


'THE EDUCATION OF THE MODERN KING, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL KING':
RAISING HEIRS TO THE THRONE IN NINETEENTH CENTURY
SPAIN

Richard Meyer Forsting

A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD
at the
University of St Andrews



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
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“The Education of the Modern King, the
Constitutional King”:
Raising Heirs to the Throne in Nineteenth-Century
Spain.

Richard Meyer Forsting



University of
St Andrews

This thesis is submitted in partial fulfilment for the degree of PhD
at the
University of St Andrews

14/03/2017

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Abstract

This thesis analyses royal education in nineteenth-century, constitutional Spain. The main subjects of this investigations are Isabel II (1830- 1904), Alfonso XII (1857-1885) and Alfonso XIII (1886-1941) during their time as monarchs-in-waiting. It will be argued that their upbringing was considered an opportunity to shape the future of Spain, reflected the political struggles that emerged in the course of the construction of a liberal state, and allowed for the modernisation of the monarchy. The upbringing of royal heirs was a subject taken seriously by contemporaries and at various points in time assumed a wider political, social and cultural significance. The thesis is structured around the three powerful groups that showed an active interest, influenced, and significantly shaped the education of heirs to the throne: the court, the military, and the public. The study aims to throw new light on the position of the Spanish monarchy in the constitutional state, its ability to adapt to social, political, and cultural change and its varied sources of legitimacy, power, and attraction. One of the central aims of the thesis is to contribute to scholars' growing interest in nineteenth-century Spain and the re-establishment of the Peninsula's history as an integral part of European historiography.

Author's Note

All translation in this thesis are my own, unless otherwise stated. Longer citations can be found in the original Spanish in the appendix. The spelling of place names and the names of individuals follows English spelling conventions.

List of Abbreviations

AGP – Archivo General de Palacio

AGMM – Archivo General Militar de Madrid

AGMS – Archivo General Militar de Segovia

AHN – Archivo Histórico Nacional

BNE – Biblioteca Nacional de España

PRRB – Palacio Real Real Biblioteca

RAH – Real Academia de la Historia

Introduction

The importance of royal education

In March 1894 Adolfo Posada, a prominent sociologist and prolific writer, published an article entitled ‘La Educación del Rey’ in Spain’s leading cultural magazine *La España moderna*. The fourteen-page piece reflected on how best to educate the king of Spain, Alfonso XIII, who was only seven years old at the time. Posada had already published works on female education, European constitutional law, and parliamentary government in Spain.¹ Compared to these topics royal education might seem like a niche and rather inconsequential topic; it did not to Posada and his contemporaries. He opened his article with great confidence: ‘I do not believe that anyone will think the subject of this study a trivial thing and unworthy of a citizen’s reflection, no matter how he might think about political matters, as long as these really concern him and he takes them seriously.’ Anyone interested in politics should care for how their monarch was brought up. Posada was certain that the ‘education of the king is an issue that should matter *greatly to all* [Spaniards] (...).’ Furthermore, he claimed that the monarch’s upbringing had become a more significant and more complex issue during the constitutional period: ‘The *education of the modern king*, the constitutional king, in a democratic society like that of our time, is a difficult question, (...).’ It was not immediately apparent how one should raise a monarch, whose position, powers and function had changed so drastically after the death of the last absolutist king, Ferdinand VII, in 1833. How was one to educate a child who was to be the embodiment of ‘this modern political institution that we call the constitutional king; this king who reigns and does not govern; something like a line that is neither straight nor bent?’²

Posada’s treatise is one example of several instances in which the education of a future constitutional monarch was publicly discussed in nineteenth-century Spain. Indeed, royal upbringing had acquired political importance from the very early stages of the emergence of the liberal state. The monarchy and its future, personified in the heir to the throne,

¹ See Adolfo Posada, *Estudios sobre el régimen parlamentario en España* (Madrid, 1891); Adolfo Posada, *Tratado de derecho político*. (Madrid, 1893); Posada and Urbano González Serrano, *La amistad y el sexo: cartas sobre la educación de la mujer* (Madrid, 1893); Posada, *Guía para el estudio y aplicación del derecho constitucional de Europa y América*, (Madrid, 1894).

² Adolfo Posada, “La Educación del Rey”, *La España moderna*, 01/03/1894, 29-33. Emphases are in original unless otherwise stated.

whether that was Isabel II, Alfonso XII or Alfonso XIII, were at the centre of political and public attention at various moments throughout the century. Contemporaries considered the monarchy an important institution. Taking the preoccupations of the time seriously raises fundamental questions: Why did the monarchy continue to be regarded as relevant? What role did the heir play in this regard? Is the close attention paid to royal education indicative of the monarchy's enduring social and political power, importance and appeal?

Modernisation is a consistent theme in discussion on the persistence of the monarchy. Given Spain's purported "backwardness", her isolation from political, social, and economic developments in Europe and the supposed failure of liberalism, Posada's description of Spain's constitutional monarchy as modern is striking.³ Intellectual historians Javier Fernández Sebastián and Gonzalo Capellán Miguel have demonstrated that Spanish elites reflected extensively on "modernity", conceived of in terms of the rejection of tradition, the adaptation of new technologies and a transition from feudalism to capitalism. They argued that notions of Spanish exceptionalism should be revised to point out the parallels in the development of intellectual thought, much in the same way as the German *Sonderweg*, French *singularité* and England's *uniqueness* have been re-examined.⁴ The question for this study is where and how the monarchy fits into this discussion. In what ways was the monarchy, and in particular the design of the heir's education, an important factor in the modernisation of Spanish political culture? How did changes in the ways in which heirs were taught help the monarchy adapt to a more liberal, constitutional context and remain relevant in a rapidly changing socio-economic and political environment? Such changes would indicate that the institution was more flexible and, most importantly, more modern than it is usually given credit for. Additionally, this discussion opens up questions about Spain's position in Europe and the extent to which other monarchies served as models of progressive, cosmopolitan, and modern reinvention.

Historians have paid little attention to royal education in nineteenth-century Spain. One reason for this is a more general lack of studies of Spanish history for the period, in particular outside of Spain. The nineteenth century sits somewhat uncomfortably

³ See Isabel Burdiel, 'Myths of Failure, Myths of Success: New Perspectives on Nineteenth-Century Spanish Liberalism', *The Journal of Modern History*, 70.4 (1998), 892–912.

⁴ Javier Fernández Sebastián and Gonzalo Capellán De Miguel, 'The Notion of Modernity in 19th-Century Spain An Example of Conceptual History', *European Journal of Political Theory*, 3.4 (2004), 393–410.

between two of the most densely researched periods of Spain's modern history – the imperial golden age and the tumultuous years of the Second Republic and the *Guerra Civil*. Moreover, a lack of publications by Spanish historians in English and the undeniable decline of Spanish influence in high politics, culture, and diplomacy since the eighteenth century has led to the history of nineteenth-century Spain becoming *ensimismada* – occupied with itself – and isolated from English-language historiography. This has contributed to what Adrian Shubert has called a 'seriously truncated view of what constitutes Europe.'⁵ As a result a reading of Spain's history emerged that focused on the state's failure to reform, economic decline, excessive military intervention, and general backwardness.⁶ By pointing to some of the more modern features reflected in royal education, its public discussion and its engagement with political, social and cultural changes, this investigation aims to add to the revision of accounts that exclude Spain from a wider European narrative. The second and third chapters will also address historiographical controversies over Spanish post-1824 imperialism and militarism in the nineteenth century, which has sometimes been interpreted as the forerunner to Spain's twentieth-century military dictatorships.⁷

This investigation aims to be part of a recent reappraisal of nineteenth-century Spanish studies by historians, linguists and social scientists. These scholars have highlighted the importance of the nineteenth century to the development of modern Spain: her institutions, her conflicts and her identity. This renewed interest has led to the revision of traditional tropes of decline and overly teleological interpretations and allowed for important insights into Spanish politics, society, and culture.⁸ The foundation of the Nineteenth-Century Hispanist network is further evidence of a growing interest in the period and the effort to re-establish the Spanish experience as part of a broader European narrative. These developments are enabling a more extensive exchange of

⁵ Adrian Shubert, 'Spanish Historians and English-Speaking Scholarship', *Social History*, 29.3 (2004), 358.

⁶ See Richard L. Kagan, 'Prescott's Paradigm: American Historical Scholarship and the Decline of Spain', *The American Historical Review*, 101.2 (1996), 423–46.

⁷ Joaquim Lleixà, *Cien años de militarismo en España: funciones estatales confiadas al Ejército en la Restauración y el franquismo* (Barcelona, 1986) and Christopher Schmidt-Nowara, 'A History of Disasters: Spanish Colonialism in the Age of Empire', *History Compass*, 5.3 (2007), 943–54.

⁸ Examples of this are Gregorio Alonso García, *La nación en capilla: ciudadanía católica y cuestión religiosa en España, 1793-1874*, (Granada, 2014); Kate Ferris, *Imagining 'America' in Late Nineteenth-Century Spain*, (London, 2016); Geraldine Lawless, *Modernity's Metonyms: Figuring Time in Nineteenth-Century Spanish Stories* (Lewisburg, 2011); Mark Lawrence, *Spain's First Carlist War, 1833-40*, (New York, 2014).

ideas, encouraging further research into hitherto neglected areas, and providing a platform to discuss and present new insights and interpretations. Contributing to this growing body of scholarship is one of the central goals of this study.

Research on the monarchy has not been excluded from this newfound interest, but there are still relatively few works that consider the crown's role in the development of a modern constitutional state.⁹ Royal education has unsurprisingly not been studied systematically or in-depth.¹⁰ There is some treatment of this in biographies of Spanish kings and queens. Isabel Burdiel's unrivalled biography of Isabel II, dedicates several pages to the queen's education as well as to her raising of Alfonso XII.¹¹ The latter's upbringing was first documented by Manuel Espadas Burgos in his study of the origins of the Bourbon Restoration, and has been addressed in Carlos Secco Serrano's as well as Carlos Dardé's biographies of Alfonso XII.¹² Javier Tusell and Genoveva Queipo de Llano dedicated a chapter of their biography of Alfonso XIII to his education and most contributors to a volume on the king's different political roles also refer to his upbringing.¹³ A few shorter studies that engage with aspects of the heir's education and especially the significance of military education are also noteworthy.¹⁴ However, with the exception of Burdiel and Espadas Burgos, who connected the education of Isabel II and Alfonso XII to wider political and cultural developments, most of these works have not sought to analyse the education of future monarchs systematically. Historians' interest has so far been largely confined to tracing certain character traits, behaviours, and attitudes to the youth and upbringing of the monarch, which has resulted in rather deterministic, superficial, and descriptive accounts of monarchical education. Nevertheless, the above studies serve as points of departure for this thesis in terms of

⁹ Some notable exceptions include *Monarquía y república en la España contemporánea* ed. by Angeles Lario (Madrid, 2007); *Culturas políticas monárquicas en la España liberal: discursos, representaciones y prácticas, 1808-1902*, ed. by Encarnación García Moneris, Mónica Moreno Seco, and Juan Ignacio Marcuello Benedicto, (Madrid, 2013); Isabel Burdiel, *Isabel II: una biografía (1830-1904)*, (Madrid, 2010), Kindle Edition; Teresa González-Aja, 'Sport, Nationalism and Militarism – Alfonso XIII: Sportsman, Soldier, King', *The International Journal of the History of Sport*, 28.14 (2011), 1987–2030.

¹⁰ See Mónica Burguera and Christopher Schmidt-Nowara, 'Backwardness and Its Discontents', *Social History*, 29.3 (2004), 279–83.

¹¹ Burdiel, *Isabel II*.

¹² Manuel Espadas Burgos, *Alfonso XII y los orígenes de la Restauración* (Madrid, 1990); Carlos Dardé, *Alfonso XII*, (Madrid, 2001); Carlos Seco Serrano, *Alfonso XII* (Barcelona, 2007).

¹³ Javier Tusell and Genoveva García Queipo de Llano, *Alfonso XIII: el rey polémico* (Madrid, 2001); *Alfonso XIII: un político en el trono*, ed. by Javier Moreno Luzón (Madrid, 2003).

¹⁴ See Carlos Seco Serrano, 'Relaciones Entre La Corona Y El Ejército', *Revista de Estudios Políticos*, 1987, 27–54 and Rafael Fernández Sirvent, 'De "Rey Soldado" a "pacificador"'. Representaciones Simbólicas de Alfonso XII de Borbón', *Historia Constitucional*, 2010, 47–75.

unexplored areas, research questions and source material addressing the narrower question of the development of royal education and its public repercussions.

Royal education in its historical context

Royal education has been regarded as crucial for centuries, because it represented an opportunity to shape the future of the monarchy and the state. The heir's educators were keenly aware of the importance of their work and the many guides and pamphlets on the subject. Isabel II's *Ayos* (tutors) claimed to know and to have consulted all the texts written on the topic, despite their limited usefulness.¹⁵ In fact throughout history, countless books, pamphlets and articles have sought to define the best way to educate a ruler. As early as the fourth century BC, Xenophon, a student of Socrates, wrote an idealised biography of King Cyrus the Great, which was to serve as guide to future rulers.¹⁶ In 55 AD Seneca composed *De Clementia* in part at least for his pupil Nero. He provided examples of model rulers, whose virtues, foremost among them mercy, the emperor should emulate.¹⁷ These tracts remained influential and later served as templates for the 'Mirror of Princes' genre, which proliferated across Europe during the medieval period. Among the most famous are Thomas Aquinas' *De regno*, his follower Ptolemy of Lucca's *De Regimine Principum* and Giles of Rome's work of the same title.¹⁸ The texts aimed to prove that monarchy was the best form of government, that rulers should direct society toward the common good and, most importantly, emphasised the central role that Christian virtues should play in the education and life of princes.¹⁹ As was demonstrated by reference to these texts, ultra-conservative Catholics in nineteenth-century Spain shared many of these values.

In the Renaissance the emphasis shifted toward a humanist approach, which stressed self-improvement and inner faith and sought to combine the writings of antiquity with Christian ethics.²⁰ The secularisation of politics, furthermore, implied a changing conception of the king and his duties. As Pérez Marcos has argued, knowledge of

¹⁵ AHN-Leg3757-N.5, "Exposición de los Ayos de SM y A al Señor tutor", 20/05/1843.

¹⁶ Xenophon, *The Education of Cyrus / Xenophon ; Translated and Annotated by Wayne Ambler.*, (Ithaca, 2001).

¹⁷ Lucius Annaeus Seneca and Susanna Morton Braund, *De clementia* (Oxford, 2009).

¹⁸ Ptolemy of Lucca and Thomas Aquinas, *On the Government of Rulers: De Regimine Principum* (Pennsylvania, 2010); Charles F Briggs, *Giles of Rome's De Regimine Principum: Reading and Writing Politics at Court and University, C. 1275-c.1525* (Cambridge, 1999).

¹⁹ James M. Blythe, 'Introduction' in Lucca and Aquinas, *Government*, 5

²⁰ See Paul Oskar Kristeller, *The Classics and Renaissance Thought*. (Cambridge, 1955), 350-374.

history, languages and arts came to be seen as essential to a prince's education.²¹ The most representative example of the conduct book for princes and teachers that gained currency at the time, is Erasmus' *The Education of a Christian Prince*, written in 1516 and dedicated to the later Habsburg emperor, Charles V. Erasmus commented extensively on the moral and intellectual qualities teachers should possess and the need to instruct the future monarch in the humanities.²² It remains to be seen to what extent this advice concerning the selection of teachers remained valid in nineteenth-century Spain and how these pedagogical principles continued to be relevant. The most famous text on princely education is probably Niccolò Machiavelli's 1513 *The Prince*, dedicated to the Medici family. While its form is that of a mirror, it presented a radical departure from the dominant Christian ethics and doctrines of the church. Rather than invoking virtue, Machiavelli laid out a pragmatic approach, which stressed military ability more heavily and justified immoral means in the name of higher aims.²³ The loyalty of soldiers remained a significant concern for the Spanish monarchy and it is interesting to ask how this was reflected in Isabel II's, Alfonso XII, and Alfonso XIII's upbringing.²⁴

Spanish texts on princely education exhibited a very similar structure. One of the fundamental tracts that set out how a monarch was to be educated were Alfonso X's thirteenth-century Castilian statutory codes, the *Partidas*. Amongst other things, the *Partidas* regulated the prince's upbringing, stipulated that carefully selected *Ayos* should care for the heir to the throne, and divided education into three separate phases. In some aspects, the text functioned as a template for centuries: the title of *Ayo* for example was preserved throughout the nineteenth century.²⁵ A wide range of mirrors were written in the fourteenth and fifteenth century, most of them inspired by Aquinas and Lucca. They were usually divided into two parts. The first addressed the relation between prince and subject, which was ideally based on mutual love. The second part contained a moral exposition that revolved around the cardinal virtues such as prudence, fortitude, temperance, and justice.²⁶ Spanish renaissance writings were heavily influenced by

²¹ Regina Pérez Marcos, "La educación del príncipe" in José Antonio Escudero (ed.), *El Rey: Historia de La Monarquía* (Barcelona, 2000), 90.

²² Lisa Jardine et al., *Erasmus: 'The Education of a Christian Prince'* (Cambridge, 1997), 1-14.

²³ Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince*, (Cambridge, 1988).

²⁴ *Ibid*, Ch.14 'A Prince's Duty Concerning Military Matters'.

²⁵ Pérez Marcos, "La educación del príncipe", 88-89.

²⁶ Miguel Ángel Pérez-Priego, 'Sobre La Configuración Literaria de Los Espejos de Príncipes En El Siglo XV Castellano', in *Studia Hispanica Medivalia III* (Buenos Aires, 1993), 34-59. For Spanish Mirrors see Manuel de Castro and Instituto Jerónimo Zurita, *Las Ideas políticas y la formación del*

Erasmus' work, which was available in translation. In addition, historical examples frequently functioned as models of good governance and there was more of an emphasis on the selection of teachers.²⁷ Some conservative papers still cited these works in the nineteenth century. As the court turned into a more powerful institution in itself during the sixteenth and seventeenth century, the socialisation of princes at court became an important topic in monarchical upbringing in Spain.²⁸ The education of heirs to the throne has to be understood within this intellectual tradition that aimed primarily at forming a moral, virtuous, and Christian king, able to command authority and aware of tradition and etiquette.

In addition to the texts on royal education, we should consider the pedagogical practices implemented at the Bourbon court prior to the constitutional period. Charles IV had his two oldest sons, Ferdinand and Carlos, instructed by highly qualified teachers and private tutors. The direction of teaching was in the hands of prominent clerics, who naturally put religion at the core of the curriculum. Ferdinand's first teachers were said to have subjected him to a rather draconian schedule of prayers, Latin, and grammar.²⁹ While religion was central, Arzadun's assertion that this was purely a 'regime of the seminary' is overly simplistic.³⁰ Antonio Moral Roncal has demonstrated that Ferdinand VII's and Don Carlos' education was taken seriously and reached beyond narrow religious confines. He has pointed to the existence of a chemistry and physics laboratory for experiments at the royal palace, to the moral imprint of classical education, and to the importance attached to military instruction.³¹ All of Charles IV's sons appear to have received a carefully directed education in the art of war, military history, and practical aspects of command such as horse riding. Officers were carefully selected and it was high-ranking veterans with experience in military instruction who took on this part of the curriculum. A good example of this is Colonel Vicente Maturana, an officer who had

príncipe en el 'De preconis hispanie' de Fr. Juan Gil de Zamora (Madrid, 1958); Pedro López de Ayala and Germán Orduna, *Rimado de palacio* (Pisa, 1981).

²⁷ See Diego de Saavedra Fajardo and Johann Sadeler, *Idea de vn príncipe político christiano : representada en cien empresas* (Monaco, 1640); Jerónimo Fernández de Otero, *El maestro del príncipe* (1633).

²⁸ Pérez Marcos, "La educación del príncipe", 92.

²⁹ Pedro Voltés Bou, *Fernando VII : vida y reinado*, (Barcelona, 1985), 13/14.

³⁰ Juan Arzadún y Zabala, *Fernando VII y su tiempo*. (Madrid, 1942), 30.

³¹ Antonio Moral Roncal, *Carlos V de Borbón, 1788-1855* (Madrid, 1999), 40/41.

written a manual on the use of arms and had been in charge of instruction committees, and the prestigious artillery academy in Toledo.³²

In some instances, royal education became a political issue, at least in the narrow sense of court politics. Juan de Escóiquiz, Ferdinand's teacher of mathematics and geography, was known to have been a central figure in the heir's camarilla that plotted against Charles IV and his chief minister Godoy.³³ Teachers were aware of their influence and used it to further their own agenda. It is worth emphasising that royal education was not a neglected subject prior to the constitutional period. While Charles IV was not constrained by a constitution and did not envision raising his son as a constitutional monarch, teaching was seen as vital to the formation of the pious and enlightened absolute monarch that Ferdinand VII was meant to become. As the importance of royal education was linked to the power of the crown, we need to consider the impact that constitutional restrictions had on the heir's upbringing. It is worth studying the different and new constitutional responsibilities of the monarch and how these were transmitted to future rulers. An interesting consideration is whether models of princely education had to be adapted, reinvented or discarded to fit these changing circumstances.

The monarchy in nineteenth-century Spain

The position of the Spanish monarchy in the political system, its powers, prerogatives and function, changed fundamentally throughout the nineteenth century and so did the role of the heir to the throne. There were two central developments that had a fundamental impact on the monarchy and, by implication, on royal offspring. The first, and most significant, concerns the constraints imposed by constitutions and parliamentary government. Even Ferdinand VII, who styled himself as an absolute monarch, was temporarily forced to accept the imposition of a constitution in 1820. It is too often forgotten that one of the more radical model constitutions in Europe was drafted in Cadiz, Spain, in 1812.³⁴ This raises questions about the extent to which monarchs-in-waiting were expected to be prepared for their constitutional duties and what the diminution of the monarchy's powers implied for royal education. The second development is a broader change in the conception of monarchy. The Napoleonic

³² Ibid, 40

³³ Arzadún y Zabala, *Fernando VII*, 29-35.

³⁴ Andreas Timmermann, *Die 'gemässigte Monarchie' in der Verfassung von Cadix (1812) und das frühe liberale Verfassungsdenken in Spanien* (Münster, 2007).

occupation and the disposition of Ferdinand VII, eroded the Bourbon monarchy's prestige and on the king's return to Spain in 1814, there was a widespread feeling that the nation was owed something for its sacrifices in the struggle against foreign intrusion.³⁵ The traditional reverence for the monarchy was diminished not only by liberals' experience of Ferdinand's intractability, but also by their knowledge and understanding of broader events and ideas from beyond Spain.³⁶ The potential implication for heirs was that they were increasingly expected to prove their liberal credentials.

Even though the 1812 Cadiz constitution was composed in Ferdinand VII's absence and without his approval, it established a constitutional monarchy that was to be headed by the Bourbon king on his return. Sovereignty was attributed to the nation, not the king, whose powers were severely limited.³⁷ The idea of a sovereign nation as represented in elected chambers and the restriction of the monarch's powers were unacceptable to Ferdinand VII, who, with the help of conservative deputies and military leaders, abolished the constitution and all laws passed in his absence. Although the 1812 Constitution was only in effect for a brief period (1820-23) it remained an influential model in Spain, the Mediterranean, and Latin America.³⁸ However, after 1823 Ferdinand VII left no doubt as to his intention to rule as an absolute monarch unconstrained by a constitution or even a charter.

Isabel II was born into this conservative environment in 1830, but the need to defend her claim to the throne fundamentally altered the crown's position and led to the re-establishment of constitutional rule. When Ferdinand VII's brother Don Carlos challenged the female succession, which led to the First Carlist War (1833-39), the queen regent, María Cristina of the Two Sicilies, was forced to seek an alliance with liberal

³⁵ Emilio La Parra López, "Fernando VII, el rey imaginado" in Ibid. (ed.), *La imagen del poder: Reyes y regentes en la España del siglo XIX* (Madrid, 2011), 29-32 and Irene Castells, *Crisis del Antiguo Régimen y Revolución Liberal en España (1789-1845)*, (Barcelona, 2000).

³⁶ On the international dimension and the influence of exile on Spanish liberals see Christiana Brennecke, 'Von Cádiz nach London : spanischer Liberalismus im Spannungsfeld von nationaler Selbstbestimmung, Internationalität und Exil (1820-1833)', (PhD diss., Göttingen, 2010).

³⁷ See Title IV, "Del Rey", Spain, *Constitucion Política de la Monarquía Española*, Congreso de los Diputados, http://www.congreso.es/docu/constituciones/1812/ce1812_cd.pdf. Also M. Martínez Sospedra, *La Constitución Española de 1812 : el constitucionalismo liberal a principios del siglo XIX* (Valencia, 1978).

³⁸ See Stephen G. H Roberts and Adam Sharman, *1812 Echoes: The Cadiz Constitution in Hispanic History, Culture and Politics*. (Newcastle, 2013); Matthew C Mirow, *Latin American Constitutions: The Constitution of Cádiz and Its Legacy in Spanish America*, 2015; Natalia Sobrevilla Perea and Scott Eastman, *The Rise of Constitutional Government in the Iberian Atlantic World the Impact of the Cádiz Constitution of 1812* (Tuscaloosa, 2015).

forces.³⁹ What were the consequences of this political realignment of the monarchy for the upbringing of her daughter, Isabel II? The most tangible change was the promulgation of a royal statute in 1834, modelled on the French charter of 1814. While the Cortes were re-established, the power to initiate laws remained with the monarch, who also had the right to veto legislation and dissolve the chambers.⁴⁰ Liberal pressure led to the Charter's replacement by the 1837 Constitution, which remained in place for most of Isabel II's formative years. This compromise between the progressive and moderate liberal elements in the Cortes preserved the royal veto over legislation but insisted on a 'shared sovereignty' between crown and parliament. It thus watered down the separation of powers and gave more weight to the monarchy than the 1812 Constitution, but restricted royal authority to a much greater extent than the 1834 Charter had done.⁴¹ Did Isabel II's education reflect the concessions that had been made to progressive liberals? Was her teaching reformed to account for the change in the role she would take on as an adult? In 1840, as a result of a political dispute between the Queen Regent and progressive liberals, María Cristina went into exile and Baldomero Espartero, a successful general in the Carlist war, took on the role of regent and the powers it entailed in accordance with the constitution.

The next major change in the constitutional set-up moved the dial back in a more conservative direction, but no longer affected Isabel II's upbringing. The new Constitution was promulgated in 1845, two years after her majority. This document eliminated all references to national sovereignty and instead emphasised the royal will as essential for granting the new settlement, which was also reflected in the strengthening of the monarchy's autonomy. In addition, the upper chamber, the Senate, changed from being semi-elected to a body that was entirely appointed by the monarch.⁴² Despite attempts to replace or modify this constitution, it essentially remained in place until 1868. It is vital to consider whether the constitution determined the way Alfonso XII was brought up and the objectives associated with his education. It is worth considering the

³⁹ See Jaime del Burgo, *Bibliografía del siglo XIX : guerras carlistas, luchas políticas*, (Pamplona, 1978).

⁴⁰ Spain, *Estatuo Real de 1834*, Cervantes Virtual Library, http://www.cervantesvirtual.com/servlet/SirveObras/49134064215809640303346/p0000001.htm#I_0

⁴¹ See Juan Pro Ruiz, *El estatuto real y la constitución de 1837* (Madrid, 2010).

⁴² Jorge Vilches García, *Progreso y libertad: el Partido Progresista en la revolución liberal española* (Madrid, 2001), 39-40.

hypothesis that the additional powers and responsibilities conferred on the crown implied a need for a more extensive education.

The royal family's exile in 1868 completely altered these considerations and it was clear that Alfonso would not come to the throne under the 1869 Constitution, which declared the nation sovereign and created a parliamentary monarchy whose powers were severely curtailed.⁴³ Six years later, following significant political upheaval, including eleven months of republican rule, Cánovas del Castillo, the architect of the restoration, justified *ad hoc* political and legal changes with reference to Spain's 'internal constitution' that guaranteed the union of Cortes and crown.⁴⁴ This principle formed the basis of the 1876 Constitution, which attributed extensive executive power to the monarch. The new constitution re-established the concept of shared sovereignty between monarch and parliament and installed the crown as the central arbiter of the political system.⁴⁵ The corruption of the political process, where elections were "made" by the government, meant that the king's power to dismiss ministers and appoint new governments, which would deliver a majority in the Cortes, was central to bringing about political change. A government could not survive without 'royal confidence'. As Antonio María Calero has argued, the crown was not merely a functional instrument but exercised substantial control over the political system.⁴⁶ Given the monarchy's pivotal and subtle role, one has to study whether the constitution was designed with Alfonso XII in mind or, in his son's case, how the young king was prepared to fulfil this function.

The 1876 Constitution and the *Ley Constitutiva del Ejército* of 1878 strengthened the link between the armed forces and the crown. They conferred upon the monarch extensive powers over the armed forces, including the supreme command over army and navy, the ability to dispose of them directly and the right to approve or veto major promotions. There is some debate as to the extent to which this made the monarch a representative of military interests or whether it created an effective bond between the crown and

⁴³ See Antonio María Calero, *Monarquía y democracia en las Cortes de 1869* (Madrid, 1987) and Manuel Pérez Ledesma, *La Constitución de 1869* (Madrid, 2010).

⁴⁴ Stephen Jacobson and Javier Moreno Luzon, "The political system of the Restoration, 1875-1914" in Adrian Shubert and José Álvarez Junco (eds), *Spanish History since 1808* (London, 2000), 94.

⁴⁵ Joaquín. Varela Suanzes-Carpegna, *La Constitución de 1876* (Madrid, 2009).

⁴⁶ Antonio María Calero Amor, 'La Prerrogativa Regia En La Restauración: Teoría Y Práctica (1875-1902)', *Revista de Estudios Políticos*, 1987, 282/283.

military elites, which kept the soldiers in their barracks instead of intervening in politics.⁴⁷ This controversy raises important questions as to the role that military instruction played in royal education. We have to weigh up whether the monarch was raised to be a soldier and identify with the armed forces or whether he was meant to control the military's interventionist tendencies. In this regard the heir was either taught merely to fulfil his constitutional duties vis-à-vis the military or he was expected to be actively involved in its affairs. The role of military teachers is vital in this respect.

The other long-term development that affected the Spanish monarchy was a breakdown in its traditional power and legitimacy. The defeats against France (1793-1795) and Britain (1796-1802) during the Napoleonic wars showed that the monarchy was not capable of defending Spanish territory against foreign intrusion;⁴⁸ a sentiment further reinforced by the loss of Spain's American colonies in 1824. The Aranjuez uprising of 1808, which led to Prime Minister Manuel Godoy's dismissal and Charles IV's abdication in favour of his son Ferdinand, were the first signs of popular dissatisfaction with the monarchy. The inviolability of the monarch as well as the political, social, and economic basis of the Ancien Régime were further undermined by Ferdinand VII's abdication in exile. During the Peninsular War (1808-14) against Napoleonic occupation, local juntas gave structure to the rebellion against the French and rejected the king's abdication, assuming power in his name. The social consensus that formed the basis of the monarchical regime for centuries was crumbling. This trend was exacerbated by the colonial crisis and growing bourgeois demands for commercial and civil liberties.⁴⁹ These developments, together with the changes experienced in the armed forces, allowed for a legitimate rebellion to rise against the regime, but most of these uprisings were not openly directed against the monarch. As Emilio La Parra López has demonstrated, Ferdinand VII was long spared direct criticism and liberals instead created a myth of the *rey engañado* (misled king). However, after Ferdinand VII actively courted foreign intervention to achieve the restoration of his absolutist rule, liberals 'had no other

⁴⁷ See Carlos Seco Serrano, *Militarismo Y Civilismo En La España Contemporánea*, (Madrid, 1984), 193; Gabriel Cardona, *El problema militar en España* (Madrid, 1990), 21 and José Ramón Alonso, *Historia política del ejército español* (Madrid, 1974), 398.

⁴⁸ Isabel Burdiel, 'The liberal revolution 1808-43' in Shubert and Álvarez Junco, *Spanish History*, 19.

⁴⁹ *Ibid*, 20-23.

options but to accept reality'.⁵⁰ The monarchy's image was severely tarnished. Progressive liberals in particular continued to view the crown with suspicion and considered it prone to anti-constitutional actions.

Politics, Cortes, and constitutions in nineteenth-century Spain

Prior to the nineteenth century, the Cortes Generales, like the French Estates General, were a largely consultative body that convened when summoned by the king.⁵¹ The 1810 constituent Cadiz Cortes had little in common with its predecessors. As the true representation of the nation, the Cortes declared itself sovereign and then proceeded to attack seigneurial jurisdictions, noble privileges, and the church's secular powers.⁵² The Cadiz Cortes contained various factions, including absolutists, moderate, and progressive liberals, united only in their opposition to French rule. The 'extremely lengthy and detailed constitution' that the Cortes approved in 1812 foresaw a strict division of powers, legal equality, and personal liberty, while upholding Spain's strictly Catholic religious identity.⁵³

In Spain the end of the Napoleonic wars brought the restoration of Ferdinand VII, who ruled as an absolutist monarch from 1814 to 1820 and after a brief constitutional interlude again from 1823 until his death in 1834. The 1834 Royal Charter re-established the Cortes and the 1837 Constitution extended the parliamentary chambers' powers. The new system established a bicameral legislature, elections based on a restricted property based suffrage, and the guarantee of various civil and public liberties.⁵⁴ The constitution represented a pact between progressives and moderate liberals, known as *moderados* and *progresistas*. When the military threat of Carlism was eliminated in 1839, liberal unity began to crumble. This had important implications for Isabel II's upbringing, which had only been tangentially affected by previous political changes. The tensions that had built up between *progresistas* and *moderados* over centralisation, the extent of royal power, and the

⁵⁰ Emilio La Parra López, 'La Metamorfosis de La Imagen Del Rey Fernando VII Entre Los Primeros Liberales', 2004, Cervantes Virtual Library, <<http://www.cervantesvirtual.com/obra-visor/la-metamorfosis-de-la-imagen-del-rey-fernando-vii-entre-los-primeros-liberales/html/>>.

⁵¹ See Juan Sempere and Guarinos and Rafael Herrera Guillén (eds), *Historia de las Cortes de España* (Madrid, 2011).

⁵² Manuel Pérez Ledesma and Juan Ignacio Marcuello Benedicto, 'Parlamento Y Poder Ejecutivo En La España Contemporánea (1810-1936)', *Revista de Estudios Políticos*, 1996, 17–21.

⁵³ Burdiel, 'The liberal revolution' in Shubert and Álvarez Junco, *Spanish history*, 22.

⁵⁴ See Pro Ruiz, *El estatuo real*.

expropriation of church lands came to a head in 1840 and ultimately resulted in María Cristina's exile and the regency of Baldomero Espartero.⁵⁵ The former Queen Regent's rights over her children were debated extensively in the press and the Cortes. These discussions echoed wider debates over the delineation between the monarchy's private rights and public interest.⁵⁶ What did this politicisation of royal upbringing imply for Isabel II? How did the absence of her mother and a *progresista* regency manifest itself in the young queen's education? Even as constitutions changed the arguments over the possible distinction and prescription of what was meant to be private and what public persisted and these questions also remained salient for Alfonso XII and his son.

Spain's constitutions granted different degrees of authority and autonomy to parliament, but under Bourbon rule there was no major change to the bicameral set-up and to general party political alignments. The 1854 revolution foreshadowed the emergence of the Union Liberal, an alliance between reformist *moderados* and progressives founded by General Leopoldo O'Donnell in 1858. The so-called progressive Bienio (1854-56) and brief periods of rule by the Union Liberal were the only interruptions to almost a quarter of a century of *moderado* dominance, which entailed severe restrictions on suffrage, limited freedoms, and rule by decree.⁵⁷ One aspect worth highlighting is the political practice known in Spain to this day as *caciquismo*, a system of clientele politics that allowed the ruling elites to manipulate elections and maintain control over the political system. Elections were not contested freely but often "made" with the tools at the disposal of the interior minister and local patronage networks in the hands of the property-owning elites, the *caciques*. This political practice has mainly been associated with the Restoration, but has also been shown to be applicable to Isabel II's reign.⁵⁸ It is worth asking whether the heir ever provided a hope for a less corrupt, more democratic political system that functioned without these manipulative practices.

For Cánovas it was clear that the restoration could not return to the status-quo-ante 1868 and that a mechanism for political change that was not reliant on force needed to be installed. The result was the practice known as *turnismo*, where the dynastic parties, as the

⁵⁵ Ángel Bahamonde Magro and Jesús A. Martínez, *Historia de España : siglo XIX*, (Madrid, 2011), 214–16.

⁵⁶ See Encarna García Monerris y Carmen García Monerris, "Interés de familia u objeto político?" in Encarnación García Monerris et al (eds), *Culturas*, 207–211.

⁵⁷ See Isabel Burdiel, *La política en el reinado de Isabel II* (Madrid, 1998).

⁵⁸ Carmelo Romero and Margarita Caballero, 'Oligarquía Y Caciquismo Durante El Reinado de Isabel II (1833-1868)', *Historia Agraria*, 2006, 24/25.

Conservatives and Liberal parties were known due to their commitment to the Bourbon constitutional monarchy, alternated in power. The system relied on the king appointing a new government in moments of political crisis or when a party programme had become exhausted. The faction appointed to form a government then used the system of *caciques* and electoral manipulation to ensure it gained a majority in parliament. This practice was technically constitutional, but certainly not democratic. As Calero has pointed out, even though the political system in theory became more progressive, for example with the introduction of universal male suffrage in 1880, the position of the crown and the essentially undemocratic practice of *turnismo* persisted well into the twentieth century.⁵⁹ The question has to be to what extent the monarchy was part of the solution to the democratic deficit or a part of the problem and whether the heir was prepared for his or her central but difficult political position.

Throughout the nineteenth century, constitutions protected the monarch's place as commander-in-chief of the armed forces. This affected the relationship between the crown and the military. Under constitutional rule the latter primarily owed allegiance to the nation rather than exclusively to the monarch, as had been the case under absolutist rule.⁶⁰ The army's loyalty to the government and the crown were thus dependent on their (perceived) constitutionality. Additionally, the armed forces underwent a fundamental structural transformation and became an active instrument for bringing about political change. The Peninsular War altered the social composition of the armed forces from a thoroughly aristocratic into a much more bourgeois institution and left the army with a bloated officer corps.⁶¹ In combination with the disappointment that followed Ferdinand VII's return to absolutism and the troops' poor economic conditions this fostered various military-led rebellions. Known as *pronunciamientos*, these uprisings became a regular feature in nineteenth-century Spain and Mexico.⁶² Between 1812 and 1874 this 'intervention of high-ranking military men in Spanish politics was manifest, constant, and decisive.'⁶³ Generals played an important role in politics and often rose to the highest positions in government. Ramón María Narváez, Leopoldo O'Donnell, and Juan Prim are just some of the most famous examples of generals reaching the highest government

⁵⁹ Calero Amor, 'La Prerrogativa', 281.

⁶⁰ José Cepeda Gómez, *Los pronunciamientos en la España del siglo XIX* (Madrid, 1999), 9.

⁶¹ Seco Serrano, 'Relaciones', 29-38.

⁶² For the Mexican *pronunciamientos* see *Malcontents, Rebels, and Pronunciados: The Politics of Insurrection in Nineteenth-Century Mexico*, ed. by Will Fowler, (Lincoln, 2012).

⁶³ Cepeda Gómez, *Los pronunciamientos*, 8.

posts and shaping nineteenth-century Spanish politics.⁶⁴ This development had serious repercussions for heirs to the throne: given that the army's loyalty was not guaranteed, the crown was forced to bind the military leadership to the future of the monarchy, as represented by the heir. It is worth asking whether the heirs' education aimed to imitate or re-establish the pre-constitutional bond between military elites and the monarchy.

The *pronunciamiento* fell out of use during the last quarter of the century, but there is some debate if this was a sign of civil elements asserting themselves over the armed forces or if this was achieved at the cost of a more militarised society.⁶⁵ The role Alfonso XII's and Alfonso XIII's martial education played in the disappearance of the *pronunciamiento* as a tool for political change needs to be clarified. To do so it is vital to examine whether they were seen as credible soldiers-in-the-making, who represented the interests of the military elite. The swift defeat in the 1898 Spanish-Cuban-American war at the hands of the US, demonstrated the deficiencies of the Spanish army and navy and brought to light the underlying tensions between civil and military elements in Spain.⁶⁶ This came to a head after Alfonso XIII acceded to the throne. The king's tendency to side with officers and against politicians has often been associated with a fondness for the armed forces developed in his youth.⁶⁷ Whether Alfonso XII and his son were meant to control the officer corps or become soldiers themselves remains an open question.

During the same period the Spanish public sphere experienced a fundamental transformation. While newspapers had played an important role in creating a national consciousness during the Peninsular War and the *Trienio Liberal* (1820-23), the restoration of the absolutist regime in 1814 and again in 1823 severely restricted the activity of the press, reading societies, and other forums of public discussion.⁶⁸ Even during the constitutional period, constraints on press and associational freedoms and relatively low literacy rates limited the scope of the public to debate political and court matters.⁶⁹ Ever since the *Trienio Liberal* however, urban centres developed a vibrant culture of reading societies, clubs, and *tertulias* (social circles) that provided spaces for political debate, the

⁶⁴ See for example José Luis Comellas et al., *Los generales de Isabel II*, (Madrid, 2016).

⁶⁵ See Carlos Navajas Zubeldía, 'Historiografía militar española contemporánea (1940-1989)', *Brocar. Cuadernos de Investigación Histórica*, 0.15, (2013), 142–48.

⁶⁶ Carolyn Boyd, *Praetorian Politics in Liberal Spain* (Chapel Hill, 1979), 9.

⁶⁷ Caroline Boyd, "El rey soldado" Alfonso XIII y el ejército" in Moreno Luzón, (ed.), *Alfonso XIII*, 217.

⁶⁸ María Cruz Seoane and María Dolores Saíz, *Cuatro Siglos Del Periodismo En España: De Los Avisos a Los Periódicos Digitales* (Madrid, 2007), 75.

⁶⁹ *Ibid*, 101–2.

exchange of news, and the dissemination of scientific knowledge.⁷⁰ In addition to the general limits on freedom of speech and the press, the danger was that critically examining royal education could fall under constitutional provisions that penalised insults directed at the monarchy. It is necessary to consider what impact this had on the reporting on the heir's education. The degree of freedom of expression depended on the party in power, which was reflected in the extensive restriction imposed on the press during most of the period of *moderado* dominance (1833-40, 1843-54, 1856-68). The 1874 Restoration brought back many of the curbs that had been abolished during the democratic *Sexenio* (1868-74).⁷¹ However, the *Ley de Policía de Imprenta* of 26 July 1883, which guaranteed extensive press freedoms, finally allowed for a flourishing of print culture and the emergence of large media businesses.

Ortiz has argued that from then on a liberal culture of contention and debate took hold in Spain, which, in a corrupt political system, presented an alternative form of public participation.⁷² Some historians even termed this emergence of mass newspapers and informative broadsheets, the 'golden age of journalism' in Spain.⁷³ The implications for royal education are significant: the press might raise expectations as to the heir's public role and scrutinise his education more thoroughly. It is worth considering whether the monarchy reacted to such pressures and developed anything akin to a media strategy or at least tried to disseminate certain messages to the public. Arguably, these issues were relevant even when press freedoms were less extensive. Furthermore, remembering that the heir to the throne presented the future of the monarchy, it is worth asking what expectations and hopes were associated with his or her instruction.

Spanish political culture and education

Spain's political culture had an important impact on the heir's upbringing and the way it was discussed. First of all, the heir's learning should be understood in the context of the centrality of education in liberal thought: as a tool for bringing about long-term social and political change. To nineteenth-century liberals schooling was seen as the essential

⁷⁰ Alberto Gil Novales, Juan Francisco Fuentes and Lluís Roura i Aulinas, *Sociabilidad y liberalismo en la España del siglo XIX: homenaje al profesor Alberto Gil Novales*, (Lleida, 2001).

⁷¹ Juan Francisco Fuentes and Javier Fernández Sebastián, *Historia Del Periodismo Español: Prensa, Política Y Opinión Pública En La España Contemporánea*, (Madrid, 1997), 118-120.

⁷² David Ortiz, *Paper Liberals: Press and Politics in Restoration Spain* (Westport, 2000), 10.

⁷³ José Javier Sánchez Aranda and Carlos Barrera del Barrio, *Historia Del Periodismo Español: Desde Sus Orígenes Hasta 1975* (Pamplona, 1992), 167-69.

source of virtue, as fundamental for the nation's future prosperity, and most of all for the formation of citizens able to participate in political life.⁷⁴ Furthermore, as Carolyn Boyd has argued 'the faith in education was particularly fervent in Spain, where other non-violent agencies of social and political change were as yet poorly developed.'⁷⁵ The significance attributed to the topic is reflected in the number of projects and attempts made to install a standardised, rational, and centralised liberal system of schooling, from the 1821 *Reglamento de Instrucción Pública* to the 1852 *Ley de Instrucción Pública* (also *Ley Moyano*) and the *Institucion Libre de Enseñanza* during and after the *Sexenio* (1868-74).⁷⁶ Did these projects stand in any relation to the heir's upbringing? Was his or her education meant to serve as an example or was it modelled after the way children were taught in public schools? One particularly Spanish development was the strong influence of Karl Krause's pedagogical thought in the latter half of the century, which inspired a generation of intellectuals to pursue national regeneration through education. Their ideals were closely related to the belief that Spain was in dire need of modernisation, the path to which had to begin with education.⁷⁷ If these tendencies were represented or influenced teaching at the court this would give an indication of the extent to which the future monarch's upbringing was open to outside developments and influenced by this drive toward standardisation, centralisation, and modernisation.

Reform attempts almost inevitably put liberals on a collision course with the church. Despite various episodes of expropriation, the abolition of the inquisition and its diminished secular powers, the Catholic Church remained an influential institution throughout the nineteenth century.⁷⁸ Education became one of the central battlegrounds between the church, which insisted on maintaining its right to teach without government interference, and the liberal state, which aimed to impose a unified curriculum but lacked the resources to do so. The two sides of the debate represented a 'microcosm of the long-standing antagonism between state and church.'⁷⁹ The Catholic Church was as determined to protect its influence in education, as progressive liberals were to drive

⁷⁴ Alfonso. Capitán Díaz, *Breve historia de la educación en España* (Madrid, 2002), 250–52.

⁷⁵ Carolyn P. Boyd, *Historia Patria: Politics, History, and National Identity in Spain, 1875-1975* (Princeton, 1997), 21.

⁷⁶ Ramón Alberdi, Buenaventura Delgado Criado and Fundación Santa María, *Historia de la educación en España y América. Vol. 3*, (Madrid, 1994), 13-14, 265-279.

⁷⁷ Juan López-Morillas, *The Krausist Movement and Ideological Change in Spain, 1854-1874* (Cambridge, UK, 1981).

⁷⁸ See William James Callahan, *Church, Politics, and Society in Spain, 1750-1874*, 73 (Cambridge, Mass, 1984).

⁷⁹ Ortiz, *Paper Liberals*, 49.

forward a secularisation, nationalisation, and modernisation of the education system.⁸⁰ The question is to what extent this confrontation between church and the liberal state impacted the upbringing of constitutional monarchs and played itself out at court. The challenge was to marry the traditional religious instruction heirs received to the liberal education aimed at forming a good constitutional ruler. The way these could come into conflict was a recurring issue in the upbringing of heirs.

Alongside these debates over education, Spaniards showed a growing concern with national identity, which was linked to religion, military culture, and empire. Religion played an important role in marking out belonging to the national community and even anti-clerical liberals would continuously call themselves ‘good Catholics’. There was no agreement, though, on what Catholicism meant, leading to an ideological confrontation between liberals and the church that made the development of a strong Catholic constitutional national identity impossible. As Gregorio Alonso has argued, the conflict between clericalism and anti-clericalism in Spain and the values and actions associated with each provided one of the main sources for political instability and polarisation during the nineteenth century.⁸¹ This raises the issue of the reconciliation between the monarchy’s and the country’s religious identity and processes of nationalisation, secularisation, and liberalisation.

Military culture, and the virtues associated with it, was central in defining Spain’s national identity since well before the Peninsular War.⁸² According to José Álvarez Junco, ‘if there is a collective character trait and essence of Spaniards in history that no author fails to emphasise it is bellicosity.’⁸³ Thus a capability for individual action, initiative, and bravery came to be imagined as essential Spanish and masculine characteristics. During the Carlist Wars this evolved into the liberal and romantic idea of a “citizen soldier” taking up arms to defend national sovereignty and liberty.⁸⁴ As Geoffrey Jensen has demonstrated, intellectuals among the military elite transformed warfare into a conceptually relevant experience and cultivated an idea of national identity closely linked to the armed forces.⁸⁵ Was the heir’s military education therefore also a way of

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Alonso García *La nación*, 3/4.

⁸² Thilo Jens Wittenberg, *Mut und Ehre die professionelle, ideologische und politische Entwicklung des spanischen Offizierskorps im 19. Jahrhundert (1808-1908)*, (Phd Diss., Freiburg, 2000).

⁸³ José Álvarez Junco, *Mater Dolorosa : la idea de España en el siglo XIX* (Madrid, 2001), 207.

⁸⁴ Charles J Esdaile, *The Spanish Army in the Peninsular War* (Manchester, 1988), 168-173.

⁸⁵ Geoffrey Jensen, *Cultura militar española: modernistas, tradicionalistas y liberales* (Madrid, 2014), 27.

demonstrating the monarchy's Spanish identity? Was instruction in warfare a way of teaching the future monarch virtues that were perceived to be essentially Spanish and masculine?

Lastly, one should not forget the role empire played in conceptions of the Spanish nation. While Spain lost a large part of her colonial possessions in 1824, after failing to suppress the independence movements in the Americas, the remaining territories and the legacy of empire remained important in Spanish national consciousness. As Alda Blanco has argued to 're-articulate Spain's former present, it is necessary to inextricably link Spain's identity as a nation to colonialism, modernization, and modernity as they clearly were during the 19th century'.⁸⁶ Spain was not different from other European nations in this regard: she saw herself as having a strong colonial vocation, pursued "prestige politics" and linked its identity to its imperial past.⁸⁷ To quote Christopher Schmidt-Nowara, 'empire shaped the very contours of the nation's "imagined community" in the nineteenth century'.⁸⁸ This explains the impact that the 1898 defeat and loss of the remaining colonies had on Spain, which saw her imperial national history come to a traumatic end. In particular with regard to Alfonso XII and Alfonso XIII, it is important to study the effect that imperial crises had on their upbringing. The presentation of heirs as promises of a regenerated, imperial great nation will be of particular interest here.

One theme that was – to some degree – present in all of these discussions was a concern with "modernity", with social, political, and economic progress. Spanish liberals regarded the military, the empire, the economy, schools, and the political system as in need of modernisation.⁸⁹ Revisionist scholarship has emphasised Spain's relative success in economic development as a marker of the emergence of a more modern society.⁹⁰ According to Fernández Sebastián and Capellan de Miguel, contemporaries felt strongly that they lived in a 'century of progress and modernity', which implied a move toward a social order based on individual freedom, equality and private property.⁹¹ Teleological interpretations that have tended to see the failure of the Second Republic as an inevitable

⁸⁶ Alda Blanco, 'Spain at the Crossroads: Imperial Nostalgia or Modern Colonialism?', *A Contra Corriente*, 5.1 (2007), 11.

⁸⁷ *Ibid*, 20-23.

⁸⁸ Christopher Schmidt-Nowara, 'La España Ultramarina': Colonialism and Nation-Building in Nineteenth-Century Spain', *European History Quarterly*, 34.2 (2004), 205.

⁸⁹ On Spaniards understanding of modernity see Ferris *Imagining*, 249-.

⁹⁰ David R. Ringrose, *Spain, Europe, and the 'Spanish Miracle', 1700-1900* (Cambridge, UK, 1996).

⁹¹ Sebastián and de Miguel, 'Modernity', 401-2.

result of nineteenth-century underdevelopment have been revised.⁹² The role of the monarchy in the modernisation process has been largely neglected, though, and even Burdiel has previously dismissed the idea that there was any hope for reform from above after 1837.⁹³

Despite a small but vocal contingent of liberal republicans, the majority of Spanish liberals remained wedded to the monarchy and aimed to turn the crown into an agent of progress. As education was seen as central for building a modern society, the heir's upbringing became a tool with the potential to convert the monarchy into a driver of change. This brings us back to questions concerning the modernity of the Spanish monarchy. The hypothesis to be tested here is that the education of heirs to the throne and its public discussion reveal that the Spanish monarchy evolved into a more progressive, functional, and ultimately modern institution. Rather than pressing for reform in opposition to the monarchy, most progressives sought to gain the crown's allegiance as part of their efforts to modernise Spain. This investigation is thus meant to contribute to a re-evaluation of the monarchy's part in driving economic, political, and social progress and the process of reaching modernity. Dieter Langewiesche's argument that it was the monarchy's 'ability to adapt, and keep its social, cultural and political power of integration, that gave it the strength to assert itself', needs to be taken seriously.⁹⁴ It is vital to ask why most liberals did not see the monarchy as an obstacle to progress, but instead aimed to make it an integral part of a modern political system. In particular, the role of the heir's education in this process of modernisation of the monarchy needs to be explored. This means asking additional questions about the crown's agency in this process.

The court, the military, and the public

This study will analyse the questions and issues highlighted above by examining the actors who took a strong interest in the way the future monarch was educated over the course of the nineteenth century. These can be grouped into three broad categories, representing the three major loci of power and activity that interacted with the heir and

⁹² Carles Sirera Miralles, 'Neglecting the 19th Century Democracy, the Consensus Trap and Modernization Theory in Spain', *History of the Human Sciences*, 2015, 55-66.

⁹³ Burdiel, 'Myths of Failure, Myths of Success', 908.

⁹⁴ On the monarchy's adaptability and willingness to change see Dieter Langewiesche, *Die Monarchie im Jahrhundert Europas* (Heidelberg, 2013), 39.

each other. The first analytical category, the one closest to the heir, is the dynasty itself and the court. They continued to hold substantial political and social power throughout the constitutional period. Even though the monarchy's room for independent action and favours was increasingly constrained by the law, the monarchy retained many of its prerogatives over the armed forces, its patronage, and its status as a central actor in the political system. Due to political corruption and the crown's extensive constitutional powers, the struggle for political power inevitably involved the monarchy. The enduring power of the monarchy meant that the extent of royal authority proved a major point of contention between the different political parties throughout the century. Despite important instances of governmental and parliamentary interference, the heir to the throne's education remained essentially a prerogative of the royal family, who for the most part held onto its authority over the appointments of teachers and tutors. The first chapter will focus on these court elements and their influence on the upbringing of Isabel II, Alfonso XII, and Alfonso XIII.

The second powerful actor that played an important role in the heir's upbringing was the military, and more specifically the officer corps. The armed forces were crucial to Spanish politics, society, and culture and were involved in all the major upheavals of the nineteenth century from 1808 onwards. The crown was interested in maintaining a close bond with the army and the navy, while officers in turn attempted to ensure the monarchy's favour in the form of promotions, honours, and money. One of the central objectives of the second chapter is to study heir to the throne's function in this relationship between members of the military establishment and the monarchy. At the same time, it is important to consider the limitations that affected the creation of a meaningful connection between heir and military: issues such as gender or exile. The questions that will guide the investigation explore why military education was considered important, what role notions of masculinity played, and what this meant for a female ruler.

The last dimension, to be studied in chapter three, is the public sphere, which includes the press, the Cortes and other public forums of debate. These entities extensively discussed the education of heirs to the throne. Despite the outsized influence of the armed forces and the continued weight of the monarchy, Spain developed strong public institutions. The two chambers of parliament wielded significant powers and together with the press played an increasingly important role in putting pressure on the government, holding ministers and the monarchy to account and shaping public opinion.

Due to this influence and as an approximation of the opinions of the wider populace, it is worth analysing the ways in which the heir's education was approached in the press. Talking about the upbringing of the future ruler almost inevitably raised questions concerning a society's identity, its values, vices, and ideals. These discussions also highlighted the expectations the public formed of the impending reign. The wider hopes and fears expressed in articles and speeches on royal education and the values that were commonly ascribed to a good constitutional ruler need to be explored. Additionally, it can be argued that these discussions of the monarch's upbringing contribute to our understanding of extant Spanish conceptions of the nation and the state of the country.

This study rests on a detailed analysis of a wide range of primary sources relating to the education of future monarchs. The first and second chapter, are mainly based on letters, memoirs, and reports written by or closely related to individuals involved with the heir to the throne's education. The chapter on the court relies on private correspondence and internal reports held in the *Archivo Histórico Nacional*, the *Archivo de la Real Academia de la Historia*, the *Archivo General de Palacio* and the *Real Biblioteca del Palacio Real de Madrid*. These archives contain a wealth of material on the organisation of teaching, its supervision, the selection of teachers, their biographies and their aims. In addition to that, the memoir of Juana de Vega, Condesa de Espoz y Mina, is a central source for Isabel II's upbringing, as is Alfonso XIII's published diary for his education.

The second chapter uses the same and similar sources, but analyses them with a closer focus on the role of the armed forces and subjects relevant to the military in the upbringing of future monarchs. In addition, chapter two pursues a more prosopographical approach in order to assess the significance of military education and its broader underlying aims. The analysis of individual military records, correspondence, and works by officers involved in the heir's upbringing, found primarily in the *Archivo General Militar* of Madrid and Segovia, seeks to reconstruct the network of officers appointed to the heir's household and establish who they were; i.e. their career in the armed forces, their qualifications, and their ideological background.

Chapter three, will take a different approach, as it is not concerned with the attitudes, aims and opinion of insiders, but with the public's perception, the view of royal education from outside the palace's walls. Despite the limitations caused by relatively low distribution numbers, its concentration in urban centres, and low literacy rates throughout the century, the press is the most instructive source material available to

historians studying the different viewpoints promoted in the growing Spanish public sphere. Most of the newspapers examined have been taken from the archives of the *Biblioteca Nacional de España*. In addition to sampling around significant dates in the heir's upbringing (birthdays, appointment of new teachers, public scandals, etc.) in leading newspapers, the digitisation of a vast number of publications and their full print run has allowed for the use of a wide-ranging word search to identify relevant articles. The selection of writings is also meant to reflect the range of opinions and debates that existed in nineteenth-century Spain. As a whole, the sources studied make up a significant body of material, which has not previously been analysed systematically to gain insights into the upbringing of royal offspring.

While there is bound to be some overlap between the three categories – the court, the military, and the public sphere - they represent sufficiently distinct groups, each showing a strong interest in the heir's education, actively trying to exert their authority, shaping the discussion and therefore allowing for significant new insights into the political culture of nineteenth-century Spain. It is worth noting that the Catholic Church remained a powerful institution with significant influence on the monarch's upbringing. The role of the church will be examined as part of the court, with particular focus on the role of the confessor and of the religious educators in the first chapter. Additionally, the church found its voice in the Spanish public through conservative and explicitly Catholic publications, which will be examined in the third chapter's investigation of the public sphere.

Posada concluded that one thing was essential: Alfonso XIII should be raised like other young Spaniards so that he would 'do what they do, feel what they feel, appreciate their qualities deficiencies, get to know the national life outside his palace walls (...)'. This would ensure that he would become 'more than anything, a good citizen who carried in his heart the intimate conviction that his elevated functions, even if attained by the work and miracle of inheritance, [...] should be employed for the good of society or the state, which [...] has a right to make use of them.' The change from the absolutist view of kingship could hardly be starker than this. The king was another citizen, whose inherited position obliged him to be a model citizen in the service of the state. Posada's concern with the restrictiveness of palace walls and the pernicious influence of the court on the young king was neither new nor particularly Spanish. He looked to William II of Germany as an example of how one could raise a ruler outside of this environment and other authors had expressed similar ideas for centuries. However, the influence of the

court, of what Posada called an ‘atmosphere of humble servitude, of small-mindedness, this arching of backs’, was and remained strong throughout the nineteenth century.⁹⁵ No ruler, apart from Alfonso XII during his time in exile, was educated outside the palace. Private tutors, courtiers, and other palace personnel continued to play an important role in royal upbringing. It is to these elements and their attitudes, aims and influence that we will turn first.

⁹⁵ Posada, “La Educación”, *La España moderna*, 01/03/1894, 41/42.

1. *Teachers and Courtiers*

The personnel in charge of royal education

Heirs to the throne played a vital role in the process of repositioning, redefining, modernising, and communicating the monarchy in nineteenth-century Spain. The next-in-line to the throne was expected to alter or re-assert the characteristic features of the monarchy and thus prefigure the future of the institution. As the Spanish heirs studied here were relatively young when they came to the throne, their early education played a central role in the process of creating and communicating a new monarchical model, broadening its appeal, and updating it in line with changing demands. More than simply influencing and forming the new monarch, royal education thus functioned as a channel through which the institution itself could be reconfigured vis-à-vis the nation. The methods, aims, and content of education at court were important elements within this process. This explains why such close attention was paid to their effects and to who would formulate and deliver them. The education of heirs to the throne in nineteenth-century Spain was largely in the hands of palace appointments: men and women who were responsible for the upbringing, teaching, and care of future monarchs. This chapter aims to analyse these individuals and the politics, ideology, and aims underlying the decisions to appoint or dismiss them. What were their backgrounds, motivations and goals?

A significant part of this analysis will be dedicated to the court environment and the teachers who surrounded the heir: their biographies and what they reveal about the essential qualities that educators needed. These priorities provide some insight into the importance attached to education during moments of transition, when the monarchy could be reshaped through the upbringing of the heir. Intellectual ability, prior experience, and some form of public service were relevant factors that influenced the nomination of teachers. This speaks to the prestige that was attached to such posts in Spain: a phenomenon which contrasts markedly with most other European constitutional monarchies.¹ The selection of teachers, guardians, and tutors also had a

¹ See John C. G Röhl, *Young Wilhelm: The Kaiser's Early Life, 1859-1888* (Cambridge, 1998); Yvonne Wagner, *Prinzenerziehung in der 2. Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts: zum Bildungsverhalten des preussisch-deutschen Hofes im gesellschaftlichen Wandel* (Frankfurt am Main, 1995); Jane Ridley, *Bertie: A Life of Edward VII* (London, 2012).

signalling function with respect to the public and to parliament. It meant to convey that the future ruler was being adequately prepared. Education can thus be understood as a crucial part of the public communication of the monarchical system.

It is also worth asking to what extent education touched on wider political debates concerning the role, sources of legitimacy and authority of the monarchy within the emergent constitutional system. One of the points of contention was the limit of parliamentary authority vis-à-vis dynastic rights and the division between the private and the public. How these limits were to be shaped in the future depended to a large degree on the precedents that would be set in these instances of dynastic transition. A new balance needed to be found between rights of the parents of a royal heir over their children and the public interest in the upbringing of the future-monarch. Was the composition of the heir's entourage therefore a political or family issue? This had already become a controversial topic in France during the early years of the 1789 revolution, when the future of the monarchy was uncertain and new constitutional frameworks were being developed.² Similar debates emerged in Spain during the construction of the liberal state.³

Given that education can be understood as a tool for instilling certain abilities, skills and attitudes in the future ruler, one of the central questions concerns the characteristics that were associated with good, modern, effective kingship. By analysing the aims of teachers at court and their ideological and social histories we can link their beliefs to those of wider sections of society or to different political actors. For this study, it is of particular relevance to ask how these beliefs related to the function the future ruler was meant to fulfil in their monarchical office and whether a “modern” monarchy required a skilful, properly educated, and competent sovereign.

1.1 Isabel II

In the context of her contested succession and the Carlist War, Isabel II was frequently at the centre of efforts to ensure that Spain would become a constitutional state. The

² See Adrian O'Connor, 'Between Monarch and Monarchy: The Education of the Dauphin and Revolutionary Politics, 1790–91', *French History*, 27.2 (2013), 176–201.

³ Encarna García Monerris y Carmen García Monerris, “¿Interés de familia?” in Encarna García Monerris et al.(eds), *Cultururas*, 177-180.

appointments and selection of her teachers provide insights into the substantial political changes and the conflicts that emerged while delineating the boundaries of monarchical and parliamentary authority during the emergence of the liberal capitalist-bourgeois state.

Many individuals from within the traditional aristocratic elites at court tried to forestall the development of a constitutional monarchy and sought to use Isabel's education to preserve their monarchical vision. At court these elements attempted to preserve their power over the young queen's upbringing and tried to avoid changes to the social composition of the royal entourage. They were largely successful in their endeavour at least until María Cristina of the Two Sicilies, queen regent since Ferdinand VII's death in 1833, fled the country. When María Cristina left for exile, the situation changed. Conservatives and many moderate liberals felt that the *Cortes'* decision to nominate a *Tutor* (guardian) without the Queen Regent's approval was illegitimate. Conservative forces at the palace sought to undermine the new regime either by resigning *en masse*, or continuing to stifle the influence of liberal forces from within.

The strength of the conservative forces at court, at least up to 1841, suggests that Isabel II's image as the *alumna de la libertad* (student of liberty) was largely a fiction and liberal invention. This notion of an ideal constitutional monarch was an icon that liberals were keen to create, but barely able to realise. Rather, the conservative environment in which Isabel was raised was reminiscent of the upbringing of her father under the *ancien regime* and not of that of a future liberal and constitutional queen. While the idealised image of her education did not correspond to reality, it served the specific needs of both María Cristina's conservative supporters and of liberals, who tried to forge a stable alliance against ultra-reactionary Carlism. Isabel thus functioned as a unifying symbol, which simultaneously represented the hope of a liberal future and dynastic continuity. An investigation of her upbringing supports the notion that the alliance between María Cristina and liberalism was more a marriage of convenience than a love match.

Lastly, it is worth underlining the heavily gendered nature of Isabel's education and the continued importance of religion. Even though she would eventually become the ruler of Spain, a key aim in her education was to make her a good wife, a lady, and a dutiful Catholic. This conception of Isabel's education conforms to the idealisation of the '*ángel del hogar*' (domestic angel), which became an important image in Spanish literature and

culture during the nineteenth century.⁴ While the monarchy was to be transformed in some respects, in others it remained wedded to traditional notions of gender and propriety. It was assumed that Isabel II's future husband would dominate his wife, which made her marriage an issue of immense political significance. This also explains why the teaching of subjects that were deemed appropriate to her gender were so prominent. The religious emphasis was an important element that sought to connect Isabel II to the heritage of her namesake Isabel la Católica, the most famous example of successful female rule in Spanish history. There was some opposition to the idea of a strictly Christian and highly gendered curriculum from one of Isabel's teachers, but his was a lone voice; the general consensus was that it was important for Isabel II to be educated as a 'proper lady', instructed in dance, singing and needlework, and as a 'good Catholic'.

The organisation of teaching at court

The organisation of the personnel at the palace and the structure of teaching are crucial for understanding the arguments surrounding Isabel II's education. The internal struggle for these positions had a significant influence on how the royal children were brought up. Furthermore, the individuals appointed to positions of responsibility at court had significant influence on Isabel's moral development and learning. Juan Vincente Ventosa was one of the most prominent figures in the education of Isabel II. He was the 'teacher of first letters', often simply referred to as 'the teacher'.⁵ This designation demonstrates the centrality of Ventosa's position within the rather vaguely defined hierarchy of the teaching staff. María Cristina appointed Ventosa in 1836, when Isabel was six years old and he continued in this post until 1842. Another significant appointment was that of the *Ayo instructor*, who was in charge of the direction of teaching staff and curriculum design. It appears that María Cristina nominated the first *Ayo instructor*, Manuel José Quintana (1772-1857) just before she went into exile in 1840. As will be demonstrated below, both Ventosa and Quintana played a significant role in Isabel's education.

One of the most important positions in Isabel's entourage was that of the *Aya*. The *Aya's* proximity to the queen and her constant vigilance over Isabel and her sister potentially made her one of the most influential individuals at the side of the princesses.

⁴ See Bridget Aldaraca, *El Ángel Del Hogar: Galdós and the Ideology of Domesticity in Spain* (Chapel Hill, 1992).

⁵ Juana María de la Vega Espoz y Mina and Juan Pérez de Guzmán, *Apuntes para la historia del tiempo en que ocupó los destinos de aya de S.M.Y.A. y camarera mayor de palacio* (Madrid, 1910).

While the *Aya* was not formally expected to teach, there was a clear pedagogical dimension to the post, from making casual observations to providing explanations and reading out aloud to Isabel and Luisa Fernanda. Furthermore, Espoz y Mina, who held the post from 1841 to 1843, as well as Santa Cruz before her, actively influenced and scrutinised teaching. It is clear from Mina's comments on her arrival at the palace that she understood the supervision and direction of teaching to be an essential part of her job.⁶ As a close assistant to the *Aya* and her stand-in the *Tenienta de Aya*, also occupied an influential post. She also spent much of her time in the company of Isabel and her sister, which gave her an opportunity to exert her influence.

The ultimate authority over the entourage of the young queen and over her education was invested in the *Tutor*, which is perhaps best translated as 'guardian' rather than 'tutor'. During the Regency of María Cristina of the Two Sicilies, the post did not formally exist as she herself acted as the guardian of her daughter. This changed in 1841, after María Cristina had gone into exile and the Cortes had declared Espartero regent. The *Tutor* oversaw appointments to the entourage of Isabel and her sister, and was also responsible for designating the *Ayo instructor* and the *Aya*. He also had the power to dismiss court employees and was regularly informed about Isabel's education. The last position that is worth mentioning is that of the confessor, who apart from taking confession, was also in charge of Isabel's religious education. The frequent contact which the holders of these posts had with Isabel and their influence in instructing and guiding the young royals, gave them considerable social as well as political importance. Their beliefs, actions and aims will be the central focus of this chapter.

There is little first-hand material shedding light on the earliest stage of Isabel's education. What is known is that Ferdinand VII's death and the ostensible shift toward a more liberal monarchical system barely altered the make-up of María Cristina's court.⁷ This persistence of absolutist tradition and conservative elements stood in contrast to the idealised vision of Isabel II as a symbol of progress and liberty. The analysis of her early education reveals that Isabel's public image as a '*niña de la libertad*' (child of liberty), discussed in more detail below, was a front that hid the absence of change in the composition of the royal household.

⁶ Ibid, 26.

⁷ Burdiel, *Isabel II*.

The court was still dominated by conservative aristocrats. In 1830 Ferdinand VII officially appointed Joaquina Téllez-Girón, the Marquésa de Santa Cruz as *Aya* to his yet unborn child. She was also made *Camarera Mayor* (First Lady of the Bedchamber) in 1834. The Marquésa came from one of the oldest and most distinguished Spanish noble families and – as was obligatory for a *Camarera Mayor* – belonged to the ranks of the *grandees* of Spain. The other ladies-in-waiting assigned to take care of Isabel were from similar backgrounds. A further example of this was Bishop Manuel Joaquín Tarancón y Morón, who was in charge of Isabel II's religious education. He was a staunch conservative and defender of the church, who was closely associated with Ferdinand VII's absolutist court.⁸ The conservative resistance to change is evident even beyond this initial period of Isabel's education. After María Cristina went into exile, Santa Cruz frequently complained to the queen mother that Ventosa and his wife were going beyond their subject matter during lessons by making political insinuations and were thus trying to influence Isabel and Luisa Fernanda.⁹ María Cristina and Santa Cruz were, from the very outset, opposed to Isabel's education reflecting changes in the political situation. They never dropped their resistance to liberal influence in the queen's upbringing.

Even when there was an ostensible shift toward a more liberal approach to education, conservative elements at court and María Cristina herself tried to stop the implementation of fundamental changes. After the 'La Granja incident' of 1836, when a group of sergeants pressured the queen regent to re-introduce the 1812 Cadiz constitution, a new teacher of 'first letters and elemental notions' had to be found. The then *preceptor* (head teacher), Don Juan Cabo eventually settled on Don Juan Vincente Ventosa, who had apparently previously taught Spanish to King Louis Phillippe of France's children. Ventosa was a former lieutenant in the Spanish army during the Peninsular War, who had spent much of the conflict in French captivity. He married a French woman, Maria Brochot, established a school in Normandy, and eventually moved to Paris to teach there. By all accounts he was a principled liberal, who had been heavily influenced by the pedagogical notions of Pestalozzi and Fröbel. When he was appointed as 'teacher of elemental notions' at the Spanish court, his wife was selected to

⁸ Unknown author, *Biografía Del Emmo. Excmo. Illmo. y Rmo. Sr. D. Manuel Joaquín Tarancón y Morón Cardenal Presbítero de la Sta. Iglesia Romana, Arzobispo de Sevilla*. (1864).

⁹ AHN-DiversosTítulosFamilias-Legajo3519-Libro48-Docs11/12, Santa Cruz to María Cristina, 27/11/1840.

teach Isabel and her sister *francés y labores* (French and crafts).¹⁰ Given the timing of this decision, Ventosa's background and the frequent disputes the teacher would later have with conservative elements at the palace, it is reasonable to conclude that the appointment of a man influenced by progressive pedagogy was intended as a concession to liberals. However, as the teacher admitted during the Espartero regency, he felt unable to bring about major change due to the stiff resistance he encountered from Santa Cruz, *Aya* and *Camarrera Mayor*, and the similarly conservative *Teniente de Aya*, Inés Blake.¹¹

Conservative reactions to the appointment of liberals to the palace during the Espartero regency are also telling. The mass resignation that followed the appointment of Espoz y Mina, a prominent liberal from relatively modest origins, as new *Aya* in July 1841 is evidence of the stiff resistance of the conservative palace staff to changes and their disapproval of the appointment of non-aristocratic individuals to court.¹² Santa Cruz informed María Cristina that for the ladies to have to 'walk behind that Mina woman was really too cruel'.¹³ María Cristina's reaction to these resignations was unfavourable, as she worried about losing her influence over her daughters.¹⁴ The *rebelión de las damas* (rebellion of the ladies), as the affair became known, and the constant infighting for influence at court, exemplified the reactionary attitudes at court and the unwillingness of courtly elites to be part of a more liberal approach to Isabel's care. Open rebellions reflected the importance that courtiers attached to Isabel's upbringing. The October 1841 *pronunciamiento*, which aimed to re-instate María Cristina as regent, had a similar agenda. One of the central components of the plan was to kidnap Isabel and her sister. Ángel Bahamonde and Jesús Martínez interpreted this *moderado* conspiracy as, at least ostensibly, based on the idea of the 'captive queen' who needed to be defended against the progressives' efforts to make her into a liberal monarch.¹⁵

¹⁰ Espoz y Mina and Pérez de Guzmán, *Apuntes*, 24

¹¹ Josef Vicente Ventosa cited in Espoz y Mina and Pérez de Guzmán, *Apuntes*, 142

¹² AHN-DiversoTítulosFamilias-Leg.3519-Libro48-Doc.86, Santa Cruz to María Cristina, 31/07/1841.

¹³ AHN-DiversoTítulosFamilias-Leg.3519-Libro48-Doc.90, Santa Cruz to María Cristina, 07/08/1841.

¹⁴ AHN-DiversoTítulosFamilias-Leg.3519-Libro 48-Doc. 89, María Cristina to Santa Cruz, 07/08/1841.

¹⁵ Ángel Bahamonde Magro and Jesús A. Martínez, *Historia de España : siglo XIX*, (Madrid, 2011), 231.

The Espartero regency and progressive change

Both the 1840 revolution and María Cristina's exile had sprung from the debates surrounding the *Ley de Ayuntamientos* (Municipalities Law), proposed by Evaristo Pérez de Castro's government in 1839. This effort to create a modern, centralised state brought the existing division within Spanish liberalism into the open.¹⁶ The controversial law caused a lasting split between progressive liberal *progresistas* and the more conservative, liberal *moderados*. Popular unrest and a press campaign led to calls for General Espartero to take over the reins of government. While María Cristina was happy to offer him this post, the general made the withdrawal of the 'Ley de Ayuntamientos' his central demand. The political crisis came to a head when María Cristina signed the law into force on 15 July 1840. This resulted in various towns rebelling and forming revolutionary *juntas*. María Cristina urged Espartero to end the rebellion, but the general demanded various commitments from the Queen Regent, which included the appointment of a new cabinet, the election of new Cortes and the revocation of the controversial law. Unwilling to concede all of this and with the situation escalating, María Cristina renounced the Regency on 12 October 1840 and left the care of her daughters in Espartero's hands.¹⁷ As will be argued below, the political changes heralded by the Espartero Regency (October 1840-July 1843) had important consequences for Isabel's upbringing and brought about the first real attempts to make her a liberal queen.

Even before she was forced into exile, the queen regent could not ignore the increasing dominance of the *progresistas*. On 1 October 1840, she nominated the author, poet, and lawyer Manuel José Quintana to the newly created post of *Ayo instructor*, replacing the former *preceptor*.¹⁸ The timing of the appointment can be interpreted as a concession by María Cristina towards the *progresistas*, who were now in power and increased their demand for change. According to Burdiel, María Cristina would have preferred someone more conservative and closer to the *moderados* to take on this post.¹⁹ Isabel's education was clearly becoming an important political battleground in the confrontation between conservative and moderate liberals on the one side and the progressives on the other. Furthermore, Quintana's appointment was also an attempt by the queen regent to

¹⁶ Mary Vincent, *Spain 1833-2002: People and State* (Oxford, 2007), 13-15

¹⁷ For an overview on politics of the period see Angel Bahamonde Magro and Jesús Martínez, *Historia de España : siglo XIX* (Madrid: Cátedra, 1994), 207-227, 229-237 and Jorge Vilches García, *Progreso y libertad: el Partido Progresista en la revolución liberal española* (Madrid, 2001), 135-150.

¹⁸ Espoz y Mina and Pérez de Guzmán, *Apuntes*, 549.

¹⁹ Burdiel, *Isabel II*.

maintain control over her daughters' education in light of her impending departure. María Cristina sought to safeguard her influence by requiring that changes were to be approved by the *Aya*, an office which, at this point, was still held by her confidante Santa Cruz and by installing Quintana, who despite his liberal credentials she considered loyal and trustworthy.²⁰

The appointment of a high-profile liberal and public intellectual and the new, weightier title accorded to him, point to the Queen Regent's belated acceptance that political changes in Spain would also impact the court and colour her daughters' education.²¹ Quintana was not only a famous romantic poet but also a liberal with a strong sense of public service, who had been incarcerated for his political convictions after Ferdinand VII's return in 1814.²² During the *Trienio Liberal* he was released and restored to the post of *Director General de Estudios* (General Director of Education), which he had formerly held during the Peninsular War. Quintana was forced to remove himself again from all his functions upon the re-establishment of absolutism and it was only after Ferdinand VII's death in 1833 that he returned to Madrid. He was re-appointed *Director General de Estudios* in 1836. As Albert Dérozier has argued, between 1836 and 1844 Quintana 'first of all dedicated himself to the intellectual formation of his country's youth'.²³ Thus he was not only an eminent 'Liberal of the first hour'²⁴, but also highly qualified to guide Isabel II's education. It is nevertheless astonishing that a former prisoner of Ferdinand VII was appointed to this court. Furthermore, it is striking that such a prominent public figure would accept the appointment. His readiness to serve suggests that Isabel's education was considered of the utmost importance.

After going into exile in October 1840, María Cristina increasingly lost control over her daughter's upbringing. The official government line was that Isabel's care and education were not a private matter but one of public concern.²⁵ There was a fundamental clash between the *progresistas'* view that the tutelage was a matter to be decided by the nation as represented in the Cortes, while *moderados* defended María Cristina's rights by insisting

²⁰ Espoz y Mina and Pérez de Guzmán, 549/550.

²¹ Quintana commented that 'the title of employment Ayo Instructor of H.M. and H. was created, which also indicated a new regard [for the position]' in Espoz y Mina and Pérez de Guzmán, 551.

²² Albert Dérozier, 'Les étapes de la vie officielle de Manuel Josef Quintana', *Bulletin Hispanique*, 66.3 (1964), 363–90.

²³ *Ibid*, 375.

²⁴ *Ibid*, 378.

²⁵ *Gaceta de Madrid*, 18/11/1840.

that the appointment of teachers and a guardian were purely private family issues. In the end, the progressive majority in the Cortes elected Agustín Argüelles as the new *Tutor* to the young queen on 10 July 1841. He won the chamber's vote with an overwhelming majority of 170 votes out of 239. The debate had been mainly focused on whether the Cortes had the authority to install a tutor at all; before Argüelles's election a vote was held to determine whether to consider the *tutela* was indeed vacant. 36 deputies did not believe this was the case. The opposition to the whole principle of the Cortes nominating a *Tutor* is reflected in the fact that more deputies abstained (31) than voted for the second placed candidate (17), who incidentally was the aforementioned *Ayo Instructor* Manuel Quintana.²⁶ The debates thus revealed two different conceptions of monarchy, with one side stressing the monarchy's patrimonial powers and the other claiming that national sovereignty extended into the realm of royal education.

It is worth noting that Argüelles's appointment as *Tutor* represented a significant break with the past. He was also the president of the Cortes, and had been a candidate for the regency. Argüelles had been a leading man behind the 1812 Cadiz Constitution, was imprisoned upon Ferdinand VII's return and, after a brief period as Minister of the Interior during the *Trienio Liberal*, had fled into exile in Britain. He returned to Spain only after María Cristina had signed the 1834 Royal Charter which created new parliament and granted an amnesty to liberals. Argüelles's election as *Tutor* to Ferdinand VII's children was a turnaround reflecting the wide-ranging changes brought about by the rise of the *progresistas*. His acceptance further underlines the importance attributed to Isabel's upbringing and the hopes that *progresistas* continued to invest in the constitutional monarchy.

The Espartero regime clearly sought to instil a new, more progressive spirit at the court. The new *Aya*, Espoz y Mina, was not, as tradition would have dictated, of noble origin. She was the only daughter of a successful, liberal merchant, who had been involved in the constitutional project of 1812 and had made sure that his daughter received what can be considered an exceptional education for a woman in early nineteenth-century Spain.²⁷ Mina rose to prominence at the side of her husband, Francisco de Espoz y Mina, who had been known for his role in the Peninsular and Carlist wars and for his direction of

²⁶ Vote breakdown Argüelles-180, Quintana-17, Conde de Almodóvar-3, Pedro Chacon-2, María Cristina-1, Others-5, Abstentions-31.

²⁷ See Consuelo Flecha, *Las mujeres en la legislación educativa española: Enseñanza Primaria y Normal en los siglos XVIII y XIX*, (Sevilla, 1997).

the liberal cause from England and France after the *Trienio Liberal*. Francisco de Espoz y Mina had twice fled into exile, rebelled unsuccessfully against Ferdinand VII in 1814 and 1830, and in 1836 played an important part in forcing the Queen Regent into accepting the constitution. The general died in 1836, but his wife's image remained inextricably linked to that of her late husband and his position as a liberal stalwart. Her appointment was designed to signal Isabel's education was to undergo major changes. The progressive spirit was meant to enter one of the last bastions of the old regime: the court.

However, the *Ayo Instructor* had not felt the need to alter how things were done before Argüelles's arrival at court. In his opinion the methods in place had so far produced 'such good results'.²⁸ Argüelles's election as *tutor* and the appointment of Mina brought about a formalisation of education in the form of teaching plans. While it is difficult to establish to what extent these were put into practice, the formalisation and evaluation of Isabel's education represented an important step toward a more rigorous approach and is indicative of the *progresista's* push for rationalisation and progress. In September 1841, Quintana and Mina each presented a study plan to Argüelles. These proposals were concerned with teaching in general and moral education. In October 1841 Martín de los Heros, who was in charge of palace administration as the new *Intendente de Palacio*, also suggested improvements to the teaching of history. De los Heros, much like Argüelles and Quintana, was another noted liberal, who had suffered persecution under Ferdinand VII, and was now a senator whilst also holding the post of *Director de la Biblioteca Nacional de España*. In April 1842 the new confessor, Rodrigo Valdés y Bustos, wrote a report on Isabel's and her sister's moral and religious education. He represented the liberal tendency within the clergy, and had also spent much of Ferdinand VII's reign in exile. The biographies of these office holders suggest that a more liberal spirit reigned at the palace and that Isabel's education was put on a more rigorous, structured path, attuned to the demands of progress. This notion is confirmed by an analysis of their arguments presented in these texts.

Firstly, Mina's and Quintana's teaching plan, de los Hero's booklet, and Valdés y Bustos' report all discussed how Isabel should be taught and what values could be transmitted through education. To Quintana, it was essential that the young royals were inclined towards learning by taking account of their natural interests and talents. Ideally Isabel

²⁸ Quintana to Argüelles as cited in Espoz y Mina and Pérez de Guzmán, *Apuntes*, 552.

would learn to reason independently and develop her own ‘interest in being educated.’²⁹ Mina made a similar argument and identified the pupil’s ‘inclination toward charity’ as ‘one of the principal virtues’ that ought to be encouraged further.³⁰ De los Heros’ and Bustos’ concerns were more subject-specific. The former believed that new developments in the way history was studied had not found their way into Isabel’s teaching and that a more analytical approach that highlighted the value of freedom was needed. De los Heros went as far as arguing that ‘what they [Isabel and her sister Luisa Fernanda] study today does not merit the name history, but genealogy or chronology, (...)’.³¹ Bustos emphasised the importance of teaching Christianity in a less dogmatic fashion to allow for religious tolerance. Isabel would thus be able to contribute to the ‘consolidation and augmentation of pure Catholic religion’, instead of the ‘old, intolerant, and ferocious currents’ that had previously been dominant in Spain. He regarded this as an important point, given that Isabel would in future play a significant diplomatic role, where she would have to ‘deal frequently with individuals of different religious principles (...)’.³² Her education was meant to foster intellectual curiosity, charity, and an appreciation for traditional freedoms and religious tolerance.

Secondly, there is a strong sense that it was possible to instil in Isabel a firm appreciation and respect for Spain’s constitutional institutions. Quintana called this the ‘highest and most essential end’ of education. He wanted Isabel to show gratitude ‘to the Spanish people, who have made so many sacrifices for them [Isabel and her sister], and show respect for the political institutions the nation has created, when it shed rivers of blood in defence of her throne.’³³ Mina echoed these sentiments and insisted that she always reminded the queen of the ‘immense sacrifices this nation has made for its institutions and its queen, and the rights it had thus acquired’.³⁴ Heros’ booklet further emphasised the historical legitimacy of ‘Cortes and representative government’ in Spain. He condemned the ‘pure monarchy’ as unnatural, ‘something our remote forefather never knew.’³⁵ Gratitude to the nation’s sacrifices, an understanding of the monarch’s role in

²⁹ Ibid, 553.

³⁰ AGP-SecciónHistorica-Caja189, Espoz y Mina to Argüelles, 27/09/1841.

³¹ , AHN-DiversosTítulosFamilias-Leg.3757-N.47, Martín de los Heros to Espoz y Mina and *cuadernillo* on Spanish History, 17/10/1841.

³² D. Rodrigo Valdés y Bustos to Argüelles as cited in Espoz y Mina and Pérez de Guzmán, *Apuntes*, 567/558

³³ Quintana to Argüelles as cited in Espoz y Mina and Pérez de Guzmán, *Apuntes*, 556.

³⁴ AGP-SecciónHistorica-Caja189, Espoz y Mina to Argüelles, 27/09/1841.

³⁵ AHN-DiversosTítulosFamilias-Leg.3757-N.47, de los Heros to Espoz y Mina.

the liberal state, and the historical legitimisation of its institutions were to be established in Isabel's education.

All of this amounted to a radical departure from María Cristina's insistence that political issues should not play a role in Isabel's education and that teachers should restrict themselves to their subject matters.³⁶ Quintana, Mina, de los Heros, and Bustos pursued a progressive liberal agenda, which aimed to make Isabel II into a virtuous queen, who acknowledged and respected the nation's sacrifices and understood her obligations and position in relation to the political institutions of the liberal state.

The politics of infighting at court

It was not long until criticism of Isabel II's upbringing began to emerge – even from within the progressive camp. In April 1842, Ventosa presented a long memoir to Mina, which outlined problems in Isabel's education.³⁷ His criticism concerned influence over the queen and Ventosa's desire for more autonomy. It is surprising that Ventosa attacked the teaching plan so sharply, considering that he played a central part in Isabel's education for some time and was a known *progresista*. Ventosa mainly took issue with the 'anarchy' that he believed had engulfed the palace since the beginning of the Espartero Regency. He divided Isabel's education into three separate periods; the first was one of progress, the second one of decadence and the last one of anarchy. It is telling that, according to Ventosa, the '*periodo del progreso*' (1836-1839) coincided with the period of his greatest autonomy and responsibility over the teaching of his pupils. While Ventosa's account is highly self-interested, the quarrel at court reflected some of the wider divisions that emerged among progressive liberals and became another issue that Espartero's opponents employed against him.

Most striking is Ventosa's disappointment with the changes to the teaching staff that were made after María Cristina's departure in October 1841. Initially he had believed that a final victory over the forces of reaction had been achieved and that María Cristina's exile offered the ultimate opportunity to set Isabel's education on the right path.³⁸ However, he felt the changes at the palace had not gone far enough. Ventosa believed

³⁶ AHN-DiversosTítulosFamilias-Leg.3519-Libro48-Doc.9, María Cristina to Santa Cruz, 11/11/1840.

³⁷ Ventosa, "Memoria", 04/1842 cited in full in Espoz y Mina and Pérez de Guzman. *Apuntes*, 139-149.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 146.

that too much time was spent on *labores*, painting, and dancing, rather than helping with the challenges she would face as a queen. While he did not specify what these would be exactly, he seems to refer to her political and constitutional duties. He wanted to see the introduction of ‘a more boyish education, adequate for the pupil’s position and the necessities of the people (...)’. It was time to prepare her properly for her constitutional role and the political struggles ahead. Particularly interesting is the emphasis on a *educación varonil* (boyish education). This can be understood as a rejection of the queen’s highly gendered education, which justified extensive teaching of sewing, embroidery, dance, and singing. Ventosa believed that this needed to be replaced by more practical and scientific lessons. The special position of Isabel as heir to the throne meant that masculine elements had to supersede the traditional elements associated with the education of women. It is worth quoting the redirection that Ventosa had in mind at some length:

To reach these objectives it is necessary to break with the routine way of transmitting knowledge, and more than anything, highlight especially scientific and political instruction, which is the basis of a philosophical education (...). It would be superfluous for me to pause to indicate how small the benefits would be that the nation would receive from the talents of painting, singing and dancing, handwork, etc. from its Queen and how harmful it would even be if any of those skills captivated her full attention, (...)³⁹

For the nation to benefit from the queen’s education, a new direction was needed in her teaching and the remaining conservative elements would have to be purged from the palace and a new routine implemented.

Mina disagreed with these allegations, revealing a split even within the progressive palace staff. She did not think that the lesson plan had suffered due to the addition of new activities and preoccupations, and regarded Ventosa as motivated by his political self-interest, rather than actual concern for Isabel’s and Luisa Fernanda’s education. Mina had, furthermore, regarded Ventosa’s teaching method as inadequate and excessively playful.⁴⁰ As Burdiel concluded, if anything Mina was an example of a more progressive version of female education and was interested in transmitting a similar upbringing to

³⁹ Ibid, 148. All translations are my own unless otherwise stated. For the original Spanish quote see Appendix, No.1. Future references to original quotes in Spanish in the Appendix will be referred to simply as A/No.

⁴⁰ Espoz y Mina and Pérez de Guzmán, *Apuntes*, 149/150.

her queen.⁴¹ Despite this dispute, Ventosa was left in post for the time being, though his criticism was roundly rejected and his actions and teaching subsequently came under increased scrutiny.⁴²

It was Isabel II's future marriage options that brought internal discord into the open. In the summer of 1842 Ventosa allegedly presented a portrait of Francisco de Asís, the son of Isabel's paternal uncle, the Infante Francisco de Paula, to the young queen and passed on messages to her from the Infante and his wife. Ventosa, as well as many other *progresistas* at the time saw this match as essential to guaranteeing the freedom of the Spanish nation in the long-term and the only viable alternative to some *moderados'* favourite option of marrying the queen off to a son of the pretender Don Carlos.⁴³ Ventosa's attempts to cajole Isabel II into marrying her cousin ultimately led to his dismissal on 12 July 1842.

Following the downfall of Espartero in 1843, Ventosa admitted to Mina that 'my first work was to inspire in my disciple [Isabel II] hate and horror toward D. Carlos and all his family.' He openly conceded that his priority had been to preserve the power of the progressive party. He sought to do so through 'a liberal, very liberal instruction of the queen' on the one hand and, on the other, her marriage. In his opinion, 'the party that shapes it [the marriage] will dominate the situation.'⁴⁴ Control over the marriage and political control were inextricably linked. Ventosa firmly believed that a king consort had the power to influence the queen, despite her constitutional supremacy. This perceived female weakness made marriage such a central concern to liberals and conservatives alike.

Ventosa's dismissal and its aftermath did not lead to a fundamental alteration in the liberal direction of Isabel's teaching. The newly appointed teacher, Colonel Francisco Luján, was another example of a politically active and highly educated liberal selected to take a leading role in teaching at the palace. The colonel was a distinguished officer, son of a prominent liberal deputy to the Cadiz Cortes, and was himself a deputy for the region of Badajoz at the time of his appointment. In addition, he had published an influential book on geology in 1841 and was one of the founding members of the

⁴¹ Burdiel, *Isabel II*.

⁴² "Resolution of Argüelles", 23/06/1842, cited in Espoz y Mina and Pérez de Guzmán, 136-138.

⁴³ AHN-DiversosTítulosFamilias-Leg.3476-366/1, Donoso Cortes to María Cristina, 24/02/1842. Donoso Cortes, a prominent conservative thinker, politician and adviser to María Cristina, concluded that the best arrangement was Isabel II's marriage to Don Carlos' son,

⁴⁴ AHN-DiversosTítulosFamilias-Leg.3757-N.42, Ventosa to Espoz y Mina, 30/09/1843.

Academia de Ciencias de Madrid (1836).⁴⁵ Luján tried to introduce a more scientific approach to Isabel's education and to this end ordered new teaching materials as natural sciences and geography were given a new impetus. Somewhat ironically the move toward a more scientific method was one of the points Ventosa had previously advocated.

Ventosa's dismissal, however, was not easily brushed aside. The resignation of Santa Cruz as *Camarera Mayor* on 28 July 1842 put Isabel's upbringing back into the centre of the press's attention. In her resignation letter, published in the progressive *Eco del Comercio*, Santa Cruz alleged that 'an inquisitorial spirit of control, suspicion, not to say oppression' reigned at the palace and undermined 'the dignity of the throne.'⁴⁶ *El Español Independiente* and *La Postdata* had also got hold of and printed excerpts of Ventosa's criticism of Isabel's education. This raised further doubts about the progress of Isabel's teaching and its suitability for a future constitutional queen.⁴⁷ The dismissal of a progressive liberal teacher and the resignation of one of the few grandees that had remained at Isabel's side after María Cristina's departure, reinforced the perception that Isabel was being held captive by a clique of Espartero loyalists. This played into the hand of the *moderados* agitating for political change, as well as *progresitas* increasingly alienated by Espartero's authoritarianism and cronyism.

Mina and Quintana compiled a written defence of their record to the *Tutor* in May 1843. The report reveals three highly significant issues concerning Isabel II's education. Firstly, it shows that the appointment of new teachers was intended to signal a change in priorities and methods. Public endorsement of their choices was sought and used as a form of validation. Mina and Quintana argued that the appointment of 'the ablest teachers' meant that Isabel's instruction in science, arts, and history would reach more advanced levels. They felt that the teachers selected had been approved by the 'public applause' for their work. They wanted to counter claims that education was neglected and provided evidence of their efforts to ensure teaching was closely supervised and entrusted to distinguished individuals. They believed that their examples proved 'that the education of the Spanish princesses has not been neglected, nor is it being neglected, as

⁴⁵ On Francisco de Luján see A. Gil Novales, *Diccionario Biográfico de España (1808-1833): De los orígenes del liberalismo a la reacción absolutista*, <http://diccionario.historia.fundacionmapfre.org/bio.php?id=95349> .

⁴⁶ *El Eco del Comercio*, 28/07/1842.

⁴⁷ *El Español Independiente*, 06/08/1842 and *La Postdata* 05/08/1842.

has been claimed so imprudently.⁴⁸ The latter part of that statement also reveals the *Ayos*'s concern with and awareness of public criticism.

Secondly, the report shows that Mina and Quintana used and were aware of other examples of monarchical education and of texts on royal education.⁴⁹ They argued that they knew all the texts written on the topic, but that these could not be applied. It was too late to subject Isabel and her sister to the appropriate and severe discipline from an early age as recommended by much of the literature on royal education. They also referred to the example of the education of Louis XIV's first son to justify an approach to education that was not excessively reliant on meticulous study. It is argued that the effect of the rigid upbringing on the Dauphin ran counter to its intentions to instil discipline and love of scholarship, leaving the heir instead with a lifelong distaste for books and learning. The same was to be avoided for Isabel II, which explained why a more playful and natural form of teaching had been preferred in her early childhood.⁵⁰

The third issue that is worth highlighting is the aims espoused in the report. The emphasis on instilling in the queen a new conception of monarchy, whose legitimacy was based on the nation is made even more explicit than in previous documents. The 'source of her [Isabel II's] glory and security' was to be found exclusively in the political systems and the laws that governed the nation. This is a radical move away from traditional or absolutist monarchies, which considered themselves legitimised by religion, history, and raw power. The princesses were to be 'highly grateful to the sacrifice that this nation has made for them and dedicated to keep her in the liberty and independence, (...).' In the only reference to Isabel II specifically, i.e. without mentioning her in conjunction with her sister, the *Ayos* defined their mission as follows: 'In sum the thoughts, habits and customs of Isabel II should correspond to those of the queen of a free people.' It was Quintana's and Mina's foremost duty to ensure that Isabel II's education would make

⁴⁸ AHN-DiversosTitulosFamilias-Leg3757-N.5, "Exposición de los Ayos de SM y A al Señor tutor", 20/05/1843.

⁴⁹ Some of the works mentioned in the preface of Espoz y Mina and Pérez de Guzmán, *Apuntes*, x, are Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo y Valdés, *Libro de la camara real del Príncipe Don Juan e offiçios de su casa e seruiçio ordinario* (Madrid, 1870); Vicente Mut, *El Príncipe En La Guerra Y En La Paz: Copiado de La Vida Del Emperador Iustiniano* (Madrid, 1640); Iñigo Gomez Barreda, *El Ayo de la nobleza, y el noble instruido en su infancia, y politico en la corte, sin faltar à la virtud*, (1762).

⁵⁰ AHN-DiversosTitulosFamilias-Leg3757-N.5, "Exposición de los Ayos", 20/05/1843.

her a good constitutional and liberal ruler.⁵¹ If this brought her into conflict with other teachers and the press, it was a sacrifice worth making for the benefit of the nation.

Espartero's downfall and Isabel II's early majority

The fall of Madrid to an alliance of rebellious officers supported by some of the civil *progresista* elements disillusioned with Espartero in July 1843 brought the general's regency to an end. As a consequence of these events, Argüelles, Quintana, Mina, Luján, and the *Confesor* all resigned from their posts and left the palace, thus pre-empting their likely dismissal. The pre-Espartero era confessor and teacher, Manuel Joaquín Tarancón, senator and Bishop of Osma, became the new head teacher and there was a renewed focus on religious education. For this short interim period immediately preceding Isabel's reign, there is little evidence pertaining to her upbringing. What is clear is that once more political events led to major changes and did not allow for consistency in her education. Furthermore, the new regime decided to bring Isabel II's majority forward in order to avoid a third regency, which brought a rather abrupt end to her teaching. Isabel II was declared of age in November 1843, when she was only 13 years old.

The continued importance attached to *labores* and other gendered aspects of Isabel's education throughout her youth, supports the argument that bourgeois conceptions of femininity and their idealisation of the 'domestic angel' played an important role in her symbolic representation.⁵² Comparing Isabel's upbringing to more progressive examples of female education among the *haute bourgeoisie*, it is fair to say that the queen's education remained limited and exhibited a focus on the domestic rather than preparing her fully for her future role as a constitutional monarch.⁵³ Despite the centrality of her position in the political system, her gender conditioned her learning and inhibited her preparation. This supports Burdiel's conclusion that 'Isabel II was basically not educated as a constitutional queen, but as a lady of high society' and that 'instances of more advanced female education – that could be found among middle class women, such as Mina – only

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Burdiel, 'The Queen', 317-319.

⁵³ For works on female education in nineteenth-century Spain see Aurora Rivière Gómez, *La educación de la mujer en el Madrid de Isabel II* (Madrid, 1993); Victoria Robles "La historia de la educación de las mujeres. Líneas, problemas y aportaciones a la historiografía educativa" in María Isabel del Val (ed.) *La historia de las mujeres. Una revisión historiográfica*, (Valladolid, 2004), 355-371; Consuelo Flecha, *Las mujeres XVIII y XIX*.

resonated as an echo in the general Palace environment during the short period in which the condesa [de Espoz y Mina] had some influence on it'.⁵⁴

1.2 Alfonso XII

An analysis of the aims that underpinned Alfonso XII's education provides interesting insights into the relationship between the court and the state, the link between the military and the heir, and the challenges, as well as the opportunities that a life in exile offered. The intersection of state and public interests in Alfonso XII's education introduces questions concerning the boundary between the public and the private. More specifically this section will ask to what extent the monarchy realised and accepted that the heir's education could no longer be considered a predominantly private affair and whether this affected the selection of teachers and development of a pedagogical plan. Alfonso's upbringing is remarkable, not only because it took place during a time of extensive political turmoil, but also because much of his formational period was spent in exile. His education in France, Austria and England shines a light on the challenges of an education outside of the palace environment and on the efforts that were made to restore the Bourbon monarchy. Furthermore, the significance of the heir's education in the schemes that would eventually lead to the Restoration in December 1874 also needs to be assessed.

Alfonso's education and dynastic stability

Alfonso was born on 28 November 1858 amid great public celebration; Isabel II had finally produced a male heir to the throne. The news was greeted with a 25-shot gun salute across Spain and gifts of money and wine were distributed to members of the armed forces.⁵⁵ The birth of a healthy male child meant that Spain appeared to banish the threat of another crisis of succession in the form of a Carlist rising. Due to his gender and the fact that there was never a male spare, Alfonso was always a politically

⁵⁴ Burdiel, *Isabel II*.

⁵⁵ AGP-ReinadosAlfonsoXII-Caja12830-Leg.4, "Natalico de SM el Rey como Principe de Asturias", 07/12/1857.

significant figure. It is hence unsurprising that it was not long before teachers were appointed and the plan for his upbringing became an issue of wider concern.

On Alfonso's third birthday Isabel II and her husband Francisco de Asís sent a remarkable open letter to Rafael de Busto y Castilla, Marqués de Corvera, at the time the *Ministro de Fomento*⁵⁶, to ask for advice on how to educate the heir. It is worth quoting the letter at length:

We wish that he will be in his day a Prince able to rule the great and complicated circumstances of his age; pious, enlightened, valorous, magnanimous, instructed in all the affairs of war and peace, and of such a loyal and firm character as that of the Nation to which Providence has destined him; Prince of a Spanish heart, worthy of Spain and worthy of her name.⁵⁷

Isabel and her husband believed that the best way to prepare Alfonso for the difficult and rapidly changing times ahead was to lay the foundations for his education early on. It was meant to balance the demands of a modern nation and its increasing complexity with traditional elements of royal upbringing such as military and religious instruction, as well as traditional Christian virtues such as magnanimity, mercy, and valour.

As interesting as the content of the letter is its sheer existence. The fact that the monarchy sought the government's advice on how to educate the prince so publicly can be interpreted in various ways. The first would be to follow the line of argument employed in the letter. Isabel II and Francisco de Asís stated that it was their 'care and the elevated position of the prince' that 'demand the advice of many other media'.⁵⁸ This is evidence if not necessarily of the acceptance, then of an acute awareness of the idea that the heir's upbringing could not be considered a mainly private affair, but had to be treated as an issue of public and political concern. It is remarkable that the monarchy should feel compelled to acknowledge this. In particular, if we consider that María Cristina had so vigorously defended her child's education as her prerogative in the 1840s. A more cynical interpretation would be to see the letter as nothing more than a public relations exercise, rather than a serious solicitation for advice. But even then, it is notable that the royal couple would engage in this form of publicity with regards to their son's education.

⁵⁶ The *Ministro de Fomento* was responsible for public works, infrastructure and public education for much of the nineteenth century.

⁵⁷ PRRB-II/3380, Isabel II and Francisco de Asís to Corvera, 28/11/1860. A/No.2.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

The minister took his time to produce a response. It was almost a year before it materialised. In October 1861, the Marqués de Corvera sent a 25-page report on how the heir should ideally be educated. What is striking about this document in the first place, is the care with which it was compiled. To come to its conclusions the author stated that he ‘consulted competent, practical and accredited people.’⁵⁹ This is despite the fact that the minister was himself an expert on education, who had been involved in the foundation of the *Real Academia de Ciencias Morales y Políticas* and had sponsored the establishment of various public institutions. The importance of the heir’s education was such that even the minister with his extensive experience in pedagogical matters did not feel sufficiently qualified to design a plan on his own.

The report offers intriguing insights into the qualities, skills and functions of an ideal constitutional monarch. What stands out is the emphasis the minister placed on Alfonso’s physical and practical abilities. To him, intellectual education should not come at the cost of practice, exercise, and a broad knowledge of science, history and politics. There are two fundamental beliefs underpinning Corvera’s emphasis on practicality, one relating to the pedagogical method and the other to the function of a constitutional monarch. The former was the idea, present throughout the text, that learning at all stages and particularly at a young age required some form of active practice. Only then could theory be effective later on. Thus, the prince was not to be overly burdened with books and theoretical concepts. Instead it appears that the minister had various practical devices made that would aid Alfonso’s progress in reading and writing. As the author stressed, it was important that the heir learned a lot and that he did so fast; to this end practice and the best tools were essential.

The second belief was that the heir, as future constitutional king, had to embody the nation and to do so meant that he had to acquire a broad knowledge. To quote Corvera, the heir should not ‘pretend to be what one calls a specialist of any kind’, as this would only narrow his character. Instead he suggested the character ‘of the prince and his post should be the most general and comprehensive representation of society as a whole.’⁶⁰ The emphasis on character development and bodily exercise fits well with upper-class notions of education across Europe.⁶¹ For the heir to fulfil this function as a

⁵⁹ PRRB-II/3380, Corvera to Isabel II and Francisco de Asis, 15/10/1861.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ British public school education is a good example. See John Roach, *A History of Secondary Education in England, 1800-1870* (London, 1986), 260-269.

representative embodiment of the nation, he should not be a theorist, scientist or philosopher but an expert in the practical issues ‘of peace and war, political and military morality, (...).’ Corvera concluded that the ‘happiness of a reign’ depended not just on the king’s personal virtue, but on how closely the ruler personified the national spirit. ‘All forms of government, even the most absolutist’, he declared, ‘have always been powerful and happy in as far as they represented the most genuine and comprehensive personification of the spirit of its country in its time.’ It was therefore necessary that the ‘spirit of the nation’ would become the ‘prince’s highest teacher.’⁶² Corvera believed that education had the potential to form the future king into a man of his age and nation. The monarchy was meant to adapt and conform to wider social and political developments that shaped contemporary Spain.

Unfortunately, not much is known of Alfonso’s early education beyond the subjects he was taught, some rough schedules and his marks.⁶³ From January 1864, when Alfonso was seven years old, records were kept of Alfonso’s classes. These usually took the form of a short comment on his performance in a subject – at the beginning mainly reading, writing, and religious doctrine, with geography, arithmetic, and history taught from a later age. There are also some longer comments on his conduct. Two points are worth making. Firstly, the very existence and the quantity of records is notable. There are a total of 3,220 individual marks, on average more than two for every day between January 1864 to April 1868. This demonstrates that a great effort was made to monitor Alfonso XII’s education.⁶⁴ It is even possible that these were kept to guard against any critics who claimed the heirs’ education was not taken seriously. The schedules we have for Alfonso further support the argument that learning played a large role in the young heir’s life and was by no means neglected.⁶⁵

Secondly, an analysis of the marks over the four years shows that a more meritocratic spirit began to take a hold not only across Spanish society but also at court. Unlike his mother, Alfonso was not excessively praised or showered with flattery. On the contrary, there are some entries suggesting that on certain days Alfonso performed ‘*muy mal*’ (very

⁶² PRRB-II/3380, Corvera to Isabel II and Francisco de Asis, 15/10/1861.

⁶³ PRRB-II/4067(12)–(14); “Cuadernos de caligrafía de S.M. Alfonso XII”, 1864-1868

⁶⁴ PRRB-II/4067(1), “Cuaderno de calificaciones diarias de S.M. Alfonso XII desde el 2 de enero de 1864 hasta el 4 de abril de 1868”.

⁶⁵ AGP-Cajón114-Leg.2, “Distribucion de horas para SAR el Principe de Asturias”. At least three hours a day were dedicated to lessons.

badly) or was even described as *'insoportable'* (unbearable) or *'inaguantable'* (intolerable).⁶⁶ Very rarely did he receive the best mark, *'immejorable'* (superb) and on average, he received a *'bien'* (good). The fairness and bluntness of the prince's assessment is further underlined when we compare his marks to those of Juan de Ceballos, an aristocratic child who appears to either have been educated with Alfonso or at least alongside him. They performed similarly, with Alfonso gaining only slightly higher marks over the period.⁶⁷ The common narrative of royal education – that it was ruined by flattery and a lack of discipline – can be rejected on this basis. It provides some evidence of the emergence of a more meritocratic and closely supervised pedagogical method. It was not only important for the heir to receive an education, but just like his peers at public schools, for the outcome to be measured and evaluated. The process of rationalisation and continuous evaluation had penetrated the palace walls.

The rank of the teachers and their qualifications reflected the importance that was accorded to Alfonso's education and the court's continued political significance. Posts at court, including amongst Alfonso's teaching staff, remained coveted and were politically significant. The position of *jefe de estudios*, a sort of overall director of studies, was assigned to a high-ranking member of the armed forces, General Antonio Sánchez Ossorio.⁶⁸ The *jefe de cuarto*, the director of the royal chamber, was the Marqués of Alcañices, a respected and well-connected nobleman, and the father of José Osorio de Silva, Duque de Sesto, who would become one of the most influential financial and political sponsors of the Bourbon family in exile. The task of religious education was initially entrusted to Cayetano Fernández, a professor from the University of Seville. He was eventually replaced by the Archbishop of Burgos, who also took on the role of confessor to the prince. The *gentilhombre de cámara* (gentleman-in-waiting), Guillermo Morphy had a lasting impact on Alfonso's education. He would follow the royal family into exile in the fall of 1868, gave private lessons to the prince and remained one of Alfonso's closest confidants as his private secretary until the king's death. He was a multi-talented and highly educated man, who spoke several languages, had studied law

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Data taken from PRRB-II/4067(1), "Cuaderno" and PRRB-II/4067(2), "Cuaderno de calificaciones diarias de un condiscípulo de S.M. Alfonso XII, pbte. Juan de Ceballos, desde el 1 de enero de 1864 hasta el 19 de julio de 1867". An averaging of marks indicated that both Alfonso and Ceballos received an average mark of *'bien'*, which was the third best mark in the scale applied. There are instances when Ceballos did better than Alfonso XII.

⁶⁸ AGP-ReinadosIsabelIII-Caja8682-Leg.26, "Carta del Mayordomo Mayor al Insp. Gral. De oficios y gastos", 20/12/1864.

and was known as a patron of the arts. While there is no doubt that these tutors were extremely qualified individuals, little is known about the subject matters each of them taught at this time. However, the appointments of such well-known and respected individuals support the argument that, at the very least, the monarchy felt the need to give the impression that Alfonso was taught in the best way possible.

Exile as challenge and opportunity

Isabel II's rule came to an end in September 1868, amid events that have become known as the *Gloriosa*, the Glorious Revolution. Widespread dissatisfaction among the progressive liberal party, the Unión Liberal, and sections of the armed forces at their exclusion from power had steadily undermined the queen's standing. There was also unhappiness about the disproportionate influence that court camarillas seemed to exert on the political process. After various failed attempts and the death of two of the monarchy's strongest supporters in the army, Generals O'Donnell and Narváez, a *pronunciamento* led by elements of the navy and army, but enjoying substantial popular support, finally succeeded in toppling the monarchy.⁶⁹ On 30 September, the royal family crossed the border at Biarritz to begin their French exile, which would last until 1875. This political change had important consequences for Alfonso's education. He could no longer be educated as before; new teachers and new ways of teaching the prince had to be found.

Alfonso's standing within the dynasty during his exile is vital to an evaluation of his education. From the very start it was clear that Isabel would not accept her removal from the throne without a fight and would do everything to return to Spain. It was not long, though, before monarchists considered Isabel's abdication in favour of her son. After much agonising, those urging Isabel II to give up her claim to the Spanish throne prevailed and on 25 June 1870 the exiled queen abdicated and transmitted her 'political rights' to Alfonso. However, unlike her mother, who had given up her authority over her children, she insisted on reserving hers over the Prince of Asturias until 'he was

⁶⁹ The causes of the revolution are more complex and disputed than could possibly be outlined here. See Bahamonde Magro and Martínez, *Historia*, Cuarta parte. La construcción del estado democrático (1868-1874).

proclaimed by a Government and Cortes, which represent the legitimate vote of the nation'.⁷⁰

The most significant changes in exile took place in Alfonso's schooling. They reflected new priorities as well as the challenges presented by the royal family's expulsion from Spain. The custom had been for Bourbon princes to be educated at court by private tutors, professors and clerics. The same held true for Alfonso until 1868. In Paris, Alfonso, together with his companion the Conde de Benalúa, enrolled in the *Collège Stanislas*, located in the *Rue Notre-Dame de Champs* in Paris. While this was by no means a school for the common people – Dardé has pointed out it was a private and highly elitist establishment – the fact that Alfonso was educated alongside other pupils marked a significant and remarkable change.⁷¹ Never before had a Bourbon heir to the Spanish throne been educated in a classroom outside the palace. One factor that might have influenced the decision against a purely private education could have been increasing financial difficulties that the royal family was facing. Moreover, it was much easier for Alfonso to attend a school with other pupils when he was no longer the officially designated heir.

There is reliable information on the subjects Alfonso was taught and the kind of education that he received during his time at the *Collège Stanislas*. The royal library in Madrid holds several exercise books dating to Alfonso's time at the college and these show that the prince worked extensively on translations from French into Latin and Greek. Interestingly, these documents appear to have been presented to Alfonso XIII by Professor Eug. de Ribier, probably a former teacher at the school, to thank him for subscribing to his *Revue de Poeters*. De Ribier told Alfonso XII's son that the manuscripts 'give a perfect impression of the excellent classical education the young prince [Alfonso XII] received, as a worthy preparation to reign the destinies of Spain.'⁷² The presentation itself and the sophistication of the translations point to a relatively high standard of education, especially as Alfonso was only thirteen at the time. Furthermore, the classics were evidently still an important element in the instruction of a prince.

Despite being exiled, some special arrangements were made for the royal pupil, which were intended to strengthen Alfonso's bond with Spain, her culture, history, and politics.

⁷⁰ AGP-ReinadosAlfonsoXII-Cajón19-Leg.22, "Abdicación de Isabel II (Paris)", 25/06/1870

⁷¹ Carlos Dardé, *Alfonso XII*, 43.

⁷² PRRB-II/4067(4), "Ejercicios escolares de tema de francés al latín y al griego realizados por S.M. Alfonso XII cuando fue alumno del colegio Stanislas de Paris", c.1870.

Alfonso and Benalúa received special lessons in Spanish literature, grammar, history, and politics.⁷³ There was a deliberate effort to make sure that Alfonso did not lose contact with Spain – at least intellectually. It was probably the aim of Alcañices and Isabel that Alfonso should not appear as a foreign prince, unaware of his own nation’s cultural identity. The emphasis on Alfonso’s essential and enduring Spanishness remained an important feature of his public image, as would be evident in his Sandhurst Manifesto of November 1874.⁷⁴

Even when Isabel’s abdication was not yet decided upon, Alfonso’s education had already started to play a central role in preparations for a possible restoration. The one issue that constantly appeared in the correspondence received by Alfonso were his studies. As early as November 1869, the Marqués de Novaliches expressed that he had ‘known with great pleasure that Your Highness has affection for the college and that you apply yourself and procure to advance in your studies.’⁷⁵ Novaliches expected nothing less of Alfonso than for him to be the best in his class. Alfonso’s response indicated that the prince applied himself. In August 1870 Alfonso reported that he ‘had passed his exams in which I obtained two firsts and two seconds.’⁷⁶ His best marks were in history and geography, while he also did well in arithmetic and writing. Novaliches expressed his pleasure at Alfonso’s progress and asked to hear more about his advances in other subject areas.⁷⁷ The interest shown by this high-ranking General and nobleman and by Alcañices demonstrates that the heir’s education was regarded as an essential piece in the long-term effort to restore the Bourbon monarchy to Spain.

⁷³ Julio Quesada Cañaverl y Piédrola, *Memorias Del Conde de Benalúa, Duque de San Galatino*, (Madrid, 1924).

⁷⁴ Alfonso XII, “Manifiesto de Sandhurst”, Own translation at <http://heirstothethrone-project.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Sandhurst-Manifiesto-Translation.pdf>. The manifesto was written by Cánovas, but signed by Alfonso, as a response to the congratulatory messages Alfonso XII received on his seventeenth birthday. The text is a declaration of Alfonso’s intentions in case of his return to Spain.

⁷⁵ AGP-ArchivoPersonalesFamiliaries-Novaliches-Caja19100-Leg.8, Novaliches to Alfonso XII, 26/11/1869.

⁷⁶ AGP-ArchivoPersonalesFamiliaries-Novaliches-Caja19100-Leg.8, Alfonso XII to Novaliches, 08/08/1870.

⁷⁷ AGP-ArchivoPersonalesFamiliaries-Novaliches-Caja19100-Leg.8, Novaliches to Alfonso XII 12/08/1870 and 15/09/1870

In search of an education appropriate for a Spanish king (1870-1873)

Isabel's abdication in 1870 significantly changed matters for Alfonso. From then on he was officially the holder of the royal family's dynastic rights. While the queen did not sign away her rights as mother, she did formalise the planning of Alfonso's education and put some of her most trusted men in charge. Alcañices was nominated as '*ayo, jefe* and only director of his [Alfonso's] education.' She also made Don Guillermo Morphy y Guzmán the prince's new '*jefe de estudios*', which according to Benalúa was due to his 'qualifications, loyalty, and great enlightenment.'⁷⁸ Morphy had close links to the court, an exceptional education, and a good relationship with Alfonso. Espadas Burgos has described him as 'one of the most distinguished individuals of the Restoration'.⁷⁹

Morphy was optimistic that he and the other teachers could mould Alfonso into a good ruler. In the summer of 1870, Morphy and O'Ryan, a colonel and military instructor, privately taught Benalúa and Alfonso in Deauville, France. Benalúa noted in his memoirs that they were taught modern history and that these lessons 'showed the Prince to be a constitutional king and introduced his mind to the necessity to reign modern people, and more than anything Spain, with the regalia of the crown, with a constitution, guarantee to the people, and respecting dogma without superstition.'⁸⁰ From these principles Alfonso's teachers sought to teach a young adolescent how to be a good king. Kingship was not taken to be a God-given talent but had to be learned. The heir had to internalize and respect these signifiers of modernity: constitutions, rationality, and tolerance.

New options and further changes had to be considered in 1870 following the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian war, which ended Alfonso's time at the *Collège Stanislas*, and forced the royal family to move to Geneva.⁸¹ Finding a new school in Switzerland was not an easy task, as it had to fulfil a dual function. The school had to both conform to Isabel II's wishes and create a favourable impression among the royal family's supporters and potential allies. This period of uncertainty and the search for the best possible school for Alfonso, laid bare some of the priorities underlying Alfonso's education. It shows what skills, knowledge, and values a restored constitutional king was meant to acquire

⁷⁸ Quesada Cañaveral y Piédrola, *Memorias*, 87

⁷⁹ Espadas Burgos, *Alfonso XII y los orígenes de la Restauración*, 51.

⁸⁰ Julio Quesada Cañaveral y Piédrola, *Memorias*, 97. and ARAH-IsabelII-9/6962, O'Ryan to Isabel II, 19/11/1870.

⁸¹ ARAH-IsabelII-9/6962, O'Ryan to Isabel II, 19/11/1870.

and highlights Isabel II's and her supporters' concern with the transmission of Alfonso's image in Spain.

The search for a new school was put in the hands of O'Ryan y Vazquez. The first major challenge O'Ryan had to confront was that the institution Alfonso was to attend had to be Catholic. He noted that the search for a school had proved difficult, because in Protestant Switzerland there was 'barely a regular Catholic establishment of instruction nor a [Catholic] professor'.⁸² While the search continued O'Ryan organised Alfonso's education, which was too important to be suspended. He set a limit of five hours of study a day, which were directed by professors from nearby schools. A letter from a teacher of the *Collège Royale d'Annecy*, Victor Duret, which reminded the prince of his holiday homework during the summer of 1871, suggests that the religious issue was at least temporarily addressed by the hiring of professors from across the French border.⁸³

Why was the denomination of the school such a crucial issue to Isabel II and those in charge of Alfonso's education? One answer would be to point to Isabel II's piety and her unreformed hostility to Protestantism. While this played a role, Isabel's correspondence suggests that there was more to it than her personal beliefs. The function of education within the political project of the restoration, in particular with respect to the construction of Alfonso's image, was another important factor. In reply to O'Ryan's report on the *Pagérie*, a respected school in Munich directed by Baron von Lerchenfeld, Isabel II explained her misgivings about sending Alfonso to a mixed (Catholic and Protestant) institution. She believed this to be 'a grave thing in religious matters, mainly because of its effect in Spain'. Isabel II's concern was not with morality, but with the possible outrage the choice of school could cause. What she sought to protect was Alfonso's reputation and image that were to be transmitted across the border. She believed that there must be no question about the purity of Alfonso's Catholic faith. Her worry about the message that the choice of educational establishment would send went even further. She believed that the name of the school could lead to confusion due to 'the meaning of the title of the college and the word *pagé*'. In combination with the religious issue this meant that 'it would not be prudent or correct that the prince should enrol as a student at this institute [the *Pagérie*].'⁸⁴ It was not the set-up of the school, its

⁸² AGP-ArchivosPersonalesFamiliares-Novaliches-Caja19100, O'Ryan to Novaliches, 19/10/1870.

⁸³ AGP-ReinadosAlfonso XII-Cajón21-Leg.23, Victor Duret to Alfonso XII, 18/08/1871.

⁸⁴ ARAH-Isabel II-9/6962, Isabel II to O'Ryan, c.1871.

curriculum or the teachers, but the possible negative effects on Alfonso's image in Spain that counted against the school and complicated O'Ryan's task.

The denomination of the new school was central to the decision to send Alfonso to the *Theresianum* in Vienna. Isabel's personal interest and piety coincided directly with her concerns for Alfonso's image and the religious issue could therefore not be avoided. As a conservative Catholic country with sympathies for the Bourbon cause, Austria seemed a sound choice. Besides, prestige mattered. Martín Belda, later Marqués de Cabra and prominent former governor of Madrid, in a letter to Isabel II highlighted the *Theresianum*'s advantageous features.⁸⁵ He pointed out that the school was directed by the president of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Empire (*Tribunal Supremo de Justicia de este Imperio*) and that the *jefe de estudios* was a highly respected individual. The *Theresianum* was praised for its impressive facilities, 'its scientific cabinets, its schools for horse-riding, gymnastics, fencing, and swimming, which leave nothing to be desired.' All in all, he concluded this was 'one of the most complete and most remarkable educational establishments in all of Europe.'⁸⁶

Lastly there was a significant political aspect to the decision to send Alfonso to the *Theresianum*. The autumn of 1871 witnessed the rapprochement between Montpensier, the queen's brother-in-law, with his own intentions on the Spanish throne, and Isabel II. Montpensier had been seen as the queen's rival before the 1868 revolution, as he was considered a liberal monarchical alternative for the Spanish throne. In January 1872, the rapprochement led to the agreement known as the *Convenio de Cannes*, in which Montpensier agreed to recognise Alfonso as the rightful heir to the Spanish throne, committed himself to the direction of the Alfonsist movement and in turn was promised the regency in case Alfonso was restored while still a minor.⁸⁷

Espadas Burgos has argued that one of the initial conditions in the negotiations of the *Convenio* was that Alfonso should be educated far from home to become more independent of his mother and her entourage. According to him, any agreement meant that the Prince of Asturias 'would continue his education at a foreign college, away from his mother.'⁸⁸ Dardé has also interpreted Montpensier's wish to keep Alfonso removed

⁸⁵ On Martín Belda see AHN-Catálogo de Títulos y Grandezas de España, 82

⁸⁶ ARAH-IsabelII-9/6953, Martín Belda to Isabel II, 05/01/1872.

⁸⁷ Espadas Burgos *Alfonso XII*, 181.

⁸⁸ *Ibid*, 178.

from Isabel's court as one of the main motivations behind the choice of the *Theresianum*.⁸⁹

This is not entirely convincing. Firstly it has been shown above that the idea of educating Alfonso at a college and not at home had been approved by October 1870, well before any rapprochement with Montpensier.⁹⁰ Moreover, in a note on the talks with Montpensier Isabel II wrote that she had 'guarded the absolute custody and care of my son's and his sister's education, preserving the indispensable right to put at his side the individuals that inspire me with utmost confidence.'⁹¹ Lastly, it is clear that Alfonso and O'Ryan would have gone to Vienna much earlier than January 1871, had it not been for the epidemic that had broken out in the city. This undermines the argument of direct connection between the *Convenio* and the decision in favour of the *Theresianum*.⁹²

It is possible, however, that the rapprochement between Isabel and Montpensier gave an added impetus and urgency to the search of a new school, which after all had been discussed for over a year. While doubts over Montpensier's influence must remain, the fact that Alfonso's education played a part in the negotiations of the *Convenio* at all is remarkable. It underlines the importance that was attached to control over Alfonso's upbringing and entourage, as a means to influencing the exiled heir. For Isabel and Montpensier, as well as their respective supporters, the prince's education played a vital role in shaping the heir's political future, his allegiances and his character. It presented an opportunity to shape the future of the Spanish monarchy.

During his time at the *Theresianum*, Alfonso's education was closely supervised, carefully directed and tailored to the needs of a monarch-in-waiting. The direction of Alfonso's teaching at the college was in the hands of the school's director, a certain Mr Pavlovsky. According to Alfonso's private German teacher, the task of educating the prince was 'not at all easy' at first. The teacher described his task as 'accompanying the prince everywhere, monitor his studies and practice German with him with a few conversations.' Moreover, 'all the teachers did what they could to eliminate this

⁸⁹ Dardé *Alfonso XII*, 40.

⁹⁰ For example AGP-ArchivosPersonalesFamiliares-Novaliches-Caja19100-Leg.1, Isabel II to Novaliches, 24/10/1870.

⁹¹ ARAH-IsabelII-9/6951, Hand-written note by Isabel II also cited in Espadas Burgos, *Alfonso XII*, 180.

⁹² AGP-ArchivosPersonalesFamiliares-Novaliches-Caja19100-Leg. 8, Alfonso XII to Novaliches, 31/12/1871. Alfonso wrote: 'We are here without being able to go to Vienna, due to the diseases that reign there, in the meantime I am dedicating my time to the study of German, which I am beginning to understand.'

difficulty' by 'explaining a lesson in French, another in Spanish, and others in Italian (...).'⁹³ Special arrangements were also made to preserve the prince's elevated position and enable him to receive guests to his lodgings at the school. While it is difficult to confirm whether these receptions were politically meaningful, it is interesting to see that Alfonso was increasingly expected to play a more active part in politics. One frequent visitor was Montpensier, who tried to forge a closer link between himself and the prince.⁹⁴ Another was Tomás del Corral y Oña, Marqués de San Gregorio. The rector of the Universidad Central had Alfonsist sympathies and reported back to Isabel II to convey his approval of the curriculum and, in particular, of the combination of physical and intellectual exercise. He was impressed with the spaciousness of the college. The princes' quarters had 'a salon that is larger than that in Y.M.'s palace in Paris and a large salon as his bedroom.'⁹⁵ The school allowed Alfonso to receive visitors in the manner appropriate for an heir to the Spanish throne.

All in all, the prince appears to have done well during his time at the *Theresianum*, as demonstrated by reports in the Austrian press. These were relayed to Alfonso's family and his supporters. On 22 July 1872, Pawlowsky sent Morphy a letter containing press cuttings from the *Wiener Zeitung* and the *Tagesblatt*, which both reported favourably on Alfonso's excellent performance and particularly commended his command of German.⁹⁶ That same month Alfonso also sent a certificate of his results to the Marqués de Novaliches and received a congratulatory note from his grandmother on his exam performance.⁹⁷ In March 1873, he received a letter from Mariano Roca de Togores, Marqués de Molins, a faithful loyalist of Isabel II's, which expressed the 'paternal interest' with which he followed and enjoyed the 'progress that Y.H. is making'. He told Alfonso that 'only in this way are thrones gained, are they merited, are they conserved.'⁹⁸ Two points are worth highlighting here. The first is that selected known supporters and the press in Vienna were deliberately informed of Alfonso's progress. There can be no clearer indication that Alfonso's education also functioned as a propaganda tool.

⁹³ AGP-ReinadosAlfonsoXII-Cajón25-Exp.Ó, "De la Juventud de Alfonso XII de España (por su preceptor alemán en Viena)", no date.

⁹⁴ ARAH-IsabelII-9/6952, Alfonso XII to Isabel II, 24/05/1872.

⁹⁵ ARAH-IsabelII-9/6963-LegXXIV-No. 55, Tomás del Corral y Oña to Isabel II, c.1872/73.

⁹⁶ AGP-ReinadosAlfonsoXII-Cajón22-Leg.14, Pawlowsky to Morphy, 22/07/1872.

⁹⁷ AGP-ArchivosPersonalesFamiliares-Novaliches-Caja19100-Leg.8 , Alfonso XII to Novaliches, 30/07/1872, and AGP-ReinadosAlfonsoXII-Cajón19-Leg.17, María Cristina to Alfonso XII, 27/07/1872.

⁹⁸ AGP-ReinadosAlfonsoXII-Cajón22-Leg.7-A, Mariano Roca de Togores to Alfonso XII, 19/03/1873.

Secondly there is at least an implicit and in the case of the Marqués de Molins even an explicit acceptance that it was not sufficient for an heir to claim his inherited dynastic rights, but he had to prove his merit through examination and the acquisition of values, skills, and knowledge. He had to show to his people that he deserved to be king. This is a substantial change from the conceptions of kingship that had been dominant in the pre-constitutional period. The idea that rule had to be exercised in service of the nation, that the king was accountable to his people and had to earn his right through his merits was gaining currency even at court.

Preparing Alfonso for constitutional rule (1873-74)

Cánovas' nomination to the leadership of the Alfonsist movement had important consequences for the prince's upbringing. Cánovas, who would become the architect of the Restoration and the dominant political figure in late nineteenth-century Spain, had not been Isabel's favourite candidate. She had clashed with him when he was Minister of Ultramar under O'Donnell in 1865 and his criticism of the *camarilla* and court politics did not endear him to the queen. Moreover Cánovas had not rushed to defend the monarchy's cause in 1868, and instead 'he saw it [the 1868 revolution] with fatalistic passivity' and dedicated himself to his other passion – the study of history in the Simancas archive.⁹⁹ Even though Cánovas *de facto* took over the direction of the Alfonsist cause inside Spain in February 1872, it was not until after the renewed break between Isabel II and Montpensier in January 1873 and after other options had fallen through, that he received the official commission from the queen. The formal concession of powers to Cánovas took place on 4 August 1873, and was confirmed by Isabel on the 22nd of the same month.¹⁰⁰ Crucially, Cánovas' nomination meant that the queen ostensibly accepted that any restoration would have to be brought about by a broader coalition, which included some of those who had rebelled against her in 1868. Thus, Cánovas sought to broaden the appeal of Alfonsism by assuring the Spanish people that the restoration would not mean a return to Isabel II's reign, demonstrating his commitment to constitutional rule and gaining military support. These aims would have a significant influence on Alfonso's education.

⁹⁹ Espadas Burgos *Alfonso XII*, 376-378

¹⁰⁰ AGP-ReinadosAlfonsoXII-Cajón19-Leg.19, Isabel II to Alfonso XII, 22/08/1873.

Cánovas probably agreed with those that recommended military instruction for the next stage of Alfonso's education, but to him it also needed to fulfil a broader function.¹⁰¹ As he told the queen in January 1874,

If it were possible to have Alfonso here [in Madrid] today I would not take him to the salons where people have waited for him like a Messiah, nor to the garrisons, where the majority of chiefs and officers are in his favour, but to the Puerta del Sol, and the Calle de Toledo, so that everyone would understand when they looked at him and contemplated his good-hearted appearance, that his coming shall not mean punishment nor vengeance, but peace, love and harmony.¹⁰²

Thus Cánovas's preoccupation was not in the first place with the military. While he stressed to the prince that he had to be presented as an alternative to the 'miserable interests of militarism', it was his main concern to 'distance [Alfonso] from the title of schoolboy' as he 'was already *todo un hombre*'.¹⁰³ Cánovas's aim was not to make the prince into a soldier but instead to foster a manly, military image of the prince that would preempt – rather than reinforce – the military's aspirations for power.

Moreover, by sending Alfonso to England, 'that classical country of constitutional kings', Cánovas sought to dispel the belief that the restoration would bring a reactionary turn. This was meant to demonstrate to the Spanish people, the military and politicians that he was 'as the majority of the country desires, a Prince inspired in the ideas of the time.' To Cánovas Alfonso's journey to Britain was 'indispensable'.¹⁰⁴ Crucially, Isabel II agreed and stressed that she understood that the times and the post of constitutional king demanded that 'his [Alfonso's] education should be perfect in every concept'.¹⁰⁵ Alfonso was to be educated as a modern, progressive king, closely modelled on the British example of constitutional rule.

It appears that in the spring of that same year the idea materialised that Alfonso should be sent to a military academy. Cánovas saw an opportunity to combine this new phase of the prince's education with his desire to have him experience the British constitutional

¹⁰¹ See AGP-ReinadoAlfonsoXII-Cajón22-Leg.32, Eduardo Fernandez San Roman to Alfonso XII, 19/09/1873.

¹⁰² AGP-ReinadosAlfonsoXII-Cajón19-Leg20, Cánovas to Isabel II, 09/01/1874. A/No.3.

¹⁰³ AGP-ReinadosAlfonsoXII-Cajón21-Leg.14-DocA, Cánovas to Alfonso XII, 17/01/1874. The expression 'todo un hombre' perhaps best translates as 'fully a man'.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ AGP-ReinadosAlfonsoXII-Cajón19-Leg.19, Isabel II to Cánovas, 18/01/1874.

system. He told Isabel II that it was ‘most urgent that he [Alfonso] becomes a soldier and England has fields of instructions and military establishments, where at the side of good teachers, real men of war, he can learn the office, from the age of 17, which many Spanish and foreign monarchs have known and practiced.’¹⁰⁶ It is interesting that Cánovas sought to combine an education that corresponded to the needs of the time with earlier traditions of monarchical upbringing; an English military academy appeared to fulfil this dual function. Once the journey to England was agreed on, the military component to Alfonso’s education became ever more apparent. This aspect to the prince’s upbringing and image will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.

Britain had always been Cánovas’s first choice.¹⁰⁷ In March 1874 he wrote to Isabel II that Alfonso had been in Austria long enough and it was now time ‘to transfer him to a country more sympathetic to Spain and where there are more constitutional traditions.’¹⁰⁸ Alfonso appears to have internalised these beliefs, telling Cánovas that ‘my heart desires that my country [Spain] should be as enlightened, as free and as rational as the most [enlightened, free and rational] in Europe.’¹⁰⁹ In addition, it is interesting to see that France was not even considered as a possible alternative; a republic was no place for a future Spanish king. The German Reich was, like Austria, probably not deemed constitutional enough. It is striking that this should have mattered to Cánovas. On the one hand, he was truly convinced that Alfonso should learn from the British example, and on the other he sought to reassure the Spanish people of the heir’s constitutional credentials. Thus he effectively combined Alfonso’s constitutional education and the image he sought the Spanish to form of the heir. It had to be possible for Spaniards to picture him as their future constitutional king.

What was Alfonso’s agency in any of this? As he neared the completion of his studies at the *Theresianum*, he was no longer a child but a maturing adolescent. At this time, Alfonso developed his own ideas on how his education should proceed and actively tried to become more independent from his mother. The first evidence of this is a letter to Isabel II in 1874, in which Alfonso stated that he would start writing ‘more independently’. Alfonso believed that if he corresponded personally with ‘those gentlemen who today are the best men of letters, this will serve me as study to learn to write well by myself;

¹⁰⁶ ARAH-IsabelII-9/6955-Leg.XVI-No.38, Cánovas to Isabel II, 12/03/1874.

¹⁰⁷ His Anglophilia is well-documented. See Kate Ferris, *Imagining ‘America’*, 11-13.

¹⁰⁸ ARAH-Isabel II-9/6955-Leg.XVI-No.38, Cánovas to Isabel II, 12/03/1874.

¹⁰⁹ ARAH-Isabel II-9/6960-Leg.XXI-No.301, Alfonso XII to Cánovas, 06/02/1874.

(...).¹¹⁰ He showed a desire to develop his skills further and connected this to becoming a self-reliant adult.

As Alfonso was nearing adulthood, he also gave his opinion on what the best option for his future education should be. He agreed with the change of professors that Cánovas had planned, but believed that Morphy should be kept by his side as a *Secretario Particular* (private secretary). Alfonso expressed his personal preference for university education, suggested to him by the Marqués de Molins, as it would allow him the flexibility to come and go as he pleased and take extra classes in mathematics and Spanish history and literature. Furthermore, he believed that ‘What cannot be denied, is that it is also essential for me to study and know what Cortes are, what a constitution is, what government is, etc. etc., because if I did not, it would be the same as wanting to be a writer, who when asked if he could write, answered no, but that it had a nice ring to it. Imagine what King Leopold of Belgium would have been without it’. He believed and was probably made to believe, that as a future king of Spain he had to be versed in the workings of a constitutional system. Alfonso also took other European monarchs as examples of the importance of political education. He accepted the centrality of the military component, but thought this requirement could be fulfilled simply by attending nearby army practice exercises.¹¹¹ Alfonso’s desire to receive a constitutional and political education is worth noting. The future king accepted that an understanding of Spain’s political institutions and her constitution was essential for a successful reign.

In the end, Alfonso remained in agreement with Cánovas, which meant that he would not attend university. Indeed, Alfonso’s political beliefs came to be almost indistinguishable from those of his political mentor. In November 1874, he agreed with Isabel II that replying to the congratulations received on his coming of age in November 1874 by means of a public declaration was not a good idea. He nevertheless insisted that Cánovas was right to insist on a response that laid out what sort of king he would be. He explained to his mother that ‘I believe that what I must do in Spain will be to unite all the intellectual forces of the country to overcome the word “party” and instead install the word “regeneration of the patria” (...).’ Further on, he wrote that he wanted to ‘protect the laws in the future, forgetting the past to obtain order.’¹¹² His belief in

¹¹⁰ ARAH-IsabelIII-9/6952-Leg.XIII-No.153, Alfonso XII to Isabel II”, 16/02/1874.

¹¹¹ ARAH-IsabelIII-9/6952-No.173, Alfonso XII to Isabel II, 27/04/1874.

¹¹² ARAH-IsabelIII-9/6952-No.214, Alfonso XII to Isabel II, 30/11/1874.

bringing prosperity to Spain through order, reconciliation, and a wholesale regeneration of the country closely echoed Cánovas' core message.

The short time that Alfonso spent at Sandhurst will be studied in more depth in the next chapter but suffice to say, that Cánovas's tactics worked. On 29 December 1874 Martínez Campos started the *pronunciamento* that led to the restoration of the Bourbon monarchy.

1.3 Alfonso XIII

Although Alfonso XIII's succession did not involve a fundamental political shift as had been the case with that of his father, it was not straightforward. Indeed, this dynastic transition presented an opportunity to redefine and reshape the monarchy as it approached the close of the nineteenth century and as the constitutional, ostensibly liberal, political system consolidated in Spain. The curriculum, choice of teachers, and the pedagogical aims were important means through which the future ruler and the monarchical institution were shaped. Alfonso's upbringing offers significant insights into the qualities, duties, and functions a modern, constitutional, and virtuous monarch was meant to possess at the turn of the century. The hopes and wishes for regeneration of the *patria*, especially after the loss of Cuba in 1898, left their mark on Alfonso XIII's education.

Unlike his father, who had become heir and king without a constitution in place and among uncertainty over the type of monarchy that would be established, Alfonso XIII was a monarch-in-waiting whose future political and military duties as king of Spain were quite clearly circumscribed by the 1876 constitution. Decisions on Alfonso XIII's education thus conformed to and ensured the fulfilment of the functions assigned to the monarch by the constitution. To understand the pedagogical aims behind the nomination of teachers and the selection of subjects, it is crucial to gain some understanding of the monarchy's place within the political system. Alfonso XIII was not only meant to bring change and regeneration, but was also supposed to emulate the example of his parents. Both were considered to have successfully fulfilled their constitutional duties and presided over an extended period of domestic stability. Like his

father, Alfonso XII, Alfonso XIII was to become a soldier-king and like both his parents he was to act as a just, fair and constitutional arbiter of party politics.

The Restoration's legal framework and Alfonso XIII's education (1885-1892)

It might seem odd to begin the story of Alfonso XIII's education before his birth on 17 May 1886, but the political importance of a future king of Spain can start in the womb. When Alfonso XII died on 25 November 1885, three days short of his 28th birthday, there was no male heir. However, his wife was pregnant. Instead of proclaiming the Princess of Asturias María de las Mercedes queen, the monarchical parties in government and opposition decided to wait and see if the pregnant Queen Regent María Cristina of Habsburg would give birth to a male heir. During the period of uncertainty that followed the death of the monarch, Cánovas, then President of the Council of Ministers, met with the leader of the opposition Liberal-Fusionist party, Práxedes Mateo Sagasta, to decide on how the political system could be stabilised. The agreement between the two parties, which became known as the *pacto del Prado*, established a peace between the monarchical parties that was vital to ensuring the survival of the Restoration system.¹¹³ The pact provided stability in the face of uncertainty, republican agitation, and the possible re-emergence of the Carlist threat. The gamble paid off, when on 17 May 1886, María Cristina gave birth to a son, who was immediately proclaimed King Alfonso XIII.¹¹⁴ The new king had – inadvertently of course – brought about a change of government, a pact between the monarchical parties, and a split in Cánovas's Conservative party before he was even born. This crisis highlights the continued fragility of the restoration system, the persistent threat to the monarchy from the left (Republicans, socialists, etc.) and the right (Carlists, ultraconservatives), and the importance of gender. It should not be surprising that Alfonso XIII's education would come to be closely linked to the politics of the Restoration.

The significance of Alfonso's education was compounded by the position the monarch occupied in the political system of the Restoration. The 1876 constitution installed the monarch as the central figure in the political process. While it established the principle of

¹¹³ Carlos Dardé, *La Restauración [1875-1902]: Alfonso XII y la regencia de María Cristina* (Madrid, 1996), 76.

¹¹⁴ See Carmina López Sánchez, "The Succession of an Unborn King: Constitutional Politics in Spain after the Death of Alfonso XII" in Müller, Frank Lorenz and Heidi Mehrkens, (eds), *Sons and Heirs*, (Basingstoke, 2015), 147-159.

shared sovereignty between monarch and Cortes, it attributed decisive executive power to the former.¹¹⁵ The royal prerogative empowered the monarch to dismiss and appoint the government and dissolve the Cortes. The only restriction was that the government required the “double confidence” of the monarch and the Cortes. However, elections were not free and returned the majority that was desired by the newly appointed government. This made royal authority the decisive factor in the formation of governments and explains the parliamentary deficit of the constitutional monarchy in Spain.¹¹⁶ The system worked effectively because Alfonso XII was willing to allow for the two monarchical parties to alternate in power in order to curb discontent, a practice that became known as *turnismo*.¹¹⁷ Isabel II and her mother had failed in this regard, as they became associated with a single party, the *moderados*, and did not allow the *progresistas* to gain power peacefully, which meant they resorted to extra-parliamentary means, usually in the form of the *pronunciamiento*.

Cánovas, the ideological architect of the 1876 constitution, had a dual solution to this problem. Firstly, he sought to end the military’s intervention in politics, which had plagued Isabel II’s reign. To this end he established the monarch as the supreme commander of the armed forces, legally and symbolically. Central to the monarch’s effective hold over the armed forces were the legal powers conferred upon him in the *Ley Constitutiva del Ejército* and the 1876 Constitution. At the same time his representation as an effective, competent and trusted soldier-king was important symbolically, as it would ensure the army’s acceptance of the monarch as commander-in-chief. Rafael Fernández Sirvent has demonstrated that Alfonso XII’s soldierly image, his military training, and his capacity for leadership were key in asserting royal authority over the army’s high command and consolidating his rule.¹¹⁸

Secondly, in military and political matters Cánovas sought to position the king above the minutiae and controversies associated with party politics and administration, so that he would only be concerned with what Cánovas considered ‘the great questions, the great

¹¹⁵ For a detailed analysis of the 1876 constitution see Varela Suanzes-Carpegna, *La Constitución de 1876*.

¹¹⁶ Carlos Dardé "Ideas acerca de la monarquía y las funciones del monarca en el reinado de Alfonso XII" in *Culturas*, 321.

¹¹⁷ For more on *turnismo*, elections and party politics during the Restoration see José Varela Ortega, *Los amigos políticos: partidos, elecciones y caciquismo en la Restauración (1875-1900)* (Madrid, 1977).

¹¹⁸ Rafael Fernández Sirvent, ‘De “Rey Soldado” a “pacificador”’. Representaciones Simbólicas de Alfonso XII de Borbón’, *Historia Constitucional*, 2010, 49-50.

influences: only leaving him with the elevated, the great, the truly supreme; (...).¹¹⁹ Thus the *Ley Constitutiva del Ejército* attributed administrative control over the armed forces to the Minister of War, not the monarch. Paradoxically, the monarch's involvement in government was at once significant and superficial. Control over the army coupled with the peaceful alternation in power of the main monarchical parties fulfilled Cánovas's aim to end the age of *pronunciamientos*, as it allowed for regular, non-violent changes in government and led the army to regard the monarch as an intermediary between civil and military power. It will be demonstrated below that Alfonso XIII's education was meant to enable him to fulfil these constitutional functions properly.

The first thing to note about the young king's education is that no time was lost to appoint his directors of education (*Jefes de Estudios*) and teachers. Documents from the palace administration show that the first and second director of education and two teachers accompanied Alfonso on the royal family's annual holidays in San Sebastian as early as September 1887, when the king was only sixteen months old.¹²⁰ There is no indication of Alfonso XIII receiving any lessons at such a young age, and it is reasonable to assume that he did not. Why then did he already have teachers assigned to him? There are two factors that probably played a part. The first is that these directors were employed at such an early stage to set out the future curriculum. Their trip to San Sebastian with the royal family indicates that the main factor behind this early appointment was to assure the public, which was keenly aware of how central Alfonso's birth had been to the stability of the political system, that his education was taken seriously. It was to be made apparent that Alfonso XIII would be the best prepared king Spain had ever seen.¹²¹

Perhaps most striking are the appointments themselves. Tusell and Queipo de Llano have correctly pointed out that the king's education was almost exclusively entrusted to high-ranking military men.¹²² The first tier of so called *Jefes de estudios*, was made up of the first *jefe*, the artillery general José Sanchiz, and the second *jefe*, the navy admiral Patricio Aguirre de Tejada. The appointment of the former, is interesting beyond the military

¹¹⁹ *Diario de Sesiones del Senado*, 21/05/1878, 1005.

¹²⁰ AGP-ReinadosAlfonsoXIII-Caja15,593-Leg.2, "Al Intendente de la Casa Real", 01/10/1887.

¹²¹ The public dimension is analysed further in Chapter three. Some papers such as *La Época* or *La Ilustración Española y Americana* in their coverage of Alfonso's accession in 1902 referred to his preparation from a young age.

¹²² Tusell and García Queipo de Llano, *Alfonso XIII*, 102. Their assertion is confirmed by documents pertaining to the palace administration, AGP-ReinadosAlfonsoXIII-Caja15593.

dimension, as he had already been involved in Alfonso XII's pre-exile education. The criteria for choosing the directors did not seem to have changed significantly, and perhaps it was to some extent his previous experience that qualified him to take on an even more prominent post now. The second tier was made up of tutors who would take on more specific functions. These were the artillery commander Juan Loriga and the commander of the General Staff Miguel González de Castejón, in charge of mathematics and general studies respectively.¹²³ The choice of such high-ranking officers and their acceptance reinforce the point about the wider significance of royal education. These officers certainly considered teaching the young king a worthwhile cause, notwithstanding their elevated status within the armed forces. Secondly, the choice of prominent and qualified officers signalled to the wider public that Alfonso XIII's education was closely supervised and carefully directed. Only the most capable were chosen for this task.

Alfonso's training by officers reinforced his constitutional position as commander-in-chief. As a symbolic tool it contributed to ensuring the army's loyalty to the monarchy in the face of increasing demands for democratisation. Furthermore, it would allow Alfonso XIII to assume the function of the soldier-king, as his father, had done before becoming widely known as the *pacificador*.¹²⁴ Unlike Isabel II or Alfonso XII, Alfonso XIII had no need to distance himself from his parents' example, but could emulate the achievements of his father, on the military and political battlefield, and his mother's careful and competent fulfilment of her constitutional duties. Thus, while dynastic change allowed for a reshaping of the monarchy, this did not perforce signify modernisation or innovation. Alfonso XIII's education was meant to marry the past and his father's legacy with the promise of future modernisation and regeneration of monarchy and country.

The selection of educators for the young king (1893-1898)

While the initial and basic education was provided by the military professors mentioned above, little is known about which subjects they taught. Although this chapter will not discuss the military dimension of his studies in detail, it should be kept in mind that martial instruction played an important part in Alfonso's education. In December 1893,

¹²³ Tusell and García Queipo de Llano, *Alfonso XIII*, 102-3.

¹²⁴ Fernández Sirvent 'Rey Soldado', 47-50.

the priest Regino Zaragoza was appointed as *Maestro de primera enseñanza de S.M. el Rey Don Alfonso XIII*.¹²⁵ The appointment of a priest is significant as it exemplifies the central role that the church continued to play in the Spanish education system at the end of the nineteenth and well into the twentieth century.¹²⁶ It also drew on the historical connection between the Spanish monarchy and the church, and the clergy's traditional influence on royal education. Spain was a deeply religious country and the church remained one of the essential providers of basic teaching. Moreover, Julio De la Cueva Merino has pointed out that religion continued to play an important role at María Cristina of Habsburg's court and strongly influenced Alfonso XIII, as well as providing the foundation of interpretations of the king as "clerical" in later years.¹²⁷ It is, however, worth noting that Zaragoza was not selected from the highest echelons of the clergy as had been the case with the religious teachers of both Isabel II and Alfonso XII. Instead, he had extensive pedagogical experience, as the director of a school for the aristocracy in Madrid.¹²⁸ In this regard it is also relevant that he was not specifically in charge of religious teaching but rather of primary education more broadly. The court apparently wanted to avoid the impression of an excessively clerical appointment.

As far as we can tell, Alfonso XIII was educated privately at court for most of his minority. Comparing the subjects on Alfonso's curriculum with those taught at elementary schools according to the 1854 *Ley Moyano* (a wide-ranging, influential liberal reform of the Spanish education system), it is notable how much these overlapped.¹²⁹ The emphasis in both public and royal education was, first, on a solid grounding in reading, writing, grammar, arithmetic, and Christian doctrine; thereafter attention was focused on history, geography, geometry, and what could be summarised as economics. This suggests that royal education was not exempt from the trend toward an increasing standardisation and rationalisation of teaching.

As with his father, Alfonso XIII's marks were carefully recorded and many of his exercise books have been preserved. The purpose was probably to keep the queen regent informed about the progress of her son's education. It also meant that teaching methods conformed to the principles of continuous evaluation associated with public education

¹²⁵ AGP-Personal-Caja1,114-Leg.1, "Expediente Personal de Regino Zaragoza", 04/12/1893.

¹²⁶ See Alfonso Capitán Díaz, *Breve historia de la educación*, 250-98.

¹²⁷ *Ibid*, 282-4

¹²⁸ Julio de la Cueva Merino, "El rey católico" in Moreno Luzón (ed.) *Alfonso XIII*, 283.

¹²⁹ For a table of the subjects taught at primary schools in Spain according to the Ley Moyano see Capitán Díaz *Historia*. 270.

and examinations. A trawl through the archives has produced no fewer than 6,128 individual marks for the period from November 1893 to June 1900. Such meticulous and detailed record-keeping is telling in itself. Moreover, these marks make it possible to test whether Alfonso's education was, as is sometimes claimed, dominated by flattery and teachers unwilling to correct the young king.¹³⁰ In fact, an analysis of the marks received contradicts such interpretations. By far the most frequently awarded mark was *bien* (good, 73.5%), followed by *regular* (average, 21%) and *mal* (bad, 4.4%). In less than 1% of cases did Alfonso receive a *notable/muy bien* (remarkable/very good, 0.5%) or the highest mark, *sobresaliente* (outstanding, 0.1%).¹³¹ This means that the king was probably an average student. More importantly, his teachers had no qualms about recording his average performance and reporting it to the Queen Regent. A commitment to truthfully reflecting aptitude and accomplishment is evident in these evaluations; even a king had to submit himself to this form of continuous assessment. The monarchy was, at least based on this evidence, buying into the values of a more meritocratic bourgeois society that emerged in Spain.

When Alfonso was eight years old, his curriculum expanded to include French, German, and Latin. While the latter was typical of nineteenth-century educational canons, it is remarkable that Alfonso was taught modern languages so early on. There are two reasons for this. The first is simply that his mother was Austrian, which made German a natural choice. Indeed, the earliest exercises in a foreign language preserved in the palace archives are in German.¹³² French appears on the marking record for the first time in October 1894. Languages were hence taught more extensively than was the case for regular pupils if we go by the *Ley Moyano* as the standard template for public education. The emphasis on foreign languages reflects one essential duty of a constitutional monarch. Alfonso XIII was to represent Spain abroad in a dignified manner and speak at least the international language of diplomacy, which was French. Future international representative duties had already been a factor in Isabel II's education, despite her difficulties and apparent aversion to speaking French and other languages. Alfonso XII had been forced to learn German, French, and English while he was in exile and his son

¹³⁰ An example of this are the memoirs of his aunt Eulalia de Borbon, see Eulalia, *Memorias de doña Eulalia de Borbón, infanta de España* (Barcelona, 1958).

¹³¹ PRRB-II/4067(6), "Cuaderno de censuras obtenidas en sus estudios por S.M. el Rey D. Alfonso". To analyse the marks these were recorded and assigned numerical rank according to the teacher's own classification.

¹³² AGP-ReinadosAlfonsoXIII-Cajón17-Leg.3, "Cuaderno de Caligrafía de Alfonso XIII", 04/01/1895.

was to follow this example. The ability to speak, read, and correspond in foreign languages was regarded an essential component of a European constitutional monarch's repertoire of skills and Spain was no exception in this respect.

The other significant change was the substitution of Regino Zaragoza by José Fernández Montaña. While this still left the king's instruction in the hands of a priest, his appointment deserves some further analysis due to the controversy it would cause later. Fernández Montaña, more frequently referred to as Padre Montaña, was not just any priest but an ultramontane defender of the church against the encroachments of liberalism.¹³³ He was clearly qualified to teach Alfonso *Historia Sagrada*, Latin, literature, and religion, but it was probably the queen's confidence, which he had won as her confessor, that was central to the appointment. While Montaña would later claim to have given Alfonso an apolitical education, de la Cueva Merino has argued that his materials had the imprint of political Catholicism. The emphasis on the importance of providence and religion in history and politics invalidated Montaña's claim to neutrality.¹³⁴ His aim, perhaps agreed with the pious Queen Regent, was to make Alfonso a good Catholic and a defender of church interests. The strength of the Queen Regent's religious sentiments and its influence on Alfonso XIII's education had to be carefully balanced with the monarchy's constitutional and liberal credentials. This echoes Alfonso XII's famous declaration in the 1874 Sandhurst Manifesto not to 'stop being a good Spaniard, nor, like all my forefathers, a good Catholic, nor like a man of the age, truly liberal.'¹³⁵ That Alfonso XIII should be a good Catholic was never in doubt, but it was the extent to which he should be liberal that appeared under threat.

Thus, much like the military professors, Montaña seems to have regarded royal education as a channel through which the monarch could be influenced in a way that would protect the corporate interest of the Catholic Church. This became particularly salient when the clergy was perceived to be fighting for its power in the face of increasing secularisation and the spread of religious tolerance

¹³³ de la Cueva Merino, "El rey católico" in *Alfonso XIII* (Madrid, 2003), 284.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Alfonso XII, "Manifiesto de Sandhurst", Own translation at <http://heirstothethrone-project.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Sandhurst-Manifiesto-Translation.pdf>

Regeneration and the king's impending majority (1898-1902)

To understand the trajectory of Alfonso's education in the last four years before his accession to the throne it is necessary to consider the effect of the Cuban *desastre* on the political and intellectual environment of turn-of-the-century Spain. This surge in the 'regenerationist' climate would shape the expectations invested in the king, further accentuated the emphasis on Alfonso's military training and increased some liberals' anxiety over a perceived conservative bias at court.¹³⁶

While Spain lost most of its empire in the 1820s, scholars have recently stressed the continued importance that imperialism played in Spanish conceptions of their place in the world, their national identity and their economic interest.¹³⁷ Schmidt-Nowara has pointed to the central role that Spain's remaining colonies – mainly Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines and the new imperial project associated with them – still played in Spanish collective imagination. He has argued that the loss of these colonies had a profound effect on Spanish society.¹³⁸ More specifically, the swift colonial defeat led to a sense of national shame, a feeling that the country was suffering from decadence. It brought the pre-existing ideas of national regeneration to the fore. Spaniards increased their calls for modernisation and change as a reaction to the *desastre*.¹³⁹ One sector that was especially affected as well as infected by this mentality was the army, which was increasingly on the defensive after it was blamed for losing out to the US. Officials at the palace were concerned and kept a close eye on the dissatisfaction spreading among officers.¹⁴⁰ The pressure on the king to become the embodiment of national regeneration

¹³⁶ It is worth noting that regenerationism pre-dated the 1898 *desastre* but was given an added push by the crisis and was retrospectively seen as its starting point. See Eric Storm, *La perspectiva del progreso: pensamiento político en la España del cambio de siglo, 1890-1914* (Madrid, 2001).

¹³⁷ For a broad and comprehensive treatment of the colonial issue see Josep Maria Fradera, *Colonias para después de un imperio* (Barcelona, 2005). For a discussion of the economics of empire in Cuba see José Antonio Piqueras Arenas, 'Disputar El Mercado Sin Ganar La Nación: El Comercio de Importación Cubano Al Final de La Colonia', 2000, 217–40. For the influence of colonial elites on the politics of Spain see Angel Bahamonde Magro and José G Cayuela Fernández, *Hacer las Américas: las élites coloniales españolas en el siglo XIX* (Madrid, 1992). For the importance of imperialism to Spanish identity and culture in Alda Blanco, *Cultura y conciencia imperial en la España del siglo XIX*. (València, 2012) and Christopher Schmidt-Nowara, *The Conquest of History: Spanish Colonialism and National Histories in the Nineteenth Century* (Pittsburgh, 2006).

¹³⁸ C. Schmidt-Nowara.

¹³⁹ Juan Pan-Montojo and José Álvarez Junco "Introduction" in Juan Pan-Montojo and José Álvarez Junco (eds), *Más se perdió en Cuba: España, 1898 y la crisis de fin de siglo* (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1998) 12-13.

¹⁴⁰ Records were kept at the palace of the officer reunions. See AGP-ReinadosAlfonsoXIII-Cajón18-Exp.7, "Reunion de Generales en Madrid", 30/12/1898.

grew substantially. This would have significant repercussions for Alfonso XIII's education.

The regenerationist spirit was not confined to the military, but was strongly felt throughout society and in the politics of *fin-de-siècle* Spain. While regenerationist ideas had previously been something of a niche phenomenon, dominant mainly among the intellectual elite, after 1898 they became mainstream and significantly shaped political discourse. In 1899 Silvela, Cánovas's successor as leader of the Conservative party, came to power on what was essentially a promise of top-down economic and political regeneration. Alfonso came of age in this highly regenerationist environment.¹⁴¹ The future king was not to be kept isolated from these strong ideological currents demanding reform and reinvigoration, and he was expected to play a part in the modernisation project that the regenerationists had in mind. His 'higher' education, for lack of a better term, was a case in point. For Alfonso to be an effective modernising and regenerating ruler, he would have to acquire an understanding of politics, the constitution and the monarch's place within the constitutional system. To this end Alfonso began to receive lessons in politics, law, and economics. Pilar de Borbón, who had some insight into palace affairs due to her correspondence with María Cristina, has even claimed that the Queen Regent had wanted Alfonso to be taught at university. However, this was regarded as impractical by the queen regent and her advisers.¹⁴² Instead professors of the Universidad Central would be employed as private tutors to the young king. The wish to send Alfonso XIII to university and have him gain a good understanding of the constitution and the institutions governing Spain provide an interesting parallel to his father's wishes for his own education. University was regarded as a suitable environment for future monarchs to learn constitutional rule.

Fernando Brieva Salvatierra, professor of history at the faculty of philosophy and letters at the Universidad Central, was appointed as the king's history teacher on 1 December 1900.¹⁴³ Alfonso's exercise books give some insight into lesson contents. He was taught that Spain was a 'product of a free people, which freely worked in accordance with the faculties they received from God.' Moreover, his exercises included writings on the

¹⁴¹ Tusell and Queipo de Llano, *Alfonso XIII*, 86-88.

¹⁴² Pilar de Borbón, Desmond Chapman-Huston and Aubrey F. G Bell, *Don Alfonso XIII, a Study of Monarchy*, by H.R.H. Princess Pilar of Bavaria and Major Desmond Chapman-Huston, (London, 1931), 59.

¹⁴³ AGP-ReinadosAlfonsoXIII-Caja16686-Leg.31, "Expediente de Fernando Brieva Salvatierra", 1900.

origins of society and the nation with a liberal imprint, which, however also linked history and divine providence.¹⁴⁴ This speaks to the professor's more conservative political instincts. Brieva Salvatierra was not to remain the only university appointment. In November 1901, only seven months before Alfonso's accession, Dr. Vicente Santamaría de Paredes of the law faculty was appointed as teacher in law and political economy.¹⁴⁵ Santamaría de Paredes was a member of the Liberal party, deputy, and later senator of the Cortes and *Ministro de Instrucción Pública y Bellas Artes*.¹⁴⁶ There was no doubting his qualifications or his liberal credentials. Besides, the palace librarian, the Conde de las Navas, claimed that Santamaría de Paredes made Alfonso learn the constitution by heart, instructed the king in the theories of jurisprudence, and made him aware of the monarch's position as arbiter and moderator.¹⁴⁷ Alfonso was meant to be, at least in appearance, a liberal and constitutional monarch. To liberals this would also be the only way that the king could possibly regenerate what was to them essentially a backward country.

Sciences also played an important role in Alfonso XIII's "higher" education. Around the same time that Santamaría de Paredes was appointed, Francisco de Paula Arrillaga, an academic with extensive pedagogical experience and vice-secretary of the *Real Academia de Ciencias exactas físicas y naturales* was named as teacher of *Historia Natural* (natural science).¹⁴⁸ While he appears to not have been politically active, his nomination and those of other academics, reflect the monarchy's increasing interest in university education. Furthermore, it can be argued that the nomination of university professors to teaching posts at the palace is a good example of the monarchy buying into the European bourgeoisie's ideal of knowledge acquisition and intellectual development and their ambitions for their own children.¹⁴⁹ As the middle classes began sending their children to

¹⁴⁴ PRRB-II/4067(10), "Cuaderno de ejercicios de composición de Historia Universal de S.M. Alfonso XIII", 1901.

¹⁴⁵ AGP-ReinadosAlfonsoXIII-Caja15593-Leg.2, José Sanchiz, to the Mayordomo Mayor, 03/11/1901.

¹⁴⁶ Archivo del Senado(online)-Expediente Personal-ES.28079.HIS-0430-06, "Expediente personal del Senador Conde de Santamaría de Paredes, D. Vicente Santamaría de Paredes".

¹⁴⁷ Juan Gualberto López Valdemoro de Quesada Navas, *La educación de un Rey 'a nativitate'* (Madrid, 1921).

¹⁴⁸ AGP-ReinadosAlfonsoXIII-Caja15593-Exp.2, José Sanchiz to the Mayordomo Mayor, 08/11/1901.

¹⁴⁹ Konrad H. Jarausch, "Die neuhumanistische Universität und die bürgerliche Gesellschaft, 1800-1870." in Paul Wentzcke and Gesellschaft für Burschenschaftliche Geschichtsforschung (eds), Vol.11, *Darstellungen und Quellen zur Geschichte der deutschen Einheitsbewegung im neunzehnten und zwanzigsten Jahrhundert*, (Heidelberg, 1981), 11-58.

university to train as lawyers, civil servants, and engineers, the Queen Regent had the same professors teach her son how to be a good constitutional king.

There is one aspect to this choice of professors as private teachers to the king that needs to be considered in more depth. The issue is whom they came to replace. The choice of Santamaría de Paredes can at least in part be understood as a public relations exercise in the face of the affair surrounding the dismissal of Alfonso's former teacher, the Padre Montaña. The latter published an article in the ultraconservative newspaper *El Siglo Futuro* on 21 December 1900. It revealed his ultramontane attitudes and his absolute hostility to liberal ideals, declaring most infamously that '*El liberalismo es pecado*'.¹⁵⁰ What might have driven Montaña to write this piece is hard to explain, but the fallout materialised rapidly. On 25 December, *El Correo* expressed its concern, writing that, 'his [Montaña's] article makes one doubt his discretion, a highly important quality in an individual that fulfils such delicate functions of responsibility.'¹⁵¹ The queen regent, rather unlike María Cristina of the Two Sicilies in the 1830s, grasped the nettle quickly; *La Época* reported Montaña's dismissal on 27 December.¹⁵²

Nevertheless, a deputy mentioned the affair in parliament and voiced his concern that even if the teacher was quickly expelled the effects might linger. It is interesting that, in his reply, Sánchez de Toca, Minister of Agriculture, not only defended the education Montaña imparted to Alfonso but argued that it 'had been sanctioned by successive governments'. There is a clear implication that the government was involved – and entitled to do so – if not in the direct selection of teachers then at least in controlling and regulating the future king's curriculum. Sánchez de Toca somewhat contradicted himself when he claimed at the same time that 'the royal prerogative to name a new teacher is indisputable', as education should always 'be entrusted to the mother, even more so when such qualities, as recognised by everyone, are reunited in her.'¹⁵³ Family right, combined with the trust the Queen Regent had earned, meant she should be allowed to choose teachers freely. The Republican press unsurprisingly saw all of this as evidence of a conservative, ultra-Catholic environment predominating at court. The affair was even seen as a symptom of a much wider malaise of excessive clerical influence in public education. It is particularly interesting that *El País*, a republican newspaper, believed that

¹⁵⁰ Montaña, "Los Errores del Señor Canalejas en el Congreso", *El Siglo Futuro*, 21/12/1900.

¹⁵¹ *El Correo*, 25/12/1900.

¹⁵² *La Época*, 27/12/1900.

¹⁵³ *La Época*, 27/12/1900.

Alfonso's upbringing should have constituted an example of a progressive, modern education to the country's public schools, but failed completely in this regard.¹⁵⁴ In this instance the heir's teaching was connected to much wider issues concerning secularisation, public education and politics.

After Montaña's dismissal, the appointment of clerics was avoided. Instead professors from the Universidad Central were chosen, such as Brieva Salvatierra. His rather conservative credentials did not please the more radical press, but the choice seems to have placated most.¹⁵⁵ Santamaría de Paredes' nomination later on, was a stronger signal of a liberal turn in education. The affair had created the impression that Alfonso was growing up in an illiberal, anti-constitutional environment, and was not being raised to be a good constitutional king. The Queen Regent chose to counter such impressions and demonstrate the monarchy's liberal reputation by appointing Santamaría de Paredes an unflinching liberal, a defender of the constitution to teach her son law and political economy.

Educating a ruling monarch (1902-05)

For Isabel II and Alfonso XII, the beginning of their reigns provided a natural cut-off point for an analysis of their education. From the sources available it seems that after their accession they did not receive any further formal teaching. If anything, they appear to have "learned on the job" or been guided by their former teachers.¹⁵⁶ It is hence interesting to see that Alfonso XIII's education continued beyond his coming of age. There are a few aspects of this that deserve further attention.

It is noteworthy that his education was carried on at all after he had come to the throne. Why this break with the examples of his predecessors? Unfortunately, there is little evidence on the motivations, but an analysis of the subjects that were continued and the professors who stayed on suggest some answers. There are exercise books for French and German dating from 1903 and August 1904 respectively, which include grammatical,

¹⁵⁴ See for example *El País*, 28/12/1900.

¹⁵⁵ Ángela del Valle López, *Aportación bio-bibliográfica a la Historia de la Ciencia: Universidad Central, 1886-1902* (Narcea, 1997), 107-8.

¹⁵⁶ This is especially true for Alfonso XII, who kept many of his former teachers close to him throughout his reign.

vocabulary and dictation exercises.¹⁵⁷ It was only on 31 October 1905 that the foreign language teachers were finally dismissed, as ‘the knowledge acquired by H.M. the King in foreign languages, to which he has dedicated himself diligently and with constant determination since his most tender infancy, now permit him to do without the help of the honourable teachers who have helped him with in such an important task.’¹⁵⁸

Languages had been and remained a priority and there was no reason to stop simply because Alfonso had come of age when he turned sixteen in 1902. On the one hand this points to the monarch’s continued importance, or perceived importance, in foreign affairs. While it has been argued that this role toward the end of the century became largely symbolic, it was not without significance, in particular if we keep in mind that Europe was still mostly ruled by monarchies.¹⁵⁹ The emphasis on foreign languages could also be related to regenerationist discourse. The examples Spain was to follow were Great Britain and Germany. A king who was not fluent in German or English could hardly claim to have an understanding of these outstanding examples of modernity. Lastly, family issues, in the broadest sense, also played a role. María Cristina was Austrian and it is hence not surprising for her to want her son to perfect his German.¹⁶⁰ In addition, Alfonso was expected to find a suitable bride to provide Spain with an heir. To be a successful suitor of a foreign princess - who in the end turned out to be Victoria Eugenie of Battenberg, one of Queen Victoria’s grand-daughters— a command of foreign languages was essential.

Alfonso XIII was also further instructed in sciences, law, and politics. The evidence on this is slightly ambiguous, but Tusell and Queipo de Llano are convinced that Santamaría de Paredes was in post at least until 1904.¹⁶¹ Pilar de Bourbon has suggested something similar in her memoirs. She remembered that Alfonso’s habits did not change significantly after he came of age and that he continued taking most of his classes. She believed that the changes were symbolical rather than real, as tutors were just not

¹⁵⁷ AGP-ReinadosAlfonsoXIII-Caja12,911-Exp.25, “Cuadernos de trabajo de Alfonso XIII. Frances”, 1903-1904.

¹⁵⁸ AGP-ReinadosAlfonsoXIII-Caja12,462-Exp.3, “Letter to Alfonso Merry del Val”, 31/10/1905.

¹⁵⁹ For the role of monarchs in the international system see Johannes Paulmann, *Pomp und Politik: Monarchenbegegnungen in Europa zwischen Ancien Régime und Erstem Weltkrieg* (Paderborn, 2000).

¹⁶⁰ See Pilar de Borbón, Chapman-Huston, and Bell, *Alfonso XIII*, 59 and Tusell and García Queipo de Llano, *Alfonso XIII*, .110-12. Also Boyd, “El rey soldado” in Moreno Luzón, (ed.), *Alfonso XIII*, 216/7.

¹⁶¹ Tusell and García Queipo de Llano, *Alfonso XIII*, 103.

referred to as teachers or tutors anymore and instead given different posts at the palace, while carrying out the same duties.¹⁶² There is some evidence to support this claim. Alfonso Merry del Val y Zulueta, Alfonso's English teacher was officially listed as his teacher only until 16 May 1902 and then then became '*Oficial 1o de la Secretaria particular de S.M. el Rey*'.¹⁶³ However, we know from a letter from October 1905 that he was still employed as his English teacher.¹⁶⁴ Something similar is true for many of the officers directing Alfonso's education. Aguirre de Tejada, *Jefe de Estudios* became private secretary to the king and Miguel González de Castejón assumed the office of the intendant of the royal household.¹⁶⁵

This suggests an interesting parallel to Cánovas's insistence on Alfonso XII losing the mantle of student; it was not appropriate for a mature, manly, and independent king to continue to be a mere pupil. María Cristina of Habsburg and her advisers recognised the need for Alfonso XIII to be seen as self-reliant and vigorous, but considered it useful to have Alfonso XIII carry on with his studies. The change in professors' titles and their move into different positions at court was significant for Alfonso XIII's image as ruler. It appears, however, that some teachers either kept their titles or that any pretence was dropped later on. *La Correspondencia de España* reported the dismissal of Alfonso's language teachers, referring to them as such.¹⁶⁶ There was an effort to drive Alfonso's education on further, while departing from the pupil or student image, which could potentially undermine the young monarch's authority.

1.4 Conclusion

This chapter has analysed the court and dynastic aspect of an heir's education. Despite the significant changes witnessed inside the palace and beyond, the heir to the throne's immediate environment continued to play an essential role in his/her education. This

¹⁶² Pilar de Borbón, Chapman-Huston and Bell, *Don Alfonso XIII*, 75.

¹⁶³ AGP-Personal-Caja677-Exp.19, "Expediente Personal de Alfonso Merry del Val y Zulueta", 1902.

¹⁶⁴ AGP-ReinadosAlfonsoXIII-Caja12.462, Exp.3, "Letter to Alfonso Merry del Val", 31/10/1905.

¹⁶⁵ See AGP-Personal-Cajón24-Exp.8, "Expediente Personal de Patricio Aguirre de Tejada", and AGP-Personal-Caja2,636-Exp.24, "Expediente Personal de Manuel González de Castejón".

¹⁶⁶ *La Correspondencia de España*, 17/11/1905.

inner space of the monarchical institution increasingly came into contact and at times clashed with the new demands for political and social reform from outside the palace. Political and public interests came into conflict with traditional, aristocratic elements, who had monopolised court positions and attempted to preserve their standing. In this context, the education of the future monarch represented one of the battlegrounds between liberals intending to dismantle the social order of the *ancien régime* and conservative aristocrats trying to preserve their powers. Furthermore, the heir's upbringing represented an opportunity to shape the future of the monarchy. Dynastic changes were not simply moments when one ruler replaced another, but rather important opportunities for the modernisation, redefinition, and renewed legitimisation of the monarchical institutions. Those closest to the heir played a vital role in this process.

Spain's political, social, and cultural elites tried to exert influence on royal education to shape the monarchy according to their priorities and their ideological beliefs. Isabel II first received a conservative and traditional education, reflecting the continued strength of conservative forces at court. As the progressive elites gained power and were able to reshape the make-up of Isabel's entourage, Isabel II was brought up in a more liberal environment. Progressive forces sought to ensure that the future monarch would be a constitutional, liberal ruler. Alfonso XII was taught to fulfil the political and military functions that first Isabel and her followers and later Cánovas considered essential for the realisation of their monarchical concept. Alfonso XIII was to follow the successful example set by his father. The 1876 Constitution and the political practices of the Restoration served as guides for the teaching he was to receive. Throughout the liberal period, education was aimed at creating an ideal-type constitutional and virtuous monarch. Tracing these changing pedagogical priorities has demonstrated that these varied according to time, the heir's gender, and the constitutional set-up.

As has been argued above, it was not solely the content of the curriculum that mattered. The message that an heir's education communicated to the public or to specific interest groups was as important. This is true for all the heirs studied. Isabel II's upbringing symbolised the transition from absolutism toward a constitutional monarchy. The teachers appointed during the Espartero Regency were not only highly qualified individuals but also had impeccable liberal credentials. When they were accused of neglect, the government and court quickly tried to counteract that impression to protect the image of the monarch from political damage. In Alfonso XII's case, the court

stressed that his reign would mean a monarchical renewal, reconciliation and peace, rather than a return to his mother's reign. While his upbringing emphasised his undiminished Spanishness, it added a cosmopolitan edge and furthermore sought to portray the heir not as a student but as a man, ready to fight for Spain and be a good constitutional and liberal king. Alfonso XIII's education was meant to signal the advent of regeneration from above, as well as his commitment to constitutionalism and to his father's legacy. Generally speaking, education was an instrument to attract the elites and the public to the monarchy by portraying the heir as a paragon of virtue and of 'true' liberty, as well as pandering to specific corporate interests.

Authority over the heirs' education remained contested and was an issue that was never entirely settled. The monarchy and the court were increasingly forced to accept, though, that the heir's upbringing was a public matter. María Cristina of Bourbon insisted on her rights over her daughter, but was in the end powerless to stop the Cortes from declaring Isabel II's guardianship a public matter and appointing a *tutor*. From then onwards royal education could no longer be treated as a purely private matter. Isabel II herself explicitly acknowledged that her only son's education was a matter of public concern by asking a government minister for a teaching plan. In exile, she accepted that political leaders would take care of Alfonso XII's upbringing, even though she never legally renounced her rights over her son. The same is true for her daughter-in-law, who retained de jure control over Alfonso XIII's education. Nevertheless, María Cristina of Habsburg was highly aware of the public's interest in her son's upbringing, as shown in her choice of teachers and in her responsiveness to public criticism in the Montaña affair. She was granted some autonomy due to the trust leading politicians had in her and her constitutional credentials. Governments were involved in supervising the heir's teaching but the issue was never legally settled and the public's influence was to a large degree dependent on the behaviour of the heirs' mothers.

Lastly, the pedagogical methods chosen for royal offspring increasingly resembled the standard curriculum and demonstrated an increased appreciation of university education. This was definitely the case for Alfonso XIII, whose marks were meticulously recorded, and who was, toward the latter stages of his education, taught by university professors. Alfonso XII had to sit public exams and was educated alongside his peers, even if this was more out of necessity than out of choice. Furthermore, he expressed his own interest in receiving a university education to gain a better understanding of

constitutional government. Alfonso XII and his successor, unlike Isabel II earlier in the century, received a very carefully planned and largely consistent education.

Thus, the appointment of teachers, *Ayos* and other instructors in charge of the heirs' upbringing was often an opportunity to modernise, advance, and assimilate royal education according to social, political, and cultural developments. On occasion, however, such appointments also reflected the determination to resist those very trends.

2. *Officers and Educators*

The military dimension of royal education

This chapter will analyse the influence of the armed forces on the upbringing of Isabel II, Alfonso XII, and Alfonso XIII. Given the military's central role in the politics, society, and culture of nineteenth-century Spain, it is worth asking how this power was reflected in its relationship to the monarchy, and more specifically to the formation of the next-in-line to the throne. Officers were involved in almost all major political changes and occupied important positions in Spain's representative institutions, government, administration, and at the palace. It is hence not surprising that they took up posts as educators and that military symbols, values, and culture were an essential feature in royal education. The military's influence, the quest for civilian control over the armed forces, and the monarchy's search for new forms of legitimacy were reflected in the upbringing of heirs to the throne.

The Peninsular War against the Napoleonic occupation of Spain changed the make-up of the Spanish armed forces, which heralded a transition from a royal to a national army.¹ The war brought more bourgeois elements into the officer corps, which had been the traditional preserve of the aristocracy, and opened up the elitist military academies to commoners.² The general organisational structure established by Charles III during the eighteenth century remained largely unchanged throughout the nineteenth. It divided Spain into various Captain Generalities and established a system of ranks modelled on the French system. The recruitment process worked through a system of *quintas*, which translates as "the fifths" after its procedure of selecting every fifth fit man for service by lot; the exemptions and payments for substitutes ensured that the burden of service fell on the lower orders.³

The various wars in which Spain was involved, civil and colonial, and the armed forces' political influence meant that military expenditure consumed a large part of the budget and the army and navy were left with a top-heavy hierarchy. Dismissing officers after the war was difficult and as a consequence the Spanish general staff, the *Estado Mayor General*, comprised around 450-600 officers in command position for an army averaging around 100,000 men for most of the

¹ Carlos Seco Serrano, 'Relaciones Entre La Corona Y El Ejército', *Revista de Estudios Políticos*, 1987, 37-38.

² *Ibid*, 29-30.

³ Stanley G. Payne, *Politics and the Military in Modern Spain* (Stanford, 1967), 6.

century.⁴ This was a much higher ratio than in any of the other European armies at this time.⁵ Moreover, in times of peace around 75% of the officers did not have an active commission, while their pay swallowed up much of the budget, which represented around 30-40% of the state's total expenditure.⁶ There were some attempts at increasing the army's effectiveness, reducing size of the officer corps and accelerating its professionalization, but these largely failed.⁷ In addition, many of the military leaders were well connected to colonial, aristocratic, and political elites. A prime example of this is General Gutiérrez de la Concha, who had strong links to the high aristocracy, to political leaders, and the Cuban landholding elite.⁸ The deep involvement of the officer corps in politics and the colonial project is undeniable.

The central role the Spanish military played in nineteenth-century politics was foreshadowed by its extensive involvement in public administration during the eighteenth century. Army officers exercised their influence throughout Spain as provincial Captain Generals with wide ranging emergency powers and partial control over civil administration.⁹ This remained an important feature of military power, but, more significantly, officers became increasingly involved in politics. On Ferdinand VII's return to Spain in 1814, Captain Generals Elio and Egui proved decisive in allowing the king to restore absolutism. Between 1814 and 1820 the suppression of the 1812 Cadiz constitution provoked various military rebellions by liberal generals.¹⁰ In 1820, Rafael del Riego, a liberal officer serving with the troops destined for America near Cadiz, successfully rebelled against Ferdinand VII's absolutist government, which led to three years of liberal rule. Thereafter, this insurrectionary practice became known as the *pronunciamiento*. As Will Fowler has argued, the *pronunciamiento* subsequently became a way of "doing politics" in both Spain and Mexico. The 1820 rebellion provided a template that would be used to bring about political change until the Bourbon restoration in late 1874.¹¹ While there is some debate over what actually constituted a *pronunciamiento*, it is fair to say that in Spain it became 'the instrument

⁴ Ibid, .463/464.

⁵ Fernando Fernández Bastarreche, 'El ejército en el sexenio revolucionario (1868-1874)', 263. He calculated that the ratio of the Estado Mayor to the effective army in 1871 was about 1:241 for Spain, as compared to 1:310 for England, 1:535 for Prussia and 1:816 for France.

⁶ Antonio Blazquez y Delgado Aguilera, *Historia de la administración militar* (Madrid, 1897); Payne, *Politics*, 8.

⁷ Wittenberg, *Mut*, 5-42.

⁸ Fernando Fernández Bastarreche, 'Don Manuel Gutiérrez de La Concha: Un General Liberal En La España de Isabel II ', *Cilniana: Revista de La Asociación Cilniana Para La Defensa Y Difusión Del Patrimonio Cultural*, 2009, 117-26.

⁹ Eric Christiansen, *The Origins of Military Power in Spain, 1800-1854*, (London, 1967), 7-8.

¹⁰ José Cepeda Gómez, *Los pronunciamientos*, 19-29.

¹¹ Will Fowler 'Rafael de Riego and the Spanish Origins of the Nineteenth Century Mexican Pronunciamiento' in Matthew Brown and Gabriel B Paquette (eds) *Connections after Colonialism: Europe and Latin America in the 1820s* (Tuscaloosa, 2013), 49-56.

of liberal revolution in the nineteenth century.’¹² This does not mean, though, that the *pronunciamiento* was a tool used exclusively to return progressive liberals to power. It was at times also employed by reactionaries and more conservative liberals when progress appeared to run ahead of itself.

The military established itself as the interpreter of the national will and frequently intervened to force political change. This idea rested on a populist self-conception of the military as the nation in arms, which emerged during the Peninsular War. Pablo González-Pola de la Granja has demonstrated that the concept changed over the course of the nineteenth century and moved away from a focus on the people and the king to a more abstract notion of *Patria*, on a higher plane above the people and embodied by soldiers.¹³ During the regency of María Cristina of the Two Sicilies a series of *pronunciamientos* led to the adoption of the progressive 1837 constitution. The failed counter-rebellion in Seville in 1838 demonstrated that the *pronunciamiento* was not a preserve of progressive forces, but was instead a more general instrument for the expression of political dissatisfaction. Between 1814 and 1868, the *pronunciamiento*, while officially unlawful, came to be accepted as a legitimate tool for political change. This has led historians to term the period “The Era of Pronunciamientos”¹⁴ and the “regime of the generals”.¹⁵ The influence of the military is beyond dispute.

While the 1874 Restoration largely ended the *pronunciamiento* as a tool for political change, the military continued to be powerful. In fact, there remains considerable disagreement as to the degree to which Cánovas managed to subject the army to civilian control. Seco Serrano, Stanley Payne, and others have emphasised the extent of civilian dominance and the lack of a clearly articulated militaristic agenda. On the other hand, Boyd and Manuel Ballbé have argued that the absence of direct military intervention only disguised the reliance of the restoration system on the army for its existence, stability, and continuity.¹⁶ Moreover, Joaquim Lleixa would contend that the military deliberately established itself as the guarantor of the system’s survival by monopolising the state’s means of coercion.¹⁷ The disagreement is mainly about timing, as both sides largely agree that at the end of the century colonial warfare and the open criticism the army

¹² Raymond Carr, *Spain, 1808-1975*. (Oxford, 1982), 124.

¹³ Pablo González-Pola de la Granja, ‘La Configuración de La Mentalidad Militar Contemporánea Y El Movimiento Intelectual Castrense: El Siglo Crítico, 1800-1900’ (PhD Diss., Madrid, 2002), 503-504.

¹⁴ Payne, *Politics*, 14 .

¹⁵ Carlos Seco Serrano, *Militarismo Y Civilismo En La España Contemporánea*, (Madrid, 1984), 71.

¹⁶ See Seco Serrano, *Militarismo*, 79-208; Payne, *Politics*, 44-66 on the one hand and Carolyn P. Boyd, *Praetorian Politics in Liberal Spain* (Chapel Hill, 1979), 3-11 and Manuel Ballbé, *Orden público y militarismo en la España constitucional (1812-1983)* (Madrid, 1983).

¹⁷ Lleixà, *Cien años de militarismo*, 47.

faced in its aftermath, led to the development of a corporate interest divorced from party allegiance and the pursuit of militaristic aims opposed to civilian authority. González-Pola de la Granja has concluded that this development of a more specific corporate military interest manifested itself in its increasing sensitivity to criticism, a feeling of being misunderstood by civil society, and the belief that the armed forces held the key to a future regeneration of the nation.¹⁸ The extent and meaning of the military's influence need to be kept in mind when discussing the links between the armed forces and the monarchs-in-waiting.

The military's influence extended well beyond politics. Military culture played an important role in shaping values connected to masculinity and nationalism. The qualities Spanish soldiers had shown during the Spanish "Golden Age" in their daring conquest of America and more recently during the Peninsular War thus came to exemplify common national characteristics of Spaniards later in the century.¹⁹ Valour, strength, ingenuity, and initiative were the core components of what Wittenberg has called the 'myth of the Spanish talent' fostered by the insurrectionary nature of anti-Napoleonic warfare.²⁰ These nationalist tendencies became increasingly influential toward the end of the century and were closely connected to warfare. Álvarez Junco has stressed that the one national characteristic highlighted as essential to Spaniards by all nationalist authors has been their bellicosity.²¹ Combined with religious rhetoric these martial attributes provided a bridge between the traditional discourse of the state and that of modern nationalism.²²

This martial value system was also closely linked to ideals of masculinity. While this has been a neglected area in Spanish historiography to date, the role of martial values in conceptions of masculinity has been well-established.²³ Furthermore the *quinta* led to the emergence of the idea of the citizen-soldier taking up arms to defend liberty and national sovereignty. This allowed for the transmission of military values into wider society.²⁴ The idealisation of martial aesthetics, virtues, and behaviour played into nineteenth-century bourgeois ideals of manliness, which emphasised independence, discipline, and hard work. Such notions were further reinforced by

¹⁸ González-Pola de la Granja, 'La configuración', 470-472.

¹⁹ Jensen, *Cultura militar*, 40.

²⁰ Wittenberg, *Mut*, 7-11.

²¹ Álvarez Junco, *Mater Dolorosa*, 207.

²² Scott Eastman, *Preaching Spanish Nationalism across the Hispanic Atlantic, 1759-1823* (Baton Rouge, 2012).

²³ Berit Elisabeth Dencker, 'Popular Gymnastics and the Military Spirit in Germany, 1848-1871', *Central European History*, 34.04 (2001), 503-30; Marcus Funck, 'Ready for War? Conceptions of Military Manliness in the Prusso-German Officer Corps before the First World War', in Karen Hagemann and Stefanie Schüler-Springorum (eds.), *Home/front: The Military, War and Gender in Twentieth-Century Germany* (Oxford, 2004).

²⁴ Jensen, *Cultura militar*, 51/52.

the pedagogical and cultural activities of Spanish military intellectuals, such as public lectures, articles in the military and regular press, and literature.²⁵

All this has important implications for the relationship between the Spanish military and the crown. During the eighteenth century, the army's interests were largely protected through its connections at court, and even during the Peninsular War the army's loyalty 'remained emotionally engaged in the person of the absent King.'²⁶ Ferdinand VII's personal involvement in the attempt to return to the status-quo-ante brought his government into conflict with liberal army elements. Interestingly, the *pronunciamientos* initially did not aim to overthrow the monarchy, and it was in fact not until the 1868 revolution that a *pronunciamiento* brought down a monarch. As La Parra López has pointed out, liberals, including the army, remained strongly monarchical and went to extreme lengths to excuse the monarch's behaviour.²⁷ The Carlist Wars showed that despite a political return to absolutism the army had become a loyal and more professional fighting force, able to sustain a protracted war effort.²⁸

María Cristina of the 'Two Sicilies' alliance with liberalism meant that the armed forces became or at least regarded themselves as the guarantors of the liberal institutions, which put them into a more complicated position vis-à-vis the monarchy. The military justified its interventions with reference to its role as arbiter of the political system, which was meant to be the function of the monarchy.²⁹ When Isabel II appeared to hand power exclusively to the *moderado* party, progressive officers took on the task of political intercession and rebelled against the queen and what the opposition *progresistas* perceived to be one-party-domination. In 1868 only a few loyalist generals followed the disgraced queen into exile or gave up their posts in the army. The rapport between the monarch and the armed forces had finally broken down.

The relationship between army and king was put on a new footing during the Restoration. Alfonso was legally and symbolically installed as head of the army and navy.³⁰ As Boyd has argued, Cánovas most important step was to create a system that functioned without the army as the moderating power and to replace it with the monarch, who had wide ranging powers to dissolve the Cortes and appoint a new government. This was not democratic and served the

²⁵ Francisco José Vanaclocha Bellver, *Prensa político-militar y sistemas de partidos en España (1874-1898)* (Madrid, 1981); Jensen *Cultura militar*, 32.

²⁶ Christiansen, *Origins*, 12

²⁷ Emilio La Parra López, 'Fernando VII, el rey imaginado' in La Parra López (ed.) *La imagen*, 49-55.

²⁸ Fernando Puell de la Villa, *Historia del ejército en España* (Madrid, 2000), 58.

²⁹ Seco Serrano, 'Relaciones', *Revista de Estudios Políticos*, 1987, 39.

³⁰ Fernández Sirvent, 'De "Rey Soldado" a "pacificador"' 47-75.

interest of Spain's socio-economic elites and the monarchy³¹ The 1898 crisis can be seen as the beginning of the rupture between civil elements and an increasingly aggressive militarism. While Lleixa has maintained that the roots of the problem lay in the autonomy the restoration settlement conceded to the army, he also stressed the centrality of the monarch's actions. He argued that Alfonso XIII amplified the exclusive role of the king in the military sphere and encouraged a dualism between the armed forces on the one hand and political institutions on the other.³²

It should be clear then that the army played an important political and cultural role in nineteenth-century Spain. Naturally, the upbringing of future monarchs reflected the involvement and influence of the armed forces in Spanish politics, society and culture.

2.1 *Isabel II*

Ever since the return to absolutism in 1814, the relationship between the monarchy and the armed forces had been marked by mutual distrust. In particular, the army's frequent attempts at rebellion meant that the crown could not take military support for granted. Furthermore, the outbreak of civil war after Ferdinand VII's death in 1833 forced the monarchy to come to an agreement with the officers it had previously condemned. Such was the price for upholding Isabel II's dynastic rights in the face of the Carlist challenge. In due course Isabel herself came to play an important part in this negotiation, as she was turned into a symbol of innocence, liberty and peace. At the same time liberal generals started to exert an ever-growing influence over the political process and over the court, most notably following María Cristina's exile. While the military leaders cannot be said to have pursued a corporate army interest, it will be argued that their views on how the future ruler should be educated were at least in part inspired by the ideals of a new liberal army of citizen soldiers.

The relationship between Isabel II and the military elite was heavily conditioned by her gender. The fact that she was female meant that she never obtained an education in military matters and was not able to foster a martial image in the same way her son and grandson subsequently would. Instead of military training, Isabel II's schooling was designed to be more appropriate to her gender and her duties as a future mother and wife, rather than a soldier. There was almost no

³¹ Boyd *Praetorian Politics*, 4-5

³² Lleixà, *Cien años de militarismo*, 75-83.

sense in which she was prepared to be the commander-in-chief or that she was to be instilled with a strong military mind-set.

This does not mean that officers had no influence on her education and upbringing. During the Espartero regency, one of the teachers appointed to the palace was, Francisco Luján, a leading military intellectual. Espartero himself met frequently with the queen and would remain an important point of contact between the monarchy and the armed forces throughout his life. Besides that, sporadic efforts were made to foster the young queen's respect for the sacrifices the armed forces had made for her cause and personal safety.

Lastly it is worth pointing out that the lack of a clearly defined military agenda in Isabel's education stems at least in part from the internal divisions of the armed forces, which reflected wider political splits within nineteenth-century Spanish liberalism. The involvement of leading liberal officers in Isabel's upbringing supports the view that the officer corps did not defend a separate corporate interest, but aligned according to political allegiances.

Defending the female succession

On 29 March 1830, just over half a year before Isabel's birth on 10 October 1830, Ferdinand VII published the Pragmatic Sanction, which replaced the Salic Law and ensured that Isabel II would be able to succeed her father on the Spanish throne. The monarch made various efforts to reinforce the legitimacy of his daughter's claim symbolically. The king was determined to provide her with the honours associated with her title of Princess of Asturias. The army was one element in this symbolic legitimation. Only nine days after Isabel's birth, Ferdinand VII instructed the troops to 'accord to his beloved daughter the Infanta Doña Maria Luisa Isabel the honours as to the Prince of Asturias for being the legitimate hereditary successor to the crown.'³³ Even at this early stage the legitimacy of his daughter's claim needed to be reinforced through the armed forces' interaction with her. As will be shown below, this symbolic relationship between queen and army remained a significant factor throughout her time as monarch-in-waiting.

Ferdinand VII's death and the Carlist challenge to the female succession meant that his widow, María Cristina, had to find new allies to sustain her daughter's claim. The armed forces were no exception to this. Ferdinand VII had not expected to have children and had allowed his brother extensive involvement in political and military affairs during the 1820s. This meant that Don Carlos was able to build a network among the army command, which he at least partially

³³ AGMM-Celebres-IsabelIII-Caja78-Exp. 1, "Honores", 19/10/1830.

converted into a personal following after 1833.³⁴ While significant military elements remained loyal to María Cristina, she had to allow for the return of liberal generals from exile and promised wide-ranging reforms to the political system. Eric Christiansen has argued that even before Ferdinand VII died ‘much had to be done before military opinion was firmly wedded to the female succession.’³⁵ Thus the crown distributed favours, used royal festivities, and promoted celebrated generals to win over the armed forces. The most pertinent example was the raising of two *Princesa* regiments in March 1833, which were to provide vacancies and promotions to the officer corps.³⁶ This explicitly linked Isabel’s cause and her succession to the army. Thus, when the female heir was only three years old, the first attempts had already been made to link her symbolically to the military.

During the early years of her regency, María Cristina enjoyed a relatively calm relationship with the armed forces. It was only with the sergeants’ insurrection at La Granja de San Idelfonso, the royal summer residence, in August 1836 that resentment at the lack of progress and the regent’s perceived favouritism of the *moderados* became a matter of contention.³⁷ Her weakened position made her turn to Espartero. Initially, the general was a firm supporter of the regent and her daughter, publicly lauding her on 25 September 1836 as the ‘mother of the people, the protector of the troops’.³⁸ By invoking her motherhood, Espartero emphasised the army’s allegiance to the regent and to her daughter, the future queen. As Raquel Casado Sánchez has argued, these attempts to unite different political forces, including the army, around the queen regent and the *reina niña* ultimately clashed with the ‘superficial, easily influential and egoistic image that María Cristina offered of herself.’³⁹

Isabel II’s own image was not tainted in the same way. Due to her gender and youth the queen was not portrayed as a martial figure and her representations cannot be linked explicitly to an appeal to the military. However, images of the young monarch fulfilled the dual function of winning the allegiance of liberals and emphasising the historic legitimacy of her claim to the throne. In this way, she was meant to appeal, at least indirectly, to both the liberal and legitimist factions within the army. First of all, the name Isabel evoked the memory of the most famous of Spanish queens, Isabel the Catholic, who had led the Reconquista, set in motion the unification

³⁴ Antonio Moral Roncal, *Carlos V de Borbón, 1788-1855* (Madrid, 1999), 118/119.

³⁵ Christiansen, *Origins*, 44.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 45.

³⁷ Cepeda Gómez, *Los pronunciamientos*, 43/44

³⁸ Raquel Sánchez García, *Alcalá Galiano y el liberalismo español* (Madrid, 2005), 255.

³⁹ María Ángeles Casado Sánchez, ‘María Cristina de Borbón. Una regente cuestionada’ in Emilio La Parra López (ed.), *La imagen*, 157.

of Spain under one kingdom, and sent Columbus on his famous voyage to America. She had posthumously become a symbol of military success, colonial glory, and religious piety.⁴⁰ This link was made explicit in several portraits, such as Vicente López' *El templo de la Gloria*, which depicts Isabel the Catholic guiding young Isabel II to the temple of light. The symbolism is clear: Isabel II guided by her historic predecessor and namesake was to lead Spain through war into a better future.⁴¹ During the civil war, her image became inseparable from the mission to defeat Carlism. José Ribelles famous *Alegoría de España con la Reina Cristina e Isabel II*, portrays the Spanish nation as breaking free from the chains of oppression and the new monarchy bringing prosperity, regeneration, and modernity as represented by ships in a harbour and the cornucopia. Moreover, there is an explicit reference to the war in the shape of a tempest in the background from which Minerva emerges to announce the victory of the forces of freedom. As Rosa Gutiérrez Lloret has argued, this popular romanticism turned Isabel into the allegorical representation of a people at war. Rather than an explicitly martial figure, Isabel II was portrayed as a vulnerable girl, whose throne was challenged on the battlefield.⁴² These representations put the army into a central position as the gallant defenders of an otherwise defenceless and innocent girl, whose legitimate claim to the throne was attacked by the forces of absolutism. It mattered little that the queen's upbringing did not match this highly idealised vision.

The general, the innocent queen, and a kidnapping attempt

During his regency General Espartero further sought to strengthen his position by identifying the Queen with liberty, constitutionalism, and the liberal nation that defended her throne. The fact that he, the most famous and successful general of the civil war was exercising the regency in Isabel II's name favoured this image.⁴³ Furthermore, Espartero tried to link his persona to that of the young queen, as well as strengthening her bond to the armed forces. Thus, in one of Isabel II's earliest public appearances after her mother's departure for France, the young queen watched a military parade from the palace balcony. Santa Cruz reported that Isabel II was there 'with the Duke [Espartero] who constantly remained at the side of the Queen, pointing out the names of the different regiments that passed (...).'⁴⁴ After the Cortes officially declared

⁴⁰ Schmidt-Nowara, *The Conquest of History*, 33.

⁴¹ Jorge Vilches, *Isabel II imágenes de una reina* (Madrid, 2007), 18/19.

⁴² Rosa Ana Gutiérrez Lloret, "Isabel II, de símbolo de la libertad a deshonra de España" in La Parra López (ed.) *La imagen*, 229.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ AHN-DiversosTítulosFamilias-Leg.3519-Libro48-Doc.2, Santa Cruz to María Cristina, 03/10/1840.

Espartero regent in May 1841 he marked the occasion in a similar way. He was again seen on the palace balcony with the queen watching as the troops marched by.⁴⁵ On this visit to the palace the regent was accompanied by various members of the army's high command.⁴⁶ It is remarkable that Espartero showed an interest in being seen in proximity to the queen and that he chose military parades as occasions to do so. These gestures were designed to strengthen his personal bond to the monarchy, portraying him as the protector of the queen, and at the same time symbolised the queen's close ties to the armed forces. Santa Cruz's correspondence further suggests that Espartero visited Isabel and her sister almost every Sunday and was keen to be frequently seen in public with her.⁴⁷ As Burdiel has argued, the symbolic significance of these visits did not escape María Cristina and increased the tensions between the progressive government and conservative elements at the palace and in exile.⁴⁸

Some of the more traditional and intimate social connections between the highest ranks of the military and the monarchy also continued during the regency. High ranking officers formed an important part of the social events that were organised at the palace. Santa Cruz, Isabel's *Aya*, reported that much as in previous years, she had given a list of the 'same and many generals and military men' to prepare invitations for a ball. It is particularly interesting that she promised María Cristina to send a list of the officers that attended, but not of everyone else.⁴⁹ It was evidently important for the former queen regent to know the names of the officers, who had visited her daughter. From Santa Cruz's correspondence, we also know that Isabel II was at this young age already handing out military honours and orders to soldiers.⁵⁰ The queen was expected to continue the monarchy's traditional patronage of the military and did so even before coming of age.

There were significant elements within the armed forces that opposed the new, more progressive direction the government had taken. They increasingly resented Espartero's obvious favouritism towards his fellow *Ayacucho*s, as his trusted generals were known due to their shared experience in the eponymous battle. These officers and their political supporters, largely associated with the *moderado* party, painted a very different picture of the queen. Much like their progressive

⁴⁵ AHN-DiversosTítulosFamilias-Leg.3519-Libro48-Doc.61, Santa Cruz to María Cristina, 18/05/1841.

⁴⁶ AHN-DiversosTítulosFamilias-Leg.3519-Libro48-Doc.72, "Lista adjunta a la Carta de Santa Cruz a María Cristina", 12/06/1841.

⁴⁷ AHN-DiversosTítulosFamilias-Leg.3519-Libro48-Docs11,12,16,27, Santa Cruz to María Cristina, 27/11/1840-23/01/1841. Espartero visited about once a week and accompanied Isabel and her sister to the theatre, circus and on visits to public institutions.

⁴⁸ Burdiel *Isabel II: una biografía*, Kindle Edition.

⁴⁹ AHN-DiversosTítulosFamilias-Leg.3519-Libro48-Doc.41, Santa Cruz to María Cristina, 23/02/1841.

⁵⁰ AHN-DiversosTítulosFamilias-Leg.3519-Libro48-Doc.52, Santa Cruz to María Cristina, 17/04/1841.

colleagues, the *moderados* also bought into representations of Isabel II as an innocent, young girl, but crucially they portrayed her as a captive, forcibly removed from her mother by her progressive entourage.⁵¹ In this narrative, Espartero and his followers became the oppressors of Isabel II and her sister.

In 1841 this aspect would form a crucial element in the justification of the unsuccessful October *pronunciamiento*. After losing the guardianship of her daughter, María Cristina and some of the most conservative loyalist and *moderado* generals that had gone into exile, started plotting an uprising. The aim was to regain control over the government and re-install María Cristina as regent. Despite the failure of the initial uprising in Pamplona, parts of the Madrid garrison unsuccessfully attempted to capture the queen by assaulting the palace.⁵² As Vilches has pointed out, the representation of the queen as a captured and orphaned hostage, gave the attackers a justification for their assault on the palace and for their plan to kidnap Isabel II and her sister.⁵³ Furthermore, it can be argued that Isabel II's image not only served to justify the military uprising, but also made it clear that the attack on the palace was in no way an assault on the monarchy. These generals conceived of themselves as the monarchy's true defenders, acting against the child queen's hostile imprisonment in the palace.

The assault on the palace on 7 October 1841, repelled by the halberdiers commanded by Coronel Domingo Dulce y Garray, and its aftermath also had significant effects on the military establishment and its relationship with Isabel II. The first important consequence of the uprising was that within the military the split between those supporting and opposing the Espartero Regency became more pronounced. This was largely due to the regent's insistence on punishing the conspirators exceptionally harshly. It appears that the captured military leaders of the *pronunciamiento* expected a fellow soldier to have mercy on them. However, to the outrage of the *moderados*, General Diego de León and at least fourteen others conspirators were executed for treason.⁵⁴ Espartero's prestige among officers suffered greatly as a result. Opposition to the regent within and outside the army hardened.⁵⁵ It did not help that de León and his co-conspirators were portrayed as having died as gallant martyrs, bravely facing their executioners in splendid uniforms. To quote Christiansen, 'the *pronunciados* knew how to die if not how to

⁵¹ Spain and Cortes, *Discusion de las Cortes sobre la Tutela de S. M. la Reina dona Isabela II y su Augusta Hermana, con otros discursos y documentos que la esclarecen*. (Madrid, 1842).

⁵² Ángel Bahamonde Magro and Jesús A. Martínez, *Historia de España: siglo XIX*, (Madrid, 2011), 232.

⁵³ Vilches, *La imagen*, 28

⁵⁴ Cepeda Gómez, *Los pronunciamientos*, 54-56.

⁵⁵ Christiansen, *Origins*, 108.

rebel.⁵⁶ The importance attributed to outward appearance, the projection of military virtue, and symbolic gestures is evident in this episode and continued to play a significant role in the relationship between monarchy and army.

Notably, the growth in opposition to Espartero did not translate into opposition to Isabel II, despite Espartero's and Mina's attempts to reinforce the links between the young queen and her military protectors. Coronel Dulce, the heroic defender of the palace, had been close to Espartero and would remain a staunch progressive liberal, who in a somewhat ironic twist, would participate in the monarchy's overthrow in 1868.⁵⁷ The regent sought to reward him for his valour and the honours bestowed upon him were to be delivered by the young queen herself. Mina reported that the halberdiers' bravery during the night of October 7 remained a constant topic of conversation at the palace and that Isabel and her sister repeatedly mentioned the issue of a reward.⁵⁸ The '22 brave men of the Royal Halberdier Guard Corps' were all rewarded with the military order of San Fernando and Dulce received the title of *Gentilhombre del interior* (gentleman of the bedchamber).⁵⁹ In addition to that, the *Tutor* Argüelles suggested to the queen that the Coronel was to receive a personalised sword. The importance of this gesture is emphasised by the fact that the ceremony was allegedly boycotted by a chambermaid with *moderado* sympathies, who told the queen that Dulce did not deserve the honour. The act of handing a reward to a progressive general, who had successfully fought a *moderado* uprising was a political and symbolically significant act. It aimed to tie the monarchy closer to the progressive officers associated with Espartero.

The *moderados'* response was an attempt to dissociate the queen from the government's actions and portray Isabel as having been coerced by a hostile entourage. In particular in relation to Diego de León's execution, the queen was portrayed as a merciful defender of the general, who had wished to pardon him but had been ignored. The commemorative issue of the newspaper *La Postdata*, published on 19 November 1842, exemplifies the *moderado* approach. The paper alleged that even Colonel Dulce had asked for a pardon for his adversary and that Isabel II was 'extremely moved and joined in the sobbing of those pleading with her, and unfortunately not being in the position to do what was requested, she did not hesitate to offer her mediation,

⁵⁶ Ibid, 109.

⁵⁷ For more on this remarkable officer, involved extensively in Cuban affairs and in conflict with colonial landholders for his strong advocacy of abolition, see Joaquín Buxó de Abaigar Castell-Florite, *Domingo Dulce, general isabelino; vida y época*. (Barcelona, 1962).

⁵⁸ Espoz y Mina and Pérez de Guzmán, *Apuntes*, (Madrid,1910), 87.

⁵⁹ AHN-DiversosTítulosFamilias-Leg.3757-N.37, "Carta de la Fiscalía Militar de la Capitanía General de Castilla la Nueva", 26/10/1841.

deciding to write to the man, who had León's fortune in his hands.' *La Postdata* highlighted the queen's 'magnanimity and clemency' and contrasted it to the 'miserable instruments of the dominant faction.'⁶⁰ There is a sense that this episode had a silver lining, as it demonstrated the virtues of the future queen and inspired hope for her forthcoming reign, when she could independently decide on matters, including justice and the army.

Gender and the limits of military education

There was practically no direct military involvement with Isabel II's education until shortly before the end of the Espartero regency and her accession to the throne, when Colonel Francisco Luján was appointed to replace the disgraced teacher Ventosa in the summer of 1842. As *El Espectador* commented he was put in charge of 'instructing them in General History and civil and political [History] of our Patria, as well as some notions and principles of exact and natural sciences.'⁶¹ Analysing Luján's background indicates that while he was chosen on account of his qualifications, rather than his military credentials, his career in the armed forces mattered. As mentioned before, the colonel was not only an officer, but also a renowned scientist, deputy to the Cortes, and a progressive liberal.

Luján had been educated at the *Colegio de Artillería de Segovia*, one of the army's elite academies. As was typical for many progressive officers, he had played a part in various military battles associated with the struggle against absolutism, such as the defence of Cadiz in 1823 and the Carlist Wars. He studied Chemistry and Metallurgy and travelled through Europe to visit arms factories and foundries.⁶² Luján thus represented the nineteenth-century liberal military intellectual that Geoffrey Jensen has described in his study of military culture.⁶³ As Isabel's teacher, his task was to transmit the knowledge he had acquired through his studies at military academies and during his travels in Europe. While we do not know to what extent his lessons had a martial imprint, it is reasonable to assume that they were at least heavily influenced by Luján's own learning and conception of the importance of science. Mina's account partially confirms this impression, when she noted that the lessons had a much greater focus on arithmetic, geometry, natural history, and even included some notions of mineralogy.⁶⁴ The letter

⁶⁰ *La Postdata*, 19/11/1842.

⁶¹ *El Espectador*, 24/07/1842.

⁶² A. Gil Novales, *Diccionario Biográfico de España (1808-1833): De los orígenes del liberalismo a la reacción absolutista* (Madrid, 2011), at <http://diccionario.historia.fundacionmapfre.org/bio.php?id=95349>

⁶³ Jensen, *Cultura Militar*, 15

⁶⁴ Espoz y Mina and Pérez de Guzmán, *Apuntes*, 162

confirming his appointment, while mainly stressing ‘the recommendable circumstances concurring in Colonel Don Francisco Luján, Cortes Deputy, and the variety of useful knowledge that he possesses’, also made reference to his ‘distinction due to his character, integrity, and notable services to the nation.’⁶⁵ These values and qualities are closely related to military service.⁶⁶ It was perhaps hoped that he would inculcate these values, as well as his extensive knowledge, to the young queen. In this way, it also reflected the belief that a liberal monarch, much like a liberal citizen-soldier, was meant to serve the nation.

Luján’s short stay at the palace makes it difficult to evaluate to what extent he achieved his aims. However, there is a possibility that his introduction might have been planned as a precursor to further instruction in military matters.⁶⁷ His position as a long-serving deputy in the Cortes and his selection by Argüelles, Quintana, and Mina suggest that he was well connected politically. It is worth remembering that personal favouritism, political connections, and local power – a combination often summed up in Spain under the term *caciquismo* – were essential to the working of the political system, the Cortes, and the administration.⁶⁸

However, it is striking that a military instruction does not figure at all in Isabel II’s education. None of the education plans and reports on her progress, which are full of references to her future responsibilities as queen, makes any reference to future military duties or to the need for a martial aspect to her education.⁶⁹ This omission can be linked back to a broader theme of the role of gender in education. Burdiel has demonstrated that the public perceptions of Queen Victoria and Isabel II were heavily gendered, to the extent that Victoria and Isabel II were primarily seen as women rather than as rulers.⁷⁰ Moreover, Burdiel has argued that the middle-class construction of a value system associated with feminine behaviour and the nature of women, combined with the symbolic legitimisation of the emergent constitutional monarchy led to the conversion of the ruler’s private lives into matters of public interest. Thus it was precisely the liberal bourgeois conception of womanhood and the symbolic function of the monarchy that emerged after the “Liberal Revolution”, which meant that Isabel was conceived of as a woman

⁶⁵ AHN-DiversoTítulosFamilias-Leg.3757-N.50-Doc.6, Intendencia General de la Real Casa to Espoz y Mina, 21/07/1842.

⁶⁶ See Esdaile, *The Spanish Army*, 168-175 and Fernando Puell de la Villa, *El soldado desconocido: de la leva a la ‘mili’, 1700-1912* (Madrid, 1996), 172-178.

⁶⁷ It is worth noting that Alfonso XIII’s formal military instruction began in 1898, when he was 12 years old. Isabel’s formal education ended when she was 14.

⁶⁸ Romero and Caballero.

⁶⁹ See for example AGP-SecciónHistorica-Caja189, Espoz y Mina to Argüelles, 27/09/1841 and AHN-DiversosTítulosFamilias-Leg3757-N.5, “Exposición de los Ayos de SM y A al Señor tutor”, 20/05/1843.

⁷⁰ Isabel Burdiel, ‘The Queen’, 318.

rather than as a queen.⁷¹ While Burdiel is mainly concerned with Isabel's actual reign and the political repercussions of her symbolic failure, the effect of this perception of the queen as woman rather than as a future ruler is also evident in her education and to some extent explains why military instruction was not considered as part of her curriculum. The education of other female monarchs, such as that of Queen Victoria, reflects similar issues. However, as Arnstein has demonstrated, Queen Victoria's personal interest in military affairs allowed her to portray herself publicly as a "warrior queen", as well as the emblem of domesticity.⁷² While this is not an issue that has so far been studied for the Spanish case, there are indications that Isabel II took on some duties associated with the armed forces, such as troop inspections and the awarding of military honours.

As has been argued above, during the Espartero Regency Isabel's education became more focused on making her a good constitutional ruler. However, the subjects she was taught remained closely related to domesticity and stereotypically female activities. The schedule María Cristina wanted Isabel and her sister to follow in her absence has about two-fifths of her teaching dedicated to *labores* and dancing.⁷³ In part this was linked to the importance attached to her marriage, as evident in Donoso Cortes' extensive exposé to María Cristina on the matter.⁷⁴ This emphasis does not seem to have changed immediately with Mina's appointment, as she also emphasised that 'No occasion is wasted to encourage (*recomendar*) the studies they are following and the dedicated *labores* and the ornamental ones appropriate to their sex and condition, (...).'⁷⁵ The aims of marriage and of turning Isabel II into a good wife are also evident in the education plan submitted by Rodrigo Valdés y Bustos, the new teacher of religion. He stressed that 'she should be advised as to the way that she should conduct herself with her husband, whom she is obliged to obey as a subject, according to the revealed doctrine of the Apostle, (...).'⁷⁶ Only Ventosa expressed concerns about a possible over-reliance on "female" subjects and argued that 'what is needed is that it be a masculine (*varonil*) education and appropriate to the student's position and the necessities of the people; (...).'⁷⁷ The exposition written in response to Ventosa's accusations made no reference to this and instead praised the advances made in *labores*

⁷¹ Ibid, 302-304.

⁷² Walter L. Arnstein, 'The Warrior Queen: Reflections on Victoria and Her World', *Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies*, 30.1 (1998), 1–28.

⁷³ AHN-Diversos/Títulos/Familias-Leg.3491/415-Exp.1-Doc. 11, "Instrucciones manuscritas", 1841.

⁷⁴ AHN-Leg.3476-Leg.366/1, Juan Donoso Cortes to María Cristina, 24/02/1842.

⁷⁵ AGP-SecciónHistorica-Caja189, Espoz y Mina to Argüelles, 27/09/1841.

⁷⁶ AGP-SecciónHistorica-Caja189, Obispo electo de Farazon, Confesor de S.M. y A. to Agustín Argüelles, 20/04/1842.

⁷⁷ "Memoria de Ventosa", 04/1842 cited in Espoz y Mina and Pérez de Guzmán, *Apuntes*, 148.

and the qualification of their new teacher in the subject.⁷⁸ No mention is made of a more masculine or military education and, if anything, the appropriateness of Isabel's education is positively stressed. It could be the case that her husband was expected to fulfil this military dimension, in a similar way that Prince Albert attempted to in Great Britain.⁷⁹ This would further help to explain the importance that was attached to Isabel II's marriage.

2.2. *Alfonso XII*

The military played an important role throughout Alfonso XII's life. The initial link between the future ruler and the armed forces was established during his childhood and became increasingly significant during his time in exile. This chapter will engage with the sociological concept of the formation of a *Habitus* through the acquisition of manners, behavioural patterns, and value systems. Both the idea of *Habitus*, as developed by Marcel Mauss among others, and the integration of the body into this concept, have demonstrated that the body, physical appearance, and behaviours are not ahistorical and fixed in time.⁸⁰ The application of these theoretical frameworks allows us to trace the projection and acquisition of a *Habitus* associated with masculine, martial, and national qualities in order to study its function. The hypothesis is that Alfonso XII acquired a military, masculine *Habitus* and that it fulfilled three basic functions, which will form the analytical categories into which this chapter is divided.

The first category is concerned with how Alfonso XII's military *Habitus* allowed for and was aimed at his integration into the military and the extent to which this shaped him or was meant to influence him. This means analysing why it might have been significant for officers to see the heir to the throne absorb military beliefs and at least symbolically become a fellow soldier. The question that arises is to what extent the military attempted to make the heir to the throne one of its own and what benefits it hoped to accrue from this. To what degree was Alfonso's image shaped by members of the Spanish military and what influence did they have on his upbringing? Furthermore, was his *Habitus* formed by and used by members of the military elite?

⁷⁸ AHN-Diverso/TitulosFamilias-Leg.3757-N.5, "Exposición de los Ayos de SM y A al Señor tutor sobre los estudios de las Señoras", 20/05/1843.

⁷⁹ Arnstein, 'Warrior Queen', 3-5.

⁸⁰ Mauss, Marcel, 'Les techniques du corps', *Sociologie et anthropologie*, (1960), 363–86; Max Weber, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie*, (Tübingen, 1922). The later uses the term *Habitus* almost as an aside but made an important contribution to sociological understanding of behaviours.

The second category deals with the extent to which Alfonso's military *Habitus* was meant to put the monarchy into a position that allowed it to appeal to members of the armed forces and gain their support. This section will analyse whether Alfonso's military image, instruction, and pretensions were deliberately aimed at the armed forces to bind them more closely to the monarchy and thus contributed to the restoration of the monarchy.

The final section will turn to how the effort to attract the armed forces to the cause of the heir became increasingly significant during the build-up to the restoration. It was at this time that Alfonso's *Habitus* started also to fulfil the long-term aim of establishing civilian control of the armed forces. The main driver of this two-pronged strategy was Cánovas, who played a central role in Alfonso's upbringing and the restoration.

There is a certain tension between Cánovas's aim to establish control and the military's intention to turn the monarch into a defender of their interests, which needs to be discussed. The argument will be made that the conflict was resolved by making Alfonso *appear* to be the defender of military interests in order to win the armed forces acceptance of his leadership and to achieve some degree of civilian control. In the process the king himself became an important arbiter between civilian and military institutions.

The early makings of a soldier-king

The idea that Alfonso was to have some sort of military training emerged early in his life. In November 1860 Isabel II and her husband Francisco de Asís asked the *Ministro de Fomento* for advice on their son's education and expressed the wish that Alfonso should be 'pious, valiant, magnanimous, instructed in all things of peace and of war, (...)'.⁸¹ The minister's reply picked up on this, when he argued that studies of war and peace, military strategy and tactics had to be at the forefront of the heir's scholarly education. Moreover, he argued that these theoretical lessons needed to be complemented by practical learning. 'His life should be active and from masculine exercises he should learn arms and military theory in action and exercises at the side of experienced captains: (...)'.⁸² This implies that Alfonso was to be a part of the armed forces and would interact regularly with leading officers. The military was to be an important part of the manners, upbringing, and behaviours that would come to form his *Habitus*. Sociologists have used this concept to refer to individuals' learned habits, skills, and tastes. Pierre Bourdieu defined

⁸¹ PRRB-II/3380, Isabel II and Francisco de Asís to Ministro de Fomento, 28/11/1860,

⁸² PRRB-II/3380, Ministro de Fomento to Isabel II and Francisco de Asís, 15/10/1861.

the *Habitus* as the ‘principles which generate and organize practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary to obtain them’.⁸³ Furthermore, Bourdieu and Michel Foucault maintained that these principles are shaped by their social and historical context, structures and memory. This makes *Habitus* a dynamic concept, which is subject to change over time.⁸⁴ When this framework is applied to the heir it is possible to identify the projection and acquisition of a *Habitus* associated with masculine, martial, and national qualities.⁸⁵ Furthermore, the dynamic nature of a *Habitus* allows for comparisons across time and the identification of evolution in the projection of masculinity as a result of social, political, and technological change.⁸⁶

The aims expressed in his parents’ correspondence with Corvera were at least partially put into practice. Officers were involved in Alfonso’s education as so called ‘*Maestros Militares*’, who received special permission to wear uniforms when in the royal chambers.⁸⁷ The ‘*jefe de estudios*’ was also an officer, General Álvarez Ossorio.⁸⁸ The heir was surrounded and instructed by high-ranking officers in uniform. That these military elites would take on the role of teachers to the young prince is indicative of the prestige attached to these pedagogical posts and the importance these men attributed to it. It is reasonable to assume that these officers believed that they would have significant influence on the future monarch and could turn him into a proper soldier.

This link between education and the military manifested itself in Alfonso’s curriculum and activities. The officers were there for a good reason. Military instruction included fencing, shooting practice, and various other exercises at least from 1866 onwards, but it appears that officers were involved in his general education even earlier than that.⁸⁹ The Prince of Asturias’s military training was taken seriously by his *Mayordomo Mayor* (mayor of the household), the Marqués de Novaliches, who pressed for Alfonso to receive a ‘sword of major dimensions’ to be

⁸³ Pierre Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice* (Stanford, 1990), 53.

⁸⁴ See for example Pierre Bourdieu, *Masculine Domination* (Cambridge, UK, 2001); Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (Harmondsworth, 1979).

⁸⁵ The pioneering work is Ernst Hartwig Kantorowicz, *The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology*, (Princeton, 1957), which established the difference between the "body politic" and the "body natural" of the monarch; Regina Schulte (2006), (ed.), *The Body of the Queen: Gender and Rule in the Courty World, 1500-2000*, (New York, 2006) includes several studies on the female body.

⁸⁶ See Svenja Goltermann, *Körper der Nation: Habitusformierung und die Politik des Turnens 1860-1890.*,(Göttingen, 1998).

⁸⁷ AGP-SecciónHistorica-Caja114-Exp.1, “Orden del Mayordomo Mayor”, 08/11/1864.

⁸⁸ AGP-ReinadosIsabelIII-Caja8682-Leg.26, “Ca.rta del Mayordomo Mayor al Insp. Gral. De oficios y gastos”, 20/12/1864.

⁸⁹ AGP-SecciónHistorica-Cajón114-Exp.2, “Distribucion de horas para SAR el Principe de Asturias”, 23/11/1866 & 03/12/1866.

produced especially for him at the bladed weapons factory.⁹⁰ At least five of his teachers were high-ranking officers and accompanied him frequently.⁹¹ The prince's instruction in military matters and the presence of officers in his daily life allowed for him to become integrated into the military and to acquire the dress, belief systems, and knowledge that make up a military *Habitus*. This was important for the military as it meant the future head of state would identify with them and their interest, which they believed to be identical with the nation's interest as officers' proclamations in various *pronunciamientos* demonstrate.⁹²

Alfonso's participation also entailed a significant symbolic element, which integrated or was at least meant to integrate the heir into the armed forces. On 30 September 1862 shortly before he turned five, Alfonso was formally enrolled as a volunteer in the *Regimiento infantería inmemorial del Rey no.1*. He remained a member of the regiment until his exile and was promoted on four occasions, reaching the rank of supernumerary Sergeant First Class.⁹³ While he did not serve actively, his enrolment and promotions were accompanied by the usual official formalities. He did not skip any ranks and he received an official military file, the *Hoja de Servicios*.⁹⁴ This introduction into the armed forces formalised his membership of the institution and was likely to foster a sense of comradeship and *esprit de corps*. Pedro de Répide, an early biographer of Alfonso XII, recounts an anecdote of the heir demanding to be shot along with the sergeants of his regiment, who were punished for joining one of the more violent military rebellions on 22 June 1866.⁹⁵ While this is unlikely, it is telling that this anecdote survived and that Répide thought it believable enough to recount in 1947. The impression was created that Alfonso was a fellow soldier, another member of the regiment ready to make the ultimate sacrifice alongside his comrades in arms.

Alfonso's exile significantly complicated matters for the prince. He could no longer serve in the Spanish military and any further integration into the armed forces needed to be postponed. However, some officers followed Isabel II into exile or kept up their correspondence with the royal family. Others - mostly on the more conservative political spectrum - remained closely

⁹⁰ AGP-SecciónHistorica-Cajón114-Exp.2, "Nota de la Mayordomía Mayor de S.A.R. El Sermo. Principe de Asturias", 13/01/1868.

⁹¹ AGP-Caja8654-Exp.1, "Circular de la Mayordomía Mayor de S.A.R. El Sermo. Principe de Asturias", 01/04/1868. Their names are Lt.Colonel Emilio Bernaldez, Lt.Coronel Enrique Sola, Lt.Coronel Martiniano Moreno, Lt.Coronel José Sánchez and Captain Cesar Fournell.

⁹² Cepeda Gómez, *Los pronunciamientos*, 32.

⁹³ AGP-SecciónHistorica-Cajón114-Exp.2, "Ingreso de S.M. en el Regimiento de Infantería inmemorial del Rey no.1".

⁹⁴ AGMM-Expedientes Personales-Celebres-Caja4-Exp.11, "Alfonso XII, Rey de España. Hoja de Servicios: Regimiento Infantería Inmemorial del Rey, Num.1", 30/09/1864,

⁹⁵ Pedro de Répide, *Alfonso XII: la restauración de un trono* (Madrid, 1947), 7.

involved in Alfonso's upbringing, in part out of loyalty to the monarchy and disillusionment with the new regime.

A general, who remained loyal throughout the royal family's exile and had been one of last commanding officers to have confronted the 1868 revolution, was the Marqués de Novaliches. He had previously served as Alfonso's *Mayordomo Mayor* and remained in close contact with the prince throughout his exile. He consistently urged Alfonso to become a man and expressed his pleasure at seeing him receive military training. He reminded Isabel II how important the army would be in any attempt to restore the monarchy.⁹⁶ General Fernández de San Román, a senator and prominent general who went into exile during the First Republic, also urged Alfonso to focus on a military education. He told the young prince to 'aspire to be a consummate master (*Maestro*) in the theory and practice of war, (...).'⁹⁷ A military education was regarded as essential to the success of the heir – it would make the future king into a true soldier capable of leading Spain to renewed military glory.

Officers were also involved more directly and closely with Alfonso's upbringing. During Alfonso's stays in Paris, Switzerland, and Bavaria between 1868 and 1871, Colonel Tomás O'Ryan played an important role in directing his teaching, accompanying him on his travels, planning his schedule and aiding with the selection of schools and teachers.⁹⁸ O'Ryan was an experienced officer, who had served in Cuba and in the African campaign, as well as holding important post in military administration. In an interesting parallel to Isabel's former teacher Luján, O'Ryan's record also shows experience in military education, study of foreign army academies, and involvement in military administration.⁹⁹ The combination of experience in education and strong military credentials were clearly of great importance. O'Ryan introduced an emphasis on practical science to understanding the mechanics of war machinery and the use of firearms to Alfonso's curriculum.¹⁰⁰ When in charge of visiting and assessing various schools, he regarded military credentials as essential. Thus he commented favourably on the fact that the *Pagèrie* near Munich was directed by a respected lieutenant-colonel, the Baron Lerchenfeld.¹⁰¹ While he was not the one to make the final decisions on Alfonso's schooling, his judgement had

⁹⁶ AGP-ArchivosPersonalesFamiliares-Novaliches-Caja19100-Exp.1, Novaliches to Isabel II, 03/07/1869.

⁹⁷ AGP-ReinadosAlfonsoXII-Cajón22-Exp.32, Eduardo Fernández de San Roman to Alfonso XII, 19/09/1873.

⁹⁸ See AGP-ArchivosPersonalesFamiliares-Novaliches-Caja19100, O'Ryan to Novaliches, 05/12/1870 and PRRB II/4557-Doc.728, Alfonso to Isabel II, 04/10/1871.

⁹⁹ AGP-Personal-Caja15975-Exp.10, "Mariscal de Campo Don Tomás O'Ryan y Vazquez".

¹⁰⁰ AGP-ArchivosPersonalesFamiliares-Novaliches-Caja19100, O'Ryan to Novaliches, 05/12/1870.

¹⁰¹ ARAH-Isabel II-Leg.6962, "Memoirs on the studies of the Prince", 11/1870-04/1871.

considerable influence. Men like O’Ryan did not necessarily act solely out of ideological conviction. It is worth considering the personal benefit that O’Ryan and other officers could hope to gain from turning Alfonso into a soldier and taking a post as his teacher. In March 1875, shortly after Alfonso’s return to Spain., O’Ryan was promoted to *Mariscal de Campo* (Field Marshall) and in April 1875 he was appointed *Jefe de Estado Mayor General*.¹⁰² His qualifications certainly mattered, but it probably helped that he had a close connection to the monarch, who took a personal and public interest in the army.

While Alfonso was assigned a non-military companion during his time at the *Theresianum*, this did not mean he was not engaged in military activities. He visited arms factories, observed military manoeuvres, and took lessons in horsemanship.¹⁰³ As his time in Austria was coming to an end and it was decided that Alfonso should attend a military academy, Colonel Juan Velasco was appointed to accompany him. Velasco’s record reveals that he was a respected officer, who had campaign experience and had been recommended for his hard work and reliability. Just like his predecessor, his professional military experience was complemented by his technical experience. Among other merits, Velasco had been the *Jefe de todos los trabajos geográficos* (head of geographical work) at the War Depository from 1866 until 1868.¹⁰⁴ Cánovas reported that this selection was met with the approval of important generals sympathetic to the Bourbons’ cause.¹⁰⁵ Velasco was well regarded and the generals apparently saw him as the right person to take up a position close to the future king. His influence reached beyond the years in exile, as he was appointed *Ayudante de Campo de S.M. el Rey* (Field Adjutant to H.R.H.) on 5 February 1875 and remained in that post for another two years. His military career would lead him to hold important positions in the armed forces and eventually gained him promotion to the rank of Division General.¹⁰⁶ A personal connection with the monarch enhanced future career prospects for officers. Together with the ability to shape the future monarch’s *Habitus*, this helps explain why military elites were eager to take on these posts. They could not be sure that Alfonso would become the next monarch, but they knew that they would benefit if he did, which made them personally invested in his cause.

¹⁰² AGP-Personal-Caja15975-Exp.10, “Biografías de Generales nombrados despues del 1o-Enero-1875”, 1875.

¹⁰³ AGP-ReinadosAlfonso XII-Cajón25-Exp.Ó, “De la Juventud de Alfonso XII de España (por su preceptor alemán en Viena)”, 01/02/1872.

¹⁰⁴ AGMS-1a/B-1501, “Expediente Personal de Juan Velasco y Fernández de la Cuesta”.

¹⁰⁵ AGP-ReinadosAlfonsoXII-Cajón24-Exp.5B Cánovas to Isabel II, 13/04/1874,

¹⁰⁶ AGMS-1a/B-1501, “Juan Velasco”.

Isabel II's personal attitude to her son's soldierly instruction is interesting. She actively encouraged Alfonso's military education and was convinced that it was vital to his future success. In a letter to Alfonso she expressed her wish to 'see you on a horse, at the helm of the troops, being an accomplished gentlemen and a distinguished general.'¹⁰⁷ Later on she told Alfonso that once he had completed his exams it was 'necessary that you shall be very much a man and very much a military man, (...)'.¹⁰⁸ Isabel II conceived of Alfonso's role as one of active participation, which would almost amount to his integration into the armed forces, rather than just a symbolic tool to control the generals. She wanted Alfonso to acquire the abilities and forms of behaviour that would identify him as a soldier; that is to acquire a military *Habitus*. This is supported by Isabel's frequent, independent negotiations with high-ranking officers as an alternative route to a political resolution and some of her advisers' insistence on the centrality of the military even at the expense of civilian support.¹⁰⁹

Winning the armed forces' trust and affection

What was the symbolic function of Alfonso's military training? In particular, who was the martial aspect of his upbringing intended to attract to the Bourbon cause? Alfonso's acquisition of a military *Habitus* served the purpose of binding the armed forces more closely to the monarchy and securing their support, but to what extent? The division between symbolic representation and active participation is porous; it is possible for Alfonso to have been an integrated member of the military and have independently wanted to acquire the allegiance of the military. If the armed forces were successful, the monarch would identify with their positions and their interests would become indistinguishable from those of the officers. It is hence crucial to ask to what extent the monarchy gained the army's loyalty through a symbolic projection of a military *Habitus*.

The heir was already employed as a tool to foster allegiance between the monarchy and the armed forces before he was even a month old. To celebrate the birth of a male heir, a royal

¹⁰⁷ AGP-ReinadosAlfonsoXII-Cajón19-Exp.21, Isabel II to Alfonso XII, 25/04/1872.

¹⁰⁸ AGP-ReinadosAlfonsoXII-Cajón24-Exp.5F, Isabel II to Alfonso XII, 19/06/1874. The phrasing makes more sense in the original: '*es menester que seas muy hombre y muy militar*'

¹⁰⁹ For evidence of this see various examples in her correspondence: The letter of Duque de Baena to Isabel II (ARAH-Leg.6953, 22/11/1871) emphasised the need for a military uprising, while in her letter to Cánovas on 18 January 1874 (AGP-ReinadosAlfonsoXII-Cajón19-Exp.19) she expressed her conviction that the military remained an irresistible force She was also in contact with Martínez Campos before his *pronunciamiento* in 1874. See Manuel Izquierdo Hernández, *Historia clínica de la restauración*, (Madrid, 1946),41.

decree in December 1857 awarded various benefits to officers, among them 22 extraordinary promotions of colonels to the rank of brigadier, other officer promotions and the distribution of different medals and awards.¹¹⁰ On the actual day that Alfonso was born the troops received presents in the form of money or in kind. Sergeants, corporals, and privates were handed a sum of 10, 6 and 4 reales respectively and the troops in Madrid received additional rations of meat, bread, and wine, all adding up to a cost of 91,153 reales. The military celebrated his birth with a 25-gun salute, official receptions, and three days of general festivities.¹¹¹ Alfonso's birth thus provided the opportunity for the monarchy to distribute rewards to the troops and reinforce their links to the crown and in particular the future ruler; the first step in establishing a symbolic link between the ruler and the military.

His enrolment in an infantry regiment was intended to function not only as a tool for Alfonso's integration into the military, but also symbolised the monarchy's commitment to the army and reinforced its allegiance to the future monarch. As the Captain General of Andalusia put it on the occasion of Alfonso's enrolment in the *Regimiento Infantería inmemorial del Rey*, the heir was to 'familiarise himself with its [the Spanish military's] glories, valour and loyalty, (...).' At the same time he called on the 'Soldiers of the Army of Andalucía, be sure to never forget the new links that have today united us to Our Queen and the Prince of Asturias (...).'¹¹² The Brigadier in charge of the regiment echoed these sentiments. To him 'the Prince of Asturias D. Alfonso de Borbon y Borbon, heir to the Throne, wear[ing] our uniform' was the 'greatest proof of affection that the Infantry and in particular this Regiment could deserve, (...).' It meant that 'today we have to make even more of an effort and serve our queen and our *patria* with adhesion.'¹¹³ While one can doubt the sincerity of these declarations, it is reasonable to assume that this is exactly the reaction that the monarch had hoped for.

Alfonso's connection to the regiment did not stop with his enrolment but was reinforced in various ways. While it was impossible for the four-year-old prince to join in its exercises, he did take part in the troop inspections carried out together with his father.¹¹⁴ This link between the heir and the regiment was consolidated throughout Alfonso's youth. There are photos of Alfonso at a very young age dressed in a specially fitted uniform of the regiment. It shows him

¹¹⁰ AGP-ReinadosAlfonso XII-Caja12830-Exp.4, "Extracto del Real decreto de gracias", 07/12/1857.

¹¹¹ AGP-ReinadosAlfonso XII-Caja12830-Exp.4, "Natalico de S.M. el Rey como Principe de Asturias", 07/12/1857.

¹¹² AGP-SecciónHistorica-Caja114-Exp.2, "Orden general del Capitan General de Andalucía", 01/10/1862.

¹¹³ AGP-SecciónHistorica-Caja114-Exp.2, "Orden del Cuerpo, Regimiento Infanteria inmemorial del Rey".

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

with a serious expression, armed with a small sabre and wearing full military dress.¹¹⁵ Unfortunately it is not clear whether this is a private family picture or whether it received wider distribution, but a petition by one of the regiment's commanders to have a portrait sent to him, suggests that some copies might well have been destined for the troops.¹¹⁶ On top of that, the regimental commanders were awarded honours such as the credentials of the order of Charles III and payments were distributed from the prince's *bolsillo particular* (private budget) to the soldiers.¹¹⁷ The award of promotions, often accompanied by congratulatory messages from the officers, was another frequently used tool.¹¹⁸ The limit of the prince's active participation only reinforces its symbolic importance and the role it played in forging closer, emotional links between the crown and the army. The monarchy had a strong interest in winning the trust and affection of the armed forces.

It is worth briefly considering the efficacy of this method of binding the monarchy to the military. The very same troops that declared their undying loyalty to the crown in response to Alfonso's enrolment and the various rewards they received were implicated in the unsuccessful 1866 revolt, one of the first military rebellions that challenged the queen's legitimacy and openly called for her overthrow.¹¹⁹ The nature of the revolt, which was led mainly by sergeants rather than officers and was inspired by dissatisfaction with opportunities for promotion, suggests two tentative conclusions.¹²⁰ The first is that the heir's symbolic appeal to the military through his incorporation into a regiment was aimed mainly at officers, who benefitted disproportionately from rewards and in return declared their loyalty. Secondly, while the symbolic link might well have been significant, it could not necessarily compensate for deeper, more acute grievances within the armed forces. It is important to recognise these limitations to the effectiveness of the monarchy's symbolic appeals to the military.

The *Gloriosa* of September 1868 and the royal family's subsequent exile completely changed the monarchy's relationship with the armed forces. The traditional channels of patronage and symbolic representation were no longer available and new ways had to be found to instil a military, manly *Habitus* in Alfonso that would continue to allow him to figure as a soldier and

¹¹⁵ PRRB-FOT/719-No.10185039, "Album con retratos de Alfonso XII desde su nacimiento hasta 1885 y de algunos familiares".

¹¹⁶ AGP-SecciónHistorica-Cája 114-Exp.2, Coronel D. Joaquín Vitoria to Novaliches, 22/11/1866.

¹¹⁷ AGP-SecciónHistorica-Cája114-Exp.2, Francisco Diaz y Soler to Novaliches, 03/02/1867 and "Note of Mayordomia Mayor", 13/12/1867.

¹¹⁸ AGP-SecciónHistorica-Cája 114-Exp. 2, "Alfonso XII, Rey de España. Hoja de Servicios: Regimiento Infantería Inmemorial del Rey, Num.1", 30/09/1864.

¹¹⁹ Vilches García, *Progreso y libertad*, 68-70.

¹²⁰ Cepeda Gómez, *Los pronunciamientos*, 82.

appeal to the armed forces. This was largely achieved through his entourage, socialisation, and education. In particular, after Cánovas took over the political direction of Alfonso's cause and the restoration became a more realistic possibility, the heir's symbolic military persona was reinforced and emphasised further.

Even before Isabel II's abdication, it was clear to some of her advisers that the armed forces would have an important role to play in a potential Bourbon restoration. Novaliches believed that the armed forces were essential in any attempt to change the political situation in Spain. However, he was not convinced that Alfonso was better positioned than Isabel II to accomplish this task. He felt that the prince was too young and inexperienced at this point.¹²¹ The Marqués de Alcañices, Isabel's financial sponsor and the director of Alfonso's studies, came to a different conclusion. He was certain that Alfonso had a better chance to win over the military than his mother, as his image was not associated with the corruption, one-party rule, and increasing conservatism which the leaders of the 1868 revolution had rejected; his youth exempted him from responsibility and worked to his advantage.¹²² As he put it 'I believe the triumph of any military uprising would be very difficult without the support of some of the same generals involved in the revolution; (...).'¹²³ He agreed that the military was essential but in his opinion it was only Alfonso, who could win over its leaders and thus ensure a successful rebellion. This put the heir in the centre of efforts to gain the military's allegiance.

Given Novaliches's concern with Alfonso's maturity, it is not surprising that he continuously emphasised the importance of a masculine and physical education for the heir. He considered it of the utmost importance that Alfonso 'acquired a character and manners that influence his figure to become manly, a very useful thing for H.H.'¹²⁴ As Svenja Goltermann has argued, the striving for physical fitness and a masculine appearance were often closely bound up with a military *Habitus* that stressed the individual's ability to fight, or *Wehrhaftigkeit*.¹²⁵ This link is substantiated by a brief look at the composition of Alfonso's teaching staff. Officers not only directed education but also took charge of his physical education. O'Ryan informed Novaliches that during his stay in Switzerland in 1870/71 Alfonso exercised in the gymnasium for two hours

¹²¹ AGP-ArchivosPersonalesFamiliares-Novaliches-Caja19100-Exp.1, Novaliches to Isabel II, 03/07/1869.

¹²² Alcañices to Isabel II, 04/07/1869 cited in Julio Quesada Cañaveral y Piédrola, *Memorias Del Conde de Benalúa*, 73.

¹²³ *Ibid*, 65.

¹²⁴ AGP-ArchivosPersonalesFamiliares-Novaliches-Caja19100-Exp.1, Novaliches to Isabel II, 07/11/1870.

¹²⁵ Goltermann, *Körper*.

twice a week and was instructed by a colonel of the Swiss federal army.¹²⁶ To ensure that Alfonso would exhibit a manly physique and bearing, which was an important part of the formation of a military *Habitus*, the royal family found a foreign officer to supervise a strict physical regime.

Controlling the armed forces

Disillusioned elements and loyalists among the armed forces were not sufficient to ensure the success of a *pronunciamiento* in favour of the Bourbon heir. Cánovas wanted Alfonso to acquire a military *Habitus* or to put it in his terms, '*hacerse militar*' to gain the allegiance of the military.¹²⁷ He informed Isabel II that after close consultation with leading generals, he had received their approval to appoint Juan de Velasco as the new *Ayudante Profesor* to Alfonso. Furthermore, having a completely new officer at the heir's side and rotating the person occupying the post was a policy explicitly aimed at appealing to the wishes expressed by the upper echelon of the army. Cánovas reported that 'it seemed good to all the generals that I have consulted, including the Conde de Cheste, that the *Ayudantes Profesores* should be new officers, that have not hitherto been with the Prince, and they argued further that after some time other officers should get a turn, to avoid even the smallest semblance of favouritism.' Cánovas wanted Alfonso to be prepared in case his presence was needed to serve as 'a guarantee to the Jefes [of the army] and an incitement to the soldiers; (...).' The ultimate aim was to 'harmonise, moderate, preserve the goodwill' of the armed forces, which was a task 'on which I [Cánovas] spent the most part of my time and all my efforts.'¹²⁸ The wishes of leading generals were taken into account to win them over.

Alfonso's military upbringing played a central part in these efforts. As has been outlined in the previous chapter, Cánovas pressed for Alfonso to go to England and attend a military college there. As he made clear to Isabel in March 1874, it was 'most urgent that Alfonso should become [*hacerse* in original] a soldier and there are fields for instruction and military establishment in England.' He was to do so 'at the side of real men of war' to reinforce this image.¹²⁹ This was meant to ensure, that 'he [Alfonso] would be able to fulfil his role with dignity and make a good impression (...).'¹³⁰ In this regard he had Isabel II's full support. She told Alfonso that she agreed with Cánovas that 'yes my son, it is necessary that you shall be very much a man and very much

¹²⁶ AGP-ArchivosPersonalesFamiliares-Novaliches-Caja19100, O'Ryan to Novaliches, 05/12/1870.

¹²⁷ The phrase comes up repeatedly in Cánovas, Alfonso's and Isabel II's correspondence in 1874. It translates literally as "making oneself a military man", which implies the acquisition of military manners, habits and behavior which add up to a *Habitus*.

¹²⁸ AGP-ReinadosAlfonsoXII-Cajón24-Exp.5B, Cánovas to Isabel II, 13/04/1874.

¹²⁹ ARAH-Isabel II-Leg.6955, Cánovas to Isabel II, 12/03/1874.

¹³⁰ AGP-ReinadosAlfonsoXII-Cajón24-Exp.5B, Cánovas to Isabel II, 02/05/1874.

a military man'.¹³¹ The link between masculinity and the military is explicit. By becoming a soldier Alfonso was simultaneously turning into a man, leaving behind the mantle of the student. The connection between a military *Habitus* and notions of masculinity and maturity is evident.

It is important to note that this *symbolic* appeal to the military was essential. The Marqués de Molins argued that 'Alfonso had to be a man of war; not a strategist or a sage, not a trooper ['troupiér' in original], but a brave one, familiar with military matters.' He was not to lecture the recruits or overshadow the generals but to instil enthusiasm in them and win them over.¹³² To the political leaders of the restoration, Alfonso's acquisition of a military *Habitus*, including instruction in warfare, a martial appearance, and acquisition of behaviours associated with the military were an important way to appeal to the armed forces and gain their support. The intention, however, was by no means to turn him into a full-blooded soldier.

Cánovas' longer-term strategy was to control the army and reign in its interventionist tendencies by establishing their loyalty to a soldier-king. He felt that Spain was facing something worse than Carlism in 'mac-mahonismo: that is the perpetual aspiration to supreme power by a soldier of fortune.'¹³³ He explained to Isabel that militarism had been able to take deep roots in Spain, because officers had been 'taking advantage of the long reign of a Lady, your august and kind-hearted mother [María Cristina of the Two Sicilies]'. Thus, the monarch and their gender played an important role in Cánovas's analysis; a female was bound to not be taken seriously and to be taken advantage of. The same was not to happen to Alfonso. He had to leave behind his student days and become a man. The desired result was that 'the nation would begin to understand, (...), that it does not have to entrust its security and repose to the *caudillos*, who between us have lost the American things, [they can] count [instead] on the determination, valour and knowledge of their own and legitimate sovereign.'¹³⁴

Cánovas' critical attitude toward the military is striking; he did not want Alfonso to become an active part of the officer corps, but rather a credible commander-in-chief, able to counteract the militaristic tendencies that had developed in the absence of a male, symbolic soldier figure on the throne. Even when it came to winning over leading generals in the Spanish army, Cánovas tried to avoid excessive involvement of the military. While he expressed his satisfaction and agreement

¹³¹ AGP-ReinadosAlfonsoXII-Cajón19-Exp.21, Isabel II to Alfonso XII, 09/06/1874.

¹³² AGP-ReinadosAlfonsoXII-Cajón24-Exp.5F, Marqués de Molins to Isabel II, 19/06/1874.

¹³³ AGP-Reinados-AlfonsoXII-Cajón21-Expediente14A, Cánovas to Isabel II, 17/01/1874. "mac mahonismo" is a reference to General Mac Mahon in France, who was the chief of state and later second president of the Third Republic. Cánovas wanted to avert a similar popular military figure emerging in Spain.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*

with Alfonsist generals, among them Primo de Rivera, Captain General of Castilla-la-Nueva, and the Conde de Balmaseda, an important general in the Northern Army fighting the Carlists, he did not want them to gain excessive influence. He wrote to Isabel that ‘I agree with the Conde de Balmaseda, and I believe he can lend us his services but it is necessary that he be neither the only, nor the first of the generals.’¹³⁵ The army needed to be won over in its majority and not led by a few that could then make a claim to political authority. He wanted to control the army, not make it the leading power in the constitutional monarchy he envisioned; Alfonso’s upbringing as a soldier-king was part of that plan.

The decision to send Alfonso to Sandhurst underlined the symbolic nature of his military instruction. Cánovas knew that this step in his education was not necessary, as he felt that Alfonso could learn everything he needed to know about military matters ‘within 15 days’.¹³⁶ There had been warnings about the difficulties Alfonso would encounter in adapting to the college and the English language.¹³⁷ And indeed Alfonso’s examination results, admittedly taken after having been enrolled only for a matter of weeks, were poor.¹³⁸ This was apparently not a cause for worry, as the Director General of Military Education remarked to his mother on how Alfonso’s ‘affability of manners, candour of his character and his aptitudes have won him the esteem and affection of all the young officers (...).’¹³⁹ There is no sign that either Cánovas nor anyone else expressed any concern with his actual military instruction. What mattered was that he became a symbol capable of appealing to the military, formed his character into that of a soldier, and thus learned how to negotiate with and appeal to the armed forces at home.

The question that remains is how effective this appeal and the quest for control over the military was. To what extent did the monarchy and civilian institutions assert themselves over the armed forces? As early as April 1874, Frederico Argüelles, an Alfonsist close to Cánovas with exceptional contacts to the military, reported that various generals were passionately in favour of a Bourbon restoration. He told Isabel that ‘in the Army there is barely a Gefe or Officer who is not an Alfonsist’ and that they were ‘preparing the opportune moment for the general

¹³⁵ AGP-ReinadosAlfonsoXII-Cajón24-Exp.5B, Cánovas to Isabel II, 08/05/1874.

¹³⁶ AGP-ReinadosAlfonsoXII-Cajón24-Exp.5B, Cánovas to Isabel II, 02/05/1874.

¹³⁷ AGP-ReinadosAlfonsoXII-Caja12830-Exp.27, D.Y. Cameron to the Governor of the Royal Military College at Sandhurst, 09/10/1874.

¹³⁸ AGP-ReinadosAlfonsoXII-Caja12830-Exp.27, “Results of the Examination of the Marquis de Covadonga”, 01/11/1874. Marqués de Covadonga was Alfonso’s not very inconspicuous alias during exile.

¹³⁹ AGP-ReinadosAlfonsoXII-Caja12830-Exp.27, “Results of the Examination of the Marquis de Covadonga”, 21/11/1874.

acclamation of Alfonso XII (...).¹⁴⁰ In his opinion it was particularly the belief that Alfonso's restoration could weaken the Carlists that favoured his cause. A more neutral source, the British ambassador, Lord Stanley remarked, 'It is said that the army has recently shown marked Alfonsist tendencies.' He believed that the main reason Alfonso had not been proclaimed king was his relative youth, something that the military image sought to counter-act.¹⁴¹ Ultimately the fact that the restoration was brought about by a *pronunciamiento*, which found widespread adherence and was not effectively opposed by military force is indicative of many generals' and officers' willingness to actively support a Bourbon restoration or at least accept Alfonso as their king and commander-in-chief.

It is more difficult to gauge whether civil control over the military was established and this is a matter of extensive debate. The almost complete disappearance of the *pronunciamiento* as a tool for the change of government, civilian control over the armed forces and the installation of Alfonso XII as a legal and symbolic soldier-king seem to support Seco Serrano's argument that the restoration was a period where *civilismo*, civilian rule, became a reality. He has argued that loyalty of the army to the monarch and civil control of the armed forces were firmly established.¹⁴² However, others such as Lleixa and Boyd, have contended that the system merely bought off the military by granting them extensive autonomy in the system, strengthening the prerogatives of the crown with relation to the military, and handing them political influence in the form of posts in the Cortes, administration, and government. The army was not under control but just placated for the time being and retreating to an 'inner vocation', which in the long term only contributed to its divorce from society.¹⁴³

Alfonso XII's military *Habitus* gives some insight into the centrality of the crown to this historiographical debate. There is evidence that a significant section of the armed forces accepted Alfonso as a military commander, approved of his involvement in their affairs and looked to him for leadership soon after his return to Spain.¹⁴⁴ As Earl Beck has demonstrated, though, while Alfonso was intimately involved in army affairs he was not always in agreement with the military establishment and some of his proposals for reform and rationalisation put him into outright

¹⁴⁰ AGP-ReinadosAlfonsoXII-Cajón24-Exp.5C, Federico Argüelles to Isabel II, 1874.

¹⁴¹ TNA-FO72/1367-GeneralCorrespondenceSpain, Lord Stanley to Earl of Derby, 28/04/1874.

¹⁴² Seco Serrano, *Militarismo*, 179-208.

¹⁴³ Lleixa, *Cien años*, 60-61 and Boyd, *Praetorian Politics*, 6-8.

¹⁴⁴ See for example AGP-ReinadosAlfonsoXII-Cajón22-Exp.39, General Balmaseda to AlfonsoXII and AGP-ReinadosAlfonsoXII-Cajón22-Exp.38, General Trillo y Figueroa to Alfonso XII, 10/04/1875. Remarkable is the detail that these letters go into, demonstrating these general's confidence in the monarch's understanding of military matters.

opposition to some generals.¹⁴⁵ He can certainly not be described as a mere agent of the interests of the military elite. On the other hand, the acceptance of Alfonso as commander-in-chief, a status which the 1876 constitution accorded to him¹⁴⁶, was only possible if Alfonso XII remained wedded to his military *Habitus*. Thus early in his reign, the king decided he would go and campaign with the troops fighting the Carlists, ignoring Morphy's warning to stay away from the campaign and 'avoid dying obscurely in a civil war'.¹⁴⁷ Cánovas, on the other hand, was happy to let Alfonso campaign, as he recognised that the military image could not be effective without these symbolic acts reinforcing them. A more careful approach was taken, though, after the king almost got caught in a Carlist ambush.¹⁴⁸ This balancing act of exhibiting a military *Habitus* and its acceptance by the military on the one side, and the supremacy of civilian power on the other are exemplified in an argument that arose between Cánovas and Arsenio Martínez Campos, the officer who had initiated the Sagunto rebellion, in December 1874. In January 1875, Alfonso XII intervened with the government on behalf of Martínez Campos to keep him in his post in Cataluña, in a show of allegiance to the general who had pronounced in his favour and the armed forces.¹⁴⁹ However, he assured Cánovas, at the time president of the Council of Ministers, that if the situation escalated further 'Your Excellence [Cánovas] and the Government can completely count on my support and confidence.'¹⁵⁰

While this indicates that Alfonso would probably have sided with the government and opted for civilian supremacy, this episode illustrates the potential there was for the monarch to intervene actively on behalf of officers. Seco Serrano, probably for that reason, identified Alfonso XII as fundamental to the *civilismo* of the period.¹⁵¹ The army came under civilian control only as far as the monarch was willing to favour civil over military elements in his decision making. The 1876 constitution and the *Ley Constitutiva del Ejército* placed Alfonso XII in a central position with regards to matters pertaining to the armed forces. All in all, Alfonso XII, despite his military *Habitus*, would show himself to have been Cánovas' student rather than the military's.

¹⁴⁵ Earl Ray Beck, *A Time of Triumph and of Sorrow: Spanish Politics During the Reign of Alfonso XII, 1874-1885* (Carbondale, 1979), 134-135.

¹⁴⁶ Spain, 1876 Constitution, Art. 52 and Art. 53.

¹⁴⁷ AGP-ReinadosAlfonsoXII-Cajón25-Exp.F1, Morphy to Alfonso XII, 02/02/1875.

¹⁴⁸ Beck, *Triumph*, 41.

¹⁴⁹ AGP-ReinadosAlfonsoXII-Cajón25-Exp.E2, Alfonso XII to Consejo de Minsitros, 27/01/1875.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ Seco Serrano, 'Relaciones', 44.

2.3 *Alfonso XIII*

The link between military elites and Alfonso XIII has been well established and the impact of this relationship on Spain continues to influence judgements of Alfonso's reign. This is due to his personal involvement in the 1921 *Desastre de Annual* (a battle in Morocco that cost thousands of Spanish lives), his implicit support for the Primo de Rivera dictatorship, and his initial patronage of the future Generalissimo, the dictator Francisco Franco Bahamonde. This chapter will aim to avoid a teleological interpretation of Alfonso XIII's relationship with the armed forces; it does not set out to find the origins of his later behaviour. Instead it will analyse the role that military instruction and education played in his upbringing based on three themes that shaped and determined Alfonso XIII's military education and its functions. Having said that, the question of whether his military upbringing in some ways predisposed him toward intervention in military affairs and siding with the armed forces at crucial junctures in his life will be touched upon.

The first theme is the influence of the legal, constitutional and historical framework on Alfonso XIII's military upbringing. The analysis will centre on the 1876 constitution, the 1878 *Ley Constitutiva del Ejército*, and the example set by his father. To what extent was the role of the future monarch defined by the 1876 constitution and the *Ley constitutiva*? Did the monarch's position in the constitutional system of the Restoration make military instruction an essential component of his upbringing? The other factor to be considered is the influence of Alfonso XII's example and legacy on his son's education. To what extent was Alfonso XIII meant to emulate the soldier-king and *pacificador* image of his father and follow a similar educational path?

The second theme concerns the idea of military training and the formation of a martial *Habitus* in its connection to moral, modern and national education. The purpose of this is to analyse how the pedagogical concept of military educators might have been linked to wider issues of morality, national virtues, and modernity. Another issue to be highlighted here is the extent to which military instruction formed part of the military's wider efforts to extend its soft power while retreating from more direct forms of public intervention.

The final section of the chapter will engage with what was probably the most decisive event to occur during Spain's fin-de-siècle and Alfonso's youth, the 1898 *desastre*, the loss of Spain's remaining overseas colonies in the Spanish-American War. The swift defeat of the Spanish forces impacted on the already uneasy relationship between military and civilian institutions, brought about by a strong sense that there was a need for regeneration. These events would have

impacted Alfonso's upbringing, his public representation, and his world-view. It is worth asking whether the soldierly image created of Alfonso XIII can be understood as a response to the urges unleashed by military defeat and led to an increased emphasis placed on his military upbringing.

Civil control, militarism, and the example of Alfonso XII

Rafael Fernández Sirvent's analysis of the legal attributions connected to Alfonso XII as soldier-king has stressed the importance of the 1876 Constitution and the 1878 *Ley Constitutiva del Ejército*. He has argued that these reinforced the king's martial image, strengthened the connection between the monarchy and the army and gave the monarchy extensive symbolic and effective power over the armed forces.¹⁵² Instead of focusing on Alfonso XII, this section aims to demonstrate how these legal bases, which remained in place under María Cristina of Habsburg's regency, influenced and conditioned Alfonso XIII's upbringing and made a military education essential. Besides, the ways in which Alfonso XII's soldierly image functioned as an example for Alfonso XIII to emulate must also be considered.

The 1876 constitution provided the first and essential basis for the indissoluble connection between monarch and army.¹⁵³ Article 52 of the constitution attributed to the king 'the supreme command of the army and the navy, and [the monarch] disposes all the forces of land and sea'.¹⁵⁴ Previous constitutions had contained a similar paragraph, which made the monarch the commander-in-chief.¹⁵⁵ However, as Fernández Sirvent has pointed out, this paragraph made the relationship more explicit; the 'supreme command of the army and the navy' was added to the less clear and shorter 'disposes of all the forces of the land and sea'.¹⁵⁶ The king could also declare war and make peace, and only had to inform the Cortes after the fact.¹⁵⁷ There was to be no doubt that it was the king who was in charge. Furthermore, the constitution gave the monarch the power to make the final decision on appointments, rewards and promotions; an important source for patronage that the monarchy used extensively.¹⁵⁸ The constitutional

¹⁵² Fernández Sirvent, 'De "Rey Soldado" a "pacificador"', 59-61.

¹⁵³ For a detailed analysis of the constitution and its elaboration see . Varela Suanzes-Carpegna, *La Constitución de 1876*.

¹⁵⁴ Spain, 1876 Constitution, Art. 52.

¹⁵⁵ See José María Lafuente Balle, "La jefatura militar del rey", in Antonio Torres del Moral (ed.), *Monarquía y Constitución*, (Madrid, 2002), 579.

¹⁵⁶ Fernández Sirvent, 'De "Rey Soldado"', 59

¹⁵⁷ Spain, 1876 Constitution, Art. 54, Paragraph 4.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.* Art. 53.

paragraphs concerned with the powers of the king were not up for discussion – Cánovas excluded all the articles under “Title VI - On the King and his Ministers’ from the debates of the constituent Cortes.¹⁵⁹ On a constitutional basis, the centrality of the monarch to the system was beyond dispute and so was the need for a Restoration monarch to be a soldier-king.

The 1878 *Ley Constitutiva del Ejército*, reinforced the position of the monarch further and gave him extensive authority over the armed forces. Article 4 reiterated the monarch’s constitutional position as commander-in-chief, emphasising that the command of the army and the navy ‘correspond exclusively to the king’.¹⁶⁰ Article 5 strengthened Alfonso XII’s personal authority. It freed the monarch from seeking ministerial approval when he took control of troops in the field. The organisation of the army in areas other than the budget was to be the joint responsibility of the monarch and the government. In general, the War Ministry remained in control of much of the administration of the armed forces, which was a point of contention for some senior generals. Thus, General Concha, a strong supporter of the Restoration, demanded a ‘more immediate intervention, (...) in the army than in the others branches of the State, because the military has special conditions that make this essential and necessary.’¹⁶¹ Martínez Campos, similarly urged Alfonso XII directly to take a more personal approach to army matters.¹⁶² Clearly the army accepted monarchical leadership, and, if anything, desired the monarch to be involved even beyond what the law established. This wish partially explains why Alfonso XIII’s upbringing would be shaped to such a large extent by officers.

Cánovas designed this legislation to keep the army out of politics, but he also sought to avoid the king’s excessive involvement in the day-to-day running of the armed forces. Dardé has maintained that Cánovas did not want the monarch to wield absolute power over the military or have him compromised by minor issues of government. The architect of the Restoration wanted monarchical power to be effective and powerful but located on a higher level that would not make the monarch vulnerable to public opinion.¹⁶³ The potential dangers of associating the crown too closely with the army did not escape politicians. Some senators expressed their concern that the *Ley Constitutiva’s* articles concerning the king laid the monarchy open to being assigned moral responsibility for defeats or capitulations.¹⁶⁴ It was hence the symbolic aspect, the

¹⁵⁹ Varela Suanzes-Carpegna, *Constitución*, 59.

¹⁶⁰ Biblioteca Academia de Artillería-Segovia-R.16973-Art4, Ley constitutiva del Ejército, 1878.

¹⁶¹ *Diario de Sesiones del Senado*, 16/05/1878, 904-914

¹⁶² AGP-ReinadosAlfonsoXII-Cajón22/1, Martínez Campos to Alfonso XII, 11/11/1878.

¹⁶³ Carlos Dardé, “Ideas acerca de la monarquía y las funciones del monarca en el reinado de Alfonso XII”, in Encarnación García Monerris et al. (eds), *Culturas* 329-330.

¹⁶⁴ Fernández Sirvent, ‘De “Rey Soldado”’, 61

role of a monarch capable of leading his troops into battle, which the king was to fulfil. For the monarch to conform to these expectations and represent a believable military image it was essential to for him to learn the tools of the trade.

Besides these strictly legal bases, that made army training almost unavoidable, Alfonso XIII was expected to follow the example his father had set by adhering to a similar educational model. Cánovas had ensured that Alfonso XII acquired a convincing military *Habitus*, even before his return to Spain. Alfonso XII maintained and added to this military *Habitus* during his reign, by campaigning with the troops on several occasions, staying in personal contact with senior generals, and frequently directing military manoeuvres in the field.¹⁶⁵ The king showed a personal interest in the armed forces and in reforming their organisation.¹⁶⁶ Moreover, it was the end of the Cuban conflict and the Carlist War, which emerged as the centrepieces of Alfonso XII's symbolic representation. As Fernández Sirvent has argued, the monarchists used these victories to create 'the legitimising image of the young brave, charismatic soldier-king of all Spaniards, (...)'.¹⁶⁷ Nevertheless, as Beck has demonstrated the loyalty of the military remained one of Alfonso XII's constant preoccupations and was never taken for granted.¹⁶⁸ Alfonso XIII was likewise not guaranteed the army's allegiance, but had to earn it. Raising the young king to conform to his father's idealised example was one way to achieve this aim.

There was some concern over the reliance of the political system on the monarch as an individual with a strong interest in military affairs. Thus, one senator pointed out that 'the law has not been written solely for Alfonso XII, who has a fondness for the armed forces, it will be applicable for his successors, who might not be as fond of the things of war as H.M., or [it could be] a woman'.¹⁶⁹ His doubts were justified. As regent, María Cristina of Habsburg never fulfilled the role in the same way as her deceased husband and, as will be argued later, this contributed to a growing restlessness in the army. However, steps were taken to ensure that Alfonso XIII followed in his father's footsteps. The upbringing of the future ruler was part of a process intended to guarantee that he would fulfil the functions Spain's laws prescribed. The aim was obvious: to establish a link between Alfonso XIII and his father, and in particular with his military achievements. The best example of this was when Alfonso XIII laid the foundation

¹⁶⁵ For correspondence with high-ranking generals see collection of his correspondence in AGP-ReinadosAlfonsoXII and Seco Serrano, 'Relaciones', 27–54.

¹⁶⁶ Beck, *Triumph*, 134–138.

¹⁶⁷ Fernández Sirvent, 'De "Rey Soldado"', 65.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 104–105.

¹⁶⁹ Senator Salamanca quoted in José María Verdejo Lucas, *Ejército, Política Y Sociedad En El Reinado de Alfonso XII* (Madrid, 2004), 86.

stone for the Alfonso XII monument in the Retiro Park during the festivities that accompanied his accession in 1902. Fittingly, he inaugurated the equestrian statue, which was to depict his father campaigning with the troops during the Carlist Wars, in full military dress.¹⁷⁰ The suggestion of continuity would not have escaped anyone.

Steps to ensure that Alfonso XIII could fulfil his role of soldier-king along the lines prescribed by his father's example and the constitution were taken early on. It must have appeared only natural that the *Jefe de estudios*, appointed in October 1893, when the king was only 8 years old, was Don José Sánchiz, a high-ranking army officer. Not only was he a respected general, he had also been one of Alfonso XII's teachers between 1864 and 1868, served as the king's *Ayudante* from 1875 to 1877 and, in that function, had accompanied the monarch on his campaign against the Carlists.¹⁷¹ The link between father and son and to the deceased monarch's close connection to the army could not have been personified better than in the biography of Sánchiz. The entire direction of the king's education and much of the teaching was in fact dominated by officers.¹⁷²

Before moving on to the wider significance of this education, it is worth picking up on the historiographical debate concerning militarism in Spain. Was Alfonso XIII's extensive martial instruction a sign of a growing militarism, sometimes attested to the early Restoration period?¹⁷³ Building on Gabriel Cardona's analysis, Fernández Sirvent has developed a convincing argument that the Restoration witnessed the replacement of "praetorianism", defined as the arbitrary political influence of the military on the government and public life, with "militarism", which he has described as the omnipresence in public life of a military spirit that was nevertheless controlled by the head of state.¹⁷⁴ The omnipresence of the military spirit in Alfonso XIII's education is undeniable: the constant presence of officers, the emphasis on a martial drill, and the king's own enthusiastic adoption of uniforms are all evidence of this form of militarism. As will be demonstrated below, the soldiers surrounding the king did not intervene directly to press their interest or seek political power, but the prevalence of a militaristic spirit and the influence of its ideological principles on the king are undeniable. Together with his later, disastrous interventions on behalf of the armed forces, this helped form an image of Alfonso XIII as ruler

¹⁷⁰ *La Ilustración Española y Americana*, 30/05/1902.

¹⁷¹ AGMS-1a/S-1321 "Expediente Personal: José Sánchiz y Castillo (General de División)".

¹⁷² AGP-ReinadosAlfonsoXIII-Caja15593. Other officers mentioned include: General Patricio Aguirre de Tejada (Navy), Comandante Juan Loriga (Artillery), Comandante Gonzalez de Castejon (Estado Mayor).

¹⁷³ Lleixa, *Cien años*.

¹⁷⁴ Fernández Sirvent, 'De "Rey Soldado"', 52; Cardona, *El problema militar*, 96.

who was excessively fond of the military.¹⁷⁵ As Javier Moreno Luzón has highlighted, the image portrayed by Romanones, minister in Alfonso XIII's first government, of a king who was, from the very outset, determined to intervene actively in military affairs has been surprisingly persistent, despite being largely based on the memories of a disgruntled politician.¹⁷⁶ While Boyd is right that the army and navy once more developed 'praetorian' tendencies at the turn of the century, Alfonso XIII's education during the 1890s and early 1900s was more symptomatic of that other variant: the omnipresence of a military spirit.¹⁷⁷

A soldier-king's education

An analysis of the records of military officers instructing the king offers an insight into the factors behind their selection and the qualities they had in common. On this basis, wider issues such as the pedagogical functions of the military, its modernity, and its search for channels of cultural and ideological influence can be addressed. The strong presence of officers in Alfonso's education has already been noted, but it is worth examining these individuals and their views more closely.

While it would be an exaggeration to talk of a complete, coherent and settled military ideology, it can be argued that the highest ranks of the armed forces, from which Alfonso's teachers were recruited, inhabited a shared intellectual space.¹⁷⁸ Intellectual military elites conceived of the army as a moral force in society and regarded military virtues, derived from Spanish national history, as essential to the formation of a "military spirit".¹⁷⁹ Furthermore, Jensen has emphasised that this belief in the primacy of mind over matter, had a significant influence on their fellow officers and created a vibrant military culture through the books, articles and manuals they published. Intellectual officers conceived of themselves as the creators of doctrines and more importantly

¹⁷⁵ Typical is the judgement of one of the elder statesmen of the Restoration, Romano Robledo, who reportedly remarked that Alfonso should have been brought to the schools instead of the barracks. See Tusell and García Queipo de Llano. *Alfonso XIII*, 107.

¹⁷⁶ Javier Moreno Luzón, "El Rey de Papel – Textos y debates sobre Alfonso XIII" in Moreno Luzón (ed.), *Alfonso XIII*, 30. For the story see Alvaro Figueroa y Torres Romanones, *Notas de Una Vida* (Madrid, 1900), 161. It appears doubtful whether the council meeting he described even took place.

¹⁷⁷ Boyd, *Praetorian Politics*, 10-14.

¹⁷⁸ For more on the configuration of a military mentality see González-Pola de la Granja, 'La Configuración'. For the military's self-conception see Wittenberg, *Mut*. For an insight into military culture see Jensen, *Cultura*.

¹⁷⁹ Wittenberg, *Mut*, 197-200.

as educators.¹⁸⁰ Some of the intellectual leaders in the military served this aim at the highest possible level by taking on the monarch's teaching.

One of them was Enrique Ruiz-Fornells, who was appointed to direct Alfonso XIII's military education in 1898. Unlike that of the other officers, his brief was focused on providing the king with training similar to that of an army cadet. Interestingly, Ruiz-Fornells had previously written *La educación moral del soldado*, a tract on the moral education of soldiers, which became the standard textbook for army recruits and which demonstrates his much broader interpretation of what it meant to bring someone up as a soldier. To Ruiz-Fornells it was mainly a task of instilling virtues and creating a moral individual imbued with a strong sense of their own history and nation, all amounting to the creation of a strong 'military spirit'.¹⁸¹ Ruiz-Fornells was a graduate of the *Academia General Militar* (AGM), which was closely based on the Prussian military academies and was influential in shaping the environment of the armed forces.¹⁸² His writings on army organisation in Spain and abroad became one of the basic instruction manuals of the AGM in 1882.¹⁸³ There is no question that he was one of the leading intellectuals of the armed forces with a very clear idea of how military education should proceed.¹⁸⁴

His work on the moral education of soldiers and his intellectual background are worth analysing for what they might tell us about how he sought to teach Alfonso XIII. Ruiz-Fornells did not simply conceive of military education as technical instruction, but as imbuing the pupil with a sense of morality and a military ethos. An important aspect of this was a physical and practical learning, as well as scientific and intellectual pursuits.¹⁸⁵ Ruiz-Fornells called it 'undeniable' that moral aspects were even more important than material ones.¹⁸⁶ Secondly, much of the book is concerned with the virtues inherent in a military education and their wider importance. The chapters are entitled 'On duty', 'On patriotism', 'On discipline', etc., constructing what amounts to a classical catalogue of military virtues.¹⁸⁷ In his position of teacher to Alfonso XIII Ruiz-Fornells would have tried to transmit these values to Alfonso XIII, not only in the belief that it would make him a good soldier, but that it would also make him a virtuous king. Martial values and morality were closely connected. Thirdly, Ruiz-Fornells aimed to reconcile modernity and

¹⁸⁰ Jensen, *Cultura*, 15

¹⁸¹ See Enrique Ruiz-Fornells and Pedro A Berenguer y Ballester, *La educación moral del soldado*, (Toledo, 1894). This is the first edition. The book ran to eight editions.

¹⁸² Julio Busquets, *El militar de carrera en España; estudio de sociología militar*. (Barcelona, 1967), 78-80.

¹⁸³ AGMS-1a/R-3459, "Expediente Personal: Enrique Ruiz-Fornells Regueiro".

¹⁸⁴ See Jensen, *Cultura militar*, 191-218.

¹⁸⁵ Fornells and Berenguer y Ballester, *La educación moral*, 27-28.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid*, 23

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid*, pp.vi-vii for a chapter summary.

progress on the one hand with what he regards as the historic principles and duties of the soldier on the other.¹⁸⁸

His nationalistic conception of the nature of the Spanish soldier and his qualities was based on an idealised account of national history, which emphasised the individual spirit of the Spanish soldier that had prevailed during the glory days of the Spanish empire and shown itself during the Peninsular War. However, he did not think these to be incompatible with modernity; he believed that the combination of the military spirit with the rationalisation of warfare would bring about a renewed and strengthened army.¹⁸⁹ The soldiers' correct moral education could form them into virtuous servants of the *patria*, who could overcome the challenges of modern combat warfare.¹⁹⁰ This worldview, according to Jensen, was not grounded in romanticism or emotive rhetoric, but in a humanistic and rational view of morality and virtue.¹⁹¹ It was through reason and modern scientific methods, and not through punishment, that discipline, nationalism, and a true military spirit were to be instilled. Alfonso XIII's education would not have been exempt from these principles, even if Ruiz-Fornells claimed in his memoirs that most of the subjects he taught the king were technical.¹⁹²

Military education was also associated with nationalism, and in particular the idea that the armed forces could be a tool for nationalisation. According to Baquer, during the Restoration intellectuals in army and navy increasingly associated martial values with the values of the nation.¹⁹³ Even before that, the transformation of military service from a lifelong profession to a temporary mass duty and the blood spilled during the various civil wars created the romantic liberal ideal of a citizen soldier.¹⁹⁴ In Ruiz Fornells's pseudo-scientific view, the Spanish soldier's temperament inherited from his partially Moorish forefathers made him particularly apt for heroic actions and represented the essential traits of the Spaniard handed down the generations.¹⁹⁵ One of the architects of this view was one of the chief educators of the future king. While there is no substantial evidence of this in his exercise books, his history lessons seem to have had strongly nationalistic undertones. His writings are focused on 'Notable Periods in Spain's history', which deal with the events that are connected to the glories of Spain, such as the

¹⁸⁸ Ibid, 24.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid 48-58.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid, 25.

¹⁹¹ Jensen, *Cultura militar*, 217.

¹⁹² Enrique Ruiz-Fornells, "Memorias del Excmo. D. Enrique Ruiz-Fornells Regueiro", unpublished memoirs provided to me in excerpts by his grandson José Enrique Ruiz-Fornells Bonet in 2016.

¹⁹³ Miguel Alonso Baquer, *El ejército en la sociedad española*. (Madrid, 1971), 170-180.

¹⁹⁴ Fernando Puell de la Villa, *El soldado desconocido: de la leva a la 'mili', 1700-1912* (Madrid, 1996), 170-171.

¹⁹⁵ Fornells and Berenguer y Ballester, *La educación moral*, 55-57.

discovery of the Americas.¹⁹⁶ For Alfonso to be a good king he had to also be a good Spanish soldier, the embodiment of Spanish national characteristics.

The other members of the teaching staff had similar background and it is reasonable to assume that they shared Ruiz-Fornells's views. They were military educators with a moral conception of the necessary components for the king's best upbringing. As has been outlined above, General José Sánchiz was appointed as *Jefe de Estudios*, which established a direct link to Alfonso XII's military past and his pre-1868 education. In addition to that Sánchiz had shown a marked interest in education during his career. He wrote a textbook on arithmetic to be used by sergeants and privates, and received official recognition for this work by being awarded the Order of Carlos III. In addition, he had been a teacher (*profesor*) at the prestigious Artillery Academy in Segovia. His subsequent personal service to Alfonso XII during the Restoration has been outlined above.¹⁹⁷ Teaching the king was a natural progression from his pedagogical career within the artillery and enabled him to have a lasting influence on the future monarch. The personal rewards and decorations received probably functioned as an additional incentive.¹⁹⁸

The careers of the other officers appointed to the teaching staff followed a similar trajectory. Thus Admiral Patricio Aguirre de Tejada, the second *Jefe de Estudios* also exhibited a markedly intellectual background. He published various poems, wrote a prologue to a book on the Count of Bazán, a sixteenth-century Spanish naval commander, and had distinguished himself during his colonial service.¹⁹⁹ In his obituary, the monarchist paper *ABC* described him as an 'impeccable gentleman, military man, and poet, model of civic and private virtues, he served the throne with admirable fidelity'.²⁰⁰ His faith, sense of duty and knowledge of naval history were virtues he would have wanted to transmit to the king. As an officer, who had served in the upper echelons of the navy, he made important decisions on how Alfonso XIII's education would proceed.

Sánchiz and Tejada picked some of the lower ranking officers more directly involved in Alfonso XIII's day-to-day teaching. One of them was Juan Lóriga, who like Sánchiz was a graduate of the artillery academy and later on an *Ayudante de profesor* at said institution. He published a book on

¹⁹⁶ AGP-ReinadosAlfonsoXIII-Caja12911-Exp.25, "Cuaderno de trabajo de Alfonso 13. Historia", c.1900.

¹⁹⁷ AGMS-1a/S-1321, "Expediente Personal: José Sánchiz y Castillo (General de Division)".

¹⁹⁸ AGP-Personal-Caja972-Exp.22, "Expediente Personal de José Sánchiz (Jefe de Estudios de S.M.)".

¹⁹⁹ See Ángel de Altolaquirre y Duvale, Patricio Aguirre de Tejada and Álvaro de Baçan, *Don Álvaro de Bazán ... Estudio histórico-biográfico ... Con un prólogo del Sr. D. Patricio Aguirre de Tejada*. (Madrid, 1888); Patricio Aguirre de Tejada, *Poesías de Patricio Aguirre de Tejada* (Madrid, 1872).

²⁰⁰ *ABC*, 02/01/1908

ballistics for which he received an honorary medal.²⁰¹ When he was temporarily relieved of his post to join the war in Cuba in 1897, he was commended in particular for his ‘love of learning’ and moreover for ‘maintaining and strengthening in H.M. the King the principles of healthy morals, which were instilled in him from the cradle.’²⁰² It is interesting that it was the moral influence Lóriga had on the monarch that was highlighted. This demonstrates that the tasks of these officers were not bound by a narrow definition of military instruction but aimed at shaping the king’s character, morality, and virtue.

The other officer tasked with directing the king’s education was Miguel González de Castejón. He was a graduate of the highly selective *Estado Mayor* and had achieved extraordinarily high marks on his service records, specifically in military tactics, practical knowledge, and the theory of warfare.²⁰³ Besides, he appears to have successfully sat various examinations at the *Escuela Superior de la Guerra* before being called to the palace. Together with Lóriga he was in charge of teaching maths and general studies. To some extent both of these soldiers were intellectually overqualified for their appointments. The opportunity for financial and prestigious rewards certainly played a role. However, it is likely that beyond this they were attracted by the opportunity of exercising a lasting influence on the child that was born king of Spain.

Unfortunately there is not much evidence as to the contents and praxis of these men’s teaching. Still, it is possible to draw some inferences from the analysis of these officer’s individual biographies. The first is an acknowledgement that they were not only officers but professional educators, meaning that they had some form of teaching experience and were almost all respected authors. This is perhaps unsurprising if one considers Jensen’s findings that the armed forces provided access to some of the best educational establishments in the country and that as a result the officer corps was one of the most intellectually diverse groupings. Many of them were not conservative traditionalist but liberal nationalists and modernisers.²⁰⁴ Furthermore, the interest that these officers showed in pedagogical issues was a common phenomenon in the nationalisation efforts driven on by European armies at the time.²⁰⁵ By educating the future ruler as a good Spanish soldier, he would be able to serve as an example of national virtue to all Spaniards. Tusell and Queipo de Llano have highlighted that the dominance of officers in

²⁰¹ AGMS-1a/L-1889, “Expediente Personal de Juan Lóriga y Herrero-Davila, Conde de Grove”.

²⁰² AGP-ReinadosAlfonsoXIII-Caja15593-Exp.2, Ministry of War to the Jefe de Estudios, 08/09/1897.

²⁰³ AGMS-1a/G-3538, “Expediente Personal de Miguel González de Castejón y Elio”. For the position of the different corps within the armed forces see Fernández Bastarreche, *El ejército español*.

²⁰⁴ Jensen, *Cultura militar*, 13.

²⁰⁵ *Ibid*, 28/29

education was common at nineteenth-century European courts, and in Spain it would continue even in Juan Carlos I's upbringing.²⁰⁶

While they are right to point to the similarities between Alfonso XIII's education and those of other monarchs in Europe, which undoubtedly existed, it is also worth discussing the differences. The teachers selected to these posts in Spain were generally more distinguished and of higher rank than those in other countries.²⁰⁷ This supports Jensen's hypothesis that during the Restoration the armed forces in Spain were seeking to use ideology, culture, and their moral leadership to strengthen their position, forsaking the *pronunciamiento* that had previously been the dominant form of military intervention.²⁰⁸ It furthermore sustains the notion of a transition from the armed forces' direct "praetorian" involvement to their elaboration and diffusion of a military spirit throughout Spanish society. It is also for those reasons that leading officers continued to regard teaching the monarch as an important enough task to be taken on by men of their rank.

Alfonso XIII's education was one of the ways that these officers exerted their moral and ideological influence. Snchiz, Tejada, Loriga, and Castejn accompanied the king on almost all his travels and were clearly close to him personally.²⁰⁹ Furthermore, their proximity to the king, his appreciation of their company, and their continued influence are demonstrated by their careers after Alfonso XIII's majority in 1902. Apart from Snchiz, who died in 1901, all the officers mentioned continued to serve at the palace in some function. Tejada was rewarded with the title of Conde de Andino and became personal secretary to the king, a post he held until his death in January 1908.²¹⁰ Similarly Alfonso XIII created the title of Conde de Grove for Juan Lriga, who became *ayudante Secretario del Augusto Soberano* in 1902 and in 1918 continued his work in the education of heirs to the throne, when he was appointed *Jefe de Estudios de S.A.R. el Serenissimo Seor Prncipe de Asturias*. This post came with a promotion to the rank of Division General.²¹¹ Gonzlez de Castejn was made Conde de Aybar and served at the side of Alfonso XIII from 1902 to 1904, when he was officially appointed *Ayudante de Secretario de S.M. el Rey*, a post he held until 1917.²¹²

²⁰⁶ Tusell and Garca Queipo de Llano, *Alfonso XIII*, 102.

²⁰⁷ See for the Prussian case Yvonne Wagner, *Prinzenerziehung*.

²⁰⁸ Jensen, *Cultura militar*, 26

²⁰⁹ AGP-ReinadosAlfonsoXIII-Caja15.593-Exp.2, Jefe de Estudios to the General en Jefe del 1er Cuerpo de Ejercito, 12/06/1896. This is one of various letters in which Snchiz requests special travel documents so he and the other officers could accompany Alfonso on his summer holidays to San Sebastian.

²¹⁰ AGP-ReinadosAlfonso XIII-Cajn 24-Exp.8, "Expediente Personal de Patricio Aguirre de Tejada (Conde de Andino)".

²¹¹ AGMS-1a/L-1889, "Expediente Personal de Juan Lriga y Herrero-Davila, Conde de Grove",

²¹² AGP-Personal-Caja2636-Exp.24, "Expediente Personal de Manuel Gonzalez de Castejon y Elio".

“Más se perdió en Cuba”: The king, the military, and regenerationism

Under María Cristina of Habsburg’s regency the monarchy assumed a much less interventionist attitude to military matters. The queen regent did not try to fill the role of the commander-in-chief, probably due to her foreignness and her gender. The War Ministry presented resolutions on military affairs to her as *faits accomplis*.²¹³ Her official image was that of a discreet queen, who worked diligently for the interest of the nation, to whom she had given a male, Spanish heir.²¹⁴ The flipside was that the crown’s control over the upper echelons of the military waned and generals such as Martínez Campos, of Sagunto fame, re-entered the political frame. As Tusell and Queipo de Llano have argued, Martínez Campos played an important role in the politics of the late 1880s and early 1890s as ‘other generals started agitating and frequently attempted to have a more direct relation to the head of state.’²¹⁵ The continued susceptibility of the system to military intervention was evident. Cánovas wrote to the queen that the one thing that made him sleep uneasy was the issue of military promotions and the potential this had to cause acts of rebellion.²¹⁶ Even the architect of the Restoration continued to fear the military. This environment contributed to the perception that Alfonso XIII needed to become a soldier-king, capable of reigning in these tendencies. This became even further accentuated after 1898.

The 1895-98 Cuban conflict, which famously ended in a disastrous defeat by U.S. forces, led to loud calls for national and military regeneration and ‘exponentially multiplied the sense of fragility that the Restoration Monarchy had always suffered from.’²¹⁷ The intervention of the military in public life became once more an immediate danger to the Restoration settlement. The military leadership resented being the scapegoat for public anger and demanded that those accusing and insulting the armed forces publicly should be sentenced by military tribunals: a demand that foreshadowed the 1906 *Ley de Jurisdicciones*.²¹⁸ The palace watched these developments and reports on reunions of generals closely.²¹⁹ It is interesting that the appointment of Ruiz-Fornells, and thus the formalisation of Alfonso’s military training, coincided so closely with Spain’s defeat in 1898. The appointment of an intellectual, highly

²¹³ AGP-Cajón5-Exp.39A&Cajón 15-Exp.1 for María Cristina’s correspondence with the War Ministry.

²¹⁴ Mónica Moreno Seco, ‘María Cristina de Habsburgo, la (in)discrete regente’, in La Parra López (ed.) *La imagen*, 395-401.

²¹⁵ Tusell and Queipo de Llano, *Alfonso XIII*, 69

²¹⁶ AGP-ReinadosAlfonsoXIII-Cajón5-Exp.29, Cánovas to María Cristina, 25/08/1890.

²¹⁷ Tusell and Queipo de Llano, *Alfonso XIII*, 79

²¹⁸ Boyd, *Praetorian Politics*, 11-12.

²¹⁹ AGP-Reinados-AlfonsoXIII-Cajón18-Exp.7-1, “Reunion of Generals in Madrid”, 30/12/1898.

qualified officer, who had studied the organisation of other, more successful European armies, played a signalling function. It assured the restless generals that they would soon have another soldier-king, who would be able to regenerate and revitalise the Spanish armed forces. The hope was that Alfonso would become a strong defender of military interests and a driving-force behind its future regeneration. The Marqués de Polavieja, a conservative Catholic general with ties to the court, suggested to the queen a regeneration from above, driven by the generals with the help of the monarchy, could ultimately be realised through the future king.²²⁰ Fernando Puell de la Villa has demonstrated that the military at this time also used the *Cuarto Militar del Rey* (military household), created in 1855, to strengthen their bond to the monarchy and to further their ambitions.²²¹ The *Cuarto Militar* represented the institutionalisation of the long-standing tradition of monarch's surrounding themselves with military adjutants and advisers. It was meant to strengthen the monarch's hold over the military through the dispensation of favours and the maintenance of close contacts to the high command, but it also allowed the military an additional channel into court politics.²²² Alfonso's education was a similar issue. It provided another route through which the military sought to strengthen its link to the monarchy and mould the future ruler in its own image.

It is important to recognise that 'regeneration' also had a strong progressive impulse. Tusell and Queipo de Llano defined it as 'the desire for modernisation and change in all areas', which became a 'regenerationist fury that invaded Spain after the disaster.'²²³ The same authors have called Alfonso a 'regenerationist king'.²²⁴ Moreover, Seco Serrano has argued that the attitudes of young Alfonso toward the military can only be understood in light of 1898 and the growing desire of the monarchy to show its concerns for the 'ills of the patria' and the need for modernisation.²²⁵ The call for regeneration was closely linked to the perceived crisis of Spain's national identity caused by the defeat. There was a sense that Spain had failed to become a modern nation and that the political system did not represent the "real" country. To change its collective destiny and regain its former glories, the nation needed to be regenerated.²²⁶ Historians

²²⁰ AGP-ReinadosAlfonsoXIII-Cajón4-Exp.57, Polavieja to María Cristina, 06/10/1898.

²²¹ Puell de la Villa, *Historia del ejército en España*, 94-98.

²²² There is very little academic research done on the *Cuarto Militar*. For a good summary of the origins and members of the institutions see Alfonso de Ceballos-Escalera y Gila, "El Cuarto Militar Del Rey: La Institución, Las Personas" in *Cuadernos de Ayala*, (2012), 52, .3-24. The *Cuarto Militar* has its counterpart in the *Maison Militaire* in Prussia, which Wilhelm II renamed the *Kaiserliches Hauptquartier*. See John C.G. Röhl, *Wilhelm II. 2, 2.* (München, 2001), 196.

²²³ Tusell and Queipo de Llano, *Alfonso XIII*, 82

²²⁴ Ibid, Ch.1 'El Rey Regeneracionista', 53-100.

²²⁵ Seco Serrano, 'Relaciones', 45.

²²⁶ Pan-Montojo and Álvarez Junco, *Más se perdió en Cuba*, 27.

have since re-established the importance of the remaining imperial territories to regenerationist thought, Spain's self-conception, economy, and society.²²⁷ Regenerationism, rather than being an overreaction to the loss of minor territories, emerged from a deep crisis of consciousness caused by the loss of the historical, imperial, and economic connections that existed between the colony and the metropolis. To quote Schmidt-Nowara, '[in 1898] a glorious and densely written chapter of Spain's 'national history' had come to a traumatic and definitive close.'²²⁸ The end of empire called for a redefinition of Spain's identity through national regeneration.

So how did regenerationism, and in particular its military component, manifest itself in the upbringing of the king? The first notable development was Alfonso's increasingly numerous and publicised visits to munitions factories and military quarters, always dressed in full military uniform. The most frequent references in his diary refer to military parades, army drills, and inspections of barracks.²²⁹ One gets a sense of the king's pride in his troops and as the editor of Alfonso XIII's diary put it, one is struck by the young monarch's 'impatience with effecting a re-organisation of the military.'²³⁰ The illustrated magazine *La Ilustración Española y Americana*, covered many of these visits. For one of them Alfonso XIII went on board of the naval ship *Giralda* in September 1900. Its symbolic significance lay in the connection it created between the future king and the navy, which had suffered the most severe defeats during the Spanish-American war. In the images that accompany the report, Alfonso is dressed as a naval captain and poses with the men on the ship, creating a union between him and the officers surrounding him.²³¹ It is also interesting that unlike in former images, his mother no longer appeared alongside him. A new independent, manly and martial image of Alfonso XIII was being formed. Here was a future ruler capable of the *patria's* and most importantly the armed forces' regeneration.

The tendency to portray Alfonso XIII as an active member of the military, at home with his fellow soldiers and capable of leading them in future conflicts, became more pronounced as his accession to the throne approached. The king participated in manoeuvres that showcased modern military capabilities while representing the traditional virtues associated with military service. His participation in the military manoeuvres and exercises carried out on the outskirts of

²²⁷ Christopher Schmidt-Nowara, *The Conquest of History: Spanish Colonialism and National Histories in the Nineteenth Century* (Pittsburgh, 2006); Josep Maria Fradera, *Colonias*; Alda Blanco, *Cultura y conciencia imperial en la España del siglo XIX* (València, 2012).

²²⁸ Schmidt-Nowara, 'La España Ultramarina', 209.

²²⁹ King of Spain Alfonso XIII, *Diario íntimo de Alfonso XIII / Recogido y comentado por J.L. Castillo-Puche.*, (Madrid, 1961).

²³⁰ *Ibid*, 219.

²³¹ *La Ilustración Española y Americana*, 30/09/1900.

Madrid were reported extensively in the press. The *Ilustración Española y Americana* dedicated most of one of its popular issues to the king's involvement in these exercises.²³² It showed Alfonso on horseback, actively taking part in the exercises and described his excellent performance. These instances provided the basis for the monarchical image that was reinforced during his reign, which portrayed Alfonso XIII as the king able to cure the ills of Spain and lead her into a better future. This positive representation of the monarch supports Carlos Ferrera Cuesta's argument that the regime was struggling for legitimacy post 1898 and therefore employed the regenerationist discourse to embed the idea of a young, dynamic, and active monarch, who could successfully take up the task of leading the process of national regeneration.²³³

The extent to which Alfonso had taken on the part of the soldier-king, of defender of the armed forces, and of monarch that would guide Spain and her military to a brighter future, is exemplified in his declaration to the soldiers on his accession in May 1902. He squarely established himself as a fellow soldier and man of the military, when he declared that 'As a King, as a General, as a Spaniard, and as a soldier, I salute in you the representatives of our military glories and of our national grandeur.'²³⁴ He further expressed his belief that the soldiers embodied the essential virtues of the nation, which were 'Valour, energy, perseverance, discipline, patriotism' – a list that is strikingly similar to the virtues enumerated by Ruiz-Fornells.²³⁵ He also assured his audience of the vital role the armed forces would play in his reign as 'the firmest support for the social order, the firmest cement for public peace, the most resolute defender of the institutions, the most solid base for wellbeing and happiness of the patria.' Not only would they continue to be central in these functions, but he assured them that he would follow his father's example and 'live like the great Alfonso XII did: for your good I shall take great care, following the example of my mother: you shall be with me in the moments of danger, and History will talk of me when it should talk of you.'²³⁶ The military spirit was raised to a quasi-religious level and he urged them to march with him toward a future of renewed military glory: 'with the help of God we shall march together, without vacillation or dismay, on the rough path that the narrow and beautiful religion of the militia has marked out for us. Thus we will conquer the love of the good Spaniards: thus we will form an always great Patria, always happy, always worthy of admiration and respect: thus you can always count on the affection of

²³² *La Ilustración Española y Americana*, 22/05/1901.

²³³ Carlos Ferrera Cuesta, 'Formación de La Imagen Monárquica E Intervencionismo Regio: Los Comienzos Del Reinado de Alfonso XIII (1902-1910)', *Hispania*, 64.216 (2004), 246.

²³⁴ AGP-ReinadosAlfonsoXIII-Cajón4-Exp.12, "Alfonso XII a los soldados y marinos", 17/05/1902.

²³⁵ *Ibid* and Ruiz-Fornells, *La educación moral*.

²³⁶ AGP-ReinadosAlfonsoXIII-Cajón4-Exp.12, "Alfonso XII a los soldados y marinos", 17/05/1902.

your King.’ His military education and the regenerationist spirit laid the groundwork that made this speech believable and allowed him to become the soldier-king that he was expected to be and that Spanish military elites clamoured for after the painful loss of Cuba.

2.4 Conclusion

The involvement of officers in the education of the heir to the throne was a constant feature in nineteenth-century Spain. Their influence on the upbringing of future monarchs, whether it was in the form of the appointment of officers as teachers, military training or their role in public ceremonies, was significant. The military’s prominent position in the education of Isabel II, Alfonso XII and Alfonso XIII reflected its centrality in nineteenth-century Spanish politics, society and culture.

During times of internal warfare and challenges to the legitimacy of Ferdinand VII’s line of succession, the monarchy often relied on the military as a guarantor of stability and order and as a source of legitimacy. Isabel II’s claim to the throne was bound up with the sacrifices of the nation, as represented by the army’s efforts in the Carlist wars. The Restoration was not only brought about by a *pronunciamiento*, but also relied on the army to fend off the renewed Carlist challenge and suppress any social unrest. The crown’s links to the armed forces were established early in recognition of the importance of army support for the stability of the monarchy. Alfonso XII and Alfonso XIII’s education were meant to allow them to acquire a military *Habitus* and thus to appeal to the armed forces and tie them closer to the regime. Even in Isabel II’s upbringing symbolic elements and ceremonies were used to strengthen the bond between crown and armed forces: a trend continued during her successors’ minorities and reigns.

Military education was not, however, simply a tool used by the monarchy to gain the allegiance of the armed forces and its political leaders. Military elites saw the crown as an important channel through which they could press for their political interest and instil their conceptions of morality into the future heir. The heir’s upbringing presented an opportunity for shaping the future of the monarchical institution. Officers increasingly interested in ideas of regeneration and education were closely involved in this process. Especially during the reign of Alfonso XIII, they emphasised the moral component of military education. Previously, Espartero sought to connect his military glories with the image of the innocent queen and after Alfonso XII’s birth in 1857, male heirs would offer more opportunities for officers to exert their influence and shape

monarchs into soldier-like figures. Both Alfonso XII's and Alfonso XIII's education relied heavily on teachers from the upper echelons of the army and navy.

The third aspect of military instruction was related to the armed forces' propensity to intervene in politics. The *pronunciamiento* had become a common tool for political change and in 1868 brought down the Bourbon monarchy. This led to efforts to curtail this type of rebellion. The symbolic representation of Alfonso XII and his son as soldier-kings was not only a tool to gain allegiance. It was also meant to encourage the military leadership to see in the monarchy the representation of their interest, the legitimate commander-in-chief, and to accept it as the arbiter of the political process. In order to substantiate this image, it was vital for male heirs to receive, or at least appear to receive, an extensive military education. Cánovas was one of the main proponents of this belief. In many ways the educational plan he set out for Alfonso XII and the constitution he designed became the blueprint for Alfonso XIII's upbringing. The armed forces would ideally come to regard the soldier-king as the natural representative of their interest and as the arbiter between the civil and military institutions in Spain.

The significance of a military upbringing and a martial image, from the outset, put Isabel II in a weaker position than her male successors vis-à-vis the armed forces. Her lack of military authority, coupled with her failures as an arbiter in the corrupt political process meant that she was unable to reign in the praetorian tendencies of the generals. Alfonso XII was more successful in controlling the political aspirations of the armed forces, but this was arguably achieved at the expense of a more militaristic spirit taking hold in Restoration Spain. One of the most controversial legacies of royal military education was supposedly Alfonso XIII's willingness to intervene on behalf of his beloved army and allow them to acquire powers outside of the state's control. He became more directly involved in military affairs, with ruinous consequences for his own reputation. In particular, his involvement in the disastrous *Annual* campaign and his promotion of prominent *Africanistas*, among them the future Generalissimo Francisco Franco Bahamonde, had serious implications for the course of twentieth-century Spanish history. While it would be too simplistic to draw a line from his military education to his decisions in the 1920s, it is not difficult to see some of the roots of his fondness for the armed forces in his upbringing.

3. *The Public Sphere and Royal Education*

Hope, fear, and national identity

Isabel II's, Alfonso XII's, and Alfonso XIII's education was discussed extensively in Spain's public sphere. Remarkably, the press and Cortes debated the issue of how the future monarch should be raised more openly than was the case in liberal regimes in other European monarchies despite continued censorship and laws that punished insults to the crown.¹ Moreover, public commentary addressed concerns that went beyond the narrow issue of princely education; in many ways, it was a manifestation of more extensive hopes, deeper fears, and a quest for national identity. The Spanish public, in raising the subject, expressed what kind of society they wanted to construct for the future, what they feared the country could become, and who they thought they were. It is along these three themes of hope, fear, and national identity that this chapter will be organised. The analysis will move beyond the perspective from within the palace and the military elites to pursue a wider exploration of the political culture of nineteenth-century Spain. That these issues were projected onto the seemingly narrow topic of royal upbringing is indicative of two points. First, it suggests that the monarchy remained central to the Spanish political system and its future. Its function, image and power were considered to be of vital importance across the political spectrum. Secondly, the relative openness of the subject can be interpreted as a form of "path dependence".² María Cristina's departure in 1840, removed Isabel II's education from the private realm of the royal family and allowed for its extensive public examination. This historical accident was at least in part responsible for turning royal education into an issue that was not off limits in the press, the Cortes, and other public fora.

Nineteenth-century Spain saw the emergence and consolidation of new public institutions and spaces for discussions, criticism, and deliberation amounting to what Jürgen Habermas famously termed the liberal public sphere.³ While Habermas's classic conception of a liberal public sphere has been criticised, historians have shown its continued relevance and applicability.⁴ This chapter

¹ Almost no evidence of royal education raised in parliament or as a major part of public debate in Germany, Britain or Italy during the nineteenth century has been found.

² See Paul A. David, "Understanding the economics of QWERTY: the Necessity of History.", in Parker, William N. (ed.), *Economic History and the Modern Economist*. (Oxford, 1986), 30-49.

³ Jürgen Habermas, *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit Untersuchungen zu einer Kategorie der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft* (Frankfurt am Main, 2013).

⁴ For criticism of the concept of a liberal public sphere see Pierre Bourdieu "The Public Sphere does not Exist", in Armand Mattelart and Seth Siegelau (eds), *Communication and Class Struggle: An Anthology in Two*

will use Brophy's advancement of the concept as a descriptive term that allows us to analyse the circulation of news and information, the extent to which ideas penetrated society, and the forms that public deliberation took. His definition allows for a less rigid definition of the public sphere that renders it useful for the analysis of public discourse in nineteenth-century Spain.⁵ For the historian the press is its most important representation as well as the most readily accessible source. Not only did newspapers reach an increasing number of literate members of the middle class, but articles were read aloud and discussed extensively in *tertulias*, casinos, and clubs. Newspapers aimed to reflect wider public opinion and framed the hopes, fears, and self-conceptions of Spaniards.

However, we cannot ignore the limitations and legal restrictions to the free expression of opinions, ideas, and criticism. These had a significant impact on reports on royal education. Press freedom was suppressed during much of Ferdinand VII's reign, apart from the brief liberal interlude known as the *Trienio Liberal* (1820-23). It returned gradually as absolutism transitioned to liberalism after the death of Ferdinand VII in 1833. The 1837 constitution established, at least in theory, a free press. In practice, heavy restrictions such as wealth requirements for editors, payments of deposits, and judicial oversight of content presented substantial barriers. Their impact varied according to the attitudes of the party in power – generally progressive liberals were more lenient and allowed for more freedoms than their moderate counterparts.⁶ The repression of press freedom that followed the failed *pronunciamiento* of 1866, contrasted strongly with the wide-ranging liberty given to political expression during the revolutionary *Sexenio* (1868-1874).⁷

Restrictions on the press were re-established during the restoration, but the 1876 constitution continued to guarantee freedom of press and association, at least in theory.⁸ The 26 July 1883 *Ley de Policía de Imprenta* guaranteed broader press freedom.⁹ This period of relative liberty and stability led to a flourishing of print and the emergence of large media businesses and has hence been termed the 'golden age of journalism'.¹⁰ In particular during the regency of María Cristina

Volumes (New York, 1979); Bruce Robbins and Social Text Collective, *The Phantom Public Sphere* (Minneapolis, 1993). For historians employing the concept in new ways see T. C. W. Blanning, *The Culture of Power and the Power of Culture: Old Regime Europe, 1660-1789* (Oxford, 2002); Nick Crossley and John Michael Roberts, *After Habermas: New Perspectives on the Public Sphere* (Oxford, 2006).

⁵ James M Brophy, *Popular Culture and the Public Sphere in the Rhineland, 1800-1850* (Cambridge, 2007), 3.

⁶ Seoane, *Cuatro Siglos*, 101/102

⁷ Fuentes and Fernández Sebastián, *Historia del periodismo*, 118/119.

⁸ Cruz Seoane and Saíz, *Cuatro Siglos*, 128.

⁹ *Ibid*, 129

¹⁰ Javier Sánchez Aranda and Barrera del Barrio, *Historia Del Periodismo*, 167-169.

of Habsburg (1885-1902), the public sphere was a vital arena for political discussion which facilitated the transformation of Spain into a more liberal country.

The 1898 Cuban disaster demonstrated the power of the press in directing public opinion and led to more thorough scrutiny of the role of journalism in society. Many editors and journalists had made common cause with some of the most bellicose political elements and contributed significantly to the emotional exuberance that drove Spain into war.¹¹ While the defeat led to criticism of the government and the armed forces, the press was also reproached for its excessively positive and inflammatory reporting. The beneficiaries were more marginal outlets and associations that had opposed the war, mainly on the radical left.¹² Spain thus entered the twentieth century with a number of well-established liberal newspapers, which, however, found themselves in an identity crisis and in need of reinvention.

During the *Trienio Liberal* newspapers expanded and a vibrant culture of cafés and debating societies emerged across Spain.¹³ The return to absolutism after 1823, however, halted any further expansion. Once restrictions began to be lifted, the returning liberal exiles brought with them modern printing and publishing techniques and even before the 1837 constitution was set up there were around 120 newspapers in Spain, a number which grew to around 150 in 1857.¹⁴ For that year, the collective print-run of the 12 largest dailies has been estimated to be around 100,000, with the most popular newspapers selling up to 15,000 copies a day.¹⁵ This was accompanied by a growth in café culture and public spaces dedicated to the consumption of newspapers, as demonstrated by the existence of 59 such cafés in Madrid and about a dozen reading cabinets in the capital and several more in regional towns in 1840.¹⁶ The number of newspapers published took off during the *Sexenio* (1868-1874) when up to 112 different papers were published in Madrid per year. That number subsequently declined, but during the Restoration another boom occurred in newspaper publishing between 1878 and 1902, driven by higher literacy rates, more permissive regulation, and new technological possibilities.¹⁷ Towards

¹¹ See among others Cruz Seoane and Saíz, *Cuatro Siglos*, 149; Pedro Gómez Aparicio, *Historia del periodismo español de las guerras coloniales a la Dictadura* (Madrid, 1974), 28.

¹² Sánchez Aranda and Barrera del Barrio, *Periodismo español*, 172-175.

¹³ Gil Novales, *Las sociedades*

¹⁴ Cruz Seoane and Saíz, *Cuatro Siglos*, 92.

¹⁵ *Ibid*, 103/104

¹⁶ Marie-Claude Lecuyer, 'Algunos Aspectos de La Sociabilidad En España Hacia 1840', *Estudios de Historia Social*, 1989, 145–59.

¹⁷ Jean-François Botrel, "Estadística de la prensa madrileña de 1858 a 1909, según el registro de contribución industrial" in Manuel Tuñón de Lara, Antonio Elorza, and Manuel Pérez Ledesma (eds), *Prensa Y Sociedad En España (1820-1936)*, (Madrid, 1975), 41.

the end of the century some of the biggest newspapers such as *El Imparcial* had print runs of around 100,000 copies a day, which was significantly behind the European standard, but still represented substantial growth.¹⁸

At the same time literacy rates remained low. In 1860 only 27% of Spaniards were literate, a figure which rose to a still low 45% in 1900, compared to around 89% in the US and 83.5% in France.¹⁹ However, reading societies, public discussion, and shared subscriptions helped to compensate for this barrier.²⁰ Reading out aloud and the socialisation of reading continued to play an important function in Spanish public life.²¹ The press was therefore the preeminent medium of information and direction of public opinion during the nineteenth century and retained this position until the advent of the radio at the beginning of the twentieth century.²²

The low literacy rates were a problem for the press, not only because it reduced its potential customer base but because of its perceived didactic mission. During the Peninsular War the press thought of itself as the principal vehicle for the instruction and education of Spanish readers.²³ Journalists and editors were to be the tool of the political enlightenment of the people. They would instruct citizens on their rights and obligations – a self-conception that remained central to the press in nineteenth-century Spain.²⁴ They cast themselves in J.S. Mill's mid-nineteenth-century, idealised version of the public as the modern equivalent of the classical assemblies, where ideas were openly debated and evaluated.²⁵ Furthermore, liberal newspapers regarded education as essential to the nation's intellectual progress and well-being, which turned them into advocates for public education reform.²⁶ This frequently put them into opposition to the church, which was determined to maintain its traditional hold over education in Spain.²⁷ More directly, newspapers also functioned as educational material. Read out in clubs, societies, and cafés they served to inform and teach the illiterate their rights and duties to enable them to gain a civic consciousness. These associations were especially important for and gave a voice to

¹⁸ Cruz Seoane and Saíz, *Cuatro Siglos*, 130.

¹⁹ Ortiz, *Paper Liberals*, 51/52.

²⁰ *Ibid*, 54/55.

²¹ Jesús A. Martínez Martín, 'La Lectura En La España Contemporánea: Lectores, Discursos Y Prácticas de Lectura', *Ayer*, 2005, 19-20.

²² Carlos Barrera, *El periodismo español en su historia* (Barcelona, 2000), 9.

²³ Cruz Seoane and Saíz, *Cuatro Siglos*, 71.

²⁴ Francisco Fuentes and Fernández Sebastián, *Historia Del Periodismo*, 55.

²⁵ *Ibid*, 91.

²⁶ "El decreto sobre obligaciones de enseñanza", *El Imparcial*, 05/05/1886.

²⁷ See Ortiz, *Paper Liberals*, 54-56.

some of the more marginalised groups in Spain, such as women and workers.²⁸ Despite its significant limitations, the reach, influence, and central role the press played as a manifestation of the public sphere must not be underestimated.

3.1 Hope

Notwithstanding the growth of small but vocal republican groups in the second half of the century, the monarchy remained central to Spanish conceptions of the future. While there were vast differences in ideas concerning the role, functions, and prominence of the monarchy, many Spaniards pinned their hopes for a better future on the heir to the throne. Dynastic successions provided moments of transition, which opened new possibilities for improvement, renewal and progress. Liberals' strong belief in the power of education to transform society and the youth of the heirs in question, created the expectation that teaching could ensure the realisation of wider hopes for peace, prosperity, and reform. The monarch's education presented an opportunity to express the public's aspirations, desires and optimism for their country.

Isabel II - A virtuous, liberal, constitutional queen

The public discourse on Isabel II's education must be understood in the context of the Carlist wars, the beginnings of the constitutional system that guaranteed the freedom of both the press and association, and, most importantly, the absence, after October 1840, of her mother, the queen regent María Cristina. It was in this atmosphere of new possibilities, the expectation of peace, and the lack of parental authority that Isabel II's education took on a public dimension.

The first concern of those who supported Isabel II's claim to the succession – a diverse alliance that included progressive and moderate liberals as well as some enlightened absolutists – was to strengthen the young queen's legitimacy. Combining their hope with the fate of the young queen they saw the future monarch as an important ally in establishing a more liberal state and a means to entrenching progress in Spain. The public interest and reporting on Isabel II's education became more pronounced after María Cristina left the country in November 1840. The

²⁸ Jean-Luis Guereña, "Las Instituciones Culturales: Políticas Educativas" in Serge Salaün and Carlos Serrano (eds) *1900 en España*, (Madrid, 1991), 78-79.

progressive press became an active agent in promoting interest in her education, which these papers identified as a central concern for the nation's prospects.

The *progresistas*, aimed to protect the gains of the revolution by means of the press and of parliament. They argued that the monarch had to be educated to respect and protect liberal institutions and civil rights so that, one day, she would become a true guarantor of these liberties. The expression of hope was therefore also a sign of the uncertainty and precariousness that liberals felt concerning constitutionalism and the future of the liberal state they were constructing. In addition, it revealed a strong belief in the potential of education for the improvement of society and its institutions. Moreover, it demonstrates that kingship, or in this case queenship, was conceived of as something that could and even had to be taught and learned.

At the same time, the government became more directly involved in Isabel II's education, made its efforts public, and gave journalists access to the court. Espartero and his government appear to have been eager to show that the young queen's upbringing was carefully designed and that she was being prepared for her future role as constitutional monarch. They were thus responding to the country's expectations, forestalling criticism by granting the public unprecedented insights into royal education and the daily lives of Isabel II and her sister.

The link established between the under-age queen as a vehicle of hope for a better and more liberal future began as a top-down campaign that used images, essays, and commemorative tracts to emphasise the historic legitimacy of the female succession.²⁹ However, as Vilches has argued, the successful construction and persistence of this image in the collective imagination was based on the anecdotes, books, public discourses, and pamphlets that began to appear. One image frequently used to bolster the historical legitimacy of the female succession was Isabel's comparison with her namesake Isabel the Catholic. Examples of this are famous paintings such as Manuel Breton's *El templo de la Gloria* or José Ribelles Helip's *La reina gobernadora con Isabel II niña cogiendo a España*. Brimming with allegorical references to the first Isabel, they were hung in public spaces and widely copied, causing a veritable popular fascination with the child queen.³⁰ The literary output that accompanied this enthusiasm appeared even beyond the metropolis, as evidenced by the *Diario constitucional de Santiago de Cuba* and *El Eco de Cuba*, which both published

²⁹ See Juan Bautista Arriaza, *Rasgo Lírico En Celebridad de La Jura de S.A.R. La Serenísima Princesa Heredera* (Madrid, 1833).

³⁰ Vilches, *La imagen*, 18/19.

poems on her sixth birthday that expressed the hope they invested in the future queen.³¹ Likewise, Isabel II's historic legitimacy was invoked during public festivals and through dedicated poetry albums, where the comparison of Isabel II to her fifteenth-century namesake was one of the dominant themes.³² The link made in imagery, literature, and public celebration between Isabel II and a prosperous liberal future became more evident after the promulgation of the 1837 constitution.³³ The idea that she would be brought up as a constitutional ruler, an expectation that was voiced more explicitly after 1840, once her mother had gone into exile, was implicit in this public emotional investment in the queen. The public's growing engagement with the construction and spread of Isabel's image is an early sign of the emergence of a more modern and liberal society in Spain.

Once the queen regent had departed, Isabel II's and her sister's *tutela* became a public issue, discussed in newspapers and the Cortes. Despite her initial renunciation of all responsibilities for her daughters, María Cristina sent a manifesto to Espartero and the nation, in which she insisted on her rights as mother. This 'Manifiesto to the Nation' was printed in several newspapers with a critical commentary by the government.³⁴ It started a debate in the press which eventually moved onto the issue of the queen's education. An article in the *Eco del Comercio*, the leading progressive liberal newspaper in Madrid, published in April 1841 complained about the 'absolute silence' the other press outlets maintained over the *tutela*. The paper regarded it as its responsibility to inform the public further and urged the Cortes to choose the right person as *tutor*, as it believed that 'on the education of H.M. depends the fortune or misfortune of our *patria*, it is evident that the question of the *tutela* is one of general interest, (...).' Furthermore, the queen's youth, her innocence, and her mother's absence presented a unique opportunity: 'no prince has been in the position of being able to receive an education more favourable to the interest of peoples [*pueblos*] (...).'³⁵ There is a palpable sense of hope and optimism surrounding the possibilities for Isabel II's education. It was assumed that a 'liberal education' would make her immune to flattery and corruption, enable her to look beyond privilege and allow her to 'regenerate this unhappy nation, and elevate it to the grade of prosperity of which it is capable. The almost utopian belief invested in the queen's upbringing is evident, when the author admonished the deputies to 'recognise that

³¹ *Diario Constitucional de Santiago de Cuba* and *El Eco de Cuba*, 10/10/1836.

³² Rosa Ana Gutiérrez Lloret, "Isabel II, de símbolo de la libertad a deshonra de España" in La Parra López (ed.), *La imagen*, 226/227.

³³ See Vilches, *Imágenes*, 20. He cites the spread of various images depicting Isabel II swearing the oath on the 1837 constitution.

³⁴ See *El Católico*, 16/11/1840; *El Corresponsal*, 16/11/1840; *El Eco del Comercio*, 17/11/1840.

³⁵ *El Eco del Comercio*, 13/04/1841.

in all their life no other case will present itself to do so much, and such lasting good to the country, to humanity and to the august children themselves, (...).³⁶ The prosperity, stability, and progress of the nation were explicitly linked to the education of the child queen. This is indicative of liberal optimism and the importance they attached to education in general.

In June 1841, the Cortes decided that the *tutela* was indeed empty and that they had to elect a new *tutor*. In the debates leading up to the vote, which were commented on and summarised at length in various newspapers, Isabel's education played an important role. Before the discussion began, the special commission that had studied the issue expressed the opinion that the *tutela* did not 'enter in consideration of common or public right', because the guardianship of princes 'should be established by more elevated principles of constitutional politics and public interest.'³⁷

The deputies and senators in favour of declaring the *tutela* vacant tended to place an emphasis on the queen's education. In that context, they brought forward concerns with national sovereignty, modernity, and gender, which linked Isabel II's education to the prospects of Spain. These deputies insisted first of all that the *tutela* and the upbringing of Isabel II could not be considered similar to that of a regular individual. Senator Lasaña, a known *progresista*, argued that the consequences of the education of an 'individual who would occupy the throne to rule thirteen million inhabitants' belonged 'the public interest.' Another pro-government deputy believed that the 'fortunes or misfortunes of the *patria*' were to a large degree dependent on the morality, customs, and education of Isabel II, which meant the nation had the right to demand that she be 'inspired with the major conjunct of good qualities (...).' Martinez de Velasco, a *progresista*, urged his fellow senators to ensure that Isabel II was taught to 'love the liberal institutions that should sustain her throne.'³⁸ The significance of the young queen's education to the country's future meant that it was a national, not a private concern, and hence the nation had to assert its sovereignty.

There were others that connected the issue to hopes of a belated arrival of modernity. The need to resolve the *tutela* according to modern principles meant first and foremost that monarchs learned that they were indebted to and had to serve the nation. One deputy cited the public discussion in the press as a sign that modernity was taking hold in Spain, which, in his opinion, justified a progressive resolution of the question of the *tutela*. It can be argued that the fact that the queen's guardianship was debated in parliament and newspapers in itself represents a modern

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Spain and Cortes, *Discusion de las Cortes*, 23.

³⁸ Ibid, 96, 122, 234.

conception of the monarchy as a public good. Interestingly, those defending the private rights of the queen mother were also forced to engage in this public debate. Sometimes they even used the liberals' arguments against them, as was the case with the bishop of Cordoba, who, in his capacity as senator, defended the inviolability of a citizen's private rights, independent of their political or social position.³⁹

The gender element was another instance where liberals projected their expectations of the future onto the child queen. Both sides of the debate highlighted that, as queen, Isabel II would eventually have to marry, which made her education and control over palace appointments particularly important.⁴⁰ Only a well-educated queen could rule effectively without being led by her husband and the choice of king consort should be guided by a *tutor* appointed by the Cortes. Again, liberals invested their hopes in education – as long as the queen received the right teaching and upbringing, she would be able to guide the country into a better future, without being 'her husband's slave' as the *Eco del Comercio* put it.⁴¹ Given the position of women in Spanish society and the lack of consideration given to female suffrage at this time, this was probably an argument made specifically concerning the role of the queen, rather than representing more modern thinking on a wife's role in the family.⁴²

The new appointments to the teaching staff, were initially greeted with enthusiasm in the progressive liberal press. Thus, the *Eco del Comercio* talked of the extraordinary satisfaction that the paper and the public at large felt at the news of Mina's appointment as *Aya* in August 1841. It praised her 'exceptional instruction, her clear talent, and her pure love for liberal institutions', which 'could not but strongly influence Isabel II's good education.'⁴³ The future of the monarchy looked bright. *El Constitucional* of Barcelona, published an article entitled "Educacion de las Augustas Niñas", which told the story of the author's visit of the palace, where he met Isabel's teacher Ventosa. The access given to these journalists is remarkable, as it demonstrates the public relations work the government was doing and its concern with showing that it was in no way neglecting the queen's education. The reader learned that Ventosa was 'an enlightened director and a liberal'. There is an emphasis on how modern and customised Isabel's teaching was, which contrasted with the standard education in Spanish public schools. The author

³⁹ Ibid, 38, 49, 137.

⁴⁰ Ibid, 40.

⁴¹ *Eco del Comercio*, 13/04/1841.

⁴² See Mary Nash, "The Rise of the Women's Movement in Nineteenth-Century Spain" in *Women's Emancipation Movements in the Nineteenth Century: A European Perspective*, Sylvia Paletschek (ed.), (Stanford, 2006), 244-250.

⁴³ *El Eco del Comercio*, 20/08/1841.

reported on the astonishment of his companion, who ‘had never seen anything else than the Christian notebooks and cardboards of the schools back home.’⁴⁴ The implied critique of Catholic schools and their methods is barely concealed. This juxtaposition of modern and clerical schooling foreshadows the idea of the existence of two Spains, one obscurantist and backward and the other progressive and liberal.⁴⁵ Furthermore the author lauded Ventosa for the vast progress Isabel was making and in particular for adding to her ‘political education, based on the sanest principles and maxims of constitutional law.’⁴⁶ For this ‘Spain owes a tribute of gratitude to the distinguished Colonel Don José Vicente Ventosa’.⁴⁷

Alfonso XII: Glory, progress, and peace

Although for most of his youth Alfonso’s education as prince of Asturias remained under the control of his mother, the issue of how to bring up a monarch remained salient in Spain’s public discourse. The press, when commenting on the heir’s education, frequently expressed hopes and expectations for the country’s political, social, and moral development. Monarchists wanted to inspire confidence in the prince’s development and his parents’ supervision and direction of his progress. Moreover, the belief in the potential of education as a tool to form an ideal constitutional monarch, which had previously been one of the central characteristics of the commentary on Isabel II’s upbringing, figured prominently. However, science featured more heavily in the comments on Alfonso’s early education than it had done previously. This is an indication that expectations varied according to gender as well as the emergence of an increased emphasis on science as a tool for progress and development.

As Alfonso approached his secondary education in 1864, the authoritarian *moderado* government of general Ramón María Narváez, published a decree on the prince’s upbringing. This document set out a conservative and militaristic vision of royal education. The decree looked forward to the king commanding the armed forces and restoring Spain’s former military and imperial glory, reflecting Narváez’s militaristic background and world view. To the public it was also presented as bringing Spain into line with other European monarchies, thus appealing to hopes that the country would be able to play a larger role on the international stage. The moderate liberal press bought into this vision, setting out its idealised view of the military as the defenders of liberty. By

⁴⁴ *El Constitucional* (Barcelona), 12/08/1841.

⁴⁵ For the origins of this idea see José Álvarez Junco, *Mater Dolorosa: la idea de España en el siglo XIX* (Madrid, 2001).

⁴⁶ *El Constitucional* (Barcelona), 12/08/1841.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

association, an heir instructed in the art of war would become part of this tradition of protecting liberal institutions and rights, rather than be a threat to them.

During Alfonso's exile, it was mainly monarchists in favour of a Bourbon restoration, composed predominantly of members of the aristocracy and the conservative political elite, who commented on the prince's education. They were frustrated with the perceived failures of Amadeo's reign, political instability, and the civil and colonial wars plaguing Spain. They projected their hope for peace, order, and stability onto the Bourbon heir and his possible return. His upbringing was idealised and intended to raise the possibility of an accord with the Carlists under a King Alfonso XII, who could command the armed forces effectively. Having learned from the examples of successful constitutional monarchies during his stays in Vienna and Sandhurst, he would then be able to restore political liberties, social order, and good government at home.

From a very early stage the public spotlight was turned on Alfonso's education. This reflected the belief that Alfonso's upbringing would shape the monarchy and hence the kingdom itself. In 1860, when Alfonso was just two years old, the newspaper *El Clamor Público*, stressed the importance of the heir's education due to its intimate link to the country's future. The paper looked forward to a prosperous and brilliant reign that would be brought by the 'seed of patriotism' implanted through the prince's upbringing.⁴⁸ The Cortes expressed similar feelings. On Alfonso's third birthday the President of the Cortes addressed Isabel II in the name of the chamber to praise the royal couple for the great care they were investing in this 'tender offspring growing in the shadow of the throne, symbol of unity and hope.' He believed the royal couple were the best suited to 'instruct the young prince in the difficult art of reigning.'⁴⁹ *La España*, a conservative monarchist paper, argued that 'it is a matter of primary importance, in the mid nineteenth century, to form the heart and direct the intelligence of a prince destined by Providence to reign over the Spanish nation.'⁵⁰ God-given talents and providence alone were no longer sufficient to make a good king.

The belief that Alfonso's education was carefully supervised and scientifically advanced was also expressed through reports that appeared on the arrival of teaching tools, in particular scientific instruments. The close association between science and progress in the nineteenth century has

⁴⁸ *El Clamor Público*, 24/01/1860.

⁴⁹ Speech printed in full in *La Iberia*, 29/11/1860.

⁵⁰ *La España*, 07/04/1864.

been well established and is also evident in royal education and its public discussion.⁵¹ In June 1861 *El Contemporáneo* informed on the arrival of a 'large box containing instruments and learning devices that appear to be intended for the education of Prince Alfonso.'⁵² The article stressed that these had been made specifically for the prince and imported from abroad. 'The reference to the foreign nature of the objects is indicative of the perception that scientific discovery and knowledge in Spain had to be imported.'⁵³ *El Mundo Militar* described in detail the military tools that were put at the prince's disposal.⁵⁴ The idea reinforced in these articles was that Alfonso was being prepared for kingship in a rigorous, scientific, rational, and ultimately modern way.

The Spanish government intervened directly and openly in the debates over Alfonso XII's teaching, which brought the heir's upbringing further into the public eye and led to a wider discussion of its merits and shortcomings.⁵⁵ On 27 October 1864 the government, headed by the *moderado* General Narváez, issued a decree on public education and accompanied it with a preamble on the education of the prince of Asturias. The government left no doubt that Alfonso had to be 'enlightened' in many aspects, but the priority was to form his character through a military education. Firstly, the decree stipulated that 'all the sovereigns of belligerent nations have led their troops into battle' and that it 'can be observed that the education given to princes today is preferably military in all its conditions.' Regardless of the veracity of this statement, it reflected a wish for Spain to follow the example of other European countries, including their method of bringing up royal heirs. Additionally, the government conceived of military training as character forming, allowing the prince to 'have his own initiative and high conditions of command' and to 'forcibly acquire the conditions of great captains, (...).' The heir should one day be capable of restoring what the government called the 'glorious memories and [her] most brilliant history'. The government thus played into the view that military victories and imperial glory had made Spain a respected, powerful, and rich nation. Lastly the government assured its readers that the prince's moral and religious education must not be ignored, as 'religion [was] the monarch's code.' This was to satisfy the religious right and to present an image of a traditionally Catholic monarch, in tune with the pious sentiments of his people.⁵⁶

⁵¹ For the association of science and progress in the European periphery and in particular Spain see Jesusa Vega, *Ciencia, arte e ilusión en la España ilustrada*, (Madrid, 2010).

⁵² *El Contemporáneo*, 30/06/1861.

⁵³ One example is Spaniards image of the US as a pioneer in science and technology. See Kate Ferris, *Imagining 'America' in Late Nineteenth-Century Spain* (London, 2016), 199-247.

⁵⁴ *El Mundo Militar*, 18/03/1860.

⁵⁵ Criticism and fears expressed in this debate are the subject of a later section of this chapter.

⁵⁶ *Gaceta de Madrid*, 28/10/1864

The reactions to the decree were varied, but newspapers aligned relatively neatly along ideological lines. The conservative *moderado* forces, which supported the Narváez government showed themselves most content with the pedagogical plan set out in the decree. The *moderado* paper *El Contemporáneo* commented that the decree ‘was one of those political documents that honour the men that signed it’ due to the inherently patriotic feelings it expressed.⁵⁷ The paper also set out to defend the military as a liberal institution that had fought absolutism and was the guarantor of liberty. *El Contemporáneo* thought it inconceivable that ‘with those teachers the royal disciple would receive an education opposed to that demanded by our social and political state; (...)’ Instead readers were reassured that they would not be let down by the future monarch; Alfonso’s upbringing would ‘respond to the legitimate hopes conceived by the Spanish people; (...)’⁵⁸

Another common argument in the press focused on the international and colonial hopes invested in the heir and his military upbringing. The monarchist *La Época* espoused an idealistic belief in the possibilities to be opened by Alfonso’s teaching. The paper cited Austria, France, Italy, and Belgium as nations where ‘princes are dedicated to the noble career of arms, in the army or navy.’ The Spanish monarchy needed to be in tune with the rest of Western Europe and its monarchical traditions. This was an argument about legitimacy and tradition rather than progress. Moreover, the article revealed an almost utopian expectation invested in the future monarch, who was described as the ‘hope of the nation’, who ‘would tomorrow realize in everything and for everyone’ the expectations invested in him.⁵⁹ A lot was at stake: ‘Alfonso XII’s education is today one of our supreme interests because it is the work of future happiness of our *patria*.’⁶⁰ A later article made even more explicit the expectation of national glory and connected it with the good omen presented by the recent success of Spanish forces in North Africa. *La Época* wrote that ‘when the laurels conquered in Africa were still fresh, interesting documents were published revealing the ardent desire to think with sound judgement about the king’s education.’⁶¹ As Blanco has argued, the short-lived colonial adventure in Africa as well as the more durable discourse that surrounded it, demonstrated the prevalent conviction among

⁵⁷ *El Contemporáneo*, 28/10/1864.

⁵⁸ *El Contemporáneo*, 30/10/1864.

⁵⁹ *Ibid*

⁶⁰ *La Época*, 28/10/1864.

⁶¹ *La Época*, 10/11/1864. For the African war and its effects on Spain see Lecuyer, Marie-, *La guerre d’Afrique et ses répercussions en Espagne: idéologies et colonialisme en Espagne, 1859-1904*. (Paris, 1976).

many Spaniards that for Spain 'becoming modern' was inextricably linked to empire.⁶² The imperial idea and visions of former colonial glories remained attractive to Spaniards.⁶³ In this context, Alfonso was also presented, at least implicitly, as the hope for a modern Spanish imperial project that would return the country to its former glory.

During Alfonso's exile (1868-1874) his education was mainly discussed in the Alfonsist newspapers *La Época* and *El Tiempo* and during the reunions of Alfonsist *circulos*, which continued to consider Isabel II and her offspring as Spain's only legitimate rulers.⁶⁴ As the country descended into civil and colonial war, the prince in exile was increasingly portrayed as Spain's only option for peace, order, and unity. The commentary on his education was deliberately designed to appeal to a nation tired of war, political instability, and international decline. Even before Amadeo's reign it was clear to *La Época* that to protect the liberties of the Spanish citizens, to maintain social order, and to achieve national unity there 'is and will be no other definite and permanent solution than that of a Spanish prince.'⁶⁵ In this context Alfonso's education was praised in the highest terms, including eulogies and exaggerations of his performance at college in Paris.⁶⁶ *La Esperanza*, a monarchist newspaper with Carlist and absolutist tendencies, described Alfonso's entourage as 'firm in their principles, defenders of a liberal and monarchical solution that they will use to oppose, if necessary, a future republic or Carlism.'⁶⁷ Alfonso was represented as the legitimate, moderate solution that avoided republican radicalism and Carlist ultra-conservatism. In 1872, with Amadeo installed as king, *La Época* reported on Alfonso's progress in Vienna, and highlighted his useful lessons in Austria. These consisted of 'learn[ing] how empires are lifted from the ruins, even after the greatest catastrophes' and 'unit[ing] the prestige of traditions and the sentiments of modern progress, (...).'⁶⁸ While civil war had broken out in Spain in February 1872 and the remains of the

⁶² Alda Blanco, 'La Guerra de África En Sus Textos: Un Momento En La Búsqueda Española de La Modernidad', *Revista de Estudios Hispánicos*, 38.3 (2004), 403.

⁶³ See Christopher Schmidt-Nowara, *The Conquest of History: Spanish Colonialism and National Histories in the Nineteenth Century* (Pittsburgh, 2006).

⁶⁴ See Rafael Fernández Sirvent, 'El "Partido Alfonsino" Y La Restauración de La Monarquía Constitucional En España: En Torno Al Manifiesto de Sandhurst', 2011 <<http://www.cervantesvirtual.com/obra/el-partido-alfonsino-y-la-restauracion-de-la-monarquia-constitucional-en-espana-en-torno-al-manifiesto-de-sandhurst-1-de-diciembre-de-1874/>>.

⁶⁵ *La Época*, 24/12/1869.

⁶⁶ *La Época*, 18/02/1870. This issue reported that Alfonso 'competed with the most excellent [students] and won all the first prizes.' His personal correspondence shows that the latter part of that statement is false.

⁶⁷ *La Esperanza*, 21/09/1871.

⁶⁸ *La Época*, 07/04/1872.

country's empire in Cuba threatened to break away, the former heir was learning how to remedy these ills and restore the empire, order, and national unity.

However, it was only with Alfonso's proclamation as king of Spain in late 1874 that Alfonsists freely expressed the hope and expectation that they invested in the education their king had received. These sentiments had grown stronger due to the political upheavals of 1874, the ongoing and increasingly costly civil and colonial warfare and were reinforced by the promises made in the Sandhurst manifesto.⁶⁹ The first page of *La Época*'s 14 January issue was dedicated entirely to laudatory poems to the young king. Many of these praised his education and the qualities with which it had endowed Alfonso: one stanza admired, 'His knowledge, his virtue, his honour, his glory' and another looked forward to the day when he would 'extinguish from the *patria* the pains / and eclipse [these pains] from all memory.' More than that, Alfonso with his 'juvenile attractiveness' and 'clear intelligence' was meant to teach the people 'duties and obedience', which would bring peace and order to Spain. The paper believed that Alfonso had been prepared to bring 'peace and union of Spaniards.' It was for that reason that 'the masses in Spain's villages and towns acclaimed Alfonso XII as the remedy of present ills, as a hope for the future.'⁷⁰

Even non-Alfonsist publications such as *El Imparcial* were hopeful that Alfonso would be able to deliver an end to warfare, as it was known that a former Carlist general, Ramon Cabrera, 'had sympathetically followed the progress of the Prince of Asturias's admirable education in Austria and England' and considered reconciliation.⁷¹ In addition, the public was provided with ample information on Alfonso's teachers. *La Ilustración Española y Americana* carried a three-page spread on "El Caballero Morphy", who was described in the most favourable tones.⁷² Alfonso would bring all these talents, nurtured expertly by his teachers, to bear on the tasks facing him as king. The expectation of his reign could not have been higher. The end of both wars and relative political stability achieved within the first four years of his reign, meant that a good proportion of these wishes were fulfilled, contributing to the king's popularity and contemporaries' relatively positive view of his reign.

⁶⁹ Alfonso XII, "Sandhurst Manifesto", 1874, <http://heirstothethrone-project.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Sandhurst-Manifesto-Translation.pdf>. For more on the political/colonial upheaval of the Sexenio see José A. Piqueras Arenas, *La revolución democrática (1868-1874): cuestión social, colonialismo y grupos de presión* (Madrid, 1992) and *España, 1868-1874. Nuevos Enfoques Sobre El Sexenio*, ed. by Serrano García Rafael (Madrid, 2002).

⁷⁰ *La Época*, 14/01/1875.

⁷¹ *El Imparcial*, 15/01/1875.

⁷² *La Ilustración Española y Americana*, 15/02/1875.

Alfonso XIII – Political, economic, and military regeneration

Alfonso XIII was the male heir that the leaders of the dynastic parties had hoped for when they agreed to wait for María Cristina of Habsburg to give birth instead of proclaiming her first-born daughter María de las Mercedes queen.⁷³ While he was born king, the constitution stipulated that his reign would formally begin on his sixteenth birthday in May 1902. In the meantime, his education became increasingly invested with expectations and desires for stability, popularity, and, first and foremost, renovation and regeneration. His education was discussed extensively in the press and parliament, to the extent that *La Correspondencia* in 1894 already felt that the topic had been given ‘excessive proportions.’⁷⁴

The dominant theme was national regeneration. While Spaniards did not agree on what that meant or what form it should take, there was a yearning for renewal and reinvigoration across the political spectrum. The belief that Spain had fallen behind and was no longer a world power became even more strongly accentuated by the humiliation experienced at the hands of the US in 1898 and the subsequent loss of her remaining imperial possessions.⁷⁵ In this climate monarchists, on the left and right, also looked toward the crown as the initiator of national renewal. As Moreno Luzón has argued, ‘young Alfonso inspired enormous expectations in a country that still suffered from the recent overseas defeat and whose elites expressed themselves in nationalist tones.’⁷⁶ These expectations were tied to his education, which was seen as the essential preparation for the monumental task lying ahead of the young king. Furthermore, these hopes were linked to a reform agenda promoted by prominent academics and public intellectuals, who inspired by the teachings of Karl Krause, believed that national regeneration had to be achieved through schools, academies, and universities.⁷⁷ To them, it was evident that the head of state had to be educated with the intention of teaching him how to regenerate the country.

⁷³ See Carmina López Sánchez, ‘The Succession of an Unborn King’ in Müller and Mehrkens, (eds), *Sons and Heirs*.

⁷⁴ “La Educación del Rey”, *La Correspondencia de España*, 15/08/1894.

⁷⁵ See Juan Pan-Montojo and José Álvarez Junco, *Más se perdió en Cuba: España, 1898 y la crisis de fin de siglo* (Madrid, 1998).

⁷⁶ Javier Moreno Luzón, “El Rey patriota Alfonso XIII y el nacionalismo español” in Ángeles Lario (ed.), *Monarquía y República*, 269.

⁷⁷ See Carolyn P. Boyd, *Historia Patria*, 36-39; On Krause's thought and his followers in Spain see Ellias Diaz, *La filosofía social del krausismo español*. (Madrid, 1973); Juan López-Morillas, *The Krausist Movement*.

Additionally, public commentary on Alfonso's education was an opportunity for defenders of the monarchy to express their confidence in the current regime. They emphasised the queen regent María Cristina's great qualities and the care with which she directed the upbringing of the future ruler. The high standards his mother applied to Alfonso XIII's education were a guarantee for order, stability, and unity in the face of the challenges of regionalism and the emergence of working class political movements, which advocated for a socialist and republican future.⁷⁸

Furthermore, some monarchists, as well as moderate democrats, hoped to put the relations between monarchy and people on a new footing. It was their desire that the king should receive an education that brought him closer to the experiences, lives, and concerns of his subjects, which would help him in his mission to regenerate the monarchy and the nation. These expectations were more prominent in the period prior to the 1898 "disaster" and before it became clear that Alfonso was not going to be brought up outside of the confines of the royal palace.

As early as 1888, when Alfonso was only two years old, the Cortes raised the issue of his education with the queen and expressed the hope that the king's upbringing would be directed in such a way as to overcome the 'immense sorrow and anxiety that the nation has felt for the death of his [Alfonso XIII's] august father, (...)' The senators further declared that this 'hope is even more vivid, in the secure knowledge that H.M., educated and his heart formed under your maternal guidance, will be inspired in the love of his people, (...).'⁷⁹ In 1895, *La Época* declared that, with regards to the heir and his education, it remained 'firmly convinced that the nation could only restore its old heroism in the shadow of the throne.'⁸⁰ The significance of the overseas territories (*ultramar*) was publicly highlighted as soon as the Cuban insurrection began in 1895. Thus *La Correspondencia de España* and *La Iberia*, in 1896 reprinted an article from an 'important German newspaper', supposedly translated from a smaller Belgian publication, on the young king.⁸¹ Aside from the active and physical aspects of Alfonso's education, which were seen as signs of his youthful vitality, it stressed his interest in Cuban affairs and how he was able to 'explain to his sisters, *right there*, the telegrams from the [Cuban] campaign (...).'⁸² The impression given is that future monarch was well-informed and had been instructed on the conflict and appreciated its importance.

⁷⁸ Boyd, *Historia patria*, 39/40.

⁷⁹ "Las Camaras en Palacio", *El Día*, 23/01/1888.

⁸⁰ "Ecos del Día", *La Época*, 11/09/1895.

⁸¹ "La Educación del Rey", *La Iberia*, 12/05/1896 and *La Correspondencia de España*, 13/05/1896.

⁸² *La Iberia*, 13/05/1896.

The regenerationist discourse came to play a larger role as Alfonso's majority drew closer. One of the sectors that was seen as most in need of reform and reinvigoration were the armed forces, which played an important part in the public discourse on Alfonso's upbringing. In December 1901 *Nuevo Mundo* reported on his visit to the naval museum. The paper expressed the hope that the visit would allow Alfonso to 'compare the greatness of our past with the darkness in which the present is covered and the beaming hopes that the future offers him.'⁸³ The location was significant, as the navy had almost been annihilated in a matter of weeks during the conflict with the U.S. The 'beaming hopes' unmistakably referred to expectations of national regeneration, not least of the navy. In April 1902, a month before Alfonso XIII's majority, *La Correspondencia militar* commented on the king's military education. The paper believed that Spaniards found themselves 'in such need of a military King, a soldier Monarch.' The reason was that Spain relied on the king to command the troops 'either in a decisive battle for the nation, or in the great parades in front of foreign Kings, Princes and magnates.'⁸⁴ Representative functions and possible conflicts demanded sound military training. In May 1902, the magazine *Por Esos Mundos* even claimed that Alfonso wanted to join the war 'with his soldiers when the armed struggle between Spain and the United States of America was declared.'⁸⁵ The author also emphasised Alfonso's vigorous athleticism, describing him as 'a most complete *sportsman*.'⁸⁶ The magazine concluded that this augured well for 'Spain to recover the place that, due to her most glorious history and tradition, she has a right to occupy in the world of cultured nations.'⁸⁷ Only a vigorous monarch, trained in the art of war, could lead the military regeneration of the nation; it was the realisation of the dream of 'The soldier monarch! That great ideal of the military institutions and the people (...).'⁸⁸

Regeneration was not solely concerned with the armed forces. In December 1901, *El Día* reported on the appointment of the academic Santamaría de Paredes as Alfonso's teacher in *derecho político* (political law), which it interpreted as a sign that Alfonso would be taught according to 'the truths on which today the majority of peoples that progress, base themselves.'⁸⁹ The king would transmit these truths to his people and facilitate the nation's overdue progress. *Por esos mundos* believed that 'reunited in our monarch are all the conditions necessary to make him a man

⁸³ "Visita del Rey al Museo Naval", *Nuevo Mundo*, 25/12/1901.

⁸⁴ "Rey Soldado", *La Correspondencia militar*, 02/04/1902.

⁸⁵ "Personajes Reales en la Intimidad", *Por Esos Mundos*, 05/1902, 380.

⁸⁶ *Ibid*, 381. *Sportsman* English and italicised in original.

⁸⁷ *Ibid*, 386.

⁸⁸ "Rey Soldado", *La Correspondencia militar*, 02/04/1902.

⁸⁹ "La educación del rey y el Sr. Santamaría.", *El Día* (Madrid), 10/12/1901.

educated in a modern way [*a lo moderno*], which would allow him to ‘take us on the path that the universal progress of this period obliges all nations to traverse.’⁹⁰ Others saw in his youth an opportunity for the nation. *Nuevo Mundo* declared that ‘no one, (...), puts in doubt the necessity that our patria feels for a real renovation. The monarch’s youth is the bond for this longing.’⁹¹ This sentiment echoed Sagasta’s defence of the king’s education in parliament, when he rejected the claim that the monarch’s youth was a problem and argued that on the contrary it was a cause for optimism.⁹²

When Alfonso’s education was first discussed, there was hope that the young king could be transformed into a people’s monarch. The centrist liberal *El Imparcial* argued that ‘communication, the spiritual contact would dispose the mind of the king to understand his constitutional functions.’ This would enable him to ‘see royalty as ascribed to the exercise of the moderating function and placed above the ambitions and miseries of the parties, he would be the incarnation of the supreme power, of national consciousness, (...).’⁹³ In 1894 Adolfo Posada, a famous regenerationist professor of law and prominent author, published a long essay on Alfonso XIII’s education in the magazine *La España moderna*. He strongly believed in sending the future monarch to a specially built school, where he would be treated like other children.⁹⁴ Alfonso would learn to ‘be a good citizen, who would carry in his soul the intimate conviction that his elevated functions, (...) should be carried out for the good of society.’⁹⁵ This view was symptomatic of his Krausist belief in the potential of education to allow a child to develop his inner abilities organically, in close contact with fellow students.⁹⁶ While hopes of a semi-public education were never fulfilled, *Nuevo Mundo* still argued that Alfonso’s trip to Bilbao in August 1901 had shown that the young king could become ‘the legitimate representative of national unity’ as long as he ‘visited them [the provinces], got to know them, and put himself in the most frequent communication possible with all Spaniards.’⁹⁷

Shortly after Alfonso’s majority, *La Ilustración Española y Americana*, an illustrated newspaper generally sympathetic to the monarchy, reported on the king’s first such visit to the provinces. It wrote that the people ‘desire and hope for happy days for the beloved *patria* under the reign of

⁹⁰ “Personas Reales”, *Por Esos Mundos*, 05/1902, 386.

⁹¹ “Alfonso XIII. Su infancia y adolescencia”, *Nuevo Mundo*, 19/05/1902.

⁹² *La Correspondencia de España*, 03/11/1901.

⁹³ “La Educacion de los Reyes en las monarquías constitucionales”, *El Imparcial*”, 22/07/1894.

⁹⁴ Adolfo Posada, “La Educación del Rey”, *La España moderna*, 01/03/1894, 29-42.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 42.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

⁹⁷ *Nuevo Mundo*, “Alfonso XIII.” 19/05/1902.

D. Alfonso XIII, [as] they know of the care and diligence his august mother has taken for the education of the King.⁹⁸ However, it is perhaps telling that the desired communication and a certain duty to show oneself, something Juliane Vogel has called the ‘monarchical duty of self-display’ (*monarchische Zeigepflicht*), had not been fulfilled.⁹⁹ The paper reported that the people, despite what they had heard of his education, showed ‘a natural desire to get to know him [Alfonso XIII] personally and see him close up to appreciate his character; (...).’¹⁰⁰ It was not enough to read and hear of his excellent education, the king still needed to exhibit its result to his people.

3.2. *Fear*

Dynastic transitions were not just anticipated with optimism, but frequently raised fears over the country’s current or future state. The dispute between Ferdinand VII and his father in 1808, and even more so the Carlist War, demonstrated to Spaniards the dangers inherent in moments of monarchical succession. The uncertainty, risk of civil war, and relative fragility of the political system was reflected in the public commentary on the heir’s upbringing. On one side of the political spectrum, left liberal and democratic press worried that the heir was not being prepared to overcome these challenges or would contribute to the demise of liberal constitutional government. On the other side, conservatives were scared of a debasement of the monarchy and the abandonment of religious and political traditions leading to disorder and disunity. In addition, criticising the future monarch’s upbringing was used to highlight the wider problems afflicting Spain’s economic, social, and political development, as well as providing a basis for the discussion of educational reform. Some of the primary concerns of reformers and reactionaries alike, such as secularisation, democratisation, and liberalisation, all coalesced and were reflected in the debates surrounding Isabel II and her successors’ education. The relevance of the monarchy to Spain’s future meant it could potentially endanger the nation’s progress, traditions, and unity.

⁹⁸ *La Ilustración Española y Americana*, 22/08/1902.

⁹⁹ Juliane Vogel, *Elisabeth von Österreich. Momente aus dem Leben einer Kunstfigur* (Frankfurt am Main, 1998), 161.

¹⁰⁰ *La Ilustración Española y Americana*, 22/08/1902.

Isabel II - Progressive overreach and the disregard of tradition

A critical view of the state of Isabel's education first emerged during the discussions concerning her guardianship that followed her mother's departure in 1840. The *moderado* opposition to Espartero in the Cortes took the lead in criticising developments. Their arguments were initially largely judicial, denying the government the right to appoint a new *tutor* and other palace staff. Their interventions in newspapers and the parliamentary chamber revealed a concern about the undermining of traditions, the dismantling of society's hierarchical organisation and a lack of respect of family rights. These were part of a broader sentiment that the revolution was moving too fast and beyond its original, limited aims, with potentially disastrous effects for the future of the monarchy as well as the nation.

Having failed to stop the appointment of Argüelles as *tutor*, the *moderado* press turned to attacking the methods and behaviour of the new palace staff. They regarded Isabel and her sister's more frequent outings and allegedly less formal treatment, especially by Mina and Espartero, as signs that these office holders were not qualified to oversee the queen's education. They feared that royal dignity was disregarded and was being publicly undermined. To the *moderados*, the decorum of the crown was a central concern. On top of that, the public voicing of these issues became a political tool used to attack the Espartero Regency and to show that it had been mistaken in wresting control over Isabel II's upbringing from her mother.

Considering the 1841 affair surrounding Isabel's teacher Juan Ventosa and the resignation of other members of the royal household, criticism became more focused on education itself and it was no longer just the *moderados*, who criticised the regent and Isabel's upbringing. The publication of Ventosa's accusations in progressive newspapers, reflected a split within the *progresistas* and foreshadowed the alliance that was forming between *moderados* and progressive liberals opposed to Espartero's increasing authoritarianism. For different reasons, these forces publicly attacked the lack of care taken in Isabel's education and gaps in her preparation as Spain's constitutional ruler in-waiting. The fear was that those educating Isabel II did not have her or the monarchy's best interest at heart, but were driven by self-interest. This accusation was connected to Espartero's increasing reliance on his closest confidants and the ensuing dissatisfaction of many progressives.

As a special commission of the Cortes considered the question of Isabel's *tutela* in May 1841, several newspapers expressed their misgivings about what they regarded as the chambers'

intrusion into the royal family's private affairs.¹⁰¹ *El Correo Nacional* made it clear that it considered it beyond the jurisdiction of government and the parliamentary chamber to make a decision concerning Isabel II's *tutela*. It saw the discussion as an attempt to challenge monarchical sovereignty and accused the Cortes of undermining its own authority by deferring to mob rule and disregarding a mother's rights over her children. *El Correo* feared 'the destruction of liberty and of monarchy: and that (...) the royal Child (*Niña*) will be insulted and violated'.¹⁰² *El Corresponsal* took a similar line and stressed the citizens' rights and liberties that had been achieved under the constitution and which, in its opinion, had to remain valid even for the royal family and hence for María Cristina's rights over her daughters.¹⁰³ The tactic of turning liberal principles of inviolable individual rights against the *progresistas* was one used frequently in political disputes by those opposing an expansion of the state into areas such as education. What is more, it illustrates a growing split within the liberal camp and the existence of different, clashing conception of royal patrimony. The *moderados* did not believe that the importance of royal education justified government interference in affairs, which, in their opinion, belonged strictly to the private sphere and the royal prerogative.

The Cortes deputies opposed to declaring the *tutela* vacant echoed many of the legal arguments expressed in the press. Thus Joaquín Francisco Panheco, a prominent *moderado* deputy and later president of the Council of Ministers, disputed the entire process and criticised the convocation of a special commission as parliamentary overreach. He felt that the discussion, taking place shortly after a bloody civil war had ended, was threatening peace and order.¹⁰⁴ Opposition was even stronger in the more conservative and aristocratic upper chamber, the Senate. The Conde de Pinofiel, Senator for Malaga and former minister of justice in Ferdinand VII's last government and the first government of Isabel II, made a sophisticated legal argument to defend the private right of María Cristina as the future-queen's mother.¹⁰⁵ Others believed that besides the legal considerations mentioned above, it was only a mother's affection for her children that could ensure a well-directed education; if this maternal bond was lost, it could potentially have disastrous consequences.¹⁰⁶ The senator Bonel y Orbe, bishop of Cordoba, complained that the whole process represented a denial of tradition and could be the cause for future instability as

¹⁰¹ For the final judgment reached by the special commission that examined the *tutela*, presented on 13/06/1841, see Spain and Cortes, *Discusion*, 23.

¹⁰² *El Correo Nacional*, 21/05/1841.

¹⁰³ *El Corresponsal*, 18/05/1842.

¹⁰⁴ Spain and Cortes, *Discusion*, 40-48.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid*, 113/114.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid*, 118/119.

Spain's historic institutions came under undue attack.¹⁰⁷ His criticism of the government's plans articulated the fears of radical and excessively rapid change challenging the foundations of Spain's social order.

Once the Cortes declared the *tutela* unfilled and made various changes to central posts in the royal household, public criticism frequently took the form of *ad personam* attacks on the newcomers. *El Independiente* alleged in December 1841 that many deputies had not initially wanted to elect Argüelles as *tutor* due to his disrespectful conduct towards other palace personnel.¹⁰⁸ A few months later *La Postdata* referred critically to Isabel II's visit to a museum in the company of Argüelles and de los Heros, the new palace intendant. They had apparently shown excessive familiarity in their treatment of the queen. Furthermore, de los Heros was dismissed as someone 'who had obtained his appointment without any other merits than his ignorance and his audacity and friendship and favouritism (*pandillaje*) that unite him with Mr Argüelles.'¹⁰⁹ Mina, who often accompanied Isabel and her sister, was another frequent target. She was accused in *La Postdata* of taking the children by the arm on the stairway and on their regular walks in Madrid's Retiro Park, which was seen as an unacceptable lack of decorum.¹¹⁰ Mina's memoirs recount an incident where *El Heraldo* claimed that the queen 'did not receive the conscientious education adequate to her high calling; that she is surrounded by enemies, and not accessible to Spaniards.'¹¹¹ The contradiction in the accusation that Isabel II had become less accessible and the criticism of a lack of consideration for traditional decorum in her treatment is evident. Be that as it may, the statement illustrated the fear that Isabel II was educated by people hostile to her and was kept from contact with those outside the closed circle of Espartero's confidants.

Teaching methods came into the spotlight after Ventosa's well-publicised, controversial dismissal and the resignation of Santa Cruz as *Camarera Mayor*, which led criticism even from sectors of the public traditionally aligned with the *progresistas*. The teacher's account of the mistakes being made in Isabel's education, referred to in more detail in the first chapter, were reprinted and commented on in several newspapers.¹¹² *La Postdata* saw the incident as further evidence of

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid*, 135-137.

¹⁰⁸ *El Independiente*, 18/12/1841.

¹⁰⁹ *La Postdata*, 17/05/1842.

¹¹⁰ *La Postdata*, 25/04/1842.

¹¹¹ *El Heraldo* cited in Espoz y Mina and Pérez de Guzmán, *Apuntes*, 622.

¹¹² The discussion took place across the political spectrum from the centrist *El Español Independiente*, 06/08/1842 to the progressive *El Eco del Comercio*, 23/07/1842, and the moderate *El Heraldo*, 23/07/1842 and even the Republican *El Peninsular*, 02/08/1842.

decadence and anarchy in the direction of Isabel II's upbringing that had taken hold after the departure of the queen regent.¹¹³ The fears originally voiced on the appointment of a new *tutor* had seemingly come true. *El Eco de Comercio*, the most influential progressive newspaper at the time, praised Ventosa and voiced its concern with how the future queen's education failed to advance.¹¹⁴ Mina alleged that progressive newspapers made Ventosa into a 'martyr of liberty, who ha[d] sacrificed his good fortune for the happiness of the Queen and the Patria.'¹¹⁵ The public uproar meant that Argüelles had to justify Ventosa's dismissal before the Cortes, where he met with loud accusations.¹¹⁶ There was considerable alarm at the lack of stability and order described in Ventosa's published account, which indicated that the young queen was not being suitably prepared for her role. The dismissals and resignations were seen as signs of political infighting at court, which could do nothing but harm the prospects of Isabel II's reign. As has been demonstrated in chapter one this was not too far from the truth: political manoeuvring, in particular with regard to Isabel II's future marriage, was one of the main reasons for the upheavals within the royal household. Moreover, as Burdiel has argued, this growing public criticism of the young queen's upbringing across political divides foreshadowed the anti-Espartero alliance that would ultimately bring him down.¹¹⁷

Alfonso XII - An excessive emphasis on military education

The first-time Alfonso's upbringing was critically examined in public was in October 1864, when the government accompanied its decree on public education with a preamble on how the prince's instruction should proceed. The discussion in the public sphere revolved mainly around the weight the government had placed on military training. The notion that an instruction in warfare was essential, was attacked from the progressive left and, albeit less vehemently, from the Catholic right.

The liberal progressive critique expressed the fear that the heir to the throne's excessively militaristic education was dangerous for the country and did not match the spirit of the times. First, the growth in the armed forces' influence in Spanish society and governments had not gone unnoticed among the public and was increasingly seen as problematic. Rather than educating Alfonso to be a soldier, the government should have sought ways to limit and control

¹¹³ *La Postdata*, 5/08/1842.

¹¹⁴ *El Eco de Comercio*, 23/07/1842.

¹¹⁵ Espoz y Mina and Pérez de Guzmán, *Apuntes*, 170.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid*, 167.

¹¹⁷ Isabel Burdiel, *Isabel II : una biografía (1830-1904)*, Kindle Edition.

the power of the army. Moreover, the possibility of a soldier-king was ominous, as it opened the possibility of an alliance between the crown and the armed forces against public liberties and the constitution. The fear of such betrayal was deeply rooted in the liberals' collective historical consciousness since Ferdinand VII had restored absolutism in Spain with the help of conservative officers in 1814. Secondly, instructing a future monarch like a soldier appeared out of touch with the spirit of the times and the crown's function in a constitutional state. Many liberals believed that the nineteenth century was not a time of military power but of scientific, intellectual, and artistic progress, an age of ideas. The role of the crown had changed accordingly: the king was to guide the people and set an example, not command his troops. He should be educated to the highest standards to achieve prosperity, progress, and liberty for the nation. Progressive liberals shared in the ideal of restoring Spain's glory but did not regard it primarily as a military issue, but an economic, social, and political one.

The conservative Catholic critique was less severe, as it did not entirely disagree with the government's prescription, but argued that Christian morality had to take precedence. Their belief that it was essential for the heir to become a good Catholic expressed the church's fear that Spain was becoming increasingly secularised and that its power was being severely diminished. Education was one of the central battlegrounds between the church and the liberal state in nineteenth-century Spain and extended to the realm of royal education. The Catholic press praised the government, which also strengthened the church's autonomy in public education, for mentioning the importance of religious teaching but believed that it needed to go beyond those proposals to ensure Alfonso became a virtuous and moral king.

Initially, there was little public criticism of Alfonso's education. The primary curriculum set out by Corvera, a former minister responsible for public works and education, was only commented on sporadically. Thus *El Clamor Público* stated that 'we are not in agreement with the señor Marqués in various points', but did not elaborate much further, apart from a vague mention that 'the education of a *constitutional* prince should be dominated by a spirit different from the narrow and coercive one that the former companion of general O'Donnell [i.e. Corvera] possesses and is animated by.'¹¹⁸ The minister was not seen as the right person to give advice on raising a constitutional monarch, due to his authoritarian and conservative world-view. However, the paper did not criticise the plan in more detail, which is reminiscent of the attacks on the palace staff during Isabel II's minority. The paper's limited criticism avoided any impression of open

¹¹⁸ *El Clamor Público*, 17/12/1861.

hostility toward the monarch, who had solicited Corvera's advice. It was more complicated to criticise the heir's education when its direction was determined by the queen.

The government's decree of October 1864 put the issue of royal education back into the spotlight. To some of the progressive newspapers such as *La Discusión*, the decrees on Alfonso's teaching and public education, published simultaneously, were a 'signal of the divorce between the ministry and the spirit of the century.' The spirit of the laws was described as 'an attempt against civilization and science.'¹¹⁹ *La Iberia* argued that this was 'an age where ideas should prevail over force', which meant it made no sense to focus on military instruction for the future monarch. The publication agreed with the government that 'a King should be educated for his time' and that the central demand of the century was 'instruction [*instrucción*]' but disagreed with the conclusions drawn. The decree appeared to hark back to a time before reason prevailed over force and superstition, which led to the mistaken priorities: 'During the Middle Ages education had to be primarily bellicose and in second place scientific, and today it should be scientific in the first and bellicose in the second place.' *La Iberia* was outraged by the idea of 'A preferably military education for the prince of Asturias in a constitutional period!'¹²⁰ The liberal *La Nación* disagreed with the government's interpretation of the international context. The state of Europe or Spain did not justify the emphasis that was placed on military instruction. Force was not the dominant power; reason and justice sustained the nation. The author believed that once Alfonso was king, he did not require the skills to command troops but needed to be taught the importance of valour and actions in the 'moral interest of the people.' In its idealistic conception of the world, the spirit of the time was one of disarmament, where philosophers argued for peace and reason, the principles that would allow nations to flourish.¹²¹

Progressive liberals also worried about the practical consequences of a primarily military education. *La Nación* argued that the government had become an instrument of reaction and accused it of 'Educat[ing] a constitutional Prince to be an absolute or despotic King' and 'mak[ing] a wretch out of a prince, and what is worse, unhappy a nation that will not be able to live without disruptions that will liberate it from a load it cannot resist.' Some form of revolution seemed inevitable, if Alfonso was educated out of tune with his constitutional role. *La Nación* argued that a 'constitutional King should not have his own initiative, (...), but a higher criterion, which removes him from party political battles; (...).' Otherwise the king could be inclined

¹¹⁹ *La Discusión*, 29/11/1864.

¹²⁰ *La Iberia*, 29/10/1864.

¹²¹ *La Nación*, 29/10/1864.

toward reaction and ‘dream of coups d’état, of despotism, against the will of the nation that only desires a constitutional king.’¹²² The fear of a king conspiring with the forces of reaction was probably inspired by the historical precedent of Ferdinand VII’s betrayal of liberals in 1814 and 1823.

The strong emphasis on military and religious aspects was seen as further evidence of a reactionary turn. Thus, *La Iberia* rhetorically asked whether the aim was to ‘at present, silently prepare Spain for an absolutist future? Is it that the prince is educated to be the warrior of the neo-Catholics and for that reason his religious education is also recommended?’ The newspaper cited Napoleon I as an example of how a head of state could use the prestige of his military victories to dispense with representative bodies and establish a dictatorship.¹²³ While kings might have to lead their troops, this did not mean they had to learn to command them:

‘It was sufficient that they [kings] be educated as men of honour, and it is not necessary that they be essentially military men. The prince should know how to die as the best soldier: but he does not need to understand the military like the best general.’¹²⁴

A prince as general would furthermore have worrying implications for Spain’s external relations. There was a risk that a king would ‘launch himself, and launch the nation continuously into bellicose enterprises, which will wear out its powers, (...).’¹²⁵ The crown’s extensive powers in foreign affairs, at least nominally, meant that a militaristic monarch could pursue an excessively aggressive and expansive foreign policy to the detriment of the nation. It is evident that these comments formed part of a wider debate over military influence in Spanish society.

The satirical, radical liberal weekly *Gil Blas* published an extensive piece, which ridiculed the government’s assertions on royal education. It did not share the belief that the world needed a prince ‘armed from head to toe.’ It criticised the idea that to be an effective leader Alfonso needed to be taught by officers. A counter-example to the historical justification given by the government was Alexander the Great, who ‘had Aristoteles as a teacher...and you have, among others, a cavalry captain.’ Alfonso’s teachers lacked intellectual distinction and a philosophical education was considered more useful than middle-ranking army officers showing Alfonso how to be a soldier. More than that, the article accused the teaching staff of being excessively

¹²² *La Nación*, 01/11/1864.

¹²³ *La Iberia*, 29/10/1864.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.* A/No.4.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*

conservative or even Carlist sympathisers. Alfonso would be surprised to find that many of those surrounding him and pretending to be his friends, had previously fought against his mother's constitutional throne. There was also an anti-colonial tone to the piece, as it advised Alfonso to be careful when studying Spanish annexations, so that he learned that 'there is no country in all of America, which desires with all its heart to submit to the paternal regime of our ministers.' This was mainly because 'Americans do not understand their happiness', which was an ironic take on the patronising colonial attitudes of Spanish governments.¹²⁶

From a more conservative and Catholic standpoint, the concern was not with excessive militarism and its possible consequences, but more with the prioritising of military instruction over religious teaching. The fear was that morality and Christian values, could come up short. A good example of this criticism is an article published in October 1864 in *La Regeneración*, a monarchist, Catholic daily, written by Miguel Sánchez, a priest and contributing author for the paper. While he subscribed to the idea that 'The army and the church must be in agreement', he believed that 'a soldier without faith is an incomprehensible thing.' Sánchez had knowledge of traditional texts on royal education, and cited as his inspiration the seventeenth-century writer Diego Saavedra Fajardo's *Idea de un Príncipe político Cristiano*, which laid out the virtues a good monarch should embrace. He argued that for a prince to consolidate the throne it was essential that he was 'Catholic, truly Catholic', as monarchy and Catholicism were understood as each other's best guarantor. Neglecting religious education would, on the other hand lead, to disorder, warfare, and disunion, because 'How should anyone fear the King if they do not fear God?'¹²⁷ In another article, written in response to *Las Novedades'* criticism of the excessive military and religious imprint on Alfonso's education, *La Regeneración* expressed its fear of the results of a more progressive education. It alleged that should Alfonso receive a 'krausista' upbringing he would learn nothing useful and if he went to university, his education would be too specific and not sufficiently focused on morality. Furthermore, the liberals' aim to build a militia, while not allowing the king to be instructed in military matters meant that 'all Spaniards can be soldiers or militias, *apart from the King*'¹²⁸ To the author this revealed the progressive's hypocrisy and their true intent to damage the monarchy, the church, and the traditions of Spain.

¹²⁶ "Enseñanza Militar", *Gil Blas*, 26/11/1864.

¹²⁷ *La Regeneración*, 29/10/1864.

¹²⁸ *La Regeneración*, 31/10/1864. The term 'krausista' refers to the pedagogical approaches inspired by German philosopher Karl Christian Friedrich Krause, which became highly influential in nineteenth-century Spain. See Ellias Diaz, *La filosofía social del krausismo español*. (Madrid, 1973).

During Alfonso's exile, progressive liberal newspapers barely reported on the prince's education and, when they did, sought to undermine his cause. Thus, *El Debate*, a pro-Amadeo newspaper, published a critical article on a reunion at Isabel II's palace in Paris. The paper emphasised that 'the moderado, ultra-conservative element, was in majority.'¹²⁹ What was implied is that the Bourbons had not moved on: the same people remained in charge and a restoration would be nothing but a return to the disastrous latter stages of Isabel II's reign. *La Nación* briefly commented on news that Montpensier was to be put in charge of the direction of Alfonso's education, which it interpreted as a sign of the Bourbon's desperation and the 'ridiculous role' that Montpensier was taking on.¹³⁰ *La Nación* found the whole idea of a Bourbon return absurd and compared it to 'waiting for the last judgement to descend from heaven'.¹³¹ This could either be a sign of excessive confidence in the new regime or an attempt to forestall the unsettling prospect of a return of a Bourbon prince to the Spanish throne. The biggest fear was, as Cánovas realised when he took over the direction of Alfonso's education, that a Bourbon restoration would signal nothing more than a return to the *status quo ante* 1868.¹³²

Alfonso XIII - A reactionary, militaristic monarch

The strongest criticism of Alfonso XIII's education came from the growing republican and democratic movements. The liberal press and association legislation passed in the early 1880s gave republicans a platform from which they could criticise the monarchy and the corruption of the political system relatively freely. The king's education was one of the issues republicans picked up on, and some of their concerns were shared by less radical elements that looked to the future with dread. After all, periods of dynastic transition had often been fraught with conflict and violence.

The most common fear expressed on the political left, was that Alfonso XIII's education did not correspond to that of a modern, liberal, constitutional ruler but was instead steeped in tradition, religion, and militarism. In many ways, this echoed the liberal progressive critique of Alfonso XII's education. There was a widespread belief that the king was raised in a reactionary spirit, by illiberal teachers. The attacks were aimed at the individuals selected to teach the king, the didactic

¹²⁹ *El Debate*, 29/09/1871.

¹³⁰ *La Nación*, 19/02/1871.

¹³¹ *La Nación*, 20/07/1871.

¹³² See Chapter 1 for Cánovas aim to bring together a larger coalition of supporters. For evidence that he wanted to avoid the impression of a return to Isabel II's reign See AGP-ReinadosAlfonsoXII-Cajón19-Expediente19, Isabel II to Cánovas, 23/04/1875.

methods, and the subjects studied. Deficiencies in these areas were regarded as preventing Alfonso XIII from fulfilling his constitutional functions properly and as an indication that he would not be prepared to tackle the issues afflicting the nation.

For republicans as well as many less radical democrats, this only highlighted a more fundamental problem with the political system. They believed that the lack of transparency, cronyism and reactionary tendencies in Alfonso's education were symptomatic of the incompatibility of a modern political system with the restoration monarchy. It was impossible to provide the king with a progressive education that would enable him to regenerate the nation: regeneration could only be brought about under a republic or at least a more democratic parliamentary monarchy.

Lastly, and in some ways connected to the previous theme, there was a feeling that the monarchy, as well as the dynastic parties that supported it, had become disconnected from the people. The comments on Alfonso's education reflected the fear that the king was isolated from his people, lacked contact with their concerns and troubles and was therefore unable to lead the nation effectively into a prosperous future. Republicans believed this disconnect was natural. The people demanded democratic and fair elections, which the ruling elites would never grant them, as that would ultimately undermine their dominant socio-economic position.

In 1893 the first rumours concerning the appointment of a teacher for the young king circulated in Madrid. They pointed to the choice of either a cleric or a general, which caused some on the political left to fear that Alfonso would be educated within an extremely conservative environment. The federalist weekly *El Nuevo régimen* believed that this choice of potential teachers showed that 'the old institution [the monarchy], greedy with its symbols and traditional form, has not thought of adjusting the education of princes to the demands of progress.' The possible appointees indicate a 'lack of rigour in the direction [of education] by a sophistic cleric or a soldier' which was seen as a hindrance for 'intelligence to apply itself and the stimulation of ingenuity.'¹³³ Alfonso's education did not serve his personal development or that of a more progressive nation.

Fear of conservative, clerical influences at court became more widespread and accentuated over the affair surrounding a fiercely anti-liberal article written by Alfonso's teacher Padre Montaña in December 1900.¹³⁴ *El Correo*, despite conceding that Montaña possessed 'knowledge and virtues', regarded the article he had written for the integrist *El Siglo Futuro* and his position at the palace as a sign that Alfonso's reign might bring a return to the politics associated with the late stages of

¹³³ *El Nuevo régimen*, "La educación de los reyes", 05/08/1893.

¹³⁴ *El Siglo Futuro*, 'Los errores del Señor Canalejas'. 21/12/1900.

Isabel II's reign; a direction the country should under no circumstances be taking.¹³⁵ The centrist *El Imparcial* believed that the reactionary opinions of Montaña reflected badly on Alfonso's upbringing and that the government needed to intervene.¹³⁶ Republican newspapers went even further. *El País* believed that the effects of having someone like Montaña teach Alfonso XIII were so severe that they amounted to *lèse majesté* on behalf of the government.¹³⁷ It demanded to know 'if the government w[ould] continue to tolerate that integrist doctrines poison Spaniards, children and adults?'¹³⁸ These comments exhibit the combination of a strong anti-clerical tradition in Spanish liberalism and the constant preoccupation of many on the political left with the strength of the Catholic Church in society and in particular in education.¹³⁹

Rekindled by the Montaña affair, fears of excessive clerical influence in Alfonso's upbringing and its adverse effects on his reign continued to play an important role even beyond his dismissal. Ten months after the affair unfolded, *El País* picked up on a report that claimed Alfonso XIII had served as an altar boy to the papal nuncio. The newspaper argued that the act was not the problem, but 'the symptom that revealed what the young king will one day become, (...), he will either end up being a democrat or unpopular' and by 'helping the Nuncio at mass, we do not believe that princes learn democracy.' Furthermore, this act seemed to indicate that Alfonso's education had not changed after Montaña's dismissal and it was incomprehensible to the author that Spain should have a king who was subservient to the Catholic Church. The author could apparently not imagine anything worse and concluded that 'we understand everything: a womanizing king, a tyrant king like Ferdinand VII, a complaisant king like Charles IV, an idiot king like Henry IV, everything, we understand everything, apart from an altar boy king.'¹⁴⁰ The impression that the monarchy was too close to the church would persist well into Alfonso XIII's reign.

It was not only the clerical elements at court that made republicans and democratic liberals concerned about a possible reactionary turn after Alfonso's majority. In November 1901, the Asturian republican deputy and later founder of the Reformist Party, Melquíades Álvarez publicly admonished the government to pay closer attention to the king's education. *El Siglo Futuro* reported that Álvarez told the Cortes that he 'mistrusts it [Alfonso's education], because

¹³⁵ *El Correo*, "Cuestion Cadente", 25/12/1900.

¹³⁶ *El Imparcial*, 26/12/1900.

¹³⁷ *El País*, "El catecismo del Padre Montaña." 28/12/1900.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*

¹³⁹ Boyd, *Historia patria*, 30-35 and Alonso García, *La nación*, 13-14.

¹⁴⁰ "El Rey Monaguillo?", *El País*, 05/10/1901.

first the P. Montaña had his influence and now a History professor whose reactionary ideas are perfectly well known.’¹⁴¹ He thought the government was responsible for ‘removing the king from the ideals of liberty to deliver him to reaction’, which ‘justified the fears that everyone feels for the new reign.’¹⁴² Spain was afflicted by ‘Doubts and pessimism, because the new reign arrives when there are two dangers: the danger of reaction and the danger of anarchism and dictatorship.’¹⁴³ As early as 1894 Adolfo Posada had already highlighted the dangers that an excessive military education could bring. He believed that it was ‘inadequate for the essentially *civil* role of the constitutional king’ and would make it impossible for Alfonso XIII to be ‘the peace-loving, humble king, (...)’ the nation demanded.¹⁴⁴ Military education was not the way to prepare a king for constitutional rule in this progressive and civil conception of a monarch’s role. Some republicans developed a fundamental critique of Alfonso’s upbringing, which regarded a progressive, modern education for a king as an impossibility and argued that national regeneration could not be achieved under a monarch. The republican weekly *El nuevo régimen* argued that a king could not receive an education that ‘corresponded to his rank in society’, as only in a republic would the public vote ensure ‘that the person elected [to teach] possessed all the sufficient conditions, as he would not receive the appointment if he had not demonstrated his indispensable abilities in the art of politics.’ The resulting paradox between a republican system as the only one capable of designating the king’s educator and the abolition of the monarchy a republic implied, was probably deliberate. Under a hereditary monarchy, the underlying argument went, the post would always be awarded based on favours, not merit. Even if it were possible to provide a progressive, philosophical education for the monarch, this would lead the king to the realisation that ‘the institution [monarchy] was incompatible with the decorum of men and the dignity of the people.’¹⁴⁵ In other words the king’s progressive education would eventually undermine the system itself and was hence inconceivable. Melquíades Álvarez made a similar point in the Cortes. He argued that ‘I desire that D. Alfonso were a democrat’, but believed that the corruption of the system, the cronyism in Spanish society and ‘network of friendships’ made this impossible.¹⁴⁶ Furthermore, ‘here [in Spain] where the monarchical regime is the cause of our national disaster, I do not understand that there are some

¹⁴¹ Melquíades Álvarez González-Posada, quoted in *El Siglo Futuro*, 05/11/1901.

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ Melquíades Álvarez González-Posada, quoted in *El Liberal*, 05/11/1901.

¹⁴⁴ Posada, “La Educación del Rey” in *La España moderna*, 35.

¹⁴⁵ *El nuevo régimen*, “La educación de los Reyes”, 05/08/1893.

¹⁴⁶ Melquíades Álvarez González-Posada, quoted in *El Día*, 05/11/1901.

who are not Republicans.¹⁴⁷ It was only a republic that could regenerate the *patria*, and not the king, especially not one educated in the manner in which Alfonso XIII inevitably was.

While not quite as pessimistic as Álvarez, Posada explained to his readers the difficulty involved in a constitutional king's upbringing. The problem he identified was not so much a fundamental incompatibility of monarchy and progress, but defining the role of the constitutional king and adjusting his education to its development. He argued that 'the constitutional king is a very complicated institution', which 'is a great political fiction whose nature is not always clear and recognisable, (...)'.¹⁴⁸ This together with the transformation of the institution presented a tremendous challenge:

the great difficulty to first determine and then resolve the problem of the king's education, is based on the fact that the special conditions of the political function and the social representations, which are characteristic of a modern king, do not indicate the way in which his person should *truly and positively transform* itself from within, in the same measure that his institution has been transformed.¹⁴⁹

Moreover, he believed that there was a clash between the '*integral* character' of education in modern public schools that aimed to 'condition the spontaneous production of personal aptitudes' and the need to prepare the king for the specific task of ruling a country.¹⁵⁰ Adequately educating a constitutional ruler was an ill-defined, very complicated, if not quite impossible task.

This leads on to more explicit concerns over a perceived widening of the chasm between the monarchy and the people. The left-liberal, democratic *El Heraldo de Madrid* believed that 'kings cannot complete their education far away from their people' and should learn 'in the bosom of their people.' This had not been the case in the king's youth: 'The Spanish people, the national mass, has never been in contact with the monarch [Alfonso XIII].' It was of the utmost importance that before his rapidly approaching majority 'the king familiarise himself with the nation', as otherwise he would 'find himself isolated'. In practical terms this meant less of an emphasis on military issues and more of an intellectual education. The king should 'visit universities, where the intellectual generations are formed and the youth casts itself in the cult of knowledge, the cornerstone, solid foundation of nationalities; (...)'.¹⁵¹ The deputy and later minister of the navy, Santiago Alba Bonifaz, a member of the short-lived, regenerationist Union

¹⁴⁷ Ibid quoted in *El Liberal*, 05/11/1901.

¹⁴⁸ Posada, "La Educación del Rey", *La España moderna*, 33.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid, 33, A/No.5.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid, 31

¹⁵¹ *El Heraldo de Madrid*, 07/03/1901.

Nacional, was concerned about the ‘great disequilibrium between the state and the Spanish nation’ and connected this problem to Alfonso’s education. He reportedly, ‘based his distrust on the education of the king, in which religion and the militia predominated, (...)’ He believed that instead the monarch ‘should have been taken to Castile, Andalusia, Cataluña, to all parts [of Spain], to appreciate the necessities of the country, the production and the work.’¹⁵² The reference to the provinces is indicative of a growing concern with regionalism and the need for national unity, which the monarch was meant to represent. According to these critics, Alfonso XIII should have come into closer contact with the nation and its different people.

3.3 National Identity

What did it mean to be Spanish? Who were the bearers of national identity and what qualities, virtues and vices did they or should they represent? These questions formed an important part of the public debates over the upbringing of future monarchs in nineteenth-century Spain. The ruler was expected to represent an idealised, imagined identity, which could supposedly be shaped by adequately educating the heir. Therefore, the expression of hopes and fears for the future in the public discussion of royal education can also be read as a commentary on the current state of the nation, the national characteristics, the nation’s historical conception, and its ideological foundations.

After Ferdinand VII’s death, liberals wanted to redefine Spain as a free nation that had fought and made sacrifices for its liberty. This first took the form of resistance against Napoleonic rule and then the struggle against Don Carlos’ absolutism. As the Peninsular War became the founding myth of the liberal nation - which explains why it is referred to in Spain as the War of Independence - the armed forces were regarded as and saw themselves as its embodiment.¹⁵³ During Isabel II’s minority the nation was frequently conceived as emerging from decline, forcefully progressing toward the establishment of a modern, liberal constitutional state. As the hoped for political liberalisation, economic progress, and bureaucratic rationalisation failed to materialise, backwardness increasingly came to be regarded as one of Spain’s chief characteristics, reflected in her political and social life. Those on the right believed this was due to the abandonment of religious traditions and social hierarchies, which they saw as deeply ingrained in

¹⁵² *La Correspondencia de España*, 03/11/1901.

¹⁵³ Álvarez Junco has called this the ‘invention of the War of Independence’. See Junco, *Mater Dolorosa*, Kindle Edition, Chapter III ‘La “Guerra del Independencia”, un prometedor comienzo.”

Spanish history and integral to its national identity. The left did not deny that Catholicism was deeply rooted in Spain, but argued that its rejection of science and rationality was what held the country back. Democrats believed only a democratic state, which implied a parliamentary, popular monarchy or a republic, could represent the people, who were the only true bearers of national identity. This foreshadowed the emergence of two broad, competing and at times clashing conceptions of the nation; a development reinforced by Spain's decline on the international stage and her loss of empire. The arguments over royal education were suffused within this wider debate about modernity and the question of what it meant to be Spanish.

Isabel II – Overcoming the nation's backwardness

During Isabel II's minority, *moderados* and *progresistas* felt a strong sense of belonging to a nation that was still backward and had only just begun to emerge from the obscurity of absolutism and the political and economic underdevelopment associated with it. There was a sentiment, particularly among progressive liberals, that the nation was in flux; that the Spanish people had the ability and strength to establish a more modern and liberal political system. It found its expression in the public image of Isabel and her upbringing, which often contrasted the dark, oppressive past from which the nation was emerging with a brighter present and future. Moreover, the notion that the Spanish people were capable of liberal, representative government was expressed in the *progresistas'* desire to determine the direction of Isabel II's education and assert the sovereignty of the nation over the royal prerogatives of the Queen Regent. Even the monarchy needed to be put into the service of the nation for Spain to shed her backwardness and for liberal institutions to truly take root.

Secondly, liberals still identified with the developments of Western Europe and thought of themselves as belonging among the traditional great civilised powers. Education played a vital role in this regard, as it would serve to elevate the status of the Spanish people. Isabel II was to be instructed to lead this change and reign over what was now a free, liberal, and constitutional nation. This belief in Spain's potential was firmly rooted in ideas of past glories and imperial greatness, which found its expression mainly in comparisons between Isabel II and her early modern namesake Isabel the Catholic. While not suggesting that her education should be the same, the example was used to inspire a belief that the nation could be restored to its former grandeur under female rule.

The Catholic Church and more conservative elements in society, held onto a conception of Spain that was essentially traditional and confessional. They were convinced that Spain remained

a conservative, Catholic, and rural nation, wedded to its monarchs because of a sense of religious and moral devotion. Recent decline had been the product of increasing secularisation and the abandonment of traditions. Thus, they emphasised the need to maintain the traditional aspects of Isabel II's education, in particular with regards to court etiquette, posts in the royal household, and the treatment of the royal children. Many of them saw the alliance of church and crown as essential for the unity of Spain; a nation inherently monarchical and Catholic.

The Carlist Wars not only pitted a conservative, absolutist political programme against a liberal, modernising, and constitutional one, they also entailed the confrontation of two different conceptions of Spain. Thus, the Carlists saw themselves as the defenders of a deeply conservative, monarchical, Catholic country, wedded to its ancient traditions, including regional privileges, the so-called *fueros*. María Cristina's liberal supporters depicted this vision as backward and wanted the nation to break with the shackles of the past. The liberal's nationalism was 'a civic force for nation-building' and modernisation'.¹⁵⁴ A good image of this contrast is José Ribelles y Helip's famous and frequently reproduced painting *Alegoría de España con la Reina Maria Cristina e Isabel II*. Painted at the beginning of the civil war, around 1833, it depicted the Spanish nation allegorically breaking the shackles of oppression and obscurantism as well as the figures of Isabel II and her mother, in the centre of the image, leading Spain to a prosperous future of peace and prosperity.¹⁵⁵ This contrast of a bright future with a dark past, and the tempestuous present – in the background of the image – is representative of a wider belief that the nation needed to overcome its backwardness and was able to do so under Isabel II and her mother's guidance. The rule of law, popular sovereignty, and Isabel's upbringing as a constitutional queen would be essential to this end. That national decline needed to be and could be overcome with the help of an educated monarch was expressed in various iconographic representations and literary works that portrayed Isabel II as 'the student of liberty' [*la alumna de la libertad*], a phrase apparently popularised by Argüelles during the Espartero regency.¹⁵⁶ The reference to the queen as a student, in the process of learning what it meant to rule a free nation is exemplary of the emergence of a more liberal conception of the nation and the monarchy. Isabel needed to learn what liberty meant to the nation and for her role as monarch. One of these depictions of the queen's education was the publicly displayed and famous portrait by Vicente López of Isabel II studying geography: a portrait that showed the wider public that their future queen was being

¹⁵⁴ Lawrence, *Spain's First Carlist War*, Kindle edition, Ch.1 "Introduction, History and Sources".

¹⁵⁵ Rosa Ana Gutierrez Lloret, "Isabel II, de simbolo de la libertad a deshonor de España", in La Parra López (ed.), *La imagen*, 227.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid*, 230.

carefully educated to fulfil the ambitions of a free nation. Highlighting her knowledge of geography also conveys some territorial or imperial ambitions, as well as the desire for Spain to once more become an important actor on the international stage.

After María Cristina's departure, the discussion of Isabel II's education in the Cortes further added to the impression of a nation that had fallen behind, but was now ready to be more assertive in delivering civil liberties and a new political order. González Bravo, a leading progressive deputy, argued that the nation in 'modern times' did not owe anything to the monarch, instead it was the crown that had to serve the nation. Isabel II's upbringing was a political issue and it was of the utmost importance to ensure that it proceeded in accordance with what Gonzalez Bravo called 'the national cause.'¹⁵⁷ Martínez de Velasco, a progressive senator, argued that it was the responsibility of the parliamentary chambers that every Spaniard could rest assured of 'the virtue and propriety of the person to whom the Cortes will have entrusted the most precious of consignations, the queen's education.'¹⁵⁸ In this argument, deputies and senators owed this to the nation, who they believed to be sovereign and who they represented. Sovereignty then was not the sole preserve of the monarch, but was delegated by the nation to parliament and the crown. This created an equality between monarch and Cortes as servants of the sovereign nation, which parallels developments in other European states, where kingship was claimed to have increasingly assumed the status of an office (*Amtscharakter*).¹⁵⁹ To correspond to her role, Isabel had to learn to represent the nation she would eventually rule. One of the central disputes in nineteenth-century Spain was about the limits of parliamentary authority and what national sovereignty implied for the political system, in particular for the monarchy. Even those arguing against the appointment of a new *tutor*, believed that the nation was going through 'a period of public oscillations and vicissitudes.'¹⁶⁰ There was a general perception that the country was experiencing fundamental changes that could determine its future.

The *progresistas'* strong belief in the possibility of improving the Spain's future was at the same time an indictment of the recent past and present, partially borne out of an unfavourable comparison to other European nations and her own perceived glorious early modern past. *El Constitucional*, a progressive paper from Barcelona, reported on the contrast between the

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ Spain and Cortes, *Discussion*, 38.

¹⁵⁹ Monika Wienfort, *Monarchie in der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft: Deutschland und England von 1640 bis 1848* (Göttingen, 1993), 69, 158.

¹⁶⁰ Spain and Cortes, *Discussion*, 220.

modernity of Isabel's teaching and the backwardness of Spanish public educational methods. The author felt that the queen was now receiving an education appropriate to 'a princess who is destined to rule the sceptre of a free nation, (...).' He praised Ventosa for overcoming the obstacles of a conservative entourage and asked 'What would this enlightened and conscientious teacher not have done if he did not have so many elements against him?'¹⁶¹ *El Eco de Comercio* believed that this was an exceptional opportunity to consolidate the liberal system and overcome its recent troubles. One of its contributors hoped that Isabel II would receive 'all the instruction that she needed to regenerate this unhappy nation and elevate her to the degree of prosperity that she is capable of.' In practice this meant getting rid of the harmful vices such as flattery, corruption and privilege that continued to hold the country back.¹⁶²

The historical point of comparison was naturally the young queen's fifteenth-century namesake Isabel the Catholic. As Gutierrez Lloret demonstrated, Isabel the Catholic was frequently upheld as a symbol of Spanish unity, effective female rule, successful colonial expansion, and transition from traditional to the early modern world.¹⁶³ Isabel II's Spain was similarly understood to be at a threshold between two eras, facing a series of challenges formed by the loss of most of the American empire and the transition from absolutism to liberalism.¹⁶⁴ The comparison of her namesake served not only to enhance Isabel II's religious credentials and strengthen the case for female rule, but also suggested that the young queen could seek guidance on the restoration of national glory from an education in Spanish history.

Conservatives interpreted national decline as a result of an essentially Catholic country becoming increasingly secular and departing from its traditions. These developments were perceived to be reflected in Isabel II's upbringing. In the senate, the bishop of Cordoba expressed this frustration at the lack of respect for María Cristina's rights as a mother. He saw the whole debate over the *tutela* as an encroachment, an indication of the ingratitude toward the monarchy's historical achievements and the instability that had befallen the nation.¹⁶⁵ The disregard for tradition and religion in the appointment of a *tutor* were thus signs of a wider malaise that would bring further decline and disorder. Conservatives and moderate liberals believed that the *progresistas* were getting ahead of themselves and Isabel's education was emblematic of the resulting decay of Spain's traditional value system.

¹⁶¹ "Educacion de las Augustas Niñas", *El Constitucional (Barcelona)*, 12/08/1841.

¹⁶² *El Eco del Comercio*, 13/04/1841.

¹⁶³ Gutierrez Lloret, "Isabel II" *La imagen*, 227.

¹⁶⁴ Alda Blanco, 'Spain at the Crossroads: Imperial Nostalgia or Modern Colonialism?', *A Contra Corriente*, 5.1 (2007), 1-11.

¹⁶⁵ Spain and Cortes, *Discussion*, 135-137

Ruiz de la Vega, a *moderado* senator, was similarly worried about the effect that ‘pernicious, impious and even revolutionary ideas’ could have on the young queen’s education.¹⁶⁶ Moderate liberal newspapers such as *La Revista de Madrid* agreed and regarded the clergy as the main victims of this new spirit introduced by the ‘partido dominante’.¹⁶⁷ *El Nacional de Barcelona* saw the appointment of a new *tutor* as an illegal act and argued that the decision showed that the Cortes had given in to passion rather than listening to reason and tradition.¹⁶⁸ In August 1842, during the more turbulent stages of the Espartero regency, the *moderado* newspaper *La Postdata* condemned the general anarchy and decadence that had befallen the palace, painting a picture of immorality at court.¹⁶⁹ Previously, the paper had criticised the lack of respect with which Isabel II was treated and the many breaches of decorum in the royal household. It was clear that in this environment the young queen’s education could not be carried out with the required respect for tradition and religion, which were essential attributes of the Spanish nation.¹⁷⁰ The behaviour and attitudes of those charged with supervising the future queen were regarded as a threat to the customs, values and hierarchical organisation of the palace and the nation. These principles were seen as essential to maintaining order, stability, and unity in Spain. For Isabel II to be a good queen she should be taught to maintain these pillars sustaining her throne and the nation.

Alfonso XII – A vigorous military, masculine, and Catholic heir

The public debates surrounding Alfonso XII’s education reflected the emergence of a conception that tied the nation to moral and historical traits. These discourses co-existed alongside the conservatives’ insistence on religion as the source of Spanish identity and liberal narratives of continued backwardness – discourses that had already been present in the discussion of Isabel II’s upbringing.

A set of values that was heavily emphasised as inherently Spanish and essential to Alfonso’s education were those associated with masculinity. It was important that the leader of the Spanish people exhibited its core ideals, such as honour, courage, and daring, with the expectation that he would become a real Spanish man. The more conservative *moderados* often associated these characteristics with those of the military, which they stylised to be representative of the national

¹⁶⁶ Ibid, 151.

¹⁶⁷ *Revista de Madrid*, 06/1841 cited in Ibid, 331.

¹⁶⁸ *El Nacional de Barcelona*, 10/07/1841.

¹⁶⁹ *La Postdata*, 05/08/1842.

¹⁷⁰ See for example *La Postdata*, 25/04/1842&13/10/1842.

ideal. The intention behind a soldierly upbringing was not only to turn Alfonso into a capable leader, but was also designed to transmit the manly virtues associated with Spanishness.

In addition to that, the debate over the heir to the throne's military training, demonstrates the centrality of the armed forces to national identity. The defenders as well as the critics of the heir's military education acknowledged the crucial role that the army and navy had played in Spain's history, as the Peninsular War (1808-1814) became the founding myth of the liberal nation.¹⁷¹ It was especially the *moderados* who defended the role of the armed forces not only as guarantors of public order, but as the upholders of liberty. While the *progresistas* were more concerned with the negative impact that excessive militarism could have, they did not dispute the significance of these qualities to national identity.

Two themes that touched on national identity persisted from the debates surrounding Isabel II's upbringing. First, there was the idea that Spain remained backward: a nation in decline that was failing to catch up with the rest of Europe in terms of social, political, and economic development. This was further accentuated by Spain's ever diminishing role in international affairs and the increasing danger of losing what remained of her overseas empire. The focus on a scientific, cosmopolitan, and modern education for the royal heir was thus born out of the perception that Spain no longer was, but needed to return to the status of a great nation. Secondly, many moderate liberals, Carlists and other conservative elements remained convinced that Spain was an essentially Catholic country, which could only return to greatness by holding onto its ancient traditions. This backward-looking conception of Spanish national identity found its expression in comments on Alfonso's education that emphasised the centrality of Catholicism to the achievements of other Spanish monarchs and the importance of religious instruction for the prince's moral guidance.

Svenja Goltermann and Lucy Riall, among others, have demonstrated that there was a connection between masculine aesthetics, virtues and behaviours on the one side, and military values and national identity on the other in nineteenth-century Germany and Italy.¹⁷² A similar link existed in the public discussions surrounding Alfonso's education. Thus *El Contemporáneo* defended the Nárvaez government's 1864 decree on the heir's upbringing on the ground that

¹⁷¹ Álvarez Junco, *Mater Dolorosa*, Ch.3 "La "Guerra de la Independencia", un prometedor comienzo".

¹⁷² For the relation between exercise, masculinity and national identity in Germany see S. Goltermann, 'Exercise and Perfection: Embodying the Nation in Nineteenth-Century Germany', *European Review of History*, 11.3 (2004), 333–46. For the role of masculine virtue in Italian national identity see Lucy Riall, 'Men at War: Masculinity and Military Ideals in the Risorgimento' in Patriarca, Silvana, and Lucy Riall (eds), *The Risorgimento Revisited: Nationalism and Culture in Nineteenth-Century Italy*, (Basingstoke, 2012), 153.

military education signalled ‘vigorous teaching’, which would strengthen the future monarch’s character to ‘respond to the legitimate hopes that the Spanish people conceive of.’¹⁷³ The monarchist *La Época* described military education as the tool that would allow the heir to identify with ‘the masculine and tough fibre of our people.’ It would enable him to be the ‘first defender of our rights’, and put Spain into line with other nations such as Austria, France, Italy and Britain where ‘princes are dedicated to the noble career of arms, in the army or the navy.’¹⁷⁴ While masculinity was hence not necessarily an exclusively Spanish characteristic, it was one that a great European nation, which Spain ought to be, possessed and imparted on their monarchs.

Even some of the liberal newspapers that were more critical of the prominence of military matters in Alfonso’s education believed in the importance of valour to the Spanish national spirit. Thus *La Iberia* noted that ‘valour, which in men is not a merit but a duty and the lack of which makes every being undignified of the title of man [*hombre*], because the idea of valour is united to the idea of virility.’ However, it argued that ‘it is enough that they [boys] be educated like men of honour, and it is not necessary that they be made essentially military men.’¹⁷⁵ This different interpretation of what it meant to be a man or how it could be produced was also evident in *La Nación*’s commentary. The progressive liberal newspaper believed that the king should act ‘with valour in his soul to be an enlightened king, a constitutional king, a popular king, a king without ‘camarilla’, without favourites.’¹⁷⁶ For progressive liberals a Spaniard’s valour was not uniquely bound up with a military education.

After Alfonso’s return to Spain in 1875, when the Carlist and Cuban wars were still raging, the monarchist newspapers praised the king for his appearance, which showed that he had been raised as a true Spaniard and, despite his young age, was already a man. Thus *La Correspondencia de la Mañana* wrote that ‘young Alfonso exceeded all expectations’ on his entry to Madrid on 14 January 1875 and pointed out that everyone noticed his ‘expressive gaze, his martial bearing, elegant manners’.¹⁷⁷ *La Época* also informed its readers of his military dress and how Alfonso ‘rode superbly on a brilliant horse.’¹⁷⁸ It furthermore lauded his ‘attractive youthfulness’ and other qualities including his valour, intelligence, and maturity in its many poems dedicated to the

¹⁷³ *El Contemporáneo*, 30/10/1864.

¹⁷⁴ *La Época*, 28/10/1864.

¹⁷⁵ *La Iberia*, 29/10/1864.

¹⁷⁶ *La Nación*, 29/10/1864.

¹⁷⁷ *La Correspondencia de la Mañana*, 15/01/1875.

¹⁷⁸ *La Época*, 15/01/1875.

return of the Bourbon king.¹⁷⁹ In this regard the press largely took on the image that Isabel II, Cánovas, and others involved in the heir's education wanted to create of Alfonso as '*todo un hombre*.'¹⁸⁰ As these examples illustrate, and as Robert A. Nye has argued, masculinity was closely bound up with values associated with military service, such as bravery and honour, in particular in the context of warfare and empire.¹⁸¹

Moreover, the debates over how Alfonso should be raised involved a more direct discussion of the armed forces; their role in the construction of the liberal nation state and their position in Spanish society. The moderate supporters of the government's plan took an extremely favourable view of the military's influence and historical legacy. *La Época* argued that a martial education did not have to be authoritarian or lead to an adventurous or expansionist spirit; instead it praised the 'extraordinary comprehension with which they [the armed forces] have taken on all the demands and ended all the complications of their time.'¹⁸² Similarly *El Contemporáneo* believed that the army in Spain, unlike in other countries, were not the enemies of public institutions and liberty. It considered the heir's military education the acknowledgement of the armed forces' struggle for representative institutions and against absolutism in defence of the nation's liberties, which meant that 'it is impossible that the royal pupil should with these teachers acquire an education that is opposed to that required by our social and political condition (...).'¹⁸³ On the political right, there was a strong belief in the military's historical and political achievements, its values, and the vital role it was therefore entitled to play in Spanish society and Alfonso's upbringing.

The *progresistas* would certainly not have argued with the historical importance of the armed forces to the Spanish nation, as the Peninsular War and the recourse to liberal militias had long been turned into a liberal founding myth of the *patria*.¹⁸⁴ However, their commentary on Alfonso's military education revealed the hope that force was no longer the dominant principle in modern society and that the armed forces could be a danger to the constitutional regime. Firstly, there was a sense that the government's stress on military education was exaggerated. The satirical newspaper *Gil Blas* argued that the world was not in a state to justify that 'you [Alfonso] have not even left childhood, and already professors surround you, who try to make you a

¹⁷⁹ *La Época*, 14/01/1875.

¹⁸⁰ See Chapter 2.2. of this dissertation for evidence of this.

¹⁸¹ Robert A. Nye, 'Locating Masculinity: Some Recent Work on Men', *Signs*, 30.3 (2005), 1937-40.

¹⁸² *La Época*, 10/11/1864.

¹⁸³ *El Contemporáneo*, 30/10/1864.

¹⁸⁴ On the Peninsular War as a founding myth of the Spanish *patria* see Álvarez Junco, *Mater Dolorosa*, Ch.III "La Guerra de La Independencia", 119-151.

hero.¹⁸⁵ *La Discusión* saw in the emphasis the October 1864 decree placed on a military education the ‘divorce signal between the ministry and the spirit of the century.’¹⁸⁶ *La Iberia* expressed its belief that this was ‘a period where ideas should prevail over force’, which meant that rather than instructing Alfonso in the use of force, he should be educated to enhance his intelligence and understanding.¹⁸⁷ The decree was a step back, which signified that ‘We [Spaniards] are returning to the times of the Goths.’¹⁸⁸ Similarly, *La Nación* argued that it was not force but ‘reason and justice’ that now sustained the nation.¹⁸⁹ Such criticisms reveal a growing concern with the influence of the military in Spanish society, as well as the perception that an alliance between the throne and the armed forces could be dangerous for the liberal nation.

This was linked to the sentiment that Spain had not yet managed to overcome her backwardness or firmly establish liberal institutions. *La Nación* pleaded for a more philosophical and scientific education, to bring forward Spain’s advancement.¹⁹⁰ Those concerns reveal a lack of confidence in the durability and strength of the constitutional settlement. Even supporters of the decree, such as *La Época*, believed that Spain needed a new impetus and renewal. However, it argued that the government’s provisions meant that Alfonso ‘could lead and should lead the great developments of our social regeneration.’ They saw the principles expressed in the decree as universal and capable of bridging the divides that continued to plague Spain.¹⁹¹ On Alfonso’s return to Madrid in January 1875, *La Época* reported that ‘The people and cities in Spain acclaimed Alfonso XII en masse as a remedy to the present ills, (...)’ What the nation needed now was ‘peace and union of Spaniards.’¹⁹² The public, in this telling, had enough of the disunity, disorder, and civil warfare of previous years, which had held Spain back or even threw her further behind other European nations.

Finally, it is important to note that the nation’s religious identity remained an important factor in discussion of Alfonso’s education. Thus *La Regeneración* argued that religion was a guarantee for law and order, and that a people without religion could only be immoral. Furthermore, it invoked the history of Spain as evidence that the country was degenerate when it abandoned faith and was great when it embraced it, citing Isabel the Catholic as the prime example of the

¹⁸⁵ *Gil Blas*, 26/11/1864. The article is written as if the author was talking directly to the prince of Asturias, i.e. Alfonso. That explains the odd format.

¹⁸⁶ *La Discusión*, 29/11/1864.

¹⁸⁷ *La Iberia*, 29/10/1864.

¹⁸⁸ *La Iberia*, 30/10/1864.

¹⁸⁹ *La Nación*, 29/10/1864.

¹⁹⁰ *La Nación*, 29/10/1864.

¹⁹¹ *La Época*, 28/10/1864.

¹⁹² *La Época*, 14/10/1875.

union between monarchy, faith, and Spanish greatness.¹⁹³ The nation could not be moral, great, and unified without a monarch that was raised to be a good Catholic. *La Época* highlighted that religious teaching was an aspect where Spain could not imitate other European countries. As to religious education it was important that the measures were ‘particular to Spain’.¹⁹⁴ This belief in and defence of the essentially Catholic nature of Spain accords to what Álvarez Junco has referred to as the ‘counter-offensive’ of the neo-Catholics, who were determined to perpetuate the identification of Spain with Catholicism, when it came under attack following Ferdinand VII’s death.¹⁹⁵

Alfonso XIII - The search for a lost glory

Alfonso XIII was brought up at a time when Spanish national identity was being questioned; the country was perceived to be at a turning point at the end of the century. The discussions surrounding the king’s education reflected many of the public’s concerns with the state of the nation and the need to redefine what it meant to be Spanish. The 1898 *desastre*, the growth of regionalism and the rise of nationalism across Europe gave a new urgency to the need to regenerate the country and deepened the sense of a nation in crisis.

The dominant theme in the debates surrounding Alfonso XIII’s education, as it had been in Isabel II’s, was a profound sense that Spain was backward and underdeveloped compared to other European nations and urgently needed to overcome this deficit. This was most strongly felt after the country lost the remaining vestiges of its empire in 1898, while Great Britain, France and Germany were expanding their imperial reach. One way in which this feeling was expressed in public were the recommendations to follow the example of other, more advanced countries in the way the king was brought up. More optimistic commentators believed that once Spain’s unique character had been revived and revitalised it could successfully be harnessed. To achieve this regeneration of the national character Alfonso XIII had to be trained to become a paragon of national virtues.

A slightly different backwardness paradigm manifested itself among the more radical sections of the public. This growing political movement came to believe that the restoration system no longer corresponded to the sentiments and character of the nation. These elements, which included some democratic liberals who did not fundamentally oppose the monarchy, argued that

¹⁹³ *La Regeneración*, 29/10/1864.

¹⁹⁴ *La Época*, 28/10/1864.

¹⁹⁵ Álvarez Junco, *Mater Dolorosa*, 405.

the Spanish people, the true bearers of national identity, were inherently democratic. Therefore, late nineteenth-century Spain was a democratic nation in spirit but not in practice. This discrepancy meant that for the king's education to be national it had to comprise public, popular, and democratic elements.

Lastly, the identification of the nation with masculine and martial characteristics, which already occurred with regard to Alfonso XII, continued to be salient. In the aftermath of 1898 it was assumed to need a new impetus. Within this narrative, it was often the armed forces that were regarded as the real representatives of the national spirit, ideals, and values. It was deemed essential that Alfonso XIII acquire a military education and bearing to enable him to restore the army and navy to the former glory that had once made Spain a great nation. In this representation, the country remained valorous and honourable at heart, but had recently abandoned these national virtues and been befallen by a disastrous decline.

The sense of Spanish backwardness was a concern that pre-dated the 1898 defeat in the Spanish American War. Adolfo Posada believed that this deficiency made it particularly difficult to educate the king according to his idealised notion of a citizen's education. In 1894 he wrote that ensuring a 'national education' was practically difficult 'in somewhat backward and *misoneist* countries' such as Spain and therefore concluded it was vital to form 'a special school, which the king could attend in the same way some other children did.'¹⁹⁶ Furthermore, he based his ideas on the example of the Hohenzollern monarchy, in the conviction that 'the education of the two previous emperors, Frederick III and William II, is worthy to be known and to be adopted at the beginning, (...).'¹⁹⁷ While he disagreed with what he saw as the excessive militarism in the Prussian monarchs' education, it is evident that he sought inspiration for his model of princely education abroad. This is indicative of the common view that for Spain to succeed she needed to start imitating more successful nations and engage more deeply with developments outside of the Peninsula.¹⁹⁸

Juan Pan-Montojo and José Álvarez Junco have argued that the identity crisis following the 1898 defeat was perceived as singularly Spanish, even though it was also experienced in other

¹⁹⁶ Posada, "La Educación", *La España moderna*, 37.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid*, 39.

¹⁹⁸ The idea that Spain does not and has not engaged sufficiently with developments in the wider world is pertinent to this day. See Adrian Shubert, 'Spanish Historians and English-Speaking Scholarship', *Social History*, 29.3 (2004), 358–63.

European countries at the turn of the century.¹⁹⁹ The liberal *El Día* expressed this sentiment in its article on the appointment of Santamaría as the king's teacher of political law. What stood Santamaría in good stead was that he did not exhibit 'Southern temperament', which meant 'that we [Spaniards] are given to rely on making use of *synthesis*, (...), and abandon *analysis*, eminently necessary when teaching so that the pupil reflects and deduces by himself; (...).' However, the teacher, who was a university professor, was known to follow the German model, which exhibited 'something *exact*, they do not go from one truth to another without demonstrating it.' This was remarkable for 'a temperament like the Spanish.' Furthermore, it demonstrated that Santamaría was 'constantly studying the most modern evolutions of judicial knowledge, in Europe as well as in America (...).'²⁰⁰ Spain's temperament and unscientific method did not allow her to be at the forefront of intellectual thought and it was therefore necessary to look abroad for guidance for the king's political education, without going quite as far as appointing a foreign teacher.

There was also a sense that the crisis in national identity, and the need to redefine it after the disastrous recent past was something the monarchy had to tackle. Thus *Por Esos Mundos* claimed that María Cristina's main task with regard to Alfonso's upbringing involved 'a most thorough anatomical analysis of the Spanish soul.' This meant getting to grips with Spain's difficult character, 'not only dominated by the most contradictory passions, but given to major exaltations, the most dreadful and painful collapses'; an inescapable feature that resulted from 'her special character, found uniquely in the Spanish race.'²⁰¹ This was particularly difficult for the queen regent whose 'cold Austrian dignity' contrasted with 'the fire and animation of the Spanish character.'²⁰² These deficiencies were directly associated with the flawed leadership the country had experienced in recent years; a trend that needed to be reversed. The paper declared that 'the instability of the national spirit, its lack of direction, and the little love for study, comes from the absence of a guiding power' and hence 'D. Alfonso XIII's work should give direction to the Spanish soul, a most noble enterprise, which at its core contains the root of the true renovation of the race.'²⁰³ The references to the need for direction and regeneration of the "race" also point

¹⁹⁹ Juan Pan Montojo, "Introduction" in Juan Pan-Montojo and José Álvarez Junco, *Más se perdió en Cuba*, 10. For Britain see Aaron Friedberg, *The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895-1905*, (Princeton, 1988).

²⁰⁰ "La educación del rey y el Sr. Santamaría.", *El Día* (Madrid), 10/12/1901.

²⁰¹ "Personas Reales en la Intimidad", *Por Esos Mundos*, 01/05/1902, 369.

²⁰² *Ibid*, 374

²⁰³ "Los Doce Alfonsos y el alma Española.", *Por Esos Mundos*, 01/05/1902, 445.

to the emergence of a more Darwinist and assertive nationalism, based at least in part on ethnicity.²⁰⁴

The church and its excessive influence in Spanish society were, for many liberals and republicans, further signs of the nation's backwardness. An example of this is *El País's* commentary on what it called 'the religious problem'. It described the Montaña affair surrounding Alfonso's religion teacher, as just another symptom of the pervasiveness of clerical influence in Spain, which the nation needed to overcome. It argued that the public's patience had run out now that 'the church and the convent invade everything from the palace to the school, from government to industry, from conscience to medicine.' It was not surprising to the author that 'a Padre Montaña, coarse and intolerant, would direct the king's education, (...).' While 'the same [religious] problem has presented itself in all of Europe', it maintained that Spain was more deeply afflicted by it, because the issue 'principally attacks the ignorant, poor and backward people.'²⁰⁵ The clerical influence on Alfonso XIII's education was therefore viewed as indicative of a deeper malaise that kept the Spanish nation in an underdeveloped state. Shortly after Alfonso's majority, Canalejas, a leading liberal politician, once more attacked the excessive clerical influence in the king's upbringing and concluded that this showed that 'Spain needs to be given a European atmosphere and be pulled out of the regressive state that she finds herself in. If Spain becomes an African nation, we cannot expect her to connect with progressive countries.'²⁰⁶

As Juan Pro Ruíz has argued, the democratic liberal left and republicans believed that the identity crisis of the Spanish nation had its deeper roots in the failure of the political system to represent the "real" country through a democratic process.²⁰⁷ Posada was convinced as early as 1894 that the central question that had to be answered was how to educate 'a king in a democratic society such as our society in these times.'²⁰⁸ It was clear to him that despite being a constitutional monarchy, Spain was democratic and hence Alfonso XIII 'in time had to know how to be king, in a way that our societies without monarchical tendencies can endure, (...).'²⁰⁹ As has been shown above, the only way to achieve this, in his opinion, was to make the king live like other

²⁰⁴ Joshua Goode, *Impurity of Blood*, (Baton Rouge, 2009), Kindle Edition, Ch.1 "The Racial Alloy - The Meanings and Uses of Racial Identity in Late-Nineteenth-and-Early Twentieth-Century Spain".

²⁰⁵ "El problema religioso.", *El País*, 26/03/1901.

²⁰⁶ José Canalejas, quoted in "El Banquete Monstruo", *El Siglo Futuro*, 30/06/1902.

²⁰⁷ On the notion that the political system did not represent the real Spain due to a democratic deficit see Juan Pro Ruíz, "La política en tiempos del Desastre" in in Pan-Montojo and Álvarez Junco, *Más se perdió en Cuba*, 151-154.

²⁰⁸ Posada, "La Educación ", *La España moderna*, 30.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid*, 35.

young Spaniards and ‘feel what they feel, appreciate their qualities and deficiencies, getting to know what the national life [*vida nacional*] is like outside the elevated walls of his palace.’²¹⁰ Reporting on Alfonso’s impending majority *Nuevo Mundo* also believed that ‘this is about the education of a Prince, who by law of inheritance is called to very soon to reign the destinies of a country constitutional and democratic by history and temperament’.²¹¹ *El Heraldo de Madrid* did not go quite as far, but wanted Alfonso XIII to attend universities and academies as institutions representing Spanish culture. The monarch’s contact with the nation’s intellectual life could fulfil the aim to ‘make the monarchy very human, very national, and very much of its period.’²¹² The discrepancy between a corrupted political system with a hereditary monarchy at its head and a democratic people that made up the nation was seen as a fundamental problem and explanation of the disasters that had befallen Spain.

At the same time the nation was still frequently identified with the ideals of masculinity and virility, which, in turn, were associated with the armed forces. As Álvarez Junco has argued, this also entailed the belief that the political leadership did not represent the real country, but the solution was sought in a more authoritarian construction of national power.²¹³ *Nuevo Mundo* sought a compromise between its democratic assertions and the identification of the armed forces as the historical representatives of the nation’s achievements. Alfonso XIII’s military education showed that his teachers ‘have evoked and still evoke in his soul from the dawn of his life the enthusiasm for the glories of his people and the great deeds of his ancestors.’²¹⁴ *La Correspondencia militar* complained about the criticism that Alfonso XIII’s military education had received. The newspaper, with its close ties to the officer corps, believed the military spirit to be essential for a national revival. It felt that other newspapers were failing to ‘identify themselves with the aspirations of the people and the army’, which wanted the king to be ‘a true soldier.’ This was based on the conception of the Spanish nation the newspaper proposed. It believed that ‘a people like the Spanish, warlike by temperament and by will needs a soldier king, like the emperor of Germany, who today is admired in the world for his military initiatives.’ Moreover, this identification with the armed forces would benefit ‘everyone; firstly the king himself, the army, and lastly, the people, which adores the monarch if it sees in him its own representation: a

²¹⁰ Ibid, 41.

²¹¹ “La Educación del Rey”, *Nuevo Mundo*, 19/05/1902.

²¹² *El Heraldo de Madrid*, 07/03/1901.

²¹³ Álvarez Junco, *Mater Dolorosa*.

²¹⁴ “Alfonso XIII. Su infancia y adolescencia.”, *Nuevo Mundo*, 19/05/1902.

soldier.²¹⁵ The military was a representation of the spirit of the Spanish people and hence the true carrier of national identity. As the king was raised to be a soldier, he was raised to represent the nation.

3.4 Conclusion

Royal education was an important topic in Spain's public discourse, with which actors across the political spectrum engaged - from supporters and critics of the monarchy, conservatives and republicans to ultramontane, political Catholics, and anti-clericals. The arguments touched on deeper issues connected to the past, present, and future of the nation, and allowed for the projection of wider hopes, fears, and the assertion of national identity.

Publicly expressing hope in the future monarch's education was a way of showing confidence in those responsible for its direction, whether that was the dynasty itself, the government, or the political system more broadly. This tendency was particularly pronounced for Isabel II, whose claim to the throne was weakened by her gender, threatened by civil war, and who was raised in a volatile political climate. For Alfonso XII and Alfonso XIII, the hopeful reports on their education were a way of strengthening the monarchy and an embattled political system. It was mainly convinced monarchists and supporters of the *status quo* that articulated their expectations in this way.

The idea that kingship and queenship could be taught points to a changing conception of monarchical rule. The Spanish public no longer accepted that princes were born with a natural, or even God-given, ability to rule due to their position in society. Rule was something that could and needed to be learned, which is indicative of Spain's transformation - perhaps desired rather than real - into a more meritocratic society, where ability and not birth were decisive. It thus echoed efforts by liberals to abolish privileges and create a fairer society.

Furthermore, the expectations invested in royal education, positive and negative, are indicative of the strong liberal conviction that knowledge, science and teaching had the power to transform society for better or worse. The way the monarch was instructed, could mean the difference between a prospering or failing nation, between progress and decline, and between isolation or international leadership. In the debate surrounding Alfonso XII's curriculum, the need for

²¹⁵ "El Rey Soldado", *La Correspondencia militar*, 02/04/1902.

broader educational reform and its potential for the nation is abundantly clear. Similarly, the concerns with Alfonso XIII's upbringing were connected to the perception that Spain's schools and academies required a complete overhaul.

Moderate liberals and conservatives were more likely to praise the traditional elements that still played a central role in both Alfonso XII and Alfonso XIII's early life. This is suggestive of their strong belief in the Catholic Church and the military as institutions central to Spain's national identity and to international glory. They were worried, on the other hand, when they felt that traditions, religion and royal dignity were undermined. The church was afraid that its diminishing influence and the attacks on clerics teaching at the palace, were symptomatic of a wider loss of power. Schools were one of the Catholic Church's remaining strongholds in Spanish society and it was not prepared to give them up to the liberal state without a fight, as evident in the defence of Padre Montaña and the need for Alfonso XII's solidly Catholic instruction.

Progressive liberals were more likely to fear the influence of institutions it considered potentially dangerous to the constitution and civil liberties: the church and the military. This manifested itself in criticisms focused on the excessive hold that officers and clerics had over the future monarch. It was felt that this could be harmful to the protection of hard-won liberties, hindered the country's progress, and further cemented these institutions disproportionate power. Furthermore, they believed this sort of education failed to represent the spirit of a time shaped by science and knowledge. Toward the end of the century there was a growing concern that the political system itself was broken and the failures in the monarch's upbringing were only a symptom of this wider malaise.

In addressing hopes and fears of the future, these debates also provide a commentary on Spanish conceptions of national identity: who Spaniards were, what virtues and vices the nation possessed, and what it meant to be Spanish. For some liberals, particularly the *progresistas*, being Spanish, for most of the century at least, implied backwardness and decline, especially in comparison to other European nations; a sentiment confirmed and reinforced most clearly after Spain's disastrous performance in the 1898 war with the US. At the same time, the nation was conceived of as masculine, vigorous, and brave, with a tendency toward impetuosity. In this concept, the nation's glory lay in its military power and its bygone age of empire, whose loss was felt even more strongly after the *desastre*. Many *moderados* and conservative religious elements remained identified with Catholicism and its achievements, which should be represented by the monarch. In these narratives, the country had fallen behind, not because it stuck to its traditions but because it abandoned them.

It is striking that, at certain points of transition and crisis in Spain, royal education provided a screen onto which these issues were projected and was discussed publicly to this extent. It was extraordinary by nineteenth-century European standards that the parliamentary chambers debated an heir's education, that a government decree publicly laid out a royal prince's curriculum, or that newspapers contributed to the dismissal of teachers. This exceptional circumstance seems to suggest three important points. First, the public believed the monarchy remained central to Spain's political system, her future, past, and present. Even though the crown was constrained by the constitution, the personality, learning and upbringing of the monarch mattered. Secondly, the terms of public discourse, of what is of public interest and what is not, is at least partially determined by historical precedent and accident. The debate in the Cortes and press over Isabel II's upbringing in 1841 set the tone and established the issue as a legitimate topic for public discussion. Lastly, it suggests that the recent move towards a more nuanced historiographical narrative concerning the alleged backwardness of the Spanish public sphere is to be welcomed. While Spain lagged behind in terms of readership, literacy rates, and diffusion, some topics that were off limits in other countries could be openly voiced in Spain's papers, the Cortes and on the streets of Madrid. It was almost exclusively in Spain, where one could veritably claim that the king's education is 'a *free* topic, as free and as...objective, for lack of a better word, as the *deficit* or parliamentary immunity.'²¹⁶

²¹⁶ Posada, "La Educación", *La España moderna*, 30.

Conclusion

The education of heirs to the throne frequently became a prominent issue in nineteenth-century Spain. This is an indication of the continued relevance of royal succession at a time of rapid social, political, and economic change, and radical revolutionary and liberal challenges to the institution of monarchy. Contemporaries projected wider concerns about progress, constitutionalism, militarism, and reform onto the monarchy, the heir to the throne, and his or her upbringing. This is a point worth emphasizing. It was not usual in nineteenth-century Europe for teachers at court to be recruited from among the highest echelons of politics, academia and the armed forces. In Spain, this practice was in part conditioned by the public nature and open discussion surrounding the heir's education, as well as by the increasing politicisation of the topic in the context of various upheavals throughout the century. Almost nowhere else in Europe were there parliamentary debates about how to bring up the future queen or king, or a governmental decree publicly suggesting a curriculum for the crown prince, or newspapers actively contributing to the dismissal of teachers.

This study has sought to provide a systematic analysis of the education of heirs to the throne and thus revealed the significance of the topic itself, as well as shedding light onto the position, power, and relative modernity of the monarchy in constitutional Spain. Looking at the sources in this new light and connecting military records, newspaper articles, and memoirs with correspondence from the royal and state archives has yielded insights into the functioning of the Spanish state, debates on its so-called backwardness, modernity, and militarism and public perceptions of the royal family.

The continued relevance of the monarchy

The wide-ranging debates and conflicts that surrounded the heirs' upbringing lend support to the notion that the monarchy remained central to contemporary mind-sets, the political system, and Spanish society as a whole. Even though the crown was constrained by the constitution and royal powers became more circumscribed, the upbringing of the future monarch still roused passions and mattered to court insiders, military elites, and the public alike. The relative scarcity of in-depth studies of the monarchy in nineteenth century Spain can therefore not be attributed

solely to the monarchy's declining influence.¹ Rather, it appears related to shifting historiographical priorities. As historians have focused on the emergence of the liberal state and the roots of Spain's inherent backwardness, the monarchy has often fallen through the cracks or been dismissed as an anachronistic institution doomed to failure.² As this study has demonstrated, the monarchy continued to play a changed, but no less important role as a politically, socially, and culturally relevant institution. The education of heirs was seen as an opportunity to shape the future of the monarchy and, by implication, the emerging liberal state. The increasing politicisation of the heir's upbringing, evident in the in-fighting at court, the attempts of government to show that the best teachers were chosen, and the debates in the press, demonstrate the importance contemporaries accorded to the topic.

In addition, it has become clear, that the military, which enjoyed significant political and societal leverage in nineteenth-century Spain, continued to regard the monarch as a politically and culturally relevant actor. Military elites constantly tried to influence and direct royal education, as was demonstrated by the commitment of highly qualified officers to serve among the heir's teaching staff. Members of the armed forces had a strong motive to ensure that the king would acquire a military *Habitus* and become a representative of their interests. To a large extent they were willing to accept a soldier-king as a commander in chief, if he was trained and socialised similarly to them.³ Isabel's lack of military instruction, a result of her gender, meant that she could never establish as close a bond to the armed forces as her successors.

Lastly, one should not ignore the extent to which sections of the Spanish public still projected their hopes, fears, and national identity onto the monarchy and remained convinced that it was essential for determining the country's present and future. While access to the public sphere remained limited mainly to the relatively small number of middle and upper class town dwellers, its influence and reach expanded significantly during the nineteenth century and played an important part in the debates over royal education. There appears to have been a belief in nineteenth-century Spain that moments of monarchical transition could deliver meaningful political, social, and economic change for the nation. Much in the same way that Spanish liberals were convinced that change could be achieved through constitutions, or as Marx put it by 'one

¹ This trend has been countered slightly recently. A good example is García Monerris, Moreno Seco, and Marcuello Benedicto.

² One example of this is Irene Castells, *Crisis del Antiguo Régimen y Revolución Liberal en España (1789-1845)*, (Barcelona, 2000).

³ Carlos Seco Serrano, 'Relaciones', 44.

stroke of the pen⁴, they invested their hope in the transformational powers of an heir educated according to liberal principles. Press commentary reflected this deeply-held liberal belief in the power of education. The heir's upbringing was considered to be of formative, and indeed transformative importance, because it had the power to shape his or her world view, behaviour, and personality to such an extent that it could significantly alter the fate of the whole nation. It was the task of the monarchy to respond, or at least appear to meet, these expectations. As we have seen, it did so by adapting the heir's curriculum to represent values associated with the notion of a Spanish national character and by pursuing something akin to a media strategy. This involved allowing insights into teaching at the palace and the good progress the heir was making, or, in other instances, reacting to public pressure to dismiss individual teachers and put the curriculum on a more liberal footing. Thus, this investigation has also sought to engage with recent progress in the study of Spanish nationalism and its development throughout the nineteenth century.⁵

The monarchy between modernity, backwardness, and militarism

The openness of the debate, the adaptation of the monarchy to changing circumstances, and its continued relevance: all of this supports calls for the revision of notions of a perceived Spanish backwardness that has been particularly strong in Anglo-Saxon scholarship.⁶ Moments of transition and the educational period of an heir provided opportunities for the modernisation of the monarchy. They enabled the crown to show its commitment to the new constitutional order and seek new ways of legitimisation. Monarchical education increasingly aimed at creating and presenting to the public modern, constitutional rulers, who were well-versed in the principles of constitutional government and accepted the limitations imposed on their powers. Birth remained a necessary condition for future monarchs, but it was no longer sufficient. Especially in Spain, where the succession of Isabel II had been contested in a bloody civil war, the Bourbon monarchy was sent into exile for six years (1868-1874), and the spectre of republicanism and Carlism loomed large, the monarchy could not take its dominant position at the head of the state for granted. This forced the monarchy to demonstrate its constitutional commitment publicly and seek new means of legitimisation. This was partially achieved by forming the heirs to the throne into good constitutional and modern rulers, as well as credible commanders-in-chief to

⁴ Karl Marx, "Revolutionary Spain", *New-York Daily Tribune*, 02/12/1854.

⁵ See José Álvarez Junco, *Mater Dolorosa*.

⁶ See Richard L. Kagan, 'Prescott's Paradigm: American Historical Scholarship and the Decline of Spain', *The American Historical Review*, 101.2 (1996), 423–46, among others.

satisfy the armed forces. The monarchy did not remain unchanged, but adapted to the times and essentially modernised in step with other political institutions. It was more than a relic of the feudal age: it developed into a more modern, flexible institution.

The other area that, in the light of this investigation, appears much less backward than is often assumed is the public sphere. While it is true that the Spanish public sphere was limited in its reach by low rates of literacy, urbanisation, and restrictions on freedom of expression, this did not impede the emergence of a vibrant atmosphere for discussion.⁷ The wide-ranging debates on the heir's education in the press and Cortes strongly support this notion. In no other country was the heir's education discussed so openly and extensively. In Isabel II's case this had a very direct impact on her education, but even after that the monarchy was forced to accept that the upbringing of royal princes would be a legitimate issue for public discussion. This is not to say that the heir's education was a constant preoccupation of newspapers and Cortes, but it did come to the fore at points of transition, conflict, and reform. It was also reflected in and coloured much broader debates over Spain's future. The coverage in the press revealed preoccupations typical for nineteenth-century European liberalism.⁸ One of the central topics was the importance of a scientific and humanist education as a way of bringing progress and prosperity to Spain, especially in the second half of the century.⁹ Authors were aware that Spain lagged behind in these areas and wanted to transform the heir's education into a symbol of a good, liberal upbringing. At the same time, progressive liberals publicly worried about the continued presence at court of traditional, aristocratic elements and the prominence of religious teaching in the heirs' curriculum. However, only the small minority of republicans seem to have thought that this made the monarchy, rather than the church, an impediment to progress and modernisation. Many assumed that the future monarch could provide a vital impetus to further drive on reform and economic development. Thus, more often than not, the monarchy was seen as a possible ally in efforts to modernise Spain, rather than its natural opponent.

While military education might at first sight appear to be an anachronistic left-over from the pre-constitutional era, it was anything but. The military teachers called upon to educate heirs frequently had a prominent liberal background and had received modern scientific and army training. Moreover, the military instruction given to Alfonso XII and his son had little to do with old aristocratic notions of service in the armed forces, but was instead much more similar to

⁷ See David Ortiz, *Paper Liberals*.

⁸ See for example the German case in Werner Conze and Jürgen Kocka, *Bildungsbürgertum im 19. Jahrhundert*. (Stuttgart, 1992).

⁹ See Antonio Jiménez García, *El krausismo y la Institución Libre de Enseñanza* (Madrid, 1985).

what recruits across Spain, or in case of Alfonso XII, across England, received in preparation for an officer career. This meant taking part in practical shooting exercises and analysing modern military tactics, as well as gaining a historical understanding of the armed forces' role in bringing about liberal change in Spain. To associate the military solely with the reaction, conservatism, and neo-Catholic traditionalism that developed among the army leadership in twentieth-century Spain is anachronistic and does not reflect its modernising influence on royal education.

This also has implications for the debate over militarism and the disproportionate sway held by officers over Spanish politics and society.¹⁰ While it is undeniable that this influence was strongly reflected in royal education and the make-up of the teaching staff, this does not mean that heirs were raised to be soldiers or blind instruments of military interests. This is evident in the appointments of officers to the palace. They ranged from liberal officers to more traditional, aristocratic generals, representing a wide spectrum of political beliefs. Most of them, however, were committed to upholding the liberal gains made since Ferdinand VII's death and defended the country against the threat of the ultra-conservative, absolutist Carlists.

Secondly, military education was never simply an instrument employed by officers to ensure that heirs would identify with the army or navy. The acquisition of a military *Habitus*, especially by Alfonso XII and Alfonso XIII was also vital for curbing the interventionist tendencies of officers, controlling their involvement in politics and society, and assuring their loyalty to the royal family, which was no longer a given. Thus, Alfonso XII was educated at Sandhurst not to become a better soldier or a good general, but to send the message to the Spanish troops and officers that he was a capable commander-in-chief, who could restore the nation's military glory and bring stability and order. For Cánovas it was essential that the monarch be able to keep the military in check and remove its ability to determine political change. While this tactic worked in ending the practice of the *pronunciamiento*, it does appear that the military's influence became more institutionalized and the armed forces felt increasingly divorced from civil society and sought out the monarch as a representative of their interests.

It is worth noting that military influence in royal education was not uncritically accepted in Spanish society. In fact, Spain's liberal press frequently attacked what is viewed as the excessive emphasis on military education in the heir's upbringing during an era dominated by science, progress, and the humanities. In many ways, they recognized the danger posed to liberal institutions by a possible alliance between an excessively militaristic ruler and the armed forces.

¹⁰ For an impression of the debates see Carlos Seco Serrano, *Militarismo Y Civilismo*; Joaquim Lleixà, *Cien años o* (Barcelona, 1986).

To some liberals, the presence of so many high-ranking officers in the king's entourage did not bode well for the future of liberal institutions. In the end, these concerns proved well founded, but it would be overly deterministic to attribute the decisions Alfonso XIII's took in the 1920s solely to his military upbringing. While militarism and praetorianism existed in nineteenth-century Spain, it would be reductionist to conclude that the armed forces captured the monarchy or that Spain's descent into two military dictatorships in the twentieth century was an inevitable result of how its monarchs were brought up in the nineteenth.

Continuity and change

Royal education in the nineteenth century marked a departure from how monarchs had been brought up before. As has been outlined above, it seems that there is no question as to monarchy's capacity for adaptation and ability to modernise. However, it is worth briefly separating out some of the major areas of rupture with the past and those of continuity.

One important element that remained constant throughout the period and was already present during the eighteenth century was the influence of the church and the importance of religious teaching in royal education. Despite the increasing secularisation of society, Spain remained committed to its Catholic identity and so did the monarchy. It was clear that religious morals should guide the heir, much like they had done in previous centuries.¹¹ The ideals associated with Christianity, such as charity, magnanimity, and compassion, remained central to what education was meant to accomplish. Having said that, there were times when a more liberal approach to religious education was practiced, especially during the Espartero regency, when Isabel II's religion teacher was intent on making her a tolerant and forgiving queen. All in all, the religious element remained strong but lost its leading position at court to officers, who, during the nineteenth century, more frequently took control of the direction of royal education. In this way, royal upbringing reflected the relative loss of influence of the church and the strengthened political position of military elites.

Other conservatives and aristocrats, who continued to fill influential positions at court, in politics and the press also tried to defend a more traditional education, often based on religion, but also emphasizing elements such as court etiquette, fencing, and horse riding. Moreover, they vigorously defended the private nature of royal education and sought to fend off any

¹¹ See Antonio Manuel Moral Moral Roncal, 'La Impronta Religiosa En La Vida Del Infante Don Carlos María Isidro de Borbón', *Hispania Sacra*, 53.107 (2001), 111–32.

involvement of public bodies in the upbringing of heirs to the throne. Aristocrats were afraid that their privileges, which included key positions at court (among them, teaching posts), were being undermined and that the social structure of the court was being changed too rapidly and radically. They regarded these changes as undermining the dignity of the Crown, which was closely linked to its soft power. Hence the violent attacks and strong fears expressed in the conservative press and moderate liberal deputies in the Cortes.

Even the conservatives and moderate liberals ultimately had to accept, though, that political and legal changes also altered the way the heir was brought up. A good example of this can be found during the Espartero regency, when the court's resistance to new appointments was ultimately ineffective. Furthermore, the monarchy itself accepted that it no longer had full authority over the Prince of Asturias's upbringing but at the very least had to take into account the opinion of the Cortes, ask for the advice of ministers or react to public pressure to change the make-up of the teaching staff. Before Ferdinand VII's death there was no question that the upbringing of the heir, despite its importance for the country, was purely a family issue that should be determined predominantly by the king or queen. This was no longer the case, as the royal prince's education came under scrutiny and had to fulfil the expectations of politicians, military elites, and the public. María Cristina of Habsburg was clearly responsive to public demands for information on her son's education, as well as to public pressure to ensure that her son was taught by liberal professors and not Catholic integrists. The monarchy was responsive to these changes and adapted relatively well to its new, more limited role in the constitutional state.

One of the most significant changes underlying many of the developments in royal education was a thoroughly changed conception of kingship that emerged during the nineteenth century. While princely education had been an important topic in previous centuries, it had not been a central source for the monarchy's legitimacy. The shift toward education as a legitimation device reveals a fundamentally different conception of monarchy that assumed that royals had inherited neither right nor the ability to rule. Instead rule was something that had to be earned and that could be learned. Liberal idealism believed that progressive rule and the role of the constitutional king was something that could be taught. In that sense the position of the king became formalized and much more akin to a functional post. Crowns became another victim of the 'disenchantment' experienced across nineteenth-century Europe.¹² The radical nature of this new concept was that its logical conclusion would have made hereditary monarchies redundant; if rule could be taught why should only a select few from a specific bloodline have access to it?

¹² Max Weber and others, *Wissenschaft als Beruf, 1917/1919 ; Politik als Beruf, 1919* (Tübingen, 1992), 9.

Most liberals, however, were not willing to go that far, as they continued to regard the monarchy as essential to Spain's unity, stability, and prosperity. They believed the monarchy could adapt to a more democratic society and even help transform a country plagued by corruption, illiteracy, and cronyism. The monarchy could be as much a driver of modernity as an obstacle to it. If the heir was educated in the right way he would help engender, consolidate, and defend democracy, progress, and liberalism.

The influence of education on the monarch

While it has been a common practice to connect the heir's upbringing to their time in power it is inherently difficult to evaluate the success or the influence of royal education on a monarch's behaviour, attitudes, and actions.¹³ It is important to keep in mind that a wide range of factors outside of the heir's upbringing shape a monarch's reign, such as innate ability, economic and political developments, marriage, and international affairs. Nevertheless, it is worth briefly evaluating what the possible effects the court, the military's, and the public's influence on education had on monarchs and to what extent they behaved according to the ideals that informed their upbringing. As reception theorists have argued, there is a gap between the intention of a text and how it is received. The communicator cannot guarantee that the values are taken up by the audience as intended.¹⁴ Applying this theory to royal education means that the ideas, values, and beliefs educators meant to transmit might not have been received or were understood differently by the future monarch.

In Isabel II's case there is no doubt that traditional court elements and religion, which had been influential in her education, played an important role during her reign. Isabel II was known to have been deeply religious, even if this was not reflected in her behaviour and multiple affairs. Her inability to project an image of domesticity and her reliance on court camarillas ultimately meant that she failed to function as a unifier or a symbol of bourgeois morality in the way that Queen Victoria did in England.¹⁵ One reason for this failure was that she became queen at very young age and remained relatively unprepared for her post as constitutional queen. Moreover, her gender made it almost impossible to build a strong bond with the military beyond her core of

¹³ Especially early biographies tend to stress the close link between a monarch's upbringing and their reign. See for example Pedro de Répide, *Alfonso XII: la restauración de un trono* (Madrid, 1947).

¹⁴ One of the foundational texts of reception theory is Stuart Hall, 'Encoding, Decoding', *The Cultural Studies Reader*, 1980, 90-103.

¹⁵ Burdiel, 'The Queen, the Woman and the Middle Class. The Symbolic Failure of Isabel II of Spain', *Social History*, 29.3 (2004), 301-319.

favourites. Both her lack of military education and her inability to stop the generals from active political intervention were, to some extent, related to factors beyond her control. She did, however, make the monarchy more accessible to the public than it had previously been, as was evident in her consultation with ministers over her offspring's education, her frequent travels, and her extensive charity. Whether that is related to the greater public scrutiny her own education had been under is, however, not entirely clear and has not yet been studied.

Alfonso XII on the other hand, seems to have conformed more closely to the ideals that he was raised to embody. He was adept at playing the role of the good husband and Catholic monarch, despite the bitterness felt after the loss of his young wife, only six months into their marriage in 1878. The end of the Carlist and Cuban wars, a period of economic expansion and Cánovas' reconciliatory approach helped to create a positive impression of the king and appeared to vindicate the choices made in his education.¹⁶ At the same time, we know that he personally held doubts when it came to religion and while he seemed to enjoy many of his military duties, he was frustrated by the lack of progress in army reform.¹⁷ Remarkably, officers seemed to have viewed him as a real commander-in-chief, as demonstrated by the detailed campaign and status reports they sent to the king. This contributed to the almost complete disappearance of the *pronunciamiento* during his reign. It is also worth noting that Alfonso XII appears to have been extremely loyal to his former teachers, whom he either kept personally close to him or who advanced to the highest positions in the military, politics, or both. Furthermore, despite the lack of clear definition of his post and the relative broad sphere of action conceded to him, Alfonso XII conformed rather closely to Cánovas' ideal of a constitutional king.¹⁸ In many ways it was Cánovas, the director of his education and his political mentor, who helped him manoeuvre the crises experienced during his reign.

The influence of education on a monarch is perhaps most controversially discussed in the case of Alfonso XIII. It is often assumed that his status as king from birth meant that he could not be raised in a truly meritocratic fashion and was instead brought up in an atmosphere of flattery. This is then used as an explanation for his failings as a king and the fall of the monarchy in Spain in 1931.¹⁹ This thesis has shown that this highly simplistic narrative is not substantiated by historical evidence. Alfonso XIII received marks that were not particularly flattering, his

¹⁶ Dardé, *Alfonso XII*, 86.

¹⁷ Earl Ray Beck, *Triumph*.

¹⁸ Angeles Lario, *El Rey, piloto sin brújula: la Corona y el sistema político de la Restauración, 1875-1902* (Madrid, 1999), 26.

¹⁹ Charles Petrie, *King Alfonso XIII and His Age* (London, 1963), 46/47.

education was directed by highly qualified professors from the *Universidad Central*, and he received his military instructions alongside other recruits without any obvious preferential treatment. More than the court atmosphere in which he was raised, it is this martial imprint on his youth and its perceived long-term effects that have received critical attention. His active interventions on behalf of the military and his low regard for politicians have frequently been attributed to the excessive influence of officers in the young king's education.²⁰ It is true that Alfonso XIII appears to have been imbued with a strong fondness for the military, which might explain why he often sided with military elements even if this ran counter to the decisions made by his governments. However, the ruling elites and the monarchy's reliance on the armed forces for internal stability were more a symptom of the weakness of the Restoration as a political settlement than of the excessive influence of officers on royal education.

This study has sought, above all, to make three broad claims. Firstly, the monarchy continued to be relevant and was perceived to be relevant during the nineteenth century despite its more restricted political and social power. Secondly, the Spanish monarchy in the nineteenth century should be incorporated into European monarchical studies. Spain and its ruling house were in many ways no less modern or less significant than some of their other European counterparts, who have attracted the bulk of historians' attention. Scholars within and outside the peninsula are making significant inroads in re-establishing Spain's nineteenth century as important in its own right, rather than regarding it as a prelude to the twentieth century and its more famous socio-political history.²¹ These approaches need to be integrated into modern European historiography to arrive at a broader and more complete understanding of nineteenth-century politics, society, and culture. In particular, the field of nineteenth-century monarchical studies is in need of further attention and rediscovery by scholar of European history. Thirdly, it is important to move away from notions of the inevitability of the decline of the monarchy. Too often the fall of many European monarchies after WWI or, in Spain's case, with the proclamation of the Second Republic in 1931, is presented as the inevitable end of an irrelevant, outdated, and anti-modern institution. Instead, one should try and gain an understanding of the monarchy's capacity for reinvention, ability to adapt to rapid socio-economic and political change, and success in finding new sources of legitimacy. This approach will yield results that are closer to the lived realities of nineteenth-century Spaniards.

²⁰ Carolie Boyd, 'El rey soldado' in Moreno Luzón (ed.), *Alfonso XIII*, 215/216.

²¹ Good examples of this are Isabel Burdiel, *Isabel II; Monarquía y república en la España contemporánea*, ed. by Angeles Lario (Madrid, 2007); Dardé; María Victor Campos Zabala, *La España anónima en la época de Alfonso XIII: La opinión del pueblo a sus monarcas*, 2010, <<http://hdl.handle.net/10115/3087>>.

Appendix

Original source material

Chapter 1:

A/No.1: José Vicente Ventosa cited in Espoz y Mina and Pérez de Guzmán. *Apuntes*, 148.

Para alcanzar estos objetos es menester apartarse de la rutina en el modo de transmitir los conocimientos, y sobre todo, distinguir muy mucho la instrucción científica y política, que es el fondo de la educación filosófica, de las artes de adorno y habilidades, escollo muy común y en que se han precipitado muchos de los que han dirigido la educación de los Príncipes y personas de clases elevadas. Superfluo sería que me detuviera en indicar el poco provecho que la Nación sacaría de los talentos de pintura, canto y baile, labores, etc, de su Reina y aun lo perjudicial que sería si alguna de estas habilidades captase toda su atención, (...).

A/No.2: PRRB-II/3380, Isabel II and Francisco de Asís to Corvera, 28/11/1860.

Quisiéramos que fuese en su día un Príncipe capaz de comprender y regir las grandiosas y complicadas circunstancias de su época; piadoso, ilustrado, valeroso, magnánimo, instruido en todas las cosas de la paz y de la guerra, y de tan leal, franco y firme carácter, como lo es el de la Nación a la que la Providencia le has destinado; Príncipe de corazón español, digno de España y digno de su nombre.

A/No.3: AGP-ReinadosAlfonsoXII-Cajón19-Leg20, Cánovas to Isabel II, 09/01/1874.

Si fuera posible que tuviera hoy yo aquí a D. Alfonso, no le llevaría por de pronto a los salones donde años ha esperado como un Mesías, ni a los cuarteles, donde la mayoría de los Jefes y oficiales está ya por él, sino a la Puerta del Sol, y a la calle de Toledo, para que todo el mundo comprendiera al mirarlo y contemplar si bondadosa fisonomía, que su venida no ha de significar castigo ni venganza, sino perdón y amor y concordia.

Chapter 3:

A/No.4: *La Iberia*, 29/10/1864.

Basta con que se les eduque como hombres de honor, y no es necesario que se les haga esencialmente militares. El príncipe debe saber morir como el mejor soldado: pero no necesita entender de milicia como el mejor general.

A/No.5: Posada, "La Educación del Rey", *La España moderna*, 33.

la gran dificultad para poder primero plantear y luego resolver el problema de la educación del rey, estriba en que por las condiciones especiales de la función política y de la representación social, que son características de un rey moderno, no sé de que manera podrá conseguir que su persona se *transforme real y positivamente* por dentro, al compás mismo que se ha transformado su institución.

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