

WHAT FACTORS WOULD MAKE TERRORISTS
RESORT TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS?

Gavin Cameron

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November 1997



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Abstract

This thesis considers the factors that affect the escalation of terrorist violence. Terrorists often have an emotional and psychological stake in preserving the identity, the character, and, above all, the existence of their group. This has the effect of subverting ends to means: the ideology and goals of the group become secondary in importance to the necessities of organisational survival. At the same time, terrorism is generally a highly inefficient means of achieving strategic political objectives. Confronted by the failure of their campaign and unable to move from violence, since that would endanger the group's survival, terrorists may conclude that their best option is to increase the level of violence that they employ. In the past, self-imposed restraints and the fear of a backlash have often prevented terrorists from resorting to highly lethal acts of violence.

However, recently these dynamics have been combined with "non-traditional" terrorism that finds greater levels of violence not only acceptable, but necessary. Such terrorism has encompassed a range of motivations, but much of it reflects a growing dependence on religion, often combined with other factors, as legitimation. Undoubtedly, such groups aspire to higher levels of violence than has been the case with other, more traditional terrorist organisations. Consequently, they may be more willing to regard mass terrorism as justifiable.

These factors are considered in the context of the increased opportunities for nuclear proliferation, arising from the collapse of the former Soviet Union, and the increased feasibility of biological or chemical terrorism. The thesis concludes by arguing that, whereas non-conventional terrorism was once a remote threat, the changing nature of terrorism, combined with its intrinsic escalatory and self-perpetuating nature, means that the threat of nuclear terrorism has never been greater than it is now.

I, Gavin Cameron, hereby certify that this thesis, which is approximately 97,000 words in length, has been written by me, that it is the record of work carried out by me and that it has not been submitted in any previous application for a higher degree.

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I was admitted as a research student in October, 1994 and as a candidate for the degree of Ph.D in November, 1997; the higher study for which this is a record was carried out in the University of St Andrews between 1994 and 1997.

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Abbreviations

AD:	Action Directe
ADC:	Aide-de-camp
ALF:	Animal Liberation Front
ASALA:	Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia
BCE:	Before Common Era
BKA:	German Bundeskriminalamt
CCC:	Cellules Communistes Combatants
CE:	Common Era
CIA:	Central Intelligence Agency
CWC:	Chemical Weapons Convention
EMETIC:	Evan Mecham Eco-Terrorist International Conspiracy
ETA:	Euskadi Ta Askatasuna
FARC:	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
FBI:	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FEMA:	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FLN:	Front de Libération Nationale
FLQ:	Front de Libération du Quebec
GDR:	German Democratic Republic
GIA:	Armed Islamic Group
HEU:	Highly Enriched Uranium
INLA:	Irish National Liberation Army
IRA:	Irish Republican Army
JDL:	Jewish Defense League
JRA:	Japanese Red Army
KGB:	Soviet Intelligence Organisation
KKK:	Ku Klux Klan
LEHI:	Lohame Herut Israel
MLN:	Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional
MPCA:	Material Protection, Control and Accountability
MVD:	Russian Ministry of the Interior
NATO:	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC:	Nuclear, Biological & Chemical
NEST:	Nuclear Emergency Search Team
NNWS:	Non Nuclear Weapons State
NWS:	Nuclear Weapons State
NPT:	Nuclear Proliferation Treaty
OAS:	Secret Army Organisation
PFLP:	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PFLP-GC:	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command

PLO:	Palestion Liberation Organization
RAF:	Rot Armeefraktion
RB:	Red Brigades
RUC:	Royal Ulster Constabulary
SAM:	Surface to Air Missile
SDS:	Students for a Democratic Society
SLA:	Sybonese Liberation Army
SRF:	Special Rocket Forces
UDA:	Ulster Defence Association
UFF:	Ulster Freedom Fighters
UN:	United Nations
US:	United States
USSR:	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
UVF:	Ulster Volunteer Force
U-235:	Uranium-235
WMA:	War Measures Act
WMD:	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTC:	World Trade Center
ZOG:	Zionist Occupation Government

Introduction - The Opportunities For Nuclear Terrorism

On March 20, 1995, members of the Aum Shinrikyo cult released a lethal nerve agent, sarin, on the Tokyo underground. The attack caused the death of 12 people and injuries to over 5000 others and was the first major sub-state use of a weapon of mass destruction. Although terrorism using non-conventional weaponry had been the subject of academic and governmental discussion for twenty years prior to the attack, the events in Tokyo gave new impetus to this debate. Aum's actions broke a norm, that terrorists almost invariably limit their attacks to conventional means, and, given the derivative nature of many terrorist tactics, it thus increased the likelihood that there will be further attacks using weapons of mass destruction.

This thesis concentrates almost entirely on just one part of non-conventional terrorism, nuclear terrorism. There are three reasons for this: firstly, within the relatively limited confines of a doctoral thesis, an in-depth study of the opportunities for chemical, biological and nuclear terrorism would preclude a meaningful examination of the factors that would make terrorists prepared to contemplate using such weapons, the topic that is at the heart of this dissertation. Consequently, it is necessary to focus on just one of the three varieties of device. Secondly, nuclear weapons possess a unique destructive force and still, eight years after the end of the Cold War, remain unsurpassed in their power as a tool towards political legitimacy¹ and in their ability to capture the attention of a wide audience. Finally, in the wake of the collapse of the former Soviet Union, the opportunities for rogue states and sub-state actors to acquire fissile material have risen exponentially. Since 1989, the proliferation of the means to acquire weapons of mass destruction has become one of the foremost global issues for the future. Since the change has been the greatest in the case of nuclear, rather

¹ One of the strategies that many governments employ to undermine the effects of terrorism is to refuse to negotiate or otherwise deal with the group, since to do otherwise would be to acknowledge them as political entities that cannot be ignored, and thus to recognise the effectiveness of their campaign in gaining the group a voice. A credible nuclear threat makes such a strategy difficult, since the potential consequences of an attack are too immense for a government to ignore. Of course, acknowledging the existence of the group, or negotiating with them, do not preclude other, more forceful methods of dealing with the threat.

than chemical or biological, weapons, it is they that are most deserving of renewed study.

Nuclear terrorism covers a broad spectrum, from low-level incidents of threats involving radioactive material through attacks on reactors to a terrorist nuclear bomb. There have been several terrorist attacks on reactors, such as the ETA rocket assault on Lemoniz in northern Spain;² and the possibility of sabotage or a siege and hostage situation developing at a facility remains, particularly from single-issue anti-nuclear groups. In most cases, the latter form of terrorism is aimed at highlighting security and safety failures at facilities, and for that purpose, such actions will continue to remain a possibility.³ However, where the objective is to embarrass the government or to gain leverage for a group, then other varieties of nuclear terrorism have become increasingly likely because the feasibility of acquiring fissile material has also increased, making such actions easier and therefore more attractive. The result has been that "the threat of terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction has never been greater; and at the same time, it is never going to be less than it is right now."⁴

² David Fischer's response to Thomas Davies "What Nuclear Means & Targets Might Terrorists Find Attractive?" in Paul Leventhal & Yonah Alexander (eds.), Nuclear Terrorism: Defining The Threat, (Washington DC:Pergamon, 1985) pp. 85-86.

³ Terrorists too though continue to regard reactors as possible targets for attack. For example, the Chechen rebels have made several threats against Russian nuclear power facilities, although these have never materialised. "Chechen Rebels Reportedly Planning To Target Nuclear Facilities", BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, March 14, 1996. There have also been threats against reactors in Lithuania and Ukraine and by Sikh extremists against Indian facilities. See, for example: G. Kulbitsky, "Germany warns Lithuania About Intended Terrorist Act", TASS, November 12, 1994; "Attack Threatened On Lithuanian Reactor", Reuters, November 12, 1994; "White Brotherhood Sect Threatens Acts At Nuclear Power Stations", BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, November 23, 1993; "FBI Withheld Sikh Threat To Atom Plant, Gandhi Says", Los Angeles Times, June 4, 1985; Rone Tempest, "Gandhi Says FBI Should Have Told Him Earlier Of Terrorist Death Plot", Los Angeles Times, June 5, 1985. Four people were arrested in the USA in 1989 for plotting to simultaneously sabotage electrical transmission lines to three reactors in California, Arizona and Colorado, conspiring to "cause a significant interruption and impairment of the function of the [facilities]", Paul Feldman & Richard E. Meyer, "4 Held In Plot To Cut Lines Near Nuclear Plants", Los Angeles Times, June 1, 1989.

⁴ Kyle Olson, Testimony to: US Senate Committee on Global Affairs, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 104th Congress, 1st Session, October 31 and November 1, 1995, p. 104.

Nuclear Proliferation

Easier access to fissile material is largely a result of the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the growth of nuclear trafficking that has stemmed from it.⁵ FBI chief, Louis Freeh, has described the situation as "the greatest long-term threat to the security of the US"⁶ and Graham Allison, former Assistant Secretary of Defense, has stated that "the greatest single threat to the security of America today is the threat from loose nukes from the Soviet Union".⁷ Russia too acknowledges the danger. As early as 1989, then chairman of the KGB, Vladimir Kryuchkov said:

The threat of nuclear terrorism is for us very dangerous. The fact is that on the globe several tons of enriched uranium has disappeared from sites where it was produced and stored. It is not technically difficult to make a nuclear device, and this will mean that individual groups can terrorize not only towns, but even entire countries.⁸

While nuclear weapons remain under tight military supervision,⁹ there is a huge quantity of nuclear materials, dispersed throughout Russia, that is far less secure. One estimate puts the Russian inventory at 150 metric tonnes of weapons grade plutonium, 1000 metric tonnes

⁵ There is widespread recognition of this as the root of the current proliferation problem. For example, Stella Rimington, formerly Director General of MI5, states that "...the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction...is not a new threat, of course, but it has been made more immediate by the collapse of the Soviet Union. General instability there has resulted in the loosening of controls over both sensitive materials and related expertise." Stella Rimington, "Security & Democracy- Is There A Conflict?", The Richard Dimbleby Lecture 1994, BBC Educational Development, 1994. p. 9. Graham Allison has noted that: "Russia is a state in revolution... This revolution is shredding the fabric of a command and control society, in a state that houses a superpower nuclear arsenal and a superpower nuclear enterprise.", Graham T. Allison, Testimony To The Senate Committee On Foreign Relations Subcommittee On European Affairs, August 23, 1995.

⁶ "Sceptical Bear Ill-Disposed To Having Its Claws Clipped", Financial Times, January 15, 1996, p. 4.

⁷ Graham T. Allison, Testimony to: US Senate Committee on Government Affairs, Permanent Subcommittee On Investigations, Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 104th Congress, 2nd Session, March 13, 1996.

⁸ Alexander Raht, "Soviet Fear Of Nuclear Terrorism", Report On The USSR, Volume 2, Number 13, (March 30, 1990), p. 11.

⁹ Although even this may be less secure than once believed. Many nuclear warheads are being stored in facilities intended for conventional weapons "in less than adequate physical security." Warhead disassembly plants at Zarechny, Trekhgorny and Lesnoy have especially worryingly lax security. There may have been at least one case where a fissile material component of a weapon was stolen and then recovered. William Potter, "Before The Deluge? Assessing The Threat Of Nuclear Leakage From The Post-Soviet States", Arms Control Today, (October 1995), p. 13.

of enriched uranium, and at Chelyabinsk alone about 685,000 cubic metres of radioactive waste.¹⁰ William Potter, Director of Non-Proliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, puts the figures at 165 tons of separated weapons-usable plutonium and 1100 to 1300 tons of highly enriched uranium.¹¹ However, no-one really knows what quantities are involved because during the Cold War, Soviet facilities were set production targets. When they exceeded these, material was kept aside rather than be declared, so as to compensate for any shortfalls in subsequent targets.¹² Consequently, they were more concerned to produce as much nuclear material as possible, rather than keeping an accurate record of existing stocks. Furthermore, material was counted in rouble value rather than in weight and inventories could be out by several tons.¹³ This obviously all poses immense problems of accounting;¹⁴ and the danger is heightened by poor security, especially at nuclear sites, secret cities and research institutes.¹⁵ As an example, Charles Curtis of the US Energy

¹⁰ Phil Williams & Paul Woessner, "Nuclear Material Trafficking: An Interim Assessment", Transnational Organized Crime, Volume 1, Number 2, (Summer 1995), pp. 211-212. Frank Barnaby suggests that the military stockpile of plutonium in the former Soviet Union is around 125 tonnes, of which about 50 tonnes are outside nuclear weapons. Russia is dismantling around 1800 nuclear weapons per year, containing around 7 tonnes of plutonium. Frank Barnaby, "Nuclear Accidents Waiting To Happen", The World Today, Volume 52, Number 4, (April 1996), p. 94. A number of the so-called plutonium cities have recently changed their names. Chelyabinsk-65 is now Ozersk, Tomsk-7 Seversk, and Krasnoyarsk-26 is Zheleznogorsk. Oleg Bukharin, "The Future of Russia's Plutonium Cities", International Security, Volume 21, Number 4, (Spring 1997), p. 126.

¹¹ Potter, "Before The Deluge...", p. 12.

¹² Leonard Spector, Director, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Project, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC, Interview with Author, November 15, 1996, Washington D.C.

¹³ John Sopko, "The Changing Proliferation Threat", Foreign Policy, Volume 105 (Winter 1996-97), p. 10.

¹⁴ As an example, the Russians appear to have forgotten completely about the highly enriched uranium which was later purchased by the United States from Kazakhstan under Project Sapphire. It is impossible to know how many other caches of material may be unclaimed by the relevant authorities in the former USSR. Allison, Testimony... August 23, 1995.

¹⁵ Williams & Woessner, "Nuclear Material Trafficking...", pp. 211-212. The problem stems, at least in part, from the fact that in the Soviet Union, nuclear security was dependent on the fact that it was a closed state with strict controls over foreign travel by its citizens, internal security within the state was strict and discipline was rigidly enforced when controls were violated, and there was simply no black market for nuclear materials. Personnel were tightly screened and closely supervised by members of the security services. Usually, nuclear material could only be accessed in a three man team: two technicians and a member of the security services. Clearly, such procedures are no longer feasible in the new Russia and members of the security services are now as likely to be responsible for nuclear diversion as anyone else. US General Accounting Office,

Department visited the Kurchatov Institute near Moscow and found about 160 pounds of weapons grade uranium stored in lockers secured only by a chain through the handles of the lockers. There was no other security.¹⁶ It is estimated that fewer than 20% of these research facilities have even the most elementary electronic monitoring system as part of the security.¹⁷ The problem is further exacerbated by the fact that there are over 100 such storage sites and civilian research facilities in the former Soviet Union.¹⁸ In March 1994, the Russian Counterintelligence Service reported to President Yeltsin that there had been 900 thefts from military and nuclear plants and 700 thefts of secret technology in the second half of 1993 alone.¹⁹ The Ministry of Internal Affairs reported 900 attempts to gain illegal entry into nuclear facilities in 1993.²⁰ The German federal criminal police (the BKA) reported 267 cases of "illicit traffic in nuclear or radioactive materials" in 1994, compared to 241 in 1993, 158 in 1992 and 41 in 1991.²¹ Much of the theft is insider crime: staff employed within the industry making the most of their access to nuclear material.²²

Furthermore, the amounts of material available for theft will only increase in the near future. Russian-American arms reduction agreements mean that Russia will cut its number of nuclear warheads from 30,000 to 5000 by the year 2000, increasing its supplies of HEU by

"Nuclear Nonproliferation: Status of US Efforts to Improve Nuclear Material Controls in Newly Independent States", (March 1996), pp. 18-19.

¹⁶ John Barry, "Future Shock", Newsweek, July 24, 1995, pp. 34-37.

¹⁷ Allison, Testimony..., March 13, 1996.

¹⁸ Holly Yeager, "Warning: Nuclear Theft Peril Rising; Stockpiles of Bomb Material Are Growing But Security Is Lagging In The Former Soviet Union, Experts Say", The Orange County Register, March 14, 1996, p. A03.

¹⁹ Williams & Woessner, "Nuclear Material Trafficking...", p. 212.

²⁰ Rensselaer Lee III, "Post-Soviet Nuclear Trafficking: Myths, Half-Truths, and the Reality", Current History, (October 1995), p. 345.

²¹ A. Robitaille & R. Purver, "Smuggling Special Nuclear Materials", Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Commentary, Number 57, (May 1995).

²² See for example, Richard Beeston, "Russian 'Secret City' Admits Uranium Stolen By Civilians", The Times, August 25, 1994, p. 8. Even some of the former Soviet nuclear scientists are involved in the theft of materials, an example being the man who worked in the secret city of Krasnoyarsk and who attempted to smuggle two pounds of weapons-grade material out of the country. See T. de Waal, The Times, May 8, 1996, p. 13 or Christopher Bellamy & Phil Reeves, "Western Spies Find No Shortage of Secrets", The Independent, May 8, 1996.

hundreds of tonnes and of plutonium by tens of tonnes.²³ Currently there is a considerable debate on what should be done with the additional material: using it as part of a closed fuel cycle is the most probable option.²⁴ However, whatever is decided seems certain to take time to implement, adding to the risk of the material falling into the wrong hands. It seems unlikely that the disposal process will begin before 2010, due to the lack of a technological infrastructure and the enormous cost involved. This may be a mixed blessing in the current situation, given the social and economic state of the former Soviet Union, because the transportation of fissile materials at the moment would only increase the possibilities for their theft.²⁵

The problem is not limited to Russia; Ukraine, Kazakhstan and the Baltic states are in a similar predicament and there has been leakage from non-members of the former Soviet Union too: 130 barrels of enriched uranium waste were stolen from a facility in South Africa in August 1994,²⁶ more than a ton of beryllium, used in nuclear warheads, vanished from Stockholm airport in 1995²⁷ and there have been seizures of illicit nuclear materials in Switzerland, Poland, Turkey, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Austria, Belgium, Italy and India.²⁸

An additional problem has been a haemorrhage of personnel. The nuclear industry used to support entire cities such as Tomsk, but cutbacks have resulted in thousands of redundancies.²⁹ Workers often lived in secret cities where they were well paid and highly respected

²³ Aleksandr Bolsunovsky, "How To Utilize Fissile Materials After Dismantling Russian Warheads", The Monitor: Nonproliferation, Demilitarization and Arms Control, Volume 2 Number 4 (Fall 1996), p. 1. Bukharin assesses the quantities from this source to be around 100 tons of plutonium and 500 tons of uranium. Bukharin, "The Future of Russia's....", p. 126.

²⁴ For a sample of this debate, see: Mike Moore, "Plutonium: The disposal decision", The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Volume 53, Number 2, (March/April 1997), pp. 40-41; John P. Holdren, "Work with Russia", The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Volume 53, Number 2, (March/April 1997), pp. 42-45; Edwin S. Lyman & Paul Leventhal, "Bury the stuff", The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Volume 53, Number 2, (March/April 1997), pp. 45-48.

²⁵ Bukharin, "The Future of Russia's....", p. 140.

²⁶ John Deutch, Testimony to: US Senate Committee on Government Affairs, Permanent Subcommittee On Investigations, Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction", 104th Congress, 2nd Session, March 20, 1996.

²⁷ "Nuclear Material Disappears", The Globe & Mail, November 23 1996, p. A12.

²⁸ Robitaille & Purver, "Smuggling Special Nuclear Materials..."

²⁹ "Uranium, plutonium, pandemonium", The Economist, June 5, 1993, p. 105.

members of Soviet society. Since 1989, they have periodically been unpaid for months at a time; their wages have failed to increase in line with inflation and they have lost their cachet in society.³⁰ Vladimir Orlov, a Russian nuclear safety expert, stated in July 1997 that: "The industry is seriously and dangerously underfunded - 70% of security devices at Russian facilities are outdated...Some of the staff working at these plants are desperately depressed and haven't been paid in months - and the temptation to smuggle nuclear material out is great. The situation is very serious."³¹ In such circumstances, it is not surprising that some Russian scientists have been tempted to offer their services elsewhere: their base wage tends to be around \$67 a month; the Russian press reports that Iran is offering \$5000 per month for former Soviet scientists.³² Other prospective employers offer similar amounts. The problem is exacerbated by the Russian press's publication of alleged prices for nuclear materials in Western countries.³³ Between 1000 and 2000 individuals have detailed knowledge of nuclear weapons design and another 3000 to 5000 have been directly involved in the production of plutonium and enrichment of uranium in the former Soviet Union.³⁴ In 1991, at least one Russian nuclear scientist, from Krasnoyarsk, turned down an offer from Iraq. Brazil, India, Libya and Pakistan are alleged also to have actively sought scientists from the Soviet nuclear program, and in 1991, no fewer than 19 high-level scientists emigrated from Russia to

³⁰ "Darkness visible", The Economist, December 25 1993-January 7 1994, pp. 47-50. Bukharin, "The Future of Russia's...", p. 134.

³¹ Mark Franchetti, "US atom workers help Russia", The Sunday Times, July 20, 1997. Douglas Shaw & William Alberque, "Cooperative Efforts to Prevent the Terrorist Acquisition of Nuclear Materials from Russia, the New Independent States, & the Baltics", Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement, Volume 6, Number 2, Autumn 1997, pp. 169-178.

³² Sam Seibert with Karen Breslau, John Barry, Carroll Bogert, Betsy McKay, Andrew Nagorski, Theresa Waldrop & Christopher Dickey, "To Build A Bomb", Newsweek, May 15, 1995, pp. 10-15.

³³ Lee, "Post-Soviet Nuclear Trafficking...", p. 345.

³⁴ William Potter, "Exports and Experts: Proliferation Risks From The New Commonwealth", Arms Control Today, (January/February 1992), p. 34. These numbers are disputed: in 1992 Gennadii Evstaf'ev claimed that of about 100,000 scientists involved in some way with the production of WMD, only "several tens" had the knowledge to produce a bomb. However, many other knowledgeable Russian sources put the figure at 2000 to 4000 scientists with high level expertise and a couple of hundred who know in theory how to build a nuclear bomb from start to finish. D. L. Averre, "Proliferation, Export Controls and Russian National Security", Contemporary Security Policy, Volume 17, Number 2, (August 1996), p. 195.

Israel.³⁵ Money is not the only possible way for scientists to be recruited: the Aum Shinrikyo cult attracted Russian scientists and research students' attention through vast donations to leading facilities. They then attempted to persuade them to join the cult itself. They partially succeeded, having a follower who worked in the I.V. Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy and another in the Mendeleev Chemical Institute, a facility that researched nerve gas, amongst other things.³⁶ However, at the moment, the majority of scientists that are moving are doing so to states that already possess a nuclear capability, such as Israel or China, that are intent on upgrading the quality of that capability.³⁷ Such vertical proliferation is a major global concern, but is not of immediate importance to the issue of nuclear terrorism since it involves a level of complexity and sophistication well beyond any foreseeable terrorist objective. While it does not preclude that groups, such as Aum Shinrikyo, might be able to recruit specialists to their cause, it is also questionable whether terrorist organisations, intent on maintaining tight security, would want to risk using a mercenary scientist, no matter what their expertise or the amount they were being paid.³⁸ This is particularly so since the information required to design and construct a crude nuclear device is so readily available that weapons scientists from the former Soviet Union are almost superfluous. The biggest barrier to micro-proliferation is the ability of groups to obtain sufficient fissile material and it is in this that the opportunities for rogue states or non-state actors to exploit the increased vulnerability of people and material is considerable. Russia, with US assistance, is improving their accountability and control systems, but the extent of the problem remains vast.³⁹

³⁵ Potter, "Exports & Experts...", p. 34.

³⁶ David E. Kaplan & Andrew Marshall, The Cult At The End Of The World: The Incredible Story Of Aum, (London: Random House, 1996), pp. 73-76; James K. Campbell, "Excerpts from Research Study 'Weapons of Mass Destruction & Terrorism: Proliferation By Non-State Actors'", Terrorism & Political Violence, Volume 9 Number 2 (Summer 1997), pp. 35-39; Frank Barnaby, Instruments of Terror, (London: Vision Paperbacks, 1996), pp. 128-132; Christopher Drew, "Japanese Sect Tried To Buy US Arms Technology, Senator Says", New York Times, October 31 1995, p. A5.

³⁷ Thomas Cochran, Senior Scientist, Natural Resources Defense Council, Washington DC, Interview with Author, November 21, 1996, Washington D.C.

³⁸ Richard Falkenrath, Executive Director, Center for Science and International Affairs, JFK School of Government, Harvard University, Interview with Author, November 12, 1996, Cambridge, Mass.

³⁹ "Threat Of Nuclear Terrorism Increasing", Central News Network, August 22, 1995.

The extent of nuclear trafficking, the so-called grey market, is much debated: a March 1996 General Accounting Office report linked lax control over fissile materials to several nuclear thefts and the threat of nuclear blackmail, but found no direct evidence of a market operating within the former Soviet Union.⁴⁰ This would suggest that the trade is still in its infancy and has yet to be firmly established, that it is still a series of opportunistic bilateral deals, but in fact, there has yet to be a single unequivocal example of stolen nuclear materials reaching a *bona fide* customer.⁴¹ Of 278 radioactive theft incidents recorded by the Russian MVD between January 1992 and December 1995, only eight involved a purchase, in each case to a middleman.⁴² It is worth noting that when the Aum cult was investigating methods of developing a nuclear device (in 1993 they sought a meeting with Russian Minister of nuclear energy, Viktor Mikhailov, possibly to enquire about the cost of a nuclear warhead, but their request for a meeting was denied), they eventually sought to acquire the fissile material in the form of natural uranium from Australia. Given Aum's vast wealth, and their excellent contacts with Russian security forces and dealers in black-market arms, it seems almost inconceivable that they did not seek an alternative source of the fissile material first, and yet they evidently failed in this quest.⁴³ However, the Aum example is probably not a good one in this case since, if they had been less idiosyncratic about acquiring nuclear material, they would certainly have done more to target Japan's reprocessing facilities. It would offer an excellent and obvious source of material and although not a soft target by any means, was surely not an impossible one, given the cult's resources. That there have been no unequivocal cases of a transaction involving stolen fissile material may be as much a reflection of our ability to apprehend these

⁴⁰ US General Accounting Office, "Nuclear Nonproliferation...".

⁴¹ James L. Ford, "Nuclear Smuggling: How Serious A Threat?", Institute for National Strategic Studies, Strategic Forum, Number 59, (January 1996). See too the excellent chronology of known incidents in: Paul N. Woessner, "Chronology of Radioactive & Nuclear Smuggling Incidents: July 1991 - June 1997", Transnational Organized Crime, Volume 3 Number 1 Spring 1997, pp. 114-209. This is an updated version of the chronology by the same author in Volume 1 Number 2 of the same journal.

⁴² Rensselaer Lee III, Address to: Institute For National Security Studies, Center for Strategic Leadership, "Report of the Executive Seminar on Special Material Smuggling", September 13 1996, p. 21.

⁴³ Kaplan & Marshall, The Cult..., pp. 110-112 and 126; Drew, "Japanese...", p. A5; Barnaby, Instruments..., pp. 129-130; Campbell, "Excerpts from Research...", p. 36.

smugglers as the absence of such a market.⁴⁴ There clearly are states (and maybe substate actors), such as Iran, that would be willing buyers for such material. Equally, there is solid evidence of individuals who have been able to obtain such material, but who have little contact with buyers. It is these individuals that have been caught as they tried to find a market for their product. The real risk, in terms of a market developing, comes from middlemen willing to exploit an individual's access to sources of material and also having contacts with buyers. The obvious candidates for such a role would be the military or organised crime in Russia.⁴⁵

It has even been suggested that the market that may exist is composed almost exclusively of non-weapons grade material⁴⁶ or a situation artificially created by journalists and security service personnel setting up sting operations,⁴⁷ the notable example being the case of the seizure

⁴⁴ Sopko, "The Changing Proliferation...", p. 11.

⁴⁵ Cochran, Interview...

⁴⁶ For example, of the 158 cases of transactions involving illicit radioactive materials recorded by the BKA in Germany in 1992, 59 were fraudulent and of the remaining 99 examples, only 18 actually did involve radioactive material. Myles Robertson, "The Impact Of Crime In Eastern Europe On The European Union", Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement, Volume 3 Number 1 (Summer 1994), p. 144. However, by 1994, 77 out of 124 cases of actual or attempted nuclear smuggling from former communist states that were reported to Western authorities involved uranium or plutonium rather than more harmless materials. Robitaille & Purver, "Smuggling Special..." It is undeniable that the vast majority of the cases of nuclear smuggling have involved non weapons-grade material. See for example, Woessner "Chronology..." or the CIA's chronology of incidents from November 1993 to March 1996 in Gordon C. Oehler, "The Continuing Threat From Weapons Of Mass Destruction", Testimony To The Senate Armed Services Committee, Appendix A, March 27, 1996. However, it is difficult to assess whether most buyers believe that they would receive weapons grade material and had then been "duped" by their suppliers or whether it reflects a genuine trade in this quality of material, as would be suggested by articles such as "Romania Police Reveal Radioactive Smuggling Case", Reuters, March 15, 1996. There can be no doubt that there is a least some trickery in the market, the best example of which is that of red mercury, an almost mythical and certainly mysterious element that the Soviets allegedly used to facilitate their nuclear program. Since the late 1970s, there have been at least 25 attempts to sell red mercury on the black market, generating dozens of stories. All these sales have involved ordinary mercury compounds of little use in a weapons program, sold at exorbitant rates. The consensus of most experts is that red mercury does not exist at all. See The Uranium Institute, "Red Mercury", UI Briefing, Number 92/5 and US Department of Energy, "Red Mercury: *Caveat Emptor*", Critical Technologies Newsletter, (April 1992), Volume 10 Issue 1.

⁴⁷ Phil Williams & Paul Woessner, "The Real Threat Of Nuclear Smuggling", Scientific American, Volume 274, Number 1, (January 1996), pp. 26-27.

of 350 grams of atomic fuel at Munich airport on August 10, 1994.⁴⁸ There is little doubt though that the quantities of low-grade material being trafficked are increasing.⁴⁹ It is also important to note that it is only in bomb-building that the quality of fissile material is key: most other forms of nuclear terrorism would be just as effective using industrial-grade material as weapons-grade. Furthermore, while it is possible that the market has been inflated in Germany, where most of these supposed sting operations have occurred; there is increasing evidence that there are several more conduits into the West which have grown in significance, as the profile of the German one has risen and thus decreased its usefulness to nuclear smugglers. It seems clear that progressively more and more material is being brought through southern routes such as the Balkans or Turkey, rather than through Eastern Europe.⁵⁰ In many cases traditional routes for smuggling a range of other goods are being utilised for the nuclear traffic. John Deutch, Director of Central Intelligence, testifying before a Senate Committee on March 20, 1996, stated:

The countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus - Kazakhstan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan - form transit links between Asia and the West, and the Middle East and the West. The break-up of the Soviet Union has resulted in the breakdown of the institutions that kept many smugglers and questionable traders out of this region. The pervasive control once exerted by a combination of the Soviet KGB, the Soviet military, and the Soviet border guards no longer exist. Even before the break-up, however, some of the southern borders, especially with Afghanistan, were penetrable. According to anecdotal information from recent

⁴⁸ The shipment was Russian MOX (mixed-oxide fuel) for reactors, perfectly usable for bomb-building since it contained plutonium enriched to 87%. Bruce Nelan, "Formula For Terror", Time, August 29, 1994, p. 15. The possibility that the Munich seizure was a sting operation is still being investigated in the German courts. See for example, Patricia Clough, "German Master Spy Accused Of Plutonium Sting", Sunday Times, May 14, 1995. At the very least, the BND knew of the shipment and allowed it to continue to Germany, rather than alerting Ukrainian or Russian authorities. "Germany's Plutonium Sting Was Sham - TV Report", Reuters, February 15, 1996. There does now seem little doubt that the plutonium was of Russian origin, although the precise source remains unclear. Vyacheslav Kevorkov & Gennady Kulbitsky, "Germany Ready To Give Russia 10 Grams Of Smuggled Plutonium", TASS, February 14, 1996.

⁴⁹ Potter, "Before The Deluge...", p. 12.

⁵⁰ Examples of these alternative routes are suggested by cases such as the seizure of nearly 255 grams of high-grade uranium in Macedonia or by the arrest of five Siberian criminals trying to sell 5kg of U-235, stolen from Kazakhstan, to contacts in China or Pakistan. "Pair tried to sell uranium", Globe & Mail, April 4 1997, p. A8; "Arrests in uranium-theft case", Globe & Mail, April 5 1997, p. A8.

travellers to these areas, anything can go across the borders in these countries for a minimal price.⁵¹

Such smuggled goods have in the past included antiques, drugs and conventional weaponry. All trade in these and nuclear goods too seems to centre on the Pakistani town of Peshawar, on the border with Afghanistan. There, there is a thriving market for nuclear equipment, some of it of weapons-making calibre, stolen from reactors and military installations within the former Soviet republics. Goods on offer are reputed to include ultra-powerful magnets, catalysts and alloys to make thermo-nuclear devices and enriched uranium. Iran, India and Pakistan are all alleged to be buyers, and there is the added risk of terrorists also making use of the Peshawar market: religious extremists from Algeria, Kashmir, Egypt and Sudan used the town as a back base in the war between the Soviet Union and the mujahedin. Many are still in Peshawar. A great deal of the material available in the town is fake: worthless but dangerous radioactive waste passed off as enriched uranium. In part, this reflects many of the sellers' own ignorance of the properties of the smuggled goods: there are numerous stories of material being transported and stored recklessly by Afghan traders who are then fatally irradiated as a result. The extent of the nuclear market in Peshawar is hard to assess, but even Pakistani officials such as General Naseerullah Babar, the interior minister, concede that it exists: "... there was someone here offering these things [nuclear arms]. They bring photographs and things, though not the material itself."⁵² At least some of the smuggling is concealed under legitimate exports, for example, shipments of cesium-137, correctly labelled and with the required paperwork, may also include a quantity of illicit nuclear material, such as HEU or plutonium. Such practices form an important part of the criminal proliferation in the former Soviet Union.⁵³

It would also be a considerable exaggeration to suggest that there has been no weapons-grade material trafficked: since 1992 there have been at least six examples of such trade. In 1992, an employee stole 3.7 pounds of HEU from the Luch Scientific Production Association at Podolsk in Russia. Around 1.8kg of material enriched to 30% U-235 was stolen from two fuel assemblies at a facility of the Northern Fleet naval

⁵¹ Deutch, *Testimony...*

⁵² Tim McGirk, "A Year Of Looting Dangerously", *The Independent*, March 24, 1996.

⁵³ Lee, *Address*, p. 23.

base at Andreeva Guba in July 1993 by two naval servicemen. In November 1993, a Russian Navy captain stole about 10 pounds of HEU from the Murmansk submarine fuel storage facility. German police discovered 5.6 grams of supergrade plutonium in Tengen and then 0.8 grams of HEU in Landshut in May and June 1994. In December 1994, Czech police seized six pounds of HEU in Prague.⁵⁴ It is worth making two further points, based in part on comparisons with drug trafficking: physical detection measures are not infallible, generally, those caught trafficking drugs are the ones who are less experienced or competent at it, the good ones are much more likely to get through; and drug seizure rates vary between 10% and 40%, even if the nuclear seizure rate was well above that, the probability that some goes undetected is considerable.⁵⁵ The strict comparability of the drugs example is debatable: nuclear smuggling is likely to be much smaller in volume and receive a much higher priority than drugs do; but the comparison is at least suggestive.⁵⁶ There is little evidence that drug trafficking routes are being used to smuggle nuclear materials, but the fact that they are established and successful makes them easily adaptable for nuclear materials diversion.⁵⁷

It is apparent that there are several different varieties of nuclear trafficker currently operating. Most of the detected smuggling so far has been by amateurs simply trying to make some fast money.⁵⁸ In some cases, these individuals have no knowledge or experience of nuclear material, so there are instances of someone carrying cesium in their shirt pocket and dying as a result; or of a St Petersburg butcher who stored enriched uranium in his fridge and tried to sell it at weekly street markets in the city. That such people can acquire material is indicative of just how easy gaining access to it really is. These amateurs are almost invariably simply opportunists: they rarely have past criminal records, links to organised crime or illegal business

⁵⁴ William Potter, Testimony to: US Senate Committee on Government Affairs, Permanent Subcommittee On Investigations, Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 104th Congress, 2nd Session, March 13, 1996.

⁵⁵ Williams & Woessner, "Nuclear Material Trafficking...", pp. 208-209.

⁵⁶ The problem has forced specific counter-measures to be contemplated by organisations such as the EU. See, for example, 1806 General Affairs Council, Brussels, 28 November 1994.

⁵⁷ Deutch, Testimony...

⁵⁸ Bernd Schmidbauer, "Illegaler Nuklearhandel und Nuklearterrorismus", Internationale Politik, Volume 50, Number 2, (February 1995).

involvement. Instead, they tend to be employees or former employees of the nuclear-industrial complex, linked to such an insider, or live in the vicinity of a vulnerable facility.⁵⁹ They also appear rarely to have a customer in mind at the time of the diversion or theft, rather, they have been willing to seize their chance and then seek a buyer.⁶⁰ In many cases, they are simply people who are desperate to find a way to maintain their livelihoods. The situation at the Zvezda repair yard gives a good indication of their plight. There, striking workers, frustrated at their inability to force the Russian government to pay their overdue wages, threatened to sabotage the nuclear submarines at the yard.⁶¹ It would be quite plausible to believe that these workers might, given the opportunity, also resort to theft of the available nuclear material. A more sophisticated group are those opportunist entrepreneurs and business people who regard trafficking as simply an extension of their legitimate activities. The Russian Internal Affairs Ministry Economic Crimes division has reported that, of the 172 people arrested for nuclear smuggling in 1993, 10 were directors of small commercial enterprises and 2 were low-level employees of the same firms. These dealers have export licences and Western bank accounts and trade legally and illegally in goods such as oil, weapons or rare materials. Nuclear trafficking is simply a highly profitable sideline, one done primarily on consignment.⁶² This group is by no means limited to inhabitants of the former Soviet states: there have been arrests of citizens of every state where trafficking has occurred.

The extent of the Russian Mafiya's role in nuclear trafficking is hard to assess: it would increase the likelihood of a crackdown on the sector as a whole and offers relatively low incentives for them, especially while other activities such as drugs smuggling are so lucrative, providing an easily accessible mass market and little physical danger from the materials.⁶³ In fact, there is some evidence that the main mafiya groups positively discourage such activities in case they endanger other interests or risk the considerable leverage the mafiya enjoys with

⁵⁹ Lee, "Post-Soviet Nuclear Trafficking...", p. 345.

⁶⁰ Potter, "Before The Deluge...", p. 12.

⁶¹ Geoffrey York, "Unhappy Russian workers threaten nuclear disaster", The Globe & Mail, July 2 1997, pp. 1-2.

⁶² Lee, "Post-Soviet Nuclear Trafficking...", p. 346.

⁶³ Potter, "Before The Deluge...", p. 14.

political and law enforcement officials.⁶⁴ Although the Russian authorities have made numerous arrests of individuals with links to organised crime attempting to smuggle non-weapons grade nuclear material, there is little evidence currently that large organised crime groups *per se*, with established structures and international connections, are involved in the trafficking of radioactive materials.⁶⁵ These organisations do possess the means to acquire nuclear materials by threats or bribery and, almost certainly, the network to move them out of the country.⁶⁶ In truth, organised crime is not monolithic and is barely organised. It is closely intertwined with government, and increasingly the line between political and criminal agendas has been blurred. There are an estimated 2,500 organised crime groups in Russia, many with increasingly sophisticated international links. In 1994, the official Russian estimate was that such groups controlled 40,000 state and private organisations, including hundreds of state enterprises, companies, co-operatives, banks and markets.⁶⁷ The official figure for mafiya membership, 20,000 to 25,000, is almost certainly understated: other sources suggest the number is closer to 100,000.⁶⁸ Russian organised crime is a series of networks encompassing criminals, businessmen, politicians, bureaucrats, security and military personnel, who between them are more than capable of moving stolen fissile material without Western intelligence forces ever being aware of the fact. The relative ease with which this could be achieved suggests that it would be extremely rash to wholly exclude the possibility of organised crime being involved in nuclear trafficking and certainly not as the result of any moral strictures.⁶⁹

Amongst those best able to engage in nuclear smuggling are former Soviet bloc military and intelligence personnel, some of whom spent their Cold War careers moving material and technology from West to East, and now find themselves, using the same methods, able to simply

⁶⁴ Mark Galeotti, "Mafiya: Organized Crime in Russia", Jane's Intelligence Review, Special Report 10, (June 1996), p. 19.

⁶⁵ Deutch, Testimony...

⁶⁶ Williams & Woessner, "Nuclear Material Trafficking...", pp. 215-217.

⁶⁷ Graham H. Turbiville, "Mafia In Uniform: The 'Criminalization' of the Russian Armed Forces", Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, (July 1995), pp. 3-5.

⁶⁸ Galeotti, "Mafiya...", p. 4.

⁶⁹ Sopko, "The Changing Proliferation...", pp. 6-7.

reverse the route.⁷⁰ Like the scientists of the former Soviet Union, many military personnel greatly resent the deterioration in standards of living, budgets and social status, and might be willing to exploit the lax security surrounding fissile material.⁷¹ In October 1996, Russian defence minister, General Igor Rodionov, warned that the army was demoralised and on the brink of revolt over unpaid salaries and poor conditions. Furthermore, this state of affairs applied equally to the strategic rocket forces (SRF), the section of the army responsible for security of Russia's nuclear armoury.⁷² Given their poor work conditions, there is no substantial reason to believe that personnel responsible for Russia's WMD are more reliable than the demonstrably corrupt military officials assigned to other duties.⁷³ There are already several examples of military personnel using their access to nuclear material for their profit. On November 29, 1993, Lieutenant-Colonel Alexei Tikhomirov of the Russian Navy and Alyak Beranov, deputy administrator of the Polyarnyy submarine base, stole 4 kg of uranium from the Navy's nuclear weapons and fuel store in Murmansk, in the hope of selling it for \$50,000. Lieutenant Dimitri Tikhomirov, Alexei's brother and in charge of a nuclear reactor, helped them handle the fuel. The thieves walked through a hole in the perimeter fence, forced the padlock on the fuel-store door, and stole 3 fuel rods containing uranium 235 enriched to 20%. The theft was not discovered until twelve hours later, by which time Tikhomirov and Beranov had smuggled the fuel into the top-security Polyarnyy naval base where it was stored in Beranov's garage for seven months, until Dimitri got drunk and boasted to fellow officers, when the three were arrested.⁷⁴ The theft would have taken even longer to detect were it not for the fact that the thieves left the door to the warehouse open. Otherwise, it "could have been concealed for ten years or longer".⁷⁵ Another concern about the Russian military centres on the fact that it may be possible for

⁷⁰ See for example, Roger Boyes, "Bonn Uncovers Nuclear Leaks At Military Bases", The Times, August 25, 1994, p.8.

⁷¹ Jennifer G. Mathers, "Corruption In The Russian Armed Services", The World Today, Volume 51, Numbers 8-9, (August-September 1995), pp. 169-170.

⁷² James Adams & Carey Scott, "US fears grow as Russia loses nuclear grip", The Sunday Times, October 27 1996, p. A19.

⁷³ Turbiville, "Mafia In Uniform...", p. 17.

⁷⁴ Andrew Veitch, "Nuclear Smuggling", Transcript of Channel 4 Television 7pm News, February 15, 1995.

⁷⁵ Potter, "Before The Deluge...", p. 10.

rogue officers to bypass the authorisation process for launching a nuclear strike. Supposedly, only the President of the Republic can legitimately order such an action but the reality is probably that all technical checks could be circumvented in a matter of hours or days, depending on the weapon. Such an eventuality would obviously open up an entire new range of nuclear terrorism as a possibility.⁷⁶

The main buyers for nuclear material are almost certainly pariah states eager to take a shortcut towards nuclear programmes of their own.⁷⁷ Although there have been states pursuing nuclear weapons since the Second World War, some do question whether there is really a demand for stolen or illegally bought nuclear material. There is currently little hard evidence to decisively prove the existence of this market, but that is possibly more a reflection of the fact that the opportunities stemming from the collapse of the former Soviet Union are so relatively new. However, in view of the expense and time required to develop a nuclear capability, it seems unlikely that states would decline the opportunity to ease the process by acquiring fissile material.⁷⁸ There is decisive evidence that both Iran and Iraq, for example, sought to illicitly obtain other items of use to a nuclear weapons programme, so it is illogical to suppose that they would scorn the opportunity to obtain fissile material.⁷⁹ Weapons-grade material is simply not sold on the open market, so states are compelled to produce their own or to acquire the material illicitly. The purchase of such material would probably save proliferator states 8-10 years on their weapons programmes and, in view of the time and facilities required for manufacture, improve the chances of maintaining the secrecy of the project.⁸⁰ It seems unlikely though that this will replace

⁷⁶ Adams & Scott, "US fears...", p. A19.

⁷⁷ Nelan, "Formula...", p. 19.

⁷⁸ Graham T. Allison & Richard Falkenrath, "The World's Biggest Problem?", Prospect, (February 1996), p. 83. It is worth noting though that among those states not seeking to acquire a nuclear capability are those within the former Soviet Union from which fissile material is leaking. All the non-Russian successor states have signed the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states and many have concluded safeguard arrangements with the IAEA. Potter, "Before The Deluge...", p. 13.

⁷⁹ Spector, Interview..., The examples are: a carbon-fibre winding machine that could be used for the centrifuge process and two shipments of gyroscopes from dismantled strategic rockets that Iraq received. The first was dumped in the Tigris to hide it from UN inspectors and the second was found in Jordan.

⁸⁰ Oleg Bukharin, "Nuclear Safeguards & Security In the Former Soviet Union", Survival, Volume 36, Number 4, (Winter 1994-5), p. 53.

proliferator states' normal process of hidden weapon acquisition; states will use the black market to facilitate the indigenous development of a nuclear capability rather than as a substitute for it. States derive considerable regional and international leverage from their nuclear programmes and are unlikely to be willing to abandon them in favour of an external supply system that is bound to be unpredictable and unreliable, particularly when every effort is being made internationally to shut it down altogether.⁸¹

Whether this equates to an increased likelihood of state-sponsored nuclear terrorism is more problematic. It would be rash to wholly exclude the possibility: the Director General of MI5 has said that "Some two dozen governments are currently trying to obtain such technology. A number of these countries sponsor or even practise terrorism, and we cannot rule out the possibility that these weapons could be used for that purpose."⁸² However, sponsoring states would have to be completely certain of plausible deniability in perpetuity for any terrorist attack since the repercussions from states that have been the victim of an act of nuclear terrorism could be immense. Furthermore, having given a client terrorist group a nuclear weapon, the sponsor state has very little control over the group, and may even be subjected to blackmail by the organisation. This conclusion is emphasised by the experience of East Germany in sponsoring the actions of Illich Ramirez Sanchez (Carlos the Jackal) in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Markus Wolf, who controlled much of East Germany's foreign intelligence network, regarded Carlos as a liability, someone who "disregarded all the rules of discretion, there-by endangering those who worked with him." Wolf's main objective was

getting him out of the country as soon as possible - no simple task. One of the most difficult aspects of liaison with terrorists like Carlos was that the power relationship between us and them had an unfortunate tendency to reverse itself. Originally, Carlos was grateful for assistance in organising his clandestine life. But once he sensed that we were less keen on his presence, his mood turned nasty. He began to make the same threats towards us that he carried out against enemy

⁸¹ Rose Gottemoeller, "Preventing A Nuclear Nightmare", *Survival*, Volume 38, Number 2, (Summer 1996), p. 172.

⁸² Rimington, "Security...", p.9.

governments, warning those who tried to dissuade him from a visit that he would seek out East German targets abroad.⁸³

Although state-sponsored nuclear terrorism is not impossible, particularly if a state found itself *in extremis*, it makes more sense to suggest that, having obtained fissile material, a state would use its own agencies to exploit the situation. Richard Falkenrath argues that unless a state could guarantee complete control over its client group, it is very unlikely that a state would use a terrorist organisation to deliver a nuclear device because the stakes are too high, in which case the problem essentially becomes one of deterrence.⁸⁴ This is certainly true for a nuclear-yield weapon, but may not be so for radiological devices since it might be possible to ensure that such a weapon dispersed radiation covertly, minimising the risk of detection. Whether a state would choose to utilise such a capability is another question, but it is not inconceivable, although its effects would almost certainly be long-term, rather than instantaneous, so would be more likely to be a form of extended punishment than a means of leverage for the terrorists. However, by and large, states seem to seek membership of "the nuclear club" for the security, prestige and the leverage that it conveys on a regional and global level, rather than for the overt intention of imminently using the new capability.⁸⁵ It is worth noting, as an analogue, that while there are a number of states that sponsor terrorism and have a chemical or biological weapons capability, there is little evidence that there has been biological or chemical terrorism by sub-state actors as a result.

While state-sponsored groups potentially have many advantages in terms of resources, the real danger from an intelligence and incident aversion perspective comes from groups such as Aum Shinrikyo or loosely-affiliated splinters of larger organisations, such as the alleged bombers of the Murrah Building in Oklahoma, because they come from nowhere. Aum "just weren't on anyone's radar screens".⁸⁶

⁸³ Markus Wolf with Anne McElvoy, "When Carlos the Jackal turned nasty", The Sunday Times, June 15 1997.

⁸⁴ Falkenrath, Interview ...

⁸⁵ An interesting discussion on why states proliferate is contained in: Scott D. Sagan, "The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation", Current History, (April 1997), Volume 96, Number 609.

⁸⁶ Floyd Clarke, Former Deputy Director, FBI, Interview with Author, November 20, 1996, Washington D.C..

Likewise, one of the reasons that it took so long to apprehend the alleged Unabomber was that he had no network, there was no chain of people leading back to him. As yet, there is little evidence that terrorist groups are buyers in their own right,⁸⁷ although if the flow of nuclear materials out of Russia continues, it is probably only a matter of time before a well-resourced organisation is able to become a purchaser. Such a group need not be state-sponsored: the Aum Shinrikyo cult had a billion dollars and 40,000 members spread world-wide.⁸⁸ Director of Central Intelligence Deutch has stated: "We currently have no evidence that any terrorist organization has obtained contraband nuclear materials. However, we are concerned because only a small amount of material is necessary to terrorize populated areas."⁸⁹

It is worth noting though that it would be unwise to assume that cost alone is likely to be the determining factor that precludes terrorist groups from acquiring fissile material. Although Aum were certainly exceptional, in terms of their assets, an increasing number of terrorist organisations are self-funded. This is as a result of two, inter-related trends: firstly, the amount of state-sponsorship for terrorism, which although never as widespread as was sometimes claimed was still a significant element in international terrorism, has decreased dramatically with the end of the Cold War and the declining necessity for surrogate warfare in other states; and secondly, to compensate for the first point, terrorist groups have become increasingly involved in racketeering and transnational crime. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), for example, has been heavily involved in drug trafficking. A study of Colombian guerrilla finances found that they had doubled between 1991 and 1994, with drugs contributing 34% of the income, extortion and robbery 26% and kidnappings 23%.⁹⁰ The IRA has been involved in social clubs, charities, gaming and fraud to supplement its finances.⁹¹ Many of these activities are international:

⁸⁷ Williams & Woessner, "Nuclear Material Trafficking...", p. 222.

⁸⁸ "Thinking The Unthinkable", New Scientist, Editorial, May 11, 1996, p. 3.

⁸⁹ Deutch, Testimony...

⁹⁰ S. Kendall, "Colombia measures the cost of violence", Financial Times, November 12 1996.

⁹¹ The best account of this is to be found in James Adams, The Financing of Terror. (Sevenoaks, New English Library, 1986.) Richard Clutterbuck has written extensively on the connection between drug trafficking and terrorism. See, for example, Richard Clutterbuck, Terrorism In An Unstable World, (London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 87-111.

the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam are allegedly involved in fraud, extortion, alien smuggling and drug trafficking in Canada, all to aid their cause in Sri Lanka.⁹² It is increasingly obvious that "the links between war and crime are growing stronger in the 1990s." As an example, in February 1994, a notorious Peruvian drug baron was sentenced to life in prison, but for treason as a result of his business with the Sendero Luminoso guerrillas, rather than because of his drug trafficking. The connection between the two types of illegal organisation stems, in part, from the increased accessibility of international crime for terrorists, arising from easier travel, communications and money-laundering in the modern world. In some cases, terrorism itself has become a source of income: both the IRA and the UDA have construction rackets that largely determine which firms receive the building contracts (in exchange for a kickback) to reconstruct the areas of Belfast wrecked by the two groups' violence.⁹³

Whether this equates to terrorist groups having considerable disposable income, and therefore being potential buyers of fissile material, is questionable. It seems likely that it is the largest, most sophisticated groups that are able to exploit these opportunities. For others, it probably remains that terrorism is an expensive occupation, especially for underground organisations, needing to support members who are unlikely to be able to have another form of income. Rather than building up their assets, most groups seem to lead a relatively hand-to-mouth financial existence, dictated by immediate operational needs, as well as the prerequisite of maintaining the group as a viable organisation.

The diminution of state-sponsorship, compared to that of the 1980s when it was the pre-eminent characteristic of terrorism, may be important for another reason: it may mean that those terrorist groups, unconstrained by the agendas of actors that have a stake in the international system and that are clearly vulnerable to reprisals from

⁹² Samuel Porteous, "The Threat From Transnational Crime: An Intelligence Perspective", Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Commentary, Number 70, (Winter 1996), pp. 5-6.

⁹³ Charles Hanley, "Increasingly guerrillas financed by drugs", Toronto Star, December 29 1994, p. A19.

other states, have greater freedom of action. No longer restrained by this influence, they may be more inclined to take radical action, possibly even involving weapons of mass destruction.

Nuclear Terrorism

Concerns about nuclear terrorism are not new: in the past 25 years, a multitude of books have been written on the subject. However, the literature prior to 1989 is dominated by a few key studies. Willrich and Taylor's book, published in 1974, effectively set the genre. It argued that building nuclear weapons was relatively straightforward, provided that terrorists could acquire the necessary nuclear material. They concentrated on the opportunities for theft of such material from the United States programme, and urged that greater precautions be taken to safeguard it.⁹⁴ This was followed in 1975 by Brian Jenkins' article: "Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?", originally published by the California Seminar on Arms Control and Foreign Policy, and subsequently as a paper by the Rand Corporation.⁹⁵ This was a critical study because it did deal with the question of terrorist motivation, not only could terrorists go nuclear, but would they want to? Consequently, it has become the most cited, important, and most influential work in the subject of nuclear terrorism. Jenkins' much-quoted central argument was that "Terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead,"⁹⁶ and that consequently mass-destructive terrorism was unlikely, since it would be counter-productive to the terrorist's aims. The next key book was in 1979, Norton and Greenberg's Studies in Nuclear Terrorism, an edited collection of articles and conference papers. There was no overarching hypothesis that linked these essays; instead, it reflected the best survey of the arguments to that date on the likelihood of nuclear terrorism. It included work by authors who believed that nuclear terrorism posed a real threat that had to be addressed immediately (Beres); and that state-sponsorship, leading to a heightened danger, was plausible (Krieger); along with others who believed that terrorists would be unwilling to go nuclear (Jenkins); that nuclear terrorism was

⁹⁴ Mason Willrich & Theodore B. Taylor, Nuclear Theft: Risks & Safeguards. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1974.)

⁹⁵ Brian Jenkins, "Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?", California Seminar on Arms Control and Foreign Policy, Paper Number 64, Los Angeles, Crescent Publications, 1975 and Rand P-5541, November 1975.

⁹⁶ Jenkins, "Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?", Rand P-5541, November 1975, pp. 4-5.

unlikely (Mullins); and that proliferation by states was not only more plausible, but also more dangerous (Schelling). It considered the threat to nuclear energy facilities (Flood) and how to combat that threat (Kupperman), as well as the possibility of theft of nuclear material and the means to prevent it.⁹⁷ Leventhal and Alexander's books, Nuclear Terrorism: Defining The Threat (1985) and Preventing Nuclear Terrorism (1987), contained reports on the proceedings of a conference and then, in the later book, on the findings of the International Task Force on the Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism which was established as a result of the earlier conference. These reports were combined with essays that assessed various aspects of the problem. In the 1985 book, these included a discussion of the plausibility of nuclear terrorism (Jenkins); and of the means and targets that terrorists might use (Davies). The book also included articles on preventing the threat (O'Keefe) and possible responses by government and industry to the issue (Giuffrida). The 1987 volume included analysis of the means that terrorists could use to go nuclear; the factors that might make them want to do so; and responses to, and strategies for dealing with, a threat, including safeguards, international measures and threat minimisation.⁹⁸ The 1970s and 1980s also saw a series of important studies by the Rand Corporation which added significantly to the existing literature. These reports considered, in various forms, several central aspects of the subject of nuclear terrorism including the likelihood of terrorists resorting to such weapons and the key attributes of potential adversaries, including hostile employees, within the context of the overall threat. Among the most important of these studies were: Bass, Jenkins, Kellen, Krofcheck, Petty, Reinstedt and Ronfeldt's "Motivations & Possible Actions Of Potential Criminal Adversaries Of US Nuclear Programmes",⁹⁹ Bass and Jenkins' "A Review Of Recent Trends In International Terrorism & Nuclear

⁹⁷ Augustus Norton & Michael Greenberg, Studies In Nuclear Terrorism, (Boston: G. K. Hull, 1979).

⁹⁸ Leventhal & Alexander, Nuclear Terrorism: Defining The Threat. Paul Leventhal & Yonah Alexander (eds), Preventing Nuclear Terrorism, (Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1987.)

⁹⁹ Gail Bass, Brian Jenkins, Konrad Kellen, Joseph Krofcheck, Geraldine Petty, Robert Reinstedt, David Ronfeldt, "Motivations & Possible Actions Of Potential Criminal Adversaries Of US Nuclear Programmes", RAND, February 1980.

Incidents Abroad",¹⁰⁰ deLeon, Hoffman, Kellen and Jenkins' "The Threat Of Nuclear Terrorism: A Reexamination",¹⁰¹ and Reinstedt and Westbury's "Major Crimes As Analogs To Potential Threats To Nuclear Facilities & Programs",¹⁰²

Prior to 1989, the literature on nuclear terrorism dealt with the subject from two main perspectives: the means by which terrorists might be able to "go nuclear", and the reasons that might compel them to use or to reject such a possibility. With the end of the Cold War, the dynamics that underpinned the answers to both of these questions have altered considerably. Not only have the means by which sub-state actors could acquire fissile material changed, but the nature and motivations of terrorism itself have also changed. In the 1990s, there has been a growth in terrorism perpetrated by groups that cannot be readily pigeon-holed as nationalist-separatist, left-wing, right-wing, religious or into any of the other typologies that were effective in describing "traditional" varieties of group. In every case, examples of these types still exist: ETA and the IRA remain nationalist-separatist, Sendero Luminoso are left-wing, neo-Nazi attacks occur in a multitude of states, and Hizbollah are religious terrorists. However, supplementing these have been other, "non-traditional" types of organisation, such as Aum Shinrikyo, the bombers of the Murrah Building in Oklahoma City, or the ad hoc group, led by Ramiz Yousef, responsible for the attack on the World Trade Center in 1993. Although several "traditional" terrorist groups talked about resorting to nuclear weapons, they were, in general, conservative in their tactics and in the levels of violence they were willing to use to pursue their goals. The newer, "non-traditional" groups have not only been more violent, they have also been more innovative, and more willing to use new types of weaponry. Furthermore, they have, in many cases, been unconstrained by considerations of proportionality or the need to appeal to an audience for support, factors that were critical in ensuring that "traditional"

¹⁰⁰ Gail Bass, Brian Jenkins, "A Review Of Recent Trends In International Terrorism & Nuclear Incidents Abroad", RAND, April 1983.

¹⁰¹ Peter deLeon, Bruce Hoffman with Konrad Kellen, Brian Jenkins, "The Threat Of Nuclear Terrorism: A Reexamination", RAND N-2706, January 1988.

¹⁰² Robert Reinstedt, J Westbury, "Major Crimes As Analogs To Potential Threats To Nuclear Facilities & Programs", RAND, April 1980.

terrorist groups used a measure of self-restraint.¹⁰³ Bearing this in mind, it is valid to question not only whether the opportunities for nuclear terrorism have changed in the past eight years, but also whether the desire of terrorist groups to perpetrate such attacks has altered in that period.

Since 1989, however, much of the literature on nuclear terrorism has been predominantly focused on the new opportunities for nuclear smuggling and theft, arising from the collapse of the former Soviet Union, and on the possible ramifications of that, in terms of the ease with which terrorists could use the material to build a nuclear-yield device. Although much of the avalanche of articles on the subject have been highly derivative, a few have been outstanding. These include the report, Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy,¹⁰⁴ and subsequent testimony before the United States Congress by Allison, Cote, Falkenrath, and Miller; and articles by Phil Williams and Paul Woessner¹⁰⁵, William Potter¹⁰⁶, Oleg Bukharin¹⁰⁷, and Rensselaer Lee III.¹⁰⁸ However, where these studies dealt with nuclear terrorism, it was as a by-product of the nuclear proliferation issue. Most recently, Bruce Hoffman's article "Terrorism and WMD: Some Preliminary Hypotheses" has gone some way towards filling this gap. In it, Hoffman argues that the new type of terrorism is more religious and lethal than was its predecessor, and concludes that this combination, along with increased opportunities for acquisition of non-conventional weaponry, makes the possibility of mass-destructive terrorism a much more real threat than was previously the case.¹⁰⁹ However, the question of why terrorists might resort to nuclear weapons, beyond the increased opportunities for doing so, remain to some extent, unaddressed. This thesis attempts to analyse the nature of terrorism in the post-Cold War world. The issue of nuclear terrorism acts as a catalyst for this study. The thesis shows

¹⁰³ Bruce Hoffman, "Terrorism and WMD: Some Preliminary Hypotheses", The Nonproliferation Review, Volume 4, Number 3, (Spring/Summer 1997), pp. 45-47.

¹⁰⁴ Graham Allison, Owen Cote, Richard Falkenrath & Steve Miller, "Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy: Containing The Threat Of Loose Nuclear Weapons & Fissile Material", Center for Science & International Affairs (CSIA), JFK School of Government, Harvard University, (April 1996.)

¹⁰⁵ Williams & Woessner, "Nuclear Material Trafficking..."

¹⁰⁶ Potter, "Before The Deluge..."

¹⁰⁷ Bukharin, "The Future..."

¹⁰⁸ Lee, "Post-Soviet Nuclear Trafficking..."

¹⁰⁹ Hoffman, "Terrorism and WMD..."

that while nuclear terrorism is important and remains a critical threat, even if the increased opportunities for fissile proliferation did not exist, the nature of contemporary terrorism would mean that mass-destructive terrorism would still be a problem.

To achieve this objective, the dissertation will consider, in-depth, the motivations and objectives of terrorism. It is not intended that this should be a general theory of terrorism, so much as an analysis of certain key and specifically relevant aspects of it, in particular, of the debate over whether it is instrumentality or group psychology that is the predominant driving force behind terrorist's actions. It is this thesis' hypothesis that the former is a real factor, since terrorists are goal-oriented, but that these goals may often become subverted by the latter, by the drive to maintain the organisation's structural integrity. Such an outcome would have a profound impact on the terrorists' ultimate objectives, as well as on their willingness to use extreme measures by which to achieve these goals. This discussion, between rational activity, geared to a specific goal, and psychological pressures that promote a continuation and even an escalation of the group's campaign has unfolded for nearly twenty years. Martha Crenshaw, who has tended to subscribe increasingly to an instrumental perspective, summarised much of this argument in 1981: "Significant campaigns of terrorism depend on rational political choice. As purposeful activity, terrorism is the result of an organization's decision that it is a politically useful means to oppose a government." However, she concludes the same article by arguing that:

The psychological relationships within the terrorist group - the interplay of commitment, risk, solidarity, loyalty, guilt, revenge, and isolation - discourage terrorists from changing the direction they have taken. This may explain why - even if objective circumstances change when, for example, grievances are satisfied, or if the logic of the situation changes when, for example, the terrorists are offered other alternatives for the expression of opposition - terrorism may endure until the terrorist group is physically destroyed.¹¹⁰

Jerrold Post, a political psychologist, has argued that terrorists join, and remain within, the group because they are dependent on the organisation for psychological relief from their own feelings of being

¹¹⁰ Martha Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism", Comparative Politics, Volume 13 (July 1981), pp. 358, 396-397.

an outsider. Terrorism offers an identity and a sense of belonging that they have been unable to find elsewhere. However, he is careful to differentiate between terrorists who are nationalist-separatist and those who are anarchic-ideologues, since for the former, violence offers a reaffirmation of their cultural and social identity, whereas, for the latter, violence is a blow against their society. In both cases, terrorists remain able to justify their violence by minimising the effects of their actions through a series of largely unconscious attempts to shift blame and ultimate responsibility onto others. Consequently, it is Post's belief that: "political terrorists are driven to commit acts of violence as a consequence of psychological forces, and that their special psycho-logic is constructed to rationalize acts they are psychologically compelled to commit... individuals are drawn to the path of terrorism in order to commit acts of violence."¹¹¹

This thesis assesses the likelihood of nuclear terrorism by considering both sides of this theoretical debate concerning terrorist motivations. It discusses both the individual and the group pressures that apply to terrorists and then supports them with empirical examples from the literature, ideally in the form of memoirs of, or interviews with, the terrorists themselves. This approach is applied not only to the "traditional", left-wing or nationalist-separatist, groups that were the original basis for most of the theories of terrorism, but also to the right-wing, religious and "non-traditional" types of group that have become increasingly prevalent in terrorism in the past 15 years. This approach has the benefit of combining the extensive theoretical literature on terrorism with the means of "proving" their hypotheses by testing them against the primary sources: the memoirs or direct quotes of the terrorists themselves. In doing this, it will be demonstrated that it is possible to make a judgement about the willingness of various categories of terrorist to employ weapons of mass destruction to further their campaigns. It could be argued that such a technique leaves the thesis at the mercy of its sources, since, obviously, it is only possible to analyse that which has been written or said by terrorists. Only some terrorists have written about their activities at all, and of those that

¹¹¹ Jerrold M. Post, "Terrorist psycho-logic: Terrorist behaviour as a product of psychological forces" in Walter Reich (ed.), Origins Of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States Of Mind, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 25.

have written, their version of events risks being selective or even self-serving, designed to portray them, afterwards, in the best light. Clearly, therefore, there is a possibility that this will give only a partial picture. To minimise the danger that this could skew the conclusions of this study, many different sources are used, and all are placed within the framework of the theoretical literature, intended to test these theories, rather than being relied upon in their own right. In order to mitigate any problems of objectivity or perception, this thesis deliberately considers a wide range of perspectives from both sides of the theoretical discussion. Furthermore, the cases of terrorism used in the study were specifically chosen to reflect as wide a geographical and chronological diversity as possible. Every continent except Australia is represented, and the groups reflect not only the entire period from 1968 onwards, the beginnings of modern international terrorism, but also the era of colonial terrorism, which occurred considerably before that date. This approach, by providing a representative cross-section of terrorist groups, heightens the validity of the study's conclusions because it offers an analysis that is not culturally or chronologically limited in its application. For the same reason, the thesis is careful to differentiate between the various types of terrorist group, especially when the general point being made is only selectively applicable. In this manner, it is intended that this study should offer a window into the motivations of terrorist organisations and the likely causes of their resort to nuclear weapons.

In considering the opportunities for nuclear proliferation, the thesis relies heavily on testimonies given before various committees of the United States Congress. There are two principle reasons for this: firstly, the Congress hearings represent the most comprehensive open-source and current account of the extent of the problem in the former Soviet Union and include information that is either unavailable elsewhere or has been published in a multitude of other places. The Congress hearings are therefore not only extensive, but also accessible. Secondly, and more important, since the counter-proliferation efforts in the former Soviet Union are being predominantly led by the United States, using the reports from Congressional committees offers an insight into the information that is being used to provide the impetus for these efforts and into the effectiveness of the campaign to remedy the situation. These testimonies, along with reports written by non-

governmental organisations such as the Rand Corporation, and much of the rapidly expanding library of articles on the subject, are then supported by practical examples, in many cases drawn from the media within the past three years, and by interviews, conducted in Washington DC in November 1996, with a range of experts familiar with the problem. This approach has ensured that it has been possible, not only to reflect the current proliferation situation, but also to compare, and thereby test, both empirical studies and United States policy statements about the perceived threat with the theoretical literature, described earlier, and with terrorists' own words.

While it is obviously desirable that no sub-state actor acquires access to nuclear material, this study is specifically concerned with the possibility that it might be terrorists that not only gain such access but also use it in pursuit of their objectives. Consequently, it is necessary to define "terrorism", to differentiate it from other types of violence or intimidation. It is vital to have at least some basis for delineating the subject under discussion; otherwise, there is a danger that it will be "a book on an unidentified subject, so that the author can include whatever he sees fit", as one criticism of another discussion of terrorism had it.¹¹² The most widely accepted academic definition is that of Schmid and Jongman, in part because theirs is based on a survey of over one hundred other definitions. They define terrorism as:

an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-)clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons, whereby - in contrast to assassination - the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat- and violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperilled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought.¹¹³

¹¹² Cited in Alex P. Schmid & Albert J. Jongman, Political Terrorism: A New Guide To Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories & Literature, (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1988), p. 3.

¹¹³ Ibid., p. 28.

While it is extremely thorough in its coverage, this definition has the weakness of being overly general. It includes far more actors and actions than is helpful for the purposes of this thesis. Other, non-academic, organisations put the emphasis elsewhere. The FBI defines terrorism as "the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government or civilian population in furtherance of political or social objectives."¹¹⁴ This definition has the advantage of imposing an absolute, the legality of the action, on the definition, so it circumvents the problem of whether the act has to be morally unjustified to be terrorism, rather than freedom fighting, for example. Wilkinson defines it as: "coercive intimidation. It is the systemic use of murder and destruction in order to terrorise individuals, groups, communities or governments into conceding to the terrorists' political demands."¹¹⁵ This contains the important concept that terrorism must be systemic: one-off or unco-ordinated acts of violence do not constitute terrorism. There is a further difficulty in all of these definitions, as they relate to this thesis: they do not differentiate between actors that use terrorism as an occasional tactic and those for whom it is their main activity. While it is undeniable that both states and guerrilla organisations, for example, do resort to terrorism, as one amongst several means to an end, they are not the focus of this study. It is crucial that the distinction between such actors and terrorists is made, because the psychological and organisational dynamics at the heart of this discussion differ so greatly between the two. The factors that would make states resort to weapons of mass destruction are obviously completely different from those which affect terrorists. Consequently, for the purposes of this study, terrorism will simply be "the systemic and unlawful use, by individuals or groups, of violence or the threat of violence to coerce concessions from, or influence, a wider audience than the immediate victims."

The difference between states and terrorists, particularly in relation to nuclear proliferation, is a critical aspect of this study, worthy of fuller discussion. The general consensus amongst academics as to why states seek nuclear weapons is that they do so if the state believe that they face

¹¹⁴ Andrew Silke, "Terrorism and the Blind Man's Elephant", Terrorism & Political Violence, Volume 8, Number 3, (Autumn 1996), p. 21.

¹¹⁵ Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism And The Liberal State, (London: Macmillan, 1979), p. 49.

security threats that cannot be dealt with other means. In this analysis, nuclear weapons are first and foremost instruments of national security. Such weapons are the ultimate guarantee of a state's survival from external pressure (obviously, as is shown in the case of the former Soviet Union, nuclear weapons are less effective at combating pressure from internal sources.) They compel their owners to be accepted as part of the international status quo, since the costs of removing a nuclear-armed state would be so great. From a security perspective, this deterrence element of nuclear-weapon possession is the most important. This is because it has become increasingly accepted that the utility of such weapons for gaining military or political concessions from another state, irrespective of whether it possessed nuclear weapons too, are minimal. The threat is too disproportionate to have credibility. Consequently, nuclear weapons have become instruments of last resort, to be used to protect a state, or conceivably a regime, from ultimate defeat.

It could be argued that nuclear weapons might fulfil a similar role for terrorist groups. Certainly, any state, confronted by a nuclear-armed terrorist group, would have to be extremely careful in the way that they dealt with the organisation. In this way, nuclear weapons might be a way that a terrorist group could stave off defeat and collapse. If this were so, and bearing in mind that organisational survival is a prime objective of terrorist groups, then nuclear weapons might well appear to be highly attractive options. In contrast to states, such devices might also have some use as instruments to gain concessions from a state. This is particularly so for those terrorist groups that are not bound by the need for proportionality or a fear of the counter-productive consequences of such an action. Furthermore, since terrorist organisations are not as easily targeted as a state's population, it would be harder for an attacked state to launch reprisals or counter-attacks, in the same way that it would do against an attack by another state.

There is also an extent to which, as has been argued earlier, nuclear weapons represent an important symbol of statehood, status and of prestige. They enable their owners to be able to stand, as equals, with the largest and most powerful states in the world. Scott D. Sagan suggests that: "Military arsenals can be envisaged as serving symbolic

functions similar to flags, airlines, and Olympic teams. They are part of an international norm concerning what it means to be a modern and legitimate state."¹¹⁶ This has consequences for nuclear terrorism too. An important aspect of terrorism is the attempt, by the group, to deny the power and legitimacy of their enemies, either a state or government. Nuclear weapons would enable the terrorist organisation to claim to be at least the equals, militarily, of their opponents.

Nuclear terrorism needs to be defined for the purposes of this study. As was discussed earlier, it encompasses a range of threats with the only common theme that they include a central nuclear component. This means that every thing from anti-nuclear protests; attacks of, or siege-and-hostage situations at, a nuclear reactor; to the use, or threatened use, of a radiological dispersal device or of a nuclear-yield device would be acts of nuclear terrorism. Few studies have radically differed in accepting that these elements were parts of nuclear terrorism. However, the emphasis on different aspects of the subject has varied. For example, Willrich and Taylor's predominant concern was the vulnerability to theft of material from civil fuel cycle in the United States.¹¹⁷ One exception to a broad definition of nuclear terrorism was Norton and Greenberg's book. They focused on a nuclear-yield device, deliberately not dealing with radiological terrorism or the sabotage of nuclear facilities because they argued that the former, while significant, was indistinguishable from chemical or biological terrorism and should be analysed as such. The latter, sabotage, "more properly belong[ed] to a discussion of attacks upon high-value targets or inherently dangerous facilities."¹¹⁸ Particularly in the case of radiological terrorism, this seems to underestimate the symbolic and psychological importance of an attack comprising a nuclear element. However, Norton and Greenberg's exclusive approach appears to be unusual. At the introduction to the conference, from which stemmed Leventhal and Alexander's first book on the subject, Paul Leventhal "cited the risks of explosive nuclear fuels being stolen from commerce and made into bombs; of actual weapons or weapons components being stolen and exploded; and of nuclear facilities being sabotaged or conventional industrial installations being subjected to nuclear

¹¹⁶ Sagan, "The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation", p. 154.

¹¹⁷ Willrich and Taylor, Nuclear Theft: Risks & Safeguards

¹¹⁸ Norton & Greenberg, Studies In Nuclear Terrorism, p. 23 n.8

sabotage."¹¹⁹ In their 1987 book, the threat of nuclear terrorism, defined by the International Taskforce on the Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism, was, in order of severity: "[the] theft and explosion of a nuclear weapon...[the] theft of nuclear materials and their use or threatened use in a crude homemade bomb - or, with help from a state, in a more sophisticated device...[and the] sabotage or threatened sabotage of a reactor, fuel facility, or fuel shipment."¹²⁰ Rand also found nuclear terrorism to be a broad term. Although most studies concentrated on specific aspects of the subject, nuclear terrorism, as a term, encompassed actions against civilian or military nuclear facilities, including against vehicles used to transport nuclear materials or components. The term also incorporated the use of nuclear weapons or material to threaten or destroy people or property.¹²¹ Latterly, the focus has increasingly been on terrorism involving radiological and nuclear-yield weapons,¹²² but any definition of nuclear terrorism would still have to retain the other types of threat. However, since this thesis essentially addresses the question of how far terrorists might go, most attention will be devoted to considering the most extreme forms of nuclear terrorism: the possibility of the terrorist use of a radiological dispersal or a nuclear-yield device.

If the possibility of terrorists obtaining fissile material can no longer be wholly excluded, the next question has to be one of motivation. The increased availability of such material is important, not only in its own right, but also because it vastly increases the options available to terrorists, and may radically heighten the level of devastation they are capable of causing, the political leverage and the attention for their cause they can obtain. However, that does not alter the question: if they have the opportunity, would terrorists resort to nuclear weapons, and if so, what sorts of weapons are they most likely to use? In order to answer this, the thesis will, having discussed the increased opportunities for terrorists to "go nuclear", concentrate on the desirability, from the terrorist's perspective, of doing so.

¹¹⁹ Robert Beckman, "Conference Report - International Terrorism: The Nuclear Dimension", Terrorism, Volume 8, Number 4, (1986), p.352.

¹²⁰ Leventhal & Alexander, Preventing Nuclear Terrorism, p. 12.

¹²¹ deLeon, Hoffman with Kellen & Jenkins, "The Threat Of Nuclear Terrorism: A Reexamination", p. 3.

¹²² See, for example, the discussion of nuclear terrorism in: Hoffman, "Terrorism and WMD...", p. 50.

By examining the psychology of terrorists and terrorism, both from an individual and an organisational perspective, using the theoretical literature and comparing it to empirical examples, the thesis will draw conclusions about the reasons that people join and remain within terrorist groups, as well as the pressures that are exerted on the group to escalate the levels of violence that they employ. The concept of political violence as the result of some set personality or terrorist type is dismissed, but it is argued that leaders do play an important role in determining the character of the group. The nature of terrorist groups is that they make dissent and exiting extremely difficult, and deflect responsibility for actions onto others, so that it is easier to remain within the organisation and accept its use of violence. Furthermore, violence is the activity that sets the group apart, it gives the organisation its identity, so any attempt to alter that is extremely difficult.

The tactics and targeting decisions of terrorist organisations are then considered, using the psychological insights gained from the previous chapter and comparing them to a rational, instrumental perspective of why groups use the methods they do and the basis for that decision. The thesis finds that though terrorism is not an effective means of achieving political objectives, groups that use it are often unable to resort to alternative strategies, for the reasons that are outlined above. Consequently, as the group begins to fail and face the possibility of defeat, it will often favour escalating the level of violence that it employs, believing it to be the best means of recapturing their advantage.

The thesis then considers the case of religious terrorism, arguing that it offers a unique legitimising force for violence, one that is increasing in importance as a justification and that is the most probable motivating force for an act of mass destructive terrorism. It analyses how the divinely ordained aspect of this terrorism makes it more absolutist and less constrained by secular morality than is the case for other types of terrorist group. The two varieties, secular and religious, are compared and some key similarities in their organisational dynamics are discussed. The chapter concludes by considering messianic violence that is especially relevant to mass-destructive terrorism since, in some

cases, it may promote the use of extreme levels of violence to hasten the end of the world and the salvation of the messianic adherents.

The study then discusses politically-motivated terrorism, from both the right and the left sides of the political spectrum. Right-wing terrorism is subdivided into conservative violence and radical violence, the latter of which is the increasingly prevalent variety. The perpetrators, motivations, and group dynamics of the two types are then compared with the conclusions derived from the previous chapter on psychology and the importance of split delegitimation, the belief that the government and the undesirable sections of society that they seek to protect are enemies, is noted. The section concludes that although most right-wing terrorism is instrumental, amongst groups, notably White Supremacists in the United States, where religion is also important to their beliefs, the likelihood of mass-destructive violence is much greater. This is supported by the fact that it is precisely amongst such groups that most attempted cases of non-conventional terrorism have occurred in the United States.

In contrast, although left-wing groups are the least likely to engage in high-level nuclear terrorism, it is anti-nuclear groups that have been responsible for most low-level nuclear acts to date. This phenomenon of single-issue terrorism is examined and is connected to other forms of radical leftist violence. As with each of the other main types of terrorism, the motivations, psychology and dynamics of left-wing groups are discussed. Of particular importance is their self-perception as the just protectors of the people and the environment against the forces of imperialist big-business and government. This is key because it means that such groups tend to be self-limiting, making an act of nuclear terrorism from such a group very unlikely, since they emphasise the proportionality and justice of their cause and so would believe that an act of mass terror would be counter-productive and unjust.

The thesis' final chapter draws together the elements already discussed and considers their implications for nuclear terrorism. It begins by discussing the feasibility of constructing a nuclear-yield device from fissile material and decides that though not impossible, it still would be a difficult task. Radiological terrorism is then considered as an

alternative to a nuclear-yield device, since it would offer many of the same benefits to the terrorists without the same difficulty in acquiring the material and constructing a nuclear-yield bomb. The chapter then discusses the changing nature of modern terrorism, asking whether there are circumstances in which terrorists might want to kill as many people as possible, and whether a nuclear weapon was likely to be the way that this could be achieved. The conservative attitude of many terrorist groups towards weaponry and tactics is noted and contrasted with the increasing lethality of terrorism itself. Previous cases of nuclear terrorism are noted, along with the significance of Aum's attack, and then chemical and biological weapons are considered as alternatives to nuclear weapons. The conclusion is that while nuclear-yield weapons remain unlikely, radiological ones are more plausible. However, the changing nature of terrorism and in particular, the increased importance of religion as a motivation, makes a full nuclear attack impossible to discount completely. The chapter ends by considering possible governmental responses to the threat, such as improving the control, protection and accountability of fissile materials and heightened intelligence, contingency planning and emergency responses. However, the thesis' ultimate conclusion is that although these measures may help the immediate problem and lessen the risk of nuclear terrorism stemming from the collapse of the former Soviet Union, the changing nature of terrorism, and the constant escalatory pressures on individuals and groups within terrorist organisations, means that the problem and the threat of mass-destructive violence will remain, even after the present danger has been mitigated.

The Psychological Motivations For Terrorism

Terrorism is an extraordinary and extreme form of political behaviour; its historical, political, economic, religious and social causes are far from clear, but it does seem apparent that a major influence is the individual psychology of those who perpetrate such acts. From the point of view of analysis, this poses a problem since there is the difficulty of acquiring detailed information that could be used to build an effective psychological theory of terrorism. Much of the data comes either from studies of other forms of violence, political behaviour or group interactions that are then extrapolated to explain terrorism; or is from studies of former terrorists which is problematic since they have either been caught, or else have renounced violence, undoubtedly affecting their perceptions of the acts they previously committed. To a large extent then, psychological studies of terrorism could be viewed as largely speculation, albeit of an informed nature.

A further difficulty arises due to the extremely diffuse nature of terrorism, making it questionable whether any single psychological theory of the phenomenon could be sufficiently comprehensive so as to include the vast variety. The basis of terrorism extends ideologically from revolution or national self-determination to defence of the status quo; structurally from centralised and hierarchical to a near anarchical model; methods and targeting vary from group to group and even within the same group over time. It is also the case that the motivations for terrorism may be quite different across cultures, what drives an individual in Northern Ireland to join the IRA differs from that which drives someone in Germany to join the RAF, so is likely to vary just as significantly from someone in the Middle East joining Abu Nidal's organisation or someone in Peru joining the Shining Path. As Crenshaw has argued:

Answers to the questions of why individuals are attracted to terrorism, why terrorism finds support amongst the population, why a terrorist organisation chooses particular strategies, and why terrorism has extreme effects in some cases but not in others depend on political and social context

and type of terrorist organisation as well as on psychological theory.¹²³

While this context is vital, it is the psychological explanation for terrorist actions that this section will focus on, along with the implications of that for acts of mass destructive terrorism.

It is important to note at the outset that there are considerable differences in the psychological pressures and motivations of initiating a campaign of terrorism and continuing one, and between being a leader of a terrorist group and a follower within one. Furthermore, the idea of being a terrorist is not a straightforward one: it is not necessary to have physical interaction with victims to be a terrorist. Most organised groups also consist of individuals involved in finance, logistics, propaganda, or weapons-building, to name only a few of the activities besides violence. For example, there are several categories of member within ETA, each of which has a vital role to play in the preservation and support of the organisation. However, relatively few *etarras* carry weapons and even less have been involved in activities that could clearly be defined as "terrorist", i.e. violent actions.¹²⁴ Such individuals are clearly still terrorists, but does their psychological motivation differ from those that are involved in violent acts?¹²⁵ They are terrorists by association, but does that mean that they share the guilt that those terrorists involved in violent acts have to deal with?¹²⁶

¹²³ Martha Crenshaw, "The Psychology of Political Terrorism" in Margaret Herman (ed.) Political Psychology- Contemporary Problems & Issues, (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Inc., 1986) p. 383.

¹²⁴ Robert P. Clark, "Patterns in the Lives of ETA Members", Terrorism: An International Journal, Volume 6, Number 3, (1983), p. 425.

¹²⁵ Although there is clearly some overlap: for example, the cell of the FLQ that kidnapped and then murdered Pierre Laporte in 1970 was originally intended to raise finance for the organisation. Allowing for this overlap, the fact remains that there is some gradation of involvement, most notably between those who are involved in violence and those who are not. In 1970, the FLQ had between 40 and 100 extremists willing to commit acts of violence; a limited editorial and propaganda section; some 200-300 active supporters; and between 2000 and 3000 passive sympathisers. Eleanor S. Wainstein, "The Cross & Laporte Kidnappings, Montreal, October 1970", RAND-R1986-DOS/ARPA, October 1976, p. 2.

¹²⁶ Maxwell Taylor, The Terrorist, (London: Brassey's, 1988) p. 137

Individual Psychology

Terrorist acts clearly require the threat or actual use of force, yet they are also apparently unnecessarily violent to the outside observer, they target seemingly innocent and random victims. There is a tendency to seek explanations that set the terrorist apart from other people, to assume that the terrorist is unusual simply because the acts they commit are in that they break the "rules of engagement". Consequently, there is a tendency to give labels to terrorists and their actions, for example, Dominic McGlinchey, former leader of the INLA, was known as the "Mad Dog"¹²⁷; Tim McVeigh, bomber of the Murrah Building in Oklahoma, has been described as a "monster".¹²⁸ A practical example of the dangers of attempting to dehumanise terrorists is provided by Menachem Begin, once the leader of Irgun. When British security forces raided his flat, they found two pictures of him, one that bore a fair resemblance to him, the second of which did not. The British chose to disseminate the second photograph though because the first made him look "more or less human." The result that Begin was unrecognisable from his picture and was able to continue to walk the streets with some degree of impunity.¹²⁹ However, it appears that terrorists often do follow rules but not necessarily the ones that might be deemed "conventional" by most people. Even within the bounds of conventional rules, acts of extreme violence are not invariably regarded as abnormal or unacceptable: the cases of warfare or self-defence are both examples of this and both are frequently used by terrorists as justifications for their acts.¹³⁰ The key difference is that in conventional morality, justifications such as self-defence or war¹³¹

¹²⁷ See for example, Walter Ellis, "Rebel Consumed by Blood Lust and Republican Rage", The Times, 12th February 1994, p. 6.

¹²⁸ The Sunday Times, Magazine Cover, 3rd September 1995.

¹²⁹ Menachem Begin, The Revolt: Story Of The Irgun, (New York: Henry Schuman Incorporated, 1951) pp. 103-105.

¹³⁰ Taylor, The Terrorist, pp. 73-77.

¹³¹ Terrorism is frequently compared to warfare, most often by the terrorists themselves because it offers a form of legitimacy, vital to justify the acts committed. An example that demonstrates both this point and that most terrorists are not "mad bombers", bent on destruction, no matter what the cost to themselves comes from Lehi (the Stern Gang), a group renowned for the bloodiness of its actions. Yitzhak Shamir, one of the leaders of the group, wrote:

Lehi was in no way made up of suicide squads. We were not Kamikaze fighters; we valued life... On the other hand, we were all well aware that our enemies vastly outnumbered our friends and that soldiers indeed die in action."

require an element of proportionality to be acceptable, the idea of "reasonable force". Terrorist morality is more likely to be absolutist and therefore to lack this component, so that the end can be made to justify the means in a way that is not possible, certainly using Judaic-Christian morality. This emphasis on proportionality means that it would be difficult to justify an act of mass destructive violence with such conventional constraints. By contrast, the absolutist terrorist's focus on results over methods makes it impossible to completely rule out any action, including nuclear terrorism, no matter how heinous, purely on the basis of morality. This is because, as Bandura argues, by rationalising their actions as warfare, the terrorist is able to ensure that killing is free from self-censoring restraints by "cognitively restructuring the moral value of killing."¹³² This task is eased if, through the moral sanction of violent means, people are able to see themselves as battling against violent oppressors; non-violent means of opposition have been ineffective; and the suffering caused by these terrorist counter-attacks can be portrayed as less than that inflicted by the enemy. The end is the key; the means secondary. Margolin is right to emphasise "not so much the normality of terrorism (which it clearly is not) but its susceptibility to the normal rules controlling behaviour."¹³³ The psychology governing terrorist behaviour are applicable to other people; terrorist acts however, are still far from conventional behaviour. Terrorism is abnormal, terrorists are not: they conform to psychological rules and can thus be analysed in such terms.

If there is a risk of over generalisation in dealing with psychological explanations for terrorism; there is also the danger of reductionism, of finding mono-casual explanations for the phenomenon. Psychologists who have written on the subject of terrorism are in general agreement that there is no common "terrorist personality"; and in fact, as Crenshaw notes, terrorism is as much a result of group interaction as of individual choice.¹³⁴ Corrado found that it was unlikely that

Yitzhak Shamir, Summing Up: An Autobiography, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1994), p. 38.

¹³² Albert Bandura, "Mechanisms Of Moral Disengagement" in Reich, Origins Of Terrorism...., p. 164.

¹³³ Joseph Margolin, "Psychological Perspectives In Terrorism" in Yonah Alexander & Seymour Finger (eds.) Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, (New York: John Jay Press, 1992) pp. 271-274.

¹³⁴ Crenshaw, "The Psychology of Political Terrorism", p.385.

"narcissism"¹³⁵ or the "death instinct"¹³⁶, both Freudian theories of personality, explain terrorism in even a small number of ideologically radical groups.¹³⁷ Post argues that while there was no set terrorist "type", a number of personality traits did occur frequently amongst individuals involved in terrorism, notably that of "splitting". This is characteristic of people whose personality development has been shaped by psychological damage during childhood, they have a damaged self-image and never wholly reconcile the "good" and "bad" aspects of their nature. Instead they split it into what "is me" and that which is "not me", projecting all their weaknesses onto others. They seek an external target to blame for all their inadequacies, gaining satisfaction and respite by being able to believe that "it's not my fault"¹³⁸ and this is a trait that is frequently found in the terrorists own explanations of their actions. A prime example of this is the bombing of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem, on July 22, 1946, in which 91 people were killed and 45 injured.¹³⁹ Irgun, the group responsible for the attack planned to give enough time for the hotel to be evacuated, and issued bomb warnings to the hotel, the Palestine Post and the French Consulate. Furthermore, since the bombers became involved in a gun fight with British forces shortly after planting the device, the British could have reasonably have been expected to believe that the threats were genuine. However, the hotel was not evacuated.¹⁴⁰ Another example of the same phenomenon is offered by Maria McGuire, in many respects an IRA moderate, nonetheless describes an attack in 1971 in which there were widespread civilian casualties. The

135 Narcissism in Freudian theory, is any investment of libido in aspects of the self as opposed to external objects. Rom Harre & Roger Lamb (eds.), The Encyclopedic Dictionary Of Psychology, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Publishers Limited, 1983) p. 406.

136 The death instinct, Freud believed, is balanced by the life instinct (Eros) which he attempted to identify with libido. The libido has the effect of turning the usually self-destructive death instinct outwards, onto the external world. This is then manifested as the destructive instinct, the instinct for mastery and the will for power. Ibid., pp. 240-243 and Erich Fromm, The Anatomy Of Human Destructiveness, (London: Penguin Books, 1977). Appendix pp. 581-631.

137 Raymond R. Corrado, "A Critique Of The Mental Disorder Perspective Of Political Terrorism", International Journal Of Law & Psychiatry, Number 4 (1981), pp. 293-310.

138 Jerrold M. Post, "Terrorist Psycho-Logic: Terrorist Behaviour As A Product Of Psychological Forces" in Reich, Origins Of Terrorism..., p. 27.

139 This is the official count, issued on August 4, 1946 by the British authorities. See J. Bowyer Bell, Terror Out Of Zion, (New York: St Martin's Press, 1977), p. 172. However, Begin, writing five years after the attack, still put the figure at over 200 killed or injured. Begin, The Revolt, p. 220.

140 Begin, The Revolt, pp. 212-230.

IRA blamed the security forces in Belfast for failing to clear the area quickly enough; the security services blamed the IRA for giving a deliberately ambiguous warning; McGuire believed that the result was due to a misunderstanding, that the IRA's aim was not to deliberately cause casualties in this case. There are two further interesting points that she makes in her description of the bombing in Donegal Street: although blaming the security services, the IRA accepted responsibility for the action, and by doing so felt that they had in some way atoned for the casualties, suggesting a curious, almost Confession-like attitude towards responsibility. The second point is the connection between action and audience and shows the way that many terrorists assess the success of an operation, in terms of its impact on the audience: "I did not connect with the people who were killed or injured in such explosions. I always judged such deaths in terms of the effect they would have on our support- and I felt this in turn depended on how many people accepted our explanation."¹⁴¹ This is an important aspect of terrorism because, as will be discussed later, it is this awareness of the consequences of such acts on terrorist support that, to some extent, determines the levels of violence that the terrorist is willing to employ. The constraints that mitigate against highly lethal acts of terrorism are therefore not moral, so much as political and instrumental.

Taylor and Quayle state that "the violence and damage the terrorist inflicts is the result not of a personality trait or disposition, but of an act of some form- a behaviour... responses to circumstances and forces." It is terrorist actions that is the key defining factor, rather than a psychological profile that is specific to terrorists.¹⁴² They do not have traits that are unique to those who commit acts of political violence,

¹⁴¹ Maria McGuire, To Take Arms, (London: MacMillan, 1973), pp. 102-103. McGuire's book has to be treated with some caution: it is evident that she did not see action with the IRA, and it is not clear whether she even belonged to the organisation, rather than to its political wing, *Sinn Fein*. Consequently, the extent to which she was privy to Army Council decisions is also debatable. However, her book remains important because it does offer an unprecedented insight into the Republican movement. M. L. R. Smith, Fighting For Ireland? The Military Strategy of the Irish Republican Movement, (London: Routledge, 1995), pp. 112-113.

It is also sometimes the case that terrorists defend their actions by putting them in the context of actions by other groups or the authorities. Abu Iyad defended the PLO campaign, stating: "We stopped terrorism in 1974... but the Israelis did not, although they convinced the world of the contrary. They continued to attack us." Patrick Seale, Abu Nidal: A Gun For Hire, (London: Arrow Books Ltd, 1992), p. 175.

¹⁴² Maxwell Taylor & Ethel Quayle, Terrorist Lives, (London: Brasseys, 1994) p. 33.

instead, it is necessary to regard such acts as stemming from individuals who are psychologically normal. There is widespread consensus that the overwhelming majority of terrorists are not mentally ill, abnormal, psychopaths¹⁴³ or even especially psychologically disposed towards violence. One possible and high-profile exception to this may be Kozo Okamoto, one of the JRA members responsible for the Lod Airport attack in May 1972. He was declared sane to stand trial for the attack, but there must be some doubts. He exhibited indications of a "death wish" and "survival guilt", repeatedly stating that he only wanted to die after his capture. He sought the death penalty and co-operated with the prosecution to speed the trial process, although he eventually received a prison sentence rather than death. Kozo treated the trial as a propaganda opportunity for the proletarian revolution against the bourgeoisie. His statement ended:

When I was a child, I was told that when people died they became stars. I didn't really believe it, but I could appreciate it. We three Red Army soldiers wanted to become Orion when we died. And it calms my heart that all the people we killed will also become stars in the same heavens. As the revolution goes on, how the stars will multiply!

To some extent, this reflects the Japanese Buddhist tradition that an individual's life and death are merely stations in the greater continuum of human existence, that life is only meaningful in its social context, not in the individual's experience. This would have made his sacrifice of life easier to rationalise, it was a by-product of the act rather than being the aim in itself. Although it is possible to partially rationalise Kozo's attitude, his statement, along with the fact that he attempted to circumcise himself with a pair of scissors whilst in prison, must cast serious doubts on his sanity.¹⁴⁴ While an individual must be oriented towards terrorism, to some extent, they are selected by existing members of the group. The covert and illegal nature of terrorism makes it unlikely that such an unstable individual would knowingly be chosen. A mentally ill member of a terrorist group

¹⁴³ Psychopaths are characterised by antisocial, irresponsible, aggressive and impulsive behaviour. It is associated with parental deprivation and a history of childhood disturbance. Aggressive traits are most prominent in early adulthood, and tend to decrease later, although lack of motivation and insight remain constants. Harre & Lamb, *The Encyclopedic...*, p. 502.

¹⁴⁴ Patricia Steinhoff, "Kozo Okamoto", *Asian Survey*, Volume 16, Number 9, (September 1976), pp. 830-845.

would be a "loose cannon", a security threat that endangered the entire group. Sam Melville was a prime example of this: he "played" at being a terrorist, dressing up, and holding up his girlfriend, Jane Alpert, in the bath. He consistently broke his own rules on not discussing terrorist activities or using friend's houses as addresses for illegal activities that could have led to the whole group being traced. He even stored dynamite in his own home and would spend hours playing with it. His violence was impulsive and ranged from threatening to beat up Alpert when she disagreed with him over bombing a radical radio station to unilaterally planting a bomb at the Marine Midland Bank in New York. When Alpert asked him why he had chosen Marine Midland, his response was: "No particular reason. I just walked around Wall Street until I found a likely-looking place." He had merely planted the bomb at random. Unsurprisingly, his actions appalled the other members of his group who were more inclined to plan their terrorism carefully, as they did in attacking the Whitehall Induction Centre, an army draft centre, on October 8, 1969.¹⁴⁵ Therefore, it is logical that most terrorist groups would avoid recruiting such a person; although it is possible that in cell-based organisations with less central control, it would be harder for the group to exercise such a stringent hold over recruitment, making it possible that a psychopath could become a member of the group.¹⁴⁶ A further exception might be Eliahu Giladi, a leader of LEHI, who according to Shamir:

was perhaps the only one of us who was, by nature, an extremist, a fanatic, a man free of the fetters of personal loyalties or ordinary sentiments, who found it difficult to function within any framework or discipline...

Then he developed a new *idée fixe*: Lehi should 'do away', as he put it, with the Zionist leadership, kill Ben-Gurion and

¹⁴⁵ Jane Alpert, Growing Up Underground, (New York: William Morrow & Company Inc., 1981), pp. 178-219.

¹⁴⁶ Another means by which a psychopath or mentally ill person could be part of a terrorist group is if they had established it. Abu Nidal used to be renowned for his ferocious nationalism, but now it is for his murderous methods. He is responsible for hundreds of deaths *within his own organisation*: Dozens died in the 1970s when the group was based in Iraq, but it is estimated that between November 1987 and the end of 1988, when his colleagues objected, around six hundred of his own people were purged, nearly half of his membership, and the number of people who died in the first three years of the *intifada*. To be so bathed in blood is scarcely normal behaviour; in many organisations it would have led to an attempted coup; but the authoritarian and suspicious nature of Abu Nidal's group has precluded this. Presumably, potentially dangerous rivals have been amongst those purged. Seale, Abu Nidal, pp. 287-288.

clear the stage. He was not a traitor or an informer, but he was irrational. I waited for him to change, for the dreadful fantasies to leave him, but he went on, talking icily about the need to kill. I knew then that I'd have to make a fateful decision and I did. I decided that we couldn't go on like that; Giladi was too dangerous to the movement. The circumstances being what they were [most members of the organisation were in prison], there weren't many people I could talk to freely, but I did speak to two or three of my colleagues and the next day the decision was made - and carried out.¹⁴⁷

However, these cases are unusual: Shamir in the same passage says: "I tried to find out what happened in other underground groups, other resistance movements, but never found a parallel."¹⁴⁸ The nature of most terrorism is that it involves long periods of inaction interspersed with bouts of activity. It therefore requires reflective rather than impulsive violence and the ability to delay gratification derived from activity through the long and dull planning stages that characterise the preparation for an attack in most organised terrorist groups.¹⁴⁹ It is doubtful whether such inactivity would appeal greatly, or satisfy the psychological needs of a psychopath, even were they to join a terrorist group. Taylor and Quayle distinguish between hostile and instrumental aggression. The former was a spontaneous upsurge of emotion and anger whereas the latter referred to aggression as a means towards some other end, it was calculated and usually a deliberate policy for a specific goal. Most terrorist acts fall into this second category, they are born not of frustration but of planning. They argue that aggression, like any behaviour, can be learned, that it is related to its consequences, and that when it is rewarded, by media attention for example, then it occurs more frequently.¹⁵⁰ Post suggests that individuals are drawn to the path of terrorism because it gives an opportunity to commit acts of violence and they are psychologically

¹⁴⁷ Shamir, *Summing...*, pp. 42-43.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.* p. 43.

¹⁴⁹ McGuire cites the case of the Northern Volunteers that caused grave concerns within the IRA in 1969 by openly carrying their arms; gambling with their weapons next to their money; and by being drunk and quarrelsome. On one occasion, they were watching horse racing and shot the television when their horse lost; on another they shot at the door of a disco in Dublin to which they had been refused entry. Although not psychopathic, it is obvious that their uncontrolled, impulsive violence was a grave embarrassment to the IRA, and the Volunteers as an organisation was marginalised as a result. McGuire, *To Take Arms*, pp. 83-84.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.* pp 19-20.

compelled to commit these acts in order to exorcise the enemy within.¹⁵¹ Alpert says that her terrorism "stemmed as much from a longing for acceptance as from a passion to rebel, as much from the kinds of relationships I formed in childhood as from my outrage at the United States government."¹⁵² Post too believes that most terrorism is not a result of terrorists being psychopathic or psychotic,¹⁵³ and that most terrorists are "normal", the factors governing behaviour in most people can still be applied to terrorists.¹⁵⁴ Taylor notes that:

Many authors refer to the psychopaths inability to profit from experience; this alone may well serve to distinguish most political terrorist from the psychopath. Another, and rather important difference between the psychopath and the terrorist is that while both are manifesting behaviour outside the normal moral and legal framework, for the psychopath, the purposiveness of the behaviour if it exists, is essentially personal. This is clearly not the case for the terrorist.¹⁵⁵

Although most terrorists are "normal" psychologically, some do display schizoid tendencies: McDonald cites the example of the ETA member, Amaia, who denied being responsible for people's deaths yet in the next sentence said that she was pleased to have killed "the bastards".¹⁵⁶ This is an example of "splitting", a person holding two opposing attitudes to the same subject. It may be a symptom of schizophrenia¹⁵⁷, although the existence of such a schizoid¹⁵⁸ mechanism is not necessarily an indication of mental instability. It is more likely that such tendencies reflect the individual's means of dealing with the effects of their actions: by separating its results from the credit for the action, the terrorist is able to derive the necessary

¹⁵¹ Post, "Terrorist Psycho- Logic ..." pp. 25-26.

¹⁵² Alpert, Growing Up Underground, pp. 17-18.

¹⁵³ A psychotic is someone suffering from a psychosis: a serious disorder of mental functioning, whether physically or personality based. Harre & Lamb, The Encyclopedic... pp. 507-508.

¹⁵⁴ Post, "Terrorist Psycho- Logic ..." pp. 25-26.

¹⁵⁵ Taylor, The Terrorist, p.88.

¹⁵⁶ Eileen McDonald, Shoot The Women First, (New York: Random House Inc., 1991), pp. 233-234.

¹⁵⁷ Schizophrenia is a mental illness in which there is a fundamental disturbance of the personality characterised by disturbances of thinking, motivation and mood together with delusions and hallucinations but in which cognition is normal. Harre & Lamb, The Encyclopedic..., p. 544.

¹⁵⁸ The schizoid withdraws from affectional , social and other contacts with an autistic preference for fantasy and introspective reserve. Harre & Lamb, The Encyclopedic..., p. 462.

satisfaction without having to overcome the guilt associated with it. Such traits certainly do not correspond to any tendency towards psychopathy in the overwhelming majority of terrorists that operate within groups. This is important for nuclear terrorism because it largely dispels the scenario, so beloved of film-makers and novelists, that an act of nuclear terrorism would be the work of some maniacal individual, intent on either dominating the world or holding it to ransom. Terrorism, especially nuclear terrorism, is more likely to be conducted for limited political (rather than purely financial) gains and to require the resources of a group of psychologically normal individuals.

Far from being psychopathic, Knutson found that many terrorists were "psychologically non-violent".¹⁵⁹ They spent a great deal of their efforts in attempting to avoid the ultimate responsibility for deaths by transferring the guilt onto an external source and in planning their actions so that while violence was threatened, it was rarely actually used. They saw terrorism as a last resort, an act of personal futility when all other options had been exhausted. However, there is a difficulty here in separating motivation from rationalisation, the idea of "we had no choice" as a justification for their actions. In seeking to displace responsibility, they sought to view their activities as arising from the dictates of authorities, not from their own volition; they are an instrument, not the cause of the violence, so are freed from self-censorship for it.¹⁶⁰ Begin applied an almost existential aspect to the Irgun's decision to resort to violence:

...we steeled our hearts against doubts, and against alternative "solutions."

What use was there in writing memoranda? What value in speeches? If you are attacked by a wolf in the forest, do you try to persuade him that it is not fair to tear you to pieces, or that he is not a wolf at all but an innocent lamb? Do you send him a "memorandum"? No, there was no other way. If we did not fight we should be destroyed. To fight was the only way to salvation.

...There are times when everything in you cries out: your very self-respect as a human being lies in your resistance to evil.

¹⁵⁹ Jeanne N. Knutson, "The Terrorists Dilemmas: Some Implicit Rules Of The Game", Terrorism: An International Journal, Volume 4, (1980), p. 199.

¹⁶⁰ Bandura, "Mechanisms of Moral...", p. 173.

We fight therefore we are!¹⁶¹

It is also the case that Knutson's observations only apply to some terrorists: Morf found a fascination with violence amongst members of the FLQ¹⁶² and Bollinger amongst West German groups. Members of the organisations showed unconscious aggressive tendencies and the group provided an outlet for these emotions that stemmed from personal feelings of inadequacy and inferiority.¹⁶³ This is supported by Kaplan, who states that:

"Terrorism is a response to a lack of self-esteem"¹⁶⁴

However, it seems that Sean O'Callaghan is more typical of terrorists. Describing his killing of Detective Inspector Peter Flanagan, of the RUC Special Branch, he said: "I felt that he had been a legitimate target and that it was a job well done. But I do not think I enjoyed killing."¹⁶⁵

Erikson developed a theory linking an individual's psychology to society which helps explain the need of many terrorists to belong to a group, and which would reinforce the idea that being a terrorist is of secondary importance to membership of the organisation.¹⁶⁶ He argued that the concept of identity was the key; that personality developed through a series of childhood turning points that formed developmental stages. These crises could either be resolved or not, but if not, they could come back to dog the individual, especially in adolescence when they were seeking to find a stable identity. The earlier failure to establish trust, autonomy, initiative or industry would be a handicap in their search for a positive identity and could lead to confusion or a negative identity. Identity is not found alone, it is rooted in the ethnic, family and national inheritance of an individual, based on collectivity and connected to historical circumstances. Erikson explored the need for "fidelity", to have faith in something, the key role played by ideology as the guardian of identity.¹⁶⁷ He cited the

¹⁶¹ Begin, The Revolt, p. 46.

¹⁶² Gustave Morf, Terror In Quebec: Case Study Of The FLO, (Toronto: Clark Irwin, 1970.)

¹⁶³ Crenshaw, "The Psychology of Political Terrorism", p. 387.

¹⁶⁴ Abraham Kaplan, "The Psychodynamics Of Terrorism", Terrorism: An International Journal, Volume 1, Numbers 3/4, p. 245.

¹⁶⁵ Sean O'Callaghan, "The Killer Who Said Sorry: Confessions of a gunman who betrayed the IRA", Sunday Times, December 15 1996, Section 3, p. 2.

¹⁶⁶ Erik H. Erikson, Childhood & Society, (New York: Norton, 1963) & Identity: Youth & Crisis, (New York: Norton, 1968.)

¹⁶⁷ Erikson, Identity...p. 232.

example of youth undergrounds that utilise this need for fidelity and are a store of anger for those deprived of something in which they had faith. A crisis of identity can also make some youths susceptible to "totalism", assuming a totalistic collective identity that promises certainty.

Erikson argued that the rage felt by individuals at being helpless was projected onto controlling figures and engendered feelings of guilt. Failure to achieve objectives could lead such individuals to suffer feelings of self-doubt, suspicion, shame, inferiority and incompetence that acted as a further handicap on their subsequent activities, leading to their underachieving again. Bollinger suggested that the act of joining a terrorist group represented the last attempt to establish an identity; in doing so, an individual was seeking purpose and identity from the organisation.¹⁶⁸ Often they would abandon their individual responsibilities and assume the collective identity of the group, enabling a feeling of belonging. Both Susan Stern, a member of the Weathermen organisation, and Michael Baumann, founder of the 2nd of June Movement in West Germany during the early 1970s, cite membership of the group as a key factor in their progression into political violence.¹⁶⁹ This is a vital point in an explanation of why individuals join a terrorist group and why they are able to commit terrorist acts: the group enables them to feel valued, a chance to feel omnipotent and express aggressive tendencies whilst neutralising any feelings of guilt through the intellectual and emotional justifications of the group. The individual's justification for terrorism is related at a fundamental psychological level to a sense of purpose and self worth.¹⁷⁰ The fact that belonging to a terrorist organisation may be a final attempt to establish identity by an individual means that it is entirely plausible to suggest that they believe that they have "nowhere else to go". This would certainly make the individual concerned more willing to accept the absolutist perspective of the terrorist group and willing to overlook or justify the violent consequences of that.

¹⁶⁸ Crenshaw, "The Psychology of Political Terrorism", p. 392.

¹⁶⁹ Konrad Kellen, "Terrorists- What are They Like? How Some Terrorists Describe Their World & Actions", RAND N-1300-SL, (November 1979), p. 15.

¹⁷⁰ Taylor & Quayle, Terrorist Lives, p. 35.

Many terrorists have a "negative identity", a vindictive rejection of the roles and norms considered desirable and proper by the individual's family and community. Having failed to achieve the objectives set, the individual prefers to be "a bad person" rather than a nobody. If early steps towards acquisition of a negative identity are treated by society as final, then individuals may be railroaded into conformity with the worst that is expected of them, finding their refuge in radical groups that assure them of a degree of certainty, and forced into their choice by others interpretation of their behaviour. The same effect can be seen to exist when governments put pressure on terrorist groups, they make the group into "something" by being forced to recognise its presence; and narrowing the choices of the group if it wishes to continue being so acknowledged. Media coverage is also vital, the life blood of terrorist organisations: the group is in constant need of reaffirmation of its existence and importance, such coverage provides this. When the SLA kidnapped Patty Hearst:

...Cinque and his comrades could not hide their delight and illusions of grandeur over the widespread blast of publicity given to them in the press as a result of my kidnapping. I was their passport to fame and popularity... Cinque and the others could not resist telling me what was being said about them. It would all help spread the word of their revolutionary war against the government, they said, for "the people" would now know that the oppressors could be engaged in open combat. It proved that they had been right all the time...¹⁷¹

Begin also noted the key role of publicity for the campaign of the Irgun: "The interest of the newspapers is the measure of the interest of the public. And the public - not only Jews but non-Jews too - were manifestly interested in the blows we were striking in Eretz Israel." He suggested that this publicity was important not only for publicising the Irgun's cause, but because it precluded excessive measures being used to repress the revolt, the British being sensitive to world opinion.¹⁷² Consequently, it might be possible to argue that in some circumstances, as far as some groups are concerned, adverse publicity is better than no publicity at all to maintain the existence of the group. If true, it would remove a major constraint from the actions of such groups because the consequences would be secondary in importance to the fact of having

¹⁷¹ Patty Hearst, Patty Hearst, (London: Corgi Books, 1988), p. 55.

¹⁷² Begin, The Revolt, p. 55.

staged a publicly acknowledged attack. In such a case, the results would matter less than that it was spectacular and newsworthy. Given these criteria, a high level act of terrorism, such as a nuclear attack, would have considerable attractions for the group.

There is little doubt that nationalist-separatist terrorist groups, such as ETA or the IRA, differ considerably in this respect from anarchic-ideologue groups, such as the RAF. They have different degrees of negative identity, since it is quite possible that the former type will not be perceived wholly adversely in their own community, and that joining a terrorist group was an act of solidarity and commitment to the community into which an individual was born, although even in this case, the decision to be a terrorist would be an extreme one.¹⁷³ One clear exception to this is that of Armenian groups where the resort to violence is encouraged by embracing the concepts of martyrdom, armed struggle and the legacy of ancestors in pursuing the first two as central to the political and religious culture.¹⁷⁴ Even in this instance, it is the case that of an Armenian diaspora of around 1.5 million, fewer than 150 people have been active members of the Justice Commandos, Armenian Revolutionary Army or Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA).¹⁷⁵ Some terrorist groups claiming to act on behalf of a minority community actually have almost no support there: the FLQ in Canada never achieved widespread support and remained isolated from society and from political parties espousing a similar political objective. Similarly the African-American community in the United States largely rejected the actions of the Black Panthers, even if sometimes in agreement with their grievances.¹⁷⁶ A third category, religious fundamentalist terrorists, is also crucially different since their intended audience of influence is not elite decision makers, it is the deity.¹⁷⁷ As with nationalist-separatist movements,

¹⁷³ Taylor, The Terrorist, p. 165.

¹⁷⁴ Khachig Toloyan, "Martyrdom As Legitimacy: Terrorism, Religion & Symbolic Appropriation In The Armenian Diaspora" in Paul Wilkinson & Alexander Stewart (eds.), Contemporary Research On Terrorism, (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1987.)

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., pp. 92-93.

¹⁷⁶ Martha Crenshaw, "An Organizational Approach To The Analysis Of Political Terrorism", Orbis, Volume 29, (Fall 1985), p. 469.

¹⁷⁷ Jerrold M. Post, "Current Understanding Of Terrorist Motivation & Psychology: Implications For A Differentiated Antiterrorist Policy" , Terrorism, Volume 13, Number 1, (1989), p. 66.

their community may be sympathetic to their cause, even if it condemns their actions. In one sense, although the perception that they have at least some support is important, the actual level of support that a terrorist group enjoys is secondary to the belief that they are in the right and will ultimately be seen to be so. Yalin-Mor, a member of LEHI, provides an example of this:

...I admit that in 1944 most Jews were quite satisfied with British rule in Palestine. They did business, they were quite well off. If you had taken a vote, perhaps eighty or ninety per cent would have given a good opinion of the British. But this was not the point. They were the alien power and we had to fight them to gain our freedom, whether they were liberal or inhuman.¹⁷⁸

Providing that they believe themselves to be right and to be ahead of public opinion, terrorists may be willing to act against the prevailing popular consensus. Support and thus public opinion about a situation is important, and is a major restriction on extremes of terrorism, such as the use of nuclear weaponry, but it is not the sole factor in terrorists' rationalisation of how to conduct their campaign. Consequently, it would be unwise to assume that public opinion or support alone would determine or necessarily constrain the action of a terrorist group.

The anarchic-ideologue group remains most likely to be isolated from society and is far more likely to be seen in purely negative terms. It draws its strength from political ideals which provide both the goals to aim for and the justification for the methods to achieve that goal.¹⁷⁹ Even this represents something of an over generalisation since the degree to which a group exists "underground" varies. Some, such as the RAF in West Germany consist largely of professional terrorists who have no other employment and live concealed from the authorities; whilst others, such as the Red Cells, were "part-time" terrorists. Obviously, the extent to which members of the group remain in touch with the outside world has implications for the amount of cohesion and solidarity that exists within the group. If the organisation is

¹⁷⁸ Nicholas Bethell, The Palestine Triangle: The Struggle For The Holy Land, 1935-48, (New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1979), p. 161.

¹⁷⁹ Taylor, The Terrorist, p.165.

underground or in some other way isolated, then the members of the group will become increasingly dependent on one another for company and a release from the pressure the individual is experiencing in the highly stressful situation they are in. The group and its activities become the individual's life, all-encompassing in a way that is not the case if the individual has an existence beyond the group. In the former case, the individual increasingly focuses on, and identifies with, the group. This difference is also significant for the strategic choices that the group makes. Crenshaw suggests that part-time terrorists are less likely to use actions that require extensive planning whereas the costs of maintaining a professional terrorist group means that the organisation has to spend involved in fund-raising activities such as bank robberies.¹⁸⁰

Knutson argued that negative identity reflects the values instilled early in life, that it reaffirms ethnic traditions and roots, and that it is unwise to blame all terrorist activity on individual difficulties with a positive identity. Many adolescents with a negative identity rebel socially, in their choice of clothes or music for example, but not politically. This may reflect their inner needs or a lack of opportunity to join a terrorist group, or it may show that there are more factors to be considered than simply whether or not an individual has difficulty with their identity. The resort to terrorism is not one but two decisions, firstly to break with society and secondly to join a group espousing political violence. They are not synonymous because many people achieve the former and not the latter, monks are just one example.¹⁸¹ An additional trait in a number of terrorists has been their sense of being morally betrayed at a crucial stage in their development that formed the basis for an acute sensibility to perceived injustices by the establishment later. In the case of members of the Baader-Meinhof gang, this betrayal was their parents Nazi past. The early failure of their parents to prove worthy of the role model for conscience that was assigned to them lead the members of the gang to violently oppose resent what their parents had stood for, and by extension, what the establishment stood for.¹⁸² This is an extreme example and the circumstances are exceptional;

¹⁸⁰ Crenshaw, "An Organizational Approach ...", p. 470.

¹⁸¹ Kellen, "Terrorists- What Are They Like? ...", p. 34.

¹⁸² Erikson, *Identity...* p.119.

however, the tendency for terrorists to feel that they have been betrayed is a frequent one. As well as occurring in individuals with anarchic-ideologue leanings, it is an aspect of nationalist-separatist terrorism. Leila Khaled speaks of "European Zionists" that expelled the Palestinians from their lands by military might and who now "live where we should be living while we float around, exiled"¹⁸³ and goes on to argue that no Palestinian should ever forget "the three historic days of betrayal...: the Balfour Declaration of November 2, 1917; the partition of Palestine, November 29, 1947; and the proclamation of the state of Israel, May 15, 1948."¹⁸⁴

Erikson further postulates that the choice of terrorism as an anti-authoritarian conflict may be because:

The individual unconsciously arranges for variations of an original theme which he has not learned either to overcome or to live with: he tries to master a situation which in its original form has been too much for him by meeting it repeatedly and of his own accord.¹⁸⁵

The individual who was unable to violently challenge their parents' authority at the time that they were a child may later try to overcome that fear by attacking external authorities such as the social and political elites. Post suggests that there is a key difference here between anarchic-ideologue terrorists and those involved in nationalist-separatist movements. The latter reflected loyalty to parents who had been disloyal to the established regime, so was an effort to carry on the mission of elders who had been wounded by the regime. For them, terrorist acts represented a rite of passage, enabling them to be widely known in the community and even lionised.¹⁸⁶ It was only anarchic-ideologue terrorism that represented an attack on the parental generation who had been loyal to the regime.¹⁸⁷ Where individuals

¹⁸³ Leila Khaled, *My People Shall Live*, (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1973), p. 22.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 31-32.

¹⁸⁵ Erikson, *Childhood...* p. 189.

¹⁸⁶ Jerrold M. Post, "Rewarding Fire With Fire: Effects Of Retaliation On Terrorist Group Dynamics", *Terrorism*, Volume 10, Number 1, (1987), p. 25.

¹⁸⁷ Susan Stern, for example, a member of the Weatherman Organisation, became involved in terrorism through the radical student movement of the late 1960s to which she had been introduced by her husband, Robby Stern. In the Autumn of 1965, she taught at a ghetto school in Syracuse which profoundly affected her view of society and the way that it seemed to her to be failing. In August 1967, she attended the New Politics Convention with Robby, and was introduced to the national organisers of the Students for Democratic Society (SDS), which had links to the Black Panthers; and later in the year, joined their group. By August 1968, she was working in the Los

were loyal to their parents' generation who in turn had been loyal to the regime, then terrorism rarely occurred.¹⁸⁸

It is possible that terrorists are "stress-seekers" who find terrorism attractive because it offers an element of danger.¹⁸⁹ When Susan Stern became a terrorist, she says: "I wondered how I had led a middle-class existence for so long. I knew that that part of my life was over. I would never again know how to be or want to be Susan Stern- Student, housewife, potential mother."¹⁹⁰ This would be significant for the likelihood of nuclear terrorism because it would mean that acts were primarily the result of individual's internal rather than external imperatives; the factors that are the primary causes of terrorism stem predominantly from psychological motivations, rather than from socio-economic conditions or any other form of outside stimuli. More importantly, it would suggest that terrorism is escalatory, something that obviously would have great significance for the prospects for nuclear terrorism. Terrorists have to do increasingly difficult acts in order to satisfy their need. Stress-seekers fall into two categories: the individual that is uncomfortable as a follower who will be attention-seeking and require self-affirmation in the face of danger; and the group stress seeker who will abandon their individuality in favour of the group, merging into the collective personality. This may represent a significant difference between leaders and followers, with the latter more interested in the group itself, rather than in its activities.

Leaders are more likely to possess the traits that would make violent oppositional behaviour attractive to them. Sullwold, a German

Angeles office of the SDS, and attended the Democratic Convention in Chicago, and was one of those outside the Convention Hall involved in repeated clashes with Mayor Daly's police force. She became increasingly affiliated to the Progressive Labor faction within the SDS, which after the resolution "Toward a Revolutionary Youth Movement" (RYM) in December 1968, began to split from the rest of the SDS, a process that lasted until August 1969 when the Seattle Weatherman was formed. By this time, Stern had participated in the Ave riots in Seattle's University District; and two months later in the Days of Rage in Chicago, where she was arrested for assaulting a police officer. By the end of the year, the Weathermen were attacking university ROTCs; and had decided to go underground. From there, they organised further demonstrations and attacks on establishment targets connected with the Vietnam War. Susan Stern, With The Weathermen: The Personal Journal of a Revolutionary Woman, (New York: Doubleday & Company Inc, 1975).

¹⁸⁸ Post, "Terrorist Psycho- Logic ...", pp. 29-30.

¹⁸⁹ Crenshaw, "The Psychology of Political Terrorism", p. 388.

¹⁹⁰ Stern, With The Weathermen, p. 41.

psychologist, noted two types of terrorist leader: the extrovert who tended to be unstable, uninhibited, inconsiderate, self-interested and unemotional with a high tolerance for stress and a reluctance to accept responsibility for their actions; and the neurotically hostile who tended to be suspicious, defensive, intolerant, aggressive, to reject internal criticism and be hypersensitive to external criticism.¹⁹¹ Abu Nidal, for example, while a mixture of the two types to some extent, clearly displayed more aspects of the latter variety than the former. According to Seale, he is extremely violent and generates great fear, even amongst his own members; yet he is a fantasist who trusts no-one and lives a secluded, self-protective life, with few of the trappings of his considerable success in his role. Although not materialistic, he is egotistic, as one acquaintance put it: "For Abu Nidal, self is everything. When he feels personally threatened, he goes berserk."¹⁹² Cinque, leader of the SLA, displayed considerably more of the second group of tendencies. Hearst says that:

He was the leader and never hesitated to remind you of that... he told us on several occasions that our top priority in this or any other action was to protect our leader. [He would say] "I'm the black leadership of the SLA. Without me, you'd all be nothing. There'd be no revolution." ... To me, he seemed to be a strutting egomaniac, swilling plum wine most of the day... doing whatever he damn well pleased, while all the others struggled mightily to shape up to his fantasy of an elite army of revolutionary cadre.¹⁹³

It is worth noting that by no means all terrorist leaders are as extreme in their behaviour as Cinque or Abu Nidal. Most of the founders and leaders of the Tupamaros in Uruguay were singularly mainstream. They mostly came from regular families and were recognised and respected members of the community. Although political militants, most of them began their involvement in one of the three major political parties in the country. For these leaders, many of them professionals of high repute that had actively and fully participated in other organisations prior to forming the Tupamaros, the resort to terrorism cannot be simply labelled as a search for identity or belonging. In this case, it seems to have been fired primarily by ideology. It was a conscious tactical decision based on the belief that the

¹⁹¹ Jerrold M. Post, "Notes On A Psychodynamic Theory Of Terrorist Behaviour", Terrorism: An International Journal, Volume 7, Number 3, (1984), p. 245.

¹⁹² Seale, Abu Nidal, p. 57 and p. 99.

¹⁹³ Hearst, Patty Hearst, pp. 143-144.

time for revolution was at hand and mounting frustration at the failure of their previous efforts to achieve their objectives.¹⁹⁴

However, Weinberg and Eubank, in their study of Italian groups suggest that the notion of the leader as an entity emotionally and psychologically separate from ordinary members of the organisation, may be problematic. Terrorist groups may be sufficiently unusual that leadership requires relatively few additional predispositions, in which case the fact of being a leader may reflect a particular situation or interaction that causes individuals to move from being followers. Another possibility is natural evolution: since many terrorist groups have a high turnover with members exiting the group, dying or being captured, it is possible that leadership comes to those who simply remain with the group longest. This hypothesis would particularly apply to organisations that exist over several generations of terrorists, but seems to be largely disproved by groups such as ETA or the IRA where leaders seem to be selected more on the basis of ability than longevity. The idea of leadership in itself is not straightforward: the role a leader has to play in a terrorist organisation depends to a large extent on the type of group: on its size, goals, and organisational structure for example. One variety of leadership might entail directing a small band in dangerous violent acts, while another might be to refine the group's political views and to manage its resources. The differences might mean that the psychology of leadership in terrorist groups was dependant more on the type of organisation and therefore the type of role played by the leader, than on simply the fact of being a terrorist leader.¹⁹⁵

Group Psychology

Terrorism though is not the act of individuals; it is committed by groups who reach collective decisions based on commonly held beliefs. This is not to suggest that lone terrorists do not exist: they obviously do. Individuals do act alone to commit acts of violence with a political

¹⁹⁴ Fernando Loez-Alves, "Political Crises, Strategic Choices, and Terrorism: The Rise and Fall of the Uruguayan Tupamaros", *Terrorism & Political Violence*, Volume 1, Number 2, (April 1989), pp. 208-209.

¹⁹⁵ Leonard Weinberg & William Eubank, "Leaders & Followers In Italian Terrorist Groups", *Terrorism & Political Violence*, Volume 1, Number 2, (April 1989), p. 157.

objective and end in mind, the Unabomber in the United States is an example. However, most terrorism is not the work of such people, but rather of groups; and it is the psychology of collections of individuals, groups, that is important in assessing the driving forces behind terrorism. It is a political act perpetrated by individuals acting together and trying, together, to justify their behaviour. These justifications reflect prevailing social values and to some extent, social conditions, although the individual's perception of the latter is more important than the reality.¹⁹⁶ It represents a response to the psychological and social environment as experienced by the individual rather than being a quality inherent within the individual terrorist.¹⁹⁷ There clearly are links between background conditions and the incidence of terrorism; the former undoubtedly affects susceptibility to the attractions of terrorism, ability to overcome moral restraint or fear of the costs, and collective beliefs.¹⁹⁸ Studies of the backgrounds of terrorists from the RAF and Red Brigades show a pattern of incomplete family structure, especially during adolescence. In the German example, 25% had lost a parent by the age of 14; and one third had had juvenile convictions.¹⁹⁹

¹⁹⁶ Martha Crenshaw, "Questions To Be Answered, Research To Be Done, Knowledge To Be Applied", in Reich, *Origins Of Terrorism...* p. 250.

For example, Cinque genuinely believed that "The press... were all a bunch of bourgeois pigs; the news media were all owned by fascist multinational corporations. All sorts of lies were spewed out in the newspapers and on the television about the SLA. This was a class war: the capitalists and the bourgeoisie against the SLA and the people." P. Hearst, *Patty Hearst*, p. 66. Later, Cinque went out knocking on doors in the area around where the group were hiding because the SLA felt unable to risk going out for provisions on a regular basis, so he sought people who would act as suppliers for them in the safe house. Cinque believed that: "They're all poor people in this neighbourhood... and now that they know who we are, they'll all be willing to help." *Ibid.* p. 174. Unsurprisingly, he met with only very little success: one family did offer to assist; most were singularly unappreciative of his efforts for the revolution on their behalf.

¹⁹⁷ Taylor & Quayle, *Terrorist Lives*, p.189.

¹⁹⁸ One example is that of Jorde, a former terrorist with Abu Nidal's organisation, a Palestinian born in Lebanon, but who grew up in Algeria. He was a petty thief, unemployed and very reluctant to work to take care of his mother and sisters. He entered Spain illegally, and made some underworld contacts, but was deported after a few months to Lebanon. He became involved in Abu Nidal's group through a girlfriend in Beirut who was also engaged in work for the organisation. He was attracted to the organisation predominantly because it offered to him a meal a day, and a bed without the necessity of regular work. Although the process of initiation was unpleasant, Jorde continued within the group mainly because he could not see any alternative he sought means of escape but could not find any. His former life did not appeal greatly, and he hoped that after his training was ended, he would be able to live at the organisation's expense in appealing European cities. Seale, *Abu Nidal*, pp. 9-27.

¹⁹⁹ Jerrold M. Post, "Hostilite, Conformite, Fraternite: The Group Dynamics Of Terrorist Behaviour", *International Journal of Group Psychotherapy*, Volume 36, Number 2, (April 1986) pp. 214-215.

Their lives were characterised by social isolation and personal failure.²⁰⁰ The decision to join a national-separatist group represents less of an extreme break with society, but even there, it often stems from a feeling of alienation. Children of mixed Spanish- Basque heritage are scorned and rejected in the Basque region, they make up only 8% of the population yet 40% of the membership of ETA. They attempt to be more nationalistic than the Basques themselves; they attempt to exaggerate their political identity to find a psycho social identity.²⁰¹ Idoia Lopez Riano was one of ETA's most effective assassins until her capture in France in 1994, yet her parents were from Salamanca, not the Basque country. She learnt the language at school, and while not perfect was quite fluent. Her introduction to ETA probably came via a boyfriend; and by the age of twenty she had joined one of the organisation's most lethal cells, led by Juan Manuel Soares. As part of this group, she participated in some of the worst atrocities of ETA's campaign: including the execution at point-blank range of three soldiers; a car bomb that killed nine and the rocketing of the Defence Ministry across a ten-lane motorway. When four of the cell were captured in 1989, they received a total of 9000 years in prison sentences. It appears that Lopez Riano actively sought out danger and was unable to avoid drawing attention to herself, even to the extent that she became known as *La Tigressa* (the tigress) in the Spanish press.²⁰²

The same tendency to exaggerate a national identity might be said to exist amongst a number of the IRA's members. Sean MacStiofain, leader of the break by the Provisionals from the Official IRA, and first Provisional Chief of Staff, was born John Stephenson in south-east England. His mother was Irish, but it was his service with the Royal

²⁰⁰ This is supported by examples such as that of Sam Melville, whose parents separated soon after he was born; he grew up in a discordant household which he left at the age of sixteen and did various odd jobs until he "rediscovered" his father. His father, a member of the American Communist Party, persuaded him to graduate from high school, which Melville did only with great difficulty, but was increasingly disillusioned with the party. After he left it, Melville cut all contact with him. By this time, Melville was in a failed marriage and drifting from job to job. After his marriage broke up, he lived with whatever woman would give him a place to stay; his chief ties were to the radical movement which gave him a vision of the future and the means to express his discontent with establishment America. Alpert, *Growing Up Underground*, pp. 118-122.

²⁰¹ Post, "Hostilie, Conformite, Fraternite..." pp. 214-215. Clark, "Patterns...", p. 433.

²⁰² Anne McElvoy, "The Trapping Of A Tigress", *The Times*, Magazine, September 9, 1995, pp. 23-26.

Air Force that accentuated his ancestral nationalism. He joined the IRA via various Irish Language movements in the 1950s; served a prison term for his part in the Felstead School armoury raid of 1953; and was a key factor in the Provisional's organisational build up between 1969 and 1971.²⁰³ Undeniably dedicated to the cause of Irish nationalism, he did take his Irish identity to extremes: Maria McGuire states in her autobiography that he refused to speak anything other than Gaelic in his house and expected others to do likewise; and that he claimed to be tee-total to emphasise his single-minded commitment to the cause.²⁰⁴

Even if most Western terrorists did come from identifiable categories, such as being young, or middle class rebels of broken homes, it is unhelpful to a general explanation of terrorism since it is largely culturally specific, and more crucially it fails to account for the fact that the vast majority of people of similar backgrounds do not resort to terrorism. Consequently, few analysts of terrorism attribute it exclusively to environment.²⁰⁵

Where political culture is important is in bringing meaningful symbols and narratives to the individual's attention.²⁰⁶ This is particularly the case with national-separatist groups where the community's history and experience may be a key factor.²⁰⁷ The best example of this is that of Armenian organisations. Toloyan has identified several such symbols that are central to an Armenian consciousness and self-identity: that of the Genocide that occurred under Turkish rule in 1915 and 1922, which in the Armenian narrative is closely identified with Christ's Passion, and the victims of which are invariably regarded as martyrs; the story of St. Vartan which deals with heroic resistance and the eventual martyrdom of Vartan and his followers in the battle of Avarayr in 450-451 AD; and the betrayal by the Great Powers at the

²⁰³ See Sean MacStiofain, *Revolutionary In Ireland*, (London: Gordon Cremonesi, 1975.)

²⁰⁴ McGuire, *To Take Arms*, pp. 71-72.

²⁰⁵ Crenshaw, "Questions To Be Answered...", pp. 250-253.

²⁰⁶ Maria McGuire came from a middle-class Catholic family in Dublin with no history of Republicanism; she did well at school and went to University College, Dublin. However, she was fascinated by Irish history and came to hate the fact that Ireland was not free of its ties with Britain and continued to be dominated by the conservative Catholic Church; and to dislike the ineffectual politicians who told an accepting people that Ireland was free. McGuire, *To Take Arms*, pp. 11-15.

²⁰⁷ Crenshaw, "Questions To Be Answered...", p. 253.

Congress of Berlin in 1878, where Armenian interests were ignored. The Armenian representative at Berlin was the Patriarch of Constantinople, Megerdich Khrimian, who used the metaphor of herisa (an Armenian dish); but whereas the Powers had iron ladles, he had only a paper one, so got no herisa. Until the Armenians got an iron ladle (seen as a image for armed force), the situation would continue because they could never rely on their allies for help. The narrative of St. Vartan is also vital because he was prepared to risk all in defence of Armenian Christianity, a crucial component of national identity. Therefore martyrdom is accepted as wholly valid in such cases; and because all Armenians recognise Vartan as an ancestor, they acknowledge his moral and symbolic authority. These three narratives mesh the elements of armed self-reliance, martyrdom and an acute awareness of being persecuted by other powers into the Armenian national identity, and thus do much to engender an environment in which terrorism may be seen as a valid option in pursuit of nationalist objectives.²⁰⁸ Furthermore, particularly in cases, as with the Armenian one, where the terrorist comes from a community that believes it has been grossly persecuted or wronged, it is easier to morally justify high level acts of violence as an attempt to gain revenge, acquire justice or otherwise right that wrong.

It is often suggested that violence is self-perpetuating, that if children are socialised into patterns of violence then these acts may become part of the social fabric, the norm in the community, and the Armenian example would certainly appear to support this perspective. However, it is unclear whether this occurs on a wider basis; it does seem possible that growing up surrounded by violence would to some degree inure the individual to the horror of it, possibly therefore lowering the moral constraints that might otherwise exist. More significant though, is that if such violence exists in an individual's society, it offers an outlet for their emotions that they would be forced to spend elsewhere otherwise. Observational learning also plays a significant role in the development of aggression. Violent cultures, through the provision of role models, may provide many opportunities for the young to be initiated into violence. Groups in themselves can act to facilitate violence by giving

²⁰⁸ Toloyan, "Martyrdom As Legitimacy...", pp. 93-96.

opportunity for imitation.²⁰⁹ It is undeniable that groups also learn through imitation of their predecessors, by studying their publications and deriving lessons from their mistakes.²¹⁰ One of the clearest examples of this is the Irgun under the leadership of Begin, that was acutely aware of the case of the Zealot revolt in 73 CE which resulted in a 1900 year exile from the Jewish homeland. He blamed this on two factors, that the Zealots engaged in fratricidal violence and that the scale of their terrorism was so considerable that it compelled the Romans to crush the rising. Begin was careful to ensure that the Irgun did not retaliate, no matter how extreme the provocation from other Jewish groups, and that they struck against only "legitimate" targets.²¹¹ In some cases, terrorist groups even receive training from such organisations: the PFLP ran training camps for European radicals in the late 1960s,²¹² Kozo Okamoto acquired his weapons expertise there prior to the attack on Lod Airport; and "Carlos" was recruited by Bassam Abu-Sharif, and later helped to run such camps for foreigners.²¹³ It makes sense to suggest that the resort to terrorism in all but a few cases represents the combination of motivation and opportunity. While it is common-sense that terrorist groups have an origin in some way, and may coalesce around a leader, the majority of terrorists become members of existing groups or found their own after membership of another group. A vital element in an individual's progress towards terrorism, therefore, is access to a group that offers, and accepts the

209 Taylor & Quayle, Terrorist Lives, pp. 20-21. The terrorist group that Sam Melville and Jane Alpert formed was partially inspired in its beginnings by the FLQ: Melville offered sanctuary in the Alpert's flat to two members of the FLQ for a number of weeks. Melville and Alpert then enabled the two Canadians to hijack a plane to Cuba, by providing the weapons and doing the necessary reconnaissance while the fugitives stayed under cover in the flat. It was Alpert and Melville's first experience of terrorism, and the impact on the latter was considerable, he discovered a taste for such illicit activities, which Alpert acquiesced with to retain Melville's affections. Alpert, Growing pp. 153-156 and 166-167.

210 The Provisional IRA in the early 1970s looked at the guerrilla campaigns against the British in Aden and Cyprus; and studied "The War Of The Flea", an assessment of guerrilla theory and practice, by Robert Tauber, and compared it to the campaigns in China, Cuba, Vietnam and Israel. McGuire, To Take Arms, p. 74.

211 See Begin, The Revolt, p. 153 and David C. Rapoport, "Terror & the Messiah: An Ancient Experience & Some Modern Parallels" in David C. Rapoport & Yonah Alexander (eds), The Morality Of Terrorism: Religious & Secular Justifications, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 2nd Edition, pp. 31-33.

212 Bassam Abu-Sharif & Uzi Mahnaimi, Tried By Fire, (London: Little, Brown & Company, 1995), pp. 65-66.

213 Ibid., pp. 69-72 and 78-79.

individual into, membership.²¹⁴ Sean O'Callaghan was able to join the IRA at the start of their campaign because he was known and could be used for low-level work. He recounted that:

When the Provisional IRA was formed and started seeking support around Tralee, the members knew who I was because of my father [who had been interned by the Irish government as a result of his IRA activities in the 1940s]. It turned out that the owner of a sweetie shop was the man to talk to about joining. He passed me on to the owner of a supermarket up the street, who was in charge.

I was taken to a big farm and into a granary, where there was a group of people. Some of them started digging away grain with wooden shovels, revealing a pile of about 30 to 40 guns. Our job was to clean and package them for shipment up to Northern Ireland.²¹⁵

For most followers, membership of the group is the vital motive. Before engaging in acts of terrorism, usually there is a progression through the ranks of the group or even a drift from other groups and organisations. As the individual moves towards those that espouse violence, the groups became increasingly radical. Kellen suggests that there is a long process of alienation, rebellion and experimentation with a variety of social settings and political ideas, and only then a commitment to terrorist action and a clandestine lifestyle.²¹⁶ The decision by an individual to use violence is not a sudden one. Participation in riots or demonstrations is often the entry into a life of violence although obviously not all rioters or demonstrators go on to become terrorists.²¹⁷ For the Italian Red Brigades, the main recruitment area was groups formed in Milanese factories that functioned primarily as critics of union policy. They used alternative methods of action to strikes such as sabotage or picketing, actions that would damage production without harming the workers in the factories. These movements were gradually infiltrated by the Red Brigades, and with that came a progression towards illegality. In the Red Brigades, people were initially asked to perform "individual illegal actions" such as distributing propaganda documents around their factory or storing weapons at their home. Later they might be required

²¹⁴ Taylor, *The Terrorist*, p. 153.

²¹⁵ O'Callaghan, "The Killer...", p. 1.

²¹⁶ Kellen, "Terrorists- What Are They Like? ...", p. 24.

²¹⁷ Taylor & Quayle, *Terrorist Lives*, pp. 39-40.

to spray graffiti on factory walls or leave intimidator messages in the offices or homes of the management. The progression to violence occurred only after the individual had passed a number of tests, not on their weapons skill or ideological knowledge, but simply on their commitment to the group and their willingness to conform within it.²¹⁸ In ETA, the process of gaining membership is also a gradual one. Although most members were in their mid to late twenties on joining the organisation, as adolescents, many engaged in "searching behaviour", seeking solutions to the crises of culture and national-identity that affected them. In most cases, they sought alternatives to armed struggle before they joined ETA (often following a great deal of discussion and heart-searching with their friends). Older *etarras* approach the prospective member, usually on an innocuous occasion, such as during a mountain climbing expedition. If the young prospective member expresses interest, they are approached again a few months later and invited to participate in a simple, low-security operation, such as spray-painting slogans on a wall. If they perform well, they will be invited to be involved in increasingly complex and risky actions. It may be as much as a year before the new recruit gains full membership of ETA. This time frame can even be considerable longer, because it is quite common for young prospects to resist joining the group for months or even years after the initial approach, presumably until they come to believe that there is no alternative to terrorism.²¹⁹

Crenshaw states that the decision to resort to violence is as a result of association with the group. The choice is between participating in violence and leaving the group. The individual who is already a member of the group and has become dependent on the things it could supply, finds it difficult, in psychological terms, to go back.²²⁰ Taylor and Quayle assert that the realisation of this boundary being crossed is a key point in the psychology of a terrorist, but that it is a state of mind rather than a legal or moral point of reference. It might arise as a result of a personal event such as the death of a friend "in action" or from an incident of significance to the community or party, such as an atrocity

²¹⁸ Alison Jamieson, "Entry, Discipline & Exit In The Italian Red Brigades", Terrorism & Political Violence, Volume 2, Number 1, (Spring 1990), pp. 1-3.

²¹⁹ Clark, "Patterns In The Lives...", pp. 427, 439-443.

²²⁰ Crenshaw, "The Psychology of Political Terrorism", p. 389.

committed by the establishment. Whereas before, the individual might be willing to perform small and unimportant tasks for the group, afterwards there is a willingness to act as a fully fledged terrorist.²²¹ German sources refer to this critical point as "der sprung" (the leap). For Baumann, the event was the shooting of a student by the police during a demonstration; he refers to its impact on him as "a tremendous flash" and that "it left an indelible impression."²²² For Bassam Abu-Sharif, the key moment was when, in the aftermath of the Arab defeat in the 1967 War, a Palestinian girl offered to sleep with him for five dinars. He describes the moment:

[Palestinian girls] had to sell themselves, dishonour themselves just to survive? Anger took hold of me... A blurred image danced in front of me: the girl, with her hand out, offering herself up for money.

I understood now what I had to do. There was no going back. My own fight began here, now. I would not stop until that girl, and the thousands like her, were back in their rightful homes. I would regain our country or die for it.²²³

However, this clearly is not a universal event. Clark found almost no evidence of a single catalytic occurrence that transformed the opinions of ETA recruits. Instead, it was a gradual progression, as a result of discussion and thought, that brought them to membership of the organisation.²²⁴ However, it does seem to be generally true amongst terrorist groups that the qualitative decision to turn to violence is harder to make than the quantitative one on the level of violence to employ and, at a later stage, whether to increase that level. Particularly if the progression is steady, rather than rapid, terrorists evidently find it psychologically easier to escalate their violence than to engage in terrorist acts in the first place. This suggests that even the highest levels of violence differ in quantity, rather than quality from more standard acts of terrorism, and therefore may not be as psychologically troubling for the terrorist as might be otherwise supposed. Furthermore, when the alternative is to leave the group, many individuals appear willing to acquiesce to committing extremely violent acts on behalf of the organisation.

²²¹ Taylor & Quayle, *Terrorist Lives*, p.44.

²²² Kellen, "Terrorists- What Are They Like? ...", pp. 18-19.

²²³ Bassam Abu-Sharif & Uzi Mahnaimi, *Tried By Fire*, p. 50.

²²⁴ Clark, "Patterns In The Lives...", p. 443.

When the existence of the group precedes the decision to turn to terrorism, the decision might be made by the group as a whole or by a faction within the organisation. Alpert's group discussed the issue from the perspectives of its morality, effectiveness and the precedents for terrorism. They argued about targeting and came to the conclusion that "physical destruction aimed at the enemy [was] the only course left to revolutionaries." However, they also found that it was impossible to be completely candid, since with new explosives in their possession, no-one was willing to admit to having second thoughts for fear that they would be accused of cowardice.²²⁵ The individual who has become highly dependent on the group may acquiesce with the decision to use violence even though they may not have made an independent choice.²²⁶ Obviously, this is not always the case: Leila Khaled debated the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the morality of hijacking and the legitimacy of revolutionary violence, before she became deeply involved in illegal activities for the Palestinian campaign, although she had been involved in non-violent actions for the cause for years beforehand. The progression to violence was not natural or automatic.²²⁷ Zvonko Busic, a Croat, hijacked a TWA plane in New York in 1976 using fake bombs because "... I care so much about human life... I couldn't put... human life of these passengers into another person's hands... it's against my principles." However, Busic did simultaneously use live bombs planted at Grand Central Station as insurance, one of which did explode, killing a policeman and blinding another. Clearly, his attitude towards the use of violence was far from straightforward.²²⁸ In some cases too, the decision to use violence appears not to be controversial: for the Stern Gang (LEHI), revolutionary terror was the only means of promoting the objective of removing the British from Palestine. The main point of debate was over its efficacy. Yitzhak Shamir says that Stern undertook no action blindly or automatically or for brutality's sake. Instead, the aim was less to punish than to deter the British and Arabs from taking or damaging Jewish lives.²²⁹

²²⁵ Alpert, *Growing* pp 196-197.

²²⁶ Crenshaw, "An Organizational Approach ...", p. 478

²²⁷ Leila Khaled, *My People Shall Live*, p. 109.

²²⁸ Kellen, "Terrorists - What Are They Like? ...", pp. 28-32.

²²⁹ Shamir, *Summing....* pp. 22-23. Bell, *Terror....* p. 63.

It seems that in some cases, the terrorist group becomes a surrogate family for the terrorist and the leader of the group a mentor for the younger members. This appears to be more the case in examples of ideological terrorism, where terrorism is in part a reaction against society and an individual's origins, than with nationalist-separatist terrorism where, to some extent, the individual is more likely to be acting in accordance with their background and familial origins. The fact of being underground, cut off from the rest of society is almost certainly the key determinant in whether the terrorist group does become a surrogate family for the terrorist. For example, Maria McGuire stayed in regular contact with her family throughout her association with the IRA,²³⁰ whereas members of the Irgun were forced into hiding during the campaign. Begin wrote of the group; "We were a family. There was mutual trust. Each was prepared to give his life for his comrade... It was love, love of the ideal, that infused the fighters with mutual fraternal affection."²³¹ Terrorists are individuals with a powerful need to belong and this is not satisfied outside the group which provides the emotional protection and company that other people find in their family or circle of friends. The group therefore has a strong hold over the individual and the leader of the group is likely to be highly influential in determining how new recruits view the organisation and its goals. Personal contacts are obviously important in an individual's decision to join a group; although in the case of Armenian groups it appears that the entire political culture has a radicalising effect, in the same way that individuals do in other organisations. Certainly, this can be seen to be so in the example of Monte Melkonian, Armenian guerrilla leader in Nagorno-Karabakh until his death in June 1993.²³² Other terrorists, though, clearly are influenced by individuals: Kozo Okamoto, one of the terrorists responsible for the attack on Lod Airport on May 30, 1972, was introduced to the JRA by his brother, Takeshi. Kozo went to Kagoshima University, studying in the agricultural faculty and becoming deeply involved in the pollution issue. He was active in the local chapter of Behiren, a large middle-of-the-road peace organisation, but despite attending all their meetings he believed it to be ineffective

²³⁰ McGuire, *To Take Arms*, p. 62.

²³¹ Begin, *The Revolt*, p. 73.

²³² Joseph E. Vorbach, "Monte Melkonian: Armenian Revolutionary Leader", *Terrorism & Political Violence*, Volume 6 Number 2 (Summer 1994).

and had little affinity with its members. Early in 1970, he met with the JRA representative in Fukuoka, at his brother, Takeshi's, request. Takeshi was one of the JRA members involved in the hijacking of a Korean plane that year. Although he met with the JRA's Tokyo representatives a month after the Fukuoka meeting, and he organised JRA activities at Kagoshima in a fairly perfunctory way, Kozo had little real interest in the ideology of the organisation. He sought to be an active revolutionary, so long as it encompassed his concerns on pollution and his political frustrations. In September 1971, Kozo went to Beirut, ostensibly to see his brother; in fact he received seven weeks weapons training with the PFLP between April and May 1972. At the end of this time he was told about the proposed attack on Lod, to which he agreed, as he would have done to any action that furthered the revolution. The attack by three JRA members left twenty-six people dead and nearly eighty wounded. Kozo was the only one of the three to survive.²³³ In Basque militant organisations, youngsters were influenced in their choice by elder members; the Italian Red Brigades were found to contain a number of married couples. Sullwold argued that for women terrorists, personal contacts were especially influential in affecting their degree of participation, although the core motivations remained intrinsically the same as for male terrorists. A good example of such contact is that of Jane Alpert and Sam Melville. Alpert did not have an especially exceptional childhood: she had a secure family, although her father being made redundant ensured that money was fairly short at times; she was unhappy at school but did well and was able to go to college where she was rebellious and eventually was suspended. However, she went to Bryn Mawr and then to Columbia University, and became involved in radical politics, initially predominantly, feminist, but later more generally. Being vehemently antiwar she felt disenfranchised during the 1968 Presidential Election, so joined the SDS. She met Sam Melville, with whom she became besotted and acquiesced in his wild schemes of violence. She seems to have been a partially moderating influence in the group, but was also the one that gave intellectual weight and some ideological justification to their actions. Once outside Melville's influence, she remained radical and on the run for several years, but did not return to violence. It is possible to suggest that without Melville, Alpert would have been

²³³ See Steinhoff, "Kozo Okamoto", pp 830-839.

politically radical, but perhaps not a terrorist: his influence in her decision to resort to violence was immense.²³⁴

Galvin disagrees with Sullwold's assessment: she believes that there are appreciable differences between male and female terrorists since the socialisation process and power structure of outside society that impacts on women generally are just as applicable within the terrorist group.²³⁵ MacDonald also believes that important differences exist in the motivations of female terrorists compared to their male counterparts: "[They regard] themselves as victims not only of what their male comrades would call 'political oppression' but also of male oppression... The key awareness is of being a double victim, with oppression having to be fought on two fronts."²³⁶ Galvin did agree with Sullwold that personal contacts were important to female terrorists, citing the case of the example of women in Northern Ireland, witnessing the effects of terrorism at first hand and seeking revenge for injuries to acquaintances and the community.²³⁷ However, it should be noted that this aspect seems very similar for both men and women involved in terrorism.²³⁸

There is a danger in clustering women terrorists together; clearly they are no more a homogenous group than are terrorists as a whole. However, there do seem to be a number of factors common to many women who become terrorists, but largely these are those that apply to terrorists in general, such as the relatively ordinary lives that they were relieved to leave; or the limitations on their lives once they had joined the terrorist group. Female members of radical terrorist groups, such as

²³⁴ Alpert, Growing Up Underground, see especially pp. 106 and 200-226.

²³⁵ Deborah M. Galvin, "The Female Terrorist: A Socio-Psychological Perspective", Behavioural Sciences & The Law, Volume 1, Number 2, (1983), p. 20.

²³⁶ MacDonald, Shoot..., p. 232. However, there are flaws in MacDonald's analysis and methodology that may limit the usefulness of her conclusions. See Bruce Hoffman's review of Shoot The Women First in The Oral History Review, Volume 22, Number 1, (Summer 1995), pp. 126-129.

²³⁷ McGuire was in Spain in 1971 and was inspired to return to Northern Ireland when she learnt of the IRA taking up arms to defend the Catholic population against armed Protestants. She heard Sean O Bradaigh, Sinn Fein Director Of Publicity, on the radio, was impressed, and made contact with the organisation through him. She became involved in the publicity of the organisation, and from there progressed to attempting to collect an arms shipment from Amsterdam. McGuire, To Take Arms, pp. 18-21 and 41-51.

²³⁸ Galvin, "The Female Terrorist ...", pp. 23-25.

Susanna Ronconi or Jane Alpert, began as radical feminists and moved on to join men in a struggle against society's wider injustices.²³⁹

Another important incentive for individuals to resort to terrorism is the social status that it offers, especially in the case of nationalist-separatist movements with community support. The recruit joins hoping to enhance their appearance in the eyes of family and friends and there can be no doubt that being a terrorist offers an opportunity to engage in fantasies of domination and heroism that would appeal to the adolescents, often psychologically insecure, that constitute a significant number of terrorist recruits. Terrorism may also offer the opportunity for material rewards although this is less of an incentive than others such as the need to belong.²⁴⁰ While few terrorists have made large amounts of money from their activities, there are notable exceptions: "Carlos" was rumoured to have received around \$5 million from Libya for his part in a number of terrorist acts.²⁴¹ West German terrorists were frequently accused of leading extravagant lifestyles, preferring expensive sports cars for their getaways. Kellen suggests that terrorists are attracted to money and "increasing affluence" without the necessity of working.²⁴² For example, Baumann found that the

²³⁹ McDonald, *Shoot ...*, pp. 231-232.

²⁴⁰ Stern's reason when she was on the fringes of terrorism was;
...I felt I was part of a vast network of intense, exciting and brilliant people. I was amazed at the genius in the SDS. I was galvanized by the energy. I went to every SDS meeting, worked endlessly on every rally, demonstration and open forum we organized. I was learning all the time and loving it. Enthralled, as I was with political activity and political people, I couldn't understand why everybody didn't want to be in the SDS. Nothing in my life had ever been this exciting.

Stern, *With The Weathermen*, pp. 40-41.

²⁴¹ Knutson, "The Terrorist Dilemmas ...", p. 198.

The budget of some terrorist groups exceeds that of a number of small states. Drug trafficking netted a number of South American groups between \$50m. and \$150m. of profits in 1985 alone. Such vast amounts of money are not exceptional- Fatah allegedly had a budget of nearly \$200m. in 1975. Clearly, there is scope for wealth accumulation within these groups. George Ibrahim Abdullah's Christian Lebanese terrorist group was said by members of his community to have devolved from fighters for freedom to seeking to gain wealth. Cited in Reich, "Understanding Terrorist Behaviour ...", pp. 271-272n. Likewise, the PFLP was said to have rejected its Communist roots after a fund-raising visit by a number of leading terrorists, including Leila Khaled, to the United Arab Emirates in the early 1970s. There, they were well received, and acquired £1 million from Sheikh Zayid bin Sultan. This led to the creation of a non-fighting clique within the organisation that began to move from its guerrilla origins towards more conventional warfare. See As'ad AbuKhalil, "Internal Contradictions In The PFLP: Decision Making And Policy Orientation", *Middle East Journal*, Volume 41, Number 3, (Summer 1987), pp. 370-373.

²⁴² Kellen, "Terrorists- What Are They Like? ...", pp 36-38.

prospect of working in uninteresting jobs forever was a sufficiently great incentive for him to drop out and join dissident groups, ultimately leading to a terrorist career.²⁴³ The romance of carrying a gun or the hope of material reward may have some part to play in why individuals join terrorist groups, but it has little role in their staying. Such goals are quickly overcome by the reality of living as a fugitive. People stay terrorists because they are driven by their ideology, their objective, and because they rapidly find that exiting is extremely difficult.²⁴⁴ In ETA, much of the time is devoted to study sessions or discussion groups that debate complex political, economic and ideological matters. Even senior members of the group attend. The sessions serve two purposes: they help recruitment because non-members are able to attend and hear ETA in action, and they educate members, pursuant to the organisation's belief that well-informed and indoctrinated members are more reliable and effective in their activities.²⁴⁵

The main reason for individuals embarking on terrorism remains that it is an alternative that offers the terrorist a sense of purpose and control over their own lives and equally importantly, those of other people. It enables them to master their feelings of futility through achieving goals. They become important, people who have to be acknowledged and dealt with by the authorities. At last, they are someone.²⁴⁶ This tendency applies as much to groups as it does to individuals, recognition of the terrorist group is a form of legitimation, an acknowledgement of their existence. It is for this reason, above all others, that terrorists seek the attention of the media, and through that, publicity. It is this that is a major motivating force in the planning of terrorist "spectaculars", of which nuclear terrorism would be a prime example. Such acts are therefore a means of pursuing recognition from the authorities, but also from the population at large. Bassam Abu-Sharif describes the PLO campaign following the 1967 Arab-Israeli War:

²⁴³ Michael Baumann, *Terror Or Love?*, (New York: Grove Press Incorporated, 1977). p. 20.

²⁴⁴ J. Bowyer Bell, "Revolutionary Dynamics: The Inherent Inefficiency of the Underground", *Terrorism & Political Violence*, Volume 2, Number 2, (Summer 1990), p. 206.

²⁴⁵ Clark, "Patterns In The Lives...", pp. 443-444.

²⁴⁶ Kaplan, "The Psychodynamics ...", p. 245.

There was no way a relative handful of young men, armed for the most part with antiquated hunting rifles, could take on the Israeli tanks, mines, and machine guns, the well armed and vigilant army patrols. But these raids were a necessary step. They showed the world that the Palestinian spirit was not crushed. They showed the Israelis that the Palestinian people would never give up, that they would fight with whatever came to hand, by whatever means they could, to recover their dignity and their lost lands, to get justice. But the cross-border raids were never practical. Looking back now, they were a joke.²⁴⁷

It is an example of Bakunin's "propaganda by deed", actions aimed at ensuring that both the Israelis and the Palestinian people remained conscious that the PLO was still a force able to continue the fight, even after the defeats of 1967. In that year, the PFLP began hijacking planes outside the Middle East to prove their point and three years later, in September 1970, attempted to simultaneously hijack three planes bound for New York; they were partially successful: the attack led by Leila Khaled was foiled, but they managed to capture another plane in its place. The operation was clearly aimed at displaying the power of the PFLP, as well as forcing Israel and European states holding Palestinian prisoners to negotiate.²⁴⁸ This desire for widespread recognition and acknowledgement by authorities would be the ideal motivation for an act of low-level nuclear terrorism, since even a minor incident involving nuclear material would be likely to be highly publicised. However, there have been literally dozens of hoaxes involving nuclear material in the United States alone, most of which have gone largely unnoticed by the public and the media, in part because there is a understandable reluctance by the authorities to cause unjustified alarm. This means that, to be effective, a threat would have to be credible and sufficiently severe that it could not be reasonably kept secret by the government concerned. While this does not wholly exclude the possibility, it sets the standard sufficiently high that there are undoubtedly easier ways of attracting attention and publicity, if that is the terrorist's sole objective.

If the material and heroic attractions of being a terrorist are important then this has significant implications for group outcomes. The leader

²⁴⁷ Bassam Abu-Sharif & Uzi Mahnaimi, *Tried By Fire*, p. 58.

²⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 80-82.

cannot moderate without risking being usurped by someone willing to prosecute the campaign more vigorously. In extreme cases, this can actually result in a split within the group, as one faction seeks to increase the level of violence employed. An example would be the Stern Gang, who in 1940 split from their parent organisation, the Irgun, over the best way to pursue the campaign to create a free and independent Jewish homeland. Irgun was motivated partly by an inability to continue the violence and partly by a reluctance to try, since they believed that to do so would risk undermining the British (under whom they had a better opportunity for independence than would be the case under the Axis Powers) at a point in the Second World War when their grip on the Middle East was tenuous. Abraham Stern, the gang's leader, by contrast, was unwilling to accept any cessation of action. In his break from Irgun, he was accompanied by impatient, driven men who distrusted politics and instead required that action be taken.²⁴⁹ Zawodny suggested that the main determinant of underground decision making is the group's psychological climate, not the external reality of the situation.²⁵⁰ Personality clashes may also act as a catalyst for a split: in 1968 Ahmad Jibril left George Habash's PFLP to form his own group, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) and in 1969 Nayif Hawatmah formed the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Both were, at least in part, reacting against the organisational dominance of Habash within the PFLP.²⁵¹

Terrorists tend to be action-oriented individuals who consequently will find inaction highly stressful, leading to tensions within the group. When Patty Hearst and two other members of the SLA were underground, trapped in a flat together, and unable to go out for fear that they would be recognised and challenged, there was a great deal of fighting between them. Hearst says: "As time went on in that small apartment, they fought more and more over petty, ridiculous issues... When I quieted them they would usually sulk at opposite ends of the

²⁴⁹ Shamir, *Summing...*, pp. 30-31. Bell, *Terror...*, p. 62.

²⁵⁰ J. K. Zawodny, "Internal Organizational Problems & The Sources Of Tensions Of Terrorist Movements As Catalysts Of Violence", *Terrorism: An International Journal*, Volume 1, Numbers 3/4, p. 278.

²⁵¹ As'ad AbuKhalil, "Internal Contradictions...", pp. 363-364.

room. But just as often, they would both turn on me."²⁵² This willingness to fight within the group seems to apply particularly to underground terrorist organisations: "doves" within the IRA actually contemplated assassinating MacStiofain because he was prosecuting the military campaign too vigorously.²⁵³ However, this is exceptional, even within nationalist-separatist groups. The group has to commit terrorist acts to justify its existence and the leader has to plan such acts to enable the group to release its aggressive tendencies and reaffirm its identity. It is also extremely difficult for the leader to amend this identity in any way: the SLA was ostensibly an organisation that sought to liberate blacks and other oppressed people in the United States. However, it had one black member: Cinque, everyone else was white. When Teko, the leader of the surviving rump of the group, tried to suggest that Doc Holiday, a black man, should be invited to lead the group so as to maintain the focus of the organisation, he was strongly opposed by those in the organisation who felt that the real aim of the group was simply revolutionary and that colour was an irrelevance. Both factions believed that they were trying to retain the true character of the organisation against encroachment by the other.²⁵⁴ Group dynamics therefore mitigate towards a maintenance of existing patterns of identity and action: a continuation of violence and the taking of ever greater risks. Janis thought that such organisations become subject to "group think": illusions of invulnerability leading to over optimism and excessive risk-taking; a presumption of the group's morality; a one-dimensional perception of the enemy as wholly evil; and an intolerance of internal challenges to shared key beliefs.²⁵⁵ These characteristics all increase the likelihood of the terrorist group concerned will believe that heightened levels of violence, perhaps including nuclear terrorism, can and should be achieved in the pursuit of their campaign.

Bion identified two types within the group: the "work group" and the "basic assumption group". The former works in a goal-related manner to achieve stated objectives. However, he argued that this was

²⁵² Hearst, *Patty Hearst*, p. 259.

²⁵³ McGuire, *To Take Arms*, pp. 115-116.

²⁵⁴ Hearst, *Patty Hearst*, p. 385.

²⁵⁵ Irving L. Janis, *Victims Of Groupthink*, (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin), 1972. pp. 191-192.

relatively rare in terrorist groups and that the group tended instead to operate on the basis of basic assumptions. The "basic assumption group" could be subdivided into the "fight-flight group" which defines itself in relation to the outside world that both threatens and justifies its existence so that it has to flee or fight the enemy; the "dependency group" which turns to an omnipotent leader for direction, subordinating individual judgement to theirs; and the "pairing group" which acts as though the group will bring forth a messiah who will lead them and create a better world.²⁵⁶ While the extent to which these types apply to a group depends on the makeup of the individuals within it, Post believes that terrorist groups are the apotheosis of the "basic assumption group" and often fall into all three sub-types of that group.²⁵⁷ An example of this would be the SLA which combined all three of Bion's elements of the group. It needed the media attention to give it an identity, an acknowledged existence; members of the group deferred to Cinque even when he was clearly in the wrong or endangering the group with his actions; and they earnestly believed that the result of their campaign, and Cinque's leadership, would be a revolution that freed the people of their oppressors.²⁵⁸

Terrorist organisations are likely to contain a combination of people whose need is the group and those who are seeking to change the political or social environment; both however need the organisation to satisfy their objectives. Stern says: "When it came to paying for the endless leaflets, no-one hassled me about where the money came from. The Movement came first. It didn't matter how I supported my habit."²⁵⁹ The social psychological dynamics of the group help to determine not only why individuals join, but why they stay and why terrorism is chosen as a tactic. Terrorist organisations offer a counterculture with their own norms and values into which new recruits are indoctrinated. They tend to demand complete obedience from their members, and to be largely exclusive, isolated from society. Abu Nidal controlled his members lives by keeping the rank-and-file members in camps isolated from the outside world. He forbade all

²⁵⁶ Wilfred R. Bion, Experiences In Groups, (London: Tavistock, 1970), 2nd edition, pp. 98-137.

²⁵⁷ Post, "Terrorist Psycho- Logic ...", pp. 32-33.

²⁵⁸ Hearst, Patty Hearst, p. 88.

²⁵⁹ Stern, With The Weathermen, p. 45.

socialising amongst his followers except on official business; all passports, forged or real, had to be handed in to him; the phone calls that they were allowed to make were restricted; and what his cadres were permitted to purchase on foreign missions was also limited. As much as anything, it was a means for Abu Nidal to impose his authority on the members of his group.²⁶⁰ Terrorist organisations strive for uniformity and cohesiveness, the group is built on the political homogeneity of like-minded individuals, their futures, goals and even their lives are bound together. It is essential that members are able to trust one another fully not to betray the group, they stand or fall together and that engenders cohesiveness. This cohesiveness may be further enhanced by the promise of violence if an individual appears to threaten to leave or in some way betray the group. For example, the Justice Committee of Abu Nidal's organisation regularly pursued purges of the group in its quest to eradicate spies. Prisoners were tortured and revealed their guilt, genuine or not, as a result. They were usually executed to avoid the Committee's methods from emerging although enough did survive for these means to be well known throughout the organisation.²⁶¹ This all means that individuals have considerable influence over one another in the group, but also that the group's influence over the individual rises with growing cohesiveness. The element of shared danger increases the group's solidarity, and the motivation for the individual to remain affiliated to the group and therefore not to deviate from its norms because it is only within the group that the individual can receive the reassurance that they require when faced with the external threat of society. There is a lack of alternatives to membership of the group, there can be no going back, partly because the individual has become a pariah by being a terrorist, but more because they abandoned their previous life since it was so unsatisfactory. The main fear of group members is that they will be rejected by other members and abandoned by the group. It is this that is the key element in ensuring conformity within the group, and explains why ideologically anti authoritarian terrorist groups can be highly authoritarian in their organisational

²⁶⁰ Seale, *Abu Nidal*, pp. 258-259.

²⁶¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 285-286.

psychology.²⁶² Members of such groups often feel a responsibility, a duty to their superiors and their peers. Bandura argues that:

Self-sanctions operate most efficiently in the service of authority when followers assume personal responsibility for being dutiful executors while relinquishing personal responsibility for the harm caused by their behaviour. Followers who disowned responsibility without being bound by a sense of duty would be quite unreliable.²⁶³

In this sense, terrorists are not unlike soldiers in their rationale, a comparison that they seek to foster. Individuals therefore find it hard to question or criticise the direction that the group is taking, unless it is to urge even greater commitment to violence, without triggering a crisis in their identity. Consequently, particularly in small, cellular organisations, it is possible for such groups to conform to the agenda and concept of just a few of their members or even, in some cases, to acquire a momentum of their own in pursuit of their campaign. There are few mitigating factors or members calling for restraint on the levels of violence being employed. It is not inconceivable to suggest that in extreme cases, high levels of violence are employed by groups, none of whose members, individually, believe is justified by the situation, but who are unwilling to speak out for fear of endangering their position within the organisation.

The factors that encouraged the individual to become a terrorist in the first place also lessen the opportunities for their re-entry to the society from which they have become isolated. The strong ties between members of the organisation reinforce the pressure to conform, the rewards for membership may be more related to the approval of an individual's peers than task-oriented, and this approval may be linked as much to a willingness to conform as to successful actions. Increasingly, the goal of the group becomes self-maintenance and decreasingly changing the political environment, members' primary objective is to keep the group together. It offers security to members; the group and its survival are paramount, its activities become less so. An exception to this is the example of the SLA following the argument about identity discussed above. The dissent of the group became too much for Teko who said: "That's it... It's all over...We have to split up

²⁶² Post, "Hostilite ...", p. 216.

²⁶³ Bandura, "Mechanisms of Moral...", p. 175.

and go our own separate ways!" He felt that violence and black leadership were integral to the SLA; others were less certain. While schisms within terrorist organisations are not unusual, the defection of the leadership is more so. However, in this case, the lack of willingness of the members of the group to conform made Teko believe they were endangering the group of which he and Yolanda had become the only true guardians.²⁶⁴ The ease with which an individual is able to exit the group also has considerable correlation with the type of existence they have had within the organisation. Members who continue to live in their communities, such as most IRA or ETA terrorists, who largely have ordinary lives, interspersed with flurries of violent activity, find it easier to simply leave the group, even if the terrorist organisation does threaten reprisals against those to leave the struggle.²⁶⁵ It tends to be those involved in underground movements, whose whole life is subsumed by the group, that find it especially difficult to exit. However, in any variety of organisation, it seems to be a decision that is seldom taken lightly.

Group cohesiveness encourages the pursuit of violence because as the group becomes increasingly cut off from society most news of the outside world is filtered through the group, leading to increased misperceptions of the external environment, which in turn reinforce the beliefs of the group and make it easier to assume that the enemy is unrelentingly hostile. Obviously, such groups remain in touch with the wider world via newspapers and the media, but if the group is the only form of human contact then the media sources are interpreted solely by the group; there is no relief from the organisation's spin on events.²⁶⁶ This serves an important purpose since the internal group tensions and hostilities can be projected onto an external source. There

²⁶⁴ Hearst, Patty Hearst, pp. 385-386.

²⁶⁵ See for example, Clark, "Patterns In The Lives...", p. 436.

²⁶⁶ After the SLA's kidnapping of Patty Hearst, the media portrayed the organisation as a band of misguided radicals; Cinque dismissed them as bourgeois and capitalist oriented. The group, as Hearst described it:

... Sunk into the depths of psychosis. We were cut off from the outside world and lived in an isolated realm of our own...The radio played all day long and most of the night too and Cinque would often hear song lyrics which contained for him special allusions to the revolution... we would all focus on a song's lyrics for a hint of our revolution. I never doubted that the hidden meaning was there, only that I was not sufficiently knowledgeable to understand what our leader heard.

Hearst, Patty Hearst, p. 214.

is also a propensity for individuals to be more willing to take risks when they are part of a group than they would be solely as individuals, encouraging escalation because the terrorist becomes less inhibited by the prospect of the negative consequences of their actions. Peer pressure means that individuals are more willing to perform acts that they would otherwise morally balk at. This willingness seems to correspond to the extent of relief that the recruit felt on joining the group.²⁶⁷ The pressure also promotes acts of self-sacrifice: individuals imagine themselves as martyrs or avengers for the wrongs that been committed by the enemy or for former colleagues who have been captured or killed.²⁶⁸ The fallen comrade then becomes an icon, a symbol that further precludes turning back since it would be a betrayal of their memory and would make their death merely a waste.²⁶⁹ This willingness for self-sacrifice is an important means for the terrorist to believe that their actions are not only justified, but also altruistic. Guilt avoidance of this type increases dependency on the group; induces the individual to commit more guilt-ridden acts; and makes exit from the group even more difficult since the individual would encounter social approbation, legal sanctions and remorse. It is easier to remain within the group.

Terrorist groups seem to regard dissent as a more severe threat than exit, it is equated with treason and as divisive because it questions the accepted reasoning and leadership of the group. Morucci, a member of the Italian Red Brigades, explained that organisational reasons always prevailed over individual intentions. When influential members of the group attempted to change things the organisation broke up.²⁷⁰ Dissent fragmented the group, conformity was the cement that bound the organisation together. Even in such cases though, the ideological

²⁶⁷ Post, "Terrorist Psycho- Logic ...", p. 35.

²⁶⁸ Crenshaw, "Questions To Be Answered...", p. 18.

²⁶⁹ Joe McCann, a member of the Official IRA, was shot by British soldiers on June 15, 1972. He was given a hero's funeral by the IRA and as McGuire says: "...his life story, and the nature of his death, quickly became one of the myths of Irish Republican history." McGuire, *To Take Arms*, pp. 106-107. Of course, revenge forms another key aspect of the impact of martyrs on terrorism. When Abraham Stern was killed by Inspector Morton, a British policeman, while 'trying to escape' on February 12, 1941, the priority for his group, LEHI, became vengeance on his murderers by killing those responsible, even indirectly. The death of their founder and leader not only devastated their organisation, it considerably affected their victim targeting. Bell, *Terror...* pp. 72-73.

²⁷⁰ Jamieson, "Entry, Discipline...", p. 15.

framework continues to be used as a justification for the actions of the group. It may not necessarily encourage the use of violence directly, but remains functional to many terrorists who resort to terrorism, a means of reaffirmation for their beliefs and actions, and a core pillar of the group.²⁷¹ What the group through its interpretation of its ideology defines as moral becomes moral and the authority for compliant members: if "they" are responsible for our problems then "their" destruction can be justified. Stern rationalised her violent actions as part of the Weathermen group:

I had tried working in the Establishment, first as a teacher, then as a social worker. Then I had tried to be a pacifist, first with the Civil Rights movement, then with the anti-war movement. I had joined SDS and demonstrated and marched for two years. And still the war continued. While the rich were getting richer, the poor were getting poorer. Since the government and the capitalist wouldn't listen to reason, then other means had to be employed.²⁷²

Stern is clearly arguing that violence was a last resort; the authorities had failed to listen other means; effectively, she displaces responsibility for the use of violence onto the government.

However, as Crenshaw notes, ideology may become increasingly corrupted and "surrealistic, used to escape a disconcerting reality rather than to guide actions. The extreme abstractness of such beliefs... disconnect their holders from objective reality."²⁷³ The individual becomes ever more dependent on the group for their existence. Whereas, Crenshaw sees terrorism as largely instrumental, a tactic to achieve goals, Post believes that violence becomes an end in itself and that group ideology is simply a rationale for the acts that terrorists are driven to commit. He argues that individuals join terrorist groups to become terrorists and commit acts of terrorism.²⁷⁴ If terrorism is instrumental then it ought to cease if the goals it sought were achieved. Post cites the example of ETA that continues to use violence even though it has had many of its demands met and the use of force may be

²⁷¹ Post, "Terrorist Psycho-Logic ...", p.34.

²⁷² Stern, With The Weathermen, p. 88.

Stern is clearly arguing that violence was a last resort; the authorities had failed to listen to other means; effectively, she displaces responsibility for the use of violence onto the government.

²⁷³ Maritha Crenshaw, Terrorism & International Co-operation, (New York: Institute For East- West Security Inc., 1989.) p. 16.

²⁷⁴ Post, "Terrorist Psycho- Logic ...", p. 35.

counter-productive. Its goals are absolutist, it seeks nothing less than total victory. The primary aim of all groups is survival. This is especially the case for terrorist groups and success is a threat because it removes the objectives of the organisation. It has to find a balance between being successful enough to attract members and perpetuate itself, yet not so successful that it puts itself out of business. It solves this dilemma by finding fresh goals to pursue through its use of absolutist rhetoric.²⁷⁵ The paramount importance placed on the survival of the group means that other, non-terrorist, activity is justifiable in the greater good. Terrorism is expensive: apart from weapons, ammunition and publicity, especially if the group is underground, other items such as food are equally vital. Many organisations have relied on criminal acts such as bank robberies or extortion to finance their terrorist activities. One such example was LEHI, which, especially in the months after its split from Irgun did little else beyond work towards its own survival by stealing and threatening until sufficient funds were gained. They did try to justify this in terms of their revolutionary purpose and principles, although they convinced very few. However, the primary objective, group survival, was achieved.²⁷⁶

Hirschman notes that organisations attempt to limit to risks of members departure by imposing "severe initiation costs", the idea that recruits will be reluctant to leave the group if they have had to invest a great deal to join initially.²⁷⁷ An excellent example of such an initiation is described in Seale's book on Abu Nidal. Jorde, a Kabyle recruit, joined the organisation in Beirut. He was made to write out the story of his life; and was then flown to Libya for training in a camp run by the group. There, the discipline was extremely strict, and every aspect of the recruit's life was controlled. There were inconsistencies in Jorde's story, so he was made to write it out several times more, under the suspicion that he was a spy for some rival or intelligence service. While he was doing this, he was kept in solitary confinement, for ten days, in a very hot cupboard. He was then taken to a tent in the desert, where he was tied to the ground and beaten with hosepipes on the

²⁷⁵ *Ibid.* pp. 37-38.

²⁷⁶ Bell, *Terror...* p. 66.

²⁷⁷ Albert Hirschman, *Exit, Voice & Loyalty*, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1970.) p. 93.

soles of his feet. He was kept there for days, being beaten periodically, and given little to eat or drink. He then spent a further two months in prison being beaten every day, before he was finally led to believe that he would be taken out and executed. Instead, he was congratulated on having passed the test, and his terrorist training began. He was taught to use various weapons and how to keep a target under surveillance without being spotted; to assume a false identity and other techniques potentially useful in intelligence gathering. Jorde was then sent on a fake mission to steal some passports in Athens for the organisation. Further trial missions to Belgrade and Brussels followed, before he was given his first genuine operation: to steal some passports and set up contacts in various European cities. After that, his role was predominantly to reconnoitre a target prior to an attack, as he did in synagogues in Istanbul. Jorde's experience is certainly exceptional: even within Abu Nidal's organisation few recruits received such a lengthy or tough initiation; the suspicion that he was a spy must in part account for this. The results of his interrogation seem to have been counter-productive if they were supposed to make exiting less likely since they made Jorde determined to leave as soon as he got the chance. It was only the latter part of his training that made it less certain that he would go.²⁷⁸ By contrast, Shamir's initiation into Irgun was designed to impress the importance of the undertaking into the recruit, but was a ritual, the decision to accept the recruit already having been made. Shamir writes:

It took place one evening in the darkened classroom of a Tel Aviv school... The only source of light was a gooseneck lamp beamed right at me to ensure that I could not get a good (i.e. an identifying) look at the three members of the admissions committee sitting at a table in front of me. Someone solemnly asked ritual questions: 'Are you prepared to make sacrifices if called upon to do so?' 'Are you prepared to accept military discipline?' 'Are you aware that joining this organization may involve you in great danger?' Equally solemnly I gave ritual answers.²⁷⁹

Hirschman was writing initially about dysfunctional behaviour in the economy but firmly believed that the work was applicable to society as a whole. He was convinced that politics and economics were not mutually exclusive and that they would benefit from using the

²⁷⁸ Seale, *Abu Nidal*, pp. 9-27.

²⁷⁹ Shamir, *Summing...*, pp. 20-21.

analytical tools of one another. Consequently, he took his examples from both business and political groups. Terrorist organisations often require an illegal act as the cost of admission in order to eliminate the option of exiting for the new member; to test their commitment; and to increase the impetus for them to go underground. This has the added effect of inducing the individual to "fight harder" because it means that they are reluctant to admit defeat even if they believe that the group has failed in its objectives since they must prove that they were right to pay a high entrance fee to join the organisation.²⁸⁰ It may take the individual a considerable time to come to this belief because they have a stake in self-deception, in fighting the realisation that the group that they belong to is in the process of deterioration.²⁸¹ Jamieson quotes Adriana Faranda who remained with the group long after she had ceased to support it and explained that the individual is extremely insecure and more likely to attribute the fault to themselves than the organisation, so stay within the group until the evidence against the organisation is undeniable. In an underground terrorist group, such as the Red Brigade, the individual has often had a close relationship with other members of the group, and may well be dependant on them in a number of ways, increasing the difficulties of leaving.²⁸² If there appears to be no alternative to exit, either because dissent is impossible or ineffective, then the individual may seek to lessen the strain of defection by persuading others to leave as well. A good example of this is the split in the IRA in 1969 into what became the Official IRA and the Provisional IRA. Sean MacStiofain states in his autobiography that he made repeated attempts to persuade the IRA leadership in Belfast that they were on the wrong course, hoping that it would be possible to retain a united movement. The strains increased after August 1969 when the IRA failed in their objective of protecting Catholics against the rioting Protestants of Northern Ireland; and by mid December, an

280 When all but three members of the SLA, including Hearst, were killed in a siege with the police, the group was clearly destroyed as a revolutionary organisation. However, they continued their efforts because, as Yolanda, one of the survivors, said: "Cin would want us to live and fight on... That's what we've got to do." This clearly reflects elements of the "fight harder" trait; but it also displays "survivor guilt": Teko, the leader of the remaining group, had said that the three of them should go and die with their comrades in the siege. Yolanda favoured making the deaths worthwhile and meaningful; Teko wanted to them sacrifice themselves in the name of their cause: both are different elements of the same phenomenon. Heast, *Patty Hearst*, pp. 244-245.

281 *Ibid*, p. 93.

282 Jamieson, "Entry, Discipline ...", p. 13.

extraordinary meeting of the General Army Council was held. MacStiofain, then Director of Intelligence, failed to defeat a vote to allow members of Sinn Fein to sit in the parliaments at Dublin, Westminster or Stormont, if they were elected. MacStiofain left the Army Convention with his allies, reconvened elsewhere, and contacted the units that had either been absent from the meeting or had been reorganised in recent months. A new IRA leadership was elected with MacStiofain as Chief of Staff. At Sinn Fein's annual conference, held on January 10, 1970, in Dublin, MacStiofain rejected a call for a vote of allegiance to the old Army Council; announcing that a "Provisional" Army Council had been established; pledged his allegiance to this; and urged all Republicans to leave the conference with him. About 45% did so.²⁸³ This example is perhaps exceptional in terrorist groups because it was such a formalised and drawn-out exit, reflecting the established nature of the Republican movement. Equally exceptional, but because it did permit its members to leave, was the Irgun, in spite of the potential damage to the underground movement that former, disenchanted, members could do.²⁸⁴

Hirschman notes that the actual decision to leave, especially by influential members of the group, is dependent less on an assessment of the suffering that the individual would have to endure in the process than on the impact on the organisation. If members believe that they have a voice, they are more likely to be concerned about whether their departure from the group will result in further deterioration or deviation from the organisation's stated goals. Hirschman then argues that this suggests that full exit from the group is impossible, that even after the individual has formally left, they continue to be concerned about the group's activities.²⁸⁵ Individuals leave because they are disillusioned with the group, not necessarily with the cause. McGuire left the Provisional IRA because she believed that it had destroyed its best chance of success by restarting the military campaign after the truce of 1972; and she believed that power within the organisation had shifted decisively towards those, like MacStiofain, who favoured the military option, at the expense of more moderate

²⁸³ MacStiofain, *Revolutionary* pp. 128-143.

²⁸⁴ Begin, *The Revolt*, p. 74.

²⁸⁵ Hirschman, *Exit, Voice ...*, pp. 98-100.

members who had lost their voice in the group.²⁸⁶ Once they have left, they are likely to be super-critical of the parent organisation, fomenting severe inter-group rivalry. This is more the case with ideologically motivated groups than with nationalist-separatist ones: the IRA's membership reflects a steady turnover of people without there being considerable acrimony in the process, the members simply become steadily less active over a period of time, and in many cases, it is hard to adjudge precisely when the individual does exit the organisation. With ideologically motivated groups, the breaks do tend to be more extreme. Faranda and Morucci sought to set up a rival group to the Red Brigades, one where violence was not the "be all and end all" of the campaign,²⁸⁷ but in other cases, the creation of a rival organisation may mean that they resort to greater levels of violence to demonstrate the superior ardour of the new group and to provide attractive incentives to new recruits.²⁸⁸

Such rivalries can occur as easily intra-group as inter-group if the organisation dissolves into factions all intent on displaying their dedication to the cause. This was the case with members of the FLQ during the October Crisis of 1970. Those responsible for the kidnappings of James Cross, the British Trade Commissioner in Montreal, and Pierre Laporte, the Quebec Minister of Labour and Immigration, were centred on two leaders within the FLQ, Paul Rose and Jacques Lanctot. While Rose was more systematic, Lanctot became frustrated with the ineffectiveness of the organisation's campaign, so decided on a political kidnapping to increase progress.²⁸⁹ It was a radical departure from the FLQ's usual tactics and was a change strongly opposed by Rose's group. In September 1970, having lost a vote to determine future strategy, Rose decided to establish a separate group and continue with the long-term strategy. He left the country on September 24 on hearing the nature of Lanctot's plans. Cross was kidnapped by Lanctot's group on October 5; the intention was that they would take a British diplomat as a protest against "cultural imperialism" and then an American diplomat as a protest against

²⁸⁶ McGuire, *To Take Arms*, pp. 146-147.

²⁸⁷ Jamieson, "Entry, Discipline...", p. 14.

²⁸⁸ Crenshaw, "An Organizational Approach ...", p.486.

²⁸⁹ Ronald Crelinstein, "The Internal Dynamics Of The FLQ During The October Crisis Of 1970", *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Volume 10, Number 4, (1987), p. 62.

"economic imperialism", but with insufficient resources to deal with a double kidnapping, the group determined on consecutive attacks. Rose's group was unaware of this dual strategy and believed that the kidnapping of Cross had actually undermined the likelihood of a successful outcome (the release of 20 FLQ members held by the Canadian authorities). To attempt to strengthen the kidnappers position they decided to return to Quebec and stage another kidnapping.²⁹⁰ The result was the taking of Laporte by the Rose faction on October 10 and his death on October 17. Although they had initially opposed kidnapping as a tactic, it was the Rose group that proved to be more hard-line and extreme in its use once they had determined to emulate the Lanctot group, spurred on by the belief that they were acting in the best interests of their organisation and Quebec as a whole.²⁹¹ Another example of in-fighting in a group is that of ASALA in July 1983 when it split into two factions over the bombing of the Turkish Airlines desk at Orly Airport that resulted in 8 deaths and 54 injuries. Monte Melkonian, leader of the break away faction described the attack: "The people who died at Orly are to us innocent dead [sic]. They are detrimental to our cause." In the aftermath of the split, ASALA leader Hagop Hagopian executed two of Melkonian's allies within ASALA in retaliation for the assassination of two of Hagopian's closest aides.²⁹²

Where exit is possible through the defection to another group, increases in violence are less likely to be as a result of such factionalism. Baeyer-Kaette, a political psychologist, found that there was a high turnover of terrorists among German groups, largely due to individual doubts about the legitimacy of the organisation that had existed from the outset of the individual's membership and which had never been resolved properly. They increasingly questioned the goals of the group and whether their actions did anything to promote these. The duration of their membership averaged only one year, with 36% staying for less than six months.²⁹³ Amongst Belfast members of the IRA, the average age for entry into the group was 19 years, and the

²⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 68-69.

²⁹¹ Peter Janke (ed.), *Terrorism & Democracy*. (London: Macmillan, 1992.) pp 42-57.

²⁹² Vorbach, "Monte Melkonian...", pp. 182-183.

²⁹³ Post, "Rewarding Fire...", p. 28.

average career length was 29 months.²⁹⁴ In this respect, the RAF was clearly atypical as most of its members remained with the organisation for several years and exited as a result of being captured, rather than disillusioned with the group. Since the average age for the terrorists in all of the groups surveyed by Baeyer-Kaette was around 22, it might be possible to suggest that entrance to a group reflected the uncertainty of adolescence and youth while their exit showed the resolution of some of these life-cycle dilemmas. As terrorists grew slightly older, they became disillusioned and cynical about the group's objectives, with a corresponding increase in the drop out rate. Once the reason for the individual joining the terrorist group became less important, the hold on the individual by the group fell too, making exit increasingly likely.²⁹⁵

Zawodny argued that the composition of the group could also increase the likelihood of the organisation to use violence, citing the example of women members. He believed that while they were equal in their membership of the group, they also created internal pressures within it, particularly when the organisation was isolated from the rest of society, since the male membership would be in competition for the women, although possibly unconsciously. This competition might well manifest itself in the form of efforts to outdo the other male members of the group, by use of violence directed against external sources.²⁹⁶ Zawodny's example of women as catalysts for violence is perhaps questionable, although Kaplan agrees that there is an element of machismo to some terrorist acts;²⁹⁷ and Zawodny's view assumes that the decision to use violence is in the hands of individuals which is possibly not the case. It is supported to some extent by the example of Sam Melville, who became increasingly involved in terrorism as Jane Alpert became more focused on other aspects of her life and less on Melville; although the timing also corresponds with when Melville became increasingly erratic in his behaviour generally. It seems reasonable to suggest that in part at least, Melville's violence was an

²⁹⁴ Robert W. White & Terry Falkenberg White, "Revolution in the City: On the Resources of Urban Guerrillas", *Terrorism & Political Violence*, Volume 3, Number 4, (Winter 1991), p. 111.

²⁹⁵ Post, "Rewarding Fire...", p. 28.

²⁹⁶ Zawodny, "Internal...", pp. 280-281.

²⁹⁷ Kaplan, "The Psychodynamics ...", p. 246.

attempt to re acquire Alpert's attention.²⁹⁸ Zawodny's hypothesis does highlight an incentive to escalate: that of competition within the group. Individuals compete for peer approval, and may seek it by proposing greater levels of violence, thereby demonstrating the strength of their adherence to the cause. Interestingly, Galvin also suggests that in some circumstances women may increase the probability of increased violence, that an added insecurity many female terrorists feel is sexual inferiority that they attempt to assuage by "out-doing" their male counterparts in "daring, obduracy, and brutality."²⁹⁹ Leila Khaled expressed the desire to carry out her mission (to hijack an El-Al plane from Amsterdam in September 1970) perfectly, and it was she, not her male companion who appears to have done the bulk of the terrorising.³⁰⁰ For such women, power and approval seem to be even greater motivations than they are for terrorists as a whole. Being extremely adept at their job, they have a means of being at least the equal of men and in many cases, superior to them. Leila Khaled found revolutionary activity to be a way of liberating herself from the traditional expectations of women. It would be quite wrong though to suggest that this motivation replaced those of ideology or nationalism that spurred others on. The sexual element was an added factor, not a replacement for those that was the ostensible cause of terrorist actions by men. Their dedication to the cause was no less than that of their male counterparts.³⁰¹

Membership of the group makes it easier to avoid the guilt associated with even the worst terrorist actions since the norms and values of the group make violence against the enemy not merely acceptable but desirable, even a duty. The gross misdeeds of the enemy are emphasised as a justification for acting against it. The opposition is reduced to an abstraction, it is a structure not a body consisting of individuals. In 1971, the IRA's Army Council set a target to kill thirty-six British soldiers, which was achieved by November of that year. The number was then raised to eighty. Clearly, they soldiers were not treated as individuals, they were merely numbers in a quota to be

²⁹⁸ Alpert, *Growing Up Underground...*, p. 188.

²⁹⁹ Galvin, "The Female Terrorist ...", pp. 29-30.

³⁰⁰ McDonald, *Shoot ...*, p. 238.

³⁰¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 240-241.

reached as quickly as possible.³⁰² In this way, it is possible to attack these people as representatives of the structure. They are dehumanised. Obviously, this is not always possible: Leila Khaled hijacked TWA flight 840 from Rome in August 1969, but experienced severe qualms about doing so when she saw a little girl on the plane wearing a badge on her dress with the message "Make Friends". It reminded Leila that the girl had committed no crime against the Palestinian people and it would be cruel to risk her life in an action over which the girl had no conception. Leila overcame her conscience by reminding herself of the fact that she and her people had done nothing to deserve the fate that they had received and therefore: "The operation must be carried out. There can be no doubt or retreat." Clearly in this case, Leila's commitment to the cause and her training were of greater significance to her ability to carry out the hijacking than an ability to dehumanise the passengers on the plane.³⁰³ Terrorists are freed from self-censuring restraints not by altering their personalities, aggressive drives or moral values but by redefining their actions as justifiable.³⁰⁴ Group decision making ensures that no one person feels responsible for decisions arrived at collectively. When everyone is responsible then no-one is really responsible. Collective action can also be used to diffuse the weakening of self-restraints. Any harm done by the group can always be attributed to the actions of other members, can be largely discounted by laying the blame for mistakes or over-reaction with others. People therefore act more harshly when their actions are obscured by collective instrumentality than when they have to hold themselves personally accountable for their actions.³⁰⁵

Disregarding or misrepresenting the consequences of action also makes it easier for terrorists to commit their acts. This is achieved by minimising the damage that they cause and thus avoiding having to face the full implications of their actions. It is also easier if the suffering of the victims is not visible and when casual actions are physically and temporally removed from their effects. When aggressors do not know the harm they inflict on their victims, it becomes depersonalised and therefore much less difficult to overcome any

³⁰² McGuire, *To Take Arms*, pp. 74-75.

³⁰³ Leila Khaled, *My People Shall Live*, p. 133.

³⁰⁴ Bandura, "Mechanisms of Moral..." , p.164.

³⁰⁵ *Ibid*, p.176.

moral inhibitions that might otherwise exist. For the same reason, distance from the results, if the decision-makers and executors of an action are not the same people it is easier for the former to call for higher levels of violence. When the SLA carried out a bank raid in which a female customer had been shot dead, those who had actually committed the robbery were initially shocked, although Yolanda, who had actually fired the shot, recovered quickly. Teko, the leader, who had planned the attack and had not been inside the bank, was positively enthusiastic, believing that it would improve the group's cohesion since they had now committed a capital offence; and joking "If it hadn't been for good ol' Myrna (the dead woman), one of our comrades would be dead now. Good old Myrna, she took all the buckshot."³⁰⁶ This divorce from effect is even more of a factor for intermediaries, since they have neither to make the decision nor carry it out, they are merely the messenger. However, Milgram found that in studies of commanded aggression, obedience diminished as the victims' pain became more evident and personalised.³⁰⁷ While that was the case in a controlled laboratory experiment, it is less certain whether it would apply to the same degree once considerations of loyalty to the terrorist group had been taken into account.

An individual's ability to disengage from the moral realities of their actions develops slowly rather than emerging complete as a result of conviction or unconventional moral values. It is an evolution of which the individual themselves may be unaware of. The group often eases the progress by asking the individual to perform unpleasant acts that they can endure without much self-censure. By repeated performance and exposure to aggressive modelling by more experienced associates, the bonds of self-reproof and discomfort are weakened, permitting acts of greater ruthlessness, so that acts formerly regarded as abhorrent can readily be performed by the individual. Sean O'Callaghan, describing his feelings after the mortar attack in which he killed an Ulster Defence Regiment officer, Eva Martin, said:

Looking back I think it was a stinking, shameful thing to have been involved in. But when you are wrapped up in a cause you do not take much of normal life into account. I

³⁰⁶ Hearst, *Patty Hearst*, pp. 361-362.

³⁰⁷ Stanley Milgram, *Obedience To Authority: An Experimental View*, (New York: Harper & Row, 1974.) pp 32-43.

think I was slightly upset that it was a woman who was killed, but this may just be retrospect.³⁰⁸

As another example, Patty Hearst was kidnapped and held against her will for months, yet she also participated in the actions of the SLA, her captors. It would be possible to suggest that she collaborated because the alternative was death, and this is partially true, but she had opportunities to escape in the course of missions, yet did not do so. Instead, she carried out her part in these as a full member of the group which she nonetheless hated. Her own view was that she had:

... acted instinctively, because I had been trained and drilled to do just that, to react to a situation without thinking, just as soldiers are trained and drilled to obey an order under fire instinctively, without questioning it. By the time they had finished with me I was, in fact, a soldier in the Symbionese Liberation Army...The penalty for failure, in combat, according to our Codes of War, was death.³⁰⁹

The process will be accelerated if acts of violence are presented as morally vital and the victims are depersonalised. This training, combined with immersion in the group's ideology and value system, instils the moral rectitude and importance of the cause for militant action, as well as creating a sense of eliteness and providing the social rewards of group esteem and solidarity for excelling in terrorist activities.³¹⁰ It might reasonably be thought that the ability of individual terrorists to disengage from the realities of their actions would decrease as the consequences of that act increased and that therefore, an act of mass terror would be less likely as a result. However, this appears not to be the case. Once the victims cease to be individuals and are reduced to an abstract, and provided the attack can be ideologically justified, the difference between an ordinary act of terrorism and an act of mass destructive terrorism is quantitative, not qualitative. It is indicative that even when directly confronted with the victims of the Murrah Building at his trial, the results of his action, so that he had to recognise the consequences of the attack, Tim McVeigh remained impassive and calm, convinced that he had struck a valid blow against a government he hated.

³⁰⁸ O'Callaghan, "The Killer...", p. 1.

³⁰⁹ Hearst, Patty Hearst, pp. 224-225.

³¹⁰ Bandura, "Mechanisms of Moral...", pp. 185-186.

Over time, violence becomes the norm of the group through a process of desensitisation and brutalisation. Whereas the initial use of violent force may be hotly debated within the group, later it becomes the accepted and required means.³¹¹ This is especially the case once a terrorist group acquires a longevity beyond the first generation because then its value system is set and violence is a characteristic of the group, it is internalised in the psychological dynamics of the group and its members so that ends and means become blurred since violence is tied irrevocably to the values that it serves. This has the effect of constraining the possibilities for compromise or innovation within the terrorist group, since group norms become a restricting influence on the leadership. Their position is dependent on their interpretation of group goals and effective direction of terrorist operations and they need to use violence as a means of maintaining group cohesiveness as well as pursuing instrumental objectives. It is rarely possible for them to find a substitute for violence since many recruits rejected other organisations precisely because of their nonviolence. Paxto Unzueta, a former member of ETA, said that:

Today's ETA has nothing to do with the ETA of the beginning... We were against Franco and saw ourselves as part of an intellectual movement, influenced by the wider events of 1968. Most of us came from middle-class, urban backgrounds. A lot of us were students. Now the recruits are the disaffected youth in search of a ruck with authority.³¹²

In this case it appears that violence may have become the end, not the means as Post argued, and it is this violence that provides the *raison d'être* of the group. As will be discussed later, an excessive focus on the struggle, rather than the goal, poses immense problems for the terrorist organisation, if it still does have a nominal strategic objective. Cathal Goulding recognised that the IRA were in such a position in the early 1960s:

The fight for freedom had become an end in itself to us. Instead of a means, it become an end. We hadn't planned to achieve the freedom of Ireland. We simply planned to *fight*

³¹¹ McGuire says that at one point, before she left the IRA, if she heard that a British soldier had been shot, she would hope that he would be dead by morning; and that she accepted the bombing of Belfast, and when civilians were accidentally blown up dismissed this as one of the unfortunate consequences of urban guerrilla warfare. McGuire, *To Take Arms*, p.9.

³¹² McElvoy, "The Trapping...", p. 26.

for the freedom of Ireland. We could never hope to succeed because we never planned to succeed.³¹³

Psychology may not explain nuclear terrorism specifically, but it does offer significant explanations of the escalatory pressures on terrorists, both individually and collectively, that would be critical to any act of nuclear terrorism. It is clear that in some cases, terrorist groups move beyond employing violence as a instrument, and instead become driven to commit violent acts by individual and group pressures. This can be used as both an explanation and a justification since it enables the perpetrators of violence to deflect responsibility onto others. They can argue that "it's not really my fault", blaming outside authorities for "driving" them to terrorism as a last resort, and thus avoiding the guilt that would in other circumstances act as a check on their actions. This shifting of responsibility is important not only in the use of terrorism as a tactic, but in the specific levels of violence employed: escalations of violence, even acts of mass terror, can be justified in exactly the same way, that the terrorists were left with no choice in order to ensure that their message was heard. The need for publicity is "the lifeblood of terrorism", at least that committed for political ends, is vital and is intimately connected to the survival of the group, the prime objective of the organisation. It is this that makes it hard for terrorist leaders to de-escalate the level of violence employed, particularly if there is competition either from within or without the group. Violence is also the main identifying aspect of the group, it is what sets it apart from other organisations. To even consider reducing the level of violence or stopping it altogether is to strike at the heart of the group's identity. Leaders have a key role, especially in close-knit groups that have gone underground. In such cases, the organisation may come to reflect the personality of the leader; a prime example of this is Abu Nidal, especially when fear and the pressures against dissent or exiting are strong. It is then hard to avoid doing the will of the group, as focused by the leader. However, this is not to suggest that there is a "terrorist personality", either amongst leaders or followers, and although some traits, such as a negative identity, do appear to be more prevalent amongst terrorists than society as a whole, it does not obviously correspond to a determinant of those who engage in terrorism. It is the

³¹³ Smith, *Fighting For Ireland...*, pp. 72-73.

act of terrorism that is the link between diffuse terrorists and groups with a wide range of motivations, rather than some initial psychological commonalty. Psychology does, though, offer a partial explanation for the way that individuals become involved, and the way that group dynamics determine the development of a terrorist campaign. As will be seen in later sections, although there are marked motivational differences between secular and religious terrorism, and even between left and right-wing terrorism, there are also significant psychological similarities, many of which have been discussed here.

Tactics & Targeting

Psychology and motivation may partially explain how an individual becomes a terrorist; why they remain involved and the pressures that are felt by both the individual and the group as a result of the dynamics of the organisation. However, it is of limited efficacy in establishing why a terrorist group uses a specific method to attempt to achieve its ends, and thus to partially assess the likelihood of a group believing that the use of a weapon of mass destruction is in their interests. Psychology and motivation may explain why terrorism is used at all, but it needs a more instrumental approach to determine why the group uses a bomb over a gun, for example. It may be that, especially in the earlier stages of involvement, there is no separation between the resort to terrorism and the method chosen. It is clear that there is rarely a single, clear-cut decision to use terrorism. Instead, there is a progression towards violence, a process rather than a definite choice. That being so, it is quite likely that the first few terrorist attacks are likely to be determined to a very large extent on what is feasible: by those materials and skills that are available to the group. Later on, the tactics and targeting of the group will largely hinge on organisational dynamics: the belief system, structure and decision-making process within the group. Tactics employed, and the example set, by other groups may also represent an important influence on terrorist organisations. As groups decline in influence or begin to split, there is an increased tendency to escalate the level of violence employed, a trend that is reflected in a number of cases and which might have important implications for a terrorist use of nuclear means. However, overarching all this is the question of terrorist rationality: to what extent is strategic choice purely an instrumental decision of which

methods will be most effective for the group?³¹⁴ Is it also crucially affected by other factors, such as psychology, which partially determine tactics as well as involvement?³¹⁵ At this point, it is worth clarifying the concept of rational choice. It does not equate to the "right" decision of which strategy will be most effective in achieving goals. It does mean though that there is a judgement of how to effectively tie means to ends, the conclusions of which are followed through consistently. The decision only needs to appear to be the optimal one at the given moment, once a cost-benefit assessment has been made by the terrorist.³¹⁶ It would be a considerable mistake to wholly dismiss rationality as a basis for terrorist's tactical choices. Even in the case of fundamentalist terrorism, often perceived as one of the least rational forms of political violence, there are clear elements of pragmatism and instrumentality in strategic choices. Hizbollah's move from suicide-bombings to kidnapping foreigners in Lebanon during the mid-1980s was due to a number of factors, external as well as internal. Firstly, their previous tactic had succeeded in dramatically reducing the Western presence in Lebanon, so there were simply less obvious targets to bomb. However, the group wanted to continue to pressurise the West over its Middle Eastern policies. Furthermore, they sought a method that would permit this pressure to be exerted over a prolonged period, enabling their campaign to be tied to external factors such as the release of Shiite prisoners, notably the al Da'wa group in Kuwait. The move from kidnapping, with the release of Terry Anderson in 1991, was a reflection of Hizbollah's altering relationship with Iran and its

³¹⁴ Martha Crenshaw, "The Strategic Development of Terrorism", Paper for the 1985 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans, August 29-September 1 1985, p. 1.

³¹⁵ Bowyer Bell suggests that a central aspect of the life of the terrorist who lives underground is that they focus almost exclusively on survival, buoyed by ideology to maintain the struggle. "Their life is consumed by the cost of merely maintaining, much less escalating, the armed struggle." Bell, "Revolutionary...", pp. 194-197. This suggests that tactical choices rely less on a conscious decision to pursue the most effective strategy, and more on simply avoiding capture whilst keeping the campaign alive. By this logic, and in keeping with the findings described earlier on the psychological pressures of terrorism, organisational survival and expediency are the key determinants of tactics. However, even if terrorism was resource-led, it does not preclude that a large scope of tactical choices have to be made. For example, it is undeniable that terrorist groups do sometimes escalate their campaign, a decision that clearly does require some degree of instrumental assessment.

³¹⁶ Lopez-Alves, "Political Crises...", p. 204.

own role within Lebanon, that made holding Western hostages superfluous.³¹⁷

To some extent, terrorism as a strategy has already been discussed. Terrorism is the resort of the desperate: the defence that "we had no choice" is not only a justification; within the parameters of group goals, objectives, willingness to compromise, and likelihood of success otherwise, it is the truth. The options for would be terrorist groups are genuinely limited. In many cases, they do lack public support and this fatally restricts their ability to alter government policies in their favour. As has already been discussed, terrorism is often a strategy of the impatient, those who have cursorily attempted to achieve their goals using the instruments available to them, but who are reluctant to invest the time, in mass organisational work for example, especially if the final success is doubtful. Connected to this is a frequent belief that time is short: either that they are unwilling to wait any longer for justice, or else that the moment for action is now, that the time is ripe, that there is an opportunity to be exploited. The decision to use terrorism is a process rather than a single choice, so other techniques will usually have been unsuccessfully attempted first. Terrorism has a number of potential advantages: it places an issue on the public agenda and it forces authorities to acknowledge the problem. Connected to that is that it creates publicity for the group, it makes them an entity that must be dealt with: they exist. Terrorism may also create the conditions for a wider movement, one with more likelihood of success, if it inspires the group's potential constituency, undermines the government's authority, or forces them to take measures that increase sympathy for the group and its cause.³¹⁸ It is important at this point to differentiate between the ultimate goals of terrorist groups, their strategic objectives, and the tactical goals employed to achieve this. In essence, it is the difference between long-term political goals, such as the overthrow of a regime, and military goals, the means to obtain that.³¹⁹ The scale of terrorist demands is also important because it will

³¹⁷ Magnus Ranstorp, Hizb'allah In Lebanon: The Politics Of The Western Hostage Crisis, (London: Macmillan Press Limited, 1997), pp. 88-108.

³¹⁸ Crenshaw, "The Strategic..", pp. 2-7.

³¹⁹ Wilkinson, Terrorism And The Liberal State, p. 106. For example, while the IRA's ultimate goal is a free, united Ireland; their military strategy, as defined in the "Green Book" is:

certainly, at least in part, determine the lengths to which the group will be willing to go. A group seeking only a change in policy has more interest in maintaining the structure of government than a group intent on revolution. It is logical to suggest therefore that the first group is less likely to be willing to inflict widespread damage on society than the second group. One of the key differences between various types of terrorist organisation is in how they define their enemies. Nationalist groups may regard the enemy as the nation oppressing them; revolutionaries as the ruling class; and religious groups as apostates or other corrupting influences. Each definition produces radically different targets and thus campaigns.³²⁰ Such factors must affect the tactics, strategies and means that a terrorist organisation is prepared to use. The question for this section then is "how are these strategic goals to be achieved, within the framework of terrorism?" How do these goal-related choices affect the level of violence employed by terrorists, and thus how likely are they to use non-conventional weaponry?

One interesting, and possibly significant, point is made by Rapoport in his article on three premodern terrorist groups: the Assassins, Thugees and Zealot-Sicarii. In each case, the group was more durable and posed a greater threat to their society than any modern terrorist organisation. Yet the weapons they employed were primitive; travel was by horse or foot; and communications were limited. It is one of Rapoport's contentions that: "The critical variable, therefore, cannot be technology: rather, the purpose and organization of particular groups and the

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1. A war of attrition against enemy personnel which is aimed at causing as many casualties and deaths as possible so as to create a demand from their people at home for their withdrawal.
 2. A bombing campaign aimed at making the enemy's financial interest in our country unprofitable while at the same time curbing long term financial investment in our country.
 3. To make the Six Counties as at present and for the past several years ungovernable except by colonial military rule.
 4. To sustain the war and gain support for its ends by National and International propaganda and publicity campaigns.
 5. By defending the war of liberation by punishing criminals, collaborators and informers.

Tim Pat Coogan, *The IRA*, (London: Fontana, 1987), p. 693.

³²⁰ Christopher Hewitt, "Terrorism and Public Opinion: A Five Country Comparison", *Terrorism & Political Violence*, Volume 2 Number 2, (Summer 1990), p. 146.

vulnerabilities of particular societies to them are decisive factors."³²¹ This might be important in the possibilities for the effects of a terrorist attack using non-conventional weaponry. At the very least, it is worth considering as a possible rationale for terrorist tactics and targeting, since it suggests, logically, that terrorist groups tend to identify, and strike at, the weak spots of their victim.

Terrorists have proved extremely adept at inventing new methods of attack to circumvent the protective counter-measures imposed by state's security forces. It is this inventiveness, and willingness to adapt tactics that make it virtually impossible to protect against every possibility. Terrorist groups and security forces are engaged in a constant battle for technological supremacy. However, terrorist organisations are also able to inflict significant damage using low technology weaponry. One example was the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), a radical Algerian Islamic group, that between July and October 1995, launched a campaign of nail-bombing in France, using camping gas canisters as their explosive. They succeeded in killing eight people, wounding 180, and caused 32,000 security personnel to be mobilised.³²² Other well-established terrorist organisations have also been periodically willing to use crude but effective weapons in pursuit of their campaigns. The IRA bombings of July 20, 1982, also used nail-bombs, although the explosive used, 25lbs of gelignite in the Hyde Park attack, was not as improvised as that of the GIA. The effects were devastating: seven members of the Royal Greenjackets were killed in Regent's Park and four members of the Household Cavalry and several horses died in Hyde Park. The British public's outrage at the attack apparently owed as much to the injuries to the animals, as to the soldiers.³²³ Even well-established groups, such as the IRA, have been willing to use home-made weapons as a part of their arsenal. Although the organisation used Semtex as early as 1976 and retains a sizeable quantity of the plastic explosive, even today they still sometimes use agricultural chemicals and fuel as the basis for their devices. Furthermore, as the campaign has gone on, the IRA has become

³²¹ David C. Rapoport, "Fear & Trembling: Terrorism In Three Religious Traditions", American Political Science Review, Volume 78, Number 3, (September 1984), p. 659.

³²² Bruce Hoffman, "Intelligence and Terrorism: Emerging Threats and New Security Challenges in the Post-Cold War Era", Intelligence and National Security, Volume 11, Number 2, (April 1996), p. 207.

³²³ Coogan, The IRA, pp. 646-647.

increasingly adept at building its own mortars, hand grenades, mechanical and electronic timers, mercury fulminate detonators, radio and command wire bombs, and booby trap devices, to name only a selection.³²⁴

One question that arises from attacks such as these is whether a terrorist group uses a particular weapon because it has limited alternatives or because it is the best means of attracting attention to the campaign and forcing revolted governments and publics to reassess their willingness to remain committed to a particular course, such as the retention of a military presence in Northern Ireland. The two options are not mutually exclusive, but they do have important reverberations for the issue of nuclear terrorism: if there is no terrorism involving nuclear devices, is it because no groups are able to get the necessary materials to commit such an act, or because no group wants to commit such an act, that conventional means remain sufficient? Is it always a sign of organisational weakness if a terrorist group resorts to low technology for their attacks?³²⁵ This is a critical question because one argument for possible circumstances in which terrorists might resort to non-conventional weaponry is precisely this point at which groups believe themselves to be in decline and decide to escalate their level of violence to ensure organisational survival. The two, desperation due to a perception of the group's weakness, and a desire to escalate, are entirely compatible. Terrorist groups decline for more reasons than simply lack of resources. Clearly then, organisational weakness and scarcity of resources are not synonymous and it is possible for some terrorist groups to escalate from a position of weakness. It may not even follow that low technology terrorism equates to a lack of alternatives due to a paucity of resources. In fact,

³²⁴ James Adams, Trading In Death: The Modern Arms Race, (London: Pan Books Limited, 1991), pp. 8-10.

³²⁵ Although, obviously, in many cases it is. One of the best examples of this comes from the Mau Mau movement in Kenya in the 1950s. Members of the Military Wing were mostly poor, landless, and semi-literate with little or no military training. However, the main constraint on their activity was the lack of weapons: only about 10% - 15% of members had precision weapons and only about 30% - 40% carried any weapon at all. The British took four years to suppress the rising but this was as a result of insufficient resources being applied to the problem and to organisational deficiencies within the British administrative structure. Once these had been rectified, the rising was comprehensively defeated within a year. Randall W. Heather, "Intelligence and Counter-Insurgency in Kenya, 1952-56", Intelligence & National Security, Volume 5, Number 3, (July 1990), pp. 58, 78-79.

terrorists appear to be extremely technologically conservative. They resort to a few well tested, and, as they perceive, reliable methods.³²⁶ Many terrorist organisations also appear to be risk-adverse: the emphasis is often on the group's survival and practically, that requires keeping its members alive and free from arrest. For example:

The principle that the terrorist must have a safe method of escape is the dominant feature in PIRA tactics. PIRA very seldom plan operations that involve high risk and if in doubt they abort the mission. Shooting attacks are mainly conducted on the "shoot and scoot" principle.³²⁷

Obviously, this has the effect of mitigating towards the terrorist group favouring the tactics and weaponry with which it is familiar.

Although Aum Shinrikyo's sarin gas attack in Tokyo represents an obvious exception, even non-traditional terrorist organisations such as the Unabomber, Tim McVeigh or the World Trade Center bombers have continued to use variants of traditional terrorist weapons. Even when terrorists want to be certain of making a successful attack or are seeking to cause widespread casualties, they may be able to do so by using multiple conventional weapons. This may be especially so, given the untested and therefore unreliable nature of non-conventional weaponry as a terrorist device. On June 29, 1992, Mohammed Boudiaf, president of the Algerian High Committee of State, was assassinated in the town of Annaba as he gave a speech. A bomb was detonated first as a distraction while a gunman wearing a military uniform walked onto the platform and sprayed automatic fire. Boudiaf was fatally wounded in the back and head and 41 others were injured.³²⁸ On August 27, 1979, the same day that they assassinated Earl Mountbatten, the IRA succeeded in killing 18 British soldiers at Warrenpoint in Northern Ireland. They used two bombs, detonated by radio, one in a hay truck that exploded as a lorry filled with soldiers went past; and the second in an abandoned stone building that caught reinforcements arriving in two Land Rovers and a helicopter to assist the first group of soldiers.

³²⁶ See Bruce Hoffman, "Terrorist Targeting: Tactics, Trends, and Potentialities" in Paul Wilkinson (ed.), "Technology & Terrorism", Terrorism & Political Violence, Special Edition, Volume 5 Number 2, (Summer 1993.)

³²⁷ White & White, "Revolution in the City...", pp. 104-105.

³²⁸ Edgar O'Ballance, Islamic Fundamentalist Terrorism, 1979-95: The Iranian Connection, (London: Macmillan, 1997), p. 187. Youssef M. Ibrahim, "Algerian President Fatally Shot at Rally", The New York Times, June 30, 1992, p. A8; "Algerian leader is assassinated", The Times, June 30 1992, pp. 1,18; "Murder in Annaba", The Economist, July 4 1992, p. 37.

There was also an exchange of fire between the soldiers and terrorists that killed one passer-by and wounded another.³²⁹ Although obviously neither group had access to non-conventional weaponry for their attacks, it is almost inconceivable that they would have been used, even if available, conventional means being more effective.

There can be no doubt that terrorist tactics vary significantly over time: terrorists and authorities are engaged in a constant battle of wits to gain supremacy. A prime example of this is aircraft hijackings, during the late 1960s and early 1970s a regular high-profile target, but now rarely attacked since fewer countries are willing to accept the planes; weapon-detection at airports has made it harder; and many countries have special units able to deal with such incidents. All this has meant that terrorists have moved on in search of easier targets that offer better returns.³³⁰ Similarly, until the recent barricade and hostage situation in Lima, the embassy siege had been in decline as a tactic since the early 1980s, in contrast to 35 such incidents in 1979 and 42 in 1980 alone.³³¹ Obviously, tactics vary dramatically in intensity and violence over time. Between 1963 and 1967, the FLQ planted about 35, mostly small, bombs and carried out eight hold-ups. In the three years leading up to the October Crisis, these figures rose to 50-60 bombings and 25 hold-ups.³³² The level of violence in these attacks also increased: on June 24, 1970, two were killed and two wounded in a bomb attack at Defense

³²⁹ See: Leonard Downie Jr, "IRA Bomb Kills Lord Mountbatten", The Washington Post, August 28, 1979, pp. A1, A8; Paul Potts, "Inch by inch check on ambushed vehicles", The Daily Telegraph, September 3, 1979, p. 1.

³³⁰ Walter Laqueur, "Postmodern Terrorism", Foreign Affairs, Volume 75, Number 5, (September/October 1996), p. 25. However, terrorists have not completely abandoned hijacking as a tactic. One interesting variant occurred on December 24, 1994, when members of the GIA took over an Air France plane on its way between Algiers and Paris. It landed at Marseilles, where the hijackers used 20 sticks of dynamite to turn the plane into a vast bomb that they intended to detonate as the flew over Paris, sending the wreckage crashing into the city below. They were prevented from doing so because the French GIGN antiterrorist squad stormed the plane on the tarmac in Marseilles, killing all four terrorists, but injuring 25 others, including nine commandos, in the process. O'Ballance, Islamic..., pp. 183-184.

³³¹ Paul Wilkinson, "Beleaguered in Lima", Times Higher Educational Supplement, February 21 1997, p. 18. In contrast, there were only 2 international terrorist barricade and hostage situations of any sort in 1994 and 4 such incidents in 1995. Bruce Hoffman & Donna Kim Hoffman, "The Rand-St Andrews Chronology of International Terrorism, 1994", Terrorism & Political Violence, Volume 7, Number 4, (Winter 1995), p. 226; Bruce Hoffman & Donna Kim Hoffman, "The Rand-St Andrews Chronology of International Terrorist Incidents 1995", Terrorism & Political Violence, Volume 8, Number 3, (Autumn 1996), p. 95.

³³² Wainstein, "The Cross...", p. 2.

Headquarters in Ottawa. In July, police defused 150lbs of dynamite planted in a car outside the Bank of Montreal.³³³ James Cross was kidnapped because he was senior British trade commissioner and head of the British government office in Montreal. The FLQ believed that as such, his abduction would be more easily identified with by the Anglo-Canadian community and therefore would be more likely to lead to a successful conclusion for the terrorists than could be achieved by attacking the original target, the American Consul-General.³³⁴ Pierre Laporte was a target partly because he was a friend of Prime Minister Trudeau, and because he was an important figure, both in his own right and as a member of Bourassa's Quebec administration. The FLQ cell wanted to shock the authorities into action. That his house was only ten minutes drive from the kidnapper's in St Hubert was also an influence on their choice of victim.³³⁵

In recent years, there has been a significant decline in the proportion of bombing incidents, compared to other forms of international terrorism. Between 1968 and 1969, 44% of all such terrorist attacks were bombings, it rose to 53% in the 1970s and then fell slightly to 49% in the 1980s. However, by 1995, this figure had fallen to just 23%. In its place has been an increase in attacks designed to directly harm persons. Armed attacks for example provided 44% of incidents in 1995, compared with an average of only 19% in 1980s.³³⁶ This is significant, since it supports the suggestion that terrorism is not only increasing in lethality, but that terrorists are selecting tactics that are more likely to cause fatalities, are more precise, in addition to employing familiar weapons in ways that are aimed at raising the likelihood of fatalities (e.g. by using bigger bombs). It is worth noting that, in 1995, although the number of fatal bombings fell to 21% of all types of fatal incidents, 48% of all fatalities caused by international terrorism were as a result of bombings.³³⁷ This is not exceptional. In 1994, the figures for bombings were 20% of all fatal incidents, but 51% of all fatalities.³³⁸ Furthermore,

³³³ Wainstein, "The Cross...", p. 3.

³³⁴ Wainstein, "The Cross...", p. 4.

³³⁵ Wainstein, "The Cross...", pp. 38-39.

³³⁶ Hoffman & Hoffman, "The Rand-St Andrews... 1995", pp. 87 & 91n.

³³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 95.

³³⁸ Hoffman & Hoffman, "The Rand-St Andrews... 1994", p. 226.

1994 and 1995 were "quiet" years, with few high fatality incidents.³³⁹ In other years, this proportionate figure would be much higher. It remains the case that bombings are the terrorist tactic most likely to cause wide-spread casualties. A key difference has occurred in the past few years though: whereas, in the past, terrorists tended to increase their technological sophistication,³⁴⁰ in some of the most significant

³³⁹ Although on July 18, 1994, 96 people were killed in a Hizbollah attack on the Argentine-Jewish Mutual Aid Association in Buenos Aires. See for example, O'Ballance, Islamic..., p. 13.

³⁴⁰ As an example, in two similar incidents, the RAF attempted to assassinate General Haig in 1979 and succeeded in killing Alfred Herrhausen, CEO of Deutsche Bank, in 1988. In the first attack, they used 100lbs of TNT, detonated by a household switch attached to four 9-volt batteries, which was connected to 180 yards of wire, laid under grass, leading to the explosive. The ambush relied on visual control: two motorcyclists with walkie-talkies would warn of the approach of Haig's car. Despite good intelligence and considerable patience (the attackers had waited several weeks at the same place, waiting for Haig to take that route), the assault missed by a split-second and left Haig uninjured. See: Michael Field, "Haig escapes assassination by a second", Daily Telegraph, June 26, 1979, p. 1; John Vinocur, "Gen Haig Uninjured as Car Is Hit By Bomb on Road to NATO Office", New York Times, June 26 1979, pp. A1, A12 & "Bomb Attempt on Gen Haig's Life Not Tied to Major Terrorist Groups", New York Times, June 27 1979; Michael Getler, "Haig Escapes Apparent Try On His Life", Washington Post, June 26 1979, pp. A1, A17; John Saar with David Fouquet, "Assassins Miss Haig - By Inches", Newsweek, July 9 1979, p. 44. The Herrhausen attack also relied on excellent intelligence and advanced planning. The bomb was set off when the car broke a beam of light between two poles on opposite sides of the road. A control cable was used to activate the trigger, ensuring that it was Herrhausen's car that broke the beam. The bomb, containing armour-piercing explosives, put in a funnel-shaped charge, and hidden inside a bicycle, was directed at the rear, right passenger door, exactly where Herrhausen was sitting. See: Ferdinand Protzman, "Head of Top West German Bank Is Killed in Bombing by Terrorists", New York Times, December 1 1989 & "German Slaying Was Well Planned", New York Times, December 2 1989; Anna Tomforde, "Killing breaks terrorist silence", The Guardian, December 1 1989; Michael La Garde & Waller Tarra, "Herrhausen Attack Possibly Rehearsed Near Vienna", FBIS-WEU-89-241, December 18 1989. The RAF frequently planned its attacks months in advance. The assault on Karlheinz Beckurts, on July 9 1986, was, according to the BKA, prepared for three months. That prior to the attack on Herrhausen was almost certainly longer. Hans Horchem, "The Decline of the Red Army Faction", Terrorism & Political Violence, Volume 3, Number 2, (Summer 1991), p. 62. Preparations of this scale are not unusual when terrorist groups target prominent people. Prior to their kidnapping of Aldo Moro, the Red Brigades considered Amintore Fanfani, the President of the Italian Senate and former Prime Minister, and Giulio Andreotti, the current Prime Minister, as possible alternative targets to Moro. However, the two were dismissed as options as a result of the intensive observation that the Red Brigades made of all three men throughout 1977. They found that Fanfani was too unpredictable in his movements and too well protected. Andreotti was ruled out because his house was continually guarded by at least ten armed police, and he always travelled with two escort cars and two motorcycle outriders. By contrast, Moro used one escort vehicle, and neither it nor his car was armoured. He left his house each day at the same time and invariably made a ten minute stop at the church of Santa Chiara to pray each morning. Although accompanied by five armed bodyguards, Moro was thus an easier target. On March 16, 1978, he was kidnapped from his car, and six weeks later, murdered. Alison Jamieson,

cases of terrorism of recent years, such as the bombings of the World Trade Center and the Murrah Building in Oklahoma, the perpetrators appear to have deliberately chosen to remain at a low technological level. Constructing bombs from diesel oil and nitrate fertilisers has a number of advantages, not least that it is a virtual impossibility to prevent terrorists obtaining such materials; but also that, given the amateur nature of those responsible for the bombings, crude home-made devices were almost certainly the most practicable to build.

While the tactics employed by a group may have to change,³⁴¹ it is also the case that most terrorist groups have a repertoire of favoured tactics, which they are reluctant to deviate from and which they adapt over time. These are not necessarily the same for all other groups.³⁴² As an example, while almost all terrorist organisations use bombings as part of their tactics, relatively few rely on airline hijackings.³⁴³ To some extent this may be a result of the fact that some activities clearly require less expertise, resources and risk than others. In that sense, at their most simplistic, bombings and shootings are among the most

The Heart Attacked: Terrorism & Conflict In The Italian State, (London: Marion Boyars Publishers, 1989), pp. 108, 113.

³⁴¹ For example, the RAF's strategy until 1977 had predominantly relied on kidnappings of leading political, economic and industrial figures, in order to place the authorities under pressure and compel them to release the RAF prisoners from German prisons. With the high profile failures of 1977, the murders of Ponto, Buback and Schleyer, with their attendant adverse and counter-productive reaction from the German public, the RAF abandoned the strategy. They turned instead to killing members of the Military-Industrial-Complex and of the "apparatus of repression". This was the strategy they would continue to use until their ultimate decline in 1992. Horchem, "The Decline...", p. 65.

³⁴² The IRA, for example, have often used vehicle bombs, as a means to attack targets. Rather than stealing the vehicle, the group have periodically use "proxy bombs", members of the public, coerced by threats to themselves or their families into driving their bomb-laden vehicle to the target. This removes much of the risk of planting the bomb for members of the IRA. Proxy bombs are usually detonated by a timer and the driver has enough time to get away from the scene. However, on October 24, 1990, the IRA used three "human bombs", Catholics deemed "collaborators", who were strapped into their vehicles and coerced by the threats made against their families into driving up to army posts or checkpoints just before the bombs exploded. Six soldiers and one of the drivers died, but the expectation was clearly that they all would. This was seen by the IRA as both an effective weapon against the British military and a means of deterring further collaborators. C. J. M. Drake, "The Provisional IRA: A Case Study", Terrorism & Political Violence, Volume 3, Number 2, (Summer 1991), p. 50. Vehicle bombs offered a means to transport large explosive devices across Northern Ireland, and thus to devastate the Province's economic base by attacking commercial and business premises, driving away potential investors and forcing the British to pay compensation. Smith, Fighting For Ireland..., pp. 98-99.

³⁴³ Brian Jenkins, "The Terrorist Mindset And Terrorist Decisionmaking: Two Areas Of Ignorance", Rand P-6340, California, (June 1979), pp. 4-5.

"accessible" of terrorist activities, and are certainly more so than more complex tactics such as kidnapping. Obviously, the tactic chosen depends on a number of factors, of which targeting and resources, both human and material, are the most important. For example, if a group has amongst its members a skilled bombmaker, then the likelihood is that they will favour bombing campaigns over other methods. Equally, members with formal military training might be able to effectively use highly technical weaponry in a way that others could not. However, the bigger determinant is the availability of material: terrorists have repeatedly shown a willingness and an ability to learn new techniques, to adapt favoured tactics, but if the weaponry or the means are absent, then it is obviously a largely hypothetical issue. As an example, the four shipments of arms from Libya to the IRA in 1985 and 1986 included a tonne of Semtex explosive, 12 SAM-7 ground-to-air missiles, rocket-propelled-grenade launchers, and nearly 120 tonnes of explosives, ammunition and guns. This arsenal continued to fuel the IRA's campaign for years: by 1990, British security forces had accounted for only a minute fraction of the weapons shipped into Ireland.³⁴⁴ It would be inaccurate to suggest that IRA military strategy was determined by the shipment, but the availability of the arms did increase the options and directions that that strategy could take. The issue of resources is, at least in part, connected to the stage that the terrorist group is at. In 1968, for example, the arsenal of the Belfast unit of the IRA consisted of two Thompson sub-machine guns, one Sten gun, one rifle and nine pistols.³⁴⁵ Similarly, the FLQ's campaigns from 1967 benefited greatly from the ready availability of detonators and dynamite, as a result of the construction of the Montreal Metro, Expo '67 and the Laurentian Autoroute, and from a number of quarries around Quebec. At all these sites, security was poor and the explosives were available in such large quantities that it took some time for the losses to be recognised.³⁴⁶ Such weaponry obviously limited the first few actions of the unit, until a wider range of arms was available. This

³⁴⁴ The Economist, "Arming The IRA: The Libyan Connection", March 31 1990, pp. 19-22. James Adams & Liam Clarke, "War Without End", Sunday Times, June 17 1990. An excellent, and more detailed, description of the IRA's attempts to effectively arm itself can be found in Adams, Trading... pp. 1-47.

³⁴⁵ Adams & Clarke, "War..."

³⁴⁶ Jeffrey Ian Ross, "The Rise and Fall of Quebecois Separatist Terrorism: A Qualitative Application of Factors from Two Models", Studies In Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 18, Number 4, (October-December 1995), p. 288.

may be related to the reason that there often appears to be a time-lag between the decision to resort to form a quasi-military organisation and the first attacks they carry out. Other factors in this include the need for training in techniques and the time needed to construct an organisational structure. Clearly, this varies according to the size, complexity and sophistication of the group and the acts it intends to perpetrate. As an example, the Tupamaros carried out their first operations in 1967, but the underground military group from which they stemmed, the MLN, was created in mid-1963.³⁴⁷

The subject of targeting is vast in itself, but it is worth considering one particular aspect in this context: the intended audience. Some attacks clearly have an international viewer as their prime object. They hope to bring international coverage to their cause and possibly increase the likelihood of international interference on the terrorist's behalf. It is not a coincidence, for example, that the Tupac Amaru rebels chose to stage a take-over of the Japanese Ambassador's residence in Lima during a reception that so many of the diplomatic corps attended. Not only did the rebels succeed in refuting President Fujimori's claim to have finally defeated terrorism in Peru, they also gained world-wide publicity for their ailing campaign.³⁴⁸ The ability of terrorists to attract this sort of coverage hinges on two aspects: either they must involve victims of interest to the world's media, which probably means citizens of Western countries,³⁴⁹ or else the implications or scale of the attack needs to be so immense that it is covered for its own sake. This is increasingly hard to achieve: on January 31, 1996, a suicide truck bomber drove into the Central Bank in the heart of Colombo's business district. The 500kg of high explosive killed nearly 100 people, injured 1400 others and caused millions of dollars worth of damage, and possibly cost billions of dollars in loss of business confidence. In spite of this, the coverage of the incident was modest in the Western press, certainly compared to an incident such as the World Trade Center

³⁴⁷ Lopez-Alves, "Political...", pp. 214-215.

³⁴⁸ Ronald Crelinsten, "What the Peruvian hostage-takers wanted to achieve", The Globe & Mail, December 31 1996, p. A19.

³⁴⁹ For example, one of the reasons that the Dawa Hijacking between April 5 and 20, 1988, was allowed to drag on for so long and coverage of event was so disappointing from the Hizbollah hijacker's perspectives, was arguably that there were no American or Western hostages aboard. An unspecified PLO source, commenting on the affair, certainly had no doubt that this was one reason that the Western negotiators had been willing to permit the plane to depart for an Arab country. O'Ballance, Islamic..., p. 97.

bombing, or even the Peru siege.³⁵⁰ In view of these circumstances, a terrorist group might be willing to consider a non-conventional attack, since that would increase the likelihood of widespread press coverage. However, it obviously poses considerable problems in other respects for the organisation.

This problem of receiving publicity and acknowledgement is not a new one for terrorists. The Stern Gang when they broke from Irgun in 1940, were badly equipped and funded and had few members. Consequently, they adopted their tactics to accommodate this weakness. Revolutionary violence was only to be one part of the strategy, but it rapidly came to dominate all the others.³⁵¹ Initially, due to their belief that the Irgun would never take part in an armed revolt, the LEHI decided to act alone. Their basic tactic was to strike at the British in whatever way would hurt. This had the effect of encouraging sporadic and ill-directed violence. However, after the death of Stern and the arrests of 1941-1942, new strategies were formulated. Previously, they had been fairly open in their activity; they had been politically active and had remained in contact with friends, family and associates, making it easy for them to be arrested by the police. After this period, they resolved to go fully underground, to break all connections with those outside a trusted inner circle, and to use completely safe houses or else bunkers in deserted areas. They would vanish from sight, emerging only to attack.³⁵²

By 1944, as the full plight of the Jews in Europe began to be realised, LEHI sought a victim that would 'change history', rather than the police constables and inspectors who had been their main targets to date. That, at least, was their ostensible reason, the one that LEHI

³⁵⁰ For example, the New York Times, The Times and The Globe & Mail all carried the Sri Lanka bombing on their front pages on February 1, 1996. However, in each case, by February 2, the story had been relegated to a small article on an inside page. In contrast, the siege in Lima continued to receive front page coverage even after the situation had settled down to a long drawn out stalemate between the terrorists and the Peruvian security forces. The reasons for the decline in television coverage of foreign news are discussed in: Garrick Utley, "The Shrinking of Foreign News": From Broadcast to Narrowcast", *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 76, Number 2, (March/April 1997), pp. 2-10. He attributes the cause of this diminishing coverage in the USA to a widespread perception that foreign affairs are less relevant, now that the security threat has also decreased with the end of the Cold War. With no imminent existential danger, the focus has swung to domestic issues.

³⁵¹ Bell, *Terror...*, pp. 62-63.

³⁵² Bell, *Terror...*, p. 75.

propaganda would later try to reinforce for posterity. Just as crucial was the fact that Irgun's return to prominence (with their revolt of February 1944) was utterly eclipsing the efforts of LEHI. The group had to find a new tactic to reclaim the limelight. They chose, as their next target, High Commissioner Sir Harold MacMichael because he was the highest representative of the British in Palestine; and because they wanted to educate the British to the follies of their policy in the region and their fellow Jews to the benefits of armed resistance. Furthermore, it was MacMichael who had placed heavy restraints on Jewish immigration to Palestine, compelling many to remain in Europe. This final reason owes more to LEHI propaganda than to reality: MacMichael simply enforced policy made in London by the Cabinet. To claim it was he who restricted Jewish immigrant access to Palestine was a convenient, albeit inaccurate, justification to make him a target, to legitimise attempting to assassinate him.³⁵³ Throughout the summer of 1944, MacMichael's movements and routines were watched and noted. There were no fewer than five assassination attempts that had to be aborted for various reasons before they were able to ambush his car between Jerusalem and Jaffa on August 8. A petrol bomb was thrown, covering the road in flames and then the car was raked with machine gun fire. MacMichael himself suffered only minor injuries and, since he returned to Britain shortly afterwards, had to be abandoned as a target. LEHI again sought a significant victim and found one in Lord Moyne, British Minister of State in Cairo and the highest ranking British official in the Middle East. LEHI, in a further effort at target legitimisation, would also claim he was anti-Zionist and anti-Semitic, although the evidence for this is patchy at best. Yalin-Mor, a member of LEHI would later affirm this, saying:

Really, these acts by Lord Moyne were without meaning for us. They were useful only as propaganda, because they allowed us to explain to the people why we had killed him. What was important to us was that he symbolized the British Empire in Cairo. We weren't yet in a position to try to hit Churchill in London, so the logical second best was to hit Lord Moyne in Cairo.³⁵⁴

Moyne was an attractive victim, even without an added incentive: a cabinet minister, titled, a friend of the Prime Minister, his death would be noticed. It would force Britain to regard Palestine as an international

³⁵³ Bruce Hoffman, *Author's Correspondance*, May 14 1997.

³⁵⁴ Bethell, *The Palestine...*, p. 181.

problem, not an isolated and internal one as they would have liked to believe. A less important reason was that, as the Irgun also sought to do, LEHI hoped that it would draw Arab attention to the frailty of the British position, perhaps encouraging resistance there too, easing their task in Palestine. Two young members of the group were selected, Eliahu Hakim and Eliahu Bet-Zouri. Hakim spent the autumn of 1944 watching Moyne's movements and was joined at the end of October by Bet-Zouri. On November 6, as Moyne, in his car, pulled up outside the ministerial residence for lunch, Hakim and Bet-Zouri approached on foot. Bet-Zouri shot Moyne's driver as he stood by the car and then Hakim, opening the rear door of the car, fatally shot Moyne three times, in the neck, abdomen and hand. They left Moyne's ADC, Captain Hughes-Onslow, and his secretary, Dorothy Osmond, entirely unharmed. The two assassins then tried to escape on rented bicycles they had left on the street, but were caught by a member of the Ministerial Protection Squad, El-Amin Mahomed Abdullah, whom they also refused to shoot at because it would have alienated Arab support, potential allies, to do so. It was an example of the rationality and instrumentality of a group renowned for its bloody use of violence. It also offered LEHI two more martyrs, as Hakim and Bet-Zouri were tried, and then executed on March 23, 1945.³⁵⁵

Terrorists may also be able to gain publicity for their cause by using tactics that are fresh, that set them apart from previous groups or tactics. For example, one of the main reasons that 1968 is widely acknowledged as the beginning of the modern age of terrorism is that that was when the first airline hijackings occurred. Had the hijackers instead chosen to pursue a campaign of bombing and shooting, it is questionable whether they would have been perceived to be such a break from the numerous anti-colonial groups that had gone before. Of course, most terrorist organisations will not seek to achieve such "spectaculars" and will continue with variations on their previous campaigns,³⁵⁶ but for those that do crave international recognition that

³⁵⁵ Bell, *Terror...*, pp. 89-100. Shamir, *Summing...*, pp. 52-54.

³⁵⁶ Some terrorist groups clearly do favour such "spectaculars", the PFLP being one and Tupac Amaru, although probably more accurately described as a guerrilla organisation, is another. Most of the Peruvian group's actions have been kidnappings of wealthy businessmen, attacks on buildings and hijackings of deliveries in Lima, all of which caused relatively few casualties, compared to the campaign of Sendero Luminoso. However, they were also responsible for seizing Juanjui, a city of over 20,000

sets them apart from other terrorists, the challenge is to find a "new" method of violence. It is here that a group might consider using non-conventional weaponry to achieve this objective.

Selecting a weakness in a victim's defence need not necessarily preclude employing non-conventional means. In 1995, Ivan Kivelidi, chairman of Rosbiznesbank, was killed when the mafiya spread a nerve toxin around his office. Although there was undoubted symbolic significance to the choice of weapon, part of the rationale may also have been that it offered a means to strike at the otherwise heavily protected target. By rejecting standard methods such as the bomb or bullet, Kivelidi's assassins were able to circumvent his defences.³⁵⁷

There are historical precedents for terrorists deciding to make a technological leap in their weaponry. In the second half of the 19th Century, three groups, Narodnaya Volya in Russia, the Fenians in Ireland and Anarchists across Europe and the United States, relied heavily on the new invention of dynamite to promote their campaigns. The most spectacular example of its use was in the assassination of Tsar Alexander II in 1881. Although using a gun would have been easier and more reliable, dynamite was selected for the attack because, according to Mikhail Frolenko, a member of the executive committee of Narodnaya Volya, using a gun would have meant that "this assassination would not have created the same impression; it would have been interpreted as an ordinary murder, and would not have expressed a new stage in the revolutionary movement."³⁵⁸ Dynamite, as a terrorist weapon, was accorded vast, almost mythical, powers until its limitations became clear. The

inhabitants and the capital of the Huallaga region. Once there, they imprisoned the police in their barracks, convened community meetings and then organised soccer matches, dances and parties for the residents, in a clear attempt to "win hearts and minds." Jorge Aliaga, *Terrorism in Peru*, (Edinburgh: Jananti, 1995), pp. 39 & 44. Although most of their attacks prior to 1992 were targeted at property, after that date, they have killed policemen, soldiers and civilians, including a businessman who refused to pay a large ransom. Wilkinson, "Beleaguered...". Such actions have done much to reduce not only their support, but also their number of members from around 1000 in the early 1990s to around 120 today. With this reduced membership has come heightened group security, and a tight cell-structure that has made it much harder for Peru's security services to infiltrate the organisation. Alistair Scrutton, "Peruvian rebels the devil peasants know", *Globe & Mail*, March 6 1997, p. A11.

³⁵⁷ Galeotti, "Mafiya...", p. 11.

³⁵⁸ Ze'ev Iviansky, "Individual Terror: Concept and Typology", *Journal of Contemporary History*, Volume 12 (1977), p. 47.

parallels with terrorist use of non-conventional weaponry today are striking. Both appeared to offer the instrument for enormous destruction and millennial redemption, to annihilate the state, to expose its foundations in a way not possible with other weapons.³⁵⁹ The dynamite campaigns ended, not as a result of government measures to prevent access to dynamite (although the method for manufacturing the explosive was widely disseminated amongst the terrorist groups, most chose to buy or steal ready-made dynamite), but because leaders such as Peter Kropotkin, a founding figure in the Anarchist movement, eventually concluded that it was not possible to destroy historical structures built over thousands of years with a few sticks of explosive.³⁶⁰ This again suggests that it is the target that matters, more than the weapon selected to attack it with.

One of the main weak spots of advanced industrial societies today may be their reliance on the electronic storage, retrieval, analysis and transmission of information. Therefore, it may be that the converse of Rapoport's theory is true: technology is vital. Vast areas of modern life are affected by computers and are thus vulnerable to sabotage by hackers. Most Western states have communications, medical, transportation, and financial infrastructures that are all heavily dependent on computers. Dedicated hackers, even armed with the most ordinary computer, can cause chaos, as well as access the most sensitive information. The US Department of Defense estimates that it receives around 250,000 computer attacks each year³⁶¹ and within the past couple of years, at least one hacker has very publicly broken into the CIA's files. A concerted effort could, theoretically, render a country unable to function. Laqueur suggests the switch at Culpeper, Virginia, headquarters of the Federal Reserve's electronic network, handling all federal funds and transactions, would be a possible place in the US at which to strike.³⁶² It should be noted though that although the specific concern of a society vulnerable to attack through its computer system is comparatively new, the concept of states being technologically vulnerable is not. Into the 1980s, there was concern that a single

³⁵⁹ For a comparison, see David Ronfeldt and W. Sater, "The Mindsets of High-Technology Terrorists: Future Implications From An Historical Analog", RAND, California, March 1981.

³⁶⁰ Iviansky, "Individual Terror...", p. 45.

³⁶¹ Sam Nunn, Congressional Record - US Senate, September 28 1996, S11756.

³⁶² Laqueur, "Postmodern...", p. 35.

terrorist bomb placed in the right place in the US power grid could disrupt lines to major cities, blacking out huge swathes of the country and causing massive disruption. It was also feared that a potential adversary might attempt to detonate a nuclear device that would create an electro-magnetic pulse over the Midwest, burning out the electronic controls for refineries, gas-processing plants and powerplants, to name only a few. With the difficulty of obtaining parts and the need for highly skilled labour to replace them, the disruption and economic cost would be potentially vast over a protracted period.³⁶³ A similar attack was planned by the IRA in the summer of 1996. They intended to use multiple bombs to destroy six electric substations that link London and the South East of England to the National Grid. Despite the National Grid's contingency plans to deal with a cataclysmic power failure, the destruction of the transformers would have threatened to disrupt power to Britain's capital for months.³⁶⁴ The economic, and therefore political, consequences of a successful attack would have been immense. However, it also raises the question, which will be returned to later, whether, given the potential effect of such a conventional attack, it would be necessary for any terrorist to resort to non-conventional weaponry.

It is relatively rare for the tactic of terrorism to have the desired effect. Yigal Amir's assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Rabin could easily have brought the more dovish Shimon Peres to power in the May 1996 elections, were it not for Muslim terrorists making security an election issue. Yet Amir acted because he believed Rabin was making too many concessions to the Palestinians in the peace settlements. Equally, while Hamas and Hizbollah may have succeeded in making such a settlement harder for Yasir Arafat, it is hard to see how a Likud government in Israel is in the best interests of the group's cause. Some

³⁶³ Amory & L. Hunter Lovins, "The Fragility of Domestic Energy", *The Atlantic Monthly*, (November 1983), pp. 118-126. The United States has four power grids, all of which interconnect in Nebraska. The system is designed to deal with a problem in only one of the grids at any one time. If a primary line went down, power would be shut off to a specific section and electricity would be rerouted around the problem. However, if there were two such disruptions, the entire system is designed to shut down. Stephen Bowman, *When The Eagle Screams: America's Vulnerability To Terrorism*, (New York: Birch Lane Press, 1994), p. 125.

³⁶⁴ Stewart Tendler, "How police watched the 'A team' ", *The Times*, July 3, 1997 & "The men who tried to shut London", *The Times*, July 3, 1997.

former terrorists have become leaders of their respective countries, Menachem Begin, Yassir Arafat and Yitzhak Shamir are all examples, but this has always occurred once they have renounced violence in favour of the political process.³⁶⁵ Most of the marked successes of terrorism have come against colonial powers. Begin's strategy was largely to make the British withdraw from Palestine because they could no longer afford to be there. This was to be achieved by attacking property; the British would have to increase their garrison in the Levant which was economically unviable for any extended period; or else they would be driven to desperate, and possibly counter-productive, measures to preserve their position.

Begin suggests that the Irgun made a deliberate attempt to undermine the British government's position and particularly its prestige in Palestine. However, he believed that this arose as much from the existence of the group, as from specific tactics or targeting. While on the one hand, they hit at British prestige "deliberately, tirelessly and unceasingly", the very fact of their presence, undefeated by repressive measures was enough to deny "the legend of its omnipotence". Begin's point almost certainly applies more widely to most groups fighting governments: "Even if the attack does not succeed, it makes a dent in that prestige, and that dent widens into a crack which is extended with every succeeding attack".³⁶⁶ The targeting of Irgun and LEHI represents a major difference between the groups. Begin said: "We never attacked individuals, not even policemen or soldiers...Our opinion was that if you killed an individual, there will be another individual. So we did not use this method."³⁶⁷ By contrast, LEHI believed that when Irgun focused entirely on attacking buildings, it permitted the British to rebuild them, using money levied in Palestine. Shamir thought that the Irgun's strategy was less humane than LEHI's personal-terror tactic, since Irgun's bombing of buildings risked causing casualties at random, whereas LEHI's victims were all selected individually, for a specific reason.³⁶⁸ Clearly, as this example shows, it is possible for groups to have a similar objective, to both use terrorism, and still to have significantly different tactics from one another. The most effective

³⁶⁵ Laqueur, "Postmodern..." pp. 27-28.

³⁶⁶ Begin, *The Revolt*, p. 52.

³⁶⁷ Cited in Bethell, *The Palestine...*, p. 157.

³⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 161.

strategy to achieve a particular goal is not self-evident; there is no one terrorist tactic that is certain to bring the desired results. Consequently, terrorists have to be willing to alter their targeting and tactics. It also means that it is possible for terrorists to be unsuccessful in achieving their goal, yet believe that it is not the fact of using terrorism that is the problem, so much as the variety of violence they are using. This conclusion would obviously encourage experimentation with other types of terrorism, and, quite possibly, with an escalation of the level of violence being used, conceivably even to the level of non-conventional weaponry.

The Irgun had a relatively small number of full-time underground members (Begin claimed it was never more than 30-40) and hundreds of others who remained part-time and above ground. The group was led by a High Command advised by a General Staff that was organised in departments to suit the requirements of the underground. The High Command controlled both political and military actions by the group, considered general principles, strategies and tactics and dealt with all external relations. The High Command made all the decisions, there were none by individual commanders.³⁶⁹

The Irgun's most notorious attack, the bombing of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem, was carried out for two reasons. On June 29, 1946, the British occupied the Offices of the Jewish Agency. These were regarded by the Jewish independence movement as Jewish headquarters, so they were determined to strike against British headquarters, situated in part of the hotel. The other, and more important, reason was that as a result of their occupation, the British had seized a number of documents that revealed vital details that would severely jeopardise the movement which had to be destroyed. This second reason was also the prime determinant of the amount of warning that Irgun gave before the detonation of the bomb: if it was too much, it was feared that the British might have the chance to remove not only themselves, but some of the more important documents from the hotel. Consequently, a warning time of 30 minutes was decided upon.³⁷⁰

³⁶⁹ Begin, *The Revolt*, p. 61.

³⁷⁰ Begin, *The Revolt*, pp. 214-216.

This attempt to expose the authorities as repressive and provoke them to over-react is a common objective of many terrorist campaigns, since it is hoped that it will lead to increased support, resources, members and thus ultimately to victory. Another example of this working successfully is that of the FLN in Algeria in the 1950s and 1960s. Algeria was governed on the premise that it was not a separate nation, but rather an integral part of France. The FLN sought to drive the French government to react in a way that would show comprehensively to Algerians that the French regarded them as a separate entity. The FLN planted bombs in market places and other crowded locations. The French treated all non-Europeans as potential suspects, and in the mid-1950s, transferred all Algerian Muslim military units to mainland France and replaced them in Africa with European troops. The reality of an *Algerie Francaise* was thus hopelessly undermined.³⁷¹ There can be little doubt that terrorism poses severe problems for any regime that is concerned to maintain a state governed by the rule of law and that preserves individual liberties. If the target is unable to protect its people, then it is failing in one of the most fundamental objectives of a state and the regime could be argued to lose some legitimacy as a result. The target's power is, to some extent, deflated. The nature of terrorism, seemingly random hit-and-run attacks, makes it extremely difficult to prevent altogether, and can therefore lend the terrorist organisation an air of superiority in the face of authority impotence. If unable to deal with the terrorist threat directly, a regime must try to minimise support for it. This can pose an awkward choice: do nothing and seem to be helpless; implement security measures that risk restricting the rights of uninvolved people as well as limiting the scope of terrorist actions; or make concessions to moderates, which although it may bleed off support for the terrorist group, can also be perceived as making concessions to the terrorist's cause, possibly encouraging more attacks and groups in the long-run.³⁷² In each case, the results can be diametrically opposed to those intended and further undermine the regime's legitimacy. However, with the exception of anti-colonial struggles, it is still the case that, as Paul Wilkinson has argued: "There is ample historical evidence that terror alone is not generally an

³⁷¹ David Fromkin, "The Strategy Of Terrorism", Foreign Affairs, Volume 53, Number 4, (July 1975), pp. 687-691.

³⁷² Nicholas O. Berry, "Theories On The Efficacy Of Terrorism", Conflict Quarterly, Volume 7, Number 1, (Winter 1987), pp. 10-14.

effective weapon in bringing about the overthrow of dictatorships or democracies." Furthermore, even in those cases where terrorism was successful in achieving major political change, it was almost invariably in the context of other factors, such as the unwillingness of the authorities to impose repressive measures to eradicate the terrorism; overwhelming support for the group in the population at large; or an internecine conflict that precluded a political or negotiated solution.³⁷³ The absolutist nature of many insurgents and their organisations are precisely the factors that undermine their ultimate chances of success. This is reflected by Eamon de Valera, who in 1922, during the Irish Civil War, wrote: "What guerrilla warfare leads to is a desire on our opponent's part to come to terms with us, provided that these terms do not mean complete surrender by him to us, which is unfortunately what we require."³⁷⁴

Many terrorist groups have been inefficient in recognising the effectiveness of their campaigns. They frequently delude themselves as to the results they are able to achieve. However, once they do appreciate the true situation, the group is faced with a number of critical choices, all of which threaten potential decline: to carry on regardless, diversifying their tactics, to join another organisation or to escalate the level of violence that they employ. An example of this is the IRA campaign of the mid 1970s, when bewildered by the lack of success from their campaigns, they concluded not that the premise of the strategy had been flawed, but that they simply had not applied enough pressure. Consequently, they escalated the level of violence that they employed. The results were the series of devastating attacks on the British mainland, starting with the Birmingham pub bombings on November 21, 1974, in which 21 people died.³⁷⁵ Although the IRA themselves are extremely unlikely to resort to nuclear terrorism, their logic, that more violence rather than less was needed, could conceivably be used by other groups to justify acts of mass destructive terror. This is more plausible if the organisation is on the brink of collapse and failure, since, as has already been discussed, survival of the group can become the dominant motivation in determining a group's strategy.

³⁷³ Wilkinson, *Terrorism & The Liberal State*, pp. 50-51.

³⁷⁴ Smith, *Fighting For Ireland*, p. 60.

³⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 127.

The reasons for terrorist groups' decline are far from clear and are almost certainly a different combination of factors in each individual case. One instrumental approach might be that terrorism ends when it is no longer viewed by its practitioners as effective or legitimate, is no longer justifiable in terms of the ends it serves.³⁷⁶ Certainly, the strategic choices of groups are key, but so are their organisational resources and the government's response. The effect of an action or response in ending terrorism is also tremendously variable.³⁷⁷ For example, while the *pentiti* system in Italy is widely credited with having contributed to the decline of the Red Brigades, the Supergrass system, applied in Northern Ireland, was an abject failure. An example of poor strategic choice would be the decision of the Red Brigades to kidnap and murder Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro in 1978, a decision which "initiated its fragmentation and defeat."³⁷⁸

As with the Moro case, the kidnapping and murder of Laporte by the FLQ forced the population at large to make the choice between terror and more mainstream methods of pressure. In both cases they chose the peaceable option. When the Tupamaros kidnapped American police advisor, Dan Mitrione, in August 1970, the Uruguayan government declined to accommodate the terrorist's demands for the release of fellow group members. The Tupamaros felt obliged to execute their hostage, believing the government to be bluffing, but unwilling to risk losing bargaining power and the utility of political kidnapping (the group's main tactic at that point). As with the Red Brigades and the FLQ, their decision was the catalyst that permitted the government to impose heightened security measures that contributed to the ultimate defeat of the organisation.³⁷⁹

In the Canadian example, there were other factors at work too. Many people were deterred by the War Measures Act (WMA) imposed in the wake of the murder. Furthermore, as legitimate Quebec nationalist political parties gained an effective voice, the need for terrorism appeared less pressing. This decline in public support corresponded with increasingly efficient antiterrorism techniques by the Canadian

³⁷⁶ Adrian Guelke cited in Martha Crenshaw, "How Terrorism Declines", Terrorism & Political Violence, Volume 3, Number 1, (Spring 1991).

³⁷⁷ Crenshaw, "How Terrorism Declines", pp. 80-81.

³⁷⁸ Jamieson, The Heart Attacked... p. 23.

³⁷⁹ Lopez-Alves, "Political...", pp. 228-229.

police and military, widespread short-term imprisonments, and a high incidence of individual burnout amongst members of the FLQ who increasingly came to believe that their terrorism was no longer an effective weapon.³⁸⁰ Certainly, this example would seem to be compatible with Ross and Gurr's assessment of why terrorism subsides: the authorities make it impossible for the group to act and increase the costs of their trying to do so. At the same time, there may be a decline in popular support for the group and increased disillusionment, causing members to exit the organisation.³⁸¹ Crenshaw adds the possibility of physical defeat, a strategic shift, as well as internal disintegration to the possible reasons that terrorism might subside.³⁸² Reilly believes that the considerations affecting both the initiation and the decline of political violence in a given situation are centred around attitudes and approval levels towards violence in a society, on its utility and on the likelihood of the group achieving their goals. The acceptability of violence in a society is key in whether terrorism is perceived to be a valid form of protest and thus may be closely linked to the level of support a group can hope to receive from their society at large. Clearly, these perceptions may vary over time and are certainly situationally determined, depending on the possibilities for a non-violent solution and the importance assigned to the issue in question. However, it does seem connected to the role of violence in a society's history, whether constitutional or unconstitutional traditions are dominant and whether violence succeeds in achieving goals for its users.³⁸³ The role of this support is an especially central issue in the rise and decline of groups with nationalist-separatist objectives, where popular support obviously does have some correlation to success. However, this can also apply to other types of terrorist group. The Tupamaros failed for a number of reasons, but a vital one was their inability to attract new members and supporters for their cause. Their urban strategy was an urban adaptation of Che Guevara's *foco* theory of rural guerrilla warfare. They sought to provide the urban workers with

³⁸⁰ Ross, "The Rise...", pp. 292-294.

³⁸¹ Jeffrey Ian Ross & Ted Robert Gurr, "Why Terrorism Subsides", Comparative Politics, Volume 21, Number 4, (July 1989.)

³⁸² Crenshaw, "How Terrorism Declines"

³⁸³ Wayne G. Reilly, "The Management of Political Violence in Quebec and Northern Ireland: A Comparison", Terrorism & Political Violence, Volume 6, Number 1, (Spring 1994), pp. 46-56.

access to a well-organised revolutionary group, "in order to channel their revolutionary potential". They emphasised revolutionary actions above rhetoric, believed relative deprivation theory, and thought that terrorism would be the spark that would turn mass discontent over falling real wages into revolutionary zeal. However, the group could offer only long-term ethereal gains to the workers, who really believed in reform elections anyway. Consequently, the overwhelming majority of people remained loyal to the party political system that already existed. Every use of terrorism by the Tupamaros thus served only to widen the gap between them and their potential constituents who now accepted elective politics as the norm.³⁸⁴

It must be stated, though, that the correlation between support for terrorist groups and their decline is far from a straightforward one. Some organisations are clearly less reliant than others on popular support as a prop. Nationalist-separatist organisations seem, in most cases, to have a far higher "natural rate" of support amongst their constituency than is generally the case for anarchic-ideologue groups, although both may perceive their level of popular support to be significantly higher than it really is. Furthermore, support for such nationalist-separatist groups seems much less sensitive to decline as a result of terrorist actions, provided that the actions can be justified within the context of being part of a patriotic struggle and do not endanger fellow ethnics.³⁸⁵ This is important because the fear of losing popular support is often cited as a reason why terrorists seldom resort to high-level violence. However, provided it is within the accepted traditions of a nationalist struggle, higher levels of terrorism may not jeopardise support for nationalist-separatist groups to the extent that it might for anarchic-ideologue organisations. In this context, acts of mass destructive terrorism are not as inconceivable as was once thought. However, since the idea of acceptable traditions is likely to convey a degree of proportionality, it is probably still reasonable to say that an act of non-conventional terrorism on this basis is singularly unlikely.

This does not necessarily suggest that if support is lacking, terrorists will renounce violence because it is counter-productive. As was

³⁸⁴ Lopez-Alves, "Political...", pp. 217-222.

³⁸⁵ A fuller discussion of these points can be found in: Hewitt, "Terrorism...", pp. 143-170.

observed earlier, part of their difficulty is that terrorist organisations often have grave difficulties in moving from violence. In part, this is as a result of psychological pressures and a determination to preserve the group's *raison d'être*. However, it is also that many terrorist organisations are genuinely slow to recognise when there are gains to be made through non-violent activity. The IRA in 1972 was a good example of this, missing the opportunity for effective dialogue with the British government, after the latter had been driven into talks by Republican violence. Then, and in common with many other terrorist groups, they showed an inability to link their political demands to their military strength. It is worth noting though, that in this case, the failure may have owed as much to the difficulty of persuading key members of the organisation to temporarily renounce violence, as to a deliberate, strategic choice.³⁸⁶ Even sophisticated organisations, such as the IRA, that have well-established political wings, appear to have difficulty in pursuing an effective dual-track strategy. Even once the movement had reorganised, after the failures of the 1970s, and the apparent success of *Sinn Féin* in the British elections of 1982-83 had suggested that a new "total strategy", incorporating the military as simply one tool in a wider campaign, might be more fruitful, the IRA retained primacy within the Republican movement and continued to use violence, irrespective of the political repercussions or popular reaction.³⁸⁷ Instead, compelled by a reluctance to compromise and a fear that any interim progress may become permanent, the campaign remains dominated by the military option.³⁸⁸ This is summarised in Danny Morrison's observation in 1989 that: "when it is politically costly for the British to remain in Ireland, they'll go...it won't be triggered until a large number of British soldiers are killed and that's what's going to happen"³⁸⁹ or as Martin McGuinness put it more succinctly in 1977, to keep "blattering on until the Brits leave."³⁹⁰ This inflexibility does not universally apply to terrorist groups: the Tupamaros never used it as their sole strategy, relying on exposing corruption and other mild tactics too. Their initial resort to terrorism

³⁸⁶ Smith, *Fighting For Ireland*, pp. 106-108, 114-115 & 219-220.

³⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 152-7 & 170-178

³⁸⁸ For a discussion of why the IRA continue to use force as their primary means, see Smith, *Fighting For Ireland*, pp. 14-19 & 21-22.

³⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p.224.

³⁹⁰ David Blundy, "Inside The IRA", *The Sunday Times*, July 3, 1977.

stemmed from an assessment of the conditions of Uruguayan society that the time was "ripe" for more revolutionary actions. It was not until the group neared its end that terrorism as a tactic gained a momentum of its own. Originally it was seen as an experimental, and limited, method that could be abandoned, should it prove unproductive. However, after the kidnapping and murder of Dan Mitrione in 1970, the group, wrought with disagreement, faced with an increasingly repressive regime and unable to admit that they had made a mistake, were driven to pursue the tactic of terrorism more thoroughly. It became the group norm for a time, but the organisation's leaders were also aware that their strategy would ultimately end in failure. Consequently, they abandoned terrorism altogether and instead sought to move to rural guerrilla warfare and more open confrontation with the Uruguayan military. This too, would finish in failure, and finally end the group.³⁹¹

The strategic inflexibility of a movement at a given time does not necessarily preclude that they later learn to use a twin-track approach. The two arms of Republicanism in Northern Ireland, the IRA and *Sinn Fein*, have competing strategies: coercive military pressure against a desire to be included in any discussions about a solution to the situation in the province. By the 1990s, the movement had become more adept at alternating between the two to put pressure on the British. This can be seen in the use of short-term ceasefires in 1993 and 1994 that seemed to place the onus on the British government to find a means of maintaining the progress towards a settlement. It is in this context, that the unilateral and indefinite ceasefire declaration of August 31, 1994, can be seen.³⁹² However, the strategy of the IRA has remained, in essence, unchanged: the British must withdraw, otherwise violence will ensue. The breakdown of the ceasefire, after over a year, reflected the growing frustration of the organisation at the perceived failure of the political process. Although affiliated to a wider movement, and more willing to act as a part of that, the IRA itself remains a military organisation. As such, it is dedicated to achieving its objectives through an armed strategy. Although, as part of the Republican movement, it obviously does have other options than the

³⁹¹ Lopez-Alves, "Political...", pp. 226-229.

³⁹² Smith, *Fighting For Ireland*, pp. 194, 197-200 & 211-214.

purely military one, and despite being a highly sophisticated organisation, the IRA remains as bound by the organisational dynamics described earlier as any other terrorist group.³⁹³ It is as dedicated to the military option as ever. Having made such a choice, terrorist groups are limited in the available possibilities to increase pressure on their target. Escalating the level of that violence is an obvious choice, one that, given the additional psychological and organisational pressures already discussed, can be irresistible. Potentially, this could lead terrorists to consider the ultimate increase in violence, to non-conventional means.

A variant on lack of support as the cause of terrorist group decline is that of the Red Army Faction. In this case, the German government took action that effectively denied the group's ability to attract new members. Imprisoned members of the RAF were vital to the group's strategy for recruitment. It was evident from the testimonies of former members of the organisation that many second and third generation terrorists "joined the RAF because of the alleged inhuman conditions of imprisonment and for the goal of liberating the prisoners."³⁹⁴ Consequently, from November 1991 to September 1992, led by Justice Minister, Klaus Kinkel, the German government released four members of the RAF after they had served the minimum time required by their sentences. The government made it clear that future prisoners would be released early, in accordance with the penal code, provided that the RAF cease-fire of April 1992 held.³⁹⁵ Denied much of its *raison d'être*, terrorism, as well as the release of the prisoners, the group lost most of its direction and went into a terminal decline. This was more to do with the group's difficulties of recruitment than that the government action *per se* forced them into premature retirement. These problems could also be attributed to the irrelevance of the RAF's ideology in the post-Cold War world and the consequent preference of potential German terrorists for more local, non-underground and issue-specific groups, such as the Revolutionary Cells and

³⁹³ For example, to admit that their military strategy had been a failure would be to suggest that those who died promoting it, the IRA's martyrs, died in vain. *Ibid.* p. 225.

³⁹⁴ Dennis Pluchinsky, "Germany's Red Army Faction: An Obituary", *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Volume 16, Number 2, (April-June 1993), pp. 142-144.

³⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

Autonomen.³⁹⁶ LEHI also feared the effects that prison would have on the group. Yalin-Mor said: "Our slogan was, 'Kill or be killed, but don't be arrested.' Prison could have destroyed our movement. Conditions in the detention camps were not bad and many people inside were broken. They became neutral."³⁹⁷ They were afraid that support would just haemorrhage away, undermining their campaign.

The extent to which the Soviet Union and Eastern European states ever heavily sponsored terrorism is debatable,³⁹⁸ but since the end of the Cold War, it has certainly been negligible. For example, in 1990, it was discovered that East Germany had permitted members of the RAF to live in the country, under assumed names, since around 1980. Before becoming citizens of the GDR, these terrorists first had to renounce violence and all connections with the RAF. This was largely as a result of the country's desire for better relations with the West, along with the financial assistance that that brought.³⁹⁹ This clearly indicates that state sponsorship takes more than one form. It may simply be shelter for group members. It further shows that deterrence of state-sponsorship may be a by-product of the "normalisation" of relations between opposing states. However, a few Middle Eastern and African states do continue to sponsor terrorists, although, since the 1986 US airstrikes against Libya, countries such as Libya, Syria and Iran have been less overt in their actions.⁴⁰⁰ A major example of flagrant state-sponsorship is Sudan, which offers a safe haven for a multiplicity of groups, believing that no-one is sufficiently concerned by the situation that they will try to become involved in the state.⁴⁰¹ It is worth noting, though, that the likelihood of state-sponsored nuclear terrorism remains remote: those who have the material to do so have largely moved away from sponsorship, leaving those states that are not

³⁹⁶ Bruce A. Scharlau & Donald Philips, "Not the End of German Left-Wing Terrorism", Terrorism & Political Violence, Volume 4, Number 3, (Autumn 1992), p. 114.

³⁹⁷ Bethell, The Palestine..., p. 161.

³⁹⁸ For the leading argument that the Soviet bloc were the pre-eminent sponsors of terrorism, see Claire Sterling, The Terror Network. (New York: Holt, Reinhart & Winston, 1981.)

³⁹⁹ Horchem, "The Decline...", pp. 61-63.

⁴⁰⁰ Although they continue to do so. Both Iran and Syria cooperated with groups such as Hizbollah in the kidnapping of Westerners in Lebanon in the 1980s, partly in an attempt to influence Western policy in the country and partly to exploit the situation for regional foreign policy gains. Ranstorp, Hizbollah..., p. 54.

⁴⁰¹ Laqueur, "Postmodern...", pp. 26-27.

yet in a position to supply their client groups with the means for a nuclear attack. Furthermore, it seems unlikely, as has already been stated, that states with a nuclear capability would want to pass that on to organisations that are generally loosely affiliated with that state.

By and large, terrorism has been treated by authorities as a deviant behaviour, as abnormal and illegal. Therefore, the strategy to deter it has had strong parallels with campaigns against other, similarly, deviant behaviour such as crime or international aggression. This has tended to take the form of controlling immediate risks by measures such as target hardening and by imposing heavy costs in the form of punishments as a means of deterring further actions.⁴⁰² Deterrence requires the ability to punish or deny success to the terrorist and the willingness to use this capability. However, when the terrorist group does not control territory, retribution against physical targets is rarely possible. Countermeasures do have some impact, but since one objective of terrorism is to drive the authorities to commit repressive measures, it does risk accentuating the threat, strengthening support for the organisation, if the authorities are perceived to have over-reacted. The most effective countermeasures, in the short-term at least, are those that guarantee that a terrorist attack on a certain target will be a failure, since it means that most terrorist groups will seek other objects to attack. Since foiling terrorism can only be a partial solution, it being impossible to protect every potential target, the conclusion has to be that deterrence, in the form of target-hardening, can be used to prevent specific acts of terror, but not to prevent terrorism as a whole.⁴⁰³ The issue of state-sponsorship does make deterrence against terrorism theoretically possible, since there is a physical target, the sponsoring state, that can be threatened. Even where a state is merely acting as host to a terrorist group rather than sponsoring it, as was the case with the PLO in Jordan between 1967 and 1970, it is possible to impose unacceptable costs on the host state, as Israel did in the Jordanian example, so that the group is constrained or expelled (as happened in September 1970, "Black September" to the Palestinian

⁴⁰² Helen Purkitt, "Dealing with Terrorism: Deterrence and the Search for an Alternative Model" in Michael Banks (ed.), Conflict In World Society, (Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books Limited, 1984), pp 162-163.

⁴⁰³ Hannah Alon, "Can Terrorism Be Deterred? Some Thoughts and Doubts" in Anat Kurz (ed.), Contemporary Trends In World Terrorism, (New York: Praeger, 1987), pp. 126-130.

terrorists).⁴⁰⁴ Clearly in some cases, the sponsoring state can be "persuaded" to resort to tactics other than terrorism, especially when there are viable alternatives.⁴⁰⁵ However, the reality is that, even in the case of the Libyan airstrikes, often offered as proof that such military actions do have a positive impact, such attacks and threats are frequently counter-productive. In revenge, Libya attempted to arrange the bombing of a US military recruiting centre in New York City on April 15 1988, and the same day, the second anniversary of the airstrike, succeeded in sponsoring a carbomb attack on a USO club in Naples. They are also alleged to have orchestrated the destruction of Pan-Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie in December 1988; and certainly were involved in the shipping of arms to the IRA, as punishment for Britain's role in the airstrikes.⁴⁰⁶ A rare successful use of deterrence against terrorism was the Soviet reaction to the kidnap of four members of their Beirut embassy by Hizbollah on September 30 1985. Several days later, one of the hostages was found dead in Beirut. The Soviets immediately withdrew staff from their embassy. Allegedly, a close male relative of Sheikh Fadlallah was then kidnapped and killed, and his private parts sent to the Sheikh in a plastic bag. The three remaining Soviet hostages were immediately released and no more Soviets were taken captive by the organisation.⁴⁰⁷ Clearly, Hizbollah's leaders were persuaded that it was not in their interests to kidnap Soviet citizens, but this model of deterrence (if it can be so called) is scarcely one that could be conscientiously followed by a liberal democracy. It does however show that even experienced, hardened terrorists can be prevented from a certain course of action. In all probability, this simply represented an example of target substitution: the Soviet reaction certainly did not stop Hizbollah taking hostages, it meant only that they chose not to take Soviet ones, so instead concentrated on Westerners. Deterrence clearly did not work on the group responsible for the plot after the World Trade Center bombing, to release those imprisoned for the attack. Their plan also included bombing two of New York's tunnels under the Hudson; a carbomb attack on the UN Building; an assault on the FBI's New York headquarters; the bombing of the George

⁴⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 127.

⁴⁰⁵ See for example, Diane Tueller Pritchett, "The Syrian Strategy on Terrorism: 1971-1977", *Conflict Quarterly*, Volume 8, Number 3, (Summer 1988), p. 28.

⁴⁰⁶ Hoffman, "Intelligence...", p. 217.

⁴⁰⁷ O'Ballance, *Islamic...*, pp. 105-106.

Washington Bridge; and the simultaneous assassination of Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Egyptian President Mubarak, New York Senator D'Amato, and Brooklyn Assemblyman Dov Hilkind.⁴⁰⁸

It is worth noting that deterrence is not only an anti-terrorism tactic, but also a strategy used by terrorists themselves. They threaten to impose unacceptable costs on their target unless the victim does (or does not do) something. Sheikh Abbas al-Musawi, of Hizbollah, is reported to have said in 1989: "America should think a million times before carrying out any foolish action: There will be no limits whatsoever to our reprisals."⁴⁰⁹ Whether such threats actually have the desired effect is almost impossible to prove (this is one of the central difficulties with deterrence of any variety), especially since most states are singularly reluctant to be perceived to be engaged in dialogue with terrorists, never mind making concessions to them. To be able to make the threat credible, groups such as Hizbollah must appear to be capable of widespread and large-scale actions. The alternative is that they are perceived to be making empty threats, not uncommon amongst terrorist organisations, but something that does go some way towards undermining the credibility of the group itself. Since, as has been discussed, it is important to terrorists that they be taken seriously, this means that they must be reluctant to issue threats that can be readily "seen through". Therefore, their threats must either be tied to their capabilities, or else they must be seen to be plausibly seeking to escalate the level of violence they employ. In the case of already highly violent groups, this may mean that they at least contemplate non-conventional means.

Terrorist groups base their tactical and targeting decisions on what is feasible, the availability both of resources and of potential victims, and on what they believe will be effective in promoting the objectives of their campaign. However, the inability of many terrorist groups to see beyond a military option may mean those organisations, faced with their failure to obtain key objectives, may be more likely to interpret that as being due to insufficient levels of violence being employed, rather than an indication of the instrumental paucity of violence as a strategy. If that is so, the obvious conclusion of such an interpretation

⁴⁰⁸ Hoffman, "Intelligence...", p. 216.

⁴⁰⁹ Ranstorp, *Hizb'allah...*, p. 144.

would be that an escalation of terrorism should be the preferred option. Given that the feasibility of high-level attacks has risen with the increased availability of new resources, such as fissile material, some groups might even extend that, if they could, to non-conventional weaponry and to nuclear terrorism. The next two sections analyse the two broad types of terrorist organisation that have come closest to resorting to mass destructive terrorism: those motivated by political extremism, and right-wing beliefs in particular, and those driven by religious ideologies.

Religious Terror

Religious Terrorism

Until now, this discussion has focused predominantly on anarchic-ideologue and nationalist-separatist groups, but in the past fifteen years there has been a rising tide of terrorist violence from outside of these categories. In that time there has been a renaissance of religiously-motivated actions, and more recently, a resurgence of violence stemming from right-wing organisations. Between them, these types of groups have been responsible for many of the worst terrorist incidents of recent times, and therefore clearly merit exploration in any assessment of possible perpetrators of nuclear terrorism.

To cleanly pigeon-hole many terrorist organisations is problematic, for example ASALA clearly contains both nationalist and religious elements, and it is also the case that religion and right-wing motivations are interlinked, notably in North American white supremacist groups, but for the sake of clarity they will be dealt with here as separate phenomena. Perhaps the easiest method to distinguish religious terrorism from other types is that in the former case, the group will make use of, and require, scripture or a clerical authority to justify, sanction and approve the violence they employ. Hoffman notes that in 1994 a third of the known, active international terrorist groups had a predominantly religious component or motivation. By 1995 they accounted for nearly half the groups. This does not include organisations, such as the IRA, ETA or Armenian groups that clearly do have a religious element but whose main impetus is nationalist.⁴¹⁰ Wieviorka states that:

... Apart from any violence overtly wreaked in the name of religion... there are a good number of armed insurgents who act in the name of the religious faith upon which their actions are founded... In a great number of modern-day instances, the most striking phenomenon we notice is that of a disengagement from one's religious background or training, a secularization of activities organized by leaders who, having passed through a religious phase, have deserted

⁴¹⁰ The figures are: in 1994 16 of 49 groups were religious. By 1995, 25 of 58 or 42% of identified groups were religious. Hoffman, "Terrorism and WMD...", p. 48.

it or at least abandoned it as the guiding principle of their struggle.⁴¹¹

The examples Wieviorka cites are those of the Christian militias in the Lebanon and the Red Brigades in Italy, who define themselves by cause not religion. He suggests, though, that the importance of religion can also increase in a group's motivation. An example of this would be the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, which was originally a mass student movement concerned primarily with the lack of resources on university campuses in Egypt, but which became increasingly pro-Islam and was involved in the assassination of President Sadat.⁴¹² It is Rubenstein's contention that even fundamentalist terrorism is clearly nationalist. This is obviously so in some cases, Sikh militarism for example, but other movements do seem more religious than secular and more international than nationalist.⁴¹³ However, even in these cases, terrorism comes from volatile extremist groups on the fringes of nationalist coalitions; this applies equally to Middle Eastern Muslim and to American Christian white supremacist fundamentalism. The decision to remain on that fringe or to break away is largely determined by political issues such as doctrinal differences within the broader movement, tactical and local matters, and the degree of threat posed to their cause by secularisation.⁴¹⁴ Religion is the way that they express political ideals, including hatred of foreign domination, dreams of national redemption and their social conservatism.⁴¹⁵ They seek power to defend the faith, defeat their enemies and establish a regional dominance. A good example of this is Hamas which seeks to turn Palestine into an Islamic state. It has deep roots in the community and spends around 95% of its estimated \$79 million annual budget on a network of schools, hospitals and mosques in most towns in the West Bank and Gaza Strip rather than on terrorism. These social services

411 Michel Wieviorka, The Making Of Terrorism, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993) p. 33.

412 Ibid, pp. 38-40.

413 For example, Hizbollah is a pan-Islamic movement, that seeks to create a single Islamic community and rejects the concepts of Arab or Persian nationalism. Rather, it sees itself as being at the vanguard of the struggle, led originally by Ayatollah Khomeini, to free downtrodden Muslims from domination by imperial and colonial forces. See Ranstorp, Hizb'allah..., p. 55.

414 Magnus Ranstorp, "Terrorism in the Name of Religion", Journal of International Affairs, Volume 50, Number 1, (Summer 1996), p. 48.

415 Richard E. Rubenstein, Alchemists Of Revolution: Terrorism In The Modern World, (New York: Basic Books Incorporated, 1987). pp. 132-134.

provide a cover and a recruiting ground for terrorists, as well as a means of support for the families of suicide bombers and others killed in the fight against Israel.⁴¹⁶

The upsurge in religious terrorism, especially since 1988, can in part be attributed to the widespread belief that the group's respective religions lie at a vital historical point. This stems from increased globalisation, and the perceived erosion of traditional values, along with widespread economic and political upheaval and inequality, leading to heightened feelings of fragility, instability and uncertainty about the future. Terrorists feel the need to preserve their religious identity, but also believe that there is the opportunity to fundamentally alter their futures. Religion is a refuge, familiar and reflecting constant values, in an age of change. It is also an instrument for political action. However, it remains defensive and reactive in the eyes of its perpetrators. This is often combined with an upsurge in militant clerical leaders. These more activist ideologues increase support, strengthen the group and act as a legitimating force for the use of violence through their theological justifications for terrorism.⁴¹⁷

Since the quest for power is quintessential to politics and international relations, it is impossible to regard religious terrorists as apolitical.⁴¹⁸ Juergensmeyer, also suggests that by using a religious justification for violence, the terrorist becomes overtly political: they break the state's monopoly on morally justifiable killing, and therefore make a claim of political independence.⁴¹⁹ While driven by religion, religious terrorists undoubtedly make day-to-day practical political judgements as a result of their particular situation.⁴²⁰ However, this is not to deny that religious terrorism is significantly different from its secular counterpart, that it clearly has an added component that is lacking from nationalist-separatist or anarchic-ideologue violence.

⁴¹⁶ John Kifner, "Alms and Arms: Tactics in a Holy War", *New York Times*, March 15, 1996, pp. A1,8.

⁴¹⁷ Ranstorp, "Terrorism in the Name...", p. 46-50.

⁴¹⁸ Bruce Hoffman, "The Contrasting Ethical Foundations Of Terrorism In The 1980s", *Terrorism & Political Violence*, Volume 1, Number 3, (July 1989) p. 389.

⁴¹⁹ Mark Juergensmeyer, "The Logic Of Religious Violence" in David C. Rapoport (ed.), *Inside Terrorist Organizations*. (London: Frank Cass & Company Limited, 1988). p. 183.

⁴²⁰ Ranstorp, "Terrorism in the Name...", p. 44.

Religious terror is not new: Rapoport argues that until the 19th Century religion was the only justification for terrorism,⁴²¹ but as a major motivation of modern international terrorism it is comparatively recent; in 1968 none of the 11 identifiable active terrorist groups could be classed as religious.⁴²² The importance of religion in enhancing the likelihood of violence being employed by some groups is that it has the ability to inspire total loyalty and commitment, and as has been seen in the case of secular terrorism, such an uncompromisingly holistic attitude is a prime factor in the utilisation of force as a valid means. The intensity of feeling that religion engenders also mitigates against ready resolutions to religious disputes and encourages more violent solutions than might otherwise have been the case.⁴²³ The struggle is often perceived as an all-out fight between good versus evil, believer versus unbeliever, justice against injustice, order versus chaos. This totalism is critical in justifying violence generally, but as with secular terrorism, can also be the legitimation for greater acts of terror than would otherwise be tolerable. The intensity and importance of the battle can be used to justify the levels of violence employed in its name.⁴²⁴ Also relevant is that, as a result of group fragmentation or the imprisonment or killing of older members, many religious terrorist groups have an extremely young, educated and newly urbanised membership that hold intolerant, radical worldviews. Such terrorists are more likely than their older counterparts to resort to higher levels of violence,⁴²⁵ and maybe, in some cases, to the very highest levels, acts of nuclear terrorism.

Furthermore, the language of religion often deals explicitly with violence because it reflects the ultimate tension between order and disorder, the latter of which is inherently violent. That language can readily be adopted by terrorists to reinforce their message.⁴²⁶ This has two purposes: because religious images and metaphors tend to be

⁴²¹ Rapoport, "Fear & Trembling...", p. 659.

⁴²² Bruce Hoffman, "Holy Terror: The Implications Of Terrorism Motivated By A Religious Imperative", Studies In Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 18, Number 4, (1995), p. 272.

⁴²³ David C. Rapoport, "Some General Observations On Religion & Violence" in Mark Juergensmeyer (ed.), "Violence & The Sacred In The Modern World", Terrorism & Political Violence, Special Issue, Volume 3, Number 3, (Autumn 1991), pp. 120-121.

⁴²⁴ Ranstorp, "Terrorism in the Name...", p. 52.

⁴²⁵ Ibid., pp. 54-55.

⁴²⁶ See Juergensmeyer, "The Logic...", pp. 180-182.

widely and rapidly recognised by the population as a whole, it enables the terrorist group to easily portray their message, and also has the effect of giving that message a heightened legitimacy through assuming a divine purpose. Many Armenian groups, for instance, identify their struggle with Christ's Passion, an ideal metaphor for revolution since it encompasses violence followed by rebirth. In messianic movements, it is the renewal and revival aspects of the religion that are key, a return to the vital core, and in many cases this means a resort to violence. In both Islam and Judaism, the founding period was defined by force: Mohammed and the early Caliphs were great warriors and in Israel, Gush Emunim members emphasise the ruthless conquest of Canaan and the partnership between God and Israel for taking the Promised Land, revealed in the Sinai Covenant. By contrast, the early Christian church was pacifist in nature, but even here, messianic movements can find support for their cause, emphasising a vengeful Christ, returning to exact retribution for his wronged people and cleansing the world ready for Judgement.⁴²⁷ Girard argues that religion and violence are inextricably linked, that its prime purpose is to direct violence outside the religious community, to avoid fratricide within the group. He believes that violence is necessary to conquer violence within the group, so that the states of violence and non-violence are not unconnected conditions. He argues that sacrifice is the primary sacred act because it offers a process whereby those performing the sacrifice project their own concerns onto the victim: by destroying the victim they demolish aspects of themselves. It channels their aggressive and violent activities away from their community, ensuring that it is not endangered by such sentiments. In this respect, the theories of Freud and Girard are similar, but they differ over the cause of these destructive urges that require sacrifice to divert them. Freud suggested most violence was an attack on a scapegoat representing the parental figure; Girard attributes violence to "mimetic desire". In this, one identifies with an idealised image of another person; but this can also lead to hatred and competition, so it is necessary to have symbols of the rival that can be conquered and thus assimilated, hence the centrality of the rite of sacrifice: it is a scapegoat

⁴²⁷ Rapoport, "Some General...", pp. 128-129.

of the rival.⁴²⁸ This leads to the conclusion that religious terrorism might be a result of the failure of religious ritual to function correctly, creating a "sacrificial crisis" in Girard's phraseology. Girard's theory might be successfully applied to all the major world religions with the exception of Buddhism, which differs from the others in at least one key way: whereas other religions attach importance to a cosmic struggle enacted in the terrestrial world (there are numerous examples of this in both the Old and New Testaments and the Hindu Mahabharata, for instance), Buddhism's spiritual clash is internalised in the mind of the believer between the perception that this imperfect and illusory world is real and a higher consciousness that surpasses worldly perception completely. Buddhism is a tradition almost wholly devoid of religious-sanctioned violence, so may well offer an exception that proves the rule.⁴²⁹

Sacrifice & Martyrdom

The terrorism of the followers of Rabbi Meir Kahane does show elements of Girard's theory. Kahane displayed "mimetic desire" in his drive to avenge the perennial vilification of the Jews, to humiliate the Gentile, to be stronger than the other and to demonstrate that through physical force. He ideologised and sanctified anti-Gentile violence; rather than his religion being a control on the use of violence in the community, it raised tensions and encouraged the resort to violence.⁴³⁰

Some religious terrorism clearly does encompass the idea of sacrifice, sometimes expressed in the form of martyrdom, but much of it seems more akin to warfare than to sacrifice in a meaningful sense. However, there do seem to be Girardian elements in the use and selection of martyrs by Shiite groups in Lebanon during the 1980s. They had to be male; old enough to be deemed individually responsible for their actions, yet young enough that they were not married so there would

⁴²⁸ Mark Juergensmeyer, "Editor's Introduction: Is Symbolic Violence Related To Real Violence?" in Juergensmeyer (ed.), "Violence & The Sacred..." pp. 2-3.

⁴²⁹ Juergensmeyer, "The Logic...", p. 186. There are a few examples of Buddhist sects using violence, such as Theravada Buddhists in Sri Lanka, but these are most unusual. Richard C. Martin, "The Study Of Religion & Violence" in Rapoport & Alexander (eds), The Morality Of Terrorism... p. 349.

⁴³⁰ Ehud Sprinzak, "Violence & Catastrophe In The Theology Of Rabbi Meir Kahane: The Ideologization Of Mimetic Desire", in Juergensmeyer (ed.), "Violence & The Sacred..." pp. 67-68.

be no dependants left behind; the martyrs could have no ties to anyone who might consider it their duty to avenge the death against its sponsors; those selected for self-sacrifice also had to have a minimal measure of pious intent and no traits that might be interpreted in the surrounding society, the audience, as a sign of emotional disorder because it is important that only the purest of motives can be attached to the action.⁴³¹ It was crucial to Girard that these people lacked a key social link because then they could be exposed to violence without fear of reprisal. Their death would not automatically entail an act of vengeance. Israeli security services drew up a profile of the "average" Hamas or Islamic Jihad suicide-terrorist. They tended to be single; aged between 18 and 27; from a family of limited means; be either unemployed or with a meagre income; and have little education. Of those that lived in the Gaza Strip, most came from Gaza City itself; and from outside the region, most were from around Ramallah or the Jenin/Kalkilya region. In both localities, the terrorists had often been taught at religious educational institutions administered and funded by Hamas. All the terrorists studied by the security services were extreme in their nationalism and religious adherence; and were mentally distressed after specific incidents at the hands of Israeli soldiers or civilians. There were other important secondary motivations too: the desire to imitate other suicides who had been successful in their mission and earned great prestige in the Palestinian community; the desire to avenge attacks by Israeli terrorists such as that by Baruch Goldstein on the Cave of the Patriarchs in Hebron in February 1994, or other past injustices; or the desire to cleanse the individual's name from a charge of collaboration, whether just or unjust, although this motivation appears rare in the case of suicide-terrorists.⁴³² Bombers also believe that they are assured a place in heaven as a result of their actions. There, they will be allowed to choose 70 family members to join them; be fed oceans of milk, wine and honey; and receive the services of 70 virgins.⁴³³

⁴³¹ Martin Kramer, "Sacrifice & Fratricide In Shiite Lebanon" in Juergensmeyer (ed.) "Violence & The Sacred..." pp. 38-40.

⁴³² Ron Ben-Yishai, "Anatomy Of A Suicide", Yediot Ahronot, January 27, 1995, Supplement, pp. 7 & 23.

⁴³³ Sunday Times, "Wedded To Death In A Blaze Of Glory", March 10, 1996.

The voluntary acceptance of death in order to demonstrate the truth to man is a vital method of message-giving religions to dispel the doubts of believers and to aid evangelical efforts. It is only necessary to consider the role of the early saints in Christianity to see the truth of this. In Islam, martyrdom is also widely admired, especially if it is achieved attempting to defeat Islam's enemies. Hizbollah described the 1983 embassy bombers in Beirut as: "two martyr mujahidin [who] set out to inflict on the US Administration an utter defeat not experienced since Vietnam, and a similar one upon the French Administration."⁴³⁴ However, as Taylor points out, it is not only religion that incites martyrdom amongst fanatical adherents: he cites the example of the IRA hunger strikers in the early 1980s. Although they did not die committing a terrorist action, their deliberate, preplanned deaths clearly were a form of suicide in the pursuit of the cause. Roman Catholicism does play a significant role in Irish Nationalism, but it is not the primary motivation of the IRA. This suggests that religion *per se* is not the critical factor in suicidal terrorism; rather, it is an environmental context that allows and supports martyrdom that is key, and religion is one of the possible environmental facilitators. However, in many cases, it is impossible to separate religion from other forces, such as nationalism. June Leavitt, a neighbour of Goldstein's, and someone who had known him for over ten years, described his motivation for the Hebron attack as follows:

...[T]his coldness of character went together with a flaming feeling for God and the Jewish people, not as individuals who could be hurt by his severe manner but as a nation. He adored his family, yet his inner life was larger and more allegorical. He came to Israel because he believed the biblical prophecy that Jews would return to the land. He believed that this was the time of the redemption. He was back in the Bible when God spoke to people. Since the signing of the "peace treaty", at least 60 Israelis have been killed. Many of them he reached when their lungs and stomachs were hanging out. He saw the ancient Philistines before his eyes. Heard the Jewish nation crying. The night before he committed his act of revenge, as he tried to listen to the Book of Esther for Purim in the Cave of the Fathers, he heard the chants of the modern Arabs "*Itbach el Yehud*" ("Kill the Jews"). How long he planned to rise up like an ancient Samson and slay the ancient enemy, no one knows...If there was a God and if he came to people and made them do earth-shattering things,

⁴³⁴ Ranstorp, *Hizb'allah...*, p. 38.

then he would come to a man like Baruch. Cold and hard like ice, with a fiery devotion to things higher and deeper than this world. God would choose a man who could unblinkingly sit with his son and listen to the Book of Esther in the night, and in the morning put on his Army uniform, take his rifle and much ammunition, creep out of the house, knowing the chances were he'd never see his sleeping wife or children again.⁴³⁵

Martyrdom is important for the likelihood of nuclear terrorism in two respects. Firstly, it shows that there are individuals who might be willing to sacrifice themselves to ensure that a nuclear attack was executed effectively. Given the potential effect of such an attack, if the terrorist had to have the chance to escape, it would require more time than is the case with a conventional attack, increasing the possibility that the device might be discovered in the meantime. Secondly, it is clear that martyrdom is not solely the province of extremely committed religious adherents. Although religion remains the chief motivation of suicide-terrorists, individuals willing to sacrifice themselves for such an attack could also come from a much wider, secular, background.

There are several examples of mass-suicides, usually in a religious or cult context, from Masada in 73 CE through Jim Jones Peoples Temple in 1977 to the Branch Davidians at Waco in 1993.⁴³⁶ While the

⁴³⁵ June Leavitt, "Maze of terror: A settler's diary. Fear and faith in a West Bank settlement", US News & World Report, April 18, 1994, p 58.

⁴³⁶ On April 19, 1993, 86 people, including 24 children, were killed in an inferno at the Branch Davidians compound in Waco, Texas. Only nine members of the cult survived. It was the culmination of a 51-day standoff that had previously peaked on February 28 in a 45 minute exchange of fire between agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and those in the compound. Four ATF officers and six cultists died and 16 were injured in this exchange and estimates of the number of rounds fired during it vary from 10,000 to 1,500. US Congress, House Judiciary Committee, "Events Surrounding The Branch Davidian Cult Standoff In Waco, Texas", 103rd Congress, 1st Session, April 28 1993, pp. 3-5, 13, 130-131. The official assessments of whether David Koresh, cult leader, was suicidal also vary. However, he did believe himself to be God or the Son of God, and repeatedly used apocalyptic Biblical passages in his sermons, and was apparently determined not to be taken alive. Ibid., pp. 6, 124, 133. It is clear though that discipline in the compound was tight: between February 28 and March 23, 21 children and 14 adults were permitted to leave the besieged compound, possibly expelled by Koresh for indiscipline. It is this possibility that subsequently fuelled speculation that a mass suicide was an option. Ibid., pp. 15, 146. The cause of the fire on April 19 is the greatest source of controversy. The FBI claim that their helicopter surveillance captured at least three of the fires being started deliberately by cult members. This is supported by the fact that the compound had apparently been doused

religious aspect is obviously important, peer pressure seems to have been as vital in the decisions of people to voluntarily take their own lives.⁴³⁷ The threat to commit suicide remains as a potent weapon to groups: in April 1982 Rabbi Kahane's followers in Kach barricaded themselves underground in Yamit, as a protest at the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai. The event achieved widespread coverage and Kahane was rushed from New York by the Israeli government to negotiate a resolution to the situation. The action was unsuccessful in achieving a cessation of the withdrawal, but it did raise the profile of the group and their cause.⁴³⁸ However, the opportunity to commit mass-suicide does not appear to be an obvious motivation for an act of nuclear terrorism. There have been groups, such as Aum Shinrikyo, that attempted to cause massive casualties to hasten Armageddon, as well as organisations in which everyone killed themselves, but there is little evidence, as yet, of terrorists that combine both elements, seeking, Samson-like, to destroy their enemies along with themselves.

The Objective Of Religious Terrorism

The primary concern of most religious radical movements is to save their own culture from the dangers of apostates *within* the community, rather than from the influence of infidels without it.⁴³⁹ Juergensmeyer cites the example of Sikh extremists, who find that:

in petrol and by survivors who heard other cultists shouting: "The fire is lit, the fire is lit" and by one survivor's account that states that Koresh told his disciples to: "Stay put, do nothing, wait until you see God. God is coming, the end is nigh." All of this strongly suggests a mass suicide, rather than a tragic combination of unforeseeable circumstances. Furthermore, there can be no doubt that Koresh himself committed suicide, since he died from gunshot wounds to his head, rather than from the effects of the fire. However, the other possibility is that the fire started as a result either of the FBI's use of tear gas or that in breaching the compound walls with their tanks, the FBI knocked over something flammable, such as a paraffin lamp. Since the compound was undeniably full of combustibles such as ammunition, paraffin and petrol, this cannot be wholly dismissed as a possibility. Alan Hamilton, Martin Fletcher & Giles Whittell, "Dispute still rages over Waco inferno", The Times, April 20 1995.

⁴³⁷ Taylor, "The Terrorist", pp. 118-119.

⁴³⁸ Raphael Cohen-Almagor, "Vigilant Jewish Fundamentalism: From The JDL To Kach (or 'Shalom Jews, Shalom Dogs')", Terrorism & Political Violence, Volume 4, Number 1, (Spring 1992), pp. 51-52.

⁴³⁹ For example, Benazir Bhutto claims that Ramzi Yousef, mastermind of the WTC bombing, targeted her in 1993 because she was a moderate Muslim leader who was friendly to the West. However, the accuracy of her accusation is perhaps questionable, certainly Pakistani police found little proof of such a plot. John-Thor Dahlberg, "Bhutto Says Trade Center Suspect Also Targeted Her", Los Angeles Times, March 19, 1995.

"secularism is as much a threat as Hinduism, and like fundamentalist movements in many other parts of the world, Sikh traditionalists have seen the secular government as the perpetrator of a dangerous anti-religious ideology that threatens the existence of such traditional religious communities as their own."⁴⁴⁰ External enemies are of secondary importance to internal ones, and violence can easily become fratricidal; hence the need in Girard's view for external sacrifices.⁴⁴¹ The Shiite case provides evidence for this: when in the late 1980s it became clear that self-sacrifices were not achieving their military objectives, they were banned by Islamic clerics because they had lost their value as acts of war and become merely wasteful of life. In January 1989, several hundred Hizbollah fighters entered villages in southern Lebanon and slaughtered the followers of the rival Amal movement in their sleep. The two groups were contesting the ground that the Israelis left as they withdrew from southern Lebanon, and the conflict between the Shiite organisations threatened to destroy the community. Clerics appealed for an end to violence and banned the killing of a Muslim by a Muslim, but it had little effect: passions were deep-running and the self-sacrificing operations had suggested that one Muslim might legitimately kill another in the name of Islam. Girard argues that "the eroding of the sacrificial system seems to result in the emergence of reciprocal violence. Neighbours who have previously discharged their mutual aggressions on a third party, joining together in the sacrifice of an 'outside' victim, now turn to sacrificing one another."⁴⁴² Another aspect of the same phenomenon is the way that individuals seeking to exit the organisation are treated. Some of the reasons for this are those that apply to secular terrorist groups: exit offers an increased risk of discovery and persecution by the enemies of the cause. As an additional factor though, as well as rejecting the group, the exiting individual may also be perceived to be rejecting the beliefs of the organisation. Effectively, they become apostates of the worst kind. An extreme example is that of the Aum Shinrikyo cult which kept its ordinary members subdued through a poor diet, drugs, little sleep and other various bizarre methods such as the "Perfect Salvation Initiation (PSI)", an electrified skull cap that administered shocks to the

⁴⁴⁰ Juergensmeyer, "The Logic...", p. 173.

⁴⁴¹ Emmanuel Sivan, "The Mythologies Of Religious Radicalism: Judaism & Islam" in M. Juergensmeyer (ed.), "Violence & The Sacred...", p. 84.

⁴⁴² Kramer, "Sacrifice...", pp. 43-45.

member to harmonise their thought waves with that of cult leader Shoko Asahara.⁴⁴³ The cult became increasingly violent in dealing with dissent, attempts to leave or members who became excessively weak or mentally unbalanced by their experience within Aum. They were murdered, or made to "disappear."⁴⁴⁴ There are similarities in the example of the Branch Davidians at Waco: there, ordinary members were controlled by rationing their food; newcomers were gradually relieved of their assets; all male members of the cult had to be celibate except Koresh who could take as many wives as he wanted. He claimed to be the Lamb of God, that he alone could understand the Scriptures, his interpretations of which varied. There is no doubt, though, that his knowledge of them was formidable. Increasingly, he became fixated with the Apocalypse, focusing the cult in a shared vision that further severed the links between the group and the outside world in a cycle of paranoia, melodrama and shared catastrophe.⁴⁴⁵ He kept the cult in constant fear. "He developed a crisis mentality, constantly talking about the end of the world, telling [his followers] they always had to be ready for the aggressors who would come from without the walls to destroy them."⁴⁴⁶ In this context, the events of April 19, 1993, may very well have seemed like the beginning of the Last Days to members of the Branch Davidians in the compound, and may explain why so few attempted to leave during the siege, or even escape as it burned.

Although the primary concern might be religious purity within a religion, this does not preclude an outward focus too. The reason may reflect a Girardian desire to shift violent conflict onto an external body; but it is more likely that it stems from a belief that it is necessary to attack the cause of godlessness, corrupting parts of the religion, at its root. Certainly, such an attitude would seem to be supported by statements such as that contained in the letter given to the hostage, John McCarthy, on his release, to pass on to the UN Secretary General:

This is a message for mankind, that they may thereby be warned, that they may know that there is but one God, and that men of understanding may ponder it.

⁴⁴³ Kaplan & Marshall, *The Cult...* pp. 32-33 and 62.

⁴⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 35-37 and 114.

⁴⁴⁵ Richard Lacayo, "In The Grip Of A Psychopath", *Time*, May 3 1993, pp. 34-35.

⁴⁴⁶ Barbara Kantowitz, Andrew Murr, Peter Annin, Ginny Carroll and Tony Clifton, "The Messiah of Waco", *Newsweek*, March 15 1993, p. 56.

The United Nations... has become a plaything in the hands of the Superpowers, particularly America, the Great Satan, since your organisation has become merely a cover to protect the interests of world imperialism, and suppress the movement of the oppressed peoples yearning for the achievement of their independence...

We appeal to you... and to the world as a whole, to adopt Islam as an ideology, a code of law, and a system and to follow the teachings of the great Imam Khomeini...

The uprising of people seeking to achieve self-determination, recover their stolen freedom and independence, sever their links of dependence on the imperious states and ensure that the principles of justice are put into practice, is not terrorism: it is a legitimate right. If the slogan of the need to combat international terrorism is an attempt to divert us from our course of *jihad* in the face of international arrogance, we will continue along the difficult path that we have chosen for ourselves, without giving an inch.⁴⁴⁷

The language of this statement is significant since it demonises Islam's western enemies and therefore increases the perceived legitimacy of attacking them and thus the ease of doing so. Ramzi Yousef justified attacks on the US because of Western support of Israel against the Palestinians and Lebanese and because it was of the "'utmost importance' for the world to know that Muslims would never agree to give up Jerusalem."⁴⁴⁸ As with secular terrorism, religious terrorists need to use instruments of guilt avoidance: reducing the opponent to an abstraction; transposing blame onto the victims and the enemy; and self-justification and restatement of the validity of the cause. Religious violence offers its perpetrator a greater opportunity for vengeance on their enemy than they would otherwise have. As with all terrorism, it gives them an influence and impact that is out of proportion to their size or voice in the political process. Furthermore, although it is unlikely that terrorists would resort to such indiscriminate methods against members of their own community, for fear of injuring the just, it is entirely plausible to suggest, particularly in view of the absolutist nature of many religious terrorists' beliefs, that acts of mass destructive terrorism could be used in an attempt to destroy as much of a corrupting infidel as possible.

⁴⁴⁷ Cited in Peter Janke, "Terrorism: Trends & Growth?" RUSI Journal, August 1993, p. 25.

⁴⁴⁸ Washington Post, "World Trade Center Bombing Statement", March 25 1995.

In some cases, violence is given a cleansing, redemptive property by religious groups. Rabbi Meir Kahane argued that the Holocaust was a natural product of anti-Semitism that could occur in any "normal" society and therefore could recur; it left almost irreparable damage in the Israeli nation's collective psyche that could only be redressed by concrete revenge, a physical humiliation of the Gentiles. Peaceful liberation of the Promised Land was insufficient; it required a military force to awe the world, "a fist in the face of the Gentile".⁴⁴⁹ For this reason, Kahane attempted to put his teachings into practice by creating a violent order that made anti-Gentile violence and terror the norm; this was reflected in his involvement with groups such as the JDL and Kach. He argued that "Jewish violence in the defence of Jewish interests is never bad" because it was an extension of *Ahavat Israel* (Jewish love) which requires Jews to care for and help one another regardless of the circumstances involved.⁴⁵⁰ Unlike Fanon, who also espoused violence as a therapeutic recompense for years of oppression and mistreatment,⁴⁵¹ Kahane's theory of violence is almost cosmic, it is an insatiable desire for revenge which goes beyond time and space and becomes metahistorical. An example of this approach is:

The bitter battle some 2500 years ago was between those Jews who sought to create a truly Jewish culture and society as opposed to those who sought to be Greek in form and idea. The latter came to be known as the Hellenists and the real battle of the Maccabees was against them, against the perversion and corruption of the Jewish people into a hideous, Hebrew caricature of foreign, gentilized, culture. That is precisely what the struggle is today in the Jewish state.⁴⁵²

By contrast, Fanon's theory is wholly rooted in a specific situation: the anti-colonial struggle in Africa. Kahane's violence is not political; it stems from the belief that anti-Semitism will continue even after the foundation of the Israeli state. Gentiles will continue to wish to desecrate the name of God through the humiliation and persecution of His people until the arrival of the Messiah and the redemption of the world. This means that Jews should fight Gentiles wherever they are

⁴⁴⁹ Sprinzak, "Violence ...", p. 51.

⁴⁵⁰ *Ibid*, pp. 54-56.

⁴⁵¹ See Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched Of The Earth*, (London: Penguin Books, 1967.)

⁴⁵² Meir Kahane, *Forty Years*, (Miami Beach: Institute of the Jewish Idea, 1983), p. 36.

and since such violence is always legitimate, there is no need to worry about legality or restraints.⁴⁵³

A Comparison Of Religious & Secular Terrorism

There are, however, some clear similarities in motivations between these religiously-motivated terrorists and their secular counterparts: both experience a key event that altered their perspective and willingness to take action (*der sprung*); the need for recognition and praise in their community; the use of role models and imitation of them; and aspects of "survivor guilt", manifested in the need to avenge fallen colleagues or coreligionists. A variant of survivor guilt is provided by several religions' historical traditions, and this may be instrumental in the resort to violence in some cases. Shiite Muslims bear communal guilt for failing to defend one of the founders of their tradition, Husain, when he was killed by the evil Yazid. By identifying subsequent enemies of Shiism as Yazids returned, and then attacking them, Shiites might hope to right an ancient wrong. The denial and betrayal of Christ by early Christians, and the individual responsibility for that which is an aspect of subsequent Christianity has led some Christians to violent anti-Semitism, believing that it was to the Jews that Christ was delivered by such negligence.⁴⁵⁴

Religious terrorists can be seen to be similar to nationalist-separatist terrorists in their use of violence as a means of attacking authority whilst reinforcing their place in their community and therefore it might be possible to argue that religious terrorism is as motivated by the need to establish identity as is secular terrorism. The role of the group in the move to violence is also key in the case of these suicide-terrorists. After selecting those who will embark on such missions, the group takes the suicide to a secret place where they are isolated with their trainers and instructed in the use of the explosive device and on how to react in various possible situations; and at the same time the suicide bomber undergoes a process of indoctrination and purification, climaxing on the day of the action.⁴⁵⁵ Some of the trainees also undergo an initiation to test their nerve: two 17-year olds, captured

⁴⁵³ Sprinzak, "Violence...", pp. 63-66.

⁴⁵⁴ Juergensmeyer, "The Logic...", p. 187.

⁴⁵⁵ Ben-Yishai, "Anatomy of a Suicide"

before they could go on a Hamas suicide mission, told of being taken to a graveyard at night and then buried alive until dawn with just a small breathing hole.⁴⁵⁶ The role of secrecy and mutual trust is vital too, and often arises from personal and family connections: for example, one trio of bombers in March 1996 were two cousins and their neighbour.⁴⁵⁷ Clearly the group plays a central role in directing and focusing the actions of the prospective terrorist towards their violent objective. In some cases, the group may also prey on the weaknesses of potential members. An Australian Federal Police psychologist, asked to profile members of the Aum cult, wrote that there was:

[N]o specific psychological profile that would predict a person's susceptibility for recruitment to the sect, although many sect members would have their personal, emotional, social and intellectual needs satisfied.

The recruitment of members could target people experiencing an existential or personal crisis which would provide an illusion of support, meaning, value or power.⁴⁵⁸

Taylor & Quayle argue that the behaviour of religious fundamentalists has similar qualities to that of "normal" people, differing along a continuum; rather than differing in absolute terms. The fundamentalist's behaviour is closely controlled by a limited set of rules that are tightly interrelated and relatively limited in scope. The rules are obviously different, but psychologically there is relatively little difference between a religious fundamentalist and a "normal" person, constrained by the rules and norms that govern everyday life.⁴⁵⁹ Religious violence also has the same degree of opportunism on both an individual and institutional level that applies to secular political violence. This reflects that in many cases, individuals wait until there is a movement to join, a ground swell, before acting because it is easier, both psychologically and instrumentally, to challenge the existing order as a member of a group than as an individual. Until that exists, even if they are severely discontented, it is certainly safer to

⁴⁵⁶ Sunday Times, "Wedded to Death "

⁴⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁸ US Senate Committee on Government Affairs, Permanent Subcommittee On Investigations, "Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction", 104th Congress, 1st Session, US Congress, 104th Congress 1st Session, October 31 and November 1 1995, p. 656.

⁴⁵⁹ Taylor & Quayle, Terrorist Lives, pp. 219-220.

conform to societal norms and avoid such violence.⁴⁶⁰ It is obvious that terrorism is situationally dependent: as an example, the extreme right in Israel grew greatly in strength after the 1967 Six Day War because it offered fresh hope to territorial maximalists and enabled the principle of an undivided *Eretz Yisrael* to become a central tenet of modern Zionism.⁴⁶¹ For the extreme right, the victories of 1967 were nothing less than the hand of God assisting His people to reclaim another portion of land lost, by the pragmatism of Ben-Gurion and the betrayals of the UN, to the Arabs. Gush Emunim, founded in 1974, was able to exploit the idea of a Greater Israel to make political capital from the 1978 Camp David Accords that seemed to pose a threat to the gains of 1967. However, Gush Emunim and Kach form only a small part of those committed to Greater *Eretz Yisrael*. It also incorporates the radical leaders of the political parties Tehiya, Moledet and Tzomet, as well as elements within Likud, all of whom support the cause for reasons not related to religious fundamentalism.⁴⁶² Organisations such as Gush Emunim can, in such circumstances, be viewed as extremist beneficiaries of a more widespread movement.

Hoffman suggests that religious terror is significantly different from its secular counterpart in a number of key aspects. Whereas, in secular terrorism, violence usually begins as an instrument and may become an end in itself, in religious terrorism, violence is predominantly a sacramental act or divine duty carried out in response to a theological

⁴⁶⁰ In this, identification of the moment for dissent is clearly vital and it is here that the role of leadership is critical. Such leaders obviously cannot be effective if there is no background discontent, although it need not be overt. However, they do have a major effect in moulding and enhancing the effects of existing discontent. To do this, they must ensure that the continuation of the status quo no longer seems inevitable by emphasising the extent of hidden support the dissenting movement has; they must shape people's private preferences by finding flaws in the existing order and making people believe that they would be better off under a new regime; and enhance the benefits of siding with the opposition, both in positive and negative terms, emphasising the costs of not being on the right side when the opposition triumphs. See Timur Kuran, "Sparks & Prairie Fires: A Theory Of Unanticipated Political Violence", *Public Choice*, Volume 61, (1989), pp. 41-74 or "The Element Of Surprise In The Eastern European Revolutions Of 1989", *World Politics*, Volume 44, (1991), pp. 7-48. An adaption of Timur's public preference falsification hypothesis can be found in Martha Crenshaw, "Political Violence In Algeria", *Terrorism & Political Violence*, Volume 6 Number 3, (Autumn 1994), pp. 261-280.

⁴⁶¹ A good, if general, discussion of this development can be found in: Thomas Friedman, *From Beirut To Jerusalem*, (New York: Doubleday, 1989), pp. 251-321.

⁴⁶² Richard D. Hecht, "The Political Cultures of Israel's Radical Right: Commentary on Ehud Sprinzak's 'The Ascendance of Israel's Radical Right'", *Terrorism & Political Violence*, Volume 5 Number 1, (Spring 1993), pp. 135-137.

imperative.⁴⁶³ Rapoport sees this transcendental source of religious terrorism as its most distinguishing feature. It is the deity that has a decisive impact on the determination of means and ends, in contrast to the modern secular-motivated terrorist for whom political ends are the objective and are to be achieved wholly through human efforts.⁴⁶⁴ Fromm notes that religion can have such an influence that it can even impel a parent to injure their child; one Biblical example would be that of Abraham and Isaac. Fromm's point is that the man in such a situation is completely devoted to his religious system and is not cruel, although he may seem so to those outside of that system. Instead, he is operating within the parameters of his system.⁴⁶⁵ This characteristic means that religious-motivated terrorists may be less constrained by the moral, political or practical obstacles that impede other terrorists. Religion is a legitimising force, it can morally justify and even require the sort of indiscriminate or mass destructive violence that most secular terrorists would regard as immoral and counter-productive. This is because the constituencies of the two varieties of terrorism differ so greatly. Secular terrorists attempt to appeal to their actual or potential sympathisers, the people they claim to defend or speak for; in almost all cases, it is assumed that perpetrators only mean to harm their victims incidentally. It is the public that is the primary object of the action.⁴⁶⁶ Religious terrorists, on the other hand, are simultaneously both the perpetrator and the audience; they comprise the constituents themselves. Post believes that in the case of religious terrorists, the intended audience is the deity.⁴⁶⁷ This is important because, whereas usually the symbolic and the audience-oriented aspects of terrorism are separate, in the case of religious-inspired violence, the two are synonymous. The need to gear action to what the terrorist believes the audience considers appropriate is therefore removed as a constraining influence in the case of religious terror. This clearly increases the possibility that religion could be used as a justification for nuclear terrorism. The level of symbolism in much religiously-motivated terrorism is high. In the case of groups such as

463 Hoffman, "Holy Terror'...", p. 272.

464 Rapoport, "Fear & Trembling...", p. 674.

465 Fromm, The Anatomy..., p. 243.

466 Rapoport, "Fear & Trembling...", p. 660.

467 Jerrold M. Post, "Fundamentalism & The Justification Of Terrorist Violence", Terrorism, Volume 11 Number 5, p. 369.

Kach or Gush Emunim, the Land of Israel is key: one of the latter's rabbis wrote in *Nekuda* that "the land is the goal and the state is nothing but the means to achieve this goal".⁴⁶⁸ The symbols of force and power are harnessed to intense symbolic nostalgia for the past, represented by the land. The messianic Jews believe that it is only through the land that redemption will come.⁴⁶⁹ Other examples include striking at the heart of enemy territory, at the root of the perceived evil: an Islamic group attacking the World Trade Center in 1992 is a good case of this. The timing of an attack may also be highly symbolic: for instance, the upsurge in Hamas violence in February 1996 coincided with the second anniversary of the massacre in Hebron.⁴⁷⁰

Furthermore, in some extreme cases, the act of religious terrorism may have no political purpose at all: the aim is purely the satisfaction of religious objectives: the Thugs would be an example of this.⁴⁷¹ This is not to suggest that no religious terrorism has a secular audience: in contrast to the Thugs, the Assassins and the Zealot-Sicariis had a human audience of importance. To some extent, this reflects the difference between terrorist sects based on the Hindu religion, where there is no ground for believing that the world can be changed so the Thugs were convinced their role was simply to maintain the world in balance, and Islam or Judaism where the possibilities for radical attacks are intrinsic to the concept of unfulfilled divine promises. Since the promises are known to every member of the religious community, the Islamic and Jewish terrorist has a human audience not present for their Hindu counterparts.⁴⁷² In some cases, this human audience has an important impact on the tactics or targeting employed, in the same way that it does in the case of secular terrorism: Islamic Jihad, unlike Hamas, does distinguish in its attacks between civilians and soldiers or settlers, trying to avoid victims from the former type. This may reflect that the relatively small group is keen to avoid incurring the condemnation of the Palestinian majority who reject the indiscriminate killing of women and children.⁴⁷³ Even here though, it

⁴⁶⁸ Cited in Hecht, "Israel's Radical Right...", p. 143.

⁴⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 154-157.

⁴⁷⁰ Ranstorp, "Terrorism in the Name...", p. 61.

⁴⁷¹ Rapoport, "Fear & Trembling...", p. 662.

⁴⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 673.

⁴⁷³ Ben-Yishai, "Anatomy..."

remains that the prime object is not the secular audience as it is with non-religious terrorism. However, such considerations do play a role, and would make it much less likely that a group such as Islamic Jihad would resort to the sort of widespread and wholly indiscriminate attack that is necessarily implied in an act of mass destructive terrorism.

There is an absence of conflict for true believers whose actions are reaffirmed by clerical authority as being consistent with the word of God and His mission.⁴⁷⁴ Wieviorka claims that:

[There is] no dissociation between perpetrators of violence, clergy, or their communal constituency. Here we find a powerful band of unity between both religious and secular leaders, violent insurgent groups, and a given popular base.⁴⁷⁵

However, this does not, as Wieviorka suggests,⁴⁷⁶ mean that sociologically speaking, the actor cannot be regarded as a terrorist since it is the action, rather than the extent or nature of support, that is the defining principle.

One key similarity between religious and secular terrorism is that they both operate within the bounds of perceived rationality: the "mad bomber" is no more an aspect of the former than it is of the latter. Instead, as has been demonstrated, they represent a differing value system from that considered conventional. An example would be Yehuda Etzion, ideologist of Kach, who, when asked whether he respected the legitimacy of the government, replied that he recognised its legitimacy as the sovereign, but not the legitimacy of every law it passed, each of which had to be analysed separately to see if it was compatible with the Law of the Torah. When the government disobeys the Law, it disobeys God and brings anarchy. If it did so, it lost any legal or moral right to the obedience of the people who wished to live according to the Law, and who therefore had a duty to oppose such a government by whatever means necessary.⁴⁷⁷ Even where, as in the case of the Thugs, no political objective is discernible, this rationality exists. Rapoport quotes two 19th Century British observers of the Thug cult:

⁴⁷⁴ Post, "Fundamentalism..." p. 370.

⁴⁷⁵ Wieviorka, *The Making...*, p. 264.

⁴⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷⁷ Cited in Cohen-Almagor, "Vigilant..", pp. 54-55.

"Whatever the true source may be, (the system) is beyond all doubt the work of a man of genius, no ordinary man could have fenced and regulated it with so elaborate a code of rules - rules which the Thugs seem to believe are of divine origin, but in each of which we can trace a shrewd practical purpose." "Ridiculous as their superstitions must appear... they serve the most important purposes of cementing the union of the gang, of kindling courage, and confidence; and by an appeal to religious texts deemed infallible of imparting to their atrocities the semblance of divine sanction."⁴⁷⁸

On an individual level, some of the motivations for religious involvement are similar to those that impel activity in secular terrorist organisations. Erikson's hypothesis of the need by some (mostly young) people for identity applies equally in the case of extremist religions and may offer a partial explanation of the recruitment of individuals into such groups.⁴⁷⁹ Individuals may be able to relieve their feelings of fragmented identity by adhering to an idealised self-image and by projecting weaknesses and faults onto scapegoats selected by the group's world view. The amount of relief and belonging that adherents feel on joining a religious group seems to be related to the extent of their societal alienation. They rapidly became dependent on the group for support and psychologically dependent on their enemies who symbolise evil to provide a focus and *raison d'etre* for the adherent's group.⁴⁸⁰ The majority of Aum's members were in their early to mid twenties; some were dropouts from college, others already had jobs. Many of them were amongst the brightest of their generation and came from the best universities in Japan. By 1989, Aum had brilliant, highly qualified chemists, biologists, doctors and computer programmers at their disposal. Many of these recruits were attracted to the cult by the alternative that it offered to Japanese society that seemed to crush individualism; it appealed to those lost and alienated by the system.⁴⁸¹ However, Aum also targeted potential recruits: those who were young, lonely, financially needy, dropouts or otherwise detached from the norms of Japanese society were encouraged to join the cult, and then

⁴⁷⁸ Cited in Rapoport, "Fear & Trembling...", p. 663.

⁴⁷⁹ Dick Anthony & Thomas Robbins, "Religious Totalism, Violence and Exemplary Dualism: Beyond the Extrinsic Model" in M. Barkun (ed.) "Millennialism & Violence", Terrorism & Political Violence, Special Issue, Volume 7 Number 3, (Autumn 1995). pp. 13-18.

⁴⁸⁰ Ibid., pp. 10-50.

⁴⁸¹ Kaplan & Marshall, The Cult..., pp. 26-29.

found it exceptionally difficult to leave.⁴⁸² As with secular terrorists, this has the effect of making individual terrorists far more willing to accept acts of violence that they might otherwise question.

Another significant similarity between religious and secular terrorism is the existence of inter-group rivalries; as in secular terrorism, they have the effect of increasing the frequency and level of violence employed. Amal and Hizbollah, for example, competed with each other for dominance in sponsoring suicide assaults. They sought to outdo the other in demonstrating their capacity for mobilising the necessary forces for the operation. Amal and Hizbollah are fraternal movements: allegiances divided families, villages and neighbourhoods. Balance was crucial to maintaining peace between them and when Hizbollah initiated self-martyring operations, Amal had to follow suit. The military advantages of these became less significant; self-martyrdom was presented as having its own rewards. Therefore, the practical yield of such operations diminished as Hizbollah and Amal sought to outdo the other in the frequency of their operations.⁴⁸³ This is important because it suggests that other inter and intra-group pressures that exist in secular groups might be just as prevalent within terrorist organisations with predominantly religious motives. In his study of the structure of Hizbollah, Ranstorp has shown that such rivalry certainly applies with that group, and therefore it is almost impossible to regard it as an unitary actor. Rather, it is a loose coalition of Lebanese Shiite clerics, all with their own views and followings and all engaged in almost continuous factionalism amongst themselves.⁴⁸⁴ If this is typically the case then it might be that the vital driving forces behind religious terrorism are psychological and organisational, just as they are with secular groups. This may mean that as rival groups seek to outdo each other in exhibiting their piety and fervour, they will resort to ever increasing levels of action, to attract support and new adherents. What could better display commitment to, and a dedication to the pursuit of, the cause than an unsurpassed attack against the enemies of one's religion?

⁴⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 91.

⁴⁸³ Kramer, "Sacrifice...", pp. 40-41. For the causes of the split between Amal and Hizbollah, see: Ranstorp, *Hizb'allah* especially Chapter 2.

⁴⁸⁴ Magnus Ranstorp, "Hizbollah's Command Leadership: Its Structure, Decision-Making and Relationship with Iranian Clergy and Institutions", *Terror & Political Violence*, Volume 6, Number 3, (Autumn 1994), p. 304.

This belief that organisation factors play an important role in religious groups is supported by the example of the Branch Davidians which originated as a break from the Adventist Church in the 1930s, when its founder, Victor Houteff, became obsessed with passages in the Book of Ezekiel in which the faithful are divided from the sinful before Jerusalem fell to the Babylonians. Convinced the Adventist Church was sinful, Houteff established a new congregation at Waco, Texas. The in-fighting was continued in the mid-1980s when David Koresh (then called Vernon Howell) successfully battled for control of the cult with George Roden, the previous leader.⁴⁸⁵ Indeed, many underground terrorist organisations are similar to religious cults in their redemptive nature: dividing the world into those who are damned (them) and those who are to be saved (us); being authoritarian in nature; rejecting society; and offering solidarity and identity for their members. ⁴⁸⁶ A good example of a secular group that contained this element of salvation for its members is LEHI (the Stern Gang). Bell, who based his work on interviews with former members of the group, wrote:

Everyone who came to LEHI entered into a mystical bond. All were dedicated to the destruction of the alien occupier and the creation of a Jewish state - they were a few hundred against an empire... Each had somehow been fired by the example of Stern... LEHI created a haven for those dedicated to the absolutes, those without restraints, for those who could feel in each other the dream at work...[T]hey answered an ecstatic call within themselves to participate in a violent redemption. Not only power and the state would come from the barrel of a gun, but also their own salvation.⁴⁸⁷

In one sense, religious terrorists are quite limited in their objectives: they seek simply the maximum benefit for themselves and their coreligionists; whereas secular terrorists seek the maximum benefit for the greatest number possible. However, the reality of this is that secular terrorists (unless anarchists) tend to regard themselves as part of a system that they operate within and attempt to alter to their advantage; religious terrorists are more inclined to reject the system as a whole and seek to replace it with another, based on theological grounds. This self-perception of themselves as "outsiders" makes it easier for them to contemplate more deadly and extreme forms of political violence

⁴⁸⁵ Richard Layaco, "Cult of Death", *Time*, March 15, 1993, pp. 36-37.

⁴⁸⁶ Crenshaw, "An Organizational...", pp. 481-482.

⁴⁸⁷ Bell, *Terror...*, p. 85.

against a much wider-defined enemy than is the case with secular terrorists.⁴⁸⁸

Messianism & Millennialism

It is worth differentiating at this point between what Post describes as "message-oriented" religions, which believe that the promised future will occur only when all humanity hears their message, and messianic religions which are more prepared to emphasise the role of man in hastening the coming of a prophesied messiah. Messianic belief means that the end of the world is coming because God has promised that it is; and at that time, He will intervene to save only those who deserve to be saved. This is called millenarianism or millennialism. Whereas most religions are prepared to take a passive role in this respect, waiting in expectation, for some of the fundamentalist religions, it is possible to facilitate redemption, "to force the end". An example of the former would be Hinduism, which does have a messianic figure in the universal god, Vishnu, who will reappear at the time of worst distress. However, because this appearance is not predicted until 32,899 CE, and not even Vishnu can break the endless cosmic cycle and bring eternal redemption, the idea of a messiah figure is not significant in Hinduism. Likewise, in orthodox Buddhism, there is little need for a messiah because the emphasis is on the religious transformation of the individual and any change would occur only when a majority of people were inwardly reformed, an event that might not happen for ages to come, if ever.⁴⁸⁹ This is not to deny that Hinduism and, to a lesser extent, Buddhism can and have been used to justify religious violence: for example, Hindu rulers have rights and duties under sacred law, which if breached, justify their subjects in revolting against the ruler.⁴⁹⁰ However, millenarianism does not form a major part of either religion.

By contrast, Jewish Messianism, the belief in the heavenly ordained redemption of the Jewish people and the whole of mankind, is central to Judaism. Yahweh, as experienced by Israel in the Exodus, is a God of

⁴⁸⁸ Hoffman, "Holy Terror'...", p. 273.

⁴⁸⁹ Guenter Lewy, Religion & Revolution. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), pp. 13, 26-27.

⁴⁹⁰ Ibid., pp. 13-14.

action who expresses his power and purpose through historical events. There is a strong belief that God is working out his prime objective through human history and is working for the good of his chosen people. Yahweh is completely distinct from the world and completely supreme, and uses King-Messiah figures (David is the most important of these) as political and spiritual heads, whilst Yahweh remains the redeemer. The "Day of Yahweh" (Amos 5:18) speaks of God executing judgement and on that day the messianic era will become a fact.⁴⁹¹ The traditional concept of it, especially following the failure of the Zealot's rising, involved a passive and apolitical attitude, while Jews awaited the coming of the Messiah.⁴⁹² However, religious Zionism, as expounded by groups such as Gush Emunim, introduced a political element into that tradition by insisting on the religious right and duty of Jews in the post-emancipation period to actively participate in the God-ordained national redemption process, to be achieved by political, economic and other means to resettle Jews in the land of Israel, and regain their national independence.⁴⁹³ Rabbi Kahane developed his theory of "catastrophic Messianism" in his essays "Israel's Eternity and Victory" and "Numbers 23:9" based on the passage of Isaiah "In its time, I will hurry it (the Redemption)" and the Rabbinical interpretation of the passage "If they, the Jews, merit it I will hurry it. If they do not merit it, it will come 'in its time'". He argued that although the redemption was inevitable, Jews had a choice how and when it would occur: if they repented, then it would come quickly and painlessly, otherwise it would be preceded by a period of great troubles and strife.⁴⁹⁴

As with Judaism, Christianity has a rich tradition of divinely-inspired radical movements, dating back to the earliest church. The synoptic Gospels predict the early realisation of the heavenly kingdom, as Christ returned and consummated the messianic vision. Likewise, Paul assured the Thessalonians that the Second Coming was near and that

⁴⁹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 32-36.

⁴⁹² The Book of Lamentations (3:25-27) says the "The Lord is good to those whose hope is in him, to the one who seeks him; it is good to wait quietly for the salvation of the Lord. It is good for a man to bear the yoke while he is young."

⁴⁹³ Eliezer Don-Yehiya, "Jewish Messianism, Religious Zionism And Israeli Politics: The Impact & Origins Of Gush Emunim", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Volume 23, Number 2, (April 1987) pp. 222-223.

⁴⁹⁴ Sprinzak, "Violence...", p. 53.

he and many of them would live to see the day (1 Thessalonians 4:13-17). Just as much of the Old Testament deals with the tribulations of the Jewish nation; so too do the persecutions of the early Christians inspire apocalyptic writing, the best known of which is the Book of Revelation, written to comfort Christians suffering for their faith. It contains multiple references to the impending Second Coming: "The Lord, the God of the spirits of the prophets, sent his angel to show his servants the things that must soon take place."(22:6); "The time is near"(22:10); or "Behold, I am coming soon!"(22:12). Christ will defeat Satan and establish his kingdom on earth for 1000 years. After that will be the Last Judgement and then the new heaven and earth predicted in Isaiah 65:17. Mainstream Christianity also espouses a passive waiting for the coming, of salvation through faith alone. Christians must stand firm and continue to follow the teachings of Christ, until He comes again (2 Thessalonians 2:15). Neither are Christians to resist the established authorities (Romans 13:1-2), but they do have a higher loyalty to the principles of Christianity, so must "obey God rather than men" (Acts 5:29).⁴⁹⁵ None of this calls for a proactive stance, to speed the Coming, but it is a constant theme throughout the New Testament to be ready, to "keep watch, because you do not know the day or the hour" (Matthew 25:13).

Islamic millenarian movements are predominantly associated with Shia Muslims who believe that eventually a Mahdi (Messiah or Rightly Guided One) will emerge to lead a cleansing holy war against the Islamic orthodox establishment. This jihad (armed revolutionary struggle) is essential in Mahdist theory as the method to achieve a perfected social order.⁴⁹⁶ One method of doing this is to remove or eliminate those who interfere with the propagation of the Truth.⁴⁹⁷ There is no mention of a Mahdi in either the Koran or in the collections of the Prophet's teachings. Lewy suggests this may be because in orthodox Islam, the faithful are saved by their membership of the Islamic community. The first Mahdi was Mohammed, the son of Ali (the Prophet Mohammed's son-in-law). This Mohammed was the first of a line of infallible leaders or Imams. The twelfth of these is

⁴⁹⁵ Lewy, *Religion...* pp.38-41.

⁴⁹⁶ Rapoport, "Fear & Trembling...", p. 665.

⁴⁹⁷ Post, "Fundamentalism...", p. 370.

expected to return to earth, from heaven, as the Mahdi, to establish an era of righteousness. Eventually, messianic traditions established themselves in the beliefs of many Sunni Muslims too, and the role of the Mahdi developed from merely a just and righteous sovereign into a redeemer of the faithful.⁴⁹⁸

Not all messianic beliefs result in terrorism.⁴⁹⁹ They are not essentially or inherently violent; most of their adherents must be pushed before resorting to such extremes of action. However, such beliefs do create a background conducive to violence by polarising society and thereby exacerbating existing tensions.⁵⁰⁰ Messianism appeals because although many established religions preach that the timing of the Messiah's coming is preordained, they also encourage the belief that the righteous and the wicked have different fates. Logically then, an individual's actions do count, and this makes it impossible for some who believe that the Coming is imminent to wait passively, because the risks of being mistaken are so momentous. At the least, they must work to ensure their own salvation; action is imperative.⁵⁰¹ There is also a need to "prove" faith to God through acts that display moral worthiness. An example of this was in the 1st Century when the Zealots burned their own food supplies after Jerusalem was taken, to indicate that they had placed all their faith in God and that that faith was unshakeable. They believed that He was bound to act since He had promised to rescue the righteous remnant. In effect, it was an attempt to blackmail God into action, and was perceived as such by most rabbis.⁵⁰² However, it is possible to prove faith with God by inaction too: Jesus' disciples were explicitly told not to take up arms, but to await the justice of God.⁵⁰³ Rapoport suggests that Messianic followers, believing that the time was near, tend to resort to one of two methods for "seeing the process in": pacifism or violence. The two responses are not as diametrically opposed as might at first seem to be the case since both reflect a rejection of conventional actions. Which is chosen at any

⁴⁹⁸ Lewy, *Religion...*, pp. 51-52.

⁴⁹⁹ David C. Rapoport, "Why Does Religious Messianism Produce Terror?" in Wilkinson & Stewart (eds), *Contemporary Research On Terrorism*

⁵⁰⁰ Jean E. Rosenfeld, "Pai Marire: Peace and Violence in a New Zealand Millenarian Tradition" in Barkun (ed.), *Millennialism...* p. 86.

⁵⁰¹ Rapoport, "Why Does Religious...", pp. 77-78.

⁵⁰² *Ibid.*, p. 81.

⁵⁰³ Rosenfeld, "Pai Marire...", pp. 96-97.

given point is, to some extent, a matter of timing. The major revealed religions all contain doctrinal images of both "the suffering servant" and "the avenging angel", the latter usually being reserved for the final days and the former appropriate only while waiting for the messianic activity to begin. Therefore, a choice between the two is dependant on the stage that the group believes the messianic process is at; and it is possible for such organisations to move between the two, based on the belief that they were formerly mistaken about the stage.⁵⁰⁴ Kaplan points out that this is an aspect of millenarian groups within White Supremacist movements in the United States. By the 1980s, they were bitterly split on the violence issue, due to differing interpretations of inerrant texts.⁵⁰⁵ Overall, they tend towards a quietist position, withdrawing to the greatest possible degree from a society that is inherently contaminating. Occasionally, they appear as activists or even as violent centres of revolutionary activism, before retiring back into withdrawal.⁵⁰⁶ Rosenfeld suggests that millenarian movements may still incite violence by withdrawing, if they proclaim allegiance to a higher law, effectively rejecting society and declaring their own theocracy.⁵⁰⁷

Both Islam and Judaism contain examples of pacifist and violent groups. Members of Gush Emunim believe that it is possible to shape the messianic process and are zealous in promoting the messianic convictions of the order, to the extent of organising the "Jewish Underground" and the "Temple Mount Plot", terrorist activities directed against the Palestinians. The Haredi tend towards the other extreme, believing it presumptuous for humans to attempt to alter the messianic process, so they withdraw from a Jewish state they do not recognise, usually only acting to prevent Jews around them from breaching sacred laws. In Islam, the entire Shia community moves at irregular intervals between passive and active phases, the latter usually accompanied by violence. Some Sunni millenarian sects follow a similar pattern.⁵⁰⁸ Most messianic visions associate the destruction of

⁵⁰⁴ Rapoport, "Why Does Religious...", p. 79.

⁵⁰⁵ Jeffrey Kaplan, "The Context Of American Millenarian Revolutionary Theology: The Case Of The 'Identity Christian' Church Of Israel", Terrorism & Political Violence, Volume 5, Number 1, (Spring 1993), p. 56.

⁵⁰⁶ Kaplan, "The Context...", p. 31.

⁵⁰⁷ Rosenfeld, "Pai Marire...", p. 97.

⁵⁰⁸ Rapoport, "Some General...", pp.132-133.

the old order and the birth of the new with a series of cataclysmic disasters: a sign of deliverance is therefore a period of unsurpassed woe. This encourages people to commission and commit atrocities because if the fulfilment of the Promise is dependent on life being as terrible as possible, violence has no limits because it cannot be associated with principles that demand cession or moderation of action. If disasters do not bring forth the Promise, it may be that life is not yet terrible enough, more suffering and violence are required.⁵⁰⁹ However, the failure of messianic activity to occur can also lead to great disappointment amongst the believers, and with it, a search for explanations.⁵¹⁰ A common one is to believe that traitors were responsible, possibly with severe consequences for those who have been seen to have betrayed the cause. There is a tendency to perceive the enemy as wholly evil, always dangerous and thus to be ruthlessly destroyed since there is a belief by the group in the righteousness of themselves and their cause.⁵¹¹ In such circumstances, it is vital to remove these people that are delaying or possibly even threatening redemption. Since their destruction is committed in the pursuit of a higher good, any means to achieve this is likely to be viewed as justified. The overt rationale for many of Aum's actions was also redemptive: Asahara chose the Hindu god of destruction, Shiva, as the chief deity of the cult, but was eclectic, drawing on apocalyptic aspects of Nostradamus and the Book of Revelations too.⁵¹² Aum saw their mission was to save mankind after Armageddon, and seem to have drawn many of their plans for this from the science fiction of Isaac Asimov's Foundation books.⁵¹³ When a vast earthquake struck the city of Kobe on January 17, 1995, it served only to confirm Aum in their beliefs that the end was near.⁵¹⁴ By that time, after their defeats in elections for the Diet of February 1990, Asahara and Aum, feeling rejected and bent on revenge, had already decided that the world as a

⁵⁰⁹ Rapoport, "Why Does Religious...", p. 83.

⁵¹⁰ Houteff's sect, which later became the Branch Davidians, originally predicted the last days of creation would begin on April 22, 1959. When that failed to come to fruition, the group, disappointed, declined to a rump of its former self. Lacayo, "Cult..", p. 36.

⁵¹¹ Rapoport, "Why Does Religious...", pp. 84-85.

⁵¹² Kaplan & Marshall, The Cult..., pp. 14-16.

⁵¹³ Ibid., pp. 29-31.

⁵¹⁴ Ibid., p. 222.

whole was irredeemable, and therefore needed to be destroyed.⁵¹⁵ David Koresh and the Branch Davidians blended apocalyptic theology with secular survivalism, building up vast stockpiles of food and ammunition and constructing a fortified compound from their settlement.⁵¹⁶ Koresh claimed to be the seventh and final angel, destined to be the agent of God who brought about the end of the world.⁵¹⁷ Later, Koresh believed himself to be God: in letters of April 10 and 11, 1993, written to his besiegers, he signed himself "Yahweh Koresh" and wrote "I AM your God and you will bow under my feet" and "You have the chance to learn My Salvation. Do not find yourselves to be fighting against Me".⁵¹⁸ Koresh's apocalyptic vision relied heavily on the Book of Revelation and the Seven Seals described there. The Federal raid and battle on February 28 signalled the opening of the fifth seal, after which the faithful are "told to wait a little longer, until the number of their fellow servants and brothers who were to be killed as they had been was completed" (Revelation 6:11). Koresh interpreted this to mean that after a short while, it would be the turn of the rest of the cult to die, as some had on February 28.⁵¹⁹

As the end of the century approaches, the amount of millennial terrorism is likely to increase, a trend that is already occurring. Messianism is closely associated with "signs": for example, "The Last Days" in the Christian, Jewish and Islamic religions tend to be perceived as consisting predominantly of world catastrophe, of Armageddon, a possibility that has seemed much more real in the last fifty years in a nuclear world than at any time in the past. Another common theme in both Christian and Jewish apocalyptic prophecies is the restoration of a state of Israel, which has again occurred within the last fifty years.⁵²⁰ Finally, the impact of a new millennium is likely to be viewed by some groups as significant and a key date in the coming redemption, possibly a further impetus for action.⁵²¹ Important dates are often a spur to messianic action: in Islam, it is prophesied that a Mahdi will come at the start of a century, according to the Islamic

⁵¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 34 & 46-48.

⁵¹⁶ Lacayo, "Cult...", p. 37.

⁵¹⁷ Kantrowitz, Murr, Annin, Carroll & Clifton, "The Messiah...", p. 57.

⁵¹⁸ Cited as "Last Letters From David" in *Time*, May 3 1993, p. 36.

⁵¹⁹ Nancy Gibbs, *Time*, May 3 1993, pp. 39-40.

⁵²⁰ Rapoport, "Why Does Religious...", pp. 76-77.

⁵²¹ Hoffman, "Holy Terror'...", pp. 281-282.

calendar. The 1979 attack on the Grand Mosque in Mecca corresponded with the first hour of the year 1400 in the Islamic calendar and had clear messianic connotations,⁵²² as did the assassination of the Sadat in the same year and the attack on General Gordon by the Sudanese Mahdi who claimed to be *the* Mahdi a century before.⁵²³ Messianism may mean that, as Aum did, some groups attempt to "hasten the end", to speed Armageddon. The destructive force of nuclear weapons makes them an attractive potential instrument for groups that hold such aims, once they believe that the time has come.

Religion gives a unique character to the violence perpetrated in its name because although religious terrorists are influenced by factors such as politics or nationalism, the justification and purpose of their violence is clearly qualitatively different from its secular equivalents. Religion offers a sanctuary of tradition and certainty, a refuge from an increasingly changing and unpredictable world, but religion itself must be defended against the apostasy and different cultures that are parts of this process. It is in this defence that religious terrorism occurs. The nature of religion, an all-out struggle for order and good against the corrupting forces of evil, means that it inspires total loyalty, commitment and an uncompromising position. Consequently, not only is violence valid in defence of religion, but also it is possible to use the images and language of the religion to reinforce and justify terror against a much broader-defined foe than is the case with secular terrorism. Whereas secular terrorism is, in most cases, instrumental and goal-oriented, religious terrorism is more focused on the divine for inspiration and as a determinant of objectives and therefore is able to justify high levels of violence, unfettered by the need for proportionality or support from an audience within the wider population because the religious terrorist regards themselves to be outsiders in the world system.

This trend appears to be especially prevalent in the case of messianic groups, which form a part of Islam, Judaism and Christianity, in particular. By believing that the role of Man is critical to the timing of

⁵²² The assault was in accordance with a well-known Islamic prophesy and one of the attackers was named by his co-assailants as Mahdi. Rapoport, "Why Does Religious...",p.

⁵²³ Ibid.

the coming messiah, end of the world and salvation, they increase the importance of destroying those elements in the world that threaten the process. Since the individual must prove their faith at a time when the stakes are so high, when their eternal life is directly involved, it is unsurprising that there should be a willingness to resort to whatever means are necessary to achieve the required objective.

While religious factors are central to the pursuit of terrorism perpetrated in the name of religion, it is also the case that individual and organisational aspects have important influences as well, just as they do with secular terrorist groups. On an individual level, they encompass the need to establish identity, to follow the example of others, gain widespread acceptance and commendation, as well as for personal spiritual gain. Religious groups are no less in competition with other religious organisations for adherents and support, than is so for secular groups. While support is not critical to religious terrorist groups for approbation and approval of their actions, it is central in determining their influence within the community and their survival. Continued terrorism not only displays commitment to the cause, but ensures that the group's voice remains heard, vital since the organisation is likely to be certain of the ultimate truth of their interpretation and pursuit of the correct path. It is for this reason that, as with secular groups, there is little toleration for dissent or exiting the organisation, since both are a betrayal not only of the group, but of their faith as well.

It is with the White Supremacist movement in the United States that it is hardest to separate religious and right-wing terrorism, but the two have some similarities. Both are rooted in a defensive reaction to a corrupting threat that endangers traditional-bound values and both offer the heightened opportunity for exacting vengeance on that debasing influence. If Girard's theory is accepted, violence is central to religion as a whole, but it certainly has a redemptive value for some millenarian groups, a role not dissimilar to some right-wing terrorist groups. Violence in that context may be justified as promoting the true way. This is especially likely to occur in the case of millenarian groups that believe they have a role to play in speeding the Last Days, the end of the world and redemption. It is such a group, Aum, that carried out the only major terrorist attack using non-conventional weaponry; and

it is such a group that is still the most likely contender for any further incident. However, those motivated by right-wing beliefs should not be discounted either, as the next section will argue.

Ideological Terrorism

Right-Wing Terrorism

Right-wing terrorism is extremely hard to define because it covers a vast spectrum of groups and actions, from millenarianists in North America that have racist dogmas as part of their religious beliefs, through politically-motivated actions, particularly in states such as Italy, to thuggery perpetrated by youths on ethnic minorities in a multitude of states. It is necessary to attempt to distinguish between the various types of right-wing violence if useful comments are to be made about any of them. The problem arises, though, that such divisions tend to be fairly arbitrary since each group contains different combinations of a few key elements that may vary significantly, even within the same organisation, but which have a major impact in determining what sort of group it is in terms of dynamics, outlook and objectives.

An important division in strictly secular right-wing terrorism is between that perpetrated by the "old right", that is, reactionary terrorism, and the "new right", which is the subject of much of this discussion. The former is mainly perpetrated by those who have lost political power or fear that they are in imminent danger of doing so. It is their quest for power and determination to preserve or restore the status quo that characterises them, rather than their ideology (although this is not to deny the importance of a belief system to such groups). This is "pro-state" violence, of the sort used by the Ulster loyalist paramilitaries: the Ulster Defence Association (UDA), which uses the name of the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF) in attacks, and the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF). "Pro-state" terrorism is illegal violence employed in the defence of the state from its enemies.⁵²⁴ Although in this particular case, the term "right-wing" is probably not a useful one, the loyalist paramilitaries clearly fit the mould of reactionary terrorists. Both organisations, although they had their roots earlier in the century, became active again in the early 1970s, as a response to IRA

⁵²⁴ Steve Bruce, "The Problems of 'Pro-State' Terrorism: Loyalist Paramilitaries in Northern Ireland", in Paul Wilkinson (ed.), Terrorism: British Perspectives, (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Company Limited, 1993), p. 205.

violence. They began as "defensive" organisations against the onslaught of republican attacks on the loyalist community in Northern Ireland. However, from the Spring of 1972, the loyalist paramilitaries began attacks on the Catholic community at large, killing 102 people by the end of the year. Believing all Catholics to be potential rebels, the predominantly Protestant paramilitaries targeted members of the Catholic community, irrespective of whether they were affiliated to Republican movements. This had two effects: firstly, it forced the IRA to choose between its role as defender of the Catholic community, developed during the civil unrest of 1969, and its ostensibly non-sectarian campaign for a free and united Ireland. Secondly, as the attacks continued and escalated and the IRA responded in kind, it became increasingly difficult for the British, in their role of peacekeepers between the communities, to withdraw from Northern Ireland. This withdrawal is something the loyalists, regarding it as a "sell out" to the enemy within (the IRA) and without (the Irish Republic), were determined to prevent.⁵²⁵ Another example of a reactionary group would be the Secret Army Organisation (OAS) in Algeria in the 1960s. They sought to prevent equal rights for Algerians in the late 1950s and then later, when it became clear that the French government would pull out of the country, assumed a secondary campaign aimed at the French government in France. Although 85% of the OAS's victims were Algerian Muslims, the group also attacked police officers who sought to curtail the group's activities and European liberals who seemed overly sympathetic to the cause of an independent Algeria; they even attempted to assassinate French President Charles de Gaulle, who, they believed, had "sold out" French Algeria.⁵²⁶ This targeting is a vital aspect of "pro-state" or reactionary terrorism. Groups that use it rarely regard themselves as enemies of the state they purport to support, but, rather, they are in competition with it. This means that their actions may run contrary to the state's objectives and policies, but also that in some cases, as with the loyalist groups, as the protection the

⁵²⁵ Peter Taylor, States of Terror: Democracy and Political Violence, (London: Penguin/BBC Books, 1993), pp. 285-286. Smith, Fighting For Ireland, pp. 117-118. Taylor & Quayle, Terrorist Lives, pp. 64-66. Arthur Aughey & Colin McIlheney, "The Ulster Defense Association: Paramilitaries And Politics" in Wilkinson, Terrorism: British Perspectives, p. 189.

⁵²⁶ C. J. M. Drake, "The Phenomenon of Conservative Terrorism", Terrorism & Political Violence, Volume 8, Number 3, (Autumn 1996), p. 35.

state is perceived to offer to the organisation's constituency increases, the level of support for the illegal group will decline.⁵²⁷

Vigilante violence is used by groups and individuals who believe that they and their rights are not being adequately defended by the government from incursions by "dangerous" sections of society. Consequently, they choose to protect themselves. They also rarely see themselves in conflict with the established authorities. Rather, they are simply enforcing justice and the law in self-defence. Vigilante violence has been especially prevalent in South America during periods of military rule and in apartheid-era South Africa. Faced by threats that the justice system was unable to control, police and military officers took the law into their own hands. Many of the actions taken in these cases appear to have been with the tacit co-operation of the police and governments involved, and the objective was to free the officers of the constraints of due process.⁵²⁸ To some extent, this is supported by Rubenstein who points out that even if both left and right seek to undermine the established government, rightist terrorists often have allies in the armed forces and security services, as well as amongst ultraconservative businessmen and landowners. They may even have support from secret organisations within the army, and covert aid from wealthy backers of large political parties. Such groups are effectively state terrorists if they represent either an authoritarian regime in power or dissident elements within the ruling class or armed forces. Rubenstein cited such examples as the death squads of El Salvador or Guatemala; or the Greek terrorists of the 1960s. They typically specialised in assassination and violence directed against liberal politicians, labour organisers, Communists, Jews, foreigners, and others that were seen as alien influences or enemies of the state; and their membership was largely drawn from the lower classes while their leaders tended to be of the higher echelons of society.⁵²⁹ However, it would be a mistake to see such right-wing terrorism as limited to Central American groups or the past: it exists as an element in Western terrorism, from the failed putsch of Colonel Tejero in Spain in

⁵²⁷ Bruce, "The Problem...", pp. 204-206.

⁵²⁸ Ehud Sprinzak, "Right-Wing Terrorism in a Comparative Perspective: The Case of Split Delegitimization" in Tore Bjorgo (ed.), Terror from the Extreme Right, (London: Frank Cass & Company Limited, 1995), pp. 26-30.

⁵²⁹ Rubenstein, Alchemists..., pp. 127-128.

February 1981,⁵³⁰ to the activities of groups closely associated with legitimate political parties such as the MSI in Italy, the Front National in France,⁵³¹ and even some of the more extreme elements of the Reform Party in Canada⁵³² and the Republican Party in the United States,⁵³³ although it would be a mistake to see these as exclusively reactionary organisations. Extreme rightists have been characterised, ideologically, by a desire for authoritarian leadership, antipathy towards liberalism, communism and socialism, and by a belief that they alone are the true guardians of the nation's future and identity. The "old right" have tended to be authoritarian, monarchist and reactionary without sharing the Fascist or neo-Nazi ideals of the "new", radical right extremists.⁵³⁴ It is anti-revolutionary or counter-revolutionary in contrast to the "new" right which clearly does contain revolutionary elements.⁵³⁵

Within the armies of the West too, there are clearly extreme right-wing factions, although increasingly, these are of the "new right". The perpetrators of the bombing of the Murrah Building, Oklahoma, Tim McVeigh and Terry Nichols, met in the 4th-36th Infantry Regiment, United States Army,⁵³⁶ and there was a considerable political scandal when, in 1993, it was discovered that Aryan Nations supporters were amongst those serving with the Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia.⁵³⁷ Rubenstein's argument that far-right terrorists are seldom complete outsiders, even in the West, is probably decreasingly the case in North American Supremacist movements, but it does retain an element of the truth when examining European movements and groups, especially when compared to their left-wing counterparts.⁵³⁸

530 Paul Wilkinson, The New Fascists, (London: Pan Books, 1983), pp. 133-137.

531 See Wilkinson, The New Fascists.

532 See Warren Kinsella, Web Of Hate: Inside Canada's Far Right Network, (Toronto: HarperCollins Publishers Limited, 1994), p. 413.

533 Michael Barkun, "Religion, Militias and Oklahoma City: The Mind of Conspiratorialists", Terrorism & Political Violence, Volume 8, Number 1, (Spring 1996), pp. 56, 61-2.

534 Paul Wilkinson, "Violence and Terror and the Extreme Right", Terrorism & Political Violence, Volume 7, Number 4, (Winter 1995), p. 82.

535 Drake, "The Phenomenon...", p. 29.

536 James Dalrymple, "Nightmare USA", The Sunday Times, Magazine, September 3 1995, p. 34.

537 Kinsella, Web.... pp. 393-410.

538 Rubenstein, Alchemists...., p. 129.

Sprinzak argues that one of the key defining aspects of right-wing terror is that it is particularist in contrast to most other forms that are universalist. That is they are fighting private wars against particular groups in the community: ethnic, "illegitimate" religious groups, classes of undesirable people or "inferior races".⁵³⁹ This leads to another key difference between right-wing terrorists and other groups: whereas left-wing and nationalist-separatist organisations are in direct conflict with the government of a state, right-wing groups conflict directly with "antisocial" groups in the community and only indirectly with the government, if they attempt to intervene to protect these groups or fail to be sufficiently sympathetic towards the right-wing group. If the government responds to these cases of private violence by prosecuting the right wingers responsible, then sections of the group will transform the government into the primary enemy and begin acting accordingly.⁵⁴⁰ This leads to what Sprinzak terms "a process of delegitimization" where the terrorist group becomes willing to use violence against the agents of the government. It theoretically consists of three stages: a crisis of confidence, a conflict of legitimacy and a crisis of legitimacy.⁵⁴¹ The crisis of confidence does not involve violence and implies only a conflict with specific rulers or policies rather than a challenge to the political system as a whole. There is no structural delegitimation. In a conflict of legitimacy, the group moves on to questioning the legitimacy of the entire regime, with alternative cultural and ideological systems being offered. Actions may vary between angry protest and low level violence directed against the regime. The movement becomes increasingly radicalised and close-knit and wholly discredits the existing social order. The crisis of legitimacy stems from the first two phases and extends the delegitimation of the system to every individual associated with it, dehumanising them and thereby justifying acts of violence against them. This is followed by systematic terrorism against anything associated with the status quo. The group will become increasingly isolated from mainstream society and will assume many of the characteristics described earlier in the

⁵³⁹ Sprinzak, "Right-Wing...", p. 17.

⁵⁴⁰ Leonard Weinberg, "On Responding to Right-wing Terrorism", Terrorism & Political Violence, Volume 8, Number 1, (Spring 1996), p. 82.

⁵⁴¹ Sprinzak, "Right-Wing...", pp17-18.

discussion of underground groups.⁵⁴² However, the reality of many right-wing groups is one of "split delegitimization" because they are initially unwilling to risk confrontation with the authorities and instead direct most of their actions at the non-ruling group. This implies an uneven radicalisation of the extremists developing against the two different entities. Most particularist groups begin with a conflict of legitimacy because, as a result of usually long-held beliefs, the object of their antipathy is regarded as illegitimate in the first place. They do not belong in the same society and should not be accorded the same status as the extremists. This is an important difference from other secular forms of terrorism, since, whereas others assume non-violence to be the norm, and that the resort to violence is a temporary but necessary aberration, for particularist terrorists, violence is directed against certain sections of the community that are inferior and do not belong anyway, and who can be therefore treated accordingly. It is a control mechanism, so is reasonable and natural, and certainly does not require a justification. Using such logic, it is not inconceivable to suggest that an attack, even one that used non-conventional means, that destroyed a large part of that "illegitimate" section of society could also be defended as valid if it removed that unwanted and unnecessary part of the community.

The psychodynamics of right-wing terrorism are significantly different from those of the left-wing. For the former, violence is a societal norm, it does not require a psycho-political transformation to inflict it. Some right-wing ideologies, notably Fascism, positively glorify the use of violence and regard it as an essential aspect of government.⁵⁴³ Traditionally though, even Fascist and neo-Nazi organisations have exercised "split delegitimization", avoiding conflict with the government and instead concentrating on targeted groups such as Jews or leftists. However, recently this has begun to change and many European and North American rightist organisations have become violently confrontational with governmental authorities that are increasingly seen as Jewish dominated as the mythology of the ZOG has gained currency amongst these groups and consequently created the perception that such governments are irretrievably corrupted.⁵⁴⁴ It

⁵⁴² *Ibid.* pp. 19-20.

⁵⁴³ *Ibid.* pp. 20-23.

⁵⁴⁴ *Ibid.* pp. 23-26.

is in such circumstances that attacks such as the bombing of the Murrah Building, in Oklahoma, have occurred. Given a desire to attack the government and its agents, but a reluctance to inflict harm on other, innocent, members of society, it is plausible to suggest that terrorists might resort to limited non-conventional attacks, as a high profile alternative to major bombings using conventional explosives. Radiological terrorism and some types of biological or chemical terrorism could all be used in this way. However, although NEST, the Nuclear Emergency Search Team, has dealt with numerous hoaxes, many of them directed against governmental facilities, there has yet to be an unequivocated non-conventional assault of this type.

The most startling aspect of the "new right" has been the growth of youth counterculture terrorism and the rise of millenarian terrorism, the latter of which was largely discussed in the previous section. Sprinzak argues that millenarian terrorists rarely resort to violence as a direct result of their views. Instead, it is due either to a violence-prone leader, such as Shoko Asahara, or to having been forced into a corner by society; that is, they are unable to sufficiently seclude themselves from the wider community,⁵⁴⁵ such as might be argued to have been the case with the Branch Davidians. However, in such a case, violence is just as likely to be directed against the millenarians themselves as against the outside world. The youth counterculture, which in this case mainly means Skinheads, does not consist of systematic terrorists and their violence is an extension of their non-political glorification of brutality.⁵⁴⁶ However, in the past decade, Skinheads have taken part in numerous murderous assaults and arson attacks, the most notorious of which was in the German town of Molln on November 23, 1992, in

⁵⁴⁵ Sprinzak, "The Case...", p.33.

⁵⁴⁶ As an example, of the 17 Skinhead caused fatalities in Germany in 1992, six were German homeless men; two were Germans who got in political arguments with a gang; two Germans died for no obvious reason; one was a Romanian asylum seeker, two were immigrants, one of which was killed in a discotheque, possibly over a girl, one was a Vietnamese knifed in a Berlin street; and the last three were the women in Molln. This makes it hard to argue that the Skinheads exclusively targeted foreigners and asylum seekers. As well as these targets, other, non-fatal, objects of violence included the elderly, gays and lesbians, handicapped people, patrons at restaurants, passers-by, motorists, police, several proprietors of liquor stores, opposing fans at soccer games, and political opponents. It seems clear that, for such groups, arbitrary violence was the norm, determined not by political agenda so much as by whim. Peter Merkl, "Radical Right Parties in Europe and Anti-Foreign Violence: A Comparative Essay" in Bjorgo (ed.), *Terror...*, p. 105.

which three Turkish women were killed in a fire-bomb attack. Alcohol seems to play a central part in these attacks: they are particularly prevalent after Skinhead concerts at which there is heavy drinking as well as music extolling violence.⁵⁴⁷ Although not politically organised in their own right, there is increasing evidence that Skinhead groups are being used by other more experienced groups and right-wing extremists as foot soldiers in their campaigns. Neo-fascist and neo-Nazi organisations exploit the social marginality, youth and socio-economic alienation of the Skinheads to recruit them to the cause. For example, most of the Skinhead groups in the USA are affiliated to neo-Nazi organisations or the Aryan Nation, who use them to commit many of their acts of extreme violence because the leaders of these other groups are more aware of the legal and political dangers of such action, and so are willing to let others take the risks. The American Anti-Defamation League currently believes Skinheads to be the most violent of White Supremacist groups. Almost all of this violence has been directed against minority groups: Blacks, Hispanics, Asians, homosexuals and the homeless.⁵⁴⁸ Part of the reason for the recruitment of skinheads by neo-Nazi groups in North America is that while they are extremely active, the neo-Nazis are also highly fratricidal and small in number, and thus are compelled to use outside help.⁵⁴⁹ Merkl suggests strongly that, in the European case, much of Skinhead violence can be attributed to negative identity, and vicious self-hatred; they turn onto groups that they perceive as weaker and even more contemptible than themselves. While they attempt to attract community support by attacking refugee hostels, to make "them" go away, the first reason is the more significant: they are displaced and alienated youths that seek a soft target at which to strike out and on which to displace the blame for their own inadequacies onto.⁵⁵⁰ Skinhead violence can also occur within the group: in August 1987 a California group nailed its former leader to a plank. Violence is not only a norm, it is a requirement and prerequisite of membership. One of the California gang, explaining their action said: "To be a skinhead, none of the other skinheads are

⁵⁴⁷ Sprinzak, "The Case...", p. 36.

⁵⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 36-37.

⁵⁴⁹ Jeffrey Kaplan, "Right-Wing Violence In North America" in Bjorgo (ed.), *Terror...*, p. 56.

⁵⁵⁰ Merkl, "Radical Right...", p. 109-110.

going to respect you unless you go out and mess somebody up, and if you don't, you get messed up."⁵⁵¹

A further problem for right wing groups that emphasise violence so much is that they attract "mentally unstable people, psychopaths, neurotics...whose hearts do not belong to our good cause."⁵⁵² The issue of uncontrollable, fringe members of terrorist organisations is as much a facet of right wing as left wing violence. Some Swedish groups try to deal with this difficulty by allowing membership of their organisation only to those who have already "proved" themselves with their actions. This has the effect of making the group an elite and therefore making membership in it even more desirable to potential recruits since it carries a heightened status.⁵⁵³ However, whereas left-wing and religiously-motivated terrorists appear not to conform to any psychological profile of abnormality, there is some evidence for believing that many right-wingers are exceptional. Psychiatric studies of imprisoned neo-Fascist terrorists in Italy found that many exhibited "free-floating feelings of aggression and hostility". They were disturbed in a way that other types of terrorist rarely are. However, the evidence for this is relatively limited, so the implications to be drawn from it are at best fragmentary.⁵⁵⁴

Membership of the Skinheads, along with religious millenarian sects and very extreme neo-Nazi groups, tends to be a full-time occupation. Their members have a high degree of alienation from society and reject many of its political and economic norms. They have less of a commitment to a bourgeois lifestyle, including property ownership and a regular family life. This is in contrast to most other perpetrators of right-wing violence who are less likely to live underground. Many members of these other groups lead an almost normal life, maintain families and may regard themselves as pillars of the community. Their terrorism is not a full-time exercise. It is a sideline, a means of dealing with socio-political pressures and concerns and of promoting their beliefs.⁵⁵⁵

⁵⁵¹ David Van Biema, "When White Makes Right", *Time*, August 9 1993, p. 39.

⁵⁵² Helene Loow, "Racist Violence and Criminal Behaviour In Sweden: Myths and Realities" in Bjorgo (ed.), *Terror...* p. 123.

⁵⁵³ Loow, "Racist...", p. 122.

⁵⁵⁴ Weinberg, "On Responding...", p. 83.

⁵⁵⁵ Sprinzak, "The Case...", pp. 38-39.

The fact that most right-wing terrorists are not complete outsiders is significant. Ross suggests that membership of right-wing groups is flexible: an individual may simultaneously belong to several different radical groups; and others may periodically adhere to the agenda of the group to which they belong, whilst at other times act independently of these organisations.⁵⁵⁶ Kaplan agrees with this and, like Ross, believes that there are also lone actors who, although rare, occasionally decide to strike a blow for the cause by a random murder. The example he cites is that of the Goldmark family who were killed on Christmas Eve 1985 by a single gunman who mistakenly believed the couple were Jewish.⁵⁵⁷ That right-wingers may belong to several groups or to no groups at all suggests that the close-knit, insular organisation that engenders a feeling of identity, of belonging, is less an aspect of right-wing terrorism than that of the left. Therefore, membership in the group, with its attendant pressures and dynamics may be less significant as a reason why right-wingers become and remain terrorists. This makes sense if one considers that such individuals are closer, situationally, to nationalists than to left-wing terrorists, since, if their beliefs are widespread in their community, they have a ready-made constituency from which to gain support and claim to represent. However, this accounts for only some right-wing terrorism: obviously, there are groups and individuals that do not enjoy such support, real or perceived, and the role of the group in such cases is presumably more important. Salmony and Smoke indicate that the Ku Klux Klan may provide support to its members in a way that has already been discussed in relation to left-wing terrorist organisations.⁵⁵⁸ Individuals who joined the Klan appeared to share a number of traits: aimlessness, personal failure, lack of status, low self-esteem, alienation and poor adaptation to the requirements of reality, which, in combination led them to seek a group that offered support and permitted them to engage in regressive behaviour in some instances. Social groups are used by some adults as a defence against anxiety, because the group is able to organise itself as a defence against the common threat. The Klan

⁵⁵⁶ Jeffrey Ian Ross, "Research Note: Contemporary Radical Right-Wing Violence In Canada: A Quantitative Analysis", *Terrorism & Political Violence*, Volume 4, Number 3, (Autumn 1992), pp. 74-75.

⁵⁵⁷ Kaplan, "The Context...", pp. 38-39.

⁵⁵⁸ Steven E. Salmony & Richard Smoke, "The Appeal & Behaviour Of The Ku Klux Klan In Object Relations Perspective", *Terrorism: An International Journal*, Volume 11, (1988)

is such a group and bolsters the part of society that is positive from a white racist perspective, emphasising a white supremacist social order that evokes the Old South and a supportive bond among the members that excludes the rest of society. It makes its members feel part of a chosen group, an elite; and harks back to an idealised period when society was less threatening, offering a dominant place for "a White male Gentile person, a native-born citizen of the United States", the only section of society that can be a member of the KKK.⁵⁵⁹ In this case, the motivations behind group membership and the progression to violence are similar to that for long-standing terrorist groups of other varieties: the Klan has a tradition of violence, it is a norm of the organisation, so those who elect to join it do so in that knowledge and therefore precisely because it is so. The attraction of the KKK is that it offers to its members a feeling of belonging and of being an elite, as well as the expectation of violence.

There clearly are appreciable differences between left and right wing terrorism. Weinberg and Eubank examined these as they appeared in the leaders and ordinary members of Italian groups. The rightist leaders tended to be older than their left-wing counterparts but the age difference between leaders and followers in groups of the right was more exaggerated than was the case with those on the left. Whereas groups from the left were inclined to have both male and female leaders, the right-wing groups were almost wholly male-dominated at that level of membership, although amongst the followers, women composed about 8% of the numbers.⁵⁶⁰ However, there were not significant geographical, religious, or parental occupational differences between left and right leaders. Weinberg and Eubank found no crossover between the two ideologies amongst the leadership, so clearly early political experience is significant, since they served to accentuate their polarisation. In general, the same kinds of background relevant for leadership roles in non-violent political organisations seem to distinguish leaders from followers in terrorist groups. Occupation was another key difference: both groups had white collar leaders, but while teachers, students, manual workers and a few sub proletarians played

⁵⁵⁹ Salmony & Smoke, "The Appeal...", pp. 249-254.

⁵⁶⁰ While this sexual discrepancy is largely true of extreme right groups, it is not applicable to Skinhead organisations which have had female leaders from the outset. See Van Biema, "When...", p. 40.

prominent roles in the left-wing groups, they were largely lacking in the right-wing organisations, where businessmen, policemen and soldiers were more dominant, although they were represented amongst the followers.⁵⁶¹ Italian right-wing terrorism is not representative of the type in a number of ways though. It is more characteristic of the violence of the "old right". While there has been some violence directed against minorities, most Italian right-wing terrorism has been anti-Communist and has continued for four decades, since shortly after the Second World War.⁵⁶² While Italian right-wing terrorists follow the pattern of split delegitimisation described by Sprinzak in that they unleashed campaigns of mass violence and strategic terrorism and, regarding the parliamentary regime as fatally flawed, sought to replace it with a military-backed one and attacked representatives of the government, such as members of the judiciary; in a number of key aspects they do not conform to Sprinzak's pattern. Italian right-wing terrorism was not particularist. Instead, it was guided by universal neo-Fascist principles. One of the results of holding such views was that, far from the Italian government and state becoming delegitimised, they were always regarded with the utmost contempt by leaders of the Italian groups. Finally, rather than the transition between stages of disenchantment and alienation from the state described by Sprinzak, Italian right-wingers sustained violent activity over the course of four decades. It was not a process of delegitimisation.⁵⁶³

The difference between terrorists from the left and right does apply more widely than the Italian example however. Handler's socio-economic profile of American terrorists of the 1960s and 1970s reiterates many of the same points.⁵⁶⁴ Women, while heavily represented at all levels in left-wing groups, were almost an irrelevance in right-wing groups. The pattern of leadership between terrorist groups appears to have been influenced by their political ideology. Whereas leftist groups seem more liberal, more egalitarian, right-wing groups, are reactionary by definition, pro-family and against

⁵⁶¹ Weinberg & Eubank, "Leaders...", pp. 156-176.

⁵⁶² Leonard Weinberg, "Italian Neo-Fascist Terrorism: A Comparative Perspective" in Bjorgo (ed.), *Terror...*, pp. 221-223.

⁵⁶³ Weinberg, "Italian...", pp. 221-223.

⁵⁶⁴ Jeffrey S. Handler, "Socioeconomic Profile Of An American Terrorist: 1960s & 1970s", *Terrorism: An International Journal*, Volume 13, (1990).

anything that disrupted the pattern of the nuclear family. This view of the limited role for women meant that such groups were not very attractive or welcoming to women. The chasm between leaders and ordinary members was clear in right-wing organisations: the former were mostly educated to college level and many held white-collar jobs; the latter had usually only completed high school and were overwhelmingly blue-collar. This difference may have important implications for the group dynamics of such organisations since it suggests a lack of uniformity between the two that might lead to difficulties in acting concertedly and in policy formulation and implementation. Significantly, though, both sections were invariably Caucasian and nearly always Protestants from the Bible Belt providing some degree of communality.⁵⁶⁵ Only the geographical origin of right-wing terrorists appears to be altering radically in recent years: as militias and other non-specifically White Supremacist movements grow in importance, areas such as the Northwest have risen in prominence alongside the Bible Belt.

In Sweden, in a study of the 165 arrested perpetrators of racist crime between 1990 and 1993, the majority of suspected or convicted perpetrators were between 16 and 20 years old at the time of their crime. Over half (52%) had previous convictions; almost all (98%) came from the town or village where the crime was committed or from the surrounding region. Very few of them can be traced to a nationalist or racist organisation and only slightly over half of them were intoxicated at the time of their crime. It is the last two points that are unusual, the lack of affiliation to a group and the role of drinking.⁵⁶⁶ Otherwise, the Swedish example does seem to correspond to the wider model of the perpetrators of hate violence. The lack of affiliation can perhaps be explained by the fact that some Swedish extreme right groups make potential recruits "prove" themselves, suggesting that those caught committing these acts were in the pre-membership stage. Drinking is a central part of Skinhead violence, but is less so with other extreme right movements whose violence is more instrumental. This suggests that, in the Swedish case, right-wing violence is caused both by Skinhead and by more politically focused

⁵⁶⁵ Handler, "Socioeconomic...", pp. 203-208.

⁵⁶⁶ Loow, "Racist...", pp. 132-133.

organisations. Willems found some similarities in his study of right-wing youth violence in Germany between 1990 and 1993. Over 90% of crimes were committed by groups and especially by those connected with the Skinhead subculture (about 30% of all cases). There were relatively few examples of preplanned, instrumental violence. Instead, it was more likely to be spontaneous, encouraged by large quantities of alcohol. Around 10% of the perpetrators already had convictions for politically-motivated crimes and over 35% for other crimes. However, it is the socio-economic breakdown that is especially interesting: over 95% of xenophobic crimes were committed by men; over 75% by men under 20 years old; and 35% by men under 18 years old. There was some correlation between such violence and lower levels of education, social problems, deficient family structures and lower social class. Once the perpetrators were subdivided into four types, though, considerable differences emerged in their socio-economic profiles. Politically-motivated right-wing extremists were mostly well-educated, had successfully undergone training and held jobs. They generally exhibited an ideologically-validated, disciplined and instrumentally -oriented attitude to violence against specific "ungerman" groups. It was such extremists who directed many of the other youths ideologically and, to some extent, strategically to commit their acts. Xenophobe or ethnocentric youths were more likely to have left school earlier and to have been sociologically disadvantaged than the right-wing extremists. Their motivation was primarily one of feeling threatened by "foreigners" and refugees in particular who competed with them for jobs, housing and financial assistance. Their violence, although directed against specific groups, was more expressive than instrumental. Criminal and marginalised youths tended to be slightly older, to be unsuccessful at their careers and to have more likelihood of criminal records. They tended to be action and violence-oriented. For them, violence was a norm, not a political means, and was directed much more widely than simply against foreigners or refugees. The final type, fellow travellers, were better educated and often came from functional middle-class families. They rarely had prior convictions and were found in both skinhead and fascist groups. Their motivation for participation was group pressure and dynamics, rather than ideology or

xenophobia. Although they did little to prevent violence, they were rarely violent themselves.⁵⁶⁷

The example of Ingo Hasselbach indicates that, on an individual level too, there may be motivational similarities between left and right wing terrorists. Hasselbach, an East German, was one of the leading neo-Nazis in the reunified Germany until his defection in 1993. His father was a leading supporter of the East German state, a communist celebrity, who despised the Nazis. Hasselbach said: "... The state that oppressed us all was the same. It was literally the extension of the will of our parents, whose generation had strived to establish the first German 'anti-Fascist' state...My father's voice *was* the state, and I directed all my rage at it, rather than at him. He barely existed for me."⁵⁶⁸ As it was for RAF members, Hasselbach's terrorism represented a rebellion against parental authority, transposed onto the state. He began by being a fringe member of a hippie commune, but progressed through being a punk and then a skinhead and neo-Nazi, all increasingly extreme means of reacting against the state. Imprisoned for anti-state activities, he was exposed to unrepentant Nazis and it was here that his hatred of anti-Fascism grew:

[In prison] the German anti-Fascist state carried on with the trappings of the German Fascist state... The hypocrisy of it bothered me more than anything: If you're going to worship power, why not admit it? At least the Nazis had been straightforward in their brutality. These people insisted that they were beating you and locking you up for your own edification and for the sake of universal brotherhood... For me, protest became ever more closely associated with the forbidden Nazi past. I'd reached a point where I thought, I've always rejected Communism and the idea of the anti-Fascist state: now I would fight the anti-Fascists by being a Fascist.⁵⁶⁹

A vital point of Hasselbach's decision to be a neo-Nazi was when he encountered West German members who gave him literature "proving" that Auschwitz and other Nazi atrocities had not occurred. He describes the moment:

It was a revelation beyond words. No gas chambers! No mass murder of the Jews! It had all been Communist lies, like so

⁵⁶⁷ Helmut Willems, "Development, Patterns and Causes of Violence Against Foreigners in Germany: Social and Biographical Characteristics of Perpetrators and the Process of Escalation" in Bjorgo (ed.), *Terror...*, pp. 168-173.

⁵⁶⁸ Ingo Hasselbach with Tom Reiss, "How Nazis Are Made", *New Yorker Magazine*, January 8 1996, p. 39.

⁵⁶⁹ *Ibid*, pp. 40-41.

much else... And in this moment of relief and joy for me and other new recruits I think we passed from being simply rebels against the GDR to being true neo-Nazis. Even as citizens of the GDR, we'd grown up with German Guilt. Now this guilt was lifted.⁵⁷⁰

This seems to suggest that *der sprung* is as applicable to far-right terrorist groups as to other organisations. Loow cites a Swedish member of the extreme right who had a similar moment of revelation when he went to hear a former Nazi speak: "At first I thought the Nazis were just shit, I hated Germans, everything German, but I was interested in the Second World War... I and my friends went to a meeting where an old nationalist socialist spoke. He spoke about democracy, the hypocrisy, the double standard, the lies, it was like something fell from my eyes. I woke up."⁵⁷¹ This is also significant because it shows the importance of the older generation of right wingers in motivating and politicising some of the modern activists.

Like other terrorists, Hasselbach developed the ability to distance himself from everything except his group:

... I never thought about the safety or well-being of the people in the house [that was being attacked]. They didn't exist for me. Only my friends and I existed. And the Cause, the Party. The foreigners were far away from me somehow, even though I was acting as though they were so much in my way and pasting things on the walls of their house.⁵⁷²

It is common for activists to live together, and for the group to become a surrogate family for them. Even those with families of their own tend to steadily break their ties with the outside world as they become more and more centred on the group. Loyalty towards the group is of central importance for members. They are bound not only to the immediate cell, but also to the wider community of the extreme right who are regarded as brothers-in-arms.⁵⁷³

Hasselbach's Movement was also decentralised to enable its members to deny responsibility for violent actions and ease the process of justifying membership of the group. He states:

⁵⁷⁰ Ingo Hasselbach, "Fantasy Fuhrer", *The Guardian*, Weekend, February 10, 1996, p. 14.

⁵⁷¹ Loow, "Racist...", p. 126.

⁵⁷² Hasselbach with Reiss, "How...", p. 48.

⁵⁷³ Loow, "Racist...", p. 128.

This deniability helps keep its members both morally and legally in the clear. Though I trained young people to hate, I could still express shock that any of them would go out and actually commit murder. Our racist propaganda always put hate in a positive light - it expressed racism as racial pride - and removed from the reader any responsibility for its bloody consequences. All responsibility rested with the victim, who was biologically inferior and brought trouble on himself by mixing with the master race, or so the thinking went.⁵⁷⁴

The legitimacy of a target was also important. Hasselbach says that he never enjoyed attacking foreigners; they were a problem that had to be solved politically. The only violence he considered legitimate was that directed against the Anarchist Anti-Fascists who attacked the neo-Nazis with equal fervour.⁵⁷⁵ When three Turks were killed in a firebombing in Molln in November 1992, he felt that a certain boundary had been overstepped and that the act was reprehensible, cowardly and deadly.⁵⁷⁶ However, by this point, he was seeking to exit the group: he had begun to doubt whether the Cause was worth risking his life for.⁵⁷⁷ The attack in Molln sickened him and made him question the group's tactics, especially since anti-immigrant feeling was so widespread amongst the German population as a whole that Hasselbach believed violence was now redundant.⁵⁷⁸ He quit publicly in March 1993, burning a picture of Hitler on national television. This was perceived as the ultimate betrayal and Hasselbach was targeted by his former comrades who sought to kill him and his relatives.⁵⁷⁹ For his part, Hasselbach has become hyper-critical of his former colleagues and has spent much of his time campaigning against them, a characteristic that is similar to other terrorists that succeed in exiting from their group.

Right-wing groups, like those engaged in other forms of terrorism, have contacts with similar, like-minded organisations, and learn from their experiences. Combat 18, a British neo-Nazi group, has clear links with groups in Denmark, Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Austria and eastern Europe. From these connections, Combat 18 had little

⁵⁷⁴ Hasselbach with Reiss, "How...", p. 36.

⁵⁷⁵ Hasselbach, "Fantasy...", p. 15.

⁵⁷⁶ Hasselbach with Reiss, "How...", p. 53.

⁵⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

⁵⁷⁸ Hasselbach, "Fantasy...", pp. 18-19.

⁵⁷⁹ Hasselbach with Reiss, "How...", pp. 54-56.

difficulty in acquiring the technical expertise to build letter bombs. Previously limited to arson, Combat 18's links enabled it to escalate their level of violence and plan to post explosive devices in video cassettes from Sweden to targets in London.⁵⁸⁰ Likewise, the German neo-Nazis feel an affinity and commonalty with right-wingers in the United States, based on a hatred of government, a belief that their freedoms as white men were being infringed on by a multi-cultural society, and a general anti-Semitism. Hasselbach states that virtually all of his group's literature came from extremist organisations in the United States, where it is easier to publish such material. The neo-Nazis did a lot of weapons training, and read a great deal on terrorist tactics and on how to destroy bridges, cars, and train tracks. This was based on handbooks such as "A Movement in Arms" that was sent to the group from Nebraska via the Internet.⁵⁸¹ Hasselbach says the international neo-Nazis movement was highly dependent on Gary Rex Lauck in Lincoln, Nebraska, who was the publisher and distributor of most of their propaganda. His "was also the center of a worldwide umbrella organization, with which practically every serious neo-Nazi had contact."⁵⁸²

European radical rightists are rarely admirers of American society as a whole since it is seen as a warning for the future of their own countries. They particularly despise the ethnic and racial diversity of the United States, with all its attendant problems. This is an attitude that is shared by many on the American right. As the social and economic impact of migration to European states continues, right-wingers there see a society reminiscent of the American one developing. The result is the feelings of hatred and being dispossessed by immigrants that are indicative of much of European extreme right action. The link with American extremists is further cemented by the fact of the extraordinary views that they hold in common and which bind them to each other: of Holocaust revisionism, Identity theology

⁵⁸⁰ Stewart Tendler & Roger Boyes, "Letter bombs turn British neo-Nazis into terrorists", *The Times*, January 20, 1997; Adrian Lee & Craig Lord, "Top sports stars are targeted by letter bombers", *The Times*, January 20, 1997.

⁵⁸¹ Hasselbach with Reiss, "How...", pp. 37 & 51.

⁵⁸² *Ibid*, p. 47.

and Odinism.⁵⁸³ This heightens the perception within the group that there is also some wider community of right-wingers, an example of which is that they share a common martyrology.

Although the American White Supremacist movement is extremely diverse, there are a number of common factors to all of them: a myth of a lost and bygone world of innocence and purity; a culture that has been stolen by influxes of immigrants into the United States; an ideology based on scriptural texts; a Manichaeic world view; a conspiratorial view of history; the view of themselves as a persecuted elite; and a millenarian view centred on an imminent apocalypse.⁵⁸⁴ The Christian Identity Church, part of the United States White Supremacist movement, is premillennialist (they believe that Jesus will return before the thousand year period of total bliss on earth begins); but they do not believe that the Chosen will be spared the seven-year Tribulation period of war, turmoil and suffering. This means that adherents are encouraged to act decisively to ensure their place amongst God's elect, and to survive the Tribulation period.⁵⁸⁵ They see the existing order as irremediably evil and destined for destruction, and attribute the fulfilment of the millenarian to divine forces; yet they do occasionally resort to violence, believing that their actions do have some bearing on events.⁵⁸⁶ They seek the violent overthrow of the government and believe it is possible, basing their campaign on that laid out in "The Turner Diaries", an apocalyptic novel written under a pseudonym by William Pierce, leader of the National Alliance. White Supremacists believe that there has to be a battle, a day of reckoning, between the children of darkness (Jews) and those of light (the Aryan race), not only to usher in the millennium of saintly rule, but also to ensure that the usurping Jews are thrown out as the chosen people return to their roots and their "special destiny". Since the government of the United States is currently in the hands of the "Zionist Occupation Government" (ZOG), the country has been corrupted beyond reform; the political process is therefore a closed avenue and bringing down "ZOG" as quickly as possible is the only

583 Weinberg, "On Responding...", pp. 85-88.

584 Kaplan, "The Context...", pp. 42-43.

585 *Ibid.*, p. 57.

586 Michael Barkun, "Millenarian Aspects Of 'White Supremacist' Movements", *Terrorism & Political Violence*, Volume 1, Number 4, (October 1989), p. 412.

solution, enabling an Aryan state to be declared prior to the Tribulation.⁵⁸⁷ Pierce himself sees no possibility for dealing with the deficiencies of government other than a strategically planned insurrection, since the government is so completely corrupt. However, he has consistently urged caution against premature action before the National Alliance was ready. Consequently, although he certainly did not condemn it, Pierce was quick to dissociate himself from the Oklahoma Bombing of April 19, 1995 because, he argued, the bomber's action was random and ineffective.⁵⁸⁸

The role of martyrdom is of importance to many right-wing groups, and has assumed a central role in the mythology of some, notably those American organisations that emphasise events such as the Weaver siege in August 1993. Randy Weaver, a Christian Identity member, failed to appear at his trial for selling a saw-off shotgun, and fled to a cabin in the Idaho hills, where federal agents kept him and his family under surveillance for 20 months. It ended abruptly when the Weaver dog was killed, attacking a federal agent. This precipitated a gunfight in which Federal Marshall William Degan and Weaver's 14 year old son, Samuel, were killed. The siege then went on another 11 days, until Weaver's wife, Vicki, was also killed, as she sat at the kitchen table holding their 10 month old baby. At the subsequent trial, the jury, conscious of the recent apocalyptic end to the Waco siege, in which 85 people died, and persuaded by Weaver's lawyer that the government could do this to anyone, acquitted Weaver and his co-defendant of all charges, including the original firearms offence.⁵⁸⁹ It is events such as this that suggest that Sprinzak's theory of split delegitimization may not be wholly accurate with regard to some of the North American groups since many have come to believe that the government and the "other" are inextricably linked. Therefore to strike at one is to strike at both. Increasingly, it is the government that is seen as the main threat and it is the government that is targeted.⁵⁹⁰ Wayne LaPierre (CEO of the National Rifle Association) indicated this feeling of government as the enemy in arguing that:

⁵⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 425-30.

⁵⁸⁸ Brad Whitsel, "Aryan Visions for the Future in the West Virginia Mountains", *Terrorism & Political Violence*, Volume 7, Number 4, (Winter 1995), pp. 132-133.

⁵⁸⁹ Kaplan, "Right Wing...", pp. 66-67.

⁵⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 80-81.

If owning multiple firearms is of itself sufficient reason to justify the conduct and actions of BATF [the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms] and the FBI at Randy Weaver's home and at Waco - and the Randy Weaver and Waco cases are just the beginning - we are clearly on the road to government oppression.⁵⁹¹

Equally, Tim McVeigh's decision to attack a government building was apparently sparked by the Waco siege, exactly two years before the bombing at Oklahoma. McVeigh followed the televised live coverage of the siege, ranting and crying at the result and the actions of the government. He later made a pilgrimage to the site, returning with burnt wood from the compound.⁵⁹²

Closely connected with right wing terrorism in the United States in recent years has been the growth of the militia movement, of which there are between 40 and 100 in the country at the moment, with a membership of around 50,000.⁵⁹³ They trace themselves back to the citizen's militias of the American Revolutionary War, and have direct ancestry from the Minuteman movement in the 1950s and the Posse Comitatus of the 1970s. They reject all forms of government above the local level and deny the legitimacy of the means, such as taxes and the judiciary, that state and federal authorities use to reinforce their role. However, militias are more than simply anti-government movements. They embrace a wide variety of beliefs, connected to a religious veneer and racial intolerance. They combine a traditional right-wing fear of an elitist cabal with a millenarian view of history.⁵⁹⁴ They tend to be strongly anti-communist, believe in the Protestant work ethic and distributive justice, and be based in rural areas. Interestingly, although part of a national network, there is some evidence that, as groups have felt increasingly alienated from the government, some have moved towards a more secure cellular model

⁵⁹¹ Wayne LaPierre, Guns, Crime and Freedom, (New York: HarperPerennial, 1995), p. 200.

⁵⁹² Dalrymple, "Nightmare...", p. 39.

⁵⁹³ Bruce Hoffman, "American Right-Wing Extremism", Jane's Intelligence Review, Volume 7, Number 7, (July 1995), pp. 329-330. Although the Klanwatch Project at the Southern Poverty Law Center puts the figure at 272 militia groups in 48 states, at least 66 of which have links to the White Supremacist Movement. Brian Levin, Testimony to US House of Representatives Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee On Crime, "The Nature & Threat of Violent Anti-Government Groups In America", 104th Congress, 1st Session, November 2, 1995, p. 64.

⁵⁹⁴ Barkun, "Religion...", p. 50.

of organisation.⁵⁹⁵ They are obsessed with achieving religious and racial purity in the United States and with overthrowing the all-pervasive Jewish-controlled government (ZOG). Believing that the final victory of this cabal is imminent, they call for immediate action in the ultimate battle between good and evil.⁵⁹⁶ They are convinced that there is a world-wide conspiracy to create a New World Order, using the UN and other international forces, which will ultimately lead to the subjugation of the American people. Such conspiracy theorists have no difficulty pointing to suspicious government activities and agencies, such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) that are acting to bring this disaster to reality⁵⁹⁷ and to other agencies that are committed to eradicating anti-government violence and therefore have increasingly focused on the activities of such organisations.⁵⁹⁸ The connecting theme of many of these groups is the Christian Identity movement, a white supremacist religious ideology. The beliefs within the movement are diverse, depending to a large degree on which of the pastors within the movement is followed, but they almost all include that Christ was an Aryan rather than a Jew, as were the Lost Tribes of Israel; that the USA is the Promised Land; and that Anglo-Saxons are God's Chosen People. In the Last Days, the Chosen will fight against their foes until racial victory and the Kingdom of God is won.⁵⁹⁹

At the centre of the Christian Identity movement is the Aryan Nations, an anti-Semitic, neo-Nazi group founded in 1974 by Richard Butler. The organisation forms a liaison between like-minded groups and helps co-ordinate their efforts. There is little doubt that the militias and their connected organisations have an intimate link with much of the domestic terrorism occurring in the United States today, including the bombing of the Murrah Building in Oklahoma on April 19, 1995, in

⁵⁹⁵ Brent Smith, Testimony to US House of Representatives Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee On Crime. "The Nature & Threat of Violent Anti-Government Groups In America", 104th Congress, 1st Session, November 2, 1995, p. 21.

⁵⁹⁶ Barkun, "Religion...", p. 52.

⁵⁹⁷ Martin Durham, "Preparing for Armageddon: Citizen Militias, the Patriot Movement and the Oklahoma City Bombing", Terrorism & Political Violence, Volume 8, Number 1, (Spring 1996), p. 70.

⁵⁹⁸ Smith, Testimony... , p. 21.

⁵⁹⁹ Durham, "Preparing...", p. 67.

which 168 people died.⁶⁰⁰ These groups, like others that are inspired by religious extremism, seem unconstrained by the norms of proportionality, instrumentality and societal acceptability that govern the action of most other terrorists. It is for this reason that their potential for acts of mass destruction terrorism cannot be discounted.⁶⁰¹ However, confusingly, some of the militias clearly are not racist and may therefore simply be Patriot movements, dedicated to the rigorous upholding of the Constitution. The leader of one of the Oklahoma brigades is a Cherokee and the New Hampshire militia supposedly includes blacks, Asians and Latinos. However, these are almost certainly exceptional, and possibly beside the point, given the role militias play in the right-wing movement in America.⁶⁰² Part of the significance of the militias is that they are an important link between other far-right organisations and the wider population. While they are connected to the right-wing information underground, militias also espouse a number of core American values, such as patriotism and constitutional fidelity, that make them more attractive to people within the mainstream and introduce them to other, more radical ideas.⁶⁰³ Even where the militia leader is not a white supremacist, it is impossible to go to a militia meeting, read their literature or join a newsgroup on the Internet without being exposed to white supremacist views.⁶⁰⁴

In the early 1980s, there were a string of right-wing terrorist attacks, such as at Bologna train station or the Munich Oktoberfest, that seemed to herald a new period of highly-violent and relatively indiscriminate incidents, of a variety rarely observed in secular political terrorism until then. However, in subsequent years, these attacks have proved to be exceptional: the 1980s did not see a period of heightened right-wing

⁶⁰⁰ The Michigan Militia Corps, which McVeigh joined and enthusiastically threw himself into, denies any further connection with the Oklahoma bombing. In fact, it does seem that McVeigh was shunned by the Militia's leaders because "his ideas were pretty disturbing...he seemed to be pushing always for some action." Dalrymple, "Nightmare...", p. 37.

⁶⁰¹ Hoffman, "American...", pp. 329-330.

⁶⁰² Durham, "Preparing...", p. 75.

⁶⁰³ Barkun, "Religion...", p. 61

⁶⁰⁴ Kenneth Stern, Testimony to US House of Representatives Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee On Crime, "The Nature & Threat of Violent Anti-Government Groups In America", 104th Congress, 1st Session, November 2, 1995, p. 50.

violence in Europe, and, apart from the attack on the Naples-Milan express train in December 1984, in which 15 people died, there were relatively few indiscriminate bombings. Between 1969 and 1987, there were 359 attacks that caused death or injury in Italy, of which only 7.6% were perpetrated by the right-wing, compared to 74% by left-wing groups and 7% by foreign groups. However, of these attacks, the right-wing ones resulted in 193 deaths, compared to 148 in left wing-attacks. Even if the bombing of the railway station in Bologna in 1980, in which 85 people died, is discounted as abnormal, the right-wing can be seen to be considerably more lethal per attack than their left-wing contemporaries.⁶⁰⁵ With a few exceptions, right-wing terrorism in Europe was not indiscriminate: instead, it was mostly targeted against immigrants, Jews or Arabs in France and Germany and against left-wing targets in Italy.⁶⁰⁶ The targets of such attacks were carefully chosen, but since these targets were often entire sections of the community, the intended victims were merely representatives of that group, rather than individual targets. In that sense, the violence is not so different from sectarian killings, purely on the basis of religion, that have been so much an aspect of terrorism in Northern Ireland, or indeed from any other terrorism that is waged on communal grounds. It is here that it becomes hardest to distinguish far-right violence from that with a religious imperative because, as has been discussed earlier, much religious terrorism has an intensely nationalist element that is also common to extreme right terrorism.⁶⁰⁷

Providing that such an attack could be limited to members of that alien community, so that it is indiscriminate within only that group, a widespread attack, possibly even using mass destructive weaponry, seems initially plausible. However, when applied to purely secular right-wing terrorism, Hoffman's analysis, written in 1989, is still completely relevant:

...Right-wing terrorism is based not on some pathological obsession to kill as many innocent people as possible, but on a deliberate policy of intimidating the general public into acceding to specific demands or pressure. The right-wing terrorists see themselves, if not as a revolutionary vanguard, then as a catalyst of events that will lead to an authoritarian

⁶⁰⁵ Jamieson, *The Heart...*, pp. 20-21.

⁶⁰⁶ Hoffman, "The Contrasting...", pp. 366-367.

⁶⁰⁷ Rubenstein, *Alchemists...*, pp. 131-132.

form of government. Thus, they tailor their violence to appeal to their perceived constituency... and, with the exception of a few indiscriminate bombings, they seek to keep it within the bounds of what the ruling government will tolerate without undertaking massive repressive actions against the terrorists themselves.⁶⁰⁸

For such right-wingers, terrorism is an instrument to further a particular outcome, be it governmental policy or the driving of an ethnic or religious group out of a state. That seems to utterly preclude extreme levels of violence, especially in view of the certain governmental reaction to such an attack. However, in some groups, notably a few Skinhead organisations, violence is a norm, a prerequisite for membership, and assumes an almost therapeutic quality. This violence can be directed, but it probably has relatively little impact on high-level terrorism because such groups seem to relish a type of violence that is intensely personal and low-tech, involving brutal contact with the victim. Much of their violence is committed without the long-term planning or rigorous preparations that would characterise most acts of nuclear terrorism. However, when discussing the effect of the combination of religion and right-wing violence, as occurs amongst white supremacists in North America or in Jewish groups such as Kach, it can be seen that the results are rather different from that of the purely secular European political terrorists. There are several examples of North American right-wingers using or threatening to use non-conventional weaponry. In March 1995, two members of the Minnesota Patriots Council, a militia-type organisation, were convicted of attempting to kill federal officials by mixing ricin with a solvent which would be absorbed through the skin. They rubbed the mixture onto the doorknobs of federal buildings and onto the doorhandles and steering wheels of cars.⁶⁰⁹ The possibility that they might move from chemical to nuclear weaponry is a real one that cannot be discounted.

Left-wing & Anti-nuclear Terrorism

In contrast to right-wing violence, left-wing terrorism is probably the least likely type to cause a high level act of nuclear terrorism. However,

⁶⁰⁸ Hoffman, "The Contrasting...", p. 367.

⁶⁰⁹ Sopko, "The Changing...", p. 9.

it is conversely the variety that has been responsible for most of the low level acts to date. Connected with radicalism, especially since the growth of nuclear power as an alternative to fossil fuels in the 1970s, has been the rise of specifically anti-nuclear groups.

Violence by anti-nuclear groups, in this context, is an example of single-issue terrorism. As such, it has theoretical similarities with other violent single-cause organisations, such as anti-abortion campaigners that bomb clinics, animal rights activists that attack laboratories or radical environmentalists that "spike" trees that are to be logged or vandalise "destructive technology". One common feature of their respective campaigns has been a reluctance to attack people rather than property. Clutterbuck suggests that this is because such tactics are sufficient for their purpose and are the least likely to alienate potential supporters. Consequently, many militant single-issue groups set their bombs and incendiary devices to go off in the middle of the night, and threaten to escalate to peak-time attacks unless their demands are accommodated.⁶¹⁰ One exception to environmental terrorists' preference of targeting property over people was Theodore Kaczynski, the alleged Unabomber. He was arrested in April 1996 following a 17 year bombing campaign directed predominantly against workers involved with technology in the airline industry and in universities. Kaczynski's hatred of technology appears to stemmed, in part, from the combination of political radicalism and environmentalism that he developed whilst at the University of California in the 1960s. However, he is exceptional in two respects: he acted alone, being part of no group or organisation and until the New York Times and Washington Post published his 35,000 word Manifesto, shortly before his arrest, Kaczynski made little effort to publicise either his campaign or his beliefs and demands. Consequently, it is highly doubtful whether he is representative of other terrorists or of other radical environmental groups.

Another tactic, this time fairly generally applicable to such organisations, is a strategy of intimidation directed at those who work in such research facilities. In Britain during the 1980s, the Animal

⁶¹⁰ Clutterbuck, *Terrorism In An Unstable World*, p. 167. Obviously, this is not always the case: ETA killed Ryan, the head engineer of the Lemoniz plant, in January 1981 and Pascaul, the project leader, in April 1982. Wieviorka, *The Making....*, p. 168.

Liberation Front (ALF) pursued such a campaign, spraying paint stripper on workers' cars, and using petrol bombs to start fires. In 1982, they posted letterbombs to four leading politicians, and in 1986 they placed magnetic bombs under the cars of research scientists. Their strategy also encompassed intimidating the public at large, hoping that they would pressure the government into meeting their demands. Consequently, in November 1984, they embarked on a campaign of product contamination against the confectionery manufacturer, Mars. The threats were largely hoaxes, but it still led to widespread concern amongst the public and to Mars withdrawing and destroying some £3 million of its products.⁶¹¹ Such intimidation is an aspect of anti-nuclear violence as well. In March 1981, ETA sent death threats to 33 technicians working in the Lemoniz plant. The letter explained that the group would target all specialised personnel "because of [their] participation in the illegal Lemoniz project." The threats had little impact: the technicians continued working at the nuclear power plant, even in the wake of the assassinations of the chief engineer and later of the project manager.⁶¹²

The definition of anti-nuclear terrorism is problematic for the same reason that terrorism perpetrated by right-wing youth counterculture groups is. Both grow out of wider, semi-organised movements that, while legal in themselves, engage occasionally in illegal acts. These movements are also the umbrella for more radical and violent organisations that favour more illicit action. In the case of the anti-nuclear movement, this involves activities such as trespass actions at nuclear sites or civil disobedience to hinder the transport of nuclear material or waste. Their objective tends to be "demonstration" actions that increase public anxiety about nuclear safety and "co-opt anti-nuclear sentiment or environmental concerns for their own radical agenda" by exposing the lack of security, control and protection provided for nuclear programmes by either the nuclear industry or the government. Such groups rarely resort to high-level terrorist actions. Since the primary aim of anti-nuclear action is to win over public opinion, as well as to halt the construction or operation of nuclear

⁶¹¹ Clutterbuck, *Terrorism In An Unstable World*, pp. 171-172.

⁶¹² Konrad Kellen, "Appendix: Nuclear-Related Terrorist Activities by Political Terrorists" in Leventhal & Alexander (eds.), *Preventing Nuclear Terrorism*, pp. 129-130.

facilities, they favour methods that, while disruptive, are also proportional and as unlikely to injure people as possible. Equally, they are usually careful to use tactics that are unlikely to compromise so utterly the safety of a nuclear operation that it might result in the very danger to the surrounding environment that the anti-nuclear protesters most fear. Consequently, most anti-nuclear protests tend to be "nuisance actions", such as illegal entry into facilities, rather than anything more severe. Trespass actions at reactors are also fairly common and are often perceived to be a legitimate tactic of anti-nuclear protesters. For example, the activists at Greenham Common in Britain in the early 1980s made frequent attempts to cut through the fence and enter the USAF base, as a demonstration against the deployment of cruise missiles there. However, nuclear facilities, as high-profile targets, even attract actions by adversaries with no obvious anti-nuclear agenda. In February 1993, a man drove through the main gate at the Three Mile Island nuclear plant, and crashed through two closely spaced chain-linked fences into the "protected area" of the plant, where he hid for four hours, but caused no damage. The assailant, Pierce Hye, had recently been released from the mental ward of a community hospital in Ephrata, Pennsylvania, and had no clear motive.⁶¹³

Where the objective is to be more disruptive, activists have favoured actions such as destroying power lines to nuclear facilities, which has the advantages of being easier for the group, harder for the authorities to defend against, and serving as a means of effectively halting work at the facility, in the short term, without the attendant risks, to workers or the activists, that an attack on the facility itself might entail.⁶¹⁴ In this respect, actions such as the bomb placed outside the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory on November 28, 1987, may be fairly

⁶¹³ Matthew L. Wald, "Gate Crasher Shakes Up Nuclear Debate", New York Times, February 11 1993, p. A16.

⁶¹⁴ Bruce Hoffman, Report Of Dr Bruce Hoffman for Ontario Court (General Division) On The Likelihood Of Nuclear Terrorism In Canada, (July 1993), pp. 4-5. As an example, on January 25 1985, the 1,300-megawatt Krummel Nuclear Reactor in Germany was shut down when a 230-tower carrying electric cables between the plant and Hamburg was toppled by an explosive charge laid by activists, causing a short circuit on the power lines that tripped the plant's automatic switch. The shut down caused a blackout in Hamburg's suburbs for several hours. World Press Review, "Eco-Terrorists", (May 1985), p. 58.

representative of violence by anti-nuclear activists. The bomb detonated just after midnight and destroyed dozens of windows and a car, damaged three other cars, and scattered debris over a wide area. However, the bombing, which was claimed by the Nuclear Liberation Front, injured no-one.⁶¹⁵ As well as power lines to facilities, anti-nuclear protesters have also targeted the system used to transport nuclear materials to and from facilities. Examples of this type of action include the November 1994 sabotage of power lines on a railway line near Hanover, used in the transport of material to the storage site at Gorleben, and the 1996 destruction of this same piece of track.⁶¹⁶ However, it is risky to generalise too much about anti-nuclear activity because it has varied so greatly from one state to another and over time. For example, it was much less prevalent or violent in the United States than outside it between 1970 and 1984 and there was a much greater willingness to target people over property in these protests in other states.⁶¹⁷ There have also been more violent attacks on reactors themselves. Although they are harder targets than research facilities, reactors are also attacked by anti-nuclear groups. An extreme example was the 1982 use of five antitank rockets against the Creys-Malville Superphoenix full-scale breeder reactor, near Lyon. The reactor was still under construction and, apart from damaging the outer shell of the building, little damage was done by the rockets. A previously unknown group, called the Pacifist and Ecologist Committee, claimed responsibility for the attack.⁶¹⁸ However, it is worth trying to differentiate between violence by specifically anti-nuclear groups and attacks by wider organisations that merely have anti-nuclear activities as one of several aspects of their campaign. The most violent groups have, in many cases, fallen into the latter category, so it may still be possible to suggest that the majority of single-issue anti-nuclear groups are not interested in higher level attacks or in attacks directed primarily

615 "FBI Seizes Nuclear Protester In Car Bombing At A-Weapons Lab", Los Angeles Times, April 8, 1988, p. A.32.

616 "Anti-nuclear group damaged railways - German police", Reuters, November 14, 1994; "Wagonload of nuclear waste heads for Germany", Agence France Presse, May 7, 1996.

617 Bruce Hoffman, Thomas C. Tompkins, Bonnie Cordes, Peter deLeon, Sue Ellen Moran, "The Changing Threat To US Nuclear Programmes", RAND, May 1985, pp. 27-29.

618 Frank J. Prial, "Antitank Rokets Are Fired At French Nuclear Reactor", New York Times, January 20, 1982, p. A3.

at people rather than property. It is also worth noting that, although they are connected, there is a difference between anti-nuclear terrorism and the wider anti-nuclear movement. Increases in the former do not necessarily correspond with the peaks of activity in the latter. The height of peaceful anti-nuclear action was in the late 1970s and early 1980s, when there were widespread attempts, in many states, to affect the decision-making process at a perceived critical time, when the fate of nuclear power was uncertain.⁶¹⁹ There has been significant anti-nuclear terrorism both before and after this period.

Jasper and Poulsen conducted research with around 1000 anti-nuclear activists who were at a demonstration at Diablo Canyon nuclear power plant in August 1984. They found that US anti-nuclear activists tended to have been first involved in a range of other political protest movements. These ranged from anti-war activities, environmentalism, feminism and the women's movement, nuclear disarmament and civil rights to animal rights. The protesters were mostly young (the median age was 32); well educated (95% were high school graduates and 88% had at least started college); had lower than average incomes; and overwhelmingly described themselves as politically left of centre.⁶²⁰ Although factors such as friends and family, previous activism and news coverage were important in the recruitment of anti-nuclear protesters, Jasper and Poulsen found that the key factor was specific events or moral shock arising from a series of these events.⁶²¹ This makes sense, since it would explain rises in anti-nuclear protest in the wake of highly publicised incidents such as Three Mile Island in 1979 or Chernobyl in 1986.⁶²² Interestingly,

⁶¹⁹ Hoffman, Tompkins, Cordes, deLeon, Moran, "The Changing...", pp. 32-33.

⁶²⁰ This assessment of the background of antinuclear protesters is supported by other studies, such as: James Scaminaci III & Riley E. Dunlap, "No Nukes! A Comparison of Participants in Two National Antinuclear Demonstrations", Sociological Inquiry, Volume 56, Number 2, (Spring 1986), pp. 273-276.

⁶²¹ James M. Jasper & Jane D. Poulsen, "Recruiting Strangers and Friends: Moral Shocks and Social Networks in Animal Rights and Anti-Nuclear Protests", Social Problems, Volume 42, Number 4, (November 1995), pp. 498-503.

⁶²² Although this is a far from straightforward trend. In the US, the antinuclear movement was at its strongest between 1955 and 1963 (the test ban campaign) and again between 1981 and 1984 (the nuclear freeze campaign). David Meyer, "Peace Protest and Policy: Explaining the Rise and Decline of Antinuclear Movements in Postwar America", Policy Studies Journal, Volume 21, Number 1, (1993), p. 40. Koopmans and Duyvendak show that, in reality, support for antinuclear issues after a major incident is

although Jasper and Poulsen studied activists, rather than anti-nuclear terrorists specifically, this aspect of the recruitment process is similar to the moment of "*der sprung*", described by Baumann and other terrorists. Another key similarity was the depersonalisation and stereotyping of the enemy in general and of governmental authorities in particular. In both cases, activists and terrorists, this serves as a recruitment aid and a justification for their actions. There is a clear anti-instrumental theme running through the anti-nuclear literature. Technology is depicted as out of control, the natural world as being destroyed and the government complicitous. The main enemy is technocracy: large bureaucracies, driven by money and careerism, uncaring about human needs. The literature calls for moral standards and political control over the instrumental techniques and rationalities of the nuclear industry.⁶²³ In their view, nuclear energy is not only unsafe, uneconomical and unnecessary, it is also socially undesirable. It reinforces commercial growth at the expense of environmental quality, the power of large corporations over individuals, and an undue emphasis on materialistic consumption.⁶²⁴ Activists feel that they had been alienated. They feel victimised by public authorities that are perceived to be inflexible, secretive, and undemocratic in their decision-making process.⁶²⁵

In the United States, anti-nuclear violence formed a major component of the attacks of the extreme environmentalist group, the Evan Mecham Eco-Terrorist International Conspiracy (EMETIC). This group grew out of the most radical elements of Earth First!, another

dependant on a range of other factors such as the state of the antinuclear movement immediately prior to the incident (how organised and visible it was), the political situation in which it occurred (how the government reacts to the incident) and by the outcome of the interpretative struggle between the pro-nuclear and anti-nuclear advocates. However, incidents, such as Chernobyl do seem to have a multiplier effect on the state of the anti-nuclear campaign, as it already exists. So, for example, Chernobyl caused support for the movement to soar in Germany, where it was already strong, but made little impact on the weak French and Dutch movements, even although their countries were similarly affected to Germany. Ruud Koopmans & Jan Willem Duyvendak, "The Political Construction of the Nuclear Energy Issue and Its Impact on the Mobilization of Anti-Nuclear Movements in Western Europe", Social Problems, Volume 42, Number 2, (May 1995).

⁶²³ Jasper & Poulsen, "Recruiting...", p. 504.

⁶²⁴ Scaminaci & Dunlap, "No Nukes!...", p. 276.

⁶²⁵ David Kowalewski & Karen L. Porter, "Ecoprotest: Alienation, Deprivation, or Resources?", Social Science Quarterly, Volume 73, Number 3, (September 1992).

environmental group. Angered by Earth First!'s increased dedication to civil disobedience as a tactic, its leader, Dave Forman, and four others, all in their mid-thirties but from differing backgrounds, formed EMETIC in October 1987.⁶²⁶ By then, members of the nascent organisation had probably already been responsible for the May 1986 attack on power lines at Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, although they never claimed responsibility. The organisation was formed to conduct sabotage against nuclear power plants in the southwestern USA. On September 26, 1988, the group destroyed power lines feeding uranium mines around the Grand Canyon. Thirty-four power poles were damaged, restricting power supplies to two mines owned by Energy Fuels Nuclear. Two days later, EMETIC claimed responsibility for the attack. On May 30, 1989, three members of the group were arrested near Wendon, Arizona, attempting to cut through a support tower that delivered power to a local substation. The attack was intended as a dry-run before simultaneously attacking the electricity transmission cables at three nuclear facilities in Colorado, California and Arizona. They were subsequently sentenced to terms ranging from one month to six years.⁶²⁷

Earth First!, the group from which EMETIC grew, is noteworthy because it unusually combined radical and violent environmentalism with a form of millenarianism. At its foundation in 1980, Earth First! emphasised both non-violent direct action and attacks against private property to preserve the American environment. Many of its adherents believed that the wasteful destructiveness of industrial civilisation would lead to its imminent collapse. Earth First! members' role, they believed, was to save as much of the American wilderness as possible, from this industrial complex, in the hope that biodiversity and evolution would be able to continue after the collapse. The Earth First! ideology was, like millenarian belief, essentially apocalyptic, but

⁶²⁶ Margaret Miller was a part-time worker at the local Planned Parenthood; Ilse Asplund was a divorced mother of two who worked in Yauapai County, Arizona; and Marc Baker was married with two children and had a Ph.D in botany from Arizona State University. Brent L. Smith, Terrorism In America: Pipe Bombs and Pipe Dreams, (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1994), p. 126..

⁶²⁷ Smith, Terrorism In America.... pp. 26-27 & 125-127. Martha Lee, "Violence and the Environment: The Case of "Earth First!" in Barkun (ed.), "Millennialism & Violence", pp. 121-122. Paul Feldman & Richard E. Meyer, "4 Held In Plot To Cut Lines Near Nuclear Plants", The Los Angeles Times, June 1 1989, p. A1.

they were convinced that their salvation would be secular and terrestrial, rather than spiritual, in the form of a healthy post-apocalypse environment. Convinced that the United States government's environmental protection programme had failed, Earth First! resolved to use more effective means to defend the wilderness. In this they were inspired by Edward Abbey's 1975 book: The Monkey Wrench Gang, a novel based on the experiences in the early 1970s of an Arizona-based environmental group called the Eco-Raiders. Earth First!'s initial action was at Glen Canyon Dam on March 20, 1980. A demonstration distracted the Dam's guards, while members of Earth First! placed a 300 foot plastic wedge on the dam's face, giving the impression that the Dam had been cracked. Later in their campaign, they used other tactics that included arson, tree and road spiking, grounding aircraft, and disabling heavy equipment, techniques they cumulatively called "monkeywrenching" or eco-sabotage. While not every member of Earth First! engaged in eco-sabotage, few condemned it. Believing that the earth should be placed first in any calculations, even ahead of human welfare, virtually any tactic was justifiable. However, increasingly, concerns about the use of eco-sabotage arose within the group due to fears of the counter-productive effect of causing injury or death and of encouraging mindless vandalism, rather than any moral constraint on doing so. However, despite numerical strength (it peaked at about 10,000 members in 1987), by the late 1980s Earth First! had still failed to make long-term gains in protecting the environment, and significantly declined following the defection of the faction lead by Dave Foreman.⁶²⁸

Anti-nuclear violence, while it can be single-issue terrorism, can also be the starting point for wider actions. Wieviorka suggests that in both France and the Basque homeland, what began as a campaign against nuclear power, came to be subsumed into a wider revolutionary struggle in France and in ETA's nationalist fight in Spain. In France, the anti-nuclear campaign moved from being simply a struggle against a particular type of power into a battle between the people and the regions versus a faceless, centralised, state-run entity, the power company, EDF.⁶²⁹ In a few cases, nationalism also played a role in anti-

⁶²⁸ Lee, "Violence and the Environment...", pp. 109-121.

⁶²⁹ Wieviorka, The Making..., p. 118.

nuclear violence within France. On August 15 1975, two bombs exploded at the Mt D'Arree Nuclear Power Plant in Brennilis, Brittany, causing minor damage. The chief suspects were Breton separatists.⁶³⁰ In 1972-73, the Spanish government announced four new nuclear projects (these would later become two: the Ea and Lemoniz facilities). Initially, resistance to these was localised and was driven specifically by fear and doubts. By 1976, the driving force behind the increasingly broad-based anti-nuclear movement had become anger at the highhandedness of the Spanish government and Iberduero SA (the electricity company), and the lack of democratic procedures in arriving at the decisions. The protest was gradually absorbed by the wider Basque nationalist movement. From 1977, it was ETA that spearheaded the campaign, launching a number of attacks on the reactors and their personnel.⁶³¹ Activists who were purely anti-nuclear were undoubtedly dismayed at the hijacking of their campaign. Generally, their sphere of operations was oriented towards Spain and even Europe as a whole. However, simultaneously, theirs were uniquely Basque organisations, which emphasised that character until it became their defining aspect.⁶³²

One group that combined the wider left-wing concerns of the need to fight against an exploitive corporate-dominated state with the focus on environmental and specifically anti-nuclear issues, was the Canadian organisation, Direct Action, which was responsible for a number of attacks in the early 1980s. The five members of the group came from a variety of familial and educational backgrounds, although all were young, and had already shown a level of commitment to radical causes. They showed a number of characteristics, held in common with other terrorist groups: Juliet Belmas, the youngest of the group, 19 at the time of the attacks, was insecure and clearly greatly admired and respected the leaders of the group, Ann Brit Hansen and Brent Taylor. The other "soldier" of the group, Gerald Hannah, was a reluctant member, and refused to be involved in the bombings that the organisation perpetrated. Although not conclusive, this strongly hints that the organisational dynamics that make exit from, and dissension within, a

⁶³⁰ Richard Wigg, "Atom power station is sabotaged in France", The Times, August 16 1975, p. 3.

⁶³¹ Wieviorka, The Making.... pp. 166-168.

⁶³² Ibid., p. 174.

group extremely difficult were present in Direct Action. The fifth member of the organisation, Douglas Stewart, was the technical expert and chief bomb-maker. His expertise was evident in the fact that the May 31, 1982 bombing of the (non-nuclear) Dunsmuir British Columbia Hydro substation on Vancouver Island, and the October 14, 1982 attack on the Litton Systems of Canada Limited factory in Toronto were later described by investigating authorities as planted by someone who knew exactly where to lay the explosives so as to cause maximum damage and was "the work of experts". The group also firebombed three of the pornographic Red Hot Video stores in the Vancouver area on November 22, 1982 and subsequently plotted to attack Canadian Forces jets, and a federal government icebreaker, and rehearsed an armed robbery of a Brink's guard. Their various assaults caused around \$10 million of damage and wounded or maimed 10 people. Direct Action studied and admired European left-wing groups such as the Red Brigades and Baader-Meinhof, as well as reading and discussing radical writers such as Pierre Joseph Proudhon, who once declared "property is theft". However, they chose their targets based on "a moral obligation to do all that is humanly possible to prevent the destruction of the earth." Even at their trials, the members of the group showed little remorse, declaring that they were not terrorists. Rather, it was "Businesses such as Litton (which manufactured Cruise missile guidance systems), B.C. Hydro and Red Hot Video [that] are the real terrorists. They are guilty of crimes against humanity and the earth." The 100kg of dynamite attack on the four 500 k.v. transformers at the Dunsmuir substation was an attempt to halt the building of a power line from Cheekeye that would provide enough electricity for heightened industrial activity on Vancouver Island.⁶³³ Direct Action, claiming responsibility for the attack said that they:

reject ecological destruction and human oppression whether they be caused by the corporate machines of the West or the Communist machine of the East... We must make this an insecure and inhabitable place for the capitalists and their

⁶³³ Gerry Bellett, "Mounties begin probe of sabotage at Hydro station", Vancouver Sun, June 1 1982, p. A3; Malcolm Gray, "A protest becomes destructive", Macleans, June 14 1982; "Dynamite blasts Litton plant; 7 hurt", Globe & Mail, October 15 1982, pp. 1,2; Jock Ferguson & Lorne Slotnick, "Litton blast called work of experts", Globe & Mail, October 16 1982, pp. 1,2; "Saboteur cites moral basis for bombings", Globe & Mail, June 6 1984, p. 5; "Bomber gets life term, hurls tomato at judge", Globe & Mail, June 8 1984, pp. 1,2; Ian Mulgrew, "The defiant Squamish Five: down to earth with a thud", Globe & Mail, June 19 1984, p. 7.

projects. This is the best contribution we can make towards protecting the earth and struggling for a liberated society.⁶³⁴

While the attack on the substation was largely environmental and anti-developmental, the bombing of the Litton Systems plant was overtly anti-nuclear. Nuclear war was "beyond question the ultimate expression of the negative characteristics of Western civilisation [whose] roots lie deep within centuries of patriarchy, racism, imperialism, class domination and all other forms of violence and oppression that have scarred human history."⁶³⁵ They explained the rationale for selecting that target as:

We believe that people must actively fight the nuclear war system in whatever forms they exist and wherever they exist. Although, in total, the nuclear militarization of the world is a vast and seemingly unfathomable and omnipotent network, it can be understood and effectively resisted when we recognise that it is designed, built and operated in thousands of separate facilities and industries spread throughout the world. By analysing the interests and institutions in our own regions that are contributing to the nuclear build-up we find the smaller component pieces of the nuclear network that are realistic targets for direct confrontation and sabotage. Our opposition to the insanity of nuclear war must be transformed into militant resistance and direct action on a local and regional basis...⁶³⁶

This preoccupation with defending "the people" against technology and detrimental foreign influences (especially during the Reagan Administration, anti-nuclear campaigns in Europe were tied, at least emotionally, with anti-Americanism) is common to many left-wing movements. It is even possible to see this in groups that have no obvious anti-nuclear agenda. An anti-American sentiment was especially prevalent amongst the European left-wing terrorists that conducted a series of joint operations in the mid 1980s, groups such as the Cellules Communistes Combatants of Belgium that, until 1984, committed attacks which were unlikely to cause fatalities, but after that date, sought to kill the "Yankee military and their accomplices."⁶³⁷ Although there are no nuclear reactors in Peru (Argentina's two at

⁶³⁴ "Sun receives 'blast' letter", *Vancouver Sun*, June 2 1982, pp. A1,2.

⁶³⁵ Direct Action, "Statement Regarding The October 14 Litton Bombing", October 17, 1982.

⁶³⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶³⁷ Laqueur, *The Age...* p. 289.

Embalse and Atucha and Brazil's one at Angra are the only South American plants), this anti-technology strategy can be seen to have been part of the Sendero Luminoso's (Shining Path) campaign to attack the Peruvian government. An offshoot of the Peruvian Communist Party, between 1976 and 1978, Sendero Luminoso took the decision to resort to armed struggle against a government that they denounced as both fascist and corporatist. Based predominantly in the poor and underdeveloped area around Ayacucho, Sendero Luminoso launched their first armed action on June 16, 1980, attacking the town hall of San Martin de Porres with Molotov cocktails. By May, 1983, the group had attacked Lima's Bayer plant and succeeded in blacking out the city. Their objective was the destruction of the state and the creation of a new democracy based on the peasants and the urban workers. By 1988, the focus of their actions had moved from a rural-based insurrection to an urban revolution, and they had attacked factories, power plants and communication and transport systems. They also directed their violence against foreign representatives, attacking the embassies of China, India, West Germany and Spain. The cause of these attacks seemed to have more to do with undermining the Peruvian government than drawing the attention of the world to their case. In this sense, Sendero Luminoso differed considerably in objectives from its bitter rival, Tupac Amaru, which, in January and February 1991, as a protest against the Gulf War, attacked the US embassy with rocket propelled grenades and dynamited Lima's Pizza Hut, Kentucky Fried Chicken, Mormon churches and the US Peruvian Institute. Clearly, as with the group's long-running siege at the Japanese Ambassador's residence from December 1996 to April 1997, these actions were intended to have an impact on a foreign audience, not just one in Peru.⁶³⁸ However, these examples are not universally applicable: the Tupamaros of Uruguay made little effort to acquire foreign audiences or to attack foreign targets. There are several principle reasons for this: the Tupamaros had little hope of attracting assistance from other governments because their left-wing cause met with little sympathy amongst the increasingly reactionary regimes of Latin America; the importance of foreign influence was limited in Uruguay, so the assistance or pressure they could bring to bear was minimal; and there was a negligible Uruguayan diaspora, so there was little need for action

⁶³⁸ Aliaga, *Terrorism...*, pp. 32-35, 47; Laqueur, *The Age...*, pp. 255-257.

designed to win over potential constituents.⁶³⁹ It is also possible for the object and target of a terrorist group's campaign to change over time. Not only did the RAF join "the worldwide revolt against US imperialism", but:

In the various phases of our 22-year struggle, we intervened as guerrillas of the metropolis against the imperialist plans for world domination, against the US policy, against NATO, against the formation of a Western European Bloc, and against the development of a Greater Germany into a world power, and against the 'New World Order'.⁶⁴⁰

Left-wing terrorism, like religious-inspired violence, is based heavily in textual references. These give both a philosophical and a practical basis for terrorism. Obviously, writers such as Marx, Lenin and Mao were tremendously influential, and all justified violence as a necessary condition of revolution.⁶⁴¹ Writers who advocated violence but who

⁶³⁹ Lopez-Alves, "Political...", p. 216.

⁶⁴⁰ Translation of Red Army Faction's June 29 1992 communique in: Pluchinsky, "Germany's..", p. 154.

⁶⁴¹ Marx's view of violence, like that of Lenin, is class-specific. However, for Marx, violence was a tool to enable successful revolution, never an end in itself. It might "help to refine the souls of the workers, but it is not necessarily an indispensable function". Raphael Cohen-Almagor, "Foundations Of Violence, Terror & War In The Writings Of Marx, Engels & Lenin", Terrorism & Political Violence, Volume 3, Number 2, (Summer 1991), p.6.

He saw nothing wrong with revolution by peaceful means when the circumstances permit social transition without resorting to violence. However, Marx regarded it as implausible that the ruling classes would surrender power without the proletariat forcing them to do so through violence. It was therefore a "necessary means to bring about a more equal, more democratic society, more human than the exploitive capitalist system". Ibid., p. 7. He therefore argued that violence was only useful in dealing with absolutist regimes in which peaceful revolution was not a feasible option available for the proletariat. In such cases, violence became the instrument to enforce the reign of labour. However, for Marx there was another role for violence: revolution was vital, not only to create a more just society but to enable the rising class to renew itself by getting rid of the contaminating rubbish that was the ruling class. It is hard to reconcile this view with Marx's arguments in favour of revolution by peaceful means. Furthermore, Marx realised that the exploited class had yet to realise the injustice of its situation or its full revolutionary potential and that violence, along with other measures, offered an opportunity for the revolutionary leadership to awaken the proletariat to the possibilities for seizing power. He argued that violence was "primarily necessary to transform the nature of the working class... it was therapeutic in character, and it alone would psychologically renovate the working class so that it would be fit to rule." Grant Wardlaw, Political Terrorism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p.23. It is as a result of this ambiguous position that many interpretations of Marx's attitude towards violence have been possible. He argues that there is a legitimate role for violence even where peaceful revolution is feasible. However, clearly for him, violence is the lever of the revolution and never the end in itself.

By contrast, even before the 1917 Revolution, Lenin was effectively arguing that the end justified the means regarding the use of force in perpetuating revolution. In his

view, whatever factors could bring the eventual goal nearer were invariably positive and desirable. *Ibid.*, p. 18. However, like Marx, Lenin's view altered over the course of his works, allowing a great deal of latitude in interpreting his attitude towards violence. He originally opposed its use; but ended by giving unadulterated support for force and its application by all possible means. What is more important, he encouraged not only the use of force but the resort to terrorist activities. That is, he allowed the use of acts intended to arouse panic and fear amongst specific groups, justifying it with Marxist ideology, using the notions of "suppression of the governing bourgeoisie" and "proletariat dictatorship" for this purpose. It is for this reason, his support for the use of terror, that Lenin is perhaps more important than Marx in influencing modern terrorists. It is also crucial that whereas Marx was a theorist, Lenin implemented a revolution and it is therefore inevitable that he built on Marx's work, as well as others such as Engels, and that his own writings display a considerable development on from theirs.

The influence of all three has been repeatedly stated by national liberation movements, which chose violence and terror as means for achieving their ends. *Ibid.*, p. 1. However, in most cases, their work has been a reference point to develop from, rather than a blueprint for the revolution. Mao Zedong deviated significantly from Leninism in developing the strategy of revolutionary war, a method of subversion aimed at overthrowing a regime and seizing power by ensuring that the vanguard of the revolution was grafted onto the peasantry so that they could effectively direct their efforts in pursuing revolution. This technique of attempting to gain the support of a section of the population and retain it sufficiently long for the adversary to grow tired of the conflict and seek a settlement has been widely used by Marxist-Leninist movements, with varying degrees of success.

A variation on Mao's revolutionary war was the Cuban theory of "foco" or mobile strategic base, launching the armed struggle without any of the preliminary political groundwork amongst the population. This resulted in a number of failed revolutions in the 1960s by Latin American movements and led the Tupamaros in Uruguay and Carlos Marighella in Brazil to adopt the tactics of the urban guerrilla, intrinsically a form of urban "foco". It is this model that has been widely copied across the world by other revolutionary groups and has meant that Marighella's 1969 book "Mini-Manual Of The Urban Guerrilla" has been vastly important as a source of practical advice to such movements. However, it offers more a discussion of tactics once the decision to resort to violence has already been made, rather than an incitement to use force in the first place. Moreover, terrorism and urban guerrilla warfare are not synonymous, although they do have considerable common ground. Gillespie argues that the latter is more discriminate and predictable in its use of violence than is terrorism. Richard Gillespie in Wilkinson (ed.) *Terrorism: British Perspectives*, p. 285. Urban guerrillas seldom reject terrorism, using it when they are weak or politically isolated, but it remains simply one of a series of tactics employed by them, rather than their sole method. Therefore, the importance of Marighella's work as a philosophical cause of terrorism is limited because he was dealing with an issue of which terrorism was only one aspect.

The same argument could be levelled against the influence of other terrorists, such as Mikhail Bakunin or Nechayev, who wrote on the subject. Both were Russian activists of the late Nineteenth Century who were key in the development of anarchist and nihilist terrorism. Nechayev wrote "Revolutionary Catechism" in 1869, a book often quoted by present-day groups as a guide to part of their thinking. Wardlaw, *Political...*, p. 20. It is a handbook of terrorist organisation and tactics and a description of the ideal terrorist. But as he had no post-revolution vision, and therefore no political motivation, it is even questionable whether he was writing about terrorism in the true sense. His influence is more intellectual than concrete since unlike Marighella, Nechayev rarely engaged in terrorist activities himself. Bakunin however, spent much of his time travelling around Europe fermenting and assisting in revolutionary endeavours. He believed that the passion to destroy was a creative urge and that any state was eventually exploitive, regarding violence and bloodshed as the only

were purely philosophical, such as Satre or Sorel, "instinctivists" such as Lorenz, who argued that violence was a psychological need, or even writers who influenced other types of groups, such as Fanon (who was significant in justifying nationalist-separatist struggles), seem to have been of less importance than those who could be seen to be overtly revolutionary. The Red Brigades read and, to some extent, followed the teachings of Mao and Carlos Marighella. This seems curious for an urban European group, given that Mao's experience was predominantly rural and that both his and Marighella's experiences were non-European, being Chinese and South American respectively. Marighella was admired because he had successfully implemented the techniques he advocated in his "Mini-Manual of the Urban Guerrilla" which was the first practical text on how to effectively wage a guerrilla war.⁶⁴² Marighella argued that:

The urban guerrilla is...a political revolutionary and an ardent patriot, he is a fighter for his country's liberation, a friend of the people and of freedom...The urban guerrilla follows a political goal and only attacks the government, the big capitalists, and the foreign imperialists...The urban guerrilla is the implacable enemy of the government and systematically inflicts damage on the authorities and on the men who dominate the country and exercise power...The urban guerrilla's arms are inferior to the enemy's, but from a moral point of view, the urban guerrilla has an undeniable superiority. This moral superiority is what sustains the urban guerrilla. Thanks to it, the urban guerrilla can accomplish his principal duty, which is to attack and to survive.⁶⁴³

purgative to cleanse society. *Ibid.* In this, he was clearly at odds with Marx who saw capitalism as the problem rather than the state per se. Bakunin regarded the vanguard of the revolution to be the peasantry and banditry rather than the proletariat. However, his main contribution to revolutionary thinking was the concept of "propaganda of the deed", that violent acts should be committed as individual revolutionary statements. It is hard to ascertain the extent of the influence of such notions on terrorist movements in the post-war era, however they clearly do have some philosophical and intellectual debt to Russian terrorists and anarchist of the late Nineteenth Century. Although the use of terror was not new then, the use of it as a systematic programme was. The propaganda of groups such as Baader-Meinhof in Germany or the Weathermen in the United States has displayed anarchist or nihilist leanings which acknowledged that debt. Wilkinson, *Terrorism & The Liberal State*, p. 98. However, since the nature of terrorism has altered radically in the last hundred years, it must be seen that such influences represent only one of many on contemporary groups.

⁶⁴² Jamieson, *The Heart...* p. 55.

⁶⁴³ Carlos Marighella, *Mini-Manual Of The Urban Guerrilla*, 1969, pp. 2-5.

However, Mao was especially significant to the Red Brigades, possibly in part because a defining experience in the radicalisation of group members was opposition to the Vietnam War, and support for the supposedly Maoist Hanoi regime. However, the real importance of Mao to the group came from his guiding framework for revolution, rather than from the teachings themselves. The group especially favoured a teaching that fostered self-belief and patience for ultimate victory: the revolutionary process "cannot be other than protracted and ruthless...It is wrong to think that the forces of the Chinese revolution can be built up in the twinkling of an eye, or that China's revolution can triumph overnight." The Red Brigades were also able to use Mao's teachings to justify not only their own potential death, but also their need to kill others in the process of revolution. As Mao himself argued:

All men must die, but death can vary in its significance. The ancient Chinese writer, Szuma Chien said, 'Though death befalls all men alike, it may be heavier than Mount Tai or lighter than a feather.' To die for the people is heavier than Mount Tai, but to work for the fascists and die for the exploiters and oppressors is lighter than a feather.

Mao therefore glorified dying a "heavy death", and absolved the murderer that perpetrated a "light death" of moral responsibility or guilt.⁶⁴⁴

The importance of ideology, in its strict theoretical sense, varies significantly from one group to another. While they would still be classified as anarchic-ideologue, organisations such as Action Direct or the Cellules Communistes Combattantes, in stark contrast to organisations such as the Red Brigades or RAF, both of whom discussed their ideas in depth and produced manifestos, were evidently unimpressed by theoretical discussions, and instead favoured action, as is suggested by statements such as "*les documents qui proposent DOCOM, sont des documents de combats, non des analyses de salon...*"⁶⁴⁵ One of the consequences of an ideological motivation is that, in contrast to groups motivated by other goals, such as nationalist-separatism, it perpetuates a world view and thus lends an international, as well as a more narrow perspective to the cause. This is clearly supported by the example of left-wing terrorist groups, and

⁶⁴⁴ Jamieson, *The Heart...*, pp. 52-54.

⁶⁴⁵ Docom, 1981 or 1982, cited in Laqueur, *The Age...*, p. 302.

especially by the RAF, which from the mid 1980s focused its efforts in an attempt to build a West European Guerrilla organisation, an alliance with other Marxist-Leninist European terrorists, such as Action Direct (AD) or the Belgian Cellules Communistes Combattantes (CCC). The co-operation between the RAF and AD resulted in the murders of General Rene Audran in Paris and Ernst Zimmermann, a German manager in the munitions industry, in Munich on February 1 1985; an attack on the US Air Base in Frankfurt; and the murder of the Director-General of the French Renault Works, Georges Besse, on November 17 1986. All the murder victims could be perceived to have been members of the European Military-Industry-Complex. The CCC was less involved in such collaborative efforts: the only evidence of practical co-operation is that the explosive used by the RAF in its failed December 1984 attack on the NATO School in Oberammergau was stolen by the CCC in June from a quarry in Belgium. However, the arrests of the leading members of AD in February 1987 and the CCC in December 1985 largely finished those groups as viable organisations. After that, the RAF focused on its relationship with the Red Brigades, which by 1985 had split into two "positions": the BR-PCC (Red Brigades for the Construction of the Fighting Communist Party) which was internationalist and anti-imperialist, and the UCC (the Union of Fighting Communists) which was proletarian and focused on the class struggle. However, the attempt to create a pan-European terrorist movement, directed predominantly against NATO, was only half-heartedly pursued and so failed.⁶⁴⁶ This fact was acknowledged in the RAF's statement of April 10, 1992, in which they announced the cessation of their violence in exchange for improvements in the prison conditions of those RAF members being held by the German state. Part of the statement was as follows:

We were faced with the fact that we had failed to accomplish our objective, namely to achieve a breakthrough in the joint international struggle for liberation. The liberation struggles were generally too weak to hold their own against the imperialist war, which was extended to all levels.⁶⁴⁷

⁶⁴⁶ Horchem, "The Decline...", pp. 67-69.

⁶⁴⁷ Translation of Red Army Faction's April 10 1992 communique in: Pluchinsky, "Germany's..." p. 148.

The ability of the Red Brigades to justify their actions was enhanced by the belief that their violence was largely defensive. They were battling against oppression, on behalf of the exploited workers, for whom there were ever diminishing opportunities for liberty and justice. Within Italian society, violence was a norm, not an aberration; fascist violence was being perpetrated against the weaker members of society. The ruling elite would do anything to maintain their power; their code was arbitrarily imposed rules of law and morality. To disrupt or overthrow such a code, even using violence, was justifiable. To protect oneself against the violence of fascist policemen, industrialists or employers was certainly legitimate.⁶⁴⁸ This growing awareness about the intrinsic nature of Italian society was focused by a number of key events that appeared to confirm the first generation members of the Red Brigades in their belief that there was a need to act, to protect themselves and others from the threat of fascism. The key such event was the bombing of a bank in the Piazza Fontana in Milan on December 12, 1969, in which 16 people died and 88 were injured. The attack was perpetrated by conservative terrorists, intent on ensuring that left-wing groups were blamed, convincing the Italian population that their safety was so jeopardised that the sacrifice of freedoms to a military dictatorship was desirable. The inclination to initially accuse left-wingers of the act, and the subsequent political exploitation of the situation, acted as a catalyst for the members of the nascent Red Brigades.⁶⁴⁹

Martyrs played an important role in the perpetuation of the Italian terrorist groups, in common with most other terrorist organisations, including the West German groups, for whom imprisoned members were a vital source of inspiration and publicity, and who became increasingly critical to the group's identity and sense of purpose.⁶⁵⁰ On June 4, 1975, the Red Brigades kidnapped the millionaire Vallarino Gancia. However, within a day, the Italian police had found and surrounded the building where Gancia was being held. In the subsequent shoot-out, one policeman was killed, two were injured and Mara Cagol, a founder member of the group, also died. The Red Brigade's tribute was clearly designed to inspire and motivate others to join the cause:

⁶⁴⁸ Jamieson, *The Heart.....* p. 53.

⁶⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 59-60.

⁶⁵⁰ See, for example, Pluchinsky, "Germany's..."; Horchem, "The Decline..."

Let all sincere revolutionaries honour the memory of Mara, reflecting on the political lesson she gave by means of her choice, her work, her life. Let a thousand arms reach out to pick up her gun...Mara is a flower which has bloomed, and the Red Brigades will continue to cultivate this flower of liberty until victory comes.⁶⁵¹

Adriana Faranda and Valerio Morucci, prominent second generation leaders of the Red Brigades, were examples of people attracted by the group's campaign and martyrs such as Cagol. During 1975, both were active in the radical group, *Formazioni Armante Comuniste*. In the autumn of 1976, they were offered the command of the newly formed Rome column of the Red Brigades by Mario Moretti. Although intended to help the oppressed workers, the Red Brigades included many clearly middle-class members. Faranda came from a close, relatively prosperous family in Sicily. She went to the Arts faculty of Rome university and gradually became radicalised, as her need to feel involved meshed with her growing social conscience. Although she initially participated solely in mainstream marches, rallies and distributions of leaflets, she became more drastic in her protest when it became clear that dissent was a punishable offence: at one march in 1969, most of her friends ended up in prison or in hospital, so Faranda sought other means of action. Increasingly convinced that society was too corrupt to be recovered, she believed that "to bring about a radical transformation the only possible way was through revolution, which necessitated violence." Morucci was the son of Rome caretakers, and like Faranda, started in the Arts Faculty of Rome University in 1968. Also like Faranda, he spent much of the early 1970s in a series of increasingly radical organisations, such as *Potere Operaio*, in which he was a part of the hard-line semi-covert wing, as he grew increasingly frustrated at the lack of political will to transform Italian society, a reform it clearly needed.⁶⁵²

Unlike right-wing terrorists, left-wing groups have little experience of "split delegitimation". For them, the government, establishment and enemy are all one and the same. As a result, such left-wing groups are more likely than reactionary terrorists to regard themselves as "outsiders" and to be irretrievably hostile to the authorities from the

⁶⁵¹ Jamieson, *The Heart...*, p. 89.

⁶⁵² *Ibid.*, pp. 103-105.

outset, driven on by revolutionary ideology. Such implacable opposition might, logically, be perceived to have an escalatory impact on the level of violence they are willing to employ against a state in which they have no stake. However, this is not obviously so, even in the most extreme cases. Although it is not typical of left-wing terrorist groups, both the Red Brigades and their contemporary West German organisations, such as Baader-Meinhof, shared a strong, adverse reaction against fascism and Nazism, as a major component of their initial radicalism and subsequent alienation from the Italian and West German establishment. In part, it reflected a generational difference, believing that these establishments represented the remnants of the far-right regimes of twenty-five years before. At best, they had colluded and collaborated with these regimes; at worst, they were these regimes, thinly cloaked under democratic respectability.⁶⁵³ Every clash the group had with authority was taken to represent further proof of an attempt by the right-wing establishment to repress the freedoms of the organisation and the people. A good example is Baumann's comment that "The three deaths in Stammheim [the suicide of three leaders of the Baader-Meinhof gang] were regarded as confirmation by these groups that fascism has now broken out openly."⁶⁵⁴ Although none of its current membership had been active before 1984,⁶⁵⁵ even in 1992, in the RAF's penultimate communiqué, Germany's Nazi past figured prominently in the group's justification for the original decision to use violence:

Our movement was possible...in this country, where the society has not come to grips with the realities of Auschwitz and its Nazi past, and where Nazis were reinstated in all sectors of government and business, and where instead communists and antifascists were persecuted, and rearmament was forced on the society against the opposition of many who wanted a real break with the fascist past.⁶⁵⁶

Even when a state does have nuclear power, it is not invariably the case that left-wing groups within that state target the industry, as a core

⁶⁵³ The best account of this aspect of the Baader-Meinhof is in: Jillian Becker, Hitler's Children: The Story of the Baader-Meinhof Gang, 3rd edition, (London: Pickwick, 1989).

⁶⁵⁴ Kellen, "Terrorists...", pp. 61-62.

⁶⁵⁵ Pluchinsky, "Germany's...", p. 142.

⁶⁵⁶ Translation of Red Army Faction's June 29 1992 communiqué in: Pluchinsky, "Germany's...", p. 154.

part of their campaign, even if the rejection of the state's establishment is as total as was the case in both the Italian and German examples. Italy had four reactor sites (Latina, Garigliano, Caorso and Trino Vercellese), all of which have subsequently been closed; yet, according to a chronology of nuclear incidents based on the RAND-St Andrews Database, between 1968 and 1986, a period of intense terrorist activity in Italy, there were very few confirmed incidents that could even conceivably be described as perpetrated by terrorists, and only one of those appeared to have an anti-nuclear motive. That was the May 1979 attack on the National Nuclear Energy Centre in which intruders poured gasoline on a computer within the Centre and then returned fire when a night watchman discovered them and started shooting. No group claimed credit for the attack and a motive was never established.⁶⁵⁷ It is interesting that in France and the United States, both of which had dozens of incidents over the same period, the overall level of terrorism was much lower than in West Germany or Italy, which had fewer nuclear incidents, in spite of a vibrant anti-nuclear movement in the former case.

West Germany's example provides an interesting counter-weight to the Italian one. Michael Baumann believed that, at one point, it was entirely plausible that the RAF might engage in an act of nuclear terrorism. In an interview with *Encounter*, he said:

I am not suggesting that at the present moment the groups have concrete plans or even ideas of that kind. But such things are in accordance with the logic of the age and the logic of the group...Henceforth there are no limits...Now [the RAF have] got to do something that will certainly work. And what can that be except an ultimate thing like that [nuclear terrorism]?..They are clever people, and they have vast

⁶⁵⁷ There were however, a number of other incidents in Italy that were unconfirmed or the work of disaffected individuals. These included the supposed plot, revealed in October 1974, of a right-wing group that planned to poison several aqueducts with radioactive waste stolen from a nuclear plant in northern Italy. However, in spite of vast publicity and a thorough investigation, the evidence for these allegations was sketchy. In August 1980, SNIA-Techint was bombed in Rome by the Committee for the Defence of the Islamic Revolution. The company had supplied nuclear technology to Iraq. In November 1983, 11 ounces of radioactive material were seized by Rome police. The material was low-grade uranium, intended for an unspecified Middle Eastern country. The following year, around 30 Italians and a Turk were arrested for planning to smuggle nuclear bombs, Exocet missiles, uranium and plutonium to Iraq. Their ability to acquire any of these was uncertain. RAND-St Andrews Database.

amounts of money. A primitive atomic bomb could also be made. But a raid on a stockpile is more likely.⁶⁵⁸

However, such a possibility came to nothing, and there is little other evidence of a serious attempt to perpetrate such an attack. It could, therefore, possibly be dismissed as idle speculation by someone who was, at the time of the interview, an alienated former member of a rival terrorist organisation. Despite the apparent interest of left-wing terrorists in the potentialities of nuclear terrorism,⁶⁵⁹ and with the exception of a few high-profile incidents, such as the assassinations of Heinz Karry in 1981 and of Karl-Heinz Beckurts in 1986 that although they had a nuclear component owed more to other factors,⁶⁶⁰ the overwhelming majority of nuclear incidents, in West Germany, recorded by the Rand-St Andrews Database for the years 1969 to 1986 were perpetrated by genuinely single-issue anti-nuclear groups. Apart from these high-profile incidents, most of the other events appear to have been relatively low-level and directed against property, not people. These include: eight attacks on reactors in northern Germany between 1977 and April 1979, all using home-made explosives; an attack using two home-made bombs on a mast carrying a high-tension line from the Esenham power plant in April 1979; the June 1979 attack on the building of the "Urangesellschaft" (Uranium Company) in Frankfurt; the bombing in December 1980 of the Society for Nuclear

⁶⁵⁸ Peter Neuhauser, "The Mind of a German Terrorist", Encounter, p. 87.

⁶⁵⁹ See too Baumann's comments that there had been discussion in the group about the possibility of nuclear terrorism and that "Anyone who had something like that [nuclear weapons] in hand has enough power to make the Prime Minister dance on a table in front of a T.V. camera." in Kellen, "Terrorists...", pp. 61-62.

⁶⁶⁰ Karry, the economics minister of Hesse, was shot in his bed in a well-organised attack (despite issuing several warnings to Karry, the assassins were able to cut the telephone wires to the house, and enter the building undetected) in May 1981. Police suggested that the motive might have stemmed from Karry's support for the expansion of Frankfurt airport and the building of a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant in Hesse. Karry was Jewish and his assassination had similarities with the earlier killing of Heinz Nittel, also a prominent Jew, which was claimed by Al-Assifa, one of the alternative names for Abu Nidal's organisation. However, the Karry killing was later claimed by the Revolutionary Cells, who stated that his death was an accident since they had intended to "punish" him by shooting him in the legs. RAND- St Andrews Database. Karl-Heinz Beckurts, a senior executive of the company Siemens, was killed, along with his driver, in July 1986 by a 22-pound bomb that was detonated by remote control as his car went by. Responsibility was claimed by the RAF, who attributed the attack to Siemens involvement in the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) research, the company's plans to build a nuclear reprocessing plant in Bavaria, and to Beckurt's position as one of the premier industrialists in West Germany. William Tuohy, "Terrorists' Bomb Kills W. German A-Scientist", Los Angeles Times, July 10 1986, p. A1; Robert J. McCartney, "Terrorist Group kills Executive Near Munich", Washington Post, July 10 1986, p. A1.

Reactor Security's office in Cologne; an unexploded bomb at the West Berlin turbine plant of the builders of nuclear power plants, Kraftwerk Union, in March 1981; a July 1986 fire at a firm that built nuclear fuel reprocessing plants in Schwandorf; as well as a series of attacks and trespass actions at United States Army bases.⁶⁶¹

The Italian and German examples suggest that anti-nuclear violence is not necessarily a factor in left-wing terrorism, even when it might be an option and where the terrorist depiction of their adversaries comes close to demonisation. There evidently has to be another element as well to explain the actions of left-wing groups such as Action Direct in France and Direct Action in Canada, or nationalist-separatist groups such as ETA in Spain. Despite the dominance of left-wing motivations in anti-nuclear violence, it remains the case that this type of group is singularly unlikely to be responsible for a high-level act of nuclear terrorism. There are a number of reasons for this, most critically, that left-wing groups actions are mitigated by bounded morality. As has been discussed with the bounded rationality of terrorist's actions, while their morality may not be clear to, or shared by, the majority of the population, it exists in a way that is a genuine constraint on the scope of left-wing groups' campaigns. Bearing in mind this dichotomy between the ethics of the terrorist and that of the general population, it is curious that the basis for left-wing organisations' self-imposed limitations is their perception of their audience's morality, in terms of what actions by the terrorists will be tolerated. Nonetheless, this morality is critical in legitimising the actions of left-wing terrorists. It is this that separates them in their own minds from criminals; it justifies their consistent infringement of widely accepted moral and legal boundaries in society. They can claim to be fighting a defensive and "just" war against an oppressive and overbearing state.⁶⁶² Furthermore, since a great deal of left-wing violence is perpetuated by a "revolutionary vanguard", in the name of the people, against the government and elite of a state, such groups are reluctant to commit acts that needlessly injure "innocent" people.⁶⁶³ Horst Mahler, one of the founders of the Baader-Meinhof group, said of their targeting: "Of

⁶⁶¹ Rand-St Andrews Database

⁶⁶² Bonnie Cordes, "When Terrorists Do the Talking: Reflections on Terrorist Literature" in Rapoport (ed.), Inside..., p. 157.

⁶⁶³ Hoffman, "The Ethical...", pp. 363-364.

course, it was not 'the people', the little man who is innocent and not involved in any repression that we would kill. The main point in our struggle was to be some kind of sabotage and punishment of responsible personages for cruelties against the people."⁶⁶⁴ Direct Action are another example of this, in that they displayed a ruthlessness and contempt towards their enemies, but were equally appalled when their attacks wounded innocent people. The Tupamaros are also a good example of this: they sought to be the "armed vanguard" of the Uruguayan left, a perspective that led it to treat terrorism as just one tactic amongst several on the road to political power. The group never ceased to be aware that terrorism could be potentially damaging to the revolution, so constantly sought to avoid unnecessary violence and especially injury to people other than their targets.⁶⁶⁵ This point is so important as to bear re-emphasis: the targeting and actions of left-wing groups are restricted by proportionality and justice: attacks that are disproportionate or unjust are counter-productive, risking causing a government clamp-down, as well as alienating the terrorists from their audience and potential sympathisers. Consequently, while they may be capable of mass destructive terrorism, left-wing groups are unlikely to engage in such actions. The likelihood of nuclear terrorism, determined by such considerations of tactics and targeting, and shaped by factors like ideology, psychology and opportunity, is the focus of the next section.

⁶⁶⁴ Elizabeth Pond, "Remorseful terrorist looks back", Christian Science Monitor, August 29 1978, p. 13.

⁶⁶⁵ Lopez-Alves, "Political...", pp. 203-206.

The Likelihood of Nuclear Terrorism

The implications of the increased opportunity to proliferate arising from the collapse of the former Soviet Union are far from clear when it comes to applying them to nuclear terrorism. Jenkins has suggested that it is psychotics that are most likely to be attracted to such acts, but that, of all terrorists, it is also psychotics that would be least capable of the sustained teamwork and incremental progress that would probably characterise this variety of terrorism.⁶⁶⁶ Post generally agrees with this assessment but believes that it risks oversimplifying the case.⁶⁶⁷ Most crucially, it fails to differentiate between various types of nuclear terrorism: are the implications for a radiological device necessarily the same as for the likelihood of terrorists building a yield-giving bomb or using one? It seems unlikely. The most crucial difference that has emerged in recent years is between those that stress terrorist capability and those that emphasise terrorist intent as the main factor affecting the likelihood of a terrorist nuclear device. In both cases, though, nuclear terrorism would be "a quantum leap" from conventional weapons terrorism.⁶⁶⁸

Setting off a nuclear-yield bomb would require that a group somehow acquire a weapon, possibly through state-sponsorship, but more likely by stealing one, an extremely difficult proposition and a relatively unlikely one, given the presumed need of terrorists or states for anonymity and complete security at such a delicate stage of their operations. The other, more likely, alternative would be that they build a bomb; since this would require fissile material it would seem to preclude all but the most well-off or state-sponsored terrorist groups. If terrorists were intent on building a nuclear-yield device, their biggest technical difficulty would almost certainly be the acquisition of fissile material. It is worth recalling that the design for a crude nuclear device has been publicly accessible for 25 years and that it relies on technology that was challenging in the 1940s, but that is almost certainly no longer

⁶⁶⁶ Brian Jenkins, "The Potential For Nuclear Terrorism", RAND P-5876, May 1977.

⁶⁶⁷ Jerrold M. Post "Prospects For Nuclear Terrorism: Psychological Motivations & Constraints" in Leventhal & Alexander (ed.), Preventing Nuclear Terrorism, p. 92.

⁶⁶⁸ Clarke, Author's...

so.⁶⁶⁹ Balanced against that is the argument that states such as Iran and Iraq have been actively pursuing a nuclear weapons capability for a

⁶⁶⁹ This is especially the case if the assumption is that terrorists are content with a crude nuclear weapon, of variable and uncertain yield. Easiest to construct would be a gun-type assembly using HEU. A less than critical mass quantity of uranium (probably around 15kg) would be fired down a cylinder, using a high explosive charge, into another less than critical mass quantity of uranium (about 40kg) at the other end of the cylinder and which had been hollowed out so that the smaller quantity of uranium fitted snugly, forming a supercritical mass and creating a nuclear explosion. Although such a device requires a relatively large amount of HEU and a thick-walled cylinder, probably about 50cm long, the device would not be impossibly heavy and could certainly be easily transported by van. Terrorists could use any plutonium for a bomb, but if it were reactor grade material it would probably be first necessary to convert plutonium oxide into metal, a relatively straightforward chemical process. For a bomb, a quantity of material close to critical mass (about 8kg for plutonium metal) would be used since that would negate the necessity of using shaped high explosives to create a supercritical mass. It would be sufficient to simply stack the explosives around the plutonium which would need to have been machined to a sphere (this could be readily done in a machine-shop, preferably one with a fume cupboard since plutonium metal can spontaneously burst into flames in air) and place 50-60 detonators, fired simultaneously, so that the plutonium is compressed symmetrically enough to form a supercritical mass. There are some potential risks to building a crude nuclear bomb, but fairly elementary precautions would minimise the danger of radiological hazards or accidentally achieving criticality. A crude device could be built by a small group, using the open literature, and without requiring testing of components or a great deal of technological equipment, the cost of which would be a fraction of a million dollars. International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, "Crude Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and the Terrorist Threat", IPPNW Global Health Watch, Report Number 1, 1996, pp. 6-10.

The biggest barrier to such a device is access to the nuclear material. The amount of fissile material required to build a bomb is much disputed: the IAEA assumes that 18lbs (8 kg) of weapons-grade plutonium is enough, but the American lobby group, the National Resources Defence Council (NRDC), puts the figure at significantly less. The bomb at Nagasaki in August 1945 produced a yield equivalent to 21,000 tonnes of TNT using 6kg of plutonium. The NRDC believes that experts could achieve the same yield now with a third of the fissile material. However, this sort of efficiency requires computer-modelling and components testing. Without that, it is still possible to make a device: South Africa's bombs were certain to work, but did use 60kg of highly-enriched uranium. "Little Boys", The Economist, August 27 1994, p. 74. Frank Barnaby, a former nuclear scientist, states that at most, 10 kg of plutonium or 50 kg of highly enriched uranium are needed to create a nuclear explosion. Barnaby, "Nuclear Accidents...", p. 95. Oleg Bukharin, a research fellow at Princeton's Center for Energy & Environmental Studies, puts the figure at 6kg of plutonium or 25kg of highly enriched uranium for a crude implosion-type device and about 50kg of uranium for a gun-type device. Bukharin, "Nuclear Safeguards...", p. 54. The cost of building such a bomb would certainly run into the millions or tens of millions for the material alone, probably more than most terrorist organisations could afford. However, if the group is contemplating acquiring a nuclear device, it would be unwise to suppose that their abilities do not extend to also acquiring the means to buy enough fissile material for the bomb. Nelan, "Formula...", p. 19. There is also no agreement about the black market price of nuclear materials, particularly since the quality of the materials is so variable. The Berlin Information Centre for Transatlantic Security, an independent research institute, claimed that the price in 1994 was \$6 million per kilogram of plutonium,

number of years and have still not succeeded. This has as much to do with their difficulty in obtaining sufficient fissile material as anything else. However, it is precisely this possibility, a terrorist built nuclear device, that is the focus of so much attention and speculation currently and is the reason that events in the former Soviet Union are of such importance. While terrorism other than a nuclear-yield bomb, such as a radiological device, is more likely, the severity of the former means that the extent of the problem of a radiological device is not proportionate to a full scale terrorist nuclear weapon; thus most of the focus has thus far been on the nuclear-yield device.⁶⁷⁰ However, there is widespread recognition that:

Adding to this threat [the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction] is the emergence of low-technology nuclear devices and radioactive material dispersal weapons, based on diverted or stolen material (nuclear smuggling); indigenous or covert production of biological or chemical agents (as demonstrated by the Aum Shinrikyo cult's attack); and advances and diffusion of biotechnology that enable genetically engineered agents that may thwart the use of productive countermeasures.⁶⁷¹

It still seems unlikely that most terrorist organisations would seek to enrich material for a yield-producing device: it is simply too complex and requires considerable expertise and unnecessary cost to achieve. The more telling argument against it, though, is that enrichment would be unnecessary in many cases: a crude nuclear-yield bomb can be made with material that is not weapons-grade and even low-grade fissile material would have considerable utility as the basis for a radiological device. Materials in this category can be more easily stolen from nuclear, industrial and research facilities than can weapons-grade

but other sources put it as low as \$250,000. Michael Evans, "Russian Officials Offered Plutonium Sale To Briton", The Times, August 18, 1994, p. 1. The Russian Counter-Intelligence Service cites \$400,000 a kilo for uranium fuel rods and \$2.2 million a kilo for weapons grade uranium as the price in 1995. "Nuclear Smuggling", Channel 4 Television 7 pm News, February 15, 1995.

⁶⁷⁰ Falkenrath, Author's...

⁶⁷¹ D. Cobb & W. Kirchner, Testimony to US Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Permanent Subcommittee On Investigations, "Reducing the Threat of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Proliferation and Terrorism", 104th Congress 2nd Session, March 13, 20, and 22 1996, p. 4.

material.⁶⁷² Since such a radiological device would be extremely easy to construct (it need only be an aerosol can or a bomb with a radioactive coating or with a container of radioactive material next to it), and since the materials for it are so widely available (cesium-137, for example, is commonly used in hospitals for X-rays), it is by far the most likely form of nuclear device, as well as the least catastrophic. However, it would still have considerable value as a terrorist weapon, since the mere fact of being "nuclear" would almost certainly ensure that it had an impact on the public's imagination and fear, and thus on a governmental response, far in excess of the danger it poses. An example of this would be the response to the Three Mile Island accident in 1979: the risk to the public was minimal, but the outcry and fear were considerable.⁶⁷³ Radiological devices are not ideal for creating mass casualties, and certainly not in the short-term, but they would have vast impact and could, potentially, pose a considerable problem for an extended period. Once aware of the problem, it would probably be possible to clean up the radiological effects of a device, but restoring public confidence would be very difficult.⁶⁷⁴ Suppose that terrorists put radioactive material in the main ventilation system of a building such as the World Trade Center or of the New York subway. Even if all of the material was successfully removed and the contamination dealt with, how easy would it be to persuade people to return to work in the WTC or to use the subway again? Clearly, the disruption would be immense. The decision as to whether or not to use a nuclear-yield device, or a radiological weapon,

⁶⁷² Louis Freeh, Testimony to US Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Permanent Subcommittee On Investigations, "International Organized Crime And Its Impact On The United States", 103rd Congress, 2nd Session, May 25 1994, p. 62.

⁶⁷³ It is almost impossible to generalise on the extent of the risk to the public from a radiological dispersal device: it depends so much on the material used, the means of dispersal, population density, weather conditions and the period of time that the public is exposed to it. However, the IPPNW, in their publication on crude nuclear weapons, argue that:

...[T]he consequences of a radiological weapon using plutonium in amounts that are potentially available for a terrorist attack are very largely long-term in nature: primarily increased cancer incidence, particularly of lung, bone, and liver cancer... Thus in health effect terms, the impact of such a weapon would be hidden for several decades, and probably would not be dramatic. However, given the public aversion to cancer risk, and the fears engendered by plutonium as a potential carcinogen, there are likely to be immediate and dramatic responses by the emergency services.

International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, "Crude...", p. 38.

⁶⁷⁴ Spector, Author's...

or neither, must be largely dependent not only on the type of terrorist group concerned, but also on the type of target selected. An attack requiring the destruction of an enormous area, such as an army base, or the death of as many people as possible, might conceivably justify the use of a full-scale nuclear weapon. However, in terms of destructive capability, a radiological device is unlikely to improve significantly on conventional weapons. This, then, leads to the question: why would one use such a weapon, since it would require so much more effort, especially in acquiring fissile material, than would conventional terrorism?⁶⁷⁵ Part of the answer must lie in its publicity value, and the fear it is capable of engendering. At the moment, it is still possible to argue that massive conventional attacks attract just as much coverage as previous non-conventional actions: the publicity around the WTC and Oklahoma attacks or the assault on the Marine Barracks in Beirut or the destruction of Pan-Am 103 was just as intense as that surrounding the sarin attack in Tokyo by Aum. It is no less so for the fact that there have now been several such devastating attacks in the past 15 years. However, radiological terrorism is potentially attractive to a terrorist because it sets them apart from other groups; it takes terrorism to a new level, and it evokes the word "nuclear" and all that that conjures in the minds of the public. Perversely, given the immense destructiveness associated with nuclear weapons, radiological terrorism offers terrorists the opportunity to obtain vast publicity *without* necessarily having to kill many people, at least not visibly or immediately. However, the sorts of group that might consider this an advantage are those whose strategy is based on an element of rationality, those that do have an earthly objective, and therefore those that are likely to be reluctant to potentially commit themselves to being considered responsible for continuing to kill people decades after the attack. To a very large extent, though, the effects of a radiological weapon are dependent on the type of material used: while weapons-grade plutonium might cause limited damage, other elements such as cesium or even radioactive waste are potentially lethal very rapidly. In 1987, in Goiana, Brazil, two adults broke open a cesium source found abandoned in a clinic and allowed children to play with the glowing material inside. Within days, four people died and 249 others were contaminated. There was public

⁶⁷⁵ Brad Thayer & Robert Newman, Research Fellows, Center for Science and International Affairs, JFK School of Government, Harvard University, Interview With Author, November 12, 1996, Cambridge, Mass.

hysteria and thousands of cubic metres of soil had to be removed for decontamination.⁶⁷⁶

The Psychology of Nuclear Terrorism

Nuclear terrorism encompasses a number of different acts that have to be treated individually if a discussion of the psychological motivations for nuclear terrorism is to have much meaning. It is hard to envisage a psychologically normal person who would be willing to carry out an act of mass destruction, yet most terrorists are psychologically normal. They may be particularly susceptible to group or organisational pressures, be social or personal failures so that they feel marginalised and use the terrorist group as a means of consolidating their identity, but most terrorists are not insane or psychotic. However, the propensity of some terrorists to suffer from "survivor guilt", as has already been discussed, is potentially significant. DeNike has argued that the willingness of some terrorists to sacrifice themselves actually extends not only to being prepared to die but even to a desire to die. He cites the example of skyjackers who "lack the guts to kill themselves. They manipulate their society into killing them... [they] are often committing the act to be killed"⁶⁷⁷ This would be important for nuclear terrorism not because it seems probable that many terrorists, determined to "go out in a blaze of glory", would go to the considerable trouble of acquiring nuclear means to do so, but because it clearly suggests that there are some terrorists for whom the certainty of death would not be a disincentive. There has been at least one hoaxed extortion threat of kamikaze action against a nuclear facility. In November 1972, hijackers of a Southern Airways DC-9 forced it to circle the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee, threatening to crash the plane into the plant unless a ransom of \$10 million was paid. Personnel were evacuated from the facility but the threat came to nothing. Furthermore, this incident cannot really be regarded as terrorism since the hijackers of the plane were driven by a

⁶⁷⁶ Sopko, "The Changing...", pp.7-8.

⁶⁷⁷ L. Douglas DeNike, "The Psychology Of Nuclear - Related Crimes & Terrorism", Invited Testimony To Subcommittee On Energy & The Environment, House Committee On Interior & Insular Affairs, WashingtonDC, February 26 1976. p. 4.

financial, not a political motivation.⁶⁷⁸ It is also possible to argue that in some cases the people ultimately responsible for the terrorist act would not be the same as those who carried it out and that the latter might be unaware of the full extent of their physical danger. Merari suggested that this might be the case with some of the suicidal bombers in the Middle East in the early to mid 1980s. He thought that some of these were in reality "remote control martyrs", fooled by their senders into believing that they would survive the operation. In several attempted Lebanese car-bombings, the detonation was from a following vehicle, giving the driver of the lead car carrying the explosive, no possibility of escape.⁶⁷⁹ It is worth noting that, psychologically, there is a considerable difference between genuinely suicidal attacks, such as the majority of car-bombings, and those attacks where there is a high probability of death: the difference between seeking to die and being ready to die. In contrast to DeNike, Merari believed that those who actively sought death were quite limited in number, even amongst those motivated by religious factors; for example, claiming that a major reason for the decline of Shiite suicide bombings in the mid 1980s was that they simply ran out of volunteers.⁶⁸⁰ However, even if this was once the case, it is evidently no longer so: according to Ami Ayalon, head of Israel's Shin Bet intelligence service, Hamas has thousands of Palestinian youths awaiting their chance.⁶⁸¹ Merari's views would be important, if correct, because they would suggest that terrorism, even if religiously-motivated, offers only the opportunity to commit suicide for individuals already predisposed to do so, just as Post argued that a major reason individuals became terrorists was that it offered the means for them to use violence. However, there can be little doubt now that religion can motivate individuals sufficiently for them to commit

⁶⁷⁸ "Hijacked Plane Lands In Havana A Second Time, 31 Hostages Free; 3 Gunmen Seized After 29 Hours", New York Times, November 12 1972, pp. 1, 73.

⁶⁷⁹ Ariel Merari, "The Readiness to Kill & Die: Suicidal Terrorism In The Middle East" in Reich (ed.) Origins of Terrorism, pp. 194-96.

⁶⁸⁰ Merari suggests that religion is not the key factor in truly suicidal terrorism, believing that only those who wish to die as distinct from those willing to die resort to it. Therefore, it is a personal rather than a group-inspired decision. He does however concede that the individual's choice may be heavily affected by culture, situation & indoctrination as well as personality, and that it is in this respect that religion is significant. Ibid. p. 206. This view is rather the exception. Kramer attributes the decline to a tactical choice by groups such as Hizballah. Kramer, "The Moral Logic Of Hizballah", in Reich (ed) Origins of Terrorism, p. 148.

⁶⁸¹ "Wedded To Death In A Blaze Of Glory", Sunday Times, March 10, 1996.

suicidal acts. Even some secularly-motivated terrorist organisations can inspire their adherents sufficiently that they are willing to commit suicide rather than be captured if they are wounded in combat. The Tamil Tigers carry cyanide around their neck for just such a purpose.⁶⁸² It should be noted, though, that the Tamil example is exceptional, particularly amongst nationalist-separatist groups.

The decision to resort to weapons of mass destruction, if it was made, and assuming that terrorists were able to acquire the means to engage in such an act, would be more likely to be a result of group dynamics than any individual's choice, although this is more likely to be the case in secular groups than religious groups or cults where the influence of a single person, such as Shoko Asahara the leader of Aum Shinrikyo, can be decisive. The group becomes subject to "group think", as described by Janis, in which it over-estimates both its own strength and the threat posed to the organisation by external factors. However, the group needs this danger to have meaning in order to enable the organisation to focus their attentions and frustrations on the threat from without. Terrorist groups are dominated by the "flight-fight" tendency in Bion's "basic- assumption group". Their belief that the world is out to destroy them is not merely a paranoid delusion since, while this view may initially be caused by internal psychological convictions, it becomes self-fulfilling once the group begins to engage in terrorist acts. This would be especially the case if a group were to engage in terrorism employing WMD, since it would elicit an extremely strong response from the government threatened, possibly endangering the existence of the group itself. Counter-balancing this seeming disincentive is the fact that many terrorist groups try to make the government over-react to the threat, and experience a rise in support, resulting from the government's repressive measures. Furthermore, fear of repression is scarcely a disincentive to those desperate groups that believe they have little chance of survival anyway or to those motivated by apocalyptic religious beliefs.⁶⁸³ However, the likelihood of terrorists gaining support as a result of government repression is also remote, since it is

⁶⁸² See Mark Fineman, "Rebels' Weapon: Cyanide", Los Angeles Times, January 20, 1992, pp. A1, 10, 12.

⁶⁸³ Ron Purver, "Understanding Past Non-Use of CBW By Terrorists", Conference on 'ChenBio Terrorism: Wave of the Future?' Sponsored by the Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, Washington DC, April 29, 1996, pp. 7-8.

more than possible that the majority of people would regard almost any (temporary) measure as commensurate with the threat of high-level nuclear terrorism, and it is this perceived proportionality that is key to terrorist support.

A possible motivation for nuclear terrorism would be the group's belief that it has nothing to lose. The core priority of the organisation is survival; acts justify and call attention to its existence. If the group felt that it was fading, dissolving into factions or being usurped for prominence by another group, it might launch an act of nuclear terrorism to regain its status. The moral constraints against using terrorism are eroded by the use of ideology and rhetoric to polarise "them" from "us" and to reinforce the pressure to conform. If an act, no matter how heinous, furthers the group cause then it must be good by definition. The cause of society's ills is perceived to lie outside the group, often with the establishment. To destroy the source of those ills is therefore the height of morality.

Mass murder is a relatively rare terrorist phenomenon, since in most cases, killing a handful is just as effective for achieving group goals.⁶⁸⁴ There have been no instances to date where terrorists have resorted to nuclear weapons for mass destruction. There are a number of important reasons for this: terrorists are technologically conservative; preferring to use tried and tested methods to achieve their aims, they have yet to reach what Hoffman calls "their killing potential" using conventional weaponry, so have little need to be innovative.⁶⁸⁵ This is reinforced by the fact that the organisational dynamics of many terrorist groups mitigate the sudden escalation of means into the nuclear domain because that would cause intense debate and risk schism.⁶⁸⁶ Most terrorist groups have latent defectors; the group is likely to be split at the decision to "go nuclear" between those who want to escalate and those who do not want to. Such polarisation increases the likelihood of splitting and therefore raises the risk of betrayal.⁶⁸⁷ Since the primary goal of the organisation is survival, such controversies are avoided.

⁶⁸⁴ Brian Jenkins, "The Likelihood Of Nuclear Terrorism", RAND P-7119, July 1985, p. 6.

⁶⁸⁵ Hoffman, "Terrorist Targeting...", p. 23.

⁶⁸⁶ Hoffman, "An Assessment Of The Potential..." p. 9.

⁶⁸⁷ Jenkins, "The Likelihood...", p. 8.

However, distorted decision-making does not equate to total irrationality. Do circumstances exist where terrorists would seek to kill many people? Jenkins has argued that "terrorists want a lot of people watching not a lot of people dead."⁶⁸⁸ The key point in favour of this view is that causing mass casualties would be counter-productive; if this were not so, if such an act did not alienate the terrorist's constituency of supporters, then a major limitation would have been removed. While organisations such as ETA, the IRA or the RAF are trying to alter the views of their own population, for groups that operate across state boundaries the disapproval of the targeted population is a reward not a disincentive. Two possible, related, examples of this might be the attack by Baruch Goldstein at the Cave of the Patriarchs in Hebron on February 24, 1994 and the attack by Hamas member Salah Abdel-Rahim Hassan Assawi on a bus in Tel Aviv on October 19, 1994. In the first attack, 30 Muslim worshippers were killed; in the second, 22 Israelis. Both Goldstein and Assawi were fanatical opponents of the September 1993 Israeli-Palestinian Peace Accord; each sought, by an act of terrorism beyond the usual level of violence, to encourage an adverse reaction in the population as a whole, making further concessions impossible and derailing the entire Peace Process.⁶⁸⁹ In these cases, the levels of violence are not constrained by what might be deemed 'acceptable' to the targeted audience, so much as accentuated by the terrorist's desire that they are as unacceptably high as possible. However, it is questionable whether nuclear weapons would be appropriate as "spoilers" since such an action depends on an individual or group claiming responsibility, the implications of which, in the context of a nuclear-yield bomb, are likely to be severe and possibly counter-productive if it meant that there would be increased outside intervention to compel an agreement.⁶⁹⁰ Another possible scenario for a terrorist use of a nuclear-yield device is an attack on an ally of the US, rather than on a US target, for "demonstration purposes", with the clear possibility of a further attack, to compel compliance by the US administration. The logic of such a high-profile action would be that it would place a huge amount of pressure on the US government without necessarily producing the same degree of counter-productive

⁶⁸⁸ Jenkins, "Will Terrorist Go Nuclear?", pp. 4-5.

⁶⁸⁹ Friedman, *From Beirut To Jerusalem*, pp. 559-560.

⁶⁹⁰ Thayer & Newman, *Author's...*

sentiments and over-powering desire for revenge that an attack on US soil would engender.⁶⁹¹ The subsequent reaction to such an assault is not clear: the scale of the threat and the trend towards international co-operation on terrorism might well mean that the intelligence and security force efforts to deal with the situation might be no less as a result of an attack in Britain or Canada than for one in the United States. Furthermore, restating a pledge made by the United States, Britain and the USSR in the 1968 UN Security Council Resolution 255 "to provide or support immediate assistance, in accordance with the Charter" in the event of nuclear aggression or the threat of it, in 1995 all five Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) gave non-specific promises to take measures to restore international peace and security, in the event of a nuclear attack on a Non-Nuclear Weapon State (NNWS). However, they stopped short of guaranteeing a nuclear or even a military response.⁶⁹² Although this probably should not be regarded as binding, it does show a clear, long-standing, commitment to regarding nuclear use or the threat of it as a problem that transcends state boundaries. Therefore, the fear of the possible repercussions may be just as much a factor when terrorists contemplate using nuclear weapons outside the US as within it. One, more justifiably worrying, factor that might encourage a terrorist use of non-conventional weaponry is that, particularly in some parts of the world, even secular terrorism is perceived in absolutist terms, more readily associated with religious motivations for violence. The Armenian example has already been cited, but it applies equally to parts of South Asia. Some groups are willing to define their enemies in very broad terms: anyone belonging to a rival sect, organisation or community, and to target them indiscriminately as a consequence.⁶⁹³ Such a trait is certainly not unique to these groups, but it is rarer that they also have the willingness to impose mass casualties at random, as happened in the business district of Colombo in January 1996.

Jenkins made his point about the objectives of terrorists in the mid-Seventies, so it is reasonable to question whether it is still applicable

⁶⁹¹ David I. Ross, "Canada and the world at risk: depression, war and isolationism in the 21st century?", *International Journal*, Volume LII Number 1 Winter 1996-7, p. 13.

⁶⁹² E. Johanson, "Nuke Vote", *Voice of America*, April 11 1995.

⁶⁹³ Paul Leventhal & Brahma Chellaney, "Nuclear Terrorism: Threat, Perception, and Response in South Asia", *Terrorism*, Volume 11, (1988), pp. 458-459.

today, especially since the opportunities for nuclear terrorism have undoubtedly grown in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War. However, despite examples such as Hebron and Tel Aviv, it largely seems that Jenkins point is still valid: "simply killing a lot of people has seldom been one terrorist objective... terrorists operate on the principle of the minimum force necessary. They find it unnecessary to kill many, as long as killing a few suffices for their purposes."⁶⁹⁴ Although there have been several small scale attacks against nuclear plants across the world, none have endangered any part of their nuclear component or produced nuclear fallout. The only credible threats have been against non-operational or newly constructed plants.⁶⁹⁵ Other, non-reactor targets connected with the nuclear industry have included the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory which was car bombed in 1987⁶⁹⁶ and a factory near Toronto that produced guidance systems for the Cruise Missile.⁶⁹⁷ Personnel connected with the nuclear industry have also been attacked: Lemoniz project manager Angel Pascual was murdered

⁶⁹⁴ Jenkins, "The Likelihood....", RAND P-7119, p. 6.

⁶⁹⁵ Attacks have included an antitank assault on the partially constructed Creys-Malville plant in France. Prial, "Antitank Rockets Are Fired At French Nuclear Reactor", p. A3. Others have been: one against the Koeberg nuclear power plant near Cape Town where the facility's control room was damaged; a rocket-powered grenade attack by ETA against a reactor containment tower at Lemoniz; and the bombing of three off-site power lines at Palo Verde nuclear power plant in Arizona in May 1986. D. Fischer's response to T. Davies "What Nuclear Means & Targets Might Terrorists Find Attractive?" in Leventhal & Alexander (eds.), Nuclear Terrorism: Defining The Threat, pp. 85-86. Other targets within the United States have included the visitor's centre of the Trojan reactor in Oregon which was bombed in 1971; and unexploded bombs have been found at the Point Beach reactor in Wisconsin in 1970 and the Illinois Institute of Technology reactor in 1969. Discontented workers have done millions of dollars of damage, the Indian Point Two reactor in New York in 1971, Zion reactor in Illinois, Quad Cities in Illinois, Peach Bottom in Pennsylvania, Fort St Vrain in Colorado, Browns Ferry in Alabama, Beaver Valley plant in Pennsylvania and the Surrey reactor in Virginia all being notable examples. Allegedly, there have also been numerous examples of theft from US facilities: the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory lost a ton of lead shielding in a year; two sixty-six-pound drums of low-enriched uranium were stolen from the General Electric Fuel Processing Plant in Wilmington, North Carolina, by an employee seeking to extort \$100,000 from the company; and the Apollo, Pennsylvania plant lost enough highly enriched uranium for several nuclear bombs. Bowman, When The Eagle..., pp. 134-135.

⁶⁹⁶ "FBI Seizes Nuclear Protestor In Car Bombing At A-Weapons Lab", Los Angeles Times, April 8, 1988, p. A32.

⁶⁹⁷ See Nicholas Hirst, "Bomb Damages Cruise Missile Plant In Toronto", Financial Times, October 16, 1982; or John Best, "Toronto Missile Plant Bombed", The Times, October 16, 1982, p. 6.

by ETA in 1982,⁶⁹⁸ and in 1986 the RAF assassinated Karl Heinz Beckurts, a physicist in charge of research and technology for Siemens, because he represented "Western Europe's biggest high-tech concern and the world's third-biggest atomic concern".⁶⁹⁹ None of these attacks could be regarded as approaching mass-destructive terrorism, despite their nuclear component. There have, though, been other incidents, some of which are discussed below, that show an alarming trend towards using fissile material as a radiological weapon.

Most terrorist violence is symbolic: aimed at drawing attention to the group and its cause rather than to destroying people or property unnecessarily. Consequently, most of such violence is directed against inanimate objects: fatal attacks accounted for only about 29% of all assaults in 1995. However, this figure is rising: in 1994 it was 27% of incidents and it was only 19% in the 1980s and 17% in the 1970s. Most attacks are still against targets with symbolic importance for the terrorist, so that (in descending order) diplomatic, business, airline, military and finally civilian targets are the most frequent. It is extremely rare for terrorists to contemplate the infliction of mass casualties such as might be caused by a nuclear incident. Of over 8000 international terrorist incidents since 1968, fewer than 60 show any indication of terrorists seeking to use non-conventional means.⁷⁰⁰

However, terrorism is becoming increasingly lethal: in the 1980s terrorist incidents rose by a third compared to the 1970s, but the result was a twofold increase in fatalities as a result of these attacks.⁷⁰¹ While fatalities from international terrorism peaked at 800 in 1987, followed by 663 in 1988, 661 in 1983 and 467 in 1993,⁷⁰² the percentage of incidents that involved at least one fatality in 1995 was higher than at any time since 1968 at 29%.⁷⁰³ To some extent, this could be explained by the fact

⁶⁹⁸ Jules Stewart, "The Murder Of Lemoniz Project Manager Angel Pascual", Nucleonics Week, Volume 23 Number 19, May 13, 1982, p. 2.

⁶⁹⁹ William Tuohy, "Terrorists Bomb Kills W. German A-Scientist", Los Angeles Times, July 10, 1986, p. A1; Robert J. McCartney, "Terrorist Group Kills Executive Near Munich", Washington Post, July 10, 1986, p. A1.

⁷⁰⁰ RAND-St Andrews Chronology of International Terrorism.

⁷⁰¹ Bruce Hoffman, "Testimony Before The US Senate Committee On Enviroment & Public Works, Subcommittee On Clean Air & Nuclear Regulation", RAND, (March 1993), p. 7.

⁷⁰² Hoffman & Hoffman, "The Rand-St Andrews... 1994", p. 185.

⁷⁰³ Hoffman & Hoffman, "The Rand-St Andrews... 1995", p. 87.

that a few incidents, such as the bombing of the US Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983, the 1985 bombing of the Air India jet, and the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie in 1988, each resulted in the deaths of hundreds of people causing terrorism as a whole to appear increasingly lethal. However, such figures also reflect a trend that has three key elements: the "amateurisation" of terrorism, the contrastingly improved professionalism of other terrorists, and the rise of religious terrorism.

Previously, terrorist groups were largely seen as well-defined bodies with a coherent (although sometimes loose) command and control structure⁷⁰⁴ that spent the bulk of their time focused on their cause and planning future actions. The World Trade Centre (WTC) attack in February 1993 compelled many of these assumptions to be re-examined. It was a one-off operation conducted on an ad hoc basis by a group of like-minded individuals who shared similar frustrations, friends and religious beliefs. They were only indirectly connected to a controlling body making it very hard for the authorities to trace them beforehand. This would be significant for the likelihood of nuclear terrorism for two reasons: the lack of tight controls may mean that there are fewer constraints for terrorists to cause mass casualties and the use of cut-outs would mean that state-sponsorship of nuclear terrorism could not be ruled out, so long as the state concerned could continue to plausibly deny all knowledge of the attack.⁷⁰⁵ Acting Director of Central Intelligence, William Studeman, testified in April 1995 that:

...a new Islamic extremist threat is on the rise. These groups - often ad hoc - are even more dangerous in some ways than the traditional groups because they do not have a well established organizational identity and they tend to decentralize and compartment their activities. They also are capable of producing and using more sophisticated conventional weapons as well as chemical and biological agents. They are less restrained by state sponsors or other benefactors than are the traditional groups. These groups appear disinclined to negotiate, but instead seek to take revenge on the United States and Western countries by inflicting heavy civilian casualties...

⁷⁰⁴ See for example, Crenshaw, "An Organizational Approach..."

⁷⁰⁵ Hoffman, "Responding To Terrorism Across The Technological Spectrum", RAND, (April 1994), pp. 13-16.

Both the traditional Islamic terrorists and the new breed have filled their ranks with militants who trained in the Afghan war, where they learned the value of violence in defeating a major power. They are well funded. Some have developed sophisticated international networks that allow them great freedom of movement and opportunity to strike, including in the United States. They also are attracting a more qualified cadre with greater technical skills. Several groups have established footholds within ethnic or resident alien communities here in the United States. These communities offer terrorists financial support and a source for new recruits.⁷⁰⁶

In the past, it was easier to argue that terrorism was clearly instrumental, at least in part: groups sought legitimacy and "a seat at the table". However, now it is possible to see organisations that, as Brad Roberts of the Institute for Defense Analyses in Virginia, states: "don't seem to care about establishing legitimacy, but just want to strike a blow in anger and kill as many people as possible... For them, the calculation of the right level of violence seems to have no upper bounds."⁷⁰⁷ To brand most terrorism in this way would be an over-generalisation: politically-motivated groups retain as much rationality and calculated instrumentalism as ever. But Robert's point does have some validity for a number of other, predominantly religiously-motivated, organisations, such as Aum Shinrikyo.

Religious terrorist groups appear to have a higher level of lethality than most other types of groups: since 1982 Shia groups have been responsible for 8% of terrorist attacks but 28% of deaths arising from such attacks. Such forms of terrorism are widespread: from Islamic groups to white supremacists in the US, ultra-Orthodox Jews in Israel, or Sikhs in India. The importance of religion in enhancing the likelihood of violence being employed by some groups is that it has the ability to inspire total loyalty and commitment, and as has been seen in the case of secular terrorism, such an uncompromisingly holistic attitude is a prime factor in the utilisation of force as a valid means. Such organisations may seek to remove whole sections of society and

⁷⁰⁶ William O. Studeman, Testimony Of The Acting Director Of Central Intelligence To The House Judiciary Committee Hearings On The Omnibus Counterterrorism Act Of 1995, April 6, 1995.

⁷⁰⁷ Cited in Robert Taylor, "All Fall Down", New Scientist, May 11, 1996, pp. 32-33.

are not constrained by the political, practical or moral factors that limit others' actions.⁷⁰⁸ Whereas, in secular terrorism, violence usually begins as an instrument and may become an end in itself, in religious terrorism, violence can be an end in itself, a sacramental act or divine duty carried out in response to a theological imperative.⁷⁰⁹ Religion is a legitimising force, it can morally justify and even require the sort of indiscriminate violence that most secular terrorists would regard as immoral and counter-productive. This is because the constituencies of the two varieties of terrorism differ so greatly. Secular terrorists attempt to appeal to their actual or potential sympathisers, the people they claim to defend or speak for; in almost all cases, it is assumed that perpetrators mean to harm their victims only incidentally. It is the public that is the primary object of the action.⁷¹⁰ Religious terrorists, on the other hand, are simultaneously both the perpetrator and the audience, they comprise the constituents themselves. This is important because, whereas usually the symbolic and the audience-oriented aspects of terrorism are separate, in the case of religious-inspired violence, the two are synonymous. The need to gear action to what the terrorist believes the audience considers appropriate is therefore removed as a constraining influence in the case of religious terror.

Cults and millenarian groups are the most likely of religious groups to resort to high-level violence because, in the former case, they are the most likely to be controlled by a single leader and to be isolated from moderating outside influences. As can be seen from examples such as Shoko Asahara, Jim Jones or David Koresh, undiluted authority can be rigorously imposed with devastating effects to both the cult members and the wider world. Millenarian groups believe that the world will end imminently with the descent from heaven of a redeemer, a messiah. This means that they have nothing to lose by extreme action and may even be encouraged by the prospect of speeding the process. In both cases, cultists and millenarians may be spurred on to drastic action involving high-level violence, in the belief that they are fulfilling their divine duty. Post uses the example of a Jewish sect that formed a group within the Gush Emunim organisation, and that planned to destroy the El Aksa Mosque and the Mosque of Omar (the Dome of the Rock), both

⁷⁰⁸ Hoffman, "Responding...", pp. 9-12.

⁷⁰⁹ Hoffman, "Holy Terror...", p. 272.

⁷¹⁰ Rapoport, "Fear & Trembling...", p. 660.

in Jerusalem. The former is the third holiest site in Islam, but the Jewish terrorists argued that it stood on Temple Mount, the holiest place in Judaism. As Kabbalist millenarians, they believed that the coming of the Messiah would be delayed for a thousand years unless they helped to promote the world's redemption, scheduled for the year 6000 in the Jewish calendar, and that the destruction of the mosques was wholly justifiable and necessary. Post argues that such acts would surely have caused a world-wide jihad and made the possibility of nuclear terrorism against Israel permissible in the eyes of some Islamic groups.⁷¹¹ However, this fails to distinguish between motivation and intent; it is the latter that is vital to any assessment of the likelihood of nuclear terrorism since possible motivations for such an act are so numerous that it does little to assist in an helpful analysis of the situation. A similar case involves white supremacists in the United States who allegedly sought to engage in mass indiscriminate killing. The federal grand jury indictment stated that they met in 1983 at Aryan Nations headquarters in Idaho and there plotted to overthrow the federal government and establish a separate Aryan state within the United States. To achieve this, they planned to assassinate federal officials, politicians and Jews, and to bomb and pollute municipal water supplies. When, in April 1984, federal agents raided a supremacist compound in Arkansas, they found 30 gallons of cyanide intended for this mass poisoning.⁷¹² This program of action was in line with that prescribed in "The Turner Diaries", an apocalyptic novel that has become the manual of the white supremacy movement in planning actions. It culminates with supremacists gaining control of the US nuclear arsenal and using it to obliterate their foes, and is one of the reasons that some white supremacists seem to positively welcome the prospect of nuclear war as a means to achieve their objective of creating a new world order consisting exclusively of the white race.⁷¹³ White supremacists continue to experiment with WMD: in April 1993 there was an attempt by Thomas Lewis Lavy to smuggle 130 grams of ricin (a nerve agent) into Canada from Alaska. The Lavy example is significant because although he had links to white supremacist and survivalist groups, he acted alone in bringing in enough ricin to kill thousands of

⁷¹¹ Post, "Prospects ...", pp. 99-100.

⁷¹² Hoffman, "Holy Terror'...", p. 277.

⁷¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 277-278.

people. When he was arrested, he was carrying four guns, 20,000 rounds of ammunition and at least two pieces of survivalist literature: "The Poisoner's Handbook" and "Silent Death".⁷¹⁴ Another incident of significance was the May 1995 arrest of Larry Wayne Harris, a former member of the Aryan Nations, who successfully mail-ordered three vials of bubonic plague bacteria for \$240 from the American Type Culture Collection. When arrested, Harris claimed he was working on an antidote for plague and was "concerned about an imminent invasion from Iraq of super-germ-carrying rats".⁷¹⁵

Professional terrorists have become increasingly ruthless, as well as more sophisticated and operationally competent. Each group learns from the mistakes of its predecessors making it harder for state authorities to detect and destroy them. Although most groups remain technologically conservative in that they prefer off-the-shelf weaponry with which they are familiar and confident, some groups are also adept at adapting or improvising their weaponry: the WTC bombers used readily available fertiliser as the main component of their device. Such innovation from freely available resources makes it almost impossible for the governmental forces to guard against every eventuality and protect every target.⁷¹⁶ Conventional explosives such as Semtex, used to destroy the Pan Am flight over Lockerbie, are sufficiently powerful that relatively little is required to inflict considerable damage: theoretically, a quantity the size of a fist would be enough to blow a hole in the side of an aircraft.⁷¹⁷ Therefore, even when it is not a viable option to plant a truckbomb, there are conventional explosives

⁷¹⁴ See: "Arrest follows 1993 poison seizure", Globe & Mail, December 23 1995, p. A13; John Kifner, "Antiterrorism Law Used In Poison Smuggling Case", New York Times, December 23, 1995, p. A7, John Kifner, "Man Arrested In Poison Case Kills Himself In Jail Cell", New York Times, December 24 1995, p. A11.

⁷¹⁵ Sopko, "The Changing...", pp. 4-6.

⁷¹⁶ This inability to provide constant protection even applies to high-profile targets such as the Channel Tunnel. The IRA apparently considered an attack on the Tunnel itself, but decided it was too well protect, so elected to launch an assault on its electricity supply, threatening to black out the Tunnel and bring all trains to a halt. The operation was prevented because the IRA cell involved had been under police surveillance and was destroyed in September 1996. Police admitted though that Cheriton, the power substation that provides electricity for the tunnel, could be patrolled occasionally but not kept under constant observation. David Leppard, "Dead IRA suspect planned to black out Channel tunnel", The Sunday Times, September 29, 1996, p. A1,2.

⁷¹⁷ Vitali Vitaliov Pardubice, "Semtex sales go through the roof", The Sunday Times, 29 September, 1996, p. A16.

available to terrorists that negate the necessity of escalating to non-conventional weaponry. This would seem to mitigate against the higher-level forms of nuclear terrorism: as yet the materials for it are not easily available and vast damage can be achieved using more conventional means, even against major targets, since they cannot be comprehensively guarded all the time.⁷¹⁸

The psychological constraints are almost certainly less extreme for the use of a nuclear hoax or the seizure of a nuclear weapon than for the detonation of one. A credible hoax might well be an attractive option for a terrorist group because it would require high-level decision making by the threatened state, which might be regarded by the group as a success in itself since it conveys prestige and status upon the group, thus making them a major actor. DeLeon, Hoffman, Kellen and Jenkins argued that while there were at least three major motivations for acts of nuclear terrorism, propaganda, coercion and destruction, it was probable that any such act would reflect a combination of all three.⁷¹⁹ Since both the public and government agencies are so sensitised to the potential of nuclear weapons, even a minor incident would cause chaos and panic and risk a break-down in co-operation with authorities.⁷²⁰ Even a credible nuclear hoax, posing no danger to an area, could potentially cause panic, create vast disruption to daily life and commerce and could result in casualties as terrified residents fled from the area. Even if the physical damage caused by the incident were to be minimal, the psychological ramifications for the public and government and the cache for the terrorists would be considerable.⁷²¹ Knutson noted that while a *fait accompli* might be safer, there is a high possibility that it will easily be dismissed from our consciousness (very unlikely in the case of nuclear terrorism) or that the horror of a major nuclear event would erase any interest in its political intent, that the act would obscure the cause.⁷²² In the case of nuclear terrorism, the threat is as politically potent as the execution, and once such an act has been committed the efforts to trace the terrorists would be unhindered by the

⁷¹⁸ Hoffman, "Responding...", pp. 21-26.

⁷¹⁹ Peter DeLeon, Bruce Hoffman with Konrad Kellen & Brian Jenkins, "The Threat Of Nuclear Terrorism: A Reexamination", *RAND*, (January 1988). p. 3.

⁷²⁰ Clarke, *Author's...*

⁷²¹ Hoffman, "An Assessment...", p. 4.

⁷²² Knutson, "The Terrorists Dilemmas ...", p. 201.

fear of what was to come (always supposing that the terrorists were not capable of more than one such act). In such circumstances, it may be that time-bound violence in the form of an accomplished action may be an inferior option to an ongoing, negotiated act in which the terrorist's aim is instrumental. An example of what might happen if there was a credible hoax occurred in Japan on April 15, 1995, when Aum Shinrikyo threatened further attacks in Tokyo. Having already established that they were capable of such action by attacking the underground with chemical weapons on March 20, the threat was taken seriously; there was widespread alarm and the city remained at a standstill on what would ordinarily have been a busy working day.⁷²³

One difficulty with a high-level act of nuclear terrorism is that of credibility: terrorists have to prove to governments that they are capable of the acts that are being threatened. They also have to persuade the government that it is worth negotiating, that a settlement can be reached without the threat being consummated. In some cases this is clearly not feasible: no government could agree to dissolve itself for example, nor could policy be permanently altered because it would require retaining a perpetual threat and one government condition would certainly be the surrender of the nuclear capability. These problems would not be insoluble for a terrorist group, merely complicating factors and constraints on what was possible. However, such high-level acts might be unnecessary anyway, since there is plenty of low-level nuclear terrorism that could potentially give almost as much leverage to the terrorists.⁷²⁴ Shortly after the WTC bombing in February 1993, the FBI investigated whether a group of Iranians was planning a nuclear attack on New York. They were allegedly going to smuggle radioactive material into the city and distribute it around Manhattan. A successful attack would have caused panic and made the area unusable for a long time. The FBI was concerned, too, that the proliferation of fissile material out of the former USSR would result, not in a terrorist nuclear bomb, but in a nuclear-enriched conventional explosion.⁷²⁵ The Chechen case in Moscow in November 1995 may represent the first stage in a move towards a terrorist "dirty" bomb, a

⁷²³ Kaplan & Marshall, *The Cult...*, p. 271.

⁷²⁴ Jenkins, "The Likelihood...", pp. 10-11.

⁷²⁵ "FBI probed Iranian nuclear attack plan", *United Press International*, February 18, 1996.

conventional device with a highly radioactive coating, the sort of weapon that the FBI feared could be used in Manhattan. The CIA are also concerned that non-fissile, radioactive materials could be used in a terrorist device designed to create psychological or economic trauma or to contaminate buildings or localised areas.⁷²⁶ Such a bomb could make whole areas no-go zones without requiring the cost, difficulty or risk that is entailed by a nuclear bomb. Such a device would also be less likely to cause massive casualties, so the political risks of using one are less than for a nuclear weapon.⁷²⁷

An Assessment Of The Future Risk Of Nuclear Terrorism

Low-level nuclear terrorism is already a reality: on November 23, 1995, Chechen guerrilla leader, Shamyil Basayev, informed the Russian television network, NTV, that four cases of radioactive cesium had been hidden around Moscow. NTV discovered the 32 kilo case, wrapped in a yellow plastic bag and giving off 310 times the normal amount of radioactivity in Ismailovo Park.⁷²⁸ Basayev had repeatedly threatened to attack Moscow with nuclear or chemical weapons, and had already proved his ability to create "terrorist spectacles" by taking 1500 people hostage in Budennovsk in June. Russian officials largely dismissed the nuclear threat, claiming that the material was cesium 137, used in X-ray equipment or some industrial processes, capable only of emitting 100 times the background amount of radioactivity.⁷²⁹ Western experts also dismissed the threat, doubting that the Chechens had access to weapons-grade material although quite possibly to lower-grade radiological sources from an inventory of nuclear waste in Grozny, the Chechen

⁷²⁶ The danger posed by terrorists attempting to poison water supplies with nuclear material is small though. Such attacks have occurred: in 1985, plutonium trichloride was put in reservoirs serving New York by a man demanding that murder charges be dropped against Bernard Goetz, who shot four black youths allegedly attempting to mug him on the subway. "Mayor Says Man Threatened To Put Plutonium In City Water", *Reuters*, July 27, 1985. In this and other cases, though the amount of plutonium in the water was a fraction of the danger level. Even if a kilogram of weapons grade plutonium were deposited in a billion-cubic-metre reservoir, the increased level of concentration would be less than one year's natural background radiation. This is partly because plutonium is so insoluble. A chemical agent such as potassium cyanide would be a far more effective means of contaminating water supplies. Mark Hibbs, "Plutonium Thieves Pose No Threat To Drinking Water, LLNL Reports", *Nucleonics Week*, Volume 36 Number 6, (February 9, 1995), p. 13.

⁷²⁷ See Oehler, "The Continuing..."

⁷²⁸ *Agence France Presse*, November 23, 1995.

⁷²⁹ *Agence France Presse*, November 23, 1995.

capital.⁷³⁰ However, the truth about the material is less important than the fact that it was credible, as shown by the precautions the Russian authorities took, sending emergency search teams out around the city with Geiger counters.⁷³¹ If the Chechens had sought to inflict harm on the city's residents, they could have left the container open and allowed the contents to disseminate through the park.⁷³² Dzhohar Dudayev, then Chechen leader, did claim that there were conventional explosives with the nuclear material, threatening radiological dispersal, but this was a hoax.⁷³³ Basayev was intent on displaying capability and in ensuring that his threats to launch further attacks against Moscow, unless Russia withdrew from Chechenya, were taken seriously.⁷³⁴ His attack was plausible because the state of the Russian nuclear industry made it impossible to rule out that the Chechens did have access to fissile material.

A far more serious incident was the attack on March 20, 1995 in Tokyo. At about 8am, the morning rush hour, sarin, a lethal nerve-gas agent, was simultaneously released on five underground trains, all bound for central government ministries.⁷³⁵ Twelve people were killed and about 5500 were injured in the attack.⁷³⁶ This attack followed another in Matsumoto on June 24, 1994, in which seven died and over 200 were treated for the effects of sarin.⁷³⁷ Blame for both incidents was levelled at the Aum Shinrikyo cult, led by Shoko Asahara. Subsequent police raids uncovered vast amounts of raw materials for making sarin at

⁷³⁰Mark Hibbs, "Chechen Separatists Take Credit For Moscow Cesium-137 Threat", Nuclear Fuel, Volume 20 Number 25, (December 5, 1995), p. 5.

⁷³¹ Phil Reeves, "Moscow Tries To Play Down Radioactive Chechen Feat", The Irish Times, November 25, 1995, p. 11. "Moscow On Alert For Radiation Hot Spots", The Herald (Glasgow), November 25, 1995, p. 10.

⁷³² Eileen O'Connor, "Russians Tighten Radioactive Monitoring After Scare", Cable News Network, Incorporated, November 24, 1995.

⁷³³ "Chechen...", Nuclear Fuel, p. 5.

⁷³⁴ Stephane Orjollet, "Nuke package raises fear of Chechen attacks - but how real are they?", Agence France Presse, November 24, 1995. Nanette Van Der Laan, "Rebel's Nuclear Threat To Moscow", The Daily Telegraph, November 25, 1995, p. 13.

⁷³⁵ "Six Die, 3,200 Hurt In Gas Attack", The Japan Times, March 21, 1995, p. 1. Clive Cookson, "How Sarin Killed In Tokyo", The Financial Times, March 21, 1995.

⁷³⁶ Gwen Robinson, "Diary Blames Asahara For Subway Attack", The Times, April 18, 1995, p. 10.

⁷³⁷ Jonathan Annells & James Adams, "Did Terrorists Kill With Deadly Nerve Gas Test?", The Sunday Times, March 19, 1995

various cult buildings.⁷³⁸ The chemical fingerprints at these facilities, along with the quantity and variety of chemicals stored there, leave little doubt that Aum Shinrikyo was responsible for the attacks.⁷³⁹

While the immediate timing of the Tokyo attack may have reflected the fact that the cult was under investigation by the Japanese authorities,⁷⁴⁰ more significantly, the cult displayed clear millenarian tendencies: Shoko Asahara had predicted that the world would end in 1997, in an Armageddon-type finale that the cult planned to further by bringing down the Japanese establishment.⁷⁴¹ It planned to extend its campaign of slaughter to include the United States: Yoshihiro Inoue, the cult's "Intelligence Minister", stated at the trial of Asahara that "If things had gone as planned, the Aum Shinrikyo would have released 50 tonnes of sarin in Tokyo and ten tonnes each in Washington and New York... We regarded the world outside as evil, and destroying the evil was salvation."⁷⁴²

Aum ensured unswerving loyalty from its members by brainwashing them: individuals were made to wear "brain-hats" which delivered 4 to 10-volt shocks;⁷⁴³ other cultists were imprisoned against their will, or were drugged using a glucose solution that induced a "meditative state".⁷⁴⁴ The cult even contemplated developing nuclear weapons, investigating methods of enriching uranium,⁷⁴⁵ but chose not to pursue the option. While their reasons for investigating non-conventional means at all is unknown nuclear weaponry, appearing to incorporate cosmic energy and possessing the ability to destroy human life on earth, seems to transfer world-destroying capabilities from the deity to

⁷³⁸ "Sarin Raw Material Seized In Raid", The Japan Times, March 23, 1995, p. 1.

⁷³⁹ "All Three Sarin Cases Tied To Same Group", The Japan Times, March 26, 1995, p. 1.

⁷⁴⁰ Gwen Robinson & Michael Binyon, "Police Raid May Have Triggered Nerve Gas Attack", The Times, March 21, 1995, p. 10.

⁷⁴¹ "Doomsday Cult Plotted Urban War On Japan - Report", The Daily Telegraph, May 26, 1995.

⁷⁴² Robert Whyment, "Cult planned gas raids on America", The Times, March 29 1997.

⁷⁴³ Sunday Times, March 26, 1995.

⁷⁴⁴ Robert Guest, "Police Make More Finds At Supreme Truth Commune Of Aum Cult", The Daily Telegraph, March 28, 1995.

⁷⁴⁵ "Cult 'Linked To Nuclear Weapons'", The Times, April 3, 1995, p. 10. They used lasers in an attempt to enrich U-235 to 80%. Kaplan & Marshall, The Cult... p. 208. For a discussion on how close the cult was to nuclear weapons, see Ibid., pp. 190-192.

humans and thus make the terrorist the arbiter of human destiny in the place of God, making it possibly attractive to millenarian groups, such as Aum Shinrikyo.⁷⁴⁶ Chemical weapons, though, do not so obviously contain these cosmic elements, so the rationale behind the cult's tactical choice is unclear. Furthermore, "if destabilizing society or drawing attention to one's cause is the goal, a mushroom cloud outranks truck bombs and sarin attacks".⁷⁴⁷ There can be no doubt that there is a fascination that exists with nuclear weapons which is starting to have an impact on the tactical decisions of would-be attackers. Three New Yorkers were arrested in June 1996 for plotting to kill the chief investigator for Brookhaven and two officials of the local Republican Party by planting radioactive material in their food and in their cars. Rather than trying to use the five cases of radium that they stole from a defence contractor, it would have been far more straightforward and effective to rely on conventional means for the assault.⁷⁴⁸ In the past, there have been a few isolated incidents of radiological poisoning, but it does seem to be becoming a more widespread phenomenon, and one that, whereas in the past, was largely the province of disaffected workers able to exploit their access to nuclear material, is increasingly the tactic of attackers with a political motive for their actions.⁷⁴⁹

⁷⁴⁶ Barkun, "Millenarian...", p. 431.

⁷⁴⁷ Douglas Waller, "Nuclear Ninjas: A New Kind Of SWAT Team Hunts Atomic Terrorists. An Exclusive Look At Their Operation", Time, Volume 147 Number 2, (January 8, 1996), pp. 38-40.

⁷⁴⁸ "NY Police Uncover Plot Against Politicians", Reuters, June 13, 1996. John T. McQuiston, "Third Man Held In Plot To Use Radium to Kill N.Y. Officials", New York Times, June 14, 1996, p. B2.

⁷⁴⁹ Previous cases of use (rather than threats, of which there are dozens) of radiological weapons include: a mentally ill Austrian with little political agenda who contaminated a railway coach with non-lethal quantities of Iodine 131 and, the following week, Indium 113-M in Vienna in April 1974. There was an attempt by a disaffected worker to kill his supervisor using three highly irradiated pieces of magnesium placed under the driver's seat of the foreman's car. The pair worked at the French Atomic Energy Commission's nuclear waste reprocessing plant at La Hague in Normandy and the worker was able to simply walk out of the plant with the material. The supervisor was exposed, between August and November 1978, to many times the recommended level of radiation, but appeared to suffer no ill effects beyond fatigue. In 1982, two university laboratory researchers at Brown University, Rhode Island, were apparently deliberately contaminated with a small amount of radioactive phosphorous, when the material was used to poison their food. Authorities asserted that it was impossible for this contamination to have occurred accidentally. RAND-St-Andrews Database.

The Tokyo attack was unusual not because it was an attempt to kill hundreds of people, although in this century fewer than a dozen incidents have resulted in over 100 deaths;⁷⁵⁰ instead it was unusual because of the method chosen. Although there have been previous incidents, such as followers of Baghwan Shree Rajneesh contaminating salad bars in a small Oregon town with salmonella bacteria to debilitate the locals,⁷⁵¹ or the Russian Mafia killing a Moscow businessman by planting gamma-ray-emitting pellets in his office,⁷⁵² Tokyo was by far the most serious sub-state actor use of non-conventional weaponry.⁷⁵³ However, with the exception of some religious organisations, most groups do not want to cause mass-killings; and conventional means remain sufficient to achieve their objectives. There is the added disincentive for using high-level non-conventional weapons that the results are highly unpredictable and radiological, chemical or biological effects continue to occur over a long time, denying the immediacy that many terrorists seek and providing a residue of counter-productive publicity long after the event. However, this should not be overstated as a reason against terrorist use of WMD because this element of uncertainty exists, to some extent, with any weapon and where the objective is to maximise casualties, the whole concept of uncertainty is largely meaningless.⁷⁵⁴ A related issue is that of indiscrimination: most terrorism in the past has been limited and has been targeted. A powerful element of terrorism is that it appears random and indiscriminate. The reality is that it is only so within a set framework;

⁷⁵⁰ Jenkins, "The Likelihood...", p. 7.

⁷⁵¹ Bruce Hoffman, "Apocalypse Now?", Times Higher Education Supplement, April 7, 1995, p.16.

⁷⁵² Williams & Woessner, "The Real Threat...", p. 30.

⁷⁵³ Other serious examples of biological or chemical terrorism include:

a 1970s attempt by the Weather Underground to acquire biological agents from the US Army's biological weapons facility in Fort Detrick, Maryland; the 1980s discovery of a Red Army Faction 'safe house' in Paris containing quantities of botulin toxin...the 1980 discovery of an RAF safe house in Germany containing several hundred kilograms of organophosphorous compounds; the 1975 theft of a large quantity of mustard gas from a US ammunition bunker in West Germany, followed by threats of its use by the Baader-Meinhof Gang against Stuttgart and possibly other cities; the 1970s contamination of Israeli citrus fruit exports to Europe with liquid mercury, resulting in severe economic losses to Israel; and similar threats of contamination of South African products, also resulting in their removal from the market. Ron Purver, "Chemical And Biological Terrorism: The Threat According To The Open Literature", June 1995, p. 151.

⁷⁵⁴ Purver, "Understanding...", pp. 3-4.

the location and timing of an attack determine the probable victims: a bomb detonated at 8am in the City of London is likely to predominantly injure people who work in the financial sector for example. The randomness within that is which financial workers it is that are hurt. Even in much less narrow examples, it is still possible to argue that this element of targeting exists, that those injured were representative of a widely-defined intended victim, such as "the United States" or "the West". A truly random terrorist attack would have to be objectiveless, and although a completely nihilistic attack is not unprecedented, it is extremely rare. The consequence of this for terrorists' use of WMD is minimal: the scale of destruction would be larger, but the basic concept of injuring "innocent" people is no different from that with any other form of terrorism.

It is worth more fully considering chemical and biological weapons as alternatives to nuclear devices. As with nuclear weapons, they have the potential to cause a range of effects, varying from mass-murder to incapacitating a small portion of the population. Aum undoubtedly sought to cause as many fatalities as possible, but were betrayed in their objective by the poor quality of the sarin and the dispersal device that they employed.⁷⁵⁵ However, prior to Aum's assault, even if they had the opportunity and the resources to launch such an attack, terrorists have abstained from doing so. As with nuclear terrorism, the ramifications of Aum's attack on future uses of chemical or biological weapons by terrorists is far from clear.⁷⁵⁶

The factors that mitigate against most terrorists, and especially those with left-wing or nationalist-separatist motivations, resorting to nuclear weapons apply equally to both biological and chemical weapons. Aum represented a new type of terrorist group, being both apocalyptic and, in part, criminal, since they sought to extort money from both members and non-members to promote the activities of the organisation. However, even groups such as Aum are not certain to resort to these weapons again. It is possible that the cult represented a unique

⁷⁵⁵ Jonathan B. Tucker, "Chemical/Biological Terrorism: Coping with a New Threat", Politics and the Life Sciences, Volume 15, Number 2, (September 1996), p. 167.

⁷⁵⁶ Richard Falkenrath, "Chemical/Biological Terrorism: Coping with Uncertain Threats and Certain Vulnerabilities", Politics and the Life Sciences, Volume 15, Number 2, (September 1996), pp. 201-202.

combination of factors, motivated by revenge, apocalyptic desires and material greed. It would be unwise, though, to preclude the possibility that they were not unique and may represent the pattern of future attempts to produce mass destructive terrorism. Roberts points out that many terrorist groups mimic other groups' actions, so the fact that one chemical attack has occurred would significantly increase the likelihood of another such incident.⁷⁵⁷

Despite the example of Aum, terrorist use of either chemical or biological agents is a rarity. At least in part, this is a result of the same factors that have restricted the terrorist use of nuclear devices: a fear of the response by both governments and potential supporters, along with a belief that such an act would be not only unnecessary, given the potential of conventional weapons, but is also disproportionate and counter-productive. This is especially so, given the abhorrence with which chemical and biological weaponry are widely regarded. This repugnance exceeds even that for nuclear weapons, which are, at least, acknowledged and legitimate instruments of states in a way that other weapons of mass destruction have not been since the 1925 Geneva Protocol on Chemical and Biological Weapons (although that has not prevented many states continuing to produce, and even use, both until the present).⁷⁵⁸ Furthermore, and certainly compared to conventional weapons with which terrorists are familiar, chemical or biological weapons would present a significant risk to the terrorists themselves, arising from the toxic nature of the materials being handled. This is one of the most significant barriers to terrorist use of biological weapons in particular. The extent of the risk is shown by the U.S. biological weapons programme between the 1950s and early 1970s, in which, even under the most tightly controlled and well-funded conditions, there were at least four fatalities and 400 other incidents in which the victims did not die, as a result of the accidental exposure of workers to the agents.⁷⁵⁹ Furthermore, weaponising the biological agent would be problematic, given that dispersal in a water supply would be ineffective and that an open air dispersal method would pose as great a risk to the

⁷⁵⁷ Brad Roberts, "Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Has the Taboo Been Broken?", *Politics and the Life Sciences*, Volume 15, Number 2, (September 1996), pp. 216-217.

⁷⁵⁸ Tucker, "Chemical/Biological...", p. 169.

⁷⁵⁹ Purver, "Chemical and Biological...", p. 42.

terrorist as to the target audience.⁷⁶⁰ The possibility of self-sacrifice might not be a significant disincentive to some groups, (the role of martyrs in such organisations has been discussed already), but it may represent a barrier at the production stage. While there is ample evidence of suicidal terrorists being willing to die delivering their weapon and attacking the enemy in the process, there is little proof that any terrorists favour taking risks that are not absolutely necessary in manufacturing their weapon. To die killing an adversary may be one, acceptable, thing; to die mixing chemicals or preparing a biological agent may be quite another.

Assuming that the terrorists were unused to dealing with such weapons, there would also be additional technical hurdles to be overcome and heightened uncertainty about the likely effects of an attack with either chemical or biological weapons, due, in large part, to the importance of weather conditions in the effective dissemination of such agents. Both types of agent would be a highly inefficient means of attack as a result of this uncertainty. To be sure of causing the desired effect, terrorists would probably have to obtain and release significantly greater quantities of the material than would be the case under optimum conditions. This obviously heightens other difficulties, such as the uncertainty over the effect of the attack and the problems associated with acquiring the requisite amounts of the agent.⁷⁶¹ Particularly in the case of biological weapons, this leaves the possibility that the effects could range from non-existent to a worldwide epidemic.⁷⁶² Even if terrorists were willing to accept massive, indiscriminate casualties, this does pose difficulties of reliability and effectiveness. Consequently, terrorists might be more inclined to channel their efforts into other types of weapons. Finally, especially in the case of biological weapons, the effects tend not to be immediate, but rather require an incubation period from hours to days, depending on the type of agent used. Chemical agents vary considerably in the rapidity of their effects: some nerve agents are almost instantaneous, whereas others, such as sulphur mustard, take between three and eight hours following exposure to cause pain and blistering. This robs terrorists of

⁷⁶⁰ W. Mullins cited in *Ibid.*

⁷⁶¹ Graham S. Pearson, "Chemical/Biological Terrorism: How Serious a Risk?", *Politics and the Life Sciences*, Volume 15, Number 2, (September 1996), pp. 210-211.

⁷⁶² Purver, "Chemical and Biological...", p. 41.

the spectacular effects that might be achieved using other weapons. Consequently, as authors such as Tucker argue, a biological attack is unlikely to appeal to a group seeking to use their terrorism as a means of drawing attention to themselves and their cause.⁷⁶³ However, this assumes that media and public attention can be obtained only through immediate and devastating attacks; it is more persuasive to suggest that any terrorist attack using biological weapons would, by its very nature, attract attention and that, as large numbers of people became sick, there would be considerable interest in the cause of the outbreak.

Both chemical and biological weapons would have some appeal for a terrorist group intent on a non-conventional attack because, certainly compared to a nuclear weapon, chemical and biological weapons have the potential to be cheap and are lethal in small quantities, easing the problems of production, concealment, transportation and delivery. They are also less likely to be detected, and so increase the likelihood that the terrorists would "get away with it". In addition, due to the possibility of pre-testing and in spite of the uncertainties described above, they are still likely to be more reliable than a nuclear weapon.⁷⁶⁴ Furthermore, the lead time between "desiring and acquiring" a useful capability is much shorter for chemical weapons than for their nuclear equivalent: Shoko Asahara ordered his cult to develop chemical weapons in 1993, only slightly over a year before the Tokyo attack. It is for these reasons that the most immediate terrorist threat is from a chemical or biological weapon, although, if the prospects for nuclear non-proliferation were to deteriorate significantly, this would compel a rapid reassessment of the situation especially in light of the greater scope for destruction of nuclear weapons than chemical or biological ones.⁷⁶⁵ However, while these advantages undoubtedly do apply when chemical and biological weapons are compared to a nuclear-yield device, they are much less obvious when the comparison is with a radiological dispersal device, since all of these factors are equally applicable to a weapon using highly radioactive material, such as cobalt-

⁷⁶³ Tucker, "Chemical/Biological...", p. 169.

⁷⁶⁴ Purver, "Chemical and Biological...", p. 96.

⁷⁶⁵ John Deutch, Conference on Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Weapons Proliferation and Terrorism, May 23, 1996.

60; thus it would be unwise to exclude the possibility of this variety of nuclear terrorism now.

Terrorists intent on acquiring a chemical or biological weapon capability would have a number of possible avenues of obtaining the required material. Probably not amongst those options is state sponsorship. Although many more states have chemical or biological weapons than have nuclear ones, the arguments against transferring control of any of that capability to a client group is basically the same: an unwillingness to abdicate control over both the material and the group, and a fear of the possible repercussions from attacked states. Roberts disagrees with this assessment, arguing that it would be more feasible for an aggressor state to be able to deny responsibility for an epidemic of a naturally occurring disease, as might be caused by a biological attack. Consequently, the risks of retaliation from the victim state would be lessened, and the willingness of the state to sponsor mass-destructive terrorism increased as a result.⁷⁶⁶ However, this does not preclude the possibility that terrorists might covertly acquire their capability from a state's stockpile. In addition to states such as Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya and North Korea, all of which possess such a supply, Russia alone has, by its own admission, 40,000 metric tons of chemical-warfare agents. These are stored at seven declared sites, at least four of which have recently been found to have lax security, closely replicating the situation at a number of storage sites for nuclear material in Russia.⁷⁶⁷ Terrorists' other option would be to manufacture the chemical or biological weapons themselves. Although this would not be an easy process, depending on the agents being manufactured, neither would it be an impossible one, particularly for groups that had sufficient financial and technical resources, as was the case with Aum. Organisations such as the Australia Group of States do attempt to impose some restrictions and export-controls on the sale of chemical and biological weapons-usable materials and equipment. However, these are far from an effective barrier to proliferation because restrictions are limited to targeted states, so it is possible, through legitimate front companies, for determined states or terrorist groups to obtain the necessary materials.

⁷⁶⁶ Roberts, "Terrorism...", p. 216.

⁷⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 170.

Aum had particular difficulty in finding an effective means of delivery for their chemical weapons. This problem is especially acute due to the highly hazardous nature of the agents. This risk could be minimised by using "binary" chemical weapons, since they are easier to produce, transport and use. This means that two precursor chemicals are stored separately and then mixed to form the agent immediately before use. There are methods to achieve this mixing process automatically or by remote-control, but these have, so far, proved to be technologically difficult or unreliable (as the Aum example shows). The most likely possibility is that terrorists would have to manually mix the precursor chemicals, an extremely hazardous procedure and one that, at least in part, defeats the purpose of separating the chemicals in the first place.⁷⁶⁸

Biological agents have the potential to be extremely effective and potent weapons. Since pathogenic micro-organisms are able to rapidly multiply within a host, only small quantities of the agent are required to cause widespread casualties over an extended area, especially if it is disseminated through the air in the form of an aerosol. Furthermore, many animal pathogens, such as anthrax or brucellosis, are highly lethal when inhaled, but are not passed from one individual to another. Therefore, they have the advantage that it would be possible for the terrorists to partially control the extent of the attack, using such agents. However, other types of potential biological weaponry are contagious, such as pneumonic plague bacteria or haemorrhagic fever viruses such as Ebola, and could be used with the objective of causing mass casualties from an epidemic. Aum certainly considered this possibility: members of the cult were sent to Zaire in 1992, ostensibly to minister to the victims of the Ebola virus, as part of their "African Salvation Tour", but, in reality, to collect samples of the disease to aid production of biological weapons.⁷⁶⁹ Once back in Japan, the cult was unable to cultivate its samples into a usable form. A biological weapon attack would almost certainly be undetectable, both because it is odourless, colourless and tasteless and because its effects would not be manifest for hours or even days, depending on the agent used. Therefore, the likelihood would be that if the attack was conducted covertly, its

⁷⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 172.

⁷⁶⁹ Kaplan & Marshall, *The Cult...* pp. 96-97.

perpetrators would have ample time to make their escape, an attractive proposition for most terrorists.

The production of biological agents is certainly not an insurmountable problem for terrorists. Most of the material and equipment are readily available because they have other, legitimate, commercial applications. Even lethal agents, such as anthrax, can currently be openly obtained by sending a letter on the letterhead of a university or research institute to commercial vendors. Biological agents also have the advantage that they can be grown in a short time, even using low-technology equipment; there would thus be no need for terrorists to stockpile it for long periods before an attack. The cultivation process would not be especially dangerous, compared to that for chemical weapons. The use of masks and vaccinations against the agent would probably be sufficient protection at this stage of the process. Later parts of the manufacturing process would be more risky: concentrating the agent in a continuous-flow centrifuge, drying it in a spray or freeze-dryer, and milling the dried cake into a fine powder would all entail greater danger and would require more protective measures.⁷⁷⁰ These parts of the process would be necessary if terrorists sought to maximise the effectiveness of their biological agent because most biological weapons rely on inhalation of the material, rather than penetration of the skin. Therefore, ideally, the biological agent needs to be contained in an aerosol and to consist of particles small enough (a diameter of about 1-5 microns or thousandths of a millimetre) to remain suspended in the atmosphere for long periods. This would be technologically difficult to achieve, so terrorists might well choose instead to prepare the agent in liquid form and then refrigerate it until use, a considerably easier, if less efficient method. As with nuclear weaponry, there is some concern that affluent terrorists might be able to acquire the services of scientists who had worked on a state's biological weapons program, in particular that of Russia. There has been speculation that President Yeltsin's 1992 decision to eliminate the Russian program has resulted in hundreds of unemployed scientists, all with the knowledge that would greatly enhance the development of a biological weapons capability by sub-state actors.

⁷⁷⁰ Tucker, "Chemical/Biological...", p. 174.

The effects of a biological weapons attack would be hard to gauge because, like chemical weapons, the result depends heavily on a number of external factors, such as weather conditions. Warm convection currents would cause the agent to dissipate, and living biological agents would rapidly die if exposed to direct sunlight. For that reason, an attack would be more effective when it was overcast or dark. However, even under the best of conditions there is considerable uncertainty as to the result: Aum apparently launched two biological attacks in Tokyo with no effect at all.⁷⁷¹ Clearly, chemical and biological weapons, as well as nuclear ones, are not straightforward to use, which is a major reason that makes a massive conventional attack a more realistic option for the majority of terrorists.

It is important to note that the devastation caused by fertiliser bombs at the WTC and Oklahoma suggests that even when groups are less concerned about a counter-productive impact on their audience, conventional weaponry is still enough.⁷⁷² Furthermore, it is cheaper, easier to access, harder for the authorities to detect, and given most terrorists' unfamiliarity with non-conventional weapons, probably safer to use as well.⁷⁷³ Furthermore, there is a very real element to which terrorist tactical decisions rest on chance, insofar as many of them are opportunistic and dependent on circumstances. A prime example of this that, though fictional, has great relevance to the actions of a number of extremist groups in North America, is that in *The Turner Diaries* the terrorists used a radiological device, largely because the author, William Pierce, was a nuclear physicist. He could just as easily have been a biologist, a chemist or a demolition expert, all of which might have influenced the tactics used in his book. It is precisely this

⁷⁷¹ Kaplan & Marshall, *The Cult...*, pp. 94-96.

⁷⁷² Another example is the FBI-named "Beta cell" that in the summer of 1993 plotted to bomb the Holland and Lincoln Tunnels in New York and then attack the UN Building and the Jacob Javits Federal Building. The eight Muslims arrested for the plot were planning to use fuel oil, fertiliser pellets and detonators to make a vitually identical bomb to that which wrecked the WTC in 1992. See Tom Morganthau with Tom Masland, Karen Breslau, Robin Spareman, Susan Miller, Bob Cobb and Douglas Waller, "The New Terrorism", *Newsweek*, July 5, 1993, pp. 18-23.

⁷⁷³ Although weapons grade material is not very difficult to handle. Weapons grade plutonium emits alpha particles but these cannot penetrate skin; HEU is hardly radioactive at all. It is only the less pure varieties of fissile material that are radioactively dangerous. Allison & Falkenrath, "The World's...", p. 83.

type of wildcard that makes it almost impossible to reliably predict terrorist incidents. For example, who would have been able to state with confidence in 1994 that the first major substate use of non-conventional weaponry would be a chemical attack in Tokyo?

The increased availability of fissile material has probably had relatively little impact on the likelihood of a terrorist nuclear bomb: it would still be difficult and expensive to build, and the credibility of all but a cult group using such a device remains low. The Aum cult may have investigated the possibility of building a nuclear bomb, but they were still a long way off achieving it, and consequently chose a more straightforward method of creating terror. However, fissile material availability has made the feasibility and thus the credibility of a threat or hoax involving radiological terrorism a much more real possibility, one that will have to be taken seriously and would give considerable leverage to any group using such a threat. This may mean that the arguments against any secular sub-state use of non-conventional means are lessened. Religious terrorism is undoubtedly on the increase, but it is for the above reasons that it is the attack in Moscow and possibly the threat in New York, not the attack in Tokyo that is the most likely model for nuclear terrorism in the near future. However, this is not to deny the importance of the attack. Aum Shinrikyo set a precedent, being the first terrorist attempt at an act of mass-destruction using non-conventional means. As Brian Jenkins has said: "It breaks a taboo and has psychological import. Others will ask whether such tactics should be adopted by them. It is now more likely that at least some will say yes."⁷⁷⁴ According to Bruce Hoffman, "We've definitely crossed a threshold. This is the cutting edge of high-tech terrorism for the year 2000 and beyond. It's the nightmare scenario that people have quietly talked about for years coming true."⁷⁷⁵

Governmental Responses

Part of the difficulty in formulating a response to this danger has been that there is a definitional problem. Issues that might in the past have been regarded as distinct are clearly now merging to some extent:

⁷⁷⁴ Cited in Ron Purver, "The Threat Of Chemical/Biological Terrorism", Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Commentary, Number 60, (August 1995).

⁷⁷⁵ Cited in Kaplan & Marshall, The Cult..., p. 289.

proliferation, terrorism, arms control and organised crime. Solutions have to be reached that at least begin to address this fact.⁷⁷⁶ There is widespread recognition that: "The control of nuclear materials and weapons remains one of the primary means of preventing the entire range of nuclear threats - nuclear weapon proliferation by nations or nuclear terrorism by subnational groups."⁷⁷⁷ Some measures are being undertaken to improve the situation: the problem of material proliferation from the former Soviet Union has two core elements, money and the lack of a culture of nuclear safety.⁷⁷⁸ Some analysts go even further, suggesting that the real problem is weak government, that the rule of law applies in Russia only to those not powerful enough to ignore it with impunity.⁷⁷⁹ Either way, the safety mindset is simply not as great as it perhaps ought to be: there appears to be a genuine difference of opinion on the seriousness of the problem between the West and the Russians.⁷⁸⁰ However, the Russians have accepted US assistance in upgrading equipment, training and procedures to remedy faults in their security programs. It is a slow process, but safety cultures are being built and there is some prioritisation in allocating money to the most sensitive areas.⁷⁸¹ Joint US-Russian co-operation on improving material protection, control, and accountability (MPC&A) is also a reality.⁷⁸² Almost \$2 billion is being spent to install video cameras, locks, alarm systems, electronic fences, and gates at over 25 civilian and military nuclear sites within Russia. As an indication of this increased co-operation, the American-installed security cameras at the Kurchatov Institute send images not only to its Russian defenders, but also to the Los Alamos Laboratory in New Mexico, so that the US is able to monitor security, and detect intruders, as well. Perhaps

⁷⁷⁶ Sopko, "The Changing...", p. 16.

⁷⁷⁷ Cobb & Kirchner, *Testimony...*, p. 6.

⁷⁷⁸ The lack of the latter is clearly demonstrated by the events on the Kola Peninsula of Russia's Arctic coast when the local electricity company was able to temporarily cut power to the Northern Fleet (they had not paid their bill), causing the risk that the Fleet's nuclear submarine reactors, requiring a constant energy flow, would overheat and meltdown. Armed marines had to be sent to take over power stations and restore the flow of electricity to the Fleet. See Richard Beeston, "Russian Marines Get Back Power", *The Times*, September 23, 1995, p. 1.

⁷⁷⁹ Henry Sokolski, Executive Director, The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, Washington DC, *Interview with Author*, November 13, 1996, Washington DC.

⁷⁸⁰ Cochran, *Author's...*

⁷⁸¹ Spector, *Author's...*

⁷⁸² Oehler, "The Continuing..."

unsurprisingly, this has generated considerable opposition from Russian nationalists, who view this collaboration in so sensitive an area as a threat to their state's security.⁷⁸³

In April 1994, the US Department of Energy initiated the lab-to-lab programme, co-operating with Russian laboratory personnel in bringing MPC&A improvements to Russian nuclear facilities.⁷⁸⁴ This is probably the most effective part of the upgrade programme.⁷⁸⁵ A major step would be the concentration of nuclear material in a few sites, ideally in as few as 20 sites. This is occurring, particularly with material from dismantled weapons, but there is still a long way to go.⁷⁸⁶ The 1992 Cooperative Threat Reduction programme (the Nunn-Lugar programme) provides American financial assistance for the safe transport of weapons from the former-Soviet republics to storage sites within Russia, the destruction of the weapons and the alternative employment in Russia of ex-Soviet nuclear scientists.⁷⁸⁷ However, there has been a two-year lag on Nunn-Lugar, so the effects have started to be felt only in the last couple of years.⁷⁸⁸ The United States is also buying 500 tonnes of highly-enriched uranium from dismantled Russian warheads, which when mixed with natural uranium or depleted uranium in Russia, is useful for powering reactors, but useless for building nuclear weapons.⁷⁸⁹ A similar operation was conducted in

783 Franchetti, "US atom...".

784 US General Accounting Office, "Nuclear...", p.14.

785 Cochran, Author'...

786 Spector, Author's...

787 The International Science and Technology Center in Moscow, administered by the State Department, provides funding for scientists of the former-Soviet Union to collaborate with Department of Energy - Defense Programs laboratories on non-weapons projects of benefit to both states. There is also an Industrial Partnering Program which, in 1996, employed over 2000 scientists on 200 projects in 60 institutes in the former-Soviet Union. Cobb & Kirchner, Testimony... pp. 8-9.

788 John Sopko, Chief Counsel (Minority), Permanent Subcommittee On Investigations, US Senate, Interview with Author, November 19, 1996, Washington DC.

789 There are, however, considerable doubts about whether the purchase agreement for Russian highly enriched uranium is verifiable. When the Bush administration negotiated the \$12 billion deal in 1992, the intention was that the weapons grade material containing 90% pure U-235 would be shipped to the United States and there diluted to the 4% purity required for industry. However, by the time the Clinton administration signed the agreement in February 1993, it was the Russians who had become responsible for diluting the uranium, making it impossible for US experts to ascertain its source or original purity so that it is equally impossible to be certain that it is weapons grade material that is being removed from circulation. Although no evidence exists that the Russians are deliberately attempting to

October 1994 to remove 600kg of highly-enriched uranium from the Ust-Kamenogorsk plant, near Ulba in Kazakhstan, with the co-operation of the Kazakh government, and transport it to Oak Ridge, Tennessee for reprocessing.⁷⁹⁰ However, these measures have been criticised as insufficient: Congress has allocated approximately \$1200 million to the Cooperative Threat Reduction programme.⁷⁹¹ It is true that this represents a solution to just a small fraction of the problem,⁷⁹² especially in view of the lack of a safety culture in Russia, but it is at least some progress.⁷⁹³ A bigger problem stems from the Russians' apparent unwillingness to prioritise the proliferation issue above all others. One of the reasons that Operation Sapphire is unlikely to be repeated on a wide scale is, quite apart from the cost,⁷⁹⁴ that the Russians have been extremely reluctant to discuss the widespread removal of nuclear material from Russian soil.⁷⁹⁵ As another example, Russian officials refused, initially, to reveal details of its global arms sales to the new export control regime, the Wassenaar Arrangement,

evade the terms of the agreement, the US remains sufficiently concerned that it is attempting to renegotiate the verification procedures. William J. Broad, "Uranium Deal: Is Russia Delivering?", New York Times, January 29, 1996, p. A6.

⁷⁹⁰ See "US Smuggles Uranium Out Of Former Soviet Union", The Glasgow Herald, November 24, 1994; or "US Secures Kazakhstan Nuclear Stock", The Guardian, November 24, 1994. Kazakhstan originally offered to sell to the US 1,323lbs of highly enriched uranium that it felt unable to store securely. M. Fletcher, "US Smuggles Soviet Uranium To Safety", The Times, November 24, 1994, p. 1. The US government bought the uranium because it feared that the material would fall into terrorist or other unfriendly hands. This concern was heightened by the poor security at the plant: the warehouse where the material was being stored was secured solely by "a big padlock like the kind you see on Saturday morning cartoon shows". "US Takes Nuclear Fuel: Officials Feared Terrorism In Kazakhstan", The Washington Post, November 23, 1994, pp. 1,4. The material accounting procedures were also rudimentary at the warehouse which was sited in the middle of the plant that employed around 14,000 people. There were no chemical assays or radiation sensors to limit the risk of theft. Instead, all the material was simply recorded by hand in notebooks. "Kazakhstan Site Had Lax Security", The Washington Post, November 24, 1994. The laxity of the accounting is further demonstrated by the fact that when the shipment arrived in Tennessee, it was found to contain 4% more material than had been bought by the US. Allison, Testimony..., August 23, 1995. The reported cost of the material for the US was around \$20 million. Allison, Testimony..., March 13, 1996.

⁷⁹¹ International Institute For Strategic Studies, Transnational Crime, Strategic Survey 1994-1995, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).

⁷⁹² For example, the 600kg of uranium moved to the USA from Kazakhstan represents just 0.05% of the total weapons-usable material in the former Soviet Union. Robitaille & Purver, "Smuggling..."

⁷⁹³ Barnaby, "Nuclear...", p. 95.

⁷⁹⁴ On purely cost grounds, it is probably justifiable. See Allison, Testimony..., March 13, 1996.

⁷⁹⁵ Cochran, Author's...

aimed at being a first line of defence against proliferation. The officials feared that such disclosures might jeopardise a key source of hard currency, required to prop up the ailing Russian economy.⁷⁹⁶ The effectiveness of these US-sponsored measures is debatable; on the one hand, there has not been a serious nuclear smuggling incident since 1994, but that may only reflect that none have been discovered rather than that none have occurred. On the other hand, Russian military pay and morale remains poor, and the situation is actually worsening, although it is the civilian side that remains the main proliferation concern.⁷⁹⁷ The Nunn-Lugar-Domenici amendment to the 1997 Defense Authorization Act, passed at the end of the 104th Congress in 1996, goes further towards trying to solve the problem, not only of avoiding nuclear leakage from the former Soviet Union, but of improving the US domestic response to a nuclear incident. It provides training and advice to local officials likely to be first on the scene of any incident and improves co-operation between federal and local authorities in responding to an incident involving WMD. It provides funds for both US and Russian customs officials to buy equipment that would ease their task of detecting materials crossing their borders.⁷⁹⁸ It provides funds for MPCA programmes in the US Departments of Energy and Defense and builds on the Co-operative Threat Reduction programme, extending its provisions to other states in the former Soviet Union, and providing increased funds to continue improvements in safeguards on weapons, weapons materials, technology and expertise. Finally, it creates a Presidentially-appointed national co-ordinator to oversee US policy and counter-measures against proliferation of WMD and related materials and technologies.⁷⁹⁹

⁷⁹⁶ Michael Dynes, "Russians Torpedo Plan to Control Global Arms Sales", The Times, April 2, 1996.

⁷⁹⁷ Sopko, Author's...

⁷⁹⁸ The Los Alamos National Laboratory is in the process of developing new sensors for a range of applications, from unattended ground-based instruments, to space-based ones carried by satellite. Cobb & Kirchner, Testimony... p. 3. However, even this may be of limited use since it is quite possible to hide fissile material or smuggle it across a border by "shielding" it, so that it was not "detectable by practical gamma-ray monitoring means". The reality is that techniques, such as gamma-ray monitoring, X-ray radiography, or physical search will detect only a portion of the illegal material. Obviously, this is better than detecting none of it, but is still far from a solution. See: Bukharin, "The Future of Russia's...", p. 127.

⁷⁹⁹ Sam Nunn, Former US Senator, Georgia, Author's Correspondence. See also Sopko, "The Changing...", pp. 16-20.

It is worth noting that although the current focus of attention is the proliferation problem from the former Soviet Union, in a few years the problem could be equally great from another source, for example China or Pakistan. It is impossible to accurately predict the future, so it is important that there are non-proliferation measures that extend beyond safeguarding material in Russia now. Essentially, what is needed is an effective two-tier system. The priority needs to be on control at the source; but there also have to be export controls and effective non-proliferation regimes, especially since, at the moment, dual-use goods are poorly protected at the source.⁸⁰⁰ While they contain a number of helpful provisions and certainly continue to have an important role in non-proliferation, especially in establishing the norms of a state's nuclear-related activities, providing "a moral and legal framework for practical mechanisms to deter and detect violations of international treaties",⁸⁰¹ the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), may be of only limited effectiveness in countering the acquisition of WMD by terrorists. For example, even if the CWC had been fully in place, the Aum Cult would have had little difficulty gaining the means required for its Tokyo attack, since they used information publicly accessible in the United States, and the chemicals used were all classed as Schedule 3 (those with the widest application and supposedly least likely to be used in chemical weapons) such as the pesticide phosphorous trichloride.⁸⁰² The problem of dual-usage is less acute for weapons-grade nuclear material, but is considerable for material such as cesium-137 or cobalt-60 which could be used for a terrorist "dirty" bomb. It is hard to envisage how a regime such as the NPT could successfully close these loopholes and therefore genuinely control access to these necessary materials that are nonetheless exploitable for terrorist use.⁸⁰³ There are similar problems with dual-use machinery and instruments: Aum attempted to buy an interferometer in New York, ostensibly to use in a semi-conductor plant, but it could be used for the precise shaping of plutonium that is required to make a bomb. Aum were told that they would not need a special export licence to ship it overseas and were not seriously

⁸⁰⁰ Spector, *Author's...*

⁸⁰¹ Sam Nunn, *Congressional Record - Senate*, September 28 1996, S11755.

⁸⁰² Kaplan & Marshall, *The Cult...*, pp. 101-102.

⁸⁰³ Oehler, "The Continuing..."

questioned about why they needed such machinery.⁸⁰⁴ Agreements, such as the NPT, may slow the transfer of relevant technologies and materials but they remain most unlikely to stop them.⁸⁰⁵ This remains particularly the case since, under Article IV of the NPT, the non-discriminatory dissemination of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes is encouraged. It was an important provision of the Treaty that was vital in guaranteeing the adherence of a number of key non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS). There are two problems that arise from this: even nuclear technology intended for peaceful use is helpful in developing weapons, and states that were once allies and consequently given a wide range of technological assistance with their nuclear energy programmes can relatively rapidly become steadfast enemies of their former benefactors. The best and most obvious example of this latter point is Iraq, which received aid from France, Britain and West Germany during its war with Iran, but which is now regarded as a continued proliferation threat, even after the UN-enforced eradication of much of its nuclear programme following the Gulf War of 1991. The acceptability of a state's nuclear programme is irrevocably tied to the geo-politics of the time, providing that its attempts at proliferation can be plausibly denied by its supplier state. Pakistan was regarded as a rogue state by the Carter administration for its efforts to develop a nuclear capability. When The USSR invaded Afghanistan in 1979, Pakistan became a key regional power and the nuclear issue was temporarily sidelined. At the end of the Cold War, Pakistan's status as a rogue proliferator was reaffirmed. Yet the pattern of Pakistani nuclear weapons work remained consistent throughout this period; it is only international, and especially US attitudes to the work that vary. Micro-proliferation may be intimately connected with macro-proliferation, at the very least, the opportunities for the former will increase with the latter, so a consistent and unified policy by governments on nuclear proliferation as a whole remains crucial to avoiding nuclear terrorism.⁸⁰⁶

804 Kaplan & Marshall, *The Cult...*, pp. 99-100.

805 Deutch, *Conference...*

806 For a discussion of the inconsistencies of proliferation policy, see for example: A. Kapur, "Rogue states and the international nuclear order", *International Journal*, Volume LI Number 3 Summer 1996.

The establishment or government's psychological response to the threat of nuclear terrorism is also important. If the extent of the threat is so immense, then it is possible that the government would be unable to attend to the political message that underlay the threat or to evaluate rather than prejudge the characteristics of their opponents, perceiving the need for a total response to a total threat. The government cannot afford to underestimate the threat, so will overestimate it and refuse to take any unnecessary risks.⁸⁰⁷ This severely constrains the likelihood of a successful negotiated settlement to such a crisis.

Perhaps the best example of a government overestimating the threat of terrorism and acting accordingly is that of the Canadian administration during the crisis of October 1970 when the FLQ kidnapped James Cross and Pierre Laporte and subsequently killed the latter. The group was amateurish compared to many other terrorist organisations; it posed little genuine threat to the stability of Canada, and lacked the organisational or structural cohesiveness to generate a concerted attack on the government. Furthermore, it displayed a consistent lack of ruthlessness in its campaigns between 1963 and 1972: all of those killed as a result of their actions were the results of bombings or robberies that went wrong.⁸⁰⁸ Even Laporte's murder on October 17, 1970 was arguably as a result of the failure of satisfactory negotiations; the terrorists believed that they had lost any scope for flexibility if they were to retain credibility. Neither Laporte's nor the other deaths were preplanned by the FLQ. However, the Canadian government's response to the crisis was to introduce the War Measures Act for two months, enabling the federal authorities to send troops into the Montreal area to perform static guard duties (following the kidnappings, all public figures that were possible future targets were heavily protected), leaving the police free to search for the kidnappers.⁸⁰⁹ The security services were given widespread powers of search, arrest and holding of suspects without warrant that they used in the detention for questioning of 340 individuals believed to be FLQ activists. However, they assumed no

⁸⁰⁷ Knutson, "The Terrorists Dilemmas ...", pp. 206-208.

⁸⁰⁸ Janke, *Terrorism & Democracy*, p. 61.

⁸⁰⁹ At the height of the crisis, there were about 7500 troops on duty in Quebec, and it was made clear by both the federal and provincial governments that martial law had not been imposed, the troops were simply there to assist the police. Wainstein, "The Cross..", p. 53.

other extraordinary powers.⁸¹⁰ The formal request for this military assistance came from the Quebec provincial administration of Robert Bourassa, and especially after the murder of Laporte, there was nearly universal support for the measures despite the threat that it posed to civil liberties.⁸¹¹ Prime Minister Trudeau led this hard-line response, stating on October 13:

It's more important to maintain law and order in society than to worry about weak-kneed people who don't like the looks of an army... Society must use every means at its disposal to defend itself against the emergence of a parallel power which defies the elected power in this country, and I think that that goes to any distance. So long as there is a power which is challenging the elected representatives of the people, then I think that power must be stopped and I think it's only, I repeat, weak-kneed bleeding hearts who are afraid to take these measures.⁸¹²

Prior to Laporte's death, there had been public demonstrations of support for the FLQ: students at various universities in Quebec boycotted their classes and there was a rally of between 1500 and 3000 people at the Paul Sauve Arena on the evening of October 15. It was in this climate that governmental estimates of 3000 terrorists in Quebec armed with thousands of weapons were made.⁸¹³ In fact, as was noted earlier, the FLQ had only a fraction of those numbers, but this stage of the crisis was accompanied by increasing numbers of bomb threats, rumours, false leads and requests for protection. The regular policing authorities in the area found themselves stretched beyond their capacity.⁸¹⁴ Whether Trudeau over-reacted is largely an irrelevance; there can be little doubt that he firmly believed that the situation was a national emergency. The crisis made him determined to crush the FLQ properly, and this was achieved by 1972, although the schism within the terrorist group was the greatest factor. The group had always been a

⁸¹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁸¹¹ Crelinstein, "The FLQ...", pp. 63-64. The Information Collection Institute published a poll on October 19, showing that 78% of Montrealers wholly disapproved of the kidnappings as against 1% who supported them. The day after the WMA was enacted, but before Laporte's death, a Canadian Institute of Public Affairs poll indicated that 86 - 88% of Canadians supported the government's actions. About 85% of Quebecers supported the government in a November 15 poll for CTV, but by November 27, as the level of the threat was perceived to have subsided, that support had fallen to 73%. Wainstein, "The Cross...", p. 49.

⁸¹² Janke, *Terrorism...*, p. 53.

⁸¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 203.

⁸¹⁴ Wainstein, "The Cross...", p. 52.

loosely bound cell organisation, but the WMA and its successor of December 1970, the Public Order (Temporary Measures) Act, in effect until April 1971, polarised the FLQ between those that sought to escalate the fight and those that wished to lie low and reorganise.⁸¹⁵

The vital result of the kidnappings was to draw the attention of Canadians to the FLQ and to make it a matter of prestige for the government to defeat the terrorists. It is this point that is crucial to a discussion of possible governmental responses to acts of nuclear terrorism: Trudeau was prepared to go to the brink of martial law, supported by the majority of Canadians and other democratic governments, to overcome the FLQ. It would be reasonable to anticipate a similarly extreme response to an act of nuclear terrorism. While one objective of terrorism is to provoke the government into over-reaction, to make it seem panicked and out of control, the scale of the threat would make it hard to argue that this was possible in the case of a severe nuclear threat. It is also worth noting from this example the response of the terrorists to the government's actions. Even writers at the time thought it unlikely that the FLQ would be intimidated by the WMA: Morf argued that it was more likely to make them withdraw for a while and then commit acts of retaliation at a later stage: if anything it would make them more determined. He cited an unspecified supporter of the FLQ:

[Although he] admitted that they could not win they would be prepared to go to any lengths to overthrow the existing order and go down with it so as to focus national and world attention on the plight of Quebec.⁸¹⁶

There is clearly a problem with this quote since the source was merely "a supporter" and given the cell structure of the FLQ, it is unlikely that it is representative of the kidnappers of Cross or Laporte. Equally, it could easily be dismissed as an overblown statement that was impossible to prove one way or the other. However, if it truly reflected the attitude of the organisation, then it would be significant, showing the degree of fanaticism that stems from politically-motivated as well as religiously-motivated terrorism. It seems possible though that it is not wholly reflective since the FLQ, as was shown earlier, became

⁸¹⁵ Crelinstein, "The FLQ...", p. 83.

⁸¹⁶ Hilary Brigstocke, "Police Frustrated In Quebec Search", The Times, October 26, 1970, p. 6.

decreasingly focused on their political goals, suggesting that any action that risked destroying the group was unlikely to be encouraged.

The representativeness of the Canadian government's response to the threat under which it perceived itself to be is far from clear when applied to potential acts of nuclear terrorism. Obviously, the variety of response would depend almost entirely on the type of threat being posed, but it seems possible to make a few general points. Particularly in democratic states, there is a problem balancing the need for security against the core values of social justice and civil liberties that are essential to the existence of such states as democracies. Beres argues that a full-scale military assault designed to eradicate the terrorist group altogether is most unlikely in such states, although it would be more probable in less democratic countries. As well as the threat it would pose to civil liberties, such a response also risks conferring combatant status on the terrorists, granting them a greater degree of legitimacy.⁸¹⁷ A less extreme series of measures remains a more likely answer unless the crisis was to be perceived by the government or the public to be out of control. The precedents for emergency powers short of military authority are manifold: the UK Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1974, allowed detention without a hearing for 48 hours, extendible by five more days. Even in the United States, there is some evidence that greater central authority would be demanded in the event of a major nuclear crisis. There is a clear delineation of duties between federal and state powers in such an event,⁸¹⁸ but the possibility of central involvement would probably be in proportion to the extent of the threat. Although there has been a trend towards mistrust of the federal authorities in the past few years in the United States, it still seems likely that there would be widespread support for a temporary extension of central powers in a nuclear emergency. It is also probable that limited measures such as extended area searches, wiretapping or surveillance and increased powers of detention would be upheld as constitutional by the Supreme Court in the event of a challenge.⁸¹⁹ The

⁸¹⁷ Louis Rene Beres, "Responding To The Threat Of Nuclear Terrorism" in Charles Kegley Jr, (ed.) International Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls, (New York: St. Martin's Press Inc., 1990), p. 238.

⁸¹⁸ See for example: California Office of Emergency Services, Nuclear Blackmail Or Nuclear Threat Emergency Response Plan, Sacramento, 1976.

⁸¹⁹ J. H. Barton, "The Civil Liberties Implications Of A Nuclear Emergency", New York University Review Of Law & Social Change, Volume 10, (1981), pp. 310- 314.

priorities of the state are likely to be geared towards survival and that may lead it to over-ride the norms of democratic countries temporarily. Whether such measures could be preserved in the long-term, if for example, there was a heightened risk of nuclear terrorism but no specific threat, is more open to question.

Contingency planning for nuclear emergencies, including terrorist incidents, is vital to an effective response and, as has already been discussed, that is one of the main provisions of the new Nunn-Lugar-Domenici amendment. As well as civic actions such as the California Office Of Emergency Services's "Nuclear Blackmail Or Nuclear Threat Emergency Response Plan", the US also has the NEST, a government agency with 1000 volunteers mostly taken from within the nuclear power industry.⁸²⁰ Their role is similar to that of the search teams that were deployed in Moscow following the Chechen threat. NEST has a database of everything written publicly about making a nuclear weapon, enabling computers to run cross-checks to see if the potential terrorist really knows how to build a bomb or is a hoaxer merely quoting from a thriller novel.⁸²¹ Specialists are on constant standby to respond to a threat and can be anywhere within the US in four hours.⁸²² Set up in 1975 within the Department of Energy, which now has an annual budget of \$70 million to deal with nuclear emergencies,⁸²³ the agency is linked to the White House, Pentagon, CIA, FBI and State Department. They operate in teams to search for nuclear devices using radiation detectors, and have been placed on alert over 110 times and mobilised 30 times, although always for what turned out to be a hoax,⁸²⁴ for example, 42 members of the Las Vegas-based team were sent to Reno on January 9, 1981 in response to a threat to detonate explosives that would unleash plutonium throughout the air ducts of Harrah's Hotel and Casino.⁸²⁵ If a genuine device were found, NEST has various methods of disabling the bomb or conducting a controlled conventional explosion that prevents the nuclear component from detonating.

⁸²⁰ James Bone, "American Nuclear 'Swat' Team Emerges From The Shadows", The Times, January 2, 1996, p. 9.

⁸²¹ Waller, "Nuclear Ninjas..."

⁸²² Bone, "American Nuclear..."

⁸²³ Waller, "Nuclear Ninjas..."

⁸²⁴ Bone, "American Nuclear..."

⁸²⁵ "Response Of US Nuclear Team To Threatened Hotel", Los Angeles Times, January 22, 1987, p. B16.

Although NEST does not operate outside the USA, its scientists do maintain links with their counterparts abroad, and are able to offer advice and equipment to assist in the recovery and handling stolen weapons.⁸²⁶ Other states have equivalent organisations: Canada has a Special Threat Assessment Group (STAG), formed in 1976 and comprising medics and scientists, to assess, prevent, contain or assist in the response to terrorist threats and incidents involving non-conventional weaponry.⁸²⁷ In addition, both Canadian and United States armed forces retain specially trained response teams to deal with such a threat: in Canada, the Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) Response Team, attached to the NBC School at CFB Borden, Ontario⁸²⁸ and in the US counter-proliferation is one of the Principal Special Operations Missions of the Special Operations Forces (SOF).⁸²⁹

A proactive response to the problem is difficult. By target-hardening and a variety of measures, largely discussed above, designed to make it as difficult as possible for terrorists both to acquire fissile material at all and to be in a position where they can use such material for terrorism, it may be possible to deflect most potential terrorists onto other tactics and targets. It will probably not deter the most determined and most resourceful groups. Effective intelligence does offer some protection, but even this is limited. Inter-agency co-operation is good amongst most of the states of Western Europe and North America, but it remains, as always, dependent on personalities: intelligence sharing is contingent upon trust and reliability between agencies. A bigger problem (from a purely law-enforcement and anti-terrorism, rather than a civil rights, perspective) is that democratic societies rightly protect the liberties of the individual. However, this does mean that it is hard for intelligence agencies to track groups and individuals, protected by freedoms of speech, travel and religion, unless there is clear proof that the intent and ability to commit an offence exists. The best example of this is that of Aum which, under Japanese law, was strongly protected as a religious movement, severely limiting the extent to which Japanese law-

⁸²⁶ Waller, "Nuclear Ninjas..."

⁸²⁷ Purver, "The Threat..."

⁸²⁸ *Ibid.*

⁸²⁹ United States Special Operations Command, Special Operations In Peace And War, USSOCOM PUB 1, January 25, 1996, p. 3-3.

enforcement agencies were willing to investigate their activities.⁸³⁰ However, it is precisely these non-traditional types of organisation that it is most important to target in defending against nuclear terrorism because they are the least predictable and currently most likely to find a non-conventional attack conceivable. As well as the legal difficulties in such an approach is the sheer magnitude of the task: even focusing on one type of group in one country, the militias in the United States, is a massive task. Effective defence will realistically mean concentrating on scores of different types of organisation in dozens of states.⁸³¹

Efforts to combat nuclear terrorism should therefore have three elements: "deterrence, interdiction and consequence mitigation."⁸³² On the basis that intelligence and effective policing may only partially deal with the problem, the most effective policy to prevent nuclear terrorism is likely to continue to be one of international co-operation encompassing risk minimisation schemes such as the Cooperative Threat Reduction programme, strong export controls, the preservation of international regimes such as the NPT, and target-hardening measures designed to deter potential terrorists as much as possible, along with vigorous police and intelligence efforts to detect and intercept possible terrorist attacks and incidents of nuclear smuggling. Finally, in the event that these policies fail to deflect an incident of nuclear terrorism, there should be an effective emergency response that provides a fully trained and prepared, multi-agency effort that ensures that the results of such an act are as minimal and harmless as possible. This three-pronged approach to nuclear terrorism cannot guarantee that there will never be such an act, but it can go some way to guaranteeing that it is difficult to achieve and that its repercussions are mitigated as far as possible. While not ideal, it is the best, most realistically available solution.

⁸³⁰ Clarke, Author's...

⁸³¹ Institute For National Security Studies, Center for Strategic Leadership, "Report of the Executive Seminar on Special Material Smuggling", September 13 1996, pp. 96-98.

⁸³² Nunn, Congressional..., S11761

Conclusion

The issue of mass destructive terrorism has, in the post-Cold War era, caused concern to an unprecedented degree. This sentiment was aptly expressed by former United States Senator Sam Nunn who has argued that: "Combating the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons is the most pressing issue that we face today."⁸³³ Indeed, Senator Nunn has contended, rogue nation's or terrorist groups' possession of nuclear weapons "could pose a clear and present danger to our society."⁸³⁴ Particularly in the case of nuclear terrorism, the impetus for such concern is often cited as being the collapse of the former Soviet Union which has led to increased opportunities for proliferation. However, it is the argument of this thesis that the real driving force behind the heightened danger of nuclear terrorism lies not with the increased opportunities for micro-proliferation, but rather with the changing nature of political violence and the psychological and organisational characteristics of terrorism itself. It is these that are the true factors that would make terrorist resort to nuclear weapons.

While the ostensible source of this concern is relatively new, arising from the opportunities for nuclear smuggling,⁸³⁵ the fact of it is not. Nuclear terrorism has been a source of regular academic and policy-oriented discussion from the early 1970s onwards. Authors, such as Willrich and Taylor, Brian Jenkins, Norton and Greenberg, Leventhal and Alexander, Gail Bass, Bruce Hoffman, and Peter deLeon have been arguing that nuclear terrorism posed a threat that could not be ignored, well before the end of the Cold War.⁸³⁶ This strongly suggests that the

⁸³³ Nunn, Author's.

⁸³⁴ Nunn, Congressional..., S11761

⁸³⁵ See, for example, US Congress, 104th Congress 2nd Session, "Global Proliferation Of Weapons Of Mass Destruction", US Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Hearings Held March 13, 20 and 22 1996, Parts I-III.

⁸³⁶ Willrich & Taylor, Nuclear Theft:... Jenkins, "Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?" Norton & Greenberg, Studies In Nuclear Terrorism, Leventhal & Alexander (eds.), Nuclear Terrorism: Defining The Threat, Leventhal & Alexander (eds), Preventing Nuclear Terrorism, Gail Bass, Brian Jenkins, Konrad Kellen, Joseph Krofcheck, Geraldine Petty, Robert Reinstedt, David Ronfeldt, "Motivations & Possible Actions Of Potential Criminal Adversaries Of US Nuclear Programmes", RAND, February 1980. deLeon, Hoffman with Kellen, Jenkins, "The Threat Of Nuclear Terrorism: A Reexamination".

danger stems from more than simply the fact that terrorists now have a better chance to acquire fissile materials and then use it.

In fact, the very nature of terrorist behaviour is at the core of this problem. It is a conflict between the psychological and instrumental instincts of terrorists. At a psychological level, terrorism is essentially about the search for, and then the reaffirmation of, identity. It is violence that defines the group and the individual within that group. It is the aspect that sets them apart from other types of group or individual. Although there is no "terrorist personality", no psychological profile that would describe all perpetrators of political violence, there are clearly characteristics that are common to many groups and individuals that make heightened levels of violence not only more likely, but from an organisational perspective, even highly desirable.

Individuals tend to initially join terrorist groups because it offers an opportunity to belong, an identity as part of the organisation, and because it offers an outlet to channel their frustrations and anger at society or some element within that society. They find themselves finally accepted, usually after a progression through several other groups, amongst similarly-minded individuals. Certainly, the evidence for this sequence of events is supported by the examples of individuals such as Adriana Faranda, of the Italian Red Brigades, or Susan Stern of the Weathermen. There are a number of important consequences of this progression that have an impact on the willingness of groups to use extremes of violence. Since individuals tend to become members of terrorist organisations only after they have rejected, and moved on from, membership of less violent groups, there is a very real extent to which they "have nowhere else to go". This, combined with the fact that the terrorist group offers an identity, a sense of belonging, means that the individual's primary concern is to remain within the organisation. As a result, they are far more likely to accept the absolutist and violent characteristics of the group than might otherwise be the case. Their psychological and emotional well-being are intimately associated with the group and with the members within it. This not only partially explains why individuals join such organisations, but also why, once they are members, they are able to engage in violent acts. The group enables them to feel powerful and

fulfilled as individuals. The group's violence compels recognition from their society and government. Not only must it acknowledge their existence for the first time, but the government must also deal with the group. The bigger the problem the group creates through its actions, the more urgently the government must try to overcome them, tacitly recognising them as "a player" in the process. The individual is emotionally, intellectually and psychologically tied to the group. As well as making it less likely that they would seek to leave the organisation, it also ensures that individuals have a stake in preserving the identity, the character, and above all, the existence of the group. It is from this that the need to maintain violence as a tactic, and even to escalate it, comes.

At the same time, the emotional and ideological justifications of the organisation protect its members from suffering the psychological costs of imposing violence on its victims. The moral imperative for the action is altered by using the norms and values of the group to make such attacks a desirable duty, rather than an abhorrence. By emphasising the necessity of the action, in the face of the enemy's gross misdeeds, terrorism is justified, within the group's moral framework. The worthy end, the group's objective, permits the violent means since it is perpetrated in pursuit of the higher good. Furthermore, when the victims of the terrorist act are depicted as representatives of the enemy, rather than as individuals, they are depersonalised, dehumanised, so that the consequences of the violence are psychologically easier to accept for the individual terrorist. The explanation of Adriana Faranda, a member of the Red Brigades, was that:

[T]here is a very high level of abstraction, which serves to project a series of feelings over a whole category of people and over the symbols that represent this category. And in carrying out this mental process of abstraction, you can attribute a series of responsibilities or blame for things on to the category: things which are also concrete facts - the real unhappiness of people, deaths at the workplace...and also our own friends, comrades killed during demonstrations by the police.⁸³⁷

They are able to disengage from the realities of their actions by redefining the moral framework in which it occurs. This is important because it means that morality, at either a group or an individual level,

⁸³⁷ Cited in Jamieson, *The Heart...*, pp. 270-271.

could not, by itself, be regarded as a restraint on mass destructive terrorism. There is no moral absolute that would prohibit the use of such weapons in all circumstances. If a sufficiently important end were sought by the group, all means, including nuclear terrorism might be justifiable.

At the same time, anarchic-ideologue groups, especially ones that are compelled by a lack of support to exist underground, tend to contain members that are much more dependent on the organisation and are consequently much more affected by the dynamics of the group. This is best shown in the case of the SLA, as described by Patty Hearst, in which the pressures of being cut off from the rest of society, and the interactions between the members of the group, had a profound impact on the range of actions that the SLA pursued. An important example of this was their need to perform acts of terrorism on a regular basis, to reaffirm the group's importance, defined by the publicity and attention it received. The individual's need for feelings of power and authority over others was transferred onto the group as well. It had to be constantly planning or perpetrating acts of terrorism to satisfy its members' psychological requirements. Group dynamics therefore perpetuated existing patterns of behaviour, identity and action: the continued use of violence.

The need to preserve the group's organisational integrity and identity manifests itself in a number of critical ways. It ensures that any challenge, either internal or external, to the group is likely to be regarded adversely by its members. This applies equally to dissent or attempts to leave by individuals within the terrorist organisation, and to any attempt by factions within the group to mitigate the level of violence that the organisation employs. Such challenges threaten to split the group because they dispute the norms of the group. They are equated with treason within the group because they risk destroying the organisation. As the survival of the group becomes paramount, the instrumental objectives of the organisation become subverted. Since violence defines the group and sets it apart from other organisations, to cease or reduce the level of violence that the terrorists use is to lower the group to the status of other non-violent organisations. Such groups were previously psychologically unsatisfactory for the individual, so they have a stake in maintaining the organisation in its present state.

Consequently, even when the group does achieve its declared goal, it may not disband. This is not a universal trend: in these circumstances, ETA continued their campaign, but in a similar case, the PLO moved to pursuing their goals through non-violent means.

This inability to alter the character of the group has an impact not only on the type of action, violence, that the terrorist organisation employs, but also on the level of that violence. Terrorism rarely achieves its intended goal. However, even when the utility of terrorism, as an instrument with which to achieve strategic objectives, has declined, many groups remain committed to the military option. Faced with the failure of their campaign, terrorist groups face a series of unpalatable choices, all of which may ultimately risk the destruction of the group. Since terrorist organisations define themselves in terms of their violence, and since, as has been shown, they are singularly poor in their ability to pursue twin-track strategies, their solution to the threat of extinction is likely to be further violence. In such circumstances, it is not unreasonable to suggest that an escalation of violence is the most plausible outcome. Such an assertion is supported by examples such as the IRA's campaign, particularly in the 1970s, or the Tamil Tigers in recent years. In the latter example, as Sri Lankan government forces compelled a Tamil retreat, the violence of Tiger attacks in Colombo has increased, culminating in the devastating bombings of January 31, 1996, and October 15, 1997. One group that is an exception to this trend towards escalation is the RAF, which did not attempt a violent recovery to stem its decline. However, in this respect, the RAF is not strictly comparable to other organisations, since it collapsed due to the increasing irrelevance of its ideology and removal of its main campaign objectives, following the release of prisoners under the Kinkel initiative of 1992.

As a group declines, it may be tempted to attempt a "spectacular", such as the Tamil bombings, to achieve publicity and thus to reassert its cause and attract much-needed support from potential sympathisers, impressed with the group's capability and commitment to its objectives. While the need for publicity is by no means universal, it is a common motivation for many organisations. It emphasises their power and importance, so reinforces the psycho-dynamics of terrorism that make such groups attractive to their members in the first instance.

This need to set themselves apart, to use a "spectacular", means that terrorists must either resort to new tactics, or to new levels of violence. The series of hijackings of airliners in 1968 by the PFLP was an example of the former; an act of mass-destructive terrorism would be an example of the latter.

Instrumentally, terrorist groups base their tactical and targeting decisions not only on their capabilities, but also, to a crucial extent, on their strategic objectives. For many organisations, these both form very considerable barriers to any use of non-conventional weaponry. Terrorist groups all use an element of rational choice in their pursuit of goals. Although the group's instrumental decisions may be constrained or partially determined by psychology, this rationality does exist. It is crucially tied to proportionality, to the way that means are tied to ends. The scale of terrorist demands and their perception of their enemy are clearly linked to the lengths to which they are likely to be willing to go in pursuit of their campaign. A group that defines an entire society as its opponent and wishes to purify the world in preparation for a messianic arrival is far more likely to be willing to regard high levels of violence against that society as acceptable than would a group that purports to fight on behalf of that society against an oppressive and exploitative government. Obviously then, the motivation of the organisation plays a central role in determining their willingness to engage in high level acts of terrorism.

While it might be argued that major incidents of nuclear terrorism have not occurred as a result of terrorists' inability to acquire the means to do so, in fact, it appears that the majority of groups choose not to. They are tactically conservative, preferring the weapons with which they are familiar. Rather than adopting entirely new techniques, most terrorists appear to prefer to adapt and improve their existing ones, as the RAF did in its use of bombs to attack dignitaries travelling in moving cars. In such examples, it seems clear that such a radical departure as the use of non-conventional weaponry, though not unprecedented, is highly improbable. This is partly because more straightforward conventional attacks have a higher probability of success, requiring less technical skills, resources or risks than would presumably be entailed in producing a non-conventional weapon.

Despite psychological escalatory pressures, there have been few incidents of mass destructive terrorism, and no major nuclear terrorism incidents, to date. This is largely because, until relatively recently, the prevalent types of terrorism, while containing these escalatory pressures, were also, paradoxically, self-moderating. Heavily dependent on the support, or at least on the perceived support, of a wider audience, terrorist groups largely had to restrict their actions to those that were tolerable to this audience. The role of an individual's identity, in determining terrorist action, is fundamentally different, depending on the type of group that they are a member of, and this is reflected in their respective willingness to engage in acts of mass destruction. In the case of nationalist-separatist groups, such as the IRA or ETA, an individual's violence can be seen to be an effort to promote their national identity. It is an attempt to earn the approbation of their community, to "prove" their loyalty, by attacking the enemies of their people. Even if the wider community does not wholly support the methods of the terrorists, they may have some sympathy for their objectives. Although not universally applicable to nationalist-separatist groups, the FLQ are one exception, there does tend to be some support for the group in the wider community. This support is vital, emotionally and often logistically, to the terrorists and their actions are, to a considerable extent, geared to a level that will enable them to maintain that support. When the group oversteps the boundaries of "acceptable" violence, it may not necessarily denounce the attack or apologise, as the IRA did following the Remembrance Day bombing in Enniskillen in 1987, but they will often issue a statement explaining that it was not their intention to cause considerable loss of life. An example of this might be Irgun's bombing of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem in 1946. Consequently, assuming that their national community's desire for mass destructive terrorism remains small, the likelihood of nationalist-separatist terrorists using nuclear terrorism remains small too.

In contrast to national-separatists, anarchic-ideologues, left-wing terrorists such as the Red Brigades or the RAF, perpetrate violence as a rejection of the values of their community. In this case, it is far more likely that their terrorism will be perceived wholly negatively by their society. Left-wing terrorism is usually an attack on the "establishment" of a community, and on the political, military and economic leadership

in particular. Ideologically, left-wing terrorism is perpetrated on behalf of "the people", to liberate them from oppression. This means though, that any action that injures innocent victims, members of "the people", is unjustifiable, disproportionate and counter-productive. Consequently, an act, such as nuclear terrorism, that threatens the lives of hundreds or even thousands of innocents is extremely unlikely.

However, where it was once the case that nationalist-separatist and anarchic-ideologue violence were the predominant varieties of terrorism, other types have become increasingly prevalent today. The change has not been rapid or total, but its effect on the nature of contemporary terrorism, and thus on the likelihood of terrorist using nuclear weapons, has been profound. Amongst the most significant of these developments has been the growth in religious-motivated terrorism. Religion may be the oldest cause of political violence, but in the modern era, it has been largely overshadowed by secular motivations. In 1968, no international terrorist group could be described as religious; by 1980, only two of 64 could be classed as non-secular. However, in the 1990s, the proportion had risen markedly: in 1992, 11 of 48 terrorist groups were religious, in 1994, 16 of 49, and in 1995, 25 of 58 active international terrorist organisations were predominantly religious in character or motivation.⁸³⁸

There are two inter-related consequences of the increase in religious terrorism, both of which are significant for the likelihood of nuclear terrorism. Firstly, the nature of religion, as a motivation for terrorism, means that it is more likely to support, and even demand, higher levels of violence than secular-oriented terrorism. Secondly, although religiously-motivated terrorism, as a whole, is more lethal than secular terrorism, there has also been a growth in terrorism driven by messianic beliefs or millenarianism, both of which appear to especially inspire heightened levels of violence.

Terrorism in general is becoming increasingly lethal: in 1995, 29% of incidents resulted in at least one fatality, the highest percentage since 1968. During the 1980s, the number of terrorist incidents rose by roughly 30%, compared to the 1970s; fatalities rose by 100% in the same period. Religious terrorism accounts for a disproportionate amount of

⁸³⁸ Hoffman, "Terrorism and WMD...", p. 48.

this. Between 1982 and 1992, Shia groups caused 28% of fatalities from terrorism, but were responsible for only 8% of attacks. There are a number of reasons for this. In the case of religious terrorism, violence is perceived to be part of an all-encompassing struggle between good and evil. The stakes involved legitimise the means used by religious terrorists to defend their faith and even justify acts of self-sacrifice in that protection. Although much religious violence is aimed at preserving purity within that religion, it is also directed against external sources of corruption which threaten to erode that purity. It is entirely possible that, in order to protect their faith from such an influence, adherents might resort to extreme levels of violence, especially given the totalist nature of many religious terrorist beliefs.

However, the organisational dynamics that apply to secular terrorism also have a role to play in religious terrorism and it is therefore reasonable to suggest that many of the same escalatory pressures also exist. A critical difference is that whereas these pressures are somewhat moderated by instrumental considerations in nationalist-separatist and anarchic-ideologue terrorism, these considerations have a less effective mitigating role in religious violence. As with nationalist-separatists, religious terrorists use their violence as a means of establishing their identity within their community. However, whereas in secular terrorism, the rewards of victory are finite, in religious terrorism they are infinite: national determination, compared to paradise. Furthermore, religious terrorism is sanctioned by figures who draw their justifications from the highest sources, interpreted in holy texts. Consequently, not only is the absolutist and uncompromising aspect of the terrorist magnified, but the possibility of unconditional support from their community is also increased. Secular groups, such as nationalist-separatists, that find that a "natural constituency's" support is critical to their continuation, are much more likely to be moderate in their actions because that support is conditional, so there has to be some proportionality between their goals and the means used to attain those. In the case of religious terrorists, that necessity for moderation is removed, thus the likelihood of high levels of violence is increased. This is especially so since the organisational pressures that inhibit moderate action or de-escalation in secular terrorism also apply to religious terrorism, but with the added aspect that any compromise

may be perceived as a betrayal not only of the goal or the group, but of an entire faith and perhaps of God as well.

The danger of non-conventional terrorism is especially acute in the case of messianic or millenarian groups since, in some cases, they may come to believe that their role and duty is to speed the end of the world, to facilitate redemption. Since the ultimate result will be the higher good, the salvation of the righteous and the punishment of the faithless, any action that promotes this situation, including a wholesale destruction of the corrupting elements of society, may be justified. This problem of religious-inspired violence is even greater now, as the millennium approaches and the numbers of millenarian groups increase. Not all messianic belief results in terrorism, but for that which does, that violence may well be at an apocalyptic level. Aum Shinrikyo offers the clearest example of this.

Significantly, although groups such as the RAF talked about using nuclear weapons, it has been non-traditional, often amateur, types of organisations, such as Aum, that have come closest to using weapons of mass destruction. These include various white supremacist plots in the United States to use chemical or biological agents, and the attempt by followers of Baghwan Shree Rajneesh to use salmonella to debilitate an entire town. In common with Aum and groups, such as the bombers of the World Trade Center and the Kabbalist millenarians who tried to destroy the El Aksa Mosque and the Mosque of Omar in Jerusalem, who have used conventional weaponry for a mass destructive act of terrorism, these organisations all have a significant religious content. Clearly, not all large-scale terrorist attacks are perpetrated by religious terrorists; for example, the Tamil Tigers, responsible for a series of massive bombings in Sri Lanka, are predominantly driven by nationalism. Neither are all uses of non-conventional weaponry by religious terrorists; (the Chechen threat in Moscow in December 1995 is one secular example), but virtually all attempts to cause mass casualties with non-conventional weapons, and the majority of attempts to do so with conventional weapons, have been by terrorists for whom religion is a key component in their motivation.

The collapse of the former Soviet Union has significantly increased the opportunities for terrorists, particularly well-funded or state-sponsored ones, to acquire fissile materials. The question remains, however, of whether terrorists would necessarily seek to exploit this, given the technological conservatism that has already been discussed. This is particularly so since building and using nuclear-yield, chemical or biological weapons, although not impossible, is also far from straightforward. However, these difficulties should not be over-estimated as a barrier to micro-proliferation. In all probability, it is the acquisition of fissile materials that is the greatest obstacle for terrorists seeking to construct a nuclear bomb, which, since a device of uncertain and variable yield can be built using more easily obtained non-weapons-grade material, is certainly not an insuperable problem. Such a weapon could be built, at modest expense, using the open literature, and with minimal risk of detection, since it would be unnecessary to test the components.⁸³⁹

However, this should not mask the fact that the level of difficulty required to construct such a weapon is still considerably above that of a large conventional device that would be capable of causing mass-casualties. The bomb used at Oklahoma consisted of little more than nitrate fertiliser and benzene. Why then, would non-conventional weaponry be attractive to terrorists? Certainly, their destructive potential would be beyond that of any conventional device, but there are other reasons too. In the case of nuclear weapons, it would have considerable value as a terrorist instrument, since the mere fact of being "nuclear" would almost certainly ensure that it had vast coercive power, having a considerable impact on the public's imagination and fear, and thus on a governmental response. For the same reason, being "nuclear", it would convey added prestige and status on the perpetrators. It would also set them apart from other groups, in a way that even the use of biological or chemical weapons could not.

Much of the material potentially available to terrorists through the "grey market" has been of non-fissionable quality. This has opened a further possibility: that of radiological terrorism. This would consist of either leaving radiation-emitting material to contaminate an area, as the Chechen separatists claimed to have done in 1995, or of wrapping

⁸³⁹ International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, pp. 6-10.

conventional explosives in a radiological agent, to create a "dirty bomb." In both cases, such a weapon would offer many of the same benefits to the terrorist as a full-scale nuclear-yield device, whilst also being more credible and easier for the terrorist to build and use.

There can be no doubt that the attraction of using nuclear weapons has had some impact on the tactical decisions of would be terrorists. The RAF talked about using a nuclear bomb because they perceived it to be the "ultimate thing."⁸⁴⁰ However, while there are concrete examples of radiological terrorism, such as the three men accused of using radioactive material against Republican Party officials and the chief investigator for Brookhaven in New York,⁸⁴¹ or the Russian Mafiya's assassination of a Moscow businessman using gamma ray emitting pellets,⁸⁴² there are few clear-cut cases, apart from Aum, of terrorists trying to construct a nuclear-yield weapon. Instead, most examples of non-conventional attempts to cause mass-casualties have involved chemical or biological weapons, as Aum ultimately used, or the alleged plot by the World Trade Center bombers to use sodium cyanide simultaneously with a conventional bomb, so as to kill any survivors of the explosion.⁸⁴³ This suggests that chemical and biological weapons are more readily accessible than nuclear-yield weapons for mass-destructive terrorism. Although both chemical and biological weapons share the problem, with nuclear-yield weapons, of having an uncertain effect, they have the advantage of being cheaper to produce and may be lethal in small quantities, easing the production process. Furthermore, although this process is not simple, particularly in "weaponising" the agent, chemical and biological weapons could be produced more rapidly and require less specialist equipment and expertise than a nuclear weapon would necessitate. Consequently, a chemical or biological weapon is a more likely method than a nuclear yield device for terrorists to achieve an attack in which mass-casualties is the primary objective. However, where the objective is to set the group apart from others and to guarantee that the group continues to be noticed, to be acknowledged as an important entity, radiological

⁸⁴⁰ Neuhauser, "The Mind of a German Terrorist", *Encounter*, p. 87.

⁸⁴¹ McQuiston, "Third Man Held In Plot To Use Radium to Kill N.Y. Officials".

⁸⁴² Williams and Woessner, "The Real Threat...", p. 30.

⁸⁴³ Hoffman, "Terrorism and WMD...", p. 50.

terrorism, combining the coercive advantage of being "nuclear" with ease of production and access to raw materials may be the most likely form of non-conventional terrorism.

The collapse of the former Soviet Union has undoubtedly made the opportunities for nuclear terrorism significantly greater but even if these increased chances for micro-proliferation had not existed, the threat of nuclear terrorism would still be significantly greater than it was fifteen years ago. The key point is that terrorism is growing in its lethality. How individual groups achieve that is partly an instrumental decision, based on the objectives of the group, and partly a matter of opportunism. Mass-destructive terrorism is now the greatest non-traditional threat to international security, and of these, nuclear terrorism poses a real danger. A terrorist use of a nuclear-yield device is the most devastating type of terrorism conceivable and a radiological attack is the most likely variety of non-conventional terrorism. It is a danger that cannot be ignored since, given that it is not the current proliferation problems, but rather the current psycho-dynamics of terrorist groups combined with the nature of terrorism in the 1990s that make the threat so potent, it will not recede in the foreseeable future.

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