

# France and the Origins of the United Nations, 1944–1945: “Si La France ne compte plus, qu’on nous le dise”

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## **France and the Origins of the United Nations, 1944-1945:**

**“Si La France ne compte plus, qu’on nous le dise”**

**Andrew Williams**

Abstract. During their long exile during 1940-1944, various components of the “Free French” were largely kept out of the “Post-War Planning” process that took place in the American State Department. They perceived this absence as a major, and often deliberate, humiliation that made the circumstances of their exile all the more exasperating. Charles de Gaulle was seen by the “Anglo-Saxon” Allies as a figure of dubious worth and usefulness, and Washington’s general tone was to dismiss the exiles as the “so-called Free French”. They were admitted to the decision-making process only slowly and grudgingly, and not until after many of the key decisions about organising the United Nations had been taken. This article shows how that exclusion affected the French leadership, how they reacted, and suggests some lasting results. It also assesses to what extent France had a coherent contribution to the formation of a global international organisation during 1943-1944, and what factors inhibited France properly articulating that contribution.

The literature on the creation of the United Nations [UN] in the last two years of the Second World War, especially the initial conference at Dumbarton Oaks in Washington, DC between 21 August and 7 October 1944 and that at San Francisco from 25 April to 26 June 1945, is copious.<sup>1</sup> Maybe

understandably, the contribution of France tends to be neglected in favour of discussions of the attitudes of the Big Three – Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union. France’s defeat in 1940 meant that the official French “Vichy” state was dominated by a German occupation until summer 1944 and was seen as a hostile factor by the Allies. The Allies remaining in the fight were already calling themselves the “United Nations” after the name was first adopted on 29 December 1941 at the White House conference between British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and American President Franklin Delano Roosevelt.<sup>2</sup> No role was initially envisaged for a France still tainted in 1941 by the stain of collaboration with the enemy. And a France that aspired to full independence was not represented at a 26-nation conference on 1 January 1942 in Washington attended by Churchill, Roosevelt, Maxim Litvinov, the Soviet foreign minister, and T.V. Soong, the Nationalist Chinese foreign minister. Amongst European states occupied by the Nazis even Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Greece, the Netherlands, and Poland were represented.<sup>3</sup>

For many in the emerging French Resistance, which contained many strains of opinion, this neglect created a feeling of hurt pride that only added to an existing sense of despair and humiliation over the events of 1940. From the perspective of the Big Three, the military state of the war and the greatly changed and diminished importance of France as a major Power in international politics clearly played a determinate role in France’s exclusion from the top table. But other factors were at work. One clear reason for the exclusion was that Roosevelt admired France, and especially those fighting within the French Resistance, but harboured a not unreasonable distrust of General Charles De Gaulle, the self-proclaimed and generally acknowledged leader of the Free French. Many French exiles and *résistants* also feared De Gaulle’s Napoleonic or “Boulangist” traits: was he merely just another French general set on total power?

De Gaulle’s relationship with both Churchill and Roosevelt was fractious. Churchill tended to protect him against Roosevelt, who was annoyed from the beginning of his acquaintance with the

general after De Gaulle ordered Free French marines to re-take the islands of St Pierre and Miquelon off the coast of Canada from Vichy forces in 1941 without telling the authorities in London or Washington, or even those in Ottawa.<sup>4</sup> Roosevelt initially wanted to send an American battleship to remove the upstarts until persuaded against doing so by the Canadian government.<sup>5</sup> After that there was little love lost between De Gaulle and Roosevelt's Administration. De Gaulle was not by any means the favoured candidate of the Anglo-Saxon Allies for any future leadership of France. Only Churchill both loved France and, most of the time, admired De Gaulle.<sup>6</sup>

The France represented by the Free French was admitted to the decision-making process only slowly and grudgingly, and not until after many of the key decisions about the organisation of the UN had been taken. This analysis shows how that exclusion affected the French leadership, how it reacted, and suggests some lasting results. It also demonstrates to what extent France had a coherent contribution to make to the formation of a global international organisation during 1943-1944, and what factors inhibited France properly articulating that contribution.

The great "Anglo-Saxon" Powers, Britain and the United States, have had an ambiguous relationship with France throughout their mutual history. The Anglo-French case has frequently been punctuated by war as well as by alliance. Robert and Isabel Tombs have summed that up by quoting Philip Sydney's sobriquet, "that sweet enemy, France".<sup>7</sup> However it is undeniable that all three Powers played key roles in defining what the "West" would and should be and, amongst them, they were instrumental in forging the main theories and practices of international relations for a good part of the last 100 years. Sometimes this has led to what might be called "progressive" or even "liberal" thinking; sometimes it has led to massive divergence of thinking.<sup>8</sup>

The creation of international organisations is one of the greatest "liberal" ideas in international relations. France played an important role in setting up the League of Nations after 1918, especially through the initiatory role before and during the First World War of Senator Léon Bourgeois. This

influence continued through to the 1930s, led by French foreign minister – and on occasion premier – Aristide Briand.<sup>9</sup> Broadly speaking, French thinkers and politicians believed international organisations should build on the early twentieth century tradition of bi- and multi-lateral legal agreements to limit armaments and enshrine the necessity for peace in globally-binding documents, of which the Franco-American Kellogg-Briand pact to outlaw war in 1928 was the crowning glory. These declarations and the legalistic spirit that inspired them never much impressed the Anglo-Saxon governments in London and Washington, even if some prominent British and American input smoothed their passage in the League.<sup>10</sup>

But by the early 1930s many in France, especially on the right, had come to doubt that what Robert Aron and Arnaud Dandieu called the “*plate-forme de Genève*”, where the League was based; it had produced nothing more than a “*République des mots*” and, moreover, one where France’s interests were routinely flouted and traduced, not least by French politicians like Briand. So, for example, the prolonged agony of the League’s Disarmament Conferences from 1925 to 1934 had led to scant rewards for France’s security needs. The main beneficiaries of this neglect were said to be mainly the “Anglo-Saxon” Powers, Britain and the United States, as well as Germany. France was portrayed as being outflanked and outgunned in the battle of ideas and in international politics more broadly.<sup>11</sup> So the idea of what international organisations should aim to achieve was already one where France felt both a strong sense of co-ownership, and also one of having been stripped of that by the “Anglo-Saxons” well before the subject of a next generation of international organisations arose as a result of the Second World War. When Roosevelt proclaimed a renewed vision of international organisations as part of his “New World Order” and had that elaborated as part of the largely Anglo-American process known as “Post-War Planning” after 1941, France’s voice was conspicuously absent in both official meetings and as part of the Post-War Planning process. Arguably other exiled governments that had had the good sense to establish themselves in Washington

– rather than London or Algiers as did the Free French – had the ear of the post-war planners more than did the Free French.

After the initial hesitant and largely symbolic steps of late 1941 and early 1942, the Moscow Declaration of October 1943 had led to a Four-Nation Declaration – Britain, China, the United States, and Soviet Union – establishing a “general organization for the maintenance of peace and security”. When the process of European liberation began, the tripartite British, American, and Soviet European Advisory Commission [EAC] was set up, as well as bodies like the Advisory Council for Italy. A Tripartite Commission resulted in an early decision to co-ordinate relief work through the “United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration” [UNRRA], led by Roosevelt’s close associate and former Governor of New York, Herbert Lehman,<sup>12</sup> after a ceremony in the White House in early November 1943.<sup>13</sup> Early discussions of membership did not give France an immediate right to membership whilst it was still occupied by the Germans, and certainly not a right to sit in the highest fora of decision-making about the form the UN might take.

Even if by mid-1944 France’s position had been marginally enhanced in Roosevelt’s eyes by an inevitably minor contribution to the war effort, it was by no means certain that the visceral hostility felt by Roosevelt towards De Gaulle was surmountable. The French were not invited to send a delegation to the initial Dumbarton Oaks Conference of July-August 1944, which planned the basis of what became the UN. A pre-war French foreign minister, Georges Bonnet, gave short shrift to the subject in his semi-official history of the French Foreign Ministry, *Le Quai d’Orsay sous trois républiques*. He merely recounted that before the subsequent conference in San Francisco in April 1945, “the French Government intended to freely discuss decisions already made without it, notably at Dumbarton Oaks”.<sup>14</sup> A former *Quai d’Orsay* official, René Massigli, a very prominent diplomat before the war and based in London from 1941 and 1944 as De Gaulle’s eyes and ears, would normally have been expected to be given access to the highest table of discussions about any future

international organisation. He had been the main *Quai* official concerned with the Kellogg-Briand pact and more generally the key French official at the League in the early 1930s, rising to become deputy political director of the *Quai*. After being dismissed by the Vichy Government in 1940, Massigli became De Gaulle's commissioner for Foreign Affairs – *commissaire aux Affaires étrangères* – the effective Free French foreign minister from early 1943 until he was given the post of ambassador at London by De Gaulle in August 1944.<sup>15</sup>

But, even as De Gaulle's ambassador to London, Massigli recorded that the closest he got to the Dumbarton Oaks discussions was to be entertained at a dinner at the Foreign Office in London in late August 1944 with the foreign secretary's, Anthony Eden's, jokes about Stalin. He was also briefed about the broad thrust of the proposals – a Security Council, an Assembly, probably a permanent site, “the question has not been decided upon” [*la question demeure ouverte*]. Extensive notes were taken by various members of the French hierarchy in exile in Washington, which shows that they were very aware of what was being planned, but they were not formally consulted about what they thought of such ideas at the time of Dumbarton Oaks. And none of the notes, other than those by Massigli, remaining as French ambassador at London until 1954, indicate a contemporaneous account: they are dated to much later in 1944.<sup>16</sup> One obvious reason for this fact is that the reconstituted *Quai d'Orsay* was not properly established in Paris until December 1944, and it is from that date that the first official papers on international conferences can be found.<sup>17</sup>

A key question has to be why representatives of the Free French had so little influence in Washington? De Gaulle's maybe laudable but mistaken decision was to base Free French decision-making as close as possible to the fighting and to France, thus in London or Algiers. First contacts between the American State Department and the Free French occurred in early 1941 in Brazzaville in French Equatorial Africa. De Gaulle had sent a trusted group of aides there in August 1940 to foment revolt against Vichy, including René Pleven, a pre-war industrialist who had worked in the

United States. As has been pointed out by Jean Lacouture, “At that time of course De Gaulle had no notion of decolonization”, and De Gaulle wanted in any case to make the point that the French Empire was a key element in France’s future resurrection as a Great Power. Churchill had also given his support to an African base, and the result was most satisfying, as most of French Equatorial Africa rallied to Free France in “Three Glorious Days”, 26-28 August 1940.<sup>18</sup> However, the choice of a distinctly colonial base was bound to irritate both Roosevelt and most of the State Department, which was distinctly anti-colonial. In his first communications with the State Department, through the British Embassy in Washington as he had no other direct system, De Gaulle asked the British to make it very clear that they recognise the “*Conseil de Défense de l’Empire*”. Importantly, De Gaulle was in no way claiming that his forces represented “*un Gouvernement française indépendant*”. The clumsy formulation of the *Conseil de Défense de l’Empire* was intended to show the American authorities that he was not claiming to be the French government-in-exile – so persuading the Americans that he could safely be given minimal recognition – whilst simultaneously reminding Washington that he based his authority on a colonial reality that the Americans abhorred.<sup>19</sup> This dialogue of the deaf was never really overcome through to the end of the war, and indeed beyond it.

But there were also Free French representatives based in Washington throughout most of the war. The initial main point of contact between the emerging Free French and the State Department was Pleven, who was held in some evident personal esteem in both the State Department and in the Foreign Office and went to Washington in June 1941. Nonetheless, Pleven worried that his arrival might upset “certain high ranking Americans”.<sup>20</sup> The last French government before the surrender of 1940 had given him the thankless task of trying to increase French aircraft production in 1939 – under the last French air minister, Guy La Chambre.<sup>21</sup> Pleven knew Eden well enough to ask him to ascertain in May 1941, before going to the United States, what he thought was American policy towards Vichy and the Free French. Eden expressed his dismay to Pleven that the Americans were

sending oil and other commodities to French colonies in North Africa, which clearly could be used by the Axis.<sup>22</sup> Despite the Free French and initially attempting to be even-handed towards Vichy through his ambassador, Admiral William Leahy, Roosevelt grappled with “which France” needed to be recognised. William L. Langer called this Roosevelt’s “Vichy gamble”, and it was greatly resented at the time and after by De Gaulle.<sup>23</sup>

This problem was exacerbated by infighting about who should represent the Free French in Washington. The French community in the United States in 1941-1942 was made up of many different factions, some openly sympathetic to Vichy, and by no means all of those who opposed Vichy supported De Gaulle. The analogous problem for Roosevelt was that several key French political figures “rallied” to De Gaulle, whilst others were distrusted by De Gaulle or distrusted him. One such reluctant recruit was the former Third Republic radical-socialist politician, Pierre Cot, now exiled in the United States. He offered his services to De Gaulle through Plevén and was rebuffed. De Gaulle’s lack of belief in democratic politics particularly irked Cot, although he still believed only De Gaulle could lead France.<sup>24</sup>

But the choice of Plevén as representative in Washington did not meet the approval of other, even Gaullist, French exiles such as Jacques Maritain, an American-based French academic, who thought he was not able to speak adequately for the “whole movement”. What they all agreed on was the increasingly vital task of trying to influence the American Post-War Planning process. René Cassin and Maurice Dejean, two De Gaulle loyalists, tried to be more encouraging than Plevén about the state of affairs, but even they agreed that “the Americans are either unenthusiastic or know nothing about us” [*peu favorables ou nous ignorent*].<sup>25</sup> Plevén stayed on for quite awhile as De Gaulle’s representative in Washington. However, later in 1941, a report for De Gaulle from another veteran *Quai* diplomat, Hervé Alphand, showed that Plevén never managed to quell the feeling in official American circles that the Free French attracted “*une sympathie certaine*”. Sumner Welles, a senior

State Department official close to Roosevelt, still believed that “France, for us, is Pétain [the Vichy leader], Weygand [a Vichy collaborationist later imprisoned by the Germans] and De Gaulle”. Pleven reported that when he met Welles in October 1941, “*M. Welles est toujours très froid*”. Pleven was replaced by Adrien Tixier, an anti-Vichy politician, not long afterwards; in turn, Henri Hoppenot, a former diplomat, replaced Tixier in 1943.<sup>26</sup>

After Pearl Harbor and the entry of the United States into the war, Free French-American relations should have improved, but did not noticeably. One reason was the continuing suspicion of and antipathy for De Gaulle, which has been well-documented. But a subsidiary and just as important corollary was the way French representatives often reported in less than favourable terms on the content of emerging American or Anglo-American initiatives for the future world order and of international organisations in particular. Details about Post-War Planning emerged only very slowly. As late as April 1943 a “Note” from the Free French office in Washington agreed with the *Sunday Star* journalist, Constantine Brown, that so far no system had been developed by the State Department to “synchronise” American planning with that of the other Allies. Brown dismissed the Anglo-American Atlantic Charter of 1941 “as a document expressing in a vague style theories and ideals which are even more vague”. Barner Nover in the *Washington Post* was reported as saying in an article, “Beyond the Atlantic Charter”, until the United States adopted “a precise policy about the organization of the peace, the Allies had no other choice than to await on events” [*rester dans l’expectative*]. He also reminded his readers that these Allies were also worried about another “*volte-face*” like that of 1919.<sup>27</sup>

It was of course not true that no Post-War Planning had yet taken place, although the main committee set up under the overall jurisdiction of Welles only started work in early 1942. But in the febrile atmosphere of Washington at that period, it was easy for the French in particular to feel they were being left out of the discussions, especially given Welles’ well-known antipathy towards De

Gaulle. His dismissal of the French in London and later Algiers – admittedly in early 1941 – as the “so-called Free French” gave great offense and even outraged some members of the Post-War Planning process like Assistant Secretary of State Adolf Berle.<sup>28</sup> But it was definitely the case that Welles reflected Roosevelt’s feelings about De Gaulle and the Free French. Even as late as August 1943, *Time* magazine reported that there had only been “rumors” that the Allies “would give some sort of recognition to the French Committee of National Liberation”. Again there were accusations of disunity amongst the Free French leadership. In a bout of black humour, a prominent French official, André Philip, was reported in *The Nation* as suggesting that the Free French should question whether “with certainty . . . there was a United States of America”, whilst asking that the State Department “should be told to achieve unity among its own leaders before applying for any recognition [by the French]”.<sup>29</sup>

The Free French did take steps to counter these accusations of disunity. Hoppenot reported on American politics and other matters of interest to the Free French and seems to have been given fairly open access to the State Department. However, there is some justification for the complaints of the Free French hierarchy, and later after 3 June 1944 of the French Provisional Government – *gouvernement provisoire de la République française* [GPRF] – that they were being kept informed about many major developments in Post-War Planning by State Department press releases. Moreover, Cordell Hull, Roosevelt’s secretary of state, informed the French government-in-exile on 17 July 1944 that only representatives of the Big Three would meet at Dumbarton Oaks, and that the Chinese and “other” governments would later be informed of progress. The State Department then gave Hoppenot what he qualified as “evasive replies” as to which governments, although “in principle there would be a place for the French”. But it was made clear this would *only* be once France had a “Government freely chosen by the French people”.<sup>30</sup>

Bonnet was nonetheless not entirely correct in implying that French representatives had not been consulted about Dumbarton Oaks, nor that the Free French government had no influence over the discussions about the future of international organisations in the broad sense of the term. Pierre Mendès France, another of De Gaulle's then close allies in the United States, attended much of the Bretton Woods discussions on the future of economic international organisations. But to unpack exactly *how much* influence the French had over the future of post-war international organisations is not entirely straightforward. To do so requires an analysis of the views of France held, especially, by American officials at every level including the president, but also by politicians in London. It also requires an analysis of what the involved French officials thought should be discussed and why.

In 1944-1945, Free French officials were generally despondent about the loss of European influence in the world. In the first general file from after the Liberation, an anonymous summary muses that whilst Europe and Western "civilisation" were not quite "decadent", a term taken from Arnold Toynbee's oft-quoted writings, the very idea of them was now "morally ambiguous". Europe had certainly lost its sense of being "pre-eminent". Europe's fate was now being decided by three "non-European Powers" [*sic*], the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union. Insofar as this affected international organisations, and the UN in particular, the cause was clear: the United States did not want to repeat the mistakes of the last war, which meant that this time questions of international organisations had to be settled *before* the war ended. All decisions about this planning had been made by the Big Three, behind closed doors, from 1941 onwards. In turn, international organisations were linked to the Big Three's obsession with "spheres of influence" that had been decided by the Russians and the "English" at Moscow in October 1944 – Churchill and Stalin's so-called "percentages agreement". The United States that was mainly accused of "blame" for this state of affairs with its practice of "covering up realist bargains with the rhetoric of high principle" [*couvrir de grands principes des marchandages réalistes imposés par la situation*]. This the way that nineteenth century

diplomats like Talleyrand or Castlereagh would have done it; but the *result* was that “there were no more bases, no more common principles upon which international society was to be [hereafter] based”.<sup>31</sup>

The general feeling amongst the Free French in this period can therefore be summed up as being that encapsulated in the plaintive appeal of the title of this analysis: “If France is no longer of any importance to you, we would like to be told”.<sup>32</sup> These particular words were addressed to Britain’s deputy prime minister and Labour Party leader, Clement Attlee, and his Party by the prominent French socialist, Vincent Auriol, in July 1944. It is a fair reflection of much of French feeling about their relationship with the British and American governments before D-Day, during much of the darkest period of the Second World War, and for a good few years to come.

However, the subsequent establishment of the GPRF on 3 June 1944 and then of the Fourth Republic (1946-1958) owed most to the residual prestige of France, inextricably linked to the personality of De Gaulle. The full integration of France into international society would have to wait for the election of a proper French government or, as a document by Hoppenot from Washington of November 1944 summed it up, “all in good time” [variously “*en temps voulu*” and “*le moment venu*”].<sup>33</sup>

The Free French believed then, and many French officials continued to believe well into the post-war period, that Roosevelt and the State Department’s personal dislike of De Gaulle had motivated some very perverse policy decisions in Washington. Was that not why Leahy had developed rather friendly relations with Pétain, asked Hoppenot in January 1945 as he left his post in the United States? Hoppenot’s assessment of Roosevelt was even more brutally frank in his last despatch to Paris: he was “*vieilli, instable, superficiel, de plus en plus dépendant d’un entourage qui ne nous est pas favorable*” [an old, unstable and superficial man increasingly dependent on a group of officials which is not favourable to us]. This was despite Roosevelt in his farewell meeting with

Hoppenot giving a very favourable report of De Gaulle's meeting with Stalin in late 1944 and greeting the ambassador with his "habitual cordiality" [*avec sa cordialité habituelle*].<sup>34</sup> To be fair to Roosevelt, he had been advised in 1943 by Robert Murphy, American *chargé d'affaires* in Vichy, not to over-antagonise Vichy so as to help with American plans to invade North Africa – Operation Torch.<sup>35</sup> But the Free French were not informed of these plans and would not have approved of them if they had.

The French were also not entirely excluded from the emerging plans for international organisations. Pleven received information in early 1944 of the existence a number of meetings about the "[Harry Dexter] White Plan" that eventually became the basis of the Bretton Woods Agreements – White was a senior American Treasury official. Mendès France was given a much more positive role as the French delegate at Bretton Woods in July and informed of the underlying "Anglo-Saxon" rationale for future international economic co-operation. This awoke French fears of economic dominance by the United States and, in particular, triggered an obsession about the future value of the French franc, a subject that seems to have summed up all their justified fears of a future pound sterling and, especially, American dollar domination of the post-war financial system. They also feared being given a minor role in the new International Monetary Fund and World Bank as France would have just 4.8 percent of the votes, well behind Britain and Canada. Even China, which French politicians treated with disdain, was to get 5.8 percent and the United States 28 percent. The various versions of the "White" and "Keynes" plans – the latter a British proposal for an international currency union – were not discussed with the Free French until the final "Common Declaration" of 21 April 1944, to which "*aucun expert français n'y avait donné son adhésion* [no French official had agreed].<sup>36</sup>

So France was to be excluded from the very top table. Alphanand, a key collaborator of Pleven on economic matters for the Free French, had warned about this well before 1944. Another French diplomat in exile having been stranded at the French Embassy at Washington in May 1940, he was

made Free French national commissioner for the Economy, Finance, and the Colonies and director of Economic Affairs in Algiers by De Gaulle in 1941 and was his main economic advisor until 1944. Alphanand pointed out to De Gaulle in mid-1942 that the problem with economic negotiations about Europe after the war hinged on two essentials – “the supplying [*ravitaillement*] of Europe and economic re-organisation”. These were not *just* technical problems but provided precedents for a more general system that the Allies would have to develop. But they were being discussed “*par des organismes exclusivement inter-Américains et en dehors des Alliés*” [without wider Allied participation]. This course was extremely dangerous for the future of French economic independence. Alphanand also feared that the Americans would “with that economic mentality which is their key characteristic [*qui les caractérise*] interpret European problems as too narrowly economic and too narrowly American, as happened after 1919”. Mechanisms must therefore be set up “with the British” to stop a repeat of the “lack of harmonisation of economic and political interests” that had happened after the First World War. So France had to participate in the big conferences that were to come, and he felt the Free French must take the lead.<sup>37</sup>

The fear of exclusion was not only about financial discussions, it was about being taken seriously as a state and having French views taken seriously about what any international organisation should look like. The French elites were well aware that the new “League of Nations” would have to be sensitive to American feelings and prejudices. Just after Dumbarton Oaks, Cot suggested that the French had to put their views with “*le réalisme et la souplesse*” [realism and flexibility].<sup>38</sup> Massigli had been deeply marked, even scarred, by the results of American isolationism after the Great War, and by his frustrating battles within the League of Nations against France’s “Allies” in the 1930s. Terrified of another withdrawal by “*Les Puissances Anglo-Saxonnes*”, he was now convinced that the war would have an extremely violent aftermath, possibly including a collapse of one of the victor Powers in the same fashion as Italy after 1919. The only answers to these possibilities were to make

sure that history did not repeat itself, which made a real agreement with the Powers essential. It also meant they had to get to the basis of what caused war: economic, social and political.

Massigli was very impressed by the French writer's, Elie Halévy's, view that political and economic factors both caused wars and that economics could contribute their solution.<sup>39</sup> But this would only be achieved by a pooling of global resources – “vast plans must be put into operation . . . the realisation of a real community between states”. This had to be done by new organisations to create “a concrete and humane economics [*une économie concrète, une économie humaine*]”. Quoting the philosopher, Henri Bergson, in his support, this had to be a “satisfaction of essential human needs . . . a return to simplicity”.<sup>40</sup>

As to the nature of the UN, it could not be like the League, a “closed society”, but rather one that could have effective sanction powers, as France had wanted in 1919 but been denied by the other Allies. The new organisation had to be based on “*égalité*” between states, people, and groups, and “*liberté*” as much as possible economically. In a subsequent analysis, he bemoaned that France was not at present an equal “partner” and that the two Great Powers who led the “game” [*jeu*], were the United States and Soviet Union, which had radically different views of the future of Europe, differences which could rip it apart “*à la remorque de l'un et de l'autre*”. As for the European states, the United States was now convinced that the war had been caused by the leaving of one Power in charge in Europe as after 1919, France, and that this must never happen again. So “The United States was preparing to treat the European states as clients, not as equals” [*en clients, non en égaux*]. These were views, stressed at the beginning of this analysis, widely held, a reflection on the diminishing influence of France, and indeed Europe, on “Western civilisation”.

Britain was different, as it had fought and played an important role in the war from the outset; however, thought Massigli, fundamentally “British problems are like ours [*analogues aux nôtres*]”. France must do its utmost to co-ordinate efforts with the British as a consequence, as well as look to

a security alliance with them and the Benelux countries to protect the northeast of France.<sup>41</sup> In 1943 and 1944, much more thought was put into what became in effect the notion of European Union, except to note that both Massigli and De Gaulle were much more concerned with local European security than what they saw as the vague generalities of the League. A senior Free French advisor, Jean Monnet, was to emerge in this debate as a key advocate of a Europe that included *all* European states, including the Soviet Union. His formulation importantly was for “a European organisation which includes Germany but changes it completely” [*la change fondamentale*].<sup>42</sup>

So the Dumbarton Oaks conference, which was to plan a successor to the League, might be seen as a second-order priority in 1943 and 1944. After all, Europe was where the fighting was to take place to liberate France. That was partly a mistaken impression: Massigli and De Gaulle got very interested once the first UN agency established before Dumbarton Oaks, UNRRA, started to emerge and began operations, run by Roosevelt’s political friend, Lehman. The Free French were keen to be consulted about what role UNRRA would play in Europe after the hoped for liberation, about which they became more and more nervous as the prospect of D-Day approached. After the liberation, the French were very ambivalent about ceding any of their sovereignty to Lehman in spite of a huge American army and air force backing him. The “restoration” or “reconstruction” of France certainly had to be done in co-operation with the Anglo-Americans, but not only by them.<sup>43</sup>

Right up to and including June 1944, the Free French were wary that Roosevelt in particular was using every ruse possible to avoid including them in serious planning of a future global order. As Alphant put it in mid-June 1944, “as I have always believed, the key to the problem remains the White House . . . the attitude of the President does not seem to have varied”. He had great hopes that De Gaulle’s first visit to Bayeux in Normandy after the liberation would do something to change Roosevelt’s attitude.<sup>44</sup>

Alphand, Massigli, and De Gaulle worried that they were not only being excluded from these international organisation discussions but also from the EAC; chaired by the American ambassador at London, John Winant, it first met in January 1944 to decide on the wider implications of the liberation of Europe. Composed of the Big Three, the EAC did not include France or the other Allied governments, and they were merely asked for their “opinions”. A later comment in August 1944 by Massigli recorded that the now retired Welles had stated in his recent book that he “did not consider France as being a key member of the permanent council [*directoire permanent*] of the Powers”. Even though France, by now led by the GPRF, was invited onto the EAC not long afterwards – on 27 August – the issue added to those that irritated the French hierarchy.<sup>45</sup>

But it was still a divided hierarchy. There were other sections within the Free French that were interested in what kind of Europe and global international organisations might emerge from the ruins of the League and the war. Somewhat in opposition to De Gaulle’s “capital” in Algiers, the London-based Free French, which met in a loose grouping called the “*Groupe Jean Jaurès*”, often felt that De Gaulle excluded them from decision-making, something that galled them as many of their number were directly involved in Resistance activities. Indeed many of their number had been killed or captured by the Gestapo. They were also as unimpressed as Auriol, who attended their meetings on occasion, about the lack of “internationalist spirit” of British Labour Party officials who were their main contacts with the Churchill’s government. But many of the “*Groupe*” were also unimpressed by De Gaulle, accused at one point in 1941 of having systematically gotten rid of men of the left and replacing them with those of the right. Although such feelings started to dissipate by the end of 1941, they were never entirely absent, leaving this key body distrustful of both the British and their French compatriots. Their discussions on occasion ended up in fisticuffs, such was the passion involved, understandable as many of their discussions were about the dreadful conditions that existed on the ground in France.<sup>46</sup>

The place given to France by the Big Three in the up-coming decisions on the future of Europe and the UN were to prove the key tests of how much the United States in particular really took France seriously. Giving France a token seat at the table of power in the EAC in August 1944 and the recognition of the GPRF was one small step in this direction, even though everyone knew that *real* decisions had so far been taken by the Big Three in private. But it did mean that De Gaulle and other French opinions were at least now being heard. They had also gained the ear of top officials of the Labour Party, as when William Gillies, international secretary of the Party, Philip Noel Baker, a junior Foreign Office minister and prominent Party intellectual, and Hugh Dalton, the president of the Board of Trade, attended the first Socialist Party Congress in Paris after the Liberation in November 1944. Auriol, whose complaint of July forms the title of this analysis, was not much relieved by this presence. The “International Conference of London” of European Socialist parties in March 1945 later recorded their approval of the UN structure: the Security Council, General Assembly, and Economic and Social Council [ECOSOC]. Interestingly, what they did *not* like was either the “equality of states” or a “hierarchy corresponding to the real importance of states”, the latter a principle that would not have worked in France’s favour in 1944.<sup>47</sup>

The French leadership wanted there to be much more clarification of the new-fangled UN proposal that was to become the Security Council. Concerns about this body occur consistently in the diplomatic record in late 1944 and until the San Francisco Conference in June 1945. De Gaulle remained as president of the GPRF until 2 January 1946 and, whilst in this post, relations with the United States were to remain frosty at best. As he had with Hoppenot, Roosevelt tried his best to continue the charm offensive with Hoppenot’s very heavyweight successor, Henri Bonnet. When first meeting Bonnet in January 1945, Roosevelt told him of his admiration for De Gaulle “*dans les termes les plus sympathiques*” and that Franco-American relations were “*faites de confiance et d’amitié*”. He wanted to arm ten French divisions for the final stages of the war. Most significantly,

he claimed that he wished to give “France a place in the future international organisation deserved by its traditions, ideals and importance”.<sup>48</sup>

But France was put in its place in the “hierarchy” in quite a brutal fashion not much later in the war, and this showed the Franco-American wounds were as wide as ever. The new French foreign minister, Georges Bidault, had met with Roosevelt’s closest advisor, Harry Hopkins, in late January 1945 in Paris and been assured that De Gaulle *should* have been invited to the next Big Three meeting at Yalta in early February. Roosevelt “desperately [*vivement*]” wanted to meet De Gaulle as soon as possible: “No European settlement would be worthwhile [*valable*] without the agreement of France”. But unfortunately, chipped in Jefferson Caffery, the American ambassador at Paris, French attendance would not be possible before Yalta. There followed a series of exchanges on the future of Germany and the French colonies, the most important issues for France that revealed that Roosevelt had no sympathy for French demands. France could not be given any “exclusive” role in the Rhineland as after 1919, but France would be given an “equal role” in a “quadri-partite . . . provisional organ” [*organe provisoire*] to oversee the area. As for colonies, Hopkins had already discussed this with Pleven in Washington and undiplomatically told him that Roosevelt’s view was that “colonies were a smokescreen [*un simple décor*] for the exploitation of the native populations by Western businessmen”. Hopkins had not been impressed when Pleven had countered that nowhere in the French Empire was there the same “segregation vis-à-vis coloured populations” that was seen in the United States.<sup>49</sup> Unsurprisingly, when De Gaulle met Hopkins the next day, their opening gambits were for Hopkins to say he wished to “gloss over the details and get to the heart of things: the existence of a malaise in relations between Paris and Washington”. Always a man of few words, De Gaulle replied “en effet” [“indeed”].

The rest of the period until the San Francisco Conference was a master class in Gaullist petulance and brinkmanship countered by American icy forbearance. The French set up a

“Commission” at the end of 1944 to come up with ideas for the conference, with a star-studded roster of politicians and even historians like Pierre Renouvin. The Conference, they decided, should be based on the same noble ideas that had underpinned the French delegation in 1919, and especially the thinking of Bourgeois, whose ideas that the League should have had proper “teeth” had now been triumphantly confirmed by the setting up of the Security Council and talk of a UN army. It showed the “slow progress [*progrès tardif*] of the Anglo-Saxon countries in this matter”. It was Bourgeois whom Cecil had said was “rather feeble physically and cannot see very much” and makes speeches of “interminable length”.<sup>50</sup> The Commission was therefore in effect a declaration of independent intent, for the American government had set its sights firmly against any repetition of the mistakes of 1919.

But a second declaration of independence then followed when the French delegation for San Francisco was formed in April 1945. It had some overlap in its membership with the Commission and some very significant additions. Pleven was now included for ECOSOC issues, as was Monnet, well known and respected in Washington on economic matters. The initial reflections in Paris on how to play the conference game were that France went to it with few allies. Most of France’s pre-war partners in the Eastern European *Petite Entente* were now either Axis states or under the thumb of the Soviet Union. Neutrals had not been invited, which excluded Spain, Portugal, Switzerland, and Ireland, all much more likely to be sympathetic to France than to the United States. So how could France “affirm itself as a Great Power”, and how could it “maintain its liberty of action”?<sup>51</sup>

In the build-up to San Francisco, the French were still being excluded with the State Department servicing the Yalta Conference at the same time as it planned the future of the UN. Even after Yalta, the French Embassy at Washington was being told that there was no certainty that France would be invited to any more Big Three meetings, which would involve issues of prime French interest like the future of Poland, UN Trusteeship, and Germany. Then during the Yalta discussions,

the United States government suggested to Massigli, now French ambassador at London, that France and China could join the Big Three in sending out the invitations to San Francisco as “equals”. De Gaulle and his officials replied it would *only* do this if it was allowed to add that France had had no part in the Dumbarton Oaks discussions and that it had numerous amendments to propose. The Big Three, particularly Stalin, took extreme umbrage and told De Gaulle through Henri Bonnet that he had 48 hours to agree with the proposal or the invitation would be rescinded. To cut a very long story short, the French refused, in spite of several more extensions of the deadline, and did not send out the invitations.<sup>52</sup> France did nonetheless attend the San Francisco Conference, was granted permanent seat on the Security Council, and played a constructive role there. France had maybe proved its “Great Power” status and “liberty of action”, for only Great Powers could say no to the Big Three. But the exclusion from participation in Yalta, “manifestly signifying their lost status”, also fostered a feeling in Paris that the French were now subject to a “keenly disliked Anglo-American and then a United States-Soviet hegemony”.<sup>53</sup>

This “liberty of action” was of course an illusion. When the franc was devalued at the end of 1945, all the American secretary of the Treasury, Fred Vinson, could offer was United States “sympathy” that “a change in the franc rate was an essential step in the French program of economic reconstruction”; and the British Treasury thought a drop from the then current 200 francs to the dollar to 400 or 480 was necessary, with the Americans probably holding out for more than 500.<sup>54</sup> Non-consultation over the UN at Dumbarton Oaks was thus to prove the first of a long series of further humiliations for France that continued after the end of the war. Perhaps the closest parallel would be to see France in the situation of Greece and the United States as Germany in the European financial crises after 2008. Such economic behaviour may have made absolute sense, but it greatly contributed to a feeling of diminished sovereignty in France.

So the patterns of the war years were largely continued into the peace. Although the French attended the San Francisco Conference and were granted equal status with the other Great Powers in the Security Council, the rest of the period until at least 1950 is a history of mainly small humiliations for the various French governments both during De Gaulle's final year in office – until January 1946 – and after. The implementation of the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and a host of other major developments were not much influenced by French feelings, positive or negative. The British governments of the period, and of course British politicians like Churchill and Ernst Bevin, the Labour foreign secretary after July 1945, were perceived in Paris as having the ear of Washington, which made the French feel more embittered and alienated. This perception constituted, of course, somewhat of an illusion – Britain's parlous economic state after 1945 meant it needed its "American uncle" just as much as France needed its "*oncle d'Amerique*". It was not really until after Bidault left office as foreign minister in 1948 that the tide turned and Washington really engaged in policies, notably on Germany and Europe, with which the French could agree. Those are beyond the scope of this exegesis.

So a last thought might be as to why the Americans were so tough with the French? Partly it was because of the aforementioned feeling in Washington circles that the French leadership, and De Gaulle in particular, were not trustworthy, or maybe not even the basis a possible viable future government. Partly it was because the United States government was aware that Americans would not welcome it propping up yet another series of useless French politicians. This course had after all culminated in American armed forces having to be sent to Europe for a second time. But equally, the British and French had not forgotten their own nightmare scenario, a repeat of the American withdrawal from European affairs of the 1920s. The trauma of the 1920s and 1930s were not easily forgotten on either side of the Atlantic.

As mentioned above, Pleven went personally to the San Francisco Conference to find out what the Americans now thought of France and the future in general. He decided the main American fears were of unemployment after the war – as had happened the last time – and a fear that they would not have access to primary commodities [*matières premières*], as well as a natural fear of what might still happen in China and Japan. Pleven also asked White what were his main personal fears about France. Again, the 1920s were evoked by White: Would France rearm instead of reconstruct? Could France modernise its production? Given Pleven’s role in the hapless French aircraft industry in 1939, this must have struck home. It might even be asked whether Pleven’s different perception of the United States after spending the war years there made for his subsequent breach with De Gaulle in the 1950s. The wartime experiences of the two men were very different, and they formed separate parties in France that pursued very different policies.

But whereas Pleven understood that France could no longer ask for what it had taken as its birth right in 1919, De Gaulle did not. France needed the United States in quite basic ways. The French now had only 6 kilograms of sugar annually per person on which to live – opposed to 23 kilograms in 1939 – and only 250 grams of meat a week – instead of the 1939 figure of 3 kilograms.<sup>55</sup> The United States was to prove adept at forcing the French into compromises that would have been impossible 25 years previously. The above- mentioned *diktat* about the French franc was thus merely the harbinger of some “rough wooing” of France by America, economic statecraft at its most brutal. France now *did* matter, but it had to behave itself.

## Notes

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<sup>1</sup> Robert C. Hildebrand, *Dumbarton Oaks: The Origins of the United Nations and the Search for Post-War Security* (Chapel Hill, NC, 1990); Stephen Wertheim, “Instrumental Internationalism: The United Nations as America’s will to lead the world”, paper presented to “The UN and the Post-War

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Global Order: Dumbarton Oaks in Perspective after 70 years”, Centre for International Studies and Diplomacy, SOAS, University of London (17 May 2014); Stephen Schlesinger, *Act of Creation: The Founding of the United Nations* (Boulder, CO, Oxford, 2003); Patrick Hearden, *Architects of Globalism: Building a New World Order During World War II* (Fayetteville, AR, 2002); Christopher O’Sullivan, *Sumner Welles, Postwar Planning, and the Quest for a New World Order, 1937-1943* (NY, 2008); Neil Smith, *American Empire: Roosevelt’s Geographer and the Prelude to Globalization* (Berkeley, CA, 2003).

<sup>2</sup> David L. Roll, *The Hopkins Touch: Harry Hopkins and the Forging of the Alliance to Defeat Hitler* (London, 2013), 172-75.

<sup>3</sup> “1942: La Déclaration de Nations Unies” : <http://www.un.org/fr/sections/history-united-nations-charter/1942-declaration-united-nations/>.

<sup>4</sup> David Woolner, “Canada, Mackenzie King and the St. Pierre and Miquelon Crisis of 1941”, *London Journal of Canadian Studies*, 24(2008-2009), 42-84; J.F. Hilliker, “The Canadian Government and the Free French: Perceptions and Constraints, 1940-44”, *International History Review*, 2/1(1980), 87-108.

<sup>5</sup> American Consul [Saint Pierre-Miquelon] to State Department, 10 January 1942, PSF [Private Secretary Files, Franklin Delano Roosevelt Presidential Library, Poughkeepsie, NY] Dispatches – France Box 31.

<sup>6</sup> For example, François Kersaudy, *Churchill and De Gaulle* (London, 1981); François Malye, *De Gaulle vu par les Anglais* (Paris, 2015).

<sup>7</sup> Robert and Isabel Tombs, *That Sweet Enemy: Britain and France. The History of a Love-Hate Relationship* (NY, 2008).

<sup>8</sup> Andrew Williams, *France, Britain and the United States, 1900-1940: A Reappraisal* (Houndmills, 2014).

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<sup>9</sup> Andrew Williams, *Failed Imagination? The Anglo-American New World Order from Wilson to Bush* (Manchester, 2007).

<sup>10</sup> This was notably the case of American academics like Nicholas Murray Butler and James T. Shotwell, whilst in Britain the charge was led by Lord Robert Cecil; see Williams, *France, Britain and the United States*, Chapter 3; Gaynor Johnson, *Lord Robert Cecil: Politician and Internationalist*, (Farnham, 2013).

<sup>11</sup> Robert Aron and Arnaud Dandieu, *Décadence de la nation française* (Paris, 1931). See also Andrew Williams, “The IR that dare not speak its name: the French Extreme (and not so extreme) Right in the 1930s and its lessons from and to the history of thought in International Relations”, in Ian Hall, *Radicals and Revolutionaries in Twentieth-Century International Thought* (London, 2015), 101-22.

<sup>12</sup> See Andrew Williams, “‘Reconstruction’ before the Marshall Plan”, *Review of International Studies*, 31/3(2005), 541-58.

<sup>13</sup> Williams, *Failed Imagination*, Chapters 3 and 6.

<sup>14</sup> Georges Bonnet, *Le Quai d’Orsay sous trois républiques* (Paris, 1961), 387.

<sup>15</sup> Rogelia Pastor-Castro, “René Massigli’s Mission to London, 1944-1954”, *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, 24/4(2013), 539-58.

<sup>16</sup> Massigli [in London to discuss joint actions in France] note, 22 August 1944, PAAP [Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris] Commissariat aux Affaires Etrangères: Politique Extérieure, Volume 42, 217; record of discussion with Eden, 25 August 1944, Massigli [René Massigli Papers, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris]. See also Auriol notes on Dumbarton Oaks, all dating from 11 December 1945, AN [Vincent Auriol Papers, Archives Nationales, Paris] 3 AU14 Dr5 sdrn.

<sup>17</sup> The *Quai d’Orsay* archives on the UN start in December 1944. The first folder is “Commission pour l’étude des principes d’une Organisation Internationale”, 2.12.44-5.1.45: “ONU Secrétariat des

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Conférences: Nations Unis et Organisations Internationales”, MAE [Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris] 372QO/1.

<sup>18</sup> Jean Lacouture, *De Gaulle: The Rebel, 1890-1944* (London, 1993), 271-72. See also Martin Thomas, *The French Empire at War, 1940-45* (Manchester, 1998).

<sup>19</sup> De Gaulle [Brazzaville] to British Consul General, 1 February 1941, De Gaulle [Charles De Gaulle Papers, La Fondation Charles De Gaulle, Paris] AN AG/3 (1)/256, AE-EU Dossier 1b.

<sup>20</sup> Pleven [London] to De Gaulle [Brazzaville], 1 June 1941, Ibid.

<sup>21</sup> For more on this issue, see Williams, *France, Britain and the United States*, Chapter 4 and 168-70; as well as Gavin Bailey, *The Arsenal of Democracy: Aircraft Supply and the Evolution of the Anglo-American Alliance, 1938-1942* (Edinburgh, 2013).

<sup>22</sup> Pleven [London] to De Gaulle [Brazzaville], 16 May 1941, De Gaulle AN AG/3 (1)/256, AE-EU, Dossier 1b.

<sup>23</sup> William L. Langer, *Our Vichy Gamble* (NY, 1947); Robert O. Paxton, *Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, 1940-1944* (NY, 1972).

<sup>24</sup> Cot to Pleven, 13 September 1941, with annotations by De Gaulle, De Gaulle to Pleven, 18 March 1942, Pleven [Rene Pleven Papers, Archives Nationales, Paris] AN 550 AP 16.

<sup>25</sup> High Commission [Ottawa] to Dominion Office for De Gaulle, 6 June 1941, Consul General [San Marino, New York] to De Gaulle, 26 June 1941, Pleven to De Gaulle, 26 June 1941, Cassin and Dejean to De Gaulle, 3 July 1941, all De Gaulle AN AG/3 (1)/256, AE-EU, Dossier 1b.

<sup>26</sup> Alphanth, “Soutien de la France libre aux Etats- Unis”, 6 September 1941, Pleven to De Gaulle, 7 October 1941, both Ibid.

<sup>27</sup> “Note” [quoting the US press], April 1943, De Gaulle AN AG/3 (1)/256 Dossier 1a, AE-EU, “Informations sur les ETATS UNIS”.

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<sup>28</sup> Welles, quoted by Berle, 2 January 1941, Berle [Adolph Berle Papers, Franklin Delano Roosevelt Presidential Library, Poughkeepsie, NY]; Williams, *Failed Imagination*, 145.

<sup>29</sup> “France through the looking glass”, *Time* (30 August 1943); clipping sent to De Gaulle, De Gaulle AN AG/3 (1)/256, AE-EU, Dossier 1a.

<sup>30</sup> State Department Press Release, 17 July 1944, Hoppenot to Algiers, 30 July 1944, “ONU Secrétariat des Conférences: Nations Unis et Organisations Internationales”, MAE 372QO/1.

<sup>31</sup> “L’Europe et les Trois Grands, 1941-1945: Aux origines de la tension actuelle”, nd [probably late 1945], “Questions Générales de Politique Mondiale, 1945-1949”, MAE Affaires politiques: Internationale, Série Y, 1944-49, 76 CT com/2.

<sup>32</sup> Auriol to London, 13 July 1944 – the letters had been written on 12 May – Auriol AN, AU 10 Dr 5. Auriol become *Président du Conseil* – prime minister – in 1946 and *Président de la République* between 1947 and 1954, thus a key politician of the Fourth Republic

<sup>33</sup> Hoppenot to Algiers, 1 November 1944, “ONU Secrétariat des Conférences: Nations Unis et Organisations Internationales”, MAE 372QO/ 1.

<sup>34</sup> Hoppenot to MAE, 3 January 1945, and [meeting with FDR] 21 December 1944, MAE Série Y, Internationale, 1944-1949, Affaires Politiques; Etats Unis, 76CPcom/7.

<sup>35</sup> Andrew Buchanan, *American Grand Strategy in the Mediterranean during World War II* (Cambridge, 2014); Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, *L’abîme, 1939-1944* (Paris, 1990).

<sup>36</sup> “Rapport fait par M. Jean de Largentaye, Inspecteur des Finances”, nd [but July 1944], Pleven AN 560 AP 32 “Bretton Woods” file.

<sup>37</sup> Alphand memorandum, 25 June 1942, PAAP 217, Volume 41.

<sup>38</sup> Cot [*Compte Rendu* of the discussions of Dumbarton Oaks with the French Socialist Party], 29 December 1944, Auriol AN 3 AU 14 Dr 5 sdrn.

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<sup>39</sup> Halévy was a major critic of the Third Republic and possibly the key French thinker about international politics of the 1930s.

<sup>40</sup> Massigli, “Le Problème de la Paix”, February-March 1943, PAAP 217, Volume 41. He is referring to Elie Halévy, *L’ère des Tyrannies* (Paris, 1938).

<sup>41</sup> Massigli, “Eléments d’une politique étrangère de la France combattante”, 9 March 1943, PAAP 217, Volume 41.

<sup>42</sup> See the rest of Ibid. for the latter part of 1943. On Monnet, see unsigned [probably Monnet] holograph summary of discussions of 12 October 1943, Monnet, “Notes prises a la séance du Comité National de la Libération”, both Ibid.

<sup>43</sup> See Andrew Williams, “‘Reconstruction’ before the Marshall Plan”, *Review of International Studies*, 31/3(2005), 541-58

<sup>44</sup> Alphan, “Note sur le plan international, dans la domaine de la reconstruction économique”, 17 September 1943, PAAP 217, Volume 41; Alphan to Massigli, 16 June 1944, PAAP 217, Volume 42.

<sup>45</sup> Winant [London] to Camille [Paris], 25 July 1944, Massigli note about Sumner Welles’ *The Time for Decision*, August 1944, Massigli [Paris] note to De Gaulle [Algiers], 27 August 1944, all Ibid.

<sup>46</sup> “Comité de liason des Socialistes français en Grande Bretagne (Groupe Jean Jaurès), Procès verbale”, 27 April 1941 and 23 August 1941, OURS [Office Universitaire de Recherche Socialiste, Paris].

<sup>47</sup> Auriol [on Parti Socialiste relations with the *Parti communiste français*, 1944], 11 November 1944, and 3-5 March 1945, Auriol AN, 3AU 13 Dr1, Dr2, and 552 AP 36 dr 1 and dr2.

<sup>48</sup> Bonnet to MAE 1 January 1945, MAE “Série Y, Internationale, 1944-1949”, Affaires Politiques; Etats Unis, 76CPcom/7.

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<sup>49</sup> Bidault, “Note pour le Général”, “Entretien entre le Général De Gaulle et M. Harry Hopkins, le 27 janvier 1945”, both 28 January 1945, both Ibid.

<sup>50</sup> “Commission pour l’étude des principes d’une Organisation Internationale”, 2 December 1944-January 1945, and unsigned note in the file of 11 October 1944 about Bourgeois, “ONU Secrétariat des Conférences: Nations Unis et Organisations Internationales”, MAE 372QO/1; Cecil diary, 4 February 1919, Cecil [Cecil of Chelwood Papers, British Library, London] Add Ms 51131. Cf. Williams, *France, Britain and the United States*, Chapter 2.

<sup>51</sup> “Instructions pour le Ministre”, 16 April 1945, “ONU Secrétariat des Conférences: Nations Unis et Organisations Internationales”, MAE 372QO/2.

<sup>52</sup> Massigli to MAE, 17 January 1945, MAE to Caffery, 23 February 1945, Bonnet to MAE, 25 February 1945, all Ibid.

<sup>53</sup> F.J. Harbutt, *Yalta 1945: Europe and America at the Crossroads* (NY, 2010), 6.

<sup>54</sup> Vinson to Plevin [still minister of Finance], 28 December 1945, Eady [British Treasury] to Plevin, 14 December 1945, Plevin AN 560 AP 32.

<sup>55</sup> Plevin notes of discussion with White of 27 April 1945, Plevin AN 550 AP 16.