THE DYNAMICS OF THE POLICIES OF ETHNIC CLEANSING IN SILESIA IN THE NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH CENTURIES

by

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PREFACE

Establishing who was the first one to use the phrase 'ethnic cleansing' poses quite a problem to a researcher. There are certain indications that the term might originate as a part of the Nazi vocabulary. The German word Judenrein, "clean of Jews", was used to designate areas from which all Jews had been deported (Bell-Falkoff, 1993:114); whereas Judenreinigung is a derivative encompassing actions and processes leading to the completion of Endlösung, 'the final solution'. Judenreinigung could serve as a springboard for the more general expression Rassenreinigung which rather predates the English coinage 'ethnic cleansing' which seems to be quite recent as it is not featured in the 1990s editions of generally accessible dictionaries of the English language. However, on the basis of the SilverPlatter 3.1 CD ROM Social Sciences Index (2/83-11/93), it may be conveniently determined that the phrase was first used in a headline of an article published in a mass-circulation periodical on August 1, 1992; namely, in two contributions to The Economist entitled: "Out of Bosnia: Serbia Engages in Ethnic Cleansing" and "Brutalised Ethnic Cleansing of Muslims".

Thus, it is appropriate to propound that the coinage was prompted by the horrors of the Yugoslav conflict--the first fully-fledged war waged on the European continent after the messy closing of the Second World War with the Greek Civil War. Soon the term
gained wide-spread currency and secure footing in contemporary English usage since journalists, scholars and statesmen started using it in order to describe gruesome developments in the ex-Soviet Union, Africa, Iraq, Turkey, etc.

Using the above linguistic analysis of the etymology of the phrase, one could wrongly infer that ethnic cleansing is peculiar to the modern Twentieth-century world. The acts which aimed at homogenizing population were first recorded in connection to the Assyrian ruler Tiglath-Pileser III (747-727 BC) (Bell-Fialkoff, 1993:III). Similar policies were pursued and implemented by the Babylonians, Greeks and Romans (cf. the case of the Jewish nation) in Antiquity. The Middle Ages commenced the period of massacres and expulsions of the Jews and Muslims, and sparked off religious wars and persecutions which intensified especially after 1530 when the Confession of Augsburg had explicitly laid down the principle of religious homogeneity as the basis of political order (Bell-Fialkoff, 1993: 112). However, only in the Nineteenth century did the complete destruction of an ethnic group manifest itself as the goal of a state. The most notable examples are extermination of the Native Americans, and the Afrikaners during the Boer Wars. The Twentieth century, on the other hand, saw the rise of 'scientific race theories' which augmented by contemporary technology allowed Turkey to obliterate more than half of the Armenian populace in 1915 and provided the Third Reich with the tools to annihilate the European Jews. Subsequently, since the middle of the Twentieth century ethnic cleansing has been carried out on purely ethnic grounds in
numerous cases, and it is apparent that the trend dangerously escalates at the end of the Second Millennium following the collapse of the post-Second-World-War status quo, which has produced new states and broken the carefully worked-out grid of borders in Europe and Asia opening the way to uncertainty and insecurity.

In the context of this volatile situation, it is important to understand the nature and mechanisms of ethnic cleansing. Ethnic cleansing, nonetheless defies easy definition. Bell-Fialkoff delimits the semantic field of the term to "the expulsions of 'undesirable' population from a given territory due to religious or ethnic discrimination, political, strategic or ideological considerations, or a combination of these" (Bell-Fialkoff, 1993: 110). Should one espouse this definition one may overlook subtler forms of ethnic cleansing which are virtually indistinguishable from forced emigration and population exchange, as well as the other extreme of ethnic-based harassment, which merges with deportation and genocide. Hence, the argument to be presented in this thesis is going to use the latter open-ended description for the sake of better a depiction of the problem announced in the title.

Additionally, some preliminary techniques, which precede first instances of ethnic cleansing, will be probed into. This approach will let the author to present the necessary background without which clear comprehension of the origins and causes of ethnic cleansing in Silesia may be difficult if not sheerly impossible.
Among others the methods include: discriminatory legislation, customary discrimination, lower social status pegged to ethnic origin, less or more forced assimilation, gradual destruction of culture and language/dialect with the means of institutionalized education, conscript army and centralized state bureaucracy.
INTRODUCTION

Silesia (Czech Slezsko, Polish Śląsk, German Schlesien) is a rich land which used to be, and still, to a certain extent, is ethnically, linguistically, culturally and religiously heterogenous. It was an attractive meeting point for the Czech/Moravian, German and Polish spheres of influences which formed the specific identity of Silesia which, in turn, acted as an interface among the three facilitating contacts and commerce which led to quicker development of the province and the adjacent regions. Unfortunately though, despite its aspirations, Silesia has never managed to found its own state leaving itself vulnerable to territorial ambitions of the states on which it has bordered. Consequently, it was often changing hands and belonged to the Great Moravian State, Bohemia, Hungary, Austria, Prussia, Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland and the German Democratic Republic during the last eleven centuries.

The frequent border changes exposed the local populace to different state bureaucracies. The process of adjustment to them was rather painless before the onset of the Nineteenth century though marred by prolonged warfare which had tendency to stall advancement of this land. The 'quantum leap' in this respect was staged by rapid industrialization. Silesia on the par with the Ruhrgebiet was one of the first areas on the European landmass to undergo this dynamic course of modernization. In the
aftermath, this region being an engine of industry became the object of contest among the neighboring countries, which flared up especially in the Twentieth century in the form of serious conflicts involving Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia.

As empirically proved by Gellner, industrialization opened the age of nationalism precipitating ethnic polarization among the multicultural (or at least bilingual) Silesians. Invariably, the group of Silesians identifying themselves with the dominant nationality governing a given part of Silesia, was favored while the rest was more or less harshly discriminated. On the other hand, the segment of Silesians advantaged by legislation and authorities was by and large mistrusted because perceived as turncoats and nationally an uncertain element. Anyway, the underprivileged section of the population tended to change their national orientation in order to adjust to the new environment. However, they hardly ever surpassed their status of the second class citizens, and the more they were successful the more they suffered in cases of political upheavals bringing Silesia under the rule of a different nation-state.

It is a common fate of borderlands. Its most famous illustration in the Twentieth century was presented by the life of Robert Schuman, one of the fathers of the ongoing process of European integration. He was an indigenous inhabitant of Alsace-Lorraine; and accordingly, he had to experience, at the human level, the poignant destiny of his land which changed hands several times between Germany and France in this century. He fought in the
German army during the First World War while another World war presented him with a French military uniform.

These ironic occurrences made him acutely aware of the problems of small borderland homelands suppressed by centralistic governments for the sake of strengthening unitarian nation-states without any respect for people and their local traditions. Thus, together with Monnet, he conceived the idea of European union as the mechanism to prevent intra-European warfare by coaxing nation-states to devolve, and ensuingly to transfer some prerogatives to regions and supra-European institutions. He trusted that in future Europe would be not a continent of struggling nation-states but of regions, Heimaten, which would follow the peaceful tradition of cooperation and argument-solving painstakingly worked out by the Swiss cantons.

Western Europe has largely fulfilled his hopes, especially with the positive settlements reached in South Tyrol, Schleswig-Holstein and Catalonia; though the victim-claiming conflicts, notably in Northern Ireland and the Basque Country, are the proof that there is still much to be done in this field. The end of Communism, however, poses new challenges for European integration. Central and Eastern Europe has never managed to give a birth to strong nation-states, whereas the Soviet domination also quelled local nationalisms for almost five decades. Therefore, the outbreak of nationalistic feelings and tensions in the wake of the 1989 events presents with itself a serious logistic problem to the European institutions--the Central and
Eastern European countries have not undergone the full process of nation-state development like their Western European counterparts.

Providing regions and ethnic minorities with rights is an outright sacrilege to advocates of nationalist centralism and homogeneity, who consider it to be an exercise in state dismantling. Such an attitude may be altered by cautious and truthful presentation of dangers and advantages of centralist nation-state and devolved region-oriented federal models, and by widening the scope of mutually beneficial power-sharing between centers and regions. But it is possible only after having come to terms with various white spots in history of relations between dominant groups and minorities.

The best way to exorcise specters of the past is to expose them in an objective way devoid of nationalistic jingoism. Ergo, the thesis intends to present the dynamics of the policies of ethnic cleansing in Silesia from the outbreak of nationalistic tensions in the Nineteenth century till the present day.

To facilitate this purpose, a concise presentation of the geographical location, peopling and history of Silesia constitutes the basis for the background explication of ethnic tensions in this region and the ensuing policies of ethnic cleansing. The successive chapters are an overview of exemplars of ethnic cleansing during the Nineteenth and Twentieth centuries in relation to the growing national polarization and the rise of
aggressive nationalisms which engendered dramatic political changes in Europe. The conclusive remarks concentrate on the possibility of amicable settlement of ethnic-based controversies and wrongdoings, which was created by the fall of Communism in 1989 and the ratification of the two treaties between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of Poland, namely on confirmation of the existing border between the states (November 14, 1990), and on good neighborliness and friendly cooperation (June 17, 1991).
CHAPTER ONE
SILESIA AND ITS PAST

History of Silesia is the ground of contest for the modern nationalist historiographies of Poland and Germany especially, but also of the Czechs. Its richness and unusual complicatedness typical of borderlands lend themselves easily to contradictory interpretations. Consequently, when one reads works on the past of this land one should bear it in one’s mind that they are to a greater or lesser extent biased in their implicit or overt manipulation of facts striving to ‘prove’ primordial Czechness, Germaness or Polishness of this land which could decide (at least at the pseudo-scientific plane) on national ownership of Silesia.

This struggle also includes etymology of the very name of the region. German philologists claim that it is derived from a Vandal tribe, the Silings, which inhabited the fertile plain south of Wroclaw (Breslau, Vratislav) from the Second through Fourth century A.D. (Vetter, 1992: 15; Birke, 1968: 5). Their Polish polemicists maintain it stems from the Slavic tribe of Ślężanie which settled in the same area at the later stage; all linguistic connections of the name ‘Silings’ to the ethnonym are refuted and its origin is attributed to the Slavic root ‘śleż’ which means wetness, wateriness.
Therefore, one must be circumspect while attempting an objective synopsis of history of Silesia not to base it solely and uncritically on works belonging to one national historiography. Ideally speaking, one should acquire knowledge of Latin, German, Polish and Czech in order to conduct one’s research in Silesian history relying on original documents and source texts. Such a titanic task, however, would take decades, nay, lifetimes of generations of historians so the author decided to use Polish, Czech and German materials together completed with relevant publications available in English, striving for objectivity and impartiality.

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Silesia covers an area of approximately 380 by 120 kilometers in a northwesterly-southeasterly direction along the Oder (Polish Odra) River. It has almost no natural borders which sometimes allowed extensive territorial changes at its edges. In the northwest it converges on German Plain, in the East on the almost flat drainage basins of the Prosna and the Obra, while in the southeast Silesian Upland merges with the Beskidy Mountains. The Sudeten Mountains, which are located roughly parallel south to the Oder, can be considered as a natural frontier but only in the belt of the Izerskie Mountains (Isergebirge) and the Karkonosze Mountains (Riesengebirge), because in other places the mountains are cut with easily accessible passes. The situation resulted in fluctuations of the territory of Silesia through the ages but the changes has never seriously truncated the main body of the region
having been limited to the peripheries.

Human settlement in Silesia dates back to the early Stone Age and was followed by a plethora of the so-called archeological cultures whose ethnic provenance cannot be clearly determined. But especially some Polish scholars propounded the theory that the Lusitian Culture was created by a people who should be classified as archaic Slavs. Supposedly, they were later suppressed by Germanic tribes (Vetter, 1992: 15). Leaving aside the speculations, it is more certain that the Scythians invaded Silesia in the middle of the First Millennium BC. The established facts begin with the peopling of southern Silesia by the Celts from Bohemia and Moravia. In the Fourth century BC they were superseded by the Germanic tribes of the Vandals and Lugiers. In the time of Völkwanderung the Slavs moved in from c. 400 to 600 A.D.

It may be inferred that they were included in the sphere of influence of Samo's Realm which lasted from c. 624 to 659 with its center in Moravia (Krejci, 1990: 213). The lost momentum of the first Slavic state was regained in the Ninth century by the Great Moravian State which also comprised Silesia with its Slavic tribes of the Dedosize (Dziadoszanie), Trebowane (Trzebowianie), Opolane (Opolanie), Golensize (Golęszycze), Slenzane (Śleżanie) and Bobrane (Bobrzanie) (Czapliński, 1993: 35) whose names were recorded by the so-called Bavarian Geographer in the middle of the Ninth century (Vetter, 1992: 15).
The Great Moravian State fell victim to the assault of the Magyars in c. 907 and the center of political gravity shifted to Bohemia. Vratislav I (894-921) united Bohemia and Moravia, and started bringing parts of Silesia under the Czech rule. At the well located Oder ford he established a fortified border settlement which was named after him as Vratislavia and in future was destined to become the Silesian capital (Vratislav, Breslau, Wroclaw).

The first Christianizing efforts in Silesia are connected to the missionary work of Cyril and Methodius in the Great Moravian State (Kopiec, 1991: 15). Their achievements were frustrated by the destruction of the realm and were renewed after establishment of the Prague bishopric in 973. The Bohemian clergy did not attempt broadening of the Church administration into the land which was commenced after 1000 when the Emperor Otto III founded the archbishopric in Gniezno, Poland, to which the Vratislavia bishop was subjected.

The conflict over Silesia between Bohemia and Poland continued for almost two centuries. The first ruler of Poland, Mieszko I, started the conquest of the land which was completed by his son Boleslaus the Brave (992-1025). The decision of Otto III attaching the ecclesiastical structure of Silesia to Poland did not seem to be final and the Bohemian claims of political overlordship of the land were not curbed by the arbitration of Henry III in 1054 who awarded the area to Poland for payment of an annual tribute to Bohemia. The efforts of the Bohemians
brought about the decision of the Emperor Henry IV who re-joined the westernmost part of Silesia and the areas north-west of Vratislavia with the Prague bishopric in 1086.

The continuing Polish-Bohemian struggle was terminated by the 1137 Peace Treaty in Kladzko (Glatz, Klodzko) which gave the Kladzko Land and the territories centered on today’s Głubczyce, Krnov and Opava to Bohemia.

In 1138 after the death of Boleslaus III the Wrymouthed, the Polish Kingdom was divided among his four sons. The principate was given to his eldest son Ladislaus II the Exile (1138-1146) who inherited Małopolska (Little Poland) with the throne in Cracow, and Silesia. Because of contentions with his brothers he had to escape with his family to Germany where he stayed at the court of his brother-in-law Conrad III of Hohenstaufen in Thuringia where he died in 1159. Thanks to the efforts of Conrad III and the Emperor Frederick Barbarossa the two sons of Ladislaus III were reinstated in their Silesian inheritance. Thereafter, Silesia was regarded in Germany as an imperial fief and other Polish principalities were obliged to pay tribute.

Boleslaus I the Tall received the western part of this province, which was to become Lower Silesia, and Mieszko the Teschen-Ratibor (Cieszyńsko-raciborskie) Principality which roughly coincided with the area of would-be Upper Silesia. Thus, the very important regional division of Silesia was introduced and has shaped its history till nowadays.

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The young princes opened a significant chapter in Silesian history which was to add to the Polish-Czech/Moravian biculturality of Silesia the German element. They married German princesses like the majority of the Silesian Piasts after them. When they returned from Germany they brought along Cistercian monks from Thuringia, who founded their famous monastery in Leubus (Lubiąż) near Liegnitz (Legnica) in 1163, as well as German knights and courtiers. The Westernizing efforts were fostered by the monks who most probably invited the first colonists from Flanders, and next fully developed by Boleslaus's son Henry I the Bearded (1201-1238) and his Bavarian wife St. Hedwig (Św. Jadwiga) who is the patron saint of Silesia and has played an important role in Christianizing and unifying the Silesian consciousness. More Cistercian monasteries were erected and more immigrants arrived from the nearby Mark Meissen, Main-Franconia, Hesse and the Low German Countries attracted by special privileges and escaping poverty of overpopulated Western Europe. They introduced improved agricultural techniques and tools which allowed them to achieve economic success in numerous Waldenhufendoörfer (small villages in woodland clearings). Towns also grew up encouraged by the fact that they were provided with the old-established municipal rights of Magdeburg and Halle. In turn even more craftsmen, merchants, miners, knights and monks came from Germany.

The systematic settlement led to consolidation of the sparse population, clearing of extensive forests and to rapid economic growth. From 1200 to 1350 120 towns were incorporated and over
1,200 villages established (March, 1991: 11). It must be also noted that over 450 parishes sprang into being during the Thirteenth century (Kopiec, 1991: 19). Moreover, progressive Western legal, social, economic and working conditions, coupled with the tenacious industry of the colonists, increased the production of foodstuffs fivefold (Birke, 1968: 9). On the basis of these accomplishments Henry I the Bearded and his son Henry II the Pious strove to unify fragmented Poland under their rule as legitimate descendants of the last Polish king, who belonged to the senorial line of the House of Piast. Their attempts were frustrated by the Mongol invasion in 1241 and the death of the latter at the battle of Liegnitz (Legnica) on April 9.

The wave of colonization slackened for a while but already in 1242 Breslau (Vratislavia, Wroclaw) was incorporated under German law as the first Polish municipality in order to attract new settlers who could re-build the devastated land and replace the casualties\(^2\). Soon other Polish cities emulated the example, and Germanization of Silesia continued. It reached a high point under the Prince Henry IV of Breslau (1266-1290) whose work as Minnesänger is included in the Heidelberg manuscripts (Birke, 1968: 9). During the same time one could also observe proliferation of Silesian principalities which were very weak because of their small size. Subsequently, they sought support of Bohemia as fragmented Poland was ravaged by internecine warfare. In 1330 all of them became fiefs of the Czech King John.

\(^2\) German law was started to be applied to Polish peasants as early as in 1229 (Kołodziej, 1992: 1).
III with the exception of the independent Principality of Jawor-
Świdnica (Jauer-Schweidnitz). Bohemia was eager to legalize the
situation and in 1335 the Treaty of Trenczyn (Trentschin) was
signed, where John III and his son Charles waived their claims
to the Polish throne. In return, the Polish King Casimir the
Great confirmed, expressly and 'for all time' the severance of
Silesia from the newly-unified Kingdom of Poland which had failed
to include this land.

Having become an integral part of the Czech Kingdom, Silesia was
entered to the Holy Roman Empire by Charles IV though the Breslau
bishopric remained subjected to the see in Gniezno till 1748
(Davies, 1981: I 169). The formal independence of the
Principality of Jawor-Świdnica was weakened by the marriage of
the Emperor Charles IV (1346-1378) with Anna of Świdnica, and
eventually terminated in 1392. The Czech suzerainty over Silesia
and finality of this settlement was reaffirmed by the Polish
Crown in 1338, 1356 and 1372.

In this way the Silesian intellectual life was oriented towards
German universities and Charles University in Prague though also

\footnote{From 1300 to 1305 Poland was connected to Bohemia in the
personal union under the rule of the Czech King Vaclav II.}

\footnote{Some small areas in northeastern Silesia stayed attached
to the Cracow bishopric (Davies, 1981: I 69). Moreover, the
region of Wschowa (Fraustadt) was annexed to Poland in 1343-46),
and the Principalities of Oświęcim (Auschwitz) and Zator
(Neustadt-Sator) became Polish in 1457 and 1494 respectively when
they were bought by the Polish kings. The Cracow bishopric
purchased the Principality of Siewierz (Sewerien) in 1443, which
was officially re-incorporated into Poland only in 1790 (Anon.,
1968: 302).}
Jagiellonian University in Cracow was attended by many Silesians. Settlement got enlivened especially after the sweeping epidemics in 1333, and chains of new towns were established along the right bank of the Oder. Silesia actually became a source of settlers at the close of the Fourteenth century, so, for instance, in 1405 Silesians constituted the majority of the 4,000 German population of Lvov whose total population amounted to 5,000 (Kołodziej, 1992: 3). Thanks to the good location at the crossroads of commercial routes leading from Germany via Cracow to the Ukraine, and from the South to the Baltic, Breslau became a Hanseatic city. The German character of the land seemed to be stabilized but northern and eastern parts of Silesia, with their less favorable natural potential, were influenced less by German settlement than the area to the left of the Oder. Moreover, the Piast princes of Silesia were left the status of principes Poloniae. They became princes of the Empire only under the Emperor Rudolph II.

After 1420 the Emperor Sigismund held the Reichstag (imperial diet) in Breslau and Silesia participated in the crusade against the Bohemian Hussites (1425-1435). The latter were victorious which led to devastation and the general decline of the province. The German element suffered severely because the Hussitic movement was staunchly anti-German. The situation was worsened by the war of Breslau against the Czech King Georg of Podebrad (1459-1460), and the power struggle between Ladislaus II Jagiellon and Matthias Corvinus (1471-1474). Consequently, economic development and Germanization were impeded.
The Peace treaty of Olmütz (Olomouc, Olomuniec) in 1479 ceded Silesia to Hungary. King Matthias Corvinus instituted the Silesian Diet (Fürstentag) and the position of the Superior Governor (Landesoberhauptmann). The institutional reform was completed under the Jagiellonians who established the Silesian Supreme Court in 1498.

A certain degree of stabilization attained at the close of the Fifteenth century allowed continuation of slow Germanization in the west and south, whereas in the eastern parts the German-speaking population was peacefully Slavicized (Birke, 1968: 12/13). Furthermore, numerous dynastic lines of Piast princes became extinct and the last Piast—George William died in 1675. Their territories were transferred into possession of the Premislids, Podebrads and Hohenzollerns, or were incorporated into the Habsburg realm.

After the death of Louis II Jagiellon the Silesian estates accepted without demur the succession of Ferdinand of Habsburg (husband of Louis’s sister Anna) on December 5, 1526. In this manner the inclusion of Silesia in the sphere of German culture was strengthened when the seat of the suzerain of Silesia shifted from Prague to Vienna. The continued economic development of Silesia during the 200-year-long rule of the Habsburgs was seriously hampered only by the Thirty Years’ War.

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5. He was killed in a battle with the Turks.
In 1609 Rudolph's II Letter of Majesty guaranteed equal rights for Catholics and Protestants in all of Silesia. However, after the Defenestration of Prague in 1618, predominantly Lutheran Silesia sided with Bohemia which had backed the 'Winter King' Frederick V and thus was strongly affected by his defeat at the Battle of the White Mountain in 1620. Ferdinand II gradually regained his grasp on Bohemia and Silesia in the course of years. His unwavering policy of enforcing Counter-Reformation in his realm was somewhat less severe in Silesia than in Bohemia as a result of the intervention of Protestant Saxony. Anyway, trade and industry were brought to a standstill and a high proportion of the population either lost their lives or emigrated. Only the Peace and Treaties of Westphalia in 1648 provided that freedom of religion should prevail in parts of Silesia, and three Protestant churches were left to the population. At the Peace of Altranstadt in 1707, Charles XII of Sweden forced Joseph I of Austria to restore to the Protestants 128 churches with permission to build more. Silesia was again the most Protestant part of the Emperor's Austrian dominions. The Peace of Westphalia set boundaries between Protestantism and Catholicism in Silesia which stayed valid till 1945.

Meanwhile, the land had been making an economic recovery which for some time was very slow, but the Austrian mercantilist reforms of the late Seventeenth century and early Eighteenth century made the development of its mining and textile industries

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6 Many protestants were expelled by the local rulers who also authorized seizure of Protestant property and churches (Kopiec, 1991: 48).
the cornerstone of their plans, and before long Silesia counted as the richest of all the Austrian provinces, while Breslau was now one of the largest and richest cities of the Empire. The Hapsburg rule exerted its indelible imprint on Silesia in the form of numerous Baroque buildings. The field of education was unfortunately quite neglected and in the framework of the Catholic reforms only the Jesuit High School 'Leopoldina' was founded in Breslau. In spite of this shortcoming, Silesia found itself the very leader in the sphere of German literature with its two famous schools of poetry, Schlesische Dichterschule (e.g. Martin Opitz, Andreas Gryphius, Friedrich von Logau, Johann Christian Günther) and mystical writers: Angelus Silesius, Jacobus Böhme.

Notwithstanding, the direct connections with Vienna were quite loose; since Ferdinand II's journey of homage in 1617, no Hapsburg ruler had set foot on the Silesian soil (Birke, 1968: 17). In addition, the ponderous administration often delayed necessary reforms and there was discrimination against the non-Catholic population until 1740. Thus, it is not surprising that Frederick the Great's conquest of Silesia met with little local resistance (Birke, 1968: 18).

Silesia became Prussian after the war in 1740-1742. The status quo was reaffirmed by the Second Silesian War (1744-1745) and the Seven Years' War (1756-1763). The Hubertsburg Peace of February 15, 1763 left with Austria the southern parts of the Neisse (Nysa) diocese and the principalities of Jägendorf (Krnov) and
Troppau (Opava)\textsuperscript{7}, as well as with all of the Teschen (Tesen, Cieszyn) land. Troppau became the capital of the truncated Austrian Silesia which in 1782 was united with Moravia for the purpose of imperial administration by Joseph II who resigned to the conquests of Frederick the Great more than his mother Maria Theresa. This arrangement was reversed by his successors except for a second brief period from 1860 to 1861. So Austrian Silesia gained the status of a separate land of the Austrian Empire and its own diet.

It must be also mentioned that in 1742 Prussia also seized the Margravate of Glatz (Kladsko, Klodzko)\textsuperscript{8}. It was officially added to Prussian Silesia in 1807 and in the same year the whole land was formally incorporated in Prussia as the Duchy of Silesia. In 1807 Prussia also obtained the part of Upper Lusatia east of the Spree. It was incorporated in Silesia in 1815 by the Peace of Vienna, and further enlarged by the part west of the Spree in 1825.

\textsuperscript{7} Opava Silesia belonged to the Moravian Margravate till the Thirteenth century. It had become a separate province of Moravia already in the Twelfth century and at the end of the Thirteenth century it was a separate principality. In 1315 Opava Silesia was considered to be a separate land equal to Moravia. The Prince Mikulas II received the Silesian Principality of Ratibor (Racibórz) in the 1330s which commenced incorporation of the Opava land into Silesia. For a long time it was subjected to the ecclesiastical power of the bishopric in Olomouc (Olmütz, Olomuniec) in Moravia (Bakala, 1992: 1).

\textsuperscript{8} The land is centered on the town of Glatz which in 981 was mentioned as a Czech fortress on the border with Poland. From the Eleventh century it became a part of Silesia as a fief of the Piast princes and the Premyslids. Kladsko attained the status of a separate margravate which was reaffirmed by the privileges of 1472 and 1578 (Anon., 1986: 389/90). Even during the Prussian time it was subjected to the Prague bishopric (Lesiuk, 1992: 79).
Moreover, in 1790 the principality of Sewerien (Siewierz, which had been separated from Silesia in the Fifteenth century, was seized by Prussia as new Silesia. Its Prussian ownership was legalized by the Second Partition of Poland in 1793. The whole northern frontier of Silesia was only an internal Prussian division after the Third Partition of Poland in 1795 when Prussia gained the rest of Wielkopolska (Great Poland) and renamed it South Prussia. Although the conquest was partially reverted by the war with Napoleon in 1806-07, when the Principality of Siewierz (Sewerien) was lost to the would-be Congress Kingdom of Poland and South Prussia limited to Posnania, the incorporation of the latter into Prussia allowed free migration from ethnically Polish Posnania to Germanized Silesia which was to influence and complicate ethnic relations in the latter.

The consolidation of integrity of Silesia was also conducted in the ecclesiastical sphere. In 1811 the districts of Beuthen (Bytom) and Pless (Pszczyna), which had belonged to the Cracow bishopric, were transferred to the bishopric of Breslau. The latter was disconnected from the Gniezno (Gnesen) archbishopric in 1821, and placed directly under the Papal authority, Berlin being made dependant on Breslau (Wiskemann, 1956: 23).

Considering economic and administrative development of Silesia under the Prussian rule it is worth mentioning that following the damages caused by the Silesian wars, Frederick the Great invited tens of thousands of Prussian citizens to repopulate the land. He devoted much attention to his new acquisition, which was
placed under a special Landesminister. The old estates were abolished and a more efficient administration introduced. He also prepared to develop the rich mineral resources of Silesia and to create armaments industry; for this purpose thirty-three colonies of German workmen were sent to the Malapane (Ozimek) region between 1770 and 1774 commencing rapid industrial revolution in Upper Silesia (Volz, 1920: 13). The first Prussian steel-mill was erected in the 1780s in the Ruhr, and in 1794 in Silesia (Davies, 1981: II 118). In the wake of these achievements steam engines and the requisite engineers arrived from England, and coking process was learned—these were the key to the rich deposits of coal in Upper Silesia. In 1791 the royal coal pits were opened near Beuthen (Bytom), and in 1794 the royal iron and steel works at Gleiwitz (Gliwice); in 1802 the first blast furnace at Königshütte (Królewska Huta, now a part of Chorzów) was inaugurated (Rose, 1936: 38). Upper Silesia was at this stage ahead of the Ruhr (Wiskemann, 1956: 24).

The Napoleonic Wars displayed weaknesses of Prussia in confrontation with France and prompted the Stein-Hardenbergsche reforms of 1807-12 (Vetter, 1992: 51). Peasantry was gradually freed from the bondage of serfdom (which had been strengthened and made extremely strict in the time of the religious wars). Delayed upon the Prussian seizure of Silesia, secularization of Church properties was conducted in 1810 and in 1811, Breslau was made the seat of Schlesische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität (the result of the fusion of the Leopoldina and the Viadrina University of Frankfurt on the Oder) based on Humboldt’s modern
concept of university.

Silesia's ties to Prussia were reaffirmed in the spring of 1813 when Breslau became the focal point of the uprising against Napoleon, thus, the most important political center of Prussia if not of all of Germany. The eventual success of the uprising was possible only thanks to the sustained production of weapons by Upper Silesian industry. In Breslau Frederick Wilhelm announced his "Proclamation to My Nation" and founded the Iron Cross which was produced in Gleiwitz (Gliwice). Also here young Eichendorff of Lubowitz (Lubowice) (the greatest poet of late German Romanticism), Ernest Moritz Arndt, Theodor Körner and other poets joined the Voluntary Corps of Lützow to fight for freedom (Neubach, 1992: 7).

History of Silesia and its crucial role in history of Germany prompted the Germans to regard the land at the time to be part of Germany. It was included in the German League from 1815 to 1866 unlike the Grand Duchy of Posen, and West and East Prussia which only in 1834 were accepted into the Zollverein, the German Custom Union, and in 1867 into the North German Confederation (Davies, 1981: II 112). The Nineteenth century, though, also saw the unprecedented rise of nationalism overshadowing the earlier religious conflicts. Thus the multinational state of Prussia like the Austrian Empire was gradually subjected to the centrifugal forces of growing emergent ethnic loyalties. The image of the law-obeying Prussian or Austrian citizen looking towards and complying with decisions made in their respective capitals, was
gradually giving way to the bifurcated perception which classified the populace according to its ethnic origin as dependable through and through German patriots, and the nationally suspicious and vacillating element. Rapid nationalistic polarization reinforced by popular education, suffrage, military conscription and all-embracing bureaucracy—the products of industrialization—did not exclude Silesia evincing heterogeneity of this land, especially of its westernmost, easternmost and southeasternmost reaches. This situation was more shocking than in Posnania which was given to Prussia by the Partitions of Poland at the end of the Eighteenth century and was predominantly Polish in its character. Silesia had been considered purely German and awareness of its Slavic past was lost to the Nineteenth century German public opinion which ascribed the awakening of national feelings, especially in Upper Silesia, to unwanted influences from Posnania and the adjacent regions of the Russian and Austrian partitions of Poland.

This experience was of traumatic value for forming Germandom and was dealt with by the means of various restrictive measures which in their extreme exemplars resulted in movements of population, preceding later actions in the Twentieth century, which can be unmistakably labeled as ethnic cleansing.
CHAPTER TWO

THE ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF SILESIA AND THE
POLICIES OF ETHNIC CLEANSING TILL 1918

The previous chapter sketched a panorama of Silesian history in
the context of peopling of the land which has invariably
constituted a rich and distant border region in every of the
states to which it has belonged. Not surprisingly so, did Silesia
present with itself a strongly hybrid entity which seemed remote
and was generally neglected and unfamiliar in the West until the
Eighteenth century. Moreover, it must be said that its unusual
Silesian identity has not been properly understood and taken into
consideration by decision-makers almost till nowadays.

The specific Silesian identity is the product of intermingling
of the Moravians/Bohemians and Poles, and the German-speaking
migrants. In the Middle Ages the Czech and Polish tribes were not
much ethnically diversified being rather homogenous also
linguistically. The first Polish ruler Mieszko I married a Czech
princess Dubravka and adopted the Catholic faith from Prague,
which on top of that was the birthplace of Voitech (Adalbert,
Wojciech)--the first Polish saint who is also revered on the
Moldau (Vltava, Welawa). This tentative Polish-Czech alliance
directed against the eastern advances of the Germans was
shattered by border animosities and especially by the seizure of
Bohemia by Boleslaus the Brave (992-1025) who captured Prague in

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Twenty years later, the Czech king replied in kind seizing
the opportunity presented by the great pagan rebellion of
1035-1037; Bretislav sacked Cracow and Gniezno (Gnesen), and
carried off the body of St. Wojciech. He held Silesia till 1050.
Afterwards, in the wars between the Poles and the Empire, the
Bohemian kings often sided with the Empire, raiding deep into
Poland and inviting Polish rides in return.

Despite the animosities cultural ties were well-established
between the two kingdoms and because Czech was earlier committed
to paper than Polish, the former language was used in business
and in epistolary writing in Poland at the close of the Middle
Ages since one could express one’s mind better in this medium
that in the Polish language which being a vernacular did not
include many important phrases and words needed to lead a
cultured discourse. Actually, because of the Czech influences
dating back to the Hussitic Wars, Czech was used as the official
language in Upper Silesia till the Seventeenth century; and the
so called Silesian dialect of Polish is nothing more or less than
the whole spectrum of transitional dialects between Polish and
Czech (Short, 1992: 331).

To the biculturality, of basically Slavic Silesia, another
dimension was added by the German-speaking colonizers who,
besides different agricultural techniques and other skills, had
also brought along their language and customs. Slavic and
especially Polish historiography presents this phenomenon through
the Nineteenth-century spectacles as relentless and perfidiously
organized 'Drang nach Osten', drive to the East, which aimed at Germanization of the Polish/Slavic population and dispossessing them of their land. As the matter of fact the medieval colonization was to populate and economically develop sparsely inhabited and underutilized territories. It was a peaceful and evolutionary process undertaken on the invitation issued by local rulers. The phenomenon is not specific to Germany though. The archipelagoes of German-speaking islands in the German Ostgebiete were and still are matched by the fragmentary sprawl of the Polish population in contemporary Lithuania, Byelorussia and the Ukraine, or of the Russian population in the Asiatic part of the Russian Federation.

Thus, it must be concluded that eastward migratory movements are the common experience of Central and Eastern Europe, and the representation of German colonization as 'Drang nach Osten' with the accompanying legend of the predatory Teutonic knights (Tazbir, 1992) belongs to the realm of myth and has nothing to do with reality.

In the period of German medieval colonization of Silesia, one could not observe tensions between the local population and the settlers. It can be explicated by the fact that German migrants settled down in uninhabited regions building new villages, or in newly-founded towns (Kołodziej, 1992: 2). There was not any bone of contention which could trigger off a conflict. Quite on the contrary—settlers facilitated advancement of economy and culture. Moreover, during the times before the rise of
nationalism in the Nineteenth century, rulers and their respective administrations did respect the existing legal, linguistic and cultural status quo and did not try to alter it (Menzel, 1993: 5).

In the Thirteenth century the German settlers could retain their German law and the local Poles their own with the right to be accepted into the fold of the more advantageous German law. In accordance with the decisions of the Fourth Lateran Synod of 1215 the Catholic Church catered to its members in German, as well as in Polish. In the Breslau Lent Disagreement of 1248, the legate decided that the Polish and German Lent rituals are equal and of the same significance. In the Latin book (c. 1270), which was found at the beginning of the Twentieth century in Heinrichau (Henryków), there is the first recorded Polish sentence which was uttered by a Czech peasant to his Polish wife and written down by a German monk. The oldest Silesian incunabulum of 1475 includes "The Breslau Synodal Statutes" which were printed in Latin, German and Polish in parallel columns. In bilingual Oppeln (Opole) since the Middle Ages there had been two priests, one for Poles and the other for Germans. When they engaged in the competence argument on mixed Polish-German couples, the Breslau bishopric solved it in 1678 by declaring that the couples alone are to decide in accordance with which rite they wish to be wed, and which priest is to extend his ecclesiastical power over them. In the bilingual parishes of Upper Silesia masses were conducted in German and Polish (Menzel, 1993: 5), and in some also in Czech.
Thus, the meeting of the three cultures on the Silesian soil was a peaceful process characterized by intermingling of the population of different ethnic stock and vacillating assimilation. The eastward spread of the German language at first was limited to nobility, burghers and villages of German-speaking settlers. Later it even spilled over to the ethnically Polish lands. But in the sea of the German language Polish-speaking islands existed. In the Fifteenth and Sixteenth centuries Polish rural population dominated right of the Oder whereas German left of it; only between Strehlen (Strzelin) and Ohlau (Oława) some Polish villages extended westward. Polish elements still could be discerned as far west as Sprotau (Szprotawa), Sagan (Żagań) and Grünberg (Zielona Góra), and in the south in the vicinity of Frankenstein (Ząbkowice Śląskie). The Upper Silesian countryside and towns were still predominantly Polish, while Glatz (Kłodsko, Klodzko) was Czech, and the areas of Teschen (Tesen, Cieszyn), Ratibor ( Racibórz), Leobschütz (Głubczyce) and Troppau (Opava, Opawa) Moravian (Anon., 1968: 302).

In the Seventeenth century the German-Polish linguistic border went along the line marked by the following towns and localities: Trachenberg (Żmigród) - Trebnitz (Trzebnica) - Breslau (Wrocław) - Strehlen (Strzelin) - Ohlau (Oława) - Brieg (Brzeg) - Stoberau (Stobrawa) - Norok (Wolfsgrund, Narok) - Dambrau (Dabrowa

9 German was still spoken in Cracow in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth centuries and it survived in the villages at the feet of the Carpathians till the Eighteenth century (Kolodziej, 1992: 1). In the Sixteenth century sermons were still preached in Polish and German in the Lvov Cathedral though this century marks the beginning of the reverse process—Polonization (Kolodziej, 1992: 3).
Niemodlińska)-Falkenberg (Niemodlin)-Pramsen (Pręžyna)-Schönau (Szonów)-Matzkirch (Maciowakrze)-Wanowitz (Hubertusruh, Wojnowice)-Bogumin (Bohumin) (Lesiuk, 1992: 82). This line only slowly moved eastward so in 1744 Frederick the Great, nevertheless, considered it worthwhile to publish a proclamation in Polish in Breslau in December 1744 in order to warn the inhabitants against Viennese machinations (Wiskemann, 1956: 23).

After the division of Silesia between Prussia and Austria, German was much spoken in the towns and Polish, Czech/Moravian and Sorbian in the countryside (Wiskemann, 1956: 23). On the other hand, The Silesian-Bohemian/Moravian frontier did not coincide with the linguistic border between Czech/Moravian and German. The latter made deep inroads southward in the region which in future was to become known under the name of Sudetenland. At the part of the frontier from Troppau (Opava, Opawa) to Ostrau (Ostrava, Ostrawa) Czech/Moravian crossed into Prussia while east of Ostrau Polish dominated in the northernmost corner of Austrian Silesia (Wiskemann, 1938: map at end). Before the First World War the border between Polish and German stabilized at the line: Gross Wartenberg (Syców)-Oppeln (Opole)-Zülz (Biała)-Oberglogau (Głogówek)-Ratibor (Racibórz) (Lesiuk, 1992: 82).

However, it must be remembered that the Polish language which was spoken in Silesia was a transitory dialect between Czech/Moravian and Polish which with time acquired many loan

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10 The Moravian dialect of the Czech language differs from the latter though not so considerably as the Silesian dialect from Polish. Moravian also entered into all kind of linguistic
words and other linguistic features from German. Silesian German was as specific as Silesian Polish. Its nucleus was formed on the basis of the dialects from Thuringia and Meissen, with additional contributions from Hesse-Franconia and other Low and High German sources. Silesian German not unlike Polish was a whole spectrum of dialects varying from the mountains to the lowlands, and in the west, north and south (Birke, 1968: 16).

Moreover, intermingling of ethnically and linguistically different populations resulted in creation of new German toponyms and in transforming the Slavic ones into German-sounding counterparts (Jarczak, 1993). It was also true in the sphere of personal names which, nowadays, survive in a plethora of surnames with the Polish ‘-ski’ ending in contemporary Austria or Germany. On the other hand, such German surnames as Traugutt, Platter or Brückner are well-known to every educated Pole". The two languages got enriched by adopting words and phrases from each other (De Vincez, 1992).

However, to the pre-nationalist era, the idea that the population of a state could be categorized according to the language which they spoke, was entirely alien. In the famous address An mein

interferences between Silesian Polish and Silesian German though its significance was not paramount because its occurrence in Silesia was limited to its Austrian part and southeasternmost parts of Prussian Silesia adjacent to the Prussian-Austrian border.

"Romuald Traugutt, a political and military leader of the Polish January Uprising (1863-1864) against the Russians; Emilia Platter, a Polish female patriot and soldier in the Uprising; Alexander Brückner, a renowned Polish language and culture scholar.
Volk (To My People), delivered at Breslau on March 17, 1813, on the occasion of Prussian re-entry into the war against Napoleon, Frederick-William III specifically appealed to the separate peoples of his Kingdom--Brandenburgers, Prussians, Silesians and Lithuanians for a common effort against the common oppressor (Davies, 1981: II 131/2). His appeal was answered positively, which clearly proves that nationalist loyalty to the people sharing the same language was still to be developed while at that time the citizen preferred to be identified with his locality, his small homeland, his Heimat. There is plenty of contemporary evidence to show that the King's Polish-speaking subjects thought of themselves, not as 'Prussian Poles' but as 'Polish Prussians'--a phrase which in later times would have been considered a contradiction in terms. In 1835, in response to one of the earliest attempts to conduct a linguistic survey, the squire of Langenau (Legowo) in Mazuria, Samuel von Polenz, penned the following return:

On these properties, there are 52 persons of the male kind and 59 of the female kind, who have command of both the Polish and the German languages. 8 persons of the male kind and 11 of the female kind, who can speak properly in Polish only, but who can mouth a few broken words in German: 15 persons of the male kind and 12 of the female kind, who speak exclusively in German: one male who speaks German, Polish, Latin, French, and Hebrew, and another who speaks Russian and 16 persons of male kind and 19 of the female kind who as yet neither speak nor read any language at all, but merely shriek and babble (Martuszewski, 1974: 8/9).

It was quite inappropriate, of course, on the basis of the return that the official charged with determining the number of German-speakers should have recorded the population as consisting of 175
'Germans', and 20 'Poles' (including the Russian). But it would be equally incorrect to imagine that the majority were Poles. They were both Polish and German at one and the same time, and all, irrespective of their language, were first and foremost Prussians. Such distinctions, which were understood by everyone in Frederick-William's reign, were unthinkable in the Wilhelmine era.

This overall pattern can be easily applied to Silesia though one must be aware that due to the peculiarities of Silesian history the Slavic population around Teschen (Těšen, Cieszyn) tended to be obstinately Lutheran by way of resisting Austrian Catholic authority, just as in Prussian Silesia they increasingly professed Catholicism partially in order to differentiate themselves from the Germans (Wiskemann, 1956: 23), and earlier to sustain and show their waning sentimental attachment to Vienna (Birke, 1968: 18). In the pre-nationalist times almost exclusively religious fervor could precipitate cleansings in the forms of discrimination, extermination and expulsions which may remind one about the Nineteenth-and-Twentieth-centuries atrocities committed in the name of purity of the nation, but one should not mistakenly ascribe the same effect to the same cause since it was religion which fomented the bloodiest wars then.

Thus, the first massive relocations of population and massacres (if we do not take into consideration the pre-Christian period) were perpetrated, in Silesia, by the Hussitic movement which was
also slightly anti-German. The reverse force of Counter-Reformation reached its apogee in the Sixteenth century when the persecuted Czech Brethren left Silesia and settled predominantly in Leszno (Lissa) near Poznań (Posen) where they gave rise to weaving industry (Kolodziej, 1992: 4). Similar events marked history of Silesia during the Thirty Years’ War. Shortly before the outbreak of the war, conversion of Silesian princes to Catholicism and decisions of the Emperor entrusting certain Silesian territories to Catholic administrators resulted in limiting of the Protestant influences, and at the later stage in liquidation of the Protestant Church administration. The war itself intensified discrimination of Protestants who were deprived of their churches and schools, and also of their parsons who were often expelled. Even after the end of the war, the Hapsburg administration in 1654 issued a number of acts which authorized changing of Protestant churches into Catholic temples (Kopiec, 1991: 48). It is understandable that such actions antagonized the population of Silesia and brought about emigration of Protestants. In the later period zeal of Counter-Reformation was curbed by the Convention of 1707 which was signed by victorious Charles XII of Sweden and the defeated emperor Joseph I, and returned c. 160 churches to Protestants simultaneously granting them with the privilege to build several new ones (Kopiec, 1991: 48).

12 Here it must be noted that this anti-German characteristic of the Hussits is emphasized usually by Czech and Slavic scholars. The former also claim that it was a pro-Czech national movement. However, Western scholars point out that among the Hussites as well as in later Protestant movements which developed in Bohemia and Moravia, there were Germans who could not speak Czech.
But full freedom Silesian Protestants gained only after the land had been connected to Prussia after the three consecutive silesian Wars. The Prussian victory alienated the Silesian catholics who had to face a conflict between their loyalty to the empress Maria Theresa in Vienna, who rapidly became popular, and the duties which the new master in Berlin and Potsdam expected of them. Frederick II prevented any violent outbreaks or a major migration by his pragmatic policies. He considerably delayed secularization of rich monasteries in Silesia (unlike in the other parts of Prussia)\(^{13}\), and let the Society of Jesus stay after the order had been dissolved because he appreciated its pedagogical achievements and endeavors. This tolerant attitude, despite all the appearances, was a limited one as Catholics were not allowed to hold important offices in the state administration. This discriminatory distrust was terminated only in 1918 (Neubach, 1992: 6).

The situation of the Silesian Jews, who had settled in this land in the Twelfth century\(^{14}\), was strongly influenced by the hostile attitude of Western Europe towards which Silesia gravitated having had been severed from Poland. The first anti-Jewish legislation was introduced in 1267 by the Synod of Breslau where the largest Jewish community developed. Expulsions from various other towns occurred during the Fourteenth century and their

\(^{13}\) Secularization of Silesia was carried out only in 1810 (Neubach, 1992: 7).

\(^{14}\) They enjoyed ducal privileges in Breslau but their community was largely wiped out in the 1349 Black Death epidemic (Wigoder, 1992: 173).
position deteriorated during the Hussitic Wars and in 1453 when an Italian Franciscan Capistrano preached against the Jews and instigated a Ritual Murder charge at Breslau. As a result of expulsions in the Sixteenth century, Jews remained only in Glogau (Głogów) and Zülz (Biała). After most of Silesia became part of Prussia, the Jews were banished again in 1746 (Wigoder, 1992: 864). Afterwards, a certain degree of normalization could be observed when Frederick the Great gave the Prussian Jews a detailed statute, restricting rabbinical juridical competence and prohibiting rural residence, but granting equal rights with Christians in permitted occupations. Social ties were forged between Jews and Christians, and--led by Moses Mendelssohn--the Haskalah\(^\text{15}\) made a rapid headway (Wigoder, 1992: 774/5). The situation of Silesian Jews greatly improved when they were enfranchised in 1808 and successively won local elections in Beuthen (Bytom), Groß-Strehlitz (Strzelce Opolskie) and Glogau (Głogów) in the 1810s and 1820s (Pulzer, 1992: 65/6). Further amelioration came in 1812 when the Jews of Prussia were recognized as citizens, while the remaining powers of the

\(^{15}\) The program of Jewish Enlightenment which promoted modernization and assimilation whereas rejecting many facets of Jewish tradition such as Hassidism, which was wide-spread in the historical Polish territories; and Yiddish, which was considered a 'kitchen dialect' unworthy of an educated man. Therefore, then the sophisticated urban Jews of Silesia who spoke German, identified themselves with German culture and donned suites because they radically differed from their Polish brethren steeped in messianism of Hassidism and the rural universe of shtetle, who wore distinctive frocks and beards, and communicated in Yiddish and local languages with a specific Jewish accent and usage. The latter are responsible for the typical picture of the Jew in literature and art since the former were exact replicas of non-Jewish Prussian citizens, even their Judaism was suppressed in day-to-day life and they often converted into Christianity.
rabbinical courts were abolished. Although certain disqualifications from the public office remained till 1918 (Wigoder, 1992: 775), many Silesian Jews rose in the economic scale, many entered the liberal professions, and there was increasing Jewish participation in general cultural and politics. The greatest success stories are presented by the Jewish industrialists in Upper Silesia and emergence of local Jewish dynasties dominating city councils in Beuthen (the Sorauer and Guttmans), Breslau (the Freund-Milch families) (Pulzer, 1992: 78/8) and Kattowitz (Pulzer, 1992: 133). Many Jews also chaired significant commercial and juridical organizations (Pulzer, 1992: 133). In 1871 the population of the Silesian Jews stabilized at the level of 46,619 (Pulzer, 1992: 133), unlike the population of Christian Poles who immigrated from the adjacent Polish territories controlled by Russia and Austria. Jewish workers of Galicia were largely barred by discriminatory legislation from employment in Upper Silesian industry (Wertheimer, 1987: 52) so the Jewish population of Prussian Silesia was just 44,985 in 1910 (Pulzer, 1992: 133). The situation of the Silesian Jews started to deteriorate during the First World War when many of them were conscripted as forced laborers for Upper Silesian works (Wertheimer, 1987: 96)

Considering development of tensions between the Polish-speaking population of Silesia and the Prussian administration, one must bear it in one’s mind that already at the beginning of the Prussian rule in Silesia, Lower Silesia was identified with

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protestantism and Upper Silesia with Catholicism. This distinction is a certain generalization but of facilitating value for comprehension of later growth of national awareness.

This division was not radically altered by colonization promoted by Frederick the Great. Actually, the settling program amounted to migration of Upper Silesians to Lower Silesia and immigration of Czech/Moravian- and German-speaking settlers to Upper Silesia. Clerks, merchants, military officers and craftsmen who were badly needed in Upper Silesia (especially at the close of the Eighteenth century due to fast industrialization) were not very eager to settle in the southeasternmost corner of Prussia far away from the German-speaking hinterland. Anyway, they fortified Upper Silesian Protestantism and about twenty churches were built to serve their spiritual needs (Kopiec, 1991: 68).\(^6\)

However, as emphasized above, at that time there was no discernable nationalistic feeling present among the populace, especially the uneducated strata of the society. Peasants were just peasants. They spoke so diversified dialects that an inhabitant of Mecklenburg hardly understood a Swabian (Kołodziej, 1992: 4). The only trait which might divide the population was faith, Protestantism in the case of Lower Silesia and Catholicism in Upper Silesia. This division was deepened and fossilized by denominational education. Moreover, the apparent differences between Lower and Upper Silesian schools were made more stark by

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\(^6\) Czech Brethren made their home at Petersfeld (Petersgrätz, Piotrówka) and Groditz (Grodziec) (Kopiec, 1991: 68).

[40]
the Polish-German linguistic divide (Kopiec, 1991: 69). This dual system of education, which was reinforcing the gap between the two parts of Silesia, was gradually phased out by the state which took over the educational activities performed by different churches. Ecclesiastical influences in the system of education were eventually excluded in 1872 (Kopiec, 1991: 69/70).

The linguistic and denominational differences between Lower and Upper Silesia began to become of certain importance only with acceleration of industrialization at the beginning of the Nineteenth century, and concurrent abolishment of serfdom in 1807 which facilitated transformation of the poorer segments of peasantry into industrial labor (Anon., 1968: 303). Living in rapidly growing cities, workers who used Silesian Polish, must have gained a form of awareness of their own ethnic and linguistic distinctiveness in confrontation with the state bureaucracy, and bourgeois who used the official language of Prussia--German. Acuteness of this alienating experience was alleviated by the staunch stance of the Catholic Church which demanded presence of the Polish language in schools and offices because it was afraid that Germanization could make many Polish-speaking Catholics convert to Protestantism (Kopiec, 1991: 71). To prevent this possibility the Catholic Church supported small Polish-medium presses which came into being at the very beginning of the Nineteenth century. They printed predominantly devotional and prayer books (Kopiec, 1991: 74/5)
Non-existence of any pro-Polish national awareness in Silesia is also proved by absence of any organized and vocative support for the Polish national uprisings of 1794, 1832 and 1864 which aimed at restitution of independent Poland and mainly took place on the Polish lands of the Russian partition. Participants of the uprisings were almost exclusively impoverished nobility, professionals and intelligentsia, whereas peasantry dissociated themselves from 'the conflict of lords' staying neutral or vindicative when their houses were burnt down and fields destroyed.

In Silesia the Polish-speaking population, except for its priests, was leaderless, for there were no Polish landowners or professional men; the land was divided into huge German-owned estates, belonging to families like that of the Henckels von Donnersmarck or the Prince of Pless (Pszczyna), with industrial interests as well. Thus, any active engagement in Polish matters was impossible as devoid of any immediate interest for the peasantry. Moreover, Silesia had lived apart from Poland so long that in the Nineteenth century its Polish-speaking people did not regard themselves as Poles but as Silesians—both the Polish- and German-speaking segments of the Silesian populace felt a certain regional loyalty. This loyalty was augmented by poverty of Silesian peasants and workers which had nothing to do with a language one happened to speak. Peasant rebellions took place in 1793 (the Sudeten Mountains and the vicinity), 1794 (Northern Silesia), 1798/9 and 1811 (Upper Silesia); and insurgences of Silesian weavers in 1793 (the vicinity of Landeshut [Kamienna
Góra) and in 1844 (Peterswaldau [Pieszyce] and Nieder Bielau [Bielawa Dolna]) (Anon., 1968: 303).

Especially the last insurrection, bloodily suppressed, was widely publicized all over the world and inspired the Silesian Nobel award winner, Gerhart Hauptmann, to write *The Weavers*. The repercussions of the rebellion were equal to those of the 1813 uprising against Napoleon, and radicalized the Silesians who suffered very low standards of living in the early phase of Prussian capitalism. The squalor of their existence was appalling and deepened by disastrous famines and concurrent epidemics of cholera in 1831 and typhus in 1846-1848 and 1852-1853 (Kopiec, 1991: 82). Understandably, the revolution of 1848 strongly affected Silesia in the form of demonstrations which took place in villages and urban areas in March 1848 and in May 1849 (Anon., 1968: 303).

The occurrences were followed by social reforms in the whole of Prussia and gave a boost to the development of the social movement whose most significant representatives in Silesia were Wilhelm Wolff and Heinrich Simon (Neubach, 1992: 7). Also German Catholicism, initiated by the Grottkau (Grodków) priest Johannes Ronge, contained some social elements but predominantly it was a religious and national movement striving to bring about reforms (Neubach, 1992: 7). Since the 1840s the Catholic Church made efforts to quell the plague of alcoholism in the industrialized areas and developed charitable activities which were coupled with the so-called 'missions' (i.e. week-long recollections) aiming
The ongoing reforms were also influenced by journalists and scholars who concentrated on promoting unification of the German states under the leadership of Prussia as the answer to the social problems. In Silesia this national strain was espoused by Gustav Freytag and Rudolf Haym. National polarization arrived to the Polish-speaking areas of Upper Silesia a little bit later and at first in the muted form of education in the Polish language which was introduced in the Oppeln (Opole) region by the school councillor, priest Bernard Bogdein in 1848 (Kopiec, 1991: 71). In the period of the 1850s and 1860s also several Catholic papers began to be published, among others Tygodnik Katolicki (The Catholic Weekly) and Zwiastun Górnoshląski (The Upper Silesian Messenger) in Deutsch Piekar (Piekary Śląskie), and the most famous Katolik (The Catholic) published by Karol Miarka. Under the aegis of the Church, Polish reading rooms and circles, and amateur theaters were established (Kopiec, 1991: 82/3).

The same pattern of activities could be also observed in Austrian Silesia where Tygodnik Cieszyński (The Teschen/Cieszyn Weekly) was commenced in 1848, and was followed by Polish organizations (Anon., 1968: 303; Zahrenak, 1992: 40) and growing interest in the local Polish folklore (Kadłubiec, 1992). The situation, however, was complicated by the fact that this region was effectively trilingual and aside German and Austrian Silesian Polish, Moravian/Czech was spoken. In the second half of the Eighteenth century, the Czech nationalists fought for some
recognition for their language in the Austrian Empire. The change came in 1774 when it was decided that mother tongues of pupils should be used at school. In Austrian Silesia, unfortunately, it meant solely Moravian/Czech education which led to the situation where Moravian/Czech textbooks were used while teachers lectured in Silesian Polish. Reflecting upon it in 1807, the school inspector Leopold Scherschnik advised publication of Polish textbooks. His suggestion was turned down by the school authorities in Brünn (Brno) as economically unfeasible, but with time more Polish textbooks were introduced in Austrian Silesian schools (Zahradník, 1992: 22/23), and the situation improved considerably when, thanks to the efforts of the Galician Poles, Polish was put on equal footing with German in 1869 (Davies, 1981: II 144). The picture got complicated with the onset of conscious nationalism which resulted in establishing of the Związek Śląskich Katolików (the Association of Silesian Catholics) in 1885, the Protestant Polityczne Towarzystwo Ludowe (the Peasant political Society) in 1884, and the Macierz Szkolna dla Księstwa Cieszyńskiego (the Educational Organization for the Principality of Teschen/Cieszyn) in 1885. The achievements were accompanied by publication of numerous Polish periodicals and calendars, and by organizing Polish cooperatives. The swift development of the basis for Polish nationalism was curbed by Austrian Germanizing efforts which culminated in establishment of Schulverein in 1880, and in the activities of pastor Teodor Haase who was the head of the Protestant Church in the Teschen (Tesen, Cieszyn) Principality. Even the Polish-medium periodicals
*Nowy Czas* (New Time) and *Ślązak* (The Silesian) were largely pro-German. The third force struggling for loyalty of the Teschen population was Czech nationalism which became active at the beginning of the 1880s. Czechization was conducted with the assistance of the Czech-dominated administration and the *Matica Skolske* (the Czech Educational Organization). In 1894 the Prague periodical *Narodni Listy* (The National Letters) published the demand to absorb Austrian Silesia culturally and politically into the Czech lands. However, till the turn of the centuries the Polish and Czech/Moravian national groups co-existed peacefully in Austrian Silesia and their respective national organizations even shared the same premises. Czech nationalists became very active after the publication of the 1890 and 1900 censuses which indicated a decrease of the Czechs in the national make-up of Austrian Silesia which was partially caused by immigration of Polish-speaking labor from Galicia which was attracted by dynamic Austrian Silesian industry where employment was more easily gained than abroad in Prussian Upper Silesia (Zahradnik, 1992: 41; Davies, 1981: II 147). Ignacy Hirića claimed that the population of Austrian Silesia were Polonized Moravians and in

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17 It was established by the movement which gave rise to the *Śląska Partia Ludowa* (the Silesian Peasant Party), which despite the fact that it was pro-German, did represent the interests of the local population, distancing itself from the opposite extremes of Polish, Czech/Moravian or German nationalisms. Few works have been devoted to such local-oriented Silesian movements so their exact political/national orientation is largely unknown (Zahradnik, 1992: 43).

18 Like in Prussian Silesia, the Polish-speaking Silesians in Austrian Silesia were not represented in the ruling stratum of society being predominantly peasants and industrial workers without a good chance of gaining tertiary or secondary education unless they accepted the Czech or Austrian identity as their own.
1901 a series of lectures was organized in Prague in order to arise interest in Czechization of Austrian Silesia which was envisaged as part of a future Czech state. Subsequently, Czechization brought about a decrease of the Polish-speaking population at the beginning of the Twentieth century. The Poles opposed Czechization having organized themselves in the Polska Partia Socjalno-Demokratyczna Śląska i Moraw (the Polish Social-Democratic Party of Silesia and Moravia) (1906), the Związek Katolików Śląskich (the Association of Silesian Catholics) and the Protestant Polskie Zjednoczenie Narodowe (the Polish National Association). Despite denominational differences the two latter organizations got united and together with the former curbed development of the local-oriented Silesian national movement preventing crystallization of a unitary Silesian identity (Zahradnik, 1992: 42-47).

In conclusion it must be, however, remembered that politically Austrian Silesia retained a German complexion until the days of the Czechoslovak Republic. Its deputies to the Reichsrat till the universal suffrage in 1907, were nearly all German; after 1907 it sent ten Germans, two Czechs and three Poles. The Silesian Diet was entirely dominated by Germans, albeit the actual population figures were 49% Germans, 23% Czechs/Moravians and 28% Polish, the Slavic element gradually increasing from 51% in 1880 to 56% in 1910 and the Poles more quickly than the Czechs. Whereas the Moravian Diet accepted the Bohemian lead in 1871, the Silesian Diet was strongly opposed to incorporation in a parliament representing the lands of the Bohemian Crown, and
protested sharply against the Fundamental Articles; the Stermayr language ordinances of 1880 and the abortive Badeni decrees were never applied in Austrian Silesia (Wiskemann, 1938: 115).

The quick deterioration of national relations in Austrian Silesia at the end of the Nineteenth century and at the beginning of the Twentieth century was duly reflected in the Prussian part of the region. Still in the middle of the Nineteenth century nothing presaged such a deterioration. The Polish-speaking Silesians considered themselves to be Prussians and loyally fought in the war with Austria in 1866 when Prussia struggling for hegemony among the German countries launched the decisive onslaught (which culminated in the Prussian victory at Sadowa) from the territory of Silesia. They also took part in the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1) and supported unification of Germany which was demanded by many Silesian politicians and journalists (Neubach, 1992: 9). Their attitude was even more fortified by the stance of the Poles from Posnania who accepted that modernization went hand in hand with Germanization (Davies, 1981: II 119). Thus, many Silesian workmen with ambition, outwardly at least, became as German as they could. They were almost ashamed to speak Polish at home and were glad for the schools to make their children into good Germans after 1872 (Kaeckenbeeck, 1942: 17)\(^9\). Therefore, the

\(^9\) In the field of politics, the Polish-speaking and Catholic Silesians were the faithful electorate of the German Catholic movement. The success of the Polish faction in 1848 when ten Polish farmers led by a priest, Józef Szafranek, became members of the National Assembly in Berlin was only an isolated incident. The German Catholic movement dominated Upper Silesia, after its position had been weakened in the 1850s, and from 1867 onwards. The Polish nationalist faction made itself decisively heard only in 1869 when Karol Miarka started to publish his paper Katolik
more they were surprised that in 1871—the year of the victory over France and unification of Germany in the form of Empire under the Prussian leadership, Bismarck commenced *Kulturkampf* which was a campaign in concert with German liberals against political Catholicism. Bismarck's aim was clearly to destroy the Center (*Zentrum*) Party (Kirby, 1991: 112) which had represented the Catholic movement since 1870 (Trzeciakowski, 1992: 178). In 1871 the Catholic Department in the Prussian Ministry of Religion was abolished and in 1873 clergy were banned from the positions from which they could supervise education. Moreover, after 1870 the Prussian government supported development of the Old Catholic Movement which had not accepted the dogma of infallibility of the Pope. Thus, the Old Catholics constituted the very core of the teaching cadre in the Upper Silesian *Gymnasia* from Neisse (Nysa) to Beuthen (Bytom).

*Kulturkampf* in Upper Silesia was not only anti-Catholic, but also an anti-Polish policy as traditionally and simplistically the Polish-speaking Silesians and Prussians, on the whole, were identified with Catholicism; and the former were unjustifiably perceived as potentially irredentist (Wiskemann, 1956: 26). The Polish language in schools and in church was only used as an instrument preventing advances of Protestantism and facilitating education and socialization of the Polish-speaking Upper Silesians. No Polish nationalist movement could be developed in Upper Silesia due to the lack of any local Polish-speaking intelligentsia and to the fact that the Upper Silesians wanted

to be Prussians not citizens of then the non-existent state of Poland. Their emotional and national bond with Polish culture and tradition was a fictitious invention of Polish nationalist historiography as by that time Silesia had been disjoined from Poland for six centuries. On the other hand, it is true that there were efforts (emanating from Posnania) directed at stirring up Polish-oriented nationalism. But they were half-hearted and brought about little if any response at all. Actually only rapid Germanization was capable of triggering off resistance and the development of national consciousness, and the feared and criticized scenario was played out by Kulturkampf (Trzeciakowski, 1992: 178) which systematically enforced Germanization at all levels (Davies, 1981: II 124). In 1872 a ministerial decree banned Polish in all state schools, except for religious instructions, and the language could not be used as previously for teaching German to Polish-speaking pupils. Teachers were forbidden to join Polish Catholic societies, and were offered financial inducements (Ostmarkenzulagen) for working in non-German districts. All graduates, including priests, were required to pass an exam in German culture. In 1876 German was made compulsory in all courts and in all government offices from the post office to the ticket office of the railway station. Although the Prussian state's struggle with the Catholic Church reached its end in the early 1880s with the political settlement in the person of Georg Kopp who was instituted as the bishop of Breslau and was identified with Germanizing forces (Schofer, 1974: 154), the Polish-speaking Upper Silesians became alienated which commenced their national radicalization. Under such an ambiguous
policy the Polish national movement was revived and channelled into the hands of radical priests (Davies, 1981: II 127).

The anti-Polish policy did not stop with the end of Kulturkampf but continued since then the Polish-speaking population was considered to be the major enemy of the state in the East (Schofer, 1974: 24). This perception was specifically strengthened by population movements which were considered to weaken Germandom. The German (European) phenomenon of population pressure on food supply was met at first by out-migration, mainly to other sections of the country but also abroad (Walker, 1964: 175). In the case of Silesia, emigration abroad was not of such significance for the anti-Polish attitude like the inter-Prussian east-west migration. East Prussia sent out above 560,000 people in the period 1871-1910, and from Silesia almost 600,000 people emigrated. In general only industrial eastern counties of Upper Silesia with large cities showed a surplus of immigrants over emigrants in that time (Schofer, 1974: 20). The migration was caused mainly by aggrandizement of large estates at the expense of smallholders, and worse work and payment conditions in Silesia in comparison to other western lands of Prussia (Schofer, 1974: 24). It cannot be excluded that also the strong Polish character of eastern Silesia fortified by Kulturkampf induced some Silesians identifying themselves with

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20 Interestingly enough though, it should be remembered that the first Poles to settle in the US were Polish-speaking Silesians from the vicinity of St. Annaberg (Góra Św. Anny) in Upper Silesia who under the leadership of their priest Moczygeba, established their village Panna Maria in Texas in 1854 (Ladomirska, 1966).
Germandom to leave (Schofer, 1974: 62).

The internal migration was dubbed as Landflucht ('flight from the countryside') and Ostflucht ('flight from the East') and were real phenomena, which coupled with the influx of the Polish-speaking labor in Upper Silesia, predominantly from Galicia and the Russian partition of Poland, caused another wave of anti-Polish policies which were designed as a defensive measure to counteract the drastic migration. In 1885 the Prussian government acting against the above-presented situation, but also reacting in part to Russian Pan-Slavism and Balkan unrest, in part following a wave of nationalistic xenophobia at home, and in part continuing its policy of trying to create a uni-national German state, ordered the expulsion of all alien Poles resident in Prussia (Schofer, 1974: 23). However, only 16,000 such alien workers with families lived in Upper Silesia and only 8,000 of the number in the industrial counties where the total population amounted to 500,000 (Schofer, 1974: 23). The number of alien Slavic workers in Upper Silesia was insignificant in comparison to the number of such workers in the Berlin-Brandenburg or in the Ruhrgebiet and the expulsions were fewer than 7,000 persons and did not affect daily cross-border commuters. The traffic involved 8,000 people before 1885 and continued to involve thousands of daily migrants down to 1914 (Schofer, 1974: 23).

The expulsions were followed by restrictive administrative measures to prevent new alien Polish workers from entering the Upper Silesian work market. However, Galicia and Russian Poland
were the natural hinterland of this region and it was difficult to be denied. In 1886, Bismarck created the Prussian Colonization Commission, the *Ansiedlungskommission* to attract German settlers to the Eastern parts of Prussia (Davies, 1981: II 129) but this policy was of little success in Silesia and in 1907 there were only 200,000 of these 'settlers' in the whole province, whereas 75,000 of these worked in mining and industry (Schofer, 1974: 23). Thus, despite the proposals to bring in Swedes, Lithuanians, Estonians, Finns, Byelorussians, Ukrainians, Germans from Hungary, Italians and even Chinese almost all the foreign contract workers in Upper Silesia were Poles from Austria and Russia, but in 1905 Ruthenians were introduced to offset Polish nationalist agitation and the Polish presence in general (Schofer, 1974: 24). Though since 1908 the Ruthenian contract workers constituted a larger percentage than the Polish foreign contract workers (Schoffer, 1974: 26), the Polish-speaking labor remained the majority in Upper Silesia (Schofer, 1974: 25).

On the political arena in the last decades before the First World War attitudes sharpened on the pro-Polish and pro-German sides which was the logical consequence of the previous policies, which had antagonized and nationally polarized the population of Silesia, drawing the dividing line along the linguistic distinction. In 1894 the *Verein zur Förderung des Deutschtums in den Ostmarken* (the Advancement of Germandom in the Eastern Marches Association) was formed in Posen (Poznań) to promote the welfare of German culture and German interests. Known to the Poles as the 'HaKaTa', from the initials of its founders--F.
Hansemann, H. Kennemann and H. Tiedemann—it soon gained the reputation of a powerful, extremist lobby. Some of its slogans were reminiscent of later Nazi talk of German Lebensraum (Tims, 1966: 29). Albeit there was always a large HaKaTa membership in Silesia, 11,850 in 1913 (Tims, 1966: 287/8), the organization devoted only a very small part of its activities to Upper Silesia despite the fact that the Oppeln Regency contained a third of all the Polish-speaking population in Prussia, or more than a million out of three and a half million, making it the most densely inhabited Polish center in the German Empire. It bordered on Galicia, regarded by Germans as a main breeding ground of Polish nationalism, and on that part of Prussian Poland which contained the foremost national religious shrine of the Poles, Częstochowa. It can be explicated by slow development of Polish nationalism here, which for the first time was seriously ignited only by Kulturkampf. Moreover, there was no such struggle for land here as in Posnania since landowners were almost exclusively of German extraction while the Polish-speaking population were industrial and countryside labor or smallholders. Thus, there was neither indigenous Polish nobility, nor intelligentsia, nor well-established middle class which could lead a nationalist movement. Only when it became evident that such leadership partly supplied from Posnania, was commencing to appear, and that the Polish-speaking Silesians were being aroused to independent political action, did the HaKaTa start to occupy itself with the region. For instance, in 1904 it persuaded the government to insert safeguards against Polish nationalist or socialist domination of miners' organizations in a bill (the Knapschaftgesetz)
regulating elections in them (Tims, 1966: 214/5)\textsuperscript{21}. Also petty anti-Polish measures were intensified. Street names, and official signs, even in cemeteries or public lavatories, were Germanized like numerous place-names\textsuperscript{22}. Bonuses were paid not just to teachers, but to any German official who would serve in the East. Schools, railroads, libraries and museums were built on the strength of special grants (Davies, 1981: II 134). The Center (Zentrum) Party which had also grouped the Polish-speaking Catholics during Kulturkampf (they had been faithful electorate of the party then) in struggle against the discrimination instituted by the Protestant-dominated state, distanced itself from the latter when Bismarck intensified his anti-Polish policies after 1885. The mutual bond was eventually terminated when the party’s leader count Franz von Ballestrem became the president of the Reichstag and decided to steer the party into a more pro-German stream of politics wishing to gain approval of wider strata of German society which could facilitate his aim to

\textsuperscript{21} The strikes in Königshütte (Królewska Huta) (1871), Kattowitz (Katowice) (1872), Scharley (Szarlej) (1873), the demonstration of miners near Beuthen (Bytom) who demanded to conduct negotiations in Polish not German (this instance is not properly documented) (Schoffer, 1974: 153), and especially the general strike of 1889 were undeniably led by the Polish-speaking labor (Anon., 1968: 303), who were getting nationally radicalized while demanding improved work conditions and higher wages. However, strikes and their organizers were discouraged by the Church opposition, and further delayed by ethnic conflicts within the workforce. This obstacle was circumvented by creation of all-German and all-Polish groups and despite the restrictive measures of the 1904 Knappschaftsgesetz waves of strikes hit Upper Silesian industry in 1905–1907, 1912 and 1913.

\textsuperscript{22} In 1873 the first official project of Germanization of all Silesian place-names was prepared by the Governor of the Province of Silesia in Breslau, count von Nordenflycht and dispatched to Landräten. It was eagerly espoused in the Oppeln Regency by Councillor von Neefe who prepared a detailed proposal of specific changes in 1874 (Jarczak, 1993: 14/15).
seize power in Germany (Neubach, 1992: 11).²³

Thus, the Polish-speaking Upper Silesians alienated from the German-oriented parties and deprived of effective parliamentary representation, decided to put forward their own candidates in the 1903 Reichstag elections, and to the surprise of German politicians, Wojciech (Adalbert) Korfanty (1873-1939) won his mandate from the constituency of Kattowitz (Katowice)-Zabrze (Hindenburg) and ostensibly joined the Polish circle formed by the deputies from Posen (Wiskemann, 1956: 27) opening the new chapter in the history of ethnic polarization of Upper Silesia. In the next elections of 1907 the Polish-speaking Upper Silesians improved their share of votes from 6.2% to 14.3% which allowed them to gain five mandates out of twelve for Upper Silesia. Apart from Korfanty and Napieralski (who was a journalist) three Polish-oriented clergymen entered the Reichstag. However, two of them were not local Silesians but Poles from Posen and West Prussia (Neubach, 1992: 11). Most probably thanks to intensified cultural activities of the administration the number of Polish parliamentarians fell down to four (11.1% of votes) in the 1912 elections.

Although spurred up by the political successes and the nationalist press, Polish national feeling spread in Upper Silesia into classes and areas which hitherto had rarely

²³ A small part of the newly emerged Polish-speaking middle class continued to cooperate with the Center (Zentrum) Party under the leadership of Adam Napieralski (1870-1928) (Anon., 1968: 303).
considered themselves Polish, Polish-speaking Silesians together
with Poles from the Pomeranian, Prussian and Posnanian regiments
marched through the Great War to the strains of Preussens Gloria
with never a thought but to keep in step. They served on all
frontiers with distinction and there was never a hint of mutiny
till the very end of the war. Only because to the vacuum left by
the revolution in Berlin and the abdication of the Kaiser, the
Poles of Posnania were stirred into rebellion at the turn of 1918
and 1919 by Ignacy Paderewski who on his way from Stettin
(Szczecin) to Warsaw had delivered a nationalist pro-independent
speech in Posen (Poznan) (Davies, 1981: II 137). It must be noted
that no similar occurrences took place in Upper Silesia except
the 1917 demonstrations in Gleiwitz (Gliwice) which reacted
against anti-Polish war regulations such as banning of most
newspapers and censorship of the rest (Anon., 1968: 303). The
ground for Polish nationalist demands was prepared first by the
restoration of the Kingdom of Poland by Germany in 1916, and in
1917 by President Wilson’s Fourteen Points which spearheaded the
ideal of self-determination of nations. The further boost was
given by the very emergence of independent Poland. On June 3,
1918 the Allied governments recognized the principle of Polish
independence and later on Posnania became Polish as (Davies,

In the wake of these events and the revolutionary situation in
Germany the strike of the military industry workers, incited by
the Communist Spartacus Association in January 1918, quickly
gulped Upper Silesia. In June Korfanty defeated the candidate

[57]
of the Center (Zentrum) Party and won the by-election in Gleiwitz (Gliwice). Consequently, he demanded the whole of Upper Silesia and a part of Lower Silesia for Poland in the Reichstag. His stance was supported by other like-minded deputies and the pro-Polish Upper Silesian press (Neubach, 1992: 12). During the German revolution in October and November 1918 separate Polish and German worker and soldier soviets were constituted (Anon., 1968: 303). Moreover, the newly-established state of Czechoslovakia also claimed a part of Upper Silesia. Czechoslovakia and Poland were the contestants over Austrian Silesia as well. The highly volatile postwar situation following the collapse of the Russian, German and Austro-Hungarian empires was to be solved in the coming years which are dealt with in the further parts of the thesis.

At the close of the chapter one should mention the westernmost part of Silesia constituted by Lusatia. Not unlike Upper Silesia was the area subjected to an intensive Germanization campaign in the eastern sections after 1871 when Kulturkampf was commenced. The Sorbs were suppressed again by Hitler and only when Lusatia was incorporated into the GDR in 1949, they were guaranteed the right to use their language and to maintain their identity and culture (Anon., 1991a: 569) but within the framework of the Communist state which with time caused the opposite effect, as the efforts to preserve the Sorbian national distinctiveness were to serve Communist propaganda and were largely disassociated from the grass-roots movement which had always been suppressed by the Communist authorities which to a greater or lesser extent were
interested in creating such an environment which would make the Sorbs 'naturally' assimilate with the German element.
CHAPTER THREE

INTENSIFICATION OF POLICIES OF ETHNIC CLEANSING IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD AND DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR

At the end of the First World War Germany asked the US President Woodrow Wilson to arrange peace. The three empires of Germany, Russia and Austro-Hungary, which had controlled Central Europe, collapsed and a plethora of new countries came into being. Especially the states of Czechoslovakia and Poland are important for our argument. Since respective national politicians had attempted to create the states in 1916, one of the main problems had been posed by the question of future territories the countries should possess in accordance with the Wilsonian idea of national self-determination based on linguistic boundaries.

The easiest adjustment was the transfer of the small territory of Hultschin (Hlucín, Hulczyn), north-east from Troppau (Opava, Opava)—with about 50,000 inhabitants—which was taken from Germany and given to Czechoslovakia in 1919. About 80% of the Hlucín people spoke Moravian Czech and they used to give the Prussian authorities a good deal of trouble. The Hlucín country was mainly agricultural and of no particular value and its transfer was based on the straightforward application of linguistic Wilsonianism because the principle did not conflict
with other considerations, but also satisfied the Czechs who were only too eager to win more covering territory in order a little to protect the vulnerable industrial district around Ostrau (Ostrava) so near the point Czechoslovakia, Germany and Poland were to meet. In their Second Memoire to the Peace Conference they suggested that their country should stretch as far as to Ratibor (Racibórz) but to no avail (Wiskemann, 1938: 116/117).

The question of the division of Austrian Silesia was a thorny issue in the Polish-Czechoslovak relations. According to the 1910 census the Polish-speaking inhabitants accounted for 54.8% of the population, Czech-speaking for 27.1% and German-speaking for 18.1% (Zahradnik, 1992: 45) on the basis of language of intercourse (Roucek, 1945: 174). The local agreement between the Rada Narodowa Księstwa Cieszyńskiego (the National Council of the Cieszyn/Teschen/Tesen Principality) and the Zemski Narodni Wybor pro Slezsko (the Land National Committee for Silesia) provisionally granted Poland with the regions of Bielitz (Bielsko), Teschen (Cieszyn, Tesen) and Freistadt (Frystat, Frysztat) (except eight administrative subdivisions) because they were predominantly inhabited by Polish-speakers. The ethnic basis of this agreement was questioned by the Czechoslovak authorities who claimed that historical and economic reasons entailed adding all of Austrian Silesia to Czechoslovakia, and establishing the would-be Polish-Czechoslovak border on the River Biała or the Vistula, or in the worst case on the Olza. While the main Polish

24. Ostrava lies on a thin strip of land belonging to Moravia, which was curiously squeezed in-between the two parts of Austrian Silesia almost cutting the latter in half.

[61]
army was stationed in Galicia facing the Ukrainians, on January 23, 1911 the Czechs invaded the Principality, and though opposed by the Polish-speaking miners (Roucek, 1945a: 148), they reached the Vistula. The Czechoslovak-Polish negotiations in Cracow (July 22-29, 1919) failed and at the Paris Peace conference it was decided on September 27, 1919 that a plebiscite should be conducted in Austrian Silesia (Długajczyk, 1989: 2).

The Austrian Silesian German-speaking population which was much irredentist not agreeing to the position of a minority in Czechoslovakia\textsuperscript{25} was restrained by their industrialists who wanted to avoid the competition of Reich German heavy industry. The capitalists much preferred a Czech, i.e. more Western, to a Polish prospect, and extended their influence towards pushing the Czechoslovak-Polish border as far to the east as possible.

\textsuperscript{25} On October 21, 1918 the ‘independent German-Austrian state’ was proclaimed, with jurisdiction over the whole German ethnic area, particularly the Sudeten territories (the Germans in Old Austria used to call Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia die Sudetenländer, i.e. the Sudeten territories). On the basis of the proclamation the Province of German-Bohemia was established and on October 30, 1918 it was followed by founding of another province constituted from the German districts of Northern Bohemia and Silesia, with Troppau (Opava, Opawa) as capital. Moreover, also two other German provinces of the Böhmerwaldgau (Bohemian Forest District) and German Southern Moravia were created (the short-lived country was called Sudetenland which by no means is identical with the bigger Sudetenland of the 1938 Munich Agreement).

Governor and Depuy-Governor of the Province of Northern Moravia and Silesia (which falls into the scope of the thesis) were Robert Freissler and Hans Jokl respectively. They planned to take into consideration possible demands from the Czechs, Poles, Silesians and Jews living in the territory, thus, clearly realizing their province was not mono-ethnic and could not exist without active participation and consent of the inhabitants of non-Germanic ethnic stocks (Breugel, 1973: 22/23).
(Wiskemann, 1938: 115). Because of the pro-Czechoslovak attitude of the Germans and the local population of the Silesian identity (irrespective of their mother tongues), Czechoslovakia could count on gaining more than 50% of votes in the plebiscite, Czechoslovak historians claimed that even more than 60% (Gruchala, 1990: 4). Thus Poland opposed organization of the plebiscite using political and even terrorist measures. Due to the tense situation the plebiscite was revoked and on June 28, 1920 the Council of Ambassadors in Spa divided Austrian Silesia (Kerner, 1945: 66). Poland received the region of Bielsko (Bielitz) and a part of the Cieszyn (Teschen, Tesen) region which were unquestionably ethnically Polish with an admixture of a small German minority. The Czechoslovak part of Austrian Silesia contained 140,000 Polish speakers, 114,000 Moravian/Czech speakers and 30,000 German speakers. The Polish–Czechoslovak agreement on minority rights signed in November 1920 was never ratified leaving room for aggravation of differences (Gruchala, 1990: 4).

A similar situation complete with nationalistic conflicts and territorial claims could be observed in Upper Silesia. Germany and Austro-Hungary strove to curb radicalization of Polish irredentism by proclaiming creation of the Polish Kingdom in 1916 and issuing, in 1917, a bill which allowed to teach religion in Polish in the first grades of the elementary school. They were half-measures as Polish was not re-introduced to Upper Silesian schools as the Prussian government argued that the local population used 'Wasserpolsch' (Silesian Polish) not literary
polish. Moreover, it was prohibited to disseminate information on Polish Legions which were formed in Austro-Hungary. The half-hearted pseudo-solutions intensified the feeling of irredentism. The Church hierarchy in the person of the Breslau bishop Adolf Bertram demanded education in Polish because the majority of Upper Silesians used Polish, in order to soothe antagonisms (Mendel, 1988: 4). At the Paris Peace Conference on September 8, 1918 Roman Dmowski claimed the whole of the Oppeln Regency for Poland with the exception of predominantly German areas of Grottkau (Grodków), Neisse (Nysa), Falkenberg (Niemodlin) and Neustadt (Prudnik). In reciprocation he demanded the areas of Namslau (Namysłów), Gross Wartenberg (Syców) and Militsch (Milicz) from the Breslau Regency. He was supported by Korfanty in the Reichstag who in his speeches presented a similar position. The claimed territory of about 12,000 sq km was inhabited by 2.1 mln out of which 67% were Polish speakers (Przewlocki, 1988: 1)

The growing Polish nationalism, which caused a many pro-German-oriented Silesian to flee west, was answered on December 3, 1918 by the Oppeln Regency President Bitta who declared state of emergency (Przewlocki, 1988a: 2) which was extended to whole Silesia by the Government Commissary Otto Hörsing on January 13, 1919. He introduced martial courts and abolished Polish organizations. Resemblance of order was maintained by the Grenschutz, 117th Infantry Division under the command of gen. Karl Hoefer, which had arrived to Silesia in November 1918 requested by Hörsing (Lis, 1988: 3). It was followed by the
remnants of the German Army which responded by forming their celebrated Freikorps to defend the German cause, and brought about victimization of private people of both nationalities²⁶ (Wiskemann, 1956: 27).

The decisions of the German government caused escalation of Polish irredentism and the Polska Organizacja Wojskowa (POW, the Polish Military Organization) came into being and staged a short-lived rebellion (which is referred to as the First Silesian Uprising in Polish historiography) in August 1919 which was bloodily suppressed and sent a wave of refugees who were involved in it to Poland (Długajczyk, 1989a: 2) because the Berlin government intensified its efforts to uproot Polish irredentism. On the other hand, the government decided to address the aspirations of locally-oriented Upper Silesians who wished their region to become autonomous. For a long time they had felt neglected by the authorities in Berlin and Breslau so they could side with the Polish irredentist. In order to prevent the possibility and to contain Polish nationalism, in October 1919 the German government divided Silesia into two provinces: Lower Silesia with the capital in Breslau, and Upper Silesia with its capital in Oppeln. Many Protestant administrative officers from outside of Upper Silesia were replaced with locally-born Catholics (Kopiec, 1991: 88).

²⁶ Notably on June 24, 1922 a gang of former Freikorps executed a prominent German Jew, Walter Rathenau, the foreign minister of Weimar Germany (Raymond, 1992: 269).
Article 88 of the Treaty of Versailles was the basis of organizing a plebiscite in Upper Silesia. Since January 31, 1920 French and later Italian troops started entering Upper Silesia and on February 11 the British, French and Italian representatives of the Allied Governing and Plebiscite Commission arrived to Oppeln. The occupation forces were to confiscate weapons and to liquidate military and paramilitary organizations. However, many weapons remained in hands of the local population (Długajczyk, 1990: 1/2) and were used in nationalistic skirmishes which left many dead and wounded on both the sides. The Polish-German tension culminated in the Second Silesian Rebellion (Uprising) which lasted from August 18 to August 25, 1920 (Racięski, 1990: 3) and resulted in replacement of the German Police with the German-Polish Plebiscite Police (Anon., 1968: 303).

Nationalistic struggle in the period preceding the plebiscite was accompanied by intensive Polish and German propaganda which was directed mainly at this segment of the population which identified itself rather with Upper Silesia than Poland or Germany. Thus, the Polish side started to publish Der Weisse Adler and Grenzzeitung27 striving to influence the group while Germany (and Czechoslovakia) promoted development of the very Silesian identity and used the stereotype of Polnische Wirtschaft which claimed that to give Upper Silesia to Poland would be like

27 Because the newspapers were published in German it is obvious they were to appeal to local-oriented Upper Silesians who did not know Polish. Not accidentally the title of the former newspaper means ‘the white eagle’ which is the coat-of-arms of Poland.
presenting a watch to an ape (Kaganiec, 1990: 2).

At last Upper Silesia voted on March 20, 1921. There were 707,393 votes for Germany and 476,365 votes for Poland, which meant that c. 300,000 Silesians who spoke the Polish dialect had voted for Germany. The champions of Poland pointed out that it was due to intimidation and participation of emigrants, people born in Silesia28. There was also some, but perhaps less, truth in the claim that Korfanty's men had intimidated others. The Germans were convinced that Upper Silesia would stay with Germany, while the Poles did not espouse the result as unduly favorable to Germany (Wiskemann, 1956: 28) and rose in the third and biggest rebellion (Uprising) in May 1921 in an effort to seize the territories they demanded. Gen. Karl Hoefer's Selbstschutz (Self-Defence) defeated the Polish troops in the decisive battle of St. Annaberg (Góra św. Anny) on May 21, 1921 and suppressed the rebellion pushing away the Poles south-eastward.

Under the influence of the rebellion, on October 20, 1921 the League of Nations decided to do unthinkable—to divide Upper Silesia across its industrial heart. Poland was granted two fifths of the area (3,213 sq km), four fifths of the industry and 893,000 inhabitants. The progress of gradual division of the German and Polish parts of the industrial complex from one another and minority rights were to be guarded by the Geneva Convention which was signed on May 15, 1922 and was valid for

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28 180,000 of them voted for Germany, and only 10,000 for Poland (Wiskemann, 1956: 28).

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fifteen years, i.e. through 1937. It did not prevent migrations of the threatened pro-Polish activists from the German part of Upper Silesia to the Polish part (Szaraniec, 1992: 1), and of the pro-German Sileians, who did not want to be Polonized, to the Reich (Neubach, 1992: 13). The cross-border population movement included approximately 100,000 people (Bartodziej, 1993: 25).

The parts of Upper Silesia and Austrian Silesia gained by Poland were joined into the small and territorially disjointed Silesian Voivodaship which was the smallest one of the interwar Polish voivodaships though economically most important and most densely populated. Preservation of cultural, historical and ethnic distinctiveness of this land was guaranteed by the regional autonomy which was granted to it by the respective act of the Polish Sejm (Parliament) of July 15, 1920. This unusual event in the history of Polish statehood, which in the modern times was modeled on the example of the French unitary state where minorities, dialects and local differences were thoroughly suppressed and obliterated; was prompted by the rise of the idea of separate Silesian state, Freistaat Schlesien29. It was promoted by Germany and the Sileians who identified themselves with their own land and not with Poland nor Germany. Moreover, this approach was gradually accepted by Korfanty disillusioned by the Polish authorities who did not comprehend Silesian

29. On September 3, 1922 the inhabitants of the part of the Oppeln Regency which remained within Germany after the division of Upper Silesia, voted on the issue of becoming a Land, an autonomous region in Germany. The outcome of the plebiscite was negative but did not prevent development of the Upper Silesian identity also on the German side of the border (Neubach, 1992: 16; Wiskemann, 1956: 31/32).
problems. Silesian autonomy, at the institutional level, was reflected by the Organic Status (the constitution) which gave the legal basis for establishing the Silesian Sejm (parliament)\(^{30}\) which was inaugurated on October 10, 1922. Article 22 of the Status did not allow limiting of the powers of the Silesian Sejm without its prior consent. The competencies of the Silesian Sejm were strongly checked by the powerful Voivoda (governor) who was appointed by the Warsaw government (Goclon, 1993: 1). The legal make-up of the territory was marred by an important anomaly—the Geneva Convention did not apply to the Polish part of Austrian Silesia which was an integral part of the Voivodaship (Goclon, 1993: 2).

The settlement of the German, Czechoslovak and Polish interests in Silesia prepared a ground for interwar co-existence which was marked with successes and failures.

Most curiously the division of Silesia between Poland, Germany and Czechoslovakia was not followed by immediate changes in the ecclesiastical division of the Catholic Church. Only in the much-publicized case of the Silesian Voivodaship already one day after the official division of Upper Silesia by the Council of Ambassadors, Cardinal Bertram established a sub-bishopsric for the Voivodaship on October 21, 1921. On November 7, 1922 the Holy See established the Apostolic Administration for Katowice Silesia

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\(^{30}\) Besides the Silesian Sejm, Katowice Silesia was also represented in the Polish Sejm, and there was no restriction on being an MP simultaneously in both the legislatures which though practically rarely happened (Goclon, 1993: 11).
directly subordinated to Vatican. The Silesian (Katowice) Diocese was established and attached to the Cracow Metropolis by the Pope Pius XI on October 28, 1925. The diocese consisted of the Apostolic Administration and the parishes of Polish Cieszyn (Tesen, Teschen) Silesia. Since the middle 1920s, the Katowice Church published its newspaper in Polish and German versions (Gość Niedzielny and Sonntagsboter) and continued the tradition of celebrating masses in languages spoken in a given parish in order to lessen and distance itself from nationalist tensions (Myszor, 1992: 3). In the case of German and Czechoslovak Silesia, the District of Glatz (Kladzko, Klodzko) stayed within the diocese of Prague while much of Czechoslovak Silesia remained subject to the archbishop of Breslau; a few parishes in German Silesia, too, remained in the diocese of Olomouc (Olomütz, Olomuniec). The Church was not eager to conduct any alterations impoverished and weakened by Czechoslovakia’s Land Reform and in conflict with the government over the person of John Hus. This antagonism was alleviated later on but the ecclesiastical division of the Church not compatible with the new borders stayed as it had been (Wiskemann, 1938: 229/30).

Albeit nationalistic fervor subsided after the settlement of the postwar borders and the signature of minority treaties worked-out by the League of Nations, differences still prevailed. The treaties were to prevent state-forced assimilation of minorities allowing them to choose between adhering to their own language and culture or accepting the tradition of a majority. Thus assimilation should have been natural. Unfortunately, the
treaties provided for no obligation on the part of minorities themselves (Roucek, 1945: 173). This flaw posed a danger to respective countries which were apprehensive of disloyalty of their minorities. In order to prevent the risk, the states more or less forcefully tried to assimilate their minorities which naturally delayed the process of natural assimilation and increased the number of cases of disloyalty of minorities to the host country.

The mechanism played a significant role in the Hlucin (Hultschein) territory where the Czechoslovak government adopted the racist attitude towards the population, i.e. that these people, who were clearly Slavic by decent and by language, must be rescued from the semi-Germanization which had overtaken them until then. The census indicated that the German-speaking minority was smaller than 20% of the population so the German schools were closed, and their children either went to school in Opava (Troppau) or learnt privately at home. Strangely enough non-German-speaking parents showed great eagerness for their children to join the German classes which sprang up. Germanophilia of the population might be caused by the Czechization measures, and it considerably increased after the introduction of the Lex Uhlíř Act which compelled all the Hlucin children to attend Czech schools irrespectively of their ethnic background. In May 1935 an 80% of the population voted for the Sudetendeutsche Partei. The Czechoslovak government wanted to contain increasing irredentism by incarcerating pro-German activists and teachers inciting people for action against the state. The measures justified from
the Czechoslovak point of view appeared grossly oppressive to the
Hlucin populace. The outcome of the situation can be summed up
in the saying one often hear in Opava (Troppau): "Bismarck could
not make the 'Hlutschiner' into Germans, but where he failed the
Czechs have succeeded" (Wiskemann, 1938: 232-234). This common
truth, unfortunately, aptly describes the outcome of minority
policies in other parts of Silesia which did not belong to
Germany in the interwar period.

The situation in the post-First-World-War Czechoslovakia was
complicated by mutual adversity of the Polish and Czech
authorities which failed to reach even a semblance of peaceful
settlement. Czechoslovakia was displeased that it obtained only
a part not the whole of Austrian Silesia while the Poles declared
that they would have never complied with the decision of the
Council of Ambassadors had they not been engaged in the war with
Soviet Russia (Kerner, 1945: 68). On the other hand, the Germans
who suddenly were reduced to the position of a minority and a
non-dominant ethnic group in Czechoslovakia after the break-up
of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and who had not managed to
maintain their Sudetenland, had been strongly irredentist in
Czechoslovak Silesia ever since then. Their stance was fortified
by the change in the ethnic composition of the province after the
separation of the Polish part of Austrian Silesia. They formed
40.5% of the population (the Czechs 47.5%, the Poles 11.2%)
(Roucek, 1945: 174), which was a bigger proportion than the
corresponding number of the Germans in Bohemia and Moravia,
although it totalled only 252,635 (Wiskemann, 1938: 116).
The population statistics became another weapon in the nationalist strife in Czechoslovak Silesia. In Austro-Hungary the basis for national description in censuses was the language of intercourse. It was changed to the declaration of a mother tongue in Czechoslovakia (Roucek, 1945: 174). Moreover, the question of the Silesian identity arose in that time. The Poles considered it a ploy to diminish the percentage of Polish-speakers in the official statistics (Zahradnik, 1992: 77). The Czechs argued on the basis of election statistics that the Silesians were an objectively existing ethnic group which even formed its own political parties (Gawrecki, 1991: 25). It was established that in 1930 there were 24,697 Silesians; 10,672 of them were pro-Polish, 13,834 pro-Czechoslovak, 191 pro-German and 4,036 pro-Silesian. It was also claimed that 14,500 Germans were Silesians who had accepted the German identity in the postwar years (Gawrecki, 1991: 26). For this reason, Polish, German and Czechoslovak reckonings on the ethnic make-up of this region vary widely serving the needs of the respective nationalist propagandas.

First of all, the role of the German language was limited with the advent of the Czechoslovak statehood which introduced Czech as the official language in Czechoslovak Silesia, which entailed Czechization of place-names as the matter of course. Generally speaking, the situation of the Czechoslovak Silesian Germans was a reflection of the position of the Germans in the Czechoslovak Republic. During the first days of the Republic, the Czechs set out to humiliate them in a thousand little ways, e.g., on the new

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Czechoslovak paper money the four languages of the Republic correctly appeared, but German came third on the list, following the Cyrillic script of some hundred thousands Ruthenians (Wiskemann, 1938: 118). This unfriendly attitude of the Czechs, coupled with the loss of Sudetenland as an independent state, caused the Germans to protest against the Czechoslovak Constitution in April 1920 as forced on them, and to refuse to take part in the presidential elections (Wiskemann, 1938: 122). The Czechoslovak-German relationship deteriorated even more due to the 1921 census irregularities--it was proved that the actual number of the Germans in Czechoslovakia was higher by 1% than shown in the official statistics (Wiskemann, 1938: 123, 125). In 1925 the deadlock was broken when the two German parties--the Agrarians and Christian Socialists--joined the government majority (Carter, 1991: 924).

This period of moderate relaxation in the nationalist struggle was cut short in Czechoslovak Silesia in 1927 when the province was merged with Moravia on the grounds that it was too small to be independently viable. It was the most regrettable step from the German point of view because it was the only province in Czechoslovakia where the German minority reached 40%. On this occasion, some German nationalists began to accuse the Activists (the Germans cooperating with the Czechoslovak government) of betrayal of German interests which also facilitated Czechization of the German minority, thus, deepening a rift in the German political life (Breugel, 1973: 78).
Subsequently, influences of Pan-Germanism emanating from the Weimar Republic, grew stronger in Czechoslovakia especially supported by the inflow of financial resources from different Auslandsdeutsche organizations in Germany. This facilitated the creation of Kameradschaftsbund (KB) in 1926, which grouped the mystically inclined who enthusiastically embraced the teaching of the Vienna University professor Othmar Spann. He believed in organic—bündisch or ständisch—social grouping, a vaguely back-to-the-guild medievalism, which rejected the concept of western democracy. What was perhaps even more to the point was that he believed in a resurrection of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, a tidying-up of the whole of Central and Eastern Europe by the Germans—the cream of Humanity and the only possible saviors of civilization—as Fichte claimed in 1809. In Czechoslovak Silesia the ideology was widespread among the professional classes and simple-life youth of Opava (Troppau) and Tesin (Cieszyn, Teschin). Some of them believed that the Historic Provinces (i.e. Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia) should form the heart of the new German empire to come. A certain Dr. Patscheider, Tyrolese by birth, but now a schoolmaster in Opava, urged the reunion of the Prussian, Polish and Czechoslovak parts of Silesia, so that united Silesia should be Germany’s ‘gate to Moravia and her bridge to the valley of the Danube.’ The KB and similar organizations were associated with the Arbeitskreis für gesamtschlesische Stammeskultur in Breslau (Vratislavia, Wroclaw), the Verein für das Deutsch tum im Auslande (VPA) and the Bünische Front Nord-Ost (Wiskemann, 1938: 136-138).
This trend revived the old prewar Pan-Slavic, Neo-Slavic and Pan-German arguments. Moreover, from 1930 Czech mistakes, economic decline\(^3\) and the rising tide of Hitlerist propaganda increased Pan-German thinking among the Sudeten Germans. Activities of the German organizations which claimed to be solely culture-oriented brought about an increase of the Czech apprehension of German disloyalty. This charged atmosphere culminated in the famous Volkssport trial in 1932. Seven young members of the Volkssport\(^2\) were accused of having prepared an armed rebellion in connection with a foreign power. Later this charge was dropped but they were sentenced for conspiring against the Republic and its democratic constitution (Wiskemann, 1938: 138).

The trial, the Great Depression, German grievances caused by the Land Reform\(^3\) (Wiskemann, 1938: 147-160), and financial aid for the Sudeten Germans from Germany prepared the ground for the rise of the Sudeten German Party (the Sudetendeutsche Partei) in October 1933. It was established by Konrad·Heinlein, a supporter of Hitler and head of the political active Sudeten Turnverband gymnastics society. In the parliamentary elections of May 1935,

\(^3\) The Great Depression hit the highly industrialized German-speaking districts more severely than the predominantly agricultural Lowlands (Carter, 1991: 925).

\(^2\) Members of the sports organization belonged to the Czech DNSAP which, at Salzburg in 1920, had regarded itself as the very same thing as Hitler's NSDAP. Moreover, it is worth remembering that in 1931 Nazi and Volkssport uniforms were forbidden in Czechoslovakia (Wiskemann, 1938: 138).

\(^3\) It liquidated great disproportions in land ownership which had led to such a situation that 2% of the population had owned one quarter of the land (Wiskemann, 1938: 147). No democratic state can afford to maintain such a state of affairs without endangering the existence of democracy itself.
the party captured nearly two thirds of the Sudeten German vote and became a political force second only to the Czech Agrarians. The German irredentism amplified in all ex-Sudetenland provinces (including Czechoslovak Silesia) and triggered off the bitter political struggle between this separatist trend and the Czechoslovak state which wished to preserve its democratic existence. In 1938 Czechoslovakia was defeated when the leaders of Western Europe wishing to appease Hitler decided at the Munich Conference that by October 10 Czechoslovakia was to transfer all the territories of Bohemia and Moravia with 50% or more Germans to the Reich (Carter, 1991: 925). Some pieces of the Czechoslovak land were also annexed by Hungary and, most importantly for our argument, by Poland in the case of a part of Czechoslovak Silesia (i.e. Transolza) which was seized by the country.

The division of Austrian Silesia 'clearly subordinated the ethnic to the economic principles' (Buell in Roucek, 1945: 188) thus leaving beyond Poland's boundaries a Polish-speaking minority of 69,967 (11.24%) in Czechoslovak Silesia according to the Czechoslovak census of 1921 (Roucek, 1945: 174). The data was not accepted by the Polish sources stating that 129,000 Polish-speakers lived in Czechoslovak Silesia in 1921, and that they formed a majority of 54.6% in the counties of Czech Tesen (Teschen, Cieszyn) and Frystat (Freistadt, Frysztat) (Zahradnik, 1992: 72).

In the first period after the division the Czech authorities had a negative attitude towards the Polish-speakers who fended off
Czechization by founding and re-activating numerous political, cultural and social organizations, and, most importantly, Polish cooperatives. However, nationalist tendencies subsided later on and the Association of Silesian Catholics (the Związek Śląskich Katolików) started to support the Czech Agrarians. The Polish-Czechoslovak relations worsened in 1927 when Czechoslovak Silesia was merged with Moravia arguably for economic and administrative reasons, and the Silesian Parliament in Opava (Troppau) liquidated. The policies of assimilation and Czechization practised by the Czechoslovak authorities as justified means of strengthening the new state, were directed at all Czechoslovak minorities but were especially successful in the case of the Polish-speakers whose national feelings were heterogenous. The process of assimilation was accelerated by the ongoing industrialization of this region which constantly attracted newcomers from all over Czechoslovakia, but especially from Moravia and Bohemia; thus, decreasing the number of the Polish-speakers in the ethnic composition of the populace. Moreover, certain sources maintain that above 15,000 Polish-speakers left Czechoslovak Silesia looking for work farther afield or displeased with the ethnic policies (Zahradnik, 1992: 70/71-75).

Czechization, as in the case of the Sudeten Germans, was also conducted at the plane of education. There were less or more

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The role of the Silesian movement and its Silesian Peasant Party (the Slezska lidova strana, Schlesische Volkspartei, Śląska Partia Ludowa) in the context of the Polish nationalist movement in Czechoslovak Silesia, has not been adequately researched so far, and could alter the interpretation of the ethnic situation presented in this thesis.
covert efforts to close down Polish schools whereas Czech schools were located in ethnically Polish regions. Not surprisingly did the number of schoolchildren in Polish schools decreased from 22,104 in 1920 to 9,504 in 1938, and rise in Czech schools from 7,582 to 24,167 in the respective years. Such a dramatic fall was also facilitated by a low economic position of the Polish-speakers who were predominantly peasants and workers, and could not count on financial support from Poland unlike the German minority which was incited into disloyalty also by economic incentives from the Reich. Actually, the Czechs emulated the German example in the years of the Great Depression, when the Polish-speakers could immediately receive a job should they decide to send their children to a Czech school. Moreover, Polish educational organizations obtained only one licence to open a cinema (which was an influential mass medium then) as opposed to sixteen such licences for Czech organizations (Zahradník, 1992: 75/76, 79).

It is also important to notice that the Polish-speakers (maybe also due to substandard education) were underrepresented among in the local bureaucracy. In 1930 there was one officer among every 5,445 Polish-speakers, one among 662 Czechs, and one among 245 Germans. During the time the state employed 268 officers in Czechoslovak Silesia, i.e. 182 Czechs, 70 Germans and 14 Polish-speakers. No single Polish-speaker was employed in jurisdiction or in the authorities of state-owned enterprises in this region. In the local government of Frystat (Frysztat, Freistadt) only one Polish-speaker was employed instead of four, and two instead of
six in Tesen (Cieszyn, Teschen). According to the Polish-speakers they were also underrepresented in the Czechoslovak Parliament while the Jews were clearly discriminated which shows up even in the official Czechoslovak statistics (Roucek, 1945: 175). Because the Sudeten Germans were anti-Semitic having had been influenced by the ideology of Nazism, the German-speaking Jews of Czechoslovak Silesia took part in parliamentary elections in a bloc together with political groups of the Polish-speakers (Gawrecki, 1991: 24). (Zahradnik, 1992: 76, 79)

Immediate worsening of the Polish-Czechoslovak relations was brought about in 1934 when Poland signed the Pact of Non-aggression with Germany, which Czechoslovakia felt as appeasement of Germany at its cost. Intensification of discrimination was countered by the Polish-speakers. In 1935 the Polish Workers’ Socialist Party (the Polska Socjalistyczna Partia Robotnicza) presented, before the Parliament of the Czechoslovak Republic, a document entitled Cieszyn Silesia, Its Postulates, and Grievances. In 1936 the action was undertaken once again by the Association of the Polish Catholics (the Związek Katolików Polskich) in the form of The Postulates of the Polish Population in Czechoslovakia. The documents emphasized loyalty of the Polish-speakers towards the Czechoslovak state and demanded discontinuation of discrimination and compensation for the consequences of the anti-Polish policies\(^3\). In 1937 the Polish

\(^3\) Also the Land Reform of the 1920s and 1930s was conducted in such a way that instead of making up for inequalities in land ownership, it promoted the Czechs to higher social positions in the Czechoslovak Silesian countryside at the cost of the Polish-speakers (Zahradnik, 1992: 76).
Workers' Socialist Party, the Polish Peasant Party (the Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe) and the Association of the Polish Catholics formed a common committee which appealed the Czechoslovak government to positively address the national demands of the Polish-speakers. The appeal coincided with the Czechoslovak government's declaration of February 20, 1937 which spelt out a more accommodating official line towards the minorities in Czechoslovakia including the Polish-speakers (Zahradnik, 1992: 77, 79).

One cannot say if it was a sincere effort on the part of the Czechoslovak government to alleviate grievances of the minorities in Czechoslovakia or just a tactical ploy undertaken in order to facilitate preservation of unity of the Republic, and of democracy in the context of appeasement of Germany by the West at the cost of Czechoslovakia. Anyway, the international political situation was ripe for peaceful acceptance of the Reich's seizure of Czechoslovakia after the Anschluss of Austria.

To conclude this part devoted to ethnic relations and policies in Czechoslovak Silesia, one should not forget that the Protestant Church in the province was almost purely of the Polish character because parsons and the administration was composed from Polish-speakers. However, one third of the Czechoslovak Silesian Protestants were Czechs and they chose to demand equal rights for themselves (Zahradnik, 1992: 78).
After the division of Upper Silesia between Germany and Poland, the uneasy situation was regulated and controlled by the Geneva Convention which had duly established its institutions: the Mixed Commission and the Arbitration Tribunal in Katowice (Kattowitz), Poland, and in Beuthen (Bytom), Germany, respectively. The institutions were to oversee correct implementation of the Geneva Convention which from the legal point of view guaranteed equal treatment for the minorities in Oppeln (Opole) and Katowice (Kattowitz) Silesia, individual rights, the rights to freedom and life, the right to language, minority schools and publishing houses, and freedom of religion among others. Moreover, some other original solutions in the field of international law were taken to guard the rights—every citizen living on the territory protected by the Convention could sue the states of Poland or Germany after having filed a complaint in the Minority Offices in Oppeln or Katowice. The ensuing trial was conducted before non-state, international institutions whose final decisions were obligatory and had to be observed by the sued state and the minority member who had initiated the litigation. During the fifteen years from 1922 to 1937 when the Convention was in force, 2,283 complaints\textsuperscript{36} were filed (Polomski, 1989: 33-38).

\textsuperscript{36} 1,613 complaints were filed by the German minority in the Silesian Voivodaship, and in the Oppeln Regency 522 by the Polish-speaking minority and 148 by the Jews (Polomski, 1989: 37/38).
between Poland and Germany was widespread in Upper Silesia, which was treated as a ground of contest between German and Polish nationalisms which must have limited effectiveness of the Convention and radicalized the populace along the ethnic lines.

After having gained the eastern part of Upper Silesia, the Warsaw government set out to Polonize it, or 'unGermanize' it as the comprehensive action was presented by the official propaganda. The most visible effect of Polonization was changes in place-names, street names and information inscriptions which became exclusively Polish (Jarczak, 1993: 15; Goclon, 1993: 2). In 1923 the proposal of some German parliamentaries in the Silesian Sejm to introduce bilingual street signs in localities with a German majority was staunchly rejected as well as the possibility to use the German language in offices where there were not enough officers able to speak Polish. Actually, Polonization had been already affirmed by Korfanty in 1922 when he ruled out any chance of bilinguality in the Silesian Sejm with his statement that only Polish can be the official language in Poland. The only retractions from this hard-line position which could conflict with the Geneva Convention, allowed the Silesian Sejm deputies to deliver speeches in German till the expiration of the Convention on July 15, 1937, the populace to submit documents to Silesian institutions in German, and German officers to use German inside their offices until July 15, 1937 (Goclon, 1993: 2). Education was directly linked to the question of language. It also became the field where the fierce nationalistic struggle was waged. The Polish state procrastinated opening of new German
schools with German as the medium of instruction (Goclon, 1993: 3), and did not allow all willing children to attend the schools arguing that some of them were sent to German schools by Polish-speaking parents who were either intimidated by their German employers or allured into the fold of Germandom by the financial support they could thus receive from German organizations subsidized from Germany, which was quite an opportunity in the years of the Great Depression (Komjathy, 1980: 68). In reciprocation, the German Sejm Club strove to hinder opening of the Polish vocational school of metallurgy and mechanics in Królewska Huta (Königshütte) in effort not to allow Polonization of the ranks of industrial technicians and engineers who were predominantly of German stock (Goclon, 1993: 3). This hostile reaction was also caused by the influx of Polish engineers, teachers and settlers during the post-plebiscite period when many German teachers and German-speaking inhabitants decided to leave Upper Silesia (Falęcki, 1989: 166) for Germany where they could enjoy a better economic situation and be free from harassment of the Polish nationalists, which also included such minor but painful instances as prohibition of certain literature for use in the schools: 'Goethe’s Childhood' from Dichtung und Wahrheit, the Nibelungenlied and Edda (Komjathy, 1980: 88). The measures were extended to the Catholic Church as well. They culminated in cases of dismissal and expulsion of clergy of German ethnic origin in 1937. Therefore, it is not surprising

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They hardly ever understood ethnic and cultural specificity of Silesia nor its problems and thus did not mix well with the local population bringing about mutual mistrust and discontent.
that German- and Silesian-oriented organizations answered with the slogan: 'Upper Silesia for Upper Sileans' (Kulak, 1989: 86).

Some concrete actions followed: German industrialists, first of all, employed Sileans and Germans and in the periods of economic difficulties dismissed Polish workers as first. Even some Church officials entered the conflict preaching expulsion of non-Silesian Poles to Poland (Manatowicz, 1989: 151). However, one must be careful not to overestimate effectiveness of this pro-Silesian propaganda like the Polish nationalist historiography, because similar measures were directed at Germans and pro-German Silesians by the hostile pro-Polish administration of the Silesian Voivodship. For instance, in 1925 it proposed merging of the Voivodship with the Cracow Voivodship (Manatowicz, 1989: 150) which would automatically liquidate Silesian autonomy and submerge the ethnically diversified populace in the Polish element. Moreover, not only the economic depression but also the restrictive nationalist policies of the Polish authorities must be taken into consideration to account for the very high ratio of unemployment among the members of the Volksbund (43%) and the Trade Union of German Workers (62%) (Komjathy, 1980: 75, 87/88).

38 The efforts aimed at weakening of the German element in Upper Silesia were clearly exposed by the manipulated official statistics which lowered the number of the Upper Silesian Germans by half in the 1931 census (Manatowicz, 1989: 141).
such an antagonistic attitude of the Polish authorities towards the German minority in the Silesian Voivodaship was not caused only by the desire on their part to assimilate this region in order to construct an ethnically homogenous Poland. They strove to reciprocate for the biased treatment of the Polish-speakers who were left, after the plebiscite, in the western part of the Oppeln Regency which remained with Germany. First of all, Lower Silesia which ethnically was almost purely German, did not like strengthening of the postwar ethnic diversification of Upper Silesia which was going against the Pan-German idea of ethnically unitarian German state. Thus, the fact that the inhabitants of the Oppeln Regency rejected the offer of autonomy (comparable to that which was instituted in the Katowice Voivodaship), served as the springboard for renewed Germanizing efforts in the territory, which were a response to the action of Polonization (or ‘re-Polonization’ as the contemporary Polish propaganda dubbed the process) in the Katowice Voivodaship. Already in 1926 a general plan (the so-called Ausrottungsprogram) to eradicate Polishdom from the German Ostgebiete existed, which, at first, manifested itself in changes in place-names—all Slavic names and Germanized forms of Slavic names were replaced with German ones (Jarczak, 1993: 15). Polish-speakers who were elected to become members of court juries, mayors, or heads of local governments in the countryside were not accepted for the positions by the Regency administration in the persons of President Alfons Prosko and his successor Hans Lukaschek. Their decisions breached many

39 Only 3.4% Polish-speakers, 2.6% Sorbian-speakers and 0.6% Czech-speakers lived in Lower Silesia before the Second World War (Kulak, 1989: 85).
guarantees given by the Geneva Convention and Article 113 of the Weimar Constitution. They were partially reverted by the efforts of the Association of Poles in Germany (the Związek Polaków w Niemczech) and under the pressure of the Polish administration in the Silesian Voivodaship which reciprocated with not accepting Germans who had been elected to local governments. Moreover, Polish-speaking parents who decided to send their children to German schools, and the families of the insurrectionists who fought on the Polish side in the three Silesian rebellions (Uprisings) but now joined some German nationalist organizations, could count on good jobs and generous financial support which attracted many Polish-speakers during the difficult years of the Great Depression. Some more harsh means of nationalist struggle with Polishdom included closing of schools, harassment of Polish organizations, physical and verbal assaults, and generalized violence. Moreover, in 1937 a law was passed which let expel Polish leaders residing in border areas in order to protect the borders of the Reich. It was part of the systematic ten-year plan of eradication of Polishdom which was accepted by Hitler in 1934 (Anon., 1968: 304). So till the outbreak of the Second World War only very few Polish schools had survived and the Polish cultural and national life had been largely suppressed. The oppression was eased for a short time in 1934 when Poland signed the Non-aggression Pact with Germany, but did increase after the expiration of the Geneva Convention in 1937. Despite the vociferous criticism by the Poles and the Germans as well, it did maintain an uneasy status quo in Upper Silesia considerably weakening if not making forced assimilation impossible.

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significantly, it delayed introduction of Nazi anti-Semitic legislation in the Oppeln Regency till 1937. However, on the whole, the Convention was more advantageous to the German minority actively supported by the industrial might and prosperity of the Reich than to the Polish minority which could not expect much assistance from the newly-restituted and mainly agricultural Polish state\(^{40}\) (Polomski, 1989: 31-44).

In the Silesian Voivodaship, the nationalistic struggle between the German minority and the Polish state was less successful for the latter than in the case of the German state in the Oppeln Regency. A significant role in preservation of the German and Silesian identity and culture was played by Silesian autonomy. The German minority was represented in the Silesian Sejm by four influential parties—nationalistic: the Deutsche Partei and the Volksbund, the Deutsche Katholische Volkspartei, and the social-democratic Deutsche Socialistische Arbeiterpartei (Goclon, 1993: 2). All of the parties and German cultural organizations (but especially the Volksbund which espoused the Pan-German ideology)

\(^{40}\) One could not forget that in the sea of anti-Polish measures the Catholic Church played a very positive role in the Oppeln Regency. Each priest sent to Upper Silesia had to know Polish which was a compulsory subject at the Breslau (Wroclaw) Seminary. Moreover, the Church fostered establishment of different organizations for the laymen, and was involved in educational, social and even political life though distanced itself from official ideologies which besides being anti-Polish, were anti-Catholic too. The Polish-speaking population responded by connecting its Polishdom stronger with the Church which was clearly demonstrated in the 1930 elections when the Polish-Catholic Peasant Party (the Polsko-Katolicka Partia Ludowa) demanded establishment of a separate Oppeln diocese and a Polish bishop in Oppeln. Unfortunately, the wishes of the Polish-speakers of the Oppeln Regency could not be actualized due to the rise of the anti-Polish and anti-Catholic movement of Nazism in the whole of German Silesia (Kopiec, 1991: 90-94).
received large amounts of money from organizations in Germany, which supported preservation of Germandom among the Auslandsdeutsche and Volksdeutsche (Komjathy, 1980: 1-16). The parties got radicalized when despite many endeavors from 1924 to 1926 Korfanty did not succeed in securing loyalty of the German industrialists in the Silesian Voivodaship, for the Polish state let alone their cooperation (Falęcki, 1989: 171) which could stop nationalistic tensions in the region. The industrialists were not interested in such proposals because the majority of their economic interests was connected to Germany, and they trusted in future re-unification of Upper Silesia, especially after 1925 when Germany failed to guarantee the borders of Poland and Czechoslovakia at Locarno, implicitly leaving them to a possibility of revision. This caused deterioration of the Polish-German relations which had negative repercussions for the position of the German minority especially after the May coup d’etat in 1926 when dictatorship was installed in Poland, and the new Warsaw government nominated Dr. Michał Grażyński to the position of Silesian Voivoda.

He decided to use the very extensive prerogatives of the Silesian Voivoda in a dictatorial way, like Marshal Piłsudzki in Poland, in order to stall the activities of the Silesian Sejm, gradually dismantle Silesian autonomy and thoroughly Polonize the voivodship. Korfanty reacted emphatically against this hard-line course in Silesia, which did not take into account specificity of the region and its inhabitants. Since then on he began to vocatively defend Silesia autonomy disillusioned by the Polish
politics in the Voivodship and the role of Grażyński who had been one of the commanders in the Silesian rebellions (Uprisings). He sided with the Silesian deputies who supported the condemnation of the 1926 coup d'etat in the Silesian Sejm. His politics was summarized by his Two Theses which were espoused by the majority of the Silesian parliamentarians:

1. Security of the Poles and the Germans in Silesia should be defended to the equal degree;

2. The Silesian insurrectionists are the sole representatives of the Silesian people.

The postulates were an effort to put the powers of decision-making about the region back into the hands of the original inhabitants of the Voivodship which was not accepted by the Polish dictatorial government. It led to a prolonged struggle between the government represented by Grażyński and Korfanty supported by the pro-Silesian forces. The bitter strife, at least at the political level, was won by the Polish junta and on the basis of minor charges Korfanty was incarcerated in 1930 (like another opponent of Marshal Pilsudzki - the Peasant Party ex-Prime Minister Wincenty Witos) (Wiskemann, 1956: 32), and later received political asylum in Czechoslovakia which was the only Central European country to retain the democratic system of government till 1939. Korfanty returned to Poland after the Anschluss of Czechoslovakia in 1939 and died as a broken man before the outbreak of the Second World war (Goclon, 1994: 5).
The installation of the junta replacing the legal Polish government in 1926 was of decisive influence on the Silesians in whose eyes the significance and status of the voivodship authorities, considered to be a direct extension of the Warsaw dictatorial government, plunged considerably, which coupled with the growth of factionalism among the Polish parties and the unstable economic situation of the region⁴¹ caused the victory of the pro-German candidates in the regional elections on November 19, 1926⁴² (Goclon, 1994: 5). For the first time intimidation was practised during the regional elections, and this illegal instrument of election campaigning, unfortunately, got solidly rooted in the political life of Upper Silesia which was indicated by similar excesses during the Polish parliamentary elections of 1930 (Wiskemann, 1956: 32).

For Grażyński Silesian autonomy smacked of separatism (Wiskemann, 1956: 32) and he did not spare any effort to weaken it (Goclon, 1993: 1) which alienated the German minority and many a Silesian, who even happened to have been pro-Polish earlier, because they perceived it as endangering of their ethnic and cultural

⁴¹ Poland, unlike Germany in the Oppeln Regency, could not afford to cushion the economic effects of the division of Upper Silesia, and rather treated the Silesian Voivodship as the source of financing for modernization of the Polish state; which inescapably must have lowered the standard of life in this region in comparison to the Oppeln Regency.

⁴² Participation in the elections reached the very high figure of 94.6%. The most spectacular victory of the German parties was observed in Katowice (Kattowitz) - 57%, Królewská Huta (Königshütte) - 70% and Świętochłowice (Schwientochlowitz) - 54%, where the industry was concentrated. Of course, there was a handful of non-industrial counties where the Germans lost, e.g.: Pszczyna (Pless) - 9% or Rybnik - 17% (Goclon, 1994: 5).
existence. Consequently, numerous Silesians disappointed with the policy and worsening economic climate, whose rapid deterioration had been started by the Polish-German tariff wars and the Great Depression, opted for the pro-German orientation also enticed by financial assistance offered by German organizations (Goclon, 1993: 4). Germany invested GM 37,000,000 in Upper Silesia trying to win the population for the sake of Germandom but with little success, however, because of which the Volksbund leaders were scolded by Berlin. The Polish authorities especially after Locarno and having observed violent irredentism of the Sudeten Germans, considered the contacts of the Upper Silesian German minority with Germany as a direct danger to the Polish interests. Ensuingly, the Polish authorities started to use 'preventive incarceration' of Silesians suspected of disloyalty or anti-Polish activities, and strove to limit the privileges of the Germans (Goclon, 1993: 4). The Upper Silesian German minority perceived it as obvious hostility of the host country which wanted to assimilate them forcefully, and thus the propaganda war in the Polish and German Silesian mass media escalated (Kulak, 1989). There were efforts, especially on the part of Dr Eduard Pant, the leader of the Deutsche Christliche Volkspartei to promote acceptance of the status quo and a moderate attitude towards Poland. He loyally upheld his stance till the very end of the Second Polish Republic in 1939, and strongly opposed Nazism in Upper Silesia (Komjathy, 1980: 67; Falęcki, 1989: 170). He was a sober politician and after the victory of Hitler's NSDAP in Germany in 1933, he emphatically criticized the Polish ethnic policies in Upper Silesia which resulted in emotional outbreaks
of Polish nationalists preventing any possibility of a calm discussion on the issue in the Silesian Sejm (Gocłon, 1994: 6).

The rise of Nazism in Upper Silesia, however, was difficult to be curbed due to the afore-presented economic and political situation, and the disastrous ethnic policies of the Polish government. The nationalist Volksbund, which had become influential in 1926 when its complaints against the Polish school policy had been heard in the league of Nations (Komjathy, 1980: 68), had to give way to the more radical Jungdeutsche Partei (JDP, the Party of Young Germans), which was formed by the disillusioned younger and idealistic generation, who were influenced by the success of National Socialism in Germany. They followed the Nazi ideas but still professed loyalty to the Polish state and denied any connection with the Reich (Komjathy, 1980: 72/73). Having noticed the success of the JDP, Otto Ulitz, the leader of the Volksbund, expressed his and his party’s unconditional support for Hitler’s regime on May 28, 1933 (Gocłon, 1994: 6). Anyway, the Volksbund was discredited among the young Upper Silesian Germans so the JDP’s popularity steeply increased and after the local elections in December 1934, it became the strongest German party in Upper Silesia (Komjathy, 1980: 73). Its advances were facilitated by the growing hostility of the Polish factions in the Silesian Sejm to the pro-German groups often dubbed as Nazist (Gocłon, 1994: 6), and by the Polish-German Non-aggression Pact (signed on January 26, 1934) which was interpreted by the Polish authorities as Hitler’s consent to deal with Poland’s German minorities as they wished
(Komjathy, 1980: 20) which allowed Polish nationalism to become Nazi-like (Goclon, 1994: 6). Besides accounting for the success of the JDP, accelerated ‘re-Polonization’ of the Germanized Silesians, and official and unofficial harassment of ethnic German organizations and individuals triggered a reaction, especially on the part of the younger German generation, which began to organize—against the advice and will of the elders—‘active defenses’ (Komjathy, 1980: 70).

Although the Non-aggression Pact enabled the Upper Silesian Germans to halt Polonization (Komjathy, 1980: 81), it was of no help in the struggle with anti-German policies. In September 1935 Poland renounced the minority treaties and established concentration camps for elements hostile to Poland. When in March 1936 Germany reoccupied the Rhineland, large anti-German demonstrations were organized by the West Marches Society (a Polish veterans’ organization) all over Poland (Komjathy, 1980: 76). On the other hand, the Polish press constantly emphasized the Germanization policies of the Reich towards the Polish minority in the Oppeln Regency and elsewhere in Germany which resulted in anti-German demonstrations in late 1935. In May 1936, a JDP meeting was disrupted in Upper Silesia leaving seventy persons injured, including women, and in July the police in Katowice dissolved the Upper Silesian Wanderbund which was loosely connected to the JDP. In June 1936 a sensational trial was held against the NSDAB\(^3\) which in the initiation demanded an

\(^3\) The name of the NSDAB differs from the name of Hitler’s NSDAP only by the last letter of the acronym. The ‘B’ is for ‘Bund’.
oath of unconditional loyalty to Adolf Hitler. It was organized by one Manjura of Strzybnica (Friedenshütte) and predominantly grouped simple and unemployed Polish-speakers. Moreover, repressive measures against the German minority (especially Protestant) Churches escalated\textsuperscript{44} (Komjathy, 1980: 79-83).

The Geneva Convention regulating the situation of the Polish-speaking minority in the Oppeln Regency and the German minority in the Silesian Voivodaship, expired on July 15, 1937 to the delight of the German and Polish governments which now could deal with their minorities without any international supervision (Palecki, 1989). However, Poland and Germany did not want to lose all instruments with which they could influence the fate of their respective minorities in order not to leave them at the mercy of the law of reciprocation\textsuperscript{45}. Thus, the German-Polish Minority Declaration was signed on November 5, 1937. By signing this Declaration, Poland had conceded that the minority question was intergovernmental rather than domestic. From that moment the Reich became the advocate of the German minorities. But since Germany was seeking rapprochement with Poland, the concession did not seem to be serious. Poland paid only 'lip service' to the Declaration and continued its 're-Polonization' campaign and the

\textsuperscript{44} The official state religion of Poland, after the May 1926 coup d'état, was Catholicism and other faiths such as Protestantism and Orthodox Christianity were barely tolerated because they were associated with the greatest adversaries of Poland: Germany and Russia respectively.

\textsuperscript{45} Grażyński wanted it to be the basis of ethnic relations in Upper Silesia (Gocłon, 1994: 5).
land redistribution program at the expense of German landowners\textsuperscript{46}. German objections, if they were voiced at all, were mild considering the unchanged Polish attitude. In the meantime oppression escalated: German families were relocated or expelled from areas considered strategically important, and the Frontier Zone Decree of January 22, 1937 provided that within 30 km from the border Volksdeutsche could not make any land transactions (Komjathy, 1980: 85-87).

Germany escalated Germanization of the Polish-speaking minority in the Oppeln Regency as well, especially after the anti-Polish speech of Minister Hjalmar Schacht in Oppeln (Goclon, 1994: 6), which presented the official line of the NSDAP. However, the party was not so popular in German Silesia as in the rest of the Reich which is indicated by relative poor election results and the fact that German Silesia had not almost any indigenous Nazi leaders (Neubach, 1992: 17, 19). In the so-called Röhm's putsch (1934) which was especially bloody suppressed in Silesia, more than one quarter of the victims were Silesians, or persons politically or professionally linked with the province. The first concentration camp was organized in Dürrgoy (Tarnogaj)--a district of Breslau (Neubach, 1989: 17), and discrimination of the Jews in German Silesia increased as elsewhere in the Reich (with the exception of the Oppeln Regency where they were protected by the Geneva Convention) and culminated in Pogromnacht of November 9, 1938 which opened the way to the

\textsuperscript{46} The land reform was not of such great significance in Upper Silesia as in, for instance, in Posnania because the former was heavily industrialized.
Holocaust.

The Munich Conference which sanctioned annexation of Sudetenland by Germany was perceived as a direct danger to Poland territorially encircled by the Reich in the West, North and South (Mroczko, 1989: 120). Thus, at night, at the turn of September 30 and October 1, 1938, the Polish Ambassador in Czechoslovakia, Kazimierz Papee, submitted the Polish ultimatum to the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Kamil Kofta. Poland demanded the south-western strip of Czechoslovak Silesia, the so-called Transolza or the Czechoslovak part of Tesen (Cieszyn, Teschen) Silesia. The Czechoslovak government striving to save its state and democracy consented to the ultimatum on October 1, 1938 and transferred to Poland the territory of 1,296 sq km (Goclon, 1993: 1) with the population of 230,282 (Roucek, 1945: 188). Polish sources claim that this annexation was fully justified because in 1910 65% of the population were Polish-speakers (Zahradnik, 1992: 82). However, at the moment of annexation the population of Transolza was composed of 134,311 Czechs and

47 The rest of Czechoslovak Silesia was annexed by Germany. United German Silesia (Lower and Upper Silesia were merged into one province following the Nazi concept of strong and centralized state) governed by Josef Wagner, hoped that Czechoslovak Silesia would be re-attached to it but only the Hultschin (Hlucin, Hulczyn) Territory, which had been lost in 1919 due to the decision of the Versailles Treaty, was re-incorporated in Silesia. The rest of the part of Czechoslovak Silesia gained by Germany after 1938 remained in the Province of Sudetenland. However, in 1938 after the dissolution of Border March Posen-West Prussia, Silesia received the county of Fraustadt (Wschowa) and the southern part of the county of Bomst (Babimost). According to the census of May 1939, the population of enlarged German Silesia was 4.8 mln (Neubach, 1992: 17/18).

48 Transolza was incorporated in the Silesian Voivodaship.
slovaks, 17,351 Germans and only of 76,303 Poles (Roucek, 1945: 188). The Czechs considered the ultimatum as a betrayal by a fellow Slavic country, whereas the Poles defended the act as an attempt to protect the Polish population which otherwise would have been immediately subjected to the authoritarian dictate of Hitler. Considering the ethnic relations, the Polish authorities immediately replaced Czechization with Polonization and brought about 6,000 Polish settlers to this region (Zahradnik, 1992: 115) in order to fortify the Polish element\textsuperscript{49}. Unfortunately, the eleven months of the Polish rule in Transolza rapidly worsened the Polish-Czech relations which was deftly used in this region by the Reich authorities during the Second World War (Zahradnik, 1992: 82-96).

In 1939 when the world was on the verge of another world war, chauvinistic feelings made any meaningful dialog impossible. Poland and Germany were fighting with each other at the international level, as well in the Polish and Silesian Sejms. In March 1939 Germany annexed the whole of Czechoslovakia and in April Hitler renounced the Non-aggression Pact and the Minority Declaration after Poland had received security guarantees from Britain (Davies, 1981: II 431). Also in March, the National Party (the Stronnictwo Narodowe) published its declaration stating that Poland had the right to Danzig (Gdańsk), East Prussia, and to the

\textsuperscript{49} The annexation of Transolza triggered off emigration of Czechs. It is estimated that about 35,000 of them left the territory during the short Polish rule (Zahradnik, 1992: 100). Also the Slezsky odboj (the Silesian Resistance) was organized which fought with the Polish state in Transolza and after September 1, 1939 became part of the Czech Resistance in this region (Zahradnik, 1992: 105).
western border based on the line of the Sudeten Mountains and the lower Oder. This stance was accepted by Foreign Minister Józef Beck who rejected all the German demands in his speech in the Sejm on May 5, 1939 (Mroczko, 1989: 121). Dr. Eduard Pant and his Deutsche Katholische Volkspartei sided with the Polish government because they were anti-Nazi. But the relationship between ethnic Germans and Poles at the local level worsened, under the influence of war psychosis, so much that Polish-speakers and Germans of the minorities in the Oppeln Regency and the Silesian Voivodaship respectively, were afraid to speak their mother tongues in public. German minority papers were censored, then confiscated, and finally closed down. The Polish authorities as well as the common people, boycotted German businesses. Because of heavy Polish pressure, the Silesian Germans who only two years earlier had displayed disinterest in nationalism and Nazi ideology, began to accept more directions from the Volksbund, which was designed to become the chief organization of the German minority group. As international events moved closer to the great crisis of August 1939, attacks against the Germans increased. The Polish authorities used discrimination and took to custody those Germans whose names appeared on the list of suspects drawn by the state in April and May 1939. They were marched under guards to the eastern parts of Poland. Unofficial German sources estimate their number between 50,000 and 58,000. Many died during the march or were murdered by hysterical mobs along the roads, despite best efforts of the guards. The German minority lived in fear and many of them left for the Reich while the rest were hoping for quick appearance of the liberating German armies.

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(Komjathy, 1980: 93-95).  

The Second World War was started on the Silesian soil by a provocation carried out by Sturmbaführer Alfred Helmut Naujocks of the Nazi Security Service (SD). At 8pm on August 31, 1939, he led an attack on the German radio station at Gleiwitz (Gliwice). His men were a dozen convicted criminals, who had been promised a reprieve in return for their cooperation. They burst into one of the studios, broadcast a patriotic announcement in Polish, sang a rousing chorus, fired a few pistol shots and left. Once outside they were mown down by the machine guns of the SS. Their bodies, carefully dressed in blood-soaked Polish uniforms, were abandoned where they fell, to be found in due course by the local police. Before the night was out, the world was awakening to the astonishing news that the Polish army had launched an unprovoked attack on the Third Reich (Davies, 1980: II 435). Having created the necessary casus beli, Germany

50 This volatile situation caused many nationally indifferent Silesians, who identified themselves with Silesia only, to choose suitable national identities to survive. The attitude is well summarized by the opinion Lord Bülow heard from a peasant during the German occupation of Poland: 'Your Lordship! We were Germans before and that passed away. Then we were Poles and that passed away too. Now we are Germans once again, and that too, will pass.' This conviction prevented Silesians from participating in activities directed against Poland, and also from challenging the Polish authorities. When the time came they even obeyed the mobilization orders (Komjathy, 1980: 92/93). The same situation recreated itself during the occupation of Poland, when the Silesians who had served in the Polish army at the beginning of the Second World War, now had to join the Wehrmacht.

51 The war in Transolza was commenced even earlier, that is, on August 26, 1939 when a German officer with civil troops illegally crossed the border from Slovakia to Poland and for several hours managed to control the railway in Mosty (Zahradnik, 1992: 97).
attacked Poland on September 1, 1939.

In Upper Silesia the war activities lasted from September 1 to 4 (Szefler, 1989: 179). Due to the ensuing panic flared up by the Polish mass media, every German became a 'fifth columnist' who should be dealt with as such and executed without trial. The new wave of violent attacks convinced the still loyal Germans to welcome with flowers the invading German armies and help their advance, sometimes actively participating in the military operations\(^{32}\). The atrocities and hysterical mob actions disappointed many Polish patriots, who risked their lives to offer asylum to the hunted Volksdeutsche (Komjathy, 1980: 95). The Polish troops in Upper Silesia were assisted by Silesian insurrectionists but they were soon crushed by the overwhelming German forces. The defeat was followed by a wave of anti-Polish terror and repression which lasted till the beginning of October. Although it was not so intensive as in other parts of Poland, it claimed 2,500 casualties. Silesian insurrectionists, Polish organizations' members and intelligentsia were executed without trial or arrested. The actions were chaotic and often undertaken on the basis of denouncements by local Germans. The arrested were transferred to the makeshift concentration camp in Nieborowice (Neubertsdorf) near Tychy (Tichau, Tuchau) where a majority of them perished (Szefler, 1989: 179).

\(^{32}\) However, a majority of the Upper Silesian population, be they of German stock or not, did not participate in the war activities. On the other hand, much of the 'proof' of fifth column subversion is based on hearsay individual depositions not affirmed by other witnesses (Komjathy, 1980: 191).
On the basis of Reichsführer Heidrich Himmler's order of September 4, 1939 organized military groups with the assistance of Freikorps members were to suppress any Silesian opposition to the new rule. Gen. Georg Barndt in command of the border troops issued a regulation obligating the populace to inform the authorities on the places of abode of Silesian insurrectionists and people suspected of possessing weapons or ammunition, and on secrete resistance organizations (Sroka, 1968; Sroka, 1969). Private and public book collections and monuments were destroyed which was especially painful in the case of the almost completed building of the Museum of Silesia in Katowice (Matuszczak, 1976). In the second half of September the first cells of the NSDAP and SA were established together with the youth organizations of the Hitler-Jugend and the Bund Deutscher Mädel (Szefer, 1989: 181). On October 2, 1939 all Polish organizations were officially dissolved and it was prohibited to use the Polish language in public. Later even a whole system of eavesdropping was organized by the Nazionalsozialistische Volkswohlfahrt (the National Socialist Welfare Organization) and the Bund Deutscher Osten (the Association of the German East) to discourage the use of Polish at home (Szefer, 1989: 181). Should one anyway speak in this language one could be severely punished or be struck in the face in street. Also the removal of all public notices and inscriptions in Polish was ordered (Anon., 1943: 500). The Germanization policy pursued after September 1, 1939 was the logical continuation of the ten-year plan of eradication of 'polishdom which had been started in German Silesia in 1934 (Anon., 1968: 304) and had resulted in the alteration of 2622
slavic place- and geographical-names till 1938; Germanization of surnames and given names was started by the official acts of 1932 and 1938. Official Germanization of incorporated Czechoslovak and Polish Silesia was completed in 1944 (Jarczak, 1993: 16/17).

The ethnic Germans, after the unbelievable happiness of the first few days, went through a bitter period of awakening. Many of them were arrested and promptly executed without trial for their cooperation with the Poles, or simply on the basis of reports submitted by their personal enemies. Houses were plundered, and property was confiscated. The destruction of Catholic religious monuments which was carried out at night to provide the Nazi propaganda with good anti-Polish material alienated the Volksdeutsche. On the other hand, Silesian Germans who followed the Protestant Evangelical faith were considered to be real Germans as opposed to Silesian German Catholics regarded as Poles, that is, enemies. The handling of the Jews also created animosity so eventually not a single Volksdeutsch of Upper Silesia was deemed trustworthy enough to be appointed to a higher position by the Reich authorities (Komjathy, 1980: 96).

On October 25, 1939 the military administration of Upper Silesia was replaced with civilian rule (Szefer, 1989: 182) and one day later the Silesian Voivodaship together with Transolza were incorporated in the German Province of Silesia (Anon., 1943: 309). Subsequently, the new Kattowitz Regency was established which was added to the three other Silesian Regencies of Liegnitz (Legnica), Breslau and Oppeln. On November 19, 1939 the Kattowitz
Regency was enlarged by the incorporation of the purely Polish counties of Będzin and Żywiec, and of the western part of the Cracow Voivodaship rich in coal (Chrzanów-Jaworzno) (Szefer, 1989: 182). The eastern border of such enlarged Upper Silesia went on the edge of the most important for the Polish Catholics city of Częstochowa and only 25 km from Cracow (Neubach, 1992: 18). The administrative structure of the Province of Silesia was changed once again in April 1941 when it was divided into two separate Provinces of Upper and Lower Silesia to make it easier to administer the large territory (Neubach, 1992: 18).

The incorporation of the Polish territories and Cieszyn (Tesen, Teschen) Silesia to the Upper Silesian Province made sense from the economic point of view uniting the industrial complex whose development had been hindered by its division among Poland, Germany and Czechoslovakia. However, taking into consideration the ethnic aspect of the decision, it was most unfortunate since now one third of the population was constituted by Poles with a sizeable admixture of Czechs/Moravians (Neubach, 1992: 18). Thus, paradoxically, an inner policing border had to be established in the province (Szefer, 1989: 183).

The ethnic-racist policies of the Third Reich were the very backbone of its legislation and official ideology so already at the turn of 1939 and 1940 the national registration was conducted in Upper Silesia. In the eastern part of the incorporated territories which before the second World War had not belonged to the Silesian Voivodaship, only 0.7% inhabitants declared to
be German. In what used to be the Silesian Voivodship 95% inhabitants declared to be German which means that many Poles and almost all the locally-oriented Silesians changed their national orientation to make it compatible with the repressive policies of the Third Reich. Due to the complicated ethnic situation in Teschen Silesia, the Germans decided to sustain the Czechoslovak-introduced national category of Silesians. So 42% declared to be Polish, 30% Silesian, 23% Czech and only 5% German. The Silesians, however, were referred to as Deutsche-Schlesier and hence would-be Germans. It is also possible that some Polish-speakers and Silesians who did not want to be considered Germans, declared themselves as Czechs because this national group was treated well in Teschen Silesia as well as in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. They were to be Germanized not eradicated (Wiskemann, 1956: 68) unlike the Poles. Moreover, the Czechs were not expelled, their property was not confiscated, did not pay 15% of their wages as the war effort tax (which applied to the Poles), received German food rations, did not have to serve in the Wehrmacht unlike the people who had declared to be Germans (Szefer, 1989: 184-186), had longer annual leaves than the Poles, could marry Germans and enter the public places where it was prohibited for the Poles (Zahradnik, 1992: 99).

The territories incorporated into the Reich were to be thoroughly Germanized in order to make them homogenous with the purely German core of the state. Subsequently, all the population of Upper Silesia which could not be classified as non-Polish, and thus inclined to Germandom, was either to be expelled to the
Generalgouvernement or sent inside the Reich as forced labor (Anon., 1943: 158), and the Polish property was confiscated (Anon., 1943: 171). The same methods were applied to the Silesian Jews (Szefer, 1989: 191) who first were relocated to the ghettos in Będzin, Sosnowiec and Zawiercie (Szefer, 1989: 192) and then murdered in the concentration camp complex of Auschwitz-Birkenau (Oświęcim-Brzezinka) which had been established in 1940 on the territory of the Kattowitz Regency (Neubach, 1992: 19). In consequence, 81,000 Poles were expelled from Upper Silesia, who were replaced with 37,000 families of German settlers. It was planned to settle 300,000 German families after the war only in the Kattowitz Regency alone which would have forced many more Poles and Polish-oriented Silesians to leave the territory (Szefer, 1989: 191).

The Catholic Church in Silesia found itself in a situation similar to the period of Kulturkampf. The irreligious state tended to associate the Protestant Church with Germandom and regarded the Catholic Church as a haven of nationally uncertain and unGerman elements. Bearing it in mind Cardinal Adolf Bertram of the Breslau archbishopric reacted to the cases of incarceration and murders of priests, and to the extermination of the Jews and the mentally retarded, only with written

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53 The last Jews in Silesia were liquidated only in August 1943 because of the desperate shortage of labor in Upper Silesia (Hilborg, 1985: 524/525). Considering Silesia, it should be added that the Silesian Jewish philosopher Edith Stein also perished in Auschwitz (Neubach, 1992: 19).
complaints directed to the Reich government (Neubach, 1992: 19/20). The Katowice bishop Stanislaw Adamski, before he was deprived of his function and transferred to Cracow in February 1941, had suspended masses in Polish and any other use of the Polish language in churches which was intended to protect the population from persecutions; and had advised priests to apply for the Reich citizenship so that they could remain in Upper Silesia and serve the believers in their parishes (Adamski, 1946: 12/13).

The hectic and to certain extent chaotic ethnic policies in Upper Silesia at the beginning of the Second World War were replaced with more thoughtful measures aiming at assuring loyalty of the population to the Third Reich. The March 4, 1941 act on German citizenship in the Incorporated Territories and on the Deutsche Volksliste (DVL) was the legal basis for the final national-cum-political classification of the populace, and the previous grantings of German citizenship were annulled. The mechanism of including people on the German national list and quotas for respective groups were established by Himmler’s order of September 1940. He decided that Wiedereindeutschung (re-acceptance into Germandom) is to be applied to 400,000-500,000

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54 The parochial priest of the cathedral in Ohlau (Oława), Bernhard Lichtenberg, publicly prayed for the persecuted Jews and had to pay with his life for his courage (Neubach, 1992: 19).

55 Many religious Catholics, especially women, established informal groups where they prayed and sang religious songs in Polish. It should not be perceived as an element of nationalist struggle for preservation of Polishdom but as attachment to the local Upper Silesian tradition and culture where Polish was a traditional element of local Catholicism (Sobeczka in Anon., 1993: 6).
Wasserpolen (Upper Silesians) and 120,000 Slonsaken (Silesians of Teschen Silesia). However, Gauleiter of the Province of Upper Silesia, SS-Brigadenführer Fritz Bracht decided that all Wasserpolen and Slonsaken are of German origin so the third group of the DVL, where they were to be included, swelled to 1.2 mln much exceeding Himmler’s quota of 600,000. Thus, the third group contained many Silesians of the pro-Polish and pro-Czech orientation which made it difficult for the authorities to ensure complete loyalty of the group (c. 73% of the populace) which was vital for successful implementation of the war economic policy and Germanization of this region. Other groups of the DVL were much smaller; the first one comprised Reichsdeutsche, second the segment of the local population which had declared themselves German before the war, and fourth people who were more Slavic than German but not purely Slavic. The people of the fourth group were treated almost as badly as Poles: the could not possess any property, had to pay rent even if living in own houses, could not be promoted to higher positions and the education of their children was limited to elementary school. The only privilege created for them was the possibility for their children to join the Hitler-Jugend\(^6\) (Szefer, 1989: 187-189; Zahradnik, 1992: 101).

\(^6\) The DVL was for the first time introduced in Upper Silesia at the end of 1939, however, the population were pressed to apply for it so eventually only 2% of them were not included in it making the list completely useless from the point of view of ethnic policy-makers (Szefer, 1989: 188).
Silesians who largely identified themselves only with their own homeland, *Heimat*, was numerous splits in families which included some individuals who developed non-Silesian national consciousness oriented to Poland, Germany or Czechoslovakia. Such persons got actively involved in resistance groups or joined the NSDAP (Borak, 1991; Szefer, 1989: 192-197) while their brothers and fathers had to join the *Wehrmacht* and fight for Greater Germany (Anon., 1968: 304). Consequently, many of the latter Silesians found their death abroad whereas the Silesian resistance fighters were sentenced to death by the so-called special courts (c. 3,700 death penalty verdicts in the Kattowitz Regency) or sent to the *KL-Auschwitz-Birkenau* which at the beginning was intended as a concentration camp for Silesians who opposed Germanization (Szefer, 1989: 197). Considering Lower Silesia, German resistance played an important role there. In 1942 in the mansion of count Helmuth James von Moltke, 25 km from Groß Rosen (Rogożnica) the *Kreisauer Kreis* group was established with the aim to liquidate the Nazi regime and rebuild democratic Germany. Von Moltke's friend count Peter Yorck van Wartenburg closely cooperated with his cousin count Claus Schenk von Stauffenberg who tried to assassinate Hitler. Another assassination of Hitler which was not carried out due to a sudden alteration in the daily schedule of the *Führer*, was planned by baron Rudolph-Christoph von Gersdorff of Lüben (Lubin) (Neubach, 1992: 19).

The united industrial basin of Upper Silesia was of extreme importance for the Third Reich and as such was ruthlessly
exploited especially at the end of the war when intensified production caused widespread decapitalization (Anon., 1943: 309-311). Due to numerous bombings of the Ruhr, the Silesian mines supplied 60% of Germany’s coal (Shirer, 1993: 1097) and Silesian industry accounted for a sizeable share in the Reich’s military production (Neubach, 1992: 20). There was virtually no bombing of Silesia till the end of 1944 with the exception of the American raids from Central Italy which hit military works in Upper Silesia in the Summer of 1944, and sporadic Soviet air raids of Breslau in October. Understandably, because of its relatively safe location Silesia together with East Prussia and Pommern became a haven for the civil population of Central and Western Germany. At the dawn of tragic 1945 the population of Silesia was swollen with hundreds of thousands of such refugees which makes it difficult if not sheerly impossible to objectively analyze movements of the population at the end of the war, and explains widely varying statistics which deal with this region during the time (Neubach, 1992: 20).

The Soviet offensive from the line of the Vistula River started on January 12, 1945, and by February 1 the Ukrainian Front stabilized at the line of the Oder. The majority of Silesia was overrun by the Soviet troops by April 14. Glogau (Glogów) and Breslau were announced to be fortresses and suffered terrible damage due to the long-lasting sieges. The latter surrendered only on May 6 (Davies, 1981: II 470; Neubach, 1992: 20). Already at the beginning of 1945 and even earlier many Silesians decided to flee westward not to be ‘liberated’ by the Red Army which
having captured for several days the first place on the German soil in East Prussia, did massacre every living creature in the village of Nemmersdorf on October 20-21, 1944 (De Zayas, 1988: 61). The trek intensified in January 1945 when a virtual flood of Silesians headed for Saxony, and some of them for the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. Many of the civilians died of cold and starvation, and many others perished attacked by Soviet planes or overrun by front lines. The most tragic event was the carpet bombing of the capital of Saxony, Dresden on February 13-14, 1945, which was known to be teeming with refugees, a majority of them from Silesia (600,000). It claimed the lives of 100,000 people (De Zayas, 1988: 77/78).

When the Red Army crossed the frontiers of the territories incorporated in the Reich, all caution was thrown to the winds. The Soviet soldiers incited by Ilya Ehrenburg’s notorious leaflet ‘Kill’ did not show any restraint committing acts of wanton vandalism, stealing and killing. German soldiers were hunted down like vermin. Members of the Volkssturm, young and old were denied combatant status, and were killed out of hand. Silesian graves, no less than Silesian womenfolk and farm animals, were indiscriminately assaulted. The significance of the invaders’ limited vocabulary, of Davay (give) and Frau, komm (woman, come), was known to everyone. Arson, battery, murder, group rapes, and family suicides marked the passage of the liberating armies on a scale unparalleled elsewhere in Europe. The well-documented

37 The last paragraph reads in part: ‘The Germans are not human beings...there is nothing more amusing for us than a heap of German corps’ (De Zayas, 1988: illustration 1, after p. 32).
devastation of Silesia, which was so much more severe than comparable events in the provinces of Central Germany\textsuperscript{\textit{58}}, has led some historians to suspect a calculated policy of driving the German population from their homes in anticipation of the Potsdam Agreement (Grau, 1970).

The events conclude this part of the thesis and the influence of the postwar order on Silesia and its inhabitants is dealt with in the next chapter.

\textsuperscript{58} One of many spectacular operations was to dismantle and to carry off to Russia the entire electrification system of the Silesian Railways (Davies, 1981: II 481).
CHAPTER FOUR

ULTIMATE ETHNIC CLEANSING: AN EXERCISE IN SOCIAL ENGINEERING OR THE POST-POTSDAM POPULATION TRANSFERS AND SUPPRESSION OF THE EXISTENCE OF MINORITIES IN SILESIA IN COMMUNIST POLAND AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA

The postwar order was commenced to be shaped already at the beginning of the Second World War. The method of faits accomplis was the instrument of ultimate ethnic cleansing in this part of Europe. Immediately after having invaded Poland on September 1, 1939, the Germans started expelling from the would-be incorporated territories people of non-Germanic origin who could not be possibly Germanized. The same tactics was utilized by the Soviet Union after September 17, 1939, which started transferring the Polish population to Siberia and Kazakhstan preparing the eastern territories of the prewar Poland for incorporation into the Soviet Republics of the Ukraine and Byelorussia; and propagating among the Polish Communists the Curzon line of the Bug River as the future Polish-Soviet border.

The developments were seconded by the dynamic political dialog
among the exiled governments of the occupied countries and the Allied Powers in the West. In 1940 the Sudeten German Socialists in Britain provisionally agreed to a federation with the Czechs provided they were a fully recognized nationality with a regional parliament and government of their own. However, after the experience of Munich, the Czechs were quite unwilling to accept the demands and decided to do away with the German encirclement of Bohemia and Moravia. Their leader Benes approved the principle of population transfers under decent human conditions, under international control and with international support, and hence the plan of the Odsun (expulsion) was born in the winter of 1941/1942 and was bolstered by the official annulment of the Munich Agreement by the British Parliament on August 5, 1942. The Soviets and Americans agreed to the concept of the transfer of minority populations in June 1943. The Polish government in exile did not consider this idea at all and favored a federation of Poland and Czechoslovakia which would be strong enough to oppose the German threat in Central Europe. The first declaration of this view was made on November 11, 1940 and was followed by Czechoslovak-Polish negotiations which were marred by the question of Cieszyn (Tesen, Teschen) Silesia (Zacek, 1991). On the other hand, the Poles were not prepared to accept the line of the Bug as the eastern border of their country. Their stance was fortified by the discovery of the mass graves of the Polish officer corps at the Katyń forest in April 1943. By that time the notion of the Czechoslovak-Polish federation had been largely forgotten in the context of the international decisions of more vital significance for the postwar existence of the two
countries. Churchill considered it essential that Prussia would be dismembered (Wagner, 1991: 270) and he presented his point of view at the Teheran Conference (November 28 – December 1, 1943). Stalin, in exchange for the warm-water port of Königsberg (Kalinigrad) was ready to accept the Curzon line and demanded the line of the Oder and the Neisse (Nysa) as the western frontier of Poland. Churchill consented but failed to know that there are two Neisse (Nysa) Rivers--western (Görlitzer, Lausitzer, Łużycka) and eastern (Glätzer, Klodzka) which introduced much uncertainty to later negotiations. At Teheran the matter of the expulsions of the Germans from the would-be western territories or the Deutsche Ostgebiete which were to be handed over to Poland, and from Sudetenland got no further than 'disentanglement of population at some points'. It even seems that after the conference in 1944 Mikołajczyk of the Polish London government was opposed to exaggerated expansion of Poland westward because seemingly he did not predict any transfers of Germans which had by now been mentioned so often by the Americans and British (Wiskemann, 1956: 62-78).

The Big Three conferred together--for the last time in the persons of Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin--at Yalta in the Crimea from February 4 to 10, 1945. The western Allies were at a disadvantage exhausted by Hitler's offensive in the Ardennes and eager to obtain Russian help against Japan, whereas the Soviet armies swept forward so that by February roughly all Central and Eastern Europe except for Bohemia, Moravia and Slovakia was in their hands. By now Churchill had time to study
the map and discover the difference between the two Neisse (Nysa) Rivers: he had informed himself that some three million Silesian Germans lived in the area between them and had become aware of feeling in Britain against the transference of vast numbers of people. On February 6 Stalin made it clear that he favored the western Neisse and to the objection of Churchill Stalin answered that there were no Germans in these areas, as they had all run away which was not true. At last Roosevelt and Churchill accepted Stalin’s demands but did not clearly say which of the Neisse Rivers should become the western border of Poland. They also agreed that the Germans were to be ‘repatriated’ and the Poles from Germany the same, and on the Curzon line with minor rectifications in favor of Poland. On February 5, however, the Polish Communist authorities had announced that the administration of the country up to the Oder and western Neisse had been taken over by them. The London Poles protested against the Yalta decisions on February 13 describing them as Poland’s fifth partition, this time by her Allies. In the end even the latter assented to the proposal having had accepted the political reality, although in the process of having its borders shifted from the East to the West Poland regained roughly half of the territory it had lost to the Soviet Union⁵⁹ (Bark, 1993: I 24/25). The land Poland obtained in the West was highly developed and heavily industrialized in comparison to the lost eastern areas largely comprising poor agricultural land, forest and the

⁵⁹ The lost territory amounted to 178,220 sq km, and the territory gained by Poland was 101,200 sq km (Davies, 1981: II 449).
Pripet Marshes. Thus, curiously enough, the 'history' of, and the basis for the rapid postwar development of Polish industry was created (Wiskemann, 1956: 83-86).

Since the beginning of 1945 refugees from Warthegau and Generalgouvernement had been streaming to Silesia and a large segment of the swollen population of the province were desperately trying to cross the Oder-Neisse line in order to escape the Soviet offensive preferring occupation at the hands of the western Allies. The trek was harassed by Soviet air raids and the quickly moving front line while the number of casualties was increased by the unusually cold winter and frequent blizzards. Those who did not flee faced a terrible ordeal mentioned at the end of the previous chapter. Except wanton destruction, violence and pillage, another constant element in the Soviet policy was the drive to acquire German slave labor to rebuild Russia. Already in March, and systematically until the end of April, the Soviet army commanders deported Germans to Russia. Possibly the biggest 'haul' they made in Upper Silesia where many skilled workers had been kept at work until the very moment of the Soviet conquest (Wiskemann, 1956: 93/94). The Silesians were transported to the East in freight trains or had to walk in columns, often barefoot. Those who were sent off during the worst cold of the winter suffered proportionally and some of them died on the journey. Curiously, the inmates were not

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60 There was only some industry concentrated around Lwów (Lemberg, Lviv, Lvo), Wilno (Vilnius) and Borysław (Borislav) -- an oil center; and an undeveloped coal field extending from Lwów Eastward (Davies, 1981: II 520).

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only Wehrmacht soldiers and men—in some of the camps two thirds of prisoners were women and children (Cholewa, 1993: 1). It is known that Silesians were imprisoned in numerous camps in the Soviet Union, but so far it has been confirmed that they were kept at the following localities: Moscow, Kiyev, Sverdlovsk, the Krivoy Rog industrial basin, Kola Peninsula, Ivano-Frankovsk (Stanisławów), Kazakhstan. Kasirka, Zhelapin’sk, Stalinogorsk, Mikhailov, Tula, Kasimov, Skopin, Shirkolag in the Urals, and in the camps ‘Polarniy’ at the Usa River and ‘Kharabiey’ at the same river in the Arctic Urals. They were regular Soviet concentration camps where 50%-75% inmates usually died of malnutrition, slave work, inhuman treatment and complete lack of any medical care (Honka, 1993). Although these people began to be sent back in the Summer and Autumn of 1945 some of them did not return until 1949 (Wiskemann, 1956: 94) and the mid-1950s. A majority of the freed Silesian prisoners left for Germany through the refugee point in Berlin Kaulsdorf. Those who wished to return to Silesia had to go through the

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61 It is estimated that only from eastern Upper Silesia, 40,000 people were deported to Russia. Although some Silesians returned the fate of many thousands of them has remained unknown (Lis, 1991: 13).

62 This date is based on confirmed information considering two members of the author’s family.

63 Having reached Germany, they and other refugees could not be unconditionally sure that they would not be sent to Russia unless they found their way to the western occupation zones. Especially the fate of intelligentsia was uncertain which is best illustrated by the case of young Gleiwitz (Gliwice) writer Horst Binek who despite the (dubious) protection of Bertolt Brecht in East Berlin, was sent to the Vorkhuta mines in 1951 and was allowed to return only in 1955 (Vetter, 1992: 93).

64 Most often they were Upper Silesians who were considered to be Germanized Poles by the Polish authorities.

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refugee point in Brest (Brześć) and stay for a time in the Central Work Camp in Jaworzno. The Silesians who were sent to Berlin Kaulsdorf could not legally go back to Silesia and were turned back or employed in Soviet-controlled enterprises before they managed to reach their Heimat (Honka, 1993).

The deportations led to a clash of interests between the Russian authorities and their protegé, the Polish provisional government; the latter, it had been announced at Yalta on February 5, 1945, would take over the administration of the liberated territories destined to become Polish. On March 3, the provisional Prime Minister, announced to the Polish National Council that these 'Recovered Territories'⁶⁵, as the Poles henceforth called them⁶⁶, would be settled by Poles from the lost eastern territories, as well as, by Poles from formerly overcrowded Central or Congress Poland and Western Galicia now known as Southern Poland (Wiskemann, 1956: 94). To Silesia, usually the Poles from the Ukraine were directed, and they were followed by their cultural

⁶⁵ Using this specific name and the huge historical-cum-political propaganda action which lingers in the Polish mass media even nowadays, the Polish government wanted to erase from the Polish mind awareness of the 600 years during which the Germans lived in this land, and to prove its 'primordial Polishness'. The action was extremely successful and at present rarely any regular Pole knows that some of the territories used to belong to Poland only for short periods of time in the Middle Ages (cf. the chapter on history of Silesia at the beginning of the thesis) whereas the others (Stettin/Szczecin or East Prussia) had never been parts of Poland before. From this pseudo-historical point of view based on anachronism Poland has even more 'rights' to Kiev or Smolensk but the propaganda following the Kremlin dictate was careful not to remind the Poles of the lost eastern territories.

⁶⁶ Molotov, towards the end of the Yalta Conference, spoke of the 'return' of these territories to Poland (Wiskemann, 1956: 94).
institutions such as the University of Lvov and the Ossolińscy Library which were transplanted from Lvov to Wrocław (Breslau). A sizeable amount of the deportees removed from Silesia and Poland by Germany and Russia as forced labor, settled in Silesia after the war (Davies, 1981: II 562). By May 1945 the transfer of the Polish peasants from the eastern territories lost to the Soviet Union, was in full swing as the Polish authorities had already been handed over administration of the land east of the Oder-Neisse line by the Russians (Wiskemann, 1956: 90). After the end of the war, in the Summer of 1945 many Silesians decided to return to their homes not believing in the finality of the severance of the Deutsche Ostgebiete or wishing to remain in their Heimat no matter what. A majority of them were turned back already at the Oder-Neisse line or at later stages of their travel. Those few who succeeded in reaching their destinations, found that their houses and apartments had been repossessed by Polish families from the East. By this time the property of the Silesians who fled, was exhausted and the authorities began to evict the Silesians who had not left on their own accord. On the other hand, the Poles like the Russians were determined to do unto the Germans as they had been done by. It meant that the very anti-German men, who had escaped from forced labor for the Germans, were enrolled in the new Polish militia, the Germans were branded by wearing armlets, their food rations were subnormal, and their movements restricted. Many Germans accused of Nazi affiliations were interned in camps (which were reminiscent of Dachau and Belsen) (Wiskemann, 1956: 94/95) and also a great deal of completely innocent Silesians including the
elderly, women and children (Miś, 1993: 1, 3). In the years 1945–1946 there were at least twenty-three camps for the civilian Silesian populace of German extraction. Without any trial or court sentence, especially Silesians who signed the DVL, were held in the camps provisionally accused of 'treason of Polishdom'. Over 40,000 of them perished during their internment. The most notorious camps were located in Jaworzno, Łambinowice (Lamsdorf) and Świętochłowice (Schwientochlowitz) (Anon, 1993a: 8).

The appalling treatment of the population of Silesia was demanded by the raison d'etre of the new postwar European order. The two champions of the rights of the Silesians: Cardinal Bertram in his residence at Jawornik, Czechoslovak Silesia, and the literary Nobel Award winner Gerhart Hauptmann living in Agnetendorf (Jagniatków) were too ill and too old to undertake any protest which could be heard worldwide. They died shortly after the end of the war. Only the Socialist Paul Löbe decided to speak on behalf of the Silesians and went to Berlin but he was not allowed to see Marshal Zhukov (Neubach, 1992: 21).

67 The estimated number of the Silesian internees is c. 70,000 (Lis, 1991: 13).

68 The camp in Świętochłowice is meticulously portrayed in the diaries of Dutchman Eric van Calestern who survived it. Also John Sack wrote a work on this camp (Anon., 1993a: 8), and many German publications were devoted to the camp in Łambinowice. The problem of the camps has not been properly researched in Poland and the few Polish publications dealing with this issue deny the high death rate among the inmates or state that in comparison with the KL-Auschwitz-Birkenau the camps were 'quite humane' (Nowak, 1991).
The situation worsened in June 1945 when the confused German refugees started streaming to and from Silesia. An appalling crisis overtook the city of Görlich (Zgorzelec) where the streams were crossing at the bridge on the western Neisse River. The catastrophe was intensified towards the end of the month by the sudden eviction by Polish troops of all Germans who lived within a strip of territory 100 to 200 km deep to the east of the Oder and western Neisse. The congestion was made still more alarming especially during June, by the return of many Silesians from Bohemia where a new Czechoslovak state had been established since the middle of May (Wiskemann, 1956: 98).

Due to the annulment of the Munich Agreement Czechoslovakia was to be restituted after the war in its pre-1938 shape less the Subcarpathian Ruthenia 'ceded' to the Soviet Republic of the Ukraine. On March 17, 1945 Benes formally announced what had been accepted by the Big Three in 1943—that Czechoslovakia would be a national state with no special rights for minorities. The program proclaimed at Kosice in Slovakia on April 5, a month before Prague was freed, announced that the former Czechoslovak citizens of German and Magyar nationalities would be expelled and their property confiscated unless their loyalty to Czechoslovakia was proved. Subsequently, the decree on confiscation of property was issued on June 21, and the decree of August 2 deprived the Sudeten Germans\(^6\) of their property. Like in Poland all the

\(^6\) The group included the Silesians of Troppau (Opava) whose land was part of Sudetenland during the war, and the Silesians of Czechoslovak Silesia whose land had been merged with the Reich Province of Upper Silesia.
Germans were subjected to subnormal food rations, to a curfew and
to wearing distinctive armlets (Wiskemann, 1956: 101-103).

The above-sketched background together with the widespread fear
of the fifth column especially in the form of the Wehrwolf, was
the basis for the negotiations on the future of the German
population of the Deutsche Ostgebiete at the Potsdam Conference
on July 17, 1945. By that time Churchill's attitude changed, for
he had been made aware that 'large transferences', are far from
being 'more possible in modern conditions than they ever were
before' (Leahy, 1950: 462; De Zayas, 1988: 87), and he
unequivocally opposed the Soviet-Polish plan of moving the German
population westward. Yet in spite of objections, the western
Allies did finally approve the transfer of the Germans in Article
XIII of the Potsdam Protocol faced with the adamant stance of
Stalin who realized that the Soviet control over the Deutsche
Ostgebiete gave him an upper hand and the argument of fait
accompli in the negotiations (De Zayas, 1988: 87). The only
concession the West won was that any transfers of the remaining
German population from Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary should
be effected in an orderly and humane manner (De Zayas, 1988: 88)
which resulted in the brief suspension of these expulsions so
that they could be more systematically organized. The decision
practically created the Oder-Neisse line and sealed the fate of

70 A secret organization of ex-German soldiers which was to
destabilize the rule of the new owners of the Deutsche
Ostgebiete. It rarely had time enough to get organized and
undertake any acts of subversion anywhere (with the exception of
Romania) before the transfer of the population deprived it of its
social base (De Zayas, 1988: 98, 107, 202).

[123]
the German East which was formally obliterated by the Allied control Council's Law No. 46 of February 25, 1947 which abolished the state of Prussia\(^7\) (Blumenwitz, 1989: 89). Here it is adequate to mention the contrast between the attitude of the Czechoslovak and Polish governments towards the expulsions—in Poland no voice was raised to preach restraint (Wiskemann, 1956: 111) which might be caused by the rapid shifting of the Polish borders 300 km westward. For the Poles that tragedy of this change and the heavy biological losses during the Second World War overshadowed the sufferings of the German nation and the Polish propaganda fortified the lack of empathy promoting the picture of the German as inhuman animal obsessed with the desire to kill Slavs and conquer their land.

The Potsdam decisions slowed down informal expulsions till 1946 but did not stop them altogether. The German element in Silesia was quickly overtaken by the Polish refugees from the East who often showed hostility to them especially in the cases when there was lack of property, which could be distributed among the newcomers. It prompted many Silesians to leave on their own accord. Moreover, the Germans were harassed verbally and sometimes physically assaulted, and their language was scorned upon; in big cities such as Wroclaw (Breslau) a Polish militiaman was likely to remonstrate should he hear German spoken (Wiskemann, 1956: 272). Inscriptions in German were removed from

\(^7\) The finality of this abolishment is more tragic than the partitions of Poland, because on the territory of ex-Prussia there is no Prussian German population left (because of the expulsions) which could try to restitute the state.
public places and German books wantonly destroyed by the new owners of Silesian houses and apartments, or carelessly thrown into cellars or attics. Tombs in cemeteries were defaced by the means of a chisel or cement (with the exception of Polish-sounding names) and German monuments razed. The newcomers were sometimes so hostile to the local Silesian population and reality that when the authorities told the Polish settlers to remove German signs, they even removed the plaques off agricultural machinery, destroying many new tractors and cultivators (Siembieda, 1993: 16). Already in 1945 Polonization of place-names started in Silesia and by the end of 1947 all the localities which before the war had had more than 50 inhabitants, received brand-new Polish names. The alterations were regulated by the Komisja Ustalania Nazw Miejscowych i Obiektów Fizjograficznych przy Urzędzie Rady Ministrów (the Council of Ministers Commission Responsible for Changing Place- and Geographical-Names) which was established in 1946 and was active till 1950 (Jarczak, 1993: 18). So the linguistic, cultural and ethnic structure of Silesia was rapidly getting Polonized (or Czechized in the case of Czechoslovak Silesia) alienating the original inhabitants of this land and facilitating the expulsions.

The expulsions as agreed upon at Potsdam started again at the beginning of 1946 in accordance with an agreement of February, 14, 1946 reached at Berlin between Polish and British representatives of the Combined Repatriation Executive. The trains from Silesia were to use the routes: C--from Kalawsk
(Kohlfurt, Węgliniec) to Mariental and Alversdorf via Helmstedt, by rail at rate of 3,000 per day (2 trains); and D--at a later stage 2,500 per day to Friedland (Davies, 1989: II 563). Operation Swallow was commenced on February 20, 1946 when the first Polish train left Węgliniec (Wiskemann, 1956: 116).

The Silesian Germans who were expelled at the first stage, comprised the elderly, crippled, ill, single mothers, children and the Reich refugees who had not managed to flee. The rest of the German population of Silesia, who were considered as productive, were divided into three categories: I unskilled workers; II qualified workers; and III highly qualified professionals. The workers of the groups I and II were employed as long as the could not be replaced with Polish counterparts and till that time they could stay in the 'Recovered Territories' with their families. They could not take managerial positions and had to work 12 hours and 14 hours per day in industry and agriculture respectively. 25% of their wages was deducted as the tax for 'reconstruction of the country and welfare'. The restrictions were not used in the case of the group III which included specialists who could not be easily replaced by Polish personnel; they enjoyed all the privileges accessible to the Poles (Calka, 1993: 4).

Moreover, intelligentsia and clergy were also included in the group which was to be expelled at the very beginning of Operation Swallow. Already in January 1946 the Polish authorities received information on secret German lessons, but only the anti-Polish
sermon preached by one of Wroclaw priests in the presence of Soviet ambassador Viktor Lebyedenv brought about the decision of immediate expulsion of Silesian intelligentsia and clergy at the end of 1946 (Calka, 1993: 5).

Operation Swallow nevertheless came to a sad end. Not only were the Poles disorganized and starving in 1946, they were also without fuel or stoves; thus, the stoves which they originally fixed in the Swallow trains tended to disappear (especially in the Soviet zone) like beds and blankets which were often stolen by the Polish railway workers who also robbed the expellees of their belongings (Calka, 1993: 9). The idea of providing the expellees with food was abandoned in March 1946 and since the winter 1946/1947 was another abnormally severe it led to many cases of death and first degree frost-bite. The British protested and having learned about the terrorist measures used against the expellees by the Polish authorities72 (Calka, 1993), they called off the whole operation at the beginning of 1947. The Soviets also stopped population transfers demanding less unproductive persons and more qualified personnel which they badly needed in their occupation zone (Calka, 1993: 9). At last they decided to accept trains on April 20, 1947 (Wiskemann, 1956: 118) and the operation was eventually terminated in October 1948 (Calka, 1993: 6) (Wiskemann, 1956: 116-118). By that time a large proportion

72 Expelled Germans had very little time to collect their belongings before being barred from their places of abode (often in the thick of a night). Their possessions were confiscated and many families were split en route. The Germans caught while traveling west on their own, were interned in work camps (Calka, 1993: 6).
of the Germans claimed to have remained in Silesia were the bilingual Upper Silesians whom the Poles treated and regarded as Germanized Poles who should be 're-Polonized' and 'rescued from the clutches of Germandom'. Moreover, the biggest compact mass of undoubted Germans who were left in Silesia and in the new Poland were the miners of Waldenburg (Walbrzych): this was an important coal field where mining was difficult and the miners required a particular technical skill. The skilled Polish miners brought back from France were settled here, but the experienced Germans were indispensable. Other German technicians were sent off to Polish towns or to help the new plans for development of the Upper Silesian industrial complex (Wiskemann, 1956: 118/119). The two groups of Silesian inhabitants (i.e. the Upper Silesians and the undoubted Germans) constituted the hotly denied German minority in Poland. Before one delves deeply into the problem, one should also survey the expulsions of the Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia in the context of Silesia, and the problem of Silesia in the Czechoslovak-Polish relations.

Although the Czechs had treated their Germans perhaps as badly as the Poles in 1945, the transfer of the Sudeten Germans to Germany was better managed than that of the Germans from Poland (Wiskemann, 1956: 124). Actually, in the border area many Silesian Germans decide to flee to Czechoslovakia to be deported from there. It was decided on June 26, 1945 that all of them should return to Polish Silesia by August 30. The refugees who came back to Czechoslovakia once again, were promptly expelled to Germany (Stanek, 1991: 136). A vast majority of Czechoslovak
Silesian Germans were expelled to Germany from 1945 to 1947 through the gathering points of which the most important were: Krnov (Jägendorf), Bruntal (Freudenthal), Opava (Troppau) and Ostrava (Ostrau) (Stanek, 1991: map at beginning). Besides, the structure of industry in Czechoslovak Silesia changed dramatically already in the period prior to the introduction of Communism in 1948 because big Jewish industrialists (who had also controlled many mines and enterprises in Czechoslovak Silesia before the war) instead of being restored to their former positions in the economy, had their property confiscated, the reason given in 1945 being that they had facilitated Germanization of Bohemia and Moravia, which was true (Wiskemann, 1956: 123) but in an ironic way—the Czechoslovak Jews could not help it because predominantly they were German-speaking.

After the war there was a clash of interests between the Czechs and the Poles over the question of Silesia which especially in the region of the industrial complex of Upper Silesia had been an area of ethnic confusion for many centuries. Due to the annulment of the Munich Agreement Czechoslovakia regained its part of Austrian Silesia and the Hlucin land while the transfers of the German population were soon to liquidate the wedge of German-speaking Sudetenland and Silesia creating an unprecedentedly long border between Czechoslovakia and Poland. Czechoslovakia, emboldened by the postwar Polish 'gains' in the West and the loss of Subcarpathian Ruthenia, demanded the whole of Cieszyn (Tesen, Teschen) Silesia (on the other hand, the Poles called for the area's annexation to Poland in order to recreate
the post-Munich status quo), and the areas of the former German Silesia concentrated on the towns of Ratibor (Racibórz) and Leobschütz (Hlubice, Głubczyce) in order to better cover its industrialized region of Ostrava (Ostrau, Ostrawa) (Kaplan, 1987: 19-23; Palys, 1991). Moreover, the Czechs also remembered that at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 there had been talk of the cession of Glatz (Kladzko, Kłodzko) and even of Lusatia73 with its Slavic Sorbs to them (Wiskemann, 1956: 131). However, already in May 1945 all the territories (with the exception of Lusatia which was included in the Soviet occupation zone) were controlled by the Polish authorities. The tension grew when the Poles started expelling the ethnically Czech population of the territories in and June 1945 (Wiskemann, 1956: 132. Many Czechs also decided to leave the areas on their own accord determined not to face the hostile Polish administration and the Polish settlers (Stanek, 1991: 135/136). In June the Czech troops penetrated into the Ratibor county (Palys, 1991: 19) and the Warsaw government was considering a military intervention in Transolza which was controlled by the Czech administration in agreement with the international decisions. The situation was so serious that a battle between Polish and Czechoslovak units was imminent and only the Soviet troops prevented a military encounter (Kaplan, 1987: 20). Subsequently, Moscow pushed the Poles and the Czechs to the negotiation table but with no practical success. By the Autumn 12,000 Czech/Moravian refugees had arrived in Czechoslovakia. They invariably told stories of beatings for those who would not say they were Poles, and the

73 It used to be part of Silesia since 1825.
seizure of land and other property from Czech peasants without compensation, in order to give them to the Polish colonists. The obvious Polish policy of ethnic cleansing Czechoslovakia reciprocated with intensified Czechization of Transolza—the Czechs expelled to Germany a number of pro-Polish Silesians because the Nazis had inscribed them on the DVL (Wiskemann, 1956: 132). Because of no signs of improvement in the Polish-Czechoslovak relations Moscow decided to suppress the hostility between the two Slavic states in its sphere of influence, and made Prague and Warsaw draft a treaty on friendship and cooperation which was ready by December 1946. It was signed under the pressure of Kremlin at the beginning of 1947 (Kaplan, 1987: 23/24) and on June 13, 1958 was followed by the agreement on the definitive demarcation of the Czechoslovak-Polish border based on the pre-Munich status quo (Palys, 1991: 21).

This tacitly contained disagreement had to influence the attitude of the respective authorities towards the pro-Polish and pro-Czech minorities on their territories. In the postwar history it was consistently characterized by hostility and policies of forced assimilation. For instance, after 1947 1,500 Klodzko (Kladsko, Glatz) Czechs stayed in their Heimat which had become Polish (Stanek, 1991: 136) but nowadays one cannot hear about any Czechs in this region. On the other hand, the Czechs/Moravians and pro-Czech Silesians of Głubczyce (Hlubicic, Leobschütz) and Racibórz (Ratibor) have been thoroughly Polonized and though may happen to speak Moravian Czech they consider themselves to be Polish, and if decide to change their national identity they opt
for German rather than Czech citizenship. The same pattern could be observed in Transolza. In Czechoslovak Upper Silesia Polish schools and even kindergartens were closed down and rehabilitation of Silesians inscribed on the DVL was swifter and more certain if they decided to declare they were Czechs. Thus, the pro-Polish segment of the population was diminished by 30,000 persons. Although the Polish Communist Alfred Kaleta was elected from Transolza to the National Assembly on May 26, 1946 it could not improve the situation of the pro-Polish population in this region. Their reactivated system of education was being gradually Czechized and Polish organizations faced dire problems seeking legalization. The Polish-speakers were not promoted to higher positions and were treated as second class citizens unless they denounced their pro-Polish attitude. In 1968 the leaders of the Polish Cultural and Educational Association in Czechoslovakia (the Polski Związek Kulturalno-Oświatowy w Czechosłowacji) condemned the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, and the Association of the Polish Youth and the Polish Scouting Movement which had been reactivated thanks to the democratization of Prague Spring, were promptly abolished in 1970. At the end of 1969 the district committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party purged the journalists of the Polish paper Głos Ludu (The People’s Voice) who had supported the democratic changes of 1968. Once again Czechization became the course of the day though the decision of June 8, 1976 by the Ostrava local government reaffirmed the right of the citizen to use his mother tongue while dealing with the state bureaucracy in Transolza, and that bilingual notices should be used in public places and state
offices. Subsequently, the young generation having observed disadvantages of clinging to Polishness was thoroughly Czechized, also because of the growing number of mixed marriages and the desire of parents that their children should be able to enter the mainstream of Czechoslovak life without the apparent obstacle of Polish identity. The other trend has been to claim German citizenship on the basis of Reich citizenship which one obtained after having had been inscribed on the DVL. This right to German citizenship is automatically extended to descendants of people with Reich citizenship, and as such is also widely used by the population of the Hlucin (Hultschin) land where after the war only 29% of the populace declared to be Germans while the rest chose Czechoslovak citizenship in order to be able to stay in their Heimat (Stanek, 1991: 138). (Zahradnik, 1989: 112-117, 152-157)

Regarding the policies of ethnic cleansing directed against the Sileans in the postwar People’s Republic of Poland, one should scrutinize the administrative decisions which shaped the Silesian reality. On May 6, 1945 the Communist, pro-Soviet Polish provisional government, led by Boleslaw Bierut, issued the act which abolished the Organic status of the Silesian Voivodaship and thus effectively liquidated Silesian autonomy, which had been considered as a dangerous centrifugal force by the government and as such incompatible with the communist idea of strong and highly centralized state which should strive for ethnic and national homogeneity (Goclon, 1994: 6). On May 15 Bishop Adamski of Katowice arrived in Wroclaw (Breslau) and conveyed to the German
Catholic authorities there that it would be best if the Germans left as Poland was shifting up to the Oder\textsuperscript{74} (Wiskemann, 1956: 97). On May 26 Silesia was divided between two voivodships. The Wroclaw (Breslau) Voivodship contained Lower Silesia without Lusatia\textsuperscript{75} and the Silesian Voivodship comprised Upper Silesia together with the Dabrowskie industrial basin concentrated on the cities of Zawiercie, Bedzin and Sosnowiec\textsuperscript{76}. The boundary between the two voivodships was exactly the same as the border between the oppeln and Breslau Regencies. The Lower Silesian counties of

\textsuperscript{74} From May to July 1945 Cardinal A. Hlond was canvassing in Rome for establishment of the Polish Church administration in the ‘Recovered Territories’ but to no avail since the Holy See’s way is to institute administrative changes only following international agreements, and there was no internationally recognized and valid treaty between Poland and Germany till 1970 when the Federal Republic of Germany consented to the Oder–Neisse line as the western frontier of Poland. In the meantime the German Catholic hierarchy was to serve the western territories but practically did not barred by the Polish-German border and hostility of the Polish authorities. Hence, the new Church territorial division of the lands was conducted solely by the Polish Church authorities and was not recognized abroad. Some German clergy was allowed to stay in Opole (Oppeln) Silesia but after their deaths they were replaced with Polish priests. In 1965, one year before the celebrations of the Millennium of Polish Christianity and statehood in 1966, the Polish bishops participating in the last session of the Second Vatican Council decided to foster reconciliation with the German Church authorities (which could soften the staunch opposition of Vatican towards recognition of the Polish Church administration in the western territories) by sending the German episcopate a letter which invited its members to take part in the celebrations, and, most importantly, conveyed the message of forgiveness (Chrypinski, 1990: 122). However, only on June 28, 1972 Pope Paul VI with his Episcoporum Poloniae coetus acknowledged the Polish Church administration of the western territories and introduced some minor changes in it (Kopiec, 1991: 102-104).

\textsuperscript{75} It was incorporated in the Soviet occupation zone and then in the German Democratic Republic. After the unification of Germany it became part of Saxony.

\textsuperscript{76} The territory was incorporated in Upper Silesia by the Nazis after 1939, and before had not formed part of the Silesian Voivodship. Prior to 1918, it had been included in the Russian partition of Poland.
zielona Góra (Grünberg) and Wschowa (Fraustadt) were added to the poznań (Posen) Voivodaship (Lesiuk, 1992: 83). In 1950 the Opole Voivodaship was formed on the basis of the Oppeln Regency with the addition of the Wrocław Voivodaship counties of Brzeg (Brieg) and Namysłów (Namslau) (Kopiec, 1991: 105). Moreover, the county of Częstochowa was added to the Katowice Voivodaship and the Zielona Góra Voivodaship was constituted on the basis of the Silesian counties of the Poznań Voivodaship and the border counties of the Wrocław Voivodaship and some ex-Brandenburg counties. In 1975 Poland was divided into the multitude of forty-nine voivodaships and Silesia was promptly divided into eight voivodaships which included many counties of Posen while non-Silesian voivodaships included a certain number of Silesian counties. Thus, Silesia as an administrative, historical and cultural region was obliterated and its concept survives only in geographical terminology (Leszczycki, 1978: 3/4).

The changes were to facilitate the creation of new administrative-cum-regional environment with which the Polish settlers could easily identify, and to deny history of Silesia as an important province with a distinctive past loosely if at all connected to Polish history77. The Upper Silesians who identified themselves with their Heimat rather than with Poland or Germany were considered to be "Autochtons" (indigenous people) of Polish origin who were Germanized and should be returned to

77 Nowadays, the term Silesia is most often associated with the industrial complex in Upper Silesia than with anything else. Ironically, this area also contains the Dąbrowskie basin which never was part of historical Silesia.
the fold of Polishdom. Therefore, on March 22, 1945, the Silesian Voivoda issued a regulation which formed the legal basis for national verification of the Upper Silesians. It was finished at the end of 1949, and subsequently 848,131 inhabitants of Upper Silesia and 15,146 of Lower Silesia received Polish citizenship\(^7\). The Silesians constituted 85\% of the population who were positively verified in the western territories (Lis, 1991: 29). During the process of this verification, many irregularities and wrongdoings were committed which effectively alienated a large segment of the Silesians from the new state administration\(^7\). This alienation was deepened by the disregard for cultural, ethnic and linguistic distinctiveness of this region, and by hostility of the Polish settlers for whom hardly intelligible Silesian Polish interlaced with a plethora of German words seemed to be the German language itself. Moreover, many Upper Silesians could not speak Polish and often were branded as 'Nazis', 'Hitlermen' and 'Krauts'. The authorities, which were usually completely ignorant and scornful of Silesian tradition, strove to forcefully Polonize them by the system of education.

\(^7\) The verification was still conducted in 1950 in the sporadic cases, especially of Silesians returning from Soviet concentration camps (Lis, 1991: 29).

\(^7\) It is worth mentioning that since the end of May 1946, the authorities began to receive many applications for emigration to Germany from Silesians who had been verified to be Poles, especially from mothers whose husbands had stayed in Germany after the war. The authorities did not allow them to leave and advised divorce. The prewar pensioners could not emigrate either and had to stay in Poland deprived of financial resources which otherwise would allow them to lead decent lives (Linek, 1993: 2)
with teachers from Central Poland\textsuperscript{80}, and by the ban on teaching and use of German. Immediately after the war, and later on the basis of the government's regulation of April 7, 1952 names and surnames of the Silesians, were Polonized or changed more often than not without any prior agreement of the persons concerned (Jarczak, 1993: 19). Also the declaration of loyalty was demanded from the Silesians who received Polish citizenship. Ironically, the Protestant Church became an ersatz of normal life for them because over there they could speak in German with their friends and acquaintances. Paradoxically, Silesian Catholics accounted for one third of the people who attended Protestant celebrations (Kowalski, 1994).

In 1950\textsuperscript{81} the Poles agreed to the Link Action which rescued isolated members of families which were already in Germany\textsuperscript{82}. It lasted from March 1950 to the end of 1951 and completed the

\textsuperscript{80} They were ignorant of Silesia and its complexities and largely alienated the young generation of the Silesians, and almost managed to obliterate Silesian Polish.

\textsuperscript{81} In 1948 the official action of Polonization was terminated because it was announced that all ethnic groups of the Opole Voivodaship had been successfully integrated in the fold of Polishdom. It meant lack of information on Silesia and its inhabitants till 1950, which allowed the Polish authorities, unhindered by the mass media coverage of the situation in this region, to speed up collectivization of farms, to destroy the economic and commercial infrastructure of Silesian cities and towns, and to intensify the struggle against the Catholic Church which as the only Polish institution had achieved at least some modest successes in the field of integrating the diverse local population (Linek, 1993: 2).

\textsuperscript{82} According to the Polish sources there were 53,472 Germans left in the Wroclaw Voivodaship and 4,986 in the Silesian Voivodaship. The West German sources estimate that there were 280,000 to 1,6 mln Germans in Silesia. The disparity is caused by the 'Autochtons' or Upper Silesians who are considered Germans by Germany and Polish by the Poles (Lis, 1991: 35).
process of expulsions. Nevertheless, the authorities often refused to let able-bodied and qualified workers go (Wiskemann, 1956: 120) but this action commenced Polish-German normalization under the auspices of Moscow. In spite of strongly adverse sentiment on the part of the East German population, their government accepted the Oder-Neisse frontier at Zgorzelec (Görlitz) on July 6, 1950 (Wiskemann, 1956: 273). On November 24, 1950 the Communist Party Committee of the Opole Voivodaship\[^{3} \] demanded more Silesians to be promoted to middle-managerial positions, their larger share in membership of the Communist party in the Voivodaship, and improved participation of the Silesians in the militia troops (MO), security forces (UB), Railways (PKP), and the Związek Młodzieży Polskiej (the Polish Youth Association)\[^{4} \]. However, the percentage of Silesians in these work places, organizations, the Communist Party, and the local government has remained consistently low indicating the fact that the Silesians have been treated as the second class citizens (Lis, 1991: 38/39).

After the proclamation of March 1951 as the month of Polish-German friendship (Wiskemann, 1956: 273), in June 1951 the strictly confidential government decision of February 1945 about

\[^{3} \] It was the only voivodaship where the 'Autochtons' constituted more than half of the population. However, the proportion changed after 1959 when the action of linking of families was officially finished. By that time 46,000 Silesians had left the Opole Voivodaship (Linek, 1993: 2).

\[^{4} \] The local authorities strove to comply with the guideline promoting former members of the Communist Party of Germany to higher positions in the local governments and regional committees of the Communist Party (Linek, 1993: 2).
excluding the people of German origin from Polish society was rescinded (Schmidla, 1993: 3). On April 22 Polish President Bierut visited Berlin (Wiskemann, 1956: 273). This ongoing normalization and gradual acceptance of the existence of the German minority in Poland brought about the permission of the authorities for 2,757 persons, from 1952 to 1953, to leave for both Germanies to join their families there (Lis, 1991: 40/41). Confiscated German property was returned to owners (Kowalski, 1994), the ban upon the use of German in Poland was reversed85 (Wiskemann, 1956: 274) and the Ministry of Education began to organize primary schools and kindergartens with German as the medium of instruction. Textbooks and periodicals at first were imported from East Germany and later were published in Poland86. The German education and press were run by German Communists, and were loaded with ideological messages not unlike the Polish press and education. The publications used only Polish place-names in the course of their German texts which could repulse many German readers (Wiskemann, 1956: 276). In 1952 first German artistic and folk groups were established (Kowalski, 1994). Relaxation of anti-German policies and allowing Germans to leave Poland (usually for East Germany) brought to the attention of the authorities the problem of the German minority in the Opole Voivodaship. It had been claimed that the German minority was

85 This ban stayed in place in the Opole Voivodaship in order to speed up Polonization of the ‘Autochtons’ (Wiskemann, 1956: 274).

86 The German daily in Poland Arbeitstimme was opened in 1952. On May 5, 1958 it became a weekly entitled Die Woche in Polen and shortly afterwards the publication was defunct (Lis, 1991: 51).
concentrated in Lower Silesia and that after the verification only the 'Autochtons' had remained in Upper Silesia, however, the information gathered till June 1, 1952 indicated that over 47,000 persons felt to be German. The Voivodship statistics give even a bigger number of 69,645 persons\footnote{The information was obtained in the course of issuing new internal passports (i.e. dowody osobiste). The Silesians declared their national feelings by filling in the blank for their nationality with the word 'German' (Linek, 1993: 2).}. The findings triggered off a swift propaganda and harassment campaign which managed to make 30,102 persons to decide their nationality as Polish\footnote{The methods of the harassment most often included dismissal from work and refusal to allow the pro-German Silesians' children to attend schools in Poland (Linek, 1993: 2).} (Lis, 1991: 41/42). Moreover, young Germans made repeated efforts to escape from Poland since the did not want to serve in the army for two years and did not have a chance for legal emigration (Wiskemann, 1956: 277). This tense situation and an increase in applications for emigration to both Germanies were the basis for the negotiations between the Polish and West German Cross, and after the end of Stalinism in 1956 151,226 persons left Silesia for the FRG from 1956 to 1959 during the renewed action of family linking (Lis, 1991: 54). Also in October 1956 the party members from the Opole and Katowice Voivodships demanded from General Secretary Wieslaw Gomolka a change in the policies towards the 'Autochtons' and an end to treating them as an 'uncertain element'\footnote{Especially Eryk Wyra (a former member of the Communist Party of Germany), a member of the Opole Voivodship Communist Party Committee, was vocative on this point. He demanded: an investigation of confiscations of property belonging to Silesians, asking the government to allow each person wishing to leave for the GDR or FRG to emigrate, and introduction of German} (Lis, 1991: 47). The official acknowledgment of the
existence of German minority in Poland allowed them to establish the Niemieckie Towarzystwo Społeczno-Kulturalne (the German social and Cultural Society) in April 1957, which was supported and controlled by the Ministry of Internal Affairs (i.e. security forces) (Kowalski, 1994). The Silesians of the Opole Voivodship were not allowed to join the Association in order not to allow them to be 're-Germanized'. Because of the emigration the Association was dissolved and publication of Die Woche in Polen was discontinued, for the 'Autochtons' who perused the weekly were supposed to read the Polish not German press (Lis, 1991: 51). In 1960 West Germany strove to renew the action of family linking which stopped in 1959, but the Central Committee of the Communist Party issued strict regulations which severely restrained emigration of Silesians till 1970. From 1963 to 1970 only 57,142 Silesians were allowed to leave Poland causing much discontent in West Germany (Lis, 1991: 55).

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Teaching to secondary schools, complete with providing the voivodship population with 'progressive' (i.e. Communist) books and periodicals. Existence of any German minority in the Opole Voivodship was denied by the former activists of the Association of Poles in Germany which was explicitly expressed in the open letter of Wojciech Wawrzynek. In December 1956 the Voivodship Conference of the Communist Party decided to accept the hard-line of the latter, and subsequently Jan Marchon (a former member of the Communist Party in Germany), the president of the voivodship local government was made to resign together with Henryk Werbejczyk (the editor-in-chief of the voivodship Communist daily Trybuna Opolska, where the depicted conflict was played out in the form of letters and polemical articles) who soon after emigrated to Israel (Linek, 1993: 2).

*Ironically, in this wave of emigration from 1956 to 1959 many Communist Party members and prewar pro-Polish Silesian activists (e.g. E. Zmarzły) participated which led to the collapse of numerous Communist Party basic cells in the Opole Voivodship* (Linek, 1993: 2)
The 1960s were a decade of the intensified Cold War and the 
detente came only in October 1969 following the election of Willy 
Brandt to the Federal Chancellorship. His government embarked on 
a new conciliatory Ostpolitik. Article 3 of the Treaty of August 
12, 1970 with the Soviet Union stated that the FRG regarded the 
present European borders (including the Oder-Neisse line) as 
inviolable. The Oder-Neisse line as the western frontier of 
Poland was reaffirmed by Article 1 of the Polish-German Treaty 
signed on November 20, 1970. the treaty went into force on June 
3, 1972 after having had been ratified by the Bundestag on May 
17, 1972 (Allcock, 1992: 89/90). The warming of the Polish-German 
relations toned down Polish anti-German propaganda and the 
support of the German government for revisionist groups which 
allowed a slight relaxation of Polish anti-emigration policies. 
Thus, in the period 1971-1975 28,056 persons emigrated from Upper 
Silesia (Lis, 1991: 55), which means that predominantly they were 
'Aufochtonts' who previously had been considered ethnically Polish 
by the Warsaw government. The dynamic development of diplomatic, 
cultural, tourist and scientific links between Poland and the FRG 
culminated in 1975 at the CSCE Helsinki Summit where General 
Secretary Edward Gierek and Chancellor Willy Brandt met (Lis, 
1991: 56). Under the protocol agreed to the conclusion of the 
Helsinki Final Act on August 1, 1975, between 120,000 and 125,000 
ethnic Germans were allowed to leave Poland and settle in the FRG 
during the following four years, with further emigration 
applications being permitted after the expiry period (Allcock, 
1992: 91). It meant a tacit reversal of the Polish policies on 
the Silesian 'Aufochtonts' especially under the influence of the
jumbo loan which the FRG gave to Poland which struggled with its outstanding debt incurred during the first half of the 1970s (Dobrosielski, 1992: 38). From 1976 to 1979 87,306 persons emigrated from Upper Silesia but the realization of the Helsinki protocol did not diminish the number of persons from the Katowice and Opole Voivodaships eager to leave for the FRG, so in the period 1980-1985 c. 100,000 left Upper Silesia daunted by the most severe economic crisis, which was worsened by the Communist clamp down on the Solidarity movement on December 13, 1981 (which brought about the Western economic embargo); and despite all the bureaucratic and legislative obstacles which they had to overcome with bribery and cunning (Siembieda, 1993a: 16). Gradual worsening of the economic situation and the efforts of the Polish Communist government to leave the post-1981 international isolation and to re-enter the world political arena as an equal partner, resulted in relaxation of passport issuing and border controls91 which allowed 101,000 persons to leave Upper Silesia from 1986 to 1988 (Lis, 1991: 57).

This emigration was actively stimulated by the ethnic policies of the FRG which never stopped considering the Upper Silesian 'Autochton' as people of German ancestry or German-oriented. It is explicitly demonstrated by Article 116 of the German Constitution which reaffirms the right of all the people born inside the 1937 borders of the Third Reich before May 9, 1945 and

91 It was an established practice that the local security offices issued tourist passports to the 'Autochton' who went to Yugoslavia, Austria or East Berlin whence they could easily reach the FRG where they claimed German citizenship or political asylum.
their descendants to German citizenship (Kowalski, 1994). More leverage to this preferential treatment of the Silesian emigrants in the FRG was added by the weighty presence of Silesians in Germany and its political life. According to the census of October 29, 1946: 1,623,000 Silesians lived in West Germany, 27,000 in Berlin and 1,049,000 in the Soviet zone (Wiskemann, 1956: 146). Already in 1946 the Silesians wanted to found their organization in Munich, Bavaria (Neubach, 1992: 21) where half a million of them had settled down; but to no avail since the Allied authorities did not tolerate any kind of organizations of the expellees, political or otherwise (Wiskemann, 1956: 149). Only at the end of 1948 the Association of the Silesians in Bavaria was established (Neubach, 1992: 21), and after the FRG was called into existence by the Allies in May 1945, the Landsmannschaft-Schlesien (LS) was established in Bad Godesberg in 1950, and in October official patronage over it was taken by Lower Saxony where several hundred thousands Silesians lived. Even earlier, in December 1949 a group of Upper Silesians founded the Landsmannschaft der Oberschlesier (LdO). In 1964 North Rheinland-Westfalen became its patron. Twenty-three Silesian politics were elected to the first Bundestag and then endeavored to facilitate the new beginning of their fellowmen in the FRG (Neubach, 1992: 21/22). On August 5, 1950 at Stuttgart the organizations of all the German expellees accepted The Charter of the German Expellees where, most importantly, they 'renounced all thought of revenge and retaliation' and expressed their 'unwavering support for the establishment of a united Europe in which the nations may live in freedom from fear and coercion',
but called for recognition of 'the right to [their] native homeland [as] one of the basic rights of man, granted to him by God' (Anon., 1950).

The Polish authorities have considered the official renunciation of revisionism as a meaningless statement⁹², and the right to homeland and adjacent cultural activities as the practical actualization of revisionism and a threat to the existence of Poland (Cygański, 1992: 12). Thus, the organizations of the Silesians in the FRG were even more misrepresented by the Polish propaganda than the Germans themselves. Calumnies and offensive invectives were directed at the organizations, the more intensively the greater economic and democratic progress was achieved in the FRG, and the more Silesians strove to leave Poland where they were harassed by the Communist regime and had to suffer constant acute economic crisis (Lis, 1991: 79). The Silesians were identified by the Polish population as Germans and as such even became an object of Polish nationalist hatred fuelled by the tendentiously negative picture of the German which was installed in the Polish mind by Polish and Soviet war films which were the dominating genre before the end of Communism.

The Silesian homeland organizations had approximately 418,000 members in the years 1955-1958 and became bigger than the homeland organizations of the Sudeten Germans. Understandably, the Silesians became one of important political forces in the FRG

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⁹² However, it largely prevented Palestinian-like terrorism and the expellees have never striven to regain their homeland by force or coercion.
especially after 1960 when their organizations were united with the organizations of the Sudeten Germans under the aegis of the Verband der Landsmannschaften (VdL). Moreover, the VdL became also part of the Bund der Vertriebenen Vereinigte Landsmannschaften und Landsverbände (BdV) whose membership rose from 1.34 mln in 1959 to 2.2 mln in 1963, and most significantly Herbert Czaja, the President of the LdO, was elected the President of the BdV in 1970 (Cygański, 1992: 10/11).

In the 1950s the organizations of the expellees were mainly interested in improving the lot of their members inside the FRG and facilitating the action of family linking. In the 1960s when the whole net of their cultural, social and political organizations worked out a stable position for their members inside the FRG, the influence of the expellees in politics culminated in Chancellor Erhard’s note of March 26, 1966 sent to all the governments with which the FRG had political ties. It questioned legality of the Oder-Neisse line on the basis of the fact that there had been no peace conference after the Second World War which would reaffirm the postwar status quo (Allcock, 1992: 89). But under the influence of approaching detente the stance was softened which was also reflected in the political statements of the organization of the expellees. The Federal Congress of the LdO in Würzburg, March 29-30, 1969 under the leadership of Czaja announced a new program which emphasized: a future united Europe as the goal, the right to homeland, collective minority rights and the realization of human rights on the other side of the Iron Curtain (Cygański, 1992: 14; Czaja

[146]
in Anon., 1950). This mitigated attitude facilitated the signature of the German-Polish Treaty in 1970 and fostered emigration of the Silesians from Poland after 1975. Czaja, however, remained adamant in the question of illegality of the Oder-Neisse line, and was largely assisted by the Federal Constitutional Tribunal’s statements of July 31, 1973 and July 7, 1975 which expressed the opinion that the lands east of the Oder-Neisse line still belong to Germany from the legal point of view (Cygański, 1992: 17).

In the second half of the 1970s the BdV concentrated on the question of human rights and collective minority rights in the Deutsche Ostgebiete, and on cooperation with the organizations of the expellees abroad. The Silesian groups managed to establish contacts with the Verein der Schlesier in the United States and the Verband Ehemaliger Oberschlesier in Israel and thus international interest in the fate of the Silesians remaining in Polish Silesia was established. In 1977 at the CSCE Conference in Belgrade, the BdV postulated establishment of the Human Rights Protection International Tribunal and the signature of a convention against forced assimilation but to no avail, the West did not want to endanger the shaky detente. Czaja presented the situation of the 'Autochtons' in Washington during his American

93 The majority of the Silesian Jews were exterminated and the survivors most often decided not to return to Silesia so the most important Jewish centers in Silesia: Wroclaw, Ziębice (Münsterberg), Katowice and Gliwice are mainly populated by the Jews from the Polish East. They numbered 10,000 but after 1967, when the anti-Semitic campaign was flared up by the Communist government, almost all of them left. Hence, with the exception of 1,500 Jews in Wroclaw only small pockets of them remain in Silesia (Wigoder, 1992: 173, 864).
visit, August 12-24, 1978. G. Prusko, spokesman of the LdB, sent a letter to the UN Secretary General during the Geneva Conference on Racism and Discrimination of Minorities. During the European Parliamentary elections in June 1979 Czaja appealed for implementation of collective minority rights in every European country. This line was continued in the 1980s and broadened by the grass roots humanitarian action of sending food/clothes parcels, medicines and medical equipment to Poland which suffered even more acute economic crisis after the trade embargo was imposed on the country in reply to the introduction of martial law on December 13, 1981 (Cygański, 1992: 16-18).

After the return to power of the CDU/CSU coalition in the FRG, the Silesian homeland organizations received full government support. In January 1984 the CDU/CSU representatives introduced to the European Parliament's agenda the issue of discriminated German minority in Upper Silesia, and on January 17, 1985 in the Bundestag, H. Hupka (the Vice-President of the BdV and President of the LS) spoke on the ban on the German language in Upper Silesia. Moreover, the rights of the expellees and German minorities were championed by F.J. Strauss, the leader of the Bavarian CSU, who demanded an end to the Polish propaganda which was obfuscating the fact that the western territories of Poland used to be centers of German culture, and denying the right of the German minorities in Silesia, Pommern, Danzig and East Prussia to preserve their identity (Cygański, 1992: 18-30).

Accordingly, in 1983 and 1984 the West German government tried
to influence the Polish authorities to give a consent to establishment of the *Verband der Deutschen in Polen* (VdDP) which would emulate the Association of the Poles in the FRG and the defunct German Social and Cultural Society in Walbrzych (Waldenburg). None of the Polish courts registered the VdDP but its branches were illegally formed in the Katowice and Opole Voivodaships during 1985. From 1985 to 1988 the German minority movement was developed in numerous branches of the *Deutsche Freundschaftskreise in Schlesien* (DFK, the German Friendship Circles in Silesia), it was headed by Franz Poppe from Raszowice (Raschewitz) who worked in Kędzierzyn-Koźle (Kandrzin/Hydebreck-Cösel). On January 12, 1988 he met FRG Foreign Minister Hans-Districh Genscher in the West German Embassy in Warsaw, and the latter promised support for the DFK’s continuous efforts to obtain legalization. However, the DFK chiefly advocated emigration to the FRG which coupled with the repressions by the Polish security forces considerably weakened the organization.

The year 1989 marks the fall of Communism in Central and Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union. The old ideology was proved to be economically unfeasible and socially unsound. The ethnic violence in Nagorno-Karabakh and the approaching ethnic conflict in Yugoslavia made Central and East European leaders aware that nationalism and ethnic feelings could not be contained any longer. Some decided to use them as an instrument to gain power (cf. ex-Yugoslavia, Slovakia) but others decided to recognize minorities in their countries and to grant them some obvious rights (which had been denied to them during the Communist times)
in order to ensure a peaceful social situation, only on the basis of which one can try to build a working capitalist economy and the liberal-democratic system of government.
CHAPTER FIVE

THE END OF THE POLICIES OF ETHNIC CLEANSING

IN SILESIA AFTER 1989, AND WHAT NEXT?

The strong wave of strikes in the Spring and Summer of 1988 coaxed Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski to consent to the idea of the Round Table which was held from February to April 1989 and in June led to the partially free elections to the Sejm and the newly re-established Senate de facto marking the end of Communism. In Czechoslovakia it was matched by the Velvet Revolution in November 1989 which allowed broader recognition for the national minorities in Transolza and put an end to the action of forced assimilation which was conducted by the Czechoslovak Communist Party from 1947 to 1989. According to the March 1991 census there are c. 44,000 Poles, c. 45,000 Silesians and c. 40,000 Moravians in Transolza. The vast majority of the Transolza inhabitants is now constituted by the Czechs due to intensive industrialization and forced assimilation in the previous decades (Zahradník, 1992: 167). However, nowadays, the minorities regained their rights to their languages/dialects, culture and identity. They are and should continue to be an integral element of the process of democratization and the economic reform which are currently implemented in the country.

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4 In the most Polish Frydek-Místek and Karvina counties the Poles account for 9.06% and 8.2% of the population respectively, the Moravians for 7.9% and 5.29%, and the Silesians for 2.16% and 2.84% (Zahradník, 1992: 167).
In this respect the words of the Polish President Lech Wałęsa uttered in the Federal Assembly during his first visit to Czecho-
slovakia (September 16-18, 1991) are encouraging. He said that
the Transolza Polish minority should not be the source of Polish-
Czecho-Slovak conflicts but a bridge which should facilitate
fostering of closer relations between the two countries
(Zahradník, 1992: 166-174). Besides the Poles, the Silesians also
wanted to voice their concerns about their and their land’s role in the postcommunist Czecho-Slovakia. In order to make their
voice heard, together with the Moravians they founded the Hnuti
za samospravnou demokracii-Spolecnost pro Moravu a Slezsko (the
Movement for Self-Governing Democracy Association for Moravia and
Silesia) on January 23, 1990. With 7.9% of the votes to the
House of the People and 9.11% to the House of Nations, the
Movement seated 16 deputies in the Federal Assembly. They are
most vocative on the rights of the Moravians and the Silesians
to autonomy, own identities, and after January 1, 1993 when
Slovakia became independent, to their own republic which would
be part of a future Czech-Moravian-Silesian Republic (Wolchik,
1991: 94, 185; Zielonka, 1992: 3). However, it seems that from
the demographic point of view the Polish and Silesian ethnic
groups in Transolza have only small chance to survive in future

95 After 1927 Czechoslovak Silesia continued to be submerged in bigger administrative districts and still nowadays is just an unrecognized part of the North Moravian District with the capital in Ostrava.

96 During the Communist times interests of the Czechoslovak Silesians were represented (to the degree tolerated by the aggressively atheistic state) by the Silesian Evangelical Church of the Augsburg Confession whose 46,725 members predominantly speak the Silesian dialect which is their mother tongue (Ramet, 1989: 276).
due to the growing number of mixed marriages and to the fact that parents want their children rather to enter the fold of Czech/Moravian identity so that in future they could be successful citizens of the Czech Republic.

In the wake of the dismantling of Communism in Poland the Silesian/German minority posed a greater problem to the government (as the Sudeten Germans in the case of Czecho-Slovakia). First of all, the Silesian homeland organizations still have at their disposal the formidable social base of 1.94 mln Lower Silesians and 1.33 mln Upper Silesians in the former FRG, 0.87 mln Lower Silesians and 0.3 mln Upper Silesians in the former GDR⁷ and 10,000 Upper Silesians in Austria (Reichling, 1986: 64). Secondly, German sources maintain that there are 0.5-1 mln Germans/Silesians in Upper Silesia nowadays (Schmidla, 1993: 4) or 30,000 Lower Silesians and 750,000 Upper Silesians (Reichling, 1986: 64). The estimates of the number of the Germans/Silesians in Poland given by Anglophone sources vary from 600,000 to 900,000 (Zielonka, 1992: 25; Anon., 1993b: 48). The Polish authorities are interested in reducing this number as far as possible therefore it seems that only the estimate of the German minority Senator, Gerhard Bartodziej is most objective. Having excluded the pro-Polish Silesians from this number he considers the German/Silesian minority to be 300,000 persons.

⁷ The Soviet-imposed silence on the question of the expellees in the GDR was broken in 1985 by the Silesian author Ursula Höntsch who published a biographic book on the times of the transfer of the German population from Silesia and the aftermath, entitled Wir Flüchtlingskinder (We, Children of the Expellees). The Polish translation of the novel was brought up in 1993 (Höntsch, 1993).
strong in the historic area of Upper Silesia (Bartodziej, 1993: 26).

Therefore, the German minority in Upper Silesia had to be recognized in postcommunist Poland, especially in the view of the fact that Poland demanded a similar recognition of Polish minorities in Lithuania, Latvia, Byelorus and the Ukraine. Moreover, the Poles could not continue the campaign of indiscriminate condemnation and accusations of German homeland organizations because similar homeland organizations of the Poles expelled from the former eastern territories of Poland began to mushroom all over the country, often generously supported by the local and state authorities (Schmidla, 1993: 4; Anon., 1993c).

In March 1989 the Sozial-Kulturelle Gesellschaft der Deutschen Minderheit in Oppelner Schlesien (SKGDMs, the Social and Cultural Association of the German Minority in Opole Silesia) came into being as the effect of the merger of the DFK in Gogolin and the Society of Friends of German Culture in Jemielnica (Himmelwitz). The Association was officially registered and followed by a plethora of smaller and more specialized organizations of the German minority in the western territories of Poland, but especially in Upper Silesia. On November 15, 1990 in Wroclaw, an umbrella association for all the groups was formed, namely: the Zentralrat der Deutschen Gesellschaften in der Republik Polen

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99 It is mainly concentrated in the eastern part of the Opole Voivodaship (which used to border with Polish Upper Silesia before the Second World War), in the Olesno (Rosenberg) County, now incorporated in the Częstochowa Voivodaship, and in a plethora of small pockets in the Katowice Voivodaship.
(the Central Council of the German Minority Associations in the Republic of Poland). Also two important pro-Polish Silesian organizations came into being during the time: the conservative Związek Górnosłaski (the Upper Silesian Association) in Katowice, Cieszyn (Tesen, Teschen) and Opole on June 30, 1989, and later the traditional-liberal Związek Górnosłazaków (the Association of the Upper Silesians).

The pro-Polish organizations, however, cannot match the German/Silesian organizations in membership and intensity of activities. Of all the latter, the SKGDMS is by far the most significant one. In November 1989 it gathered over 250,000 signatures of people declaring their German origin and at the end of 1990 the organization had c. 130,000 card holders (Cygański, 1992: 45/46). The administration of the SKGDMS was elected at the meeting of April 19, 1990 in Gogolin, and immediately issued its program which aimed at liquidating disparities in treatment of the Silesians/Germans in comparison to other Polish citizens, spreading of German teaching and knowledge of German culture, promoting environmental protection in Upper Silesia⁹⁹, gaining the right to co-decision about the country and the region, and access to mass-media among others (Anon., 1990).

⁹⁹ After the Second World War, this highly developed and industrialized region was treated as an internal colony which was to provide sources for development of the rest of Poland. Due to this inconsiderate economic policies, Upper Silesia is the most ecologically devastated region in Poland and its industry is largely decapitalized which coupled with general unfeasibility of heavy industry causes soaring rates of unemployment in Upper Silesia (Anon., 1990: 2; Dworaczyk, 1993; Rother, 1990: 5).

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Thus, linguistic, social, educational and cultural discrimination of the Germans/Silesians in Upper Silesia gradually came to an end. On April 20, 1990 the bilingual biweekly of the SKGDMS Oberschlesische Nachrichten/Wiadomości Górnośląskie\(^{100}\) was launched and it replaced the ultra-nationalist Schlesische Nachrichten\(^{101}\) which was closed down after it had published the forbidden national anthem of the Third Reich in full in 1992. Oberschlesische Nachrichten/Wiadomości Górnośląskie at the moment of its inception started local elections campaign thanks to which the German/Silesian electorate was mobilized and in May 1990 gained representation in 40 counties (to 64 counties in the whole Opole Voivodship) and in 26 counties they constituted a majority (Bartodziej, 1993: 26).

Meanwhile, the positive domestic achievements were constantly facilitated by the course of international efforts. In November 1989 Chancellor Helmut Kohl visited Poland\(^{102}\) and met with thousands of Germans/Silesians at Krzyżowa (Lichtenwaldau) in southern Lower Silesia. On November 14 a joint declaration signed

\(^{100}\) Later, its name was changed was changed to Oberschlesische Zeitung/Gazeta Górnośląska; and at the close of 1993 it became a weekly. The periodical is bilingual so that it could also cater for the Silesians/Germans who lost or did not acquire knowledge of the German language due to the official ban on it in Upper Silesia during the Communist time; and for the Poles interested in the region where they live.

\(^{101}\) It was financed from the FRG and at the beginning was even printed over there.

\(^{102}\) When the news of the opening of the Berlin Wall on November 9 arrived, he returned for two days to the FRG, and so could not participate in the Catholic mass with the Silesians/Germans at the Holy Mountain of Upper Silesia - Góra Św. Anny (St. Annaberg).
by Kohl and the Polish Prime Minister, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, committed the FRG to accept the fact of the post-1945 frontiers of Poland and gave a reciprocal pledge of respect for minority German/Polish rights. On June 21, 1990 the FRG Bundestag and the GDR Volkskammer adopted identically-worded resolutions calling for the existing borders to be 'definitely confirmed by a treaty under international law' and reaffirming 'the inviolability of the frontier existing between [Germany and Poland] now and in the future'. Finally after the completion of the 'Two-Plus-Four' negotiations on September 12, 1990 and the unification of Germany on October 3, 1990, Genscher and his Polish counterpart signed The Treaty Between the Republic of Poland and the FRG Reaffirming the Borders Existing Between Them on November 14, 1990. The real breakthrough came with The Treaty Between the FRG and the Republic of Poland on Good Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation of June 17, 1991 (Allcock, 1992: 95-98). For the first time in the history of the post-Second-World-War world the notion of 'national minority' was explicitly used in a ratified and binding international treaty\textsuperscript{103}. The Treaty which is valid for the period of ten years, regulates the status, rights and obligations of the Polish minority in the FRG and the German minority in the Republic of Poland in Articles 20, 21 and 22:

Article 20

(1) The members of the German minority in the Republic of Poland, i.e. the persons with Polish citizenship, but of German origin or espousing the German language,

\textsuperscript{103} Earlier, the concept of 'national minority' was merely mentioned in Article 14 of The European Convention on Human Rights.
culture or tradition, and also the persons in the Federal Republic of Germany with Polish citizenship, but of Polish origin or espousing the Polish language, culture or tradition; have the right to individual or collective (with other members of their ethnic group) free expression, preservation and development of their own ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity without any attempt at assimilation against their will. They have the right to full and effective use of human rights and basic freedoms without any discrimination and fully equality before the law.


(3) The Parties to the Treaty declare that the persons mentioned in Item (1) have individual and collective (together with other members of their ethnic group) rights to:

- free use of their mother tongue in private and public life, access to information in this language, and to exchange and dissemination of it,

- establishing and maintaining own institutions, organizations, and educational, cultural and religious associations, which are allowed to try to obtain financial and other support from private persons as well as from public sources in accordance with the domestic law, and which have, and should have equal access to the mass media in their respective regions,

- confessing and practising their religion, including purchasing, possessing and use of religious materials, and to conducting educational religious activities in their mother tongue,

- establishing and maintaining unhindered contacts among themselves inside the borders of the host country, and also cross-border contacts with citizens of other countries with whom they are connected by the same ethnic or national origin, cultural tradition or religious feelings,
- use of their names and surnames in the way demanded by the rules of their mother tongue,

- establishing and maintaining organizations or associations inside the host country, and to membership in international non-governmental organizations,

- use of effective legal means (on par with other citizens) for realization of their rights in accordance with domestic law.

(4) The Parties to the Treaty reaffirm that belonging to the groups mentioned in Item (1) is the matter of individual choice, and that no negative consequences may result from the choice.

Article 21

(1) The Parties to the Treaty shall protect, on their respective territories, ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identities of the groups enumerated in Article 20 Item (1), and shall create conditions needed to support these identities. The role of intensified constructive cooperation in this field is highly appreciated. This cooperation should strengthen peaceful coexistence and good neighborliness of the German and Polish Nations, and contribute to better understanding and reconciliation between them.

(2) The Parties to the Treaty especially:

- shall mutually make possible and facilitate activities aimed at supporting the members of the groups enumerated in Article 20 Item (1) or their organizations in the framework of valid legal acts,

- despite the necessity of learning the official language of the respective country, shall endeavor in accordance with the appropriate regulations of domestic law to ensure for the members of the groups enumerated in Article 20 Item (1) appropriate opportunities for teaching of, or in their mother tongue, in the public educational system, and of using the language before the public authorities wherever it is possible and necessary,

- shall include history and culture of the groups enumerated in Article 20 Item (1) in the history and culture syllabi in the educational system,

- shall honor the right of the members of the groups enumerated in Article 20 Item (1) to effective participation in public matters including protection of and support for their identity,
- thus, shall undertake necessary steps to comply with the afore-stated commitment after appropriate consultations, in accordance with the procedure of undertaking such decisions in a given state, and in conjunction with the organizations or associations of the groups enumerated in Article 20 Item (1).

(3) The Parties to the Treaty shall comply with the decisions of Article 3 regarding the matters dealt with in this Article and in Articles 20 and 22.

Article 22

(1) None of the obligations enumerated by Articles 20 and 21 can be interpreted as giving the right to engage in any activities or to conducting any activities breaching the aims and rules of The UN Charter, or other obligations required by international law, and the Final Act of the CSCE, which also includes respecting territorial integrity of states.

(2) Every person in the Republic of Poland or in the Federal Republic of Germany belonging to the groups mentioned in Article 20 Item (1) is accordingly obligated, in accordance with the afore-mentioned decisions, to be loyal to the respective State adhering to the obligations enacted by the legislation of the State.\textsuperscript{104} (Anon., 1991: 45-53)

The Treaty constitutes the model for reciprocal minority treaties which are signed in the postcommunist Europe. From the practical point of view it allowed the German/Silesian minority to take part in the first free Polish parliamentary elections in October 1991\textsuperscript{105}. Subsequently, the minority managed to elect seven of its

\textsuperscript{104} The author’s own translation on the basis of the Polish text of the Treaty.

\textsuperscript{105} The tension between the Poles and the German/Silesian minority in the Opole Voivodaship reached the climax in the Winter of 1990 during the by-election campaign to the Senate. The candidacy of an assertive German Silesian Henryk Krol (one of the SKGDMs leaders) was met with hostile, if not hysterical reaction by the local Polish populace. Finally the Polish candidate, Professor Dorota Simonides (a pro-Polish Silesian and a lecturer in Silesian ethnography at the Higher Pedagogical School in Opole) won in the second round (Zielonka, 1992: 27).
candidates to the Sejm and one to the Senate. The deputies always consistently voted for all the initiatives needed to reform the state and its economy, and for bills which aimed at improvement of the social, economic and ecological situation in Upper Silesia, and at cooperation with the FRG in the framework of European integration (Bartodziej, 1993: 27).

In the following years, the German/Silesian minority had the German language and culture introduced to numerous schools in the Opole Voivodaship. Also German kindergartens were opened, and the Department of German at the Higher Pedagogical School in Opole was instituted to provide the local educational system with qualified German teachers who are badly needed in this region because only in 1990 the ban on teaching German in Opole Voivodaship schools was repealed (Urban, 1993: 1). The issue of education of German/Silesia children and youth was officially regulated by the Agreement between the Opole Voivodaship School Inspectorate and the SKGDMS (Anon., 1992: 1). With the support of the FRG and the BdV a net of libraries and cheap/free German language courses was created. In 1993 the German Vice-Consulate was opened in Opole and the Silesians/Germans were allowed to submit documents necessary to obtain German citizenship (in accordance with Article 116 of the German Constitution) while

\[106\] Soon it is going to be upgraded to the status of a university and its name will be most probably the Piast University. The Piasts were the first rulers of Poland and formed long-lasting dynastic lines in the Silesian principalities when their main line became extinct and the Jagiellonians began to sit in the Polish throne. The House of Piast is the symbol of Polishdom for Polish patriots who rarely realize that the Piast rulers were responsible for Germanization of Silesia.

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residing in Poland. Exchanges of schoolchildren with Germany have been organized and German university scholarships have been offered to the Silesian/German students. Translations and originals of works by such renowned Silesian authors as Eichendorff, Bienek, Piontek or Angelus Silesius commenced to be published as well as new periodicals, among which especially the color bilingual biweekly Hoffnung of the Towarzystwo Spoleczno-Kulturalne Ludnosci Pochodenia Niemieckiego Wojewodztwa Katowickiego (the Social and Cultural Association of the Population of German Origin in the Katowice Voivodaship), launched at the end of 1993, is worth mentioning. 

All the efforts coupled with intensification of economic contacts with the FRG at the level of private enterprises slowed down emigration—the modern Ostflucht—of the Silesians/Germans to the FRG which is one of the most important program aims of the SKGDMS (Cygański, 1992: 50). Another factor responsible for diminishing of their emigration is a poor economic shape of the FRG in comparison to the period of the ‘economic miracle’ in the 1960s and 1970s. Moreover, the German authorities do not provide such emigrants, Aussiedlers with a job, partially free accommodation and gratis language courses as they used to in the past. But the economic situation and the standard of life in Poland is much lower which still causes some dynamic persons to leave Silesia; rather few since the possibility of possessing two passports

\[107\] The Catholic Church also did contribute to the normalization in Silesia by re-introducing bilingual religious services which had had long tradition in this region before they had been abolished after the outbreak of the Second World War.

[162]
enables them to emigrate immediately should they decide so. Double citizenship, from the legal point of view, is not allowed neither in the FRG nor in Poland. It is sometimes frowned upon by the Polish authorities but luckily, at present, no measures are taken to curb the practice (Urban, 1993: 1) because it could trigger off an exodus of young Silesians (Anon., 1992a: 3; Ludwig, 1993: 2).

Another unresolved problem which hovers over Upper Silesia is the ban on the use of German place-names in documents, notices and mass media. Albeit the ban is often breached in the Silesian minority press, it is still unacceptable to put up signs with bilingual names of localities or streets. In The Letters to the German-Polish Treaty of June 17, 1991, the Polish side strongly repudiated such a possibility though may choose to look into it at a later date (Anon., 1991: 73, 75). The question if the German/Silesian minority has the right to renovate and build new monuments commemorating their husbands and sons who died during the two World Wars caused almost a hysterical nationalistic outcry in the Polish press. Most objections were directed against inscriptions in German (sic !) and Maltese crosses which the Poles interpret as Iron Crosses of the Reich. The right of the Silesians/Germans to honor their beloved ones

108 During his sojourn in South Africa, the author noticed that Polish passports are readily issued to Polish nationals with South African citizenship which clearly constitutes a breach of the Polish law.

109 Poland demanded abolishing of a similar ban directed at the Polish minority in Lithuania, and the authorities of the latter did abrogate it (Anon., 1993c).
who died in action, was reaffirmed and regulated by the Mixed Monument Commission with its final document of May 24, 1993 (Anon., 1993d; Hupka, 1993). The most serious and difficult social problem of the Silesian/German minority is the Wehrmacht veterans. The Wehrmacht was not a criminal organization, as the SS Waffen, but a regular conscript army. Its veterans in Silesia, of whom 48,500 still survive, are denied any veteran status, and are considered to be on par with the SSmen by the Polish veteran organizations, and, most importantly, the time they spent in the army and in Soviet concentration camps is not added to the years during which they worked which is a usual practice in the case of war veterans. In 1975 Bonn transferred to Warsaw DM1.2 bln which were to be distributed among them but the money never reached its destination. Till 1989 their case was a taboo and nowadays neither the Polish nor German governments show any eagerness to help these old and more often than not destitute people (Bubin, 1993). Yet the last complaint of the German/Silesian minority is about the excesses of Polish extremists in the form of breaking windows in the houses of German/Silesian MPs, acts of vandalism at headquarters of German/Silesian organizations, and offensive graffiti which recently concentrated on the person of Opole bishop Alfons Nossoł. Sometimes such actions may be caused by the activities of German extremists in Upper Silesia (Urban, 1993: 2), hence both the tendencies should be contained by the police which

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110 He is the first ethnic Silesian to head the Opole diocese, which is an important sign of the reversal of the Polish Church policy which earlier promoted Polishdom at the cost of suppression of the Silesian identity (Schmidla, 1993: 4).
unfortunately seems to sympathize with the Polish nationalists. However, Poland is a very young democracy which only starts to learn the truth that the attitude towards minorities is a measure of the level of civilization a country has achieved, so the Polish accomplishments in this field should not be overshadowed by failures. Thus, it must be rightly recognized, that, although only after one year and a half of efforts, the SKGDMS was registered by the Opole Voivodaship Court as the Sozial-Kulturelle Gesellschaft der Deutsche (the Social and Cultural Association of the Germans) on May 5, 1993 (Miś, 1993a: 1,3). In March 1993 the Polish Prime Minister, Hanna Suchocka visited Opole and delivered a groundbreaking speech in which she officially recognized that Silesia is inhabited by ethnically very diversified populace, including its original inhabitants—the Silesians, and that well-being and security of the land and even whole Poland depends on peaceful cooperation here which is and shall be fostered and facilitated by the Polish state (Suchocka, 1993: 1, 3). Moreover, when the new parliamentary elections ordinance introduced the 5% vote threshold for parties and 7% for coalitions to limit the number of splinter groups, the minority parties and organizations were exempted from it which allowed the German/Silesian minority to elect one senator and five members of the Sejm in the last parliamentary elections of September 1993. After the wave of strikes of the Upper Silesian

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The battle had been fought over changing the term 'German minority' to 'the Germans', which had seemed to be quite unacceptable to the Polish authorities (Miś, 1993a: 1,3).
at the end of April 1994, President Lech Walesa officially came to Katowice (Kattowitz) on the Sunday of May 8, 1992 to placate angry social feelings. His visit was widely televised, and, among other activities, he watched the premiere showing of Smierc jak kromka chleba (Death As a Slice of Bread)—the latest film by the foremost Silesian director Kutz. Most significantly, the director admitted that history of Silesia is highly idiosyncratic, and hardly constitutes a part of the Polish past—for the first time in the postwar history of Poland, such a statement was so widely publicized. Let us hope it will be a harbinger of a better future for Silesia.

From this chapter of the thesis it is visible that after 1989 the Polish state has striven to acknowledge the previously hotly denied existence of the German/Silesian minority by the ongoing and dynamic process of legal regulations which, if consistently and justly implemented and observed, in future may result in a system of minority protection comparable to these ones worked-out in South Tyrol, Schleswig-Holstein or Catalonia. These developments are facilitated by the fact that 82% of the Polish coal is mined in Silesia.

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112 The prices of the Polish coal are not competitive at the world market any more so many miners are unemployed nowadays and the government plans to close down majority of the mines in near future. The economic situation is desperate here as it was before the war. It is clearly demonstrated by the fact that many unemployed miners started to illegally mine low-calorific coal from shallow seams as their fathers and grandfathers used to in the 1930s (Wieczorek, 1994: 40/41).

113 The film is about the strike of miners of the 'Wujek' Coal Mine, who commenced it after the introduction of the martial law on December 13, 1981. The strike was forcefully quelled by the security police (ZOMO) and seven miners were shot to death in the process.
populace accepts the fact that the German/Silesian minority is represented in the Polish parliament (Kowalski, 1994). On the international arena, Poland having become a member of the Council of Europe, ratified The European Convention on Human Rights. On the other hand, in the light of Poland's endeavors to be allowed to ascend into the European Union, one may trust that it shall observe the 1992 UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (Anon., 1993b: 4). Besides, the Polish-German Treaty of June 17, 1991, the Convention and the Declaration should constitute a basis on which the standards of German/Silesian minority protection in Poland ought to be developed, so that the standards would be compatible with the European norms, and hence Poland could easily enter a future united Europe of regions. This dream has been shared by so many Poles, and Silesians both at home and especially in Germany, that one must hope for its actualization which ideally would replace nationalistic tensions and conflicts with cooperation and respect for different identities--they add flavor and a spectrum of interesting and seminal diversities to the largely homogenous Euro-American sphere of culture.
CONCLUSION

To reiterate, Silesia was and still is a multicultural and at least bi- if not trilingual borderland which lies in the transitory area between Western and Central Europe. In the past its diverse population lived peacefully gradually developing this rich region of outstanding soils and mineral riches, but exactly because of the fact that Silesia was usually placed at the peripheries of a country to which it happened to belong to, and was a wealthy country; it was often changing hands as a 'prize trophy' in Polish-Czech, Czech-Hungarian, Czech-Austrian and Austrian-Prussian wars. Reformation and Counter-Reformation also imprinted their bloody sign on Silesia which then experienced first forced movements of its population.

It was only a portent of what was to come later with the spread of the concept of nation state which served as the model for the absolutist countries of Western Europe which usually were fairly homogenous from the ethnic point of view. On the other hand, the states in Central and eastern Europe were too small (as the three hundred odd German states, or a plethora of Italian statelets) or too big (Prussia, the Austrian or the Russian empires) to serve as the basis for construction of nation states. The small state organisms were underinclusive whereas the big overinclusive. This tension intensified by modernization, industrialization and establishment of nationalist movements had
to be somehow bridged or liquidated in the process of nation building. The main methods of dealing with this predicament were federalism (e.g. the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, the FRG) or centralism (e.g. Russia, Poland, Prussia). The former solution entailed tolerance towards national minorities and the latter forced assimilation and ethnic cleansing. Unfortunately, the majority of the Central and Eastern European states based on the federal model proved to be centralist though in disguise, therefore, the federations were unstable and had to crumble down.

Silesia has been a traditional bone of contention among Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia—modern states which were created only in 1871 and 1918 respectively. Upon their foundation, the states aggressively embarked on the process of nation building to match the achievements of Western Europe in this sphere. Forced assimilation and policies of ethnic cleansing were sanctified by the ideal of nation state with a complete disregard for the rights of minorities. Accordingly, in Silesian history one can distinguish several periods which well illustrate the dynamics of policies of ethnic cleansing which were presented in the thesis, namely:

1) The Austrian rule till 1742 when Prussia seized most of Silesia, was marked by more or less intensified discrimination of Protestants.

2) 1742-1848: discrimination of Catholics and the rise of the Silesian national awareness.
3) 1848-1871: an increase in discrimination of Catholics and the beginning of national polarization.

4) 1871-1921: this period is opened by Bismarck's Kulturkampf (in the year of German unification) which was an undeclared war with Catholicism. The majority of Catholics were Polish-speaking Upper Silesians so the policy and Polish nationalist influences from Posnania and Galicia radicalized them. Czech nationalism was also widespread in Austrian Silesia. There were also German and Austrian attempts to quench these growing irredentisms.

5) 1921-1938/1939: after the division of Upper Silesia between Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia the countries used all methods allowed by law and international agreements to assimilate their minorities. After the post-plebiscite division of Upper Silesia between Poland and Germany the movements of Silesians from the German side to the Polish one and vice versa involved approximately 100,000 people (Bartodziej, 1993: 25) -- the first clear exemplar of ethnic cleansing.

6) 1939-1945: the Third Reich Germanizes Upper Silesia with all available means including genocide in the case of the Silesian Jews and homicide in the cases of Polish-oriented Silesians.

7) 1945-1949: Silesia is a part of the postwar social engineering operation approved by the Allies, which resulted in the expulsion of 16,910,000 ethnic Germans from the Deutsche Ostgebiet and other Central and Eastern European countries (Reichling, 1986: [170])
26). It has been an instance of biggest ethnic cleansing in the human history so far.

8) 1950-1988: the German/Silesian minority in Upper Silesia and the Polish-speaking minority in Czechoslovak Silesia are suppressed by the Communist authorities. Their existence is questioned and they are subjected to forced assimilation. The Prague Spring of 1968 terminated Czechization of Czechoslovak Silesia for several months.

9) 1989-: after the fall of Communism existence of minorities is acknowledged and the state relations of with them are based on the system of laws and agreements which are currently being worked-out, and on international conventions which are gradually adopted in the process of democratization by the countries possessing parts of Silesia.

Let us here express the hope that after the two centuries of policies of ethnic cleansing in Silesia, which have driven away most of its population, and almost obliterated its specific culture and tradition; we will observe peaceful cooperation among ethnically diversified groups which inhabit the land nowadays, with due respect for one another. It seems that the best framework for this difficult but worthwhile task is offered by a united Europe of regions which apparently is the goal of contemporary European politics. However, the right to attest if the statement is true or not belongs to future generations--our own should strive to actualize this ideal.
In the Silesian context it means that the chauvinistic bias of Polish, German and Czech national historiographies (which only endeavor to 'prove' that Silesia rightly belongs only to one of the three nations) ought to be dropped for the sake of objectivity which is the very first step in re-building amicable and fruitful relations between different ethnic groups. Thus, ideally, academicians of the three countries should compile a synthetic history of Silesia which could become a basic common background for discussions on this region. The histories of Silesia which are obtainable at present are multi-voluminous works of minute detail, or short sketches, whereas scholarly articles dealing with the Silesian past never dare offer any broad synthesis (which could clash with the official line of a national historiography) and contain themselves to minor aspects and narrow issues.

It is a pity that so far no history of Silesia has been written by an English-speaker, who, by the virtue of the very fact that he would have no ethnic or emotional ties with the region, could produce an objective work. But obstacles awaiting such a person are really daunting. The source materials to Silesian history are written in Latin, German, Polish, Czech, English and French (the two latter languages were used in the cases of such international agreements as: The Versailles Treaty, The Geneva Convention, and Plebiscite Commission documents). Moreover, to obtain some reliable information from scholarly works in Polish, German or Czech, one should read several articles or books in all the three languages on every single event (which usually is differently
interpreted by each national historiography), and acquire the
difficult art of reading in-between lines because often the most
crucial for Silesian history incidents and facts are those which
are not explicitly stated, or are obviously omitted in academic
accounts.

The author of this thesis does fully realize these difficulties
and does not claim that has mastered all the skills necessary to
attain objectivity while tackling the complicated past of
Silesia. However, he made an effort, which is duly reflected in
the bibliography, to use German, Polish, Czech and English works
while having researched for this work. Thus, though it is
certainly not free from errors and omissions\textsuperscript{114} (for which only
the author is to be blamed), the thesis is an attempt at a
synthetic overview of the problem of ethnic cleansing in Silesia.
To the knowledge of the author, only parts of this significant
issue were separately researched so one could not obtain its
whole mental picture unless had diligently read scattered
articles devoted to Silesian history. Therefore, the author
believes, that the work can be a substantial contribution to the
new synthetic and objective approach to Silesian history which
he has postulated above.

\textsuperscript{114} The omissions and errors are mainly caused by the fact
that all the sources the author had to consult are fragmentary
and narrowly specialist.
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APPENDIX I

PLACE-NAMES IN SILESIA

Silesia not unlike Central and Eastern Europe has been a theater of onomastic wars for centuries. When this land changed its owner its place-names were often changed accordingly in order to suit the rules of pronunciation and spelling of the official language. However, before the Nineteenth century when nationalism began to spread in Silesia, this process was rather evolutionary and based on the usage of the local population inhabiting given localities. Thus, Czech Vratislav was transformed into Breslau only when the inhabitants of the city became predominantly German-speaking. On the other hand, Zabrze remained Zabrze till 1933 because it contained a large Polish-speaking populace. Only after coming to power, the Nazis started consistently Germanizing Silesian place-names in an artificial manner\textsuperscript{115}, so Zabrze was Hindenburg till 1945. After the war when Silesia was attached to Poland, the Polish authorities Polonized all the German-sounding Silesian place-names in the very same artificial fashion though they claimed that it was just a return to old Slavic names, but it was not and Vratislav/Breslau, out of sudden, was christened Wroclaw (Davies, 1981: II 510-517, 526/527).

Having been faced with this difficult methodological problem, the author could not determine that a certain name is solely

\textsuperscript{115} Partially it was an answer to systematic Polonization of place-names which was undertaken in the Silesian Voivodaship after the plebiscite.
correct' for a certain locality because, bearing in mind what has been said above, it would have constituted a breach of the academic rule of objectivity. Subsequently, the author decided to use names appropriate for specific time periods with which the thesis deals with. For the sake of clarity other forms, i.e. Polish, German or Czech are given in parenthesis where necessary. Sometimes, two German names are given—one traditional and the other used after 1933. The Czech place-names, as well as publication titles and surnames are written without the use of appropriate diacritics because of technical problems, for which the author apologizes hoping that this drawback will not impede intelligibility of this work.

While writing the thesis, the author extensively used the dictionary of Polish and German forms of Silesian place-names compiled by Marek J. Battek and Joanna Szczepankiewicz (see the bibliography for details), however, he thought that it could be useful, for the sake of the prospective Reader, to include three lists of the most important forms of Silesian place-names, which constitute this appendix.
Map 22. Poland’s Recovered Territories, since 1945
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<tr>
<th>Polish-Deutsch</th>
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<td>Henryków</td>
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<td>Jedlna Zdroj</td>
<td>Bad Charlottenbrunn</td>
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<td>Jelenia Gör</td>
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<td>Glatz</td>
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<td>Freystadt</td>
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<td>Chełmno</td>
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INDEKS MIEJSCOWOŚCI

WYSTĘPUJĄCYCH W SŁOWNIKU WRAZ Z ICH DAWNIEJSZymi NAZWAMI

SOURCE: (Snoch 1991)

Stroje oznaczające: n.d. — nazwy wymienione w dokumentach (ogólnie w języku bałtyckim); n. — nazwy niemieckie; n.p. — nazwy inne zamiast wypowiedziane dla znaczenia pol. charakterów nazw miejscowych; n.pw. — nazwy pol. wymienione używane bezpośrednio po wojnie; obocz. — nazwy używane równolegle do istniejących; cz. — nazwy czasowe dla miejscowości położonych na Śląsku Opolskim i Cieszyńskim (obecnie w granicach Czechosłowacji).

n.d. - NAMES CITED IN DOCUMENTS, USU.
LATIN FORMS

n. - GERMAN NAMES
n.d. - GERMAN NAMES INTRODUCED AFTER 1933

n.pw. - TEMPORARY POLISH NAMES USED SHORTLY AFTER 1945

B

Bardo — n.d. Gradice Barda; Brdo; n. Wartba; n.pw. Warta
Biala Prudnicka — n.d. Bela; n. Zulitz
Biela — n.d. Bela Inferior, Bela Superior, Biala Langen; n. Langenbiela
Bielsko — n.d. Belsko, Belceo; n. Bielitz
Bierut Stary — n.d. Berun, Byerun; n. Alt Berun
Bierutów — n.d. Berolstadt, Bernhardsdorf; n. Bernstadt
Bogumín — n. Oderberg, cz. Bohumin
Boniszów — n. Gottesberg; n.pw. Boza Gora
Bolchemie — n.d. Bolchern, Bolsslaw, Bombalavia; n. Bunzlau
Bolzów — n. Bolchenhain; n.pw. Bolckowice
Borów — n.d. Borov, Borow, Borowu; n. Bohrau
Brochów — n.d. Brohov, Brochow; n. Brockau; n.pw. Prochów
Brohów — n.d. Broheów, Brohove, Bruchow; n. Bruchow; n.pw. Prochów
Bruntal — n. Freundenthal; cz. Bruntal
Brzęcz Dolny — n.d. Breg, Breg; n. Dyrenfurth
Byczyna — n.d. Bycina, Biczina; n. Pitschen
Bystrzyca Kłodzka — n.d. Weistritz, Havelsdorf; n. Habelschwerdt
Bytom — n.d. Bitom; n. Beuthen/OS

C

Cerekrówek — n.d. Circulce, n. Zirkwitz
Chelmno Śląskie — n. Schömberg, n.pw. Szymanow
Cholien — n.d. Chobena, Hubena, Kobin; n. Köben an der Oder
Chorzów — n.d. Chorzow, Chorzow, Królewsko Huta; n. Königshütte
Ciechanowice — n.d. Tschechanowiz, n. Rudelstadt
Cieplińce Śląskie — n.d. Caldisi fonts, Warmenborn; n. Warmbrunn
Cieszyn — n.d. Freyno; n. Freiau
Cieszyn — n.d. Tescin, Teschin; n. Teschen; cz. Český Tešín
Czechowice-Dziedzice — n.d. Cochemitz, Ciechowitz, Dzieditz; n. Czechowitz-Dzieditz
Czernina — n. Tschirnau
Czeviersenk — n.d. Netka, Netikow; n. Rotenburg

D

Dobrodzyń — n.d. Dobrodyn, Dobradin, Dobrodzin; n. Guttenag
Dobromierz — n.d. Frohdeberg, Fredeberg; n. Hohenfriedberg
Duszki — n.d. Dusznik, Rynarcz; n. Reiners
Dejtenstow — n.d. Reichinsbach, Reichenbach; obocz. Rychbach; n. Reichenbach; n.pw. Rychbach

F

Frydek-Kleski — n.d. Friedek, Mistek; cz. Friedek-Mistek
Fryštát — n.d. Frisat, Freistadt; cz. Fryštát (Karvona I Fryštát)

G

Gliwice — n.d. Gliwicz, Gliwycz, Glewicz; n. Glewitz
Głogów — n.d. Głogow, Głogow, Głogovia; n. Głogau
Głogów — n.d. Głogow, Minor Głogovia; n. Oberglau
Glubczycy — n.d. Glupci, Głubczyce; n. Leobschütz; n.pw. Gląbczycy

176
H
Harsin — n. Halschen, cz. Hlucin

I
Ilwa — n.d. Ilwa, Ilwa; n. Halbau; n.pw. Ilwa

J
Jezioro Zdroj — n. Charlottenbrunn, n.pw. Zdrojowice

K
Kamenna Gora — n.d. Kamieno Gora, Landeshut; n. Landeshut, obocz. Lennest; n.pw. Kamieno-
Gora
Kamiensko — n. Jägersdorf, cz. Krnov
Kamieniak — n. Kramshäbel
Kamienica — n. Karwin; cz. Karvina
Kamieniec w. Woiwodske — n. Kanti
Kamionka — n.d. Frydland, Huttland; n. Friedland, obocz. gwarowo Fryštát, Fryštát
Kamionkowice — n.d. Kosomlot; n. Koszebblat
Kamionkowice — n.d. Czotle, Koda; n. Cose
Karłowice w. Odrzańskie — n.d. Cronno, Chrnow; n. Cossen a d. Oder
Karłowice — n.d. Griesbohr, Griesboer, Gryvšov; n. Grillau
Kaza Zdroj — n.d. Chudoba; n. Bad Kadan; n.pw. Chudoba
Kaza Rachowska — n.d. Ferrocudina, Kazneca; n. Ratiborhammer

L
Laica — n.d. Wustendorph; n. Wüstczerich; n.pw. Giessze Puste
Laigel — n.d. Gogolinio; n. Gogolin
Lańcow Śląski — n.d. Gogiczow, Landsberg; n. Landsberg
Land — n.d. Antiqua Gora, Goraviza; n. Gahrica
Land Gora, Anny — n.d. menier Helm, M. Sancta Anna; n. Sankt Annaberg, Annaberg; obocz. Święta
Anna
Landow — n.d. Grodkowichi, Grodczow, Grodczow; n. Grożkau; n.pw. Grotków
Lańcow — n.d. Gubyn, n. Guben
Legnickie Pole — n.d. Legnichówka; n. Wahlstatt, obocz. Dobrepole
Lesin — n.d. Lesza, Lesza, Marklissa; n. Marklissa
Lesnica (wroc.) — n.d. Lesnica, Lesnica, Lesna; n. Lissa
Lesnica (op.) — n.d. Lesnica; n. Lesnica; n. Bergstadt
Lewin Brzeski — n.d. Lewin; n. Lówen; n.pw. Lubień
Lewin Kłodzki — n.d. Lewin; Lewina; n. Humbelstadt
Lipa — n.d. Lipa; n. Lippe
Luban — n.d. Luban; n. Luban
Lubawa — n.d. Lubawa; Lubawa; n. Liebau; n.pw. Lubawa
Lubasz — n.d. Lubens; n. Leubus
Lubin — Lubin; Lubin; n. Lüben
Lubliniec — n.d. Lubliniec; Lubliniec; n. Lubliniec; n.n. Löbau
Lubomierz — n.d. Lybental; n. Liebenthal; n.pw. Milosna
Lubusko — n. Sommerfeld; n.pw. Zems
Lutyńia — n.d. Luthynia; n. Leuthen
Łówek Śląski — n.d. Lewenberg, Loeborga; n. Löwenberg

M
Małupowice — n.d. Malewicz, Molwitz; n. Moliwitz
Miaściecko Śląskie — n. Georgenberg
Międzynanka — n.d. Czupi; Gódnia; n. Kupferberg
Mieroszów — n.d. i n. Friedland; n.pw. Frydlitand, Fryldąd
Międzyborz — n.d. Meerihor; n. Naumittelwalde; n.pw. Międzyborz
Międzylesie — n.d. Medlesie; Mittelwalde
Międzykołow — n.d. Mciékołów, Micolów, n. Nikolai
Miłcz — n.d. Milcz, Munich; n. Militsch
Mirs — n.d. Friulberg; n. Friedberg; n.pw. Spokona Góra
Mysłowice — n.d. Myslowitz, Mślowice; n. Myślowitz

N
Namysłów — n.d. Namyslow, Namysłów; n. Namslau
Nemodlin — n.d. Nemodlin, Falkenberg; n. Falkenberg
Nowa Cerekwia — n.d. Nova Ecleuria, Nowocerkwie; n. Neukirch
Nowa Rud — n.d. Neuwendorf, Neundorf; n. Neude
Nowy Bytom — n.d. Czarny Las; n. Friedenstelle; od 1922 Nowy Bytom

O
Olesno — n.d. Oleszno, Olešno; n. Rosenberg
Olesnica — n.d. Olesnica, Olesnice, Olesnitz; n. Oels
Oława — n.d. Olawa, Oltava; n. Ohlau
Opawa — n.d. Opava; n. Trepcau; cz. Opava
Oppol — n.d. Oppol, Opol; n. Oppeln
Orłowa — n.d. Orlau; cz. Orlová
Oświęcim — n.d. Oswiaceczm, Osvětin, Auswiczn; n. Auchwitz
Otmachów — n.d. Otomachow, Otmachow, Otmachau, n. Otmachau
P
Paczów — n.d. Paczchow, Paczow; n. Patschkau
Pechowce — n. Petersdorff
Pieskowce — n.d. Pocare, Pecari, Wielkie Piekary; n. Deutsch Pickar
Piroz — n.d. Petrsswalde; n. Peterswaldau; n.pw. Piotrolesie
Prudnik — n. Ullersdorf
Prużnia Zdroj — n. Alttheide; n.pw. Pużczyków Zdroj
Pułtowice — n.d. Polkowitz; n. Polkivitz; n.a. Heilmegen
Purchowice — n.d. Parchowici; n. Parchwitz; n.pw. Parchowice, Parchwiese
Proszków — n.d. Proszow, Proskow; n. Proskau
Prusiec — n.d. Prudnic; n. Neustadt; n.pw. Prądnik
Prusiec — n.d. Proszac, Prusin, Prusnitz
Przemków — n.d. Przymkenau, Przymkenowe; n. Przymkenau; n.pw. Przemkowo, Przymka
Prze Pole — n.d. Pez Pole; n. Hundsfeld (przejściowo: Friedrichsfeld)
Pysczyna — n.d. Pyschyn, Plesina, Pischina, Piszczyna, Bieszczyna; n. Piess
Pylawice — n.d. Pyškúwiec, n. Petskreischam

R
Radoberz — n.d. Radibor; n. Radibor
Radłów — n.d. Hradek; n. Wünschelburg; n.pw. Grödek, Hradek
Radliska — n.d. Rudka; n. Rudka
Ruda — n.d. Rudna; n. Rauden
Rudawa Wielkie — n.d. Rudna, Rudno; n. Gross Rauden
Rudnik — n.d. Ribnitz, Rebnitz, Rybniki; n. Rybnik
Ruszn — n.d. Reichen, n. Reitschen

S
Sielkow — n. Boberrőhrsdoß
Siemowice Śląskie — n.d. Simonowici, Semenowizte; oboz. Huta Lauru, n. Laurahütte
Siemianowicz
Siewierz — n.d. Siewier, Siewior
Siewierz — n.d. Zboczewo; n. Skotchau
Skoczów — n.d. Scorogostow Most; n. Schergast
Skowrończycy — n.d. Sławiecici, Slawentzitz; n. Sławentzitz; n.a. Ehrenforti
Skowraz — n.d. Sobota, Sabat, Zabothus; n. Zobten
Skownowice — n.d. Sonnensowizte, Sonnieszowizte; n. Kieferstädtel
Skotnica Góra — n. Silberberg
Skrzemiń — n.d. Stratmiern, n. Schwarzwasser
Sregom — n.d. Zirigom, Ziregome; n. Sliegau
Stryje Słaskie — n.d. Strylich; n. Sreblitz, Gross Sreblitz; oboz. Strzelce Wielkie
Stryjek — n.d. Sreblin, Sreblin; n. Strehlen
Stryszów — n.d. Neuwesondersbuck, Schöninerich; n. Schönberg Oberlausitz; oboz. Szybark
Stuczów — n.d. Syczewo, Syczew; Szyzow; n. Gross Warsenberg
Steczko Zdroj — n.d. Salzborn, Salzbor; n. Salzbrunn, oboz. i n.pw. Solce
Stelma Pórpę — n.d. i n. Schleenharth
Sopotice — n.d. Szopiniec; n. Schoppnitz
Stobnów — n.d. Sprottau, Sprotavia; n. Sprottau

S
Sosnovka — n.d. Scinawia, Stinava, Stinaw; n. Steinau
Stara Łaska — n.d. Novoforos, Neumarch, Schrodia; n. Neumarkt
Świdnicza — n.d. Zusdnitza; n. Schweidnitz
Świeciowice — n.d. Vriehne; n. Freihburg, obocz. Frybork
Świerzadow Zdroj — n.d. Flinsberg; n. Bad Flinsberg; n.pw. Wiśnic Zdroj
Świerzawa — n.d. Sonowa; Schenow; n. Schönau; n.pw. Szamow
Świętochłowice — n.d. Swentochlowicz, Stwentochlowice; n. Schwentochohowitz

T

Tarnowskie Góry — n.d. Tarnowice; n. Tarnowitz
Toszek — n.d. Tosseck; Thoseck; n. Tost
Trebnicza — n.d. Trebnitscha; Trebenic; n. Trebnitz
Trzyniec — n.d. Trzymietz; cz. Trinec
Twardogóra — n.d. Vestenberg; n. Feidenberg; n.pw. Twarda Góra

U

Ujazd — n.d. Uszaud; n. Ujesz; n.n. Buschofsdal
Uraz — n.d. Urazd; Uraz; Vraz; n. Auras

W

Walbrzych — n.d. Waldenburg; n. Waldenburg
Wambierzyce — n.d. Wamburts; n. Albrandorf, Hl. Gottesstadt
Wasog — n.d. Wamsow; Waschow; n. Herrnstadt
Widzawa — n.d. Wesenau; cz. Wiszawa
Wiżpów — n.d. Wozowici, Wiszow; n. Wyszow; n.pw. Węspów
Winiszko — n.d. Wia, Winzki; n. Winiż
Wisła — n.d. Wisla, Wisla; n n. Wieschel
Wien — n.d. Valan, Wien; n. Lahn; n.pw. Leino
Wodzisław Śląski — n.d. Wodrazlau, Wodznitz; n. Losau
Wolow — n.d. Wolow, Wolow; n. Wohllau
Woszki — n.d. Woszek, Uoszks; n. Woschniki
Wrocław — n.d. Wrotzlau, Wroclaw; Wraslawitz; n. Breslau
Wuschowa — n.d. Wyschow, Wroclawitz; n. Frankfurt

Z

Zaborze — n.d. Zobrze (Sadber); n. Zahrze, n.n. Hindenburg
Zawidów — n.d. Syden, Sydenberg; n. Seidenberg
Zawonia — n.d. Sawonia, Sawon, Zawion; n. Sawona
Zábkiwice Śląskie — n.d. Wanekstein; n. Frankenstein; obocz. Frankenstein
Zebrowo Śląskie — n.d. Samhau; n. Zembowitz; n.n. Fohrendorf
Zielona Góra — n.d. Vindis Morn, Grünberg; n. Grünberg
Ziębice — n.d. Sambis, Sambow; n. Müntschen; n.pw. Żemłube
Złotomiki Lubuskie — n. Goldentraum
Złotoryja — n.d. Auror Mont; n. Goldberg; n.pw. Zlotoria
Złotoria Stok — n.d. Richtstein; n. Richtenstein; n.pw. Równe

Ż

Zmiętrod — n.d. Smitrod, Znmiętrod; n. Trachenberg
Żory — n.d. Sari, Zary; n. Sobrau
APPENDIX II

MAPS

The graphic material in the form of maps may greatly facilitate clear comprehension of complex territorial and administrative issues. Thus, in the light of the fact that no historical atlas of Silesia exists, the author included in the appendix photocopies of interesting maps having to do with Silesia, which he had come across in the course of his research for this thesis.
Map: A.D. c.840 Founding of Polish-Polabian Piast Dynasty of the Polanians.
Siły w Polsce Bolesława Chrobrego (1025 r.)

Zrównoważone podział na Siły, „Kwartalnik Opolski” nr 3, s. 82.

(Księga, 1992, 68/69)
Śląsk w 1169 r. Silesia in 1169

Źródło: K. Orzechowski, Territorialne podziały na Śląsku. „Kwartalnik Opolski” 1971, nr 3, s. 84.

(Łęskiuk, 1992: 70)
Śląsk w 1286 r.

[Ilustracja mapy Śląska w 1286 r.]
A.D. 1308
AGGRESSION AGAINST POLAND AND BETRAYAL BY THE TEUTONIC ORDER
THE MASSACRE OF GDANSK

1288-1290 United Polish duchies of Henry IV of Silesia
1289-1294 United Polish duchies of Ladislas the Short
1294-1296 Kingdom of Poland of Przemyslaw II

German aggression in the Baltic. Falsification of a temporary land grant as a permanent one by German Brethren.

1259 Second Tartar invasion
1255-1306 Lithuanian invasions
1287-8 Third Tartar invasion
Brandenburgian Invasions
1308-1309 Betrayal and massacre in Gdansk of Polish people by allied German Brethren

1306 Ladislas the Short successful attempt to unify Poland

Map: 1308 Aggression against Poland. Betrayal by the Teutonic Order. The Massacre of Gdansk.
Map: 1320 Kingdom of Poland of Ladislas the Short.
Polish ethnic area is also known as the Land of the Piasts of Dziwna Pomorska (Dziwno Pomorska) related to the Pacta conventa concept of the Polish Nation State on the Polish ethnic area in contradistinction to the Jagiellonian concept of a multi-national commonwealth of nations between German and Russian ethnic area.

Polish Ethnic Borders

Frontiers of the Polish Kingdom and the Duchy of Jawor-Swidnica

A.D. 1370
Kingdom of Poland of Casimir the Great

By 1340 began centuries-long Polish political presence east of the Polish ethnic lands.
THE GERMAN BORDERS IN 1400

[221]
Księstwa opolskie w 1480 r.
Ziemia: 1 — synów Mikołaja I; 2 — Kazimierza II cieszyńskiego; 3 — Kazimierza II zwierzyskiego; 4 — Jana karnowskiego; 5 — synów Jerzego z Podiebradu; 6 — Macieja Korwina; 7 — Jana opolskiego cieszyńskiego; 8 — Jana III odgomeckiego; 9 — Jana opolskiego.
Zródło: K. Orzechowski, Terytorialne podziały na Śląsku, „Kwartalnik Opolski” 1971, nr 4, s. 104

Slask & Opole principalities
in 1480

Silesia in the Habsburg Empire after 1526

Lesiu, 1992: 74/75
Śląsk po 1619 r.

Zdjęcie autorstwa K. Orzechowskiego, "Terytorialne podziały na Śląsku", "Kwartalnik Opolski" 1972, nr 1, s. 12.
Die deutsche Ostgrenze nach 1650, nach Aschenbrenner. 1967 s. o.
Map 3. The Prussian Partition, (1773–1918)

(Davies, 1991: 113)
Podziały terytorialne Kościoła katolickiego

*Żródło:* K. Oronowski, *Terytorialne podziały na Śląsku*, „Kwartalnik Opolski” 1972, nr 2, s. 41.

**TERRITORIAL DIVISION OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH**

(C EFERS, 1992: 79)
Map 4. Austrian Galicia, (1773—1918)

(Davies, 1991: II 140)
THE EASTERN BORDER OF GERMANY AFTER 1871

4 Die deutsche Ostgrenze nach 1871, nach Aschenbrenner, 1907, a.a.O., Karte 9
Diagram B. Conflicting Territorial Claims of the Nationalities, c. 1900
Map 5. Industrialization, (c. 1900)

(Olives, 1991: 766)
11.52. The Upper Silesian–Moravian industrial region

(Pounds, 1970: 423)
A.D. 1905-1907
REVOLUTION-
URBAN GUERRILLA AND
MASSIVE PEASANT STRIKES

700 Peasants Strikes
Armed resistance to
police; demands for
Polish as the official
language in Poland.

Jan. 28, 1905, four-week general strike by 400,000,
1905-1906, 6,991 work stoppages
Involving 1,300,000 people.
Urban guerrillas bomb government officials and eliminate criminal
element in Warsaw.
May Day 1905, 45 killed, 105 wounded.
Dec. 29, 1906, execution of 105 urban guerillas. Fighting on
barricades, police terror gaining upper hand.

Important center of major strikes in Prussian and Austrian Polish provinces before 1905.

Important centers of strikes in Prussian and Austrian Poland in 1905-1907.
Oct. 13, 1904, First shots fired by demonstrators in Warsaw.
Sept. 1905, Russia signing humiliating treaty ending the war with Japan.
Polish language reinstated in schools.

Oct. 30, 1905, Tsarist government agreeing to general elections and legislative powers of parliament; Duma — recognition of the basic civil rights of inhabitants of the Russian Empire.
Rys. 20. Ludność polskojęzyczna w 1910 r. w stosunku do ogółu ludności

PERCENTAGE OF THE POLISH-SPEAKERS IN 1910
Note 1: Eastern Prussia and neighboring states, 1914. The areas named as Prussian regencies (Regierungsbezirke). The province of Silesia comprised the regencies of Liegnitz, Breslau, and Oppeln. (GALICIA)

(SCHOFEN, 1974:5)
Figure 2. Oppeln Regency, 1914. The areas named were counties. The Upper Silesian industrial region consisted of the southeastern counties outlined on the map.

(SCHOFER, 1974:6)
Map: 1918-1922 Comparison of Demanded and Actual Frontiers.
Map 12. The Formation of the Polish Republic, (1918–21)

(DAVIES, 1991: 395)
Six Concurrent Wars on the Borders of Poland

1. Ukrainian War
Nov. 1918 to July 1919, ended with the collapse of the West Ukrainian Republic and Polish control over Galicia to the River Zbrucz.

2. Poznanian War with Germany,
Dec. 27, 1918, June, 28, 1919.
German terror causing Polish uprising in Silesia

3. Silesian War with Germany; three risings; Aug. 16-24, 1919; Aug. 19-25, 1920; and May 2-7, 1921; settled in Geneva in 1922 in Silesian Convention.

4. Lithuanian War for Vilno (Vilnus)
July 1919, to Oct. 1920, ended without a peace treaty.

5. Czechoslovak War of Cieszyn (Tesin); Czechoslovak invasion in violation of a local agreement. During Soviet advance on Warsaw terminated by Allied arbitration July 28, 1920, giving to the Czechs Zaolzie with over 200,000 Poles and 400 sq. miles of rich industrial and mining area located in the strategic Moravian Gate to Poland. (Poland recovered this area in 1938.)

Questionable timing; even though the operation followed Polish-Czech agreement in face of Nazi advance.

The Second Polish Republic (1918-1945)

Map: 1918-1922 Six Concurrent Wars for the Borders of Poland.
SILESIA

SCHLESIEN

(THEILUNG, 1926: 70)

TO POLAND
AFTER 1921

TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA
AFTER 1919
Śląsk
SILESIA
Polska
POLAND

Provinzialgrenze ab 1920
Provinzialgrenze bis 1920 bzw. 1922
Grenze zwischen Nieder- und Oberschlesien

Über 500.000 Einwohner
bis zu 200.000 Einwohner
bis zu 100.000 Einwohner
bis zu 30.000 Einwohner
bis zu 10.000 Einwohner (Einwohnerzahlen 1939)

Czechosłowacja
CZECHOSLOVAKIA

100 km
THE DIVISION OF UPPER SILESIA
IN 1921
TERRITORY GIVEN TO POLAND

(Szaraniec, 1992:1)

CENA ZŁ 1500

ROZSTRZYGNIĘCIE Rady Najwyższej W SPRAWIE GÓRNEGO ŚLĄSKA.

GRANICA POLSKI NA ŚLĄSKU GÓRNYM
Anhang

Bevölkerungsstatistik Oberschlesien
1910–1939

I. 1910–1922


Gemäß dem Versailler Vertrag wurde der südliche Teil des Kreises Ratibor, das Hultschiner Ländchen, mit 316 qkm und 49.000 Einwohnern an die Tschechoslowakei abgetreten.

Nach dem Schiedspreis des Völkerbundrates wurde das verbleibende Gebiet am 12. 7. 1922 zwischen Deutschland und Polen geteilt: Deutschland behielt West-
Map 14: The Second Republic, (1921–39)

(Davies, 1991: II 403)
5 Die deutsche Ostgrenze zwischen den Weltkriegen, nach Aschenbrenner. 1967, a.a.O., Karte 10

THE EASTERN BORDER OF GERMANY BETWEEN THE WORLD WARS
Deutsche in der Tschechoslowakei (1918–1938)

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

GERMANS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA
(REICHLIN, 1936: 70)

CZECHOSLOVAK
SILESIA

Deutsche in der Tschechoslowakei (1918–1938)

BÖHmen

MÄHREN

SLOWAKei

KARDATO-UKRAINE

Praag

Wien

Dresden

Chemnitz

Krasnograd

Danzig

Košice

Veszprem

Rzeszow

Kutno

Wolfsberg

Pilsen

Krakau

Domažlice

Troppau

Budapest

Deutschland

Deutsches Reich

Russland

Deutsch-Ostafrika

Österreich-Ungarn

Polen

Sowjetunion

Czechoslovakia

Hungary

Quelle: Reichlin, p. 70

German-speaking Areas

Pre-Krieg Gründerzeit Ceded to Poland & Hungary after 1938
Deutsche Staatsgebiete und deutsche Siedlungsgebiete 1937

Deutsches Staatsgebiet

Deutsche Siedlungsgebiete

Republik Österreich und freie Stadt Danzig
Map 16. The German Occupation, (1939–45)

(DAVIES, 1991: 442)
(AECN, 1943: AFTER P. 536)
The administrative division of Germany in 1941

(\textit{Wagner}, 1991: 257)
A Plan for the Dismemberment of Germany into 3 to 5 States.
(Western boundary of State No. 2 follows same lines as Rhine Province in Figure 1.)

Possibly to State 3 (Magdeburg).
Possibly to Poland.

(Davies, 1991: 470)
Demography of North Western Poland East of the Oder-Neisse 1945
Provinces Transferred to Poland a Part of Gigantic Chain Reaction to German Mass Murders and Deportation of Millions

Map: 1945-1986 Demography of North Western Poland. Lands East of the Oder-Neisse

- Allied decision to transfer 3,500,000 Germans out of Poland
- 2,000,000 to the Soviet Zone in East Germany
- 1,500,000 to the British Zone in West Germany
- Transport by the Allied Control Commission
- After Polish British protocol of Feb. 20, 1946, and closing of the Polish border to German immigration east of the Oder-Neisse Line.

Lands transferred to Poland in 1945
- East of the Oder-Neisse Line
- 105,000 sq. km, or 40,000 sq. miles
- with wartime destruction of 56% of towns and 27.5% of rural areas
- 1940 population 8,850,000
- Native Poles 1,504,134
- Opole Silesia 446,782
- Upper Silesia 340,563
- Mazovia 115,287 in 1945
- Polish immigrants 4,497,984
- 2,792,714 from Poland
- 1,553,512 from U.S.S.R.
- France 54,576, Germany 44,170
- Other Countries 53,012
1950 Total 5,602,118

Germany destroyed 40% of Poland’s national wealth. The wealth of the lands acquired from Germany was estimated at $8,500,000,000 and the wealth of the lands lost by Poland to the Soviets was estimated at $3,500,000,000 based on dollar value of 1945. The difference was used by the Soviets as an argument to deny Poland direct payments for war damages by the defeated Germans. However, the westward territorial shift enabled Poland to overcome debilitation caused by partitions (1795-1918) and helped in rebuilding the war torn country. The Church provided the unifying force among diverse resettled Polish groups. These provinces are now a fully integrated part of Poland. In these lands Poland now produces eight times more university graduates than did Germany before the war.
Map 5. Germany – Poland: proposed territorial changes
Map 6. Poland's removal to the West: losses in the East - compensation in the West
FRONTIER CHANGES 1914-1945

(WISSEMANN, 1956: 11)
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Śląsk w 1946 r. SILESIA IN 1946 (LEWIN, 1992: 83)

Źródło: K. Orzechowski, Terytorialne podziały na Śląsku, „Kwartalnik Opolski” 1972, nr 3, s. 18.
Śląsk w 1964 r.  SILESIA IN 1964 (LERNER, 1942: 84)

Źródło: K. Orzechowski, Terytorialne podziały na Śląsku, „Kwartalnik Opolski” 1972, nr 3, s. 20.
Map 23. The Polish People's Republic (1975)
EMIGRATION FROM POLAND, 1979 - 1987

(MAP BY SIEJGIELSKI, 1992: AFTER P 72)
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(220 osób, 1945, 72)

(Cycy Silejia, 1945, 72)