PROCEDURES AND OUTCOMES: A DEFENCE AND DEVELOPMENT OF J. L. AUSTIN'S CONCEPTION OF SPEECH ACTS

Michael G. Keenan

A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of St Andrews

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Procedures and Outcomes

A Defence and Development of J. L. Austin's
Conception of Speech Acts

by

Michael G. Keenan

A Thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
at the University of St. Andrews
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Abstract of Procedures and Outcomes:

This work's main thesis is that a theory of action provides a more appropriate framework than a theory of language for furthering the purpose of Austin's conception of speech acts. The main purpose of that conception was the elucidation of the species of language-use that is exemplified by illocutionary acts and is distinct from those species exemplified by locutionary and perlocutionary acts. Austin's conception of locutionary acts isolates those features of a speech act situation which are amenable to subsumption under a theory of language. This conception is expounded, developed and defended in Chapter One. The orthodox "reject-and-replace" view of the relationship between Austin's performative-constative distinction and his distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts threatens several of Austin's insights concerning the type of theory appropriate for developing his conception of speech acts. In Chapter Two the performative-constative distinction is expounded, the "reject-and-replace" is shown to be false, and an alternative view, which retrieves the threatened insights, is advanced. Austin's distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts, and his parallel distinction between locutionary meaning and illocutionary force, are also established in the course of defending them against objections. The terms in which Austin drew the distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts - those of a conventional act distinct from its non-conventional outcomes - indicate the theoretical framework required for a development of his conception. In Chapter Three this distinction is expounded and a partial analysis is made of the concepts of some outcomes of acts, viz., effects, consequences and results.

Illocutionary acts are not constituted in toto by agents' bodily movements - a point captured in Austin's thesis that illocutionary acts are conventional acts. In Chapter Four the interpretation customarily imposed on that thesis is discussed and shown to be unfaithful. An alternative interpretation is constructed from points in Austin's own lectures. The solution to the problem of the constitution of illocutionary acts provided by this interpretation is that such acts are constituted by the conventional procedures as part of which locutionary acts are performed. Some other suggested solutions are canvassed. In Chapter Five an account is given of the conventional procedures constitutive of illocutionary acts. In Chapter Six the claim embodied in the main thesis of this work is defended against the counter-claims implicit in Schiffer's, Strawson's and Searle's work. In the Appendix Austin's performative-constative distinction and his later views on truth are defended. An analytical table of contents is included.
I declare that this thesis has been composed by myself, that the work of which it is a record has been done by myself, and that it has not been accepted in any previous application for a higher degree; and

I state that I was admitted to the University of St. Andrews as a research student under Ordinance General No. 12 on the 13th April, 1971, and that I was transferred from that Ordinance and enrolled under the Ph.D. Resolution of the University Court on the 23rd June, 1972.

M.G. Keenan

I state that Mr. M.G. Keenan has fulfilled the conditions of the Resolution and Regulations pertaining to this degree.

G.B.B. Hunter
This work is dedicated
to the memory of my parents
James Reginald Keenan
Sarah Evalene Agnew Keenan
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<td>The main purpose of Austin's conception of speech acts, formulated in terms of a threefold distinction between locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts, was the elucidation of a specific use of language. Some of his comments on these types of act provide textual support for the claim that the species of language-use central to that conception is a species of sentence-use. The uses of language for referring and predicating are not, therefore, central to Austin's conception of speech acts, these uses being selective with respect to expressions which are only parts of sentences.</td>
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<td>Ryle's argument that talk of the use of sentences is absurd because it involves a category mistake is examined and found to contain errors; in particular, a conflation of sentences and acts of saying something. It is argued that once this distinction is recognized the terminology of the use of a sentence to say or ask something is unexceptionable, appropriate, and necessary.</td>
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<td>One source of Ryle's errors is located in the way he drew and deployed the distinction between Language and Speech. This distinction is redrawn along different lines, and a point of contact between it and Austin's conception of speech acts is found in one of the distinctions which Austin drew within the locutionary act.</td>
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<td>Austin used the devices of direct and indirect quotation to identify, respectively, phatic and rhetic acts performed in speech act situations. The rationale for this is explained. An example is provided to show that restrictions on the forms of indirect quotation need</td>
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to be imposed if this form of quotation is to be a reliable means for identifying rhetic acts. Such restrictions are imposed in terms of basic normal forms of indirect quotation.

6 Robinson's proposed revisions of Austin's definitions of phatic and rhetic acts are rejected on the grounds of inadequate justification. Her account of the relationship between phonetic and phatic acts is shown to be exegetically incorrect, inadequate and false.

7 Austin's account of locutionary acts elucidates one species of language-use and one species of the use of sentences. But the species of language- and sentence-use that are central to Austin's conception of speech acts are those exemplified by illocutionary acts, not locutionary acts. A locutionary act exemplifies a use of Language; an illocutionary act exemplifies a use of Speech. A locutionary act is the use of a sentence with a certain meaning to say or ask something; an illocutionary act is the use of a sentence (meaningful utterance) with a certain force to do something distinct from saying or asking something.

Chapter Two

1 In its early version, Austin's conception of speech acts was formulated in terms of the performative-constative distinction. The distinction is expounded. The orthodox "reject-and-replace" view of the relationship between this distinction and the distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts is sketched and shown to be false.

2 An alternative view is proposed; this view takes account of the contemporary philosophical trends in which Austin's work on speech acts was set and preserves the unity of Austin's conception of speech acts. Some insights in that conception, threatened by the reject-and-replace view but retrievable on the alternative view, are discussed.
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**Chapter Three**

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| The terms in which Austin distinguished illocutionary and perlocutionary acts are the terms in which he sketched the outlines of those aspects of a theory of action that are required for an elucidation of the performative use of language. Austin's discussion of the distinction in the formal mode is reviewed. |

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| The notional framework drawn from a theory of action which is required for an elucidation of the performative use of language, and is indicated by the two main features of the distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts, is that which is required to elucidate a particular kind of conventional act, distinguished from its non-conventional outcomes. One difficulty in distinguishing acts and outcomes is noted; Austin's two (unsatisfactory) suggestions of ways around this difficulty are discussed. |

| 3       | 108  |
| Austin distinguished three types of outcomes involved in the performance of illocutionary acts in terms of "securing uptake", "taking effect", and "inviting by convention a response or sequel". Each is distinct from an outcome of an illocutionary act that is a perlocutionary act in so far as each is a conventional type of outcome. These three types of outcomes are discussed. |
A conceptual analysis of some outcomes of human acts - effects, consequences and results - is commenced. The wider interest attaching to such an account, beyond the clarification of Austin's distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts, is noted. Some conceptual features of these outcomes are elicited from the forms and functions of the adjectives formed from "effect", "consequence" and "result", e.g., that all acts have effects but some acts do not have results. The relationships between the distinct notions of effectiveness, efficacy and efficiency are discussed.

The account is continued with an analysis of the different functions of the verbs "effect" and "result". Differences between the temporal characteristics of occurrences of outcomes of the respective types are claimed on the basis of this analysis, e.g., that effects have temporal duration but results do not. Differences between the temporal relationships obtaining between occurrences of outcomes of these types and their respective antecedent acts are claimed on the basis of phrases used in description of outcomes, e.g., that effects can be more or less temporally remote from their antecedent acts but results are not and are coincident with the terminus of their antecedent act. A number of considerations are advanced in support of the suggestion that consequences, unlike effects and results, are not occurrences, but states initiated by their respective antecedent acts.

The account is concluded with a discussion of results, which are claimed to be outcomes of more or less successful attempts by agents to achieve purposes. The notions of intentions and purposes, and of attempting and trying, are discussed by way of clarification of this claim.

Chapter Four

1 The problem of the constitution of illocutionary
acts is set. The problem arises because such acts are not just physical acts; the problem consists in determining the feature by virtue of which a locutionary act is constituted as an illocutionary act. Austin's thesis that illocutionary acts are conventional acts indicates the direction in which a solution to the problem is to be sought. It is also the thesis that has attracted the most concerted opposition from critics of his conception of speech acts.

2 Irrespective of how sympathetically Austin's thesis of the essential conventionality of illocutionary acts has been received, it has become customary to interpret it in terms of Anscombe's distinction between brute and institutional facts. The distinction is expounded and its applicability to Austin's conception of speech acts is noted. Searle's, Strawson's and Schiffer's commitment to this interpretation of Austin's thesis is shown. The fidelity of this interpretation to Austin's thesis is tested and found wanting.

3 An alternative interpretation is constructed from points made in the text of Austin's own lectures. The solution to the problem of the constitution of illocutionary acts yielded by this interpretation is that an illocutionary act is constituted as such by virtue of the conventional procedure as part of which a locutionary act is performed. The respective merits of conventional procedures and social institutions as candidates for the essential constitutive feature of illocutionary acts are discussed; arguments are advanced in favour of the former.

4 The suggestion that illocutionary acts are constituted as such by virtue of the circumstances in which locutionary acts are performed is canvassed. The outlines of an account of the constitution of illocutionary acts in these terms are sketched.
Section

1. Searle's notion of constitutive rules is criticized. It is argued that Searle has not shown that rules are constitutive in any sense other than one which he himself admits is trivial, and that what Searle regards as a "constitutive rule" in some non-trivial sense is not a rule but a definition.

2. An alternative account of the constitution of illocutionary acts, in terms of conventional procedures, is commenced. The notion of a procedure is introduced and explained, leading to a principle for the individuation of conventional procedures. Such a procedure, constitutive of illocutionary acts of a particular type can be specified in the form of an ordered triplet comprising a set of (types of) presuppositions, a set of locutionary act types, and a set of (types of) strictly necessitated outcomes.

3. Some cases of promising, warning and objecting are analyzed in terms of this account by way of clarification.

4. The bases of Austin's classification of verdictive, exercitive, commissive, behabitive and expositive illocutionary act types are discussed. The connections between these bases and the present account are shown.

5. An account of the conventional nature of the procedures constitutive of illocutionary acts is commenced, with initial reference to the example of promising. The account is developed to the point where it can be said that there is a convention with respect to this procedure. This sense of "convention" is that of a "rule or practice". Two explananda of an adequate account of the conven-
Section E&S

The account is developed to provide such explanations. The notion informing the sense of "convention" involved in this development is that of an "implicit agreement constituting the origin and foundation of any custom, institution...as embodied in any accepted usage, standard of behaviour...or the like". The notion of implicit agreement is spelled out in terms of the coincidence of certain social expectations and preferences. The application of the conclusions of this account to the procedures constitutive of illocutionary acts of other types is shown.

Chapter Six

1 The strategy for defending the claim that a theory of action provides a more appropriate framework for developing Austin's conception of speech acts, and furthering its purpose, than a theory of language, is set out.

2 A feature of Schiffer's account of Austin's conception of speech acts, which is symptomatic of Schiffer's misunderstanding of that conception, is discussed. Various features of Strawson's argument, endorsed by Schiffer, against Austin's thesis of the essential conventionality of illocutionary acts are discussed in order to support the claim that that argument is an ignoratio elenchi.

3 Examples are adduced to show, contra Schiffer and Strawson, that speakers' intentions are not the essential constitutive features of illocutionary acts.

4 Searle's hypothesis for giving an account of illocutionary acts within the framework of a theory of language is discussed. It is argued that Searle has failed to establish that what he regards as the rules constitutive of illocutionary acts are manifested in the semantic conventions of a language. An analogy,
between playing chess and using a language, is developed to show why it is misguided to attempt to give an account of the use of language exemplified by illocutionary acts within the framework of a theory of language. A possible objection against this analogy, and against the claim being defended in this chapter, is discussed. The objection, that the theories of language informing that analogy and that claim are too restricted in not, apparently, including a pragmatic component, is dismissed.

Appendix

1 Austin’s performative-constative distinction - as a distinction between non-truth-valued utterances and truth-valued utterances - is defended against the arguments of Lemmon and Warnock et al. who have argued that explicit performative utterances are truth-valued.

2 Strawson’s misunderstandings of Austin’s views on truth in *Words* are exposed.

3 A neglected feature of Austin’s later views on truth is discussed in order to show a possible starting point for a theoretical justification for his performative-constative distinction.
Abbreviations, Foot-notes and References

The following abbreviations are used for the titles of books and journals referred to in the text:

**An.**  Analysis (Supplement)

**A.J.P.**  Australasian Journal of Philosophy

**A.P.Q.**  American Philosophical Quarterly


**I.S.P.**  International Studies in Philosophy

**J.P.**  The Journal of Philosophy


**P.A.S.(S.)**  Proceedings of The Aristotelian Society (Supplementary Volume)


**P.Q.**  The Philosophical Quarterly

**P.R.**  The Philosophical Review

**Symp.**  Fann, K.T.(ed.): Symposium on J.L. Austin, 1969.


Foot-notes are collected at the ends of their respective chapters. In order to minimize their number, page references of quotations are given in the body of the text. Page references are given without titles when the work referred to is the same as that referred to with the immediately preceding reference.
"I do not know what I may appear to the world, but to myself I seem to have been only a boy playing on the sea-shore, and diverting myself in now and then finding a smoother pebble or a prettier shell than ordinary, whilst the great ocean of truth lay all undiscovered before me."
- attributed to Sir Isaac Newton

"Finally we must meet the objection about our illocutionary and perlocutionary acts - namely that the notion of an act is unclear - by a general doctrine about action. We have the idea of an 'act' as a fixed physical thing that we do, as distinguished from conventions and as distinguished from consequences. But..."
- J.L. Austin in How to Do Things with Words
Chapter One
Locutionary Acts

The main purpose of Austin's conception of speech acts was the elucidation of a specific use of language. The particular species that was at the focus of Austin's attention can be identified, to some extent, by the type of linguistic unit - a word, a phrase or a sentence - which bulked largest within that conception. For to some extent, species of language-use can be distinguished on the basis of the suitability or non-suitability for specific uses of linguistic units of these types. Much as different kinds of job are selective with respect to the tools which can be used for them, different species of language-use are selective with respect to the type of linguistic unit that can be put to those uses. Referring is a specific use of language for which words or phrases of certain types, parts of sentences, are suitable, but one for which whole sentences are not. Saying something, on the other hand, is a use of language for whole sentences, even single word sentences, but not one for parts of sentences. The possibility of classifying specific language-uses on this basis is limited, however. There are more species of use than types of unit so this basis will not yield an exclusive classification of specific uses of language. Predicating and syncategorematic uses of language, as well as referring, are selective with respect to parts of sentences; and asking something, like saying something, is a language-use selective with respect to whole sentences. Nor will this basis yield an exhaustive classification. Some uses of language are not tied to any of these types of linguistic unit, e.g., the use of language in poetry. But in so far as some uses of language can only be accomplished with one type of linguistic unit and not another,
seeing which type was central to Austin's conception of speech acts will help to narrow the range in which the specific use of language that he was concerned to elucidate lies. The main purpose of Austin's conception of speech acts can be characterized, in the formal mode, as the elucidation of one of the senses of the phrase "the use of language".

In its later version, that conception was formulated in terms of a three-fold distinction between locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. Each type of act is an abstraction from an actual speech act situation; a situation, that is, in which a speaker not only says something but does something and where what is done is not exhausted by the acts performed as part of the act of saying something. Before reviewing these types of act and their distinguishing characteristics, some of Austin's comments about them in connexion with the use of language should be noted. "Here we have three, if not more, different senses or dimensions of the 'use of a sentence' or of 'the use of language' (and, of course, there are others also)" (Words pp.109-10). "Our interest in these lectures is essentially to fasten on the second, illocutionary act and contrast it with the other two. There is a constant tendency in philosophy to elide this in favour of one or other of the other two. Yet it is distinct from both" (p.103). Immediately after introducing the notion of an illocutionary act Austin said, "To determine what illocutionary act is so performed we must determine in what way we are using the locution" (p.98); and after listing a number of examples, "The trouble rather is the number of different senses of so vague an expression as 'in what way are we using it' -- this may refer even to a locutionary act, and further to perlocutionary acts..." (p.99). On the following page the discussion returns to the use
of language: "...we have here an illustration of the different uses of the expression, 'uses of language', or 'use of a sentence', etc. - 'use' is a hopelessly ambiguous or wide word, just as is the word 'meaning', which it has become customary to deride. But 'use', its supplanter, is not in much better case. We may entirely clear up the 'use of a sentence' on a particular occasion, in the sense of the locutionary act, without yet touching upon its use in the sense of an illocutionary act" (pp.100-1). Further on: "...the expressions 'meaning' and 'use of sentence' can blur the distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts. We now notice that to speak of the 'use' of language can likewise blur the distinction between the illocutionary and perlocutionary act..." (p.103). And so on; similar comments are scattered throughout the second half of Words. What these comments and those just quoted make clear are the two points that in his conception of speech acts, Austin was concerned to come to grips with the manifold ambiguity of the phrase "the use of language" and that the species of use with which he was primarily concerned had to do with whole sentences rather than expressions which form only parts of sentences. The uses of language for referring and predicating were not, therefore, central to Austin's conception of speech acts. However, the use of sentences which was central to that conception remains to be made clear.

Ryle maintained in "Use, Usage and Meaning" (C.P.II pp.407-14) that talk about the use of sentences is absurd because it involves a category confusion. His general argument to this conclusion was that though it makes sense to talk of the employment or use of words, it does not make sense to talk of the employment or use of sentences because words and sentences belong to differ-
ent categories. Words stand to sentences as coins to lendings, roads to journeys and bats to strokes; as coins are used to make loans, roads used to make journeys and bats to make strokes, so words are used to say things; and for Ryle "...a sentence is an instance of someone saying something" (p. 409). But as lendings, journeys and strokes are not the sort of things which either have or lack a use, so sentences or the sayings of things are not the sort of things which can be used, misused or left unused. They are the uses to which words and phrases are put. For instance, "We are tempted to treat the relation between sentences and words as akin to the relation between faggots and sticks. But this is entirely wrong. Words, constructions, etc. are the atoms of a Language; sentences are the units of Speech....Words have histories; sentences do not, though their authors do....I am (a sentence’s) author, not its employer" (p. 408). "As we employ coins to make loans, but do not employ lendings, so we employ words, etc. in order to say things, but we do not employ the sayings of things - or misemploy them or leave them unemployed either. Dictions and dicta belong to different categories. So do roads and journeys; so do gallows and executions" (p. 410). "My last sentence but three, say, is not something with which I once learned how to say things. It is my saying something. Nor is an execution something erected to hang people on. It is the hanging of somebody" (p. 412).

In an example which bears closely upon current interests, Ryle considered different uses of the Latin expression "vici"; first as it was used by Caesar when boasting of his exploits in Asia Minor and second as it may have been used by a Roman gladiator coming to after some combat and inquiring as to its outcome. Ryle attempted to demonstrate the category mistake involved in
talking of the use of sentences from an alleged queerness in
the question, "Is 'vici' a word or a sentence?" He said, "The
boast 'vici' was a different sentence from the question 'vici?',
though the authors of both used the same Latin word, of which
neither was the inventor. The word 'vici' was there, in their
common fund, to be employed, misemployed or left unemployed by
anyone anywhen. The boast 'vici' and the query 'vici?' were two
momentary speech-acts in which this one word was utilised for
saying different things. Our question 'Is "vici" a word or a
sentence?' was queer because its subject was ambiguous. Was it
about a speech-episode, like a boast or a query, or was it about
an inflected Latin verb? It was queer also because '...a word or
a sentence?' was a disjunction between predicates of quite differ­
ent categories, on a par with '...a bat or a stroke?'" (p. 409).

There are several mistakes in this account. One is Ryle's
identification of speech acts with acts of saying something. It
is false that the different sayings of things with the word
"vici" are the speech acts of boasting and querying. If Caesar
had said "Vici" modestly rather than boastfully, he would have
uttered the same sentence and said the same thing, viz., that he
conquered, but he would not have performed the speech act of
boasting. So a speech act is not just an act of saying something.
But it is on the presumption of identity relations holding be­
tween such acts and sentences that Ryle argues that talk of the
use of sentences is categorically confused. The confusion, al­
legedly evident in the question "Is 'vici' a word or a sentence?",
is held to consist in disjoining predicates of different types:
a type of linguistic unit and a type of action, respectively.
Secondly, even if this argument was sound, (which it is not, for
as will be shown presently, sentences should not be identified
with acts of saying something) it would not establish the point the Ryle wanted it to. For the category difference which he alleged to exist between words and sentences does not by itself show that talk of the use of sentences is absurd. Indeed, Ryle's own examples of category differences parallel to this one, between roads and journeys, bats and strokes, coins and loans and gallows and executions show quite the opposite. It is not absurd to ask what the use of Heyerdahl's journey on the Kon-Tiki raft was, nor to answer that it proved such a journey to be possible and hence confirmed a hypothesis about South Pacific migrations. Similarly, the square cut is a type of cricketing stroke used to play a ball which is moving away from the off stump. And loans and executions have their uses: to help a friend out of trouble or to make an example of some poor wretch. The uses to which cars and roads (or rafts and oceans), bats, coins and gallows are put - to make journeys, strokes, loans and executions - are indeed different from the uses to which these latter can be put, but this does not show that these latter do not have uses, nor that it is absurd to talk about such uses. Mutatis mutandis, the uses to which words are put to form sentences are indeed different from the uses to which sentences can be put, but this does not show that sentences do not have uses, nor that it is absurd to talk about such uses. This conclusion is one which, elsewhere, Ryle showed himself willing to accept.

So is the question "Is 'vici' a word or a sentence?" really as queer as Ryle tried to make it out to be, or even queer at all? It is not queer if English translations of the Latin are substituted into it. The question "Is 'I conquered' a word or a sentence?" can be asked without absurdity and can be given an unequivocal and obvious answer. The grammatical conventions of
a language provide criteria for determining to which type of linguistic unit - a word, a phrase or a sentence - any token linguistic expression belongs, so of any token linguistic expression, the question "Is it a word or a sentence?" can sensibly be asked. Nor is Ryle's question made queer by the fact, evidenced by his example, that some grammatically well-formed sentences can be composed of just one word. "Fire!" is a sentence-token of one type; "Fire?" is a sentence-token of a different type; "fire" is a word-token. The sentence-frame "Is '...' a word or a sentence?" generates no absurdity when tokens of these types are substituted alternately for the gap-sign. In the case of one-word sentences, the grammatical conventions providing criteria for determining the type of a token linguistic expression may only be those of spelling and punctuation but these are, nevertheless, adequate for being able to answer suitably filled-in questions of the form "Is '...' a word or a sentence?". Thus asking such a question neither involves the category mistake nor shows the sort of category difference between words and sentences that Ryle alleged.

The conception of a sentence as a grammatically well-formed word-sequence is one which Ryle appeared to reject in maintaining that a sentence is an instance of someone saying something. But ironically, in maintaining this, Ryle himself committed a category mistake. For things of the kind that are ordinarily thought of as sentences are among the things that can be uttered or written down, but an instance of someone saying something is not something that can be uttered or written down. On the other hand, instances of someone saying something are dateable events and have histories, albeit short ones, but sentences are not dateable events and, as Ryle said, they have no histories. There
is, therefore, an inconsistency as well among the things which Ryle said about sentences.

To identify sentences with speakers' sayings of things is to confuse those acts and what they are performed with; it is to confuse the instrument of the act with the act itself. Ryle's mistake in maintaining that a sentence is an instance of someone saying something can be diagnosed as just such a confusion. And once this distinction, between an act of saying something and what such an act is performed with, is recognized, the terminology of the use of a sentence to say something is not only unexceptionable but appropriate. Moreover, the identification of a sentence with an instance of someone saying something is apt to mask other features of people's speech behaviour, viz., that different tokens of the same type of sentence can be used on different occasions to say the same thing or something different and that token sentences of different types can be used to say the same thing. If one speaker says "Venus is the morning star" and another speaker says "Venus is the morning star", these may be two instances of the same thing being said though it is said with a sentence of the same type in each instance. If one speaker says "I'll do it to-day" and another speaker says "I'll do it to-day", different things will have been said, though again, each has been said with a sentence of the same type. Ryle's gladiator could just as well have said "Superavi?" as "Vici?" to inquire as to the outcome of his fight, and Caesar could have said with "Superavi" that he conquered just as well as with "Vici". To cope with these cases, the terminology of the use of a sentence to say or ask something is not only unexceptionable and appropriate but seems necessary. However, it would be excessively carping to belabour Ryle any further on this point. Elsewhere, he talked of
the uses of sentences without any apparent categorial qualms or misgivings and his arguments in "Use, Usage and Meaning" seem to have been an unfortunate aberration."
particular natural language. It thus makes sense to speak of the Language of a language. "Speech", on the other hand, denotes the activity speakers of a natural language engage in when and just in so far as they say (or write) things in their language. A mastery of Language, in the sense of an acquaintance with the lexicon and knowledge of how to operate with the relevant conventions, is required for fluency in that language, i.e., the ability to produce and understand utterances of an indefinitely large class of previously unencountered sentences of that language. Speech is the continual exercising of that ability. The traditional aim of linguistic theories has been to provide theoretical descriptions of the Language of particular natural languages. Speech provides the explananda for such theories and the data against which hypotheses formulated as part of that theory construction are tested. How, precisely, the Language of any natural language is organized is a matter of scientific discovery, progress towards which will be guided and judged by the usual canons of explanatory power, theoretical economy, goodness of fit between theory and fact and so on. The present state of progress of current linguistic theories with this task need not be reviewed here; for present purposes it will be sufficient to regard the Language of a natural language, say English, as specifiable in some such way as the following.

The lexicon will comprise a list of all the simple (i.e., non-complex) units of the language. Lexical items in traditional theories of linguistics are variously described as phonemes or morphemes depending on whether the emphasis of the particular theory is phonological or semantic. With no such emphasis being adopted here, the lexical items referred to may be regarded as vocables or words. Certain syntactic, phonological and semantic information will be specified with each vocable's listing in the
lexicon; specifications of, respectively, the syntactic category to which the vocable belongs (e.g., article, noun, verb, adjective, etc., although these traditional syntactic categories are certainly subject to finer sub-division, and may be subject to more or less radical revision), the phonemic description of the vocable and a specification of its normal use. Homonyms will, therefore, have as many listings in the lexicon as the number of ways in which they are homonymous. The normal use of a vocable will usually be specified in terms of its normal sense or reference but in some cases the specification of the syntactic category to which it belongs will exhaust the specification of its normal use.

The syntactic conventions may be specified in terms of rules for forming all and only those types of sentences of the language that are syntactically correct. In the currently influential theories of phrase-structure transformational grammar, for instance, such rules are of three types: first, phrase-structure rules which generate the basic forms of the sentences of the language, usually referred to as deep structures. Some of these rules are recursive in nature, generating complex syntactic structures either by embedding one or more simple structure (a sentence or a phrase) within another, or by concatenating (conjoining or disjoining) two or more simple structures. Second, transformation rules which operate on the deep structures generated by the phrase-structure rules to yield the surface structures of sentences. Such rules govern, for instance, the deletion of identical elements in embedded structures, the transformations between constructions around verbs in the indicative and imperative mood and transformations between constructions around verbs in their active and passive voice. The surface structures of
sentences derived by the combined operations of phrase-structure and transformation rules are specified in terms of ordered sequences of syntactic categories. Lexical insertion rules, the third type of syntactic rule, yield syntactically correct sentences of the language by mapping lexical items belonging to the appropriate syntactic categories onto the derived surface structures. It perhaps needs emphasizing that these types of syntactic rules are but some of the types under discussion and development in current linguistic theories.

The phonological conventions may be specified in terms of rules governing the location of stress on individual constituent units of a sentence and the pitch contour or intonation over the whole. Together with the phonological information specified for each vocable in the lexicon, these conventions determine all and only those types of the sentences of the language that are phonologically correct.

The semantic conventions may be specified in terms of rules for interpreting lexically, syntactically and phonologically correct sentences of the language in terms of the semantic information specified for each of their constituent units in the lexicon. Phonetic and orthographic conventions (among other signalling conventions) may be specified in terms of rules of pronunciation and spelling for realizing the sentences of the language in sensible (i.e., audible or visible) form.

This sketch of what is involved in one side of the Language-Speech distinction, though drawn in the broadest of schematic outlines, reflects the commonplace of linguistic theory that the sentence is the maximum unit of grammatical analysis and shows that sentences are units of Language rather than Speech. Instances of the latter, being an activity, are acts: acts of
saying or asking something. The strongest relation that can be held to obtain between a sentence and an act of saying or asking something is that the production of the former is a necessary condition for the latter. But it is not a sufficient condition and the issuing of incomplete or elliptical sentences of some sorts as part of Speech suggests that it may not even be a necessary condition. However, the units of Speech are what is said and what is asked, products of acts of saying or asking something. Certainly, "what is said" and "what is asked" have their ambiguities, some of which will be resolved in the next section. But it was a distinction between Language and Speech drawn along lines very similar to these that Austin alluded to with his remark, "The pheme is a unit of language... the rheme is a unit of speech..." (Words p.98).

Phones, phemes and rhemes are utterances of different types; the acts of uttering which are respectively phonetic, phatic and rhetic acts. The definitions of these types of act define progressively richer senses of "saying something" and together exhaust its full normal sense. By extension to the products of these acts - phones, phemes and rhemes - these definitions also define different senses of "what is said". Austin introduced these definitions as follows: "...to say anything is

(A.a) always to perform the act of uttering certain noises (a 'phonetic' act), and the utterance is a phone;
(A.b) always to perform the act of uttering certain vocables or words, i.e. noises of certain types belonging to and as belonging to a certain vocabulary, in a certain construction, i.e. conforming to and as conforming to a certain grammar, with a certain intonation, etc. This act we may call a 'phatic' act, and the utterance which it is the act of uttering a 'pheme' (as distinct from the phememe of linguistic theory); and
generally to perform the act of using that pheme or its constituents with a certain more or less definite 'sense' and a more or less definite 'reference' (which together are equivalent to 'meaning'). This act we may call a 'rhetic' act, and the utterance which it is the act of uttering a 'rheme'" (pp. 92-3).

"The act of 'saying something' in this full normal sense I call, i.e. dub, the performance of a locutionary act, and the study of utterances thus far and in these respects the study of locutions, or of the full units of speech" (p. 94).

Austin's abstraction from the locutionary act in terms of the phonetic act is simply a gesture towards accommodating the fact that in oral speech act situations, to which the scope of these definitions is restricted, utterances are oral utterances. Phemes and rhemes issued in such situations have phonetic realization. This is not a customary interpretation of Austin's notion of the phonetic act and will be defended in the penultimate section of this chapter.

Two conditions, severally necessary and jointly sufficient, have to be satisfied for a speaker's utterance to be a pheme: first, that it conforms to the lexicon and the syntactic and phonological conventions of the language which the speaker is using and second, that in so conforming it is as the speaker intends it to be. Austin drew attention to both these conditions by saying that a phatic act is the uttering of "...noises of certain types belonging to and as belonging to a certain vocabulary...conforming to and as conforming to a certain grammar, with a certain intonation, etc." The differences between these conditions can be illustrated by the different kinds of fault that occur when one or other of them is not satisfied. Accidental malapropisms and spoonerisms and Freudian slips of the tongue provide examples of putative phemes which, though
conforming to the lexicon and syntactic and phonological conventions of the language, are not as their authors intend them to be. Solecisms and mispronunciations on the other hand, common enough when a speaker is in the process of learning a new language, provide examples of putative phemes which are as their authors intend them to be but fail to conform to these conventions of the language. In everyday practice, the boundaries set by this condition between what counts as a pheme and a mere nonsense utterance have a fairly wide degree of tolerance. While probably no amount of good intentions would save "Doo-dah-diddy-dum-diddy-dah" from being nonsense, a Frenchman's utterance of "That was a book very interesting" may pass as a pheme in spite of its not conforming strictly to the syntactic conventions of English. Whatever these tolerances, however, a faultless pheme is an utterance having the properties of a lexically, syntactically and phonologically correct sentence and which is, with respect to those properties, as the speaker intends it to be. Malapropisms, spoonerisms and Freudian slips are interesting in this respect in that they seem to be the limiting cases of word-sequences that are well-formed sentences in spite of their authors' intentions.

The conditions to be satisfied for a speaker's utterance to be a rheme, further to those satisfied by the performance of a phatic act, are that the pheme or its constituents are used with a more or less definite sense and reference which together are equivalent to meaning. Here again, severally necessary and jointly sufficient conditions can be distinguished in terms of conventions and intentions: first, that the use of the pheme or its constituents conforms to the semantic conventions of the language and second, that in so conforming it is as it is in-
tended to be. And here again, different speech phenomena occurring when one or other of these conditions is not satisfied illustrate the differences between them. Some metaphorical uses of language (e.g., "He had to eat his words" and "The cold hand of winter gripped the land") are instances of the use of a pheme with a particular sense and/or reference which the speaker intends it to have but which is not in strict conformity with the semantic conventions of the language. Instances of litotes and hyperbole provide other examples of similarly non-conformist rhemes. Some types of ambiguity, on the other hand, illustrate how a pheme may be used with a sense and/or reference which is in strict conformity with the conventions of the language but which is not as intended, or not just as intended, by the speaker. The ambiguous reference of "He" or the ambiguous sense of "on the bench" in "He sits on the bench on Tuesday mornings" may make such a rheme less than completely successful for this reason. (Ambiguities of sense and reference are types of rhetic ambiguity and are to be distinguished from types of phatic ambiguity; the latter occurs if the same word-sequence forms a grammatical construction of more than one type, each of which conforms to the syntactic and phonological conventions of the language, e.g., "He saw her duck" and "They can fish"). But here too, there is a wide degree of tolerance in actual speech for any utterance which does not satisfy with complete strictness these conditions for being a rheme. It may have been for this reason that Austin qualified his characterization of the meaning of an utterance with the phrases "...a certain more or less definite 'sense' and a more or less definite 'reference'...". The main reason for this tolerance is, of course, that the circumstances of the situation in which the utterance is issued
may serve to disambiguate the rheme or be such as to make it clear both that and how the speaker is using the pheme in some non-literal way. That is to say, it may be quite clear from the context in which the speaker said, "He sits on the bench on Tuesday mornings" both who the speaker is referring to with his use of "He" and with what sense he is using "on the bench" so that it is clear that the speaker's utterance means that the local tramp sits on the seat in the garden each Tuesday morning rather than that the local magistrate conducts hearings of his court on Tuesday mornings. In such cases, the performance of the rhetic act is quite successful. Similarly, the context of an utterance may make it clear that a speaker is speaking metaphorically and so make it clear that his utterance of "He had to eat his words" does not mean literally that someone had to chew and digest linguistic units. Such figurative, non-literal uses of language are common enough and may easily be recognized in the contexts in which they occur so need not necessarily make the performance of the rhetic act unsuccessful. And if, even in spite of contextual clues, the meaning of the utterance is unclear, it will usually be open to the speaker to use a different pheme so as to avoid the ambiguity or non-literalness of the original rheme and so make his meaning more precise. For example, a speaker may say, "Old Swagger sits on the seat in the garden every Tuesday morning" or "He had to retract his statement" and mean more precisely therewith what was meant by, respectively, "He sits on the bench on Tuesday mornings" and "He had to eat his words". Austin called pairs of rhetic acts like these rhetically equivalent acts. These are to be distinguished from "the same rhetic acts" which are performed by the use of identical phemes with identical sense and/or reference,
e.g., if one speaker says, "He had to retract his statement" and another speaker says, "He had to retract his statement" and both speakers refer to the same person and talk about the same retraction. "When different phemes are used with the same sense and reference, we might speak of rhetically equivalent acts ('the same statement' in one sense) but not of the same rheme or rhetoric acts (which are the same statement in another sense which involves using the same words)"(p.98).

However, there are limits to the degree of tolerance in the conditions upon an utterance being a rheme. These limits are not easily specified in advance. But where a non-literal use of language is too far removed from uses sanctioned by the semantic conventions of the language (as perhaps would be the case with "All the world's a stage") or where there is a complete absence of intention on the part of the speaker to use a pheme with any sense or reference (as in the case of an actor going over his lines just to see whether he could remember them) a rhetoric act, attempted or not, is not performed and the utterance is meaningless. So generally, an utterance is meaningless if and only if, in the context in which it is issued, either the speaker does not intend to use the pheme (or its constituents) with a sense and/or reference in conformity with the semantic conventions of the language or so intending, such use is neither in strict conformity with those conventions (i.e., it is literally meaningless) nor within certain limits of non-literal conformity with those conventions. Otherwise, the utterance is meaningful and the speaker has uttered a sentence with meaning.

Austin used the devices of direct and indirect quotation to
identify, respectively, phatic and rhetic acts performed in speech act situations. These devices are suitable for this purpose because the necessary conditions for the truth of the different forms of speech reports are specifiable in the same terms as the defining characteristics of the respective types of act. A speaker quoting directly reports the form of the quoted utterance; a direct quotation is true only if it contains a sentence of the same type as that used by the quoted speaker: words of the same types, in a syntactic construction of the same type, with the same types of phonological features as the original. A speaker quoting indirectly reports the content or meaning of the quoted utterance; an indirect quotation is true only if it contains a paraphrase of the quoted utterance.

A direct quotation abstracts from the meaning of what was said. This is why, if an utterance is meaningless, it can only be truly quoted directly and not indirectly. The indirect quotation of an actor memorizing his lines, e.g., "He said that friends, Romans and fellow-countrymen were to lend him their ears", is false whereas a direct quotation of the actor's utterance in the same situation, e.g., "He said, 'Friends, Romans, fellow-countrymen; lend me your ears!'", is true. A meaningless utterance cannot be quoted indirectly because it cannot be paraphrased. If an utterance is rhetically ambiguous a true indirect quotation of it must preserve the ambiguity, although in some such cases indirect quotation is problematic and only true direct quotation may be possible. For instance, still lacking the contextual clues whose absence rendered the meaning of "He sits on the bench on Tuesday mornings" unclear, the indirect quotation "He said that he sits on the bench on
Tuesday mornings" is misleading because it suggests, what is false, that he who does the saying and the sitting are one and the same, whereas the direct quotation "He said, 'He sits on the bench on Tuesday mornings,'" entails what is true, that they are different. As Austin said, "If the sense or reference is not being taken as clear, then the whole or part is to be in quotation marks. Thus I might say: 'He said I was to go to "the minister," but he did not say which minister'..." (pp. 96-7). In abstracting from the meaning of what was said, a direct quotation abstracts from the rhetic act performed as part of an act of saying something and reports only the phatic act. This is not to say, of course, that an utterance quoted directly is always quoted as being meaningless, simply that its meaning on the occasion of its issuance is not reported by such a quotation. A directly quoted utterance may be understood to have whatever meaning it had on the occasion of its issuance. An indirect quotation, on the other hand, abstracts from the type of sentence used by a speaker and reports only the meaning of what was said. This is why a speaker can only be truly quoted indirectly and not directly in translation. Thus if, of the same situation, "Pierre said, 'C'est un livre très intéressant'" is true, then while "Pierre said that this is a very interesting book" is true, "Pierre said, 'This is a very interesting book'" is not a direct quotation. And in abstracting from the type of sentence used and reporting only the meaning of what was said, an indirect quotation abstracts from the phatic act performed as part of an act of saying something and reports only the rhetic act. Austin's examples of pairs of phatic and rhetic acts distinguished by these means are quoted on p. 68 below.

Discussing this point, Austin said, "We cannot, however,
always use 'said that' easily: we would say 'told to', 'advise to', etc., if he used the imperative mood, or such equivalent phrases as 'said I was to', 'said I should', etc. Compare such phrases as 'bade me welcome' and 'extended his apologies' (p. 97). This remark raises the question of how variable in form the device of indirect quotation can be and hence, how effective it is as a means for identifying the rhetic act performed in a speech act situation. For if "He bade me welcome" is an acceptable form of indirect quotation, it can be shown that a true report of a speech act situation, cast in that form, does not always identify the rhetic act performed in that situation. Suppose "He bade me welcome" to have been said of a tribal chief by a missionary after arriving by river boat at the tribal village. As he arrived, the missionary was greeted by the chief of the tribe standing on the river bank, chanting and waving a palm leaf. The missionary knew the natives' language and customs and interpreted the chief's chants and waves correctly. His report "He bade me welcome" is therefore true and in the form of an indirect quotation. But now suppose that the missionary's arrival coincided with the tribe's annual day of river rites; rites which required the tribal chief to stand by the river chanting prayers to the river gods enjoining them to give the men of the tribe abundant fishing in the year ahead. And suppose too that the natives' only form of bidding welcome to non-members of the tribe was to wave palm leaves at them as they approached. The natives have no verbal form of greeting with which to bid a stranger welcome. Now, in this case, the missionary's report "He bade me welcome", though true and in the form of an indirect quotation, is not a report of the rhetic act(s) performed in that situation. The acts which the missionary's utterance does
report and in virtue of which it is true are the chief's acts of waving his palm leaf, and these are not rhetic acts. The rhetic acts performed in this situation are those acts performed as part of the chief's chanting of his prayers, and these acts are not reported in the missionary's utterance. But clearly, "He bade me welcome" can be used to identify the rhetic act performed in a speech act situation; it is a quite acceptable indirect quotation by the addressee of a speaker's utterance, "I bid you welcome". So either the use of indirect quotation-devices to identify rhetic acts performed in speech act situations has to be abandoned, because true reports cast in such form do not always identify the rhetic acts performed therein, or restrictions need to be imposed on the forms of indirect quotation so that true reports of speech act situations, cast in those forms, do always identify the rhetic acts performed in those situations. In view of the initial attractions of the quotation devices as means for identifying phatic and rhetic acts, it seems preferable to exhaust the possibilities left open by the latter alternative before adopting the former.

Such restrictions may be imposed by specifying a basic normal form of indirect quotation, viz., "S said that..." where "S" here and hereafter reserves a place for an expression used to refer to the quoted speaker(s) and "..." reserves a place for a paraphrase of the quoted utterance. True reports of speech act situations cast in this form identify the rhetic acts performed in those situations. A basic normal form of direct quotation can also be specified, viz., "S said, '...'" where "...' reserves a place for a token sentence of the same type as that used by the quoted speaker(s). True reports of speech act situations cast in this form identify the phatic acts performed in those situations.
The restrictions imposed on quotation devices by these basic normal forms are not so arbitrary as they might appear at first sight. Save for one qualification on the basic normal form of indirect quotation to be introduced shortly, any speech act situation in which a phatic and rhetic act is performed can be reported in these forms and true reports so cast identify the respective acts. This applies even to those situations in which acts may be performed about which Austin expressed some uneasiness at reporting with the use of "said that"; i.e., situations in which the speaker extends his apologies or bids his hearer welcome or uses a sentence in the imperative mood to tell or advise his hearer to do something. "He said that he was sorry", "He said that I was welcome", "He said that I was to go" and "He said that I should go" are all quite acceptable indirect quotations in basic normal form by the addressee of a speaker's utterance issued in such situations. Austin's remark that "said that" cannot always be used easily should not be taken as making the point that sometimes this form of indirect quotation cannot be used to report the rhetic act performed in a speech act situation. That would be false. Rather, Austin's remark makes the quite different point that sometimes the forms of speech reports may not be the most appropriate forms in which to report the situation. And obviously, the purposes with which reports are given may vary widely from case to case and different features of the situation are likely to be more relevant to some purposes than to others. So an indirect speech report, for instance, which captures only the meaning of the speaker's utterance may not be the most appropriate form of report to use if other features of the situation are more relevant. For example, it may be more appropriate to report a speech act situation with "It was
"It was an order" than with "He said that I was to go" if the reporter is being urged by some third person not to go. But the latter may be more appropriate than the former if there is some uncertainty as to who was to go. That these are reports of different features of the situation can be seen from their different truth conditions. While "He said that I was to go" may be true, "It was an order" may not be true; the speaker, in saying "You are to go" may have been giving instructions rather than an order, or merely relaying them as distinct from actually giving them. There are very many different reports that can be given of a speech act situation and it cannot be assumed that all such reports are speech reports of the situation. Some reports make no pretence of being speech reports, e.g., "It was an order", "He gave the order", "He relayed the instructions"; others, while in a form in which speech reports can be given may, in spite of that, not be speech reports. The example of the missionary's report "He bade me welcome" is a case in point and similar examples could be constructed around the forms "S extended his apologies", "S told..." and "S advised...". The advantages of the basic normal forms of quotation are that true reports of speech act situations cast in those forms are always and only speech reports of those situations.

The need for a qualification on the basic normal form of indirect quotation arises from cases in which a speaker asks a question, e.g., if he may go out, whether the postman has called yet, what time the train was due to leave, where the biscuits are kept, which route is shorter, why the furniture was arranged as it was, etc. Such utterances cannot be quoted indirectly in the form "S said that..." so the basic normal form of indirect quotation needs to be augmented to include both this form
and the form "S asked..." where "..." again reserves a place for a paraphrase of the quoted utterance. Because the basic normal forms of indirect quotation specify forms of speech reports which identify rhetic acts performed in speech act situations, the need for these two forms suggests that there are two distinct types of rhetic act (saying something and asking something); and so in terms of the rhetic act performed, two distinct types of sentence-use: the use of a sentence to say something and to ask something.

Revisions to the distinctions Austin drew between the different types of act performed as part of a locutionary act have been proposed by Robinson in "The Individuation of Speech Acts" (P.Q.(1974)pp.516-36). These distinctions and the proposed revisions are discussed there with reference to the following examples:

(1) Jones' uttering at t the phonetic sequence "The bull is in the field"
(2) Jones' uttering at t the syntactically and lexically correct English sentence "The bull is in the field"
(3) Jones' uttering at t the meaningful English sentence "The bull is in the field"
(4) Jones' expressing at t the proposition that the bull is in the field.

Robinson does not explain what she means by "syntactically and lexically correct English sentence". But as the examples she gives of sentences that are either syntactically or lexically incorrect are the same as those Austin gave of sentences with faults of grammar or vocabulary it may be assumed that this difference between Robinson and Austin is merely one of terminology.

Robinson claims that "in Austin's terms, (1) is the phonetic act, (3) the phatic act, and (2) is an "abstraction" from the
phatic act" but makes no claim on his behalf about the relationship between (3) and (4), asserting rather that they are respectively her versions of the phatic and rhetic acts (p.320). But in terms of Austin's definitions of these acts, quoted on pp.13-4 above, it would seem that (1) exemplifies a phonetic act, (2) a phatic act, not just an abstraction from a phatic act, and (3) a rhetic act, not a phatic act. The differences between Robinson's view of these acts, Robinson's view of Austin's view of them and Austin's own view, with reference to (1)-(4) can be shown as follows:

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<th>Robinson</th>
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<tr>
<td>(1) phonetic act</td>
<td>phonetic act</td>
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<tr>
<td>(2) abstraction from phatic act</td>
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<td>phatic act</td>
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<tr>
<td>(3) phatic act</td>
<td>phatic act</td>
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<td>(4) rhetic act</td>
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Robinson's proposed revisions of Austin's distinctions are twofold, comprising (a) a redefinition of the rhetic act as the expression of a proposition; and (b) a redefinition of the phatic act as the uttering of a syntactically and lexically correct and meaningful English sentence. The first need not be lingered over. Robinson admits the redefinition requires defence and that the distinction between (3) and (4) requires clarification but chooses to ignore these matters as irrelevant. Without such clarification the distinction between (3) and (4) seems to be one without a difference; its application to those which Austin drew is problematic since the notion of acts of expressing propositions had no place within his conception of speech acts. Robinson does, however, offer two justifications for the second of her proposed revisions.

The first is that Austin himself allowed that further dis-
tinctions could be made within the phatic act beside those drawn in terms of the lexical and syntactic features of sentences. This is true. Austin said, "Obviously in the definition of the phatic act two things are lumped together: vocabulary and grammar.... Yet a further point arising is the intonation as well as grammar and vocabulary" (Words p.96). Thus, as already indicated, phonological features of sentences are included in Austin's notion of phatic acts. Tokens of the sentence-types "You are going?" and "You are going!" uttered in certain ways would exemplify token phemes that are lexically, syntactically and phonologically correct but which are, on phonological grounds, of distinct types. This distinction is not one that Robinson mentions but it is no doubt one that she would not deny has a place within the phatic act. Robinson maintains, however, that yet another distinction can be made within the phatic act in terms of a distinction between the lexical and syntactic correctness of sentences and their meaningfulness. She illustrates this distinction with the sentence "Quadruplicity drinks procrastination", to utter which "...is to utter a syntactically and lexically correct English sentence, but one that most people would hold to be meaningless" (P.Q. p.321). Hence, Robinson argues, the performance of a phatic act is not successful if only a syntactically and lexically correct sentence is uttered. The pheme must also satisfy a certain criterion of meaningfulness - a criterion of the sort that "Quadruplicity drinks procrastination" apparently fails to satisfy. Robinson does not spell out this criterion; nor is it clear how she is using "meaningful English sentence" in the description of a pheme to mean something other than just a lexically and syntactically correct English sentence. In order to draw this further distinction within the phatic act,
such a criterion would need to be one, like those for the lexical and syntactic correctness of sentences, which applies to types of sentences; one such that if any token of a particular type of sentence satisfied or failed to satisfy the criterion, then all tokens of that type satisfied or failed to satisfy it. It is doubtful that such a criterion for the meaningfulness of sentences can be formulated which meets this requirement and opens a non-vacuous distinction between types of lexically and syntactically correct sentences.

The attempt to distinguish types of sentences that are meaningless though well-formed (i.e., lexically and syntactically correct) runs counter to the following intuition about language: for any type of well-formed sentence, there is a possible context such that a token sentence of that type, used in that context, in conformity with the normal semantic conventions of the language, is meaningful. If this intuition is correct, it follows that there are no types of well-formed but meaningless sentences. For if meaningfulness is a property of some types of sentences then all tokens of those types are meaningless. But ex hypothesi, there is no type of well-formed sentence of which at least one token could not be meaningful in a possible context of use. While it may be difficult to prove this intuition to be true, an informal justification for it is forthcoming from the natural economy of language. As the resources of a language are developed to enable users of that language to cope more efficiently with the situations confronting them, a capacity to construct types of well-formed but meaningless sentences, if it existed, would be curiously redundant. For there is no possible use for such sentences in normal situations of linguistic communication and from the point of view of the natural economy of language a capacity
to construct such sentences would evidence a rare and exceptional overrichness in the resources of the language. This point should raise doubts, either about the well-formedness of the alleged examples, (and these doubts may lead on to some beneficial revisions of the traditional syntactic categories) or, if these doubts are shown to be unfounded, other doubts about whether there are not contexts in which these examples could be meaningful.

A consequence of this intuition, viz., that there are no types of well-formed but meaningless sentences, is, in fact, the common ground between what are otherwise widely diverging views on the status of suspect sentences such as "Quadruplicity drinks procrastination". It is the common ground between, on the one hand, the view that tokens of these types of sentence are not well-formed and, on the other hand, the view that they are meaningful (and therefore well-formed) but false. These views differ as to whether some particular types of sentences are well-formed or not and hence, differ over the scope of the syntactic rules of a language required to generate all and only the well-formed sentences of that language. But they are alike in denying that there are types of well-formed but meaningless sentences. So it is up to those, of whom Robinson would seem to be one, who wish to adopt some middle position between these views and maintain that there are types of well-formed but meaningless sentences, to establish their position. The familiar examples produced for this purpose are none too successful. Whether the token sentence "Tuesday is in bed" (with "Tuesday" used as a proper name to refer to a day of the week) is meaningless or false, a different token of the same type with "Tuesday" used as a proper name, or a nick-name, to refer to a person would be
meaningful and could be true. Similarly, if procrastination is a species of moonshine and one of a drinking fraternity is nick-named "Quadruplicity" by his fellows - he may have used that word on some inebriate occasion and the incident has had a lasting effect on his friends - then, in such a context, the token sentence "Quadruplicity drinks procrastination" would not only be meaningful but could be used to give a true description of that person's drinking habits. It is not a sound objection against this example that it involves an abnormal use of language. The use of some words as nick-names, carrying with it the use of words with unfamiliar reference, is not an abnormal use of language. It is a use of language which any adequate theory of linguistics has to accommodate. Here is another example: if in a dream (it would probably be a nightmare) someone dreamed that quadruplicity drinks procrastination and on waking was describing his experience to another, the token sentence "Quadruplicity drinks procrastination" would seem to be the most suitable for giving a succinct, true and, therefore, meaningful report of the content of the dream experience. It is not a sound objection against either of these examples that tokens of the sentence type "Quadruplicity drinks procrastination" can only be shown to be meaningful by specifying possible contexts for their use. It is only in a context of use that any sentence is meaningful or meaningless. The context-dependence of the meaningfulness of a sentence, consisting in the sense and reference with which words in the sentence are used on the occasion of its production, which is in contrast with the independence of context of a sentence's lexical and syntactic correctness, is one reason for not including the meaningfulness of the sentence among the necessary conditions on a satisfactory pheme. It is also a reason for lo-
cating the meaning of an utterance where Austin located it: in the rheme, not in the pheme; in the use of "...that pheme or its constituents with a certain more or less definite 'sense' and a more or less definite 'reference' (which together are equivalent to 'meaning')" (Words p.93).

This last point, however, is one that Robinson would deny. For her second justification of the proposed revision of Austin's definition of the phatic act is that it is in accord with his remarks and examples. "My claim that a phatic act is correctly and fully described as the utterance of a meaningful English sentence seems to me justified in view of Austin's usage" (P.Q. p.321). Now if this were true, it would mean that there was some inconsistency between Austin's definition of phatic acts and some of his remarks about them. So what is Robinson's textual support for this justification? She says, "Every example he gives of a pheme is a meaningful English sentence, and the examples of sequences that fail to be phemes are sequences that fail in one way or another to be meaningful" (p.321). The examples of putative phemes which Austin gave were "cat thoroughly the if" and "the slithy toves did gyre". These are only examples of, respectively, syntactically and lexically incorrect word-sequences; neither example introduces the kind of fault of sentence-types which Robinson is referring to here as meaninglessness. And what property Austin's examples of satisfactory phemes have, over and above their syntactic and lexical correctness, which Robinson refers to as their meaningfulness, is not evident in those examples. So Austin's examples do not warrant a revision of his definition of phatic acts. What of his remarks? Robinson says, "Austin says that the 'typical fault' of a pheme is to be meaningless or nonsense. This is an
ambiguous statement, but I take it to mean not that some phemes unfortunately suffer from meaninglessness, but that if anything is meaningless than it is not a pheme" (p. 321). Austin's actual words were, "The pheme is a unit of language; its typical fault is to be nonsense - meaningless" (Words p. 98). This remark is ambiguous and it bears interpretations different from that which Robinson places upon it. For instance, Austin may have been using "meaningless" here with the same sense that he used it with in the phrase "meaningless sentence", between scare quotes, to mean "ungrammatical, incomplete, mumbo-jumbo, etc." (p. 51); i.e., as an umbrella term for the different ways in which a word-sequence can fail to be a well-formed sentence. Interpreted in this way, Austin's last quoted remark does not evidence any shift away from the distinction between the lexical, syntactic (and phonological) aspects of an utterance and its semantic aspects which lies behind the distinction between phatic and rhetic acts as Austin originally defined them.

Moreover, Robinson's claim to the effect that such a shift took place, based on that one ambiguous remark, can only be sustained if Austin's other remarks about phatic and rhetic acts are ignored. There are, for instance, his repeated remarks that phatic acts are reported in direct quotation and rhetic acts in indirect quotation. And as shown earlier, the necessary conditions for the different forms of quotation can be specified in the same terms as those in which Austin defined phatic and rhetic acts. So Robinson has not shown any inconsistency between Austin's definition of phatic acts and his remarks about them either, and hence has failed to make good this second justification of her proposed revision of that definition.  

Robinson lays down a criterion for the use of the expression
"same act" according to which a phonetic and phatic act performed in a speech act situation can be said to be the same act. By this criterion, which is specified in terms of the set-theoretic concept of inclusion, the set of phatic acts is a subset of the set of phonetic acts. "The reason for this is that the set of meaningful English sentences is a subset of the set of syntactically and lexically correct English sentences, which in turn is a subset of the set of phonetic sequences." (P.Q.p, 381). There is a certain now-you-see-it-now-you-don't quality about what is claimed on behalf of the identity relationship expressed in this criterion and alleged to hold between the different acts. For Robinson says that it is inaccurate to say that they are strictly identical acts, but that they are the same act according to her Inclusion Criterion, but then later, that it is doubtful that the criterion defines some sense of the expression "same act" when it is not a symmetric relation holding between these acts (pp.321,323). However this may be, and irrespective of the difference between Robinson's and Austin's definitions of the phatic act, this account of the relationship between phatic and phonetic acts is incorrect as an exegesis of Austin's view of that relationship, inadequate as it stands and, even when strengthened in appropriate ways, false. Austin said, "Obviously, to perform a phatic act I must perform a phonetic act, or, if you like, in performing one I am performing the other (not, however, that phatic acts are a sub-class of phonetic acts; we defined the phatic act as the uttering of vocables as belonging to a certain vocabulary); but the converse is not true, for if a monkey makes a noise indistinguishable from 'go' it is still not a phatic act" (Words pp.95-6, underlining added). The clause
not underlined in the parenthesis of the remark just quoted indicates the reason why Robinson's account is inadequate as it stands. On her account the set of phatic acts includes the utterings of phonetic sequences which just happen to conform to the syntactic and phonological conventions of a language and whose constituents just happen to be members of the phonemic lexicon of that language. And such an account is too weak, for on that basis it requires an arbitrary restriction to human acts to exclude a piece of random monkey chatter, phonetically indistinguishable from \textit{Go}, from the set of phatic acts. Robinson's account ignores the necessary condition on the successful performance of a phatic act that the pheme, in conforming to the lexicon and syntactic and phonological conventions of the language, is as it is intended to be. However, even if Robinson's account were to be strengthened to include this condition, as it easily could be, it would still be false.

One reason for this, a reason which also supports Austin's denial of such an account, can be gleaned from a number of remarks in the text of his lectures. Utterances that are phemes, the products of phatic acts, can be produced in more than one way, which is to say that a phatic act can be performed in more than one way: orally (or phonetically) certainly; but also in writing (or graphically), and in other ways as well, e.g., in semaphore, morse code, etc. Several of Austin's remarks show that he was using "utterance" with a sense that was not restricted to that of "oral utterance" or "spoken utterance" but included that of "written utterance"; for example, "...the utterance (in writing) of the sentence..." (p. 57), "(a)In verbal utterances..." and "(b)In written utterances..." (p. 60), and "...written utterances are not tethered to their
origin in the way spoken ones are" (p. 61). On the following page there are examples of performative utterances: "...'I, John Jones, warn you that the bull is dangerous' or 'This bull is dangerous. (Signed) John Jones' (p. 62); the first example is of an oral utterance, the second of a written one. Later, Austin discussed ways in which the illocutionary force of utterances can be made explicit in both written and spoken language (pp. 74-5), and most importantly, on p. 114, there is the foot-note "Still confining ourselves, for simplicity, to spoken utterance". In view of these remarks it seems certain that Austin envisaged his conception of speech acts having application to situations involving written utterances as well as oral utterances.

The context of the definition of the phatic act on pp. 92-3 of *Words*, especially the paragraph preceding the statement of that definition, as well as Austin's repetition of the definition of the phonetic act (...the act of uttering certain noises...) within the definition of the phatic act (...the act of uttering certain vocables or words, i.e., noises of certain types...) makes it clear that Austin was restricting that definition to acts performed in oral speech act situations, i.e., to acts performed as part of acts of saying something, to the exclusion of acts performed as part of, say, acts of writing something. It is this restriction, made for the sake of simplicity, which is referred to in the foot-note on p. 114. If this restriction is lifted, a general definition of the phatic act can easily be obtained from Austin's definition by deleting the definition of the phonetic act from the definition of the phatic act (where it is redundant in any case) and reformulating the latter as "...the act of producing certain vocables or
words belonging to and as belonging to a certain vocabulary, in a certain construction...etc.". The abstraction from the total oral speech act situation which Austin made in terms of the phonetic act can then be seen as a gesture towards accommodating the fact that in such situations the phatic act is performed orally, or to put it another way, the fact that in such situations the pheme has phonetic realization. For other types of speech act situations parallel definitions can be formulated for the appropriate types of act which provide ways of performing a phatic act in those situations. For example, for situations in which a phatic act is performed as part of an act of writing something, i.e., for situations in which a pheme has graphic realization, a graphic act can be defined as the act of making certain marks. Hence, the set of phatic acts is included in the sum of the set of phonetic acts, the set of graphic acts and the sets of such other acts as provide ways of performing phatic acts (e.g., the set of semaphore-signalling acts), but is not included within any one such set.

Robinson admits that Austin picked out important features of the locutionary act in terms of the three-fold distinction between phonetic, phatic and rhetic acts (P.Q. p.320). Irrespective of what others have said about his choice of labels for these types of act, the distinctions Austin drew in these terms mesh with some of the more important distinctions drawn and deployed in linguistic theory. And his account of locutionary acts in these terms, specifying severally necessary and jointly sufficient conditions on the issuing of a satisfactory locution - a full unit of Speech - elucidates one species of language-use: the use of a sentence to say or ask something. But it is not this species of language-use, nor
this use of sentences, which is central to Austin's conception of speech acts. "Our interest in the locutionary act is, of course, principally to make quite clear what it is, in order to distinguish it from other [illocutionary] acts with which we are going to be primarily concerned" (Words pp. 94-5). The use of language exemplified in locutionary acts is a use of Language; the use of language exemplified in illocutionary acts is a use of Speech. The use of a sentence exemplified in a locutionary act is the use of a lexically, syntactically and phonologically correct word-sequence (which with respect to those features is as it is intended to be) to say or ask something. That is, it is the use of a pheme or unit of Language with sense and reference (together, equivalent to meaning) to produce a meaningful utterance or rheme. The use of a sentence exemplified in an illocutionary act is the use of a rheme or unit of Speech with a certain force, to do something distinct from saying or asking something, e.g., to describe or to report, to promise or to state an intention, to request or to order, to bet or to christen.

"When we perform a locutionary act, we use speech: but in what way precisely are we using it on this occasion? For there are very numerous functions of or ways in which we use speech, and it makes a great difference to our [illocutionary] act ...in which way and which sense we were on this occasion 'using' it. It makes a great difference whether we were advising, or merely suggesting, or actually ordering, whether we were strictly promising or only announcing a vague intention, and so forth. These issues penetrate a little but not without confusion into grammar, but we constantly do debate them, in such terms as whether certain words (a certain locution) had the
force of a question, or ought to have been taken as an estimate and so on” (p. 99). Thus within a particular speech act situation, each of these different species of language-use, as well as that exemplified in perlocutionary acts which will be discussed later, may be evident in a speaker’s locutionary act of saying that he had forgotten to bring it, his illocutionary act of reporting that he had forgotten to bring it and his perlocutionary act of angering his audience. Or, again, these uses may be evident in a speaker’s locutionary act of asking if he could go ashore, his illocutionary act of requesting permission to go ashore and his perlocutionary act of getting permission to go ashore. Some more of Austin’s examples of these different uses of language are quoted on p. 68 below.

Foot-notes:

1 (from p. 2) This sentence is quoted from the first edition of *Words*. Its omission from the second edition would seem to be somewhat less than felicitous. Introducing the notion of an illocutionary act, Austin made the two points: (a) that to perform a locutionary act is *eo ipso* to perform an illocutionary act and (b) that to determine what illocutionary act is performed it is necessary to determine how the locution is used. After listing some examples of illocutionary acts Austin took up these points, dismissing the first with “There is nothing mysterious about our *eo ipso* here” and concentrating his discussion on the second. The immediate relevance of this discussion is made unclear in the second edition by the omission of the quoted sentence.

2 (from p. 6) For example, in “The Theory of Meaning” (C.P. II pp. 350–73) Ryle said, “The sorts of things that we do with sentences are different from the sorts of things that we do with most single words — and some sorts of things that we can significantly do with some sorts of sentences, we cannot
significantly do with others" (p. 365).

3 (from p. 9) "We have to learn to use sentences for the first job before we can learn to use them for the second, and we have to learn to use them for the first and second jobs before we can learn to use them for the third. There are, of course, plenty of other sentence-jobs, which it is not our present business to consider. For example, the sentences which occupy these pages have not got any of the jobs which they have been describing" (The Concept of Mind p. 123).

4 (from p. 13) Throughout, "utterance" is used with the sense of "what is uttered" to denote a product of, or an object produced by, an act of uttering. It is not used with the sense of "act of uttering". This usage is in accord with Austin's practice, not always strictly adhered to, but clearly announced in *Words*, "I use 'utterance' only as equivalent to *utteratum*; for *utteratio* I use 'the issuing of an utterance'" (p. 92, fn. 1).

5 (from p. 25) This section is a modified version of the writer's "Robinson's Individuation of Speech Acts" (P.Q. (1976) pp. 261-6).

6 (from p. 32) In "The Logic of Austin's Locutionary Subdivision" (Theoria (1969) pp. 204-14) Griffiths gives an extraordinarily confused and inaccurate exposition of Austin's notions of phonetic, phatic and rhetic acts. There is a running together of phatic and rhetic acts (p. 205) and of phemes and rhemes (p. 209). Griffiths fails to take the point of Austin's examples "cat thoroughly the if" and "the slithy toves did gyre", allowing that in direct quotation these are reports of phatic acts. Griffiths shows a complete ignorance of the conditions on the speaker's intentions involved in the performance of these acts, as well as of the "act-object" or "process-product" ambiguity of the noun "utterance". Thus he remarks, "However, one problem which arises is how a rheme ... differs from a rhetic act" (p. 207). And while, "One cannot perform a rhetic act without producing a rheme..." is correct, how "...one can produce a rheme without performing a rhetic act" (p. 207) remains a mystery. Griffiths claims that "Talk
about token and type phemes makes sense, but it is nonsense to talk about token and type rhemes" (p. 208). Yet Austin dis­
cussed briefly "the question when one pheme or one rheme is the same as another, whether in the 'type' or 'token' sense ...")(Wordsp. 97). Two token utterances are rhemes of the same type if and only if two token phemes of the same type are used with the same sense and reference.

7 (from p. 36) In "Austin on Performatives" (Symp. pp. 401-11)
Black says, "It seems to me somewhat crude and perversely
idiosyncratic..." (p. 409).
In its early version, Austin's conception of speech acts was formulated in terms of the distinction between performative and constative utterances. The range of this distinction shows that conception to be informed by the same concern with a specific use of sentences in its early version as in its later one. Some of Austin's remarks adverting to the distinction do likewise: "...very commonly the same sentence is used on different occasions of utterance in both ways, performative and constative" (Words p. 67); "...it will be most dangerous...to take it that we somehow know that the primary or primitive use of sentences must be, because it ought to be, statemental or constative..." (p. 72). Austin's remarks locating his work on speech acts within the contemporary developments in philosophy show this too. These historical remarks are also important for what they show of Austin's reasons for attending to different species of language-use. While such remarks can be found on the opening pages of Words, more succinct remarks to the same effect were made in his later radio talk "Performative Utterances"; accordingly, the following quotations are from the transcript of that talk (Papers pp. 233-52). "We have not got to go very far back in the history of philosophy to find philosophers assuming more or less as a matter of course that...the sole interesting business of any utterance - that is, of anything we say - is to be true or at least false...philosophers have assumed that the only things that they are interested in are utterances which report facts or which describe situations truly or falsely" (p. 233). Austin regarded other philosophers' growing interest in the uses of language as a reaction against some
of the excesses which this assumption had led to. The view espoused by some Logical Positivists in their Verifiability Criterion of Meaningfulness, that utterances having the same indicative grammatical form as sentences typically used to make statements were nonsense or meaningless if they lacked a decidable truth-value, is one example of such an excess. "After all, we set some limits to...the amount of nonsense that we are prepared to admit we talk; and so people began to ask whether after all some of those things which, treated as statements, were in danger of being dismissed as nonsense did after all really set out to be statements at all. Mightn't they perhaps be intended not to report facts but to influence people in this way or that, or to let off steam in this way or that?...On these lines people have now adopted a new slogan, the slogan of the 'different uses of language'....the old statemental approach is sometimes called even a fallacy, the descriptive fallacy"(p.234). But Austin saw this new approach, the 'use of language' movement, as being in danger of being taken to excess as well. "It's rather a pity that people are apt to invoke a new use of language whenever they feel so inclined, to help them out of this, that, or the other well-known philosophical tangle;...I think we should not despair too easily and talk, as people are apt to do, about the infinite uses of language"(p.234). Hence the need to distinguish and elucidate specific uses of language. "Certainly there are a great many uses of language....we need more of a framework in which to discuss these uses....Now it is one such sort of use of language that I want to examine here"(pp.234-5).

This use, the performative use of language, is exemplified in the issuing of utterances which are not nonsense, and have in-
dicative grammatical form, but are such that:

"A. they do not 'describe' or 'report' or constate anything at all, are not 'true or false'; and

B. the uttering of the sentence is, or is part of, the doing of an action, which again would not normally be described as, or as 'just', saying something" (Words p.5).

Austin's initial examples of such performative utterances in Words were "I do take this woman to be my lawful wedded wife", as uttered in the course of a marriage ceremony, "I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth", as uttered when smashing the bottle against the stem, "I give and bequeath my watch to my brother", as occurring in a will, and "I bet you sixpence it will rain to-morrow". Of these, Austin said, "...it seems clear that to utter the sentence (in, of course, the appropriate circumstances) is not to describe my doing of what I should be said in so uttering to be doing or to state that I am doing it: it is to do it. None of the utterances cited is either true or false....To name the ship is to say (in the appropriate circumstances) the words 'I name, etc.'. When I say, before the registrar or altar, etc., 'I do', I am not reporting on a marriage: I am indulging in it" (p.6). Some examples of the contrasted type of constative utterances were the truth-valued utterances: "The cat is on the mat", "He is running", "France is hexagonal", "Lord Raglan won the battle of Alma", "He did not do it".

Although Austin's definition and examples of performative utterances on p.5 of Words are only part of the "preliminary isolation of the performative" (p.4), two necessary conditions on an utterance being a performative utterance are already evident there: first, that it is not of a kind which could be either true or false, and second, that the issuing of the utterance is part of an action which is not exhausted by the speaker's
act of saying something but includes what the speaker "should be said in so uttering to be doing"; e.g., marrying in saying "I do", naming in saying "I name, etc.", bequeathing in saying "I give and bequeath, etc.", betting in saying "I bet you".

Thus performative utterances satisfying these conditions, bets, bequests, christenings or namings, promises or vows, etc. are distinguished from truth-valued constative utterances such as statements, descriptions, reports, assertions, etc.

In Lecture II Austin filled out the terms of the performative-constative distinction. For though performatives are not truth-valued, and hence, not assessable as either true or false, it does not follow that they are immune from all assessment or criticism. As utterances, they are liable to the different kinds of fault which may beset any utterance: meaninglessness, ambiguity and vagueness on the one hand, and on the other, not being correctly or completely understood by their addressees. And as products of acts they are liable to the kinds of fault that may mar any product of an act: being unintended, produced by mistake, by accident, under duress, etc. As well as these faults, the products of the acts under consideration here (although not only these, of course) are also liable to the kinds of fault due to the act being attempted or performed in inappropriate circumstances. Austin's stress on the appropriateness of the circumstances in which these acts are satisfactorily performed is clearly evident both from the examples he gives and his comments on them. When, because of some misperformance or because the act is attempted or performed in inappropriate circumstances "...something goes wrong and the act - marrying, betting, bequeathing, christening, or what not - is therefore at least to some extent a failure: the utterance is then, we may
say, not indeed false but in general unhappy" (p. 14). So here is another general dimension of assessment of utterances to set alongside that in which the truth-values of utterances are assessed. What Austin took the bases of these respective types of assessment to be will be discussed presently; what may be noted here is that an utterance's being assessable as either happy or unhappy completes the characterization of a performative utterance. Austin summarized this characterization at the start of Lecture III. "In our first lecture we isolated in a preliminary way the performative utterance as not, or not merely, saying something but doing something, and as not a true or false report of something. In the second, we pointed out that though it was not ever true or false it still was subject to criticism—could be unhappy, and we listed six of these types of Infelicity" (p. 86). And at the start of Lecture XI the performative-constative distinction was fully specified in the following terms: "When we originally contrasted the performative with the constative utterance we said that (1) the performative should be doing something as opposed to just saying something; and (2) the performative is happy or unhappy as opposed to true or false" (p. 133).

There is a widely held and, to the writer's knowledge, nowhere dissented from view of the relationship between the early and later versions of Austin's conception of speech acts. This view is that Austin rejected the performative-constative distinction and replaced it by the distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts. It is not difficult to show that prima facie there is something very wrong with this "reject-and-replace" view. For at the start of Lecture XII, having discussed the two versions in the preceding lecture, Austin said, "The
doctrine of the performative/constative distinction stands to
the doctrine of locutionary and illocutionary acts in the total
speech act as the special theory to the general theory" (p.148).
To relate the two distinctions in this way, albeit one which re-
quires elucidation, is, clearly, not to reject or abandon the
former and replace it by the latter. The signal feature of the
reject-and-replace view is the failure of its proponents to per-
ceive clearly the several necessary conditions on performative
utterances: that they are such that their issuance is part of
an action which is not just an act of saying something and that
they are not of a kind that are assessable as either true or
false but are assessable, rather, as happy or unhappy. These
conditions are jointly sufficient but severally necessary. Thus
an utterance may be such that its issuance is not just (part of)
an act of saying something and hence is assessable as either
happy or unhappy, but if it is also assessable as either true or
false, i.e., is of a kind which is truth-valued, then it is not
a performative utterance but a constative utterance. As it seems
to be a misunderstanding of this point which lies at the bottom
of the error and confusion in the reject-and-replace view, a
discussion of the bases of these respective dimensions of utter-
ance assessment, and the types of utterance that are assessable
on each basis, will not only show why that view is false but
will also clarify the performative-constative distinction and
justify Austin's retention of it.

Austin spelled out the basis for the assessment of an utter-
ance as either happy or unhappy in terms of necessary conditions
for the felicitous performance of the act that a speaker performs
on the occasion of uttering which would not normally be described
as an act of saying something but as what the speaker should be
said in so uttering to be doing. A speaker's utterance is happy or unhappy to the extent that these Felicity conditions are satisfied or not:

"(A.1) There must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a certain conventional effect, that procedure to include the uttering of certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances, and further,

(A.2) the particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked.

(B.1) The procedure must be executed by all participants both correctly and completely.

(F.1) Where, as often, the procedure is designed for use by persons having certain thoughts or feelings or intentions, or for the inauguration of certain consequential conduct on the part of any participant, then a person participating in and so invoking the procedure must in fact have those thoughts or feelings or intentions, and the participants must intend so to conduct themselves, and further

(F.2) must actually so conduct themselves subsequently" (pp. 14-5).

Austin devoted more than two and a half lectures (Lectures II, III and most of IV) to a discussion of these conditions and the different types of infelicity arising from their non-satisfaction. These latter were referred to, respectively, as non-plays, misapplications, flaws, hitches, insincerities and breaches.

This emphasis gives some indication of the importance of these Felicity conditions within Austin's conception of speech acts.

At several places in his lectures (pp. 20, 54-5, 136-40), Austin raised the question of whether some types of constative utterance, e.g., assertions, descriptions, reports, statements, etc., are also subject to assessment on the basis of the Felicity conditions (A.1)-(F.2). His answer was in the affirmative. His discussions of this point, the most detailed of which, con-
centrating on the example of statements, was in Lecture XI, showed not only that utterances of these types are subject to assessment in the happy-unhappy dimension but also that acts of asserting, describing, reporting and stating are as much acts performed in acts of saying something as acts of betting, bequeathing, christening and marrying etc. But this does not collapse the performative-constative distinction. For even though, as Austin said that he had shown, statements, for instance, lack nothing that performatives have (p.140), they, like all constative utterances, have something which performatives do not and which disqualifies them from being performatives: they have truth-values.

The basis for assessment of utterances in terms of truth and falsity was, for Austin, their correspondence to facts. He did not spell out this basis in detail in Words. But a simple view, adequate for utterances whose truth-value is a contingent matter, which can be slotted smoothly into position here is as follows. A speaker using a sentence with certain sense and reference characterizes, according to the tense of the verb, a past, present or future possible state of affairs. The question may then be asked whether the possible state of affairs so characterized by the utterance was, is or will be an actual state of affairs. To ask this question is to ask whether the utterance corresponds to a fact. If the question has an answer in the affirmative, the utterance receives a positive assessment on this basis; if the answer to the question is in the negative, the utterance receives a negative assessment.

When at different stages in his lectures (pp.54-5, 140-5), Austin raised the question of whether some types of performative utterance, though not assessable in terms of truth and falsity,
are assessable on the basis of their correspondence to facts, his answer was again in the affirmative. Taking warnings as one example, he said, "...connected with the performative (I presume it is one) 'I warn you that the bull is about to charge' is the fact, if it is one, that the bull is about to charge: if the bull is not, then indeed the utterance...is open to criticism - but not in any of the ways we have hitherto characterized as varieties of unhappiness...we should feel much more inclined to say the warning was false or (better) mistaken..." (p. 55). In the later, fuller discussion of this point, again in Lecture XI, a similar example drew the comment, "...it is both a warning and true or false that it 'the bull is going to charge' and that comes in in appraising the warning just as much as, though not quite in the same way as, in appraising the statement"(p. 136). Some other examples Austin considered were pieces of advice, judgements of certain kinds and ascriptions of blame. Now while none of these is assessable in terms of truth and falsity, each is subject to some kind of assessment on the basis of its correspondence to fact. The blame a speaker ascribes in saying, e.g., "He did it" is merited or unmerited according as the person referred to by "He" did "it"; a Court judge's finding that the defendant is guilty of negligence is a fair or unfair judgement according as the defendant was or was not negligent; the advice given in saying, e.g., "You should go" is good or bad advice according as the addressee of the utterance should or should not go. So here are cases of some types of performative utterance whose tokens are assessable on the same basis as that upon which the truth-values of constative utterances are assessed. But, again, this does not collapse the performative-constative distinction. For though
these performative utterances are assessable on the same basis
as constative utterances are assessed in terms of truth and
falsity they are not assessed as either true or false on that
basis. Austin summarized the position as follows: "...considerations of the happiness and unhappiness type may infect statements (or some statements)..." (p. 55); "...we found sufficient indications that unhappiness nevertheless seems to characterize both kinds of utterance, not merely the performative; and that the requirement of conforming or bearing some relation to the facts, different in different cases, seems to characterize performatives..." (p. 91); "...considerations of the type of truth and falsity may infect performatives (or some performatives)" (p. 55).

It is on these grounds that some proponents of the reject-and-replace view have claimed that the performative-constative distinction collapses. Such claims betray a misunderstanding of the terms in which that distinction was drawn. For underlying the distinction, there is, introduced in the A. clause of the definition on p. 5 of Words and restated in Austin's summaries on pp. 25 and 133, a distinction between (constative) truth-valued utterances and (performative) utterances that are not truth-valued. This distinction demarcates two classes of utterances that are necessarily mutually exclusive. And neither the second distinction informing the performative-constative distinction, introduced in the B. clause of the definition on p. 5 of Words and drawn in terms of doing and saying, nor the notion of an utterance's assessability as either happy or unhappy with which Austin completed his characterization of the performative utterance, is inconsistent with the performative-constative distinction being a mutually exclusive distinction ranging over ut-
terences. So it is just not the case that the two classes of utterances are identical, as White suggests in saying that the distinction between performatives and constatives "...had broken down...because either can be appraised both in the true/false and in the happy/unhappy dimension" (An. S. (1963) p. 60). Performative utterances such as ascriptions of blame, pieces of advice and Court verdicts, though they may be assessed on the same basis of correspondence to fact as constative utterances are assessed for truth and falsity, are not assessed in the true/false dimension on that basis. Nor, even, is it the case that one class of utterances is a sub-class of the other, e.g., that all constatives are performatives in being assessable in the happy/unhappy dimension as well as the true/false dimension, as Searle suggests in saying, "What was originally supposed to be a special case of utterances (performatives) swallows the general case (constatives)...") (Essays p. 142). There are what Austin called "extreme marginal cases" (Words p. 146) and elsewhere "marginal limiting" (p. 150) cases of utterances that are assessable in only one or other dimension. "Now in certain cases, perhaps with mathematical formulas in physics books as examples of constatives, or with utterances produced in the issuing of simple executive orders or the giving of simple names, say, as examples of performatives, we approximate in real life to finding such things" (p. 146).

The reject-and-replace view exposes a sorry standard of textual exegesis and philosophical acumen. That view would not, perhaps, have gained such widespread acceptance if its proponents had paid more attention to the contemporary philosophical trends impinging on Austin's work and to the influences of those
trends upon his conception of speech acts. An appreciation of the (philosophical) historical circumstances in which a philosopher's work is set seldom hinders and usually helps the understanding of that work. And it is clear, in Austin's case, what the main impinging trends were: first, the working out of the implications of recognizing the Descriptive Fallacy and second, the burgeoning employment of the notion of different uses of language. Although these trends were not unrelated, the latter growing out of the former, they were different, as were Austin's reactions to them. Whereas in the former case Austin tried to show precisely where and why the Descriptive Fallacy was a fallacy, in the latter case, his aim was to refine the notion of use of language by providing a framework in which different species of language-use could be distinguished and elucidated. If the early and later versions of Austin's conception of speech acts are seen as embodying these respective reactions the insights in that conception threatened by the reject-and-replace view can be retrieved.

It was pointed out earlier that this view founders on Austin's relating of the performative-constative distinction to the one between locutionary and illocutionary acts as the special theory to the general theory. His use of this simile was part of his final attempt in *Words* to show just what was wrong with the Descriptive Fallacy. Austin took this fallacy to be the assumption that "...the primary or primitive use of sentences must be ...statemental or constative, in the philosophers' preferred sense of simply uttering something whose sole pretension is to be true or false and which is not liable to criticism in any other dimension" (p. 72). What he took the relationship to be between this assumption and the early version of his conception of
speech acts is clear from the following remark: "This topic is one development—there are many others—in the recent movement towards questioning an age-old assumption in philosophy—the assumption that to say something...is always and simply to state something" (p. 12). Now if Austin's specification of the performative-constative distinction in *Words* (p. 133) is recurred to (i.e., "that (1) the performative should be doing something as opposed to just saying something; and (2) the performative is happy or unhappy as opposed to true or false") it will be seen that the notions used to characterize performative utterances—doing something as opposed to saying something, and utterances that are happy or unhappy as opposed to true or false—are foils for the notions encapsulated in the Descriptive Fallacy: acts of saying something and truth-valued utterances. By drawing each of the distinctions (1) and (2) underlying the performative-constative distinction, Austin exposed different points at which the assumption involved in the Descriptive Fallacy errs. The second distinction, (2) above, not only shows that the assumption is false, simply by demarcating a non-empty class of (performative) utterances that are not truth-valued though they may be meaningful and in the same grammatical form as sentences typically used to make statements. It also exposes the error in assuming that statements are liable to criticism in no other dimension than the true/false one. For in his discussion of the terms in which that distinction was drawn, i.e., the Felicity conditions on the basis of which an utterance is assessed as either happy or unhappy, Austin showed that statements are subject to assessment in this dimension as well. Utterances that are only assessable in the true/false dimension, which usually and swiftly and rather too swiftly had been called 'statements', are in fact special
cases, not the central or primary cases as assumed by proponents of the Descriptive Fallacy. The first distinction, (1) above, exposes the error in assuming that to say something is always and simply to state something. Stating is a type of act which can be performed in saying something but for whose successful and felicitous performance particular sorts of circumstances are required to obtain further to those in which acts of just saying something may be performed. And in this, stating, and other types of act given pre-eminence by the Descriptive Fallacy, e.g., asserting, describing, reporting, etc., are on a par with such other types of act as betting, bequeathing, marrying, christening, promising, warning, blaming, judging, advising, etc., whose tokens may also be performed in acts of saying something. "Stating, describing, etc., are just two names among a very great many others for illocutionary acts; they have no unique position" (pp. 148-9).

What was needed as a corrective for these errors was the view of a statement, not as a type of sentence, but as the product of an act of using a sentence in a particular way. Austin disclaimed originality for this discovery but he did give a new form of expression both to the diagnosis of these errors and to the prescription for their correction. The Descriptive Fallacy had arisen, according to Austin, because of philosophers' concentration on too few types of sentence-use and an over-simplification of those types they had attended to. Not only had a whole general basis of utterance-assessment been ignored - the sort which Austin sketched in terms of his Felicity conditions for the use of sentences - but the basis of assessment to which attention had been given - that of an utterance's correspondence to fact - had been over-simplified by
being regarded as yielding just one dimension of assessment: the true/false dimension. Different types of utterance, ignored by the assumption in the Descriptive Fallacy, are subject to assessment in different dimensions on the same basis; for instance, as warnings are assessable for being misleading or not, verdicts for being fair or unfair, blame for being merited or unmerited, advice for being good or bad, etc. Moreover, some constative utterances are assessable in some of these other dimensions as well; statements can be assessed for being misleading or not, fair or unfair too. "When a constative is confronted with the facts, we in fact appraise it in ways involving the employment of a vast array of terms which overlap with those we use in the appraisal of performatives" (pp.142-3).

What Austin prescribed in his conception of speech acts as a corrective for these errors was a general theory of the species of sentence-use exemplified by acts performed in saying something, the need for which "...arises simply because the traditional 'statement' is an abstraction, an ideal, and so is its traditional truth or falsity" (p.148), and for which the locutionary-illocutionary distinction provides a partial outline. Such a theory construes differences between utterances of the types statement, description, warning, judgement, advice, bet, promise, order, etc. as determined by the different types of (illocutionary) act performed in (locutionary) acts of saying something in particular types of speech act situation. It will explain not only how sentences are used in these ways, i.e., their illocutionary forces, but also, how the type of force which an utterance has determines the particular dimension(s) of assessment on the basis of correspondence with fact to which an utterance is exposed by virtue of its being issued with a certain
sense and reference. In general, therefore, utterances are assessable on both bases; both on the basis of whether the act performed in issuing the utterance is felicitous or not and on the basis of its correspondence with fact. Only special cases, the "extreme, marginal, limiting cases" - "pure performatives" and "pure constatives" - are assessable on just one basis. "(a) With the constative utterance, we abstract from the illocutionary (let alone the perlocutionary) aspects of the speech act, and we concentrate on the locutionary: moreover, we use an over-simplified notion of correspondence with the facts - over-simplified because essentially it brings in the illocutionary aspect. This is the ideal of what would be right to say in all circumstances, for any purpose, to any audience, etc. Perhaps it is sometimes realized. (b) With the performative utterance, we attend as much as possible to the illocutionary force of the utterance, and abstract from the dimension of correspondence with facts" (pp. 145-6).

One conclusion that may be drawn from the reject-and-replace view, and one which most of its proponents seem to have acted on, is that Austin's effective discussion of his conception of speech acts started at the end of Lecture VII and what preceded that is of little consequence. For instance, the selection from Words in Rosenberg and Travis' collection includes only Lectures VIII, IX and XI. By thus encouraging a neglect of the first half of Austin's lectures, the reject-and-replace view puts at risk one important insight concerning a type of theory which is not appropriate for elucidating the performative use of language and several insights concerning the type of theory that is.

Because it can be the case that "the same sentence is used on different occasions of utterance in both ways, performative
and constative", hopes of being able to identify performative utterances by particular syntactic or lexical features of sentences are doomed. Such hopes have little justification from the outset, however, in view of Austin's introduction of performative utterances as utterances having the same grammatical form as constative utterances though differing from the latter in lacking a truth-value. The main burden of Austin's fifth, sixth and seventh lectures was to show that no criterion couched in terms of either syntactic or lexical features of sentences, or any combination of these, sufficed to identify performative utterances. Issued token sentences constructed around their main verb in any mood, in either voice and in any tense, with the subject term in first, second or third person, singular or plural, can be performative utterances. No particular person, tense, voice or mood is either a necessary or sufficient condition for an issued token sentence being a performative utterance; nor is the inclusion of any particular word in an issued token sentence a necessary or sufficient condition for its being a performative utterance. No criterion specifying a combination of lexical and syntactic features of sentences fares any better. For instance, it is not a necessary condition for an issued token sentence being a performative utterance that it be constructed around a verb, in the first person present indicative active, which could otherwise be used to name the type of act that the speaker may be performing in issuing the sentence. For contrasted to the explicit performative utterances satisfying this condition, "I promise that I shall go", "I order you to go" and "I question his suitability for the job", there are the primary or implicit performative utterances, "I' ll go", "Go!" and "Is he suitable?", in saying which
the speaker may, respectively, be promising, ordering or ques-
tioning just as felicitously. (The distinction between primary
and explicit performative utterances is discussed further on
pp. 80-1 below.) Nor is it a sufficient condition for being a
performative utterance that the issued token sentence is in the
form of an explicit performative utterance. If a speaker states
something in saying, "I state that he did not do it", then his
utterance is not a performative but a constative utterance.

Austin discussed other defects of such a criterion in Lectures
V-VII. His demonstration in these lectures that no linguistic
criterion could be formulated for identifying utterances exem-
plifying the specific use of language which his conception of
speech acts was designed to elucidate strikes a cautionary note
against trying to elucidate that use and develop that concep-
tion within the framework of a theory of language or part of a
theory of language such as a theory of syntax. This point has
been lost on philosophers such as Vendler (in Res Cogitans) and
Searle (in "A classification of illocutionary acts") - each a
proponent of the reject-and-replace view - as well as some
theorists of linguistics who attempt to explain this use of
language in terms of linguistic descriptions of the deep struc-
tures of sentences. These attempts have been criticized by
other theorists of linguistics as well as by Cohen (in "Speech
Acts") and Holdcroft (in "Indicatives, Performatives and Deep
Structure"). What these latter discussions fail to bring out,
however, is that such attempts show a radical misunderstanding
of the purpose of Austin's conception of speech acts and that as
attempts to develop that conception, they are misdirected. It was
a specific use of language that that conception was designed to
elucidate, use rather than language, and for this purpose, clear-
ly, a theory of action is more appropriate than a theory of language.

Austin's introduction of the distinctions between locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts at the end of Lecture VII and through Lecture VIII was not the new, radical point of departure in his conception of speech acts suggested by the reject-and-replace view. These distinctions had been adumbrated as early as Lecture II when Austin said, "We were to consider, you will remember, some cases and senses in which to say something is to do something; or in which by saying or in saying something we are doing something" (p. 12). So pace White, Austin's moves in Lectures VII and VIII were not a case of Austin starting all over again and considering de novo these different senses (An.S. (1965) p. 60). Austin said, "We want to reconsider more generally..." these senses (Words p. 91); and by way of summary at the start of Lecture VIII, "...it seemed that we were going to find it not always easy to distinguish performative utterances from constative, and it therefore seemed expedient to go farther back for a while to fundamentals - to consider from the ground up how many senses there are in which to say something is to do something, or in saying something we do something..." (p. 94 underlining added). When Austin said, "It is time then to make a fresh start on the problem" (p. 91), he was not starting all over again de novo; he was going back to the distinction, introduced in the B. clause of the definition on p. 5 of Words, between acts of saying something and acts performed on the occasion of uttering which would not normally be described as acts of saying something but rather as what the speaker should be said in so uttering to be doing. This distinction had lain fallow since being drawn in the open-
ing lecture with only two passing references being made to it in the following six lectures; once on p. 13 and again on p. 47:

"This is one way in which we might justify the 'performative-constative' distinction - as a distinction between doing and saying". It was only at the end of Lecture VII that Austin took up this distinction in earnest ("It is time to refine upon the circumstances of 'issuing an utterance'" (p. 92)) and then developed it in terms of the distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts. The distinction runs through Austin's conception of speech acts from beginning to end: "... these two kinds of acts (illocutionary and locutionary) seem to be the very things which we tried to use, under the names of 'doing' and 'saying', as a means of distinguishing performatives from constatives" (p. 133).

Austin's characterization of different species of language-use in terms of different kinds of doing associated with saying can be seen as a move towards describing the phenomenon which he was concerned to elucidate in terms which makes it amenable to subsumption under a theory of action. The reject-and-replace view obscures this fact by failing to show clearly that the crucially important distinction between (locutionary) acts of saying something and (illocutionary) acts performed in saying something was drawn in both versions of Austin's conception of speech acts. And by effectively bifurcating Austin's lectures, that view obscures the relevance of Austin's discussion in his early lectures to the later version. For instance, Austin's statement and discussion of the Felicity conditions in Lectures II-IV is the closest approach in his published work to a statement and discussion of the general conditions for the specific use of language which his conception was designed to elucidate.
One effect of the reject-and-replace view's encouragement to neglect these lectures can be seen in the total neglect in post-Austinian developments in speech act theory of the notion which featured so prominently in his statement of the Felicity conditions: the notion of a conventional procedure.

Austin did not pretend to have provided a formula for identifying illocutionary acts performed in speech act situations comparable in precision to the basic normal forms of indirect quotation for identifying locutionary acts. The formula "In saying that..., S was v-ing" which he was prepared to use with caution for this purpose does not, when filled out as a report of a speech act situation, exclude all acts other than the illocutionary act that may be performed in that situation. But in the copious literature on the subject published subsequently to *Words* no improvement on this formula has been suggested; nor, regrettably, is one to be offered here. This lack is not serious, however. There is, even among critics of Austin's conception of speech acts, agreement with him on a large body of examples of types of illocutionary acts. These examples, some of which have been mentioned here already, provide an adequate basis from which to defend and develop that conception. The distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts will be made more clear in the next section, in the course of defending it against some objections.

In "Austin on Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts" (*Essays* pp.141-59) Searle argues in support of two objections against this distinction. The weaker of the two is that it is not a completely general distinction, in the sense of marking off two mutually exclusive classes of acts, because some members of the
class of locutionary acts are members of the class of illocutionary acts. His stronger objection is that there really is no distinction at all in this sense because all the members of the class of locutionary acts are members of the class of illocutionary acts. Searle summarizes his argument in support of the first objection as follows: "The concept of an utterance with a certain meaning (that is, the concept of a locutionary act) is indeed a different concept from the concept of an utterance with a certain force (that is, the concept of an illocutionary act). But there are many sentences whose meaning is such as to determine that the serious utterance of the sentence with its literal meaning has a particular force. Hence the class of illocutionary acts will contain members of the class of locutionary acts. The concepts are different but they denote overlapping classes" (p.144). Searle's example of a joint member of these classes is an uttering of the sentence, "I hereby promise that I am going to do it", of which he says, "Its serious and literal utterance must be a promise....The meaning of the sentence determines an illocutionary force of its utterances in such a way that serious utterances of it with that literal meaning will have that particular force. The description of the act as a happily performed locutionary act, since it involves the meaning of the sentence, is already a description of the illocutionary act, since a particular illocutionary act is determined by that meaning. They are one and the same act" (p.143).

The point of this objection is not that locutionary and illocutionary acts are acts of identical types. Searle apparently allows this type difference by admitting that the respective concepts of locutionary and illocutionary acts are distinct.
His point here is that at least in some cases, a token of one of these types of act may also be a token of the other type; one and the same act may be both a locutionary and an illocutionary act. The point is mistaken, however. The identity conditions of a token locutionary act are not the same as those of a token illocutionary act. Conditions further to the necessary and sufficient conditions for a successful performance of the former have to be satisfied for a performance of the latter to be successful. In particular, the circumstances of the situation in which a locutionary act is performed have to be appropriate in certain ways for any attempt therein at an illocutionary act to be successful. And some sorts of inappropriate circumstances are sufficient to frustrate such an attempt without impairing the success of the locutionary act. For example, if unexpectedly and unbeknown to the speaker at the time of his seriously and literally uttering "I hereby promise that I am going to do it", and continuously thereafter, it is impossible for him to do "it", then while he may have successfully performed a locutionary act, his attempt to promise therein will not be successful. In such a case the purported promise is void. This can be seen from the fact that the speaker would not be said to have broken his promise when he fails, perforce of these circumstances, to do what he said that he promises to do. The point has general application. It is generally the case that additional circumstances to those obtaining when a locutionary act is successfully performed are required to obtain for any attempted illocutionary act to be successfully performed. These circumstances are of the sort alluded to in Austin's (A.2) Felicity condition. Now Searle seems to take this point when he subsequently considers a possible defence of Austin's
distinction along these lines (pp. 144-6). He even provides an example of his own to illustrate it - that of a putative order given by a speaker lacking the requisite authority. Searle dismisses the point on the grounds that it reduces the distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts to one between trying to perform an illocutionary act and succeeding in doing so, a distinction which he claims is not only different but less interesting than the original. But by dismissing the point in this way, Searle shows that he has failed to appreciate the force of the counter-objection. That a speaker can attempt to perform an illocutionary act in performing a locutionary act, and succeed in the latter but fail in the former demonstrates that these acts have different identity conditions and hence, that even when an illocutionary act is successfully performed in a locutionary act it is mistaken and misleading to talk of the one as identical with the other in such terms as "one and the same act".

Searle's objection gains a measure of plausibility from his identification of the concepts of a locutionary act and an illocutionary act with those respectively of an utterance with a certain meaning and an utterance with a certain force. Given this assimilation, his objection seems plausible because it seems plausible to maintain that an utterance with a certain meaning could also be an utterance with a certain force. Searle, in fact, introduces Austin's distinction in these terms and suggests that Austin did likewise. "As initially presented, it is the distinction between uttering a sentence with a certain meaning, in one sense of 'meaning' which Austin characterizes as 'sense and reference' (the locutionary act) and uttering a sentence with a certain force (the illocutionary act)" (p.142). Set-
ting aside for the moment the question of whether this was actually the way Austin introduced his distinction, it can be seen that this move of Searle's reduces locutionary and illocutionary acts to the same type of act, viz., utterings. If this is consistent with Searle's previously noted admission that the respective concepts of these acts are distinct, the content of that admission is now unclear. But this apart, his reduction of illocutionary acts to the same type of act as locutionary acts involves a category confusion. Locutionary acts, acts of saying something, are utterings of a certain type; illocutionary acts are not. Any two locutionary acts performed in oral speech act situations can be compared in terms of their relative loudness or softness but the same comparison cannot be made between illocutionary acts. If Galileo did say "Eppur si muove" rising from his knees after reciting the formula renouncing his Copernican views, then he performed two illocutionary acts: an abjuration and an objection. But he did not perform a loud abjuration followed by a soft objection. Similarly, a sergeant bawling out orders to the squad of soldiers being drilled on the parade ground is not therein ordering loudly, noisily, sonorously or stridently. Nor if someone makes a request in a whisper is she requesting quietly, softly or pianissimo. Acts of promising are not loud or soft, nor can someone listen for them or literally be deaf to them. "Did you hear him promise?" is an ellipsis for "Did you hear him say that he promises?" just as "Did you hear him order the advance?" is elliptical for "Did you hear him give the order to advance?". This latter question makes sense whereas "Did you hear him order to advance?" does not; "Did you hear him say to advance?" does. "He was deaf to all our entreaties" is just a
figure of speech. It is simply a category confusion to as-
similate, as Searle does, acts of these different types. The
Austinian formula, "In saying that..., S was v-ing", express-
ing the relationship between locutionary and illocutionary acts,
if it does nothing else, serves to mark the distinction between
acts of these types for the relation expressed by that formula
does not have all the formal features of an identity relation.
For example, "In saying that he promises to go, he was promising
to go" expresses an asymmetric and irreflexive relation.

Nor, to return to the point deferred a moment ago, is it the
case that Austin introduced his distinction between these acts
as one between uttering a sentence with a certain meaning and
uttering a sentence with a certain force. As initially presented
the distinction is one between different species of language-use,
drawn in terms of different types of act performed in a speech
act situation and isolating the specific use of language that
Austin's conception of speech acts was designed to elucidate.
Characterizing this use in terms of a type of act performed by a
speaker in saying something indicates the sort of theory in
whose terms the species of language-use is to be elucidated: a
theory of action rather than a theory of language or part of a
theory of language such as a theory of meaning. When Austin did
come to broach the meaning-force distinction, after introducing
the distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts, it
was expressly to set aside and warn against giving an explana-
tion of this species of language-use in terms of a theory of
meaning. "Yet still perhaps we are too prone to give these ex-
planations in terms of 'the meanings of words'. Admittedly we can
use 'meaning' also with reference to illocutionary force - 'He
meant it as an order', etc. But I want to distinguish force and
meaning in the sense in which meaning is equivalent to sense and reference, just as it has become essential to distinguish sense and reference"(Words p.100). Searle's programme for elucidating the nature of illocutionary acts in terms of a theory of meaning, foreshadowed in his assertion that "...the study of the meanings of sentences and the study of the illocutionary acts which could be performed in the utterances of sentences are not two different studies, but one and the same study from two different points of view"(Essays p.154), not only runs counter to this warning but warps Austin's conception of speech acts beyond recognizable shape. For where that conception was designed to elucidate a specific use of language in terms of a theory of action, Searle's programme is aimed at elucidating a type of act in terms of a theory of meaning.

The reasons for the failure of Searle's weaker objection against Austin's distinction, viz., that the identity conditions for a token locutionary act and any illocutionary act performed therein are different, and that it is a category confusion to assimilate the different types of act, are also reasons for the failure of his stronger objection. But Searle supports this objection, that every member of the class of locutionary acts is a member of the class of illocutionary acts, with a different argument which must be examined independently. The argument turns on Austin's use of various forms of report to distinguish the different types of act. It embodies three claims (pp.146-7):

(C.1) that Austin used the forms of direct and indirect quotation to identify, respectively, not only phatic and rhetoric acts but also locutionary and illocutionary acts,

(C.2) that the verb phrases in the reports of rhetoric acts invariably contain illocutionary verbs and hence in charac-
Characterizing rhetic acts Austin characterized them as illocutionary acts, and

(C.3) that there is no way to give an indirect speech report of a rhetic act which does not turn the report into a report of an illocutionary act.

Searle's argument, then, is that Austin used the form of indirect quotation to identify both rhetic and illocutionary acts; these are therefore identical acts, and since a token rhetic act is equivalent to a token locutionary act, a token locutionary act is equivalent to a token illocutionary act -- there is no distinction between them. However, each of Searle's claims (C.1)-(C.3) is false.

In support of (C.1) Searle cites Austin's own examples of reports of acts of the various types (Words pp.95, 101-2):

**Phatic acts**

(Ph.1) He said "The cat is on the mat".
(Ph.2) He said "I shall be there".
(Ph.3) He said "Get out".
(Ph.4) He said "Is it in Oxford or Cambridge?"

**Rhetic acts**

(Rh.1) He said (that) the cat was on the mat.
(Rh.2) He said he would be there.
(Rh.3) He told me to get out.
(Rh.4) He asked whether it was in Oxford or Cambridge.

**Locutionary acts**

(A.1) He said to me "Shoot her!" meaning by "shoot" shoot and referring by "her" to her.
(A.2) He said to me "You can't do that" meaning by "can't do" cannot do and referring by "You" to me and by "that" to what I was going to do.

**Illocutionary Acts**

(B.1) He urged (or advised, ordered, etc.) me to shoot her.
(B.2) He protested against my doing it.
From these examples it is clear that Austin did use the forms of direct and indirect quotation to identify phatic and rhetic acts, but equally clear that he did not use these forms to identify locutionary and illocutionary acts. The reports of locutionary acts, (A.2) filled out in a fashion indicated by the form of (A.1), are not exhausted by direct quotations of the speaker's words. The first part of each report, including just the direct quotation, is a report of the (phonetic and) phatic component(s) of the locutionary act; the remainder, specifying the sense and reference with which the quoted words were used, is a report of the rhetic component of the locutionary act. So in this form of report of locutionary acts, Austin included reports of each of the component acts involved and quite consistently used direct quotation for reporting only the phatic act. Searle is quite mistaken, then, to claim that Austin used this form of report for identifying locutionary acts. He is similarly mistaken in claiming that Austin used the form of indirect quotation for identifying illocutionary acts. Such reports of the utterances "Shoot her!" and "You can't do that" would be "He said that I am/was to shoot her" and "He said that I cannot do that" and neither of these is the example of the report of the illocutionary act which Austin gave. His examples, (B.1) and (B.2), are not indirect quotations, not reports of what was said, but reports of what was done in saying what was said. So Searle's first claim is false.

His second claim fares no better, i.e., (C.2), that the verb phrases in the reports of rhetic acts invariably contain illocutionary verbs and hence, in characterizing rhetic acts Austin characterized them as illocutionary acts. A test of absolute minimal strictness for a verb "v" being an illocutionary
verb is whether "v" can occur in the formula "In saying that..., S was v-ing". This test is minimally strict in the sense that while the relation between any rhetic or locutionary act and an illocutionary act performed therein can be expressed in this form, numerous instances of the use of this formula can be imagined which yield reports which are not reports of such relations. But because of the irreflexivity of the relation expressed by that formula, the verb "say" fails even this test. "In saying that he would be there, he was saying that he would be there" is just a pleonasm. Nor is it the case that the verb "ask", which Austin also used in giving examples of reports of rhetic acts, is invariably an illocutionary verb. There is a fairly clearly discernible ambiguity on "ask" as between its uses to report rhetic and illocutionary acts. For example, it is used to report the rhetic acts but cannot be used to report truly the illocutionary act in "In asking if she would close the door on her way out, he was telling her to leave", - the speaker's words were "You'll close the door on your way out, won't you?". Conversely, "ask" is used to report the illocutionary act but cannot be used to report truly the rhetic act in "In saying that he was sorry and that he could not hear you, he was asking you to repeat what you said", - the speaker's words were "I'm sorry. I couldn't hear you". It is only this ambiguity on the word "ask" which prevents "In asking whether it was in Oxford or Cambridge, he was asking whether it was in Oxford or Cambridge" from being pleonastic as well. Now it is true that in one example of a report of a rhetic act, (Rh.3), Austin did use the illocutionary verb "tell". But this slip is inconsequential. As has already been shown, a report of this rhetic act can be cast in one of the basic normal forms of in-
direct quotation: "He said that I was to get out." It is quite untrue, however, for Searle to say that "the verbs in Austin's examples of indirect-speech reports of rhetic acts are all illocutionary verbs of a very general kind, which stand in relation to the verbs in his reports of illocutionary acts as genus to species" (Essays p.147). The verbs "say" and "ask" as used in one or other of the basic normal forms of indirect quotation are not illocutionary verbs, whether of a very general kind or no. So, Austin's slip with "He told me to get out" aside, Searle's second claim is false.

The collapse of this claim brings down his third claim as well, i.e., (C.3), that there is no way to give an indirect speech report of a rhetic act which does not turn the report into a report of an illocutionary act. The basic normal forms of indirect quotation, "S said that..." and "S asked...", provide the means for giving such reports. True reports of speech act situations cast in either of these forms are reports of the rhetic acts performed in those situations. They are not reports of the illocutionary acts performed by the speakers, for "say" and "ask" as used in these reports are not illocutionary verbs and these reports leave unspecified which illocutionary act, if any, was performed in issuing the reported utterance.

The failure of Searle's argument in support of his stronger objection to Austin's distinction is due to his misunderstanding of Austin's use of quotation devices to identify some of the acts performed in a speech act situation. Searle is not alone in this misunderstanding. For example, Holdcroft in "Doubts About the Locutionary Illocutionary Distinction" (I.S.P. (1974)pp.5-16) says that Austin used both direct and indirect
quotation for reporting locutionary acts (pp.7-8). And For-
guson, in a reply to Searle in "Locutionary and Illocutionary
Acts" (Essays pp.160-85) in which he attempts to defend Austin's
distinction, takes the points of Searle's first two claims :
(c.1) and (c.2). Forguson engages in a long and involved apology
on Austin's behalf about the rationale and limitations of quo-
tation devices which is designed to show that the potentially
embarrassing feature of the necessity of using illocutionary
verbs in indirect speech reports of rhetic acts is a red herring.
Forguson's account is not, in all respects, correct. For example,
he claims that the rationale for the use of oratio recta for re-
porting locutionary acts is provided by the recognition that an
utterance may be meaningful and worth reporting even if the in-
tended force is ambiguous (p.176). But in such cases, the use of
ortia obliqua is equally, if not more, appropriate. "He said
that he will do it" may be used to report the meaning of a
speaker's utterance "I'll do it", even if the force of the utter-
ance is ambiguous as between that of a threat, a warning, a pre-
diction, a promise or a statement of intention. But the main
point against Forguson is that no apology on Austin's behalf is
required. Searle's claims (c.1)-(c.3) are false and his argument
against Austin's distinction, based on those claims, just does
not get started.

Vendler is another who has demonstrated, unwittingly, a mis-
understanding of the use of direct and indirect quotation devices
for reporting some of the different acts performed in a speech
act situation (Rea Cogitans pp.55-7). Vendler would take a dim
view of the "S said that..." form of indirect quotation as it
has been introduced and deployed here. For he claims "...that
indirect quotation does not by any means consist in a blind application of 'said that' followed by the original utterance or some slightly revised version of it"(p.56) and asserts that "...telling what somebody said will consist in specifying the illocutionary act that person performed. Consequently any such report will begin by indicating the illocutionary force: 'He stated...suggested...promised...ordered...praised...' etc."(p.55). Indeed, Vendler is loath to allow the use of the verb "say" in any non-defective indirect speech report. The use of this verb is proscribed by his normal form of indirect quotation:

\[ \text{I V} \text{ nom (N t (V) nom (N V +))} \]

"...where the suffixes mean performative (verb) and human (noun) and \( t \) indicates the tense mark (past) on the second performative" (p.57). An indirect quotation in this form of the utterance "I order you to attack" would be "I report that he ordered me to attack". And it can be quickly shown that an indirect quotation constructed around the verb "say" does not meet the conditions imposed by Vendler's normal form. "I report that he said that he orders me to attack" moves the performative verb of the original utterance to a position that is marked for a non-performative verb; "I report that he said that I was to attack" is defective according to Vendler because it leaves the illocutionary force of the original utterance unspecified. Vendler shies away from openly stating the conclusion to which his account of indirect quotation drives him, i.e., that the use of "say" is out of place in any adequate indirect quotation. He allows that such use can sometimes be in order, but only, it seems, because "say" is a very general performative verb which can stand in for the more specific performative verbs: "state", "suggest", "promise", "order", "praise", etc.(p.55). But this grudging concession is
not enough; "say" is not a performative verb, even on Vendler's own definition of such verbs (p. 7 fn. 2) since its use does not make explicit the illocutionary force of an utterance. Moreover, Vendler's antipathy towards the use of "say" in correct and adequate indirect quotation is clear from his comments on four alternative indirect quotations of the utterance "I order you to attack", all cast in the form "S said that..." : (p. 56)

(1) He said that he ordered me to attack.
(2) He said that he had ordered me to attack.
(3) He said that I should attack.
(4) He said that he orders me to attack.

Vendler advances reasons for rejecting each of (1)-(4) but none of these is a good reason for rejecting the use of "say" in such reports.

Vendler claims that (1) is ungrammatical and misleading. It is difficult to see how it could be both of these; if it was ungrammatical it could be neither misleading nor not misleading. But the grammatical faults of (1) are not apparent and if it is misleading it is not because of the occurrence of the verb "say" but because (1) would be used more correctly to report an utterance of "I ordered you to attack" than "I order you to attack".

Vendler claims that (2) is grammatically correct but false. This claim is true but (2) is false, again, not because of the use of "say", but because (2) could only be true of the utterance(s) "I (have/had) ordered you to attack". Vendler claims that (3) is grammatically correct, true but vague (and therefore defective) because the use of "say" in place of "order" leaves the illocutionary force of the original utterance unspecified. But (3) is inaccurate. It would be more accurate as a report of "You should attack" or even, though rather imprecisely, of "I advise you to
attack" rather than "I order you to attack". The truth of an indirect quotation is not impugned by the use of "say" but by how inaccurate or imprecise it is as a paraphrase of the original utterance. And that quite satisfactory indirect quotations can be given of utterances whose illocutionary forces are unclear (as in "You should attack", wherein the addressee may have been ordered, told or advised to attack) shows, contra Vendler, that it is not a function of such reports to include a specification of the illocutionary force of the utterance.

Vendler's initial comment on (4) is that it "...is an interesting specimen. The tense goes from 'order' to 'say', leaving 'order' tenseless - a bloodless appendage to 'say'"(p.56). This feature of the report amounts to a failure to satisfy one of Vendler's conditions on satisfactory indirect quotation, which is expressed in his normal form, that the performative verb occurring in the original utterance is reproduced in its past tense. In a footnote on p.57 Vendler makes it clear that he regards a report such as (4) "and the like" - presumably, all reports of explicit performative utterances cast in the form "S said that..." with the performative prefix reproduced in the present tense - as dubious exceptions. But it is hardly true that such reports are exceptions. "He said that he orders me to attack" may be used quite unexceptionably to answer the question "What did he say?" Nor need this example be frozen fast to. "He said that he warns us not to do it again", "He said that he advises us to act cautiously in the future", "She said that she apologizes for what happened last night", "She said that she promises not to do it again" are all examples of unexceptionable indirect quotations cast in the form "S said that..." with the performative verb of the original utterance reproduced in the present tense. Such examples are "dubious"
only in so far as they are effective counter-examples to Vendler's account of indirect quotation. But it is, surely, just absurd to maintain, what follows from that account, that the use of "say" is never in order in a completely non-defective indirect quotation. Nor is the origin of this absurdity difficult to trace. For Vendler repeatedly identifies acts of saying something, locutionary acts, with illocutionary acts (pp. 6, 25, 53, 54, 55). Hence his claim that a correct report of what a speaker said should contain a specification of the illocutionary force of the utterance, the illocutionary act performed in issuing the utterance. And Vendler attributes to Austin the view that to say something in the full sense of "say" is to perform an illocutionary act. Not only is this a gross misrepresentation of Austin's view but the absurdity to which Vendler's account leads, that the verb "say" has no place in correct indirect quotation, is an effective reductio ad absurdum of not drawing a clear distinction between these different types of act.

Parallel to the distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts, Austin distinguished the locutionary meanings and illocutionary forces of utterances. The distinctions are not co-ordinate; each of the terms of the latter distinction is derivative upon the respective terms of the former distinction. An utterance has an illocutionary force of a particular type (say, $F$) if and only if an illocutionary act of type $F$ is performed in issuing the utterance: (Words p. 150). An utterance has locutionary meaning if and only if the pheme produced as part of the issuing of the utterance, or its constituents, is used with a certain more or less definite sense and reference in conformity with the semantic conventions of the language.
The apparent tension in Austin's conception of speech acts, evident in this general specification of the locutionary meaning of an utterance by way of a general specification of the rhetic act performed as part of a locutionary act, is only apparent. Because a rhetic act presupposes the performance of a phatic act and these two presuppose the performance of a phonetic act and these three together are sufficient for the performance of a locutionary act, the performance of a rhetic act is equivalent to the performance of a locutionary act. When and only when there is one, there is the other.

Austin's concept of illocutionary force and the accompanying distinction between the meaning and force of an utterance have been subjected to quite hostile criticism by Cohen in "Do Illocutionary Forces Exist?" (Symp. pp. 420-44). However, there is much rhetoric and little cogent argument against Austin's position in Cohen's rather long article. The main points with which Cohen tries to justify a negative answer to the title question are made in section II of his article and it is only these which will be dealt with here. The discussion in sections III and IV adds nothing of consequence to his argument and section I is just a fairly accurate summary of the main points of Austin's eighth, ninth, and tenth lectures. Cohen begins by taking advantage of the lacunae in Austin's account of meaning in terms of sense and reference to suggest three possible interpretations, each of which is objectionable. However, none of these objections is as serious for Austin's distinction between meaning and force as Cohen makes it out to be. For instance, Cohen claims, correctly, that it is the meaning of a whole utterance rather than the meaning of its parts which Austin wished to distinguish from its illocutionary force, but claims that by
"sense" and "reference" Austin must, therefore, have meant the sense and reference of a whole utterance, since the sense and reference of an utterance's component words or phrases are insufficient to determine the meaning of the whole utterance. "He would have had to cite sense, reference and word-order instead, for he could hardly have wanted to ascribe the same meaning to 'George hit John' and 'John hit George'" (p.423). But the word-order of an utterance is accommodated in Austin's account of locutionary acts in terms of the phatic act performed as part of an act of saying something. Moreover, the notion of word-order is a syntactic rather than a semantic one, and even if syntactic features of utterances do help to determine the meaning of a whole utterance in some sense of that rather obscure phrase, it does not follow that such features are part of the meaning of an utterance, on a level with sense and reference. Cohen goes on to mention several features of Frege's theory of sense and reference of whole utterances which are claimed to be disadvantageous for Austin's purposes. But Austin is not committed to Frege's theory of the sense and reference of whole utterances by his use of the terms "sense" and "reference" and in the text of his lectures there is no evidence to suggest that Austin did adopt this theory. The little that Austin did have to say in his lectures about meaning, which is, incidentally, another indication that he did not intend his conception of speech acts to be developed within the framework of a theory of meaning, is not, however, so little as to prevent any defence from being put up against Cohen's criticisms. There is sufficient material in Austin's lectures to construct a working definition of "locutionary meaning" which is adequate for defending his distinction between meaning and force against
Cohen's criticisms. Austin located the meaning of an utterance in the rheme - the product of the (rhetic) act of using the pheme, or its constituents, with a certain more or less definite sense and reference. Any rhetic act performed in a speech act situation can be identified by a true indirect speech report - in basic normal form - of that situation, and an indirect quotation in that form is true if and only if it contains a paraphrase of the reported utterance. The locutionary meaning of an utterance is, therefore, what is specified by the content of a true indirect quotation of the utterance in either of the forms "S said that..." or "S asked...". Cohen ignores this point and it does not seem to have been fully appreciated by Strawson in "Austin and 'Locutionary Meaning'" (Essays pp.46-68).³

Cohen concludes these initial sallies against Austin's notion of locutionary meaning with the rather sharp remark that "...in some respects it seems doubtful whether Austin can have had any clear idea of meaning at all here" (Symp. p.424). This remark is unjustified and it suggests, equally unjustifiably, that if Austin's ideas about meaning were confused then his attempt to distinguish illocutionary force from locutionary meaning may be equally confused. Cohen reinforces this suggestion by implying that there is an inconsistency between Austin's views that every utterance except for exclamations has both meaning and force because both a locutionary and an illocutionary act is performed, and that where there is an explicit performative there is an illocutionary act. "When we say 'I warn you that' or 'I order you to' as an explicit performative, we perform the illocutionary act of warning or ordering, respectively. But what locutionary act do we then perform? What is the
meaning of our utterance, as distinct from its illocutionary force?" (p. 424). But neither "I warn you that" nor "I order you to" exemplify explicit performatives and the uttering of either of these phrases would not be the performance of a locutionary act in which an illocutionary act of warning or ordering could be performed. In giving these phrases as examples of explicit performatives Cohen has mistaken performative prefixes for explicit performative utterances. Austin made it clear from the outset of his lectures that he was using "performative" as short for "performative utterance" or "performative sentence" (Words, p. 6), so the uttering of a performative requires the uttering of a whole sentence. A similar requirement holds for the performance of a locutionary act. Austin also devoted some space to the distinction between explicit and implicit performatives (pp. 52-3) or between explicit and primary performatives (pp. 69-77). Performative prefixes such as:

(1.a) I warn you that, or
(2.a) I order you to

appended to implicit or primary performatives such as:

(1.b) Your haystack is on fire, or
(2.b) Go to London!

transform the latter into the explicit performatives:

(1) I warn you that your haystack is on fire, and
(2) I order you to go to London.

The function of the prefix is to make explicit the type of illocutionary act whose performance is being attempted in the issuing of the utterance, or, what is the same, to make explicit the intended force of the utterance. Its function is not to describe, report or state the type of act being attempted, nor to describe, report or state anything. For although this device is perhaps
the most effective for this purpose, the same function is shared by other linguistic devices: grammatical mood, adverbs and adverbial phrases, connecting particles, intonation, stress, emphasis, etc., and it would not be said of these devices that their function is to describe, report or state something. So within the framework of Austin's conception of speech acts, Cohen's questions "What locutionary act do we perform?" and "What is the meaning of our utterance, as distinct from its illocutionary force?" posed with reference to either (1, a) or (2, a) are just incoherent. When asked of examples of actual explicit performatives such as (1) and (2) these questions are coherent, but then they do not expose any tension within Austin's conception. The locutionary acts performed are the acts of uttering the sentences (1) and (2) with more or less definite sense and reference. The meaning of each utterance is what would be specified by the content of the "that"-clause of an indirect speech report of each utterance; e.g., "He said that he warns me that my haystack is on fire" and "He said that he orders me to go to London", as reported by the addressee of each utterance. And if the illocutionary act that one might normally expect to be performed in the uttering of each sentence is successfully performed, then the illocutionary force of each utterance is, respectively, that of a warning and an order. And this may be reported in such forms as "He warned me that my haystack was on fire" and "He ordered me to go to London". If, on the other hand, these illocutionary acts are for some reason not successfully performed - if, for example, the addressee of the 'warning' already knows that his haystack is in flames, or the person giving the 'order' lacks the requisite authority - then the respective utterances lack the force of a warning or
an order. Even so, in these different circumstances the meanings of the utterances may be the same; the indirect speech reports of the utterances may be true whether or not the utterances have the specific illocutionary forces their speakers intend. Indeed, this form of report seems especially appropriate for reporting the unhappy situation where an utterance lacks a particular force: "He said that he warns me....But I knew that already" and "He said that he orders me....But he can't order me around". The point these examples illustrate, that utterances with the same meaning may have or lack a particular illocutionary force, is evidence for the distinction Austin drew between the meaning and force of utterances. So not only is there no inconsistency between these two views of Austin's which Cohen alleges "...are very difficult to reconcile" (Symp. p.434), but Cohen's own examples, when more carefully considered, support the distinction which he is seeking to break down.

Cohen next launches a two-stage argument to establish his main conclusion that "...what Austin calls the illocutionary force of an utterance is that aspect of its meaning which is either conveyed by its explicitly performative prefix, if it has one, or might have been so conveyed by the use of such an expression" (p.429). In effect, Cohen splits an explicit performative utterance into two parts: its performative prefix and the subordinate clause following the performative prefix, and considers in turn whether the illocutionary force of the utterance can be distinguished from the meaning of either part. "It is tempting at first to suppose that in Austin's view the meaning of our utterance is found solely in the clause that follows the performative prefix. The meaning would then lie in the clause 'your haystack is on fire', when the whole utterance was
'I warn you that your haystack is on fire', or in the clause
'go to London' when the whole utterance was 'I order you to go
to London'. It would then be plausible to claim that these ut­
terances have precisely the same meaning and illocutionary
force as their respective subordinate clauses might have had
if uttered alone and without the benefit of performative prefix.
Their only difference from the latter kind of utterance would
be in having their illocutionary force rendered explicit"(pp.
424-5). And after advancing three objections against this view
Cohen concludes, "One is thus forced to the conclusion that on
Austin's view the meaning of an utterance like 'I warn you that
your haystack is on fire' is not to be found solely in its sub­
ordinate clause"(p.425). But Cohen's objections against Austin
in this stage of his argument are purely rhetorical. Why, in
the first place, is it tempting to suppose that in Austin's
view the meaning of an utterance of a sentence such as (1) or
(2) is to be found solely in the clause following the performa­
tive prefix? And why is one forced to the conclusion that on
Austin's view this is not so? The view that the meaning of an
utterance of a compound sentence is to be found solely in its
subordinate clause is a very odd view indeed. It was certainly
not one that Austin shared and it is significant that Cohen
does not provide any textual support for succumbing to the
temptation of supposing that it was. But Cohen's whole strategy
here of looking for the distinction between meaning and force
in parts of utterances and when failing to find any declaring
that the concept of illocutionary force is empty really is
rather crude. Nor does it work. For the immediate conclusion
to be drawn is not that illocutionary forces do not exist but
that the distinction between the meaning and force of utter­
ances ranges over whole utterances and not parts of utterances. However, having established to his own satisfaction the somewhat trivial conclusion that the meaning of an utterance of a sentence such as (1) or (2) is not to be found in its subordinate clause, and hence that the distinction between meaning and force does not range over subordinate clauses of sentences, Cohen passes on to the second stage of his argument by way of answering the question, "In what way then does the illocutionary force of such an utterance differ from that part of its meaning which belongs to it in virtue of its performative prefix?" (p. 486). But here again, Cohen confuses performative prefixes with explicitly performative utterances. Having posed the question in terms of the former, Cohen proceeds to answer it in terms of the latter. "If your utterance "I protest" is to be assigned a meaning of any kind, this meaning must be of a performative kind. The meaning lies solely in the making of the protest. This emerges... even if we accept Austin's own thesis that the meaning of a locutionary act is reported in indirect discourse. For we can report your utterance not only by 'You protested', but also by 'You said you protested', as Austin remarks elsewhere" (p. 426). Cohen's reference to indirect speech reports and to the meaning of a locutionary act in this argument makes it clear that the direction of his attack against the meaning-force distinction has swung away from just the performative prefixes of explicit performatives. So setting aside the confusion of these two things which, however, vitiates any support that this stage of Cohen's argument would have given to the conclusion he is concerned to establish, and attending to his argument as it now applies to whole utterances, it would still seem that Cohen fails to show that Austin was mistaken in
drawing such a distinction. Cohen's argument here is that the report "You protested" is just as much an indirect speech report of a speaker's utterance "I protest" as "You said you protested". Hence in being a report of the meaning of an utterance, a report such as "You protested", while it may be a report of the illocutionary act performed in the issuing of the utterance is not a report of anything, such as illocutionary force, which is to be distinguished from meaning.

But the conflation of these two types of report can only be bought at the cost of ignoring certain logical differences between them. "You said you protested" is indeed a form of indirect speech report which may be used to report the speaker's utterance "I protest". But it does not follow from the truth of this report of the meaning of the speaker's utterance that the speaker, in saying what he said, was making a protest. For if the speaker was replying to the question "What do you do when someone infringes your rights?", then in saying "I protest" he would not be making a protest but describing a habit. So "You said you protested" does not entail "You protested". And while the use of "You protested" to describe some feature of a speech act situation would most probably be a report of an illocutionary act performed in that situation, which in Austin's terms, is just to say that it is a report of the illocutionary force of the utterance issued in that situation, it does not follow from the truth of this report that the meaning of the utterance in which the protest is made is the same as that of "I protest". For a speaker may make a protest in saying something like "Wait a minute. You can't do that" and this utterance would require an indirect speech report very different from "You said you protested", e.g., "You said that he was to wait a minute and that
he couldn't do that". So "You protested" does not entail "You said you protested" either. This is not to deny, of course, that both the reports "You said you protested" and "You protested" could be true of the same situation. But if and when this is the case, it is a contingent matter, dependent on the circumstances of the situation, and the logical independence of the truth of reports of the meanings of utterances and what Austin called their illocutionary forces shows that each is a report of a different type of feature of a speech act situation.

Cohen advances several points against Austin's thesis that the illocutionary force of an utterance is made explicit by the use of a performative prefix. But none of these is successful in collapsing the distinction between meaning and force. "If one says 'He caught a large one' and is asked to be more explicit, one might say 'James landed a trout more than ten pounds in weight', and certainly then it is meaning - sense and reference, if you like - that has been made explicit. What reason is there for supposing that it is illocutionary force, rather than meaning, that has been rendered explicit in 'I warn you that your haystack is on fire'?" (p.486). But it is not the sense and reference of "Your haystack is on fire" that is made explicit in "I warn you that your haystack is on fire". If, for example, the reference of "Your haystack" is ambiguous in the former, it remains so in the latter. Rather, what is being made explicit in the latter utterance is the type of illocutionary act the speaker intends to perform in issuing his utterance and this just is the intended illocutionary force of his utterance.

Cohen's second point is a red herring. "It is no use arguing that meaning is said to be rendered explicit only when the sense or reference of individual expressions within the utterance is
vague, ambiguous or otherwise uncertain. It may instead be the whole grammatical structure of an utterance that prevents its meaning from being fully explicit" (p. 426). This is true but the possibility of utterances being phatically ambiguous does not impinge at all on the question of whether they can have an illocutionary force as well as a meaning. The different types of phatic ambiguity that can occur manifest themselves in the phrase which is used in an act of saying something and the distinction Austin drew between the meaning and force of an utterance falls between the rhetic or locutionary act and the illocutionary act.

If Cohen had wanted to question Austin's distinction in terms of the various species of ambiguity that can occur in a speech act situation, his question would only have been relevant if directed towards these types of act. But, of course, it is well for Cohen not to raise such a question. For it is true, as Austin said, "We may agree on the actual words that were uttered, and even also on the senses in which they were being used and on the realities to which they were being used to refer, and yet still disagree as to whether, in the circumstances, they amounted to an order or a threat or merely to advice or a warning" (Words p. 115, fn. 1). The possibility of an utterance being quite unambiguous rhetically (i.e., with respect to sense and reference) and yet ambiguous with respect to its force adds further support for Austin's distinction.

Cohen's third point starts off in much the same vein as his first. "Similarly, it is pretty clear that if you address the English sentence 'Is it raining?' to your friend, as he looks out of the window, your meaning would be made even more explicit if you added, a moment later, 'I ask whether it is raining'" (Symp. pp. 426-7). But would it? What if the addressee of the
question understands from the speaker's intonation that he is asking a question but does not know the meaning of the word "raining"? Cohen continues, "Yet even in your first utterance ('Is it raining?'), let alone in your second ('I ask whether it is raining'), it is impossible to distinguish illocutionary force from meaning. What on earth could be the meaning of your locutionary act other than to ask whether it is raining?" (p. 427).

This last question, however, merely exposes the categorial confusion in the notion of meaning that Cohen deploys against Austin's concept of illocutionary force. For the answer that question invites is: the meaning of the locutionary act just is to ask whether it is raining, i.e., the meaning of an utterance is the illocutionary act performed in issuing the utterance. The same notion of meaning, involving the same category mistake, is evident in Cohen's already quoted remarks on an utterance of "I protest", viz., that if the utterance is to be assigned any meaning, that meaning must be of a performative kind and that the meaning lies solely in the making of the protest. A weaker version of this notion of meaning is deployed in the paragraph following in which Cohen says, "...if the utterance 'Your haystack is on fire' gives a warning that is rendered explicit by 'I warn you that your haystack is on fire', and if the warning is part of the meaning of the latter utterance, it is hardly unreasonable to suppose that the warning is also part of the former utterance's meaning..." (p. 426 underlining added).

The category mistake involved here consists in assimilating the meaning of an utterance to a kind of action. And it can be shown very quickly that the meaning of an utterance is not a kind of action. Actions are performed, meanings are not; meanings can be paraphrased, actions cannot. It seems extraordinary that Cohen should be so bent on eliminating Austin's concept of illocutionary force
as to be led into making such an error. But the exposure of this confusion in Cohen's notion of meaning also helps to justify Austin's distinction for it is just such a categorial distinction between the meaning of an utterance and a type of illocutionary act performed in issuing the utterance that Austin's distinction between meaning and force is intended to mark.

Cohen's final point against Austin's thesis that illocutionary force can be made explicit by the use of certain linguistic devices takes in such other devices beside performative prefixes as verb-mood, tone of voice, cadence, emphasis, adverbs and adverbial phrases and connecting particles. Cohen's point is that "Austin seems to hold that all such devices clarify illocutionary force, not meaning. But on this view there can be no difference of meaning at all between such utterances as 'It must have rained, because the streets are wet' and 'It must have rained, therefore the streets are wet'" (p. 487). This point seems to be an extension of the one Cohen earlier tried unsuccessfully to establish, that what Austin called the illocutionary force of an utterance is to be found in specific parts of an utterance but has, here, the additional feature that those parts of an utterance which do help to make force explicit are meaningless and contribute nothing to the meaning of the utterance. This is a misunderstanding. Not only is it not true that Austin's distinction between the meaning and force of an utterance ranges over parts of utterances but it was not part of Austin's concept of illocutionary force either that those words and phrases which do help to make the force of an utterance explicit are, because of that, meaningless. It is significant that here too, as in the former case, Cohen does not cite any textual support for attributing this view to Austin.
Foot-notes:

1 (from p.45) This "reject-and-replace" view can be seen to have been held by each of the following writers. Searle says in "Austin on Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts" (Essays pp. 141-59), "The main theme of Austin's *Words* is the replacement of the original distinction between performatives and constatives by a general theory of speech acts" (p.141). And in "A classification of illocutionary acts" (Language in Society (1976) pp.1-23), "The original distinction between constatives and performatives was supposed to be a distinction between utterances which are sayings (constatives, statements, assertions, etc.) and utterances which are doings (promises, bets, warnings, etc.). . . . The main theme of Austin's mature work, *Words*, is that this distinction collapses" (p.14). Garner's main aim in "Utterances and Acts in the Philosophy of J.L. Austin" (Nous (1968) pp.209-27) is "...to explain Austin's abandonment of the performative-constative distinction..." (p.209). *Words* is... a play by play account of the pursuit of the performative-constative distinction (and its thrilling, if sometimes frustrating, escape). About half way through the book Austin seems to despair of being able to draw the distinction which he had so boldly sketched in the first few chapters, and turns to a discussion of locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts" (pp.216-7). In their introduction to the section on speech acts in *Readings in the Philosophy of Language* Rosenberg and Travis say, "Austin originally hoped that "performative" would turn out to mark a well-defined, grammatically specifiable class of things we can do by talking - as opposed to saying or stating something (constative functions of language) - but this early view was abandoned in favor of the more complex typology of locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts..." (p.559). According to Holdcroft in "Doubts about the Locutionary Illocutionary Distinction" (I.S.P.(1974) pp.3-16), Austin in *Words* "...starts by trying to make a distinction between two kinds of sentence type" but "...abandoned the attempt to distinguish performatives from constatives, and instead developed a classification of speech acts" (p.3). In "Austin on Performatives" (Symp. pp.401-11), Black discusses "...Austin's main reasons for rejecting the original distinction between constatives and performatives as ultimately un-
satisfactory" (p.405) and the considerations which "...played a large part in Austin's decision 'to make a fresh start on the problem' by introducing the doctrine of 'illocutionary forces'" (p.408). Nordenstam, in "On Austin's Theory of Speech Acts" (Mind (1966) pp.141-3), says, "The upshot of *Words* is that the deceptively simple constative-performative distinction should be abandoned in favour of a more general distinction between locutionary and illocutionary speech acts" (p.141).

Reviewers of *Words* also espoused this view. In his critical review (Symp. pp.351-79), Cerf claims that Austin's doctrine of speech acts "...is the Aufhebung of his old distinction between performatives and constatives" (p.351) and that "Lectures I and VII of *Words* draw, and then begin to erase, the distinction between constatives and performatives, between utterances used to state something and utterances used to do something" (p.352). And in his review (A.J.P. (1963) pp.417-24), Brown says, "Austin abandoned his original contrast between two classes of utterances - performative and constative - because he thought they threatened to coalesce. In his 'theory of linguistic acts' he accepted this as unavoidable and converted these two classes into dual aspects of every speech act. But in thus making every utterance an illocution, Austin discarded the distinction with which he began, that between (a) saying something true or false and (b) performing an action in issuing an utterance" (p.422). Fergusson, in "Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts" (Essays pp.160-85), claims that "the first seven sections of *Words* chronicle the rise and fall of the performative-constative distinction" (p.160), and in an article actually entitled "The Rise and Fall of the Doctrine of Performatives" (Contemporary Philosophy in Scandinavia, pp.197-312), Ross claims that in *Words* Austin "...presented the doctrine in a slightly revised form and actually stated his premises for the conclusion that the doctrine had to be abandoned as a mistake..." (p.197). Likewise Fingarette in "Performatives" (A.P.Q. (1967) pp.39-48): "In *Words,* his most elaborate study of the performative use of language, Austin mentioned certain crucial and intuitively obvious features of the performative, but he failed to appreciate them adequately. It is for this reason, I believe, that the initially distinctive notion seems to dissolve before his very eyes. He ends by
"producing a programme" rather than proposing a definitive account of the nature of the performative" (p. 39).

If this view is not declared, it is evidently assumed by those writing on the subject. For instance, Vendler says, "In this new perspective of the locutionary-illocutionary distinction the performative-constative distinction fades away..." (Res Cogitans p. 8). And in his review of Words (An. S. (1963) pp. 58-64), White says "Having established this new classification of Locutionary, Illocutionary, Perlocutionary, Austin then (lecture XI) tries to take up into this new classification the distinction of Performative and Constative - which had broken down, both because Constatives as much as Performatives are a doing as well as a saying, and because either can be appraised both in the true/false and in the happy/unhappy dimension" (p. 60). Chisholm, in his review of Papers (Symp. pp. 101-36), says that "...Austin seems to despair of being able to draw any clearcut distinction between performatives and constatives..." (p. 109) and in "Some Types of Performative Utterance" (Essays pp. 69-89), Warnock, too, can be seen to subscribe to some form of the reject-and-replace view. In "Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts" (Practical Inferences pp. 100-14), Hare gives an extra twist to the story by suggesting that though Austin rejected the performative-constative distinction and replaced it by the locutionary-illocutionary distinction, the latter distinction should also be rejected because it retains some of the objectionable elements of the former. "So, then, the performative-constative distinction, immensely fruitful and important as it was, had to be abandoned. But, on its way out, it engendered the locutionary-illocutionary distinction; and I think that this itself is open to grave objection, and that it might never have been produced in the form in which we have it but for the historical reason that Austin was trying to salvage something of his original distinction" (p. 105). A possible exception to this view being expressed nem. con. is Sesonske in "Performatives" (J.P. (1965) pp. 459-68). Sesonske does only claim that the performative-constative distinction "...finally disappeared almost entirely..." (p. 459).

Obviously, the many expressions of this view embrace a number of variations on its central theme, some minor, some not
so. The performative-constative distinction is variously taken to range over sentence-types (Hodcroft), utterances (Searle), uses of utterances (Cerf), acts (Brown) or both utterances and acts (White). There is also a major difference between proponents of the reject-and-replace view as to whether Austin was right or wrong to reject the distinction. For example, Fingarette (op.cit.) and Hodcroft, in "Performatives and Statements" (Mind (1974) pp.1-18), mount their own rescue operations for the performative-constative distinction while Searle inveighs, "As Austin saw but as many philosophers still fail to see, the parallel between performatives and constatives is exact" (Language in Society p.14); and Ross claims that "Austin is well-known as the author of the doctrine, but less well-known as the man who did away with it. Thus people continue to dispute the definition of "performatives" without discussing (or noticing?) Austin's virtual admission that the concept lacks any rationale" (op.cit. p.197). Similarly, in an exchange between Black, Chisholm and Forguson, the former two propose different definitions of the performative-constative distinction aimed at avoiding the difficulties which allegedly caused Austin to abandon it, and are taken to task for doing so by Forguson in "In Pursuit of Performatives" (Symp. pp.412-9). "...I wish to suggest that neither Chisholm's nor Black's amendment in any way avoids the difficulties Austin foresaw, and that both of these attempts to amend Austin's analysis are based upon a fundamental misunderstanding of his reasons for abandoning it" (p.413). All are agreed, however, that Austin abandoned it. So deeply entrenched is this view that it may be called the orthodox view - an expression of it occurs on the dust-jacket of Words. It happens to be false.

2 (from p.47) The parenthetical phrases are added on the grounds that they occur in Austin's restatement of this Felicity condition on p.39 of Words. Other discrepancies in the wording between Austin's statement and restatement of these conditions are insignificant.

3 (from p.79) In the first half of "Austin and 'Locutionary Meaning'" (Essays pp.46-68), Strawson discusses, but only to
reject, three possible interpretations of Austin's notion of locutionary meaning. This is done in order to clear the way for his own interpretation in terms of the notions of a proposition, imperative, etc. which is spelled out and defended against what Strawson imagines to be Austinian objections in the second half of his paper. Textual support from Words is claimed for each of the interpretations Strawson rejects although this claim seems able to be made good only with respect to the third interpretation Strawson discusses (pp. 55-6). His reasons for rejecting this interpretation in terms of the content of the rhetic act performed as part of a locutionary act are inadequate. Having introduced a notion of restricted sense-and-reference as that which is left of the meaning of an utterance, other than an explicit performative, after abstracting from the significance of the grammatical mood and the implications of such words as "but", "therefore", "perhaps", etc. occurring in the utterance (p. 54), Strawson queries this interpretation by asking, "How much more than restricted sense-and-reference is to be allowed into locutionary meaning by way of the specification of the rhetic act? Which of the linguistic devices employed are to be allowed to bear on the specification of the rhetic act, and why?" (p. 55). Strawson believes that some restrictions on the devices that are to be allowed so to bear are required if this interpretation is not to blur Austin's distinction between locutionary meaning and illocutionary force. And it is the alleged failure to be able to impose such restrictions that is Strawson's reason for rejecting this interpretation. It is for the same sort of reason that Strawson rejects the first interpretation of locutionary meaning that he discusses. This interpretation is, in substance, tantamount to the third, though couched in terms of Strawson's own distinctions between different senses of the phrase, "the meaning of what is said", rather than the distinctions Austin drew within the locutionary act. Strawson spells out his reason for rejecting this interpretation, which applies to the third interpretation as well, as follows: "In general, on this interpretation, the more freely a speaker uses the devices which Austin refers to in Lecture VI as devices for 'making explicit' the force of his utterance {e.g., performative prefixes, grammatical mood, connecting particles, etc.}, the narrower will be the gap between know-
ledge of the locutionary meaning of the utterance and knowledge of its illocutionary force... One could say, indeed, on this interpretation of Austin's distinctions, that his discovery of the explicit performative formula was precisely a discovery of one device of peculiar precision for absorbing more and more illocutionary force into locutionary meaning" (pp. 51-2). That Strawson's grasp of Austin's distinction between locutionary meaning and illocutionary force displayed in his metaphor of the former absorbing the latter - later, on p. 55, he talks of force entering into meaning - is quite mistaken, is argued in the second section of Chapter Six. Here, it is sufficient to register the point against Strawson that even if there is no gap between knowing the locutionary meaning of an utterance and knowing its illocutionary force, it does not follow from this that such knowledge is knowledge of the same thing, nor that the distinction between meaning and force is thereby collapsed. So the need to exclude those features of an utterance which serve to make explicit its illocutionary force from a specification of its locutionary meaning, by way of a specification of the content of the rhetic act performed as part of the act of saying something, is not one that arises. Hence Strawson's reason for rejecting this interpretation of "locutionary meaning", which is based on the alleged inability to satisfy such a need, is not a good reason. (A corollary to the view that such features do need to be excluded is the quite extraordinary view, which Strawson also attributes to Austin (p. 61), that these features have no locutionary meaning at all, in the sense that they contribute nothing to the meaning of the utterance.) Strawson's claim that the locutionary meaning of an utterance cannot be specified by way of a specification of the content of its corresponding rhetic act without including some specification of its illocutionary force ignores the possibilities created by the basic normal forms of indirect quotation. The examples Strawson holds out as recalcitrant to this interpretation - utterances in the optative mood and explicit performative utterances - are easily accommodated by these forms. The rarely used optative mood, when it is used, is used to express a wish, so an indirect quotation of the utterance "Would it were day!" in basic normal form would run "He said that he wishes it were day" and that of
an explicit performative such as "I promise to be there" can simply be cast as "He said that he promises to be there". In each case, the content of the "that"-clause in the indirect quotation specifies the locutionary meaning of the quoted utterance.

Strawson summarizes his own interpretation of "locutionary meaning" as follows: "...in every case in which a locution as a whole expresses a proposition, we should say that its locutionary meaning is the proposition expressed. For such other broad classes of locutions as we may find it expedient to distinguish from proposition-expressing locutions, we shall need terms of art comparable with the term 'proposition', to set beside the latter. Let us suppose that 'imperative' is one such term. Then, again, we should say, of every locution which, as a whole, expresses an imperative, that its locutionary meaning is the imperative expressed. A scheme for separately specifying the illocutionary force and the locutionary meaning of single utterances which, as wholes, express propositions or imperatives (or any other broad classes we find it expedient to distinguish) might be imagined as follows:

$X$ issues the _____ (that...) with the force of a $xxxxx$.

A specification of the general type of locutionary meaning fills the first blank (e.g., "proposition", "imperative", etc.), of specific locutionary content the second (e.g., "that $S$ is $P$", "that $Z$(person) is to $Y$(act)", respectively), of illocutionary force the third (e.g., "accusation", "report", "forecast", "conclusion", "objection", "hypothesis", "guess", "verdict", etc. and "command", "request", "piece of advice", "prayer", "invitation", "entreaty", etc., respectively) (p.60).

Granted that "locutionary meaning" is a term of art whose use requires explanation, it can scarcely be accounted an adequate explanation simply to replace this term of art by others, even ones so familiar as "proposition". For the familiarity of the notion of a proposition stems not from its being a clearly defined notion, having a definite location within the theory of language, but from its ubiquity in philosophical discussions of the theory of language and its continuing capacity therein to be different things to different men; even different things to the same man as Strawson demonstrates. For as well as proposing that propositions are the locutionary meanings of some types of
utterance, Strawson also wants to maintain that propositions are the primary and essential bearers of truth-value. It sounds exceedingly odd to say that what is primarily and essentially either true or false is the meaning of an utterance. The point is not that as a term of art, it is open to those who use the term "proposition" to define it as they please; the point is that because it is a term of art, it has to be defined if its introduction is to serve any explanatory purpose. And this, Strawson manifestly fails to do. He admits that his remarks "... are not offered as a complete characterization of the notion of a proposition" (p. 61); earlier, he disclaims that it is his "... present purpose to say exactly what limitations on the notion of proposition are to be imposed" (p. 59). His one gesture towards defining the notion of a proposition is contained in what he calls "the normal form provision" for the expression of propositions: "Any proposition is capable of being expressed either in some clause or sentence which is capable, in all linguistic propriety, of following the phrase 'it is true that' or in some logical compound (e.g. a disjunction) of such clauses or sentences" (p. 57). Strawson's remarks on this provision, however, only serve to emphasize its weakness and in one respect which bears on his interpretation of "locutionary meaning", this weakness is crucial. Strawson distinguishes propositions and imperatives as different types of locutionary meaning and from his examples, two utterances with meanings of these different types would be of the forms "S is P" and "Z(person) is to Y(act)", respectively. But some utterances of the latter form satisfy the normal form provision for the expression of propositions, e.g., "It is true that he is to resign". So this characterization of a proposition does not even serve to distinguish this type of locutionary meaning from others which Strawson evidently wants to set beside it. Moreover, in Strawson's correlation of specific types of illocutionary force with general types of locutionary meaning - "... imperatives being variously expressible with the force of pieces of advice, requests, commands, recommendations, prayers, invitations, etc." (p. 60) - and in the consequent suggestion that different types of locutionary meaning may be distinguished by the different types of illocutionary force
with which they may be expressed, there is just that blurring of the distinction between locutionary meaning and illocutionary force which Strawson claimed, albeit mistakenly in those cases, to be grounds for rejecting other interpretations of "locutionary meaning". In the absence of argument to the contrary, there is no need within a conception of speech acts to distinguish general types of locutionary meaning in such terms as "proposition", "imperative", etc. Strawson's reasons, which are not good reasons, for grinding this particular axe will be discussed in the Appendix when the criticisms in the final section of his paper of Austin's views on truth in *Words* are examined. Here, an alternative scheme for specifying the locutionary meaning and illocutionary force of an utterance, without recourse to general types of locutionary meaning, can be noted:

S said that... (or asked...) with the force of a ____, where a specification of locutionary meaning in the form of a paraphrase of the speaker's utterance fills either of the first two blanks and a specification of illocutionary force the third.
Chapter Three
Illocutionary and Perlocutionary Acts

Compared to the distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts, the distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts has received little attention in the critical literature on *Words*. Austin thought that this latter distinction was the one "...likeliest to give trouble..." (*Words* p.110). Usually it is only mentioned in summaries of Austin's conception of speech acts and then dismissed as yet another distinction which he drew. For instance, at the end of a short paragraph devoted to the distinction Schiffer says, "I shall have nothing more to say about perlocutionary acts" (*Meaning* p.91); while Furberg says of Austin, "He discusses the perlocutionary act only in passing, and I shall follow his example" (*Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts* p.187). This last hardly accords with the fact that Austin devoted two whole lectures to the distinction. The neglect of the distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts is not so much a sign of its tacit acceptance by Austin's critics as a symptom of their misunderstanding of his conception of speech acts. For the terms in which Austin distinguished these types of act are the terms in which he sketched the outlines of those aspects of a theory of action that are required for an elucidation of the performative use of language.

In Lecture X the discussion of the distinction was conducted in the formal mode and concentrated on the formulas:

1. In saying that..., S was v-ing, and
2. By saying that..., S was v-ing

to see if these provided adequate means for identifying and distinguishing acts of the respective types. "For it was because of the availability of these formulas which seem specially suitable,
the former (in) for picking out verbs which are names for illocutionary acts, and the latter (by) for picking out verbs which are names for perlocutionary acts, that we chose in fact the names illocutionary and perlocutionary" (Words p.122). Thus some substitution instances for "v-ing" in (1) : "advising", "arguing", "ordering", "promising", "protesting", "threatening", "undertaking", "warning", etc. are names for illocutionary acts, while some substitution instances for "v-ing" in (2) : "alarming", "alerting", "amusing", "annoying", "convincing", "determining", "frightening", "humiliating", "misleading", "persuading", "surprising", "upsetting", etc. are names for perlocutionary acts. "The general conclusion must be, however, that these formulas are at best very slippery tests for deciding whether an expression is an illocution as distinct from a perlocution or neither" (pp.131-2).

A true report of a speech act situation cast in the form of (1) does not necessarily identify the illocutionary act performed in that situation. Such a report may identify a perlocutionary act, as in

(1.a) In saying that she could do better herself, she was humiliating him;

or it may identify a component of a locutionary act, as in

(1.b) In saying that Adam was innocent, he meant that Adam was ignorant of evil.

Or such a report may identify an act which is neither of these nor an illocutionary act, as in

(1.c) In saying that New Zealand is part of Australia, you are making a mistake.

Austin maintained (p.128) that in cases like (1.a), saying what was said accounts for or explains what was done - here, her humiliating of him; whereas in cases like (1.b) and (1.c) doing
what was done — meaning and making a mistake — accounts for or explains what was said. But, according to Austin, neither of these is the case when (1) is filled out as a true report identifying some illocutionary act performed in a speech act situation. Such a report as

(1.d.1) In saying that it was slipping, he was warning, is like
(1.d.2) In buzzing, I was pretending to be a bee, and
(1.d.3) In buzzing, I was behaving like a buffoon
in so far as "...saying what one did (buzzing) in intention or in fact constituted my saying so-and-so, an act of a certain kind, and made it callable by a different name "pretending to be a bee", and "behaving like a buffoon"...But it is different...in that the act is constituted not by intention or by fact, essentially but by convention..." (p.128). But it is not clear that the cases (1.d.1-3) do differ from the cases (1.b) and (1.c) in the way that Austin claimed. In each of (1.d.1-3), which are Austin's examples, doing what was done accounts for or explains what was said (or the buzzing) as in (1.b) and (1.c). Austin also claimed that when (1) is used in any of the cases (1.a)-(1.c) it is used with the sense of "in the process of" or "in the course of" as distinct from its use involving the sense of "a criterion" when an illocutionary verb is substituted for "v-ing" (pp.126-7). This claim is not very clear either but it recurs in Austin's discussion of (2).

A true report of a speech act situation cast in the form of (2) does not necessarily identify a perlocutionary act performed in that situation. It too may identify a component of a locutionary act, as in

(2.a) By saying that they can fish, he meant that they tin fish, not that they may fish.

It may identify an act which is not a component of a locutionary...
act, nor either an illocutionary act or a perlocutionary act, as in

(3.b) By saying that I had been doing 140 m.p.h.,
I put myself in the wrong.

When an illocutionary verb is substituted for "v-ing" in (2), as in

(2.c.1) By saying that it was slipping, he was warning him
this "...sense of 'by' - the criterion sense - is, it seems,
also very close to 'in' in one of its senses...and in this way
'by' can certainly be used with illocutionary verbs in the 'by
saying' formula" (pp. 129-30). This sense of "by" is further
exemplified in

(2.c.2) By inserting a plate, I was practising dentistry
where "...'by' indicates a criterion, that about what I did
which enables my action to be classified as practising dentis-
try" (p. 129 Austin's own examples). "But 'by', in this sense, is
not used with perlocutionary verbs" (p. 130). When it is, as in

(2.d.1) By saying that I would definitely be there,
I convinced (persuaded) him

"...'by' will here have the means-to-end sense, or anyway sig-
nify the manner in which or method by which I did it" (p. 130);
and this is the same as in

(2.d.2) By hitting the nail on the head, I was driving
it into the wall
where "...'by' indicates the means by which, the manner in which
or the method by which I was bringing off the action..." (p. 129).

In spite of the failure of the formulas (1) and (2) to pro-
vide means for identifying exclusively the illocutionary and
perlocutionary acts performed in speech act situations, they are
not the broken reeds alleged by White (An.S. (1965) p. 64). The
formal features of the relationships expressed by those formulas
are instructive. The asymmetry and irreflexivity of the relationship expressed by (1), when that formula is filled out to give a report of a locutionary act and an illocutionary act, have already been deployed in defence of the distinction between acts of those types against Searle's objections. Later, the transitivity of that relationship will be deployed against another of Cohen's objections. And Austin's comments on (2), when that formula is used to frame a report of a perlocutionary act performed in some speech act situation, make it clear that the antecedent acts to perlocutionary acts so reported stand in the relationship of means to end.

Introducing his notion of perlocutionary acts in Lecture VIII Austin said, "Saying something will often, or even normally, produce certain consequential effects upon the feelings, thoughts, or actions of the audience, or of the speaker, or of other persons: and it may be done with the design, intention, or purpose of producing them; and we may then say, thinking of this, that the speaker has performed an act in the nomenclature of which reference is made either only obliquely, or even not at all, to the performance of the locutionary or illocutionary act. We shall call the performance of an act of this kind the performance of a 'perlocutionary' act..." (Words p. 101). After giving some examples of such acts Austin said, "It will be seen that the consequential effects of perlocutions are really consequences, which do not include such conventional effects as, for example, the speaker's being committed by his promise (which comes into the illocutionary act). Perhaps distinctions need drawing, as there is clearly a difference between what we feel to be the real production of real effects and what we regard as mere conventional consequences;
we shall in any case return later to this" (p.103). And towards the end of that lecture: "Finally we must meet the objection about our illocutionary and perlocutionary acts — namely that the notion of an act is unclear — by a general doctrine about action. We have the idea of an 'act' as a fixed physical thing that we do, as distinguished from conventions and as distinguished from consequences. But (a) the illocutionary act and even the locutionary act too involve conventions: . . . (b) the perlocutionary act always includes some consequences, as when we say 'By doing X I was doing Y': we do bring in a greater or less stretch of 'consequences' always..." (p.107). This formula was soon refined and recast in the form "By B-ing he C-ed" for use when "we mention both a B act (illocution) and a C act (perlocution)..." (p.108). The relationship expressed by this formula, determined by the particle "by", is, again, one of means to end. "This is the reason for calling C a perlocutionary act as distinct from an illocutionary act" (p.108). So by the time Austin came to discuss the distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts in Lecture IX the main features of that distinction had already been adumbrated. In summary they are two:

(1) "Illocutionary acts are conventional acts: perlocutionary acts are not conventional" (p.121). "Speaking of the 'use of language' for arguing and warning' (illocutionary acts) looks just like speaking of 'the use of 'language' for persuading, rousing, alarming' (perlocutionary acts); yet the former may, for rough contrast, be said to be conventional... but the latter could not" (p.103).

(2) An illocutionary act stands to perlocutionary acts performed in the same speech act situation as an act to some of its outcomes. "We have then to draw the line between an action we do
(here an illocution) and its consequences" (p. 111); "... a line for our present purposes where we want one, that is, between the completion of the illocutionary act and all consequences thereafter" (p. 114).

The notional framework drawn from a theory of action which is required for an elucidation of the performative use of language as exemplified in illocutionary acts is, therefore, that which is required to elucidate a particular kind of conventional act distinguished from its non-conventional (perlocutionary) outcomes. In Lecture IX Austin discussed one difficulty confronting the attempt to distinguish acts from their outcomes, two possible ways around this difficulty and three types of outcome involved in the performance of illocutionary acts which are to be distinguished from perlocutionary acts in so far as each is a conventional type of outcome.

One difficulty in distinguishing acts and outcomes arises from the fact that some descriptions of acts are also descriptions of outcomes of (other) acts. Both "He filled the tank" and "He was working the pump-handle" may be true descriptions of acts performed by some agent. Combined in the description "By working the pump-handle, he filled the tank" the double role of "He filled the tank" as a description of both an act and an outcome is shown explicitly. The identical form of this compound description and substitution instances of "By B-ing he C-ed", which Austin devised for use when both an illocutionary and a perlocutionary act is mentioned, shows that this difficulty arises in the case of distinguishing acts of these types. Whatever the solution to this difficulty may be, the point relieves a tension between the two main features of the illocutionary-perlocutionary distinction, (1) and (3) above. For thinking of those, it may be asked how the
same distinction can be drawn in terms of both two types of act, i.e., in terms of (1), and a general distinction between an act and some of its outcomes, i.e., in terms of (2), when the second term of the latter distinction is prima facie not of a type with acts. The answer lies in the fact that in some cases, including this one, what can be described as an act can also be described as an outcome of an act.

Austin claimed that "...we can import an arbitrarily long stretch of what might also be called the 'consequences' of our act into the act itself..." and held that this "...is, or should be, a fundamental commonplace of the theory of our language about all 'action' in general" (p.107). Perhaps it now is. Austin's reason for emphasizing this commonplace — he recurred to it twice in Lecture IX (pp.111,117) — was his wish to deny that the notion of movements of bodily parts (what Austin called the minimum physical act) had a very significant place in the concept of human action; and hence, to deny that any very significant distinction between acts and outcomes could be drawn in these terms. "There is no restriction to the minimum physical act at all" (p.107); "We not merely do not use the notion of a minimum physical act (which is in any case doubtful) but we do not seem to have any class of names which distinguish physical acts from consequences..." (p.112). Some types of act are constituted by movements of bodily parts, e.g., nodding, winking, crossing the legs, folding the arms, etc. But the concept of human action is informed by a variety of notions yielding different constitutive features of acts in terms of which acts can be described. Austin mentioned two such features beside outcomes: "...we nearly always naturally name the action not in terms of what we are here calling the minimum physical act, but in terms which embrace a
greater or less but indefinitely extensive range of what might be called its natural consequences (or, looking at it another way, the intention with which it was done)"(p.112) ; and "... doing obeisance. It is obeisance only because it is conventional and it is done only because it is conventional"(p.107). There are others too : the circumstances in which some acts are performed constitute those acts as tokens of particular types of act and, as some have said, some acts are constituted by virtue of being performed in accordance with certain rules.

Austin's two suggestions for ways of marking the distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts are marred by his speaking of the former as acts of saying something, i.e., as locutionary acts. This fault is fatal to his second suggestion and the first has additional problems which render it unsatisfactory as well. The first suggestion exploits the "nomenclature of illocutions" : "...the vocabulary of names for acts (B) \(\text{i.e., illocutionary acts}\) seems expressly designed to mark a break at a certain regular point between the act (our saying something) and its consequences (which are usually not the saying of anything), or at any rate a great many of them"(p.112). But this suggestion requires a satisfactory test for whether an expression is a name of an illocutionary act or not and, as shown in the previous section, the formula "In saying that..., S was v-ing", while it may be the best test available, does not satisfy this requirement. Austin's parentheses in the last quoted remark foreshadow his second suggestion. Whatever the outcomes of acts of saying something are, they are not usually other further acts of saying something, so in this case act and outcome may be distinguished on the grounds that they are not in pari materia as "...'a movement of a trigger finger' is in pari materia with 'a movement of
a trigger" (p. 113, fn. 1). But however sound this distinction may be, it is not to the point of distinguishing illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. For the acts which this distinction would isolate from their outcomes are acts of saying something, locutionary acts, not illocutionary acts. And in the paragraph following these suggestions (pp. 113-5) Austin went to some length to deny that either illocutionary or perlocutionary acts are outcomes of locutionary acts. "What we do import by the use of the nomenclature of illocution is a reference, not to the consequences (at least in any ordinary sense) of the locution, but to the conventions of illocutionary force as bearing on the special circumstances of the occasion of the issuing of the utterance" (p. 115). The reason why neither of these suggestions for drawing the act-outcome distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts is a good suggestion is, perhaps, that that distinction is not just a single uniform distinction. Outcomes of different types, e.g., effects, results and consequences, stand in different relationships to their antecedent acts, and the distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts, drawn in terms of a general distinction between acts and outcomes, will not really be clear until these various relationships have been distinguished and analysed. Some attempt to do this will be made following the next section in which three types of non-perlocutionary outcomes involved in the performance of illocutionary acts are reviewed.

Austin distinguished these outcomes in terms of "securing uptake", "taking effect" and "inviting by convention a response or sequel". Each is distinct from any outcome in which an illocutionary act may issue as a perlocutionary act in so far as
each is a conventional outcome of its antecedent act whereas a perlocutionary act is not a conventional act. However, the conventions involved are not the same in all cases.

The securing of uptake "...amounts to bringing about the understanding of the meaning and of the force of the locution" (p.117). Austin indicated the type of conventions involved in the production of this effect on an audience in a foot-note: "...the sense in which saying something produces effects on other persons, or causes things, is a fundamentally different sense of cause from that used in physical causation by pressure, etc. It has to operate through the conventions of language..."(p.113,fn.1). Austin's comments on the securing of uptake take up a point which he foreshadowed much earlier, in Lecture II, when he was discussing different kinds of infelicity of utterances. There, he distinguished from the specific infelicities arising from the non-satisfaction of the Felicity conditions (A.1)-(F.2) two general kinds of infelicity to which all utterances are liable simply because they are utterances and products of acts. He called these two general kinds "Misunderstandings" and "Mistakes" and said of the former, "It is obviously necessary that to have promised I must normally (A) have been heard by someone, perhaps the promisee; (B) have been understood by him as promising. If one or another of these conditions is not satisfied, doubts arise as to whether I have really promised, and it might be held that my act was only attempted or was void"(p.22). A similar point is made with a different example in his later discussion of securing uptake. "I cannot be said to have warned an audience unless it hears what I say and takes what I say in a certain sense. An effect must be achieved on the audience if the illocutionary act is to be carried out" (p.116). A locutionary act's securing of uptake can be seen as the
satisfaction of necessary and sufficient conditions for such an act being an act of successful linguistic communication. It is a necessary and sufficient condition for a speaker successfully communicating something to his audience with his locutionary act that the audience hears what is said and understands its meaning and force. But it is not the case, nor did Austin maintain, that either a locutionary act with uptake secured, or just the securing of uptake, is an illocutionary act. "This is not to say in the first edition: "This is to be distinguished from saying..." that the illocutionary act is the achieving of a certain effect" (p.116). However, it appears from the second previous quotation that Austin did hold that the securing of uptake is a necessary condition for the performance of an illocutionary act. This does not seem to be correct. For included in the securing of uptake is the bringing about of the audience's understanding of the illocutionary force of the utterance; this presupposes that the utterance has a particular illocutionary force which in turn presupposes that an illocutionary act of the respective type is performed in issuing the utterance. Perhaps the point can be clarified by some illustrative examples.

Austin made it clear that "our performative utterances, felicitous or not, are to be understood as issued in ordinary circumstances"(p.22); i.e., not as issued by an actor in a play, or by a speaker reciting a poem or practising elocution, and not in circumstances where the speaker is using language metaphorically, sarcastically or in other non-literal ways. Now taking Austin's first example, promising: assuming that the circumstances are in these ways "ordinary", and that they are such that a felicitous promise could be given, and further that the speaker, intending to carry out his promise, does say seriously and literally that
he promises to go, then it is far from obvious that the speaker fails to promise in that situation just because his utterance goes unheard or is not understood by his audience as a promise. The speaker may fail to achieve the purpose he had in promising. And he may be in trouble later on if pressed to prove that he promised and there is no record of it nor any witnesses to vouchsafe. The situation may be unhappy in either of these ways but neither is sufficient to void the promise. And it would not be untoward for the speaker in such a situation either to feel obliged to do what he has said that he promises to do, or to mention as a reason for doing it the fact that he had promised to do it. Similarly, protests made sotto voce and muttered statements seem, ceteris paribus, to be no less protests or statements for not being understood by their audiences. Again, the order to withdraw may not get through and the platoon marches on into the ambush - a very unhappy situation for those concerned. But the order was given. Austin's second example, warning, raises a special difficulty. Numerous senses are specified in the Dictionary for the verb "warn" ; one of these is "give notice to", another is "put on guard". This ambiguity may encourage the view that the securing of uptake is a necessary condition for the illocutionary act of warning. But "warning", when used with the sense of "putting on guard" as a name for an act which is performed in a speech act situation, implies more than just bringing about the understanding of the meaning and force of the utterance. It also implies some effect on the feelings, thoughts and even actions of the audience in the light of that understanding. It seems clear that when used with this sense "warning" is the name of a perlocutionary act. When used with the sense of "giving notice to", "warning" can be the name of an illo-
cutionary act, but then it also seems clear that such an act does not require the securing of uptake in order to be accomplished. The differences between these acts of warning and their relationships with the securing of uptake are illustrated by the following cases:

(1) S uttered a warning and thereby put his audience, A, on its guard against the danger.

(2) S uttered a warning which A understood but ignored.

(3) S uttered a warning ("Look out!"); A heard what was said but misunderstood the utterance, craned forward to look out of the window and was hit on the head by the falling brick.

(4) S uttered a warning; A heard what was said but did not understand the language.

(5) S uttered a warning but A was stone deaf and could not lip read.

(6) S opened his mouth to utter a warning but at that precise moment was shot in the head and died instantly.

In each case, S attempted to perform the illocutionary act of warning; in (1)-(5) that attempt succeeded, in (6) it failed. In (1) and (2) uptake was secured; in (3)-(6) it was not, because in (3) A misunderstood, in (4) A did not understand, and in (5) A did not hear what was said. In (1) S performed the perlocutionary act of warning; in (2)-(6) he did not.

The outcomes of illocutionary acts which Austin distinguished from perlocutionary acts in terms of "taking effect" and "inviting by convention a response or sequel" differ from the securing of uptake in that (a) they are outcomes of illocutionary acts, not locutionary acts and (b) the conventions by virtue of which they follow are the conventions of illocutionary force which are not the conventions of language. An illocutionary act's taking effect is to be "...distinguished from producing consequences in the sense of bringing about states of affairs in the 'normal' way,
i.e. changes in the natural course of events" (p. 117). Austin expanded on this point in his subsequent lecture "Performative - Constatative" (P. L. pp. 15-22). "We do not mean by that "i.e., an illocutionary act's taking effect" that such-and-such a future event is or will be brought about as an effect of this action functioning as a cause. We mean rather that, in consequence of the performance of this act, such-and-such a future event, if it happens, will be in order, and such-and-such other events, if they happen, will not be in order. If I have said 'I promise', I shall not be in order if I break my word; if I have said 'I welcome you', I shall not be in order if I proceed to treat you as an enemy or an intruder" (p. 14). This distinction between perlocutionary acts and outcomes of illocutionary acts taking effect was foreshadowed in Austin's distinction (quoted on p. 103 above) between "the consequential effects of perlocutions that are really consequences", e.g., a promisee's being convinced that the promisor will perform the promised act, and "...such conventional effects as, for example, the speaker's being committed by his promise (which comes into the illocutionary act)".

A sequel to an illocutionary act is a further act performed by the speaker; a response to an illocutionary act is a further act performed by someone other than the speaker. Where the outcome of an illocutionary act taking effect is to put in or out of order certain further acts which may be performed, but whose performance is not required by the conventions of illocutionary force invoked by the performance of the illocutionary act, responses and sequels to illocutionary acts that are invited by convention are further acts required by the respective conventions. All successfully performed illocutionary acts take effect, but many do not invite conventional responses or sequels. The il-
locutionary act of warning is one such example: it would be out of order for someone who had been warned against some peril to protest after the peril befell him that he had been given no warning. But the conventions of warning do not require the person warned to perform any act in response to it - a warning may be ignored without any breach of convention. And once a warning is given, no further act is required of the speaker as a sequel to it. Apologizing, describing, protesting and stating are other illocutionary acts which do not invite conventional responses or sequels. Of those which do, these outcomes may be one-way or two-way: inviting just a response or just a sequel or inviting both. In these terms Austin distinguished ordering (inviting a one-way response - obeying) and promising (inviting a one-way sequel - carrying out the promise) from offering (inviting first a response - the offeree's acceptance - and secondly a sequel - the offeror's execution of the offer).

The differences between these non-perlocutionary outcomes involved in the performance of illocutionary acts can be further illustrated from speech act situations in which they occur at temporally distinct stages. Thus a promise given to-day to leave town on the first stage-coach after noon to-morrow may secure uptake to-day, will take effect at noon to-morrow and, if carried out, will have its sequel implemented when the first stage-coach leaves town after that time. A Government minister may order a retrospective salary increase for his Department's employees, to be paid in full on the occasion of the next salary disbursements. Such an order would secure uptake as and when it is received and understood by those to whom it is directed, take effect as from the date to which the increase is back-dated, and have its response accorded on the next pay day. This latter example also il-
lustrates the conventional nature of an illocutionary act's taking effect, i.e., not in the normal way as producing changes in the natural course of events. In the natural course of events things do not happen retrospectively.

The differences between perlocutionary acts and outcomes involved in the performance of illocutionary acts which Austin distinguished in terms of securing uptake and taking effect seem clear enough. The difference between perlocutionary acts and the responses and sequels to illocutionary acts invited by convention may not seem so clear because Austin also spoke of some perlocutionary acts as responses and sequels to illocutionary acts (Words p.119). However, the different ways in which these respective responses and sequels were said to occur—the former being accorded or implemented, the latter being achieved or produced—indicate the substantial differences between them. Of those invited by convention, "if this response is accorded, or the sequel implemented, that requires a second act by the speaker or another person; and it is a commonplace of the consequence-language that this cannot be included under the initial stretch of action" (p. 117). This effectively disqualifies these outcomes from being perlocutionary acts. Descriptions of illocutionary acts and conventional responses and sequels to them cannot be cast in the form "By B-ing he C-ed" which can be used as a form of description when both an illocutionary act and a perlocutionary act are mentioned. For example, neither "By ordering him, he obeyed" (when "him" and "he" are used with identical reference) nor "By promising to go, he went" makes sense. The act-outcome nexus between illocutionary acts and these conventional responses and sequels to them is not that of means-to-end as it is in the case of an illocutionary and perlocutionary act. Nor can these re-
responses or sequels be ascribed to the speaker performing the illocutionary act as an act performed by him; whereas non-conventional perlocutionary responses and sequels to the illocutionary act can be so ascribed. They can be included under the initial stretch of action as in "By ordering her to stop, he stopped her/got her to stop" and "By promising to go, he convinced her that he would go". Here the illocutionary act is the means to the end achieved and described in terms of the perlocutionary act. "Thus we must distinguish 'I ordered him and he obeyed' [a conventional response to an illocutionary act] from 'I got him to obey' [a perlocutionary act]. The general implication of the latter is that other additional means were employed to produce this consequence as ascribable to me, inducements, personal presence, and influence which may amount to duress..." (pp.117-8). Thus acts called by the names of perlocutionary acts which are the achieving of ends may be achieved by non-conventional means and even non-verbal means, but illocutionary acts are only exceptionally performed non-verbally and even then to deserve the name of an illocutionary act it must be a conventional non-verbal act, e.g., giving a warning in flashing a red light. Illocutionary acts are conventional means for attaining ends (pp.119-22).

"The perlocutionary act may be either the achievement of a perlocutionary object or the production of a perlocutionary sequel" (p.118). This comment reflects the point common to most acts, including perlocutionary acts, that agents' attempts to achieve their purposes may succeed or fail and in either case have unintended outcomes. "Thus the act of warning may achieve its perlocutionary object of alerting and also have the perlocutionary sequel of alarming, and an argument against a view may fail to achieve its object but have the perlocutionary sequel of convinc-
A conceptual analysis of the outcomes of human action has an interest extending beyond the clarification of Austin's distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. Such an account of even the restricted set of effects, consequences and results of human acts would help to fill some gaps in philosophical understanding of the general concept of human action; gaps which have been left open by the preponderant emphasis in discussion of that concept upon the antecedents of human acts. This is not to deny that that discussion has been fruitful. Aspects of the general concept of human action, that most complex of concepts, have been elucidated by the discussion of conceptual distinctions and relationships between, say, agents' causes, reasons and motives for acting, and between acting deliberately, intentionally and purposely. But just as this is so, an account of the conceptual distinctions between such outcomes of acts as effects, consequences and results, and of the relationships in which they stand to their respective antecedent acts, may also elucidate aspects of the general concept of human action.

Vendler has published two attempts at such an account, both of which rely heavily on linguistic data gathered from the forms and functions of some of the expressions used to articulate the concepts of effects, consequences and results. The following account has a similar basis but some of its conclusions differ significantly from those of Vendler's accounts. Some of the conclusions of Vendler's first account, "Effects, Results and Consequences" (Analytical Philosophy (1962) pp.1-15), have already been criticized by Bromberger in "What are Effects?" (pp.15-20)
and by Dray in "Must Effects Have Causes?"(pp.20-5). Some of the conclusions of Vendler's second account in Chapter 6 of Linguistics in Philosophy have already been criticized by Cohen in a review of Vendler's book (Foundations of Language (1971) pp.125-30). Those criticisms need not be repeated here. The deficiencies of Vendler's accounts are in part due to his exclusive attention to the linguistic constructions in which the nouns "effect", "result" and "consequence" can or cannot occur. Vendler pays no attention, for instance, to the fact that "effect" and "result" also function as verbs while "consequence" does not; nor to the instructive differences that there are between the functions, as verbs, of "effect" and "result". He ignores, too, the various adjectives formed from these words: "consequent" and "consequential", "resultant" and "resultful", "effective" and "effectual", and the latter two's not too distantly related to be interesting cousins, "efficient" and "efficacious". Nothing is made either of the differences between the prepositions which go with some of these words in typical phrases, e.g., that an outcome is said to result from, be effected by or be consequent upon the act which is said to have that effect, result or consequence. The concepts of these outcomes are articulated and deployed in linguistic constructions around these words as well, and the forms and functions of these words and phrases provide additional perspectives on these concepts.

The different senses imported by the different suffixes forming these adjectives can, with a little ingenuity, be used to elicit features of the concepts articulated by the use of those adjectives in descriptions of acts and outcomes. For instance, the suffix "-ial" forming adjectives from nouns ending
in "-ance" or "-ence" imports a sense of "being of the kind..." or "having the nature of..." that which is denoted by the root substantive. Thus prudential counsel is wise counsel, informed by prudence, rather than uninformed, hollow or misdirected counsel; a providential intervention is a lucky, freakish one, rather than a planned, deliberate one, and circumstantial evidence is evidence gathered from the circumstances of the case, distinct from hearsay evidence or evidence of eye-witnesses. So to describe, say, some loss arising from some damage as a consequential loss is to describe that loss as a consequence of the damage. These descriptions have a classifying function as well. Just as the description of counsel as prudential, of evidence as circumstantial and of an intervention as providential classifies that counsel, evidence or intervention as being of a certain kind, the description of some loss as consequential classifies that loss as being of a certain kind and may be made in order to distinguish it from other losses.

The selectivity of different suffixes with respect to certain roots suggests that the conceptual features expressed by words so formed are exclusive to the respective concepts. For instance, "consequent" and "resultant" are used in descriptions of consequences and results but there is no similarly formed adjective for use in the description of effects. And as may be expected from these adjectives being formed with the Latin present participial suffix, there are differences between the kinds of temporal relationships obtaining between outcomes of these respective types and their antecedent acts. Some of these differences will be discussed in the next section. "Resultful" is unique among the group of adjectives "resultant", "consequent" and "consequential" in not being used to describe outcomes;
like "effective" for instance, "resultful" is used to describe acts in terms of some of the outcomes they may have. The different ways in which these two adjectives are negated show a difference between the relationships between acts and effects and acts and results. The sense of negation imported by the suffix "-less" in the transformation from "resultful" to "resultless" is that of "none at all" or "none whatsoever". Something described by an adjective in this negative form is thus described as completely lacking or quite devoid of the respective quality. Thus a useless tool is one which has no use at all and a thoughtless deed is one to which no thought was given by the person who did it; likewise, a resultless act is one which has no result. However, this interpretation is too strong for the sense of negation imported by the prefixes "in-" or "un-" to adjectives formed by the suffix "-ive". If a person's memory is said to be unretentive, or the hearing an audience gives a speaker is said to be inattentive, it is not being said that the person can remember nothing of the past, or that the audience paid no attention to the speaker. If either of these was the case it would be more accurate to say that the person had lost his memory, or had no memory, and that the audience did not give the speaker a hearing. A completely unretentive memory is not a memory and a completely inattentive hearing is not a hearing. The sense of negation involved here is just that of "not many or much, but some". So if an act is said to be ineffective, it is not being said that the act had no effect, or that the act was completely devoid of effects; by comparison with completely unretentive memories and completely inattentive hearings, the complete absence of effects may be evidence for an act not having been performed. Rather, one of the things
that may be meant by the phrase "ineffective act" is that the act had some but not many effects, or some but not much effect. This point, that all acts have effect(s) but some acts do not have results, is supported by the selectivity of the different prefixes and suffixes with respect to the different adjectives: "resultive" and "effectful" are not lexically correct words.

If all acts have effects it will generally be uninformative to qualify descriptions of acts with the adjective "effective" or, for that matter, to modify verbs of action occurring in sentences used to make such descriptions with the adverb "effectively". No extra information is provided by such qualification or modification if all that is being asserted with such sentences is that this general feature of acts has been instantiated in the case described. Attention to some of the contexts in which these words are used informatively reveal certain typical considerations limiting their application in the description of acts; in particular, to cases in which what happened deviated in some way from what was intended or desired. For instance, both "Smith effectively led the expedition" and "Smith was the effective leader of the expedition" imply that Smith was not appointed or intended to be the leader, but nevertheless ended up doing the leading. The former, especially, may be contrasted with the barely informative "Smith led the expedition effectively"; and each of these with the quite different "Smith led the expedition efficiently". The adoption and use of the phrase "side-effects" to refer to unintended effects of acts indicates in a different way that the intended effects of acts are of primary importance in an assessment of their effectiveness.

"Efficacious", unlike "effective", is not used in descriptions of human agents or their acts but in descriptions of the
instruments or methods which agents use to perform their acts. Doctors may prescribe medicines and pills that are efficacious for treating the ills of their patients, but they do not prescribe medicines and pills efficaciously, nor are they themselves the more or less efficacious according as what they do prescribe does or does not reduce the ills of their patients. Describing something as efficacious attributes to it a capacity for being used or put into action and thereby being instrumental in the production of effects. Of something described as efficacious it will always make sense to ask, "Efficacious for what?" And part of what is required for a correct answer to such a question is a reference to some act for whose performance what is so described can be used as an instrument or method. "What were the doctor's pills efficacious for?" "Treating his patient's complaint."

Efficacy, being a capacity, is a disposition and the uses of "efficacious" are generally dispositional. "Effective" also has dispositional uses but effectiveness is not the same sort of disposition as efficacy; rather than a capacity it is more akin to a tendency. The differences between capacities and tendencies are various but for present purposes they may be put as follows. Statements attributing a tendency entail but are not entailed by statements attributing a corresponding capacity. A stronger statement about what is likely to happen is made when a tendency is attributed to something than when a capacity is attributed to something. If an agent, A, swears a lot, then obviously A can swear, but even if another agent, B, can swear, that does not entail that B does or will swear a lot. Likewise with the attribution of tendencies to and capacities for the production of effects. In the former case, what is being said is that it is likely, perhaps very likely, that effects will be produced; in
the latter case, it is not being said that it is likely that effects will be produced but only that they can be produced. This difference helps to explain why attributions of effectiveness and efficacy with the words "effective" and "efficacious" are made to the different sorts of things that they are. Agents, by their acts, produce effects and so support the attribution of a tendency to produce effects. Instruments and methods for performing acts, on the other hand, are not likely to produce effects by themselves; it is only when they are used or applied in the performance of acts that effects are produced and for this reason only support the attribution of a capacity to produce effects. Sometimes of course, perhaps often, attributions of tendencies to produce effects are made to things which in other contexts can be referred to as instruments or methods of acting. But far from providing counter-instances to the point that it is not things of these types but rather acts and agents to which such tendencies are attributed, all that this shows is that some tokens of some of these different types may be identical. For instance, what in one context may be referred to as an act may in a different context be referred to as a method of acting. Writing a letter is an act which can be performed with a pen or pencil and a piece of paper and comments can be made on the efficacy of this equipment for letter-writing. Comments can also be made on the efficacy of letter-writing, not as an act but in so far as it is a method of performing an act—communicating with a distant friend or conducting business negotiations. Even the type distinction between agents and instruments of action may disappear at token level: some people regard themselves as instruments of God's will. But in general the type distinctions be-
tween agents and acts and between instruments and methods of action are clear enough — agents perform acts, instruments are used and methods are applied by agents in performing acts. So the possibility of one thing being referred to as a token of one type in one context and as a token of a different type in another context should not be allowed to obscure the distinctions between the uses of "efficacious" and "effective" which have been drawn here in terms of the types of thing each is used to describe. Moreover, these distinctions are not arbitrary and the reason why they are marked in ordinary language is not difficult to find. Common everyday needs for finding satisfactory ways of doing things, or means adequate for accomplishing intended ends, impose a requirement for linguistic forms suitable for expressing both these needs and their satisfaction. Frequently, situations arise in which questions are posed and answers given as to what could be done and what would happen if something were done, what can be done and what tends to happen if it is done. The availability of adjectives such as "efficacious" and "effective" satisfies, in part at least, the requirements on language for the means of expressing such questions and answers.

Dispositions are to be contrasted with occurrences and dispositional uses of expressions with their occurrent uses; i.e., the use of an expression to attribute a disposition or to describe an occurrence. To attribute a disposition to produce effects to something is not to say that that thing is effecting outcomes of a certain type at a particular time but that such outcomes can be produced under certain conditions or that they tend to be produced in circumstances of certain kinds. To describe actual occurrences of the production of effects, on
the other hand, is to say that at a particular time effects were or are being produced. However, a tendency to produce effects could not be attributed truly to something of a particular type unless there were actual occurrences of things of that type producing effects. Saying that acts tend to produce effects, or that acts are effective, is not the same as saying of a particular act that it was or is effective, that it did produce effects or is, even now, producing them; but unless things like these latter can be said truly from time to time, things like the former could not. In this way the dispositional use of "effective" is dependent upon its occurrent use. The dispositional use of "efficacious" is also dependent upon the occurrent use of "effective". The attribution to an instrument or method of a capacity for producing certain effects when used or applied under certain conditions could not be made, or if made, would have to be withdrawn, if on repeated occasions acts performed with those instruments or by applying those methods did not produce such effects. Describing something truly as efficacious is dependent on the acts performed, using the instruments or applying the methods so described, producing effects. And this shows the relative status of these uses of "efficacious" and "effective" because for acts to produce effects is for them to be effective.

The use of "efficient" is dependent on the use of "effective" too, though in a different way from that of "efficacious". And there are other differences between the uses of "efficient" and "efficacious". The latter cannot be used in descriptions of agents or their acts but the former can. Doctors may be efficient or inefficient in the way they run their practices but they cannot by the same token be efficacious or inefficacious. The
treatment which a patient receives from his doctor may be effective and efficient but to say that a patient was given effective treatment is not to say that he was given efficient treatment. A sufficient condition for the truth of the first is that the treatment given the patient had some effect, e.g., a reduction of his ills, but this is only a necessary and not a sufficient condition for the truth of the second. In addition to being productive of effects acts have to be performed with a certain manner or style in order for either them or their agents to be described truly as efficient. A notion of economy of effort in the performance of acts is included in the sense of saying that they are efficiently performed and this restricts the use of "efficient" in comparison with that of "effective". If a patient recovers his health because of treatment he has received the treatment can be said to have been effective. But if the patient made his recovery only after first having to recover from the effects of treatment which exacerbated his condition and which was prescribed on the basis of a mistaken diagnosis, the treatment he received could not be said to have been efficient. On the other hand, no amount of economy of effort in the performance of an act will preserve the efficiency of that performance if the act lacks a certain effectiveness: a doctor may stream-line his procedures for treating patients and so become more efficient, but if the stream-lining is carried to the point where the treatment received by the patients does not have those effects the doctor and the treatment of his patients cease to be efficient.

The concept of causation in action has diverse applications. It applies not only in the case of acts producing effects, and thereby to agents, but also, via the notion of efficiency, to
the manner or style of an agent's performance, and via the notion of efficacy to instruments and methods which an agent might use in the performance of acts. But as is shown by the various dependencies of the different uses of the adjectives "effective", "efficient" and "efficacious" upon the occurrent use of "effective", the central application of the concept of causation in action is to the relationship between an act and the effects caused thereby. This relationship, however, is but one of the relationships obtaining between an act and its outcomes.

It was noted earlier that "effect" and "result" function as verbs but "consequence" does not. This fact is indicative of a difference between the outcomes of the respective types; in particular, that effects and results have, whereas consequences lack, those features that are expressed by the use of verbs and verb-phrases. What those features are may best be brought out by first examining the similarities and differences between the grammatical behaviour, as verbs, of "effect" and "result".

An expression, say "A", used to refer to a human agent, can occupy the place of the grammatical subject of the verb "effect", cast in the active voice, but this is not the case for the verb "result". Acceptable sentences can be formed by completing "A effected...", e.g., "The mechanic effected repairs to the car"; but acceptable sentences cannot be formed by completing "A resulted in...". "A resulted from..." yields acceptable sentences, e.g., "He resulted from his parents spending the night together stranded in an elevator during the power failure". However, in these cases, "A" is not used to
refer to a person as a human agent but as an outcome of some act. This is a use of "result" in a quasi-passive voice. The forms of simple sentences constructed around "effect" and "result" in a past tense in their quasi-active and quasi-passive voices are as follows:

(1) A effected 0
(2) 0 was effected by A
(3) A resulted in 0
(4) 0 resulted from A

where "A" reserves a place for an expression used to refer to some act (or agent in the case of "effect") and "0" reserves a place for an expression used to refer to some outcome of the act. These "active-passive" transformations are exemplified below:

(1.a) his pumping effected a rise in the water-level.
(2.a) A rise in the water-level was effected by his pumping.
(3.a) The search resulted in a find of explosives.
(4.a) A find of explosives resulted from the search.

These transformations coincide with the active-passive transformations as defined in traditional grammar in the case of "effect" but not in the case of "result". The reasons for this, which have led to describing the voices of the verbs in these sentences as quasi-active and quasi-passive, need not be gone into here.

"Effect" and "result" are highly determinable verbs used to express occurrences which belong to two broad genera. Many of the specific occurrences belonging to each of these genera can be expressed with verbs which are determinate in relation to the verbs "effect" and "result". This relationship is exemplified in the relationships between the verbs in the sentences (1.a) and
(1.b) His pumping raised the water-level.

(3.b) The searchers found some explosives.

The verbs "effect" and "result" and their respective determinates differ in their present tense behaviour. The use of "effect" and its determinates in the present continuous tense is not problematic. Both "The mechanic is effecting repairs to the car" and "A rise in the water-level is being effected by his pumping" are acceptable sentences. But the use of "result" and its determinates in the present continuous tense is problematic. While "Repairs are being effected" is an acceptable sentence, "Repairs are being resulted" is not. And in "Repairs are resulting" the use of "result" is like the use of "win" and "find" in the sentences "My horse is winning" (uttered, say, as the horse comes to the last fence well clear of the rest of the field) and "The jewels are being found right now" (uttered to the irate owner of some jewels which have been borrowed and lost). What is problematic in these cases is that the utterances are not descriptions, reports, statements, etc. of something in process or going on at the time at which they are uttered as is implied by the use of the present continuous tense. The horse may go on to win the race, or it may fall at the last fence and never cross the finishing line and so not win the race; the jewels may be found, already, just then or eventually, or they may be lost forever. Other verbs, different from these in that they can be used unproblematically in the present continuous tense, are available for expressing more accurately what is in process or being done in such circumstances. The horse may be said to be leading the field, or holding its lead; it may be said of the jewels that they are being looked for, searched for, hunted high and low. On
the basis of the points made in this and the previous paragraph, "effect" and its determinates are verbs of action, in that broad sense of the phrase "verb of action" in which a verb is such if sentences formed around it can be used to give sensible answers to the question "What is he (or "she") doing?" The verbs "result" and its determinates are not verbs of action in this sense.

The differences in the present tense behaviour of "effect" and "result" are indicative of differences in the temporal characteristics of occurrences of outcomes of the respective types. Of an occurrence that can be expressed by a verb which can be used unproblematically in the present continuous tense, it makes sense to ask any of the questions : "When did it start?", "When did it finish?", "How long did it go on for?" ; e.g., "When did his pumping start/finish raising the water-level?", "How long did the raising of the water-level go on for?", "When did the mechanic start/finish effecting repairs to the car?", "How long did the effecting of repairs to the car go on for?" If all three questions are asked of any one occurrence, correct answers to the first two questions specify points in time which mark the beginning and end of a period of time which, if continuous, is occupied by the occurrence and specified by a correct answer to the third question. The raising of the water-level goes on for so long and at any moment during that period the water-level is being raised. The effecting of repairs goes on for so long and at any moment during that period repairs are being effected. However, this set of questions is inappropriate for determining the temporal location of occurrences that are expressed by verbs, such as "result" and its determinates, which cannot be used unproblematically in the present continuous tense. If information about the temporal locations of these occurrences is required the question
to ask is simply, "When did it occur?" ; e.g., "When were the jewels found?", "When was the race won?", "When did the search result in a find of explosives?" And a correct answer to any of these questions specifies not a period of time during which the occurrence took place, but a point in time at which it took place. The temporal locations of occurrences of effects are specified in terms of periods of time; those of results are specified in terms of points in time.

Differences between the kinds of temporal relationship obtaining between occurrences of effects and results and their respective antecedent acts are indicated by some phrases used in ordinary speech. A number of phrases used in descriptions of effects import references to such relationships. Effects are described as short- or long-term effects, immediate effects, after-effects, lasting effects and delayed effects. (Consequences, too, are described as short- or long-term, and this suggests that like effects, but unlike results, consequences have temporal duration.) But among the phrases used in descriptions of results there is no corresponding stock of phrases alluding to the temporal relationships in which results stand to their antecedent acts. The phrases used in descriptions of effects which do this seem to be designed to discriminate between effects of varying duration and to single out effects standing in relationships of greater or less temporal proximity to their antecedent acts. This suggests, in turn, that the temporal relationship between an act and one of its effects and the duration of any effect are not conceptual features of outcomes of this type but are, rather, contingent matters, dependent on the empirical circumstances in which the effect occurs. Were this not so, i.e., if the duration of an effect and its temporal re-
relationship to the antecedent act were conceptual matters, such that all effects were of equal duration and stood in the same temporal relationship to their antecedent acts, the use of these phrases would be redundant. There would be no need for, and hence, no point in using phrases for distinguishing effects in these ways, and the natural economy of speech would have prevailed against these phrases entering common usage. On the other hand, the absence of a corresponding stock of phrases for results suggests that the temporal characteristics of these outcomes are not diverse as in the case of effects. A stock of phrases parallel to those used in descriptions of effects has not developed for use in descriptions of results because outcomes of this type neither have varying duration nor are more or less proximate in time to their antecedent acts. An explanation of the former is forthcoming from the previously established point about the temporal characteristics of occurrences of results: results do not have varying duration because they do not have duration. And if results do not occur at various intervals after the acts of which they are results it is hardly a contingent matter that they all occur at the same time relative to their acts. It is more likely that this relationship is a conceptual one and one which may be expected to be discovered by further analysis of examples. Before going on to do this, however, something of the diversity in the temporal relationships between acts and their effects can be illustrated with the following example.

Suppose an agent is operating a manual pump to move water from one tank to another. One effect of the agent's act of pumping is the raising of the water-level in the second tank; these two are related as cause to effect: the former makes the latter
happen. If the system is suitably pressurized this effect may be completely simultaneous with its cause: as soon as the agent operates the pump water flows into the second tank and the water-level starts to rise; when the agent stops pumping the flow of water stops and the water-level in the second tank ceases to rise. If the system is not pressurized there may be a time-lag between the commencement of pumping and the water-level in the second tank starting to rise as water flows along the pipe connecting the two tanks: in this case, the commencement of the effect succeeds the commencement of its cause. If the agent continues to pump until the water-level in the second tank begins to rise cause and effect are temporally contiguous; if the agent stops pumping before the water-level in the second tank begins to rise cause and effect are not temporally contiguous. In these circumstances, too, there may be a time-lag between the cessation of pumping and the water-level in the second tank ceasing to rise as pumped water continues to flow into it out of the connecting pipe: in this case, the cessation of the effect succeeds the cessation of its cause.

This example can also be used to illustrate how the duration of an effect can be determined by circumstances in which it occurs apart from the duration of its cause. Apart from the water-level ceasing to rise because the agent stops pumping (and ceasing to rise either simultaneously with or subsequently to the agent stopping pumping) the water-level may cease to rise while the agent is pumping either because the first tank is pumped dry or because the second tank overflows. In these latter two cases, it is not only that the duration of the effect is determined by circumstances other than the duration of the cause; in these cases, the duration of the effect determines the duration of the
cause. The act of pumping which is performed after the water-level has ceased to rise is not a cause of the water-level rising for this effect does not occur. This point provides one indication that the notion of retroactive causation is not part of the concept of causation in action. So much is also indicated by the fact that such phrases as "prior effects" or "pre-effective action", whose use might be expected if some acts produced temporally precedent effects, are not used in the description of acts and their effects.

For an act to result in a particular outcome is for it "to end or conclude in a specified manner". This definition of the verb "result", when used in its quasi-active voice, indicates that the point in time which dates an occurrence of a result is coincident with the completion of its antecedent act. The result of competing in a contest, e.g., a win, a loss, a tie or a draw, is determined on the basis of the end-position of the contest. It is not until the contest is completed that the results of it are determined or can be said to have occurred. Some colloquial locutions that may seem to controvert this point, e.g., "He won from the start", "The result was never in doubt from the beginning", do not in fact do so. Both have a ring of the wisdom of hindsight and the first is inaccurate. It would be more accurate to say something like "He led from the start" or "He led from start to finish". The second does not entail that the result occurred before the completion of the contest; merely that from the way the contest progressed one could be reasonably certain what its result would be. Moreover, other colloquial locutions support the point. Both "The result was a foregone conclusion" and "The result was in doubt to the end" bring in a reference to the terminus of the act when its result occurs. But if a result
of an act does not occur before the act is complete, neither does it occur after the act is complete. There is no time interval between a chess player's completing of the final move of a game and his checkmating his opponent; nor between the front runner breasting the tape and his winning the race. Of course, the result of an act may not be known until some time after the completion of the act. But just because, in some cases, it may take time to collate all the data required for working out a result, and then for the necessary calculations to be made, and then for the result to be made known, this does not alter the fact that it is the end-position of the act that provides the basic data for such calculations and dates the actual occurrence of the result. Examples of results that may evidence these characteristics apart from results of competing in contests are results of voting in elections, conducting scientific experiments and sitting examinations.

The conceptual as opposed to the contingent nature of the temporal relationship of a result coincident with the terminus of its act can be demonstrated in the first instance with reference to examples drawn from contests of some types. One function of rules for contests is to govern the duration of the contest. In some cases, this function is discharged, not by the rules stipulating a specific time limit, but by their specification of one or more positions of play which determine a result of the contest. For instance, the Laws of Chess do not stipulate any time limit for a game of chess but Articles 11, 12 and 17 of the Laws specify various positions of play which determine, respectively, a won, drawn or lost game. A game of chess concludes once one of these positions is reached. The rules governing major tennis tournaments do not stipulate time limits for
matches either, but they do stipulate that matches are to be decided on the basis of the player or pair who wins the most of three or five sets. Thus a men's match, for instance, will continue for three, four or five sets, just until one player or pair has won three. Were the temporal location of a result at the terminus of its act not a conceptual matter, but a contingent one, perhaps true in all past instances but possibly false in some future instances, it would not be able to be exploited as it is in the formulation of rules governing the duration of contests by specifying positions of play which determine a result. The conceptual nature of this relationship is reflected in the incoherence of an utterance, addressed by a tennis player to his opponent who has just lost three straight sets: "Well, I've won the match but we'll play on and see if you can win it." One thing that would be clear about such a situation though, is that if the players did play on they would not be contesting the same match which they were contesting in the three previous sets. The rules governing some other games do prescribe time limits on the duration of play and specify procedures for determining the result of the game at its conclusion. For instance, the rules of Rugby Union football prescribe that play shall continue for two forty minute intervals at the end of which the result of the game is determined on the basis of the number of points each side has scored in that time. In spite of this difference, the nature of the temporal relationship between the playing of the game and the occurrence of its result is the same. It is conceptually impossible for two football teams to go on contesting the game and thereby attempt to affect the result after the referee has blown the final whistle.

Occurrences of results serve to terminate acts of certain
sorts other than contests of certain sorts. Finding something may be the result of a search and except where mistakes are made about the identity of the object being sought, or where there is a lack of communication between numerous searchers, a successful search comes to an end when the thing being sought is found. This is not just a contingent point about searching and finding; were someone to say, "Good, I've found the thing I was looking for. Now I'll go on searching for it" he would be demonstrating a misunderstanding of the respective concepts. This point provides the solution to the riddle, "Why do we always find the thing we are looking for in the last place we look for it?" We do so, not because, irrespective of the number of places in which we look for something, it just happens that we find it, if we do, in the last place we look, but because we cannot (conceptually) go on looking for it (continue performing the act) after we have found it (after a result of the act has occurred). If a search is called off before the thing being sought is found and then resumed, and on this second occasion with success, this is not a case of two results occurring at different points in time during one act but a case of two results occurring at the respective termini of two distinct acts. This is shown by an unsuccessful searcher deciding for himself or being instructed to look again or to go and have another look. Cases such as unsuccessful searches in which the occurrence of a result does not serve to terminate the act are not counter-instances. All that such cases show is that other factors can determine the duration of an act. And it is not difficult to imagine a wide range of reasons why a search may be called off without the quarry being found; nor is it difficult to see why time limits are set for the duration of exam-
inactions rather than having their duration determined by the achievement of results.

The verbs "effect" and "result" exhibit the characteristics of what Vendler calls, respectively, "accomplishment" and "achievement" terms (Linguistics in Philosophy pp. 97-121). These two classes of verb-uses form part of a fourfold classification which Vendler sets up by distinguishing "activity", "accomplishment", "achievement" and "state" terms on the basis of the different "time-schemata" exhibited in the use of verbs: "...the concept of activities calls for periods of time that are not unique or definite. Accomplishments...imply the notion of unique and definite time periods...achievements involve unique and definite time instants, states involve time instants in an indefinite and nonunique sense" (pp. 106-7). Vendler claims that the "air of completeness" about this classification is one of its merits. But on closer inspection of his examples it seems that the bases of his different time-schemata are at once, though in different ways, both too fine-grained and not fine-grained enough to do justice to the interesting differences that there are between uses of verbs. For instance, the distinction between activity and accomplishment terms is developed with reference to such examples as "running" and "pushing a cart" (activity terms) and "running a mile" and "drawing a circle" (accomplishment terms). But on Vendler's criteria, "running a distance" and "drawing a line" would be classified as activity terms, and it may be questioned (a) whether the difference between these terms and "running a mile" and "drawing a circle" does not just show a difference between the types of thing that can be referred to with the grammatical object of these verbs rather than a difference between uses of these
verbs, and (b) whether the former difference is more significant than the difference between transitive and intransitive uses of verbs which Vendler's criterion obliterates by classifying both "running" and "running a distance" as activity terms.

In view of Vendler's classification being designed to capture different uses of verbs, it is surprising that he does not incorporate within his system of classification the distinction between dispositional and occurrent uses of verbs. Vendler is evidently aware of these distinct types of use but he classifies dispositional uses of verbs as state terms. "Habits (in a broader sense including occupations, dispositions, abilities, and so forth) are also states in our sense. Compare the two questions: 'Are you smoking?' and 'Do you smoke?' The first one asks about an activity, the second, a state....It is not only activities that are "habit-forming" in this sense. Writers are people who write books or articles, and writing a book is an accomplishment; dogcatchers are men who catch dogs, and catching a dog is an achievement....Many activities (and some accomplishments and achievements) have a "derived" state sense \( \text{sic} \) (pp. 108-9). However, the suggestion that Vendler's classification of activity, accomplishment and achievement terms on the one hand and state terms on the other hand captures the distinction between occurrent and dispositional uses of verbs, albeit clumsily and with idiosyncratic terminology, is not borne out by his discussion of the verb "see" in the last few sections of the chapter. There, Vendler distinguishes the use of "see" as an achievement term, as in "I see it now!", from its use in "I saw him cross the street". Vendler claims, correctly, that when the verb is used in this latter way its sense involves a period of time, and he asks whether such
a period is a process or a state. Denying that seeing can be a process, Vendler opts for the latter. But this is an occurrent use of "see", and classifying it as a state term along with dispositional uses obscures the distinction between this use of "see" and its dispositional use in e.g., "The supervisor sees his research student each week". There are other tensions in Vendler's categorization of states which will be discussed presently. But perhaps sufficient has been said already to show both that Vendler's time-schemata do not provide an adequate basis for distinguishing verb-uses and that his categorization of types of occurrence that can be expressed by the use of verbs and verb phrases is in need of revision.

If different uses of verbs are to be appealed to in drawing type distinctions between occurrences a distinction which is of first importance is that between occurrent and dispositional uses of verbs. If this distinction is not observed it is most likely that things which are not occurrences will be regarded as such. It is the occurrent, not the dispositional, uses of verbs that are apposite to distinguishing types of occurrence that can be expressed by the use of verbs. Deploying the notion of different time-schemata exhibited in the grammatical behaviour of verbs may not further this process far beyond distinguishing period from point occurrences, i.e., those that do have temporal duration from those that do not. But using whatever other criteria are sound and relevant to current concerns, distinctions may be drawn within these two broad types in terms of period events, processes, acts, accomplishments, point events, achievements, etc. It will be noted that unlike Vendler's categorization, this list of types of occurrence does not include states. The reason for this is
that it is by no means certain that states are a type of occurrence. States are conditions in which things are; occurrences are happenings.

As already remarked, Vendler categorizes both dispositions and occurrences as states. Whether or not dispositions are states, they are not occurrences and it seems very forced to say, as Vendler does, that an occurrence of someone seeing another crossing a street is a state. The seer may get into a state because of what he sees but his seeing of what he sees is not a state; rather, it is a period event, i.e., an event with temporal duration. Vendler’s claim that such instances of seeing are states because seeing is not a process falls foul of the suggestio falsi, in his disjunction “a state or a process”, that it is only states and processes that have temporal duration. However, Vendler categorizes other things beside dispositions and occurrences as states. “From the point of view of time schemata, being married, being present or absent, healthy or ill, and so on also behave like states. But then we can take one more step and realize that this is true of all qualities. Indeed, something is hard, hot, or yellow for a time, yet to be yellow, for instance, does not mean that a process of yellowing is going on. Similarly, although hardening is a process (activity or accomplishment), being hard is a state” (p.108). Now these examples, someone’s being married, healthy or ill, and something’s being hard, hot or yellow, are examples of states. Each is a condition which some person or thing may be in. But what is notable about these examples is that they are neither occurrences nor, save for the exception of being ill, can they be expressed by the use of verbs. Marrying, or getting married, is an occurrence, but being mar-
ried is a state; one may present or absent oneself, and each of these is an occurrence, but each is different from being present and being absent. The difference between occurrences which initiate states and the states themselves is fairly obvious. A typical form of expression of states is not a verb, as is the case for occurrences, but a predicate formed with the copula and an adjective. This linguistic difference reflects the difference between states, as conditions in which things are, and occurrences as happenings. The tension in Vendler's categorization of states on the basis of his time-schema for state terms is this. A few verbs, e.g., "ail" and "equal", whose use does exhibit this time-schema, are used to express states. But all those verbs whose occurrent use exhibits this time-schema are not used to express states, and most of those terms whose use exhibits this time-schema and which are used to express states are not verbs. Vendler himself notes this tension in his comment on states: "...that puzzling category in which the role of verb melts into that of predicate, and actions fade into qualities and relations" (p.109).

However, in these last few points there are indications both of an explanation of why "consequence" does not function as a verb and of the status of consequences in contrast to that of effects and results. If it is the case, as it seems reasonable to suppose, that if something is an occurrence of a certain type then it can be expressed by the use of a verb, it follows from "consequence" not being used as a verb that consequences are not occurrences. The examples adduced in the previous paragraph of states initiated by occurrences suggest what the status of consequences of acts may be. Just as, for instance, being harder and being hotter are consequences of the
processes of, respectively, hardening and heating, so being married is a consequence of the act of getting married. The distinctions marked in ordinary language between various types of consequence — logical and causal consequences, natural and conventional consequences, etc. — can easily be accommodated by this view of consequences of acts as states arising from ("consequent upon") the performance of acts. Being married is a logical consequence of getting married but being tired and happy would be causal consequences of getting married. If a wedding couple were tired in consequence of getting married then their tiring would be an effect of getting married; their being tired would be a logical consequence of their tiring. A promisor being committed to perform the promised act is a conventional consequence of his promising; the promisee's being convinced that the promisor will perform the promised act is a natural (and also causal) consequence of the promisor's act.

It has been suggested that effects and results are tokens of different types of occurrence: accomplishments and achievements respectively. This distinction may be made more clear by the following example. Track athletes are said to accomplish distances and field athletes are said to achieve distances. But it is not said of track athletes that they achieve the distances they run; rather that they achieve certain times for the distances they run or that they accomplish the distances in certain times. And it is not said of field athletes that they accomplish the distances of their jumps or throws; rather that they achieve these and accomplish their run-ups, take-offs and wind-ups. The selectivity of these terms in descriptions of athletic events is not a terminological idiosyncrasy, peculiar to such
descriptions; it reflects a general difference between accomplishments and achievements whose connexions with effects and results are also evident in this example. What is said to be achieved in each case determines the result of the event. The placings of competitors in field events are determined by the distances of their throws and leaps; the placings of competitors in track events are determined by the times taken to cover the distances. What is said to be accomplished in each case is part of what is effected: jumpers effect their take-offs, jumpers and javelin-throwers effect their run-ups, hammer- and discus-throwers effect their wind-ups. Nor is it too forced to say that runners effect the distances they accomplish; for instance, "He effected the rest of the distance with blood pouring from his wound, gripping the baton between his teeth, holding his shorts up with one hand and acknowledging the cheers of the crowd with the other".

When acts are assessed in terms of what is accomplished or achieved by their performance assessments of different types are being made. To know what is accomplished by an act is not necessarily to know what is achieved thereby. For instance, to know that a runner finished in a race, that he accomplished the distance, is not to know what he achieved, i.e., whether or not he won or where he was placed—a result of the race. And to know that a survey team has accomplished its task of effecting a survey of an area is not to know the results of the survey—whether or not oil was found. Accomplishments consist in what is completed by an act, achievements consist in something over and above the completion of the act. Confirming a hypothesis, an achievement, does not consist in an extra piece of experimental testing, and missing a train is not of a piece with running onto
the platform as the train pulls out of the station. In cases where achievements are results, the assessment of an act's achievement is generally made with reference to the purpose with which the act was performed. This is evident from the athletics example. A field athlete's purpose in competition is to jump or throw as far as he can, and it is not the purpose of an athlete competing in a track event to accomplish the distance of his race but generally to cover that distance in the shortest possible time. These are the things which the athletes purpose to do and with reference to which their achievements are assessed. These are things striven for, unlike what is accomplished. A well trained miler does not have to strive to accomplish that distance, just as a well trained discus-thrower does not have to strive to accomplish his wind-up and a well trained pole-vaulter does not have to strive to accomplish his run-up and take-off in an attempt at a certain height; their training enables them to do these things without striving, and with "accomplished ease".

The connexions between results, achievements and purposes that are evident in this example suggest that a result of an act is the more or less successful outcome of an attempt by an agent to achieve some purpose. "Purpose" may be understood here as a general term for a variety of objects of acts whose achievement may be attempted by an agent, e.g., the end, goal or objective which an agent has in mind when acting in a certain way, the aim or point of his action, etc. There are no doubt discernible differences between some of these but something which they all need to be distinguished from, and in contrast to which they are as one, is an agent's intention in acting in a certain way. Utterances of the forms "A v-ed intention-
ally" and "A v-ed purposely", where in each case "A" reserves a place for an agent-referring expression and "v" reserves a place for a verb of action, can be used to deny that the agent acted, respectively, without any intention and without any purpose. But whereas in the former case, it can be inferred from the utterance what the agent's intention was, in the latter case, it cannot be inferred from the utterance what the agent's purpose was. If it is said that she left her handkerchief there intentionally, what is being said is that she did not leave the handkerchief there by accident or by mistake, unconsciously or inadvertently, but with the intention of so doing. If it is said that she left her handkerchief there purposely, then while it may be true that she acted with some purpose, what that purpose was cannot be inferred from what is said, e.g., that her purpose in leaving the handkerchief there was to compromise another. The same point is suggested by the fact that neither "A v-ed on intention" nor "A v-ed for an intention" yield acceptable sentences, but both "A v-ed on purpose" and "A v-ed for a purpose" do. Utterances of either of the latter two forms allude to some object of the act, further to its performance, to be achieved by so acting. In line with this difference between intentions relating to acts themselves and purposes relating to objects to be achieved by acting is the difference between the sufficient conditions for fulfilling an intention and achieving a purpose. The performance of the act expressed by the verb of action "v" in each utterance is a sufficient condition for the former but not for the latter. Leaving the handkerchief there fulfills the lady's intention but it does not necessarily achieve her purpose: the abandoned handkerchief may go forever unnoticed so that no-one is compromised.
Just as some acts can be performed both intentionally and purposefully, with some intention and with some purpose, so other acts, e.g., snoring while asleep, can be performed both unintentionally and purposelessly, without any intention and without any purpose. The distinction between intentions and purposes may be made more clear by cases in which acts are performed with one and not the other. Wanton acts of vandalism are examples of acts that are performed without any purpose but with some intention. People who wantonly deface public buildings or slash the tyres of parked cars do so purposelessly but not unintentionally. They are not unaware of what they are doing when they push the point of the knife through the rubber, nor do they daub the walls accidentally. More interesting is the question whether acts can be performed without any intention but with some purpose. If there were such acts then they could be said, literally and truly, to be performed "accidentally on purpose", for to perform an act accidentally is to perform it unintentionally. But usually this phrase is not used literally, but sarcastically, insinuatingly. And usually the acts so described are performed in such a way as to only make them appear as though they are performed unintentionally while they are, in fact, performed intentionally (and on purpose) and not accidentally. Thus a reluctant party-goer, opening the car door for his eagerly anticipating partner as they are about to set off for the party may "accidentally on purpose" drop the car keys down the drain at the kerb-side, thereby preventing their departure. His act may appear to be unintentional, and it may be backed up with exasperated exclamations. The deception may work; the party may be avoided and the lady may not be too disappointed after all. But her charge that he had dropped the
keys down the drain "accidentally on purpose" would be one way of showing that the deception had been penetrated. And if there had been no deception then the act would not have been performed "accidentally on purpose" because it would not have been performed on purpose. That the phrase "accidentally on purpose" is usually reserved for descriptions of acts whose appearances are contrary to fact suggests that acts cannot, in fact, be performed accidentally on purpose, i.e., unintentionally but on purpose. However, there are cases in which acts performed unintentionally nevertheless achieve purposes which their agents have. The way in which B.F. Goodrich discovered the method of what later became known as the vulcanization of rubber provides an example. While conducting experiments to find a way of reducing the sensitivity of rubber compounds to variations in temperature, Goodrich unintentionally left a bunsen flame burning beneath a crucible containing some latex solution. After rectifying his mistake and allowing the crucible to cool he noticed that its contents were harder and tougher than before, and subsequent tests showed their texture to be less susceptible to changes in temperature than previously. Goodrich had found what he had been looking for: he achieved his purpose by doing something which he did not intend to do. Goodrich's unintentional act of leaving the bunsen burning under the crucible would not be described as having been performed purposely, nor on purpose or for the purpose he had in conducting his experiments but rather as being to the purpose he had.3

The identification of results with achievements of purposes and the possibility of some acts being performed (either intentionally or unintentionally) without any purpose helps to explain why some acts do not have any results. (This last claim
was made in the second previous section on the basis of the forms of the adjectives "resultful" and "resultless". Those acts which have no results are those acts which are not performed purposely, nor on or for a purpose, or whose perhaps unintentional performance is not to any purpose.

The claim that a result of an act is the more or less successful outcome of an attempt by an agent to achieve a purpose requires for its clarification some clarification of the notions of attempting and trying. The verbs "try" and "attempt" are not verbs of action. This is shown by the oddity of the simple answers "Attempting" or "Trying" to the question "What is he doing?" At best, each answer is elliptical, requiring another verb to be understood or supplied in order for the answer to make sense. The complementing verb need not be a verb of action: "Attempting to find it" and "Trying to win" are equally sensible answers to the question "What is he doing?" as "Attempting to look for it" and "Trying to run". Hence whether or not the verb "v" in the complexes "trying to v" and "attempting to v" is itself a verb of action, each of these verb complexes is the form of a verb of action if, when filled out, the whole yields a sensible answer to the question "What is he doing?" Because "try" and "attempt" are not verbs of action, "trying" and "attempting" are not names of species of acts, nor even names of genera of acts divisible into species.

Thalberg, in his account of trying, "Some Puzzles about Effort"(E.A.pp.87-104), claims otherwise and suggests that pretending is a form of trying (p.94). The falsity of this suggestion is fairly obvious. In one of Baroness Orczy's stories, the French agent, Chauvelin, intercepts a message written over the device of the Scarlet Pimpernel, telling the addressee to meet
the writer in a certain room of a house at a certain time during a party that is to be given in the house. Chauvelin goes to the party and at the appointed hour moves to watch the room in order to discover the identity of the Scarlet Pimpernel. Nobody comes. Eventually, Chauvelin enters the room to find only Sir Percy Blakeney, sprawled on his back on a couch, snoring softly and apparently the worse for the wine. Chauvelin withdraws, foiled again. The Scarlet Pimpernel was pretending to be asleep but he was not trying to be asleep. Thalberg argues that because trying to try is impossible and pretending is a form of trying, trying to pretend is impossible. He examines one of Austin's examples of trying to pretend. Thalberg's failure to refute this counter-example is instructive because some of Austin's comments on the example are indicative of the functions of the verbs "try" and "attempt" and help to clarify the notions of trying and attempting. The example occurs in Austin's paper "Pretending" (Papers pp.253-71). "Told to pretend to be a hyena at a party....you proceed to jump around powerfully on your hind legs, boxing with your fists and fondling something in your pocket....you evidently have a wrong idea of what a hyena is....You are meaning or trying to pretend to be a hyena, but actually behaving like a kangaroo: this is the correct and the shortest accurate way of describing the situation. There is no short answer to the question 'Is he pretending to be a hyena or isn't he?' nor to 'Is he pretending to be a hyena or a kangaroo?' since such simple expressions are not adequate to cope with such a complicated case" (pp.265-7). Part of Thalberg's response to this example is that "...if we assume, with Austin, that you meant to pretend to be a hyena, we must conclude that you were indeed pretending, although your gestures were singularly inappropriate. Consequently, you
were not trying to pretend" (E.A., p.94). There are two errors in the response so far. The first is in Thalberg's apparent claim that if someone intends to pretend ("meant" here just means "intended") then he does pretend, no matter how inappropriate his gestures. This is far too strong; with instances of pretending, as with instances of any other intentional action, there are limits to the types of act that may be performed which serve to fulfil the intention with which they are performed. Thalberg's second error is in his claim that from "you were indeed pretending" it follows that you were not trying to pretend. Comment on the falsity of the principle "If A (indeed) v-ed, then A did not try to v" will be deferred for the moment. For Thalberg continues, "If Austin cannot give the short answer that you were not pretending to be a hyena, how will he maintain that you were only trying?" (p.94). It seems from this latter question that Thalberg thinks that by not being able to give the short answer that you were not pretending to be a hyena, Austin is committed to giving the short answer that you were pretending to be a hyena, which makes the claim that you were only trying to pretend to be a hyena out of place. But Austin is not so committed, and his point was, of course, that none of the short answers invited by the questions "Is he pretending to be a hyena or isn't he?" and "Is he pretending to be a hyena or a kangaroo?" will do in the circumstances. The questions oversimplify the complicated situations they are about and short answers to them are either false or misleading. The short answer "A kangaroo" given to the second question is false because although his behaviour is like that of a kangaroo, he is not pretending to be a kangaroo because that is not his intention and pretending is intention-dependent. One cannot pre-
tend inadvertently. The short answer "A hyena" given to either question is false, because although it is his intention to pretend to be a hyena his performance falls short of fulfilling that intention. And the answers "No" or "No, not a hyena" given to the first question are misleading, because they may suggest that he is pretending to be something other than a hyena when he is in fact not managing to pretend to be anything. It is in cases such as these, where the situation to be described is more complex than any simple description can adequately cope with, that such words as "try" and "attempt" come into play. "He is trying to pretend to be a hyena" is the shortest accurate description of what is done in the situation, and the shortest accurate answer to the question "What is he doing?" asked about that situation.

The vocabulary of verbs of action is finite whereas the range of what those verbs are used to express is not so finite; it is subject to indefinite extension by the number of different ways in which people do things and the number of different ways in which they fail to do things. The verbs "try" and "attempt" provide means for systematically extending the scope of the vocabulary of verbs of action and thus help to satisfy the need, when it arises, for a means of expressing those acts performed, successfully or unsuccessfully, in ways which cannot be expressed by simple verbs of action. In some cases, the function of the verbs "try" and "attempt" in the complexes "try to v" and "attempt to v" is that of what Austin called "adjuster-words". The analogy he used to explain the meaning of this term may not be familiar. "If we think of words as being shot like arrows at the world, the function of these adjuster-words is to free us from the disability of being able to shoot only straight ahead; by
their use on occasion, *other words* can be, so to speak, brought into connexion with targets lying slightly off the simple, straightforward line on which they are ordinarily aimed" (S.S.p.74). The example of the description of the person intending to pretend to be a hyena, but behaving like a kangaroo instead, is a case in point. There is no simple verb of action "v" such that a description of the form "He is v-ing" would be an accurate description of his performance. "He is trying to pretend to be a hyena" contains the necessary adjustment to "He is pretending to be a hyena". It is easy to imagine many other similar examples. But it is important to notice that the use of "try" and "attempt" is not confined to descriptions of acts which are in some way unsuccessful. Someone may have tried to get a job and got it. Descriptions of the type "He applied for the job and got it" may be adequate for some such situations but the moves made in some other situations in order to get the job may not be as uncomplicated and straightforward as can be expressed simply by the verb "apply". For instance, someone who wants the job and is well qualified to hold it but is ineligible to apply for it may resort to all sorts of manoeuvres - pleas, cajoleries, threats and even blackmail - in order to circumvent his ineligibility. Here again, there is no simple verb of action "v" such that a description of the form "He v-ed" is an accurate description of the acts he performed in order to have his application "accepted". The description "He tried to get the job and got it" copes with the complication.

The verb complexes "try to v" and "attempt to v" provide compendious forms for expressing acts which cannot be expressed by simple verbs of action. Their use brackets what is done in certain ways; this bracketing function is also evident in the
use of the nouns "try" and "attempt". Confronted by the need to say what a team of mountaineers is doing, the long story of their performance of all the planned tasks as well as the unforeseen and perhaps unforeseeable ones can be cut short by saying that they are making an attempt on the summit. Descriptions of acts cast in these forms are often couched in terms of the agents' intentions or purposes when autobiographical and in terms of imputed intentions and purposes when not autobiographical. This is probably because of the foreknowledge of an agent's acts yielded by his intentions and purposes; it does not evidence any necessary conceptual link between trying or attempting and intending or purposing. An agent can try to do something which he does not intend to do; for instance, with his key not turning in the lock and beginning to wonder what can be wrong, someone may be trying to get into his neighbour's garage while not intending to do that but intending to get into his own adjacent garage. And conversely, an agent may be intending, in the sense of having an intention, to do something while not trying to do it. For instance, someone may intend to-day to go to the cinema to-morrow, but his attempt to go to the cinema may not commence until he sets off for the cinema to-morrow.

Examples can also be constructed to illustrate the independence of attempts and purposes. Thus the definition of trying which O'Shaughnessy gives in "Trying (as the Mental 'Pineal Gland')" (J.P., (1975) pp. 365-86) seems to be misconceived: "Trying consists in doing, intentionally and with just that purpose, whatever one takes to be needed if, the rest of the world suitably cooperating, one is to perform the action" (p. 369).

A lack of awareness of the point that the verbs "try" and "attempt" do not function as verbs of action has led some to
regard trying and attempting as particular species of acts, *sui generis*, and to seek for their essential characteristics. On closer inspection, the features latched on to appear not to be essential in so far as contexts for the unexceptionable use of "try" and "attempt" can be constructed in which these features are not evident. For instance, Thalberg maintains that one requirement for trying is that there is some obstacle in the way of the agent doing what he tries to do. "How could you strain in lifting your arm when you are in a normal, unhindered condition? Something must hamper you. The hindrance would be external if you are holding an immense bar-bell that makes you toil as you raise your arms above your head. Perhaps the impediment is inside you. You might have a painful stiffness that makes you struggle to move your arm" (E.A.p.91). Thalberg’s confusion of trying and striving is evident here. The title of his chapter on trying, "Some Puzzles about Effort", is symptomatic of this confusion and it pervades his account. It may be a necessary condition for an agent striving to do something that there is some impediment in his way, against which he has to exert himself or expend some effort, but this is not a necessary condition for trying to do something. Lying quite still in bed, fatigued and letting oneself drift into unconsciousness, one is trying to go to sleep but one is not exerting oneself or expending any effort in the attempt. Conversely, a sleeper in the grip of a nightmare and thrashing about among the bed-clothes is expending a good deal of effort, but could not literally be said to be trying to avoid the avalanche which he dreams is about to engulf him, nor literally be said to be trying to do anything. Thalberg appears to have derived this requirement for trying from some remarks in *Philosophical Investi-
gations. He makes an invalid inference from one of these remarks: "At all costs I will get to that house." - But if there is no difficulty about it - can I try at all costs to get to that house?" (§623). Perhaps not; but the most that can be inferred from this is that one cannot try at all costs to do something if there is no difficulty about doing it. It cannot be inferred that one cannot try to do something if there is no difficulty about it. "Can I try to get to that house if there is no difficulty about it?" "Of course you can. Just walk towards it."

Another of Wittgenstein's remarks, that "...in the sense in which I cannot fail to will, I cannot try to will either" (§618), seems to have inspired another of Thalberg's requirements for trying: "...there must be some doubt that he will manage to X, before we can talk of his attempt to X. More precisely, we say that a person is trying, or will try, to X, when we think he may be unable to X" (E.A. p.91). It is on the basis of this point of talk of trying "suggesting the likelihood of failure" that Thalberg develops the principle "If A tried to v, then A did not v"; the contrapositive of "If A v-ed, then A did not try to v". The example of someone trying to get a job and getting it shows this principle to be false. What seems to have led Thalberg to this hasty and false generalization is an ignorance of the point that the predominant but not exclusive use of the verbs "try" and "attempt" occurs in descriptions of acts which are in some way unsuccessful. As Heath has noted succinctly in "Trying and Attempting" (P.A.S.S. (1971) pp.193-208), "If trying meant having to fail, then obviously nobody would try if he could help it" (p.194). "A tried to v" does not entail either "A v-ed" or "A did not v"; the success or failure of an attempt is logically and conceptually independent of the attempt. It will, therefore, always be
an open question whether an agent's attempt to achieve some purpose succeeds or fails. And given the need for answers to such questions in the course of rational goal-directed action, the concept of results, a concept of outcomes of attempts to achieve purposes, can be seen to satisfy the need for a concept in terms of which answers to those questions can be given. The notions of success and failure in results are reflected in the senses of the words and phrases used to express outcomes of this type. Results of contests are usually expressed in terms of victories and defeats, wins and losses. Results of some kinds of tests and examinations are expressed in terms of passing and failing the test or examination; the result of another kind of test may be that a hypothesis is confirmed or disconfirmed, and the result of another kind of examination may be that something is or is not found. A marksman hits the bull's-eye, scores an "outer" or misses the target; a patient is completely cured, partially cured or dies as a result of the doctor's treatment, the reader gets the point or fails to get the point. Some of the achievement verbs used to express results may also be used to express the purpose an agent has in performing a certain act. Generally, the purpose of competing in contests is to win and the purpose of travelling is to arrive at one's destination, but not always. The purpose a person has in running in a race may not be to win it but to set a fast pace in its early stages in order to assist another runner to establish a record time, and the purpose of taking a walk may not be to arrive at a particular destination but merely to get some exercise or to sight-see. In each case, however, the degree of success or failure with which the agent's purpose is achieved determines the result of his act.
Foot-notes:

1 (from p.99) This remark is not made in Furberg's revised work, *Saying and Meaning*.

2 (from p.104) This passage is quoted from the first edition of *Words*. The first quoted sentence is much more clear than the corresponding sentence in the second edition. In the phrase "the consequential effects of perlocutions", "of" should be read with its identity sense rather than with any of its origin, derivation or cause senses.

3 (from p.148) Austin discussed the differences between acting intentionally and purposely, and deliberately, more expertly, more exhaustively and more entertainingly in "Three Ways of Spilling Ink" (*Papers* pp.272-87).

4 (from p.157) Perhaps it has been unfair to zero in on Thalberg's account of trying in this section. But his account does have the merit over some others of being clearly false in parts and generally relevant to the topic. O'Shaughnessy's account, as its title suggests - "Trying (as the Mental 'Pineal Gland')" (*J.P.* (1973) pp.365-86) - does not clearly make the ascent to the level of falsehood, and Winch in "Trying and Attempting" (*P.A.S.S.* (1971) pp.209-27) says little on the subject. Each of these accounts is to be distinguished from Heath's generally splendid account, "Trying and Attempting" (*P.A.S.S.* (1971) pp.193-208). With his discussion of some of Austin's remarks, Thalberg comes closest to, without actually touching on, the points which the writer has tried to develop in this account.
Chapter Four
The Constitution of Illocutionary Acts

To perform an illocutionary act "...is not to perform an act in some specially physical way, other than in so far as it involves, when verbal, the making of movements of vocal organs ..." (Words p. 134). There is, then, an initial problem confronting any attempt to give an account of illocutionary acts and, therewith, an account of the performative use of language, in terms of a theory of action. It may be called the problem of the constitution of illocutionary acts. The problem arises because such acts are not just physical acts; an illocutionary act is not constituted in toto by movements of parts of the agent's physical body. In this, illocutionary acts are unlike such acts as crossing the legs, folding the arms, twiddling the thumbs, nodding and blinking which are wholly constituted by movements of parts of the body and to whose performance there need be nothing more than such movements. The problem consists in determining the feature(s), apart from those "...more or less indescribable movements with the vocal organs" (p. 114), by virtue of which an act is constituted as an illocutionary act.

A similar problem arises in the case of locutionary acts; these too are not just physical acts. The solution to this problem, given in Chapter One, is that a speaker's act of uttering certain noises is constituted as a locutionary act by virtue of its being performed in a certain speech context, in conformity with the conventions of a language and fulfilling the speaker's intentions with respect to that act. This solution offers a standing temptation to give a parallel account of the constitution of illocutionary acts in terms of linguistic conventions and/or speakers' intentions. But, as argued in Chapter Two, lo-
cutionary and illocutionary acts are distinct, and later, in Chapter Six, it will be argued against those who have succumbed in different ways to this temptation that neither the speaker's intentions nor the conventions of a language are the constitutive features of illocutionary acts. The solution to the problem of the constitution of locutionary acts does, however, provide part of a solution to the problem of the constitution of illocutionary acts. For in so far as a use of language is exemplified by the performance of illocutionary acts it is only in the performance of a locutionary act that an illocutionary act can be performed. So the problem can be formulated in the following question: What is the general feature by virtue of which a locutionary act is constituted as an illocutionary act?

Austin characterized both locutionary and illocutionary acts as conventional acts. Some of his remarks suggest that his adoption of the natural-conventional distinction here was simply in order to mark the distinction between physical and non-physical acts and to register the point that illocutionary (and locutionary) acts are not physical acts. For instance, "...a great many of the acts which fall within the province of Ethics are not, as philosophers are too prone to assume, simply in the last resort physical movements: very many of them have the general character, in whole or part, of conventional...acts..."(pp.19-20). Later, the same contrast is alluded to in "...a non-conventional 'physical' action..."(p.111), and on the following two pages illocutionary (conventional) acts were spoken of in distinction from physical acts and their natural consequences. This is not an idiosyncratic use of the natural-conventional distinction; there is an established use of it in legal writing to mark the difference between things physical and non-physical. Thus Markby
in his Elements of Law writes in §130 on Death: "...besides the cessation of physical existence which is generally signified by the term, there is known to some systems of law a sort of conventional death....This used to be considered in Europe as taking place when a man made certain religious vows and became a monk." But other remarks make it clear that the point of Austin's reiterated characterization of illocutionary acts as conventional acts was not just to emphasize the point that they are not a type of physical act. It was also to indicate the direction in which a solution to the problem of the constitution of illocutionary acts was to be sought. For Austin also spoke of the conventions of illocutionary force and of illocutionary acts as acts performed in conformity with such conventions. "We must notice that the illocutionary act is a conventional act: an act done as conforming to a convention"(Words p.105). "What we do import by the use of the nomenclature of illocution is a reference, not to the consequences (at least in any ordinary sense) of the locution, but to the conventions of illocutionary force as bearing on the special circumstances of the occasion of the issuing of the utterance"(p.115). And there is that one cryptic but crucial remark on the constitution of illocutionary acts, "...that the act is constituted not by intention or by fact, essentially but by convention (which is, of course, a fact)"(p.128).

It is important, therefore, to determine the sense with which Austin used "convention" in this latter connexion; not only in order to solve the problem of the constitution of illocutionary acts and thereby open the way for an account of the performative use of language, but also from the point of view of defending Austin's conception of speech acts. For as well as
being central to that conception, Austin's thesis that illocutionary acts are conventional acts, or acts constituted by conventions, is also the thesis which has attracted the most concerted opposition from critics of that conception. This criticism can hardly be supposed to be directed towards denying that illocutionary acts are not a type of physical act.

Irrespective of how sympathetically Austin's thesis of the conventionality of illocutionary acts has been received, it has become customary for that thesis and Austin's use of the natural-conventional distinction to be interpreted in terms of a distinction between brute and institutional facts. Much of the clarification that has been given to this distinction is owed to Anscombe and her article "On Brute Facts" (An. (1958) pp. 69-72). If it were to be asked, as Anscombe asks, whether the fact, W, that she owes the grocer so much money, consists in any facts beyond the ones, x, y, z, that she ordered a quarter of potatoes from him, that he delivered them and that he sent her a bill, the answer would be "No". In the context of our institutions, the fact that the grocer is owed so much for the potatoes consists in these facts. The facts x, y, z are brute facts with respect to the institutional fact, W. A statement of W is not a description of the relevant institutions (in this case, those of buying and selling goods); but a statement of this kind presupposes such institutions as contextual background in order to be the kind of statement it is. But as for W with respect to x, y, z, so also for x, y, z. A set of events is the ordering and delivering of a quarter of potatoes and something is a bill only in the context of our institutions. Hence the distinction between brute and institutional facts is not an absolute one, separating all facts into
two mutually exclusive classes; it is relative to the facts in question. Being supplied with a quarter of potatoes is a brute fact with respect to owing the supplier for them, but having the potatoes brought to one's house, and left there, are brute facts with respect to being supplied with them. In essence, Anscombe's distinction is that one fact is brute with respect to another if the description of the second is true in virtue of the first obtaining, among others, in the appropriate context, and if the description of the second presupposes an institutional context for its truth or falsity which is not presupposed for the truth of the description of the first. Thus, being supplied with a quarter of potatoes is a brute fact with respect to owing the supplier for them, for while the description of the second is true by virtue of the first obtaining, among others, in the context of the institutions of buying and selling goods, this institutional context is presupposed for the description of the second but not for that of the first.

The distinction between brute and institutional facts would seem to be easily applicable to the phenomena central to Austin's conception of speech acts. Accomplished illocutionary acts which he maintained are conventional acts could be held out as good examples of institutional facts. It could be held, for instance, that given the institutions of acting within some system of ranked authority, of competitive sport, of debate and even of ordinary conversation, descriptions of illocutionary acts such as commanding, declaring won, arguing, greeting, etc. are true in virtue of other facts obtaining whose descriptions do not presuppose the same institutional contexts; such facts as, for instance, that in certain circumstances, the speaker issued a meaningful utterance and addressed it to an audience.
Stresses and strains may begin to appear when an attempt is made to accommodate some of Austin's other claims within this interpretation, e.g., the claims that locutionary acts are conventional acts and perlocutionary acts are not conventional acts. But perhaps proponents of this interpretation could exploit the relativity of the distinction between brute and institutional facts and accommodate these claims by holding that while performances of locutionary acts are brute facts with respect to illocutionary acts, there are other acts whose performances are brute facts with respect to the performance of a locutionary act. The description of an act of saying something presupposes the institution of speech and is true in virtue of other facts obtaining whose descriptions do not necessarily presuppose the same institutional context for their truth or falsehood, e.g., that a person utters certain noises, in conformity with certain linguistic conventions, with certain intentions. And it could be held that descriptions of perlocutionary acts such as convincing, humiliating and persuading, while presupposing some institutional context and being true in virtue of other facts obtaining whose descriptions do not presuppose the same institutional context, do not themselves presuppose the same or as much institutional context as descriptions of either locutionary or illocutionary acts, and hence are brute facts with respect to each of these. Or proponents of this interpretation may claim that these matters are peripheral. For the main purpose of imposing the distinction between brute and institutional facts upon Austin's conception of speech acts has not been to redescribe the phenomena; it has been to provide an interpretative framework for developing or criticizing Austin's thesis that illocutionary acts are conventional acts, acts constituted by convention.
Searle's commitment to this interpretation of Austin's thesis is the most explicit. Taking over Anscombe's distinction, Searle cites as examples of institutional facts the facts that one team beat another at baseball, a man married a woman, a man was convicted of larceny, as well as the fact that a man performed a certain speech act: made a promise, stated a fact, etc. (S.A. pp. 50-3). The terms in which Searle explicates the notion of institutions are the explanatory terms in his account of the constitution of illocutionary acts. "These 'institutions' are systems of constitutive rules" (p. 51) and an act is constituted as an illocutionary act of a particular type by virtue of being performed in accordance with the appropriate set of constitutive rules. Some of Strawson's remarks in "Intention and Convention in Speech Acts" (Symp. pp. 380-400) also show a commitment to this "institutional-cum-rule-constituted" interpretation of Austin's thesis that illocutionary acts are constituted by convention. Examples of illocutionary acts which Strawson allows are essentially conventional are adduced from within "...the sphere of social institutions which have a legal point (like the marriage ceremony and the law courts themselves) or of activities governed by a definite set of rules (like cricket and games generally)..." (p. 384). Marrying, a Court judge's pronouncing sentence, a jury foreman's bringing in of a verdict, redoubling in bridge and a cricket umpire's giving a batsman out are cited as examples. "Such acts could have no existence outside the rule- or convention-governed practices and procedures of which they essentially form parts" (p. 397). Strawson differs from Searle by denying that Austin's thesis is true for all cases. Allowing that illocutionary acts of some types are essentially conventional, i.e., constituted by extra-linguistic conventions,
Strawson maintains that in many cases, warning and objecting for instance, no conventions are involved other than those linguistic conventions required to determine the meaning of the utterance in the issuing of which the illocutionary act is performed. To the extent that Strawson affirms or denies Austin's thesis, however, that thesis is interpreted in terms of rule-constituted acts performed in the context of certain social institutions. Schiffer denies completely the truth of Austin's thesis, summarily dismissing the examples of acts which Strawson allows are essentially conventional. "Perhaps there are some speech acts - e.g., an umpire putting a runner out by uttering 'Out!' - which are conventional acts in the sense intended by Austin, but these are very special cases and of peripheral interest only..." (Meaning p. 91); "...such speech acts as belong to highly conventionalized institutions are...of marginal interest only. The primary and important case is that of the kind of illocutionary act which is not essentially conventional..." (pp. 93-4). "...I would agree with Strawson that in the majority of cases 'it is not as conforming to an accepted convention of any kind (other than those linguistic conventions which help to fix the meaning of the utterance) that an illocutionary act is performed'. For example, in uttering the sentence 'Jones has only one leg', S may be objecting to A's statement that Jones is a nimble dancer, but that this is so would seem to be a result of the intentions with which the sentence was uttered and not a result of any conventions of illocutionary force 'bearing on the special circumstances of the occasion of the issuing of the utterance'" (p. 91). But Schiffer's interpretation of the thesis he denies is as one with that of Searle and Strawson. "I think that we are to understand Austin's claim that
Illocutionary acts are conventional acts as at least committing him to this: a kind of act X is a kind of illocutionary act only if there exist certain conventions such that (primarily) by virtue of these conventions the performance of certain sorts of non-conventional acts (e.g., uttering sounds of a certain type) by certain sorts of persons in certain sorts of circumstances is constituted an instance of X-ing. This... suggests that Austin thought illocutionary acts are made possible by conventions or rules of the type which Rawls and Searle have called 'constitutive rules'. I believe that it is false that illocutionary acts are conventional acts in the sense intended by Austin" (p.91).

Here, then, are three differing views on the truth of Austin's thesis that illocutionary acts are conventional acts, all based on the "conventional act" = "institutional act" = "rule-constituted act" interpretation of that thesis. For two reasons, it is important to test the fidelity of this interpretation to Austin's thesis: first, to determine whether Strawson's argument, endorsed by Schiffer, against the thesis so interpreted is an ignoratio elenchi or not, and second, to determine the relevance of attempting to develop Austin's conception of speech acts within the framework imposed by that interpretation. The interpretation in terms of the distinction between brute and institutional facts is supposed to provide the framework of Austin's solution to the problem of the constitution of illocutionary acts. An appropriate test of the fidelity of this interpretation, therefore, is whether it accommodates his crucial but elliptical remark about the constitution of illocutionary acts, that "...the act is constituted not by intention or by fact, essentially but by convention..." (Words p.128).
The short answer is that it does not, but to show this more of the context of that remark needs to be considered.

Austin was discussing the formula:

(1) In saying that..., S was \( v \)-ing

which can be filled out to give a true description of a locutionary act and an illocutionary act performed in the same speech act situation. He compared (and contrasted) with such descriptions the two descriptions:

(2) In buzzing, I was pretending to be a bee, and

(3) In buzzing, I was behaving like a buffoon.

Austin said of these, "...we find here that saying what one did (buzzing) in intention or in fact constituted my saying so-and-so, an act of a certain kind, and made it callable by a different name. The illocutionary example:

(4) In saying so-and-so I was warning

is of this kind..." (p.128). (1)-(4) have the general form of:

(5) In A-ing, S was B-ing.

In the last quoted remark, Austin linked the conditions for the description of an act (i.e., what makes it "callable by a different name") with the constitutive feature of the act so described. What makes what is done, described by "A", able to be described by "B" is the feature by virtue of which A is constituted as B. "B" is a description of an act in terms of its constitutive feature, this feature being mentioned in the description "B". This is the lesson to be drawn from Austin's examples (2) and (3). What constitutes the act of buzzing (A) as an act of pretending to be a bee (B) is the intention with which the agent buzzed, viz., the intention of pretending to be a bee.

This constitutive feature of the act B is mentioned in the description of the act, "I was pretending to be a bee". But, of
course, agents' intentions are not the only constitutive features of acts. What an agent does can, under one description, be described as an intentional act, and under a different description, not be described as an intentional act. This is illustrated by Austin's second buzzing example, (3). Going about buzzing with no apparent intention is, when coolly considered, behaving rather stupidly and it is unlikely that it would be done with that intention, i.e., the intention to behave stupidly. It is just as a matter of fact in this case that buzzing constitutes behaving stupidly, like a buffoon, and can be described in these terms.

The illocutionary example (4) is like (2) and (3) in that what is done, described as an act of saying so-and-so (i.e., described by "A") can be described as an act of warning (i.e., described by "B") in terms of the feature by virtue of which A is constituted as B. But it is different in that "the act is constituted not by intention or by fact, essentially but by convention". But "convention" here cannot be read as "institution(s)" with fidelity to Austin's point. For while the description "I was warning" mentions the constitutive feature of that act, referred to here, vaguely enough, as a convention, the description does not contain a description of the institutions of warning: the established customs and practices of, say, trying to protect people from harm or alerting them to the existence of potential danger to themselves. The existence of such institutions is presupposed by the description of the act as an act of warning, but these institutions are not mentioned in that description. Recurring to Anscombe: "...the statement that I owe the grocer does not contain a description of our institutions, any more than the statement that I gave someone a shilling con-
contains a description of the institutions of money and of the currency of this country. On the other hand, it requires these or very similar institutions as background in order so much as to be the kind of statement it is” (An. (1958) p.69).

So institutions are not the essential constitutive feature of illocutionary acts. It is not by virtue of being performed in the context of, or against the background of, certain social institutions that a locutionary act is constituted as an illocutionary act of a particular type. Hence, Strawson’s argument, endorsed by Schiffer, against Austin’s thesis that illocutionary acts are convention-constituted acts, which they have interpreted in these terms, is an ignoratio elenchi. And whatever relevance the notion of rule-constituted behaviour has to an account of the constitution of illocutionary acts, it is not owed to that notion being an explication of the notion of a social institution. It follows, too, that if Austin’s conception of speech acts is to be developed, an alternative interpretation has to be found for “convention” as it occurs in his statement of the thesis that illocutionary acts are constituted by convention. It would not be an altogether startling discovery if the materials for such an interpretation were to be found in the text of Austin’s own lectures.

Austin twice compared conventional acts with ritual and ceremonial acts: once in saying “...infelicity is an ill to which all acts are heir which have the general character of ritual or ceremonial, all conventional acts...” (Words pp.18-9), and again in “...the performance of a conventional action (here ritual or ceremonial) is rather like this...” (p.69). At several other points conventional acts were compared with one or other
of these types of act (pp.20, 25, 70, 84). A common feature of ritual and ceremonial acts is that they are formal acts, performed according to some form or procedure. In comparing conventional acts with ritual and ceremonial acts it is unlikely that Austin was alluding to any other features of them beside this one, e.g., that some ritual and ceremonial acts are solemn or religious in nature and sometimes accompanied by a measure of pomp and pageantry. For not only are such features never mentioned but Austin occasionally used "form" synonymously with "procedure" and "procedure" synonymously with "ritual" and "ceremony". Discussing the infelicities arising from the non-satisfaction of the Felicity conditions (B.1) and (B.2) Austin said, "By contrast with the A cases, the notion of the B cases is rather that the procedure is all right, and it does apply all right, but we muf the execution of the ritual with more or less dire consequences: ... the purported act is viti­ ated by a flaw or hitch in the conduct of the ceremony" (p.17 underlining added throughout this section). And later, discussing these infelicities in more detail: "... a flaw in the ritual is involved... we attempt to carry out the procedure but the act is abortive.... my attempt ceremonially to open a li­ brary is abortive if..." (pp.36-7). A few pages previously, the synonymous use of "procedure" and "ritual" occurs again: "...he did not accept the procedure, on the ground that the ritual was incompletely carried out..." (p.33). Austin's use of "procedure" synonymously with "form" also occurred in his discussion of infelicities; in the cases, for instance, of the procedures for getting married or naming ships being executed incorrectly, the participants "went through a form of marriage" (p.16) or "went through a form of naming the vessel" (p.23). Elsewhere, Austin
spoke of the "...development of social forms and procedures ...")(p.72).

Austin's comparison of ritual and ceremonial acts with conventional acts, and his use of "ritual" and "ceremony" synonymously with "procedure" in his discussion of infelicities, directs attention to the notion which pervades his statement of the Felicity conditions: the notion of a conventional procedure. "(A.1) There must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a certain conventional effect...(A.2) the particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked. (B.1) The procedure must be executed by all participants both correctly and (B.2) completely. (G.1) Where, as often, the procedure is designed for use..."(pp.14-5). Now in his discussion of these conditions in Lectures II-IV Austin sometimes used "convention" and "procedure" as abbreviations for "conventional procedure". Discussing infelicities arising from the non-satisfaction of the condition (A.1) and taking the utterance "I insult you" as an example, he said, "...while insulting is a conventional procedure...so that in a way we cannot help understanding the procedure that someone who says 'I insult you' is purporting to invoke...we are bound to non-play him...because the convention is not accepted..."(p.31). Likewise when he introduced an example of infelicity which hovered on the borderline between not satisfying the condition (A.1) and not satisfying the condition (A.2) : "...we may say you have not picked George, whether because there is no convention that you can pick people who aren't playing or because George in the circumstances is an inappropriate object for the procedure of picking"(p.28). The use of "convention" as an abbreviation for "con-
ventional procedure" is also evident in "...it becomes more or less arbitrary whether we regard ourselves as deciding (A.1) that a convention does not exist or as deciding (A.2) that the circumstances are not appropriate for the invocation of a convention which undoubtedly does exist..."(p.32). And it would seem to have occurred again when Austin asked, "Have I invoked a non-existent convention in inappropriate circumstances?"(p.38). "Conventional procedure" can be read for "convention" in each of these passages without disturbing their sense. This is also true of the passages in Austin's later lectures, most evidently when he recurred to the Felicity conditions to show that stating was a type of illocutionary act. "The first cases are A.1 and A.2, where there is no convention (or not an accepted convention) or where the circumstances are not appropriate for its invocation by the speaker" (p.137). But it is also true of the passages in which Austin stated his thesis that an illocutionary act is a conventional act, an act constituted by convention. "Conventional procedure" can be read for "convention" in these passages without disturbing their sense, e.g., "...the illocutionary act is a conventional act: an act done as conforming to a convention"(p.105). Most importantly, it is true of Austin's one explicit remark about the constitution of illocutionary acts. For recast as: "...the act is constituted not by intention or by fact, essentially but by a conventional procedure", this remark provides the solution to the problem of the constitution of illocutionary acts.

It is by virtue of being performed as part of a conventional procedure that a locutionary act is constituted as an illocutionary act. The particular conventional procedure exe-
cuted in saying or asking something is the essential constitutive feature of the illocutionary act performed in that locutionary act. It is not the mere matter of fact of saying or asking something which constitutes that act as an illocutionary act. Locutionary and illocutionary acts are distinct; the performance of an act of each type may be attempted in the same situation and the attempt at the first may succeed while the attempt at the second fails. Nor, pace Schiffer, are the speaker’s intentions the essential constitutive feature. Illocutionary acts of most types, including objecting, can be performed unintentionally yet felicitously. (This claim will be established in the third section of Chapter Six.) The social institutions presupposed as background context by the descriptions of illocutionary acts are not the essential constitutive features of those acts either. The respective institutions are presupposed by, but not mentioned in, the description of an act as an illocutionary act of a particular type. On the other hand, the respective procedure constitutive of a particular type of illocutionary act is mentioned in the description of an act of that type. An illocutionary act is described in terms of the conventional procedure executed by the speaker in performing a locutionary act. Thus a speaker may be warning, rather than promising or predicting, in saying that he will go, and the conventional procedure of warning, as distinct from those of promising or predicting, is mentioned in the descriptions of his act as "an act of warning" or simply "He was warning".

The respective merits of institutions and conventional procedures as candidates for the constitutive feature of illocutionary acts may be better judged after a brief consideration of these notions. It will be clear from the outset that insti-
tutions and procedures are not the same sort of thing. The institution of marriage, for instance, is not the marriage ceremony, the procedure for getting married. And in schools with a traditional bent, while the Old Boys vs School cricket match may be an institution in the life of the school, the playing, in any one year, of a one-day cricket match between the school's 1st XI and a team of ex-pupils is not itself an institution; though to participate in such a game would be to go through a particular procedure. Institutions are established customs or practices; procedures are forms of episodic actions. To go through a procedure for doing something requires only one performance of an act of that type but to make a practice of doing something requires more than one performance of an act of one or more specific type. Hence there is less irony in saying of a priest that his weddings are an institution than there is in saying of a bridegroom that his weddings are an institution. The existence of a practice is dependent upon the continual performance of the type(s) of act in which the practice consists; once such acts cease to be performed the practice which they go to make up ceases to exist. If people ceased to get married the institution of marriage would wither away; if the ex-pupils could no longer field a side against the school's 1st XI each year, the institution of the annual Old Boys vs School cricket match would die out. But even though institutions involving the performance of acts constituted by procedures may cease to exist, the procedures for performing those acts remain. In present times, the staging of jousts trades on this fact. Jousting is no longer the established custom or institution which it once was but from time to time historically minded enthusiasts may re-enact such tournaments for their own enjoyment.
In so doing, they do not recreate or re-establish the bygone institution; nor is what they do constituted as such by the institution of jousting, for such does not exist. Rather, what they do is constituted as jousting by being performed in accordance with those forms and procedures of jousting which they adopt for enacting their tournament.

A similar but more apposite example, since it is an example of an illocutionary act, is the case of challenging to a duel. Duelling is now a defunct social institution but the procedures for, as opposed to the practice of, duelling still survive: the issuing of the challenge, its acceptance, the meeting of the duellists, etc. Thus one who perhaps regrets the passing of the practice and believes in an old fashioned way that honour has been wronged may, even seriously, believing the circumstances to be appropriate, issue a challenge in saying, "I'll meet you in the park at dawn to-morrow." In this case the speaker's utterance is especially liable to infelicity because the addressee may reject the whole code of honour involved in duelling, and with that, all the procedures constitutive of acts whose continual performance went to make up the practice of duelling. But suppose that the addressee does not; suppose that he is of like mind with the speaker in regretting the passing of the institution of duelling and accepts the procedure which the speaker has invoked, and even, though this is not important, accepts the challenge. Now clearly, in this case, the speaker's illocutionary act of challenging is not constituted by any institution or practice of duelling for such does not exist. Here, as generally, the speaker's locutionary act of saying, "I'll meet you in the park at dawn to-morrow" is constituted as an illocutionary act of the type it is by virtue of
being performed as part of a particular procedure. The performance of an illocutionary act is dependent, inter alia, upon the existence of an accepted conventional procedure for performing an act of that type and not on any associated institution(s) which may or may not exist and which, if they do, are themselves dependent upon the continual performance of such acts among others.

By identifying systems of rules that are alleged to be constitutive of illocutionary acts with institutions, Searle implies not only that these latter are the constitutive feature of illocutionary acts but also that the performance of a particular illocutionary act is dependent upon the existence of some associated institution(s). Indeed, Searle says of acts of the same conventional (i.e., for him, institutional) type as illocutionary acts, "It is only given the institution of marriage that certain forms of behaviour constitute Mr Smith's marrying Miss Jones. Similarly, it is only given the institution of baseball that certain movements by certain men constitute the Dodgers' beating the Giants 3 to 2 in eleven innings. And, at an even simpler level, it is only given the institution of money that I now have a five dollar bill in my hand. Take away the institution and all I have is a piece of paper with various gray and green markings" (S.A.p.51). But take away all the "paper" and coins and one does not have an institution of money either. And acts of marrying, for instance, are not dependent upon the institution of marriage; the dependence is the other way around. The institution of marriage is dependent, inter alia, upon the continual performance of such acts without which the custom or practice would die out. What constitutes acts of marrying as such are the accepted conventional proce-
dures, correctly and completely executed by participants in the marriage ceremony. This is the feature by virtue of which, for instance, a priest's locutionary act of saying "I declare this man and this woman to be husband and wife" is constituted as his illocutionary act of marrying the couple before him.

There are two possible defences which Searle could make of his claim that institutions, specifiable in terms of sets of rules, are the essential constitutive features of illocutionary acts. First, he could maintain that he was merely taking Austin's statement that an illocutionary act is constituted essentially by convention at its face value, interpreting it literally, and point to one of the Dictionary's definitions of "convention": "A rule or practice, based on general consent or accepted and upheld by society at large...". However, if the points made in this section bear the weight of argument placed upon them, "convention" in Austin's statement of his thesis that illocutionary acts are constituted by convention is not to be taken at its face value but as an abbreviation for "conventional procedure"; and the notion of a practice (or institution) informing this sense of "convention" is inappropriate as an explanatory term in an account of the constitution of illocutionary acts. If these points do not carry the argument, then the matter will have to rest until the next chapter. There it will be argued that an account of the conventional nature of illocutionary acts based on this sense of "convention" does not give an adequate explanation of the constitution of these acts, and that a different sense of "convention" is involved: that of a "general agreement or consent, deliberate or implicit, as constituting the origin and foundation of any custom, institution...or as embodied in any...standard of behaviour...". It
will be clear that these senses of "convention" are distinct; in the former sense, a convention is a rule or practice, in the latter sense, a convention is a general agreement or consent. Alternatively, Searle could deny that in identifying systems of constitutive rules with institutions he was identifying such systems with established customs or practices. That is, he may deny that he was using "institutions" with its normal sense. For in his earlier quoted statement that institutions are systems of constitutive rules, "institutions" is in quotation marks. This defence renders Searle's claim immune to the points made in the three previous paragraphs but throws the whole weight of his account of the constitution of illocutionary acts onto his notion of constitutive rules. The criticism of this notion will be deferred until the next chapter as well.

In some cases, an act of a certain type is constituted as an act of that type by the circumstances in which it is performed. This is not only so when the act, considered apart from its circumstances, is a physical act, as an act of coition is, and the circumstances in which that act is performed constitute it as either an act of love, or incest, or rape. Acts that are not just physical acts are in similar case. Thus the circumstance of not having the owner's permission to enter his property may constitute the act of entering his property as one of trespass; being under oath when telling a lie constitutes that act as one of perjury and the circumstances of having one spouse already, living and undivorced, constitutes an act of going through a form of marriage to another as an act of bigamy.

White has claimed that Austin's distinctions between locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts parallel dis-
tions drawn by others between "acts proper" (the basic physical movement of the agent), "acts and circumstances" and "acts and consequences" (P.A.p.9). No case can be made for the first claimed parallel: between locutionary acts and "acts proper". Even the phonetic act, the act of uttering certain noises, is only a consequence of the "act proper" - those certain more or less indescribable movements with the vocal organs. But some case can be made for the second claimed parallel: between illocutionary acts and "acts and circumstances". Provided the constituent act of acts classified under that rubric include locutionary acts and are not restricted to "acts proper" or physical acts, as the last three examples in the previous paragraph show they need not be, two points can be adduced in support of this claim. First, there is Austin's own heavy emphasis in his early lectures on the need for the circumstances in which an utterance is issued to be appropriate for the performance of an illocutionary act in that situation to be felicitous. Allowing that such an act does not just consist in saying certain words, Austin said, "Speaking generally, it is always necessary that the circumstances in which the words are uttered should be in some way, or ways, appropriate..." (Words p.8). His list of the Felicity conditions (A.1)-(F.2), the first two of which contain explicit reference to the circumstances of the speech act situation, is introduced with some understatement by, "Let us first at least concentrate attention on the little matter already mentioned in passing - this matter of 'the appropriate circumstances'" (p.15). And the ensuing discussion of infelicities arising from the non-satisfaction of these conditions is peppered with examples of acts which are either unsuccessful or infelicitous because of
being attempted or performed in inappropriate circumstances. Secondly, as has been argued against Searle in defence of Austin's distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts, tokens of each of these types of act, performed in the same situation, can be distinguished by the different circumstances presupposed for the performance of each. With this support, White's claim suggests that an illocutionary act is constituted as such by the circumstances in which a locutionary act is performed and that an account of the constitution of illocutionary acts could be given in these terms.

If this were so, and such an account were to be made complete, it would yield, for each type of illocutionary act, a specification of the set of circumstances whose members, obtaining in a speech act situation, satisfied severally necessary and jointly sufficient conditions on the circumstances of the situation to constitute the performance of a locutionary act in that situation as a felicitous illocutionary act of the respective type. In this section an attempt will be made to illustrate what would be involved in such an account by showing some of the different sorts of circumstances that would be mentioned in it. The attempt will be summary in form, not only perforce of space, but also for the number of reasons to be argued for presently, that even if such a range of sets could be specified they would not provide an adequate account of the constitution of illocutionary acts. In spite of this, the attempt will not be wholly in vain. For while circumstances are not the essential constitutive feature of illocutionary acts they do have an important place in the account of the constitution of illocutionary acts to be given in terms of conventional procedures in the next chapter. So it is necessary, and at this stage, con-
venient, to show something of the sorts of circumstances involved. The account to be embarked on here will also show that different sorts of circumstances are selective with respect to different types of illocutionary acts. That is, it will show that a certain circumstance may be a necessary condition for the performance of illocutionary acts of some types but not others, and indeed, may be such as to rule out the possibility of the successful performance of illocutionary acts of some types in the sets of circumstances of which it is a member. This point of the selectivity of circumstances with respect to illocutionary act types will also be deployed later.

Now clearly, in order for such an account to proceed, distinctions need to be drawn between different sorts of circumstances. These distinctions may in the first instance be somewhat arbitrary and they will be subject to greater refinement as the account becomes more detailed. But to impose some initial order, general distinctions which seem reasonably clear will be drawn between those circumstances of a speech act situation pertaining to the speaker, those pertaining to the audience of the illocutionary act, and those other circumstances of the situation, apart from those presupposed for the performance of a locutionary act, which do not pertain directly to either the speaker or the audience. Circumstances falling into this latter category will be dealt with first. Examples of illocutionary act types to be discussed will be drawn in the main from the class of constative-determining illocutionary act types, i.e., those illocutionary acts whose performance determines that the utterance, in the act of uttering which they are performed, is one which has a truth-value.

There is first, then, the circumstance of the bearing of
prior illocutionary acts upon the current situation. The types of illocutionary act with respect to which this circumstance is selective can be divided into three groups:

(a) those which presuppose the prior performance of an illocutionary act of some specific type, e.g., reaffirming, reassuring, restating, etc.

(b) those which presuppose the prior performance of some illocutionary act but not of one specific type, e.g., concurring, corroborating, dissenting, repudiating, etc.

(c) those which do not presuppose the prior performance of any illocutionary act, e.g., anticipating, forecasting, stating, reporting, describing, dating, etc.

Another of these circumstances is that of the temporal relationship between the performance of the illocutionary act and the obtaining of the possible state of affairs that the speaker characterizes by his utterance in the issuing of which the act is performed. Again, the types of illocutionary act with respect to which this circumstance is selective can be divided into three groups:

(a) those which require the state of affairs to be some future possible state of affairs, e.g., anticipating, forecasting, foretelling, predicting, prophesying, etc.

(b) those which require the state of affairs to be some present or past possible state of affairs, e.g., explaining, reporting, retrodiciting, restating, stating, etc.

(c) those which are indifferent to any of these temporal relationships, e.g., claiming, dating, describing, estimating, postulating, reassessing, suggesting, etc.

It can be seen that these two threefold distinctions do not coincide; they cut across each other.
Among the circumstances presupposed for the felicitous performance of illocutionary acts which pertain directly to the speaker there are those which have to do with his mental states - attitudes, beliefs, intentions, etc. - and those which have to do with his authority to perform the illocutionary act. Some of the attitudes involved here can most easily be illustrated in the first instance with reference to the types of illocutionary act which presuppose the performance of some other illocutionary act. For instance, having a certain pro-attitude towards a previous utterance is a necessary circumstance for felicitously agreeing with what was said; having a certain contrary-attitude is a necessary circumstance for felicitously disagreeing. As well as this sort of difference between attitudes, the strength with which a speaker holds these attitudes is a circumstance selective with respect to different types of illocutionary act. Thus progressively stronger pro-attitudes are selective with respect to felicitously concurring, corroborating, confirming, and endorsing, while progressively stronger contrary-attitudes are selective with respect to felicitously dissenting, objecting, contradicting, and repudiating. (Depending on how the original speaker is moved in his beliefs by one of these challenges, he may either amend, revise, or correct his original utterance or, if he is unmoved, contend, maintain, or insist that it was correct.) The strength with which certain attitudes are held is also a circumstance selective with respect to some types of illocutionary acts which do not presuppose the prior performance of any illocutionary act. Thus, how reprehensible a speaker believes an act of his was is selective with respect to his felicitously allowing, admitting, or confessing that he com-
mitted the act.

These attitudes are of the nature of beliefs. The different terminology (i.e., "attitude" as distinct from "belief") is intended simply to set these beliefs off from another which seems to have a special status among the set of beliefs comprising some of the necessary circumstances for the felicitous performance of a constative-determining illocutionary act. This belief is one with respect to the possible state of affairs which the speaker intends to characterize by his utterance, and its special status consists in its holding by the speaker being a necessary condition for the felicitous performance of any constative-determining illocutionary act. Generally, but with a few exceptions, this belief is that the possible state of affairs intended to be characterized by the utterance was, or is, or will be an actual state of affairs. The few exceptions occur in the case of such illocutionary act types as denying, disclaiming, disavowing, etc. where the relevant belief is that the possible state of affairs intended to be characterized was not, or is not, or will not be an actual state of affairs. Here too, the circumstance of how strongly such a belief is held is selective with respect to particular types of illocutionary act. Felicitously affirming, assuring, avouching, and testifying are only appropriate in circumstances in which, inter alia, such beliefs are held especially strongly. These acts would be infelicitous, because insincere, in circumstances in which the speaker entertained doubts about the past, present or future actuality of the state of affairs he was professing to affirm, avouch, testify to, or assure his audience of.

The speaker's having of certain intentions is a necessary circumstance for the felicitous performance of illocutionary
acts of some types. It is clear, though, that in the attempt to give an account of the constitution of an illocutionary act of any type by specifying the set of necessary and sufficient circumstances for its felicitous performance, which set may include requisite intentions on the speaker's part, the specification of the speaker's intention to perform an act of that type has no place. For such a specification, being formulated in terms of the type of act of whose analysis it is intended to be a part, would render the account partially circular. This point provides one indication of the ultimate failure of the attempt to give a general and complete account of the constitution of illocutionary acts in terms of "constitutive circumstances". For those acts which can only be performed intentionally, it is a necessary condition on the circumstances of their performance that the speaker has the intention to perform an act of that type. But this condition cannot be specified without circularity.

Cases in which the speaker's having of a certain intention is a requisite circumstance for the felicitous performance of an illocutionary act, and can be specified without circularity, are most easily discerned where the illocutionary act is of a type which invites by convention a sequel. The different types of sequel, thus required to be intended, are selective with respect to different types of illocutionary act. For instance, the intention to implement some sequel, conditional upon some act by the addressee, is a necessary circumstance for felicitously threatening and offering, and is selective with respect to these acts as opposed to, say, promising and bequeathing. The implementation of sequels to promises and bequests can be made conditional upon some act by the addressee but this is not
a necessary circumstance for their felicitous performance (and, of course, special arrangements have to be made for the implementation of bequests). A sequel which is believed to be to the detriment of or to the benefit of the addressee is selective, respectively, with respect to felicitously threatening and offering. However, neither of these types of illocutionary act is a constative-determining type and parallel examples within the class of such types are not so common. But the procedure for arguing (philosophically) provides one example: premising invites the sequel of concluding and having the intention to conclude something from premises would seem to be a necessary condition for felicitously premising.

The range of kinds of a speaker’s authority which feature among the necessary circumstances for the performance of illocutionary acts is considerable. The authority can be that of powers or rights of a legal or quasi-legal nature; it can be the authority of personal influence; it can be the authority of the evidence in support of beliefs held by the speaker. These kinds of authority are not necessarily exclusive to particular types of illocutionary acts; more than one kind may feature among the circumstances for one particular type. And, of course, it is not just constative-determining types of illocutionary acts to which the circumstances of the speaker’s authority are relevant. One kind of authority which is particularly relevant to these types, however, is that of the evidential support of the speaker’s beliefs. The type of evidence, and the strength of the support it gives to his belief about, for instance, the actuality of the possible state of affairs which he intends to characterize by his utterance, are selective with respect to a number of these act types. Different types of
evidence are revelation (selective with respect to divining and prophesying), calculation and observation. Different mixes of the latter two, rather than each individually, are selective with respect to different types of illocutionary acts. Evidence for belief containing a greater element of observation than calculation is selective with respect to describing, forecasting, judging or reporting what the speaker believes to be the case; a greater element of calculation than observation in the evidence for his belief that something is the case is selective with respect to his estimating, foretelling or predicting it.

So far as the strength of evidence is concerned, progressively stronger support for a speaker's belief is selective with respect to suggesting, estimating, claiming, asserting and stating. In the latter case, this evidential support must be such as to support the further belief of the speaker that he knows the state of affairs which he intends to characterize by his utterance to be the case. A speaker's belief that he knows so-and-so to be the case is a necessary circumstance for his felicitously stating so-and-so to be the case. The circumstance of the strength of the evidential support for these beliefs is also selective with respect to a quite different class of illocutionary act types, e.g., assuming, hypothesizing, postulating, presuming, speculating and surmising. The performance of acts of these types is appropriate in circumstances in which the speaker has very weak evidence or no evidence at all in support of the belief in the obtaining of the state of affairs which he intends to characterize by his utterance. Making explicit that an act of one or another of these types is being performed is one way of entering a caveat to that effect.

It has been remarked that more than one kind of authority
may feature among the necessary circumstances for the performance of an illocutionary act of a particular type. In special cases, some acts of assuring and endorsing may require the speaker to have, in addition to evidential support for his beliefs, some special personal influence in order to be successful on the occasion on which they are performed. And the having of certain powers or rights of a legal or quasi-legal nature may be an additional necessary circumstance for the successful performance of some acts of announcing and testifying. These latter two kinds of authority involve relationships between the speaker and his audience in ways which the authority of the evidence for the speaker's beliefs does not. The circumstances of the relationship obtaining between a speaker and his audience in terms of one's authority vis-a-vis the other is selective with respect to such other illocutionary act types as commanding, ordering, instructing, directing, demanding, requesting, pleading, entreating, beseeching, and begging. None of these is a constative-determining type of illocutionary act however.

One sort of circumstance which pertains to the audience of an illocutionary act, and is selective with respect to some of these types of act, is whether the presence of an audience is essential for the performance of the act or not. The presence of an audience, other than the speaker himself, is essential for announcing, asserting, attesting, averring, avouching, avowing, claiming, confessing, confiding, declaring, disclaiming, disclosing, divulging, informing, intimating, notifying, reporting, revealing, stating, suggesting, telling, and testifying. It is not essential for affirming, analysing, appraising, arguing, ascribing, assessing, assuming, attributing, classi-
fying, conjecturing, dating, defining, divining, estimating, forecasting, foretelling, holding (as a matter of fact), hypothesizing, identifying, judging, labelling, postulating, predicting, prophesying, recognizing, recalling, speculating, and surmising.

Here, then, are just some of the sorts of circumstances which can readily be seen to be candidates for inclusion in an account of the constitution of illocutionary acts given in these terms. Even this very restricted sample, however, has been sufficient to show the selectivity of different sorts of circumstances to different types of illocutionary acts. For instance, it has shown in the case of stating, maintaining and testifying, that apart from the necessary circumstances for their felicitous performance which acts of these types have in common, a speaker's belief that he knows that something is the case is a necessary circumstance for his stating that it is the case but not for maintaining that it is the case or testifying to it; that some challenge, actually made or envisaged, is a necessary circumstance for maintaining but not for stating or testifying; and that some authority of a legal or quasi-legal nature may be required by the speaker to testify but not to state or maintain. Similarly, it has shown in the case of prophesying, forecasting and predicting, that different types and different mixes of different types of evidence in support of the speaker's belief in the future state of affairs which he intends to characterize by his utterance are necessary circumstances for the felicitous performance of acts of these different types. Now there seems to be no reason in principle why a restricted account such as this could not be extended until it yielded a set of necessary conditions on the circumstances for
the felicitous performance of illocutionary acts of each type, which range of sets contained no two sets that were identical with each other. Circumstances additional to those already mentioned would have to be introduced into the account, and finer distinctions between those already mentioned would have to be drawn. One way in which such an account could proceed is via the construction of a distinctive feature matrix of the necessary circumstances for the felicitous performance of illocutionary acts. The matrix would be set up by plotting illocutionary act types against all the sorts of circumstances that are necessary circumstances for the felicitous performance of any illocutionary act. Then, specifying for each circumstance whether it is a necessary circumstance for a given type of illocutionary act or not, and repeating this procedure for each type of illocutionary act, the sets of necessary conditions on the circumstances of the situation for the performance of each type of illocutionary act could be specified by enumeration from the entries in the matrix. Suppose such a matrix was constructed. There are several reasons why it would not provide an adequate account of the constitution of illocutionary acts; just two need be mentioned here.

One of these reasons has already been noted in passing. In the case of those types of illocutionary act which can only be performed intentionally, e.g., recognizing (something to be the case) and commiserating, it is a necessary condition on the circumstances for the performance of such acts that the speaker both has the intention to perform an act of that type and does so with the intention. But these conditions cannot be specified without circularity.

A second reason for rejecting the suggestion that an ac-
count of the constitution of illocutionary acts could be
given solely in these terms is forthcoming from within Austin's
conception of speech acts. It may be the reason for Austin's
own apparent rejection of such a suggestion in his remark
that "above all all must not be put into flat factual circum­
stances..." (p. 29). It is the same sort of reason that led to
the rejection of the claim that social institutions are the
constitutive features of illocutionary acts. It will be recall­
ed that, for Austin, the constitutive feature of an act is that
in terms of which the act is described - that feature being
mentioned in the description of the act or in a synonymous de­
scription. Thus a conventional procedure, such as that of warn­
ing, or objecting, or promising, as part of which a locutionary
act is performed, constitutes that act as an illocutionary act
of a particular type; the respective procedure is mentioned in
the description of the illocutionary act as an act of warning,
objecting or promising. Similarly, an act of perjury, constitu­
ted by the circumstances in which a lie is told, can be describ­
ed synonymously with "He committed perjury" as "He lied under
oath", and in this latter description the constitutive circum­
cstances of the act are mentioned. But in the case of those acts
performed against the background of a network of social insti­
tutions, these institutions are not mentioned in the descrip­
tion of the act though they are presupposed by it. And as for
the institutions with respect to those acts, so also for the
circumstances of a speech act situation with respect to illocu­
tionary acts. Certain circumstances obtaining in a speech act
situation are necessary conditions for the performance of an
illocutionary act in that situation and are presupposed by the
description of that act. But they are not mentioned in that de­
Foot-note:
1 (from p.191) The term "distinctive feature matrix" is borrowed from Cohen's article "Speech Acts" (C.T.L. pp.173-208) although the point of the distinctive feature matrix which Cohen sketches in outline there is quite different. Cohen rejects the terminology and distinctions of Austin's conception of speech acts and conceives his task to be the elucidation of the role of the verbs used to describe the things achieved with linguistic utterances in virtue of their contents (p.192). The scope of this conception of speech acts is much broader than that of Austin's, as can be seen from the facts (a) that the class of verbs which Cohen's distinctive feature matrix ranges over includes but is not exhausted by the class of illocutionary verbs, and (b) that not all the features of Cohen's distinctive feature matrix are relevant to Austin's conception. However, a closer examination than Cohen appears to have made of his own illustrative examples renders some of the distinctions in his matrix so unclear, or if clear, of such dubious validity as to put in doubt the relevance of such distinctions to any conception of speech acts. For instance, one distinction (the tenth) which Cohen draws is between those words whose meanings are such as to classify or evaluate the utterance's achievement that they describe. "Assert", "name" and "persuade" are some of Cohen's examples of classifiers; "lie", "misname" and "refute" are some examples of evaluators. But even these few examples do not evidence just one distinction: there seems to be no way in which the difference of meaning between "name" and "misname" is the same as the difference between either "assert" and "refute" or "assert" and "lie". Nor do these examples show a difference between classifying and evaluating verbs: if "He lied" is used to evaluate someone's utterance it may equally well be used to classify it - as belonging to a kind of telling of falsehoods. The point which Cohen seems to have missed here is that "classifying" and "evaluating" are names for different uses of sentences, not names for different kinds of meanings of words.

Two other distinctions (the seventh and eighth in Cohen's list) are unclear. "Hint" and "persuade" are given as respective
examples of words which imply that the speech act they describe is covert or not. But gently persuading someone would seem to be a covert operation, and hinting broadly not so covert. In any case, Cohen does not specify what the covertness of a speech act consists in, nor what it is to be distinguished from: "not covert" may mean "overt", "explicit", "open", "unconcealed", "patent", "definite". No two of these are exact synonyms. Cohen next distinguishes words used to describe acts achieved in virtue of the content of an utterance, e.g., "lie", from those used to describe achievements in virtue of the vocabulary, style, accent of an utterance, e.g., "blaspheme". But a blasphemous utterance would seem to be so, just as much, if not more, because of its content than its "vocabulary, style, accent, etc." And the essential element in lying is not the content of what the liar says but that he says what he says as if he believes it to be true while not believing it to be true. (The success of lie-detector tests suggests that there is more "style, accent, etc." involved in lying than Cohen supposes.)

These three distinctions seem to have been drawn simply for the sake of drawing distinctions; the most cursory examination shows them to be of the rapidly vanishing kind. The same is not true of the other distinctions in Cohen's matrix; each of these is well-grounded and is of direct relevance to any investigation of speech acts. But at the same time, they are all accommodated within Austin's conception of speech acts; none of them exposes any lacuna in that conception. Two of these distinctions, while clear enough in themselves, become problematic in Cohen's hands. For instance, the fourth distinction he draws is between those words which can be used to introduce indirect discourse of some kind - declarative, interrogative, imperative, optative - e.g., "report", "inquire", "order", and "hope", from those which cannot, e.g., "resign". But as was shown earlier in the discussion leading to the introduction of basic normal forms of indirect quotation in Chapter One, "that-" or "whether-" clauses headed by words which can be used to introduce indirect discourse, even when used to describe truly some feature of a speech act situation, do not always yield an indirect quotation of the utterance issued in that situation. So if the notion of indirect discourse is to be given a place in the study of speech acts, more needs to be said about it than Cohen says here. Another of Cohen's dis-
tinctions (the fifth), between words whose meanings imply that the speech act they describe is regulated by extra-linguistic rules of some kind or not, is made vague by the variety of kinds of things he counts as extra-linguistic rules. As well as logical principles, religious canon, and laws of inheritance he counts "a hierarchy of authority" as a kind of extra-linguistic rule. This is problematic.

The next two distinctions (Cohen's second and sixth), between descriptions which imply that the act is either intended or not, and between descriptions which imply different outcomes of the act, are quite straightforward. The latter is accommodated within Austin's conception of speech acts in terms of an act's securing uptake, taking effect and producing a perlocutionary sequel. Of the three remaining distinctions in Cohen's matrix, two (the first and ninth) are appropriated directly from Austin in spite of Cohen's earlier expressed rejection of Austin's terminology and distinctions. Cohen's point here, though, is to try to show some inconsistency between Austin's characterization of an illocutionary act as a type of act whose performance is able to be made explicit by the use of a performative prefix to the utterance, in the act of uttering which it is performed, and the lists of illocutionary act types given in the final lecture under the heads: veridivitive, exercitive, commissive, behabitive, and expositive. Cohen argues that "drink to" cannot be used to describe an illocutionary act even though it appears in Austin's lists of behabitives, and that "perorate", though it does not appear in any of Austin's lists, can be used to describe a type of illocutionary act. Austin did not claim that his lists were exhaustive, but even so, the non-inclusion of "perorate" is quite correct. When, if ever, "perorate" is used in an utterance having the grammatical form of an explicit performative utterance, it has the sense of "sum up" or "conclude". The use of such an utterance would be a case of suit- ing the action to the word and Austin repeatedly distinguished such cases from those of performative utterances (Wörter pp. 65, 81, 85). So it is not the performance of an illocutionary act that a speaker is making explicit in saying something like "I perorate as follows ...". This point enables the other horn of the dilemma on which Cohen attempts to impale Austin to be
turned as well. A note in the Appendix to the second edition of Words indicates that "or suiting action to words" was written beside the words "drink to" (and "toast") in the list of behabitives in the original manuscript. So it is clear that Austin himself had strong reservations about these types of acts being types of illocutionary acts.

The remaining (third) distinction in Cohen's matrix, between descriptions which imply that the utterance is or is not to be taken literally, is not included in Austin's conception of speech acts but can be accommodated by it. Non-literal uses of language, e.g., telling an allegory, speaking in parables, and non-serious uses of language, e.g., joking, pretending, etc. - the examples are Cohen's - are parasitic upon normal uses of language. In these cases, involving "a sea-change in special circumstances" (p.23) of the performance of a locutionary act, the conditions for the use of words with their normal sense or reference are suspended.
Chapter Five
Constitutive Rules and Constitutive Procedures

Under Wittgenstein's influence, the notions of following a rule, acting according to a rule, a rule-governed form of behaviour, and the like, have enjoyed a considerable vogue in certain philosophical quarters without the nature of the rules so frequently alluded to being adequately clarified. Searle's attempt to provide such clarification in his account of constitutive rules (S.A. pp.33-6) was, therefore, to be welcomed. Searle's account is also of crucial importance to his theory of speech acts, for Searle sums up that theory in the hypothesis that "...the semantic structure of a language may be regarded as a conventional realization of a series of sets of underlying constitutive rules, and that speech acts are acts characteristically performed by uttering expressions in accordance with these sets of constitutive rules" (p.37). It is to be argued here that Searle has not given an adequate account of these rules; in particular, that he has not shown that rules are constitutive in any sense other than one which he himself admits is trivial, and that what Searle takes to be a "constitutive rule" in some non-trivial sense is not a rule but a definition. The discussion of Searle's hypothesis will be deferred until the next chapter.

Searle's account begins with a contrast between constitutive and regulative rules. Not much is said to indicate what is meant by "regulative rule", but nothing said prevents taking "rule" in this phrase in what Ryle, in "Use, Usage and Meaning" (C.P.II pp.407-14), called that "...extended sense of 'rule' in which a rule is anything against which faults are adjudged to be at fault..." (p.410). Searle's initial contrast suggests that regulative and constitutive rules are rules of quite different
types; so different, indeed, that a token of one type cannot be a token of the other type. For Searle distinguishes the typical forms of expression of these rules: whereas regulative rules are characteristically expressed in imperative form, "Do X" or "If Y, do X", constitutive rules are characteristically expressed in declarative form, "X counts as Y in context C". This latter formula assumes considerable importance as Searle's account proceeds and it will be recurred to later. However, the formula "X counts as Y in context C" was not intended by Searle to be a formal criterion for distinguishing constitutive and regulative rules, for "first, since constitutive rules come in systems, it may be the whole system which exemplifies this form and not individual rules within the system"; and secondly, "Any regulative rule could be twisted into this form..." (S.A., p.56).

Moreover, Searle says that "constitutive rules constitute (and also regulate)..." (p.34), that they "...do not merely regulate ..." (p.33), and talks of cases "where the rule is purely regulative..." (p.35). So it appears that the initial suggestion was wrong. It now appears that the constitutive/regulative distinction does not distinguish two mutually exclusive sets of rules but two different functions of rules, both of which may be shared by any one rule. Two criteria for this distinction can be extracted from Searle's account, one being specified in the material mode and the other in the formal mode. They are:

(C.1) In so far as a rule or system of rules is constitutive, it creates or defines new forms of behaviour; activities whose existence is dependent upon the rules. "The rules of football or chess, for example, do not merely regulate playing football or chess, but as it were they create the very possibility of playing such games. The activities of playing football or
chess are constituted by acting in accordance with (at least a large subset of) the appropriate rules" (p. 35-4). On the other hand, in so far as a rule is regulative, it regulates antecedently or independently existing forms of behaviour; "...for example, many rules of etiquette regulate interpersonal relationships which exist independently of the rules" (p. 33). Searle's specific examples of rules conforming to this criterion are, in the case of constitutive rules: "A checkmate is made when the king is attacked in such a way that no move will leave it unattacked" and "A touch-down is scored when a player has possession of the ball in the opponents' end zone while a play is in progress" and, in the case of regula­ tive rules: "Officers must wear ties at dinner" and "When cutting food, hold the knife in the right hand" (p. 34). These examples could easily be recast to conform strictly with the formulas "X counts as Y in context C" and "Do X" or "If Y, do X". (C.2) "...where the rule (or system of rules) is constitutive, behaviour which is in accordance with the rule can receive specifications or descriptions which it could not receive if the rule or rules did not exist" (p. 35); for example, "They played football". "Where the rule is purely regulative, behaviour which is in accordance with the rule could be given the same description or specification...whether or not the rule existed..." (p. 35); for example, "He sent out the invitations at least two weeks in advance".

This is Searle's account in summary form. Similar distinctions have been discussed before and in other works Searle acknowledges his indebtedness to Rawls and Black for different aspects of his account. Following Black in "Notes on the Meaning of 'Rule'" (Theoria (1958), pp. 107-26, 139-61), one sense of "consti-
"Consider the case of any activity controlled by (or subject to) regulations but not constituted by them. Then it is always open to us to define another system of activities which is the system of activities of those who do 'recognize' or heed the regulations in question. And this derivative system of activities will... necessarily be constituted by the relevant regulations. Take as an example, the system of activities consisting of the parking of automobiles. This may be said to be subject to (official) regulations but not constituted by them. Call this system S. Now consider the system of activities defined as the activities of those who are aware of the regulations for parking, and also take heed of them. Call this system S'. Then S' is, although S is not, constituted by a set of regulations. It is clear that no matter what system S, of activities subject to rules is given, we can always in parallel fashion define an associated system, S', which will necessarily be constituted by the same regulations. Hence, there seems to be little point in talking separately about activities constituted by rules" (p.147). However, it is absolutely clear that it is not in this sense that Searle wants to maintain that some rules have a constitutive function, creative or definitive of "new forms of behaviour". For commenting on this phrase, Searle says, "There is a trivial sense in which the creation of any rule creates the possibility of new forms of behaviour, namely, behaviour done as in accordance with the rule", and adds, "That is not the sense in which my remark is intended. What I mean can perhaps be best put in the formal mode" (p.35). Searle goes on to give the criterion for the regulative/constitutive distinction outlined under (C.2) above. Presumably, the examples which Searle uses to illu-
strate this criterion for the distinction were chosen with care. But far from showing what the non-trivial sense of "constitutive rule" is, which Searle is concerned to establish, these examples do not even show that there is such a sense. For if it is asked what the rules are, that action described by "They played football" is action in accordance with, the answer which that question invites is: "The rules of the game. In their play they observed all the rules of football and all their play was in accordance with those rules." And this only shows that these rules are constitutive in the agreed trivial sense of constituting an activity composed of acts performed in accordance with those rules, by agents observing or heeding those rules; it does not show that there is any other (non-trivial) sense in which these rules "create the possibility of new forms of behaviour", still less what that sense is. Indeed, here, Searle seems to have been misled by his own examples and by his preoccupation with the playing of games as an example of a rule-governed form of behaviour.

The activity of playing competitive games is engaged in, by and large, with the aim of winning according to the rules. Otherwise, when playing chess for example, why not just sweep all the opponent's pieces save for his king off the board and arrange one's own pieces in formation so that the opposing king "cannot move out of check"? It is just this feature of having wide-ranging restrictions imposed on the practical means that players could adopt to achieve the end which, if achieved by permitted means, would count as winning the game, that sets the playing of most games off from most other activities, and makes them the intensively rule-governed activities that they are. But this is a distinctive feature of the activities, the games,
not of the rules. Searle seems to have taken this difference, between activities which are intensively rule-governed, such as games of chess and football, and activities which like some social activities are not so intensively rule-governed, as indicative of a difference between the nature of the rules governing those activities. But there seems to be no reason for supposing that rules have any different function or nature in a more intensively rule-governed activity than in a less intensively rule-governed activity. It may well be that the existence and observance of rules in an intensively rule-governed activity should figure in a definition of such an activity and with this sense it may be said, albeit unclearly, that the rules are to some extent definitive of the activity. But it is natural to define something in terms of its distinctive feature and this does not impute an extra function to the rules governing such activities. Even if an argument, which Searle does not provide, could be given to show that regulative rules take on an extra "constitutive" function in intensively rule-governed activities, it would not help his account much. For Searle cites rules of etiquette as examples of purely regulative rules and rules of games as examples of constitutive rules; but some games are subject to far more simple sets of rules than the set of rules governing, say, the conduct of the Japanese tea ceremony. And given that some activities are more intensively rule-governed than others, it should not be surprising to find that there is more scope for describing acts without presupposing the existence of any rules when those acts are performed as part of a less intensively rule-governed activity than when they are performed as part of a more intensively rule-governed activity. This evacuates much of the force from Searle's claim
that there is a distinction between functions of rules of the sort drawn in terms of his second criterion. And for two further reasons, each forthcoming from within Searle's own account, the distinction drawn in those terms and illustrated by the examples "He sent out the invitations at least two weeks in advance" and "They played football" is quite illusory.

Further on in his book, Searle identifies systems of constitutive rules with institutions and adopts this latter notion from Anscombe's distinction between brute and institutional facts. Thus following Anscombe, Searle would want to say that the description "They played football" is true in virtue of certain other facts obtaining whose descriptions do not presuppose the same institutional context for their truth or falsity that "They played football" does; such facts as, for example, that certain men performed certain acts with an inflated leather object. These latter facts are brute facts with respect to the institutional fact that they played football. But things are invitations and a set of acts is the sending out of invitations only in the context of certain social institutions. So the description "He sent out the invitations at least two weeks in advance" is like the description "They played football" in presupposing certain institutions, and since, for Searle, these latter are just systems of constitutive rules, these descriptions are on a par in presupposing the existence of certain rules. Irrespective of whether Searle's identification of institutions with systems of constitutive rules is correct, these examples do not support the distinction between regulative and constitutive rules which he is attempting to draw.

The second reason for the failure of the second criterion
for that distinction is forthcoming from Searle's own concession that regulative rules often provide the basis for appraisals of actions which could not be made were it not for the existence of such rules, appraisals such as "He was rude" and "He was immoral". Searle seeks to defend his distinction against this point by claiming that these appraisals are not the same as the specifications or descriptions of acts which could not be given were it not for the existence of constitutive rules, for example, "He voted for Wilkie" and "He hit a home run". This defence betrays a rather out-moded reliance on a simple value/fact distinction. It is not obvious either that "He was rude" and "He was immoral" cannot be used to describe as well as to appraise, or that "He voted for Wilkie" and "He hit a home run" cannot be used to appraise as well as to describe. "He voted for Hitler" and "He made four ducks in as many innings" could be used to do both. It is no good for Searle just to say, "...appraisals are not specifications or descriptions as I am now using those phrases" (p.36). His point in introducing these examples was to illustrate a distinction between two different functions of rules and this they do not, as they stand, do.

The failure of Searle's second criterion throws the burden of his account on to the first criterion for the distinction, specified in the material mode. But it is not clear that the change of mode is of much help, or, even, that it makes much difference to Searle's account. For it is not clear what sense can be attached to saying, as Searle does, that constitutive rules create the possibility of new forms of behaviour whose existence is dependent upon the rules, other than that constitutive rules create the possibility of new forms of description
of behaviour, or descriptions that are (logically) dependent upon the rules. And this would just seem to return the first criterion to the same status as the second. Searle would accept this, however. For in his remarks on the phrase "new forms of behaviour" he does allow that "it is possible that twenty-two men might go through the same physical movements as are gone through by two teams at a football game, but if there were no rules of football, that is, no antecedently existing game of football, there is no sense in which their behaviour could be described as playing football" (pp. 35-6, underlining added). Nevertheless, this does bring into focus the problem which Searle's notion of constitutive rules is designed to solve.

Given the location of the distinction between brute and institutional facts within his theory of speech acts, Searle needs something which enables him to move from a description of what a speaker did as a brute fact - that he said certain words - to a description of what he did as an institutional fact - that he made a promise. What would meet this requirement is something of the nature of a definition, defining an institutional fact such as the making of a promise in terms of certain brute facts subject to conditions on the circumstances of the situation in which they obtain. And suitably filled out, Searle's formula "X counts as Y in context C", with "X" and "Y" reserving places for the definiens and definiendum respectively, not only seems to satisfy this requirement but seems expressly designed to do so. For commenting on the examples of constitutive rules which can be cast in this form: "Attacking a king in such a way that no move will leave it unattacked counts as checkmate in a game of chess" and "A player having possession
of the ball in the opponents' end zone while a play is in progress counts as a touch-down in a game of American football"; Searle says, "The rules for checkmate or touchdown must 'define' checkmate in chess or touchdown in American football in the same way that the rules of football define 'football' or the rules of chess define 'chess'..."(p.34). Though doubts may be entertained about the basis of this analogy, i.e., that the rules of football define "football" and the rules of chess define "chess", it is clear from this remark that the distinctive function of what Searle calls a constitutive rule is that of a definition. But questions now arise as to whether rules can function as definitions, and vice versa, and hence, whether "rules" that are constitutive in this sense are rules. Certain differences between rules and definitions which Searle seems to have ignored will be discussed by way of arguing for negative answers to these questions.

These differences begin to emerge from the differences between rule-formulations and formulations of definitions. Searle seems to have noticed some of these but has failed to appreciate their significance; for instance, he says that "if our paradigms of rules are imperative regulative rules, such non-imperative constitutive rules are likely to strike us as extremely curious and hardly even as rules at all"(p.34), to which it may be replied, "Indeed." Searle seems to have assumed that any utterance occurring in the rule-book for a game is the formulation of a rule. But this is not necessarily the case, any more than it need be the case that all the utterances in the specification of a cooking recipe are formulations of directions to be followed in preparing the dish for the table. In fact, usually, in the case of recipes, one finds a list of the ingredients
required to make the dish preceding the list of directions for its preparation. And distinctions which are analogous to this one between the list of ingredients and the list of directions in the specification of a cooking recipe can be found in the rule-books for games. As well as formulations of the rules regulating players' actions, the rule-books for most games also contain specifications of what may loosely be called the "equipment" required for playing the game: the bats, racquets, sticks and balls with which the game is played, as well as specifications of the "location" of the game: the board, court or field on which the game is played. Beside specifications of the equipment and location peculiar to this or that game occurring in the respective rule-book, terms peculiar to particular games for moves, positions or situations that may occur in the game also have to be defined: such terms as, for instance, "off-side", "touchdown", "castling", "taking en passant", "promoting", "checkmate", etc. But of the sentences used to give these definitions it is more correct to say that they are just formulations of definitions rather than rule-formulations. There are ways of deciding which is which: formulations of definitions are truth-valued, rule-formulations are not; rule-formulations, if not in the imperative mood, will contain such deontic modal words as "must", "ought", "may", "permitted", "forbidden", etc., but these words are seldom used in the formulations of definitions. These differences are illustrated, conveniently, in the section of the Laws of Chess relating to checkmate, to which, apparently, Searle did not have recourse when formulating his version of the "rule" of checkmate. Article 10(2) of the Laws of Chess reads: "The check must be met on the move immediately follow-
ing. If the check cannot be met then it is called 'mate'."

The first quoted sentence is a rule-formulation; the second is a formulation of a definition.

These differences between definition- and rule-formulations simply reflect the fact that the general point of the former is to specify what the definiendum consist in while the point of the latter is to specify what acts are permitted, forbidden or required. But these differences indicate a more substantial difference between rules and definitions (of acts). Adequate formulations of each identify classes of acts: in the case of a rule-formulation the class of acts so identified is the class of acts to which that rule can be applied; in the case of a formulation of a definition it is the class of acts so defined. Taking Article 10(2) of the Laws of Chess as an example again, the class of acts identified by the rule "The check must be met on the move immediately following" is the class of moves made by chess players whose kings have been checked by their opponents' immediately preceding moves. The class of acts (of checkmate) identified by the definition "If the check cannot be met then it is called 'mate'" is the class of moves made by chess players which give check to their opponents' kings in such a way that the check cannot be met on the move immediately following. Now an act which is a member of the class of acts identified by the formulation of a rule or definition can be said to fall within the scope of the respective rule or definition. But while it makes sense to ask of an act which falls within the scope of a rule whether or not it conforms to that rule, it does not make sense to ask of an act falling within the scope of a definition whether it conforms to that definition or not. An act either falls within the
scope of a definition or not, and if it does there are no further appraisals of the act that can be made with respect to the definition. It is otherwise with an act falling within the scope of a rule. In this case, the act is subject to further appraisal with respect to the rule: in terms of whether it conforms to or contravenes the rule, whether it is or is not in accordance with the rule, whether it follows or fails to follow the rule, whether the rule is kept or broken, obeyed or disobeyed, and so on. Here, there is a whole battery of terms of appraisal of acts falling within the scope of a rule which not only are inapplicable in the case of an act falling within the scope of a definition but seem to have no counterpart in the latter case. A corollary to the point that these terms of appraisal are applicable to acts falling within the scope of a rule is that if these terms of appraisal are not applicable to an act then the act does not fall within the scope of a rule.

If Searle’s examples of constitutive rules are reconsidered in the light of this point, it can be seen that they do not meet this rather minimal condition on being a rule. A move a chess player makes either does or does not fall within the scope of the formulation "A checkmate is made when the king is attacked in such a way that no move will leave it unattacked". If it does not, then the move is not an act of checkmate; if it does, the move is an act of checkmate, but then it is not subject to any further appraisal with respect to what that formulation formulates. In particular, the terms of appraisal which are applicable to acts falling within the scope of a rule are not applicable to an act belonging to the class of acts identified by this formulation. It makes no sense to ask
of an act of checkmate whether it conforms to or contravenes the "rule" "A checkmate is made when the king is attacked in such a way that no move will leave it unattacked", or whether this "rule" was obeyed or disobeyed, kept or broken, followed or not. And it follows from the inapplicability of these terms that this formulation is not a formulation of a rule. The same point can be made with respect to Searle's other examples of constitutive rules.

Searle's notion of a constitutive rule extends the ordinary concept of a rule beyond its normal limits. And in at least one respect, the extension creates tensions in that notion which threaten its intelligibility. For in maintaining that constitutive rules define activities Searle is committed to maintaining that constitutive rules are like definitions and unlike ordinary rules in so far as a constitutive rule cannot be broken, disobeyed, contravened or violated by an act falling within its scope. At one point Searle draws attention to this tension in his notion of constitutive rules. "Indeed, it is not easy to see how one could even violate the rule as to what constitutes checkmate in chess, or touchdown in football"(p.41). But a rule which cannot be broken or disobeyed, contravened or violated is not a rule, and in so far as constitutive rules are definitive of activities they are not rules but definitions of activities. Searle has therefore failed in his attempt to clarify the notion of a rule which is so crucial to his account of the constitution of illocutionary acts. And the notion which emerges from that attempt, the notion of a definition, is quite irrelevant to the solution of the problem of the constitution of illocutionary acts. For to say that an act is constituted as an illocutionary act by virtue of the satisfaction of conditions
specified in a definition of that act is not even to come to grips with the problem. The subsequent attempts to improve on Searle’s account of constitutive rules, made by Ransdell in “Constitutive Rules and Speech-act Analysis” (J.P. (1971) pp. 385-400) and by Boer in “Speech Acts and Constitutive Rules” (J.P. (1974) pp. 169-74), do not avoid Searle’s confusion of the notions of rules and definitions.

As an alternative to Searle’s account of the constitution of illocutionary acts an account is to be given here in terms of conventional procedures. This account is designed to elucidate the solution to the problem of the constitution of illocutionary acts offered in the previous chapter, viz., that an illocutionary act is constituted as such by the procedure as part of which a locutionary act is performed. The account will develop the points made by Austin in his statement of the Felicity conditions (A.1)-(r.2), quoted above on p. 47. The account will also incorporate those features of the performance of illocutionary acts which Austin discussed in terms of their non-perlocutionary outcomes - an illocutionary act’s “taking effect” and “inviting by convention a response or sequel” - as well as those features underpinning his fivefold classification of illocutionary forces of utterances as either verdictive, exercitve, commissive, behabitive or expositive.

The sense with which “procedure” is used in this account is not a technical or extraordinary one; it is one of the senses specified for that word in the Oxford English Dictionary: “the...manner of proceeding with any action...in any circumstance or situation”. Nor is it difficult to gain an intuitive grasp of this notion of a procedure. The course of ordin-
ary everyday affairs provides numerous examples of such procedures being followed: getting up in the morning, getting dressed, preparing breakfast, having breakfast, going out to work, etc. Two such procedures will be taken as initial working examples; their execution can be described in greater detail. The first example is of a procedure for fishing. It is easy to imagine a fisherman, engaged in his business, going through the following procedure. Having prepared his tackle (itself a procedure involving an inspection of the net for tears and the mending of any that there are, a check on the floats and weights attached to the net, etc.) the fisherman takes it to the bank of the river from which he is going to fish. He selects a place on the river bank which he thinks is the best place to cast his net from, having a mind for such things as where in the river he has taken good or bad catches before, where he thinks fish will be swimming this time, ease of access to the water, and so on. He casts his net and waits. Then, when he thinks sufficient fish for one catch have swum into the net and been caught, or when he cannot afford to wait any longer, he pulls in his net. The second example, taken from the workshop manual for a particular make of car, is of a procedure for removing the silencer from the car. The origin of this example accounts for the procedure's execution being specified in the form of a list of instructions. "Disconnect the battery cables (earth first). Remove the rear luggage compartment by undoing the two bolts set in the floor of the unit. Undo the nut and bolt on the pipe clamp at the rear of the silencer assembly. Withdraw the tail-pipe rearwards from within the silencer and remove it from the vehicle. Undo the nut attaching the horizontal strap of the silencer assembly to the left-hand
side of the clutch housing. Remove the two bolts and washers securing the silencer mounting bracket to the left-hand side of the gearbox. Undo the nut and bolt on the pipe clamp at the front of the silencer assembly. The silencer can now be removed by withdrawing it rearwards off the down pipe." The main noteworthy features of procedures can be discussed with reference to these examples.

Procedures like these are means for attaining certain ends. Given a certain set of circumstances in which an agent is situated, with a certain end in view, the attainment of that end can be furthered by the adoption and execution of a particular procedure. Ends of different kinds may, of course, be served by procedures of the same type. An amateur who fishes for enjoyment or relaxation may adopt the same procedure for fishing as the professional who fishes in order to earn his livelihood. And going through the procedure of removing the car's silencer may be part of a process aimed at improving the car's performance or it may be part of a practical test set for apprentice mechanics. Procedures serve as means for the attainment of ends by virtue of the fact that, given circumstances appropriate for the adoption of a particular procedure, its execution in those circumstances has certain outcomes. These outcomes may be more or less remote from the desired end and additional procedures may have to be gone through (or the same ones repeated in the case of misexecutions) before that end is actually attained. Thus, unlike the amateur, the professional fisherman who earns his livelihood from fishing must not only go through the procedures of preparing his tackle and fishing, but also those of taking his catch to market and selling it, or having his catch taken to market and having it sold, and being paid for it. The improvement in the
car's performance may be attained simply by removing the car's silencer, or it may require the replacement of the old silencer by a new one, or if no new silencers are available it may require the repairing and refitting of the old one after it has been removed. A single procedure, then, may only provide part of the means for attaining a certain end, but the successful outcome of the execution of one procedure in a sequence of executions of suitable procedures represents a stage in the attainment of that end. Procedures can thus be seen to have a place among the strategies and tactics which an agent adopts as part of his purposive action.

Procedures of the same type can be executed in different ways. For instance, the execution of the procedure of fishing may involve angling with rod and fly, or paying out a line with baited hooks attached, rather than the casting and hauling in of nets. And the procedure for removing the car's silencer may be just as successfully executed by taking a hack-saw to the parts attaching the silencer to the rest of the car as by performing all the acts listed for its execution in the car's workshop manual. Hence, procedures of different types cannot be individuated in terms of the types of act involved in their execution; procedures of the same type can be executed in the performance of acts of different types. More apposite as terms for individuating procedures of different types are the types of circumstances that are appropriate for the adoption of a procedure of a particular type and the types of outcomes which the execution of that procedure is designed to have. For it is by virtue of these features that a procedure is a manner or means of proceeding (towards some end) in any circumstance or situation.

There are important differences between the types of rela-
tionship that can obtain between the execution of a procedure and its disparate outcomes. One of these is exemplified in the difference between the relationships obtaining between the execution of the procedures for fishing and removing the car's silencer, as described in first presenting these examples, and the occurrence of the outcome which each procedure is designed to have. In the case of the procedure for removing the car's silencer, an occurrence of the outcome which that procedure is designed to have, i.e., the removal of the silencer, is necessitated by the correct and complete execution of the procedure. That is to say, it is not possible that, given the correct and complete execution of the procedure, and nothing intervening, that outcome does not follow. In the case of the procedure for fishing, however, an occurrence of the outcome which that procedure is designed to have, i.e., a catch of fish, is not necessitated by the correct and complete execution of the procedure. In this case, it is possible that even though the procedure is correctly and completely executed, without anything intervening, no fish are caught. No fish, or none large enough to be caught in the net, may have been swimming at the time and place where the fisherman cast his net and waited until he hauled it in.

Now between these (non-conventional) procedures and conventional procedures that are constitutive of illocutionary acts, of which those of promising, warning and objecting will be taken as examples, there is an important difference and some important similarities. First, these procedures are alike in that the circumstances in which they are adopted must be appropriate if their execution is to succeed. For instance, if after a long drought a river has receded to a mere trickle in the middle of its bed and it is clear that it is carrying no fish, it would be inappropri-
ate in these circumstances to adopt the procedure for fishing from that river. And the procedure for removing the car's silencer is not likely to be successful if, for example, the mechanic does not have the necessary tools for the job. Similarly, the circumstances would be inappropriate for adopting the procedure of promising to perform some act if for one reason or another the agent could not perform that act; the circumstances would be inappropriate for warning if someone was not, and was not believed to be, in any possible danger; and for objecting if something said was incontestably true. There is more to say, and more will be said, about the appropriateness of the circumstances in which these conventional procedures can be executed. The point of these examples, however, has simply been to show that since inappropriate circumstances can vitiate the execution of each of these procedures, the appropriateness of the circumstances in which a procedure is adopted is just as necessary for the successful execution of a conventional procedure as it is for the successful execution of a non-conventional procedure.

The second point of similarity between these different kinds of procedure is that among the outcomes of their correct and complete execution there are both necessitated and non-necessitated outcomes. An example of a non-necessitated outcome of the execution of each of these conventional procedures would be, respectively, a promisee's conviction that the promisor will perform the act which he has promised to perform; fright or alarm on the part of the person to whom the warning is addressed at the possibility of the danger against which he has been warned; admiration on the part of the audience at the acuteness of the intelligence of the speaker which has enabled him to raise the objection he has. In each of these cases it is possible that, without any-
thing intervening, the correct and complete execution of the procedure does not have this outcome. The promisee may have found the promisor to be unreliable in the past, the promisor may have a history of broken promises known to the promisee who has decided never to trust his word, and even his promises, again. So the promisee is not convinced by this promise. The addressee of the warning may be cool-headed by nature and not prone to take fright or be alarmed at the prospect of personal danger; so he is not frightened or alarmed by this warning. And the audience amongst whom the objection has been raised may just fail to be impressed in the way indicated, having come across the same sort of objection many times before and knowing that the speaker raising the objection is a bit of a plagiarist anyway. A single example of an outcome that is necessitated by the correct and complete execution of the procedure will suffice as it applies equally in the case of each of these conventional procedures. In ideal circumstances, the performance of a locutionary act, performed as part of the correct and complete execution of the procedure, necessitates the addressee’s understanding of the meaning and the force of the speaker’s utterance. In Austin’s words, it secures uptake. In these cases, something does have to intervene for the correct and complete execution of the procedure not to have this outcome. For instance, just as the speaker begins speaking, the addressee may suddenly be convulsed by a violent sneeze, preventing him from hearing all that was said and inhibiting his full understanding of it. And although the speaker may go on to complete the execution of the procedure correctly, uptake will not have been secured because of this intervention. But in the absence of any like intervention, it is not possible that the correct and com-
plete execution of the procedure, in ideal circumstances, does not bring about the audience's understanding of the meaning and force of the speaker's utterance.

The point on which these two kinds of procedure differ importantly is that the execution of a conventional procedure has a type of outcome which the execution of a non-conventional procedure does not, viz., outcomes that are strictly necessitated by the execution of the procedure. For this type of outcome, it is not possible, given the correct and complete execution of the procedure in appropriate circumstances, that such outcomes do not follow. The type difference between necessitated and strictly necessitated outcomes is that in the former case it is possible for something to intervene to frustrate the occurrence of the outcome but in the latter case it is not. A strictly necessitated outcome of the execution of the procedure of promising would be, for example, the speaker's commitment to perform the promised act. Examples of outcomes of this type following from the execution of the procedures of warning and objecting will be introduced in the next section. To say that such outcomes follow from the execution of the respective procedures as a matter of convention, or that they are conventional outcomes of those procedures, though true, is not, in the present context, to say very much. For it is the nature of the relationship between the execution of such a procedure and an outcome of this type, which has only been characterized schematically so far in terms of strict necessitation, that is part of the explanandum of the present account of conventional procedures. While an attempt to spell out the nature of this relationship will be made in the final two sections of this chapter, it may be noted here that it is such outcomes as these, and their obtaining, which provides
content for the respective Austinian notions of a conventional procedure having "a certain conventional effect" and the performance of an illocutionary act "taking effect".

These points of similarity and difference between conventional and non-conventional procedures suggest the following principle of individuation for different types of conventional procedures that are constitutive of illocutionary acts. Two such procedures are procedures of the same type if and only if the correct and complete execution of those procedures requires the same set of (types of) presuppositions to be satisfied and strictly necessitates the same set of (types of) outcomes. The satisfaction of the presuppositions mentioned in this principle consists in the obtaining of certain circumstances in the speech act situation in which the procedure is to be adopted. The objects of such presuppositions (i.e., what is presupposed by such presuppositions) are circumstances of the sort occurring in a distinctive feature matrix of the necessary circumstances for the felicitous performance of illocutionary acts, of the kind sketched in the concluding section of the previous chapter. The circumstances specified for a particular type of illocutionary act in such a matrix are the objects of the members of the set of presuppositions of the conventional procedure constitutive of an illocutionary act of that type.

The specification of a particular type of conventional procedure can be completed by adding to the specification of its sets of presuppositions and strictly necessitated outcomes a specification of the set of (types of) acts in the performance of any one of which a procedure of that type can be executed. However, with the restriction on conventional procedures to those that are constitutive of illocutionary acts as they are adopted
in oral speech act situations, these sets are singletons containing just one type of act, viz., a locutionary type of act. Hence the conventional procedure constitutive of a particular type of illocutionary act can be completely specified in the form of an ordered triplet consisting of a set of (types of) presuppositions, a set of locutionary act types and a set of (types of) strictly necessitated outcomes. Each of these three features of conventional procedures is mentioned in Austin's statement of the Felicity condition (A.1): that there must be a "...conventional procedure having a certain conventional effect, that procedure to include the uttering of certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances...". The correct and complete execution of such a procedure is the felicitous performance of an illocutionary act. It is by virtue of being performed as part of such a procedure that a locutionary act is constituted as an illocutionary act. For any procedure constitutive of a particular type of illocutionary act, correctly and completely executed, the utterance issued in those circumstances, with those outcomes following, has and may be taken to have the illocutionary force of that type.

Perhaps this account can be clarified a little by analyzing some types of illocutionary acts in terms of it. The following analyses of the illocutionary acts of promising, warning and objecting are only intended to be illustrative. They are not intended to be exhaustive of all cases of the felicitous performance of acts of these types. They do not, for instance, accommodate cases of these acts being performed in the issuing of elliptical utterances, e.g., promising in saying just "I promise", warning in saying just "I'm warning you", objecting in saying
just "I object". Nor do they accommodate cases of these acts being performed in the issuing of an utterance in response to a question, e.g., promising in saying "Yes" to the question "Do you promise?"; nor cases of these acts being performed in the issuing of conditional utterances, e.g., warning in saying "If you do that you'll hurt yourself". As well as being subject to these limitations, the following analysis of objecting is further restricted to cases of an objection being raised against a constative utterance on the grounds that it is contingently false. But within the limits of these restrictions the following analyses are submitted as being tolerably correct.

Some presuppositions of the procedure of promising are:

(P.1) that the speaker intends to perform some future act,
(P.2) that the speaker's performance of that act is possible,
(P.3) that the speaker believes his performance of that act is possible, and
(P.4) that the speaker has some evidence in support of such a belief.

There is a difference between (P.2) on the one hand, and (P.1), (P.3) and (P.4) on the other, which corresponds to the difference between the sorts of circumstances necessary for the felicitous performance of an illocutionary act alluded to by Austin's separate statements of the Felicity conditions (A.2) and (P.1). Attempts to execute the procedure in situations in which (P.2) is not satisfied are misapplications of the procedure; the attempt is unsuccessful and the act is not performed. The execution of the procedure in situations in which either (P.1), (P.3) or (P.4) is not satisfied is an instance of insincerity; the act, though successfully performed, is infelicitous because it is insincere. The kinds of circumstances which may lead to the non-satisfaction of (P.2), in addition to those of the
speaker's physical incapacity, are those of his being under some prior obligation or commitment which prevents him from performing the act. Even though a speaker may go through the procedure of promising in such circumstances, unaware of the non-satisfaction of (P.2), and hence without insincerity, the later discovery of that fact would be sufficient to void the promise.

The locutionary act performed as part of the procedure of promising, at least in the simple cases of the execution of the procedure that are being analyzed here, must be such that the product of that act, addressed directly or indirectly to the promisee, characterizes the speaker's future performance of the (promised) act, e.g., saying that he will take her to the cinema to-morrow. And as has been noted already, one of the outcomes strictly necessitated by the correct and complete execution of the procedure is that the speaker is committed to performing the promised act. The point embodied in the claim that such an outcome is strictly necessitated, viz., that it is not possible for anything to intervene between the correct and complete execution of the procedure and the obtaining of this outcome, is not jeopardized by the possibility of something occurring subsequently to a felicitous act of promising which releases the promisor from his commitment to carry out his promise. Such an occurrence is not an intervention between the act of promising and the promisor's being so committed and, indeed, presupposes that the promisor was so committed by his act of promising. Nor is it a counter-instance to this point that the speaker may be under a prior commitment or obligation which prevents his performance of the purportedly promised act. For a circumstance of this sort obtaining in a speech act situation is sufficient to render that
situation inappropriate for the adoption of the procedure of promising and hence the procedure cannot be correctly executed.

Promises are sometimes assimilated to predictions about one's future actions. But they are really quite distinct from these, as well as from statements of intention with which they may also be confused. These differences are due to the different procedures involved in the performance of these acts and begin to emerge from the different sets of presuppositions of the respective procedures. For example, (P.1) is not a presupposition of the procedure of predicting; one can quite happily predict that one will do something without at any time intending to do it. And (P.2) is not a presupposition of the procedure of stating (an intention to perform some future act). For one can intend to do what is in fact impossible, and, therefore, one can state the intention which one has to do it. There are, of course, numerous other differences between these procedures, and it would be a pleasant leisure-time activity to draw up lists of the constituent presuppositions and outcomes of these procedures as well as those of all the other different types of illocutionary acts. But this would be a strictly leisure-time activity; it is not clear what philosophical problems would be being solved in indulging in it. The differences between the procedures constitutive of the various types of illocutionary acts are not, therefore, of immediate primary concern.

Some presuppositions of the procedure of warning are:

(P.1) that there is some present or future possible state of affairs whose obtaining would put the audience in possible danger,

(P.2) that the speaker believes that such a state of affairs does or will obtain, i.e., that it is or will be an actual state of affairs,
(P.3) that the speaker has some evidence in support of such a belief.

(P.1) and (P.2) are stated separately in order to accommodate cases of unintended warnings. Such cases are possible. For clearly, a speaker may say to a companion, as they stand together by the side of a frozen pond, that the ice on the far side of the pond is very thin, without believing, because he has no reason to believe, that his companion has any intention to go skating on the ice, and hence, without believing that his companion is in any possible danger from the thin ice. But if in fact his companion does have such an intention, and being aware of the dangers generally inherent in skating on thin ice, he may take the speaker's utterance as a warning, in which case, albeit unintentionally, the speaker will have warned his companion. Hence, it is not a presupposition of the procedure of warning, though it may in fact be the case in the great majority of instances of the execution of the procedure, that the speaker believes that the audience of his act would be put in possible danger by the obtaining of the state of affairs whose obtaining would do so.

The locutionary act performed as part of the procedure of warning, e.g., saying that the ice over there is very thin, must be such that the product of that act characterizes the state of affairs whose obtaining would put the audience of that act in possible danger. Complete uptake of the utterance, i.e., the audience's understanding of the meaning and force of the utterance, will not be secured unless the audience appreciates the possible danger to himself from the obtaining of the state of affairs characterized by the speaker's utterance. But even if the uptake secured is incomplete in this respect, the speaker's execution of the procedure is, ceteris paribus, an act of
warning in the sense of giving notice to the audience of the possible danger. One of the outcomes strictly necessitated by the correct and complete execution of the procedure is that the speaker has diminished responsibility for injury to the addressee of the warning flowing from the danger against which the speaker gave his warning, and against which the addressee has had reasonable opportunity to protect himself. The extent to which the speaker's responsibility is so diminished will, of course, be affected by other contingent circumstances of the speech act situation; e.g., the extent to which the speaker himself is responsible for the obtaining of the state of affairs which would endanger the addressee, the extent to which the speaker is responsible for the general protection of the addressee, etc. But that some diminution of the speaker's responsibility is consequent upon (the giving of) a warning taking effect is shown by the fact that it is in general out of order for the addressee of a warning to protest to the speaker about damage or injury he has suffered arising from the state of affairs against which he was given a warning.

Some presuppositions of the procedure of objecting are:

(P.1) that some previously issued utterance has a bearing on the current speech act situation, e.g., the utterance that Jones is a nimble dancer,

(P.2) that the speaker has a certain contrary-attitude towards that utterance; in this case, a belief that it is false,

(P.3) that there is a possible state of affairs whose obtaining provides some grounds for believing that that utterance is false,

(P.4) that the speaker believes that such a state of affairs has obtained, or does or will obtain, i.e., that it was, is or will be an actual state of affairs,

(P.5) that the speaker has some evidence in support of such a belief.
The locutionary act performed as part of the procedure of objecting, e.g., saying that Jones only has one leg, must be such that the product of that act characterizes the state of affairs whose obtaining provides some grounds for believing that the utterance against which the objection is being raised is false. And one of the outcomes strictly necessitated by the correct and complete execution of the procedure is that there are some grounds before the audience for believing that the utterance being objected to is false.

Whether the evidence thus provided is sufficient for the falsehood of the previous utterance determines the soundness of the objection. But a negative assessment of the objection in this dimension does not impugn the felicity of the objection; an unsound objection may be raised in all sincerity, just as a piece of bad advice may be given in good faith and not all false statements are lies. What this point does show, however, is the necessity of the satisfaction of (P.2) for a felicitous objection. For in saying that Jones only has one leg, in a speech act situation in which (P.1)-(P.5) with the exception of (P.2) are satisfied, the speaker may not be objecting to the previous utterance that Jones is a nimble dancer but confirming, corroborating or affirming that Jones is a nimble dancer. Again, that such a confirmation, corroboration or affirmation may be unsound is not to the point; that depends, as for the soundness of the objection, on whether Jones' one-leggedness provides conclusive evidence for or against his nimbleness as a dancer. What is to the point is that the distinguishing feature of the procedures constitutive of objecting on the one hand, and confirming, corroborating and affirming on the other, is, \textit{ceteris paribus}, the presupposition
concerning the speaker's attitude towards the previous utterance. In the former case, this presupposition is one of the speaker's contrary-attitude towards the previous utterance; in the latter case, one of a pro-attitude.

(P.2) and (P.3) are stated separately for reasons similar to those for the separate statements of (P.1) and (P.2) of the procedure of warning, i.e., to accommodate cases of unintended objections. Again, such cases are possible. For a speaker may disagree with the previous utterance that Jones is a nimble dancer, i.e., believe that it is false, and yet while not believing that Jones' one-leggedness is grounds for that belief, say with good grounds for believing it to be so that Jones only has one leg. And if, in fact, Jones' one-leggedness is evidence for the falsehood of the utterance that Jones is a nimble dancer, then the speaker will have raised, albeit unintentionally, an objection to that utterance. Hence, it is not a presupposition of the procedure of objecting, though it may in fact be the case in the great majority of instances of the execution of the procedure, that the state of affairs characterized by the utterance issued as part of the procedure, which provides some evidence for the falsehood of the previous utterance, is believed to do so by the speaker. That (P.3) is a presupposition of the procedure of objecting is shown by the fact that if there is no possible state of affairs whose obtaining provides grounds for believing that an utterance is false, then that utterance is unobjectionable on the grounds that it is false. It may, of course, be objectionable on other grounds, e.g., on the grounds of triviality. In the present analysis, however, the cases of objections being considered are restricted to those made on the grounds that the previous
utterance is contingently false. This restriction also pro-
tects the statements of (P.4) and (P.5), which would have to
be amended if the analysis was to accommodate hypothetical
objections.

In Lecture XII Austin out-lined a fivefold classification
of types of illocutionary act, or types of illocutionary force
of utterances, under the heads: verdictive, exercitive, com-
missive, behabitive and expositive. The signal feature of this
classification, one which Austin himself was at some pains to
point out, is its tentative, provisional nature. "I said I
would attempt some general preliminary classification and make
some remarks on these proposed classes. Well, here we go. I
shall only give you a run around, or rather a flounder around.
I distinguish five very general classes: but I am far from e-
qually happy about all of them" (Words pp.150-1). "We should be
clear from the start that there are still wide possibilities of
marginal or awkward cases, or of overlaps...I am not putting
any of this forward as in the very least definitive" (p.152).
In Austin's discussion of this classification his doubts about
the exclusiveness of the distinctions between the classes are
borne out in his systematic comparisons of members of one class
with members of the others. Reasons justifying these doubts e-
merge from the defining characteristics of membership of the
respective classes. "Verdictives consist in the delivering of a
finding, official or unofficial, upon evidence or reasons as to
value or fact, so far as these are distinguishable" (p.153).
"The second, exercitives, are the exercising of powers, rights,
or influence" (p.151). "The whole point of a commissive is to
commit the speaker to a certain course of action" (p.157); "...
the commissive is an assuming of an obligation...the behabi­
tive is the adopting of an attitude..."(p.163). "The fifth,
expositives, are difficult to define. They make plain how
our utterances fit into the course of an argument or conver­
sation, how we are using words..."(p.152). "An enormous num­
ber of expositives seem naturally, but no longer neces­
sarily, to refer to conversational interchange..."(p.162).

The definitions of the first four classes are specified
in terms of different features - presupposed circumstances
and outcomes - of procedures constitutive of illocutionary
acts; terms which are implicit in Austin's statement of the
two Felicity conditions (A.2) and (r.1). The distinction be­
tween behabitives and commissives maps onto a distinction,
drawn in the statement of (r.1), between procedures for use
by persons having certain thoughts, feelings, etc., i.e.,
attitudes, and procedures for the inauguration of certain
consequential conduct. The holding of a certain attitude is
presupposed for the correct execution of a procedure of the
former kind and a behabitive is the adopting of an attitude.
By executing a procedure of the latter kind, a speaker as­
sumes an obligation in the form of committing himself to cer­
tain consequential conduct and a commissive is the assuming
of an obligation; its whole point is to commit the speaker
to a certain course of action. Among the circumstances pre­s­
supposed for the correct execution of a procedure that are al­
luded to in the statement of (A.2) are those of different
kinds of authority required by a speaker for his illocution­
ary act. As emerged from the discussion of these circumstances
in the final section of the previous chapter, the kind of au­
thority so required may be that of evidence in support of his
utterance in the issuing of which the illocutionary act is performed, or it may be that of powers or rights of a legal or quasi-legal nature or it may just be that of the speaker's personal influence. These different kinds of authority underpin Austin's distinction between verdictives and exercitives: verdictives consist in the delivering of a finding upon evidence or reasons as to value or fact; exercitives are the exercising of powers, rights or influence.

Austin seems to have been guided in classifying a particular type of illocutionary act as either verdictive, exercitive, commissive or behabitive by the sort of feature which is an especially prominent feature of the procedure constitutive of an act of that type. Thus an especially prominent feature of convicting (verdictive) is that the person performing the act does so on the basis of evidence. An especially prominent feature of demoting (exercitive) is that the person doing so has the requisite authority to demote. An especially prominent feature of promising (commissive) is that the speaker assumes an obligation and is committed to performing the promised act. An especially prominent feature of protesting (behabitive) is that the speaker has certain thoughts, feelings, etc., i.e., attitudes, on the subject. If this is so, it is not surprising to find, as Austin showed, that there is a considerable degree of overlap between the classes. For while one feature of a procedure may be an especially prominent feature, it is not the only one, and some of the procedure's other features may well be ones that are definitive of membership of other classes. Thus, for instance, the definitive feature of verdictives, that the speaker has evidence in support in some way for his utterance, is also a circumstance presupposed for the correct execution of
the procedures demoting (exercitive), promising (commissive), and protesting (behabitive). The definitive feature of exercitives, that the speaker has certain powers, rights or influence, is also a circumstance presupposed for the correct execution of the procedures of convicting (verdictive), contracting (commissive) and protesting (behabitive). The definitive feature of commissives, that a speaker assumes an obligation with respect to acting in a certain way, is also an outcome of executing the procedures of convicting (verdictive), excommunicating (exercitive) and challenging (behabitive). And the definitive feature of behabitives, that the speaker holds certain attitudes, is also a circumstance presupposed for the correct execution of the procedures of convicting (verdictive), advising (exercitive) and opposing (commissive).

The basis of Austin's classification of some types of illocutionary acts as expositives is in a quite different case. His definition of this class, that its members "make plain how our utterances fit into the course of an argument or conversation, how we are using words", suggests that what Austin had in mind as the basis for this classification was the role of the explicit performative prefix; a phrase prefixed to an utterance which serves to make explicit the particular type of illocutionary force with which the utterance is intended to be taken, or the particular type of illocutionary act whose performance is being attempted in the issuing of the utterance. On this basis, the class of expositives is the class of acts whose performance is able to be made explicit by the use of the explicit performative prefix. If there is anything to this suggestion, the class of expositives includes the sum of the classes of verdictives, exercitives, commissives and behabi-
tives since for any type of illocutionary act there is an explicit performative prefix which can be used to make explicit that it is an act of that type whose performance is being attempted in the issuing of the utterance. It may be this point which underlies the first part of Austin's comment that expositives "...seem both to be included in the other classes and at the same time to be unique in a way that I have not succeeded in making clear even to myself" (p. 152). A clue to the way in which expositives may be unique, albeit unclearly even to Austin, can be seen in his other remark that an enormous number of them seem naturally to refer to conversational interchange. For while it is easy to imagine an act of any of the types classified as expositive being performed in the course of conversation, e.g., describing, remarking, telling, answering, agreeing, arguing, explaining, calling, etc., it is difficult to conceive of acts of some of the types included in the other classes being performed in the course of conversation, e.g., the verdictives acquitting and convicting, the exercitives excommunicating and declaring open, the commissives covenanting and dedicating oneself to, the behabitives condoling and welcoming. But clearly, this distinction, between expositives on the one hand and verdictives, exercitives, commissives and behabitives on the other, like those between the latter four classes, is a very blurred one, and perhaps the only merit in examining the bases of this classification is to justify Austin's own doubts that any great weight can be put upon it.²

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² It remains in this chapter to give some account of the conventional nature of the procedures that are constitutive
of illocutionary acts. Because these procedures are, inter alia, means for attaining certain ends, to give an account of their conventional nature is, inter alia, to give an account of those of their features by virtue of which they are conventional means for attaining certain ends. And, as has been noted already, procedures are means for attaining ends by virtue of the fact that their execution has certain outcomes - in short, because they are efficacious. So an account of the conventional nature of the procedures constitutive of illocutionary acts can be approached by way of an account of how the efficacy of a procedure is at first natural but then ceases to be so and becomes conventional. This account will be given with reference to the example of the procedure of promising; the application of its conclusions to other types of illocutionary act constituting procedures will be shown later.

Suppose that two members of a society are in a situation in which one wants to convince the other that he, the first, will perform some act in the future. It may be assumed that the members of this society are rational human agents, and quite clever with it, but that, as yet, there is known to them no conventional means, linguistic or otherwise, for convincing other people of something. That is, as well as not having a conventional procedure of promising, the language used by members of this society does not have such adverbs or adverbial phrases as "definitely" or "without fail". The language of these people is thus somewhat restricted in scope but it may be assumed that it has sufficient resources to enable linguistically competent members of the society to issue and understand utterances in conditional form, as well as utterances which
characterize their own or others' performances of acts at different times in the future. A member of this society, the speaker, wanting to convince another, the audience, of his own performance of some act in the future can thus say to his audience what act it is that he will perform but must seek some other means for convincing his audience that he will perform it. Being quite clever, he may hit on the idea of giving something of his own which is of value to himself and his audience to the latter, and saying to him that whatever it is - a goat, one of his wives, a sack of corn - is his to keep if he, the speaker, does not perform the future act but is to be returned to him if he does perform the future act. That is, the speaker gives his audience a hostage against his non-performance of the act, and says as much, along with saying what act it is that he will perform.

Now as a means of convincing his audience that the speaker will perform the future act, this move may or may not be successful. It may be unsuccessful for a number of disparate reasons. The procedure may have been altogether too complex for the audience to understand so that he is quite in the dark as to what is going on. Or the audience, while understanding the speaker's utterance characterizing his future performance of the act, may have failed to understand the rest and taken the hostage as a straight gift. So slightly bewildered but pleasantly surprised at the beneficence of the speaker, he may have some belief that the speaker will perform the future act but not be convinced that he will. Or the audience may be convinced by some other means, per accidens, that the speaker will perform the act, and not because of the procedure which he has gone through. But while the procedure may be unsuccessful for
any of these reasons, and more, there are also reasons why it may be successful. Given the audience's understanding of the speaker's utterances, and his appreciation of the hostage as such, the audience has a reason for being convinced that the speaker will perform the act. Being quite clever himself, the audience may reason from the premises that the hostage is of value to the speaker, and that its return to the speaker is conditional upon his performance of the act, to the conclusion that the speaker will prefer the performance of the act to its non-performance because it is in his own interest to perform the act. Perhaps the speaker hopes that his audience will reason in this way. But it does not seem to be a necessary condition for the audience's arrival at such a conclusion that he recognizes the speaker's hope that he will reason in this way; nor is it the case that the speaker has to rely on such a recognition being made in order for the procedure he has adopted to be successful. All the speaker need rely on, and perhaps, all that he can rely on, is the audience's native wit and ability to know a good bargain (for another) when he sees one. This is, in any case, sufficient for the audience to be able to arrive at the hoped for conclusion and make the procedure successful. For to the extent that the audience believes that the speaker prefers the performance of the act to its non-performance because it is in his interest to perform the act, the audience has a reason for being convinced that the speaker will perform the act. And being a rational person, to the extent that he has a reason for being convinced that the speaker will perform the act, he will be so convinced.

Irrespective of the number of times a speaker may go
through this procedure without success, once one of his attempts with it is successful in the way indicated a significantly new situation obtains. For there is now, where there was not before, a successful means for convincing another of one's own performance of some future act known to at least two members of that society. A precedent has been set. And if either of those two people should subsequently find himself in a situation in which he wants to convince another of his own performance of some future act, either the person with whom he was involved on the occasion of the first successful execution of the procedure or another, it is more likely than not that he will follow precedent and adopt the same procedure to attain this end. Suppose the audience of the first successful execution of the procedure subsequently wants to convince another, who is not the original speaker, that he will perform some future act. Ex hypothesi, he has no conventional means at his disposal for attaining this end. And although he is able to say to his audience what act it is that he will perform, he too, as the original speaker before him, must seek some means for convincing his audience that he will perform that act. Even if he can devise a number of means, each of which he thinks could succeed in attaining his end but is different from the means which he knows has been tried and found to be successful for attaining a similar end, it is more likely than not that he will adopt the latter. For, ceteris paribus, he will be more sure of the future success of a means that he knows has already been tried and found to be successful than of the future success of untried means. And since as a rational being, he will adopt those means of whose success he is most sure, it is more likely than not that he will adopt those that
have already been tried and found to be successful, and hence follow precedent and adopt the same procedure as the speaker before him adopted to attain a similar end. If he does, then for the same reasons that applied before, the audience on this occasion may or may not be convinced by those means. And again, irrespective of the number of times the execution of the procedure by this speaker does not meet with success, if and when it does, a significantly new situation obtains. For now there is a successful means for convincing another of one's own future performance of some act known to at least three members of that society. And if the audience of the second successful execution of the procedure should subsequently find himself in a situation in which he wants to convince another, who has not been a participant in either of the previous successful executions of the procedure, of his own performance of some future act, then for the same reasons that led the audience of the first successful execution of the procedure to follow precedent and adopt the same procedure in a similar situation, the audience of the second successful execution of the procedure will follow precedent and adopt the same procedure in that situation. And an execution of the procedure by this person which meets with success will have as one of its outcomes that a successful means for convincing another of one's own performance of some future act is known to at least four members of that society. And so on.

In this way, iterated successful executions of the procedure will have a spreading effect throughout the society. With each successful execution of the procedure, an increasing proportion of the members of this society will come to know this procedure as an efficacious means for convincing another that
one will perform some future act. This effect may also be contributed to by speakers, who have used the procedure successfully before, executing the same procedure successfully in subsequent similar situations involving different audiences. The reasons why a speaker is more likely than not to repeat the execution of a procedure which he himself has tried and found to be successful in the past in subsequent similar situations involving different audiences are, ceteris paribus, even stronger than those for an audience of a previously successful execution of the procedure being more likely than not to adopt the same procedure in subsequent similar situations involving audiences other than the original speakers. For, ceteris paribus, one is even more likely to follow a successful precedent in subsequent similar situations when that precedent has been set by oneself than by another. Knowledge of this procedure may also become more widespread throughout the society in a quite different way. For as the procedure "catches on", people will start talking about it; news of it will travel by word of mouth. It may even in this process be given a name, e.g., "the procedure of promising" or "promising" for short; and a battery of "promising"-terminology may enter the vocabulary and vernacular of the people, e.g., "promisor" and "promisee" may be introduced as general terms for, respectively, the speaker and the audience participating in an execution of the procedure, "promising" or "giving a promise" for the act of executing the procedure, "keeping a promise" and "breaking a promise" for performing and failing to perform the promised act.

Part of what this increasingly general knowledge of the procedure of promising will consist in, be it gained from experience or hearsay, is knowledge of what is involved in its
correct and complete execution; i.e., that it is a procedure suitable for adoption in situations in which one wants to convince another of one's own performance of some future act, that it involves giving a hostage to one's audience against one's own non-performance of that act and saying to one's audience that it is a hostage, as well as saying what act it is that one will perform. But because some of this knowledge is gained from experience of successful executions of the procedure, it will also comprise the knowledge not only that the procedure is a successful means for attaining such an end but also the knowledge of how executions of it succeed in attaining such an end, i.e., what the procedure's efficacy consists in: its capacity to provide the audience with a reason for being convinced that the speaker will do what he says he will do—which reason is that, known to the audience, the speaker prefers the performance of the promised act to its non-performance because of his interest in the retrieval of the hostage which is conditional upon his performance of the promised act. And because this knowledge is passed on by word of mouth, not only will the recipients of this knowledge, as well as those passing it on, know these things, but each will know that others know these things. As the growing use of the procedure contributes towards the more widespread knowledge of it within society, so this knowledge may contribute towards the increasing use of the procedure. For someone who has had no previous personal experience of the procedure, finding himself in a situation of wanting to convince another of his own performance of some future act, may, simply on the basis of his knowledge of the procedure gained from hearsay, adopt the procedure in that situation. So given time, not only may all members of
the society gain knowledge and experience of the procedure of promising, but also, given a continual need for members of that society to convince others of their own performance of future acts, executions of the procedure in such situations may become quite a familiar feature of the behaviour of members of that society.

Now there is a sense of "convention" with which it can be said that within this society there is a convention with respect to the procedure of promising as it has been described so far. This is the sense of "a rule or practice based upon general consent, or accepted and upheld by society at large". Derivative upon this sense, acts can be said to be conventional in so far as they are what agents usually or as a rule do, or make a practice of doing. And with this sense the procedure of promising as described so far can be said to be a conventional procedure in so far as executions of it are what members of this society usually or as a rule do, or make a practice of doing, when they want to convince another of their own future performance of some act. But if this sense is at all relevant, and it is not clear that it is, it is clear that it does not exhaust the sense with which it is said that the procedure constitutive of the illocutionary act of promising is a conventional procedure. This can be seen from the different ways in which the account given thus far falls short of an adequate account of the procedure in its more highly evolved and familiar form. First, the use of the procedure, in the form described so far, is tied to the attainment of one particular type of end. But the use of the procedure in its familiar form is not so tied and an adequate account of it should explain its suitability for the attainment of a variety of types of end. Secondly, there is a
major difference between the ways in which the procedure is executed in the form described so far and in its familiar form. Whereas the former includes giving something as a hostage in addition to acts of saying something, the latter includes only acts of saying something and an adequate account of the procedure should accommodate the way in which, typically, in its familiar form, it is executed. Perhaps neither of these points by itself shows that the account given so far is inadequate as an account of the conventional features of the procedure. However, two further points do; each highlights a part of the explanandum of an account of the conventional nature of the procedure of promising which is not explained by the account given so far. The points are interrelated and so their explanations are not independent of each other, but in the interests of clarity they will be stated separately. They have to do, respectively, with the nature of a promisor's commitment to perform the promised act and the grounds of the reason, provided by an execution of the procedure, for a promisee's conviction that the promisor will perform the promised act. (In the meantime, this example of an end which can be attained by means of the procedure will be adhered to.)

Thirdly, then, while content can be found for the notion of a promisor's commitment to perform the promised act, within the account given so far, the nature of that commitment is very different from that undertaken by a promisor executing the procedure in its familiar form. In the former case, a promisor is committed to performing the promised act because it is in his interest to do so, because the return of the hostage which is of value to him is conditional upon his performance. But in the
latter case, where the execution of the procedure does not involve the giving of a hostage, there is no such natural constraint upon the promisor to perform. So the account of the procedure given so far does not explain the nature of the commitment undertaken by a promisor executing the procedure in its familiar form and hence does not explain the conventional nature of that commitment. Finally, the grounds of the reason for a promisee's conviction that the promisor will perform the promised act, provided by the execution of the procedure, differ according to which form of the procedure is executed. Where the execution of the procedure involves giving a hostage, the reason for the promisee's conviction, i.e., that the speaker prefers the performance of the promised act to its non-performance, is grounded upon the fact that it is in the speaker's interest to perform, which interest lies in the value of the hostage to the speaker. And this is a matter of natural fact. It is a matter of natural fact, not of convention, that something is of value to someone, that he loses in the event of its forfeit and gains from its retrieval. And it will be clear that where the execution of the procedure does not involve giving a hostage the grounds of the reason for the promisee's conviction provided thereby must lie elsewhere. But it is the procedure's capacity to provide such a reason that comprises its efficacy as a means for convincing another. So the account of the procedure given so far does not explain the nature of the efficacy of the procedure in its familiar form and so does not explain the conventional nature of that efficacy. In the next section, an attempt will be made to explain and accommodate these four points within an account of the conventional nature of the familiar procedure of promising before extending the conclusions of that account to
One requirement on the correct and complete execution of the procedure in the form described so far is that the speaker has, at the time of executing it, some part of his possessions at his disposal to give to the audience as a hostage. This requirement may curtail the frequency of the procedure's use. For situations may well arise in which a speaker may want to convince another of his own performance of some future act, and is familiar with the procedure of promising, but is prevented from adopting it to attain this end for want of anything to give as a hostage. Suppose that such a situation arises; it may be assumed that on this occasion the speaker knows that his audience is familiar with the procedure. Being quite clever, and his need to convince his audience being great, the speaker may hit on the idea of saying to his audience what act it is that he will perform, but instead of giving his audience a hostage and saying that it is a hostage, saying to his audience that he has no hostage to give against his non-performance of the act but that nevertheless he promises to perform the act. Given the audience's understanding of the meaning of the speaker's utterances and his familiarity with the procedure of promising, the audience will know that the speaker, in saying what he said, was at least trying to convince him of his future performance of the act. To this attempt the audience may react in a variety of ways. He may laugh the speaker to scorn: "What do you take me for, a fool? Where's your hostage?" Or, being a believer in the virtue of tradition, he may point out rather prickily to the speaker that he has executed the procedure neither correctly nor completely and that he does not accept
this unusual ("unconventional") procedure which the speaker has adopted. Or he may reason in the following way.

The speaker has tried to convince me that he will perform this act in the future. Either he is man of good faith or a man of bad faith, i.e., a deceiver. If he is a man of good faith, then although he has adopted these unusual means in his attempt to convince me, his reasons for doing so are clear enough, and because he is a man of good faith he will, ceteris paribus, prefer the performance of an act which he has said he will perform to its non-performance. If he is a man of bad faith, i.e., a deceiver, then he may or may not have been lying when he said that he had no hostage to give against his non-performance of the act. But if he was lying and in fact did have something to give as a hostage, it is unlikely that he would adopt these means to deceive me on this occasion. For not only does the mere fact of deviating from the usual way of executing the procedure reduce his chances of convincing me, and hence reduce his chances of deceiving me, but the particular form of that deviation on this occasion reduces those chances still further. For by not giving a hostage he makes it evident that he has nothing to lose from not performing the act, and hence makes it even less likely that I will be convinced that he will perform the act. Moreover, if he does have something to give as a hostage and does want to deceive me on this occasion, there are better means (i.e., means more likely to succeed) available to him for doing so. For he need only execute the procedure in the usual way and give me a hostage of such value that he thinks will be sufficient to convince me of his future performance of the act, and is of less value than that of the advantage to him of the successful deception, for these means
to be not only worthwhile but more likely to succeed. And as a rational agent, he will adopt those means that are most likely to succeed in attaining his end. So if he is trying to deceive me on this occasion he would not have adopted the means which he has; hence, he is not trying to deceive me on this occasion if he was lying when he said that he had no hostage to give. But it is also unlikely that the speaker is trying to deceive me on this occasion if he was not lying when he said this, even though he is a deceiver. For he too will know that by deviating from the usual way of executing the procedure, especially in the way that he has, he reduces his chances of deceiving me. It is more likely, if the speaker is a deceiver with nothing to give as a hostage, and is at all clever, that what he is doing on this occasion is trying to establish the precedent of convincing me (non-deceitfully) by these unusual means not involving the giving of a hostage. The speaker stands to gain from the setting of such a precedent. For on a subsequent occasion of the procedure being executed in this way, the precedent can be relied on, if it is known to the audience, to reduce the chances of the audience suspecting an attempt at deception because of the way the procedure is executed, and so to increase the chances of that attempt to convince the audience being successful, whether it is made in good faith or not. (Nor is the subsequent acceptance of this way of executing the procedure, based on knowledge of a satisfactory precedent, advantageous only to deceivers who have nothing to give as a hostage. It is advantageous to all deceivers. For a procedural form which does not involve the giving of a hostage is, ceteris paribus, more advantageous to a deceiver than one which does, since the advantages to be gained from a deceitful use of the former are
not diminished by the forfeit of the hostage as they would be in the case of a deceitful use of the latter. Thus the speaker who lies when he says that he has nothing to give as a hostage also stands to gain from the setting of such a precedent and the desire to set such a precedent may be a motive for his lie.) So it will be in the speaker's interest to do all in his power to establish this precedent of a successful non-deceitful use of the procedure executed in this unusual way. And one very obvious way open to him to do this is to perform the act which he has said that he promises to perform. For by doing so, he not only allays any suspicions of deception aroused by the unusual way in which he executed the procedure, but he also provides positive reinforcement for whatever conviction was created by it. Hence, even if the speaker is a deceiver, and whether or not he was lying in saying that he has no hostage to give, he will on this occasion, ceteris paribus, prefer the performance of the act which he has said he will perform to its non-performance.

By reasoning in this way, the audience is able to exclude the likelihood that the speaker is trying to deceive him on this occasion. And by reasoning in this way to the conclusion that the speaker, whether he is a man of good or bad faith, on this occasion prefers the performance of the promised act to its non-performance, the audience has a reason for being convinced that the speaker will perform that act. And because he is a rational being, to the extent that the audience has a reason for being so convinced, he will be convinced. So the speaker's execution of the procedure of promising in this new way, in the performance only of acts of saying something and not involving the giving of a hostage, succeeds in attaining the end
he wanted it to. It may have succeeded in different ways. So it is not a necessary condition for the success of the procedure that the audience reasons in the way just indicated nor, even if the speaker has hopes of the audience reasoning in this way, that the audience recognizes such hopes. For the two participants in the procedure may be well known to each other, the audience may know the speaker to be a reliable sort of person and so accept his word on trust, without any thought of an attempt at deception crossing his mind. However, succeeding in this way makes the success of the procedure fortuitous, fluky, and obscures the fact that its success has and can be shown to have a rational basis; a basis, moreover, which underpins the conventional efficacy of the procedure executed in this new way as opposed to its natural efficacy when executed in the old way.

The efficacy of the procedure, to recapitulate, is its capacity to provide the audience with a reason for being convinced that the speaker will perform the promised act. Whether the procedure is executed in the old or new way this reason is that, known to the audience, the speaker, ceteris paribus, prefers the performance of that act to its non-performance. But where the procedure is executed in the new way, not involving the giving of a hostage, this preference cannot be grounded on the hostage’s value to the speaker. Here, the speaker’s preference is grounded upon the coincidence of the audience’s expectations of the speaker’s performance of the act (expectations created by the speaker invoking the procedure of promising by saying that he promises to perform the act as part of his execution of the procedure), and the speaker’s preferences with respect to those expectations. In this case, the speaker prefers
the performance of the promised act to its non-performance because the audience expects it and the speaker prefers the fulfilment of those expectations to their non-fulfilment. It is not of importance to the present issue, the first successful attempt by these unusual means to convince another of one's own future performance of some act, that the speaker may have different motives for preferring the fulfilment of the audience's expectations to their non-fulfilment; e.g., that if the speaker is a man of bad faith, his preference may be motivated by a desire to establish the precedent of convincing another by these means in order to make future deceptions easier and more advantageous to himself, whereas if the speaker is a man of good faith, he will, just by his nature, prefer to fulfil rather than disappoint another's expectations which he himself has created. Nor is it important that the speaker may have other reasons for preferring the performance of the promised act to its non-performance besides that of the audience's expectations of it. What is important is that these expectations and preferences can be created by the speaker's execution of the procedure in this way, and that they coincide. For these are the grounds of the audience's reason for being convinced that the speaker will perform the promised act, and the capacity of the procedure to provide such a reason comprises its efficacy as a means for attaining such an end. Moreover, the coincidence of these expectations and preferences forms an implicit agreement between the speaker and his audience and in so far as a convention is an implicit agreement it can properly be said that the efficacy of the procedure executed in this way is dependent upon a convention rather than a matter of natural fact such as the value of the hostage to the speaker.
That this is a proper sense of "convention" and one directly relevant to an account of the conventional nature of the procedures constitutive of illocutionary acts can be seen from part of the specification of another sense of that word in the Oxford English Dictionary: an "...agreement or consent, deliberate or implicit, as constituting the origin and foundation of any custom, institution...". For just as the first successful attempt to convince another of one's future performance of some act by means of the procedure, executed in the old way, set a precedent for how best to proceed in subsequent like situations, so the first attainment of a similar end by means of the procedure executed in this new way (the success of which is based upon a convention between the speaker and his audience) sets a precedent for how best to proceed in subsequent like situations, and thus originates the custom or institution of promising in its familiar style. The old way of executing the procedure may, of course, continue to be practised as the practice of executing the procedure in this new way begins to develop. But this new way of promising has two features which together make it reasonable to suppose that it will eventually replace the old way of executing the procedure and become the universally practised way.

The first may at first sight appear to be a reason for supposing just the opposite. It is the greater advantage that a speaker may gain from a deceitful use of the procedure when it is executed in the new way. This is not to say that a deceitful use of the procedure, executed in the old way, may be entirely without advantage to the speaker. As indicated already, a speaker need only give a hostage of such value as is sufficient to convince the audience of his future performance, and is
less than the value of the advantages to him of the successful deception of his audience, for that deception to be to the speaker's overall advantage. Nor is this to deny that persistently deceitful use of the procedure, executed in this new way, will be ultimately self-defeating. For if a speaker acquires a reputation of being a promise-breaker from his persistently deceitful use of the procedure then those aware of this reputation and involved as the audience in his executions of the procedure will be increasingly less likely to be convinced, and hence increasingly less likely to be deceived, by his execution of the procedure. So ultimately, the speaker will be unable to deceive another by these means. The point here is that on any one occasion of a deception being attained by means of the procedure, the advantages of that deception to the speaker will be greater, *ceteris paribus*, if the procedure is executed in the new way, because those advantages will not be diminished by the forfeit of the hostage as they would be if the procedure had been executed in the old way. There is, therefore, a partial restraint on the deceitful use of the procedure when executed in the old way, a restraint imposed by the requirement on the correct and complete execution of the procedure in that way to give something of value as a hostage against one's non-performance of the promised act, which does not operate in the case of executions of the procedure in the new way. The opportunities thus afforded for more advantageous deceptions may be expected to be exploited by men of bad faith as the practice of executing the procedure in this new way begins to develop. Such exploitation will, however, check that development. It is for this reason that it was said earlier that this feature of the new way of executing the procedure may at first sight ap-
pear to be a reason for supposing that this way of promising will not become the universally practised way. For as the increasing incidence of deceitful uses of the procedure becomes known to members of the society they will become more likely to suspect an attempt at deception whenever they are the audience of a speaker's execution of the procedure. This will make it less likely that an execution of the procedure, even one made in good faith, succeeds in convincing the audience that the speaker will perform his future act, and repeated failures of attempts to attain this end by means of the procedure will make it a less sure means for attaining that end. Knowledge of this, gained by experience or hearsay, will reduce the inclination of members of the society to adopt this way of executing the procedure in situations in which they need to convince another, and hence the practice of executing the procedure in this new way will diminish.

There is another reason why the execution of the procedure in this new way will become a less sure means for attaining that end as its practice begins to develop. On the first occasions of it successfully convincing the audience, that success depends in part upon the audience being able to exclude the likelihood that the speaker is attempting to deceive him, on the grounds that the speaker is trying to establish a precedent of convincing another by these means and the best way which the speaker has of establishing such a precedent is to perform the promised act. But once this precedent has been established, with the first few executions of the procedure in this new way succeeding in convincing the audience, this factor no longer applies. It can neither feature in an audience's reasoning on these subsequent occasions to the conclusion that the speaker
prefers the performance of the promised act to its non-performance; nor can it be relied upon to do so by a speaker contemplating this new way of executing the procedure. Hence, for this reason as well, irrespective of whether a deception is being attempted, this new way of executing the procedure becomes a less sure means for convincing another as its practice begins to develop, and so that practice will diminish.

However, this situation is disadvantageous to members of the society, particularly to those among them who are deceivers. For not only are all of them in danger of losing an efficacious means for convincing others of their own performance of future acts - an end which any of them may from time to time want to attain - but those among them who are of bad faith and given on occasion to deceiving others are also in danger of losing an efficacious means for attaining that end. Of the deceivers, those who tell the truth when they say that they have nothing to give as a hostage are in an even more disadvantageous position than those who lie when they say this as part of their execution of the procedure. For even though the old way of executing the procedure is a less advantageous means for deceiving others than the new way, those who lie can fall back on the old way of executing the procedure to work their deceptions whereas those who tell the truth cannot. But whether it is to retain a more advantageous means or just to retain any means for deceiving others, it will be to their advantage to retain this new way of executing the procedure as an efficacious means for convincing others. And being clever, they will realize this and realize also that the efficacy of the procedure, executed in this new way, can be preserved by maintaining or (re-)establishing a personal reputation of being a promise-keeper. For
having such a reputation will make it less likely that a speaker will be suspected of attempting a deception in executing the procedure and hence more likely that any such attempt so made will be successful. (Whether this personal reputation has to be re-established or just maintained depends on how clever the respective person is; on whether he has been able to anticipate the effect of persistently deceitful use of the procedure upon its efficacy or has had to discover it from experience.) The best way to (re-)establish and then maintain such a personal reputation is to ensure that the incidence of one's deceitful uses of the procedure is only a small, virtually insignificant fraction of the total incidence of one's use of the procedure and that in the great majority of cases the promise so given is carried out. And because it is in a deceiver's own interest to have the reputation of a promise-keeper, and this is the best way to establish and maintain such a reputation, he will, being rational, adopt this way. So each deceiver will execute the procedure in this new way whenever he has the opportunity to do so, even if this involves lying in saying that he has nothing to give as a hostage, and will ensure that in the great majority of cases the promise given is carried out. A deceiver may even deliberately contrive situations in which he can adopt and execute the procedure in this way and carry out the promises thus given without disadvantage to himself in order to minimize the proportion of his total uses of the procedure that are deceitful. For it is only so long as deceitful uses of the procedure are the (rare) exception rather than the rule that an execution of it in this new way remains an efficacious means for convincing others, and hence for deceiving others. But because it is a more advantage-
ous means, and for some their only means, for deceiving others, it will be in the interests of deceivers to satisfy this condition. And being rational, they will satisfy it, and so execute the procedure in this new way whenever the opportunity arises or can be contrived, and will ensure that in the great majority of instances the promise given is carried out. So in spite of first appearances, this feature of the new way of promising will contribute towards that way becoming the universally practised way.

There is also in this point content for the notion of a promisor's commitment to carry out his promise, given in this way, in the early stages of the development of the practice of executing the procedure in this new way. As with the procedure being executed in the old way, a promisor is committed to performing the promised act because it is in his interest to do so. But whereas in the latter case it is in the promisor's interest to perform the promised act because the retrieval of the hostage is conditional upon such performance, in the former case it is in the promisor's interest to perform the promised act in order to establish and maintain his reputation as a promise-keeper, so that his future executions of the procedure will succeed in convincing their audiences. It is in this way and to this extent, as the practice of executing the procedure in this new way begins to develop, that a promisor is committed to carrying out a promise given in that way.

The second feature of this new way of executing the procedure contributing towards that way becoming the universally practised way is its greater ease and convenience. As well as actually having something to give as a hostage, the following are further requirements on the correct and complete execution
of the procedure in the old way: finding part of one's possessions to give as a hostage, transferring it physically to the audience, surrendering possession of it for some time and risking its loss in the event of the audience not returning it after the performance of the promised act. None of these is a requirement on the correct and complete execution of the procedure in the new way involving only acts of saying something, which is, therefore, an easier and more convenient way of executing the procedure. And as the practice of executing the procedure in this new way develops further, with deceitful uses of it becoming the (rare) exception and the procedure executed in this way thus becoming an increasingly sure means for convincing another, this feature may be expected to lead to the new way of executing the procedure being adopted even when the speaker has something to give as a hostage and no deception is being attempted or foreshadowed, simply because the execution of the procedure is facilitated thereby. So for these two reasons the new way of executing the procedure may be expected to replace the old way and become the universally practised way.

Certain changes will occur as it does so. First, if the members of the society have used the same battery of "promising"-terminology to talk about the persons participating in the procedure and their actions, irrespective of whether the procedure is executed in the old or new way, the consequent ambiguity in the sense and reference of those terms will be removed as the new way of executing the procedure becomes the universally practised way. Secondly, there will be a minor change in the way the procedure is executed. For as the new way of executing the procedure replaces the old way, it will no longer be necessary for the speaker to say as part of his execution of the procedure
that he has nothing to give as a hostage. All that it will be necessary to say is what act it is that he promises to perform and that he promises to perform it; although on any occasion, either (but not both) of these may not have to be said if the context of the speaker's utterance makes clear either what act it is that he promises to perform or that he promises to perform it. Hence, with respect to the way in which the procedure is typically executed, the procedure in the form described so far coincides with the procedure of promising in its familiar form.

The development of the practice of executing the procedure in the new way may be expected to follow the same pattern as the spread of the use of the procedure executed in the old way, subject to any checks (of a self-reversing nature) caused by phases of persistently deceitful use of the procedure by some members of the society. And with this development, knowledge of this new way of executing the procedure, gained from experience or hearsay, will become general knowledge among an increasingly large proportion of the members of the society. Again, that knowledge will comprise, as well as the knowledge of what is involved in the execution of the procedure, not only the knowledge that the procedure is a successful means for convincing others but also the knowledge of how an execution of the procedure succeeds in attaining such an end, i.e., what the procedure's efficacy consists in, viz., its capacity to provide a reason for the audience's conviction that the promisor will perform the promised act; which reason is that, known to the promisee, the promisor prefers the performance of the promised act to its non-performance, ceteris paribus, on the grounds that it is in his interest to perform that act in order to establish or
maintain his reputation as a promise-keeper, i.e., on the
grounds that he is committed to performing the act. And as be­
fore, as the development of the practice of executing the pro­
cedure in this new way contributes towards the more widespread
knowledge of it within the society so that knowledge may
further that development. A member of the society who has had
no previous personal experience of the procedure being executed
in this way but has this general knowledge of it, gained from
hearsay, may, on the basis of that knowledge, adopt the proce­
dure as a means for convincing another of his own performance
of some future act. So this knowledge is manifested in the be­
haviour of members of the society.

On the basis of this knowledge, members of the society will
have certain expectations and preferences with respect to the
use of the procedure. They will not only expect, on the basis of
this knowledge, that those who execute the procedure are thereby
committed to performing the promised act; they will also prefer
this. For it is by virtue of the fact that a speaker is commit­
ted to performing the promised act by his execution of the pro­
cedure that the procedure is efficacious, and members of the
society, being rational, will prefer to preserve rather than de­
stroy the efficacy of a means which is a means for attaining an
end which from time to time they want to attain. These expecta­
tions and preferences too will be embodied in the behaviour of
the members of the society, in their acting as if they expect
and prefer a promisor's being committed to performing the prom­
ised act to follow as an outcome of his execution of the proce­
dure. More will be said presently about this notion of a stan­
dard of behaviour embodying the social expectations and prefer­
ences with respect to a type of outcome following from the exe­
cution of a procedure. But here it can be noted that the coincidence of such expectations and preferences forms an implicit agreement among members of the society and that in so far as an implicit agreement is a convention it can properly be said that it is by convention that a promisor's being committed to perform the promised act follows as an outcome from his execution of the procedure, or that this type of outcome is a conventional outcome of an execution of the procedure. That this is a proper sense of "convention" can be seen from the remainder of the specification of the sense of that word quoted earlier from the Oxford English Dictionary: an "...agreement or consent, deliberate or implicit,...as embodied in any accepted usage, standard of behaviour...or the like".

Once it is established and generally known that this type of outcome is a conventional outcome of the procedure, one generally known both to be expected and preferred to follow upon an execution of the procedure, and human ingenuity being what it is, different uses for the procedure may be found. The procedure of promising may be deployed in attempts to attain ends of quite different types than that of another's conviction that one will perform some act in the future. For example, a parent may have been encouraging his child for some time to give up the habit of smoking. Knowing that a promisor is committed to performing the promised act, and knowing that his child knows this, the parent may exploit the opportunity offered by the child saying, perhaps in a moment of weakness, that he will give up smoking, to extract a promise from the child to that effect and so commit him to give up smoking. Obviously, in this case, if the child does promise in saying something like "Oh yea, all right, I promise" in reply to his parent's question
"Do you promise?" or "Is that a promise?" his act is liable to more than just the usual infelicities; e.g., it may be marred by undue influence having been exerted upon him to produce the promise. But equally, his act may be quite felicitous. For the child may realize that smoking is a bad habit and may want to give it up. He may even have a vague intention of doing so and believe that he can on the grounds that he has done so once before. He may, therefore, be in a position to commit himself to stop smoking by promising to do so, and may be quite willing to do so, not just to please his parent (and still less to convince him, for he may believe that his parent will remain unconvinced by such a promise) but also because by so committing himself he gives himself an additional reason for breaking the habit. So here is an example of the deployment of the procedure for the attainment of different ends, each distinct from that in the type of situation in which the procedure evolved. What makes the procedure suitable for deployment in a course of action directed towards the attainment of some end, apart from the possibility of its presuppositions being satisfied by the circumstances of the particular situation in which it is adopted, is the extent to which the type(s) of conventional outcome following upon the execution of the procedure can further the attainment of the desired end.

It will be clear now how this account of the conventional nature of the procedure of promising has application to the procedures constitutive of other types of illocutionary acts. While it is a fair guess that all these procedures have evolved from various forms of natural behaviour, it is not essential to their conventional status either that the paths of their evolu-
tion are as direct or as straightforward as that out-lined in the foregoing conjectural, but hopefully plausible, account of the evolution of the procedure of promising; or that there is a one-to-one relationship between each conventional procedure and some form of primitive behaviour from which it has evolved. Groupings of different conventional procedures can be discerned whose members differ only relatively slightly with respect to their presuppositions and conventional outcomes; it is reasonable to suppose that such procedures have evolved from a common form of natural behaviour. For example, the conventional procedures of banishing, excommunicating, expelling and sentencing can be seen as related variants which have evolved from the form of natural behaviour of excluding someone from membership of (some section of) a society; the minor differences between their presuppositions and conventional outcomes reflecting the special circumstances of the types of situation in which such behaviour occurs. The same is true of the conventional procedures constitutive of the central cluster of illocutionary acts of the constative-determining kind: asserting, describing, reporting, stating, telling, etc. These may be supposed to have evolved from the natural pre-conventional form of behaviour of one person conveying information to another. Another group of procedures, constitutive of types of illocutionary act which are sometimes misleadingly classified as interrogatives, e.g., asking, inquiring, querying, questioning, etc., have supposedly evolved from a form of behaviour of one person seeking information from another. Yet another large group, constitutive of types of act which are sometimes, again misleadingly, classified as imperatives may be supposed to have evolved from some form of one person attempting to get another to do something,
e.g., commanding, ordering, demanding, requesting, begging, etc. What is essential to the conventional nature of these procedures, at least to the status of their conventional outcomes, is that for each, there is at least one type of outcome whose obtaining from the execution of the procedure comes to be both expected and preferred by the great majority of members of the society in which the procedure evolves. The conventional nature of the relationship holding between the execution of the procedure and the obtaining of such an outcome consists in the coincidence of such social expectations and preferences. In general, the presuppositions of a procedure specify conditions upon the circumstances of a speech act situation whose satisfaction is a necessary condition for executions of the procedure to be efficacious. And because the efficacy of any procedure as a means for attaining certain ends is dependent upon the particular type(s) of its conventional outcome(s), the circumstances presupposed for the correct execution of any procedure are of two general sorts: those whose obtaining is necessary for its particular type(s) of conventional outcome(s) not to be rendered pointless or vacuous in the situation in which the procedure is executed; and secondly, those whose obtaining is necessary for the preservation of the conventional nature of the procedure's outcome(s). This difference between these two general sorts of circumstances was recognized by Austin in his separate statements of the Felicity conditions (A.2) and (P.1). Some illustrative examples may be clarificatory.

Circumstances of the first general sort, mentioned in the Felicity condition (A.2), are exemplified by those presupposed by the presuppositions (P.2), (P.1), and (P.1) and (P.3), respectively, of the procedures of promising, warning and object-
ing. The non-satisfaction of these presuppositions in any situation in which an attempt is made to execute the procedure is sufficient to render the conventional outcome of the respective procedure pointless or vacuous, and hence sufficient to frustrate the efficacy of the procedure on that occasion. For instance, if (P.2) of the procedure of promising is not satisfied and the speaker's performance of the purportedly promised act is not possible, there is no point to his being committed to perform it. Similarly, the conventional outcome of warning, that the speaker has diminished responsibility for any injury to the addressee flowing from the danger against which he is given the warning, is rendered vacuous if (P.1) of that procedure is not satisfied and the obtaining of the state of affairs characterized by the speaker's utterance would not put the addressee in possible danger. And in the case of non-hypothetical objections, the conventional outcome of that procedure, that there are some grounds before the audience for believing the utterance purportedly objected to is false, is similarly frustrated if (P.1) of the procedure is not satisfied and no such utterance was issued. Austin called the infelicities arising from attempts to execute the procedure in such inappropriate circumstances misapplications of the procedure; in such cases, the execution of the procedure, the illocutionary act, is purported but void. The infelicities arising from a procedure being executed in a situation in which circumstances of the second general sort do not obtain were called insincerities. These circumstances, mentioned in the Felicity condition (P.1), have to do with the requisite psychological states of participants in the procedure: their attitudes, beliefs, intentions, etc. In general, the psycho-
logical states thus presupposed are those that are relevant to maintaining the standards of behaviour (those, at least, of the participants in the procedure) embodying the coincident expectations and preferences in which the nature of the conventional outcome(s) of a procedure consists. Repeated executions of a procedure in circumstances in which these presuppositions are not satisfied are likely to give rise to an incidence of agents not acting as if they expect and prefer the respective type(s) of conventional outcome to follow upon an execution of the procedure. Such an incidence will weaken the social expectations of, and preferences for, such an outcome to follow, and in turn, and in time if the trend continues, this will cause that outcome not to be a conventional outcome of the procedure and so destroy the procedure's efficacy. It is in this way that the obtaining of circumstances of this second general sort in situations in which a procedure is executed is a necessary condition for the (continued) efficacy of the procedure.

These circumstances are exemplified by those presupposed by the presuppositions (P.1) and (P.3), (P.2), and (P.2) and (P.4), respectively, of the procedures of promising, warning and objecting. If a promisor either does not intend to perform the promised act or does not believe that his performance of it is possible (thus not satisfying either (P.1) or (P.3) of the procedure), it is unlikely that he will perform the promised act; i.e., it is unlikely that he will carry out his promise. But the carrying out of a promise is one type of act which will be performed by agents acting as if they expect and prefer that a speaker's commitment to performing the promised act follows upon his execution of the procedure. The carrying
out of promises is one and, perhaps, the principal component of that standard of behaviour embodying the coincident social expectations and preferences with respect to this type of outcome which comprise the conventional nature of that outcome.

Of course, a promise given in a situation in which either (P.1) or (P.3) is not satisfied may be carried out. If the promise is given by mistake, for instance, the promisor may, upon realizing that he has given a promise, accept that he is committed to performing the promised act and so try to carry it out and succeed. But such cases are probably exceptional. It is more likely that promises given in situations in which either (P.1) or (P.3) is not satisfied are deceitful promises, given not only without the intention of carrying them out but also, perhaps, with the intention of not carrying them out. It is likely, therefore, that repeated executions of the procedure in such situations will give rise to an incidence of agents not carrying out their promises, i.e., to an incidence of agents not acting as if they expect and prefer promisors to be committed to performing their promised acts. This incidence will in turn weaken the social expectations and preferences with respect to this type of outcome following the execution of the procedure, in whose coincidence the conventional nature of that outcome consists, and hence will tend to destroy the efficacy of the procedure. The satisfaction of the presupposition (P.2) of the procedure of objecting, that the speaker has a certain contrary attitude towards the utterance being objected to - in the cases considered here, a belief that it is false - is necessary for the preservation of the efficacy of the procedure, for a similar reason. Central among the types of act that will be performed by agents acting as if they expect and prefer that it follows as an
outcome of an execution of the procedure that there are some
grounds for believing that the utterance objected to is false,
are acts of withholding assent from and even dissenting from
the truth of the utterance objected to. Such acts are an im-
portant part of the standard of behaviour embodying the coin-
cident social expectations and preferences which comprise the
conventional nature of this type of outcome of the procedure.
But if a speaker executes the procedure without believing that
the utterance against which the objection is raised is false
(thus not satisfying (P.2) of the procedure), it is unlikely
that he will withhold assent from, and even less likely that he
will dissent from the truth of that utterance. So repeated
executions of the procedure in situations in which this pre-
supposition is not satisfied are likely to give rise to an in-
cidence of agents not acting as if they expect and prefer that
this type of outcome follows upon an execution of the procedure
and so, for the now familiar reason, this will tend to destroy
the efficacy of the procedure. The presuppositions (P.2) and
(P.4) of the respective procedures of warning and objecting are
alike in presupposing that the speaker believes that the poss-
ible state of affairs, characterized by the utterance issued as
part of his execution of the procedure, was, is, or will be an
actual state of affairs. This type of presupposition is shared
by a great many other types of procedure constitutive of illo-
cutionary acts: all those, indeed, which involve a significant
element of conveying information about how the world was, is or
will be. For those types of procedure of which this type of pre-
supposition is a constituent, if the presupposition is satis-
fied then the speaker is not lying when he executes the proce-
dure. Now lying, essentially, is a deceitful use of a procedure
which involves a significant element of conveying information about the world, and an account which in essential respects is parallel to the account given of the ultimately self-defeating nature of persistently deceitful use of the procedure of promising could be given of the ultimately self-defeating nature of persistent lying. Like persistent deceitful use of the procedure of promising, persistent lying tends to destroy the efficacy of the very means by which a lie is accomplished. For any procedure, therefore, involving a significant element of conveying information about the world, of which warning and objecting are two, the satisfaction of this type of presupposition is a necessary condition for the preservation of the procedure's efficacy.

The difference between these two general sorts of circumstances can be seen from the different effect upon the efficacy of the procedure of the non-satisfaction of presuppositions of the respective sorts. The procedure's efficacy is frustrated on the occasion of its execution being attempted in a situation in which circumstances of the first sort do not obtain because in those circumstances the procedure's conventional outcome is rendered pointless or vacuous. And though the procedure may be successfully executed in a situation in which circumstances of the second sort do not obtain, its execution in those circumstances is such that if repeated with a significant incidence, the procedure's conventional outcome, upon which its efficacy depends, would cease to be a conventional outcome of that procedure. In a different idiom, the destructive effect upon the procedure's efficacy of the non-satisfaction of presuppositions of the different sorts can be said in the first case to be occurrent and in the second case to be dispositional.
Foot-notes :

1 (from p.223) This point may be compared with that of Ryle's aptly disparaging remark in "The Theory of Meaning"(C.P.II pp.350-72), "...as if the judge, in explaining to the members of the jury the differences between manslaughter and murder, was helping them out of a philosophical quandary" (p.372).

2 (from p.232) These reasons why the distinctions within Austin's classification are not exclusive do not seem to have been appreciated by Searle in "A classification of illocutionary acts"(Language in Society(1976)pp.1-23). And the objections which Searle does raise there against Austin's classification are just as effective against the alternative taxonomy which Searle proposes. Searle's main objections are that "there is no clear or consistent principle or set of principles on the basis of which the taxonomy is constructed" (p.8), and hence that "...there is too much overlap of the categories, too much heterogeneity within the categories"(pp. 9-10). However, with four of Austin's five classes being defined in terms of features of the procedures constitutive of illocutionary acts the basis of Austin's classification is more systematic than Searle allows. But Searle has failed to understand the role of conventional procedures within Austin's conception of speech acts. Searle's own proposal is for a taxonomy of five basic categories of illocutionary acts, distinguished in terms of something he calls the act's illocutionary point, the direction of fit between words and the world which is required of the utterance in the issuing of which the act is performed, and the type of psychological state expressed in the performance of the act. Thus the illocutionary point of representatives "...is to commit the speaker to...the truth of the expressed proposition"(p.10); that of directives "...consists in the fact that they are attempts by the speaker to get the hearer to do something"(p. 11). Searle's class of commissives is appropriated directly from Austin; their point "...is to commit the speaker to some future course of action"(p.11). The point of expressives "...is to express the psychological state specified in the sincerity condition about a state of affairs specified in the
propositional content" (p.12). No illocutionary point is specified for Searle's fifth category, declarations, nor is it easy to see from the offered examples what it would be. So Searle's taxonomy is not constructed on the basis of one "clear or consistent principle or set of principles" either. Moreover, within this latter category Searle defines a sub-category of representative declarations whose point is "...issuing a representative with the force of a declaration..." (p.16). So there is major overlap between Searle's first and fifth categories and much heterogeneity in the latter. Overlap and heterogeneity within Searle's classification is further increased by the fact that the expression of some psychological state, while being the main defining characteristic of expressives, also enters into the definitions of membership of the other categories.

3 (from p.235) Another reason for the possible failure of the speaker to convince his audience by these means would be the latter's suspicion of an attempt at deception and his regarding of the hostage as a decoy given to lure him into falsely believing that the speaker will perform the act. The effects of deceitful uses of the procedure on the efficacy and development of the procedure will be discussed in the next section; they are not important at this stage of the account.

4 (from p.260) This use of the classificatory terms "interrogative" and "imperative" is misleading because it suggests, on the basis of the primary use of these terms as classificatory of syntactic forms, that the dependence of the type of illocutionary act upon the syntactic form of the utterance in which the act is performed is much stronger than in fact it is. Acts falling under either classification can be performed in the issuing of utterances of indicative syntactic form, e.g., questioning in saying "I question his suitability for the position" and demanding in saying "I demand to see the manager".
Chapter Six
Convention and Intention in Speech Acts

A particular approach to a theory of speech acts has been developed to its highest point so far by Schiffer in Chapter IV of his book *Meaning*. That approach, which has dominated developments in speech act theory since the publication of *Words*, can be traced from its origin in Strawson's article "Intention and Convention in Speech Acts" (PL pp. 23-38), through the work of Searle to its most recent expression in Schiffer's book. Its main feature has been the utilization of variously augmented and amended versions of Grice's theory of meaning for the purposes of giving an account of illocutionary acts within the framework of what its proponents variously describe as a theory of meaning or a theory of linguistic communication. Each of these may be included within a theory of language, broadly construed. That approach differs from the one that has been adopted in this work, which has been directed towards giving an account of illocutionary acts within the framework of a theory of action. Now, it is not to the present purpose to adjudicate the respective merits of the rival claims of each of these theories to be the sole theory suitable for explaining speech act phenomena. "The total speech act in the total speech situation...the only actual phenomenon which, in the last resort, we are engaged in elucidating" (*Words* p. 148), being the many-faceted phenomenon it is, has features of various types which are amenable to subsumption under different theories. But the writer has claimed, on the grounds that the main purpose of Austin's conception of speech acts was the elucidation of the species of language-use exemplified by the
performance of illocutionary acts, that a theory of action provides a more appropriate framework for developing that conception and furthering that purpose than a theory of language. It is with the defence of this claim, against the counter-claims implicit in the work of Strawson, Searle and Schiffer, that the discussion in this chapter will be principally concerned. If successful, that defence will provide further justification for the kind of development of Austin's conception of speech acts undertaken in the previous chapter, and the discussion will also go some way towards showing which features of "the total speech act in the total speech situation" are amenable to subsumption under a theory of language and which are amenable to subsumption under a theory of action. The tactics to be adopted to gain this end will be those of skirmishing rather than those of a set battle, performance of the enemy's dispositions along the line of engagement. For the line of engagement in this case is Austin's thesis that illocutionary acts are essentially conventional acts, acts constituted by convention, and as shown in Chapter Four, Schiffer, Strawson and Searle hold differing views on the truth of that thesis. Before setting out the strategy to be followed, some quotations from Words may be in order to show that the position to be defended is an Austinian position.

There is, first, the general remark that "...we must meet the objection about our illocutionary and perlocutionary acts - namely that the notion of an act is unclear - by a general doctrine about action"(p.107). But more particularly, there are two remarks which seem, with hindsight, to have been expressly designed to reject an account of illocutionary acts in the sort of terms that are central to Grice's theory of meaning and have
been taken over by Strawson, Searle and Schiffer in developing their respective accounts; i.e., those of the speaker's intended effects on or responses from his audience, produced by his utterance in the issuing of which an illocutionary act is performed: "...much more important, we must avoid the idea ... that the illocutionary act is a consequence of the locutionary act, and even the idea that what is imported by the nomenclature of illocutions is an additional reference to some of the consequences of the locutions, i.e. that to say 'he urged me to' is to say he said certain words and in addition that his saying them had or perhaps was intended to have certain consequences (an effect upon me)" (pp.114-5). "What we do import by the use of the nomenclature of illocution is a reference, not to the consequences (at least in any ordinary sense) of the locution, but to the conventions of illocutionary force as bearing on the special circumstances of the occasion of the issuing of the utterance" (p.115). The opposition between Austin's position and Schiffer's, for instance, is clearly evident in the contradiction between the remarks just quoted and Schiffer's earlier quoted remark that "...in uttering the sentence 'Jones has only one leg', S may be objecting to A's statement that Jones is a nimble dancer, but that this is so would seem to be a result of the intentions with which the sentence was uttered and not a result of any conventions of illocutionary force 'bearing on the special circumstances of the occasion of the issuing of the utterance'" (Meaning p.91). How Austin's notion of "the conventions of illocutionary force as bearing on the special circumstances of the occasion of the issuing of the utterance" is to be spelled out will be clear from the preceding chapter. These conventions are the conven-
tional procedures constitutive of illocutionary acts, executed by speakers in speech act situations in the performance of locutionary acts and "bearing on the special circumstances of the occasion of the issuing of the utterance" by virtue of their presuppositions.

In Chapter Two it was argued that Austin's distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts is sound. As a distinction between different types of act exemplifying different species of language-use, one exemplified by acts of saying or asking something, the other exemplified by acts of doing something distinct from saying or asking something, that distinction indicates the line between those features of a speech act situation that are amenable to subsumption under a theory of language and those that are amenable to subsumption under a theory of action. And as a distinction between different types of act that are constituted in part or in toto by conventions, that distinction creates something of a problem for those who wish to give an account of illocutionary acts within the framework of a theory of language. The conventions involved in the respective types of act are quite distinct. In the case of a locutionary act, the act is constituted in part by the conventions of the language which the speaker is using, and in part by the speaker's intentions operating within the scope of those conventions. A theory of language, broadly construed, is adequate for giving an account of acts of this type. The qualification "broadly construed" is intended to make clear that the semantic component of such a theory is a theory of a speaker's communication intention, and a theory of language thus construed may be distinguished from one in which the semantic component is only a theory of formal semantics. ¹ But the "conven-
tions of illocutionary force" constitute of illocutionary acts are not linguistic conventions. These conventions, the conventional procedures constitutive of illocutionary acts, are not included among the conventions of syntax, semantics, phonology, phonetics and orthography whose specification is the task of a theory of language. Acts constituted by these conventions of illocutionary force can thus be seen to fall outside the scope of even a broadly construed theory of language. Those wishing to give an account of illocutionary acts within the framework of a theory of language have different moves available to them for trying to overcome this problem created by the distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts.

First, it may be allowed that these acts are acts of distinct types but denied that illocutionary acts are conventional acts in the sense that they are constituted essentially by non-linguistic conventions. The essential constitutive features of illocutionary acts are then claimed to be certain intentions speakers have in issuing utterances and the scope of a theory of language, already broadly construed, is thus extended further to encompass illocutionary acts. This is the move made by Schiffer, and by Strawson to the extent that the latter denies Austin's thesis that illocutionary acts are in general essentially conventional acts. Alternatively, it may be allowed that illocutionary acts are conventional acts but denied that locutionary and illocutionary acts are acts of distinct types. Illocutionary acts are thus brought within the scope of a theory of language adequate for explaining locutionary acts and their constitutive features are held to be certain rules manifested in the se-
semantic conventions of the language which the speaker is using. This is the move made by Searle prior to developing his account of illocutionary acts within the context of his hypothesis "...that speaking a language is performing speech acts, acts such as making statements, giving commands, asking questions, making promises, and...that these acts are in general made possible by and are performed in accordance with certain rules for the use of linguistic elements" (S.A.p.16).

The strategy for defending the claim that a theory of action provides a more appropriate framework for an account of illocutionary acts than a theory of language, against the counter-claims implicit in the work of Schiffer, Strawson and Searle is, therefore, clear. It is to show that each of the crucial steps in their moves outlined above is wrong. One of the steps in Searle's move, the denial of Austin's distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts, has already been shown to be false in the defence, in Chapter Two, of that distinction against Searle's objections to it. In the next section but two, discussion will be concentrated upon Searle's hypothesis. It will be argued that Searle has not established that what he regards as the rules constitutive of illocutionary acts are manifested in the semantic conventions of a language. In the next two sections, the main points to be argued for are against Schiffer and Strawson and are two: first, that their argument against Austin's thesis that illocutionary acts are in general conventional acts is invalid, and secondly, that speakers' intentions are not the essential constitutive features of illocutionary acts.

In Chapter Four it was argued that Strawson's argument,
endorsed by Schiffer, against Austin's thesis is an igno-
ratio elenchii. Before exposing the misunderstandings of pur-
pose and detail of Austin's conception of speech acts in
Strawson's argument, a short digression will be made to take
in a different point in Schiffer's account of speech acts
which is symptomatic of similar misunderstandings. Schiffer
devotes a section of his chapter on speech acts to Austin's
notion of explicit performatives (Meaning pp.104-10), the
main thrust of which seems to be his "...wish to deny that
explicit performative sentences are not constative" and to
show thereby that "...Austin is wrong in his claim to have
exposed a new class of masqueraders"(p.107). The appearances
that Schiffer gives in this section of wishing to collapse
Austin's performative-constative distinction are deceptive.
For example, Schiffer does not claim that all explicit per-
formatives are constative in the sense of being truth-valued.
This much is clear from his comments on the definitions of
the kinds of illocutionary acts in his classification of as-
sertive and imperative kinds of illocutionary acts (pp.95-
104). Nor does Schiffer claim that explicit performatives
are constative in the sense that in issuing such an utter-
ance the speaker is constating that he is performing an illo-
cutionary act of the type which he may be performing in so
uttering. Schiffer agrees with Austin that this is not the
case (pp.107,108) and produces an argument to that effect
(pp.108-9). Schiffer's claim is "...that there is no differ-
ence of the sort claimed in logical form or conventional
force between, say, 'I (hereby) order you to leave' and 'I am
scratching my head' or 'The cat is on the mat'"(p.107). Schif-
fer is not very forthcoming either on the different logical
forms which he denies explicit performatives and constatives to have, or on the same logical form which he claims they share. Some of his remarks make the entailed claim that all explicit performative utterances have the same logical form surprising. For instance, Schiffer mentions with apparent approval the Fregean device of assertion sign plus sentence radical and uses them to represent the logical form of the explicit performative, "I (hereby) promise to pay you twopence" as

(1) \[ \omega \top \text{ (hereby) promising to pay you twopence} \] (p.109).

But Schiffer also places great emphasis on his claim that the class of utterances divides neatly into two mutually exclusive and exhaustive sub-classes which he calls the "assertive" and "imperative" classes. So one might have expected that Schiffer would represent the logical form of an explicit performative belonging to the latter class, e.g., "I (hereby) order you to leave" as

(2) \[ \omega \top \text{ (hereby) ordering you to leave} \].

But it is not so. Schiffer represents the logical form of "I (hereby) order you to leave" not as (2), but as

(3) \[ \omega \top \text{ (hereby) ordering you to leave} \] (p.109).

So expectations to the contrary notwithstanding, it seems that the logical form characterized by the Fregean device of assertion sign plus sentence radical, as shown in (1) and (3), is the logical form which Schiffer claims that all explicit performatives and constatives share. Schiffer goes on to defend his position, that in spite of the fact that explicit performatives are constative in logical form a speaker who issues such an utterance is not constating that he is performing an illocutionary act, with the claim that in such cases the speaker
utters the sentence with something slightly less than its full conventional force (pp. 109-10). The details of this claim, which seems ad hoc, need not be gone into here. What is more relevant is the claim, which Schiffer attributes to Austin, of a difference in logical form between explicit performatives and constatives. The attributed claim is that the way to represent an explicit performative such as "I (hereby) promise to pay you twopence" is not as (1), but as (4) Pr[/"my paying you twopence/], "where 'Pr' is to be taken as a conventional force-indicating device which makes explicit that an utterance of the sentence has the force of a promise, just as 'I' would serve to make explicit that an assertion is being made" (p. 106). Now this claim has a distinctly Searlean rather than Austinian ring to it (see Schiffer's foot-note to p. 106). Its connexions with Austin's conception of speech acts are tenuous in the extreme. There is only one remark in Words which offers any textual support at all for the attribution of this claim to Austin and that remark is heavily qualified: "...we could distinguish the performative opening part (I state that) which makes clear how the utterance is to be taken, that it is a statement (as distinct from a prediction, etc.), from the bit in the that-clause which is required to be true or false. However, there are many cases which, as language stands at present, we are not able to split into two parts in this way, even though the utterance seems to have a sort of explicit performative in it: thus 'I liken x to y', 'I analyse x as y'. Here we both do the likening and assert that there is a likeness by means of one compendious phrase of at least a quasi-performative character" (Words p. 90). This is not so much a case of Austin damning
with faint praise the claim which Schiffer attributes to him as of him rejecting it with faint mention.

Schiffer's mistake is evident from the introductory remarks to his section on explicit performatives. There he locates Austin's discovery of explicit performatives in a historical tradition, stemming from Russell's paper "On Denoting", in which different philosophers have argued that the grammatical form of some types of utterance is misleading because such utterances have a logical form quite different from the one which their grammatical form would suggest. Schiffer holds that Austin believed that in discovering explicit performatives he had not only exposed another class of 'masqueraders' but had discovered a new logical form as well. But to locate Austin's discovery and his work on speech acts in this philosophical tradition is to locate it in the wrong tradition. Austin did not seek solutions to philosophical problems via the logical analysis of language but, inter alia, by attending to the uses of language. His discovery of explicit performatives was the discovery of a class of utterances masquerading in a deceptive grammatical form. But what their grammatical form was held to mask was not a new logical form, nor even a familiar logical form different from that which they appeared to have. It was, rather, a use of sentences different from that which hitherto had customarily been associated with utterances having that grammatical form: the use of a sentence to do something distinct from saying something true or false. The implications of the concern for the uses as distinct from the forms of language in Austin's conception of speech acts for the type of theory appropriate for developing that conception are clear.
Schiffer does not provide an argument of his own against Austin's thesis that illocutionary acts are in general conventional acts. As already noted, he merely endorses Strawson's argument against that thesis and summarily dismisses those types of illocutionary act which Strawson allows are essentially conventional. If Strawson's argument were free from fallacy, it would have the effect of revising Austin's thesis so as to allow a broad distinction, admitting a wide range of intermediate cases, between two kinds of illocutionary acts: those that are essentially conventional, in the sense of being constituted by non-linguistic conventions, and those that are not. The interpretation in terms of institutions and rules under which Strawson denies Austin's thesis to be true in general is not the only interpretation under which he considers that thesis. Strawson makes considerable play with one of Austin's remarks in *Words* which he takes to mean that the use of a sentence with a certain illocutionary force, i.e., an illocutionary act, may be said to be conventional in the sense that it could be made explicit by the use of a performative prefix. Strawson comments that "the remark has a certain authority in that it is the first explicit statement of the conventional nature of the illocutionary act" (*P.L.p.25*), and evidently regards it as Austin's definition of "conventional" as that word was used by Austin in stating his thesis. Adverting to the remark later on, Strawson denies that there is such a sense of "conventional" (and so denies that illocutionary acts are conventional in that sense) but allows that "whatever it is that leads Austin to call illocutionary acts in general 'conventional' must be closely connected with whatever it is about such acts... that accounts for the fact that they at least could be made explicit by the use
of the corresponding first-person performative form" (pp. 27-8). The alleged ability of Strawson's account to yield "... a deduction of the general possibility and utility of the explicitly performative formula for the cases of illocutionary acts not essentially conventional" (p. 32) is claimed by Strawson to be one of his account's explanatory merits. Two points need to be made by way of rejoinder to this interpretation which Strawson imposes on Austin's thesis. The first has to do with Austin's remark on which Strawson bases this interpretation; the second has to do with Strawson's initial comment on that remark.

The first point is that it is only when quoted out of context that Austin's remark has even the appearance of a definition of the sense with which he was using "conventional." In the passage in which it occurs, Austin was discussing the different species of language-use exemplified by illocutionary and perlocutionary acts, and the complete sentence, of which Strawson only quotes separate fragments, reads, "Speaking of the 'use of "language" for arguing or warning' looks just like speaking of 'the use of "language" for persuading, rousing, alarming'; yet the former may, for rough contrast, be said to be conventional, in the sense that at least it could be made explicit by the performative formula; but the latter could not" (Words p. 103). Here, Austin was pointing out the ambiguity in the phrase "use of language" as used to talk about the uses of language exemplified by illocutionary and perlocutionary acts, foreshadowing the distinction between these types of act as one between a type of conventional act and a type of non-conventional act and giving, not a definition of "conventional" - as Strawson notes, there is no such
sense of "conventional" - but rather, a criterion for identifying these different uses of language in terms of their respective capacity and incapacity for being made explicit by the use of a performative formula. This last is, in any case, the point illustrated by the examples immediately following the quoted sentence. The second point is that Strawson's initial comment on Austin's remark is misleading. If Austin's remark was the first explicit statement of the conventional nature of illocutionary acts, this is so only because it was made soon after his introduction of the "nomenclature of illocutions". It was not the first statement of the conventional nature of the use of language exemplified by illocutionary acts; acts performed in acts of saying something. The conventional nature of these acts (illocutionary acts in all but name) had been stated and explicited in Austin's Lectures II-IV in terms of the conventional procedures constitutive of such acts whose performance in the issuing of an utterance was specified as a necessary condition for an utterance being a performative utterance. Strawson's ascription of "a certain authority" to Austin's remark by virtue of it being the first explicit statement of the conventional nature of the illocutionary act is just another product of the baleful influence of the "reject-and-replace" view's bifurcation of Austin's lectures and its obscuring of the relevance of the early lectures to the later ones.

Strawson's unawareness of Austin's use of "convention" as an abbreviation for "conventional procedure" in saying that illocutionary acts are constituted by conventions is evident in his argument by example and counter-example against Austin's thesis. Strawson notes with approval of Austin's
thesis that "...the fact that the word 'guilty' is pronounced by the foreman of the jury in court at the proper moment constitutes his utterance as the act of bringing in a verdict; and that this is so is certainly a matter of the conventional procedures of the law" (P.L.p.26). This remark comes very close to capturing the correct interpretation of Austin's thesis but it is not clear that its doing so is not coincidental. The weight of evidence suggests that it is coincidental. For, first, there are the two other, different interpretations of Austin's thesis under which it is rejected by Strawson, each of which receives far greater emphasis than the one alluded to in the remark just quoted. And secondly, in Strawson's discussion of his counter-examples to Austin's thesis following the remark just quoted, that interpretation slips from view. The examples of warning and objecting are presented as counter-examples, not to the thesis that illocutionary acts are constituted by virtue of the conventional procedures as part of which locutionary acts are performed, but to the thesis that there are statable conventions simpliciter, other than those linguistic conventions which "...bear on the nature of the locutionary act..." (p.26) or which "...help to fix the meanings of the utterances" (p.27). It does not seem to have impressed Strawson that there are statable conventional procedures of warning and objecting by virtue of which speakers' acts of saying something, performed as part of those procedures, are thereby constituted as acts of warning and objecting.

In developing his argument against Austin's thesis to establish a kind of illocutionary act not essentially conventional, Strawson makes use of an analysis of what it is for a speaker to understand an utterance. This analysis is comple-
mentary to an amended version of an early Gricean analysis of what it is for a speaker to mean something by an utterance. The Gricean analysis is given in terms of a complex, threefold intention on the part of a speaker; a speaker, S, non-naturally means something by an utterance x if S intends:

(i) to produce by uttering x a certain response r in an audience A, and

(ii) that A shall recognize S's intention (i), and

(iii) that this recognition on the part of A of S's intention (i) shall function as A's reason, or a part of his reason, for his response r.

Strawson makes it clear that his use of "response" in summarizing Grice's analysis is intended to cover cognitive and affective states or attitudes as well as actions (p.28). He takes Grice's analysis to be one of a typical situation in which one person is trying to communicate with another and proceeds to construct an example which shows that while all the conditions corresponding to (i)-(iii) laid down in that analysis may be satisfied, the complex of intentions and appropriate actions does not amount to a case of attempted communication in the relevant sense. In order to rectify this, a fourth condition is added to the analysans, viz.,

(iv) that S should have the further intention:

(i) that A shall recognize his intention (i).

Strawson has reservations, which Schiffer has since shown to be justified, about the sufficiency of even this augmented set of conditions to constitute the case as one of attempted communication in a speech act situation, but uses it as the basis for his own account of an audience's understanding of an utterance. Strawson's analysis runs as follows: "...for
A (in the appropriate sense of 'understand') to understand something by utterance x, it is necessary (and perhaps sufficient) that there should be some complex intention of the \(i_2\) form, described above, which A takes S to have, and that for A to understand the utterance correctly, it is necessary that A should take S to have the complex intention of the \(i_2\) form which S does have. In other words, if A is to understand the utterance correctly, S's \(i_4\) intention and hence his \(i_2\) intention must be fulfilled" (pp. 29-30).

Strawson next identifies this notion of an audience's understanding of an utterance with Austin's notion of uptake, the securing of which seems to have been held by Austin to be a necessary condition for the successful performance of an illocutionary act. Strawson believes that "if the identification were correct, then it would follow that to say something with a certain illocutionary force is at least (in the standard case) to have a certain complex intention of the \(i_4\) form described in setting out and modifying Grice's doctrine" (p. 30). It is true that Strawson qualifies his position here: the identification of his notion of audience understanding with Austin's notion of uptake is only tentative - "to be subsequently qualified and revised"; his analysis of these notions is only partial. But these qualifications, which are really only cosmetic, should not be allowed to obscure a much more important feature of Strawson's account. Strawson says that "...the identification \(\rightarrow\) of his notion of understanding with Austin's notion of uptake \(\rightarrow\) is equivalent to a tentative (and partial) analysis of the notion of uptake and hence of the notions of illocutionary act and illocutionary force" (p. 30, underlining added). Here Strawson assimilates the secur-
ing of uptake to the performance of an illocutionary act, as
is required for an analysis of the former to be an analysis
of the latter, and commits himself to maintaining a much
closer relationship between these two things than Austin was
willing to maintain. For instance, when discussing the secur-
ing of uptake in terms of the achieving of a certain effect
upon the audience, Austin said, "This is not to say [in the
first edition : "This is to be distinguished from saying..."
that the illocutionary act is the achieving of a certain ef-
fect"(Words p.116). Strawson's assimilation of acts of these
distinct types is incorrect and betrays a misunderstanding of
the main purpose of Austin's conception of speech acts.

In Chapter Three, it was argued that Austin's apparent
view, that the securing of uptake is a necessary condition
for the successful performance of an illocutionary act, is in-
correct. Strawson accepts objections to this view of Austin's
(P.L.p.30). It is difficult to see, then, how Strawson can
consistently maintain the assimilation of these different types
of act as is required for his analysis. His response to these
objections is to say, "...that the aim, if not the achievement,
of securing uptake is essentially a standard, if not an invari-
able, element in the performance of the illocutionary act. So
the analysis of the aim of securing uptake remains an essential
element in the analysis of the notion of the illocutionary act"
(p.30). But this is incorrect on two counts. First, it is not
the case, as Strawson seems to hold, that if M is essentially a
standard element in N, then an analysis of M is an essential
element in the analysis of the notion of N. Compare Strawson's
"...the aim...of securing uptake is essentially a standard...
element in the performance of the illocutionary act" with "the
presence of a speaker is essentially a standard element in the performance of the illocutionary act. It does not follow from the latter, which is true, that an analysis of the presence of a speaker is an essential element in the analysis of the notion of the illocutionary act, for this latter is false. Secondly, and more importantly, it is not the case that the aim or achievement of securing uptake is an essential element, standard or otherwise, in the performance of an illocutionary act. Rather, the aim of securing of uptake is a standard element in the total speech act situation, and if and when that aim is achieved, the act of securing uptake is distinct from the illocutionary act performed in that situation because the former is not a necessary condition for the latter. Strawson's assimilation of these distinct types of act and his attempt to provide an analysis of both in terms of an amended Gricean theory expose his misunderstanding of the main purpose of Austin's conception of speech acts. As Strawson's account proceeds, utilizing Grice's theory of meaning which "...is undoubtedly offered as an analysis of a situation in which one person is trying, in a sense of the word 'communicate' fundamental to any theory of meaning, to communicate with another" (p.28), the phrase "act of communication" is used repeatedly, and with a sense that can be clearly seen to be equivalent to that of "illocutionary act": "What we initially take from Grice - with modifications - is an at least partially analytical account of an act of communication, an act which might indeed be performed nonverbally and yet exhibit all the essential characteristics of a (nonverbal) equivalent of an illocutionary act" (p.35). But if it were to be asked what the specific use of language is which is exemplified by illocutionary
acts, and which Austin's conception of speech acts was primarily designed to elucidate, it would be incorrect to give the answer forthcoming from Strawson's account, i.e., the answer, "The use of language to communicate." So much is clear from the peripheral place within Austin's conception of speech acts of the notion of the act of securing uptake, which is the closest correlate of the notion of the act of communication of which Strawson makes so much.

Strawson's tentative (and partial) analysis of securing uptake is intended as a tentative (and partial) analysis of illocutionary force as well as of the illocutionary act. So it may be appropriate to comment here on his views on illocutionary force and the distinction between the locutionary meaning and the illocutionary force of an utterance. The metaphors which Strawson uses to characterize the relationship between these different notions in his more recent article, "Austin and 'Locutionary Meaning'" (Essays pp.46-68), have already been remarked (see p.95 above). According to Strawson in that article, the illocutionary force of an utterance is that part of its meaning over and above the linguistic-cum-referential meaning of what is said which is not included in the part of the complete meaning of what is said that is implied by the speaker. (For definitions of the underlined phrases see Essays pp.46-9.) On this view, the more a speaker uses the linguistic devices which Austin noted were suitable for making explicit the illocutionary force of an utterance, the more its illocutionary force is "absorbed by" or "enters into" its locutionary meaning, i.e., Strawson's linguistic-cum-referential meaning. So that in the case, for instance, of an explicit performative utterance, to know its
locutionary meaning is to know its illocutionary force and the knowledge of the latter adds nothing to the knowledge of the meaning of the utterance which cannot be gained from the knowledge of the former "except the knowledge that there is nothing to be added" (p.49). In "Intention and Convention in Speech Acts" Strawson's view is substantially the same although the metaphors are different. There he says, "The meaning of a (serious) utterance, as conceived by Austin, always embodies some limitation on its possible force, and sometimes – as, for example, in some cases where an explicit performative formula, like 'I apologize', is used - the meaning of an utterance may exhaust its force; that is, there may be no more to the force than there is to the meaning; but very often the meaning, though it limits, does not exhaust, the force" (F.L. pp23-4). The "meaning-may-exhaust-force" metaphor has no source in Words and is a profoundly misleading way of characterizing the relationship between these categorically distinct notions. It encourages the view that what Austin called the illocutionary force of an utterance is just that part of a speaker's meaning, or his intended meaning, which is not conveyed directly by the literal meaning of his utterance but which can be so conveyed by the use of the various linguistic force-indicating devices. But on this view, with more and more of the force of an utterance being able to be "absorbed into" or "exhausted by" its locutionary meaning, by the use of these devices, to the point where "there may be no more to the force than there is to the meaning", an utterance whose force is thereby made fully explicit has no force. By his use of these metaphors Strawson tries to assimilate illocutionary force to locutionary meaning and tries to make it
look as though a theory of meaning would be adequate for explaining the notion of illocutionary force. Searle seeks to effect the same assimilation in a different way by invoking his Principle of Expressibility according to which whatever can be meant can be said. The details and application of this principle need not be gone into here. Both Strawson's and Searle's proposed assimilation is subject to the objection made in the final section of Chapter Two in the course of defending Austin's distinction between locutionary meaning and illocutionary force against Cohen's criticisms, i.e., the objection that to assimilate these two notions is to commit a category confusion. Austin's talk of the force of an utterance as distinct from its meaning, and of "how the utterance is to be taken" was, of course, metaphorical. But the origin of these metaphors in the language of action — how one takes a blow to the body: by ducking or fending it, depends on the perceived force of the blow — points to the sort of theory in whose terms the phenomena thus metaphorically described are to be explained.

It is on the basis of his account of securing uptake in terms of audience understanding that Strawson mounts his attack on Austin's thesis that illocutionary acts are in general essentially conventional acts. The crux of the matter for Strawson seems to be the different ways in which the complex overt intention of the speaker performing an illocutionary act may fail to be fulfilled. "In the case of an illocutionary act of a kind not essentially conventional, the act of communication is performed if uptake is secured, if the utterance is taken to be issued with the complex overt intention with which it is issued. But even though the act of communication is per-
formed, the wholly overt intention which lies at the core of the intention complex may, without any breach of rules or conventions, be frustrated. The audience response (belief, action, or attitude) may simply not be forthcoming. It is different with the utterance which forms part of a wholly convention-governed procedure. Granted that uptake is secured, then any frustration of the wholly overt intention of the utterance (the intention to further the procedure in a certain way) must be attributable to a breach of rule or convention" (p.37). So the revision of Austin's thesis that Strawson seeks to effect relies for its success on the presumption that the failure of the audience of the illocutionary act to make the intended response to it, without contravening any rules or conventions, or the frustration, without any breach of rules or conventions, of the intention with which the act is performed, implies that the illocutionary act itself is not a conventional act.

In his Introduction to P.L. Searle expresses doubts that this distinction has the force that Strawson attributes to it. There are good grounds for such doubts but they are not the ones which Searle advances, viz., that with Grice, Strawson confuses the notions of illocutionary uptake and perlocutionary object. "Strawson and Grice both think of the 'overt intention' of the speaker in the non-conventional case as the eliciting of some response or effect in the hearer, such as, e.g., getting him to believe something (the overt intended effect of statements) or getting him to do something (the overt intended effect of requests)" (p.8). But it is difficult to see how this charge can be made good against Strawson for the point on which he parts company with Grice is precisely that
which concerns the extent of the intended audience response which is to be included in the complex overt intention manifested in any illocutionary act. On p. 33 Strawson argues for a more restricted view on this point than the one adopted by Grice and further on summarizes his position with the remark, "It would equally be a mistake, as we have seen, to generalize the account of illocutionary force derived from Grice's analysis; for this would involve holding, falsely, that the complex overt intention manifested in any illocutionary act always includes the intention to secure a certain definite response or reaction in an audience over and above that which is necessarily secured if the illocutionary force of the utterance is understood" (p. 37). Here, perlocutionary object is clearly distinguished and isolated in the intended response or reaction of the audience "over and above that which is necessarily secured if the illocutionary force of the utterance is understood", i.e., if uptake is secured. The notions which Strawson has confused are not those of illocutionary uptake and perlocutionary object but those of securing uptake (of a locution) and performing an illocutionary act. Although it is serious in its own way, this confusion does not bear directly on the question whether Strawson has succeeded in establishing a kind of illocutionary act which is not essentially conventional and whether, therefore, a revision of Austin's thesis is necessary. But it would seem that Strawson has failed to establish this. For the contrast he draws in terms of the ways the complex overt intention manifested in any illocutionary act may be frustrated is a distinction not between kinds of illocutionary acts, but one between kinds of responses to illocutionary acts, i.e., between outcomes of
illocutionary acts, not illocutionary acts themselves. And one can readily admit that the intended response from an audience of an illocutionary act, successfully performed, may fail to be forthcoming without any breach of convention without admitting, and without being committed to admitting, that the illocutionary act is of a kind not essentially conventional. For example, an act of promising may be performed with the intention of convincing the promisee that the promisor will perform the promised act. This intention may be frustrated by the promisee's refusal to be so convinced and the promisee's refusal to be so convinced contravenes no "conventions" of promising. But this does not imply that the act of promising is not a conventional act, an act performed in accordance with a fairly clearly statable conventional procedure constitutive of the act.

In developing his objection against Strawson, then, Searle is on firmer ground when he compares a supposedly non-conventional illocutionary act, e.g., making a statement, with a conventional one, e.g., bidding at bridge, and declares, "In both cases the intended perlocutionary effect may not be achieved, e.g., the hearer may not believe my statement, or he may not believe I have as many high cards as my five no-trump bid would indicate. And in neither case does he breach any rules or conventions if he fails to believe me" (p. 9). But what needs to be made clear here is that the distinction which Searle deploys against Strawson, between illocutionary acts and perlocutionary effects, is one which Austin himself formulated and which was designed to mark the distinction between illocutionary acts and some of their outcomes. Moreover, the contrast Strawson draws between kinds of outcomes of illocu-
tionary acts which may or may not fail to be forthcoming without any breach of convention is also accommodated by Austin's distinction between responses and sequels to illocutionary acts which are invited by convention and those which are not. Austin regarded only the latter as perlocutionary outcomes of illocutionary acts and so Searle goes astray again in saying, "Furthermore, even in those cases where failure to secure the perlocutionary effect does indeed involve a breach of rules, this is only for the trivial reason that the rules are designed to enforce the perlocutionary effect" (p. 9). As Austin used the terminology of perlocutions, such effects are not perlocutionary effects.

A second explanatory merit which Strawson claims for his account is its ability to explain the exclusion from the class of illocutionary acts of those acts which can be expressed by a verb "v" occurring in the formula "In saying that, ... S was v-ing" and which Austin denied, on intuitive grounds, were illocutionary acts, e.g., boasting and insinuating. However, a more apposite test of the explanatory power of any account is whether it accommodates those cases of which it purports to be an account. Strawson's account fails this test and this failure shows the falsity of holding that speakers' intentions are the essential constitutive features of illocutionary acts. This failure will be demonstrated with reference to the examples of warning and objecting. These are examples which Strawson alleges are counter-examples to Austin's thesis, so presumably they are examples which Strawson would claim are able to be accommodated within his alternative account of illocutionary acts. (It has already been shown, in the previous
chapter, that these examples of illocutionary acts can be accommodated within an account which develops Austin's thesis and hence, contra Strawson, that they are not counter-examples to that thesis.)

Strawson glosses his account of warning as follows: "... where I do not simply inform, but warn, you that p, among the intentions I intend you to recognize (and intend you to recognize as intended to be recognized), are not only the intention to secure your belief that p, but the intention to secure that you are on your guard against p-perils" (p.33). It will be clear from this gloss that Strawson's account cannot accommodate cases of warnings given unintentionally, and it will be clear from the general nature of Strawson's account that it cannot accommodate any case of an illocutionary act performed unintentionally. Now Strawson does not deny that "... an illocutionary act may be performed altogether unintentionally" (p.30, fn.4). "I do not mean that such an act could never be performed unintentionally. A player might let slip the word 'redouble' without meaning to redouble; but if the circumstances are appropriate and the play strict, then he has redoubled (or he may be held to have redoubled)... Forms can take charge, in the absence of appropriate intention; but when they do, the case is essentially deviant or nonstandard" (p.36). Strawson is justified in rejecting this example as a counter-example to his account. In the case described, if the player is held to have redoubled, the mistake by virtue of which he redoubled unintentionally, a slip of the tongue, does make the case essentially a deviant or nonstandard one. In this case, it is not even true that the player says that he redoubles, in the full normal sense of "say". So the play would be overly strict,
rather than just strict, if the other players exploited the coincidence of the word which was let slip being an utterance which could be used to bid, and of it being let slip in circumstances appropriate for bidding, to hold that the player, in letting slip the word in those circumstances, did bid. But there really is much more scope for unintentional performances of illocutionary acts than Strawson would seem, from this example, to be prepared to admit. And the rejection of other examples of such performances on the grounds that they are essentially deviant or nonstandard would contain an element of arbitrary legislation. For there are situations in which illocutionary acts of some types may, either by mistake or by inadvertence, be performed unintentionally, and yet be successfully performed and even, in some cases, felicitously performed.

For instance, two courtiers making their plans to murder their king may be overheard by the king hiding behind the arras in the room in which they are talking. The courtiers certainly make a big mistake in not ensuring that they hatch their plot in secret, and the situation will become very unhappy for them in the near future when the king’s loyal men-at-arms are sent in to despatch them. But no mistakes are made in what they say, and the king is warned of the plot against him; and warned, albeit by mistake and unintentionally, by the conspirators in saying what they say. Next, an example of an objection raised by mistake. A speaker may have asserted that Jones is a nimble dancer and may be trying to corroborate this in saying that Jones has only one leg, believing, perhaps, that Jones must be nimble if he is a dancer and has only one leg. But if, in fact, Jones has only one leg and is not a nimble dancer because he has only one leg, then in saying that Jones has only one leg
the speaker will not be corroborating his earlier assertion but raising an objection against it. In such cases of an unintentional warning or objection being given or raised by mistake, while the warning is felicitous (and therefore successful) the objection is successful but infelicitous. The presupposition of objecting, that the speaker has a certain contrary attitude towards the utterance objected to, is not satisfied. This meshes with intuitions. It is indeed an unhappy situation when one unintentionally raises an objection against something which one has said. An example of a felicitous unintentional objection and another example of a felicitous unintentional warning were introduced and discussed in the third section of the previous chapter and need not be repeated here (see pp. 224, 227 above). In those examples, the warning and objection are not given or raised by mistake but by inadvertence. The differences between unintentional objections being raised by mistake and inadvertently may be sketched schematically as follows if "p" abbreviates "Jones has only one leg" and "q" abbreviates "Jones is a nimble dancer". In either case of a speaker objecting that p against the utterance that q, p is true and believed to be true by the speaker, and q is false. In the case of a speaker objecting that p against q inadvertently, q is correctly believed by the speaker to be false but he does not see any connexion between p and q, i.e., he has no belief with respect to one providing grounds for the truth or falsity of the other. In the case of a speaker objecting that p against q by mistake, q is incorrectly believed by the speaker to be true and he mistakes the connexion between p and q, i.e., he believes that p provides grounds for the truth of q when it provides grounds for the falsity of q.
Each of these examples is a different counter-example to Schiffer's claim that "...in uttering the sentence 'Jones has only one leg', S may be objecting to A's statement that Jones is a nimble dancer, but that this is so would seem to be a result of the intentions with which the sentence was uttered..." (Meaning p. 91). In the former example, the speaker is objecting without any such intention, and in the latter example, he is objecting in spite of his intention to the contrary.

The possibility of illocutionary acts of most types being performed unintentionally is not the paradox that at first sight it may appear to be. Illocutionary acts are distinct from locutionary acts and the general presumption that an agent knows what he is saying is stronger than the general presumption that he knows what he is doing. The knowledge alluded to here is just the knowledge an agent (or speaker) has of what he is doing (or saying) that is derived from his intentions. This difference surfaces in the difference between the rhetorical force of the reproofs "You don't know what you're saying" and "You don't know what you're doing". The first is much the stronger of the two. It seems paraphraseable as "You don't, you can't, mean what you say because if you did you wouldn't say it", while the second seems paraphraseable as just either "You don't foresee what is a fairly obvious outcome of what you're doing" or "You're making a bit of a mess of what you're doing". The point here is not that unintentional acts of saying something are exceptional while unintentional acts of doing something are not. The point, rather, is that lack of the relevant intention(s) vitiates acts of the former sort but not acts of the latter sort. If a speaker "says" something without intend-
ing to say it then he does not say it in the full normal sense of "say"; but if, for instance, an agent shoots someone unintentionally, then he does shoot him in the full normal sense of "shoot". Because the speaker’s having of the relevant intention is not a necessary condition for the successful and, in many cases, the felicitous performance of an illocutionary act, speakers’ intentions are not the essential constitutive features of illocutionary acts. At one point, Schiffer glosses his account of illocutionary acts with the words "...to perform a certain illocutionary act is just to utter something with certain intentions..." (p. 108). This will not do. Nor will it do to try to extend the scope of a theory of language to encompass illocutionary acts by denying their essential conventionality and making speakers’ intentions their essential constitutive features.

The main hypothesis in Searle’s attempt to give an account of illocutionary acts within the framework of a theory of language is "...that the semantic structure of a language may be regarded as a conventional realization of a series of sets of underlying constitutive rules, and that speech acts are acts characteristically performed by uttering expressions in accordance with these sets of constitutive rules" (S.A. p. 37). By way of initial clarification of this hypothesis Searle addresses himself to the following question: "What is the difference between making promises and, say, fishing that makes me want to say that doing the first in a language is only made possible by the existence of constitutive rules concerning the elements of a language and doing the second requires no analogous set of constitutive rules?" (p. 37). Searle characterizes this differ-
ence in terms of a natural-conventional distinction. "In the case of fishing the ends-means relations...that facilitate or enable me to reach my goal, are matters of natural physical facts...that under such and such conditions one catches a fish is not a matter of convention or anything like a convention. In the case of speech acts performed within a language, on the other hand, it is a matter of convention - as opposed to strategy, technique, procedure, or natural fact - that the utterance of such and such expressions under certain conditions counts as the making of a promise"(p.37).

With these remarks, Searle can be seen to be raising, albeit unclearly, the problem of the constitution of illocutionary acts. That the utterance of certain expressions under certain conditions counts as the making of a promise is not a matter of natural, physical fact, but a matter of convention; and one which is to be explained, according to Searle, in terms of constitutive rules underlying and realized in the semantic conventions of a language. One of the unclarities in these remarks arises from Searle's mentioning of means-to-end relationships. At first sight, it appears as though Searle regards the relationship between uttering certain expressions under certain conditions and the making of a promise as a means-to-end relationship, like that between fishing and catching a fish; the two being distinct only in so far as the relationship is conventional in the former case and natural in the latter case. The impression conveyed by these opening remarks, that one of the roles for Searle's notion of constitutive rules is to explain the bringing about of some non-natural conventional end, is reinforced by another example which Searle uses to illustrate the difference between two practices, both
of which have conventional modes of performance but in only one of which it is the case that the conventions are realizations of underlying rules. The practice in which the conventions are not realizations of underlying constitutive rules is that of a society of sadists who like to cause each other pain by making loud noises in each other's ears and adopt the convention of making the noise BANG as a means of achieving this end. Searle's point is that rules do not operate, and are not required to operate, to bring about this end because the pain so caused is a natural effect. Were Searle to go on and claim that rules do operate to bring about some conventional end, such as the making of a promise, and are required to operate in such a case because the end is a conventional end, it would create a serious flaw in his account quite apart from the invalidity of such a move. For the uttering of certain expressions in certain circumstances and the making of a promise are not related as means-to-end, and to conceive them to be so related is to misconceive the problem of the constitution of illocutionary acts. But Searle does not make this move, and elsewhere, denies that these acts are related as means-to-end. "Nor should it be thought from this that utterance acts...stand to illocutionary acts in the way buying a ticket and getting on a train stand to taking a railroad trip. They are not means to ends; rather, utterance acts stand to...illocutionary acts in the way in which, e.g., making an 'X' on a ballot paper stands to voting" (p.24). So while Searle's mention of means-to-end relationships in these initial remarks on his hypothesis is not ultimately confusing, it does nothing to clarify that hypothesis. Another point arising from these remarks, which may just be noted here in passing, is Searle's unargued rejection of proce-
dues as the essential constitutive features of illocutionary acts. Searle does not appear to have considered very carefully the possibility that it is by virtue of being performed as part of a procedure of a particular type that an act of uttering certain expressions is constituted as, or in his terminology, counts as, the performance of an illocutionary act of a particular type.

Searle illustrates the sense with which he uses the phrase "a conventional realization of underlying rules" by an example of the game of chess being played in different countries according to different conventions. "Imagine, e.g., that in one country the king is represented by a big piece, in another the king is smaller than the rook. In one country the game is played on a board as we do it, in another the board is represented entirely by a sequence of numbers, one of which is assigned to any piece that 'moves' to that number. Of these different countries, we could say that they play the same game of chess according to different conventional forms. Notice, also, that the rules must be realized in some form in order that the game be playable. Something, even if it is not a material object, must represent what we call the king or the board" (p.39).

Searle regards this situation as analogous to that of different natural languages - English, French, German, etc. - being different conventional realizations of the same set of underlying rules. But while the analogy between different conventional forms of the game of chess and different natural languages may be reasonably clear, the analogy between the rules of chess underlying those different conventional forms of the game and the rules constitutive of illocutionary acts underlying those different natural languages is not at all clear. This latter anal-
ogy is the more important of the two, and it is essential for
the clarification of his hypothesis that Searle does succeed
in establishing that there is such an analogue to the rules of
chess. His one gesture towards doing this is made with a claim
about the inter-translatability of languages. "Just as in the
above "chess" example, we can translate a chess game in one
country into a chess game of another because they share the
same underlying rules, so we can translate utterances of one
language into another because they share the same underlying
rules"(p.40). Different human languages, to the extent they
are inter-translatable, can be regarded as different conven­
tional realizations of the same underlying rules"(p.39).

In view of Searle's aim to connect the rules constitutive
of illocutionary acts with the semantic structures of differ­
ent languages, and given that meaning is what is preserved in
translation, this is the sort of claim that may be expected
from Searle. And this claim does serve as a reminder of one
sort of rule which Searle is not concerned to establish as the
rules constitutive of illocutionary acts. For these latter
rules, underlying and shared by different natural languages,
are not the rules peculiar to just one natural language which
may be formulated in an attempt to specify the particular se­
mantic conventions of that language. Searle is quite explicit
on this point. "When I say that speaking a language is engag­
ing in a rule-governed form of behaviour, I am not especially
concerned with the particular conventions one invokes in
speaking this language or that (and it is primarily for this
reason that my investigation differs fundamentally from lin­
guistics, construed as an examination of the actual structure
of natural human languages) but the underlying rules which the
conventions manifest or realize, in the sense of the chess example" (p. 41). But this point having been made, it is difficult to see what rules there are, allegedly manifested in the semantic conventions of natural languages and in virtue of which different languages are inter-translatable, that can serve Searle's purpose. In another remark which makes much the same point as that of the previously quoted remark, Searle also gives what he evidently takes to be an example of such a rule. "The fact that in French one can make a promise by saying 'je promets' and in English one can make it by saying 'I promise' is a matter of convention. But the fact that an utterance of a promising device (under appropriate conditions) counts as the undertaking of an obligation is a matter of rules and not a matter of the conventions of French or English" (pp. 39-40). Setting aside the questions of whether or not this fact is a matter of rules, and of how the rule, if it is a rule, that the utterance of a promising device (under certain conditions) counts as the undertaking of an obligation, fits in with the alleged series of sets of underlying constitutive rules, the questions now confronting Searle's hypothesis are whether this "rule" is something manifested or realized in the semantic conventions of a language, and whether it is in virtue of something like this that (fragments at least) of natural languages are inter-translatable. If the answers to these latter questions are in the affirmative, then what the "rule" specifies is what is meant or said when a speaker seriously and literally utters a sentence such as "I promise". For the rules manifested or realized in the semantic conventions of a language operate to assign meanings or semantic interpretations to sentences of the language, and a rule for translating an utterance in one
language into an utterance in another language has to preserve the identity of what is said in the translation. But neither what is meant, nor what is said, is specified by Searle's "rule" that the utterance of a promising device (under certain conditions) counts as the undertaking of an obligation. What this "rule" specifies - the undertaking of an obligation - is one of the things that might be done by a speaker in saying, seriously and literally, "I promise". So it would seem that the answers to these questions are in the negative, and that this "rule", which is typical of the sort of rules which Searle claims to be constitutive of illocutionary acts, is not manifested or realized in the semantic conventions of a language. Searle has, therefore, failed to establish that there are underlying rules, constitutive of illocutionary acts, manifested or realized in the conventions of natural languages analogous to the rules of chess in his example of the game of chess being played in different countries according to different conventions. But the establishment of such (a series of sets of) rules is required for the clarification of his hypothesis, and lacking clarification from any other source that hypothesis seems unable to be assessed in terms of truth and falsity.

One reason for Searle's failure to establish the required analogy can, perhaps, be shown by developing a slightly different analogy - between playing chess and using a language - which may also show why it is misguided to attempt to give an account of illocutionary acts within the framework of a theory of language. It is not so important for this analogy that there may not be a very close analogy between the rules of chess and the rules of a language. There are obvious disanalogies between these rules arising from the greater complexity of the latter.
But some possible disanalogies between these rules which suggest themselves may not be actual disanalogies. For instance, the suggestion that the rules of chess are prescriptive whereas the rules of a language are descriptive, if that distinction is a clear one, may just reflect the different state of codification of the respective rules rather than any difference in their natures. And it is sufficient for the purposes of this analogy that these rules are alike in so far as it is by reference to each that certain faults in the respective performances of chess-players and speakers are judged to be faults. To the extent that these rules are analogous, a corrective can be found for Searle's claim that there is, manifested or realized in the conventions of different natural languages, a common set of underlying rules analogous to the rules of chess that manifested or realized in each of the conventional forms of the game of chess described in his hypothetical example. If the analogues of these different conventional realizations of the rules of chess are seen to be, not different natural languages, but different conventional realizations, e.g., phonetic and graphic realizations, of the output of the operations of the syntactic and semantic rules of one particular natural language upon the items in the lexicon of that language, as they may easily be seen to be, then Searle's implausible claim has the ground cut from under it.

However, what is more important in this analogy is the similarity between the ways in which the abilities displayed by people using a language, and playing a game such as chess, are not exhausted by the abilities gained from their mastery of the rules of the language, or from their mastery of the rules of chess. The possession of these latter abilities is,
of course, a necessary condition for a person being able to use a language or to play chess at all. And in the case of a language-user, the possession of abilities gained from a mastery of the rules of the language, together with a knowledge of the lexicon of the language, is a sufficient condition for that person being able to speak the language. These abilities include the ability to issue lexically and syntactically correct and meaningful sentences of the language, the ability to understand such sentences issued by others and which may or may not have been encountered previously, as well as the ability to recognize grammatical faults of various types that may occur in attempts to issue such sentences. In Austinian terms, the possession of these abilities by a speaker adds up to his being able to perform locutionary acts. In the case of a chess-player, the abilities gained from a mastery of the rules of the game include the ability to identify the correct arrangement of the pieces on the board preparatory to play from among any number of different arrangements of the pieces, the ability to distinguish legal moves from any illegal moves that may be made in the course of play, and the ability to identify a position of play which counts as winning, or losing, or drawing a game of chess. However, the sense with which it may be said of a person that he can use language, or that he can play chess, which is informed only by the abilities gained from his mastery of the respective rules, is a very weak sense. Perhaps this can be seen most easily by imagining a speaker's use of language or a chess-player's game which displays only these abilities. If all that can be said of a speaker's use of language is that (most of) his utterances are well-formed, meaningful and clearly enunciated, then the speaker's perform-
ance is damned with faint praise. The same is true of a chess-
player's play of which all that can be said are such things as
that he arranged the pieces on the board correctly before the
game commenced, that he made no illegal moves during the game,
and that he knew that he had lost the game when his king was
mated. Such performances invite the comment that the speaker
or the chess-player does not really know how to use language,
or does not really know how to play chess. What is lacking in
the chess-player's game is a display of some ability for combi-
national and positional play. In order to be able to play
the game properly, a chess-player has to be able to adopt tac-
tics which, given the position of play and the pieces at his
disposal, will serve the principal strategic objective of win-
ning the game. The ability to adopt such tactics consists in
the ability to adopt certain procedures whose executions at
certain stages of the game have outcomes which further the at-
tainment of that objective. The intended analogy between the
different abilities that inform each of these senses with
which it may be said that a person can play chess, and the
different abilities, displayed in the performance of locution-
ary and illocutionary acts, that inform different senses with
which it may be said that a person can use language, should
now be clear. For what is lacking in the speaker's performance
which displays only the abilities gained from his mastery of
the rules of the language is a display of some ability to per-
form illocutionary acts; some ability, that is, to do things
in the exercise of those abilities gained from his mastery of
the rules of the language, which will help to bring about the
various objectives that arise in the course of his purposive
action. And this ability consists in the ability to adopt cer-
tain procedures whose executions in appropriate circumstances have outcomes which further the attainment of those objectives.

Perhaps an illustrative example will help to establish the analogy between the procedures constitutive of illocutionary acts that are adopted by speaker's in their use of language and the tactical procedures that are adopted by chess-players in their games of chess. A speaker may wish to convince someone of his own future performance of some act, and a chess-player, Black, will no doubt wish to defend his position against White's opening move (P-K4). The speaker may have a number of procedures available to him for convincing his companion but may decide to adopt the procedure of promising, believing that that is the best procedure to adopt in the circumstances. Similarly, Black has a number of procedures available to him for defending his position against White's King's Pawn Opening but may decide to adopt the Sicilian Defence, believing that that is the best procedure to adopt in the circumstances. And just as what the speaker does, when he says that he promises to perform the act, is constituted as an act of promising by virtue of his locutionary act being performed as part of a procedure, what Black does, when he makes the move (P-QB4), is constituted as a Sicilian Defence by virtue of that move being made as part of a procedure. Each procedure can be specified in the same sort of terms: an ordered triplet comprising a set of (types of) presuppositions, a set of (types of) acts, and a set of (types of) strictly necessitated outcomes. And the following of such outcomes from the correct and complete execution of each procedure furthers the attainment of the speaker's and the chess-player's respective objectives.

The abilities displayed by people in their use of such
procedures inform a stronger sense with which it may be said that they can use language or that they can play chess. And although the acquisition and the exercise of these abilities go along with the acquisition and the exercise of the abilities informing the weak sense with which these things may be said, i.e., the abilities gained from a mastery of the rules of a language or from a mastery of the rules of chess, the former abilities are neither exhausted by the latter abilities nor gained from a mastery of the respective rules. Just as it is not a rule of chess that Black must play the Sicilian Defence to White's King's Pawn Opening, it is not a rule of language that a speaker must give a promise in order to convince another of his own future performance of some act. That a chess-player's move (P-QB4) is a legal move is a matter, inter alia, of the rules of chess, and that a speaker's act of uttering the sentence "I promise" is an instance of him saying that he promises is a matter, inter alia, of the rules of a language. But that the chess-player's move is constituted as a Sicilian Defence, and that the speaker's locutionary act is constituted as an act of promising, are not matters of the rules of chess or of the rules of a language. Just as no rule of chess is controverted if the player's move (P-QB4) is not constituted as a Sicilian Defence - assuming that the move was legal in the circumstances in which it was made - no rule of language is controverted if a speaker's act of saying that he promises is not constituted as an act of promising. Just as a person does not learn from the rules of chess either what the Sicilian Defence is, or how, when or why it may be deployed, a person learns from the rules of a language which he has to master in order to be able to speak the language neither what
promising is, nor how, when or why promises may be given. From his mastery of those rules he acquires the ability to use "the procedure of promising" and "promises", but he does not acquire the ability to use promises or the procedure of promising from his mastery of those rules. The objective of a theory of language is to give an account of the linguistic competence of native speakers of the language and the task of constructing such a theory may be compared to the task of codifying the rules of chess. The tasks differ in that the former is complete whereas the latter is still incomplete. But even if a complete codification of the rules of a language, whose mastery enabled people to be speakers of that language, was to hand, such a theory of language would be inadequate for giving an account of the use of language exemplified by the performance of illocutionary acts, because the abilities displayed in the performance of such acts are not included in the abilities gained from a mastery of those rules.

It may be objected against this analogy, and against the claim that has been defended in this chapter, that the conceptions of a theory of language which inform that analogy and that claim are too restricted. It may be held, for instance, that a theory of language need not, or does not, only have syntactic and semantic components but may, or should, also have a pragmatic component. And it may be argued that because pragmatics is the study of language in relation to the users of language, and because illocutionary acts exemplify a specific use of language, such acts fall within the scope of pragmatics and are amenable to subsumption under a pragmatic component of a theory of language. Such an argument might be convincing if it was clear what the scope and inter-relationships
of these different components are; and, in particular, if it was clear that a pragmatic component could not be included in the semantic component (and perhaps, in the syntactic component as well) to provide an enriched theory of language which still, basically, comprised only a syntactic and a semantic component, rather than having to be given its own place in a genuinely tripartite theory of language. Some of Stalnaker's remarks in "Pragmatics" (S.N.I. pp. 380-97) not only show something of the range of the different distinctions that have been drawn and deployed between pragmatic and non-pragmatic phenomena, and, thereby, something of the varying scopes of pragmatic components of theories of language; they also show something of the arbitrariness with which these distinctions have been drawn. For instance, "The problems of pragmatics have been treated informally by philosophers in the ordinary language tradition, and by some linguists, but logicians and philosophers of a formalistic frame of mind have generally ignored pragmatic problems, or else pushed them into semantics and syntax" (p. 380). The distinction between pragmatic and non-pragmatic phenomena which is indicated by this partly historical remark distinguishes phenomena which are, or have been, treated informally in a theory of language from those phenomena which are, or have been, treated formally in such a theory. A similar distinction, going along with his distinction between theorists of formal semantics and theorists of communication-intention, can be seen to lie behind Strawson's remark that a theorist of formal semantics "...may be happy to concede rights in some small outlying portion of the de facto territory of theoretical semantics to the theorist of communication-intention, instead of confining the latter entirely to some less ap-
A different distinction between pragmatic and non-pragmatic phenomena which emerges from some of Stalnaker's other remarks distinguishes, among the phenomena subsumed under a theory of language, those that are context-dependent from those that are not. For instance, Stalnaker maintains that the problem of analyzing the necessary and sufficient conditions for the successful performance of speech acts is a pragmatic problem "...since these necessary and sufficient conditions will ordinarily involve the presence or absence of various properties of the context in which the act is performed." His qualification of this position is telling. "This is not necessarily so, however. Since speech act types can be any way of picking out a class of particular speech acts, one might define one in such a way that the context was irrelevant, and the problem of analysis reduced to a problem of syntax or semantics, as for example the speech act of uttering a grammatical sentence of English, or the speech act of expressing the proposition X" (p.396, fn.6).

It is clear that this second distinction does not coincide with the first; context-dependent features of speech can be treated formally. And it is the latter distinction which Stalnaker deploys in his attempt "...to carve out a subject matter that might plausibly be called pragmatics...a subject [which] can be developed in a relatively straightforward way as a formal pragmatics no less rigorous than present day logical syntax and semantics" (p.380). According to Stalnaker, "pragmatics is the study of linguistic acts and the contexts in which they are performed", and "there are two major types of problems to be solved within pragmatics: first, to define interesting types of
speech acts and speech products; second, to characterize the features of the speech context which help determine which proposition is expressed by a given sentence. The analysis of illocutionary acts is an example of a problem of the first kind..." (p. 383). But on the same page, Stalnaker claims that "...it is a semantical problem to specify the rules for matching up sentences of a natural language with the propositions that they express." So it is difficult to see Stalnaker's reason for thinking that the problem of characterizing the features of the speech context which help determine which proposition is expressed by a given sentence is a pragmatic problem, rather than one for a context-sensitive semantic component of a theory of language. The views from which this thought seems to be derived, "...that semantics is best viewed as the study of propositions, and...that propositions may be studied independently of language" (p. 395), simply expose the arbitrariness of Stalnaker's demarcation of a pragmatic component of a theory of language in terms of what is context-dependent. It is a commonplace that the meaningfulness of sentences is context-dependent, one more generally accepted than the view that the syntactic correctness of sentences is context-dependent, and it does not seem inappropriate that this commonplace should be explained within the semantic component of a theory of language. Stalnaker's reason for including illocutionary acts within the scope of a pragmatic component of a theory of language is not a sufficient reason. Types of acts which, like illocutionary acts, exemplify some use of language and are context-dependent would be included, even though they are not good candidates for inclusion; e.g., playing Scrabble and doing cross-word puzzles.

To show that Stalnaker has not given a sufficient reason
for regarding the analysis of illocutionary acts as a pragmatic problem is not, of course, to prove that such acts cannot, or should not, be subsumed under a pragmatic component of a theory of language. But perhaps there is, in this discussion of Stalnaker's remarks on pragmatics, sufficient material for the construction of a defence against the previously outlined objection to the claim being defended in this chapter and to the analogy between playing chess and using a language. The objection was that the theories of language informing that analogy and that claim are too restricted in not, apparently, including pragmatic components. But it can be seen from the various distinctions which Stalnaker draws between pragmatic and non-pragmatic phenomena that each of these theories does include a pragmatic component. The theory of language informing the analogy, which is adequate for giving an account of locutionary acts, includes a pragmatic component within its semantic component by making the successful performance of a rhetoric act dependent, in part, upon some of the circumstances of the context in which the act is performed. And the broadly construed theory of language informing the claim of this chapter (i.e., the claim that a theory of action provides a more appropriate framework for developing Austin's conception of speech acts than a theory of language) also includes a pragmatic component within its semantic component by virtue of the latter being construed, not (just) as a theory of formal semantics, but as (including) a theory of speakers' communication-intentions. The objection may be pressed. It may be urged that although Stalnaker may have failed to show that illocutionary acts fall within the scope of a pragmatic component of a theory of language, distinct from its syntactic and semantic compon-
ents, some such component could be delineated and developed in order to provide an account of illocutionary acts. But to press the objection in this way is to lose the point, for two reasons. Not only is the envisaged theory of language radically different from that deployed by Schiffer, Strawson and Searle in their respective work on speech acts - and it is against the counter-claims implicit in that work that the claim of this chapter is being defended - but the scope of the envisaged theory of language contains an arbitrary extension beyond that of traditional theories of language, and an arbitrary extension beyond that required of a theory adequate for giving an account of the abilities displayed by people in so far as they are speakers of a language.

In "Speech Acts" (C.T.L. pp.173-208), Cohen argues "...that a study of the so-called illocutionary forces of English (or French) utterances is not to be thought of as a branch of linguistics co-ordinate with English (or French) phonology, morphology, syntax, and semantics" (p.199). However, the aim of this argument is not one which the writer is in sympathy with. In "Do Illocutionary Forces Exist?" Cohen argued for a negative answer to the title question, and in "Speech Acts" he makes four criticisms of Austin's conception of speech acts, each of which bears on the notion of the illocutionary act. Cohen's objective is not to show that the phenomena of illocutionary forces or of illocutionary acts are subjects for a theory of action; Cohen would deny that such phenomena occur. His objective is to show that speech act phenomena are to be subsumed under a semantic component of a theory of language. Perhaps this discussion can be rounded off with a brief examination of these more recent criticisms that Cohen has made of Austin's
conception of speech acts. In summary, they are that that conception "...multiplies acts unnecessarily, its distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts is obscure, its distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts is equally troublesome, and its thesis about the essential conventionality of illocutionary acts is quite untenable" (p. 180).

The first criticism, concerning the unnecessary proliferation of acts, has two quite distinct parts. For the first part, Cohen criticizes Austin's conception of phonetic, phatic and rhetic acts. "It is just a reification and telescoping of customary distinctions between phonetic, morpho-phonemic, syntactic, and semantic modes of description. In other words Austin's theory sprouts novel and redundant terminology that cuts off his account of speech from any obvious continuity with current linguistic theory" (p. 176). But even when this criticism is linked with Cohen's point that Austin adopted the material mode of discourse rather than the formal mode, what is wrong with what Cohen is criticizing here is not clear. Cohen does not sharpen the criticism; nor does he show what is lost by Austin's abandonment of the formal mode in talking about speech acts; in particular, Cohen does not show why a multiplicity of (types of) descriptions of speech act situations is to be preferred to a multiplicity of (types of) acts distinguished within such situations. The point which Cohen seems to have missed in making this criticism is that the distinctions drawn within the locutionary act between phonetic, phatic and rhetic acts (distinctions which mesh with some of the more important distinctions drawn in linguistic theory), when set alongside the distinctions between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts, serve to separate those features of a speech act situation
which are amenable to subsumption under a theory of language from those which are not. The second part of Cohen's first criticism is "...that on some occasions at least an indefinitely large number of illocutionary acts are encapsulated in a single speech-act. In saying to a politician "There is a plot to oust you", a man may be committing himself to the politician's cause, in thus committing himself he may have been condemning his own past actions, in condemning his own past actions he may have been repudiating his previous beliefs, in repudiating his previous beliefs he may have been drawing the obvious conclusions from events, and so on, and so on.

When acts begin to multiply like this it looks as though there is work for Occam's razor to do"(p.177). The point of this criticism is quite mysterious. It can hardly be that it is a consequence of Austin's conception of speech acts that more than one type of illocutionary act can be performed in the issuing of one single utterance in a speech act situation. For such a state of affairs is possible, as Cohen's example shows, and an adequate account of illocutionary acts should be able to accommodate such a possibility. The point of Cohen's criticism may be that Austin's conception of speech acts cannot accommodate such a possibility. (Compare the point which Cohen tries to make with a very similar example in "Do Illocutionary Forces Exist?"(Symppp.436-7).) But if this is the point which Cohen is trying to make, he has ignored the transitivity of the relationship expressed by the formula "In saying that..., S was v-ing". This formula can be used to report a locutionary act and any illocutionary act performed therein. So if "v_1" and "v_2" are verbs which can be used to express illocutionary acts of different types, and if in saying that..., S was v_1-ing, and in
V-ing S was V-ing, then in saying that... S was V-ing. A speaker performs just as many illocutionary acts in a given speech act situation as the number of procedures, constitutive of such acts, that are executed by the speaker in that situation.

In his criticism of Austin's distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts, Cohen merely repeats, without emendation, some of the points which he tried to make against Austin's distinction between locutionary meaning and illocutionary force in "Do Illocutionary Forces Exist?". These points have been rebutted in the final section of Chapter Two and need not be discussed here. Cohen's criticism of Austin's distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts focuses on the notion of securing uptake. Cohen's point is that Austin tended to blur this distinction - as a distinction between an illocutionary act and some of the effects on the audience produced by the act - by holding that the securing of uptake, i.e., the achieving of a certain effect on the audience, is a necessary condition for the successful performance of an illocutionary act. Cohen is correct in maintaining, contra Austin, that the securing of uptake is not a necessary condition for the successful performance of an illocutionary act. But his criticism that Austin's notion of securing uptake blurs the distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts does not do justice to Austin's discussion of the notions of securing uptake, taking effect, and inviting by convention a response or sequel. By distinguishing these three types of outcome involved in the performance of illocutionary acts, none of which is a perlocutionary type of outcome, Austin clarified the distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts.
Cohen's criticism of Austin's thesis of the essential conventionality of illocutionary acts is vitiated by his misinterpretations of that thesis. Against the interpretation, in terms of conventional procedures, which has been placed on that thesis in this work, Cohen has claimed, in correspondence with the writer, that such an interpretation destroys an essential difference between acts like naming, excommunicating, etc. (which all have to be done in accordance with some special convention) and those like warning, commiserating, etc. (which are often done in unconventional ways); and further, that progress in the study of speech acts will not be made by defending all of Austin's *ipsissima verba*. The writer fails to see what is essential about the difference between the acts which Cohen distinguishes, and believes that some progress in the study of speech acts has been made by defending most of Austin's *ipsissima verba*.

Foot-notes:

1 (from p.272) This distinction between two types of semantic theory is drawn and discussed by Strawson in *Meaning and Truth*.


3 (from p.313) The views that the syntactic correctness of sentences is context-dependent and that it is now a commonplace among generative grammarians that syntactic rules are to some extent dependent on pragmatic considerations, i.e.,
on the context of utterance, are views that have been put forward by Robinson in "Syntax, Meaning and Context: A Reply to Keenan" (P.Q. (1977) pp. 162-4) and in correspondence with the writer. The writer does not share such views; see his "Reply to Robinson" (P.Q. (1977) pp. 164-5).

4 (from p. 315) For a discussion and criticism of Cohen's rather sketchy proposals for how this may be accomplished see Bird's unpublished paper "Do We Need a New Start in Speech Act Theory". The details of Cohen's distinctive feature matrix for the semantic markers of verbs used to express speech acts, which is a part of these proposals, have been discussed above on pp. 193-6.
Appendix

Truth in Words

Austin's performative-constative distinction demarcates two classes of utterances: those that are truth-valued, i.e., constative utterances such as assertions, descriptions, predictions, reports, statements, etc., and those that are not truth-valued, i.e., performative utterances such as bets, commands, greetings, promises, questions, threats, etc. It has been argued by some that Austin was wrong to draw this distinction, because performative utterances are truth-valued; and it has been argued by one, Strawson, that Austin did not draw the distinction between truth-valued and non-truth-valued utterances (or that he did not maintain that distinction) and that he was wrong not to do so. It is to be argued in the course of this Appendix, in defence of Austin, that he did draw and maintain this distinction, and that he was right to do so. In this first section, an attempt will be made to rebut the two main arguments that have been advanced in support of the view that performative utterances are truth-valued. Some intuitions in favour of the performative-constative distinction which, apparently, some do not share, will also be discussed. In the next section, Strawson's misunderstandings of Austin's views on the nature of performative and constative utterances will be exposed. In the final section, a neglected feature of Austin's later views on truth will be discussed in order to show a possible starting point for a theoretical justification of the performative-constative distinction.

One of the issues that will be decided by the outcome of the arguments against this distinction is whether the Descrip-
tive Fallacy still retains its grip in certain quarters, or whether, in maintaining this distinction, Austin was maintaining something that could be called the Descriptive Fallacy Fallacy. For the arguments in support of the view that performative utterances are truth-valued have generally been advanced with respect to explicit performative utterances, i.e., utterances whose main verb is typically in the first person singular present indicative active, and whose main clause is used as a performative prefix to make explicit the type of illocutionary act whose performance the speaker is attempting in issuing the utterance. It was just such performative utterances as these which were claimed by Austin to exemplify a type of sentence-use different from that which had usually been associated with sentences having that form — the use of a sentence to say something true or false — and to provide another reason for believing that the Descriptive Fallacy is a fallacy. The opponents of Austin's performative-constative distinction do well to challenge the distinction at this point. For there is nothing in (the characterization of) the form of explicit performative utterances which serves to distinguish them from some constative utterances; and the case against the distinction is at its most convincing when argued with respect to equiform examples of explicit constative utterances such as "I predict that I shall go" and explicit performative utterances such as "I promise that I shall go". Of course, Austin would not have denied that a sentence of the latter type could be used as a constative utterance: to make an implicit statement of a habit, for instance. But this is not a point which is deployed against his distinction. The case argued for by opponents to his distinction is that the utterance "I promise that I shall go", 
when that sentence is used to make a promise, has a truth-value, just as the utterance "I predict that I shall go", when that sentence is used to make a prediction, has a truth-value.

However, the emphasis upon explicit performative utterances in the arguments against Austin's distinction only throws into sharper relief one of the weaknesses in the general position being advanced by those arguments. For without qualification, the claim that performative utterances are truth-valued entails the claim that implicit performative utterances are truth-valued; and this claim commits the claimant to ascribing truth-values to utterances such as "Leave the room!", "Good morning" and even "Are you going?". The oddity of ascribing truth-values to implicit performative utterances is sometimes admitted; more often, this commitment is simply ignored.

Thus Heal in "Explicit Performative Utterances and Statements" (P.Q. (1974)pp. 106-21) defends the position that explicit orders such as "I order you to leave the room" can be assessed as true or false, but admits that such an assessment of the implicit order "Leave the room!" "...is indeed odd" (p.116). And Quine, in a contribution to "A Symposium on Austin's Method" (Symp, pp. 86-90), does not commit himself on the issue of whether the implicit greeting "Good morning" is truth-valued; but Quine does say that "...'I bid you good morning' is true of us on a given occasion if and only if, on that occasion, I bid you good morning" (p.90). An attempt to avoid the difficulties created by this commitment may be made by restricting the claim that performative utterances are truth-valued to the claim that only explicit performative utterances are truth-valued. But this restricted claim has problems of its own; and not much scrutiny is required to see that any reliance for a basis for that claim
upon the similarity of form of explicit constative and performative utterances is misplaced. For from Quine's "'I bid you good morning' is true...if and only if...I bid you good morning", it is a short step to "'I state that he did not do it' is true if and only if I state that he did not do it". And here, all contact with a rational theory of truth is lost. An Alice-in-Wonderland situation is entered into in which the truth of statements can be impugned by comments ad hominem. "I state that he did not do it." "Well, that's just a statement about you." On this point, Austin's insights seem to have been more clear than Quine's. "If someone says 'I state that he did not do it', we investigate the truth of his statement in just the same way as if he had said 'He did not do it' simpliciter, when we took that to be, as we naturally often should, a statement. That is, to say 'I state that he did not' is to make the very same statement as to say 'He did not': it is not to make a different statement about what 'I' state (except in exceptional cases: the historic and habitual present, etc.). As notoriously, when I say even 'I think he did it' someone is being rude if he says 'That's a statement about you': and this might conceivably be about myself, whereas 'I state that he did it' could not" (Words p.135). The truth conditions of a constative utterance of a particular type are the same irrespective of whether the utterance is issued in implicit or explicit form. So restricting the claim against Austin's distinction to the claim that only explicit performative utterances are truth-valued merely replaces one set of problems with another. For presumably, not even Quine would want to say that "I bid you good morning" is true if and only if (it is a) good morning. And even if an account of the unusual truth conditions alluded to
in "'I bid you good morning' is true if and only if I bid you good morning" could be generalized for all explicit performative utterances, such an account would be so different from an account of the truth conditions of constative utterances that the argument against Austin's performative-constative distinction, based on that account, would be oblique at best. But the attempt to assign truth-values to utterances such as "I bid you good morning" just seems to show a misunderstanding of the role which greetings play in ordinary, everyday discourse.

Another of Quine's remarks, "A performative is a notable sort of utterance, I grant; it makes itself true; but then it is true" (Symp. p. 90), suggests that he thinks that performative utterances are sentences verifiable by their use. Lemmon argued for such a claim in a paper, "On Sentences Verifiable by Their Use" (An. (1962) pp. 86-9), which also contains a useful elucidation of the notion. According to Lemmon, "A sentence S is verifiable by its use if and only if there are circumstances and a manner of delivery such that it is analytic that, for all people x, if in those circumstances x delivers S in the given manner then what x delivers is true" (p. 88). What is peculiar to this sort of sentence is that "...in the appropriate circumstances, the very delivery of them in the right way ensures logically the truth of the propositions they in those circumstances express, without, as is ordinarily required of sentences, reference to circumstances beyond the immediate circumstances of their delivery" (p. 88). The spoken sentences "I am speaking" and "I am thinking" and the written sentence "I am writing" are the examples which Lemmon used in developing his account. Each of these sentences is verifiable by its use because it is analytic that if a person delivers the sentence in
the appropriate way then he is doing what he is saying or writing that he is doing, and so it is analytic that if the person delivers the sentence in that way then the sentence which he delivers is true.

At the beginning of his paper, Lemmon defined a sense of "performative verb" in which any verb "v" is a performative verb if and only if the sentence "For any proposition p, to say in the appropriate circumstances 'I promise that p' is to promise that p" remains true when the first occurrence of "promise" is replaced by the first person singular simple present tense of "v", and the second occurrence of "promise" is replaced by "v"(p.86). Lemmon maintained that sentences of the form "I promise that p" and all sentences of similar form constructed around such performative verbs are verifiable by their use. "Exactly what the circumstances and manner of delivery in question are is hard to specify, but, for example, they do not include the cases in which a man is speaking in isolation or talking in his sleep. That there must be such circumstances and such a manner of delivery follows from the fact that we sometimes succeed in promising merely by using such sentences. Hence, in those circumstances and manner, it is analytic that if x delivers 'I promise that p' then what x delivers is true..."(p.89).

However, Lemmon's argument against Austin's performative-constative distinction, based on this account of sentences that are verifiable by their use, is open to criticism at several points. First, it begs the question. Lemmon's formulation of the definition of sentences that are verifiable by their use stipulates that the sentence, delivered in a certain way, in certain circumstances, etc., is true. This presupposes what the argument against Austin's distinction purports to prove, viz., that the
sentence used, or the utterance, is of a kind which can have truth-values ascribed to it. Secondly, it follows from Lemmon's definition of a performative verb, "v", and his claim that all sentences of the form "I v that p" are verifiable by their use, that explicit constative utterances are verifiable by their use. This consequence is unacceptable. These criticisms may be able to be met fairly easily by reformulating the definition in the first instance, and, in the second instance, by imposing some restriction whereby the class of explicit constative utterances are not verifiable by their use. But meeting these criticisms does not save Lemmon's argument from another, nor is it easy to see how this third criticism could be met.

In extending his account from examples of sentences that undoubtedly are verifiable by their use, e.g., "I am speaking", "I am writing", etc., to explicit performative utterances, Lemmon seems to have failed to notice a difference in the circumstances alluded to in the analytic sentences "To write in the appropriate circumstances 'I am writing' is to write" and "To write in the appropriate circumstances 'I promise that p' is to promise that p". In the former case, as for sentences verifiable by their use generally, these circumstances are just the immediate circumstances of the delivery of the sentence in a certain manner. It is precisely, and only, because no circumstances other than these need be in order for a person to succeed in doing what he should be said to be doing, in so delivering the sentence, that these sentences, when of a kind that are true or false, are verifiable by their use. The situation is different in the case of performative utterances such as "I promise that p". In this case, the immediate circumstances of
the delivery of the sentence are never sufficient for the successful performance of the act which the person should be said to be doing in delivering the sentence. For instance, one circumstance, which is required for a successful act of promising is that the speaker can perform the promised act. But this state of affairs is no more an immediate circumstance of the delivery of the sentence than it would be of the delivery of a sentence which is used to state that the speaker can perform a certain act. (It should not be thought that just as the obtaining of such a state of affairs satisfies a truth condition of such a statement, the obtaining of such a state of affairs satisfies a truth condition of the promise. The relationships of such states of affairs to the respective utterances are different: in the former case, the state of affairs is stated; in the latter case, it is presupposed.) So sentences used as explicit performative utterances, even if they were of a kind which could have truth-values ascribed to them, are not verifiable by their use. Perhaps this point can be brought out more clearly by recasting the two analytic sentences above as "Just to write 'I am writing' is to write" and "Just to write 'I promise that p' is to promise that p". The first is analytic; the second is false.¹

Promises made in circumstances in which the promisors do not intend to carry out their promises are sometimes described as false promises. But this point cannot be used to show that promises made without this defect are true, and hence, that promises are truth-valued. "False" is not always used as an opposite of "true", as the descriptions of false beards and false teeth show. Here, "false" is used as an opposite of "real", or, more specifically, "natural". And in the case of promises,
"false" is used as an opposite of "sincere"; a false promise is an insincere promise. (A false statement is not necessarily an insincere statement.) It would be wrong to suppose that in making a sincere promise, a promisor is constating, i.e., describing, reporting, stating, etc., his intention to perform the promised act, and that his having of such an intention satisfies a truth condition of his utterance. Describing, reporting or stating an intention is not part of the execution of the procedure of promising. It is, in any case, difficult to see what a description of an intention would be like. One can describe an intended act, just as one can describe a promised act—but that is a different matter. And there are different procedures at a speaker's disposal for reporting or stating intentions. These may be executed explicitly, in saying "I report that I intend to go" or "I state that I intend to go", or implicitly in saying just "I intend to go". Between each of these and "I promise to go" a considerable gulf is fixed. There is nothing analogous to either of the first two in the case of promising: "I promise that I intend to go" is sol-ecistic. "I intend to go" and "I promise to go" are often only contrasted on the grounds that the latter makes explicit a stronger commitment to perform the respective act. But there is a more instructive difference than this one. "I intend to go" can be compared with "I hope to go", "I want to go" and "I expect to go". Utterances of these types are expressions of mental states and are true or false according as their utterers have, or are in, the state in question. But whereas these utterances can be characterized as expressions of intention, hope, desire, and expectation, respectively, "I promise to go" cannot be characterized as an expression of promising. A promise is
not a mental state, so "I promise to go" is not true or false, as "I intend to go" is, by virtue of it being a report, statement, etc. of such a state.

In "Some Types of Performative Utterance" (Essays pp. 69-89) Warnock takes both the points that performative utterances are not verifiable by their use, and that an utterance such as "I promise to go" is not truth-valued by virtue of its use on occasion to make a false promise, but maintains, nevertheless, that explicit performative utterances are truth-valued. "...one can well hold, I think, that one can say / truly or _ falsely that one promises (and likewise mutatis mutandis for other explicit performatives). For promising is, as we earlier platitudeously remarked, not just saying that one does so, just producing that dictum. For it to be the case that one promises, there must (very roughly) be some envisaged commitment, asked for by, or offered to, some second party, which in one's utterance one formally undertakes. If I say here and now 'I promise', out of the blue, I have not - other necessary circumstances being absent in this case - therein promised; so that in such a case, maybe, I say that I promise, but falsely - I do not. (Of course I don't make a false promise - that's a different matter.)" (pp. 84-5). Warnock does not specify the truth conditions for a promisor's utterance "I promise"; the closest he comes to doing so is to say that "...the truth-value of what he says is involved (let us say vaguely) in a decidedly unusual way with the fact that he says it" (p.85). But from other remarks, it is reasonably clear what Warnock takes such conditions to be. For example, "On any view, I do not promise in saying 'I promise' if the circumstances in which I speak are wrong for the purpose; so that, on my view, it seems it can be quite well held that, in unhappy
circumstances, one may say that one promises falsely, when actually one does not" (p. 85). On Warnock's view then, "I promise" is true if and only if I promise, i.e., if and only if all the circumstances of the speech act situation in which "I promise" is uttered are such that the speaker's attempted act of promising is successful. Warnock thus regards the felicity conditions for the successful performance of an illocutionary act as the truth conditions of the utterance in the issuing of which that act is attempted. But this is confused. If the felicity conditions for the successful performance of an illocutionary act are satisfied, then it is a fact that the speaker has performed that act. But it is not such facts as these that determine the truth-values of constative utterances. A sentence used to make a statement, if true, is not true because the speaker succeeds in making a statement in uttering the sentence. Warnock would probably admit this, but claim that in the case of explicit performative utterances, it just is such facts as these which determine the truth-value of what the speaker utters, albeit in a decidedly unusual way. But it is even more unusual to say that these utterances do have truth-values. So much is apparent in Warnock's own example of a speaker saying "I promise" out of the blue. In this case, other necessary circumstances being absent, the speaker does not promise, and so, according to Warnock, what the speaker says is false. But "That's false" or "That's not true" would be an odd retort to make to someone who did say, just out of the blue, "I promise". A more natural reaction would be one of puzzlement at what the speaker could have meant, whether he actually intended to say that he promises, and if so, why and what he was promising. Nor would these retorts be in order in
less infelicitous circumstances in which it was clear that the speaker intended to promise, and it was clear what he was promising, but for some reason, his promise was defective - for instance, because others knew, but the promisor did not, that the promise could not be carried out. Here, rather than saying, "That's false" or "That's not true" to the promisor, it would be more natural to say something like "You can't promise that because you can't do that". And in circumstances in which a fully felicitous promise had just been given, it would, at best, be something of a mild witticism to rejoin, "That's true! You do" or "That's true! You just have".

The argument in defence of Austin's distinction, from the inappropriateness of assessments of explicit performative utterances as true or false, has been criticized by Heal (P.Q.(1974) pp.115-6). But Heal's attempt to dismantle this argument is unsuccessful. She compares the remark "Very true - you order me to leave the room", made in response to the order "I order you to leave the room", with the remark "You have just uttered fourteen words", made in response to the plea "For God's sake help me - a homicidal maniac is chasing me with a gun". Heal argues that the bizarre nature of these remarks can be explained by facts about conversational implication, and that the deliberate irrelevance of a remark is no proof that the remark is false or embodies a category mistake. There may well be deliberately irrelevant remarks made which both are true and embody no category mistakes. Heal's second example provides a case in point. But what Heal needs to show in order to rebut the argument in favour of Austin's distinction, and what she fails to show, is that it is ever relevant or appropriate to assess an explicit performative utterance such as "I order you to leave the room"
as true or false. However, it seems that Heal has withdrawn from the position which she maintained in "Explicit Performative Utterances and Statements". For in a more recent article, "Insincerity and Commands" (P.A.S. (1977) pp. 183-201), Heal takes lying, i.e., asserting that so-and-so when one does not believe that so-and-so, to be paradigmatic of insincerity, but argues that there is no strict analogue of this form of insincerity in commanding. This position is inconsistent with her earlier position that all explicit performative utterances, including commands and orders, are statements.

Strawson stands out among those who have argued against Austin's performative-constative distinction as one who holds that the distinction between truth-valued and non-truth-valued utterances should be drawn, and criticizes Austin for not maintaining such a distinction. These criticisms are made in the final section of his paper "Austin and 'Locutionary Meaning'" (Essays pp. 46-68). In the two preceding sections of that paper Strawson seeks to locate some notion of a proposition within Austin's conception of speech acts in order to provide an interpretation of Austin's notion of locutionary meaning; the need for which is regarded by Strawson as symptomatic of an ambivalence in Austin's attitude towards any conception of a primary and fundamental bearer of truth-value. Strawson's criticisms of Austin's views on truth in Words are designed to show that reasons which Strawson thinks Austin had for reserve, and even scepticism, about a conception of a primary and fundamental bearer of truth-value are not good reasons.

The first of these criticisms rests on a change in Austin's views between the 1950 paper "Truth" (Papers pp. 117-33) and Words.
In the former, Austin was content to regard "statement" as the "...generic name for that which at bottom we are always saying 'is true'" (p. 118). In the latter, a statement is held to "... have no unique position over the matter of being related to facts in a unique way called being true or false..." (Words p. 149). Thus far, and in these respects, Strawson is in accord with Austin. In his reply to Austin in 1950, Strawson disclaimed any objection to Austin's use of "statement" in the way proposed (P.A.S.S. (1950) p. 189). And in the paper under discussion, Strawson agrees with Austin that there are many cases in which what is uttered has truth-value, but to which the noun "statement" cannot be naturally applied. (Essays pp. 62-3). Strawson goes on from this point to argue in support of his use of "the artificial term 'proposition'" (p. 63) to stand for what primarily and fundamentally is either true or false, this term having, or being given, the desired general coverage of cases, in which what is uttered has truth-value, that any term in common usage, e.g., "assertion", "statement", etc., seems to lack. But at the same time, Strawson construes Austin's reservations about statements being the primary and fundamental bearers of truth-value as reservations about whether there are any such bearers of truth-value at all. And this, surely, is a mistake. Throughout the William James Lectures, and in his two subsequent published lectures on speech acts, Austin never abandoned the view that what are true or false are constative utterances: the bearers of truth-value are token utterances, issued in particular speech act situations as accusations, assertions, claims, conclusions, descriptions, estimates, forecasts, objections, predictions, reports, statements, etc. And it was precisely as a general term to cover this range of utterances having truth-
value that Austin introduced the term "constative". Between 1950 and 1955 there was a change in Austin's views on the bearers of truth-value; but it was a change to a more catholic position, not a sceptical one.

Another way in which Austin's more catholic views on truth are shown is the target for Strawson's second criticism. Against the view that the question "Is it true or false?", asked about any constative utterance, admitted of a simple answer, "True" or "False", Austin maintained that it allows for, and, indeed, often requires a more or less qualified answer. This kind of qualification in the assessment of the truth-values of constative utterances can be seen in the various terms of appraisal used in making such assessments, e.g., a rough description, an exaggerated claim, an approximate estimate, a fair statement. Each of these indicates that in some way the utterance is not completely true, nor yet completely false. The expressions "not absolutely", "not exactly", "not strictly", "not altogether", "only roughly", "only more or less", when held ready to qualify the adjective "true", have the same use. Austin's point here is consistent with his view that the bearers of truth-values are token utterances. Being issued in particular situations and normally being directed towards specific audiences, utterances have a greater or less degree of detail, precision and conciseness which reflects the intentions and purposes of the speakers in the situations in which they are issued. Thus of two utterances of the same type issued in different situations, while one may be quite adequate in the circumstances and be judged true without qualification, the other may not be adequate, and may only be able to be assessed as true in some qualified way. In the former case, however, it is only in the
light of full knowledge of the situation that an unqualified assessment can be made; without such knowledge, the need for qualification on an assessment of the constative utterance's truth-value arises here too. In Austin's words, "...'true' and 'false', like 'free' and 'unfree', do not stand for anything simple at all; but only for a general dimension of being a right or proper thing to say as opposed to a wrong thing, in these circumstances, to this audience, for these purposes and with these intentions" (Words p.145). They are "...not names for relations, qualities, or what not, but for a dimension of assessment - how the words stand in respect of satisfactoriness to the facts, events, situations, etc., to which they refer" (p.148).

Now, again, Strawson agrees with most of what Austin had to say on this point. For instance, he allows that constative utterances "...may be adequate for some purposes and not for others, suitable to some contexts and not to others" (Essays p.63); and he allows that assessments of truth-values "...are liable to qualifications of degree, of more or less" (p.66). But Strawson takes this point to be a denial by Austin that the words "true" or "false" can ever be used in giving a qualified assessment of the truth-value of an utterance. He claims that Austin's "...tolerance wavers when the words 'true' and 'false' come into play" (p.64) and puts the rhetorical question: "Is it Austin's point that the words 'true' and 'false' are never in place in such cases?" (p.64). But again, this is a mistake. Towards the end of his lecture "Performative-Constative" (P.L. pp.13-32), Austin addressed himself to the same point with reference to the same examples of constative utterances which he had used in Words: "France is hexagonal", "Lord Raglan won the
battle of Alma", together with the additional one, "Oxford is sixty miles from London". Discussing each in turn, starting with "France is hexagonal" Austin said, "What are we to say, is it true or not? The question, plainly, oversimplifies things. Oh well, up to a point if you like, I see what you mean, true perhaps for some purposes in some contexts, that would do for the man in the street but not for geographers. And so on. It's a rough statement, no denying that, but one can't just say straight out that it's false. Then Alma, a soldier's battle if ever there was one; it's true that Lord Raglan was in command of the allied army, and that this army to some extent won a confused sort of victory; yes, that would be a fair judgement, even well deserved, for schoolchildren anyway, though really it's a bit of an exaggeration. And Oxford, well yes, it's true that that city is 60 miles from London, so long as you want only a certain degree of precision"(p.21). Austin's use of "true" and "false" in the assessments of the truth-values of these examples of constative utterances makes it clear that Strawson has misconstrued Austin's point. Strawson says, "Austin successfully makes us aware of the hesitation we feel when confronted with the hold-up question 'Is it true or false that France is hexagonal?' But it is not so much the presence of the words 'true' and 'false' as the absence of qualification or context that accounts for the hesitation"(Essays p.64). But in saying this, Strawson does not make a point against Austin; he simply restates Austin's point. Austin's terminology of "a dimension of assessment" in talking of utterances' truth valuation is useful for registering the point that such assessments are open to qualifications of degree. But it is a misunderstanding on Strawson's part of Austin's handling of this terminology that
lies at the bottom of his third criticism.

There are numerous different points of view from which an utterance can be assessed as being in some way more or less right or wrong, satisfactory or unsatisfactory, in the situation in which it is issued. The criticism of a remark that it is ambiguous is different in kind from the criticism that it is impolite, and each is different in kind from the criticism that the remark is irrelevant. A criticism of the first kind alludes to the meaning of what was said, the second to the conventions of social etiquette adopted by the speaker, and the third to the point or bearing of the remark in the context in which it is made. A fourth kind of criticism or assessment of utterances, and one with which Austin was much concerned, is that which can be made in terms of an utterance's "happiness", according as the Felicity conditions for the performance of the illocutionary act attempted or performed in issuing the utterance are satisfied or not. And alongside these several general dimensions of assessment there is the one, for constative utterances, in terms of which the truth-value of the utterance can be assessed. Now it is clear that in the William James Lectures Austin was still wishing to maintain some version of a correspondence theory of truth: "...the question arises, was what I stated true or false? And this we feel, speaking in popular terms, is now the question of whether the statement 'corresponds with the facts'. With this I agree: attempts to say that the use of the expression 'is true' is equivalent to endorsing or the like are no good. So we have here a new dimension of criticism of the accomplished statement" (Words p.140); and one, it may be added, that is made on the basis of the degree to which the utterance corresponds to a fact. But it was one of Austin's points in
this connexion, the one which attracts Strawson's third criticism, that while the dimension in which an utterance is assessed as just or more or less true or false lies within a range of dimensions in which utterances can be assessed on this basis—"how the words stand in respect of satisfactoriness to the facts, events, situations, etc., to which they refer"—it does not exhaust it. The specific dimension in which utterances are assessed for truth-value is only one among a number of different dimensions in which utterances, including performative utterances of some types, are assessed on the basis of their correspondence to facts. If in the first two points on which Strawson takes issue with Austin there are moves by Austin towards a more catholic view of truth, there can be seen in this last point a move by Austin to refine upon the catholicity of the notion of an utterance's correspondence to fact in order to underpin a viable theory of truth.

The types of utterance and types of assessment of utterances which Austin had in mind here are indicated in the following questions: "Can we be sure that stating truly is a different class of assessment from arguing soundly, advising well, judging fairly, and blaming justifiably? Do these not have something to do in complicated ways with facts?" (p.142). The parallels between these types of utterance assessment have been discussed already (see pp.48-9 above). There is, however, a broad distinction to be drawn between this group of types of utterance assessment and another group of types of assessment which involve a relationship of correspondence between utterance and fact. There is some overlap among the types of utterance with respect to which the types of assessment belonging to each group are applicable, but characteristically, the types of
assessment belonging to this second group are made with respect to orders and commands in terms of their being obeyed or disobeyed, with respect to demands in terms of their being met or not met, with respect to pleas in terms of their being granted or not, and with respect to instructions, directions, and pieces of advice in terms of their being followed or not. These assessments are subject to qualifications of degree as well. Now, if the conditions to be satisfied for positive assessment in any of these dimensions are regarded as the compliance conditions of the respective utterance, the generic difference between the types of assessment belonging to each group can be seen in the different relationships of correspondence between utterance and fact which obtain when, say, the truth conditions of constative utterances are satisfied, and when the compliance conditions of utterances are satisfied. The difference is in the direction of correspondence between utterance and fact. In the former case, the satisfaction of the truth conditions of an utterance is a matter of the utterance's correspondence to a fact; in the latter case, the satisfaction of compliance conditions is a matter of a fact's correspondence to an utterance. It follows that assessments made on the basis of compliance conditions are not assessments of utterances. Unlike the assessments of constative utterances as being just or more or less true or false, the more or less qualified assessments made in the specific dimensions of compliance conditions of utterances are assessments of the responses of the addressees of the utterances to those utterances. A failure of correspondence between utterance and fact in one of these dimensions is a basis for imputing a fault to the performance of the agent responding to the utterance, not to the utterance itself. As An-
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Scombe has remarked in this connexion, "In some cases the facts are, so to speak, impugned for not being in accordance with the words, rather than vice versa" (Intention §2). In the case of a request, for instance, it is not, without further explanation, a basis for assessment of the utterance that a person, in attempting to comply with the request to turn up the sound volume of a TV broadcast, exerts too much pressure on the sound control knob and turns the set off. Similarly, it is not a basis for an assessment of the order to turn left, that the addressee mistakes his right hand for his left and turns right, thereby failing to obey the order. The difference between the types of assessment belonging to each group can be illustrated most clearly with reference to pieces of advice. These are utterances to which types of assessment belonging to each group are applicable. But an assessment of the extent to which advice is good or bad, and an assessment of the extent to which advice is followed or not followed, are quite independent of each other.

Orders, commands and requests are unlike pieces of advice in so far as utterances of these types are not assessed on the basis of their correspondence to facts. However, utterances of these types are subject to some assessment on the basis of their relationships to some of the facts bearing on the speech act situation. For example, when a request or order is issued, one of the facts bearing on the situation is that of the capacity (or lack of it) of the addressee to comply with the request or order. On the basis of the relationship between the utterance and this fact, the utterance can be assessed in terms of being more or less reasonable or unreasonable. Again, the strategic facts of the situation in which a speaker is acting bear
on any command or order he issues, and on this basis, the utterance can be assessed in terms of being more or less sound or unsound, according as compliance with the utterance is likely to bring about the speaker's strategic objective. But it is clear that the relationships between utterance and fact required to hold for a positive assessment of the utterance in either of these dimensions is not one of correspondence of utterance to fact. An answer to the question of whether the state of affairs characterized by the utterance actually obtains, either at the time of the issuance of the utterance or at some future time, does not determine the assessment of these utterances in either of these dimensions.

In the course of his third criticism of Austin, Strawson makes a point which distinguishes, in a different way, the type of assessment made of constative utterances in terms of their truth-value from those made of performative utterances such as orders, commands and requests in terms of their reasonableness or soundness. In the former case, according to Strawson, a specification of the locutionary meaning of the utterance is also a specification of the conditions to be satisfied for a positive assessment of the utterance, i.e., as being more or less true. In the latter case, to specify the locutionary meaning of the utterance is not to specify conditions for a positive assessment of the utterance in either of the respective dimensions. A specification of the locutionary meaning - the content of the "that"-clause in an indirect speech report of the utterance - of the order that B company is to attack and destroy the bridge south of the city before dawn, is not a specification of the conditions to be satisfied for a positive assessment of the reasonableness or soundness of the order; it is simply a speci-
fication of who, according to the utterance, is to do what, when and where. Doubts may be felt about the first part of Strawson's point, about whether a specification of the locutionary meaning of a constative utterance is a specification of the sufficient conditions for its truth, but this point will be recurred to.

Strawson's third criticism is that Austin proposed assimilating the types of assessment made of requests as more or less reasonable or unreasonable, of orders as more or less sound or unsound, and of advice as more or less good or bad - what Strawson calls the warrantability-valuation of such utterances - to the type of assessment which is made of the truth-values of constative utterances. "What Austin proposes is that we regard warrantability-valuation and truth-valuation as belonging to a single dimension of assessment - for which he appropriates the name, 'the truth-and-falsity dimension'" (Essays p.67). "When he says that 'true' and 'false' are the names of a general dimension of assessment, he means to include both the above kinds of assessment in this general dimension. He wants us to join him in refusing to draw any sharp line between saying that an announcement, accusation, or surmise was true, and saying that a request, a piece of advice, or a command was warranted or justified by the facts of the case" (p.66). This criticism misrepresents Austin's position in two ways.

First, Austin did not use examples of utterances such as orders, commands and requests to make his point that some types of non-constative, performative utterances are subject to certain types of assessment on the same basis - that of their correspondence to facts - as constative utterances are assessed on, in terms of truth and falsity. Austin's examples, quoted earlier,
were of pieces of advice being assessed as good or bad, judgments as fair or unfair, blame as merited or unmerited. So it is misleading for Strawson to hold out the examples of orders, commands and requests as if they had been used by Austin to illustrate this point. And as the foregoing discussion has shown, the assessments of utterances of these types in terms of their reasonableness or soundness are not made on the basis of their correspondence to facts. Ironically, there is in this criticism just that sort of confusion of which Strawson wrongly accuses Austin in Strawson's own assimilation of these types of assessment of orders, commands and requests, and the assessment of advice as being good or bad, under the general title of an utterance's "warrantability-valuation". Moreover, the closer affinity of this type of assessment of advice with the truth-valuation of constative utterances is one to which attention may be drawn by Strawson's own point about a specification of the locutionary meaning of an utterance being a specification of the conditions to be satisfied for a positive assessment of the utterance in the respective dimension. To the extent that a specification of the locutionary meaning of the statement that he did it is a specification of the truth conditions of the statement, the specification of the locutionary meaning of the piece of advice that she should not do it is a specification of the conditions to be satisfied for that advice to be good advice.

Strawson's criticism misrepresents Austin's position too because it implies that Austin misappropriated the words "true" and "false" as terms for both of what Strawson calls utterances' truth-valuation and warrantability-valuation. Strawson does not offer any textual support for this point; and, indeed, there is none to offer. But even if the notion of warrantability-valu-
tion is discarded for being confused, and un-Austinian, and Strawson's claim is limited to the claim that Austin appropriated "true" and "false" to do general duty for the assessments made of utterances on the basis of their correspondence to facts - a point at which Strawson's criticism might conceivably get some grip - this revised claim must also be rejected as false. Turning again to Austin's remarks at the end of "Performative-Constative" : "If we are content to restrict ourselves to statements of an idiotic or ideal simplicity, we shall never succeed in disentangling the true from the just, fair, deserved,... etc...."(P.L.p.22). The desire which so clearly lies behind this remark, to disentangle these terms of assessment is quite contrary to the point of the revised claim put forward on Strawson's behalf, and even further removed from the proposed assimilation that Strawson himself alleges.

As well as being mistaken in various ways, Strawson's criticisms of Austin's views on the truth and falsity of constative utterances are peculiarly obfuscating. Being made in defence of his imposition of the notion of a proposition upon Austin's conception of speech acts, Strawson's criticisms obscure the main point of Austin's discussion of truth in *Words*. This point is important, not only because truth is important, as Austin remarked elsewhere, but also because it suggests that a developed conception of speech acts may yield some insights into certain features of the general problem of truth. With the emphasis in the discussion of Austin's views on truth falling heavily on the 1950 debate with Strawson, and its sequels, this point, along with other changes and developments in Austin's views after 1954, has been rather neglected. In
Austin's words the point is that "the truth or falsity of a statement depends not merely on the meanings of the words but on what act you were performing in what circumstances" (Words, p.145). Perhaps it can be made even more clear if it is rephrased slightly: the truth or falsity of an utterance depends not only on the locutionary meaning of the utterance, but also on the type of illocutionary act performed in the circumstances in which the utterance is issued. The point can be illustrated by cases of illocutionary acts of different types being performed in different tokens - or even the same token - of a type of locutionary act. In saying that he will do it, a speaker may be performing an illocutionary act of at least one of the four following types: stating an intention he has to do something, prophesying that he will do it, betting that he will do it, and threatening to do it. It is only in the first two of these cases, however, in which the utterance is issued as a statement or a prophecy, that it is a truth-valued, constative utterance. In neither of the latter two cases is the utterance a constative utterance for neither bets nor threats are assessed in terms of truth and falsity. Moreover, between the first two cases, there is a difference in the truth conditions of the utterance which is also dependent on the type of illocutionary act performed in issuing the utterance. A true statement of intention is true because of some state of affairs obtaining prior to or contemporaneously with the making of the statement - in this case, the fact that the speaker has the stated intention. A true prophecy, on the other hand, is true because of some state of affairs obtaining subsequently to the making of the prophecy - in this case, the fact that the speaker performs the prophesied act. So not only
is the constative status of an utterance dependent on the type of illocutionary act performed in issuing it, but different types of truth conditions of constative utterances of different types are similarly dependent. (This example, in which identical locutionary acts may be performed, producing utterances with identical locutionary meanings but with different truth conditions, provides grounds for the doubt about Strawson's point that a specification of the locutionary meaning of a (constative) utterance is also a specification of the truth conditions of the utterance.) With this point, Austin seems to have been suggesting the need for a two-level theory of truth, operating on one level - the locutionary level - to explain how a meaningful utterance characterizes a possible state of affairs by virtue of its constituent words and phrases being used with more or less definite sense and reference, and on a different level - the illocutionary level - to explain how the particular type of constative-determining illocutionary act performed in issuing the utterance determines its truth conditions.

A desirable preliminary to an explanation of the second sort would seem to be the identification of a feature common to constative-determining illocutionary act types which is not shared by other illocutionary act types. Such a feature appears to be the presupposition of the conventional procedures constitutive of some types of illocutionary act concerning the speaker's belief about the actuality of the state of affairs characterized by the utterance in the issuing of which the illocutionary act is performed. This presupposition is selective with respect to constative-determining illocutionary act types. For instance, it is a necessary condition on the circumstances in
which felicitous acts of stating and prophesying are performed that the speaker believes, respectively, that what is stated or prophesied is or will be an actual state of affairs, that it is or will be the case. But it is not a necessary condition for a felicitous act of betting, though, of course, it may be the case on the occasion of such an act, that the speaker believes that what he bets on will be the case. A person may, rationally and felicitously, bet on something happening which he does not necessarily believe will happen, just because the odds offered are so favourable. And it is not a necessary condition for a felicitous act of threatening, though, again, it may be case on the occasion of such an act, that the speaker believes that he will perform the act characterized by the utterance in the issuing of which the threat is made. The psychological state involved here is one of intention, not belief. It is a presupposition of the procedure of threatening that the speaker intends to perform the threatened act (if and only if, of course, the addressee is not dissuaded by the threat) but it is not a presupposition of that procedure that the speaker believes that he will perform the threatened act (if and only if the addressee is not dissuaded). Nor is the holding of such a belief required by the having of such an intention. "A intends to v" does not entail "A believes that he will v". A may intend to v without believing that he will v because he may not believe that it is possible for him to v. (Thus a person under torture may intend to hold out to the end against his tormentors, without believing that he will hold out to the end, because he may not believe that he will be able to.) There is no incoherence in such thoughts. It would be incoherent if A believes that he will v when he does not believe that it is pos-
sible for him to v. And it may be incoherent if A intends to v when he believes that it is impossible for him to v, but if this is so, it just shows that there is a difference between "A does not believe that it is possible for him to v" and "A believes that it is impossible for him to v".

Similar considerations apply, mutatis mutandis, in the case of promising. It is a presupposition of that procedure that the speaker intends to perform the future act characterized by the utterance in the issuing of which the procedure is executed. But it is not a presupposition of that procedure that the speaker believes that he will perform that act; merely, that he believes that his performance of that act is possible.

Court verdicts, ascriptions of blame, and pieces of advice are non-constative, performative utterances, even though such utterances are assessable in certain dimensions on the basis of their correspondence to facts. But it is not a presupposition of any of the procedures constitutive of the respective illocutionary forces of these utterances that the speaker believes that the past, present or future possible state of affairs characterized by his utterances was, is or will be an actual state of affairs. For instance, it is not a necessary condition for a felicitous act of advising that the speaker believes that his advice will be followed, and hence, that the future act characterized by his utterance will be performed. A speaker may advise sincerely while despairing of his advice being followed. What is a necessary condition for a felicitous act of advising is the speaker's belief that the performance of the advised act is in the best interests of the addressee. And it is by virtue of this belief being a presupposition of the procedure that utterances issued in the execution of the procedure
are assessable as good or bad pieces of advice. In *Words*, warnings hovered uneasily on the borderline between performative and constative utterances (see *Words* pp. 55, 145). A consequence of the view that the presupposition of the speaker's belief in the actuality of the state of affairs characterized by his utterance is selective with respect to the procedures constitutive of constative-determining illocutionary acts is that warnings are constative utterances. One possible merit of this view is that it provides part of the basis for a theoretical, as opposed to an intuitive, justification of Austin's performative-constative distinction between utterances which are truth-valued and those which are not.

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Foot-notes:

1 (from p. 328) In "Performatives and Sentences Verifiable by their Use" (*Synthese* 1967, pp.), O'Hair has shown some of the difficulties confronting the attempt to extend the class of sentences verifiable by their use beyond the class of sentences used to make immediate autobiographical reports such as "I am talking", "I am writing"; etc. These difficulties suggest that the class of sentences verifiable by their use may be relatively small, and, being restricted to such cases, that they are ultimately of no great interest. The difficulties confronting the attempt to extend the account of such sentences to explicit performative utterances have just been ignored by Aqvist in *Performatives and Verifiability by the Use of Language*. Aqvist claims "...that Austin managed effectively to deadlock the discussion of the nature of performativeness for years by the unhappy requirement that performative sentences and utterances be essentially truthvalueless" (p. 2). Aqvist fulsomely praises a paper by Hedenius which "...defines and defends the position of the pro-truthvalue camp very clearly and cleverly, and, in our opinion, remains the most remarkable contribution to the solution of our key problem that exists up to this date" (p. 2). But Aqvist makes no mention of, and pro-
ceeds regardless of, the objections to Hedenius' position in that paper "Performatives" (*Theoria* (1965) pp.115-36), which have been made by Hartnack in "The Performatory Use of Sentences" (*Theoria* (1965) pp.137-46).

2 (from p.333) Austin's performative-constative distinction, and in particular, his claim that performative utterances are not truth-valued, has been criticized by others, e.g., Davidson in "On Saying That" (*Words and Objections* pp.158-74), Lewis in "General Semantics" (*S.N.L.* pp.169-218) and Wiggins in "On sentence-sense, word-sense and difference of word-sense" (*Semantics* pp.14-34). Where arguments are to be discerned in these criticisms, there are no points advanced against Austin's distinction which are not advanced in either Lemmon's or Warnock's argument.
"...what has the fly missed, that has never got into the bottle and therefore never looked for or found the way out of it?"
- Ryle in *Plato's Progress* with allusions to Wittgenstein

"My dear Kepler, what should we make of this? Should we laugh, or should we cry?"
- attributed to Galileo
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