

THE CONCEPT OF PLURALISTIC SECURITY
COMMUNITY : AN ATTEMPT TO APPLY IT TO THE
EUROPEAN UNION CASE

Efthymios George Costopoulos

A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of MPhil
at the
University of St Andrews



1997

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
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The Concept of Pluralistic Security Community: An Attempt to Apply it to the European Union Case

Efthymios George Costopoulos



M.Phil., University of St. Andrews
July 1995

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Abstract

This dissertation aims at developing and testing the concept of pluralistic security community evolved by Karl Deutsch in the 1950s. In essence, a pluralistic security community is a union in which war is no longer contemplated as a possible way of resolving conflicts among its members.

The conditions for the emergence of a pluralistic security community are threefold: (a) compatibility of major values; (b) mutual responsiveness and (c) mutual predictability of behaviour. Compatibility of major values has often been studied in relation to the democratic peace theory but, more than democracy as such, it is the conditions underlying its emergence (individualism and the spirit of trade) that foster peace. Mutual responsiveness is closely linked to the theory of cybernetics and requires the existence of many links between the units of the security community allowing the peaceful resolution of conflicts. Mutual predictability of behaviour implies the existence of long-term trust between the members of the community. A parallel is possible with the rational expectation theory in economics. As a conclusion to this part, it can be asserted that the concept studied is the main contribution to an embryonic theory of international pluralism.

After the analysis of the concept, an attempt is made to apply it in the case of the European Union. To test the reality of compatibility of major values, a content analysis of the final communiqués of the European Council over the past few years is made. Mutual responsiveness is tested thanks to a study of European regional policy and redistribution, since the existence of redistribution is a sign of cohesion and trust. Finally, mutual predictability of behaviour is tested through the study of European security integration (especially the Franco-German partnership, weapons co-production and through the study of Europe as an 'actor' in the world stage).

This concept of pluralistic security community is a valuable tool for explaining some features of the global setting like the peaceful long-term coexistence of states at the international level. The concept is also very relevant in the European Union as it explains one important achievement of European integration: long-term peace in Europe.

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Table of Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS	I
ABBREVIATIONS	IV
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	V
INTRODUCTION	1
1. SECURITY AND COMMUNITY: CONTESTED IDEAS AND IMPERFECT DEFINITIONS	5
Security: an ambiguous notion, an important issue	5
Security: a contested idea	5
Realism and Idealism: a critique of their premises	8
Security as a helpful concept	12
Community: a neglected concept with interesting prospects	16
A functional definition of community	16
Conflict resolution within a community	19
Security and community, common features and possible applications	20
PART ONE	22
THE ESSENTIAL CONDITIONS FOR THE EMERGENCE OF A PLURALISTIC SECURITY COMMUNITY	22
2. COMPATIBILITY OF MAJOR VALUES RELEVANT TO POLITICAL DECISION MAKING: IS A DEMOCRATIC OR A LIBERAL PEACE POSSIBLE?	23
The assumptions and the logic of the 'democratic peace'	24
The Kantian project	24
Causal logic and evaluation of the democratic peace	26
The critique of the democratic peace theory	27
The ambiguity of the definitions	27
Is the democratic peace statistically proven?	29
Alternative causal mechanisms	30
Which major values can make war unattractive and improbable?	32
War and enemy: the implications of some very common words	32
The emergence of peaceful values	35

3. MUTUAL RESPONSIVENESS: THE CONCRETE TRANSLATION OF THE SENSE OF COMMUNITY	39
Mutual responsiveness as a process of learning and understanding	40
Understanding, learning and conflict resolution	40
A cybernetic approach of the problem	44
Mutual responsiveness: fragile or self-perpetuating?	47
Mutual responsiveness in an interdependent world. Complexity and reality	48
Bargaining as a process of mutual responsiveness	50
4. MUTUAL PREDICTABILITY OF BEHAVIOUR: THE GUARANTEE OF LONG-TERM EXPECTATIONS OF PEACEFUL CHANGE	54
A sociological analysis of mutual predictability of behaviour	56
Parsons, systems theory and mutual predictability of behaviour	56
The creation of new relations between men and states	59
A model of rational expectations: mutual predictability of behaviour as a question of credibility	62
Rational expectations in macroeconomics: a brief overview	62
A model of integration and disintegration based on expectations and credibility	64
5. SECURITY COMMUNITY: AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO AN EMBRYONIC THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL PLURALISM	69
Integration: an imperfect description of a complex process	70
Security community theory vis-à-vis some other theories of international integration	75
PART TWO	81
TESTING THE EXISTENCE OF A PLURALISTIC SECURITY COMMUNITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION	81
6. TESTING COMPATIBILITY OF MAJOR VALUES: A CONTENT ANALYSIS OF THE COMMUNIQUÉS OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL	82
Testing compatibility of major values: some methodological considerations	83
Content analysis: methods and rules	84
The use of values by the European Council for the portrayal of the European Union	87
The main themes used by the European Council	87
The analysis of the results	88
The use of values with respect to states outside the European Union	92
The result of the content analysis	92
Analysis of the results	93
The example of Central and Eastern Europe	96
7. TESTING MUTUAL RESPONSIVENESS: THE CASE OF EUROPEAN UNION REGIONAL POLICIES AND REDISTRIBUTION	99

The growing importance of European regional policy and redistribution	100
The original instruments and provisions for the implementation of a regional and redistribution policy	102
The progressive strengthening of the regional dimension	104
The emergence of a real European regional policy	106
Rationale for Community regional policy and mutual responsiveness: explaining the construction of a policy	109
The rationale of European regional policy	109
European regional policy as a process of mutual responsiveness	112
8. TESTING MUTUAL PREDICTABILITY OF BEHAVIOUR: THE CASE OF EUROPEAN SECURITY INTEGRATION	119
The EU as a single foreign policy actor: achievements and short-comings	120
The notion of actorness: some theoretical considerations	120
The evolution of the European Union as a single foreign policy actor	122
Evaluation of the degree of mutual predictability of behaviour	124
Security and Defence co-operation and mutual predictability of behaviour	129
The Franco-German security relationship as a case of mutual predictability of behaviour	130
Interstate defence co-operation as an indicator of empathy and mutual responsiveness	Error! Bookmark not defined
CONCLUSION	141
BIBLIOGRAPHY	147
INDEX	164

Abbreviations

CAP	Common Agricultural Policy
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
COREU	Correspondant Européen
EAGGF	European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund
EC	European Community
ECOFIN	Council of Economic and Finance Ministers
EDC	European Defence Community
EEC	European Economic Community
EIB	European Investment Bank
EPC	European Political Co-operation
ERDF	European Regional Development Fund
EU	European Union
PPS	Purchasing Power Standard
UK	United Kingdom
UNRRA	United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration
US	United States
WEU	Western European Union

Acknowledgments

I would like, first and foremost, to thank Professor Trevor Salmon for supervising my dissertation and coping with all the problems and defaults of the text. I have had the chance to appreciate, throughout this year, his capacity for work, his friendly character and his open mind. I have very much appreciated the quality and the magnitude of his effort to supervise my work closely. This enterprise would never have come to fruition without his help and advice.

I would also like to thank Professor Pierre Hassner (Sciences-Po, Paris) for helping me with his sharp mind and his immense culture. Our conversations have been a great stimulus for further research and a great lesson in modesty. I am indebted to Pierre Hassner for showing me, in particular, the importance of recognising the limits of what can be proved and asserted.

I am also very grateful to Dr. Alison Watson (University of St. Andrews) for her directions and the ideas she gave me, and to the Greek diplomats Mr. Sotiropoulos and Dr. Catranis for ideas and advice.

Finally, I am indebted to Professors Michael Barnett (University of Wisconsin—Madison) and Emanuel Adler (Hebrew University of Jerusalem and University of Wisconsin—Madison) for sending me copies of their unpublished work and allowing me to quote from them. I must also thank Dr. Andrew Hurrell (Nuffield College—Oxford) for sending me his unpublished and forthcoming work and allowing me to quote from it.

Introduction

“We undertook this inquiry as a contribution to the study of possible ways in which men some day might abolish war.”¹ The classic study of Karl Deutsch and his colleagues thus had a clear and grand ambition. As always in such cases, however, it failed to deliver the straightforward and definitive answer to the problem of war and peace. Still, the notion of security community developed in this book has had a lasting influence in international relations theory.²

The main reason for this durability is that this notion has been helpful in explaining at once the process of nation-building and that of peaceful coexistence at the international level. In particular, the concept of a pluralistic security community is the main plausible explanation for the existence of long-term peace in some regions of the globe. “A security community, therefore, is one in which there is real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way.”³

The attempt at definition of the notion is worth quoting in its entirety:

A SECURITY COMMUNITY is a group of people which has become “integrated.”

By INTEGRATION we mean the attainment, within a territory, of a “sense of community” and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a “long” time, dependable expectations of “peaceful change.”

By SENSE OF COMMUNITY we mean a belief on the part of individuals in a group that they have come to agreement on at least this one point: that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of “peaceful change.”

¹Karl W. Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 3.

²The notion of security community was actually formulated by Richard W. Van Wagenen in *Research in the International Organization Field: Some Notes on a Possible Focus* (Princeton, N.J.: Center for Research on World Political Institutions, 1952). But the notion was mainly used by Karl Deutsch and is usually associated with his name.

³Deutsch, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

By PEACEFUL CHANGE we mean the resolution of social problems, normally by institutionalized procedures, without resort to large-scale physical force.⁴

To put it in a nutshell, a security community is characterised by the absence of violence. "What is essential for integration (...) is not a particular kind of formal institutional change, but the attainment of peace and security in the international system."⁵

A security community can be either amalgamated or pluralistic. Amalgamation implies the formal merger of previously independent units. This process is one of national integration. A pluralistic security community "retains the legal independence of separate governments. The combined territory of the United States and Canada is an example of the pluralistic type. Its two separate governmental units form a security community without being merged."⁶

The latter form of security community has not been thoroughly studied so far.⁷ The main reason for this is that there is no obvious explanation for the existence of long-term expectations of peaceful change in some regions. The image of peace as an interval between two wars can suffer a fatal blow if there can be a plausible explanation for the existence of peaceful relations over many decades and sometimes many centuries.

Karl Deutsch did not find a recipe for eternal peace. What he actually found was that under some, fairly restrictive, conditions, it was possible to reach a condition of integration that makes war almost impossible in the foreseeable future. Unforeseen circumstances could possibly ruin this achievement, but in a security community it is most probable that no war will occur. This achievement is very important and is thus worth studying.

This paper concentrates, therefore, on the conditions for the emergence of a security community. These conditions (compatibility of major values, mutual responsiveness

⁴Ibid., p. 5.

⁵Charles Pentland, *International Theory and European Integration* (London: Faber and Faber, 1973), p. 30.

⁶Deutsch, op. cit., p. 6.

⁷"We know of no thorough investigation into the ways in which certain areas of the world have, in the past, "permanently" eliminated war." Ibid., p. 4. But Deutsch concentrates mostly on cases of amalgamation and little research has been made in the field of pluralism since the 1950s.

and mutual predictability of behaviour) were initially indicated by Karl Deutsch but they have been little studied either by Deutsch or by any other researcher. The fulfilment of these three conditions does not necessarily mean that peace is mechanically guaranteed. "We do not know whether any other condition might be required which we may well have overlooked."⁸ What seems assured is that there is a tendency to have dependable peace if these conditions are realised.

The choice to concentrate on these conditions was also made because as in all cases of integration it is almost impossible to distinguish cause and effect. These conditions are also the result of the integrative process and therefore their study is also a study in integration in general. This analysis aims at providing the reader with a framework for explaining an integrative process leading to steady peace.

The most obvious step to take after the initial theoretical study is to proceed to an attempt to empirically verify the theory. For this purpose the study of European integration is an outstanding case. Europe, after many decades of war and conflict, seems now in a steady course of peace.

Why Europe? It is obviously (...) in order to proceed to a mutation in a European history made, especially in the last centuries, of so many murderous conflicts. For peace, therefore, since it was considered that peace would arise only through a new political construction: the substitution of an integrated political entity to the Nation-State system which is in a permanent state of precarious equilibrium, in fact necessarily in periodical imbalance.⁹

This accomplishment is worth studying and, it is possible thanks to the tools of security community theory to examine the degree of integration achieved in Europe.

"The preservation and extension of the European security community"¹⁰ is the least controversial aspect of European integration. European integration clearly aims at avoiding any return to the previous situation of "territorial rivalry, nationalist animus, and (...) uncertain military balance."¹¹ The commonality of this objective does not

⁸Ibid., p. 13.

⁹Jean-Yves Calvez, 'Europe : la signification politique d'un grand projet international', in Bertrand Badie and Allain Pellet (eds.), *Les relations internationales à l'épreuve de la science politique. Mélanges Marcel Merle* (Paris: Economica, 1993), pp. 171-172.

¹⁰Ian Gambles, 'European Security Integration in the 1990s', *Chaillot Papers*, no. 3, 1991, p. 8.

¹¹Ibid., p. 9.

mean, however, that the degree of integration is automatically sufficient to make war impossible, nor that there is agreement on how it might be best achieved.

It is the aim of this paper to evaluate the degree of integration prevailing in the European Union with respect to the conditions mentioned by Deutsch.¹² An effort is made to operationalise the three aforementioned conditions to allow the testing of the degree of integration achieved. The methods used for making the conditions operational are certainly open to question as the methodology put to use is obviously just one possible way of proceeding and many other possibilities come to mind. Still, this attempt uses methods either proposed by Deutsch or fairly easily linked to the conditions studied. The result remains utterly delicate and imperfect. The study of European integration remains handicapped by the limitations of the methodology used. But, it must be borne in mind that there is no perfect way of proceeding. The answer is incomplete, but it is still valid.

The empirical part is a useful complement to the theoretical one. Thanks to the conjunction of theory and practice it is hoped that a comprehensive study of both the notion and its application is made.

¹²More specifically, the aim is to establish if the construction of a pluralistic security community was eventually successful and integration was achieved. For more details on the difference between successful and unsuccessful integration see Deutsch, *op. cit.*, p. 6 ff.

1. Security and Community: contested ideas and imperfect definitions

Security and community are basic notions that lie at the heart of this study and have therefore to be examined and defined as thoroughly as possible. Neither of these notions has been adequately studied in the mainstream international relations literature. The concept of community has been used mainly by sociologists and has seldom been used in international relations theory. The notion of security has been insufficiently studied as most scholars preferred to refer to more basic concepts such as peace or power. Producing a link between these two concepts is an equally challenging task. At first glance, the two words seem completely unrelated. So far, Karl Deutsch is the main scholar who has succeeded in linking these words in a helpful and innovative way.¹ It will be argued that the two concepts have important links that make their joint use very helpful.

Security: an ambiguous notion, an important issue

Barry Buzan, in a seminal book, discussed the problem of national security. He considers that security is “an underdeveloped concept,”² because it was usually studied either as an aftermath of state power or as a likely result of world peace.

Security: a contested idea

So far, security has been considered as a second rate concept. In the words of Barry Buzan:³

¹Karl W. Deutsch et alii, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience* (Princeton N.J: Princeton University Press, 1957).

²Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear, The National Security Problem in International Relations* (Brighton: Harvester Hill, 1983), pp. 3-9.

³*Ibid.*, pp. 1-2.

Most of the literature which attempts analysis or prescription is based on the concepts of power and peace. Those who favour the approach through power derive their thinking from the traditional Realist school of International Relations (...) Those who favour the approach through peace are more loosely associated into the idealist school.

Both of these positions have an internal logic that has to be captured.

On the one hand, Realists⁴ equate power and security. Realists would argue that in an international setting that is akin to the state of nature that Thomas Hobbes described in *Leviathan*, it is quite obvious that the only possible way to ensure one's security is to acquire as much power as possible. If a state is a wolf for another state, then the only way to protect oneself in this unstable environment is to be powerful. No alliance or union can be considered as anything more than a tactical response to an imminent threat. No attempt to organise the international system should ever be expected to succeed in the long term. The basic premises to such a view are: (a) the existence of international anarchy and (b) the continuing importance of state sovereignty. These two conditions are mutually dependent, as sovereignty by definition means that there is no overarching authority, which is a (possible) definition of anarchy.

Thus, the realist school, while applying widely the concept of security, uses it commonly for empirical studies in the field of strategic studies. The concept itself is never addressed on its own right, and it is always considered of lesser value than the concept of power. Transnational links, supranational and subnational actors are seen as of little value, as ultimately power rests on the principal unit of the international system (i.e. the state). Efforts to limit the anarchical character of the system are equally doomed to failure. Realists consider that as the international order is, in essence, a non-

⁴By realism is meant the traditional paradigm of international relations that puts power at its core. Discord is the main feature of interstate relations. International organisations have only a marginal role to play and cannot solve the security dilemma in the anarchic international setting. This view has been expressed by many famous scholars such as E. H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz, John Herz, Henry Kissinger, Robert Gilpin, Raymond Aron and George Kennan, and its basic assumptions owe a lot to Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes and Clausewitz. For a comprehensive survey of the notion of realism see James Der Derian (ed.), *International Theory: Critical Investigation* (London: Macmillan, 1995). In particular, Martin Wight, 'Why is there no International Theory?'; J. Ann Tickner, 'Hans Morgenthau's Principles of Political Realism: A Feminist Reformulation' and James Der Derian, 'A Reinterpretation of Realism: Genealogy, Semiology, Dromology'.

co-operative one, it is impossible to imagine a harmonious setting. The reason why is that either a co-operative system can be used by a free rider within it,⁵ or a non-member can profit from the restraints imposed on the members of the system to enhance its power.⁶ In both cases co-operation is nothing more than a fragile and limited reply to problems that have only power as their definitive answer.

On the other hand, Idealists⁷ usually consider that the basic pattern of the international system is not the quest for power but the search for peace. This school considers that achieving international peace is possible through (a) the improvement of oneself by education and thus a gradual change of human nature (b) the democratisation process that should put more control on the deeds of the government and (c) an international system that puts more emphasis to collective security and the participation of all states in the concert of nations.

Idealists consider it feasible to change human nature in a way that will enable control of its intrinsically violent tendencies. The national system is considered as being amendable in a manner that will institute sufficient checks and balances to provide for lasting peace. Finally the international system is considered as being reformable in a fashion that will make international co-operation and collective security possible. In other words, Idealists think that peace is within reach, and therefore security is but an

⁵This analysis owes a lot to Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups* (New York: Schocken Books, 1968).

⁶This point is made with great eloquence by Kenneth Waltz in *Man, the State and War, a Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954, 1959). He argues (see pp. 218 ff.) that it is of no use for a state (or for a group of states) being virtuous as long as other states can profit from their restraint in order to enhance their power. Consequently, the anarchical character of the international system is self-perpetuating. Latency is one of the most important characteristics of international anarchy.

⁷The distinction between realism and idealism was made with great expressiveness by E. H. Carr in his classic book *The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939, An Introduction to the Study of International Relations* (London: Macmillan, 1940). Carr demonstrated that utopianism is an intellectual descendent of Enlightenment optimism, nineteenth century liberalism and twentieth century Wilsonian idealism. International relations have been profoundly influenced by this school. In the words of Carr (p. 11): "Like other infant sciences, the science of international politics has been markedly and frankly utopian. It has been in the initial stage in which wishing prevails over thinking, generalisation over observation, and in which little attempt is made at a critical analysis of existing facts." An important number of scholars are generally considered as being idealists. Ernst Haas, David Mitran, Michael Doyle, Bruce Russett and Robert Rosecrance are often viewed as belonging to this group. For a study of the realism vs. idealism debate see Athanasios Platias' paper in Dimitri C. Constat and Panayotis I. Tsakonas (eds.), *Elliniki Exoteriki Politiki: Esoterikoi kai Diethneis Parametroi* [Greek Foreign Policy: Internal and External Parameters] (Athens: Odysseas, 1994), see also Ray Maghroori and Benett Ramberg (eds.), *Globalism Versus Realism: International Relations' Third Debate* (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1982) and Robert N. Berki, *On Political Realism* (London: Dent, 1981).

imperfect way of addressing international problems. A possible search for security can only delay the ultimate quest, which is the one for peace.

This cleavage between the realist and the idealist view follows a similar rift between optimists and pessimists.

[Optimists] would go on to argue that it is false to say—or assume—that war is a necessary or inherent feature of the international political system. [Pessimists] take the view that the wave of the future is not community and peace but several states torn apart, with Yugoslavia as a more reliable precursor of the future.⁸

This division is not just a matter of academic interest. It is one of political choice and therefore has great practical consequences. The realist paradigm implies that the only rational policy is one aiming (at the state level) to reduce vulnerability. The idealist paradigm, in contrast, implies that by working on various levels (the level of the individual, of the state and of the international system), it is possible to reach perpetual peace.

Realism and Idealism: a critique of their premises

The dichotomy between Realists and Idealists is a very artificial one.⁹ Going beyond this rift is essential if a more reliable concept is to be found. Neither of these visions is flawless.

The realist view has important premises that are very much debatable. The first premise is the perpetual character of international anarchy. Even non-realists like Barry Buzan agree that a form of anarchy is a constant feature of international relations.¹⁰ The most common definition given to anarchy is the absence of an overarching authority. This lacking authority means that there is no monopoly of the legitimate use of violence.¹¹ This conception is not as clear as it seems, for this monopoly can be legitimate or not depending on the circumstances. The existence of an overarching

⁸Trevor C. Salmon, 'The Nature of International Security' in Roger Carey and Trevor C. Salmon (eds.), *International Security in the Modern World* (London: MacMillan Press, 1992), pp. 7-8.

⁹The two schools described previously are mere ideal-types. In reality, most of their partisans have more subtle positions.

¹⁰See Barry Buzan, 'Peace, Power and Security: Contending Concepts in the Study of International Relations', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 21, no. 2, 1984, pp. 112 ff.

¹¹This is a Weberian definition of the state, see Max Weber, *Politik als Beruf* (Munich and Leipzig: 1919).

government does not guarantee its legitimacy, and without legitimacy a government (national as well as international) cannot possibly expect to be respected forever. The non-existence of an overarching authority does not necessarily intimate that chaos is the state of the global system. Anarchy also has the meaning of disorder, of a Hobbesian state of nature. According to this view, international relations are a zero sum game in which the gains of one of the players are the losses of another.¹² Nevertheless, important elements of order are undeniably present in the international system. Hedley Bull, for instance, argues that some elements of order exist "because at no stage can it be said that the conception of the common interests of states, of common rules, accepted and common institutions worked by them, has ceased to exert an influence."¹³ Elements such as the balance of power or the presence of the great powers are important stabilising factors that cannot be completely ruled out in the international system. Anarchy is an ambiguous concept that rarely serves intellectual clarity. "While anarchy is an important condition of world politics, it is not the only one. Strategic interdependence among the actors is at least as fundamental."¹⁴

The second important assumption of the realist school relates to the continuing importance of state sovereignty. "The claim to sovereignty makes the state the highest form of social unit, and explains its centrality to political analysis."¹⁵ Even if the centrality of the sovereign state in the international system cannot be questioned, the concept of sovereignty is highly controversial. Sovereign states are meant to be equal. But, this legalistic approach does not encapture the reality of international life. All states are not equally sovereign, and it is clear that as sovereignty puts a lot of emphasis on self-help, it is much more suitable for great powers. Lesser powers have to become either junior partners or clients of a great power. The realist paradigm is suitable for a system dominated by great powers that have vested interests in

¹²For a study of the notion of international anarchy see Richard Ashley, 'The Powers of Anarchy: Theory, Sovereignty, and the Domestication of Global Life', in James Der Derian (ed.), *op. cit.* and Alexander Wendt, 'Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics', in *ibid.*

¹³Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of World Order* (London: Macmillan 1977), p. 42.

¹⁴Helen Milner, 'The assumption of anarchy in international relations theory: a critique', *Review of International Studies*, vol. 17, 1991, p. 85. For an incisive critique of the state of nature theory in international relations, see also Charles Beitz, *Political Theory and International Relations* (Princeton N.J: Princeton University Press, 1979).

¹⁵Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, *op. cit.*, p 41.

maintaining a world of anarchy and sovereignty where power is the emblematic feature. From a realist point of view, no integration other than one based on a (by definition) fragile and changing balance of power is possible, as "it has been argued that political systems become or remain cohesive because of the presence, or threat, of force."¹⁶ Not only is the sovereignty assumption biased in favour of the great powers, it also ignores the growing interdependence that limits more and more the possibility for efficient action at the state level. This growing interdependence ultimately means "a *loss of autonomy* in economic decision-making, and (...) increasing political *entanglements* that constrain foreign policy choices."¹⁷ In other terms, interdependence is an inescapable pattern that will grow more and more important. Great powers are less vulnerable to it, but they cannot escape it. The relative economic decline of the United States and its growing dependence on foreign credits, or the impossibility of a national fiscal policy in a Europe characterised by perfect capital mobility and multiple currencies¹⁸ are but some signs of this growing interdependence.

The idealist view is equally flawed by its own assumptions. These are the possibility for mankind to control its violent instincts, the possibility to control state action and the possibility to generate a peaceful international system. It must be borne in mind that only the realisation of all of the above conditions can possibly produce the expected result, i.e. world peace. Kenneth Waltz argued convincingly that the realisation of any of these conditions by only a few states or a few individuals is doomed to fail, as this kind of logic has to be totally shared by everybody in order to be reliable.¹⁹ The idealist view also overstates the elements of order included in the international system. The fact that there is not a complete disorder does not mean that there could be a complete order. Assuming, as the idealist school does, that there is no necessary incompatibility of interests is a risky view. Even if all of the interests of the states are not *per se*

¹⁶James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., *Contending Theories of International Relations, a Comprehensive Survey* (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1990), p. 431.

¹⁷Beverly Crawford, 'The New Security Dilemma under International Economic Interdependence', *Millennium*, vol. 23, no. 1, 1994, p. 27, emphasis in original.

¹⁸See the Mundell Fleming model as explained in Rudiger Dornbusch and Stanley Fischer, *Macroeconomics* (New York: MacGraw Hill, 1990).

¹⁹"In international politics a partial 'solution', such as one major country becoming pacifist, might be a real contribution to world peace; but it might as easily hasten the coming of another major war.", *op. cit.*, p. 231.

incompatible, it is difficult to consider that there is a possibility to avoid conflicts of interest forever.

Moreover, idealism assumes that it is possible to build a system of command and decision that could be totally rational and not be subject to the usual flaws of the decision making process (that is imperfect information, misperceptions, misunderstandings etc.). This view is totally unrealistic, since the decision making process is dominated by what Herbert Simon called "bounded rationality".²⁰ At every level of the process a lack of information and the impossibility of implementing it perfectly makes a totally rational decision impossible. Instead, the decisions are taken by a process dominated by experience and by partial information. In reality, therefore, there is no hope that the decision process will ever be rational enough to exclude completely all mistakes. In the words of Trevor Salmon:²¹

The fact that individuals are so important has significant implications, because they act on their perception of what the world is like. They do not act on the basis of what some omniscient, objective observer may know the world to be like.

Machiavelli ensured a lasting influence in political theory by pointing to the impossibility of living virtuously in a world dominated by vice. Idealists respond to this critique by assuming that a world government or a collective system of governance can ensure the rule of virtue in the world. Another prospect is total isolation, a dream present in many philosophical treaties. But, as Pierre Hassner argues:²²

²⁰Herbert Simon, *Administration Behavior* (New York: Macmillan, 1958).

²¹Salmon, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

²²Pierre Hassner, 'Beyond the three traditions: the philosophy of war and peace in historical perspective', *International Affairs*, vol. 70, no. 4, 1994, pp. 740-741.

the problem is the same for the Platonic republic or for the Stalinist 'socialism in one country': ties with foreign lands trouble the unity of the body politic and the exclusive loyalty of the citizens (...) The imperatives of survival tend to replace those of the good life; the city risks being dominated by those who defend it, or having to imitate those who threaten it and whom it would like to avoid. This is Machiavelli's problem: can one be good alone in a world where everyone else is bad? (...) It is the problem of the size of the states, raised, after the Greeks, by Montesquieu and, in a more acute form still, by Rousseau: if it is small, a republic risks losing its existence; if it is big, it risks losing its reasons for existing. In one case, it risks becoming the victim of external war; in the other, it risks becoming the victim of domestic discord.

Small or universal, the government imagined by the idealists is nothing more than an illusion. Peace is always something contingent, something that cannot be guaranteed forever. At best, one can hope of achieving peace for the foreseeable future.

Security as a helpful concept

The polarisation of international relations theory does not serve intellectual precision. Therefore, going beyond these two schools seems indispensable. "The constitution of a community of values in Western Europe since the end of World War II and the conditions created by the end of the cold war and the mostly peaceful revolutions in Eastern Europe for the enlargement of the community demonstrate the growing inadequacy of both 'realistic' balance-of-power thinking and 'idealistic' world-government ideas in this part of the world."²³ Security is, in that respect, a very helpful concept.

Security is, at the same time, an aim of any human condition and "a precondition of ordered human condition."²⁴ States, as well as individuals, primarily need to ensure a pressureless existence. Thus, the first and foremost concern of these states is their security and not their power as such. Of course, power can provide security but security can also be reached by other means. "Direct competition and hostility among states" are as much a source of insecurity as are "fragmented and incremental decision making procedures, misunderstandings and misperceptions, arms racing, complexity of

²³Emanuel Adler, 'Europe's New Security Order: A Pluralistic Security Community', in Beverly Crawford (ed.), *The Future of European Security* (Berkeley, CA: IAS, UC Berkeley, 1992), p. 287.

²⁴Peter Mangold, *National Security and International Relations* (London: Routledge, 1990), p. 1.

interests in a complex system of interdependence".²⁵ Insecurity can therefore be addressed by enhancing one's own power, or it can be addressed by eliminating some sources of insecurity by a process of growing integration.

Barry Buzan claims that three important conditions are imposed on the concept of international security by the context of anarchy: (1) the centrality of states as the principal referent object of security; (2) the fact that the dynamics of international security are highly relational and interdependent between states and (3) under anarchy, security can only be relative, never absolute.²⁶ However vague and ambiguous the term of anarchy seems useful for defining the international system. Nevertheless, the presence of considerable elements of order (especially in some regional settings) bounds anarchy. Instead of anarchy as such the international system could be characterised by a state of semi-anarchy in which anarchy and order coexist in various amounts depending on the particular issue and on the level of integration of the regional subsystem. In this context of semi-anarchy the international 'violence' that the state of nature implies can take various forms.

In order to have a helpful definition of security it is important to address the nature of the threats against national security. Conventional wisdom, on the one hand, usually asserts that there is only one true threat against national security which is military attack. This vision underestimates the possibility of having a more subtle indirect threat against a state's security. On the other hand, a growing literature considers that it is not possible to exclude any threat on the ground that it is not direct or important enough. This vision is unhelpful, however, as the notion of security is then so broad that it becomes unworkable. Barry Buzan identifies four main kinds of threats: (1) military; (2) political; (3) economic; and (4) ecological.²⁷ The number of the sources of threats seems of little importance, what is important is their characteristics.

Arnold Wolfers made a seminal definition of the concept of security:²⁸

²⁵Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, op. cit., pp. 156-172.

²⁶Barry Buzan, 'Is international security possible?' in Ken Booth (ed.), *New Thinking about Strategy and International Security* (London: Harper Collins Academic, 1991), p. 34.

²⁷Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, op. cit., chapter 3.

²⁸Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1965), p. 150.

security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked.

This definition makes an uneasy distinction between objective and subjective sense. A threat even in a subjective sense implies that there should be preparations to match it. These preparations can be considered as a threat by another actor. This actor will respond to this threat and a spiral of insecurity will be on motion. This subjective threat will become objective. Insecurity usually calls for more power and competition for power has a self-defeating aspect. John Herz named this spiral the "security dilemma"²⁹ meaning that as no state can make a distinction between an offensive or a defensive security plan, an actor should always be set for a potential war.

Security can be defined as the protection of the core values of a society from external threats. The important thing about these threats is neither their objective existence nor their source, it is their nature. In order to avoid a definition of security that will be unhelpful it is essential to make sure that the threats considered are of violent nature. Values, even core values, of a society change over time, but if this change is peaceful and does not come from any coercive, violent pressure then it is more of a challenge than of a threat. A military invasion, a nuclear accident in another state that will change the equilibrium of the ecosystem, the partially violent subversion of a state's political system in contrast are matters of security, because they can induce a change in the values of a society against the will of its members.³⁰ A challenge is an invitation to take part in a contest for the achievement of a certain goal whereas a threat aims at changing the core values of a society not by a peaceful process resulting from the inability of these values to respond to the changes in life, but by a violent and coercive process that wants to impose new values and ways.

So far, the words values or core values has been used without ever being properly defined. These values can be both material (values that can be quantified like territorial

²⁹John Herz, 'Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma', *World Politics*, vol. 2, 1950, pp. 157-180. See also Robert Jervis, 'The spiral of international security', in Richard Little and Michael Smith (eds.), *Perspectives on World Politics* (London: Routledge, 1991), pp. 91-101.

³⁰Johan Galtung made an interesting distinction between *direct* (mainly military), *structural* (economic coercion for instance) and *cultural* violence (coercive legitimisation of the other two types of power). See Johan Galtung, *60 Speeches on War and Peace* (Oslo: PRIO, 1990) and Dietrich Fischer, *Non-military Aspects of Security: A Systems Approach* (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1993), p. 6.

integrity for instance) and immaterial (values that cannot be quantified like democracy or freedom for instance). This distinction is similar to the one made by Raymond Aron between material (resources, subjects, territory) and immaterial (values, principles) interests.³¹ However, this separation does not imply that either of these values is any more relevant to the concept of security than the other. Both are needed in order to understand this notion.

The notion of core values is very difficult to confine. What is the difference between the values that are considered as core values and those that are not? Who decides which value is to be a core one? These questions have no practicable answer. A value is a core value if a violent threat against it provokes a strong reaction against this threat and if its loss changes fundamentally the shape of a society. "Core values can be described as those kind of goals for which most people are willing to make ultimate sacrifices."³² The question of which value is a core value is one that is doomed to be eternally debated without ever hoping to resolve it. The concept of core value is an essentially 'contested concept'.

Given these premises, the definition of security (as the protection of the core values of a society against external threats) acquires a holistic character³³ and does not have the bias that the other, more strict, definitions of this notion have. The concept of security (defined in this way) "combines many of the strengths of the other two concepts [power and peace], and (...) opens up previously neglected area for research by pointing to the large potential for idealistic thinking which exists within the fixed, but not immutable, factors of the anarchy and the arms race."³⁴

³¹Raymond Aron, *Paix et guerre entre les Nations* (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1984). The term of interest is often used instead of the word value in definitions of security. Panayotis Ifestos defines security as "all the factors (...) that ensure and preserve the interests of one or many states" (P. Ifestos and C. Tsardanidis, *To Evropaiiko systima asfalias kai i elliniki exoteriki politiki pros to 2000* [The European Security System and the Greek Foreign Policy towards the year 2000] (Athens: Sideris, 1992), pp. 29-30). The term values is viewed as more accurate as it is more neutral and does not have the 'realist' connotation of interest.

³²K. J., Holsti, *International Politics, A Framework for Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice Hall, 1983), p. 129.

³³The need for a holistic concept of security was first emphasised by Barry Buzan in the conclusion of his *People, States and Fear*, op. cit..

³⁴Buzan, 'Peace, Power and Security', op. cit., p. 124.

Community: a neglected concept with interesting prospects

The notion of community has been almost exclusively used by sociologists, the other social sciences avoiding its study despite its very common employment in every day language in terms like European Community. The first task should be to find a functional definition of the concept of community. The second is to study the process of conflict resolution within a community. This should provide the necessary framework to link this concept with the one of security studied before.

A functional definition of community

Community is a word so widely used in normal every day language that its definition seems almost obvious. Whenever a group of people have something in common they are spontaneously called a community. In international relations, the term is little studied but widely used. There is continuous talk about the Atlantic Community or the European Community, but scholars or policy makers seldom define what community means to them.

It is indispensable to refer to the definitions of community produced by sociologists. Community is usually defined as "a collectivity, the members of which are linked by a strong feeling of participation."³⁵ Another possible definition is: "communities are structural units of cultural and social organization and transmission."³⁶ The main elements included in a community are: (a) a population (b) a territory and (c) a link between these elements that makes the community as a whole capable of intervening in the lives of its members.³⁷ Communities are identified by (a) the existence of shared values and beliefs, (b) the actuality of many interactions among its members and (c) the reality of a reciprocity that expresses some long-term interest and altruism.³⁸

³⁵G.A. Hillery, 'Definitions of community: areas of agreement', *Rural Sociology*, vol. 20, 1955.

³⁶C. M. Arensberg, 'The Community as object and as sample' in R. König, *Handbook of Empirical Sociology* (Cologne: 1961).

³⁷The elements of a community, defined above, are very close to the elements of the standard definition of the state (a territory, a population and a governing principle). The main difference lies in the third principal. A community is able to intervene in its members life, but not necessarily in an organised, formal and institutionalised way, whereas a state implies a governmental, institutionalised intervention principle. The concept of community is far broader and far less explicit than the one of state.

³⁸See Emanuel Adler and Michael N. Barnett, *Security Communities* (Paper presented at the 1994 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association), p. 29.

A community is also a complex system made up of a set of interlocking or integrated subsystems (economic, political, social etc.) fulfilling various functions and of various importance. A community is not exclusively characterised by a harmonious population or a 'we feeling', but a minimum amount of consensus is absolutely required.³⁹ "According to the minimal definition, community is simply a relevant degree of interdependence, and hence an objective fact, regardless of whether the governments or populations involved are aware of it or not."⁴⁰

A community, by definition, is a group of people who share certain attributes. Members of a community share values, preferences, and life-styles. They also share memories of common experiences. They aspire toward common ends, show deference or loyalty to common symbols, and sense common destinies. Most important, they identify with one another and distinguish between themselves and outsiders.⁴¹

Two main kinds of community seem possible, one based on kinship, status and hierarchy; and another based on territory, contract and individual rights. The former is a 'community of feeling', a community based on individual character and on habit, the latter is grounded on rational will and market economic logic (the pursuit of individual profit and the invisible hand that takes care of the general interest). The former results from likeness and from shared-life experience, the latter results from contractual relationships rooted on monetary values. This distinction was first made by Ferdinand Tönnies in his book *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* (1887). The differentiation is very important as *Gemeinschaft* usually refers to relationships illustrated by the family link and as *Gesellschaft* is used to qualify merchant ties or links of political allegiance.

³⁹Paul Taylor claims: "I mean community in the sense of community of beliefs, values, attitudes and loyalties. I call this a socio-psychological community..." See Paul Taylor, 'The Concept of Community and the European Process', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 7, no. 2, 1968, p. 85. For other accounts of the idea of community in international relations theory see Andrew Linklater, 'The Problem of Community in International Relations Theory', *Alternatives*, no. 2, 1990 and Andrew Hurrell, 'International Society and the Study of Regimes: A Reflective Approach', in Vokler Rittberger (ed.), *Regime Theory and International Relations* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993).

⁴⁰Karl W. Deutsch, *The Analysis of International Relations* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice Hall, 1988), p. 214.

⁴¹Donald J. Puchala, 'International Transactions and Regional Integration', *International Organization*, vol. 24, no. 4, 1970, p. 741.

A *Gemeinschaft* is therefore a 'natural' community but not necessarily a formal one. In particular, nations are usually considered as being 'natural' communities even though there are nothing more than an artificial creation. The claim of being natural is one of the bases of nationalism.

[A nation] is imagined as a *community*, because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship. Ultimately it is this fraternity that makes it possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings.⁴²

A nation that considers itself as a natural community is in actuality an "imagined community", a deeply artificial one. The separation between *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* is blurred. The usual translation of the word *Gesellschaft* by society does not explain the fact that all societies in one way or another claim a natural dimension. What is certain, nevertheless, is that a community that claims for itself a natural ascendant seems more solid, more likely to last.

A political community is a particular community. A seminal definition of this concept is provided by Ernst Haas:⁴³

Political community is a condition in which specific groups and individuals show more loyalty to their central political institutions than to any other political authority, in a specific period of time and in a definable geographic space.

A political community⁴⁴ is specifically a community in which there is consensus concerning the legitimacy of the central political authority and of the political values this authority stands for. "A common sovereign or supreme enforcement agency do not necessarily imply a political community, if by this is meant a common 'body politic'."⁴⁵ Communication in the political sub-system has to be particularly dynamic and efficient.

⁴²Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities, Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983), p. 16.

⁴³Ernst B. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe, Political, Social and Economic Forces 1950-1957* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958), p. 5, emphasis in original.

⁴⁴Ernst Haas is very suspicious of the notion of *Gemeinschaft* and substitutes for it a pluralist model of society, a community of competing interests co-existing thanks to an agreement about the rules of the institutional system. See *ibid.*, pp. 30-35.

⁴⁵Karl W. Deutsch, *Political Community at the International Level: Problems of Definition and Measurement* (Princeton N.J.: 1953), p. 6.

“A well developed political community contains everything that is necessary for the harmonious coexistence with other communities: civic culture, basic freedoms, law, civil society, good institutions, religious and ethnic associations, traditional communities such as the family and so on.”⁴⁶

Conflict resolution within a community

In sociology, the study of communities deal specifically with the way communities solve the problems they encounter. Previously, the concept of community was defined with reference to a minimum consensus or to put it in a different way, with reference to certain shared core values. It is, therefore, of great interest to study the pattern of conflict resolution that is adopted by a community. A community has to be strong enough so that no core values will ever be in danger and flexible enough so that change which is useful for the community can still occur. The *status quo* could be restraining the members of the community from better possibilities as it can be a synonym for the *sine qua non* condition of every organised body (that is stability).

Conflicts occur as a failure in the functioning of one of the sub-systems of the community can provoke the reaction of the other sub-systems and, depending on the importance of the original sub-system, a change of the whole. A community that is functioning properly, is one in which all the subsystems are working normally, meaning that none of them under or overworks. This implies that (a) the institutions and groups of the community are able to respond to the needs and to the demands of the members; (b) there is a consensus concerning core values so that every member knows what to expect from the other members; and (c) there is confidence that the first two conditions will be fulfilled, that is there are long-term expectations that the core values of the community will be honoured, and that the organisational functioning of the body is good enough. When these three conditions are matched, change can not only occur in the community, but this change will be compatible with its functioning and with its core values.

There is a strong relationship between, on the one hand, the legitimacy and the adaptability of the institutions and, on the other hand, the possibility of peaceful change

⁴⁶Ryszard Legutko, ‘Cosmopolitans and communitarians: a commentary’, in Chris Brown (ed.), *Political Restructuring in Europe. Ethical Perspectives* (London:Routledge, 1994), p. 233.

of the community. Conflict that is highly institutionalised does not disorganise the community. On the contrary, conflict in this case is often an organising factor. Frictions can occur from either an absence of conformity to the main patterns of the body or from overconformity to the system and its values because this overconformity can restrict the capacity of the system for latency and adaptation. Karl Deutsch made an opposition between communities of conflict and communities of interests.⁴⁷ Clearly both patterns exist and usually they coexist in the same social body. Conflict is an inherent feature of every community, its resolution is a crucial test for the capacities of the community to change without jeopardising its fundamental values.

Security and community, common features and possible applications

The two concepts studied in this chapter, are closely linked by the most obvious of their common elements: the centrality of shared core values. In both notions, core values serve as the organising principles undergirding their mere existence and as the main focuses of their care.

A sense of community implies a minimum consensus on the topic of core values. Security is the protection of core values against external threats. The importance of security is therefore more obvious than ever: the loss of its core values means the end of a given community and either its assimilation by another or its radical, coerced transformation into a new one. The two notions are interdependent. A community cannot survive without an effort to ensure its security.⁴⁸ Security has no sense if there is no community of values to protect.

The process of conflict resolution within a community, demonstrates that security can be ensured by various methods. The institutionalisation of some processes of conflict resolution greatly improves the capacity of the system for latency and adaptation. Security can be guaranteed by peaceful processes, and violent conflicts can be prevented in this way. Sharing some common values and an agreed institutional resolution system can limit drastically the violent nature of any eventual conflict. Thus,

⁴⁷Deutsch, *The Analysis of International Relations*, op. cit., pp. 214-215.

⁴⁸The reference to the security of a community (as opposed to the security of a state) is deliberate. "The security of states dominates our understanding of what security can be, and who it can be for, not because conflict between states is inevitable, but because other forms of political community have been rendered almost unthinkable." In R. B. J. Walker, 'Security, Sovereignty, and the Challenge of World Politics', *Alternatives*, no. 15, 1990, p. 6.

a community can live with its members sharing long-term expectations of peaceful change. Security is not necessarily a violent process, as discords can also be restrained by a system that makes violent antagonisms impossible.

Part One

The Essential Conditions for the Emergence of a Pluralistic Security Community

2. Compatibility of major values relevant to political decision making: is a democratic or a liberal peace possible?

Karl Deutsch considers the compatibility of major values as one of the essential conditions for the emergence of both a pluralistic and an amalgamated security community. He assumes that:¹

In regard to values, we found in all our cases a compatibility of the main values held by the politically relevant strata of all participating units. Sometimes this was supplemented by a tacit agreement to deprive of political significance any incompatible values that might remain.

This condition has an obvious link with the concepts of security and community examined previously. Security involves the protection of the core values of a community from violent threats. There is, therefore, the necessity to have a broad agreement on the subject of major values among the members of the community. Deutsch defines main values as “those which seem to be of major importance in the domestic policies of the units concerned.”² This definition is compatible with the one given in the previous chapter, this “major importance” being measured by the possibility of these values to induce the ultimate sacrifice for their defence.

Examples of major values, cited by Deutsch in the empirical part of his study,³ are: “basic political ideology (...) covered for the most part by the terms ‘constitutionalism’ and ‘democracy’”; “modified free enterprise” or the “rule of law”. It is worth noting that religion has, in most successful cases of integration, been excluded from the politically relevant values.⁴ This constant pattern of exclusion of the most controversial issues is a very important characteristic of the integrative process. Points that are too

¹Karl W. Deutsch et alii, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience* (Princeton N.J: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 46.

²*Ibid.*, p. 123.

³*Ibid.*, pp. 124-129.

⁴*Ibid.*, p. 125.

sensitive to be resolved have to become dead issues to allow the continuation of integration.

It is quite obvious that this first condition is both essential and very difficult to interpret. Most research has so far concentrated on the issue of what is widely called 'democratic peace' (i.e. the hypothesis that democracies do not fight against each other), but it seems indispensable not to limit this first condition to democracy to make it more instrumental.

The assumptions and the logic of the 'democratic peace'

The Kantian project

The hypothesis of a democratic peace is not novel. This idea has been advanced by many philosophers from the eighteenth century onward. Immanuel Kant in 1795 wrote his famous treaty *On Perpetual Peace* in which he argues that perpetual peace is possible if three conditions are fulfilled: (1) the civil constitution in each state is republican; (2) the law of nations is based upon a federation of free states; (3) the cosmopolitan or world law is limited to conditions of universal hospitality.⁵ This treatise raised many hopes about the possible achievement of a democratic peace based on these very conditions.

Kant, following Rousseau, considered war as an immense waste of time and wealth. In the words of Rousseau:⁶

Think of the waste of men, of money, of strength in every form; think of the exhaustion in which any state is plunged by the most successful war; compare these ravages with the profit which results: and we shall find that we commonly lose where we suppose ourselves to gain.

⁵Immanuel Kant, *On Perpetual Peace* (1795), section 2. For an analysis of Kant's positions see Michael Doyle, 'Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs', Part I, *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, vol. 12, no. 3, 1983 pp. 205-235; Thomas Donaldson, 'Kant's Global Rationalism', in Terry Nardin and David R. Maple (eds.), *Traditions of International Ethics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 136-158 and Andrew Hurrell, 'Kant and the Kantian Paradigm in International Relations', *Review of International Studies*, vol. 16, 1990.

⁶Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 'Saint-Pierre's Project for Peace', in Stanley Hoffmann and David Fidler (eds.), *Rousseau on International Relations* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), p. 78.

The perpetual peace was according to Kant the outcome mainly of constitutional constraints. Citizens that pay the price of a war in blood and treasure do not easily accept to fight. As long as the checks and balances of a republic function correctly there is little chance for an unjust war to happen, although "peace among men living side by side is not the natural state."⁷ Kant claims that:⁸

If the consent of the citizens is required in order to decide that war should be declared (...) nothing is more natural that they should be very cautious in commencing such a poor game, decreeing for themselves all the calamities of war.

Peace is not viewed as a natural but as an artificial state induced by liberalism and republicanism. *On Perpetual Peace* is an attempt to "construct a framework of ideas within which the generally acknowledged rights and duties of states *vis-à-vis* their own citizens can be shown to require, logically, acknowledgements of certain equally important rights and duties toward each other (and each other's citizens)."⁹ Perpetual peace seems to result and to be guaranteed by the recognition for all people of a "'a public law of men in general' (...) thanks to which no individual would any longer be in the state of nature, or, as Hannah Arendt was to say, deprived of 'the right to have rights'."¹⁰

Defining democracy is of course a very difficult task and most authors define democracy with reference to free speech, the rule of law, and regular competitive elections of the officials empowered to declare war.¹¹ Kant considers that the ancient democracies did not have a republican constitution because all of the power was held

⁷Kant, *op. cit.*, section 2.

⁸Kant, *op. cit.*, quoted from Hans Reiss (ed.), *Kant's Political Writings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 100.

⁹W. B. Gallie, *Philosophers of Peace and War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), pp. 13-14.

¹⁰Pierre Hassner, 'Beyond the three traditions: the philosophy of war and peace in historical perspective', *International Affairs*, vol. 70, no. 4, 1994, p. 747.

¹¹See Doyle, *op. cit.*, pp. 206-207, John M. Owen, 'How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace', *International Security*, vol. 19, no. 2, 1994, p. 89. Bruce Russett, in *Grasping the Democratic Peace* (Princeton N.J: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 14 argues that: "Democracy (...) is usually identified with a voting franchise for a substantial fraction of citizens, a government brought to power in contested elections, and an executive either popularly elected or responsible to an elected legislature, often also with requirements for civil liberties such as free speech." See also Robert A. Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), Tatu Vanhavanen, *The Process of Democratization: A Comparative Study of 147 States, 1980-1988* (New York: Crane Russak, 1990), and Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky, *The Real World Order, Zones of Peace / Zones of Turmoil* (Chatham, N.J: Chatham House Publishers, Inc., 1993).

by the *demos* and no checks and balances were available.¹² This distinction is important as the causal logic of the democratic peace usually derives from the definition of democracy itself.

Causal logic and evaluation of the democratic peace

The main reasons why democracies are loath to fight each other are of two sorts.¹³ The democratic peace can be explained by structural reasons namely the institutional constraints within democracies. The division of power and the various checks and balances of constitutional democracies are meant to prevent unjust wars from happening.¹⁴ The second explanation can be called normative as it bases its assertion on the norms supposedly shared by all democracies, these shared norms are meant to be applied at the interstate level and thus produce the kind of peace that reigns in the internal affairs of democracies. “The *culture, perceptions and practices* that permit compromise and peaceful solution of conflicts without the threat of violence within countries come to apply across national boundaries toward other democratic countries.”¹⁵ Democratic norms are the reason for this behaviour: “when it comes to democratic norms, nation-states not only can know each other better, but they *can know each other as nation-states that tend to solve their internal and external problems by peaceful means.*”¹⁶

The democratic peace has been considered as “the closest thing we have to an empirical law in the study of international relations.”¹⁷ Thanks to ‘cognitive evolution’, peaceful ideas originating in one nation are diffused to others.¹⁸ The partisans of the democratic peace claim that no democracy has ever waged war against another

¹²See Alain Lagarde, ‘Introduction’, in Kant, *Projet de paix perpétuelle* (Paris: Hatier, 1988), p. 34.

¹³This interesting distinction was made by Owen, op. cit., p. 90. See also Christopher Layne, ‘Kant or Cant: the Myth of the Democratic Peace’, *International Security*, vol. 19, no. 2, 1994, pp. 6-10.

¹⁴This explanation is favored by Kant (cf. supra).

¹⁵Bruce Russett, op. cit., p. 31, emphasis in original.

¹⁶Emanuel Adler, *Imagined (Security) Communities* (Paper prepared for delivery at the 1994 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association), p. 22, emphasis in original.

¹⁷Jack Levy, ‘Domestic Politics and War’, in Robert Rotberg and Theodore Rabb, *The Origins and Prevention of Major Wars* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 88.

¹⁸See Emanuel Adler, Beverly Crawford and Jack Donnelly, ‘Defining and Conceptualizing Progress in International Relations’, in Emanuel Adler and Beverly Crawford (eds.), *Progress in Postwar International Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), p. 14 ff.

democracy.¹⁹ “In fact, democracies seldom even engage one another with threats of military violence, and when disputes do arise, they hardly ever result in military hostilities.”²⁰ Thus, the hope of creating a genuine zone of peace in the world:

The political relations among the countries in the zones of peace and democracy will not be influenced by relative military power. Nor will those nations be divided into competing military blocs seeking to balance each other's power. There probably will be plenty of national and other conflict, but the decisive special characteristic of this conflict is that no one will believe that it can lead to war.²¹

Of course, the fact that such a war has not yet happened does not guarantee that it will not happen in the future. It seems nevertheless very unlikely that these statistical studies can either confirm or infirm the theory.

The critique of the democratic peace theory

The opponents of the democratic peace theory argue that (1) this theory is inherently ambiguous because of the difficulty in defining the two central notions of war and democracy; (2) democracies have been too few and too remote from one another so that no real risk of war between them ever existed; (3) democracy is not evidently the causal mechanism that accounts for the absence of war between democratic states, many other possible explanations can be proposed.

The ambiguity of the definitions

It is very tempting for partisans of the democratic peace to define democracy and war in a way that will validate their claims. As any statistical test (which can be objective),

¹⁹Doyle, op. cit.; Russett, op. cit.; Melvin Small and David Singer, ‘The War Proneness of Democratic Regimes’, *The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations*, no. 1, 1976, pp. 50-67; Erich Weede, ‘Some Simple Calculations on Democracy and War Involvement’, *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 29, no. 4, 1992, pp. 377-383; William J. Dixon, ‘Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement of International Conflicts’, *American Political Science Review*, vol. 88, no. 1, 1994, pp. 14-32. It is beyond the scope of this study to evaluate the statistical evidence produced by either the proponents or the opponents of the democratic peace theory. A rapid overview of modern history does not produce any clear example of war between democracies.

²⁰Dixon, op. cit., p. 14.

²¹Singer and Wildavsky, op. cit., p. 3. The existence of conflict is not denied by the authors: “Conflict among the nations of the zone of peace will have two sources: money (jobs) and symbols. That is, it will be conflict based on either opposing financial interests or on issues that are of psychological or emotional importance. But the key fact is that none of this conflict will affect the fundamental interests and feelings of any of the parties to the conflict.” *Ibid.*, p. 25.

prerequisites a definition of the concepts (which is subjective) no test can really be conclusive. Therefore, it is not really possible to test the theory from a purely scientific point of view. All the tests conducted so far are valid to the extent that their definitions are acceptable.

Political realism considers "war as a feature of all historical times and of all civilisations."²² The habitual definition of war is the one given by Bruce Russett:

War here means large-scale institutionally organized lethal violence, and to define "large-scale" we shall use the threshold commonly used in the social scientific literature of war: one thousand battle fatalities.²³

The definition of war as an armed conflict that produces over 1000 deaths²⁴ excludes *de facto* many low intensity conflicts and has therefore only a finite validity. War today is more complex and more difficult to circumscribe than before 1945 when most armed conflicts were preceded by declarations of war. Democracies are suspected of trying to avoid the embarrassment of an out and out war by resorting "to precisely those forms of non-attributable violence excluded from the Maoz definition."²⁵

Most studies excluded civil wars from their scope because of the need to distinguish between domestic violence and interstate conflicts. This distinction removes from consideration the American Civil War, an otherwise crucial test for the democratic peace theory. Because of the same reason, the Boer war is also excluded.

The definition of democracy is even more ambiguous and difficult to assess. There are inherent difficulties in the definition of a democracy. The abolition of slavery, female suffrage are but two of the *sine-qua-non* conditions of modern democracy but these were clearly not the conditions prevailing in the nineteenth century. In short, the definition of democracy has varied over the years and it still varies a lot across states as

²²Raymond Aron, *Paix et guerre entre les nations* (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1984), p. 157.

²³Russett, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

²⁴As in Small and Singer, *op. cit.*

²⁵Raymond Cohen, 'Pacific unions: a reappraisal of the theory that democracies do not go to war with each other', *Review of International Studies*, vol. 20, 1994, p. 218. Cohen refers to a definition proposed by Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, 'Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-1986', *American Political Science Review*, vol. 87, 1993. This definition is based on the concept of " Militarized Interstate Dispute", defined as (p. 628) "a set of interactions between or among states involving threats to use military force, displays of military force, or actual uses of force (...) these acts must be explicit, overt, nonaccidental and government sanctioned."

the political systems labelled as democratic have often as many similarities as dissimilarities.

It is only through some very ambiguous definitions of either democracy or war that the military occupation of the Ruhr by the French in 1923 or even the First World War is not considered as an armed conflict between democracies. Michael Doyle, for instance, considers that Germany at the brink of the First World War was a democracy for its internal affairs but not for its external relations.²⁶ This distinction may be considered as correct or not, but, in any case, shows the difficulty to explain some wars.

Neither war nor democracy can have a clear and universally accepted definition. As long as these definitions remain so imperfect, the democratic peace hypothesis remains utterly fragile as a rejection of the definitions of the terms means also the rejection of the theory itself.

Is the democratic peace statistically proven?

There is no doubt that especially in the pre-1945 period democracies were very few in number and very far away from one another. War cannot be considered as a real option in that case and it is not surprising therefore that no war occurred during this period between democratic states. As John Mearsheimer notes:²⁷

Democracies have been few in number over the past two centuries, and thus there have not been many cases where two democracies were in a position to fight each other.

Most opponents of the democratic peace theory claim that "random chance predicts the absence of war between democracies better than liberal theories of international relations."²⁸ Statistical studies conclude that "a test of the relationship between dyads at war and liberal dyads over time indicates that this relationship is very weak."²⁹

²⁶Doyle, *op. cit.*, pp. 216-217.

²⁷John Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War', *International Security*, vol. 15, no. 1, 1990, pp. 50-51.

²⁸David E. Spiro, 'The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace', *International Security*, vol. 19, no. 2, 1994, p. 51.

²⁹*Ibid.*, p. 68.

Democratic peace is explained by the fact that democracies “have rarely been neighbors.”³⁰

On a more abstract level, it seems difficult to reconcile two findings of many partisans of the democratic peace theory, namely that at the same time democracies loath to fight each other but do not equally loath to fight against non-democracies. Michael Doyle is steadier than other analysts when he claims that:³¹

Where liberal internationalism among liberal states has been deficient is in preserving its basic preconditions under changing international circumstances and particularly in supporting the liberal character of its constituent states. It has failed on occasion, as it did in regard to Germany in the 1920s, to provide international economic support for liberal regimes whose market foundations were in crisis.

Besides, decisional constraints are not a privilege of democracies. Every type of regime has some decisional constraints although, it could be argued that democracies have more constraints than other regimes. The relationship between democracy and war remains highly problematic as no completely satisfying theory can be found to explain it.³²

Alternative causal mechanisms

One of the main claims of the opponents of the democratic peace theory is that there is no convincing reason why democracy should be the explanation of the fact that there has been no war between a certain number of democratic states.

Christopher Layne, for instance, considers, after a series of case studies of crises between democratic states that did not result in a war, that realism explains better why there has been no war. He claims that:³³

³⁰Small and Singer, *op. cit.*, pp. 50-69.

³¹Doyle, *op. cit.*, p. 232.

³²For a discussion of different opinions concerning the relationship between democracy and security community see Emanuel Adler and Michael N. Barnett, *Security Communities* (Paper presented at the 1994 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association), pp. 25-27.

³³Layne, *op. cit.*, pp. 44-45.

From a realist perspective, democratic peace theory has mistakenly reversed the linkage between international systemic constraints and domestic political institutions. (...) States that enjoy a high degree of security, like Britain and the United States at the beginning of the twentieth century, can afford the more minimalist state political structures of classical Anglo-American liberalism, because there is no imminent external threat that necessitates a powerful governmental apparatus to mobilize resources for national security purposes. (...) The greater the external threat a state faces (or believes it does), the more 'autocratic' its foreign policymaking process will be, and the more centralized its political structures will be.

In short, according to this view, it is peace and security that produces democratisation and not democratisation that produces peace and security.

A more sympathetic view to the democratic peace theory still claims that it is not democracy as such that explains the fact that democracies do not wage wars against each other, but rather asserts that republican regimes usually ally with other regimes of the same kind. Thus:

Regimes that agree on the conditions of 'universal hospitality' are likely to define their interests in a similar manner, and to ally to fight for the same causes. This is not as Kant suggested, due to the liberal nature of the conditions of universal hospitality, but rather to power and interests, subjectively conceived.³⁴

Some other alternative hypotheses are advanced to explain the democratic peace. One of them is that "many democracies are peaceful toward each other because they are bound by common ties in a network of institutions, including transnational ones (e.g. the European Community)."³⁵ Another alternative explanation proposed by the same authors claims that "many democracies have common interests in presenting a unified alliance front, as in NATO, against a common enemy (perhaps enhanced by an active policy of US hegemony as a peace-keeper within the alliance)."³⁶

³⁴Spiro, *op. cit.*, p. 81.

³⁵Bruce Russett and William Antholis, 'Do Democracies Fight Each Other? Evidence from the Peloponnesian War', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 29, no. 4, 1992, p. 416. Similar analyses that finally validate the liberal peace hypothesis while keeping a realist framework are advanced by Georg Sorensen, 'Kant and Processes of Democratization: Consequences for Neorealist Thought', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 29, no. 4, 1992, pp. 397-414.

³⁶Russett and Antholis, *op. cit.*, p. 416. It must be borne in mind that the two authors are partisans of the democratic peace theory and do not accept the validity of these views.

The variety of these views shows that there is not for the time being any clear explanation of the absence of war between democracies. An explanation resting solely on democracy is still debatable and not entirely convincing.

Which major values can make war unattractive and improbable?

The process of establishing a pluralistic security community requires "an increasing unattractiveness and improbability of war among the political units of the emerging pluralistic security community, as perceived by their governments, elites, and (eventually) populations."³⁷ This requirement is met if the members of the pluralistic security community share some common peaceful values.

In the words of Seyom Brown:³⁸

Realistic strategies for durable peace, whether between two historically antagonistic nations, among a set of countries in a region pervaded by warprone instabilities, or for the world as a whole, need to address the systemic causes of war and to provide the involved communities with options for fundamental, even radical, restructuring of their relationships.

Moreover, the nature of any pacifying influence still seems inexplicable. Besides, the acknowledgement of the existence of a pacifier begs the question of its emergence. Such pioneers as Lewis Richardson, although confirming the importance and the reality of a pacifying influence, could not clearly demonstrate what this influence involved:

The existence of a pacifier is here proved, but its nature is not entirely clear. It may well be the habit of obedience to a common government. But there are several other social features which have positive correlations with common government.³⁹

War and enemy: the implications of some very common words

The assumption that war is the central feature of the international setting is not intellectually innocent. Such an assumption has as a premise, the fact that at the core of

³⁷Karl W. Deutsch, *The Analysis of International Relations* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1988), p. 281.

³⁸Seyom Brown, *The Causes and Prevention of War* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), p. 239.

³⁹Lewis F. Richardson, *Statistics of Deadly Quarrels* (Pittsburgh: Boxwood / Chicago: Quadrangle, 1960), p. 295.

the notion of politics lies a distinction between friend and enemy. If politics can only offer this binary choice, then it is obvious that the whole notion of politics is conflictual. This theory of the inherent conflictual character of politics was first developed by the German philosopher Carl Schmitt who claimed that the concept of politics was solely based on the antithesis between friend and enemy.⁴⁰ According to Schmitt, politics were only possible against someone or something. The enemy is considered as the indispensable stimulus for any political intercourse. Politics cannot exist without enemies and a friend-enemy relationship cannot exist without conflict. Conflict and, consequently, international war are inherent parts of politics.

This position is highly problematic and very reductionist. The whole complex issue of politics is reduced to a binary choice and no other alternative option is available. This vision does not encapture the complexity and the variety of either politics or international relations. Pierre Hassner proposes a sharply different distinction:⁴¹

It is the pairing 'them and us' (...) that constitutes human experience. But what is contained in this 'us', is it the nation, is it the land or any other portion, any other union? I do not know it. We all have selective solidarities, because as Rousseau said, the friend of mankind is the friend of nobody. (...) There is a plurality of loyalties and at the same time the need for an identity that supplants the others.

This distinction between 'them and us' contains a great number of different distinctions: 'them' can be the enemies but also the contestants and, broadly speaking, in a political relationship all participants are at the same time enemies and partners, they are conflicting and collaborating.⁴²

the "Enemy", is always the "Other", but not all "Others" can be defined as "Enemies", however important they are from the viewpoint of "our" identity.⁴³

This debate concerning 'them and us' opens a whole new multitude of possibilities. Politics are not necessarily conflictual, and war although central, is not always the main

⁴⁰Carl Schmitt, *Der Begriff des Politischen* (Berlin: 1932).

⁴¹Pierre Hassner, 'Le XXe siècle, la guerre et la paix', *La Pensée politique*, 1994, p. 49. The difference between 'us' and 'them' was well expressed by Goethe's Herr Biedermann: „Nichts Besseres weiß ich mir an Sonn- und Feiertagen / Als ein Gespräch von Krieg und Kriegsgeschrei / wenn hinten, weit, in der Türkei, die Völker aufeinander schlagen.“

⁴²Interview of Pierre Hassner by the author, December 14, 1994.

⁴³Vilho Harle, 'On the Concepts of the "Other" and the "Enemy"', *History of European Ideas*, vol. 19, nos. 1-3, 1994, p. 29.

feature of international relations. Politics and a broader social process can be conflictual at some times and collaborative at other moments. Competition is always under girding the whole social life but it does not inevitably reach the stage of becoming a violent conflict. The vision of international politics as an inherently conflictual relationship is not flawless:

Such a perception owes a lot to a philosophical-political vision that dates (...) to before the classical era of western diplomacy, the diplomacy of the interstate system consecrated by the treaty of Westphalia in 1648, or even to the times of the Greek city-state when, well before the invention of the territorial state, the idea of the inevitability of war between neighbouring, and therefore rival, political units, was sketched for the first time.⁴⁴

The traditional conception of the relationship between war and peace considers that: "Peace has hitherto appeared to be a more or less lasting suspension of violent modes of rivalry between political units."⁴⁵

This conception of the dialectic between war and peace is no longer valid in large parts of the world as for example in Europe where war is not a political option in most of the continent. To take into account this extraordinary change, a radical revision of the conventional wisdom is needed. Raymond Aron noticed this change that makes war far more unattractive today than some decades ago:⁴⁶

Who in Europe who is sane would dream of reviving the romanticism of fresh and joyous war? Who can forget the mincer of Verdun, the mud of the Flanders and the flower of European youth mowed down by machine gun, let alone the unspeakable horrors of the Second World War, the death camps, genocide and the area bombings?

A few lines later he explains what alteration of the core values of a society permitted this change:⁴⁷

⁴⁴Dario Battistella, 'Fin de la guerre froide, fin de l'état de guerre?', *Politique étrangère*, no. 3, 1993, p. 748.

⁴⁵Aron, op. cit., p. 158.

⁴⁶Raymond Aron, *Clausewitz Philosopher of War* (London: Routledge, 1983), p. 400.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 400.

I experience none of Clausewitz's passions - the cult of the fatherland incarnated in the sovereign, the exaltation of the martial virtues or the intoxication brought on by victory.

The emergence of peaceful values

External threats do not provide a satisfactory answer for the development of security communities. "Although external threats might be quite prominent in the production of many past, present, and future security communities, we see no theoretical reason why an external threat is a necessary condition. In fact, it is the recognition of shared identities that frequently creates the desire, the very expectation that it is possible to develop a security community."⁴⁸ Peace is based on common values and shared identities. What is apparently needed is some regional awareness, in the words of Andrew Hurrell: "Regional awareness, the shared perception of belonging to a particular community can rest on internal factors, often defined in terms of common culture, history, religious traditions."⁴⁹

But, every internal factor is not essential. More than the process of democratisation itself, it is some basic prerequisites of modern democracy that can be credited with the growing unattractiveness of war.⁵⁰ There is no longer much prestige in the uniform and the conquest of new lands looks pointless.⁵¹ The liberal philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries have predicted this trend. Grotius and Locke defined the state of nature in exactly the opposite way from the Hobbesian state of war and insisted on the coexistence of co-operation and conflict. Montesquieu predicted with great accuracy a shift away from the 'hot' passions of his times towards the 'cold' passions

⁴⁸ Adler and Barnett, *op. cit.*, p. 45. This argument is clearly developed by Adler: "such factors as the destructiveness of nuclear weapons and economic interdependence may explain states' reluctance to go to war, but only community bonds and the common identity that becomes established among democratic states can explain dependable expectations of peaceful change." In Emanuel Adler, 'Europe's New Security Order: A Pluralistic Security Community', in Beverly Crawford (ed.), *The Future of European Security* (Berkeley, CA: IAS, UC Berkeley, 1992), p. 290.

⁴⁹ Andrew Hurrell, 'Explaining the Resurgence of Regionalism in World Politics', *Review of International Studies*, forthcoming October 1995.

⁵⁰ For a discussion of the role of democratisation in Latin America see Andrew Hurrell, *An Emerging Security Community in South America?* (Paper presented at the 90th American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, 1994), p. 15.

⁵¹ This point was stressed at length by Pierre Hassner in his interview.

of merchant spirit and of individualism.⁵² These informal and only conceptual changes make a lot of difference in the way societies and states are organised.

Individualism in particular can account for an important role as it constitutes the very basis of our 'modern liberty'. In his very accurate analysis, *de la liberté des anciens comparée à celle des modernes*, Benjamin Constant claimed that freedom in the modern world means first and foremost individual, private freedom. This private freedom cannot be enhanced by military conquest and military values seem completely irrelevant.⁵³ This kind of freedom is not a zero sum game and the law that according to Thucydides dooms an imperialist power to either a boundless expansion or a quick disappearance is no longer prevailing. The main demand addressed to the modern government is not to acquire new lands but to create the necessary conditions for the production of wealth and the preservation of the basic rights of the individual.⁵⁴ "The motivation of individuals in the mass and in government, and the influence and skill of leaders, weigh far more heavily in the balance than differences in the form of authority."⁵⁵ International politics are profoundly affected by these social changes:

⁵²Montesquieu believes that "the natural effect of trade is to bring peace." In the first chapter of the tenth book of *De l'esprit des lois* (1748) named 'on the subject of trade', he claims that "everywhere mores are mild, there is trade; and everywhere there is trade, mores are mild." This view is also shared by Adam Smith in *The Wealth of Nations* (1776). These views are based on the basic assumption that trade and, broadly speaking, the pursuit of welfare are able to control men's passions. This view is expressed also by Albert O. Hirschmann, *The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism Before its Triumph* (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1977). A different view was expressed by Dupuy. He believes that the spirit of trade can fail to control the passions of men. This spirit is a passion that can go out of control. See Jean-Pierre Dupuy, *Le sacrifice et l'envie: le libéralisme aux prises avec la justice sociale* (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1992).

⁵³Individualism is a very complex notion having many different definitions: "«Utilitarian individualism» proposes the vision of a society of equal atoms directed by the pursuit of their interest, «romantic individualism», the one of incommensurable individuals of which none can be replaced; «market individualism» utters of a man free of passions entering in a new moral community shaped by the 'doux commerce', as well as a way (that of economics) to analyse human comportment." In Pierre Birnbaum and Jean Leca (eds.), *Sur l'individualisme: théories et méthodes* (Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1991), p. 12. For a discussion of the influence of individualism on liberalism, see Suzanne D. Jacobitti, 'Individualism and Political Community: Arendt and Tocqueville on the Current Debate in Liberalism', *Nomos: Yearbook of the American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy*, vol. 35, 1993.

⁵⁴This is a specific trend of contemporary democracies: "While there have been many democracies through history, most of the countries of the zones of peace are a particular kind of democracy that never existed before a few decades ago -modern, mass-high-wealth democracies, where the ordinary people are materially extremely well off by historical standards." In Singer and Widavsky, op. cit., p. 14.

⁵⁵Klaus Knorr, *The War Potential of Nations* (Princeton N.J: Princeton University Press, 1956), p. 96.

The triple process of state modernisation - on the political level a state is no longer composed by subjects but by citizens; on the economic level a state is no longer autarkic but interdependent; on a symbolic level a state is no longer only meant to protect the corporal security but also the economic and even the social welfare of its members - implies necessarily a rift with the postulate of the necessary autonomy of international politics with respect to the internal political order.⁵⁶

This modernisation of the state creates the necessary conditions for the emergence of an *homogeneous* international system. Such a system is composed of states "of the same type, and following the same conception of politics."⁵⁷ The homogeneity of the international state is certainly a guarantee for a more peaceful interstate framework. An heterogeneous international system is an important premise of the prevailing realist view concerning international relations.

The thesis developed above is quite similar to the liberal peace theory advanced by John Owen:⁵⁸

Liberals believe that individuals everywhere are fundamentally the same, and are best off pursuing self-preservation and material well-being. Freedom is required for these pursuits, and peace is required for freedom; coercion and violence are counter-productive.

The mechanism of the liberal peace is now more obvious. "Liberalism gives rise to an ideology that distinguishes states primarily according to regime type: in assessing a state, liberalism first asks whether it is a liberal democracy or not."⁵⁹

Given these premises, the definitional problem of the concept of democracy is now much easier to solve. In case of an interstate dispute, a regime can be considered as liberal if it is perceived so by the other part(s) of the dispute. This perception is necessarily subjective, but it is nevertheless the best way to solve this apparently insoluble problem.⁶⁰ Two fellow liberal states have little chance to go to war against

⁵⁶Battistella, *op. cit.*, p. 755.

⁵⁷Aron, *Paix et guerre entre les nations*, *op. cit.*, p. 108.

⁵⁸Owen, *op. cit.*, p. 89.

⁵⁹*Ibid.*, p. 95.

⁶⁰*Ibid.*, p. 90.

one another as they share the same values and consider wars of conquest as useless. This is true regardless of any formal arrangements existing between the two.⁶¹

The compatibility of major values relevant to political decision making is one important step in the integrative process that leads to the creation of a security community. It is certainly a *sine qua non* condition for the emergence of a pluralistic security community as a community pre-requires a certain homogeneity and a number of common core values. But more than abstract notions of basic political ideology like democracy and constitutionalism, it is rather individualism and the spirit of trade that make war pointless and peace always preferable.

⁶¹Lewis Richardson demonstrated, for instance, that common citizenship has not assured peace. See Richardson, *op. cit.*, pp. 184 ff.

3. Mutual responsiveness: the concrete translation of the sense of community

The second essential condition for the emergence of a pluralistic security community, according to Karl Deutsch, is:¹

The capacity of the participating political units or governments to respond to each other's needs, messages, and actions quickly, adequately and without resort to violence. In the case of a pluralistic security community, such capabilities for political responsiveness required in each participating state a great many established political habits, and of functioning political institutions, favoring mutual communication and consultation. To be effective, such habits and institutions had to insure that messages from other member governments or units would not merely be received, but would be understood, and that they would be given real weight in the process of decision making.

This second condition is the most concrete consequence of the achievement of integration. Because of the existence of a sense of community, the member units of a security community are able to respond to the demands formulated by their fellow units without using violence and without even threatening its use. A well organised (formal or informal) framework for co-operation, mutual understanding and help is needed to fulfil this condition.

A sense of community is "much more than simply attachment to any number of similar or identical values." It is rather "a matter of perpetual attention, communication, perception of needs, and responsiveness (...) a dynamic process - a process of social learning."² Describing mutual responsiveness as a learning process is very accurate. Without a notion of concrete solidarity and of mutual help there is no real chance of ever attaining integration. This solidarity is achieved through a process of learning and a constant effort to retain the attainments of the learning process.

¹Karl W. Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience* (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 66-67.

²Ibid., p. 129.

Thus, mutual responsiveness involves (i) the capacity of the member units to understand the problems of their fellow members; (ii) the possibility to find responses to these needs through a bargaining process that satisfies (up to a certain point) every one and (iii) the implementation of these solutions and a feedback process concerning the new demands generated by these settlements. The first and the third conditions are so closely linked and so interdependent that they can be considered as one and only condition.

Mutual responsiveness as a process of learning and understanding

Mutual responsiveness implies first of all that the demands of the participating units of the pluralistic security community will be received and understood.

While political units in this category might be able to do much without each other's aid, and might have no need to tremble at one another's threats, they might have acquired the political habits, practices, and institutions necessary *to perceive one another's sensitive spots or "vital interests", and to make prompt and adequate responses to each other's critical needs.*³

In this early definition of the concept of mutual responsiveness, Deutsch insists on the perception of the essential needs of the participating units. This capacity, in turn, requires the establishment of many communication processes that are efficient enough to allow the understanding of the various demands formulated.

Understanding, learning and conflict resolution

The process of understanding that leads naturally to mutual responsiveness (that is to the peaceful and adequate resolution of possible conflicts), is an essential feature of regional integration as such. In the words of Ernst Haas:

³Karl W. Deutsch, *Political Community at the International Level: Problems of Definition and Measurement* (Princeton, N.J: 1953), p. 10, emphasis added.

The study of regional integration is concerned with explaining how and why states cease to be wholly sovereign, how and why they voluntarily mingle, merge, and mix their neighbors so as to lose the factual attributes of sovereignty while acquiring new techniques for resolving conflict between themselves.⁴

Conflict resolution requires the existence of an efficient process of interchange that facilitates mutual understanding. It is therefore an essential feature of every security community and of every integrated region to have an efficient communication process that allows its units to understand the demands of their fellow members. This condition of integration is very close to the first characteristic of 'complex interdependence'. This characteristic, according to Keohane and Nye, implies that:

Multiple channels connect societies, including: informal ties between governmental elites as well as formal foreign office arrangements; informal ties among nongovernmental elites (face to face and through telecommunications); and transnational organizations (such as multinational banks or corporations). These channels can be summarized as interstate, transgovernmental, and transnational relations. *Interstate* relations are the normal channels assumed by realists. *Transgovernmental* applies when we relax the realist assumption that states act coherently as units; *transnational* applies when we relax the assumption that states are the only units.⁵

The coexistence of interstate, transnational and intergovernmental communication channels is necessary as the complexity of the needs and the demands of a member unit of a security community is great and the use of only one of these channels is not sufficient. To receive and to understand the needs and messages of another unit is, therefore, a very difficult task. This makes the realisation of mutual responsiveness very difficult.

The coexistence of many different conceptions about the necessity of a considered action makes the realisation of a common and well accepted policy action difficult. It seems proper to the process of mutual responsiveness that the conflicts that inevitably arise are understood and resolved. The process of understanding is also a mutual operation. The unit that formulates the demand expects the other units to understand it

⁴Ernst B. Haas, 'The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorizing', *International Organization*, vol. 24, no. 4, 1970, p. 610.

⁵Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence* (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1989), pp. 24-25, emphasis in original.

and, at the same time, the units that receive the demand expect the unit that expressed it to understand their possible objections and to consequently modify its claim.

This process of understanding is essential for the evolution from the power-orientated paradigm towards a non-violent international system. When a message is considered to be understood there is little chance that the issue will evolve into a violent conflict if the demand is sensible, or if it can be made more reasonable after negotiations.

Through the process of learning, initially power-orientated governmental pursuits evolve into welfare-orientated action. (...) When actors realize that their interest would best be achieved by adopting new approaches, and if these approaches involve commitment to larger organizations, then and only then does "learning" contribute to integration.⁶

The process of 'learning' described by Ernst Haas is quite similar to the notion of understanding that was used previously. Learning being generally used "as the adoption by policymakers of new interpretations of reality, as they are created and introduced to the political system by individuals and institutions."⁷ These notions of learning and understanding lie at the core of the social communication model developed by Deutsch.

⁶Ernst B. Haas, *Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964), pp. 47-48, emphasis in original.

⁷Emanuel Adler, 'Cognitive Evolution: A Dynamic Approach for the Study of International Relations and their Progress', in Emanuel Adler and Beverly Crawford (eds.), *Progress in Postwar International Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), p. 52.

The Deutschian model represents a process of integration based on a wide array of inter-societal transactions that are of mutual benefit to the people involved. The process is based on *learning* - learning that such transactions provide benefits, that such benefits outweigh the costs involved, and that there are positive payoffs to continue such interactions and even expand them. As such interactions occur, and expand, the peoples involved become more and more interdependent, and thus raise the costs of stopping such interactions. Also, as interactions occur and increase, peoples develop greater responsiveness to one another, the expectation that wants and needs will be responded to positively. At some point this produces the 'we-feeling', trust and mutual consideration that Deutsch called community. Responsiveness and community arise out of a continuing and growing set of social transactions by which people learn they can benefit, and through which they come to respect and trust others, and expect such respect and trust in return.⁸

The difficulty in analysing the process leading ultimately to the understanding of the needs of the other fellow members of the security community, lies in the fact that this process is at the same time a result of integration and a condition for the realisation of the integrative procedure. This makes it almost impossible to distinguish cause and effect of integration. Is mutual responsiveness a condition *for* or a result *of* the emergence of a security community?⁹ The problem is actually broader and concerns the whole issue of integration:

[Integration] can be seen as a state of affairs or as a process. As a state of affairs certain criteria must be met for integration to have occurred (...) The criteria are usually specified by the observer or participant, since there is no generally accepted 'essentialist' definition of integration. When integration is conceived as a process, units are seen to move between conditions of complete isolation and complete integration. (...) Thus, integration involves movement towards (or disintegration away from) collective action based upon consensual values for the achievement of common goals in which the parties have long-term expectations of mutually compatible and acceptable behaviour.¹⁰

⁸Harvey Starr, 'Democracy and War: Choice, Learning and Security Communities', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 29, no. 2, 1992, pp. 210-211, emphasis in original.

⁹Ernst Haas acknowledged this problem: "Do variables explaining the initiation of a union also explain its maintenance, as we seem to have assumed?", but did not propose any explanation or solution. See Haas, 'The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorizing', *op. cit.*, p. 622.

¹⁰A. J. R. Groom and Alexis Heraclides, 'Integration and Disintegration' in Margot Light and A. J. R. Groom (eds.), *International Relations: A Handbook of Current Theory* (London: Frances Pinter, 1985), p. 174.

A partial solution of this problem can be found through the consideration of integration as a continuous process. Integration is a process that does not start *ex-nihilo*, but from certain preconditions that exist in the given area and a process that has no clear and universally agreed end. The fact that the process has no agreed end implies that it is to be considered as a perpetual process. Having no clear goal to reach, the process is a self-perpetuating one. Achievements can be reached and progress made, but the effort has to be continuous as no stage reached can be considered as completely satisfactory. This does not mean that an ever more integrated area has to perpetually expand its scope and its centralisation. It rather means that the quality of the communication and mutual responsiveness inside the community has to always be a prime care of the participating units. The achievements of integration can never be taken for granted. Consequently, the realisation of integration can be measured through the quality of mutual responsiveness existing in the community. Mutual responsiveness evolving from the learning process implies the obsolescence of violent conflict and is therefore a most crucial condition and a very important test for integration.

A cybernetic approach of the problem

How is mutual responsiveness to be understood? The insistence of Karl Deutsch on the process of mutual responsiveness is highly influenced by the assumptions that eventually founded his cybernetic approach.¹¹ This approach in the words of Deutsch himself involves:¹²

the systematic study of communication and control in organizations of all kinds (...) Essentially it represents a shift in the center of interest from drives to steering, and from instincts to systems of decisions, regulation, and control, including the noncyclical aspects of such systems (...) In other words, the viewpoint of cybernetics suggests that all organizations are alike in certain fundamental characteristics and that every organization is held together by communication (...) It is communication, that is, the ability to transmit messages and to react to them, that makes organizations...

¹¹The theory of cybernetics, developed by Deutsch, is indeed more recent than his theory of integration. Nevertheless, the important assumptions of Deutsch concerning the nature and the characteristics of organizations are already present.

¹²Karl W. Deutsch, *The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and Control* (New York: The Free Press, 1966), pp. 76-77.

Deutsch believes that “cybernetics, understood in terms of communication and control, offers a general perspective on *all* politics. (...) Because cybernetics indicates that it is *steering* that stands as the most fundamental process, the study of it in institutions, societies, and individuals ought to increase our grasp of problems in all these fields.”¹³

“At the heart of Deutsch’s ‘pluralistic,’ ‘cybernetic,’ or ‘transactionalist’ approach was the assumption that *communication* is the cement of social groups in general and political communities in particular.”¹⁴ This process of communication implies the capacity of the participating units to emit and to receive stimuli. This is a very important pre-condition as it means that there must be established ways of communication and many channels that can allow the emission and the reception of all these messages. After the reception of a stimulus, it is important to be able to analyse it. The analysis of received messages is all the more easier if there are past experiences that can be useful in decision making. The whole notion of experience is very important as it has been already demonstrated by Herbert Simon.¹⁵ The importance of experience demonstrates the centrality of the existence of a great many established channels that allow a continuous flow of messages between the members of a security community. It now clearly appears that time is very important (despite the underrating of this argument by Karl Deutsch)¹⁶ as the greater the past experience and the regularity and the performance of the communication process the more efficient the course of mutual responsiveness will be.¹⁷

¹³Robert J. Lieber, *Theory and World Politics* (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1973), pp. 70-71, emphasis in original.

¹⁴Emanuel Adler and Michael N. Barnett, *Security Communities* (Paper presented at the 1994 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association), p. 6, emphasis in original.

¹⁵Herbert Simon, *Administration Behavior* (New York: Macmillan, 1958). Simon argued that the whole notion of ‘bounded rationality’ is based on the usage of past experience by the organisations and their members.

¹⁶Karl Deutsch argues that: “Integration is a matter of fact not of time. If people on both sides do not fear war and do not prepare for it, it matters little how long it took them to reach this stage. But once integration has been reached, the length of time over which it persists may contribute to its consolidation.”; in *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*, op. cit., p. 6. Thus, according to Deutsch’s view, integration is rather a state of affairs and only partially a process. The process (and the time required for its achievement) is not considered as important, but the importance of time is not denied altogether. The fact that it is difficult to evaluate the importance of time seems to have discouraged Deutsch from studying it.

¹⁷Lewis Richardson noted that the longer groups have been united by common government, the less a war between them is probable. See Lewis Richardson, *Statistics of Deadly Quarrels* (Pittsburgh: The Boxwood Press / Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1960), pp. 190 ff. This argument seems valid for formal or informal relationships. The longer a successful system of co-operation, the greater the

Cybernetics is the science of communication, control, interactions and learning. The success of the integrative course depends heavily on the ability of the members of the community to learn from their errors and to avoid new failures. Integration of a community may be seen as its "ability to receive and transmit information on wide ranges of different topics with relatively little delay or loss of relevant detail."¹⁸ The success of integration, in turn, depends heavily on the ability of the system to efficiently utilise the feedback (especially the negative one) that it receives. "Without feedback, any social unit will drift - ultimately to catastrophe."¹⁹ It is this feedback function that allows a community to correct the course of its action and to make adjustments of all kinds. Usually, most researchers put a lot of emphasis on the positive feedback of the transactions occurring within a community.

When these transactions are highly visible, easy to identify and differentiate, people may form images of the community or of the group involved in the transactions. If these transactions were rewarded, the image of a community may be strongly positive. Liking this kind of community, people may say: We belong together. In their favorable reaction to a community, they might then also say, I can see myself as a member of this community; I will call it "we" if I speak of a group. I will call it "home" if I speak of territory.²⁰

However true this analysis may be, it is important to bear in mind that the crucial test for the coherence and the success of the integrative process is a crisis and its tackling. In that respect the efficiency and the accuracy of the negative feedback is crucial. If the feedback is efficient enough, it is highly improbable that military security will be ever at stake in the relations between the members of the community. The efficiency of the process depends on the efficiency of its adaptive learning, i.e. the capacity of the

chances of its maintenance. The importance of time was also acknowledged by Kant. He believed that: "Passions and vices, discord and war are indeed the stuff out of which culture and history are made; but it is also these things which, in the long run, are opening the road to morality, to concord and to peace." In Pierre Hassner, 'Beyond the three traditions: the philosophy of war and peace in historical perspective', *International Affairs*, vol. 70, no. 4, 1994, p. 746.

¹⁸Deutsch, *The Nerves of Government*, op. cit., p. 150.

¹⁹William C. Olson and A. J. R. Groom, *International Relations then and now: Origins and trends in interpretation* (London: Routledge, 1991), p. 162. "By feedback - or, as it is often called a servo-mechanism - is meant a communication network that produces action in response to an input of information, and includes the results of its own action in the new information by which it modifies its subsequent behavior." In Deutsch, *ibid.*, p. 88.

²⁰Karl W. Deutsch, 'Communication Theory and Political Integration', in Philip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano (eds.), *The Integration of Political Communities* (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Co., 1964), p. 54.

system “to recognize and control or master an increasing variety of challenging situations.”²¹ In this case, the two other characteristics of complex interdependence are discernible as well:

2. The agenda of interstate relationships consists of multiple issues that are not arranged in a clear or consistent hierarchy. This *absence of hierarchy among issues* means, among other things, that military security does not consistently dominate the agenda. (...) 3. Military force is not used by governments toward other governments within the region, or on the issues, when complex interdependence prevails.²²

Mutual responsiveness in a cybernetic framework can, thanks to a system of communication and learning guarantee ‘dependable expectations of peaceful change’.

Mutual responsiveness: fragile or self-perpetuating?

The fact that mutual responsiveness needs the constant attention of the members of the community can be interpreted as the proof that a security community is not anything specific. Case by case dealings, according to this view, explain the various achievements better than the existence of a more abstract sense of community. The life at the community level is thus seen as a mere particular case of normal inter-state relations.

This view, albeit attractive, misses the point. The frailty of mutual responsiveness does not mean its non-existence. In a well established security community, the multiplicity of the channels of communication and the complexity of the relationships at stake can easily explain why there is being in the community that goes well beyond the being of its members.

This vision is fully compatible with the basic assumptions of cybernetics.

²¹Manfred Kochen, ‘Can the Global System Learn to Control Conflict?’, in Richard L. Merritt and Bruce M. Russett (eds.), *From National Development to Global Community: Essays in Honor of Karl W. Deutsch* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981), p. 393. See also Karl W. Deutsch, ‘On the learning capacity of large political systems’, in Manfred Kochen (ed.), *Information for Action* (New York: Academic Press, 1975).

²²Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, op. cit., p. 25, emphasis in original.

The view point of cybernetics suggests that all organizations are alike in certain fundamental characteristics and that every organization is held together by communication. (...) [Communications engineering] transmits messages that contain quantities of information (...) communication, that is, the ability to transmit messages and to react to them (...) makes organizations (...) of living cells in the body (...) pieces of machinery in an electric calculator (...) [and] social groups. Finally, cybernetics suggests that steering or governing is one of the most (...) significant processes in the world.²³

The lives of the individual members of the organisation are important and certainly have a great degree of autonomy. Nevertheless, the life of the organisation is not simply the sum of the lives of its members. The community has a life and a power of its own. The momentum for its existence and the modalities of the transactions inside the community are only up to a certain point determined by the members. Mutual responsiveness is the translation of this proper existence of the community. This existence shows the presence of a sense of community despite the egoism of the member units.

Mutual responsiveness in an interdependent world. Complexity and reality

In an excellent work, Andrei Markovits and Warren Oliver claim that the work of Karl Deutsch is very similar to that of the sociologist Emile Durkheim. "Deutsch like Durkheim, has been preoccupied with a fundamental analysis of modernization and systemic development, both as a process and as a condition."²⁴ The authors believe that Deutsch and Durkheim agree on a series of questions and especially on the question of legitimacy.

²³Deutsch, *The Nerves of Government*, op. cit., p. 77.

²⁴Andrei S. Markovits and Warren W. Oliver III, 'The Political Sociology of Integration and Social Development: a Comparative Analysis of Emile Durkheim and Karl W. Deutsch', in Merritt and Russett (eds.), op. cit., p. 167.

(...) a society without moral tenets and legitimate non-coercive channels of communication is bound to stagnate and eventually disintegrate from information overload due to lack of legitimation rather than technological deficiencies. The constraints of time and human capacities necessitate the existence in every society of what could be best labeled the 'non-contractual elements of contract'. People do not keep promises, abide by rules, and follow other patterns of peaceful and co-operative interaction because the enforcers of the law require them to do so; rather, they do so because of the legitimacy of certain 'unwritten rules', that is, because of the existence of the *conscience collective*.²⁵

This notion of *conscience collective* (collective consciousness or collective conscience) was introduced by Durkheim in order to analyse and to understand the social phenomenon. This notion goes well beyond the compatibility of major values studied previously. The social bond requires a communication framework that can transmit analyse and efficiently respond to the needs of the members of society.

The totality of beliefs and sentiments common to average citizens of the same society forms a determinate system which has its own life; one may call it the *collective or common conscience*. No doubt it has not as a source an unique organ; it is, by definition, spread in the whole of society; but it does, nevertheless have specific characteristics that make itself a distinct reality.²⁶

Society has an existence and a conscience of its own. This assumption is clearly incompatible with a social system (national or international) characterised by anarchy and the egoism of the units. The existence of a complex social system means that, thanks to the interdependent relationships of its members, the system has its proper existence.

This assumption makes mutual responsiveness all the more important as it is both the normal consequence of the actuality of a sense of community and a crucial condition for the continuing presence of the social bond.

²⁵Ibid., p. 171, emphasis in original.

²⁶Emile Durkheim, *De la division du travail social* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1960), p. 46, emphasis in original. Karl Deutsch also referred to the notion of consciousness: "Consciousness may be defined, as a first approximation and for the purposes of this discussion, as a collection of internal feedbacks of secondary messages. *Secondary messages* are messages about changes in the state of parts of the system, that is, about primary messages. *Primary messages* are those that move through the system in consequence of its interaction with the outside world." In Deutsch, *The Nerves of Government*, op. cit., p. 98, emphasis in original.

The process of mutual responsiveness is closely linked to the notion of interdependence. It is because the interests and the needs of the community are so completely intermingled that a practice of mutual responsiveness exists in the considered area. Oran Young defines interdependence:²⁷

...in terms of the extent to which events occurring in any given part or within any given component unit of a world system affect (either physically or perceptually) events taking place in each of the other parts or component units of the system. By definition, therefore, the greater the extensiveness and weight of the impact of events occurring in any given part of a system for each of the other parts, the higher the level of interdependence in the system.

Mutual responsiveness is an absolute necessity if there is to be a situation of interdependence (as opposed to pure dependence) in the considered area. In a situation of interdependence, the acts of a unit have great consequences in the lives of the other units. These consequences have to be either positive or (if negative) they have to be compensated in some way so that no single unit feels forlorn and left aside.

“International community is indicated by high volumes of international transactions over multiple ranges of social, economic, cultural and political concerns.”²⁸ For this community to be durable, its members must perceive themselves as benefiting from the existence of the community. If this condition is roughly fulfilled, then a process of mutual responsiveness that is real (albeit complex) exists.

Bargaining as a process of mutual responsiveness

At first glance, bargaining is the antithesis of mutual responsiveness. In a bargaining process, there is apparently an exchange between the members of the process that has nothing to do with altruism. Self-interest and egoism are meant to be the main preoccupation during the negotiations. In the process of bargaining the parties are not only motivated by the desire to agree. But if agreement is reached, this means that the forces for agreement proved stronger than forces for disagreement. The outcome can often be predicted “on some basis of some ‘obvious’ focus for agreement, some strong

²⁷Oran R. Young, ‘Interdependencies in World Politics’, in Ray Maghroori and Bennett Ramberg, *Globalism Versus Realism: International Relations’ Third Debate* (Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1982), pp. 57-58. For a critique of the notion of interdependence see Kenneth Waltz, ‘The Myth of National Interdependence’, in *ibid.*, pp. 81-96.

²⁸Donald J. Puchala, ‘International Transactions and Regional Integration’, *International Organization*, vol. 24, no. 4, 1970, p. 743.

suggestion contained in the situation itself, without much regard to the merits of the case.²⁹ In a world of complex interdependence, the process of bargaining conducing to decision making, is far more complex. For instance, Ernst Haas distinguished three patterns of compromise: (1) accommodation on the basis of the minimum common denominator, typical of classic diplomatic negotiations; (2) accommodation by splitting the difference, prevalent in the negotiations of international economic organisations; and (3) accommodation on the basis of upgrading the interests of the parties. This latter mode was considered as the most effective since co-operation in one area was leading to co-operation in another.³⁰

The existence of a security community makes a difference since: (a) thanks to the existence of a complex, interdependent world, the notions of national interest and of self-interest are even more blurred and difficult to circumscribe than otherwise and (b) the process of learning completely transforms the traditional way of negotiating. There is no obvious explanation of this phenomenon. It is very surprising that sovereign units basing their attitude on self-interest would have an attitude based on anything else. Still, mutual responsiveness is a reality.

Some scholars link interpersonal trust and responsiveness, as a hypothesis, with progressively rewarding experiences derived from the activities of common markets. Thus: progressively rewarding experiences → learning → trust. Others seek to press simple stimulus-response theory into service in suggesting that the intensity and the frequency of the regional interaction pattern will explain a given integrative outcome. Still others assume a more cognitive style of social learning for explaining the kinds of increasing responsiveness in which we are interested and therefore prefer the lessons of formal decision and coalition theory to discover how and when actors redefine their utilities in bargaining with each other. This approach, of course, differs sharply from the study of emotive forces, affect, and the manipulation of symbols as agents of social learning.³¹

²⁹Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 68. In particular, Schelling cites 'splitting the difference' as an example of recurring willingness to find a compromise.

³⁰Ernst B. Haas, *Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964), p. 111.

³¹Haas, 'The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorizing', op. cit., p. 643.

In this text, Ernst Haas quite clearly assesses all the problems that social scientists have in explaining the mutual responsiveness phenomenon. But, whatever the view point, the fact is that trust and the continuing existence of mutually rewarding experiences allows a substantial transformation of normal inter-state relations. These relations are no longer viewed as a zero sum game, but as a mutually enriching and rewarding experience. "Trust may develop through a number of mechanisms. One path is around political and economic agreements, and key symbolic and meaningful events."³² It is therefore logical that states would try to satisfy each other's needs and demands as that is no way contrary to their long-term interests. Mutual responsiveness is rational as long as it is truly mutual and there is not one side that benefits more than normally of the relationship.

Of course, there must be some overall balance over time among important distributive outcomes so that actors who lose or gain relatively little in one situation will be able to gain relatively more on some other issue. In other words, significant tangible or symbolic benefits must be perceived as available now or in the future in order for national political actors (or mass public) to alter goals, values, strategies, identifications, and behaviors, so that they can participate in and support an ongoing collective decisionmaking process of any significant scope, decisiveness, etc.³³

Mutual responsiveness is a novel concept that has not been sufficiently studied so far. Difficult to define and to understand, its utility is very hard to appraise. The complexity of the world and, in particular of certain regional subsettings, makes things even more difficult for the analyst. This difficulty was very well expressed by Donald Puchala.³⁴

³²Adler and Barnett, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

³³Leon N. Lindberg, 'Political Integration as a Multidimensional Phenomenon Requiring Multivariate Measurement', *International Organization*, vol. 24, no. 4, 1970, p. 660.

³⁴Donald J. Puchala, 'Integration Theory and the Study of International Relations', in Merritt and Russett (eds.), *From National Development to Global Community*, *op. cit.*, pp. 159-160, emphasis in original.

Beyond defining [the pluralistic security community], and listing characteristics of intracommunity relations, [Deutsch] says little about origins, development processes, or causal relationships. We can assume that the process of international community formation (i.e. integration) resembles the assimilatory process in nationalism, as discussed above. Communications and transactions have an assimilatory process of some kind. But, even if these assumptions are valid, the formulation remains limited in its analytic utility by concerns raised earlier. What also needs to be discovered is whether the learning that prompts attitudinal change during community formation follows from explicit *teaching*. (...) Analyzing Deutsch's thinking on the pluralistic security community underlines that we presently have no theory of international pluralism.

Mutual responsiveness develops, thanks to a process of social learning that makes mutually rewarding experiences more and more common and finally succeeds in building a community based on trust, that is a community in which the maintenance of peace in the long term, is highly credible. This situation of long term peace expectations makes international co-operation easier and the messages received are "not merely (...) received, but (...) understood, and (...) given real weight in the process of decision making."³⁵

³⁵Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*, op. cit., p. 67.

4. Mutual Predictability of Behaviour: the guarantee of long-term expectations of peaceful change

This third essential condition for the success of a pluralistic security community, is considered by Deutsch to be of less importance than the previous two conditions. He claims that this condition can be viewed as flowing from the two previous conditions.

A third essential condition for a pluralistic security community may be mutual predictability of behavior; this appears closely related to the foregoing. But the member states of a pluralistic security community have to make joint decisions only about a more limited range of subject matters, and retain each a far wider range of problems for autonomous decision-making within their own borders. Consequently the range and extent of the mutual predictability of behavior required from members of a pluralistic security community is considerably less than would be essential for the successful operation of an amalgamated one.¹

Karl Deutsch clearly considers this final provision as a normal consequence of the two, previously defined, conditions. He seems, more specifically, to consider this condition as an aftermath of mutual responsiveness. In conditions of mutual responsiveness, when the messages and the demands of the member units are not merely received but understood and given real weight in the decision-making process, it is only normal that the behaviour of the member units would be very easily predicted.

The kind of sense of community that is relevant for integration, and therefore for our study, turned out to be rather a matter of mutual sympathy and loyalties; of 'we-feeling', trust, and mutual consideration; of partial identification in terms of self-images and interests; of mutually successful predictions of behavior, and of cooperative action in accordance with it - in short, a matter of a perpetual dynamic process of mutual attention, communication, perception of needs, and responsiveness in the process of decision-making. 'Peaceful change' could not be assured without this kind of relationship.²

¹Karl W. Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience* (Princeton N.J: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 67.

²*Ibid.*, p. 36.

This term of 'peaceful change' is crucial to the whole study. Firstly, it is an essential part of the definition of the concepts of integration and of security community. A security community is considered to be an integrated area characterised by a sense of community, that is long-term expectations of peaceful change.

By PEACEFUL CHANGE we mean the resolution of social problems, normally by institutionalized procedures, without resort to large-scale physical force.³

Secondly, it is this notion of peaceful change that lies at the core of the whole issue of mutual predictability of behaviour. In a really integrated area, it is to be expected that all member units have long term expectations of peaceful change, and that they can predict with accuracy similar expectations on the part of their fellow units. The commitment to peaceful change has to be highly credible and a huge effort to build and to maintain this credibility is essential to the success of the pluralistic security community.

The concept of 'security community' implies stability of expectations of continuing peaceful adjustments. To be stable, however, such expectations must be geared not only to the current load of mutual interaction and potential conflicts among the participants, but also to any increase in the volume of such interaction and possible friction among them as can be foreseen.⁴

Deutsch considers that mutual predictability of behaviour is more easily obtained in a pluralistic security community as the necessary scope and range of the common action is not as broad as in the case of an amalgamated one. This does not, however, imply that reaching mutual predictability is easy and quick. It is a matter of constant attention. Reconciliation after a long period of enmity and conflict is difficult and takes time. It is therefore important to understand the mechanisms leading to a build-up of trust and confidence. These mechanisms allow the building of expectations that are based on credible commitments to peaceful change by the member units. Expectations

³Ibid., p. 5.

⁴Karl W. Deutsch, *Political Community at the International Level: Problems of Definition and Measurement* (Princeton N.J: 1953), p. 15.

can be (for the time being) defined as: “an image of the future bounded by what is physically, humanly, and socially possible.”⁵

The requirement of credibility implies the existence of an important degree of confidence and trust among the member units. This credibility can be analysed through both a sociological and an economic approach.

A sociological analysis of mutual predictability of behaviour

The necessity of mutual predictability of behaviour is beyond any possible doubt. Despite the difficulties associated with the analysis of integration, there is no doubt that integration cannot be maintained if the members of the community are not credibly committed to peaceful behaviour towards the fellow members of the community. This process of community formation is still a very important problem for political scientists:

The general theoretical questions associated with the process of community formation—the process through which inter-unit bonds develop to give structure and stability to larger social collectivities—are among the most persistent and rudimentary problems of political analysis.⁶

The importance of mutual predictability of behaviour is certainly the least controversial issue in the realm of community formation and maintenance. But, the building of confidence that is implied by this notion is very difficult to understand.

Parsons, systems theory and mutual predictability of behaviour

Talcott Parsons is the sociologist who studied systems theory with most constancy and insight. The centrality of systems is explained by his basic assumption: “since the relationships between actors and their situation have a recurrent character or system, all action occurs in systems.”⁷

⁵Emanuel Adler, ‘Cognitive Evolution: A Dynamic Approach for the Study of International Relations and their Progress’, in Emanuel Adler and Beverly Crawford (eds.), *Progress in Postwar International Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), p. 53.

⁶Roger W. Cobb and Charles Elder, *International Community: A Regional and Global Study* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), p. 4.

⁷James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., *Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey* (New York: Harper and Row, 1990), p. 143.

Maintenance of the system is based on the development of mutual acceptance of the system that creates an equilibrium and a momentum for its continuing existence. There is a plurality of subsystems of which the most important are: (1) the personality system, (2) the social system, and (3) the cultural system. These subsystems are integrated into a larger system that Parsons calls the "action system".⁸ Social intercourse occurs in a general network of social systems and subsystems. A change in one of these subsystems influences the course of the others subsystems and the 'action system' as a whole.⁹

The system theory developed by Parsons has the steadfast concern of analysing the patterns of social maintenance (latency or pattern maintenance in his words).¹⁰ Parsons does not, however, completely rule out the possibility of change. On the contrary, one of his main objectives is to understand how change can occur without jeopardising the existence of the system as a whole. The importance of equilibrium should not be considered as a purely 'conservative' feature. Parsons makes an important distinction between 'stable' and 'moving equilibrium'. Equilibrium, in Parsons view, is not necessarily synonymous with...¹¹

...static self-maintenance or a stable equilibrium. It may be an ordered process of change—a process following a determinate pattern rather than random variability relative to the starting point. This is called a moving equilibrium and it is well exemplified in growth.

⁸See Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Schils (eds.), *Toward a General Theory of Action* (New York: Harper Row).

⁹Parsons defines a social system as "a system of interaction of a plurality of actors, in which the action is oriented by rules which are complexes of complementary expectations concerning roles and sanctions. As a system, it has determinate internal organization and determinate patterns of structural change. It has, furthermore, as a system, a variety of mechanisms of adaptation to changes in the external environment. These mechanisms function to create one of the important properties of the system, namely, a tendency to maintain boundaries. A total social system which, for practical purposes, may be treated as self-sufficient—which, in other words, contains within approximately the boundaries defined by membership all the functional mechanisms required for its maintenance as a system - is here called a society." *Ibid.*, pp. 195-196, emphasis in original.

¹⁰The four functional prerequisites for the maintenance of the social system are according to Parsons: (1) adaptation to the environment and to the changes in it; (2) goal attainment (3) integration of the different functions and subsystems into a cohesive whole, and (4) pattern maintenance (or latency), that is the ability of a system to ensure the reproduction of its own basic patterns, values, and norms. Each of these functions is best served by a particular subsystem: pattern maintenance by the subsystem of families and households, adaptation by the economy and the social system, goal attainment by the polity and integration by the subsystem of culture. See *ibid.* and Talcott Parsons, 'An Outline of the Social System', in Talcott Parsons, Edward A. Schils, Kaspar Naegle, and Jesse R. Pitts (eds.), *Theories of Society* (New York: The Free Press, 1961).

¹¹Parsons, 'An Outline of the Social System', *op. cit.*, p. 107.

The problem of maintaining the equilibrium of a system (i.e. managing its inner tensions), while permitting progress and change is probably the most important problem in any social system.

The importance of mutual predictability of behaviour is underlined by the fact that it is important for the mere existence of the system itself that people and, broadly speaking, all members of the given system develop 'complementary expectations concerning roles and sanctions.' The function of mutual predictability of behaviour is to allow the formation of reliable expectations about the future behaviour of the other members of the system. The stability of these expectations is of great importance for the latency of the social system as such. Besides, these expectations should be able to change over time and to adapt to the changing circumstances of the social subsystems and of the action system as a whole. These expectations should be able to evolve (up to a certain point) and stable enough to allow change within the maintenance of the main patterns of the system.

Karl Deutsch was very profoundly influenced by the interchange model of Talcott Parsons.¹² The main concerns present in his study of international integration are also present in systems theory, especially the analysis of the four main functions of every system.

When a system is functioning to maintain its own fundamental patterns by adapting itself to various changes in environment and pursuing one or several goals, problems arise concerning the integration and coordination of the various messages and the allocation of facilities or functions inside the system. This is the *integration* (I) function which requires that something be done to prevent the different operations of the system from interfering with each other in a frustrating or destructive way. The maintenance of compatibility and the shift from mutual inhibition to mutual facilitation of the fundamental efforts are all tasks of an integrative system.¹³

Mutual predictability of behaviour is precisely the condition that makes mutual facilitation possible. Mutual inhibition is the result of enmity and lack of transparency.

¹²See Karl W. Deutsch, *The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and Control* (New York: The Free Press, 1966), pp. 116-118.

¹³Karl W. Deutsch, 'Integration and the Social System: Implications of Functional Analysis', in Philip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano (eds.), *The Integration of Political Communities* (New York: J. B. Lippincott, 1964), p. 183, emphasis in original.

The building of confidence between the members of a security community makes them less reluctant towards co-operative solutions and creates an important momentum for integration.¹⁴

The creation of new relations between men and states

The importance of mutual predictability of behaviour lies, first and foremost, in the fact that it radically transforms interpersonal and interstate relations. The fact that a kind of peaceful relationship can, in an integrated area, be rationally, easily and reliably predicted, marks a great contrast with the alleged state of social or international anarchy. "Deutsch suggests that the fundamentally social character of international politics can transform the identities, interests and behaviors of states."¹⁵

One of the major regionalist claims is that micro-regional economic organizations are a means of going beyond national sovereignty in political institutions and of creating "new relations between men and states." In Jean Monnet's view the ultimate causes of violent conflict lie in human nature, but it is possible, through creating new regional institutions, to limit the conflict-laden consequences of the division of mankind into sovereign national states.¹⁶

In a realist framework, the state of anarchy is self-perpetuating, because of the continuous danger that the members of a social system (the states in the case of the international system) will betray their fellow members with whom they were co-operating. The existence of genuine mutual predictability of behaviour has as a consequence the existence of a reliable and persistent state of international co-operation. "At the international level, community formation has transformed the very character of the states system—states have become integrated to the point that peaceful change becomes taken for granted."¹⁷

¹⁴This explains the growing importance of confidence building measures in international relations. For a study of confidence building see Jonathan Alford (ed.), 'The Future of Arms Control, Part 3: Confidence Building Measures', *Adelphi Papers*, no 149, 1978 and Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, *Vienna Document 1990: of the negotiations on confidence and security building measures convened in accordance with the relevant provisions of the concluding document of the Vienna meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe* (Vienna: 1990).

¹⁵Emanuel Adler and Michael N. Barnett, *Security Communities* (Paper presented at the 1994 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association), p. 8.

¹⁶Joseph S. Nye, *Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organization* (Boston: Little Brown, 1971), p. 14.

¹⁷Adler and Barnett, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

The argument [of the regionalist doctrine] is that regional organizations, particularly those involving economic integration, are the best setting for functional cooperation that can make states less prone to exercise their sovereign power for violent conflict. Along with the cooperation, a sense of community or positive feeling may develop between people of different states. The emphasis is not so much on diminishing sovereignty but on making it less dangerous by tying up states in a tight web of functional relationships.¹⁸

This 'tight web' is made stronger thanks to the existence of expectations that it will hold. In other words, integration is a self-fulfilling prophecy.¹⁹ The mere existence of expectations that integration will continue to exist creates the momentum that allows its persistence. Integration is not possible without an important amount of attitudinal integration. Institutional or policy integration cannot be considered as sufficient because it remains utterly fragile if not completed by attitudinal integration.

Mutual predictability of behaviour lies at the core of the required attitudinal change. In the words of Joseph Nye:²⁰

one of the concerns generally associated with the concept of political integration is the extent to which a group of people not only interact or share institutions but the extent to which they develop a sense of common identity and mutual obligation. This is the sense in which theorists in comparative politics tend to use the word "integration."

This sense of common identity involves the existence of many established political and social habits that make behaviour easier to predict. People and states that have a sense of 'we-feeling' will, presumably, be less likely to behave in an unexpected way towards other members of the security community.

The existence for a long time of a (formal or informal) framework for co-operation makes the attitudes of members of the security community easier to predict. The existence of close interdependence between the economies of the member units, creates *de facto* a functional linkage between the actions and the policies of each and

¹⁸Ibid., p. 16.

¹⁹For an analysis of the notion of self-fulfilling prophecy from a psychological point of view see Russell Crescimanto, *Culture, Consciousness and Beyond* (Washington D.C: University Press of America, 1982).

²⁰Ibid., p. 44.

every unit. Autonomous policies are more and more difficult to implement and the existence of a great number of centres of power substantially reduces the possibility of a sudden change in the course of a member unit. The continuing existence of mutual predictability of behaviour makes an abrupt change of policy more and more difficult and less and less probable and profitable.

The concept of mutual predictability of behaviour is very closely linked to the, previously studied, notion of mutual responsiveness. Mutual responsiveness was based upon the existence of an efficient system of feedback allowing "a series of diminishing mistakes—a dwindling series of under- and over-corrections converging on the goal."²¹ The permanent correction of the system of communication and control can produce a system that is highly reliable and thanks to which behaviour can be easily predicted. "By observing directly a person's past responses under specific conditions, it is possible to predict or explain a response if the specified conditions are present."²² The likely outcome of the coexistence of mutual responsiveness with mutual predictability of behaviour is 'stable peace'.²³

an economic or functional web of interdependence can create new relations which affect the way in which states handle conflict situations (...) through creation of widespread sense of common identity or community among populations in a region which makes recourse to violence seem illegitimate to leaders and important segments of the population.

A proper characteristic of pluralistic security community is the development among member units of "capabilities of mutual communication and accommodation such that they can rely on peaceful change and adjustment in problems or disputes."²⁴

²¹Deutsch, *The Nerves of Government*, op. cit., p. 89.

²²Henry Teune, 'The Learning of Integrative Habits', in Jacob and Toscano (eds.), *The Integration of Political Communities*, op. cit., p. 251.

²³Nye, *Peace in Parts*, op. cit., p. 110. The concept of stable peace was developed by Ken Boulding in *Stable Peace* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1978).

²⁴Karl W. Deutsch, 'The Impact of Communications upon International Relations Theory', in Abdul A. Said (ed.), *Theory of International Relations: the Crisis of Relevance* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1968), p. 92.

A model of rational expectations: mutual predictability of behaviour as a question of credibility

The importance of mutual predictability of behaviour is all the more obvious in macroeconomics. In the 1970s, the rational expectation school challenged the traditional vision of expectations.²⁵ This new vision has been of great consequence for economic analysis as well as for policy-making. The theory of rational expectations in macroeconomics can be of great interest to political science as well. It can, in particular, allow the shaping of a theory of the credibility of commitment to peaceful change, and the formation of some elements of a broader theory of security community formation, maintenance and disintegration.

Rational expectations in macroeconomics: a brief overview

The theory of rational expectations is based on the assumption of the optimum usage of all available information.

Sensible people will use all the available information relating to the process determining a variable when forming their forecast or expectation of that variable.²⁶

This fundamental assumption has a number of consequences. These consequences are that: (1) the errors of rational expectations are on average zero; (2) the errors of rational expectations exhibit no pattern; (3) rational expectations are the most accurate expectations.

The fact that errors of rational expectations are on average zero means that expectations are correct *on average*. People can (and indeed do) make mistakes, but over a longer period of time, their expectations are correct.

This is quite consistent with large or even very large errors in any individual period. The size of the expectational error depends upon the size of the unpredictable component of the process itself.²⁷

²⁵Members of this school are, in particular, the following economists: John Kareken, Thomas Muench, Thomas Sargent, Neil Wallace and Robert Lucas. See Preston J. Miller (ed.), *The Rational Expectations Revolution: Readings from the Front Line* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1994). Also see Ronan Frydman and Edmund Phelps (eds.), *Individual Forecasting and Aggregate Outcomes: Rational Expectations Examined* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984); Thomas J. Sargent, *Rational Expectations and Inflation* (New York: Harper and Row, 1986) and Steven M. Sheffrin, *Rational Expectations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

²⁶C. L. F. Attfield, D. Demery and N. W. Duck, *Rational Expectations in Macroeconomics: An Introduction to Theory and Evidence* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), p. 18.

It is of no use to expect people to permanently make mistakes (and especially the *same* mistakes). Their expectations are self-correcting through a feedback process.

The fact that the errors of rational expectations exhibit no pattern means that the errors that people make cannot be predicted. It is not possible to presume that people will make a particular type of mistake. This also entails that there is no possibility to systematically deceive people. People do not make predictable mistakes (the mistakes made are perfectly random) and it is not possible to make much of any successful case of deception. On the contrary, once the credibility of someone is ruined it has to be built anew and this is a time-consuming process and a process that is not easy to achieve.

Finally, the fact that rational expectations are the most accurate expectations means that this kind of expectations are based on all available information and on a good knowledge of the process.

Forecasts of a variable Y made using all the available information on the *true* process determining Y are bound to be at least as accurate as, and usually more accurate than, forecasts of Y made on some other basis.²⁸

This characteristic encaptures the two previous characteristics. As rational expectations are the most accurate expectations, the expectational error in any period is a random element that on average equals zero (i.e. on average the expectations are correct).

Rational expectations theory revolutionised economic theory because a lot of emphasis is put on the importance of constant policies based on rules rather than discretion and on credibility rather than surprise and deception.

The rational expectations approach directs attention away from particular isolated actions and toward choices among feasible rules of the game, or repeated strategies for choosing policy variables.²⁹

²⁷Ibid., p. 22.

²⁸Ibid., p. 24, emphasis in original.

²⁹Thomas J. Sargent, 'Rational Expectations and the Reconstruction of Macroeconomics', in Miller (ed.), *The Rational Expectations Revolution*, op. cit., p. 37.

The importance of the credibility of the commitment to peaceful change, and of the amount of confidence existing among the members of a security community is vital for the understanding of international pluralism.

A model of integration and disintegration based on expectations and credibility

The concept of rational expectations is of great interest to political science as it can be used to underline the importance of attitudes and predictions of attitudes by the members of a given integrated area.

The emergence of mutual predictability of behaviour is the result of an increasingly rewarding experience. The verification of past predictions creates a sense of confidence and increases the predictability of the behaviour of other member units. Attitudes become mechanistic and the rules governing interstate action are more and more visible. In particular, the rule which serves as the basis of pluralistic security communities (that is the resolution of disputes without resort to large scale interstate violence) is considered, in security communities, as a rule that cannot be disowned. The sense of confidence is very strong and that, paradoxically, is what makes the security community fragile.

A breach of trust in a security community is bound to be considered of great importance. Once the credibility capital accumulated after years of effort has been ruined, it is considerably difficult to build it anew. This frailty of any success resulting from deception directly challenges a realist assumption. Machiavelli urged *The Prince* to make the most of any possibility to extend its power at the expense of his neighbours, if necessary by using deception.³⁰ Rational expectations theory prompts a less absolute approach to the same problem. If the political philosophy of Machiavelli is still valid on the whole, there are cases in which it cannot be applied in an absolute and irresponsible way. "While peaceful change might be explained through the language of power politics and the calculation of expected material benefits to be

³⁰Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince* (1514). Machiavelli claims that "a prince, and especially a new prince, cannot observe all those things which give men a reputation for virtue, because in order to maintain his state he is often forced to act in defiance of good faith, of charity, of kindness, of religion. And so he should have a flexible disposition, varying as fortune and circumstances dictate. As I said above, he should not deviate from what is good, if that is possible, but he should know how to do evil, if that is necessary." Quoted from Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince* (London: Penguin Books, 1995), p. 56.

derived from a course of action, Deutsch relies on social knowledge, learning, and the existence of norms that emerge from both interstate practices and, more fundamentally, transnational forces.³¹ In an integrated area, where the condition of mutual predictability of behaviour is actual, the reasoning is far more complex. If a state deceives its partners, it can hope to gain a considerable amount of profit in the short term. In the longer term, the state which breaches the trust of its partners cannot expect to co-operate with them in the same way after the deception. In actuality, the normal reaction of its partners would be to be far more cautious and to ask for compensation and insurance whenever they co-operate with it. Deception has a price which is measured by the difficulty of re-establishing trust among the partners once the damage is done. Before breaching the trust of its partners a state should take into consideration the impossibility of continuing to collaborate in a 'business as usual' way after such a deception.³²

According to Karl Deutsch, the failure of a political system can have six possible causes: (1) the loss of power, (2) the loss of intakes of channels of information, (3) the loss of steering capacity or co-ordination, (4) the loss of depth of memory, (5) the loss of capacity for partial inner rearrangement and (6) the loss of capacity for comprehensive or fundamental rearrangement of inner structure.³³ All of these reasons have in common that they challenge the mutual predictability of behaviour condition. This challenge is made in two different ways: (a) through the doubts arising concerning

³¹ Adler and Barnett, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

³² These questions of trust and confidence are of great importance in the literature on decision-making and its rationality. The classic model of decision-making assumes that policymakers try to maximise the expected utility of an action given the probability of its success. Consequently, they must bear in mind that they have to make complex calculations about the possibility of achieving a goal without suffering excessively from any possible drawback. The rationality of the process cannot be taken for granted, however, important rational elements exist insofar as the goal priorities of individuals are set forth explicitly and the means for attaining the goals are also clear. Once again it is 'bounded rationality' that seems the more appropriate model. For an analysis of decision-making see Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck and Burton Sapin (eds.), *Foreign Policy Decision-Making* (New York: The Free Press, 1963); Marshall Dimock, *A Philosophy of Administration* (New York: Harper and Row, 1958); J. David Singer, 'Inter-Nation Influence: A Formal Model', *American Political Science Review*, vol. 62, June 1963; Sidney Verba, 'Assumptions of Rationality and Nonrationality in Models of the International System', in James N. Rosenau (ed.), *International Politics and Foreign Policy* (New York: The Free Press, 1969); Herbert Simon, *Administration Behavior* (New York: Macmillan, 1958) and Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little Brown, 1971).

³³ Deutsch, *The Nerves of Government*, *op. cit.*, pp. 221-222.

the system as such, and (b) through the doubts arising concerning the will and capacity of a member.

In the first case, the doubts concerning the capacity of a system to provide the basic functions that are considered to be its duties creates a sense of distrust and lack of confidence in the future of the system as well as in its capacity to fulfil its role as a forum for inter-member relations. In this case, mutual predictability of behaviour is impossible because the environment that allowed it to be built-up has changed and it is not able to cope with the requirements of the action system.

In the second case, fundamental changes in the policies and actions of a member unit cast heavy clouds over its commitment to the common system of values. Disintegration results from the fact that a member unit of the security community is considered as unreliable by the other members. Once the rational expectations concerning the behaviour of the given unit are not verified, the behaviour anticipated is radically different. Any verbal commitment to peaceful change by the member is viewed with circumspection and even any action that is in accordance with this commitment is considered as insufficient.

Once ruined, confidence is difficult to rebuild. This means equally that a member should not expect that a breach of trust will easily be forgotten and co-operation will go on as usual. A failure is all the more difficult to overcome as confidence is based on pattern maintenance. Once the pattern of confidence is damaged, it is highly difficult for the system to survive, as confidence is the fundamental basis of its structure.

The problem is almost the same in economic policy making:³⁴

The standard framework for economic policy design consists of a model to predict how people will behave under alternative policies and a criterion to compare the outcomes of alternative policies. Given a model, the policy design problem is to use the model to choose the best policy under the criterion.

³⁴V. V. Chari, 'Time Consistency and Optimal Policy Design', in Miller (ed.), *The Rational Expectations Revolution*, op. cit., p. 41.

Although this process seems straightforward, in practice solving the design problem is far from simple. The main difficulty is developing models that accurately predict private behavior under alternative policies. In most situations, people's current decisions depend on their expectations of future policies, and forecasting how these expectations will change in response to current policy changes is a difficult task.

There is no known model allowing a reliable prediction of the changes in future expectations. Therefore, the soundest strategy is to follow a constant policy, that is a policy that is easy to understand and to predict and one that is difficult to abandon.

If commitment to peaceful change is considered reliable and strong, the reality of the security community is firm. This commitment is all the more difficult to abandon as it was built thanks to considerable effort and time. All this effort would easily be jeopardised if this commitment is called into question.

The importance of rationality in the integrative process is compatible with both the importance of learning and the pursuit of self-interest. Firstly, learning and mutual predictability of behaviour are mutually reinforcing.

Rationality involves some statement about what means would maximize the chances of achieving a goal at a minimum "cost." (...) The simple proposition underlying any system of rational calculation of payoffs is that changes in reward patterns will significantly alter human behavior—that habits can be changed or new habits will be sought if older habits are not rewarded or are punished. This is a directive from the reinforcement principle of stimulus-response learning theory.³⁵

Mutual predictability of behaviour is based on a self-correcting process which obviously requires the existence of important facilities for communication and a feedback process based on learning.

Secondly, the pursuit of self-interest is equally a normal aftermath of the rationality of the integrative behaviour of a member of a security community. "Cooperation, alliances, and mergers between political communities—instances of political integration—can be explained as the result of rational calculation of payoffs or rewards."³⁶ The importance of self-interest is underlined by Karl Deutsch himself.³⁷

³⁵Henry Teune, 'The Learning of Integrative Habits', in Jacob and Toscano (eds.), *The Integration of Political Communities*, op. cit., pp. 261-262.

³⁶Ibid.

Integration does have a price, one which must be met by government and is, in part, set by those who are governed. In fact it is the capabilities and performances of government that provide the key to integration and cohesion in societies. By their very nature, governments have the means to establish and maintain certain standards of well-being for their populations which are basic conditions for integration.

By insisting on the existence of a price of integration, Karl Deutsch shows the importance of rational calculation and of the pursuit of self-interest in the integrative process. No country enters into a security community if it does not expect to profit from it. The difference with the state of international anarchy lies in the fact that in a security community, the main (if not the unique) way to benefit from the state of integration is through co-operation. It is in this respect that mutual predictability of behaviour is of great relevance. Without it, co-operation is utterly fragile, with it co-operation becomes an automatic process.

³⁷Karl W. Deutsch, 'The Price of Integration', in Jacob and Toscano (eds.), *The Integration of Political Communities*, op. cit., p. 143.

5. Security Community: an important contribution to an embryonic theory of international pluralism

The three essential conditions for the emergence of a pluralistic security community (examined previously) are so far the main contributions to a theory yet to be built. The coexistence of states at the international level from a security perspective has been mainly studied through the concept of balance of power and of its consequences.¹ National integration has also been a quite influential concept but one that is only considered applicable in a very limited number of cases.² The peaceful coexistence of states in an international framework has been considered a precarious success and international anarchy still remains the basic reference point of international relations.³

International pluralism is, however, a reality and one that is very much present at some particular historical periods or in certain regional sub-settings such as Western Europe today. This kind of pluralism implies the coexistence of tolerance⁴ for the other at the individual, national and interstate level.

Pluralism stresses a moving equilibrium composed of a balance of demands and decisions. The problem is how can it be sustained while individual preferences change.⁵

¹For a thorough study of the notion of balance of power see Inis L. Claude, Jr., *Power and International Relations* (New York: Random House, 1962); Edward V. Gulick, *Europe's Classical Balance of Power* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1955); Paul Seabury (ed.), *Balance of Power* (San Francisco: Chandler, 1965). For a critique of the theory see Ernst B. Haas, 'The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept or Propaganda?', *World Politics*, vol. 5, July 1953; Ernst B. Haas, 'The Balance of Power as a Guide to Policy-Making', *Journal of Politics*, vol. 15, August 1953 and Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations* (New York: Knopf, 1967).

²See the extensive literature on nationalism, in particular Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1953); Karl W. Deutsch, *Tides Among Nations* (New York: The Free Press, 1979); Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities, Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983) and Eric J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

³See Helen Milner, 'The assumption of anarchy in international relations theory: a critique', *Review of International Studies*, no. 17, 1991.

⁴Tolerance certainly involves permitting without protest or interference but it undoubtedly remains an 'essentially contested concept'.

⁵David Apter, 'Structuralism, Pluralism and Problems of Post-Industrial Society', paper presented for a round table of the International Political Science Association on *Political Integration* (Jerusalem: 1974), p. 9.

The most important contribution to a theory of international pluralism, made by Deutsch, is the concept of pluralistic security community. Thanks to this concept, the peaceful coexistence of states at the international level can be (at least partially) explained and is no longer a mere anomaly in a framework relying on the assumption of international anarchy.

[A pluralistic security community] is a community of nations that have produced something close to an “informal government to ensure peaceful change without subordinating all the differences in values, culture, and the like that make the separate units distinctively free and independent.” As such, a pluralistic security community is something truly new under the sun.⁶

This concept is very important and a lot of work need to be done in this field.

Analyzing Deutsch’s thinking on the pluralistic security community underlines that we presently have no theory of international pluralism.⁷

Integration: an imperfect description of a complex process

Integration is a word that has been mainly used as an economic concept.⁸ The term of political integration is much less common and far more controversial and difficult to define. The difficulty with the concept of integration (considered as an economic as well as a political concept) lies, first and foremost, in the fact that integration is simultaneously both a process and a situation:⁹

Integration can be considered from two points of view: the first point of view insists on the *static* aspect of the phenomenon, whereas the second insists on the idea of *process*.

⁶Emanuel Adler, ‘Seasons of Peace: Progress in Postwar International Security’, in Emanuel Adler and Beverly Crawford (eds.), *Progress in Postwar International Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), p. 138. Adler quotes Lynn H. Miller, *Global Order: Values and Power in International Politics* (Boulder, Co: Westview, 1985), p. 85.

⁷Donald J. Puchala, ‘Integration Theory and the Study of International Relations’, in Richard L. Merritt and Bruce M. Russett, *From National Development to Global Community: Essays in Honor of Karl W. Deutsch* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981), p. 160.

⁸See Bela Balassa, *The Theory of Economic Integration* (Homewood, Ill:Richard D. Irwin, 1961) and Alfred Toviias, ‘A Survey of the Theory of Economic Integration’, in Hans J. Michelmann and Panayotis Soldatos (eds.), *European Integration: Theories and Approaches* (Lanham: University Press of America, 1994).

⁹Panayotis Soldatos, *Vers une sociologie de l’intégration communautaire européenne: Essai de théorie générale systématique* (Louvain: Vander, 1973), p. 15, emphasis in original.

The notion of integration remains extremely difficult to encapture. Obviously, there is a point of integration beyond which it can be considered as not worth it to pursue the process. This point can be defined in a way similar to the Pareto optimum in economics. The optimum point of integration is the level of integration beyond which it is impossible to go without damaging the welfare of, at least, one member unit of the security community. The notion of welfare introduced at this point should not be considered as a strictly economic term. It can be viewed through a variety of indicators (economic, political, social and military).¹⁰ To determine the concrete situation of this point remains almost impossible. Nevertheless, the intellectual and conceptual value of this point of equilibrium is beyond any possible doubt.

Besides, there is a certain degree of achievement of the process that can be measured through the usage of a series of indicators.¹¹ Thus, what has been named the integrative process, is at the same time a state of affairs, indicating a certain degree of integration achieved and a continuing process that leads towards a distinct point of integration. Panayotis Soldatos thinks it is possible to reconcile the two aspects of the phenomenon:¹²

The integrative process could find its simplified graphic representation in a cumulative curve if, on one of the axes is represented, at the end of each stage of the process, not the degree of integration of each accomplished stage but the total of all the previous stages including the last one. In the framework of this graphic, the notion of integration as a process can coexist with the notion of integration as a situation: every point of the cumulative curve representing the process is an encouragement to use the notion of integration as a situation: it represents the state of integration at a given moment.

This double countenance of the notion of integration renders the notion far more difficult to study. Distinguishing the situation from the process is not easy. Still, this dual aspect of the concept facilitates understanding and analysis of the situation of the international system. "In sum, the evolution of political communities is path-dependent

¹⁰Welfare implies the coexistence of well-being and security and is also certainly an 'essentially contested concept'.

¹¹For an example of a number of possible indicators of international integration, see Karl W. Deutsch, *Political Community at the International Level: Problems of Definition and Measurement* (Princeton N.J. 1953), appendix, pp. 70-71.

¹²Soldatos, *op. cit.*, pp. 16-17.

and not foreordained. Each choice and step in the direction of community expands the set of vested interests and issues that will affect the next round of choice and evolution, and thus increases the chances for pluralistic security communities to become established—until they themselves make room for the next round of transformations and the new kinds of institutionalization.”¹³

This first distinction between the static and the dynamic aspect of integration should be completed by a distinction between external and internal integration. External integration being “the creation of a new unique framework or the incorporation of new parts in a unit”; internal integration being “the growth of the degree of integration of an already existing whole.”¹⁴

These distinctions are all the more important in the European context where diversity and unity coexist. In the words of Edgar Morin:¹⁵

The difficulty of thinking Europe, is first of all the difficulty of thinking the singular in the plural and the plural in the singular: the *unitas multiplex*. (...) Thus, to conceptualise how European unity lies in disunion and heterogeneity, we should use two principles of intelligence capable of explaining such complex phenomena: the *dialogic principle* and the *recursion principle*. The dialogic principle means that two or more different logics are linked in a unit in a complex manner (complementary, competitive and antagonistic) without this duality being lost in this unity. (...) The principle of recursion means that we must consider the generative or regenerative processes as an uninterrupted productive circle in which, every moment, component or instance of the process is at once product and producer of the other moments, components or instances.

This complex *unitas multiplex* lies at the core of the whole integrative process.¹⁶

¹³Emanuel Adler, *Imagined (Security) Communities* (Paper prepared for delivery at the 1994 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association), p. 31, about the path-dependent character of the process see the previous chapter on credibility and mutual predictability of behaviour.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, p. 17. This conceptual distinction lies at the heart of the ‘deepening versus enlargement’ debate in the European Union.

¹⁵Edgar Morin, *Penser l'Europe* (Paris: Gallimard, 1990), p. 24, emphasis in original. This same idea of complexity was expressed by Pascal: “Everything being caused and a cause, helped and helping, mediate and immediate and all of them being perpetuated by a natural and insensible link that links the most remote and the most different, I think it impossible either to know the parts without knowing the whole, or to know the whole without individually knowing the parts.” In Pascal, *Pensées* (Paris: Garnier-Flammarion, 1976), p. 69.

¹⁶This tension existing between unity and diversity is thoroughly examined in Pierre Hassner, ‘Vers un universalisme pluriel’, *Esprit*, December 1992.

Integration is therefore a phenomenon that is at once a process and an achievement, a union of diversities. The difficulty of the analysis of the phenomenon lies mainly in the difficulty of understanding and explaining the coexistence of pluralism and unity. Thus, in the Deutschian framework, independent nation-states form a pluralistic security community thanks to the fulfilment of three conditions: (1) compatibility of major values; (2) mutual responsiveness and (3) mutual predictability of behaviour.¹⁷ Deutsch described integration as aiming “at the creation of a wide range of *general purpose* capabilities, often exceeding by an order of magnitude or more the capabilities of the components states.”¹⁸ States continue to exist while having so much in common that their continuing independence seems either doubtful or useless.

International pluralism is a reality while lacking a coherent theoretical framework.¹⁹ Pluralistic security community theory and these three conditions/achievements are an accurate but incomplete description of international pluralism. The prodigy seems too complex to be understood. New conditions could be added. Referring to the process of European integration, Panayotis Soldatos believes that the following conditions are the essential reasons for the process: (1) The need for enhancement of common security; (2) the hope of achieving greater economic prosperity; (3) the will to promote some shared values; and (4) the will to promote supra-nationalism.²⁰ Since many other conditions can come to mind, the problem is that no set of conditions can fully and accurately describe international integration.

Our list of conditions and “integrative” characteristics, far from favouring the tendency to adopt a monoconceptual interpretation, puts a lot of emphasis on the plurality and the interaction of “integrative” variables.²¹

¹⁷Karl W. Deutsch, *The Analysis of International Relations* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice Hall, 1988), p. 281.

¹⁸Karl W. Deutsch, ‘Between Sovereignty and Integration: Conclusion’, *Government and Opposition*, vol. 9, no. 2, 1974, p. 113, emphasis in original.

¹⁹For a critique of the theoretical framework of international pluralism see Oran R. Young, ‘Professor Russett, Industrious Tailor to a Naked Emperor’, *World Politics*, no. 21, 1969. For the necessity to extend the theoretical basis of the theory see Stuart A. Scheingold, ‘Domestic and International Consequences of Regional Integration’, *International Organization*, vol. 24, no. 4, 1970.

²⁰Soldatos, *op. cit.*, pp. 107 ff.

²¹*Ibid.*, p. 253.

Many attempts at definition have been made but none of them can be considered as complete or definitive.

In studies of international regional integration scholars have defined integration in terms of the process of shifting loyalties from a national setting to a larger entity, the ability to ensure peaceful change over time, the establishment and maintenance of community, the ability of a system to maintain itself, and the collective capacity to make decisions. Writers primarily concerned with national integration have defined integration as a system cohesion, adaptation to structures, a bridging of the elite-mass gap, the establishment of common norms and commitment to patterns of political behavior.²²

Even support for political integration is a complex phenomenon. Deutsch believes that support for political integration follows a high level of transactions and social communication.

When these transactions are highly visible, easy to identify and differentiate, people may form images of the community or group involved in the transactions. If these transactions were rewarded, the image of the community may be strongly positive.²³

The mechanism of political support can find a possible description in the following matrix.²⁴

Table 5.1: Political Support and International Integration

	Systemic Interaction	Identitive Interaction
<i>Utilitarian Response</i>	Expectations of future gain as result of past satisfaction	Belief in a common interest

²²Fred M. Hayward, 'Continuities and Discontinuities between Studies of National and International Political Integration: Some Implications for Future Research Efforts', *International Organization*, vol. 24, no. 4, 1970, pp. 919-920. Hayward refers, respectively, to the works of Ernst Haas, Karl Deutsch, Amitai Etzioni in *Political Unification: A Comparative Study of Leaders and Forces* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965) and Claude Ake in *A Theory of Political Integration* (Homewood, Ill: Dorsey Press, 1967).

²³Werner J. Feld, 'Sociological Theories of European Integration', in Michelmann and Soldatos (eds.), op. cit., p. 46.

²⁴Adapted from Leon L. Lindberg, 'Political Integration as a Multidimensional Phenomenon Requiring Multivariate Measurement', *International Organization*, vol. 24, no. 4, 1970, p. 693. For a more complete account of these dimensions see Leon L. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold, *Europe's Would-Be Polity: Patterns of Change in the European Community* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice Hall, 1970).

<i>Affective Response</i>	Belief in legitimacy, as basis of willingness to comply with authoritative outputs of system	Sense of mutual political identification
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Security community theory vis-à-vis some other theories of international integration

Security community theory is just a theory of regional integration, and it is, in actuality, a theory that could be considered to be minimalist. The only concrete achievement of the construction of a pluralistic security community is considered to be the impossibility of war among the member states of the community.²⁵ Besides the whole theory is based on the use of data series concerning communication. This theory can be labelled “communicative interactionism”.²⁶ It is clearly based upon a sociological perspective as “society is seen as being in a process of evolution and progress; what is to be determined are the uniformities governing this process and the meaning of integration.”²⁷

²⁵The concept of security community refers, solely, to a region in which war is no longer considered as a possible way of resolving inter-state disputes, a group “in which there is real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way.” In Karl W. Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience* (Princeton N.J: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 5. “In (...) pluralistic security communities the participating states remain sovereign; but they maintain a high level of mutual transactions and develop capabilities of mutual communication and accommodation such that they can rely on peaceful change and adjustment in problems or disputes.” In Karl W. Deutsch, ‘The Impact of Communications upon International Relations Theory’, in Abdul A. Said (ed.), *Theory of International Relations: the Crisis of Relevance* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice Hall, 1968), p. 92. “The absence of (...) advance preparations for large-scale violence between any two territories or groups of people prevents any immediate outbreak of effective war between them, and it serves for this reason as the test for the existence or non-existence of a security community among the groups concerned. The attainment of a security community thus can be tested operationally in terms of the absence of presence of significant organized preparations for war or large-scale violence among its members, and integration for us is the creation of those practices and machinery—the habits and institutions—which actually result in the establishment of a security community.” In Deutsch, *Political Community at the International Level*, op. cit., pp. 2-3.

²⁶David Mutimer, ‘Theories of Political Integration’, in Michelmann and Soldatos (eds.), op. cit., p. 34.

²⁷Werner J. Feld, ‘Sociological Theories of European Integration’, in Michelmann and Soldatos (eds.), op. cit., p. 43.

For Deutsch, the dynamic of integration is found in the learning of individuals in social groups —groups he classes as communities, societies and cultures. The social groups are defined primarily with reference to interaction, and although clearly simple interaction is insufficient to create meaningful social groups. Thus, to form a social group, the collection of interacting individuals must partake in stable structures of communication (...) Learning, in turn, is driven by this communicative interaction (...) Such increased capacity to communicate builds and strengthens community, a process of building which is Deutsch's concept of integration.²⁸

The importance of communicative interaction and learning explains the main method (i.e. quantitative analysis) used by Deutsch for the empirical verification of his thesis.²⁹

Deutsch views international political integration or community formation as a process leading towards an integrated political community. This community must possess (1) a certain number of structural components; (2) a political process that allows non-violent coexistence at the international level; (3) a high degree of interaction among its members permitting the formation of a sense of common destiny. In the words of William Fisher:³⁰

The sociocausal paradigm contends that a process of *social assimilation* leads to or cause a process of *political development* to occur. In the paradigm social assimilation is conceptualized as a learning process during which peoples, in response to mutually rewarding transactions, adopt habits that they perceive as conducive to further rewarding transactions. (...) It should be noted that this paradigm is based on the hypothesis that social assimilation caused political development and therefore that social assimilation must exist before political development can start.

The paradigm came under heavy criticism during the sixties, on the grounds that the linkage between the empirical data and its hypotheses is not well established.

²⁸Ibid., pp. 34-35.

²⁹See Karl W. Deutsch, Lewis J. Edinger, Roy Macridis and Richard L. Merritt, *France, Germany and the Western Alliance: A Study of Elites Attitudes on European Integration and World Politics* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967) and Karl W. Deutsch, 'Efforts d'intégration dans le complexe de la politique européenne', in Dusan Sidjanski (ed.), *Méthodes quantitatives et intégration européenne* (Geneva: Institut d'Etudes Européennes, 1970).

³⁰William E. Fisher, 'An Analysis of the Deutsch Sociocausal Paradigm of Political Integration', *International Organization*, vol. 23, no. 2, 1969, pp. 257-258, emphasis in original.

the paradigm posits the existence of a direct causal relation between two types of variables —social assimilation which can be described as a psychological variable relating to the attitudes of mass publics and political development which can be described as a variable relating to the behavior of selected elite populations. Never does the paradigm, however, theoretically state how the attitudes of mass populations are translated into elite behaviors. (...) Political development is very much a process involving the interactions of various political elites. Yet the paradigm fails to specify the variables which probably determine elite *behaviors* regarding integration.³¹

These thoughtful critiques do not invalidate the whole of the security community theory, but rather call for the creation and development of complementary theories and the invention of new tests and methods allowing the empirical control of the assumptions of the theory.³² This empirical control is difficult. Very often, the acknowledgement of the existence of security communities is followed by the avowal that it is not possible to explain this achievement.

The fact that not only war, but the use of its threat has become totally inconceivable in the mutual relations of Western countries, brings the idea of peace through interdependence and democracy back into fashion. Certainly an extremely important development has taken place in the West, a development whose source is as debatable as that of the nineteenth-century revolution mentioned by Aron (industrial society? democracy? capitalism? individualism? economic and demographic evolution?), but whose reality is not: relations between liberal developed countries can no longer be understood in the light of the definition of international relations as a state of nature, characterized by the possibility of resorting to force. Neither the constraints nor the priorities of the modern state can be thought through satisfactorily on the basis of its classical attributes such as sovereignty and territoriality; even less, on the basis of the extreme case, on that of war.³³

³¹Ibid., pp. 288-290, emphasis in original. For a critique along similar lines see Ronald Inglehart, 'An End to European Integration?', *American Political Science Review*, vol. 61, no. 1, 1967.

³²An innovative approach of the national security problem that borrows a lot of ideas from Security Community theory, can be found in Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear. The National Security Problem in International Relations* (Brighton: Harvester Hill, 1983). Buzan refers (p. 106) to Security Complexes "defined as a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another."

³³Pierre Hassner, 'Beyond the three traditions: the philosophy of war and peace in historical perspective', *International Affairs*, vol. 70, no. 4, 1994, pp. 750-751.

Regional integration has been explained by a number of different theories that have been unable to explain in an easy and comprehensive way the whole of the integrative process. Their common use cannot explain the whole process either but some of the weaknesses of these theories can be better exposed in this way.³⁴

Table 5.2: Main Theories of International Integration

	Integrative Dynamic	Goal
<i>Federalism</i>	Creation of a constitutional assembly or constitutional intergovernmental bargaining	Federal state
<i>Functionalism</i>	Functional organisations progressively reduce the power of the nation states	Framework of functional organisations
<i>Neofunctionalism</i>	Spillover of integrative demand from technical to political tasks	Institutionalised regional supra-nationalism
<i>Regime Theory</i>	Need to co-ordinate state action (in a world of sovereign states) in order to achieve desired outcomes in specific issue areas	Sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures in a given area of international relations
<i>Security Community Theory</i>	Compatibility of major values and learning through communication and mutually rewarding transactions	Security community

³⁴The small presentation of the various theories of international integration that follows, is not meant to be comprehensive or complete. It only aims at putting security community theory into perspective. The reader should refer to the literature indicated in the footnotes for further details.

Federalism is excessively based on a legalistic approach and political will.³⁵ Functionalism³⁶ and neofunctionalism over-rely on the notion of spillover and fail to consider the problem of self-encapsulation.³⁷ Security community theory cannot distinguish cause and effect and over-relies on quantitative data of attitudes to determine the level of integration.³⁸ Ultimately, as argued by Adler and Barnett: it is “unclear how changes at the socio-psychological level, like learning and socialization processes, [are] transformed into state interests and policies.”³⁹ Regime theory developed in the 1970s as a response to the apparent failure of political integration theory fails to link the demand for international services with the supply in functional organisations.⁴⁰

³⁵For an analysis of the federalist approach see Dusan Sidjanski, *Dimensions européennes de la science politique: Questions méthodologiques et programme de recherches* (Paris: Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1963); Carl J. Friedrich, *Trends of Federalism in Theory and Practice* (New York: Praeger, 1968); Henri Brugmans, *La pensée politique du fédéralisme* (Leyden: 1969) and P. Hay, *Federalism and Supranational Organizations* (London: 1966).

³⁶For a classic study of functionalism see David Mitrany, *A Working Peace System* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966). See also Johan K. De Vree, *Political Integration: The Formation of Theory and Its Problems* (The Hague-Paris: Mouton, 1972) and A. J. R. Groom and Paul Taylor (eds.), *Theory and Practice in International Relations: Functionalism* (New York: Crane, Russak).

³⁷The notion of ‘self-encapsulation’ highlights the fact that a successful international organisation does not necessarily further integration. If the level of integration attained is considered as sufficient and if the cost of further integration is viewed as too heavy then, even a successive international organisation does not identify with progressive integration. The spillover process is not an overwhelming cosmic force driving inexorably towards further integration. See Ernst B. Haas, ‘The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorizing’, *International Organization*, vol. 24, no. 4, 1970, pp. 611-615. For an example of self-encapsulation in Europe see Robert L. Pfaltzgraff and James L. Deghand, ‘European Technological Collaboration: The Experience of the European Launcher Development Organization (ELDO)’, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 7, no. 1, 1968. For a neofunctionalist treatment of European integration see Leon Lindberg, *The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963) and Charles Pentland, *International Theory and European Integration* (London: Faber and Faber, 1973).

³⁸“Communications theory suggests—it does not assert or prove—that an intensive pattern of communication between national units will result in a closer ‘community’ among the units if loads and capabilities remain in balance.” In Ernst B. Haas, ‘The Study of Regional Integration’, op. cit., p. 626, emphasis added. For a critique of the Deutschian model see also Fisher, op. cit., and Inglehart, op. cit.. Another critique of Deutsch’s work argues that he has developed a theory not so much of political integration but more of “social or moral community” which, “ignores too much that is politically relevant.” In Leon N. Lindberg, ‘The European Community as a Political System’, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 5, no. 4, 1967, p. 345.

³⁹Emanuel Adler and Michael N. Barnett, *Security Communities* (Paper presented at the 1994 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association), p. 37.

⁴⁰See Robert O. Keohane, ‘The Demand for International Regimes’, in Stephen D. Krasner (ed.), *International Regimes* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983). For another critique of this theory see Susan Strange, ‘Cave! Hic Dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis’, in *ibid.* Regime theory does not reject the assumption of international anarchy, it rather considers that “under certain restrictive conditions involving the failure of individual action to secure Pareto-optimal outcomes, international regimes may have a significant impact even in an anarchic world.” In Stephen D. Krasner, ‘Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening variables’, in *ibid.*, p.

Whatever the relevance of one or another of these theories, regional political integration can not be expected to be theorised, thoroughly, in the future. A 'neither fish nor fowl' approach is undoubtedly valid even though it is not always very helpful for understanding the international setting.⁴¹ Similarly, the still inadequate theory of international pluralism cannot be expected to be developed to a plainly satisfactory level. Still, some elements permitting a theorisation of the reality of international pluralism do exist, and this is particularly the case of pluralistic security community theory.

This very much debatable theorisation is all the more useful if it allows the operationalisation of the concepts developed. This is a task of the utmost importance for the validity and the utility of the theory. If an operationalisation is possible, the theory can be considered as having a practical importance. This operationalisation is possible through the construction of a series of indicators and tests allowing the appraisal of the level of integration achieved.

2. For an analysis of regime theory and its application to the Cold War antagonism see John S. Duffield, 'Explaining the Long Peace in Europe: the contributions of regional security regimes', *Review of International Studies*, vol. 20, 1994. For an analysis of European Political Co-operation through the framework of regime theory see Heinz-Jürgen Axt, 'Kooperation unter Konkurrenten: Das Regime als Theorie der außenpolitischen Zusammenarbeit der EG-Staaten', *Zeitschrift für Politik*, 40 Jg, no. 3, 1993. For an overview of coalition and alliance theory see Vincent Lemieux with Namatié Traoré and Nathalie Bolduc, 'Coalitions, alignements et alliances interrétatiques', *Revue Etudes Internationales*, vol. 25, no. 2, 1994; Francis A. Beer (ed.), *Alliances: Latent War Communities in the Contemporary World* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970); George F. Liska, *Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962) and Julian R. Friedman, Christopher Bladen and Steven Rosen (eds.), *Alliance in International Politics* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1970).

⁴¹For such an analysis of European integration see Donand J. Puchala, 'Of blind men, elephants and international integration', in Richard Little and Michael Smith (eds.), *Perspectives on World Politics* (London: Routledge, 1991).

Part Two

Testing the Existence of a Pluralistic Security Community in the European Union

6. Testing Compatibility of Major Values: a content analysis of the communiqués of the European Council

Compatibility of major values is a necessary condition for the existence of a pluralistic security community, since such a community is characterised by the existence of a high level of integration leading to the establishment of long-term expectations of peaceful change. This high level of integration is notably indicated by the existence of common beliefs and values.

The importance of compatibility of major values for European integration has been widely noticed before. After the Second World War, the time was ripe for a reappraisal of inter-European relations and some shared beliefs made the beginnings of European integration much easier.

Given this level of destruction, it is not surprising that many continental Europeans were prepared to envisage radical solutions, even solutions which encompassed the doing away of the 'state', that 19th century epitome of grandeur. Most interestingly, even some resistance groups were thinking along these lines, calling in Geneva in 1944 not only for a Federal Union, which 'alone could ensure the preservation of liberty and civilisation on the Continent of Europe', but for a government directly responsible to the European people, with 'an army placed under the orders of this government and excluding all other national armies'.¹

The whole process of European integration was made possible by the agreement of the participant states concerning a certain number of major values. This agreement was forcefully expressed in the preamble of the Statute establishing the Council of Europe. The high contracting parties reaffirmed their "devotion to the spiritual and moral values which are the common heritage of their peoples and the true source of individual freedom, political liberty and the rule of law, principles which form the basis of all genuine democracy." Besides, the Council of Europe also showed its support for human rights by passing a Convention on Human Rights.² Major values are clearly

¹Trevor C. Salmon, *A European Defence Identity* (London: British Atlantic, 1983), p. 3.

²See Arthur H. Robertson, *Human Rights in Europe* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1977) this book includes the text of the Convention signed on 4 November 1950 and the protocols.

articulated through this Convention. "In Articles 2 to 14 inclusive of the Convention and the subsequent First and Fourth Protocols, a number of rights and freedoms are laid down: for example, freedom to life protected by law; freedom from torture and slavery; the right to a fair trial; the right to private and family life; the freedom of thought, conscience, religion and expression; the freedom of peaceful assembly and association; the right to marry and found a family."³

As in the case of the Council of Europe, common values lie clearly at the core of the objectives of the European Union. Thus, the Treaty on European Union states (article J.1) that the goals of the EU are to safeguard common values, interests and the independence of the Union; strengthen security; promote international co-operation; and enhance democracy.

The aim of this section is to examine the degree of compatibility of major values prevailing among the member states of the European Union, as well as the coherence and the usage of these values.

Testing compatibility of major values: some methodological considerations

The study of compatibility of major values has to take into consideration the existence of some inherent problems with any analysis of values.

Images of larger political units—Europe, Atlantic union, world government—are often laden with positive values. "Separatism" or "parochialism" seems unimpressive by comparison. But we must note the great emotional charge that "independence" has for Americans, as it has for many other peoples. We do not celebrate "integration day" or the ratification day of the American Constitution; we celebrate Independence Day on the fourth of July. (...) In many countries, we find such value-laden words as "liberation," "freedom" and "independence". To a large extent, we find a similar value charge in favor of a shift, sometimes to a larger, sometimes to a smaller political unit. What seems to make the difference is the association, in experience or expectation, of the proposed larger or smaller political unit with other values and valued services.⁴

³Clive Archer, *Organizing Western Europe* (London: Edward Arnold, 1990), p. 47.

⁴Karl W. Deutsch, *Tides Among Nations* (New York: The Free Press, 1979), pp. 284-285.

It is therefore important to make the difference between the values that are considered positive and the values that are negatively laden. The values that are deliberately omitted must also be taken into account. One of the most obvious ways of establishing the level of compatibility of major values is to make a content analysis. This method is proposed by Karl Deutsch himself.⁵

The compatibility of major politically relevant values and value patterns may then be a crucial condition for political integration. Where such major values are incompatible, common institutions and frequent contacts are likely to produce not integration but bitter and protracted conflict. A testing of the compatibility of major values by survey methods, content analysis and/or historical description or literary methods may, therefore, be of crucial importance for the realism of our analysis.

Content analysis is therefore a highly relevant method for the evaluation of the degree of compatibility of major values. The existence of compatibility of major values should logically be accounted for in public documents. It is, therefore, rational to seek to study this notion through content analysis.

Content analysis: methods and rules

Content analysis is today a highly sophisticated method for the study of texts and documents of all kind. This paper is going to use some of the methods used in content analysis, especially methods relevant to the study of values.⁶

The documents examined are the final communiqués of the European Council during the years 1989-1994. The choice of these documents is justified by the fact that these communiqués are the expression of the highest political body of the European Union.⁷ It is only logical to expect that the main policy making centre of the EU would state with authority and confidence the values and beliefs, the Union stands for. This hypothesis is verified by the subsequent empirical analysis. The documents used are,

⁵Ibid., pp. 270-271, emphasis in original.

⁶For the theory of content analysis, see Laurence Bardin, *L'analyse de contenu* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1993), especially pp. 125-206; O. R. Holsti, *Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities* (Addison Wesley, 1969); Robert P. Weber, *Basic Content Analysis* (London: Sage, 1985); Klaus Klippendorf, *Content Analysis: An Introduction to its Methodology* (London: Sage, 1980); R. Ghillioné, J.-L. Beauvois, C. Chabrol and A. Trognon, *Manuel d'analyse de contenu* (Paris: Colin, 1980) and K. E. Rosengren (ed.), *Advances in Content Analysis* (London: Sage, 1981).

⁷For reasons of convenience, the term European Union is used instead of the term European Community although before the entry into force of the Treaty on European Union there is entity called European Union.

accordingly, abundant with relevant information for the study of values. Another reason for using these documents is that they are the product of a lengthy, intensive process of negotiation and re-negotiation. In them can be found genuinely agreed and shared values that result from a procedure that gives them particular importance. Since every single word of these documents was included after serious consideration, a content analysis of them is all the more relevant.

One of the most important rules of content analysis affirms that the documents used must be used exhaustively.⁸ This study respects this rule: all the documents since 1989 are used. The relevant part of the documents is the conclusion of the presidency.⁹ The choice of 1989 as the starting point for the study is made because of the historical significance of this year. 1989 is the beginning of a new era in European politics. This new era is characterised by the importance of some shared values and the expression of the importance of values in politics is more emphatic because of this fact. This makes the documents pertinent. A great many of references to common values are to be found in them.

The documents are very homogeneous: they come from the same political authority and are of roughly the same importance both politically and materially (their length is usually similar, especially in the case of regular meetings of the Council). This homogeneity makes possible the use of the document as a point of reference in the whole study, in particular for the statistics of the content analysis. The unit of the study is the theme or subject, i.e. the use of a certain subject or theme by the European Council. The use of the notion of theme is very common in content analysis. A theme is a recording unit of complex meaning, its length can be variable and its reality is not linguistic but psychological. An assertion, but also a simple allusion can constitute a theme, a theme can also be developed in several different assertions. But in a similar

⁸Bardin, op. cit., p. 127.

⁹The special meeting of the European Council in Brussels on the 15th of July of 1994 (*Bulletin of the European Communities* 7/8-1994, p. 7) is therefore excluded of the study because of the absence of conclusions of the presidency (this European Council had as its only purpose the appointment of Jacques Santer as the new President of the European Commission). The corpus used in this study is, therefore, composed by 16 documents (in parentheses the relevant issue of the *Bulletin of the European Communities*): The European Councils of Madrid (6-1989), Strasbourg (12-1989), Dublin (4-1990), Dublin (6-1990), Rome (10-1990), Rome (12-1990), Luxembourg (6-1991), Maastricht (12-1991), Lisbon (6-1992), Birmingham (10-1992), Edinburgh (12-1992), Copenhagen (6-1993), Brussels (10-1993), Brussels (12-1993), Corfu (6-1994) and Essen (12-1994).

way, a single assertion can refer to many themes. A subject will be counted only once per numbered paragraph of the communiqué. This is made to avoid counting the repetitions of the same theme in the same paragraph as different items. The use of the theme as the recording unit is very common for the study of values and beliefs through content analysis.¹⁰

One hypothesis of the study is that the European Council expresses judgements on values either concerning the European Union (i.e. the values and the beliefs of the European Union) or concerning non-member states (i.e. values and beliefs that the European Council would like to see other states adopt or reject). This distinction explains the structure of the section in one part examining the 'internal values' (values mentioned with respect to the internal organisation of the European Union) and another part examining the 'external values' (values that the EU supports or rejects vis-à-vis questions of foreign policy). The comparison of the results of the two parts should be very interesting for an analysis of the degree of coherence of the major values that prevail in Europe today.

This paper seeks to demonstrate that the commonality of the beliefs in democracy and the rule of law, and more fundamentally, the belief in the centrality of the individual and of individual freedoms has a pacifying influence in the European Union. The compatibility of these values is a guarantee against the resurgence of territorial disputes and European wars.

A final, very important, problem for the realisation of this study, lies with the definition of the word values. Values are certainly standards or principles considered precious or important in life. This dictionary definition shows the subjectivity of the term. A value remains ultimately an essentially contested concept. There is little hope of achieving a good and workable definition of it. All words chosen are chosen in an utterly subjective way. An effort is made hereafter to take into account all words depicting a tenet or belief that serves as a focal point in the European Council communiqués. However, the subjective character of the operation is not denied.

¹⁰Bardin, *op. cit.*, p. 137.

The use of values by the European Council for the portrayal of the European Union

The main themes used by the European Council

A content analysis of the documents of the European Council over this period shows the importance of four main themes: democracy, rights and freedoms, racism and anti-semitism and the nation-state.

Table 6.1: Values significant to the European Union

Subject	Key Words	Key Verbs	Items
<i>Democracy</i>	democratic control democratic requirement democratic accountability strong and democratic institutions election democratic tradition democratic legitimacy	emphasize comply increase	17
<i>Rights and Freedoms</i>	free movement of persons freedom common sense of belonging single entity welfare individual citizens protection of individuals openness/transparency	emphasize promote	32
<i>Racism and Anti-Semitism</i>	Racism Xenophobia Anti-Semitism revulsion human dignity concern discrimination violence intolerance unacceptable	deplore combat condemn	10
<i>Nation-State</i>	national identity subsidiarity history, culture and traditions of individual nations independence sovereignty national particularities	respect	10

The analysis of the results

Not surprisingly (especially given the period reviewed), the theme which seems to be of the utmost importance in the documents of the European Council is democracy (17 items in 16 documents and most importantly, this value is stated as being the most important in the documents themselves). Democracy is clearly stated as being the main characteristic of every European polity. In particular, democracy is considered as the main feature needed for accession to the European Union: "any European States whose systems of government are founded on the principle of democracy may apply to become members of the Union."¹¹

The wording seems unambiguous, but some important limitations remain. The European Council often seeks to remind member states of the importance of complying with the "democratic requirement". References to elections, democratic institutions, and to the democratic traditions of the member states show just how important this theme can be. The need to strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the EU is also very often underlined.¹² Broadly speaking, the references to democracy often have as a meaning that democracy must be reinforced and the democratic rules observed either by the member states or the European institutions.¹³ In short, democracy is not considered as developed to a satisfactory level, but rather as a matter for perpetual attention and care. The frailty of democracy and the dangers of centralisation and bureaucratisation are acknowledged, directly or indirectly. If there is agreement on the centrality of democracy, its degree of development does not seem satisfying.

Nevertheless, democracy is certainly a value held by both the member states and the Union as a whole. There is compatibility of values in this field, since the need for the reinforcement of the value implies the commonality of the belief in it.

¹¹*Bulletin of the European Communities*, 12-1991, p. 8. The same phrase (with exactly the same wording) is also used in *Bulletin of the European Communities*, 6-1992, p. 10.

¹²The European Council often associates the reinforcement of citizens' rights and the enhancement of democracy: "[The European Council] (...) welcomes the political agreement on the detailed arrangements concerning the right to vote and to stand for municipal elections, which will be in addition to Union citizens' existing right to vote and to stand in European parliament elections." In *Bulletin of the European Communities*, 12-1994, p. 17.

¹³One characteristic reference to the need to respect democracy is the following: "The European Council emphasized (...) the need to ensure the proper observance of democratic control in each of the Member States." In *Bulletin of the European Communities*, 12-1989, p. 12.

What (at first glance) seems to be a surprise, is the importance of the number of references to rights and freedoms of the European citizen (32 items in 16 documents). References to the freedom of movement of persons (for instance) are very common: "The European Council, feeling that free movement of people was a priority for 1992,..."¹⁴ Wider references to individual rights and to the role of the individual or the citizen also abound throughout the text. Since the citizens are asked to support European integration, the European Council tries to convince them that they stand to benefit from the process: "The Maastricht Treaty will bring direct benefits to individual citizens."¹⁵ The need for the support of the citizens has as a result the admittance by the European Council of the fact that the main benefits of integration are for the individual:

With a view to enhancing the benefits which our people derive from belonging to a Community which has as its *raison d'être* the promotion of their rights, their freedoms and their welfare, the European Council dealt with a number of themes of particular relevance to the individual citizen,..."¹⁶

The essentially individualistic nature of European societies and of the European polity as a whole is asserted and accepted in the documents analysed. Welfare is considered as the main aim of the Union and references to economic values are made mainly through mentions of the benefits that European citizens stand to gain. Thus, the aim of the EU employment policy is to "create more jobs for our citizens."¹⁷ The allusion to the citizen is used to underline both the democratic aspect of the process and its individualistic nature. The rights of the individuals are closely associated with welfare and economic values:

As taxpayers, the citizens of Europe rightly expect fraud, wastefulness and mismanagement to be combated with the greatest rigour.¹⁸

The rights granted by the EU are considered to be additional to the ones granted by the member states. The functioning of the EU itself is a matter of concern for the

¹⁴*Bulletin of the European Communities*, 6-1989, p. 10.

¹⁵*Bulletin of the European Communities*, 10-1992, p. 9.

¹⁶*Bulletin of the European Communities*, 6-1992, p. 8.

¹⁷*Bulletin of the European Communities*, 12-1992, p. 8.

¹⁸*Bulletin of the European Communities*, 12-1994, p. 16.

European citizen and references to the benefits of the individuals by the increased openness and transparency of the Union are quite common.

The individualistic nature of the Union is also demonstrated in the field of immigration and more particularly with respect to the right of asylum. These matters are always treated in a very neutral way as mere technical matters and not as political ones. The rare mentions to the existence of a right of asylum are also aimed at providing a justification for the European policy in this subject: “[The European Council] recognized the importance of such measures against the misuse of the right of asylum in order to safeguard the principle itself.”¹⁹ The rights and freedoms, asserted as important in the documents, are first and foremost the rights and freedoms that benefit the European citizens.

The need for the satisfaction of the European citizen is even asserted as being an essential component for the building of a united Europe. The European Council speaks of “the adoption of concrete measures which will enable European citizens to recognize in their daily lives that they belong to a single entity.”²⁰ European integration is not possible without the support of the individual and common action aims at persuading the citizen that he or she stands to benefit from being in a single polity.

The only major values that are consistently and vigorously rejected in the documents studied are racism, xenophobia and anti-Semitism (10 items in 16 documents). The European Council expresses with an unambiguous wording its “deep revulsion” and its “concern” as well as the need to combat these phenomena. The opposition to such actions and deeds shows the agreement of all European states concerning the belief in the need to condemn and fight these phenomena. There is, therefore, a clear case of commonality of rejection of some beliefs which can be considered as an instance of compatibility of major values.

Finally, there is the occurrence of the mention of the Nation-State in the communiqués (10 items). The terms used in that purpose are very neutral. For instance, the main verb used for this reason is ‘to respect’. The importance of national identity and the usual attributes of the Nation-State (sovereignty, independence) are

¹⁹*Bulletin of the European Communities*, 12-1992, p. 23.

²⁰*Bulletin of the European Communities*, 12-1989, p. 10.

often underlined: "The Treaty on European Union involves independent and sovereign States having freely decided to exercise in common some of their competences."²¹ The importance of the Nation-State is not denied and an important degree of agreement exists concerning its importance, but the neutrality of many terms used gives the impression that the European Council is very cautious. There is nevertheless, an agreement concerning the importance of the value of notions such as national identity.

As a conclusion of this part, it can be asserted that the communiqués of the European Council show how much modern democracies are based upon individualistic values. The pursuit of welfare by the individual citizen is important (as demonstrated in section 2) because it is a value that makes war unattractive and almost unfeasible. The enhancement of the welfare of the citizens is one of the main priorities of every European government. To ensure the maintenance of welfare is considered as a duty of the government. The link with peace lies in the fact that the pursuit of welfare and of more and more individual freedoms is incompatible with the pursuit of any adventurous and violent action. The insistence on the rights of the citizen is also closely linked to the weight of democracy. Democracy is based on the individual citizen and only its satisfaction can be considered as a sufficient guarantee for the future of democracy. Democracy and individual freedoms are directly related.

The debate on the pertinence or the obsolescence of the nation-state is by no means yet finished. This field is still very sensitive and the evolution of the ideas concerning the role of the nation-state remains utterly unpredictable. This is clearly demonstrated by the caution with which the terms are used in the communiqués. However, the degree of compatibility of major values seems well advanced and even if some disagreements and uncertainties remain, the existence of a sense of community and the importance of shared values is undeniable. The belief in a democracy based on individual freedoms and rights is clearly shared by all member states.

²¹*Bulletin of the European Communities*, 12-1992, p. 25.

The use of values with respect to states outside the European Union

The result of the content analysis

The communiqués of the European Council show very clearly which major values the European Council considers as positive and which are considered as negative.

Table 6.2: Positively-laden values

Values	Items
Democracy	46
Respect for human rights/individual freedoms	38
Co-operation in peace talks/dialogue	26
Economic development/economic co-operation	24
Peace	23
Regional co-operation	17
Security	16
Peaceful settlements of conflicts	15
Territorial integrity	14
Respect for international agreements/international law	14
Sovereignty	12
Protection of minorities	12
Unity	11
Independence	11
Rule of law	11
Reconciliation	10
Freedom	8
Pluralism	8
Social justice/well being/prosperity	8
Market economy	8
Self-determination	5
Good government	5
Freedom of circulation of persons	4
Freedom of circulation of ideas/freedom of expression	3
Openness	2
Freedom of information	1

Beside the positively-laden values, accounted above, the European Council often makes references to practices it rejects and condemns. These condemnations complement the positively-laden values examined before. Practices rejected are symptomatic of the values that are asserted as being essential by the European Council and the member states. These rejections are mainly re-assertions and reinforcements of the major values of the European Council.

Table 6.3: Practices rejected by the European Council

Practices	Examples	Items
Violence/war		24
International tensions/conflicts		7
Violations of human rights		30 of which
	Arbitrary arrests and treatment	4
	Apartheid	3
	Detention of political prisoners	3
	Executions	2
	Torture	2
	Occupation	2
	Oppression of people	2
	Holding of hostages	2
	Problem of exiles/refugees	2
	Undue state of emergency	1
	Deportation of people	1
	Collective reprisals	1
	Administrative arrests	1
	Intimidation	1
	Persecution	1
Socio-economic problems		4 of which
	Illness	1
	Poverty	1
	Illiteracy	1
	Hunger	1
Violation of international law/agreements		5

Analysis of the results

For the analysis of the above results, it is impossible to separate the positively-laden values from the rejected practices, since one cannot be studied without reference to the other. Besides, the two things are completely intermingled in the documents. For instance: "The European Council, concerned at the renewal of tensions in Central America and particularly at the recent explosion of violence in El Salvador, considers that a peaceful solution in accordance with the aspirations of the peoples of the region can only come through dialogue, the safeguarding of human rights, and respect for democracy."²²

Again, the importance of the respect for democracy (46 items) and human rights (38 items) comes as no surprise. The first important group of positively-laden values have

²²*Bulletin of the European Communities*, 12-1989, p. 17.

to do with what should be (according to the European Council) the desired goal of every state. The development of democracy and the respect of human rights and individual freedom is the ideal condition for every member of the international community. Peace, security prosperity and respect of the rule of law are corollaries of this achievement. This is the reason why all these elements are usually employed in the same sentences.²³

Respect for democracy and human rights is the outstanding issue at stake in the communiqués of the European Council. The rejection of the practices of violation of human rights is very important (30 items in the 16 documents). What is emblematic in that respect, is that the cases of violation of human rights are accounted in detail and there are but few references to violations to human rights *as such*. Most often, the European Council refers to specific cases of violation of human rights (arbitrary arrests, executions, torture etc.). The pursuit of a policy aiming at the universal respect of human rights is an essential element of European foreign policy:

The Community and its Member States undertake to pursue their policy of promoting and safeguarding human rights and fundamental freedoms throughout the world. This is the legitimate and permanent duty of the world community and of all the States acting individually or collectively. They recall that the different ways of expressing concern about violations of rights, as well as requests designed to secure those rights, cannot be considered as interference in the internal affairs of a State, and constitute an important and legitimate part of their dialogue with third countries. For their part, the Community and its Member States will continue to take up violations wherever they occur.²⁴

The substance of these values can be labelled *reference values*.²⁵ Namely, these values are the ones that serve as the central rule in the evaluation of all situations abroad. All situations not complying with the rule (i.e. with these reference values) are considered abnormal. Democracy, pluralism, respect for human rights, peace, freedom, the rule of

²³See *Bulletin of the European Communities*, 6-1989, p. 15.

²⁴*Bulletin of the European Communities*, 6-1991, p. 17.

²⁵For the importance of reference values see two classic value analyses: R. K. White, *Value-Analysis: the nature and the use of the method* (Glen Gardiner, N.J: Libertarian Press, 1951) and V. Isambert-Jamati, *Crises de la société, crises de l'enseignement* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1970).

law and prosperity are such major values that are widely adhered by the member states of the European Council.

These reference values are clearly reflected in the practices and attitudes rejected by the European Council: the clear rejection of war and violence is closely associated with the belief in the peaceful resolution of conflicts. The rejection of all cases of violations of human rights is associated with the belief in human rights and especially individual rights. Interestingly enough, most cases of human rights violation concern individual rights (one important exception being apartheid). Thus, arbitrary arrests, torture, detention of political prisoners, executions, intimidation and persecution (to take but a few cases) are clearly contrary to the rights of the individual (freedom of speech and belief, *habeas corpus* etc.).

Some other values mentioned by the European Council seem essentially as being a means to achieve the above-mentioned reference values. Such *subsidiary values* are dialogue and co-operation in peace talks, the belief in the peaceful settlement of conflicts economic development and co-operation, security, reconciliation, protection of minorities, good government, openness and the belief in the market economy. These values are auxiliaries for the achievement of the reference values, but this does not mean that they are of minor importance. It only implies that they are means whereas the reference values are desired end-results. Thus, the European Council asserts that "A just, stable and lasting solution must be found through diplomatic action, regional dialogue, economic cooperation and reconciliation based on respect for democracy and human rights..."²⁶ Reconciliation is at once a process and a state, that is why it is accounted (in this case) as a subsidiary value. The other values (diplomatic action, regional dialogue, economic co-operation) are clearly subsidiary and are accounted as a means for achieving the reference values (the word through is used). The end-result is distinctly democracy and the respect of human rights.²⁷

²⁶*Bulletin of the European Communities*, 6-1989, p. 15.

²⁷The European Council seems especially to consider that the experience of European regional integration can be an interesting model for other regions of the world: "The easing of international tensions with the end of the Cold War provides new possibilities and resources for development but also favours the emergence of new forms of cooperation, namely at the inter-regional level." *Bulletin of the European Communities*, 6-1992, p. 17.

It is worth noting that there is an important number of references to sovereignty, independence or unity. These references are mainly made in cases of decolonisation processes or in cases of occupation of the territory of a state. The wording of the references to these values is very standardised and sounds, therefore, very repetitious. The reason for this is that the European Council is very uneasy with the use of such terms as sovereignty and independence. The verbs and the common meaning terms²⁸ are almost neutral which shows just how difficult this matter is for the European Council.²⁹

The example of Central and Eastern Europe

The importance of some major values for the EU and for its foreign relations is made all the more clear in the references of the European Council to the states of Central and Eastern Europe. The support for the transition to democracy is unambiguous: "The Community has taken and will take the necessary decisions to strengthen its cooperation with peoples aspiring to freedom, democracy and progress and with States which intend their founding principles to be democracy, pluralism and the rule of law."³⁰

The process of change and the progressive liberalisation of these states is seen as an historic chance to construct a Europe based on compatibility of major values:

This process of change brings ever closer a Europe which, having overcome the unnatural divisions imposed on it by ideology and confrontation, stands united in its commitment to democracy, pluralism, the rule of law, full respect for human rights, and the principles of the market economy.³¹

The possibility of achieving a lasting peace in a free Europe is also closely associated with the success of European integration. The European Council cannot think of a peaceful Europe without a successful and dynamic European Union. The EU is

²⁸The common meaning terms are evaluative terms of the attitude objects, they designate the value considered. For more details, see Bardin, *op. cit.*, p. 210 ff.

²⁹Key verbs in that respect are to respect and to support. For instance, "The European Council reaffirms the Union's support for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine." In *Bulletin of the European Communities*, 6-1994, pp. 15-16. The standardised use of the aforementioned verbs and the absence or the neutrality of the common meaning terms greatly contrasts with the use of common meaning terms that are positively and negatively-laden for the description of other values.

³⁰*Bulletin of the European Communities*, 12-1989, p. 12.

³¹*Bulletin of the European Communities*, 4-1990, p. 7.

considered as the polity that is able to ensure peace and stability in the continent. The development of the EU is viewed as a necessity not only for itself, but also for the needs of Europe as a whole.

A point has now been reached where the continued dynamic development of the Community has become an imperative not only because it corresponds to the direct interests of the 12 Member States but also because it has become a crucial element in the progress that is being made in establishing a reliable framework for peace and security in Europe.³²

The support for the transition to democracy and to market economy is likewise associated with the individual citizen: "The European Council reaffirmed the right of individual citizens to participate fully in this process and called on all States to observe this principle without reservation."³³ The importance of individual rights is, once again, underlined and the belief in the importance of the support of the individual for the success of the founding of a peaceful Europe is beyond any possible doubt.

As in the case of the 'internal values', the 'external values' consider the individual as the corner stone of democracy. The references to a market-orientated economy are also made to show that the citizen can be prosperous and benefit from progress. The enhancement of individual freedoms is seen as the best way of establishing a community of democracies that do not consider war as possible any more. "A political consensus is growing around the fundamental relationship between pluralistic democracy, respect for human rights and development regarded as an equitable and sustainable process focused on the individual."³⁴ The EU clearly states its will to extend abroad the relations among its member states that are based on compatibility of major values.³⁵ It is seeking to forge new partnerships, based on respect for shared values of freedom, democracy, civil and political rights social well-being, market-orientated economies and free enterprise. The belief is that relationships based on such

³²*Bulletin of the European Communities*, 4-1990, p. 8, this sentence is repeated in *ibid.*, 6-1990, p. 15. In the Essen European Council a similar assertion is made: "The European Union is making an essential contribution to overcoming the legacy of past divisions, and promoting peace, security and stability in and around Europe." *Ibid.*, 12-1994, p. 12.

³³*Bulletin of the European Communities*, 6-1990, p. 13.

³⁴*Bulletin of the European Communities*, 6-1992, p. 17.

³⁵See in particular the aims of the CFSP stated in *Bulletin of the European Communities*, 12-1990, p. 9.

values are inherently peaceful and this belief is obviously supported by experience from inter-European relations since the end of World War II. Compatibility of major—peaceful—values is a guarantee for peace between the member states of the European Union.

Seemingly, the degree of compatibility of major values looks unimpressive. The agreement is limited to some very 'basic' notions such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law. There is no mention, for example, of the existence of common interests. This small achievement is, however, sufficient to sustain peaceful relations between the member states of the European Union.

7. Testing Mutual Responsiveness: the case of European Union Regional Policies and Redistribution

Mutual responsiveness, as already demonstrated, is a crucial test for the existence of a security community. If the demands and needs of the members of a security community are “not merely (...) received, but (...) understood, and (...) given real weight in the process of decision-making”¹ then the considered area can reasonably be considered as integrated. Karl Deutsch insists on the importance of communication (that he measures mostly through the ratio of foreign to domestic mail) for testing the reality of this notion but he also proposes some other ways of empirically testing the reality of the notion.

Another specific aspect of responsiveness we found was the disintegrative effect of reacting with excessive delay to the social, economic, or political reforms that came to be expected by the people in the area. Mainly, this is the responsibility of national governments within their own borders. But, those governments sometimes needed help from outside, and other countries had a chance to demonstrate international responsiveness. (...) The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), early American assistance to Greece, the Marshall Plan, and NATO are the outstanding instances. (...) Within Europe, the Coal and Steel Community and the proposed atomic energy pool and common market plan seem to be further evidence of responsiveness.²

Unilateral transfers and redistribution towards the poorer members of a community are therefore clear examples of an increased level of mutual responsiveness. Therefore, the study of European regional policy and redistribution is a way of examining the degree of mutual responsiveness achieved. In a broader perspective, a high level of

¹Karl W. Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience* (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 67.

²*Ibid.*, p. 131.

redistribution is a prerequisite for successive integration and an unconfusable indication of past achievements. In the words of Loukas Tsoukalis:³

A relatively equitable distribution of the gains and losses, or at least the perception of such an equitable distribution, can be a determining factor for the continuation of the integration process. (...) Redistribution can (...) be considered as an index of the political and social cohesion of a new system; large transfers of funds across national frontiers not being a normal feature of international organizations.

Regional policy and redistribution in the European Union progressively gained momentum. "The gradual acceptance of the redistributive function of the EC budget and hence the link between economic integration and solidarity across national frontiers makes the Community very different from traditional international organizations, and can be interpreted as a sign of the EC slowly acquiring the traits of proper political system."⁴ The study of the evolution of European regional policies and redistribution shows a growing level of integration in Europe. These policies have then to be analysed from a more theoretical viewpoint as to properly show the importance and magnitude of mutual responsiveness.

The growing importance of European regional policy and redistribution

The perceived need for a European regional policy has been growing over the years, at a pace similar to the one of European integration. For Europe, the existence of a regional policy can even be considered as more important than in the cases of the member states.

³Loukas Tsoukalis, *The New European Economy: The Politics and Economics of Integration* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 228-229.

⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 261-262.

(...) the frontiers of economic communities often coincide with the frontiers of defence communities or with the provision or preservation of other 'public goods' such as security, justice, common culture, language and heritage. In such cases, non-economic values may easily outweigh episodic disadvantages for some region of an economic nature. The European Community, by contrast, has at present a narrower range of policy function with which to assure a satisfactory overall balance of advantage for all its Member States. The public good of 'unity' may thus require a relatively greater amount of attention than would be necessary if the Community extended its functions to wider policy areas.⁵

In the European Union, there are enormous income and infrastructure disparities that greatly exceed similar disparities in the United States.⁶ The aim of achieving a common market cannot therefore be severed from a necessary convergence of the regional economies towards the European average. The realisation of a single European market is at risk of becoming unpopular, or even irrelevant to some states. "On the basis of PPSs, per capita income levels in Greece and Portugal are less than half those enjoyed in Germany and Luxembourg."⁷ The poorest regions are in danger of being forever laggards. In this case some regions could consider their European experience as not being a rewarding one. This is clearly a great danger as a fundamental objective of European construction has been the establishment of an 'ever closer union'.⁸ A genuine community is not possible if internal disparities of a large scale persist. There is clearly an income distribution problem in Europe and, the existence of a rich centre

⁵Tomasso Padoa-Schioppa with Michael Emerson, Mervyn King, Jean-Claude Milleron, Jean Paelinck, Lucas Papademos, Alfredo Pastor and Fritz Scharpf, *Efficiency, Stability and Equity: A Strategy for the Evolution of the Economic System of the European Community, A Report* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 89. For a broader analysis of regional policy see Horst Siebert, *Regional Economic Growth: Theory and Policy* (Scranton: International Textbook, 1968); John Friedman and William Alonso (eds.), *Regional Policy: Readings in Theory and Applications* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1975); Harvey Armstrong and Jim Taylor, *Regional Policy: The Way Forward* (London: Employment Institute, 1987) and Harvey Armstrong and Jim Taylor, *Regional Economics and Policy* (Oxford: Philip Allen, 1985); Harvey Armstrong, 'The reform of the European Community regional policy', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 23, no. 4.

⁶See Andrea Boltho, 'European and United States regional differentials: a note', *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*, vol. 5, no. 2, 1989.

⁷Tsoukalis, *op. cit.*, p. 232. PPS stands for Purchasing Power Standards.

⁸In the preamble of the Treaty of Rome, the six governments were "determined to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe" and were "resolved to ensure the economic and social progress of their countries by common action to eliminate the barriers that divide Europe."

as opposed to a poor periphery endangers the rationality and the coherence of the European edifice. This is clearly acknowledged by the European Commission.⁹

In crude terms, the 10 most prosperous regions, headed by Groningen in the Netherlands and Hambourg in Germany, are three times as rich and invest three times as much in their basic economic fabric as the 10 poorest regions in Greece and Portugal. The Community is committed to reducing this gap and to ensuring that no one is a second class citizen.

This is the reason why regional policy and in a larger perspective redistribution has progressively become one of the most important single items on the European agenda. Whereas from 1958 to 1975, no common regional policy existed *per se*, from 1975-on some instruments were created allowing the strengthening of the regional dimension. Finally, in 1988 the creation of the Structural Funds has constituted an important step forward towards the creation of a genuine regional policy and an increase of the effectiveness of the instruments used.¹⁰ The creation of the single European market and later-on, the beginnings of the process leading to Economic and Monetary Union were decisive factors for the implementation of a more comprehensive regional policy.

The original instruments and provisions for the implementation of a regional and redistribution policy

The problem of regional heterogeneity was relatively minor in the early years after the creation of the Community. With the important exception of the Mezzogiorno all the other regions were relatively homogeneous. The problem of the Mezzogiorno was acknowledged in an additional protocol to the Treaty of Rome. Regional problems were considered as a task that came within the assignments of the Community. The preamble is quite clear when stating the aims of the Community:

⁹Commission of the European Communities, *Helping Europe's Regions* (Brussels and Luxembourg: 1992), p. 1.

¹⁰The chronological periods chosen are also those chosen in Tsoukalis, *op. cit.*, pp. 232-233. For another account of the history of European regional policy, see John Ryan, 'The Regional Policies of the European Commission, the United Kingdom and Germany', *Journal of Regional Policy*, vol. 13, nos. 3-4, 1993; A. Marques, 'Community competition policy and economic and social cohesion', *Regional Studies*, vol. 26, no. 4; John Mawson, Mario Ruis Martins and John T. Gibney, 'The Development of the European Community Regional Policy', in Michael Keating and Barry Jones (eds.), *Regions in the European Community* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985) and David Keeble, John Offord and Sheila Walker, *Peripheral Regions in a Community of Twelve Member States* (Luxembourg: Commission of the European Communities, 1988).

Anxious to strengthen the unity of their economies and to ensure their harmonious development by reducing both the differences existing between the various regions and the backwardness of the less favoured regions.

And article two of the Treaty goes even further in that respect:

The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a Common Market and progressively approximating the economic policies of Member States, to promote throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer relations between the States belonging to it.

Beyond these direct references to the regional dimension of the Community, "the common policies have regional effects, but, conversely, the common policies can be an instrument of regional policy at the Community level."¹¹ In particular, the Common Agricultural Policy was meant to reduce income inequalities as regional concentration on agriculture and economic backwardness are closely linked.¹²

Some other instruments were created for the implementation of this 'regional dimension'. In particular, the European Investment Bank was used as a source of relatively small interest loans and guarantees for the less developed areas of the Community. Nevertheless, regional policy stayed throughout this period an awkward European matter:

The various derogations, together with the lack of any separate chapter on a common regional policy, suggest that the authors of the Treaty of Rome, while recognizing the regional problem and the need to employ special instruments to deal with it, had decided to leave the responsibility basically to the hands of national authorities.¹³

During this period the instruments and, in an even greater extent, the sums employed were far too small to allow the implementation of a real European regional policy.

¹¹Norbert Vanhove and Leo H. Klaasen, *Regional Policy: A European Approach* (Westmead: Saxon House, 1980), p. 382.

¹²One of the main aims of the CAP is to ensure a "fair standard of living" for people employed in agriculture (article 39.1). For the importance of the CAP to questions of welfare in some countries see Fiona Butler, 'The EC's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)', in Juliet Lodge (ed.), *The European Community and the Challenge of the Future* (London: Pinter, 1993).

¹³Tsoukalis, *op. cit.*, p. 236.

Redistribution was of a very modest scale.¹⁴ Besides, during this period rapid economic growth explains why income differences did not become a major political issue. Over this period income disparities among the Six were reduced which helped to allay fears about the effects of economic integration upon the weaker economies.¹⁵

The progressive strengthening of the regional dimension

The first enlargement of the EC added to the Community many poor regions and the economic and income disparities were considerably increased. "The primary responsibility for dealing with the backward regions was [hitherto] left with the member states. Community Regional Policy, which hardly existed before 1973, has been slowly taking shape since the first enlargement."¹⁶ Thus, Ireland succeeded into adding protocol no 30 to its accession Treaty that states that: "THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES (...) RECALL that the fundamental objectives of the European Economic Community include the steady improvement of the living standards and working conditions of the peoples of the Member States, and the harmonious development of their economies by reducing the differences existing between the various regions and the backwardness of the less favoured regions."¹⁷ This protocol was considered by the Irish "as a commitment that Community resources would be available to assist them, particularly a far-reaching regional policy."¹⁸ Besides, the economic crisis from 1973-on and the rapid deterioration of the international economic environment created a profound malaise and a great many doubts about the efficiency of the European process.

The UK government was, at the time, looking for ways to reduce the financial burden arising from its accession to the EC and more specifically the UK contribution

¹⁴No account of the funds redistributed was found, but there is no doubt that since the only sums redistributed came from the Common Agricultural Policy, the European Investment Bank and the Mezzogiorno protocol, redistribution was of a small scale.

¹⁵See Vanhove and Klaasen, *op. cit.*

¹⁶Marjia-Liisa Kiljunen, 'Regional Disparities and Policy in the EEC', in Dudley Seers and Constantine Vaitsos, *Integration and Unequal Development: the Experience of the EEC* (London: Macmillan, 1980), p. 213. For an analysis of these times see also Andrea Boltho (ed.), *The European Economy: Growth and Crisis* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982) and David Dyker (ed.), *The European Economy* (London: Longman, 1992).

¹⁷Quoted in Trevor C. Salmon, 'Ireland' in Carol Twitchett and Kenneth J. Twitchett (eds.), *Building Europe: Britain's Partners in the EEC* (London: Europa Publications Limited, 1981), p. 197.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, p. 197.

to the CAP. The European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) was created in 1975 for this purpose.¹⁹ This shows how closely redistribution and regional policy are linked. At the beginning, the ERDF had very few financial means and these means were distributed on the basis of quota allocations for each member state decided by the Council of Ministers. This simply meant that every single state (even the most developed one) was getting some funding for its regional problems. This became increasingly unpopular and irrational after the two following enlargements and was progressively modified.²⁰ Funds available through the ERDF grew over the years and a bias in favour of the poorest states was introduced. The resources allocated to the Social Fund and to the Regional Fund reached 7 billion ECU in 1988.²¹ Still, at this time, regional policy was very little co-ordinated and no real control of the allocation of the funds was possible.²²

In 1985, the introduction of the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes intended for the Mediterranean regions of France, Italy and the whole of Greece was an important step forward in the direction of a genuine European regional policy. This programme can be considered as the "valuation of the background of a European Union."²³ Each Programme would last from three to seven years and a total of 6.6 billion ECUs was to be allocated through them.²⁴ After the 1986 enlargement, the need for a more efficient regional policy was even greater than before. The Single European Act laid the foundations for a qualitative step forward. In particular, Title V named 'Economic and Social Cohesion' was a formal recognition of the importance of redistribution. Articles 130a and 130e provided a link between the reduction of regional disparities and

¹⁹See Helen Wallace, 'Distributional Politics: dividing up the Community cake', in H. Wallace, W. Wallace and C. Webb (eds.), *Policy Making in the European Community* (Chichester: John Wiley, 1983).

²⁰Changes were introduced in the quotas of the member states and a non-quota element was introduced.

²¹See S. F. Goodman, *The European Community* (London: Macmillan, 1993), p. 168.

²²Tsoukalis, *op. cit.*, p. 240.

²³Fritz Fraumeyer and Bernhard Seidel, 'Regional- und Sozialpolitik', in Werner Weinfeld and Wolfgang Wessels (eds.), *Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration 1984* (Bonn: Institut für Europäische Politik and Europa Union Verlag, 1984), p. 169.

²⁴These funds came from various EC funds and the EIB as well as from newly created budget resources. See Tsoukalis, *op. cit.*, p. 242, for details. The 6.6 billion ECUs fund target was not actually reached since most states have been unable to absorb the totality of the capital available.

specific instruments like the ERDF, the European Social Fund and the EAGGF-Guidance Section²⁵ (the so-called structural funds) and the EIB.

The aim of new article 130a was to strengthen this cohesion and to promote 'overall harmonious development', in particular by reducing disparities between the various regions and the backwardness of least-favoured regions. Member states were to conduct their economic policies to this end and the achievement of the Single European Market was to take into account the needs of economic and social cohesion. The structural funds (...) and the European Investment Bank were also to be used to achieve these objectives (new Article 130b EEC). The ERDF was to be used to adjust regional imbalances within the EC and plans were to be made to rationalize the various structural funds so that they may more efficiently achieve economic and social cohesion within the Communities.²⁶

The ground was ready for the creation of a real European regional policy.

The emergence of a real European regional policy

In 1988, during the Brussels meeting of the European Council, a decision was taken to double the resources available to the Structural Funds (in real terms) between 1987 and 1993.²⁷ This decision, together with the reform of the EC budget and the one of the CAP, constituted the so-called Delors package for the successful implementation of the internal market programme.²⁸ It was then clear that this was the necessary price to pay for the political acceptance of the internal market programme, especially in some states. These measures were followed by measures aiming at enhancing the efficiency of EC action. The Funds were given five priority objectives:

1. Regions lagging behind;
2. Declining industrial areas;
3. The long-term unemployed;

²⁵European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund. For an account of the reform of the ERDF see G. J. Croxford, M. Wise and B. S. Chalkley, 'The reform of the European Regional Development Fund: a preliminary assessment', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 26, no. 1, 1987.

²⁶Clive Archer, *Organizing Western Europe* (London: Edward Arnold, 1990), pp. 109-110.

²⁷"By 1993 the budget appropriations for the Funds will increase to ECU 14 billion (European currency units), or about 25 percent of the total Community budget." In Gary Marks, 'Structural Policy in the European Community', in Alberta M. Sbragia (ed.), *Euro-Politics: Institutions and Policymaking in the "New" European Community* (Washington D.C: The Brookings Institution, 1992), p. 191.

²⁸See Andrew Scott, 'Financing the Community: The Delors II package', in Lodge (ed.), op. cit..

4. Employment of young people;
5. (a) adjustment of agricultural structures and (b) development of rural areas.²⁹

The first objective now concerns Greece, the Republic of Ireland, Northern Ireland, Portugal, most of Spain, the Mezzogiorno and the new German *Länder*. Objective one was meant to absorb 60% of the Structural Funds by 1993. The regions concerned by the second objective are concentrated in central and north-western Europe and a great number of them are in the UK. Objectives three and four are the domain of the European Social Fund and the funds allocated to objective 5 are significantly smaller.³⁰

Table 7.1: Rough breakdown by priority objective (billion ECU, 1988 prices)

	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
Objective 1			5.6	6.6	7.4	8.2	9.2
Objective 2			1.0	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.5
Objectives 3-4			1.2	1.2	1.4	1.6	1.8
Objective 5a			0.6	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.7
Objective 5b			0.3	0.3	0.5	0.7	0.9
Total Objectives			8.7	9.9	11.3	12.6	14.1
Transitional measures			0.3	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.4
Total Funds	7.2	7.7	9.0	10.3	11.6	12.9	14.5

Source: Eurostat, *Europe in Figures* (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1992), p 45.

Regional policy is now clearly the second most important expenditure post of the European Union budget.³¹ The budget, of course, remains of fairly modest proportions

²⁹See Commission of the European Communities, *op. cit.*, p. 4 for more details. See also Eurostat, *Europe in Figures* (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1992), pp. 44-45.


³⁰See J. Van Ginderachter, 'La réforme des fonds structurels', *Revue du Marché Commun*, May 1989.

³¹Eurostat, *op. cit.*, p. 41. In 1993, commitments to structural operations reached 21.270 million ECUs at 1992 prices compared to 35.340 million ECUs for the CAP and 4.500 million ECUs for internal policies.

(up to 1.2 percent of European Gross Domestic Product), but since it concentrates its action in a small number of fields, its impact is not unimportant.³² The financial perspectives show in that respect the growing importance of structural action. Over the 1993-1999 period, structural operations are set to increase by almost 41 percent whereas, the budget increases by just over 21 percent.

Table 7.2: Appropriations for commitments (million ECU at 1992 prices)

	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
<i>Structural operations</i>	21.277	21.785	23.480	24.990	26.526	28.240	30.000
<i>Total appropriations for commitments</i>	69.177	69.944	72.485	75.224	77.989	80.977	84.089



Source: *Bulletin of the European Communities*, 12-1992, p. 32.

The principle of additionality was also reinforced after this reform. This principle means that "EC expenditure should represent a net increase in the amounts spent on

³²For the financing problems of the European Union, see Goodman, *op. cit.*, pp. 74-84, and Valerio Lintner and Sonia Mazey, *The European Community: Economic and Political Aspects* (London: McGraw-Hill, 1991), pp. 72-94.

development and not on consumption.³³ This, of course, implies the necessity to exercise some kind of central control.³⁴

The principal objective of regional policies should not be to subsidize incomes and simply offset inequalities in standards of living, but to help to equalize production conditions through investment programmes in such areas as physical infrastructure, communications, transportation and education so that large scale movements of labour do not become the major adjustment factor.

The Treaty on European Union has gone a step further towards a comprehensive regional policy with the creation of the cohesion fund. This fund is worth 15.250 million ECUs at 1992 prices over seven years.³⁵ It is aimed at helping the transition towards a common currency in the poorest members of the Union. The second Delors package (i.e. the main budgetary guidelines for 1993-1997) called for a further increase in the resources of the Structural Funds which should represent 33.5 percent of the expenditure of the EU budget in 1997. Concerning the less developed countries and regions, this would represent a doubling of resources in real terms.³⁶

Rationale for Community regional policy and mutual responsiveness: explaining the construction of a policy

The rationale of European regional policy

European regional policy has a threefold rationale: economic, social and political. All three elements are very important and very closely linked.

The economic rationale is that it is essential to intervene at a local level to overcome possible adverse effects of market integration on disadvantaged regions.

³³Tsoukalis, *op. cit.*, p. 246.

³⁴Committee for the Study of Economic and Monetary Union (Delors Report), *Report on Economic and Monetary Union in the European Community* (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1989), pp. 22-23.

³⁵*Bulletin of the European Communities*, 12-1992, p. 29.

³⁶For more details, see Scott, 'Financing the Community: the Delors II package', in Lodge (ed.), *op. cit.*, (London: Pinter, 1993).

In a perfect market, equilibrium would be established by the free movement of capital and labour, and flexible factor costs. Capital would move to depressed areas to take advantage of surplus labour and lower costs. Labour would migrate to growing areas in search of employment and higher wages. In practice this may not happen. Economics of scale may produce higher returns to capital in booming areas; while outmigration may leave behind the unskilled and the old in the declining regions. (...) In any case, labour is less mobile in Europe than in the United States, let alone the perfect market model. There are also external social costs to capital and labour mobility in the form of congestion in expanding areas and under-utilized infrastructure in the declining areas.³⁷

The effects of market integration especially in the European case are very difficult to determine. There is no overwhelming evidence to support either that the common market helps regional convergence or that it induces regional divergence.³⁸ Market integration can have very different effects depending on the sector concerned. "Improvements in the competitiveness of transport and telecommunication services should, for example, reduce the locational disadvantage of peripheral regions. On the other hand, the liberalization of financial services seems likely to emphasize the economies of scale offered by specialized centres."³⁹ It is clear that this problem is even more delicate seen from the wider perspective of world trade. "If Europe as a whole decides to bargain away its protection of the textile and clothing sector in order to gain concessions on say, opening up of trade in financial services, the impact will be to favour financial centres like London or Paris, at the expense of regions specializing

³⁷Liesbet Hooghe and Michael Keating, 'The politics of European Union regional policy', *Journal of European Public Policy*, vol. 1, no. 3, 1994, p. 368.

³⁸The danger of economic integration in some regions was underlined by Gunnar Myrdal who considered that the free movement of capital can lead to 'polarization' effects through a process of 'cumulative causation'. In short, the inflow of capital in regions where its marginal productivity is greatest leads to a dynamic process that reinforces the attractiveness of these regions. The free flow of labour can have similar effects since it drains the most dynamic workers of the poor regions. The costs of development in the dynamic regions (pollution and congestion for instance) can provoke an inflow of capital to the poor regions but this is unlikely to compensate the initial outflow. See Gunnar Myrdal, *Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions* (London: Duckworth, 1957). For an analysis of the total impact of the single market see Paolo Cecchini with Michael Catinat and Alexis Jacquemin, *The European Challenge: 1992 The Benefits of the Single European Market* (Aldershot: Wildwood House, 1988). See also M. Quevit, 'The regional impact of the internal market: a comparative analysis of traditional industrial regions and lagging regions', *Regional Studies*, vol. 26, no. 4 and W. J. Steinle, 'Regional competitiveness and the Single Market', *Regional Studies*, vol. 26, no. 4.

³⁹Padoa-Schioppa et al., *op. cit.*, p. 94.

in textiles and clothing.”⁴⁰ Still, four important reasons make market integration difficult for certain regions: (a) increased competition would harm non-competitive firms that are highly concentrated in the peripheral regions; (b) integration would necessitate the reconversion of whole regions where stagnating activities are concentrated; (c) important external economies would increase the attractiveness of certain regions; (d) regions with a high concentration in agriculture can be detrimental as these structures are very difficult to change.⁴¹

But, besides the uncertain economic effects of market integration, there are important social reasons for European regional policy. The equalisation of interregional living standards has been recognised as a major objective in all contemporary democracies.⁴² The right of people to remain in their proper communities and to preserve their traditions is also a powerful reason for the reduction of migration towards booming areas. Any regional policy aims at “maintaining and encouraging the social and cultural basis of the life of the regional populations including the preservation and best use of natural, cultural and amenity resources available.”⁴³

Finally, the political case for European regional policy is based upon the need to legitimise the European economic and social order. In nation states, there is an important redistributive effect of fiscal policy and taxation which is added to the regional policies implemented. In the European Union, the small scale of fiscal integration does not allow such a massive redistribution. It is therefore important for the cohesion of the Union to have specific actions in the field of regional policies.⁴⁴

⁴⁰Iain Begg, ‘European Integration and Regional Policy’, *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*, vol. 5, no. 2, 1989, p. 98.

⁴¹See Vanhove and Klaasen, *op. cit.*, p. 229.

⁴²This is also the case for the EU as it is assumed that the construction of a single market (economic integration) will *ultimately* help the convergence of living standards although no time schedule is set for this convergence.

⁴³Willem Molle with the collaboration of Bas Van Holst and Hans Smit, *Regional Disparity and Economic Development in the European Community* (Westmead: Saxon House, 1980), p. 3.

⁴⁴See Hooghe and Keating, *op. cit.*, p. 369. See also Tsoukalis, *op. cit.*, pp. 264-265. Tsoukalis claims (p. 264) that: “Two basic characteristics of the EC budget, are its small size and the legal requirement for zero balance between revenue and expenditure. Thus its role in terms of the traditional functions of allocation, stabilization, and redistribution can only be extremely limited.”

European regional policy as a process of mutual responsiveness

It is often considered, by some part of public opinion in states that are net contributors of the European budget, that its development is only for the benefit of the poorest members of the Union and that the other members do not stand to benefit from it. The notion of *juste retour* (meaning that states should aim at a zero balance between their contribution and their benefits from the European process) in particular "risks undermining the capacity of sectoral policies to achieve their specific objectives, and thence the utility of developing new policy initiatives, and in an extreme situation risks paralysing the Community system as a whole."⁴⁵ Over 60 percent of the EU budget is now financed by just three states: Germany (30%), France (20%) and the UK (12%). The burden clearly seems very unequally shared.⁴⁶ This can provoke a severe crisis of confidence in the utility of the policies.

Besides, the European regional policies have had many important effects that result from their mere principles. These principles are: (1) partnership between the regional, national and Community level; (2) subsidiarity and (3) additionality to national funds.⁴⁷ The first principle has as a consequence the emergence of European regions as an important political and administrative entity.⁴⁸ Subsidiarity and additionality have a federalist flavour that helped the perception of the EU as a genuine political entity. These developments foster the perception of the EU as the entity that has far-reaching powers and responsibilities. Thus, the Union is seen as an essential instance for the transmission of demands and the realisation of the 'mutual responsiveness process'.

These radical changes explain to a large extent the difficulties that some states had with the implementation of this policy. It is very difficult to adapt to these changes. Besides, there are some other important reasons that make these policies somewhat unpopular.

⁴⁵Padoa-Schioppa et al., op. cit., p. 90.

⁴⁶Maurice Schumann, 'Le nerf de l'Union européenne', *Revue des deux mondes*, February 1994.

⁴⁷Commission of the European Communities, op. cit., p. 5.

⁴⁸See Claude de Granrut, *Europe : le temps des Régions* (Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit et de la Jurisprudence, 1994). Article 109a of the Treaty on European Union establishes also a 'Committee of the Regions' with advisory functions defined by the Treaty. See Sir William Nicoll and Trevor C. Salmon, *Understanding the New European Community* (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1994), p. 108. For an analysis of the impact of the Regions upon the distribution of the structural funds, see Marks, op. cit., pp. 218-221.

One of them is that net contributors of the EU budget have often the impression that the money of their contribution is wasted. This feeling comes from the fact that many resources were wasted for the development of the Mezzogiorno and no European state wants a similar thing to happen in the case of European regional policy. These wasted resources have many reasons. The first of these reasons is 'rent seeking'. This term refers to lobbying activities aiming at procuring profits to minorities or even to organised crime from licences and government regulation, activities that can be labelled "Directly Unproductive Profit seeking."⁴⁹ The argument in favour of this kind of unilateral transfers states that these transfers are meant to correct initially distorted situations and are therefore but measures of justice. Still, the most likely result of these activities is price distortion and the increase of the number of monopolies. In this case, rich regions directly subsidise poor regions without this subsidies being conducive to development. The most rational strategy in this case is to remove directly the market distortions.⁵⁰ Otherwise, there is welfare loss for society (in particular a lot of resources are allocated towards political bargaining) and the process is clearly neither efficient nor mutual.

The theory of collective action and the notion of 'free rider' also help to explain the reason why rich regions or States are unwilling to pay for poor ones.⁵¹ Members of a large organisation only receive part of the benefits of collective action while bearing the costs. A member is a 'free rider' when it receives a disproportionate part of the benefits while bearing little part or no part at all of the costs. In this case also, the process is not mutual and only one side stands to benefit substantially from it.

These concerns have been increasingly taken into account in the formulation of the European regional policy. The existence of wide spread fraud and the necessity to control the efficiency of the usage of the funds has been a problem that the EU has been trying to tackle. In particular, fraud has been increasingly considered as a penal

⁴⁹Katrin Millock and Sophie Olson, 'Why Poor Regions Stay Poor', *Journal of Regional Policy*, vol. 13, no. 1, 1993, p. 62.

⁵⁰See Padoa-Schioppa et al., *op. cit.*, p. 92.

⁵¹Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups* (New York: Schocken Books, 1968).

offence and community law has developed a new branch in order to limit this problem.⁵²

The comparisons made with regional policies at the national level also clearly show that.⁵³

It has become clear that a successful regional policy needs to establish adequate networks of the political, social and economic agents concerned on local and regional levels as well.

The development of multi-level partnerships involving regional, national and European authorities is more widespread than before. The reform of the Structural Funds in 1988 has had as a consequence the shift of power away from the national level towards the European and the regional ones.⁵⁴ This reform aims, once again, at enhancing the efficiency of the process.

The requirement of efficiency has been equally taken into serious consideration. As early as 1984, during the reform of the ERDF and the creation of the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes, the problem was acknowledged and an effort was made to strengthen control.

Strong emphasis has also been placed on the close monitoring of different programmes in an attempt to deal with earlier criticism regarding the wastage of resources and wide-spread malpractices.⁵⁵

With the adoption of the Treaty on the European Union, a new step in the direction of conditionality was made.

There is also a new element of conditionality introduced with respect to the Cohesion Fund: the countries benefiting from it will need to have a programme of economic convergence approved by ECOFIN in the context of multilateral surveillance.⁵⁶

⁵²See John A. E. Vervaele, *La fraude communautaire et le droit pénal européen des affaires* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1995).

⁵³Ryan, *op. cit.*, p. 465.

⁵⁴Marks, *op. cit.*, pp. 212 ff.

⁵⁵Tsoukalis, *op. cit.*, pp. 244-245.

⁵⁶*Ibid.*, p. 247.

The necessity of a certain kind of balance between the costs and the benefits of European membership has also been acknowledged through the creation of the ERDF. This is a very dangerous matter, though.

The efforts of the UK to reduce its own net budgetary contributions opened the Pandora's box by turning net national contributions to the budget for the first time into an important, and also explosive, political issue, and thus raising alarm in Brussels about the negative consequences of a possible entrenchment of the *juste retour* principle.⁵⁷

The necessity of an overall balance between costs and benefits of integration is beyond doubt for the process to be popular.

Regional disparities may be a severe barrier to further integration. The EC advances by way of the mutual consent of its members. Where large areas remain underdeveloped it is difficult to obtain the consent to move further along the road of economic and monetary union. The EC can only advance if everyone feels they are benefiting.⁵⁸

But, it must be borne in mind that the necessary balance has to be considered as a complex phenomenon. One particular case showing the complexity of the process is the case of so-called 'tied aid', "where the donor country provides financial aid which has to be spent on imported goods from this same country."⁵⁹ In this case the impact in the donor state is minor as the aid is, in reality, more of a subsidy to the firms of the aid-donor. This is clearly the case in European regional policies as the various projects financed by European Union funds are exclusively attributed to firms coming from the net contributor states.

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 263, emphasis in original.

⁵⁸Harvey Armstrong, 'Community regional policy', in Lodge (ed.), *op. cit.*, (London: Pinter, 1993), p. 135.

⁵⁹A. J. Marques Mendes, 'Economic Cohesion in Europe: The Impact of the Delors Plan', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 29, no. 1, 1990, p. 22.

It can be easily seen that in this circumstance the donor country will be unaffected no matter how much it decides to give away. However, it should be noted that this conclusion is valid only for 'reasonable' values, that is, values which leave unaffected the growth rates of the propensity to import and the terms of trade. Nevertheless, it emphasizes the point that in this case a country can become a generous donor without jeopardizing its own growth rate.⁶⁰

To put in a nutshell, the recipient states stand to benefit from the European funds by developing their infrastructures and their economy, whereas net contributors to the European budget also stand to benefit from regional action thanks to the social stability induced by economic growth in the former states, thanks also to the substantial part of funds that will be returned to firms of the contributor states and, finally, to the overall positive effect on economic welfare that development will certainly have.

(...) it must be stressed that the overall judgement over costs and benefits of participation in the Community must be made in a wider context than merely the budget. Gains from trade are likely for most countries to be of greater significance. Wider still are benefits of a purely political character, such as support for democracy and other political values.⁶¹

Regional policy at the European level can therefore be seen as a process of mutual responsiveness. It is clear that both contributors and recipients stand to benefit from it. "The most straightforward explanation for the growth of the structural Funds is that they are a side payment or bribe paid by the wealthier members to the poorer peripheral members of the EC in return for their assent to the 1992 package of economic liberalization."⁶² Both sides are responding to the needs and messages of the other side. For instance, donor states ask for more efficiency and a better control over the usage of the resources, recipients ask for more funds.

These various strategies of the different actors can be studied through a game-theoretical framework. For this purpose, actors at the European level can be divided into two categories: net contributors and net recipients from European regional

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 22.

⁶¹Padoa-Schioppa et al., *op. cit.*, p. 90.

⁶²Marks, *op. cit.*, p. 194.

policies and redistribution.⁶³ These two groups can also be labelled recipients⁶⁴ and donors.⁶⁵ The two actors have two different options which are either co-operation or deception. The situation before the implementation of the regional policy and the acceptance of some compensation by the recipients is noted x in the donor countries and y in the recipients. According to the choices taken different values are attributed to the interaction of their strategies. These strategies can be translated into the following payoff matrix:

		<i>Strategy for recipients</i>	
		Deception	Co-operation
<i>Strategy for donors</i>	Deception	$x-2, y-2$	$x+5, y-5$
	Co-operation	$x-5, y+5$	$x+10, y+10$

In this payoff matrix regional policies are considered as a mixed-sum game.⁶⁶ Lack of mutuality in co-operation or in deception can result into a zero-sum game in which the gains of one actor equal the losses of the other. But, mutuality in deception or in co-operation have either a positive or a negative-sum game as a result.

⁶³This characterisation is, obviously, subjective. It also has the drawback to exclude the Commission from the reasoning. Nevertheless, the construction is of some value as it allows to see clearly the process of mutual compensation characterising this kind of political negotiation. Some other simplifications are necessary for the use of the model. Namely, the model deals with homogeneous actors, whereas in reality, the actors considered being independent states, they may have very different approaches of the problems and the solutions envisaged. The strategies of the actors are considered as producing a fix amount of payoff. This amount is totally subjective. Finally, preferences of the actors are considered as constant, whereas in reality they can change over time. This is a common assumption to every application of game theory. For a more complete account of game theory see John P. Mayberry, John C. Hersanyi, Herbert E. Scarf and Reinhard Selten, *Game-Theoretic Models of Cooperation and Conflict* (Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1992); Martin Shubik, *Game Theory in the Social Sciences: Concepts and Solutions* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1984) and Roger B. Myerson, *Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991).

⁶⁴Recipients include Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Spain.

⁶⁵Donors include Luxembourg, Germany, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, the UK, Italy and Belgium. These reasoning is conducted for the European Union of 12 member States, but a similar reasoning seems valid for a Union of 15.

⁶⁶For a complete analysis of the application of game theory in political science see Peter C. Ordeshook, *Game theory and political theory* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

If both actors choose the strategy of deception (for instance, the donors refusing to provide the assistance and the recipients refusing to implement the liberalisation of their economies), the net result is a negative sum game that harms their global welfare. If one of the actors chooses a strategy of deception whereas the other chooses a strategy of co-operation, the result is a zero sum game. What is won by the actor that chooses to deceive its partner is lost by the faithful and honest actor (this is the case, if the donors provide the necessary assistance whereas the recipients do not implement any economic reform). Finally, if both actors choose a consistent course of co-operation, then they both stand to benefit from the mutual efforts and this result in a positive sum game that shows an increase in their global welfare (both of them benefit either from the regional assistance or from the progress of economic integration and from social and political stability).

It is now clear that genuine mutual co-operation results into a positive outcome. In the European case, the evolution of regional policy shows that it has been an increasingly clear case of mutual responsiveness as the policy has been increasingly adapted to the needs and the demands of the actors.

8. Testing Mutual Predictability of Behaviour: the case of European Security Integration

Mutual predictability of behaviour is an essential condition for the emergence of a pluralistic security community in so far as it helps the building of dependable expectations of peaceful change. Testing the reality of this condition is not easy. In particular, it is difficult to predict how a relationship will evolve. The existence of peaceful relations at one point in time cannot automatically mean that these relations will remain peaceful in the future. However, it is possible to make reasonable predictions for the future thanks to a correct appreciation of the lessons of the past. This is the method applied by Karl Deutsch himself in his seminal book, despite its obvious limitations.¹

In particular, in Europe, it is difficult to predict the peaceful evolution of the continent since the security situation is changing at a very quick pace and there are a lot of uncertainties about basic parameters of European security. In the European Union, the situation is certainly more stable and, therefore, future evolution is easier to predict.

Once the whole of Europe grows together at a governmental level, and a nonregulated exchange between associations, political parties, and organizations of any kind becomes natural, interdependence and, with it, constraints for a *coordination of behavior* develop.²

¹“The reason that historical cases have something to teach us about the contemporary problem of integration is to reason by analogy. This is what most people do when they try to guide present actions by past experience. But intelligent use of experience need not rely completely upon parallels. Past examples are suggestive, not conclusive. They point in a general direction, but not toward a specific destination.” Karl Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 10-11. The use of past experience is indeed very difficult. “When resorting to an analogy, [policy-makers] tend to seize upon the first that comes to mind. They do not search more widely. Nor do they pause to analyze the case, test its fitness, or even ask in what ways it might be misleading. Seeing a trend running toward the present, they tend to assume that it will continue into the future, not stopping to consider what produced it or why a linear projection might prove to be mistaken.” In Ernest R. May, *“Lessons” of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. XI. There is an imperative of caution if the lessons of the past are to be of any help.

²Dieter Senghaas, ‘Europe 2000: A Peace Plan’, *Alternatives*, no. 15, 1990, p. 468, emphasis in original.

Two ways for testing mutual predictability of behaviour are chosen. Firstly, it is possible to assess the cohesion of the Union by examining the actuality of a single foreign policy actor embodied by the EU. The implicit logic of this argument is that if the EU is able to aggregate the needs of the member states and to represent them abroad, it is logical to assert that their behaviour is easily predictable and well co-ordinated. Since the EU is an actor on the international stage, the member states have only a limited autonomy of action and their behaviour can hardly be unpredictable. Secondly, this paper examines the degree of achievement of European defence co-operation. In this case, the logic behind the argument is that if states collaborate in defence industry and security action, they clearly themselves do not expect they will ever use the weapons they construct in common against each other.

The EU as a single foreign policy actor: achievements and short-comings

Since the late 1960s, with the development of European Political Co-operation the EU³ has tried to build a 'European reality' in the world stage.⁴ The efforts of the EU aiming at providing a certain degree of cohesion in foreign policy thanks to the development of common positions and actions developed the image of a united Europe abroad and gave more weight to the actions and positions taken than if there was no such co-ordination.

The notion of actorness: some theoretical considerations

The notion of actorness is quite difficult to circumscribe. Certainly, it involves (conscious or unconscious) deeds or non-deeds that show a united front towards non-

³Once again the term European Union is used for reasons of convenience despite the fact that, at the time, the term used at the time was that of European Communities.

⁴For a complete analysis of European Political Co-operation see Panayiotis Ifestos, *European Political Cooperation, Towards a framework of supranational diplomacy?* (Aldershot: Avebury, 1987); P. Ifestos and C. Tsardanidis, *To Evropaiko systima asfallas kai i elliniki exoteriki politiki pros to 2000* [The European Security System and the Greek Foreign Policy towards the year 2000] (Athens: Sideris, 1992), pp. 81-87; Sir William Nicoll and Trevor C. Salmon, *Understanding the New European Community* (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1994), pp. 185-213 and Simon Nuttall, *European Political Co-operation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).

members, international organisations, and international issues.⁵ To show a united front on one international matter leads to expectations that this will happen again in other issues and cases.

Action leads to expectations. This action may not necessarily be concrete or directly perceivable. Rather, action may be inaction, it may be passive or active, explicit or implicit. But whatever the nature of the action, its objective is the achievement of status and rank internationally. (...) Action itself establishes customary patterns of behaviour for the EC that are then expected by the international system.⁶

In that sense, if the European Union increasingly acts as a single actor, this has as a consequence the building of expectations that the EU will continue to act in this way.

A union of states does not become a single foreign policy actor overnight. Actor capability is built little by little and there is no fixed amount of it at any time. Actor capability has important structural prerequisites that are: (a) a community of interests; (b) a decision making process; (c) a system of crisis management; (d) a system for the management of interdependence; (e) a system of implementation; (f) external communication channels and external representation; and (g) resources and a mobilisation system.⁷ The fulfilment of these condition may greatly depend on the issue. "The capacity of being an actor is most appropriately conceived of as a variable property which the Community may possess to a greater or lesser extent."⁸ What seems basic for an actor is (a) to be able to show its difference from the external environment (b) to have a minimum degree of internal cohesion and (c) to possess some amount of power.⁹

⁵K. J. Holsti gives one possible definition of action as "the things governments do to others in order to effect certain orientations, fulfill roles, or achieve and defend objectives." In K. J. Holsti, *International Politics* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J: Prentice Hall, 1983), p. 144.

⁶Kathleen M. Spieker, *A Community Perspective on the Interaction of EC External Relations and European Political Cooperation in the Pre-Maastricht Community: case studies of actor behaviour manifested through economic sanctions and trade used as political instruments* (Ph.D. dissertation, University of St. Andrews, 1994), p. 48.

⁷These prerequisites are proposed by Gunnar Sjöstedt in *The External Role of the European Community* (London: Saxon House, 1976).

⁸*Ibid.*, p. 14.

⁹Hedley Bull asserts for instance that the European Community needs to develop some measure of military capability in order to be considered as a genuine international actor. See Hedley Bull, 'Civilian Power Europe: a Contradiction in Terms?', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 21, 1982-1983, pp. 149-164.

In sum, what can be considered as a minimum definition of actorship is the coexistence in one political body of an autonomous (or quasi-autonomous in the case of a strictly co-ordinated system) decision-making structure that possesses enough power to have a significant impact on the international system.

The evolution of the European Union as a single foreign policy actor

At the beginning of European integration, foreign affairs were excluded from the competence of the Community.¹⁰ "However, its economic weight and influence, the rapidly changing and turbulent international agenda and the member states' recognition of the inseparability of external relations from foreign policy and security resulted in the mid-1980s in a reappraisal of what international role, if any, the EC should pursue."¹¹ The EC is a subject of international public law and, therefore, has an international legal personality. But, an international personality has been developed that goes well beyond this legal approach.

The European Community of the beginnings was meant to be a 'civilian power'.¹² But, some competences of the EC have very broad consequences on the external relations of the member states.¹³ An 'ever closer union' cannot go without a progressive build-up of a European personality. This build-up was made possible thanks to the progressive alignment of the positions of the national states on a number of questions.

The foundation of the European Political Co-operation in 1970 created the background for the treatment of foreign policy matters, but, once again, defence had been excluded.¹⁴

¹⁰In particular, articles 223 and 224 of the Treaty of Rome exclude security related products from the measures concerning economic integration and the construction of a Single Market.

¹¹Juliet Lodge, 'From civilian power to speaking with a common voice: the transition to a CFSP', in Juliet Lodge (ed.), *The European Community and the Challenge of the Future* (London: Pinter, 1993), p. 227.

¹²See Bull, *op. cit.*

¹³"...Treaty obligations (association agreements with third countries (Article 238)) proved unexpectedly fertile ground for expanding EC competences - for example under the Single Act and through the European Parliament. Association with Overseas Territories (Article 132) and the power to conclude international treaties (Article 228), as well as the increasingly important and politically sensitive ability to receive and establish diplomatic missions, all augmented the EC's international visibility and presence *per se*." In Lodge, *op. cit.*, p. 229.

¹⁴Ifestos and Tsardanidis, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

Since that time, most taboos have been lifted, notably the security taboo since the creation of the Franco-German brigade and the resurrection of the WFU, from now-on considered as the security arm of the EU. "The civilian-power imagery remained important, but it was unclear how it fitted with the increasingly typical security/military responsibilities and activities into which the Community was being drawn."¹⁵ The Treaty on European Union definitely put defence on the agenda of the Union. "In spite of the cautious approach followed in the Maastricht treaty, it is of more than symbolic importance that the idea of a common European defence is no longer anathema at the official EC level."¹⁶ The member states still keep most of the power in the decision making process concerning foreign policy. "The willingness of member states to pool their national sovereignty has been made conditional upon a mutual recognition of each other's interest."¹⁷

In the autumn of 1973 the foreign ministers of the then Nine stressed that the Nine intended to 'play an active role in world affairs', to 'progressively define common positions in the sphere of foreign policy' and to seek to act 'as a single entity', bringing out the distinctive character' of that entity.¹⁸

EPC has aimed at increasing mutual understanding on international issues among the member states and at harmonising their views.¹⁹ The Single European Act which codified the EPC insisted on: the necessity for partners to inform and consult each other in matters of mutual interest; the formulation of international positions after consultation of the partners; the positions of the member states should take into consideration the positions adopted through EPC; measures that damage the coherence of EPC in international relations should be avoided; and finally, in international organisations and institutions, the positions of member states that do not participate in

¹⁵Lodge, *op. cit.*, p. 231.

¹⁶Alfred van Staden, 'After Maastricht: Explaining the Movement towards a Common European Defence Policy', in Walter Carlsnaes and Steve Smith (eds.), *European Foreign Policy: The EC and Changing Perspectives in Europe* (London: SAGE, 1994), p. 142. For another account of the development of the defence role of the Union in the Maastricht Treaty see Anand Menon, Anthony Forster and William Wallace, 'A common European defence?', *Survival*, vol. 34, no. 3, 1992.

¹⁷Ben Soetendorp, 'The Evolution of the EC/EU as a Single Foreign Policy Actor', in Carlsnaes and Smith (eds.), *op. cit.*, p. 116.

¹⁸Nicoll and Salmon, *op. cit.*, p. 186.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, p. 187.

them should be taken into account by those that do.²⁰ In all these cases, it is clear that one likely result of the co-operation process has been that the behaviour of the member states has been more predictable than ever before. Since the member states were constantly in touch, few if any surprises were to be expected from any of them.²¹ Of course, co-ordination was far from perfect. Especially, factors like commercial competition, incompatibility of interests and divergence of views concerning the future (and the desired end-product) of European integration are still important and reduce the possibility of common action and the reliability of states' expectations for the future. Still, the mere fact that a steady pattern of co-operation is now a constant feature of the EU is a minimum guarantee against a possible shift in national preferences and actions.

Evaluation of the degree of mutual predictability of behaviour

The development of a CFSP and of political union in the Treaty on European Union has had as an underlying rationale the need for reinforcement of predictability of behaviour.

Responding to German unification, political union had the undeclared aim of reinforcing the interaction of Germany into the EC, thus constraining the freedom of Germany to act alone.²²

A tight web of relations in the field of foreign affairs has had as a consequence the reduction of the number of choices available to member states. National behaviour has been more easily predictable in this way. "The CFSP and political union have been developed with the aim of assisting the EU in its new tasks that are to absorb the united Germany; to develop stability on the continent as a whole and to keep a good relationship with the United States in the new strategic environment."²³ Common action in these fields is considered as more efficient than national one.

²⁰See Heinz-Jürgen Axt, 'Kooperation unter Konkurrenten: Das Regime als Theorie der außenpolitischen Zusammenarbeit der EG-Staaten', *Zeitschrift für Politik*, 40 Jg., no. 3, 1993, p. 248.

²¹The COREU telex system has been very useful in that respect (cf. *infra*).

²²Sostendorp, *op. cit.*, p. 103.

²³Reinhardt Rummel, 'Regional Integration in the Global Test', in Reinhardt Rummel (ed.), *Toward Political Union: Planning a Common Foreign and Security Policy in the European Community* (Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1992), pp. 10-17.

Important problems remain to be solved. Notably, when member states value their 'national interest' more than community solidarity or the will to have common positions and actions with the other states, it is very difficult to make them change this attitude.²⁴ Ultimately, national interest can still prevail if there is not a sense of mutual interest in common action. The co-operation model remains an inter-governmental one. In particular, article J.8.2 of the Treaty on European Union states that "The Council shall act unanimously, except for procedural questions." Qualified majority voting is also possible where the Council unanimously agreed that these are "matters on which decisions are to be taken by a qualified vote" (article J.3.2). Even though there is a strong incentive to co-operate, it is not possible to do it without the notion that all countries involved stand to benefit (or at least not to lose) from the common action. This argument is acknowledged by the proponents of a European common defence who argue that a failure to achieve it will be also a failure for all member states:

Our march towards the construction of a European defence, albeit long and full of obstacles, is an imperious necessity, from which we will not escape without a failure for each and everyone of our countries.²⁵

The idea of a common European defence and of the construction of a single foreign policy actor is by no means entirely new. "From 1945 to 1954, the debate was about transcending sovereign independence in national security, which had failed to contain Germany in the past and held little prospect of containing Germany or the Soviet Union in the future, and urgently establishing new and durable international or supranational security structures."²⁶ These efforts have had as a conclusion the signing of the European Defence Community Treaty in 1952 which if ratified "would have created a European army integrated at division level with a common uniform, a unified command structure, a unified armaments production and procurement system, and a

²⁴This is particularly the case about the imposition by Greece of an embargo against the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the action of the European Commission against Greece is likely to fail. The European court is likely to consider (since this is the position of the judge-rapporteur) that even though this constitutes a breach of the common external trade policy, it is for each member state to evaluate if there is a superior national interest that makes the implementation of a Community rule impossible.

²⁵François Léotard, 'Notre projet de défense européenne', *Revue des deux mondes*, December 1994, p. 52.

²⁶Ian Gambles, 'European Security Integration in the 1990s', *Chaillot Papers*, no. 3, 1991, p. 3.

mix of supranational and intergovernmental authorities mirroring the European Coal and Steel Community."²⁷ The failure of this project showed how difficult the construction of a common identity can be, especially in defence matters.²⁸ This difficulty was acknowledged by the Treaty on European Union which makes an interesting distinction between common defence policy and common defence. Common defence "means more than a closer integration of the armed forces of the EU's/WEU's member states for the collective self-defence which would be implied by a narrow interpretation of *Common Defence*; it will cover the whole range of the functions of armed forces."²⁹ Both of these notions go well beyond the traditional notion of alliance and "contain aspects of *endogenous* cooperation and integration resulting from the process of developing a political union."³⁰ What is special about European Security Integration is that it happens not just because of the necessity to fight a common external threat or to share the burden of defence, but also because of a constant drive towards tighter integration and co-operation. The limits of this tendency are difficult to assess.

It is beyond any possible doubt that a 'natural tendency' to co-operate now exists in Europe.

The institutionalization of coordination and cooperation with respect to foreign policy matters has created a habit of cooperation. As a rule, the member states consult each other on all important foreign policy issues and adherence to this rule depends on the members' goodwill.³¹

²⁷Ibid., p. 4.

²⁸For an account of the failure of the EDC, see Raymond Poidevin, 'Communauté de défense et communauté politique: des projets prématurés?', *Cadmos*, vol. 14, no. 55, 1991.

²⁹John Roper, 'Defining a common defence policy and common defence', in Laurence Martin and John Roper (eds.), *Towards a common defence policy* (Paris: The Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, 1995), p. 8, emphasis in original. Roper defines the notion of common defence policy as "a common policy with respect to the use of the armed forces of the member states of the European Union' and [this Common Defence Policy] will aim at developing concepts as to how the necessary means for the pursuit of the European Union's objectives in the field of defence can be constituted and employed. (...) *Common Defence* on the other hand can be defined in two ways: a stronger version would be 'the organisation of the armed forces of the member states in common', and a weaker one 'the organisation of the activities of the armed forces of the member states in common.'" Ibid., pp. 8-9, emphasis in original. This, somewhat uneasy, distinction shows how broad the choices are concerning integration in this field.

³⁰Ibid., p. 8.

³¹Soetendorp, *op. cit.*, p. 118.

This tendency remains contingent to the will and the decision of the individual member states. Besides, common European action has very few possibilities at hand. Like the EPC in the case of Yugoslavia, the main weapons available to any common action are: public opinion, the withholding of diplomatic recognition and economic sanctions.³² Action in this case is very difficult if the Union is faced with people that do not share its logic and its values. One of the main arguments used by the EU during the Yugoslav crisis in order to stop the war has been that whoever is considered responsible for waging the war will eventually have trouble joining the Union and will become an international pariah. This argument is of little effect when faced with the determination of the Serbs.³³ This problem is inherent to the values of the European Union, but has important consequences for any future action. The divergence of opinion, interests and action in the treatment of the Yugoslav affair come from this incapacity to formulate a coherent common position and action.

This difficulty of translating into coherent action the common values existing in the Union is quite obvious in the output of the CFSP since the entry into force of the Treaty on European Union. Since this date, 10 common actions/positions and 15 joint actions have been adopted, whereas, during the same period 125 common declarations have been made. In sum, the CFSP (like the EPC in its time) has mostly produced a declaratory policy and little common action.³⁴ Integration remains insufficient for the development of real joint action.

Nevertheless, the existence of an automatic process of co-operation reduces the possibilities to have a surprise position on any major political subject. There is close consultation through COREU³⁵ and a great deal of effort is made to allow the

³²Trevor C. Salmon, 'The Union, the CFSP and the European security debate', in Lodge, *op. cit.*, p. 257.

³³Argument presented by Pierre Hassner, interview with the author in December 1994 and in March 1995. A more optimistic view of European policy in Yugoslavia is proposed by van Staden: "The final decision to organize such a [peacekeeping] force under the auspices of the United Nations does not alter the fact that during the Yugoslavian crisis joint diplomacy among EC members had become a policy in itself, and that the sending of observers to an explosive situation had brought the Community to the brink of direct military intervention." In van Staden, *op. cit.*, p. 142. This view underestimates the divergence on views concerning the details of the Yugoslav crisis and the variety of different actions taken by member states.

³⁴Council Report to Reflection Group, April 1995, pp. 31-39. The importance of common declarations is also obvious in the communiqués of the European Council in which the ideas and values of the Union are expressed (cf. chapter 6).

³⁵Correspondant Européen is the telex system connecting the Foreign Offices of the member states.

formation of common positions. Consultation and co-operation is now taken for granted, even if there is a lack of political will that makes progress difficult.³⁶ Predictability of behaviour is stronger than otherwise. Since states develop expectations concerning common action and the habit to form common positions, the behaviour of national states is easier to predict. The degree of security integration is, however, too low and too fragile to assert that the European Union has reached a satisfying level concerning mutual predictability of behaviour. There are too many uncertainties about the future and the instinctive character of co-operation remains utterly frail. 'Events since the signing of the Maastricht Treaty suggest that domestic support will be a more crucial factor in European integration than it has been so far. The analysis also points to the importance of the external environment.'³⁷ Divergences in national policies and too many uncertainties remain concerning the future of the many different conditions affecting European security.³⁸

In particular, there are strong differences in views concerning collaboration in foreign policy and (in a broader perspective) the future of European integration among the member states. This is an important problem because if a state does not perceive the integrative process as rewarding, it then has a motive for pursuing independent action.³⁹ Franck Pfetsch considers that there are five behavioural patterns in the EC: traditional behaviour of a national independent actor; supportive behaviour (i.e. national policy pursued with the support of the other member states); selective joint action; co-ordination and harmonisation of policies; and finally, uniform behaviour conducted by a supranational or federative organism.⁴⁰ These divergences in behaviour

³⁶Views expressed by Hugh Mortimer head of the CFSP unit at the Foreign Office, notes taken by Trevor C. Salmon, Hull Conference, 12 May 1995.

³⁷Nicolaj Petersen, 'The European Union and Foreign and Security Policy', in Ole Nørgaard, Thomas Pedersen and Nicolaj Petersen (eds.), *The European Community in World Politics* (London: Pinter, 1993), p. 27.

³⁸'The sovereignty issue, especially in the sensitive areas of defence and security, remained important as did the fear of upsetting the US by implying that it was either not wanted or not needed. The plethora of institutions in the security and defence field and the pervasive uncertainty surrounding the new European environment, an uncertainty which in some minds counseled the cautious view that institutions and arrangements that had served them well should not be tampered with, were also problems requiring resolution.' Salmon, *op. cit.*, p. 258.

³⁹For the necessity of considering integration as rewarding see Karl W. Deutsch, *Die Schweiz als ein paradigmatischer Fall politischer Integration* (Bern: Paul Haupt, 1976).

⁴⁰Franck Pfetsch, 'Tensions in Sovereignty: Foreign Policies of EC Members Compared', in Carlsnaes and Smith (eds.), *op. cit.*, p. 125.

have corresponding differences concerning the desired end-product of European integration.⁴¹ The inclusion of a defence component in the European integration process is an issue at stake. And there are a number of other splits.

There are, for example, unresolved, differences between nuclear and non-nuclear states, states that deploy nuclear weapons on their soil and those that do not, large versus small and economically strong versus economically weak countries.⁴²

These disagreements do not render common action completely impossible. "On the whole the EC, in most of the cases examined, acted as a coordinated flexible governmental entity over broad issues and general positions. On specific matters, national political interests prevailed and differences became clearly visible."⁴³ National policies are far from being completely predictable and most predictions made about future behaviour still contain a great 'risk premium' that reduces substantially the concrete achievements of integration.

In sum, although the progressive strengthening of the image of the Union as a single foreign policy actor is now quite important, the many uncertainties and short-comings of this effort do not allow to clearly state that there is mutual predictability of behaviour in the EU. What can be assumed is that a certain degree of mutual predictability of behaviour exists but, the stability of this achievement and its possible furthering remain unclear.

Security and Defence co-operation and mutual predictability of behaviour

It is necessary to go beyond the analysis of the EU as a single foreign policy actor. A real (albeit very limited) mutual predictability of behaviour leading to long-term expectations of peaceful change can be assumed to exist because of this fact. But, since

⁴¹Ibid., pp. 129-130.

⁴²Reinhardt Rummel and Peter Schmidt, 'West European Integration and Security Cooperation: Converging and Diverging Trends', in Mathias Jopp, Reinhardt Rummel and Peter Schmidt (eds.), *Integration and Security in Western Europe: Inside the European Pillar* (Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1991), p. 22.

⁴³Ibid., p. 135. For another account of national divergent views, see Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup, Pierre Lemaitre, Elzbieta Tromer and Ole Wæver, *The European Security Order Recast: Scenarios for the Post-Cold War Era* (London: Pinter, 1990), pp. 134-162.

the EU remains ultimately a union of sovereign states, it is necessary to examine the relations among these states in order to assess the degree of mutual predictability of behaviour prevailing in the Union.

An almost paradigmatic case of co-operation in Europe is the Franco-German 'special relationship' that has been the engine of European integration since the sixties. Another possible way of examining the degree of mutual predictability of behaviour existing among the member states is to look at the pattern of co-operation concerning defence and in particular weapons co-production.

The Franco-German security relationship as a case of mutual predictability of behaviour

The end of the long-standing Franco-German enmity and the establishment of a reliable pattern of co-operation is one of the most remarkable achievements of the post-war period.⁴⁴ This pattern is very well established and its failure seems difficult (albeit still possible).

Sometimes it appears as if the Franco-German relationship is maintained more through anxiety over the possible negative consequences that could result from the failure of the 'entente' than by a convergence of political interests and political-cultural rapprochement. The exaggerated symbolism of many Franco-German summits and the fact that major political moves have been undertaken by the French President and the German Chancellor without intensive consultation of the ministries concerned, can be regarded more an indication of the remaining divergences than of the many points of convergence.⁴⁵

The special relationship is considered as the ultimate guarantee for the maintenance of peace and of the pursuit of European integration. It is therefore not possible to envisage an end to it without important consequences for the future of peace in Europe. The relationship is maintained despite the dissimilarities of the partners and the important points of divergence existing among them.

⁴⁴For an account of the history of the Franco-German relationship see Robert Picht (ed.), *Das Bündnis im Bündnis. Deutsch-französische Beziehungen im internationalen Spannungsfeld* (Berlin: Severin und Sielder, 1982); Karl Kaiser and Pierre Lellouche (eds.), *Le couple franco-allemand et la défense de l'Europe* (Paris: IFRI, 1986). Maurice Vaïsse, 'La réconciliation franco-allemande : le dialogue de Gaulle-Adenauer', *Politique étrangère*, Winter 1993-1994.

⁴⁵Peter Schmidt, 'The special Franco-German security relationship in the 1990s', *Chaillot Papers*, no. 8, 1993, p. 1.

The main contribution of this partnership is the building of trust among these former enemies and the establishment of an engine for the furthering of European integration. Each state stands to benefit from it. Germany uses the relationship to overcome the handicap of being a loser of the Second World War and to pursue its policy of further European integration. France uses the relationship to keep German power at bay and to enhance its role and its strength in Europe. In particular, "France, potentially weaker than Germany, needs a strong influence over the others to remain an attractive bilateral partner."⁴⁶ From a French point of view, the EU is a tool used in order "to give France the political and economic base which it otherwise lacks as a medium-sized nation-state, so as to be able to play a global role commensurate with its assessment of itself."⁴⁷

German unification challenged the equilibrium of the partnership and for some time national interest seemed to prevail.⁴⁸ The fear of a 're-nationalisation' of German policy looks unfounded since Germany is comfortable with its position as a member of the Western organisations.⁴⁹ But for some time (a time in which took place the German unification and the early recognition of Croatia and Slovenia by the Federal Republic), the French did not consider German behaviour as reliable and predictable.⁵⁰ In particular German unification has been considered as a new beginning for the German question. "The postwar division of Germany into the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic has in some way provided a workable solution to the perennial problem of German power."⁵¹ The existence of a strong and united Germany has been a radical change to the Cold-War situation. France, in particular, had many difficulties to cope with this change. The acceptance of the new situation, finally, re-established a more normal pattern of collaboration.

⁴⁶David P. Calleo, 'L'Union européenne et la fin de la guerre froide', *Les Cahiers du CERJ*, no. 10, 1994, p. 7.

⁴⁷Dieter Mahncke, 'Parameters of European Security', *Chaillot Papers*, no. 10, 1993, p. 16.

⁴⁸See Ingo Kolboom, 'Frankreich und das vereinte Deutschland', *Europa-Archiv*, nos. 15-16, 1991.

⁴⁹Gebhard Schweigler, *Grundlagen der außenpolitischen Orientierung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Rahmenbelidungen, Motive, Einstellungen* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1985).

⁵⁰Hans Stark, 'France-Allemagne : entente et mésententes', *Politique étrangère*, Winter 1993-1994.

⁵¹Adrian G. V. Hyde-Price and John Roper, 'New directions in European security', in Ken Booth (ed.), *New Thinking About Strategy and International Security* (London: Harper Collins Academic, 1991), p. 247.

It is still somewhat of a paradox to see that Germany is on the one hand feared because its behaviour is not considered as reliable and, on the other hand, its allies demand more and more from it. "[Germany] is both feared for its great potential and constantly called upon to develop and demonstrate that potential in response to calls for support from all quarters."⁵²

The two states also have very different visions concerning the future of European integration. France considers that "united Europe must have, vis-à-vis the rest of the world, an economic and political personality; the nation-states must form the foundation of this whole and retain their own room for manoeuvre. Behind these ideas lies France's double concern to preserve the special status of a great power and to use the European Community when its own national resources prove inadequate."⁵³ Germany insists on a democratically controlled EU system, a communitarian decision-making process and openness to the greatest extent in the economic arena.⁵⁴

But, the assumption that the two states should go forward together still prevails. The main reason for this is the desire "to avoid a conceivable re-nationalisation of security policy, which is quite often judged as a concern on both sides of the Rhine, because this could lead to the re-emergence of old power struggles among the West European nation states."⁵⁵ Another reason is that (in spite of all their disagreements) both states share the common objective of a European Union.

The Franco-German partnership survived the important strains of the first post-Cold War years which shows just how stable and capable of reform this relationship can be. The partnership is a way of enhancing the predictability of behaviour prevailing in the two countries. "Before the War, Germany has never been able of forging a national vision that leaves a normal place to the rest of Europe. The long Franco-German partnership of the post-war period allows us to hope in a different future."⁵⁶ Working

⁵² Alfred Grosser, 'L'Allemagne élargie dans l'Europe élargie', *Politique étrangère*, no. 4, 1991, p. 831. See also Caleo, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

⁵³ Philippe Moreau-Defarges, 'L'Allemagne et l'avenir de l'unification européenne', *Politique étrangère*, no. 4, 1991, p. 850.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 852-853.

⁵⁵ Schimdt, *op. cit.*, pp. 52-53. This is a very common objective of regionalism, see Andrew Hurrell, 'Explaining the Resurgence of Regionalism in World Politics', *Review of International Studies*, forthcoming October 1995.

⁵⁶ Caleo, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

together involves not working against each other. There exist today long-term expectations of peaceful change between France and Germany.

The existence of long-term expectations of peaceful change is particularly obvious in the case of the Eurocorps, the former Franco-German brigade. The idea, born in 1987, of a Franco-German brigade was novel and ambitious. Merging units of two states with two languages at a low military level is something difficult and reminds of Monnet's strategy for integrating Europe through a series of concrete achievements. It was hoped that this initiative will be an example for the future and allow the constitutions of an embryo of European defence.⁵⁷ But, on the whole the positions of the two partners were very different:

The French concept is of a purely binational command; this stresses limiting the initiative to a strictly Franco-German process, keeping defence firmly within national hands and cooperating on a purely state-to-state basis. Against this, the German model sees the joint brigade forming the nucleus of a European army firmly embedded in the Atlantic Alliance, the initiation of a process towards a supranational defence framework.⁵⁸

France is a medium nuclear power and is not a member of NATO's integrated command. Germany has strong links with the United States and NATO and a clear ambition for a more integrated federal Europe.⁵⁹

The differences are thus that the first function of the brigade was utterly symbolic:

To the French, the joint brigade is primarily a symbol which is not expected to lead to an amalgamation of the two armies. To the Germans too, the joint brigade is being used as a symbol of the continuing vitality of the Bonn-Paris axis as it comes under strain over economic and financial issues.⁶⁰

Security considerations between the two states did not disappear because of the joint brigade. The nuclear issue remains unsettled and the rediscovery of Central and Eastern Europe by the United Germany changed considerably the question.

⁵⁷Interview of President Mitterrand, *Le Monde*, 23-6-1987.

⁵⁸Dominik von Wolff Metternich, 'The Franco-German Brigade: A German Perspective', *RUSI journal*, vol. 136, Autumn 1991, p. 45.

⁵⁹For the relative positions of the two states see Ifestos and Tsardanidis, *op. cit.*, pp. 111 ff.

⁶⁰Passim

As it is often the case with the Franco-German axis, the apparently blocked situation found a solution through summit diplomacy. An unexpected breakthrough occurred thanks to the agreement of the two leaders. In the 1992 summit in La Rochelle, the creation of a European corps of Franco-German initiative was announced by the French President and the German Chancellor. This corps has two main kinds of mission: (a) peacekeeping, peacemaking and humanitarian mission in the framework of international organisations and (b) participation in the common defence of the members of NATO and the WEU.⁶¹

An important effort was made to avoid presenting this new corps as a threat to the existing defence arrangements. The communiqué of the summit clearly stated that: "National contributions to this corps do not affect existing obligations with respect to other organisations. The European corps will contribute to the strengthening of the Atlantic Alliance." This effort was not very successful since the Atlanticists were convinced that this was part of a plan to undermine NATO and the American presence in Europe: "Conscious of his continuing need of German support to further de Gaulle's model of a Europe standing free of the United States, Mitterrand was now prepared to compromise on another Gaullist axiom, that of a France's national military autonomy."⁶²

These initial problems and limitations have been overcome since that time. The American presence in Europe is less controversial than before and, nowadays, most doubts concerning the US role in Europe emanate from the US itself. The necessity to build a Common European Defence Policy, included in the Maastricht Treaty, makes the need to form pan-European armed units more urgent than ever before.⁶³ Besides, the choice to make a corps is operationally more convenient, since it is possible to integrate the command of the various national units without merging them. The ambition undergirding the formation of the Eurocorps is certainly very significant.

⁶¹Stark, *op. cit.*, p. 995. The final communiqué of the summit states in particular that "The Corps may be used either for common defence of the Allies in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty or the Treaty of Brussels. It can be authorised to perform peacekeeping or peacemaking and humanitarian missions."

⁶²Edward Foster, 'The Franco-German Corps: A 'Theological' Debate?', *RUSI Journal*, vol. 137, August 1992, p. 63.

⁶³Helmut Willmann, 'The European Corps—Political Dimension and Military Aims', *RUSI Journal*, vol. 139, August 1994, p. 28.

The European Corps is only a first step. Formed by a French-German initiative, it will become the first operational army corps of the WEU—with more than 50.000 soldiers from four nations (France, Germany, Belgium and Spain) it is one of the strongest major formations in Western Europe. The European Corps is the expression of the commitment of the participating nations to jointly reinforce European responsibility in the field of security and defence.⁶⁴

Despite all the difficulties associated with the beginnings of the common brigade, the fact that most problems have been surmounted and that further integration has been enabled to go ahead is a sign of success. Obviously, patterns of behaviour, even between France and Germany, are not well established as yet, but there is a reality of predictability of behaviour. In particular, expectations of further integration and co-operation seem to be well established.

Interstate defence co-operation as an indicator of empathy and mutual responsiveness

Another possible way of looking at mutual predictability of behaviour is to examine defence co-operation from the point of view of mutual predictability of behaviour. The assumptions regarding this consideration are that states that collaborate at this level, share long-term expectations of peaceful change concerning their mutual relations. Their behaviour is quite easily predictable. Such co-operation is an unmistakable sign of integration.

The leading thought behind the formation of the alliance and also the trading of the given abilities is *empathy*: 'that means the readiness to understand the feelings of threat and fear of the other side and to consider them in so far as one's own security allows. It demands (...) the momentous insight (...) that the inner security of the other side is of existential significance for our own security, since one can only rely on stable systems; only they [these type of systems] remain true to the institutions, reliable and predictable.'⁶⁵

Co-operation in defence production is a translation of empathy into a concrete form. It is also a way of rendering defence affordable which is one of the main aims of European Security Integration. For many years, defence procurement was purely a national matter. 'Despite high costs, European countries procure most of their

⁶⁴Ibid., p. 29.

⁶⁵Franz H. U. Borkenhagen, 'Eine neue Sicherheitspolitik-Chance für Europa', *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, no. 36, 1990, emphasis in original.

weapons at home.”⁶⁶ But, “three other possible solutions have received increased attention since the mid 1980s, at least among the European NATO members: collaborative development and production of advanced weapons, coordinated procurement policies and rationalised and restructured defence industrial sectors.”⁶⁷ The Tornado and the Eurofighter combat aircraft’s are the hallmark projects in this respect. But, the development of this effort is not without problems. In particular, there is an important tension between pan-European market integration and national protection. The formation of the Independent European Programme Group in NATO did not resolve this contradiction.⁶⁸ “These contradictory impulses, plus the fact that the political oversight, management and sponsorship of these activities is being conducted under several (and often competing) auspices, strongly suggests that some combination of national and continental policies is most likely to evolve in Europe.”⁶⁹

These strategies have very limited effects for the moment since there are just second best solutions compared to the “preferred strategy of subsidised autonomous national production and exports, for they involve serious compromises in national decision-making autonomy that are still anathema to most producers.”⁷⁰ Integration in this field remains fragile. It should also be borne in mind that defence co-operation is still a function of the situation of the market. When there is sufficient demand to allow the production of national military systems, the incentive to co-operate disappears. Even when the situation is difficult, national pride and pressures from weapons producers result in the multiplication of weapon products. For instance, there will be three European combat aircrafts of the next generation: the Eurofighter, the Rafale and the Swedish aircraft, and it is likely that many European states will buy the American aircraft of this same generation. In short, there is no such thing as a European single market in this field and this is a sign of weakness of European integration.

⁶⁶Andrew Moravcsik, ‘The European armaments industry at the crossroads’, *Survival*, vol. 32, no. 1, 1990, p. 65.

⁶⁷Keith Krause, *Arms and the State: Patterns of Military Production and Trade* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 147.

⁶⁸For an analysis of the 1988 report of the group see William Walker and Philip Gummert, ‘Nationalism, Internationalism and the European Defence Market’, *Chaillot Papers*, no. 9, 1993, pp. 10-11.

⁶⁹Krause, *op. cit.*, p. 149.

⁷⁰Passim.

The most encouraging aspect of European co-operation in the field of weapon production is the fact that there is long-term involvement in common projects. The decision to collaborate for the production of a weapon system, implies a partnership for many years. The development of Eurofighter proper started in 1983 and three of the four participants have already the experience of the Tornado programme behind them.⁷¹ The long-term element is obviously present. The states that produce weapons in common do not expect that there will be, at least for the duration of the project, any violent conflicts with their fellow partners.

The necessity to reinforce European co-operation in this field is recognised by almost all European political leaders.⁷² Risks and difficulties do exist but the rationale for collaborative programmes is unequivocal. "Equipment procured collaboratively may be the most cost effective means of meeting a nation's needs, although the need to compromise on specifications has to be weighed carefully against cost savings."⁷³ The increased sophistication of contemporary weapons make research and development costs more and more important. It is, therefore, increasingly profitable to share these costs and thus decrease the per unit cost of the military system.⁷⁴ The link between co-operation and mutual predictability of behaviour is very important: "Partnerships can be very productive, but to work require trust, commitment to a long term relationship, and compatible corporate cultures."⁷⁵ These conditions are quite restrictive but, once a partnership is efficient mutual predictability of behaviour is real. The objective difficulties for fulfilling these requirements in the field of defence joint action place severe limits to the amount of mutual predictability of behaviour achieved.

Of course, these limits of co-operation do not mean that European states fear their fellow member states. But, still, mutual predictability of behaviour is limited and expectations of peaceful change are frailer than otherwise. The proposal to create a

⁷¹Ned Frith, 'The European Fighter Aircraft—Potential and Prospects', *RUSI journal*, vol. 137, April 1992.

⁷²See the position of Jacques Chirac vis-à-vis a European aerospace policy in *Le Monde*, June 13th 1995. For the British support to European defence co-operation, see *The Economist*, March 11th 1995.

⁷³Sir John Bourn, 'Securing Value for Money in Defence Procurement', *RUSI Whitehall Paper Series 1994*, p. 49.

⁷⁴Ron Smith, 'Defence Procurement: A European Identity?', *RUSI journal*, vol. 137, February 1992, p. 44.

⁷⁵Ron Smith, 'The Economic Driver', *RUSI journal*, vol. 138, June 1993, p. 28.

single defence market by abolishing the relevant article 223 of the Treaty of Rome can (if it succeeds) prove a decisive contribution to the establishment of a more reliable and predictable system in defence procurement.⁷⁶ This could be an important help in the establishment of genuine mutual predictability of behaviour among the members of the European Union.

Such an arrangement will be far more efficient than *ad hoc* co-operation. "European co-development has generally taken the form of ad hoc intergovernmental arrangements negotiated on a project-by-project basis."⁷⁷ What is needed is real internationalisation, i.e. "not (...) cooperative arrangements that simply preserve national capabilities and traditions: there must be an element of real *integration*, involving industrial specialisation, competition, and the collective identification of operational requirements."⁷⁸ Co-operation is usually a rather costly substitute for real market integration.⁷⁹ This radical approach can completely change the present situation characterised by the existence of huge differences in the attitudes of the member states.⁸⁰ Such radical change requires the radical transformation of political co-operation: "a truly open defence equipment market would require sufficient political integration to enable defence equipment to be treated like any other tradeable commodity."⁸¹ Joint ventures in defence industry are beginning to produce something close to a Eurocompany, but the way to go is still very strenuous.⁸²

⁷⁶For the background concerning the proposal of establishing a single market for arm procurement in the European Union see *The Economist*, March 11th 1995 and April 8th 1995. For the idea of founding a European Armament Agency, see Jean Fournet, 'The European Answer', *RUSI journal*, vol. 138, June 1993.

⁷⁷Moravcsik, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

⁷⁸Walker and Gummet, *op. cit.*, p. 4, emphasis in original.

⁷⁹Smith, 'The Economic Driver', *op. cit.*, p. 27.

⁸⁰For an account of the positions of the member states see *ibid.*, pp. 20-22.

⁸¹*Ibid.*, p. 31.

⁸²See Moravcsik, *op. cit.*, pp. 68 ff.

In its present form, West European co-operation in armaments production and procurement is only by extension an element of West European security co-operation, for its progress is neither particularly dependent on any broader co-operative developments nor particularly critical in the short term to any of the political or military aspects of security co-operation. Nevertheless, the multilateral and bilateral governmental and industrial initiatives accelerating the restructuring of European armaments production and procurement are combining with economic imperatives to bring about changes in this field of considerable long-term significance. A truly unified European armaments market (...) would certainly be a vital and dynamic element in West European security co-operation.⁸³

Important difficulties remain for the development of European Defence Co-operation. In particular, the fear that this will foster an American withdrawal from Europe, the limited political appeal of the enterprise, institutional difficulties (not least with neutral countries) and the existence of conflicting interests, make this field of co-operation a very difficult one.⁸⁴ "The political game leads to a situation in which West European states pursue, on the one hand, a policy of 'Europeanization', and on the other hand, look for political tools to slow down the Europeanization process."⁸⁵

As in the case of the EU considered as a single foreign policy actor, or in that of the Franco-German partnership, the case of European security and defence co-operation shows the existence of many uncertainties concerning the future. These uncertainties show how difficult it is to predict the future behaviour of the European states. European integration limits the unpredictable element in these relations, but predictability is not sufficiently developed, yet. The future evolution of the continent remains difficult to assess. The security agenda of the next decade will be very different from the one of the past. Threats of ethno-nationalism, and societal insecurity are now top of the security agenda.⁸⁶ Insecurity has now new dimensions: (a) differentials of power create tensions and fears among the nations; (b) modernity creates fears about a

⁸³ Ian Gambles, 'Prospects for West European Security Co-operation', *Adelphi Papers*, no. 244, 1989, p. 45.

⁸⁴ See Trevor Taylor, *European Defence Cooperation* (London: RIIA, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984), pp. 28-42.

⁸⁵ Peter Schmidt, 'The 'National Factor' and the Current Change', in Peter Schmidt (ed.), *In the Midst of Change: On the Development of West European Security and Defence Cooperation* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1992), p. 230.

⁸⁶ See Ole Wæver, Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup and Pierre Lemaitre, *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe* (London: Pinter, 1993).

loss of identity and (c) immigration and social-economic problems can produce violent reactions that are difficult to control.⁸⁷ The reaction of the European states to these new questions is not possible to predict as yet. "The continent is therefore at once too divided to be an area of common security, and too unified not to be an area of common insecurity."⁸⁸

⁸⁷Pierre Hassner, *La violence et la paix : de la bombe atomique au nettoyage ethnique* (Paris: Esprit, 1995), p. 322.

⁸⁸Dominique David, 'La Communauté entre la paix et la guerre', *Politique étrangère*, no. 1, 1993, p. 82.

Conclusion

The study of a neglected concept such as that of pluralistic security community is rewarding, particularly it is very useful in explaining the peaceful co-existence of states at the international level. Even if no definitive answer is found to the great questions discussed in this dissertation (peace and war, unity and diversity...), there is reasonable ground for optimism. It is possible to assert that the fulfilment of the conditions examined above can result into the establishment of a steady framework of peace.

Pluralistic security community theory has many short-comings, not least the unclear relationship between the formation of the community and force:

In his writing on integration, Deutsch has evolved a theoretical framework based on a consensual approach. Integration occurs as peoples (...) find areas of commonality of interest and expectations of joint reward. Force is consigned to a minimal role. While core areas themselves are identified, we find little place in Deutsch's writings for the coercive capabilities which are often employed in the integrative process. To understand the unification of Germany without the 'blood and iron' of Bismarck; the unification of the United States without the conquest of the South in the Civil War; the building of modern Russia without the force employed by the Tsars and their successors (...) is once again to ignore an important set of variables.¹

This uneasy relationship with force and the difficulty (even the impossibility) of distinguishing cause from effect are the two main problems of security community theory. Despite these problems, this theory remains of the utmost importance being the main contribution to the exegesis of international pluralism. International pluralism is, in turn, the main way of explaining the existence of long-term peace in large areas of the world.

International pluralism, in the form of a pluralistic security community, is achieved through the fulfilment of three essential conditions. Firstly, the compatibility of major values is an important guarantee of peace. Peoples sharing the same beliefs and values are not likely to be war-like. This is more true for some specific values that have a

¹Robert L. Pfalzgraff Jr., 'Karl Deutsch and the Study of Political Science', *Political Science Reviewer*, vol. 2, Fall 1972, pp. 105-106.

pacifying influence. Such values were found to be not broad concepts such as democracy or the rule of law as such, but rather the values fundamental for the existence of democracy, namely, individualism and the values of market economies (maximisation of profit and expansion of trade) such values make war unattractive.

The second essential condition is mutual responsiveness. This condition is essential for the mere reason that states can be considered as integrated only if their demands and needs are understood and given real weight in the process of decision-making. This process has to be mutual since if not there can be no guarantee of its endurance. Mutual responsiveness comes about after a process of learning and understanding that makes conflict resolution ever easier. Mutual responsiveness is all the more important since the establishment of a solid pattern of co-operation is likely to be a self-perpetuating operation. Once a process of co-operation has begun, mutually rewarding experiences produce trust and a virtuous circle of collaboration is on motion, and is difficult to reverse.

The final essential condition for the emergence of a pluralistic security community is mutual predictability of behaviour. In a region that is integrated, the behaviour of member states follows stable patterns and is easily predictable. For this condition to be true, actions announced have to be consistent and credible. This occurs when announced actions are effectively completed and if and when there are reliable expectations that actions professed will be implemented. Mutual predictability of behaviour means that the eternal fear that there will be a breach of trust among the partners no longer prevails. This is a radical change from the condition of international anarchy.

The fulfilment of these three conditions is certainly a pacifying factor. Pluralism is possible when there is no real reason for going to war over some dispute since the disadvantages outweigh any possible gain. Trust, shared values and the credibility of the commitments undertaken make conflict resolution possible. And even if a conflict is not effectively settled, there is little chance that it will lead to violence.

If the pacifying influence of these conditions is beyond doubt, their mere fulfilment does not guarantee eternal peace or the end of political violence. There is always a possibility that unforeseen circumstances and a change in beliefs and attitudes will

jeopardise the whole achievement. The fulfilment of these conditions does not guarantee any particular kind of integration either. There is no real reason why these conditions will lead to common institutions or to the formation of a federal entity. Scandinavia has been a pluralistic security community for centuries without having common institutions. Pluralistic security community theory is one possible theory of integration and the existence of many other approaches is necessary since, a single approach is unable to explain such a complex phenomenon. Pluralistic security community theory is just an island of “‘middle range’ theory”² The development of these middle range theories could lead to a more general theory, but such progress is still very difficult:

Whether we can build bridges between these islands and arrive at, say, a general theory of political change which incorporates, among other components, a theory of integration, is a question which ought logically to await the emergence of a body of falsifiable general propositions about integration.³

The approach above is a modest contribution to the study of integration. The ambition of the approach was to underline key issues and to show how the achievement of lasting peace at the international level is made possible.

Steady peace is something which is broadly achieved in Western Europe, even though there are still some uncertainties and problems. The establishment of peace in Europe is the least debatable success of European integration.

²Charles Pentland, *International Theory and European Integration* (London: Faber and Faber, 1973), p. 18.

³*Ibid.*, p. 18.

Between 1870 and 1945 millions had died because of conflict between the French and their neighbours to the east, yet on 9 May 1950 Robert Schuman, the French Foreign Minister, could talk of the contribution that an organised and living Europe could bring to civilization by maintaining peace. He and Monnet, who submitted the plan to him, tackled that central problem of Franco-German relations, specifically advocating the *rassemblement* of the nations of Europe and, crucially, 'the elimination of the age-old opposition of France and Germany. Any action taken must in the first place concern these two countries.' Of course, Schuman also went on to say that by establishing solidarity of production of coal and steel it is plain that 'any war between France and Germany becomes not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible'. That central aim has now been achieved.⁴

Difficulties and shortcomings still remain but it is beyond doubt that war is out of a question among the states of the European Union. "In other words, several parts of the Community which have been violently opposed to each other for decades have been brought into a new pattern and environment of relationships."⁵ The youngest generation of Europeans, in particular, have lived through an era of peace and stability that has transformed Europe. "The experience of a peaceful postwar era may, in short, have socialized the next generation of European leaders so as to make a high degree of integration a realistic aspiration for the near future."⁶

In a broader perspective, "postwar Europe, and Western Europe in particular, remains the richest source of historical evidence by which to judge theoretical explanations and prescriptions."⁷ This is the main reason why it is so interesting to test the fulfilment of the conditions in the European Union. The empirical tests have been chosen with a concern for clarity. They are one possible way of testing the reality of the integrative process in Europe, other tests are possible.

The results of the tests show the difficulty of determining the degree of integration, although a degree of achievement is acknowledged. There are important limitations and doubts about the degree of integration achieved. Certainly, the European Union is characterised by compatibility of major values, mutual responsiveness and mutual

⁴Sir William Nicoll and Trevor C. Salmon, *Understanding the New European Communities* (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester-Wheatsheaf, 1994), p. 314.

⁵*Ibid.*, p. 314.

⁶Pentland, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

⁷*Ibid.*, p. 25.

predictability of behaviour. However, the degree of achievement and the endurance capacity of the achievement is difficult to assess. The tests conducted can only give some indications about the degree of integration but they cannot guarantee that the findings are totally reliable. Nevertheless, all three tests conducted seem to point to the direction of the existence of a pluralistic security community. The degree of achievement seem sufficient to guarantee the absence of violent conflicts in the foreseeable future.

The existence of a pluralistic security community in the European Union does not imply that any particular form of future integration will prevail. European integration still has an unknown destination.⁸ The interaction of politics and economics in the process makes its end result even more difficult to determine. “[European integration’s] goal is political. Its instruments are economic. But its essence, its *raison d’être*, is cemented by the *acquis communautaire*; by the supremacy of binding supranational legislation over national legislation; and by the decisionmaking authority of supranational institutions and their rules.”⁹ The existence of a continuing process of integration seems to guarantee that at least the realisation of a pluralistic security community will not be put into doubt.

The existence of a pluralistic security community does not eliminate the problems of conflict and political violence as such. The dilemmas of international relations remain. In particular, the stability of peaceful relations in the pluralistic security communities make it very tempting to try to export this reality abroad. But this temptation is dangerous and success is difficult. Peace and stability can only progress step by step and it is a fallacy to expect a rapid change of attitudes and conditions anywhere in the world. If too much is expected from this theory, deception can prove fatal to what has been achieved so far.

⁸See Andrew Shonfield, *Europe: Journey to an Unknown Destination* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973).

⁹Juliet Lodge, ‘Towards a political union?’, in Juliet Lodge (ed.), *The European Community and the Challenge of the Future* (London: Pinter, 1993), p. 382.

The Europeans and the North Americans can only blame themselves if the world takes them at their word; since they are the ones who have proclaimed human rights in the course of the last 200 years. These are demands that should apply to everyone, without exception and difference. Their universalism recognises no difference in proximity or distance; it is unconditional and abstract. The duty, which they place on everyone, is in principle without limits. In this, their theological nucleus is displayed, which has survived all secularisation. Everybody is supposed to be responsible for everyone else; in this demand the duty to become like God is incorporated, since it presupposes omnipresence and omnipotence. But since our abilities to act are finite, the gulf between demands and reality becomes even wider. Soon the border of objective deception will be trespassed upon then universalism will prove itself to be a moral trap.¹⁰

There is therefore a real need for humility. The limitations of the theory should, nevertheless, not conceal the fact that the concept of pluralistic security community is very helpful.

It is to Karl Deutsch's everlasting credit that he opened the way for an explanation of international pluralism, although as has been demonstrated above, operationalising this theory and concepts is a different task (and not one he really undertook himself). This approach seems very promising and its instructive power, as experienced in the empirical study of the situation in the European Union, is considerable. This thesis aimed at demonstrating both the utility of the notion of security community and its relevance in the case of the European Union. The predictive power of the theory is limited but peaceful relations are far easier to achieve and to preserve if the essential conditions examined above are fulfilled and respected. This means that the most convenient path to peace is the progressive convergence of the states towards some shared values and practices. This path is long and strenuous but it remains the most certain way of ensuring peace.

¹⁰Hans Magnus Enzensberger, 'Ausblicke auf den Bürgerkrieg', *Der Spiegel*, no. 25, 1993, pp. 173-174. For more details about these ideas see Hans Magnus Enzensberger, *Aussichten auf den Bürgerkrieg* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1993).

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Index

—A—

- Adler
Emanuel, v, 12, 16, 26, 30, 35, 42, 45, 52, 56,
59, 60, 65, 70, 72, 79, 147
- American aircraft, 136
- American assistance, 99
- American Civil War, 28, 141
- American Constitution, 83
- American presence in Europe, 134
- Arendt
Hannah, 25, 36, 155
- Aron
Raymond, 6, 15, 28, 34, 37, 77, 147
- Atlantic Alliance, 133, 134
- Atlantic Community, 16
- Atlantic union, 83
- Atlanticists, 134

—B—

- Barnett
Michael, v, 16, 30, 35, 45, 52, 59, 60, 65, 79,
147
- Belgium, 117, 135
- Bismarck, 141
- Boer war, 28
- Britain, 31, 104, 161
- Brown
Seyom, 19, 32, 59, 65, 148, 156, 159
- Brussels, 85, 102, 106, 115, 134, 149, 153
- Bull
Hedley, 9, 121, 122, 148
- Buzan
Barry, 5, 8, 9, 13, 15, 77, 129, 139, 149, 164

—C—

- Canada, 2
- Central America, 93
- Central and Eastern Europe, ii, 96, 133
- Clausewitz, 6, 34, 35, 147
- Cohesion Fund, 114
- cold war, 12
- Common Agricultural Policy, iv, 103, 104, 105,
106, 107
- Common Agriculture Policy, 103, 105, 106, 107
- Common Foreign and Security Policy, iv, 97, 122,
124, 127, 128, 157
- Common Market, 17, 79, 101, 103, 106, 115, 121,
148, 150, 158, 160, 163
- COREU, iv, 124, 127
- Council of Europe, 82, 83
- Croatia, 131

—D—

- de Gaulle
Charles, 134
- de la liberté des anciens comparée à celle des
modernes, 36
- Dclors packages, 106, 109, 115, 150, 158, 162
- Deutsch
Karl, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 17, 18, 20, 23, 32, 39, 40, 42,
43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 53, 54, 55, 58, 59,
61, 62, 65, 66, 68, 69, 70, 71, 73, 74, 75, 76,
79, 83, 84, 99, 119, 128, 130, 141, 146, 150,
153, 157, 158, 160
- Deutschian, 43, 73, 79
- Doyle
Michael, 7, 24, 25, 27, 29, 30, 151
- Durkheim
Emile, 48, 49, 152, 157

—E—

- Eastern Europe, ii, 12, 96, 133
- ECOFIN, iv, 114
- Economic and Monetary Union, 102, 109, 150
- El Salvador, 93
- Eurocorps, 133, 134
- Eurofighter, 136, 137
- Europe, ii, iii, iv, 2, 3, 4, 10, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19,
29, 31, 33, 34, 35, 59, 69, 70, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76,
77, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90,
91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102,
103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111,
112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120,
121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129,
130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138,
139, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150,
151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159,
160, 161, 162, 163, 164
- European Coal and Steel Community, 99, 126
- European Commission, 85, 102, 125, 161
- European Community, iv, 16, 31, 74, 79, 84, 100,
101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 108, 109, 111,
112, 115, 116, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 127,
128, 129, 132, 145, 147, 149, 150, 154, 157,
158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164
- European corps, 134
- European Council, ii, 82, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90,
91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 106, 127, 152
- European Defence Community, iv, 125
- European Economic Community, iv, 104, 106, 156,
161, 162
- European integration, 3, 4, 73, 79, 80, 82, 89, 90,
96, 100, 122, 124, 128, 130, 131, 132, 136, 139,
143, 145
- European Investment Bank, iv, 103, 104, 105, 106
- European Political Co-operation, iv, 120, 121, 123,
127, 163
- European Regional Development Fund, iv, 105,
106, 114, 115
- European regional policy, iii, 99, 100, 102, 103,
105, 106, 109, 111, 112, 113
- European Security Integration, iii, 119, 125, 126,
135, 154
- European Social Fund, 106, 107

European Union, ii, iii, iv, 72, 81, 83, 84, 86, 87, 88, 89, 91, 92, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 105, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 117, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 131, 132, 138, 139, 144, 145, 146, 155, 160, 162
Treaty on, 83, 84, 91, 109, 112, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127

Europeans
the, 82, 144, 146

—F—

First World War, 29
Fisher
William, 76, 79, 153
Flanders, 34
France, 29, 49, 76, 84, 94, 105, 112, 114, 117, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 144, 148, 151, 152, 163
French President, 130, 134

—G—

Gaullist, 134
Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft, 17, 163
Geneva, 76, 82, 151, 162
German Chancellor, 130, 134
German Democratic Republic, 131
German unification, 124, 131
Germany, iii, 29, 30, 33, 76, 101, 102, 107, 112, 117, 123, 124, 125, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 139, 141, 144, 151, 153, 161, 162, 164
Greece, 99, 101, 102, 105, 107, 117, 125
Greeks, 12
Groningen, 102
Grotius, 35

—H—

Haas
Ernst, 7, 18, 40, 41, 42, 43, 51, 52, 69, 74, 79, 154
Hambourg, 102
Hassner
Pierre, v, 11, 25, 33, 35, 46, 72, 77, 127, 140, 154
Herz
John, 6, 14, 154
Hobbes
Thomas, 6, 154
Hurrell
Andrew, v, 17, 24, 35, 132, 155

—I—

Independence Day, 83
Independent European Programme Group, 136
Integrated Mediterranean Programmes, 105, 114
Ireland
Republic of, 104, 107, 117, 161
Italy, 105, 117

—K—

Kant, 24, 25, 26, 31, 46, 151, 155, 156, 163
Kantian, i, 24, 155
Keohane
Robert, 41, 47, 79, 156

—L—

La Rochelle
summit, 134
Länder
new German, 107
Layne
Christopher, 26, 30, 156
Leviathan, 6, 154
Locke, 35
Luxembourg, 85, 101, 102, 107, 109, 117, 149, 150, 152, 153

—M—

Maastricht
Treaty, 85, 89, 121, 123, 128, 134, 152, 163
Machiavelli, 6, 11, 12, 64, 157
Maoz
Zccv, 28, 162
Markovits
Andrei, 48, 157
Marshall Plan, 99
Mearsheimer
John, 29, 158
Mediterranean, 105, 114
Mezzogiorno, 102, 104, 107, 113
Mitterrand
François, 133, 134
Monnet
Jean, 59, 133, 144
Montesquieu, 12, 35, 36, 158
Morin
Edgar, 72, 158

—N—

NATO, 31, 99, 133, 134, 136
Netherlands, 102, 117
North Americans
the, 146
Northern Ireland, 107
Nye
Joseph, 41, 47, 59, 60, 61, 156, 159

—O—

Oliver
Warren, 48, 157
Owen
John, 25, 26, 37, 159

—P—

Pareto optimum, 71, 79
Parsons
Talcott, ii, 56, 57, 58, 159

Perpetual Peace
 On, 24, 25
 Pfetsch
 Franck, 128, 160
 Plato, 12
 Portugal, 101, 102, 107, 117
 Prince
 The, 64, 157
 Puchala
 Donald, 17, 50, 52, 70, 80, 160

—R—

Rafale, 136
 Rhine, 132
 Richardson
 Lewis, 32, 38, 45, 160
 Rome
 Treaty of, 85, 101, 102, 103, 122, 138, 152
 Rousseau, 12, 24, 33, 155, 160
 Ruhr, 29
 Russett
 Bruce, 7, 25, 26, 27, 28, 31, 47, 48, 52, 70, 73,
 157, 158, 160, 161, 164
 Russia, 141

—S—

Salmon
 Trevor, v, 8, 11, 82, 104, 112, 120, 123, 127,
 128, 144, 149, 159, 161
 Scandinavia, 143
 Schmitt
 Carl, 33, 162
 Schuman
 Robert, 144
 Second World War, 12, 34, 82, 98, 131
 Serbs, 127
 Simon
 Herbert, 11, 45, 65, 120, 162
 Single European Act, 105, 123
 Single European Market, 106, 110
 Slovenia, 131
 Soldatos
 Panayotis, 70, 71, 73, 74, 75, 153, 158, 163
 Soviet Union, 125
 Spain, 107, 117, 135
 Stalinist, 12
 Structural Funds, 102, 106, 107, 109, 114
 Swedish aircraft, 136

—T—

Thucydides, 6, 36
 Tönnies
 Ferdinand, 17, 163
 Tornado, 136, 137
 Tsars
 the, 141
 Tsoukalis
 Loukas, 100, 101, 102, 103, 105, 109, 111, 114,
 163

—U—

United Kingdom, 104, 107, 112, 115, 117
 United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation
 Administration, 99
 United States, 2, 10, 31, 101, 110, 124, 128, 133,
 134, 141, 148

—V—

Verdun, 34

—W—

Waltz
 Kenneth, 6, 7, 10, 50, 164
 West, 77, 129, 132, 139, 154, 160, 161, 162
 West European nation states, 132
 Western countries, 77
 Western Europe, 12, 69, 83, 106, 126, 129, 135,
 143, 144, 147, 155, 158, 160
 Western European Union, 123, 126, 134, 135
 Western organisations, 131
 Westphalia
 Treaty of, 34
 Wolfers
 Arnold, 13, 164

—Y—

Young
 Oran, 50, 73, 164
 Yugoslav crisis, 127
 Yugoslavia, 8, 127