

A PARADIGM FOR THE NEW WORLD ORDER : A
SCHOOL OF THOUGHT ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

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**A Paradigm for the New World Order: A Schools of
Thought Analysis of American Foreign Policy in the
Post-Cold War Era**



John C. Hulsman

PhD in International Relations

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ABSTRACT

This thesis applies a schools of thought analysis to American foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. In chapter 1, it discusses what a schools of thought analysis involves and its usefulness as an analytical tool, with particular reference to Franz Schurmann's book, The Logic of World Power, an earlier attempt at an overarching review.

In chapters 2-4, it classifies and analyses the specific schools of thought of American foreign policy in the post-Cold War era; the democratists, the neo-realists, and the institutionalists. It illustrates how general schools of thought predilections lead to policy preferences with reference to five issue areas in the post-Cold War era; US-Western European relations, US-Russian relations, American initiatives in Bosnia, the MFN controversy with China, and the American position on regional and global trade pacts (Nafta and Gatt). It also classifies various opinion-makers in the overall schools of thought analysis by matching their specific policy preferences in the five issue areas to the general schools of thought positions.

In chapter 5, it places individual administration and legislative decision-makers into the model, using the same techniques applied to the opinion-makers in chapters 2-4. In chapter 6, it uses schools of thought analysis as a template for analysing the Clinton administration's response to the Bosnian crisis, with particular reference to US-Russian relations and US-European relations. It identifies overall administration stances regarding these three areas by classifying White House initiatives using the schools of thought rubric.

In chapter 7, having identified overall American foreign policy initiatives regarding Bosnia, Russia, and Western Europe and having placed individual political actors within the assessment, it is able, through the fusion of bureaucratic analysis and schools of thought analysis, to determine how specific policy inputs advocated by decision-makers partly due to their schools of thought orientation, lead to overall American foreign policy outputs. In chapter 8, it concludes by reassessing schools of thought analysis, both in relation to the Bosnian crisis and in general, and evaluating its worth as an analytical tool.

This thesis represents an attempt to relate theory directly to political processes and specific policy-makers. By its use I am trying to both classify and analyse the intellectual and practical nature of the American foreign policy-making process in the post-Cold War era.

I, John Charles Hulsman, hereby certify that this thesis, which is approximately 112,500 words in length, has been written by me, that it is the record of work carried out by me and that it has not been submitted in any previous application for a higher degree.

31/3/96
.....

I was admitted as a research student in October 1992 and as a candidate for the degree of PhD in October 1992; the higher study for which this is a record was carried out in the University of St. Andrews between 1992 and 1996.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I used to think that the acknowledgement page of a book was just a chance for an author to gratify his friends by giving them a 'plug' in print. (In other words it served a purpose about as meaningful as an Academy Awards speech!)

After finishing this, my first serious work, I now realise how very wrong I was. Writing a thesis is such an all-consuming task that all those mentioned here have had to put up with this odd extension to my personality for much of the past three years. As they are all still speaking to me, I thank them generally for their forbearance which has enabled me to give this project the fanaticism that is essential to do anything one can be proud of.

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My parents, Carl and Jane Hulsman, have also been more than supportive. Never complaining about my exodus to Europe, they gave a boy from Rocky River, Ohio the unique chance to grow up in Britain. Also without them, my interest in politics might itself have never developed, as our family summer holidays were geared almost exclusively around educating me about my country that I've come to love so much.

Finally, I have to thank my wife, Ollie. I met her the week after I started this mammoth undertaking, so she has never known me without the thesis dangling over me. She has been at turns editor, confidant, adviser, and far more even than all this to me. It is to her that this work is gratefully dedicated.

**For my parents, who never gave up on my life,
and to Ollie,
who taught me how to live it.**

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Valentine, the hero of Tom Stoppard's excellent play, "Arcadia," aptly sums up the situation political scientists find themselves in. "It makes me so happy. To be at the beginning again, knowing almost nothing...A door like this has cracked open five or six times since we got up on our hind legs. It's the best possible time to be alive, when almost everything you know is wrong."¹ So it is also for the United States. The victory parade celebrating American triumph in the Gulf War was one of the great moments of hubris in modern American history. 1.5 million people gathered in Washington to celebrate the fact that, at last, the ghost of the Vietnam War had been laid to rest. This, coupled with the astounding surprise of 1989, was certainly cause for rejoicing. The United States (US) had many felt, quite brilliantly, won the Cold War. Kuwait had been the first test of George Bush's 'New World Order'² and it had been a resounding success. Yet just a year on from this idyllic day, Los Angeles was on fire, suffused in racial hatred and despair. Both of these seemingly paradoxical events are part of a new epoch, a new world.

This thesis will explore different conceptions of the post-1989 world by identifying, presenting and analysing different schools of thought that underlie the policy positions of both opinion-makers and practitioners in the new era. It will also examine the debate that underlies general American foreign policy options in the post-Cold War era, particularly regarding the Clinton administration. The end of the Cold War changed many things. Among them, the 45 years of largely bipartisan consensus over foreign policy issues, symbolised by the adoption of the containment doctrine by President Truman and Senator Vandenberg, has come to an end. There are now serious differences of opinion, both within and between the Democratic and Republican parties, as to what should be the general, overarching foreign policy of the US. This thesis will analyse the nature of the debate through the use of schools of thought analysis, pointing out the givens and assumptions behind the various schools of thought and then relating them in detail to the Bosnian crisis. A school of thought, which can be thought of as a type of sub-ideology, is the central part of a method (schools of thought analysis) which has been formulated to relate ideational givens to concrete policy actions. A given upon which this endeavour rests is that it is crucial to specify the assumptions underlying each school of thought's analysis of the world, and that these overarching foreign policy views, or schools of thought, can be shown to lead to policy preferences regarding the central foreign policy issues confronting America in the post-Cold War era.

A) Derivation of Schools of Thought Analysis

This thesis will build on the work of Franz Schurmann who expertly related theory to political processes in his book, The Logic of World Power, published in 1974. Schurmann persuasively attempted nothing less than a systemic, if general, understanding of the US perspective on the workings of the post-1945 world.³ As he noted, there are, "few convincing analyses of the contemporary political processes that govern the executive branch of the American government."⁴ Schurmann's analysis of the early Cold War era stands alone precisely because of his use of a theoretical, ideological construct that he related directly to specific outcomes in American foreign policy.

Yet for all the brilliance of Schurmann's thesis, it is a fundamental flaw in his argument that inspired the genesis of the notion of schools of thought analysis. Schurmann incorrectly viewed political leaders as being ideological empty boxes, as not having ideological orientations of their own which motivate their policy prescriptions. This was particularly true of Schurmann's analysis of the Presidency. He explained,

"When challenged to make innovative policy, the leader senses certain currents of thought, feeling, and aspiration, which are commonly held by most or all members of the constituency. Using these currents as inspiration and adding a scheme made up of real capabilities of the organization, the leader comes up with a new policy which will gain him support from his constituency on both ideological and practical grounds."⁵

While Schurmann was correct that political ideas, political organization, and political constituencies turn ideas into ideological fixtures, he was incorrect in assuming that such ideas come from the mass public, and that leaders somehow manipulate these currents to their political advantage, as though they were immune from the contagion of ideological impulses. The notion of currents of thought must be improved upon as leaders more reflect than merely manipulate ideological beliefs of the rest of society, particularly elite society in the case of foreign policy decision-making. To use one of Schurmann's analogies it is certainly true that, "The clever general knows the shared sentiments of his soldiers and can use them to implement a new course of action."⁶ Yet what the concept of currents of thought ignores is that the 'general's' course of action is itself largely determined by his/her own belief system. This is a flaw schools of thought analysis hopes to correct by looking at the sub-ideologies of central foreign policy actors involved in the decision-making process, as not even the President comes to the White House all manipulator, no believer.

Yet despite this major weakness, Schurmann's model has much in it that is directly adopted into the concept of schools of thought. Firstly, Schurmann identified the centrality of the bureaucratic position of the leader in affecting the ideological discourse of the day. He saw, "the great leader or executive projecting a vision who succeeds in transforming ideological beliefs into structures of organizational power."⁷ He correctly noted that, "policies, whatever their roots, are set only at the apex of the organization."⁸ His conviction is reflected in this thesis' methodological use of Allison's bureaucratic politics model, which posits the central role bureaucratic leaders play in determining policy outputs.

Schurmann also foreshadowed the use of Allison in observing that bureaucracies themselves have collective ideological leanings.⁹ Both his notion of currents of thought and the idea of schools of thought advance the point of view that the beliefs of large governmental organisations such as the Congress, the State Department, and the military are building blocs in analysing the construction of American policy outputs. As Schurmann, right and wrong, is an essential inspiration in the development of this thesis, it is instructive to now paraphrase his argument about the construction of an overriding current of thought in the post-1945 era. For in the detailed process are many of the same constructs that will be employed in a schools of thought analysis of the competing orientations in post-Cold War era US foreign policy.

Schurmann identified three basic strands of American opinion regarding post-war foreign policy, calling them currents of thought (See Table 1). Schurmann felt that imperialism was the overarching current which dominated post-1945 American foreign policy. It was a hybrid of the older orientations of nationalism and internationalism. Policy outputs however often had to suit all three currents, as all were embedded in the bureaucracy in Washington, with the nationalist bastion being the military, the internationalist current dominating the State Department, and the imperialists, men such as Truman, Marshall, and Acheson, dominating the executive branch itself. An example of the three currents agreeing on specific policy can be seen in the creation of the UN. "The nationalists were satisfied that American power was safeguarded. The internationalists were satisfied that the UN would help to advance and consolidate the international systems, such as those established at Bretton Woods. And the liberals in the Democratic Party who had come to power through the New Deal were inspired by the progressive ideological aura surrounding the UN."¹⁰ This consensus over general policy between the various currents was essential to the success of containment as an overarching doctrine that, though primarily espoused by imperialists, was at least tacitly accepted by both the nationalists and internationalists, for largely political reasons.

Schurmann then looked at how the basic currents related to the American political parties (See Table 2). The dominant imperialists, symbolised by Truman and Vandenberg, created an imperialist bipartisan consensus between the Democratic Party (except for its Wallaceite left-wing) and liberal Republicans such as Wilkie, Dewey, and Eisenhower. Schurmann persuasively illustrated that both the nationalists and internationalists were politically minority currents, with the internationalists being far too elitist to gain mass support and the nationalists being a minority even within their Republican Party stronghold. Schurmann cogently noted that bureaucracies represent interests, with historical individuals symbolising various ideological tenets. The internationalist bastion was the State Department, where most of the Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) were from Ivy League backgrounds. Interest-wise, the State Department had long represented East Coast corporate business interests. Many FSOs from this period felt that, "power was best vested in a class of wealthy and propertied men who had been taught responsibility in the finest schools."¹¹ Obviously this East Coast elitism would not culturally generate vast popular support in the rest of the country. The internationalists' grand champion and symbol was FDR himself. With his death their power declined, but never disappeared, as is illustrated by the continuing career of Henry Wallace.¹² In fact, in their belief that the international economy was crucial to the workings of the new order, and in their enthusiasm for multilateral institutions, the internationalists were the forefathers of the institutionalists, a major school of thought of the present day.

The nationalists were another old and powerful force in American foreign policy. Primarily Republicans, the nationalists were epitomised by Senator Robert Taft of Ohio. Their failure to control the Republican Party is a central factor in the development of imperialism as the dominant foreign policy current in the post-war world. If Taft had controlled the Republicans, the bipartisan consensus that it was essential for containment to attain if it was to become the dominant post-war policy would have been made impossible, as Taft would have led the Republican Party to espouse his nationalist convictions. "The nationalists felt powerless even within their own preferred Republican Party. In 1940, 1944, 1948, and 1952 the liberal wing of the Republican Party managed to nominate its own Presidential candidates."¹³ The nationalists grew increasingly alienated from the American political process. They felt, "the essence of America was the small town with its white, middle-class population, its generally Protestant or decently Catholic religion, its values of individualism, private enterprise and national pride."¹⁴ The bastion of nationalist support was small-town, small-time American business, forces that would be logically alienated from both the New Dealism of the internationalists and the imperialists, as well as the East Coast,

corporate, liberal Republicans. Their outrage, sense of loss, for example the illuminating metaphor is the 'loss' of China, acquired grotesque form with the McCarthy hearings.¹⁵ Their alliance with the military, particularly the conservative Navy, established them as a permanent, if minority, current on the American foreign policy scene. "The alliance of electoral losers with like-minded bureaucratic losers was a major new source of power."¹⁶ With the dawn of the atomic age, the Navy found itself in bureaucratic budgetary peril as its rival, the Air Force, was the logical vehicle for nuclear weapons and thus seemed certain to have its budget increased at the Navy's expense. The Navy was the most conservative of the armed forces, as can be seen by its protracted struggle to prevent its racial integration, and was essentially a Pacific fleet in the interwar era as the Atlantic was the preserve of the British navy. The Navy's conservative, nationalist tendencies made it a logical choice for an alliance with the right-wing of the Republican Party.¹⁷

One of the reasons that the right-wing Republicans adopted their Asia-first policy was because the Navy's interests lay in the Pacific. The war in the Pacific had been largely a nationalist, unilateralist show as compared with the internationalist co-operation in Europe.¹⁸ It was the fusing of nationalist, expansionist, unilateralist, and essentially anti-internationalist elements that led to calls for an Asia-first policy. "The big bankers of Wall Street were internationalists - so were the Communists with their Marxist doctrines, and so were the British with their empire."¹⁹ These three groups were anathema to the nationalists explicitly because of their internationalist orientation. Then for the nationalists, as is now so for the neo-realist school of thought, promoting the national interest was the primary goal of foreign policy (See Tables 1 and 3). It was in the Pacific that the nationalists, with their Navy allies, hoped to implement their policy of 'America first.'

While NSC-68 reaffirmed the primacy of the Europe-first approach developed by Roosevelt in World War II, Schurmann noted that the process was more complicated than this.²⁰ Sometimes victorious currents as well as schools of thought, and the bureaucracies that espouse them, have to compromise to an extent with their vanquished foes. Schurmann illustrated that this is exactly what happened in the post-war era. "Whereas American actions in Europe were an ever-changing mix of containment and peaceful coexistence [the policies of the imperialists and internationalists respectively], in East Asia they were a mix of containment and rollback [the policies of the imperialists and nationalists]."²¹ An example of this process was post-war US policy to China. After the Korean War the US extended its containment policy, demarcating both Korea and Vietnam. However, unlike US policy regarding the USSR, America engaged in no official contact with the Chinese for twenty-five

years. This was partially a sop to the nationalists. It was this mixture of the various foreign policy currents, and the interests that they represented, that ultimately helped determine general foreign policy outputs. It is suggested that this process will hold true for a schools of thought analysis of the post-Cold War era as well.

Schurmann identified the dominant current in the post-war era as that of imperialism. It was symbolised by men such as Harry Truman²² and George Kennan²³, with the Presidency itself as its bureaucratic bastion. It called for a continuation of the New Deal to the rest of the world. "Just as the New Deal brought 'social security' to America, so 'one world' will bring political security to the entire world."²⁴ Imperialists believed that if the US was to learn from the errors of 1918, an activist, vigorous, foreign policy was essential to prevent World War III. Such a policy would, of course, cost money, supplied largely by business, which was not a core New Deal constituency, and make the government, particularly the Chief Executive, the primary actor in the world in the post-war era. The President, and the officials clustered around the executive branch, had a virtual monopoly over national security issues, particularly with the advent of the atomic bomb. It was through the use of national security issues that the Presidency, and the imperialist current it adhered to, became ever more dominant in American foreign policy. "In no comparable period of American history did the state undergo such an accretion of power as in those early postwar years."²⁵ Schurmann believed containment was the policy which led to and justified this increase in executive power and illustrated the supremacy of the imperialist current in the post-war era.

Containment had three basic precepts. Firstly, it wished to maintain American nuclear superiority. Secondly, it endeavoured to draw demarcation lines between the free and communist worlds. Thirdly, it was to bolster the free world, with the priority going to those states near the demarcation lines. As Schurmann stated, "the basic goal of containment policy was the creation of a Pax Americana, which would prevent a new world war from erupting, unify the free world under an American aegis, and give the member nations economic growth and political stability."²⁶ It is the great success of this policy which has paradoxically led to the need for a new overarching direction in American foreign policy following the destruction of the Berlin Wall. President Truman succeeded in establishing imperialism as the dominant current by capitalising on the spectre of the Russian bear. For instance, in lobbying Congress to support the Truman Doctrine in 1947, he quieted both his nationalist (Taft) and internationalist (Wallace) opponents by highlighting the threat of the communist menace to Greece and Turkey. Today the threat of Russian adventurism beyond the boundaries of the

former USSR is simply not tenable. It is the loss of this unifying enemy and the fundamental structural change in the world away from the bipolarity of the Cold War era that are the main reasons that new overriding principles of American foreign policy are needed.

While Schurmann's analysis is both comprehensive and unique, new research into the present ideological state of American foreign policy is essential and is a major *raison d'être* of this work. Beyond even the fundamental differences between schools of thought analysis and Schurmann's currents of thought model about the extent the leader himself/herself is reflective of a belief system beyond their capacity to ignore, time has not stopped, and events have eroded Schurmann's analysis, which was more applicable to the late 1940s-early 1950s than to the 1990s. Also, Schurmann's classification system is too broad to explain much that goes on in international affairs. This can be looked upon as an occupational hazard of grand theorists and is a pitfall Schurmann does not wholly avoid. As Goertzel observes, "principles that purport to explain everything must necessarily be quite vague and abstract."²⁷ This lack of focus sometimes hinders Schurmann's work. For example, Schurmann classified FDR as an imperialist, an internationalist, and a nationalist. Such all-pervasive classification at some point ceases to have meaning. Therefore, an updating and improvement upon Schurmann's work is necessary and is attempted in this thesis.

So definitionally what is a school of thought, and how does it relate contextually to ideas about ideology, belief systems, and elite consensus? Schools of thought analysis, while intimately connected to these three concepts, is an attempt to eradicate theoretical flaws that currently limit the impact of the link between beliefs and action, particularly by augmenting the notion of ideology.²⁸

There is much in the notion of ideology that has direct relevance for schools of thought analysis. Before looking at some working International Relations definitions of the term, it is necessary to first assess ideology's roots, grounded in both Marxism and modern sociology. Edward Shils provides a definition of ideology that highlights the concept's broad philosophical aspects. He stated that ideology can be defined as, "comprehensive patterns of cognitive and moral beliefs about man, society, and the universe in relation to man and society."²⁹ Ideology then is a systemic attempt by man to answer the 'big' questions about his existence regarding his relationship to the universe. Yet early sociologists such as Karl Mannheim observed that ideology has also a collective nature and a political function. Goertzel notes that Mannheim defined ideologies as beliefs that reflect class or group interests and play a political function.³⁰ Mannheim himself stated, "Today we recognize that

behind every theory there are collective forces expressive of group-purposes, group-power, and group interests.”³¹ This notion that ideological beliefs reflect group political struggles will be a concept often applied in utilising schools of thought analysis.

Schools of thought analysis also adopts the position of sociology, that ideological thinking is characterised by the adoption of certain specific verities and then universalizes them, often ignoring evidence that does not fit into hermetically sealed paradigms. Shils observed that ideologies are, “integrated around one or a few pre-eminent values.”³² As shall be illustrated later in chapter 1, this precept is also true for those who adhere to a school of thought.

Even when Marxist and sociological thinking about ideology is not directly adopted by schools of thought analysis, their general views regarding ideological thought as having a socio-historical basis is a major insight permeating the general study of beliefs. Marxists like the theorist Louis Althusser saw ideological thought as merely part of the superstructure predicated by the economic means of production. Althusser argued that for Marx, “the material life of men explains their history, their consciousness, their ideologies are merely the phenomena of their material life.”³³ Mannheim goes beyond this single-factor explanation for ideological thought, while retaining the Marxist premise that ideological thinking is determined by factors other than pure reason. Mannheim argued that, “human thought arises, and operates, not in a social vacuum but in a definite social milieu.”³⁴ This central concept can be seen as the basis for much of modern sociology. Mannheim continued, “every form of historical and political thought is essentially conditioned by the life situation of the thinker and his groups.”³⁵ This major sociological assumption about ideology will also form a central component of schools of thought analysis. Only by linking an actor’s ideological formulations to his/her relative historical, economic, cultural, and bureaucratic position within society and government can his/her beliefs be given the context they need to be understood. Schools of thought analysis, while a factor leading to policy outputs, is not the only variable it is necessary to apprehend to discern the crucial context of the decision-making process and indeed other factors (psychological, cultural, sociological, economic, and political) may themselves condition an actor’s adoption of a particular school of thought.

A major flaw with the notion of ideology is that its elusiveness suggests that it is too broad a concept to adequately explain the notion of 'praxis', the unity of thought and action.³⁶ One need only look at the disparate analyses of three leading International Relations experts on the subject to see that the broad definitions of the term limit its direct efficacy for

the study of the link between actions and beliefs. Michael Hunt, in his important work, Ideology and US Foreign Policy, defined ideology as, "an interrelated set of convictions or assumptions that decreases the complexities of a particular slice of reality to easily comprehensible terms and suggests appropriate ways of dealing with that reality."³⁷ Schurmann's definition is more concise. He regarded ideology as a set of ideas designed to implement actions.³⁸ While not strictly defining the term, Francis Fukuyama in The End Of History And The Last Man, sees Islam, Communism, Fascism, and Liberalism as the most important ideologies of the Twentieth Century, with Liberalism eventually prevailing in the global ideational struggle. Fukuyama argued, "What is emerging victorious, in other words, is not so much liberal practice as the liberal idea (his emphasis). That is to say, for a very large part of the world, there is now no ideology with pretensions to universality that is in a position to challenge liberal democracy."³⁹ Clearly these three uses of the term ideology are similar, yet not the same. The confusion about the very meaning of the term 'ideology' reflects its excessive broadness, a characteristic the schools of thought definition does not share.

Yet while the notion of ideology is overly vague, its main social science limitation is that it is too far removed from the reality of policy preferences. The schools of thought concept is grounded in some of the general precepts usually ascribed to ideological thought, while at the same time functioning as a link between ideological precepts and specific policies. This point is illustrated by looking more closely at what Hunt, Schurmann, and Fukuyama each mean by ideology, and drawing on some of their observations in the definition of a school of thought, which itself can be thought of as a sort of sub-ideology.⁴⁰

The main problem with Hunt's view of ideology is that it does not acknowledge that in practice there is a direct link between beliefs and action. He stated, " It is important, to begin with, to accept the view that the relationship between ideas and action is not rigid. The simple idea or set of ideas on which a policy may initially rest invariably has to leave room for diverse nonideological considerations."⁴¹ Hunt is assuredly correct that ideological factors alone almost never determine policy outputs, but allowing for this somewhat obvious point does not obscure the telling evidence that Hunt's own notion of ideology in many ways obscures more than it reveals.

Hunt's book makes the case for the existence of an American foreign policy ideology predicated on the three pillars of : 1) national greatness and the promotion of liberty, 2) attitudes to other peoples being largely formed through racial considerations, 3) the notion

that revolutions, particularly social revolutions, can easily spin out of control and prove to be a negative phenomenon.⁴² Hunt expertly used the whole of American history to attempt to persuade the reader that America has had one ideology throughout its history. While his three general beliefs have undoubtedly been present at various times throughout the American saga, it is a far stretch to believe that these three unchanging factors, and no more, lie at the heart of the collective American psyche. Because of the rigidity of Hunt's position, he was forced to make some very strange claims to preserve the inner logic of his theory. For example, he claimed that the outset of World War II did not significantly alter America's foreign policy ideology.⁴³ To conclude that a state which had been passing neutrality acts in the 1930s did not go through some sort of fundamental change in the 1940s when it was militarily and diplomatically wholly involved in both a World War and constructing the post-war security structure, is to be either blind to global realities or labouring under the burden of trying to prove an overly restrictive theory. Another example of Hunt making history rather oddly correspond with his theory was his characterisation of Twentieth Century American development policy as being mainly a continuation of earlier racial prejudices.⁴⁴ Yet it is not necessarily racist to conceive of Africa occupying a relatively low development rung. Indeed after the disasters in Ethiopia, Somalia, and Rwanda in the past ten years such a view may be seen as objectively sensible. Certainly Hunt's conception of development policy as being largely a continuation of a primary American propensity to view the world through the lens of a racial hierarchy is open to strenuous debate.

Both of these examples point to the structural flaw with Hunt's work. He argued, "a nation's self-conception provides the intellectual underpinnings - the guiding assumptions and concerns - for foreign policy and may even in crucial respects dictate its terms."⁴⁵ While Hunt was correct in illuminating the importance ideological factors play in decision-making he neither highlighted how this process occurs within the federal government nor acknowledged, as the case of his ignoring the ideological sea-change that occurred in the 1940s attests to, that there are and have been several dominant and competing ideologies and that this competition has gone on at both the ideological and sub-ideological levels since the dawn of the Republic. Hunt's failure to support his rigid thesis of a single permanent ideology leads one to the conclusion that there have always been several competing American belief systems, and that the concept of ideology itself as Hunt and many others define it, is too broad to tell one much about the central linkage between systemic thought and political action.

What Hunt did do well was to focus on the general importance the belief-systems of policy-makers have on their eventual decisions, and the key and neglected role beliefs play in the overall decision-making process. Hunt argued,

"The blend of ideas that oriented policymakers to the world should neither be treated in isolation nor be counted as determinative of policy...Personality, bureaucratic pressures, available national resources, and the international environment must be given their due as potent influences over the ways ideas are translated into action. But even after all these points are conceded, ideology remains the obvious starting point for explaining both the American outlook and American behavior in world affairs."⁴⁶

Hunt's emphasis on the centrality of beliefs in the decision-making process and on the personal views of elites being crucial to this process will be critical facets of schools of thought analysis.

Francis Fukuyama's belief that liberalism has won the ideological contest of the Twentieth Century again illustrates that the notion of ideology is often too vague a concept to be of much use in International Relations, particularly at the crucial domestic level. Fukuyama implicitly regards liberalism as a single, all-encompassing ideology, without explaining what the policy outcomes are of adhering to such a creed, (beyond advocating free market economics and representative democracy), how these outcomes are reached, or accounting for the different general policy positions held by different 'liberal' states. Ben Wattenberg illustrated the intellectual flaw in viewing liberalism as an undifferentiated creed. He contrasted liberalism in the US with liberalism in Western Europe, believing them to be largely distinct phenomena. He sees American democracy as having, "distinctive features...individualism, pluralism, opportunity, dynamism, and the absence of a rigid class structure,"⁴⁷ contrasting it with the more corporatist version of the European Open Market and its democratic institutions. Not only does Wattenberg see these two types of 'liberalism' as being unlike, he believes they are fated to come into conflict. He observed, "The global contest will not concern whether, but what kind of, democratic values will be influential."⁴⁸ Wattenberg once again demonstrates that Fukuyama's overly broad conception of what constitutes an ideology obscures more than it reveals about the workings of the international system.

Of the three International Relations expositors of the notion of ideology detailed here, Schurmann comes closest to linking beliefs directly to policy preferences of individual actors and detailing how these beliefs help translate into policy outcomes. Schurmann defined ideology as a set of ideas designed to implement actions,⁴⁹ thus stressing that praxis must be a major part of any useful social science definition of ideology. He also noted that the term

ideology has been obscured by, "clouds of verbiage political scientists have emitted on the subject,"⁵⁰ a process which has led to the undervaluation of the ideological variable in the study of policy outputs. Unlike Hunt and Fukuyama, Schurmann directly linked beliefs to concrete policy actions.

Schurmann's model is also useful to schools of thought analysis in a methodological sense. While, as stated earlier, Schurmann wrongly viewed the President as solely manipulative of ideological currents, rather than noting the effect his belief system has on decision-making, he was correct in viewing governmental activity as largely an elite bureaucratic process. Schools of thought analysis adopts Schurmann's view that for a systemic belief to acquire political relevance, it must be represented as the collective belief-system of an important bureaucratic entity inside the government, such as the National Security Council (NSC), the Department of Defence (DoD), or the State Department.⁵¹ Schurmann correctly focused on the executive branch, and particularly the President, as the actor who is most likely to influence both overall policy outputs as well as the ideological tone of American foreign affairs. As he stated, "the theory suggests that it does make a difference who is President."⁵² While currents of thought has important differences from the schools of thought analysis utilised in this thesis, in both its recognition of the centrality of the idea that systemic beliefs are directly wedded to policy, and in its methodological focus on bureaucratic politics and the presidency, Schurmann's theory is the single most important forerunner of schools of thought analysis.

Yet currents of thought and schools of thought are not the same concept. Schurmann's currents of thought are not sub-ideologies as are schools of thought but rather are separate ideologies themselves. Schurmann observed, "The more clearcut and explicit they become [currents of thought] the more they take on certain qualities of doctrine and so become ideologies."⁵³ For Schurmann, the bureaucratic conflict that is played out in the American foreign policy decision-making process is between wholly different ideologies, whereas relying on the more conventional definitions of Hunt and Fukuyama, schools of thought analysis sees the concept of ideology as farther away from direct involvement in the decision-making process. Thus schools of thought analysis is here a synthesis of both Schurmann and the more standard view of Hunt. While agreeing with Schurmann that ideas directly influence policy outputs, schools of thought analysis feels, unlike Schurmann, that this process is performed at a lower analytical level, thus retaining the broad notion of ideology advocated by Hunt and others, with one important difference. Schools of thought analysis refines the standard view of ideology by positing a sub-level where the various impulses within

liberalism are prioritised in such a manner as to directly affect policy outputs in conjunction with bureaucratic political considerations and objective domestic and international conditions. For example, while agreeing with Fukuyama that 'liberalism' is the dominant ideology of the day and agreeing that this is certainly true in the US, this fact in and of itself does not explain how beliefs influence American foreign policy. Within the liberal ideology of the US however, are the schools of thought sub-ideologies which, when integrated within bureaucratic politics analysis and coupled with objective international and domestic conditions, lead to genuine foreign policy outputs in the post-Cold War era. Thus, while Schurmann's paradigm is undoubtedly the basis for much of schools of thought analysis, the two concepts are clearly different.

Methodologically, there are also differences between Schurmann's construct and schools of thought analysis. Unlike Schurmann, schools of thought analysis does not view the executive branch as the sole ideological battleground. Schurmann stated, "The realm of ideology centers on the chief executive of the state, and the realm of interests centers on the state's bureaucracies."⁵⁴ Surely by Schurmann's own analysis, which discerned ideological impulses in governmental structures other than the White House, this statement oversimplifies what is an extremely complicated process. Schools of thought analysis takes the view that both the executive and legislative branches, as well as the foreign policy bureaucracies clustered around the presidency, all reflect and promote sub-ideological impulses as well as interests, and thus all can be classified and analysed by use of the schools of thought method. Schurmann's overly simple focus on the executive branch, as the key to understanding how beliefs are translated into policy in the American government, will be methodologically replaced in this thesis by the bureaucratic politics method linked to a schools of thought analysis of key Cabinet and Congressional leaders in the American government, as well as the President. This process will accurately reflect the complexity of the US foreign policy decision-making process.

There is a final point that needs to be made about the relationship between ideologies and schools of thought. While both relate directly to belief systems, they do so in very different ways. As Hinich and Munger observed, "ideologies unite personal belief systems in the population, even though individual schema will be different."⁵⁵ While it is true that ideologies serve to transform personal belief systems into a larger collective belief system (with some allowance for individual variation), as the Fukuyama case illustrated, this is done in only the most general way. Schools of thought analysis is predicated on the concept that there is another stage in the process, that of the school of thought sub-ideology, which unites

personal belief systems to a more specific collective point of view that does have direct policy repercussions when combined with other decision-making variables.

Thus for both the concepts of ideology and schools of thought, belief systems are a central factor.⁵⁶ The best specific definition of 'belief system' is probably Ole Holsti's, an expert in understanding the process of linking beliefs to foreign policy outputs. He stated that a belief system may be thought of as, "the set of lenses through which information concerning the physical and social environment is received. It orients the individual to his environment, defining it for him and identifying its salient characteristics."⁵⁷ In addition Holsti noted that a belief system implies a construct in which priorities are formed, choices made. He argued, "In addition to organizing perceptions into a meaningful guide for behavior, the belief system has the function of the establishing of goals and the ordering of preferences."⁵⁸ This process of establishing priorities at the belief system level is continued at the higher analytical plane of schools of thought analysis. Indeed many of the differences between the various schools of thought boil down to differences of priority, differences first articulated at the individual belief system level. As schools of thought are merely the collective expression of the political aspects of the belief systems of individual members of the foreign policy elite, this is not surprising.

Belief systems, like ideologies, cover a broader philosophical area than does the notion of schools of thought. Belief systems are generally thought of as representing the views of an individual, though bureaucracies can have collective belief systems, a concept closely related to that of bureaucratic culture. For example, Barber defined a belief system as a 'world view' which consists of an individual's, "primary, politically relevant beliefs, particularly his conceptions of social causality, human nature, and central moral conflicts of the time. This is how he sees the world and his lasting opinions about what he sees."⁵⁹ Belief systems are the building blocs for schools of thought analysis, which refines these politically relevant beliefs into a collective belief system complete with concrete policy outputs.

It is the idea of elites and elite consensus that is the last major concept that gives schools of thought analysis contextual value.⁶⁰ A major assumption of schools of thought analysis is that it is elite belief systems that need to be assessed if foreign policy outputs are to be analysed. As Galtung noted, "foreign policy ideology, we feel, is a center [elite] phenomenon."⁶¹ This is because, regarding foreign policy, it is the elites who have both a more coherent position than the general public and due to the fact that elites largely control

the information flow of foreign policy the masses receive. Based on his analysis of the relationship between masses and elites in America regarding foreign policy, Jennings observed, "its patent that political party elites have a vastly more constrained and stable set of political preferences and perspectives than does the mass public in general."⁶² Part of the reason for this heightened coherence vis-a-vis the general public is that elites, both opinion-makers and decision-makers, have the interest and the expertise across the spectrum of issues in International Relations that the general public lacks, qualities that are conducive to integrating policy preferences into personal elite belief systems.

Beyond having a greater belief system coherence than the mass public, elites, both opinion-makers and decision-makers, largely control the flow of information about foreign affairs to the public. Elites have a far greater level of power over foreign policy issues vis-a-vis the general public than they do over domestic policy. As Jennings stated, "they [elites] serve as major sources of political information for the citizenry, through the media and other communication channels. This two-way flow of communication has a very asymmetrical quality,"⁶³ in that in terms of immediate power it greatly favours the elites in American society. It is generally recognised that in most cases, foreign affairs issues are the preserve and interest of a tiny minority of the American population. For example, exit polls taken by the Washington Post during election day November 3, 1992, showed that only one voter in twelve cited foreign policy concerns as a significant issue that affected their vote.⁶⁴ Even more significantly, only eight voters out of one hundred mentioned foreign policy issues as their main concern.⁶⁵ That is not to say that on some foreign policy issues, particularly those involving war and peace, the general public does not make itself heard. Indeed even on less salient issues for the American public, such as the Bosnian crisis chronicled in this work, they exert a powerful if indirect influence, particularly regarding what they will not countenance. Still, schools of thought analysis, while accepting that the mass public is a factor in understanding foreign policy decision-making posits that its role is indirect, largely ideologically unfocused, and thus the concept of schools of thought applies primarily to the foreign policy elite of the United States.

Schools of thought analysis can be understood in terms of its relationship to the concepts of ideology, belief systems, and elite domination of the foreign policy decision-making process. Definitionally, schools of thought can be defined as a sub-ideology, that unlike Hunt's definition of ideology, can be directly linked to concrete policy preferences in American foreign policy. Schools of thought analysis is predicated on the Greek notion of 'praxis', the unity of thought and action. Unlike the notion of belief systems, schools of

thought analysis relates directly to a group or individual's political philosophy primarily, rather than to a general philosophical point of view. Unlike Schurmann's currents of thought paradigm, schools of thought analysis advocates that all of the key foreign policy actors themselves have a schools of thought orientation, including the Congress and the foreign policy bureaucracies clustered around the presidency. These organisations' schools of thought orientations are determined by the power struggles that take place between individuals in their organisations, each of whom adheres to one of the major schools of thought. Unlike Hunt, schools of thought analysis posits a foreign policy arena where several competing schools of thought battle for primacy as they have throughout American history, and that periodically, such as after 1941, such battles lead to a new dominant school of thought emerging. Schools of thought analysis is also predicated on the idea that it is the orientation of American foreign policy elites that is the key factor that helps explain how foreign policy outputs are arrived at. Schools of thought analysis is just one variable in explaining foreign policy outputs, as like Schurmann's model, schools of thought analysis acknowledges that objective conditions of American society (particularly what is politically possible, a factor arrived at partly by mass public opinion) and the nature of the international political arena are major factors that need to be taken into account to explain foreign policy outputs.

B) Methodological Aspects of Schools of Thought Analysis

Something must now be said about the bureaucratic political method that, wedded with schools of thought analysis, will provide the methodological background for this work. The bureaucratic politics method is the natural partner of schools of thought analysis. The paradigm asserts that, "politics within a government influences decisions and actors ostensibly directed outward."⁶⁶ Thus the key to any analysis of US foreign policy-making must rest on a vision of the American government as a series of bureaucratic fiefdoms, where both individuals and organisations compete for the political power to most strongly influence overall foreign policy decision-making. As Rubin argued, "Perhaps the greatest difficulty in understanding US foreign policy arises when the process itself is left out of consideration. Anyone who has dealt directly with international affairs knows that these human elements and bureaucratic considerations cannot be ignored."⁶⁷ The large degree of pluralism that is indicative of US foreign policy decision-making is the key unique feature distinguishing the American foreign policy-making process from that of other states.⁶⁸ As Neustadt noted, compared to the ordered Western European governments and that of Japan, the American policy-making process is a rat race.⁶⁹ As this is the case, the schools of thought orientations

of both the leaders of bureaucracies within the government, such as the Secretaries of State and Defence, and the collective schools of thought ethos of these bureaucracies themselves, such as the general institutionalist orientation of the State Department, become crucial factors in charting the bureaucratic interplay that results in overall American foreign policy outputs.

This thesis will use a fusion of Graham Allison's Organisational Processes Model and his Bureaucratic Politics Model in analysing America's response to the Bosnian crisis. He indicated their compatibility for fusion in his assessment of the two paradigms as emblematic of his double-pronged assault on the standard rational actor model of foreign policy decision-making. Allison reasoned, "Although the Rational Actor Model has proved useful for many purposes, there is powerful evidence that it must be supplemented, if not supplanted, by frames of reference that focus on the governmental machine - the organizations and political actors involved in the policy process."⁷⁰

The Organisational Processes Model sees foreign policy as being largely predicated on the outputs of large organisations functioning according to regularised patterns of behaviour.⁷¹ The Organisational Processes Model concentrates on the notion of the distinctiveness of the bureaucracies operating within the American government. As Neustadt observed,

"operating agencies owe their existence least of all to one another - and only in some part to him [the President]. Each has a separate statutory base; each has its statutes to administer; each deals with a different set of subcommittees at the Capitol. Each has its own peculiar set of clients, friends, and enemies outside the formal government. Each has a different set of specialized careerists inside its own bailiwick."⁷²

These differing functions and interests lead to fundamental differences in collective and personal ideologies, and often differing overall schools of thought orientations between the various bureaucracies. As Allison noted, "Separate responsibilities laid on the shoulders of distinct individuals encourage differences in what each sees and judges to be important,"⁷³ or in the famous phrase, "Where you stand depends on where you sit."⁷⁴ Thus Allison sees operational differences between bureaucracies as largely facilitating perpetual cleavages that lead to genuine schools of thought differences about what is in America's general interest. For example, as Halperin noted, "participants come to equate national security with the interests of their organization."⁷⁵ Nor should this be looked upon as either sinister or surprising. The Department of Defence is a case in point. Those who decide to work there are likely to feel that national security is largely determined by military power, at least to a greater extent than the general American public. As they feel this is the case, and thus a career

in the military is important, such individuals decide to join the military. Every day this initial belief is reinforced by confined contact at work with others, who as they joined the armed services for similar reasons, are likely to share general foreign policy views, and agree on an overall schools of thought orientation. This is how individuals are socialised into bureaucratic structures, and the reason these organisations are likely to retain unchanged in their collective schools of thought orientation.⁷⁶

The Organisational Processes Model leads one to the conclusion that a decision-maker must be sensitive to his/her organisation's schools of thought orientation,⁷⁷ and that this collective orientation can constrain a decision-maker's policy options. For example, the former Secretary of Defence, Les Aspin, was poorly received by the Department of Defence (DoD) at least partly because he did not share that organisation's schools of thought orientation. DoD officials leaked complaints of Aspin's bureaucratic shortcomings to the press. Aspin was eventually replaced by William Perry, who while not sharing the Pentagon's primary schools of thought orientation, held significant minority beliefs that jibed with its collective schools of thought position, particularly regarding US relations with Russia and the American stance on Bosnia, both primary Pentagon concerns.⁷⁸

The Organisational Processes Model identifies bureaucratic organisations within the American government as powerful factors in the formulation of overall US foreign policy decision-making. American foreign policy outputs are seen as an amalgamation of bureaucratic governmental organisations and interests, with the President acting largely as the co-ordinator of these divergent governmental strains. As Rubin argued, "the State Department, National Security Council Staff, White House aides, Defense Department, CIA and Treasury and Commerce departments each represent a portion of reality which must be brought together to make or end decisions."⁷⁹ The model correctly recognises, as Schurmann put it, "the dual nature of the state - as a realm of ideology and a realm of interests."⁸⁰ While schools of thought analysis helps explain the nature of the ideational struggle within the American government, it is the Organisational Processes Model and the Bureaucratic Politics paradigm that discern the roles both interests and bureaucratic power play in the American foreign policy decision-making process.

It is, however, Allison's Bureaucratic Politics Model that proves of greatest use to applying a schools of thought analysis to American foreign policy. While the Organisational Processes Model correctly identifies bureaucratic institutions within the US government as central players in the making of American foreign policy, it is the Bureaucratic Politics Model

that perceives the essentially conflictual nature of American foreign policy decision-making. Such decision-making is seen as the result of various bargains struck by bureaucratic 'players' in the national government.⁸¹

In line with the Organisational Processes Model, the Bureaucratic Politics paradigm allows that the various bureaucracies in the American government have different interests, perceptions, sub-ideologies, and policy preferences. It goes on to view the government as an arena where these differing views and interests compete for power at the expense of other entrenched organisations. Further, the Bureaucratic Politics Model sees this conflict as being largely carried out by individual decision-makers representing both personal and bureaucratic interests. As Allison observed, "The hard core of the bureaucratic politics mix is personality."⁸² Adherents of the paradigm feel that to correctly analyse how individual decisions are reached in American foreign policy it is essential to ascertain: Who is primarily concerned with the issue? (Who is playing the bureaucratic game?); What determines each player's stand?; and What determines each player's influence?⁸³ This analytical list will be used in a modified form to highlight a schools of thought analysis of American foreign policy responses to the Bosnian crisis.

It is important to note the natural linkages between the Bureaucratic Politics Model and schools of thought analysis. Firstly, both relate to specific individuals who are central to the American foreign policy-making process. Where Bureaucratic Politics analysis stresses the power relationships that are essential to comprehend how foreign policy outputs are reached, schools of thought analysis provides a more convincing answer to the question as to how bureaucratic players determine their policy stands than has been put forward by either the Organisational Processes Model or the Bureaucratic Politics paradigm. While accepting that bureaucratic position and organisational orientation help determine an individual decision-maker's policy preferences, schools of thought analysis provides the crucial ingredient as to what primarily determines a bureaucratic player's policy stand. As such, it is an important refinement of the Bureaucratic Politics approach to American foreign policy decision-making analysis.

The three overall factors that will be posited as determining bureaucratic political outcomes in American foreign policy in the post-Cold War era flow from Allison's bureaucratic political analysis, but are slightly modified. A player's bureaucratic success is suggested to be determined by his/her: bureaucratic position, and its general structural power within the American government; the personal characteristics of each individual

decision-maker that hamper or enhance the player's power; and the ideological fervour each decision-maker brings to the table regarding specific issues.

A player's bureaucratic position, and its general strength within the government, is a crucial factor in determining his/her chances for bureaucratic success. For example, both tradition and the constitutional elaboration of powers means that the views of a Secretary of State are usually considered more influential in determining overall American foreign policy outputs than the schools of thought orientation of an Assistant Secretary of Defence. Likewise, given the general nature of the American foreign policy process, the President will always play a central role in foreign policy decision-making. Yet while the presidency is the single most important bureaucratic entity in the American foreign policy process, it is not alone. As Smith argued, "the machinery of American foreign policy has become so sprawling and so cumbersome that no one has exclusive domain over foreign and national security policy."⁸⁴ Neustadt concurred, saying, "The President of the United States has an extraordinary range of formal powers, of authority in statute law and in the Constitution. Here is testimony that despite his 'powers' he does not obtain results by giving orders - or not, at any rate, merely by giving orders...Presidential power is the power to persuade."⁸⁵ The Bureaucratic Politics Model has demonstrated the essentially pluralist nature of American foreign policy decision-making, that the President does not make foreign policy alone. This modification of the Bureaucratic Politics formula acknowledges this, while at the same time stressing that while there are many bureaucratic pieces on the chessboard, as in chess, these pieces are not all of equal worth in terms of power.

A player's personality effects the bureaucratic equation, but the notion of 'personality' must be assessed in further detail if it is to have a concrete effect on bureaucratic political analysis. As Halperin stated, for all the important foreign policy players, "The single most important determinant of the influence of any senior official is his relationship with the President,"⁸⁶ and this relationship is largely influenced by the personalities involved. To win the President's trust, a player must illustrate that he/she has mastered his/her own bureaucratic brief, and yet still has the President's interest at heart.⁸⁷ Often these two considerations will be in conflict, for example if the schools of thought orientation of a bureaucratic department does not jibe with the predilections of the President. Also, the attributes that make for the mastery of a bureaucratic brief: intellectual dominance, vigorous leadership, and taking the bureaucracy's concerns to heart, do not wholly coincide with the traits needed to illustrate to the President that a player has his interests at heart. These traits include: a sublimation of personal views for the administration's good, the propensity to be a

'team player', and the ability to override bureaucratic objections and make presidential preferences into policy.

If a player can personally master these contradictions his/her bureaucratic reward is great. It includes the power implicit in the general acceptance of 'closeness' to the single most important foreign policy decision-maker, as is measured by how seriously the President generally considers the player's views, and in access to the chief executive. As Smith stated, access is both a channel for doing business and is also emblematic of presidential trust and bureaucratic importance.⁸⁸ For example, General Marshall measured the difficult personality paradox and reaped the bureaucratic reward by being seen as a prime foreign policy player in President Truman's White House.⁸⁹ While the impact of personality on the decision-making process is difficult to analyse, it is essential to apprehend. As Halperin argued, "there is nothing that Washington officials watch more closely than the relationship of particular individuals to the President."⁹⁰

Lastly, success in bureaucratic politics relates to a player's ideological fervour, to how important an issue is to the player involved. As Halperin stated, "If power in general depends on relationships with the President, power on a particular issue may depend much more on the amount of time, energy, and interest one is prepared to devote. A senior official who is prepared to devote substantial energy to a problem can exert influence far beyond his ordinary performance. The same is often true of a junior official who has the confidence of his principal and devotes himself passionately to any one issue."⁹¹ This fervour is partly predicated by schools of thought considerations.

The most obvious, and in many ways the most important bureaucratic competition, is the eternal battle between the presidency and the Congress for control of American foreign policy. It is certainly true that the executive branch has dominated foreign policy since the 1940s,⁹² but it is not that Congress is without institutional power regarding foreign policy.⁹³ Indeed, as Patterson argued,

"Congress is probably the most impressive specimen of its genre. Among other things it is a powerful legislative [his emphasis] body. In an era in which law-making has in most countries fallen heavily into the hands of executives, the American Congress continues to be a significant, independent law-making institution, capable of legislative innovation and able to undertake the creative art of law-making without executive leadership if necessary."⁹⁴

Regarding foreign policy, Congress' most potent power is control of the purse. As Wilcox stated, "Its great potential powers are to refuse to vote public moneys for foreign policies

with which it disagrees and to investigate foreign policy with a view to influence public and foreign government opinion."95 Congress' investigative powers, in decline since Watergate and the Iran-Contra debacle, are nevertheless still an important potential power. Its pushing of its agenda through control of foreign affairs appropriations is a fact of life. In the area of foreign aid, Congressional amendments to appropriations bills enabling the President to conduct foreign policy usually contain riders that reflect Congressional opinion as to how that money ought to be spent. These riders thus directly affect US foreign policy outputs.96 For example, the 104th Congress has made it clear that it has little enthusiasm for aid to Russia. This limited the expenditure the Clinton administration formally requested of Congress, as they knew the grant would be unpopular. The amount of aid eventually approved will amount to even less than the administration originally requested.97 In this decisive way, through its control of all government expenditure, Congress is assured of relevance in foreign policy decision-making.

Constitutionally there is little doubt the founding fathers intended Congress to play a large role in foreign affairs decision-making, a far larger role in fact than Congress played throughout the Cold War era. This is illustrated by the fact that legally Congress has a wide array of foreign policy powers enumerated by the Constitution. Congress is given sanction by the founding fathers to : regulate commerce; ratify treaties (in the Senate); raise and maintain armed forces; control immigration; impose tariffs; and most importantly, to declare war (Article I Section 8).98 As Schlesinger observed, "it should not be in the power of a single man to bring the country into war - [this] unquestionably expressed the original intent,"99 of the Founders. That many of these powers have been operationally ceded to the presidency is not a sign of Constitutional intent, but rather of the executive's successful struggle throughout the Twentieth Century, particularly during the Cold War, to wrest the foreign policy initiative for the executive branch.

Yet there is no doubt that the Founders intended the President to play a central role in foreign policy decision-making. The President's institutional advantages over Congress regarding foreign policy are vast.100 Noted constitutional scholar Edward Corwin, paraphrasing The Federalist Papers, listed four general reasons for presidential leverage over Congress,

- "(1) unity of office - whereas the president operates as a single decision-maker, Congress speaks with many voices
- (2) secrecy and dispatch - the president conducts policy in private away from public scrutiny. Congress by its nature is a very public institution
- (3) superior sources of information - the president has access to information from the entire executive branch apparatus
- (4) presidential availability - whereas Congress must meet formally and act as one body, the president has the flexibility to act without formal processes, increasing his ability to respond to rapidly changing events."¹⁰¹

These prodigious institutional advantages have enabled the President to generally dominate foreign policy-making throughout the history of the American republic.¹⁰² As that sage overseer of foreign policy decision-making, Lee Hamilton, noted, "We [the Congress] can modify, we can alter. But the fundamental policy remains the president's policy...I think a president can win any foreign policy issue if he fights hard enough for it."¹⁰³ While this may be overstating the President's power somewhat, the quotation neatly illustrates the general preponderance of presidential power over the legislative branch in the making of American foreign policy.

One of Corwin's points needs to be discussed further as it bears directly on the schools of thought analysis of American foreign policy outputs regarding the Bosnian crisis. The presidential advantage of unity of office gives the chief executive a huge edge in maintaining schools of thought coherence vis-a-vis the Congress. The President selects his advisers and cabinet and can fire them at will, whereas individual Congressmen have no role to play in selecting their fellow colleagues on the Foreign Relations Committee. The President is likely to select his foreign policy advisers at least partly on the basis of their having a shared schools of thought orientation with him, and in any case, even if they deviate from the executive's schools of thought line, as he can fire them, the President has the vast preponderance of power within the executive branch in setting its overall schools of thought orientation.

Thus, the President has far more individual power in setting the schools of thought orientation of the executive branch than does the most powerful Senate leader in determining Congress' schools of thought point of view. This bureaucratic advantage means the executive branch's schools of thought orientation is apt to be more coherent and less divided than any Congressional schools of thought response to a foreign policy issue. This institutional advantage goes a long way toward explaining the Clinton administration's

success in determining American policy regarding Bosnia during the time of the 103rd Congress.

The presidency was granted broad if limited powers in the Constitution. Although Congress was given the power to declare war, the President, as Commander-in-chief, was delegated the responsibility for conducting all military operations. This prerogative has grown to the point where the presidency has accrued more power vis-a-vis the Congress over issues of war and peace than it was Constitutionally granted. The Constitution also mandated that the President is to receive foreign envoys, and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint ambassadors to serve America abroad.¹⁰⁴ The President was also granted the responsibility for negotiating treaties, that to become law need a two-thirds majority in the Senate. This Constitutional enumeration of powers leads one to the conclusion that the Founders generally expected the President to run foreign policy, but, as in the case of war powers and treaties, the Congress, especially the Senate, was to have a legislative veto over the executive branch's conduct of foreign affairs.

In reality, inter-branch conflict over foreign policy decision-making was and is as inevitable as anything is likely to be in the social sciences. This is because inter-branch conflict has both structural and bureaucratic origins. Bureaucratically, the nature of the American system itself has made inter-branch conflict likely. As in other cases of bureaucratic politics, differing operational duties lead to different perceptions being formed in the Congress and the executive branch. This leads to endemic conflict. As Peters argued, "congressmen have devoted themselves to thwarting the will of whomever happens to be residing at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, often without regard to whether he is a member of their party."¹⁰⁵ This is not done out of some expression of perversity, but rather because of differing bureaucratic roles leading to differing perceptions. The President is asked to solve major national and world problems, his constituency is uniquely the entire country. Congressmen are asked to solve individual problems their constituents have with the government, their constituencies are local and parochial.¹⁰⁶ It is not surprising then that these two branches should disagree about many issues, as their bureaucratic interests and areas of competency are so unlike. For example, over the ratification of Nafta, President Clinton argued that on balance the accord was in the interests of America as a whole. Even if this objectively was the case, it is not surprising so many members of the House derided the treaty and voted against its ratification. For a congressman from a district that would be hurt by the agreement, such as one with a large work force that manufactured textiles or had a large union representation, even if Nafta was in the national interest, it was most assuredly

not in the local interest, and as the local interest was the electorate for a congressman, he/she would ignore its dictates at his/her peril. The struggle between the presidency and the Congress is in many respects merely the institutional reflection of a deeper conflict inherent in any state between differing national and local interests.

This general struggle is repeated in the debate about which institution should primarily run foreign affairs. It is a debate the Founders were well aware of, and indeed enshrined in the Constitution. As Schlesinger observed, "The Founding Fathers made a deliberate effort to divide the control of the war powers. They vested in Congress the authority to commence and authorize war, whether that war be declared or undeclared. At the same time they vested in the Presidency the conduct both of ongoing foreign relations and ongoing war as well as the right to respond to sudden attack when Congress was not in session."¹⁰⁷ Constitutionally, over this central question of foreign relations, the right to decide issues of war and peace, the result was, "an invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign policy."¹⁰⁸

It is a struggle the presidency has won hands down throughout much of the Twentieth Century, particularly during the era of the Cold War. One need only look at the historical erosion of the Congress' constitutional powers in the realm of foreign policy as illustrative of the vast power the presidency has accrued in this political arena. Congressional powers have been reduced: in deciding questions of war and peace; treaty-approving; and oversight of the executive branch. No one has documented this process more fully than Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., in his seminal work, The Imperial Presidency. Schlesinger cleverly used a historical perspective to catalogue Congressional decline in foreign policy decision-making. He feels that in this century Congress has lost its war-making powers, with the process starting with US involvement in the Boxer Rebellion of 1900, which was the first case of a President (McKinley, then Theodore Roosevelt) using force in International Relations without obtaining Congressional approval. This trend gathered pace after World War II. As Smith observed, "No war has been declared since World War II, but hundreds of thousands of Americans have fought in Korea, Vietnam, Lebanon, the Dominican Republic, and Grenada."¹⁰⁹ Clearly the Cold War brought a diminution of one of Congress' most significant powers.

Schlesinger argued that the presidency began accumulating foreign policy power even before the end of World War II. In the 1930s in a series of Supreme Court cases (US vs. Belmont, US vs. Curtiss-Wright Corporation et al), Presidential supremacy in foreign affairs

was acknowledged. Also conceded was explicit recognition of the legal validity of the executive agreement, an executive device that while like a treaty, did not require the approval of the US Senate.¹¹⁰ Over time, executive agreements came to largely supercede treaties, thus removing both another presidential constraint as well as diluting another Congressional power. For example, up to May 1, 1972, Richard Nixon concluded 71 treaties and 608 executive agreements.¹¹¹

Even the seemingly uncontroversial Congressional power of executive oversight waned during the Cold War. This is illustrated by Congress' meek acceptance of the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) activities throughout much of the Cold War. As Schlesinger argued, "Though the CIA was persistently, ingeniously and sometimes irresponsibly engaged in undertakings that confronted the nation with the possibility of war, Congress had no effective means of control or oversight or even of finding out what the Agency was up to."¹¹² This was especially true during the 1950s when President Eisenhower made Allen Dulles a major actor regarding overall foreign policy decision-making. Congressional meekness before this uninvestigated, powerful executive bureaucracy is highlighted by the fact that it released the CIA from compliance with federal laws requiring the disclosure of the number, names, titles, functions, and salaries of public employees in the name of national security.¹¹³ Up until the time of the Clinton administration, Congress did not even know the size of the CIA's budget.

What were the reasons for this dramatic accrual of Presidential power? Schlesinger cogently argued that they were primarily historical. The first major historical factor leading to the increase in executive power concerned Congressional failure in the inter-war period, and the second concerned the changed nature of the international environment in the age of the atom. Schlesinger clearly observed the shock Pearl Harbor was for the American foreign policy establishment, a surprise that remained a major argument for limiting Congressional power over foreign affairs decision-making after the end of World War II. As Schlesinger noted, after Pearl Harbor, "No one for a long time after would trust Congress with basic foreign policy. Congress did not even trust itself. The grand revival of presidential prerogative after Pearl Harbor must be understood as a direct reaction to what happened when Congress tried to seize the guiding reins of foreign policy in the years 1919 to 1939."¹¹⁴ After the defeat of President Wilson's Versailles peace treaty by Henry Cabot Lodge and the Republican Senate, an insular Congress dominated US foreign policy in the inter-war era. Its obsession in the 1930s with neutrality acts belied a lack of military preparedness that caught up with the United States December 7, 1941. It was inconceivable

that America, which had incorrectly trusted its safety to Congress in the inter-war years, would repeat the mistake in 1945.

It was the Cold War era that put the seal on the presidential dominance of American foreign policy. A major reason for this was the dawn of the nuclear age. As Schlesinger noted, "The revolution in the technology of war increased the premium placed on the capacity for swift and secret action residing uniquely in the Presidency."¹¹⁵ It is not an anomaly that the CIA, the DoD, and the NSC were all founded during the early days of the Cold War. These powerful executive agencies, bureaucratic symbols of increased presidential power in the Cold War era, were operationally fitted to cope with the possibility of the US being menaced by nuclear weapons. The CIA secretly collected information about both the nuclear capabilities and the outlook of the Soviet leadership. The DoD, in bureaucratically uniting the armed services, made military coordination easier and most importantly swifter, in an era where an Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) could quickly threaten the American mainland. The NSC provided diplomatic coordination, as it included all the major executive foreign policy decision-makers such as the President, the Secretary of Defence, and the Secretary of State. Nuclear technology itself, made the concepts of quick coordination and counter-striking abilities essential in times of crisis. These attributes were not the institutional *métiers* of the Congress, which was by its very structure a more decentralised institution than the presidency. Thus the very demands the new technology placed on the United States contributed to the vast accretion of presidential power in the Cold War era.

It is a major underlying premise of this thesis that with the end of the Cold War, presidential dominance in foreign policy decision-making is at an end. As Hart noted,

"In times of crisis, other branches of government, and other powerful influences within the American political system, tend to stand back and let the president get on with the job...But in non-crisis times, the American polity is less enthusiastic about presidential leadership and less willing to give the president a free hand. In these more normal periods, the political system reverts to type and becomes what it was originally designed to be, a system of multiple centers of power."¹¹⁶

We are now returning to a more normal time, and hence to a more 'normal' American foreign policy system of Presidential leadership, but not dominance of the decision-making process. In terms of geo-strategic power, the US is safer now with its Cold War enemy vanquished than it has been in many years. Thus the urgencies of the Cold War era have given way to more diffuse, less immediate threats to American security. This has practical consequences for the inter-branch rivalry between Congress and the President. As Jamison argued, "with the passing of the strategy of containment as a central organizing principle between the

executive and legislative branches of government on questions related to the international role of the US, age-old questions of the purposes and conduct of US foreign policy are returning."¹¹⁷ This thesis will demonstrate that these questions have been raised anew by the Clinton administration's handling of the Bosnian crisis, but have not yet been answered. What is clear is that Congressional actors will play an increased role in foreign policy decision-making in the post-1989 era, compared with that of the Cold War. As this is the case, Congress as a whole must be included in any bureaucratic political analysis of American foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. Allison, who wrote his seminal work Essence of Decision in the midst of the Cold War, concentrated on the executive branch as the focus of bureaucratic politics due to its then dominant role in US foreign policy decision-making. With the end of the Cold War this overweening dominance is no more. As such, for a schools of thought analysis of American foreign policy to be accurate, Congressional leaders' schools of thought orientations need to be examined as well as executive elites for a comprehensive picture of the American foreign policy decision-making process to emerge.

To extend and improve on Schurmann's work, it will be necessary to first explain the 'givens' behind each school of thought. These general predilections form the prism of analysis through which decision-makers view policy questions.¹¹⁸ It is thus the contention of this thesis that if the givens of each school of thought can be discerned and analysed, their adherents' general policy preferences can be determined largely as a function of these underlying analytical and philosophical predilections. It is in linking these givens to specific policies and policy-makers that forms the basis of the schools of thought classification system adopted in this thesis. This linkage, as well as noting the parameters in each school of thought, helps give one a thorough understanding of the American response to the post-1989 era. Some of the schools of thought will engender policies that are complementary, some will be in friction, and all have political, economic and military dimensions. This thesis will attempt to classify and analyse the various American foreign policy schools of thought grappling with the post-Cold War era.

C) Operational Aspects of Schools of Thought Analysis

After generally delineating each school of thought in chapter 1, they will be further divided into majority and minority currents and sequentially analysed in chapters 2-4, in an attempt to add refinement and precision to schools of thought thinking that Schurmann's fine analysis lacked. While it is the basis of this thesis that it is extremely useful to analyse a school of thought as a coherent whole, a narrower level of analysis is also useful, looking at

majority and minority currents within each school of thought, before placing individual opinion-makers and decision-makers into the general schools of thought analysis. In looking at the schools of thought as a whole, it is important to keep in mind that not all positions are intellectually equidistant. Also, as will be shown, not all schools of thought currents have equal intellectual or political power. These factors should be kept in mind when comparing schools of thought (See Table 3).

In chapters 2-4, after delineating the broad range of givens underlying each school of thought and further dividing them into majority and minority currents (where minority currents exist), a school of thought's general policy preferences regarding large foreign policy issue areas of the day can be ascertained. After having discussed these general schools of thought policy preferences, it is possible to place specific individuals into both a general school of thought and a majority/minority current within the overall orientation.

To do so, it is necessary to look once again at the general schools of thought policy preferences regarding five important issue areas in the post-Cold War era, that have been discerned from analysis of the general givens underlying each school of thought, and compare them to individual opinion-makers' and decision-makers' policy preferences. If they broadly match the general schools of thought prescriptions (in this case 3 correlations out of 5 issue areas) the individual will be labelled as belonging to that particular school of thought. The general classification of each individual into the school of thought proposed here will not necessarily reflect the complete views of any single opinion-maker or decision-maker, as many espouse characteristics of more than one school of thought. Ultimately however, each actor will have one dominant orientation, and that is where he/she will be placed in the schools of thought model. However, in an effort to add further precision to this endeavour, an actor's minority views will also be classified. That is, if an opinion-maker or decision-maker has a significant schools of thought orientation that correlates to a general school of thought's cluster of policy preferences 2 out of 5 times, it will nevertheless be noted and analysed after the individual's majority schools of thought orientation is discussed. The examination of minority views adds needed precision to schools of thought analysis, reflecting the reality that rarely is an individual's belief system uniform.

How were opinion-makers chosen to be assessed in this thesis? Before this query can be answered, the concept of 'opinion-makers' must be further refined. Throughout this work, the term opinion-maker connotes a leading contributor to the print argument about the debate over America's role in the new world order. This definition thus allows a broad range of

individuals to be assessed using schools of thought analysis, a far wider range of actors than can be looked at after the term decision-maker is defined. This is methodologically as it should be for, unlike a decision-maker, an opinion-maker can have a wide range of occupational experience. For example, in this thesis, opinion-makers will be consultants, denizens of think-tanks, academics, columnists, and even a former President. The important point linking these disparate people is that they all write widely regarding the US position in the new era, and advocate discernible policy preferences. They are all extensively quoted, and are both the promulgators and popularisers of ideas. To some extent then, the individuals were chosen on the basis of the intellectual significance attached to them by both their peers and the informed public.

Opinion-makers are the first link in the schools of thought analysis chain. Many academics, opinion-makers and decision-makers would argue that analysing belief systems through the use of schools of thought analysis simply does not matter, as beliefs and ideas are not essential for understanding foreign policy formulation.¹¹⁹ It is a major 'given' of this thesis that ideas do matter, matter enormously, and that the theoretical underpinnings of schools of thought analysis is an ignored field. It is important for all who study International Relations, as even those who contend they have no theoretical underpinnings, unwittingly, by this stance, espouse theoretical underpinnings. As Robert Keohane sagely commented,

"As Keynes said in another context, practitioners are prisoners of 'academic scribblers', whose views of reality profoundly affect the contemporary actions of practical people. The choice for practitioners is not between being influenced by theory or examining each case 'on its merits': its rather between being aware of the theoretical basis for one's interpretation and action and being unaware of it."¹²⁰

As Althusser exhorted, one should not, "take an ideology's consciousness of itself for its essence."¹²¹ This holds true for schools of thought analysis as well. Almost all the decision-makers chronicled in this work would not classify their beliefs using schools of thought terminology, but that does not negate its existence and importance in analysing the foreign policy preferences of individual decision-makers, as well as its role in helping assess how overall American foreign policy outputs are arrived at. Thus a form of Mannheim's concept of 'false consciousness' is present. Just because decision-makers are not aware of schools of thought analysis and terminology, does not mean the processes it analyses are not real and important. Opinion-makers in this thesis, in line with Mannheim's belief that they are more likely to somehow transcend this 'false consciousness', are more likely to use schools of thought terminology and be aware of the processes involved in schools of thought analysis.¹²² A key given of this work then is that there are ongoing processes involved in

determining decision-makers' specific foreign policy prescriptions that are not recognised by most of those making these decisions.

The opinion-makers in this thesis are 'academic scribblers' who, by their advocacy of certain general ideas and specific policy preferences, influence the decision-makers who create foreign policy outputs. This process exists, whether admitted or not, and as all agree it is crucial to understand action (foreign policy outputs), so it is important to comprehend schools of thought analysis, a contributing variable to foreign policy inputs. This process begins with the opinion-makers. Keohane argued, "we must understand the context of action before we can understand the action itself."¹²³ Schools of thought analysis provides part of this context by assessing the sub-ideological orientations of opinion-makers who provide intellectual reference points for hard-pressed decision-makers.

Beyond this rather broad definition of 'opinion-maker', the individuals assessed were chosen impressionistically, based on the quantity of material available on each. Certainly there are many other relevant opinion-makers that could have been analysed as also contributing to the debate about America's role in the post-Cold War era. Before this project was attempted, one had little idea where most of the opinion-makers selected would fall within a schools of thought analysis.

The major flaw with the method used in this work to select the sample of opinion-makers for analysis is that it is quite small. While with the use of Allison's bureaucratic politics model for analysis of the decision-makers this is to be accepted, regarding the opinion-makers this is a limitation of the work. This stands to reason intuitively, as there are doubtless many more opinion-makers than decision-makers who actually affect US foreign policy outputs. Thus while methodologically the sample is secure in that all the individuals analysed are significant opinion-makers based on this thesis' definition of the term, a codicil must be placed after the results of this work's schools of thought analysis of the opinion-makers mentioned here. Whatever the outcome of the sample, schools of thought analysis must be further investigated with a larger opinion-makers' sample before its full efficacy can be conclusively illustrated.

In chapters 2-4, opinion-makers will be categorised using schools of thought analysis. But this is not sufficient. To understand foreign policy outputs, the factors of political power and electoral restraints that change, inhibit, and limit the role of a decision-maker's belief system must be explored. Chapters 5, 6, and 7 will do just this. The political variable must

be mixed with a decision-maker's general schools of thought orientation if foreign policy outputs are to be truly understood.

The Clinton administration's response to the Bosnian crisis will be analysed, in chapter 6, using schools of thought analysis. It was chosen because three of the five policy issue areas that were used in analysing general schools of thought policy prescriptions intersect in the Bosnian crisis. They are: the US response to the Bosnian crisis itself, American views and policy regarding Yeltsin's Russia, and US policy regarding the post-Cold War security structure in Western Europe. Earlier, in chapter 5, decision-makers' views on the three major American foreign policy issue-areas will be compared with general schools of thought policy preferences and the policy-makers will thus also be placed in a 'box' as opinion-makers were in chapters 2-4. However, in discerning the reason for American foreign policy initiatives it is important to also note the relative bureaucratic political power of the current foreign policy players regarding the Bosnian crisis. This will be done in chapter 7. It is this dichotomous process of discerning an actor's schools of thought orientation and his/her political and bureaucratic power within the American system, that leads to an enhanced understanding of US foreign policy outputs in the post-Cold War era.

The decision-maker sample was selected using the three principles earlier gleaned from Allison's bureaucratic politics model: 1) Does the individual hold a central position regarding foreign policy decision-making?; 2) Does the individual exhibit personal characteristics, such as closeness to the President or a widely acknowledged mastery of his/her brief which gives them influence in foreign policy decision-making?; 3) Does the individual exhibit ideological fervour regarding specific foreign policy issue-areas which makes him/her influential regarding these individual issues. For a decision-maker to be included in the sample, he/she had to exhibit at least one of these bureaucratic power variables.

Regarding the executive branch, most of the individuals selected were obvious choices. President Clinton, Secretary of State Christopher, Secretary of Defence Perry, and National Security Adviser Lake hold the four primary bureaucratic posts regarding foreign policy decision-making and thus are all analysed in this work. The inclusion of Strobe Talbott takes more of an explanation. While his position in the administration does not allow him to qualify for the sample as holding a central post regarding foreign policy decision-making, his personal relationship with President Clinton makes him far more bureaucratically powerful than the average Deputy Secretary of State. As Lane noted, "in the Clinton administration, Friends of Bill are usually more important than their bosses."¹²⁴ While this may be

overstating the case somewhat, there is no doubt that President Clinton values personal relationships in apportioning bureaucratic power even more highly than most chief executives. Thus his old Oxford room-mate Talbott qualifies for the sample as his very close personal relationship with the President makes him a formidable bureaucratic power.

It is more difficult to choose a decision-maker sample regarding foreign policy questions in the Congress. Although Congress has leadership positions, they matter less as determinants of bureaucratic power regarding overall foreign policy issues than in the executive branch. Foreign policy power in both chambers in the Congress is concentrated in the hands of a few individuals, due largely to the onerous task a legislator faces in becoming competent enough to vote on the wide range of issues that Congress attends to in a session.

As Lake cogently stated,

"No senator or representative can be personally engaged or even knowledgeable about the full range of foreign policy and domestic issues facing the nation, although some - like Lee Hamilton and Stephen Solarz - are leading authorities on the full range of American foreign policies. Most pick a few issues on which they try to be expert, and when required to vote on other issues tend to follow the lead of their best-informed ideological allies."¹²⁵

It is for this reason, the institutional processes at work in Congress itself, that schools of thought analysis has relevance for understanding the Congressional aspects of American foreign policy-making. The Congressional system means that leaders emerge on most issues, including foreign affairs, based on: their expertise regarding the issue (a variation of the second bureaucratic politics principle); the bureaucratic power the leader has within the Congress as an institution (a variation of the first bureaucratic politics criterion); his/her schools of thought orientation reflects the overall viewpoint of a number of less informed Senators or Congressmen (a variation of the third bureaucratic politics principle). While the political formula for gauging bureaucratic power is slightly different in the Congress than in the executive branch, it is merely a variation of the bureaucratic politics principles that determined the decision-maker sample in the executive branch. As such, as with the White House, for a Congressional actor to be included in the decision-maker sample he/she must exhibit one of the three general indicators of bureaucratic power, as the initial criteria fit similarly in both processes.

Three individuals are included in the decision-maker sample based on their bureaucratic power within Congress as an institution. Senators Bob Dole and George Mitchell were important actors in determining overall foreign policy stances of the Senate (and all other issues besides) by virtue of the fact that they were the Minority and Majority Leaders of the

upper chamber during the 103rd Congress. As Donovan observed, the Majority and Minority leaders have the practical power of control over their respective party's legislative agenda. The Majority Leader can keep the Senate in session, has the right to be recognised first on the Senate floor, and plots party strategy, determining legislative priorities for a party during the Congressional term.¹²⁶ The Minority Leader's powers parallel those of the Majority Leader in that he/she also charts his/her party's general legislative course. Thus both Dole and Mitchell directly affected foreign policy decision-making during the 103rd Congress.

Senator Biden also, by virtue of his bureaucratic position in the 103rd Congress, qualified for the decision-making sample. Regarding foreign policy power in Congress, as Olson noted, "The ultimate policy responsibility lies in [sic] the Foreign Relations Committee."¹²⁷ The committee is seen as the 'expert' Congressional opinion on foreign affairs, and thus greatly influences the full Senate as to its policy preferences. While Olson is correct, the power of the Foreign Relations Committee has lessened under the weak leadership of Claiborne Pell, who was Chairman between 1987-94.¹²⁸ It was the subcommittee chairmen of the Foreign Relations Committee who gained the power that Pell had so readily abdicated. As Politics in America wryly observed, in 1991, "Pell ceded much of his chairman's powers to more assertive subcommittee chairmanships. In effect, Pell joined in a coup against himself."¹²⁹ A result of this 'coup' was that for the first time, subcommittees were staffed independently of the full Foreign Relations Committee. Thus Senator Biden, as Chairman of the largely autonomous European Affairs Subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee, had more of a say over the legislative initiatives regarding the Bosnian crisis in the 103rd Congress than did Pell, even though the latter was Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee.

Senator Richard Lugar, Congressman Lee Hamilton, and then Minority Whip Newt Gingrich are all included in the decision-maker sample due to their personal expertise in mastering their respective legislative briefs. Both Lugar and Hamilton are well-known foreign policy leaders. The major reason for Lugar's leadership position is that he is seen as both a good Republican spokesman as well as being influential in forming Republican policies. Lugar is telegenic, being, "Well-spoken and comfortable on TV."¹³⁰ It is Lugar's almost unique versatility, as both initiator and public spokesman for Republican foreign policy positions, that is the main reason for his prominence in helping to set overall Congressional schools of thought stances in the new world order.

Likewise Hamilton is a respected foreign affairs leader in the Congress. He rose to prominence as the even-handed Chairman of the House Iran-Contra investigation, and has since preserved a bipartisan reputation for fairness. "Hamilton's judicious manner has earned him the reputation as one of the wise men of the House."¹³¹ By staying above the partisanship that has increasingly come to characterise the House, Hamilton has earned the respect of Congressmen from both parties, a respect he parleys into a bureaucratic position of influence, for his expertise is beyond dispute. Hamilton, like Lugar, is a leader on foreign policy issues because of his unique versatility. Hamilton's versatility is revealed by the fact that he is an expert across the wide path of International Relations, being knowledgeable about almost all the regions of the globe and regarding all the major foreign affairs issues, from arms control to debt relief.¹³² Hamilton's uniquely broad area of foreign policy competence has made him an unquestioned Congressional leader regarding American foreign policy decision-making.

The Minority Whip of the House during the 103rd Congress utilised a very different bureaucratic strategy than did Congressman Hamilton. In fact Newt Gingrich has come to exemplify the very notion of political partisanship. Yet even during the 103rd Congress, before his stunningly successful role as Republican architect of the 1994 mid-term elections led him to the Speaker's chair, Gingrich was already a force in every aspect of House business, including its limited role in foreign policy-making. Gingrich was a Congressional leader in that he led a new Republican faction in the House that was to radically alter the political equation of the Congress and thus affect its overall schools of thought orientation regarding foreign policy.

During the 103rd Congress, Gingrich advocated a major change in the parliamentary strategy for the Republicans in dealing with the majority Democrats in the House. Gingrich, "argued for years that ranking Republicans should fight Democratic bills, not try to compromise with them for a few crumbs in return."¹³³ Regarding foreign policy, this was a move away from the largely bipartisan ethos that had characterised legislative relations during the Cold War era. This more combative approach made Gingrich popular within the Republican party, whose increasingly partisan and confrontational stance reflected the then Minority Whip's rise to power in the House between 1989-1994. For though, "Gingrich was a surprise winner for minority whip in 1989, [yet] in not quite four years, members sharing his conservative ideology and combative approach were occupying almost all the House GOP leadership positions except Michel's."¹³⁴ (Bob Michel, a moderate Republican, was then the placatory House Minority Leader. He retired in 1994.) It is obvious that as Speaker

of the House, Gingrich will exert far more bureaucratic power regarding foreign affairs decision-making in the 104th Congress. Still, even while Minority Whip Gingrich had mastered his brief to the extent that it was obvious that he was behind significant ideological changes regarding Republicans in the House, and that he, and not Michel, was largely directing the Minority Party throughout the 103rd Congress. As such, Gingrich was a leader who affected Congress' overall schools of thought orientation regarding foreign policy.

It is important to acknowledge the limitations of schools of thought analysis. As was briefly mentioned, several of the opinion-makers and decision-makers do not fit perfectly into any one school of thought 'box'. This is true for a variety of reasons, but particularly because of the pragmatism that is so often seen as a principal characteristic of American foreign policy. It is possible to note that there is often a gap between rhetoric and reality in the conduct of American foreign policy. This pragmatism is partly due to the political constraints placed upon decision-makers, particularly elected decision-makers. As John Kennedy paraphrased Bismarck, politics is indeed the art of the possible. Electoral constraints help delineate which policies are impossible for political actors to implement, regardless of their desirability. This underlying reality is reflected in the problems created for schools of thought analysis in dealing with the differences between political rhetoric and policy realities.

A problem of using rhetoric to determine individual decision-makers' place in the analysis is that, for electoral reasons, most decision-makers generally favour all positive foreign policy outcomes, even if they know the outcomes come into conflict with each other or are not likely to be achieved. For instance, in the economic sphere politicians are apt to favour high growth rates and low inflation, a favourable balance of trade, and a strong currency rate, even though several of these processes tend to be in conflict, at least to an extent. This same all-things-to-all-people process can be seen in rhetoric surrounding foreign policy initiatives. While agreeing with Friedman and Karsh that, "despite the proclivity of those in public office to propoganda, rhetoric, chicanery, and lies, on the whole even they usually end up saying what they mean and meaning what they say,"¹³⁵ rhetoric alone is not sufficient to ascertain an individual actor's schools of thought orientation. Almost all foreign policy decision-makers in the US desire to promote democracy throughout the world, to protect US national interests, stop the appearance of a hegemonic rival, and foster world economic capitalisation. It is the way these goals are advanced, and most importantly, their priority vis-a-vis one another that helps determine foreign policy. It is this that makes a concentration on five specific issue areas in the post-Cold War world so valuable a part of the

schools of thought analysis. It is an analysis of specific prescriptions that is made with the notions of pragmatism and rhetoric being included in the overall foreign policy output. For example, while most policy-makers may favour both hounding China over its human rights abuses and expanding trade with Deng Xiaphong's government, the question over what to do about MFN with China makes the underlying priorities of these two goals evident, depending on the policy-maker's specific prescriptions. Thus it is by analysing the specific policy preferences of decision-makers relating to the five issue areas, that their genuine priorities and schools of thought orientation can be apprehended. Specific policies reflect a school of thought's prioritization of the above mentioned foreign policy benefits. The advocacy of specific policies removes the confusion rhetorical flourishes often bring to discerning an actor's genuine foreign policy priorities.

Yet despite pragmatic political considerations, rhetorical dangers, and the fact that in several instances decision-makers do not fit perfectly into any one school of thought, this analytical tool is still valuable in understanding how American foreign policy decisions are made. While it is true that if there are too many exceptions to general schools of thought precepts the categorisations cease to have meaning, a less than perfect 'fit' (at worst in this case three out of five policy prescriptions conforming to the school of thought's general view) does not negate the overall classification. There is a difference between acknowledging that a decision-maker's overall orientation is a major factor in foreign policy decision-making, and advocating a construct that becomes a deterministic, ideological strait-jacket. There are certainly other major factors in foreign policy decision-making that must be taken into account if the reasons for specific policy initiatives are to be understood. These include economic factors, the dynamic of domestic political struggles, cultural factors, and the nature of the international system, among others.

Yet a basic answer as to why this thesis is being written is that the overall orientation (school of thought) a decision-maker espouses has not been accorded sufficient weight in thinking about International Relations. Part of the purpose of this thesis is to raise the level of consciousness about the importance of this variable in the decision-making process. It is to see not only what are the specific orientations of certain individuals regarding foreign policy schools of thought, but also to determine to what extent it is useful to put decision-makers into a general schools of thought classification system that gives this process meaning. Understanding the importance an individual's adherence to a foreign policy school of thought plays in decision-making is not to see this variable as the be all and end all, but as an important and undervalued component in the foreign policy decision-making process.

Undoubtedly, the schools of thought variable matters in analysing foreign policy outputs. It is also a necessary tool needed in order to examine what the overarching American foreign policy precepts will be in the new era, as Schurmann has shown that belief orientations are crucial building blocks in analysing this process. As Schurmann noted, bureaucracies represent interests which often have a collective orientation. Ultimately, as Schurmann showed was the case after 1945, the dominant new 'voice' in American foreign policy could either be a new intellectual construct, though undoubtedly it would be a hybrid of today's schools of thought, or the new era could be dominated by one distinctive, already discernible school of thought. Either way, the schools of thought variable is a notion worth keeping. The outcome of the current foreign policy debate will likely be some type of schools of thought synthesis of current foreign policy options, around which bipartisan support can coalesce. The academic argument now raging about the American role in the post-Cold War order¹³⁶ and its general foreign policy goals, partly based on schools of thought disputes, far from being esoteric, will be played out in the corridors of power and will help determine US foreign policy well into the next century. Chapter 6 will examine this process in action, relating it to the Clinton administration's policy toward Bosnia. This thesis will contend that schools of thought can be established in post-Cold War American foreign policy and that knowledge of this decision-making variable is important in understanding the Clinton administration's foreign policy outputs.

What good does it do to place people into a schools of thought 'box'? By doing so, one is able to say what they believe in, what their general foreign policy preferences are in the post-Cold War era, and most importantly, what, in general, are the theoretical 'givens' they used to arrive at their specific policy prescriptions. The schools of thought variable provides part of the answer to the crucial question, Why? In this case, why do decision-makers believe what they do, and how do these beliefs affect foreign policy formulation? Once again, it is in linking the schools of thought givens to specific policies and policy-makers that gives this process meaning. Also by 'boxing' noted opinion-makers and decision-makers, it is easier to compare their general foreign policy formulations, and more importantly, to examine and contrast the schools of thought givens that provide each policy-maker with a prism of perception, a general way of viewing the world, whether they acknowledge it or not.¹³⁷

There are three primary differentiating embarkation points for studying the current three schools of thought in American foreign policy. Firstly, the three schools of thought

orientations roughly relate to different political groupings, with the neo-realists being primarily Republican, the institutionalists - Democrats, and the democratists - neoconservatives in both parties. Secondly, regarding priorities, each has a different primary foreign policy goal. The democratists see the promotion of democracy around the world as central to their thinking, while neo-realists wish to protect and further the American national interest, whereas institutionalists feel the promotion of capitalism around the globe should be the central factor determining America's post-Cold War foreign policy. Thirdly, these differences in priorities are matched by a fundamental conflict between all three major schools of thought over what should be the primary level of analysis used in studying global conditions. Democratists feel a state's policy is moved primarily by domestic concerns, neo-realists feel systemic factors and balance of power considerations are central, and institutionalists believe the workings of the international economy are the prime determinant of a state's foreign policy. As this thesis will illustrate, from these different general priorities and levels of analysis shall flow distinctive schools of thought, which will lead to policy-makers having very different ways of looking at the world if they fail to share a similar schools of thought orientation. From here, it follows that general, broad differences over policy are likely to emerge.

The democratists are the first major school of thought broadly examined in this chapter, and will be examined in detail in chapter 2. Among primary democratist adherents are Strobe Talbott and George Mitchell. They fundamentally believe that states that are democracies share certain universal values and that these like values have, rather conclusively, prevented intra-democratic warfare. As Michael Doyle observed, "even though liberal states have become involved in numerous wars with nonliberal states, constitutionally secure liberal states have yet to engage in war with one another."¹³⁸ For example, despite having varied national interests, democratists point out that all the democratic states ended up on the same side in both World Wars. As democratists believe that democratic states always have essentially peaceful relations with one another, the successful expansion of democracy is, for democratists, nothing less than the cornerstone for building real peace in the world. Democratists shun the fashionable view of cultural relativism. They do not see democracy as ultimately having cultural limits, or being innately alien to certain civilisations. Democratists have a predilection to extrapolate their global beliefs directly and exclusively from the American experience. Like Thomas Paine, they feel the world can be largely remade in America's image.

So how do these general democratist 'givens' relate to policy preferences? Using the case of aid options to Russia exposes a situation where all three schools of thought share broadly complementary policy preferences. All wish to aid President Yeltsin and further democratisation in Russia. But even in this case, where schools of thought policy prescriptions at least partly coincide, there is a marked difference of degree in the enthusiasm for Russian reform between the three schools of thought. For democratists, the Russian democratic experiment is a key concern. They see the success of Yeltsin as essential for the continued flourishing of democracy throughout all of the former USSR and Eastern Europe. It is their highest issue area priority. As Richard Nixon, an avid adherent of large-scale support for Russia, stated, "As Russia goes, so will go the other republics. If reform fails there, it will fail everywhere. If it succeeds there, others will follow."¹³⁹ Democratists see Russia as a democratic catalyst, both due to its power and its example. For democratists, above all else, Yeltsin must remain as President, as he currently embodies democracy in Russia. Unlike the institutionalists, democratists believe a strategy of extreme economic deprivation being used to thrust Russia into the capitalist world must go if it becomes so unpopular as to lead to the threat of revolution. Likewise, the West should give Russia large-scale aid, both bilaterally and through the International Monetary Fund (IMF), even if it does not meet the economic criteria usually necessary for such loans. This general cluster of policy preferences reflects democratism's key concern being political rather than economic factors (a democratist given). Democratists want the West to give more aid to Russia than do neo-realists or institutionalists, and above all want to promote Yeltsin's democratic regime, whatever its economic policies. Democratists believe it may take many years for a genuine market economy to develop in Russia, and see that if in the meantime Russia becomes a genuine democracy the world will be a far better place. Why do they take this view? A core democratist tenet is that democracies do not go to war with one another. This basic democratist 'given' is at the root of its general policy preference of full-fledged support for Russian political reforms. Democratists feel that as Russia has had no stable democratic government for 1000 years, the US should try to take advantage of the current propitious, if perilous situation.

The neo-realists are the second major school of thought to be analysed, and will be examined in detail in chapter 3. Leading neo-realist decision-makers include: Bob Dole, Newt Gingrich, Richard Lugar, and Joseph Biden. They believe that the ambiguous concept of the national interest should be the defining principle of American foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. Neo-realists posit an anarchic international system where states view one another positionally and thus relatively. A main neo-realist goal is for the US to prevent the

emergence of a hegemonic rival. They see foreign policy outputs as dominated by balance of power considerations. Neo-realists see the promotion of a state's immediate, selfish interests as the supreme goal in foreign policy. Unlike democratists, neo-realists see no natural allies, only natural interests. Ultimately, the only end for neo-realism is the practical consideration of a state's survival. A sober evaluation of American national interests must always be the yardstick by which neo-realists believe all specific US policy options should be measured.

Unlike democratists, neo-realists believe all nations have fundamentally different values. If democratism is a universalist creed, neo-realism is very much a nationalist school of thought. Power is seen as relative and the key to survival in the Hobbesian jungle. Neo-realists feel that for a state to feel itself successful, by definition, it must be more successful than others. Neo-realists value tangible power components, such as geopolitical and military power, over intangible variables, such as ideological influence, in the overall equation of power. The national interest is at least partly determined for neo-realists by a state's structural position in the international system, as well as the structural nature of the world system, its polarity, itself. Unlike democratists, neo-realists feel the permanence of geography outweighs any values states may transiently share.

The neo-realists' general cluster of policy preferences toward Yeltsin's Russia also, as with democratism, follows from its 'givens'. Regarding Yeltsin's survival, neo-realists want to hedge their bets, giving the Russians some limited aid due to its being an important state, while also bolstering the states surrounding Russia as insurance should it again become expansionistic. This use of the balance of power, a key neo-realist tenet, leads neo-realists to advocate giving increased aid to Eastern Europe and Ukraine, in an effort to 'balance' them against a possibly resurgent Russia. For example, in an effort to buttress Eastern Europe, neo-realists advocate quickly admitting the Poles, Czechs, and the Hungarians into Nato. Unlike the democratists, neo-realists do not greatly care about the political nature of the Russian regime, as for them Russia's geopolitical position is far more important in analysing Russian foreign policy outputs. For example, neo-realists are more cheered by the historical fact that Russia and America (with the possible exception of half-hearted American intervention in the Russian Civil War) never engaged in martial conflict than by the fact that Yeltsin is a democrat. For neo-realists the historical sign that Russian and American interests are not necessarily incompatible is more important than the character of the present Russian government.

Thus, neo-realists are nowhere nearly as enthusiastic about the possibilities of a stable, democratic Russia emerging as are democratists. Pessimism towards Russia's democratic chances is another reason neo-realists advocate increased aid and security offers to the former Soviet satrapies of Eastern Europe. They want the Clinton administration to be tougher with the Yeltsin regime about its increasingly adventurous policies toward its 'near abroad'. Neo-realists fear the recurring threat of Russian expansionism and want to focus American efforts more on protecting and stabilising East-Central Europe, the Baltic states, and Ukraine, rather than overemphasising the long-term chances of democratic success in Russia.

The third general school of thought, the institutionalists, believe that the increased capitalisation of the world should be the central priority of US foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. Leading institutionalist adherents include President Clinton, Warren Christopher, William Perry, Anthony Lake, and Lee Hamilton. Institutionalists assume capitalist states generally share common interests. Prosperous states are seen as less likely to threaten the international order than are impoverished rogue states, who have no stake in maintaining such an order. Unlike the neo-realists, the institutionalists view absolute rather than relative economic success as crucial. Multilateral institutions such as the Gatt, the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the European Union (EU), the IMF and the World Bank are seen as the cornerstone for facilitating the world system. Unlike democratism and neo-realism, institutionalism has no minority currents. For institutionalists, free trade is the key to fostering global economic prosperity and political stability. As President Clinton stated, "The habits of commerce run counter to the habits of war...People who raise each others living standards are less likely to become combatants."¹⁴⁰ Institutionalists believe that in promoting capitalism, they will stoke the central engine that propels the motive force of history. This is because institutionalists feel the expansion of capitalism will lead those who adopt it to evolve into more open societies. It thus comes as little surprise that for institutionalists the key analytical orientation for viewing international relations is the study of the economic variable in the overall equation of power.

Institutionalists believe that the pre-eminence of the economic variable in the overall equation of power can be seen in the economic effect on a democratic state's domestic politics. The political truism has long been acknowledged that domestic economic concerns in democratic societies almost always outweigh military and international concerns for the electorate. Thus, to win reelection, a political decision-maker must put domestic economic concerns in a central position in his/her conduct of policy. For institutionalists, economic considerations largely determine political outcomes in most democratic states. To halt

American decline, brought about in their eyes by economic stagnation, institutionalists urge the US to engage in multilateralism in conducting foreign policy. To avoid permanent decline, institutionalists believe America needs an era of intense domestic focus and reform, thus collective security and increased reliance on International Organisations, such as Nato and the UN, are essential to preserve some sort of order in the international system. Due to its decline, institutionalists acknowledge that America cannot expect to have the same influence in multilateral institutions that it once had, and must learn to function in a more collective decision-making process regarding foreign policy than was necessary during the Cold War. This belief in a fundamental change in the nature of the international system with the end of the Cold War is a core institutionalist tenet. Not only do institutionalists see an America in decline, they also believe that the relative power of the state itself is decreasing in the international arena as more nonstate actors, such as International Organisations (IOs) and Multinational Corporations (MNCs), gain a degree of power at the international level.

Regarding Russia, institutionalists are for more of an effort being made to bolster Yeltsin than the neo-realists advocate, but believe less effort should be expended than democratists favour. Institutionalists believe that foreign aid to Russia should be co-ordinated by multilateral institutions like the IMF and World Bank. They feel it is essential to engage Russia in the Western economic community, and strongly favour attempting to find ways to extend East-West trade rather than simply providing Russia with foreign aid. Unlike democratists, institutionalists want no easing of economic stringency to hasten the Russian transition to capitalism. Like the neo-realists, they believe that the IMF should employ the usual strict loan conditions on Russia it generally demands. Institutionalists believe that without Russia undergoing a painful, radical restructuring of its economy, for example using IMF funds to float the ruble rather than immediately providing the Russian people with cheaper consumer goods, it will not be able to trade with the West and thus its situation will stagnate or worsen, and its democratic reforms will be doomed.

Implicit in this institutionalist policy preference is its general economics-first policy predilection. Underlying institutionalists' general Russian policy is their belief that increased capitalisation is essential for the improvement of global conditions. Regarding Russia, institutionalists believe that if it is successful in its market reforms, it will gradually but inevitably become a more open and peaceful society. It will be more peaceful as increased economic prosperity will give Russia a greater stake in the emerging international order. It will become more open as institutionalists believe certain qualities of mind are essential for the running of a successful capitalist society. These include the ability to take risks, to think

for oneself, and to innovate. In short, these traits all require a fairly open society. Institutionalists believe that authoritarian states with successful capitalist economies will become less politically rigid over time. They point to the example of South Korea, which after undergoing a capitalist transformation, increasingly became more politically open until today it is a democratic state. In complete contradiction to the democratists, institutionalists believe the openness of the Russian economy, and not the immediate openness of Yeltsin's government, is the crucial first step towards modernisation and then democracy itself.

With the passing of the Cold War, it is evident that the US needs to establish new overall guiding principles for the conduct of foreign policy. Schools of thought analysis provides the building blocks needed to analyse how this process will evolve. It is a useful tool for relating theory to political processes. Schools of thought analysis helps explain the intellectual context of decision-makers' policy preferences, and helps to answer the crucial question, which is why certain policy-makers hold specific policy positions. Schools of thought analysis is an attempt to both classify and understand the intellectual nature of the post-Cold War era, and through this process, to begin to apprehend the contours of the strange new era we find ourselves in.

Table 1 - Schurmann's Currents of Cold War American Foreign Policy
 (Inspired by Franz Schurmann's, The Logic of World Power)

CURRENT	TEND IN CRISIS	PRIMARY AREA OF CONCERN	BUREAUCRATIC BASTION	KEY CONCERN	PROGRAM	SYMBOL
Nationalists	War	US	Military	National Interest	Asia - First	Taft
Imperialists (The Dominant Current)	Cold War	Free World	Presidency	National Security	Containment	Truman
Internationalists	Peaceful Coexistence	Universalists	State Department	International Economy	Europe - First	Wallace

In Asia during the Cold War, US foreign policy was either Imperialist or Nationalist;
 in Europe, either Imperialist or Internationalist.

Table 2 - Currents Relating to American Political Parties
 (Inspired by Franz Schurmann, The Logic of World Power)

REPUBLICANS
 -Party of the affluent
 -Party of Interests

	<u>'LIBERALS'</u>	<u>'CONSERVATIVES'</u>
GEOGRAPHICAL STRONGHOLD	EAST COAST ORIENTED	WEST AND SOUTH
SPECIFIC INTERESTS	INTERNATIONAL BIG BUSINESS	SMALL BUSINESS
ECONOMIC VALUES	COMMITTED TO FREE ENTERPRISE BUT COGNIZANT OF THE NEED FOR FEDERAL SPENDING	OPPOSE TAXATION, INCOME REDISTRIBUTION COMMITTED TO MILITARY AND POLICE POWER TO PROTECT WEALTH AND PRIVILEGE
COLD WAR POLICY	BIPARTISAN CONTAINMENT	ROLLBACK
POLITICAL ACTORS	WILKIE, DEWEY, EISENHOWER, ROCKEFELLAR, BUSH	MACARTHUR, DULLES, GOLDWATER, TAFT, REAGAN
SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT ORIENTATION	IMPERIALIST	NATIONALIST

Table 3 - Current American Foreign Policy Schools of Thought

	Democratists	Neo-Realists	Institutionalists
Goal	Promote Democracy	Promote National Interests, stop appearance of a hegemonic rival.	Promote economic liberalism through international institutions.
Declinist/Triumphalist	Triumphalist	Declinist	Declinist
Schurmann Code	NATIONALIST/ IMPERIALIST	IMPERIALIST/ NATIONALIST	INTERNATIONALIST
Assume	Democracies have common values (i.e. democracies do not go to war with one another).	Nations have fundamentally different values. International Relations is a zero-sum game.	Capitalist states are inherently linked and have common interests. Multilateral institutions are the cornerstone for facilitating the world system.
Policy toward Russia	Large-scale aid	Aid, but not large-scale	Aid mainly through IOs. Continue shock therapy.
Variations within the currents	HYPER-DEMOCRATISTS/ MODERATE DEMOCRATISTS The difference is in degree but it is qualitative.	REALIST- INTERNATIONALISTS/ REALIST-ISOLATIONISTS. The difference is vast, yet the same ideological roots.	NO MINORITY CURRENT
Academics	Allison, Wattenberg	Kissinger, Buchanan	Nye, Keohane
Political Actors	Neoconservatives	DoD, CIA, Republican Party	Democratic Party Presidency
Level of Analysis	Domestic Concerns	Systemic Factors, Balance of Power Considerations	International Economy

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Chapter 2: The Democratists

Chart 2-1: The Belief System of the Democratists

- 1) Background: Kant
- 2) Goal: Promote Global Democracy
- 3) Assume: Liberal democracies have common values. Liberal democracies do not go to war with one another. Democracy is a universalist creed and is ultimately universally applicable. (Increasing world contact brought about by the telecommunications revolution is seen as culturally unifying and encouraging a global trend towards democracy.)
Democracy leads to economic liberalism, not vice-versa.
- 4) See state: Run primarily by internal politics/bureaucratic politics.
- 5) Key analytical orientation: Political, ideological.
- 6) Declinist/Revivalist: Revivalist
- 7) World Structure: Unipolar
- 8) Preferred mode of action: US-dominated multilateral force. Unilateral action to be taken if necessary.
- 9) Basis of force: Organisations like Nato.
- 10) World Policeman: US, with like-minded states.
- 11) Key areas and foci: Newly democratic states of Eastern Europe and especially Russia; human rights.

- 12) Schurmann classification: Mix of Imperialists and Nationalists (especially in Asia).
- 13) General political supporters: Neoconservatives
- 14) Political actors: Former Senator Mitchell, Deputy Secretary of State Talbott.
- 15) Bureaucratic bastions of support: Think-tanks, lower levels of the State Department.
- 16) Policy cluster preference towards Western Europe/European defencesystem: Pro-European integration, especially pro-Nato. Do not see a politically integrated Europe as threatening, due to shared values. (i.e. There is no need to fear the Germans.) Favour US dominated Nato. An extension of Nato is not to be advocated, due to concerns about Russia. Want Nato to engage in out-of-area missions.
- 17) Policy cluster preference towards Bosnia: Interventionist; Favour lifting of embargo and Nato bombing raids to bolster Bosnian government, even advocating limited US military involvement on the Muslim side of the conflict.
- 18) Policy cluster preference towards Trade (Nafta and Gatt): Generally favour, but not a priority.
- 19) Policy cluster preference towards Russia: Strongly for large-scale aid, as it is a chief area of concern.

- 20) Policy cluster preference towards China: Hard-line (no MFN, or MFN with strict conditions.)
- 21) Academics: Wattenberg - Hyper-democratist; Muravchik and Allison - Moderate Democratists; Fukuyama - Moderate democratist with a neo-realist minority.
- 22) Variations within the school of thought: HYPER-DEMOCRATIST (Minority)/ MODERATE DEMOCRATIST (Majority); difference is in degree but it is important.

This chapter is devoted in detail to the democratists, one of the three major schools of thought in the post-Cold War era. It is necessary at this point to briefly delineate the assumptions underlying chapters 2, 3 and 4. These chapters will illustrate the contention that these over-arching views usually lead to specific policy clusters on the central foreign policy issues confronting America in the new world order.

Central here is the notion of praxis, as described by Zbigniew Brzezinski, the idea that theory (ideas) lead to action (policies).¹ The belief in the validity of this notion is the unspoken assumption undergirding the next three chapters. After outlining the general schools of thought in chapters 2, 3 and 4, chapters 5 and 6 will be a study of specific policies affected by decision-makers in the Clinton administration, showing that their general belief structures lead to the positions they stake out policy-wise.

At a certain level of generality nearly everyone agrees with the general goals of all three schools of thought. Almost all the foreign policy decision-makers in the US desire to promote democracy throughout the world, protect the national interest, stop the appearance of a hegemonic rival, and promote world economic liberalism. It is in the way these goals are advanced, their rationales, and their priority however, that determines specific policy. Then, it is only in specific policies and policy-making, that the individual priorities and general orientation of policy-makers can be deduced. After outlining the theoretical precepts that underline the democratist position, this chapter will conclude by generally describing the general democratist policy position towards aid to Russia, relations with China, and noting democratist views toward trade, Bosnia, and Western Europe.

The democratist creed claims the German philosopher Kant as its father. In Perpetual Peace, written in 1795, Kant stated that a league of democratic states was the key to universal peace. The simple, overriding priority of the democratists is to promote democratic movements around the globe. As Ben J. Wattenberg, a hyper-democratist, stated in his book, The First Universal Nation, published in 1991, "Americans have a missionary streak and democracy is our mission."² For democratists, the advocacy of democracy combines the idealism of Wattenberg's statement with the practicality of another democratist's viewpoint. Writing in Foreign Affairs, Graham Allison noted, "America's interests clearly require that it support and speak out on behalf of democratic change."³ Democratists fundamentally believe that American geopolitical and strategic interests are best served by the encouraging and nurturing of like-minded democratic states around the globe.

There are four underlying assumptions behind democratism. Firstly, democratists assume all democracies share basic common values. Among these are: respect for the individual and individual freedoms, governments having limited power, political pluralism, and free and regular elections.⁴ It is these common democratic values that are the essential reason for the democratists' strongest assumption, that is the second assumption, namely that liberal democracies do not go to war with one another. As Francis Fukuyama stated in The New Republic, "those that disrespect the rights of their own citizens are much more likely to disrespect the rights of neighboring states as well."⁵ This is the common sense basis to democratism, that the internal nature of a state is an essential guide to its external behaviour. Further, that as Michael Doyle noted in his seminal democratist piece, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs Part 1," published in the summer of 1983, "even though liberal states have become involved in numerous wars with nonliberal states, constitutionally secure liberal states have yet to engage in war with one another."⁶ (Emphasis added). This is a bold assertion, and is the single most important point in the democratist case.

It can be disputed. Peru and Ecuador were both democracies when they went to war in the 19th century. The Nixon administration certainly played a role in the toppling of the democratically elected government of Allende in Chile in the early 1970s. Even Wilhelmine Germany was a semi-democratic state with its Reichstag immediately prior to World War I. Yet the farfetchedness of these counter-examples and their paucity, simply serve to highlight how strong a case the democratists have on this issue. Peru and Ecuador were both nascent democracies when they went to war, neither having a strong democratic tradition. The Nixon administration helped topple Allende by means of covert operations. Given the climate

engendered by the Vietnam War, it is highly unlikely that at that time the US could have sustained a prolonged, public war with another democratic state. Finally, while Whilhelmine Germany was an evolving constitutional monarchy over domestic issues, foreign affairs were still very much the preserve of the Kaiser and factions of the army in the early 20th century. So while one can quibble, Doyle's general point seems beyond dispute.

Nor is this truism known only to theoreticians. Andrei Kozyrev, Yeltsin's former reformist foreign minister, is quoted expressing democratist sentiments in Brzezinski's Foreign Affairs article, "Selective Global Commitment." He said, "The main thing is that the Western countries are pluralistic democracies. Their governments are under the control of legal public institutions, and this practically rules out the pursuance of an aggressive foreign policy. In the system of Western states...the problem of war has essentially been removed."⁷ For a democratist, not only does democracy lead to an absence of war with other democratic states, a state's democratic orientation overrides all of the other major variables in the state system. Michael Doyle noted, "politically more significant, perhaps, is that when states are forced to decide by the pressure of an impinging world war, on which side of the world contest they will fight, liberal states wind up all on the same side, despite the real complexity of the historical, economic and political factors that affect their foreign policies."⁸ For a democratist, other factors do not obviate the key determinant of a state's behaviour in the international arena; whether it is (or is not) a democracy. Democratists then, as Doyle points out, believe world peace is inevitable if and when all of the states of the world are democratic. Thus US policy should simply be to encourage and enlarge the world's democratic zone.

The third basic democratist assumption is that there is a link between democracy and the free market, but not necessarily vice-versa. While some economically liberal states, such as Malaysia, Singapore and Taiwan have not become truly democratic while evolving into capitalist states, never has a truly democratic state been economically anything other than a member of the capitalist world. Wattenberg stated simply the general development formula for democratists, "Liberty yields peace, and peace yields prosperity, in exactly that sequence. Elections come first."⁹ For democratists, the stability engendered by the rule of the people is essential to long-term economic success. Tommy Thong-Bee Koh stated, "One of the prerequisites of economic growth is political stability and this is more likely to occur with a government elected by the people."¹⁰ This legitimacy and stability is especially necessary if governments such as those in recently democratised Eastern Europe, have to adopt severe and universally unpopular austerity measures. As The Economist illustrated, "in the Eastern

European countries that have pushed inflation below 50% a year, democratic legitimacy enabled governments to pursue unpopular reforms."¹¹ The popular, personal moral authority of Walesa, Havel, and to a lesser extent, Yeltsin, enabled their reformist efforts to endure the immediate unpopularity of necessary austerity measures. Democratists believe the causation here is one-sided. While democracy may enhance the stability necessary for free market success and protect newly-capitalising states from revolution, the urge for democracy is seen as emanating from non-economic sources. Fukuyama argued, "economic development is neither a sufficient nor a necessary cause of democracy. While democracy can best arise under certain economic conditions, it must be desired for essentially non-economic reasons."¹² This belief is in direct contradiction to that of the institutionalists, who see democracy as being largely the result of a developing free market society. (Witness the differences these two neo-Wilsonian schools of thought have over American policy towards China). In fact, even when democratists doubt the short-term efficacy of economic liberalism, as Bruce Ackerman did in Russia, democracy is seen as an achievable goal. He felt, "it will take decades to create a functioning market system, during which [time] revolutionary leaders inevitably dissipate their popular authority. Before that happens, a window of opportunity remains open, during which leaders can gain popular consent to break the hold of communist constitutionalism on the rule of law."¹³ Clearly for democratists establishing democratic institutions takes priority over the free market, desirable though this latter element is judged to be.

The fourth and final precept of democratism is that not only do all democracies espouse universal values, democracy itself is seen to be universally applicable. Democratists shun the fashionable view of cultural relativism. As Allison stated, "[I] don't agree with arguments about the moral or practical equivalency of political systems."¹⁴ Democratists do not see their creed as having cultural limitations, or being ideologically alien to certain civilisations. Even the neo-realist, Samuel Huntington, stated, "some support undoubtedly exists in almost every society for liberty, equality, democracy, and the rights of the individual."¹⁵ When democratists see newly democratic states struggling to succeed, such as the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, they see a continuation of the struggle of Washington, Jefferson and Adams. Jeane Kirkpatrick illustrated this democratist phenomenon. She stated, "I believe Eastern Europeans have developed a passionate appreciation for limited government, not unlike the passionate appreciation for limited government felt by the American founding fathers."¹⁶ This democratist predilection to extrapolate from the American experience was also shrewdly noted by Stanley Hoffmann in January 1968. Even then he argued that, "Americans, whose history is a success story, tend to believe that the values that arise from

their experience are of universal applicability."¹⁷ Democratists believe, as the American patriot Thomas Paine did 200 years ago, the world can indeed be remade in America's image.¹⁸

Institutionalists would disagree about the universal applicability of democracy, as well as over causation regarding democratic and free market development. However, the two schools of thought both see the internal workings of the state as being a key determinant of its actions on the international stage. Hoffmann, an institutionalist, stated, "foreign policy today is...largely shaped by domestic demands and expectations."¹⁹ For democratists, it is logical that as their focus is on the democratic nature of a regime, a state's internal political character is seen to be analytically crucial. The two neo-Wilsonian schools of thought differ from the views of the neo-realists over the matter of the crucial primary level of analysis in international relations. Michael Doyle interestingly illuminates this notion, through use of the old neo-realist staple game, 'the prisoner's dilemma.' The game is crucial to neo-realists as it is supposed to point out that uncertainty and anarchy lead each 'prisoner' (state) to pursue its own limited self-interest in order to attain the best (or in the case of the game, the assured, but second-best) outcome. Doyle turns the game on its head and in so doing highlights the democratists' key belief that a state's actions can only truly be understood by analysis at the domestic level. "The 'prisoners' are presumed to be felonious, unrelated except by their partnership in crime, and lacking in mutual trust - competitive nation-states in an anarchic world. A similar game between fraternal or sorroral twins - Kant's republics - would be likely to lead to different results."²⁰ For democratists, intentions and not capabilities are crucial. This flies directly in the face of the neo-realist belief that decision-makers should evaluate capabilities over intentions. Democratists, valuing intentions and domestic analysis, would point out that the US does not fear France or Britain, although both have a nuclear capability because their domestic orientation and history point to their pacific intentions.

Likewise the democratist analytical orientation differs greatly from the other two schools of thought. Whereas neo-realists particularly value the military component of the overall power equation and institutionalists heavily weight economic factors, democratists particularly stress the political and ideological components of power. As Richard Nixon pointed out, American influence, "stems not only from our military and economic power but also from the enormous appeals or our ideals and our example."²¹ Fukuyama's critique of the neo-realist concept of the national interest is a good example of the strong democratist weighting of the ideological component of power. He argued, "threat perception and concepts of national interest aren't objective conditions established by the international

system, but are dictated by ideology."²² Democratists thus see ideology, not some sort of concrete national interest, as a primary part of the motive force of history. Indeed Allison defines American national security, the ultimate yardstick of 'national interests', as largely protection of American intangible benefits. "America's basic national security objective has remained unchanged for four decades: to preserve the US as a free nation with its fundamental institutions and values intact."²³ These values are now seen by democratists to be not only safe but also expanding their influence throughout the world.

Wattenberg, as always, is one of democratism's strongest cultural cheerleaders. He enthused, "We have sought to boost a community of ideas - political democracy, free market economics, and science and technology. These days those values are advancing, not eroding."²⁴ US dominance in the area of ideas is of great importance to democratists, and helps explain the triumphalist nature of the school of thought. As Wattenberg stated, "never has the culture of one nation been so far-flung and potent."²⁵ Democratists see the continued spread of American culture and democratic ideals as the best general policy to follow in the new world order. For democratists the spread of democracy can only be ensured through continued American leadership in global affairs. Democratism is an involved, interventionist, internationalist creed. Former President Nixon urged just such a leadership role. He felt that the world, "needs our [US] leadership in the critical area of ideas."²⁶ Democratism is a recipe for a vigorous American involvement in the world.

Triumphalism then is the democratists' response to the declinist/revivalist debate. Of the four major opinion-makers labelled in this thesis as democratists (Allison, Fukuyama, Muravchik and Wattenberg) all are revivalists, regardless of what type of democratist they are. There is an obvious link between democratism's triumphalism and revivalism, and the urging of an aggressive interventionist foreign policy. This illustrates an overarching point of the thesis: intellectual analysis of the American structural position in the world largely determines policy prescription. As democratists are unambiguously up-beat about both the state of the US and its global structural position, it is logical they should be so missionary, so interventionist. Ironically, to paraphrase Khrushchev, democratists believe that 'history is on our side'. Fukuyama stated, "the single most remarkable macropolitical phenomenon of the past generation has been the global crisis of authoritarianism, and the spread of liberal democracies in its wake."²⁷ He pointed out that democracies have increased in number from 3 in 1790, 13 in 1900, 27 in 1919, to 62 today. Not only have democratic states emerged, Fukuyama believes that democracy's rivals such as fascism and communism have all largely self-destructed. "All of the major systematic alternatives to liberal democracy have collapsed,

one by one. This, and the resulting homogeneity of world politics forces us to once again take up the study of democracy as the central issue of any true political science."²⁸

The implosion of the Soviet Union is seen by democratists as a golden opportunity to further the historical trend. Wattenberg put it bluntly, "the collapse of the Soviet Union makes it easier for us to support democracies everywhere."²⁹ A unique feature of democratism is that its adherents see the new global structure as the result of this dual process, democratic values being increasingly embraced whilst all other major ideological alternatives are being discredited. Allison, as with so many other democratists, sees in this process the unique triumph of the United States. "Life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness - in the wake of the Cold War and hot battle America's goals in the Declaration of Independence now seem ascendent around the globe...The political values of freedom and market inspire the world."³⁰ The democratist analysis of the post-Cold War world as being increasingly favourable for America explains their desire to aggressively promote democracy.

Democratists see the world structure as unipolar, unlike their neo-realist and institutionalist counterparts. None more adheres to this view than Charles Krauthammer. He argued, "There is but one first-rate power and no prospect in the immediate future of a power to rival it."³¹ This democratist assertion is based on their argument that the US is the only state in the world with a multidimensionality of power. As Nixon noted, "Today, as the only nation that possesses global economic, military and political power, the US stands at the apex of its political power."³² As the US is the only genuine great power in the world, democratists believe that American policy will thus largely determine the type of world order that emerges.

When obligated to use force or to come to grips with a crucial issue, democratists would ideally like the US to be part of an American-dominated multilateral force. Democratists believe that such a situation occurred in the Gulf War. Fukuyama said, "the UN served merely as window dressing for US unilateralism during the Gulf crisis and would have been impotent were it not for US leadership...collective action through the UN is not an alternative but a complement to American leadership. It is foolish to think, however, that action through the UN can substitute for American leadership when even bodies of like-minded states such as Nato and the EC have had trouble making tough decisions."³³

Unlike institutionalists, democratists see the UN as a multilateral cloak obscuring American unilateralism. Here, Krauthammer agreed with Fukuyama, arguing that Iraqis

"charge that the entire multilateral apparatus established in the gulf by the US is but a transparent cover for what is essentially an American challenge to Iraqi regional hegemony. But of course."³⁴ For democratists, multilateralism provides a useful diplomatic facade, but should never be confused with the real motive force of international relations in the new world order, American unilateralism. Democratists see the UN as a sometimes useful tool of American policy, but never as an international power in its own right. Here they differ greatly with the institutionalists, who see the renewed efficacy of the UN as a sign of a new order. The UN, with its bloated bureaucracy, lack of an enforcement mechanism (army), security council vetoes, and cacophony of voices, is seen as far too unwieldy to be a power unto itself. It is US leadership of like-minded democratic states that must form the focus of international power in the new world order. When consensus among even such like-minded states is impossible, democratists have a clear prescription, unilateralism. As Krauthammer posited, "The how [to use power] is simple: when the US wants to do something, it must be prepared to go it alone. Others will follow."³⁵ The democratist unilateralist impulse marks a crucial difference with their fellow neo-Wilsonians, the institutionalists, who invariably favour a true multilateralist approach.

For democratists their structural analysis and imperatives find their institutional outcome in organisations like Nato. A defence organisation composed solely of democratic states, Nato has a long record of success and is a democratist favourite. Ironically, democratists agree with De Gaulle's belief that Nato is basically a creature of the United States. America's dominant position in Nato is bureaucratically expressed by its supreme military commander always being an American. The multilateralism of like-minded states led by the US finds its focus in Nato. However for democratists, there is no doubt who the world policeman, the ultimate source of force and authority, is. Krauthammer put it succinctly, "If America wants [international] stability, it will have to create it."³⁶ To secure stability democratists see the multilateralism of like-minded states, such as is bureaucratically epitomised in Nato, as desirable, but unilateralism as the mode of operation if necessary.

Obviously all regions of the world and all major issue areas are important to a global power such as the US. But all the schools of thought have particular areas of vital interest and foci. These lead to the prioritising that goes on in foreign policy, whether consciously or not. The priorities are largely determined by the analytical orientations of each school of thought. For instance, the democratists' major concern with human rights can be directly traced back to their valuing democratic values above all else. Among these values is respect for the rights of the individual, a right contravened by human rights violators. Thus concern

for human rights is a core issue for democratists. As Brzezinski stated while National Security Adviser under Jimmy Carter in 1979, "It [commitment to human rights] represents a return to the political and moral well-springs of our uniqueness and purpose as a nation."³⁷ Today, emphasis on human rights is seen as more plausible due to seismic changes in the international order. Richard Pierre Claude noted that Gregory Fossedal believed that with the US ascendant in the new world order, an American foreign policy based partially on human rights had suddenly become practicable. Claude also observed that Fossedal believed, "the concept that international human rights involve global issues that are no longer peripheral to the future of international relations."³⁸ Democratists see the new world order as the time, when bereft of enemies, America can push forward its own liberal democratic values, especially regarding human rights.

Regionally the democratist focus is very much on the newly emerging democracies of Eastern Europe and the former USSR, especially Russia. Helping fledgling democracies acquire stability is obviously a central priority of all democratists. In 1993, as internal disturbances led by Khasbulatov, Rutskoi and the recalcitrant apparatchik-laden Russian parliament pushed the survival of Yeltsin's generally democratic, reformist government into doubt, democratists led the American rally to Yeltsin's defence. The former superpower, still far and away the most powerful state in Eastern Europe, still possessing nuclear warheads, has become the key democratic test case for democratists. Krauthammer warned the public not to be distracted by other foreign policy problems from the crucial Russian case. "Indeed, the preoccupation with Bosnia, Somalia and the world's other brushfires is a convenient distraction from the overriding foreign policy issue facing the US: helping save the Russian experiment in democracy. It is on Moscow, not Mogadishu, that the peace in the post-Cold War world hinges."³⁹ Stephen F. Cohen, a noted American Sovietologist, concurred, stating that, "Russia will be the US's largest foreign policy concern for many years to come."⁴⁰ Democratists see the success of Yeltsin's plans for democratisation as essential for the continued flourishing of democracy throughout all of Eastern Europe. It is their highest regional priority.

Having delineated democratist views, the next step is to discover who in the American political and foreign policy establishment espouses democratist positions. The democratists relate to Schurmann's classification system as both imperialists and nationalists. They are imperialist in their triumphalist, interventionist view of the United States and nationalist in their missionary zeal to promote and protect American values across the globe. It is striking

that democratists and nationalists both took a hard-line towards China's undemocratic communist government. These two groupings are the intellectual forebears of democratism.

Democratism seems to be very much a minority position. Neither major party espouses democratism as their dominant position on foreign policy issues affecting the United States. Rather, there seem to be democratists in both major parties. William Pfaff made the crucial link between the neo-conservative movement and the new democratist viewpoint. He argued, "the neo-conservatives of the 70's and 80's have assumed the part played in the past by liberal institutionalists. They want the US to lead a crusade for global democracy little different in inspiration from the 14 points of Wilson or the Atlantic Charter, or the UN as originally envisaged by Franklin Roosevelt and his associates."⁴¹

It is hard to find political actors who openly adhere to democratist views. It is among opinion-makers that democratism has found supporters. Indeed the four well-known opinion-makers used in this thesis that espouse democratism come from varied careers. One is primarily an academic (Allison), and three work in think-tanks (Muravchik, Fukuyama and Wattenberg). Although democratism is an active force in the political debate regarding the over-arching direction America should take in the post-Cold War era, it has yet to find a large number of concrete political backers, though there are some such as former Majority Leader George Mitchell and Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott.

Regarding Western Europe and the reorganisation of the European defence system with the end of the Cold War, democratists can be described as generally pro-European. They do not see a politically integrated Europe as threatening as a united EU would certainly share America's democratic values. As Brzezinski stated, "It has been the widely held American view that a united Europe, even though a potent [and now increasingly so in fact] economic rival, will have a major contribution to make to world peace. The common intellectual and philosophical heritage of the Atlantic world has doubtless much to do with the American desire for and confidence in European unity."⁴²

Democratists see the European-American alliance as based on common values, and not on the need for collective security against the USSR. For this reason, democratists expect the close European-American connection to continue, even without the Soviet threat. As former President Nixon noted, "real bonds of history and culture extend from Europe to America...the values of the Western tradition, the steadfast adherence to democratic principles and the belief in the fundamental dignity of the individual create philosophical ties

that bind."⁴³ Likewise, unlike some neo-realists, democratists have no latent fear of the unified Germany, again the strongest state in Europe. Democratists see 'the German problem' as having been resolved through West Germany's long association with Western institutions, states, and the democratic values they espouse. Nixon argued regarding Germany that, "The changes wrought by 40 years of democracy and close association with Western institutions has transformed its society."⁴⁴ If democratists are in favour of increased European political integration, they are even more enthusiastic about revitalising the Nato alliance. As has already been noted, the concept of Nato, a US-led multilateral organisation of like-minded democratic states, is the democratist's preferred modus operandi in the international theatre. Democratists favour the expansion of Nato's role to perform in out-of-area missions. However, they are not for any extension of Nato eastwards, as they fear this might antagonise or destabilise Russia. Democratists believe America ought to continue to dominate the alliance. Democratists see Nato as the 'democratic club', linchpin of the new post-Cold War security order.

The carnage in Bosnia provoked a strong reaction among democratists. With their emphasis on human rights, democratists were particularly appalled by the spectre of ethnic cleansing, enough to advocate American military intervention to end the horrendous human rights violations being propagated. After tough campaign rhetoric, the Clinton administration pursued a cautious, multilateralist policy towards Bosnia, saying that the US should not unilaterally intervene in the conflict. Democratists were outraged by this decision, feeling the US had failed to stop ethnic cleansing, despite there being no real checks on American power. Failure to end the slaughter in Bosnia remains the greatest sore point for democratists in the new world order, and their main foreign policy criticism of the Clinton administration.

On the issue of expanding free trade (Gatt and Nafta), democratists favoured both initiatives but saw them as corollary to their primary foreign policy goals. They generally favour free trade but, as in the case with the MFN controversy with China, not at the expense of their humanitarian and democratic priorities.

Large-scale aid to Russia's fledgling democracy is probably the single most important policy issue for democratists. They see it as essential both practically and ideologically. Democratists are acutely interested in the democratic success of Russia as its very method of democratising is methodologically congruent with democratist theory. That is, the USSR under Gorbachev began political reforms before economic change was implemented, just as democratists would prescribe for developmental success. On the other hand, Deng

Xiaphong's China began economic reforms that have far outpaced new political initiatives, just as institutionalists would advise is the way forward. Thus Russia's approach to development and reform is a major reason it is an area of crucial import to democratists. For democratists the success of Yeltsin's Russia is more than a strategic imperative. It would confirm basic democratist assumptions and validate democratism as a theory itself.

During the Cold War, democratists, with their emphasis on ideology found true rapprochement with the USSR impossible, as the US and USSR avowed largely antithetical creeds. Only with the advent of true 'democrats' like Yeltsin confirming ideological victory for the West, symbolised by Russia adopting western political structures and democratic values, was a true alliance possible. As it has been so long in coming, democratists do not wish to fritter away the opportunity ideological congruence brings. As Nixon noted, "The August 1991 revolution has created an unprecedented opportunity to base peace not on the balance of military power, but on the foundation of common Western values."⁴⁵

Democratists feel that pursuing a peace made durable by the Russian adoption of common democratic values would be the crowning prize of victory in the Cold War. Allison pointed out, "Having spent some 5 trillion dollars to meet the military challenge of the Soviet Union around the globe, is the US (and its allies) to opt out now when the Soviet future is being formed?"⁴⁶ Here he echoed the Clinton administration's argument that investment in Russia makes sound economic sense. If Yeltsin fails and is replaced by a leadership more antagonistic to the US, Clinton would be forced to raise defence spending again which would sabotage both of his major domestic initiatives; attempting to lower the federal budget deficit and to provide some form of universal health care. Democratists feel that Clinton rightly sees that his ambitious domestic agenda is contingent on the continued survival of a democratic Russia. They are supportive of his fairly major efforts to aid Yeltsin and his supporters. While outside aid is small compared with Russia's vast economic needs, both democratists and the administration would argue that it is significant. "With the nation [Russia] seemingly teetering between progress and retrenchment, democracy and disintegration, even marginal help could be decisive, advocates say."⁴⁷ If anything, democratists feel that Clinton should do even more than he has to bolster democratic institutions in Russia.

Democratists' fervent belief in aid to Russia found its most extreme expression in Graham Allison's plan, 'The Grand Bargain,' to provide a Marshall Plan for the beleaguered Soviet regime of Mikhail Gorbachev. Democratism's desire to aid Russia continued unabated with the demise of Gorbachev and the rise of Yeltsin. If anything, for democratists Yeltsin

was a more attractive figure, as he had fewer of the democratic ambiguities that were attached to the General Secretary of the Communist Party. As Allison then argued,

"The US stake in the Soviet Union's future merits a Grand Bargain between the US and other industrial democracies and the Soviet Union and its republics, a US strategy of step-by-step and conditional engagement as robust and refined as America's victorious Cold War strategy. The joint program would consist of initiatives that the Soviet governments - the center and the republics - would take to move rapidly to democratic pluralism and the market economy, and actions the West would take to motivate, enable and facilitate these Soviet positions."⁴⁸

For Allison and other democratists, this vast outpouring of capital (estimated at around 60 billion dollars) was justified, and was crucial to stabilising a new world order built on democratic values and supported by a still powerful Russia. Though the aid was to be primarily economic, its major purpose was to solidify democracy in the former USSR by bolstering specifically democratic forces throughout the ex-Soviet states, and was to be part of a larger democratist strategy of providing public support for the democratic cause.

Whatever the merits of 'The Grand Bargain', it failed to be implemented by either the Bush or Clinton administrations. This rejection illustrates the political wilderness the minority democratists find themselves in within the American foreign policy community and politically throughout the nation. As Thomas Friedman noted, "Clinton has been reading the polls, which are universally negative about lavishing foreign aid on Russia."⁴⁹ The American public's coolness toward foreign aid of any sort was cogently discussed by Senator Patrick Leahy, Democrat from Vermont, who was Chairman of the Senate Foreign Operations subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee, which oversees Russian aid requests from Clinton. He flatly stated, "Any foreign aid bill this year [1993] is going to be an uphill battle because no one wants to vote for foreign aid in the same year when we are voting to cut US domestic programs."⁵⁰ Rather than seeing large-scale aid to Russia as a logical compliment to Clinton's budget cuts, Americans overwhelmingly resented a call to make economic sacrifices themselves while increasing foreign aid contributions to the rest of the world, including Russia. Friedman's amusing anecdote of Clinton's 'spin' on the aid effort to Yeltsin at the Vancouver summit, aid that fell far short of 'The Grand Bargain', highlighted the political difficulties of the democratist position on aid to Russia. Friedman said, "Clinton walked a delicate verbal tightrope over the weekend, wanting his \$1.6 billion aid package for Yeltsin to look like a lot in the eyes of his Russian supporters, a little in the eyes of his Russian opponents, a lot in the eyes of America's Western allies, but not too much in the eyes of the American voters."⁵¹ The chief danger was that the aid package would be judged to be too extensive. This would add fuel to the fire of Yeltsin's thenopponents, such as Ruslan Khasbulatov and Vice-President Alexander Rutskoi, who charged that Yeltsin was a

puppet of the West.⁵² It was to prevent men such as this from seizing the political initiative from Yeltsin that impelled Clinton to moderate aid to Russia, so as not to inflame already wounded Russian sensibilities, particularly in the armed forces.

With Marshall Plan style aid ruled out both due to American public opinion and the political situation in Russia itself, the Clinton administration opted for what democratists came to consider as the second-best alternative. It is neatly summed up by Krauthammer. Regarding Russia, he stated, "My view is: Try everything."⁵³ For Krauthammer, 'everything' meant aid for housing soldiers returning from Eastern Europe, promoting trade and private investment, and using Western hard currency to cushion the inevitable casualties of economic reform. In the end, Clinton offered Yeltsin \$1.6 billion in Vancouver, money already largely proffered by the Bush administration but unspent, because of Russia's inability to meet the initial economic conditions tied to some of the aid.⁵⁴

Yet while all three schools of thought would agree for varying reasons that Russia is important, they differ somewhat in degree as to how essential the democratic experiment actually is to the new world order. Democratists see its success as vital. Their general approval of Clinton's policy increased in July 1993 with the Tokyo summit of the G-7, where \$21.4 billion was offered to Yeltsin.⁵⁵ This large multilateralist aid package illustrated the increasingly institutionalist turn Clinton's policy to Russia had taken, largely due to the domestic unpopularity of foreign aid. As Gwen Ifil pointed out, "The proportions of assistance were adjusted to reflect more in loans from international lending institutions and less in direct cash from governments."⁵⁶ This meant that the World Bank and the IMF, bastions of institutionalist-favoured multilateral co-operation, would lead the effort for Russia, rather than the recession-plagued individual states of the G-7. But the Clinton administration was not following a strictly multilateralist policy. As James Sterngold reported, "some senior Japanese officials made it clear they felt fresh money would do little good and that they were acting largely at the urging of the United States."⁵⁷ Japan, sceptical of aid to Russia for both economic reasons and due to its dispute with Russia over the Kuril Islands, was persuaded not to oppose the G-7 aid package by a US-led initiative within the multilateralist organisation. In this case, aid to Russia has been increasingly overseen by states and institutions which are not dominated by the US. For instance, Germany has given more money to Russia than the US has, so its political views regarding Russia have been even more important than its overall world economic position would lead one to imagine. As the aid is being largely administered by international organisations, such as the World Bank and the IMF, which are led but not dominated by the US (the next two highest dues-payers,

Japan and Germany, could together outvote the US in both organisations), US leadership over the policy question of aiding Russia has been crucial but not paramount. However as US pressure on Japan over the G-7 package indicates, a multilateral arena can often be used for unilateralist democratist initiatives. If in its amount and administration, Clinton's policy on aid to Russia is partly institutionalist, in placing it so highly in its hierarchy of priorities and in examples like the Vancouver summit itself, it is obvious that there is a dominant democratist element in the Clinton administration's overtures to the Russians.

In the fall of 1993 it seemed Clinton's policy was turning even more democratist towards Russia in overall orientation than before. As R. Jeffrey Smith stated, "The US plan is to help broker an end to the [ethnic] disputes before they destabilize the regime of President Yeltsin...or provide a pretext for aggressive military intervention by Russia outside its borders."⁵⁸ This plan of making peacekeepers available to moderate the ethnic disputes raging on the peripheries of the former USSR (e.g. Georgian civil war, Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh) signalled the US intention to increase its involvement in the CIS region. This policy has not been implemented largely due to Russian resistance. After an initial ambivalence, Yeltsin rejected the idea. This was the result of obvious political circumstances. Yeltsin managed to break the back of resistance to his rule by Khasbulatov and Rutskoi, but only just. The sullen and resentful Red Army, still smarting from the vast diminution in Russian power with defeat in the Cold War, and still more nationalistic and expansionistic than the average Russian, threw its crucial support behind Yeltsin only grudgingly and late in the day after Rutskoi and Khasbulatov had incited an armed rebellion against the democrat.⁵⁹ Yeltsin is now beholden to the army for his survival, an army that certainly wants to lessen a direct US presence in the region as much as possible. So while democratists have been generally pleased by the Clinton administration's policy regarding Russia, an increased US role in the region, which democratists support, has been stymied by both US public opinion and Russian internal politics.

Whereas the Clinton administration's policy towards Russia has been a mixed victory for democratist views, its policy towards China has been an unequivocal democratist defeat. Over China, democratists are in many ways the ideological heirs of Schurmann's nationalists, having a missionary, anti-communist zeal for the region. China is a key issue for all three basic American foreign policy schools of thought that have emerged in the new world order. It is particularly crucial for institutionalists and democratists. These two schools, both neo-Wilsonian, both critical of the traditionalist neo-realist view of the world, are often categorised as part of the same creed. That they are not identical can be seen in their

vastly different policy prescriptions over China. In many ways, China is the litmus test case between democratists and institutionalists. Keith Bradsher framed the policy options nicely, "President Clinton finds himself forced to decide if the US should risk its access to China's booming economy for the sake of political freedom there."⁶⁰ The specific policy debate was over whether Clinton should renew China's most-favoured-nation (MFN) trading status with the US. Without MFN, tariffs on Chinese goods to the US would increase between 8-40% and make most of their exports uncompetitive in the US market. Such a move would derail the increasingly booming trade between the two countries. (East Asia is currently far and away the economic hot spot of the world, particularly China's coastal regions where GDP has increased up to a staggering 10% per annum.) This trade is crucial to a US just beginning to show signs of coming out of recession. However, democratists reject this institutionalist argument.

Democratists favour a hard-line policy regarding China. They see the communist-led government of Deng Xiaphong as being the butchers of Tiananmen Square, murderers of the pro-democracy movement, and an administration with an extremely dubious human rights record, particularly regarding Tibet. Democratists argue that part of the reason that Chinese goods are so competitive is that a number of them are made with slave labour, which of course eliminates a worker's wage enabling costs to be drastically cut. The slave-labour camps are composed of political prisoners and are an affront to democratists, who champion both human rights and political freedom. The US is running its second largest trade deficit with China (totalling \$18 billion) and the communist government has been resistant to narrowing the gap.⁶¹ Crucially, unlike institutionalists, democratists do not see China's new capitalistic advances as leading eventually to a more pluralistic regime. Rather they see China's economic success as strengthening a despotic, malevolent regime. As the US finds itself the only superpower in the world, democratists feel strong pressure should be put on the Chinese as they need the West far more than the West needs them, especially economically. Winston Lord, a long-time critic of communist China and now US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, stated the democratist position. The end of the Cold War, "decreases the pressure to muffle consensus about unsavory governments for the sake of security."⁶² While China is not as important to the democratists as Russia, they see no long-term practical reason to support an authoritarian government which holds inimical values to those of the US. Democratists feel the US should take a hard line with China which may hasten the end of the regime and bring about the victory of democratic values expressed most poignantly by the Chinese students and workers in Tiananmen Square in 1989.

Clinton's policy towards China has been a great disappointment for democratists. Despite his campaign rhetoric, where he accused Bush of coddling the tyrants of Beijing, in practice democratists feel that Clinton has acted little differently. In May 1993, he granted China a one year extension of MFN status, while linking any future extension to improvements in human rights and Chinese adherence to arms control guidelines. This was an undoubted institutionalist victory, again as during the campaign Clinton had criticised Bush using democratist rhetoric. His volte-face is another example of the administration's overall institutionalist tilt. Further, as The International Herald-Tribune reported, "a decision [was] made quietly by the Clinton administration last month [September, 1993] to end the freeze on high-level exchanges with China."⁶³ This is a furtherance of the soft-line institutionalist policy illustrated by Clinton's renewal of MFN. In fact ending the freeze on high-level exchanges goes as far if not further than the Bush administration dared go in the aftermath of Tiananmen in placating the communists. As Daniel Williams and R. Jeffrey Smith noted, the scheduled November 19th (1993) summit of Asian powers in Seattle heralded the first meeting of President Clinton with President Jiang Zemin of China. Jiang is considered an heir to the ailing Deng Xiaoping and the meeting marked the highest-level contact between the two countries since 1989. Williams and Smith stated, "officials say [it] is meant to end formally the Tiananmen era of chilly relations."⁶⁴ The Clinton administration's increasing adoption of the institutionalist stance regarding China has been a great disappointment to democratists, and a further sign of their minority status, even within the neo-Wilsonian Clinton administration. In the end the President followed his institutionalist inclinations, and in the Spring of 1994 renewed MFN while cutting ties between renewal and China's human rights record.

Up until now, general democratist precepts, assumptions and policy prescriptions have been discussed. While these are essential to understand, there are of course variations within each school of thought as well as the inevitable differences between individuals. While it is the basis of this thesis that it is extremely useful to analyse schools of thought as a coherent whole, a narrower level of analysis is also needed, looking at majority and minority currents within each school of thought as well as looking at individual variations. At this level, it is useful to place the opinion-makers on an ideological line seen as a continuum. To do this one must look again at the general cluster of democratist policy prescriptions regarding five important issue areas in the new world order and compare them to individual policy prescriptions. Not only does this process help label individuals, it tests the value of the general policy prescriptions as well. The result of this process can be seen in Chart 2-2.

Within the democratist school of thought there are two currents, the dominant moderate democratists and the hyper-democratists. Both follow the general democratist line, their differences are based on degree but they are large. These differences of degree centre around the questions neatly posed by Francis Fukuyama and Samuel Huntington. Fukuyama noted that a belief in democratism, "begs the question of where and when to promote democracy and at what cost?"⁶⁵ Huntington asked, "to what extent should the US attempt to make the institutions and policies of other societies conform to American values?"⁶⁶ It can be seen by these questions that degree is the key division between the hyper-democratist and moderate democratist camps. Hyper-democratists are more likely to promote democracy more often, in more places and at a higher cost to the US than are moderate democratists. They see the replication of America's unique society and its values as not only desirable but essential to world stability. Moderate democratists are more likely to be cautious in choosing the instances to support democracy and are more likely to attempt to replicate Western rather than specifically American values in other societies. As their differences are those of degree, there is no neat dividing line between the two currents, but their differences are no less real for this fact.

Ben Wattenberg is an example of an adherent of hyper-democratism. His primary democratist work is entitled The First Universal Nation. Wattenberg believes that the US is the first of a new type of state that should be the prototype for the world. He believes that as all ethnic groups that have come to the US have been imbued with democratic values, these values are somehow both uniquely American and universal, and that the US pattern of democratic acculturation should be spread to the rest of the world. This is the bold and controversial hyper-democratist message. Indeed, Wattenberg described himself as a, "manifest-destinarian."⁶⁷ This term originally described US expansion across the North American continent to the Pacific, a process accepted by many of that time as inevitable, and benevolent. Such imperialistic expansion was considered necessary by its proponents, as American values were considered superior to the cultures of the American Indians the pioneers encountered along the way.⁶⁸ Now the hyper-democratists feel that American values are superior to those of the rest of the world. In fact they are deemed so superior by the hyper-democratists, they feel it is necessary for the US to propagate their spread as a cornerstone of its foreign policy if it is to be successful in the new world order.

This striking and strident position leads hyper-democratists to disagree with moderate democratists about US policy towards America's Western European democratic allies.

Wattenberg sees America's former allies as now its chief rivals. As Wattenberg bluntly put it, "American-style democracy, a way of life as well as a political system, is different from European-style democracy."⁶⁹ Here the hyper-democratists ironically agree with the neo-realists with whom they have little in common. Both see American culture as largely distinct rather than part of a larger, 'Western' democratic tradition. Wattenberg observed, "American democracy has distinctive features...individualism, pluralism, opportunity, dynamism, and the absence of a rigid class structure comes to mind."⁷⁰ He sees these characteristics as being unlike the European variation of democracy, which Wattenberg views as more corporatist and collective in character. Hyper-democratists see these differences as being the root cause of competition as to what sort of democracy the newly-emerging democratic states will adopt. Wattenberg pointed out, "The global contest will not concern whether, but what kind of, democratic values will be influential."⁷¹ Hyper-democratists see the universal triumph of democratic values as so apparent and inevitable that they have moved on to the next arena of conflict, a conflict of ideas as to which specific cultural strand of democracy will most influence the world. This view of the Western European states as being as much rivals as allies dominates Wattenberg's thinking regarding America's Western European policy, and is evidence of his hyper-democratist orientation.

Regarding China, Wattenberg followed the predictable democratist line. He urged a confrontational policy towards China. He militantly observed, "If the Chinese Communists can prevail because they slaughtered their adversaries, they will have reinstated murder as a form of politics."⁷² The Chinese economic boom poses problems for all democratists, but particularly for hyper-democratists, even beyond the obvious ideological threats. If force is still a widely used tool and authoritarian regimes can provide successful counter-models to democracies for states to choose from, then the triumph of democracy on a world-wide scale is not as self-apparent as hyper-democratists believe. For their belief system to retain intellectual validity, a state as powerful as China must cease to remain outside the family of democratic nations within a generation or so. This is the underlying reason for the hyper-democratists hard line towards China.

Wattenberg also followed the general democratist line regarding trade issues such as Nafta and Gatt. Hyper-democratists concur with moderate democratists in rejecting neo-realist's zero-sum position on trade. Wattenberg was particularly enthusiastic about Nafta, and regional trading blocs in general. He felt that, "Ever-bigger blocs lead toward global free trade, which is good for all, not zero-sum."⁷³ Over this issue both hyper-democratists and

moderate democratists agreed with institutionalists, though not with the same fervour as their Wilsonian cousins.

Hyper-democratism is a minority viewpoint within a minority creed. It is difficult to identify a single member of the cabinet or the International Affairs or Foreign Relations committees that is a hyper-democratist. Wattenberg illustrates that hyper-democratists tend to be doyens of think tanks/writers/academics, but are hardly policy-makers themselves. Hyper-democratism lies at the fringe of the debate over America's foreign policy direction in the new world order. Its power, though quite limited, lies in the boldness and clarity of its position. Hyper-democratism provides a coherent, alternative neo-Wilsonian theory for those dissatisfied with the more mainstream foreign policy views of the day.

Moderate democratists, while staking out many of the same general positions as the hyper-democratists, do so with less fervour and, they would say, less recklessness. They would agree with A.M. Rosenthal's moderate democratist viewpoint that, "Mostly freedom fighters plead not for US troops, but for food, medicine, a political arm around them."⁷⁴ Moderate democratists feel democracy is usually best promoted by non-military means. This sets them apart from the hyper-democratists who are more vague about when they would use force to promote democratic change. Caution towards military force and a more restrained embracing of democratic opportunities than hyper-democratists would countenance are hallmarks of the moderate democratists' majority point of view within democratism. The moderate democratists surveyed on Chart 2-2 are Joshua Muravchik, Francis Fukuyama, and Graham Allison.

Like Wattenberg, Joshua Muravchik is a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, a prominent neo-conservative think-tank. Unlike his more doctrinaire colleague, Muravchik is a moderate democratist who more fully adheres to general democratist positions regarding the five crucial issue areas discussed in this thesis. Yet like Wattenberg, Muravchik saw the Western victory in the Cold War as being largely the result of the ideological triumph of democracy over communism. He stated, "Ironically we Americans, who possess a profound and successful idea [democracy], have rarely understood the potency of ideas."⁷⁵ Muravchik concurred with Doyle's premise that expanding the democratic club of states is crucial for the successful expansion of America's security. He reasoned, "the more democratic the world, the friendlier America's environment will be,"⁷⁶ as he believes that democracies rarely go to war with one another. Yet Muravchik disagreed with the hyper-democratists in that he did not view democracy as a specifically American concoction, available for easy export to the rest of

the world. He argued, "nobody seriously advocates that democracy US-style can be encouraged abroad, much less expanded."⁷⁷ This is a crucial difference moderate democratists have with hyper-democratists, whether America has a specific form of democracy that is in some way in competition with other variants, such as European-style democracy. Muravchik believes that this is not the case, and that while democracy is a universal creed, each society will adopt its precepts to fit its peculiar culture. Muravchik used Japan as an example, "What the Japanese have, not surprisingly, is Japanese-style democracy rather than US-style democracy. This is exactly what they ought to have."⁷⁸ The Japanese political system has factions, emphasises loyalty and hierarchy and reflects other attributes of their culture, rather than merely replicating the American variant of democracy. Muravchik sided with the moderate democratists over the hyper-democratists regarding this crucial dividing question of whether American-style democracy can be successfully exported throughout the world.

Regarding Bosnia, Muravchik followed the standard democratist desire to punish the Serbs for their adventurism and human rights abuses. He was particularly disappointed with President Clinton for changing his hard-line democratist campaign rhetoric about Bosnia during the campaign into a less confrontational institutionalist stance once he was elected. Muravchik recounted that he joined with a group of neo-conservatives in supporting Clinton's candidacy in a New York Times statement. "It praised him [Clinton], (too), for having 'taken the lead in urging international action - indeed, if necessary, the use of US air and naval forces - ...to prevent Serbia's nationalist communist regime from doing violence to neighboring peoples'."⁷⁹ Muravchik came to the conclusion that President Clinton is generally an institutionalist and not a democratist, which explains his disaffection as Clinton's campaign rhetoric contained elements of both schools of thought.

Further, Muravchik believed President Clinton's democratist rhetoric was largely a ploy to shore-up his foreign policy credentials with the right-wing of the Democratic party, and as such he felt personally betrayed. For example, Muravchik is insensed that Secretary of State Christopher, "Shamefully, (he) testified in mid-May [1993] before the House Foreign Affairs Committee that 'there is considerable fault on all three sides' in Bosnia and 'atrocities by all three,' assertions that were at once contradicted - in a secret memo eventually leaked to the New York Times - by the State Department office charged with monitoring human rights abuses in Bosnia."⁸⁰ Muravchik saw this as especially heinous as the obscuring of ethnic cleansing by the Serbs deliberately invalidated a major impetus for democratist policy outputs, human rights considerations. That the Clinton administration could state that all three

sides were to blame in the Bosnian conflict, implicitly asserted that as all three ethnic groups had suffered at the hands of the others in the war, there were no overall communal victims in Bosnia. This moral equivalency argument struck at the heart of Muravchik's democratist viewpoint that as the Serbs committed the vast proportion of human rights abuses in the conflict they were morally culpable and ought to be stopped, even if American military might was needed to do so.

Likewise Muravchik favours the hard democratist line regarding China. He believes that the Bush administration was responsible for crucial policy errors which compounded the tragedy of Tiananmen Square. He observed, "the policy of the Bush administration toward China has been so incomprehensible. The Chinese people demonstrated in the spring of 1989 that a vast majority want to be free. They were thwarted by a clique of octogenarian autocrats who still hold a preponderance of the levers of coercion. What possible cause can we have for succoring this clique rather than using our leverage to help crack the desiccating facade of their rule?"⁸¹ Muravchik has consistently supported this activist attempt to confront China's autocratic rulers. He specifically noted that the MFN debate had a role to play in this process. Muravchik believed America, "must increase diplomatic and economic pressures on the Chinese government."⁸² The Clinton administration's about-face on MFN was another example Muravchik could point to as a sign of the President's betrayal of the democratist cause.

Muravchik has much more sympathy for the administration's Russia policy. This should come as no surprise for of the five issue areas analysed here, it is the sole area where the President has followed a strong democratist line. Even in his bitter exposition, "Lament of a Clinton Supporter," Muravchik grudgingly allowed, "I was heartened by the support he [the President] gave to President Yeltsin at the Vancouver summit."⁸³ Like the President, Muravchik sees the Russian democratic experiment as an exciting development, and not primarily as a danger for the US. He stated, "For our nation, this is the opportunity of a lifetime. Our failure to exert every possible effort to secure this [beneficial] outcome would be unforgiveable."⁸⁴ This rationale, of seeing Yeltsin's fragile regime as an opportunity to be grasped rather than a danger to global stability, is the basis for both the general democratist advocacy of large-scale aid for Russia and for Muravchik's specific endorsement of the programme.

Francis Fukuyama, author of the controversial book, The End of History, espouses general moderate democratist views, though he also adheres to minority neo-realist positions.

His stance on China follows the general democratist line, as well as proving a good critique of that arch neo-realist, Henry Kissinger. He observed, "The fact that Japan has been a stable democracy and an all-important capitalist trading partner since 1945, and that the communist regime in Beijing had just gotten through crushing the Chinese student's model of the statue of liberty under tank treads, counts for less [to Kissinger] than their underlying power positions in the global system. This is as stark and consistent an application of realist principles as one could imagine."⁸⁵ Here Fukuyama is criticising Kissinger for stating that close ties with the Chinese communists are essential to contain Japanese power in the Pacific region. Fukuyama is predictably democratist in noting it is the internal nature of regimes, the fact that Japan has been a valued American ally for 45 years and that China just crushed a student movement espousing democracy, that should be the pivotal indicator of policy, not a balance of power that takes as largely unimportant the very internal nature of a state. Fukuyama, on standard democratist grounds, rejected Kissinger's desire for rapprochement with the Chinese communists.

Fukuyama advocates the democratist position on aid to Russia. Disagreeing with Kissinger and Brzezinski's views of the chances for the success of Russian reform, Fukuyama stated, "the policy question the US faces is whether we [his emphasis] want to be the ones to turn out the lights, especially when the new constitution adopted last December [1993] at least clears the way for a hyper-presidential regime that has some chance of promoting economic reform and a moderate foreign policy."⁸⁶ Fukuyama agrees with the democratist notion that a failure to significantly support the Russian democratic experiment will lead to its failure, thus sharing the democratist conviction that American aid to Russia could be pivotal to the overall success of the Yeltsin regime.

Fukuyama also advocated a democratist position on Nafta/Gatt. He stated, "With the passage of Nafta and the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round of the Gatt, the foundations have been laid for another generation of economic growth in Latin America."⁸⁷ Unlike the neo-realists Fukuyama here looked beyond the immediate gains the Nafta and Gatt agreements had for the US, seeing that a prosperous Latin America served American interests. However he did not greet the agreements with the enthusiasm of an institutionalist, instead seeing them as an important but corollary aspect of the international scene. This lack of enthusiasm for trade issues is reflected in Fukuyama's scholarship, where Nafta and Gatt do not loom large.

Yet Fukuyama also has a decided minority neo-realist orientation. Regarding the Bosnian crisis he did not call for the degree of intervention in the conflict most democratists favoured. He argued regarding Europe, "the existing stock of political capital should be husbanded for the serious potential threats of the future, and not wasted in fruitless threats and posturing in sideshows like the Balkans."⁸⁸ Yet while Fukuyama did not embrace an interventionist policy in Bosnia, neither did he advocate the passive institutionalist course of the Clinton administration. He believed, "The international community's single most important failure was actually an error of commission rather than omission - that is, the placing of a UN arms embargo on all the combatants in the civil war, and the subsequent failure to lift it so as to give the Bosnian Muslims a chance to defend themselves."⁸⁹ Thus Fukuyama clearly adopted a neo-realist stance regarding the Bosnian crisis.

Francis Fukuyama's general tendency to fail to stake out clear consistent opinions regarding the analysis of foreign policy is illustrated by looking at his views of the European security structure in the post-Cold War world. For example in February 1994 Fukuyama felt Nato ought not to be extended saying, "It is true that the world community does not have an effective instrument to promote order and security in regions like Eastern Europe today; but if the chance of escalation [of instability] is low, this lack will not be critical."⁹⁰ By June 1994 he had changed his tune, urging the expansion of Nato to match the progress of democracy in Eastern Europe.⁹¹ Despite such chameleon-like analysis, it is possible to discern Fukuyama as having a general neo-realist position, if an unconventional one, regarding American policy prescriptions for Western Europe. He clearly has little truck for the institutionalist stance regarding Europe, observing that the Partnership for Peace plan, "serves to dilute the ideological meaning of the [Atlantic] community by opening it up to all comers."⁹² Nor does he feel that Europe will eventually become a federal state of some sort, as many institutionalists predict. Fukuyama wonders whether the more ambitious goals of Euro-federalism will come to pass, rather than Europe remaining a Europe of states.⁹³ It is also apparent that Fukuyama is not an advocate of the democratist position regarding Western Europe. He stated, "the Atlantic community has been based on three things: ideological affinity, cultural identity, and strategic self-interest. In the post-Cold War era, only the last of these factors, strategic self-interest, will endure as a glue to hold the community together while ideological and cultural bonds decay."⁹⁴ Here Fukuyama refutes the democratist contention that common ideological bonds between Europe and the US still exist after the Cold War, and that these democratic links will continue to undergird the alliance.

While Fukuyama ultimately espouses neo-realist views regarding Europe, in that he is in favour of Alliance expansion into Central Europe, he does not advocate the standard neo-realist position. Unlike most neo-realists, he does not believe the Alliance is in danger of splintering in the near future. He observed, "given the difficulty of eliminating public institutions representing entrenched interests, I believe that Nato as a political structure will be far more durable than many of its supporters fear."⁹⁵ Fukuyama also balks at the standard neo-realist contention that Nato's functions should be extended, on this point agreeing with the democratists, "Those who want to extend Nato's functions to include ethnic peacekeeping and the like seriously risk involving it in contingencies for which it is not particularly well suited, thereby unintentionally subverting its ability to execute tasks it is better able to perform."⁹⁶ While Fukuyama ultimately favours the central plank of the neo-realist policy preference for Europe, extension of Nato into Central Europe, he is not concerned with finding Nato a new mission as are most of those who advocate a neo-realist stance toward Europe.

Graham Allison, former head of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, not only adheres to the democratist position on Russia, he largely formulated the stance. Allison was an early supporter of Gorbachev. In the summer 1991 edition of Foreign Affairs he stated, "glasnost and democratskayia touched the broad public because the reforms reflected American values. The prospect, however distant, of nearly 300 million more human beings enjoying freedom's benefits and the market's prosperity must gladden the spirit of America and must be fundamentally in this nation's enduring interests."⁹⁷ This strongly-held view led Allison to be the chief author of "The Grand Bargain," the sweeping democratist proposal to provide Gorbachev with Marshall Plan-style aid, conditional upon the continued growth in Soviet political pluralism and a coherent economic program moving towards a market economy. Allison estimated that such a program would cost \$15-20 billion a year for three years. Allison, like almost all democratists saw the increased democratisation of the USSR as a golden opportunity for the US. Regarding Gorbachev's chance of success, Allison observed, "the odds of failure indeed appear higher than those of success. But with so much at stake, Western delay in trying to affect the odds on which way the Soviet future emerges is myopic."⁹⁸ Allison's strong stand for vast aid for first the Soviet Union and then Russia became a hallmark of the general democratist position.

Allison is a strong supporter of the post-1945 liberal trading regime venerated by institutionalists. He said, regarding Gatt, the IMF, and the World Bank that they, "permitted the most rapid expansion of the world economy in history."⁹⁹ Allison favours a strong

continuation of the international free trade system that he credits for the extraordinary post-World War II global economic boom. While all democratists value the free market and free trade, for them, as well as for Allison, the free market is largely a secondary consideration compared with democratic development. Allison observed, "While the successful economic performance of a society does not guarantee democracy, failing economic performance almost certainly guarantees the failure of democracy."¹⁰⁰ Here Allison affirmed the democratist view that successful economic performance does not necessarily lead a society to become democratic, a view in contradiction with that of the institutionalists. While moderate democratists accept that there is a link between the operation of a successful free market economy and the success of democratic politics, like Allison they see the causation as being one way, with democratic development being the first and essential prerequisite for a state's success. Thus while Allison credits and values the international free trade system, trading concerns are for him of secondary importance. This democratist view is illustrated in his academic writings, which focus on Russia and only rarely venture into the realm of international trade.

Allison's views on European integration and Nato jibe with basic democratist views as well. Regarding the Community, Allison stated, "The EC has played a critical role in facilitating the transition to democracy in Spain, Portugal and Greece. It is also doing so in Turkey and the newly independent states of Central Europe."¹⁰¹ Unlike the hyper-democratists, Allison does not see European Community democratising activities as a threat, but rather as a positive development. Like other moderate democratists, he believes that the EU and its member states share the same Western, democratic values and should be encouraged and supported to strengthen democratic bonds in the newly democratised states of Central Europe. This view distances Allison definitively from hyper-democratism. Allison is also a strong proponent of Nato, as are most moderate democratists. Regarding the need to reform Western European security structures in the wake of the Cold War, Allison observed, "the process should begin with the recognition that these alliances [Nato] have provided a longer peace, more sustained economic growth and greater freedom than the parties enjoyed under any earlier arrangement. Alliances such as Nato always had positive goals beyond defending against the Soviet threat. These goals should now be explained and extended."¹⁰² Like a majority of democratists, Allison sees the expansion of Nato, a US-led community of democratic states, to embrace out-of-area missions as the policy crucial to the success in reconfiguring Western European defence arrangements. As Allison noted and unlike neo-realists, democratists have always seen Nato as more of a political organisation of like-minded states rather than a military alliance held together by the fear of Soviet expansionism.

Allison sees Nato as based on the political similarities of its members, it is entirely consistent that with the waning of the Cold War, he does not see the alliance as outdated. Again Allison's policy prescriptions coincide with general moderate democratist views on Nato. In fact, in a 1992 article, "Can the US Promote Democracy?" Allison posited the most detailed moderate democratist plan as to how to implement their policy preferences. Allison lists 57 initiatives by which the US can promote democracy peacefully. These include increased funding for Radio Free Europe, and the National Endowment for Democracy. Allison also feels the United States should donate photocopiers, personal computers and faxes to the newly-emerging democracies of Central Europe. Likewise the US can plan exchanges with unions, businesses, churches, political parties, the independent media, and monitor Central European elections. All these initiatives stem from the neo-Wilsonian and particularly moderate democratist belief that increased contact with the West, and especially with the Western democratic culture, is essential if the Western values of democracy and pluralism are to find fertile soil in Central Europe. Allison has written nothing less than a handbook of practical initiatives for moderate democratists to embrace in their cautious opportunistic effort to democratise the world.

There are numerous criticisms of the general democratist viewpoint. Firstly, this is definitely a minority school of thought and has few significant political supporters. Ole Holsti and James Rosenau reported in the summer 1993 edition of Millennium on the results of the foreign policy leadership project. This is a survey of 2312 opinion-leaders that has taken place every four years since the presidential election of 1976, attempting to gauge the general mood on foreign policy of major American opinion-leaders in the press, the clergy, business, and academia as well as government. They found, "fewer than 1 in 5 [of those surveyed] favored intervention in the domestic affairs of other countries in support of a more democratic world order."¹⁰³ As the precept of some form of 'intervention' (even if by largely economic and ideological means) in the affairs of other states to promote democracy is central to the democratist creed, it is obvious democratist views have not found anything like majority favour. Without adoption by opinion-leading elites, and especially the political elite who have the power to turn theory into practice, democratism may be doomed to be seen as interesting, but esoteric. As over the question of a vast increase in foreign aid to help Russia, democratists do not seem to acknowledge the domestic political limits on American foreign policy. This is strange as democratists see the domestic level of analysis regarding decision-making as crucial. Perhaps democratists' relative political irrelevance cuts both ways. Not only has the school of thought yet to strike a popular chord among decision-makers, its 'outsider' status blinds its adherents from the political realities and limits imposed upon

theory by the day to day governing of a state; its policies. Whatever the reason, democratist prescriptions, even if sensible and desirable, often seem to fly in the face of what is politically possible.

There is a moral question about democratism as well. Is it morally correct to try to mould other societies and cultures? Samuel Huntington is one of democratism's most prescient critics, both ethically and practically. As he pointed out in the Spring 1982 edition of Political Science Quarterly, "to intrude from outside is either imperialism or colonialism, each of which violates American values."¹⁰⁴ Huntington highlights a crucial paradox of democratism. It is a creed that can by its methods easily nullify the principles for which it stands. In promoting democracy, in exporting the American revolution to the rest of the world, democratists can only too easily use authoritarian tactics, coercion and other anti-democratic means of 'persuading' other states to become more democratic. If this were to happen, democratists would seem to have missed the forest for the trees, to have forgotten that successful democracy is largely an organic political development that cannot be easily or crudely transplanted. If democracy is imposed by some sort of coercion, critics of democratism feel the United States would tragically lose some of what innately makes it democratic in the attempt to spread its creed. This apparent contradiction may be a stumbling block to democratism's political viability as a majority school of thought. The missionary zeal and desire to extend democracy world-wide are traditionally American, Wilsonian, left-wing attributes. Yet the semi-colonial imposition of American values that could easily result as practical policy from following a largely democratist foreign policy greatly dampens support on the American left for the democratist position. In uniquely and creatively linking the messianic, globalist, democratic zeal of the American left with the willingness to intervene in other states' domestic affairs, a traditional attribute of the American right, democratism has become an interesting and coherent intellectual hybrid. But this very fusion of left and right may disenchant many potential democratist decision-makers, who see democratism as futilely attempting to reconcile the irreconcilable.

Beyond its political limitations and potential intellectual contradictions, there are questions about whether democratism fulfills the ultimate political test of any school of thought; can it be implemented as a successful policy? In this case, is a democratist foreign policy practically possible? Many would say no. As Huntington stated in his excellent and influential article, "The Clash of Civilizations?" published in the summer of 1993, "Most importantly, the efforts of the West to promote its values of democracy and liberalism as universal values...engender countering responses from other civilizations."¹⁰⁵ The process of

democratism does not involve merely an aggressive, confident United States inflicting its values on an inert, *tabula rasa*. A more subtle, complicated process is at work. Huntington feels democratism can easily lead to the "reaffirmation of indigenous values as can be seen in the support for religious fundamentalism by the younger generation in non-Western cultures. The very notion that there could be a universal civilization is a Western idea, directly at odds with the particularism of most Asian societies and their emphasis on what distinguishes one people from another."¹⁰⁶

Like any self-contained cell, critics of democratism feel non-Western civilisations will forcibly reject Western notions such as the universal applicability of democracy. Tommy Thong-Bee Koh continues with the organic analogy, "Western democracy is a fragile flower that can not be easily transplanted to the soil of some Asian countries, such as China, that have no democratic tradition."¹⁰⁷ It is likely that such countries will see the American zeal for universal democracy as another thinly disguised attempt at imperial domination. Michael Richardson pointed this out in a neo-realist critique of democratism. Democratists, "apply what are seen by many Asian officials as alien Western principles that ride roughshod over national sovereignty and threaten the integration of the state."¹⁰⁸ Richardson is correct in that democratism poses an unapologetic assault on the state whose sanctity is crucial to the traditionally dominant neo-realist school of thought. If one state (the US) can intervene in another to promote democracy, the sanctity and notion of sovereignty upon which the state system has rested since 1648, neo-realists contend, would be obliterated, heralding an era of major chaos, before another competing notion led to stability. Neo-realists see democratism as nothing less than a revolutionary challenge to the primacy of the state, the triumph of ideology over stability, and therefore greatly dangerous.

Critics of democratism would argue that even if all these political, ideological, and methodological problems could be dealt with, a strict following of democratism would lead to the problems of success. As Huntington observed, "In the Arab world, in short, Western democracy strengthens anti-Western political forces."¹⁰⁹ The Algerian case is an extreme example of this problem. There is little doubt that the 1992 Algerian elections, if completed, would have led to the ascendancy of the FIS, the main Islamic fundamentalist party in Algeria. Yet such an election, which until halted was generally free and fair, would have quite possibly been the last in Algeria for the foreseeable future. The FIS is an avowed anti-Western, anti-democratic party that was attempting to use democratic means to achieve coercive power. Even if the FIS had for some reason agreed to allow elections once in power, it is questionable as to whether it is in the interests of the US to promote elections that

will almost certainly bring anti-Western and particularly anti-American forces to power in the Maghreb, an area important to the US's geopolitical interests.¹¹⁰ This would certainly be the neo-realist argument against free elections in Algeria. Elections have not proven to be a panacea in other parts of the world either. As Michael H. Posner stated, "the Reagan administration stressed the holding of elections as a defining difference between US and Soviet alliances. Unfortunately the crises in Liberia, Guatemala, Serbia and Haiti have proved elections don't guarantee respect for human rights,"¹¹¹ a claim democratists would like to make. (Though most would say that the link is durable only in established democracies which certainly none of these cases are.) Brutality did not end in Haiti with the election of Aristide, or in Angola with the election of dos Santos, nor with the triumph of the ethnic cleanser, Milosevic. In fact in the short run, elections probably led to an intensification of the brutality in all three cases. Elections do not magically end human rights violations, rather in established democracies their absence reflects the political cultural traits of toleration, of a 'loyal opposition' that are inimical to sustained brutality. Critics of democratism argue democratists place too much faith in the ability of free elections to solve deep-seated social problems. However many democratists would reply that their critics are not fully allowing for any subtlety in their argument, any taking into account of other factors in determining policy.

Despite these general theoretical criticisms and its lack of anything like majority support, democratism remains a viable major school of thought of American foreign policy in the new world order. It offers a coherent view of the new era, and a bullish triumphalist defence of the democratic values its adherents believe led to Western victory in the Cold War. It audaciously, amid all the fashionable talk of American decline and limits, argues for a robust extension of America, hoping to recreate the world in America's image to build a league of democracies that will make Kant's visionary title of 1795, Perpetual Peace, a reality. This mix of the missionary spirit as well as the calling for the export of values that almost all of America embraces, are familiar and potent themes for Americans in foreign policy. Democratism may be the relentlessly optimistic message that renews a country renowned for its relentless optimism.

Chart 2 - 2 Democratist Policy Regarding Five Key Issues

Majority Democratist View Reached From the Givens	Interventionist	Large-Scale Aid	Hard-line Anti-MFN	Generally in Favour	Nato-firsters, No Nato Expansion
Issues	Bosnia	Russia	China	Nafta/Gatt	Nato/Western European Policy
Fukuyama - Think Tank	Follows neo-realist line (-)	Pro (+)	Pro (+)	Pro (+)	Follows neo-realist line (-)
Allison - Democrat/Academic		Pro (+)		Pro (+)	Pro (+)
Muravchik - Democrat/Think-Tank	Pro (+)	Pro (+)	Pro (+)		

(+) consistent with the overall schools of thought categorisation (-) inconsistent with the overall schools of thought categorisation

ENDNOTES

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Chapter 3: The Neo-Realists

Chart 3-1: The Belief System of the Neo-Realists

- 1) Background: Hobbes
- 2) Goal: Promote national interests, stop the appearance of a hegemonic rival.
- 3) Assume: States have fundamentally different values. Ultimately, International Relations is a zero-sum game. They miss the end of Cold War stability. See increasing world contact as exacerbating world divisions. Do not see development as following universal stages.
- 4) See state: Well represented by the billiard ball/rational actor theory, feel the structure of the world system is largely the key factor in determining a state's foreign policy.
- 5) Key analytical orientation: Military/Security/Geopolitical
- 6) Declinist/Revivalist: Declinist
- 7) World Structure: Multipolar
- 8) Preferred mode of action: Multilateral if possible, Unilateral if necessary.
- 9) Basis of force: American troops.
- 10) World Policeman: None, the balance of power is self-regulating.
- 11) Key areas and foci: US, Europe secondarily.

- 12) Schurmann Imperialists
classification:
- 13) General political Primary the Republican party.
supporters:
- 14) Political actors: Dole, Gingrich, Lugar.
- 15) Bureaucratic DoD, CIA, The US security apparatus.
bastions of support:
- 16) Policy cluster Nato-firsters. Pro-Nato but fear it won't last. Wish to extend
preferencetowards Nato membership to Eastern Europe but keep it as a primarily
Western Europe/ military alliance. Ambivalent towards European unity.
European defence
system:
- 17) Policy cluster Non-interventionist, no vital US interests at stake. However,
preference towards for a lifting of the arms embargo.
Bosnia:
- 18) Policy cluster Tactically favour both agreements.
preference towards
Trade
(Nafta and Gatt):
- 19) Policy cluster Against large-scale aid, as they fear renewed authoritarian rule
preference towards and activation of vast capabilities. Want to enhance contacts with
Russia: non-Russian States of former USSR.
- 20) Policy cluster Evolutionary change favoured (MFN with possible conditions),
preference towards feel it is too important to isolate.
China:

- 21) Academics: Buchanan - realist-isolationist; Nixon - realist-internationalist; Kirkpatrick - realist-internationalist with a democratist minority; Kissinger - realist-internationalist with an institutionalist minority.
- 22) Variations within the school of thought: REALIST-ISOLATIONIST (Minority)/ REALIST-INTERNATIONALIST (Majority); the difference is vast, yet same theoretical starting point.

The neo-realists see a very different world from that viewed by the democratists. For them the anarchic nature of the international system, characterised by its lack of authority over states, (the absence of world government) consigns the international system to being a Hobbesian jungle. It is to this English philosopher and not Kant, that neo-realists turn to affirm their philosophical background. In The Leviathan, published in 1651, Hobbes characterised the anarchic international system as itself leading to conflict. Without a supreme authority, states found themselves in the jungle, where they struggled to survive. Power was the motive force of Hobbes' international system for with it a state could ensure its survival in a lawless world.¹ To survive, states must constantly think of their immediate welfare.

Neo-realists still see the promotion of a state's immediate selfish interests as its supreme goal in foreign policy. Unlike democratists, neo-realists see no natural allies, just national interests. They acknowledge that the concept of 'national interest' is ambiguous and changeable. As that arch neo-realist Henry Kissinger commented, the national interest, "must be adapted to changing circumstances."² A hallmark of neo-realism is this tactical flexibility. As circumstances and not ideology or consensus determine policy, neo-realists pride themselves on promoting practical policy initiatives. Kissinger further illuminates the neo-realist notion of strategic flexibility being the key to protection of national interests in his seminal thesis, A World Restored. Here Kissinger approvingly noted that the British foreign minister Castlereagh, "demonstrated his awareness that no policy, however successful, can be an end in itself."³ Ultimately, the only end for neo-realists is the practical consideration of a state's survival. The means to achieve this are virtually unlimited.

Though the concept of 'national interest' is slippery at best, it can be defined with some precision in practice. As Nixon stated regarding US national interests, "an American interest is vital if its loss, in and of itself, directly endangers the security of the US."⁴ Again, it is

apparent here that the concept of national interest is rooted in the survival and protection of the state itself. Neo-realists feel that since 1945, American national interests compel the US to see that no rival hegemon appears to counter American power. While Secretary of State, Kissinger expressed this neo-realist tenet at a 1973 press conference regarding the Yom Kippur war. "I stated that we will oppose the attempt by any country to achieve a position of predominance, either globally or regionally."⁵ In this case he was warning both Israel and Moscow, Israel not to opt for total victory over Egypt, and Moscow not to intervene to protect its Arab allies as the US would view this as a sign of a major escalation of the war and a marked shift in the regional balance of power. Beyond this general definition, national interest can also be defined by what it is not. Neo-realists believe that both democratists and institutionalists generally pursue policies that are not in the American national interest. James Schlesinger, the former Secretary of Defence and head of the CIA, castigated democratists regarding their crusading zeal. He commented, "Do we seriously want to change the institutions of Saudi Arabia? The brief answer is no. Indeed in the Middle East the Islamic state that has most successfully embraced democratic processes is none other than Iran."⁶ Schlesinger neatly illustrates neo-realism's 'realistic' critique of democratism. Neo-realists see American national interests as being served by the survival of the Saudi royal family despite its despotism, as it is an old and valuable friend who has helped the US through its position as swing-producer of OPEC to keep US oil prices low. Whereas Iran, despite being an 'Islamic Republic' and relatively more democratic than King Fahd, has been a thorn in the American side since the Islamic revolution began in 1979. Schlesinger continued, "Traditional diplomacy would suggest that we not pick fights, but rather base our stance towards others on whether they are antagonistic or friendly toward us - and not on their internal arrangements."⁷ Thus, neo-realists and democratists differ sharply over American support for friendly dictatorial regimes, with neo-realists contending that as long as they are friendly toward American interests they should be supported. For neo-realists the Hobbesian jungle does not allow the US the luxury of having only morally pristine allies. For them, American interests override desires for universal democracy as a goal of foreign policy.

Likewise, neo-realists believe that the institutionalists' multilateral views are too confining. To return to the Hobbesian jungle metaphor, to survive in the jungle a state must be quick, and unencumbered by anything as onerous as multilateral consensus. Kissinger has urged the Clinton administration not to follow the multilateralist path. "What it must not do is to permit its objectives and missions to be defined by invocations of international consensus."⁸ Neo-realists see neither the wrongheaded fervour of democratism nor the overly-shackled stance of the institutionalists as holding the key to American foreign policy in

the post-Cold war era. Rather, a sober evaluation of American national interests must always be the yardstick by which neo-realists feel any specific US policies are measured.

The neo-realists are the direct heirs of Schurmann's imperialists, the men who designed the Cold War system and led the US to unparalleled success after 1945. These men: Truman, Acheson, Vandenberg, Kennan, and Marshall shared many of the same foreign policy views as today's neo-realists. John Lewis Gaddis cogently explored the Truman administration's foreign policy beliefs in, "Containment: A Reassessment". He stated, "there is in Kennan's approach a set of propositions so obvious that they often escape notice: that there are limits to power; that there are no commitments without costs...that as strategy needs to be informed by policy, so policy needs to be informed by a clear vision of the national interest."⁹ Neo-realists see these basic tenets as still crucial to running American foreign policy, even with the end of the Cold War. For them, the end of the post-war era did not erase the verities taught to them by their imperialist forebears.

Unlike democratism, neo-realism is implicitly a declinist school of thought. As Christopher Layne and Benjamin Schwartz pointed out, "Realists believe that the US can and should act as an ordinary great power."¹⁰ Given the absolutely central position America occupied in the Cold War system this must be seen as a demotion. Indeed, Jeane Kirkpatrick urged the US to accept self-demotion. "We will need to learn to be a power, not a superpower."¹¹ The practical result of this declinist view is that neo-realists urge the careful selection and reevaluation of vital American interests in the post-Cold War era, as the US faces both internal and external limits on its ability to influence world events. John Gray echoed this neo-realist view. He believes that a successful foreign policy in the post-Cold War era, "entails an acknowledgement of the limits of American power as well as a judgement as to where American vital interests are at stake and where they are not."¹² The majority of neo-realists believe the United States should play an active role in the world, while at the same time recognising that American power has limits and should be used only when genuinely vital American interests are at stake. This declinist view is neatly summarised by Metternich's classic neo-realist comment in A World Restored. "I remain true to my eternal principle that events which can not be avoided must be directed."¹³ Neo-realists, to a much larger extent than democratists, believe that circumstances themselves limit even a great power's options. Metternich's belief that events which cannot be avoided must be directed will be returned to again when the neo-realist's specific policy prescriptions are discussed.

While some neo-realists see the US as the only great power left in the world, none view it as able to exert the type of world domination democratists claim is possible for the US with the demise of the Soviet Union. Nixon, while seeing the new world order as having only one superpower, also saw that superpower as having decided limits. This was his basic criticism of democratists, their inability to see American limits in a one superpower world. "Those who call for a global democratic crusade ignore the limits of our power."¹⁴ Kissinger agreed with his former boss, "We haven't the resources for domination."¹⁵ For many neo-realists the limits on American foreign policy initiatives are primarily the result of internal decline, rather than simply being the result of the world being too large and complicated a place even for a sole superpower to dominate. The neo-realist view toward burden-sharing is a case in point. Since the 1970s, America has called on its Nato allies to assume a greater proportion of the defence burden within the alliance. These calls for increased allied defence expenditure, vis-a-vis the US, are a direct result of what neo-realists feel is the relative economic decline of the US since the immediate post-war period. Increasing American economic difficulties have made the vast American commitment to Nato more painful as the years have worn on, prompting calls for increased European and Japanese support. This is an obvious sign of relative American decline, a position held by most neo-realists. As the arch declinist Paul Kennedy observed regarding the issue of burden-sharing within Nato, "burden sharing also implies sharing influence."¹⁶ Many neo-realists take his point that if the US wants increased burden sharing, it must be prepared to give up a share of its preponderant power. Many neo-realists see relative American decline as the precursor of a multipolar world where the US will be just one of many powers, a world not unlike that of Castlereagh and Metternich, a world where neo-realist principles are still valid.

Unlike democratists neo-realists believe nations have different values. If democratism is a universalist creed, neo-realism is very much a relativist, nationalist school of thought. Former Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, an outspoken neo-realist, criticised the democratist tendency in American foreign policy. "Our national vice is a tendency towards moralism in foreign policy, a kind of moral hubris which views the actions of others only through the prism of our own standards of conduct."¹⁷ Like his mentor Henry Kissinger, Eagleburger does not feel that American moral viewpoints, grounded as they are in a specific historical, cultural, and structural situation, necessarily have universal validity. Neo-realists feel that this general failing in democratist thinking is a recipe for specific foreign policy disasters. The avowed isolationist and presidential candidate Pat Buchanan criticised the hyper-democratist Ben Wattenberg's universalist viewpoint. He criticised democratism's, "endless and seditious meddling in the affairs of nations where institutions are shaped by

their own history, culture, traditions, and values, not ours. Democracy *uber alles* is a formula for permanent conflict and national bankruptcy."¹⁸ If Buchanan is correct and foreign institutions of government are not generally amenable to democracy (due to their different cultural, historical, and structural positions in the international system), then the attempt by hyper-democratists in particular, and democratists in general, to spread the alien creed of democracy is inherently doomed to failure. It also means that world-wide resistance to democratist initiatives could lead to US participation in an almost endless series of wars that would both demoralise and bankrupt the nation.

Neo-realists go far beyond merely disagreeing with democratists over whether nations inherently have different values. They feel these different values lead to differing degrees of receptivity toward democracy. This view is further extrapolated in Samuel P. Huntington's influential article, "The Clash of Civilizations?". Huntington argued, "It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world won't be primarily ideological [democratist view] or primarily economic [institutionalist view]. The great divisions among humankind and the dominant source of conflict will be cultural. Nation-states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics."¹⁹ This updating of the neo-realist creed not only argues for the non-universality of Western democratic ideology, it stresses the fact that nation-state's different values are expressed in their being part of distinctive cultural groupings larger than their individual states. These cultural groupings, or civilisations, are likely to come into conflict along their respective fault lines. For instance, Huntington's thesis would explain the Bosnian conflict as the result of Bosnia being on the border of the Western, Islamic, and Slavic-Orthodox civilisations. Huntington turned the Wilsonian view held by both democratists and institutionalists that increased interactions between societies leads to interdependence and a global culture on its head. "The interaction between peoples of different civilizations are increasing, these increased interactions intensify civilization consciousness."²⁰ Neo-realists see interaction between societies as cementing differences, not similarities. It is hard to imagine a starker contrast between neo-Wilsonianism and neo-realism than over this issue. From the notion of the non-universality of Western values logically flows the next neo-realist assumption, the idea that development does not occur according to a blueprint, in the same way everywhere.

While democratists and institutionalists would argue about whether democracy should succeed a market economy or vice-versa, both Wilsonian schools of thought implicitly

believe that there is a general, universal route that states follow towards modernisation. This Wilsonian view is antithetical to neo-realist beliefs. Richard Nixon argued that as states still find themselves at different levels of development, the hyper-democratist's urge to universally democratise should be kept in check. Nixon stated, "Americans must recognize that a highly sophisticated, highly advanced political system, which required many centuries to develop in the West, may not be best for other nations which have different traditions and are still in an earlier stage of development."²¹ Most neo-realists do not even go that far towards the democratist view on development. Many more would agree with Huntington when he said, "Conceivably, democracy in the world could stem from a single source. Clearly it does not."²² If neo-realists do not accept the democratist position that democracy comes from a single, universal source and that all states, given a certain level of development, will become democratic, neither do they accept the institutionalist variation of development theory. While accepting that economic modernisation leads to the destruction of traditional economic and political institutions, neo-realists do not believe that modernisation, particularly economic modernisation, is necessarily congruent with a single easily replicated Western model of development for all states to imitate. Huntington stated, "Economic development compels the modification or abandonment of traditional political institutions, it does not determine what political system will replace them."²³ For example, the frenetic pace of modernisation certainly played a part in the Shah's ouster from power in 1979. However rather than modernisation leading to the replacement of a despotic regime with a democratic one, the collapse of the Shah led to the advent of the Ayatollah Khomeini and the Islamic revolution in Iran. The revolution came about at least partly as a reaction to the strains of modernisation, such as its bewildering economic dislocation. Indeed the backlash from the forced, harsh, lightning pace of Iranian modernisation was a principal cause for the emergence of the virulently anti-Western government of the Imams. Neo-realists feel that while institutionalists are correct in emphasising the revolutionary aspect modernisation plays in developing nations, a 'rational' democratic outcome for all societies undergoing the modernisation process is never a foregone conclusion.

Neo-realists assume that power, the motive force of the international system, can be measured, if only generally and vaguely. A further distinguishing feature of the neo-realist school of thought is its adherents' propensity to see power as a relative phenomenon. This is antithetical to the institutionalist school which sees power as an absolute and not a zero-sum game. Trade is a key illustrative issue for both schools of thought regarding the notion of power. Neo-realists scorn the institutionalist view that as all gain from free trade, its advancement should be self-evident to every state. Neo-realists would point to the fact that

free trade, as it enables some states to do better than others, should never be adopted as more than a temporary tactic. For instance, if neo-realists felt that America's chief economic rivals, Germany and Japan, did better out of the Gatt talks than the US, they would feel that America should derail them, even if in absolute terms the US also benefited. For neo-realists the key point is that states do not exist in a vacuum. Power is relative and is the key to survival in the Hobbesian jungle. As Grieco observed, "driven by an interest in survival, states are certainly sensitive to any erosion in their relative capabilities."²⁴ Neo-realists believe that for a state to feel itself successful, by definition it must be more successful than others.

A final, unique assumption of the neo-realist school of thought is its controversial open yearning for the bipolar world. Lawrence Eagleburger put it most bluntly in a speech while Secretary of State to the Council on Foreign Relations, "My good friend Peter Tarnoff [then head of the Council on Foreign Relations, now Assistant Secretary of State] was quick to take me to task in The New York Times for having demonstrated nostalgia for the Cold War...But today, Peter, I have a confession to make: I am truly nostalgic for the Cold War."²⁵ (my emphasis). In light of all the obvious injustices wrought in the name of the Cold War era, that neo-realists should pine for it is a mark of how highly they value stability in the international system.²⁶ Structurally the bipolar Cold War era is seen by most neo-realists as more conducive to stability than the multipolar system which preceded World War II. Neo-realists see systemic breakdown with the end of the Cold War, with the new emerging international system being once again based on the more volatile multipolarity. William Pfaff, writing in The Los Angeles Times, saw the very fact of systemic breakdown leading to an increase in world anarchy. He glumly mused, "When international systems break down, a time of troubles follows. We have only entered ours."²⁷ James Schlesinger concurred with Pfaff's gloomy outlook, seeing trouble rising with the end of bipolarity. "With the end of the Cold War - and the passing of its unique disciplines - the world is becoming more rather than less anarchic."²⁸ While imperial overstretch is a major fear of most neo-realists, many yearn for the simplicities of bipolarity, where American preponderance made American leadership inevitable. It is this lack of leadership in a new world order premised on multipolarity that is a major reason for the increased level of global instability, in the eyes of the neo-realists. As Huntington noted regarding Bosnia, "The security consequences of a multipolar world have been dramatically evident in the dismal failure of the major European powers to deal with the Yugoslav catastrophe on their doorstep."²⁹ Neo-realists do not miss the Cold War out of some warped nostalgia for the

past. Rather they miss the bipolarity that they feel was a prime factor in attaining the international stability that they value so highly.

Joseph Grieco in his excellent article, "Anarchy and the limits of cooperation", outlined five basic neo-realist views regarding the state's role in the international order. Firstly, neo-realists see states as still the major actors in world affairs, despite the rise of international organisations such as the UN and EU. The billiard ball theory of international relations, with the interaction of entities (balls hitting one another) still centred at the state level, is seen by neo-realists as generally accurately expressing the international political scene. Secondly, states behave as unitary rational agents. Despite the rise of fashionable theories such as bureaucratic politics, neo-realists still believe that states basically act coherently and can define their own best interests. As has been shown, this concept of the national interest is absolutely central for neo-realists. Thirdly and fourthly, states exist in a system of international anarchy predicated on power relations, which preoccupies them. Fifthly, and in direct contradiction to institutionalist assertions, neo-realists believe that international institutions have only marginal importance in the global system. Neo-realists still see the state and its interests as central to the study of international relations.

Neo-realists believe that the key to determining a state's foreign policy is divining its structural place in the international system. This can often be expressed in geopolitical terms. As Kissinger stated, "the perspective of nations differs with their obligations, their geography, their history, and their power."³⁰ For instance, neo-realists believe that the key to understanding relations between Lithuania and Russia will be generally the same no matter the ideology of either government. The crucial fact is that Russia is a large, great power and Lithuania is a small, relatively powerless state. For neo-realists, these geopolitical power realities matter far more than the belief systems of either the leadership of Russia or Lithuania. In opposition to the democratists, neo-realists value material power relations over ideology in the overall equation of power. In the neo-realists' structural view, only states with complimentary interests can pursue agreements, whatever the ideology or personal chemistry of the two leaderships. Former President Nixon, a neo-realist, illustrated this idea comparing his diplomatic style to that of George Bush. Nixon observed, "Bush believes, far more than I, in the effectiveness of personal diplomacy. He believes that if you have a good personal relationship, it helps on substance. I believe that unless leaders interests are compatible, a personal relationship doesn't mean a thing."³¹ Once again, this highlights the centrality of the notion of the national interest for the neo-realists. It is a concept at least partly determined for them by a state's structural position in the international system, as well as the

structural nature of the system (the polarity) itself. As Mearsheimer observed, "the keys to war and peace lie more in the structure of the international system than in the nature of individual countries."³² For neo-realists, it is largely the nature of the world order that determines an individual state's actions.

Neo-realists share similar views with democratists over what should be the preferred mode of American action in foreign policy implementation. However neo-realists are more reserved about the use of force to further American goals than are the optimistic democratists. David Gergen, formerly a senior adviser to President Clinton, noted that the US was, "likely to unshackle its sword only when truly vital interests are at stake."³³ Indeed neo-realists such as former Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger suggested as far back as 1984 that the US should only use force if absolutely necessary. Weinberger observed in a November 28, 1984 speech, "We should only engage our troops if we must do so as a matter of our vital interest."³⁴ Kissinger goes so far as to believe that dispatching troops should be a definition in itself as to what America's vital national interests really are. "American military forces should be employed only for causes for which we ourselves are prepared to pay. That indeed is a good working definition of American national interest."³⁵ Yet though neo-realists are reluctant to use force except to defend perceived vital national interests, once decided, American forces are not to be encumbered by multilateral organisations. As Nixon stated, "When vital US interests are threatened, the US should act with the UN where possible but without it if necessary."³⁶ National flexibility, a key factor in the international system for neo-realists, must not be abandoned in the pursuit of some multilateralist utopia. Neo-realists feel that the US should be reluctant to use force. However once the decision is made that a vital national interest is at stake and force is necessary, the US must be prepared to act unilaterally if it has to.

Despite being prepared to act unilaterally on the international stage to defend national interests, neo-realists would prefer to act within an informal concert of great powers if possible. This concert, be it for military or peaceful purposes, is similar to the Concert of Vienna so well described by Henry Kissinger in A World Restored. Neo-realists feel that the world is becoming increasingly multipolar. Thus it may hold more opportunities to use again such an informal great power structure as existed in the multipolar Metternichean world. Unlike democratists, who believe international organisations should be forged around a common purpose growing out of a common ideology and values, neo-realists feel that informal international co-operation will arise organically due to shared global interests. As Charles Glaser stated a concert of powers, "increases the prospects for coordination that

already exist as a result of a country's shared interests."³⁷ Huntington saw such an informal concert as already forming, based on the new global power structure. He saw the US as the chairman of the board of a great power directorate that has a shifting membership depending on the issue under discussion. Huntington said, "Global political and security issues are effectively settled by a directorate of the US, Britain and France, world economic issues by a directorate of the US, Germany, and Japan."³⁸ Neo-realists see a concert of powers, united by shared national interests, as the most promising form of international co-operation to emerge in the new world order. They shun the more rigid international constructions of the institutionalists.

Neo-realists feel that the key area to focus on in the international system should be the United States itself, with Europe also being a large concern. As neo-realists believe that the national interest is the key to foreign policy, this nationalistic assertion is far from surprising. As Gaddis stated, "the chief objective of US foreign policy has been to maintain an external environment conducive to the survival and prosperity of the nation's domestic institutions...in this the US has differed little from other great powers: sovereign nations, to be secure, have always required climates in which their institutions could flourish."³⁹ It is instructive that Gaddis, a neo-realist, saw the survival of the nation's 'institutions' to be a central concern of American foreign policy, unlike the democratist Allison who saw the survival of the nation's 'values' as crucial. This standard concentration on 'America first' has been given a new twist in the new world order. Neo-realists have echoed President Clinton in seeing the interconnectedness between foreign and domestic policy. As Huntington stated, "the promotion of US strategic interests will involve not only foreign and defense policy but also domestic policy."⁴⁰ As its focus on the US remains central for neo-realists, increasingly they see the need to alleviate America's domestic ills as a source of enhancing American power. Nixon summed this point up saying, "to solve our problems at home enhances our leadership abroad."⁴¹ Implicit in their desire to concentrate more on domestic matters with the end of the Cold War, is the neo-realist desire to rebuild America. Obviously if America needs to be 'built again' (the strict definition of the word rebuild) this neo-realist tenet shows their declinist tinge, although clearly they believe measures can be taken to arrest America's decline.

Neo-realists see Europe as the United States' second concern. For like their forebears, Schurmann's Imperialists, they remain committed Atlanticists. Gaddis fleshed out this historical affinity. "For the US, in the twentieth century, the most important requirement for a congenial international environment has been that Europe not fall under the domination of a

single, dominant nation. Concern over the European balance of power dates back at least to the turn of the century."⁴² While it is a central neo-realist belief to oppose the appearance of a rival hegemon around the globe, this is particularly true for them of the Eurasian landmass. Neo-realist reasons for valuing Europe are very different from democratist motivations. Mearsheimer stated the reasons for Europe's importance to neo-realists succinctly, "Europe's important geographic position, not to mention those raw power assets like manpower and GNP that it controls, make it hard to see how one can separate European security from American security."⁴³ Unlike democratists, neo-realists value Europe for what it possesses and how that relates to American interests, rather than for what it is ideologically. This is an excellent example of two different schools of thought generally agreeing on positions for entirely different reasons.

Unlike democratists, neo-realists do not see the US as the chief global policeman, the ultimate authority in the international system. For many neo-realists, Vietnam displayed the very dangers that the US could avoid by relinquishing the role of global cop. As Nixon stated in 1967 at the height of the Vietnam conflict, "other nations must recognize that the role of the US as world policeman is likely to be limited in the future."⁴⁴ Following this policy of limiting American commitments, Nixon began the negotiating process that eventually ended the war in 1975. Likewise he took the US off the gold standard, thereby removing the dollar as the single guarantor of the international monetary system. The Economist, summed up the 'Nixon doctrine' precisely as the notion, "that America could not act as world policeman."⁴⁵ Nor is this strongly held view merely the preserve of the realist-internationalist majority. If anything, realist-isolationists feel even more strongly about America not taking on the role of global policeman. Their champion, Pat Buchanan, put it bluntly, "We aren't the world's policeman, nor its political tutor."⁴⁶ If neo-realists feel that America should not be world cop, they unanimously feel the UN has no right to the job. For them the sanctity of the state is central and if the UN were to become world policeman, there would then be an international organisation with true primacy over all states. Jeane Kirkpatrick, a neo-realist and fierce critic of the UN's expansionary aims, has argued that, "The Charter bars the UN from interfering in the internal affairs of nations."⁴⁷ If neo-realists feel that in taking the role of world policeman the US would be unwise, the idea of the UN in such a position is greeted with even greater opposition, as UN authority would undermine the sanctity of the state which is a central neo-realist belief.

For neo-realists no world policeman is needed as the international system will maintain itself naturally through a balance of power.⁴⁸ Kissinger cleverly stated the neo-realist case.

Peace, he felt, "is the expression of certain conditions and power relationships. It is to these relationships - not to peace - that diplomacy must address itself."⁴⁹ The balance of power is seen by neo-realists as the mechanism that leads to general stability, if not to an absence of war. Once again this illustrates that the concept of stability is the key to the balance of power and this is crucial to neo-realists in general. It is a system that leads states to, "know few permanent enemies and few permanent friends."⁵⁰ This is because regardless of ideological affinities, balance of power politics leads states to always attempt to stop the emergence of a hegemonic power. While this is easily envisaged in a bipolar system where lesser states group around the two superpowers, such as when the Nato and Warsaw Pact countries grouped around America and the USSR respectively, it becomes slightly more complicated in a multipolar system; but the end result is the same. In the eternal effort to stop the emergence of a dominant state or states, two or more roughly equal alliances will form. As these alliances are predicated on power and not shared values as they are for democratists, neo-realists see defections within alliances as common in a multipolar system. These defections help keep the system within balance as time passes and the great powers' relative strength ebbs or flows. Thus as neo-realists believe all states follow their natural, rational interests, the balance of power becomes a self-correcting mechanism as states defect from alliances to correct the inevitable imbalances in power that occur over time with the rise and decline of all great powers. Neo-realists see the balance of power as the chief guarantor of stability of the international system.

Neo-realists' two key analytical orientations, the factors in the overall power equation that they most value, are firstly military power and secondly geopolitics. As noted earlier, neo-realism is a structural creed with an emphasis on the idea that foreign policy outputs are largely the result of the geopolitical situation that states find themselves in. As Kissinger's neo-realist alter-ego Metternich wrote to Castlereagh, "the strongest laws governing states are those of geography."⁵¹ Neo-realists believe that geographical imperatives, which are timeless, override man's clumsy attempts at international law. As Kissinger scornfully noted, "Another dispatch [by Castlereagh] on 6 September, attempted to elucidate the legal position with respect to the revolution in Naples, as if the dilemma imposed by Austria's central location could be removed by the patient reiteration of the maxims of international law."⁵² In direct contrast to democratists, neo-realists feel that the permanence of geography outweighs any shared values nation-states may transiently share, and as such is a more important factor in the overall power equation.

For neo-realists it is power, particularly military power, that is the key to foreign policy analysis. As has been stated before, neo-realists feel military power is essential for a state to survive due to the anarchic nature of the international system. As Kissinger stated, "International Relations can not be conducted without an awareness of power relations,"⁵³ so central is it to neo-realist thought. As Kissinger wryly noted in an April 1958 Foreign Affairs article written in response to the Soviet launching of Sputnik, "Force by itself won't supply an answer to the challenge of the future; it offers the possibility that there will be a future."⁵⁴ (my emphasis). To preserve the state, neo-realists put their faith in the tangible components of power, unlike the democratists. The tangible components of power: GDP, military strength, geopolitics, are not only less likely to swiftly change and are also easier to measure in calculating the balance of power in a way intangibles like ideology and trade organisations are not. This emphasis on tangible components of power once again illustrates the essentially conservative nature of neo-realism. Kissinger recounted that after the Austrian disaster of Austerlitz, where Metternich bowed to a public nationalist outcry to fight Napoleon no matter what the material disadvantages, he never again believed in anything but the tangible components of power. For Metternich, "The disaster of 1809 had led him to believe that national élan was no substitute for a material base."⁵⁵

Neo-realists also believe that the interdependence caused by international trade is no substitute for the balance of power in preserving international stability. As Nixon observed, "If an issue affects vital national interests, a major power will throw even the strongest economic ties overboard in order to prevail."⁵⁶ Neo-realists use history to bolster this contention. Despite a great degree of interdependence in la belle époque and the inter-war period, World Wars I and II were not prevented. Indeed, much contemporary criticism by neo-realists of the last two Democratic Presidents centres on their over-reliance on economic instruments and their aversion to force. Samuel Huntington himself served under Brzezinski in Carter's National Security Council from 1977-8. Like Brzezinski he was a Democratic 'hawk'. In reviewing Brzezinski's book, Weighing Power and Principle, Huntington stated, "Carter didn't see that at times the shedding of some blood may be necessary to avert more disasters."⁵⁷ This neo-realist criticism is often aired regarding the institutionalist administration of President Clinton. Here neo-realists agree with democratists that institutionalism's hesitancy to use force in the international arena may be a fatal flaw to their foreign policy initiatives. Despite all the changes in the international system, power, especially military force, is still seen by neo-realists to be the single most important component in the overall power equation.

The neo-realist school of thought has been traditionally dominant in International Relations study since 1945, and despite coming under sustained attack by neo-Wilsonianism especially since the early 1970's, probably still is. Its dominance can be seen in Chart 3-2. Whereas most of the democratists analysed were academics/journalists, opinion-makers outside the realm government, all of the neo-realists studied are both opinion-makers and former policy-makers (Kissinger, Buchanan, Nixon and Kirkpatrick). Neo-realists control numerous bastions of power as well as having a strong hold on the public's way of looking at the world. The very terms most people (including academics) use to discuss foreign policy; 'America', 'Britain', 'China', are implicitly part of the billiard ball theory of international relations, and thus are part of the neo-realist construct. As Holsti and Rosenau pointed out in their survey of American public opinion leaders, "a strong majority expressed the view that the nature of international affairs will continue to be dominated by traditional definitions of national interests."⁵⁸ Yet despite this enduring power, neo-realists such as Henry Kissinger have long bemoaned the fact that an unfettered neo-realist foreign policy is unsustainable in the US, as it ignores the crusading, missionary streak so long apparent in the American psyche. He stated, "The drawback of this [neo-realist] approach was its dearth of emotional resonance among the American people. Though President Nixon frequently spoke of a structure of peace, structures are instruments that do not of themselves evoke commitments in the hearts and minds of a society - especially one imbued with America's tradition of exceptionalism."⁵⁹ Despite Kissinger's best efforts, the US has remained traditionally opposed to the balance of power guiding American policy. While neo-realists have often run American foreign policy (witness Nixon and Kissinger), and neo-realist thought has until recently dominated International Relations discourse, it is questionable if a purely neo-realist American foreign policy is sustainable.

Neo-realism's bureaucratic bastions are in the Republican Party, the Department of Defence, the CIA, and the old Bush administration. Neo-realists dominate the Republican Party, as can be seen in Chart 3-2, where all three opinion-makers were and are staunch Republicans. This phenomenon will be looked at in detail in the concluding chapters of this work. Neo-realists dominate the CIA and DoD, as both organisations are symbols of the tangible components of power that figure so prominently in their thinking. It is not surprising that individuals working in such institutions would value a school of thought that gives their organisation such a central role in American foreign policy formulation and implementation. Nor is it odd that those who espouse the neo-realist doctrine should choose to work in agencies their ideological orientation leads them to believe are central to American policy-making. The DoD and CIA have been bureaucratic bastions of neo-realist thought for many

years. The DoD's continued neo-realist adherence can be seen in its strong objection to President Clinton's plan to help in establishing a UN rapid deployment force. According to Barton Gellman of The Washington Post, "It [the Clinton administration] rejects the call from Butros Ghali, for a UN 'rapid deployment force' for intervention in world trouble spots, an idea Clinton endorsed in 1992. The Pentagon, in the words of one official, threw 'a major dose of cold reason' on broader proposals from the State Department and NSC staff."⁶⁰ On the issue of giving some increased military power to the UN, it is not surprising the Pentagon was opposed, as they were the bureaucratic group that actually would have lost a degree of power if such a plan had been implemented. Also, the Pentagon displayed its habitual neo-realist suspicion of the UN. Doubtless many at the DoD genuinely thought any American cession of authority would be detrimental to US interests, as it would obviously seem to followers of neo-realism. In the end, as questions of force are still largely the bureaucratic preserve of the Pentagon, its neo-realist argument carried the day on this issue. It had more bureaucratic weight with President Clinton than his like-minded institutionalist colleagues at NSC and State, who traditionally try to expand UN power. It is apparent that the DoD is still very much dominated by neo-realist thinking.

Regarding policy towards Western Europe and Nato, neo-realists tend to favour retaining Nato as the key Atlantic security structure, at least for an interim period. They see the OSCE (Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe), with over fifty members each with a veto, as both cumbersome and unreflective of the balance of power. Despite favouring Nato, American neo-realists are pessimistic about its long-term future with the demise of the Soviet Union. They expect minimally that the European role in Nato vis-a-vis the US will increase, making it ultimately an institutional vehicle for great power concerts rather than a symbol of American dominance. The neo-realists' policy towards Nato again implicitly illustrates their declinist orientation.

Despite continued advocacy of Nato as the key to the Atlantic alliance, few neo-realists feel Nato in its present form is likely to long endure. This is because of the classic neo-realist approach to alliances, that they are made because of common interests. As Kissinger stated, "We must confine our alliances to the purposes we and our allies share."⁶¹ With this limited view of alliances as based only upon shared specific interests, it is easy to see why neo-realists feel that Nato should have no greater political role. As Robert Hunter exhorted, "Nato should continue to focus on military issues and not try to expand its mandate."⁶² Neo-realists feel Nato should not expand from the military into the political realm precisely because the various states in Nato have distinctly different political agendas. This is a major

difference from the democratist view that the members of Nato have a common political position based on their shared espousal of a democratic culture. For neo-realists differences between the European and American pillars of the alliance are rooted in their different structural position in the international spectrum. As Trevor Salmon noted, "it must be accepted that the Americans and Europeans do have policy, perceptual and interest differences."⁶³ Structurally this is explained by the fact the US was a superpower in the Cold War system, and that individual European countries were at best regional powers. Further, Huntington believed there are cultural differences that divide rather than unite the Atlantic alliance. He noted, "Western civilization has two major variants, European and North American."⁶⁴ For neo-realists, these cultural differences limit policy commonalities between the two pillars of the Atlantic alliance. Kissinger concurred,

"It was naive of Americans to take for granted that a federal Europe would be more like us, that a unified Europe would automatically help carry our burdens, and that it would continue to follow American global prescriptions as it had in the early postwar years of European recovery and dependence. That can't be so...American support for European unification was therefore an expression of self-interest even if it was paraded under the banner of altruism."⁶⁵

For Kissinger, the divisions between Western Europe and America were always there, and that with Europe's relative rise, symbolised by the increased vigour of the EU, relations between Western Europe and America were bound to be more equal and conflictual. Neo-realists feel that this hidden, underlying change in power relations between the two was revealed for all to see with the end of the Cold War. As Gaddis stated, "Americans can not expect to maintain the authority the Cold War gave them on the continent for very much longer."⁶⁶ Ultimately neo-realists feel that the end of the Cold War has forced the reconfiguration of Nato at best and its abolition at worst, due to the lack of a common European-American military threat.

With the decline of the Soviet Union and the corresponding end of the military threat it posed, neo-realists see the thread that kept Nato together unravelling with the passing of shared military interests. Josef Joffe stated that, "The alliance now faces the greatest threat to its existence ever. Having 'won' the Cold War, it has lost its foe and its role."⁶⁷ Without the shared interest of collective defence against the possibly adventurist, definitely despotic Soviet regime, neo-realists feel Nato has lost its *raison d'être*. This assessment differs sharply from the democratist view that Nato can be a vital politico-military institution promoting European-wide democracy in the new world order. Joffe summed up neo-realism's bleak assessment of Nato in the post-Cold War world, "If the Cold War is truly over, then the Atlantic alliance will not survive in its traditional shape...no alliance has ever

lived past victory: logically the idea of alliance requires the idea of a foe and a threat."⁶⁸ Neo-realists point to the already differing views toward key European issues favoured by the victors of the Cold War. For instance, like hyper-democratists, neo-realists see Eastern Europe as an area of competition between the United States and Western Europe. As David Roche, (the chief European investment strategist at Morgan Stanley) said, "The real battleground for political power, investment, growth and influence in the new Europe is the East."⁶⁹ Rather than seeing Eastern Europe as a golden chance to solidify fledgling democracies as democratists do, neo-realists see it largely as an economic market where the principal American foe will be its Nato ally, Germany. Nor do neo-realists see policy differences between the US and Western Europe as limited to the economic sphere. The often acrimonious accusations of blame in the wake of the Bosnian disaster have, as Jim Hoagland of The Washington Post observed, "demonstrated that American and European security interests no longer coincide as fully as they did during the Cold War, European officials argue."⁷⁰ Without the same degree of shared interests to pull the alliance together as happened during the Cold War, neo-realists generally believe its day as a symbol of American dominance of Western Europe is over. However, neo-realists do feel a two-pillar Nato may ultimately serve as a useful political vehicle for the concert of great powers they see that will come to dominate the world in the post-Cold War era. Therefore for now, neo-realists maintain their strong support for the alliance.

Regarding Bosnia, neo-realists were staunchly non-interventionist, as they saw no vital American interests at stake in the former Yugoslavia. While accepting that there had been humanitarian outrages in Bosnia, neo-realists did not believe that this was a reason for American intervention. Rather they believed that, "moral outrage is a poor guide to America's interests and goals."⁷¹ As the former Yugoslavia was not a centre for American trade or business and as it had little strategic significance, neo-realists felt that while the atrocities committed in Bosnia were appalling, they alone should not compel a massive and potentially dangerous intervention. As the debate over intervention in Bosnia raged in 1993, it was not surprising that the Pentagon, a neo-realist bastion, led bureaucratic opposition to intervention. As Thomas L. Friedman noted, "Having forced the Pentagon to begin taking steps to overturn the ban on homosexuals in the military, and preparing to force the joint chiefs of staff to cut \$10 billion more from the military budget than proposed by Bush, Clinton is not in a strong position to ask them to get involved militarily in Bosnia - something to which they are intensely opposed."⁷² While this point can be easily over stressed as ultimately the military has a long tradition of obedience to the President, however unpopular his policies are with the military (witness the fate of MacArthur), it is certainly true that due to

lifting the ban on gays (the 'don't ask don't volunteer' compromise) and budget cuts, Clinton was not popular with the military. It is also true that the DoD has great bureaucratic power over issues of war and peace, power they tend to wield cautiously in the post-Vietnam era, being habitually reluctant to enter into any open-ended conflict. Almost to a man the Joint Chiefs and Colin Powell saw Bosnia as just such an open-ended commitment, replete with changing territorial boundaries, uncertain allies and enemies, and a vague mission. While Clinton decided not to intervene in Bosnia for largely institutionalist reasons, (due to a lack of allied consensus), he followed the neo-realists' desire to stay out of the morass of Bosnia. However political decision-makers who are neo-realists, such as Senators Dole and Lugar, were at the forefront of the allied attempt to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia. They adhered to the standard neo-realist view that while America ought not to intervene in Bosnia, the Bosnians ought to be allowed to defend themselves against Serbian tyranny. For it was also a neo-realist contention that if tyranny remained unchecked in Bosnia it could lead to greater problems for the US in the future.

The standard neo-realist position on trade was a nuanced tactical favouring of both Nafta and Gatt. Neo-realists do not believe that free trade is the panacea that institutionalists see it to be, viewing it rather as useful in promoting the national interest in certain circumstances. Kenneth Waltz, an eloquent neo-realist argued, "whether free trade serves a nation's interests depends on its situation."⁷³ This neo-realist view is underpinned by their belief in a zero-sum world. As Huntington observed, "The idea that economics is primarily a non-zero-sum game is a favorite conceit of tenured academics. It has little connection to reality."⁷⁴ For neo-realists free trade is a tactic, not a deliverance. As Nixon noted, "it is an illusion that trade by itself will lead to peace."⁷⁵ In fact, many neo-realists see trade competition as replacing military conflict as the battleground of states, as like military power, trade figures are also illustrative of a zero-sum world. Miles Kahler echoed this argument. He stated, "we should see changes in the international economy not as producing an inevitable resolution to age-old problems of interest conflict [as institutionalists do], but as intimately tied to that conflict."⁷⁶ Yet regarding the specific instances of Nafta and Gatt, it can be seen that the majority of neo-realists favoured both pacts, seeing neither as leading to the relative diminution of American economic power. This is illustrated by the fact that neo-realists are generally members of the Republican Party, and it was the Republicans who ironically provided the backbone of support for President Clinton's near-perilous Nafta success, particularly in the House where the vote was close (234-200). Republicans have long been the party of business, a group expected to do better out of Nafta than America's blue-collar workers. This internal party dynamic undoubtedly affected Republican feelings about Nafta. In this case, the pro-business

slant of the Republican Party reinforced the general neo-realist belief that the Nafta agreement would not do American economic power any long-term harm. Thus neo-realists supported Nafta and Gatt, but not unconditional free trade.

Neo-realists feel that the beleaguered Yeltsin experiment in democracy should be helped, but not too much. They have nowhere near the enthusiasm for a democratic Russia that democratists possess, nor are they optimistic about its future. As John Gray noted, "Western policy, under American leadership, would be wiser if it prepared for the likelihood, not the possibility, of authoritarian rule in Russia, without making a fetish of democratic institutions."⁷⁷ This pessimism towards Russia's democratic chances leads neo-realists to advocate increased aid and security offers to the former Soviet satrapies of Eastern Europe, in case Russian reform fails. Kissinger holds the extreme end of this position, advocating increased aid to Eastern Europe, the Baltic states and Ukraine in an attempt to contain the effects of a Russian reversion to authoritarianism. Yet while most neo-realists would agree with Stephen F. Cohen's criticism of the Clinton administration, that it has shown, "excessive support for Yeltsin's 'special regime',"⁷⁸ most still feel Russia merits some American help. It is the neo-realist view that the US should mediate conflicts and provide political support and limited economic help only to those places in the former USSR where America has major interests. This would mean help for Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan because of their vast and untapped resources, and little help for Uzbekistan, Kirgyzistan, and Tajikistan where the US have few military or economic interests. But despite its low probability of democratic success, neo-realists feel Russia must be helped (at least marginally) in some way. Regarding aid to Russia, Cohen said, "[help] of course we must. The main reason is that if Russia, with all its unprecedented potential for nuclear and ethnic holocaust, lurches into chaos or despotism, no international security will be possible."⁷⁹ Neo-realists may believe Russia's chance for democratic success to be slim, but they feel it is too important a state not to attempt to marginally improve Yeltsin's chances. But Russia's recurring regional assertiveness strikes neo-realists as a bad sign that it may soon again be inflicting its overbearing regional predominance on the former republics of the USSR. Neo-realists fear Russia because a central part of their creed is not to believe that ultimately the professed ideology of the leadership in Moscow matters as much as the geopolitical reality that Russia is a great state and its former Soviet neighbours are minor states (except for Ukraine) in determining foreign policy outputs. This structural assertion leads neo-realists to be quickly suspicious of Russian actions and motivates their desire for the Clinton administration to be tougher with the Yeltsin regime about its increasingly adventurous policies toward the 'near abroad'. As Brian Beedham stated, "The new democracies of East-

Central Europe, are already calling for protection against what they see as a returning tide of Russian power. Does the West go on telling them not to fuss? Clinton's people, on the far side of the Atlantic and with their eyes turned toward Asia, show signs of being tolerant of Russia's reexpansion."⁸⁰ Neo-realists fear the recurring threat of Russian expansionism and want to focus American efforts more on protecting and stabilising East-Central Europe, the Baltic states and Ukraine, rather than overemphasising the chances for democratic success in Russia.

Like the institutionalists and unlike the democratists, neo-realist policy towards China encourages following a conciliatory line. This is due to China's geostrategic importance and booming economy. Neo-realists feel China is just too important to ignore or isolate as was the American policy for the early Cold War years until Nixon's historic visit. For the neo-realists it is the power and importance of a region to the international system that matters above its internal characteristics. Twenty years later Nixon still advocated an 'open' policy towards China characterised by the renewal of MFN, a policy favoured by a majority of neo-realists. He argued China should not be quarantined because it is, "a voice in the world that can't be ignored and a force in the world that can't be isolated."⁸¹ For neo-realists, the 'realities' of power compel the US to continue to engage China as the best way to integrate it within the international system and enhance global stability, regardless of its human rights abuses and anti-democratic regime. Again then, neo-realists agree with Clinton's soft-line policy towards China, but for different reasons.

Neo-realism contains two currents, the majority realist-internationalists and the realist-isolationists. The differences between the two currents are often so great that they do not follow even a vaguely general line in policy prescription as will be seen. However they begin from the same starting point, that the promotion of the national interest is essential and that foreign policy should concentrate on enhancing conditions in America itself. Robert Keohane cleverly defined the essence of the realist-internationalists by relating what they are not. He said they are, "critics of zeal [in International Relations as is espoused by the neo-Wilsonian schools of thought] without being advocates of isolationism."⁸² The realist-isolationists have a long history as a permanent, if minority, view in American foreign policy. Many of Buchanan's isolationist adherents trace their creed back to Washington's farewell address, in which he urged the young republic to beware of entangling alliances, saying, "The great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign Nations, is, extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little Political [his emphasis] connection as possible."⁸³ The present isolationist incarnation, under the leadership of Buchanan, has made clear its controversial

policy prescriptions in the new world order. David Gergen stated their general views succinctly, "bring home US troops; stay out of foreign wars; eliminate foreign aid; end support for the IMF and World Bank; treat Japan and Europe as economic predators and concentrate on 'America first'."⁸⁴ Of these general prescriptions realist-internationalists would agree only with the last wholeheartedly.

Realist-isolationists feel the world, particularly the Western world, has grown rich at American expense. While the US paid billions to defend them, so the argument goes, with their security problems solved, Germany and Japan were able to concentrate on their economic policies to the long-term detriment of the American economy and interests. Christopher Layne developed this theme, arguing that, "US military commitments in Europe and Asia should end. Maintaining them won't stop Germany and Japan from becoming great powers. By forcing them to finance their security, America can compel them to forgo trading-state policies that have enriched them at US expense."⁸⁵ Realist-isolationists do not believe it is in the American interest to be the world cop, the pivot at the centre of a unipolar world, nor do many realists of either current believe it to be possible, as they see the world as becoming increasingly multipolar. Thus as a result of both choice and the changing world structure, realist-isolationists believe America should hasten the inexorable movement toward global multipolarity by withdrawing American troops from around the globe. The money saved from withdrawing US troops can then be spent on America itself, rather than to protect ally-competitors. The realist-isolationist policy towards the deployment of American troops overseas is antithetical to that of realist-internationalists, who see the defence of Western Europe as a major American interest. It is just one example of the myriad policy differences between the two currents within the neo-realist school of thought.

Pat Buchanan, Republican, noted columnist, television pundit and presidential candidate, is the standard-bearer for the realist-isolationist current. Buchanan espouses a strict 'America first' version of isolationism, and wants to radically limit America's involvement with the rest of the world. He advances an utterly pragmatic view of other states, taking the extreme plank of the neo-realist position about the lack of importance of the internal nature of other states. Buchanan exhorted, "Whether the man who rules in Bujumbura or Buenos Aires wears a business suit or a military blouse isn't our concern, so long as he does not make of his nation an enemy of the US."⁸⁶ As Buchanan firmly believes that the US should not involve itself in the affairs of other states, he considers the democratist creed particularly anathema. Buchanan quoted John Quincy Adams in explaining his opposition to internationalism. He feels America should be, "the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She is the

champion and vindicator only of her own."⁸⁷ To restore America (Buchanan is implicitly a declinist), he takes an extreme version of the neo-realist view that America should promote its own national interests above all else. Buchanan believes that the US should not really care about the internal nature of other states, so long as they do not directly oppose American interests. This is the essence of the realist-isolationist creed.

Regarding Nafta, Buchanan did not advance the majority neo-realist position in favour of the agreement. This example illustrates the fact that minority views of the schools of thought do not correspond to majority views in evaluating the charts of the individual opinion-maker's and decision-maker's policy preferences. Rather, Buchanan endorsed the minority isolationist position on trade. As the Washington Post editorialised, "The conservative columnist Buchanan, representing a decided minority within the Republican party, has taken to opposing Nafta as an attack on 'national sovereignty'."⁸⁸ As with other neo-realists, Buchanan believes firmly in the sanctity and central importance of the state in the international system. However, Buchanan's belief in the centrality of the state goes far beyond that of the realist-internationalists. While they feel free trade may be tactically in the interests of the US, Buchanan feared any trade deal as extensive as Nafta would erode the state's ability to 'control' its own territory. Indeed in the aftermath of the Mexican economic debacle Buchanan charged that the close economic links between Mexico and the US have hurt America. He argued the Mexican bailout plan of the Clinton administration was a, "rip-off of taxpayers,"⁸⁹ as it has tied the unpredictable Mexican economy even more firmly to the US than Nafta had. It is this close linkage which angered Buchanan. For him the loss of American control over its sovereignty outweighed any short-term economic benefit Nafta gave the US. As the Post reported, his view is a decided minority within the Republican Party. Yet Buchanan's minority view is expounded for specifically neo-realist reasons as he feared the erosion of national sovereignty over Nafta. For him strict sovereignty⁹⁰ is a crucial element of American power.

Henry Kissinger, former academic, Secretary of State, National Security Adviser, international consultant, and dean of the American foreign policy establishment, propagates far more conventional neo-realist views than Buchanan. This is in large part because Kissinger crafted many of the tenets behind realist-internationalist policy prescriptions himself. There is no denying the centrality of Kissinger's thought to post-war American foreign policy in general, and neo-realist attitudes in particular. As Huntington has noted, "The new realism reached its apotheosis in the central role played by the balance of power in the theory and practice of Henry Kissinger."⁹¹

Kissinger's general views are voiced by his hero Metternich in his excellent book, A World Restored, which explores the policies of Metternich at the Congress of Vienna and afterwards. It is often difficult when reading Kissinger's view of Metternich to determine whether he is talking about the Austrian minister or himself. For instance in his description of Metternich one can easily see a description of Kissinger's general foreign policy style itself. "Hardenberg, the envoy of Hanover at Vienna, wrote the following analysis of Metternich's diplomatic methods at the height of the crisis of 1812: 'Endowed with a high opinion of the superiority of his ability...he loved finesse in politics and considered it essential. Since he does not have sufficient energy to mobilize the resources of his country...he attempts to substitute cunning for strength and character'."92 Kissinger also came to see his abilities as a temporary way to make up for what he thought to be America's declining position. Since he was in power in the early 70s, Kissinger has seen the world as multipolar, and has perceived the US as in decline. To promote American national interests (that is, for essentially neo-realist reasons), many of Kissinger's pronouncements of the period have institutionalist overtones. These were made because Kissinger believed the world was moving towards multipolarity and it is a key neo-realist belief that processes that cannot be controlled must at least be directed. For instance, in his April 1974 address to the Sixth Special Session of the UN, while Secretary of State, he said, "We in this assembly must come to grips with the fact of our interdependence."93 The lack of enthusiasm in this statement is matched by Kissinger's hard-headed acceptance of what he saw as an inexorable process.

While in office Kissinger devised a paradigm of the multipolar world he saw in the 1970s, a series of interlocking triangles with the US at the centre as part of both the economic triangle (Western Europe, Japan, the US) and the military triangle (USSR, China, US). This tripolar scheme is now advanced in the 90s by institutionalists as well as influencing the neo-realist Samuel Huntington's notion of the US as chairman of the board of a series of directorates whose members change according to the issue. For many, Kissinger's model of multipolarity, while premature in the 70s, has come into its own in the new world order. While Kissinger has an institutionalist minority tinge to his thinking, it is important to see it as engendered by strictly neo-realist beliefs. His advice to the new President in 1988 dispelled any lingering doubts as to Kissinger's overall orientation, if there were any, as it is a classic definition of realist-internationalist beliefs. He stated, "he must focus American resources and energies on areas where precisely defined US national interests are at stake. He must not be reluctant to admit that there are important issues, even conflicts, in which the US

has no special role to play because our vital interests aren't engaged. But he must not shrink from defending our interests."⁹⁴

Regarding large-scale aid to Russia, Kissinger adheres to the general neo-realist position, while disagreeing with both the Clinton administration and his former boss, Richard Nixon. Like most realist-internationalists, Kissinger feels Russia should be helped because of its importance to the international system's stability, and not due to Yeltsin's democratic tendencies, as democratists believe. Kissinger believes the reason the US should support Russia, "wasn't that he's [Yeltsin] a democrat, on which point the jury is still out, but that he's likely to pursue policy less dangerous to US interests than his most recent rivals. And that is a national security, not a moral judgement."⁹⁵ In his renunciation here of democratist beliefs that Yeltsin's democratic tendencies are the reason to help Russia, Kissinger's single-minded focus on Yeltsin's relatively benevolent attitude towards the US vis-a-vis Vice President Ruskoi and Parliamentary Leader Khasbulatov, mirrors Buchanan's view that the US should judge a state by its policy towards the US above all else. However in considering offering even limited aid to Russia, Kissinger decisively distances himself from the realist-isolationists. Beyond this point Kissinger is not prepared to go. He opposes large-scale Russian aid unlike both the democratists and the Clinton administration. He criticised, "the Clinton administration in its overemphasis on Moscow politics."⁹⁶ Unlike democratists, Kissinger is not enthusiastic about the chances for Russian democratic success due to its almost thousand year tradition (with the brief exception of Kerensky) of authoritarianism. Rather than overemphasising the chances for democratic success in Russia, Kissinger advocates the increased integration of Eastern Europe into the democratic fold. As Thomas L. Friedman noted, Kissinger has been warning in recent articles of, "the dangers of the West going overboard in rebuilding Russia, without reference to Russian history. If America aids Russia to the exclusion of other former Soviet republics, Kissinger argues, it could find itself in a few years having to deal with the resurgent imperialist-minded Russia of old."⁹⁷

Kissinger's scepticism about Russian aid is opposed by the Clinton administration, who see in it the seeds of continuing the Cold War containment policy. As Jim Hoagland noted, "Warren Christopher [Secretary of State] firmly rejects published criticism of the plan [Partnership for Peace] by Kissinger, who argues that the Clinton administration's refusal to extend Nato into Eastern Europe because of concern about the Russian reaction gives Moscow a veto over Western security policy."⁹⁸ Kissinger's concern is that an overemphasis on the situation in Russia will enable the Yeltsin government to tacitly blackmail the West into following Russian policy wishes in an attempt to bolster the fragile

Yeltsin government. In this instance, Kissinger felt the Clinton administration pursued an overly tentative policy toward enlarging Nato into Eastern Europe, which anchored Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to the West by affording them Nato guarantees. Instead, in an effort not to alienate the Russian generals who saved Yeltsin from the October coup attempt, Clinton has offered the three states a half-measure called 'Partnership for Peace',⁹⁹ which ultimately provides no guarantee for Eastern Europe in the event that Russia returns to its expansionist ways. Critics of Kissinger's view, like Christopher, see it as threatening the delicate domestic balance in Russia, writing-off Yeltsin and simply extending the Iron Curtain eastwards rather than seeing in Yeltsin's democratic reforms the opportunity to forge a new era. Kissinger's support for Russian aid is lukewarm and limited. He does not want the US to become overly enamoured of Yeltsin, as he feels the democratists and Clinton have become, at the expense of other vital American interests in Western and Central Europe.

Along with Nixon, Kissinger was involved in dramatically opening relations with China in the early 70s. Like the former President, Kissinger believes China is too important to the international system to either isolate or treat as a pariah state. Kissinger's institutionalist minority views also come to the surface over China, as he believes that China's increased economic contact with the rest of the world will mitigate some of their government's less desirable tendencies. Regarding China, Kissinger observed, "our diplomatic and material aid to those who work for pluralistic economic and representative processes should be done openly."¹⁰⁰ In this case the former Secretary of State means support for Deng Xiaoping and his communist reformers, who are radically using market methods to integrate the Chinese economy into the world economic system. These are the same people who are seen by the democratists as the butchers of Tiananmen Square. Both in theory and in practice, Kissinger has endeavoured to open China through economics to the influences of the outside world, regardless of its communist leadership, in an effort to make China a great power committed to the international system. Kissinger hopes this dynamic will enhance order, rather than isolating China - making it a rogue state out to destroy the world system and the neo-realists' cherished concept of stability. Ultimately Kissinger advocated an institutionalist position on China as he stated, "President Clinton made a difficult but correct decision in extending MFN trade status to China and in decoupling that status from the objective of promoting better human rights in China."¹⁰¹ It is his desire to wholly decouple trade issues from human rights concerns that indicates Kissinger's institutionalist policy preference.

Like most neo-realists Henry Kissinger was tactically in favour of the Nafta and Gatt trade agreements. However as he holds institutionalist minority views, his embrace of free

trade goes beyond that of most neo-realists. As far back as his 1974 address to the UN General Assembly, Kissinger believed, "a new commitment is required by both developed and developing countries to an open trading system."¹⁰² Over Nafta, Kissinger was far more enthusiastic than most of his fellow neo-realists, who were generally supportive of the deal. Just before the crucial Nafta vote in the House, Kissinger exhorted, "Almost once in a generation this country has an opportunity in foreign policy to do something that establishes the structure for decades to come. Nafta is the first and crucial step in this direction."¹⁰³ For Kissinger and institutionalists, the expansion of the liberal trading system is crucial to the success of the new post-Cold War world itself. In making this assertion Kissinger far distanced himself from most of his neo-realist colleagues, and confirmed his minority institutionalist views regarding free trade.

In the 35 years Kissinger has been writing in policy journals his deep ambivalence towards increased European strength, symbolised by its increased unity, has reflected the general realist-internationalist position. Kissinger initially saw increased European power as essential to American interests, yet now sees America's role in Europe as bound to decline. He remains pro-Nato, yet doubts its chances of survival in the new world order. While wanting Nato to be extended eastwards, he does not want it to expand beyond its essentially military character. These paradoxes reflect both Kissinger's specific thoughts and those of realist-internationalists in general towards Europe. Like most neo-realists Kissinger feels Western Europe, peaceful and not dominated by a single state, is a vital American interest, second only to that of defending America itself. While desiring Nato's spread eastwards, Kissinger feared the Clinton administration's 'Partnership for Peace' scheme would not provide true protection for Eastern Europe (in the form of security guarantees), and would emasculate the most successful military alliance in history. He stated, "The partnership for peace will dilute what is left of the Atlantic alliance into a vague multilateralism. It would accelerate the trend towards European nationalism, and once Russia regains strength, European neutralism."¹⁰⁴ He felt having a twin-track Nato would wreck the cohesiveness of the alliance and that the plan's lack of real protection for Eastern Europe illustrated the Clinton administration's relative unconcern for Europe, a suspicion of many of the continent's diplomats. Thus when a revived imperialist Russia re-emerges, as Kissinger fears, Europe will become neutral as it is unable to count on a real American military commitment to Europe, "Kissinger's attack reflected the views of diplomats and Pentagon officials."¹⁰⁵ Pentagon officials, like most neo-realists, are troubled by the Clinton administration's focus on Asia and the Pacific at the expense of Europe. This highlights a key difference in focus between neo-realists, who concentrate on Europe, and liberal

institutionalists, who are Asia-centric. In attacking the Partnership for Peace plan, Kissinger was in effect accusing Clinton of not putting enough weight on Europe.

Yet while Kissinger currently sees Europe as a neglected vital national interest, he himself has fears about European power and acknowledges that the American role in Europe is bound to decline with the end of the Cold War. Without the Soviet threat to cement the alliance, Kissinger feels the structural differences between the US and its European partners will lead increasingly to disagreements. As Kissinger prophesied as far back as April 1973, "The US has global interests and responsibilities. Our European allies have regional interests. These are not essentially in conflict, but in the new era neither are they automatically identical."¹⁰⁶ Kissinger believes these differing interests, combined with increased European power vis-a-vis the US, are bound to exacerbate tensions within Nato. He stated, "we can not ignore the fact that Europe's economic success and its transformation from a recipient of our aid to a strong competitor has produced a certain amount of friction."¹⁰⁷ Kissinger feels the changes in relative power of the two pillars of the Atlantic alliance will transform it from a symbol of American preponderance to at best, a club of great powers. He observed a united Europe, "is likely to insist on a specifically European view of world affairs which is another way of saying that it will challenge American hegemony in Atlantic policy."¹⁰⁸ So while Kissinger wishes to preserve the alliance with Western Europe, he also fears its power potential. For instance, he envisages the EU as a possible bastion of protectionism, an outcome that would greatly hurt the American economy. He said, "The prospect of a closed trading system embracing the EC and growing number of other nations in Europe, the Mediterranean and Africa appears to be at the expense of the US and other nations which are excluded."¹⁰⁹ Despite fearing European power, particularly its economic manifestations, Kissinger reluctantly endorses increased European co-operation. Regarding Europe, he stated that, "growing intra-European defense cooperation, possibly in the form of a European defense entity, should be endorsed."¹¹⁰ This is in line with the neo-realist tenet to direct what cannot be avoided, in this case the increased European power that will change Nato into a great power club. Despite obvious reservations about growing European power, Kissinger and most neo-realists endorse both the continuance of Nato and a growing European role in the alliance to match its relative growth in power.

Kissinger also followed the general neo-realist line regarding Bosnia. Unlike the democratists, he did not feel the Bosnian conflict was largely a tale of Serbian aggression and Muslim victimisation. He observed, "As soon as Bosnia was declared an independent state, all the nationalities fell upon each other in a struggle for dominance."¹¹¹ Kissinger saw the

Bosnian war as being primarily a civil war, rather than a clear-cut case of Serbian adventurism. Thus it is not surprising that keeping, "American troops out of Bosnia was his bottom line."¹¹² Yet while Kissinger spurned the democratist line regarding Bosnia, he also criticised the Clinton administration's institutionalist policy preference. Kissinger felt the administration's institutionalist penchant for multilateral solutions to international crises lead to the abdication of America's leadership role, as was the case in Bosnia.¹¹³ While Kissinger was unwilling to advocate the exertion of massive American involvement in Bosnia, neither was he prepared to follow the passive institutionalist line in the conflict, which would set the precedent of holding American foreign policy decision-making hostage to the wishes of America's allies. It is for this unilateralist reason that Kissinger favoured the neo-realist position regarding Bosnia.

Jeane Kirkpatrick, academic at Georgetown and former US ambassador to the UN, is another realist-internationalist. As with most neo-realists, she has a declinist view of the American structural position in the world order. However she does not see this decline as necessarily a bad thing. She stated in a 1992 article, "I do believe that the US will be relieved of some of the very extraordinary burdens that it has borne over the long period of the Cold War...And that is a very good thing."¹¹⁴ While this declinist view is a standard realist-internationalist position, her stance that a lessening of American global power will have domestic advantages is a further confirmation of her overall realist viewpoint.

Regarding free trade, Kirkpatrick sees its benefits as overcoming protectionist views, putting her position in line with the standard neo-realist view. She argued that, "The large sucking sound heard around the world is of societies being sucked into the modernization process - as the global trading system sucked in Bill Clinton. It's not inevitable, but the fruits of modernization are nearly irresistible."¹¹⁵ In speaking of a modernisation process, Kirkpatrick is accepting a very un-neo-realist position, the neo-Wilsonian idea that there is one general road to development, in this case the institutionalist view that it is through economic, free market progress. Thus over trade, Kirkpatrick comes to a neo-realist policy stance through very non-neo-realist views. Yet her conditional support for free trade expansion, the standard neo-realist position, is clearly evident. As the quotation illustrated, Kirkpatrick observes the power of free trade, but does not overtly or unequivocally endorse its benefits. Kirkpatrick's wary acceptance of free trade as being part of the process of modernisation exemplified her general neo-realist stance regarding the Nafta/Gatt trade accords.

Her attitude to Europe, Nato, and European integration is more traditional. Firstly, she feels American power in Europe is bound to decline in the new era. "The US has in common with the Soviet Union the prospect of a significantly declining future in Europe."¹¹⁶ She feels this decline will be accompanied by a rise in the power of Western Europe, particularly through the EU. Kirkpatrick believes, "the EC will turn out to be the integrating institution of the new Europe."¹¹⁷ Despite foreseeing a Europe with the US on the periphery, Kirkpatrick does not advise shaping Nato into anything more than a military alliance in an attempt to preserve American power, as the Europeans have never seen Nato in anything other than neo-realist terms, as an institution based on the shared interests of averting Soviet expansionism. She noted the, "American view of Nato as a multipurpose alliance of democracies [democratist view], [is] a view Europeans have always resisted and are likely to continue to resist."¹¹⁸ Kirkpatrick feels the democratists' scheme to remould the alliance into a primarily political institution is doomed to fail, even if many Americans have thought of Nato in democratist terms, as Europeans have a much more neo-realist view of the alliance. In Kirkpatrick's view, this discrepancy in perception dooms any hope of changing Nato's essentially military character.

Kirkpatrick also adheres to the neo-realist line over aid to Russia. In keeping with the general neo-realist stance she believes that the Clinton administration is right to provide Russia with political, economic, and moral support.¹¹⁹ However, also in keeping with neo-realist dictates, Kirkpatrick is not sanguine about the prospects for the success of Russia's democratic experiment. She argued, "the prospects for democracy and development in the Soviet Union are exciting but not promising."¹²⁰ Neo-realists in general, and Kirkpatrick in particular, feel the Russian experiment in democratic reform is 'exciting' enough that some US aid should be given, but 'not promising' enough so that help should be quite limited.

Beyond her dominant neo-realist orientation, Kirkpatrick also holds a minority democratist viewpoint as can be seen in her activist advocacy for the Bosnian government. Kirkpatrick criticised the President's multilateralist position in Bosnia, stating, "In Bosnia, where the president has repeatedly promised more decisive action, the US position has folded once again in the face of UN and allied opposition."¹²¹ Yet Kirkpatrick's position went well beyond the neo-realist critique of the administration's excessive preoccupation with multilateralism in the Bosnian crisis. She advocated direct American involvement in the conflict. Testifying before the Subcommittee on European affairs, Kirkpatrick stated, "I don't think that the use of American ground forces would be necessary to deal with this problem...I do believe that the highly focused, selective, limited and restrained use of US or

Nato or EC or Franco-German, whomever is competent, airpower to enforce some of the provisions that have already been provided by the Security Council is appropriate."¹²² These provisions included eliminating all hinderances to aid convoys, and enforcing the no-fly zone. Kirkpatrick also favoured securing the release of Bosnians and Croats held in concentration camps, and demanding the right of refugees to return to their houses, thereby negating ethnic cleansing. These conditions, Kirkpatrick felt, should be backed up by force if necessary.¹²³ Kirkpatrick felt the stakes were high enough in Bosnia to warrant limited American military involvement. As she stated, "I believe that the presence of another violent, expansionist, racist dictator in the heart of Europe is dangerous not only to his victims but to the peace and freedom of many others."¹²⁴ By comparing Milosevic to Hitler, Kirkpatrick underlined her sense of the importance of the Bosnian conflict for the US, a notion which drove her democratist advocacy of the Bosnian Muslim cause.

Kirkpatrick also favours a democratist course of action regarding China. She affirms the democratist premise that, "people and governments cannot live on pragmatism and profits alone - however enlightened the former or abundant the latter."¹²⁵ In saying this, Kirkpatrick rejects both the general neo-realist predilection for pragmatic tactics to be used in implementing foreign policy as well as the institutionalist obsession with profits. Kirkpatrick applies this general democratist critique of both neo-realism and institutionalism to her position on China. Regarding President Carter's policy of strengthening ties with China Kirkpatrick argued, "Why is it 'important that we make progress toward normalizing relations with the People's Republic of China'?...Is that more important than demonstrating the fidelity of our commitments?"¹²⁶ Here Kirkpatrick is referring to the American 'commitment' to promote democratic movements both within and without China, such as bolstering the US commitment to the government of Taiwan. Thus Kirkpatrick has long espoused the hard democratist line toward China.

Former President Nixon was a realist-internationalist with conflicting minority views. These minority beliefs are illustrated in both his policy prescription towards Russian aid and his revivalist views. Nixon was a revivalist unlike the majority of his neo-realist colleagues, but like the democratists. His views about Russia were also more democratist than neo-realist in that he unequivocally favoured large-scale aid to Russia. He stated, "No other single factor will have a greater political impact on the world in the century to come than whether political and economic freedom take root and thrive in Russia and the other former Communist nations. Today's generation of American leaders will be judged primarily by whether they did everything possible to bring about this outcome. If they fail, the cost that their successors

will have to pay will be unimaginably high."¹²⁷ In fact, as Friedman noted two years ago, "it was Nixon's speeches and articles on the issue that embarrassed Bush into taking more aggressive steps to help Yeltsin, through enactment of the \$417 million Freedom Support Act."¹²⁸ Seen as one of the elder statesmen of the country, Nixon used his unique position as a former President to publicise his argument for large-scale aid for Russia. For him as for the democratists, the democratic success of Russia was essential for stability in the new world order.

Regarding policy towards China, the man who opened US relations with China did not change his mind. Unlike over Russia, Nixon's China views were classically institutionalist. Nixon acknowledged the moral question about the Chinese leadership but overrode it, believing engagement in the long-term will stabilise if not mellow the Chinese Communist party within the world system. He observed, "Today, China's economic power makes US lectures about morality and human rights imprudent. Within a decade, it will make them irrelevant. Within two decades, it will make them laughable."¹²⁹ Nixon believed, as do the institutionalists, that China's economic development will lead to its political liberalisation, and that this process would only be hindered if the US revoked China's MFN status. Nixon argued, "Economic freedom inevitably leads to political freedom. This happened in South Korea, Taiwan, Chile...It will happen in China, but only if economic freedom is not suppressed by frightened political dictators or sabotaged by shortsighted US policies cutting back on trade with China because of its human rights abuses."¹³⁰ Nixon's belief in the institutionalist notion that economic development drives political liberalisation predicated his advocacy of MFN status for China without conditions.

Nixon followed standard neo-realist views on trade being tactically in favour of both Gatt and Nafta. His support for Nafta was illustrated by his appearance with the other ex-presidents at Clinton's side as he opened his final public relations drive to ensure its enactment. While agreeing with Clinton, Nixon was less vocal over trade matters than over Russia, reflecting neo-realism's conditional support for the free trade process. For example, Nixon's definition of interests - vital, critical, and peripheral - was centred on whether their endangerment would require the use of American military force to secure them.¹³¹ Thus Nixon exhibited the neo-realists' propensity to see interests as being largely about military rather than economic considerations. This predilection was apparent in Nixon's neo-realist attitude toward trade issues, as he consistently placed them behind military security issues, such as Russia, in terms of his priorities.

Over Europe, Nixon also generally towed the neo-realist line. As with Kissinger and Kirkpatrick, he expressed deep ambivalence over US policy towards Western Europe in the post-Cold War era. Yet his policy views towards Europe also had a democratist tinge. He acknowledged that the American role in Europe will decrease with the end of the Cold War, saying, "With the receding Soviet threat and advancing integration, Western Europe's need for close links with the US will precipitously decline."¹³² He also agreed with the institutionalist and neo-realist position that Europe must have a greater say over its defence posture within the alliance. He stated, "While they understand the need for our nuclear guarantee and accept the voice that gives America in Europe's security decisions - they will object to a US policy that supports European political integration but demands a security relationship in which Washington retains its dominant leadership role. Our approach should welcome increased Western European self-reliance."¹³³ Nixon also agreed with most neo-realists that an integrated Europe poses possible dangers to America. Like Kissinger, he feared the Community's protectionist inclinations, saying, "a united Europe, with a greater GNP than that of the US, is becoming a 'fortress Europe'."¹³⁴ Finally, Nixon saw Nato as having a limited life-span, another neo-realist trend.

However unlike most neo-realists, Nixon did not just support Nato because nothing else exists, nor was he for purposely limiting its mandate to strictly the military sphere in Europe. "Today, no alternative security structure exists. Until a viable substitute evolves and proves itself, we would be making an irrevocable error in dismantling Nato or disengaging from Nato. In a period of massive instability in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, we should be exploring ways to preserve Nato rather than looking for ways to eliminate it."¹³⁵ Nixon wished to pursue an activist policy with regard to Nato that is more reminiscent of both democratism than the view of the neo-realists towards European security. For instance, he favoured Nato's expansion to deal militarily with out-of-area missions, an initiative that if adopted would transform the alliance and is a key neo-realist objective. Nixon believed that as it is, "the most successful regional alliance in history, Nato should become the focal point of cooperative foreign policy initiatives by the world's industrial democracies."¹³⁶ If seeing Nato as a great power club is a neo-realist notion, in Nato's centrality for his immediate post-Cold War European initiative, Nixon's plan also had some democratist overtones. Yet it retained its dominant neo-realist colouring as well. Despite favouring large-scale aid to Russia and seeing its democratic success as crucial for stability in the new world order, Nixon also favoured the eventual inclusion of the Eastern European states in Nato, which is the crucial element of the neo-realists' agenda for Europe. He said, "Because they share our values and because the current vacuum creates an incentive for adventurism, the Eastern

European democracies must be brought into Nato's security sphere without granting them full partnership...In the longer term, Nato should develop formal security links with the Eastern European democracies. Our goal should be their full integration into Nato."¹³⁷ Nixon's policy towards Europe was a mix of democratism and neo-realism, though ultimately he espoused the critical neo-realist view that Nato should extend into Central Europe.

Nixon's overall neo-realist leanings are confirmed when one looks at his stance on the Bosnian crisis. He shunned the institutionalist view that the conflict is primarily a civil war saying, "the cycle of violence began as a result of Serbian aggression against other former Yugoslav republics - aggression for which the US and its allies have consistently and repeatedly failed to exact a price."¹³⁸ It is not surprising that Nixon was critical of the institutionalist Clinton administration's response to the conflict. Nixon argued, "If the US had been willing to lead, a number of steps short of the commitment of ground forces - for instance, revoking the arms embargo - could have been taken early in the Bosnian crisis to blunt Serb aggression. Our failure to do so tarnished our reputation as an evenhanded player on the international stage."¹³⁹ While the quotation makes clear that Nixon never advocated the democratist policy prescription in Bosnia, of American military might being used to directly aid the Bosnian government, it is also apparent by his neo-realist advocacy of lifting the arms embargo that the former President was critical of the West's passive institutionalist response to the Bosnian crisis.

An attack of neo-realist precepts is made by both neo-Wilsonian schools of thought. Democratists point to the total lack of place for values and ideas in the neo-realist framework. Gaddis pointed out the fact that values and ideas are as omnipresent in the international system as the presence of conflict has been. Gaddis stated, "The simple persistence of values in politics ought to be another clue that one is dealing here with objects more complicated than billiard balls."¹⁴⁰ By concentrating on structural relations at the expense of ideas, and advocating the beguilingly simple billiard ball theory of the international system, democratists charge that neo-realists have oversimplified International Relations, leaving out the realm of ideology and other complexities in the international arena. Further, democratists charge that this conceptual error leads to practical policy mistakes. For advocates of neo-realism, there is always the danger of exalting technique over purpose. This has been a major criticism of the Nixon-Kissinger years. As Patrick Glynn shrewdly observed, the two master neo-realists have been accused of operating a, "policy of value-neutral managerialism."¹⁴¹ This criticism leads to a further existential reproof of the neo-realist position. For instance, despite the

obvious tactical brilliance of Metternich's policy, in the end he merely played the cards of a declining power well, he did not reverse Austria's slow decline. There are limits to the gains to be made by exploiting the objective international conditions a policy-maker finds himself/herself in, however brilliantly done, if the statesman does not attempt to transcend such conditions.

A further existential argument can be made about Huntington's new formulation of the neo-realist creed in his article, "The Clash of Civilizations?" As William Pfaff has pointed out, if conflict is, "interpreted as collisions of civilizations, they are thereby transferred from the realm of the negotiable and solvable into that of a perpetual and unsolvable conflict...a conflict of civilizations has no solution."¹⁴² In this instance, as civilisation differences cannot be breached by any act of policy, or in the short-term, is Huntington saying that these conflicts between civilisations are to be expected and beyond the power of mortals to solve? Neo-realists feel that such circumstances can be manipulated, but they cannot be changed. This conservative bowing to historical inevitabilities fatally weakens neo-realism for the more optimistic liberal neo-Wilsonians, who believe that genuine change within the international system is both desirable and possible, and that the prudent strategy is not always to accept international conditions as unchangeable.

Institutionalist critiques of neo-realism take a slightly different tack from democratists', emphasising the over-simplicity of the neo-realist model. Firstly, they criticise neo-realists for seeing the state as a coherent unit, and foreign policy decisions as not being the result of bureaucratic politics within the 'billiard ball'. As Nye and Keohane noted in their examination of Canadian and American sub-units of government, "certain governmental sub-units may discover that their purposes are closer to the purposes of particular sub-units of another government than they are to the goals of other agencies within the same government."¹⁴³ For example, Nye and Keohane found that the American and Canadian military forces share interests not shared by civilians in either country. For institutionalists the validity of bureaucratic politics means that the 'billiard ball' rational actor theory of the state's decision-making process is too simplistic, as it does not adequately explain the complexities of policy formulation.

Institutionalists also believe that in the new world order there are more balls on the table (to continue the billiard ball analogy) in the international system than merely states. As Nye pointed out, "Waltz's spare structural definition of system ignores international economic processes and institutions that can also have strong effect on states behavior."¹⁴⁴ Here the

institutionalist Nye provided the classic critique his school of thought directs at the neo-realist, Waltz. For Nye, states are affected by international institutions, particularly international economic institutions, such as the IMF, the World Bank, and Gatt. In the case of many developing countries, these interactions with international organisations are crucial components of their foreign policies. Institutionalists believe international organisations have become too important to be excluded from the billiard table, as they are in neo-realist formulations. Thus institutionalists see important complexities omitted by neo-realists at both the sub-state and supra-state levels of analysis. Stephen Gill elaborated on this, pointing out that neo-realists are, "weak in explaining the social basis of power relations and the development of non-state organizations such as transnational companies, and other social forces which transcend national boundaries,"¹⁴⁵ such as international organisations, ideology, and economics. As Gill noted, neo-realists see power as the crucial element in the international system but do not either adequately value the components of power that cannot be easily measured (ideology, cultural cohesion, political stability, etc.), nor do they allow for the fact that components of power can reach beyond the boundaries of a single state.

Lastly, institutionalists believe that neo-realism's structural rigidity makes its proponents unable to see that major internal and external changes to states make 1996 more than simply a replay of earlier multipolar periods. As Jack Snyder noted, neo-realism, "exaggerates the inevitability that international conflict and national excesses will follow from the erosion of the bipolar division of Europe. Its assumption, that profound changes in the domestic character of countries since the interwar period will be readily reversed as a consequence of changes in the structure of the international system, is untenable."¹⁴⁶ By their overvaluation of the effect the international structure has on determining an individual state's foreign policy, neo-realists undervalue the changes in the international system, such as free trade leading to greater prosperity and the increased democratisation of in the world, which makes 1996 unlike 1936. For Snyder, neo-realism's theoretical flaws are borne out in the fact that the world is safer now than during the time of the height of Soviet might. Whatever brush fires may rage, institutionalists see the international system as being more secure than during the Cold War, regardless of what neo-realists might believe. Yet despite all these neo-Wilsonian criticisms, neo-realism has proved remarkably resilient in the new era as has the state, which lies at the heart of its analysis.

Chart 3 - 2 Neo-Realist Policy Regarding Five Key Issues

Majority Neo-Realist View Reached From the Givens	Non-Interventionist, Lift Arms Embargo	No Large-Scale Aid	Soft-line Pro-MFN, perhaps with some conditions	Tactically Favour	Nato-firsters, Favour quick expansion of the alliance
Issues	Bosnia	Russia	China	Nafta/Gatt	Nato/Western European Policy
Kissinger - Consultant, Republican	Pro (+)	Pro (+)	Follows institutionalist line (-)	Follows institutionalist line (-)	Pro (+)
Kirkpatrick - Professor/ Think-Tank Republican	Follows democratist line (-)	Pro (+)	Follows democratist line (-)	Pro (+)	Pro (+)
Nixon - Former President, Republican	Pro (+)	Follows democratist line (-)	Follows institutionalist line (-)	Pro (+)	Pro (+)

(+) consistent with the overall schools of thought categorisation (-) inconsistent with the overall schools of thought categorisation

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Chapter 4: The Institutionalists

Chart 4-1: The Belief System of the Institutionalists

- 1) Background: Montesquieu
- 2) Goal: Promote economic prosperity through the spread of international institutions which advocate free-market policies.
- 3) Assume: Due to interdependence, capitalist states have common interests, this fact leads to international co-operation. Multilateral organisations facilitate co-operation in the world economic system (e.g. GATT, IMF, World Bank). Absolute rather than relative economic success is crucial for a state, so increased free trade is almost always welcomed. The capitalisation of the world is their pre-eminent goal, initially it can be without democracy. They see democratic change as predicated by the 'modernisation' of a state (its capitalisation) as development follows universal stages. Increased world contact between states is seen as leading to increased interdependence and co-operation.
- 4) See state: Billiard ball theory is too simplistic, especially with the increased importance of multinational corporations and international organisations in the world political arena.
- 5) Key analytical orientation: Economic
- 6) Declinist/Revivalist: Declinist
- 7) World Structure: Multipolar (Tripolar)
- 8) Preferred mode of action: Almost always multilateral action, based on international consensus.

- 9) Basis of force: UN Security Council, and other international multilateral institutions.
- 10) World Policeman: UN
- 11) Key areas and foci: International Organisations, Trilateral powers (US, Europe, Japan), and Asia.
- 12) Schurmann classification: Internationalists
- 13) General political supporters: Primarily Democrats (Liberals).
- 14) Political actors: Christopher, the Clinton administration in general.
- 15) Bureaucratic bastions of support: State Department, and currently the Presidency.
- 16) Policy cluster preference towards Western Europe/ European defence system: Especially favour better and increased ties with the EU, as they do not see it turning protectionist. Favour increased 'Europeanisation' of Europe's defence both in and out of Nato (e.g. WEU). Want a more egalitarian Nato, modelled along the lines of JFK's 'twin pillars'. Favour increased European political, security, and foreign policy integration.
- 17) Policy cluster preference towards Bosnia: Non-interventionist, unless there is an international consensus to intervene.
- 18) Policy cluster preference towards Trade (Nafta and Gatt): Strongly favour both.

- 19) Policy cluster preference towards Russia: Foreign aid should be co-ordinated by multilateral institutions like the IMF and World Bank. Want to engage Russia in the Western economic community, favour increased trade over aid. For aid to Russia, less pro-aid than the democratists and more so than the neo-realists. Unlike democratists, they want no easing of tough transition to the capitalist system.
- 20) Policy cluster preference towards China: Soft-line evolutionary change favoured (MFN under almost all circumstances), even more pro-MFN than the neo-realists. Want to delink MFN from human rights considerations.
- 21) Academics: Hoffmann, Keohane, Nye - institutionalists.
- 22) Variations within the school of thought: There is little variation, as there are no real 'supranationalists' (radical institutionalists who advocate and foresee world government), only 'moderate' institutionalists (who still see the state as central to the international system).

Although both are heirs of Wilsonianism, institutionalism has a different philosophical heritage than democratism. Institutionalists look to the eighteenth century French philosopher Montesquieu as their founder. They adhere to his view that, "The state of things in Europe is that all states depend on each other,"¹ or in other words, institutionalists see the international arena as characterised by interdependence. Their primary goal is to promote economic liberalism through the use of international institutions. This view has a long pedigree in American political thinking. As Kissinger suggested, there has been a, "perennial American assumption that economic well-being automatically ensures political stability."² Institutionalists see prosperity as the central factor leading both to general domestic stability and through stability to international peace. This view follows the common sense notion that people whose material needs are met are far less likely to become politically radicalised. This view explains the efforts of Herbert Hoover with European refugees after 1918-3 and the Marshall Plan after World War II.⁴ In both cases, the US did not want the economic devastation wrought by world war to radicalise Europe. In order to avoid this political crisis, America sought to attack the economic malaise afflicting Europe.

Far more than aid is required to make this institutionalist policy work. For institutionalists, free trade is the key to fostering both global economic prosperity and

political stability. As Gaddis noted, "It has long been a central assumption of liberal political philosophy that if only one could maximize the flow of ideas, commodities, capital, and people across international boundaries, then the causes of war would drop away."⁵ Unlike neo-realists, institutionalists do not see free trade merely as an instrument to enhance a state's power, but as positive in and of itself. As President Clinton stated, "The habits of commerce run counter to the habits of war...People who raise each others living standards are less likely to become combatants."⁶ It is this hard-headed calculation that lies at the heart of the institutionalist school of thought. As capitalism is seen by institutionalists as the most modern and most successful economic system present, it is not surprising that institutionalists see its extension as crucial to the growth of the economic prosperity that they believe is essential for a stable international system to emerge. Burman argued, "The fundamental principle which will best serve American interests is to take the lead in managing the extension of the capitalist system around the globe."⁷ Institutionalists believe that in promoting capitalism they will stoke the central engine that propels the motive force of history.

Institutionalists are the direct heirs of Schurmann's internationalists, as their primary concerns are reflected by the internationalists' policy prescriptions. As Schurmann argued the internationalists, "anticipated the great internationalization of the American economy following the end of the war."⁸ Schurmann also revealed that his internationalists shared today's institutionalists core beliefs. He added, "the core belief of the internationalist current was the need for international systems."⁹ Beyond this shared central concern for international systems Schurmann's internationalists and today's institutionalists share a primary belief in the centrality of free trade in promoting prosperity and stability. Schurmann concluded that, "the key concern of the universalist [internationalist] current: (was) free trade fuelled by sound money."¹⁰ As with the neo-realists, the institutionalists are the historical descendants of an element of Schurmann's classification system.

Institutionalism's key analytical orientation is clearly economic, almost deterministically so its critics would charge. It is certainly true that world economic processes are crucial inputs for subsequent institutionalist analysis and policy prescriptions, and that institutionalists view the economic variable in the overall equation of power as a pivotal factor in assessing a state's overall strength.¹¹ One of the factors institutionalists cite as a reason for the relative rise of the economic variable in the overall equation of power (and the corresponding decline in the relevance of the military variable) is the static nature of the military system in the Cold War era. Nye and Jones argued, "a strong case can be made that in a world of nuclear stalemate, economic dimensions of power become more important."¹²

As the nuclear arsenals of the superpowers became lethal enough to threaten the very existence of life on the planet if they were used, these very destructive capabilities proscribed their use and, institutionalists would argue, their efficacy as an instrument of power greatly diminished. By the end of the Cold War, many institutionalists thought that the long-standing process first chronicled by Keohane and Nye in the early 70s, whereby economic variables in the overall equation of power became more important than military factors, had at last come to pass. As Sorensen suggested, "superconductors are becoming more important to the balance of power than supercarriers."¹³ Institutionalists believe that as the law of diminishing returns came to characterise superpower nuclear competition, economic factors have become increasingly important in the overall power equation, and that this ongoing process has accelerated with the end of the Cold War.

Institutionalists believe that economic factors can be seen as the single most important variable in the overall equation of power in their effect on a state's domestic politics. The political truism has long been acknowledged that domestic economic concerns in democracies almost always outweigh military and international concerns for the electorate, except in times of extensive warfare directly involving the core interests of the state. Brzezinski suggested, "For the average citizen the imperatives of consumption [a chief institutionalist concern] are now more important than those of territory [a primary neo-realist concern], or ideology [a central democratist concern]."¹⁴ Thus to win reelection, a political decision-maker must put domestic economic concerns in a central position in his/her conduct of foreign policy. While this has always been true, the 1992 presidential election provided a classic example of the importance of this process.¹⁵ George Bush, despite an overwhelmingly favourable poll rating for his conduct of foreign policy, was defeated by Bill Clinton, who pledged to make domestic economic prosperity a central focus of his foreign policy. As Clinton supporter, E.J. Dionne, Jr., noted, "the way a nation's economy works is the central question - at times, the only question - for the electorates who send the diplo-military types to the summit meetings."¹⁶ For institutionalists, economic considerations largely determine political outcomes in most democratic states.

A major difference between the institutionalists and their neo-Wilsonian cousins, the democratists, is over the question of American decline. Unlike the democratists, institutionalists are convinced declinists. They see American decline as partly engendered by the rise of the economic variable in the overall equation of power itself. Institutionalists believe that this shift hurts the US as it is far more dominant in the military sphere than in the economic, and thus the shift itself is bound to lead to a diminution of American power.

Stanley Hoffmann stated, "As John Zysman noted, the shift from military to economic influence hurts the US, insofar as others depend on American military technology, and in the economic realm a US deep in debt is far from the free giant it was after the war; our ability to extract foreign policy gains from economic power has dropped, and we depend increasingly on foreign sources for important products and technologies."¹⁷ Thus institutionalists see the shift of the overall equation of power in favour of the economic sphere coinciding with American domestic decline, largely brought about by economic stagnation. These two factors are central to the institutionalists' declinist view.

To rectify American domestic decline, institutionalists offer a far different program from the realist-isolationists. While institutionalists agree with the realist-isolationists that America is in decline, to halt this process they urge more multilateralism and international contact and not less as the realist-isolationists advocate. To avoid permanent decline, institutionalists believe America needs an era of domestic retrenchment, thus collective security and an increasing reliance on international organisations, such as Nato and the UN, are essential to preserve some sort of order in the international system as the US sets about dramatic domestic reform. As Brzezinski argued, "US policy will have to strike a more deliberate balance between global needs for continued American commitment, the desirability of some development of US regional security responsibilities and the imperatives of America's domestic renewal."¹⁸ Increased internationalism thus becomes a strategy to help keep the US both engaged in the international system while at the same time allowing America to retrench and deal with its domestic ills. This notion is an undergirding principle of the foreign policy of the Clinton administration.

With the increase of American involvement in and yet delegation of decision-making power to international organisations, goes a correspondingly decreasing American say in these institutions. As Bergsten commented, "The US has to make the difficult adjustment from hegemon to partner."¹⁹ While institutionalists advocate America relying increasingly on international organisations, they readily acknowledge that due to decline, America cannot expect to have the same influence in multilateral institutions that it once had. For instance, institutionalists believe (unlike democratists) that for Nato to survive it must become an organisation modelled on President Kennedy's conception of 'twin pillars', with an increasingly assertive Europe playing a roughly equal role with the US in Nato decision-making. With the US military commitment down to 100,000 troops, for institutionalists it no longer follows that the military head of Nato ought necessarily to be an American general. As believers in American decline, institutionalists are aware of the need for a lessening of US

authority in international institutions, as other states take on an increasing burden in maintaining international structures.

Institutionalists see the world as generally multipolar and specifically tripolar, with Japan and Germany (or Western Europe) being the other poles of power besides the US. Obviously this structural analysis flows directly from the fact that economics is the key factor in institutionalism's analytical orientation. Nye believes, "the world economy is tripolar and has been since the 70's."²⁰ It is not surprising that the three major economic powers of the post-Cold War era are seen by institutionalists as the three powers of the world, so heavily do they weight economic might in determining a state's overall power. As Bergsten stated, "The big three of economics will supplant the big two of nuclear competition as the powers that will shape much of the Twenty-first century."²¹ By their tripolar structural analysis of the world, institutionalists make it obvious how greatly they weigh the economic variable in their overall equation of power assessment.

A belief in the fundamental change in the nature of the international system is a core tenet of institutionalism. Brzezinski argued, "Though America is today admittedly the world's only superpower, global conditions are too complex and America's domestic health too precarious to maintain a worldwide Pax Americana."²² So while like democratists institutionalists such as Brzezinski see the US as the sole superpower, unlike the democratists the institutionalists feel that changes in the nature of the international system itself limits American preponderance. Institutionalists believe that the relative power of the state itself is in decline in the international arena as more non-national actors (e.g. Multinational Corporations (MNCs) and International Organisations (IOs)) gain power at the international level. To return to the billiard ball analogy, institutionalists believe that states are not the only balls now on the table.

A major assumption underlying the institutionalist school of thought is that due to interdependence, capitalist states share interests, and that these shared interests lead to increased international stability. 'Shared interests' is the catchphrase for institutionalists, just as 'shared values' is a crucial notion for democratists, and 'national interests' is an essential thought undergirding neo-realism. Bergsten illustrated this process. He argued that, "The extensive interpenetration of companies and financial markets throughout the three regions (US, Western Europe, and Japan) militates against a breakdown of cooperation."²³ The key idea here is that as increasingly advanced industrial states have large economic interests in other large industrial states, the competition that neo-realists see as at the heart of the

international system is joined and to an extent superseded by the notion of co-operation present in institutionalist thinking. These shared economic interests militate against conflict, be it economic or martial. As Rosecrance suggested, "the interpenetration of investment [e.g. MNCs] in industrial economies provides a mutual stake in each other's success."²⁴ Burman illustrated how the process of interdependence leads to co-operation. He commented, "as other powers come to invest more and more in the US economy they develop less and less interest in damaging it."²⁵ For instance institutionalists believe that the more money Japan invests in the US, the more Japanese investors will want the American economy to flourish. As politicians in a democracy need to be mindful of the economic interests (including the business interests) of their people, it is unlikely that the Japanese government would pursue new policies that would actively attempt to harm the American economy. Thus interdependence creates interests that discourage conflict. This is a very different view of foreign investment from that of the neo-realists, who see increased foreign penetration as a threat to the autonomy of a particular state. However for institutionalists, it is just these private actors (businesses) whose shared interests are essential for curbing conflict.

Not only do institutionalists feel that interdependence will lessen the threat of international conflict, they also feel it will hasten increased global co-operation itself. Institutionalists believe that as states co-ordinate societal interdependence as a response to the 'new' transnational issue areas such as: the environment, AIDS, terrorism, monetary rates, and free trade, which cannot be effectively dealt with by a single state, the process will lead to increased policy interdependence. As Keohane and Nye reasoned, "the involvement of international organizations in them [transgovernmental relations], is generally stimulated by the activities of elites trying to cope with increased societal interdependence."²⁶ Institutionalists see that as the new issue areas can only be successfully dealt with multilaterally, the interdependence that this creates will logically lead to the formation of new international organisations and/or increased levels of transgovernmental relations to deal with the new 'global' agenda. Institutionalists believe that organisational structures will follow in the wake of global issues that logically lead to increased co-operation between states. Increased interdependence will thus change the nature of the state, limiting its ability to act unilaterally by the very nature of the 'new' global issues it encounters.

According to institutionalists, this erosion of state authority will also occur at the sub-state level. As the new global agenda will make the need for increasingly specialised governmental agencies apparent, states will have to go outside national parameters to receive current information on global issues. For example, the US Department of Health and Human

Services will have to attend a WHO (World Health Organisation) seminar on the latest AIDS research, or the Department of the Treasury will speak directly to the Bundesbank about European interest rates. Institutionalists feel that this process is making the world both far more fragmented and complicated. Nye and Keohane note that one of the effects of this process is the further erosion of national sovereignty, as transnational coalitions form. They argued that one important result of increased interdependence, "is that subunits of governments are provided greater opportunities for transnational contacts and coalitions."²⁷ These coalitions will form partly because of the great affinities that are likely to exist between individuals that meet as a result of this transnational process. For example, individuals that work for the Department of Health and Human Services are likely to have much in common with officials from the WHO. They share a concern for stopping the spread of disease, (as both have devoted their working lives to this cause, it is safe to assume that for them it is probably a higher priority than for others outside the field), and a technical understanding of medicine that laypeople would not possess. In many cases, these affinities will lead to shared sympathies (e.g. a common understanding of fighting losing budget battles with their executives, who would place health care as a lower priority than they are apt to) and even to informal shared bargaining positions vis-a-vis their executives. For instance, in the 60s an American military attaché was concerned about the slow-down in negotiations to return Okinawa to the Japanese. As both he and his opposite Japanese number feared the effect the delay was having on US-Japanese relations, he helped his Japanese counterpart draft memos to Washington in such a way that they would be received by sympathetic American officials and the talks could be successfully concluded.²⁸ Institutionalists believe that the increased interdependence brought about by the new global agenda will both facilitate increased international co-operation and accelerate the decline of the notion of sovereignty being indivisible.

Institutionalists, while recognising that increased interdependence can have adverse consequences (i.e. the exporting of stock market crashes that occurred in October 1987), generally think that the process of increased interdependence, for all its implications, is a favourable international development. An example of the beneficial aspects of interdependence institutionalists see, lies in their belief that the communications revolution, which made access to media coverage across state boundaries far more prevalent in the last decade, helped to topple the totalitarian regimes in Eastern Europe. Zbigniew Brzezinski developed the institutionalist argument, presciently saying in 1984, "in the age of transistors and mass communications totalitarian control can be pierced."²⁹ Institutionalists believe that increased communications interdependence helped lead to the decline of totalitarianism, that

as subjects of totalitarian states were no longer dependent on the state for all of their information, a totalitarian regime would lose its essential control over its people. Brzezinski felt that this was precisely what occurred in Eastern Europe, saying, "With the numbers of VCR's available to Eastern Europeans rapidly increasing, and despite official efforts to impose some controls, the traditional communist control over domestic mass communications was disintegrating,"³⁰ by the late 1980s. The institutionalist view that increased technological interdependence has led to a general decline in a state's sovereignty, a loss felt most crushingly by totalitarian rulers who depended on this sovereignty to control the flow of information to its inhabitants, is just one example of the general institutionalist belief that increased global interdependence is a basically favourable phenomenon.

A major reason institutionalists believe international organisations have changed the international environment is that unlike neo-realists, they believe states are motivated by absolute rather than relative gains in setting out their policy agendas. Institutionalists feel that this is particularly true in the economic sphere. As Hoffmann commented, seeing the world as a neo-realist zero-sum game is, "not an appropriate description of rational behavior on most of the economic or technical chessboards."³¹ This is because electorates largely measure absolute rather than relative economic gains in deciding who to vote for. As Nye and Keohane argued, "'doing better than the past' is more important to governments than 'doing better than other countries' in economic activities...The political processes domestically will certainly push governments towards a willingness to sacrifice relative power, if necessary, for the sake of real economic gains that can be translated into votes and jobs."³²

The Uruguay Round of the Gatt provided a good illustration of this process. Most economists predicted that the approval of the pact would add billions to the world economy. Relatively, the Third World stood to gain more out of the agreement than the G-7 states. However none of the advanced industrial states, many mired in recession, thought to reject the accord because relatively the Third World gained more out of it as a percentage of GDP than they did. Rather, they saw the opportunity to obtain crucial economic advantages for their countries, advantages that could spell the difference between victory and defeat at the next election.

A central institutionalist assumption is that multilateral institutions facilitate the international co-operation that increased global interdependence has made so imperative. Institutionalists feel that this is particularly true of the world economic system where the Gatt, the IMF, and the World Bank are essential for the smooth running of the global economic

order.³³ Like neo-realists, institutionalists believe states use international institutions to further their own objectives. As Keohane and Nye stated, "International institutions have very little strength of their own: to be successful, they must help states attain their interests."³⁴ For instance, Joseph Nye believed that international institutions generally reflect the basic interests of their most powerful founding member, and that the founding of an international organisation leads to the semi-institutionalisation of the strongest founding state's power. Nye suggested, "international institutions and norms are another potential source of power, to the extent that they structure other countries in a manner that accords with that of the dominant power."³⁵ For example Eastern European states such as Poland and the Czech Republic, in an effort to qualify for loans from the IMF, radically restructured their economies, through the use of shock therapy, from command economies to market systems. As the US was the strongest founding member of the IMF, it is not surprising that it generally reflects America's free market views. Thus the US was able to indirectly affect the economic policies of the new democratic states in Central and Eastern Europe. Institutionalists agree with neo-realists that states use international organisations for their own ends. In fact, institutionalists believe that partly because states' needs are met by international institutions, the most virulent forms of hyper-nationalism are contained. Brzezinski commented, "nationalism satisfied and controlled by multilateral arrangements becomes internationalism."³⁶ Yet institutionalists, unlike neo-realists, see the relationship between international organisations and states as more complicated than merely one whereby a state pursues its ends through multilateral means.

Institutionalists see the relationship between states and international institutions as a two-way process. Keohane and Nye commented on this critical difference between neo-realism and institutionalism, "At the broadest level the issue is whether states view institutions purely instrumentally - as a means to given ends - or whether they come to redefine their own interests in light of the rules or practices of the institutions."³⁷ Institutionalists believe that international institutions are more than just instruments for states to use. Nye and Keohane cleverly illustrated how institutions can develop a life of their own. They suggested that, "Institutions that have become successful tend to create interests that support them: even if Nato and the Gatt could not have been formed de novo under the conditions of today, they were able to persist under these new conditions."³⁸ If Nato were merely an instrument created for its component states to pursue their individual interests, which were primarily to defend Western Europe from Soviet attack, as this is no longer an immediate danger neo-realists argue that Nato may shortly disband. However just the reverse has occurred, with much of the former Warsaw Pact clamouring to join. This example supports the

institutionalist contention that successful international organisations are more than the sum of their parts. Institutionalists believe that international institutions are themselves actors in the international arena. Keohane and Hoffman cleverly reached this conclusion, using neo-realist analysis to illustrate what logically ought to be the situation in Europe in the post-Cold War era if international institutions did not exist or had only an instrumental value for states. They argued, "In an anarchic world of sovereign states, absent international institutions, the US would presumably balance against Europe in the world political economy, as Europe would balance against the US in the security realm.³⁹ But international institutions change realities and expectations."⁴⁰ Institutionalists believe that international organisations, in promoting states' shared interests, have fundamentally altered the character of the international system from the Hobbesian jungle neo-realists envisage.

Another major institutionalist assumption is that, unlike the democratists, institutionalists believe capitalism and not democracy should be the pre-eminent goal in a state's modernisation. Indeed institutionalists support capitalising states, such as China, that as yet show no signs of democratic political organisation. Another illustration of the fact that promoting democracy is not the primary institutionalist goal, is that unlike the democratists, institutionalists believe that strong support for international organisations should not depend upon their having a democratic orientation. For example, institutionalists see the UN as a major actor on the international stage and strongly support it having an increased global role, despite the fact that many member states of the UN are dictatorships. Instead institutionalists believe American interests are best served by promoting the growth of the market economy across the globe, and that if this process comes into conflict with the support of a particular state's evolution towards democracy, promotion of the market ought to take precedence. This is partly due to the fact that institutionalists believe that capitalism, particularly free trade, benefits all states.

As the promotion of capitalism is central for institutionalists, it is advocated even if it comes into conflict with democratic considerations. As Keohane argued, "In some countries, democratic institutions and modern capital may be compatible, but there is no guarantee that this will be the case everywhere."⁴¹ A codicil should be added to Keohane's statement. That is, in the short run, institutionalists feel promoting capitalism and democracy can be at odds, but that in the longer run there is seen to be a link between the two. One of the reasons that institutionalists support the promotion of capitalism over democracy is precisely because in the long-term they see the free market leading to modernising states increased democratisation. Theodore Moran underscored the institutionalist belief, shared by Marxists,

that economic factors largely determine the long-term political orientation of a state. Commenting on the tripolar world, Moran stated that, "success in multilateral trade agreements will likewise ease the pressure for more insulated neomercantilist blocs in Europe, Asia, and North America, and help build the economic 'substructure' to support the 'superstructure' of ongoing political coordination among industrial democracies."⁴² It is curious that Moran here even uses Marxist terminology to implicitly affirm the link between the Marxist and institutional assumptions that economic processes largely drive social and political forces.

Institutionalists feel that although the promotion of capitalism will eventually lead to the adoption of democracy, an indeterminate time lag is to be expected. In line with Wilsonian universalism, institutionalists believe that there is a single path for a state to follow toward 'modernisation', and that the adoption of a free market capitalist economy is the highest form of economic development. However institutionalists, unlike democratists, argue that there is an enduring link between capitalism and democracy. They feel that this process is inevitable because of the nature of the free enterprise system itself. As former Senator Timothy Wirth argued, "The educated, informed workforce and the habits of risk taking and independent thought necessary for economic success, cannot easily coexist for long with political repression and lack of freedom."⁴³ That is because the very attributes needed for success in capitalism; freedom of thought, the ability to adapt, and the propensity to take risks, are not qualities that are valued in a totalitarian state or dictatorship. Thus eventually institutionalists believe that dictatorships attempting economic reform will end up with a renewed dictatorship and economic retrenchment away from capitalism, or chaos at worst; or the political nature of the regime will become more pluralist to keep it in line with the newly-instituted free market reforms. Institutionalists point to South Korea as an example of where the latter process occurred, with its political power gradually shifting in the 80s from the military, so that now it is a bona fide democracy. Regarding China, a state with a Communist, totalitarian political system engaged in a program of rapid conversion to capitalism, Brzezinski commented, "Chinese communist leaders will have to face the fact that productively creative socio-economic pluralism is incompatible with a system of one party rule that rejects political pluralism."⁴⁴ The difference in opinion between democratists and institutionalists over whether the US should principally promote capitalism or democracy is one of the major reasons the two neo-Wilsonian schools of thought ought to be considered as separate entities. Institutionalists try to square the circle in this debate, urging that all who wish to see genuine democratic advancement throughout the world should primarily support the expansion of the

free market, even when the two notions come into conflict, as the market will eventually lead to democratisation.

Institutionalists believe that the realist conception of the state is in drastic need of an update. However, like neo-realists, institutionalists believe that the state remains the primary actor in the international arena. As Hoffmann argued, "The states remain the only legitimate public authorities and mobilizers of public resources, but the problems they face demand cooperative solutions."⁴⁵ Institutionalists see neo-realism's state-centric analysis of the international system as valid, however they do not feel it goes far enough. Institutionalists neither see states as the only significant actors in the international arena, nor do they view states as unitary, rational actors, as do neo-realists. It is here that the institutionalist concepts of transnational relations and transgovernmental relations come into play. The terms are neatly defined by Keohane and Nye, "'transnational' applies when we relax the assumption that states are the only actors, and 'transgovernmental' applies when we relax the assumption that states act as units."⁴⁶ Institutionalists thus criticise the neo-realist concept that states are rational actors and have a large degree of autonomy. Keohane criticised neo-realist contentions about the state from a sub-national perspective, saying, "The national interest is not self-evident, even if everyone uses the term. Not only do sub-national interests affect national policy, judgements about the national interest among top officials will also vary."⁴⁷ Thus, as has been noted earlier in discussions about interdependence, institutionalists criticise neo-realist assertions about the nature of the state using a bureaucratic politics perspective. However as Hoffmann recognised, this is not the crux of the institutionalist assault on the neo-realist conception of the state. He argued that, "the target of foreign policy, for world orders sake, should be the external behavior, not the internal makeup of governments."⁴⁸ Unlike democratists, institutionalists focus their criticism of the traditional concept of the state on the supranational level of analysis. They see the international system as capable of being described as an arena of transnational politics. Keohane and Nye expertly delineated the institutionalist position. They suggest,ed "Institutionalist arguments focus neither on the structure of the international system, emphasized by neo-realism, nor on the interactions between domestic politics and international relations, on which liberalism [democratism] focuses. The principal focus of institutionalism is on international political processes."⁴⁹ By focusing on supranational factors in the international arena, the institutionalists formulate a unique critique of the standard belief in the centrality of the state in international politics.

In many ways then, the institutionalist view of the state is an uneasy compromise between the neo-realist conception of the state as supreme, and the democratist notion that it

is at the lower, fragmented, domestic level that policy is generally formed through bureaucratic political tussles and local political considerations. As Keohane and Nye argued, institutionalism, "is consistent with aspects of realism since states are viewed, in both approaches, as the principal actors in world politics, and their relative power capabilities are considered to be crucial determinants of their behavior...However, institutionalists recognize, with liberals [democratists], that states are not the sole significant actors in world politics."⁵⁰ Institutionalists see the other significant actors on the world stage as being divided into two large sub-categories, international organisations and multinational corporations. As has been discussed earlier, institutionalists see international organisations as actors in their own right in the international arena. Institutionalists feel that organisations such as the UN, Nato, the EU, the IMF, the Gatt, the World Bank, the OECD, and UNCTAD, all play a significant international role. However, it is the great increase in power of the MNCs that is the single greatest reason institutionalists believe the international arena has been fundamentally altered.

There is no doubting the economic clout of the MNCs. As Keohane and Ooms pointed out, "the overseas output of American run enterprises alone was \$120 billion in 1967, representing in effect, the world's third largest economy."⁵¹ Nye and Keohane further detailed the great financial power of MNCs, noting, "In 1965 some 85 business enterprises each had annual sales larger than the GNP's of some 57 voting members of the UN."⁵² Clearly a good many MNCs have greater financial wherewithal than most Third World states. Nor do institutionalists (unlike neo-realists) believe that these corporations are largely instruments of a particular state. They are in the business of satisfying their shareholders, not furthering the national interests of the state where their headquarters happen to be. They are in many respects corporations without states, as their officials' primary loyalty is to the MNC, not any particular state. Institutionalists believe that the geometric proliferation of MNCs since the 1960s has radically altered the international arena, by greatly reducing state sovereignty. As Keohane and Ooms argued, MNCs are, "creating large and politically significant areas of activity not controlled by any government."⁵³ Nye echoed this view, observing, "large governments are losing their ability to control private actors that work easily across international borders."⁵⁴ Institutionalists believe that the MNC is the final nail in the coffin of the mirage of state sovereignty. Nye and Keohane suggested, "We have just noted that transnational relations may make all states dependent on forces none of them control."⁵⁵ For institutionalists, as has been suggested, this is particularly true in the economic sphere.

However institutionalists do not believe that the MNCs will displace the state as the primary actor on the international stage any time in the near future. Rather they see the process as both more subtle and more complicated than this. Keohane and Ooms argued that the new world will be one in which, "the emergence of transnational relations in which the role of states is not so dominant as it may have been regarded in the past. For the foreseeable future, however, it is not the multinational business enterprise in itself that will be decisive for world politics but relations between enterprises and states."⁵⁶ For example, for every case where MNCs successfully cajoled states into action to protect their interests (i.e. The United Fruit Company in Guatemala in the 50s, Union Miniere in Katanga in the 60s, ITT in Chile in the 70s), there are more where governments did not do what was in MNCs interests (i.e.. American agribusiness failing to stop the US from applying sanctions on the USSR after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan). Institutionalists, unlike Soviet critics of capitalism, do not see capitalist states as merely serving the interests of its dominant business class. Rather they see a subtle process whereby MNCs influence states and vice-versa.

For institutionalists the growing complexity of the international system no longer corresponds with neo-realism's simple models of both the state and the global arena. Institutionalists, as Nye argued, see "the growing complexity of world politics, with more actors and issues,"⁵⁷ being relevant than are dealt with by neo-realism's spare paradigm. Rosecrance believed events have overtaken the rational actor model of the state. He argued, "That conception, of each state-unit acting like a little automaton, self-sufficient and autonomous, is belied by recent history, and it cannot last much longer."⁵⁸ Krause and Nye reminded us that models, to be useful in the social sciences, must roughly correspond to reality. They observed, "the world is complex and models must reflect the essential ingredients of reality to be useful."⁵⁹ Due to the increased complexity of the international system, symbolised by the rise of MNCs, institutionalists see neo-realist constructs, such as the billiard-ball conception of international relations, as being overly simplified and no longer relevant to successfully explaining the global arena. For them, the complexities of bureaucratic politics and especially transnational relations, must be included in any model of the international system if it is to approximate reality and be genuinely useful.

Institutionalism's preferred mode of action in the international arena is almost always action of a multilateral nature. This is in accordance with institutionalism's analysis of the nature of the issues affecting the international community, their belief that the world structure is multipolar, and their assertion that America is in decline. As Hoffmann argued, "A quest for world order inevitably leads to...multilateral rather than bilateral diplomacy."⁶⁰ Nye

asserted that this is largely due to the nature of the issue areas themselves. He suggested, "The US cannot escape from these transnational problems (drugs, terrorism, AIDS, global warming) and few of them are susceptible to unilateral solutions."⁶¹ Institutionalists believe that the transnational nature of the emerging global agenda will only be successfully dealt with in a multilateral manner, and that this is becoming increasingly apparent to state decision-makers. As most institutionalists are tripolarists, they believe that to come to grips with the global agenda all the major poles of power need to be consulted. Brzezinski agreed, noting, "Consensual leadership, although still based on a central American role, is already becoming a fact."⁶² Thus a multilateral approach should be developed by American decision-makers in the institutionalist view, because it jibes with the polar realities of world power.

Finally institutionalists, though still seeing the US as the single strongest state, believe that it is in decline and does not have sufficient power to pursue a successful unilateralist policy. As Professor Fuji Kamiya argued regarding the Gulf War, "The fact that America had to finance the war through international contributions was interpreted as signalling that there is a limit to America's ability to unilaterally lead the world."⁶³ As America is in decline, particularly for institutionalists both socially and economically, it must bow to the reality that even American power is limited, and that a global multilateralist policy is required. Hoffmann added, "However, if the US addresses its internal problems, the resources it will need to raise will not be available for external purposes."⁶⁴ Thus a US intent on addressing its domestic problems will have neither the resources nor the focus to conduct an aggressive, unilateralist policy, such as the democratists advocate. The formula for renewal at home leading to a cautious, multilateralist foreign policy seems to have been generally adopted by the Clinton administration. As Daniel Williams and John Goshko reported, a Senior White House official said, "that unlike the Cold War, when Washington paid lip service to the notion of collective security, the new administration really believes in the concept."⁶⁵ Thus institutionalists see a variety of long-term trends; a change in global polarity, the rise of transnationalism, and the advent of American decline, predicating an American multilateralist approach to the problems of the international arena. Just how central multilateralism is conceptually for institutionalists will become apparent when their specific policy prescriptions are examined.

Institutionalists' three key areas of concern are with renewing the American commitment to international organisations, strengthening the trilateral alliance, and boosting the American presence (particularly economically) in Asia. As institutionalists believe that international organisations facilitate the world economic system, it is not surprising that they see

wholehearted participation in such organisations as a crucial American interest in the post-Cold War era. Gill felt that the US should, "be at the core of an emerging transnational bloc, whose national interests and key ideas are bound up with the progressive transnationalism of the global political economy."⁶⁶ Nye, who felt American policy under President Reagan became too unilateralist, urged the US to, "renew the American commitment to multilateral institutions that fell into abeyance in the 80's."⁶⁷

A second major institutionalist concern is that America strengthen co-ordination between the three major poles of power; the US, Japan, and Western Europe (especially Germany). Nye felt, "the task for the US as it enters the Twenty-first century will be to renew and update the successful alliance with the great industrial democracies that has been so critical to the global balance of power for the past 40 years."⁶⁸ Institutionalists believe that increased trilateral co-ordination is essential as tripolarism accurately reflects the primary power distribution in the world today, and that only international institutions that reflect the realities of power can have true efficacy in the new post-Cold War era. It was to improve trilateral relations that Zbigniew Brzezinski devoted himself in the mid-1970s. His impetus led to the creation of the Trilateral Commission, which attempts to more closely link American, European, and Japanese business and political leaders. Chaired by Brzezinski, (Nye was also a member) the commission proved to be a protean institutionalist haunt, which, though ahead of its time, served as a type of talent pool for the Carter administration, of which both Nye and Brzezinski were members. It was the first real attempt to institutionalise the trilateral relationship that institutionalists find so important.

A final key area of institutionalist concern is Asia and the Pacific Rim, with its booming economy. In some senses institutionalists echo Schurmann's nationalists in their Asia-centric orientation, and for largely the same reason, economics. It has long been a dream of American business to introduce the Asian and Latin American markets' billions of people to American goods. At last the time seems propitious for the dream to be realised, with the Pacific Rim booming and increasingly seeing the US as a crucial trading partner. As economics is the key analytical orientation for institutionalists, their turn toward Asia is hardly surprising. In yet another sign of its general institutionalist orientation, the Clinton administration has increasingly looked to Asia rather than to Europe as its primary foreign policy concern. As Stephen Rosenfeld noted, "With the summit of 15 Pacific Rim countries in Seattle, President Clinton audaciously positions the US for a fateful post-Cold War turn from Europe to Asia, from preoccupation with security to pursuit of economic advantage."⁶⁹ While this may be overstating the case somewhat, certainly APEC can be viewed as a nascent

international organisation, specialising in economics, or in other words, it is greatly to the institutionalists liking. Hobart Rowen, interviewing US Trade Representative Mickey Kantor, also noted the Clinton administration's turn in focus to the Pacific. He added, "Unspoken in his [Kantor's] description of the future trade agenda is that Europe is the odd man out. Attention to Japan, China, Asia and the Americas has Washington looking west to the Pacific Rim, north to Canada and South to Latin America...[Kantor stated] 'God knows we have been too Euro-centric in the past, and haven't recognized the opportunities in Asia and Latin America'."70 If institutionalists generally advocate increased trilateralism, it seems they wish to become relatively ever closer to the Asian pole, even if it is at the short-term expense of the European pole.

Institutionalists feel that sanctions will increasingly take the place of force in the international system. Keohane and Hoffmann suggested that, "sanctions are likely to be the preferred policy instrument in Europe as well as elsewhere, of concerned governments seeking to end regional warfare."⁷¹ This general prescription is in line with the institutionalist belief that economics ultimately drives domestic politics and thus a government's foreign policy decisions. Institutionalists believe that if an aggressor state is hit hard by the international community with sanctions, it will either, due to domestic pressure, ultimately cease its aggression, or if it persists, be internally overthrown. If international force has to be used, institutionalists want it to be as part of as broad-based a multilateral coalition as possible. It is important to note that due to the obvious restraints collective security poses for decisive decision-making, institutionalists are not nearly as likely to advocate the use of force as are either democratists or neo-realists to punish an aggressor. It is a cornerstone of institutionalism that most problems can be favourably resolved without recourse to force.

Institutionalists see the UN as the global policeman, the guarantor of the post-Cold War era. As the UN is the primary global multilateral institution, institutionalist enthusiasm for it is hardly surprising. With the end of the Cold War, institutionalists were cheered when the previously hopelessly deadlocked Security Council (due to Cold War vetoes by the superpowers) began to become increasingly effective, especially in repelling Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. To some extent, proponents of the UN merely saw it as filling a power vacuum left by an increasingly introspective America. As Cox argued, "Since the US has no desire to serve as policeman...there is a compelling need for collective international action through the UN."⁷² Some sort of order was needed, and as America seemed occupied by its own domestic ills, a multilateral strategy using the UN as global cop seemed possible.

Barton Gellman reported that the Clinton administration initially shared this feeling, "Its strategy is to share the military and financial burdens by encouraging the UN to become the world policeman that America does not want to be."⁷³ The Clinton administration, and even other institutionalists, have since cooled to the idea of the UN as global cop after the debacles in Angola, Somalia, and Bosnia. Still, many institutionalists feel that a properly financed UN will soon be seen as the best chance to fashion some sort of order out of the increasing chaos that is so characteristic of the post-Cold War era.

Currently institutionalism's political power in America is great, both with the public and in the corridors of power. Three key tenets of institutionalism; the multipolarity of the world system, the belief the US is in decline, and the need to primarily pursue American economic advantages through foreign policy initiatives, are all broadly supported by the American public. As Holsti and Rosenau noted in their survey of 2312 American opinion leaders, "when asked to describe the contemporary international system, about 90% of respondents to the 92 leadership survey agreed that it was multipolar."⁷⁴ Horvitz added that the 650 affluent Americans who responded to a September-October 1993 poll constructed by The Times Mirror Centre for The People and The Press, "As a group, [they] believe the US now plays a less important role in the world than it did a decade ago, but should be first among equals as it shares global leadership with other nations."⁷⁵ Broad public support for institutionalist tenets is reinforced by the election of a President who, as a candidate, pledged to put American economic interests at the centre of his foreign policy. Yankelovich's analysis of the 1992 presidential election concluded that President Clinton's victory signified that, "when it comes to setting actual priorities, support for democracy and other worthy foreign policy goals are subordinate to economic concerns."⁷⁶ Also, as will be analysed in chapter 5, much of the Clinton administration, for example Warren Christopher, not surprisingly shares the President's overall institutionalist orientation.

Yet despite broad public support for institutionalist beliefs and the election of a largely institutionalist administration, it is difficult to name a single currently popular, institutionalist policy initiative. As Paul Lewis argued, the US is \$1 billion in arrears for UN peacekeeping operations and that this, "reflects congressional hostility to the mounting cost and complexity of UN peace-keeping operations."⁷⁷ In November 1993, the Clinton administration devised a new set procedure regulating US participation in UN peacekeeping operations that sharply limits the possible deployment of US troops. There have been disputes between the US and the UN over dues payments, Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti.

So why is a supposedly institutionalist administration, backed by public support, constantly bickering with the largest international organisation? The institutionalist school of thought is currently generally supported and politically popular, but when issues become specific (i.e. become policy prescriptions) almost immediately problems arise if the policy is not quickly successful, because both the administration and particularly the public have little fervour for the current form of institutionalism. As shall be shown in chapters 5 and 6, institutionalists in the post-Cold War era are not leading a new Wilsonian crusade, but are rather embracing lukewarm public support for a policy that currently seems to them to be the most expedient. Decision-makers in the administration may be convinced internationalists, but the public they serve are as yet not. Institutionalism has yet to win the intellectual debate over what should be the general American orientation in the post-Cold War era, as the containment doctrine signified the qualified intellectual triumph of Schurmann's imperialists in the Truman White House. As of now, institutionalism's political and intellectual hold on the American public in the new world order is very precarious.

Institutionalism's bureaucratic bastions of support, are, in the long term, the State Department, and currently the Presidency. As The Los Angeles Times reported, a group of conservative democrats were unhappy with the liberal slant of many of the Clinton administration's appointees to the State Department. As institutionalists are primarily moderate to liberal democrats, this is a good indication that the State Department is an institutionalist haven. As The LA Times reported, "The group [of conservative democrats], which includes a former Clinton campaign counsel, David Ifshin, have watched in increasing discomfort as the administration has been filling the State Department with moderate liberals."⁷⁸ The best example of this process is that Secretary of State Christopher (as shall be discussed in chapter 5) is an avowed institutionalist. As the institutionalist's forefathers, Schurmann's internationalists, also controlled the State Department, this is a remarkable example of how slowly orientations change in the large bureaucratic fiefdoms that comprise the American government. Schurmann argued, "The universalist [internationalist] current ran strong in the State Department, the agency of American government traditionally close to international business."⁷⁹ It appears that the State Department rank and file has not changed its general schools of thought orientation in the past 40 years, despite the notable careers there of Dulles and Kissinger.

Like their neo-Wilsonian cousins, the democratists, institutionalists favour increased American ties with Western Europe. They especially favour closer links with the EU, as long as it does not become more protectionist. A major reason institutionalists prefer the EU even

more than democratists is because it shares institutionalism's economics-first philosophy. Unlike the neo-realists, institutionalists favour increasing European integration warmly, seeing the EU as primarily a multilateral partner rather than a rival. Institutionalists, also unlike neo-realists, do not fear that Nato's efficacy is coming to an end. They feel the economic linkages that so bind Western Europe to the US will bolster continued politico-military linkages such as Nato. As Hellmann and Wolf argued, "Economic interdependence between Western Europe and North America provides incentives for cooperative solutions, leading to the continued existence of Nato."⁸⁰ This is yet another example of institutionalists believing that economic processes largely determine political and military policies. The Clinton administration has very much adopted an institutionalist line toward Western Europe, unambiguously supporting both increased European integration and the continued importance of Nato. As The International Herald-Tribune reported, Chancellor Kohl grasped this slight change from the traditional American policy toward Western Europe, "Kohl stressed that the Clinton administration in contrast to its predecessors, supported plans for European integration in economic, political and military matters."⁸¹ This unabashed support for increased European integration is a hallmark of institutionalist thinking and confirms the Clinton administration's institutionalist leanings.

Institutionalists wish to see an increased European defence role both inside and outside of Nato, particularly regarding the expansion of the WEU into something like the defence arm of the European Union. As Walter B. Slocombe, the current principal Under-Secretary of Defence for Policy, argued, "We regard the WEU as a complement, not a rival to Nato."⁸² Institutionalists do not fear that the expansion of the WEU will lead to the obsolescence of Nato, which would predicate an American military withdrawal from the continent. Rather, the largely institutionalist Clinton Presidency has adopted a policy of strong support for the expansion of the WEU, as they see it as a multilateral tool to free US resources previously spent on the defence of Western Europe to instead combat American domestic problems. As institutionalists are declinists, it follows that they should advocate a lessening American defence commitment to Europe in order to concentrate on the President's ambitious domestic reform package. For the institutionalists, it is logical (and not to be feared or opposed) that the Europeans should fill the partial security vacuum left by an America that, with the end of the Cold War, wishes to arrest its domestic decline.

Finally, unlike democratists, institutionalists advocate a more egalitarian Nato, rather than seeing it as an instrument of US dominance. They envisage Nato at last resembling President Kennedy's conception of a 'twin pillars' arrangement, with the European stake in and

decision-making powers both equal to the American commitment. With the end of the Cold War, many believe Nato is moving in this direction. Among them are General Oakes, former Commander in Chief of Allied Air Control in Nato, who stated, "There is a significant watering down of the US leadership position."⁸³ Institutionalists believe that this process should be furthered. As Stephen A. Oxman, the former Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs argued, "we should continue to encourage our allies to take a greater share of the burdens of European security. We welcome the Maastricht Treaty's call for the development of a European security and defense identity, which can form the basis of the European pillar of Nato."⁸⁴ It is hardly surprising that institutionalists would want to use a long-established institution, the WEU, to embody the relative power shift towards an increased European role in its security.

To preserve institutional harmony institutionalists, despite favouring the eventual admittance of the Central and Eastern Europeans to Nato, want to go slow on admitting them until all the present Nato members agree to such a policy. This led to the Partnership for Peace initiative, which expressed the contentious goals of allowing Eastern Europe under Nato's security blanket, while at the same time stating that such a process would be slow as the entire alliance had to agree to such a radical change in the composition of Nato. For institutionalists institutional cohesion took precedence over the expansion of Nato. Instead institutionalists, such as those within the Clinton administration, want to concentrate on fostering an increased European defence role. As President Clinton stated in his first European speech in Brussels, the US, "will benefit more from a strong and equal partnership than from a weak one."⁸⁵ This idea of increasing American-European equality is the general basis for the institutionalist initiatives toward Western Europe.

The general institutionalist view of Bosnia was a belief that the US should not intervene there unless an international consensus called on it to do so. As with all other questions of force, institutionalists were inherently cautious. This caution was reinforced because Bosnia was not a key issue area for them, nor was it an area of extensive US business interests. As a candidate, President Clinton adopted democratist rhetoric over Bosnia, castigating President Bush for timidity and seeing the Vance-Owen plan as rewarding Serbian aggression. As shall be shown in detail in chapter 6, once elected the President rapidly adopted institutionalist precepts toward Bosnia, after his own more aggressive initiatives (to lift the weapons embargo on the Bosnian Muslims while threatening the Serbs with air strikes) found little support among the European allies. After allied objections, Clinton withdrew the plan, largely to avoid a damaging rift with America's European allies. For institutionalists,

maintaining ties with the European pole of power far outweighed Bosnia as a primary American foreign policy consideration. This is precisely what President Clinton told the Bosnian leader President Izetbegovic, "he [Clinton] added that there was simply no support among Western allies for air armed intervention in Bosnia at this time and that Washington was not inclined to go it alone."⁸⁶ Unilateral armed action in Bosnia would violate many of the institutionalists' core precepts. Not only would it open a rift with America's European allies, it would be a case of using force (which institutionalists are always comparatively reluctant to do), acting alone (a position institutionalists are generally against), and all for an area that was not seen as a primary concern. It is little wonder the largely institutionalist-oriented Clinton administration chose to generally withdraw from the Bosnian controversy following its policy rebuff from the Europeans, rather than break with so many institutionalist beliefs.

Institutionalists see increased global trade as a crucial issue area and were strongly in favour of Congressional passage of both the Nafta and Gatt agreements. Even though all three schools of thought generally favour Congressional passage of both Nafta and Gatt, neo-realists and democratists did not have the same depth of feeling about the trade issue institutionalists possessed. Institutionalists argued that Nafta and Gatt confirm a major shift in the American emphasis on trade that has taken place over the past twenty years. As Martin Walker noted, "In the course of a generation, the US has gone from being the world's most self-reliant economy into the world's biggest exporter, with a GDP that is these days more dependent than Japan on exports. Japan exports only 9% of its GDP. Last year, the US exported 11.7% of GDP, and should exceed 12% this year."⁸⁷ Institutionalists felt that both the Nafta and Gatt agreements are merely a logical response to this changing world. Free trade is at the heart of President Clinton's foreign policy. His adoption of the fervent institutionalist line on free trade confirms his general institutionalist orientation. As Lawrence Malkin reported in early February 1993, President Clinton, "urged Americans to 'compete, not retreat,' from world commerce and said trade would act as an engine of prosperity if the US and its partners opened their markets."⁸⁸ For institutionalists, Gatt was a particularly crucial issue. A Gatt agreement, economists estimated, would increase world trade by \$213 billion by 2002. In the view of the Clinton administration, this increase was essential for the recession-plagued first world and important to help stimulate American economic recovery. Indeed as Clay Chandler and Daniel Williams argued, the two free trade initiatives were essential to President Clinton's notions of the new world order. They suggested, "Unlike President Bush's vague notions of a new world order centered on US-led security, President Clinton's new order is one of US-led free trade, a harnessing of foreign policy to domestic

economic needs."⁸⁹ The granting of primacy to economics in foreign policy is, as has been illustrated, a hallmark of institutionalism and a centrepiece of the Clinton foreign policy.

Institutionalists advocate giving aid to Russia co-ordinated by multilateral institutions like the IMF and the World Bank. However they see trade and not aid as the crucial factor needed to integrate Russia into the Western economic community. Institutionalists are for more aid to Russia than the neo-realists, and less than the democratists. Like the neo-realists they advocate that the IMF employ the usual strict loan conditions it generally imposes when a state requests economic assistance. Institutionalists will only support Russian reform if the market system is introduced. They see the perils of the Russian situation, unlike the democratists, as largely resulting from economic and not political dislocation. The Clinton administration's policy towards Russia has been a mix of democratism and institutionalism. There is a tension between the two over Russia. As Mark Frankland shrewdly observed, both Yeltsin and Clintons' policies toward Russian reform have, "zigzagged between two opposing solutions: preserving democracy and managing the market, or suppressing democracy to preserve the purity of liberal economics."⁹⁰ Democratists have supported steps toward the former view, institutionalist initiatives favour the latter. What to do regarding Russia's transition to capitalism divides democratists and institutionalists and supports this thesis' contention, that far from being the same school of thought, at times democratism and institutionalism espouse antithetical policies.

The President has placed Russia at the centre of his foreign policy agenda (as democratists advocate), while at the same time advocating that the IMF should provide the single largest amount of Western aid. President Clinton has also urged that continued progress towards the free market should be a condition for such aid continuing (as institutionalists advocate). The July 1993 Tokyo summit, where the G-7 promised the Russians \$28.4 billion in aid, was largely an institutionalist initiative. Gwen Ifill reported that due to the unpopularity of foreign aid, "the proportions of assistance were adjusted [at the summit] to reflect more in loans from international lending institutions and less in direct cash from foreign governments."⁹¹ Once again, domestic unhappiness with unilateral measures made a multilateral, institutionalist policy toward aid to Russia likely. It was the IMF, and not the American government, that provided the main resources for aid to Russia and the conditions that aid would be based upon. Institutionalists feel that without undergoing a painful radical restructuring of the Russian economy (i.e. using IMF funds to float the ruble), Russia will not be able to trade with the West and thus its position will stagnate or worsen, and its democratic political reforms will be doomed. This economics-first approach, a

characteristic institutionalist view, is a crucial component in the general institutionalist approach toward aiding Russian reform.

Institutionalists are the strongest supporters of China's radical economic reforms. They generally favoured extension of MFN under almost all conditions, being even more pro-MFN than the neo-realists. The fact that Deng Xiaoping followed a path of economic over political reform, in line with standard institutionalist precepts, is a major reason institutionalists are so vocal in their support for Deng's policy. Conflicts over US policy to China present perhaps the starkest policy differences between democratists and institutionalists, as the argument underlying extension of MFN to China was really over whether economic or political factors should have pre-eminence in American foreign policy decision-making. Asian leaders grasped this key point as the Clinton administration struggled with extending MFN in the Spring of 1993. As Lee Kuan Yew, the Prime Minister of Singapore, noted, "the new US President would have to decide if his priorities were economics or politics. If it's economics then he should not muddy the situation by lingering on the politics of democracy and human rights and pressing it [China] too hard because that would upset the economic growth that is on its way in East Asia."⁹² China's economy, the second largest in Asia after Japan's, increased 11% in 1992 and increased its imports 22%. This booming new market was vital to cultivate if the Clinton administration's export-driven recovery strategy was to be implemented. Yet to some extent, Clinton had rhetorically boxed himself into a corner over China.

As a Presidential candidate, Clinton had accused China of gross human rights abuses (i.e. exports being produced by prison labour), and President Bush of coddling the tyrants who instigated the Tiananmen massacre. Yet as over Bosnia, Clinton's democratist rhetoric gave way to institutionalist policy. China is perhaps the best illustration of the Clinton administration's institutionalist, rather than democratist, general overall schools of thought orientation. In May 1993, despite his campaign rhetoric, President Clinton granted China a year's extension of MFN, but linked future extensions to improvements in China's human rights record and adherence to arms control treaties. These conditions were imposed largely to placate angry democratists who accused Clinton of betraying his own democratist campaign rhetoric. When asked his reasons for the extension, Clinton responded, "I have basically decided to extend MFN status for a year because I want to support modernization in China, and it's a great opportunity for Americans there."⁹³ Thus, in his statement, Clinton invoked both the institutionalist notions that modernisation is primarily predicated on the free market and not democracy, and that domestic economic benefits should be central to foreign

policy formulation. Since May 1993 the Clinton administration's policy towards China has become even more institutionalistically oriented. As was reported in The International Herald-Tribune, "President Clinton has decided to greatly expand high-level exchanges with China in an effort to put relations on a 'sounder footing'."94 This initiative included President Clinton speaking privately with the Chinese President Jiang Zemin at the APEC meeting in November 1993, by far the highest-level contact between US and Chinese officials since the Chinese democracy movement was crushed. This process culminated in May 1994 when Clinton chose to decouple human rights considerations from MFN renewal. To improve relations, the Clinton administration is relying on the institutionalist precept that increased contact between states leads to common interests emerging, which in turn promotes increased international stability. Over the critical question of China, the Clinton administration can be seen at its most institutionalist.

Unlike the democratist and neo-realist schools of thought, institutionalism contains no genuine minority current, as there are no real 'supranationalists', radical institutionalists who advocate and foresee a world government, in either opinion-making or decision-making circles. Instead, there are only 'moderate' institutionalists, who still see the state as central to the international system. As a result of not having a significant minority current, there is less variation in the institutionalist school of thought than there is in either neo-realism or democratism.

Stanley Hoffmann, Professor at Harvard in Government and the study of France, espouses institutionalist precepts without holding a significant minority view. The university where Hoffmann teaches, Harvard, is a centre of institutionalist thinking as Hoffmann, Nye, and Keohane have all worked there and often collaborated on joint institutionalist articles. Hoffmann advances the standard institutionalist declinist/multipolar world structural view. He envisaged a post-Cold War order where, "America's role as a tutor of Europe shrinks, as its weight in Nato decreases, as its priorities shift to its own internal problems,"95 the world will become increasingly multipolar. Hoffmann recognised the link between America's decline and the fact that a new multilateralist general foreign policy would best suit its needs. Nowhere was this process more apparent to Hoffmann than in Europe. In line with general institutionalist thinking Keohane and Hoffmann saw, "the EC is the central institution in the new post-Cold War Europe."96 Institutionalists feel a major effort should be made to improve relations with this crucial power in the new world order. As with much institutionalist thinking, Hoffmann's analysis tends to be more descriptive than prescriptive. This, while making policy-prescription analysis more difficult, does not make it impossible.

For example, Hoffmann believed the new post-Cold War security system in Europe can be described as, "a mix of a much-reformed Nato no longer dominated by the US, a Western European defense organization, and an organization set up by the CSCE."⁹⁷ Implicit in this description is a recognition that an increased European defence role both in and out of Nato (i.e. the expansion of the role of the WEU) is likely, and thus should not be futilely opposed, particularly as institutionalists favour a more egalitarian Nato as a general precept. As with the neo-realists, some institutionalist policy prescriptions are predicated on a recognition of what they believe to be the objective structural conditions of the world system, conditions that lead to processes (i.e. the growing power of the EU) that should be managed as they cannot be overcome.

This descriptive process, implicitly illustrating opinion-makers' policy preferences, can also be seen in Hoffmann's attitude towards free trade. Regarding trade in the post-Cold War era, Hoffmann urged that, "policies should be aimed at preventing the breakup of the world economy into separate blocs engaged in the varieties of economic war."⁹⁸ As Hoffmann believed this, it is logical to presume that he strongly favoured the Gatt agreement, as one of its avowed aims was to prevent the world economy becoming riven with protectionist blocs. As Hoffmann believed post-war free trade gains should be protected and expanded, it is logical to infer that he favoured the Gatt agreement, and also the Nafta accord, as long as Nafta did not promote protectionism within the North American trading bloc. This view, of course, gibes with the strong institutionalist predilection in favour of free trade in general, as well as both agreements specifically. Thus Hoffmann's policy preferences matched general institutionalist precepts regarding both Western Europe and trade.

However Hoffmann did not follow the standard institutionalist position regarding Bosnia. Instead he criticised the West's policy stating, "Negotiations backed by no credible threat of armed force have turned into appeasement."⁹⁹ Hoffmann advocated a democratist policy in Bosnia, "The proper policy would have been to press the Serbs, by force if necessary, to stop using war and ethnic cleansing and to negotiate a fair settlement with their Muslim adversaries after a lasting cease-fire had been imposed."¹⁰⁰ This willingness to directly advocate the use of American military power to influence the Bosnian conflict was characteristic of the democratist viewpoint regarding Bosnia. Thus over this issue area Hoffmann is in opposition to his institutionalist colleagues.

Like his Harvard colleague, Robert Keohane is also an institutionalist with no major minority views. Keohane, a member of the council on Foreign Relations, was also editor of

International Organization, a periodical concerned with one of institutionalism's core issues, the role of international organisations in the global arena, which was dominated by institutionalist writers such as Hoffmann and Nye. Regarding Europe, as was noted earlier, Keohane, like Hoffmann, thought that the EU would be the central European institution in the new era.¹⁰¹ As with Hoffmann, it is reasonable to conclude his policy prescriptions regarding Europe are institutional, advocating greater American ties with the EU. More concerned in his writings with the theoretical underpinnings of institutionalism than with advocating specific policy prescriptions, Keohane, nevertheless is, with Nye, one of the pioneers of institutionalist thinking.

As with both Hoffmann and Keohane, Joseph Nye is an institutionalist without minority views. Nye is a professor of Government at Harvard, served on the editorial board of International Organization (which his frequent collaborator Keohane chaired), and has served as Chairman of the editorial board of International Security. Beyond this impressive academic record, Nye served as Deputy Under-Secretary of State in the Carter administration between 1977-79. Currently he is Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security under President Clinton, where he has been a central player in US-Japanese relations. Like most institutionalists he is a democrat, who served on Brzezinski's Trilateral Commission in the 1970s. Like other institutionalist pioneers such as Keohane and Brzezinski, Nye has seen the world as tripolar since the 70s (this was the key premise of the Trilateral commission). Yet while Nye's policy prescriptions and belief in the tripolarity of the world reflect standard institutionalist views, his opinions about American decline do not.

Nye's book, Bound to Lead, is a key to the revivalist argument. Like Brzezinski, Nye's thesis centred on the changed nature of the international system itself. Nye's thesis was that America is not in decline relative to other states, but that 'states' themselves are losing power in the international system. Unlike most institutionalists Nye still felt, "The US remains the largest and richest power with the greatest capacity to shape the future."¹⁰² Yet though this view is not the standard institutionalist position, the rest of Nye's thesis corresponded exactly with the institutionalist notion that the state is not the only significant actor in the international arena. Nye argued, "The US is likely to remain the leading power, yet it will have to cope with unprecedented problems of interdependence that no great power can solve by itself."¹⁰³ For Nye then the debate over whether any other state can soon displace the US as the greatest power in the world missed the greater point that all states are increasingly losing power to act unilaterally in the international system, and that even the strongest state, the US, must usually seek co-operative solutions due to the fundamentally changed nature of the international

system. Nye commented, "The US will remain the leading power, but being 'number one' won't be what it used to be. Many of the new issues in international politics - ecology, drugs, Aids, terrorism - involve a diffusion of power away from states to private actors and require the organization of states for cooperative responses."¹⁰⁴ While much has been made of Nye's revivalist argument, it is the second institutionalist notion of Nye's thesis, that the nature of the international system has fundamentally changed, which is crucial for understanding his overall schools of thought orientation.

Regarding Gatt, Nye held the standard institutionalist view that anything that promotes the extension of Gatt, and through it free trade, is in America's interests. Nye suggested that, "Institutions governing the international economy, such as the IMF and Gatt, tend to embody the liberal free-market principles that coincide in large measure with American society and ideology."¹⁰⁵ Nye believed that international institutions tend to embody the principles of the strongest state involved in founding the particular organisation. As institutionalists such as Nye feel that it is still in America's interest to promote free trade, Gatt, constructed in an era of greater relative American power, is still seen as an important instrument used to further unchanged American objectives. For this reason, Nye saw any extension of Gatt, such as the Uruguay Round agreement, as a positive development for the US.

Nye more explicitly followed the institutionalist line regarding Europe. Nye believes a more egalitarian alliance serves American interests. He argued, "Sharing leadership with a strengthened Europe is a means of maintaining a beneficial institutional power resource."¹⁰⁶ Specifically Nye urged strong US support for increased European integration, particularly through expansion of the role of the EU, to build an alliance system buttressed by the twin pillars of American and European power. He argued, "Over the long term, continued support for European integration remains the best strategy for a stable and prosperous continent capable of acting as a partner with the US."¹⁰⁷ Nye strongly adhered to the institutionalist view that not only does a relatively strengthened Europe pose no possible threat to America, its increased power is a sign of robustness within an increasingly multilateralist Nato.

After the heady days of the late 80s and early 90s, when it seemed that a new world order based on institutionalist precepts might effortlessly appear, there has been increasing criticism of institutionalism. Critics note that several of its basic precepts seem seriously flawed. Firstly, both democratists and neo-realists criticise institutionalism's reliance on collective security and multilateralism as its preferred mode of action. As Brian Beedham noted before the disasters in Somalia and Bosnia were wholly apparent, the commitment to collective

security that had seen the UN through the Gulf crisis could prove to be a transient phenomenon. He observed, "The bigger problem is that it [the UN] may soon lose the brief cohesion that sent it into Kuwait and Bosnia and Somalia. It may no longer be able to act decisively and consistently."¹⁰⁸ Beedham's early worry has been proven correct. However at the best of times the apparatus of collective security inherently leads to problems regarding acting consistently and decisively. To act consistently, international organisations need a long-term political consensus. As a Washington Post editorial observed, such consistency is a rarity in the multilateral framework. It commented on US policy regarding the Bosnian crisis, noting, "The actual starting point of American policy appears to lie in the phenomenon called 'multilateralism'. This means consulting everyone - allies, even in a sense adversaries, national governments and International Organizations. It makes for an elaborate system of all checks and no capacity for movement and initiative. It takes the worthy purpose of consultation and converts it into a farcical invitation to doubters everywhere to paralyze American policy."¹⁰⁹ In an effort to maintain consistency and preserve multilateral unity, institutionalists inherently hamper their own ability to act decisively. Both neo-realists and democratists feel that institutionalism's firm adherence to multilateralism could cripple American foreign policy by generally removing the possibility of decisive action (that is, acting unilaterally). To act, to use force in a multilateral setting becomes so difficult as to be a rarity (i.e. The Gulf War was the first genuine case where all the members of the Security Council (except China) agreed on the use of force in 45 years). As a result institutionalists look to sanctions as their main instrument of coercion, with their debatable utility. Neo-realists and democratists charge the institutionalists with underrating the efficacy of force in international politics, thus dooming themselves to impotence.

Critics also believe institutionalists overrate the role of economics in the international system. Like Marxists, institutionalists see economics as the basis for many social and political phenomena, and as a motive force of history. Also like Marxists, they are sometimes accused of being determinists. John Lewis Gaddis cleverly picked up on this argument, criticising Wilsonians as, "certain that they have exposed an engine that drives history forward, they never seem to ask whether there might be others."¹¹⁰ Also, there is an existential critique of this economics above-all approach, articulated by Zbigniew Brzezinski. At its extreme Brzezinski reasoned that institutionalist policy merely exhorts the world towards greater materialism, a position that he and many others do not think should be the primary drive behind American policy initiatives.

Critics of institutionalism believe that the flaws in institutionalist precepts help explain the failure of several key institutionalist bastions to perform as well as they had been expected to in the new world order. With the crises in Bosnia and Somalia making a mockery of Butros-Ghali's aspirations for the UN to become the global policeman, James Bone reported, "A dispirited UN secretary-general has told a closed meeting of the UN Security Council that he does not believe the UN to be capable at present of peace enforcement operations."¹¹¹ The UN, hopelessly underfinanced and beset by intractable international problems such as Bosnia and Somalia, has begun to try to scale back its role in the world. Neo-realists feel institutionalists have always overrated international organisations, which they see as little more than tools of states. Leslie Gelb cleverly alluded to the 'UN paradox', "Without US leadership and power, the UN lacks muscle. With it, the UN loses its independent identity."¹¹² In light of the UN's failures, it is generous to say that international institutions are obviously not yet ready to fully take on a world ordering role without the wholehearted support of the great state powers.

Likewise the EU, the centrepiece of institutionalist calculations about Europe, has not become anything like as cohesive as of yet, as institutionalists believed that it would be in the post-Cold War era. The furore over passage of the Maastricht Treaty alerted many around the world that increased integration was not the historical inevitability that it had been supposed. The crisis over increased integration was heightened by the EU's failure to stop the fighting in Bosnia, a war which was ironically claimed by Jacques Delors to be the test of the EU's greater foreign policy and security role in Europe. As Michael Brenner acutely noted, "Both the mentality and behavior [in the Balkans] were wholly alien to the world of reason and reasonableness inhabited by the Community Twelve."¹¹³ One of the main reasons institutionalists favour increased contacts with the EU is that it exhibits an economics-first approach within its own organisation, for example, favouring economic threats, sanctions, over military coercion, as American institutionalists also advocate. The Bosnian war illustrated the drawbacks of such a stance. Initially the Serbs cared more about nationalism than their own economic well-being and as such were incomprehensible to the average Eurocrat. Sanctions only work if the aggressor places a great value on economic prosperity relative to other goals. For an institutionalist, or EC Commissioner, economic prosperity is the crucial goal of initiatives in the international sphere. In applying sanctions, institutionalists threaten to take away from an aggressor what they themselves would value most. Sanctions do not work if an aggressor state, in this case Serbia, places a greater value on other priorities besides prosperity, such as religion, ethnic ties, nationalism, or ideology. The Bosnian conflict showed both Western Europe and institutionalism unable to grasp the

limits of their primary instrument of coercion. Also, economic rates of growth in Western Europe and Japan have not matched their course since the 70s and 80s when institutionalists first envisaged a tripolar world. Ironically it is the United States that has achieved by far the highest rates of growth among the G-7 in the early 90s. Worse, at least in the case of Western Europe, its recession seems to be partly structural as the EU's safety net has to be paid for despite European productivity rates that lag far behind those of Japan and America. Even in their own (economic) terms, it is open to debate as to whether Europe and Japan can continue to gain relative power, predicated for institutionalists above all by economics, at the expense of the United States. The world structure may not be moving inexorably toward tripolarity after all.

Finally, neo-realists argue that institutionalists have an overly complex view of the world. It is certainly true that as institutionalists see the interactions between states, MNCs, and International Organisations as the crucial level of analysis in the international arena, they espouse an analytical view of the world that is more complicated than the state-centric neo-realists envision. As Chart 4-2 illustrates, institutionalists often offer a more descriptive than prescriptive view of major policy issue areas. Complexity is the reason institutionalists are so reticent about making specific policy prescriptions. Institutionalism's attempt to construct a model that reflects the obvious complexity of world political processes is laudable, but not if it stops them from obtaining policy outputs. Without these outputs, institutionalism limits its own relevance and effect on world political processes. Still, despite such criticism, the institutionalist school of thought represents the dominant foreign policy view of the Clinton administration. At least for the moment institutionalist prescriptions seem politically in the ascendant.

Chart 4 - 2 Institutional Policy Regarding Five Key Issues

Majority Institutional View Reached From the Givens	Non-Interventionist, No Lifting of Arms Embargo	Aid Co-ordinated by Multilateral Institutions. No Easing of Shock Therapy	Pro-MFN, Want to Decouple it from Human Rights Concerns	Crucial, Strongly Favour	EU-firsters, Evolutionary Expansion of Nato
Issues	Bosnia	Russia	China	Nafta/Gatt	Nato/Western European Policy
Hoffmann - Professor	Follows democratist line (-)			Pro (+)	Pro (+)
Keohane - Professor					Pro (+)
Nye - Professor Secretary of Defence, Democrat				Pro (+)	Pro (+)

(+) consistent with the overall schools of thought categorisation (-) inconsistent with the overall schools of thought categorisation

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Chapter 5: The Schools of Thought Orientations of Central Legislative and Executive Decision-Makers.

Now it is essential to classify the schools of thought orientation of major political actors both within Congress and the executive branch. This will be done by using precisely the same five policy areas as were used in classifying the academics in chapters 2-4. Once specific decision-makers have been placed in a schools of thought box, and the reasons for their classification have been analysed by comparing their specific policy preferences, it will be possible to analyse how the schools of thought orientation helps determine how overall American foreign policy outputs are arrived at. This will be done by tracing the specific classified decision-makers as they operate within the bureaucratic political processes that are the arena for the formulation of American foreign policy outputs. Having identified the overall American schools of thought preferences regarding Bosnia in chapter 6 (the outputs), and knowing the schools of thought orientation of crucial foreign policy decision-makers (the inputs), it will be possible to analyse American political and bureaucratic processes which determine foreign policy outputs using schools of thought analysis.

(a) Specific democratist decision-makers in US foreign policy

i) Strobe Talbott - Deputy Secretary of State

Strobe Talbott, the former ambassador-at-large and Special Adviser to Secretary Christopher on the newly independent states of the former USSR, and now Deputy Secretary of State, is the first democratist to be analysed. Like the other democratist decision-maker to be discussed, former Senate Majority Leader Mitchell, Talbott is not wholly a democratist, having a significant institutionalist minority current. This minority institutionalist predilection can be seen in both his policy preference for Bosnia and position on MFN renewal for China. Over China, Talbott explicitly attacked the position of his democratist cohorts. As he stated while an editor of Time, regarding Congress' decision to impose conditions on MFN for China in the final days of the Bush administration, "Once again, those would-be statesmen on Capitol Hill are trying to micromanage American foreign policy and legislate morality in another country - something Congress does often and badly."¹ Here the soon to be Deputy Secretary of State attacked the legislation of morality regarding China, which is precisely what the democratists in Congress were trying to accomplish by levying conditions on the regime of Deng Xiaphong. Talbott followed

this attack by asserting that, in true institutionalist style, if MFN was withdrawn the wrong people in China would be hurt, namely the entrepreneurs and emerging middle-classes, those most likely to spearhead a drive toward increased liberalisation in Chinese society. As Talbott affirmed, "curtailing MFN would hurt elements in China the outside world should be trying to help."² Thus Talbott advocated the classic institutionalist position on China.

The ambassador's stance on Bosnia was, unlike his China policy preference, hardly a standard defence of the institutionalist position. Rather it was a reflection of his fundamental democratist conviction that nothing should be allowed to jeopardise Yeltsin's radical experiment. As Talbott is the ideological godfather of the Russia-first impulse in the Clinton administration, that his Bosnia policy preference should largely be predicated by its subordination to his advocated initiatives on Russia should come as little surprise. Yet Talbott did not always hold an institutionalist position on Bosnia. Before joining the administration, his comments while editor of *Time* magazine reflected a democratist stance. He observed, "before dismissing intervention altogether, Western leaders should remember how they dealt earlier this year with the first great threat of the new world order. Global outrage, combined with diplomatic and economic sanctions, did not dislodge Saddam Hussein from that corner of Greater Iraq better known as Kuwait. It took a massive multilateral expeditionary force."³ In noting that force, not sanctions, ultimately removed Saddam Hussein from Kuwait, Talbott revealed his initial anti-institutionalist position on the Bosnian crisis, as he hinted at advocating a democratist stance. However on becoming a member of the Clinton administration, his policy preference over Bosnia jibed with the President's in advocating the very institutionalist position he had earlier attacked. Talbott's strongest call for punishing Serb aggression in Bosnia consisted merely of an initiative to tighten existing economic sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs by sealing the border with Serbia proper more effectively.⁴ The reason behind Talbott's volte-face in advocating an institutionalist position on Bosnia lay in his fundamental advocacy of Russian reform.

Talbott's crucial democratist championing of Russian reform was his primary policy concern both by inclination and title, as bureaucratically he was Special Adviser to Secretary Christopher regarding the newly independent states of the former USSR. In that role he was instrumental in the crafting of the administration's democratist policy regarding Russia. As Cox stated, the ambassador believed, "The US thus had to abandon the restraint it had previously shown, increasing its stake in Russian reform and hope that this would make the reform process irreversible."⁵ Thus a possible cleavage over Bosnia had to be

avoided at almost all costs for Talbott, who saw Russian reform as the crucial foreign policy issue facing the US. Deputy Secretary of State Talbott predicated his institutionalist Bosnia policy on his democratist Russia policy, which he had done so much to create. It was viewed by him and the administration as far more important in the overall hierarchy of foreign policy priorities.

Indeed Talbott displayed classic democratist predilections in explaining and justifying his views on America's policy toward the Yeltsin regime. Like almost all democratists, he believed US aid could prove crucial to the survival of the Russian democratic experiment. Talbott stated, "Only with international help, marshalled by the US, could Russia, Ukraine, and the other former republics of the USSR make the transition from totalitarianism to democracy."⁶ Like most democratists, Talbott felt the neo-realist position on Russia could lead to a damaging self-fulfilling prophecy. He argued, "To put it bluntly: if we base our policies on the persistent presumption that Russia will regress rather than evolve, then we would have committed, in the final years of this century, a strategic blunder equal to the one committed in the opening years at Versailles and afterward."⁷ By comparing the neo-realists' relatively passive position on Russian reform with the disastrous foreign policy inactivity of the Harding and Coolidge presidencies, Talbott illustrated not only his advocacy for an activist democratist initiative toward the former USSR, but also the central importance such a policy assumed for him specifically and for democratists in general.

If the reform process of the USSR is of central importance for Talbott, the success or failure of Yeltsin's reforms in Russia are viewed as the key to this process. Regarding Russia, Talbott stated, "What happens there will have a major, perhaps decisive, effect on the future of reform in all the former Soviet republics."⁸ Thus in the wake of the December 1993 election, which saw Yeltsin's opponents gain control of the Russian parliament, Talbott followed the standard democratist course in blaming the IMF for failing the Russian people. As Cox noted, he angrily argued, "there had been too much imposed 'shock' and not enough 'therapy' in Russia."⁹ Here Talbott again followed classic democratist thinking in placing democracy above economic considerations in evaluating American policy toward Russia. Talbott felt that the US-led IMF should have relaxed its strict conditions on borrowing so as to allow the Yeltsin government more aid, even if it did not meet all the usual economic conditions for such assistance. Talbott believed that the success of Russian democracy was too important to be threatened by the niceties of economic orthodoxy. Also, if Yeltsin fully imposed draconian economic strictures on his people, he would greatly increase the chance that his government would be overthrown.

Talbott and most democratists felt that economic short-sightedness should not be allowed to stand in the path of the most crucial democratic experiment now going in the world.

As with Bosnia, Talbott's European policy prescriptions are also largely determined by his democratist commitment to Russian reform. As Gordon reported, a senior official at the State Department observed Talbott's stance regarding Europe as being, "that the worst thing to do would be to draw a new line across Europe which would preclude Russia from the security community."¹⁰ Talbott's anti-neo-realist position on Europe is thus predicated by Russian fears of being left out of the new European security structure, which the inclusion of the Central European states into Nato would symbolise. In such circumstances, an isolated Russia would be more likely to turn to hyper-nationalist, anti-democratic solutions to its security dilemmas.¹¹ This scenario was precisely what Talbott wished to avoid as the success of the democratic Yeltsin regime was his foremost concern. In accordance with the democratist position on the expansion of Nato, Talbott felt any extension of Nato eastwards would definitely alienate Russia. Thus, democratists are more opposed to Nato expansion than are institutionalists. Talbott's decisive role in halting any agenda for the eastward extension of Nato rankled neo-realists, who believed a quick expansion of Nato was necessary to maintain continental security in the post-Cold war era. As Ives observed, for neo-realists, "The immediate charge against Talbott is that he persuaded President Clinton to overrule his boss, Warren Christopher, by keeping Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary out of Nato. If talk about a Soviet invasion of the West, was, in Talbott's words, a 'paranoid fantasy' so, in his view, is talk of a revived Russian army marching West."¹² Talbott correctly discerned that the Russian army was incapable of making a lightning thrust eastwards to reassert Russian domination over its former Warsaw Pact allies. As this was the case, the US could easily counter such a Russian drive, with or without a formal security arrangement with the Central European states. In short, even if the Yeltsin government gave way to an adversarial, nationalist regime, the West would still be able to defend the Central European states. As this was so, it was far more important, in Talbott's view, to do nothing that might lead to the destabilisation of the democratic Russian regime. As a democratist, Talbott believed that Russia's continued democratic nature was the best source of security for the central Europeans. As Talbott stated, "with each passing year, it becomes increasingly apparent that the proposition 'democracies don't go to war with one another' is not just a bromide - it's as close as we are likely to get in political science to an empirical truth."¹³ This central democratist tenet then lies at the heart of Talbott's prescription for American policy regarding the European security structure. In Talbott's view, a concentration on Russian reform would paradoxically provide the Central

Europeans with more security than would formal Nato membership. This is due to the fact that democratists believe that if Russian democratic reform succeeds, the Central Europeans need not fear their massive neighbour to the east, as democracies do not make war against one another.

As befits most democratists regarding trade issues, Talbott favoured both Nafta and Gatt, yet this issue is not a central democratist concern, as it is for the institutionalists. In Talbott's case this was true by virtue of both his schools of thought orientation and his bureaucratic specialisation on Russia. As opposed to the institutionalist school of thought, Talbott acknowledged the frailties of the Gatt. He noted, "Gatt is the imperfect, sputtering yet indispensable engine of globalization."¹⁴ This specific statement perfectly encapsulates the general democratist position on trade issues. Like most democratists, Talbott did not see the Gatt as a panacea for global problems, as befitted a follower of a school of thought which ultimately values democracy over free market institutions, yet still viewed the extension of trade as an important initiative in the new world order. Also, unlike the institutionalists, Talbott feared that without Gatt, the tripolar economic structure of the world (with power clustered around Japan, the US, and Europe (Germany)) would increasingly lead to an unstable system of aggressive, protectionist trading blocs. The institutionalists value this tripolar diffusion of power, seeing it as the firm basis for global security, and not as a danger. Talbott observed, "By its nature, a tripolar world would be less stable than the bipolar one that existed when the US and the Soviet Union were squared off against one another."¹⁵ Deputy Secretary of State Talbott thus saw regional trading blocs as having possibly pernicious as well as beneficial aspects. His pro-Gatt stance reflected the democratist position that free trade expansion is important and necessary but that it is not a cure-all for global problems and, in the case of regional trading expansion, can lead to negative, unforeseen consequences.

ii) George Mitchell - Senate Majority Leader

Like Talbott, former Senate Majority Leader Mitchell¹⁶ is a democratist with an institutionalist minority current. Yet unlike the Deputy Secretary of State, Mitchell's majority democratist viewpoint can be seen primarily in his approach to economic policy questions, such as the MFN controversy with China and trade issues, and less in the security realm where he maintained an institutionalist position both on the Bosnian crisis and on the proposed structure of the new European security architecture.

Regarding Bosnia, like his close political ally President Clinton, the Senate Majority Leader held a strong institutionalist position. Like most of those who held an institutionalist position on Bosnia, Mitchell believed containing the conflict to be a primary objective, a goal that would be threatened by the US unilaterally lifting the arms embargo. He noted, "Those horrors [of the war] will be multiplied thousands of times over if the war widens. Yet that will be the inevitable result of the unilateral lifting of the arms embargo by the US."¹⁷ Here Mitchell used a humanitarian argument against those holding the democratist position on Bosnia, knowing full well that humanitarian concerns are of great importance for his democratist cohorts. Mitchell envisioned a conflict with even more barbarism than the war if the embargo was lifted, as a zone of instability was bound to spread. Mitchell feared that this would be a certainty, for the Russians would bolster the Bosnian Serbs with weaponry if the US came to the military aid of the Bosnian government. With both sides then having virtually unlimited stockpiles of weapons, Mitchell believed that war would likely spread throughout the Balkans and with it the savagery that characterised the conflict. Thus the Senate Majority Leader used democratist humanitarian arguments against democratists who wished America to actively side with the Bosnian Muslims in the war, in support of the less activist institutionalist position regarding Bosnia.

Mitchell also felt that acting in a unilateral manner regarding the lifting of the arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslims would cause the US great hardship in the international arena. He stated, "If we now unilaterally lift the arms embargo in the former Yugoslavia, we will be saying to every participant against those other sanctioned countries (Haiti, Iraq, Libya, maybe North Korea), you can jump out whenever you see fit. We will completely undermine the international effort through the UN and with our allies to use sanctions as a means of attaining universally accepted international objectives."¹⁸ As with most of those who held an institutionalist stance on Bosnia, Mitchell was thinking in larger terms and of larger objectives than the Bosnian conflict itself. Here he questioned the continued efficacy of sanctions in general if the US unilaterally abandoned the arms embargo in the former Yugoslavia. If the US decided to flout the international community over Bosnia, why should not some other state do so over another international embargo not to its liking, for instance the Russians or the French over the Iraqi sanctions? Mitchell worried that the sanctions weapon, so crucial for institutionalists in their attempt to order the world, would be discredited generally if the US was to actively arm the Bosnian government.

Mitchell also did not accept the neo-realist position on Bosnia, that the US should arm the Bosnian Muslims yet remain generally aloof from the conflict. He stated, "If this resolution passes [the Dole-Lieberman resolution to lift the arms embargo on the Bosnian Muslims] and the embargo is lifted, the war will inevitably widen. There will be many more deaths, much more ethnic cleansing, and then it will be an American war, and we will be back here with requests to send Americans over there to do something about it. That is something we have been completely unwilling to do."¹⁹ Mitchell played on the unpopularity of the democratist position on Bosnia, that the US should get actively involved in the conflict perhaps even by sending ground troops to aid the Muslim cause. He portrayed the far more politically popular neo-realist position as being unworkable, as even aiding the Muslims militarily would not turn the tide of battle against the Serbs at such a late date. Mitchell agreed with the general institutionalist position on Bosnia that all lifting the embargo on the Bosnian Muslims would accomplish would be to bind American credibility to the lost Muslim cause. Eventually such a position would lead to either an ignominious American diplomatic setback or the US would be forced to intervene in the conflict with ground troops, which as Mitchell pointed out was a political stance almost no one in America advocated. As for many who held the institutionalist position on Bosnia, the former Senate Majority Leader felt the American line was the best of a bad lot of policy options.

Mitchell echoed the general institutionalist stance on Bosnia in feeling that the specific Bosnian war was far lower in the overall foreign policy hierarchy of priorities than were America's relations with Russia and the European allies. Regarding Nato, whose preservation is a democratist and neo-realist priority, Mitchell observed, "Many of those who are for this [Dole-Lieberman] amendment say they are for Nato but in fact support for this amendment will seriously undermine our relationship with our Nato allies."²⁰ Like the President, Mitchell believed it was imperative that the US and the European allies agree on Bosnia policy, even if that policy was not the first preference of the US. Both President Clinton and Mitchell feared that the splits that would inevitably occur, if the US adopted the neo-realist and democratist cause and lifted the embargo on the Bosnian Muslims, would mean the end of the UN's new-found credibility as well as calling into question the survival of the Nato alliance itself. The European allies, fearing that an American lifting of the arms embargo on the Bosnian government would significantly increase the intensity of the conflict and subject their peacekeepers to unacceptable risks, had indicated that they would pull their troops out of Bosnia if the embargo was violated.²¹ This loss of face, coupled with the US acting unilaterally, would certainly threaten the foundations of Nato.

For Mitchell, as for those advocating the general institutionalist stance on Bosnia; Nato, the UN, and the international multilateral process they represent were simply too important to sacrifice whatever the merits of the neo-realist case on Bosnia.

Mitchell also felt that America's burgeoning relationship with Russia was too vital to risk over disagreements about the Contact Group's Bosnia policy. As Mitchell noted, "We have a lot of foreign policy interests, but I think most Senators would agree that among the highest is the new relationship with Russia and the former states of the Soviet Union."²² Regarding Bosnia policy, Mitchell highlighted a seemingly crucial flaw in overall democratist thinking. If most democratists believe that the American relationship with Russia, and its attempts to encourage Yeltsin's democratic experiment, is the most important foreign policy issue facing the US today, how could democratists justify advocating a Bosnia policy that placed this crucial American-Russian axis in jeopardy? Mitchell seized on this, noting, "This [the Dole-Lieberman amendment] will seriously undermine our relations with Russia."²³ Again Mitchell used a democratist argument about the primacy of Russia for the US, to advocate an anti-democratist position on Bosnia. It is only when analysing the statements of Senator Joseph Biden that a convincing refutation of Mitchell's discovery of this seemingly major democratist flaw can be found.

The former Senate Majority Leader also maintained an institutionalist viewpoint regarding the European security structure. Again remarking specifically on the Bosnian controversy, Mitchell stated, "There is much about this debate that is deeply disturbing, but from my standpoint nothing is more so than the manner in which our allies have been treated with what can only be described as condescension and insult. We are told, in words demeaning to the British and French, that we simply have to tell them what to do."²⁴ Mitchell was disturbed because the recriminations flowing from the allied debate over Bosnia had led American neo-realists and democratists to urge the adoption of a unilateral Bosnia policy. This struck at the heart of Mitchell's institutionalist conception of European security as being guided by a genuinely multilateral consortium of European states and the US. Mitchell, in line with President Clinton and the general institutionalist view, wanted the Europeans to assume greater responsibility for their own defence, and be proportionally accorded more of a say in the security decision-making process in multilateral institutions such as Nato. A unilateral lifting of the arms embargo would have implied for Mitchell a greater US involvement in the Bosnian conflict at a time when institutionalist policy regarding Europe was to limit the American stake in European security. Thus part of

Mitchell's institutionalist Bosnia argument highlighted his institutionalist advocacy of a Europe with increasing and not decreasing responsibility for its own defence.

It is primarily over economic questions that Mitchell's overall democratist orientation can be seen. Regarding trade issues such as the Nafta accord, Mitchell stated, "With the passage of this agreement, Congress affirms the leadership role of the US in this hemisphere and around the world."²⁵ This statement illustrates Mitchell's democratist leanings on trade issues, as he stressed the political implications of the Nafta agreement as being paramount, rather than taking an economics-first approach, which is the central point behind the general institutionalist position on trade expansion. Mitchell affirmed the politics-first democratist viewpoint, saying, "Americans rightly have great faith in our democratic system, in the virtues of Jeffersonian democracy, and the importance of inalienable individual rights. From this individual freedom flows a vibrant economic freedom that provides opportunity and mobility."²⁶ As over his comments regarding Nafta, the former Senate Majority Leader illustrated his democratist belief that liberal democracy and not free-market economics is central to the causation argument about which is the substructure and which merely the superstructure in the world today. For Mitchell and democratists in general, the political nature of a state largely determines its economic system, and as over Nafta, it was the political considerations of economic policy that are of central importance. In the case of the Nafta accord, for instance, it was the political stability the free trade pact gave to Mexico, a state tortuously moving toward genuine democracy, that was the central benefit of the agreement. Mitchell also rejected the institutionalist notion that economic power largely determines a state's overall strength. He observed, "The US - not Japan or Germany - was the model for change in Czechoslovakia, Poland and Russia. Havel, Walesa, Yeltsin - they all looked to America. We symbolize and stand for fundamental freedoms."²⁷ Mitchell thus affirmed the democratist notion that the triumph of democracy in the Cold War is fundamentally an American, and not just a Western victory. He also, in naming Germany and Japan, two states with world class economies and significantly less military and ideological power, confirmed the democratist view that economics, while important, is not the essential force driving world politics. In line with democratist thought, Mitchell favoured the Nafta agreement, but felt it was not the key catalyst for global ordering in the post-Cold War era in the same way that institutionalists believed it to be.

Regarding the MFN controversy with China, Mitchell emerged as a convinced democratist. This issue was of such importance for the Majority Leader that he publicly led

the fight for conditions to be imposed on Chinese MFN status due to their appalling human rights record during both the administrations of George Bush and Bill Clinton. As Barone and Ujifusa noted, Mitchell, "on foreign policy differed sharply with Bush, criticizing his conciliatory stand on China."²⁸ To this end Mitchell sponsored a bill, "imposing conditions on the continued trade status enjoyed by China in the wake of the Tiananmen Square massacre."²⁹ Mitchell, horrified at the blatant murder of Chinese students by the Communist ruling elite, advocated the democratist line that gross human rights violators should not be economically bolstered or rewarded with increased American trade. This was in line with his core democratist view that regarding foreign policy, the American approach, "should be to shift our foreign policy's emphasis from exclusively protecting 'interests' to advancing our [American] ideals."³⁰ Mitchell, in agreeing with the standard democratist position on China, believed that in resolving the MFN dispute more should be taken into account than just noting narrow economic interests, as was advocated by the institutionalists, and to a lesser degree, also by the neo-realists. For him the massacre at Tiananmen Square was an affront to the US, as gross suppression of democracy and human rights struck at the very core of what the democratist school of thought held to be most sacred. Mitchell made his case against extending MFN to China in moral terms, stating,

"The Chinese government is a Communist tyranny. It has a horrendous human rights record. It occupies the neighboring land of Tibet, supports the murderous Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, uses slave labor, illegally protects its market, and sells advanced weapons and technology to countries like Iran and Syria. Ever since Tiananmen Square, I have argued that we should firmly register our disapproval of China's behavior."³¹

Mitchell was against delinking MFN renewal from human rights issues as the institutionalists advocated, as well as initially disapproving of even granting MFN with conditions to the Chinese as the neo-realists desired (until the political realities of the situation led him to side unsuccessfully with the neo-realists in a futile attempt to override the institutionalist argument) because, in standard democratist fashion, he objected to the very nature of the Chinese communist regime, and to what it represented.

Mitchell advocated supporting President Clinton's initiative to more vigorously support Russian reform. As with the general schools of thought orientation of the Clinton administration regarding Russia, Mitchell's policy preferences were a mix of a dominant democratist impulse fused with an institutionalist viewpoint. This lesser institutionalist stance on Russia can be seen in the former Senate Majority Leader's belief that Russia should be substantially aided only after it had begun to put its own economic house in order. As Mitchell observed, "If the members of the CIS join the IMF and proceed with

economic reforms leading to a market economy, the world community - including Japan, Germany, and the US - must be prepared to provide assistance, including currency stabilization and debt relief, to assist in the transition."³² Not only did Mitchell here advocate sharing the burden of financially aiding Russia in a multilateral manner by including the economically powerful states of Germany and Japan with the US in his list of those who should lead the international community in galvanising economic support to aid the Yeltsin regime, he also identified currency stabilisation as a priority in this process. This is all in line with classic institutionalist thinking. However Mitchell's overall majority democratist position on aiding Russian reform was based on his fervour for the initiative, which exceeded the more cautious institutionalist approach. In criticising President Bush's Russian policy, Mitchell stated, "The President first wedded his policy to Gorbachev's survival. Then he appeared reluctant to accept Yeltsin, despite his overwhelming popular mandate. Now the President wants to concentrate all attention on Yeltsin. Let's support democracy, not individuals and let's do it wholeheartedly."³³ Mitchell felt that in tactically supporting personalities such as the neo-realist Bush administration attempted to do with both Gorbachev and Yeltsin, the neo-realists missed the greater point that the US should support democracy in Russia itself. In order to do this America should, in Mitchell's view, engage Russia both more vigorously and broadly than President Bush was prepared to do, by disbursing some aid locally and not wholly through the centre in Moscow, as well as engaging local democrats, such as Anatoly Sobchak, the Mayor of St Petersburg, in direct dialogue with the US. Mitchell's belief in increasing and diversifying Russian aid to bolster democracy and not just individuals lay at the heart of his overall democratist policy preference regarding aiding Russian reform.

(b) Specific neo-realist decision-makers in US foreign policy

i) Joseph Biden Jr. - Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on European Affairs

Senator Joe Biden, as Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on European and Canadian Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, offered what is by far the clearest expression of the democratist case on Bosnia in his report to the Senate upon returning from a fact-finding mission in April 1993, in which he visited Croatia, Bosnia, and Serbia and talked to Tudjman, Izetbegovic, and Milosevic. Yet as ringing a call to arms as, "To Stand Against Aggression," was,³⁴ Biden is not a democratist. Rather his democratist stance regarding Bosnia was a minority position, as in all four other issue areas Biden is a convinced neo-realist.

However over the Bosnia question Senator Biden provided the most salient example of the democratist stance on the conflict. Biden saw the Bosnian conflict not as a civil war, as some institutionalists believed it was, with both the Muslims and the Serbs sharing roughly equal blame for both the conflict's genesis as well as the propagation of its horrors. Rather he viewed it as a clear cut case of Serbian aggression. As Biden caustically stated, "Is this a civil war? Only if you think Austrians and Czechs had civil wars in 1938."³⁵ Biden's choice of the Anschluss and the Nazi aggression on the Czechoslovakian regime of Benes as like political examples to what was going on in Bosnia provided an interesting comparison. In all three cases restive local minorities within the state encouraged and were encouraged by an expansionistic larger state to revolt against a fairly weak central government, with this rebellion being the pretext for the aggressive Germans and Serbs to attempt to dismember Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Bosnia, respectively. By comparing the Serbs to the genocidal Nazis, Biden left little doubt as to where both his sympathies lay and his blame for the conflict fell as well. In line with standard democratist thinking, Biden blamed the Serbs almost totally for the war in Bosnia.

Not only did Senator Biden see the war as a simple case of Serbian aggression, he believed the likely Serb victory in the conflict would have deleterious consequences for the rest of Eastern and Central Europe, whose ethnic minorities and secessionist tendencies became apparent after the thawing of the Cold War, particularly in the former USSR. As Biden noted, "What happens in Bosnia will form a prominent precedent: not for the abstract notion of a new world order but for political decisions looming in Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, and the Baltic states."³⁶

Biden raised the spectre of increased ethnic conflict within the CIS being made more likely by the successful Serbian rape of the Bosnian state. It is at this point that Biden corrected the seeming flaw in democratist thinking, obliquely exposed by Senate Majority Leader Mitchell. It was not the democratists, but President Yeltsin, in Biden's view, who had advocated a theoretically flawed policy during the Bosnian conflict. For in strongly backing the Bosnian government, Biden felt the democratists were paradoxically supporting Yeltsin, which is a cardinal goal of their overall thinking, even if they did not realise it.

Biden untangled the puzzle, believing the US should actively intervene in the Bosnian conflict as, "any action that curtails the power and longevity of the Milosevic regime

ultimately serves the interest of both Yeltsin and Russian democracy."³⁷ In Biden's view this was due to two basic factors. Firstly, in supporting the secessionist Bosnian Serbs, Yeltsin opened a Pandora's box by implicitly encouraging his own restive minorities³⁸ to believe that the inviolability of European borders, a precept that was maintained throughout the Cold War, was now obviously being discarded and they could seriously consider seceding from Russia itself. As the Russian republic stands to lose more than any other European state if its borders are open to question, due to the large numbers of ethnic minorities it contains, the Russian encouragement of the Bosnian Serbs could seriously come to weaken Yeltsin's hold on his own state.

Secondly, as Biden shrewdly noted, "Yeltsin's interest consists in defending himself against Russian reactionaries who are aligned with the Milosevic regime. Milosevic is not Yeltsin's ally but his enemy."³⁹ The earliest and warmest supporters in Russia of Milosevic were the nationalists of Vladimir Zhirinovsky and the Communists, both of whom have exhibited obvious anti-democratic tendencies. Their support of Milosevic's aggression was consistent with their desire, certainly in Zhirinovsky's case, to reclaim portions of the former Soviet empire. A victory for Milosevic would further encourage these Russian reactionaries that they could reclaim parts of the old USSR with impunity. If such a policy were pursued, it is likely that in such a crisis atmosphere democracy would perish. It is with this linkage that Biden interestingly squared the circle regarding the democratists possible theoretical contradiction between their stated Russia-first attitude and their aggressive support for the Bosnian cause.

Given a democratist diagnosis of the Bosnian conflict which identified the Serbs as the chief aggressors of the war, and noted the possible dangers to the Russian democratic experiment if the Bosnian Serbs secessionist initiative succeeded, it was not surprising Biden offered such clear democratist policy prescriptions for the US to adopt in coping with the Bosnian quagmire. He was an early and consistent supporter of the 'lift and strike' option in Bosnia, that is, lifting the arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslims and using American air strikes to shield the Bosnian government until the weapons given to them altered the military situation on the ground.⁴⁰ But Biden's advocacy of the Bosnian cause took him even beyond this standard democratist policy prescription. In his 'ten point plan' for Bosnia, Biden advocated: establishing a deadline for the turnover of all heavy weapons in Bosnia to the UN, the enforcement of no-shelling and no-fly zones by Nato, a relocation of UNPROFOR so it was militarily defensible, the punishment of war criminals in Bosnia, and the sending of an American ambassador to Sarajevo to underline the American

commitment to the Bosnian government.⁴¹ Later Senator Biden would add to this list, proposing sending \$50 million in American military aid to the Muslims in the form of weapons and ammunition.⁴² Finally, Biden urged active military support for the Muslims, saying, "The US must lead the West in a decisive response to Serb aggression, beginning with air attacks on Serb artillery everywhere in Bosnia and on Yugoslavian National Army units in Serbia that have participated in this international crime. Western forces should destroy every bridge across the Drina river by which the Serb authorities [then] continue to resupply the Bosnian Serbs."⁴³

Biden's aggressive prescription was designed to quickly even the material disparity between the Serb and Muslim forces, by destroying all links between Serbia proper and their allies at Pale, to destroy Bosnian Serb heavy weaponry such as artillery, which had been central to the Bosnian Serb successes, and to punish elements of the Yugoslav army in Serbia itself which had been directly involved in the fighting, in an attempt to deter any further incursions they might be tempted to make. Biden boldly resolved another possible contradiction in democratist thinking over Bosnia, disdaining the institutionalist view that appeasing the Serbs would save lives. As humanitarian concerns are of great importance to democratists, the charge that democratist policy prescriptions would lead to a great intensification of the fighting was one Biden could not afford to ignore. He resolved this apparent contradiction between humanitarian concerns and principle, by coming down firmly on the side of ideological purity. Moreover, Biden did so in a way which argued that in halting Serb adventurism by the use of military force, the US would actually save lives. Biden asserted, "the best means of averting a wider war is to defeat Serb aggression now."⁴⁴

Biden affirmed the democratist viewpoint that if the Serbs succeeded, adventurism by many states in the region was bound to ensue, which would ultimately cost more lives than would a resolute military response to Serb aggression. For instance, Hungary has irredentist claims on portions of Romania, Romania has similar claims on Moldova, and Albania has claims on Kosovo within Serbia itself. If the Serbs succeeded, Biden believed the law of the jungle Serb success would encourage, would almost certainly lead to further ferocious conflict in the region, and as such, it was in the humanitarian interest democratists so value to advocate that the US upheld principle and militarily challenged the Serb aggressors.

To further even the military odds in Bosnia, Senator Biden and other democratists agreed with the neo-realists that the embargo on the Bosnian Muslims had to be lifted.

Biden starkly underlined the importance of lifting the embargo for both democratists and neo-realists, stating, "Lifting the arms embargo is the only feasible option that will permit the Bosnian government the opportunity to defend itself against the Serb irregulars, who are well armed with the legacy of Tito's legions."⁴⁵ This was Biden's response to all the institutionalist critics of the lifting of the arms embargo on the Bosnian Muslims, that whatever peripheral benefits in relations with the European allies or Russia flowed from the US following their institutionalist lead on Bosnia, the price to be paid would be a condoning and a confirming of the Serbian territorial gains made at the Bosnian government's expense. For Biden and the democratists, this was simply too high a price to pay as the precedent this would set of condoning aggression could ignite the ethnic tinderbox in Central and Eastern Europe and would have possible calamitous effects on global stability itself, if Russia was destabilised. This is why democratists supported the lifting of the arms embargo with even more fervour than did neo-realists.

Senator Biden reserved the greatest measure of his vitriol about Western policy regarding Bosnia for America's European allies. Biden sarcastically observed, "Unless the West changes course, Milosevic and the barbarism he orchestrates will continue to operate under the shelter of Neville's umbrella."⁴⁶ By his caustic comparison of European policy toward Bosnia with the fainthearted and disastrous appeasement policy of Chamberlain in the late 1930s, Biden made clear his contempt for what he regarded as the Western European failure to put out the fire next door to them. As the Western Europeans were proponents of America continuing to embrace an institutionalist policy regarding Bosnia, his dislike for their views on Bosnia is understandable. The Senator's righteous indignation was also explicable by his democratist belief that the Europeans were hiding behind their peacekeepers in Bosnia. He stated, "I cannot even begin to express my anger for a European policy that is now asking us to participate in what amounts to a codification of a Serb victory."⁴⁷ Biden said this in response to the European rejection of the American initiative to pursue a tougher line against the Serbs in the crucial month of May 1993, and when their proposal to establish a UN protectorate over the safe havens was tabled. Biden saw the UN operation, so strongly supported by the British and the French, as being merely a trap designed to keep the West from actively militarily aiding the Muslim cause, a trap that the Western Europeans and the Clinton administration were happily aware they were falling into, hence his claims of moral duplicity. For Biden, the disingenuous Western argument about Bosnia revolved around the peacekeeping role of the UN.

Senator Biden saw the whole peacekeeping rationale used by the British and the French as a ruse to justify inaction in Bosnia, rather than as having genuine validity. He observed,

"If the limited UN presence now in Bosnia cannot defend itself against possible retaliation, then the time has come to remove these men and women from harm's way...In my discussions with relief workers throughout Bosnia, and with the government itself, it became clear that Bosnian civilians face a far greater threat of annihilation from Serb artillery attacks than from a lack of food or medicine. However well intentioned, the presence of UN relief personnel and peacekeeping forces, by inhibiting stronger Western action, now constitutes more an obstacle than a contribution to the humanitarian relief they were deployed to provide."⁴⁸

This was a classic democratist argument against the institutionalist advocacy of the merits of peacekeeping in Bosnia. Biden believed the peacekeeping operations in Bosnia failed on two counts. Firstly, they attempted to put a bandage on a hemorrhage, as at its best, UN humanitarian relief merely kept people alive so they could be either killed or subjugated by the Serb tactic of 'ethnic cleansing', in many cases. The humanitarian relief effort, in Biden's view, thus obscured the reality that only in militarily dealing with the main cause of the humanitarian disaster, the Bosnian Serbs, could the West hope to genuinely stem the flow of blood in Bosnia. Secondly, as the peacekeepers were lightly armed at the best of times, they functioned as virtual Serbian hostages, whenever the Serbs found the tactic of 'detaining' them useful. For example, one of the reasons given by European powers as to why significant Western bombing of the Serbs was not used to protect the Bihac safe haven from blatant Serb disregard for the UN, was that UNPROFOR troops, then 'detained' by the Serbs, might suffer reprisals. Thus, in Biden's and the general democratist view, the peacekeepers came to symbolise the limits of Western concern for the fate of the Bosnian government, not its generosity.

Nor did Biden accept the administration's institutionalist argument that although it disagreed with its European allies about lifting the arms embargo, alliance unity must come first. As Biden bluntly said to Secretary Christopher at an April 1993 meeting of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "We haven't done a damn thing."⁴⁹ Following the general democratist stance, Senator Biden saw the Bosnian tragedy as taking precedence even over the continued survival of the Nato alliance. During an interview, an aide to Senator Biden responded to a question about the future of Nato in the post-Cold War era by saying that the West's failure in Bosnia has had grave consequences in that, "Our inability to counter a lack of resolve of Western and US leaders, to protect the principle of unchanging borders, has signed the death warrant for Nato."⁵⁰ It is not that Biden and the other democratists do not value Nato and hope for its survival, as they feel it is a crucial institution for them in the

European security structure of the post-Cold War era. It is instead an indication of just how strongly democratists such as Biden felt about the need for American intervention in Bosnia, that they viewed it as the test case for the continued efficacy of Nato in the new era. If Nato could not decisively react to a case of blatant aggression on the European continent, so the democratist argument went, then its usefulness could never be relied upon again. For Biden and other democratists, differences in opinion with the institutionalists over Bosnia policy were not just principled disagreements, but betrayals of faith.

Over the MFN controversy with China, Senator Biden adopted a neo-realist line. Initially, Biden agreed with his democratist and neo-realist colleagues in the waning days of the Bush administration that human rights conditions ought to be linked to the renewal of MFN status for China and that if these conditions were not met, sanctions ought to be imposed.⁵¹ However when the matter came to a head during the Clinton administration, Biden retreated somewhat from his earlier stance. He came to believe, "it is fundamentally misguided to believe that Most-favored-nation status can catalyze fundamental change in Chinese government policies."⁵² This statement is an explicit refutation of the democratist position on MFN regarding China as Biden stressed that the MFN weapon is not sufficient to radically alter China's human rights policies, as democratists believe. However, Biden was unwilling to accept the institutionalist line, that the renewal of MFN should carry no conditions.

Instead, he adopted a neo-realist stance, suggesting that MFN be extended in 1994, but that further renewal should be tied to the more modest goal of limiting its arms sales to maverick states, such as Iran and Syria. An aide to Biden commented, "The Senator felt we ought to link one issue to MFN renewal, not human rights, but proliferation. We ought to try to get the Chinese not to sell missile technology to Iran and Pakistan."⁵³ Biden felt that placing limited conditions on China's MFN status with strictures regarding arms sales would be far more practical than analysing the nebulous concept of its human rights record over a year. Also as Biden noted, it was in China's interest to comply with these limited conditions. Its \$15 billion trade surplus with the US was ten times the rate of its earnings from weapons sales. Biden believed, "we [the US] can present China with a stark choice: irresponsible arms trade with the world - or the continuation of a far more profitable trade with the US."⁵⁴ So while Biden rejected the democratist view that MFN was a stick the US could use to fundamentally change the nature of the Chinese communist regime, he also refuted the institutionalist notion that MFN should not be used by America as a means to secure more modest changes in Chinese behaviour.

Biden also followed the general neo-realist line regarding aid to Russia. Unlike the Clinton administration, Senator Biden does not see aid to President Yeltsin's regime as the single most important foreign policy issue confronting America today. Rather as an aide to Biden stated, "The most important issue is non-proliferation, to in the Senator's words, decrease the arsenals of Armageddon built up during the Cold War. Here obviously Russia is important. The Senator favors aid to Russia to help dismantle nuclear weapons, to ratify START 2, and go even further in dismantling the Russian nuclear arsenal."⁵⁵ To advance the cause of non-proliferation, Biden was a co-sponsor of the Nunn-Lugar bill, which gave assistance to Russia to both partially dismantle its nuclear stockpiles as well as adequately house Russia's restive military. The Nunn-Lugar bill was the policy centrepiece of the American neo-realists plan to provide limited, targeted aid to the former rival superpower.

Biden agreed with other neo-realists that such aid should be limited. He argued, "The urgent question is not whether we will provide billions to the post-Soviet Commonwealth in traditional development assistance. Money on that scale is not available, nor could it be used without enormous waste."⁵⁶ Unlike democratists who are revivalists, Biden specifically and neo-realists in general share the declinist view that as relatively the US is not in as strong an economic position as it was in the immediate post-1945 period, it is unable to provide aid to Russia on a Marshall Plan scale as the democratists would like. Nor does Senator Biden, as the above quotation demonstrates, have confidence in the Russian leadership to use large-scale aid wisely. Although Senator Biden wants to aid Russia, there are distinct neo-realist limits as to how far he desires to go in assisting the Russian experiment in democracy.

Senator Biden also follows the standard neo-realist position in advocating placing conditions on Russian aid. This position is illustrated by Biden's desire to place conditions on Russia's arms sales. Acting in response to the May 1992 announcement that Russia intended to sell sophisticated rocket engines to India despite the Missile Technology Control Regime, Biden offered an amendment to the US aid pledge to the former USSR that would, "require Russia, Ukraine and the other states to abide by international standards on non-proliferation."⁵⁷ If Russia persisted in violating the regime, Biden was prepared, as his amendment makes clear, to cut off all aid to the Yeltsin regime. The Senator's placing such a draconian condition on aid to Russia illustrates both his concern about weapons proliferation as well as his general neo-realist stance regarding aid to the most important Republic of the former Soviet state.

The Senator also adheres to the sceptical neo-realist position regarding the global expansion of free trade. As an aide to Biden noted, both by inclination and committee assignment, Senator Biden is not overly enamoured with trade issues. While he did vote for both the Nafta and the Gatt accords, he favoured Nafta late in the political day.⁵⁸ This lack of enthusiasm for trade issues does not fit the agenda of an institutionalist. Biden's hesitation about Nafta is encapsulated in his remarks on the Senate floor July 1, 1992 when he argued, "All three parties [Mexico, Canada, and the US] can gain, but only with stipulations on Mexican labor and environmental standards that ensure against a rush of northern industry to the south. No principle of efficiency would be served by abetting the rise of a low wage pollution belt across the Mexican border."⁵⁹ In the end Biden supported Nafta, but as this quotation makes evident, he feared the environmental and economic drawbacks to the accord, shortcomings both institutionalists and even democratists did not feel were important compared with free trade expansion.

Nor was Biden sanguine about the long-term survival prospects of Nato. His neo-realist view of the alliance, highly coloured by the Bosnia debacle, is that Nato's days are numbered. While Senator Biden favoured the President's institutionalist Partnership for Peace initiative⁶⁰, he was not as optimistic as Clinton's men were about its significance. His negative neo-realist reaction to the chances of Nato's survival had both a general and a specific component. Generally, he followed the neo-realist maxim that without a common enemy to unify them, Western Europe and the US were likely to find that conflicting national interests increasingly divided them.⁶¹ Biden stated, "unless the Nato members can articulate a vision for a future role for Nato, the question of whether to expand to the east becomes merely an academic abstraction."⁶² Thus Biden, while agreeing with the Partnership for Peace initiative, felt it largely missed the point about what was needed to rectify the alliance.

If Senator Biden had qualms about Nato's survival generally, they were confirmed for him by the role the Europeans played in the Bosnian crisis. He bitterly observed, "Perversely, the British and French have argued that if we lift the embargo [in Bosnia] we are going to perpetuate the bloodshed. They are idiots. And we are acting collectively as a free world like cowards."⁶³ In his frustrated democratist zeal for Bosnia, Biden saw the end of the alliance. He angrily charged, "What the devil use is Nato? And I have been an absolute ardent, consistent, vehement supporter of Nato for its military as well as its political and economic reasons for 21 years in the US Senate. But if it cannot affect the

carnage in the middle of Europe, what do we need it for?"⁶⁴ Such anger at the failure of the alliance to reverse Serb gains in the Bosnia conflict predicated Senator Biden's sceptical neo-realist stance regarding the future of the alliance itself.

ii) Newt Gingrich - House Minority Whip

Regarding trade issues, the Speaker of the House has consistently advocated a neo-realist position. While eventually supporting both the Nafta and Gatt trade agreements, Gingrich supported the latter only grudgingly, preoccupied as he was with the neo-realist dictum that multilateral trade agreements must not be enacted at the expense of an erosion of national sovereignty. Gingrich's grudging support for the Gatt agreement itself confirmed the basic neo-realist belief that the expansion of free trade is not the most crucial international imperative for the US, as it often has deleterious as well as beneficial aspects. Gingrich's policy position coincided with the standard neo-realist stance on the two free trade agreements, which was the most lukewarm support for Nafta and Gatt of the three schools of thought.

It is true, as Gingrich asserted in The Economist, that, "he provided Clinton with the margin of victory,"⁶⁵ regarding Nafta, as without the marshalled support of the largely free-trade House Republicans the accord would never have passed, as most House Democrats voted against the bill. It is over the question of approval of the Gatt accord that Gingrich's neo-realist scepticism about the unalloyed virtues of free trade can be seen. Regarding the Gatt agreement, the personal animosity which characterises the relationship between the two powerful neo-realist colleagues, Senator Dole and Gingrich, was held in check as they were able to work well together in limiting the American commitment to the World Trade Organisation (WTO), which took over Gatt's role as arbiter and stimulator of global free trade expansion. As Horvitz observed, "Gingrich said that he was 'very, very concerned' about prospects for [Gatt] ratification and declared that the president 'needs to agree' with Dole's suggestions,"⁶⁶ regarding safeguards being included in the Uruguay round of the Gatt, which established the WTO. The WTO became a major sticking point which compelled the neo-realists to obliquely threaten to derail the entire accord.

As The Economist stated, this was particularly true in Gingrich's case, "It is concern over the WTO's powers that is giving Gingrich pause. He wonders whether it [the WTO] will always serve American interests."⁶⁷ Given the neo-realists' strong preoccupation with the notion of sovereignty, their fears about the WTO were well-founded. As Merritt noted,

the WTO is a far more powerful organisation than the Gatt ever was, "The big change will be sharper teeth that the WTO will have to settle trade rows. Gatt panels require unanimous agreement, but a WTO's panel's ruling will be able to be overturned only by unanimous vote."⁶⁸ Thus no longer will a state be able to effectively veto any sanction the WTO imposes upon it, as was the case with the Gatt system. Furthermore, as there will be well over 100 states in the WTO, such an overriding of the panel's decisions on trade disputes is not remotely likely. The WTO embodies another aspect which contradicts the neo-realists' belief in a strict understanding of sovereignty. Every state in the WTO will be apportioned one vote, unlike the Gatt where voting was weighted, roughly based on the respective economic power of each state. Thus, in theory a combination of economically weak states like Mali, Ghana, and Bangladesh can outvote the US on a WTO trade panel and compel it to change some aspect of its domestic trade policy.

This system goes against the grain of neo-realist thinking on two counts, as it fails to consider international power relations in establishing the structure of an international organisation, and places US domestic affairs theoretically in a partially subordinate position to an international organisation's dictates. Thus it is possible the national interest, the primary yardstick by which neo-realists attempt to gauge all foreign policy developments, would not always be served by membership in the WTO. Certainly, the partial ceding of economic sovereignty was alone enough to make neo-realists nervous. This was the rationale behind Gingrich's advocacy of Dole's reservations about the WTO.

In the end, President Clinton agreed to include the Dole safeguards into the Gatt formula, and both the then Senate Minority Leader and Gingrich supported the Gatt accord, which easily passed both in the House and the Senate.⁶⁹ The safeguards, enacted in legislation formally separate from the treaty, put the WTO on notice that an American panel of retired federal judges would review WTO decisions and that if they found three to be 'unfair' in a six month period, the Congress would retain the right to abrogate the American commitment to the WTO, rather than waiting six months to do so as the treaty formally required. While the compromise was seen as window-dressing by most pundits, it was far more than this. It neatly encapsulated the neo-realist position on free trade expansion. Neo-realists, such as Gingrich, were aware that the foundation of the WTO could well be in the overall American interest, as many economists speculated that the trade disputes that were most likely to spring up in the wake of the global ratification of the Uruguay Round were likely to involve issues such as copyright infringement and computer programme protections, where the US stands to greatly gain.⁷⁰ However, Gingrich and the

other neo-realists were not prepared to accept that such a powerful supranational organisation would necessarily serve the American national interest.

The Dole safeguards made a panel of American judges the final arbiters of trade disputes, not a panel of foreigners. Thus, ultimately American trade policy still lay in the hands of Americans, not a powerful international organisation. As American sovereignty was safeguarded, Gingrich and other neo-realists could happily vote for an accord so likely to enhance American national interests. The entire Gatt controversy, and the response of neo-realists such as Gingrich to it, illustrated the underlying neo-realist tenet, that sovereignty must always be safeguarded, and that free trade expansion may be an opportunity, but must never be viewed as a panacea for American problems in the new world order, as trade expansion can well be a mixed blessing.

Regarding Bosnia, the Minority Whip also advocated the general neo-realist line. However he was less militant about his position than were Senators Lugar and Dole, the two other neo-realists to be analysed in this chapter. Early in the Clinton administration, Gingrich took issue with the democratist position on Bosnia, as, "he spoke skeptically of military intervention in Bosnia."⁷¹ Like many neo-realists, and in opposition to democratists, Gingrich did not feel that Bosnia was an important enough priority in the hierarchy of American national interests to justify committing ground troops to aid the Bosnian Muslims in the conflict. Also in common with the institutionalist position on Bosnia, the Minority Whip saw the conflict as a European concern, as Martin observed, "Gingrich said yesterday he was opposed to any substantial reconstruction and military aid to Bosnia on budgetary grounds, adding, 'It's largely a European problem'."⁷²

Yet despite the fact that Gingrich felt only limited aid to Bosnia was possible due to domestic constraints, as Bosnia was not a high enough foreign policy priority for the US, he did not rule out all aid or succour for the Muslim cause, in keeping with standard neo-realist thinking. Gingrich also, like his neo-realist and democratist colleagues, viewed the Serbs as the aggressors in the Bosnian conflict and as possible destabilisers of the region. Unlike the institutionalists, he could envision circumstances where the US militarily aiding the Bosnian Muslims could contribute to stability in the region, and not necessarily further inflame the conflict. If further destabilisation of the Balkans occurred, the Minority Whip advocated a far more hawkish response than the institutionalists preferred. As Keillor noted, Gingrich announced, "Colin Powell (former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) ought to be dispatched to tell the Bosnian Serbs: 'If you launch a general offensive - we

would reserve the right to take you apart, and we would do it in three to five days'."73 As Gingrich has already stated (See footnote 71) that he did not agree with the democratists that US ground forces should be committed to the Bosnian war, this additional quotation illustrates that he was advocating the neo-realist policy preference of helping the Bosnian Muslims in ways short of the introduction of American ground troops, in this case by a massive show of air power to 'take out' the Serbs if they further destabilised the Balkans.

Thus while Gingrich shared several basic institutionalist opinions about Bosnia, such as that the Bosnian conflict was too marginal to American national interests to commit ground troops, nevertheless he followed the overall neo-realist policy stance on Bosnia in advocating limited aid to the Bosnian Muslims, seeing the Serbs as the aggressors in the conflict, and believing that if the Serbs should attempt further territorial advances they should be driven back by a massive display of American air power. Gingrich definitely held a neo-realist position on Bosnia, even if he was less committed to the Bosnian cause than the more fervent neo-realists such as Senator Dole.

While Speaker Gingrich agreed with his neo-realist colleague, Senator Lugar, that there should be some aid allotted to Russia to help it reduce its nuclear stockpile, he feels any further aid to the former superpower should be limited and tied to Russia's 'good' behaviour, that is, behaviour that is in the interests of the United States. Like Senator Biden, Gingrich worries what effect the demise of the USSR will have on the cause of non-proliferation. He believes a lack of Russian assistance in this area should be met by a firm American response. As Friedman observed, "Just last week [February 1995], Gingrich declared that 'we should cut off all aid to Russia' if it sells nuclear reactors to Iran."<74 This statement makes Speaker Gingrich's neo-realist position regarding aid to Russia clear. The Speaker sees the limited aid the US gives to Russia as conditional in a manner that both institutionalists and especially democratists do not.

Gingrich also maintains the classic neo-realist stance regarding relations with Europe. He agrees with the general democratist and neo-realist position, and opposes the standard institutionalist line, believing the US should continue to lead and dominate Nato.⁷⁵ Also in line with neo-realist thinking, Speaker Gingrich advocates the quick admission of the Central European states into Nato, a process facilitated by the drawing up of a timeline for their admission, a step the Clinton administration has been reluctant to take. In the National Security Restoration Act, which is part of Gingrich's election-winning 'Contract with America', he urged, "that Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia should be in a

position to further the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty and contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area no later than June 10, 1999."⁷⁶ The act is merely the practical policy expression of Gingrich's general neo-realist commitment to the revitalisation of Nato.

(iii) Richard Lugar - Ranking Minority Member, Senate Subcommittee on European Affairs

Senator Richard Lugar, former Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1985-6, and the ranking Republican in the 103rd Congress on the European Affairs subcommittee, is generally considered to have been the most politically effective Republican on the Foreign Relations Committee from the mid-80s to the present day. Unlike Senator Helms (now Chairman of the Committee in the 104th Congress), Senator Lugar has maintained a practical bipartisan modus vivendi that has enabled him to remain politically influential even during periods of Democratic ascendancy in the Senate. But despite his bipartisan reputation, Lugar is a solid Republican, as his consistent neo-realist position on foreign policy matters attests to.

Regarding Bosnia policy, Lugar was a consistent critic of the institutionalist stance throughout the 103rd Congress. As Ramet stated, even during the early phases of the conflict, Lugar, "urged the Bush administration to take the lead in putting such [military] intervention on the UN agenda...The UN should authorize nation-states to use force (in Bosnia). Nato should draw up plans for a comprehensive use of force."⁷⁷ Thus early on, Lugar's policy prescriptions regarding Bosnia had a democratist tinge, with their emphasis on American leadership in the efforts to help the Bosnian government, and their direct advocacy of the use of military force if necessary to defeat the Serbs. If the Serbs did not withdraw from their newly captured territory, Lugar argued its military machine, "should face sufficient military force to ensure its certain and sure defeat."⁷⁸ While Lugar later moderated his position on Bosnia, adopting a firm neo-realist stance, his impatience with Western inactivity in the face of Serbian aggression, and his belief that the Serbs were the villain of the Bosnian piece and were potential destabilisers of the region remained underlying assumptions of his policy prescriptions for the Bosnian war.

As with some who early on had advocated a democratist stance toward Bosnia, Lugar saw the window of opportunity for the American use of force close amid the cautious ditherings of the Bush administration. This did not mean, however, that Lugar resigned

himself to the institutionalist position advocated by the new Clinton White House. As The Christian Science Monitor noted in its interview with Lugar, "The Senator would increase pressure on the Serbs by arming the Bosnian Muslims and he would do that unilaterally if the Europeans refused to go along. Although he sees no need for US ground forces, the US might have to play an active role in arming the Muslims, he says."⁷⁹ Here Lugar espoused the classic neo-realist position on Bosnia. Having shunned his former democratist notion that American troops are needed to defeat the Serbs, Lugar now felt the Serbs could be thwarted through the US arming the Bosnian Muslims. Crucially, Lugar, following the standard neo-realist line, believed the Bosnian government should be armed with or without the approval of America's European allies. Citing a general neo-realist belief, Lugar felt the US ought not to give anyone, even the European allies, a virtual veto over US policy prescriptions regarding the Bosnian conflict. In his defence of America's right to pursue a Bosnia policy unencumbered by multilateral constraints, Lugar adopted a clear neo-realist stance.

As with other neo-realists such as Senator Dole, Lugar was frustrated with both President Clinton and the European powers for what he saw as their overly passive policy toward Bosnia. Lugar believed the President did not see the geopolitical pitfalls of his institutionalist position regarding Bosnia. Lugar felt, "the Clinton White House has allowed the Bosnian crisis to become a 'free fall' that could spread the fighting to other parts of Europe. 'I don't think they're on the right track at all'."⁸⁰ Senator Lugar disagreed with the institutionalist belief that the best way to contain the Bosnian conflict was to not arm the Bosnian Muslims. Rather, he agreed with his democratist and neo-realist colleagues that the inevitable Serb victory that would ensue if the arms embargo was not lifted would further adventurism throughout the Balkans, and would fuel further conflict, not end it. Throughout the 103rd Congress, Lugar maintained a strong anti-institutionalist position, feeling that the Clinton administration in its effort to contain the war by refusing to arm the Bosnian Muslims, had in fact increased the danger that the conflict would spread.

Nor did Lugar see the administration alone as following the wrong policy. Like Senators Dole and Biden, Lugar reserved most of his venom about the Bosnian conflict for Britain and France. As Horvitz observed, Dole and Lugar relentlessly called for Britain and France to, "remove their ground troops in Bosnia if they fear they will become targets of Serb reprisals should Washington begin air strikes."⁸¹ At the time of this quotation, Dole and Lugar were supporting the President's plan for crafting a tougher Western policy toward Serbia in May 1993. At this crucial juncture, unlike the Clinton administration,

Lugar did not accept what was to become the perpetual European excuse against Western involvement in Bosnia, that their peacekeepers would suffer at the hands of the Serbs. In accordance with neo-realist tenets, Lugar urged the Europeans to remove their peacekeepers from Bosnia.

Further, as with most neo-realists, Lugar saw the European rationale for limiting Western action in Bosnia as an untenable excuse used to justify the appeasement of the Serbs. In a joint missive, Dole and Lugar argued,

"The continuing war in Bosnia, can largely be attributed to the pursuit of half-measures on the part of the Europeans and the UN' as well as the UN-imposed embargo. The letter refers to Europe's 'failed record' in the Balkans and suggests that inaction in Bosnia by Nato might require the US to re-examine its investment in the alliance...'Our allies have argued for the maintenance of a significant number of American troops in Europe as a means of preserving European stability. However, the inability of Nato to act effectively to contain and stop a major war on European soil is bound to raise grave doubts among both the American people and the Congress about whether the enormous yearly investment we make in Nato is reaping sufficient benefits'."82

Here Lugar criticised the UN as being inept and vacillating over the Bosnian crisis, a stance entirely consistent with a school of thought which distrusts international organisations as either being too powerful and therefore a threat to a state's sovereignty, or as too weak and thus not really helpful to a state pursuing its national interests through the organisation. More striking was Lugar's advocacy of the standard democratist and neo-realist assumption that Bosnia was a test case of the continued efficacy of Nato, rather than viewing Bosnia as of little account compared with the alliance in the overall hierarchy of American foreign policy priorities, as did institutionalists. Senator Lugar directly linked questions about the European response to Bosnia with the continued vitality of Nato itself.

While neo-realists support Nato's continuation in the new world order, the above statement reflects general neo-realist pessimism about the continued usefulness of Nato in the new age, and should be read as a gloomy prognosis rather than merely as a threat to the European allies. Unlike the democratists, who see Nato as based on the shared values of the West, neo-realists have always had a more hard-headed view of the organisation, seeing it as an 'investment' in American security, rather than as a perpetual symbol of the friendship of states sharing common democratic bonds. For Lugar specifically and for neo-realists in general, the failed Bosnian test case called into question the continued viability of Nato in the post-Cold War era.

Yet although neo-realists such as Senator Lugar question the continued relevance of Nato in the post-1989 era, they are not for its abolition. This can be seen in the general neo-realist position on European security, as neo-realists such as Lugar advocate the extension of Nato into Central Europe. Paradoxically for neo-realists, the extension of Nato is essential for the survival of the alliance itself. As Kaplan stated, Lugar's telling sound bite on the future of Nato was, "Nato: Out of Area or Out of Business."⁸³ That is, without Nato accepting the new mission as guarantor of Central European security, its continued survival is doubtful. This is in line with the standard neo-realist view of international organisations, that they exist to secure a group of states' specific needs and are established to deal with specific circumstances, and that if these circumstances change the organisation will not long survive.

Such is the neo-realist view of Nato. It was created to contend with the specific threat of possible Soviet military adventurism, and that as that threat has waned (though not wholly disappeared in the neo-realist view) the *raison d'être* for Nato has correspondingly shrunk. It is only with a new mandate as serving as military guarantor to the fledging democratic states of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic that new life can be given to the alliance. Thus Senator Lugar feels the Clinton administration is missing out on an historic opportunity to revitalise Nato. As Lugar stated, "If the object [of the Partnership for Peace Plan] was to impart a greater sense of security and stability toward the countries of Eastern Europe by meeting their political and psychological need for a road map to inclusion in the West, Partnership for Peace alone did not and cannot do the job."⁸⁴

As is the case with many other neo-realists who fear a resurgent Russia, Senator Lugar believes there may be a limited time period when the admittance of the more advanced Warsaw Pact states can be easily accomplished, so there should be little delay in their inclusion in the alliance. As Rosenfeld observed, Lugar wishes to, "Take the Poles, Hungarians, Czechs and Slovaks off the 'side track' of Partnership for Peace and put them on the 'fast track' of a specific schedule for association and then full Nato membership."⁸⁵ Lugar adhered to the standard neo-realist view that the institutionalists' advocacy of the President's Partnership for Peace initiative was a dangerous cul-de-sac retarding rather than catalysing Nato's eastward expansion, as it neither allowed for a specific timetable for the admission of the Central European states into Nato, nor did it initially lay down prerequisites needed to be fulfilled for inclusion in the alliance.⁸⁶ Further, Lugar felt the delay the Partnership for Peace initiative signalled in the process of admitting the Central European states into the alliance threatened Nato's position as the premier European

security organisation. As Lugar argued, "The Partnership for Peace proposal, however, rather than resolving the European-Atlantic debate in Nato's favor, has served as an excuse or opportunity to revive certain European alternatives to Nato."⁸⁷ Senator Lugar felt that the lack of Nato revitalisation that the Partnership for Peace plan signalled could lead to the watering down of Nato's role in favour of European security structures such as the WEU and the Eurocorps, as well as the more multilateral OSCE (Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe). In keeping with general neo-realist and democratist views, and in opposition to the institutionalist Clinton administration, Lugar desired that Nato reform itself quickly so as to solidify its position as the pre-eminent security structure in Europe, as it was relatively much more susceptible to American wishes than were either the WEU or the OSCE. Lugar believed the Partnership for Peace initiative should be scrapped and replaced by a mechanism that both stabilised Central Europe and buttressed Nato itself in the post-Cold War era.

Lugar also advocates the general neo-realist stance on aid to Russia. On this foreign policy issue, Lugar joined with the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Sam Nunn, a Democrat, to push aid to Russia through the Senate. Yet Lugar and Nunn favoured giving increased aid to Russia for neo-realist rather than democratist reasons, as favoured by the Clinton administration, "he [Lugar] and Nunn have been influential advocates of additional aid to the former Soviet Union. They have framed the issue as a question of national security, arguing that any benefits derived from the end of the Cold War would dissipate if the republics of the former Soviet Union collapse economically."⁸⁸ If the democratists base their strong advocacy for giving aid to Russia on the hope that Yeltsin's democratic experiment will succeed, neo-realists such as Lugar base their support for increased but limited aid to Russia partly on their fear of further Russian collapse, leading to the demise of Yeltsin and the emergence of authoritarian rule in Russia. Lugar illustrated this pessimistic stance, saying, "signs reappear that Russia may, out of a sense of desperation, be moving in foreign policy directions not-so-strangely reminiscent of its more imperial predecessors."⁸⁹ Given this position, though they believe aid ought to be given to Yeltsin, neo-realists advocate giving Russia far less than democratists propose and targeting the aid to programmes that will be strategically in the American national interest. Not for neo-realists is there the democratists' rosy view of a real partnership with Russia based on sharing democratic values. Rather, as Cox noted, "Lugar declared that the US had 'to get over the idea' that it was involved in a 'partnership' with Moscow. 'This is a tough rivalry' he insisted."⁹⁰

Neo-realists favoured limited aid to Russia to preserve American gains made at the end of the Cold War. Thus, they wish, for example, to retain the peace dividend of being able to cut military spending and enhance domestic initiatives, not for the global democratic cause or the misguided desire to be able to view Russia as an ally, not a rival, but because it is to the advantage of the United States. Russia will always be a great power, in the neo-realist view, and thus there would always be an element of competition in its relationship with the US, as another great power with different interests.⁹¹ According to neo-realists like Lugar, helping Russia served the American national interest, no more and no less.

It was of first importance to the neo-realists to dismantle as much of the former Soviet arsenal as possible, as a hedge against the possible emergence of a nationalist, authoritarian, expansionist leadership in Moscow. As this was the case, Nunn and Lugar were the political impetus behind the Senate's enactment of the Freedom Support Act, which authorised increased aid to Russia.⁹² This aid was targeted specifically to meet American military concerns about the new Russia. The rationale behind giving Russia money and technical expertise to dismantle its nuclear stockpiles as had already been agreed under the START treaties, was simple, "If extreme nationalists regained control, the nuclear missiles might again pose a threat to the US. That is why it is urgent to begin dismantling the Russian and other ex-Soviet republic's arsenals even before the START treaty is ratified."⁹³ Thus, whatever became of Yeltsin's efforts at democratic reform, an American initiative to fund the removal of some of Russia's nuclear stockpiles was in the national interest, according to the neo-realists.

Neo-realists also advocate partially funding the resettlement of Red Army veterans who had been stationed in the Soviet Empire, especially in the Baltic states.⁹⁴ These soldiers had threatened not to leave their bases unless homes were built for them in Russia, as many had nowhere to go with the collapse of the USSR. Lugar and Nunn successfully advocated giving US aid for this project, so the Russian army had no excuse not to withdraw from Central Europe and the Baltic states. Neo-realists reasoned it was in the national interest to do this, again especially if the generally pro-Western Yeltsin government was to give way to a more aggressive, nationalist successor, it would be unable to easily reclaim the military dominance of the former Soviet sphere of influence. Lugar's neo-realist policy prescriptions were predicated upon following the standard gloomy neo-realist assessment of the chances for Yeltsin to succeed with his democratic reform, as indicated by the fact that his initiatives would serve America's strategic interests whether Yeltsin survived or not.

iv) Robert Dole - Senate Minority Leader

Senator Bob Dole was undoubtedly the most formidable critic of President Clinton in his first two years in office. While noted more for his domestic expertise, Dole has also consistently opposed the administration's overall institutionalist foreign policy, cogently advocating the neo-realist point of view in the post-Cold War era. On no foreign issue has Dole's disagreement with the President been stronger than over American policy toward Bosnia.

Regarding Bosnia, the Senate Minority Leader (now the Senate Majority Leader in the 104th Congress) was an early, consistent and fierce critic of the administration's institutionalist policy. As Dole stated on the Senate floor during his introduction of the Dole-Lieberman amendment, which if it had passed, would have forced President Clinton either to arm the Bosnian government or veto the \$263 billion Pentagon budget to which it was attached, "For more than two years now the US has gone along with failed policies in the name of consensus."⁹⁵ Here Dole cleverly affirmed the President's own explanation as to why he had not been more forceful during the Bosnian crisis, his championing of the institutionalist tenet that allied consensus on Bosnia outweighed all possible Western policy outputs. Dole turned this argument on its head, instead contending that this sacrificing of successful policy initiatives (after all it was President Clinton himself who said he did not agree with the Europeans regarding the arms embargo) was precisely the reason that the West's response to the Bosnian crisis had proved so dismal. Like Senators Biden and Lugar, the Senate Minority Leader believed that while the Clinton White House's specific institutionalist policy preference in Bosnia was misguided, it was merely the tip of the iceberg of the analytical problems that had arisen for the US and threatened, if not corrected, to inflict far greater damage on US interests throughout the world.

Like most democratists and neo-realists, Senator Dole believed the Europeans were even more to blame for the West's feeble response to the Bosnian crisis than was the Clinton administration. Dole, during the climactic debate over the Dole-Lieberman amendment on July 1, 1994, caustically attacked institutionalist proponents regarding Bosnia such as Senator Mitchell, who had admonished the Minority Leader for speaking critically of America's European allies, "Several senators have asked how we dare tell our European allies what to do, since they have troops on the ground. I think the real question is how dare we tell the Bosnians what to do."⁹⁶ In this heated exchange, Senator Dole revealed the neo-realist underpinnings of his Bosnian policy preference. Instead of

worrying primarily about allied consensus, as institutionalists did over Bosnia policy, Dole saw the goal of multilateral harmony colliding with Bosnia's inherent right to self-defence over the issue of the arms embargo. Dole largely ignored what he saw as diplomatic niceties in favour of championing the principle that all states inherently have the right to defend themselves in the anarchic international system, and that this right was being denied to the Bosnian Muslims as a result of the UN arms embargo which denied them the chance of attaining military parity with the Serbian forces. The right of all states to self-defence is a cardinal neo-realist belief. Dole argued for example, that, "The arms embargo against Bosnia violates its inherent right to self-defense - a right which is recognized in, but not limited to, Article 51 of the UN Charter."⁹⁷ Ironically Dole used a reference point of the institutionalist school of thought, international law, specifically the UN Charter, to bolster his neo-realist case regarding Bosnia.

Nor did Dole accept the European peacekeeper rationale as a valid reason to limit Western involvement in Bosnia. Following the general neo-realist stance, Dole stated, "Get the [UN] soldiers out of the way. Pull 'em out' Dole said in an outburst of frustration at European nations which cite the safety of their troops in Bosnia as an argument against tougher military intervention."⁹⁸ Like Biden, the Senate Minority Leader saw the European peacekeeping argument as little more than an excuse to avoid taking the more rigorous action on Bosnia that both neo-realists and democratists advocated.

Dole also believed the UN's operational supremacy during the Bosnian crisis was part of the reason for the West's failure of policy during the conflict. Dole has the instinctive neo-realist dislike of international organisations that try to function as foreign policy actors themselves, rather than merely serving as a conducive arena for states with common interests to co-ordinate foreign policy, as most neo-realists would want. As Rosenfeld observed, "Dole wants a more assertive policy in which America is the 'predominant' player, 'first among equals', not just 'one of equals'. He reserves special animus for an ostensibly overreaching UN, to which, he declares, President Clinton has 'subcontracted' American independence."⁹⁹ Dole felt the President allowed the UN to supersede American interests in places like Somalia and Bosnia, where American freedom of action had been subordinated to an overly ambitious UN, which had been disastrously encouraged by the institutionalist Clinton administration to see itself as the global policeman. Senator Dole's world view, in accordance with both democratist and nationalist neo-realist thinking, has the US at the centre of any attempt to fill the role of global cop. The UN, without an army

at its disposal, was shown to be all too dependent on the whims of the Security Council over Bosnia, and has proven to be far from an autonomous power, so Dole believed.

Frustratingly for the now Senate Majority Leader, the UN was allowed by the President to eclipse the one international organisation that could have made a difference in the war, Nato. As Nato has always been led by the US, symbolised by the fact that the military head of the alliance has always been an American general, and as it has the military wherewithal which neo-realists feel is still an essential part of international diplomacy, it has long been a favourite instrument of the neo-realist school of thought. That the institutionalist Clinton administration would subordinate Nato to the UN in the Bosnian crisis is a telling sign for neo-realists such as Senator Dole of institutionalism's consistent undervaluing of the military component of power in the overall scheme of international relations. As Dole stated during the Senate debate on the Dole-Lieberman amendment, "As for those who say that this amendment will have a negative impact on Nato, it seems to me that Nato has already suffered significant damage... Nato's credibility has suffered because of decisions to subordinate Nato to the UN in Bosnia - allowing UN officials to have control over Nato forces."¹⁰⁰

The dual key mechanism the West used in threatening limited force in Bosnia through the use of air strikes was so often vetoed by UN officials such as Akashi as to have little impact on the conflict. For neo-realists it was the worst of all possible worlds, the UN still did not function effectively in Bosnia as it lacked the political consensus of the states in the Security Council, yet by its thrusting itself to the forefront of the Bosnian war, with the blessings of both the European allies and President Clinton, it negated the one multilateral organisation, Nato, neo-realists such as Dole warmly advocated being used in the Bosnian conflict.

As is true for most neo-realists, the unilateral lifting of the arms embargo was central to the then Minority Leader's Bosnia policy preference. Dole ruled out the democratist policy line on the grounds that the Bosnian leadership itself did not desire American troops so much as a chance to defend itself. Dole argued, "the Bosnians aren't asking us to invade. They don't want our troops. They only want the means to effectively defend themselves and their country."¹⁰¹ Knowing that the democratist policy preference of massive American troop involvement in Bosnia was unpopular as Americans feared that the US might get bogged-down in some Vietnam-style quagmire, Dole cleverly portrayed the neo-realist policy preference of lifting the arms embargo as the policy option least likely to drag the

US into a major conflict in the Balkans, even less likely than institutionalist prescriptions. Dole argued, "The bottom line is that the arms embargo is immoral and illegal and so, our choice is clear: support the Bosnian's fundamental right to self-defense and lift the embargo - or support sending thousands of US troops to partition Bosnia."¹⁰² Here Dole interestingly fused majority neo-realist thinking with minority isolationist views. In contradiction to Senator Mitchell, who supported the administration's institutionalist line on Bosnia, Dole believed that the Clinton White House's commitment to help police any agreement the contact group eventually brokered was more likely to lead the US into war in the Balkans. For instance, if the deal came unstuck with US soldiers already on the ground, then the neo-realist policy position was that the US should arm the Bosnian Muslims and do little more in the conflict. Dole, while obviously responding to US public opinion with this argument, nevertheless challenged the institutionalist position that lifting the embargo would increase the chances of direct American involvement in the Bosnian war.

For Dole the neo-realist advocacy of unilaterally lifting the embargo was central to his Bosnian policy preference. This is illustrated by the fact that in his first remarks after the landslide Republican victory in the November 1994 midterm elections, Dole said, "In particular, the arms embargo on Bosnia should be lifted entirely."¹⁰³ It was obvious that Dole intended to use the new-found Republican majority in the Senate to press for the successful adoption of the Dole-Lieberman amendment, and to attempt to change the overall orientation of American foreign policy regarding the Bosnian crisis from an institutionalist stance to a neo-realist position.

Dole also holds a neo-realist stance on the question of the future US role in European security. Dole observed, "Nato's influence has been marginalized because of a failure to define a clear and independent role in the post-Cold war era. Moreover, Nato has been weakened by its willingness to allow Russia to dictate the terms of our security relations with former Warsaw Pact countries, like Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia."¹⁰⁴ For Dole, this example of Russian intransigence merely confirmed his worries about the nature of the Yeltsin regime and confirmed neo-realist efforts to expand the alliance. As Dole observed, "Russia continues to threaten prospective Nato members over an alliance expansion, thereby confirming the need to enlarge Nato sooner rather than later."¹⁰⁵

As over Bosnia, the Senate Majority Leader is critical of the Clinton administration's institutionalist policy. Dole believes the malaise in the alliance goes well beyond its misuse

in the Bosnian debacle. Like his neo-realist colleague, Senator Lugar, Dole is pessimistic about Nato's long-term prospects, especially in the wake of the President's indecision about whether to advocate expansion of the alliance eastwards, symbolised by the administration's adoption of the Partnership for Peace initiative. Senator Dole correctly sees concerns about the Russian bear lurking behind the White House's European policy. Dole, in common with the general neo-realist viewpoint, criticised the President for failing again to adopt an unfettered foreign policy regarding European defence issues, a concept so cherished by neo-realists. If President Clinton's Bosnia policy was a hostage to the European allies, the UN, and Russia, as Dole saw it, so his policy on Nato expansion is a captive of the administration's concerns about the Russian democratic experiment. Dole agrees with the neo-realist viewpoint that both in practice and in principle the US must not allow any other state to control general policy initiatives such as the expansion of Nato into Central Europe, a policy that if not enacted, Dole believes could soon lead to the end of the alliance itself.

Dole is also a neo-realist regarding trade issues. While supporting both the Nafta and Gatt accords, particularly over the latter, Dole feared aspects of the accord, specifically that the powers of the WTO threatened American sovereignty. As over Bosnia, Dole became the chief critic of the institutionalist administration regarding the Uruguay Round. Like most neo-realists, Dole saw the Gatt agreement as potentially of great advantage to the US. As Horvitz noted, "Long a free trade advocate, Dole wavered in recent weeks [over Gatt] while pressing the White House for political concessions."¹⁰⁶ Beyond politics, the root cause of Dole's vacillations on Gatt were the sovereignty questions the newly-formed WTO posed. Like Gingrich, Senator Dole felt the WTO was not necessarily in the national interest, "Dole said he wanted legislation outside the Gatt accord to 'extricate us from the WTO, if we are getting adverse decisions. That's the big sticking point'.¹⁰⁷ Unlike the institutionalists, the Senate Majority Leader does not see international organisations as a good in and of themselves, as is illustrated by the fact that Dole was not ready to sign on to the WTO until he was assured that the US could quickly leave the organisation if it felt it was being treated unfairly. In short, Dole was not prepared to abandon American economic sovereignty for some possible long-term economic benefits, as befits his neo-realist orientation. In the end, Dole was successful in obtaining his concessions from the President, and he voted for the Gatt accord.

While Senator Dole's overall orientation is obviously neo-realist, he curiously advocates the institutionalist position regarding the MFN controversy with China. As far

back as the Bush administration, Dole voted against abolishing MFN status for the Chinese, or even placing conditions on its renewal, despite its human rights record. Throughout the time of the Clinton administration's torturous climbdown from its hawkish campaign rhetoric over China, Senator Dole maintained a consistent institutionalist stance. When President Clinton finally adopted the institutionalist policy preference and delinked MFN renewal from human rights issues, Dole ironically agreed with him. In the run-up to this policy flip-flop, as Cornwell stated, "The President, Dole advised, should simply declare it was wrong to link trade expansion to progress on human rights."¹⁰⁸ Here Dole struck at the heart of the MFN debate, arguing the institutionalist line that trade issues and human rights concerns should always have been considered separately. Over American policy to China, one finds one of the rare occasions where the President and his chief tormentor found little to disagree about.

The same cannot be said about American policy to Russia, over which Senator Dole sharply disagrees with the President. The Majority Leader criticised President Clinton for, "defending, denying and rationalizing Russia's misdeeds."¹⁰⁹ Among them, Dole counted the brutal attempt to extinguish Chechen secessionism, interference in the US-North Korean nuclear agreement, the programme to sell arms to Iran, and the pressure put on the governments of the 'near abroad' states, such as Moldova. For Dole these examples are telling signs that Russia is returning to its adventurist ways. He argued, "We must face the fact that geopolitical rivalry with Russia did not end with the demise of Soviet Communism."¹¹⁰ Senator Dole sees Russia as as much enemy as ally due to its differing geopolitical interests with the US over the litany of issues listed above. For this reason alone, he adheres to the neo-realist position that aid to Russia should be extremely limited.

The Senate Majority Leader also, in contradiction with democratist thinking, sees President Yeltsin as an impediment to Russian democracy. He believes Yeltsin, "has moved toward authoritarian rule and has lost the political support of virtually all reform-minded Russians,"¹¹¹ and that this process has been exacerbated by the Chechnya crisis. Given this belief, it is easy to understand why Dole thinks President Clinton's democratist initiatives regarding Russia are dangerously misguided. As Dole stated, "I don't agree with their [the Clinton administration's] Russia-first policy, which has turned into a Yeltsin-first policy."¹¹² Thus Dole believes that even by democratist standards, the Clinton administration's policy regarding Russian aid is wrong as it is being used to support an essentially non-democratic regime. Senator Dole believes there is a resurgent Russia, increasingly asserting itself around the globe, as it begins to shake off the after-effects of

the demise of Communism.¹¹³ As this state has obviously conflicting interests with the US, Dole is wary of buttressing the Yeltsin regime.

(c) Specific institutionalist decision-makers in US foreign policy

i) William Perry - Secretary of Defence

While it is to be expected that Secretary of Defence William Perry shares the overall schools of thought orientation of his boss, President Clinton, what is slightly curious are the strong neo-realist minority views of the head of the Pentagon.

For example, even though Perry ultimately espoused the institutionalist point of view regarding Bosnia, he did so for largely neo-realist reasons. The Secretary of Defence is emblematic of a minor flaw in schools of thought analysis, as his neo-realist 'givens' lead to, paradoxically, institutionalist policy outputs. While there are no other leading decision-makers chronicled in the thesis who hold Secretary Perry's position, nevertheless it is significant. As Perry stated, using neo-realist terminology, "In Bosnia today we have still more limited interests, and therefore our use of military force is correspondingly more limited...But what are the national interests of the US in this war? It does not involve our supreme national interest...our national survival does not hinge on its outcome."¹¹⁴ Perry agreed with the standard neo-realist position that Bosnia was not enough of an American national security interest to justify large-scale military involvement, as democratists advocated. But he did not concur with the general neo-realist line that Bosnia was still important enough, as the first ethnic conflict to break out in Europe since the end of the Cold War, to merit US interest to the point of unilaterally lifting the arms embargo. He disagreed with the neo-realist policy position based upon a different calculation of American national interests. He believed the fundamental American interest in Bosnia is to prevent the violence from spreading, and that lifting the arms embargo was not the best way to further this goal.¹¹⁵ Thus Perry arrived squarely at the institutionalist stance regarding Bosnia. His different idiosyncratic reading of the givens underlying neo-realism reminds one that even a successful social science tool, like schools of thought analysis, can never completely map every ideological impulse of every decision-maker.

Secretary Perry's minority neo-realist orientation can also be seen in his stance on American relations with Russia. Here Perry is far more sceptical of the Yeltsin regime than is usual in the Clinton administration. He argued, "What Russia and some of its

neighboring states are trying to do today in terms of reforming their political and economic system has a very uncertain outcome."¹¹⁶ His pessimism about the prospects for successful Russian reform predicated his cautious neo-realist policy preference regarding aid to the former superpower. As in Perry's mind there is, "the small but real danger that reform in Russia might fail and a new government arise hostile to the US,"¹¹⁷ he is prepared to hedge his bets regarding America's defence posture toward the Yeltsin regime. For example, the conclusion of a classified September 1994 document by the Pentagon urged the US not to push for further nuclear reductions than previously negotiated, and to scale back American nuclear stockpiles at exactly the same rate the Russians do in their implementation of the START 1 and START 2 treaties.¹¹⁸ While Perry is prepared, in accordance with the standard neo-realist line, to provide aid to Russia along Nunn-Lugar lines,¹¹⁹ that is as far as he is willing to go in fostering Russian reform. His sceptical neo-realist outlook stands out in an administration of Russia-firsters.

The Secretary of Defence's policy prescriptions regarding Europe are more in line with the general thrust of the Clinton administration. Writing with Secretary of State Christopher in opposition to Speaker Gingrich's 'Contract With America' plank that calls for the quick admission of the Central European states into Nato, Perry and Christopher reasoned, "the bill unilaterally and prematurely designates certain European states for Nato membership...Our present steady and deliberate approach to Nato expansion is intended to ensure that each potential member is judged individually."¹²⁰ Beyond seeing the neo-realist initiative as 'premature', here Perry also feared that singling out some states (like Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary) for quick Nato admission will create new divisions in Europe and actually exacerbate instability as states left outside Nato, from Romania to Russia, will feel isolated and neglected by the West. Perry believes in the general institutionalist view that regarding the expansion of Nato, it is imperative not to draw a new East-West line as existed during the Cold War.

ii) Lee Hamilton - Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee

Lee Hamilton, the Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, as well as the Chairman of the Subcommittee on European and Middle Eastern Affairs in the 103rd Congress, has been one of President Clinton's staunchest allies on Capitol Hill. This is borne out by the fact that both of them share a strong institutionalist orientation in foreign affairs.

Congressman Hamilton supported the President's institutionalist stance on the Bosnia crisis. In fact, Hamilton advocated an institutionalist position early in the administration, even when the President was considering taking stronger action. Then Hamilton argued, "I don't think you will find support among our allies for a very broadened, extended air war. What you are now seeing discussed, and discussed very urgently, are more limited uses of air power, which I would support. I don't think we want to broaden this war. I don't think we want to make it an American war."¹²¹ Hamilton here staked out some underlying institutionalist precepts that guided his choice of policy prescriptions throughout the crisis. Not only did he accurately predict that the European allies would not support a massive air war in Bosnia, implicit in his comment is the notion that if they did not do so, the US ought not to act alone. This anti-unilateralism is a core institutionalist belief. Also Hamilton feared the escalation of the war, a prospect he equated here with a more vigorous American response to the conflict, as was advocated by both the democratists and the neo-realists. Hamilton urged President Clinton to adopt the institutionalist viewpoint during the critical month of May 1993, when the European allies rejected American initiatives for tougher action against the Serbs, "when Bosnia's militarily dominant Serbs resisted [the Vance-Owen plan], putting pressure on President Clinton for US military action during the spring of 1993, Hamilton suggested that more time was needed to allow diplomacy and economic sanctions to work."¹²² The Chairman's reliance on sanctions is a marked institutionalist trait, as was his fear that military action in Bosnia would have more drawbacks than benefits.

Hamilton based his overall institutionalist policy regarding Bosnia on the same calculation of the hierarchy of political priorities that motivated President Clinton to adopt the institutionalist stance. In an article written by Hamilton and Claiborne Pell, then Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, they stated, "If Washington lifted the embargo unilaterally, that strategy [the institutionalist policy of the Clinton administration] would fall apart, opening a serious rift in the alliance. And relations with Russia would suffer, since Moscow would find itself under great pressure to provide arms to the Serbs."¹²³ Like Dole, Hamilton saw the arms embargo as the crucial element in America's overall response to the Bosnian crisis. However, unlike his neo-realist colleague, the Chairman felt the embargo should not be lifted unilaterally, as doing so would seriously damage the alliance as well as harming America's warming relations with Russia. Here Hamilton's inclinations coincided wholly with the views of the White House.

Congressman Hamilton went further, and outlined the way in which the lifting of the embargo could lead to a wider war. If the US ignored multilateral pressure and lifted the embargo to aid the Bosnian Muslims, what was to stop the Russians from doing the same thing and abetting their Slavic Orthodox brethren, the Serbs? In such a situation, Hamilton saw the danger of a far wider and more damaging conflict, as both Russia and the US would invest so much diplomatic capital in the war that almost inevitably one or both great powers would be sucked into the Balkan conflict. In advocating an institutionalist policy regarding Bosnia, Hamilton believed that his neo-realist and democratist Congressional colleagues misunderstood the delicate balancing act that the institutionalist policy of the Clinton administration was trying to preserve, and that far greater calamities would befall the West if the overall thrust of American policy was reserved.

Hamilton has adopted an institutionalist policy regarding Russia as well, though his advocacy is less straightforward than were his Bosnia policy preferences, as on this question he also has democratist aspects to his position. As is true for many democratists regarding Russia, Hamilton is not happy with the performance of the IMF and its attempt to aid the Yeltsin regime. As Congressman Hamilton stated, "International financial institutions, which provide large amounts of cash and project assistance directly to the Russian government, should respect political realities, and not impose impossible or humiliating conditions on Russia."¹²⁴ This implicit criticism of the IMF, written in the aftermath of Russia's disastrous December 1993 elections, was not the usual institutionalist viewpoint. Hamilton continued in the democratist vein, "We will have differences with Russia on the pace of reform, but our interests are not served by penalizing reformers,"¹²⁵ which is what undoubtedly would happen if the IMF failed to deliver the aid promised to Russia, due to its failure to meet the usual strict economic conditions the Fund imposes. As an initial portion of the political credibility the Russian reformers had with the Russian people was bound up in the perception that they would be able to deliver tangible benefits to Russia by adopting a pro-Western policy, Hamilton was correct in seeing that their political standing would be disproportionately harmed if Western aid failed to materialise. Hamilton agreed with the democratists that, "The single most important foreign policy question on the desk of President Clinton is the future of economic and political reform in the [former-sic] Soviet Union,"¹²⁶ and that this question was sufficiently important to suspend the IMF's usual monetary conditions. Hamilton believes that economic short-sightedness should not be allowed to get in the way of Russian reform.

Nevertheless, the Chairman is ultimately an institutionalist regarding aid to Russia. Hamilton stated his central policy formulation regarding Russia as follows, "the US and the international community should keep focused on the direction, not the speed of reform. The priority now is to keep reform moving forward - even if at a slower pace."¹²⁷ The crucial point here is that while Congressman Hamilton agrees with the democratists that questions about shock therapy, and the general speed of reform should not obscure the primary goal of keeping the reformers in positions of power, he agrees with the institutionalists that 'reform' must keep moving ahead, albeit in fits and starts. As 'reform' for Hamilton has an economic and not a political basis, he ultimately is an institutionalist, if an odd sort.

Hamilton's belief in the economic basis of reform can be clearly seen. Hamilton observed, "I, for one, will find it very difficult to support aid for Russia if the central bank there continues to pour dollars and credit into supporting these inefficient state-run industries."¹²⁸ Thus Hamilton places definite economic conditions on Russia if it is to receive continued aid, a central institutionalist precept. Hamilton continued, "If you have hyperinflation, it does not matter if you supply them \$10 billion or \$1 billion."¹²⁹ As ultimately Hamilton believes that the economic policies of the Russian government are the central indicators determining the amount of aid that the West should give to the Yeltsin regime, his overall schools of thought orientation regarding Russian reform can be seen to be institutionalist.

Hamilton's policy preference regarding the Nafta and Gatt accords was more straightforwardly institutionalist. While Hamilton did not concentrate on trade issues during his tenure as Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, "he could be a force for the Democratic free-trade position that goes back to Cordell Hull."¹³⁰ Congressman Hamilton consistently maintained this free trade institutionalist position. When pressed to list President Clinton's foreign policy successes, Hamilton replied, "the Clinton administration has had some 'remarkable successes' on foreign policy, especially in passing the Nafta."¹³¹ This response was an indication of how important trade issues were for the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee in particular and the institutionalist school of thought in general.

Likewise Hamilton offered the standard institutionalist argument about why the passage of Nafta was important for the US, relating the foreign initiative to domestic conditions, as it is a core institutionalist belief that governance can no longer be easily divided into foreign and domestic policies. Hamilton argued, "Latin America buys more than 40% of its

imports from the US, and it has great potential for growth. Many Latin American countries seek to negotiate Nafta-type agreements with the US. Closer trading ties will mean increasing US exports and jobs."¹³² Hamilton advocated what would traditionally be thought of as a foreign initiative for largely domestic reasons, that the increasing free trade era dawning on the Western Hemisphere that Nafta is ushering in, will redound to the US' domestic economic advantage, in terms of job creation. Hamilton, like President Clinton, believed that economic interdependence, a cornerstone of institutionalist thinking, meant that benefits that accrued to America's trading partners through the Nafta agreement would ultimately benefit the US as well. For example, Mexico's increasing purchasing power will lead to a rising demand for American exports, and thus the whole process is beneficial for American interests, and not a mixed blessing as neo-realists generally believe trade accords to be.

Congressman Hamilton also followed the standard institutionalist stance regarding China, advocating renewal of MFN and a delinking of trade and human rights issues. As Friedman noted, "The chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee expects China to meet President Clinton's human rights demands as a condition to renewing trade benefits to Beijing. If it does, he said, the administration should stop threatening China with sanctions and use other means to promote human rights."¹³³ It is palpable nonsense that China's human rights record markedly improved over the 1993-4 time span, when MFN renewal was supposedly tied to China making progress on human rights issues, nor did the Chairman offer evidence to bolster his assertion.¹³⁴ Rather he was providing political cover for his ally, the President, to follow an institutionalist course and delink trade issues from human rights concerns. Hamilton also adopted the standard institutionalist viewpoint in saying, "Economic freedom may bring political freedom."¹³⁵ This is further evidence of his general economics-first institutionalist approach to development, believing that ultimately economic reform directs political change, and not vice-versa. In China, this meant retaining MFN to economically bolster entrepreneurs and the rising middle-class, those that are most historically likely to engender political reform. As on so many other issues, Congressman Hamilton agreed with the institutionalist thrust of the administration's foreign policy.

iii) Warren Christopher - Secretary of State

The American Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, is bureaucratically placed to be a central, if not the central, actor in developing overall American foreign policy. Yet if the

Secretary of State has individual views on the critical issues facing America in the new world order, they are largely immaterial, for as the schools of thought analysis both here and in chapter 7 will illustrate, he has become little more than an apologist for the President's institutionalist viewpoints.

While there is little doubt the Secretary of State himself is an institutionalist, his rhetorical flip-flops and policy U-turns reflect the administration's failure to bridge the gap between candidate Clinton's aggressive rhetoric and his genuine institutionalist orientation, exhibited more clearly once he was safely ensconced in the White House. Nowhere is this charge more readily apparent than regarding American policy toward Bosnia. President Clinton came to Washington advocating a tougher policy stance against the Serbs than President Bush had pursued. Here Christopher did have an impact, as Miller noted, "Secretary of State Christopher has also endorsed President Clinton's determination to emphasize diplomacy and sanctions, rather than military action, as the appropriate response to post-Cold War 'aggression' (as in the former Yugoslavia)."136 Here the Secretary of State was advocating a policy that viewed economic coercion as likely to be more effective than military action, in line with general institutionalist thinking.

This reliance (neo-realist and democratist critics would say over-reliance) on economic measures to force the Serbs to negotiate in good faith remained a hallmark of Christopher's thinking throughout the Bosnian conflict. In May 1993, after the Serb rejection of the Vance-Owen plan, when so many in Washington, including the President, were considering adopting a tougher stance with the Serbs, Christopher stated, "In response to the Serbs' ruthless aggression, the US joined our partners in the Security Council this weekend in passing a resolution that will dramatically tighten existing sanctions."137 Even with the evidence that sanctions had not led the Serbs to accept the Vance-Owen plan, Christopher saw the toughening of sanctions, rather than the application of military force, as the logical next step in ratcheting up the pressure on an intransigent Pale. This devotion to sanctions as the prime diplomatic instrument in the international arena is a unique institutionalist trait.

For the Secretary of State, the key interests the US had in the war were, as Palmer and Walker observed, "in preventing any widening of the war and in maintaining the credibility of Nato."138 This latter preoccupation assumed an even greater importance for the Secretary of State as the conflict continued. For Christopher, Nato credibility hinged on retaining a multilateral consensus above all else, as belief in multilateralism is another central institutionalist precept. As Christopher remarked, "the problem was at heart, a

European one. 'This is a multilateral problem and it must have a multilateral response,' Secretary Christopher told a committee of the House."¹³⁹ Here Christopher avowed two institutionalist analytical viewpoints. Firstly, as he saw the problem as primarily a European responsibility, he felt the US ought to take a back seat in decision-making regarding the Bosnian crisis. The logic that flowed from this position that America should merely support what ought to be a primarily European initiative in Bosnia, lead directly to his acceptance of their peacekeeping argument, which effectively limited Western aid to the Bosnian Muslims. Secondly, the Secretary's belief that only a multilateral response to the conflict was appropriate ruled out for him all democratist and neo-realist initiatives regarding Bosnia, as they were based on a more positive view of the chances for unilateral policies proving successful. Christopher's determination to keep the alliance together on Bosnia, whatever the moral cost, sometimes reached ridiculous extremes. As Anthony Lewis, a noted New York Times columnist, and democratist, scornfully observed, "Christopher did himself mortal damage when he said all sides in Bosnia were guilty of human rights violations, thus ignoring the role of Serbian leaders as inciters of genocide."¹⁴⁰ For Christopher the institutionalist imperative of keeping the multilateral consensus going on Bosnia overrode asking real questions about who was perpetrating the vast majority of human rights abuses in the war.

Regarding aid to Russia, Christopher agrees with the President in advocating a democratist response to helping the Russian regime. The Secretary follows the standard democratist line in viewing Russia's reform experiment as the major priority of US foreign policy during President Clinton's term of office. As Christopher stated, "Helping ensure the success of this process [Russian reform] is our highest foreign policy priority."¹⁴¹ In helping this process along, the Secretary of State insisted that the reason Russia was so important for the US was that its successful transition to becoming a market democracy would radically alter the whole of international affairs. As the Secretary of State observed, "Even at a time of belt-tightening in the US, President Clinton has taken a series of courageous steps to support reform in Russia and the former Soviet Union. He has made this case to the American people because of his conviction that nothing is more important to the security of Europe and North America than the success of economic and political reform in Russia."¹⁴²

Unlike the neo-realists, Christopher believes a lasting change in the relationship with America's former enemy is possible, and that this metamorphosis will favourably alter all global strategic calculations. By bolstering the Yeltsin government, Christopher believed,

"we can help turn our most dangerous enemy into an enduring partner."¹⁴³ This partnership, in accordance with democratist thinking, will be built on the shared democratic values of the two states. As democratists fundamentally believe that democracies do not go to war with one another, it is easy to see why those, such as Christopher, who hold democratist views regarding aid to Russia, see the Yeltsin government's reform programme as such an exciting opportunity. For if the Russians become a genuine, stable democracy, the US and Europe need no longer fear a state with 20,000 nuclear warheads.

At critical times during the past two years, Secretary of State Christopher has remained true to his democratist orientation regarding Russia. During the conflict between President Yeltsin and the unreconstructed Russian Parliament, Christopher publicly supported Yeltsin, citing a democratist rationale. Christopher argued, "The US does not easily support the suspension of parliaments. But these are extraordinary times... The parliament and the court were vestiges of the Soviet Communist past, blocking movement to democratic reform."¹⁴⁴ In deciding to support Yeltsin over Khasbulatov by portraying the Chairman of the Russian Parliament as a man impeding democratic reform, Christopher affirmed his democratist viewpoint regarding Russia. In fact, Christopher saw the benchmark for the US suspending aid to Russia as being, "if Moscow reversed its democratic course."¹⁴⁵

In carrying out the reforms themselves, the secretary felt the Russian people, not the IMF, should be central in deciding the pace of reform. Christopher noted, "How the Russian people shape and carry out their reforms is, of course, for you [the Russians] to decide."¹⁴⁶ For Christopher economic questions about the pace of reform were secondary to the political fact that the impetus existed in Russia for reform in the first place. It was this impetus that Christopher wanted above all else to help preserve.

The Secretary of State adheres to an institutionalist policy regarding questions about the European security structure in the new world order. Christopher, like other institutionalists but unlike democratists and neo-realists, is an EU-firster, seeing in the European supranational organisation the key to the continent's defence future. As Christopher noted, "I applauded the steps Europe is taking towards integration and affirmed our support for a strengthened EU,"¹⁴⁷ during consultations with various European leaders. For the institutionalists, the relative growth of power of the EU is not something to fear, but rather is an opportunity for the US to safely decrease American military commitments to the continent. Christopher implicitly affirmed this declinist institutionalist analytical perspective in calling for increased burden-sharing in the alliance, he noted, "The US will

maintain its military commitments and responsibilities in Europe. But President Clinton and I must be able to show the US Congress that the allies are doing the same. Sharing must be a visible Nato principle: sharing of burdens, sharing of responsibilities, sharing of decisions."¹⁴⁸ Unlike neo-realists and democratists, institutionalists such as the Secretary of State were willing to cede some authority over European security decision-making in exchange for an important but lessening American involvement on the continent. The savings this course of action would produce could be used to combat American decline at home, for instance, by using such savings to reduce the crippling federal budget deficit. As a result of this declinist strategy, Christopher stated, "The US welcomes the development of a European security and defense identity,"¹⁴⁹ as this was the only way such an American strategy could be implemented while maintaining an acceptable military level of preparedness on the European continent.

Another sign of Christopher's EU-firster, institutionalist orientation is that he ultimately did not believe a timetable should be adopted by the West for Nato's eastward expansion. As chapter 7 will note in further detail, Christopher initially favoured a quick expansion of Nato, but was overruled by the President and the Secretary's supposed subordinate, Strobe Talbott.¹⁵⁰ As on other occasions, Christopher merely abandoned his earlier belief and became a convinced institutionalist on this point. Christopher's volte-face does tie in with his democratist policy preference regarding Russia. As the Secretary argued, "Swift expansion of Nato eastwards could make a neo-imperialist Russia a self-fulfilling prophecy."¹⁵¹ Here Christopher illustrates the institutionalist policy preference regarding European security, which is partly predicated on the belief that Russian reform must take precedence over the speedy expansion of Nato. This also jibes with his democratist views regarding Russia, that the success of Russian reform is the crucial challenge in international relations today. Nothing, such as Nato's eastward expansion, must be allowed to jeopardise the pro-Western government of Boris Yeltsin.

Yet while Christopher's democratist inclinations regarding Russian reform rule out adopting the neo-realist policy preference regarding Europe, which is for quick expansion of Nato, he does not adopt the democratist policy plan for Europe, which is for no expansion at all. Rather he adopted the institutionalist advocacy of the Partnership for Peace initiative, which allowed that Nato will expand eastwards, but not in the short term. Crucially, no timetable was announced regarding the 'when' of Nato expansion when the partnership was established. As Christopher observed, "The January [1994] summit should formally open the door to an evolutionary process of Nato expansion. This process should

be non-discriminatory and inclusive. It should not be tied to a specific timetable or criteria for membership."¹⁵² In the end, the Secretary of State adopted the institutionalist position regarding European security, hoping not to offend Russia and yet to encourage the fledgling Central European states. Neo-realists critics of the Secretary and the initiative said that as with most compromises, it succeeded in satisfying no one and offending everyone.

The Secretary of State also advocated an institutionalist position regarding trade matters in the new world order. Consistent with his overall institutionalist orientation, Christopher stated, "President Clinton and I have placed economic policy at the heart of our foreign policy."¹⁵³ Trade policy was considered especially important by the secretary. As Bradsher noted, "Christopher and Robert Rubin the [then] head of the National Economic Council [he is currently the Treasury Secretary] have tended to ally themselves with Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen,"¹⁵⁴ a man noted for his advocacy of free trade. Indeed the Secretary of State strongly favoured both the Nafta and Gatt accords. Regarding Nafta, Christopher commented that it, "is one of the great opportunities of this generation."¹⁵⁵ This high praise for the agreement is consistent with the standard institutionalist position on free trade expansion, that it is an unmitigated good, a stance not taken by the other two schools of thought. Along with Russian reform, free trade expansion formed the other major priority in foreign policy for both Secretary Christopher and the Clinton administration as a whole.

A sign of how important trade relations are for Christopher is his about-face over China policy. As Manning noted, at the beginning of the administration, Christopher held democratist views regarding China. He then noted, "Our policy will seek to facilitate a peaceful evolution of China from Communism to democracy."¹⁵⁶ This emphasis on political factors regarding US-China relations rather than concentrating on the economic aspects of the relationship indicated the democratist viewpoint. The Secretary also seemed to view China's human rights violations as a major factor in its relationship with the US, another democratist characteristic. As was noted, "On China, Christopher said the US could not ignore continued reports that Beijing was exporting sensitive military equipment and abusing human rights."¹⁵⁷ However, when pressed to make a clear choice between trade expansion and upholding human rights principles, the Secretary of State opted for the institutionalist course of action. As Miller observed, "Secretary of State Christopher has encouraged President Clinton to follow his own inclination and elevate trade and economics as foreign instruments and to focus on Asia and Latin America as regions where these instruments will yield impressive gains for Washington."¹⁵⁸

Thus, there was a conflict between Christopher's institutionalist orientation regarding trade expansion and his early democratic murmurings regarding China. The latter were dropped, as Christopher adopted the institutionalist position regarding MFN extension, showing the priority of trade expansion for Christopher in particular and institutionalists in general. As Williams reported, at the time of the crucial decision over whether to renew China's MFN status in May 1994, "Christopher suggested that China's human rights failures can be addressed with measures short of revoking China's MFN status...Christopher's presentation appears designed to break the link between trade and human rights that has hung over Chinese-American relations for five years."¹⁵⁹ Here Christopher honestly conceded that China had not compiled with American conditions on MFN renewal for 1994, but urged the president to both renew MFN and delink trade from human rights issues anyway, all because of the imperative of the huge Chinese market. The Secretary's turnabout on China, while it can be read as an unprincipled and desperate attempt to get his President off a large political hook, can also be seen as an illustration of just how important Christopher's institutionalist advocacy of expanding free markets is for understanding his overall foreign policy orientation.

iv) Anthony Lake - National Security Adviser

Like Christopher, National Security Adviser Anthony Lake is also an institutionalist, though his policy prescriptions illustrate that there is more variety in his views than in the Secretary of State's regarding the standard line of the Clinton administration. Like Perry, Lake is not a maverick within the administration, but neither is he merely an advocate for the President's policy prescriptions. For example, regarding the future of the European security structure, Lake hews to a neo-realist policy preference despite being a member of an institutionalist administration. Regardless of the early Russia-first orientation of the Clinton White House Lake has maintained, "strong support for Nato's eastward expansion, against those counseling deference to Russian sensibilities,"¹⁶⁰ such as Deputy Secretary of State Talbott. While Lake also believes the success or failure of Yeltsin's democratic experiment is of primary importance for the United States, he does not feel that this should determine American policy regarding the revitalization of the alliance. By this neo-realist stance, Lake illustrates that he is not afraid to contest a collectively held truth of a majority of his colleagues in the administration.

This does not mean that Lake is indifferent to the significance of Russia's attempt to become a democratic state. As for a majority of others in the administration, Lake favors a democratist policy regarding American support for Russian reform. This policy flows out of Lake's broader goals. In his famous 'Enlargement Speech' of 21 September 1993, Anthony Lake provided the context for his democratist support of Russian reform. He stated, "Throughout the Cold War, we contained a global threat to market democracies, now we should seek to enlarge their reach, particularly in places of special significance to us. The successor to a doctrine of containment must be a strategy of enlargement - enlargement of the world's free community of market democracies."¹⁶¹ At the time, the 'Enlargement Speech' was hailed as the definitive word regarding the Clinton administration's foreign policy, the 'big idea' so many had been calling for. Since then it has begun to be seen for what it is, a rhetorical cul-de-sac. Lake's speech and subsequent clarifications contain almost no specific policy prescriptions which, as this school of thought analysis has made clear, is a key distinction between rhetoric and genuine sub-ideological constructs being implemented as concrete policy. However, the one practical policy prescription that grew from Lake's overly touted speech was his democratist policy preference regarding aid to Russia.

Beyond Lake sharing democratist enthusiasm that the end of the Cold War brought exciting opportunities for the US to extend democracy, he also shares the democratist precept that politics drives economics, and not vice-versa. He observed, "Democracies create free markets that offer economic opportunity."¹⁶² Thus for Lake the Russian efforts at reform begun under Gorbachev have followed the correct order for successful modernization to occur, with their emphasis on political rather than economic changes. Beyond his affinity for their methods, as for democratists, National Security Adviser Lake sees Yeltsin's efforts at reform as a central issue for American foreign policy. He argued, "Nothing is more important to the long-term security of the US than the successful transformation of Russia and the former Soviet republics into democratic nations that respect the rule of international law and the rights of their people."¹⁶³ In practice Lake has acted on the democratist premise that the success of Yeltsin's Russia is crucial to global stability. Despite the coup attempt against Yeltsin and the unfavorable December 1993 elections, "Lake never deviated from full support of Yeltsin."¹⁶⁴ Critics of the administration feel that America's support for Russian reform has become unconditional support for Boris Yeltsin. For Lake and others who advocate the democratist policy prescription regarding Russia, support for Yeltsin is imperative as he is the only bulwark of

Russian democracy, that despite his flaws President Yeltsin is the only genuine hope for the stabilization of the second Russian revolution.

Lake also tows the standard administration line regarding trade issues, avowing institutionalist policies. Lake saw support for Nafta as leading to enhanced economic opportunities within the US, in line with the institutionalist precept that foreign and domestic issues can no longer be separated. He argued, "We began last year with the hard fight for Nafta, which already has increased our exports to Mexico by nearly 20% and produced tens of thousands of new, better-paying jobs."¹⁶⁵ Lake also strongly favored the Gatt accord, citing it as a pivotal vote in post-Cold War American history. Lake stated, "I believe that the Senate vote on Gatt [tomorrow] is a watershed event much like the vote on the League of Nations at the end of World War I and the ones on the Marshall Plan after World War II"¹⁶⁶ By comparing the Gatt vote with such seminal events in American history as the vote on the League of Nations and the Marshall Plan, Anthony Lake made clear his strong belief that trade issues ought to be an absolutely central aspect of American foreign policy, a commonly held institutionalist stance.

Lake also adhered to institutionalist precepts regarding the MFN controversy with China. Indeed by the time the climactic moment of May 1994 arrived, "All of President Clinton's top advisers back[ed] extension of China's low tariff trade status despite Beijing's uneven human rights performance."¹⁶⁷ However Lake, with his overall institutionalist orientation, went far beyond this. In the months leading up to the President's decision to delink MFN consideration from human rights concerns, Lake met Chinese Ambassador to the US, Li Daoyu, in an attempt to provide political cover for the administration flip-flop on China. This was done by successfully suggesting sending an American envoy to China to press its government to pledge to improve its human rights record.¹⁶⁸ While the mission, predictably, met with little success it speaks volumes about Lake's commitment to the administration's new institutionalist policy regarding China. Aware of the political flak the President would run into for his about-face and the restraining effect such criticism might have had on Bill Clinton, Lake attempted to provide him with enough political camouflage so that the administration, while swallowing hard, would shift its China policy to a more sustainable institutionalist vein. It is a mark of Anthony Lake's loyalty to the new policy that he was prepared to attempt this transparent ruse to deflect criticism from the President, and make, if only a little, the administration's policy shift more palatable.

The prime example of Anthony Lake's ability to disagree in a nuanced manner with the general White House line, yet remain firmly within the Clinton administration's schools of thought fold, was his advocacy of a more vigorous institutionalist policy regarding Bosnia than the administration implemented. Lake presented the standard White House arguments against pursuing a democratist or neo-realist policy regarding Bosnia. He observed, "Throwing our full military might behind the Bosnian Government forces would require putting at risk more than 100,000 American ground troops in a conflict that poses no immediate threat to our security...Similarly, washing our hands of the problem by unilaterally lifting the arms embargo would be a profound mistake,"¹⁶⁹ in that it could lead to sanctions efforts against Iraq and Libya coming undone. Lake felt the US could neither act unilaterally to lift the arms embargo nor impose a military solution in Bosnia, following institutionalist precepts. Yet beyond this general institutionalist policy preference was a nuanced difference between his brand of institutionalism and the more passive strain advocated by Secretary Christopher.

Lake's more hawkish institutionalist line had as its point of departure the un-institutionalist notion that the Serbs were the primary villain of the Bosnian piece. He believed, "The Serbian-dominated federal army stoked the flames of war as several republics of the country [Yugoslavia] - Slovenia, Bosnia, and Croatia, - sought independence."¹⁷⁰ Thus Lake did not agree with the standard institutionalist view that the international community should refrain from taking sides in Bosnia, as all ethnic groups were to blame for the civil war. Lake espoused an institutionalist policy prescription regarding Bosnia not because the Serbs were seen as only equally culpable as the Croats and Muslims for instigating the conflict, but because both Russia and Western Europe mattered more to the US in the overall hierarchy of foreign policy priorities than the admittedly wronged Bosnian Muslims. Regarding Bosnia, Lake argued, "But while we have clear reasons to engage and persist (in facilitating a peace accord) they do not obliterate other American interests involving Europe and Russia."¹⁷¹ This sober calculation was the key factor behind Lake's advocacy of an institutionalist policy regarding the American response to Bosnia.

Yet while Lake accepted that any Western response to the Bosnian crisis must be implemented in a multilateral manner, and that multilateralism would generally lead to a more cautious policy outcome than would ensue if a state acted alone, he urged a heightened military response to the Serbian flouting of the international will. Lake stated, "In Bosnia, we have not seen all the progress we would like, but when diplomacy has been

married to military power, positive movement has been the result."¹⁷² This more martial institutionalist position was predicated on Lake's belief that the Serbs were, at root, to blame for the Balkan instability caused by the breakup of the Yugoslav state. While Anthony Lake believed the US should proceed to deal with the Bosnian crisis in a multilateral fashion, and in true institutionalist style accept a multilateral policy outcome that was not its first choice, within this multilateralist framework America should genuinely push for stronger measures against the Serbs. This was because the Serbs only acquiesced with international demands, as in the confrontation over Gorazde, when confronted by allied military will. Lake's nuanced differences with Christopher illustrate the fact that schools of thought analysis is ultimately about discerning decision-makers' propensity to advocate similar policies within a common cluster (as Lake and Christopher do), rather than being a process that claims that all such actors must always advocate the exact same policy prescription if they share the same school of thought. As the Lake case illustrates, foreign affairs is too complicated for this to be the case.

iv) President Clinton

As will be discussed in much more detail in chapter 7, it is no surprise that the President's specific schools of thought policy preferences in each of the five key issue-areas analysed coincide perfectly not only with the executive branch's foreign policy prescriptions, but also mirror overall American foreign policy outputs as well. This is an expression of just how powerful an actor the President can be in formulating American foreign policy. This great significance of the President makes correctly classifying him essential to the operation of a schools of thought analysis of American foreign policy outputs.

Bosnia is one example of where candidate Clinton's rhetoric did not match President Clinton's general institutionalist tendencies. As Hendrickson noted, "the Democratic challenger's [Clinton] foreign affairs agenda was far more ambitious than that of the foreign policy president himself."¹⁷³ During his campaign, Bill Clinton tended to accuse President Bush of being too passive regarding foreign affairs, of reacting to events rather than controlling them. This activist rhetoric came back to haunt him, as throughout his administration the President has consistently advocated institutionalist positions regarding foreign affairs, often the least activist of the three general schools of thought. For example, during his October 12, 1992 Presidential debate with President Bush, Clinton argued, "I think we should stiffen the embargo on the Belgrade government, and I think we have to

consider whether we should lift the arms embargo on the Bosnians since they are in no way in a fair fight with a heavily armed opponent bent on ethnic cleansing.' While always opposing intervention with ground troops, Clinton called for air strikes against the Serbs."¹⁷⁴ Thus Bill Clinton advocated the democratist 'Lift and Strike' option for Bosnia, but with an important reservation. Again during his 1992 presidential campaign, he stated, "If the Serbs persist in violating the terms of the current cease-fire agreement, the US should take the lead in seeking UN Security Council authorization for air strikes against those who are attacking the relief effort."¹⁷⁵ It is curious that even here, where the President's rhetoric was obviously tougher than events would later make it prudent to be, his chief concerns were still institutionalist, highlighting a conviction that the Security Council has the power to authorise action in Bosnia, not the US itself, and that military action should not be taken to help the Bosnian Muslims directly, but only to support UN humanitarian efforts. While President Clinton's rhetoric did change over Bosnia, the core of his institutionalist policy can be seen even during his days on the hustings.

The President's institutionalist policy preference regarding Bosnia can be most easily illustrated over the critical question of whether to lift the arms embargo. President Clinton left little doubt that he thought the European allies were incorrect in their contention that the embargo ought not to be lifted. In an interview with William Safire, the President described his failure in May 1993 to induce the European allies to lift the embargo as, "the biggest single disappointment I've had as president."¹⁷⁶ Yet he still did nothing to unilaterally to aid the Muslim cause. This is a vivid illustration of how committed to multilateralism, a cornerstone of institutionalist thinking, the President is.

This reliance on multilateralism has been a consistent component of President Clinton's foreign policy viewpoint since the beginning of his administration. At the time of the New York Primary, April 1, 1992, Clinton addressed the Foreign Policy Association in New York, saying, "it is a failure of vision not to recognize that collective action can accomplish more than just a few years ago - and it is a failure of leadership not to make use of it."¹⁷⁷ This strong advocacy of the merits of multilateralism was specifically followed during the Bosnian war. In the crucial month of May 1993, the President, "made an ironclad pledge to avoid unilateral intervention, saying the US 'is not about to act alone and should not act alone' in the Balkans."¹⁷⁸ By doing this, the President effectively gave the European allies a veto over American initiatives in Bosnia. When Safire, "asked about his lack of leadership on Bosnia, he [the president] responded: 'There is a security council. And some people on it have a veto. And the people on it who have a veto have vetoed what I think is

appropriate to do in Bosnia'.¹⁷⁹ Nowhere has there been a purer affirmation of the administration's institutionalist policy preference for Bosnia than in this statement. President Clinton so strongly believed in the necessity of a multilateral solution to the conflict that in his view, those on the Security Council always had a veto over his policy, even before he gave them an ironclad guarantee he would not act unilaterally in Bosnia. When pressed about the possible efficacy of unilateral action in Bosnia, Prentice and Brodie noted, "the President said: It would kill the peace process and harm relations with our Nato allies, undermine the partnership we are trying to build with Russia over broad areas and undermine UN embargoes."¹⁸⁰ In true institutionalist fashion, the President saw these other priorities as outweighing any inclination for the US to go its own way on the Bosnia crisis by lifting the arms embargo on the Bosnian Muslims.

Despite his strong institutionalist stance on Bosnia, the crisis caused the President to lose faith in the strongest institutionalist organisation, the UN. As Rodman stated, "the year-long gestation of Presidential Defense Directive-25 is a history of ambitious plans to expand the role of the UN as a global policeman."¹⁸¹ While never implemented, PDD-25 was an indication that the Clinton administration was at least considering advocating making the UN the global policeman, in accordance with general institutionalist thinking, by placing some US troops under UN command and supporting Butros-Ghali's initiative for the UN to obtain its own rapid deployment force, perhaps the first step on the road to the UN genuinely possessing an army.

All this failed to come to fruition, partly due to the Bosnian crisis. As the institutionalist position on Bosnia became increasingly unpopular due to its failure to end the conflict, the President criticised the UN, a leading institutionalist organisation, even as he adhered to the institutionalist notion that the UN operationally should have primacy over Nato during the crisis. As the President stated, "If the American people are to say yes to UN peacekeeping, the UN must learn when to say no."¹⁸² While bashing the UN might make for good politics, it helped discredit the very approach the President was still determined to follow in Bosnia. For if the UN had overreached itself in Bosnia, as many thought it had, it had done so with the blessing of the institutionalist Clinton administration. The Bosnia crisis increased President Clinton's disillusionment with the UN, but not with an overall institutionalist approach to the Bosnian conflict.

The President also adheres to an institutionalist policy regarding European security. As Ginsberg noted, the President, "sees a strong Europe as good for the US,"¹⁸³ definitively

ending any equivocation regarding a stronger Europe that has beset American presidents for decades. President Clinton publicly affirmed his institutionalist EU-first strategy, stating, "We also want Europe to be strong. This is why America supports Europe's own steps so far toward greater unity - the EU, the WEU, and the development of a European defense identity."¹⁸⁴ This strategy should be seen as crucially linked to the President's desire to vigorously concentrate on economic reform, as institutionalists believe foreign and domestic policies ought not to be developed in isolation. Only with a stronger European defence identity could President Clinton strategically safely reap the benefits of the peace dividend that resulted from the end of the Cold War, and plough this benefit into domestic initiatives. The President accepted that following an institutionalist strategy regarding Europe meant a relative diminution of American power on the continent. The President believed, "The US should be ready to relinquish some of its leadership prerogatives; as the president envisaged it, the US role should be 'to tip the balance...not to bear every burden',"¹⁸⁵ much as British diplomacy had operated in Europe in the 19th century. The President accepted this lessening of American power in Europe as the necessary price for pursuing his reformist strategy at home.

Regarding the future of Nato, the President kept to the institutionalist line. While a candidate for President, he argued that a more egalitarian Nato served American interests. The President stated, "In Europe, we must maintain our ties to Nato, even as the Europeans play a stronger role both within Nato and in the evolution of future security arrangements for the continent."¹⁸⁶ This was in keeping with his general institutionalist viewpoint regarding Europe, that the Europeans should be encouraged and expected to bear a greater security burden for their own defence, and thus must be accorded a greater leadership role as well. The President's strategy for the expansion of Nato, embodied in the Partnership for Peace scheme, also bore the institutionalist stamp. As President Clinton remarked, "The question is no longer whether Nato will take on new members, but when and how."¹⁸⁷ Unfortunately for the President, his deliberate lack of clarification about the 'when' and 'how' of expansion failed to mollify either the Central European states, eager for quick admittance to Nato, or the Russians, who would be happiest with a scenario entailing Nato's demise at best, or its permanent non-expansion at worst. The President chose the institutionalist middle-way regarding Nato expansion, and predictably, was attacked as being both too bold and too timid.

Regarding aid to Russia, President Clinton has been at his most activist, pursuing a consistent democratist policy preference. As a candidate, Clinton believed, "The Bush

administration has been overly cautious on the issue of aid to Russia."188 This was a mistake the President was determined not to repeat. At the heart of President Clinton's vigorous support for Russian reform was the democratist notion that the, "fate of the world will be in doubt until stable democracies rise from the debris of the Soviet empire."189 It is obvious that someone holding this view would make aid to Russia the security priority in his/her foreign policy. As Cox noted, "the Clinton strategy was less economic than political...US policy was taken to mean, and certainly was perceived, as a 'Russia-first' policy."190 All this was in accordance with standard democratist precepts.

The President saw helping Russia become a stable democracy as having several tangible benefits for the US. Firstly, such a transformation would save American money in the long-term. As President Clinton observed, "A small amount spent stabilizing the emerging democracies in the former Soviet empire today will decrease by much more the money we may have to commit to our defense in the future."191 Implicitly, this statement reveals a strategy based on the democratist idea that if Russia becomes a stable democracy, as democracies do not war with one another, the US need no longer fear Russia, and can redirect military expenditure back into domestic reform, which is the general reason the President was elected in the first place. American help for Russia thus relates paradoxically back to the domestic-first priorities of the Clinton administration.

Secondly, in keeping with overall institutionalist administration's desire for the US not to be the global policeman, a democratic Russia would have a constructive role to play in global ordering. As Cox observed, "in Clinton's version of the new world order, in which the US was neither willing or able to act as 'world cop', a secure and integrated Russia had several important parts to play,"192 such as serving as a barrier against hyper-nationalism in the other CIS states, and as a bulwark against Islamic fundamentalism in the former southern Soviet republics. President Clinton felt these benefits to be so important, that along with free trade expansion, aid to Russia became the major foreign policy priority of his administration. An example of this is that when asked by the Wisconsin press about why the public did not see him as a strong leader, the President stated, "I immediately organized the G-7 nations to support President Yeltsin when he was in (sic) the ropes last spring...we had a major role in the preservation of democracy in Russia."193 This statement is an illustration of how important President Clinton considers aiding the Russian democratic experiment, that he feels it the best example of his leadership abilities.

Trade expansion is the other major priority of the administration, and here the President again follows a consistently institutionalist policy. Even more than regarding Russian policy, Clinton felt President Bush had neglected the economic aspects of foreign policy, to the detriment of the US. While a presidential candidate, Clinton stated, "America must regain its economic strength to play our proper role as leader of the world...This has been the [Bush] administration's most glaring foreign policy failure."¹⁹⁴ President Clinton felt this was particularly true regarding free trade expansion, despite Bush's efforts as a founder of the Nafta initiative.

In accordance with general institutionalist thinking, Clinton began his term, "By defining his presidency as an effort to promote economic growth and trade liberalization."¹⁹⁵ Underlying this priority regarding trade expansion lay several basic institutionalist precepts. The President agreed with the institutionalist notion that foreign and domestic policy were so interconnected that overall policies had to take account of both realms. This was particularly true regarding trade expansion. As Clinton noted, "our first foreign policy priority and our first domestic priority must be one and the same, a revitalized economy, for we can not be strong abroad if we are not strong at home."¹⁹⁶ Thus the President views the foreign policy initiative of free trade as essential for domestic revitalisation, which is reflected again in how the US is perceived abroad. The President also agrees with the institutionalist belief that in the new world order, increasingly it is economics and not military might that is paramount in determining a state's overall power. As Friedman noted, the President remarked, "Trade, as much as troops, will increasingly define the ties that bind nations in the 21st century."¹⁹⁷ These beliefs: that as economic factors will matter increasingly regarding the overall equation of power in the next century, and as both states and policies within states must reckon with an interdependent world where domestic and foreign initiatives can no longer be separated, form the institutionalist theoretical backdrop for the President's consistent and aggressive pursuit of expanded free trade opportunities for the US in the new world order.

The President's commitment to free trade expansion can be vividly illustrated by the debate on Nafta ratification. Before being elected President, Clinton had given Nafta only lukewarm support in the neo-realist vein, "Clinton had stipulated during the campaign that the side agreements [regarding environmental matters and workers rights] were his price for the support of the trade pact."¹⁹⁸ Yet after his election, President Clinton fervently pursued an institutionalist policy regarding the expansion of free trade. In the debate President Clinton incurred large political penalties due to his support of the accord. As

Woodward observed, "Clinton knew that backing it [Nafta] would alienate organized labor, a key part of the Democrats' constituency, and hurt his chances in big union states such as Michigan and Ohio...But Clinton believed in free trade."¹⁹⁹ It is a striking example of how deeply the President was committed to free trade that he was willing to accept such obvious political damage within his own party as a result of the Nafta debate, yet still decide to strongly favour the agreement. The amount of time the White House lobbied Congress to push for the ratification of Nafta is another illustration of how vital free trade was for the administration. As Ifill remarked, "The strategy [regarding Nafta] consumed nearly all the time of the president and his lieutenants for 56 critical days."²⁰⁰ This vast time expenditure underscores the priority trade expansion assumes for the institutionalist President. While the Gatt accord did not generate the political heat, and thus require the intensive political intervention of the Clinton White House that Nafta did, it was no less a priority for President Clinton. As the President stated, "The congressional vote on the Gatt will be the defining decision for America as we head into the next century."²⁰¹ This is an illustration of how importantly the President viewed trade expansion to the overall prosperity and success of the US in the new epoch.

President Clinton's policy U-turn on MFN status for China also reflected his strong overall institutionalist orientation. As a candidate for the presidency, Clinton adopted a democratist stance in attacking President Bush's record on China. Clinton argued that despite Deng Xiaphong's massacre of Chinese students in Tiananmen Square, "The [Bush] administration continues to coddle China."²⁰² Clinton continued the attack, "When China cracked down on pro-democracy demonstrators, exported advanced weapons to radical regimes, and suppressed Tibet, Mr. Bush failed to stand up for our values."²⁰³

Yet this democratist campaign rhetoric gave way to an institutionalist policy regarding China. In May 1994, President Clinton renewed MFN status for China, and announced the delinking of human rights conditions from future consideration of China's MFN status, in accordance with institutionalist policy preferences. The President, as Friedman sardonically observed, "on Thursday gave what was surely the most eloquent defense of the Bush administration's China policy ever uttered at the White House."²⁰⁴ Yet Clinton's institutionalist turnabout regarding China was consistent with his overall goal of expanding American access to markets. In the conflict that arose over this seeming contradiction, President Clinton chose the economics-first institutionalist policy preference that marked the rest of his thinking on foreign affairs. As Friedman stated, "three numbers told the story: \$33 billion in Chinese exports to the US, \$9 billion in US exports to China - worth

almost 150,000 American jobs."²⁰⁵ It is not too much to say that without changing his mind over China, President Clinton himself would have sabotaged the economics-first, free trade thrust that he had made a cornerstone of his foreign policy.

It would seem on initial glance that as the President's foreign policy preferences in the five critical issue areas analysed perfectly match the overall American policies in these areas, a school of thought analysis of American foreign policy would begin and end with an examination of the orientation of the President. Yet the American foreign policy-making process is not that simple. While the President is the central, and at times dominant, actor in determining American foreign policy outputs, as chapter 7 will illustrate, he is not the only relevant figure in need of analysis if the process of American foreign policy-making is to be understood. As chapter 7 will explore, particularly if a Presidential policy is deemed to be a failure by the Congress and the American people, such as the Clinton administration's institutionalist policy regarding Bosnia, there is every likelihood it will be overturned, particularly if the Congress generally espouses a different school of thought orientation from the executive branch, as it has a thought-out policy preference to take the place of the executive's failed initiative.

Chart 5 - 1 Specific Democratist Policy-makers Regarding Five Key Issues

Majority Democratist View Reached From the Givens	Interventionist	Large-Scale Aid	Hard-line Anti-MFN	Generally in Favour	Nato-firsters, No Nato Expansion
Issues	Bosnia	Russia	China	Nafta/Gatt	Nato/Western European Security
Talbott - Deputy Secretary of State, Democrat	Follows institutionalist line (-)	Pro (+)	Follows institutionalist line (-)	Pro (+)	Pro (+)
Mitchell - Former Senate Majority Leader, Democrat	Follows institutionalist line (-)	Pro (+)	Pro (+)	Pro (+)	Follows institutionalist line (-)

(+) consistent with the overall schools of thought categorisation

(-) inconsistent with the overall schools of thought categorisation

Chart 5 - 2 Specific Neo-Realist Policy-makers Regarding Five Key Issues

Majority Neo-Realist View Reached From the Givens	Non-Interventionist, Lift Arms Embargo	No Large-Scale Aid	Soft-line Pro-MFN, perhaps with some conditions	Tactically Favour	Nato-firsters, Favour quick expansion of the alliance
Issues	Bosnia	Russia	China	Nafta/Gatt	Nato/Western European Security
Gingrich - House Minority Leader, Now Speaker of the House, Republican	Pro (+)	Pro (+)		Pro (+)	Pro (+)
Lugar - Ranking Republican on Senate European Affairs Subcommittee, Republican	Pro (+)	Pro (+)			Pro (+)
Dole - Senate Minority Leader, Now Senate Majority Leader, Republican	Pro (+)	Pro (+)	Follows institutionalist line (-)	Pro (+)	Pro (+)
Biden - Former Chairman of Senate European Affairs Subcommittee, Democrat	Follows democratist line (-)	Pro (+)	Pro (+)	Pro (+)	Pro (+)

(+) consistent with the overall schools of thought categorisation

(-) inconsistent with the overall schools of thought categorisation

Chart 5 - 3 Specific Institutionalist Policy-makers Regarding Five Key Issues

Majority Institutionalist View Reached From the Givens	Non-Interventionist, No Lifting of Arms Embargo	Aid Co-ordinated by Multilateral Institutions. No Easing of Shock Therapy	Pro-MFN, Want to Decouple it from Human Rights Concerns	Crucial, Strongly Favour	EU-firsters, Evolutionary Expansion of Nato
Issues	Bosnia	Russia	China	Nafta/Gatt	Nato/Western Security
Hamilton - Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Democrat	Pro (+)	Pro (+)	Pro (+)	Pro (+)	
Christopher - Secretary of State, Democrat	Pro (+)	Follows democratist line (-)	Pro (+)	Pro (+)	Pro (+)
Clinton - President of the United States, Democrat	Pro (+)	Follows democratist line (-)	Pro (+)	Pro (+)	Pro (+)
Perry - Secretary of Defence, Democrat	Pro (+)	Follows neo-realist line (-)			Pro (+)
Lake - National Security Adviser, Democrat	Pro (+)	Follows democratist line (-)	Pro (+)	Pro (+)	Follows neo-realist line (-)

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Chapter 6: The Overall Schools of Thought Orientation of the Clinton Administration Regarding the Bosnian Crisis.

The Bosnian crisis is an ideal case study for illustrating how schools of thought analysis of post-Cold War American foreign policy initiatives works. This is due to the fact that the Clinton administration's Bosnian policy was really the result of the intersection of three policies (US-Russian, US-European, as well as US-Balkan initiatives) that have already been delineated in the analysis of the schools of thought in chapters 2-4.

To analyse how the American foreign policy process works using schools of thought analysis, it is necessary to first determine which schools of thought the Clinton administration adhered to regarding its policies towards Russia, Europe, and then Bosnia. After the overall administration's policies are identified, it will be necessary to chart the individual and bureaucratic interplay that transforms individual decision-maker's schools of thought orientations and molds them into American foreign policy initiatives. It will also be necessary to examine the groups within the executive and legislative branches that oppose them, as will be shown in chapter 7.

Having delineated and analysed both the macro-level (overall American policy) and the micro-level (individual decision-makers' schools of thought orientations) of schools of thought analysis, a short survey of the bureaucratic political interplay that leads to the overall American institutionalist response to the Bosnian crisis will be illustrated in chapter 7. Finally, chapter 8 will look at the efficacy of schools of thought analysis itself, as a tool for analysing the post-Cold War era.

(a) General administration policy regarding Russia

The Clinton administration's overall policy regarding Russia has been a mix of a dominant democratist orientation with some minority institutionalist impulses. President Clinton has long been a proponent of significant aid to Russia. As long ago as the New York Primary, he advocated the US constructing a \$6 billion fund to stabilise the ruble and urged the major Western states and financial institutions to postpone Russian debt repayment.¹ After his election, Clinton continued his democratist stance toward Russia, despite significant opposition.²

This democratist orientation had direct policy implications. Firstly, the US contributed a significant amount of bilateral aid to Russia. At the Vancouver summit in April 1993, President Clinton offered President Yeltsin an aid package worth \$1.6 billion, which included a \$50 million enterprise fund to encourage the creation of small businesses in Russia, material and expertise to repair the Russian oil pipeline system, a \$95 million privatisation fund for the nascent Russian banking industry, \$700 million in agricultural credits enabling the Russian government to purchase grain on easy terms, and \$215 million to help finance the dismantling of the Russian nuclear arsenal as was mandated by the START treaties.³ Over the period 1992-3, Russia received more than half the US aid to the former Soviet Union. In 1993, in addition to the Vancouver summit aid, the US pledged \$3 billion more with the G-7 at the Tokyo summit, as well as an additional \$2.5 billion in technical aid and humanitarian assistance.⁴ American leadership moves to increase multilateral aid contributions at the Tokyo summit were agreed to be crucial. As Strobe Talbott, then the administration's roving ambassador to the former Soviet Union noted, the Clinton strategy was to emphasise, "we will do all we can to help, but we will not do it alone. We will show our leadership by taking the initiative, but we will do so largely in order to leverage much greater amounts of money from the international financial institutions and from other industrialized democracies."⁵ Thus while the Clinton administration has emphasised multilateral institutions in its policy regarding aid to Russia (a seemingly institutionalist stance), as it was increasingly the driving force behind sustained aid to Russia its economic initiatives can be characterised as more democratist than institutionalist.⁶

Despite the Clinton administration's mix of democratist and institutionalist initiatives regarding sending economic aid to Russia to bolster Yeltsin's regime, there has been a great deal of non-economic support for President Yeltsin that confirms America's overall democratist policy toward Russia. America has consistently, and publicly, been strongly supportive of Yeltsin at every crucial domestic juncture he has faced over the past few years. Indeed as Philip Zelikow noted, "Clinton has wholly cast America's lot with Yeltsin, despite having criticized Bush for too strongly and lengthily attaching American interests to Gorbachev."⁷ This strong political and diplomatic support reached its peak during the failed October 1993 coup by parliamentary leaders, led by Khasbulatov and Vice-President Rutskoi. During the crisis the US found itself in the difficult position of endorsing the shelling of a sitting parliament. Yet Talbott explained the administration's position, using paradoxically democratist language to justify the Clinton stance. That is, in this case, it was in the interests of those who wished to further Russian democracy to support attacking the usually perceived repository of modern democracy, the parliament. Talbott explained, "For

us, the relevant question - the answer to which would determine the degree of our support - was whether Yeltsin was resorting to democratic means in his effort to resolve the crisis. The answer was yes."⁸ As Yeltsin had shown restraint in dealing with parliament, as his attempt at negotiations with Khasbulatov which had been brokered by the Patriarch of the Orthodox Church in Moscow illustrated, and as he called for new parliamentary elections and a referendum on a new constitution to replace a parliament elected under a Brezhnev-era system, the Clinton administration believed that in supporting Yeltsin they were furthering genuine democratic reform in Russia. Nor did this support for reform waver after the disastrous December 1993 parliamentary elections, in which the Communists and ultra-nationalists (the latter being led by the crypto-fascist Vladimir Zhirinovskiy) won a majority of the parliamentary seats at the expense of the radical reformers clustered around Yegor Gaidar. Despite the blackening of reform prospects, the Clinton administration did not cut its losses and abandon large-scale aid initiatives as many neo-realists and even some institutionalists advocated. As Michael Cox stated, "one result of the December 'wake-up call' was to cause initial confusion followed by a resolute White House defence of its original strategy."⁹ This staunch defence of administration policy, despite the serious December electoral setback, is a crucial sign of the importance with which President Clinton viewed Russia, an importance that is a cornerstone of the democratist belief in the efficacy of a Russia-first policy.

This Russia-first policy of the Clinton administration was confirmed by words as well as deeds. As Talbott stated, "From the beginning of his presidency, President Clinton made clear that support for reform in the NIS [Newly Independent States] would be the number one foreign policy priority of his administration."¹⁰ Oberdorfer concurred, noting, "President Clinton has repeatedly identified Russia as among his highest foreign policy priorities."¹¹ Leslie Gelb, a veteran columnist and former State Department colleague of both Anthony Lake, the National Security Adviser, and Warren Christopher, the Secretary of State, also accepted that the Clinton administration had a Russia-first outlook saying, "To the extent that the Clinton administration has national security priorities, they revolve around Russia."¹² So rhetorically, politically, and diplomatically the Clinton administration's policy toward Russia can be seen to be democratist, as its primary characteristic was a Russia-first attitude which is the cornerstone of democratist thinking on Yeltsin's attempts to bring about radical reform.

The underlying reason for President Clinton's democratist view of Russia sprung from his desire to concentrate on domestic initiatives. As Friedman observed, the President, "sees this issue as an adjunct of his domestic agenda. At its crudest, the White House logic goes

like this: No Russian reform, no American defense cuts, no chance for the Clinton administration to deliver on its pledge to halve the budget deficit in four years, no dealing with the deficit, no reelection."¹³ This analysis highlights the crucial role the Russian issue played for the Clinton administration, and its desire to concentrate on the American domestic agenda. Even this, the administration's foremost foreign policy concern, was seen largely in terms of the President's domestic policies, particularly the desire to reduce the budget deficit by making substantial cuts in the military budget. It also illustrated President Clinton's contention, first made during the primaries, that there are no longer real divisions between foreign and domestic policy.¹⁴ Thus ironically, even Clinton's activist democratist stance regarding Russia can be seen as a largely defensive effort to protect American reform at home.

So what were the implications of the Clinton administration's democratist Russian policy regarding American initiatives toward the Bosnian conflict? The Russia-first policy intruded upon and partly determined American policy toward Bosnia. The Russia-first policy meant that the administration went to great lengths to avoid any crisis with Yeltsin that would force him to either look weak by meekly submitting to American dictates or that would lead to a direct confrontation with the Russian regime, as both these outcomes would almost certainly work to the advantage of President Yeltsin's ultra-nationalist foes.

Both these dangers were all too apparent to Clinton in Bosnia. For a start, as Williams observed, "The US regards the Muslims as the victim of Serb aggression, while the Yeltsin government sees the conflict as a civil war in which the Serbs, Muslims and Croats share responsibility for the problems and the horrors."¹⁵ In the very contrasting interpretations of the conflict, lay the seeds of a possible Russo-American confrontation over Bosnia. American public opinion, and that of a majority of its decision-makers as well, saw the conflict as a clear-cut case of Milosevic and Karadzic ruthlessly wishing to create a Greater Serbia from the rubble of the former Yugoslavia, and as men who were ready to use almost any means, including ethnic cleansing, to achieve their ends. This viewpoint clashed with Russian public opinion, which generally favoured their Orthodox religious cohorts, the Serbs, at the expense of the largely Muslim Bosnians and the largely Catholic Croats. This innate difference in apprehending the nature of the conflict¹⁶ was one of the internal tensions that was present throughout President Clinton's handling of the Bosnian crisis.

Fundamental differences of opinion between the US and Russia over the Bosnian conflict had become part of the administration's institutionalist rationale for its policy. President

Clinton felt that without close co-operation with the Russians over Bosnia, the real differences between America and Russia were likely to lead to a far greater crisis. Gelb's observations confirmed this analysis. He stated, "On Bosnia, for example, he [President Clinton] always wants to make sure that Russian interests are fully taken into account and that the Europeans are on board. In fact, he always has Russia's fate foremost on his mind."¹⁷ Supporters of the administration's institutionalist line on Bosnia pointed to the fact that any time it appeared that the US might act unilaterally in the crisis, in accordance with democratist and neo-realist views and in opposition to institutionalist precepts, the Russians angrily upped the diplomatic ante. For example, as the International Herald-Tribune reported, when the Americans indicated that they might unilaterally lift the UN arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslims, Russia stormily announced its intention of aiding the Serbs and Bosnian Serbs. "Russian legislators responded angrily Friday [13 May 1994] by deciding to lift the arms embargo against Serbia if the US or any other country begins supplying arms to Bosnian Muslims."¹⁸ While President Yeltsin did not explicitly endorse the confrontational stance taken by the Russian legislature, his about-face on the Partnership for Peace initiative, where he quickly changed his position regarding the admission of Central European states into Nato after the strong denunciation of such a course by the Duma, illustrated that he was susceptible to pressure from right-wing nationalists in the legislature.¹⁹ It is not too much to say that the Clinton administration's democratist Russia-first policy set the stage for its institutionalist response of advocating a low level of involvement in the Bosnian crisis. This is due to the fact that it ranked Russian goodwill and support for President Yeltsin far above the sufferings of the Bosnian Muslims, and even above the precedent of ignoring the Helsinki Final Act regarding the inviolability of European territory, in its overall hierarchy of foreign policy priorities.²⁰

(b) General administration policy regarding the security and political architecture of Europe.

Unlike the Clinton administration's policy toward Russia, which was a mix of majority democratist and minority institutionalist strands, its policy regarding the security and political architecture of Europe was unambiguously institutionalist. Among other things, this meant that unlike the Nato-firster democratists and neo-realists, the institutionalist Clinton administration did not see the European Union (EU) as a possible rival to either Nato or American power, as institutionalists do not fear that a strengthened EU will make Nato irrelevant. Rather, the administration was actively encouraging European efforts to assume an increased defence role and greater political integration. As President Clinton noted, the US, "will benefit more from a strong and equal partnership than from a weak one."²¹ Stephen A.

Oxman, then the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian affairs, elaborated on this institutionalist theme, "we [the US] should continue to encourage our allies to take on a greater share of the burden of European security. We welcome the Maastricht Treaty's call for development of a European Security and defense identity, which can form the basis of a European pillar of Nato."²² Unlike its predecessors, the Clinton administration had no schizophrenic reaction to increased European integration and enhanced defence capabilities, as it saw these developments as wholly positive rather than viewing them with a mixture of support and trepidation.

The reasons for the administration's wholehearted support for increased European self-sufficiency also fit into the institutionalist means of thinking. Unlike its predecessors, the Clinton administration's policy was genuinely multilateralist. As Michael Brenner stated, "The outlook of the Clinton administration is somewhat different [than Bush's tenure]. For one thing, it has a stronger desire to see the Europeans assume a larger share of common responsibilities. Candidate Clinton struck a theme that has become a benchmark for his administration's foreign policy: Multilateralism should be the hallmark of allied cooperation in the post-Cold War era."²³

This multilateralist policy illustrated a recognition of America's declining role in Europe, another institutionalist belief. As General Oakes, former Commander-in-Chief of the US Air Force in Europe stated regarding the American presence in Nato, "There is a significant watering down of the US leadership position."²⁴ As the US role in Europe declined, the Clinton administration clearly hoped increased European political and defence efforts would fill any security vacuum that might develop. As with the Clinton Russia policy, the administration's policy toward Europe related back to its concentration on domestic affairs. As US troop levels in Europe edged down toward 100,000, America hoped to use 'the peace dividend' to bolster US domestic reform.²⁵ As part of this process, an increased European role meant that the US could lessen its commitment in Europe to promote domestic initiatives without destabilising a vital American interest. Once again, Clinton's foreign policy stance was largely predicated on his desire to concentrate on the domestic ills of the US.

Policy-wise, the American institutionalist stance meant support for the expansion of the Western European Union (WEU), the defence arm of the EU, as well as support for the fledgling Eurocorps. As Pfaff noted, there was a declinist tinge to this policy. "As the Clinton administration has said that it wants to back off from the costs of leadership, Clinton and his people, against Washington establishment resistance, have told the Europeans that the

Eurocorps [comprised of Belgian, Spanish, German, and French units] is welcome, and that if the WEU can take over bigger responsibilities for Europe's defense, that is fine."²⁶ Nor has US support for an increased European defence role been entirely passive. As was reported, "To give political effect to Europe's greater security role, the allies agreed in principle to make available Nato military resources to the WEU."²⁷ To allow Nato to give wherewithal to the WEU was a startling sign, in contrast to its predecessors, of how comfortable the Clinton administration was with the expansion of integrated European defence capabilities.

Not only was the administration amenable to the possible relative lessening of its role in Europe at the expense of greater European self-sufficiency, it was markedly hesitant to expand Nato into Central Europe.²⁸ The result of this hesitation was the Partnership for Peace initiative, a halfway measure that affirmed Nato's intent to allow Central European states to join the organisation, without setting a specific timetable for this expansion or, until 1995, outlining a clear set of standards that had to be met before leading to new admissions.²⁹ Stephen Oxman's endorsement of the scheme indicated the main reason behind it, to avoid antagonising Russia. "It [the Partnership for Peace plan] will also create a truly integrated Europe, without drawing lines which exclude some countries."³⁰ Oxman's comment is an implicit criticism of the American neo-realist contention that Nato should quickly admit Central European members such as Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and possibly Slovakia. The administration disagreed, saying such an expansion was bound to threaten and antagonise Russia. The Partnership for Peace initiative was a telling sign of the primacy of Russian policy over European policy that is a hallmark of the Clinton administration.

The administration feared that the acceptance of Central European states into Nato could provoke a strengthening of the Russian nationalist position at the expense of President Yeltsin, as he would be seen by the Russian people as unable to avoid Western domination, as symbolised by the expansion of Nato to the Russian frontier. It would also enhance traditional Russian fears of encirclement.³¹ Paradoxically, the administration felt the risk of Russian domestic destabilisation that the expansion of Nato might provoke would actually lessen the security of the new Central European members. American sensitivity to Russian nationalist feelings was illustrated by Ottaway and Maas, who reported, "the US decision to ban the sale of sophisticated America aircraft or other weapons to Eastern European nations was made to avoid antagonizing Russia and upsetting the regional balance of power."³² This ever-present fear of destabilising Russia highlights clearly the primacy of Russian concerns

over Central European fears of renewed Russian domination in the Clinton administration's hierarchy of priorities. Indeed, a large part of the rationale for Clinton's institutionalist policy toward Europe was the dominance of both domestic and Russian concerns over European initiatives.

While European policy was not as important to the Clinton administration as its Russian policy, it was still a greater priority than American policy regarding the Bosnian conflict. As Jehl noted, "Clinton, for his part, declared the partnership [The Partnership for Peace plan] as one that would be more important to the future shape of Europe, 'than whatever is or isn't done with the tragedy of Bosnia at this late date'."³³ The Clinton administration's Bosnia stance can be partly seen as a policy based on the belief that both Russian concerns and alliance unity superseded anything taking place in the Balkans. There was a significant European dimension to the administration's institutionalist policy regarding Bosnia, that whatever the merits of the Bosnian Muslim cause, alliance unity came first. Even the manner in which the crisis was institutionally dealt with reflected the primacy of Europe over Bosnia for the Clinton administration. As Gompert observed, "The US deferred to the European wish that trans-national coordination take place in EC-US channels instead of Nato."³⁴ To use the EU rather than Nato as the primary institution for dealing with US-European relations during the Bosnia crisis meant a larger European role in the affair, as Nato is far more dominated by the US than the EU, in which the US is not a member. It is just one sign of many that throughout the Bosnian crisis the European point of view of the Bosnian affair, and its prospects for harming the alliance, took precedence over Bosnian Muslim concerns, and indeed, over the entire affair itself. The Clinton administration's policy during the Bosnian crisis becomes explicable when seen as part of the interconnection of US-Russian and US-European policies, and as the least important of the three relationships.

(c) General administration policy regarding Bosnia.

Despite some rhetorical vacillations, American foreign policy regarding Bosnia under the Clinton administration has been consistently institutionalist throughout its tenure in office. Before detailed analysis of the overall institutionalist policy regarding Bosnia is possible, a brief and very general overview of the concrete American actions in this labyrinthine conflict is necessary.

The multiethnic³⁵ republic of Bosnia seceded from the rump Yugoslav state in April 1992, and war began almost immediately, even before it was recognised by the EU and UN.

This recognition was a strong point in the American neo-realist case for greater American activity to help the Bosnian Muslim cause, for under the UN Charter, every state is guaranteed the right of self-defence. This point looms large when considering the effect of the arms embargo, which will be further discussed. The war pitted the mostly Muslim Bosnian government against Bosnian Serb rebels, who had refused to take part in the multiethnic elections held on the eve of Bosnia's secession. The Bosnian Serbs were substantially aided by Serbia proper, who had retained the lion's share of the Yugoslav army's mostly Serbian officer corps and the vast preponderance of its heavy weaponry, particularly its heavy artillery and tanks. This aid took the form of some direct military intervention by the Serbian Serbs as well as a great amount of military aid which proved decisive in the early days of the conflict, when the Bosnian Serbs scored their most decisive gains.³⁶

As a presidential candidate, Bill Clinton, denounced Serb aggression and took the Bush administration to task for its lukewarm involvement in the crisis. As Tucker and Hendrickson noted, "the Clinton administration came to office highly critical of its predecessor's record, particularly the Bush administration's failure to work toward lifting the arms embargo."³⁷ As Cohen stated, when a candidate, Clinton, "denounced Serb acts of 'genocide' and called for decisive US action in Bosnia."³⁸ This was the militant, decidedly un-institutionalist attitude toward Bosnia that President Clinton brought to the White House.

The President, despite a lack of public support for his militancy³⁹, proposed to the allies that they remove their peacekeepers from Bosnia and as a group lift the arms embargo against the Muslims, which had been imposed on all of Yugoslavia in 1992, so as to give them a chance to defend themselves against the better armed Serbs. Air strikes were also to be threatened to compel the Bosnian Serbs to withdraw from territory they had acquired through the morally repugnant practice of ethnic cleansing. This was the 'Lift and Strike' initiative that Secretary of State Christopher took with him to the European capitals in May 1993.

Chart 6-1: A Timeline of Key Diplomatic Events in the Bosnian Crisis

- Warfare between Muslims and Serbs starts - March 1992
- Bosnia recognised by the EU - April 1992
- Candidate Clinton denounces Serbs, calls for an increased American role in the conflict - Summer 1992
- Collapse of the Vance-Owen plan favoured by the Europeans - May 1993
- Clinton endorses 'Lift and Strike' policy, as Christopher tries to get European allies to concur - May 1993
- Europeans reject American proposal of tougher action against the Serbs, Clinton abandons 'Lift and Strike' - May 1993
- Safe havens initiative, with enclaves guaranteed by the UN - May 1993
- After marketplace bombing in Sarajevo, a partial Western success achieved by threatening Nato air strikes to protect Sarajevo and Gorazde - February-April 1994
- Muslim-Croat federation brokered by the US - March 1994
- Contact Group endorses 51-49 Bosnia split - May 1994
- Gore breaks Senate tie regarding the Dole-Lieberman amendment that would have unilaterally lifted the arms embargo on the Bosnian Muslims - July 1994
- Failure to enforce Contact Group plan against Bosnian Serbs - July-September 1994
- Bosnian and Croatian Serbs all but take Bihac safe area, this leads to Contact Group recriminations - November 1994
- New 'take it or leave it' plan by Contact Group would lift sanctions on Serbia proper if it recognised and policed its borders with Croatia and Bosnia - February 1995
- 'New' plan proposed by US and Russia to other Contact Group members would gradually lift sanctions on Serbia proper if it incrementally implemented principles that keep Bosnia intact, without any formal recognition being required - March 1995

The European refusal to accept the American proposal for air strikes and a greater aiding of the Bosnian Muslims, and the Clinton administration's reaction to it, was without doubt a diplomatic turning point of the war. The European allies, particularly Britain and France, unanimously and publicly rejected the Clinton initiative in favour of maintaining their peacekeepers in Bosnia, under UN command. They preferred to attempt to resuscitate the Vance-Owen plan, jointly brokered by the EU and UN, which would partition Bosnia and sustain some Serbian gains made by aggression. Faced with a possible allied crisis over Bosnia, the Clinton administration retreated to a firmly institutionalist position, stating that though the US disagreed with the Europeans about taking a harder line with the Serbs, the US would not act unilaterally, even to lift the arms embargo against the Bosnian government. For the administration, alliance unity overcame doubts about Europe's Bosnian policy. It is an overall position the Clinton administration has kept to this day.

While not diverting from their overall Bosnian policy, the French and British, partly as a sop to the Americans, orchestrated the UN construction of safe areas in May 1993. The US pledged to use air power if necessary to protect the UN peacekeepers guarding six Bosnian towns (including Srebrenica, Sarajevo, Gorazde, and Bihac) that were designated safe havens by the UN Security Council. The plan was an indication that the UN and the Europeans, while not wishing to actively aid the Muslims, would at least limit their sufferings through continued humanitarian assistance as well as offering some geographical security.

The safe havens plan was still part of an overall institutionalist policy in that it was enacted by the multilateral UN, and as Sciolino pointed out, was not, "aimed at rolling back the territorial gains of the Serbs,"⁴⁰ who by then controlled roughly 70% of Bosnia. It aimed at managing the conflict, but not by expanding the US role in it to punish Serbian aggression, as American democratists and neo-realists desired. Sciolino also agreed that the acceptance of the safe haven policy, and the Clinton administration's decision to abide by European concerns and drop their more hawkish policy was a major climbdown. "The acceptance of the creation of safe areas is a turnabout in policy for the Clinton administration. During his tour of Europe only two weeks ago, Secretary of State Christopher said that such areas would essentially put the Muslims into ethnic ghettos and thus reward 'ethnic cleansing' by Serbian nationalists."⁴¹ As the crisis progressed, the Clinton administration would often be hamstrung by critics who pointed to his earlier more militant remarks belying a more cautious

and subdued current American policy. In other words, the President had to deal with a credibility gap.

The spring of 1993 also saw the collapse of the Vance-Owen plan. Karadzic, the Bosnian Serb leader, agreed to it provisionally, while in practice his usually pliant parliament overturned his acceptance in May 1993. It is extremely likely that Karadzic's initial signature to the plan was little more than a diplomatic ploy, and that he knew the self-styled Serbian Parliament at Pale would reject the deal. However, the final nail in the coffin to the plan was delivered by none other than the Americans in the spring of 1993. Firstly, the administration rejected a Security Council resolution that was designed to demonstrate the international community's full support for the Bosnian peace plan, as the administration did not want to be seen to be involved in rewarding Serbian aggression. As Cohen noted, "the so-called Vance-Owen map never won clear support from President Clinton and was ultimately abandoned precisely because it was deemed to be morally abhorrent."⁴² As Paul Lewis cogently observed, part of the reason for the American rejection of the Vance-Owen plan was the President's hawkish stance on Bosnia during the presidential campaign, "President Clinton criticized the Vance-Owen plan in his election campaign as rewarding the Serbs for aggression."⁴³ While the events of May illustrated that the administration was moving towards a firmly institutionalist-based policy on Bosnia, the American rejection of the Vance-Owen plan showed that the President was still somewhat a prisoner of his own tough rhetoric and was not prepared, at the time, to go as far as were the British and the French in sanctioning a fragmentation of Bosnia into cantons which might well lead to the actual dismemberment of the state. Nor was the US as quick to reward Serbian aggression in the interests of ending the war. The scuttling of both the Vance-Owen plan and the Clinton administration's more hawkish proposals in the spring of 1993 left the allies united behind institutionalist precepts but without a tangible peace plan.

Matters continued to drift through the winter of 1993 and into the spring of 1994. The war itself had by now ground largely into a stalemate, with the Bosnian Muslims unable to roll back the initial Serbian gains, while the Serbs were unable to eradicate the Bosnian government army, which by now had a manpower advantage over the Bosnian Serbs, while still being far inferior in weaponry. The UN, US and European allies did experience one success during this period. By threatening Nato air strikes against the Serbs besieging first Sarajevo and then Gorazde in February 1994, the West was able to more or less stabilise the situation in both safe areas, with a minimal use of force, though Nato fighters were involved in combat for the first time in the history of the alliance. However, as will be discussed in

more detail later, it is important to note that this very limited use of military power and the tougher stance toward the Bosnian Serbs and Serbian Serbs did not signal an overall change from the policy advocated by American institutionalists, as no one in the administration suggested doing anything other than protecting the safe havens, which was itself an institutionalist initiative. The President wanted to strengthen the multilateral institutionalist response to the crisis not to change policy direction in the form of increasing support for the Bosnian Muslims, as American neo-realists and democratists would have wished.

Emboldened by its limited success, the administration was able to broker a new Muslim-Croatian alliance in March 1994. Initially the Muslims and Croats had been allies against a perceived combined attack, masterminded by Milosevic, as both had seceded from the rump Yugoslav state. However, Tudjman, the leader of Croatia, and Boban, leader of the Bosnian Croats, switched sides and attacked the primarily Muslim Bosnian government, as they feared a complete Serb victory could well lead to the partition of Bosnia, and the Croats were determined to acquire and safeguard the portions of Bosnia that were primarily Croatian in ethnic content. Fierce fighting ensued, particularly around the Bosnian city of Mostar. The Clinton administration was able to induce the Croatian government and Bosnian Croats to again ally with the Bosnian government. In exchange for agreeing to a loose Croatian-Muslim confederation, the US and Russia promised to give Tudjman full diplomatic backing in his struggle to reunite Croatia, by restoring its rule over the Croatian Serb area known as the Krajina. Also the administration promised to lift the economic sanctions that had been imposed on Croatia when it had joined the Serbs in attacking Bosnia. Yet this diplomatic bolstering of the Bosnian government was limited, and should not be seen as a change by the Clinton administration from its institutionalist policy. The contact group's peace plan was to confirm the overall institutionalist thrust of the administration's policy toward Bosnia.⁴⁴

In May 1994, the contact group of the great powers concerned with the Bosnian conflict (comprising Russia, the US, France, Germany, and Britain) proposed a peace plan for Bosnia that, as the International Herald-Tribune observed, was eerily reminiscent of the Vance-Owen plan advocated by the European powers just a year previously. "They [the European delegates within the contact group] said they were particularly pleased that Secretary of State Christopher had explicitly agreed to endorse the 51-49 division of territory - the most important plank of a plan issued by Europe last year. The communiqué said a US-brokered Muslim-Croat federation would have to be set up within the 51% target, not within 58% of the territory as agreed previously by the Muslims and Croats."⁴⁵ The Clinton administration was now agreeing to the exact percentage division of territory it had found

morally repugnant just a year before in the Vance-Owen plan. Also, rather than fighting diplomatically for Muslim-Croatian claims to 58% of Bosnia as they had implied they would at the time of the formation of the Muslim-Croat federation, the Clinton administration ultimately sided with the European and Russian wish to endorse giving just 51% of the territory to the combined Muslim and Croatian forces, in an attempt to entice the Serbs to sign the pact. The contact group peace proposal illustrated just how strongly institutionalist the Clinton administration's policy toward Bosnia had become. In it, one can discern that making the deal enticing for the Bosnian Serbs had become a priority, whereas the American rejection of the Vance-Owen plan had attacked the Europeans for rewarding aggression. A year on, ending the war by at least partly appeasing Bosnian Serb and Serbian Serb objectives had displaced any notion of rolling back the Serbian aggressors' victories. Thus ending the war, an institutionalist priority, had taken on a new precedence over aiding the Bosnian victims of aggression. Secondly, over the matter of the 58-51% controversy over the percentage of Bosnian territory the Muslims and Croats would receive, the US sided firmly with the Europeans over the Bosnian Muslims, despite promises made at the time of the Bosnian-Croatian federation to fight their corner in the contact group. Following institutionalist precepts, alliance unity easily took precedence over Bosnian Muslim claims.

Tied into the contact group plan was a clause that indicated that despite all the agreeable aspects of the initiative designed to lure the Serbs into an agreement, the contact group's patience was wearing thin. The plan was described by the contact group as a take it or leave it offer. That is, if either side refused to sign the pact, a diplomatic penalty would be paid. For the Bosnian Muslims, refusal to sign would lead to a lifting of economic sanctions imposed on both the Bosnian Serbs and on Serbia proper, which were having a significant impact on their economies. In the end, the Bosnian government reluctantly agreed to the plan. If either the Bosnian Serbs or the Serbian Serbs refused, it was agreed that there would finally be a lifting of the arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslims and possibly increased sanctions imposed against both Milosevic and Karadzic. It was at this point that a significant schism occurred between the Serb leaders. Milosevic, who by the pact could acquire and receive international sanction for most of his territorial designs, agreed to the plan, feeling that a lifting of sanctions would greatly bolster the Serb economy. Karadzic and the Bosnian Serbs however scorned the initiative, incurring the wrath of both the contact group and the Serbian Serbs themselves. In exchange for a minor lessening of sanctions against Belgrade, Milosevic himself blockaded the Bosnian Serbs, who were heavily dependent on the Serbian Serbs for materiel. From a Western perspective the best thing that can be said about the

contact group initiative is that to an extent, it divided the Serbian Serbs from the Bosnian Serbs.

Meanwhile the US domestic scene grew restive about the administration's policy toward Bosnia. As shall be illustrated when bureaucratic political analysis is wedded to schools of thought analysis, neo-realist Republicans like Senator Bob Dole of Kansas and Democrats like Senator Joseph Biden of Delaware combined in Congress to oppose the administration's institutionalist policy. This process culminated in a July 1st, 1994 Senate vote on the Dole-Lieberman amendment, which would have lifted the arms embargo against the Bosnian government. Vice-President Gore's vote broke a 50-50 tie on the bill, but for its legislative victory the administration was forced to pay a considerable political price. To persuade wavering Senators to give the contact group plan time to work, the President was forced to make concessions and endorse the Nunn-Mitchell amendment. The amendment stated that if the peace plan was not accepted by the Bosnian Serbs by October 15, the US would once again attempt to convince its Security Council allies to multilaterally lift the arms embargo, and that if they remained adamantly opposed, by November 15, the administration would unilaterally lift the ban. At last a time limit had been placed on US diplomacy in the Bosnian crisis. These administration concessions are not to be viewed as a change in overall American policy, but rather the reverse. They were desperate inducements made by the Clinton administration to give the institutionalist contact group plan time to work, for if the Dole-Lieberman amendment to the defence appropriation bill had been enacted, it would have meant both the end of President Clinton's institutionalist Bosnia policy and would have called into question the primacy of Presidential decision-making over the Bosnian crisis itself. The Nunn-Mitchell concessions should be viewed as an illustration of just how desperate the administration was to retain the thrust of its institutionalist policy.

Yet with the Bosnian Serb rejection of the plan, the hollowness of Western threats was once again exposed. As Cohen wryly stated, "The Bosnian Serbs rejection was supposed to lead quickly to tighter trade sanctions on Serbia, a stricter enforcement by Nato of the weapons exclusion zones around Sarajevo and Gorazde and the establishment of similar areas around the Muslim-held towns. But nothing has happened."⁴⁶ When it became apparent that the mixture of blandishments and threats the contact group concocted in the pact was not going to work, all the members retreated on carrying out the punitive aspects of the pact against both the Bosnian Serbs and Serbian Serbs, which of course would have embroiled them more deeply in the overall conflict.

The very fact that the plan had been largely favourable to the Serbs was a strong indication of the great desire of all members of the contact group to end the struggle, from their point of view, relatively painlessly if dishonourably. The Bosnian Serbs shrewdly saw this institutionalist precept of the West wanting to avoid entanglement in the conflict as being at the heart of the entire plan, and thus correctly reasoned that the contact group would not apply genuinely punitive measures against anyone, as they would not wish to become more significantly involved in the Bosnian crisis at this late date.

Nowhere can Western reluctance to increase its involvement in the Bosnian crisis be better seen than in the controversy as to the lifting of the arms embargo on the Bosnian government, with France, Russia, and Britain flatly contradicting their earlier contact group pledge to punish the Serbs in this manner if they failed to sign the pact. In the end, the Izetbegovic government saved the West, particularly the Clinton administration, from further embarrassment. "In one dashing sleight of hand, President Clinton is saved from embarrassment at home and from bitter rows with Russia, France and Britain. Those countries do not have to pull out their peacekeepers in humiliation...and all because President Izetbegovic said the Bosnian government was willing not to have the arms embargo on his Bosnian forces lifted for six months."⁴⁷ The Bosnian Muslims, at last getting significant illegal arms through contacts in Zagreb, could well have faced an increased Bosnian Serb onslaught before new arms could have reached them in significant numbers from the West to turn the tide of battle in their favour. Also at this juncture, President Izetbegovic worried that a lifting of the embargo would heal the rift between Milosevic and Karadzic, if Milosevic felt the overall balance of power in Bosnia was significantly changing. Again in the short run, Milosevic could reinforce Karadzic to a far deadlier extent than the Bosnian Muslims could be armed by the West. These battlefield considerations saved President Clinton from fulfilling a distasteful dual commitment, as both the Nunn-Mitchell amendment and the contact group pact itself had backed him into lifting the arms embargo against the Bosnian government, in the former case unilaterally if necessary. Yet the failure of the contact group to significantly punish the Bosnian Serb refusal to join the peace initiative, and the near crisis averted in the contact group, prophesied the divisions that were to occur over the Bosnian Serb offensive around Bihac.

The Bihac crisis of November 1994 further highlighted both Western weakness and divisions over Bosnia. A briefly successful military advance by the Bosnian V Corps from the Bihac pocket was met by a fierce counterattack in which the Bosnian Muslims not only lost all the territory they had so fleetingly recaptured, they also lost effective control of the

entire Bihac enclave. Augmented by forces loyal to the Bosnian Muslim rebel Abdic, as well as the Milosevic-dominated Krajina Serbs in Croatia, the Bosnian Serbs were able to attack the V Corps from three sides. The Bosnian Serbs also managed to best Western diplomacy. Despite some urgency from the Clinton administration, the contact group was unable to agree on a tougher policy toward the Bosnian Serbs, despite their incursion into the Bihac safe haven, which in theory was supposed to be protected and guaranteed by the UN. While Nato did launch several air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs, the contact group failed to agree on a coherent military policy for punishing the Bosnian Serbs, despite their flagrant defiance of the UN. At the end of the day, the Clinton administration, realising that it had entirely failed to convince its contact group partners of the necessity of air strikes to save Bihac, went along with the European's newly-evolving policy of altering the heretofore unalterable take it or leave it pact, by possibly allowing the Bosnian Serbs to unite in a confederation with Serbia proper, in exchange for acceptance of the original 51-49% plan.

That the administration would go along with a European initiative to sweeten the contact group pact and generally ignore the blatant Bosnian Serb humiliation of the UN at Bihac, highlights how far President Clinton was prepared to go to adhere to an overall central institutionalist precept regarding Bosnia; alliance unity came first in the overall hierarchy of American foreign policy priorities. While this general narrative exposes a gradual softening of American support for the Bosnian Muslims, it also makes clear that at least from May 1993, the Clinton administration pursued an overall institutionalist policy regarding Bosnia and that, pundit criticism to the contrary, this policy was internally consistent in that it placed both Russian and European concerns about Bosnia over the fate of the unfortunate state itself.

Ironically, after the Bihac crisis began, the strongest international actor likely to lift the arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslims was the resurgent Republican Congress of Newt Gingrich and Bob Dole. After their stunning mid-term election gains in November 1994, which saw the GOP turn a 256-178 minority in the House into a 231-203 majority, and a 56-44 deficit in the Senate into a 54-46 advantage, the largely neo-realist Republicans held control of both the houses of Congress for the first time since the 1950s.

Senator Dole, long a neo-realist proponent of lifting the arms embargo on the Bosnian Muslims as well as advocating a greater US commitment to the Bosnian Muslim cause, chastised the European allies, the UN, and Russia in the aftermath of the Bihac debacle. His increased authority, as shall be illustrated when bureaucratic political analysis is wedded to

schools of thought analysis in chapter 7, was a key component of the overall struggle for control of American policy regarding the Bosnian crisis.

Before continuing with a more detailed analysis of the overall American policy regarding Bosnia, three general comments are necessary. Firstly, it is essential to note the centrality of the embargo issue to the whole of the Bosnian conflict. Without the lifting of the embargo, the Serbs had a locked-in military advantage. As The Economist noted, regarding Serb military superiority, "the Serb forces are more professionally organised and led, having inherited virtually intact the general staff of the Yugoslav army. (Secondly) the Serbs together outgun their adversaries 4-1 in tanks, 2-1 in guns and more than 10-1 in aircraft."⁴⁸ The UN arms embargo, introduced in September 1991 against the whole of Yugoslavia, had been an effort to control ethnic bloodshed in a rapidly disintegrating state. Its great effect on the Bosnian conflict was one of its unintended consequences. The Serb military superiority was an established fact. If the embargo was not to be lifted, institutionalist critics rightly reasoned, the Bosnian government stood no chance of military success and would thus be either militarily destroyed or forced to agree to almost any peace terms the West and the Serbs could cobble together. Surprisingly institutionalists agreed with much of this analysis but felt that a lifting of the arms embargo would lead to a spreading of the war and could result in far more being lost than merely the Bosnian Muslims' right to self-defence, for example the unity of the alliance itself, as well as the chance for Russia to make a successful transition to democracy with Western help.

A second general comment it is necessary to make about the Bosnian conflict is the striking consistency of the British and the French position. The European allies were leery of any diplomatic or military provocation of either the Bosnian Serbs or the Serbian Serbs, as European peacekeepers, who comprised the vast majority of the UN force in Bosnia (UNPROFOR), would be at risk, either to Serb military retaliation, or as hostages.⁴⁹ While there is a dispute as to how effective the UN's humanitarian programme was, its political significance as a major factor in determining British and French Bosnia policy cannot be overrated. As Malcolm cogently stated, "The political consequence of placing this small and lightly-armed UN force in Bosnia was, however, that they now function as hostages, making the Western governments extremely reluctant to adopt any policies which might invite retaliation by the Serbs against these vulnerable troops."⁵⁰ For example during the Bosnian Serb assault on the UN safe haven of Bihac several hundred peacekeepers were detained, in a successful effort to deter substantial Nato air strikes. While consideration for their nationals undoubtedly played a role in the French and British hesitance to get tougher with the Serbs,

as Colin Smith noted, in many ways the British and French peacekeeping argument became a useful excuse for doing little to alter the military facts on the ground in Bosnia, as significant intervention would have been contrary to the general British and French desire to uphold institutionalist precepts in Bosnia, by limiting their involvement in the conflict. As Smith shrewdly observed, there had developed, "a certain symbiosis between the President and his two main European allies in Bosnia, Britain and France. London and Paris blatantly exaggerate the effectiveness of their soldiers' humanitarian role, and use the prospect of Serb retaliation against them as an excuse for not taking decisive military action."⁵¹

This somewhat facile peacekeeping argument lay at the heart of most European objections to any increased Western stance against Serb aggression, and was the major rationale as to why the British and French were opposed to lifting the arms embargo on the Bosnian Muslims. They feared that this would lead to a more general war that would spell the end of the UN humanitarian mission in Bosnia, and might well lead to military reprisals against the UN peacekeepers. Yet to a large extent the Europeans hid behind their peacekeepers so as to further their chief institutionalist aim of containing the conflict. However as Smith highlights, the Europeans were not alone in using sophistry to further their policy. It was President Clinton who seized upon the European peacekeeping argument as the reason for his refusal to lift the arms embargo.

Throughout the crisis the President said that he advocated lifting the embargo, but that he was sensitive to the peacekeeping arguments of the Europeans, who unlike the US had troops on the ground in Bosnia. By upholding the central institutionalist tenet of multilateralism, President Clinton pledged not to act alone in suspending the embargo, thus implicitly but directly linking America's Bosnian policy to the European peacekeeping arguments against lifting the embargo. If the embargo became the key factor surrounding the West's Bosnia policy, so the peacekeeping argument of the Europeans against lifting the embargo became the rationale for the very limited direct Western diplomatic support the Bosnians received throughout the crisis. Yet this contentious argument hid the very real institutionalist policy adhered to by both the Clinton administration and the Europeans; their first priority was to limit the conflict rather than provide succour for the wronged Bosnian Muslims. The Europeans hid their overall policy behind their peacekeepers, but the Clinton administration certainly hid its institutionalist thrust behind the Europeans.

The third general point to make about overall American policy regarding Bosnia is that despite its firm support for an institutionalist policy, the administration became increasingly

sceptical about the efficacy of the UN, the central, global, multilateral institution. Time after time the UN compelled restraint by Nato after Serb violations of UN directives. For instance, as Paul Lewis stated regarding the Serb incursion into the allied safe haven of Gorazde in the Spring of 1994, UN leniency toward the Serbs led to a growing rift with Nato and particularly the US.

"The policy dispute began in April when Akashi [the ranking UN official in Bosnia] blocked plans by Nato for air attacks on Serbs surrounding Gorazde after the Serbs failed to meet an ultimatum to withdraw. Last week, [end of April 1994] Akashi publicly criticised the [Clinton] administration for refusing to send peacekeeping troops to Bosnia, and said that since the US withdrew its forces from Somalia after suffering casualties there, Washington had become 'afraid, timid and tentative'. Then, on Saturday, a senior military officer and a senior civilian official with the UN in Sarajevo said the Bosnian government had greatly exaggerated the damage and casualties in Gorazde in the hope of encouraging Nato to attack the Serbs. The officials' comments made it clear that the two top UN officers in the former Yugoslavia, Lapresle of France and Rose of Britain, also had opposed the Nato air strikes, urging that they would turn the Serbs against the peacekeepers, force the UN to end its operations and prolong the war."⁵²

This vignette represents almost all of the seeds of dissent that led to a widening rift between the Clinton administration and the UN that erupted as the Bosnian crisis progressed.

Under the dual key operational plan constructed by Nato and the UN for use during the Bosnian crisis, only UN commanders could call in air strikes, and until the autumn of 1994, they alone chose the targets to be hit. Also operationally until the autumn of 1994, the UN commanders would warn the Serbs when Nato was about to strike, which of course greatly limited the effectiveness of any such action, which in practice had little more than a pinprick effect, and as the siege of Bihac illustrated, gradually led to the elimination of any deterrent effect air strikes may have once had on the Serbs.

American neo-realists in Congress found this operational arrangement incomprehensible, and the bureaucratic expression of the UN's tentativeness to seriously threaten the Serbs. They also objected because the operational plan effectively bound the US to European and UN policy dictates, and eliminated any possible role for unilateral American initiatives, an operational cardinal sin for both democratists and neo-realists.

While the institutionalist Clinton administration did not object to the dual-key operational procedure with the UN per se, they increasingly regarded the UN as feeble and incompetent, and saw it as a barrier to an effective multilateralist policy. For example, Akashi held Nato back from bombing Serb forces around Gorazde, even after they failed to meet a deadline for

pulling back their forces three kilometres from the city as the UN had mandated, as he argued they were withdrawing, if slowly. The Clinton administration saw the failure to promptly reply with air strikes to this technical violation of a UN directive as yet another example of the Serbs besting the international community in a test of will, whereas the UN perceived the situation as a victory and the use of air strikes as an unnecessary provocation. The administration was not as prepared to ignore Serb violations of UN resolutions as were the UN and the European allies who led UNPROFOR. Differences over Gorazde highlighted the split between the European allies and the UN on one side, who were concerned primarily with the security of the UNPROFOR forces, its humanitarian mission, and a desire to contain the war and bring it to a close under almost any circumstances; and the Clinton administration on the other, which while prizing international consensus still largely saw the Muslims as the victims of the conflict and wanted a marginally tougher international response to Serb transgressions.

The Gorazde example illustrated that the rhetorical aspects of Western differences on Bosnian policy got increasingly out of hand, thereby weakening the international community's efforts and policy in the eyes of all, most importantly the Serbs. Akashi's intemperate remarks about the US did the Clinton administration political damage, as they were grist for the mill of American neo-realists such as Senator Dole, who disliked UN and European primacy over the international decision-making process regarding the Western response to the Bosnian conflict. Such a direct verbal attack upon the US by the UN's representative could not be condoned, even by the institutionalist Clinton administration. The increased rhetorical differences between the US, the Europeans, and UN officials, called into question just how stable the international consensus was over Bosnia, as allied consensus was the administration's central selling point for its institutionalist Bosnia policy. These rhetorical attacks on the US also reinforced the suspicions of those advocating a neo-realist policy in Bosnia, that the UN officials were themselves hopelessly pro-Serb. For example, that senior UN officials should blame the people of Gorazde for overstating the damage to their city, inflicted by temporary Serb flouting of the UN resolutions regarding safe havens, struck many who were neither neo-realists nor democratists as being a case of blaming the victim.

Neo-realist and democratist decision-makers in the US encouraged the public belief that the UN would do almost anything to end the conflict quickly, which in practice meant sanctioning the Serb aggressors victory in the war. For example, as Paul Lewis noted, "US officials complain that Akashi is too conciliatory toward the Serbs. The envoy says he has a

personal 'friendship' with Karadzic and calls him 'a man of peace'.⁵³ Such ludicrous statements further galvanised neo-realist critics of the Clinton administration, as they called into question American deference towards the UN and the European allies' initiatives regarding the Bosnian crisis. If Akashi's judgement was so flawed, why should the US harness its policy to an operational procedure that revolved around his determinations about the usefulness of air strikes?

Nor was Akashi the only hate-object for both Clinton administration officials and critics of American policy. Lt. General Rose, the British commander of UN forces in Bosnia, also involved himself in criticism of the American position. As Roger Cohen noted, regarding the contact group plan, "The map, prepared by the US and four other countries as part of a peace agreement, is regarded by Rose and the British officers who surround him as unrealistic, ill-conceived and unfair to the Serbs."⁵⁴ In a state such as the US, where civilian control of the military is so total as to often preclude any public statement by a serving officer that would be critical of government policy, such a diatribe was culturally misjudged. The notion of a UN officer criticising the US for being unfair to the Serbs alienated almost all of the democratists and neo-realists in Congress, who viewed the Bosnian conflict as being the result of Serb aggression in the first place. Increased rhetorical disagreements between UN officials and the US helped transform a marginal difference over policy into an outright cooling of even the institutionalist Clinton administration's enthusiasm for viewing the UN as a possible candidate for the role of global policeman.

It is important to remember that while the US advocated a marginally more aggressive approach to the Bosnian conflict than its European allies, its policy was still very much within the institutionalist context. For example, even though the safe havens policy was to be bolstered by the threat of US-led Nato bombing, the overall thrust of the policy remained institutionalist. For in addition to adding muscle to the safe havens plan, as Williams and Marcus noted, "The Clinton administration's more aggressive approach to the Bosnian conflict involves two tracks: threatening Serb forces with air attack unless they stop the 'strangulation' of Sarajevo, and pressing the Muslims to accept a proposed partition of Bosnia."⁵⁵ The goal was to threaten the Serbs to the negotiating table, but the outcome of the talks would still be predicated by an institutionalist recognition that in order to end the war, the Serbs would be allowed by the West to gain from their aggression, and the Muslims would not be aided in their efforts to roll back Serb territorial gains. And as stated above, a cumbersome operational procedure was established for controlling any air strikes that would be launched to protect the safe havens. As Whitney observed, "Under the procedures it

established last summer, Nato will not drop a single bomb unless the UN commander on the scene asked it to, and then only if the UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros Ghali, concurs in the request."⁵⁶ Thus air strikes were to occur only if multilateral agreement was reached on such a decision, through the auspices of the UN. The procedure itself illustrated the institutionalist thrust of the Clinton administration, concentrating as it did on multilateral controls on force through the use of an international organisation. So while the administration may have been slightly more bellicose in its policy regarding the Serbs than the Europeans, as the safe havens example illustrates, both were still well within the overall institutionalist rubric.

Part of the reason for the Clinton administration's hesitation in proclaiming its adoption of an institutionalist policy regarding Bosnia was that unlike its European allies, it could never wholly reconcile the conflicting priorities between furthering humanitarian concerns and upholding international justice. While the European allies and the UN clearly opted for the former, the President and his advisers never reconciled the fact that during the Bosnian crisis, these two benign ends were mutually contradictory. Engelberg shrewdly observed this, stating that America's indecisive Bosnia policy largely derived from, "two contradictory desires: he [President Clinton] wants to bring the swiftest possible end to a war that has already taken more than 100,000 lives [as of November 1994, the figure was over 200,000]. But he also wants to set an example that aggression does not pay, and thus he is unwilling to allow the Serbs to keep the territory they have seized in a year of 'ethnic cleansing'."⁵⁷

Ultimately, American democratists and neo-realists regarded justice as a higher priority in Bosnia than satisfying short-term humanitarian needs, while institutionalists believed the humanitarian dimension of the problem was more salient than abstract notions of justice being served. True to form, the President came down on the side of the institutionalist position. Hoagland discerned that this was a victory for the European conception of the conflict, stating, "In the end, the European view of Bosnia has prevailed. The French, British, and others treated Bosnia as an insoluble problem in which outsiders could do no more than comfort the wounded and feed the starving."⁵⁸

This triumph of the institutionalist conception that in Bosnia humanitarian needs took precedence over questions of justice can be seen in the Clinton administration's adoption of the contact group initiative, which was partly predicated on the idea that a speedy end to the conflict would greatly ease humanitarian suffering, even though the Serbs would be unjustly rewarded for their aggression. As Cohen illustrated, "In drafting and backing a new map for

a territorial settlement in Bosnia, the Clinton administration has taken an extraordinary step: It has formally backed the handover to Serbs of towns in which tens of thousands of Muslim civilians were killed, put in prison camps or evicted."⁵⁹ By the spring of 1994, with its acceptance of the contact group plan for peace in Bosnia, it was obvious that the Clinton administration had resolved its dilemma in favour of the primacy of humanitarian needs.

Still, unlike the European allies and the UN, the administration was far from comfortable with its decision. This lack of comfort was largely the result of the almost unique American emphasis on morality in its foreign affairs, as well as the fact that America's Bosnia policy was in sharp contradiction with many of candidate Clinton's statements. This lack of comfort with the primacy of humanitarian needs over the precept of justice is reflected in the Clinton administration's institutionalist policy, that by its multilateralist nature, would spread the responsibility for an initiative the President knew would be sharply attacked. Also, the institutionalist tenet that the US would take on a relatively smaller global role than during the Cold War, suited both the President's overall global specific goals over Bosnia, as its secondary status in the crisis made any discomfort over its decision to pursue a non-activist, institutionalist policy seem less momentous. The administration's institutionalist policy enabled it to ward off both domestic criticism and obscured its less than decisive resolution of the conflict in Bosnia between humanitarian needs and justice.

Another reason the Clinton administration opted for an institutionalist policy in Bosnia was that the crisis was a low priority compared with domestic policy. This fact alone politically ruled out adopting the democratist stance on the conflict, which of the three schools of thought was by far the most interventionist and activist. If American public opinion was leery of the Clinton administration's cautious and passive institutionalist initiatives on Bosnia, it was downright opposed to democratist prescriptions which advocated America, unilaterally if necessary, going beyond arming the Bosnian Muslims and becoming militarily involved in directly fighting the Serbs.

Throughout his presidency, Bill Clinton adopted a strikingly anti-democratist position regarding Bosnia. As Walter Slocombe, the principal Deputy Under-Secretary of Defence for Policy, flatly stated before the Senate Armed Services Committee, "President Clinton has rightly concluded that US interests do not justify sending US ground troops to intervene [in Bosnia] to force a solution."⁶⁰ Bosnia was certainly not a state of extensive economic or political importance to the US, or one in which America had a long-term historical interest.

Its general geopolitical insignificance politically ruled out the adoption of a democratist stance on Bosnia and made the selection of an institutionalist frame of reference more likely. Further, the Bosnian crisis raised the spectre of LBJ, another Southern reformist democrat who wished to concentrate on his 'Great Society' reforms, only to have Vietnam ambush both his domestic programme and then his presidency. As Gelb observed, "he [President Clinton] would rather risk looking weak in Haiti, Somalia, or Bosnia than divert time and resources from his domestic agenda. He must dwell daily on the peril of repeating LBJ's experience."⁶¹ Bill Clinton, even more than was usual for a chief executive, was interested in and knew he had been elected to, deal with America's pressing social ills, such as controlling the deficit, and reforming both the health care system and the welfare state itself. Regarding Bosnia, the democratist policy prescriptions were the only options that could embroil the President in a quagmire that could threaten his reforms politically, as a Vietnam-style situation in Bosnia with significant American casualties would prove immensely unpopular at home. Given the clearly stated priorities of the Clinton administration, it is easy to discern why it clearly and consistently eschewed democratist policy options over Bosnia, as they were the only initiatives that could imperil its main domestic-first thrust.

As such, the administration's choice of an institutionalist policy for Bosnia makes increasing sense. Whether it was damned or supported, the President's policy was a consistent and coherent response to the crisis, contrary to accepted conventional wisdom. The President's overall institutionalist desire for Europe to shoulder more of its own security burden dovetailed nicely with his specific Bosnia policy. As Pfaff concluded, "Like President Bush, President Clinton called the Yugoslav crisis a European responsibility and said the US would back whatever the Western Europeans decided to do about it."⁶² As Bosnia was objectively a low priority in the US hierarchy of interests and entailed only dangers and not opportunities from the administration's point of view, it is not surprising that the Clinton White House was happy to follow the lead of its European allies, particularly as its subordinate role in decision-making regarding the Bosnian crisis was congruent with its overall institutionalist European policy in general. A democratist stance on Bosnia was never seriously considered by Washington because such an initiative ran counter to the general domestic priorities of the administration, and anyway would have been politically impossible to sustain. The President never seriously considered risking so much for objectively so little.

If an activist Bosnia policy did not mesh with the Clinton administration's domestic priorities, neither did it coincide with Washington's foreign agenda. As stated above, the Clinton White House pursued a democratist policy regarding Russia and institutionalist

initiatives regarding both Europe in general and Bosnia specifically. The final and decisive reason Washington adopted an institutionalist policy regarding Bosnia is that to do otherwise was seen as imperilling American initiatives toward Russia and Europe, both of which were regarded as more important to the US than was Bosnia.

While adherence to general international law precepts has been cited by the administration as a major reason for its institutionalist policy toward Bosnia, in reality it has been little more than a public cloak for defending the President's institutionalist initiatives. While respect for international law is definitely a cornerstone of institutionalist thinking, it has hardly guided Washington's Bosnia policy. As former Assistant Secretary of State Stephen Oxman explained somewhat disingenuously, regarding the administration's failure to unilaterally lift the arms embargo on the Bosnian government,

"It is no secret that the administration's preferred policy in Bosnia this spring [in 1993] was to lift the arms embargo on the Bosnian government and to support that lifting with interior air strikes. That policy would have required a resolution of the UN Security Council because the embargo had been imposed by the Security Council. Despite our strenuous efforts we were unable to secure agreement on this approach."⁶³

What Oxman failed to mention is that Bosnia was recognised as a sovereign state by the UN, and as such it had the right, under the UN Charter, to self-defence, a right effectively nullified by the UN arms embargo. Also, the embargo had been placed on the whole of the former Yugoslavia, rather than specifically on the Bosnian state. Oxman's dubious legal defence of administration policy is thus an excellent example of Washington using the facade of international law to defend its institutionalist, but not legally driven initiative.

Likewise, the President's successful if limited response to the Sarajevo massacre of February 1994, when a Serb mortar blast killed 68 in the Bosnian capital, was to move to strictly enforce the safe havens zone around Sarajevo and Gorazde. Beyond this point the President claimed he could not go, due to strictures imposed upon the US by international law, 'restrictions' which squared with Washington's policy of limiting its involvement in Bosnia. As Horvitz noted, "President Clinton said he had consulted with US allies Saturday and Sunday [5-6 February 1994] about the possibility of retaliation, but he then cited restrictions under international law that would prevent unilateral action."⁶⁴ CNN had provided graphic images of the massacre, which temporarily increased pressure upon the administration to act in some way against the Serbs. The President, fearful of being pushed toward democratist initiatives, thus used the international law argument to deflect calls for American military action against the Serbs. Rather than viewing support for the precepts of

international law as driving President Clinton's institutionalist Bosnia policy, it should be regarded as a largely convenient political cover the administration utilised to further initiatives which were largely predicated on averting a rift with either the European allies or Russia.

For it is over the determination of the Clinton administration to avoid a fatal schism with either the European allies or Russia that one finds the primary rationale for its institutionalist position on Bosnia. This can be seen in that its cardinal principle in almost every instance of the Bosnian crisis has been to act in a genuine multilateral manner, which is a hallmark of institutionalist thinking. As Hoagland observed, "Containing the war in Bosnia and containing their own sharp divisions over that war have become the principal policy objectives of the US and its most important European allies. Bosnia is no longer about Bosnia. Bosnia is about allied unity."⁶⁵ Indeed both the Bush and Clinton administrations have been prepared to set aside policy differences with the Europeans, even when they have felt them to be wrong. This is an illustration of just how pivotal the priority of allied unity has been for the Clinton administration. As Gompert noted, "Under both administrations, the US has been prepared to do more [than the Europeans], including use force, but not instead or over the objectives of its allies."⁶⁶ This tenet of multilateralism - right or wrong - was clearly enunciated by Warren Christopher, who stated that, "President Clinton had set principles on US policy toward Bosnia, the first of which was that, 'we will not act alone'.⁶⁷ Nowhere could a clearer statement of the administration's objections to the unilateralist policy prescriptions of the neo-realists and democratists over Bosnia be made.

The Clinton administration consistently followed its multilateralist policy towards Bosnia throughout the crisis. This was most crucially illustrated by its decision in May 1993 to give up on the notion of effecting any real activist effort in Bosnia, in deference to the wishes of the European allies. The primacy of a multilateralist, institutionalist policy giving preference to European views on Bosnia can be seen in every Western initiative since then. As Anthony Lewis noted,

"'It's the end of an era', a veteran diplomat said, 'the era of American leadership and power in Europe.' He was commenting on President Clinton's acceptance of the European plan to set up 'safe havens' for Muslims in Bosnia. Just two weeks ago, on his European tour, Secretary of State Christopher rejected the safe haven idea. It would confine 1.2 million Muslims to the equivalent of ghettos he said, and effectively ratify Serb conquests elsewhere in Bosnia. Now [25 May 1993] Christopher said the US was agreeing to the idea because Russia, Britain, France and Spain wanted it. President Clinton said, 'At least we're together again'.⁶⁸

It is hard to believe that President Clinton and Secretary of State Christopher altered their harsh judgement about the safe havens in fourteen days. Rather, it is more likely, especially taking the President's comments into account, that they felt allied unity took precedence over whatever Bosnian policy the West ultimately decided upon.

Certainly the question of the embargo was the most important and telling example of the administration's institutionalist priority of maintaining allied unity over Bosnia, even at the cost of possibly getting the specific Bosnian policy wrong. As The New York Times observed, "The Clinton administration has always presented lifting the arms embargo as its preferred response to the Bosnian crisis, while Europe has favored partition and asked for large numbers of US troops to help enforce it...But the administration, for the sake of Nato solidarity, has resisted congressional pressures to lift the arms embargo unilaterally."⁶⁹ Thus even though the Clinton administration agreed with its congressional neo-realist critics, like Senator Dole, that the arms embargo should be lifted, it was not prepared to do so without the multilateral consensus of the Western allies. While both neo-realists and institutionalists agree specifically that it would be best for the arms embargo to be lifted from the Bosnian Muslims, the administration's decision not to act unilaterally to do this was the crucial point of difference it had with both the neo-realists and democratists over general Bosnia policy. Multilateralism was at the heart of the Clinton administration's Bosnia policy, as they viewed it as the best way of keeping the Western alliance together, Bosnia crisis or no.

Of course, such a policy baldly stating that, while disagreeing with current Western policy, the US was prepared to go along with the Europeans over Bosnia, was bound to lead to fierce criticism in a state accustomed to leading and not following Western opinion. As Gordon noted, "the Clinton administration in effect gave the Europeans a veto over its proposals to arm the Muslim forces and protect them with airstrikes."⁷⁰ This stance made both unilateralist schools of thought, but especially the neo-realists, nervous, as they strenuously advocate never shackling a state's foreign policy, as it is determined by the national interest, to the dictates of any extra-national body. While it is obvious that much of the opposition the Clinton administration faced in Congress over its Bosnia policy was reflective of partisan political concerns, it is also equally clear that in disagreeing with the largely neo-realist Republicans, such as Senators Dole and Lugar, the administration was highlighting a basic difference of opinion over fundamental principles about American foreign policy in the post-Cold war era.

Nor were the European allies the only states the President wanted to keep on side during the Bosnian crisis. The administration was also concerned with keeping Russia in the contact group and viewed it as a key element that needed to be taken into account if an international consensus was to be reached over the Bosnian crisis. Due to the administration's democratist fervour about Russia, there is little doubt that it regarded the stability of the Yeltsin regime as far more important than the outcome of the Bosnian conflict. As Hendrickson observed, "The maintenance of that concert [with both the Russians and the EU], in the end, remains of far greater moment for European order and American interests than the precise disposition of the Bosnian civil war."⁷¹ President Yeltsin, whether to gain an advantage over the US regarding the contact group's policy toward Bosnia or out of genuine political need, warned the US against actively aiding the Bosnian Muslims. As Engelburg and Gordon stated, Yeltsin, "told the administration that tough action against the Serbs could further jeopardize his position with the Russian parliament."⁷² This was especially critical in the Duma, where the majority of delegates were anti-Yeltsin, being followers of Zhirinovsky or unreconstructed communists. Both groups it was feared, would enrage public opinion against Yeltsin for failing to come to the aid of Russia's Slavic Orthodox brethren, the Bosnian Serbs.

The Russian government was particularly worried about the US lifting the arms embargo on the Bosnian Muslims. As Barber noted, "Russia warned the US against lifting the UN arms embargo on the Bosnian government. 'If each of the great powers unilaterally supports its clients, it could result in a war, not just a war in the former Yugoslavia but a global confrontation,' said foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev."⁷³ Certainly Russia made it clear that the American lifting of the arms embargo could lead to the end of both the contact group and any chance for international consensus regarding Bosnia. Thus, by a mixture of threats about its potential weakness as well as its potential fervour about backing the Serbs, the Yeltsin government was able to influence the Clinton administration's overall institutionalist Bosnia policy, a policy characterised by its reliance on multilateral approaches to the conflict as well as its clear choice of alliance unity and a desire to augment Russian stability, even at the expense of its preferred policy in the conflict.

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- 5) Strobe Talbott, "US Policy on Support for Reform In The New Independent States," US Department of State Dispatch, vol.4 no.2, (18 October 1993), p.724. See also: Anthony Lewis, "Mr. Clinton Abroad," The New York Times, 12 July 1993.
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- 14) See: Clinton, "Address on 'Democracy in America'," address to The Institute of World Affairs, 1 October 1992; Clinton, "Clinton gives Qualified Endorsement to Nafta," address to North Carolina State University, 4 October 1992; Clinton, "Clinton Says US needs new national security policy," address to Georgetown University, 12 December 1991; Clinton, "Clinton says US support for UN will continue," address to the United Nations Association - of the USA, 9 October 1992; Clinton, "Clinton would stress economic issues in Foreign Policy," address to the World Affairs Council, 13 August 1992.
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Chapter 7: Political Analysis of the American Response to the Bosnian Crisis Using Schools of Thought Analysis

Having discussed American policy regarding Bosnia using schools of thought analysis, and having classified crucial political decision-makers involved in formulating and opposing the overall institutionalist stance, it is now necessary to analyse the political process that led to the overall American policy. This policy can be outlined through a schools of thought examination of the interaction between the White House and Capitol Hill during the first two years of the Clinton administration. This chapter will analyse how overall American foreign policy outputs regarding Bosnia were derived in the time of the 103rd Congress (January 1992-November 1994), by assessing the relationship between the executive branch and the Congress involved in foreign policy-making and classifying each branch's overall general schools of thought orientation. While not every bureaucratic player will be analysed, a clear and accurate picture will emerge regarding the collective schools of thought priorities of the executive and legislative branches of the American government.

i) The schools of thought stance of the executive branch during the 103rd Congress

As was noted in detail in chapter 6, the executive branch maintained a strong institutionalist stance throughout the Bosnian crisis. This point is affirmed by the fact that of the five individual policy-makers classified in chapter 5 who work in the executive branch, (Clinton, Christopher, Perry, Lake and Talbott) all individually preferred the institutionalist position regarding the Bosnian crisis. It is now necessary to examine how this overall policy output was arrived at in the executive branch, looking again at each of the five individual's commitment to his school of thought priority, and then at their personal and bureaucratic power within the executive branch.

An institutionalist stance on Bosnia fitted in well with Secretary Christopher's personal preferences, yet these proclivities are not what drove the man. The Secretary came to his job with the reputation of having, as Barone and Ujifusa noted, "A gift for painstaking negotiation and an abhorrence of violence."¹ These traits dovetailed well with the institutionalist position on Bosnia, which saw negotiations and sanctions, not military force, as the appropriate tools needed to end Serb adventurism. It came as little surprise that Christopher favoured the Vance-Owen plan, drawn up by his former boss and mentor at the State Department, Cyrus Vance, another statesman often criticised for undervaluing the military aspects of power by the neo-realists.²

Yet ideological fervour was not Christopher's most outstanding personal characteristic. Rather, as Leslie Gelb, the columnist who worked closely with Christopher at the State Department, noted, Christopher is, "not a policymaker and has no known policy agenda...he thinks case by case."³ Secretary of State Christopher emerged as a competent technician, rather than as an ideologue eager to stamp American foreign policy in the post-Cold War era with his overall schools of thought views. It is Jim Hoagland, of The Washington Post, who came closest to accurately probing the essence of the man. Hoagland stated, "A lawyer, Christopher took the president on as his client and has been willing to argue whatever case the president wanted argued, no matter what his own views were."⁴ While Secretary Christopher undoubtedly held institutionalist views regarding the Bosnian crisis, a sign that he did not play the instrumental role in setting the overall institutionalist direction of US policy regarding Bosnia is that he simply lacked the ideological commitment for the role.

As the 103rd Congress progressed, Christopher did not assume the major role in foreign policy-making many other Secretaries of State have obtained throughout American history. Christopher started the administration in a bureaucratically strong position, as the Secretary of State is traditionally the dean of American foreign policy formulation, second only to the President in bureaucratic clout. Modern Secretaries of State such as Acheson, Dulles, and Kissinger have played major roles in American foreign policy formulation. Beyond this, Christopher had served in government before, as for example, under Lyndon Johnson as Deputy Attorney General, and under Carter as Deputy Secretary of State, where he made a name for himself by negotiating the release of the American hostages with Iran.⁵ Thus, Christopher came to the administration with federal government experience, unlike many on the Clinton team, giving him a large bureaucratic advantage in that he was used to the unique culture of the capital city. The Secretary also had a relatively close relationship with President Clinton.⁶ An example of this close tie is that Christopher was co-chairman of the Clinton transition team, and headed the search that led to the selection of Al Gore as Vice-President, tasks normally assigned only to highly trusted aides.

Yet Secretary of State Christopher has proven to be a bureaucratic loser within the Clinton administration, and has wielded far less power than had originally been thought likely. Most put this disappointing bureaucratic record down to the personality of the Secretary himself. As Williams noted, "he [Christopher] has long insisted that his main problem is communication,"⁷ but most observers felt it went much deeper than this, to the core of the man himself. As Anthony Lewis reported, The Times of London put it well,

"Christopher may have qualities, but dynamism, creativity, vision and leadership are not among them."⁸ Woodward concurred, describing Christopher as, "A small man, with a wizened face and a hesitant voice, Christopher was known for his caution and ability to lawyer any problem to death."⁹ While caution and painstaking attention to detail may be admirable qualities for a lawyer to possess, they help little in winning bureaucratic arguments in the rough-and-tumble world of Washington politics.

While Christopher held a major bureaucratic power position within the administration, and while President Clinton valued his loyalty, he lacked the ideological fervour for bureaucratic political success. He also failed to master his brief at the State Department. While Secretary Christopher's unassuming loyalty was an asset in his relations with the President, his lack of dynamism was a factor in his inability to bind together a seriously divided State Department. The Secretary of State's personality was the key reason he was unable to dominate American foreign policy-making during the first two years of the Clinton administration.

The results of Christopher's bureaucratic failure are plain to see. Secretary Christopher was unable to win policy battles at the cabinet level, or quell dissent even within the State Department. At first it appeared that the cautious Christopher would fit in well running the State Department, which has a bureaucratic reputation for staid circumspection. As Tony Lake, a former State Department official and now National Security Adviser wryly observed about the bureaucratic culture of Foggy Bottom, "for many political appointees, the problem [with State] is explained by the adage 'There are old diplomats, and there are bold diplomats, but there are no old, bold diplomats'."¹⁰ Beyond the Secretary's personal caution meshing with State's bureaucratic circumspection, Christopher and the State Department shared a general institutionalist orientation. As The International Herald-Tribune reported, a group of conservative Democrats, "which includes a former Clinton campaign counsel, David Ifshin, have watched in increasing discomfort as the administration has been filling the State Department with moderate liberals. They contend that the tilt of the department contradicts Clinton's campaign promise that he would be a 'new kind of Democrat'."¹¹ These moderate liberals, as was illustrated in chapter 4, generally tend to be institutionalists, like the Secretary himself. Yet despite these affinities, "in the department there is a general agreement that there has not been such public protest by those charged with carrying out a policy since the height of the Vietnam war,"¹² as there has been over Bosnia.

The revolt against the administration's Bosnia policy was centred at the middle and lower levels of the State Department. As Jon Western, one of four mid-level staffers who quit the department over Bosnia policy stated, "The dissent is not confined to the European bureau. I've covered or been associated with the Yugoslav issue since the outbreak of hostilities. In my time, I have met one, possibly two people, in the department below the level of assistant secretary who believe in the policy."¹³ This wholesale revolt had a democratist, rather than a neo-realist schools of thought focus, as the moderate liberals who comprise much of the State Department were unlikely to find common cause with the neo-realists, who are primarily Republicans. As Marshall Freeman Harris, the chief State Department adviser on Bosnia noted, while resigning, "I can no longer serve in a Department of State that accepts the forceful dismemberment of a European state and that will not act against genocide and the Serb officials who perpetuate it."¹⁴ This democratist indictment of the administration's institutionalist Bosnia policy signalled that the Secretary of State could not keep order, even in his supposed bureaucratic stronghold.

Nor did Christopher fare much better at the cabinet level. Most agree that President Clinton personally dominated the Secretary of State. As Friedman and Sciolino noted, "Another thing that strikes foreign visitors is how President Clinton alone conducts the [foreign policy] meetings from the American side, while his aides seem rather intimidated. His secretary of state and national security advisor speak only if called upon by the president."¹⁵ This is surely a graphic sign that the President, at least publicly, did not value Christopher's independent judgement.

This increasing lack of confidence in Christopher by the President can be seen in several bureaucratic instances. As Christopher's White House critics noted, "he has failed, most recently with the Haiti crisis, to project an image as a strong Secretary of State. With the exception of the Middle East, they say, he has essentially ceded policy portfolios to subordinates or other government agencies."¹⁶ In other words, the Secretary failed at the most basic level of bureaucratic politics, to protect and expand his bureaucratic 'turf'. For example, during the Haitian crisis, Secretary Christopher was not included in a key meeting to discuss Jimmy Carter's Haitian plan unlike National Security Adviser Tony Lake, Secretary of Defence William Perry, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff John Shalikashvili, and Strobe Talbott.¹⁷ Christopher's exclusion from the decision-making process of an issue so obviously within his bureaucratic responsibility was a telling sign of his increasing irrelevance regarding American foreign policy formulation.

Likewise, the President himself publicly undermined his Secretary of State. As Devroy reported, "President Clinton will wait until the end of the year [1994] to decide whether his administration's much-criticised performance in international affairs merits the replacement of Secretary of State Christopher or other members of his foreign policy team, according to senior officials and outsiders who have talked to the president."¹⁸ The White House did not even bother to issue the customary denial of this scathing report. That Christopher was put on 'probation' regarding his very bureaucratic survival as Secretary of State was the most damning indication that he was not the bureaucratic locus behind the executive branch's institutionalist policy preference regarding Bosnia.

William Perry found himself in a quite different bureaucratic political position than Secretary Christopher. However while the Secretary of Defence is a major bureaucratic player in the American government, the President's overall institutionalist orientation meant that the Pentagon was organisationally not as important as it would be under a neo-realist chief executive. Thus Perry came to the job knowing his general bureaucratic position would be less advantageous than that enjoyed by powerful Secretaries of Defence like Robert McNamara, Caspar Weinberger or Dick Cheney. The initial signals seemed to suggest that Perry's personality would not be a bonus in his dealings with the President. Yet it proved his chief bureaucratic strength. For Secretary Perry mastered his brief, unlike Secretary Christopher at State. As Lancaster noted,

"uniformed leaders say, he [Perry] has restored a sense of order and discipline to the Pentagon, streamlining the department's policy shop by eliminating 2 of the 6 Assistant Secretary jobs and conducting crisp, clear meetings that begin on time and often end with a decision. In the process, he has helped repair the Clinton administration's sometimes prickly relationship with military leaders, who chafed under Aspin's lax management style and perceived habit of limiting major decisions to a small circle of civilian aides."¹⁹

Secretary Perry's popularity at the Pentagon also stemmed from the fact that he had long been a part of its bureaucracy. He was Aspin's chief deputy, and first served as a technical consultant to the DoD in the 1960s, and later as Under-Secretary of Defence for Research and Engineering under President Carter.²⁰ Perry benefitted from being a long-standing member of the DoD, and his appointment was well-received by the Pentagon bureaucracy as it saw his tenure as signalling that at last 'one of us' was rightly running the armed services, as opposed to the 'outsider' institutionalists, such as Secretary Aspin. Perry's bureaucratic triumph within the DoD enhanced his status with President Clinton, who had reason to be pleased that his cultural and bureaucratic troubles with Defence had at last been contained.

Yet as is so often the case, the personality aspect of bureaucratic politics cut both ways for Secretary Perry. While the President was grateful to him for partially quelling the dissent in the Pentagon towards the administration, the very qualities that made Secretary Perry successful at running the Pentagon limited his relationship with the President. Perry's popularity at the DoD was based partly on the fact that he is not an intimate of the President. Yet this lack of intimacy limited Perry's overall bureaucratic power. As Freedland observed, Perry was the President's fifth choice to be Secretary of Defence (after Aspin, Inman, Nunn, and Rudman), hardly a ringing personal endorsement.²¹ Nor did Perry have the easy personal access to the President that is so often indicative of a strong personal relationship with the chief executive.²² The major reason for this personal distance was precisely because Perry was not a Clinton man, and was somewhat bureaucratically distrusted as not having the President's interests as his top priority. Secretary Perry was perceived by the Clinton administration as having been partly 'captured' by the DoD bureaucracy.

That Perry should be captured by the Pentagon bureaucracy was not a strange phenomenon. As Halperin argued, "The pressures on Cabinet officers from their subordinates, as well as from outside pressure groups, is so great that they often come to see themselves as their department's representative to the President."²³ Regarding Bosnia, as has been shown in Chapter 6, Secretary Perry agreed with the President's institutionalist stance over the arms embargo, but for largely neo-realist reasons. This anomaly can be explained by his adoption of the Pentagon's bureaucratic culture regarding American military intervention. In general, the Pentagon has been against new military commitments for the US and has opposed post-Vietnam American military intervention.²⁴

In reaction to failure in Vietnam, if an interventionist strategy becomes policy, the DoD has argued that the military force employed must be overwhelming, to ensure swift victory. These conditions were singularly lacking in Bosnia, where the Pentagon saw civil war and quagmire instead of a case of clear-cut Serbian aggression. The DoD feared that incremental military involvement advocated as the dominant neo-realist position, through the arming of the Muslims and utilising possible air strikes to protect the Bosnian government before the weapons arrived, could lead to deeper American involvement in a Vietnam-style quagmire. Secretary Perry embraced this departmental position which, though it coincided with the President's policy, was determined more by intra-bureaucratic interests and processes.

The reason that Secretary Perry was easily co-opted by his department was that he exhibited little ideological fervour of his own. As Drew recounted, Perry is, "essentially a

technical man, with no real policy-making or political experience, or practice as a public communicator. Perry was solid but colorless as Lake and Christopher."²⁵ While Secretary Perry was definitely a player regarding the Bosnia crisis, as his skillful mastering of his brief enhanced his power status, his lack of ideological zeal, symbolised by his co-option by the Pentagon over Bosnia, and his lack of personal closeness to the President meant he was not the principal architect of America's Bosnia policy. Nevertheless, he was a bureaucratic political force militating against any change in the administration's position on Bosnia.

Like Christopher and Perry, National Security Adviser Anthony Lake was in a position of significant bureaucratic political power due to the fact that he held the last of the three major governmental positions devoted to foreign policy in the Clinton administration. As National Security Adviser he was the senior official most closely tied bureaucratically to the President. Therein lay the power and limitations of Lake's unique office.

The National Security Adviser (NSA) has a dual function, he alternatively manages the foreign policy process as well as serving as a source of independent advice for the President.²⁶ In his function as coordinator of the foreign policy process, the NSA administers National Security Council meetings by setting their agenda, briefing the President prior to each meeting, and controlling the preparation of material for each meeting.²⁷ The NSC members are by law the President, the Vice-President, the Secretaries of State and Defence, the NSA, and any other officials the President desires to attend the meeting. The Clinton administration rarely used the formal NSC apparatus, preferring the informality of the Principals' Committee, which was composed of the NSC core members. This bureaucratic shift in reality cost Lake little power, as he simply coordinated foreign policy informally, at his mid-week lunches with Secretaries Christopher and Perry. Needless to say, Lake's role as overall coordinator of the administration's foreign policy was a significant source of bureaucratic power.

Ironically, the agency created in 1947 to resolve bureaucratic rivalries has become another bureaucratic bastion. As Lord noted, "with the administration of Richard Nixon the NSC adviser and his staff became for the first time a powerful and independent bureaucratic actor."²⁸ The NSC staff and NSA are not only part of the executive branch, but also part of the President's personal staff. As such, they are not subject to review by the Congress. Thus the NSA is the only one of the three major foreign policy actors serving under the President in the executive branch not subject to Congressional oversight. This lack of a Congressional check on the NSA is a major source of his/her power. "As the Tower Commission concluded

in 1987, the NSC adviser and his staff are supposed to provide 'advice from the President's viewpoint unalloyed by institutional responsibilities and biases...the President is the National Security Adviser's only constituent'.²⁹ This lack of bureaucratic responsibility to other agencies and Congress has made the NSA very powerful, and as the Iran-Contra scandal attests to, very controversial.

Thus the key to the NSA's power, even more than for the other executive branch foreign policy actors, is his/her relationship with the President. Lake's structural position in the government lead to another of his bureaucratic advantages, that of physical closeness to the President. As DeParle observed, "Lake alone sees President Clinton on a daily basis."³⁰ This proximity to the President was even more bureaucratically important in the Clinton administration than is usually the case. As a top administration official argued, "Because the President is not involved in foreign policy as much as other Presidents have been, Tony is in a unique position. He is the only one who sees the President every day. That puts him in a very strong position to be the interpreter,"³¹ of foreign policy issues. Nor were Perry and Christopher likely to attack Lake's prerogative. As DeParle argued, "Lake gains an additional edge from the colorless qualities of his would-be rivals, Christopher and Perry."³²

But unlike Christopher and Perry, Lake did not have an independent Cabinet power base. The NSA's very bureaucratic closeness to the President is also a limitation on his/her bureaucratic power. The growth in the power of the NSA has been a symbiotic process, whereby the President himself has accrued greater power through independence from the foreign policy bureaucracies at State and Defence. As Lord argued, "the result [of the creation of the NSC] has been to lessen the President's dependence on his [cabinet] advisers by giving him greater control of the policy process and a staff that can effectively represent the presidential perspective in national security matters."³³ The NSA is thus even more dependent on the President than the other foreign policy actors in the executive branch, and serves as the President's specific emissary in bureaucratic battles. As Menges observed, at the time of its creation, the NSA was to be the President's eyes and ears, assuring that his directives were carried out by the foreign policy bureaucracy.³⁴ While Lake undoubtedly had real bureaucratic power in the Clinton administration, in the end, "the NSC is and must remain essentially a surrogate for the President."³⁵ The President is more master than servant of the NSA. This lack of an independent power base was a severe bureaucratic limitation of Anthony Lake's power.

Nor did Lake's personal characteristics make it likely that he would confront foreign policy issues as an equal with the President, as Kissinger and Brzezinski nearly did during their powerful tenures as NSA. Like Perry and Christopher, Lake was a team player who valued consensus highly. During the Carter administration, like Christopher, Lake served as one of Secretary of State Vance's top aides, as director of policy planning in the State Department. As Heilbrunn argued, "Still haunted by memories of the warfare between Vance and Brzezinski when he worked in the Carter White House, Lake has sanctified the notion of collegiality into a mantra."³⁶ This is not the description of the man who was likely to be the dominant force behind American foreign policy. As DeParle observed, "He [Lake] is by design the most obscure member of the Clinton foreign policy team."³⁷ Thus like Secretaries Christopher and Perry, although Lake was in a strong bureaucratic position by virtue of his structural role within the Clinton administration, his collegial temperament did not earmark him as the driving force behind American foreign policy outputs.

Nor did Lake enjoy a close personal relationship with President Clinton, compared with either Secretary of State Christopher or Deputy Secretary of State Talbott. As a high-ranking administration official observed, "Tony always gives you the impression that he is not that sure of his relationship with Bill Clinton. I can see it in meetings; he is nervous of it."³⁸ Lake, who became a top foreign policy adviser to Bill Clinton during the campaign, nevertheless came to the job late, and was not considered a 'true believer' in the President as was Secretary Christopher. While there were no reports of friction between the President and his NSA, neither were they close personally. Thus despite Lake's bureaucratic advantage of seeing the President every day, his physical proximity to the President was not matched by a personal closeness.

Nor did Lake exhibit real schools of thought fervour about the Bosnian crisis. As chapter 5 illustrated, Lake is an institutionalist both generally and regarding Bosnia specifically. While Lake was not as committed to the administration's overall Bosnia policy as others like the President, he publicly despaired of the other schools of thought policy preferences. Regarding Bosnia, Lake stated, "while we have clear reasons to engage and persist [in working for a peace accord] they do not obliterate other American interests involving Europe and Russia, and they do not justify the extreme costs of taking unilateral responsibility for imposing a solution."³⁹ This aversion to unilateral action in deference to allied considerations placed Lake firmly in the institutionalist camp on Bosnia. Yet Lake was not happy about the UN's lack of military resolution in the face of Serbian provocation. As Heilbrunn argued, "Lake has managed to appear more hawkish than the administration [regarding Bosnia] and

yet completely loyal to it."⁴⁰ What Lake desired was a more muscular form of institutionalist policy in Bosnia. For example, he championed the threat of Nato air-strikes to deter Serb attacks on the safe havens of Sarajevo and Gorazde. Lake ultimately desired a revamping, but not a fundamentally altered, institutionalist policy in Bosnia. Lake's hesitations regarding Bosnia made it unlikely he was the central executive actor behind the administration's institutionalist policy. However his advocacy of a more hawkish brand of that policy made it also unlikely that he favoured a fundamental schools of thought change in overall American policy regarding the Bosnian conflict.

Thus although Anthony Lake had a strong structural position within the administration as NSA, he was not the foreign policy actor primarily formulating administration policy. In his desire for bureaucratic consensus, his passion for anonymity, his lack of personal closeness to the President, and his halfhearted support of the Clinton White House's Bosnia policy, Lake illustrated that he was not the driving force behind administration policy. However nor was Lake's influence negligible. In his bureaucratically important role as NSA, Lake was likely to support attempts to make the West's Bosnia policy more muscular through the increased use of air-strikes, while remaining committed to the administration's overall Bosnia policy.

Nor was Strobe Talbott the key figure moulding the executive's institutionalist policy preference regarding Bosnia. However, unlike Christopher, the Deputy Secretary of State brought both a strong personality and a clearly defined ideological vision to the foreign policy arena. Talbott's personal bond with the President was strong, as is evidenced by the fact that the two men shared digs at Oxford when both were Rhodes Scholars in the late 1960s. As Adams stated, "he [Talbott] is one of the few people with instant access to the Oval Office - better than Warren Christopher, his ostensible boss."⁴¹ As access to the President and an official's relationship with the executive are two crucial aspects of bureaucratic political power within the American system, Talbott was well placed to exact influence on American foreign policy as a whole.

Yet there were significant bureaucratic limitations on Talbott's power. Before he was Deputy Secretary of State, Talbott was ambassador-at-large to the CIS states, and he was still thought of primarily as a Russian expert rather than as an actor crafting overall American foreign policy. While Talbott's personality and strong democratist convictions greatly affected US policies regarding aid to Russia and questions about European security, he had little direct impact on the administration's institutionalist Bosnia policy.⁴²

While Talbott bureaucratically won battles with Christopher and Aspin over the Partnership for Peace Plan, as it affected America's Russia policy, he had little direct power regarding other issue areas, such as Bosnia. Talbott's influence regarding the conflict was largely indirect, as he has played a major role in setting the administration's democratist Russia-first policy, which, as was illustrated in chapter 6, neatly coincided with the White House's hierarchy of priorities that partially motivated its institutionalist Bosnia stance.

Talbott's bureaucratic power was also limited in the sense that as Deputy Secretary of State he was in too junior a bureaucratic position to actively drive the Clinton administration's overall foreign policy. Given his unique relationship with the President and his clear democratist orientation, Talbott probably maximised the amount of bureaucratic power that can be retained by someone not of cabinet-level status. However, as for Talbott being the driving force behind overall American foreign policy, he was simply too junior an official to be considered for the role. For the part of chief instigator of the administration's institutionalist policy regarding Bosnia, one must look to Bill Clinton himself.

But was this not the President that was supposed to concentrate on domestic affairs? Just because it is true that Bill Clinton spent little time on foreign affairs does not mean he did not dominate American foreign policy-making. The standard perception of a President inattentive to international affairs is largely correct. As Hoagland noted, in the first ten full months of his presidency, "The president has chaired just eight full NSC meetings...or about one a month."⁴³ An even more significant bureaucratic indication of the President's lack of concern about foreign affairs is the fact that, as Sciolino noted, "Even the ever-cautious Christopher summoned the courage to tell Clinton point-blank that he has to become more engaged in foreign policy by spending at least an hour a week with his national security advisers."⁴⁴ Apart from an intensive involvement in the promotion of free trade, as was evidenced by his leadership regarding the Nafta treaty, the President did not devote much energy or attention to foreign affairs.

This lack of focus on foreign affairs mirrored candidate Clinton's pledge to spend the bulk of his time as president on domestic reform, as opposed to the conduct of President Bush. As Barone and Ujifusa stated, "No president has entered office with more ideas and proposals about domestic public policy."⁴⁵ This is reflected in a White House pamphlet issued to celebrate the achievements of the administration's first 100 days. Of 27 accomplishments listed, only 1 related directly to foreign affairs.⁴⁶ Yet this domestic-first

approach of the Clinton presidency strongly influenced the administration's overall institutionalist Bosnia policy. As Engelberg and Gordon noted, "With President Clinton elected on a platform of domestic change, clearly he wasn't going to entertain the option of 'going in [to Bosnia] in a major way' an official reasoned."⁴⁷ Thus the President's domestic priorities directly affected his administration's institutionalist Bosnia policy, which advocated the least amount of American involvement in the conflict of the three major schools of thought. This is a strong indication that despite the President's lack of attention to foreign affairs, he personally was still firmly in charge of the executive branch's foreign policy outputs.

From both a personal and a bureaucratic standpoint, Bill Clinton emerged as the dominant actor in the executive branch regarding foreign policy formulation. The President's personality was reflected in the overall style of foreign policy-making in the White House, with both its emphasis on collegiality and in the difficulties Clinton had in genuinely delegating responsibilities. This latter point is illustrated by the fact that the men the President picked to help make foreign policy around him, such as Secretary of State Christopher, were self-effacing and easily bureaucratically dominated by the gregarious President. As Gelb noted, "None of this trio [Christopher, Aspin, Lake] seeks the limelight. All will fit comfortably with the Clinton plan to make policy in the White House."⁴⁸ Sullivan concurred, shrewdly seeing that in the choice of picking such an unprepossessing Secretary of State, the President himself wished to control foreign policy. Sullivan observed, "His appointment of the empty suit, Warren Christopher, as his secretary of state was a sign that he [Clinton] was not prepared to delegate foreign policy to anyone who could rival his power or intelligence."⁴⁹

In fact it was the fatal combination of President Clinton's lack of attention to foreign affairs coupled with his dominance of the foreign policy-making process, that many critics pointed to as the major reason for the administration's oft-criticised foreign policy outputs. As Flora Lewis noted, "Christopher is a decent intelligent man, but he lacks drive and a sense of how to make the world's gears work. He could be a good Secretary of State for a president who wanted to be a foreign policy activist and needed only a loyal executive officer to carry out instructions. But President Clinton pledged to give priority to domestic affairs. He resents having to spend too much time on complex foreign issues."⁵⁰ For critics of the President, it was bureaucratically the worst of all possible worlds. Bill Clinton proved personally unable to turn foreign policy-making over to a strong Secretary of State, so he could concentrate on the domestic reform programme that led to his election. Instead, he still

dominated the policy outputs for international affairs, without giving them the time they so obviously warranted.

The very bureaucratic foreign policy formulation process of the administration itself reflected the dominance of the President in conducting international affairs. Friedman and Sciolino assessed the bureaucratic nature of how the executive branch obtained its foreign policy outputs. According to them, there were several levels of foreign policy bureaucracy working within the administration. At the lowest level were the Interagency groupings for different issue areas, such as Russia, Iraq, and Haiti. Meetings at this level were conducted by Assistant Secretaries of State, Defence, and Treasury, who prepared policy option papers for the Deputies' Committee. The Deputies' meeting, attended by the Deputy Secretaries of State (Talbot), Defence, and Treasury sent their policy recommendations to The Principals Committee, which was comprised of the Secretaries of State and Defence (Christopher and Perry), the Permanent Representative to the UN (Albright), the National Security Adviser (Lake), the Director of Central Intelligence (formerly Woolsey), and usually the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Shalikashvili), who made recommendations which were sent to President Clinton.⁵¹

This process was designed to produce consensus, with each committee sorting out its bureaucratic differences before passing a unified position on to the next level of policy-making. This was precisely what the President had in mind. As Gelb stated, "he [President Clinton] almost always urges them [top aides] to think broadly and act cautiously within a consensus."⁵² One of the President's powers is the ability to arrange the bureaucratic foreign policy decision-making process to suit his personal idiosyncrasies. As such, the exact decision-making procedures regarding foreign policy vary President to President. As Rubin argued, "Each succeeding administration expanded the number of challengers to State's primacy [in foreign policy decision-making]. Ike elevated the CIA; Kennedy, his White House staff; Johnson, the Defense Department; Nixon, the National Security Advisor."⁵³ The President has the power to not only determine the number of players in the foreign policy game, but also to construct the foreign policy decision-making process itself. Clinton's bureaucratic process ruled out the administration adopting bold or risky foreign policy initiatives, for instance advocating the democratist stance on Bosnia, as risky positions by definition will almost never lead to consensus within the cautious world of bureaucracies, predicated by its belief in standard operating procedures, which makes for conventional policy-making.

The Washington Post noted the Clinton administration's bureaucratic policy-making process made consensus too high a priority. It observed for example that, "it is quite another [thing] to let the drive for consensus and universal support take precedence over the need finally to choose a course that will of necessity create enemies."⁵⁴ Thus, the bureaucratic policy-making process of the administration mirrored its external institutionalist proclivity to attempt to attain consensus at almost any price.

This desire for consensus reflected the personality of the President himself, and is another indication that he was the primary actor determining the executive branch's institutionalist Bosnia policy. The President was consistently accused by his critics of not standing for anything, of valuing consensus over both fixed principles and even good policy. It was charged, the President was, "so open to suggestion as to be practically an empath,"⁵⁵ like the Woody Allen character Zelig, who assumed the opinions and mannerisms of all those he met.

This criticism was largely unfounded. The President, as has been illustrated, brought a strong institutionalist orientation to crafting foreign policy. Yet it is true that he valued consensus far more than 'conviction politicians' like Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher. That his bureaucratic foreign policy decision-making process reflected traits in Bill Clinton's personal character is a strong sign that he was central to foreign policy formulation within the executive branch.

Like President Carter before him, Bill Clinton was accused of being unable to delegate responsibility, even regarding an area such as foreign policy where he had a secondary interest. As Greenstein stated, "Another of Clinton's traits is a predilection to take on large numbers of personal responsibilities, so much so that it is difficult for his administration to move on more than on track at a time."⁵⁶

This propensity can be seen in the administration's overall bureaucratic method of obtaining foreign policy outputs. In the Clinton administration's decision-making structure, the ultimate decisions about policy were made only at the highest level by President Clinton himself, who thus assumed the role of key bureaucratic actor in the decision-making structure, instead of one of the cabinet officials, as has sometimes occurred in American history.⁵⁷ Yet as former President Nixon remarked, "No secretary of state is really important. The president makes foreign policy."⁵⁸

Nixon was correct about the vast power of the presidency making it possible for the executive to dominate foreign policy-making in the executive branch, and indeed overall as well. Certainly regarding the executive branch, this was the case with President Clinton. Indeed as was noted in chapter 5, it is no mistake that the President's specific policy preferences regarding Bosnia, Russia, and Europe perfectly reflected administration policy and overall American foreign policy as well. This result merely confirmed that President Clinton himself played the major bureaucratic role in concocting the administration's overall institutionalist policy regarding Bosnia.

ii) The schools of thought stance of the legislative branch regarding Bosnia during the 103rd Congress

Next, it is important to determine the overall schools of thought orientation of the 103rd Congress, by identifying the crucial actors responsible for the formulation of Congress' schools of thought policy preferences. While the analysis here does not include every major foreign policy actor in the House and Senate, enough are discussed so that an overall Congressional schools of thought orientation can be discerned.

a) The House of Representatives

i) Newt Gingrich

Newt Gingrich, the House Minority Whip during the 103rd Congress, brought solid neo-realist credentials to discussions about the Bosnia crisis. No one could doubt Gingrich's general ideological fervour, or his personal presence in key bureaucratic battles during the early days of the Clinton administration. As Barone and Ujifusa observed, Gingrich, "has come out something like an American Gaullist: a nationalist who believes in American exceptionalism and a strong military, a cultural conservative who believes that liberal values are destroying the lives of the poor, a market capitalist who celebrates technological innovation and considers high-tech and traditional values happy companions. All these beliefs run counter to the beliefs of the baby boom liberals who have dominated the thinking of the House for most of the last 20 years and now of the Clinton administration and against them Gingrich has been an insistent, impolite and persistent battering ram."⁵⁹

As Politics in America noted, rhetorically Gingrich, "has made a career as a scourge on Democrats."⁶⁰ However, the Minority Whip's partisanship extended far beyond rhetorical broadsides against the Democrats. His style was increasingly replicated among the House

Republican membership to the point that even before the 1994 midterm elections, Gingrich supporters dominated the Republican leadership in the House.

Yet Gingrich was not a major player in setting the Congressional overall schools of thought orientation during the first two years of the Clinton administration. This is due to several factors. Firstly, the then minority whip was just not that involved in the foreign affairs debate, concentrating instead on the domestic shortcomings of the Clinton administration, such as its failure to produce a politically viable health care plan. It was only towards the end of the 103rd that Gingrich became more involved in foreign policy debates, such as his role in the passage of the two free trade expansion pacts.

Secondly, Gingrich was in the minority party in the House, which unlike the more deliberative Senate, does not allow filibusters that make accommodation between the parties essential to passing almost all pieces of legislation. As the Democrats held a considerable majority in the House (256-178 with one independent member) during the 103rd Congress, they could easily ignore the Minority Whip's neo-realist disagreement with the administration and House Democratic leadership over Bosnia.

Thirdly, and most importantly, as Barone and Ujifusa observed, "The House, in foreign affairs, which Hamilton [Lee Hamilton, then Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee] came to see as something like Columbus, Indiana [his hometown] in commerce: graced with fine architecture, but off the beaten track; with its share of strong intellects, but largely ignored in favor of the more glamorous (and treaty-ratifying and appointment-confirming) Senate."⁶¹ Simply put, the House has far less institutional power regarding foreign affairs than the Senate, and that this bureaucratic restriction is bound to inhibit the practical effect all its members, including Gingrich, have on determining the overall legislative schools of thought preference.

This limiting of the House's role in the arena of foreign policy formulation, had been the intent of the founders, who gave to the Senate the power to ratify treaties and approve executive foreign policy appointments, and enshrined this right in the Constitution. They did so because the founding fathers felt the House, whose members are elected every two years, was too susceptible to public opinion to be involved as a major participant in foreign policy-making, which required long-term thinking about policy initiatives. Thus, despite his undoubted ideological commitment to neo-realism and his institutional savvy, during the 103rd Congress Gingrich was little more than a leader of a minority party in an elective

chamber that had little bureaucratic relevance for foreign policy decision-making compared with the bureaucratic might of the executive branch. Still, Gingrich's relevance regarding the schools of thought orientation of the Congress grew, as he became the new Speaker of the House, and thus the single most important representative in the lower chamber.

ii) Lee Hamilton

Lee Hamilton, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee as well as head of the European and Middle Eastern subcommittee during the 103rd Congress, had far more impact on foreign policy-making than his legislative colleague Newt Gingrich. While impeded by the same bureaucratic constraints regarding a representative's relevance for foreign policy initiatives as the Minority Whip, Hamilton was a genuine influence on foreign policy-making in the new era. However, his power was based more on his close contacts with the Clinton administration than on playing a major role in determining the overall legislative schools of thought orientation. As was illustrated in chapter 5, Hamilton's institutionalist views almost perfectly matched those of the Clinton administration, and he was a key supporter of the President in the 103rd Congress. A major reason for Hamilton's power regarding foreign affairs was this shared schools of thought orientation with the President, which enabled him to amass far more relevance than a Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee normally would be able to attain. This bureaucratic clout is illustrated by the Chairman's close links with his fellow Democratic institutionalist, Warren Christopher, who frequently sought his opinion on the key foreign policy issues of the day.⁶² While, as has been observed, Christopher's bureaucratic power was more limited than the average Secretary of State, Hamilton made the most of the connection. Thus, Hamilton parlayed a shared institutionalist affinity with the Clinton administration into an important, if informal, consultative role with the White House regarding foreign policy-making.

Hamilton's personality also augmented his power base within the House to an extent. Unlike Gingrich, the Chairman had assumed a non-partisan manner, which had won him respect in both parties, though like his friend Secretary Christopher, he was sometimes criticised as being too inoffensive and neutral to successfully push his own institutionalist foreign policy agenda. As *Politics in America* observed, "the calm and measured Hamilton tends to be overshadowed by more activist members [of the Foreign Affairs Committee]."⁶³ Thus Hamilton's personality tended to cut both ways regarding his accretion of power involving foreign policy-making. His caution was criticised as a factor impeding the forceful advancement of his institutionalist views. Also the bureaucratic strictures on House members

regarding involvement in foreign policy-making cannot be overestimated. Beyond an ability, with the Senate, to limit funding for foreign policy initiatives, even influential members of the House such as Hamilton have little direct influence on overall American foreign policy-making. Hamilton's power regarding foreign policy initiatives in the 103rd Congress lay in his informal influence with his like-minded institutionalist colleagues in the Clinton administration. Hamilton found himself no longer Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee in the 104th Congress. Still, given the informal basis of Hamilton's power, he remained somewhat influential within White House circles, even if his already limited role in setting the legislative schools of thought orientation has been further diminished.

b) The Senate

Before individual Senators are assessed regarding their role in forming the legislative schools of thought orientation of the 103rd Congress, some general bureaucratic comments about the nature of the Senate's specific decision-making process would be helpful, beyond again noting that the Senate has far more of a role in foreign policy-making than the House.⁶⁴ Firstly, the Senate was politically divided throughout the 103rd Congress, in a way in which the bureaucratically more compact executive branch can institutionally never be. This difference has an institutional basis, as there are simply more players involved in creating the Senate's overall schools of thought orientation than will ever exist in the more exclusive executive branch. This political division was not just between Republicans and Democrats. The 103rd Congress, though, "Nominally Democratic, (it) does not have a working Democratic majority on most issues, and the Democrats with only 56 votes fell well short of the 60 needed to shut off a filibuster."⁶⁵ Thus, without compromising with Republicans, Democrats were unable to advance any foreign policy initiatives, as the Republicans could obstruct any critical vote by talking the issue to death without fear of having their filibuster overridden. This system made compromise much more essential than in the House. This trend toward moderation was bolstered by the ideological makeup of the upper chamber, as the Senate was generally less partisan and more moderate than the lower chamber. About 25 of the Democrats in the Senate were liberals, with around 25 Republicans affirmed a solidly conservative agenda. That left half the votes, and the bulk of the political power, with the moderates of both parties.⁶⁶ This moderate tilt of the Senate made radical foreign policy initiatives, such as the democratist prescription for Bosnia, unlikely to emerge as the foreign policy choice of the chamber.

i) George Mitchell

As was discussed in chapter 5, Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell adopted on overall democratist schools of thought orientation, though regarding the Bosnian crisis his institutionalist minority views were exhibited. Barone and Ujifusa noted this ideological schism in Mitchell, stating, "there is a tension between Mitchell's down-the-line liberalism and President Clinton's 'new kind of democrat'."⁶⁷ Thus, it is not surprising that Mitchell's ideological stresses were reflected in his schools of thought orientation regarding American foreign policy in the new era. Mitchell adopted the democratist majority line in the post-89 era, while retaining elements of the more mainline Democratic institutionalist position on issues such as Bosnia and trade expansion. This ideological contradiction, while possibly limiting the former Majority Leader's clout regarding the Congressional response to the President's free trade initiatives, was not a drawback regarding Bosnia. Mitchell was a key player in deflecting Senator Dole's neo-realist initiatives regarding Bosnia, and thus helping to ensure the continued primacy of the administration's institutionalist policy initiatives.

Along with conflicting ideological impulses regarding foreign policy, Mitchell's bureaucratic power was further hindered by his low-key style. Like Lee Hamilton in the House, Mitchell won a reputation as an even-handed figure as he, "acted like the federal judge that he used to be."⁶⁸ However unlike Hamilton, Mitchell's more left-leaning ideology was viewed with trepidation, even within a Democratic party split between old-style liberals and newer, more conservative 'New Democrats', mainly from the south and west. These new Democrats had reservations about Mitchell's old-fashioned New England liberalism (he lives in Maine), and his non-aggressive style was thought to be a liability, especially in contrast to Minority Leader Dole's assured and combative manner.⁶⁹ That Mitchell was able to overcome these ideological and personal drawbacks and emerge as a key figure in determining the overall Congressional schools of thought policy preferences regarding the Bosnia crisis is an indication of both the bureaucratic power the Majority Leader wields in the Senate, and how this power is expanded in foreign affairs debates when his/her schools of thought orientation coincides with that of the executive branch.

Mitchell became Senate Majority Leader in 1988, and soon used this top position to make himself a major participant on almost every issue that the Senate dealt with.⁷⁰ This was particularly true as the Majority Leader traditionally directs legislative strategy regarding key bills. After the election of President Clinton, Mitchell's position became if anything more important, as he was expected to generally steer most legislation (they did disagree strongly

about China's MFN status) favourable to the President through the treacherous waters of the Senate. As the President and Mitchell shared an institutionalist policy preference regarding Bosnia, it became Mitchell's task to thwart any Congressional attempt to unify around policies inimical to President Clinton's institutionalist policy predilection, such as the Dole-Lieberman amendment which would have lifted the arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslims and effectively scuttled both the President's supremacy in crafting Bosnia policy and ended the period when American policy reflected an institutionalist thrust regarding Bosnia as well. While it was not in the realm of political possibility for Mitchell to ignore the strong neo-realist revolt in the Senate against the President's handling of the Bosnian crisis, as shall be illustrated later in this chapter, he was able (just) to preserve the President's policy by keeping most Democrats (who were, after all, mainly institutionalists) in the fold and persuading Democratic neo-realists, such as Senator Biden, to initially vote with the White House. Mitchell's crucial institutionalist input into the overall Congressional schools of thought orientation was not significant enough to insure that the President's Bosnia policy met with broad consensus in Congress. Rather, it helped keep Congressional opinion divided, and in so doing, ensured the ultimate supremacy of the Clinton administration's institutionalist policy regarding Bosnia during the 103rd Congress. The Majority Leader shocked many by retiring after the 103rd Congress.

ii) Joe Biden

Senator Joe Biden was one of the few key decision-makers in the Senate espousing the democratist policy preference regarding Bosnia. Even those such as George Mitchell and Strobe Talbott, who held overall democratist viewpoints, disagreed with Biden's fervent commitment to reverse the military successes of the Serbs. Thus, while Biden's strong ideological belief was evident, unusually, this may actually have been a hindrance to his successful pursuit of his democratist goals regarding Bosnia, as he was so patently politically out of step with both the Congress and the American people in general.

Harries pointed out an example of the political impotence of the democratist cause, noting, "In June of this year [1993], the House voted to kill the National Endowment for Democracy, the agency created during the Reagan years to promote democracy abroad,"⁷¹ and a key bureaucratic institution which democratists had hoped would increase its role of fostering democracy in the new world order. That the democratists were unable to prevent its abolition is a clear indication of their relatively weak political presence. Biden's democratist

predilection regarding Bosnia was definitely a minority viewpoint. If his views were to be relevant during the Bosnian debate, he would be forced to compromise.

Senator Biden's personal character helped advance his democratist viewpoint regarding Bosnia. As Cramer noted, observers, "praised his [Biden's] 'oratory' but wondered whether there was any thought behind the waves of stirring words."⁷² Politics in America concurred, observing that Biden's charisma did not quite eclipse his reputation as somewhat of a political lightweight. It stated, "[Biden has] the talent and charisma to be an influential Democrat for decades to come. He is personable, conciliatory, and an impressive orator. Yet a question remains: Does he radiate more heat than light?"⁷³

While Biden's prodigious gifts were partially offset by questions about his intellectual seriousness, in the case of the Bosnia debate his skills were successfully exploited. Biden's character did not make him much of either a legislative strategist or a drafter of laws. "With his glib tongue and preference for action, his strength is at the podium, not the bill-drafting table."⁷⁴

During the time of his rhetorical alliance with the neo-realists in the 103rd Congress, Biden's strengths were catered for. While neo-realists such as Senators Dole and Lugar plotted legislative strategy and drafted the Dole-Lieberman amendment, Biden was utilised as a spokesman in the Senate for the anti-Clinton position on Bosnia, where his rhetorical skills were exhibited. For example, Biden's report on his fact-finding mission to the Balkans, "To Stand Against Aggression," was a brilliant diatribe against the President's Bosnia policy.⁷⁵ Senator Biden published his report to Claiborne Pell, thus ensuring it maximum publicity. Biden's communication skills were cleverly exploited to the benefit of the anti-Clinton coalition in Congress regarding the American response to the Bosnian crisis.

Biden used his bureaucratic position as Chairman of the European Affairs Subcommittee as a personal pulpit to attack the administration's Bosnia policy, often lecturing Secretary Christopher about American inaction over Bosnia in the full glare of television cameras. With the Democrats defeated in 1994, Biden no longer held his pivotal post. Yet with his reputation for eloquence and being 'good copy' for the media, Senator Biden's personal talents continued to make him a powerful foe of the administration's institutionalist Bosnia policy.

iii) Richard Lugar

Senator Lugar, the ranking Republican on the European Affairs Subcommittee during the 103rd Congress, is a perplexing figure for the schools of thought paradigm. While as chapter 5 attests, he is a solid neo-realist on a wide range of foreign policy issues including Bosnia,⁷⁶ as time has progressed Lugar increasingly questioned the wisdom of the thrust of the Dole-Lieberman amendment, seeing in it a diminution of presidential authority that would hurt the US both now and in the future. So while Lugar generally agreed with his neo-realist colleague Senator Dole about the short-comings of the administration's Bosnia policy, he came to question the neo-realist legislative strategy he formerly supported in the 103rd Congress, valuing broad historical precedents that stood to be lost regarding presidential primacy in foreign policy-making if a version of the Dole-Lieberman amendment were to be enacted, over concerns about the specific merits of the Bosnian case.

As a result of his personal abilities, Lugar managed to retain a large amount of power over Congressional foreign affairs decision-making despite some bureaucratic setbacks. Lugar, who was Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee from 1985-86, lost control of the chairmanship due to both Republican defeat in the Senate in 1986 as well as the machinations of Jesse Helms, noted Republican anti-communist firebrand, who used his seniority over Lugar to become the ranking Republican on the committee. Nevertheless, Lugar maintained his high profile regarding foreign affairs, "in the 1990's, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and as Helms became less active and fired much of his activist staff, Lugar again became influential."⁷⁷ Lugar was able to remain more prominent than Helms on the Foreign Relations Committee due to both Helms' increasing lack of vitality after major heart surgery and the lack of relevancy of his one-note anti-communist philosophy, which after the failed August Coup became increasingly outdated. Lugar's reputation as an articulate conservative capable of genuine bipartisanship made him, "his party's de facto leader on the broad fronts of agricultural policy and foreign affairs."⁷⁸ His success in remaining a Senate leader regarding foreign policy was a testament to his perceived personal skills, rather than to Lugar holding a leading bureaucratic position, as he once had.

Still Lugar, as the ranking Republican on the European Affairs Subcommittee in the 103rd Congress, was both personally and bureaucratically well-placed to play a key role in determining Congress' overall schools of thought orientation regarding Bosnia. A solid neo-realist, he closely collaborated with Senator Dole in supporting the Dole-Lieberman amendment which so nearly scuttled the administration's institutionalist foreign policy thrust

regarding Bosnia. So it came as a shock that, in the 104th Congress, Senator Lugar appeared to be backing away from advocating Congressional action to lift the embargo on the Bosnian Muslims. As The Economist noted, "Lugar criticised Dole's Bosnia and peace-powers initiatives because they would 'tie-up the president's ability to take action'."79

This change in position was not without practical cause. In April 1995 Lugar formally announced his bid for the presidency. While at the time many felt he had little chance to win, a large number of observers believed Lugar could well end up as Secretary of State in a new Republican administration.⁸⁰ Lugar's change of position was also in line with the standard neo-realist Republican view that Congress should let the President take the lead in formulating American foreign policy.⁸¹ While this volte-face may be largely strategic, a case of not wanting to hand-cuff the possible Republican President in 1996, and while Lugar did not clearly state that he would vote against his neo-realist ally Senator Dole over a new initiative to lift the embargo, clearly Lugar moved from being a strong supporter of the former neo-realist strategy in the Senate to an undecided position over whether such a plan should be attempted again in the 104th Congress. While Lugar's neo-realist schools of thought orientation remained constant, his loyalty to Dole's neo-realist legislative strategy did not.

iv) Bob Dole

Senator Dole became the focus of neo-realist efforts in Congress to reverse the Clinton administration's institutionalist policy regarding Bosnia. As the statements in chapter 5 indicate, there was no doubting Dole's neo-realist ideological fervour about the Bosnian crisis. He consistently and actively sponsored efforts to lift the arms embargo on the Bosnian government, as was illustrated by his authorship of the Dole-Lieberman amendment as well as his primary role in plotting legislative strategy for the anti-Clinton Bosnia cause in the Senate. Beyond his clear ideological commitment to changing America's overall Bosnia policy, Senator Dole brought considerable personal skills as well as an unparalleled bureaucratic position to the Bosnia debate, making him a central leader in determining the overall Congressional schools of thought orientation regarding the Bosnian crisis.

Dole's personal characteristics, which to some extent have hindered his presidential campaigns, have paradoxically enhanced his Senate career. Senator Dole's take-no-prisoners rhetoric has become legendary. As Barone and Ujifusa observed, "The aggressiveness, the mixture of conciliatory language with clear threats of political hardball, the crisp tongue and

sharp humor, are all vintage Dole."⁸² The reason for Dole's 'meanness' or 'strength' (depending on one's viewpoint) can be traced to the battlefields of Italy in World War II, where Dole suffered grievous wounds which still cause him pain today.⁸³ The negative aspects of Dole's personality have plagued him nationally since the 1976 Presidential campaign when Dole, as President Ford's running mate, harshly attacked the Carter ticket to the detriment of his own cause. As Cramer stated, "Everybody knew Dole was...a hatchet man,"⁸⁴ a tag that has stuck with Dole to this day. However in the Senate, Dole's rhetoric has been seen as a component of a man who has the courage of his convictions, a man who engenders as much respect in the chamber as fear. It also provided Dole with ample political cover to be the bipartisan pragmatist that he is. As Politics in America stated, "Dole is a true conservative and a man skilled at bare-knuckles politics. But foremost he is a legislative pragmatist, a deal maker."⁸⁵ Dole's no-holds-barred rhetoric is just another example of his personal strength, a quality much admired in the Senate, that has made Dole perhaps its most influential member.

Likewise, Senator Dole's bureaucratic position has helped him assume a leading role in developing Congress' schools of thought orientation regarding Bosnia. Dole has been the Republican leader in the Senate since 1984, and has made his position as chief Republican in the Senate unassailable. It was as Minority Leader during the 103rd Congress that Dole utilised his considerable gifts, becoming one of the most important and effective Minority Leaders in Senate history. Senator Dole managed to keep his minority 44 Republicans together on issues such as the President's stimulus plan, where his filibuster strategy effectively killed this major Clinton initiative. Dole also easily scuttled President Clinton's Health Care plan, which had been the centrepiece of his legislative programme. Even when the President was successful, as over Nafta, Dole provided the majority of the Senate's votes for the President, and thus justifiably claimed a large share of the credit for what should have been viewed unambiguously as a victory for Clinton. Dole, as the successful and undisputed chief Senate Republican legislative strategist of the past ten years, was indeed central to the development of Congress' schools of thought predilections regarding the Bosnian crisis.

iii) The Interaction of the Executive and Legislative Schools of Thought Stances During the 103rd Congress

As section (ii) of this chapter has illustrated, unlike the White House, the legislative branch had collectively a conflicting schools of thought orientation. While powerful Senate leaders in foreign affairs, such as Dole and Lugar, advocated a neo-realist position, equally

important Senators, such as George Mitchell, advanced the President's institutionalist stance. The Senate was not united around a single school of thought (as was the executive branch).⁸⁶ As Dewar stated, "the House and Senate are more torn and splintered over Bosnian intervention than they were over any other recent US military initiative."⁸⁷ It is this division in the schools of thought orientation of the various Senate leaders that partly explains the administration's success in maintaining its institutionalist policy over Bosnia during the time of the 103rd Congress.

There are, of course, other factors which explain the White House's success in maintaining its institutionalist Bosnia policy. Public opinion, as Citrin et al note, is a peripheral concern to legislators when considering foreign policy stances.⁸⁸ Nevertheless, as Lake noted, "foreign policy does not need to be driven by politics to be influenced by it. Policy decisions can also be constrained by the anticipated political reaction."⁸⁹ Certainly this was the case regarding the democratist position toward the Bosnian crisis, which had engendered almost no support among the American people. More significantly, public opinion tended to favour the administration's minimalist institutionalist policy preference for Bosnia. "In polls last week [May 1993], CBS News found that half the public opposed US air strikes, with 38% in favor. A Gallup Poll found 55% in opposition and 36% approving. But ABC found 65% supporting air strikes if they were conducted jointly with European allies."⁹⁰ Certainly in the crucial month of May 1993, public opinion seemed to have generally supported an institutionalist position regarding Bosnia. While public opinion did not play a major role in determining the schools of thought output of American foreign policy regarding Bosnia, what residual effect it did have went the administration's way.

Even with the end of the Cold War era, it is certainly true that the executive branch has much more of a role to play in determining foreign policy outputs than does the legislative branch. Historically, "except for treaties, tariffs and an occasional declaration of war, foreign affairs were generally understood to be the prerogative of the Executive."⁹¹ This historical expectation that the President is and ought to be the primary actor determining foreign policy outputs has had a subtle but telling influence on executive-legislative relations regarding international affairs, making Congress hesitant to collectively override the presidential will on foreign policy-making, whether they have agreed with him or not. President Clinton used this point to his advantage in the Bosnian crisis, as hesitant legislators, backed the Nunn-Mitchell amendment despite reservations about the President's institutionalist Bosnia policy, citing the historical precedent of presidential authority in determining overall American foreign policy initiatives.

In light of the presidency's obvious institutional advantages, what is striking about the schools of thought controversy regarding America's Bosnia policy in the 103rd Congress was how close the anti-Clinton Congressional forces came to success. Almost all the bureaucratic advantages the President generally enjoys over Congress regarding foreign policy-making cut President Clinton's way over Bosnia. The President did dominate the executive branch's schools of thought posture toward Bosnia. This is evidenced by the fact that none of Clinton's advisers (certainly not Secretary Christopher, Deputy Secretary Talbott, Secretary Perry, or National Security Adviser Lake as profiled in this work) publicly advocated either a democratist or a neo-realist position over Bosnia. The same, of course, could not be said for Congress, where Majority Leader Mitchell used his considerable powers to oppose Senators Dole and Lugar, who attempted to overturn the arms embargo placed on the Bosnian Muslims. In the less relevant House, the schools of thought debate raged as well, with institutionalists such as Lee Hamilton opposing any attempt to divert from the President's policy. Yet despite all these advantages, the President was forced to compromise. His supporters in the Senate on Bosnia, such as Mitchell and Sam Nunn, the powerful Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, in a desperate attempt to defeat the Dole-Lieberman amendment to the Defence budget, introduced the Nunn-Mitchell bill, which generally supported the President's institutionalist policy preference regarding Bosnia, but at some cost.

"The bill stated the president would have until October 15 [1994] to seek multilateral support for lifting the arms embargo. Failing that and failing a peace agreement, all funds supporting the involvement of US forces in the embargo would end on November 15 [1994]. A last-minute letter from Clinton agreeing to push for a multilateral end to the embargo helped Nunn head off a more strongly worded House version."⁹²

In defence of his amendment, Nunn had stated, "I think the time has been - really, is overdue, in terms of lifting the embargo. But I believe it matters how we do it. I do believe it matters that we coordinate what we do with the British and the French."⁹³ This desperate institutionalist rationale to peel off natural Dole supporters succeeded but only because, as the quotation illustrates, Nunn conceded the central point that the embargo ought to be lifted, and soon. Clearly a majority of Senators were for some strategy that eventually would lead to a lifting of the embargo in July 1994. In the end, waverers decided to give the President more time to rally the European allies around a plan to end the embargo on the Bosnian government.

Thus, while the embargo would not be unilaterally broken as the neo-realists called for, Nunn-Mitchell, with its conditions for active US involvement in the enforcement of the embargo, was not a ringing endorsement of the President's institutionalist position either. The Nunn-Mitchell compromise passed only after Vice-President Gore killed Dole-Lieberman by breaking the tie in the Senate vote of July 1, 1994. How had the neo-realists managed to come so close to overturning the President's institutionalist policy?

That Senator Dole and his allies almost managed to severely embarrass the President (doubtless he would have vetoed the defence budget if Dole-Lieberman had passed, and Congress would have been unable to override the veto) gives an indication of the perceived degree of failure of the administration's institutionalist Bosnia policy. As Miller stated, "Congress is most deeply involved in foreign policy when it senses a vacuum or internal divisions within the executive branch."⁹⁴ While the President maintained a consistent institutionalist line in the executive branch regarding Bosnia, critics and even some supporters of his policy believed it to be flawed, as it had failed to bring the benefits institutionalists had insisted such an initiative would accrue if their policy preference was pursued. For example, despite the institutionalist priority for preserving Western unity whatever the Bosnia policy, Western European leaders, particularly in Britain and France, hearing President Clinton deride their policy preferences regarding Bosnia as he went along with them, reacted coolly to the American position. Likewise while President Clinton's institutionalist Bosnia policy did not seriously damage Yeltsin's position, as the Chechnya conflict illustrated, neither did it prevent him from appeasing some of his nationalist foes at the expense of relations with democrats such as Yavlinsky and Gaidar.

These diplomatic failures of the American institutionalist line, coupled with the fact that the war in Bosnia continued, despite a general appeasement of the Serbs, called into question the validity of the policy itself. While Americans were no more prepared to go to war on behalf of the Bosnian government in November 1994 than they had been in May 1993, with the failure of Clinton to seriously try, as he had promised to under Nunn-Mitchell, to unite the allies behind a plan to lift the embargo, the neo-realist option was adopted increasingly throughout the Republican party. The neo-realists around Senator Dole had used the concrete diplomatic shortcomings of the President's institutionalist policy to their political advantage in July 1994, when they nearly succeeded in forcing the President to veto the Dole-Lieberman amendment. After the stunning Republican triumph in the mid-term elections, and the corresponding growth in strength for the neo-realist school of thought at the expense of the institutionalist position, it was an open question as to whether President Clinton could

successfully use his veto to override the renewed neo-realist onslaught on his Bosnia policy in the 104th Congress.

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Chapter 8: A Reassessment of Schools of Thought Analysis

It is now necessary to conclude by reassessing schools of thought analysis, both within the context of the Bosnian crisis and in general.

A) Schools of Thought Analysis and the Climax of the Bosnian Crisis

One of the problems with any study of International Relations is that it is finite, that its 'shelf-life' is limited. This truism is particularly apt about a discipline that revolves around analysis of current events, as the factor of time makes many studies of foreign relations merely an analysis of a 'snapshot', while the world quickly moves on. A truly useful International Relations essay, like fine literature, art, or cinema, must be able to stand the test of time. So how has this schools of thought analysis of the Bosnian crisis stood the test of the tumultuous events that have occurred in Bosnia since November 1994?

The same fusion of bureaucratic politics and schools of thought analysis as was employed in chapter 7 regarding the American response to the Bosnian crisis in the time of the 103rd Congress, can now be applied to the question of American Bosnia policy during the 104th Congress. The starting point for this process is the recognition that the increasingly bitter dispute between institutionalists and neo-realists over Bosnia policy was not quieted by the President's ability during the 103rd Congress to maintain an institutionalist policy regarding Bosnia. Analysis of the differences of opinion regarding Bosnia illustrates that they related back to different basic schools of thought orientations about the fundamental way the world worked, and as such, were not likely to be easily papered over. True to form, Senator Dole once again attempted to pass legislation to lift the arms embargo in the summer of 1995.¹

So how did this political process play out? The administration did not retreat from its institutionalist stand on Bosnia. Rather its position, if anything, hardened after July 1994. Not only did the administration fail to convince the European allies to lift the embargo on the Bosnian government, it did not press them to do so, as the Nunn-Mitchell amendment had directed. On November 11, 1994 the US unilaterally stopped policing the arms embargo on the Bosnian Muslims in line with Nunn-Mitchell, but this act had little practical effect as it hampered the allied sea interdiction, leaving the primary point of entry for illicit weapons, by air into Zagreb, unmolested. The US agreed to a new 'take-it-or-leave-it' plan sponsored by the French. In return for recognising Croatia and Bosnia international sanctions on Serbia

would be lifted by the Western allies.² The plan again hoped to divide the Serbs from their Bosnian Serb compatriots by ending the dream of some at Pale that one day they would unite their conquered portions of Bosnia with Serbia proper. The plan was even more institutionalist than the previous initiatives, as gone was any attempt to present Milosevic with a 'stick' if he refused to come to terms with the West. Also gone was the notion of punishing in any way the man who had done the most to spark the Bosnian conflict. Limiting the damage done in Bosnia, at heart an institutionalist impulse, had become both the American as well as the Western priority in the conflict. The President's Bosnia policy at last contained no shadings of difference with the European institutionalist agenda.

An even further refinement of the plan was offered to Milosevic in March 1995. It urged the Serbs to approve principles to keep Bosnia intact and in return sanctions would be gradually removed from Belgrade. This meant that the Serbs had to do even less than before, as Milosevic no longer had to formally recognise Bosnia but only approve a nebulous set of 'principles' that in practice might or might not lead to the eventual partition of the Bosnian state. Milosevic rejected the offer. He found an ally in Russia who agreed with the Serb leader, in defiance of the Europeans and the US, that he ought not to recognise Croatia and Bosnia until sanctions were first lifted from Serbia. As Gordana Logar, the editor of Nasa Borba, the last major independent newspaper in Serbia stated, "This proposal [the initial French plan] won't force Milosevic to do anything other than wait for the next proposal, which is bound to be better."³ She was right.

Schools of thought analysis anticipated the strengthening of the administration's institutionalist policy regarding Bosnia. As chapter 7 indicated, President Clinton, National Security Adviser Lake, and Secretaries Christopher and Perry are all institutionalists and as such a specific institutionalist Bosnia policy was in keeping with their general global view. Thus the policy was not likely to change. In chapter 7 it was determined that President Clinton himself was the dominant bureaucratic figure in the setting of the administration's schools of thought orientation, as his primacy in the executive branch was not likely to be challenged, the overall schools of thought orientation of the executive branch and the specific institutionalist Bosnia initiative were likely to remain constant. Further, Secretary Perry, National Security Adviser Lake, and Deputy Secretary Talbott, three of the President's most bureaucratically powerful aides, for their own reasons generally agreed with the President's Bosnia policy, thereby reinforcing, not challenging the administration's Bosnia initiative.

The same cannot be said for the 104th Congress. Unlike the 103rd Congress, its schools of thought orientation was not muddled, but was strongly neo-realist. This is illustrated by again looking at the political fates of the Congressional foreign policy 'leaders' discussed in chapters 5 and 7. Due to the mid-term elections, the institutionalist leaders, primarily Democrats, fared worse in the 104th Congress than during the 103rd session. In the less important (for foreign policy) House, the neo-realist Newt Gingrich became Speaker while the institutionalist Lee Hamilton lost the chairmanship of the (newly renamed) International Relations Committee. As the House has more of a winner-take-all ethos than the Senate, as is evidenced by the fact it has no filibuster provisions so 60% of the chamber is not needed to agree on a piece of legislation, the Speaker was able, with his neo-realist Republican majority, to easily steer the new Dole bill through the House.

In the Senate such passage also occurred, but was more problematic. Senator Dole found himself once again Majority Leader, and thus was in a far better political position on most issues in the Senate after the November elections. Considering as Minority Leader he mustered 50 votes for the Dole-Lieberman amendment in July 1994, with a 54-46 Republican edge in the Senate, he was likely to pass his bill lifting the embargo on the Bosnian government this time. Dole's fervour stemmed partly from the fact that his neo-realist position on Bosnia conformed with his general neo-realist view of the world, as was highlighted in chapter 5. Such a congruence of specific schools of thought initiatives with general schools of thought predilections exhibits both a consistency of mind as well as a likely vehemence of stance, as the policy in question conforms with a decision-maker's general analysis of both the state of the world and thus how problems ought to be rectified. Dole's new bill was obviously neo-realist in that it called for: a pull-out of the UN peacekeepers; a lifting of the arms embargo; and a robust Nato bombing campaign on Serb targets in Bosnia itself.⁴ Placed in the premier bureaucratic seat in the Senate to tactically promote legislation, Senator Dole finally succeeded in passing a neo-realist bill that threatened the institutionalist Clinton administration's control of overall American policy towards Bosnia.

Yet Senator Dole's victory in the Senate was not a sure thing for he could no longer count on his important bureaucratic ally, Senator Lugar. Lugar's transition from a key proponent of the neo-realist position regarding Bosnia to a stance more supportive of the President, chronicled in chapters 5 and 7, continued into the time of the 104th Congress. Lugar criticised Dole's new amendment in January 1995, as he felt it would constrain the President's ability to lead.⁵ Why this sudden solicitude for President Clinton? In April 1995, Lugar declared himself a candidate for President. It is clear that his partial policy shift can be

explained by political considerations. Senator Lugar rightly saw that if Congress overturned the President's Bosnia policy, it would call into question the executive's central role in foreign policy decision-making. Lugar did not want this to happen either if he were (surprisingly) to become President, or (more likely) to become a member of the cabinet in the next Republican administration. Bureaucratic political analysis thus explains Lugar's shift.

In losing the unqualified support of Senator Lugar, Majority Leader Dole lost far more than a single Senator's advocacy. Lugar helped Senator Dole with legislative strategy regarding foreign affairs in the 103rd Congress, and as chapter 7 illustrated, was pointed to as 'the foreign policy expert' who helped give Dole's neo-realist Bosnia stance intellectual credibility. While Senator Lugar voted with Dole initially, his possible loss on the veto-override vote was a grievous wound for the overall success of Dole's cause. As Lugar is an acknowledged Senate 'leader' on foreign policy issues, it was likely that his possible shift would have persuaded other Republican Senators to desert Dole's neo-realist position. These defections would have had a weighty effect on any attempt to override President Clinton's expected veto of the Dole bill.

Senator Dole picked up supporters such as Joe Biden who had grown tired of the President's mantra of multilateralism regarding the Bosnian crisis. As chapter 5 highlighted, Senator Biden, despite being a Democrat, has an overall neo-realist schools of thought orientation and thus easily coalesced with his neo-realist Republican colleagues over Bosnia. His hard-line democratist policy preference regarding Bosnia made the chances Senator Biden would decide to support the institutionalist Clinton administration's initiatives slim. Feeling betrayed by the President's lukewarm efforts to convince the European allies to lift the embargo, Biden, a crucial 'swing vote' in the Spring of 1994, broke ranks with his party in the summer 1994 vote. This defection was largely based on his schools of thought orientation.

Yet despite the strengthening tide of neo-realism in the 104th Congress, Senator Dole's initiative was always likely to end in failure. An aide to Senator Biden accurately laid out the political scenario. "I'd be surprised if there are the votes to override a veto. The Republicans will follow their leader. The vote is so important to Dole, and is an easy stick to beat the President with. Lugar has changed his mind, one can speculate as to why this is, and this will affect moderate Republicans. However ultimately, I'd be surprised at a veto override."⁶ While Dole's bill passed the neo-realist Congress, there was never any doubt the institutionalist administration would certainly veto it. While a two-third's override in the

House was likely, with Lugar's possible defection a veto override in the Senate was unlikely as Senator Lugar would have enough followers to make Dole's attaining the 67 votes needed for a veto override improbable. In the end, despite an improved political situation for the neo-realists in the 104th Congress, they were able to politically embarrass the President, but unable to change the course of America's institutionalist Bosnia policy.

However the focus of the crisis shifted once again, away from the ornate chambers of Congress to the ghastly killing fields of Bosnia. Here for the first time in three years, the battlefield initiative came to rest with the Bosnian Muslims, or more exactly their Croatian allies. By Fall 1995, after Croatia had earlier recaptured the Krajina from the Croatian Serbs, a joint Bosnian-Croatian offensive had retaken territory so that it controlled approximately 50% of Bosnia itself. Sarajevo, long the symbol of suffering in Bosnia, was at last out of range of Bosnian Serb artillery shells and was successfully protected by British and French soldiers on the ground, and decisively, by American servicemen in the air. How did this dramatic change come about and what does it say about my earlier schools of thought analysis of the American response to the Bosnian crisis?

The immediate changes on the ground were the result of several significant structural alterations to the forces underlying the conflict. Croatia's lightning thrust into the Krajina was the immediate, historical reason for the shift in the fortunes of war in Bosnia. Even more importantly, the shift was accepted by Serbia proper, which did nothing to overturn Bosnian and Croatian gains. Milosevic came to accept that roughly half of Bosnia would remain under Bosnian and Croatian control, based on the fact that the West would not allow all of Bosnia to be overrun. In this context, Milosevic's non-action made sense. He was merely allowing military losses in Bosnia to occur, as he would eventually have been forced to trade such land in negotiations anyway. In return, Milosevic hoped to receive both codification by the West of Serbian gains in Bosnia and a lifting of the crippling allied sanctions imposed on his country.

What was more surprising was that after so long American and Western European resolve began to stiffen, at least on the surface. This came about ostensibly because of the fall of the UN safe haven of Srebrenica to Bosnian Serb forces. The fall of Srebrenica was the worst blow of the war for the UN. The Serbs were so contemptuous of UN authority as to be able to overrun an area designated under UN protection. This outrage by the Bosnian Serbs, and the crimes against humanity that accompanied it, made either an increased contact group reaction or total UN withdrawal the only possible options, as the UN's frayed

credibility was at last completely shattered. Nato forces next threatened the Bosnian Serb shelling of Sarajevo and carried out a massive two-week campaign that not only made the capital safe from Serb shelling but also significantly damaged Serbian command and control centers throughout Bosnia. In the end, the Serbs agreed to pull their artillery out of range of the city and to pursue negotiations with both the Croats and Muslims, under the auspices of Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs. In two weeks, Nato bombing accomplished more than the institutionalists had initially thought it was capable of.

Yet this dramatic 'turning of the tide' masked the great continuities linking later American tactics with its earlier efforts of the past three years. For US policy remained institutionalist. What happened is this. The Clinton administration, stung to the quick by allied impotence in the face of the fall of Srebrenica and threatened by the very real possibility that the neo-realist Congress would overturn the thrust of its entire Bosnia policy, was forced to adopt new tactics to save that same institutionalist orientation. The President merely adopted the more hawkish variant of institutionalism, epitomized by National Security Adviser Anthony Lake. The President was only able to accomplish this because of the emergence of a new player in the Bosnian drama, President Chirac of France, who unlike his predecessor Mitterand agreed with the Clinton White House that the Western institutionalist policy would have to become more martial. Thanks to Chirac, allied consensus, so crucial for institutionalists, allowed movement to a more aggressive Western stance.

Yet there can be no doubt that this 'new' stance was merely part of the old institutionalist policy. This is best illustrated by the fact that the outline of the peace agreement, so laboriously pursued by Assistant Secretary Holbrooke, was eerily reminiscent of the oft-maligned Vance-Owen institutionalist initiative of 1993. It still called for the Bosnian Serbs to receive 49% of Bosnia despite pursuing aggression, still gave the Bosnian Serbs the right to join a confederation with Serbia proper in return for remaining in a very weak Bosnian state, and still mandated that sanctions on Milosevic would be lifted in return for his approval of the plan. Nowhere within the institutionalist Clinton administration was there any talk about the Muslims continuing to overturn Bosnian Serb gains made by aggression, despite the change in fortunes on the battlefield. The underlying goal of the Clinton administration remained the same: to end the war as quickly as possible, to stop either its spread or its facilitating crises with either the Western Europeans or the Russians, despite the fact that such a policy rewarded Serbian aggression. As schools of thought analysis shows, despite

all the drama of the past few months, the underlying policy of the Clinton administration regarding the conflict in Bosnia remained the same.

Not only has schools of thought analysis been proven extremely useful in assessing the legislative outcomes relating to the Bosnian crisis, it has stood the test of time, in that all that has happened since the initial analytical 'snapshot' was made can be explained clearly by the analytical tool. This ability to transcend the moment makes schools of thought analysis a useful guide for apprehending the mysteries of the new world order.

B) A General Assessment of Schools of Thought Analysis

Schools of thought analysis, like every other analytical tool in the social sciences, has not proven to be perfect. Yet as this thesis has demonstrated, it is a useful methodological tool regarding understanding how American foreign policy outputs are reached in the post-Cold War era.

Three qualifiers must be placed on the statement that this thesis has shown that schools of thought analysis can be successfully applied to the study of International Relations. Firstly, in chapter 4, limited policy substantiation was found regarding the 'opinion-maker' institutionalists (see chart 4-2). For none of the three opinion-makers (Hoffmann, Keohane, and Nye) was enough evidence collected to certify their institutionalist status. The major reason for this, as was explained in chapter 4, is that a major flaw of the institutionalist creed is a proclivity for description at the expense of propounding specific policy preferences. Still, based on the evidence that was collected (in 5 out of 6 issue areas identified, the three opinion-maker's positions fit the institutionalist box), and on their general theoretical writings there is little doubt that Hoffmann, Keohane and Nye are all institutionalists. Interestingly, as chapter 5 illustrated, specific institutionalist decision-makers like Hamilton, Christopher, and President Clinton were more easily identified as institutionalists by their specific policy preferences. While the lack of evidence supporting the institutionalist opinion-makers is vexing, as the record of the institutionalist decision-makers affirms, it does not invalidate the essence of this important school of thought.

Secondly, as the example of Secretary of Defence Perry exhibited in chapters 5 and 7, it is possible for some decision-makers to follow one school of thought's policy cluster preference using another school of thought's rationale. In this case Secretary Perry adopted the institutionalist policy on Bosnia for largely neo-realist reasons. In the abstract, this would

seem to be a serious flaw with schools of thought analysis. In actuality, out of 49 decision-maker issue areas identified, Perry's position was the only example of such a process taking place. This rate of error seems acceptable to countenance.

More usefully, the Secretary's position on Bosnia does point out the important fact that other processes besides schools of thought analysis need to be analysed in determining American foreign policy outputs. As chapter 7 highlighted, Perry's position can be largely explained through bureaucratic political analysis, that he was 'captured' by the collective schools of thought orientation of the Pentagon. What William Perry's stance on Bosnia does point out is that while schools of thought analysis is an important methodological tool needed for understanding American foreign policy outputs, as it explains and analyses the sub-ideological aspects of decision-making, it must be wedded with analysis of governmental bureaucratic power to apprehend the complete picture of what is involved in making US foreign policy.

Thirdly, while schools of thought analysis accurately helps to explain how American foreign policy outputs are reached, this thesis does not attempt to explain how the foreign policy outputs for the rest of the world are arrived at, or other state's impact on the global arena. For example in the case of Bosnia, to attain a complete picture of the crisis, an evaluation of the policies of the French, British, Russians, and the UN, as well as the stances of the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims would be necessary. Girling's criticism of Schurmann's paradigm along these lines also applies to schools of thought analysis. As he stated, "What Schurmann does is to provide a stimulating analysis of one part of the equation: of course, a very important part, namely the world's greatest power."⁷ While analysis of American foreign policy is essential for any global analysis of the post-Cold War era, other states and institutions, and their interactions with American policy, must also be assessed for an overall global picture. Perhaps the other major players on the international stage can also be analysed through this new fusion of bureaucratic politics and schools of thought analysis. This thesis has been an attempt to innovatively assess the American aspects of the overall global power equation.

However even with these qualifications in mind, this thesis has illustrated the relevance of schools of thought analysis for the understanding of American foreign policy. The 'boxing' of individual decision-makers and opinion-makers has proved a success. Out of 81 specific policy prescriptions analysed (see chart 8-1), 60 coincided with the majority schools of thought box individual opinion-makers and decision-makers had been placed into, or an

accuracy rate of 74%. When minority orientations are taken into account, that is minority orientations as defined as 2 issues areas out of 5 corresponding to the same school of thought, the percentage of prescriptions correctly classified rises to 88%. Interestingly it is the political decision-makers and not the opinion-makers whose schools of thought viewpoints are the more consistent, with a 69% consistency rate for the opinion-makers, with 22 out of 32 prescriptions corresponding to their majority schools of thought classification, and a rate of 78% (38 of 49 issue areas corresponded to the cluster of policy preferences indicated by the schools of thought categorisation) for the decision-makers. While these quantitative claims are derived from a rather thin body of evidence, this thesis has illustrated that schools of thought analysis has been proven qualitatively consistent over a majority of the issue areas here examined.

The success of the schools of thought analysis confirms a central hypothesis of this thesis, that major issue areas are linked together by decision-makers and that the linkages themselves are largely the product of a decision-maker's general schools of thought orientation. For example in chapter 6 it was shown that the Clinton administration predicated its Bosnia policy at least partly on the conflict's lesser relevance in the administration's hierarchy of foreign policy priorities than were US policies to Russia and Western Europe. This prioritisation was shown to be in line with general institutionalist thinking. The success of schools of thought analysis confirms that the linkages of the issue areas a decision-maker confronts themselves follow a pattern, which is explicable by schools of thought analysis.

The schools of thought analysis presented here confirms the conventional wisdom that the Republican Party has tighter ideological discipline in foreign affairs than does its Democratic rivals. Republican decision-makers conform to their majority neo-realist orientation in 15 out of 17 issue areas discussed (see chart 8-1), or 88% of the time. Democrats, who espouse primarily either institutionalist or democratist viewpoints, are not nearly as consistent. Democrats in the thesis conform to their dominant school of thought 23 out of 32 times, or at a rate of 72%. Again, while all quantitative claims in this thesis are based on a thin body of evidence, qualitatively it is safe to say that Republicans were more sub-ideologically consistent over the issue areas assessed than the Democrats. Thus schools of thought analysis can help determine the degree of ideological unity major governmental organisations possess. In the case of the two American political parties, this can be done by looking at the orientations of Congressional 'leaders' in the foreign policy field.

Further, as was mentioned in the introduction, schools of thought analysis provides the building blocks for analysing whether a new overarching policy such as containment is now germinating in the post-Cold War era. Based on the evidence presented in this thesis, the answer so far is a resounding no. As Schurmann's analysis of the post-war world and chapter 7 illustrated, for an overarching policy to become institutionalised it needs the support of both the President and the Congress. As over Bosnia, while the President is the single most important player in determining foreign policy outputs, he needs at least enough support in Congress to prevent the legislative branch from overriding presidential vetoes. As Schurmann illustrated regarding overarching policy, the Republican Senator Arthur Vandenberg was essential for the institutionalisation of containment policy, and the imperial current of thought it represented, as the over-arching theme of post-1945 foreign policy. Vandenberg symbolised the alliance of liberal Republicans with the non-Wallaceite centrists of the Democratic Party, such as President Truman.

This thesis illustrated that such a political process has not taken place after the collapse of the Berlin Wall. As has been shown, there are currently both institutional and political divisions, symbolised by different schools of thought orientations, between the Congress and the executive branch and the Democratic and Republican parties. The 1994 mid-term elections have widened the schools of thought gulf. As the Bosnian case study highlighted, whereas the 103rd Congress had no overall dominant schools of thought orientation, the 104th Congress is effectively run by neo-realist decision-makers such as Speaker Gingrich and Majority Leader Dole, who were in no mood to compromise with the institutionalist Clinton administration. Part of the reason for their intransigence regarding foreign affairs, certainly in the case of Senator Dole, was his strenuous disagreement with the President's Bosnia policy. Until either a hybrid school of thought emerges as the result of a compromise between the neo-realist Republicans and the primarily institutionalist Democrats, or one party gains control of both houses of Congress as well as the presidency and successfully institutes policies predicated by its school of thought that become widely accepted by the general public, no new overarching foreign policy theme will emerge. At the moment it is doubtful these circumstances will occur, at least with the present administration still in office.

To sum up, there are very distinct limitations to schools of thought analysis. Before its efficacy can be conclusively illustrated, a larger sample of opinion-makers will need to be analysed. Also, as with all other analytical tools in the social sciences, schools of thought analysis is not wholly exact (witness the case of Secretary Perry) in that, in a few instances, decision-makers adhere to one school of thought's policy cluster preference using another

school of thought's sub-ideological rationale. Also schools of thought analysis is not some mono-causal analytical panacea, as obviously other processes and methods are needed for a full explanation of the unity of thought and action (such as an assessment of bureaucratic political processes).

What schools of thought analysis has accomplished in this thesis is to illustrate the overlooked commonalities of the Clinton administration's response to the Bosnian crisis, by delineating the hierarchy of policy priorities that so motivated America's response to the Bosnian tragedy. Schools of thought analysis has also shown the process by which major policy issue areas are linked together by decision-makers, a process partly the result of an individual's sub-ideological orientation. Schools of thought analysis has also provided the building blocs to assess how an overarching American foreign policy is likely to occur in the new world order, and if such a process is currently taking place. Thus schools of thought analysis has a place in the analytical armory of those who wish to study American foreign policy outputs in the new world order.

Finally, what does this assessment say about the American foreign policy-making structure in the new world order? Firstly, as chapter 7 exhibited, the institutional advantages of the presidency vis-a-vis the Congress in the realm of foreign policy-making are still immense. The row over Bosnia policy amounts to a near-miss for Congress in its perpetual struggle to erode presidential supremacy in making foreign policy. While the 104th Congress, in contrast to the 103rd session, does have a general schools of thought orientation, to defeat the President in a foreign policy battle it must have a veto-proof majority in both houses, united around a single school of thought. This circumstance is not likely to occur often.

However the Bosnia case also illustrates that while still the most important player on the chessboard in foreign policy-making, the President is likely to wield less overall power in the new era than during the Cold War. The Bosnia case study highlights how a President can be 'beaten' regarding foreign policy-making in the post-1989 era. If the President pursues an unpopular initiative, especially for a period of time without substantial result, as occurred in the case of Bosnia, and Congress can unite around a single school of thought-derived policy in opposition to the President, his will can be ignored. The key to analysing this process, beyond the political aspects of the scenario so well explained by bureaucratic political analysis, is a schools of thought examination of the foreign policy issues confronting America. Schools of thought analysis, as the Bosnian case study has shown, provides a

mechanism that can be used in assessing general foreign policy initiatives, such as the four other issue areas (Russia, China, trade, and Europe) mentioned in this thesis. It holds a key to analysing both the collective orientations of the American executive and legislative branches, as well as being a useful tool to gauge the likely fidelity of a decision-maker to his stance on a variety of foreign policy preferences.

Finally, schools of thought analysis is an analytical innovation that refines and enhances the concept of ideology. It is a refinement that links systemic beliefs to policy outputs. As it functions as a sub-ideology, it more tangibly links the remote realm of ideology to action. Fukuyama was right, liberal democracy is currently victorious in the realm of ideological combat. But that does not mean that the ideological contest is over, for within liberal democracy schools of thought analysis effectively illustrates that systematic differences have concrete policy implications. As this is so in the United States, the primary state exponent of liberal democracy, it is likely this process is occurring throughout the liberal democratic world. Schools of thought analysis is the useful analytical link between personal belief systems and transnational ideologies. Valentine, the hero of *Arcadia*, was right. Very little is known about this new era we find ourselves in. The schools of thought process is an analytical device that can help one to comprehend where the world is at the moment and why, and where it is going.

Chart 8 - 1: The results of the schools of thought boxing process

The Opinion-Makers:

Democratists: 8/11 (Eight issue areas out of 11 generally follow the cluster of policy preferences indicated by the schools of thought categorisation)

Neo-realists: 9/15

Institutionalists: 5/6

The Decision-Makers:

Democratists: 6/10

Neo-realists: 15/17

Institutionalists: 17/22

The Opinion-Makers: (With minority schools of thought orientations calculated as generally following the cluster of policy preferences indicated by the schools of thought categorisation)

Democratists: 11/11

Neo-realists: 13/15

Institutionalists: 5/6

The Decision-Makers:

Democratists: 10/10

Neo-realists: 15/17

Institutionalists: 17/22

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- 3) Pomfret, idem.
- 4) Bruce Clark, Laura Silber, and Nancy Dunne, "UK presses need for Bosnian ceasefire," The Financial Times, 5 December 1994.
- 5) The Economist, "Calling Dr. Kissinger," 14 January 1995.
- 6) Interview with an aide to Senator Biden, 6 March 1995.
- 7) John Girling, "Franz Schurmann and the logic of world power: a reappraisal," Review of International Studies, vol.11 no.4, (October 1985), p.309.

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