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My central claim is that three Socratic philosophers, Xenophon, Plato and Epictetus, engage with views presented as non-philosophical in their discussions of madness, and this engagement, which has not been sufficiently treated by previous scholarship, plays a key role in each thinker's distinct rhetorical strategy.

Xenophon's Socrates conserves a popular definition of madness in the *Memorabilia*, but adds his own account of what is similar to madness. Xenophon does not merely make Socrates transmit conventional views; instead, Socrates' comparison allows Xenophon to take rhetorical advantage of popular attitudes while enlarging the apotreptic scope of madness. Socrates can use comparisons with madness to deal with a great many people, including his rivals, the natural scientists, and various interlocutors who, unlike the mad, can still benefit from his teaching.

In the *Phaedrus*, Plato's Socrates employs a concept of madness which, I argue, is applied without equivocation across both of his speeches in the first part of the dialogue. Importantly, Socrates' inclusion of rational philosophy as a kind of madness is not presented as a distortion of this concept. The connections between madness, love and philosophy are drawn from non-philosophical material, in particular poetry and comedy, and Socrates engages with a popular caricature of the philosopher as eccentric or mad. Instead of rejecting the caricature, Socrates re-evaluates philosophical madness by explaining the transformation of the philosopher's soul.

Epictetus' view of madness is less compromising, and this is to be expected considering the Stoic doctrine that all who are unwise are mad. Like earlier Stoics, however, Epictetus recognises a surprising range of non-Stoic distinctions within madness. Although he engages with these distinctions, he does so only to undermine them and to bring his audience round to the realisation that they are mad once their own views are applied consistently with respect to Stoic teaching.
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My first thanks are to my supervisor, Dr Alex Long. Without his continued advice and support, many of the thoughts expressed in this thesis would not have reached fruition. His Stoic patience combined with his Socratic knack for asking just the right questions has helped to shape my work in innumerable ways. Any shortcomings or faults are entirely my own.

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My final thanks go to my partner and my inspiration, Elizabeth Braae. You have always had time for my rambling discussions, and you have suffered through countless drafts. Your insights and help have been simply invaluable, and your effect on this work is felt throughout. Thank you for your love and for believing in me.

I dedicate this thesis to the memory of my grandmother, Kate Gwendoline Shelton (née Bain).
ABBREVIATIONS


The following additional abbreviations are used for ancient and modern authors and collections:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aff. Dig.</td>
<td>Galen, <em>De propriorum animi cuiuslibet affectuum dignotione et curatione</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMG</td>
<td><em>Corpus Medicorum Graecorum</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DL</td>
<td>Diogenes Laertius</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHP</td>
<td>Galen, <em>De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plac.</td>
<td>Aetius, <em>De placitis</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE M</td>
<td>Sextus Empiricus, <em>Against the mathematicians</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE PH</td>
<td>Sextus Empiricus, <em>Outlines of Pyrrhonism</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stoic rep.</td>
<td>Plutarch, <em>De Stoicorum repugnantii</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virt. mor.</td>
<td>Plutarch, <em>De virtute morali</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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All translations from ancient or modern works are my own unless otherwise indicated.
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Introduction

In this thesis I examine the rhetorical use of madness by three Socratic philosophers: Xenophon, Plato and Epictetus. It is not my goal to reconstruct each philosopher's ideas about madness across all of their works; instead, I have confined my discussion in each chapter to a particular philosophical work in which I think the use of madness is particularly prominent, but which has received relatively little focussed attention. In my first chapter, I discuss Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, in my second, Plato's *Phaedrus* and, in my third, Epictetus' *Discourses*.

I show how each of these philosophers deliberately shapes his discussion of madness by referring to non-philosophical views. I am particularly, but not exclusively, interested in views presented by these philosophers as popular, but in considering non-philosophical views I do not mean to give an anthropological account of madness in the ancient world, nor do I mean to provide a study of madness across non-philosophical literature. Instead, I want to bring an appreciation of how the Socratic philosophers under discussion choose to represent non-philosophical views of madness in their own work.

Studies of madness in the ancient world typically draw attention to a large range of phenomena, from the behavioural features of madness, to its moral, emotional, cognitive and physiological aspects. Like the ancients themselves, modern scholars are cautious not to reduce madness to any single explanation or defining characteristic, and madness is often recognised as a

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1 For a recent and comprehensive survey of madness in ancient philosophy, see Ahonen 2014.
2 For notable studies which do consider non-philosophical conceptions of madness in the ancient world, see e.g. Thumiger and Singer 2018 (collected essays on medical views of madness); Ustinova 2017 (on divine madness and cults); Thumiger 2017a (on early medical accounts of madness); Harris 2013 (collected essays on madness in ancient medicine, philosophy and literature); Hershkowitz 1998 (on madness in epic); Padel 1995 (on madness in tragedy); Pigeaud 1987 (madness in medicine); Pigeaud 1981 (madness in medicine, poetry and philosophy); Simon 1978 (madness in poetry, especially tragedy; also on philosophical and medical conceptions of madness); Dodds 1973 (ch. 3: *The Blessings of Madness*, on the cultural precedents for the divine types of madness in the *Phaedrus*); Mattes 1970 (madness in fifth century drama); O'Brien-Moore 1924 (on madness in Greek and Roman poetry, and popular conceptions of madness). See also the wide-ranging collection of essays in Bosman 2009 examining madness in medicine, literature, reception and military contexts.
3 Most recently, see Thumiger 2017a, 1-16 and cf. Ahonen 2014, 2-4.
complex 'psycho-physical' phenomenon.\(^4\) However, when it comes to philosophy, much attention is given to what we may call the underlying psychology of mental phenomena; that is, thinking about madness and other conditions in terms of the nature of the soul and the emotions and perceptions of the mind.\(^5\) There is good reason for this focus. Many ancient thinkers and schools have a distinct and highly specialised conception of the soul and its relationship to the body and the outside world. For this reason, it is considered important to understand madness within the context of a particular psychological theory, such as Platonic or Stoic psychology.\(^6\)

Instead of looking first to its psychological context, my study foregrounds the rhetorical context of the discussion of madness. I am primarily interested in each philosopher's argumentative and rhetorical use of madness, and my study is distinctive in approaching madness with a view not only to Socratic literature, but with an emphasis on how all three philosophers position their discussions of madness in relation to non-philosophical views. Since my argument is that the crowd's view is considered to be especially authoritative when it comes to madness, the immediately recognisable features of madness, such as social eccentricity, are often more straightforwardly relevant than its obscure psychological or moral dimensions. My approach is not to avoid psychological theory altogether, but to consider it when it is most relevant to engagement with non-philosophical views of madness and, more generally, to the rhetorical use of madness. For example, in Plato's *Phaedrus*, I am interested in what Plato says about the transformation of the philosopher's soul if only to make the case that this portrait is not supposed to contradict his earlier claims about madness, which are presented as non-controversial. Similarly, thinking about Stoic epistemology and moral psychology is important for explaining some of the distinctions within madness on the Stoic view, but I am more interested in how Stoic authors use these distinctions (e.g. by emphasising or denying them) for rhetorical effect.

\(^4\) See e.g. van der Eijk 2013, 309-10.
\(^6\) See e.g. Sassi 2013, 417-8 on madness in the *Timaeus* and Vogt 2013, 177-92 on madness across Plato's dialogues with a focus on the *Ion, Symposium, Republic, Phaedrus*, and *Philebus*. There is a great deal of recent scholarship which relates various mental conditions to philosophical theories of emotions: e.g., Fitzgerald 2008; Konstan 2006; Price 1995; Nussbaum 1994; Pigeaud 1981. For the connection between extreme emotions and madness in the Stoics, see Graver 2007, 109-32.
I will postpone detailed engagement with the scholarship until the three main chapters, but it is nevertheless helpful to draw attention to some of the most relevant recent discussions concerning these philosophers’ use of madness. There has been little written on madness in Xenophon, despite the fact that there are references to madness across all four books of the *Memorabilia*. The various commentaries do provide some important discussion (notably, Delatte, 1933; Gigon, 1953; Dorion and Bandini, 2000-2011), but most criticism deals with the topic only indirectly. The relative scarcity of scholarship on Xenophon’s philosophical works is largely due to the view, prevalent since the end of the nineteenth century, that Xenophon is not a serious Socratic thinker in his own right. Historically, this negative attitude arose from doubts surrounding Xenophon’s value as a Socratic source in the light of the ‘Socratic problem’, and has only been reinforced by later critics, most notably Gregory Vlastos. However, recent scholarship has aimed at the rehabilitation of Xenophon as an alternative and independent source for Socratic teaching in what has been described as the ‘struggle towards the re-establishment of Xenophon as a valid source for Socratic ideas and attitudes’. Moreover, since the ‘Socratic problem’ has become less urgent, it is no longer the case that Xenophon’s importance should rest on his value as a way of accessing the historical Socrates. My study of madness responds to two alternative criticisms levelled against Xenophon: that he represents Socrates as a dully conservative or conventional thinker, and that the *Memorabilia* as a whole represents a disorganised collection of

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7 e.g. Viano 2001 (on cosmology) and Vander Waerdt 1994 (on Aristophanic allusion). The exception is Flachbartová 2014, who discusses madness in Xenophon directly in the first part of her chapter ‘Diogenes of Sinope as Socrates mainomenos’ (339-17). However, Flachbartová interprets madness predominantly ‘in relation to self-control and bodily pleasures’ (312) on the basis of minimal textual evidence. In her key passage (*Mem.* 1.3.11), Socrates explains that because Critobulus has kissed someone beautiful, he is in danger of becoming a slave (δούλος) prone to harmful pleasures (βλαβερὰς ἡδονὰς) and compelled to pay attention to things that not even a maniac would care about (σπουδάζειν δ’ ἀναγκασθῆναι ἐφ’ οἷς οὐδ’ ἂν μαινόμενος σπουδάσειεν). If anything, this shows that Critobulus’ slavery and ἀκρασία are distinct from madness.

8 See Dorion 2006a, 93-4.

9 See Gregory Vlastos’ highly influential 1971 essay, *The Paradox of Socrates*. Vlastos presents four criteria (or ‘charges’) against which he judges Xenophon to be an ‘inferior’ or less reliable source for the historical Socrates: firstly that Xenophon’s presentation of Socrates lacks irony and paradox (though see Vlastos’ later recantation of this charge: Vlastos 1987), secondly that Xenophon’s Socrates is over-persuasive in the face of opposition, thirdly that Xenophon’s Socrates holds views on theology and theodicy which are incompatible with the Socrates of Plato, and fourthly that Xenophon’s Socrates advocates treating enemies badly. This kind of criticism can be traced back to Schleiermacher’s (1818) study.

10 Waterfield 1999, 79; for similar attitudes, see e.g. Boys-Stones and Rowe 2013, xii-xiii; Gray 2013, 21-2; Dorion 2006a, 93-109; Cooper 1999, 3; Gray 1998, 1-25.

11 See Dorion 2010.
Socratic wisdom. I show that Xenophon has a consistent conception of madness across the *Memorabilia*, and that although Xenophon’s Socrates engages with conventional wisdom in his discussion of madness, he does so in a much more interesting way than most criticism typically gives him credit for.

Plato’s *Phaedrus* has received substantially more attention in modern scholarship. However, much of this criticism has been concerned with the unity of the dialogue as a whole, and those studies which do have something to say about madness often have other subjects as their primary focus, such as the soul or love. Apart from some earlier treatments, such as those of Christopher Rowe (1990) and Josef Pieper (1964), it is only more recently that studies have taken up the topic of madness as their main concern. Most of the current debate surrounds the apparent problem posed by Socrates’ claim in the opening of his second speech that rational philosophy is a kind of madness. The issue is how rational philosophy and the madness criticised in Socrates’ first speech could both be forms of madness. Two articles by Dominic Scott and Daniel Werner (both 2011) echo Christopher Rowe’s earlier scepticism about the legitimacy of the connection between madness and philosophy, and suggest that Socrates has deliberately and disingenuously manipulated madness so as to make it include philosophical activity. More recently, Katja Vogt (2013) has suggested that madness and philosophy can be less problematically reconciled, but she does not address the serious concerns raised by Werner and Scott in a systematic way. I respond explicitly to the latter’s complaints that Socrates’ conception of madness is so stretched that its meaning is etiolated. In doing so, I suggest that Socrates conceives of madness as a genuine unity in the dialogue, and that this unity is not itself presented as particularly revisionist or problematic. Instead, Socrates shows how philosophical activity can be re-assessed without needing to distort the conventional attributes of madness (or, at least, those attributes which Socrates presents as conventional).

In both Xenophon and Plato, Socrates uses a conception of madness that is deliberately constrained by non-philosophical attitudes. I argue that both authors have good rhetorical reasons

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12 For Xenophon as a conventional thinker, see Vlastos 1971 and cf. Vlastos 1994, 14. For a systematic rebuttal of Vlastos’ claims, see Morrison 1987 and cf. Morrison 2010, 206. For criticism of the *Memorabilia*’s structural unity, see the summary in Gray 1998, 9-10.

13 See Vogt 2013, 177-92. In my opinion, her claims are overly cautious; see e.g. 182: ‘if rational madness is a general feature of human motivation, it counts as madness only in a relatively thin sense’.
for showing that Socrates is interested in conserving non-philosophical views about madness. Keeping such views intact allows Xenophon to make Socrates' interlocutors appear foolish by comparing them to people the crowd would supposedly call mad; comparing them to mad people does not identify them as mad, but on the contrary implies that they are not considered mad and that they are therefore in need of, and can benefit from, Socrates' help (actually mad people are beyond his help). In the *Phaedrus*, a 'conventional' account of madness has the effect of making Socrates' claims about the role of philosophical activity in the good life particularly compelling.

In my final chapter, I turn to Epictetus’ treatment of madness. While there is growing interest in madness in earlier Stoic doxography, there is hardly any scholarship which considers the question of madness in Epictetus. In my discussion of madness in the earlier Stoa, I am especially interested in showing that there is surprising latitude within the Stoic conception of madness. Perhaps unexpectedly, given the notorious Stoic doctrine that all fools are mad, Stoic authors accommodate a range of generally held distinctions within their conception of madness, and although this has been emphasised by some critics (most recently by Marke Ahonen), I have made this aspect the focus of my study. Like Xenophon and Plato, Stoic authors are interested in engaging with non-philosophical perspectives of madness for rhetorical reasons; this is true not only of later writers, such as Seneca, but also of early Stoics such as Chrysippus.

When it comes to madness, Epictetus also shows a willingness to recognise his audience's assumption that there is a gap between themselves and mad people. However, Epictetus is considerably less compromising than Xenophon or Plato, and while he engages with the popular view that madness has to do with an exceptional kind of error, he simultaneously tries to erase any distinction between subtle forms of moral error and mistakes in more obvious matters. For Epictetus, all such errors reflect a general failure to use impressions correctly, and so, from his own Stoic perspective, they are all equally mad. Epictetus harnesses his audience's views about mad people only to show that they are, in fact, mad from the point of view of Stoic doctrine.

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14 See especially: Tieleman 2003, ch. 4.7: 'Madness and Mental Blindness'; Graver 2007, ch. 6: 'Brutishness and Insanity'; Ahonen 2014, ch. 5: 'The Stoics on the Kinds of Madness'.

15 The most extensive study of Epictetus' psychology is a DPhil thesis by Allan Girdwood 1998: *Innovation and Development in the Psychology and Epistemology of Epictetus*, but madness is not a prominent subject of discussion.

16 Ahonen 2018, 341-64.
It is not unusual for Socrates to consider perspectives which are not his own, and it is common enough for Socratic conversation to begin from shared premises and ideas. This aspect of Socratic procedure is present in each of the three philosophers under discussion, but the key question, at least for Xenophon and Plato, is why Socrates should bring in views other than that of his interlocutor, such as those of the crowd or of poets. This may be a more difficult question for Plato than Xenophon. Xenophon’s Socrates is training his interlocutors for politics (1.6.15) or (3.1) helping a would-be general seeking election or (3.4) an unsuccessful candidate, or encouraging involvement in politics (3.7). For this reason it is not surprising that he speaks with an eye to what ordinary people think. In the Memorabilia, Socrates describes Odysseus with approval as a ‘no-risk speaker’ (ἀσφαλῆ ῥήτορα) and Xenophon explains that he directs his argument according to the opinions of human beings (διὰ τῶν δοκούντων τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἄγειν τοὺς λόγους, 4.6.15). Xenophon is also seen to emphasise Socrates’ conventionalism in the face of criticism for, near the beginning of the work, Socrates is accused of quoting the poets (here Hesiod and Homer) in order to subvert conventional values by promoting tyranny and denigrating the demos (Mem. 1.2.56-9). Xenophon protests this by showing that Socrates’ interpretations of the poets are hardly controversial, and asserts that Socrates promotes the interests of the demos and is a lover of human beings (καὶ δημοτικὸς καὶ φιλάνθρωπος, 1.2.60). For all his supposed conventionalism, however, Xenophon’s Socrates elsewhere demonstrates a surprisingly low estimation of the crowd and he does not typically let οἱ πολλοί constrain his views of his subject matter.

In contrast to the aspiring politicians and generals in Xenophon, many of Socrates’ interlocutors in Plato are other philosophers or sophists who have their own highly individual beliefs which are anything but conventional. Sometimes they are young Athenians (e.g. Charmides, Theaetetus, Lysis), who have not yet distinguished themselves, but have exceptional potential or distinction (good or bad) in their future. Plato is often seen to shape Socrates’ discussion according to his interlocutor’s views, but these views are hardly uncontroversial.

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17 See Morrison 2009, 113.
18 The adjective δημοτικός could also mean that Socrates does not put himself above the demos. See Pl. Euthyd. 303d-e where an argument that silences both the sophist and other people is δημοτικὸς, in that it does not put the sophist at an advantage over ordinary people.
19 See my discussion in the chapter on Xenophon, p. 39.
20 Plato’s Socrates typically tries to bring his interlocutor’s underlying assumptions under scrutiny so as to refute or transform them. Some critics (e.g. Vlastos 1983, 27-58) suggest that Socratic dialectic is designed to draw out his
Nevertheless, Plato’s Socrates can be viewed as carrying out a general transvaluation of conventional Greek values by co-opting them for philosophical purposes;21 moreover, he is sometimes seen to engage with popular views explicitly; for example, ὁ πολλοί are enlisted in Socrates’ discussion of virtue and courage in the Protagoras (352d–358a). In this complicated passage, however, the function of the many is not to constrain Socrates’ conception of virtue and courage; instead, it is to show that the idea that knowledge has overriding power in human psychology is not entirely eccentric, because even the many can be brought to agree with such an idea, given the hedonism to which they are shown to be committed.22 The many have a job in the dialectic, and help Socrates to manipulate the conversation with Protagoras and to reject the existence of ἀκρασία (358e),23 but their view does not constrain the topic under discussion (i.e. the nature of, and relationship between, the virtues), nor is it given authority; instead, they act as an imaginary or ‘fictional third party’ who are made to defend ἀκρασία and to endorse hedonism, a position which Socrates has already introduced.24 We will see that non-philosophical views are given considerably more weight in discussions of madness.

Plato also engages with a wide range of poetry and often depicts Socrates or one of his interlocutors quoting poetic material. This reflects the broader Greek cultural practice of excerpting poetic sayings or ῥήματα which carry traditional authority and are assumed to

interlocutor’s latent but true moral beliefs (for criticism, see Frede 1992), and others emphasise that Socrates is shown to be especially engaged with the beliefs of his interlocutors to the extent that his argument in particular dialogues is shaped by their views; see e.g. Stokes 1986, 182. On Socrates’ use of his contemporaries’ views in the Symposium, see Sheffield 2006. Cf. Long 2013 on the extent to which Plato’s evaluation of conversation changes in different dialogues; Plato does not invariably assume that conversation is essential for inquiry.

21 See Guthrie 1976, 120.
22 See Schofield 2010, XX–XXX; Schofield sets out possible interpretations of the passage. The argument depends on the hedonist thesis that the good and the pleasurable are identical. Either (1a) Socrates needs to be a hedonist to maintain his own intellectualist thesis, or (1b) Socrates is merely assuming the truth of hedonism in order to show that the many can be brought round to the intellectualist position, or (2) Socrates is showing that the many have hedonistic assumptions which make the intellectualist thesis inevitable.
23 See Schofield 2010, XXX; at the end of the discussion Socrates and Protagoras decide against the views of the many in favour of intellectualism (357d). See also Wolfsdorf 2006, 113–36; the popular conception is made to seem ridiculous because it is self-contradictory.
24 Socrates earlier fails to get Protagoras to defend the hedonist thesis (351d). The many do not necessarily hold the views being ascribed to them (cf. 351ε where it is implied that the many are not committed to hedonism). On Socrates’ strategy in this passage, see the Appendix (Hedonism in the Protagoras) in Annas 1999, 167–171, esp. 170: ‘hedonism, as we have seen, is not the actual position of the many, though they are made to defend it in argument.’ See Irwin 1995, 92 for the idea that ‘the many’ show that Socrates’ elenchus does not rely on the idiosyncratic beliefs of his interlocutors, but cf. Woolf 2002, 244–52, esp. 231–2 who suggests that Socrates is interested in the contradiction, shown by the many, between words and actions.
encapsulate ethical concepts. In Plato, however, the poets are not usually invoked in order to introduce an ethical subject into a dialogue, nor are they treated as singular authorities on a subject. Instead, poetic material is typically enlisted to add authority to ideas which have already been introduced into the discussion, and such material is usually subject to philosophical judgement. For example, in the Republic (4.441b-c), Socrates discusses the relationship between the parts of the soul, particularly between ‘reasoning’ (τὸ λογιστικόν) and ‘spirit’ (θυμός), and he quotes a passage from the Odyssey (20.17-18) in which Odysseus talks to his heart (κραδίη) to show that the soul really does have distinct parts. Here, as elsewhere, it appears that poetry is used to supply evidence for a psychological theory; however, the theory does not rise and fall on the basis of poetic testimony, and poetic authority is subordinated to philosophical argument.

Despite this tendency to engage with widely accepted views in Xenophon and in Plato, I intend to show that madness is an exceptional case. I want to resist the thinking that Xenophon’s use of popular views in his portrayal of madness is merely a straightforward and uninteresting instance of Socrates’ conventionalism, or that Plato’s invocation of the poets as authorities on love in the Phaedrus fits neatly into a pattern of poetic citation in which poetic authority is, at best, auxiliary. Likewise, I do not think that Socrates appeals to conventional criteria for madness merely to carry out a thinly veiled transvaluation of traditional Greek ideas. My contention is that there is something distinctive about discussions of madness which gives non-philosophical views a particular authority which they lack elsewhere.

Xenophon’s Socrates appears to give the crowd authority when it comes to madness; however, yielding to common views does not mean that he is being unreflectively conventional or conservative. Xenophon has good rhetorical reasons for wanting Socrates to take the crowd seriously. In the third Book of the Memorabilia, Xenophon places a popular view of what madness is alongside Socrates’ view of what is similar to madness (3.9.6-7). Because Socrates’ own conception is about what merely approximates to madness, the popular view is not undermined.

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27 Cf. Resp. 3.390d and Phd. 94d-95a.
28 See Halliwell 2000, 102, 107-8 on Phd. 94d-95a, esp. 107: ‘the poet may indeed be a respectable and even impressive witness in this context, but a case for the soul’s nature cannot invoke him in more than a secondary, confirmatory capacity.’
Socrates says that madness is opposed to wisdom (σοφία) and that it is not the same as ignorance. He adds that lack of self-knowledge and presumption are very close (ἐγγυτάτω) to madness. Socrates contrasts this with the popular view that mad people make mistakes in matters of common knowledge rather than in areas where most people are ignorant. On my interpretation of the passage, Socrates does not contradict the crowd’s view that madness is reserved for those who get obvious things wrong, and this is why presumption and self-ignorance are only compared to madness (unlike madness, they represent relatively common mistakes). In this way Socrates’ comparison adds considerable psychological sophistication to the portrait of madness by opening up a range of approximate and marginal states.

In Plato’s Phaedrus, there are several clues that Socrates’ portrait of madness is supposed to be compatible with non-philosophical views. I argue that Socrates’ invocation of Sappho and Anacreon in the interlude before his speeches (235c) signals that at least one kind of madness at play in the speeches (i.e. blameworthy madness) is implicitly derived from ideas contained in these poets. Later, Socrates purports to give a traditional account, which characterises another kind of madness that is divine and praiseworthy (244a) as enthusiasm, or inhabitation by a god. Generally, my aim is to show that Socrates combines these discrete kinds of madness into a unity to which he remains committed over the course of the speeches. This unity is drawn from non-philosophical discourses, and I suggest that the generic features of madness are supposed to be recognisable to the Athenian crowd.

At a behavioural level, madness is shown by reversal of convention (see 265a: ἐξαλλαγὴ τῶν εἰσοδήμων νομίμων), and this aspect of madness is obvious to the crowd, but madness also indicates an underlying psychology. It is with respect to its psychology that madness is divided into blameworthy and praiseworthy types, and it is in this more obscure area that the crowd sometimes gets confused. I argue that Socrates appeals to a popular caricature of philosophers, that they are eccentric or mad, to recast philosophy as a kind of praiseworthy and divine madness. In contrast to recent discussions of the Phaedrus, I show that this specialised conception of philosophical madness is not intended to damage or distort the generic concept of madness, and the idea that philosophers are mad is presented as compatible with conventional views. The crowd is right that the philosopher behaves madly, but they are wrong to blame the philosopher.
Socrates achieves a re-evaluation of philosophical madness by explaining the philosopher’s underlying psychology and illustrating the transformation of the philosopher’s soul which, through recollection, comes to resemble a god.

In neither the *Memorabilia* nor the *Phaedrus* does Socrates reject outright the idea that philosophers are mad; in each text, Socrates finds a way to make the idea of philosophical madness compatible with his own conception of philosophy. This shows that both Xenophon and Plato are willing to give rhetorical weight to what the crowd have to say about madness, and I suggest that they have their own particular motivations for doing so. There are several reasons for wanting to engage with popular views of madness, or rather (to stay neutral on the accuracy of the views attributed to ordinary people) with what the philosophers present as popular views.

One reason why philosophers might want to leave non-philosophical ideas about madness intact is because reversal of customary ways of doing things may be regarded as an essential characteristic of madness. In the *Phaedrus*, Socrates stipulates that at least one variety of madness has to do with such a reversal (265a), and if customary values have a definitional role in madness, this means that the crowd do indeed have something worthwhile to say. Unconventional behaviour will be clearest to the crowd, and will seem less pronounced to someone who is already socially eccentric, such as a philosopher. This gives the crowd a special authority when it comes to madness.

In addition, both Xenophon and Plato seem to be responding to a popular charge made against philosophers: i.e. that they are mad, and it is part of their apologetic agenda to defend Socrates against this stereotype. Apart from some caricatures of philosophers as eccentric in Aristophanes, the evidence for such a view is mostly found within Socratic dialogues. For example, near the beginning of Plato’s *Sophist* (216c2-d2) Socrates explains that philosophers are virtually as hard to recognise as gods (γένος ... τοῦ θεοῦ), and sometimes appear to be completely mad (ἔχοντες μανικῶς). In my analysis, I show that Xenophon and Plato each find a different way of responding to this sort of accusation.

If madness is simply equated with ignorance, it is easy to see why such a charge might stick to Socrates who is always professing his ignorance. This is one reason for Socrates to want to undermine the straightforward connection between madness and ignorance in Xenophon (3.9.6).
Although he does not actually call philosophers mad (Anaxagoras being the notable exception), Xenophon’s Socrates says that philosophers sometimes behave like mad people (1.1.13). Moreover, he explains that the madness comparison only applies to those philosophers who engage in highly speculative fields of study, such as cosmology (the comparison is appropriate for the natural scientists because their views are necessarily controversial). As for Socrates himself, he is shown to turn away from cosmology to study ‘human things’ (ἀνθρώπινα), and this means that he escapes being compared to a mad person. In Xenophon, Socrates can deflect the madness charge by appealing to profound differences between human and divine knowledge, and so between ethical and cosmological concerns. This represents one way of responding to the popular ridicule of those who spend time on questions outside of routine human concerns, while keeping the views of the crowd intact: by suggesting that only a certain kind of so-called philosopher is mad.

The same strategy is not available to Socrates in the *Phaedrus* because the strong contrast between ethical and cosmological knowledge is undermined by the imagery of the palinode, which presents the Forms of moral virtues as ‘elevated’ or in a realm ‘above’ the celestial.29 Plato’s Socrates uses an alternative approach: Socrates endorses the crowd’s assessment that philosophers are mad (shown by their eccentricity), but makes the suggestion that the crowd is unreliable when it comes to moral analysis: philosophers are mad, but they belong in the category of beneficial madness, rather than the blameworthy kind. Socrates allows the caricature of the mad philosopher to stand, but explains that, in the case of philosophy, madness is actually a good thing.

Another important advantage of engaging with the crowd’s view of madness appears most prominently in Xenophon’s work. In Plato, I argue that the apotreptic force of madness depends on the unreliability of the lover, but not on madness itself as an intrinsic source of harm. This is because Plato’s Socrates does not conceive of madness as unequivocally harmful. Xenophon’s approach is very different. By leaving the popular conception of madness more or less intact, Xenophon’s Socrates can take advantage of popular prejudices against mad people and redirect these at his rivals, the natural scientists. While this strategy helps to avert ridicule, invoking popular views also amplifies the apotreptic potential of madness. Socrates’ comparison functions

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29 Cf. *Resp.* 7.529a-c in which Socrates makes it clear that the Forms are not really ‘elevated’ in a spatial sense.
alongside the popular view of madness, and this emphasises that various characteristics really are similar to madness in terms which the crowd can be expected to understand. Because he does not undermine the popular view, Xenophon can harness popular attitudes about madness and extend these attitudes towards qualities identified by Socrates as similar to madness.

Although authentically mad people are shown to be unable to benefit from Socratic teaching (Socrates says at 1.2.50 that they should be imprisoned), by limiting the scope of madness proper to the exceptional cases identified by the crowd, Xenophon can expand Socrates’ benefits to a great many people who display mad-like behaviour, but who are not actually mad. Throughout the Memorabilia, we see Socrates trying to eliminate presumption and to set people on a path to self-knowledge; in showing that Socrates helps such people avoid madness, Xenophon highlights Socrates' usefulness. In this respect, Socrates' view of madness in Xenophon can be contrasted with that of Epictetus.

From Epictetus' uncompromising Stoic perspective, madness is very broad; he maintains that all those who are not wise are mad, and, since the Stoic sage is very rare indeed, this includes almost everyone. This does not mean that madness loses its apotreptic potential. In fact, I show that Epictetus uses a similar comparative approach to that found in Xenophon, but, unlike Xenophon, Epictetus cannot represent those who are mad as beyond the help of philosophical therapy and argument.

Epictetus' theory and practice resembles the Socratic elenchus and draws on the Stoic idea of common or innate preconceptions as a starting point for philosophical discussion. While Epictetus thinks that everyone has common concepts (e.g. of the good), people often fail to apply these concepts correctly in the absence of proper philosophical training. Much as in other Socratic writing, Epictetus is willing to engage with his interlocutor's beliefs up to a point, but he is determined to point out when such beliefs contradict each other. For Epictetus, humans are equipped with the resources necessary for their own improvement, and once their own views are expressed coherently and applied consistently, then the ways in which they are mistaken will

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39 On Epictetus' three styles (protreptic, elenctic and didactic), see Diss. 3.23.33. For the most thorough recent discussion of Epictetus' use of the Socratic elenchus, see Long 2002, 74-86.
become clear. Epictetus' strategy thus involves referring to generally held views only to show that such views often need to be revised.

Like Xenophon, Epictetus frequently makes a distinction between obvious and subtle kinds of mistake. For example, he recognises in *Discourses* 1.28 and 2.11 that there is a difference between making mistakes in matters of simple measurement (such as weight and height) and confusion in more obscure areas such as moral judgement. However, for Epictetus, such a distinction is made only to be collapsed. His goal is to bring his audience round to the view that there really is no difference between the apparently exceptional mistakes of those whom they typically think of as mad and their own moral ignorance, which is characteristic of all who are not wise. Where Xenophon uses approximation, saying that less obvious mistakes are similar to more obvious ones, Epictetus insists that they are identical. Instead of being encouraged to recognise their own similarity to those they consider mad, Epictetus' audience is made to realise that they are actually mad themselves.

For Xenophon and Plato, it is rhetorically advantageous to conserve a non-philosophical conception of madness. Epictetus is less compromising. Popular values and attitudes are not a good guide to Stoic moral reality, and Epictetus is invested in showing that conventional distinctions within madness are the result of flawed thinking. Yet even though the crowd's conception of madness is too narrow, Epictetus still thinks it has rhetorical value. Epictetus does not mean to replace the crowd's view; instead, he wants to show his audience that if they apply their own view of madness consistently, and with a correct understanding of the relevant Stoic doctrine, then they will need to revise the scope of madness considerably. In another *Discourse* (1.22), Epictetus seems to suggest that madness is a common preconception shared by everyone. The implication is that the crowd is simply bad at applying the concept of madness with any degree of precision, and it is Epictetus' belief that training in Stoic philosophy can help with this. Epictetus shows that obvious epistemological errors and more subtle errors in the sphere of moral action are both explained by indiscriminate assent to unexamined impressions. Because the underlying explanation is the same, they are both equally mad.

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My project shows that when it comes to discussions of madness in ancient philosophy, non-philosophical views have particular importance which has not been sufficiently recognised in previous scholarship. This is true not only for Xenophon, who has often been criticised for being overly conventional, but also for Plato who is typically seen to be revisionary, and for Stoics like Epictetus, whose doctrinal position might be thought to imply indifference to conventional attitudes. For all three of these philosophers, I show that non-philosophical views of madness remain rhetorically relevant, although for different reasons.

My chapter on the *Phaedrus* is considerably longer than the other two chapters, and this discrepancy is largely dictated by the heterogeneous nature of the texts I have chosen. In Xenophon, where there is relatively little scholarship, I bring together very short discussions of madness scattered over a larger work. Similarly for Epictetus; however, I devote much of my discussion and attention in the first part of the chapter on Epictetus to a discussion of madness within the Stoic doxographic tradition. In the *Phaedrus*, I am engaging with a more prominent, complicated and continuous discussion of madness on which there is considerably more scholarship.

Last, a note on terminology. In this study I have chosen to focus first and foremost on each author’s application of the term μανία and the related verb μαίνεσθαι. These are the most unambiguous general terms for madness in the authors under discussion, and μανία frequently stands in for a range of phenomena which can be also be described using alternative terminology. In those places where I have brought other vocabulary for madness into the discussion, I have usually done so on the basis of a strong textual link between the terms in question and μανία or μαίνεσθαι.

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32 A good overview of the Greek vocabulary for madness can be found in Jouanna 2013, 97-118. See also Thumiger 2013a, 72, words in brackets mine: ‘they (i.e. words of the μανία family) have the widest range of implications, and are loaded with traditional and every-day associations’. Cf. Padel 1995, 22.
Chapter One: Madness in Xenophon’s *Memorabilia*

1. Introduction

In this chapter I explain how Socrates uses psychological simile to characterise his philosophical opponents in Xenophon’s *Memorabilia*. Socrates compares the natural scientists who investigate the hidden causes of the heavens to mad people (τοὶς μανικένοις ὁμοίως, 1.1.13). The apotrepetic function of this characterisation in the opening of the work (often identified as having apologetic emphasis)\(^1\) is clarified by Socrates’ elaboration and amplification of its psychological terms in other sections, most notably in his discussion of madness in Book 3 (3.9.6-7) where he deliberately allows popular beliefs about common knowledge to constrain his terminology. Socrates’ deprecation of his rivals culminates in his description of Anaxagoras as a mad scientist towards the end the work (4.7.6-7).

My argument is framed by a larger critical project in recent scholarship aimed at treating Xenophon as a valuable and creative Socratic thinker in his own right.\(^2\) Xenophon’s Socrates has often been censured for his conventionalism; where the elenchus of Plato’s Socrates is revisionist, Xenophon’s Socrates is noted for being only too conventional, especially in his attitudes towards piety and friendship.\(^3\) In the first part of this chapter, I discuss Xenophon’s Socrates’ use of madness, and it is in these self-same spheres, Socrates’ piety and his treatment of enemies, that I think Xenophon’s Socrates demonstrates considerable innovation. Xenophon uses madness to contrast Socratic piety with the behaviour of his philosophical rivals, and makes an implicit comparison between the treatment of mad individuals and the treatment of personal enemies. While part of this characterisation will be seen to depend on conventional views, I hope to show that, far from being straightforwardly traditional, his use of these views is by no means

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\(^1\) For a detailed explanation of the ‘compositional fragmentation’ of the *Memorabilia*, see Gray 1998, 91 n. 10. The broad division is between the ‘apologetic’ section in Book 1 and rest of the work, apart from the conclusion to Book 4, as ‘apomnemonic’. The so-called apologetic parts of the work are signalled by direct references to Socrates’ accusers. The name *Ἀπομνημονεύματα* is given by Diogenes Laertius (DL 2.48).

\(^2\) See my discussion above, pp. 3-4.

\(^3\) e.g. Vlastos 1971, 1-21.
conventional. Although his apologetic purpose might be served by understating Socrates’ revisionism, my argument is not that it suits Xenophon’s apologetic strategy to downplay Socrates’ controversial aspects, but rather that Xenophon’s Socrates uses and exploits both convention and controversy to his own advantage.

I will show that Xenophon carefully distinguishes Socrates’ own characterisation of madness from what he presents as conventional wisdom (Socrates’ view is not identical to the crowd’s), while at the same time using popular beliefs for his own purposes as a philosophical tool. Even if Socratic madmen happen to coincide with those identified by popular wisdom, this does not mean that explanations of their behaviour are to be conflated (similarly, for example, his views on piety need not be reduced to the conventions of religious practice). The apparent conventionalism of his discussion of madness is revealed to be a feature which affords madness an apposite function within an apotreptic and therapeutic strategy that is philosophically interesting in its own right.

The criticism levelled against Xenophon’s Memorabilia is by no means restricted to his portrayal of Socrates and extends to the work as a whole. These sorts of criticism are concerned with problems of unity because of the apparent fragmentation of the text, especially the division between the narrative argument for the innocence of Socrates which constitutes the so-called apologetic part (1.1-2), and the rest of the work which is identified as a loose collection of wise sayings and Socratic teachings. I do not discuss general questions of unity at any length but it is likely that these problems have been overstated and that there is more artistic structure in the work than previously thought. Although the Memorabilia constitutes a series of self-contained discussions, it has been shown to be more than a disconnected collection of sokratikoi logoi or

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4 e.g. Morrison 2009, 113.
5 Here I am considering what is presented as conventional or popular, rather than making any claims about what is actually conventional. See my discussion above, p. 1.
7 For criticism of the work’s so-called bipartition see e.g. Chroust 1957, 44. For caution about this sort of criticism, see Gray 1998, 9-10.
8 See Dorion 2006a, esp. 99-100 for the view that the plan of the Memorabilia is based on the ‘progressive extension of Socrates’ usefulness’ (i.e. Socrates expands benefits to more and more people over the course of the Memorabilia). See also Gray 1998, 10; Gray suggests that the Memorabilia’s repetitions are a formal technique of amplification rather than a disruption of sequence, and demonstrates how the connections between parts of the work result in the artistic arrangement of the whole.
χρείαι, and its structural coherence is demonstrated primarily by the amplification and arrangement of various important themes.\(^9\)

One particular *topos*, the contrast between madness and wisdom, is identified early in the text as a habitual Socratic concern: Xenophon’s Socrates is characterised as more concerned with ‘human things’ (περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπείων ἀεὶ διελέγετο, 1.1.16)\(^{10}\) than he is with ‘the nature of everything’ (περὶ τῆς τῶν πάντων φύσεως, 1.1.14), and one of his habitual sets of anthropocentric questions has to do with the nature of σωφροσύνη and μανία (τί σωφροσύνη, τί μανία, 1.1.16). Despite its central position in Xenophon’s list of Socrates’ ‘human concerns’,\(^{11}\) this opposition between σωφροσύνη and μανία is not one which features consistently in the dialogues of Plato, nor has this contrast, central to Xenophon’s Socrates, received full criticism in terms of its treatment in the *Memorabilia*.

The potential difficulties with the text’s structural consistency problematise the task of looking for a single conception of madness within the *Memorabilia*. Even if the plan of the *Memorabilia* is appreciated, the episodic nature of the text, and its being structured around (a) particular kinds of benefit (such as making people pious or just) and (b) encounters with particular people, mean that the essence of madness is unlikely to be entirely clear. I survey the key passages in which Xenophon discusses madness, and investigate how Socrates uses madness in various ways. When taken together, these passages point towards a unified picture, and, in each example, Socrates refers to madness in a way that appeals simultaneously to his own specialised view and to the view of the unphilosophical crowd. My approach involves demonstrating how Socrates uses madness to identify specific targets, in particular the natural scientists, and looking at the ways in which Socrates relates his own characterisation to less specialised views.

The popular view of madness, that it is an uncommon sort of mistake about common matters, is relatively unsophisticated, whereas Socrates’ characterisation, in which madness is very close to specific kinds of mistakes, presumption and self-ignorance, is more subtle. Socrates’ view invites limited discussion of these adjacent qualities, self-ignorance and presumption, especially as they pertain to the cosmologists whom Socrates compares to mad people, and of how associated psychological terms adumbrate his portrayal. The passages which employ madness and

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\(^{10}\) Some mss. have ἀνθρωπίνων.

\(^{11}\) Madness and sanity are considered here to be the ‘central pair’. See O’Connor 1994, 170 n. 24.
similar states in the *Memorabilia* depend primarily on their popular currency for their dissuasive character. In addition, the structural continuity in the arrangement of these passages (especially those concerning the connections between cosmology and madness at the opening and close of the work) invites reading these discussions together.

In Book 1, Xenophon compares natural scientists (who speculate about the hidden causes that govern the cosmos) to mad people, and contrasts them with Socrates who turns his attention more usefully towards state custom and towards human matters.\(^{12}\) Xenophon’s Socrates has two clear sets of opponents in this section of the work: his pre-Socratic rivals and his various accusers.\(^{13}\) The character of Socrates elicited in the contrast with the cosmologists functions rhetorically as part of a defence against the formal opposition which rests on the well-known charges of impiety and corruption of the young.\(^{14}\) The introduction of the mad-like natural scientists as a negative paradigm for philosophical activity allows Xenophon to construct a positive model for philosophy, and to emphasise the social usefulness of Socrates’ behaviour.\(^{15}\)

Apart from at the opening and closing of the *Memorabilia* (1.1; 4.7), madness appears most prominently in a section in Book 3 dealing with various definitions (3.9); here madness is opposed to wisdom (σοφία), and compared to self-ignorance and presumption. Xenophon places Socrates’ remarks about madness side-by-side with a popular explanation in a way that draws attention both to the subtlety of the Socratic characterisation and to the simplicity of the popular definition. Despite their contrasts, it seems likely that these two positions are compatible, and that Socrates’ presentation of μανία is deliberately constrained so that it conforms to the popular view. Although Xenophon’s Socrates does not give his own positive account of madness, he does not endorse the explanation given by the crowd; instead, he supplies an approximate account which describes qualities that are ‘nearest’ to madness. Whereas Socrates’ characterisation is good at explaining his


\(^{13}\) These various accusers can be identified as those from the trial of Socrates in 399 and, in some sections, as later figures like Polycrates the sophist who is mentioned by Isocrates and who published the κατηγορία Σωκράτους after Socrates’ death (see Chroust 1957, 44). For a somewhat speculative reconstruction of the contents of the κατηγορία Σωκράτους, see Chroust 1957, 69-100. Among the later accusers, some are known and others are anonymous, see Gray 1998, 60.

\(^{14}\) See Chroust 1957, 45.

\(^{15}\) Socrates’ σωφροσύνη is mentioned by the god at Xen. *Ap*. 14. See e.g. *Mem*. 3.9.4 on σοφία and σωφροσύνη where σωφροσύνη describes acting as one ought. Socrates demonstrates his σωφροσύνη when he is a benefit to other people. For Socrates’ usefulness see 1.3.1 and esp. 4.1.1. Elsewhere Xenophon uses σωφροσύνη to mean something more like temperance, cf. e.g. Tuozzo 2011, 55.
use of ‘mad-like’ to describe the activities of his opponents (they are not actually mad), the popular view is the one which receives emphasis and which best serves his rhetorical purpose; moreover, it is useful for identifying certain extreme cases as actually mad.

At the end of the work (4.7.5-6), Xenophon reintroduces the question of cosmology and here his presentation is focussed on the usefulness of such knowledge: he admits a limited benefit to study of the heavens, but only insofar as this is useful to human activity (e.g. to measure the times and seasons). In this section, Xenophon targets a specific scientist for his useless pursuit of cosmology: Anaxagoras is described as mad (παρεφρόνησεν), having taken great pride (μέγιστον φρονήσας) in his investigation into divine machinery (τὰς τῶν θεῶν μηχανὰς), and his madness is connected with his particular claims (e.g. that the sun is fire, or is a red-hot stone). Just after this, Xenophon reaffirms the importance of divination and, signalling the structural closure of the work, returns to addressing Socrates’ accusers. The mention of the trial here at 4.8.1 (‘If anyone thinks ... let him consider ...’) recalls similar framing, marked by Xenophon’s introduction of Socrates’ accusers, both at the beginning of the first Book, and at 1.4.1 which signals the beginning of the so-called ‘apomnemoneutic’ section (‘If some think ... let them consider ...’).\(^\text{16}\) The structural role of these apologetic references together is to reinforce the links between separate parts of the work using ring composition.\(^\text{17}\) Madness is mentioned in each of these parts in connection with the activities of the natural scientists, and so forms an important part of this thematic and rhetorical linking.

While it is possible that Xenophon uses discrete characterisations of madness in isolated parts of the Memorabilia as a means of discussing different topics on an ad hoc basis, I suggest that a connected examination of the passages containing descriptions of madness is useful. Madness is used as a contrast term for representing Socrates’ relationship with his philosophical opponents, as a comparative term to designate problematic kinds of activity, but also as an object of enquiry in its own right. In Book 1, Socrates’ anthropocentric study both distinguishes him as sane and is itself concerned with questions about what madness is. The use of μανία (and closely related terms) as a means of characterising Socrates’ opponents (μωραίνοντας, 1.1.12; μαινομένοις, 1.1.13) and

\(^{16}\) See Gray 1998, 60; cf. n. 1 above.

\(^{17}\) Von Arnim (1923) and Hornstein (1914) have argued for the possibility that these sections (1.1–21 and 4.8.1) were once connected, but this should probably be rejected. See Gray 1998, 61-5, 157 and cf. Chroust 1957, 45.
its inclusion as a separate object of human study (μανία, 1.1.6) feature so closely in this text that a comparison between their roles is invited. Socrates’ definitional topics in Book 3 are potentially contextualised by the same list of human questions in Book 1, and his discussion of madness here (3.9.6-7) provides a useful framework for interpreting its role in other portions of the text. Socrates’ description of characteristics which are close to madness (presumption and self-ignorance) explains the comparative use of madness as a simile in Book 1, and aspects of the popular explanation provide a novel interpretation of the madness of Anaxagoras in Book 4. In this way, Xenophon gradually develops a unified picture of madness which helps bring together different parts of the work.

The controlling feature of Socrates’ characterisation is popular consensus: mad people are highly visible and get obvious things wrong. This is corroborated by Xenophon’s description of the Socratic method towards the end of the work (4.6.15): Socrates advances his argument in stages beginning from widely accepted premises (τὰ μάλιστα ὁμολογούμενα). On my view, Socrates co-opt the crowd’s identification of mad people and supplements this with his own claim about what is approximate to madness (i.e. that madness is the opposite of wisdom and close to presumption and self-ignorance). The resulting view is psychologically subtle, but nevertheless remains compatible with popular criteria; this means that Socrates’ targets become socially vulnerable.

This serves to distance not only Socrates, but also his potential followers (and critics) from the pre-Socratic scientists in Books 1 and 4, and forms part of a socially effective apotreptic strategy in which Socrates turns his students away from potentially dangerous pursuits like cosmology. The dissuasive efficacy of madness in the Memorabilia depends on its popular currency, and both Socrates and the crowd broadly agree on what madness looks like; however, Xenophon makes it simultaneously clear that, in terms of definitions, Socrates’ view is not identical to popular opinion. Madness thus provides an opportunity for Socrates to harness the rhetorical potential of conventional wisdom without giving it his endorsement.

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19 See Strauss 1972, 117 on Socrates’ ‘what is’ questions.
20 Cf. Gray 1998, 178-192 on Socrates’ positive image within the genre of wisdom literature. Grey (esp. 179) resists the idea that ‘rhetoric drives the image (of Socrates)’ in the Memorabilia.
Socrates’ use of approximation to circumscribe the phenomenon of madness allows a comparison to be drawn between mad people and the cosmologists by means of a nexus of qualities which are close to madness. For Socrates, the most important of these are given in the approximation in Book 3: self-ignorance and presumption, but others are brought out by the simile in Book 1. It is clear that madness can be compared to a breakdown in human consensus and the severity of this breakdown is emphasised by the radical differences between the positions of the natural philosophers, and by their failure to identify their own ignorance in presuming divine knowledge. Socrates’ approximation implies that there is a range of activities extending from ordinary human behaviour to madness; these states are strictly comparative because Socrates does not commit himself to a positive definition.

2. Comparing Madness: Socrates and the Cosmologists

Early in the first Book of the Memorabilia, Xenophon explains that Socrates distinguishes his own activities from those who ‘neglect human affairs and consider only divine things’ (ἢ τὰ μὲν ἄνθρωπα παρέντες, τὰ δαιμόνια δὲ σκοποῦντες, Mem. 1.1.12); moreover, he identifies this group as behaving like madmen towards one another (ἀλλὰ τοῖς μαινομένοις ὁμοίως διακεῖσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους), because of their lack of consensus in these matters which are impossible for humans to discover (ἐθαύμαζε δ’ εἰ μὴ φανερὸν αὐτοῖς ἔστιν, ὅτι ταῦτα οὐ δυνατὸν ἔστιν ἄνθρωποις εὑρεῖν, 1.1.13).

Socrates explains this by reference to the behaviour of the authentically mad (μαινόμενοι) which is characterised by delusion: some who are mad do not fear terrible things (τὰ δεινὰ) and others fear things which are not fearful (τὰ μὴ φοβερὰ). This causes them to act in peculiar and contradictory ways: some will say or do anything in a public crowd with no sense of shame, while others will not leave the house; some will honour neither temple nor altar, while others will worship all sorts of things (e.g. stones, logs of wood and wild beasts, 1.1.14).

Madness, then, seems to be shown by excessively contradictory behaviour that fails to respond to reality in a stable or reliable way. In these examples, madness is characterised by extreme emotions (having no fear, or having too much fear), or extreme practice (worshipping

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nothing, or worshipping too many things), but these examples also emphasise the social
dimension of madness. The mad person does not fit in with the crowd, or even with other mad
people (there is not a like-minded community of mad people, but there is a like-minded
community of sane people): the very fearful person withdraws from the public sphere, while the
person who lacks fear does strange things in public; similarly, the extremes of superstition and
atheism are contrasted with conventional practices of worship.

For Socrates, this sort of behavior is similar to that exhibited by the cosmologists who are
concerned with ‘divine things’ (τὰ δαιμόνια). Divine matters are beyond the limits placed on
human knowledge, and therefore nothing can be certain; this means that individuals do not hold
the same opinions as one another (οὐ ταὐτὰ δοξάζειν ἀλλήλοις, 1.1.13). This passage shows how
Socrates can exploit the idea of madness without actually predicating madness itself of his
opponents, or of the behaviour he criticises.

2.1. Madness and Disagreement

Xenophon provides examples of the cosmologists’ views, divided into sets of extreme oppositions:
for some natural philosophers, it seems that everything is one (ἓν μόνον τὸ έίναι) while, to others,
everything seems unlimited in number (ἄπειρα τὸ πλῆθος); some believe that all things are always
in motion, some that nothing ever moves; some that all things are created and destroyed, some
that nothing can be created or destroyed (1.1.14). The cosmologists’ different views are likely
supposed to correspond closely to the different types of mad people in the portrait Xenophon has
just given. It has been suggested that the particular examples of mad delusion and extreme
behaviour are compared and structurally coordinated to the various disagreements between the
pre-Socratic positions. On this interpretation, the connections within the contrasting Presocratic
views are emphasised: movement depends on whether reality is unlimited, non-movement
depends on it being one, and creation and destruction depends on movement. These
connections are paralleled in the case of mad people, whose fear (or lack thereof) drives their

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22 On the social context of religious worship, see below, p. 25 (and see below, p. 28 on Socrates’ religious conformity).
23 See Gigon 1953, 19; these are typical arguments made against the pre-Socratic Eleatics and atomists. Gigon identifies
the targets as Parmenides, Anaxagoras and Democritus.
24 See Berns 1974, 85.
behaviour in public, and possibly determines their practice of worship (causing them to honour either no gods or many). 25

Xenophon’s comparison of the cosmologists to mad people has presented problems to various critics; it is unclear what exactly about the natural philosophers makes them similar to mad people, and it is also unclear who Xenophon’s targets are. 26 Firstly, while Xenophon may have specific philosophers in mind (e.g. Parmenides, Anaxagoras or Democritus), he is trying to demonstrate Socrates’ general repudiation of cosmology, and I think it is unhelpful to view him as targeting any school in particular. 27 Secondly, the text itself implies that the comparison to madness depends on the disagreement between the philosophers (1.1.13-14):

‘Moreover, he marvelled at their blindness in not seeing that man cannot solve these riddles (i.e. τὰ δαίμονια); since even the most conceited talkers on these problems did not agree in their theories, but behaved to one another like madmen.’ 28

The structure of Xenophon’s comparison is clear: Socrates is astounded at the scientists’ inability to see that it is impossible for humans to discover τὰ δαίμονια (the nature of all things, the cosmos and the forces that govern celestial phenomena). 29 The outward effect of this inability is the disagreement between them, and it is because of their disagreement that they are disposed to one another like mad people. Xenophon’s objection is not to any specific doctrine; instead, the explicit point of comparison with madness is the disposition of the scientists characterised by their lack of consensus. Their ‘systematic disagreement’ and the controversial nature of their views are sufficient to make them resemble mad people. 30

25 For the similarity between the relationship of the mad person’s fears to their behaviour and the relationship between scientific claims (i.e. that the assertions are divided to form exclusive and opposing sets of positions deriving from beliefs about the one and the many), see Berns 1974, 85-6 and Gigon 1953, 19; cf. Flachbartová 2014, 313 who compares Pl. Resp. 7.530a-b. For the effects of fear on the mad person’s behaviour, see Viano 2001, 102.

26 Three notable explanations for the madness comparison are (1) the extreme or fantastical nature of their claims (see Gigon 1953, 23-21 who calls the comparison supremely awkward: ‘höchst ungeschickt’), (2) the fact of their disagreement, and (3) the distinction between divine knowledge (θεῖα) and human knowledge (ἀνθρώπινα) (Vander Waerdt 1994, 82).


28 Trans. modified from Marchant and Todd 2013.

29 Cf. Mem. 1.1.11.

30 See Vander Waerdt 1994, 82 who concedes this possibility, but prefers the madness comparison to rest on the distinction between divine and human knowledge (see above, n. 26).
The disagreement between the scientists is qualified and reinforced by various features that are shared by the mad people which Xenophon describes. Since the scientists are said to behave like madmen, these similarities suggest further refinements to Xenophon’s portrait of madness. The scientists’ disagreement is set out in pairs of extreme contrasts and their views are exclusively opposed. The radical nature of their claims is a way of making the disagreement more profound: both the scientists and the mad people lack middle ground, and this suggests one quality of madness.\(^3\) Importantly, the disagreement is also characterised as impossible to resolve (1.1.13: ταῦτα οὐ δυνατόν ἐστιν ἀνθρώποις εὑρεῖν): the particular domain of the scientists’ speculation is not one in which human consensus is attainable, and in this sense their individual commitment to specific cosmological beliefs is irrational.\(^3\)

The division between divine and human knowledge which guarantees the scientists’ disagreement also invites another comparison, between the scientists and another kind of potentially mad activity: divinatory malpractice. It is helpful for Xenophon’s Socrates, charged with impiety, to connect madness with improper religious action.

2.2. Madness and Divination

In Xenophon’s example (1.1.14), mad activity is explained in terms of disproportionate fears that affect the mad person’s behaviour in two quite distinct spheres: the social (resulting in either public shamelessness or private seclusion) and the religious (resulting in either superstition or atheism). While the practice of religious worship has a clear social context, the beliefs which motivate religious behaviour concern objects that are not usually accessible to human intelligence. The demarcation of these two dimensions, social and religious, helps Xenophon to distinguish between the comprehensively mad and those who, like the scientists, are merely eccentric, because they exhibit symptoms (i.e. disagreement) in only a limited field.

\(^3\) See Viano 2001, 102.
\(^3\) Cf. Flachbartová 2014, 310-11.
Although madness need not always have a religious dimension, Socrates’ relationship with scientific speculation can be considered in terms of the charges of impiety against him.\(^{33}\) Consequently, madness in Xenophon is sometimes seen to manifest as an extreme emotional response to the gods in particular. Extreme fear or extreme lack of fear is, in this religious dimension, productive of either acute superstition or total atheism which affects the practice of worship in extreme ways. Sometimes, then, madness takes the form of extreme impiety, and Socratic activity, by contrast, demonstrates practice which conforms to civic worship.

In addition to its contrast with Socratic piety, mad religious beliefs correspond to the natural scientists’ explanations of the cosmos: in each case, such knowledge is impossible to attain for mortals. What makes the scientists’ behaviour mad-like is the extremity of their views, and this modifies the nature of the scientists’ disagreement. The disagreement involves a systematised failure of knowledge, and the lack of consensus among the scientists serves as an index of the impossibility of attaining knowledge of nature in particular.\(^{34}\) The extremity of the scientists’ positions is shown by antithetical contrasts, and it is the impossibility of attaining this sort of knowledge (i.e. about the workings of the cosmos) which necessitates their ongoing and irresolvable disagreement: the scientists are making presumptuous claims about objects of knowledge which are not available to human beings and therefore not amenable to consensus.

The scientists’ behaviour resulting from their cosmological presumptions is similar to the impiety of the mad person who, because of his extreme and incorrect beliefs about the gods, practises worship incorrectly: in each case, neither recognises the limits of their knowledge. However, social conformity provides a means to distinguish between scientific speculation and mad religious practices: religious behaviour is characterised by established communal protocol (in which disruptions are easily spotted), and worship is typically directed at the state gods;\(^{35}\) by contrast, although cosmology is a popular topic among speakers (οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ τῆς τῶν πάντων φύσεως, ἤπερ τῶν ἄλλων οἱ πλείστοι, 1.1.11), its subject matter is typically esoteric and highly contentious.


\(^{34}\) See Dorion and Bandini 2000, 6 n. 36.

\(^{35}\) The objects of Socrates’ religious practice are also the state gods (ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεούς, 1.1.2), contradicting the charge that Socrates introduced novel deities (1.1.1).
There are various Socratic objections to the natural philosophers’ scientific pursuits at the expense of human affairs. The most important is their inability to detect that knowledge about the causes of celestial phenomena is impossible (as Socrates explains at 1.1.13), and their madness is characterised, accordingly, as a failure to recognise the limitations of human knowledge. Xenophon’s comparison between disagreement and μανία depends on the idea that divine knowledge is impossible for human beings to attain. In this example, the comparison between natural philosophers, who speculate about hidden cosmological causes of things, and the authentically mad has to do with the areas of knowledge involved, and the authentically mad has to do with the areas of knowledge involved, and depends on an opposition between θεῖα and ἀνθρώπινα (between divine and human matters).

Xenophon draws attention to this opposition in his discussions of divination (1.1.7–9) and scientific motivation (1.1.15). Human skills can be learnt to practical advantage: those who have learnt a particular skill within the domain of human knowledge (οἱ τἀνθρώπεια μανθάνοντες, 1.1.15) believe that they will be able to practise it for personal ends. Do those who seek divine things (τὰ θεῖα), asks Socrates, imagine they will be able to harness cosmic forces to do their bidding? Or are they content merely to understand their hidden causes with no practical advantage? The failure to recognise the appropriate distinction between objects knowable by humans and those knowable only by gods appears to be a sufficient reason for diagnosing a kind of irrationality, and this is also identified in those who fail to practise divination properly.

Socrates’ treatment of different kinds of knowledge forms part of the defence against the charge of religious non-conformity. Divine information is revealed to Socrates through the signs given by his δαιμόνιον and this is compared by Xenophon to various common divinatory practices through signs (the consultation of birds of omen, sayings, portents and sacrificial victims). The passage on divination reveals objects of divine knowledge apart from scientific speculation.

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36 See Vander Waerdt 1994, 81 (the objections are the subjects of 1.1.12, 1.1.13 and 1.1.15 respectively). Cf. Dorion and Bandini 2000, 6 n. 32 and Gigon 1953, 18–21.
38 See Vander Waerdt 1994, 82, words in brackets mine: ‘the logic of this argument (that madness is similar to disagreement) appears to rely on Socrates’ assertion at 1.1.13 that discovery of the causes of celestial phenomena is in some sense impossible for human beings.’ Vander Waerdt finds this reliance problematic.
39 This is probably an ‘ironic question’. Cf. Gigon 1953, 21. But cf. e.g. Empedocles DK 22 B11 in which the philosopher claims to teach various powers and, possibly, how to control cosmic forces (on Empedocles’ special powers see Kingsley 1995, 217–32, 296–316); cf. also Ar. Nub. 266.
40 See Gigon 1953, 21.
41 *Mem* 1.1.3–4: ἀλλὰ τούς θεοὺς διὰ τούτων αὐτὰ σημαίνειν, κάκεινος δὲ σῶτος ἐνόμιζεν.
Socrates distinguishes between matters of learning which can be attained by human understanding (πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα μαθήματα καὶ ἀνθρώπου γνώμη ἄρετα ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι, 1.1.7-8; e.g. the various crafts, including building, smithing, farming, ruling and being a general) and the things the gods reserve for themselves (τοὺς θεοὺς ἐαυτοῖς καταλείπεσθαι, 1.1.8) which are unclear to humans. These unclear things include questions about the unforeseeable in general, and good future outcomes in particular.  

Becoming skilled in the various crafts is available to human learning and understanding, but managing or directing these skillsets ‘for the best’ (καλῶς οἰκήσειν, 1.1.7) requires divination in addition (μαντικῆς προσδεῖσθαι, 1.1.7). Those who think that particular crafts are wholly objects of human understanding and who fail to realise that there are related unforeseeable factors for humans (and fail to realise that these are objects of divine knowledge) are themselves irrational (δαιμονᾶν), as are those who use divination for the kind of information which is available to humans through learning. The message is summarised by Xenophon in 1.1.9: divination should only be used for the things which are not clear to human beings (δὲ δὲ μὴ δῆλα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐστὶ, 1.1.9) and those who cannot distinguish between objects of divine knowledge and matters of human understanding are said to be acting unlawfully (ἀθέμιτα, 1.1.9).

The position of the scientists is analogous to the position of those who practise divination incorrectly; moreover, each of these positions is represented as a set of profound category mistakes in estimation. The scientists either overestimate the extent of their knowledge about human things (believing they have complete human knowledge), and so they turn to objects of divine knowledge, thinking that undiscernables are discoverable, and that they can know

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42 See Vander Waerdt 1994, 83.
43 See Dorion and Bandini 2000, 58, n. 25. The idea, that human wisdom (ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία) can be surpassed through divination, recurs in the Memorabilia at 4.7.10 and features in the Cyropaedia. Dorion notes the similar wording of Xen. Cyr. 1.6.23 (διὰ μαντικῆς ἐν παρὰ θεῶν πυνθάνομεν) and Mem. 1.1.9 (διὰ μαντικῆς παρὰ τῶν θεῶν πυνθάνεσθαι). Cf. Pl. Lach. 198d-199a on the art of being a general being finer than and therefore commanding the practice of divination in respect of military matters and cf. Pl. Alc. 1.107a-b. These examples present a different view from that of Socrates in Xenophon: in these Platonic examples, divination, along with the other crafts, has its own discrete epistemic objects. See Labadie 2014, 145 n. 215.
44 The similar word brings out the paradox: ignoring the divine objects that inhere in human things is to be mad in a manner resembling divine possession. Cf. Bonnette 2014, 152 n. 20. “To be crazy” (daimonan) is from the same root as daimonion ... and means “to be possessed by a divinity.” Cf. O’Brien-Moore 1924, 15-16: ‘to a scholiast on Aristophanes δαιμονικόν serves as an explanatory synonym for μανικόν.’ The reference is to Schol. ad. Aristoph. Plat. 424-
everything about all things; or, they consciously undervalue the importance of knowledge about human things, and so turn to objects of divine knowledge (1.1.12). Those who get divination wrong either overestimate the extent of human knowledge (thinking that undiscoverables are discoverable, and that they can know everything about all things on their own), or they underestimate the extent of human knowledge (thinking that discoverables are undiscoverable, and that they are unable to gain knowledge about human things, 1.1.9).

The parallel example of those making errors in divination contributes to Xenophon's simile of cosmological madness: just as the scientists present a similar failure to recognise the limits of human experience and knowledge, so they might share in similar modes of irrationality. In Xenophon's representation, scientific speculation is often at the expense of knowledge of human things and the scientists' failure to properly distinguish between θεῖα and ἀνθρώπινα results in neglect of human concerns and obstruction of anthropocentric efforts (1.1.12). This is directly contrasted to Xenophon's representation of the Socratic project in which Socrates turns towards human things. With this anthropocentric focus in mind, it is worth considering to what extent Socrates is shown to attach importance to conventional views about madness.

3. Socrates' Conventionalism

In Xenophon's example of the mad person (1.1.14), madness takes place in the public arena (ἐν ὀχλῷ 1.1.14); the mistakes of those who venerate sticks and stones are assessed within the context of civic worship (temples and altars, ο ὔθ' ἱερὸν ο ὔτε βωμ ὸν 1.1.14), and in a later discussion with Euthydemus, the best veneration of the gods is revealed by Socrates, referencing the Delphic oracle, to be state custom (νόμῳ πόλεως 4.3.16). The state laws are a good guide for just action (4.4.12-13), and Socrates' attitudes about madness are clearly part of a defence against the charge of religious non-conformity. Mad people get worship wrong, whereas Socrates is described as having sacrificed both at home and at the common altars of the city (1.1.2); he was also seen practising

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47 See Berns 1974, 86-7 who emphasises 'the Socratic thinker's insistence on doing justice to the cognitive significance of common, ordinary experience.'
divination via the 'signs' given by his δαιμόνιον (1.1.2-4). Xenophon explains that Socrates lived ever in the open (ἐν τῷ φανερῷ, 1.1.10) and that his piety was beyond reproach (1.1.11); by contrast, mad people are often socially conspicuous because of their lack of conformity, and Socrates elsewhere points out the high visibility of the madman in a crowd.

Sometimes, however, the mad person is invisible and noted for their refusal to enter human society, but in each case the mad person’s behaviour is characterised by social difference or lack of conformity; people can readily detect that there is something wrong with authentically mad individuals and, in Xenophon’s schema, their actions betray opinions about reality which fall outside of human consensus. In his comparison, Xenophon does not describe the interpersonal behaviour of the natural scientists, only stating that it is characterised by disagreement. Extreme mistakes do lead to extreme behaviour (in the case of the actually mad), but disagreement is the most visible and straightforward outward sign of dysfunction, and the comparison emphasises the broad intelligibility of madness. Xenophon’s and Socrates’ usage of the term μανία is intentionally non-esoteric and does not require specialist knowledge: this is a typical part of Socrates’ approach in Xenophon and one which has received criticism for being essentially non-Socratic.

In Book 4 (4.6.15), Xenophon makes Socrates speak favourably about Odysseus, explaining that Homer calls him a ‘no-risk speaker’ (ἀσφαλῆ ῥήτορα) because of his ability to develop an argument based on peoples’ commonly held opinions (ὡς ἰκανὸν αὐτὸν ὄντα διὰ τῶν δοκούντων τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀγεν τοὺς λόγους). Xenophon says that Socrates ‘refers back’ (i.e. to the starting hypothesis) in his argument (τῶν λόγων ἐπαναγομένων) such that even his opponents see the truth, and explains further that Socrates advances his elenchus in stages, beginning from the most widely agreed upon premises (τὰ μάλιστα ὑμολογούμενα). These remarks about Socrates’ method

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48 Cf. Socrates’ dispute with Aristodemus the dwarf which is based on the fact that Aristodemus does not pray to the gods, make sacrifices or practise divination (Mem. 1.4.2) – in fact he mocks these and is a radical skeptic.
49 In this section, Socrates’ piety is emphasised in terms of his own visibility (see Vlastos 1994, 15) – i.e. he is visibly not mad.
50 See Socrates’ conversation with a cavalry man in Book 3 (Mem. 3.3.1-2). Socrates questions his motives in desiring to be a cavalry commander: is it to ride in front? In fact bowmen ride in front. Is it for the sake of being recognised? Madmen, says Socrates, are also recognised by all.
53 See Morrison 1987, 15: ‘Socrates uses widely-accepted premises because these are premises his interlocutors can be expected to accept’, and cf. e.g. Zeller 1877, 121 who depicts Socrates as appealing ‘to the common opinions of men’. This depiction earned criticism from Vlastos (see Vlastos 1994, 16).
are preceded by a paradigmatic dialogue (about which of two candidates makes the better citizen) where Socrates is shown to refer his argument back to preliminary presuppositions (ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἐπανήγεν ἂν πάντα τὸν λόγον ὃδέ πως, 4.6.13).

The Homeric reference (4.6.15) is to Odysseus’ contest with Euryalus in the Phaeacian games when Odysseus responds to Euryalus’ presumptuous attack on his athletic abilities by calling his remarks reckless (ἀτάσθαλος, 8.166); he explains the presumably uncontroversial view that different sorts of people have different gifts, and that some who seem physically weak may possess an exceptional gift with words. Such a person, unlike Euryalus, speaks without risk of reproach (ἀσφαλέως ἀγορεύει, 8.171) and is highly visible in the public crowd (who look upon him like a god, 8.173). Odysseus’ delineation of different sorts of people is itself an example of exactly that sort of good speech which only some possess. Similarly, Xenophon’s account of Socrates’ method relates not only to the form of the example dialogue, but also to its content. One of the qualities of the good citizen (ἀγαθὸς πολίτης) listed in the dialogue is that he puts an end to strife and produces harmony (ὁ στάσεις τε παύων καὶ ὁμόνοιαν ἐμποιῶν, 4.6.14) just as the dialogue itself is demonstrative of a method, special to Socrates, which produces the greatest agreement from its hearers (τοὺς ἀκούοντας ὁμολογοῦντας παρεῖχε, 4.6.15). Xenophon’s Socrates is clearly just the sort of good citizen who is capable of eliminating dissent and ensuring agreement, and his particular method for doing so depends on recourse to commonly held views.

One reason for Xenophon to draw attention to this feature in the work is because of its apologetic design: the Socrates of the Memorabilia needs to appeal to conventional Athenian attitudes, and these conventional aspects are emphasised while the less conventional aspects receive reduced emphasis.54 However, the Memorabilia should not be reduced to a defence against Socrates’ various accusers; the work’s apologetic character is not the only reason for Xenophon to emphasise these aspects. He presents Socrates as beneficial, not just innocent or harmless:

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54 See Morrison 2009, 113 and Morrison 1987, 19. Cf. Gray 1998, 91: ‘the whole work is “apologetic” to the extent that the opposition remains a major focus.’
Socrates trains others for politics (1.6.15), so he had better be able to engage with, and help others engage with, commonly held beliefs.55

Although Socrates’ discussion of madness does not explicitly begin from shared premises, his views about madness are nevertheless developed by referring to its noncontroversial characteristics. Socrates’ persuasiveness depends on his ability to relate his argument to common opinion, and when madness is characterised as disagreement, it is accessible to the crowd (we can all agree on what disagreement looks like). Such disagreement is also paradigmatically disruptive and counterproductive of the kind of agreement which Socrates’ method itself aims to achieve. In this way madness is directly opposed to the wisdom which Socratic elenchus is designed to stimulate. Madness is something which Socrates needs to exclude, and the highly visible features of madness allow him to construct a negative portrayal of particular opponents which will meet with broad popular disapproval.

In the next section, I discuss the apotreptic character of madness. Xenophon’s Socrates advocates treating enemies badly and characterises them as useless because they are incapable of improvement and therefore impervious to the benefits of Socratic teaching. Socrates’ discussion of mad people is remarkably similar: the ignorant, he says, should be taught by those who know more, whereas it is advantageous for the mad to be imprisoned.

4. Rejecting Madness: Socratic Apotreptic

What scientists have in common with those who practise divination incorrectly is that they presume a kind of knowledge which is reserved for the gods. The impossibility of consensus in this area of knowledge makes disagreement inevitable, because the opposing positions of the scientists cannot be materially corrected. This means that their disagreement is particularly recalcitrant and involves profound ignorance. Socrates makes a similar observation about madness elsewhere (1.2.50): he says that those who are ignorant of what they ought to know (τοὺς μὴ ἐπισταμένους τὰ δέοντα) should be taught by those who know more, whereas it is advantageous for the mad to be imprisoned.

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55 Cf. Dorion 2006a, 94-6 on the rehabilitation of Xenophon as a serious moral philosopher. On the limitations that have prevented a reading of the Socrates of the Memorabilia as e.g. a political moralist (following Strauss), see Ausland 2006.
imprisoned, both for themselves, and for the sake of their friends (καὶ τοὺς μὲν μαθημένους ἔτοιμο
συμφερόντως ἀν δεδέσθαι καὶ ἑαυτὸς καὶ τοῖς φίλοις). Mad individuals are, he says, unable to be taught.  

In this way, Xenophon’s Socrates explicitly limits madness to include only extreme cases, and this narrow definition opens up marginal or approximate states which are similar (but not identical) to madness. Approximate states include various kinds of ignorance, but whereas those who are ignorant are still able to benefit from the kinds of philosophical investigation carried out by Xenophon’s Socrates, people who are mad are excluded from the Socratic community. In the Memorabilia, Xenophon is interested in emphasising Socrates’ usefulness; this means that restricting madness to extreme cases is philosophically advantageous, because it limits the amount of people who might fall into this category and who would, therefore, be unable to benefit from Socratic teaching. This gives Xenophon a reason independent of convention for restricting the number of mad people. For Xenophon’s Socrates, madness lies outside the scope of Socratic usefulness and is delimited from other species of ignorance which are amenable to philosophical intervention.

4.1. Madness and Enemies

Socrates’ statement about imprisoning the mad is in response to an insinuation by his accuser (ὁ κατήγορος) that he encouraged the young to imprison their fathers on grounds of senility (παράνοια, 1.2.49), and is surely connected to the subsequent allegation concerning Socrates’ treatment of family and friends (1.2.51-55). Socrates’ accuser claims that Socrates treats his friends well according to their utility, and that only those who both know what they ought to do and can provide an account for their actions are eligible to receive honour. Repeatedly in the Memorabilia, Socrates advises helping friends and harming enemies. This is broadly compatible

[^56]: Socrates does not hold that the less ignorant can keep the more ignorant incarcerated, because this would mean the least ignorant person could imprison everyone else. Whereas it is advantageous for the mad to be locked up, it is beneficial for the ignorant to learn from those who know more. Cf. Pl. Ap. 29a-b.
[^57]: Cf. Flachbartová 2014, 313.
[^58]: Cf. Sassi 2013, 419, 423.
[^59]: Here the accuser is possibly Polycrates; see Dorion 2006, 269. This particular usage of παράνοια, meaning ‘senile deterioration’, is commonplace. See Lewis 1970, 2 and cf. Pl. Leg. 11.928e2 and 11.929d7.
[^60]: Both discussions contrast those who are ignorant with those who are knowledgeable of τὰ δέοντα.
with Greek popular morality, and in the present passage, Socrates emphasises the connection between valued friendship and usefulness (1.2.53).\(^{63}\)

Socrates uses the example (1.2.54) of burying the corpses of friends and family or, oneself being one’s own best friend, getting rid of useless parts of the body like nail-clippings, hair and calluses, or spitting out saliva which is of no use (ὤφελεῖ μὲν ὁ ὑδὲν) when it is retained in the mouth and often harmful (βλάπτει). Xenophon clarifies that this does not imply that one should bury one’s father alive or cut oneself to pieces, but shows that what is not rational (τὸ ἄφρον) is not a proper object of respect (ἀτιμόν ἐστι); this urges people to become wiser (φρονιμώτατον) and more useful (ὤφελιμώτατον), so as to be better candidates for friendship.\(^{62}\)

Although it seems as though specific technical knowledge is what makes friends useful (1.2.51-55),\(^{63}\) Xenophon elsewhere demonstrates that the basis for friends’ usefulness is self-control (with regard to corporeal pleasures and desires), or ἐγκράτεια.\(^{64}\) Virtue is also shown to depend on ἐγκράτεια and it is likely that virtue forms the basis of utility in friendship.\(^{66}\) By contrast, enemies lack virtue and self-control. Socrates’ personal vituperation of his own enemies, the natural scientists, should be understood within this context: the scientists’ knowledge represents useless learning,\(^{67}\) but both Socrates’ assertion that those who practise divination incorrectly are acting unlawfully and his comparison of the scientists to mad people seem to be more universal in their application. Although the forensic context of 1.2.50 is quite specific (see above, p. 32), Socrates appears to be making a general claim here about madness and ignorance.

Xenophon explains that the sort of argument in the present passage often (πολλάκις) led Socrates to examine the difference between madness and ignorance. Socrates’ verdict that mad people should be incarcerated is thus presented as part of a general claim about madness and ignorance.

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\(^{63}\) On the conventional stance, see Morrison 2009, 115, Dorion 2006a, 96 and Vlastos 1994, 15. Cf. e.g. Pl. Men. 71ε and Pl. Crī. 49c. On friends and usefulness, see Dorion 2006b, 270.

\(^{62}\) Parents are not included among φίλοι by default, but only according to their usefulness. See Dorion and Bandini 2000, 23 n. 164. Cf. Pl. Lys. 210c-d.

\(^{64}\) Cf. Dorion 2006b, 270.

\(^{65}\) At Mem. 1.5.4-5 Xenophon’s Socrates asserts that ἐγκράτεια is the foundation of virtue (cf. Mem. 1.6.9 and 4.5.10). See Dorion 2003 generally; cf. Dorion 2007, 123 and Dorion 2006b, 275-7.

\(^{66}\) Cf. Dorion 2006a, 97.

\(^{67}\) See Mem. 1.1.5; the cosmologists’ knowledge represents useless learning, whereas human skills can be learnt to practical advantage. Cf. Gigon 1953, 21.
ignorance. Although the juxtaposition of 1.2.50 and 1.2.51-5 makes an implicit comparison between mad people and personal enemies (or, at least, between mad people and poor candidates for friendship), mad people are not the same as enemies; they are to be excluded from society at large. Mad people are useless in general and should be jettisoned like toenail-clippings or like saliva (which needs to be spat out) because they are unable to be redeemed: their inability to improve is what makes them thoroughly useless and they are therefore excluded from Socrates’ moral community.68

4.2. Madness and Ridicule

Although the scientists are not actually mad, their disagreement is bound, for reasons outlined above, to be especially recalcitrant, and while their study is incapable of reaching human consensus (even with Socratic assistance), they can nevertheless be turned away from such pursuits, and towards better suited fields of study. The Memorabilia has a pronounced apotreptic or dissuasive character,69 and Xenophon uses the verb ἀποτρέπειν to describe Socrates’ attempts to restrain his followers from bodily desire, as in the case of Critias (1.2.29-30). The same term is used for Socrates’ discouragement of deceitful pretensions among his companions (ἀλαζονείας ἀποτρέπων τοὺς συνόντας, 1.7.1). Making a false knowledge claim results in exposure to ridicule as an imposter (ἐλεγχθήσεται γελοῖος ὃν ... ἀνθρώπος ἀλαζῶν, 1.7.2), and elsewhere in the text (3.6.1), Glaucon is in danger of becoming a laughing stock (καταγέλαστον) on account of his aspirations to oratory and statecraft without having the requisite knowledge.70

Here it is appropriate to compare the deceptive claims of the natural philosophers whom Socrates ridicules.71 The scientists display the kind of presumption and attract the kind of ridicule which Socrates’ apotreptic is designed to help his followers avoid, and in the final Book Xenophon

68 Cf. Morrison 1987, 18: ‘thus the only people whom the good man will regard as enemies, and hence treat badly, are the thoroughly bad people, the useless ones. But they are just the people whom it is impossible to benefit. These people are useless. They cannot improve, for if they could improve they would not be useless.’

69 For interpretations of the work based its protreptic or ‘proagic’ see Gray 1998, 77 and 123; and see Erbse 1961, 274. For its apotreptic character, cf. e.g. Collins 2015, 32 who points out that Demetrius’ On Style 296-298 isolates three separate protreptic styles characterised by particular authors: ‘Aristippus (accusation), Xenophon (admonition), and Socrates (elenctic and aporetic)’.

70 Socrates manages to ‘check’ (ἔπαυσεν) Glaucon’s behaviour in time to prevent ridicule (3.6.2).

depicts Socrates as turning his followers away (ἰσχυρῶς ἀπέτρεπεν) from studying astronomy and cosmology (4.7.5-6). Socrates' deprecation of the kinds of study practised by his rivals is reinforced by references to madness: the cosmologists are compared to mad people, and Anaxagoras, in particular, is said to have gone mad as a result of his explanations of divine machinery (4.7.6).

Madness functions as a powerful apotreptic in the scheme of Socratic education precisely because ridicule is the kind of thing people (especially would-be politicians) wish to avoid: Socrates uses the threat of ridicule to dissuade his followers from particular courses of action. In the first Book of the Memorabilia, the natural philosophers are called foolish (μωραίνοντας, 1.1.11) because they are anxious (μεριμνώντων, 1.1.14) about celestial causes. In the final Book, one who is anxious (μεριμνώντα, 4.7.6) about such things runs the risk of insanity like Anaxagoras. The clear connection between these passages is discussed later in this chapter (p. 46); of interest here is the fact that they both appear to allude to Aristophanes' Clouds, in which Socrates appears as an object of ridicule. Xenophon's use of μεριμνώντα alludes to Aristophanes' coinage 'μεριμνοφροντιστής' in Strepsiades' description of the philosophers to his son Pheidippides (101).

In Aristophanes, Socrates' interests in cosmology are only too clear: Socrates appears suspended in the air, and from this vantage point, away from the earth, he examines the sun and other celestial phenomena (τὰ μετέωρα πράγματα, 228). When Strepsiades encounters Socrates' followers, they are engaged in all sorts of obscure enquiry, including a farcical account of Socratic astronomy (193-4). Further, Socrates himself is seen as someone who thinks he can control meteorological phenomena (266), particularly the Clouds who are addressed as natural deities.

Of course, Socrates' remarks here form part of a prayer and are not strictly cosmological; nevertheless, Xenophon's Socrates (who turns away from cosmology) stands in quite clear

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72 See my discussion of Anaxagoras' madness below, pp. 45-49.
73 Hence protreptic towards philosophy and apotreptic away from bad objects of study.
74 These passages are linked by Dorion and Bandini 2011b (49 n. 6, on 4.7.6: μεριμνῶντα). The reference to Aristophanes is reinforced by φροντίζω (cf. φροντιστήν 4.7.6). See O'Connor 1994, 169-170 and esp. 169 n. 22 on φροντίζω and μεριμνάω; cf. Classen 1984, 158 on φροντίζω.
75 Cf. the later charge that Socrates introduced novel divinities (Mem. 1.1.1; Pl. Ap. 24b). Strepsiades observes that he must have been mad (ἐμαινόμην) to throw out the gods on account of Socrates (Ar. Nub. 1476); see Stokes 2012, 264-5.
opposition to Aristophanes’ portrait. Xenophon harnesses attitudes towards the comic Socrates who is interested in cosmology and transfers these to Socrates’ rivals, the natural philosophers.

The allusion serves both to emphasise Socrates’ own sanity, by distancing him from his pre-Socratic rivals, and to counteract the particular negative portrayal of Socrates as a ridiculous cosmologist in Aristophanes’ Clouds. I think that one reason for Xenophon’s focus on disagreement per se as a sign of madness is that it protects Socrates from engaging in specifics of the cosmological debate (i.e. from becoming his Aristophanic caricature). If Socrates identifies a particular scientific claim as crazy, or commits himself to one of the cosmologists’ indefensible positions, this would be to enter the realm of specious scientific speculation and thereby Socrates would himself run the risk of madness. Instead, madness is used defensively to circumscribe the activities of Socrates’ opponents and to distance them from Socrates in the eyes of his accusers. Just as comic representations of madness need to have broad appeal to be effective, so Socrates’ characterisation of madness in the Memorabilia needs to be intelligible at a popular level in order for it to constitute a compelling apotreptic.

I turn now to a key passage in the third Book in the Memorabilia which helps to shed light on the relationship between Socrates’ views about madness and popular opinion.

5. Constraining Madness: Socrates and the Crowd (Mem. 3.9.6-7)

In the third Book of Xenophon’s Memorabilia, Socrates provides what looks like a definition of madness. In fact, Socrates explains what is closest to madness, and it is the many, not Socrates, who supply a positive definition of madness. It has been observed that the part of the text in which this definition is contained (3.8-14) does not seem to have the organised purpose or general

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77 Cf. Vander Waerdt 1994, 75-86.
78 On Socrates’ response in Plato to this portrayal (Pl. Ap. 19c and Pl. Phd. 70C), see Halliwell 2015, 4-6 and cf. Konstan 2011, 75-90. Aristophanes’ parody is most likely distinct from any historical charges against Socrates.
thrust which many of the other parts of the work exhibit. I reproduce the definition here (3.9.6-7):

‘He said, moreover, that madness is opposed to wisdom (ἐναντίον ... σοφία); however, he did not call ignorance madness. Not knowing yourself, and to believe and to suppose that you know what you do not, these he put closest to madness (ἐγγυτάτω μανίας). He said that the many, however, do not call mad those who make mistakes in matters of which most are ignorant (ἀνέπιστημοσύνη), but they call mad those who make mistakes in matters which the many know (ὅπως ἡ γνώσει των πολλῶν).

For if someone supposes himself to be so tall as to stoop when he goes through the gateways in the city wall, or so strong as to try to lift houses, or applies himself to another of the things that are clearly impossible to everybody, they say he's mad, but he who makes a mistake about small matters does not appear to the many to be mad, but, just as they call strong desire ἔρως, so they call large παράνοια madness.

The only information about madness that Socrates himself provides in this passage is that it is opposed to wisdom (ἐναντίον ... σοφία), that it is not the same as ignorance (ἀνεπιστημοσύνη), and that it is closest (ἐγγυτάτω) both to presumption of knowledge and to lack of self-knowledge. It is not at all clear from the text whether Socrates endorses the sayings of the many or not, and the Socratic madman might turn out to be different from the popular madman who stoops to pass under city gates or who tries to lift houses.

According to the many, the magnitude of a mistake appears to relate to whether or not it concerns common knowledge (ἢ πολλοί γιγνώσκουσιν), that is, whether it is a common or uncommon sort of mistake. There seems to be an implicit similarity between a ‘mistake about small matters’ (τοὺς μικρῶν διαμαρτάνοντας) and a mistake in matters which most fail to know (ἤ μὲν οἱ πλεῖστοι ἁγνοοῦσιν), since neither of these indicates madness, and an implicit affinity between a ‘great παράνοια’ (τὴν μεγάλην παράνοιαν), presumably, given the context, a mistake about large matters, and a mistake in matters that the many know (ὁ πολλοί γιγνώσκουσι) since both of these characterise the mad.82

80 See e.g. Bonnette 2014, XX; Johnson 2009, 214; Strauss 1972, 74, 117.
81 One ms. reads μικρὸν (= ‘a small mistake’), but I do not think this changes my interpretation. I follow the text in Dorion and Bandini 2011a; on the textual transmission, see Bandini’s supplementary essay ‘Histoire du texte’ (IX-XIV).
82 It is unclear from the text whether δὲ (τοὺς δὲ μικρῶν διαμαρτάνοντας, 3.9.7) implies an identity, for the many, between a mistake in common areas of knowledge and a large παράνοια (or whether a similar identity exists between a common sort of error and a ‘small’ mistake). Although the many might have discrete ways of
There is something psychologically wrong in making a mistake, and the passage seems to assume that error and παράνοια are synonymous. For the many, when error or παράνοια is enlarged (i.e. when it is socially abnormal), it becomes μανία, just as ἔρως describes an enlargement of ἐπιθυμία. Here, madness describes an intellectual failure in matters of common knowledge (everyone knows you cannot lift houses, etc.), and consequently its position is socially delimited: a mistake is egregious when it is out of the ordinary, or is evidence of madness when the resulting behaviour looks abnormal to almost everyone else. Madness, in this popular sense, is necessarily socially recognisable, and we should recall Socrates’ earlier remarks in the same Book that mad individuals are recognised by everybody (οἱ μαινόμενοι γε υπὸ πάντων γιγνώσκονται, 3.3.1).83

This presentation, in which madness is a condition obvious and recognisable to most people, incidentally seems to prevent the Stoic paradox (‘all fools are mad’) in which everyone apart from the sage possesses impaired rationality (both morally and epistemically): for the Stoics, nearly everyone is said to be ‘mad’ in a psychological or social sense in terms of their susceptibility to emotion and their inability to construct appropriate beliefs about their experience of the outside world. Yet Stoic thinking is often drawn from Socratic material. In my final chapter, I explore the subtlety behind the apparently strong Stoic claim that all fools are mad, and show that there is room within the Stoic account of madness for a thinker like Epictetus to adopt an approach which is similar to Xenophon’s.84 It may of course be the case that Socrates of the Memorabilia believes, against the opinions of the many, that minor or common errors do indeed constitute a kind of madness,85 but what he says, speaking for himself, is that problems like presumption and self-ignorance (which are common and are found repeatedly among Socrates’ opponents) are only near to madness.86 His use of approximation demonstrates that he does not wish to expand madness to include all errors, and that he is choosing for his vocabulary to be constrained by the popular view.

83 See above, n. 50 on p. 29.
84 On the Socratic descent of the Stoics, see generally Long 2013 and Striker 1994. For Xenophon as a source of reflection among the early Stoics, see DL 7.2 (Zeno turns to philosophy after reading the second Book for Xenophon’s Memorabilia); cf. DeFilippo and Mitsis 1994, 252-71.
85 e.g. Ahonen 2014, 45 n. 36.
The surrounding definitions (of courage, wisdom, justice, envy and leisure) do not feature the opinions of the many, and the appearance of these opinions in the definition of madness is striking and unexpected. There is no scholarly consensus as to how the views of Socrates are related to the popular view (or indeed whether there is any distinction between them), but this is surely not the result of confused attribution since it is made unambiguously clear by repeated reference which parts of the passage are transmitted by Socrates and which parts by the many.87 Recent critics generally assume the views of Socrates and of the many to be one and the same, reporting, for example, that in this passage Socrates connects μανία with ‘extreme deviance’88 or that, for Socrates, μανία involves ‘making errors in regard to matters that everyone knows to be true; for example, a person who imagines that he is too tall to pass through the gates of the city.’89 However, there is no precedent in the Memorabilia for Socrates endorsing the views of the many, and often Socrates demonstrates a low estimation of the crowd.

For example, at 2.4 the many (τοὺς πολλούς) say one thing and do another: they agree that acquiring friends is prized above other forms of acquisition but fail to attend to this important activity (2.4.1), and they are bad at identifying their friends while proclaiming the importance of friendship (2.4.2-3). At 3.5.18 Socrates compares the wickedness of the Athenians to a disease (πονηρία νοσεῖν Ἀθηναίους), and later in the same Book (3.7.5-6) observes that craftsmen (such as fullers, carpenters, smiths, farmers and merchants) are included among the weakest and most senseless (ἀφρονεστάτοις τε καὶ ἀσθενεστάτοις) as opposed to those who have first place in the city. Speakers in the assembly are often ridiculed even though they may speak correctly (3.7.8),90 and lack of self-knowledge is described as an error which most people make (οἱ πλεῖστοι ἁμαρτάνουσιν) because they are distracted by other matters (3.7.9).

87 Hartman 1888 rejects these paragraphs altogether because, in his estimation, they only transmit the popular view, cf. Joël 1893 who questions whether Xenophon has represented the perspective of Socrates accurately here and suggests that he has modified the Socratic definition to match the popular perspective (i.e. that the Socratic definition is a false attribution). Most recently, see Delatte 1933, 123-4 who points out that we might just as well come to the conclusion, following this sort of argument, that the popular perspective has been modified to match the Socratic one and been misattributed.
88 Sassi 2013, 419-20. Presumably translating τὴν μεγάλην παράνοιαν. Sassi elaborates that μανία ‘is restricted to cases of the individual’s total incapability to cope both with external reality and with himself. While I agree with Sassi’s later observation (423) on 1.2.50 about limiting madness to cover extreme cases, I cannot see how these general remarks on 3.9.6-7 are supported by the text.
90 Cf. Socrates’ parody of Euthydemus in the Assembly which prompts laughter (Mem. 4.2.4-5).
For this reason, it seems likely that the adversative (second μέντοι, 3.9.6) is used to contrast the Socratic conception of madness with the popular explanation.\(^9\) While Socrates would probably agree that the popular identification is compatible with his own (the crowd can recognise a mad person), his brief characterisation is psychologically more sophisticated. A notable contrast is that while the many provide a positive account of what μανία is (identifying it simultaneously as a large παράνοια and as an unusual error), Socrates provides only a negative account, opposing μανία to σοφία (which has itself received a positive definition in the preceding sections of the text), together with an approximation (what is nearest to madness). Socrates’ account does not evaluate madness in terms of social peculiarity; rather, madness is closer to particular sorts of error (presumption/delusion of knowledge) or an error about a particular object (the self).

Socrates’ reluctance to commit himself to a positive account of μανία simultaneously signals the important moral point being made about good knowledge claims: they should avoid the perils of presumption.\(^9\) The many supply a positive definition without explaining what makes one sort of error ‘mad’ and another sort of error negligible, except by self-referencing their own collective behaviour as normative (since it is against the behaviour of the many that, according to the many, errors should be assessed). The self-referential argument betrays the superficial and presumptuous basis of their explanation which depends on the high visibility of the mad person in a crowd.\(^9\) The many, like Socrates’ various interlocutors throughout the same Book (and the Memorabilia generally), are making a claim about something without showing proper understanding, and ironically, Socrates has just explained that there is something psychologically wrong in making presumptuous claims of this sort. The crowd recognises what madness looks like without knowing what makes someone mad, or how someone becomes mad (beyond simply getting ordinary things wrong).

I think that the logical sequence of the passage is as follows: the crowd think that madness is making a socially abnormal error (like the person who thinks he can lift houses), whereas for Socrates, this sort of behaviour cannot be explained so simply. Socrates is not satisfied that

\(^9\) Cf. e.g. Mem. 3.6.16.
\(^9\) See above, n. 50 on p. 29.
madness is defined as a mistake that happens to be socially abnormal, and distinguishes a special kind of ignorance (while madness is not the same as ignorance, editors agree that madness must include some form of ignorance). Instead of saying that madness is marked by excessively strange behaviour, Socrates explains that it is closer to especially recalcitrant intellectual delusion and a failure of self-knowledge. For Socrates, presumption and self-ignorance are nearest to madness (ἐγγυτάτω μανίας), and this provides some clarification as to how madness might be distinct from ignorance per se: a specific object of ignorance is involved (i.e. the self) as is a particular kind of ignorance (i.e. presumption, or to suppose that you know what you do not); importantly however, these species of ignorance do not in themselves qualify as madness.

In the passage, the many get the last word. The textual sequence shows that Socrates does not override the opinion of the crowd, but instead chooses to emphasise this alternative account of μανία, which unlike his includes a definition. It is worthwhile considering just how stipulative Xenophon intends Socrates to be at this point in the text. Even though Socrates does not endorse the views of the many, it is useful to his purpose if he allows general opinion to constrain his usage of the word in various contexts. Even if Socrates believes that presumption and ignorance are identified with madness, he resists using his own idiosyncratic interpretation of the word (e.g. saying to his opponents: ‘I do not think you know yourself, therefore you are mad’). Socrates refrains from using madness to describe such people, and the reason for hesitating is because most people would not call presumption of knowledge madness.

Xenophon is interested in defending Socrates against various charges, and his portrayal of Socrates’ distinction between madness and ignorance may be a response to a Polycratean allegation based on Antisthenian-Cynic teachings that madness is identical to ignorance. However, the distance between madness and ignorance allows Xenophon to emphasise Socrates’ social usefulness. Madness is limited only to those whose behaviour is conspicuously deviant, and this restricts the amount of people who are beyond the reach of Socratic help.

94 e.g. Chernyakhovskaya 2014, 124-5 n. 77, and Dorion and Bandini 2003, 354 n. 14.
95 A similar argument is made about Socrates’ rejection of the view that everyone is mad (τοὺς ἄφρονας μαίνεσθαι) in the Second Alcibiades (139c), though this may in response to Stoic views (see my discussion below, p. 128 in my chapter on Epictetus and the Stoics).
By describing what is closest to madness, Socrates indicates that madness must be similar (for what else could ‘nearest’ imply?) to self-ignorance and presumption, but not identical.\footnote{Xenophon uses ‘ἐγγυτάτω’ only once elsewhere in the work in a similar context in terms of approaching godlikeness in respect of ἐγκράτεια or self-mastery (1.6.10).} Someone who is presumptuous or self-ignorant is not actually mad but may resemble a mad person. This is one explanation for Socrates’ reluctance to use madness to characterise his opponents directly, and for his use of madness as a simile in these contexts (as in the description of the mad-like behavior of the natural scientists). He may usefully compare them to mad people, but he does not actually call them mad. By leaving the crowd’s definition intact, Socrates can harness popular attitudes about madness in his discussion of psychologically approximate states: by drawing attention to behaviour which resembles madness, Socrates is able to dissuade those around him from dangerous courses of action.

6. Approximating Madness

While the basic fact of the cosmologists’ disagreement in Book 1 is analogous to mad behaviour, it is clear that various aspects are foregrounded in Socrates’ comparison (e.g. systematic and unresolvable disagreement, radical or extreme behaviour linked to large mistakes, a failure to recognise the limitations of human knowledge, neglect of human concerns, and lack of social conformity). The features, which make the disagreement between the scientists a special case, are less accessible to the Athenian crowd than the disagreement itself (the popular view describes only highly visible errors). We saw that Socrates develops the portrait of the natural scientists beyond simple disagreement, and much of the subtlety of his characterisation can be explained by Socrates’ approximation at 3.9.6-7; that is, presumption, self-ignorance, and being opposed to wisdom help to explain what in the scientists’ disagreement makes them similar to mad people, but these aspects are often less clear to the crowd.

Those who are similar to mad people (but who are not actually mad) present outward signs which are less obviously unusual than the genuinely mad. For example, in the case of the natural scientists, those features which explain why their disagreement is similar to madness also obscure the disagreement from straightforward social analysis. The fact that the controversial
opinions of the scientists have to do with objects of uncommon knowledge in which human consensus is impossible (because the gods choose not to reveal this information to mortals), simultaneously makes their beliefs presumptuous (because they claim to know more than is possible for humans), but the domain of their ignorance also ensures that there is no way of measuring the content of their different views against social conformity. On the popular view of madness (3.9.6-7), it would be mad for someone to think they can understand the cosmos only if most people recognise that this is impossible. The theories themselves (e.g. everything is one) do not make someone mad. The cosmologists are presumptuous (μέγα φρονε ἖ν, 1.1.13) in making false claims to knowledge, and they exhibit self-ignorance when they make a mistake about their own powers and limitations as human beings; however, Socrates’ socially constrained conception of madness means that these sorts of mistakes are not called mad, because they are in matters which most fail to know.97

In what follows, I will look briefly at how Socrates characterises self-ignorance in the Memorabilia more generally. Socrates’ concept of self-knowledge in Xenophon is contested, and it is often unclear whether he has his eye on moral ignorance.98 Sometimes self-knowledge has one’s physical or technical abilities as its objects,99 and Socrates’ usefulness in the Memorabilia is not limited to moral advice: he also offers teaching to various professionals (including a hetaira, Theodote, 3.11.1-18). I think that Socrates’ distinction between specialised forms of self-knowledge (moral and technical), and ‘cruder’ forms of self-knowledge helps to explain the difference between those who are mad and those who merely act like mad people.

6.1. Self-ignorance

Speaking to Charmides, Socrates states that most people are ignorant of themselves (αἱ οἱ πλεῖστοι ἁμαρτάνουσιν, 3.7-9). If self-ignorance is a common mistake, it does not qualify as madness

97 i.e. most people would not be expected to have knowledge about such matters (e.g. whether or not all things are one), the scientists’ presumption in this area is unusual (the many do not make similar claims to knowledge about such matters), but their theories do not contradict what most people know. The connection between 3.9.6-7 and 1.1.11-14 is noted by Dorion and Bandini 2000, 92 n. 2. However, this observation is frustrated their analysis which equivocates between madness (‘fous’) and behaving like madmen (μαινομένοις ἡμεῖς).
98 For general discussion, see Moore 2015a.
according to the popular definition at 3.9.6-7. The mad person, in the popular conception, who stoops under the city gates or who tries to lift houses does lack a crude or basic kind of self-knowledge (such a person presumes to know his own strength or height, when in fact he is ignorant); however, because these are mistakes in areas which most people know, they must be relatively uncommon errors (this is why the crowd call them mad). By contrast, self-ignorance is said by Socrates only to approximate to madness, and, if the crowd’s distinction between common and uncommon knowledge is accurate, this implies that self-ignorance refers to a more esoteric field, such as moral knowledge. Socrates chides Charmides for behaviour similar to the mad person of 1.1.14: Charmides betrays disproportionate fears when it comes to speaking in private and in public (3.7.4). According to Socrates, Charmides behaves like someone who can beat trained athletes, but who fears amateurs (3.7.7).

It is true that Xenophon describes self-ignorance as not knowing one’s own powers (ὁ μὴ εἰδὼς τὴν αὑτοῦ δύναμιν ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτόν) as they relate to one’s physical or technical abilities (4.2.25). However, in the same passage (4.2.24-30), Socrates emphasises other forms of self-knowledge: he asks Euthydemus if self-knowledge is knowledge of one’s name or knowledge of one’s own powers as they relate to usefulness (4.2.25). The second alternative appeals to Euthydemus, and it turns out that self-knowledge is related to a range of fields, from ‘crude’ knowledge about one’s strength or height to more complicated technical and moral knowledge (e.g. about one’s choice of career or about whether or not one will be useful). Sometimes Xenophon expresses the outcomes of self-knowledge in moral terms; for example, he explains that humans come to good (ἀγαθά) through self-knowledge, and much harm (κακά) through self-deception (4.2.26). Moreover, those who do not know themselves are said to miss the good and fall into evil (4.2.27-8). In the next part of the text, Socrates suggests to Euthydemus that he begin his search for self-knowledge by investigating knowledge of good and evil, and it is in this area that Euthydemus seems most unsure of himself (and most in danger of being worse than a slave, 4.2.31).

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100 Cf. Xenophon’s earlier discussion of the distinction between human and divine knowledge (1.1.9). There measuring and weighing (ἐπιμετρήσαντας ἢ στήσαντας) fall into the general category of human knowledge.

101 Delatte 1933, 124 makes a similar suggestion.

102 Charmides is trying to evade public ridicule since, as he says, the Assembly laugh even at a sound argument (3.7.8).

103 On the amplification of ‘usefulness’ in the work generally, see Gray 1998, 10.

104 See Moore 2015a, 397: ‘knowing yourself means coming to act on the basis of your knowledge of justice and goodness, and acting on this basis frees you from a self-imposed enslavement.’
Socrates’ distinction between different kinds of self-knowledge helps to explain the madness comparison: the authentically mad person lacks extremely rudimentary self-knowledge, while many of Socrates’ interlocutors lack more sophisticated knowledge of other areas to do with themselves. The similarity between these species of ignorance allows Socrates to identify a range of approximate states by means of the comparison to madness, and because the comparison refers to the popular view, it is designed to be appreciated by the crowd. Socrates can use the comparison to madness as an apotreptic to help his audience recognise their own flaws.

6.2. Anaxagoras

An important nuance of Socrates’ use of approximation in his characterisation at 3.9.6-7 is the implication that there are various states or stages between madness and ordinary behaviour. For the many, madness is a clear-cut distinction: a person is either mad or is not. However, Socrates’ use of approximation suggests that he considers marginal cases: one person might be closer to madness than another. Later in the Memorabilia, Socrates warns philosophers not to search out those secrets of the heavens which the gods have chosen not to humans to reveal because this runs the risk of insanity (κινδυνεύσαι ... παραφρονήσαι 4.7.6). The target here is Anaxagoras, and Xenophon’s use of παραφρονέω is a pun connecting madness with the great pride (μέγιστον φρονήσας) Anaxagoras takes in his cosmic explanations. It is worth looking at the passage in full (4.7.6-7):

‘And he turned one away wholly (ὅλως ... ἀπέτρεπεν) from becoming a thinker about the way in which the god contrives each of the heavenly things. For he held that these things are not discoverable by human beings, and he believed that the one who sought what the gods did not wish to make clear would not gratify them. And he said that the one who was anxious (μεριμνῶντα) about these things would run the risk of actually going out of his mind (κινδυνεύσαι ... παραφρονήσαι) no less than Anaxagoras went out of his mind (παρεφρόνησεν), he who took the greatest pride (μέγιστον φρονήσας) in explaining the contrivances of the gods.

For when he said that fire and sun were the same thing he was ignorant (ἠγνόει) of the fact that human beings easily gaze upon the fire but are unable to look directly at the sun; and that those who have the sun shine upon them have darker skin, but not those who have fire shine on them. And he was ignorant (ἠγνόει) also of the fact that none of the things growing from the earth could nobly increase in size without the sun’s ray, but that they all perish when heated by fire. And when he asserted that the sun is a glowing stone
he was ignorant (ἠγνόει) also of this, that a stone in fire neither shines nor holds out for a long time, while the sun persists through all time while shining most brightly of all.105

In the passage, Socrates turns people away from thinking (φροντιστ ὴν γίγνεσθαι ἀπέτρεπεν) about how the deity contrives celestial phenomena because these things cannot be discovered by human beings, and one who is anxious (μεριμνῶντα) about such things runs the risk of insanity like Anaxagoras.106 It is clear that Anaxagoras’ contentions should be connected to the views of the natural philosophers of Book 1 who are plagued by the same anxiety (τῶν τε περὶ τῆς τῶν πάντων φύσεως μεριμνῶντων, 1.1.14).107 Anaxagoras’ ‘great pride’ or presumption (μέγιστον φρονήσας, 4.7.6) resembles the ‘great pride’ of these thinkers (μέγιστον φρονοῦντας, 1.1.13) and similar general claims about the inaccessibility to humans of the hidden causes of divine machinery (τὰ δαιμόνια) are made in each section (1.1.13; 4.7.6). In both of these parts of the work, madness clearly has to do with a distinction between human and divine knowledge, that is, between the sorts of knowledge that humans are able to gain and the sorts which are impossible to gain. Anaxagoras may be the paradigm of this failure, but this does not explain why Anaxagoras is called mad while the natural philosophers are only compared to mad people.

Some critics read Anaxagoras’ madness as the result of some kind of transgression followed by divine punishment,108 but the content of the passage in addition to its position near the end of the work suggest that it should be read in connection with different parts of the Memorabilia as a whole. I have already shown that the comparison of the cosmologists to mad people at 1.1.13-14 depends primarily on their disagreement, and that the mad-like psychology of the natural scientists is elucidated by Socrates’ discussion at 3.9.6-7 of self-ignorance and presumption as very close to madness. The comparison to madness applies both to the natural scientists and to the many themselves: both groups are characterised by ignorance and presumption.109 However, the contrast between divine and human knowledge, which helps to

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105 Trans. modified from Bonette 2014.
106 Thinking about the cosmos (φροντιστὴν, 4.7.6) should be compared with Anaxagoras’ madness (παραφρονήσας, 4.7.6). Anaxagoras was thinking, but thinking wrongly.
107 For the connection between these passages and their allusion to Aristophanes Clouds see n. 74 above.
108 Presumably this is a result of the failure of this activity to please the gods (ἑοῖς χαρίζεσθαι δύνατα). For this reading, see e.g. Falcon 2003, 111-2; Sallis 1996, 37. Cf. Mem. 1.4.16 on the gods’ abilities to harm human beings.
109 See Berns 1974, 88, but cf. Dorion and Bandini 2011a, 92 n. 2 (on 3.9.6). Dorion connects 1.1.13-14 and 3.9.6-7, but identifies an apparent contradiction: in Book 1, the natural philosophers who speculate about celestial causes are compared to mad people, but the characterisation in Book 3 suggests that the many, at least, do not consider mad
explain the scientists' mad-like disagreement, is not identical to the contrast between common and uncommon knowledge used in the popular definition of madness. The many in the *Memorabilia* exhibit uncertainty in the area of moral knowledge, but also about a great deal of things which Socrates would include within the sphere of human knowledge for which there is not consensus. For example, there are many crafts that are possible for humans to learn, but which the many would hardly regard as 'common' knowledge, nor would they call someone mad who makes a mistake in a specialised area of human knowledge. Socrates' approximation shows that he is interested in a range of knowledge, extending from plain facts for which there is consensus to more specialised forms of knowledge.

Before his discussion of Anaxagoras, at 4.7-5, Socrates explains that the study of astronomical orbits and their causes is sufficient to occupy a human being's life and also that this will prevent enquiry into the beneficial things (ἐφη δὲ καὶ ταῦτα ἱκανὰ εἶναι κατατρίβειν ἀνθρώπου βίον καὶ πολλῶν καὶ ὑφελίμων ἀποκωλύειν). Speculative study of celestial phenomena can prevent access to more practical human knowledge, and this suggests that human knowledge can be compromised to varying degrees. Natural philosophy is depicted as a consuming pre-occupation with impossible knowledge as its object and, when the natural philosopher is so consumed, it is to the detriment of more useful knowledge.

Like the natural scientists, Anaxagoras' madness is also characterised by the contrast between what humans can know and what only gods can know: Anaxagoras misunderstands the limits placed on human knowledge, and so engages in scientific speculation at the expense of human knowledge. However, unlike the scientists, his speculations lead him to make knowledge claims which directly contradict facts about which there is human consensus. Each of Anaxagoras' claims about the sun is rejected by Socrates with reference to his ignorance in matters of plain experience. In each case, Anaxagoras' ignorance is expressed in terms of what humans can know: in declaring that the sun is fire, Anaxagoras is ignorant (ἤγνώει, 4.7.7) of the fact that people can look at fire easily but cannot look at the sun, and of the fact that human skin is blackened by the
sun but not by fire.\textsuperscript{112} He is also ignorant (ἠγνόει, 4.7.7) of the fact that plants require the sun to grow, whereas they wither and perish when exposed to fire and, when he says that the sun is a glowing stone, he is ignorant (ἠγνόει, 4.7.7) that stones do not glow in fire and neither do they endure for a long time, while the sun glows forever.

Anaxagoras neglects human things in favour of speculation about divine planning to the point where he no longer recognises obvious facts for which there is human consensus.\textsuperscript{113} He is not aware of his own transgressions. In terms of controversy, Anaxagoras’ claims are different from those of the natural philosophers: the philosophers are characterised as ‘mad-like’ because their opinions are controversial amongst themselves, but Anaxagoras is said to go out of his mind (παρεφρόνησεν) because his opinions are characterised as highly controversial, not only in terms of the views of other philosophers, like Socrates, but also in terms of the sorts of knowledge which are accessible to the most basic human understanding (e.g. that humans can look at fire, that plants require the sun to grow and that stones do not glow in fire; these are basic empirical truths). The controversy is not between him and other scientists, but between him and nearly everyone else. Far from being unfalsifiable like the speculations of the pre-Socratic Eleatics and atomists, his claims are easily counter-witnessed.

I have shown that Socrates uses madness against his opponents and harnesses its popular characteristics to amplify its apotreptic potential. Anaxagoras is singled out as a special case. Anaxagoras had a reputation for impiety and in some later writing is said to have been put on trial.\textsuperscript{114} By targeting him in this way, Xenophon seeks to demonstrate Socrates’ own sanity and

\textsuperscript{112} For this common view, cf. e.g. Herodotus 2.22.3, but for an opposing view see e.g. Ctesias Indika 19 (in Phot. Bibl. 72 45a21-50a4).

\textsuperscript{113} Interestingly, Anaxagoras is not presented as an atheist (cf. Pl. Ap. 26d-e), but as someone who thinks he understands god’s rationale and handiwork (τὰς τῶν θεῶν μηχανάς, 4.7.6). Instead, the main criticism of Anaxagoras is that he is making obviously wrong claims. Presumably Socrates does not think it is entirely off limits to speculate at all about divine planning, and elsewhere in Book four (4.3; cf. 1.4) Socrates has a creationist outlook and outlines the gods’ gifts to humans. The human body (1.4) and the human environment (4.3) are created by the gods for the benefit of mankind. See Sedley 2008, 78-86 on Xenophon’s Socrates as a ‘fundamentally anti-scientific creationist’ (78); see esp. 82 on the ‘re-orientation from creationist science to creationist piety’ (cf. 83: ‘once freed of physics, theological theory is permitted to remain on the agenda’).

\textsuperscript{114} Anaxagoras’ trial is surprisingly not mentioned at Pl. Ap. 26d-e (although Άναξαγόρου οἴει κατηγορεῖν; at 26d may be an allusion). See the evidence cited by Dover 1976, 25 (T3a-b). The earliest explicit source is Diodorus Siculus (12.39.2), but as Dover shows (28-30), Ephoros’ statement about Anaxagoras (and others) might be the result of ‘uncritical reading, or unscrupulous use, of comedy’ (28). The later testimonies of Diogenes Laertius (2.12) and Plutarch (Per. 32.5) are inconsistent (Dover, 31-2), and Dover suggests that ideas about what happened to e.g. Anaxagoras are, in fact, based on attitudes surrounding the trial of Socrates (the result of a ‘systematic distortion
piety towards the end of the work. Anaxagoras’ characterisation as mad appeals both to popular criteria (Anaxagoras gets obvious things wrong), and to a more nuanced interpretation (his mistake is, specifically, impious and his natural explanations of the sun are in Plato’s Apology part of his impiety charge). By co-ordinating madness and impiety, Xenophon is able to contrast Socrates’ sanity (since Socrates does not speculate about the cosmos) and thereby emphasise his piety. Distinguishing Socrates from Anaxagoras is clearly advantageous for Xenophon’s apologetic portrait.

7. Conclusion

I have suggested that despite the apparent lack of cohesion in some parts of the work, Xenophon is rhetorically consistent in his characterisation of madness throughout the Memorabilia. Although madness is never explicitly defined by Socrates himself, it is shown to have features that are broadly recognisable to the Athenian crowd. In each of his two major discussions of madness (in Books 1 and 3), Xenophon’s Socrates focusses on its social recognisability, and he presents a superficial portrait of the phenomenon: madness refers to behaviour that visibly fails to conform to social or popular consensus in extreme ways.

Xenophon’s Socrates does not offer his own positive conception of madness; instead, he describes what is similar to, or an approximation of, madness. His explanation, that self-ignorance and presumption are very close to madness, is psychologically subtle and rhetorically more interesting than the crowd’s self-referential view. Importantly, it allows him to draw attention to the mad-like behaviour of his philosophical rivals, the natural scientists. Since his approximation of madness is delimited by popular views, this also means that his ridicule of Anaxagoras and the other cosmologists has broad apotreptic potential. Socrates takes advantage of consensus and while he does not offer a revisionist account of madness, he uses madness in a novel way as part of a radical apotreptic approach. Socrates exploits existing associations and distinctions between madness and social norms, but without endorsing these views on their own terms. This should, I applied within a single politico-philosophical tradition’ (47)). See also Filonik 2013, 11-96, esp. 29-32 who casts renewed doubt on the authenticity of the trial.
think, encourage us to reassess any criticisms that Xenophon is an unthinkingly conventional thinker.

The many do not share Socrates’ strategy of saying what is similar to madness. For Socrates, this is an extremely useful move, because it allows people to be reasoned with while also giving them an incentive to change. Although the *Memorabilia* is sometimes interpreted as an apologetic work, Xenophon’s interest is not limited to proving Socrates’ innocence; he is also invested in showing that Socrates brings outstanding benefits to various groups of people across a large range of areas (e.g. piety, moral matters, how to practise a particular profession). Xenophon’s apologetic interest in showing that Socrates is not mad, and that he does not make other people mad, complements his desire to emphasise Socrates’ benign influence by showing how he keeps people away from madness. Minimising the scope of madness allows Xenophon to maximise Socrates’ benefits to others: he can draw attention to a large range of mad-like people whom Socrates can help.
Chapter Two: Madness in Plato's *Phaedrus*

Plato's *Phaedrus* features three speeches in the first half of the dialogue. The first two of these speeches put forward the argument that a boy should yield to the non-lover in preference to the lover. First, Phaedrus recites a speech supposedly authored by the Athenian orator Lysias which makes the case that the lover is sick and lacks self-control, while the non-lover is σώφρων, and so the lover will not have the boy's best interests at heart. The second speech is composed by Socrates and is designed to be an improvement on Lysias' attempt. In this speech Socrates develops a psychological portrait of two competing forces within the lover, namely judgement and desire for pleasure. When desire is in control (as in the case of the lover), this results in ὕβρις, a powerful force which makes the lover behave compulsively and harm the beloved. Plato's choice of the word ὕβρις emphasises the negative interpersonal features of the lover's behaviour, and his focus is on the lover's harmful treatment of the younger male. Unattractive as this behaviour might be, Socrates adds towards the end of this speech that when the lover stops being in love he is recovering from madness (μανια, 241a). Socrates then ends his first speech abruptly without praising the sanity of the non-lover; instead he realises that he has offended the gods because ἔρως (i.e. love) is divine. Socrates then makes a second speech (also referred to as the palinode or recantation) which responds to whatever mistake was responsible for his impiety.

Madness features as a central topic of Socrates' discussion in this second speech. Socrates explains that madness itself is not altogether negative and that there are positive forms of madness as well; positive madness comes from the gods and includes the madness of prophecy, purification and poetic inspiration. A fourth kind of divine madness is added to these: the madness of love, which Socrates sets out to prove results from divine benefaction. After this introduction, Socrates delivers an elaborate and complex description of the human soul and its pre-bodily movement through the heavens. Socrates explains that for would-be philosophers, particular earthly beauty is a reminder of the ‘true’ beauty (i.e. the Form of beauty) which their disembodied souls had previously experienced. The process of recognition and recollection of true beauty causes the soul of the philosopher to grow wings and become like a god. For Socrates, this
means that the philosopher is divinely possessed and mad. Socrates also represents the growth of wings and the concomitant changes of the soul as a bewildering and maddening experience. In the last part of his speech, Socrates illustrates the competing drives in the soul as a chariot team in which the charioteer has to train his pair of horses into obedience and bring about restraint and, hopefully, the love of wisdom which will result in the philosophical good life.

Many critics identify both Socrates’ claim in the recantation that ‘the greatest goods’ come from madness, and the implied association of μανία and philosophy, as problematic or paradoxical.¹ It is true that the association of madness and philosophy represents a departure from the moral psychology of other dialogues, such as the Republic, where there is no room for madness in the good life,² but the main source of criticism is that these two phenomena, madness and philosophy, are often taken to refer to irrationality and rationality respectively, and assumed to be irreconcilably opposed.³

In this chapter, I show that Socrates uses a concept of madness that can be applied without equivocation across both of his speeches in the first half of the dialogue, and that this concept is not presented as particularly revisionist or misleading. In advancing my own account I also argue against recent explanations of the role of madness in the Phaedrus put forward by critics such as Dominic Scott and Daniel Werner. Because Socrates presents rational philosophical activity as a kind of beneficial divine madness in his second speech, and because this is seen to damage the conceptual integrity of madness (by conflicting with its essential irrationality), these critics assert that Socrates has disingenuously distorted the meaning of madness. Moreover, Dominic Scott appeals to Socrates’ account of antilogy and rhetorical assimilation to suggest that madness is an example of deliberately misleading rhetoric. By contrast, I defend the conceptual integrity of madness in the dialogue, and I think that there is good reason to think that Socrates is committed to a conception of madness as a genuine unity. My contention is that the connection between madness and philosophy is not supposed to be misleading or merely rhetorical.⁴ In my

¹ Notably Vlastos 1973, 27 n. 80. See also e.g. Scott 2011, 169-171 esp. 170; Werner 2011, 47-8; Griswold 1996, 75-76; Price 1989, 64-65.
² For discussion, see McNeill 2001, 235-268 and Nussbaum 1986, 204.
⁴ Even if Plato has rhetorical reasons for using a particular concept of madness in the dialogue, he can still present Socrates’ discussion of madness as sincere.
discussion, I show that Socrates yields to non-philosophical views about madness in various important ways, and that his characterisation of madness is presented as uncontroversial.

One way of discrediting Socrates’ conception of madness is to draw attention to his variable commitment to the details of the cosmic myth in his second speech (see especially 265b-c). However, the most prominent claims about the positive value of divine madness are made in the opening of the palinode (244a) before the mythical portion of the speech begins (246a), and therefore the status of Socrates’ commitment to the myth is separate from the status of madness. Whether or not Plato means for Socrates’ representation of the cosmic chariot team to be a legitimate account of what the soul is like, the palinode’s human psychological subject, madness, along with the goods that madness brings (244a), should be subject to separate criticism, and we should not conflate Socrates’ commitment to his positive evaluation of μανία with his commitment to his subsequent myth. Although there are some problematic claims made in the opening of the palinode (e.g. that all parts of the soul survive death, 245c6–246a2), my focus is on the problems surrounding Socrates’ claims about madness in particular.

For this reason, I think it is more helpful to examine the exterior dialogue which frames the speeches, especially (1) Socrates’ retrospective synopsis at 265a-266b, as this is the only discussion of μανία outside the monologues (and is, in this respect, less prone to special difficulties surrounding commitment and sincerity in the speeches themselves) and (2) the interlude between Lysias’ speech and Socrates’ first speech at 235b-237a, as this passage draws attention to the contrast between τὸ ἄφρον and τὸ φρόνιμον (235e-236a) and contains Socrates’ invocation to Sappho and Anacreon (235c-d), poets who, I will argue, help to shape Plato’s picture of madness.

5 Looking back on the speeches, Socrates isolates the simile involving ἔρως as potentially misleading (τάχα δ’ ἂν καὶ ἄλλοσε παραφερόμενοι, 265b). On the misleading character of the palinode, see e.g. Werner 2012, 44-58. On the limits of psychological discourse, see Boys-Stones 2003, 3-5, and Pender 2003, 61, 72-5. For the myth, it is worth distinguishing between the epistemic question (i.e. ‘Does Socrates claim to know these things?’) and the commitment question (i.e. ‘Does Socrates sincerely believe that his account is true, even if it does fall short of knowledge, or even if it is characterised as metaphorical or imaginative?’). On this important distinction, see Pender 2000, 18-27; on the ‘truth’ of likenesses, cf. Burnyeat 2012, 244.

6 It is only at 246a (cf. 246c-d), after his discussion of madness (244a), that Socrates draws attention to the limits of human knowledge in what follows.

7 On the soul’s immortality cf. Pl. Phd., Resp. 10.608c9-621d3 and Ti. 41d4-43a6. See e.g. Miller 2006, 278-93.

8 Socrates himself draws attention to the limitations of the speeches (e.g. 265c) and although Socrates represents himself as having ‘played’ in the dialogue at large (278b) this is a second-order critique which demonstrates Plato’s awareness of the limitations of all writing including his own (for a generous reading of Socrates’ conception of ‘play’ in this passage, see Long 2014, esp. 128-9).
1. Collection and Division: the Unity of Madness

In what follows, I focus on Socrates’ retrospective synopsis, where he outlines the method of collection and division. I begin by describing the method and showing how Socrates sets about defining human and divine ἔρως by contextualising them as species within a systematised taxonomy that takes μανία as its genus. The method represents μανία as a unity which can be partitioned to the left or right to reveal erotic love and philosophy as distinct species. I examine Socrates’ illustration of the procedure of division (265e-266a) and show that, despite appearances, the various terms for madness used in the text do not exclude a unified conception of madness which is capable of accommodating both erotic love and philosophy. Moreover, I argue that Socrates’ terminology in this section does not imply a strong link between madness and unreason; such a link would make the representation of philosophy as madness problematic, and so its absence is important.

Socrates is clear that his taxonomy is drawn from both of his speeches and that the method is what allowed for the transition between blameworthy ἔρως in his first speech and a praiseworthy form of ἔρως in his second. I argue that Socrates’ seriousness about the technique (as suggested by the contrast in 265c-d) implies that readers are invited to consider the speeches as, at least in part, illustrating collection and division by means of their discussion of love and madness. I examine the speeches themselves and although the procedures are by and large implicit rather than explicit, I compare passages in which Socrates does make explicit divisions. While limited, Socrates’ first speech contributes to his portrait of blameworthy madness, and this contribution should be reflected in the final taxonomy if it is to provide a successful transition between the speeches by accommodating the variety of madness found in each speech.

I then turn to an examination of whether Socrates conceives of madness as a genuine unity, or whether it has an artificial and merely rhetorical function in bringing a semblance of unity to the speeches.⁹ I am not tackling the familiar topic of the unity of the Phaedrus; instead, I

⁹ For madness as an artificial and merely rhetorical unity, see Scott 2011, 169-200, esp. 188-194 and cf. Werner 2011, 58-64 on Plato’s transvaluation and assimilation of madness (esp. 61-2). In response to these approaches I suggest that, for Socrates, madness is a genuine unity.
am interested in the unity of madness in the first part of the dialogue. My own reading is that madness need not be identified with unreason, and that its rhetorical continuity across the speeches (including its application to philosophy) does not, therefore, damage its integrity as a meaningful term.

In the last part of this section, I consider how genera are typically discovered and characterised in other dialogues. Although madness is a genuine unit, it is never given an explicit definition, and this thin characterisation of the genus is not surprising, given what we find in other applications of the method. The connection between the species and the proposed genus often appears to be made on the basis of some kind of insight or intuition, and the stipulation of a genus is invariably accepted by interlocutors at face value and without problems. I suggest that the uncontroversial nature of the genus in the Phaedrus implies that it is drawn from popular sources and stereotypes. This means that Plato privileges non-specialised views about madness. Plato’s prioritisation of popular views suggests that madness is characterised first by its eccentricity at a behavioural level and secondly as a psychological phenomenon. Both mad lovers and mad philosophers are stereotypes familiar from non-philosophical discourses, and I suggest that there are strong reasons to think that Plato is drawing on these for his generic characterisation of madness.

1.1. Socrates’ Synopsis: the Taxonomy of Madness

Socrates begins his synopsis by outlining a series of steps which he implies were made over the course of the speeches (265a-b). As we will see, Socrates’ wording here is an important indication of what constitutes madness. Firstly, Socrates explains that ἔρως was called a kind of madness (μανίαν γάρ τινα ἐφήσαμεν εἶναι τὸν ἔρωτα, 265a7-8); then, that two distinct forms of madness were isolated (μανίας δέ γε εἴδη δύο, 265a9): one produced by human disease (ὑπὸ νοσημάτων ἀνθρωπίνων, 265a10) and one produced by divine change of usual customs (ὑπὸ θείας ἐξαλλαγῆς τῶν εἰωθότων νομίμων, 265a10-11). The form brought about by divine change was divided into four types, each being attributed to a particular god. The fourth type of divine madness, ascribed to Aphrodite and

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Erôs, is the madness of love and was called the best of the four types (265b). These steps allude to the procedures of collection and division which Socrates goes on to elaborate.

After describing much of his speeches as playful (265c), Socrates turns his attention to those features which allowed the speeches to pass from censure to praise. In Socrates’ delineation of the dialectical method of collection and division which follows, madness is brought into strong focus as a formal object of these procedures. The method accounts for the steps which Socrates has just outlined (265a-b), and the first procedure described by Socrates is collection (265d3-7).

Collection refers to the definition of ἔρως (ὁριζόμενος... περὶ Ἔρωτος ὃ ἔστιν ὁρισθέν, 265d) which must, I think, here refer to its simple definition as a kind of madness.¹¹ This is clarified by Socrates’ earlier remark that ἔρως was called a kind of madness (265a7-8). Establishing the right genus (e.g. madness) for the species in question (e.g. love) constitutes this simple definition and the unitary concept which Socrates proceeds to focus on is madness, not love.¹² This process is illustrated by bringing similar items together into a unity (‘comprehending and bringing together the scattered particulars into one idea or form’ 265d3-4) and implies that, in the speeches, the particulars were brought under the heading of madness.

The complementary procedure, division, involves dividing up this genus according to its nature (265d-266b). Division starts at the level of the genus (e.g. madness), and proceeds until the target species (e.g. love) is identified and isolated. This procedure describes the connection between the species and its genus over a series of steps and, if it is successful, results in a complex definition of the species in question. Examples of collection and division in other dialogues suggest that collection occurs along with division at each stage of this process, starting with the collection of the genus and ending with the collection of the target species. Acts of collection appear to select according to similarity the things which are to be divided.¹³ In the synopsis, Socrates has distinguished between these two activities for sake of clear exposition, but this does not mean that

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¹¹ By contrast, a complex definition of e.g. erotic love would show what distinguishes the species within the genus.
¹² I agree with the prevailing view that the definition of love in this illustration of collection refers to the determination of the genus to which love belongs (i.e. madness). See e.g. Hackforth 1952, 132 n. 5; Philip 1966, 338; de Vries 1969, 216; White 1993, 215. Contra Hayase 2016, 118.
¹³ For collection as part of division see e.g. Moravcsik 1973, 167 and 170-1.
these features are easy to distinguish in the method when it is applied (as in the speeches about love).

In his discussion of the method, Socrates is cautious not to relate the technique of collection or definition to truth, but he does state that a part of this process, the definition (i.e. of love as a kind of madness), is what allowed his speeches to develop with clarity and internal consistency (265d). It is worth noting that the generic form or entity selected in this method should have continuity throughout the whole process. In fact, the genus which is to be divided is supposed to be a broadly stable feature, and variation occurs only within the partitions and species of the genus. Clarity and consistency may not be inevitable features of the activity of collection and division but are certainly intended to be products of Socrates’ application of the method on this occasion, and his language provides a strong indication that it is the stability of the definition which allowed for the transition between the speeches (ἔσχεν εἰπεῖν ὁ λόγος, 265d echoes ἔσχεν ὁ λόγος μεταβῆναι, 265c). With this in mind it is helpful to look more closely at Socrates’ well-known exposition of division (265e1-266a7):

‘This, in turn, is to be able to cut up each kind according to its species along its natural joints, and to try not to splinter any part, as a bad butcher might do. In just this way, our two speeches placed the mad part of thinking (τὸ ἄφρον τῆς διανοίας) into one common kind (ἐν τι κοινῇ εἶδος ἐλαβέτην). Then, just as each single body has parts that naturally come in pairs of the same name (one of them being called the right-hand and the other the left-hand one), so the speeches, having considered unsoundness of mind (τὴς παρανοίας) to be by nature one single kind within us (ἐν ἐν ἣμιν πεφυκὸς εἶδος), proceeded to cut it up—the first speech cut its left-hand part, and continued to cut until it discovered among these parts a sort of love that can be called “left-handed,” which it very correctly denounced; the second speech, in turn, led us to the right-hand part of madness (τῆς μανίας); discovered a love that shares its name with the other but is actually divine; set it out before us, and praised it as the cause of our greatest goods.’

Here Socrates provides a taxonomy of madness which serves as a useful framework to consider the formal connections between the speeches he has just delivered (the first arguing that the non-lover is preferable to the lover and the second that, under the right circumstances, the lover is preferable) and reveals something about their philosophical relationship. Socrates

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15 See e.g. Griswold 1996, 174. The procedure of collection and division is not sufficient on its own, and the success of the method is determined by its correct application.
16 Trans. modified from Cooper and Hutchinson 1997.
describes how the systematic craft of collection and division was used to isolate discrete kinds of ἔρως within the genus of madness.

Socrates' diairetic schema reveals that madness (μανία, 266a6) is the genus which contains both blameworthy 'left-handed' ἔρως (σκαιόν ... ἔρωτα, 266a5) and praiseworthy 'divine' ἔρως (θεῖον ... ἔρωτα, 266a7) as its species. The analogy is clear: just as the body is, by nature, a single entity with pairs of like-named limbs, in the same way, in his speeches, madness is by nature a single form in us with a pair of like-named parts (ἁμώνυμον, 266a7), each here called ἔρως.\(^7\) Madness is a single thing which can be partitioned to the left and to the right. There are at least two kinds of ἔρως: divine ἔρως and another kind of sinister ἔρως (which is presumably not divine) and each of the kinds of ἔρως is a species of madness. Taken together with his preceding remarks (at 265a), it is implied further that divine ἔρως is a species of that form of madness which is brought about by divine reversal of ordinary customs whereas left-handed or non-divine ἔρως is a species of that form brought about by human illness (see above, p. 55).

Socrates indicates that both the first speech and the palinode had placed 'the mad part of thinking' (τὸ ἄφρον τῆς διανοίας) into one common kind and that they had started out this way, by assuming that 'unsoundness of mind' (τὸ τῆς παρανοίας) is, by its nature, one common and natural kind in us (ἐν ἐν ἡμῖν πεφυκὸς εἶδος). There are various important features in this presentation which are worth foregrounding. Socrates' clear emphasis on madness having one form despite its various names is directly contrasted by ἔρως which is manifold: although both 'kinds' of ἔρως happen to share the same name (ὁμώνυμον, 266a7) they are, in fact (μὲν ... 3' αὖ, 266a7), quite different. Despite the diverse terminology of μανία in this passage, it is clearly referred to as one common thing, whereas human ἔρως and divine ἔρως are quite distinct items despite their apparently identical names. The deliberate fluidity of Plato's terminology demonstrates the ways in which names can be unreliable. The variety of names is not a reason to discount what Socrates says about madness. One name (in this case ἔρως) can reflect a specious unity whereas several names (here τὸ ἄφρον τῆς διανοίας, τὸ τῆς παρανοίας and μανία) can mask a genuine unity.\(^8\)

\(^7\) Cf. Yunis 2011, 198 on 265e1-3: ὡσπερ ... τὸ μὲν ἄφρον τῆς διανοίας: answered by ὡσπερ δὲ σύμμορφος ἦς ἕνας (266a1).

\(^8\) Cf. Pl. Soph. 217a in which three names are introduced (τοφιστής, πολιτικός, φιλόσοφος), but these do not necessarily represent three distinct kinds.
contrast suggests that, despite any appearances to the contrary, Socrates’ conception of madness is unitary.

The proliferation of madness terminology and the coincidence of species sharing the name ἔρως have confused some interpretations of the taxonomic hierarchy in this passage. The apparently distinct terms for madness in close succession, although clearly meant as expressions for one common state, explore the full range of early Greek terminology of madness. The term μανία is a positive designation of madness (i.e. it does not have a privative or distancing prefix) and has the most flexible meaning of the terms used here. It is this term, μανία, which explicitly included both human illness and divine reversal of νόμιμα earlier in this section (265a-b). The other two expressions listed in the passage (265e1-266a7) are co-ordinate in that each is identically described as having been placed by both speeches into one common kind (i.e. μανία).

The first of these expressions, τὸ ἄφρον τῆς διανοίας, employs both φρήν- and νοῦς-denominal compounds, each of which is usually taken independently to refer to ‘thought’. The privative ἄφρων might be thought to mark off the loss or absence of thought, and τὸ ἄφρον τῆς διανοίας has recently been interpreted as ‘a kind of absence or bracketing off of the regular powers of reason’. On its own, ἄφρων often designates foolish thinking and on other occasions in the dialogue, Socrates’ use of ἄφρων might signal foolishness or irrationality, for example in the contrast between τὸ ἄφρον and τὸ φρόνιμον before Socrates’ first speech (235e-236a). In that context it is associated with one kind of madness only, the non-divine kind which features in Socrates’ first speech and which is contrasted with σωφροσύνη. In the present passage, however, τὸ ἄφρον τῆς διανοίας is synonymous with μανία, and its range of meanings is controlled by the kinds of madness explicitly under discussion. It is unlikely, therefore, for it to be restricted to meanings like foolishness or irrationality because these do not extend to the examples of divine madness.

19 e.g. Hackforth 1952, 130 n. 1 who sees ἔρως as the genus; cf. Hershkowitz 1998, 10: ‘this analysis, which multiplies the number of types of madness – as well as the possible evaluative responses to madness – leads not to a clarification of our understanding of madness but to increased ambiguity.’

20 See Jouanna 2013, 98.

21 The statements ἀλλ’ ὡσπερ ἂρτι τῷ λόγῳ τὸ μὲν ἄφρον τῆς διανοίας ἐν τι κοινῇ εἴδος ἔλαβέτην (265e3-4) and οὕτω καὶ τὸ τῆς παρανοίας ὡς <ἓν> ἐν ἡμῖν πεφυκὸς εἶδος ἡγησαμένω τῷ λόγῳ (266a2-3) are equivalent. See Yunis 2011, 198 on 266a2.

22 Vogt 2013, 182.

23 This contrast is frequent in Plato (e.g. Pl. Phd. 62e; Cra. 386c, 392c; Soph. 247a; Symp. 194b, 218d; Grg. 498b; Resp. 3.394e; Leg. 5.734c) and features prominently in the Second Alcibiades (e.g. 138d-146c; cf. Alc. I 1125a).
The compresence of ᾄφρον and διάνοια further complicates the expression and it seems entirely plausible that τῆς διάνοιας is partitive, its meaning rendered as ‘the ᾄφρον part of διάνοια’, or ‘the mad part of thinking’. On this interpretation, which I favour, the expression does not exclude or prevent διάνοια, but instead isolates a part of διάνοια as mad. Socrates’ comparison between the division of the body (into left and right halves) and the division of madness is also suggestive of a parallel between the body and the mind more generally, and while Plato is clearly able to divide up a mental phenomenon like madness (e.g. into divine or human kinds), when it comes to dividing up the mind’s general activity, that is ‘thinking’ (διάνοια), into different modes (e.g. mad and non-mad mental activities), his vocabulary is considerably less flexible (so that he has Socrates refer to ‘parts’ of thinking). While the status of τὸ ᾄφρον τῆς διανόησις is not entirely clear, the capacity of the term μανία to accommodate both human and divine forms of madness is not compromised nor διάνοια ruled out.

His second expression in the passage (παράνοια) is, like διάνοια, νοῦς-denominal, but has a distancing prefix: where the function of μανία is conspicuous in the context of the palinode in the context of etymological synthesis (in his second speech, Socrates uses the resemblance of the word μανικός to μαντικός to extend the meaning of madness to include positive forms of divine madness), the appearance of παράνοια in the synopsis, a near hapax in Plato, points to its topographical significance in the context of diairesis. The term carries a spatial dimension and implies a kind of mental activity that occurs alongside (or beyond) regular rational thought, but of course its meanings extend beyond the spatial. Here the word seems to identify a variety of διάνοια which is co-ordinated with other forms of thinking, and while Plato is careful to distinguish between these activities, παράνοια and other cognitive modes are potentially concurrent.

In each of these expressions, then, madness is identified as a mental activity that is closely related to διάνοια. This highly compartmentalised account of madness with three distinct terms and two distinct varieties (i.e. human and divine) should be expected in the context of division.

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24 Cf. e.g. Yunis 2011, 198: ‘the mad portion of the mind’ and Rowe 1986a, 231: ‘the unreasoning aspect of the mind’.
25 παράνοια appears only three times in the Platonic corpus (here and at Leg. 11.928e2 and 11.929d7); the usage in the Laws, meaning ‘senile deterioration’ is commonplace, as shown in Lewis 1970, 2; see also Wyse 1934 on Isaeus 1.7. Vogt 2013 is evidently mistaken in stating that Plato uses παράνοια or τὸ ᾄφρον throughout the Phaedrus’ (182) though she is right that their use is ‘conspicuous’.
which sets out to expose some of the item’s natural partitions, but it is an important point that each of these parts is supposed to belong to a coherent whole (see Fig. 1).

1.2. Collection and Division in the Speeches

Socrates explains in the synopsis that the speeches about love reveal the method of collection and division only *incidentally* (ἐκ τύχης, 265c), and the speeches themselves do not explicitly conform to the procedure as it is outlined. The illustration of division in the synopsis (265e1-266a7) suggests that madness as a *genus* is stipulated at the outset of each speech and that the connections between madness and the relevant target *species* (i.e. blameworthy human ἔρως in Socrates’ first speech, or praiseworthy divine ἔρως in his second) are fully described by proceeding with the method from the *genus* towards the taxonomic *termini*. It is only in Socrates’ second speech, however, that madness is explicitly taken as a starting point (244a). In the first speech, Socrates seeks initially to define ἔρως, placing emphasis on the importance of beginning with a definition and on knowing ‘what each thing really is’ before analysing it (237b-c). Although some of the concepts and vocabulary associated with ἔρως, such as Lysias’ description of the lover as sick

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27 Cf. Brown 2010, 157: ‘correct dividing into forms is presented as a matter of discerning pre-existing distinctions in the subject, and, to that extent, dividing according to those distinctions.’

28 Most commentators have been ready to point this out. See Hackforth 1952, 133 n. 1; Griswold 1996, 173-86 and Ferrari 1987, 59-62. *Contra* e.g. Ackrill 1953. This contrast between explicit and implicit craft in the dialogue is one reason why modern critics are quick to use Socrates’ synopsis in the *Phaedrus* as a good statement of the method in abstract, but turn to examples from the *Sophist* or the *Statesman* for clear applications of the method (e.g. Brown 2010, 151-71, esp. 153-4; Moravcsik 1973, 158-80, esp. 166-6).
(231d, cf. 236a-b), or, after Lysias' speech, Socrates' representation of the lover as ἄφρων and the non-lover as φρόνιμος (236a) have prepared for its appearance, madness is only introduced towards the very end of the speech (241a). Both collection, the assimilation of particulars to madness (or to parts thereof), and division, the discovery of blameworthy ἔρως within a partition of madness, are steps which are fully distinguishable only in hindsight. ⁵⁰

Each of Socrates' speeches does, however, have a passage which contains significant divisions, and these appear at the beginning of each speech: in Socrates' first speech, a passage which discovers human ἔρως (237d-238c), and, in Socrates' second speech, one which discovers divine ἔρως (244a-245b, 249d-e). Near the beginning of his first speech, in his definition of love, Socrates performs a simple division between two 'ruling and leading principles' in the human being (237d-7). One kind aims for the good and when it holds sway it is productive of σωφροσύνη; the other kind aims at pleasure and its domination is called ὕβρις. ἔρως is defined as the domination of a kind of irrational pleasure-seeking desire (i.e. a kind of ὕβρις) directed towards bodily beauty (238c; there are other kinds of ὕβρις directed at other pleasures e.g. gluttony, drunkenness etc. 238b). In this way, Socrates' first speech provides a division of human motivational structures and reveals ἔρως as a specification of ὕβρις. Towards the end of the speech, the hubristic lover is called mad (241a).

A major failure of Socrates' first speech, foreshadowed by the question as to whether ἔρως is a benefit or harm (237d), is its conflation of terms which should be subordinated: at the end of the speech, harmful hubristic love is referred to as μανία in a simple and unqualified sense. This is an example of mistaken classification (cf. τι ἡμαρτηκότα, 242c): Socrates has collapsed part of the taxonomy by identifying μανία incorrectly with one half of the dichotomy only (i.e. harmful/blameworthy ἔρως) rather than presenting madness as a complex genus in its own right (in fact a genus is noticeably absent in the dichotomy of motivational drives in Socrates' first speech). This first appearance of madness, in an erroneous position within a failed division, limits the interpretation of madness to the context of that division (i.e. it is always harmful and opposed to σωφροσύνη) and signals one of the speech's problems (it prevents μανία from having a beneficial side). Socrates says that collection and division are illustrated by both speeches (265e), and

⁵⁰ Cf. Ferrari 1987, 59-67 on the distinction between the speeches themselves and Socrates' later reflection.
mistaken though the first speech is, the classification of ἔρως as a kind of ὕβρις does seem to capture many legitimate features both of ἔρως and of madness once it is re-contextualised with μανία in the correct position (i.e. as the genus), as it is in Socrates’ second speech.

In other dialogues, mistaken classifications might produce incidental information about a particular target species, but fail to capture features that are essential to the species. In Plato’s Sophist, for example, the first five definitions of the sophist are characterised as unsuccessful applications of the method (221d-231b; 234b; 265a-268b). None of the five has properly captured what is essential to being a sophist, although they do not give information which is inaccurate. Similarly in the Phaedrus, the analysis in Socrates’ first speech is missing a step: the method has failed to pick out those features of madness which are essential to the conception of ἔρως under discussion. Madness does in fact have a beneficial side, as Socrates’ second speech shows, and so possesses qualities which do not belong to the target species: blameworthy ἔρως. Even if the vision of the first speech is limited in this way, it offers a vocabulary of interior forces which prepares for the metaphor of the psychic charioteer in the palinode, and for identifying the madness of blameworthy ἔρως with the domination of a particular part (or parts) of the ψυχή represented in that metaphor. Although it is mistaken, the dichotomy of Socrates’ first speech gives a way of thinking about human psychology - a contest between opposed elements - that is taken up in the palinode.

In the synopsis, Socrates explains that the illustration draws on the method as exemplified in both speeches (265e); this suggests that the division of motivational forces in his first speech is not completely rejected, and that the terms of that division should be reflected in the overall taxonomical schema. In this way, Socrates encourages us to integrate the division between psychological forces in his first speech with the analysis of madness in his second. Socrates’ second speech accommodates harmful varieties of μανία and hubristic ἔρως similar to the types found in his previous speech. At the beginning of the speech, Socrates says that madness is not completely harmful and that there are kinds of madness which are beneficial and divine (244a);
this leaves open the possibility for harmful forms of madness, and later, during the palinode’s
discussion of philosophical ἔρως as a form of divine madness, a non-philosophical species of ἔρως is
identified. The unphilosophical lover is driven by desire and goes the way of four-footed beasts,
lacking fear and shame, and clinging to ὕβρις (ὑβρεῖ προσομιλῶν, 250e).33 This harmful form of ἔρως
recalls the hubristic ἔρως of Socrates’ first speech. Just as the second speech preserves and
incorporates key features from the previous speech (e.g. by including a hubristic form of ἔρως), so
the first speech anticipates important details of the palinode. For example, Socrates calls
philosophy divine (θεία φιλοσοφία, 239b4). This shows, I think, that the two speeches are more
compatible in their presentation of madness than expected.

The failure of the first speech is reflected by the lack of a genus which unifies its parts.
Σωφροσύνη, the pre-eminence of an externally acquired psychological drive directed towards the
‘good’, is unrelated to ὕβρις, the domination by the innate pleasure-seeking drive. By selecting an
appropriate genus, the second speech contributes to a considerably more organised picture: the
two varieties of ἔρως are connected in this picture inasmuch as each is represented as the response
to an identical stimulus, a beautiful body. The distinction between μανία and σωφροσύνη is
represented in Socrates’ second speech as the basis for the youth’s decision between the lover and
the non-lover in the previous two speeches (244a5). This contrast is only a good index for decision-
making if μανία brings harm and σωφροσύνη brings benefit. It is rejected by Socrates’ second
speech. The philosopher’s madness does not come at the expense of σωφροσύνη (in fact, alongside
beauty and justice, it is one of the objects of the philosopher’s recollection, 247d; 254b), and this is
corroborated by the absence of an antithesis between σωφροσύνη and divine madness (although
they are still contrasted, as in the case of inspired poets, 245a).34 In Socrates’ second speech the
relationship between μανία and σωφροσύνη is modified: μανία receives a positive evaluation and
σωφροσύνη is no longer needed as a contrast term. Σωφροσύνη is not an essential feature of
Socrates’ dialectical target, divine ἔρως, and so it falls away because his objectives have shifted.

What I have argued for here is a composite taxonomy based on the illustration of
collection and division in the synopsis and supplemented by those parts of both speeches which

33 See Werner 2011, 49. The term re-appears again as a quality ascribed to the black horse (253e; 254e).
34 The poetry of those who possess σωφροσύνη (ἡ τοῦ σωφρονοῦντος) is eclipsed by the poetry of mad poets. See e.g.
Moore 2015b, 155-6, and see my discussion below, pp. 102-104.
do explicitly contain applications of the method. Each speech makes a contribution to this *schema* (Fig. 2) and, taken as a whole, the taxonomy presents a good basis for further discussion. While the speeches themselves seem to exhibit implicit rather than explicit dialectical division, Socrates’ synopsis points to the central function that madness is supposed to have had in connecting together the two different forms of ἔρως which are discovered in the speeches: Socrates does not simply posit two distinct forms of ἔρως, but rather shows how each sort of ἔρως is in fact a distinct *species* of a common *genus*. The transition from censure to praise depends on the capacity of a single and stable conception of madness to accommodate the distinct forms of ἔρως (just as a single human body has natural pairs), and if Socrates seriously considers the craft of collection and division to have effected a successful transition between invective and encomium, then there is a strong technical basis for the continuity of his conception of madness over the course of the speeches. Socrates needs a stable notion of madness, regardless of (1) whether he would endorse every detail of the two speeches, or (2) whether the two speeches are consistent with each other in every respect.

![Figure 2 - Socrates' Taxonomy (based on the synopsis and the speeches about love)](image)

**1.3. A Specious or Real Unity?**

Madness is a central subject of the dialogue in its own right irrespective of the extent to which its function is described as merely connective or rhetorical. For Plato, madness provides a good basis for challenging non-philosophical attitudes to ἔρως, and for emphasising the educational potential
of both love and philosophy. Later in this chapter, for example, I show that Sappho and Anacreon present lovers as mad; Lysias can use that as an apotrepetic against lovers, while Socrates finds a way both to endorse the poets' representation and to reject Lysias' use of it.

However, Socrates' caution about the bad butcher (265e) and his emphasis on natural dissection is a strong indication that he means for the speeches to have provided a successful example of collection and division. Socrates distinguishes between the method of dialectic and everything else in the speeches (265c-d), and while he may be 'uniquely serious' about these procedures (everything else is called 'playful'), his seriousness comes with certain commitments. It is difficult to believe that Plato is interested in collection and division only, and not especially invested in this particular application of it (i.e. the speeches about μανία); indeed, Plato has reason to give Socrates a self-consistent conception of madness, if thinly characterised, given that the speeches are each taken to be paradigmatically illustrative of the method (ὁσπερ, 265d5 ὡσπερ, 265e3). Socrates' seriousness about the success of the technique in this example must imply that he is simultaneously committed to the unity of its central term (if madness were not a unity in the speeches, they would not provide a successful example of collection and division). In this sense, madness has a separate status from the other topics of the speeches. It is uniquely stable. This is a strong and unambiguous prompt to find a unitary conception of madness in the speeches themselves.

Critics generally take it for granted that madness necessarily excludes rationality, but some have proposed various ways for keeping the relationship between madness and rational philosophical activity intact. They either (1) suggest that madness is a temporary phase on the way to becoming a fully-fledged philosopher, or (2) envisage philosophical madness as a novel form of madness (that is, 'rational madness' or 'Platonic madness') developed ad hoc by Socrates

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35 Yunis 2011, 196.
37 Christopher Rowe avoids the problem of madness by arguing that Socrates' second speech is disingenuous in its praise of beneficial μανία and that its introduction of divine madness forms part of an ironic strategy which will demonstrate that doing philosophy is, by contrast to madness, a supremely rational and controlled enterprise. See e.g. Rowe 1986a, and Rowe 1989. Conversely, Josef Pieper sees philosophy as a surrender of σωφροσύνη (see Pieper 1964, 49-62).
so as to be compatible with the philosopher’s rationality. Each of these views presents its own problems. In addition to providing a good basis for the unity of madness, the synopsis implies that both love and philosophy are quintessentially mad, and this is because the divisions of the taxonomy, starting from the genus, are supposed to yield essential characteristics of the target species. This means that madness is an essential property of philosophy or erotic love, and not just a temporary phase on the way to becoming a philosopher.

If, on the other hand, philosophical madness is an ad hoc innovation, then madness loses its integrity as a meaningful term, because Plato has distorted the definition of madness and extended or stretched it to include activities with which it is not ordinarily associated (viz. philosophy). This criticism is advanced by those who question Socrates’ sincerity in the palinode, and is taken to show that philosophical activity falls short of madness in some fundamental way (because it is not irrational). According to this view, Socrates has included distinct items disingenuously under the heading of madness, and the inclusion of philosophical ἐρως as a type of μανία in particular reveals that madness is a bogus unity designed to furnish the speeches with nothing more than rhetorical continuity. This continuity is inherently misleading precisely in treating philosophy as a genuine form of madness, and the continuity of madness across the speeches has, therefore, evacuated the term of its traditional or established meaning (that is, its apparently essential irrationality).

Those critics who see madness as a specious entity have made the argument that Socrates’ characterisation of the connections between μανία and its species is an example of misleading rhetorical assimilation, rather than a sincere attempt at classification by collection and division. Before his account of the method of collection and division, Socrates describes how skilful practitioners of rhetoric are able to argue on opposite sides of a particular issue (261a-262d). The rhetorician has the ability to make the same item appear in two contradictory ways, leading the audience from one appearance to its opposite (e.g. from ‘just’ to ‘unjust’, 261d). Rhetorical

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40 If erotic love represents one route to becoming a philosopher, then it is conceivable that harmful forms of madness are at play in the early stages of this process, but the text does not support this reading.
41 See Werner 2011, 48, 57 and Scott 2011, 176-7.
assimilation is supposed to be able to effect such a transition by amplifying gradually the similarities of particular items under discussion so that the transition appears to be a movement from e.g. blame to praise of the same item, rather than a movement between two similar yet distinct items. Socrates explains that this manoeuvre is achieved by somebody who has knowledge of what each thing really is but who covertly exaggerates the similarities between items and conceals their differences (261e-262b). Socrates further claims (262c-d) that his two speeches happen to have illustrated how someone who knows the truth (and who therefore has knowledge of similarities and differences) might mislead (παράγοι) his audience. I think there is clear potential for Socrates’ speeches to have been misleading when taken together as a rhetorical movement from the censure of ἔρως in the first speech to its opposite, the praise of ἔρως in the second. Socrates says that love belongs to the ‘disputed class’ (τὸν ἀμφισβητησίμων) which is prone to the manipulations of assimilation (263a-c), and the pertinent rhetorical effect of Socrates’ pair of speeches is surely the transition from the censure of ἔρως to its opposite, praise of ἔρως (this is how the Lysianic thesis is countered).

However, I have already demonstrated that it is the method of collection and division which is explicitly said (at 265c) to account for how the speeches were able to pass from censure to praise. This is because both blameworthy and praiseworthy ἔρως are discovered within a shared and unified genus, (i.e. madness). So, the two methods might seem to be co-ordinated, and critics who emphasise the synthetic qualities of Platonic madness have claimed that the methods are, in fact, closely integrated. They suggest that misleading assimilation conceals the spurious connections made between the genus and its species in collection and division. On this view, which I do not endorse, assimilation operates at the various moves in the speeches which connect the species (i.e. blameworthy love and philosophy) to the genus (i.e. madness): in Socrates’ first speech, erotic love is assimilated to ὡβρῖς, and ὡβρῖς is assimilated to μανία; in Socrates’ second speech philosophy is similarly assimilated to divine madness, and so on. In other words, the

42 Socrates’ examples emphatically involve contrasting judgements of the same item. See my discussion below, p. 69.
43 I take τῶ λόγῳ (262ad1) as Socrates’ speeches. See Rowe 1986a, 197, Yunis 2011, 189.
44 Contra Yunis 2011, 190 who cautions against ‘mislead’ for παράγοι, seeing only the first speech as misleading. Cf. Scott 2011, 187.
45 Notice Phaedrus’ remark in 263c-d, and see e.g. Hayase 2016, 125 and Yunis 2011, 189 (on 262c8-d2).
46 Both Scott 2011, 188-194 and Hayase 2016, 125 take the argument in this direction (but without explicitly co-ordinating assimilation with classification). For Scott, misleading assimilation operates precisely at these
suggestion is that over the course of the speeches Socrates subtly and gradually exaggerated the similarities between blameworthy love and madness, and between philosophy and madness, to construct an artificial yet superficially convincing unity, and that this is what allowed him to make the transition between blame and praise.

A major difficulty with co-ordinating the two methods is the strong contrast in Socrates’ attitude to them. The discussion of assimilation is usually connected with a later passage (267a) in which Tisias and Gorgias prioritise likelihoods (τὰ εἰκότα) over truths, and is taken to demonstrate the hostility of Plato’s Socrates towards the sophists’ reliance on exaggerated similarity in persuasion. This is contrasted with Socrates’ clearly positive enthusiasm for the dialectical art of collection and division (stated at 266b-c). Attempts to avoid these difficulties are inadequate, because they involve either (1) arguing that the speeches do not give a good example of collection and division (even though Socrates suggests that they do), or (2) arguing that the stipulation of a preliminary genus (in this case, madness) is not part of the method (even though it is clearly included in Socrates’ discussion of the method).

I think that if we consider madness to be a genuine unity and ἔρως to be a specious unity, we can see how the two methods, assimilation and classification, can each contribute to the transition between the speeches in distinct ways without compromising each other. The methods are surely distinct: collection and division mark out the species within a unifying genus (the species are differentiated by the method), whereas assimilation tries to elide the differences between species, making them look alike, rather than distinguishing their features. I do not think that assimilation is found in Socrates’ identification of blameworthy ἔρως or philosophy as species of madness, but rather in his identification of philosophy as a form of ἔρως identical to the ἔρως criticised in his first speech. Socrates’ examples of assimilation emphatically involve the apparent movement between contrasting judgements of the same item (τὸ αὖτα, 261c10-d1; τὰ αὖτα, 261d3; τὰ αὖτα, 261d7). Assimilation must refer to the art of making one species (in this case,
blameworthy ἔρως) appear identical to another species (i.e. praiseworthy/divine ἔρως) so that the transition between the speeches appears to be a movement from blame to praise of the same item (called ἔρως) rather than a movement between two similar yet distinct items. In this way, assimilation explains why Socrates’ second speech is an effective rhetorical recantation: because it makes it seem as though Socrates has revised his views about ἔρως in general. In my view, then, it is the conflict between the speeches, not the unity of madness, which is specious. The effect of assimilation is to make it look as if the speeches contain conflicting verdicts on the very same item. In this respect, assimilation does allow Socrates to move from censure to praise (as Phaedrus suggests in 263c-d); however, assimilation can be present in the speeches without making madness a bogus or ‘stretched’ concept.

The art of making blameworthy ἔρως and philosophy look alike by amplification of their similarities does not need collection and division, because the arrangement of species within a shared genus is not what makes those species themselves especially alike. Blameworthy ἔρως and philosophy do have madness in common, but the characterisation of praiseworthy ἔρως as similar to blameworthy ἔρως does not depend on their having the same genus. Having madness as the genus of both kinds of ἔρως does not imply that they are the same, and this is shown by the other, non-erotic, species of each kind of madness (e.g. gluttony, drunkenness, poetry, prophecy etc.). What is misleading here is an issue of names (i.e. identifying both kinds of ἔρως by the same name, ἔρως). I propose that assimilation in the speeches is confined to making two items, blameworthy ἔρως and praiseworthy ἔρως, look sufficiently identical so that Socrates can effect a re-evaluation of ἔρως in general. This re-evaluation is illegitimate, because the blameworthy and praiseworthy species in question are, despite appearances, distinct (as collection and division shows). Socrates’ re-evaluation of madness, on the other hand, is legitimate because (as collection and division shows) human and divine madness are both accurately described as parts of madness.

Collection and division, if it is successful, provides good definitions of the target species and helps to clarify the legitimate differences and similarities between them (this is exactly what a good taxonomy does). Socrates explains that the rhetorician who wants to mislead his audience must first accurately discern the respects in which things are similar and dissimilar (262a). I suggest that the clarification of similarities and differences provided by accurate classification
constitutes exactly the kind of preliminary knowledge required by the rhetorician in order to be able to conceal the differences between items effectively. The success of misleading assimilation depends, then, on having accurately performed collection and division, but the methods themselves are crucially opposed. In this way, both methods are illustrated by the speeches: to the extent that the two varieties of ἔρως are mutually distinguished and classified as distinct forms of madness, collection and division is illustrated; to the extent that the differences between the two kinds of ἔρως are elided in order to present the second speech as re-evaluating the same item (ἔρως) criticised in the first speech, assimilation is illustrated.

What I have tried to show is that misleading assimilation refers to the rhetorical task of making blameworthy ἔρως and praiseworthy ἔρως look identical. It is not a method for connecting these species to their genus, and so the links between blameworthy ἔρως and madness, or between philosophy and madness, cannot be misleading in this way. This means that appealing to Socrates’ account of misleading assimilation (261e-262d) does not provide a good basis for suggesting that madness is an artificial unity. It is not because of assimilation that madness has rhetorical continuity in the speeches and that it is able to accommodate philosophy. Instead, there is every indication that the species have not been placed disingenuously under the heading of madness after all.

If madness is not an ad hoc concept formulated especially to ensure rhetorical continuity across Socrates’ speeches about ἔρως, then it remains to be demonstrated where exactly Socrates’ ideas about madness come from. I have suggested (see above, p. 52 and p. 55) that Plato gives Socrates a deliberately non-controversial conception of madness, and I think it is helpful, since μανία is the genus of collection and division, to examine exactly how the genus is typically determined and characterised in this method.

1.4. Determining the genus

In Socrates’ synopsis, μανία is ascribed a connective function because the word is used to accommodate various and distinct kinds of activity: in terms of technical collection, the particulars collected under the heading of μανία form a unity capable of describing both erotic love
and divine philosophy. The breadth of his use of μανία may well imply that Socrates’ conception is considerably less developed or specialised than his detailed account of the human soul and of the psychology of ἔρως in the recantation might otherwise have led us to expect; perhaps, then, his definition or characterisation of madness is, in fact, rather thin.

It has been pointed out that the procedure of collection, which might have been expected to produce a preliminary genus before division, is often, in practice, bound up in the processes of division (collection is involved in sorting meaningful similarities within the classes and sub-classes to produce a target species) and not always involved in the initial selection or identification of the genus. Socrates explains that division starts at the level of the genus and proceeds to the target species; during this sequence, acts of collection select by similarity the things which are to be divided. Collection, therefore, occurs along with division at every stage (see above, p. 56) beginning with the collection of the genus and ending with the collection of the target species. However, the initial collection is unique because it operates on a broad range of particulars prior to any division, whereas the range of subsequent applications of collection is constrained by what was divided in the previous step.

Preliminary collection identifies a genus that is suitable to the target species and once the procedure is carried out in full, the target kinds (e.g. erotic love or divine philosophy) are supplied with thick definitions produced by recapitulating the steps taken to reach them. In this way, the genus has a role in defining the species, and so madness would feature in the answer to the question ‘What is love?’, but the reverse does not hold. The target species do not provide essential properties of madness (it is possible to be mad, one assumes, without being in love and without being a philosopher). Listing the various species is no use, as Socrates explicitly fails to provide an exhaustive list: in his first speech (238a-b), Socrates implies that there are more species of ὑβρίς

50 Plato’s language in the Phaedrus does suggest that these procedures are distinct and sequential (e.g. πάλιν, 265e), but πάλιν can also suggest contrariety, rather than temporal sequence (see LSJ s.v. I.2), and, in practice, these procedures are more closely integrated. See e.g. Hayase 2016, 111-41, esp. 134; Crivelli 2012, 19 n. 30; Gill 2010, 186; Philip 1966, 341-2; Moravcsik 1973, 167, 170-1; Hackforth 1945, 142-3.

51 See Moravcsik 1973, 171.

than the ones he has listed; in his second speech (245b), Socrates mentions that there are yet more *species* of divine madness.\[^{53}\]

None of this really helps to explain how the *genus* is first identified and marked out prior to division, and in other examples of collection and division (*e.g.* in the *Sophist* and *Statesman*), the initial suitability of the *genus* to the target *species* appears to be determined intuitively and accepted without interrogation.\[^{54}\] Indeed, this fact about the *genus-species* relationship (that it is ‘obvious’ or ‘simple and easy’) has recently been cited to dispute the role of determining the *genus* within a specialised *technê* such as collection.\[^{55}\] It is true that sometimes the *genus* may seem obvious, but other dialogues show that even determining an appropriate *genus* is something which is prone to considerable error (compare the failed divisions of Plato’s *Sophist*). There may, for example, be more than one *genus* which seems appropriate to a set of particulars under discussion, and choosing the right *genus* that yields features essential to the *species* in question might well depend on specialised insight. In the *Phaedrus*, Socrates specifies no methodical procedure for getting the *genus*, instead describing this ability as, like recollection, an act of seeing-together (*e.g.* συνορῶντα 265d3, cf. 249c2).\[^{56}\]

The relationship between a *genus* and its *species* typically represents an uncontroversial starting point for analysis. If the broad formulation of madness in the *Phaedrus* is similarly made intuitively, and the connections between μανία and its *species* (love and philosophy), are accepted *prima facie*, then we should not expect the *genus* to be one which is particularly problematic or controversial. This is an important point because, as I have shown, the suitability of the *genus*, madness, to one of its target *species*, philosophy, is often considered by modern critics to be a central problem of the first part of the dialogue. Yet Socrates’ analysis of madness is not presented as a dialectical failure or cul-de-sac, and the non-controversial character of the *genus-species* relationship suggests that Socrates’ association of madness with love and with philosophy in the dialogue is not one which is especially esoteric or unexpected. It seems plausible that Plato’s

\[^{53}\] Socrates later points out that exhaustive division is necessary if one is to define the thing which is to be divided (277b6-8). See White 1993, 74-5 and cf. Hayase 2016, 136-7.


conception of madness in the *Phaedrus* (in terms of its links with erotic love or with philosophy) draws on non-specialised views about madness.57

In a passage from his second speech, Socrates contrasts specialised and non-specialised views of the mad philosopher (249c8-249e1). Socrates explains that the crowd think the philosopher is eccentric and that they fail to realise that the philosopher is possessed, adding that the philosopher is like a bird looking upwards showing no concern for things below. Plato exploits a familiar point: philosophers are often seen by the many to be mad because they neglect convention and society. The philosopher seems eccentric to the non-philosopher and for this reason he is called mad. The popular interpretation of madness is dependent on the outward appearance of the philosopher's behaviour, and the key feature here is that the philosopher is neglectful (e.g. of bodily and social items close to him in space). The passage shows that non-philosophers think that the eccentric behaviour has a psychological explanation: madness.

I suggest that this is not a case of Plato 'trading on a confusion between appearance and reality' or 'equivocating between an external, behavioural concept (like eccentricity) and an internal, psychological one (such as “genuine madness”).'58 Instead, Plato is contrasting philosophical (i.e. specialised) and non-philosophical (i.e. non-specialised) explanations of the same phenomenon.59 What differentiates these two are their internal causes, but what unites them is their outward appearance: the unified and undifferentiated *generic* form of madness is characterised in terms of its outward appearance and is obvious to the non-specialist, but the divisions are each characterised as esoteric, internal and psychological (and only clear to the specialist). In other words it is essentially by reference to the social eccentricity, and not merely by reference to a particular internal state (to the mind or ψυχή) or moral outcome that madness is identified. In cases of madness, visible social eccentricity is an outward sign of a hidden psychological condition (related either to illness or to divine intervention); this condition (whether caused by illness or by the gods) is shown by the mad person's attachment to unusual or eccentric priorities at the expense of customary priorities.

58 Scott 2011, 180.
59 See e.g. Thumiger 2013b, 29 on madness as a twofold phenomenon; cf. Simon 1978, ch. 1-2 and Hershkowitz 1998, 1-5.
Socrates’ discussion of non-specialised views about madness that concentrate on the mad person’s eccentric behaviour anticipates his later characterisation of divine madness in the synopsis as a reversal of the νόμιμα (265a). The thin unitary conception of μανία revealed by Socrates’ taxonomy is perhaps best elucidated by the information supplied about the two kinds of madness listed there: one kind produced by human disease and another by divine change of usual customs. These kinds are the result of a differentiation of madness into constitutive left and right ‘parts’ (μέρος, 266a), and in this respect they are different from the target species such as blameworthy erotic love or divine philosophy. Taken together they contain positive information about madness as a unity and can tell us something about the essential character of madness. Since these features (e.g. divine reversal of the νόμιμα and human illness) distinguish the species within the genus, they constitute a sufficient definition of each kind of madness.

Perhaps what Plato means when he uses the word μανία is, in essence, behaviour which is extremely unusual (i.e. it contradicts the νόμιμα), and perhaps he assumes that social conventions themselves are sufficiently stable for deviations to describe a ‘natural’ type. This would satisfy the kind of madness brought about by divine intervention and that produced by human sickness: both philosophers and lovers are shown to behave eccentrically and to shift their focus away from ordinary concerns. Madness therefore has essential and non-essential characteristics: the lover may, for example, act irrationally but the criterion by which he is judged to be mad must be the very same thing by which the philosopher is judged to be mad: e.g. abandoning conventional values (265a11). In Lysias’ speech, the lover exhibits socially abnormal behaviour such as neglecting family and relatives (τὴν τῶν οἰκείων ἁμέλειαν ... τὰς πρὸς τοὺς προσήκοντας διαφορὰς, 231b), but so do those affected by divine ἔρως in Socrates’ second speech. The philosopher overlooks earthly things (ὑπεριδοῦσα ἃ νῦν εἶναι φαμέν, 249c3) and shows no concern for them (τὸν κάτω δὲ ἁμελῶν, 249d8). A similar point about social convention is made by Ferrari (1992) who observes that in the Phaedrus Socrates is combining familiar clichés about lovers and about philosophers.

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60 Cf. the discussion in Denyer 2013, 165-7 of what is ‘fashionable’ in Pl. Tht. 172a-b.
61 The lover in Socrates’ second speech forgets family and neglects social customs (νομίμων δὲ καὶ εὐσχημόνων ... πάντων καταφρονήσασα, 252a4-5).
62 Ferrari 1992, 266-7, esp. 267: ‘Socrates here puts two clichés into a bottle - the temporary insanity of the infatuated lover, the hopeless impracticality of philosophers...’ Ferrari lists examples of these clichés (n. 65), but does not
In his discussion of rhetorical persuasion, Socrates indicates that there is some difference between how a particular thing seems to the crowd and what it really is. It turns out (262b-c) that merely knowing how things appear to the crowd is insufficient for being an effective rhetorician, and it proves crucial to know what the subject he means to discuss (such as justice) really is.\(^6\) This difference between the way that certain things appear to the crowd and the way they really are is captured by the contrast between δόξα and ἀλήθεια (e.g. 262c-2). As we have seen in my discussion of misleading assimilation in the previous section, the analogous term in the speeches is ἔρως, not madness (ἔρως is the object of rhetorical manipulation, and blameworthy and praiseworthy ἔρως each receive a definition through division in the taxonomy; cf. 263c). In order to be persuasive in his speeches about ἔρως, then, Socrates must know (e.g. through definition) what ἔρως really is – not just what the crowd have to say about it. Socrates’ discussion has implications beyond the examples of justice and ἔρως, however, and reads as a strong statement about the inadequacies of popular opinion more generally. This suggests that there must be more to madness than what the crowd have to say, and that Socrates’ understanding of madness should not be delimited by or depend on non-specialised views. I consider madness to be an exceptional case, however, because of its special relationship with the νόμιμα (265a): the reversal of convention constitutes an important part of what it is to be mad. Since unconventionality itself is built into Socrates’ definition of madness, he needs to appeal to conventional behaviour in order to produce a stable typology of what is unconventional. This gives popular opinion a privileged position when it comes to circumscribing madness in terms of social difference. In other words, in discussions of madness popular views have an importance that they may lack in other areas of inquiry.

Despite Socrates’ use of convention, the characterisation of ἔρως in Socrates’ first speech, where the term μανία first appears, contributes to a sustained vision of internal psychological forces which must feature in the overall picture of μανία. In the taxonomy of the synopsis also, madness denotes an inner condition of the mind (evidenced by its close association with διάνοια, 265e4) and its meaning might be better captured as a reference to a particular mental state (e.g. an overriding attachment to eccentric priorities). Plato is clearly interested in the interior psychology identify their unity with madness explicitly. I am unconvinced by his conclusion (267) ‘that love makes philosophers of us all’. This is because I think that the unity of ἔρως is specious; see above, pp. 67–70.

\(^6\) Socrates is responding to Phaedrus’ suggestion of the opposite (260a1-2); οὐκ εἶναι ἀνάγκην τῷ μέλλοντι βήτορι ἔσεσθαι τὰ τῷ ὕπο τῇ δίκαια μανθάνειν ἀλλὰ τὰ δόξαν’ ἄν πληθεί.
of mad individuals, but their behaviour would not be mad if it were not simultaneously unusual. When an individual stands out enough to be recognised as profoundly eccentric, and really has a psychological condition that gives rise to this behaviour then, so it seems for Plato, this is sufficient for the designation of madness.

If this social aspect of madness is an essential part of Plato's definition of μανία in the *Phaedrus*, and if his characterisation is not supposed to be particularly controversial, then conventional and popular stereotypes about mad people have legitimate and controlling authority. It is for this reason, I think, that Plato's use of popular material is particularly powerful. I hope to show that it is precisely by bringing tradition to bear on his account that Plato develops his particular arguments about μανία. The ability of madness to cover a range of different states is reflective of the traditionally broad range of applications which madness has across multiple literary contexts, especially in philosophical writing, poetry and drama (e.g. in Xenophon, Plato, the lyric poets, and Aristophanes). The association of μανία with lovers and with philosophers is squarely within the traditional domain of madness: both lovers and philosophers are often represented as mad. I suggest that Socrates consistently uses popular views about madness to inform his characterisation, and to provide the groundwork for precisely those kinds of associations which critics often indicate are misleading. Plato's depiction of madness in the *Phaedrus* is more sympathetic to these contexts for μανία than previously thought.  

2. **Madness and the Poets**

In the previous section of this chapter I identified madness with the *genus* in Plato's illustration of the dialectical art of collection and division and proposed that, for Plato, madness represents a genuine unity. In addition, I identified some problems surrounding the determination of a suitable *genus*: typically the *genus* is found by an intuitive non-technical leap. In what follows, by analysing the way in which madness is brought into the dialogue, I propose that Socrates' initial discovery of the *genus* is indeed characterised as an act of pre-analytic insight. Socrates' mention of Sappho and Anacreon before his first speech begins foreshadows his inclusion of μανία at the end of the dialogue.

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64 Although recent critics (e.g. Cairns and Pender) have examined Socrates' use of poetic imagery in general, these studies do not focus on madness. See my discussion below, pp. 82-84.
speech, and his forgetfulness about the poets’ contribution alludes to recollection (249b-c), a process which itself resembles the selection of the genus in preliminary collection (265d). This implies that the lyric poets have a direct involvement in Socrates’ determination of his genus (i.e. μανία). On my view, the relationship between the genus, μανία, and the target species, ἔρως, is grounded in popular views about love contained in the lyric poets, particularly Sappho and Anacreon.

I argue that Socrates uses the poetry of Sappho and Anacreon to achieve two distinct aims. Firstly, their poetry provides a precedent for the genuine connection between love and madness. Their formulation of μανία has some of the qualities which inform the two discrete kinds of madness under discussion, most notably the conviction that lovers are mad and that madness is a result of divine contact. Secondly while Socrates’ retrospective remarks make it clear that blameworthy ἔρως and divine ἔρως are distinct, Sappho and Anacreon make the mistake of saying that the madness of blameworthy ἔρως has a divine cause. In this way, these poets fail to recognise the limits of blameworthy ἔρως: it does not reach beyond bodily beauty nor is it caused by the gods. Because of their totalising vision of ἔρως, however, Sappho and Anacreon’s poetic account of love includes a range of material suitable to different contexts. Socrates capitalises on this confusion in his second speech by using the erotic imagery found in their poetry to describe philosophical activity, and so to make praiseworthy ἔρως and blameworthy ἔρως seem indistinguishable. This is misleading yet suits Socrates’ rhetorical aim which is to recant his views about ἔρως. The persuasiveness of this strategy depends on the fact that philosophy is, like blameworthy ἔρως in the poetry of Sappho and Anacreon, connected with madness and with the gods. In sum, my argument is that the poetry of Sappho and Anacreon helps Socrates to establish legitimate connections between ἔρως and μανία, and between μανία and the gods. Poetic imagery does not, however, help to clarify the finer points of philosophical μανία because when it is applied to divine ἔρως its role is misleading and assimilative; moreover, it lacks the psychological and metaphysical vision of the palinode, especially the notion of a ’super-celestial region’ of Forms.
2.1. The Interlude: Conceptualising Madness

In the interlude before Socrates’ first speech (235b-237a), Phaedrus marvels at the comprehensive scope and worthy treatment of the subject matter in Lysias’ speech and suggests that these features protect it against any competing treatments of the same topic (235b). At its close, however, Lysias’ speech draws attention to the possibility of its own incompleteness (234c), and Socrates rejects Phaedrus’ assertion of Lysias’ comprehensiveness and superiority because it conflicts with the wise men and women of past ages who have written on this theme (235b). Socrates claims that he has heard better, perhaps in the lyric poets Sappho and Anacreon or some prose writer, and conveys his feeling that, when it comes to Lysias’ account, he has not just something different, but something at least as good to add (235c). For all of his supposed comprehensiveness, Lysias has left something important out of his speech, and what is missing might be found in the poetry of Sappho and Anacreon or in some prose writer.

Lysias’ speech makes no mention of madness at all, and the strongest negative term applied to ἔρως is sickness (νοσείν 231d, cf. 236b) which is contrasted to the non-lover’s σωφροσύνη (231d). The lover ‘thinks badly’ (κακῶς φρονοῦσιν) and the former lover ‘thinks well’ (εὖ φρονήσαντες, 231d). These prosaic contrasts have some of the resources that might lead us to associate love and madness, but the first sign that μανία will be central to Socrates’ argument is his claim, immediately after the mention of Sappho and Anacreon (235c), that he cannot make a better speech than Lysias without including the contrast between τὸ ἄφρον and τὸ φρόνιμον (235e-236a). Although Socrates represents this contrast as unoriginal, it does not appear in Lysias’ speech.

The introduction of madness in Socrates’ first speech is important not just for the speech itself, in which it has the potential to surpass Lysias’ apotreptic by making the lover’s lack of σωφροσύνη even less attractive to the youth, but more generally for the first part of the dialogue. Establishing a connection between love and madness is essential both to the argument of Socrates’ second speech in which he re-evaluates madness, and to the synopsis where madness is shown to be the basis of the speeches’ underlying unity. Because madness represents a major programmatic addition, it seems plausible that this idea, that love involves madness, is what
Lysias has left out of his portrait of love. Socrates’ naming of Sappho and Anacreon as sources, then, presumably shows that their poetry provides him with a strong link between love and madness. I think that it is possible to corroborate this attribution by examining how Socrates gets to madness as a central concept.

When it comes to accounting for whatever was lacking in Lysias’ speech, Socrates is playfully characterised as inspired by outside sources. He claims that his breast is full and that he has been filled up through the ears by external streams as if he were a vessel (235c-d). Plato’s portrayal of Socrates as forgetful and inspired can be interpreted as a dramatised representation of how Socrates gets to his genus. Discerning the appropriate genus, which is the starting point for philosophical dialectic, is typically a serendipitous act which involves something akin to intuition or insight. In Socrates’ discussion of collection and division in the synopsis, the paradigmatic genus illustrated by the speeches is μανία, and Socrates explains that the preliminary comprehension of this genus (μανία) involved surveying various scattered particulars and bringing them together into a single concept (265d). In his second speech, Socrates says that the act of philosophical recollection (ἀνάμνησις) similarly involves moving from a plurality of perceptions towards a unity (249b-c). This activity is a central feature of the philosopher’s madness because ἀνάμνησις brings the philosopher’s διάνοια close to those things which confer divinity on the gods (249c), and it is for this reason that he is described as divinely possessed (ἐνθουσιάζων 249d2). In this way, the determination of a genus in collection and division resembles the act of recollecting those things which the discarnate soul once saw.

I suggest that this similarity provides a way to interpret Socrates’ inspiration in the interlude (235c-d). Plato is staging Socrates’ conceptualisation of the genus (i.e. μανία) as a process akin to philosophical recollection, and this accounts both for Socrates’ forgetfulness (235d) about his genus and for his claim, in the interlude, to be inspired. I am not arguing that recollection and collection are identical for Plato or suggesting that he is being more than playful here. Plato is not showing how recollection proper works, but rather dramatizing how Socrates arrives at μανία (i.e. his genus) which serves as a suitable unifying concept for a set of particulars under

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67 μανία is not a ‘Form’. See Griswold 1996, 180.
discussion. If this is right, that a resemblance between collection and recollection lies behind Plato’s portrait of Socrates in the interlude, then the lyric poets Sappho and Anacreon are directly involved in determining the genus, since they are named by Socrates. Their role is analogous to a stimulus to recollection. It is my contention that Plato’s conception of madness in the dialogue is explicitly drawn from these poets, and that he represents this in the drama of the dialogue by having Socrates stumble upon the term near the end of his first speech.

Socrates’ taxonomy makes clear that despite madness having an undifferentiated generic form, it is never actually found undifferentiated. The two types of madness (the madness caused by human illness and the madness caused by the gods) are made out to be exhaustive (there are no other kinds of madness apart from specifications of these) and exclusive (any particular case of madness is an example of either one type or the other). Both sides of the dichotomy are, however, present together in Sappho and Anacreon’s portrait of madness. These poets provide an example of an undifferentiated conception of madness in which its two aetiologies (illness and the gods) are combined into one image (both diseased and divine, both bitter and sweet; Sappho’s γλυκύπικρον, fr. 130 Voigt). This is why Plato presents these poets as a good prompt for his genus. They point both to the negative representation of love, and (by focussing on divine madness) to how to move beyond it in the palinode.

Because of the playful dramatisation of Socrates as inspired by outside sources, some critics have interpreted Socrates’ inspiration to be thoroughly ironic and dismissed any serious debt to the poets. Traditional views about Plato’s attitude to the poets have discouraged alternative readings and made ‘unlikely bedfellows’ of lyric ἔρως and Platonic philosophy. This contrast has led some critics to suggest that Plato only introduces the views of the poets in order to discredit them. Plato’s hostility to the poets has recently been challenged, however, and Socrates’ mention of the ‘ancient quarrel’ between poetry and philosophy (Republic 10.607b5-6) might signify an attempt on Plato’s part to move beyond their disagreements.

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68 Griswold 1996, 116, 182 argues against a strong identity between these activities.
69 e.g. Rowe 1986a, 151; cf. duBois 1995, 85-6.
71 e.g. Carson 1986, 155.
72 Halliwell 2011, 252.
Perhaps it is not too surprising, then, to find Socrates praising Sappho and Anacreon in the *Phaedrus* (235c), and outlining later the blessings of poetic inspiration which, alongside prophecy, purification and ἔρως, constitutes a positive form of divine madness in the opening of the palinode (245a). Accordingly, some critics of the *Phaedrus* have taken Plato’s debt to the poets more seriously, and shown how Plato’s account of love is sincerely influenced by lyric formulations of the erotic experience, even if Socrates’ inspiration is made to seem less than serious. Socrates’ claim to be inspired by foreign streams is clearly playful and foreshadows the varieties of inspiration which will be encountered in the second speech (including poetry, 245a). Yet this playfulness need not show that Socrates’ characterisation of μανία is not indebted to poetic sources nor that Plato rejects poetic wisdom. Socrates’ explanation that he has heard (ἀκῆκοα, 235c) better in Sappho and Anacreon is part of a larger pattern in the dialogue of deference to outside authority. Andrea Nightingale (1995) examines the role of alien discourse in the *Phaedrus* generally and suggests that, in some cases, Plato allows for certain non-philosophical genres to have ‘semantic autonomy’ and to make a positive contribution to philosophy. This is especially evident in Plato’s handling of lyric love poetry, and Nightingale makes the important suggestion that Plato leaves Sappho and Anacreon’s conception of madness at least partially intact.

Like other critics, Nightingale’s focus is not on madness but almost exclusively on Plato’s use of erotic imagery to describe philosophical activity in Socrates’ second speech. Similar studies usually envisage μανία as one of a range of key metaphorical terms which allude to the lyric poets in Plato’s treatment of philosophical ἔρως. For Elizabeth Pender (2007a), Plato transforms traditional views of love by using poetic imagery to characterise the soul’s internal struggle between psychological forces which are brought to balance in the philosophical life. On this view, Plato’s allusions to lyric in Socrates’ first speech help to characterise love as a psychological

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73 Nussbaum 1986, 200-233 suggests that in the *Phaedrus* Socrates recants his rejection of the poets in the *Republic*.
74 See e.g. Robin 1933, Not. p. xxxi; Fortenbaugh 1966, 118-19; de Vries 1969, 75; duBois 1985, 91-103; Ferrari 1987, 154; Nehamas and Woodruff 1995, 87; Most recently see Nightingale 1995, 133-171; Foley 1998, 43; Pender 2007a; Pender 2007b; Pender 2011; Cairns 2013.
76 For the suggestion that this marks Plato’s serious acknowledgement of the poets’ contribution, while Socrates himself is deliberately made to seem less than serious, see Pender 2007a, 10.
77 Nightingale 1995, 133-171; see 133, 148-9 for ‘semantic autonomy’ and ‘passive double-voiced discourse’; see 137 on Socrates’ use of hearsay (with ἀκούειν).
78 Nightingale 1995, 161; cf. e.g. Ferrari 1987, 154.
79 Pender 2007a, 26, 55. This is a productive conflict, cf. Nussbaum 1986, 213-33.
force and contribute, in his second speech, to a tension in the soul between the initial passivity of the lover in the presence of physical beauty and the developing active response of the philosopher who recollects true beauty. For Pender, Plato’s representation of each of these effects is shaped by abstract lyric imagery, including the motif of love as madness.

For Douglas Cairns (2013), Socrates’ use of the traditional imagery of lyric poetry helps to bring together Socrates’ otherwise divergent accounts of ἔρως, and so to achieve the sublimation of erotic desire into philosophy by developing a set of features which they share. In this analysis, μανία is part of a catalogue of abstract images used by the lyric poets to describe erotic love (including, for example, the erotic gaze, warmth, softening, melting, disease, shuddering, fluttering, and forgetting family) and, once this imagery is applied to philosophical activity, then philosophy’s identification as a kind of ἔρως becomes more persuasive.

Other critics who examine Plato’s debts to the poets in the Phaedrus have emphasised ‘proto-philosophical’ aspects of Sappho’s account of love which are readily transferable to philosophy. Fr. 16 Voigt, for example, demonstrates her universalising insight into the relationship between desire and beauty: the most beautiful thing (κάλλιστον, 3) is, she says, defined as ‘whatever one loves’ (ὅττω τις ἔραται, 3-4). Beauty is therefore co-ordinated with ἔρως and obtains a relative and subjective status, referring not to any particular object, but to a general category of objects. This sort of generalising feature in Sappho’s poetry is, according to some critics, a potential influence for Plato’s account of philosophical ἔρως, because philosophical activity is similarly concerned with abstract concepts such as beauty or justice. Again, this superficial similarity helps Socrates elide some of the differences between blameworthy ἔρως and philosophical ἔρως.

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80 For Pender, the metaphorical view of love as madness found in lyric poetry is a motif which helps to explain Plato’s transition from descriptions of the lover’s behavior (in Lysias’ speech) to a portrait of the internal effects of love’s domination (in Socrates’ first speech).
81 Pender 2007a, 14-18; 46-54.
82 Pender 2007a, 29-37, esp. 27, 32. Other prominent motifs are the wings of ἔρως, contact with a divinity and the radiance of the beloved.
83 Cairns 2013, 239-41, esp. 243 n. 13.
84 What duBois 1995, 105 calls her ‘englobing category’; cf. more generally 98-145. For a recent argument against this line of interpretation of Sappho 16, see Konstan 2013, 14-26.
Unlike my own research, these studies focus on ἔρως rather than on μανία. This is common in works on the *Phaedrus* and, in each approach, the lyric imagery of ἔρως is shown to have a unifying function: Socrates repurposes poetic material in the palinode in order to characterise philosophical activity; this amplifies the similarities between blameworthy erotic love and philosophy. The allusions to Sappho and Anacreon in Socrates’ explanation of philosophical ἔρως are therefore part of a rhetorical strategy in which blameworthy ἔρως and philosophy are attracted into an artificial synthesis. By contrast, I will focus on how Sappho and Anacreon are shown to contribute to Socrates’ concept of madness.

I do not want to disregard Socrates’ rhetorical allusion to the lyric poets in his account of philosophy; my interest, however, is in what Socrates has to say about madness as a genuine unity. Despite Socrates’ assimilative purpose, I suggest that Sappho and Anacreon’s treatment of ἔρως is also central to the legitimate association of ἔρως and μανία (i.e. the classification of love as a kind of madness). Their formulation of μανία has some of the qualities which inform the two discrete kinds of madness under discussion (human and divine), and their poetry provides Socrates with a precedent for the connections between ἔρως and μανία, and μανία and the gods, which are key to Socrates’ classificatory procedure. His incorporation of the lyric formulation of erotic madness therefore has a special importance over and above the rhetorical use of erotic imagery in the dialogue. It has a programmatic role in connecting Socrates’ speeches together and in unifying his account of love.

Sappho and Anacreon’s association of ἔρως with μανία constitutes a particularly dominant and recurrent motif. In a fragment of Sappho (fr. 1 Voigt), for example, the speaker’s desires are located in her ‘maddened heart’ (μαινόλαι [θύμωι, 18]). Anacreon lists madness, love and vision alongside each other as closely associated activities (fr. 359 PMG) and his polyptosis, ἐρέω τε δηὖτε καὐκ ἐρέω | καὶ μαίνομαι καὐ μαίνομαι (fr. 428 PMG), invites a direct comparison between love and madness. Socrates’ mention of these poets in the context of responding to Lysias’ speech about

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86 Socrates describes some of his expressions in the palinode as ‘somewhat poetic’: ποιητικοῖς τυχὲν 257a. On the poetic style of the palinode, see e.g. Yunis 2011, 169. Cf. Dover 1995.

87 On ἔρως as a specious unity, see above, pp. 67-70. Cf. Cairns 2013, 235, words in brackets mine: ‘P-erôs (i.e. philosophy) is only contingently about erôs as the Greeks knew it.’

88 See Cyrino 1996, 37 who interprets Anacreon as equating these activities in fr. 359 PMG. Thumiger 2017b, 43 identifies fr. 428 PMG as an example of a literary topos in which love and madness are equated.
the detrimental effects of ἔρως is immediately suggestive of μανία and brings it into focus as a key concept. In other words, by concentrating on the connection between ἔρως and μανία, these poets have positive value in providing Socrates with a suitable central concept for his speeches about love. This is not an entirely new idea, but one which has not been sufficiently emphasised in studies of the dialogue.89

In this way, Socrates’ use of imagery from Sappho and Anacreon is both constructive and misleading. Lyric poetry provides a precedent for the genuine classification of ἔρως as a kind of μανία, and is also exploited for its rhetorical potential to exaggerate the similarity between divine and blameworthy ἔρως. I suggest that Plato has Socrates defer to these poets in order to establish legitimate connections between blameworthy ἔρως and μανία, and between μανία and the gods. For Socrates, the connection between μανία and the gods is only suitable to contexts (such as divine enthusiasm) that exclude blameworthy ἔρως. For this reason, Sappho and Anacreon’s account is more valuable for its characterisation of non-divine μανία (exemplified by blameworthy ἔρως); their description of the gods’ role in madness is fundamentally unreliable, because Sappho and Anacreon’s inclusion of the gods in blameworthy ἔρως is one of the features enlisted to suggest, wrongly, that the two species are identical.

Socrates’ deference to non-philosophical sources does not mean that he privileges their insights above the wisdom produced by philosophical dialectic. Rather, Socrates mobilises Sappho and Anacreon’s account of erotic madness as a starting point for his analysis. While Socrates does not think that the poets present an altogether unenlightened view of love, he explains at the beginning of the palinode (245b7-c2) that only the very wisest (σοφοὶ δὲ πιστῆ) will believe that the gods grant the madness of ἔρως as a benefit (ἐπ’ ἐυτυχίᾳ τῇ μεγίστῃ). In this way, Socrates’ own account (which does recognise such a benefit) is placed above the account of the lyric poets who view love’s madness unequivocally as harmful. Socrates later reveals a hierarchy of occupations for human souls ranked according to their worth (248d-e). The first rank consists of philosophers or lovers of beauty or music, while the poets occupy the sixth rank (of nine) below soldiers, politicians, businessmen, gymnasts, prophets and priests. The poets’ position in this hierarchy is surprisingly low, especially as Socrates elsewhere praises poetry inspired by divine madness.

89 See e.g. Nehamas and Woodruff 1995, 13 n. 28 Cf. Morgan 2010, 52.
Critics have responded to this apparent contradiction in different ways, and I think it is best explained by distinguishing between poets and the work that they produce (which is the product of outside inspiration).

Without revision, the conception of madness in Sappho and Anacreon is psychologically and ethically misleading (according to the taxonomy, the madness of blameworthy love is not divine), and I suggest that these limitations drive Socrates’ mistaken classification, in his first speech, of μανία as a harm only rather than as a complex term with discrete parts. Madness is a genuine feature of the erotic experience, but it is not exclusive to blameworthy ἐρως; instead, it refers to a larger phenomenon, being independently associated with other activities such as philosophy and prophecy. In his second speech, Socrates is formally concerned with redressing these limitations by separating harmful forms of μανία, such as blameworthy love, from beneficial divine forms, such as philosophy; he simultaneously capitalises on the poets’ conflation of some of these features under ἐρως to conceal the specific differences between divine/praiseworthy love and blameworthy love. Ironically, while Socrates corrects the lyric poets’ views about madness by dividing the term into its different species, he is simultaneously engaged in obscuring some of these distinctions between the species by using imagery and motifs from lyric love poetry.

With this tension in mind, it is useful to look at the speeches themselves in terms of Sappho and Anacreon’s positive contribution to Socrates’ conception of madness. I do not think that Socrates’ praise of Sappho and Anacreon is a reference to lyric poets in general (even if these two are sometimes listed as a quintessential pair in antiquity). The primary intertext which needs to be explored is Sappho and Anacreon’s poetry. Firstly, I will examine how madness is first brought into the dialogue by looking at the ways in which Sappho and Anacreon’s

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90 Annas 1982, 12 thinks Plato’s attitude towards the poets is split. For Ferrari 1987, 117–8 the poets in the sixth-rank are not the uninspired (σώφρων) poets described at 245a because Plato would have made that distinction explicit. See also Griswold 1996, 102–3 and White 1993, 70, 114–5. Pender 2007a, 10–11 decides that the passage reflects the firm position of poets within the Platonic corpus. For Morgan 2010, 51 the poets are ranked poorly because they carry out inferior mimēsis (compared to philosophical lovers who emulate gods). Werner 2011, 57 takes this as evidence that praise of divine madness elsewhere is meant only ironically. Cf. Scott 2007, 145.

91 e.g. Burnyeat 2012, 241; cf. Rowe 1986a, 181 who distinguishes between the poets’ own knowledge and the benefits that they produce for mankind.

92 For the view that Sappho and Anacreon are quintessential examples of lyric poets in antiquity, see Foley 1998, 42; but Sappho is sometimes linked with other poets, on which see Pender 2007a, 9–10.

93 For Sappho and Anacreon as primary intertexts, see Fortenbaugh 1966, 198 and Pender 2007a, 26; contra Ferrari 1987, 106.
formulation of μανία is compatible with the portrait of ἔρως, νόσος and ὕβρις developed by Socrates in his first speech. Secondly, I consider how Socrates’ drawing on the poets for his account of erotic μανία achieves his aim of improving on Lysias’ speech. Socrates’ first speech needs to offer a stronger apotreptic for the youth against the lover, and the poetic conception of μανία fulfils this role. Importantly, the apotreptic force of μανία depends on the unreliability of the lover, but not on madness itself being intrinsically harmful. Finally, I will look at divine contact as a cause of madness, a motif prominent in both Sappho and Anacreon in their poems about love.

2.2. Socrates’ First Speech: μανία and ὕβρις

As explained above (p. 68), it has recently been suggested that Socrates’ association of ὕβρις, ἔρως and μανία in his first speech constitutes an example of misleading rhetorical assimilation, and that Socrates’ equivocation between these terms deprives them of their traditional meaning and renders their function in the dialogue synthetic and artificial. I have already argued against this view on general terms, and in this section I make the specific argument that the connection between these concepts is the result of Plato working within a consciously traditional framework. I show that the conceptual links between νόσος, ὕβρις and μανία are already in place, and that Plato connects these terms in other dialogues where he does not have a comparable rhetorical agenda. I argue that by naming Sappho and Anacreon and mentioning prose writers, Socrates is appealing deliberately to non-philosophical sources to explain and demonstrate the compatibility of these terms and to bring madness into focus as a key concept for discussion.

Phaedrus accepts the point that lovers are ill in advance of Socrates’ speech: Socrates first says that the contrast between τὸ ἄφρον and τὸ φρόνιμον (235e-236a) made by Lysias will be essential to his own argument, and Phaedrus agrees with this, conceding that lovers are ‘sicker’ (τὸ μὲν τὸν ἐρῶντα τὸῦ μὴ ἐρῶντος νοσεῖν δώσω, 236a8-236b1). Lysias speech had not, in fact, made the ἄφρον/φρόνιμος contrast, but had contrasted the lover’s illness (νοσεῖν 231d) and the non-lover’s σωφροσύνη (σωφρονεῖν, 231d). The connection between ἄφροσύνη and νοσεῖν is only made explicit in the interlude, and only after Socrates has mentioned Sappho and Anacreon.

94 See Scott 2011, 189-190.
The conceptual link between illness and madness is already established in Attic tragedy, and typically involves a force which damages or otherwise affects the organs of thought.\(^95\) Sometimes, as in Euripides' *Hippolytus* or Sophocles' *Trachiniae*, the force which is responsible for this affliction is ἔρως.\(^96\) The connection between illness and madness is also present in medical writing, and features in Plato's discussions of μανία elsewhere.\(^97\) Despite these precedents, Plato is sensitive to the fact that the lyric poets were the first to make an explicit association between love and illness. Sappho in particular, more than any other lyric poet, establishes a strong connection between ἔρως, νόσος and μανία.\(^98\) In Sappho fr. 1 Voigt, for example, ἔρως is depicted as a disturbance of both the body and the mind: Sappho's reference to both 'aches' (ἄσαισι, 1.3) and 'anxieties' (ὀνίαισι, 1.3) articulate together the physical and the mental aspects of the lover's suffering.\(^99\)

Lysias' contrast between sickness and σωφροσύνη is preserved in Socrates' first speech (e.g. 238e), and reinforces the traditional dichotomy made there between ὕβρις and σωφροσύνη.\(^100\) In his first speech, Socrates provides insight into the lover's dispositional state, exposing the lover's priorities which drive his unusual behaviour. The lover's overriding attachment to these priorities is characterised as ὕβρις. Socrates' analysis takes the form of an explanation of the lover's motivational psychology. The lover is influenced by inner rulers and forces, and these are divided into two opposed drives: the inborn desire for pleasures (237d7-8) and an acquired judgement which aims at the best (237d8-9). The contrast in this section between ὕβρις and σωφροσύνη is clear

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\(^95\) See Euripides fr. 400 *TrGF* (in which Aphrodite and Erôs are a sickness) and fr. 161 *TrGF* (in which Erôs is madness). See Dover 1974, 77, 210 and Price 1989, 64.

\(^96\) Eur. *Hipp.* 764-766; Soph. *Trach.* 445-6. Cf. e.g. Aesch. *Pers.* 750: νόσος φρενών; Soph. *Aj.* 59 μανίαν νόσοι. This illness generally affects the φρένες, νόος, καρδία or θυμός; see Said 2013, 372-3. In Sophocles *Trachiniae*, love is emphatically described as a νόσος (445, 491, 544) and is linked to madness (e.g. 446). The connection between love and νόσος is a traditional Greek idea. See Easterling 1982, 129 n. 445-7; cf. McNamara 2015, 308-327. On the relationship between love and madness in Athenian drama and earlier poetry, see Thumiger 2013b, 27, 31-35.

\(^97\) In the *Theaetetus* and the *Timaeus*, for example, μανία is identified as a type of νόσος (Pl. *Tht.* 157e; *Ti* 86b), and in Plato's *Laws* (6.782e-783a), νόσος and ἔρως are used interchangeably to describe excessive desires (e.g. for food, drink or sex) which produce μανία and burn with ὕβρις. Cf. Pl. *Leg.* 1.1934d6 some kinds of madness are said to be the result of illness. For medical texts see e.g. *On the Sacred Disease* (ch. 15), parts of the Hippocratic *Peri parthenion* (*Virg.* 2.3-3.1) and the Hippocratic *On Regimen* (esp. ch. 35-36). See Sassi 2013, 415-6 and McNamara 2015, 308-327.


\(^99\) See Cyrino 1995, 142-144, esp. 143-4. Cf. e.g. Thumiger 2017a, 130-1.

\(^100\) Both sickness and ὕβρις denote domination by ἐπιθυμία (νόσος 238e; ὕβρις 238a). On the traditional nature of this contrast, see Rademaker 2005, 243-4. The contrast is tracked by North 1966, and identified as a part of a general field of cultural antitheses: the contrast appears in Homer, the tragic poets (especially Aeschylus, see Snell 1928, 1-164) and in archaic elegy.
(237e2-238a2): when judgement is in control and leads one by means of reason towards the best, its control is called restraint (σωφροσύνη), but when desire (ἐπιθυμία) drags one irrationally towards pleasures and dominates, it is called ὕβρις. This overpowering of reason by the appetites takes many forms, including gluttony and drunkenness (238b-c) and, when it is directed towards a beautiful body, ἔρως (238c).

The term ὕβρις frequently denotes harmful behaviour, and in Socrates’ first speech the lover’s psychological condition certainly leads to deliberate mistreatment of the youth. To the lover, that which offers the least resistance is pleasurable (238e), and he is therefore irresistibly invested in making the beloved weaker, stunting his physical and intellectual development, and ultimately harming him (238e-239b). As it is used in the speech, however, the term ὕβρις denotes a particular psychological condition (i.e. domination by an excessive and innate desire for pleasure) rather than a specific type of behaviour.101 This emphasis on the disposition of ὕβρις in addition to (and prior to) the act finds some precedent in tragedy,102 and appears in later discussions by Plato in which the term is paired with μανία and contrasted with σωφροσύνη.103 The terms ὕβρις and μανία also appear together in contemporary prose writing, and even Lysias himself seems to use them in similar contexts.104 This sort of pairing means that neither Socrates’ conception of ὕβρις as dispositional nor his replacement of ὕβρις with μανία is presented as revisionary.

Socrates’ use of ὕβρις to emphasise the lover’s psychological disposition (i.e. domination by a psychological impulse) over his harmful and antisocial behavior is, I suggest, especially formulated to invite a comparison with the lover depicted in the poetry of Sappho and Anacreon. Although ὕβρις and ἔρως are not prominently connected in their work, Sappho and Anacreon’s characterisation of ἔρως is similarly centred on the subjectivity of the lover and focuses on the lover’s inner condition. Sappho and Anacreon primarily represent the effects of ἔρως on themselves as subjects. This typically takes the form of mocking self-description, and their

101 See e.g. Fisher 1992, 467-479.
102 In Sophocles’ Ajax, for example, ὕβρις and μεγαλοφροσύνη are paralleled (1087-90) and indicate a disposition of prideful self-aggrandisement. See Cairns 1996, 1-32.
103 In the Statesman (306e-307c) ὕβρις and μανία result from excessive ἀνδρεία and are contrasted with σωφροσύνη. Cairns 1996, 1-32 emphasises the intentional and dispositional aspects of ὕβρις as it is traditionally understood and discusses the relevant passages in the Statesman (305e-31e) and the Laws (1.637a-b, 1.649d5, 6.782e-783a). Cairns’ contention (32) is that ὕβρις can refer to ‘purely dispositional, apparently victimless forms of self-assertion’.
104 e.g. in Lysias’ πρὸς Σίμωνα ἀπολογία. Simon’s drunken state and menacing behaviour towards the defendant’s nieces is characterised by ὕβρις (3.7.1; cf. 3.7.5-6) and his later behaviour is explained as μανία (3.7.6-8).
portrayals focus on the personal experience and psychology of the lover. They represent themselves as the frequent victims of violent ἔρως. In fr. 31 Voigt, for example, Sappho delineates the violent effect of the sight of the beloved on the narrator’s body and organs of emotion in a striking sequence of physical effects.

In Socrates’ characterisation of ὑβρίς, part of the lover’s own psychology is overwhelmed: ἐπιθυμία drags (ἐλκούσης) the lover irrationally toward pleasures and dominates (ἁρξάσης, 238a). In the poetry of Sappho and Anacreon, ἔρως is similarly envisioned as a powerful and dominating force that assails the organs of emotion and thought. In a fragment of Sappho (fr. 47 Voigt), ἔρως shakes the lover’s mind (φρένες) like the wind pelting trees in the mountains (1-2). The force of ἔρως often explicitly results in madness. So in Anacreon (fr. 398 PMG) the god Erôs inflicts madness and uproar at the roll of the dice (ἂστραγάλαι δ᾿ Ἐρωτός εἰσιν | μανίαι τε και κυδοιμοί, 1-2).

Since Sappho and Anacreon’s focus is on the inner condition of the lover and on the damaging psychological effects of the force of ἔρως, their conception fits Socrates’ portrait of hubristic ἔρως, and his mention of these poets means that madness is a natural and expected extension of his psychological account. My argument is that Plato introduces madness both into the speech and into the dialogue by having Socrates reflect on the poetry of Sappho and Anacreon. The transition from ὑβρίς to μανία depends on these poets’ conception of ἔρως as an inner force, and Socrates’ appeal to Sappho and Anacreon enables him to move from a simple contrast in Lysias’ speech to a complex psychological phenomenon. Together with Socratic philosophy, these poets are responsible for the increasing emphasis on the lover’s psychology.

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105 See e.g. Page 1955.
106 See Hutchinson 2001, 68-9 who suggests that these bear more in common with medical texts (e.g. the Hippocratic Epidemics) than they do with anything else in the lyric tradition.
107 See generally Calame 1999. Pender 2007a, 15 surveys key examples.
108 The idea of love as wielding madness is possibly also present in P.Oxy. 3722.2.1: θεράπων ἔμηνεν. The θεράπων (servant) who ‘has driven mad’ may be Erôs (cf. Sappho fr. 159 Voigt, where Aphrodite calls Erôs her servant). Cyrino 1996 points out (376) that κυδοιμοί in fr. 398 PMG evokes the battlefield and visions of a dying warrior and thus describes a physical assault as a counterpart to the mental effects.
109 Cf Pender 2007a, esp. 14-18. Pender’s argument focuses more generally on the psychological language of ἔρως, whereas my focus is on the fact that Sappho and Anacreon are directly involved in supplying Socrates with the generic concept of madness.
Although Socrates revises Sappho and Anacreon’s portrayal of the psychology of madness, Socrates’ deference to these popular non-philosophical sources indicates that he is prepared to take on board some of their key features. Dominic Scott, who is interested in showing that Plato’s conception of madness distorts the ‘traditional meaning’ of the concept, does not cite the lyric poets (whom Socrates names) as sources for such a meaning, insisting instead on a strong link between madness and irrationality. Far from being a rhetorical move of the sort which would deprive μανία of its ‘traditional meaning’, I suggest that it is precisely because of its traditional associations that μανία is appropriate. The language of lyric poetry helps to make sense of Socrates’ grouping of various terms (ἔρως, νόσος, ὕβρις) under the heading of μανία by providing a traditional framework in which they are compatible and, especially in the case of madness and ἔρως, hard to distinguish.

2.3. Competing with Lysias: μανία as Apotretic

For Socrates’ first speech to be an improvement on Lysias it must constitute a more powerful apotretic for the youth or supply a stronger endorsement of the non-lover, and as Socrates does not discuss the non-lover, it must be the former. Although μανία serves to provide the speeches with underlying unity, its introduction in Socrates’ first speech is also supposed to mark this improvement on Lysias’ argument against the lover (since, as I have argued, it represents Socrates’ key addition). If Plato's conception of μανία is drawn from the poetry of Sappho and Anacreon, then it must be because there are characteristics of their presentation of the madness of love which strengthen Lysias’ apotretic by making the lover’s lack of σωφροσύνη even less attractive than νόσος (which Lysias used) or ὕβρις (which it replaces).

Rowe (1986) suggests that the graphic depiction of the lover’s condition found in Sappho and Anacreon makes the lover generally less desirable. However, while both Lysias and Socrates emphasise the threatening and menacing behaviour of the lover towards the youth, this is not the central focus of ὕβρις in Socrates’ first speech or of μανία, especially as it is portrayed by Sappho.

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110 See Phaedrus’ comment at 241d.
111 Rowe 1986a, 151: ‘how could anyone willingly have anything to do with someone in the condition they describe?’ Cf. Pender 2007a, 10.
and Anacreon. In their poetry, μανία graphically describes the effect which love has on the lover, and puts the focus on the lover’s internal and personal psychological disposition; it does not emphasise the lover’s outward behaviour or his mistreatment of the beloved. It is true that μανία does seem to go beyond ὑβρίς in terms of its psychological intensity, but it does not follow from this that the mad person is necessarily less attractive to the youth (to whom each of the speeches in the Phaedrus is, after all, addressed). Anacreon or Sappho’s poetry (which often points to the older lover’s vulnerability or loss of dignity) must therefore be adapted if it is to make the lover less attractive to the boy.

Instead of madness being a direct menace, I suggest that it offers a stronger apotreptic because it involves an extreme change in the lover’s identity. The madness of love is temporary, and when the lover is no longer in love, he changes personality (ἄλλος γεγονός, 241a). He is alien both to his former self and to the youth who has not undergone the same undesirable changes. When madness is introduced near the end of the speech it is in exactly this context: the lover’s psychological identity changes from a state of μανία to one of σωφροσύνη (241a). The frustration of the youth (241b) is the result of the lover reneging on former promises and his being generally untrustworthy (ἀπίστῳ 241c). I think that the apotreptic strength of μανία depends less on the lover’s antisocial behavior while he is mad and more on the extremity of the changes in his identity between madness and sanity.

The fickleness of the lover’s passion is thematised in the poetic accounts of Sappho and Anacreon. The subject of Anacreon fr. 428 PMG, for example, alternates between being in and out of love, and between being mad and not being mad (ἐρέω τε δηνυτε καί μαίνομαι καί μαίνομαι καύματος). Similar alternations of passion are often depicted by dramatically alternating images of heating and cooling. So in fr. 413 PMG Anacreon depicts himself as struck by the massive hammer of Erôs like a blacksmith (ὥστε χαλκεύς, 1), before being plunged into a wintry stream (χειμερίη 8).
In Sappho fr. 1 Voigt, Aphrodite assures Sappho that her beloved will undergo a swift reversal; (21-24) instead of fleeing (φεύγειν, 21), she will pursue (διώκειν, 21); instead of refusing gifts (δῶρα μὴ δέκετ᾿, 22), she will give them (δώσει, 22), and her lack of love (μὴ φίλει, 1.23) will turn into love (φιλήσει, 23). The paired verbs διώκειν and φεύγειν refer to correlative actions: the pursuer pursues one who flees. The implication is that once the beloved is in pursuit, then Sappho will herself be running away. This complete reversal betrays the flighty nature of Sappho’s passions and explains the frequency of her prayers to the goddess (‘you asked what was the matter with me this time and why I was calling this time’, δηῦτε ... δηῦτε, 15-16). This pattern of repeated erotic episodes is typical of lyric, and the formula is reproduced prominently in Anacreon (e.g. fr. 358 PMG: δηῦτε με ... βάλλων ... "Ερως").

After Socrates has outlined the former lover’s recovery of σωφροσύνη from μανία, the beloved and lover are similarly shown to exchange roles: the beloved has become the pursuer (διώκειν, 241b5) while the former lover takes flight (ἵεται φυγῇ μεταβαλών, 241b5). This reversal is not straightforwardly erotic: the beloved pursues the former lover with imprecations rather than newfound desire, and the former lover flees his own previous commitments rather than erotic advances (241b3). Despite these differences, it is clear that Plato is reflecting on the dramatic

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114 ἐμαιόμαν seems designed to evoke madness; see Cyrino 1992, 202: ‘the assonance with μαίνομαι is unmistakable’. For cooling/relief, see e.g. Burnett 1983, 226-7, but cf. Cyrino 1992, 203 who reads ἔψυξας rather dubiously as a wind fanning the flame of erotic desire.
115 See Page 1955, 14-15, esp. 14: [διώκειν] meant not merely to run after somebody, but to run after somebody who is running away. It is seldom if ever used in early or Classical Greek literature, as “pursue” is sometimes used loosely in English, to signify a “pursuit” in which the object of the chase is falling into the pursuers arms, or meeting him half-way, or standing still.’ For examples in Greek literature, see Page 1955, n. 1.
117 See also Anacreon frs. 376, 403, 413, 428 PMG. On the use of δηῦτε, see e.g. Mace 1993, 335-364. Cf. Sappho fr. 130 Voigt; Alcman fr. 59a PMG; Ibycus fr. 287 PMG (κῦτε).
alternations of the lover’s condition found in lyric poetry, and it is certainly possible that he has Sappho’s poem in mind.\textsuperscript{118}

In Socrates’ speech the lover and beloved exchange roles as if at the toss of an ostracon (ὀστράκου μεταπεσόντος, 241b4-5). The allusion is to a children’s game (ὀστρακίνδα) in which a painted shard is tossed to determine who chases and who is pursued.\textsuperscript{119} Games feature frequently in the poetry of Anacreon. He often depicts himself as a victim at the mercy of the love god Erôs in a game or contest of some kind. So in fr. 358 PMG Erôs is hitting him with a ball and in fr. 396 PMG Erôs is envisioned as a potential opponent in the boxing ring.\textsuperscript{120} In fr. 398 PMG (quoted above, p. 90), the god Erôs inflicts madness and uproar at the toss of knucklebones. Knucklebones act as a randomising agent and their use in this poem underscores the unpredictability and changeability of love and madness.\textsuperscript{121} Although there is not a close parallel, it is possible that Socrates’ portrait of the vacillating lover recalls this kind of imagery in Anacreon.

When Socrates brings madness into the speech, Plato recapitulates in particularly allusive language the theme of alternating desire as it is found in Sappho and Anacreon. These poets were invoked to remind Socrates of something particularly unattractive about the people who are in love, and their focus on the fickleness of love, combined with their association of love and madness, provides exactly this. Lysias’ speech had already drawn attention to the lover’s change: the former lover regrets the things he has done for the beloved (μεταμέλει ὃν ἂν εἴποιήσωσιν), while the non-lover undergoes no such change (οὐκ ἔστι χρόνος ἐν ᾧ μεταγνῶναι προσήκει, 231a). The introduction of μανία in Socrates’ speech, however, marks the extremity of the lover’s change. Once out of love, it is as if the former lover has become an entirely different person (ἄλλος γεγονώς, 241a) with markedly changed priorities. Madness indicates the particularly striking difference in identity between the lover and the non-lover (or the lover and his former self), and makes the alternation between these extremes particularly unappealing.


\textsuperscript{119} See Yunis 2011, 119.

\textsuperscript{120} For the futility in challenging invincible Erôs in the boxing ring cf. Soph. Trach. 441-2. On children’s games in frs. 358 and 398 PMG, see Hutchinson 2001, 275.

\textsuperscript{121} See e.g. Rosenmeyer 2006, 45-6.
In this way, Plato shifts the apotreptic emphasis away from madness as an intrinsic harm, focusing instead on the undesirable inconsistency and instability produced by the lover’s alternation between mad and non-mad states. According to Socrates, the really off-putting thing about lovers is not that they are so passionate to the exclusion of everything else, but rather that they do not have a reliable personality (inasmuch as their social identity and interests are the products of their motivational psychology). This characterisation of the madness of love prepares for Socrates’ re-evaluation of madness because it leaves open the possibility for other kinds of madness, such as philosophy, which may be more consistent and stable.

2.4. μανία and the Gods

After Socrates’ speech, Phaedrus draws attention to its incompleteness, pointing out that Socrates stops short of praising the non-lover (241d, cf. 241e). Socrates explains that if he continues he will become possessed by nymphs (241e3-5). His decision to abandon the topic, however, is soon prevented by his δαιμόνιον, and he comes to realise that he has committed some offence against the gods (242c3): because Erôs is a god (or something divine), he is incapable of harm (242e2), but both Lysias’ speech and his first speech had treated the god Erôs as if he was pernicious (κακόν, 242e3-4).

Although this is a standard position of Socratic (and Platonic) theology, according to which the gods cannot be responsible for evil, it is difficult to see how this offence against Erôs could be meant sincerely.\footnote{For this aspect of Plato’s theology cf. Pl. Resp. 2.380c; cf. Morgan 2013, 52. On the exception to this at Leg. 10.896a4-6 where the Athenian visitor describes two cosmic souls (one bad), see Mayhew 2013, 210-11 and Mayhew 2008, 133-4. The bad cosmic soul is perhaps merely an hypothesis in the Athenian’s discussion of the cosmic soul’s rationality.} Firstly, although the madness of love is almost invariably brought on by a god in Sappho and Anacreon, the gods are almost entirely absent in Socrates’ first speech. Secondly, Socrates’ subsequent speech does nothing to undermine his negative view of hubristic love (it similarly disparages un-philosophical ἔρως, e.g. 250e), and his synopsis confirms that his censure of hubristic love was entirely justified (266a5-6). The youth of Socrates’ second speech should, like the youth of the first speech, refrain from yielding to the non-philosophical lover, and should choose the philosopher who is interested in him for different reasons. The palinode
disparages hubristic ἔρως but, through full recognition of madness as a genus, discovers another phenomenon with the same name (i.e. divine ἔρως) which it praises. This exposition of the potential benefits of one kind of ἔρως does not prevent other varieties of ἔρως from being morally deficient, and so any insult to the deity synonymous with ἔρως is not successfully recanted.

In fact, the problem of the first speech lies with its view of μανία, not ἔρως. Socrates makes this clear at the start of his second speech: if madness were simply harmful then the advice to the youth would have been fine (ei μὲν γὰρ ἦν ἁπλοῦν τὸ μανίαν κακὸν εἶναι, καλῶς ἂν ἐλέγετο, 244a5-6). Insulting the god Erôs no longer seems to be an issue; instead, the problem is Socrates’ reliance in his first speech on the simplistic view of madness as harmful. He has not given the full picture, especially as far as madness is concerned: the relevant objection to Socrates’ first speech is that μανία is invoked in a negative sense as disorder only, in order to demonstrate the destructive drives of ἔρως with which it is traditionally associated. The existence of beneficial forms of madness undermines the efficacy of madness as a general apotreptic because it means that madness is no longer a reliable guide for interpreting and evaluating the harm of erotic love, and so for deciding between the lover and the non-lover (244a4-5). However, redressing the simplistic view of madness as harmful does not entail a complete reversal in our evaluation of ἔρως; it means only that madness is no longer a good hermeneutic for the youth (it is not a good or self-sufficient way of interpreting the lover, as identifying him as mad does not in itself show whether he should be admired or blamed), and the classification of at least one variety of ἔρως as a form of harmful anthropogenic madness (i.e. ὕβρις) is never satisfactorily contradicted by the second speech. In this way, Plato’s characterisation of Socrates’ discovery of this offence puts the focus on madness as a complex phenomenon and suggests that madness really is the crux of the problem.

Towards the end of his first speech, Socrates’ characterisation of love’s power becomes increasingly poetic, drawing on the connected motifs of madness and reversal found in Sappho and Anacreon, and Socrates’ replacement of ὕβρις with μανία seems to herald the close of the speech because it suggests that madness is quintessentially harmful. The first speech did not imply that Erôs the divinity was harmful, only that madness was harmful, yet Socrates has treated these complaints as equivalent, or at least as dependent. In other words, his offence assumes the

123 See e.g. Ferrari 1987, 112-113.
124 Cf. Thumiger 2013b, 28, 35 on the conventional use of madness to interpret the ethics of ἔρως in a negative way.
involvement of the gods in love and madness, even though the first speech never claimed any such involvement. I think that this assumption (that the gods are involved in love and madness) is a consequence of Socrates’ use of poetic material. Socrates has drawn on Sappho and Anacreon’s views about madness and the potential risks of love in his negative picture of the lover’s mentality, but in their poetry, erotic madness frequently derives from divine contact. Socrates’ poetic exploration prompts the question about the relationship between love, madness and the divine.

In the context of Socrates’ explicit sources, his omission of the gods could hardly have gone unnoticed. By drawing on Sappho and Anacreon, Socrates is indirectly in danger of endorsing a view about the role of the gods in human life that is incompatible with the Socratic theology of the Republic. In the final part of the first speech there are some subtle articulations of a divine presence: the beloved calls upon the gods in his curses to the former lover (ἐπιθεάζων, 241b6), and Socrates emphasises the importance of the boy’s education to humans and gods alike (241c5-6; cf. θεία φιλοσοφία, 239b4). These references only accentuate the absence of the gods’ role in causing love’s madness, and this omission in Socrates’ first speech is surely intentional. The change which comes over the lover is emphatically not the result of outside influence; it derives from a desire for pleasure which is innate (ἐμφυτός, 237d7-8).

The two explanations offered by Socrates for the ending of his first speech, that he is getting too caught up in his source material and that he has been somehow irreverent, seem to be connected. Some critics interpret the abrupt ending of his speech as an indication of the limitations of his source material, but I suggest instead that the poetry of Sappho and Anacreon puts him at risk of transgressing the limitations of his own theology and of the binary classification of madness which is to appear later in the dialogue. Specifically, because Socrates endorses the poets’ narrow view of ἔρως as harmful, he is in danger of following them in their attribution of harmful erotic madness to a god. While the poets help to focus attention on madness as a complex phenomenon, they fail to realise that madness cannot simultaneously come from a god and be

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\[125\] Cf. Fortenbaugh 1966, 108-9 who sees these prayers and imprecations in Socrates’ first speech as a deliberate echo of Aphrodite’s interventions in Sappho fr. 1 Voigt.

\[126\] Socrates’ possession potentially alludes to his growing concern (cf. 238d1) that he is in danger of becoming too influenced by his poetic source material (i.e. Sappho and Anacreon). See Pender 2007a, 17 n. 45 and cf. Ferrari 1987, 113: ‘Socrates ... is unable to integrate poetry into his speech’.

\[127\] e.g. Rowe 1986a, 151 (poetry; the poets similarly do not praise the non-lover), Nightingale 1995, 157 cf. 155 (encomium; Socrates’ praise of the non-lover would transgress the boundaries of the encomiastic genre).
characterised as harmful. That Socrates styles himself as a prophet (μάντις, 242c4) to divine this mistake suggests, I think, that he intuitively foresees the limits later introduced by the classification of madness.\textsuperscript{128} It also suggests that he is only on the verge of causing offence rather than having already done so.

On my interpretation, Socrates’ use of Sappho and Anacreon prompts him to reflect on the divine part of his genus, and so realises his mistake. I think that this realisation dawns on Socrates within the drama of the dialogue only because the characterisation of erotic madness in his first speech is drawn from these poets (in which the motif of divine intervention is so prominent).\textsuperscript{129} Socrates expresses his mistake through a quotation from Ibycus (242d),\textsuperscript{130} and in my view, this citation disguises his disagreement with the lyric poets by making it seem as if their poetry forms the basis of his piety. This helps to legitimise the role which lyric imagery later plays in the palinode to advance his rhetorical aims.

I have suggested that Socrates’ use of Sappho and Anacreon helps to focus the discussion on the madness of love. Moreover, the poets’ conception of madness as both harmful and the result of divine contact prompts the abrupt ending of Socrates’ first speech and his consideration of the role of the gods in madness. It is not my argument that Sappho and Anacreon provide Socrates with a model of divine involvement or inspiration as madness. In their poetry, lovers are not literally invaded by a god; instead, the gods play a more oblique or auxiliary role.\textsuperscript{131} Very

\textsuperscript{128} Of course, ancient prophecy is not restricted to foretelling the future (see e.g. Most 1993, 96-111). Socrates is characterised both as a seer and as the recipient of purificatory intervention (242c). Each of these examples of divine madness later forms part of the classification of madness in the introduction of the palinode (see e.g. Rowe 1986a, 170 and Morgan 2010, 51), and their appearance here signals Socrates’ implicit recognition of the underlying dichotomy of madness (i.e. that it has a divine and beneficial side) by throwing into contrast his earlier presumption that madness is limited to being harmful.

\textsuperscript{129} This possibly explains why his mistake is expressed as an offence against this pair of gods in particular (242d9); though perhaps Aphrodite, as mother, merely supports Erôs’ claim to be a god. Explicitly, the offence is only made against Erôs.

\textsuperscript{130} Cf. Ibycus fr. 310 \textsc{PMG}.

\textsuperscript{131} It is true that poetic subjects often seem to be at the mercy of divine whims (see Pender 2011, 328-9). For example, Sappho registers the power of Aphrodite to affect her heart (fr. 1.4, 1.18 Voigt) and Anacreon observes (fr. 505d \textsc{PMG}) that the god Erôs overpowers mortals (βροτοὺς δαμάζει). Yet both poets maintain an ironic distance from the effects which they describe. Sappho depicts a complex relationship with Aphrodite in which her predicament, her maddened heart, is both caused and resolved by the goddess (see Hutchinson 2001, 151). Sometimes Anacreon’s interactions with the god Erôs seem to stand in as a playful metaphor; for example, the ball game with the god in fr. 358 \textsc{PMG} translates Anacreon’s desire to play with the girl (see Hutchinson 2001, 274). On irony and self-mockery in these poets, see e.g. Rosenmeyer 2006, 42 (Anacreon) and Page 1955, 15-18, esp. 18 (Sappho).
different is Socrates' conception of divine madness in his second speech which involves being taken over by a particular god (or, at least, being inhabited by something divine).

Socrates classifies philosophy as a form of divine madness (249d-e), characterising philosophers as ἐνθουσιάζοντες (249d2). This suggests that the mad philosopher really is taken over by a god, and that he loses control. This is a problem if philosophers are supposed to be rational and to possess the virtue of σωφροσύνη. In the next section of this chapter I consider the ways in which the philosopher is considered to be mad, and attempt to reconcile divine possession with controlled and deliberate philosophical activity.

3. Madness and the Philosophers

In the previous section I demonstrated that Sappho and Anacreon are the explicit inspiration for Plato's conception of mad lovers, and that they are invoked (alongside other unspecified prose writers) in order to supply Socrates with his genus, madness. A preliminary genus in collection and division is not typically contentious or revisionist, and Sappho and Anacreon accordingly represent familiar authorities on the madness of love. The relationship between the genus, madness, and one of its target species, blameworthy love, is underpinned by popular views about love contained in these poets. Socrates' use of non-philosophical material is especially appropriate in the case of madness, since unconventionality itself forms a crucial part of its definition: Socrates invokes familiar and popular wisdom to describe authoritatively what is unconventional. In this section, I suggest that the relationship between madness and another of its species, praiseworthy love (i.e. philosophy), is similarly uncontroversial, as least superficially.

I begin my discussion by considering the question of whether Socrates really means that philosophers are mad. I have already gone some way towards answering this question in my discussion of the unity of madness. Socrates' stipulation that philosophers are mad is treated by scholars with suspicion and scepticism for three reasons: (1) doubts often surround the sincerity of

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It is true that the poets may also have eccentric views about love; after all, the palinode makes clear that their poetry is, like philosophy, a product of divine madness. This might compromise my argument about Socrates' use of material taken over from popular sources. I think, however, that what matters is that Sappho and Anacreon's account is more familiar and less controversial than any account which the philosopher might be expected to produce.
the palinode on account of its mythic content, (2) it seems counterintuitive that philosophers who are supremely rational should be considered also mad, and (3) philosophical madness seems inconsistent and incompatible with the other forms of madness discussed in the dialogue. I have already shown how the unity of madness in the dialogue does not depend on Socrates’ sincerity in the ‘mythical’ apodeixis of the palinode. I deal with the remaining difficulties in turn.

First, I show that the opposition between madness and σωφροσύνη which appears in Socrates’ first speech is not sustained into the palinode, nor is it supported textually. Madness and σωφροσύνη are sometimes contrasted in the palinode, but they are no longer opposed; σωφροσύνη falls away as the relevant contrast term to madness. Philosophers get called mad by the crowd because of their unusual priorities which are determined by philosophical recollection, yet recollection is characterised as rational. The palinode shows that the recollecting philosopher does not disregard σωφροσύνη (it is listed as a Form alongside e.g. justice), suggesting that the philosopher’s madness does not come at the expense of σωφροσύνη. Madness is not antithetical to reason, but has a broader range of qualities which include the philosophical life. I suggest that in addition to its intellectual aspects, σωφροσύνη has a moral dimension and that, as a moral term, it is used differently by the crowd and by the philosopher because they have distinct moral priorities. I argue that perfecting rationality is a product of the philosopher’s atypical psychological motivations which are determined by unique moral priorities. The philosophical conception of σωφροσύνη is therefore at odds with the popular use of the term both morally and intellectually, and forms part of the philosopher’s madness.

3.1. Madness and σωφροσύνη: are Philosophers really Mad?

Socrates’ classification of philosophy as a kind of madness in his second speech is counter-intuitive because philosophers are usually considered to be supremely rational, while madness is assumed to refer to the absence of reason.133

I treat Socrates’ major discussion of philosophical madness (249c-250b) in some detail in the later parts of this section in which I discuss eccentricity and enthusiasm. It is sufficient for my

133 See e.g. Scott 2011, 169-170 esp. 170 and Vlastos 1973, 27 n. 80.
present argument to point out that the philosopher’s madness or (as Socrates says) ‘enthusiasm’ is a consequence of his recollection of the things which the soul saw before its incarnation (249d). Recollection here refers explicitly to human λογισμός: Socrates explains that human beings have a capacity for bringing a plurality of perceptions together into one thing by reasoning (λογισμός, 249b6-c1), and that this is a recollection of the things which the soul saw (τούτο δ’ ἐστίν ἀνάμνησις ἑκείνων καὶ ποτ’ εἶδεν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχή, 249c1-2). The philosopher’s madness, then, rests on the fact that he is reasoning (λογισμός), and there is no scope here for the role of so-called non-intellectual elements in philosophical madness (even in the early stages of recollection).134

For this reason, I argue for a conception of madness that accommodates rational philosophical activity; however, I disagree with those who indicate that such a conception would represent an ad hoc or rhetorical concession, and that elsewhere madness implies unreason.135 I think that madness is not consistently opposed to rationality over the course of the dialogue, and that the concept of madness can accommodate rational philosophical activity provided that such activity meets certain criteria.136 These criteria are not characterised as ad hoc or rhetorical; instead, they are presented as conventional, and the broadest criterion, social eccentricity, is shared by all the kinds of madness under discussion; the other most prominent popular criterion which qualifies rational philosophical activity as madness is the notion of enthusiasm, referring to inhabitation by a god. I will discuss each of these criteria in turn, but first I will examine the relationship between madness and reason over the course of the speeches by tracking Socrates’ use of σωφροσύνη which, in his first speech, stands both for reason and sanity.

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134 Nussbaum 1986, is silent about this key passage in her discussion of madness in the Phaedrus. Price 1989, 66 admits that the equation of knowledge and inspiration is the natural reading of 249c4-e4, but rejects this because ‘madness falls within the genus of the irrational (265e3-4)’. Burnyeat 2012, 242 emphasises the connection between recollection and reason.

135 e.g. Werner 2011, 58-64, Scott 2011, 169-200. Both come to the conclusion that Plato does not actually endorse the strong association of philosophy and madness offered in the palinode and that either he is being ironic (Werner) or that this is an example of misleading assimilation (Scott). My approach is closest to Vogt 2013, 179-181, 183 who suggests that rational madness is not, for Plato, a contradiction in terms, but is intuitive and forms part of his conceptualization of madness in other dialogues, notably in the Symposium where ἔρως is characterised as a pervasive and violent motivational force (205d; cf. 208c4 on the ἀλογία of love; see esp. Vogt 2013, 183). Cf. Gonzalez 2011, 100-105, who takes Socrates’ presentation of rational madness seriously, suggesting that what makes it mad is neglect of human concerns (254b5-6) and confusion due to the partial vision of the Forms (103). However, neither Vogt nor Gonzalez seems much concerned with the supposed paradox of madness and reason.

136 Cf. the features of madness in the Phaedrus listed by Vogt 2013, 182-186 (ἀφρων: absence of reason; παράνοια: parallel to reason; activity: agitated state; custom: opposite of ordinary ways of doing things; alien: cognition affected by alien force; lack of ownership: cognitive activity not one’s own). These features are helpful, but do not satisfactorily address the unity of madness in the Phaedrus (they are additive and lack structure).
I have already shown (above, pp. 59-60) that some of Socrates’ key general terms for madness, τὸ ἄφρον τῆς διάνοιας (265e4) and τὸ τῆς παρανοίας (266a2), do not imply the absence of reason. I think that this argument is further supported by the way in which Socrates develops the relationship between self-control (i.e. σωφροσύνη) and μανία over the course of the dialogue. In Socrates’ first speech σωφροσύνη and μανία refer to the psychological dominance of rational and non-rational forces respectively, and they are opposed to one another.\footnote{For the equivalence of ὕβρις and σωφροσύνη with irrationality and rationality in this speech, see North 1966, 178.} The simplicity of this opposition is rhetorically effective as an apotreptic (σωφροσύνη involves the pursuit of τὸ ἄριστον; its opposite must be bad), yet this simple appraisal of madness as negative is too narrow, and prompts Socrates’ reconsideration of the term as a complex phenomenon in his second speech. It turns out that μανία is not always harmful, and sometimes has benefits. This breaks its opposition to σωφροσύνη: μανία sometimes delivers the greatest goods (266b1), and therefore cannot be consistently in conflict with the psychological motivation aimed at τὸ ἄριστον (i.e. σωφροσύνη).

Socrates explains (244a) that the distinction between μανία and σωφροσύνη in the previous speeches formed the basis of the youth’s decision between the lover and the non-lover. This contrast is only a good index for decision-making if μανία brings harm and σωφροσύνη brings benefit. However, in Socrates’ second speech, this relationship is modified: since μανία receives a positive evaluation, σωφροσύνη is no longer appropriate as a contrast term. Despite this, madness and σωφροσύνη are sometimes contrasted in Socrates’ second speech, and I suggest that this contrast helps to show a conflict between popular and expert moral psychology.

In the opening of the palinode, μανία brings greater goods than σωφροσύνη: the ancients attest that madness from the gods is more beautiful than σωφροσύνη from human beings (244d3-5), and poetry produced by poets who are mad (τῶν μαινομένων) is far superior to poetry composed by the self-controlled poets (τοῦ σωφρονοῦντος) who rely on τέχνη (245a5-8).\footnote{Cf. the Pythia at Delphi who is mad (μαινεῖσαι) and lacks σωφροσύνη (σωφρονοῦσαι), 244b1-2. Compare Plato’s Ion; although σωφροσύνη does not feature in the dialogue, divine inspiration is clearly opposed to having knowledge or a particular skill. The inspired poet does not possess τέχνη; instead, his mind is no longer inside him as it has been displaced by a god (534b-c).} This is hardly surprising. In Socrates’ examples of divine madness, some god has taken over the thinking faculties of a human being, and theologically they are bound to deliver results which far outstrip the efforts of the person who is not similarly enthused. The sort of σωφροσύνη which is here
contrasted to divine madness is likely similar to the mortal (θνητή) σωφροσύνη dismissed by Socrates towards the end of the speech (256e5, cf. σωφροσύνη ἀνθρωπίνη, 256b6). Here Socrates describes how the non-lover’s mortal σωφροσύνη leads to a lack of freedom (ἀνελευθερίαν) which causes the soul to roam mindlessly (ἄνουν) around the earth for nine thousand years. This contradicts the strong link made previously between σωφροσύνη and rationality (e.g. νοῦν καὶ σωφροσύνην, 241a3).

The non-lover’s σωφροσύνη is praised by the crowd as a virtue (ὑπὸ πλήθους ἐπαινουμένην ὡς ἀρετὴν, 256e6), and this recalls Socrates’ emphasis in his first speech that σωφροσύνη is aimed at τὸ ἄριστον. Although σωφροσύνη carries an intellectual connotation (signalled by its association with νοῦς), Socrates is clearly interested in the term’s moral dimensions: its moral value is crucial for persuading the youth to choose the non-lover over the lover. One consequence of this is that the crowd, which has limited moral insight, is not a good authority when it comes to judging the nature or essence of σωφροσύνη. For the crowd, the non-lover’s σωφροσύνη is a praiseworthy alternative to madness of love, and refers to those goods for which the non-lover is praised in these speeches, such as looking after property and reputation. By contrast, the benefits of philosophical madness are visible only to the wise (245c): the philosopher has access to unique moral insights which come from the recollection of those objects which the soul once saw before its embodiment (249c-250c). Σωφροσύνη is itself one of these objects, and, as a Form, its essence is stable and not determined by popular views.

139 For this identification, see e.g. Werner 2011, 63-4. Cf. Moore 2015b, 156 and Griswold 1996, 75.
140 The connection between mortal σωφροσύνη and σωφροσύνη in the first speech is supported by the relationship of σωφροσύνη with τὸ ἄριστον in the first speech (237e2), and with ἀρετή in the second (256e6). The adjective and the abstract noun are each frequently paired with σώφρων and σωφροσύνη on epitaphs, see Dover 1974, 67. Cf. the non-lover’s ἀρετὴ (232d5) and the rhetorician’s ability to impart ἀρετή through prescribing custom (νομίμους, 270b8).
141 The moral and intellectual dimensions of σωφροσύνη are often emphasised by the Socratic association of virtue and knowledge in Plato’s works; see e.g. Plato’s Charmides in which σωφροσύνη is identified both as a form of knowledge, and as something which has a benefit (163e). Traditionally, σωφροσύνη has both moral and intellectual dimensions, and these are often seen to be dichotomous; see North 1966, 1-149 who describes the emergence of the moral senses of σωφροσύνη diachronically. However, this dichotomy is sometimes overstated, and the moral and intellectual features of σωφροσύνη are often found together. See Rademaker 2005, 9-10 who challenges North’s diachronic approach with a synchronic reading that avoids the dichotomy between intellectual and moral senses of the term (see esp. 253-292).
142 Cf Dover 1974, 273-8 and see North 1966, 136-8 on the orators’ use of σωφροσύνη in the fifth and fourth century to connote responsible (law abiding/civic minded) conduct in public and private life.
143 It is mentioned three times among the objects of recollection: 247d6; 250b2; 254b7.
This emphasises an important point: the philosopher who recollects the Forms does not disregard σωφροσύνη, and so the philosopher's madness (which results from his recollection) does not come at the expense of self-control. Because σωφροσύνη is a stable moral term, it cannot be consistently opposed to a morally indeterminate and socially delimited phenomenon such as madness. The crowd's narrow understanding of σωφροσύνη as mental health or sanity (i.e. in opposition to madness) turns out to be naïve, and rather than avoiding or rejecting it, certain kinds of madness (such as philosophy) actually embody σωφροσύνη.

Even if σωφροσύνη is sometimes shown to be compatible with madness, this need not mean that σωφροσύνη no longer denotes rationality. Socrates implies that the crowd is not only mistaken in its moral priorities, but also in its conception of rationality: just as the best moral insights are only accessible to the philosopher, so the non-lover's so-called rationality is called into question. Socrates' account in the palinode not only introduces a stable picture of what is good that is not determined by popular opinion (the moral Forms), but also a means of considering the good (through recollection) which amounts to λογισμός. I suggest that Socrates continues to foreground a moral and intellectual conception of σωφροσύνη in his second speech (moral because σωφροσύνη is mentioned as a Form and because the Phaedrus focuses on moral Forms; intellectual because the Forms are objects of human λογισμός), and shows both that philosophers have the clearest moral vision and that they are supremely rational. Socrates' conception of σωφροσύνη as a moral term helps to show some of the ways in which philosophical madness is rational insofar as reason refers to a motivation aimed at the good.

In Socrates' first speech, both the best-seeking impulse and the pleasure-seeking impulse are described as irresistible (οὐ επάμεθα ἢ ἄγητον, 237d7) despite the fact that the former leads

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144 See Griswold 1996, 75-6 and Gonzalez 2011, 104.
145 Madness is morally indeterminate because knowing that something is an instance of madness does not tell us, in itself, whether it is admirable or the opposite.
146 The philosopher disparages the popular conception of σωφροσύνη. Cf. Dover 1974, 68 on the traditional possibility of ‘negative σωφροσύνη’ which is contrasted with ἀρετή. There is a pervading cultural antithesis between the heroic virtue of ἀνδρεία (exhibited, for example, by Achilles, Ajax or Antigone) and σωφροσύνη which is sometimes considered negatively; see North 1966, ix-x. More specifically, the non-lover's σωφροσύνη under criticism in the Phaedrus resembles the foolish (εἰσήθης) σωφροσύνη described in the Phaedo as the quality of a person who avoids some pleasures only to indulge in others; see Hackforth 1952, 47 and North 1966, 166. For pseudo σωφροσύνη, cf. Jason's claim to be σώφρων in Euripides' Medea (548–549).
by reason (λόγῳ, 237e3) and the latter leads non-rationally (ἀλόγως, 238a1). Surprisingly perhaps, the distinction between rational and non-rational psychology is not based on the extent to which human motivation and agency are constrained by particular priorities, but instead the distinction is based on the priorities themselves. Socrates considers the difference in moral terms: an irresistible psychological motivation aimed at the best is rational, and a similar force aimed at destructive pleasures is non-rational and said to lack control. The first speech shows that σωφροσύνη implies a condition in which human agency is controlled by beliefs about the good. The second speech shows that, in the case of the philosopher, such beliefs (i.e. about the good) are best derived from special moral insights.

Philosophical madness is a product of philosopher's recollection (249d-e), and the recollecting philosopher adjusts his priorities: his motivational psychology undergoes a reorientation as a result of the discovery of previously obscure moral terms. If the philosopher's psychology is motivated towards what really is best, then he possesses authentic σωφροσύνη, and is truly rational. In this way, the philosopher's σωφροσύνη and rationality are enhanced by recollection insofar as σωφροσύνη and reason relate to what is good. During this process the philosopher may seem disoriented (e.g. ἐκπλήττονται, 250a6; cf. θάμβους 254c), or may appear to be acting under some kind of force, but this does not damage his rationality. In the chariot myth, for example, the team is forced forward (ἀναγκαζομένω, 249d1) by the dark horse, but the charioteer is compelled (ἠναγκάσθη 254b8) by the memory of beauty and σωφροσύνη to resist, only to be forced forward again (ἀναγκάζων, 254d1), and again (ἠνάγκασεν, 254d5).

I do not think that this language implies a loss of agency or passivity on the philosopher's part; rather, it reflects the complex reorientation of the philosopher's own priorities visualised from the respective vantage points of his new and his former personality. Contra e.g. Price 1989, 63-102 and Nussbaum 1986, 214-7 who view initial recollection (Price) and the force of the emotions and appetites (Nussbaum) as irrational factors which constitute the philosopher's madness. Cf. Rowe 1990, 237 who suggests that madness is a feature of these early stages of philosophical love because the lover is initially confused and the intellect is not yet fully in control, and Werner 2011, 55.

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147 These impulses are sometimes opposed (but not always; see 237e). The thought seems to be that whenever we act, we are led by one (or both) of them, and when we are led by one/both, we go wherever it leads/they lead.
148 Cf. Nussbaum 1986, 205 who suggests that 'only the logistikon is the author of genuinely voluntary actions, while the other elements are unselective causal forces.'
149 Contra e.g. Price 1989, 63-102 and Nussbaum 1986, 214-7 who view initial recollection (Price) and the force of the emotions and appetites (Nussbaum) as irrational factors which constitute the philosopher's madness. Cf. Rowe 1990, 237 who suggests that madness is a feature of these early stages of philosophical love because the lover is initially confused and the intellect is not yet fully in control, and Werner 2011, 55.
personality, the retrograde attraction to the pleasures of earthly beauty sometimes threatens to overwhelm. Compare the mental affliction of the hubristic lover in Socrates’ first speech which is described as a product of necessity (ὑπ’ ἀνάγκης ἀνοήτω, 241b7). Despite the language of compulsion (e.g. ἤναγκασθαι, 239c5; ὑπ’ ἀνάγκης τε και οἶστρου, 240c), Socrates’ portrait shows that the lover does not lack the decision-making capacity to achieve his goals. There, the lover does not seem to be acting irrationally or passively, but soon after this, the lover is described as ruled by desire, compelled to seek pleasure and driven by frenzy (240c-d). The term ἀνάγκη captures the striking contrasts witnessed in the lover’s identity: the lover seems alien to the person he becomes when he is no longer in love, and therefore seems himself to be a helpless victim of his past passions (241a-b), just as the youth had been. The lover’s irrationality and lack of σωφροσύνη are products of his morally defective priorities, rather than the limitation of his agency.

This capacity of madness to include intentional calculation explains why important parts of the philosophical life, such as deliberation and regimen, need not be prevented by madness in general. Moreover, the complex changes in the priority of motivational powers within the philosopher’s soul in Socrates’ second speech does not mean that philosophical recollection is ever irrational as long as it instils the right priorities, nor does the language of compulsion imply a lapse of control or reason. Instead, it reflects one way of illustrating the philosopher’s changing priorities. It is easy to assume that madness must have something to do with conflicting drives in the tripartite soul, but this is not necessarily the case. The philosopher who has mastered his irrational drives (represented by the dark horse) is still mad, despite the lack of conflict in his soul. Socrates implies that recollection is a rational process (λογισμῆ), and the philosopher’s rationality, along with his psychological freedom and control, is an extension of his special moral insights.

Since the philosopher’s priorities are shifted towards the moral objects of recollection, his

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150 Compulsion is a product of this kind of difference and earlier in the speech Socrates relates ‘compulsion’ (τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, 240c4) to the ‘dissimilarity’ (τῇ ἀνομοιότητι, 240c5) between the lover and the youth.
151 Contra Rowe 1990, 237 n. 37; for Rowe, madness is the antithesis of the well-ordered regimen of philosophical life (described at 257a7).
152 Socrates never refers to any part of the soul as mad; rather, the name is applied to the entire human being (and sometimes perhaps, to the whole soul, e.g. οἶστρᾷ, 251d6, ἔμμανῆς, 251d8).
153 At 256b2-3 Socrates relates psychological freedom and slavery to moral virtues and vices (δουλωσάμενοι μὲν ὧ κακία ... ἐλευθερώσαντες δὲ ὧ ἀρετῇ). Cf. Dover 1974, 116.
psychology is not irrational. It is only from the perspective of the crowd (who have a different idea about the good), that the philosopher might be thought to lack rationality and self-control.

This shows that madness does not imply the absence of reason or of σωφροσύνη, and that, depending on its moral outcomes, madness might sometimes be indistinguishable from σωφροσύνη. This is the case in philosophical recollection. Indeed, if reason refers to σωφροσύνη which is an overriding psychological motivation aimed at what is best, and if the highest goods are otherworldly objects visible only to the philosopher, then true reason is madness. The philosopher considers entities which no-one else can see, and these esoteric priorities translate into visibly eccentric behaviour. Because philosophers have a different opinion about the good, they are often seen to neglect precisely those things which appear to the crowd to be the most important (such as commitments to family and friends, and concerns about property, cf. 252a).

Importantly, however, the intellectual and moral aspects of philosophical recollection and σωφροσύνη which I have outlined in this section (i.e. the philosopher's rationality and virtue) are not sufficient conditions for madness. The gods, for example, are both rational and good (presumably because of their closeness to the Forms), but this does not mean that they are mad. Instead, the reason philosophers are called mad is that they are an awkward fit in their social world. Philosophers, unlike gods, are subject to social expectations about what human beings value and about how human beings behave. Because philosophers have special priorities determined by privileged rational access to stable moral objects, their intellectual and moral motivations do not conform to popular values and customs. In the following section, I examine philosophical madness in terms of eccentricity, and focus on how the philosopher appears to the crowd.

3.2. Mad Philosophers and Eccentricity

There are three main portions of the palinode in which Socrates’ discussion is unambiguously about μανία: the first is the outline of the various kinds of divine madness (prophecy, poetry and purification) in the opening of the recantation (244a-245c); the second is an explanation of

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154 Cf. e.g. Vogt 2013, 181: ‘[rational madness] is rational insofar as it is a good feature of human motivation’.
philosophical love as the fourth kind of divine madness, and comes after Socrates’ extended account of the soul’s pre-bodily life (249d-253c); the third is a recapitulation of the blessings of erotic madness at the close of the speech (256b-d). Of these, the extended central passage (249d-253c) gives the clearest explanation of philosophical madness, and Socrates indicates that it is a full account (ὁ πᾶς ἥκων λόγος περὶ τῆς τετάρτης μανίας, 249d4). Here madness is explicitly linked with the philosopher’s recollection, and key features of madness are elicited, the most prominent of which are eccentricity and enthusiasm.\footnote{See Scott 2011, 174-179. Scott also lists disorientation; however, as I have tried to show in the preceding section, the philosopher’s disorientation (e.g. 250a6, 254c) is in effect a rational re-orientation which does not impinge on his agency.}

In the passage, Socrates explains that those souls whose vision of truth in the hyperuranian realm becomes obstructed lose their wings and fall to earth. The souls which have seen the most become philosophers (or lovers of beauty, or someone who is musical or erotic, 248d). Human beings have souls which have seen the forms; this is shown by their ability to bring together a plurality of perceptions into one thing by reasoning (λογισμός, 249b-c). This amounts to a recollection of those things which the soul saw, but only the minds of philosophers are able achieve sufficient closeness to these things through memory for their wings to regrow, and so to regain their perfection (249c). It is worth considering the next part of this passage (249c3-249e4) in some detail:

‘Hence it is with justice that only the mind (διάνοια) of the philosopher becomes winged: for so far as it can it is close, through memory, to those things his closeness to which gives a god his divinity (πρὸς θεόν ὃν θεός ἐστιν). Thus if a man uses such reminders rightly, being continually initiated in perfect mysteries, he alone through that initiation achieves real perfection; and standing aside from human concerns (ἐξιστάμενος δὲ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων σπουδασμάτων), and coming close to the divine (πρὸς τῷ θείῳ γιγνόμενος), he is admonished by the many for being eccentric, since they do not recognise that he is enthused (νουθετεῖται μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ὡς παρακινώτως, ἐνθουσιάζων δὲ λεληθευτος τοῦς πολλοὺς).

‘Well then, this is the result of my whole account of the fourth kind of madness (ὁ πᾶς ἥκων λόγος περὶ τῆς τετάρτης μανίας) - the madness of the man who, on seeing beauty here on earth, and being reminded of true beauty, becomes winged, and fluttering with eagerness to fly upwards, but unable to leave the ground, looking upwards like a bird, and taking no heed of the things below (τῶν κάτω δὲ ἀμελῶν) is accused of being in a mad state (σκιτάσαν ἔχει ὡς μανικός διακείμενος): my conclusion is that this then reveals itself as the best of all the kinds of enthusiasm and from the best of sources both for the man who has it
and for the man who shares in it, and that it is when he partakes in this madness that the man who loves the beautiful is called a lover.  

Socrates strongly implies that madness is socially determined. His statement that this is a full account of philosophical madness is substantiated by an explanation of why the philosopher is accused of being mad (αἰτίαν ἔχει ὡς μανικ ῶς διακείμενος, 249d8-e1). Broadly speaking, the philosopher’s madness has to do with the social consequences of recollection: the philosopher who is reminded of the Forms is out of place, like a bird looking upwards and showing no concern for the things below (τῶν κάτω δὲ ἀμελῶν, 249d8), but which cannot leave the ground. In this image the philosopher is striving for remote things (which are impossible to satisfy during life) and neglects ‘lower things’ even though he is physically a part of the world of lower things, and unable to leave.

Later, Socrates explains how the philosophical lover who recognises true beauty at the sight of the beloved is in danger of seeming completely mad because his devotion to the beloved borders on divine reverence (εἰ μὴ ἐδεδίει τὴν τῆς σφόδρα μανίας δόξαν, 251a5-6). Shortly after this, Socrates describes the madness (ἔμμανής 251d8) of the soul brought on by the recollection of beauty. It might seem as if this madness comes from the mixture of two opposing feelings in response to the memory of beauty, namely anguish and joy (ὀδυνᾶται, 251d6 ... γέγηθεν, 251d7), but the resulting insecurity (ἀποροῦσα, 251d8) is temporary. There is only a transitional tension within the philosopher as his soul adjusts to the new priorities which the insights of recollection afford (their strangeness is captured by τῇ ἀτοπίᾳ, 251d8); there is, however, an ongoing tension between the philosopher’s alien motivations and those of society, and he continues to be called mad. The philosophical lover’s soul is described as sleepless (251e1) and neglectful of family and property (252a1-b1), and its outlook now resembles that of the soul when it travelled in the company of the gods and looked down on things below (ὑπεριδοῦσα ἃ νῦν εἶναι φαμέν, 249c3), except now that the soul is in a body on earth, this attitude is out of place and has social implications. This attitude is equivalent to neglect in the philosopher because he has a body in a social world. The vision of the philosopher as a bird straining towards the heavens (249d7-8) is that of the soul which has become an awkward fit in its embodied and social state.

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Trans. modified from Rowe 1986a.
The philosopher’s madness is not identical to recollection, and madness does not refer exclusively to an intellectual or epistemic state; rather, madness is a consequence, in a social matrix, of a special motivational attitude which is caused by the recollection on earth of otherworldly things which are no longer present, and this attitude is characterised by frustration, intense desire, and neglect of those things which actually are present in the philosopher’s social world. Socrates emphasises just how out of place the philosopher is; this is what the crowd recognise, and this suggests that they are correct to call him παρακινῶν (249d2).

However, the same passage appears to disparage the authority of the crowd who is unable to see that the philosopher is really enthused (ἐνθουσιάζων δὲ λέληθεν τοὺς πολλοὺς, 249d2-3). The philosopher’s eccentric disregard of conventional priorities is visible to the crowd, but this seems to be contrasted to his internal state (which is one of enthusiasm). Some critics have suggested that this implies a strong contrast between the superficial symptoms of madness on the one hand, and genuine madness on the other, and that Plato is having Socrates trade on a confusion between appearance and reality.\(^{157}\) I am not convinced that Plato’s passage makes this strong a contrast. I suggest instead that Socrates shows the compatibility of popular and expert views of madness, while contrasting popular and expert moral insights. The crowd is right that the philosopher behaves strangely (παρακινῶν), but is wrong in rebuking him (νουθετεῖται).\(^{158}\) On the basis of his eccentricity, the crowd has assumed that the philosopher’s madness falls into the blameworthy type, and this is why madness is characterised as an accusation (αἰτίαν ἔχει ὡς μανικῶς διακείμενος).\(^{159}\)

The crowd’s error is not in their mistaking being enthused for being eccentric (after all, someone who is enthused would most likely behave eccentrically); rather, their error is in rebuking the philosopher: the crowd blames the philosopher when in fact his madness is praiseworthy. The crowd has correctly identified the broad genus (i.e. madness, shown by the philosopher’s eccentricity), but has, like the bad butcher, confused the differentiae and failed to


\(^{158}\) The μὲν/δὲ construction emphasises this contrast: νουθετεῖται μὲν ... ἐνθουσιάζων δὲ. The contrast is not between παρακινῶν and ἐνθουσιάζων, and this leaves open the possibility that παρακινῶν can be an accurate description.

\(^{159}\) The meaning of παρακινῶν is likely different from μανικῶς διακείμενος, and refers to the visible eccentricity of the philosopher (although cf. Pl. Resp. 9.573e: μαινόμενος καὶ ὑποκεκινηκώς). In addition to eccentric behaviour, madness also implies an underlying psychology. The crowd has mistakenly assumed that the philosopher’s eccentricity reflects a psychological state which is blameworthy.
divide correctly between blameworthy madness and praiseworthy divine madness. The philosopher is mad, yet his madness is not the blameworthy kind (of the sort found in Lysias’ speech), but the beneficial and divine kind. Socrates’ conception of madness (as recollection) ironically explains why the crowd is unable to analyse madness accurately: the crowd lack the moral insights available to the mad philosopher through recollection. This is potentially emphasised by Plato’s use of λανθάνω (if it suggests forgetting) to explain the crowd’s mistake (249d3).

The undifferentiated generic form of madness refers to the socially recognisable qualities of madness which the mad lover and the mad philosopher share: namely, their neglect of social conventions. However, the division of madness into blameworthy and praiseworthy types has a moral basis, and refers to details of the mad person’s inner psychology, and it is therefore more specialised: dividing madness requires a level of moral and psychological insight which the crowd emphatically lacks. As a particular species of madness, philosophy should exhibit the properties both of the immediately higher species, divine madness, and of the genus as a whole in order to meet the requirements for proper classification. In other words it is essentially by reference both to social eccentricity and to moral psychology that madness is to be identified, and this is not a case of misleading equivocation on Socrates’ part.

For this reason, Socrates develops his characterisation of the philosopher’s mad appearance from a familiar caricature in which philosophers are often seen to be mad or ridiculous. Near the beginning of Plato’s Sophist (216c2-d2), for example, Socrates explains to Theodorus that, to the common man, philosophers are as hard to recognise as gods (γένος ... τοῦ θεοῦ), and sometimes appear to be completely mad (ἔχοντες μανικῶς). This passage does not necessarily endorse the crowd’s view (although the Eleatic stranger later worries that Theaetetus will think him mad), but it does assert the stereotype: philosophers sometimes seem mad to the many. In Book 10 of the Republic, Socrates cites phrases (elsewhere unattested) from the poets,

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160 The crowd acknowledges the distinction of positive types of divine madness (e.g. inspired prophecy and poetry), but fails to place philosophers in this type (as I shall argue, this is because philosophical enthusiasm is less obvious that the other types).

161 There the lover’s friends admonish him (νοοῦτα τουτίναν, 234b3) because his actions are interpreted to have bad consequences.

162 This is because he shifts his argument back and forth arbitrarily (242a10-b1).
including the comic and tragic poets, as evidence of the ancient quarrel between poetry and philosophy. Some of the phrases recall Aristophanes in particular (σι "λεπτῶς μεριμνῶντες", ὅτι ἄρα "πένονται", 10.607c), and in one phrase ("μέγας ἐν ἀφρόνων κενεαγορίαισι", 10.607b), philosophers are apparently referred to as mad, or at least ἄφρονες.

Sometimes philosophers (or would-be philosophers) are ridiculed for being obsessed. In Aristophanes’ Clouds, for example, Pheidippides refers to his father’s obsessive interest in philosophy as μανία (832, 846; cf. 1476–1509). Even though Strepsiades is hardly a model philosopher, his interest in philosophy is nevertheless characterised as a mad pursuit. In Book 7 of the Republic, Socrates claims that sometimes young people who practise dialectic tend to become obsessed with refutation (7.539b-c). He calls their obsession madness (τὴς μὲν τοιαύτης μανίας, 539c), but distinguishes it from philosophy proper which aims at truth (and to which they are a discredit).

Another reason that philosophers are ridiculed specifically is because they ignore social norms, and neglect convention and society (and instil similar neglect in others). I think it is useful to outline further examples of the stereotype of the neglectful philosopher, most of them from Plato.

In the Symposium, Apollodorus, a follower of Socrates who is perhaps notorious for his madness (μανικός 173d8), remarks sarcastically that it is obvious from his savage deprecation of everything (apart from Socrates) that he must be mad or out of his mind (μαίνομαι κα ὴ παραπαίω, 173e1-3). Even though his madness is not meant seriously, his sarcasm underscores the possibility that this kind of behaviour might sometimes be called mad. The stranger emphasises Apollodorus’ deprecation of everything (including himself) except philosophy, and except

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163 Pl. Resp. 10.607b-c; the phrases are in Page 1962, 524 (frag. adesp. 987).
165 See Most 2011, 8.
166 For examples in the Platonic corpus, see the list by Vogt 2013, 181 and Ferrari 1992, 275 n. 65 on the ‘hopeless impracticality’ of philosophers; cf. Scott 2011, 194 n. 35. Scott rejects most of these examples for showing only that some people think that philosophers are mad, rather than showing they are genuinely mad.
167 The text is disputed at 173d8; Apollodorus is either μανικός or μαλακός. If μαλακός, then this points to Apollodorus’ surprising epithet ‘soft’ in light of his savage attacks on everyone apart from Socrates; for μαλακός, see e.g. Rowe 1998, 130 and cf. Dover 1980, 79 (Dover interprets μαλακός as ‘impressionable’ and connects this with Apollodorus’ weeping at Socrates’ death, Phd. 174). If μανικός, then this picks up on Apollodorus’ later reference to his own madness (μαίνομαι, 173e2); for μανικός, see e.g. Brisson 1998, 189 n. 34.
168 For Apollodorus’ sarcasm here, see Dover 1980, 79.
Socrates (173d9-10). His ‘madness’ is characterised by his contempt for other people and their values, and he has priorities which are markedly different from the priorities of other people. Earlier, Apollodorus tells the stranger that his greatest pleasure comes from philosophical discussion, and that he does not care for other subjects, or for the talk of rich businessmen (173c5-6).

Later in the Symposium, Diotima explains that philosophy involves disdaining the human in favour of the divine: she tells Socrates that the beauty of people’s souls is more valuable than that of their bodies (210b), and compares the lover who forgets food and drink to the philosopher who contemplates beauty itself (211d-212a). After Diotima’s speech, Alcibiades famously talks of the madness caused by listening to Socrates: he compares Socrates to a Silenus or the satyr Marsyas who bewitches with his flute, and says that Socrates’ audience are driven out of their senses and possessed (ἐκπεπληγμένοι ἐσμὲν καὶ κατεχόμεθα, 215d5-6). This effect could be mistaken for inebriation (215d7), and he exceeds even the Corybantes in his madness (215e1-4). The reason for this madness is that Socrates makes Alcibiades realise that his political career is worthless, and that he neglects what is most important (216a). Both Apollodorus and Alcibiades reflect a stereotype: they are characterised as mad because Socrates’ philosophy makes them disdain (or at least realise that they should disdain) the things which appear important to everyone else. Alcibiades’ interpretation of the psychological effect of hearing Socrates as madness might well represent an unenlightened view (he is hardly the ideal student), but this only affirms that non-philosophers sometimes see philosophy as a kind of madness, even in themselves.

Although some of these cases have similarities with the Phaedrus, perhaps the example which most resembles the mad philosopher who recollects the Forms at the expense of worldly

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169 Apollodorus’ veneration of Socrates might be superseded by dedication to philosophy (or his veneration of Socrates might stand for his dedication to philosophy); see Neumann 1965, 284.
170 Alcibiades later compares the effect of philosophy on his soul to the bite of a viper (218a).
171 Although Apollodorus’ disdain is primarily for other people, he also rejects the things which wealthy people and merchants talk about (173c5-6).
173 Socrates’ description of philosophers as followers of Bacchus in the Phaedo (69c8-d3) might be added to this list. In this dialogue, philosophy is envisioned as a ritual of purification: the philosopher uses λογισμός to touch reality with the mind (ἡ τοῦ φιλοσόφου διάνοια, 249c4-5), although here the description of
things comes from the digression of Plato’s *Theaetetus*. In this part of the dialogue, Socrates draws a contrast between the philosopher’s body (τὸ σῶμα) which lives and sleeps in the city, and his intellect (ἡ διάνοια) which flies on wings (πέτεται) under the earth, measures the surface of the earth, and flies above the heavens (ὁ ὕρανοῦ θ’ ὑπερ) while doing astronomy and finding out the nature of things (173e-174a). This explains why philosophers are unfamiliar with city life such as law and politics (173d), and why they do not know their way to the agora or to the law-court (173c7-173d2): the philosopher’s mind never lowers itself to the things which are nearby (εἰς τῶν ἐγγὺς οὐδὲν αὐτήν συγκαθιείσα, 174a2). Whether or not Plato is committed to the contents of the digression, the parallels with the *Phaedrus* are difficult to ignore: the philosopher’s winged διάνοια, the contrast between the διάνοια and the body, and the philosopher’s eccentric neglect of his social world, all correspond to the portrait of the mad philosopher in the *Phaedrus* (249d-250d).

Socrates does not say explicitly in the digression that philosophers are mad, but emphasises that popular ridicule is one of the pitfalls of doing philosophy. As a further illustration, Socrates relates the story that Thales the sage fell into a pit while doing astronomy because he failed to notice what was in front of him (174a). This seemingly exaggerates the philosopher’s neglect of the world around him into a caricature, yet Socrates says that this is actually the case with philosophers, and that this gibe applies to all who do philosophy (ταῦταν δὲ ἀρκεῖ σκῶμα ἐπὶ πάντας ὅσοι ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διάγουσι, 174b): they do not pay attention to their neighbours, and they are even oblivious as to whether or not they themselves are human or some other creature (174b). The result of this is that philosophers look ridiculous and terribly awkward (ἡ ἀσχημοσύνη δεινή, 174c5-6) to the many (καὶ τῷ ἄλλῳ ὀχλῳ, 174c4) whenever they are required to talk about what is in front of them.

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philosophers as bacchants is likely supposed to allude to the fact that they are truly initiated rather than literally mad; compare the madness of extravagant pleasure (*Phd.* 83c-d).

174 See e.g. Hemmenway 1990, 323-346 for the view that the digression is a defence of the philosophical life (*contra* e.g. e.g. Ryle 1966, 158). Rue 1993, 71-100 offers a reading of the opposed views of philosophers and orators in terms of the preceding discussion of Protagorean relativism.

175 The similarity between these passages is noted by Cornford 1935, 169.

176 For the dangers of philosophy, and the philosopher’s ignorance of the world around him, compare Callicles’ charge in the *Gorgias* (484c-d).
Socrates’ portrait of the philosopher in the *Theaetetus* likely draws on a stock caricature of the philosopher who is interested in astrology and geometry found in Aristophanes’ *Clouds*.\(^{177}\) The philosophers of the φροντιστήριον expose themselves to ridicule because of the things which they study: a student explains to Strepsiades that a group of philosophical students who are hunched over are investigating the things below the earth (188-203), while their backsides gaze at the heavens (193).\(^{178}\) Earlier, the student relates the perils of studying astronomy, telling Strepsiades that when Socrates was examining the path of the moon and staring open-mouthed at the heavens, a lizard defecated on him (170-3). This scene illustrates the danger of focusing on higher things, and makes Socrates’ neglect of lower things look ridiculous (the lower world gets its comic revenge).\(^{179}\) Strepsiades delights in these stories in which Socrates is made to look even more ridiculous than the proverbial Thales (180).\(^{180}\) The comic philosopher whose study results in utter neglect of the world around him seems to be a common stereotype.\(^{181}\)

In the *Theaetetus*, philosophers are first identified as astronomers and geometers, much like their Aristophanic counterparts. However, unlike the students of the φροντιστήριον, the philosopher of the digression clearly has an interest which extends to ethical subjects such as kingship, justice, and human nature. His concern is not about particular cases (174d-e), but about generalities (175c): he is not interested, for example, in whether a king is happy (εἰ βασιλεὺς εὐδαιμων, 175c4), but in kingship, human beings, and happiness in general (βασιλείας πέρι καὶ ἀνθρωπίνης ὅλως εὐδαιμονίας, 175c5). In the *Theaetetus*, the philosopher who is immersed in generalities at the expense of particulars is implicitly similar to the philosopher who does astronomy and geography, and they are both subject to the same criticism and ridicule: The

\(^{177}\) For the suggestion, see Rue 1993, 87.

\(^{178}\) Socrates is perhaps interested in defending himself against similar ridicule. However, the references to *Clouds* in Plato’s *Apology* (19b-d) are most likely ahistorical and designed to contrast the contents of the play with actually malicious slander (comedy is the appropriate place for the absurd and the ridiculous). See Halliwell 2015, 4-6.

\(^{179}\) For a similar analysis, see O’Regan 1992, 38; cf. Segal 1967, 147.

\(^{180}\) This is a reference to popular caricatures involving Thales (of the sort found in the *Theaetetus*). See O’Regan 1992, 38 n. 14; Pucci 1963, 30; Schmid 1948, 216. On the proverbial Thales more generally, cf. Ar. *Ar. Av* 1999, and see Dover 1968, XXXVI. Anaxagoras and Protagoras are targets of similar criticism; e.g. Protagoras in Eupolis’ *Flatterers* (Eup. Col. fr. 157 PCG); on Socrates in the *Clouds* as a possible representative of Anaxagoras’ views, see Turato 1973, 70 n. 137, 47-71. Anaxagoras receives a similar criticism in Xenophon’s *Memorabilia* (4.7.6-7). See my discussion above, pp. 45-49.

\(^{181}\) For a similar charge against Socrates, see e.g. Eup. Col. fr. 386 PCG, and cf. Aristophanes fr. 691 PCG.
philosopher who thinks about justice is ridiculous if made to speak in a law court, and fails to
distinguish, for example, between kings and swineherds (174c-d).\textsuperscript{182}

I suggest that the philosopher who looks to the Forms in the \textit{Phaedrus} similarly takes on
the familiar caricature of the astronomer who is unaware of his immediate surroundings. As in the
\textit{Theaetetus}, the stereotype implies that philosophers neglect human customs and interests, and
the Platonic philosopher who is immersed in generalities rather than particulars is seen to spend
time on questions outside of routine human concerns. Although the eschatological and cosmic
speculations of the palinode are prompted by Socrates' own human introspection (in response to
the oracle at Delphi: \textit{γνῶθι σεαυτόν}, 229e), in many respects the palinode brings in new
information that extends beyond these demands (e.g. the positive account of recollection, Forms,
and pre-bodily existence).\textsuperscript{183} In the palinode, the philosopher examines moral terms, such as
justice (one of the Forms), but also, and by virtue of this kind of study, his soul emulates the gods
who move in the heavens: ethical concepts like justice and wisdom are metaphysical entities
which have a cosmological basis in the context of the myth, and his concentration on moral
concepts is framed as recovery of a highly articulated cosmic state. Since the philosopher's
preoccupation with these concepts is described by Socrates as the recollection of hyperuranian
objects, the differences between study of the heavens and study of ethics are reduced.\textsuperscript{184} Without a
strong contrast between cosmological and ethical knowledge, the philosopher who contemplates
the Forms runs the risk of seeming like an astronomer who studies the heavens. Although a moral
philosopher does not literally need to look up in order to see justice or truth (indeed the \textit{stimulus}
for recollecting true beauty is beauty on earth), the comparison with the awkward upwards-
looking bird (249d7-8) seems to incorporate the astronomical caricature. If so, Socrates invokes a
popular and formulaic satire to emphasise the ridiculous and eccentric appearance of the
philosophical lover from the perspective of the crowd, and this is used in support of the madness
charge.

\textsuperscript{182} In reality, the philosopher's interest in such generalities would likely be hindered by this sort of ignorance of the
particular; philosophers like Socrates do pay attention to particulars, and are interested both in reality and in
appearances. See Rue 1993, 87-88.

\textsuperscript{183} See Ferrari 1987, 12: 'for Socrates, myth is a tool to be used in the analysis of himself as person and philosopher'.
Socrates' introspection is (at least partially) exclusive to himself as an individual, but certainly appears
simultaneously to make wider claims about humans in general; see Griswold 1996, 2-3 and see Rowe 1986b, 228. See
Long 2013, 10-25 on the differences between \textit{inter} and \textit{intra}-personal discovery in Plato.

\textsuperscript{184} Cf. Plato's \textit{Timaeus}, where Plato has a kind of cosmological ethics, but now with a developed theory of the cosmos.
In the next section of this chapter I turn to the specific sense in which philosophy is brought under the heading of beneficial madness. Socrates achieves this by including philosophy as a kind of divine inhabitation, or enthusiasm.

3.3. Mad Philosophers and Enthusiasm

Critics have suggested that Plato’s account of the fourth type of divine madness (i.e. philosophical ἔρως) is conceptually distinct from the other three types which are presented as more established or traditional. This is because Socrates’ classification of philosophy as madness depends on his characterisation of philosophy as a kind of enthusiasm (e.g. ἐνθουσιάζων, 249d2), but philosophical enthusiasm appears to be different from those kinds of enthusiasm presented as conventional (such as poetry and prophecy). This distinction is sometimes taken to demonstrate the incompatibility of philosophical madness with the established model, and thereby to expose how Socrates’ classification of philosophy as enthusiasm alongside the other more traditional types is misleading or merely rhetorical. I think, however, that Socrates’ presentation of philosophy as enthusiasm is not supposed to be disingenuous, even if it depends on a specialised interpretation of what it means to be enthused.

Enthusiasm is broadly taken by scholars to mean that the enthused person is inhabited by a god, and, more specifically, the concept evokes a model of divine possession (familiar from other dialogues such as the Ion) in which the agent’s reason is displaced by a divine entity, resulting in a loss of agency on the part of the human. The conventional interpretation of enthusiasm, then, is that it is interchangeable with κατοκωχή (i.e. possession) which is used for the Muses’ seizure of...

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185 Of course, their presentation as traditional does not mean that they really are traditional. The idea that poets are mad is likely a Platonic innovation; see Tigerstedt 1973. Cicero (Div. 1.83) suggests that Plato’s characterisation of poets as divinely inspired in the Phaedrus (e.g. 245α; cf. Ion 534b-c) has a precedent in Democritus (cf. Cic. De or. 2. 494). For an overview of the testimony, see Wardle 2006, 323-4. Some sources for Democritus’ view (fr. B8 DK and B21 DK) are likely influenced by Platonist-Stoic syncretism; see Mansfeld 2004, 484-8.

186 e.g. Scott 2011, 177-8; Werner 2011, 61; Morgan 2010, 52-56.

187 e.g. Scott 2011, 183-181 (deliberately misleading); Werner 2011, 61-2 (transvaluation/assimilation); Morgan 2010, 53 (incompatibility/rhetorical).

the poet’s ψυχή (245a2; cf. 244e) and ἐπίπνοια (i.e. inspiration) which is used indiscriminately in
the synopsis for all the forms of divine madness (265b2). Although Socrates uses these different
terms for the phenomenon of divine madness (κατοκωχή, ἐπίπνοια and ἐνθεος/ἐνθουσιάζω), ἐνθεος, ἐνθουσιάζω and cognates of the latter are the most prominent in the dialogue, and Socrates implies
that each type of divine madness is an example of enthusiasm (249e1).

Critics who emphasise the difference between philosophical enthusiasm and the other
types of enthusiasm point out that although the vocabulary of enthusiasm is used consistently for
the madness of philosophers, philosophical madness is at odds with the conventional model
evoked by the earlier examples of enthusiasm (e.g. the ἐνθεος prophet, 244b), because it does not
involve the expected seizure and displacement of reason by a god, nor is it characterised by a loss
of agency. Socrates sometimes presents the philosophical lover as seized or invaded by Erôs (e.g.
ληφθείς, ἁλῶσι 252c), but his presentation of philosophical enthusiasm does not seem to imply
literal invasion by a god. Instead critics suggest that the philosopher has, through his own
recollection of the Forms, become somehow godlike. In this way, the conventional model of divine
invasion is supposedly replaced in the light of the later metaphysics of the speech by a new model
in which enthusiasm (viz. philosophy) is derived from an internal force, shown by its tight
association with ἀνάμνησις.\textsuperscript{189} This is why Socrates’ classification of philosophy as a kind of
enthusiasm is taken to stretch or exaggerate the conventional meaning of enthusiasm beyond its
established limits.\textsuperscript{190} This difference, between becoming godlike (philosophical enthusiasm) and
being invaded by a god (conventional enthusiasm), is typically viewed as irreconcilable, and
therefore demonstrative of the incompatibility of these concepts and of Socrates’ misleading
rhetoric which equivocates between the two.\textsuperscript{191}

\textsuperscript{189} See Scott 2011, 178, Morgan 2010, 53-6, Griswold 1996, 75. Nightingale 1995, 159-161 agrees with Griswold that the
philosophical lover is not literally seized by the god Erôs, but shows how the philosophical lover is nevertheless
shown to be susceptible to outside forces (e.g. the stream of beauty, 251b-2; nourishment, 251b5; influx of particles
251c; irrigation, 251e; the inspiration of Zeus, 253a; the stream of desire, 255c). Cf. the prosaic contrast in Socrates’
first speech between the ἔμφυτος desire for pleasure and the ἐπίκτητος δόξα directed at the best (237d7-237d9).

\textsuperscript{190} Scott 2011, 177 (conceptual stretching); Morgan 2010, 50 (exaggeration).

\textsuperscript{191} See Scott 2011, 177-80 for the argument that philosophical madness as enthusiasm is illegitimate because it breaks
with conventional notions of enthusiasm; for the opposite conclusion, but based on a similar premise of
incompatibility (i.e. that we can make sense of philosophical enthusiasm, but at the expense of the conventional
categories of enthusiasm which it supersedes), see Morgan 2010, 50.
I think that this misses the subtlety of Socrates’ argument. In the central discussion of philosophical madness from his second speech (249d), Socrates thematises precisely this distinction, between popular views about enthusiasm and the case of the enthused philosopher. The philosopher is rebuked by the crowd (νουθετεῖται μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν) and their rebuke is mistaken because they fail to realise that the philosopher is enthused (ἐνθουσιάζων, 249d2-3). In this passage, the madness of philosophers is clearly not like enthusiasm in the established or familiar sense (this is shown by the crowd’s failure to identify the philosopher’s madness as enthusiasm). The crowd is correct that the philosopher is acting strangely, but fails to see the benefits of his madness (these benefits are visible only to the wise, e.g. 245c1) and so rebukes him.

When it comes to philosophical enthusiasm, the crowd’s knowledge falls short, and the specialised sense in which the philosopher is considered to be enthused is clearly prioritised over any conventional wisdom to the contrary. I suggest, however, that the crowd is mistaken only in a narrow sense, and that this does not mean that the crowd is inaccurate in every respect (the crowd detects the philosopher’s outward eccentricity), or that the crowd is unable to identify other more obvious cases of enthusiasm. In the opening of his speech, for example, Socrates describes that the example of the Sibyl who prophesies by means of enthusiasm (ἐνθέῳ) is ‘obvious to everyone’ (δῆλα παντὶ, 244b4-5).

This sort of contrast, between conventional and specialised views, is typical of the Phaedrus, and need not imply that Plato is distorting or exaggerating the concept of enthusiasm. Sometimes Plato appears to give non-philosophical voices an active and authoritative role, and at other times he emphasises the superiority of philosophical wisdom; this produces a ‘double-voiced discourse’, or results in a ‘two-level reading’ of the dialogue in which non-philosophical views co-exist alongside philosophical insights. This is shown, for example, by Socrates’ inclusion of Sappho and Anacreon’s views about the madness of love in his first speech, and the contrast is

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192 Even though Plato’s theological views are not entirely traditional, I reject a deflationary reading of the traditional categories of enthusiasm. On such a reading, enthusiasm might point only to good outcomes, but not imply literal inhabitation by a god. My objections are similar to Vogt 2013, 183-4.


194 For Sappho and Anacreon as an example of ‘passive double voiced discourse’ (i.e. in which the author is passive and in which non-philosophical views are given autonomy), see Nightingale 1995, 158-161.
prominent in Socrates’ conceptualisation of enthusiasm. Conventional views about enthusiasm frame Socrates’ discussion of philosophical enthusiasm and recollection, and although Socrates’ own account clearly goes beyond conventional views, this does not mean that they are replaced. It is possible that Socrates has co-opted the conventional concept of enthusiasm only to empty the term of its established meaning, and instead transpose his own meaning onto it (i.e. as a rhetorical placeholder for new theological content), but this does not really explain why the conventional types of enthusiasm are never dismissed as misleading.

The co-ordination of philosophical and non-philosophical perspectives serves a particular purpose in relation to the unifying topic of the speeches, madness. Conventional views and expert knowledge are each essential parts of Socrates’ conceptualisation of his genus: conventional wisdom has authority when it comes to describing the broad characteristics of the genus, since madness is broadly distinguished by the reversal of convention (i.e. the socially visible features of madness), while expert knowledge in certain fields (e.g. psychology, theology) is required for analysing the hidden causes of madness by describing the partitions of the genus, its differentiae and species (e.g. distinguishing the beneficial and divine sort of madness from the blameworthy sort). This explains, I think, why Socrates sometimes yields to popular discourse on madness in important ways and why, at other times, he emphasises the priority of his own views. Specialised knowledge is needed in order to analyse madness in terms of its esoteric causes, since the nature of these causes (i.e. souls and gods) is hidden from all but the wise. Popular wisdom is criterial when it comes to identifying who is mad, even if it does not offer a reliable analysis of the underlying psychology and moral dimensions of madness.

Socrates is careful not to reject or marginalise the opinions of the crowd when it comes to madness; instead, he shows how conventional wisdom constrains his own thinking on the subject.

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195 Both Nightingale 1995 and Morgan 2010 observe that Plato has included conventional ideas about enthusiasm only to reformulate them. For Morgan 2010, 60-1 conventional views about enthusiasm are at odds with Plato’s own views. Nightingale 1995, 159 identifies the divine seizure of a human soul as an attitude expressed in the genre of lyric love poetry (following Carson 1986, 157) which Plato adapts into his own vision of philosophical enthusiasm (159-161).

196 For transposition and replacement, see Morgan 2010, 61 and cf. e.g. Diès 1927, 400-451; Diès observes in Plato various successive transpositions from ‘la langue du public ou la langue de ses favoris’ to ‘Platonisme’ (400-451). For Diès, Plato sublimates popular language into original philosophical insights, and the popular views from which he draws should not themselves be taken too literally. Morgan reflects on the problem (60): ‘the question arises as to why, if Plato’s reader is meant to realise that previous categories of inspiration have been superseded in the palinode, Plato does not have Socrates simply dismiss them as inaccurate.’
Socrates consciously works within a popular framework, acknowledging (sincerely I think) that philosophers and lovers are mad; ironically, it turns out that the kinds of insights needed to partition madness accurately in terms of its hidden causes (i.e. human illness and divine reversal) are only available to those whose grasp of the relevant subjects (i.e. psychology and theology) extends well beyond the ordinary limits of human knowledge (Sappho and Anacreon fail, for example, to separate madness accurately into its *differentiae*). Socrates has to go beyond conventional views about madness in order to analyse the concept with any precision. Only the esoteric insights of the mad philosopher can explain accurately what makes lovers or philosophers so out of place that they behave in an eccentric fashion.

The crowd has authority when it comes to recognising eccentric behaviour, but it is unreliable in matters that require specialised or esoteric knowledge. Socrates’ second speech offers insights in exactly those fields, namely the nature of the soul and the gods, which are required in order to give an expert account of enthusiasm. I think that the second speech offers insights which explain, from a specialised point of view, exactly why philosophical madness really is a form of enthusiasm alongside the other more obvious examples. Knowledge of these fields is emphatically unavailable to the crowd, and this explains why philosophy does not look like enthusiasm to the many, even though they are able to recognise the more familiar forms of enthusiasm. I suggest that the specialised insights available to the philosopher show how philosophy also meets the requirements for enthusiasm. The philosopher is enthused, not in some special sense, but in a sense which is not immediately obvious to the crowd.

Just as the inclusion of Sappho and Anacreon leads Socrates to a simplistic or narrow view of the madness of love which is revised by classifying blameworthy madness as only part of a more complex phenomenon, so popular ideas about enthusiasm are subject to revision (but not replacement) because they only give a partial picture. My argument is that the specialised perspective offered by Socrates’ account of souls and gods in the palinode shows that philosophy is legitimately included alongside the other divine types of madness. That is, his special account of gods and souls reveals that both philosophical enthusiasm and the more familiar types of enthusiasm are predicated on a shared model. An incompatibility between what the crowd thinks enthusiasm entails and what Socrates thinks about enthusiasm does not mean that the
conventional examples of enthusiasm are ruled out or inaccurate. The crowd’s claim, for example, that the Sibyl is enthused does not conflict with Socrates’ claim that the philosopher is enthused, if his model of enthusiasm can account for both cases. Nor is the crowd’s claim that the philosopher is eccentric contradicted by the stipulation that the philosopher is enthused (the philosopher, just like any enthused person, is bound to behave strangely). Socrates’ model of enthusiasm does not come at the expense of the previous established categories of enthusiasm; it only requires that certain aspects of the conventional explanation are revised.

Socrates shows (249d) that the crowd are by no means experts on the subject of enthusiasm, and I suggest that Socrates’ own model discards any notion (conventional or otherwise) that invasion and loss of agency are essential features of enthusiasm, yet retains the broader meaning of enthusiasm as inhabitation by a god. If the crowd insists that divine seizure is essential to enthusiasm then this is a narrow view. In what follows, I show that a model of divine inhabitation is satisfied by both conventional and philosophical enthusiasm if Socrates’ account of souls and gods is taken into account.197

Socrates explains that the mind (διάνοια) of the recollecting philosopher comes close to the Forms through memory (πρὸς γὰρ ἑκεῖνος ἀεὶ ἐστιν μνήμῃ κατὰ δύναμιν), and that it is the gods’ closeness to the self-same Forms which makes them divine (πρὸς οἷσπερ θεὸς ὢν θεῖός ἐστιν, 249c5-6). It is easy to see why some critics have suggested that what makes the philosopher enthused is that he becomes similar to a god through mnemonic contact with the Forms instead of having a god inside him,198 or why some say that the recollecting philosopher is ‘enthused’ by the Forms

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197 I contrast the approach of Scott (2011) and Morgan (2010). Scott 2011, 177-80 dismisses philosophical enthusiasm as misleading, because it is too divergent from conventional views about what enthusiasm entails (i.e. displacement of reason by a god, loss of agency); this prompts Scott to question whether philosophers are mad in any sense and to suggest that the continuity of madness in the dialogue depends on misleading assimilation (185-194). For Morgan 2010, 60-1, philosophical enthusiasm comes at the expense of the accuracy of conventional views about enthusiasm (they co-exist rhetorically but not theologically, cf. n. 46), because it depends on a sufficiently different conceptual structure (i.e. becoming godlike, rather than displacement of reason by a god).

198 e.g. Morgan 2010, 55: ‘being inspired is a question of being next to the divine by means of your memory. Rather than having a god in you, you are in the divine (to the extent that you can be).’ Cf. Scott 2011, 178: ‘so Plato has tacitly put to one side the more established sense of enthusiasm as possession and replaced it with the notion of likening oneself to the divine’.

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instead of by a god. These differences are cited as evidence of Plato’s manipulation of the concept of enthusiasm.

I think, however, that these explanations of the philosopher’s enthusiasm are premised on a mistaken equivocation between the soul or mind of the philosopher and what I shall refer to as the ‘whole philosopher’ who is a human being with a social identity, and who has both a body and a soul. If the whole philosopher (and not just his soul) becomes godlike through his proximity to the Forms during recollection, then this does indeed seem to rule out his being enthused in the conventional sense of divine inhabitation; moreover, if the whole philosopher is conflated with his soul (which used to travel in the company of the gods) then this might seem to imply that recollecting philosophers, like gods, have priorities which are determined by the Forms. But the philosopher is not the same thing as his soul or mind, and Socrates makes this clear by emphasising shortly after his description of recollection that human souls are trapped in bodies, as oysters are in shells (250c5-6).

It is the philosopher’s διάνοια (ἡ τοῦ φιλοσόφου διάνοια, 249c5-6) which gets close to the Forms through recollection, not the whole philosopher. Human souls and divine souls both possess διάνοια, and both are nourished by the Forms (247d2-3). The similarity of human and divine souls is maintained throughout the speech, and Socrates’ definition of all soul (ψυχὴ πᾶσα, 245c5) does not differentiate between them, implying that they share essential characteristics.

They are similar in composition and structure: both are likened to the chariot team (246a6-b3), and both are seemingly complex and immortal. While there are some differences between them, such as the fact that divine souls have only good horses (and perhaps have an indefinite number of

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199 e.g. Werner 2011, 61; cf. Scott 2011, 180 who suggests that ‘[the philosopher] is enthused in the same way as the gods themselves are. By contemplating the forms, the source of the gods’ own divinity, his soul comes to be divine as well.’ Cf. Griswold 1996, 75; Seeskin 1976, 581.

200 For this observation, see Burnyeat 2012, 243-4.

201 In the Timaeus (69c-d) only the rational part of the soul is immortal; for a reading of the Phaedrus in which the gods’ horses are dispensable (i.e. the gods are simple), but there so that gods can serve as paradigms for human souls, see Hoinski and Polansky 2014, 139-60.
horses), it is sufficient for my argument that they are roughly isomorphic, and that human souls are therefore capable of resembling divine souls.\(^{202}\)

When poets and prophets are enthused, their soul is displaced by a god (e.g. poets: λαβοῦσα ἁπαλὴν καὶ ἄβατον ψυχήν, 245a2). If Socrates' account of enthusiasm is consistent with what he says about human souls and gods elsewhere in the palinode, then a god represents a more or less compatible substitute for the displaced soul in terms of structure and composition. What makes gods especially different from human souls, however, is their proximity to the Forms: gods are parasitic on the Forms for their divinity (249c5–6) and have attitudes and priorities which are determined by their contact with the Forms.\(^{203}\) The enthused poet or prophet, then, is temporarily under the indirect influence of the Forms by virtue of having their human soul displaced by a god. This experience is presumably characterised by the same passivity and dissociation discussed in Plato's Ion (e.g. 533d–534e; cf. 532c5–7):\(^{204}\) the poet or prophet's personal identity is suspended and they are unable to account for their activity while they are enthused because their motivational psychology is entirely replaced by the god inside them.

By contrast, during recollection the philosopher's διάνοια is in contact with the Forms through memory (249c5–6). Socrates' use of the term διάνοια is not always consistent, but it is clear from his earlier (and clearly relevant) description of the soul's travel in the company of the gods (247c–248c) that διάνοια refers to that part of the soul which glimpses the Forms (i.e. it refers to the charioteer and not the horses), and it is through such vision that the best souls become like the gods (αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι ψυχαί, ἡ μὲν ἄριστα θεῷ ἑπομένη καὶ εἰκασμένη, 248a1–2).\(^{205}\) In this passage, it is not

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\(^{202}\) On the differences between human and divine souls, see Price 1989, 68; cf. Burnyeat 2012, 246–7 on the order of exposition and the order of explanation. Burnyeat suggests that the bad horses of human souls may once have been good and that the difference between human and divine souls is epistemic (245); cf. Ferrari 1987, 133.

\(^{203}\) Cf. Burnyeat 2012, 245 who sees the difference between human and divine souls as a difference in knowledge.


\(^{205}\) In his account of the soul's journey with the gods through the heavens, διάνοια seems to refer exclusively to that part of the soul which is likened to the charioteer and which sees the Forms (at 247d1). Technically διάνοια here is a reference to the διάνοια of a god, but linked to the role of the charioteer in human souls through comparison: the soul's charioteer sees the Forms by means of νοῦς (ψυχῆς κυβερνήτῃ μόνῳ δεήτη νῷ, 247c7–8); even the διάνοια of the gods is nourished by νοῦς and pure knowledge (ὅτε οὖν θεοῦ διάνοια νῷ τε καὶ ἐπιστήμῃ ἄκηράτῳ τρεφομένη, 247d1–2), and so is every soul (καὶ ἴκτισά ὁ πύρης, 247d1). The contrast between what the charioteer sees and what the horses can see is emphasised again at 248a1–5. Towards the end of Socrates' speech, however, διάνοια appears to refer to the whole soul (διάνοια has parts which resemble the parts of the soul: e.g. τὰ βελτίω τῆς διανοίας ἁγιάγοντα, 256a8); cf. Socrates' juxtaposition of the good and bad parts of the soul (δουλωσάμενοι μὲν ὃ κακία ψυχῆς ἐνεγίγνετο, ἐλευθερώσαντες δὲ ὃ ἄρετῆ, 256b2–3), and his later reference to 'the whole διάνοια' (πάση ... τῇ διανοίᾳ 256c6); see Griswold 1996, 107. For the relevance of 247c–248c to 249c5–6, see Burnyeat 2012, 245.
only the philosopher’s δίσκος but his whole soul which becomes like a god, by virtue of the activity of his δίσκος. The δίσκος of the philosopher who recollects this pre-bodily existence is similarly focussed on the Forms, and this means, I take it, that his soul becomes like a god. Like a god, the recollecting philosopher’s soul derives its priorities, motivations, and attitudes from its closeness to the Forms. For the philosopher, unlike gods, this closeness needs to be recovered by recollecting the soul’s former closeness in the divine procession.

The similarity of the philosopher’s soul to a god means that the states of the enthused poet (or prophet) and the recollecting philosopher are in some respects indistinguishable. As human beings with social identities, poets and philosophers are composed of souls and bodies (becoming a poet or a philosopher depends on the soul’s embodiment on earth, 248c-e). The enthused poet has a god inside; this god structurally resembles a soul and occupies the place of the soul (which it displaces). The recollecting philosopher has something godlike inside; the godlike thing is his own soul which has come to be divine through his mind’s recollection of the Forms. Both the enthused poet and the recollecting philosopher have a god (or at least something godlike in the case of the philosopher) occupying the place where people would ordinarily have a human soul with human priorities. Because of this, inspired poets and recollecting philosophers are both ἔνθεος in the established sense of the word: they are human and have something divine inside their bodies.

The divine characteristics which the philosopher’s soul takes on refer to the reprioritisation of motivations within his own soul (like a god, his soul focusses on the Forms), and this explains why the philosopher retains agency despite having something divine in control: the divine thing in control is his own soul. His soul is like a god, and gods are intellectual and ethical agents. The philosopher’s soul is not displaced, and so he does not experience the loss of agency of

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206 Cf. Burnyeat 2012, 242 who calls the philosopher’s mind a deity.
207 Cf. Burnyeat 2012, 242–246; Burnyeat comes closest to my argument. He suggests that the philosopher is inspired and possessed by his own mind (δίσκος, not soul) which is a deity (see esp. 243–6: The Deity Within). However, Burnyeat does not emphasise the role of the body in enthusiasm, nor does he make a clear and explicit comparison between philosophical recollection and the other categories of enthusiasm. Sometimes Burnyeat equivocates between the philosopher’s mind and the philosopher as a person (e.g. 245: ‘divinity growing in the mind … which makes one divine’).
208 This notion of a godlike soul as the divine inhabitant of the body is found elsewhere in Plato; in his Timaeus (90a–d), Plato represents the rational soul as a δαίμων which inhabits a part of the body (τοῦτο δ ἡ φαμεν εἰςὲν μὲν ἡμῶν ἐπ’ ἄκρῳ τῷ σῶματι, 90a4–5), and contrasts the priorities of the δαίμων with human affairs and interests (93b1–2).
209 See Burnyeat 2012, 245.
poets or prophets (they are passive and their actions are determined by the invading god).\(^{210}\) The philosopher who recognises the Forms might seem to be startled or to lose control (ἐκπλήττονται καὶ σύκέχ’ αὐτῶν γίγνονται, 250a6-7), but as I have already suggested in my discussion of σωφροσύνη, this vocabulary is an index of his alienation from his former self and from other people in his social world.\(^{211}\) Since the philosopher's attitudes and priorities have radically shifted in response to his vision of the Forms, it is as if he has become somebody else. His soul has indeed changed its character: it has become like a god because its motivational powers are directed at the Forms. A similar change in identity marked the unattractiveness of the mad lover in Socrates' first speech, but where the lover's identity is unreliable, the philosopher's new identity will be stable (because his soul is *constantly* close to stable objects: πρὸς γὰρ ἐκείνος ἀεὶ ἐστίν μνήμη κατὰ δύναμιν, 249c5).

Physically, the poet or prophet whose soul has been displaced by an invading god is hard to distinguish from the recollecting philosopher whose soul has become like a god. Socrates deliberately characterises his account of philosophical madness within the conventional parameters of enthusiasm as divine inhabitation: both poets and philosophers have gods inside their bodies. Appropriately, the same thing which legitimises philosophy as a form of enthusiasm (i.e. that the philosopher is a human being with a body) is also what makes him mad in the broader sense of eccentricity. The enthused philosopher may have a soul which has come to resemble a god, but, like any human being, he has a body and remains stuck in the social sphere, with its expectations for correct behaviour and a large number of unchosen social attachments (for example, to the city, to family, and to property). Gods are free of these attachments, and the enthused philosophical lover takes on the habits and customs of whichever god he had followed in the divine precession (καὶ ἐφαπτόμενοι αὐτοῦ τῇ μνήμῃ ἐνθουσιῶντες εξ ἐκείνου λαμβάνουσι τὰ ἔθη καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα, καθ’ ὅσον δυνατὸν θεοῦ ἀνθρώπῳ μετασχεῖν, 253a1-5). So there is a tension in living as a godlike human: enthused philosophers have priorities and motivations which match those of a god, and this produces patterns of thought and behaviour which are out of place in the human world. For this reason, the philosopher is an awkward fit in society.

\(^{210}\) See Werner 2011, 56; for Werner the philosopher's relative control undermines his claim to madness: 'the mature philosopher of the palinode shows no indication of the type of literal possession and un-self-consciousness that characterize the poet, prophet, and Bacchic initiate.'

\(^{211}\) i.e. his former self no longer has any hold over him. The phrase σύκέχ’ αὐτῶν γίγνονται means primarily that he is no longer under his own control (see Yunis 2011, 149), but also implies that he is no longer himself.
The godlikeness of the philosopher's soul satisfies the psychological and theological conditions for the classification of philosophy as a *species* of divine madness. These aspects of philosophical madness are hidden from the crowd (because they do not understand how human souls relate to gods). However, the philosopher's attitudes and priorities do stand out as eccentric, and his outward disregard for human customs and conventions fulfils the generic criterion for distinguishing madness. Philosophical madness as a *species* is defined by describing its parent division, beneficial divine madness, and its *genus*, which refers to visibly unusual behaviour. This is why both eccentricity and enthusiasm are made prominent in Socrates' discussion, and why having alternative ways of characterising madness is not an *embarras de richesses*, but part of the structure of Socrates' analysis.\(^{212}\) Anyone can see that philosophers are mad, but it requires the expert perspective of the philosopher (who considers the nature of souls and gods) to see that the philosopher is really mad in the positive and divine sense of enthusiasm, and not in the negative sense of disorder.

\(^{212}\) Cf. Scott 2011, 179.
Chapter Three: Madness in Epictetus

We have seen two Socratic authors exploring popular and Socratic conceptions of madness. In this chapter I turn to Stoicism. According to Cicero, a notorious Stoic doctrine about madness was originally Socratic: Cicero reports that the Stoics borrowed from Socrates the idea that all who are not wise are insane (Tusc. 3.10: *omnes insipientes esse non sanos*). While Cicero had access to Socratic material now lost,1 the extant Socratic literature does not seem to support this conception of madness (that it is predicated of all who are not wise). In the pseudo-Platonic *Second Alcibiades*, Socrates explicitly rejects such a view (i.e. τοὺς ἄφρονας μαίνεσθαι, 139c) because it contradicts the way in which most people differentiate between madness and lack of wisdom or ignorance more generally (139c-d).2 Instead, Socrates suggests that madness is a particular kind of ignorance, but that there are other kinds (140c-d). It is possible that this discussion from the *Second Alcibiades* is, in fact, a Platonist response to the Stoic claim in question (i.e. that all φαύλοι are mad),3 but I have shown that other Socratic writing makes a similar distinction between madness and the condition of the crowd. In the *Phaedrus*, madness is treated as an exceptional phenomenon which is sometimes compatible with wisdom, and which designates, among other things, the reversal of customary values and conventional social behaviour (e.g. 265a10-11). In the *Phaedrus*, Socrates consistently maintains a distinction between madness and ignorance, and Plato's *Timaeus* (though not Socratic) reflects a similar distinction.4

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1 e.g. Phaedo’s *Zopyrus* (mentioned at Tusc. 4.80 and Fat. 7-10), on which see Boys-Stones 2004, 1-23.
2 Ahonen 2014, 67, 104 n. 4; cf. e.g. Anthon 1852, 283.
3 Stoic influence at 139c is suggested by Jowett 1892, 538. Other critics have suggested that it is a response to the Cynic view that all forms of ignorance are madness. See e.g. Sharpe 2012, 137 and Hutchinson 1997, 596.
4 Timaeus distinguishes between madness (μανία) and ignorance (ἀμαθία) as distinct species of folly (Ξόνω, Tim. 86b-88d). It is unclear how the two terms are supposed to be related. Madness seems to have a broad application which includes emotional outbursts and excessive feelings of pleasure and pain (86c-d). However, while both madness and ignorance interrupt λογισμὸς (86c3), they are clearly kept apart (see e.g. Tielemans 2003, 188). Perhaps Plato has Timaeus make the distinction so as to contrast the cognitive and phenomenological aspects of άνοια (i.e. rather than imagining these as distinct species); for this reading, see Lautner 2011, esp. 28-31 and cf. Price 1995, 84.
Some critics have suggested that Socrates’ characterisation of madness in a passage from Xenophon’s *Memorabilia* (3.9.6) offers a close parallel to the Stoic position, but I have shown that Socrates’ discussion of madness in this part of the work explicitly rejects an identity between madness and ignorance. Instead of calling all non-wise people mad, Xenophon’s Socrates endorses the crowd’s assumption of a difference between madness and ignorance, and makes the weaker claim that some forms of ignorance (such as lack of self-knowledge) in combination with presumption are merely closely-related or similar to madness. By contrast, his conception of madness itself is controlled by the crowd and designates a condition that is obvious and recognisable to most people. Xenophon’s strategy of rhetorical approximation does not seem to be available to the Stoics because of their strong claim that all fools are mad, but I think that Xenophon’s Socrates nevertheless provides a good precedent for some Stoic approaches to madness, especially in the case of Epictetus who works within an emphatically Socratic paradigm and for whom the *Memorabilia* serves as a prominent model. Epictetus provides important insight into the rhetoric of Stoic discussions of madness over and above what can be established on the basis of doxography alone. Like Xenophon and Plato, Epictetus recognises the distinction between madness and ignorance, but whereas they have Socrates endorse the distinction, Epictetus denies it.

1. Madness in Stoic Doxography

Before turning to some case studies in Epictetus, I will give a brief overview of the range of possibilities for madness behind the apparently simple claim that all fools are mad. Despite their notorious position, the Stoics’ characterisation of madness is psychologically and rhetorically complex, and can accommodate a variety of exceptional states and marginal cases familiar from other discourses. First, I show that the Stoics recognise a difference between the madness of all φαῦλοι and the madness of some body like Orestes who suffers hallucinations. Orestes’ capacity for

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5 Most recently Graver 2002, 82; cf. Dougan and Henry 1934, 11.
6 Stoic discussions of virtue and wisdom are often drawn from Socratic writing; see Schofield 2013 and Brouwer 2014, 136-76; cf. DeFilippo and Mitsis 1994, 252-71. For Epictetus’ Socratic paradigm, see Long 2002, esp. 67-96. Long emphasises Plato’s so-called early dialogues as Epictetus’ Socratic model, but also points out Arrian’s desire to present himself as the Roman Xenophon (39), and notes similarities between Epictetus’ work and Xenophon’s *Memorabilia* (152). On the parallels between Epictetus and Xenophon see esp. Gourinat 2001 and Mulvey 2011.
impressions is profoundly disrupted to the extent that he is blinded to what is obvious or evident. Orestes' symptoms are exceptional, given that unlike him the crowd are able to form perceptual impressions of what is evident, at least most of the time. In the second part of this section, I show that the Stoics isolate two prominent causes for madness, neither of which presents a radical departure from non-Stoic thinking about madness: medical μελαγχολία and extreme emotions. The former explains madness by referring to the effects of bodily disease (conventionally black bile) on the mind; the latter explains madness as a temporary blindness to what is obvious during an extreme emotional episode (most commonly anger). Lastly, I revisit the Stoic claim that all φαῦλοι are mad, and show that the claim has to do with the fact that all φαῦλοι are susceptible to emotional episodes because their perception of the value of objects is distorted. Whether φαῦλοι really are mad all the time is a contentious issue: either madness refers to the ongoing dispositional ignorance of all φαῦλοι which makes them susceptible to having emotional responses, or madness refers to the condition of the mind during an emotional response. I will argue that even though Chrysippus views madness as a chronic condition,\(^7\) in certain contexts, he singles out only those who are particularly susceptible to emotion.

1.1. Different Symptoms

In this section I want to focus on what the Stoic claim that all φαῦλοι are mad does not mean. I defer discussion of what I think it does mean to the final part of my examination of Stoic doxography. The Stoic claim that all fools are mad does not imply that madness is a homogeneous phenomenon; instead, the Stoics describe abnormal types of madness that are broadly compatible with distinctions made in non-Stoic literature. The Stoic claim is likely exaggerated by hostile critics in order to show contradictions in Stoic thinking, and Stoic authors recognise a strong contrast between the intellectual condition of most φαῦλοι and the mental state of Orestes who suffers from hallucinations that no-one else can see. For the Stoics, Orestes' condition is emphatically different from the routine experience of the crowd: the Stoics think that while most people are flawed and make mistakes, they are nevertheless able to form reliable impressions

\(^7\) This is especially clear from his identification of madness with ignorance in a passage from Stobaeus (SVF 3.663).
about what is obvious or evident; this capacity is suspended in the case of Orestes who sees a Fury in place of his sister, Electra.

### 1.1.1. The Madness of Fools

Apart from a report by Seneca (Ep. 94.17) that Aristo of Chius refers to ‘public madness’ (insaniam publicam), the earliest secure evidence for the Stoic view that all φαυλοί are mad is found in the surviving fragments of Chrysippus.9 Plutarch reports Chrysippus’ statement that all those who are unwise are madmen and fools, impious and lawless (μαίνεσθαι πάντας, ἀφραίνειν, ἀνοσίους εἶναι, παρανόμους, Plut. Stoic rep. 1048e).10 Here, as elsewhere, madness designates a lack of virtue and is broadly identified with general foolishness and vice.11 Plutarch’s argument (challenging the Stoic account of providence) depends on the idea that there are no degrees of vice and madness, and that all humans who are not wise are therefore in the worst position possible.12 To make this point, Plutarch cites Chrysippus’ assertion that if life itself could speak, it would ventriloquize the paradigmatically mad Heracles to emphasise the totality of its suffering (γέω κακ ῶν δή, κούκετ’ ἐσθ’ ὅπου τεθῇ, 1048f = Eur. HF 1245). In the same passage, Plutarch draws attention to the fact that the principal early Stoics considered themselves, along with all non-sages, to be counted among the fools.13 Similarly, Alexander of Aphrodisias reports that the sage is said to be as rare as the Ethiopian phoenix and everyone else is said to be equally mad (μαίνεσθαι δ ὲ ὅμοίως πάντας δςοi μὴ σοφοῖ). This conclusion is supposed to follow from the Stoic claim that there are not degrees of

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8 Perhaps Aristo’s original expression was ‘μανία πολιτική’, meaning the madness of ordinary people. See LSJ on πολιτικός section V.
9 I will return to Ep. 94 below, p. 137. On the attribution to Aristo, see Ahonen 2018, 353-4. There is no explicit reference to madness in the fragments of Zeno or Cleanthes.
10 = SVF 3.662 = SVF 3.668 (part).
11 This view is echoed by Diogenes Laeritus who reports the Stoic claim that all those who are unwise are mad (πάντας τε τούς ἀφροσύνης μαίνεσθαι), and that madness is equivalent to foolishness (ἀφροσύνη, DL 7.124 = SVF 3.664).
12 For a discussion of the context, see Boys-Stones 1996.
13 Cf. Sext. Emp. Math. 7.432-5 = SVF 3.657; Sextus Empiricus attributes to Chrysippus the Stoic dogma that ‘the fool is ignorant of all things’ (πάντα ἄγνωστα τοῖς φαύλοις) even though Chrysippus himself is considered to be a fool. It is likely that the principal early Stoics (Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus) did not consider themselves or indeed anyone else to be sages (apart perhaps from Socrates); see Brouwer 2014, 92-135 contra Hirzel 1882.
vice or virtue since both are without differentiation (ὡς μηδὲν διαφέρειν ἄλλον ἄλλου, De Fato 28 = SVF 3.658). ¹⁴

Accounts like these suggest that the Stoics’ conception of madness lacks degree or differentiation and that the Stoics therefore deny any distance between madness and ignorance. ¹⁵ The Stoic claim that all fools are mad (and that only the sage is sane) is part of a wider group of paradoxes told about the sage which are supposed to emphasise the extreme contrast between the virtue of the sage and the inferior moral condition of everyone else. ¹⁶ However, these paradoxes are not necessarily aimed at undermining popular views, and they can often be restated in a less radical way. ¹⁷ From the perspective of Stoic virtue, the sage is the only person who is really sane, but this does not prevent the Stoics from recognising generally held differences between most people and those who have severe symptoms (such as Orestes’ hallucinations), or who are mentally incapacitated by bodily disease. Moreover, it is rhetorically helpful for the Stoics to maintain a distinction between the madness of φαῤῥοι and exceptional types, because this allows them to put the paradox to work by comparing or contrasting them. ¹⁸

The emphatically counterintuitive formulations of the Stoic doctrine are mostly reproduced by hostile critics interested in exposing contradictions in Stoic thinking. For example, Diogenianus the Epicurean echoes Plutarch’s criticism in his polemic against the Stoic conception of fate and providence by drawing attention to the Stoic doctrine that ἀφροσύνη makes all men (apart from one or two sages) as mad as Orestes and Alcmaeon, who were each pursued by Furies for committing matricide. ¹⁹ These critics exploit the fact that some Stoic convictions (e.g. about providence) are undermined by their apparent commitment to the madness of all φαῤῥοι. I think there is evidence which shows that the Stoic conception of madness is more flexible than the

¹⁵ Cf. Graver 2007, 117: ‘it runs contrary to popular opinion (para doxan)’.
¹⁶ See DL 7.122-3; the Stoics also claim that only the sage is really free, that only the sage can be a king, or a judge, etc. Cf. Cic. Fin. 3.75-6.
¹⁸ Cf. Graver 2007, 117-8: ‘in order for the teaching to continue in a productive direction, the Stoic speaker would need also to supply some additional explanation, going beyond the bald equivalence claim to explain what it is that an ordinary lack of wisdom has in common with insanity in the more familiar use of the word.’
¹⁹ Eusebius Praep. Ev. 264b = SVF 3.668 (part).
doctrinal implies, and that Stoic authors frequently restrict the terminology of madness to a variety of exceptional states which do seem to have more in common with conventional categories.

1.1.2. Hallucination

In the example above, Diogenianus compares the madness of all non-sages to the less controversial cases of Orestes and Alcmaeon who are each pursued by the Erinyes, but the Stoics clearly acknowledge a difference between Orestes’ insanity and the widespread deficient rationality affecting all φαῦλοι. Orestes exemplifies a paradigmatic symptom of madness, hallucination, because in place of his sister Electra, he sees a Fury (Eur. Or. 264-5). In a report by Aetius (Plac. 4.12 = SVF 2.54), Chrysippus explains that a hallucination of the sort suffered by Orestes occurs both in the case of those who have become mad and in those who are afflicted with μελαγχολία (ἐπὶ τῶν μελαγχολώντων καὶ μεμηνότων). For Chrysippus, Orestes’ hallucination (φανταστικόν) is an empty attraction (διάκενος ἑλκυσμός), meaning that it has nothing underlying it (ὑπόκειται ... οὐδέν). For the Stoics, such a profound distortion of reality is not routinely experienced by the crowd. This much is clear from a discussion of Stoic epistemology by Sextus Empiricus in which he also draws attention to the example of Orestes (M 7.242–49).

Sextus offers a more detailed explanation of the type of impression involved. Orestes’ hallucination belongs to a group of impressions which Sextus calls ‘persuasive’ or ‘plausible’ (πιθανή, 7.243); these impressions are supposed to have a degree of perspicuity (περιφάνεια, 7.242), and Sextus explains (7.244) that they can prompt true predications (e.g. ‘it is day’ when it is day) or false predications (e.g. ‘the oar under water is bent’ when it is straight, or ‘the colonnade narrows to a point’ when it does not). The impression experienced by Orestes is ‘both true and false’ (ἀληθεῖς δὲ καὶ ψευδεῖς); true insofar as it is from a real thing because Electra is real, false insofar as it is from a Fury because there is no Fury (7.244-5). However, Orestes’ thinking that

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20 Cf. Graver 2007, 111.
21 For this contrast, cf. DL 7.51.
22 The mss. have ‘persuasive and unpersuasive’ (τῶν δὲ πιθανῶν ἢ ἀπιθανῶν); ἢ ἀπιθανῶν was secluded by von Arnim. See Bett 2005, 50 n. 96, and Brunschwig 1980, 155 n. 51.
23 Sextus’ account is distinct from that of Aetius. For Aetius, Orestes’ impression has no underlying object; for Sextus there is an underlying object (Electra). Sextus’ suggestion that there is an underlying object does not prevent it being an ‘empty attraction’; this is shown by the parallel example of the dreamer who experiences an ‘empty attraction’
there is a Fury (when there is no Fury) is not identical to the examples of the bent oar or the narrowing colonnade. In the familiar optical illusions, some external condition gives the impression a plausible appearance even though it is false (refraction means that the oar really does look bent, and perspective means that the colonnade really does appear to narrow). In each case, the information in the impression is compatible with the oar actually being bent or the colonnade actually receding, but there is no similar external condition that accounts for why Electra makes for a convincing Fury. This can only be explained by the fact that Orestes is mad (κατὰ μανίαν, 7.245). In other words, the impression is persuasive only to him because of his exceptional mental condition.24

In the next part of his discussion, Sextus explains that the truth of some impressions is self-evident. These are called ‘graspable’ or cataleptic impressions, and they have the following traits: (1) they come from something real (ἀπὸ ύπάρχοντος), (2) they are produced in accordance with the object they come from (κατ᾿ αὐτὸ τὸ ύπάρχον ἐναπομεμαγμένη καὶ ἐναπεσφραγισμένη), and (3) they are of a sort that could not come from something which is not real (ὁποία οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀπὸ μὴ ύπάρχοντος, 7.248). Orestes’ impression of a Fury is therefore non-cataleptic because it falls short of the second condition: Orestes fails to derive an impression from Electra that is in accordance with her being Electra (εἶλκε μὲν γὰρ φαντασίαν ἀπὸ ύπάρχοντος τῆς Ἡλέκτρας, οὐ κατ᾿ αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ ύπάρχον, 7.249).

While only the sage will invariably assent to cataleptic impressions and invariably withhold assent from non-cataleptic impressions, the Stoics explain that φανοὶ are at least naturally inclined towards assent to cataleptic impressions, and against assent to non-cataleptic impressions, especially in the case of perceptual impressions.25 Later, Sextus says that in the absence of an ‘external obstacle’ (τὴν ἐξωθεν περίστασιν, 7.254), a cataleptic impression ‘takes hold of us, almost by the hair, and drags us into assent’ (μόνον οὐχὶ τῶν τριχῶν, φασί, λαμβάνεται,

24 Cf. Frede 1987, 157; if the mind is defective, the causal history of the impression is compromised and the wrong impression is produced.
25 See e.g.; Frede 1987, 159: ‘under normal conditions we do in fact have a clear view of an object we are confronted with, and we can tell without difficulty what its visual features are'; cf. Ahonen 2014, 115: ‘even non-sage people could, in most cases, distinguish between cataleptic and non-cataleptic impressions'.
κατασπῶσα ἡμᾶς εἰς συγκατάθεσιν, 7.257). This shows that human beings are naturally equipped to assent to cataleptic impressions, and under ordinary conditions Orestes should (like most people) produce an unmistakable impression of Electra, but in his madness he forms an alternative impression (of a Fury) which bears no resemblance to the underlying object. The non-cataleptic impressions which φαῦλοι assent to are not like Orestes' hallucination; they assent to impressions which are uncertain (like the impression of someone in the distance who looks similar to a friend), but not ones which directly contradict what is certain. In this way, the Stoic doctrine of cataleptic impressions marks out cases of hallucination as abnormal. In the Stoic account of madness, there is a clear difference between exceptional and ordinary states.

Euripides’ play assumes a difference between the relative sanity of most people and the condition of Orestes during his hallucinations (the fact that only Orestes can see the Furies likely forms an important part of the character’s dramatic staging). Importantly, the Stoic claim that all φαῦλοι are mad does not erase this distinction. Instead, it remains relevant. Both Orestes and the crowd can be characterised as equally mad in contrast to the sage (because they lack virtue), but there is nevertheless a qualitative difference between the intellectual condition of Orestes and the condition of most other φαῦλοι: unlike Orestes, the crowd’s capacity to discriminate between true and false impressions is not totally suspended. Exceptional symptoms such as Orestes’ hallucination are maintained in Stoic thinking about madness even if he is, strictly speaking, no madder than other φαῦλοι. The Stoic contrast between Orestes’ hallucinatory state and the cognitive condition of most other people shows that the Stoics are prepared to accommodate exceptional forms of madness familiar from other discourses.

26 On the normative constraints of Stoic κατάληψις, see Brittain 2014, 332-355, esp. 333-7 (our inclination to assent to cataleptic impressions countervails our inclination to assent to ‘persuasive’ or ‘plausible’ non-cataleptic impressions); see also Frede 1987, 151-176, esp. 157-163.

27 Cf. Frede 1999, 311, words in brackets mine: ‘what is characteristic of these cases (Orestes and Heracles) is that the perceiving subject with one exception sees the object under ideal conditions. Barring the exception, the subject should have a cognitive impression. But the subject does not have a cognitive impression, because he is temporarily deranged, and this drastically interferes with the formation of an impression in such a way as to, for instance, give Heracles the impression that these are Eurystheus’ children.’

28 Cf. Frede 1999, 311: ‘the impression, taken in itself, under normal conditions has a distinctive character which can never be matched by an impression formed by a subject in an abnormal state.’

29 See e.g. Most 2013, 395-413, esp. 400: ‘it surely is more effective dramatically for the director to make us see only what the Chorus sees, thereby isolating Orestes even further within his incipient madness.’
1.2. Different Causes

Sextus links Orestes’ madness with dreaming (M 7.245), and in Stoic accounts, hallucinatory madness is often grouped together with temporary and exceptional states of cognitive impairment such as sleep and intoxication. In such states, one’s capacity to discriminate between impressions is compromised to such an extent that non-cataleptic impressions are given assent (and so are called true). However, once the state of impairment has subsided (e.g. on waking or becoming sober), it is easy to recognise these impressions as false; this is because non-cataleptic impressions are intrinsically distinguishable from cataleptic impressions (unless the mind is defective), and even φαῦλοι are capable of making such a distinction.

In what follows, I give a brief outline of two prominent causes of madness in Stoic doxography, medical μελαγχολία and extreme emotions. Neither of these explanations of madness represents a radical departure from non-Stoic views. The idea that some forms of madness come from disease is not particularly Stoic; instead, the Stoics maintain a popular distinction between medical and non-medical causes for psychological conditions. Similarly, the idea that episodes of extreme emotion are linked to madness is a trope familiar from other sources such as comedy.

These causes are complex and do not neatly map onto the distinction made in the previous section between the madness of all φαῦλοι and hallucinatory madness (even though the tendency in modern scholarship has been to connect μελαγχολία with the more severe form of madness characterised by hallucination, and emotions with the widespread madness of φαῦλοι). Aetius says that μελαγχολία can cause hallucinations (Plac. 4.12), and Chrysippus equates μελαγχολία with exceptional incapacitating conditions such as drunkenness, but Seneca reports that Aristo of Chius makes little distinction between medical madness and the general insanity of all φαῦλοι (Ep. 94.17). Likewise, while the fact that all φαῦλοι are prone to emotion lies behind the Stoic claim about their madness, emotional responses do not merely explain the state of all φαῦλοι all of the time; extreme emotions are capable of temporarily compromising a person’s capacity to

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37 e.g. Cic. Acad. 2.51; Epict. Diss. 1.18.23; 2.17.33; 3.2.5; Chrysippus calls drunkenness a ‘little madness’ (μικρὰν φασί μανίαν εἶναι τὴν μέθην, Stob. Ecl. 3.18.24); cf. DL 7.127 and see Graver 2007, 114.
38 Note Cicero’s distinction between inania uisa and perspicuitas in Acad. 2.51-2.
40 See Ahonen 2018, 343-64.
41 For this idea, see Ahonen 2018, 357; Graver 2007, 111-6.
discriminate between impressions to the extent that they make mistakes about things which are otherwise obvious, and Cicero explains Orestes’ hallucination in this way.

1.2.1. Melancholia

Sextus uses a variety of terms to refer those whose capacity to discriminate between impressions is defective; different from Orestes are those who are mad (οἱ μεμηνότες) and derive impressions from what is not real (7.249); different again are those called phrenetic and melancholic (φρενιτίζοντες καὶ μελαγχολώντες) who experience true impressions that fail to convince (7.247). While some of these expressions may be interchangeable, the routine cognitive impairment of all who are not wise is differentiated in the literature from medical μελαγχολία: both affect an individual’s capacity for impressions, but the latter is the result of bodily disease or disturbance for which the agent is not held to be responsible. Posidonius explains that μελαγχολία (along with impressions and pre-emotional ‘bites’, δηγμοί) is a physical condition with mental effects (περὶ σῶμα ψυχικά), and the term seems to refer to a physical disruption of the ordinary material state of the mind.

Apart from Posidonius’ testimony, most of the sources for the distinction between non-medical and medical madness are Latin. In a report by Seneca (Ep. 94.17), Aristo of Chius similarly attributes medical madness to disease (morbo) and says that it is caused by illness (causas furoris traxit ex uaelutudine). Medical madness is the sort entrusted to doctors (hanc quae medicis traditur), and can be cured by removing black bile (bilis nigra). By contrast, ‘public madness’ (insaniám publicam) is caused by false beliefs (opinionibus falsis), is itself called an illness of the mind (animi mala uaelítudo est), and is cured by correcting the false beliefs. Apart from Posidonius’ testimony, most of the sources for the distinction between non-medical and medical madness are Latin. In a report by Seneca (Ep. 94.17), Aristo of Chius similarly attributes medical madness to disease (morbo) and says that it is caused by illness (causas furoris traxit ex uaelutudine). 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35 The meaning of this passage is probably that those who are phrenitic and melancholic fail to form cataleptic impressions when they should otherwise be able to do so; as a result, they are unable to tell reality apart from their delusions. See Ahonen 2014, 119 and Graver 2007, 114. Cf. Frede 1987, 175 who uses this passage to show that even those who are mad react differently to cataleptic and non-cataleptic impressions.
36 Plutarch, De Libidine et Aegritudine 4–6 = Posidonius, fr. 154 EK.
37 See Graver 2007, 114: ‘the causation of insanity may then be comparable to that of dreams, which come about nonmysteriously, through the relaxing of pneumatic tension in sleep.’
38 e.g. Caes. Andre. 1.144 (furor from insania publica vs. furor from morbus); Cic. Tusc. 3.11 (insania vs. furor); Sen. Ben. 2.35.2; Sen. Ep. 94.17. It is unclear to what extent Greek terminology is similarly divided. See Ahonen 2018, 341-64 and Graver 2007, 111-12.
from their different causes, Aristo emphasises that there is no difference between the two states (*nihil interest*); at least insofar as it is useless to give either kind of mad person practical advice (*praeecepta*) before their sanity has been restored.\(^{39}\)

In an important discussion, Seneca explains that Stoic language sometimes deviates from ordinary usage (*a consuetudine*): the paradoxical claim that all fools are mad does not mean that everybody should be treated with hellebore (*nec tamen omnes curamus elleboro*); instead, those that the Stoics call mad are entrusted with civic duties (*et suffragium et iurisdictionem committimus*, Ben. 2.35.2). This shows both that Seneca is aware of the contrast between the Stoics’ counterintuitive application of madness and the popular view, and that a medical conception of madness (treated with hellebore) is supposed to be commonplace. The Stoic conception of madness resulting from bodily disease reflects contemporary medical literature (such as the *Hippocratic De morbo sacro*),\(^{40}\) but the idea of black bile is also found in comedy, and it is the comics, not medical writers, who advocate hellebore as a cure.\(^{41}\) Seneca is not trying to stipulate a specialised Stoic division between medical madness and the general madness of all φαύλοι. Instead, he is showing how the Stoic conception does not contradict the popular view: the Stoics agree with the crowd that there are sometimes medical causes for madness, but they further stipulate that the crowd itself is mad in contrast to the sage.\(^{42}\)

Stoic authors are willing to accommodate generally held distinctions between diseased and healthy states, but the difference between medical and non-medical madness is perhaps not quite so trivial as Aristo or Seneca seem to suggest. Mad φαύλοι are responsible for what they do, but those who are diseased or intoxicated have diminished responsibility and even the sage is potentially prone to the effects of μελαχρολία. Some say the sage is able to resist: Diogenes Laertius

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\(^{39}\) For discussion of the context of this passage, see Ahonen 2018, 350-4. On *insaniam publicam* see above, n. 8 on p. 131.

\(^{40}\) The author of the *Hippocratic De morbo sacro* (*On the Sacred Disease*) attempted to demythologise so-called diseases of the soul such as epilepsy: they were shown not to be the result of external divine intervention but rather an internal physiological cause. See Hershkowitz 1998, 2-3. See Graver 2007, 116: ‘[Chrysippus’] reference to melancholia is no more than a casual appeal to generally accepted medical notions’ and cf. Kazantzidis 2013, 245.

\(^{41}\) For ‘black bile’, see Ar. Av. 14, and for ‘bile’ see Ar. Nub. 833 (ἀνδράσι πείθει χολήν). Menander also mentions black bile (see Men. Epit. 880-1: χολή μέλαινα). Aristophanes may have had a concept of bodily humours (see Miür 1953, 34 and Flashar 1966, 37-9), but compare Langhoff 2011, 48 n. 66: ‘bile is not used in a ‘physiological’ sense by this poet’). In Aristophanes’ *Wasps*, Xanthias tells Philocleon to take hellebore for his incipient madness (1489). See Ahonen 2018, 345. 363.

\(^{42}\) Cf. Ahonen 2018, 350: ‘his remark is not about the Stoics making a statement and declaring there to be two kinds of madness. Rather, he wishes to reassure the reader that the Stoics are not, despite the paradoxical choice of words, contradicting the generally held view that being mentally ill and lacking philosophical wisdom are different things.’
reports a Stoic view that the sage can drink wine without getting drunk and also that he will not become mad despite the fact that he will experience ‘unusual impressions’ (φαντασίαι ἀλλόκοτοι) due to μελαγχολία (7.118). Although μελαγχολία affects the wise man’s capacity for impressions, he will somehow be able to avoid going mad. This is possibly because he is capable of withholding his assent, and Cicero reports that the sage is able to restrain his assent during compromised states so as not to approve falsehoods in place of truth (Acad. 2.53). But this view is controversial. Diogenes Laertius later reports a dispute between Chrysippus and Cleanthes (7.127): Chrysippus thinks that virtue can be lost on account of drink or μελαγχολία, but Cleanthes disagrees, saying that virtue is protected by ‘firm cognition’ (βέβαιοι καταλήψεις).

It is unclear whether the Stoics used μελαγχολία to refer only to medical varieties of madness. Cicero reports the Stoic distinction between μελαγχολία and μανία, and equates these with furor and insania respectively (Tusc. 3.11). He says that μανία/insania has a ‘wider application’ because it includes foolishness (hanc enim insaniam, quae iuncta stultitia patet latius), whereas μελαγχολία/furor has a more narrow use. But not too narrow: Cicero criticises the restrictiveness of the Greek term μελαγχολία because it limits the aetiology of furor to medical explanations such as ‘black bile’ and he points out that intense emotions (such as anger, fear, or pain) can also cause madness. According to Cicero, such emotions are often responsible (saepe) for madness like that of Orestes; he thinks μανία (or insania) is too broad a term to capture the madness suffered by Orestes (there is a difference between Orestes’ state and stultitia), but that μελαγχολία is too restrictive (Orestes is not suffering from black bile). The term furor is introduced to designate madness which is qualitatively different from widespread foolishness and which is caused either by bodily disease or by extreme emotions. Cicero’s critique suggests that the Stoics had predominantly used μανία for the madness of all φάῦλοι, and μελαγχολία for other kinds of madness, medical or otherwise.

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43 It is not clear how this would actually work; see Brittain 2014, 343. How the sage avoids getting drunk is also unclear (cf. Socrates in Pl. Symp. 214a); it may be because he exercises moderation, but it is possible to be drugged unwillingly; see Graver 2007, 116.
44 See Ahonen 2018, 361 (who attributes this to Cleanthes’ Cynicizing tendencies) and Graver 2007, 115-6.
45 Cicero likely has the Stoic distinction in mind; see Kazantzidis 2013, 247-8 (who compares Aetius Plac. 4.12.6 = SVF 2.54), and Graver 2002, 8; but cf. Ahonen 2018, 356.
46 The condition of μελαγχολία is frequently compared to dreaming and intoxication, but this does not mean these parallel states involve black bile. See Kazantzidis 2013, 247 n. 11: ‘it is important to notice that Cicero does not entirely dismiss the idea of a biological origin of melancholic madness at this point; he rather means to emphasize that black bile is not its only cause.’
1.2.2. Emotions

Cicero calls *furor* mental blindness (*mentis ad omnia caecitatem*, *Tusc.* 3.11), and this suggests that the corresponding term *μελαγχολία* is especially connected with severe hallucinatory madness in contrast to the widespread ignorance of all *φαῦλοι*. Cicero’s appeal to instances of extreme emotion finds parallels in the Stoic sources. Like various kinds of transitory cognitive impairment (such as dreaming and intoxication), the Stoics note that extreme emotions like anger have the ability to distort reality by temporarily blinding someone to what is otherwise evident or obvious. For example, Chrysippus says that an angry person might mistake a piece of wool or a sponge for a suitable projectile (such as a knife), or take out their frustrations on an inanimate object, by beating doors and biting keys (*Gal. PHP* 4.6.44). During these emotional outbursts ordinary mental discrimination between evidently true impressions and false ones is temporarily suspended. The emotional person’s blindness to what is ‘evident’ (ἐκφανής) suggests that they have a distorted apprehension of reality which is markedly different from most people’s experience.

As in the case of Orestes, these scenarios in which the emotional person suffers a temporary distortion of reality are likely drawn from non-philosophical material. In another passage (*SVF* 3.390), Chrysippus explains that anger can prevent apprehension of what is obvious (*τὰ ἐκφανή*), and that it often obstructs what is grasped (*πολλά κις δ ὲ τοῖς καταλαμβανομένοις ἐπιπροσθεῖ*). He follows this observation with a quotation from Menander: ‘where were my wits … when I chose to do this, and not that? (πο ῦ ποθ᾿ <αἱ> φρένες | ἡμῶν … <ὅτ'> οὐ ταῦτ', ἀλλ' ἐκείν ἠμώμεθα).’ There are parallel examples in comic literature: the mad person who throws whatever projectile is at hand (no matter its suitability) is reminiscent of Knemon in Menander’s *Dyskolos*. The angry old man is frequently called mad and pelts Pyrrhias with stones, clumps of

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47 = *SVF* 3.478 (part); cf. *SVF* 3.390 and 3.488. Galen uses similar *topoi* frequently (see e.g. *Aff. Dig.* 4; 5; *CMG* V 4.1.1 = 12; 16 De Boer), and Philodemus gives a similar portrait (of biting a key and throwing a piece of wool) in *De ira* (fr. 8 Indelli). On the *topos*, see Harris 2001, 12-13 and Thumiger 2017a, 109-10.

48 See Tieleman 2003, 178-184, 101 on the suspension of mental assent (κατάληψις) in these examples (see esp. 179-80: ‘the sheer irrationality of emotion is illustrated by a failure to grasp the identity of things: one mistakes a sponge for something suitable for throwing, or a door for a punishable living being’).

49 Plutarch *Virt. mor.* 450C = *SVF* 3.390.

50 Men. fr. 604 *PCG*.
earth, and eventually pears (Men. Dys. 119-21). Knemon also conflates people knocking at his door with a personal attack (τι τῆς θύρας ἅπτει, 466), and when Getas and Sikon finally try to drag him out of his house, he accuses them of madness in their assault on his door (μαίνει, ἄνθρωπε; τὴν θύραν κατάξεις, 921-2). For the Stoics, extreme emotions can cause temporary mistakes about things which are otherwise obvious. This formulation of madness is not exclusive to Stoicism and shows how Stoic thinking about madness can account for familiar categories: it is not particularly controversial that experiencing extreme emotion can temporarily distort reality.

Seneca singles out anger in particular and notes that many philosophers view this emotion as a kind of temporary madness (breuis insania, De ira 1.1.2). For the Stoics, all φαῦλοι are susceptible to emotions of this sort, and this susceptibility provides one explanation of the Stoic position that all φαῦλοι are mad. Cicero shows (Tusc. 4.54) how the Stoic claim depends on the susceptibility of φαῦλοι to emotions, especially anger, by comparing the madness of fools to the foul smell of mud (coenum):

... but they explain that when they say “all fools are mad” (omnes stultos insanire) it is like saying that all mud smells bad (male olere omne coenum). But not always (at non semper). Stir it and you will sense it (senties). Similarly the irascible man is not always angry (non semper iratus est); provoke him and then you will see him in a rage (iam videbis furentem).

Cicero’s comparison implies that all stulti have a predisposition for ‘mad’ emotional episodes when agitated, and this predisposition is analogous to the angry person’s irascibility (iracundia). One way of interpreting Cicero’s comparison is to suggest that madness refers to the persistent mental state of all stulti, but that this state is only made manifest in the right conditions (i.e. during an emotional response). On this reading, the madness of stulti (like the smell of mud) is always latent, but only evident when roused. All fools are mad, but their madness is not always detectable. This view requires senties to contradict the claim ‘at non semper’ and to mean something like ‘you will realise (that it smelled all along)’. While it seems intuitive that mud really does smell bad even when it lies undisturbed, I doubt that this is what Cicero intends by the

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51 Knemon has just been called completely mad by Chaireas: μαίνόμενον λέγεις | τελέως γεωργόν (116-17).
52 See Traill 2001, 94.
53 Cf. Smikrines who bangs on a locked door in a fit of anger (Men. Epit. 1075-7). The ‘hostile doorkeeper routine’ is already a trope in Old Comedy, and comic plays frequently have characters frustrated by locked doors. On the importance of doors in Menander’s stagecraft generally, see Traill 2001, 87-108.
comparison. Cicero repeats the expression ‘not always’ in the parallel example of the irascible man who is not always angry (*non semper iratus est*); here the ‘non semper’ claim is not denied, and I think the example is supposed to highlight the difference between the disposition (*iracundia*) and the episode (*iam uidebis furentem*). Accordingly, I think it more likely that Cicero uses *senties* to mean simply ‘you will smell it’: we say mud smells, but it only actually smells when it is disturbed (and that is when you will smell it), just as the irascible man is not always angry, unless he is provoked (and that is when you will see it). Cicero’s comparison of the claim ‘all fools are mad’ (*omnes stultos insanire*) to ‘all mud smells bad’ (*male olere omne coenum*) therefore prompts a different conclusion: just as mud does not always smell, unless it is disturbed, so all fools are not always mad, unless they are agitated. If this is right, then according to Cicero the Stoic claim that all *φαῦλοι* are mad is merely a dramatic way of saying that they are liable to become mad under certain circumstances.

However, Cicero is by no means a reliable guide and he sometimes fails to make a clear distinction between dispositions and emotions. In an earlier discussion of the relationship between emotions and madness (*Tusc.* 3.7), he suggests that what the Greeks call ‘emotions’ or ‘passions’ (*πάθη*) are equivalent to ‘diseases’ (*morbi*) in Latin, but he favours *perturbatio* as a Latin equivalent. However, *morbus* corresponds more closely to the Greek term νόσος (‘sickness’) which in Chrysippus designates the disposition that gives rise to a πάθος rather than the πάθος itself. Either Cicero has confused the two, or (more likely in my opinion) he has a different source for this nomenclature. At *Tusc.* 3.23, Cicero again identifies πάθος and *morbus*, noting the similarity between the Latin ‘aegritudo’ (distress) and ‘bodily illnesses’ (*aegris ... corporibus*). However, later in the same discussion he distinguishes between the emotions (including

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55 Cicero earlier emphasises the difference between irascibility and anger (4.27: *estque aliud iracundum esse, aliud iratum*); cf. Seneca *De ira* 1.4.1: *iratus potest non esse iracundus; iracundus potest aliquando iratus non esse.*

56 Cf. Graver 2007, 119: ‘in using the word ‘insane’, then, the Stoics mean to say that the common intellectual and moral condition of humans is disposed toward episodes of irrational behavior, even though ordinary people are at other times fully capable of reflective reasoning and at all times accountable for their activities.’


58 See Inwood 1985, 127: ‘what Cicero has done, then, in saying that *pathos* would most accurately be rendered as *morbus* in Latin, is to confuse the disposition with the activity or event which it governs.’

59 Possibly Cicero’s contemporary, Posidonius; see my discussion of the body-mind analogy in Gal. *PHP* 5.2.7-8 below, pp. 150-155. Cicero was, after all, familiar with Posidonius (see *Tusc.* 2.61: *noster Posidonius...*). See Graver 2002, 216: ‘similarities between Cicero’s work and the Posidonian material quoted and paraphrased by Galen are striking’; however, Graver thinks that Cicero’s position is opposed to Posidonius’ interpretation (218).
*ae gritud*o) and their *cause*, which he identifies as ‘belief’ (*opinio*, 3.24).\(^{61}\) This suggests that his use of *morbus* does not signal confusion of emotions and the disposition which gives rise to emotions; Cicero is aware that *morbi* are different from the underlying condition.

Calling the emotions ‘diseases’ allows Cicero to make the straightforward claim that emotions (*commotio animi*) damage the mind’s health (*sanitas animi*), and produce ‘unsoundness’ or ‘madness’ (*insania*, *Tusc*. 3.8-10).\(^{62}\) But Cicero also calls the lack of wisdom (*insipientia*) ‘a sort of unsoundness’ (*quasi insanitas quaedam*), and identifies the latter with madness (*insania eademque dementia*, 3.10). Lack of wisdom is surely a chronic state; as a result, it is not certain by the end of the discussion whether Cicero considers madness to be limited to transient emotional episodes or whether he thinks it refers to an ongoing disposition. The Stoic distinction between dispositions and emotions is not always clear and so it is easy to see how such confusion arises.

For example, while the Stoics consider emotions to be a kind of ‘response’ (*ὁρμή*), in a passage from Stobaeus the ‘disposition to have responses’ is itself called a kind of response (*προστεθείσης δὲ καὶ τῆς ἑξεως τῆς ὁρμητικῆς, ἣν δὴ καὶ ἰδίως ὀρμήν λέγουσιν, *Ecl*. 2.7.9.14-16).\(^{63}\)

I have shown that Cicero seems to limit madness to particular episodes of emotion (4.54), that he calls the emotions ‘sicknesses’ (*morbi*, 3.7), and that he distinguishes these from the condition which gives rise to them: ‘belief’ (*opinio*, 3.23-4). However, I have also suggested that Cicero’s overall position is not clear, because, in contrast to 4.54, he also identifies madness with something more chronic, namely the lack of wisdom (*insipientia*, 3.8-10).

1.3. All fools are mad

In what remains of this section, I show that Stoic thinking about madness in relation to emotions is contentious. Broadly speaking, the Stoics explain that moral ignorance implies a distortion of the perceived value of objects; this ignorance gives rise to emotional responses which engender more severe distortions. We have already seen that seen that emotions can cause momentary

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\(n\) Tusc. 3.24: *est igitur causa omnis in opinione, nec uero aegritudinis solum, sed etiam reliquarum omnium perturbationum.*

\(n\) This shows Latin’s superiority over Greek since it clarifies (and apparently anticipates) Greek thought; see Gildenhard 2007, 236.

\(n\) Cf. Inwood 1985, 127.
blindness to what is obvious, and when the Stoics say that all φαῦλοι are mad, it is not always clear whether they are referring to the ongoing ignorance of all φαῦλοι characterised by warped moral beliefs, or whether they are referring to the more dramatic momentary blindness that accompanies individual emotional outbursts.

The proneness of all φαῦλοι to emotion is supposed to explain the Stoic claim that all φαῦλοι are mad, but the tension which I identified in Cicero between distinct explanations of the notorious Stoic claim (i.e. between madness as a chronic disposition and madness as an emotional episode) is also reflected in the Stoic sources. It is clear that Chrysippus thinks of madness as a chronic disposition of ignorance (ἀγνοία, SVF 3.663; cf. Cicero’s insipientia), and Chrysippus calls ignorant beliefs sicknesses (νοσήματα, Stob. Ecl. 2.7.10e); by contrast, Posidonius seems to make the suggestion that it is the emotions which are properly called sicknesses (Galen PHP 5.2.7-8). In this way Stoic authors disagree about whether madness designates a general pre-existing intellectual condition of proneness to emotional episodes, or whether madness refers exclusively to the intellectual condition during a particular emotional response.

I will begin by focussing on a text in which Chrysippus discusses the madness of all φαῦλοι (SVF 3.663 = Stob. Ecl. 2.7.5b13). Chrysippus relates the emotional responses of φαῦλοι to their ignorance about certain external objects. I connect this with a later passage in Stobaeus (Ecl. 2.7.10e) in which Chrysippus discusses people’s beliefs that certain externals are ‘choiceworthy’ (αἱρετά): such beliefs are ignorant because externals are really indifferent (while indifferents can be preferred and ‘selected’, they should not be objects of choice because they are not good).64 When such beliefs become firmly held or ingrained, they are called ‘sicknesses’ (νοσήματα). I then show how the examples which Chrysippus gives of mental sickness (such as φιλογυνία, φιλοινία and φιλαργυρία) are picked up in another discussion reported by Athenaeus (11.464d-e) where Chrysippus appeals to a popular equation between sicknesses and madness to introduce the Stoic doctrine that sicknesses are indeed called mad. Together I take these passages to imply that, for Chrysippus, madness refers to a persistent intellectual condition (ἕξις) of proneness prior to (rather than merely during) temporary or intermittent emotional outbursts. I will then turn to a

64 See Stob. Ecl. 2.7.51 (= SVF 3.131) on the difference between τὰ αἱρετά and τὰ ληπτά. Cf. Cicero’s note that an indifferent should be ‘selected’ but not ‘chosen’ (Fin. 3.22: seligendum, non expetendum). For recent discussion, see Klein 2010, 83-115. To ‘choose’ something is to believe that it is good, either intrinsically or instrumentally.
critique of Chrysippus’ view by Posidonius (Gal. PHP 5.2.7-8= Posidonius, fr. 163 EK). As part of an extended critique of a Chysippean comparison between mental and bodily health, Posidonius suggests that mental sickness should only apply to the intellectual condition during a particular emotional episode.

1.3.1. Chrysippus’ View

In part of Stobaeus’ report of the doxography of Arius Didymus which very likely transmits the views of Chrysippus,65 madness (μανία) is called the opposite of moderation (σωφροσύνη)66 and equivalent to moral ignorance (SVF 3.663 = Stob. Ecl. 2.7.5b13).67 On this account, all φαῦλοι are mad (πάντα φαῦλον μαίνεσθαι, 2.7.5b13.1), because they have ignorance both of themselves and of their own affairs (ἀγνοιαν ἔχοντα αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν καθ’ αὐτὸν). Their madness is attributed to their ‘fluttering ignorance’ which produces ‘unstable and fluttering responses’ towards a particular thing (ἀγνοιαν ... ταύτην δὲ πρὸς τί πως ἔχουσαν ἀκαταστάτους καὶ πτοιώδεις παρεχομένην τὰς ὁρμὰς μανίαν εἶναι ... ἀγνοιαν πτοιώδη, 2.7.5b13.3-6). Chrysippus thus identifies madness as ignorance about oneself, but also about some object (πρὸς τι) which produces erratic emotional responses (the concept of ‘fluttering’ is revisited later in Stobaeus where it is clear that the term refers to an emotional response, or πάθος, Ecl. 2.7.10). The interpretation of παρεχομένην makes a crucial difference to the meaning of the passage: if the participle is temporal, ignorance is madness only when it produces unstable responses; however, on a causal reading, moral ignorance is identical to madness simply because it has the potential to produce such a response. While critics have

65 On this being Chrysippus’ view, see e.g. Tieleman 2003, 185 and Kidd 1983, 107. The conjecture that Arius was the author of the epitome was originally made by Meineke (1859) and defended by Diels (1879). For more recent discussion, see Pomeroy 1999, 1-3; Inwood 1995; Fortenbaugh 1983 (especially the chapters by Kahn, Hahm and Long).

66 The mss. have ‘σωφροσύνη’ and Usener’s emendation to ‘φρονήσει’ is rejected by Pomeroy 1999 and by Long and Sedley 1987b, 259. Long and Sedley argue that ὁρμαί are in the in the same field as the virtue σωφροσύνη (σωφροσύνη is the virtue concerned with regulating the ὁρμαί and so the opposition makes sense). I see no reason to emend the mss. reading. However, cf. Boeri 2000 who makes a case for φρονήσει: while ignorance is typical of the φαῦλος, the σοφός is φρόνιμος and φρόνησις is equivalent to knowledge (Plutarch Virt. mor. 440E-441D). Interestingly, these arguments implicitly reflect the Stoic debate over whether madness has more to do with emotional responses (i.e. the ὁρμαί), or with the condition which produces such responses (i.e. ἀγνοια).

67 = LS 41I. I follow the numbering of Stobaeus' Greek text given in Pomeroy's 1999 edition; I do not provide the corresponding page numbers of Wachsmuth’s (1884) edition.
translated this passage in both ways,\textsuperscript{68} I think that some of Chrysippus’ other remarks about madness support a causal reading.

Chrysippus’ description of madness as ignorance in relation to particular objects (πρὸς τι) is picked up by his discussion of mental sickness later in Arius’ epitome (2.7.10e). Although he does not mention madness explicitly in this passage, Chrysippus explains how ignorant beliefs about particular objects can become ingrained so as to constitute a sickness (νόσημα). The beliefs under discussion have a moral dimension because they hold that a particular external object is choiceworthy (and so considered to be a ‘good’) when it is not, in fact, choiceworthy (ὑπολαμβάνουσι τὰ μὴ αἱρετὰ σφόδρα αἱρετὰ εἶναι, 2.7.10e8).\textsuperscript{69} These beliefs misunderstand the relationship between an object and the self; that is, whether the object is good or bad for us (hence Chrysippus’ emphasis on self-ignorance in SVF 3.663).\textsuperscript{70} Once such a belief has ‘settled and become ingrained into a ἔξις (ἐρρυηκυῖαν εἰς ἔξιν καὶ ἐνεσκιρωμένην, 2.7.10e7), it is called a ‘sickness’ (νόσημα, 2.7.10e6).\textsuperscript{71} Chrysippus provides the following examples of object-directed sicknesses: love-of-women, love-of-wine, and love-of-money (φιλογυνίαν, φιλοινίαν, φιλαργυρίαν, 2.7.10e9).\textsuperscript{72} Each of these expressions designates an ingrained belief about the importance of the relevant object; a person with such a condition assigns the object unnatural value and this produces overriding and disproportionate emotional responses to the object.\textsuperscript{73} When these sicknesses are combined with weakness (ἀσθένεια) then they are called ‘infirmities’ (ἀρρωστήματα), and although it is not entirely clear what ‘weakness’ adds to Chrysippus’ conception of sicknesses,\textsuperscript{74} it probably implies that the belief about the object results in a strong and persistent desire that is especially difficult to eradicate.\textsuperscript{75}

\textsuperscript{68} Temporal: e.g. Ahonen 2014, 108; Graver 2007, 118; Brittain 2003, 189. Causal: e.g. Tieleman 2003, 185; Girdwood 1998, 202; Gerson and Inwood 1988, 208 (II-95); Long and Sedley 1987a, 256 (411).

\textsuperscript{69} See Graver 2007, 139: ‘... the beliefs called nosēmata and proskopai regard their objects in a way the person of perfect understanding would not. They evaluate them unconditionally, as goods inherently worth pursuing or as evils inherently worth avoiding.’

\textsuperscript{70} See Tieleman 2003, 186.

\textsuperscript{71} Cf. Cic. Tusc. 4.24.

\textsuperscript{72} Cf. 2.7.5f: φιλαργυρίαν; οἰνοφλυγίαν.

\textsuperscript{73} See Graver 2007, 140.

\textsuperscript{74} See Graver 2007, 139-40: ‘at most, the difference between them will be a matter of emphasis, as that an infirmity is a sickness in someone who is somehow especially tolerant of self-contradiction.’

\textsuperscript{75} Cf. De Lacy 1984, 646, and cf. Epict. Diss. 2.15.20 in which Epictetus says that when a weak mind (ἀσθενής ψυχή) is reinforced with ‘strength’ (τόνος), then it will become impossible to treat. But see Graver 2007, 139 who notes that
In a related passage from an introductory treatise preserved in Athenaeus (π.46d-e), Chrysippus explains that people who have mental sicknesses (such as love-of-women or love-of-wine) are called mad. Importantly, Chrysippus invokes common usage to support the wide application of madness in Stoicism, saying that many people apply the term madness to most of humanity (τὴν δὲ μανίαν τοὺς πολλοὺς ... τοῖς πλείστοις προσάπτειν). Chrysippus encourages his reader to think about the way that many people routinely use μανία as a generic term to describe those who have particular antisocial proclivities; for example, they refer to ‘women-madness’ (γυναικομανία) or ‘quail-madness’ (ὀρτυγομανία). The former is more widespread, while the latter is clearly more bizarre and specific. Some applications of μανία are more controversial, and Chrysippus mentions that some people (as opposed to the many) refer to those who love reputation as ‘reputation-mad’ (τινὲς δὲ καὶ δοξομανεῖς καλοῦσι τοὺς φιλοδόξους), but they do so in the same way that the many call lovers of women ‘women-mad’ and lovers of birds ‘bird-mad’ (καθάπερ τοὺς φιλογύνας γυναικομανεῖς καὶ τοὺς φιλόρνιθας ὀρνιθομανεῖς), because these expressions have the same meaning (τὸ αὐτὸ σημαίνοντων τῶν ὀνομάτων τούτων). Even those who hold controversial views about who is mad nevertheless mean the same thing as the crowd when they apply the term μανία.

Chrysippus adds that there are more examples along similar lines: someone who loves fish (and who eats fish) is fish-mad, so to speak; someone who loves wine is wine-mad, and so on (καὶ γὰρ ὁ φίλοψος καὶ ὁ ὀψοφάγος οἷον ὀψομανής ἐστι καὶ ὁ φίλοινος οἰνομανής καὶ ὠσαύτως ἐπὶ τῶν ὁμοίων). Although the crowd may not think of such people as really mad (οἷον marks potential exaggeration), Chrysippus says that the use of the term madness (μανία) is actually appropriate in these examples because such people make mistakes in a mad way, removing themselves a great distance from reality (ὅπωστε ἀλλοτρίως τῆς μανίας κειμένης ἐπὶ αὐτοῖς ὡς ἁμαρτάνουσι μανικῶς καὶ τῆς because sicknesses are beliefs which have become settled and ingrained, this already suggests that the resulting condition is likely to be persistent or chronic, and hard to remove.

76 = SVF 3.667.
77 I take 'τοῖς πλείστοις' as masculine to refer to the majority of people. The parallel phrase τινὲς ... καλοῦσι τοὺς φιλοδόξους clearly has people as the object. Others construe 'τοῖς πλείστοις' as neuter; e.g.: 'people routinely attach it to a large number of other terms' (Olson 2007, 229); 'la parola pazzia (mania) è legata nel linguaggio corrente alla maggior parte delle cose' (Canfora 2001, 1139). Cf. the medieval epitome: 'τὴν μανίαν φησιν ὁ Χρύσιππος πολλαχοὺς προσάπτεσθαι'.
78 Similar terms appear in comedy; e.g. Ar. Thesm. 576: Γυναικομανία; Av. 1284: ὀρνιθομανοῦσι.
79 'τινὲς δὲ καὶ' suggests that τινὲς is not equivalent to τοῖς πολλοῖς, and therefore that δοξομανία is a controversial application.
80 Canfora 2001, 1139 explains (n. 3) that they are referring to the same concept: 'una passione excessiva'.

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Chrysippus makes a similar claim in a report by Galen (PHP 4.5.21-2 = SVF 3.480), saying that someone might call external objects good (ἀγαθα), but what makes them ‘mad’ is that they are drawn to such objects much more than is natural (ἄλλα καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἐπὶ πλέον ἐκπεπτωκέναι πρὸς ταῦτα τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ... δὲν εἰκὸν ἄλλως γνωσικομανεῖς τινες λέγονται καὶ ὀρνικομανεῖς). Such people are suffering from ‘infirmities’ (ἀρρωστήματα, 4.5.21.2). It is clear that the term μανία is only appropriate because of the types of mistakes people with certain proclivities are liable to make: Chrysippus does not think it enough, to support an attribution of madness, to say that the person is in error; they need to be in error ‘in a mad way’ and ‘to the greatest extent’ separated from the truth.

In the passage from Athenaeus (11.464d-e), Chrysippus moves from a discussion of common usage of the term μανία towards a Stoic account; it turns out that ordinary vocabulary which often exaggerates people’s single-minded proclivities by calling them ‘mad’ is entirely compatible with the Stoic view. Chrysippus is trading on the fact that these examples stand out as morally egregious, but moral ignorance is not always productive of errors which are so obvious to the crowd (as the example of δοξομανία, which only some people classify as madness, shows). For the Stoics, popular values are not a good guide to morality, and there clearly exist beliefs which depart from moral reality in a less than obvious way. For example, having firm beliefs about the choiceworthiness of indifferents such as health, beauty or a good reputation would not seem to the many to show particularly misplaced or eccentric priorities, yet for Chrysippus, deep attachments of this kind presumably fall under the category of mental sickness and are included within madness. Mistakes which are obscure to the crowd are nevertheless an obvious departure from moral reality as far as the sage is concerned, and it is from the perspective of the sage that all φαῦλοι are ultimately considered mad.

Given its title (Introduction to the Study of Good and Evil), it is not far-fetched to imagine that Chrysippus’ treatise proceeds to reveal how most of humanity’s proclivities are, in fact, out of touch with the Stoic conception of virtue: in thinking some indifferent choiceworthy, people are making a ‘mad’ error because of the great distance between their own conception of what is good (women, wine and so on) and what, for the Stoics, is actually good (virtue). Some ignorant beliefs

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81 Cf. ὥστε καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ μὴ ἄλλοτριῶς καλεῖσθαι τὸν τρόπον τούτον.
82 For health, beauty and reputation, see DL 7.132-3.
about the choiceworthiness of externals may be so pronounced as to be recognisably obsessive (e.g. love of quails), while others may be less detectable either because they are less firmly held or because they are not noticeably out of place in the social world (such as an attachment to one’s reputation). For the Stoics, any proclivity for externals is liable to produce an unstable emotional episode (i.e. a serious error) and in this sense all φαῦλοι really can be considered mad.  

I have so far suggested that Chrysippus’ description of the madness of all φαῦλοι as fluttering ignorance (SVF 3.663 = Stob. Ecl. 2.7,5b13) is explained by his conception of mental sickness (νόσημα) which appears later in Arius’ epitome (2.7,10e); this is supported by a fragment from Athenaeus (11,464d-e) in which Chrysippus affirms that these sicknesses are equivalent to madness because they produce mistakes that are noticeably out of touch with reality. For the crowd who are flawed, only some moral errors stand out as egregious, but from the perspective of Stoic virtue all errors are clearly deviant. Taken together, these passages suggest that Chrysippus considers madness to be a dispositional sickness first and foremost (madness is a ἔξις), but also that such a state intermittently produces mistaken emotional responses (the πάθη) which make this madness visible. Chrysippus makes a clear distinction between the underlying intellectual condition (ἔξις) which causes emotional responses and the responses themselves (i.e. the πάθη). This view of madness as synonymous with dispositional sickness contradicts Cicero’s interpretation of madness as a transient state of agitation and his identification of emotions as sicknesses (morbi). While it is clear that Cicero draws much of his material on emotions in Tusculans 3 and 4 from Chrysippus’ treatise On Emotions (Περ ὶ παθῶν), some of Cicero’s views more closely correspond to those of Posidonius.

83 Cf. Graver 2007, 120: ‘everyone who has some commitment to the genuine value of externals is insane in that we are liable to experience the wrong sorts of affect.’

84 Chrysippus is clear that emotional responses are distinct from the sickness itself. See the distinction between ἔξις / ἔνεργεια (Stob. Ecl. 2.7.5f); see Graver 2007, 139-41. However, cf. Diogenes Laertius’ remark that Chrysippus sometimes equates beliefs about the moral value of money or wine with related emotions, 7.111. On Chrysippus’ ‘catachrestic’ language, see Graver 2007, 141.

85 See Appendix C in Graver 2002, 203-214, esp. 204-6.

86 See Appendix D in Graver 2002, 215-223, esp. 216-7. It is not clear whether Cicero derives some of his ideas from Posidonius or whether Cicero and Posidonius are independently drawing on Chrysippus’ treatise and sometimes coming to similar conclusions (Graver favours the latter explanation).
1.3.2. Posidonius’ Critique

Fragments of Posidonius’ *On Emotions* are preserved by Galen, and one of Posidonius’ major criticisms of Chrysippus is apparently aimed at the latter’s ‘causal analysis’ or intellectualist position which explains emotions entirely as the result of a condition of ignorance.87 Galen takes aim at Chrysippus’ explanation of what makes ‘infirmities’ (ἀρρωστήματα) mad (as in the examples of woman-madness and bird-madness),88 and supposes a Chrysippean doctrine that the degree to which a belief is mistaken (or the degree to which one is prone to emotion) is responsible for the *quality* of the ensuing emotion (i.e. whether it will be extreme), thus explaining madness entirely in terms of a condition of moral ignorance.89 Galen records several of Posidonius’ objections to this idea that the quality of emotional responses, taken to be indicative of madness or infirmity, can be sufficiently explained by the extent to which one’s beliefs are mistaken or by the degree to which one is prone to emotion (*PHP* 4.5.24-45 = fr. 164 EK). Whether such an explanation involving degrees can really be attributed to Chrysippus is doubtful,90 but the discussion does show that Posidonius questions the causal link between moral ignorance and the more clearly mad emotional episodes. Posidonius thus casts doubt on Chrysippus’ idea that ‘mad’ emotional episodes betray an underlying ‘mad’ disposition of moral ignorance.

Less relevant for me is Posidonius’ own view of madness;91 I am more interested in how his critique of Chrysippus reveals important aspects of Chrysippus’ own position, and how it shows a contrast between Chrysippus’ view (that madness is a disposition) and Cicero’s view in *Tusc.* 4.54 (that madness is limited to emotional episodes). Posidonius’ interrogation of the Chrysippean

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87 At least, this is how Galen represents Posidonius’ criticism (see Graver 2002, 216). For recent discussion, see Lorenz 2011, 189–211, esp. 193.
88 For Chrysippus, such infirmities are not only mistaken moral judgements about objects, but cases in which we are drawn to such objects beyond what is natural (*PHP* 4.5.21-2 = SVF 3.480). See my discussion above, p. 148.
89 For example, it is not enough to believe that an external like money is good (ἀγαθόν); one has to believe that it is the greatest good (μέγιστα) so that one thinks it is not worth living without money (ἐξαίτης ἐπειδάν τις αὐτὰ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν ἐνοικήσῃ καὶ μηδὲ ἐξ’ ἐξον ὄρκον ὑπολαμβάνῃ τῇ στερηθέντι χρημάτων, *PHP* 4.5.25.1-4 = fr. 164 EK part). The remainder of fr. 164 EK makes it clear that Galen and Posidonius are critical of whether the degree of one’s mistaken belief or of one’s proneness to emotion corresponds to the quality of one’s emotional responses.
90 For Chrysippus, thinking that any indifferent is good at all is tantamount to serious moral error because there are not degrees of goodness. Instead, as I suggested in my discussion of the Athenaeus passage (see above, p. 148), what seems to make the error ‘mad’ is that it departs from Stoic moral reality. Cf. Kidd 1988, 589: ‘it would be dangerous to regard this objection as a “fragment” of Chrysippus ... Galen may be framing subsequent Stoic defences of the Chrysippean position.’
91 He may believe (like Galen) that madness comes from an irrational faculty (e.g. μανία δ’ ὑπὸ τῆς ἀλόγου κατὰ τὸ σῶμα γίνεται δυνάμεως, *PHP* 4.5.23). See Kidd 1988, 588.
concept of dispositional sickness is most clearly illustrated by a passage from Galen ("PHP" 5.2.3-12 = fr. 163 EK) which preserves Posidonius' critique ("PHP" 5.2.7) of an analogy that Chrysippus draws between sickness of the mind (ἡ νόσος τῆς ψυχῆς) and a sickly condition of the body (τῇ νοσώδει κακεξία τοῦ σώματος) which causes it to fall into irregular and random fevers (καθ' ἣ ν ὑποφέρειται βεμμύδεσιν οὐκὶ περιοδικοῖς οὐα τ' ἐμπίπτειν πυρετοῖς, 5.2.7.1-4). This picture of a body prone to fevers closely resembles Chrysippus' description of madness as fluctuating moral ignorance in Arian's epitome: the unstable and fluctuating responses (i.e. emotions) in the epitome reflect the irregular and erratic fevers of the body which stand for emotional episodes in Chrysippus' analogy.92

Posidonius criticises the analogy by giving Chrysippus a choice: mental sickness (ἡ ψυχικὴ νόσος) should be compared either to bodily health, which includes a proneness to sickness (σωματικὴ ύγιεία ἐχούσῃ τὸ εὐέμπτωτον εἰς τὴν νόσον), or to 'sickness itself' (αὐτῇ τῇ νόσῳ, 5.2.7.4-6). Posidonius stipulates that by 'sickness itself' he means a body already suffering from sickness (ἤδη νοσοῦσα), rather than what Chrysippus calls sickness which is more like a proneness to fevers (5.2.7.7). This is meant to expose the shortcomings of the analogy because it leads, as far as Posidonius is concerned, either to a paradoxical comparison between mental sickness and bodily health, or to a position in which nobody is mentally sick at all unless they are actually experiencing an emotional episode (which is, he says, distinct from Chrysippus' view). This criticism incidentally clarifies Chrysippus' own position: Chrysippus thinks that mental sickness is a condition that is prior to emotional episodes, just as some bodily conditions are prior to fevers.

According to Galen's preliminary exegesis ("PHP" 5.2.3-6),93 Posidonius' criticism is briefly as follows: (1.) all inferior people are prone to emotion; (2.) some people may be especially prone, but (3.) a difference in the degree of proneness does not amount to a difference in the quality of the emotion when it is experienced (in the same way that all bodies are susceptible to fevers, some especially so, but their experience when having the fever is the same, 5.2.4.4-8); (4.) the sage has no counterpart in the analogy with the body, because all bodies (even healthy ones) are susceptible to sickness, but the sage is in no way prone to emotions (5.2.5.4-5).94 Posidonius'...

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92 This is clear from Galen’s explanation of the sage’s immunity to emotions, i.e. πάθη (5.2.5.4-5). Cf. Graver 2007, 143 n. 26 and Kidd 1988, 582-4.
94 Compare Galen’s comment that the counterparts to the souls of sages would be ‘bodies immune to disease’ (ταῖς ἀπαθείσι σώματιν, 5.2.9.3). See De Lacy 1984, 650. Cicero makes a similar objection: ‘healthy bodies are prone to
criticism is, I take it, that Chrysippus’ analogy confuses the prior state and the emotional response (confusing proneness to sickness with sickness itself) and, as far as Posidonius is concerned, Chrysippus must decide between these. 95 If Chrysippus identifies mental sickness exclusively as the intellectual condition during an emotional episode, then he must concede that anyone not experiencing an emotion is healthy irrespective of the extent of their proneness to emotions (whether they are extremely prone, or whether they are immune like the sage). If he identifies mental sickness as a prior condition of proneness to emotion, then he must concede that all those who are not wise are prone, and therefore sick. This is why the mind-body analogy breaks down: bodily health includes proneness to sickness, but if mental health excludes proneness to emotions, then bodily health ends up being unhelpfully compared to mental sickness (rather than mental health).

Galen later gives Chrysippus’ version of the analogy (PHP 5.2.14 = SVF 3.465). Chrysippus explains that mental sickness is similar to a bodily condition subject to fevers in which the fevers are produced not at regular intervals, but haphazardly from the disposition of the body and at the instigation of slight *stimuli*. This suggests that Chrysippus identifies mental sickness with a condition of proneness to emotions rather than with the emotions themselves. In addition, Chrysippus’ mention of slight *stimuli* shows that he is interested in focussing on those *φαύλοι* whose mental condition makes them especially prone to emotions (not everyone who is prone will respond to a slight *stimulus*). 96 This narrow focus is one of Posidonius’ key objections, since, as far

95 As Galen puts it: ‘Chrysippus is incorrectly comparing … the sickness of the mind to the condition of the body which falls easily into sickness’ (οὕκειν ὀρθῶς εἰκάζεσθαι φησιν ὑπὸ τοῦ Χρυσίππου … τὴν δὲ νόσον τῇ ῥάθιως εἰς νόσημα ἐμπιπτούση καταστάσει τοῦ σώματος, 5.2.5.1-4). Cf. Kidd 1988, 584: ‘Chrysippus was wrong in making a simple analogy for sickness, confusing and amalgating (sic) proneness to sickness and being sick.’

96 Galen suggests that Chrysippus discusses emotions exclusively (and wrongly) in terms of the magnitude of external causes (ἐπὶ μικρῇ καὶ τυχούσῃ προφάσει, 5.2.4.1), and that it is Posidonius who introduces the concept of internal ‘proneness’ (ἐμπιπτοσία) which, because it extends to all *φαύλοι*, exposes the limitations of Chrysippus’ view (Cf. Kidd 1983, 107-13, esp. 109). Although the relevant quotation from Chrysippus (PHP 5.2.14 = SVF 3.465) mentions slight *stimuli*, there is nothing in the actual citation from Posidonius (PHP 5.2.7) to indicate that it is Posidonius who introduces the concept of proneness (ἐμπιπτοσία). The text from Posidonius’ quotation (PHP 5.2.7) reads: ‘for disease of the body is a state already diseased, but what Chrysippus calls disease resembles rather (μᾶλλον ἔσοχεν) a proneness to fevers’ (5.2.7.7-5.2.8.1, trans. De Lacy 1978, 297). I do not think that μᾶλλον ἔσοχεν compares a Posidonian alternative to Chrysippus’ talk of magnitude, but rather that it compares proneness to fevers with a feverish state. That is, for Chrysippus a disease is more like a proneness to fevers (than it is like a body already diseased or already having a fever).
as he is concerned, the degree of proneness should be irrelevant to Chrysippus (since it has no bearing on the quality of the emotional response).

However, while all φαῦλοι are prone to emotions, I do not think it is Chrysippus’ intention to show that only some (i.e. those who are exceptionally prone) are mentally sick. Instead, I think he wants to draw attention to the fact that some φαῦλοι are exceptionally difficult to treat. So it is of great importance to recognise that for Chrysippus the point of the analogy is to inform therapy or treatment: Chrysippus compares the physician of the body (τῷ περὶ τὰ σώματα ἰατρῷ) to the physician of the soul (τῷ τῆς ψυχῆς ἰατρῷ, PHP 5.2.22-4 = SVF 3.471). He clearly thinks that just as some bodies are more prone than others to sickness, so the minds of some φαῦλοι are more prone than others to particular emotions, and that it is helpful to draw attention to such people as they are most in need of treatment. This brings us to an important point about mental sickness: Chrysippus thinks that ignorant beliefs can be more or less firmly held, and that this varies among φαῦλοι. Even though all φαῦλοι are mad (by virtue of being prone), some are more prone than others.

I have already drawn attention (above, p. 146) to a passage from Stobaeus which shows that Chrysippus views mental sickness as an intellectual condition in which an ignorant belief has become ingrained or deep-rooted (εἰς ἕξιν ... ἐνεσκιρωμένην, 2.7.10e7). Another passage from Stobaeus (2.7.5f) explains that all the vices are ‘dispositions’ (διαθέσεις), but that sicknesses and infirmities (τὰ νοσήματα καὶ ἀρρωστήματα) such as love-of-money (φιλαργυρίαν) and love-of-wine (οἰνοφλυγίαν) are ‘conditions’ (ἕξεις). The important Stoic distinction between διαθέσεις and ἕξεις is explained in part of Simplicius’ commentary on Aristotle’s Categories (8.237–238); Simplicius says that ἕξεις can be ‘intensified and relaxed’ (ἐπιτείνεσθαί ... καὶ ἀνίεσθαι), while διαθέσεις cannot (8.237.29-31). Moreover, Simplicius says that the Stoics consider ‘health’ (ὕγεια) to be a ἕξις (8.238.10). For the Stoics, ‘proneness’ (εὐμπτωσία), ‘infirmities’ (ἀρρωστήματα), and ‘mental sicknesses’ (νοσήματα) are ‘scalar’ conditions or ‘traits of character’, and this means that they can be present in different people in different degrees. Some φαῦλοι may be more prone than others.

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97 = LS 47S = SVF 2.393 (part).
98 Simplicius uses the example of straightness, a quality which cannot be intensified (whereas a quality such as ‘size’ is clearly able to be increased or reduced). Cf. Cic. Fin. 3.48 and Plat. Comm. not. 165a-b.
to certain emotions (e.g. they may be more irascible), and this gives Chrysippus room to
differentiate between different intensities of mental sickness.

While the virtues and vices remain constant, scalar conditions explain the differences
between φαῦλοι, and Chrysippus is interested in these differences from a therapeutic standpoint.
It is true that all φαῦλοι are prone to emotion, but to varying degrees. Just as some bodies are
especially liable to fevers, so some φαῦλοι are especially prone to certain emotions, and it is useful
for Chrysippus to mark out those whose ignorant beliefs are particularly entrenched, not because
this affects the quality of their emotions, but because such people require a more radical
therapeutic approach.¹⁰⁰ I take it that, for Chrysippus, the general Stoic claim that everyone apart
from the sage is mad is meant to describe the proneness of all φαῦλοι to emotion (in contrast to
the sage), while in other contexts it is worth distinguishing between individual φαῦλοι who may be
more or less prone.

It is not obvious to me that Posidonius is interested in presenting a serious alternative to
Chrysippus’ view of mental sickness, but if he is, it is the idea that mental sickness refers
exclusively to the condition of the mind during an emotional episode. This view implies that
φαῦλοι are intellectually healthy despite their liability to fall into mental sickness (all prone φαῦλοι
are healthy and it is only the emotional φαῦλος who is sick). The idea that most people are
mentally healthy except when they are emotional perhaps shows a willingness to relate
philosophy to common human experience (it seems fairly uncontroversial to say that people
experiencing extreme emotions can behave madly).¹⁰¹ However, I have shown that Chrysippus is
also interested in drawing attention to the complexity of φαῦλοι. Some φαῦλοι have conditions
which make them more prone to emotions than others, and Chrysippus thinks it is worth
distinguishing between these. Moreover, I have already pointed out (in my earlier discussion of
the passage from Athenaeus above, p. 147) that Chrysippus wants to show how his conception of
madness (as a mistake which radically departs from reality) is compatible with the view of most
people, provided that they reconsider their views about what is good and bad.

treating entrenched conditions, see Graver 2007, 139.
The objections raised by Posidonius against Chrysippus’ conception of madness as a dispositional state reveal that there was considerable debate about the madness of φαῦλοι by the time of the later Stoa. This debate is reflected in Cicero who sometimes seems to link madness to individual episodes of emotion (Tusc. 4.54) and sometimes to link it to an underlying condition of ignorance (3.10). Cicero also refers to the Stoic analogy between bodily and mental illnesses (4.27); like Chrysippus, he notes that some people are more prone than others to emotion (ut sunt alii ad alios morbos procluiuiores, 4.27.8), and that emotions stem entirely from ignorant belief (opinio, Tusc. 3.24). However, unlike Chrysippus, Cicero explains that when sickness is used of a disposition its meaning is actually periphrastic. For example, when we talk about bodily sickness and say that someone ‘suffers from colds or colic’, we do so not because they are suffering now, but because they often do (non quia iam sint, sed quia saepe, 4.27.10).

For Cicero, the mind-body analogy on which the proclivities are themselves called sicknesses (i.e. Chrysippus’ view) should only be used with the caveat that these sicknesses are really a proclivity to become sick (haec igitur procluuitas ad suum quodque genus a similitudine corporis aegrotatio dicatur, dum ea intelligatur ad aegrotandum procluuitas, 4.28.4-7). This explains why Cicero sometimes calls the emotions sicknesses (morbi). For Cicero, the Stoic claim that all fools are mad can be similarly clarified: all fools are mad (meaning they have a proclivity to madness), but they are not mad all the time (4.54).

1.4. Conclusion

It is clear from this brief discussion that despite their counterintuitive claim, the Stoics are rhetorically interested in keeping conventional views about madness intact. This results in tension between subversion of popular views (i.e. by calling all φαῦλοι mad) and yielding to popular discourse (i.e. by limiting the term madness in certain contexts, and recognising the complexity of φαῦλοι). Seneca makes this explicit in his recognition of the contrast between the Stoic claim and the generally held view that bodily disease can cause madness, suggesting that the Stoic view will not override these differences. Seneca notes that the Stoic claim departs from customary usage,

102 Implying that the emotions themselves are the real sicknesses. Cf. Cicero’s explanation (4.28) that proclivities are distinct from sicknesses, just as irascibility is distinct from anger (4.27.13-14).
but returns to it (a consuetudine quaedam, quae dicimus, abhorrent, deinde alia via ad consuetudinem redeunt, Ben. 2.35.2). This implies that although the Stoics' language is eccentric, it reaches the same conclusions as ordinary usage (i.e. that there is a difference between most φαῦλοι and those who are medically mad).\(^{103}\)

The Stoic conception of madness does not erase commonly held distinctions between healthy and sick states, nor does it imply that all φαῦλοι are as mad as Orestes. Instead, the Stoics endeavour to show how their own view of madness is compatible with non-Stoic views. This can be most clearly seen in Chrysippus' discussion of madness in Athenaeus; Chrysippus emphasises that his own conception of madness (as an intellectual condition capable of producing mistakes that are far removed from reality) is similar to the way most people use the term. However, it is clear that φαῦλοι do not have a sufficient grasp of what is actually good (i.e. virtue) to realise that most of their mistakes should be called mad, even by their own definition.

By the later Stoa, there were controversial interpretations of the claim that all φαῦλοι are mad. My reading of Chrysippus shows that he thinks madness is equivalent to ignorance about oneself and one's concerns, as well as moral ignorance about indifferents. Moral values are not always obvious to the crowd, and it takes a Stoic perspective to understand just how mistaken some forms of ignorance are. Even though Chrysippus implies that madness refers to the ongoing ignorance of all those who are not wise (a condition which makes them prone to emotion), it would seem that the degree of proneness matters to Chrysippus, and that in at least some contexts, Chrysippus thinks it is helpful to single out those who are especially prone. For some later thinkers (such as Posidonius and Cicero), madness is more closely identified with the condition of the mind during intermittent emotional outbursts. For Cicero, madness refers properly and exclusively to the obviously delusional condition of the mind during an emotional episode. This rather deflates the Stoic claim, and implies that φαῦλοι are relatively sane the rest of the time.

In my discussion of these Stoic distinctions, I have kept my focus on the surprising extent to which Stoic conceptions of madness are compatible with popular views, especially given the notoriously counterintuitive claim. Even Chrysippus wants to show that his own hard-line view of

\(^{103}\) See Ahonen 2018, 350 and Griffin 2013, 204-5.
who is mad (i.e. most people, all of the time) appeals to a popular conception of what madness is (i.e. a mistake that is sufficiently removed from reality). The Stoics maintain a connection between madness and what is obvious to the crowd: Orestes’ hallucinations are marked out as exceptional because most people are equipped with the capacity to discriminate between impressions. Although subtle and less-detectable forms of moral ignorance equate to madness on Chrysippus’ view, this nomenclature is appropriate only because these mistakes do, in fact, become clear when considered from the Stoic point of view. Moreover, for Chrysippus moral ignorance is responsible for our emotional responses during which we make more conspicuous mistakes (e.g. biting keys or throwing unsuitable projectiles) which are obvious to the crowd.

These efforts to make distinctions within madness, and to constrain the application of the term, result in a conception of madness that has considerable rhetorical flexibility. Once the meaning of madness has been limited, then a range of intermediate and approximate psychological conditions become apparent. For example, if madness sometimes designates a high degree of proneness to emotional outbursts, then lesser tendencies towards emotion can be compared to madness. Again, if madness is limited to the duration of an emotional outburst, then Stoic authors can depend on the relative sanity of their audience at other times.

Possibilities like these provide later Stoics such as Epictetus with a wide range of potential strategies in their characterisation of madness. In what follows, I will show how Epictetus harnesses generally held ideas about madness in his *Discourses*. Epictetus is interested in showing that his own Stoic conception of madness is not radically different from non-Stoic views, and by encouraging his audience to examine their own moral ignorance, Epictetus hopes to make them realise their own similarity to those they consider mad. Epictetus frequently recognises, and then denies, the assumed gap between the subtler forms of routine moral confusion and mistakes in more obvious matters. This shows Epictetus’ concern to accommodate conventional attitudes about madness, yet also conveys his conviction that less detectable mistakes are often just as serious as more recognisable errors.
2. Madness in the Discourses

In the previous section of this chapter, I argued that despite the Stoics’ apparently simple claim that all φαῦλοι are mad, madness is sometimes used by Stoic authors in a more restricted sense to refer to specific mental states. I suggested that Stoic authors often recognise the fact that φαῦλοι are psychologically complex, and see the rhetorical potential in approximate and marginal intellectual states within the moral psychology of the non-wise. In this respect, Stoic authors are more sympathetic to generally held distinctions within madness than their paradoxical claim implies. While Epictetus sometimes seems to endorse the strong Stoic claim that virtually everyone is mad (e.g. Disc. 1.21.3-4), in several passages he takes advantage of some of the possibilities afforded by a more complex view. In this respect, I think that Epictetus’ approach to madness is similar to Xenophon’s characterisation of madness in the Memorabilia: both authors are interested in relating what they present as generally held views about madness to a more sophisticated philosophical perspective. However, while Xenophon is interested in keeping popular distinctions more or less intact, Epictetus seeks to erase them. In this way Epictetus is less compromising.

Because there is no coherent plan in the assembly of Discourses, I am going to examine them separately, treating them as case studies. Where possible, I will bring together those Discourses which have a similar theme or which are clearly related, but I am not looking for a unified view of madness in the text. Instead, I am interested in the different ways in which Epictetus harnesses non-philosophical ideas about madness for rhetorical effect in his discussion.

2.1. Different Applications of Madness: Discourse 1.22

I begin by examining a passage from the first Book of the Discourses in which Epictetus brings together and implicitly contrasts philosophical and popular perspectives of madness (1.22.17-21). I


104 In 1.21.3-4, Epictetus’ interlocutor wants everyone he meets to admire him (οἱ ἀπαντῶντες θαυμάζοντο, 1.21.3), and Epictetus suggests that since the interlocutor is in the habit of calling everyone mad (περὶ ὧν εἶχας λέγειν ὅτι μαίνονται), he is trying to win the favour of mad people (ὑπὸ τῶν μαίνοντων θαυμάζεσθαι θέλει, 1.21.4).
will relate these competing applications of madness which appear at the end of the Discourse to the discussion at the start of the Discourse in which Epictetus comments on common conceptions which are shared by philosophers and non-philosophers. I think that the similarities between the two applications help to illustrate some of the broad and essential characteristics of madness which specialists and non-specialists share. For the philosopher and the crowd alike, madness refers to a perceived loss of self-control: the mad person is thought to be too much under the influence of something external, and this is attributed to having a particular psychological attitude. For Epictetus, externals can exert considerable influence over behaviour when they are mistakenly thought to be worthy of choice (and so considered to be good);\textsuperscript{105} this sometimes means that it is useless trying to engage a mad person in discussion, but moral confusion on its own does not guarantee that the views of φαύλοι will be intractable. Rather, Epictetus’ discussion suggests that there are degrees of madness, that not all φαύλοι are mad all the time, and that there are marginal states. For example, someone might be confused about what is good or bad, but nevertheless remain receptive to reason. Epictetus’ rhetorical approach is sensitive to these nuances, and as a result his treatment of madness is complex and selective. One important way in which he shows differentiation within madness is by drawing attention to the relationship between more and less obvious forms of moral error through the use of popular examples; these examples have an apotreptic function and help his audience to recognise their own madness.

Towards the end of Discourse 1.22, the verb μαίνομαι occurs twice in close proximity (1.22.17; 1.22.21), and on each occasion it has a different application.\textsuperscript{106} Earlier in the Discourse, Epictetus explains that everyone has a common preconception (πρόληψις) of the good – namely, that it is beneficial (συμφέρον) and choiceworthy (αἱρετόν) and should always be desired and pursued (1.22.1) – but humans disagree when adapting common preconceptions to particular cases (1.22.2).\textsuperscript{107} So humans might have different opinions about what is good, or about who is brave or senseless (ἀνδρεῖος ... ἀπονενοημένος, 1.22.3). Epictetus explains that philosophy involves learning to

\textsuperscript{105} See my comments on the difference between choice and selection above, p. 144.

\textsuperscript{106} Cf. Laurand 2007, 65: ‘la tension à l’oeuvre entre les deux occurrences de μαίνομαι’.

\textsuperscript{107} Epictetus frequently thinks of ‘the good’ in terms of ‘benefit’ or ‘value’, and here implies that the beliefs about desire and pursuit are fundamental features of the concept itself. This is in keeping with his programme of practical ethics in which he emphasises first and foremost the importance of settling on the appropriate objects of desire and choice. It is worth noting that Epicurean thinking contradicts Epictetus’ stipulation that this conception of the good is universal, since they, the Epicureans, consider some pleasures to be ‘good’ without being choiceworthy.
apply preconceptions in accordance with nature (1.22.9-10): first we need to distinguish between what is in our power (ἐφ’ ἡμῖν; i.e. our volition or προαίρεσις) and what is not (οὐκ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν; i.e. externals such as friends, family, and property), and then we need to decide into which of these categories the good should be placed (πού σοι θῶμεν τὸ ἀγαθὸν; 1.22.11). Epictetus shows that placing the good in externals leads to various problems, from disputes and petty theft to wars and seditions (1.22.11-16). It is in this context that μαίνομαι first appears: a student who is concerned with how to behave (τί σοι ποιήσωμεν; 1.22.17.1) and who is, like Plato’s Theaetetus, in the preliminary stages of philosophical training (the ‘birth pangs’ of thought, ὠδίνοντος, 1.22.17.2), recognises that if he cannot see what is good and bad, then he is surely mad (νῦν ἐγὼ οὐχ ὁρῶ τί ἐστι τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν; 1.22.17-18). The student’s recognition of his own madness is in line with Epictetus’ presentation of Stoic views.110

In the next part of the Discourse, the student considers looking for the good in the realm of his own volition (ἐν τοῖς προαιρετικοῖς, 1.22.18) and realises that if he were to settle on this Stoic doctrine, he would risk being ridiculed by the many (πάντες μου καταγελάσονται, 1.22.18). By way of example, he imagines the ridicule this would incur from an old man wearing many gold rings. The old man exemplifies the attitude of the crowd towards the student who decides to accept Stoic moral teaching (i.e. that the good lies within one’s own προαίρεσις). The old man concedes that philosophy is necessary to learn logic (συλλογισμός), but stipulates that one must keep one’s head (δεῖ δὲ καὶ ἐγκέφαλον ἔχειν, 1.22.18).111 For the old man, looking to philosophers for moral wisdom is going too far, and he advises looking to oneself instead, saying: ‘you know better (κάλλιον οἶδας) than the philosophers how to behave’ (1.22.19). From a Stoic perspective, this advice has superficial appeal because it emphasises the idea that one’s own volition should determine the moral character of one’s behaviour rather than outside influence. However, the old man is mistaken that philosophy is limited to making syllogisms. The first part of the Discourse has already clarified that although humans are naturally equipped with a common preconception of the good,

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108 See Long 2002, 207: ‘...however prohairesis is translated, it is Epictetus’ favourite name for the purposive and self-conscious centre of a person.’ For an extended discussion of the meaning of προαίρεσις in Epictetus, see Dobbin 1991, 111-35.

109 Cf. Pl. Thet. 148e (ὡδίνεις), 210b (ὡδίνομεν), and see Dobbin 1998, 194.

110 e.g. 2.21.1-4 in which someone who is ignorant of good and bad is called ἄφρων, and see Epictetus fr. 28 Schenkl (= Marc. 11.38) in which studying philosophy is no casual matter, but determines who is sane or insane (περὶ τοῦ μαίνεσθαι ἢ μὴ); see Sellars 2018, 331-5 on the attribution of this fragment.

111 For a similar view about the limited value of philosophy, cf. 2.17.1-7.
philosophical training and Stoic doctrine are required in order to apply the preconception correctly (1.22.9-10). The old man’s claim that people already know how to act is a distortion of the Stoic view, and mistakes the presence of a preconception for actual knowledge.

The student imagines a potential response to the old man: ‘why do you criticise me, if I do know better?’ (τί ο ὤν μοι ἐπιτιμᾷς, εἰ οἶδα; 1.22.20). Instead of saying this, or indeed saying nothing, the student asks the old man to excuse him as he would someone in love, saying ‘I am not my own master, I am mad’ (οὐκ εἰμί ἐμαυτοῦ, μαίνομαι, 1.22.21). This explanation is designed to satisfy the old man and to avoid outrage (cf. ῥήγνυται, 1.22.21), and therefore invokes a non-philosophical conception of madness in which philosophers and lovers are grouped together. The way in which the student avoids madness (i.e. by seeking moral instruction from philosophers) paradoxically exposes him to ridicule by the crowd who sees him as mad. The student of philosophy is faced with a decision between two alternatives: either to remain ignorant about what is good and bad, in which case he is mad from a Stoic point of view, or to receive moral instruction from philosophers and to place the good in the realm of his volition, in which case he is mad from the point of view of the crowd. I think that the imagined interaction between the student and the old man makes this contrast between different applications of madness especially pronounced because the old man seems himself to be the quintessential example of a mad φαύλος, even though this is not stated by Epictetus.

The identity of the old man is unclear, but it has been suggested that his attitude is reminiscent of that of Callicles in Plato’s Gorgias (484c-486d). Both Callicles and the old man think that philosophy has limited value: Callicles questions the merits of practising philosophy later in life, and calls full-time philosophers ridiculous (584c-485d; καταγέλαστοι, 484e1); similarly, the old man is critical of how the student is spending his youth, and concerned that, despite having learnt logic, the student will look to philosophers for moral instruction. Although Callicles denigrates convention (483b), the old man’s critique is clearly supposed to represent the voice of common opinion (he is invoked as an example of the ridicule philosophers receive from everyone, πάντες μοι καταγέλασονται, 1.22.18), and his views should be contrasted with the

112 On the necessity of training, see Long 2002, 81-2, esp. 82 and Dobbin 1998, 93; on self-examination and the importance of logic, see Long 2002, 90-3.
114 The student’s young age is marked by τέκνον (1.22.18).
preceding philosophical perspective. The details of Epictetus’ portrait of the old man are important and seem to allude to the preceding discussion concerning madness and moral ignorance in which Epictetus explains that the good should not be applied to externals. Although he is not actually called mad, the old man’s many gold rings signal his attachment to external wealth and luxury, and this, along with his deep suspicion of the moral benefits of philosophy, makes him a good example of a mad person from the Stoic perspective set out in the first part of the Discourse.

The idea that the old man is mad is also compatible with earlier Stoic thinking on the subject. In the first part of this chapter, I discussed Chrysippus’ explanation of madness as a state of ignorance in relation to particular objects (e.g. πρός τι, Stob. Ecl. 2.7.5b13.4), and connected this with his explanation of mental sickness as a morally ignorant belief about a particular object that has become ingrained into a ἔξις (Stob. Ecl. 2.7.10e). One example of such a sickness, ‘love-of-money’ (φιλαργυρία, 2.7.10e9; cf. 2.7.5f13), is particularly apposite to the portrait of the old man in the present passage: his many gold rings show an entrenched attitude about the choiceworthiness of external riches, and so betray his moral ignorance. From the point of view of this Stoic doctrine, the old man’s attachment to gold rings shows his acute ignorance of what is good and bad, precisely that mistake for which the verb μαίνομαι is first invoked. If this is the case, then the confrontation between the student and the old man is also a confrontation between two competing views of madness: according to Stoic doctrine the old man is mad, and according to popular wisdom the student is mad.

Although the student and the old man have a common preconception of the good, they each apply it differently: the student imagines himself applying it to his own προαίρεσις, while the old man applies it to something external. Common preconceptions (προλήψεις κοιναί, 1.22.1) are elsewhere called ‘natural’ or ‘innate’ concepts (φύσει ἔννοιαι, 2.11.1; ἐμφυτοὶ ἔννοιαι, 2.11.3). Such

115 See Laurand 2007, 64.
116 See Laurand 2007, 66 for a similar comparison between Epictetus 1.22 and Stobaeus.
117 Neither Epictetus’ conflation of preconceptions (προλήψεις) with concepts (ἔννοιαι), nor his conception of them as ‘innate’ is necessarily faithful to earlier Stoicism (contra Bonhöffer 1890, 187-222), see Jackson-McCabe 2004, 325-7 and Dobbin 1998, 189-90. Their characterisation as innate (2.11.1-3) might be influenced by Platonism (Sandbach 1930, 29; but see Scott’s distinction between ‘Platonic recollection’ and ‘Stoic dispositionalism’ in Scott 1995, 159-220, esp. 159-68), or a response to the Cynics (Dobbin 1998, 188), but may have precedent in early Stoicism, referring to concepts which are guaranteed by ‘innate orientation’ or συσχετιστικός (Jackson-McCabe 2004, 327-47).
concepts are usually (but not always) ethical, and are typically listed in contrasting pairs, for example: good and bad, right and wrong, appropriate and inappropriate, useful and harmful (2.11.3; 2.17.10). In the current Discourse, another pair of ethical concepts is elicited by the example of disagreement between who is brave (ἀνδρείς) and who is senseless (ἀπονενοημένος, 1.22.3). Although the meaning of ἀπονενοημένοι is likely controlled by its contrast with bravery, it is often used as a close synonym for madness, and translators of the Discourse have variously translated the term as ‘crazy’, ‘deranged’ or ‘out of his mind’. I think that its use as an example in this passage is a strong indication that controversial uses of μαίνομαι later in the same Discourse might similarly reflect distinct applications of a common preconception. I am not suggesting that μαίνομαι and ἀπονενοημένοι are equivalent, or that the relevant contrast term for μαίνομαι is bravery. Rather, if disagreement about who is ἀνδρείς and who is ἀπονενοημένος is a good example of the conflicting application of common preconceptions, it is plausible that the same applies to the apparent disagreement, later in the Discourse, about who is mad. The old man is a good candidate for madness in the light of the Stoic view (i.e. the first application of μαίνομαι in 1.22.17), and, as far as the old man is concerned, the student of philosophy is mad (i.e. the second application of μαίνομαι in 1.22.21).

Whether or not madness is indeed one of a common set of innate ethical concepts, the old man and the student seem to agree on some of the connotations of madness despite their very different applications of the term. This suggests that Epictetus’ Stoic view of madness is quite different from that of Socrates in Xenophon or Plato, which I discussed in my previous chapters. In the Memorabilia and in the Phaedrus, Socrates and the crowd are shown to agree about who is mad, but to disagree about what madness involves. For Epictetus, on the other hand, the

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118 See Epict. Diss. 4.8.10 and 3.22.1 for non-ethical preconceptions.
119 ‘Crazy’ (Long 2002, 81); ‘deranged’ (Dobbin 2008, 53); ‘out of his mind’ (Oldfather 1926, 143, Dobbin 1998, 53 and Hard 2014, 48). It is possible that Epictetus has in mind a contrast (not without Socratic precedent) between bravery and madness; see Pl. Prt. 250b-c, 351a, 360b; Lach. 177b; cf. Dobbin 1998, 192.
120 For a suggestion that comes close to this, see Laurand 2007, 69: ‘on ne s’étonnera guère dès lors qu’Épictète use ainsi d’une double échelle de valeurs, la plus grande santé et fermeté d’esprit ne pouvant apparaître à l’insensé que sous l’espèce de la folie amoureuse : le contexte du propos l’invitait à le faire, puisqu’il s’agissait de comprendre la difficulté que chacun éprouve à appliquer des prénotions dont la diversité des systèmes de valeurs rend l’usage flou. Ainsi le courageux se mue-t-il, au gré des individus, en insensé …’
121 Preconceptions refer to essential features of a concept which are extremely broad, general and non-controversial (e.g. of the good, that is beneficial and choiceworthy and should always be desired and pursued, 1.22.1); however, these features are not sufficient to guarantee the correct application of the preconception (this is shown by disagreements about their application). See Long 2002, 81-2.
philosophy student and the old man have mostly opposed views about who is mad, but similar views about what being mad implies. Epictetus’ approach has more in common with Chrysippus’ discussion of different views about who is mad in Athenaeus (11.464d-e). Chrysippus shows that while many people use expressions such as ‘women-mad’ or ‘quail-mad’, only some would call those who crave reputation ‘reputation-mad’ (δοξομανεῖς). As I suggested in the previous section of this chapter, Chrysippus’ point is that even though people apply the term ‘μανία’ to different people, they mean the same thing (i.e. that such a person makes mistakes which are out of touch with reality).

The student explains his own madness in terms which the old man is supposed to understand: he says that he should be excused like those in love (σύγγνωθί μοι ὡς τοῖς ἐρῶσι) and that he has lost control over himself (οὐκ εἰμί ἐμαυτοῦ, 1.22.21). The latter expression is conventionally associated with both love and madness, and I think that it helps to illustrate how madness is being conceived in the imagined confrontation in the Discourse.⁴²² The student is plausibly mad to the old man because he, the student, is too much influenced in moral matters by philosophers instead of being more independent, but a similar explanation lies behind the old man’s madness: according to Stoic philosophy he is mad because he attaches the preconception of the good to things outside of himself (signified by the gold rings). In each case, madness involves being unduly influenced by something external through having a certain attitude: the student believes that philosophers have sufficient authority to be worth learning from; the old man believes that it is worthwhile to pursue riches. In the case of the old man (who is mad from the Stoic perspective), Stoic philosophy offers a more developed and specialised explanation of undue influence: because of his inability to apply the preconception of the good correctly, the old man thinks that something external is good (when it is really indifferent), and consequently that it is beneficial and choiceworthy, and that it should always be desired and pursued (these are the common features of the concept of the good). On Epictetus’ view, considering something to be good motivates certain actions (e.g. accumulating wealth), so it is easy to see how having one’s

⁴²² For example, a similar expression is used for love in Plato’s Charmides (οὐκέτ’ ἐν ἐμαυτῷ ἦν, 155d4), and for madness in Menander’s Aspis (οὐκ εἶμι ἐν ἐμαυτοῦ, μαίνομαι δ’ ἀκαρὴς πάνω, 307). See Most 2013, 396 on the popularity of this sort of terminology.
behaviour influenced by attachment to externals is construed as showing lack of control over oneself.\textsuperscript{123}

The student brings together popular caricatures of mad lovers and mad philosophers (similar to those which Plato combines in the \textit{Phaedrus})\textsuperscript{124} in an attempt to satisfy the old man’s prejudices, and the analogy with love helps to emphasise the mad person’s lack of self-control. In another Discourse (4.1), Epictetus advises his students to turn away from common yet destructive ambitions such as wealth or reputation, and instead to transfer their efforts to philosophy. To this end, he says: ‘pay court to a philosopher instead of a rich old man, and be seen hanging around his doors for a change’ (θεράπευσον ἀντὶ γέροντος πλουσίου φιλόσοφον, περὶ δύρας ἁρθήτι τὰς τοῦτου, 4.1.177). This alludes to Epictetus’ earlier disparagement of legacy-hunters in the imperial court (4.1.145-8). Epictetus describes their intolerable pseudo-erotic passion for old men and women (τίς ἀνάσχοιτο τῶν γυναῖκῶν ἐρωτός καὶ τῶν γυνών), for whom they act as slaves (ὡς δούλου) while waiting for them to die (4.1.148). The dichotomy between hanging around the doors of a rich old man and pursuing philosophy is strikingly similar to the conflict of the Discourse in question (1.22), in which the rich old man is vociferously opposed to the young student’s interest in philosophy.

In Discourse 4.1, the passion and slavery of legacy-hunters is compared to those who are actually compelled by love. Lovers’ lack of control is considered more excusable because their passion is violent, and thought in some way to be caused by something divine (ἥ’ ὑπό τινος βιαίου καὶ τρόπον τιν ἰθείου κατεσχημένον, 4.1.147-8). This helps to explain the erotic dimension of the student’s imagined exchange with the old man in Discourse 1.22: the student substitutes one kind of ‘passion’ for another; instead of being seduced by the old man’s wealth, the student turns to philosophy and excuses himself by appealing to common ideas about the similarities between philosophy and ἔρως. The idea that love is violent and in some way divine (4.147) is probably

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\textsuperscript{123} Even though his full explanation of value, desire and motivation is more complicated, Epictetus chooses to emphasise the importance of selecting appropriate objects of desire. Epictetus’ programme of practical ethics is divided into three fields which are set out very generally in 3.2.1-6 and outlined again at 2.17.15-17 (cf. 1.4.11): the first field concerns settling on suitable objects of desire so as to avoid emotions (which are a consequence of frustrated desire), the second field is concerned with applying impulses (ὁρμαί) to appropriate action, and the third concerns assent (συγκατάθεσις) to impressions and the use of logic in the scrutiny of impressions (the wise man will not assent to an untested impression). Epictetus is clear that he is mostly concerned with the first field (3.2.3; 2.17.15-16); see Crivelli 2007, 21-22 and, more generally, Girdwood 1998, 46-63.

\textsuperscript{124} See my previous chapter.
supposed to be a popular characterisation of ἔρως rather than a Stoic one,\textsuperscript{125} and near the beginning of the Discourse (4.1.20), Epictetus quotes Menander for the popular view that love is related to slavery.\textsuperscript{126} It is advantageous for the student to invoke such a view (that love represents an excusable loss of self-control) in Discourse 1.22, given his motivation to end the discussion and avoid provocation. However, the analogy with love does not entail that the student himself (or Epictetus) takes for granted a serious connection between love, philosophy and madness.\textsuperscript{127}

Yet love, philosophy and madness do share some similarities for Epictetus. Epictetus explains (3.5.18) to students who want to be excused from philosophical study due to illness that practicing Socratic philosophy and having a Socratic attitude makes bodily ills (such as sickness, hunger and even death) seem less important. Epictetus compares this to being in love (ἡφάσσει) with a pretty girl: both Socratic philosophers and lovers have priorities other than the state of their bodies.\textsuperscript{128} This fits Epictetus’ dismissive attitude to externals such as bodily health, but while Epictetus’ focus is on his own προαίρεσις instead of externals, the lover’s focus is on one external (e.g. the pretty girl) at the expense of others. Accordingly, Stoicism frequently uses the vocabulary of love to describe various attachments to a particular external at the expense of others; as we have seen, Chrysippus speaks not only of love-of-women, but also of love-of-wine, love-of-money, love-of-birds, and so on.\textsuperscript{129}

While both Epictetus and the early Stoics recognise that a virtuous form of ἔρως exists among the wise, when it is associated with vice it is considered to be blameworthy and linked to madness (e.g. ἐρωτομανῆ τινα, Stob. Ecl. 2.7.5b9, 3-6).\textsuperscript{130} This latter ἔρως refers to the love between

\textsuperscript{125} For the suggestion that this is a popular explanation, see Laurand 2007, 67-8 on Gal. PHP 4.6.27. However, in Zeno’s Republic, ἔρως is recognised as divine and given a central and positive role (see Athenaeus 56ic-d). On the cosmic function of ἔρως (i.e. ἔρως as cosmos), see Boys-Stones 1998, 168-74.

\textsuperscript{126} ‘παιδισκάριόν με καταδεδούλω’ εὐτελές, ὃν οὐδὲ ὑπώποτε’ (the line is delivered by Thrasonides, Mis. fr. 2 Sandbach = fr. 4 Arnott).

\textsuperscript{127} Cf. Laurand 2007, 65 who sees the second occurrence of μαίνειαι (1.22.21) with its association with love and philosophy as an ironic Platonism; cf. 66: ‘jamais on ne trouve chez les Stoïciens la très platonicienne folie qui est amour du savoir, de la philosophie …’

\textsuperscript{128} Cf. 3.12.12.

\textsuperscript{129} See Stob. Ecl. 2.7.10e and Athenaeus 11.464d-e.

\textsuperscript{130} On the differences between the love of the wise and the love of φασιλία, see Graver 2007, 185-189 and Inwood 1997, 55-59, esp. 63-4. On virtue and friendship as the goals of ἔρως in Zeno’s Republic, see Schofield 1991, 28-35. Love has an important place in the community of the wise and Zeno gives ἔρως the god a prominent positive role in his Republic. On virtue and friendship as the goals of ἔρως in Zeno’s Republic, see Schofield 1991, 28-35. Epictetus is also willing to consider the positive side of ἔρως and excuses Crates’ marriage to Hipparchia on the grounds that it was prompted by love, 3.22.76.
φαῦλοι and is characterised as a desire (ἔπιθυμία τις) which aims at bodily enjoyment rather than friendship (DL 7.113; cf. 7.130). Epictetus prioritises ‘affective detachment’ (such as loving someone with an appreciation of their mortality) over the theoretical possibility of positive ‘affective engagement’; and for Epictetus, love, like any attachment to external indifferents, is a form of slavery unless it is practised by the wise. From both a Stoic and a popular perspective, then, ἔρως can be seen as a dominating force which has the potential to remove the lover’s autonomy, and the student’s comparison of himself to a lover thereby illustrates the mad person’s lack of self-control. To the old man, love represents an excusable form of outside influence and intense preoccupation which can be naturally extended to include philosophy; from a Stoic perspective, the old man’s attachment to external wealth is similar to the bad kind of ἔρως, since both reveal mistakes about suitable objects of desire (and so ignorance of what is good or bad).

Of course, it is only the old man who is really enslaved to externals; the reader is in a privileged position to know what the old man does not, that the student chooses to turn to the wisdom of philosophers on his own authority, because it is what he wants to do (1.22.20). The old man’s deep attachment to externals is evoked by student calling him ‘slave’ (ἀνδράποδον, 1.22.20), whereas the student is only a pseudo-slave. I think that the student’s decision not to respond to the old man reveals another shared feature of madness. The student realises that further argument will be ineffectual, and abandons any attempt to show the old man that he is wrong. Instead, he pretends to satisfy the old man’s flawed moral outlook by calling himself mad. The student clearly expects his self-identification as mad to put an end to the old man’s line of questioning. In both instances, the belief that someone is mad carries the connotation that further argument is futile: the student decides to stop arguing with the old man (because the old man is presumed mad), and the old man is supposed to lose interest in arguing with the student (because the student is presumed mad). The underlying assumption is that madness is a dialogue-blocker whether it is caused by love or by philosophy, and the irony of using dialogue to represent philosophy as

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131 See Graver 2007, 185-6; cf. Cic. Fin. 3.68.
132 On recognition of mortality in desire, see e.g. Diss. 3.24.60 and Ench. 3. For this contrast, see Graver 2007, 177-80.
133 For example, Epictetus reports that Socrates is capable of love, but only because he has the requisite wisdom and appropriate priorities (3.24.60-1); cf. 2.22.3-7: only the wise is capable of loving consistently since the foolish cannot distinguish between good and evil.
134 Cf. Laurand 2007, 68.
dialogue-blocking madness presumably adds to the humour of this passage, and helps to show up the flaws of the old man’s reasoning.

This is another common feature of madness and one which suggests that, for Epictetus, there are degrees of severity when it comes to moral ignorance: the views of some mad people are so entrenched that they are particularly recalcitrant and difficult to treat. On the Stoic view, many people suffer from an ignorant attachment to externals, but this does not always mean that they will be impervious to reason: there are presumably other scenarios in which logical argument with φαῦλοι may prevail. Indeed, Epictetus’ theory and practice which resembles the Socratic elenchus uses common or innate preconceptions as a starting point for philosophical discussion, and this depends on the interlocutor being ‘susceptible to conversion instead of remaining an obdurate defender of his initial position’.135 Only some φαῦλοι, like the old man who wears gold rings, are so attached to externals that they are excluded from the benefits of philosophical discussion.136 The concept of madness is emphasised in those cases in which morally ignorant beliefs are so firmly held that further discussion is impossible. Despite the Stoic doctrine (that all φαῦλοι are mad), Epictetus recognises that in practice some people are more open to rational persuasion than others. Although all φαῦλοι are in a state of moral ignorance and called mad, Epictetus draws attention to a distinction within madness between those who can make moral progress and those who are completely fixed in their false beliefs (I address this distinction in more detail in my discussion of Discourse 2.15 below).

This has implications for Epictetus’ protreptic strategy. If the Discourses are to confer any benefit, his audience must themselves be responsive to philosophical discussion. The audience of the present Discourse who is privy to the student’s retort (if I know better, then why do you criticise me?) is presumably supposed to appreciate the argument in a way that the old man cannot. The old man was brought into the Discourse to exemplify the common view in a comprehensive sense (cf. πάντες μου καταγελάσονται, 1.22.18.3), but this role is undermined by the

136 It is possible that the man’s old age is also supposed to contribute to the characterisation of his recalcitrance; compare the prejudice against late-learners. The old man is not learning, even as a latecomer. Epictetus does not consistently disparage the old, and in another Discourse he mentions one of the ‘old men’ in Rome (οι εν Ρώμη γέροντες) as an example of someone whose commitment to the philosophical life is characteristically fickle (1.10.1-6); the man is ‘even older’ than Epictetus (πρεσβύτερον ἄνθρωπον ἔμοι, 1.10.2), but later in the discussion he remarks that the young are even worse (ἀλλὰ πολύ πρότερον ὑμεῖς οἱ νέοι, 1.10.12-13).
fact of his alienation. In addition to being a prototypical Stoic φαῦλος, the old man represents a popular caricature. By the imperial period, wearing multiple gold rings had come to signify wealth, luxury, and effeminacy. Both Quintilian (Inst. 11.3.142) and Pliny (HN 33.26) criticise those who wear many gold rings at once, and Seneca links the practice explicitly to the ‘madness’ of luxuria in a passage on the progress of vice (QNat. 7.31): ‘luxury discovers something new, in which it raves … we adorn our fingers with rings, a precious stone is arrayed on every joint’ (inuenit luxuria aliquid noui, in quod insaniat … exornamus anulis digitos, in omni articulo gemma disponitur). Martial and Juvenal both criticise wearing excessive rings (Mart. Epigr. 11.59; Juv. 1.1.26), and in the Satyricon (Sat. 32), Trimalchio’s many rings are clearly supposed to be ridiculous (and elicit a laugh from the unwary).

While marking him as mad from the point of view of Stoic doctrine, Epictetus’ portrait of the old man has the added benefit of harnessing the reader’s prejudices. The student imagines the old man as an example of the many who ridicule philosophers, but the old man is himself an object of ridicule from the perspective of the many because he conforms to a popular stereotype, and this means that he is distanced from the reader. The upshot of this is that the audience is both conflated with and distanced from the old man: conflated because the old man is supposed to be the voice of common opinion, distanced because the old man is a popular caricature. Not every example of moral ignorance makes for an equally compelling target: earlier in the Discourse, Epictetus concedes that the example of someone who places value on health, family, or country would have limited apotreptic value (καὶ τίς σου ἄνεξέται; 1.22.13). The old man is an effective apotreptic precisely because he is a recognisable caricature, a familiar figure of popular ridicule.

Epictetus takes rhetorical advantage of the fact that, when it comes to the old man, the crowd and the philosopher agree that he is ridiculous. Since the audience’s view of the caricature is not radically divergent from the Stoic interpretation, they are encouraged to reflect on their own relationship to the old man. That is, through recognising the obvious way in which the old man is mistaken, the audience can consider the possibility that they are ignorant of good and bad in their own lives, however counter-intuitive this may seem (for example, because they mistakenly

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137 See Olson 2017, 119-21.
attribute moral value to external indifferents such as health and family). This critical distance opens up different degrees of madness and moves the audience closer to the position of the student who is aware of his own madness, and who imagines for himself a way out of madness. In this way, Epictetus brings his audience to confront their own madness, and in so doing hopes to secure their moral progress.

Even though there are no degrees of vice according to Stoic doctrine, Epictetus encourages his audience to compare counterintuitive (or less detectable) forms of moral ignorance with more obvious cases. In my chapter on Xenophon’s *Memorabilia*, I suggested that madness proper is constrained by the perspective of the crowd: mistakes which are obvious to the crowd (i.e. mistakes in matters which are uncontroversial) are a sure sign of madness while mistakes in less obvious matters are only approximated to madness. Similarly, in my chapter on Plato’s *Phaedrus*, I argued that the crowd has authority in determining who is mad (e.g. lovers and philosophers). The Stoics are also willing to accommodate popular views, for example by distinguishing someone like Orestes from most other people, but I have shown that Chrysippus considers less detectable mistakes just as mad as those which are more obviously egregious.

In some respects, Chrysippus’ description of madness is very similar to that of Socrates in Xenophon: Xenophon’s Socrates says that madness is opposed to wisdom (σοφία, Mem. 3.9.6), Chrysippus that it is opposed to moderation (σωφροσύνη, SVF 3.663). However, there is one crucial difference: while Socrates suggests that certain forms of ignorance are similar to madness, Chrysippus shows that they are identical. Socrates says that madness is not the same as ignorance, but that lack of self-knowledge and presumption are very near (ἐγγυτάτω) to madness. On my interpretation of the passage, these are common forms of ignorance (ἃ μὲν οἱ πλεῖστοι ἀγνοοῦσι), but madness itself is reserved for ignorance about things which everybody knows (ὁὶ πολλοὶ γνῶσκουσι). Chrysippus also emphasises self-ignorance (ignorance of oneself and one’s affairs, ἄγνοιαν ἔχοντα αὑτοῦ καὶ τῶν καθ’ αὐτῶν) in addition to fluttering moral ignorance concerning some object, but, in contrast to Xenophon, he says that these forms of ignorance actually constitute madness.

139 Compare Epictetus’ discussion at 4.7.5-6 in which he explains the common view that madness can make someone fearless by causing them to regard family or property as unimportant. In fact, it is philosophers who eschew attachments of this kind (4.7.9-11).
Epictetus follows Chrysippus in this regard: the crowd does not control the meaning of madness and all forms of ignorance, obvious or otherwise, fall under the heading of madness. However, this does not mean that Epictetus is insensitive to the differences between φαῦλοι. In Discourse 1.22, Epictetus acknowledges the gap which φαῦλοι assume lies between counterintuitive and obvious cases of madness by making a rhetorical distinction between them. This distinction does not mean that some φαῦλοι are less mad than others, but it does allow Epictetus to draw attention to a more conspicuous example of moral error (i.e. the rich old man) in which Stoic and popular views coincide. This coincidence encourages his audience to endorse the Stoic doctrine which, if it is applied consistently, will work to deny the assumed gap.

2.2. Madness and Presumption: Discourse 2.15

Like earlier Stoics, Epictetus acknowledges both that there are different causes for madness, such as μελαγχολία and extreme emotions, and there are distinctions within madness (not all φαῦλοι are so incapacitated that they cannot discriminate at all between impressions). Epictetus presents μελαγχολία as an exceptional form of madness, and invariably places it alongside dreaming and intoxication (1.18.23; 2.17.33; 3.2.5). Like some, Epictetus maintains that the sage is able to resist going mad,\(^{140}\) and for Epictetus, this is achieved through exercise in logic which is the third and final field in his programme of practical ethics. Practice in logic aims at perfection in the area of assent (e.g. 1.4.11), and the sage is able to withhold his assent from any unexamined impression, even in compromised states such as dreaming or μελαγχολία (ἵνα μηδ’ ἐν ὕπνοις λάθῃ τις ἀνεξέταστος παρελθοῦσα φαντασία μηδ’ ἐν ὑπνώσει μηδ’ ἀνεξέταστος μελαγχολῶντος, 3.2.5).\(^{141}\) In another Discourse (1.18), the sage is said to be invincible because he cannot be disturbed by anything outside his own volition (προαίρεσις), and Epictetus compares the wise man’s mental invincibility to the strength of an athlete’s body (1.18.20-3).

Using a similar comparison, Epictetus contrasts this sort of ‘Athletic’ strength (τόνους ἐν σώματι, ἀλλ’ ὡς ὑγιαίνοντι, ὡς ἀθλοῦντι) with an alternative kind of mental ‘strength’, the kind that

\(^{140}\) e.g. Cleanthes at DL 7.127, cf. Cic. Acad. 2.51-3. This is a controversial position; cf. Chrysippus at DL 7.127.

\(^{141}\) Cf. 3.2.1-6 and 2.17.15-17. Exercise in logic is in the area of assent; on the relationship between logic and the other fields, see Crivelli 2007, 22.
comes from a madman (φρενιτικοῦ τόνου), which is not really strength at all, but lack of strength (τοῦτο οὐκ εἰσὶ τόνοι, ἀλλ’ ἀτονία, 2.15.2-3). Epictetus brings in the example of a friend who is committed to the apparently unexamined decision to starve himself to death (2.15.4-6). Impressions need to be scrutinised before they are given assent, and Epictetus criticises his friend’s persistence in standing by his decision unreflectively (κριθε ἖σιν ἐμμένειν), explaining that he should only abide by the right sort of decisions (τοῖς ὀρθῶς, 2.15.7). As an example, Epictetus says that if it feels like night, and appears to be night, then the friend should stick to that decision (ἔμμενε, 2.15.7). In this comparison, Epictetus relates moral and perceptual judgements. For the Stoics, both are based on impressions: perceptual impressions deliver propositional content about the visual features of an object (e.g. ‘it is night’), but impressions can also contain information about an object’s moral character (e.g. ‘x or y is good’).

An impression that it is day or that it is night should be self-evident or obvious to most people (as we have seen, the Stoics call impressions like these ‘graspable’ or cataleptic), but if someone’s capacity for impressions is severely compromised to the extent that they become blind to what is obvious (as in the case of Orestes), then this is tantamount to madness. Epictetus suggests that his friend should only be committed to his decision to starve himself to death if he is just as certain about it as he is about things which are obvious or evident (e.g. whether it is night or day). By using this example, Epictetus is implicitly drawing a comparison between his friend’s moral blindness and more severe forms of blindness: the friend’s ‘mad’ conviction when he is actually ignorant is equivalent to standing by the wrong judgement that it is night even when it is day.

To most people, the presumptuous friend is clearly different from someone who arbitrarily decides that it is night or day despite clear evidence to the contrary, but as part of his therapeutic

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142 People such as Epictetus’ friend are acting on their ‘feelings’ (πάσχουσιν, 2.15.4; cf. παθῶν, 2.15.7) rather than proper judgement. See Girdwood 1998, 167-9, ‘feelings’ denote an initial awareness of the propositional content of an impression prior to either assent or suspension of assent (see esp. 167: ‘the preliminary stage in the soul’s relationship with a new impression’); cf. Aetius Plac. 4.12.1-5 = SVP 2.54: φαντασία μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ πάθος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γεγονόμενον.

143 For the Stoics, a quality such as ‘goodness’ is a perceptible feature of bodies; see Frede 1987, 158.

144 See e.g. SE M 7.244 where the lektòn ‘it is day’ serves an example of an impression that is both persuasive (πιθανή) and true (ἀληθής); cf. M 8.316.

145 Orestes is blind to what is obvious when he sees a Fury in place of Electra. Similarly, people experiencing extreme emotions can become blind to what is obvious. See my discussion in the first part of this chapter.
approach Epictetus compares judgements in the sphere of moral action (e.g. about whether it is right to starve oneself to death or not) to more obvious perceptual errors (e.g. maintaining that it is night when it is not night). This comparison is supposed to show the friend the ridiculous nature of his stubbornness, because it relates his flawed presumption to the kind of mistake which no-one would make unless they were mad. For this approach to succeed, the friend must be able to recognise the contrast between his own moral blindness and the relative security he has in other areas of cognition.

Fools' convictions have a degree of tenacity comparable to the wise man's mental strength, but their beliefs lack the wise man's clear moral discrimination (2.15.9). The sage has a firm grasp of reality coupled with the ability to withhold assent from unexamined impressions; by contrast, fools give assent to impressions indiscriminately and without examination, with the result that they become fixed in their delusions. Some hold onto their delusions with the same degree of certainty as the sage grasps truth, and Epictetus considers such a person a ‘foolish sage’ (σοφός μωρός) since they presume to have knowledge they do not have. These people are the most difficult to treat (δυσμεταχειριστότερον οὐδὲν ἔστιν, 2.15.14), and their presumptuous conviction is directly compared to madmen (οἱ μανόμενοι) who require hellebore in doses proportionate to the strength of their conviction (2.15.15). By way of explanation, Epictetus likens a weak mind (ἀσθενὴς ψυχή) to the various sicknesses of the body (2.15.20). Epictetus explains that just as a body is inclined to various different ailments (ὥσπερ ἐν νοσοῦντι καὶ ῥευματιζομένῳ σώματι ποτὲ μὲν ἐπὶ ταῦτα ποτὲ δ' ἐπ' ἐκεῖνα ῥέπει τὸ ῥεῦμα), so it is never clear what a weak mind's inclinations are (ὅπου μὲν κλίνει, ἄδηλον ἔχει). When mental weakness is accompanied by a kind of 'strength' (τόνος), this combination can put the person beyond the philosopher's help (2.15.20).

While it is possible to change the minds of some people (e.g. Epictetus' starving friend, 2.15.13), others are unable to be persuaded of their false beliefs. Epictetus' account of the ignorant person's τόνος is supposed to explain the degree of presumption that exists together with their moral ignorance: those who are extremely presumptuous assume that their ignorant beliefs constitute knowledge, and the fixity of their delusions rivals the unshakable knowledge of the

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146 Epictetus imagines himself in the position of a doctor; see e.g. 2.15.15-16. Cf. 2.15.3: ‘... ζητεῖ τὸν θεραπεύσοντα’. 173
sage, making them impossible to treat. In this respect, Epictetus’ account is similar to that found in Xenophon’s Memorabilia. As in Epictetus, Xenophon explains that presumption is what makes some forms of ignorance particularly intractable. For Xenophon presumption makes someone similar to a mad person, yet it also can be carried to such an extreme that it spills over into madness (as in the case of Anaxagoras whose presumed knowledge contradicts obvious facts). In Xenophon, those who are actually mad are characterised as beyond the help of Socrates’ philosophy.

In my discussion of Stoic doxography in the first part of this chapter, I showed that the Stoics were interested in the fact that moral ignorance gives rise to emotional responses that have the capacity to blind someone temporarily to what is obvious. For some (e.g. Posidonius, Cicero), this even seems to be the basis of the madness claim, and Chrysippus, who identifies madness with ongoing moral ignorance, holds that madness is at least most visible during instances of extreme emotion, and that it is the extreme nature of such responses which makes the term madness suitable. Epictetus takes a different approach. He is less interested in making a close connection between madness and the emotions (πάθη) typically produced by moral ignorance; instead, he emphasises the delusional aspects of moral ignorance itself. Rather than conceptualising madness as a proclivity for making a particular kind of ‘mad’ mistake, Epictetus shows how the proclivity itself, an ongoing lack of moral clarity, is just as mad as being uncertain about much more obvious appearances.

2.3. Madness and Moral Delusion: Discourses 1.28 and 2.11

In the previous section, I suggested that Epictetus’ therapeutic rhetoric involves a comparison between people’s clarity when it comes to certain visual impressions and their relative lack of clarity in moral matters. In this section, I will argue that Epictetus ultimately wants to show that there is no real difference between perceptual and moral clarity from the point of view of Stoic philosophy. For the earlier Stoics, some features of madness are brought out by comparison with the crowd; for example, Orestes’ condition is exceptional because he makes obvious errors when

\[147\] Cf. the rich old man of Discourse 1.22 who mistakes a preconception for actual knowledge (1.22.19).
he should be capable of forming accurate impressions of objects that are visually evident, like everyone else. For Epictetus, such a comparison is only relevant rhetorically; moral behaviour is also shown to depend on impressions, and a failure to form accurate visual impressions is not so different from a failure to form accurate moral impressions. On the Stoic view, morality is not a controversial matter, and, for Epictetus, the difference between right and wrong action ought to be as clear as night and day. Epictetus emphasises that φαντάσια really do misapprehend things which should be clear (from the perspective of Stoic philosophy at least), meaning that their routine moral mistakes are no different from the hallucinations and delusions of the conventionally mad (and they can be even more serious).

In Discourse 1.28, Epictetus appeals to his audience’s views about madness only to show that, in the light of Stoic doctrine, such views ironically endorse the general Stoic claim that almost everyone (including the audience) is mad. At the end of the Discourse, Epictetus addresses the audience in a series of questions (1.28.33): ‘What are they called, those who pursue every impression (τίνες δὲ λέγονται οἱ παντὶ τῷ φαντασμένῳ ἀκολουθοῦντες)? They are called mad (μανικόμενοι). Do we, in fact, do anything different?’ I take it that the first question is designed to elicit a conception of madness as an exceptional phenomenon in which the assumed distinction between mad people and the audience is theoretically maintained. Epictetus expects that the audience do not intuitively think of themselves as mad, and he leads his them to a consideration of madness by reflecting on conventional tragic exempla set out earlier in the dialogue (e.g. Medea, 1.28.7; Paris/Helen/Menelaus, 1.28.12-13), and listed in the immediately preceding passage (e.g. Agamemnon and Achilles, 1.28.31; various plays by Euripides and Sophocles: Atreus, Oedipus, Phoenix and Hippolytus, 1.28.32). These examples emphasise the enormous and horrific

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148 Cf. Ahonen 2014, 110: ‘such later Stoics as Marcus Aurelius and Epictetus especially associated the concept of katalépsis primarily with value-judgements; thus, a morally inferior person was constantly misinterpreting the world around him.’ But cf. Dobbin 1998, 220: ‘it is doubtful, however, if there exist things as self-evidently proper or advantageous as the proposition “It is day” is clear.’

149 See e.g. 1.11.9-11 in which moral confusion has more serious consequences than a failure to discriminate between perceptible qualities such as black and white or hot and cold.

150 Ironic because the audience assume there is a distinction between themselves and mad people. I take it the imagined interlocutor stands in for the audience of the discourse more generally. It is often unclear to what extent Epictetus’ interlocutor is entirely rhetorical; see Barnes 1997, 25-6.

151 While Euripides’ Hippolytus and two plays by Sophocles called Oedipus survive, the other tragedies mentioned (Atreus and Phoenix) are no longer extant. For a possible reference to a play called Atreus by Euripides, see Cass. Dio 58.24.4; alternatively, ‘Atreus’ could refer to the character in Euripides’ Thyestes (see Schweighäuser 1798, 320 reporting Brunck).
consequences of emotions, and in Discourse 1.22, the dispute between Agamemnon and Achilles is used to demonstrate conflicting views about the application of the preconception of the good (1.22.5-8); later, moral confusion of this kind is linked to madness (1.22.17). In the present Discourse, Epictetus sets out to show that moral ignorance is identical to other, less controversial forms of ignorance.

As part of his final set of rhetorical questions, Epictetus encourages his audience to compare themselves to such exempla: ‘Am I better than Agamemnon and Achilles?’ (1.28.31). His follow-up question about mad people (‘Do we, in fact, do anything different?’) is made in the same vein, and prompts the counterintuitive conclusion that the audience are themselves mad. This conclusion can only be reached after considering the Stoic doctrine about impressions (1.28.1-6; 1.28.28-32) which explains that both routine moral confusion (of the sort experienced by the audience) and the apparently exceptional instances of mistaken judgement in the exempla share a common cause. Use of impressions gives rise to the whole story, and, at the end of the Discourse, Epictetus’ strategy is to deny the assumed distance between the audience and mad people. This prompts the audience to consider the possibility that they are mad, and so to redirect their evaluation of mad people back on themselves.

In order to link obvious and less obvious kinds of mistake, Epictetus encourages his audience to compare different sets of judgements, some of which are generally considered more clear than others. At the beginning of Discourse 1.28, Epictetus explains that some impressions are particularly clear and so compel assent. Epictetus uses the example of an impression which contains the proposition ‘It is day’. I have already shown that an impression that it is day (or that it is night) is a typical example of a visual cataleptic impression. The obviousness of certain impressions has an important role in Stoic epistemology and moral development: if there is no systematic way to decide which impressions are true and which are false, then there is no basis for judgement, and assent will be given to every impression indiscriminately. This is the position of the mad person described at the end of the Discourse. For the early Stoics, cataleptic impressions are crucial because they give human beings the capacity for a special purchase on truth more generally. They provide the basis for the formation of a privileged set of stable and reliable

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152 This counteracts Sceptic criticism. See Dobbin 1998, 219 and more generally, Frede 1987, 151-76.
concepts, the ‘preconceptions’ (προλήψεις) and common conceptions (κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι), which are retained in the mind; and when these are applied correctly (i.e. in line with Stoic teaching), further discrimination between impressions is possible. In this way, cataleptic impressions indirectly explain how the sage avoids false belief, but the reality is that almost everyone falls short of this ideal, and mistakenly accepts some false impressions as true.

Epictetus makes a comparison between evident visual impressions (which contain propositions like ‘It is day’) to the more obscure realm of moral action in order to show that moral actions also involve assent to an impression. Just as visual impressions can be true and false, Epictetus explains that in the realm of actions, true and false correspond to proper and improper, advantageous and disadvantageous (1.28.5-6; cf. 1.28.10); the moral behaviour of human beings is driven by their perception of the good. In order to show how moral delusion and visual delusion are related, Epictetus explains that all impressions (i.e. moral or otherwise) require the application of certain criteria in order to be accurate. Once the appropriate criteria are applied in the right way, then every impression becomes clear. Near the end of the Discourse he expresses his amazement at the fact that when it comes to weights and straight lines people do not make judgements at random (οὐκ εἰκῇ κρίνομεν, 1.28.28), but that this is exactly how most people operate when it comes to the moral decisions that determine right or wrong action (τοῦ κατορθοῦν ἢ ἁμαρτάνειν), or success or failure, because they lack anything like a scale or ruler (ο ὤδαμοι ἰδιοῖν τι ζυγῷ ... τι κανόνι, 1.28.30).

The comparison with weighing and measuring (1.28.28-30) directly precedes the series of rhetorical questions which lead to the conclusion that almost everyone is mad. On one level, it is likely that Epictetus means to compare the rudimentary qualities of straightness and crookedness to right and wrong actions. For example, Stoic authors appeal to the contrast between straight and crooked to convey that virtue and vice are absolutes, and this sort of resemblance is encouraged by Epictetus’ choice of vocabulary: the contrast between right or wrong action can be literally redescribed as a contrast between ‘setting straight’ and ‘missing the mark’ (τοῦ κατορθοῦν ἢ

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153 On the formation of preconceptions in the early Stoa, see e.g. Frede 1987, 153-166, esp. 154 and Brittain 2005, 166-85; for Epictetus’ view of preconceptions, see Girdwood 1998, 196-204 and Long 2002, 74-86.

154 See Dobbin 1998, 220: ‘instead of assenting to the proposition that “It is day”, one assents to the proposition that “This is advantageous”, or “This is proper”...’ Dobbin compares Stob. Ecl. 2.88.1.

155 See DL 7.127 = SVF 3.536:143.
However, the force of Epictetus’ analogy is not merely to draw a superficial similarity between technical measurements and making moral decisions. Epictetus primarily wants to show that measuring extremely rudimentary qualities (such as weight and height) and making moral decisions have a similar underlying basis: both require some sort of criterion. While the criteria for technical measurement are obvious (i.e. rulers and scales), the criteria for making moral decisions are considerably more obscure.

I think that by focussing on weights and measures, Epictetus harnesses the conventional view that a mad person has a special province. For the audience, a really mad person might be assumed to be someone who fails only to get the most rudimentary measurements right; as an example, take the popular madman portrayed in Xenophon’s Memorabilia who thinks he is so tall that he needs to stoop under the city gates or who thinks that houses are not too heavy to lift (Xen. Mem. 3.9.6-7). Xenophon’s Socrates maintains that there is a difference between the mad person who makes obvious mistakes and most other people whose errors, such as presumption and self-ignorance, are less clear. The latter are only called ‘mad like’, and Xenophon’s apotreptic is achieved through approximation: people who have qualities such as presumption and self-ignorance are dangerously similar to mad people, even if they do not realise it.

Epictetus’ strategy is similar in some respects, but his views about madness are quite different. He wants to show that madness is not limited to getting obvious measurements wrong; although moral matters might seem obscure and controversial, they should likewise be completely clear if only the appropriate criterion can be produced and applied correctly. For Epictetus, madness is not restricted to a special province but applies to all impressions equally. As part of this argument, I think it is helpful to refer to Epictetus’ discussion of madness in another Discourse with very similar themes and imagery (2.11). Epictetus explains that just as there are reliable canons for weight, such as a scale (τὸν ζυγὸν, 2.11.14), and for straightness, such as a ruler (τὴν σταθμὴν, 2.11.14), so there must be some canon for discrimination in moral matters that is superior to ‘mere opinion’ (τὸ ψεύλως δοκοῦν, 2.11.13). The artificial canons (i.e. rulers and scales) function as conventional analogues for a higher order canon (or set of canons) involved in judging a range of

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156 See e.g. Upton’s note in Schweighäuser 1798, 436 which compares μαινόμενοι (1.28.33) and μαινόμενος (2.11.12).
impressions more generally, but Epictetus’ amazement (θαυμάσαι, 1.28.28), suggests that lacking such a canon is no different from lacking any kind of measure for discriminating extremely rudimentary qualities.

Epictetus explains that despite their having common preconceptions (for example, about good and bad), people disagree in the application of preconceptions to specific cases (2.11.1-10). Disagreement about what is good or bad occurs because mere opinion, on which most people rely, is an inadequate and therefore unreliable guide to applying a preconception. This results in moral controversy, and Epictetus compares a mad person whose actions are entirely based on his opinions of what is good (ὁ δὲ μαινόμενος ἄλλα τινὰ ποιεῖ ἢ τὰ δοκοῦντά οἱ καλά; 2.11.12; cf. 2.11.13-14). I take it that the example of madness is meant to show a supposedly extreme case of someone who follows their opinions exclusively, and is thereby intended to prove to Epictetus’ interlocutor the inadequacy of opinions as a guide to action more generally. Yet while he agrees that mad people act in accordance with their own opinions about the good, Epictetus’ interlocutor fails to envisage a superior basis for applying preconceptions other than his own personal opinion. The conclusion is that there is no real difference between the mistakes of so-called mad people and the interlocutor’s own moral beliefs.

Later in the Discourse, Epictetus explains that only the discovery of a stable canon can free from madness those who use opinion as the sole measure for everything (ὃ εὑρεθὲν ἀπαλλάσσει μανίας τοὺς μόνω τῷ δοκεῖν μέτρῳ πάντων χρωμένους, 2.11.18). By this stage the interlocutor is expected to have accepted his own madness, and I think that this move is signalled by the use of πάντων to indicate that Epictetus is talking about mad people in an inclusive sense. Epictetus’ language is absolute: mad people follow every impression (cf. 1.28.33: παντὶ τῷ φαίνομένῳ), and the term madness is just as applicable to the routine moral mistakes of φαύλοι as it is to those who make exceptional or obvious errors. In this way, Epictetus denies the fact that madness refers to ignorance in a particular area. Epictetus is interested in making rhetorical differentiations within madness, only to show that these distinctions break down under proper Stoic scrutiny.

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157 Cf. e.g. SE M 7.27: Sextus distinguishes between ‘external’ criteria (τὰ μὲν ἐκτὸς κριτήρια) such as rulers and balances, and a higher-order criterion which is in us, and which is used to test external criteria (τὸ δὲ ἐν ἡμῖν καὶ τούτων αὐτῶν δοκιμαστικὸν εἶναι δοκοῦν παρῆσομεν).
158 For a similar strategy, cf. Diss. 3.9.4-6.
Epictetus’ discussion of different criteria for judging various impressions seems to be drawn from Stoic discussions of κατάληψις or infallible cognition. Sextus Empiricus explains that the Dogmatists divide κατάληψις into three groups or fields, and that they specify different criteria for each (M 7.31-3); firstly, Sextus identifies the ‘natural’ (φυσικά) criteria such as sight, hearing and taste; next are the more specific ‘technical’ (τεχνικά) criteria such as scales and a ruler; finally, there are the ‘logical’ (λογικά) criteria which are even more specific, and necessary for κατάληψις of things which are non-evident. Sextus further explains that tools such as rulers and scales are to carpenters and weighers what sense-perceptions (αίσθησις) and thoughts (διάνοια) are to philosophers (M 7.36-7).

In Discourse 1.28, Epictetus brings together all three sets of criteria, natural, technical and logical: he discusses the clarity of some visual impressions (i.e. natural criteria); he compares scales and rulers (i.e. technical criteria); lastly, he suggests people apply their preconceptions (προλήψεις) in more obscure moral matters (1.28.28-32). By showing that most people are capable of visual and technical discrimination, for which there are clear criteria, Epictetus draws attention to most people’s lack of discrimination in the sphere of moral action. In this area, Stoic logic is criterial and training is required. We have seen that in order to apply preconceptions correctly, philosophical teaching and Stoic doctrine prove essential, and in another Discourse (1.17), Epictetus explains that logic functions as the weight and measure for abstract phenomena (1.17.10). Once all three disciplines of Epictetus’ programme have been mastered, then judgements about moral action will seem just as obvious as judgements about whether it is night or day, or whether a line is straight or crooked.

From Epictetus’ Stoic perspective, someone who cannot discriminate between what is good or bad is just as mad as someone who cannot tell the difference between obvious visual phenomena, because both reflect a failure to apply appropriate criteria to test an impression before giving it assent. In this way, Epictetus shows his audience that their own view of madness points to their having too narrow a view of who is mad; instead, they need to adopt a Stoic outlook by introducing new criteria in order to determine what is clear. In both Discourses (1.28 and 2.11), the initial distinction between the mad person and the audience seems inevitably to collapse.

159 See the classifications in Brennan 1994, 155-6. Sextus’ target is general; he may have the Epicureans or the Stoics in mind.
under interrogation of the audience's own views in combination with Stoic teaching, and the scope of madness is enlarged to include the common condition of all φαῦλοι.
Conclusion

I have argued that three Socratic philosophers, Xenophon, Plato and Epictetus, engage with views that are presented as non-philosophical in their discussions of madness. While all three give these views considerable weight, each thinker has his own distinctive rhetorical goal, and each has his own reason for wanting to engage with non-specialists. In what follows, I draw attention to some of the similarities and differences of their approaches, and I consider some of the rhetorical consequences of giving importance to non-philosophical views. I conclude by reflecting on the question of whether madness stands alone as an area where non-philosophical views have the kind of authority we have seen.

Commenting on Plato's *Phaedrus*, E. R. Dodds (1973) suggests of madness: 'no doubt it startled the fourth century Athenian reader hardly less than it startles us.' While aspects of Socrates' account are certainly less than conventional, such as his introduction of apparently novel forms of divine madness, I have suggested that he goes out of his way to give his portrayal of madness a firm basis in outside authority. Moreover, I have argued that his concept of madness is supposed to be self-consistent over the course of his speeches about love, and that, insofar as it concerns the unity of madness, it is not presented as relying on misleading or assimilative rhetoric; instead, his concept is stable and unified, as reflected by Socrates' retrospective analysis. With this in mind, I have argued that even Socrates' classification of philosophy as a kind of madness (often seen as problematic) is not supposed to conflict with his 'traditional' model, nor does it deprive madness of its essential meaning. Socrates develops the view that philosophers are eccentric or mad by drawing on popular caricatures, and he shows that the crowd, who recognise the madness of the philosopher recollecting the Forms, is mistaken only in its analysis and evaluation of the philosopher's moral psychology. After Socrates' explanation of the transformation of the philosopher's soul, it becomes clear that philosophical activity is a praiseworthy form of god-given madness alongside the other divine types.

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1 Dodds 1973, 64.
2 See e.g. Nussbaum 1986, 213: 'there is little doubt that something new is here...' See above, n. 185 on p. 117.
I think that this affects our reading of the Phaedrus in a number of ways. Because Socrates singles out the application of collection and division to madness and expresses reservation about other aspects of the speeches, madness has a unique status. Moreover, I have argued that madness is a genuine unity which does not distort the ‘traditional’ qualities of madness. This makes Socrates’ claims about the role of philosophy in the good life particularly compelling. Whatever else we may say about philosophy, its identification as praiseworthy and as divine is given stability by virtue of the structural integrity of madness; Socrates’ approach assumes that the crowd does not need to revise its view of madness, nor its view of philosophers as mad, in order to be persuaded that philosophy can be a good thing. Instead, the crowd needs to be shown that it has placed philosophy into the wrong kind of madness, not being aware that the philosopher’s soul comes to resemble a god. Once this is explained, then it is clear philosophy should be grouped together with poetry and prophecy. In this way, the benefits of philosophy are made to seem like a natural consequence of traditional views in combination with specialised psychological and moral insight.

In some ways, this is similar to Epictetus’ Stoic approach. As I have argued, Epictetus does not reject his audience’s conception of madness; instead, he shows that if their own view is applied with the correct understanding of Stoic teaching, then they will naturally be brought round to the Stoic position. Epictetus agrees with his audience that people who get obvious things wrong (such as whether it is night or day) are mad, and he explains that mad people make mistakes in matters for which there is a recognised criterion (such as whether something is heavy or straight). However, his audience fail to see that moral matters also fall under this heading, because there are, in fact, criteria which can be used to determine the difference between right and wrong action: preconceptions need to be used under the direction of Stoic teaching. Mistakes which are obvious to the crowd are revealed to be similar to errors in the sphere of moral action: both are the result of failing to scrutinise impressions by applying the appropriate criteria. Making mistakes in moral matters is like failing to get obvious measurements right, which only a mad person would get wrong, and Epictetus wants his audience to concede that there is no difference between themselves and a mad person. His Stoic view does not simply contradict his audience’s view; instead, he demands that madness should be applied consistently to every case of
indiscriminate assent to an untested impression. In this way, Epictetus is conserving some of his audience’s intuitions about madness in order to make a case for his paradoxical Stoic position.

I have shown that there was at least some disagreement in earlier Stoic thinking about whether the madness of φαῦ λοι refers to the ongoing condition of moral ignorance characteristic all who are not wise, or whether it refers to the temporary and more obviously delusional condition of those who are having an extreme emotional experience that occasionally results from ignorance. This distinction is important, because while most people can be expected to recognise exceptional cases, such as Orestes’ madness or the mad behaviour of someone who is very angry (both are familiar from Greek drama), the idea that almost everyone is mad all the time is considerably more controversial. Chrysippus holds this idea, and although we might expect him just to repeat the adage that all fools are mad, one fragment (Athenaeus 11.464d-e) shows that he engages with his readers’ views by distinguishing between more familiar cases of moral ignorance (for which most people will use terms such as ‘woman madness’, or ‘wine madness’) and less obvious cases (such as ‘reputation madness’). Chrysippus allows some popular views of madness to stand, and, on my reading of this passage, he wants to show his readers that their idea of madness (that it is a mistake which is far-removed from reality) is appropriate, as long as their concept of reality includes a clear understanding of Stoic ethics. In this way, Chrysippus can bring his readers to accept the controversial Stoic position without fundamentally altering their views about madness. Despite their paradoxical doctrines, Stoic thinkers show surprising willingness to engage rhetorically with non-philosophical views about madness. Like Socrates in Plato and Xenophon, neither Chrysippus nor Epictetus simply overrules what non-philosophers have to say; instead, they try to work with the views of their audience.

Even so, the Stoics are less compromising than Plato or Xenophon; like Chrysippus, Epictetus works to deny his audience’s unreflective distinction between themselves and mad people. For Epictetus, not only is there no distinction between those cases of moral error which are clear to the crowd and those which are not, but there is also no distinction between highly recognisable cases of delusion in areas where there are established standards of judgement (such as weights and measures) and moral errors in general. Madness is not a propensity for particular emotional responses; rather, moral ignorance is itself of the same order as more recognisable
forms of madness (in obvious matters). By enlarging the scope of madness, but not rejecting his audience’s views, Epictetus can redirect their attitudes about madness back on themselves.

Epictetus’ apotreptic technique has much in common with Xenophon’s in the *Memorabilia*. Like Epictetus, Xenophon uses popular views about madness to draw attention to routine mistakes in unclear matters; however, unlike Epictetus, who seeks to enlarge the scope of madness by altering the crowd’s perspective so that routine and exceptional errors appear identical, Xenophon preserves the crowd’s view that madness is limited to exceptional mistakes in matters which are obvious to most people (such as thinking one is strong enough to lift houses, or so tall as to need to stoop under the city gates). Instead of challenging the crowd’s view, Xenophon’s Socrates explains that certain qualities are similar to madness, namely presumption and self-ignorance, and, because he does not undermine popular attitudes, Socrates can compare a wide range of people who are presumptuous and ignorant of themselves to those most people would consider legitimately mad. This allows him to use madness to dissuade his followers from dangerous pursuits, and to characterise his rivals, the natural scientists, as especially mad-like. Unlike the scientists, Socrates does not presume knowledge of divine matters, and so Xenophon can emphasise Socrates’ sanity in contrast to the natural scientists; in addition, by maintaining the distance which the crowd assumes to lie between common errors and those which are exceptional, Xenophon can restrict the amount of people who are unable to benefit from Socrates’ teaching because they are mad, and thereby emphasise Socrates’ usefulness.

Xenophon’s rhetorical engagement with popular views about madness shows that he is a highly creative and rhetorically interesting thinker in his own right. He does not merely transmit conventional views and attitudes; instead, he uses them in a subtle way to achieve various rhetorical goals. In addition, although the *Memorabilia* has been criticised for being a disparate collection of conventional sayings, Xenophon’s discussion of madness is remarkably coherent: the distinction between madness and states that are similar to madness is active across the whole of the *Memorabilia* (from the mad-like scientists in Book one to the popular definition in Book three and Anaxagoras’ madness in Book four). This organised and rhetoric ally developed view of madness reflects a more structured and complex approach than Xenophon is often given credit
for. In this way, my study contributes to a growing body of scholarship concerned with the rehabilitation of Xenophon as a serious Socratic thinker.

My work is also distinctive in juxtaposing the *Phaedrus*, in which Socrates discusses mad philosophers who look ‘upwards’ to the Forms, and Xenophon’s *Memorabilia*, in which mad-like philosophers are studying very remote matters. I show how a caricature is allowed to stand in the two texts to very different effect: in Xenophon, to distance Socrates from the mad-like scientists; in Plato, to re-evaluate philosophy and madness. Plato and Xenophon have disparate strategies, but both are interested in engaging with what the crowd has to say. In both works, Socrates agrees with the crowd’s identification of mad people. In the *Phaedrus*, Socrates draws on the poets’ conception of mad lovers and on the popular caricature of the eccentric philosopher; in the *Memorabilia*, Socrates conserves the crowd’s opinion that mad people make mistakes in matters which are obvious to most people, but also links this to the popular caricature in his portrayal of the philosophers as mad-like (and of Anaxagoras as mad).

Although Socrates allows the crowd to constrain the scope of madness, it does not follow that he relies on the crowd to analyse its underlying psychology: in the *Memorabilia*, Socrates’ view of what is similar to madness is considerably more sophisticated than the crowd’s definition, and Socrates may think that the crowd fails to provide an adequate account of mad psychology; similarly, in the *Phaedrus*, I argue that Socrates refers to non-philosophical ideas to determine the outward or generic features of madness (i.e. eccentric/anti-social behaviour), but the underlying psychology is more obscure to the crowd, and can only be reliably analysed by a specialist. By contrast, Epictetus considers his audience to have the right idea about madness (he may even consider madness to be a preconception), but shows that they fail to identify mad people consistently; for example, they do not recognise that they are mad themselves. Epictetus is unlike Xenophon and Plato in suggesting that the crowd get the ‘identification questions’ (which people are mad, which are not mad?) wrong.

There are future lines of research which my own work could lead to. For example, my study has interesting implications for wider questions about philosophers’ engagement with non-philosophical views. Given that the *Phaedrus* is, in part, a work about rhetoric, it is well worth asking whether Socrates could give this kind of weight to popular views about a different topic, or
whether there is a particular advantage in focussing on madness, namely that popular views have a special kind of authority. I have not offered a conclusive answer to this question nor have I aimed at giving an overview of how Socrates uses non-philosophical views in general; and there may well be other areas or subjects where non-philosophical views are equally important. It would be worthwhile investigating whether Socrates’ approach in these texts ever contradicts his methodological remarks elsewhere.

My own provisional perspective is that non-philosophical views have more importance in discussions of madness than in other areas, and this makes engagement with the crowd especially appropriate. The reversal of ordinary behaviour is an essential feature of madness, and this relationship with convention explains why there is a tendency in these texts to pay attention to the crowd and to engage with what the crowd has to say about madness. Madness may well be exceptional in this regard. After all, in the same part of the Memorabilia in which he considers madness (3.9.9.6-7), Socrates discusses several other ethical concepts, such as courage, wisdom, justice, envy, leisure and kingship (3.9.1-15); apart from madness, none of these incorporates the opinions of the many. This suggests that there is something different about madness, in Xenophon at least, and raises corresponding questions about Plato and Epictetus.
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