (are common in geographic theory more broadly) and are therefore valuable towards informing analysis of Chinese FDI in South Africa.

3.4 Summary

This chapter has sought to define space and place and highlight their critical importance to the circulation of capital. Postcolonial theory (and postcolonial geography more specifically) has been introduced as one approach to interpret the relationship between space, place, and capital. The chapter highlighted the various aspects of an operating environment that investors seek and the strategies employed to achieve this, including, the shaping of the imagined and material environment: from the construction of ports, roads, and factories, to shaping imaginative representation of differing actors, practices, priorities, and ends.

It has been noted that space and place has been shaped throughout history to support and protect the interests of capital accumulation. In light of this, a thread has been drawn between lineages of capitalism, imperialism, colonialism, and development. In reference to the contemporary moment it has also been suggested that FDI represents an extension of these processes. These historical geographical expressions of the capitalist mode of production supported an understanding of the various space and place making strategies that have been employed to control, organise, and maintain relations of capital.

The chapter ends by introducing an indicative framework – formed out of texts on historical colonial discourse – that is used to explore the production of space and place in the context of Chinese FDI in South Africa. This framework supports

attempts to reveal relations of power and agency (consent and cooperation) in the production of space and place in the contemporary development landscape.

4.0 Methodology

A multi-sited case study comparison approach (outlined in the following section) was employed to answer the research questions. This approach was supported by qualitative research methods – semi-structured interviews, field observations, and documentary analysis – at the site of three Chinese-led investments in South Africa (Figure 3). The term ‘-led’ here refers to investments funded by Chinese financial institutions, managed by Chinese companies, or Chinese nationals who were majority shareholders within investments. The chosen three cases include:

- (i) an automotive factory, representing a Chinese State’s state-owned enterprise, situated within one of South Africa’s Industrial Development Zones (IDZ);
- (ii) a new platinum mine, majority owned by a Chinese consortium and supported by funds from the China Africa Development Bank, opened in partnership with a traditional rural South African community through a share-hold agreement;
- (iii) a ‘new city’ development and urban infrastructure project on the outskirts of Johannesburg funded by a private Chinese developer.

These cases were identified through a search of open-source online listings of Chinese FDI projects in South Africa (see AidData 2018). A representative sample of investments were shortlisted and organised based on differing South African regions, investment sectors, and the structural relationship between the investor and host. The final three cases were selected based on the potential information they offered in response to the research questions, site access (as many investments were politically and commercially sensitive), and data availability (including the ability to recruit a substantive range of participants). This case study selection was in line with Flyvbjerg (2011, p.302) who suggested that case studies and their range should be chosen for their ability to generate ‘detail, richness, completeness, and variant’.

To support the broadest understanding, each site offered insights into differing social, environmental, and temporal contexts which was important towards recognising and revealing links between the diverse spaces, places, and social contexts through which Chinese FDI is enacted. The first case represented an investment within one of South Africa's Industrial Development Zones (IDZs), the second looked at a community-shareholding within a Chinese operated mine, and the third explored a private Chinese enterprise remote of Chinese or South African state institutions.

Additionally, the first case represented an investment interpreted as operational (open and complete), the second was in its implementation stage (financed and under construction), and the third, as of 2017, was in its planning stage. This case study selection strategy supported the analysis of Chinese investment at various stages in order to understand spatial change at differing times and locations within wider systems or processes. The chosen case studies, therefore, offered a rigorous test of the research questions through the provision of data across the broadest range of social, environmental, and temporal contexts in South Africa.




Figure 3: Field Site Locations.

4.1 Multi-sited Case Study Comparison

The production of case studies are incredibly valuable for social research and involve the study of a phenomena within its real-life setting. Kitchen and Tate (2000, p.225) wrote that:

‘Rather than studying phenomenon in general, a specific example within time and space is chosen for study. This allows a particular issue to be studied in depth and from a variety of perspectives. [...] No one data generation method is used and quite commonly a number of techniques employed’.

A case study approach in this study supported a close reading of human and spatial change at the sites of investment and the collection of data across a range of geographic scales, including: individuals, communities, regional development agencies, national governments, and transnational institutions and organisations. This depth of analysis, offered by the use of case studies, was necessary to gain an understanding of the various actors, institutions, and structural phenomena effecting the production of space and place.

A multi-sited case study comparison approach was chosen in recognition (see Dear 2005; Marcus 1995; Nijman 2007) that the study of a single case would not generate the necessary data to support an analysis of relationships and patterns across, and within, wider international political and economic systems. It was understood that space and place is produced in multiple, overlapping, and complex ways, within several locations, and that it is increasingly difficult to view spaces and places as ‘bounded and discrete’ (Ward, 2008, p. 406). A multi-sited approach is common within geographical, postcolonial, and Marxist research as such an approach supports a relational analysis of social change and systems of control (causes and consequences) to interpret how spaces and places are linked (Lees 2012; Lees & Ley 2008; Marcus 1995; McFarlane & Robinson 2012; Nijman 2007; Ward 2008).

Multi-sited research has grown in significance as a result of globalisation and a drive to understand how knowledge, culture, identities, and practices are circulated. Marcus (1995, p.105) writes that ‘multi-sited research is designed

around chains, paths, threads, conjunctions, or juxtapositions of locations’. The use of a multi-sited study therefore supported an understanding around how Chinese investments in South Africa may be related to each other, the wider systems they formed part of, and the role each site played within larger (international) political and economic structures.

Whilst the adoption of a case study approach to data collection and analysis may have limited the ability to draw wider generalisations from individual cases (see Dear 2005; Harvey 1995; Kitchen & Tate 2000; Rice 2003), each case offered the opportunity to ask questions of the other cases (how and why there are similarities and/or differences) and inform further lines of questioning.

4.2 Methods

Within each case study a range of qualitative methods were employed, including, semi-structured interviews, field observations, and documentary analysis. Qualitative methods can be characterised as situated practices that seek to interpret and make visible lived experience (see table 4) (Chase, 2011; Denzin and Lincoln, 2011; Peräkylä and Ruusuvouri, 2011). The use of qualitative methods allowed for a close engagement with the research material. A multi-method approach was undertaken on the understanding that ‘no single method [could] grasp the subtle variations in ongoing human experience’ (Denzin and Lincoln, 2011, pp. 11–12). The chosen methods supported an engagement with the myriad spaces in which FDI in employed (textual and performative) and enabled the study to adapt to the changing demands of the field environment, including, both formal (*e.g.* boardrooms and government departments) and informal settings (*e.g.* Townships and constructions sites).

Table 4: Characteristics of Qualitative Methods (adapted from Kitchen & Tate 2000, p.40)

Characteristics of Qualitative Research	
Humanistic	Subjective
Words, pictures, sounds	Data gathered personally
Inquiry from the inside	Interpretive
Specificity	Meaning and Understanding
Small sample sizes	Concepts and Categories
Participants	Self

The study identified development, and the strategies used to produce space and place, as being formed out of both discourse and practice. Qualitative methods therefore facilitated the analysis of *text*, *voice*, and *action* (see Altheide & Johnson 2011; Plummer 2011). The chosen methods opened up space to account for differing voices, knowledges, values and practices, within the broadest range of environments. Sources of data included texts, images, performances, and sounds. In line with Denzin and Lincoln (2011, p.3), these took the form of ‘fieldnotes, interviews, conversations, photographs, recordings, and memos to the self’. This range of data types acknowledged that, as well as positivist facts, the production of space and place can be guided by senses, values, creativity, and subjectivity (Kitchen & Tate 2000; Plummer 2011).

Each method was employed in differing but complementary ways within an iterative process to respond to the three research questions: to identify how investments took spatial form (Question 1); to reveal how investment decisions and priorities were made (Question 2); and to locate realities within the wider narrative of SSC (Question 3). The methods were employed over five months in South Africa over two phases (January 2015-April 2015 and January 2016-March 2016). Qualitative data is rarely generated over a single visit and it is widely acknowledged (Jindra et al. 2009; Kitchen & Tate 2000) that the study of social and environmental change is best analysed over an extended period of time.

A month was spent at the site of each investment and remaining time was spent engaging with wider stakeholders, including, Chinese and South African national government representatives, regional development agencies, and trade unions representatives. Time was also spent attending further events associated with China-South Africa investment partnerships (See Appendix 1 for fieldwork schedule). The fieldwork schedule was shaped by considerations such as seasonal holidays (including the Chinese spring break), travel costs, and the need to collect a depth of data across all stakeholder groups within each investment. Each method is now addressed in turn.

4.2.1 Semi-Structured Interviews

Semi-structured interviews were used due to the ability, by the researcher, to gain direct responses to a set of questions, ideas, and concerns. Kitchen and Tate (2000, p.215; see also Lenon & Cleves 2001; Longhurst 2003) wrote that interviews are ‘social interaction[s] in which [the researcher] tries to learn about a person’s experiences or thoughts on a specific topic’. Whilst interviews can take multiple forms – shaped by the degree to which the interviewer directs conversation – semi-structured interviews were employed to ensure that participants’ voices were not restricted to a set of limited responses. Semi-structured interviews provided the opportunity for participants to discuss avenues important to them, with respect to the investments, in the natural course of conversation. Semi-structured interviews were important for including views and events that may have fallen outside the researcher’s prior knowledge. Such an approach enabled a more thorough understanding of experiences and opinion that closed questions would not provide.

Interviews were conducted with investment executives and managers, civil servants and government representatives (from both China and South Africa), business chamber managers, trade union leaders, NGO directors, employees, and communities residing in close proximity to sites of investment. This participant structure (discussed further in section 4.3) was consistent across all cases to ensure comparability and rigour. Interviews were conducted in pre-arranged situations where prior contact had been made with participants, whilst on certain occasions, interviews were arranged following a period of field observation and follow-up interviews conducted at a later date.

All interviews were conducted face-to-face¹⁹ in locations chosen by the participants. These locations included government offices, boardrooms, trade union headquarters, shebeens²⁰, vehicles, and coffee shops²¹. Interview guides were used (one for investors, another for hosts) that began within introductory open questions and moved on to discuss the investment context (what participants knew of the investments, their participation, and priorities), how negotiations were

¹⁹ One interview was conducted over the phone once back in the UK following a cancellation.

²⁰ A licensed drinking place in a township.

²¹ A full list of interviews and dates can be found in Appendix 1.

conducted (if applicable), and, finally, questions on protest, resistance, and challenges. The interview guides were flexible and questions were added or changed dependent on the context, location, and participant's contribution to discussions. The semi-structured interviews ranged from 45 minutes to 2 hours in duration.

In agreement with participants, interviews were recorded and then transcribed on returning from the field²². In situations where it was not possible to record interviews, notes were written during the interview and written up as soon as possible afterwards. All interviews were conducted in English, apart from one, when a Chinese translator was used – supplied by the participant. The use of English for interviews was assessed not to be a barrier to data collection as English is widely spoken in South Africa and is also the predominant language of communication between Chinese and South Africa actors. Furthermore, it was recognised that conducting an interview in a second language would not remove all limitations to data collection (Smith, 2003; Lincoln, Lynham and Guba, 2011): whilst a knowledge of a language is useful, it does not account for meaning and the translation of concepts and ideas.

Semi-structured interviews are not without limitations and these were acknowledged. One limitation centred on the ability to compare responses across participants. These concerns were reduced through the use of the common interview guide and, as will be made clear, a standard analysis framework. Through having a prior knowledge of investment contexts, including historical and cultural contexts, it was also possible to reduce diversionary conversations. A second limitation stemmed from the notion that interviews are costly and time consuming. Whilst costs and time restricted the quantity of interviews, the participant recruitment structure (discussed in section 4.3) ensured interviews were rigorous, were conducted consistently, and were representative across cases, sectors, and community intersections. Both limitations were also minimised through the multi-method approach which supported the triangulation of data and the provision of additional supplementary material to validate findings.

²² See an example transcript in Appendix 7.

4.2.2 Field Observations

Jenks and Neves (2000, p.11) wrote that observation involves ‘paying attention to details of space, built forms, [and] details of human interactions’. The use of observations in this study supported a reading of FDI beyond literature and/or third person perspectives. Laurier (2003, p.135) wrote that ‘being able to comment on culture, society and the geography of various spaces and places is indeed a major requirement of doing geography’. Field observations helped to reveal more complex, surprising, and contradictory patterns that more structured methods (such as semi-structured interviews) might have missed (see Mohan 2013).

Field observations were undertaken to contextualise investments within host communities and environments, to draw out the relationship between investors, investments, and community and environmental change, structure new lines of questioning based on empirical experience, challenge existing secondary data, and witness the production of space- and place- first hand during events, meetings, and protests. Field observations supported a reading of spatial change as close to those enacting or resisting change as possible (see Adler & Adler 1994; Angrosino & Rosenberg 2011; Jenks & Neves 2000; Werner & Schoepfle 1987).

There are several degrees in which observation could take place (Table 5): from participant-as-observer to observer-as-participant (Angrosino & Rosenberg 2011). The middle-ground was chosen within this study: overt participant observation. This was done for several reasons: firstly, it was important for communities and participants to be receptive and actively engage with the research; and secondly, within a multi-sited study it is difficult for the researcher to become fully isolated within a single culture, time, or location. The multi-sited study – that required ‘cross-cutting and contradictory personal commitments’ (Marcus, 1995, p. 113) – also meant that the adoption of multiple identities would of been challenging and impractical to achieve (see Gupta & Ferguson 1996; Gustavson & Cytrynbaum 2003; Hannerz 2003; Marcus 1995). For these reasons, participants were aware of the researcher’s presence, and this also formed part of an important ethical stance (see section 4.5).

Table 5: Types of Observation (adapted from Kitchen & Tate 2000, p.220).

	Straight Observation	Participant Observation
Overt	Researcher does not engage with the group under study but makes no attempt to conceal the fact of observation.	Researcher joins a group as a participant in an event but does not hide fact (s)he is observing them.
Covert	Researcher does not engage with the group under study and does not reveal to the group that they are being studied.	Researcher joins a group as a participant in a situation without telling that that s(he) is observing them.

Observation was a continuous process across the five months in South Africa and was undertaken during time with communities, during site visits to the investor's offices, at the location of development projects, and during events such as planning meetings, at protests, and in township dwellings²³. In line with Marshall and Rossman (1995, p.76), data collection involved 'the systematic noting and recording of events, behaviours, and artefacts in [the] social setting'. This method included listening to what people said, documenting what they did, and seeking to explain how and why events unfolded (see Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias 1996).

Primary commentary from observation took the form of an in-depth field diary²⁴ and the use of photography. Field notes were also supported with the use of a voice recorder to document sounds (such as song or protest) and quotes during community events. Jenks and Neves (2000, p.3) wrote that observation involves: 'being receptive; it is being patient; it is not knowing what to do or say next; it is having fun and being scared; it is going to new, strange and even threatening places; but it is also about being repetitious and mundane; it's...not just writing'. Data was written up at the end of each day and, where sites were politically sensitive (such as port areas), thoughts were recorded shortly after site visits. Notes were organised and coded using the same framework as other methods²⁵.

Several considerations were undertaken before and during observations. Observation required permission to access and work within certain communities,

²³ A full list of site visits and dates can be found in Appendix 1

²⁴ See appendix 9 for diary extract.

²⁵ Refer back to Table 3, p.44

businesses, or government departments. This access was provided through a series of gatekeepers which required trust to be built between the researcher, the communities, and their leaders (see Laurier 2003). Similarly, the success of observation relied on the observer's ability to interpret what was happening and why (see Kitchen & Tate 2000, p.19). It was acknowledged that observation is often undertaken from a privileged position which may reflect the interests and priorities of the researcher. Insights from writing on the *flâneur*, for example, demonstrate how the observer may be a controversial and suspicious character (Buck-Morss, 1986; Jenks and Neves, 2000). Both of these concerns centre on recognising positionality (discussed in section 4.5). Events were also fast moving and this meant that it may not have been possible to see or witness everything. Observations are always only a snapshot.

These limitations were mitigated against through the extended period of field study. This supported the longest possible period of observation and ensured a broad range of events and sites could be observed. Additionally, through situating observations within wider theory, and in triangulation with interviews and documentary analysis, it was possible to mitigate against researcher bias. Angrosino and Rosenberg (2011) suggest that limitations of observations can be addressed through note style, use of photography, and interpreting data against theory. A full reflection on research positionality and issues of ethics was undertaken to limit bias and positions of power.

4.2.3 Documentary Analysis

Finally, documentary analysis was also undertaken. The study of documents supported analysis around how narratives and representations of investments were produced and circulated (by both Chinese and South African actors) through text and images (see Bartram 2003; Burgess & Wood 1988; Kitchen & Tate 2000; Rose 1995; White 2003). Peräkylä & Ruusuvouri (2011, p.529) note that 'much of social life in modern society is mediated by written text of different kinds'. Documentary analysis was valuable to position individual opinion (gained through interviews and observations) against collective or wider reported views.

Over 40 primary and secondary documents were collected and analysed (Appendix 8). Documents included government policy papers, business reports, transport maps, development plans, corporate advertisements, commentaries, and news reports. Primary documents consisted of documents produced by various actors associated with investments (such as policy documents or corporate brochures) whilst secondary documents consisted of texts and commentaries produced on or about each case (including commentaries or news reports). The documents were sourced from online searches (government and investor websites) or via participants who brought forward documents as an explanatory device to explain their plans, visions, and proposals.

Documents represent particular moments in time and were valuable for understanding ideological shifts and social changes. Housing literature and planning documents, for example, provided useful information regarding changing property values, architectural trends, and planning policy. Formal policy documents and business reports showed how differing agents operated and interacted with other stakeholders. Interest was taken not only with regard to the written text and the technical details but also the material form that documents took. Bartram (2003, p.150) noted that ‘all too often, visual imagery has been used as a straightforward reflection of reality, with no sense of how, when and by whom the image has been produced’. It was asked what documents represented, how they were produced, and why.

Beyond texts and policy documents, images, photographs, promotional advertisements, maps, and artistic impressions were also studied. This approach recognised, as Prosser (2011, p.479) does, the need to take up the challenge of understanding ‘a society increasingly dominated by visual rather than verbal textual culture’. Visual imagery is an important form in which to express and receive geographical knowledge including how spaces and places are created and how the choice of images effect audiences (Bartram, 2003).

As with the previous methods, there are limitations to documentary analysis. The documents were not empirically produced *for* the study and therefore made identifying clear links between a document’s content and themes within the study

more challenging. However, this limitation was addressed through the common analysis framework that supported comparability, coherence, and rigour across all data sources. The documents were also assessed and selected based on their authenticity. Foucault (2002, p.6; see also Kitchen & Tate 2000) wrote that documents should be assessed on ‘whether they were telling the truth, and by what right they could claim to be doing so, whether they were sincere or deliberately misleading, well informed or ignorant, authentic or tampered with’. Within analysis that follows, statements are made on the production of the referred documents, potential motivations and biases, and the contribution the document made to the research questions. This method was furthermore enhanced by the previous two methods and offered additional data when individuals may not have been available or willing to speak (Cope, 2003; Peräkylä and Ruusuvouri, 2011).

4.3 Sampling and Participant Recruitment

Yarrow (2011, p.9; see also Lenon & Cleves 2001) writes that ‘development constitutes a set of ideas, meanings and spaces, whose significance can only be grasped in relation to whom they matter’. As such, data was gathered from a broad range of participants, including, those responsible for bringing investments to fruition as well as those effected by resulting geographical changes. A rigorous sampling and participant recruitment strategy was employed to ensure data was balanced, structured, and representative of all stakeholder identities and associations.

Sampling was important, as Rice (2003, p.223) suggests, because it was not necessarily ‘possible, practical, or desirable to obtain information from an entire population’. Whilst sampling strategies can range from *extensive* (wide spread and diffuse) to *intensive* (in-depth and specific) (see Kitchen & Tate 2000; Longhurst 2003), it was the latter approach that was employed within this study. In particular, a combination of purposive and convenience sampling were undertaken. These strategies were informed by timing considerations (as a lone researcher), funding constraints, and limits to accessibility. This sampling strategy is commonly used

by economists, political sociologists, geographers, and political scientists (see Amin 2002; Cowen & Shenton 1996; Cox 1998; Granovetter 1985; Smith 1993).

Purposive sampling involved the selection of participants based on their perceived contribution to the study (*e.g.* identified through their position within a company or government department) and convenience sampling involved drawing upon participants that were close at hand in certain environments or communities (*e.g.* present during a protest or residing in close proximity to an investment). The differing strategies were employed dependent upon method and/or location. Purposive sampling, for example, was used to recruit participants for semi-structured interviews, whereas convenience sampling was employed during periods of field observation (through a snowballing approach) where it may not have been possible to identify or access participants prior to commencing the study.

Within both sampling strategies participants were drawn from the full range of geographical scales within investor-host relations: including the individual, community leadership, regional development agencies and trade unions, national government representatives, and transnational corporations (see table 6). The recruitment across the full geographical scales supported analysis of ‘spatial differentialisation’ across investments to see how differing actors participated, and how differing practices were enacted, in differing contexts. This range of participants supported the collection of data for a rigorous and original assessment of Chinese investment in South Africa.

Based on this recruitment structure, participants included national government representatives (both South African and Chinese), chief executives and directors within investment operations, traditional community leaders (including a King and his Traditional Council), employees, trade union officials, management at civil society organisations, and a range of community individuals from each site. This recruitment structure recognised that communities, particularly in South Africa, often operate in complex, multiple, and at-times, parallel ways (see Ferguson & Gupta 2002; Gupta 2012). Interviews, for example, were conducted within both government run municipalities as well as traditional communities governed by

monarchs. These actors, for example, regularly govern spaces and places in parallel. The recruitment structure successfully brings together Chinese and South African participants within a single study (an approach which to-date has been limited): empirical data from African participants is regularly absent from China-Africa studies and Chinese participant have been difficult to recruit, previously, due to political sensitives (Mohan, 2013).

Table 6: Indicative Recruitment Structure.

		Automotive Factory	Platinum Mine	City Development
International				Masterplanner, London
National		South Africa's Department for International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) Chinese Embassy Consul-General Chinese Embassy Officers		
Regional		Governor of the Western Cape		Gauteng Growth and Development Agency
Local	Investor	Manager, Automotive Factory	Director, Mining Corporation	Chief Operating Officer, Development Corporation
	Trade Union	Secretary-General	-	Secretary-General
	Civil Society (Quantity)	Business Chamber, NGO Director	Sports NGO, Zwide	Community Centre, Alexandra
	Employment/Employees (Quantity)	4	3	4
	Community members (Quantity)	6	5	7

In total 36 *formal* semi-structured interviews were conducted on top of multiple *informal* conversations and discussions recorded during field observations (at community events, factory visits, and within township dwellings). Over 30 documents were collected and analysed. Field observations produced an in-depth field diary with a photographic record of site visits and events. This range and depth of data is consistent with expectations of qualitative research and, in particular, where no prior study exists (Longhurst 2003).

Limitations to the participant recruitment strategy rested on the requirement to collect data from geographically diverse areas where, at times, participants can be difficult to access. The study was supported logistically by the Centre for Chinese Studies at Stellenbosch University. The Centre acted as a point of contact with regards to safety and risk whilst in the field. By working with the Centre it was possible to gain local South African knowledge, Chinese expertise, and the credibility of the centre (as an impartial centre for the study of China-Africa relations) aided trust building with participants. Further site access was provided by NGOs who supported access to townships. Access to investments was offered by managers and executives. The politics of these gate keepers are addressed in section 4.5.

4.4 Analysis Strategy

As set out by Kitchen and Tate (2000, p.235; see also Dey 1993), analysis consisted of three stages: description, classification, and connection (Figure 4).




Figure 4: Description, classification and connection.
(Adapted from Kitchen & Tate 2000, p.235).

Firstly, data across all three methods were transcribed. The recordings were transcribed verbatim ensuring that data was *as communicated* by the participants – this often meant interpreting strong accents (both South African and Chinese) and weak phrasing. These remained unedited. During the transcription of

interviews, conversations, and data from the field diary, participants were identified via their position and/or status within a company, institution or community, and their association (*e.g.* Manager, Automotive Factory). Data generated from field observations were referenced as Personal Observations (PO) or as Personal Communications (PC) if data was sourced from informal conversations. All transcriptions contained background information including a brief description of sites, events, community structures, dates, and timings. This was done, as Kitchen and Tate (2000, p.233) promotes, because ‘the social, spatial and temporal context can all significantly affect the data generated’.

Secondly, data was coded in respect to the differing space and place making strategies employed at the sites of each investment. Data across all three methods were analysed using the same framework so connections could be drawn across images, statements, representations, voices, performances, and texts. This approach to analysis recognised development as consisting of texts, images, and speech that must be grasped as a whole (see Kitchen & Tate 2000; Plummer 2011). It was important to see how the assemblage of materials formed a wider narrative on Chinese FDI in South Africa.

Coding was informed, although not exclusively, by strategies identified previously in relation to scholarship in postcolonial geography (Table 3): strategies employed to support the movement of capital in the context of imperialism, colonialism, and development. Coding through the use of a pre-identified framework represented a grounded theory approach (see Strauss & Corbin 1990) but this was important to offer testable tropes that aided comparison between cases and ensured that a direct response could be made to the research questions. Whilst this approach had the potential to constrain analysis, this analysis framework was necessary to aid comparability to identify relationships and how spaces and places were implicated in each other (see Hannerz 2003; Nijman 2007). Any further strategies identified were included and tested across other cases.

Finally, following coding, data was analysed to identify common and differing space- and place- making strategies across the three investments. This was undertaken in two stages. Firstly, data from interviews, field observations, and

documentary analysis were combined and divided into three cases studies (three silos). This was done to ensure data was kept as close to the source material as possible and retain contextual information. Benjamin (1968; see also Lenon & Cleves 2001) argued that data had the possibility of losing its value and meaning when removed from the context in which it was collected. It was important to firstly understand the role of differing strategies in differing contexts.

Secondly, findings from the three case studies were combined in order to compare, contrast and identify wider structural patterns between the differing investments. The relationships between them was just as important as relations within them. It was important to identify the ‘connectedness’ of things to reveal, as McFarlane (2006, p.36; see also Cresswell 2013; Shields 2013) suggests, ‘how transnational development networks are made and structured’. As Cresswell (2013, p.218) suggested: ‘It is not space or places in and of themselves that are at the heart of such an approach [...] but the ways in which they become related’. Following the identification of agency (human and structural) conclusions were then made in reference to SSC and the role hosts played in the production of space and place.

This analysis framework gives form to the empirical chapters that follow: situational context, spatial strategies, and interpretation. Firstly, data is located in its situational context, secondly, various space- and place- making strategies are identified, and final interpretation of findings are made in regard to their location within the narrative of SSC.

4.5 On Ethics, Positionality, and Validity

Prior to the commencement of the study a variety of considerations were made with regard the ethics, positionality, and rigour. These considerations were important for both the well-being of research participants and to protect the validity of the study’s findings (Charmaz 2011; Plummer 2011; Smith 2003). Identifying relations of power informed decision making with regard to the employment of methods and worked to limit misrepresentation and bias within data analysis.

With regard to ethics, Hay (2003, p.37) wrote that '[e]thical geographers are sensitive to the diversity of moral communities within which they work and are ultimately responsible for the moral significance of their deeds'. It was important for data collection to remain a neutral process whilst acknowledging that, within qualitative research, knowledge is always situated and partial (Spivak, 1988; Rose, 1997; Griffiths, 2018). Certain measures were undertaken to mitigate against these concerns.

Sultana (2007, p.375) suggested that conducting international fieldwork 'involves being attentive to histories of colonialism, development, globalisation, and local relations, to avoid exploitative research or perpetuation of relations of domination and control'. During interviews and field observations attention was paid to the local history, cultural heritage, and contemporary circumstance of participant communities in a study that engages with politically sensitive debates (particularly over land rights, inequality, and employment). This exercise was particularly important within a multi-sited study where data collection was conducted in differing social and institutional contexts: urban communities, rural monarchies, and government institutions. Within the analysis that follows, each case is preceded by an overview of the investment context.

In addition to reflecting on the participant communities, thought was also given in regard to the identity and positionality of the researcher: including biography, class, nationality, language, gender, and sexuality. Reflexivity, with regard to identity, supported an understanding of the way the researcher's ways of knowing and experiencing the world may have affected analysis or data collection (Laurier, 2003; Milner, 2007; Altheide and Johnson, 2011; Angrosino and Rosenberg, 2011; Chase, 2011; Lincoln, Lynham and Guba, 2011). The researcher in this study was a white, British, gay male.

The context of British and South African colonial history was an important consideration as the two countries continue to deal with this legacy. In line with advice from Sultana (2007), this identity was addressed through being open with participants, engaging with, and accepting criticism, and being open to the views of others. Clarity around the nature of the research, its role, and outputs also

supported the establishment of a politically neutral environment. This was necessary as interviews are rarely neutral encounters or passive means of data collection (particularly semi-structure interviews) as participants come with their own expectations (see Kitchen & Tate 2000). These expectations needed to be understood and negotiated.

The chosen methods – including field observations and semi-structured interviews – also supported an open dialogue with participants to challenge ideas and the researchers frame of reference (see Kitchen & Tate 2000; Plummer 2011; Smith 2003). Conducting interviews and discussions face-to-face with participants also worked to show mutual respect, a demonstration of interest, a willingness to share experiences, and display that the research did not know better, or best.

In terms of sexuality, key considerations for fieldwork in this regard centred on possible misunderstandings, the possibility to cause offence to certain groups, and the violation of different cultures (Lewin and Leap, 1996). Nash (2000, p.146) explains that ‘it is important to remember that every society has its own history, tradition, and ethical codes, and that you have a responsibility to behave in manner that respects the cultural, as well as the physical, environments you encounter’. South Africa, however, was one of the first African countries to legalise same-sex marriage and therefore this identity was not necessarily problematic. However, a calculation was made not to disclose this information within rural and traditional communities to respect possible cultural differences. A balance was necessary between the needs of the research and the rights of the researcher.

Relations of power were also addressed through the logistical practicalities of data collection. At every stage, clarity of the researcher’s position, the purpose of the study, and potential outputs were outlined within information sheets, consent forms, memorandums of understanding, and site access consent forms (see Appendix 2, 3, 4, and 5). Formal documentation, whilst symbolic of a formal contract (juxtaposed against natural form of conversation), was important for building trust (Nash, 2000). Participants were encouraged to ask questions before and during participation and all questions were answered openly and transparently. Furthermore, all data remained anonymous, where possible. When anonymity was

not possible due to the significance of the investment, this was fully explained to participants and consent was gained. All participants were free to withdraw from the study at any time.

Addressing concerns over positionality and ethics links also to the validity of findings within the study – through showing the hand of the researcher (Milner, 2007). Rigour and validity were also addressed in other ways. The use of a common analysis framework across the three methods and cases aided the comparability of data and the consistency of analysis. The multi-method approach also generated a range of empirical material and observations to support, challenge, and triangulate findings (see Cope 2003; Denzin & Lincoln 2011; Silverman 1993): interviews were used to clarify observations, observations generated insights into how documents became read and received, and documentary analysis supported the situating of interview data within broader opinion. The validity of findings were/are also addressed by the theoretical reasoning that follows within the analysis (see Altheide & Johnson 2011; Harvey 1969; Rice 2003).

It is also important to acknowledge the role of gatekeepers within the study in respect to the implications on gaining a representative participant sample. Whilst gatekeepers were used to access some communities (such as from the King of the Traditional Community or the Director of the IDZ), the use of a participant recruitment structure (Table 6) ensured that participant recruitment was fair, strategic, and balanced. Concerns of positionality also take form around processes of translation (taking data from the field and into analysis). The recruitment strategy incorporating both Chinese and South African actors mitigated against concerns of the researcher *speaking for* participants and the analysis framework prioritised retaining data in its direct form through quotes and verbatim transcription. The sharing of findings with participants to ensure responses, and the understanding of the researcher, were representative was also used support rigour (Kitchen and Tate, 2000; Gustavson and Cytrynbaum, 2003).

Finally, reflection was undertaken regarding safety and risk – important considerations for the success of data collection (Nash, 2000; Lenon and Cleves,

2001). Data was collected in challenging environments (such as townships and rural villages with reported protest and crime events) and politically sensitive sites (such as ports and government buildings). A risk assessment was undertaken to account for human and environmental challenges.

4.6 Summary

This chapter has outlined the methodology employed within this study to assess the production of space and place in the context of Chinese FDI in South Africa. The chosen methods included semi-structured interviews, field observations, and documentary analysis. These methods were chosen for their ability to generate in-depth data from a broad range of participants and within a range of contexts. The methods supported the analysis of text, voice, action, and imagery. Furthermore, the methods had a flexibility to allow participants to directly inform lines of questioning and shape observations in line with issues and concerns that may have fallen outside of the researcher prior knowledge.

Representing a multi-sited case study comparison approach, these methods were employed over five months in South Africa at the site of three differing Chinese-led investments. The chosen cases include a Chinese SOE investing in a South African development zone, a Chinese partnership with a Traditional South African community to open a new platinum mine, and a private Chinese investor seeking to develop a new city in Johannesburg. These investments supported an understanding of FDI in differing contexts in order to assess similarities and differences between them, and the possible structural and relational productions of space and place.

The identified participant recruitment and sampling strategy demonstrated the broad range of participants involved in the study: including community members, trade union representatives, NGO managers, Executives from each investment, and government representatives. This was a recruitment approach that recognised development and FDI as a series of scalar relationships and represented a balanced, rigorous, structured approach to the study of Chinese FDI in South Africa.

Finally, reflections have been made with regards to ethics, positionality, and the validity of findings. These considerations shaped reflexivity in assessment, power and practice within the field, and rigor within analysis. Together the identified methods, case-study selection, participant recruitment, and analysis framework represented a study that was rigorous, timely, and complete.

5.0 The Enclave: Chinese SOEs and Economic Zones

The first empirical observations highlighting the changing and, to some degree, polarising spaces and places in South Africa's development landscape came following a journey into Cape Town to celebrate the Chinese New Year (Table 7): an event hosted by the Chinese Consul General in Cape Town. On that journey, the changing environments, lived routines, and bureaucratic regimes resulting from South Africa's development transitions were on display: from the regeneration of the historic trading port, mobilities mirroring apartheid geographies as workers travelled from townships (as sites of residence) to the city centre (as places of work), and modern high-rise construction juxtaposed against suburban housing experiments seeking to identify how best to replace informal township dwellings (PO, Cape Town, 27th January 2015).

The New Year's event, itself, was a valuable experience highlighting the complex relations and devices that brought Chinese Investors and South African hosts (in their myriad forms and identities) into dialogue. In a room containing the latest models of televisions and refrigerators, produced in South Africa by Chinese companies, a speech was given by the Governor of South Africa's Western Cape:

‘We are very grateful to the Chinese for establishing themselves in our city. Now, well established, you are building factories like those making refrigerators and televisions we see here. So, to all Cape Town Chinese, I just want to say that we celebrate you. We celebrate your energy, your contributions to our economy and what you provide. Long may you be here!’ (Chinese New Year Speech, Western Cape Governor, 27th January 2015).

It could be suggested from these observations that the New Year's event held two purposes: firstly, as an event to celebrate the culture, heritage, and tradition of Chinese citizens working in South Africa's Western Cape; and secondly, an opportunity to further promote the economic and political relationship between the two groups of actors.

Table 7: A Chinese New Year's Reception (PO, Cape Town, 27th January 2015).

On the way to the New Year's Celebration in Cape Town I, along with other academics, took the grid-locked motorway from Stellenbosch. Along the route, individuals were making what money they could along the side of, or in many cases down the centre of, the three-lane carriageway. I observed two dead bodies in the middle of the road draped in black plastic sheeting. It was possible these were the unlucky ones who were walking to reach the high-rise construction sites on Cape Town's horizon or offer themselves as cheap labour in factories now transitioning from the manufacturing of textiles to the production of high-tech renewables. A key sub-group of South African society evidently continued to move from townships (as sites of residence) to the city centre (as place of work).

Police were evident along the entire stretch of road. One of my South African colleagues, sharing the car, explained that the police were pulling aside un-taxed, un-licensed, and un-roadworthy vehicles. My colleague suggested that, for those individuals pulled aside by the police, adhering to the bureaucracies-of-state would be the least of their worries. For South African taxi drivers, in what was already a competitive (and violent) business environment (see BBC 2018a), taking their car off the road could mean the loss of the route to a competitor. In the current environment of transnational capital this could mean handing the route freely to the global online taxi-hailing service 'Uber'.

When we arrived on the outskirts of Cape Town there was an experimental housing project that had been established to address 'historic and endemic problems associated with rapid urbanisation, poverty and homelessness' (HDA, 2017, para. 2). The development sought how best to replace the unsafe corrugated shacks evidenced in many of the townships. The project had been financed by a range of overseas donors across several funding cycles – evidenced through differing architectural style. The development was juxtaposed against the cranes that dominated the skyline near the Victoria and Albert Waterfront. These were putting the final panes of glass into a new investment bank. Adjacent to the bank a privately funded hospital was also under construction. It was confirmed (PC, Cape Town Resident, 27th January 2015) the hospital would treat patients who were able to pay the premium for private health insurance.

The journey that began in the vine-draped hills of Stellenbosch highlighted the changes to a landscape that gave form to what could be identified as the continuing legacies of racial and, now, economic, apartheid in South Africa. A historical landscape shaped by colonial exploitation, uneven development, and now neoliberal political economy was on display. This was a landscape shaped by overseas actors and the South African government's recent faith in FDI to bring change, growth, and optimism to a society faced with some of the world's worst levels of inequality (see Beaubien 2018; WorldBank 2018).

On display in the room were both the physical outputs from Chinese FDI in South Africa and the very seeds of those investments. During the speeches and networking opportunities that such an event offered, investors were potentially seeking to gain favoured status within the minds of South African politicians, academics, and business leaders, whilst their South African hosts worked to make investment a welcomed prospect. Importantly, the space of engagement, in the

form of a public event, was evidently a negotiated and co-produced space created by both Chinese and South African agents. Whilst the Chinese government hosted the event, space was given for South African representatives to promote the China-South Africa relationship themselves within a performative environment.

Although the changing development landscape in South Africa can only partly be attributed to Chinese FDI, the New Year's event drew attention to the material and metaphorical embodiment of a complex political economy in which FDI is located and enacted: from the production and manufacturing of goods, to a performed narrative of closeness, value, and cooperation. This initial opening observation gives empirical justification for the analysis that follows: the need to understand the spaces and places in which investments are produced, the priorities and motivations of actors, and the lived realities for those negotiating (and resisting) spaces of engagement. The first case looks at how one investment came to fruition: from negotiations with the South African government to an operational factory now exporting Chinese cars.

5.1 Situational Context

The first case centred on an automotive company – one of the Chinese government's flagship SOEs – located in South Africa's newest and largest Industrial Development Zones (IDZ)²⁶. The investment within the IDZ was in line with a shift, globally, towards the use of specially regulated zones to attract foreign investment (Aggarwal, 2006). IDZs are described by Wang (2013, p.133; see also Aggarwal 2006; Bräutigam & Xiaoyang 2011; Hess 2004) as 'contained geographic regions within a country with more liberal laws and economic policies'. IDZs are often viewed by hosts as valuable tools to trial bespoke policies that may be expensive or impractical to roll out nationally as well as offering the necessary space for large-scale infrastructure development to support larger companies (Chaudhuri and Yabuuchi, 2010; Mohan, 2013). Economic zones were also used by the Chinese government as a testbed for its own trade liberalisation and, when sending companies out, such zones continue to be favoured by the

²⁶ As of 2017.

Chinese government as a stepping stone aiding the transition into new markets (OECD, 2002; Brautigam, 2009; Wang, 2013).

The Chinese investor, in this case, moved to the South African IDZ in 2014. The automotive factory is now open and operational. Whilst the investor was ‘sent out’ by the Chinese government, with financial support from the China-Africa Development Fund (CAD Fund)²⁷, the factory was autonomous in its management. This autonomy is a common feature of most Chinese SOEs (see Wang 2007). The IDZ in this case was managed by a *Development Corporation* that was funded by, and reported to, the South African government’s Department for Trade and Industry. The governance structure of the zone was similar to other economic zones where management is decentralised and operated by bespoke authorities (see Holden 2017; Wang 2013). The Development Corporation took leadership decisions over the material and regulatory environment in which investors operated. The investment by the Chinese automotive company came following an agreement between the Chinese embassy and the South African government. The investment therefore represents one end of the China-South Africa spectrum of cooperation (with independent private enterprise located at the other end).

The IDZ was located on the outskirts of Port Elizabeth (PE) in South Africa’s Eastern Cape (Figure 5). The IDZ opened in 1999, prior to Chinese investment, and was approximately 115 square kilometres in size. Port Elizabeth lies mid-way between the densely populated and economically productive cities of Cape Town and Johannesburg. The Eastern Cape is one of South Africa’s poorest provinces and had a local unemployment rate of 36% (Interview, Secretary-General Metalworkers Union, 19th March 2015; see also STATSSA 2011). Port Elizabeth is home to a number of townships that border the IDZ, including Motherwell and Zwide, and these townships were identified by South African government and automotive company representatives as ‘target communities’ for investment

²⁷ A Chinese government policy bank with an aim to stimulate investment in Africa by Chinese companies.

opportunities (Interview, Director Development Corporation, 16th March 2015; Interview, Executive Automotive Works, 18th March 2015).



Figure 5: Situation of Port Elizabeth, Development Zone, and Townships.

One of the Directors at the Development Corporation explained that the IDZ came to fruition as part of the South African government’s spatial development plan to address inequality (against varying measures) in post-Apartheid South Africa (Interview, Director Development Corporation, 16th March 2015). The instrumental role of the IDZ in addressing uneven investment was acknowledged by the South African government’s department of Revenue Services who described the use of IDZs as ‘geographically designated areas of the country set aside for specially targeted economic activity’ (SARS, 2018, para. 1).

The IDZ was located in a region of South Africa that was said to have been ‘particularly neglected in the past’ (Interview, Director Development Corporation, 16th March 2015). The zone occupied an area of land described as remote, dry, and arid. These were conditions which were highlighted as being one reason behind the Eastern Cape’s poor performing economy (*ibid.*). This view was confirmed by a representative of the local Business Chamber who described PE as the ‘the last outpost’ of South Africa (Interview, Project Manager Business Chamber, 18th March 2015). The environment in which the automotive company came to be located was therefore regularly referenced in terms of productivity, value, and neglect (notably by South African’s actors themselves).

The Director at the Development Corporation suggested that the South African government believed that for benefits from FDI to be felt more widely, other than metropolitan centres, they needed to provide a bespoke environment to attract investors to the region (Interview, Director Development Corporation, 16th March 2015). The production of space, through centralised spatial planning, was therefore seen as a tool to address socio-economic change in PE.

To attract and support investment to the region the Development Corporation, on behalf of the South African government, established a zone that provided a ‘one-stop-shop’ for training, production, connectivity, and administration’ (Interview, Director Development Corporation, 16th March 2015). These attributes mirrored those identified as necessary to provide an enabling environment for FDI (see Moran 2006). The IDZ would support the growth of ‘agglomeration economies’ where ‘different capitals cluster together [and] differing firms and industries share facilities, access to labour skills, information and infrastructure’ (Harvey 2015. p.129). The IDZ therefore represented an intervention by the South African state to create a spatial fix to hold investors in place and attract further spill-overs through the exchange of skills, technology, services, and resources.

The investment by the automotive company came as part of a strategy by the South African government to diversify the local (and national) economy in a move away from dependence upon extractive industries. In this context, the investment was celebrated as one of the first by a Chinese investor within the manufacturing sector (Interview, Director Development Corporation, 16th March 2015). The manufacturing sector is regarded as a critical sector towards moving African nations away from the role of primary producers. It was noted that ‘fewer than 10% of African workers are currently based in manufacturing of any kind and only 1% in modern companies with advanced technologies’ (Taylor, 2014, p. 137).

Automotive production could, in particular, also be viewed as a critical barometer of change in South Africa. During the apartheid era automotive production was affected by reduced investment, increased trade barriers, and declining productivity. Moran (2006, p.16) noted that automotive factories ‘turned out high-cost vehicles in limited production runs, with productively approximately half the

average at full-scale facilities in Europe or the United States and less than half the average in Japan'. The Director at the Development Corporation therefore saw the IDZ as one way to turn around issues of productivity (Interview, Director Development Corporation, 16th March 2015).

In regard to wider developmental spill-overs, the Director at the Development Corporation argued that the automotive company would support employment, bring new foreign capital, provide international exposure to trade and production networks, and transfer wider skills and advanced technologies (Interview, Director Development Corporation, 16th March 2015). It was suggested that the factory had proposed to employ 90 percent of its workforce from the local community and would support, where possible, subsidiary businesses outside of the zone (although in the following evidence these promises are questioned). In addition to these structural exchanges, the automotive company had its own CSR agenda (supported by the Development Corporation) which granted school scholarships, uniforms, the construction of classrooms, and a hot meal to the factory's workforce (*ibid.*). It was also proudly proclaimed by the company's executive that it had facilitated an annual visit by Santa to the local townships (Interview, Executive Automotive Works, 18th March 2015).

Importantly, however, to attract the automotive investment, and accrue identified developmental spillovers and exchanges, communities and the local environment had to undergo various geographical changes. IDZs, as investment nodes, centre on the built environment – including land-use changes, construction of roads and ports, and the provision of utilities such as energy and water (Arrighi, 2008) – to support investment. These changes can be contentious for those communities located at sites of investment. Cases from India and Vietnam, for example, have highlighted the social and environmental costs of economic zones with evidence of unfair land acquisition, poor levels of compensation, and the destabilisation of local economies (Aggarwal 2006; Bräutigam & Xiaoyang 2011; Chaudhuri & Yabuuchi 2010; see also BBC 2018).

The production of space and place in this case was therefore critical to understanding how decisions were made, the priorities given, the strategies

employed, and the implications for communities already in-place. As will become evident, whilst the Development Corporation was instrumental in the decision to construct the IDZ, these decisions were not made in isolation, but involved careful calculations and negotiations with the Chinese investor. Bräutigam and Xiaoyang (2011) suggests that investors tend to be the ‘carrot’ that in turn shapes other aspects of the host operating environment.

5.2 Spatial Strategies

Towards understanding how the investment came to take form, it was important to examine the negotiations that took place prior to the Investor moving to the IDZ. An overview of negotiations – between the Development Corporation, Executives from the Automotive Factory, and representatives from the Chinese embassy – was offered by one of the Directors at the Development Corporation. It was explained that negotiations began following the careful assessment of Port Elizabeth and the local operating environment, by agents of the Investor, including the study of available space, expansion opportunities, market value and access, and labour availability. These aspects of the operating environment can be linked to the three constituent parts of the capitalist mode of production: land as a resource, the community as labour, and infrastructure to support an efficient exchange of goods and services. These assessments took the form of a feasibility study conducted in partnership with the Chinese Embassy (Interview, Director Development Corporation, 16th March 2015; *corroborated by* Interview, Executive Automotive Factory, 18th March 2015).

Whilst copies of the studies are not publically available (for reasons of competition and corporate privacy) it was suggested that the Investor sent technical experts to the IDZ four times: ‘including surveyors and accountants’ (Interview, Director Development Corporation, 16th March 2015). In a strategy similar to the *Orientalist*²⁸, within Said’s (see 2003) *Orientalism*, Chinese agents were sent to Port Elizabeth to study and learn about the host operating environment. The

²⁸ Someone who studied the culture and language of the ‘East’ and a term representative of the practice of interpreting places as an outsider and for one’s own aims.

collection of data about differing places, as far back as mercantile times, has long been a common endeavour within trading relationships (Christopher, 2008). The studies undertaken by the Investor therefore represented a practice of surveillance to observe, inspect, and account for the host community and the environment.

Outputs from the feasibility studies, conducted from above and outside of host participation, were the products of experts. Such a practice could be link to an interpretation of development, raised by Escobar (1995, p.56), that relies on seeing space and place as a whole ‘so that the whole can be grasped in some orderly fashion’. It was suggested by two *Investment Promotion Officers*²⁹ (IPO) that the studies sought to simplify and make legible the host operating environment. One IPO explained that Port Elizabeth had a challenging operating environment for new investors ‘let alone a complex social and political environment’ (Interview, IPO 2 Development Corporation, 16th March 2015).

South Africa’s economy consists of various informal economic practices, contains high levels of unskilled workers, and has a complex regulatory environment with regard to workers’ rights. Complex laws and social differences (between an investor and host) have been noted (Moran 2006) as barriers towards cooperation and the efficient exchange of goods, services, and skills. It is important to remember, however, that ‘simplifications are observations of those aspects of social life that are of official interests’ (Scott, 1998, p. 80). The simplification of the operating environment in PE may lead to issues over the valuing, ordering, and prioritising of only certain aspects of individuals, communities, and their assets.

It was evident that surveillance and the collection of data was undertaken in order to translate the operating environment into a comparative form – into measurable and comparable standards – to compare findings against existing production values (within the Chinese domestic context) and against international exchange values. Gupta (2012, p.188) wrote, in his work on development bureaucracy, that data only holds value through its ‘standardisation, replicability, and portability’. The Investor compared production costs, the available capital that could be

²⁹ Chinese nationals employed by the Development Corporation to liaise with, and seek out, Chinese investors.

invested in the site (by both the company and the South African state), the quality of production levels, and necessary labour and skill provisions (Interview, Director Development Corporation, 16th March 2015).

Only through accounting and undertaking comparison was it then possible for the investor to plan, structure, and negotiate terms of engagement with the South African Development Corporation. The linking of negotiations to the measurement of space and the identification of stakeholders indicated that investment, and potential opportunities for developmental spill-overs, were linked to careful calculation. One IPO suggested that if the studies proved that ‘there is big enough demand and profit is sufficient, then it would be worth investment here’ (Interview, IPO 1 Development Corporation, 16th March 2015). The surveillance of the operating environment could possibly be linked to a strategy of securitisation as the Investor sought to pool risks, responsibilities, and opportunities through a cautious assessment.

It was evident that, following the collection of social, market, and environmental data, the Investor used the newly collated knowledge directly within negotiations with the Development Corporation. The Development Corporation’s Director explained that the Corporation would firstly offer its own (land) measurements, market data, and (fiscal and infrastructural) incentives that could be offered and afforded. In response, the Investor’s representatives then put forward their own data stemming from the feasibility assessments. It was suggested that if the Investor was to accept any of the data offered by the Development Corporation, then they would go back with their analysts to ‘check, check, and check again’ (Interview, Director Development Corporation, 16th March 2015). It could be suggested that this performative exchange of figures, across the boardroom table, represented a strategy of authorisation as the Investor sought, or projected, a privileged and righteous position over the attribution of value and productivity to the host operating environment.

A knowledge of space and place, and the ability to locate data within wider comparative and competitive structures, was evidently a tool of leverage over rights, expectations, and privileges. This evidence reifies the notion that the

holding of knowledge, and the ability gain it (via assessment), remains a powerful tool to shape rights, access, and control over people and places (see Said 1994, 2003). A politics of space emerged at the site through the valuing, ordering, and juxtaposing of various aspects of the operating environment against local, nation, and international standards, values, and expectations.

It is important, however, to recognise that the identified strategies thus far – including that of surveillance, securitisation, comparison, and authorisation – are not necessarily unique to FDI or specific to Chinese investors. It could be suggested that these practices are simply an act of due diligence within host-investor relations. The Director at the Development Corporation proposed that the assessments and negotiations were ‘not personal’ and ‘to be expected within any form of business agreement’ (Interview, Director Development Corporation, 16th March 2015). The consequences of these strategies do, however, raise implications or concerns when assessed through the prism of SSC – where surveillance and accounting should be conducted in partnership with hosts, rather than, through a hierarchical interpretation of knowledge values.

Following the collection of data, on the host operating environment, it was important for the Investor to effectively represent findings and communicate plans to both the Development Corporation and other stakeholders (including local residential communities, other businesses, and domestic Chinese audiences). Business plans and annual reports formed an important part towards achieving this. Reports contained information such as investment commitments, employment guarantees, environmental assessments, project timelines, and wider CSR contributions (see Coega 2017b, p.53). The content of these documents were in line with what is known of corporate documents more broadly (see Peräkylä & Ruusuvouri 2011).

A key component within publications authored by the automotive company and the Development Corporation, with regard to the production of space and place, was the use of maps. Maps were used as an instrument to plan and communicate the necessary geographical changes to facilitate the investment on the ground. Maps were regularly brought forward as an instrument of explanation throughout

fieldwork (Figure 6). Maps took form following agreement, between the investor and the Development Corporation, on plot size, growth and expansion plans, infrastructural needs, and the necessary provisions to support a bespoke policy environment (Interview, Director Development Corporation, 16th March 2015). Discussed later, infrastructural development and spatial re-organisation was necessary to offer a contained fiscal and regulatory environment to support concessions and privileges secured by the Investor: mapping practices were a key tool towards achieving this.

Spatial change was represented, in maps, by lines of differing thickness, colours of differing shades, and labels assigning differing land use designations. In Harley's (1989) formative essay, *Deconstructing the map*, he highlights the importance of interpreting maps and the possible power concealed within them. He refers to the need to take note of each line, each colour, and each label: 'like art' maps hold a particularly human way of looking at the world (*ibid.* 1989, p.3). One of the implications from the maps was that colour-washing – the application of colour to designate specific zones – erased prior land uses. The production of maps involved the metaphorical clearing of land, the erasure of what had gone before, and the ascribing of new activities.

Large blocks of colour overlaid complex human and physical environment which were lost through the simplification of space and place. In this case, the Investor had been allocated former agricultural land. A resident from the neighbouring township of Zwibe suggested that land had been appropriated for higher value industries (PC, Zwibe Township, 2nd March 2016). This comment demonstrate the manner in which land had been re-valued, prioritised, and organised following strategies of surveillance. Land occupied by the IDZ had been assigned to more valuable (in productivity terms) means of production. Space occupied by the new factory had become represented as favourable for certain activities and not for others. Cartographic practice (the science and practice of drawing maps) has long held a privileged position with regard to visualising power (Clayton, 2015;

Gregory 2004; Rajchman 1988; Weizman 2011). Clayton (2015, p.21) wrote that maps, as with texts, come with ‘question of vision and visibility’.




Figure 6: Map of the IDZ (Top) and resulting material transformation (Bottom).

It could be suggested that maps produced to support the automotive investment were far from transparent or objective in their representation of the existing environment. The maps, representing the IDZ, had demarcated land as empty and ripe for the development. This representation of space contributed to a narrative, shaped by the Development Corporation, that the IDZ was a ‘greenbelt’³⁰ investment opportunity (Interviews, IPO 1 and 2, 16th March 2015). Through representing land as empty it was possible to meet the Development Corporation’s commitment to the investor that it could offer a site that was ‘very close to what [the Investor] wanted, with space to add the necessary infrastructure’ (Interview,

³⁰ Interpreted as an area of underused and undeveloped area of land.

Director Development Corporation, 16th March 2015). This was a narrative that mirrored the aspirations of the Investor who wanted to develop a site ‘hassle free and in [their] own eyes’ (Interview, Executive Automotive Factory, 18th March 2015).

The problematic representation of the IDZ as a greenbelt investment opportunity was raised by a NGO director from Zwide Township who suggested that the greenbelt narrative was a misleading one. He argued:

‘...that piece of land used to be open. There were people staying over there. There were farmers. A feasibility study was done and they deferred that zone to some other land use. Whoever was staying there had no alternative but to move on. [...] Many people have been displaced and disgruntled’ (Interview, Director NGO Zwide, 2nd March 2016).

This opinion could be supported from observational data following a visit to the site (PO, Development Zone, 17th March 2015). An abandoned hotel could be seen which was soon to be lost to overgrown shrubbery (Figure 7). Contemporary spatial planning regularly has a tendency to overlook historical land use (Beinart, 2001).

The reorganisation and representation of new spatial arrangements in Port Elizabeth had implications for the way land was viewed within the minds of those outside of the IDZ. A Union representative for the Metalworkers industry suggested the IDZ was now an exclusive space for foreign investment with little opportunity for direct engagement:

‘[I]t really is in fact simply a piece of land taken away from, especially, South Africa’s own companies. If you check which companies are there, you will find that they are all companies from abroad. It is like an island. It is an area which demonstrates that benefits that would have been enjoyed by all people have now been curtailed and are actually now reduced to just for the Chinese. [...] It is basically not actually assisting the poorest who would normally have access to go there.’ (Interview, Secretary-General Metalworkers Union, 19th March 2015).

This opinion highlighted concern for both loss of land and income security through the revaluation of land and the lack of opportunity to engage with investors within the IDZ. Not only did the plans remove common ownership of the land occupied by the IDZ, but also disrupted local economic practices. This may come to indicate that the spatial form of the IDZ did not produce or facilitate horizontal spill-overs with regard to development opportunities. Critically, it was perceived that the investment did not benefit the immediate community but was designed to support international capital networks.



Figure 7: Perimeter fences alongside homes (Top Left), New Deep-Water Port (Bottom Left), an abandoned hotel situated within the IDZ (Top Right), Coaches waiting to transfer workers (Bottom Right).

It was possible to draw a link between initial surveillance strategies, the representation of space within mapping practices, and the material displacement of native industries and communities. The IDZ was now inaccessible unless accompanied by an authorised zone representative (PO, Development Zone, 17th March 2015). The results can be problematic for host communities in respect to their ability to interpret and relate to their own environments and freely engage with investment opportunities. Validating this view, Smith (1993) has argued that the setting of boundaries is risky practices as strategies become ones of encompassment and control.

Abstract maps, created through careful negotiation, developed to take material form on the ground. Lines on maps took the form of fences, roads, and new utility provisions. The Director at the Development Corporation pointed to a new perimeter fence that had been erected on the outskirts of the zone (Figure 7, Top-right). As a result of the fence, workers to the automotive factory had to pass two security checkpoints (PC, Director Development Zone, 18th March 2015). The Director explained that the fences had been erected, partially, in response to protesters who were angry at broken employment promises. The protesters had been visiting the site and to throw stones at the management's cars.

Whilst the Director was saddened that there were now fences between the Investors and the community, it was argued that the Development Corporation had a 'responsibility to create a secure operating environment for the Investors' (Interview, Director Development Zone, 18th March 2015). It is possible to suggest that infrastructural development gave form to the structural priorities of the IDZ through prioritising the protection of foreign investors and international production networks. The prioritising and protection of international investors may result in an unequal operating environment and come at the expense of native industries and local communities.

Infrastructural change, to support the operating environment, consequently shaped local mobilities (or immobilities). A line of coaches were observed along the side of the road outside the automotive factory (Figure 8, Bottom-right; PO, Development Zone, 18th March 2015). The coaches were waiting to transport workers back from the zone to the townships of Motherwell and Zwide. By locating places of employment within a protected zone the workers had to be transported to work. This pattern of mobility replicated and sustained apartheid geographies of labour movement: from sites of residence to places of work. It could be suggested that, through locating the investment within an IDZ, there was little opportunity to challenge or de-racialize geographies attributed to labour-capital relations. Township residents employed by the automotive factory retained their identities as labourers for the interest of private capital. It is possible to suggest that infrastructural development became part of a system of unseen

structural violence that disciplined life for those living outside, but working within, the IDZ. This claim can be supported by arguments, made by Taylor (1999, p.14; see also Blaikie 2000; Foucault 1991; Gupta 2012; Ong 2000), who suggests that infrastructure can ‘become familiar, become embedded in society, and have its own effects on the reproduction of material life’.

The organisation of land and the supporting infrastructural development also facilitated the production of a differing regulatory environment for the Investor. The Development Corporation was able to offer various incentives, including, ten percent lower taxes, the suspension of import tax, and no VAT on services, stationary, and vehicle repairs (Interview, Director Development Corporation, 16th March 2015). The Development Corporation also undertook the relevant paperwork and administrative responsibilities on behalf of the investor. The Development Corporation had even won awards for being ‘Best Provider of Service to Exporters’ (see Coega 2018) and ‘Best Economic Zone in a Developing Country’³¹ (see Coega 2016). The incentives offered by the Development Corporation were in line with other (international) economic zones that offered factory construction, low rents, simplified procedures, and tax exemptions (see Aggarwal 2006; Chaudhuri & Yabuuchi 2010; Moran 2006).

Demonstrating the effect this had, with regards the intersectionality of concessions, a resident from Zwide Township spoke of the ‘load shedding’³² that residents had been experiencing in the area. The resident complained that he would ‘see people across the road blacking out and then, at the same time, within the zone it would be business as usual’ (PC, Zwide Resident 2, 4th March 2016). During negotiations the Chinese Embassy had requested (and received) guarantees that the investment would not be affected by the power outages (Interview, Director Development Corporation, 16th March 2015). These guarantees were given. It is recognised that investors operating in economic zones are often shielded from adverse conditions that may affect other parts of the host’s economy (Moran 2006).

³¹ Awarded by the Vice President of the People’s Republic of China.

³² The periodical cutting of power due to national energy shortages.

The space in which the investment came to be situated took the form of, through spatial planning, a space of exception where the South African government had offered a differing regulatory environment beyond normal laws of the State (see Gregory 2004; Kothari & Wilkinson 2010; Mohan 2013; Sidaway 2007). One Township resident argued that the IDZ ‘had been designed in a way that those companies are exempt’ (PC, Zwide Resident 2, 2nd March 2016). Such an operating environment has implications for those beyond or outside of such regulations, including, the ability to compete fairly and within the same networks of exchange as those within such zones.

A consequence of the enclavic infrastructure, and supporting policy environment, was that the conditions offered to the Investor were out-of-sync and juxtaposed against the local operating environment. When contextualising this evidence back within the narrative of SSC it was apparent that benefits and efficiencies were not applied evenly across native and international businesses. In this case, it was evident that support and assistance was given to investors who may be more resourced, financed, and able. Bureaucracy and administration, for example, has been identified as a particular problem for developing communities (see Gupta 2012) and these communities were not offered the same level of support or protections. The operational differences could represent a form of systemic violence as residents and business communities outside of the IDZ were ‘unable to achieve their capacities to their full potential, and almost certainly [...] unable to do so to the same extent as others’ (Gupta, 2012, p. 19).

Additionally, it was evident that incentives and exemptions were offered competitively and comparatively with zones within, and beyond, South Africa. These exemptions and incentives support concerns (Wang, 2013) that FDI may promote a race-to-the-bottom as the Development Corporation undercut costs and weakened regulations to draw investors from other areas. As the Trade Union representative suggested:

‘...there is a problem because within the development zone there are limitations in terms of rights of workers because companies that are there are sometimes given exemptions so they do not have to contend with the

same agreements and benefits that other companies outside the zone would have to offer' (Interview, Secretary-General Metalworkers Union, 19th March 2015).

The same representative suggested that the Investor had already chosen to close a production site in Johannesburg, possibly, to move to the zone. He suggested: '[the investor] recently wrote to us to say they are intending to retrench workers, however, we don't think retrenchment will take place here as they also have a site in Pretoria' (*ibid.*). These concerns highlighted the importance of studying the scalar relations and priorities attributed to FDI in a development context. Development in one area may come at the expense of another.

A structural relationship began to emerge between the form the IDZ took and wider international political and economic circumstance. In other words, priorities shaping the production of space and place centred on demands of international production networks. As a result, the physical and regulatory form that the IDZ took shaped how the investor integrated into the local operating environment and whether the investment supported local employment, subsidiary businesses, and local infrastructural development (beyond the IDZ). One of the attractions that the Investor saw in the IDZ, for example, was the new Port that was located within its boundary. The port was constructed to promote the integration of the IDZ within international trade and production networks. Port development has been used elsewhere in South Africa to support the promotion export industries (see African 2016). A project manager at the local Business Chamber suggested the Port was 'cost effective for getting goods directly off the factory floor, onto a ship, and into the rest of Africa and beyond' (Interview, Project Manager Business Chamber, 18th March 2015).

However, a consequence of locating a port within an IDZ is that it supports pre-established internal international supply chains and does not necessarily encourage spill-overs into the local area. These consequences were evidenced by one IPO at the Development Corporation who suggested, in regards to the automotive investment, that whilst 'the production line is here in the development zone, the market is not South Africa. The zone is mainly used as a gateway to the African

continent' (Interview, IPO 1 Development Corporation, 16th March 2015). Bräutigam and Xiaoyang (2011) identified similar concerns with regard to investments within economic zones that facilitate the re-export of goods to protected markets. A result is that there may be fewer spill-overs with respect to knowledge exchange, support for subsidiary businesses, and local employment. The investment in this case did not necessarily fulfil the needs, or the present capacities, of individuals and businesses outside of the zone as promoted by narratives of SSC.

The project manager at the local Business Chamber contextualised concerns over priorities in relations to a local skills surplus from a declining textile industry. He suggested:

'...you have got thousands of people from a generation, their grandmother worked there and their parents, daughters, and daughters kids. You have got generations of families that have worked in that sector that could pass the skill on without having to have gone through that formal education. It's in the DNA, and it's out there [...]. You know the same product you are importing from China, or other parts of the world, you can actually get here locally' (Interview, Project Manager Business Chamber, 18th March 2015).

This view was supported by the trade union representative who suggested that 'if [the Investor] chose to manufacture here and use local content then they would create and support more jobs in differing production lines' (Interview, Secretary-General Metalworkers Union, 19th March 2015). These arguments raise concern over the mutual exchange of knowledge, the role the Investor played in meeting existing local capacities, and the devaluing of native skills, industries, traditions, and agencies. The Zwide NGO Director suggested that the Investor came with experience, but asked: 'what experience' and 'what relevance' (Interview, NGO Zwide, 2nd March 2016).

The changing priorities, aligned to international production networks, shaped by the transplanting of industry within PE and the reallocation of land use had implications for career opportunities in the area. As part of the concessions and incentives offered to the Investor, the Development Corporation offered to

facilitate the necessary skills training to support the company's labour needs. The Director at the Development Corporation explained that 'if [an investor] tells us they need a particular skill, and they cannot find them in the area, then through our systems we will create a course for their needs in our central training centre' (Interview, Director Development Corporation, 16th March 2015). Skills provision was a critical component towards providing an enabling environment to support, and fix in-place, capital investment (see Arrighi 2008; Harvey 2015; OECD 2002). In this case, the Investor required welders and toolmakers and the Development Corporation established a bespoke training programme in response (Interview, Director Development Corporation, 16th March 2015).

The link between the Investor and skills priorities even spilled, on one occasion, into the local primary school. Whilst handing over R200,000 worth of school uniforms, the Executive from the automotive company delivered a speech to pupils:

'We are privileged to be here. We are your new neighbours and will look after you and assist you. You should become engineers, like in China, where everyone is an engineer. You must work in the automotive industry and one day own your own businesses' (FAW, 2015, para. 8).

The link between spatial change and skills training represented an element of affirmation to support changing priorities and development agendas driven by external stakeholders. It represented a prosaic geography as spatial change came to inform multiple aspects of social life in the immediate area (see Painter 2006). The Investor and the Development Corporation together enacted strategies, within a Marxist perspective, to secure a long-term labour supply.

The employment priorities, in line with the Investor's needs, were criticised by the NGO director who argued that such an approach to skills training would leave communities without wider transferable skills: 'people will not be able to make their own destiny that way' (Interview, NGO Zwide, 2nd March 2016). This view aligns to that of the OECD (2002) which suggests that education and skills training, via Investor-centred training facilities, cannot be substituted for public education. The change of employment and training opportunities reinforced

vertical exchanges and existing supply chains and placed limits on the mutual exchange of knowledge and the ability to act on shared priorities.

A further strategy identified that reinforced changing relations to the land came in the form of performative events – including visits by Chinese political figures, ceremonies, and promotional events – at the site of the automotive factory. As the Investment was one of the first manufacturing entities within the IDZ, the factory had regular visits from key Chinese political figures. A visit by the Chinese Ambassador³³ to South Africa, for example, was widely reported within local and international media (see PRC 2017; Vallie 2017). Many of the Investor’s CSR activities (*e.g.* classroom refurbishment and uniform donations) also had an accompanying media strategy. Furthermore, a ‘ceremonial shovel’ adorned the wall of the Director’s office at the Development Corporation’s head office (PO, Development Corporation, 16th March 2015). The shovel had been used to turn the earth during a ceremony that signified the start of the factory’s construction (Figure 8).



Figure 8: Ceremonial turning of the soil (Source: MYPORTELIZABETH 2012).

³³ The Embassy was primarily responsible for monitoring projects supported by the Chinese government.

The performative relationship between the Investor at the site of the investment may have altered the way in which communities viewed and perceived the land under development. This represented a strategy of naturalisation as the investor reinforced its role in landscape formation. Whilst it may have only been a symbolic act, the images would reinforce concerns that the land had been alienated for priorities and benefits of international actors. It is possible, however, that these performative strategies take a more prominent role in investments stemming from State-State investment partnerships.

The Director of the Development Corporation suggested that the performative strategies, associated with the Chinese investor, differed to his experience of investors of differing nationalities. He suggested:

‘China gets more attention for it’s projects even if they are doing the same as other foreign actors. They are very good at public relations in terms of having a person there to take a photography’ (Interview, Director Development Corporation, 16th March 2015).

However, these performances and representations cannot necessarily be separated from similar investments, including by USAID and UKaid, that are increasingly mediated through strategies of performance and the representation of public good and the value stemming from their contributions. The nature of these performances could be problematic if used to portray a ‘saviour’ narrative – a narrative that has been criticised in reference to wider Western development discourse (see Chouliaraki 2013) – and would come counter to principles attributed to SSC.

Finally, it is important to comment on how the production of space and place, to support this form of investment, altered the capacity for host communities (in their myriad forms) to resist changes. It was suggested by a Zwide resident, for example, that the form the IDZ took – an enclavic space – had led to the disruption of resistance and communication structures used by workers and residents. It was suggested that historically the community would gather at street committees to raise concerns about local issues and workers’ rights. The changing spatial arrangement had led ‘to those active zones of community communication dying out’ (Interview, Zwide Resident 1, 3rd March 2016).

The disruption of social organisation removes a key tool available to communities to resist exploitation at the hands labour-capital relations. This is particularly important within a case where the direct labour-production links are retained. Rodney (2012, p.150) wrote that ‘[i]t is only the organisation and resoluteness of the working class which protects it from the natural tendency of the capitalist to exploit to the utmost’.

Furthermore, the juxtaposition between the Investment and existing skills capacities meant that only a select few could gain employment at the factory. This had an effect of picking-off community members and breaking social cohesion. The disruption of community structures fell in line with broader understanding of neoliberal political economy where private interests, over community commons, takes precedent (Harvey, 2005a; Brown, 2015). As the NGO director suggested: ‘once interests [are] privatised, it is personal interest’ (Interview, NGO Director Zwide, 2nd March 2016).

Similar considerations potentially applied in relation to the compensation, offered by the Development Corporation, to those displaced by the development. However, as one individual commented:

‘Even if the incentives were big, in terms of compensation, this would not last them long. People were also unable to get advice on how to fight for the land. [...] And that is something we do not talk about’ (Interview, Director NGO Zwide, 2nd March 2016).

Although, no evidence was collected with regard to compensation rates, if any, so this argument cannot be confirmed.

The organisational structure of the IDZ, and the resulting relationship between communities and the Investor, also had implications for accountability, responsibility, and the ability for individuals to participate in decision making. There was a level of separation, for example, between Chinese actors (such as the factory executive) and South African residential communities. Even the employment of Chinese IPOs to consult directly with Chinese investors on a day-to-day basis limited direct exchanges. This separation was agreed during

negotiations as it was believed that communities would be more receptive to the Investor, and activities of the IDZ, if there was a South African corporation facilitating engagements between wider communities and the investor (Interview, IPO 1 Development Corporation, 16th March 2015).

This communication strategy was acknowledged by the South African government's Department for International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) who argued:

‘China will arguably not deal with communities at grassroots levels at the first instance. They will work with government through its tiers. That is something that probably needs to be appreciated. China is very much respectful of our sovereignty. I know some of your more traditional donors, when they are not happy with the government, would then take a grassroots community approach’ (Interview, Director DIRCO, 27th January 2016).

An issue stemming from this structure was that change represented an imaginative transformation of the investor-host relationship. The NGO director argued that ‘the Chinese company is transformed and given a South African face with no direct link between the Chinese and the local community’ (Interview, NGO Director, 2nd March 2016). This leads to issues of transparency and accountability as communities lost sight of who was enacting change and who was responsible for various outcomes. Shaping development objectives through complex networks diminishes responsibilities and therefore makes accountability more challenging (see Atkins et al. 2006).

Concerns of responsibility, however, have to be balanced against the notion that by operating through the Development Corporation (and by accepting concessions) the Investor was responsible for ensuring its commitments were met and that the South African State directly benefitted. The Development Corporation was also able to recruit members of the community from rural and remote areas that would normally be inaccessible for international companies (Interview, Director Development Corporation, 16th March 2015). These benefits can be supported by the work of Bräutigam & Xiaoyang (2011) who suggest that in some cases it is valuable for Chinese investors to partner with local organistaions who

have experience of the local operating environment. A balance is needed between direct control, top-down spatial reorganisation, and reduced participation and responsibilities.

To end, this case has demonstrated a range of space- and place- making strategies employed to bring the Chinese SOE to fruition within one of South Africa's IDZs. A thread can be drawn from initial assessment and surveillance strategies, the spatial reorganisation of land through centralised planning, and finally, to altered mobilities, employment, and resilience, as a result of the juxtaposing of local demands against international production networks. This possibly came at the detriment of existing local capacities, needs, and participation.

5.3 SOEs, Economic Zones, and SSC

In this case, the production of space and place has been explored in the context of a Chinese SOE investing in one of the South African government's newest and largest IDZs. The case represented an example of an investment supported by a State-State partnership and can be contextualised within motivations held by the South African government to attract manufacturing investments to an economically disadvantaged area, and motivations by the Chinese SOE to access African markets. The investment came to fruition via negotiations between the Development Corporation (on behalf of the South African government) and representatives from the automotive company and the Chinese Embassy.

A variety of space- and place- making strategies have been identified which were employed to bring the investment to fruition and facilitate various developmental spill-overs and linkages. Identified strategies (taking the investment from negotiation to operation) included surveillance, securitisation, simplification, comparison, authorisation, representation, and performance. These strategies were employed to study and account for the host operating environment (including an assessment of the availability of space, labour provisions, connectivity to trade and production networks, and governance regimes), to translate the operating environment into comparable and measurable assets, to communicate and plan spatial change (through mapping, reporting, and infrastructural development), to

create new divisions of land and labour, and to project the value and social good stemming from the investment (in the form of public diplomacy).

The strategies filtered down, from negotiations to infrastructural development, to give the investment both imagined and material form. In this case, this took the form of an exclusive enclavic space with a bespoke regulatory environment supported through built infrastructure. The strategies employed, and the form the investment took, evidently altered how space and place became known and experienced. The investment, through becoming situated within the IDZ, affected mobilities, employment and training opportunities, perceptions of land ownership, participation and resistance, and the form spill-overs and linkages took.

It was evident that the production of space and place in this case was undertaken by three primary actors: the Development Corporation, Executives from the SOE, and the Chinese Embassy. These actors were responsible for drawing boundaries, re-valuing land and labour, building infrastructure, negotiating concessions, and facilitating the direction of spill-overs. Their roles were evident as primary contributors within interviews, their sole authorisation of documents, maps, and images, and also their role in performative acts. There was no evidence to suggest that wider participation of communities or stakeholders. It could therefore be observed that the production of space and place in this case represented a top-down and centralised process.

Whilst it was evident that space and place was co-produced between South African and Chinese agents, it is also possible to suggest, however, that decisions were not free or aligned to the immediate needs and objectives of the hosts. Decision making, priorities, and alignments were shaped by wider international political and economic contexts. The spatial form that the IDZ took, and the concessions and incentives offered by the Development Corporation (including labour regulations, tax rules, and administrative assistance), were shaped by the need to offer competitive and comparative advantages against the immediate area of PE, national economic nodes, and other economic zones internationally. This was necessary to support the movement of capital. The result was a space juxtaposed against the local operating environment.

The constraints in which the Development Corporation was operating, on behalf of the South African government, represented the view of Lefebvre (2009f) who suggests that, whilst the State distribution of assets may be viewed in emancipatory terms (versus distribution via the market), the State apparatus is rarely free. Through careful assessment, the translation of assets for international comparison, space and place was therefore produced through careful calculation.

The production of space and place by the South African state to support the investment in this case – the production of a differentiated space – gave empirical form to the concepts, in political and economic geography, of *spatial selectivity* and *graduated sovereignty*. Spatial selectivity refers to the privileging of certain geographical areas by the State to direct certain projects (Jones 1997; Sidaway 2007). Graduated sovereignty refers to the differing modes of governance, compromises, and controls applied within single a state (Aggarwal 2006; Holden 2017; Ong 2000). Both represent the fluid relationship between the State, markets, and societies. Pauly and Grande (2005, p.11) wrote that ‘the idea that the sovereignty can be divided and reconfigured is one of the most important innovations in modern political philosophy’. The zone, in this case, represented a bespoke regulatory space within South Africa’s normal laws of governance. This was necessary to facilitate development and to directly distribute benefits to select areas of South Africa: in this case the economically remote Eastern Cape. The case therefore demonstrates how States can play an ‘essential role in the production, regulation, and reproduction of capitalist spaces’ (Brenner and Elden, 2009, p. 20).

The effect of these concepts, however, is the privileging and prioritising of certain areas, industrial sectors, and communities. The overlapping systems of governance and juxtaposition of the immediate operating environment, for example, led to space becoming out-of-sync – economically, regulatory, and environmentally – with local circumstance. This had implication for how knowledge was produced (how spaces became known), identities (new divisions of labour), voices (the ability to engage and participate in the production of space), resistance, and accountability (the disruption of community organisation networks). This will have direct consequences on how FDI can meet expectations of SSC, including,

the mutual exchange of knowledge, participation, accountability, the alignment of the investment to existing host capacities, and the ability for communities to demonstrate leadership over development priorities.

Whilst it can be suggested that the Development Corporation took ownership over spatial change and developmental opportunities (including the building of infrastructure and the offering of concessions) it was evident that decisions were directly shaped, as previously suggested, by the investor's expectations and wider competition. It could therefore be suggested that the production of space and place was produced in competition rather than in cooperation. Furthermore, development opportunities became dependent upon and intimately connected to meeting the investor's concessions and expectations. Development, from FDI, therefore took form around a dependent relationship with the investor and wider political and economic context.

The production of space and place aligned to international markets, rather than the host environment, also had implications for the alignment of investments with existing host capacities and needs. This included the requirement for communities to retrain and break with traditional skill-sets: in this case, making a transition from textile production to metalwork. It is important, however, to recognise the nuances associated with questions of alignment. The IDZ, for example, was established to meet the needs of a manufacturing deficit in South Africa. In this regard, the zone aligned with national needs. A scalar interpretation of investment relationships for SSC are therefore important to recognise.

The top-down and centralised spatial planning necessary to facilitate a bespoke operating environment also led to issues of empowerment and the distribution of benefits across the full intersection of local community groups. There was little or no participation of local communities in decision making and native industries, outside of the IDZ, were excluded from privileges held by the investor within the zone. The effect of this, in line with the theory of spatial selectivity, was that only certain individuals and industries were integrated into international production and supply chains. As the IDZ operated solely for international investors, this meant the zone supported internal supply chains rather than cooperation with local and

native South African industries. Additionally, the Development Corporation would undertake administrative tasks and offer incentives which were not available to local stakeholders. This meant that efficiencies were not evenly applied and the investor was placed at a competitive advantage to native industries and businesses.

Furthermore, the dependent relationship between the investors and local development (with few alternative in the economically remote area) meant that the investment did little to disrupt the link between labour and production. Retaining the link between labour and production restricted, as Cheru (2009, p.275) suggested, the capacity of 'local communities to initiate development autonomously'. The spatial structure also disrupted the ability for local communities to organise and resist.

Similarly, the governing structure of the zone, separating investors from the community, leads to issues of accountability and the assigning of responsibility. There was little direct contact between the Chinese investor and wider communities and this created a barrier towards enacting mutual responsibilities. Complaints against the automotive factory, for example, were often targeted at the South African Development Corporation, rather than, the Investor directly. This was achieved via design and negotiation. However, this has to be balanced against the ability of the South African development corporation to offer more direct and target development interventions which may not have occurred otherwise.

It was therefore evident that investment within the IDZ did little to challenge relations of power – including dependency and uneven development. In contrast, the South African State came to potentially support and participate in creating these spaces that had exclusionary effects upon its own citizens. It will be important to identify how these strategies and their effects change within differing investment contexts.

5.4 Summary

This chapter has explored the production of space and place in the context of a Chinese SOE investing in one of South Africa's newest and largest IDZs. The case

represented an example of a State-State investment partnership and was contextualised against the South African government's spatial development plan to distribute capital and investment to economically remote areas, and against the Chinese SOE's motivations to seek access to African markets.

A range of strategies have been identified that gave the investment both imagined and material form, including, strategies to survey the operating environment, negotiate rights and concessions, to plan and communicate spatial change, and shape the built environment to offer a bespoke regulatory environment. The investment came to produce, and become located in, what formed an enclavic and exclusive zone for international investors. This space was co-produced and negotiated – within a top-down and centralised processes – between the South African and Chinese state entities.

It was noted, however, that whilst the South African state actively participated in the production of space and place, decisions and motivations were aligned to create a competitive and comparative space within wider international political and economic trade and production networks. These alignments and juxtapositions against the local operating environment brought forward a range of concerns when contextualised back within the narrative of SSC. These concerns included the strengthening of existing production networks (over horizontal spill-overs), a misalignment with existing skill capacities in the area, competitive advantages being given to the Investor (over native industries), the disruption of resistance networks, and concerns for accountability and participation as the Development Corporation formed an metaphorical and material barrier between the Investor and the wider host communities.

The case here has begun to highlight some of the structural relationships shaping space and place. Moving forward, it is important to see how relations in differing contexts alter the space- and place- making strategies employed. It was also important to identify whether identified concepts – such as spatial selectivity and graduated sovereignty – can continued to be utilised as explanatory tools for the production of space and place in later contexts.

6.0 Community Shareholdings: King to CEO

The second case offers insights into the production of space and place in a differing context. The case focuses on a Chinese consortium that partnered with a traditional rural community to open one of South Africa's newest platinum mines. The investment differed to the previous case in three ways: firstly, the investment represented an example of a community-shareholding within a private company (in contrast to a State-State partnership); secondly, the investment was located within a traditional rural community headed by a Monarch (a King and his Uncles); and thirdly, the investment was in its implementation stage (under construction and not yet operational). By studying a differing geographical context and structural relationship, this chapter seeks to find similarities to the previous case (common spatial strategies and agents of change) whilst identifying differences and developing wider nuances regarding the production of space and place within Chinese FDI in South Africa.

6.1 Situational Context

This case focuses on a mining investment situated within a traditional rural community in South Africa's North West Province (Figure 9). The investment was located approximately 80 miles by road from Johannesburg and over 600 miles from the previous case in Port Elizabeth. The mine was one of South Africa's newest and its opening and operation was financed by a Chinese consortium. The consortium consisted of Chinese funding bodies (including the CAD Fund and the China Development Bank³⁴) and other mining corporations registered in the PRC. This investment coincided with a period of foreign interest in South Africa's mining assets in response to increasing international commodity prices and pressures to control natural resources (see Rincón & Fernandes 2018).

³⁴ China Development Bank is a Chinese State Policy bank that primarily funds large infrastructure projects.

Prior to the investment by the Chinese consortium³⁵ the mine was, itself, founded by a South African company. However, during the 2008 ‘global’ financial crisis the company failed to acquire the necessary capital to begin mining operations. Following a search for an investor, the Chinese consortium came on board and offered \$227 million to secure the mine’s construction and operation (Integrated Annual Report, 2017, p. 4). An executive from the mining corporation – who was responsible for coordinating the community, the government, and the investor – explained that ‘without the funding that came through the China-Africa partnership, the project would not have got off the ground’ (Interview, Executive Mining Corporation, 16th April 2015). The significance of the consortium was reiterated by an Uncle, from the host community’s *Traditional Council*, who noted that ‘prior to the Chinese, no-one was interested’ (Interview, Uncle 1 Traditional Council, 26th January 2016).




Figure 9: Situation of Community, Mine Complex, and Proposed Village Regeneration.

The Chinese consortium partnered with the local host by issuing shares to the community’s Traditional Council. The host³⁶ community consisted of around 35,000 members, most of whom resided in the immediate village, whilst others

³⁵ In 2005.

³⁶ Hosts in terms of the contractual relationship, between the community and the consortium, and in terms of geographical proximity to the mine.

had left to find work in Johannesburg (PC, Resident 1 Ledig, 21st January 2016). The community was governed by a Traditional Council, headed by a hereditary Monarch, which dated back to the 1800s (Interview, Uncle 1 Traditional Council, 26th January, 2016). The Traditional Council, which consisted of the King and the village ‘Uncles’, were responsible for the day-to-day decision making on behalf of the community. Importantly, when contextualised within South African governance regimes more broadly, this community structure meant that the community was not automatically entitled to the same public provision of services and utilities (*i.e.* road maintenance, piped water, and power) as State-run municipalities. This community governance structure will be important as, whilst reference is made to ‘Community-shareholdings’, the very nature of the monarchy meant that decision making often remained in the hands of a few individuals (see Teffo 2007; Wiredu 1995).

Explaining the relationship, between the Chinese consortium and the traditional community, an Uncle from the Traditional Council suggested that, prior to the establishment of the mine, the community was acutely aware that they had previously been displaced from their land following the discovery of mineral deposits (Interview, Uncle 1 Traditional Council, 26th January 2016). The Traditional Council therefore sought to strike a fairer deal with the new consortium. The Uncles believed that the community should directly benefit from the latest mining operation and therefore accepted shares within the mining corporation, as compensation for the loss of community land, and as an alternative form of community upliftment (Interview, Uncle 1 Traditional Council, 26th January 2016).

The Council was offered an initial 33 percent shareholding in the corporation with the Chinese consortium retaining 45 percent and a controlling stake. The Uncles suggested that: ‘the deal that had been done was one of a kind. The mining companies would normally go direct to the government. We wanted a greater say in what happened’ (*ibid.*). This corporate profile (of both Chinese and South African shareholders) could be positioned in relation to other China-Africa investment partnerships where Chinese companies sought to partner with local

stakeholders who held a knowledge of the local investment environment (see Harrison & Mdee 2018; OECD 2002).

With regard to the development opportunities – spillovers and linkages – the Uncle explained that the partnership was less about the ‘gift’ that the investor brought to the community but about ‘what [we] do ourselves’ (Interview, Uncle 1 Traditional Council, 26th January 2016). When shares from the partnership matured, the Traditional Council planned to use the dividends to ‘tar the roads, upgrade the water reservoirs, work towards getting running water into homes, and create an educational trust to fund university study’ (*ibid.*). In addition, the mine would be a substantial employer in the area and knowledge exchange would be facilitated through the Traditional Council’s partnership with experienced mining executives.

The mining corporation also had a separate CSR agenda that offered further benefits, in kind, including school bursaries, agricultural projects, healthcare services, the funding of a local newspaper, and the refurbishment of the community clinic and youth centre. These additional contributions were listed in a variety of publicity materials, including, annual reports, public presentations, and media documents (Figure 10). The Mine executive added that the corporation also planned to provide permanent housing for at least 70% of its employees when fully operational. The mine was also fully committed to obligations for Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (B-BBEE)³⁷ (Interview, Executive Mining Corporation, 16th April 2015). These were contributions that, again, came to be contested in the evidence that follows, in particular, with regard to who could access benefits and the knowledge produced to inform their distribution.

³⁷ Economic empowerment initiative by the South African government to distribute wealth across broad spectrum of disadvantages citizens.




Figure 10: CSR Spending (Source: Wesize 2013)

These developmental contributions, stemming from the investment, were framed in the Mining Corporation’s mission statement within a need to build positive social and industrial relations with the host community. The Mine’s executive explained that:

‘While we continue developing a mine that will provide 30 years of high quality platinum metals, we remain fully aware that our operation neighbours several host communities that need new job opportunities and unhindered access to basic services, such as potable water’ (Interview, Executive Mining Corporation, 16th April 2016).

The investor’s statement on Sustainable Development (see Wesize 2013, p.10) listed operating values which included causing zero harm to people and the environment, ethical behaviour based on integrity and honesty, ownership, accountability, dignity, respect, fairness, trust, transparency, diversity, inclusion, tenacity, and care. It was evident that these principles can be closely aligned to those of SSC.

As with the previous case, to facilitate the investment and accrue any benefits, the host community and environment had to go through various transformations. This

began prior to the investment. Two companies, headed by the Traditional Council, had to be established. The first was established to hold the shares (with the King becoming a Chief Executive) whilst the second acted as a development organisation that would take dividends and enact various development initiatives on behalf of the community. One Uncle explained: ‘We had to almost change everything in terms of our community structure’ (Interview, Uncle 1 Traditional Council, 26th January 2016). This restructuring, discussed further in the next section, was one consequence of the financialisation of traditional governance regimes to support investment and development of this type.

Whilst the shareholding agreement may attempt to remove height and hierarchy between investors and host – as host become ‘partners’ – it was evident that differences emerged between the structural relationship of the share-holding and representations of the mine. Even though the Mine’s executive explained that the company was listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE), was solely incorporated in the Republic of South Africa (RSA), and ‘follows the rules and requirements that South Africa prescribes’ (Interview, Executive Mining Corporation, 16th April 2015), a community member suggested that: ‘It is definitely not a South African mine. Maybe it works to grow our economy, but it is not a local mine for local people’ (Interview, Ledig Resident, 22nd January 2016).

It was evident that the representation of the mine, and its spatial form, were important aspects in shaping how the investment was perceived and resisted by the host community. It is important to understand how these differing structures – the removal of the South African State – altered the production of space and place and whether it at all offered differing relations of power within a narrative of SSC.

6.2 Spatial Strategies

In continuity with the previous case, strategies of surveillance were undertaken to inspect, examine, and gain a detailed overview of the host operating environment before the Chinese consortium agreed to invest in the mine. This involved an assessment of mineral resources, existing infrastructures (including mining

equipment), and human labour. As well as prospecting for mineral rights, a ‘community perception survey’ was undertaken to assess host community expectations (developmental spill-overs and social responsibilities) from the investment partnership (Interview, Executive Mining Corporation, 16th April 2015). The Chinese consortium needed to balance the value of mineral resources against extraction costs, infrastructure requirements, and social responsibility provisions (compensation, skills training, and housing).

The assessments were described in the Mining Corporation’s Sustainable Development reports as strategies undertaken to ‘generate insight’, ‘segment audiences’, ‘develop propositions’, and identify ‘stakeholders and credible voices’ (Document, Sustainable Development Annual Report, 2013, p.20). As with the previous case, surveillance strategies were seemingly a tool to account for, interpret, and make legible the hosts and their environment: to identify, value, and order land uses, identities, and priorities. The suggestion of ‘credible’ and ‘non-credible’ voices represents an element of authorisation over who the investor believed had a right to speak, participate within decision making, and benefit from any wider contributions.

The Investor held a privileged position (to organise and implement change) through holding an encompassing oversight that others did not hold. The assessments represented the selective identification of specific aspects of the operating environment which were of interest to the Investor in order to assess opportunities, costs, and risks to long term investment. These assessments, as with the previous case, highlighted the fact that any developmental spill-overs or opportunities would only be achieved following careful calculations and were tied to external dependencies.

The assessments were, again, the product of ‘experts’ brought in by the Investor. An Uncle from the Traditional Council explained that the Investor brought their own advisors’ and each advisor advised them on ‘the various protections and securities they wanted to get’ (Interview, Uncle 1 Traditional Council, 26th January 2016). The community perception survey was also undertaken by a research company brought in to undertake ‘qualitative and quantitative research approaches

via door-to-door visits of 1000 people' (Interview, Executive Mining Corporation, 16th April 2015). The production of data within these initial surveys were conducted from a privileged position where the investor could finance and contract out large-scale field studies. It could be suggested that this represented the commercialisation of knowledge production that stemmed from a structural partnership beyond a State-State partnership. Although States have the apparatus for such large scale studies, the data collected would be more freely (mutually) exchanged.

The data produced from initial studies were translated and represented in mining reports, company accounts, and corporate brochures in the form of graphs, charts, tables, and diagrams (Figure 11). Reports were produced on glossy paper and included high-resolution photography. The form the reports took gave aesthetic appeal to the data. The form corporate brochures and reports take has been of particular interest, in areas of consumer psychology, towards understanding their role in decision making (see Preston et al. 1996; Townsend & Shu 2010). Discussed further in respect to representation of CSR activities, the importance of visual imagery has often been ignored. The documents sought to appeal to the imaginative senses regarding company value, operating standards, and prospects.

Data from studies of the host environment were translated into financial value and represented within a positivist (scientific and numerical) form (Figure 11). In one example, the environment and host community was represented in terms of human, natural, social, and manufactured capital (Wesize, 2013, p. 7). This empirical representation emulated a strain of neoliberal political economy where 'everything, everywhere' is seen 'in terms of capital investment and appreciation, including especially humans themselves' (Brown 2015, p.176; see also Gupta 2012; Massey 2013; Toscano & Kinkle 2015). Whilst it was positive that human and social capitals were accounted for, these could, however, be interpreted hierarchically below the importance of financial and manufacturing capitals.




Figure 11: Company reports and example content (Source: Wesizwe 2013, 2014)

It was evident, due to the technical representation of data, that the audience of these reports were not necessarily the immediate host community, but rather financiers and businesses within the mining sector. This translation had implications for the ability of the traditional community to interpret, account for, monitor, and protect their environmental and social integrity. The community leadership deemed the data to be non-transparent, nor universality accessible. One of the Uncles suggested that the community was unable to account for the platinum quantities entering or leaving the site:

‘...there are situations when the company can say “We have dug out 250,000 tonnes this year”. But at the end of the day they have actually taken

out 350,000. We have no way of verifying it. It is a problem. [...] A community without information is a very dangerous community. Some people can come in, misinform, or sometimes deliberately try and create chaos' (Interview, Uncle 1 Traditional Council, 26th January 2016).

It was suggested that the community required the knowledge of lawyers, geologists, and accountants to interpret information about their own environment (*ibid.*). This knowledge form was not something the community leadership (representing the interests of the wider community) held, nor were they skills that the mining corporation was under any obligation to provide. As the investment was not subsidised (through tax incentives or concessions), by the South African government, then there was little diplomatic or contractual pressure to exchange knowledge. Whilst there are international frameworks³⁸ to protect communities against issues of corruption and bribery within the extractive industries, China and South Africa were not signatories (Moran, 2006)³⁹. Issues of transparency and accountability – the ability of the host to monitor activities within their existing capacities – are critical issues within SSC.

The ownership of knowledge represents a form of power. It gives authority to those that possess it, closes off space (political, economic, and aesthetic) for those without it, and limits alternative knowledge forms (see McEwan 2009, p.165). It could be suggested that the surveillance and representation strategies evident in this case lead to the privileging of the Investor, who held a broad and encompassing knowledge of the operating environment, whilst the Traditional Council and wider community remained passive receptors – with little agency to challenge the investor. Drawing through the historical lineages (between colonisation, development, and FDI), the findings here could represent a contemporary example of Mudimbe's (1988, p.10) concern that 'people and their material production were more familiar to travellers, students of human species, merchants, and European States'. In this case the host environment and

³⁸ The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative founded in 2006 and OECD Anti-Bribery Convention 1999

³⁹ As of 2018.

community assets were more familiar (within a specific knowledge form) to the mining corporation than the community, and its leadership, itself.

The authorisation of assets in this case represented the environment as global common rather than community assets. The accounting and re-valuing of the environment represented an example of idealisation and debasement as figures and charts represented the communities and existing economic practices as underutilised, underperforming, and could be managed in a more productive capacity (in the eye of the Investor).

The positivist representation of the host environment, in a diagrammatic and graphical form, had implications for shaping the host's relationship to the mining activities. Within early processes, and as this investment was in its implementation stage, many of the graphs and values attributed to space and place represented projections (of resource value, timescales, and pathways) rather than material realities. The projections, representing value and change over the lifetime of the investment, added a temporality to the investment which linked present and future operating conditions (and development possibilities). It could be suggested that the projections acted to give the investor authority over assets and the narrative of change over the lifetime of the mine.

Projections are therefore encompassing of time and, in effect, long term decision making (see Toscano & Kinkle 2015). Projections represent a specific pathway and if deviated from could alter possibilities. This had implications for the community to understanding and interpret their own spaces, identities, and temporal priorities. Projections introduce a dependency upon following a certain pathway to, in this case, generate surplus value and accrue developmental opportunities. Gupta (2012, p.159) wrote that 'it is precisely the productive aspects of statistics that makes it such an effective tool of domination'.

It was evident that the value attributed to the environment became a tool of decision making by both the investor and hosts. These decisions centred on land use, employment practices, skills training, and developmental priorities (such as where to build houses, which utility infrastructure to fund, and which roads to maintain). In this case, agricultural land that had been used as a secure form of

food supply and income had been assigned alternative financial value (PC, Uncle 1 Traditional Council, 26th January 2016). The transition from food production to the prioritising of resource extraction was in line with trends across rural Africa where traditional communities increasingly turn to non-agrarian incomes (Bradbury, 1979; Lahiri-Dutt, 2018). Such transitions are often irreversible, disrupt rural economies, and create income insecurity. The case here was a further example of rural communities turning to service short term markets, within a ‘particular moment in time’ (Bradbury, 1979, p. 155), against long term income security.

A concern with regards to the shaping of space and place in response to projections, or the future realisation of a specific value, is that developmental outcomes for the community were speculative in nature. This meant that the ability for the community to accrue any benefits were time sensitive and dependent upon circumstances beyond their control. The value of shares, for example, could increase or decrease dependent upon the price of platinum. An Uncle at the Traditional Council acknowledged that:

‘...it is outside factors that affect what our aspirations are and what can be achieved. If the price of platinum drops below \$750, we have a major problem’ (Interview, Uncle 1 Traditional Council, 26th January 2016).

This opinion was confirmed by one of the Mine’s executives who suggested that ‘whether we make a profit, or if South Africa benefits, simply requires a balance between the need to get value first and drive profitability’ (Interview, Executive Mining Corporation, 16th April 2015). Evidence, here, demonstrating the link between developmental spill-overs and external dependencies supports to the notion, raised by Taylor (2014), that relations in the context of SSC may be simply introducing and reifying new dependencies.

These dependencies were further exasperated by the structural form (a community shareholding) between the host and the investor. It became evident that as the Mining Corporation sold further shares, to support the financing of the mine’s operation, the Traditional Council’s stake in the mine declined. The traditional council came to realise that their share-hold no longer represented 33% of the

company. One of the Uncles complained that ‘it would have been wise if the shares allocated to the Community were contained at 51% where they would then have a deciding say’ (Interview, Uncle 1 Traditional Council, 26th January 2016). In a similar light, through the share-hold agreement, as there was no ‘State’ direction or guarantees, it was possible that benefits from mining activities could be felt at further distances (*i.e.* via the Johannesburg Stock Exchange) before the immediate community. The shares were, geographically speaking, free-floating and did not guarantee a return for the host community.

The share-hold also had implications for the wider community’s ability to interpret development opportunities and activities. The Traditional Council had exchanged tangible assets, such as agricultural land, for immaterial shares that the community could not see or hold. This raises important concerns regarding vision and visibility of development contributions within FDI. Shares do not physically exist, other than in an electronic database, and are immaterial until cashed-in (Toscano and Kinkle, 2015). The issues arising from this was evident, for example, in protests which were led by the local youth arm of the ANC against unfulfilled promises made by the Mining Corporation (PO, Ledig Protest, 21st January 2016). When asked about the protests, the Mine’s executive explained that:

‘...they see trucks going in and out, and they see the shaft being developed, they have assumptions. They see a mine and therefore all of them must be employed. But we are not generating any revenues’ (Interview, Executive Mining Corporation, 16th April 2015).

This confusion stemmed from the form the share-hold took, the ties of development to temporal projections, and the transparency of data and knowledge held by the investor.

In order to bridge the gap between community expectations, their grievances, and the day-to-day operating needs of the mine, other strategies were employed to shape the way in which investor activities were represented. This included, for example, representations of CSR activities within reports, websites, and wider communications. Photographs depicted completed mine structures, community projects, and evidence of community participation (Figure 12). Against the

opinion of community members who had not received benefits from the investment comparable to their expectations, these representations evidently sought to project what the mining corporation was doing and positive value it was bringing to the community.

However, the authenticity of the images (whether the images resembled empirical representations of described activity) were questioned by some of the community members (PC, Ledig resident 1, 22nd January 2016). The photographs shaped how the investor wanted to be seen, to sustain operating rights within the host community as set out in the company's sustainability statement. This could represent a strategy of insubstantialisation. In line with views of insubstantialisation, given by Spurr (1993, p.142), images and actions were not necessarily ordered by 'material unity or coherence' but possibly worked as a 'immaterial counterpart to the dissolving consciousness of the subject'. In reference to the psychology of corporate reports, Preston *et al.* (1996, p.113) suggest that documents can either be shaped by a transparent message, an ideological context, or to shape human subjectivity and reality. It could be suggested, based on community opinion, that the latter two are evident here.




Figure 12: Images from Annual Reports (Source: Wesize 2013).

There were other concerns raised regarding the representation of mining activities and contributions to development. One of these centred on the community's refurbished medical clinic. It had been suggested, by both the Clinic's manager and one of the Uncles, that the refurbishment had been completed by community members themselves. However, the Mining Corporation's logo now adorned the gates of the clinic as you walk through its entrance (PO, Clinic Visit, 23rd January 2016). The Uncle complained that: 'the clinic was there before the arrival of the mine. All they did was buy a couple of paint brushes. When I look at the plan...they did nothing' (Interview. Uncle 1 Traditional Council, 26th January 2016). The clinic manager added that 'they [were] trying to claim credit for things they haven't done' (PC, Clinic Manager, 23rd January 2016).

These strategies of representation, in both corporate literature and the symbolism on built infrastructure, can be linked to the Investor's motivations, as set out in the company's mission states, to continually seek operating rights within the community. In defence of these strategies, the Mine's Executive suggested the company needed to 'increase exposure to the good that was coming from the mine' (Interview, Executive Mining Corporation, 16th April 2015). These strategies of representation could play an increased role in a context where investor was not supported through State securities or institutions.

The perceived gap between representations and realities, as described by community members and the clinic manager, aligned to wider criticisms known of CSR programmes more broadly. Gamu and Dauvergne (2018, p.595; see also Buchanan & Marques 2018; Narula 2018) suggest that CSR agendas should seek to 'protect the environment, respect human rights, enhance development, and promote peace'. However, CSR agendas and their representation may simply operate, like a plaster, to cover over deeper structural issues attributed to extractive industries. It is suggested that CSR activities may simply serve to legitimise a contentious 'harm industry' rather than transform it:

'When implemented well, in the short-term, it can temper disputes over governance and the distribution of benefits by creating space for locals to express grievance and receive compensation. In the long run, however, we

argue that even relatively well-financed, participatory and otherwise strong CSR programming cannot peacefully transform local resource politics' (*ibid.* p.2).

This is particularly problematic within the extractive industries where there are pronounced social and environmental consequences for host communities. The representation of CSR activities in this case may therefore work only to mitigate against short term protests within the community.

Other strategies that were employed, to similar effect, included the performative act of consultation and community participation. One example included a meeting held by the Traditional Council, within the community, to discuss plans to develop a new village centre with support from the Mining Corporation (PO, Community Meeting, 27th January 2016). The meeting was held in the presence of the King and was the main platform in which the community could observe decision making and directly engage with mine representatives.

During the meeting, those present were shown a series of maps indicating how the village presently looked, and how the village could be transformed to accommodate new housing, workshops, and social amenities (Figure 13). There was a poignant moment when the maps were pulled from a roll-rube, before individuals from the community were then selected to stand up and hold the maps for others to see (PO, Community Meeting, 27th January 2016). Standing in a line, the individuals presented four consecutive images showing the transformation of the village. This was a significant act as it represented a change from the Mining Corporation presenting the development to the community, to community members presenting the development to their friends and neighbours.

Whilst the meeting supposedly represented a form of community consultation, it was possible that the process was about creating consenting subjects, to support spatial change, rather than enact broader participation and consultation. In her own experience of Town Hall and Township meetings in South Africa, Hart (2002, p.285) suggests that what might be happening was not necessarily the production of trust or consent:

‘...but intense plays of power in which the *terms* of consent were being renegotiated, along with a recreation of township dweller’s sense of themselves as political actors in relation to elected officials as well as to local bureaucrats. Central to this process was the way words, images, and symbols were being deployed to define the terms and terrain of contestation’.

During the meeting, there was no discussion or votes as to whether the development should go ahead. The plans were, however, greeted with cheers, music, dance, and celebration (PO, Community Meeting, 27th January 2016). The event was in stark contrast to the grievances the community had with the Mining Corporation and wider unrest in the province generally (see Umraw 2018). In contrast to the formalities of negotiation within the first case, the negotiation of change through performative activities led to informalities. This approach may be problematic when contextualised against the many tradition communities who have long put their faith in investors through verbal agreements and been left empty handed (see Schoneveld & German 2014).



Figure 13: Community meeting to reveal new village proposals (Source: Author).

The community meeting highlighted the importance of understanding how knowledge is produced, the voices adopted or employed, and the processes or practices (such a meeting or ceremonies) used to validate it. The meeting demonstrated how the production of space and place in this case filtered down through community agents. Gupta (2012) suggests that the enactment of change, through the use of lower-level officials, represents a strategy of naturalisation to support a dominant structure. During the meeting the Investor was able to gain

support for a plan that would see the development of workers housing and subsidiary mine infrastructure whilst also performing its social responsibilities to consult and retain operating rights within the community.

The role of local agents within the community to support necessary changes stemmed from a detachment of the investor from the South African state. The Investor needed to incorporate centres of power (*i.e.* the Traditional Council) into decision making. Bradbury (1979) argued that mining companies have often achieved their goals through annexing local elites. This was common practice in rural mining cases which are particularly vulnerable to divide and rule efforts (see Cox 1998; Gamu & Dauvergne 2018). This has implications for questions of empowerment and intersectionality (the broad involvement of multiple actors). Those left outside of decision making in these cases are often those least able to resist change (see Harrison & Mdee 2018). This was evidenced by a young individual who suggested there was little opportunity for him to get work at the mine: 'It depends who you are and where you come from' (PC, Ledig Resident 1, 21st January 2016).

The alignment of interests, through incorporating the King and his Uncles, directly informed the local priorities adopted to shape space and place. This was evident through the spending commitments the Traditional Council had decided to undertake when it had received the dividends from the Mining Corporation. These included the building of houses to rent to mine workers, the desire to build a vehicle repair workshop to service mining equipment, and the funding of learner-ship programs to support employment in the mining sector (Interview. Uncle 1 Traditional Council, 26th January 2016). Whilst it was suggested that these developments would provide the community with rent payments and employment opportunities, and it was evident that the Investor did not internalise supply chains, it could be suggested that there was a fine line between exposure to industry, integration, and dependency (see Narula 2018). The spatial form that developed, stemming from the integration of local agents and creating mutual dependencies, replicated what is known of resource towns as development became shaped around the dominant mode of production (see Bradbury 1979).

The shifting priorities, and dependencies, highlighted several issues concerning the alignment of priorities to host communities existing capacities and needs. One resident argued:

‘...when the mine comes to the community, it should first develop the community and try and figure out where social problems are and where they can intervene. But that has not happened. What has happened is that they are building laboratories in schools but, in terms of our social life, where you get youngsters squatting in corners, we need their social labour plan to work with and not against us. [...] There was no preparation or planning to work out how to utilise the mine to place food on the table. Instead they are coming up with lay learner-ship programmes that will not actually benefit us in any way’ (PC, Ledig Resident 1, 21st January 2016).

As a second resident suggested: ‘because mining is a critical industry, you cannot just take an ordinary person and put them in the mine’ (PC, Ledig Resident 2, 21st January 2016).

Therefore, whilst the investment and subsequent development did not produce an exclusive or enclavic space, the interdependent relations between the Investor and the Traditional Council led to a privileging of certain rights, decisions, and developments with similar exclusionary effect. An example included the role of one community member who was contracted to install power lines to the mine, during the same period of load-shedding faced by the automotive factory, over the top of the village (PC, Mine Contractor, 22nd January 2016). Energy and water provision was something that the Traditional Council sought to bring to the community, but now it was found in abundance at the site of the mine.

It was evident that, although there was no centralised spatial planning, infrastructure and the built environment came to shape inclusions and exclusions. Larkin (2015, para.3) wrote:

‘We tend to think of infrastructure as assemblages that fulfil technical functions. But to exist, a road or an electric plant must take on form. Once

it does, it has a mode of address that hails and constitutes subjects by virtue of that form.’

Part of the issue stems from the mine being the sole employment opportunity in the area. The local village contractor was attracted to the mine by the appeal of paid employment – even at the detriment of himself and other community members. This evidence can be linked to the hegemonic power of capital to incorporate a range of actors, even those it may exploit (Chibber, 2013).

This case has therefore shown how the changing structural relationship between hosts and investors lead to the co-production of space and place in other ways. These changing structural relations also had implication for the ability of the host community to resist change. The first centres on the interdependency of the mine’s success and the ability for the community to develop. This meant that the community had a vested interest in supporting mining activities. As the Mine Executive explained: ‘There is no “Chinese” and “South African” entities. They operate as one and have the same responsibilities and liabilities’ (Interview, Executive Mining Corporation, 16th April 2015). Liabilities, within such structures, are distributed across a range of actors rather than, as in the first case, a discreet entity or institution (Atkins, Hassan and Dunn, 2006; Gamu and Dauvergne, 2018; Harrison and Mdee, 2018).

Secondly, as well as bringing-in decision makers, the appeal of paid employment limited resistance as it introduced an element of private interest for select community members. As Gupta (2012) suggested, support for various interventions (such as the mine development) are usually offered if an individual feels that they are personally benefiting.

Some residents also raised concerns over increased corruption in the community. A couple of community members recalled how one member of the newly formed share-holding company was exiled to live in Johannesburg after having his house torched. It was suggested that ‘the guy ate the money’ (PC, Ledig Resident 2, 21st January 2016 *and* PC, Ledig Resident 3, 22nd January 2016). The local contractor confirmed these claims by suggesting:

‘...what is happening within our communities is that we have a problem with our leadership, in terms of the royals. They are careless and they misunderstand how they want to take the community forward. The result is chaos, misunderstanding, and no communication whatsoever’ (Interview, Mine Contractor, 22nd January 2016).

It was therefore evident that the share-agreement created issues for local decision making, accountability, responsibility, and transparency. As the investor had divested an element of responsibility for development through the share-agreement, it was suggested that any concerns should be taken to the Traditional Council and that any issues were down to ‘internal community challenges’ (Interview, Executive Mining Corporation, 16th April 2015).

However, it was suggested that the contractual relationship did give the host certain rights which they would not have held within a State-State partnership. An Uncle explained, for example, the provision of jobs and housing would allow communities to hold property and rent houses to the mining corporation. He explained:

‘So no one can come in and tell us what to do and what not to do. There were some times when [the mining corporation] would try and, sort of, dictate what to do and what not. But if it’s not for our benefit then we can just say...no...sorry’ (Interview, Uncle 1 Traditional Council, 26th January 2016).

It was suggested that the community had greater bargaining power in contrast to other investment agreements that took the form of top-down and centralised initiatives – such as the IDZ.

6.3 Community Shareholdings and SSC

This second case has focused on the production of space and place in the context of a Chinese investment within a South African platinum mine. Representing a differing structural partnership between the host and investor, this investment took the form of a Chinese consortium (consisting of Chinese mining corporations and

Chinese-State funding bodies) that partnered with a traditional South African community through a share-hold agreement. The share-hold was agreed by the host's Traditional Council (responsible for governing the community) as a form of compensation for loss of land and as an alternative means to achieve community development.

With regard to the strategies employed to bring the investment to fruition (and therefore accrue developmental possibilities), this case held several similarities with the previous investment. Common strategies included those employed to study and account for the operating environment, to communicate investment plans and spatial change, and to secure a long term investment environment through shaping land use and labour relations. Knowledge of the host operating environment (the ability to collect and hold it) remained, as with the previous case, a critical component towards shaping, persuading, and enacting the investment.

The operating environment was, again, translated into a positivist and financial framing: this included representing the community and the environment in differing forms of 'capital'. This translation was necessary to simplify and make legible the host environment to aid comparability within international financial values and benchmarks. The investment was shaped by the careful calculation of costs, risks, and responsibilities. This further emphasised the interdependencies between investment success (in terms of accruing value) and the ability to achieved developmental objectives.

One way in which the strategies in this case differed from the previous case, however, was in the representation of data: including the use of projections and insubstantialisation. This change could be linked to fact that this investment was in its implementation stage. A problem with the use of such projections was that they added a temporality to the investment as they represented the valuation of assets over the lifetime of the mine. This added an element of totalising control of the future development trajectory. In line with Morvaridi and Hughes (2018, p. 869), such communicative forms designated certain assets as 'common' and certain processes as 'unavoidable'.

Projections played a critical role in shaping community decision making as the Traditional Council sought to align its own development projects to the interests of the investor. This gave the operating environment a spatial form that replicated what is known of resource towns more broadly (see Bradbury 1979) as community development took form around the primary means of production: shaping labour, subsidiary businesses, and urban planning.

Contributions to local decision making was another difference, in comparison to the previous case, with regard to communicative structures. As the investor was not supported by the South African state, through concessions or securities, the investor had to work to retain operating rights within the community, bring in decision makers, and shape independent development in line with the investor's aims. This was undertaken through the representation of mining activities, and their value, alongside performative acts to engage the community. Performative strategies were employed in community meetings to demonstrate a level of participation and engagement. However, questions were raised over the authenticity of these acts. It could therefore be suggested that this case represented an increased use of imaginative representations over the use of direct intervention in the built environment.

A concern raised with these forms of communication and representation (including projections) was increased evidence of insubstantialisation. To retain operating rights, representations made by the investor may of held inaccuracies or were selective in form. As the share-agreement was time sensitive, and the community had swapped material assets for a non-tangible assets, the investor had to employ these communicative strategies to bridge the gap between structural realities and community expectations. These gaps were exposed through protests against unfulfilled commitments.

As with the previous case, consequences stemming from the identified space- and place making strategies – including the role of specialist knowledge, the linking of development to fluctuating resource values, and the selective incorporation of actors – highlighted several concerns with regards to locating FDI within the narrative of SSC.

Firstly, for example, whilst the Traditional Council played an active role in developmental decision making and the shaping of their own environment – countering the argument that rural communities are often left out of land alienation cases (Cheru 2009) – it was evident that development opportunities and decision making became aligned and dependent upon to the success and requirements of the investor. As an example, to gain dividends from the share-holding, the Traditional Council was dependent upon fluctuating resource values. It was therefore evident, in this case, that the host and investor was more intimately tied due to the share-agreement. This meant that they both acquired mutual interest in the success of the investment. This evidence could give form to what Lefebvre (2009e, p.108) describes, in terms of capitalist production, as a shift from a ‘customary’ relations to a ‘contractual’ relationship shaped by rules, codes, and regulations.

As a result of the mutual interests it was beneficial to align various community development projects to the needs of the investor. This included spending dividends on offering services and subsidiary businesses. Therefore, whilst the site did not take an exclusive and enclavic form, space and place was shaped by external and dependent priorities. The case here therefore became shaped by the hegemonic influence of the investor, as is the case generally within resource towns and single enterprise communities (Bradbury 1979; Moran 2006). A concern with this shift in focus meant that community development did not necessarily align to existing host capacities and/or needs: including skills capacities, traditional knowledge systems, and the ability to address pressing community concerns such as drug use and homelessness. This was evidenced through protest movements and complaints by community members that the developmental spill-overs (even those elected by the Traditional Council) did not meet the immediate social needs of the community.

In addition, to participate in decision making, and hold the shares, the community leadership had to change governance structures, alter their identities and formal relationship to the wider community, adapt their build environment, and align subsidiary services to the demands of the investor. These changes provided empirical insights into how FDI worked to bring traditional and metropolitan

society into a single system (see Holden 2017; Pauly & Grande 2005). The changing of the community's orientation in terms of training, work, and infrastructure development, was also an example of the community re-orientating themselves to insecure short term interests. This example adds to studies of communities which break from their agrarian ties to work as wage-labourers (Bradbury, 1979; Lahiri-Dutt, 2018). This may be problematic with regards to sustainability as communities alter their identities, ways of knowing, and relationship to their environment.

A further concern is raised in regard to empowerment and intersectionality of engagements. Firstly, due to the nature of the community governance model (a monarchy) participation of the wider community was limited; secondly, the success of the investment relied on the investor picking-off centres of power in the community to bring the investment to fruition. Participation in the production of space and place was therefore limited to those with existing privilege and power. The picking-off of decision makers may fit with studies elsewhere (Bradbury, 1979; Gamu and Dauvergne, 2018) highlighting that rural communities, particularly in regard to resource extraction, are susceptible to divide and rule attempts.

Finally, in regard to resistance, the offering of shares to the Traditional Council meant that the Mining Corporation divested, to an extent, responsibility and accountability for development and spatial change. The structural relationship also put the risk directly on the community rather than the investor or the South African State. This is problematic when SSC calls for mutual accountability and responsibility. However, with no State backing from the South African government there were no exceptional regulations or concessions. The investor did not gain any favourable efficiencies.

Additionally, without a central body, such as the Development Corporation in the previous case, the community assets required a greater degree of translation on behalf of the community. The technical and financial translation of community assets created issues with regard to holding the investor to account. The community did not hold the knowledge to interpret and value their own assets.

This created barriers for the efficient exchange of knowledge. It could also be suggested that FDI, in this case, commercialised knowledge production so it became a private and commercially sensitive asset.

The findings from this case not only worked to support strategies employed to produce space and place in the previous case, but also generates new insights into how the production of space and place was differently effected in an alternative locational, structural, and temporal context.

6.4 Summary

This second case centred on an investment by a Chinese consortium within one of South Africa's newest platinum mines. The consortium partnered with a Traditional South African community through a share-hold agreement. Shares were issued as both compensation for loss of land and as an alternative means (by the community) to reach development objectives. The case represented a differing structural partnership between the host and investor and, furthermore, represented an investment in its implementation stage.

Whilst a range of common strategies were identified, in relation to the previous case, an observable difference was the increased use of performance, aestheticisation, and insubstantialisation to incorporate decision makers, retain operating rights, and bridge the gap between structural realities of resource extraction and community expectations. These differences could be directly linked to the investor not having secured concessions from the South African state and the increased role of time-sensitive community benefits as a result of the mine not yet being operational.

As there was no central planning authority, space and place was produced through bringing in decision makers and encouraging hosts to align their priorities to those of the investor. Hosts aligned their planning and priorities for two main reasons: firstly, the mine became the dominant mode of production in the area; and secondly, through taking a share-hold, community development and the success of the mine became interdependent. It was therefore of interest to the community to align its development activities to servicing the mine. It has been identified that,

whilst the communities played an increased role in the production of space and place, motivations and priorities remained external to it.

As a result of the structural partnership, the findings highlighted several concerns in respect to SSC, including, the empowerment of only a privileged set of actors within the community, the alignment of spatial change to external measures, new dependencies, the inability to monitor mining activities due to the translation of community assets, and questions over long term sustainability of development as a result of the short term interests of resource extraction. The changing identities, knowledge forms, governance structures, and land use policies were therefore shaped by risk, insecurity, and dependency.

Against these findings it was evident that, whilst there were common strategies, these begun to take differing prominence as the context and structural relationship changed. In the final case it will be important to identify how the removal of both the South African and Chinese state affected the production of space and place further.

7.0 The Individual: Private Enterprise

The third case explores to the production of space and place in the context of a private Chinese investor who sought to construct a ‘new city’ on the outskirts of Johannesburg. This case represented an investment beyond the (direct) mechanisms of Chinese and South African state institutions or agencies (other than operating within the favourable economic and political relations established through Chinese and South African bilateral relations⁴⁰). There was, therefore, no contractual relationship between the investor and a specific host community or individual. The investment was also only in its planning stages: the investor was planning, consulting, and laying groundwork prior to construction⁴¹. The investment represents one of the most recent examples of Chinese investment in South Africa and is a valuable case for confirming or challenging emerging patterns as identified within the previous two cases.

A study into private Chinese enterprises, such as this, acknowledges a burgeoning trend for private Chinese individuals to invest in Africa, and their significance in shaping China-Africa engagements (Davies, 2017). Mohan and Lampert (2012, p.96) write that:

‘Much of the [China-Africa] debate has focused on the bounding of Chinese aid, trade, and investment but this relates primarily to ties between key Chinese ministries, development banks, and large-state-owned enterprises. [...] By contrast we see private Chinese TNCs entering to compete for sales and contracts in the local open market, where often they lack the protection afforded by tying loans to investment’.

This case therefore represents an important contribution to a gap in knowledge on private Chinese enterprises investing in South Africa.

⁴⁰ including the Chinese government’s latest commitment as part it’s ‘Going Global 2.0’ strategy to support the entry of private enterprises to overseas markets (see ChinaPolicy 2017, p.4)

⁴¹ As of 2016

7.1 Situational Context

The investment in this case centres on a private Chinese developer who sought to transform 16,000 hectares of land in Modderfontein, a suburb of Johannesburg. The investment came to fruition following the purchase of land, by the developer, from an Irish chemical company that used to produce dynamite on the site for South Africa's mining industry. The investment was independent from both the South African and Chinese governments. A representative from the South African government's Department for International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) suggested that the investment was part of a growing pattern where local and regional investment bypasses the national government. It was suggested: 'most of [our] major cities are now getting into these developments [and] it is something we are now aware of across the spectrum' (Interview, Director DIRCO, 27th January 2016). Whilst Johannesburg is one of South Africa's largest and wealthiest cities, the development is also situated next to Alexandra, one of South Africa's poorest townships (Figure 14).




Figure 14: 'New City' Situational context.

An overview of the investment was provided in a variety of company literatures (Figure 15) and it was explained by the developer's COO who suggested, on acquiring the land, the investor planned to construct a range of housing, office and industrial spaces, retail areas, education facilities, a financial services hub, and new leisure opportunities (Interview, COO Modderfontein, 21st April 2015; see also Heartland 2015). A design consultant (tasked with designing and planning the

new city) suggested they were given a remit to develop a ‘one-stop-shop’ for the communities of Johannesburg. The Masterplanner explained:

‘You have your place of work, your place to go shopping, place to buy your groceries, go to the tailor, you have everything in one place. It will be a development that shifts a city from one extreme to another in a really positive direction’ (Interview, Masterplanner London, 16th December 2015).

The investor sought to shape the built environment to offer an alternative lifestyle for workers and residents who wanted to move to the area. It was the aim to create a new ‘harmonious’ and ‘economically important’ city (Zendai n.d., p.9). The development planned to be a long term project that would evolve over a period of 20 years.




Figure 15: Overview of New City Development (Source: Zendai n.d.).

In contrast to the previous cases, in which South African hosts’ financed various infrastructural development to attract or service an investors’ needs, the Investor in this case covered the full costs of infrastructure and utility provision. A local developer explained that:

‘The increasing burden on various economic sectors in South Africa, as well as increasing construction costs, has resulted in chronic deficits and

shortages in terms of infrastructure investment. For this reason, policies have changed to shift the burden of provision of infrastructure onto developers' (Interview, South African Developer, 16th April 2016).

This provision stemmed from the investor, or hosts, holding no contractual obligation to each other in terms of, for example, developmental expectations or fiscal concessions.

As the investor was not bound by any contractual obligation, by either the Chinese or South African State, the investor was also in a position to contract out design work to a British 'Masterplanner' in London. This partnership resembled a form of triangular cooperation as the Chinese company, from the so-called Global South, partnered with an experienced third party partner (see UNDP n.d.). The role of planning consultants in overseas development is nothing new. Urban planners were used, for example, by colonial and post-colonial states to manage and control different places and spaces (Myers 2003).

The British design consultant was tasked with taking plans from conception to delivery. Explaining her role, she suggested:

'We design and build cities. Our team leads game changing projects that transform our built environment. Our innovative solutions keep cities moving – physically and economically – from rebuilding dense urban centres to delivering the social and leisure amenities that support them. [Our company] is at the heart of great cities' (Interview, Masterplanner London, 16th December 2015).

The Masterplanner proclaimed that this investment would not be 'business-as-usual' (*ibid.*) and it was therefore evident that the investor planned to radically transform the environment, landscape, and social communities to achieve this.

Supporting this agenda, the Investor's Chief Operating Officer⁴² (COO) explained that aim of the development was to take the community of Johannesburg in a 'new direction' to support the people of South Africa's will to 'better themselves'

⁴² the highest Chinese individual working on the project in South Africa.

(Interview, COO Modderfontein, 21st April 2015). This may be perceived as a problematic tone, showing a level of debasement. However, some South African individuals, including a South African developer, suggested: ‘There is a massive hunger for people in townships to move and better their situation. The black middle class has now surpassed the white middle class by maybe two times...that is significant’ (Interview, Resident 1 Modderfontein, 16th April 2015). He continued:

‘It has been a real focus of the government to create a mix of upmarket, middle, and downmarket housing within a node to try and get these communities to live closer together. You will then get kids, from mixed backgrounds, going to school together. That’s the way you create an aspirational society’ (Interview, Resident 1 Modderfontein, 16th April 2015).

Already, it is possible to see a language of betterment, change, and correction.

In terms of expected developmental spill-overs, it was hoped that construction opportunities would offer long term jobs ‘from basic to advanced skills levels’ (Interview, South African Property Developer, 16th April 2016; see also Delonno 2014, para.10). The investment would also support local business expansion and act to attract other investment in the area. The local South African property developer, for example, drew attention to a new hospital on the periphery of the Investor’s site. It was suggested that it was ‘one of the first hospitals to be built in the region for quite some time’ (*ibid.*) and that its construction would not have been feasible had it not been for pull factors associated with the new city development. This suggestion complemented the view of one Modderfontein resident who suggested the investment would bring ‘economies of scale beyond what any government could possibly provide’ (Interview, Resident Modderfontein, 17th April 2015).

The potential for increased land and property values in neighbouring areas were also raised as a further positive spill-over. The South African developer (having noted his personal interest) suggested:

‘...housing that is sitting on that 200 square kilometre of [Township] land will be worth over 1 Million Rand each within the next 5-10 years. That value alone, when the government hands out those title deeds for properties, will result in another explosion of development and opportunity. [...] Can you imagine the liquidity opportunity by being able to leverage those township properties down the line?’ (Interview, South African Developer, 16th April 2016).

The developer suggested land purchased in 2007 would now be worth ten times that as a result of the new investment.

The centrality of private interest and economic growth as the main drivers of spill-overs may come to be problematic, particularly, for the land-less or those who do not hold property rights. However, the South African government has looked to support communities through the issuing of title deeds and finance to purchase land⁴³ (see Hart 2002, p.227). The Premier of the Gauteng province wrote in an online commentary:

‘The government is rallying behind the development because the project would eventually improve the lives of children from neighbouring Alexandra who are living in poverty. [...] It is not all about job creation, but extending ownership of property and business to black people who were previously marginalised’ (Delonno, 2014, para. 5).

Developmental opportunities were thus expected, primarily, to occur via indirect spillovers rather than direct contributions by a host partner or community. It is here where a politics of space and place begins to emerge through acknowledging the knowledge and motivations used to shape the investment and how, with little State control, spill-overs and linkages were directed and distributed.

7.2 Spatial Strategies

As in the previous two cases, the investment came to fruition following strategies to survey the operating environment (*i.e.* the market, the environment,

⁴³ Through, for example, South Africa’s Settlement and Land Acquisition Grants (SLAG).

infrastructure, and social make-up), translate findings into comparable standards, represent the Investor's plans, and promote an agenda for change. As the 'new city' development was in its planning stages⁴⁴, with little to see other than a boundary fence and groundwork for a new skyscraper, the use of documentary data to represent assessments and plans were critical. Documents included corporate brochures, marketing advertisements, road and utility plans, as well as annual reports from the investor (see Appendix 8). In the documents studied, there were no less than 30 tables, maps, diagrams, and images to represent population structures, land use plans, land values, and employment sectors (Figure 16). This range of outputs gave empirical form to Tuan's (2001, p.5) view that 'we measure and map space and place, and acquire spatial laws and resources inventories for our efforts'. The collection and representation of data in this way represented space and place as abstract entities to be measured, mapped, and altered.

Maps, in particular, were brought forward by a range of participants to communicate and demonstrate how the investment would take spatial form (Figure 16). The South African property developer, on handing over a series of maps, explained that some of the maps demonstrated 'expected land use scenarios' whilst others showed the 'necessary road improvements for each scenario' (Interview, South African Developer, 16th April 2016). The maps were used to represent both the end product and the pathways to achieving it.

As with the first case (Chapter 5), colours and lines on the maps assigned new spaces for industry, learning, retail, entertainment, and housing. The assigning of land in this way resembled what Shield's (2013, p.30) described as designating a 'place-for-this' and/or 'places-for-that'. In the given plans, spaces and places became favourable for certain activities, behaviours, and identities: a space for the financier, the educator, or a space for those with time for leisure. Importantly, the approach to land use planning reaffirmed the notion that mapping practices for FDI routinely create spaces that did not presently exist (see Haraway 1991; Harley 1989).

⁴⁴ As of 2017.




Figure 16: 'Masterplan' for New City Development (Top: Source: Heartland 2014), Road and zone integration plan (Bottom-left: Source: Agency 2015), City Connections (Middle-right: Source: Zendai n.d.), Table showing Land-ownership (Bottom-right: Source Agency 2015).

A further map was employed to situate the investment within wider local, national, and international communication and trade networks (Figure 16, Middle-right). This identified the importance, and priority, of international networks in both shaping the investor's priorities (not implicitly for the local or immediate area)

and how the development would take form. The differing maps (depicting the same location) all showed something different and demonstrated what Gregory (1994) acknowledged as the elasticity of representing space and place within the imagination: the maps worked to draw connections across a range of scales and bring certain (economic) nodes into clearer sight.

The importance of the site's connectivity to the success of the investment was further remonstrated by the regular reference made to the Gautrain⁴⁵. The South African developer suggested that 'from the new station you will be able to reach Pretoria in 12 minutes, the airport in 3 or 4. The centre of Sandton is a couple of minutes away' (Interview, South African Developer, 16th April 2016). The notion of connectivity and mobility, attributed to the development, potentially highlighted that the spill-overs from the investment may not be direct or local. This could be in contrast to the bounded form of the IDZ and the state distribution of developmental opportunities.

A final map depicted how new roads to support the investment (as points of entry/exit and transit through the site) met, diverged, or bypassed existing infrastructure, residential settlements, and industries (Figure 16, Bottom-left). Transport plans are generally designed to support the navigation across or through space, to unlock land, or create corridors to removes sites of friction. It was suggested, for example, that following the completion of the new development, those working or living in the new city would be able to avoid the travel chaos of Johannesburg: 'you will be able to travel from A to B without coming into contact with the tolls of other areas' (Interview, South African Developer, 16th April 2016). Unfortunately, with regards to intersectionality, those left off the maps or transport routes would continue to sit in queues and face various toll charges. It was possible that maps produced a topology of exclusive spaces and transit areas for those privileged (*i.e.* with the financial capital) to work, live, and access the new site.

⁴⁵ A new high-speed rail line from Johannesburg airport to the Central Business District before going on to Pretoria (the administrative capital of South Africa).

Whilst it was evident that the role of maps (their context, presentation, and other rules of cartographic practice) were similar to the previous two cases, there was one noticeable difference. This difference centred on the authorisation of those maps. As there was no central planning body or state agency (such as the Development Corporation in Chapter 5) this meant that the investor had to bring together other public and private authorities to enact spatial change. The maps were therefore produced for differing purposes and by differing actors, including, the Johannesburg Road Authority, the Gauteng Regional Development Agency, and other local (neighbouring) developers. Rather than a single plan, the production of space and place was shaped by the layering of documents and the networked relations of actors.

The investment represents an example of the need, when an Investor is not supported through State securities or guarantees, to bring in local decision makers to support the production of space and place. This approach to spatial planning in Johannesburg is, however, nothing new. Butcher (2018, p.1) suggests, for example, that mining companies in Johannesburg used to regularly ‘negotiate encounters between different state entities, companies, multiple publics, and land itself’. The empirical evidence acts as a reminder that the State and its institutions do not hold a monopoly over processes of ‘bordering, planning, zoning, mapping, and unmapping’ (*ibid.* p.4).

Against the notion that the success of the investment, and its financial sustainability, depended upon drawing in other actors to support the investment (to finance infrastructure, set up homes, relocate business, attend the educational institutions), rhetorical strategies were employed to represent the development in comparative and competitive terms. The new city, for example, was regularly compared to other areas in Johannesburg other South African and international cities. A consequence of representing space and place in comparative terms is that it effected the development of other areas: the rise of one, and the fall of another. The example of Sandton was given. When Sandton developed, it was blamed for the resulting collapse of the Johannesburg CBD which became dangerous, harder for business to operate, and led to an exodus of residents (Interview, Masterplanner London, 16th December 2015). Sandton was regularly compared to the new city

development and described as the development's 'opposite' (PC, Resident Modderfontein, 18th January 2016). The investor and Masterplanner suggested that Sandton was poorly planned and the new city would seek to attract businesses from it (Interview, Masterplanner London, 16th December 2015).

Comparative representations of the local environment also filtered through into how various aspects of the investor's land, existing landscapes, residential communities, and infrastructure became perceived, viewed, and valued. Overlooking the site owned by the investor, and taking direct reference from the maps, a local resident pointed out the 'good' and the 'bad' spaces and how they featured (or not) in the new city plans (PC, Resident 1 Modderfontein, 16th April 2016). The historic buildings, including the 'Old Casino'⁴⁶, and green spaces were protected by the investor, whilst the Township of Alexandra and industrial buildings (critical spaces of employment) were represented as barriers or problematic sites. This experience overlooking the land – surveying the landscape – mirrored that of the historical knowledge projects that classified space and place as 'warm', 'productive', 'foreign', 'strange' and 'uncivilised' (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 294). The devaluing and debasement of the operating environment, here, sought to promote the value that the investor was bringing to the area and encourage other stakeholders to engage with the developer's plans.

In a similar manner – attributing value to different spaces in comparison to the new city – it was suggested by the South African property developer that Alexandra Township (on the periphery of the site) would be 'legitimised as a city in its own right through the course of the next decade' (Interview, South Africa Developer, 16th April 2016). The authorisation of spaces and places as *legitimate* and *illegitimate* represented a problematic tone and a level of debasement as the comparative narrative, promoted by the developer, resulted in the projection of a *right* or *wrong* way to develop. This example could also demonstrate how development within the context of FDI is shaped, not by a needs-based assessment, but through comparison to material realities elsewhere.

⁴⁶ Colonial style architecture that housed the entertainment complex for the former dynamite industry.

When asked how, or why, the Investor was able to avoid problems that had been identified in the context of other locations, it was suggested by the Masterplanner that the Investor held a level of knowledge and oversight regarding the operating environment that others did not hold. Reverting back to comparative reference to Sandton, the Masterplanner explained that ‘Sandton was built without the kind of overview of the market that had been completed for this project’ (Interview, Masterplanner London, 16th December 2015). This example further highlights the privileging of certain knowledge systems within FDI and the power that this holds – to be able to ascribe new ways of doing, seeing, and being – by those that possessed it. This case also develops further the privatisation of knowledge production as the investor financed large-scale, detailed, and encompassing studies of the operating environment.

The production of space and place to bring the development to fruition, as with the previous two cases, was informed by the specialist and the expert. The COO explained, for example, that the British design consultant was selected based on their ‘experience [and] expertise’ within ‘complicated’ projects (Interview, COO Modderfontein, 21st April 2015). This view was corroborated by the Masterplanner who suggested the Investor wanted a team that could manage something on this scale:

‘We have a strong history of this type of work globally. [...] So we thought the A-team would be appropriate. There were a lot of different issues to negotiate in South Africa. [...] We have experience in getting planning approval for really complex planning projects in London. We can take that experience up and offer it to Johannesburg’ (Interview, Masterplanner London, 16th December 2015).

Within this comment, the Masterplanner demonstrated a level of affirmation as the consultancy recognised only *their* ability to address issues and development concerns. These comments also reiterate a view, from previous cases, that investors see South Africa’s investment environment as complex and requiring simplification and translation to plan and bring around spatial change through an orderly and calculated method.

Following the collection of data, the representation of the development plans, and an appeal to wider stakeholders, the new city began to take material form on the ground. However, in contrast to the previous cases, as the Investor did not hold any concessions, was not supported by a central planning authority, and did not seek to produce a bounded or discreet operating environment, the development took form around informal infrastructures and/or the actions of subsidiary investors. Explaining its spatial form, for example, the South African property developer suggested ‘the powerlines that run through here are on [the Investor’s] land and the concrete fence that runs through there represents the other boundary’ (Interview, South African Developer, 16th April 2016).

As a result of the development taking form through an injection of capital (rather than natural expansion) some of the infrastructural forms produced stark juxtapositions in form. A new perimeter fence, for example, had been erected a few metres from the front door of one house (Figure 17; PO, Modderfontein, 19th January 2016). On one side of the fence was Alexandra Township, on the other was the new multi-billion Rand investment. This raised issues about the alignment of the investment to the local operating environment. In reference to the changing environment, an Alexandra resident suggested that there ‘is no point having a hospital, a big one, and a large bridge, that does not uplift or improve a single life of the poorest citizens’ (Interview, Resident 2 Alexandra, 17th April 2016).

In another example, one resident from Alexandra pointed to a bank of earth that had slowly crept up, on the outskirts of the site, along the road between O.R. Tambo International Airport and the Central Business District (PC, Resident Alexandra, 25th January 2016). The resident suggested that the earth was being used as an informal barrier to shield the sight of the township – ‘to just take Alexandra off the map’ (PC, Resident Alexandra, 25th January 2016). He continued to protest: ‘They get the skyscrapers and we get the soil. They use the soil to create a border around us’ (*ibid.*). These comments highlighted the informal role of infrastructure in shaping vision, boundaries, and exclusions. As a result of lacking exclusivity or central planning, it was evident that the investment took form through material devices to protect the aesthetic value of the development and the sites beyond the investor’s control.



Figure 17: Photos of Site Visit with Township [Bottom], High-rise Construction [Middle], and peripheral boundary [Top]. (Source: Author).

The reliance of integrating other agents into shaping the development meant that the site did not take enclavic or exclusive form. It was important for consumers, businesses, and financiers to freely access the site (PC, COO Modderfontein, 21st April 2015). Clarifying the broad range of stakeholders supporting the investment, the Masterplanner explained:

‘...one of the major misconceptions the general public had, before our recent consultations, was that this was being built for some sort of Chinese village. I mean, this was absurd. It is 16,000 hectares. It is not going to be all one type of person. Yes, people from China will move there. Awesome. But so will people from England and people from Johannesburg. [...] It will be a large development and it will be for everyone’ (Interview, Masterplanner London, 16th December 2015).

Whilst it was not necessarily a site that excluded individuals, through fences and gates, the motivations to attract international communities and other actors meant that other structural forces shaped engagement, participation, and mobility: namely access to private capital.

Developing this point, the Alexandra resident complained that land allocation, to international investors, was unfair and driven by profit motivations. He suggested that the land, now owned by the investor, had previously been promised to the township residents by the ANC government. But now, he suggests: ‘They have put the land aside for some greedy people. [...] it is the age of fuck the people’ (Interview, Resident Alexander, 18th April 2016). It was suggested, by the same individual, that the clean (green) land had been prioritised for foreign companies or those able to pay for it. The value of the land was acknowledged by the Masterplanner who suggested that the Investor was in a lucky position to be able to develop one of Johannesburg’s ‘healthy lungs’ in respect to green space and clean air’ (Interview, Masterplanner London, 16th December 2015).

The contestation of land allocation raises important questions over land distribution within relations of capital. Whilst it was suggested that the site was ‘not disputed tribal land’ (Interview, South Africa Developer, 16th April 2016) and had been under foreign ownership (including the previous Irish chemical

works) for some time, this did not necessarily mean that the land could not have been returned, or reallocated, in respect to local needs. Writing on the role of maps and contemporary bureaucracy within the allocation of land rights, Beinart (2001, p.14) suggests that one of the issues stems from the fact that contemporary documents simply reflect the ‘new colonial social geography’ of South Africa. Attempts to address issues of land rights and ownership across South Africa are currently going through the courts. The process has been problematic and a bureaucratic ‘nightmare’ (Niselow, 2018, para. 10). Maps and documents of Johannesburg rarely show land ownership prior to colonisation and/or the era of apartheid. The investor in this case had missed an opportunity, as Butcher (2018) would suggest, for a progressive planner to re-stitch the apartheid city together.

Stemming from the need for the investor to appeal to other stakeholders, and as the development was in its planning stages, it was also evident that further strategies were employed to communicate the investor’s vision. This took the form of visual imagery and a series of ‘artistic impressions’ to curate an aesthetic narrative around the proposed development (Figure 18). These images were used in corporate brochures, on the developer’s website, in press releases, and within international media coverage of the development (see AfricaPropertyNews 2017; Heartland 2015; SABC 2015; SAPA 2015). The images were part of a process which the Masterplanner suggested were designed ‘to tell a story’ and that ‘telling a story is about selling a vision’ (Interview, Masterplanner London, 16th December 2015).

There are several issues that could be raised in regard to this form of spatial representation, and the investor’s images in particular. As the development was in its planning stages, the images demonstrated a level of insubstantialisation. The images gave little or no attention to prior landscapes and became removed from material realities at the site. These representations could be aligned, in a historical sense, within an desire by the investor to ‘to possess a unified surface over which the superb eye of power can wander without encountering any inequality which hurts or limits its view’ (Scott, 1998, p.30). Furthermore, no two images were the same.

The creativity, and detachment, of the visual representation of the investment was recognised by the Masterplanner who suggested that ‘Sky’s the limit’ in terms of possibilities (Interview, Masterplanner London, 16th December 2015). This narrative filtered through onto the front of corporate literature by suggesting: ‘Dreams are the Seeds of Reality’ (Zendai, no date, p. 1). The new city was also described as the ‘African city of the future’ (Interview, Masterplanner London, 16th December 2015) with similar emotive, and unsubstantiated, effect. This adds a temporal dimension to the production of space by directing the viewer to how a future Africa should, and could, look.



Figure 18: Artistic impressions of the ‘New City’ development (Left: Zendai n.d.; Top and bottom right: Heartland 2015).

The images also appeal, emotively, by suggesting what the city could have in respect to what it presently does not have. In line with Spurr’s (1993, p.28) writing on historical spatial discourse, such emotive appeals may transfer ‘the locus of desire onto the colonized object itself. It [appropriates] territory, while it also appropriates the means by which such acts of appropriation are to be understood’. The language employed, regarding the future changes, could be aligned to a move,

within development discourse, to ‘needs-based iconography’ (Chouliaraki, 2013, p. 5) to present a more positive and personal appeal to stakeholders.

Commenting on the creativity of the planning process, the Masterplanner suggested that, whilst her job ‘paid the bills’, it was its creativity that motivated her (Interview, Masterplanner London, 16th December 2015). She continued: ‘it is an urban designer’s dream. We are not working far away in the middle of nowhere, we are in the middle of the city, on an existing high-speed rail line, with permission for a new station. [...] This is an exciting project to work on’ (*ibid.*). This statement raises numerous questions regarding the experimental nature of the development, the alignment to host needs, and the priorities on which the plans were created.

When questioned on consultation and community participation in producing the designs, the Masterplanner suggested that the independence of the investor (from the South African and Chinese States) meant the developer could recruit a third party consultant to incorporate a greater diversity of voices (Interview, Masterplanner London, 16th December 2015). The Masterplanner explained:

‘...sure, it looks like we could do it all ourselves, and technically we could, but why, if you can actually work with partners, in country, that already know how to do all the differing stuff in the context of South Africa. [...] We had environmentalists from the city of Johannesburg sitting next to the transport experts. [...] It was always about “this is how we look at it” and “this is the way I look at it” and “how do we mesh these up”?’ (*ibid.*).

The Masterplanner suggested she was able to work with people who had 17 years of experience of working in South Africa and introduced local architects, builders, and businesses to the project. Public accounts of the consultations suggested:

‘Attendees were taken through the masterplan and the guiding principles and included presentations on the details of the framework, project scope and a preliminary roll-out schedule. The sessions also offered the community from the surrounding areas an opportunity to meet [the Investor and Masterplanner]’ (EProp, 2015, para. 2).

The consultation process was evidently more thorough than in any of the previous cases.

However, the role of these consultations, and those that participated within them, were also questioned. One resident suggested that there had been little consultation and the meetings were simply designed to inform the community of the proposed development (PC, Resident 3 Alexandra, 17th April 2016). It could also be suggested that those individuals that did participate were those with a vested interest. When questioned about this, South Africa's Department of International Relations and Cooperation indicated that consultations with the immediate community was not necessarily required: 'unless it is community ground, then it would not be, in the first instance, a party that would have to be consulted' (Director, DIRCO, 27th January 2016).

Issues of empowerment and participation were highlighted in other circumstances. As the Investor had no contractual relationship with the South African government, with no concessions, it was evident that the Investor was less willing to adapt to meet conditions of the local operating environment. The view was taken, by the COO, that it was up to communities to adapt and participate. Providing one example, the COO suggested that the local communities were unwilling to learn the Chinese language to accrue benefits from the investment (Interview, COO Modderfontein, 21st April 2015). He compared South Africa's own development to China's and suggested:

'...the reason why the South African economy has not developed or picked up is because of the South African people. They do not want to change themselves. Our Chinese organisation has come here and local people are not willing to learn Mandarin to communicate with us. [...] As you know, for our opening up policy in China, so many Chinese learnt English to work for international companies. But now we come to South Africa, for South Africans, and they do not want to learn Mandarin positively' (Interview, COO Modderfontein, 21st April 2015).

Within a written commentary on the increased pressures to learn the Chinese language it was argued:

‘British missionaries wanted to convert Africa’s indigenous “heathens” to Christianity; to create little English people on the continent through the medium of English. Next came the Afrikaners, descended from the Dutch. Their slaves created a “kitchen” language out of Dutch and called it Afrikaans. White Afrikaners appropriate it as their own and it became the language of apartheid. Now there is a new potential coloniser on SA’s linguistic block’ (Kaschula *et al.*, 2015, para. 3).

The commentator drew parallels with colonial apparatus and this view highlighted a level of *debasement* as local languages, skills, and practices were de-valued in relation to the Investor’s own identity and value systems. This evidence echoed that of Hart’s (2002, p.166) evidence on Taiwanese factory owners, in South Africa, who would comment on worker’s ‘low productively’, ‘laziness’, and ‘low levels of education’.

The investor’s outward projections to Chinese citizens, and other international actors, were evident in many documents where there was an increased use of the Chinese language in promotional materials (Figure 15 and 18). This evidence aligned with the COOs plan to actively encourage Chinese businesses and citizens to move to the new city in areas, designated on maps, for ‘International Residential Communities’ (PC, COO Modderfontein, 21st April 2015). Chinese citizens in South Africa often prefer to live and work together in order to exchange knowledge on local investments, share market information, and make use of existing trade contracts (Song 2011).

The lack of direct, or obligatory, engagement with all sectors of the host environment had implications for resistance and accountability. It was suggested that, as an alternative form of engagement, individuals now used social media to protest against changes. It was suggested: ‘we now reach our objectives through social media because Facebook is the new political arena for South African politics. It began during the World Cup, for issues regarding construction, and it continues today’ (PC, Resident 3 Alexandra, 17th April 2016). Union organisation is also changing to meet the spatial matrices of international investors with increased cross-border union action and co-ordinated action with unions from all

other BRICS members (Interview, Director Construction union, 20th January 2016; Document, Declaration of the Second BRICS Trade Union Forum, 25th March 2010, para 19). The next union meeting would take place in Morocco.

Various stakeholders, as a result of the investor's independence, also sought to engage or participate in other ways. The South African property developer, previously cited, had purchased land on the outskirts of the investment. He explained:

‘What we have done with our frustration with not being able to do business with the [Chinese], is that we have now purchased properties on the outskirts of what they have done. Trapping them in. We know what is coming and we want to be part of it. You have to get creative...or left out’ (Interview, South Africa Developer, 16th April 2016).

In another example, two young boys from Alexandra, who identified themselves as ‘entrepreneurs’, were now sustaining a living, and employing six others, by giving tours of the Township to an increasing number of Chinese customers (PC, Resident 3 Alexandra, 17th April 2016).

There was also one individual who put on music events as a sound technician, within the township (Figure 19). He suggested his activities were supported by Chinese cash and cheap equipment: ‘They come at you with a case full of cash [...] I don’t have a relationship with China myself, but look, I buy a lot of Chinese things. A lot of the appliances that are here will be from China’ (PC, Resident 4 Alexandra, 18th April 2016). These opportunities for engagement were seemingly in line with expectations of the Investor who, when asked what his measure of success would be, he said he hoped communities would ‘use the environment to their own advantage [and] create their own career. That is what I see as success’ (Interview, COO Modderfontein, 21st April 2015).



Figure 19: An Alexandra Entrepreneur (Source: Author).

One resident did, however, recognise the problematic cycle of ‘earning money simply to spend it back in Chinese malls and shops’ (PC, Resident 3 Alexandra, 17th April 2016). He continued: ‘We are given money, to spend money, to remain poor’ (*ibid.*). The role of individual engagement supporting the developer was also recognised by the South African government who suggested that ‘the consumer will determine issues at the end of the day’ (Interview, Director DIRCO, 27th January 2016). This adds to the notion that private capital interests will lead to the support of a system, even one that may exploit certain communities.

These type of engagements and spill-overs were facilitated through the form the investment took – being open and non-exclusive – and therefore it could be suggested offered greater opportunities for horizontal spill-overs. These relations could also be deemed beneficial as they de-link labour-production relationships and dependencies, evident in previous cases, which required bespoke training and particular knowledge forms. This is positive, as Ferguson (see Ferguson 2015) would suggest, to meeting the challenges associated with the oversupply of labour in the global South.

Reflecting on the de-linking of labour, an Alexandra resident suggested his preference for this type of relationship. He argued that for many years people spent time in camps, hostels, or state managed residences. The ownership of land,

property, and free employment brought a sense of freedom: ‘If you live in your own house, it is not easy to be controlled. If you live in my house, then I can tell you what to do’ (PC, Resident 2 Alexandra, 17th April, 2016).

7.3 Private Enterprise and SSC

This final case has centred on the production of space and place in relation to a private Chinese developer who planned to construct a ‘new city’ development within a suburb of Johannesburg. The case held two primary differences from the previous cases: firstly, the investment was being undertaken remote of both the South African and Chinese state; secondly, the investment was within its planning stages. The multi-billion Rand investment was contextualised by its location between Sandton (one of Johannesburg wealthiest suburbs) and the Township of Alexandra (one of its poorest). As with the previous two cases, the structural context shaped the various space- and place- making strategies employed by the investor.

In continuity with the previous cases, a range of common strategies were identified. These include strategies to survey the land, to translate various elements of the operating environment to aid local, national, and international comparison, to map and represent of land use, and to employ built infrastructure to shape priorities, mobilities, and exclusions. The production of space and place in this case also continued the role of imaginative strategies – including the use of aestheticisation, insubstantialisation, and idealisation – to incorporate local actors as a result of the investment being detached from state protections and securities.

The increased number of actors and their contributions to the production of space and place was a further nuance identified in this case. In contrast to the three primary actors in the first investment (*i.e.* the Development Corporation, the Automotive Executive, and the Chinese Embassy) the production of space and place in this case was shaped by a broad range of actors. These actors included Executives from the Developer’s head office, an international design consultant, South African property developers, regional bodies (including road and utility agencies), and subsidiary businesses.

The increased role for multiple actors was evident by both the broad range of interview data but also by the varied actors authorising planning documents and corporate texts. The investment gained spatial form, therefore, through the layering of texts and images and the building of independent infrastructures. It could therefore be suggested that the production of space and place was achieved through a network of independent actors and practices. This was in direct contrast to the top-down and centrally facilitated IDZ. It was also evident that, in the absence of State actors, the control and maintenance of space was shaped through the independent infrastructures: from roads, to high-speed rail lines, to earth embankments. This maintenance of space may represent a discreet form of governmentality (in a Foucauldian sense) through the use of planning, markets, and external agencies (Foucault, 1991; Cox, 1998; Ong, 2000; Agnew, 2009; Holden, 2017).

The differing mode of governance in this case, here, supported the previously raised suggestion that the facilitation of FDI was supported through what is known of graduated sovereignty and spatial selectivity. Space, in this case, was governed by a greater degree of liberalisation in contrast to the previous two cases. It is possible to suggest, therefore, that, across the three sites, there has been a transition from state sovereignty to corporate sovereignty (Butcher, 2018, p. 1). It was evident that, without State oversight, control over spatial planning would be taken up by other agents.

The changing governance of space altered how hosts (in their varying forms) were able to participate, resist, and hold the investor to account. As was suggested by the South African government's Department for International Relations and Cooperation, it is increasingly difficult for the South African government to coordinate development across local, regional, and national levels due to the increased role of private interest development. The findings in this case therefore represents empirical evidence to support the notion (see Hart, 2002) that local sites are increasingly playing an important role in shaping regional and national development.

Towards situating this investment within the narrative of SSC. Firstly, whilst it was evident that the investment and its spatial form came to fruition through a network of actors (both South African and Chinese), all actors were driven by demands of market value and expectation. This was evident by the role of comparative and competitive representations: comparisons of adjacent communities or other global cities. Furthermore, the knowledge informing the production of space (stemming from the design consultant) was shaped not by local context or natural growth but by the circulation of transnational capital, expertise, architecture, culture, and industries – this supports ideas within comparative urbanism that cities are increasingly not necessarily shaped via natural growth and expansion (Dear, 2005; Nijman, 2007; McFarlane and Robinson, 2012).

As a result of the comparative production of space and place this raised concerns over the alignment of the project to host needs and capacities. Engagement with the Investor, and the ability to independently benefit from spill-overs, came with the expectation that the host community should adapt (including the learning of the Chinese language) to take advantage of available opportunities. These expectations, by the investor, can be linked directly to the lack of direct obligation or commitment to a host community. This evaluation also raises important questions regarding empowerment and intersectionality. The investment, for example, met the needs of capital owning classes, Chinese residential communities in Johannesburg, and South African developers. It did not, however, address local needs and priorities such as the overcrowding in the Township of Alexandra, or the provision of low-skilled jobs.

Furthermore, with the absence of a central South African intuition there were issues of responsibility and accountability. There were no direct or guaranteed spill-overs. It was also suggested, by the South African government, that if land was private then there is no reason to consult with the immediate community in the first instance. This emphasised the role of private interests in shaping participation and engagement. One of the reasons given for the potential success of the new development was the oversight generated from funding large scale studies. This knowledge was private, held for competitive advantage, and not

freely exchanged with wider communities. Furthermore, inclusion and participation was guided by finance and those with vested interests.

With a contested level of consultation, it also meant that that communities had to find alternative ways to engage and/or resist changes, including, the use of social media and cross-border union organisation.

There was, however, positives that may be identified with regards to how this investment met principles of SSC. The independence of the investor meant that it had to operate under the same conditions and circumstances as local and native industries. The investor did not hold concessions or receive favourable treatment. This was in direct contrast to State managed sites where concessions were offered and investors were given a competitive advantage. It could also be suggested that South African communities were given support (over and above the investor) through the government issuing of land rights and grants. A further positive was the breaking of the direct relationship between labour and production. Township residents were, for example, using their own ingenuity to engage with the investor on their own terms. However, this would be an example of the State making accommodations to what could be seen as an exploitative system (see Chibber 2013) rather than challenging issues of power, privilege, and inequality. It should be asked whether it was a *need* to engage, rather than, a *want* to engage. As Rodney (2012, pp.222–223) wrote in relation to dependency and decision making, ‘those were simply responses (albeit vigorous ones) to the options laid open’.

Against these findings, this case has continued to develop a narrative around the nuanced production of space and place in the context of FDI, how differing structural relationships altered the strategies employed, and the nature in which various actors engaged.

7.4 Summary

This chapter has explored the production of space and place in the context of a private Chinese investor that planned to develop a ‘new city’ within a suburb of Johannesburg. This final case represented an investment remote of both South African and Chinese state institutions and agencies. The case therefore completes

a study that has considered the broad spectrum of Chinese investment partnerships in South Africa.

The case has continued the identification of common strategies employed to shape the operating environment, including, strategies to survey the land, the production of maps to reimagine space and communicate change, and the aestheticisation of investments in order to appeal to other actors to support the development. This final aspect was particularly important in this case where the investor relied on the support of other independent stakeholders. In this regard, the case brought forward two key differences: the role of imagery and aesthetic visualisations, and secondly, the incorporation of a broader range of actors to facilitate spatial change. Both of these differences can be linked to the structural relationship between the host and investor, and the planning stage at which this investment was at.

As a result of this differing relationship between the host and investor the case also raises important nuances with regard to how the investment can be located within the narrative, and principles of, SSC. Whilst decision making and the spatial form that the investment took continued to be shaped by comparative and competitive differentialisation, and whilst participation was shaped by personal privilege and private interest, it was also evident, however, that the structural relations allowed other forms of resistance, broke the dependent link (to an extent) between labour and production, and offered a degree of free choice to wider communities.

As a result of the nuances found across all three cases, careful reflection is needed on the balance between centralised control and directed spill-overs, versus, greater private freedoms but less developmental guarantees and securities.

8.0 Discussion

The previous chapters brought forward empirical evidence to identify how space and place was produced in the context of three differing Chinese investments in South Africa. Interviews were conducted with key stakeholders, observations were undertaken at sites of investment, and policy documents, corporate literature, and commentaries were studied. Through interrogating the way in which space and place became known, the actors involved, and their priorities and motivations, it has been possible to assess both the imagined and material form that investments took, and the implications for host communities at myriad levels.

It was evident that the production of space and place was complex and, at times, a negotiated practice between host and investors (with their varying and multiple identities). Whilst investors employed a variety of strategies to gain operating rights, access to resources, and concessions, hosts sought to attract investors through offering incentives, shaping the built environment, and supporting labour provisions. Space and place was therefore produced by a range of actors (from government representatives, traditional monarchs, international design consultants, and private individuals) and in several geographical contexts (from traditional villages to metropolitan cities). The findings provide empirical evidence of the diverse and pragmatic engagements Chinese investors are making in South Africa, in what Wang (2007) sees as, the evolving trade and capital flows between China and Africa.

This chapter seeks to understand and explain the nuances involved in the production of space and place across the three cases. As outlined in the methodology to this study, the nature of a multi-sited approach means that, only when investments are considered in relation to each other, can a substantive and rigorous response be made to the research questions. The following discussion seeks to draw a thread through the three cases to identify similarities and differences and locate findings within broader political, economic, and geographic theory.

8.1 Common Strategies, Differing Contexts

It was evident that across the three investments a range of common space and place making strategies were employed to bring investments to fruition, and support potential developmental spill-overs. Strategies included the surveillance and objectification of the operating environment, the authorisation of spatial change, the naturalisation of investments and production practices, use of performance and representation to communicate change and appeal to decision makers, the use of comparison to draw out competitive difference or spatial connectivity, and the role of debasement and affirmation to de-value existing environments and processes in order to authorise a prescribed way forward. Together these strategies operated together to facilitate the preconditions for the movement of capital and secure the long term interests of the investor: accessing land, securing labour, and promoting the efficient exchange of capital and resources (see Hall 2017; Hess 2004; OECD 2002).

However, whilst there were common and recurring strategies employed across the three investments, it could be suggested that these were employed in differing shades, at differing times, within differing contexts. The strategies took different emphasis, for example, in contexts where there were no formal contractual relationship with a host community, in economically remote environments, or when investments were in their planning stages. It is suggested, therefore, that these nuances can be aligned to three differing, albeit interdependent, contexts: environmental, structural, and temporal. These contexts refer to the locational situation in which investments took place, the structural relationship between the host and investor, and the stage in which the investment was at (*e.g.* planning, implementation, or operational).

These nuances support the notion, offered by Cerny (1998, p.41), that the globalisation of capital – its geographical expansion across territories – cannot necessarily be characterised by increased homogeneity, but, by a complexity which operates ‘along a variety of levels and dimensions – in a complex process of divergence and convergence’. Understanding these nuances are important towards contributing further understanding around the link between space, place, and capital. Each context will be discussed in turn.

8.1.1 Environmental

One of the first observations centres on the suggestion that the degree to which differing space- and place- making strategies were employed depended upon the environmental and locational contexts in which they were situated. A correlation could be drawn, for example, between areas remote of economic centres (*e.g.* remote of cities) and the use of top-down spatial planning and material intervention in a community or landscape. In contrast, in urban areas where there were existing infrastructures, subsidiary businesses, and consumers, there was an increased role of imaginative strategies to appeal to other actors and centres of power to support and facilitate spatial change.

At the site of the automotive factory and the IDZ, for example, in which Port Elizabeth was described as the last outpost of South Africa, it was evident that there was a greater emphasis on centralised planning and the use of infrastructure (ports, roads, and factories) to develop a bespoke operating environment to attract investment and satisfy the requirements of the investor. This context required the re-organisation of land, the assigning of new divisions of labour, the construction of critical infrastructure to offer a secure environment connected to international supply chains, boundary making to support the administration of differing fiscal rules, and the direct provision of training, aligned to investor's requests, to provide and offer a skilled and long-term labour supply. The spatial strategies employed in this context most explicitly offered empirical insights into Escobar's (2010, p.147) critique of development where social change did not come about naturally, but was engineered through vast material operations.

Conversely, in the urban contexts, or where there were existing material assets (such as natural resources), the necessary production of space and place centred on shaping representations and perceptions of the investment. It was less important to alter the physical environment, but it was necessary to appeal to other actors and agencies to accept the new development and participate in bringing it to fruition. This was achieved through strategies of performance, representation, aestheticisation, and insubstantialisation. These strategies were employed to locate

investments into the existing production and exchange networks (via maps) and also, in cases such as the new city, to appeal to host communities (residents, developers, subsidiary businesses, and decision makers) to support the investment. This was achieved, for example, through promoting and representing the investment within wider transport networks or through comparatively representing other sites and locations in a negative light.

It was evident, when placed in relation, that the differing strategies (the degree to which material or imaginative transformations were necessary) were shaped by the need to offer spaces of competitive and/or comparative difference. In economically isolated environments, it was necessary for the State to produce spaces that offered similar (or better) operating environments than elsewhere in South Africa, or internationally. In the case of the automotive factory, this meant developing an enclavic environment, offering exclusive regulative and administrative incentives, and providing bespoke training programmes. This often meant producing a space that was juxtaposed against the local operating environment.

In contrast, in the case of the new city development, rather than the need to create space to offer bespoke conditions, strategies were employed to demonstrate how the investment integrated into the local environment and would benefit existing communities and businesses. This included representing the site in the context of transport links, proximity to business districts, and marketing the investment, visually, as a unique investment opportunity. These differing strategies, across the environmental contexts, gave form to Gregory's (1994) understanding that geographical imaginaries can fold distance and difference through making spaces and places relatable and relational.

In both contexts, the production of space and place was enacted to locate investment within international capital markets and production networks. The differing strategies can be explained through reference to the notion of *spatial selectivity* (see Jones 1997) as the South African state sought to facilitate strategically 'fragmented and differentiated' (Brenner & Elden 2009, p.33; see

also Cox 1998) growth nodes. These growth nodes were informed by the requirements of international capital and not a State's territorial circumstance.

In the context of South Africa, the differing environmental considerations were shaped by the need to offer greater developmental intervention in certain locations, to distribute development opportunities from FDI, and the need to offer more liberalised governance regimes in others. These differing contexts shape the nature of spill-overs (vertical or horizontal) as certain parts of South African society (individuals, businesses, industries) became more directly integrated into the national and international economy than others. These nuances, with regard to intervention and liberalisation, highlight the challenge, raised by Thomas (2000), of defining development in a liberal capitalist world. In South Africa, development from FDI was shaped by varied forms of both immanent and intentional development.

The suggestion that the production of space and place, in the context of FDI, was placed in a structural relationship with capital, and was not shaped by independent local, natural growth, also links FDI to wider urban theory where space and place is shaped by the injection and circulation of international capital – rather than natural growth pattern (Dear, 2005; Nijman, 2007; McFarlane and Robinson, 2012). This theoretical view is important (discussed later) for interpreting the role and participation of local actors (communities, businesses, and governments) in shaping local operating environments. The study, here, supports the view that local spaces and places cannot be understood without locating them within wider political and economic processes (see Lefebvre, 2009c).

In relation to wider literature on globalisation, and the production of space and place (Elden, 2010; Butcher, 2018; Rincón and Fernandes, 2018), it was evident through the environmental considerations that the globalisation of capital, through FDI, did not lead to de-territorialisation but, rather, FDI re-territorialised space along new lines, scales, and priorities. Findings also support those who recognised the embeddedness of finance, trade and investment in space and place (see Amin 2002; Elden 2005; Hall 2011; Hall 2017; Granovetter 1985). This study develops this understanding, however, through acknowledging how differing environmental

contexts shape the spatial form that trade and investment takes and implications upon differing host communities.

FDI may require, for example, rural areas to undergo a greater degree of change (with regards to identity, knowledge, mobility, and increased dependency) to accrue developmental spill-overs and exchanges. Rural and remote contexts, dependent on a dominant mode of production, were also shaped by increased vertical spill-overs through prioritising existing supply chains. In metropolitan areas there was less degree of change and FDI supported improved horizontal spill-overs. The findings therefore highlight the importance of geography in order to interpret how development occurs through FDI and its form.

Finally, it was found that environmental context also shaped issues of resistance and organisation. The physical shaping of the environment disrupted community organisation. Furthermore, the investments in remote areas involved a direct dependency upon the investor. This gave communities few alternative options to challenge the investor. In urban cases, however, there were no direct dependencies and facilitated the breaking of labour-production relations to allow alternative and freer engagements (albeit within the interest of capital relations). It also meant that, because of this, resistance had to take alternative form such as online social media. These environmental nuances cannot therefore be removed from differences with regard to governmentality and the structural relationship between investors and hosts which effected participation, decision making, and spill-overs.

8.1.2 Structural

A second observation that could be identified, developing from the previous discussion on environmental context, relates to the link between the structural relationship (between the host and investor) and the production of space and place. Differences emerged, for example, between contexts where there was a direct contractual relationship, between a host and investor, and where the investment centred on private enterprise. These differences were shaped by whether the investor had been offered securities, concessions, and infrastructure provisions, versus those that had to seek the support of various agencies and stakeholders to

bring the investment to fruition and/or work to retain operating rights within a community. These nuances centre upon the range of actors (and texts) and the level of participation/engagement within the co-production of space and place: from the singularity of decision makers in the first case, to the multiple and diverse actors in the latter case.

In the case of the SOE in the IDZ, it was evident that the production of space and place was top-down and achieved via centralised planning. This was produced between three primary actors: the Development Corporation, Executives from the SOE, and the Chinese Embassy. As the South African host sought to attract investment to a (economically) remote area, the host took a direct role in shaping the operating environment through the setting of boundaries and the regulatory environment, the funding of infrastructure, and the provision of training. Resembling Scott's (1998) interpretation, within *Seeing Like a State*, the first case employed a hierarchical top-down production of space and place using mapping, large scale infrastructure, and the direct provision of labour. In these processes, there was little consultation or ability to directly resist changes. This also meant that priorities were centred on State needs (manufacturing industries) rather than local skill-sets and existing capacities.

In the case of the new city development in Johannesburg, however, where there was no contractual relationship with a host community or partners, evidence could suggest that the production of space and place included the participation of multiple and differing actors in a horizontal networked relationships. This stemmed from the requirement of the investor to bring in local decision makers to support the investment and bring it to fruition (where there were no State guarantees, concessions, or securities). This dynamic was evidenced through the spaces in which investors extended their influence: in community meetings, consultations, independent planning documents, international design consultants, and amongst other developers and businesses. Investment in these contexts needed cooperation and appeals to broader stakeholders. This was achieved through an increased role of aestheticisation, representation, and performance in the form of illustrations, brochures, and consultations.

It was also evident that where an Investment was not support by a government (either South African or Chinese) then the investor funded the necessary infrastructure. A consequence of this, however, was that this meant the investor was free to develop that infrastructure (and take planning decisions) within their own vision and against their own priorities. The use of differing agents also meant that, without central oversight, there were concerns of responsibility and accountability as it become divested through complex networks (see Atkins et al. 2006). Furthermore, in cases that were not supported by the South African state, knowledge production became commercialise, privatised, and not freely exchange for reasons of competition and corporate privacy. This had implications for voice, agency, participation, accountability, and the authorisation of environmental change became an abstract and commercialised process.

The nuances, with regard participation, highlighted the complex and diverse range of actors that are engaged within the shaping of FDI, and those seeking to managing and distribute developmental opportunities: from the South African State through the Development Corporation, the King and his Uncles within the Traditional Council, and private agencies and individuals in the metropolitan context. This evidence, as previously suggested, supported further the idea of *graduated sovereignty* (Ong, 2000; Holden, 2017). The success of FDI relied on a range of differing and overlapping governance regimes, within South Africa's territorial space, to bring about change and accrue developmental spill-overs: a balance from offering institutional oversight, to simply supporting the functioning of investments *through* society (see Mann 1984; Ong 2000).

The range of differentiated actors in the production of space and place to support FDI gives form to the notion, by Ferguson and Gupta (2002; see also Lefebvre 2009e), that the roll-back of the State will lead to leadership being picked up by other actors and agents: the State is not a singular entity with the absolute power to produce space and place. Across this study, this role has been undertaken by planners, surveyors, research consultants, geologist, international design consultants, artists, and illustrators.

These nuances are important when reflecting of the position of FDI in the narrative of SSC. The differences highlight the problem of balancing, on the one hand, the direct, centralised, top-down, material production of space and place which offers direct benefits, increased accountability, monitoring, and training, yet juxtaposed against existing host capacities; versus, networked partnerships, less enclavic and exclusive infrastructure, and a break in dependent relations, yet, without support, securities, accountability, guarantees, and direct distribution of developmental opportunities. These findings offer empirical evidence with regard to the dialectical balance between freedom and control. This is the same dichotomous issue that faces politics of the *Left* and *Right* (see Lefebvre 2009d; Morvaridi & Hughes 2018). Whilst the State may be represented as emancipatory, for example, it does at the same time withdraw other rights of participation.

What was evident, however, is that, regardless of structural relationship, the production of space and place was shaped by priorities and conditions required to support the movement of capital. These structural nuances further add to previous discussions around how the State and local actors play ‘a key role in the management and maintenance of capitalist growth (Brenner & Elden 2009, p.19; see also Butcher 2018; Lefebvre 1991; Scott 1998). This raises questions of vision and visuality that this study has worked to reveal. Whilst spatial change may be undertaken by the South African state or a local actor, this may hide the role their actions and decisions play in support, possibly, of oppressive systems and processes. This view is in line with Zanotti (2013, p.288), who recognises that ‘practices which “governance” frameworks portray as “democratic” and benevolent may be part of oppressive modalities of power’.

An understanding of the role South Africa’s own actors play in shaping space and place is important in contribution to wider public debate: particularly against claims of China’s neo-colonial activities and/or a new scramble for Africa. The evident negotiations and co-productions are in line with others who have studied, for example, the colonial encounter, to demonstrate how relations are often negotiated, enacted in the spirit of friendship, and mutually re-enforcing (Cheru & Modi 2013; Clayton 2000; Smith 2010).

8.1.3 Temporal

A final observation relates to way in which the production of space and place changed over the lifecycle of an investment. It is important to note, however, that whilst the three cases represented investments at differing stages (*e.g.* planning, implementation, and operational), it is not possible to attribute different and unique strategies to explicit cases. It is possible, however, to use data across all three cases to illustrate how differing strategies were employed during differing stages. Observations, regarding temporality, recognised that investment can effect space and place differently ‘at different stages of [a] projects expansion’ (Wang, 2013, p. 142).

Firstly, during planning stages it was evident that surveillance strategies were employed to account for the host operating environment and assess risks, opportunities, costs, and requirements for investments. These assessments were primarily undertaken by agents of the investor. A key concern, across all three investments, was that the operating environment, following assessments, was represented and translated into a positivist and technical data forms. Initial assessments were therefore the product of experts and the audience for outputs were other investors, subsidiary business, and government institutions (both South African and Chinese).

These assessments and translation strategies were necessary in order to align data to internationally comparable standards, benchmarks, and knowledge systems. It was evident that the assessments sought to simplify and make legible an operating environment that many investors saw as complex and challenging. This evidence highlights, within the use of FDI for development, the continued recognition of a universal and singular knowledge system. This evidence continues the long held link between knowledge, power, and privilege. The combined role of data collection, and resulting translations, represented a processes of authorisation as the investor sought to represent a superior knowledge over how best to transform the environment.

A key observation, particularly in the final two cases, was that the production of knowledge was shaped by private interest and its commercial value. The role of the International Design consultant to provide oversight of the investment environment, and the employment of research companies in the mining community, were both examples of this. The holding of knowledge, within the planning stages, was often used as a tool of leverage to gain rights, concessions, and to shape infrastructural development. As a result of its commercial value, and technical translation, data was not freely accessible to host communities and this led to issues of accountability, risk, and the mutual exchange of knowledge. This was particularly problematic when host communities, themselves, became assets to be negotiated over (Massey, 2013; Brown, 2015).

The lack of transparency was particularly problematic in cases, such as the Development Corporation or Mining Community, where the hosts had agreed to fund development or where communities had exchanged land for non-tangible assets. The faith communities placed in investors was similar to those within historical colonial and trading encounters where negotiations were dependent upon good faith and a spirit of friendship (Cheru 2009; Cheru & Modi 2013; Clayton 2000; Smith 2010).

It was evident, therefore, that investment and the resulting ability to accrue developmental opportunities was based upon careful calculation and a dependency upon extraterritorial circumstance (values). The translation of communities and assets also meant that ongoing changes were dependent upon fluctuating resource and land prices. With little opportunity to monitor processes, this led to a level of risk and insecurity on the behalf of the host.

Secondly, during the implementation stage, the investor would employ representations of space and place to communicate spatial change and bring other stakeholders on board. This was done in a variety of ways, dependent upon on the structural relationship between the host and the investor: from maps, to meetings, to projections. Within these representations, the investor, or host (in the case of the South African government), sought to articulate a pathway from present to the

future needs of the investor. This included spatial plans, alternative employment values, and strategies to bring in decision makers.

Projections of asset values, in the form of graphs, charts, and diagrams were one important way in which this was achieved. Projections were problematic as they represented a level of control, encompassment of change, and bound stakeholders into a common trajectory across the lifetime of the investment (Toscano and Kinkle, 2015). Projections were also used as a tool of decision making. This included decisions to re-orient community assets towards the primary mode of production. Literature on the spectre of capital, and capital's ability to bring in a range of stakeholders, is of key interest here (Chibber, 2013; Toscano and Kinkle, 2015). De Vries (2007, p.30) suggests that this desire is found between the promise of development and the actual realisation, 'thus giving body to a desiring machine that also operates in between the generation and banalisation of hope'. Projections also added risk and insecurity for host communities, and often resulted in a structural deficit between realities and host expectations.

The production of maps were also a key tool of spatial representation during the implementations stage. Maps set out how to create spatial change and worked to reorganise land, introduce new mobilities, and the setting of boundaries. A concern with the production of maps was that they often resulted in the erasure of existing environment, represented colonial geographies, and simplified complex community system (including disrupting resistance and organisation when plans inevitably took material form on the ground). Whilst the production of maps varied, from centralised plans, to production of space through a network of actors, the production of maps had a similar effect of prioritising certain aspects of the host environment and the exclusion of certain cross sections of the host community.

Finally, during the operating period of investment, the strategies employed focused on retaining and negotiating ongoing operating rights within host communities. This took the form of performance and the representation of activities and positive values stemming from the investment. These representations and performances, however, were not necessary transparent or

participatory. Through motivations to promote the good stemming from an investment, representations and engagements tended to be selective and unsubstantiated. These strategies were also employed to bridge a gap between structural realities – the primacy of capital accumulation – and developmental expectations of the host communities.

It was therefore evident that the production of space and place was fluid, nuanced, and adaptive to the temporal circumstance of the investor at differing periods throughout the investment.

8.2 FDI and SSC

By identifying the structural relationship between the production of space and place, in differing contexts, it is possible to locate agency (both human and structural) and suggest how realities may challenge the position of FDI within SSC. It was evident, for example, that whilst South African actors (in their myriad forms) played an active part negotiating, producing, and resisting spatial change, motivations, priorities, ways of knowing, and decision making were primarily shaped (directly or indirectly) by wider international political and economic systems. This argument can be evidenced through several key processes undertaken to bring investments to fruition, including: the translation of human and environmental assets into internationally comparable data forms; the setting of infrastructure and the alignment of bureaucratic regimes to international trade, production, and consumer networks; the creation of new divisions of labour in line with international labour markets; the mapping of space to represent the relational context of investments to global economic centres and production networks; and the employment of aesthetic representations to appeal to international markets. The pinning of space- and place- making to extraterritorial forces, therefore, had implications for the ability of South African host communities (at local, regional, and national levels) to participate in the shaping of their own community and environmental transformations.

One of the first considerations, for example, was whether hosts (with their multiple, complex, and parallel identities) were in a position to exercise leadership

over community and environmental development in line with their own values and priorities. Whilst hosts, generally, were able to play an active role in shaping sites of investment, it was evident that decision making and priorities were shaped by international measures, benchmarks, and knowledge systems. This was demonstrated, for example, through the translation of land into more productive categories (from agriculture to resource mining), the pinning of development to share values, and the shaping of built and regulatory environments within the need to offer competitive and comparative production values.

Whether these comparative aspects were set against the immediate operating environment (in the case of the IDZ) or against international markets (in the case of the 'new city'), the priorities, values, and possibilities for development were located within the context of wider international political economy. Local values and priorities could therefore be located within a subordinate position to international capital regimes. By highlighting the role of global networks in the shaping of space and place in South African investment environment, the evidence has given empirical form to the view that you cannot make sense of local change without looking beyond the 'false summit' of local decision making (Gregory 1994, p.122). The evidence of the South African States' role in shaping these alignments, in the case of the IDZ, demonstrated how the State can itself be worked and reworked by those external to, and above, it (Holden, 2017).

The pegging of space and place to international values and priorities added a level of dependency. This dependency not only shaped the success of investments, but also the ability to accrue development opportunities. Importantly, it was evident that these two elements (investment vs. development) were placed in a hierarchical positioning. The ability for the investor to produce surplus value preceded the ability for hosts to accrue developmental spill-overs and linkages. This concern was a particularly pertinent issue in cases, such as the IDZ and the Community Share-holding, where the host had swapped material assets, or State finances, to facilitate an investor's needs. Host communities were, as a result, exposed to risk and income insecurity. These concerns could be evidenced through community protests, and unfulfilled promises, which had to be addressed through CSR

agendas and the, unsubstantiated, representation of value and public good investors were bringing to various communities.

The dependency of community development within the need to provide an enabling environment had implications for the autonomy of host decision making. The inability to separate the success of investments and host development created mutually reinforced interests and priorities. Only through satisfying the requirements of the investor was it possible to gain developmental opportunities. This was most clearly evident in the case of the Traditional Council's decision making processes when it came to spending share dividends. To support the needs of the investor, the dividends were spent on offering learnership programmes and opening up business ventures to service mining activities. This was similar to single-resource towns, more broadly, where certain changes became natural and inevitable (Bradbury, 1979; Morvaridi and Hughes, 2018).

It was significant that these changes (the re-orientation towards investor needs) took place even in cases where there were no direct or contractual relationships between hosts and investors. This partly stemmed from the role of private interests and the appeal by investors to bring in local centres of power: such as the traditional council in the mining corporation, or private developers in the 'new city' development. The intertwining of investor and host interests, through linking investment to development, highlights the problem faced by hosts who need to work closely with differing partners, whilst needing to keep a degree of distance to protect themselves and the host community (see Gumede 2018).

It is possible to suggest that decisions by host actors, to support the shaping of space and place in line with wider political economy, led to the enactment of exclusionary practices upon their own communities. This was evidenced across all three cases, including: the South African Development Corporation's construction of an enclavic zone, with a bespoke regulatory environment, that put native industries at a competitive disadvantage; contractors from the mining community who installed power and water supplies to the mine over and above community needs; and the selling of land to the highest bidder in the new city development instead of addressing overcrowding and historical land right issues in Alexandra

township. These concessions, and privileging of investor interests, also link to the efficiencies afforded to the investors over native communities, including, the undertaking of administrative tasks which, as Gupta (2012) sets out, is significant barrier for developing communities.

The production of space and place in pursuit of investment, at the expense of certain sectors of society, can be linked to wider understandings around the hegemonic influence of capital and the inherent contradiction that capital holds the ability to represent the interests of multiple classes, even those it exploits (Chibber, 2013; Harvey, 2015). The production of space and place for FDI can therefore be ‘distinguished by and delineated as part of a broader system of domination and exploitation’ (Lefebvre 2009c, p.210; see also Morvardi and Hughes 2018).

A further consequence of shaping the production of space and place to demands of international political economy takes form around the alignment of investments to existing host capacities (*i.e.* skills, resources, knowledge, and governance form). In the case of the IDZ and the ‘new city’ development, for example, spatial differentialisation was an important strategy towards bringing investment to fruition. In the case of the IDZ, this took the form of setting physical boundaries to support a bespoke fiscal and regulatory environment, whereas in the ‘new city development’, this took the form of employing various representations to juxtapose the ‘old’ and ‘failing’ places against the ‘new’ and ‘future’ ones. The production of space in comparative and competitive terms meant that investments were often out-of-sync with the immediate operating environment. This required hosts to adapt in order to engage with the new structural relationship, including, changing identities (labour-production relationships), governance structures (Traditional Council to Share-holding company), and land management (securing and revaluing land). In the absence of the investor supporting existing capacities, it was the case that this often created further gaps which required hosts to break from their historical and traditional relationship to their environment and wider communities.

When assessing alignment, however, it is important to recognise alignments at differing scales. It was evident, for example, that the automotive investment was facilitated by the South African government in order to encourage manufacturing investors. Therefore, in the context of the IDZ, whilst the automotive factory aligned to the South African government's search for manufacturing entities, and the Chinese government's need to access new markets, it did not align to needs of the local operating environment. This highlights the conflict between local sites of production, and global priorities. A scalar analysis of SSC – a need to assess cooperation across sectors of society and conflicting priorities (Mawdsley, Savage and Kim, 2014) – is something absent from existing studies. This is where the findings of this study make an important contribution.

Concerns over who benefits from FDI leads to other questions about empowerment, the intersectionality of participation in the production of space, and the distribution of various spill-overs. Whilst it was evident that FDI brought Chinese investors into a relationship with a broad cross-section of South African society (including in rural, traditional, and metropolitan contexts) it was evident that participation in the production of space and place was led by only a small sector of South African actors. It has already been acknowledged, in relation to notions of spatial selectivity and graduated sovereignty, that investment's worked to prioritise the integration of only certain sectors, environments, and communities into international capital networks. This led to the exclusion of others and shaped the verticality of spill-overs.

In cases where there was no South African state support, investors relied on the incorporation of decision makers and centres of power. This meant the empowerment of a small number of actors who may already be in a privileged position (such as a monarch) or those with financial assets. Consequences were evident in the form of protest, claims of corruption, and the fracturing of community structures. Should marginalised or excluded groups seek to participate in decision making, or accrue benefits, they would firstly have to adapt. It was suggested in the 'new city' development, for example, that the local communities should learn the Chinese language to gain employment.

There were, though, several positive aspects with regards to empowerment and intersectionality, promoted by various community members. For example, in the case of private city development, individuals were able to engage with investors on their own terms (albeit within the interest of capital). This was contextualised against the controls and regulations township communities would have faced during the Apartheid and colonial regimes. Investment, in these circumstances, may support those that State bureaucracy and centralised planning would have otherwise excluded (see Gupta 2012). The third case was also promoted as an example of breaking the link between labour and production, promoted by Ferguson (2015), in a context where the oversupply of labour is a pronounced issue.

In respect of resistance, those left out of decision making or without knowledge were not free to resist, engage, or challenge the production of space and place. The translation of the host operating environment into financial and positivist values shaped the ability for hosts to freely participate, hold investors to account, or monitor exchanges. Knowledge was technical and little understood. Data collated by investors was not mutually accessible, transparent, or freely exchanged. It could be suggested that the privatisation of interests, and their competitive form, meant knowledge held a value and became a private exchangeable asset. The commercialisation of knowledge production was evident through the employment of an international design consultant and companies to conduct community surveys. There was also little consultation and, where there was, it was suggested to be limited, partial, and not transparent. This stemmed from the growth of private interests. As the South African government suggested, in the final case study, some parts of society did not need to be consulted if it was a private development.

The contractual relationships between host and investors (in their differing forms) also made recognising accountability and responsibility complex. Contractual partnerships, such as the issuing of shares, had the effect of divesting responsibility. As Morvaridi and Hughes (2018, p.870) describes: 'in these new approaches, recipient countries are regarded as having chosen to engage, and therefore complicit in any adverse social consequences'. Furthermore, the appeal of employment and the integration of decision makers also limited resistance.

Finally, the evidenced interdependencies raise concerns over sustainability. Many of the environmental changes and community restructuring centred on the short term interests of the investor. As a consequence, communities had to alter their identities and their relationship to the environment which may lead to the loss of traditional knowledges, practices, and securities. Dependence on profit, and fluctuating values, also meant that the investor could withdraw or ‘retrench’ at a moments notice. This was a particular issue in those contexts where hosts were not supported or protected by the South African government. This raises concerns over the long term viability of spill-overs and linkages. Furthermore, in contexts where hosts financed infrastructure, and where communities transferred material assets, there was an element of risk that was not mutually shared.

In light of this reading, it is possible to suggest that the location of FDI within SSC is an unsettling one. Morvaridi and Hughes (2018, pp.871–972) wrote that ‘Self-determination and social and economic development would only be achieved if the states and the nations in the periphery were in an equal relationship with others and not while relations between states were based on unequal exchange’. This was not evidently the case here. Many of the strategies employed reinforced historical forms of spatial development – including dependency and uneven development – of which proponents of SSC seek to overcome and/or redress. The validity of these claims, however, centre on the ongoing debates around the role of SSC (*i.e.* what it stands for), in relation to the liberal capitalist order that is now arguably the norm across countries of the global South (see Morvaridi & Hughes 2018).

8.3 Summary

This chapter has sought to draw a thread through the three case studies to identify common and differing space- and place- making strategies. It was evident that, whilst common strategies were identified across the three investments – including strategies to survey and account for environments and communities, to plan and communicate spatial change, and secure a long term operating environment (including labour supply) – it was also evident that these strategies were employed

in differing shades, by different actors, and in differing environmental, structural, and temporal contexts.

In reference to geographic theory – including *graduated sovereignty* and *spatial selectivity* – it has been possible to assess the structural relationship between the production of space and wider systems and processes. These theories show how South African territory, and governance systems, are divided and shaped by the need to offer a balance between developmental and/or liberal governance, and comparative and competitive spaces. This observation demonstrated that, regardless of actor or process, space and place was shaped by international economic and political priorities beyond the state of South Africa.

As a result of the identified structural relations, it has also been possible to show how relations fitted within the narrative of SSC. It was evident that the setting of space and place to international demands and expectations generating dependent and uneven development. The production of space and place was shaped by the need to shore up the interest of capital, rather than, offer a more radical transformation of development relations as pursued by SSC. This had implications for the sustainability of development, the alignment of contributions to host capacities, the empowerment of individuals across a broad intersection of host communities, and the ability to resist and actively participate in the production of space and place.

9.0 Conclusion

This thesis represents a study into the changing contemporary development landscape – a landscape shaped by the growth of SSC and the re-centring of economic growth as a driver of development. By interpreting FDI, for development, through the Political Economy of Finance perspective, and locating FDI within lineages of capitalism, imperialism, colonialism, and International Development, the thesis raised questions around the limits of FDI within the narrative of SSC. It has been suggested that, if FDI re-centres economic growth as a driver of development, then relations of power (between host and investors) cannot be removed from what is known of the spatial co-ordinates of power associated with capitalist growth and its geographical expansion: including uneven development and relations of dependency.

Through exploring the relationship between FDI and development, it was noted that developmental spill-overs and linkages are not necessarily an automatic processes. To attract investment, and accrue developmental opportunities, hosts must offer an enabling environment. In situations where such an environment does not pre-exist, it must be actively produced. Hosts are, therefore, required to undergo various geographical transformations to support the movement of capital and the exchange of knowledge, technology, and resources. It was therefore suggested that FDI was dependent upon intimate negotiations over space and place at the sites of investment. The motivations, priorities, knowledges, and values used to shape communities and their environment, in support of FDI, was of interest in the study. Through prioritising the needs of capital, it was suggested that there is a potential for the subordination of local heritage, knowledges, identities, values, environments, and voices.

A study of space and place, its change and production, is important as space and place represent the holding ground for investment, and the locations through which knowledge, labour, land, and capital is exchanged. Elden (2010, p.799) wrote that ‘the spatial dimension of political economy is so prevalent that it is easy, if not frequently overlooked’. It was therefore the aim of the thesis to assess whether

hosts (in their myriad forms) were able to play an active role in the changing spaces and places of development, in accordance with their own values and objectives. The study sought to ask how space and place was produced, by whom, and on what priorities.

These concerns were explored through the study of Chinese FDI in South Africa. Chinese and South African investment partnerships are framed within a narrative of SSC and it is recognised that FDI increasingly overshadows other forms of development cooperation between the two countries. The case of China and South African investment partnerships were also contextualised against their, juxtaposed, domestic motivations in which Chinese actors seek access to new markets and resources, and South African actors seek to challenge issues over land rights, racial mobility, and economic inequality which stem from legacies of colonialism, imperialism, and apartheid geographies. These contexts highlighted the empirical, theoretical, and popular importance of the study.

Three questions were asked in order to respond to these aims: firstly, what space- and place- making strategies were employed within Chinese FDI in South Africa; where was agency located within the production of space and place; and how the narrative of SSC became challenged by the realities of space- and place- making in South Africa. These questions were explored through the study of three differing Chinese investments in South Africa using a multi-sited case study comparison approach. Case studies included an automotive factory situated within one of South Africa's newest and largest IDZs, a platinum mine located within a traditional rural community, and a 'new city' development in Johannesburg financed by a private Chinese developer. These cases held significance for the differing environmental, structural, and temporal contexts in which they were situated.

Interviews, field observations, and documentary analysis, conducted over five months in South Africa, were employed to support the collection and analysis of empirical data. Participants in the study included managers and executives from each Investment, government representatives, international consultants, NGO leaders, Business Chambers managers, Trade Union officials, and numerous

community members. Data took the form of voices, texts, observations, performances, and visual imagery. These data sources produced insights into the imagined and material form investment took, including, evidence of the material and aesthetic transformation of land- and city-scapes, the revaluation of land and livelihoods, altered mobilities, and new divisions of labour as host communities adapt to align to international financial and trade networks. Through insights from geographic and postcolonial theory, findings were assessed to interpret the structural relationships shaping the production of space and place, and the possible peripheralising consequences for communities at sites of investment.

Combined, the theoretical gap, empirical context, and applied methodology represented a timely and rigorous study of a changing development landscape which now enables a substantive response to the study's research questions.

9.1 Research Findings

The empirical data and analysis within the thesis supports a response to the three research questions. These questions are now addressed in turn:

What space- and place- making strategies are employed within Chinese FDI in South Africa?

It was evident that a range of space- and place- making strategies were employed across all three investments. Common strategies included: the use of surveillance to account for the host operating environment; the authorisation of knowledge on communities to demonstrate how best to value, use assets, and prescribe a pathway forward; the comparison of spaces and places to negotiate concessions and gain comparative advantages; idealisation to promote the value of investments and their social good to retain operating rights; the use of performance to naturalise developments and facilitate participation and consultation; and insubstantialisation to bridge the gap between structural realities and host expectations.

These strategies were not employed in isolation but often overlapped and, at times, were employed together to reinforce other aspects of the investor's operating

environment. The combined strategies worked to give investments and the operating environment material and imagined form. Surveillance, for example, produced statistics and technical details (translated to aid international comparison) on communities and environments, and the statistics were then used to shape land use policies through careful calculation. Maps resulted in the material transformation of landscape through the setting of boundaries and shaping of mobilities and connectivity, which in turn facilitated differing or complementary administrative environments. Projections of value within graphs and charts shaped priorities and aspirations which, in turn, shaped local employment and training provisions to service an investor's needs. And performances were used to retain operating rights within communities through, sometimes, unsubstantiated representations of investor activities.

Importantly, findings show that whilst there were common strategies employed across all three investments, these strategies were employed in differing shades, in differing contexts, and at differing times. These nuances have been discussed in relation to three contexts that came to shape the strategies employed: environmental, structural, and temporal. Firstly, a correlation could be drawn between areas remote of economically important nodes (*e.g.* remote of cities) and the role of top-down, materially produced, spaces. In urban areas, there was an increased use of imaginative strategies which were used to locate investment figuratively within existing infrastructures and to appeal to other communities to support the investment.

Linked to the previous pattern, a second relationship was identified concerning the structural relationship between the host and investor and the production of space and place. Where there was formal contractual obligations, concessions, or incentives, the production of space and place was centrally produced with the involvement of minimal stakeholders (including limited consultation) – although this created an element of directed and guaranteed development provisions. In investments where there was no formal contractual relationship, space and place was produced through a network of actors: including economists, planners, executives, and independent South African developers.

Thirdly, it was evident that during planning stages the role of surveillance and accounting was important, during implementation of investments there was a greater focus on communicative and representational strategies to deliver the required reorganisation of land. During the operation stages there was an added layer of performance and representation as the investor continually sought to retain operating rights within a host community and bridge a gap between realities (structural deficits) and community expectations.

The identified nuances in the strategies employed, shaped by context and structural relations, highlighted the depth, diversity, and pragmatic engagements that Chinese investors make in South Africa: from governments to traditional communities, and from rural areas to urban metropolitan centres. These findings challenge the homogenising narrative of Chinese actors and practices on the African continent. A single narrative on the production of space and place, therefore cannot necessarily be brought forward. However, the study highlights the critical importance, in the varying contexts, of the production of space and place to support Chinese FDI in its myriad forms.

Where is agency located within the production of space and place within Chinese FDI in South Africa?

Locating agency with regards to the production of space and place is complex and challenging. The production of space and place was often consensual and contested at the same time (often within the same communities). It was evident, for example, that space and place was produced by both hosts and investors: hosts (in their myriad forms) sought to establish an operating environment to attract and facilitate investment, whilst investors sort to negotiate concessions, shape the built environment, and appeal to subsidiary stakeholders to support the long term operating environment. These co-productions took the form of the South African government creating bespoke development zones, to traditional communities spending mining dividends on infrastructure to service mining operations. However, it has been suggested that, regardless of actor or agent, motivations,

priorities, and decisions were shaped by wider internal political and economic circumstance.

Firstly, the strategies employed sought to secure the three requisites of capitalist growth: securing access to land and resources, accessing and providing a skilled labour market, and facilitating efficient networks of exchange. These priorities were also evident in the way that space and place was translated and interpreted in financial and positivist terms to aid the calculation of costs, risks, and value in regard to international trade and productions networks. Secondly, space and place was shaped by the need to offer competitive and comparative environments to support the movement of capital. Space and place was produced in direct relation to local, regional, and international contexts. The structural relationship between space and place and wider international political economy has been explained in respect to theories of spatial selectivity and graduated sovereignty. The implications of the extraterritorial forces shaping space and place came to fruition through often multiple and parallel modes of governance: balancing the need for developmental intervention and/or the liberalisation of the operating environment. These structural considerations highlighted evidence of new dependencies and uneven development.

With regard to agency, the study has also identified a challenge between centralised top-down planning and direct developmental benefits, or greater freedoms and slack of direct benefits or guarantees. The question of agency is therefore complex and variegated dependent upon context. Differing contexts will have differing implications for the role of FDI in SSC.

Are narratives of SSC challenged by the realities of space- and place-making strategies at the sites of Chinese FDI in South Africa?

The structural relationship between FDI and the production of space and place, shaped by international political economy, was found to have a direct implication on how investments could be positioned within the broader principles attributed to SSC. It was evident, for example, that the translation and interpretation of host communities and their environments into international financial values changed

the way in which space and place became known, valued, and ordered. In doing so, a hierarchical interpretation of knowledge systems became evident with the subordination of native ways of knowing and relating to space. This had implications for a host's ability to value their own land and hold the investor to account. Furthermore, with an increased role of private interest, knowledge (and its production) became a private asset that was not freely exchanged.

It was also evident that, in order to attract investment, hosts (dependent upon structural relationship) often offered concessions or administrative support. This meant that investors could operate with greater efficiencies and at a competitive advantage to native industries. The requirement, also, to produce place and place through competitive and comparative calculation meant that investments were often juxtaposed, and out-of-sync, with the local operating environment. In such circumstances investments were not aligned to existing capacities and hosts (in myriad forms) were required to undergo various transformations to meet investor's needs prior to engagement.

In remote areas, or single commodity communities, the production of space and place was shaped around a level of dependency upon the investment. The accruing of developmental benefits became inextricably linked to the success of the investment. Whilst actors could take ownership of development, these were shaped and attached to external decisions and risks. Development, for example, became aligned to fluctuating market values. In many cases, a turn to the dominant mode of production also represented a break from secure forms of income. This added a level of risk which was placed on the host community (not shared by the investor) and raises further issues of sustainability within this form of development assistance. In some cases, any mutual accountability was lost through divesting responsibility through structural agreements (such as share-holdings) or through complex networks of agents. This fell on top of the disruption FDI made to community resistance strategies through the breakdown of community organisation, the integration of local decision makers, and an appeal to private interests.

These are just a few examples of the dependent and uneven relations that stemmed from the production of space and place to support FDI and development. It could therefore be suggested that the production of space and place in the context of FDI does not comfortably sit within principles attributed to SSC. Chinese FDI in South Africa did not disrupt the unfair, unequal, and dependent structures that actors attributed to SSC may have sought to challenge. It is important to remember, however, that as there is no single narrative regarding the production of space and place, these findings must remain located with the structural, environmental, and temporal contexts in which they were identified.

9.2 Limitations and Recommendations

Several considerations must accompany the findings to this study. These are important to aid interpretation, and also to highlight where further study should be directed.

Firstly, the nature of in-depth qualitative research means that the findings cannot implicitly be regarded as representative of all cases of FDI in South Africa or internationally. Should further work be undertaken, it will be necessary to ask how these findings play out in differing countries, in partnerships shaped by different nationalities, and in differing temporal contexts. In this regard, the study has applied geographic theory in a context not yet seen and, in line with expectations of in-depth qualitative studies, the thesis is successful in opening up new avenues of enquiry and providing source material for further comparative work to proceed.

Secondly, the study is restricted by what has been identified as a disciplinary division of labour in development studies (see Vira & James 2011). As the role of FDI in the development landscape grows, the margins between cultural, social, and economic geography narrows and this represents a disciplinary challenge for a sole researcher. Within a larger study (with increased funding and co-investigators), this divide could be overcome through collaboration with scholars of differing expertise. One case where this would have been beneficial, for example, was where participants suggested that their investment offered low cost housing. In such an example, it would have been beneficial to understand what

‘low cost’ meant through economic analysis of property values and wage levels. As this was not the case here, the findings should be opened up for further review by scholars in differing fields. This does, however, demonstrate the wider value of the study beyond the immediate discipline of geography.

Thirdly, it has been noted that theory is cheap but data is expensive (see Mkandawire 2011; Solow 1997). This was the case here. The study is shaped by constraints of time and funding. The research is located within wider pressures facing postgraduate research in the field of development, as set out in the UK’s Economic and Social Research Council’s benchmarking review of Human Geography (ESRC, 2013, p. 10). However, the chosen methods, analysis, and theoretical position, demonstrates how the study was a proportional and a rigorous test of the research questions. The study is successful in providing several original theoretical, empirical, and popular contributions (discussed in the following section).

Finally, the thesis takes, as a point of reference, a changing development landscape. The study therefore engages with live policy debates and an unsettled geopolitical landscape. Since the research began, Donald Trump has been elected as the President of the United States and is enacting his *America First* policy. The United Kingdom has also voted to leave the European Union. Both of these events represent a challenge to global governance regime that has been shaped through global groupings and multilateral cooperation – of which SSC is part. The United States and China are also on the verge of a growing trade war which has led commentators to ask how this may affect the Chinese government’s continued commitment, as its economy slows, to African investment (see ChinaAfricaProject 2018).

In 2018, Jacob Zuma was also ousted as South Africa’s President on corruption charges. President Zuma and policies of the ANC were key to many of the decisions regarding the country’s participation within SSC and its decisively close relationship to the Chinese government. It is too early, however, to suggest whether President Ramaphosa, as Zuma’s replacement, will change the government’s pursuit of Chinese investment. In addition, whilst the study focused

on one of the first manufacturing entities in the Port Elizabeth IDZ, new deals for Chinese automotive companies to enter the zone were signed in 2018 (see Gillham & Smyth 2018). This development does not challenge findings, but further emphasises the importance and relevance of the study's findings for those new investment partnerships.

These considerations demonstrate how findings, stemming from this study, must remain grounded in the contexts in which data was collected and analysed. Moving forward, the study could be replicated in other contexts, particularly, investments between others who frame their relations within the narrative of SSC (*e.g.* Brazil-China investment partnerships). The study should also be taken up by academics and policy makers in other fields, such as economics, to further explore the concerns raised within conclusions. Finally, it would also be of value to expand this existing study through additional interviews, cases, and contexts.

9.3 Contributions

To end, through applying geographic theory in a context not seen, the thesis makes several important empirical, theoretical, and popular contributions. These contributions can be aligned to three key areas: the study of China-Africa relations, the role of FDI in the contemporary development landscape (including its role in SSC), and understandings around the structural logic of space, place, and capital.

Firstly the thesis offers new empirical insights into the evolving character of China-Africa relations. While China-Africa relations are frequently studied from a geopolitical and international relations perspective, the study here contributes a qualitative assessment into how policies and practices – often taking the form of statements and announcements in ceremonial and diplomatic exercises – take form on the ground.

Whilst some spatial aspects of Chinese investments have been assessed previously – such as work on Chinese economic zones in Africa (see Mohan 2013) – the study here has developed this by exploring the multiple and differing spaces, within a single study, within which Chinese investments take place. The study has also suggested possible structural linkages between investments' differing spatial form,

and wider international political economy. This has contributed towards challenging the homogenising narrative of China's character on the African continent.

The thesis is also original in bringing together South African and Chinese participants within a single study. The study contains contributions from underrepresented voices within China-Africa scholarship, including, data from Chinese executives (whose participation of often restricted due to political sensitivities), high-level government officials from South Africa, and participants from some of more challenging research environments, including, Alexandra Township. By bringing data from both Chinese and South African participants into a single study, this has also sought to mitigate against concerns of *Orientalism* and *Sinological Orientalism* (see Hirono & Suzuki 2014; O'Brien 2016; Vukovich 2012) to ensure findings are fair, balanced, and that space was offered to give participants the opportunity to respond to findings and criticism.

The thesis also bring forward theoretical contributions towards understanding the role and impact of FDI in the development landscape. Scholarship has, to-date, mainly stemmed from work in economics, international relations, and business studies, which has sought to identify how to make spill-overs and linkages more efficient and effective. Previous work has tended to be quantitative – an assessment of the value of FDI and its distribution – and holds an uncritical standpoint with regards to politics and social consequences of its wider use. The study, here, is one that focuses on the qualitative aspects of FDI, including, the lived realities of host communities and the clashing perspectives and priorities over knowledge, voice, identities, environments, and resistance.

In addition, the thesis also makes theoretical contributions toward understanding the links between space, place, and capital in a contemporary context. Whilst the relationship between space, place, and capital has been predominantly theorised from a post-War 'North/South' perspective (including legacies of colonialism, imperialism, and US-led development), this has not yet been fully explored in relations to SSC and emerging economies. The nuances raised in the study contribute to understandings around the, rarely acknowledged (see Mawdsley et

al. 2014), conflicts between States, sectors, and institutions within SSC. The study also highlights how SSC may replicate and reinforce spatial relations, including dependency and uneven development, and cannot therefore be separated from what is known of the role of space and place in North-South development partnerships and practices.

Finally, findings from the study can also be used to inform popular debates in several areas, including: understanding China's changing role on the African continent and the implications of the government's new Belt and Road Initiative (which centres on many of the space and place making concerns highlighted in the thesis); the evolving aid and development regimes of 'traditional' actors who are adapting their policies and contributions in respect of domestic sensitivities; and, importantly, informing the political choices and actions host communities can employ (daily) to challenge, negotiate, and resist changes as a result of increasing investment practices.

The thesis, therefore, represents a broad and timely contribution to understanding, and challenging, the changing contemporary development landscape.

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Appendix 1: Site Visits and Dates

Fieldwork Periods

Phase 1 – 26th January to 26th April 2015

Phase 2 – 17th January to 22nd March 2016

Field visits, events, and dates

Case 1 15 th March 2015 – 22 nd March 2015 and 22 nd February 2016 – 10 th March 2016	Port Elizabeth City	15 th March 2015 to 19 th March 2015
	Industrial Development Zone	17 th March 2015
	Development Corporation	16 th March 2015
	Automotive Factory	18 th March 2015
	Business Chamber	20 th March 2015
	Business Chamber 25 th Anniversary Celebration	20 th March 2015
	Metalworker's Union Head Office	19 th March 2015
	Zwide Township	2 nd March 2016
	Motherwell Township	3 rd March 2016
	NGO Zwide	2 nd March 2016
Case 2 14 th April 2015, 17 th January 2016 – 22 nd January 2016	Mining Corporation (Johannesburg)	14 th April 2016
	Mining Corporation (Bakubung)	18 th January 2016
	Mine Operation	23 rd January 2016
	Bakubung Community	22 nd January 2016
	Traditional Council Community Consultation	22 nd January 2016
	Leseding Community Development Project	21 st January 2016
Case 3 13 th April 2015 – 22 nd April 2015	Bakubung Clinic	23 rd January 2016
	Developers Head Office and Vicinity	21 st April 2015
	Modderfontein	19 th January 2016
	Construction Union	20 th January 2016
	Johannesburg CBD	15 th April 2016
	Sandton	18 th January 2015
	Alexander Township	17 th April 2015 and 25 th January 2016
Xenophobic Alexander Attacks	18 th April 2015	
National 26 th January 2015 – 22 nd March 2016	Chinese New Year Reception, Cape Town	11 th February 2015
	AFRASO Conference, Cape Town	24 th -26 th March 2015
	Department for International Relations and Cooperation	27 th January 2016
	Chinese Spring Break	18-20 th February 2015
	FOCAC 2015 (Johannesburg)	3-5 th December 2015
	Hermanus, Somerset West, Robertson	29 th March 2015
	Montague Cape Town	5 th April 2015 28 th January 2015

Semi-Structured Interviews

Case 1	CEO, Development Corporation	18 th March 2015
	Director (International Markets), Development Corporation	16 th March 2015
	Investment Promotions Officer 1 (Chinese), Development Corporation	16 th March 2015
	Investment Promotions Officer 2 (Chinese), Development Corporation	16 th March 2015
	Investor Relations Officer, Development Corporation	17 th March 2015
	Executive, Automotive Works	18 th March 2015
	Project Manager, Business Chamber	20 th March 2015
	Administrator, Business Chamber	20 th March 2015
	Secretary-General, Metalworker's Union	19 th March 2015
	Director, Zwide NGO	2 nd March 2016
	Resident 1, Zwide	3 rd March 2016
	Resident 2, Zwide	3 rd March 2016
	Resident 3, Zwide	3 rd March 2016
Case 2	Executive, Mining Corporation	16 th April 2015
	Employee, Mining Corporation	16 th April 2015
	Uncle 1, Traditional Council	26 th April 2016
	Uncle 2, Traditional Council	26 th April 2016
	Mineworker, Ledig	22 nd January 2016
	Resident 1, Ledig	22 nd January 2016
	Resident 2, Ledig	22 nd January 2016
	Manager, Bakubung Clinic	23 rd January 2016
	Nurse, Bakubung Clinic	23 rd January 2016
Case 3	COO, Modderfontein	21 st April 2015
	Masterplanner, (Global Cities) Consultancy, London	16 th December 2015
	Property Developer, Modderfontein	16 th April 2015
	Employee 1, Modderfontein	21 st April 2015
	Director, Gauteng Growth and Development Agency	29 th January 2016
	Resident, Modderfontein	17 th April 2015
	Resident 1, Alexander	18 th April 2016
	Resident 2, Alexander	17 th April 2016
	Social Enterprise, Alexander	17 th April 2016
Director, Construction Workers Union	20 th January 2016	
National	Director, South Africa's Department for International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO)	27 th January 2016
	Civil Servant, South Africa's Department for International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO)	27 th January 2016
	Governor, Western Cape	11 th February 2015
	Secretary (Economic and Commercial), Chinese Embassy in South Africa	17 th April 2015

Appendix 2: Consent Form



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Participant Information Sheet

ProjectID: PHD130021269

Researcher

Mr. Liam O'Brien
(lmo@st-andrews.ac.uk)

Supervisors

Dr. Daniel Clayton
(dwc@st-andrews.ac.uk)

Dr. Mike Kesby
(mgk@st-andrews.ac.uk)

The purpose of this form is to ensure that you are willing to take part in this study and let you understand what it entails. The University of St Andrews attaches high priority to the ethical conduct of research. We therefore ask you to consider the following points before signing this form. Signing this form does not commit you to anything you do not wish to do and you are free to withdraw at any stage.

Any data gathered during this research will be kept confidential and accessed only by the researcher. It will be securely stored within a locked safe (at the premises of the researcher) and held digitally within central encrypted storage facilities at the University of St Andrews, United Kingdom. Participation in this research is completely voluntary and your consent is required before you can participate.

Please answer each statement concerning the collection and use of the research data:

- I have read and understood the information sheet.
- I have been given the opportunity to ask questions about the study.
- I have had my questions answered satisfactorily.
- I understand that I can withdraw from the study at any time without explanation.
- I understand that my data will be kept confidential.
- I agree for my data to be used by the researcher within further research projects.
- I have been made fully aware of the potential risks associated with this research and am satisfied with the information provided.
- I agree for the interview to be recorded and used in further research.
- I agree to take part in the study.
- I am happy to be contacted again to participate in further activities associated with this research.

If you decide at a later date that data should be destroyed we will agree to your request.

Your signature confirms you are happy to participate in the study.

Full Name: _____

Signature: _____

Date : _____ / _____ / _____

Appendix 3: Information Sheet



Participant Information Sheet

ProjectID: PHD130021269

What is the study about?

You are invited to participate in a research project that explores the changing relations stemming from China as a development partner within South Africa. This is a piece of research interested in documenting the stories of those who are making, and affected by, such changes. Through the study of three differing projects, the research aims to gain a wider understanding of the present and future implications (positive and negative) of these changing relations and how these in turn meet with wider goals set out by the South African government, and individuals, within South Africa. This is a study which is being conducted as part of my PhD within the Department of Geography and Sustainable Development at the University of St Andrews, United Kingdom.

Do I have to take part?

This information sheet has been written to help you decide if you would like to take part. It is up to you and you alone whether or not to take part. If you do decide to take part you will be free to withdraw at any time without providing a reason.

What would I be required to do?

This study is built around interviews with key stakeholders at three projects within South Africa. Should you consent, you will be asked to participate in an (informal) interview that asks questions about your own experiences of, contributions to, or work within, the development sector in South Africa. The discussions will take place one-on-one and last just over an hour.

Will my participation be Anonymous and Confidential?

Only the researcher and supervisors of the project will have access to information provided by participants. All responses will be kept strictly confidential and permission will be sought in the *Participant Consent Form* for the information, which will be anonymised, to be used for future research purposes. Under certain circumstances, due to the significance of the chosen projects, it may not be possible to fully anonymise participants (for example, if you hold managerial or leadership roles). Should this be the case, alternative options will be discussed at the interview. None of your information will be used until you are completely satisfied with the potential impact of your participation.

Storage and Destruction of Data Collected.

The information collected during interviews will be accessible by the researcher and supervisors involved in this study only and will be destroyed on your request. All data

will be stored physically within a safe (at the researchers premises) and digitally within central encrypted storage facilities at the University of St Andrews, United Kingdom.

What will happen to the results of the research study?

The result of the study will be finalised by the end of 2016, written up and submitted as part of my PhD Thesis. Several publications may arise from the data collected which will be made publically available and copies can be issued upon request. The research, thanks to your participation, will contribute to informing policy discussions both nationally and internationally.

Are there any potential risks to taking part?

By participating within this study you will be engaging with discussions which are currently politically sensitive within South Africa. As your information will aim to be fully anonymised this should not be a problem and interviews will never be conducted if there is any danger to either the interviewer (myself) or participant (yourself). If you are representing an organisation, nothing you say will be passed on to others within the same organisation. This study will not effect your employment rights.

Questions.

You will have the opportunity to ask any questions in relation to this project before completing the *Participant Consent Form*.

Consent and Approval.

This research proposal has been scrutinised and granted Ethical Approval through the University of St Andrews ethical approval process.

What should I do if I have concerns about this study?

A full outline of the procedures governed by the University Teaching and Research Ethical Committee is available at <http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/utrec/Guidelines/complaints/>.

Contact Details

Researcher: Mr. Liam O'Brien
Contact Details: lmo@st-andrews.ac.uk
+44 (0)7563 497 040

Supervisors: Dr. Daniel Clayton dwc@st-andrews.ac.uk
Dr. Mike Kesby mgk@st-andrews.ac.uk

Appendix 4: Site Access Form



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Site Access Consent Form

ProjectID: Understanding Chinese development initiatives in South Africa

Researcher

Mr. Liam O'Brien
(lmo@st-andrews.ac.uk)

Supervisors

Dr. Daniel Clayton
(dwc@st-andrews.ac.uk)

Dr. Mike Kesby

(mgk@st-andrews.ac.uk)

This form is designed so that you can give your consent for the researcher to access your site and collect data. The data collected will take the form of observations; the taking of notes and photographs. The University of St Andrews attaches high priority to the ethical conduct of research. We therefore ask you to consider the following points before signing this form. Signing this form does not commit you to anything you do not wish and you are free to withdraw access at any stage without explanation.

Any information gathered during time at your site will be kept confidential and accessed only by the researcher. Information collected will be securely stored within a locked safe (at the premises of the researcher) and held digitally within central encrypted storage facilities at the University of St Andrews, United Kingdom. Site access is completely voluntary and your permission is required.

Please answer each statement concerning the collection and use of the research data:

- I have read and understood the information sheet.
- I have been given the opportunity to ask questions about the study.
- I have had my questions answered satisfactorily.
- I understand that site access can be withdrawn at any time without explanation.
- I understand that giving permission to access this site does not mean I will have access to the research materials gathered – which will remain confidential.
- I agree for any information gathered to be used by the researcher within further research projects.
- I agree for the researcher to take photographs on site.
- I am happy to be contacted again to participate in further research activities.
- I give permission for the researcher to access the identified site.

Your signature confirms you are happy to participate in the study.

Full Name: _____

Signature: _____

Date: ____ / ____ / ____

Appendix 5: Memorandum of Understanding



Memorandum of Understanding

ProjectID: Understanding Chinese development initiatives in South Africa.

Organisation/Site: _____

Researcher

Mr. Liam O'Brien
(lmo@st-andrews.ac.uk)

Supervisors

Dr. Daniel Clayton
(dwc@st-andrews.ac.uk)

Dr. Mike Kesby
(mgk@st-andrews.ac.uk)

This Memorandum of Understanding is designed to ensure that all parties understand what can be expected of the researcher and also for the researcher to understand what is expected from the organisation under study. Below is a series of statements from the researcher. Following these, the opportunity is given for your organisation to put forward a set of guidelines which you expect the researcher to follow. The *Memorandum of Understanding* must be signed by both the researcher and yourself (as a representative of the organisation under study). Please refer to the *Participant Information Sheet* for further information regarding the research project.

On behalf of the researcher:

- This research is conducted independent of any political organisation, government or position.
- The research is to be conducted with fairness; taking into consideration both positive and negatives within findings.
- The researcher will not interfere with the day-to-day operations of the project sites and will adhere to all guidelines regarding health and safety.
- The researcher is not bound by any financial obligations to the organisation/site under study.
- All information gathered at the site will be confidential and anonymised where possible. Due to the significance of the project under study, it may not be possible to guarantee anonymity since those 'in the know' may be able to identify the project and even individuals. Where a risk to anonymity is likely – Individuals and organisations will be asked to participate only in this knowledge and should respond as if 'on the record'.
- Any employee/volunteer working at the organisation/project site should feel free to contribute to the study, with the organisations permission, and any information provided, in confidence, should not affect their employment rights.

- The researcher understands that your participation within the study is of great value and is only possible due to the generosity of your time. The researcher will be flexible in his visits to the site as well as in his interactions with individuals within the organisation.

- The researcher will update the organisation on any changes to the projects aims.

- The researcher is happy to share published findings with the organisations once all information has been gathered and analysed.

On behalf of the organisation under study:

- _____

- _____

- _____

- _____

- _____

Researcher

Name _____

Signature _____ Date _____

Participant/Representative

Name _____

Signature _____ Date _____

Appendix 6: Ethical Consent



University of St Andrews

University Teaching and Research Ethics Committee

School Of Geography And Geosciences

13th January 2015

Liam Michael O'Brien

Geography and Geosciences

Ethics Reference No: <i>Please quote this ref on all correspondence</i>	GG11322
Project Title:	Recasting Post/Colonialism: the imaginative geographies of Chinese development assistance to South Africa.
Researchers Name(s):	Liam Michael O'Brien
Supervisor(s):	Dr Dan Clayton & Dr Mike Kesby

Thank you for submitting your application which was considered by the Geography and Geosciences School Ethics Committee on the date specified below. The following documents were reviewed:

- | | |
|----------------------------------|------------------------------|
| 1. Ethical Application Form | 8 th January 2015 |
| 2. Participant Information Sheet | 8 th January 2015 |
| 3. Participant Consent Form | 8 th January 2015 |

The University Teaching and Research Ethics Committee (UTREC) approves this study from an ethical point of view. Please note that where approval is given by a School Ethics Committee that committee is part of UTREC and is delegated to act for UTREC.

Approval is given for three years. Projects, which have not commenced within two years of original approval, must be re-submitted to your School Ethics Committee.

You must inform your School Ethics Committee when the research has been completed. If you are unable to complete your research within the 3 three year validation period, you will be required to write to your School Ethics Committee and to UTREC (where approval was given by UTREC) to request an extension or you will need to re-apply

Any serious adverse events or significant change which occurs in connection with this study and/or which may alter its ethical consideration, must be reported immediately to the School Ethics Committee, and an Ethical Amendment Form submitted where appropriate.

Approval is given on the understanding that the 'Guidelines for Ethical Research Practice' (<http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/media/UTRECguidelines%20Feb%2008.pdf>) are adhered to.

Yours sincerely,

Dr Matt Southern

Convenor of the School Ethics Committee

Appendix 7: Sample Interview Transcript

Organisation: Metalworkers Union (Eastern Cape)

Participants: Secretary-General (SG)
Interviewer (Me)

Date: 19th March 2016

Location: Boardroom, Metalworkers Union Head Office, EC

Other Information: Recorded interview; conducted in English; conducted following visit to factory and development zone; participant had just return from an issue relating to the same company in another city; participant was only available for short period; spoke in a strong South African accent.

Me: Would you firstly be able to explain what the National Union of Metalworkers does and your role within it?

SG: The National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa, which also has the acronym NUMSA, is a Union that organises within the metal industry. We have got about four sectors that we organise including auto sector, motor sector, and engineering. When I say motor, I mean component suppliers. We recently had our annual congress meeting in December and we opened our scope. Opening our scope in terms of expanding the companies that NUMSA are organising. For instance, you will find people who are doing catering and then those people, they are utilising metal in spoons etc. So that is in fact how NUMSA operates. In terms of structure you have the National Union, I mean, an office which is situated in Johannesburg, and you have the regions. It has about nine regions and it has about 52 local. I am the secretary general of the Eastern Cape.

Me: Have you had much interaction with the Chinese investors in South Africa or the automotive factory within the development zone?

SG: Yes, we have been engaging with the investor that came to the development zone. I am not sure of the company's full name but it came from China. The company is assembling those big trucks in auto sector. Our concern is that they are not manufacturing. They are just assembling. They are not employing because most of the people they have brought in from China. They say they are here to make sure they impact the skills of the local South African people but that is not happening. So far, yes, we did engage and as an organisation we organised those people because it falls under 'auto'. We have entered into the company so that they can understand the South African situation in terms of how worker

would be treated. We have held a bargaining council where wages and other substantive matters that related to the benefits of workers were discussed. But, I can say that the factory has recently wrote to us to say they are intending to retrench workers. However, we don't think retrenchment will take place in the zone as they also have a site in Pretoria which the retrenchment would affect those people. But for now, as I was saying, were are engaging with the one in the zone in terms of understanding the situation and how they should operate in South Africa.

Me: Would you say that the investor has had a positive or negative impact on the local area?

SG: We won't say positive or negative. I am saying that in terms of ensuring they provide jobs. They are saying that need employees that are available at a certain level and be trained. There is currently not much in terms of our own people based in the Eastern Cape that could be taken by the company. But in the near future we would agree that in a period of two years they offer the training and employ locals. This means that after two years there would be more job opportunities in term of our own people within the Western Cape.

Me: As the investor works within the development zone, through the development corporation, do you think that has been problematic or beneficial in terms of supporting workers' rights?

SG: No, you see, there is a problem because within the development zone there are limitations in terms of rights of workers because companies that are there are sometimes given exemptions so they do not have to contend with the same agreements and benefits that other companies outside the zone would have to offer. So it is a question of engagement but the zone has been designed in a way that those companies can be exempted in other aspects of worker's rights. Yes.

Me: Do you think that the Investor has come and filled a skills gap for workers in the area? Or has it created skills shortages – in the sense that you have trained workers that now need to retrain to fulfil the needs of the Investor?

SG: Yes, we have been saying they are bringing people here as we do not at present have the skills they are looking for. Our problem is that even with skills training, because of the zone, the workers with skills will still not be enumerated as they should be. And the Chinese workers that come will be paid cheaper which causes them to undercut pay for equal skills. So that's a dilemma.

Me: Do you think that the Chinese Investor is any different to other nationalities – such as American and European?

- SG: Not necessarily. There is a general trend that international investors will offer the same precarious terms of pay and retrenchment. If they do not have the money, or make a profit, they simply stop investing. That is a problem we have.
- Me: As a Union do you feel enough is done to support local/indigenous industries rather the international investors?
- SG: Now, now, you see it is our view that perhaps local content should be considered rather than having foreign products that would come into our county. It has to do with issues of foreign exchange, it has to do with rates, it has to do with issues of how, for instance, jobs would be created at a particular point. You will find that some companies will not come and manufacture here. They will only come to assemble. They bring in the parts and then they are assembled. If they chose to manufacture here and use local content then they would create and support more jobs in differing production lines.
- Me: How do you view the zone both physically and in terms of ownership?
- SG: It really is in fact simply a piece of land taken away from, especially, South Africa's own companies. If you check which companies are there, you will find that they are all companies from abroad. It is like an island. It is an area which demonstrates that benefits that would have been enjoyed by all people have now been curtailed could be curtailed and are actually now reduced to just for the Chinese. The development zone is now like a different area. Like parliament, for instance, where you will not be able to enter there. They are calling...there is a name they are using which means it is not free for all. As a union you cannot just go there and organise anymore. It is basically not actually assisting the poorest of the poor who would normally have access to go there. It also effect contractors. Big contractor, not from here, can access. Small entrepreneurs are not given any option in going there. It is more of a government initiative and its then separating those who maybe want to go.
- Me: What has your experience of communication been between the Investor and the workers employed within the zone? Is language an issue for example? How is training provided?
- SG: There hasn't been too many issues. They will have people that translate to workers. There has been problems though with the Investors understanding different laws and regulations. They don't really recognise organisation either. If it was for them they wouldn't want any form of organisation or a Union to engage.

Because, the Chinese, they want only to produce and maximise profit and to make that maximisation of profit at less cost to them. There cultural issues of translation yes.

Me: And do you think the Investor has learnt anything through your engagement in the other direction? Are things improving?

SG: Yes, they are getting better. Hence what I am saying. We have now entered into a recognition agreement with the individual company so there is understanding around how workers are treated and the rights of workers. So that is what they are beginning to understand.

Me: Do you think there are lessons that the Investor will take back to China?

SG: I am not sure. It depends as to how they feel about the particular laws of this county. We say that the laws they bring here are not favourable to our workers and they are quite happy without unions in China. In China they just work and finish and are exploited. China does not, at a particular point, does not actually care much of the other stuff. If a worker can produce, they can produce until they sweat blood. That's the essence.

Me: When the Development Corporation is arranging for new investors to move to the zone does the Union have much of a say or any demands (skills etc.)?

SG: Ok. No, no we always, as a union, say if they are coming they must ensure there are jobs that are going to be created and then they must ensure they adhere to the principles and policies that governs workers in South African. We do not want a situation where rights of workers will be buried down. You will find that they will come here with less rate of pay. They will sometimes do some projects to make up for its such as erect some schools in the townships. There is a debate for that but not at any cost. We look to ensure there is link between labour government and the business. Then they will tie together to offer spin offs and further job creations.

Me: Thanks. I just have one more question as I am aware you were short of time. Do you think there should be more Chinese investors, now you have experience of others?

SG: Like I am saying. There is a lot of unemployment and as a union I have said if they come to invest they must provide employment opportunities in this province. And adhere to our laws that governs the operation of workers. To us, that would then be ok as there is a lot of unemployment here which is alarming – around 36%. It would be a problem if they say 'We are coming' but if they open a

plant and find out they only employ 6 people. Another problem if they come and only assemble. That would be problematic. That is not about creating jobs – that is about exploiting.

Me: Finally, there has been wider criticism of China in Africa. Do you think the Unions in South Africa have led to there being a unique management of Chinese companies? Have you had to change what you do?

SG: Yes, in terms of how strong the trade unions are in South Africa and how trade unions actually engage with the Chinese investors to make them understand the laws and policies that govern the workers so everyone follows the same particular protocol. Even if you open a firm here as you will be told your firm belongs to this sector and this is what you are supposed to offer because we have universal agreements that effect everybody. Therefore we tell them that if you deviate, workers will withdraw their labour power. If the investor deviates then there will be officers which will come and enforce the particular law. If it is not the government then the union will enter to force the investor to do A, B, C. That is the strength we have been having. We engage rather than disengage where other countries may not.

Me: Thanks, that's helpful. Is there anything you would like to add? Or do you have any further questions?

SG: No, thank-you, because we had another company in King William's Town. There was a couple of things and there was a case in the bargaining council with the Chinese company because the workers took a strike and then the Chinese company dismissed them all. We went to that bargaining council, we discussed, debated, they understood, then then reinstate the workers and gave them final warnings instead. I am telling you this because firstly they do not understand that if workers go on strike they cannot just be dismissed. There are laws that actually have to be followed. But I sympathise with them also. Because you cannot just engage in an illegal strike without following the proper procedures. But we engaged. That is the crux of the issue.

Appendix 8: Documents

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Appendix 9: Field Diary Extract

Date: Saturday 23rd January 2016

Location: Bakubung Community Meeting

Context: Meeting held by the Traditional Council to gain community approval for a new village development

Today I returned to Ledig. It was an early start with a three hour drive from Johannesburg. I used the same driver who agreed to take me at a reduced fare if I agreed not to tell his office that he was taking me. I got the journey for R500 less and the cash went straight into his pocket. Win-win.

I was extremely tired and the journey was slow with poor roads and the odd cow on the road. When I arrived in the village one of the two boys who was going to take me to a community meeting was still in bed. It was the weekend and I was told it was time for music and relaxing. My contact told me that he was late as he had been looking after his two nieces. I was not sure whether he, or his nieces, had parents. I felt a little bit of a burden but I was assured he had to time to help me. When he arrived he was in good spirits.

We sat and chatted for about an hour about god (something close to his heart), employment in the UK, and what I hoped. I was happy for this informal chat. As I opened up about my own issues (precarious UK universities), he too began to relax and open up.

He told me that the young man who I interviewed yesterday had heard I was going to meet the King today and apparently wanted to warn me as to what he would say. It was evident that the community may have just as many problems with the Traditional Council as they did with the mining corporation. I began to see differences within the community emerge and each wanted to get their views heard. I had time to hear from both sides of the community.

We headed over to the Council Meeting. My contact said that we should walk so that I could meet some more community members and also see how they lived. The sun was extremely hot and I got sunburn in seconds. It seemed peaceful in contrast to the protests during my previous visit. The streets were wide and the houses were small. The gardens and roads merged. Many of the community members were sitting on their front porches. Winding through the huts it took about half an hour to reach the community meeting at the offices of the Traditional Council. I asked: 'Are we lost yet?' My guide responded: 'There are many ways to skin a cat'. He laughed as I decided to pick up the pace. I didn't know if he was suggesting there were many roads that led to the same place or that he had some other plan to dispose of me.

Throughout the walk there was loud music playing across the whole of the community. It was a vibrant feeling which was juxtaposed against a community that were seemingly unhappy with events relating to the mine. When we arrived at the Traditional Council there were two marquees in the grounds. Chairs were covered in white linen with pink ribbons on the back of each seat. I asked if there was a wedding on today, a question which, again, received a bout of laughter. If I had any concern for the power relationship (my privilege and status) it was clear that there was no barriers or boundaries (quite the opposite). I was corrected and informed that the marquees were where the meeting took place.

There was much 'pomp' involved in the meeting. We sat in the middle of the marquee in the shade. I felt guilty because it was hot and I was taking the place of a community member who was standing outside. No one seemed bothered though. Everyone was wearing blue t-shirts with the world 'reconciliation for Ledig' on the back. This reminding me that many of the concerns I

was seeking to investigate were concerns of the community too. We waited for a long time – I thought ‘no wonder violence regularly breaks out’. The last meeting, I was told, ended with loud voices, houses being burnt down, in response to broken promises.

When the King arrived there was great celebration. Music was provided by the local Christian radio station. As the King took his seat a man from the front (an aid to the Uncles) pointed to me and beckoned me to the front. I had to go and sit with the King and the Royal Family. I was introduced to the community as Liam McBrian from Scotland (not my name). I was greeted with a cheer from the crowd. I felt slightly embarrassed.

Everything got underway. Today the community was being presented with plans for a new village development. SABC news cameras were there and this emphasised importance of communication to investment. For a community meeting I thought it was very elaborate. The Mining Corporation were there and they produced a set of large maps from a roll tube showing consecutive images about how the village could develop. These were issues to community members selected from the crowd so the community members were presenting change to their own people. The community were to own 60% of the new development. The plans were greeted with cheers which was a different response to what I had previously heard.

I saw the meeting primarily as a way for the corporation to show the community plans and bring them onside rather than as a meeting to consult. This idea was later confirmed by my guide on the way back from the meeting who suggested it was the first he had heard of the plans and there had been no participation or view on how community money should be spent. He wasn’t too angry as he suggested the plans – like other promises – would not go ahead. It was also a ‘new’ development for people coming to the area with the mine and would not go to supporting the existing community. Although it was explained during the meeting that the community would get rents from the new houses.

Decision making had been taken out of the community’s hands. I felt bad that my guide believed there was nothing to gain. I asked his view on state ownership of mines and he said that he would be very concerned about that as he didn’t want the country to end up like Zimbabwe. There were no perfect answers I believed.

In the afternoon we had a slow walk back to a community centre where he ran his table tennis club. He told me that he didn’t want children as he didn’t want to bring them up in South Africa. He suggested he would quite happily move away.

Today was a humbling day, I felt the community open up to me, and I had learnt things that I could not have planned for or expected.