


**CHRISTIAN AND MARXIAN CONCEPTIONS OF
HISTORY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY :
AN EVALUATION OF CERTAIN TWENTIETH
CENTURY INTERPRETATIONS OF THE MARXIAN
CONCEPTION OF HISTORY**

Walter W. Anderson

A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD
at the
University of St Andrews



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INTERPRETATIONS OF THE MARXIAN CONCEPTION OF HISTORY

A Thesis by

Walter W. Anderson, Jr.

Presented to

The University of St. Andrews

In Application for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy



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C E R T I F I C A T E

I certify that Walter Wallace Anderson has spent nine terms in Research Work in Divinity, that he has fulfilled the conditions of Ordinance No. 16 (St. Andrews) and that he is qualified to submit the accompanying Thesis in application for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Supervisor

St. Mary's College,
The University of St. Andrews.

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that the following Thesis is based on the results of research carried out by me, that the Thesis is my own composition, and that it has not previously been presented for a Higher Degree.

The research was carried out in St. Mary's College, The University of St. Andrews.

Walter Wallace Anderson, Jr.

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P R E F A C E

The original title of this thesis was "Christian and Marxian Conceptions of History in the Twentieth Century". This offered several alternatives. First, one could arbitrarily select the work of certain twentieth century theologians as representative of Christianity, to be compared with Marxian thought -- but which theologians? Second, one could accept the premise of a parallel between the two systems and accept, almost arbitrarily, certain interpretations of Soviet developments in historical theory, and proceed on these bases to compare and contrast classical Christianity and Soviet Marxism - but with what degree of validity? An interpretation of Soviet developments requires a specialist's knowledge of the language, politics, philosophy, and history of twentieth century Russia, and even the specialists do not agree.¹ Third, one could evaluate the premise of many twentieth century theologians, that there is a parallel between Marxian and Christian conceptions of

1. See J. & M. Miller, "A New Stage in the English Study of Marxism" Soviet Studies 7, 276-277 where they claim an "oral tradition" in Soviet Marxism. See also Herbert Marcuse, Soviet Marxism, in which he revises many prevailing interpretations, especially 137ff.

history and thus lay a more certain foundation for any further studies. Preliminary studies revealed a problem within this third alternative and this has been pursued. By examining the so-called "fall" in Marxian doctrine and comparing it with the Fall in classic Christianity, (not only in a superficial and formal sense, but in the sense of the place of the event in each system) it is intended to contribute to a more precise definition of the relation between Christian and Marxian conceptions of history.

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This field of study has been well worked over and at first glance appears fruitless. However, it demands re-appraisal because (1) it has seldom if ever had the prevailing pre-suppositions examined, and (2) it is in an area of work which now imposes an additional task upon Christian Apologetics.

(1) The survey in Chapter I will reveal that the assumption of a parallelism of doctrines in Marxism and Christianity is invoked more to explain certain facts than because of facts. The religious traits of Marxism and the desire to speak a prophetic message to the Church - to impress upon it its responsibility for social issues and its past failures - both of these lead theologians to view Marxism as a Christian heresy or a secularized version of it, caused by Christianity's failure in the social sphere. Enemies of both religion and Communism

stigmatise them by asserting their kinship. All start from the assumption of a kinship but few try to define it or show its historical origins. By questioning this assumption and defining it more precisely, new light is thrown upon this well-ploughed field: by taking account of a neglected "corner", the angle of vision of the whole field is affected and a new view is needed to be adequate to all the facts.

(2) There is now a new task for Christian Apologetics which goes beyond the traditional handling of purely academic problems for trained minds acquainted with the subject matter handled. This task is that of safe-guarding the accuracy and clarity of the popular understanding of the issues between Christianity and the secular world. It is imposed by the fact of mass communication media that reach the whole of the population (books, magazines, radio, television), compulsory education, and democratic institutions. Apologetics must examine and revise the exposition of issues which are either used or apt to be used by the writers for the popular press and radio and television. Formulations of these issues must be such as to enable the untrained mind to grasp the truth of the matter; it must avoid analogies and generalizations which may suggest faulty views. Apologetics must demand clear and unambiguous statements of the truth. This is not only the case with the non-specialist mind but also with the increasingly specialised mind demanded of many professional people; they do not have the opportunity for the broad and flexible education of former generations. In the field of this thesis, touching as it

does such living issues, it is doubly imperative that Christian Apologetics demand a presentation of the issues which will adequately portray the truth for all readers.

iii

Several explanatory remarks are in order regarding the intent and scope of the thesis. The primary intent of the study is to contribute to a factual and precise definition of the relationship between the systems of Christianity and Marxism. The scope of this study is the historical or genetic relationship and the structural and functional similarities of the respective doctrines of the Fall and so-called "fall". There are many other areas, and in fact, other aspects of the area studied here, which need investigation. There is especially a need for an examination of the daily propaganda of the Communist Party as it appeals to people, of the responses of people to these appeals and the "confessions" of converts to Communism, to determine whether there is any evidence of the motif of "paradise lost - paradise regained" on this popular level of thought. Only then could this question be considered adequately covered. In addition, on the broader question, there is a need for a critical study of similarities between the psychology of Communist life, institutions, ideological developments and problems, and their counterparts in Christianity. This study, however, is limited to the historical, and to the structural and functional relationship of the doctrines of the Fall and so-called "fall" in Marxism.

Reference is made in Chapter I to the varied uses made of the religious interpretation of Marxism. Since the writing of that chapter incidents continue to occur in which well-informed men and women of firm Christian convictions assert naively that there is a close similarity between the Christian and Communist systems and ideals. It is as Professor E.P. Dickie has written of the easy comparisons of the communism of the early church and modern communism: "So many people say, lightly and unthinkingly, 'After all I suppose that the first Christian Church practised communism.'"² The uncritical assumption that Communism is a religion -- the modern version of Christianity, or a Christian heresy -- has several possible effects upon the person holding it. He may on the one hand, easily accept the Marxist view of the world and life, or if a committed Christian, at least fail to comprehend the depth of the issue and the true challenge of Communism and its seriousness. On the other hand, if an ardent exponent of Christianity, the West, the American way of life, or democracy, his thought and influence will be either insipid and ineffectual or it will be dangerously fanatical and reactionary. There is no safe usage of easy generalizations and analogies in the light of their potential impact upon the non-specialist mind.

To see just how misleading the incorrect usage of words and terminology can be, one need only consider the claim that Marxism

2. E.P. Dickie God Is Light, 82.

is a Christian heresy: heresy "...presupposes loyalty to the essential tenet or tenets of the creed whose strictly orthodox form is rejected",³ while communism repudiates christianity and its doctrines. To use such a term then, one must do a considerable reinterpretation of religion to make it a term to describe human experience and reactions, regardless of their object. Rather than do this, is it not better to use terms such as: "quasi-religion", "secular-religion", or "religious type of experience"? Several have urged this restriction.⁴

It is not to be inferred that the attack upon the validity of the thought of a number of theologians on a specific point constitutes an attack upon their entire viewpoint. The writer appreciates the basic intention of many of these thinkers, that the Church be self-critical instead of self-righteous as regards social issues, and that the Church be conversant with all the aspects and realities of life about it. However, he feels that the Church cannot engage in the conflict of ideas and the struggle for the minds of men if it is armed only with clichés, unexamined assumptions and generalizations often originating in the secular world. Scholarship must free the Christian mind for an encounter with the facts of the case, both historical and contemporary. It must enable the Christian mind creatively and independently to

3. A.C. Knudson, Basic Issues in Theology, 208-209; cf. J. Pelikan, "The Marxist Heresy: A Theological Evaluation", Religion in Life, XIX, 356-358 for such a serious usage of it.

4. Cf. E.A. Burt, Types of Religious Philosophy, 398; C. Lowry, Communism and Christ, 9, 13; Prof. E.P. Dickie in class lecture, 25/2/58, urged this limitation of the word religion to its original meaning.

analyse, criticise, and contribute to the solution of, modern problems, bound only by its allegiance to Christ its Lord and the truth.

iv

The "Bibliographical Abbreviations" give the shortened forms of certain titles which are much used. The first names or initials of the classic writers (theologians, philosophers, and Marxists) are given only in the main "Bibliography". This "Bibliography" contains only those works used in the text of the thesis and does not include those titles cited or quoted from the works found in the Bibliography. Also excluded from the Bibliography are a number of works cited from Marx's reading excerpts or listed in the "Inventar" of the Marx-Engels manuscripts: only if the books themselves were used, are they listed. Obviously many works were read thoroughly, partially, or merely scanned, in the course of the study for the thesis. The writer feels that it would be pointless to burden the Bibliography with these. Also, the various individual works whether books, articles, or treatises, of the classic writers have not been given. These will be found in the text and the footnotes while the Bibliography contains only those books or publications needed to find them.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The writer is indebted to a number of people for help and encouragement in the writing of the thesis. Most especial thanks go to The Reverend Professor E.P. Dickie, M.C., Professor of Divinity at St. Mary's College, for his patient and kindly supervision of the research and his reading of the manuscript. His patience and wisdom have allowed the writer to find his way through a maze of material and viewpoints to a fresh understanding of Marx and Engels, and to some new materials. Others who have rendered varying kinds of assistance are: Professor Peter Scheibert of the East European History Seminary of Philipp's University, Marburg, who first pointed to the importance of the concept of Asiatic Society; Dr. Erich Thier, then of the Evangelische Akademie of Friedewald who gave guidance in the literature of Marxist studies; the Library staff of the University of St. Andrews, as also of the International Institute for Social History in Amsterdam who rendered innumerable services. Also especially helpful were Miss Sheila Fitzgerald, M.A., who has handled many of the details of arranging the typing and binding of the final manuscript, and also proof-reading it, and the Reverend David Hill, B.D., who has assisted in this and has read some of the preliminary manuscript. Mrs. S.E. Best has been most cordial and efficient in the typing of the manuscript. The writer's wife, Mrs. Eileen Fitzgerald Anderson, has assisted with the typing and proof-reading of the semi-final manuscript and has been most patient and encouraging through it all.

BIOGRAPHY

Walter Wallace Anderson, Jr., was born August 31, 1927, Jetersville, Virginia, U.S.A. He was educated in the public schools of the county and received the high school diploma in 1944, from Amelia County High School. He entered the University of Richmond, Virginia, in 1947 and received the B.A. Degree in 1951 with a major in history and a minor in religion and Bible. From 1951 to 1954 he attended The College of The Bible in Lexington, Kentucky, and received the B.D. Degree. During 1954 to 1956 he was minister-to-students for the Christian Churches (Disciples of Christ) at the University of Alabama in Tuscaloosa, Alabama, and earned twenty-four hours of credit in the Graduate School in the field of history. After a pastorate in Birmingham, Alabama, he resumed his studies at St. Mary's College, St. Andrews University, in October, 1957. August-September, 1958, and October-March of 1959-1960 were spent in Marburg, West Germany (the later period on a grant from the German Academic Exchange Ministry). Three weeks of April 1960 were spent at the International Institute for Social History, Amsterdam. He was matriculated at the University of St. Andrews from 1957-58 to 1960-61 and returned home in May of 1962. He was ordained to the ministry of the Christian Churches (Disciples of Christ), December, 1954. In June of 1960 he was married to Miss Eileen Fitzgerald of St. Andrews, Scotland.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ABBREVIATIONS

MEGA : Karl Marx-Friedrich Engels: Historisch-Kritische Gesamtausgabe. Frankfurt-Berlin: Marx-Engels Verlag. 1927ff. Unless otherwise indicated the first Abteilung is the one cited, and only volume numbers are given.

DF : Karl Marx, Die Fruehschriften, ed. by Siegfried Landshut, Stuttgart: Alfred Kroner Verlag. 1953.

SW : Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Selected Works, 2 vols., Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House. 1951.

Capital : Karl Marx, Capital. Unless otherwise indicated, this refers to the Everyman Edition, translated by E. & C. Paul with Introduction by G.D.H. Cole, London, J.M. Dent & Sons, 1957. Volumes II, and III will be cited from the Kerr edition and so indicated.

1844 MSS : refers to the writings of 1844 in Paris, cited from: DF; MEGA; Abt.I, Bd.III, and Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House. 1959. This abbreviation will be used in the text also.

Grundrisse : Karl Marx, Grundrisse Der Kritik Der Politischen Oekonomie, Berlin, Dietz Verlag, 1953.

Anti-Duehring : Friedrich Engels, Herrn Eugen Duehrings Umwalzung der Wissenschaft. 11th ed. Stuttgart: Dietz. 1921; Anti-Duehring: Herr Eugen Duehring's Revolution in Science. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House. 1954.

Origin : Friedrich Engels, The Origin of The Family, Private Property, and The State, in SW, II. This abbreviation will be used in the text also.

.....

P or PP indicate paragraph or paragraphs (§ or §§)

The names of the classic writers of philosophy, theology and Marxism will be given without initials in the footnotes. No names will be given with the abbreviations given above.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION AND THESIS PROBLEM

A persisting fact of the twentieth century Christian comprehension of the Marxist view of history is epitomized in the following quotations of recent and influential origin. In 1953 Alasdair MacIntyre said:

... Marxism is the form under which the concepts of traditional Christianity have entered into the contemporary world.

Communism is in fact the form under which such strains in Christian thinking as were relevant had to enter the modern world; and because Communism was religion it was open to the corruptions which always beset political religions.

Similarly, Marx inherits through Hegel a Christian interpretation of history in terms of conflict and reconciliation.¹

1. Alasdair MacIntyre, Marxism as Interpretation, 15, 107, 87.

In 1959 Reinhold Niebuhr said:

Marxism is a secularized version of Christian-sectarian apocalypse which expresses a perennial hope of mankind to break through the perennial ambiguities of history and establish a kingdom of perfect brotherhood on earth.²

Another American, Frank Wilson Price, wrote in 1957:

In Marxism, matter in motion becomes a god; the proletariat are the new chosen people; man fell from primitive innocence when he was corrupted by private ownership; the most grievous sin, and in fact the unpardonable sin, is exploitation; the revolutionary blood of the proletariat takes the place of Christ's saving blood; the state is almighty; Marx and Engels and Lenin have become a trinity incarnating the truth, and their writings have become infallible sacred scriptures. Heaven is to be sought, not in heaven, but on earth. The dialectical process of history supplants the providence of God. ... The universality of man is to be realized through a world-wide communist ecclasia, and a classless society is the coming kingdom.³

And in September 1960, J.M. Cameron stated on the BBC

Third Programme:

The power of the Marxist myth lies in its being a myth of sin, suffering, and redemption. The Fall in Marxism is the transition from primitive communism to class society. ... The redemption, in the fulness of time, is the work of the most suffering class of modern society, the proletariat; and through the passion of the proletariat mankind passes into communism, a return to man's primitive integrity but at a higher level. Death is swallowed up in victory or, if with the Marxists you prefer the categories of the Hegelian logic, the negation is negated. It is the power of this myth that has made

2. R. Niebuhr, The Godly and The Ungodly, 44.

3. Frank Wilson Price, Marx Meets Christ, 137-138.

of Marxism for so many what Marx himself said of religion: 'the heart of a heartless world'.⁴

These statements, made by respected scholars for both scholar and non-scholar, represent a major trend in Christian interpretations of Marxian Communism. Many more citations could be made, from other languages, which would bear out this assertion (and will be made when the particular problem is set forth). This is a trend which is finding acceptance outside the theological world.⁵ In addition there is a host of superficial popularizations of this interpretation which is absorbed by the so-called "men in the street". Thus a fellow student in Scotland has said that certain of his acquaintances who were members of the Communist Party felt themselves to be religious and felt that Marx was in the Christian tradition--a view they would not get from the publications of the Party! Or again, when others have learned of the field of this study their first enquiries invariably revolve around the question of parallels between

4. J.H. Cameron, "Agents and Victims" ("The New Left in Britain - III"), The Listener, LXIV, No. 1643 (Sept. 22, 1960) 460. Cameron is not a theologian but believes that the classic Christian thinkers are relevant to our modern life.

5. Cf. Robert V. Daniels, The Nature of Communism (1962), who uses the religious interpretation as one of several keys to the understanding of Marxian Communism. He says: "Communism as a faith is Christianity brought down to earth" (326).

Christian and Marxist doctrine, not around the question of the actual heritage of Marx or of the actual content of his teaching. It would appear that this is the result of so much superficial writing. For the non-specialist in this field it has a fascination which deadens genuine enquiry and understanding, appeals to naive idealism, and results in faulty points of view.

The religious interpretation of Marx is used for many purposes, as one writer has noted.⁶ The Communist Party members mentioned above furnish one example of its use. Next to their position is that of those who feel that Communism and Christianity are essentially the same or that Communism is "more Christian" than Christianity itself, as Professor Dewick has said of Professor John MacTurray.⁷ On the other hand the comparison of Communism and Christianity may be so interpreted as to dismiss some of the real significance of Communism while perceiving certain very important aspects of it. Gustav Wetter, in his recently translated book appears to do this. Showing the many parallels and points

6. Charles West, Communism and the Theologians, 19.

7. E.C. Dewick, The Christian Attitude to Other Religions, 35. His reference is to MacTurray's Creative Society, 22ff. and to The Clue to History, 206 (cf. 35, note 4 of Dewick). It should be said, however, that MacTurray sees both Communism and Christianity as deficient and in need of a dialectical transformation (cf. Creative Society, 143-144). Cf. also, Martin D'Arcy, Communism and Christianity, 52-55, on the various viewpoints concerning the relation of Christianity and Marxian Communism.

of similarity between the two systems, he says that in spite of these there can be no reconciliation because the ultimate basis of Marxism lies in the will which seeks to dismiss God.⁸ This is certainly an important and valid aspect of Marxism--its promethean humanism--but one feels that this is not the whole of the Marxist Communist impetus and that it is perilous to approach the problem as though it were. One must assume certain points of contact because of the existence of a common factor: modern man, his world and his problems. The denial of a possibility of reconciliation must not obscure this which is also one of the most important of the sources of Marxist Communism's origin and power.

The fact of the problems of modern man and his society points to one of the tasks of Christians: the analysis of, and ministry to, this aspect of life. If the Marxist "religion" is accepted as a pseudo-Christian faith which needs only certain dialectical changes, the Christian is likely to accept the Marxist analysis of society and fail in his responsibility to make a fresh analysis which at

8. G. Wetter, Dialectical Materialism, 560; cf. also, I.M. Bochenski, Der Sowjet-Russische Dialektische Materialismus, 124-126.

least takes account of present day developments (whether either a "Christian" or a "scientific" analysis is possible or not).⁹

The work of Charles West has been mentioned in references several times: this might well be considered a new trend in Christian interpretations of Marxism which ought to be pursued. West assumes the religious interpretation of Marxism but does not dwell upon it. His method is a pragmatic approach which seeks to evaluate the various interpretations of, and responses to, Marxism in terms of their value to people who must live under Communist rule and who must witness to their Communist neighbors and rulers. This is a right direction. No amount of pure anti-Communism, or purely academic understanding of Marxian Communist principles will meet either the problem of modern life or the threat of Communism. Hence the fascination and formalism of the religious interpretation must be kept to a minimum and the Christian mind and conscience kept free for a creative encounter with modern life and the Communist challenge.

It has been seen that there are dangers in an

9. Charles West, op. cit., 20, note 1, notes that most Christian socialists have discarded Marxism as a scientific instrument, in the post-war years; Alexander Miller did not, but was able to retain it because he confused a prophetic view of 19th C. capitalism with a scientific analysis.

uncritical religious interpretation of Marxism. On the other hand, as the work of West (and others) testifies, there is a value in it. There is undoubtedly a certain amount of secularized Christian doctrine in the philosophical heritage of Marx. There definitely is an element of religious psychology in much of the response to Communism. Certainly the Church, in varying degrees in various countries and situations, was remiss in its prophetic responsibility regarding society and social evils. It is, then, necessary to use some form of the religious interpretation of Marxism in order to understand it, and in order to apprehend correctly the Church's relation to it. The host of scholars who have rendered great service with this view confirms this judgement. But just because there is some truth in this interpretation and because it is fruitful and yet has its dangers, it must be refined, criticised, and set within proper limits, with especial regard for a clear popular understanding of it.

Therefore, the more general purpose of this study is to seek to contribute to the setting of proper limits to the religious interpretation of Marxism as a Christian product or heresy, by a critical study of the historical origins of Marxism, and of the elements of Marxian doctrine. As a specific contribution to this, and to show the fruitfulness of

such a study, a critique of one particular aspect of the religious interpretation is to be made. This aspect is the equating of the historical schemes of Marxian and Christianity as regards Original Righteousness, the Fall, and Original Sin on the one hand, and Primitive Communism, the division of labour, and private property, on the other. It is intended to show that these are parallel only in a superficial analogical sense, have a limited validity, and obscure the true theory and spirit of Marxian Communism: the parallel interpretation is an inadequate description and also fails to take account of historical fact. It is hoped that this limitation of the religious interpretation in its form of parallel doctrines will help to clarify the picture which is given of Marxian doctrines and to shift attention to the more pragmatic approaches which seek to understand the real force and intention of Marxian Communism and especially Christianity's task in the modern world.

Unfortunately this study can not at the present be concerned with the mass of popular leaflets, pamphlets, personal testimonials, personal reflections and reminiscences. These would reveal the thinking and concepts involved in the actual popular understanding of, and acceptance of, Marxism. Certainly much of the classic Marxist literature has been so used (hence the validity of this study for this facet of the

problem also), but there is undoubtedly much relevant material of the former type available for the investigator. However, we are faced with the problem of understanding established Communism as well as the process of its establishment and for this purpose the classic Marxist writings represent a significant body of ideas. Whatever religious ideas are brought with them, converts who are to rise to importance in the Party must soon discard them and think in the traditional pattern.

The next step in introducing the study is to consider briefly the history of the religious interpretation of Marxism and the various forms that it takes.

ii.

Perhaps one of the earliest religious interpretations of Marxism is that reported in Engels' writings against Eugen Dühring (1876):

Incidentally, Herr Dühring considered that he had brought the "negation of the negation" sufficiently into contempt by characterizing it as a copy of the old fable of original sin and redemption...¹⁰

This attempt to discredit Marxism by associating it with religion is a tactic not yet forgotten by certain anti-

10. Anti-Dühring (English edition, Moscow, 1955), 213.

religious thinkers.¹¹ During the pre-World War I years there appear to have been a number of writers who noted the religious characteristics of socialism and who sought to explain this phenomenon by examining the history of communism among the Christian sects. The work of Belfort Bax, and Karl Kautsky suggest this, though Kautsky would not have said that Marxism was a religion.¹² Eduard Bernstein noted Engels' enthusiasm for the primitive state of man and said that Engels described the formation of the State as " ... eine Art Sündenfall ..."¹³ In 1906 Dolloans published an article on the religious character of socialism.¹⁴ Also, very early in the present century B. Croce characterized the major historical forces of communism, authoritarianism, liberalism, Catholicism and democracy as "religious".¹⁵ This interpretation has continued

11. Cf. a quotation used by G. Vetter (op. cit., 554-555) from a review of his book by a Social-Democratic organ. The reviewer stresses the similar "states of soul" of the militant Catholic and the bolshevik agitator. Cf. also H. Fyfe, "Communism as Religion", Hibbert Journal, XLIX (1950-1), 67-72.

12. See W. Hordern, Christianity, Communism and History, 38, note 15, and K. Kautsky, Die Vorläufer des Neuen Sozialismus (2 volumes).

13. E. Bernstein, "Bemerkungen ueber Engel's Ueprung der Familie", Socialistische Monats Hefte (1900), 452.

14. W. Sombart's bibliography in Der Proletarische Sozialismus, 439.

15. Richard V. Burke, "A Conception of Ideology for Historians" in Journal of The History of Ideas, X (1949), 198. He refers to Croce, History of Europe in The Nineteenth Century.

on into the recent decades, as the writings of Carl Becker (The Heavenly City of the Philosophers (1932) and E. Voegelin (Die politischen Religionen (1939) indicate. The former applied it to the 18th Century Enlightenment philosophers and the latter applied it to Fascism, Communism, and Nazism.¹⁶ Professor Devick used it also in The Christian Attitude to Other Religions (1953).¹⁷

The Russian October Revolution of 1917 created a Communist power whose presence called forth interpretation, explanation, and criticism, as well as providing new material for comparisons. Fritz Gerlach, in Der Kommunismus als Lehre vom 1000-jährigen Reich (1920) attempted to trace a line from Christian chiliastic thought through Arndt, Coccejus, Spener, and Zinzendorf to the German Idealists and thence to Marx.¹⁸ In 1924 Sombart's work appeared with an analysis of the mythical element as the dynamic power in socialism and describing it as a secular version of the older Christian and Jewish chiliasm and hope for the return of a lost paradise.¹⁹ This he traces through More, Morelly,

16. Ibid., 184-186.

17. E.C. Devick, op. cit., 5,6,9,11-12.

18. E. Thier, "Etappen der Marxinterpretation", in Marxismusstudien (1954), pp. 12-13.

19. W. Sombart, op. cit., 317ff.

and Rousseau as taking the form of the property question, as well as showing the view that property is sin in many of the sectarians.

In theological circles two significant men were H. Berdyaev and Paul Tillich. Both were at once Christian philosophers and theologians and they exerted a great influence upon the theological thought concerning Marxist Communism. Berdyaev wrote with the experience of the Russian Revolution and Bolshevik state behind him, having been exiled only in 1922, and having been a member of a group of Marxists discredited by Lenin about 1900 for their religious views. Tillich was versed in the philosophy of German Idealism and was confronted by the post-war German situation with its unemployment and Communist versus anti-Communist struggle. In 1933 his influence was felt in the United States when he was exiled by Hitler. He was a friend of another influential exponent of the religious interpretation of Marxism, Reinhold Niebuhr.

In Britain in the 1930's this interpretation developed in the confrontation with the problems of the depression, the existence of a Bolshevik state, and the rise of Fascism and Nazism. Two co-operative volumes give an idea of the whole movement: Christianity and the Crisis (ed. by Dearmer, 1933) and Christianity and the Social Revolution (ed. by John Lewis, Karl Polanyi, and Donald Kitchin, 1935). John Middleton Murry

was another in this movement (The Necessity of Communism; Heaven and Earth, 1958). John MacMurray was certainly the clearest thinker and one who sought to give an explanation of the relation between Christianity and Marxism (in the article in Christianity and the Social Revolution and in his book Creative Society). Many of these writers were assuming a similarity and/or some kind of alliance between Christianity and Communism.

Following World War II there has been a fresh outpouring of studies of Christianity and Marxism, the really significant studies being done on the Continent, especially by German Protestants, French existentialists, and Catholics from all countries (predominantly French).²⁰ The most persistent exponents of the religious interpretation of Marxism are the German Protestants whose works are contained in Marxismusstudien (1954, 1957). Stressing the Hegelian heritage of Marx, they seek to find fundamental points of contact from which to witness to the Communist bloc and from which self-criticism and self-understanding of the West as well as criticism of the East may proceed.²¹ Erich Thier is one of the most prominent of this group and has been preparing a full study of the relation of Christianity to Marxism, and

20. Cf. Jean-Yves Calvez, La Pensée de Karl Marx (1957), especially his bibliography. Cf. also Erich Fromm, Marx's Concept of Man, 1, note 1 ff.

21. Marxismusstudien (1954), vi - ix.

of the development and transformations of Marxism itself.²²

Studies written in the English language have been fewer but there are several worth mentioning. Alasdair MacIntyre in Marxism: An Interpretation (1953) has availed himself of much of the continental scholarship. Karl Loewith, an exile from Germany for a number of years (but now again there) has published Meaning in History (1948) in which he uses the religious interpretation of Marxism. In the past several years there are signs of a deepening interest in the moral and religious backgrounds of Marx among non-theological writers. Eric Fromm, Marx's Concept of Man (1961) and R.C. Tucker, Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx (1961) both emphasise this side of Marx and pre-suppose some form of the religious interpretation. Robert Daniels, The Nature of Communism (1962) makes use of this facet of Communism as one of a number of its traits. And one American reviewer of Tucker's book said that it gave foundation in the early writings of Marx "... for the increasingly often encountered thesis that Marxist Communism is really religious in nature, a kind of Christian heresy."²³

The most significant characteristic of these studies spanning half a century is their increasing concreteness of

22. E. Thier, Das Menschenbild des Jungen Marx (1957), a paper cover edition of the introduction to his 1950 edition of the Marxian manuscripts of 1844.

23. Rene D.V. Williamson, The Journal of Politics, XXIV (1962), 593.

the interpretations of the religious nature of Marxism and especially of its dependence upon the Judaeo-Christian tradition. Definite accounts of the development of Marx's thought replace mere analogies and vague historical references. Yet, in spite of this, many publications still continue to show a wide variety of areas of comparisons and explanations. This suggests that apart from the fact of the Christian theological influence upon German Idealism which Marx inherited, most of the accounts are merely attempts to explain the religious characteristics of Marxian Communism. The following summary of the various comparisons and their explanations confirms this.

iii.

There are several types of comparisons of Marxism as a religion with Christianity and Judaism: some writers use one type while others combine several. Here it is not possible to work out a precise classification of each writer but an attempt is made to show the diversity of such comparisons and thus to indicate the need for caution in using them.

1. A Comparison of The Phenomena of Marxism with Those of Christianity.

This type of comparison notes the psychological, institutional and methodological phenomena common to both Marxism and Christianity.

(a) Psychological Traits:

Fanaticism, intolerance of other religions or viewpoints, as well as the complete surrender of self to the cause of Communism, are commonly taken to be an expression of the religious nature of Communism. Also, the psychological implications of such phenomena as public "confessions" and "repentance" of "sins" against the State or Party may be included in this type.²⁴

(b) Claims of the Communist Ideology and Party:

Corresponding to these psychological traits are the doctrinal claims of the Communist Party and ideology upon its adherents. The doctrine claims to be a total world view embracing all aspects of life, possessing the absolute truth, and desiring the whole soul of man. It is also a missionary movement, seeking to spread its doctrines to all lands and conditions of men. Only a religion possesses such claims.²⁵

24. Cf. H. Laski, Communism, 51-53; 246; H. Fyfe, op. cit., 67-72; John C. Bennett, Christianity and Communism, 21-22; 31-34; John MacMurray, Creative Society, 22-23, 28; Gurion, Bolshevism, 3-4; William Hardern, Christianity, Communism and History, 15.

25. Cf. H. Laski, op. cit., 51-53; 246; N. Spinka, Christianity Confronts Communism, 121f., 166ff.; John Bennett, op. cit., 34; N. Dardynov, "The Religion of Communism" in Essays in Order; No. 6, 87-88, "Russian Religious Psychology" in Ibid., 40-41, and "Communist Secularism" in Christianity and The Crisis, (ed. Dearmer), 564-565; W. Gurion, op. cit., 64-66, 220-221, 226, 241; Robert C. Tucker, Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx, 22.

(c) Institutions and Methods:

In addition to the psychology of the Communist mind and the claims of its ideology there is often noted the similarity of the institutions of Christianity and Communism. It has its hierarchy, its scriptures, its interpreters, its cults, its heresies and heresy trials, its morality, its symbols, and its festivals and pilgrimages.²⁶

2. A Comparison of The Doctrines of Marxism and Christianity.

In this type of comparison, attention is drawn to the similarity or parallelism of certain concepts in Christianity and Marxism. Some of the most important of such concepts are given below.

(a) A Higher Power Beyond Man.

Corresponding to the Judeo-Christian God there is a power beyond the individual or even a particular society which commands the loyalty and trust of men. This is variously defined as: man, social man or the collective, abstract human labour, the dialectic, matter-in-motion, the economic process, history.²⁷ The similarity of the determinism of Marxism and

26. Cf. Laski, op. cit., as cited above and also, 191-192, 194; H. Spinka, op. cit., 168-169; N. Berdyaev, "Russian Religious Psychology", op. cit., 40-41; G. Wetter, op. cit., 559-560; Frank Wilson Price, Marx Meets Christ, 157.

27. R. Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, I, 47, and Faith and History, 239; Hordern, op. cit., 15; N. Berdyaev, "Communist Secularism", op. cit., 579-580; F. Delekat, "Von Wesen des Geldes" in Marxismusstudien (1954); G. Wetter, op. cit., 558-559; R.C. Tucker, op. cit., 22.

of Calvinism has been noted also.²⁸

(b) A Similar View of History.

Both systems "take history seriously": for the Christian, history is the scene of the activity and revelation of the supra-historical God, the point at which man and God meet; for the Marxist, history is all of reality--or all reality is historical and a knowledge of history supplies the necessary knowledge of life. Further, the view of history is similar in its structure: it has a beginning, a centre, and an end; it is an irreversible and unique process whose end and purpose coincide. Often it is said that there is a "Fall" at the beginning which plunges the whole course of history into evil which is overcome at the end.²⁹

(c) A Messianic Consciousness.

There is a strong sense of the "troubles of the times", man is not as he should be, and "sin" is seen in self-interest,

28. Cf. H.C. Wood, The Truth and Error of Communism, 3-4: he compares socialism to Lutheranism and Communism to Calvinism with its greater intellectual clarity and precision, and says: "Marxism is, in fact, Calvinism secularised..." Cf. also, J. Middleton Murry, Heaven and Earth, 367-368.

29. Cf. R. Niebuhr, Nature and Destiny of Man, I, 25ff.; P. Tillich, The Protestant Era, 278-279; Charles West, op. cit., 17-18; Eduard Heimann, History of Economic Doctrines, 143-144; Karl Loewith, Meaning in History, 44-45; W. Stark, Social Theory and Christian Thought 54; A. MacIntyre, op. cit., passim; W. Hordern, op. cit., passim; R.C. Tucker, op. cit., 23; Karl Jaspers, Reason and Anti-Reason in our Time, 8-9.

exploitation, the property system, ideological thinking, and the state.³⁰ The result of this is a sense of mission and struggle, of catastrophic events in which a minority group, the Party, the Proletariat, or the Party élite carry forward the struggle and make the sacrifice. This gives a mythical power not otherwise obtainable for a purely scientific theory and comparable to religious messianism.³¹

(a) Prophetism.

Many writers have seen Marxism as a prophetic protest against modern thought and society. Marx is said to have been in rebellion against the absolutised and un-human (or inhuman) systems of Hegelianism, bourgeois Christianity, or an industrialism based upon classical economics. A quotation from Charles West epitomises this view at its best: Tillich's basic view of Marx was "... as a prophet standing on the spiritual foundation of a bourgeois society, and the socialism which he founded as 'prophecy on the grounds of an autonomous, self-

30. Cf. N. Berdyaev, "Religion of Communism", in op. cit., 68-69, and "Communist Secularism" in op. cit., 575, 577, and The Origin of The Russian Revolution, 156-157 (on Lenin). Cf. also, K. Loewith, op. cit., 43; G. Wetter, op. cit., 559; and R.C. Tucker, op. cit., 24.

31. Cf. N. Berdyaev, "Communist Secularism" in op. cit., 564-565; J. Bennett, op. cit., 44 (on both Russian and Communist Messianism); M. Spinka, op. cit., 166; R. Niebuhr, Faith and History, 238ff; K. Loewith, op. cit., 44-45; J. Middleton Murry, Heaven and Earth, 335-337, 349; H.-D. Wendland, op. cit., 218-220, 226-228; K. Jaspers, op. cit., 9-10; R.C. Tucker, op. cit., 23; A. Ahlberg, "Escatologische Motive des Marxismus", Theoria, XV, 1-16.

contained world'.³²

3. Explanations of the Similarities.

There are several widely used accounts of the sources of the Judaeo-Christian religious traits of Marxian Communism. Many writers use several of these (Berdyaev for example).

(a) Religious Psychology of Man and Historical Training of The Human Mind.

Berdyaev, in interpreting Bolshevism as well as Marx, uses the concept that man is a religious being whose religion may take various forms but that it will never disappear. This religious nature was trained by centuries of Christian discipline and ideals and hence, though receiving a different content in Communism, has many of the structural forms and ideals.³³

In the case of Russia, this Christian spirit became perverted by the religious conflicts and by the inhuman conditions associated with the Church, resulting in a reaction against suffering which itself suffered but did not understand this

32. C. West, op. cit., 91; he quotes from Tillich, Die Sozialistische Entscheidung (1933), 86; cf. also in West's book, 18-19, 20, 23. Cf. also: E. Heimann, op. cit., 143-144; J. Middleton Murry, The Necessity of Communism, 20-22; E. Loewith, op. cit., 43; R. Niebuhr, "Christian Politics and Communist Religion", in Christianity and the Social Revolution, 461-463, 471; Faith and History, 241-242; M. Spinka, op. cit., 66, says Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin are prophets; J.C. Bennett, op. cit., 46-47; R.C. Tucker, op. cit., 23-25.

33. N. Berdyaev, The Origins of The Russian Revolution, 170, "Communist Secularism", op. cit., 566-567; cf. Hordern, op. cit., 16; Marx owed much of his passion for social justice to the fact of living in the Judaeo-Christian tradition surrounding him; cf. 57 also.

condition of life: it became a defiant atheism and humanism. This was coupled with the Russian national Messianism.³⁴ This is merely a particular application of the more general thesis that Marxism is the reaction against the failure of Christianity to meet the problems of mankind in the modern world and its tendency to ally itself with the established powers.³⁵

(b) Marx's Racial Background.

Marx's Jewish background is often cited as the source of his moral indignation and his messianic and eschatological fervour: this influenced him unconsciously.³⁶ It is also said that Moses Hess influenced him in the direction of eschatological thought.³⁷

34. N. Berdyayev, "Russian Religious Psychology and Communistic Atheism", in Essays in Order, No. 6, 3-49, passim; cf. also, W. Gurian, op. cit., 5, and passim; I. von Kologriwof in, Die Materialistik des Bolschewismus, passim, and J. Bennett, op. cit., 44, who uses the idea of a national messianism.

35. Cf. A. MacIntyre, op. cit., who emphasises this, especially chapter 1; H. Kracmer, Religion and the Christian Faith, 142; R. Niebuhr, Faith and History, 217-218, 241-242; "Christian Politics and Communist Religion", in Christianity and The Social Revolution, 442-472, especially 460-461, 471; J. Bennett, op. cit., 46ff.

36. Cf. K. Loewith, op. cit., 44; Charles W. Lowry, Communism and Christ, 26-27, 32, 175; H.G. Wood, op. cit., 13-14; Toynbee, A Study of History (Somerville's abridgement) 399-400, quoted by H.B. Foster in Communist Faith and Christian Faith (ed. Mackinnon), 91.

37. E. Thier, Das Menschenbild des Jungen Marx, 61.

(c) The Inversion of Jewish and Christian Doctrine.

Closely related to both of the previous explanations is the explanation often given that Marx, consciously or unconsciously, inverted the Judaeo-Christian theology and hence retained many of its forms and categories. Hence he has a "fall", a messianic class, the restoration of the lost paradise on earth instead of in heaven, a "god", and various other counterparts to Jewish or Christian doctrine.³⁸

(d) The Influence of German Idealism.

The previous view is often treated with more discrimination by tracing Marx's Christian traits to his intellectual birthplace, German Idealism, which had already secularised Christian doctrine or re-interpreted it. Hegel and Feuerbach are especially important to this interpretation.³⁹ The doctrine of property as alienation and the equivalent of Original Sin (and its origin as the Fall) is traced from Rousseau to Hegel to Marx.⁴⁰

38. Cf. Lowry, op. cit., 25-27; Loewith, op. cit., 2,111, and passim (his view is that all modern philosophies of history are merely inverted or secularised forms of Christian philosophy of history); R. Niebuhr, "Christian Politics and Communist Religion" in Christianity and the Social Revolution, 461-462; Faith and History, 238-239; Nature and Destiny of Man, I, 25; Bennett, op. cit., 46ff.; Tucker, op. cit., 21,22,25, who does however see that it comes through German Idealism.

39. Cf. Spinka, op. cit., 150ff; Bordyaev, "Religion of Communism" in op. cit., 82-83; A. MacIntyre, op. cit., chs. II,III; J. MacMurray, Creative Society, 90-91; Tucker, op. cit., bases his thesis on Marx's German Idealistic heritage.

40. F. Dolak, op. cit., 61.

(e) Classical Economics as an Inverted Theism.

Several writers have traced certain of the religious traits of Marxism to classical economics which asserted the autonomy of economic life, making it a substitute for God.⁴¹

(f) The Christian Sectarian Heritage.

The Christian sectarian heritage in philosophy of history and as regards the evil of property has been emphasized by both Niebuhr and Tillich.⁴² This heritage presumably comes through French socialism.

Remarks on The Survey of Types of Comparisons.

There are both sound and faulty arguments among all these types of comparisons. Many are related to, or coincide with, others, and hence their multiplicity per se does not render them invalid. Many are in a rather nebulous sphere: the psychological explanations depending upon Marx's racial background, and Russian national consciousness. The unconscious is hardly a sphere of historical investigation, though after investigation leaves unexplained gaps in the whole, it may be invoked.

41. Heimann, op. cit., 143-144; cf. Stark, op. cit., 28-29, 32-34, 52-53, and Delekat, op. cit., passim, for a closely related view.

42. Niebuhr, The Children of Light and The Children of Darkness, 65-70; Faith and History, 237ff.; The Godly and The Ungodly, 44; Tillich, The Protestant Era, 29. Cf. W. Hordern, op. cit., who has made the sectarian similarities to Marxism the basis of the book; see 16, 21, 35ff., esp. 38, 39, 59, 63.

The important result of the survey is the impression that the religious interpretation arose because of the need to account for certain phenomenological similarities of Christianity and Marxism. Since its original usage, it has been refined and extended and much has been established by historical and comparative studies. Much solid ground has been found, but it is apparent that eminent scholars do not agree, and moreover, that more popular works continue to grasp at every conceivable analogy and similarity.⁴³ An example is the varied explanation of just what constitutes the Marxian "god": matter-in-motion, man, collective man, history, the dialectic, abstract human labour, Communism itself. Some of these variations arise from considering different periods of Marxism, some from imprecise definitions of terms (man, society, labour, all have a common denominator, man). But they also indicate that their origin lies in the need for an explanation, not in the discovery of factual or historical relationships between the two systems. In view of the liability of popular misunderstanding, it must be insisted that only the results of concrete historical and comparative studies are permissible.

There is one word of caution or criticism which should be voiced briefly, even though it warrants an exposition not

43. Cf. Price, op. cit., cf. Note 3 above; Lowry, op. cit., 29, 32-33, 55 (recently re-issued).

possible here: not every similarity or analogy involves a genetic relationship to Christianity. There are several factors making similar but unrelated phenomena possible: the fact of man himself being one of the basic factors in all systems; common tasks, i.e. the promotion of an ideal and the securing of adherents, the creation of institutions; the law of probability providing a coincidence in numbers (some writers make a play on trinitarian schemes). Hence the many similarities and possible analogies must be evaluated upon the basis of historical research in order to sift the grain from the chaff. One might well claim, on the basis of bare similarity, that American political parties, labour unions, and businessmen's clubs were but a secularization of American religious doctrines, institutions, and life. The similarity of methods, organizations, spirit; the concern for social amelioration (on the part of many churches and clubs), the fact of social work being done by churches, unions, and political wards; the mass meetings, moral appeals, messianic ideas, pessimistic evaluations of the situation coupled with an optimistic view of the possibilities for the future; the personality cults: all these could be used to support such a thesis. But no one goes beyond noting the influence of certain religious ideas upon American life, or asserting that all areas of it are indirectly affected by religion; no one claims that these secular departments of life are either

conscious or unconscious inversions or secularizations of American Christianity in either doctrine or practice. The fact is simply that similar tasks, co-existence in the same society, often dual membership, these and other facets of life cause a certain similarity of traits.

iv.

The particular facet of the theological interpretation of Marxian Communism to which this study is limited is the assertion that Original Righteousness, the Fall and the origin of evil, and Original Sin in Christian theology, is paralleled in the Marxist historical scheme by Primitive Communism, the division of labour, and the consequent private property and the State. This is a prevalent interpretation, made by some of the most competent and scholarly writers and is currently appearing in non-theological works.⁴⁴

Some writers speak of a Marxist view of a "fallen" condition of man without mentioning a specific "Fall", implying a symbolic view of the Fall, a non-historical event.⁴⁵ This is not really valid in considering a system which insists

44. Cf Robert V. Daniels, The Nature of Communism (1962), 327, where he equates the Garden of Eden and the Fall with Primitive Communism and the onset of the class struggle. Cf. Tucker, op. cit., 23, 25.

45. Cf. Loewith, op. cit., 45; Berdyayev, "The Religion of Communism", in Essays in Order No. 6, 68-69.

upon a purely historical account of everything.⁴⁶ The survey to follow will deal only with the direct assertions of a specific "Fall".

It should be stressed that the following expressions of this interpretation are recent and have a wide audience; this will be noted in the references and should not be overlooked simply because it is relegated to the footnotes. It indicates that the view is neither obsolete nor limited to a narrow circle of academic minds and readers, hence it is of importance for our considerations and contentions.

A recent expression of this view is that already quoted from The Listener of September, 1960, by a non-theologian, but one who thinks that in addition to Marx, Freud and Wittgenstein, "... St. Augustine and Pascal, for example, and the greater men who stand behind them ..." should be heard to-day. He says:

The power of the Marxist myth lies in its being a myth of sin, suffering and redemption. The Fall in Marxism is the transition from primitive communism to class society. (Anyone who doubts this, thinks it forced, should read what Engels has to say in The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State about the vestigial morality of that early state surviving among modern primitives.) ...
/ by the suffering / of the proletariat mankind

46. However, it appears that R.C. Tucker, op. cit., has given an exposition which allows such an interpretation: Marx is seen as writing myth, or projecting into a system his own inner vision and struggle. Hence, Marx's stated principles and actual expressions do not necessarily coincide.

passes into communism, a return to man's primitive integrity but at a higher level.⁴⁷

Alasdair MacIntyre's useful and penetrating small volume discusses the view of primitive man presented by Marx in the Deutsche Ideologie of 1845:

In the beginning there is simply the community of men, producing to satisfy their basic needs of food and shelter ... living together in families and working together as need demands. The bonds between them are the social bonds of material need and language. In its earliest simplicity man is still largely animal in his social life. But here the division of labour intervenes, to play the part that the Fall plays in Christian theology. The division of labour creates the first real cleavages in society.⁴⁸

In 1957 William Hordern's work was published in Great Britain (U.S.A., 1954). He says:

The first striking similarity between Christian and Communist views of history is that both begin with the thought of a golden age in the past and the fall therefrom. \angle The Communists see this in the primitive communism in which there is/ ... no private property, no government separate from the people as a whole, and no exploitation of one man by another. Into this peaceful and harmonious scene there came a change in the methods of production which led to private property. This, like the serpent in the Garden of Eden story led to a host of ills and the fall of man.⁴⁹

47. J.H. Cameron, op. cit., 460; this circulated as both a broadcast and in popular printed form, for specialist and non-specialist alike.

48. A. MacIntyre, Marxism: An Interpretation, (1953), 62-63. This was published in an inexpensive edition by the S.C.M. Press.

49. William Hordern, Christianity, Communism and History, 57-58. This was also presented in an article in Religion in Life, XX, No. 1 (Winter, 1950-1), 99-101; this is a popular quarterly journal among American ministers.

Gustav Wetter's work appeared in English translation in America and Great Britain in 1958. In his conclusion he departs from his presentation of Soviet philosophy to consider the similarities to Christianity, especially Catholicism. With reference to the view that the world is not as it should be, he says:

As with the Christian, so also for communism, this corruption of the world is the outcome of a sort of 'fall', occurring in the earliest days of man's history; for Marxism, it was the introduction of private property through the transition from primitive communism to a slave-owning society. This initial error works itself out throughout history as a sort of 'original sin'.⁵⁰

Another 1958 publication in Britain held the same view. Werner Stark presented the relation of social theory generally to Christian thought, finding a secularized Christian 'core'. This he holds to be the case with Marx, who, however, being an aggressive atheist, took pains to prevent suspicion that he had introduced the god-idea into his philosophy:

And yet this is precisely what he does. His whole scheme of history is modelled on Christian conceptions: first a state of happiness (primeval communism); then a fall (the origin of private property and the state); then a period of suffering and expectation (class society); and finally a return to happiness--not the pristine happiness of innocence, but the final happiness of fulfillment (the world communism of the future).⁵¹

50. Gustav Wetter, Dialectical Materialism, p.559. This is translated from the fourth German edition (being originally published in an Italian edition), hence may be considered a very influential work.

51. W. Stark, Social Theory and Christian Thought, 54.

In German works on the subject, several instances of the same view appear (in addition to Wetter's which has been mentioned already. Christine Bourbeck presented a detailed outline of parallel doctrines taken from yet another German work, in her 1957 book. In brief parallel columns the following is included:

- | | |
|---|---|
| 2. Ursuende = Hochmut. | 2. Ursuende = Privateigentum. |
| 3. Erbauende = persönlicher Mangelstand des Menschen. | 3. Erbauende = Selbstentfremdung (Abfall) des Menschen von seiner gesellschaftlichen Aufgabe. ⁵² |

H.-D. Wendland published an article in 1953 in which this interpretation was used in an exposition of the communist "Hoffnung". He shows the parallel structural elements of the Christian and Communist hope. The Communist system has a concept of evil in the history of mankind, an evil which is incorporated into the social structure: the class of capitalist exploiters:

Mit dieser Vorstellung des Bösen in der Geschichte und des gesellschaftlichen Sündenfalls ist notwendigerweise auch eine Vorstellung vom Weltgericht verbunden. ... die Weltrevolution vernichtet das ganze Reich des

52. C. Bourbeck, Kommunistische Frage an die Christen (1957) 59-60. This is taken from yet another work, by Rudolph Karisch, Der Christ und der Dialektische Materialismus (Berlin, 1956), 156. Bourbeck's book was seen in the possession of several German students and was recommended for its viewpoint by Dr. Eric Thier in an interview in September 1958, in his home at Friedewald, West Germany. He also indicated acceptance of the secularized "Fall" interpretation of Marxist doctrine, though he does not appear to stress it in his writings. Cf. Das Menschenbild des Jungen Marx, 60; "Marxismus", an article in Evangelisches Soziallexikon, (ed. by F. Karrenberg) col. 698.

Boesen. ... Auch hier geht die Geschichte vom Fall des Menschen zu seiner Erlösungder Mensch bricht wieder ins Paradies hinein, er sprengt seine Pforten auf, er macht den Bruch in der Menschheitsgeschichte rückgängig.⁵³

In the same issue of Marxismusstudien Friedrich Delekat describes Marxism as a secularized theology in which abstract labour is the "Gottesbegriff" which must be "incarnated" in concrete labour and products. The result is an "incarnation" which is also a "fall": private property results in exchange, and money which is the false god of mankind as opposed to the true "God", abstract human labour.

Die Arbeitsteilung ist also der Sündenfall der Gesellschaft, durch den sie ihren Gott, der unterschiedlosen menschlichen Arbeit abtrünnig geworden ist. Dieser Sündenfall ist ebenso schicksalhaft wie der von Adam und Eva; er hat die gleichen katastrophalen Folgen. Durch ihn entsteht der Egoismus des Privateigentums, der Zwangstaat, die Unfreiwilligkeit der Arbeit--last not least das Geld. Marx braucht natürlich den theologischen Begriff des Sündenfalls nicht. Er sagt dafür mit Hegel, "Entfremdung". This usage came from Rousseau to Hegel to Marx.⁵⁴

53. H.-D. Wendland, "Christliche und kommunistische Hoffnung" in Marxismusstudien (1954), 218-219. This appears in a condensed form in a collection of radio broadcasts published as Christen oder Bolschewisten, 116-117 (an inexpensive Kroener "Taschenausgabe").

54. F. Delekat, "Von Wesen des Geldes", in Marxismusstudien (1954), 61 (cf. 60-61 for context). This article appeared in 1950 in Evangelische Theologie.

In American publications similar expressions of the Marxist "fall" have not been lacking.⁵⁵ It is sufficient to show those of two leading theologians, Paul Tillich and Reinhold Niebuhr. In articles republished in The Protestant Era, Tillich discusses the Marxian view of history.

Sometimes the first stage is described as original communism, a stage of innocence expressed in sociological terms.⁵⁶

/Regarding the structural analogy between Christianity and Marxism:/ Man is not what he ought to be; his true being and his real existence contradict each other. Man is fallen, if not from an original actual goodness, at least from a stage of undeveloped innocence. He is estranged from himself and his true humanity, he has been dehumanised, he has become an object, a means of profit, a quantity of working power - according to Marx.⁵⁷

In a post-war address in Germany, Tillich spoke much more specifically:

In einigen ganz seltenen Gedankengängen hat Marx die Möglichkeit erwogen, dass das, was der Mensch wesentlich ist, in Form einer Art von Urkommunismus einmal wirklich gewesen ist. Er folgt darin der Rousseauschen Idee der primitive Unschuld des Menschengeschlechtes. Aber er hat im Unterschied zu manchen späteren Marxisten diesen Gedanken nicht durchgeführt.⁵⁸

55. Cf. also, F.W. Price, Marx Meets Christ, 137; Jaroslav Pelikan, "The Marxist Heresy - A Theological Interpretation", in Religion in Life, XIX (1950), 356-366; and Herdern's book mentioned above.

56. P. Tillich, The Protestant Era, 25 (an address in 1939). Tillich's book is published in U.S.A., Britain, and in Germany in translation.

57. Ibid., 279 (an article of 1941).

58. P. Tillich, Der Mensch in Christentum und in Marxismus (1952), 6.

Reinhold Niebuhr has consistently maintained that Marxism contains a secularised doctrine of the Fall. In 1939 in the Gifford Lectures he said that Marxism:

... derives human evil ... from a prior fault in economic organisation. ... Man was alienated from his natural goodness at that period in history when the equalitarian and communistic organisation of the primitive tribe grew into the class organizations of the more advanced societies. ... In the Marxist theory of man's alienation from his true communal essence... / there is a similarity to Rousseau, seeing evil more in civilization than in a particular evil in man's history, though unlike Rousseau Marx sees a new innocency in the future. /⁵⁹

Ten years later he stated that the myth of the Fall was:

... reinterpreted so that an original state of innocency was posited as existing before the rise of private property. In this state man had not lost the communal essence of his existence. The rise of private property constitutes the Fall...⁶⁰

And in 1956 he wrote:

Did not history / for the Marxist / begin with an original communal wholeness of man which represented his 'true essence'?

Communism, as an economic-political creed, is based upon the theory that the institution of property is the root of all social evil and that therefore its abolition would usher in an ideal social harmony. Marxism as a religious-moral creed is based upon the illusion that the social solidarity of primitive society expresses the 'social essence' of man, from which he has been alienated by the rise of civilization.⁶¹

59. R. Niebuhr, Nature and Destiny of Man, I, 110.

60. R. Niebuhr, Faith and History, 239.

61. R. Niebuhr, The Self and The Drapes of History, 139, 239.

In The Children of Light and The Children of Darkness

(1945) Niebuhr expressed the same idea:

In Marxist thought, the emergence of private property represents a kind of "Fall" in the history of mankind. All social evils are traced to this root source.⁶²

Here, however, he elaborated the historical background of this thought. He shows the tension within Christianity between the Church, which saw property as necessary to curb the evil in man issuing from the Fall, and the sectarians who rejected this necessity on the basis of a hope for the return of the primitive perfection. This antithesis was sharpened in the Calvinistic doctrine and the sects of the Reformation. It reached an absolute breach in the secular thought of Liberalism on the one hand and Marxism on the other. Hence he says that the Reformation sectarians "... laid the foundation for the property ethic which finally culminated in the Marxist theory."⁶³ The sectarians and the Church "... thus contain the seeds of the contradictory opinion on property which have divided the democratic world from the sixteenth to the present centuries."⁶⁴ He does not say that Marx used the sectarian teachings but places Marx as the end result of the whole movement and links him with these teachings.

62. R. Niebuhr, The Children of Light and The Children of Darkness, 65.

63. Ibid., 69; cf. 66-70.

64. Ibid., 70.

This was also done by W. Hordern in his book which is based upon the similarities of the sects and Communism (he was cited above).

This survey of the use of the religious interpretation of Marxism with reference to the assertion of parallel doctrines of the Fall shows that it is currently being used by reputable scholars and writers. Further, as is the case with the religious interpretation generally, non-theological writers are using it in current publications.⁶⁵ There is also a considerable variation in the understanding of Marx's view of the "fall" and of the source of the influence of this doctrine on him.

v.

The asserted parallel of the "Fall" doctrines in Christianity and Marxism has been selected for critical study because, (1) it is used with regularity, though it is seldom discussed in detail,⁶⁶ and (2) its uncritical use or assumption affects the understanding of Marxism in its entire scheme of history and pathos. The former became clear in the preceding survey of the expressions of it; the latter is the theme of the entire study, but should be anticipated here.

The fundamental impression created by the use of "Fall"

65. Cf. R.C. Tucker, Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx, 25; Robert V. Daniels, The Nature of Communism, 327.

66. The nearest approach to an adequate treatment is found (footnote overleaf)

and "Return" is that of a perfect condition which is lost, and, following a period of evil consequences of this, of this former perfection being regained by the action of an agent or process which refuses to tolerate the evil consequences of the "Fall". This is, in most cases (though not necessarily in all) the impression conveyed to the popular religious mind or to the uncritical reader, in the preceding citations. The traditional view of the Fall of classic Christianity is still held by many in critical discussion and is certainly held by most people in their uncritical impressions and thought. The symbolic view of the Fall, held by many of the theologians discussed, has not affected the thinking of most people, and these writers do not appear to assume it to be the view known by Marx. It is the contention of this study that this interpretation of Marxist teaching about primitive communism and its disintegration is at best an inadequate and misleading portrayal of the essential thought of Marxism concerning history, man, and evil.

The view of history, man, and evil which emerges from a careful study of Marxism which is free of these formal presuppositions concerning its structure and content, is that

(footnote contd.) in tracing Marx's "fall" doctrine to Rousseau by way of Hegel, and to the sectarian contributions. However, these do not take into account the true nature of Marx's doctrine of primitive society.

man has been in a dialectical process of evolution in which he proceeds from an undeveloped beginning through necessary stages of imperfection which are not only evil, but also an aid to the development of true man, to the final perfection of mankind. There is a similarity in the form of social and property relations of man in the first and last stage (which Marx and Engels noted but did not use as an argument for communism), but here the similarity ceases. The dominant motif in Marxism is the development of man (and the fact of primitive society is used to prove the fact of a development of various forms of society), hence there can be no more than an analogy to the "Fall-Return" doctrine. The wholeness of social relations does not constitute the total human essence: man is a creature destined to use and dominate nature and to develop his own powers, as well as to be a social being. Thus there is a dual essence of man. This becomes more apparent when it is seen that the evil consequences of the "Fall" (division of labour, private property, money exploitation) are instrumental in the development of the final fulfillment of man, hence are good in their own time in the scheme of development. Man is viewed as a creature whose nature is to be self-determining, a master of nature, and a social being. As man advances in his conquest of nature and self-determination, he loses the undeveloped and imperfect, though ideal form of

his social nature and lays the foundation both for further conquests of nature and for a higher form of social existence. This is not a fall and return, pure and simple, but a dialectical development of man and society from within themselves, through inner antagonisms. The movement is from an undeveloped social unity through antagonisms and development into a higher unity in which the total nature of mankind has been fulfilled, in a qualitatively new way.⁶⁷

This points to both the basis and the limitation of the criticism attempted in this study: Marxism is an inversion of Hegelianism, and Hegel's doctrines of the Fall, and of development are repeated in it. It is thus an evolutionary monism, in which change is necessarily in the form of dialectical change or inner antagonisms. Hence one may say that the form of the Hegelian and Marxian "Fall" is the only possible form in such a system in which the Christian Fall doctrine might be inverted. This is the limit of the criticism, logically. However the point to be stressed is that: (1) Marx inverted Hegel, not Judaeo-Christian doctrine (and may be shown to have derived his impetus from Hegel's implications);⁶⁸

67. Several of the writers (Tillich, Cameron, Stark, for example) indicated a "higher" form in the new society, but none indicated the positive part played by the "fall" or by the various evil effects of this "fall", in the development of this higher form.

68. Herbert Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, chapter VI, esp. 202ff.

(2) the unqualified comparison of the two systems on this point is misleading to the popular mind, and may be so even to the uncritical mind trained in other fields of study;

(3) it obscures the real significance of Marxism: its understanding of man in terms of history, progress, development, human self-determination, hence its promethean humanism. Thus, while logically the analogy may be defended, and while it may be shown that Marxism is the end product of Christian doctrine by way of Hegel, it does not promote a clear understanding of Marxism in its theory and driving impetus, and draws attention away from other more essential religious characteristics. In short, it tends to create a formalism in the study of Marxism which does not confront its user with the living reality of the struggle of the modern world, and makes the historically false implication that Marx himself had direct Christian roots.

In addition to these considerations, a study of the Marxist doctrine of primitive society leads to a study of Marx's concept of Asiatic society which has been neglected by many and distorted by others. For this study, previously neglected reading excerpts from Marx have been utilized, as well as the printed materials.

vi.

The plan of the thesis is first to trace briefly the development of Marx's thought and to outline his system, with reference to its philosophy of history. This will involve a more detailed investigation of certain points than of others, especially with regard to Marx's original system and intentions. Following this, a detailed survey will be made of Marx's and Engels' writings on primitive society to determine the nature of its role in their thought, and their evaluation of it, and their writings on Asiatic society. After having ascertained the nature of their concept of ancient society and its dissolution, a brief survey of the Christian doctrine of the Fall in its classic formulations and in its modern re-interpretations will be made, to determine the degree of similarity to Marx's doctrine.

CHAPTER II

MARK'S DEVELOPMENT TO 1843

1.

Karl Marx (1818-1883) was born in Trier on the Moselle, May 5, 1818, into a comfortable middle class family, his father being a lawyer and a minor official. In spite of ancestral rabbinical associations, his father left the Jewish faith to join the Lutheran Church in 1816¹ and Marx grew up in an enlightened, nominal Christian household. He attended the University of Bonn 1835-1836, and the University of Berlin 1836-1841, and completed his studies with a doctoral dissertation which he submitted to the University of Jena (as a precaution against Prussian censorship) in April, 1841. He planned a teaching career at Bonn in philosophy, at the instigation of his friend Bruno Bauer, and settled there in July, 1841, but Bauer's dismissal for heretical doctrine closed this door in March, 1842. From Bonn he went to work on the staff of the

1. Gustav Wetter, Dialectical Materialism, 17.
Karl Marx was baptised in 1824.

liberal Rheinische Zeitung of Cologne, of which he became editor in 1842. The paper was suppressed in March, 1843, and Marx then wrote a critique of Hegel's philosophy of the State, married, and spent a summer at Kreuznach when he read widely in history to support his attack on Hegel. In November he went to Paris to collaborate with Arnold Ruge in publishing the Deutsch-Franzoesische Jahrbuecher, a dismal venture which published only one edition, in February 1844. This, however, contained two important transitional articles by Marx. In the spring and summer he wrote the so-called "Paris Manuscripts of 1844" or "Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844"² in which he outlined the foundations of his system (not published until 1932; now a crucial document). In August he met Friedrich Engels a second time and formed a life-long association with him, writing a joint work immediately, Die Heilige Familie, against Bruno Bauer and his associates. Here, in Paris he made his initial contact with the working class, read political economy for the first time, and made many contacts among the intelligentsia (Bakunin, Proudhon,

2. The Marx/Engels Gesamtausgabe (hereafter: MEGA) entitled them as: "Oekonomisch-Philosophische Manuskripte". Hereafter they are designated as 1844 Mes in the text and appropriate reference to various editions will be given in the notes.

Heine, Herwegh, to name a few). He was expelled and arrived in Brussels in January of 1845, and remained there until 1848. Again he participated in workers' movements, collaborated with Engels in writing Die Deutsche Ideologie (1845-6) a first systematic statement of historical materialism (published 1927) and replied to Froudhon with Misère de la Philosophie (1847). Together with Engels he prepared the Communist Manifesto and momentarily returned to Germany during the 1848 revolutions (having been expelled from Brussels to England).

He lived in London for the rest of his life, studying in the British Museum, writing newspaper articles for the New York Tribune and other papers, and publishing Zur Kritik der Politischenökonomie (1859), and the first volume of Das Kapital (1867). He maintained contact with the revolutionary movements and helped to organize the International Working Men's Association in 1867. His final volumes of Das Kapital were edited by Engels after his death which occurred in 1883. He published various pamphlets, compiled masses of notes for his magnum opus, corresponded widely, and lived in poverty.

Friedrich Engels (1820-1895) was born in Barmen, Germany, November 18, 1820, of a family of textile millowners of pietistic bent. In Barmen, learning the merchant's trade, he began his wide reading which led him out of traditional religious life into liberal and later, radical and revolutionary, circles. In 1841, in the army, he made the

acquaintance of Bruno Bauer and the Left-Hegelians and became a Left-Hegelian himself. In 1842 he went to England to manage his father's business in Manchester and came into contact with industrialism in the raw and with the English radical movements. He brushed with Marx in 1842, but Marx distrusted him because of his associations with the radical, literary group of Berlin and it was not until 1844 that Marx accepted him, having sampled his writing in the meantime.

In 1845 he published his book, Die Lage der arbeitenden Klassen in England. He too returned to Germany during the 1848 uprisings and played a part in them. Until 1870 he lived in Manchester, directing his business (signed over to him by his father), helping with Marx's finances, reading and writing, studying languages, science and mathematics, as well as politics and economics. Upon retirement and removal to London in 1870, he devoted himself fully to writing, study, and political activity. In addition to short articles and pamphlets he wrote Anti-Duehring (published first as articles in 1875-76 and then as a book in 1878), and fragmentary manuscripts on Dialectik der Nature (1878-82; first published in 1925). His reading and writing on pre-history was carried on intermittently and allowed him to write rapidly Der Ursprung der Familie, des Privateigentums und des Staats (1884; he also utilised

Marx's notes on Lewis Henry Morgan). In 1885 he edited and published volume II of Das Kapital, in 1886 he wrote Ludwig Feuerbach und der Ausgang der klassischen deutschen Philosophie (first as articles, later as a pamphlet), and in 1894 he edited the third volume of Das Kapital. He died in 1883, considered by many as the sage of socialism and communism.

ii.

The early life of Marx was a complex of free and "enlightened" father, schoolmasters, and future father-in-law; a home province which had experienced the Napoleonic reforms; and on the other hand a period of reaction, restoration and repression. The details of these may be had in the works of Isaiah Berlin, A. Cornu, H.P. Adams, and others.³ It is sufficient merely to point out this complexity of influences which off-sets the quiet and trouble-free life of the young Marx. The early influences of home and friends bred a belief in freedom and progress, and a love of intellectual pursuits, though we may dismiss any intense religious influence.⁴ These were countered by the repressive censorship

3. Isaiah Berlin, Karl Marx; H.P. Adams, Karl Marx in His Earlier Writings; Auguste Cornu, Karl Marx und Friedrich Engels Leben und Werke, Bd. I.

4. Cf. Adams, op. cit., 11-16, which indicates a pre-occupation with the moral and beneficial effects of religion, a lack of otherworldly interests, and a typically rationalistic or "enlightened" view of religion. Cf. Berlin, op. cit., 26-28, and Cornu, op. cit., 53-55.

of the Prussian regime which impinged upon Marx's adult life so often and the all-embracing "official" Hegelian philosophy which was the "end" of all philosophy. Personally Marx was a fortunate person, who suffered little of this until later, and who had a healthy, unambittered love of freedom and progress.⁵

Marx's intellectual venture proper began in Berlin in 1836: his year in Bonn does not reveal any more profound interests than tobacco, coffee, wine and conversation - and an absence of participation in radical organizations.⁶ In Berlin he plunged into writing poetry which revealed a strong romantic spirit,⁷ and read widely in art, history, law and philosophy. In his first semester he attempted a philosophy of law, which was marked by the idealist opposition of " ... des Wirklichen und Sollenen..." and which allowed the separation of abstract principles and reality.⁸ This is reported in a letter to his father on November 10, 1837, describing the previous year, and he later remarks in the same, that at the end of the semester he was forced to rest at Stralow where he encountered the Left-Hegelians of the

5. Cf. Adams, op. cit., 16.

6. Ibid., 18; Cornu, op. cit., 64.

7. Adams, op. cit., 19-20; Cornu, op. cit., 69-72; 85-96.

8. DF, 3, (MEGA, I, 215); Cf. Adams, op. cit., 22.

Doktor Klub.⁹ He at this time seems to have renounced idealism for he says:

Ein Vorhang war gefallen, mein Allerheiligstes verrissen, und es mussten neue Götter hineingesetzt werden.

Von dem Idealismus, den ich beiläufig gesagt, mit Kantischen und Fichteschen verglichen und gesehrt, geriet ich dazu, in Wirklichen selbst die Idee zu suchen. Hatten die Götter früher ueber der Erde gewohnt, so waren sie jetzt das Zentrum derselben geworden.

[he had only known fragments of Hegel, but now he plunged into his system / ... aber mit der bestimmten Absicht, die geistige Natur ebenso notwendig, konkret und fest gerundet zu finden wie die körperliche, nicht mehr Fichterkenntnisse zu ueben, sondern die reine Perle ans Sonnenlicht zu halten.¹⁰

It is here that one sees the first gleam of Marx's thought. He is turning to a real sphere for his philosophy, rejecting pure thought, and seeking to find the Idea in Reality itself; not above the earth will his gods dwell, but within its centre. It should be remembered, and this cannot be too strongly stressed, that there is no indication that Marx had any social concerns and that political concerns were at a minimum at this time: he was an intellectual rebel, sharing the common urge to overthrow idealism and Hegel's

9. DF, 3, 8-9 (MEGA, 215, 219-220); cf. Adams, op. cit., 23.

10. DF, 7 (MEGA, 218-219).

system (which he used in order to find spirit in a concrete manner).¹¹ In the Doktor Klub, he first became acquainted with this new view, which sought to "realize" philosophy at a time when its formulation was complete.¹² It was not until his work on the Rheinische Zeitung that he became acquainted with social and economic injustice and misery.¹³ And not until the next Semester (spring of 1837) do we hear of Feuerbach among his studies.¹⁴ Further, there was an initial reluctance to accept Hegel: he only turned to Hegel to find a more concrete expression of spirit (see above).

This is revealed by a dialogue seeking to unite art and science,

... an eine philosophisch-dialektische Entwicklung der Gottheit, wie sie als Begriff an sich, als Religion, als Natur, als Geschichte sich manifestiert. Mein letzter Satz war der Anfang des Hegelschen Systems und diese Arbeit ... traegt mich wie eine falsche Sirene den Feinde in den Arm.¹⁵

His struggle against Hegel is revealed in the statement that in the fellowship of the Doktor Klub he read all of Hegel, found many insights in the discussions,

11. Cf. H. Popitz, Die Entfremdete Mensch, 4ff, and S. Landshut's introduction in Marx, Die Frühhandschriften, xiv-xv. Cf. also, Cornu, op. cit., 85, 95, for his anti-reactionary, anti-Philistine, anti-idealist biases.

12. Cf. Cornu, op. cit., 124ff; 136.

13. See Marx's preface to Zur Kritik der politischen Oekonomie, (1859) in SW, I, 327-328.

14. DF, 8 (MEGA, 219).

15. Ibid., 7-9 (MEGA, 219).

... und immer fester kettete ich mich selbst an die jetzige Weltphilosophie, der ich zu enttrinnen gedacht, aber alles Klangreiche war verstummt, eine wahre Ironiewut befiel mich, wie es wohl leicht nach so viel Negierten geschehen konnte,¹⁶

These statements have led H.P. Adams to speak of Marx's "reluctant Hegelianism" and S. Landshut to say, that in spite of using Hegel's ideal of reason in reality, Marx never fully accepted Hegel's system because he saw its obscurity and abstractness.¹⁷ Perhaps Marx could always speak of the "... Hegelschen Philosophie ... deren groteske Falschmelodie mir nicht behagte,"¹⁸ as he said of his first impression of it.

iii.

At this point it is important to survey briefly the main features of the philosophical world in which Marx (also Engels) found himself in Berlin. Hegel had died in 1831, having been the undisputed, and "official" philosopher of Germany for fifteen years. He left an ambiguous heritage which soon split into opposing camps. His system was an all-encompassing whole based upon the unity of logic and existence which was mediated by a dialectic. His Logic

16. Ibid., 8-9 (MEGA, 220).

17. Ibid., xiv-xv; Adams, op. cit., 37.

18. DE, 7 (MEGA, 218).

presented the self-development of the Absolute in its self determination, proceeding from pure Being via Non-Being to Becoming, through an entire scale of increasing determinacy until the Absolute Idea is reached. This eternal nature of the Absolute is then alienated in Time and Space by being embodied in Nature - the "otherness" of Spirit - which progresses through increasingly higher grades of self-determinacy to the point of the emergence of "Mind" (Geist). The philosophy of Mind or Spirit consists of subjective mind or individual psychology and anthropology, then of objective mind or social and historical phenomena, both of which are united in Absolute Mind (Spirit) expressed in Art (intuition), Religion (imagery and symbol) and Philosophy (concept). Absolute Mind is the self-consciousness of the Absolute Idea, it is the Absolute Idea become real to itself, an object to itself.

The contradiction in Hegel was his fusion of a dialectic, which had no inherent limits, with the present - with his Absolute of (1) Monarchy, and Prussian Monarchy especially, (2) the Christian religion (3) Hegelian philosophy.¹⁹ This latent schism was soon exploited by a loosely connected group of intellectuals, Young- or Left-Hegelians, who opposed the Prussian absolutism largely in the name of philosophic or

19. Cornu, op. cit., 124-125.

intellectual freedom and bourgeois liberal aims. Absolutism had choked any effective opposition, hence philosophy, and philosophy of religion especially, became their field of endeavour. A. Corrau says that Edward Gans first gave impetus to this schizoid movement of Hegelianism by identifying liberalism with the development of the Absolute Spirit.²⁰ David F. Strauss with his Das Leben Jesu (1835-36), however, appears to have given the movement its foundation and overt origin.²¹ He opposed the union of philosophy and religion given by Hegel (the same content in different forms of perception and expression) by (1) denying that, as Hegel had affirmed, one could reduce the dogmas to concepts without changing the essence of religion, and denying that the logical truth and specific religious truth are identical; by (2) denying that Hegel could use the Christ revealed in the Gospels as a symbol of the mediation of God and the world, since by Hegelian terms God reveals himself gradually in history and a historical Christ is only a part of this revelation. Following the example of F.C. Bauer's search for the historical content of the Old Testament, Strauss sought the historical Jesus in order to counter Hegel's transformation of Him into symbols. He found the Gospel accounts to be, not a philosophical symbol, but myths springing from Jewish prophecy and expressing the endeavours of the Jewish people.²²

20. Ibid., 126

21. Ibid., 127.

22. Ibid., 127-128.

Further, having denied the historical Jesus, he also rejected a personal God in favour of an impersonal God of historical existence as suggested by Hegel's philosophy of religion: hence Christ was a moment of the total human history and a moment of the revelation of God, who is revealed only in the whole course of human history. Strauss had destroyed the harmony of religion and philosophy and the unity of the logical and historical developments - the basis of Hegel: actual, historical existence does not necessarily conform to the truth.²³ Hence, the thin end of the revolutionary wedge had entered. Hegel had justified the present by placing it at the end of the development of the Absolute: Christianity and Prussian monarchy were absolute (though Hegel did not try to see the future, this omission itself, however, being an expression of lack of vital interest in it).²⁴ As opposed to Fichte (who saw the future as the fulfillment) and Schelling (who looked to the past) Hegel glorified the present.²⁵ Strauss, himself no political critic, gave the Young-Hegelians a basis for attacking the absolutism and reaction of the present.

In the polemics that followed Strauss' book (1835-36) the Hegelian Left took more definite form in opposition to conservative Hegelians and conservative Anti-Hegelians. The Left sought to carry his initial attack further by means of the

23. Ibid., 128

24. Cf. Hegel, Philosophy of Right (trans. by T.M. Knox), 12-13.

25. Cf. Cornu, op. cit., 37-38.

contradiction of the endless dialectic with Hegel's absolute system and political order. The fight against absolutism (as before stated) was conceived in philosophy because the actual opposition, the bourgeoisie, was weak and ineffective, and conservative; hence they must find a theoretical solution, a philosophical solution springing from within Hegelianism. August von Cieszkowski (1814-1894) a Pole, did this in his Prolegomena zur Historiographie (1838). Accepting Hegel's view of world history as the expression of the development of the Idea, he set out three stages: feeling (antiquity), thought (period of internalization, from Christ to Hegel) and will (action, though in a theoretical sense!)²⁶ Hegel, who had shown the laws of world development from its past history, failed to show human activity as will, but only as thinking. Cieszkowski prophesied the age of Will, of "die Philosophie der Tat" of "Praxis" in which men would consciously shape their destiny.²⁷ This new age he saw first coming forth in the socialist teachings of Fourier, and in Saint-Simon's emphasis on productive relations.²⁸ While the Left-Hegelians did not follow his break with liberal bourgeois aims, they were susceptible

26. Cf. Ibid., 8-9; Wetter, op. cit., 130ff.

27. Cornu, op. cit., 131.

28. Ibid., 152.

to his concept of influencing the course of historical development by theoretical criticism, through Will.²⁹

At this time Arnold Ruge founded the Hellischen Jahrbuechern fuer Kunst und Wissenschaft (1838) which proved to be an organ for the expansion of criticism from that of religion and philosophy to criticism of politics and society.³⁰ By October of 1839 Ruge and his co-editor had issued an attack on the Reaction, accusing Prussia of becoming reactionary under the influence of romanticism and calling on her to return to her mission, to be a liberal state and promote progress as at the Reformation.³¹ This was followed by another article of attack in November.³² The Young-Hegelians and the Doktor Klub now became increasingly political, a new turn for the Doktor Klub, which in 1838 contained no "political" members.³³

Another facet to the Young-Hegelian complex of ideas and personalities was that of Heinrich Heine, the poet. His view of German philosophy being essentially the theoretical expression of the French Revolution was accepted as the basis of their efforts to adopt Hegelianism to the liberal aims.³⁴

As a movement of political opposition, the Young-Hegelians now possessed a foundation of attack, (Strauss), a theory of

29. Ibid., 133.

30. Ibid., 133-134

31. Ibid., 138-139

32. Ibid., 140.

33. Ibid., 141.

34. Ibid.

transcending Hegel, (Ciesakowski's doctrine of activity, Will), and an organ of attack (Ruge's publication). They lacked, however, a clearly defined mode for the transformation to Will. This was soon supplied by the work of Bruno Bauer, a former Right-Hegelian: the transcendence of Christianity by criticism.³⁵ Bauer distinguished the revelation of the Old Testament from that of the New Testament by asserting that the latter was higher, hence superseded it: he concluded that all revelation was conditional and to be transcended. Further he followed Hegel (having just denied his view of Christ as universal mediator of God and Man) by saying that the Christian faith was the result of the situation of the Roman world (not merely the Jewish world) and that it transformed it. The next task of humanity is to transform the modern world by freeing it from Christianity, by means of criticism.³⁶ Now philosophy had not only its task, to determine the future, but also its method. He denied the absoluteness of Christianity, hence weakening Hegelianism's position and pointing to movement in history instead of the absolutising of certain stages of it, as binding for all others; he drew from Hegel himself, the concept of transforming the world (just as Christianity had done in

35. Ibid., 142ff.

36. Ibid., 146.

Hegel's view of Christianity and the Graeco-Roman world). Hegelianism was being transformed into a weapon for the liberal effort by transcending the basis of reaction within it.

Bauer had no particular political allegiance, assuming that criticism would easily destroy Christianity (as Christianity destroyed the ancient world view) and that the Prussian state would support this new view as a Vernunftstaat.³⁷ Ruge held similar views but did not limit his criticism to religion, criticising the irrational in politics as well.

We have not considered Feuerbach here. He had by 1839 broken with Hegel, attacking his basic premises instead of transforming his philosophy into a progressive one. He stood, in one sense, outside the Hegelian Left but had no doubt added to the general transformation of Hegel's thought.³⁸ His important rôle comes later and will be considered there.

Here then we have the general character of the intellectual world of Marx the student. A reactionary, romantic, and Right-Hegelian government and party of thought was opposed by a critical, liberal, Left-Hegelian circle of thinkers holding general liberal ideals, seeking the freedom to say so, and hoping to "convert" the government to an enlightened view. Excepting Strauss, the main thought was propounded from 1838 onwards, and explicit political involvement set in only from

37. Ibid., 147.

38. Ibid., 137-139; for a contrary view cf. Sidney Hook, From Hegel to Marx, 226: "To Feuerbach, as to the rest of the Young Hegelians..."

1839. Marx either came with his own ideas of realizing the good,³⁹ or received the non-political and non-social views of the nascent Left-Hegelian group. Only after his statements about finding the ideal in the real, (in 1837) could he have read Cieszkowski and others on these matters. (It should be said that after 1841, Hegelianism was abandoned by the Government - it was too subversive in any form - and that the suppression and opposition became more bitter.)⁴⁰

iv.

Turning aside from the more concrete details of the development and position of the Left-Hegelian movement of which Marx was a part, or even of his part in it, we consider next his uniqueness, his doctoral dissertation, and later, to his editorial experiences and work just prior to his acceptance of Communism and the formulation of his system.

Marx did not follow the Left-Hegelian viewpoint entirely; generally they followed the Fichtean philosophy as opposed to Hegel, as regards the relation of Spirit and Being. Marx followed Hegel, who sought the contradictions and tensions of concrete reality, the Objective Spirit, not the static opposition of Sein - Sollen and Sein, of Geist and Umwelt. In opposition to Trendelenberg,

39. Cf. note 4 above.

40. Cornu, op. cit., 153.

(who criticized Hegel by means of a non-dialectical view of Aristotle, saying that Spirit must always receive new material from concrete reality and thus denied that Spirit could develop by an inner dialectic) Marx held that the world is an organic unity of Spirit and concrete reality. Holding to the absolute creative acting of Spirit, Marx ascribed this activity to Objective Spirit, not to Subjective Spirit.⁴¹ Here is the germ of Marx's later break with the Left-Hegelians and his emphasis upon "Praxis", upon actual transformation of reality, of society.

The primary importance of the doctoral dissertation for us rests upon his remarks in the appendix containing preparatory work for it.⁴² The important point was made in his consideration of the relation of Philosophy to the world. Marx had not yet criticized Hegel as Feuerbach had (and as he

41. Cf. Ibid., 159-160 and the references.

42. In the work itself, a study of Epicurean and Democritean philosophies of nature, he favoured Epicurean philosophy. By its doctrine of atoms in free movement instead of movement only in straight lines, it gave freedom to the atom, and as it made the atom the symbol of the individual self-consciousness it gave it freedom. He differed with the Epicurean abstraction of man from the world in freedom-constituting activity, as this made effective action upon the world impossible, and isolated man. (cf. Cornu, op. cit., 163-164; 172ff.) Marx also favoured the atheism of Epicurus against the theism of Plutarch and resembles the interpretation of religion found in Feuerbach: that God and belief in Him is the self-alienation of man, the setting up of man's eternal nature as a separate being to be contemplated, and immortality as based upon fear of death. (cf. Ibid., 165-166).

himself would later) and he sought a way to go beyond Hegel to die Philosophie der Tat without falling into the error of the idealistic critical philosophy of Bauer. This he does by recourse to the history of philosophy: there are periods in which Spirit gives complete and universal expression to itself in theory, in system - as in Aristotle and Hegel. (These periods are called Knotenpunkte). Then mind seeks to find the external world in its own image, finds it not, and Will is generated by this pain of dissatisfaction springing from the contrast between inner satisfaction (of complete and harmonious theory) and the outer world. Spirit as Will then seeks to effect its reconciliation by transforming the world into its own image.⁴³ Here then Marx expresses the theme of the realization of philosophy, which means the "end" of philosophy, not as rejection but as fulfilment - a theme to recur later. Praxis, the changing of the world, action instead of contemplation - this came to be Marx's keynote. At this time, however, he was still in a theoretical frame and saw a dialectic between philosophy and the world.⁴⁴ The realization of philosophy and the identification of Spirit or God with Man's self-consciousness show Marx's position at this time, in relation to Hegel.

43. Cf. DE, 12-15, 15-19 (MEGA 131-133; 65-66) Cornu, op. cit., 146ff; R.C. Tucker, Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx, 77-79.

44. Cornu, op. cit., 179.

Marx successfully submitted his doctoral dissertation to Jena, April 6, 1841, and the degree was awarded on April 15.⁴⁵ After a few months in Trier he lived in Bonn awaiting employment, but this hope ended when Bruno Bauer was dismissed in March of 1842. Marx had, however, become involved in the publication of the liberal newspaper, Rheinische Zeitung in Cologne, securing the appointment of a member of the Doktor Klub as editor, and upon his resignation, securing the post himself, (October, 1842) having contributed articles since May.⁴⁶ During this period Marx wrote his first political and social articles (the first one written was not published until 1843, in Switzerland, for fear of censorship.⁴⁷ It was of this period that Marx later said he first came into contact with the "material questions" and the questions of economics and politics.⁴⁸ During this period (until March 16, 1843)⁴⁹ Marx became increasingly critical of Hegel's view of the State, but he did not go over to socialism or communism until the winter of 1843-44. During his Rheinische Zeitung days he wrote against the government's action in matters of censorship, divorce laws, laws depriving peasants of the age-old right to gather fallen wood, and the government's policy in relieving (or failing to do so) the distress of the wine-growers caught in the economic

45. Adams, op. cit., 42.

46. Ibid., 45, 51, 59.

47. Ibid., 46.

48. Cf. note 13 above.

49. Adams, op. cit., 71.

adjustments of the tariffs union.

It is not our purpose here to follow his problems, arguments, or slight shifts of viewpoint during this period. It is of importance only, to note his viewpoint generally: that of a radical democrat. The state should embody the moral will of the people, but leave certain matters private; free discussion was not to be suppressed.⁵⁰ Liberty was reason, the essence of humanity.⁵¹ The state is the representative of the social whole,⁵² the manifestation of reason, the individual and the whole.⁵³ The conflict of classes is not irreconcilable and there is no need for a general social conflict in order to arrive at egalitarian institutions.⁵⁴ He denounced imaginary ideal standards such as Moses Hess had propounded (in the paper just prior to Marx's editorship), that when in the ideal state, with an identity of the individual and general interest prevailing, there would be no need for a State.⁵⁵ Also the historical school of law, which justified all institutions purely on the basis of their existence, came in for criticism.⁵⁶ The state is not to be trampled by a fetishism for property.⁵⁷ In fact Marx waxes eloquent on the spiritual nature of the State:

50. Ibid., cf. also 53, 66-67.

51. Ibid., 54.

52. Ibid., 67.

53. Ibid., 58.

54. Ibid., 67.

55. Ibid., 60-61.

56. Ibid., 60.

57. Ibid., 63-64.

In a true state there is no landed property, no industry, no gross matter, which in their condition of raw elements could make a bargain with the state; there are only spiritual powers, and only in their resurrection in the state, their political re-birth, are the natural powers qualified for the franchise of the state. The state pervades the whole nature with spiritual nerves, and at every point it must be apparent that not matter but form, not nature without the state but the nature of the state, not the unfree thing but the free man dominates.⁵⁸

This does, of course, reveal tendencies of his later thought - the dominance of "free man", but the state is the condition of this.

Marx reveals several interesting realistic views, however, which find a place in his later system. First, in his very first series of articles on press censorship, he attributes the viewpoints of various speakers in the parliamentary debates to their class position.⁵⁹ Second, he denounces censorship as an action attributing to individuals (censors) the perfections which belong to the totality of mankind.⁶⁰ Third, in his last series of articles, deploring lack of Governmental action for relief of the distressed wine-growers, he makes a damaging criticism of the psychology of bureaucracy, which paralyzes all proper action. Class interest and personal interest conspire to create a fear of action and initiative in the bureaucrat. The individual is the victim of the machine, the machine is to serve the people, but it becomes

58. Ibid., 68; quoted by Adams.

59. Ibid., 52.

60. Ibid., 50.

a self-contained power unto itself.⁶¹ Here again there is an insight that receives further attention, in fact it is the basis of his next major shift of position, his criticism of Hegel's philosophy of the State.

We have seen the incipient criticism of religion in the doctoral dissertation in the identification of God with the eternal nature of man as a lost projection of man; likewise we have seen the potential critique of philosophy (potential, because Marx still lives by philosophy!) in the concept of the realization of Philosophy - its fulfilment in Praxis. In the above we have just seen the germs of disenchantment with political life which led to his criticism of political institutions. Here we have three of the four critiques of Marx (religion, philosophy, politics, economics) in their order of origin. All of these have been made in the name of man: the criticised form is an alienated form of man and is criticised from the standpoint of a free man (cf. the above quotation on the State as a condition in which "free man dominates"). This method is the heritage of Strauss (religious doctrine is a myth of the community) and Feuerbach (the object is the real and all else is derived from it) in particular, and of the age generally.

61. Ibid., 69-70.

v.

Feuerbach became increasingly important in the formation of Marx's thought: his "Kritik der Hegelschen Philosophie" appeared in 1839, his Das Wesen des Christentums in 1841,⁶² his "Vorlaeufigen Thesen zur Reform der Philosophie" in 1842, and his "Grundsaeetze der Philosophie der Zukunft" in 1843. These appeared during Marx's period of 'fermentation' and are used extensively in his writings during 1843-44. Already, the criticism of the censorship for placing a perfection of the whole of mankind in particular individuals has been a use of Feuerbach's key idea in Das Wesen des Christentums (as we shall see later). It is necessary to make a brief summary of Feuerbach before proceeding to the writings of Marx during 1843-44.

Feuerbach was early a rebel and an outcast: a student under Hegel at Berlin and a graduate at Erlangen (1828), where he was Privatdozent and where he published an anonymous pamphlet (1830) attacking the doctrine of immortality. This prevented further academic advancement and he retired from Erlangen in 1834, married in 1837, whereby he had 'independent means', and lived in Schloss Bruckberg bei Ansbach.⁶³

62. Tucker, op. cit., 80, says "some months" after the dissertation.

63. Cornu, op. cit., 137, note 29.

This life in the country, however, seems to have set him on his final development.⁶⁴ In any event, naturalism, humanism, and sensuousness were his key ideas, and he was in opposition to abstract, speculative philosophy and religion with their absolutes and systems. At heart he was a humanist whose concern was to free man, to set him on his own feet in his own world, and his various viewpoints and methods are for this purpose.⁶⁵

The first trait of Feuerbach to be noted is his rejection of Hegel by inverting the relationship of thought (Spirit) and being (Nature). In this he broke with Hegel by starting from different premises instead of trying to go beyond him, as did Marx and the other Young-Hegelians.⁶⁶ We shall not be

64. In the notes from this period is found:

Einst in Berlin und jetzt auf einem Dorfe! Welche Unsinn! Nicht doch, mein theurer Freund! Siehe, den Sand, den mir die Berliner Staatsphilosophie in die Zirbeldrüse, wohin er gehört, aber leider! auch in die Augen streute, wasche ich mir hier an den Quell der Natur vollends aus. Logik lernte ich auf einer deutschen Universität, aber Optik - die Kunst zu sehen lernte ich erst auf einem deutschen Dorfe. (Sämtliche Werke II (hereafter cited as: SW), 402; cf. Cornu, op. cit., 137, note 29.

65. Cf. Sidney Hook, From Hegel to Marx, 221-226. Also Cf. Feuerbach's statement, "Der Gott war mein erster Gedanke, die Vernunft mein Zweiter, der Mensch mein dritter und letzter Gedanke. Das Subject der Gottheit ist die Vernunft, aber das Subject der Vernunft der Mensch." (SW, II, 410) Or in Ibid., 413: "Die Philosophie zur Sache der Menschheit zu machen, das war mein erstes Bestreben." And Ibid., 414: "Einst war mir das Denken Zweck des Lebens, aber jetzt ist mir das Leben Zweck des Denkens." "Die wahre Philosophie besteht darin, nicht Bücher, sondern Menschen zu machen."

66. However, it will become increasingly clear that Feuerbach does retain much of Hegel and at times even seems to conform to the Young-Hegelian method. Cf. Tucker, op. cit., 96, who says that he never got over his Hegelianism completely.

concerned with the details of this criticism of Hegel, as by it Feuerbach merely wins his position of naturalism or materialism: the primacy of Being, of Nature, over thought.⁶⁷ The truth is not to be had by assuming a result, going to nature and history and forcing them into the result; rather, the truth is to be had by going to nature, observing it in all its concreteness and details and allowing it to impress itself upon the perceiving mind. This inversion of Thought and Being, Spirit and Matter, is the basis of all his later thought, though he seems to have found it an instrument for his humanism rather than a closely defined philosophical doctrine.

The second point on Feuerbach is his distinction between religion and philosophy, i.e. true philosophy. Hegel had equated the two as being different modes of perception and expression of the same content: Feuerbach declares there to be a radical and qualitative distinction between them. Religion is the relation of man to himself, philosophy is the relation of man to his object, as in science:

... die Religion die Beziehung des Subjects zum Object ist, welche in der Beziehung auf den Gegenstand lediglich nur eine Beziehung des Menschen auf sich selbst, auf seine innern und selbst physikalischen Beduerfnisse ausdruckt, die Philosophie dagegen die Beziehung des Subjects zum Object, welche in der Beziehung auf den Menschen--ohne solche ist, wie gesagt, Nichts fuer ihn-- lediglich nur eine Beziehung auf den Gegenstand ausdruckt.⁶⁸

67. Cf. S. Hook, op. cit., 226ff; Feuerbach, SW, II, 185ff: "Zur Kritik der Hegel'schen Philosophie"; Wetter, op. cit., 10-11.

68. Feuerbach, SW, II, 181.

Of course, Feuerbach did not deny, and, in fact, made it his point of attack, that idealistic philosophy was identical with religion, as it itself claimed.⁶⁹

This rejection of the union of philosophy and religion leads to a third point, the discussion of Feuerbach's philosophy of religion, the details of which are most important for our understanding of Marx. The most important expression of it is Das Wesen des Christentums (1841) whose elaborations Marx used; its basic premises are clarified by referring to several articles written in 1839.

In the remarks⁷⁰ to a previous article, Feuerbach said that the essence of religion is "Phantasie und Gemueth"⁷¹; in Das Wesen des Christentums he said "Die Grunddogmen des Christenthums sind erfuelle Herzenuuensche--das Wesen des Christenthums ist das Wesen des Gemueths."⁷² Or:

Der wesentliche Standpunkt der Religion ist der praktische, d.h. hier der subjektive. Der Zweck der Religion ist das Wohl, das Heil, die Seligkeit des Menschen...⁷³

69. Cf. Cornu, op. cit., 137-138.

70. Feuerbach, "Ueber Philosophie und Christentum", in SW, II, 179-184, which refers to "Ueber Philosophie und Christentum in Beziehung auf den der Hegelschen Philosophie gemachten Vorwurf der Unchristlichkeit" in SW, I, 42-107; both published in 1839.

71. Feuerbach, SW, II, 179.

72. Ibid., VII, 197.

73. Ibid., 254.

The heart, - the Gemueh and Phantasie are contrasted with the reason and objectivity. Gemueh expresses need of the individual, Phantasie is the intellectual expression of Gemueh while on the other hand reason expresses the objective reality of the thing in itself apart from the relation of the thing to the needs or possible satisfactions of the individual. Hence:

Das Gemueh druockt Beduerfnisse aus, die Phantasie Willkuhr—das hoechste Gesetz des Gemuehs ist, was befriedigt, das hoechste Gesetz der Phantasie, was gefaellt... Das Gemueh macht sich selbst zum Gott, zum absoluten Wesen; es will dass nichts sei, was dem Gemueh widerspricht--seine Wuensche sind ihm die allein gueltigen Gesetz. Das Gesetz des Herzens, im Widerspruch mit dem wirklichen Gesetz der Welt, als soussere That verwirklicht ist das Wunder--das Wunder daher die natuerliche, aber eben deswegen wesentlich charakteristische Anschauung der Religion von der Welt.

Die Phantasie ist die subjective intellectuelle Thaetigkeit, welche die Dinge darstellt, wie sie dem Gemueh entsprechen; die Vernunft, die objective intellectuelle Thaetigkeit, welche die Dinge darstellt, wie sie sind, ohne auf die Beduerfnisse des Gemuehs Ruocksicht zu nehmen.⁷⁴

The origin of this Phantasie is the discrepancy between the needs and the desires of man and his reality. In an article on miracles Feuerbach expresses this in a passage which contains much of his philosophy of religion compressed within it. He explains how it is that Phantasie arises, Phantasie, the intelligence which is determined by the needs and wishes of the hearts of men.

74. Ibid., II, 180.

Dem Menschen, der zu einem geliebten Gegenstand in der Ferne eilt, ist jeder river, forbidding ground, tree, hill,--all of which are obstacles to him...eine Schranke, die sich stoerend mitten zwischen ihm und den Gegenstand seiner Wuensche hinstellt; in seiner Phantasie ist er schon an dem ersehnten Orte, aber langsam schleppt er als eine laestige Buerde seinen schwerfaelligen Koerper mit sich fort. Der Schmerz ueber den Widerspruch der Wirklichkeit mit dem Beduerfniss seines Herzens presst ihm den Wunsch aus: O waer ich doch leicht wie ein Vogel, so schnell wie der Wind; er seufzt--und siehe! dort oben im Himmel schweben seine Seufzer als Engel--vogelleichte, ungebundene, selige Wesen--und ueber diesen Engeln das hoechste Wesen als ein schlechthin schrankenloses Wesen, als ein Wesen, dessen Willen nichts in Wege steht, bei dem Befehlen (Wuenschen, Vollen) und Schaffen identisch ist. Das Herz vergegenstaendlicht, verselbststaendigt seinen Wunsch und Drang, frei zu sein von allen Bestimmungen und Schranken, als die absolute, die goettliche Willkuehr, die Allmacht. In der goettlichen Allmacht macht der bedraengte Wunsch sich Luft, hier stroemt das bekloemene Herz seine Seufzer aus, hier entledigt es sich der eignen Schranken; hier entschaeudigt es sich fuer das, was es in der Welt entbehrt; hier gibt sich der Mensch, was er haben moechte, was ihm schmerzt, nicht zu besitzen; hier macht er seine Wuensche zu den Gesetzen, der siegreichen Maechten der Welt. Gott ist in ihm die Anschauung und Empfindung der Freiheit von den Schranken der Wirklichkeit: Gott kann Alles; ihm ist nichts unmoeglich, sein Wille ist das einzige Gesetz. Der Wunsch zerbricht die Schranken der Subjectivitaet--er will dass das sei, was er wuenscht--die Allmacht ist der realisirte Wille des Wunsches; denn der Wunsch ist nichts unmoeglich; er mag und vermag Alles.⁷⁵

Therefore, the Phantasie "... ist der Engel des Herzens, der Himmel auf Erden, der Spiegel der Welt, wie sie den Wuenschen des Menschen entspricht."⁷⁶ Miracle expresses the essence of Phantasie because it is nothing but "... die willkuehrliche Verknuepfung und Verwandlung widersprechender Dinge mit - und ineinander,"⁷⁷ hence expresses the wish in sensuous form.

75. Ibid., I, 31-32. 76. Ibid., 32.

77. Ibid., 29; cf. 138.

In these passages Feuerbach located the origin of religion in the limitation of man, in the contradiction between reality and man's wishes and needs: the objectification or projection of these into a heavenly realm is really a projection of man himself. This idea is more fully developed in Das Wesen des Christentums, with a further development of its content: there, God is the projected essence of the species, the general nature of man as a whole,⁷⁸ though he still supplies the wishes and needs of the limited individual, and as we have seen, the doctrines are fulfilled wishes. It is this species concept that is central to the book and to Marx's writings of 1844.

Religion is limited to the human race, says Feuerbach; man is distinguished by consciousness--consciousness in the strictest sense, "... wo einen Wesen seine Gattung, seine Wesenheit Gegenstand ist."⁷⁹ Man has an inner life, is able to discern his own species (and is thus capable of discerning the species life of other beings - i.e. he is capable of science), and converses with himself, is at once I-Thou; he is not bound by consciousness of his individuality but is able to have his

78. This is also evident in later writings. In his "Grundriss der Philosophie der Zukunft", P 12 he says: "Hier haben wir daher ein sinnfalliges Beispiel von der Wahrheit, dass die Vorstellung des Menschen von Gott die Vorstellung des menschlichen Individuums von seiner Gattung, dass Gott als der Inbegriff aller Realitäten oder Vollkommenheiten nichts Anderes ist, als der zum Nutzen des beschränkten Individuums compendiarisch zusammengefasst Inbegriff der unter die Menschen vertheilten, im Laufe der Weltgeschichte sich realisirenden Eigenschaften der Gattung". (SW, II, 292-293.)

79. Feuerbach, SW, VII, 24.

own essential nature and species nature as an object of thought.⁸⁰ This self-consciousness is identical with the human uniqueness, which includes religion: "Das Wesen des Menschen im Unterschied vom Thiere ist nicht nur der Grund, sondern auch der Gegenstand der Religion."⁸¹ However, since religion is consciousness of the infinite, it is the consciousness man has of his own infinite nature, consciousness of the infinity of consciousness.

The nature of man of which he is conscious is "Die Vernunft, der Wille, das Herz"; to the complete man belong the powers of these: "Die Kraft des Denkens ist das Licht der Erkenntnis, die Kraft des Willens die Energie des Characters, die Kraft des Herzens die Liebe."⁸² These make up a trinity over the individual man, for in reality man does not possess them, they constitute his being. These powers exist for their own sake, i.e. for the sake of thinking, willing, loving. These powers and all supra-individual characteristics make up the species nature of man, his general nature, his universal nature, that which is the basis of science. This is a term and concept used by Hegel; he also says that man's nature is double, that he has the ability to know his own inner, universal nature, as well as to know his immediate individual, sensuous nature, as do the animals.⁸³

One very important feature of Feuerbach is his concept of the subject-object relation (a concept used later by Marx

80. Ibid., 24-25. 81. Ibid., 25. 82. Ibid., 26.

83. Cf. Hegel, Encyklopaedia, P 24 (The Logic of Hegel (Wallace), 47).

in the 1844 Man. and interpreted by some as being an artificial method of escaping into the social world.⁸⁴

Feuerbach says that a subject's object is a revelation of the nature of the subject : it reveals the subject's powers of perception, interests, understanding, and other qualities. In the case of the relation of the sun to the earth and to the other planets, the sun as the earth's object reveals the nature of the earth for the sun is a different sun to the different planets, depending upon the various distances from the sun: intensity of light reveals the distance of the earth from the sun.⁸⁵ Hence the planets' object, the sun, mirrors the planets' own nature. Similarly with man, regarding both spiritual and sensuous objects:

An dem Gegenstande wird daher der Mensch seiner selbst bewusst: das Bewusstsein des Gegenstands ist das Selbstbewusstsein. Aus dem Gegenstande erkennst Du den Menschen; an ihm erscheint Dir sein Wesen; der Gegenstand ist sein, offenbares Wesen, sein wahres, objectives Ich.⁸⁶

Man is "...nichts ohne Gegenstand"⁸⁷; if the same object is beheld by different individuals of the same species but under various conditions, "...so ist er/wenigstens so, wie er diesen Individuen je nach ihrer Verschiedenheit Objectist, ihr eigenes aber gegenstaendliches Wesen."⁸⁸ (Thus when Marx says man's

84. Cf. R.C. Tucker, Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx, 144-149, 174-176.

85. Feuerbach, EW, VII, 28-29.

86. Ibid., 29.

87. Ibid., 28.

88. Ibid.

relation to woman or to his fellows reveals his own degree of realisation of his essential nature--as we shall see later-- he is following this principle of Feuerbach.)

Feuerbach draws an important consequence from this axiom. The power of an object over the subject merely reveals the power of his own nature, hence his own nature is the absolute to him. For example, the power of an object evoking feeling is the power of feeling itself, an attribute of the feeling subject, as in music.⁸⁹ Therefore Feuerbach holds that "Das absolute Wesen, der Gott des Menschen ist sein eignes Wesen."⁹⁰ This gives concreteness to his doctrine that God is the objectified or projected essence of man.

Having made these preliminary observations about Das Wesen des Christentums, it is perhaps most profitable to examine next his doctrine of true man, man as he is species man, man as he should be. Then his interpretation of religion as the alienated state of man will become more meaningful.

Interspersed throughout the work are indications of what Feuerbach considers the true nature of man and the true view man should take of this nature. The following points are instructive.

(1) That man is a natural, material creature who also thinks, is hardly in need of exposition. It is the well-known position of Feuerbach. A creature in space and time is subject to the limitations of space and time.

89. Ibid., 30.

90. Ibid.

(2) Contrary to Marx's criticism, Feuerbach assumed man to be a developing historical being (though it is the case that Feuerbach did not draw the consequences of this). In science, the scientific genius of a particular age comprehends in itself the powers of the preceding age and at the same time modifies them according to its own needs and character.⁹¹ Wit, imagination, feeling (not sensation), acumen, reason, are all the products of society and flourish in a historically produced situation. Further, man's history "... besteht in nichts Andern als einer fortgehenden Ueberwindung von Schranken, die zu einer bestimmten Zeit fuer Schranken der Menschheit, und darum fuer absolute, unuebersteigliche Schranken galten."⁹² This unlimited nature of the species is seen particularly in philosophy and physical science. Corresponding to this development of man's knowledge and capabilities is the development or transformation of religion in which man takes from God and adds to himself: Der

Der oben im Allgemeinen angegebene Entwicklungsgang der Religion besteht daher nacher darin, dass der Mensch immer mehr Gott abimmer mehr sich zu spricht. Anfangs setzt der Mensch Alles ohne Unterschied nussor sich. Was einer spaetern Zeit oder einem gebildeten Volk die Natur oder Vernunft, das giebt einer fruehern Zeit oder einem noch ungebildeten Volke Gott ein.⁹³

Further, in a different context, he says that religion and

91. Ibid., 127-128.

92. Ibid., 213.

93. Ibid., 63.

science are in inverse ratio: "Je beschränkter der Gesichtskreis des Menschen, je weniger er weiss von Geschichte, Natur, Philosophie, desto inniger hängt er an seiner religion."⁹⁴ What was religion yesterday is not such to-day; what is atheism to-day will be religion tomorrow.⁹⁵ The great turning point in history is at the present when man has really outgrown religion by virtue of his practical life and is now to renounce it in his consciousness, making his own being and essence his highest, his absolute.⁹⁶ It is obvious that there is a foundation of historicism beneath Feuerbach's system.

(3) Man is a species being; the individual is limited and imperfect, the species is unlimited, the absolute for man, and is continually surmounting new limits: the individual is to appropriate the perfection and infinitude of the species. The individual is a creature of space and time; he cannot utilise all his powers at the same time, he cannot be in all places at once. The species is unlimited in time and space, in perfections and attributes and in possibility. Not only does the individual utilise, in the more literal sense, the powers and perfections of his fellowmen, of the species, but he develops only in the company of his fellowmen—hence the greater development in the cities than in the country

94. Ibid., 292.

95. Ibid., 64.

96. Ibid., 361.

mentioned above: there is a qualitative as well as a quantitative increase in human power in association. Only through man does man become himself.⁹⁷ This is seen also in love between the sexes in which male and female are required to make a complete human being (biologically in reproduction of the species, and spiritually in terms of personality); in friendship where friends complement each other; in the cancelling out of sins in the race--one person's virtue cancels another's sin and vice versa.⁹⁸ Hence:

...das Du zur Vollkommenheit des Ich gehoert, dass die Menschen erst zusammen den Menschen ausmachen, die Menschen nur zusammen das sind und so sind, was und wie der Mensch sein soll und sein kann.⁹⁹

This received further expression in three theses in his "Grundsätze der Philosophie der Zukunft" of 1843:

P58. Die Wahrheit existiert nicht im Denken, nicht in Wissen fuer sich selbst. Die Wahrheit ist nur die Totalitaet des Menschlichen Lebens und Wesens.

P59. Der einzelne Mensch fuer sich hat das Wesen des Menschen weder in sich als moralischen, noch in sich als denkenden Wesen. Das Wesen des Menschen ist nur in der Gemeinschaft, in der Einheit des Menschen mit den Menschen enthalten--eine Einheit, die sich aber nur auf die Realitaet des Unterschiedes von Ich und Du stuetzt.

P60. Einigkeit ist Endlichkeit und Beschränkung, Gemeinschaftlichkeit ist Freiheit und Unendlichkeit. Der Mensch fuer sich ist Mensch (in gewöhnlichen Sinn); Mensch mit Mensch--die Einheit von Ich und Du ist Gott.¹⁰⁰

(4) This leads to Feuerbach's concept of the "other" as mediator between the individual and the species. This is the

97. Ibid., 127-128; 213; 217-219. 98. Ibid., 216-219; 221-222.

99. Ibid., 216.

100. Ibid., II, 344.

case in the cancellation of sin (moral imperfection) or the "natural reconciliation": "Der Andere ist an und fuer sich der Mittler zwischen mir und der heiligen Idee der Gattung:"¹⁰¹ and a man's sin is cast into nothingness because it is his and not that of his "other" or his fellowman. However, beyond this particular application, man is man because of another man. The truth of the doctrine of creation by the Second Person of the Trinity is the truth of the nature of man:

Die Wahrheit, die zu Grunde liegt, ist das Wesen des Menschen: die Einheit seines Selbstbewusstseins mit dem Bewusstsein von einem Andern, welches mit ihm eins ist. Und das zweite, das wesensgleiche Andere ist notwendig das Mittelglied zwischen dem Ersten und Dritten. Der Gedanke eines Andern ueberhaupt, eines wesentlich Andern entsteht mir erst durch den Gedanken eines in Wesen mir gleichen Andern.¹⁰²

The absolute Other--the world--is a limit to the egoism, the unlimitedness of self (God)--it cannot pass directly to it. This contradiction is mediated by being confronted with another who is not self, yet who confirms self and is of like nature of self.

Erst staecht das Ich seinen Blick in dem Auge eines Du, ehe es die Anschauung eines Wesens ertraegt, welches ihm nicht sein eigenes Bild zurueckstrahlt. Der andere Mensch ist das Band zwischen mir und der Welt. Ich bin und fuehle mich abhaengig von der Welt, weil zuerst von andern Mensch mich abhaengig fuehle.¹⁰³

It is by the other man that man identifies himself--comes to self-consciousness, and differentiates himself from the world;

101. Ibid., VII, 222.

102. Ibid., 125-126.

103. Ibid., 126.

it is by social contact and combination that human powers are developed (as above); it is by social existence that thought first arises.¹⁰⁴ Hence it is that natural, rational man, true man, is related to the species by his fellows, by his relation to the other.

(5) Love is the subjective reality of the species and the unity of mankind. In contrast to his own view, Feuerbach says that Christianity mediates the species to the individual by Jesus Christ who is the image of the species. There is an immediate unity of the species and the individual through faith in Christ, which kills any real and primary relations to others: Christian love is secondary, Christians love each other because Christ loved them. (This also kills the theoretical faculty of man.) The true subjective unity of the species is love (as reason is its objective reality); love is, however,

wie gesagt, nichts Andres, als die Bethaetigung, die Verwirklichung der Einheit der Gattung durch die Gesinnung. Die Gattung ist kein blosser Gedanke; sie existiert im Gefuehle, in der Gesinnung, in der Energie der Liebe. Die Gattung ist es, die mir Liebe einfloest. Ein liebevolles Herz ist das Herz der Gattung. ... Wer also dem Menschen um des Menschen willen liebt, wer sich zu Liebe der Gattung erhebt, zur universalen, dem Wesen der Gattung entsprechenden Liebe, der ist Christ, der ist Christus selbst. Wo also das Bewusstsein d r Gattung als

104. Ibid., 127-128.

Gattung entsteht, da verschwendet Christus, ohne dass sein wahres Wesen vergeht; denn Er was ja der Stellvertreter, das Bild des Bewusstseins der Gattung.¹⁰⁵

Hence Christ disappears where consciousness of the species arises, because he was a substitute for the consciousness of the species, the image for the popular mind.

In this analysis and explanation of love and the species, Feuerbach is bringing theology and philosophy into the secular or natural plane of existence, "realising" it. Love is not real in the relation of Christ and man (though this illusion served a good purpose in its time) but is only real in the relation of man to man.

(6) A prominent feature of Feuerbach's view of man is culture (Bildung) or purposive activity which combines the theoretical and practical activity of man. This activity is missing where man is truly religious and places the realization of his needs in God and Christ, where the individual and the species are immediately unified in the religious sphere, where the nature of God contains the theoretical nature of man (creativity, reason, knowledge, etc.).¹⁰⁶ The exclusively practical nature of religion, and of Christianity in particular, satisfies man's needs immediately and emphasises this side of human nature. However, it is clear that Feuerbach's true man

105. Ibid., 359-360.

106. Ibid., 291ff; cf. 359-360.

is a being who does not negate his limits in imagination and feeling, who does not unlink himself from nature, but rather applies himself to the nature of things theoretically and to the meeting of his needs practically, thus exhibiting labour and culture and science (which is philosophy for Feuerbach). Hence:

Der religiöse Mensch ist glücklich in seiner Phantasie; er hat Alles in sich immer beisammen; sein Bündel ist immer geschnürt. Jehovah begleitet mich überall; ich brauche nicht aus mir herauszugehen; ich habe in meinem Gatte den Inbegriff aller Schönheit und Kostbarkeiten, aller Wissens- und Denkwürdigkeiten. Die Bildung aber ist abhängig von Aussen, hat mancherlei Bedenken, denn sie überwindet die Schranken des sinnlichen Bewusstseins und Lebens selbst wieder durch sinnliche, wirkliche Thätigkeit, nicht religiösen Phantasie. 107

Activity (or creation) is a divine idea, is applied to God:

Im Thun fühlt sich der Mensch frei, unbeschränkt, glücklich, im Leiden beschränkt, gedrückt, unglücklich. Thätigkeit ist positives Selbstgefühl. Positiv überhaupt ist was im Menschen mit einer Freude begleitet ist—Gott daher, wie wir schon oben sagten, der Begriffer reiner, unbeschränkter Freude. Es gelingt uns nur, was wir gern thun; Alles überwindet die Freudigkeit. Eine freudige Thätigkeit ist aber eine solche, die mit unserem Wesen übereinstimmt, die wir nicht als Schranke, sogleich nicht als Zwang empfinden. Die glückliche, seligste Thätigkeit ist jedoch die producierende. 108

This highest joy is placed in God in the religious imagination and thus taken from men; in so far as it affects man it occurs in miracle.¹⁰⁹ As opposed to egoistic and subjectively oriented miracle,¹⁰⁴

107. Ibid., 293.

108. Ibid., 294.

109. Ibid.; cf. 188.

Arbeit ist gemuetlos, ungläubig, rationalistisch; denn der Mensch macht hier sein Dasein abhaengig von der Zwecktaetigkeit, die selbst wider lediglich durch die Anschauung der gegenstaendlichen Welt vermittelt ist. 110

The religious feeling centered in Gemuet does not bother itself about the objective world and is happy within itself; it does not know of self-renunciation and self-objectification.

Das Element der Bildung, das nordische Princip der Selbstentaeusserung geht dem Gemuet ab. Der classische Geist, der Geist der Bildung ist der sich selbst durch Gesetze beschraenkende, durch die Anschauung der Welt, durch die Notwendigkeit, die Wahrheit der Natur der Dinge Gemuet und Phantasie bestimmendem der gegenstaendliche Geist. An die Stelle dies Geistes trat mit dem Christenthum die unbeschraenkte, masslose, ueberschwengliche, supernaturalistische Subjectivitaet--ein in seinem innersten Wesen dem Princip der Wissenschaft, der Bildung entgegengesetztes Princip. Mit dem Christenthum verlor der Mensch den Sinn, die Faehigkeit, sich in die Natur, das Univerzum hineinsudenken. 111

However, in religion the theoretical element in man, so necessary to culture, is placed in God and lost man. 112

(7) Now, Feuerbach's true man, the new man, is designated as "natuerlichen oder vernuenftigen Menschen" who has a natural activity. 113 This man is one who:

... daher im Bewusstsein der Gattung lebt, wer sein Gemuet und seine Phantasie beschaenkt, bestimmt durch die Anschauung des wirklichen Lebens, des wirklichen Menschen, der kann sich kein Leben denken, wo das Gattungsleben und damit der Geschlechtsunterschied aufgehoben ist: erhaelt das geschlechtslose Individuum den himmlischen Geist fuer eine gemuetliche Vorstellung der Phantasie. 114

110. Ibid., 188.

111. Ibid.

112. Ibid., 188, 256-257.

113. Ibid., 198; cf. 249.

114. Ibid., 235.

And in his concluding application, he calls upon man to confess openly the identity of the consciousness of God with that of man's species nature, and that,

... dass der Mensch sich nur ueber die Schraenken seiner Individualitaet oder Persoenlichkeit erheben kann und soll, aber nicht ueber die Gesetze, die Wesensbestimmungen seiner Gattung, dass der Mensch kein anderes Wesen als absolutes, als gaettliches Wesen denken, ahnden, vorstellen, fuehlen, glauben, wollen, lieben und verehren als das gaettliche Wesen.¹¹⁵

To this he appended a footnote stipulating that human nature includes external nature--it belongs to the essence of man--and that: "Nur durch die Verbindung des Menschen mit der Natur koennen wir den supranaturalistischen Egoismus des Christenthum ueberwinden."¹¹⁶ True man for Feuerbach is the creative man, subjecting himself to the discipline of culture and science, thereby creating his own world and at the same time realising that he does this only in conjunction with others and under personal limitations: the unlimited and divine being is only the totality of mankind.

(8) Feuerbach often praises the heathen philosophers for their theoretical and aesthetic concern with nature as opposed to the Jewish and Christian utilism; this does not give the whole of his view of the relation between Christianity and heathenism, however. The demand for culture which combines

115. Ibid., 361.

116. Ibid.

the practical and the theoretical activity of man and at the same time ends the supernaturalistic egoism of Christianity corresponds more closely to his true attitude to heathenism and Christianity. Christianity has raised man above nature, and thereby unleashed his egoism, for which Feuerbach has nothing but contempt.¹¹⁷ Christianity has also robbed man of his species life by directly uniting the individual with the species in the person of Christ.¹¹⁸ However, if Christians fell into this extreme of severance from nature,

"... so verfielen dagegen die Heiden in das andere Extrem, in die Gemeinheit, welche den Unterschied zwischen Thier und Mensch aufhebt, oder gar, wie z.B. Colaus, der Gegner des Christenthums, den Menschen unter die Thier herabsetzt."¹¹⁹

And the ancients

"... opferten das Individuum der Gattung auf; die Christen die Gattung dem Individuum."¹²⁰

Further, the heathens allowed imagination to run riot in non-human forms--in a lack of concern for man-- while Christ performed miracles for the sake of needy humanity, implying again that heathenism was deficient.¹²¹ It is clear then that the species consciousness, the humanism of Feuerbach, is a fusion of the crass theoretical view of heathenism and

117. Ibid., 209-213.

118. Ibid., 214-217.

119. Ibid., 210-211.

120. Ibid., 211.

121. Ibid., 208-209.

the equally cross view of Christianity. Primarily, this union results by the fact that man views the world by first viewing his other, his fellowman, and views the world through him. This is expressed in love.¹²²

(9) An important question is that of why man objectifies himself in religion. It has been seen that it is due to need, to unfulfilled wishes or needs—due to the discrepancy between reality and the inner nature of man. But why should man live in phantasy rather than in realism and hard won reality by which he would exercise his true nature and powers? Of primary importance is the concept of the necessity of an object for man and of the relation of subject and object: man is nothing without an object and the object reveals his inner reality.

Notwendig setzt daher in der Religion der Mensch sein Wesen ausser sich, sein Wesen als ein andres Wesen - notwendig, weil all sein bewusstes Wesen aufgeht in die praktische Subjectivitaet. Gott ist sein anderes Ich, seine andere verlorne Haelfte; in Gott ergaenzt er sich; in Gott ist er erst vollkommener Mensch. Gott ist ihm ein Beduerfniss; es fehlt ihm Etwas, ohne zu wissen, was ihm fehlt--Gott ist dieses fehlende Etwas, Gott ihm unentbehrlich; Gott gehört zu seinem Wesen.

122. Moses Hess, and following him, Marx, viewed this as being embodied in actual activity, in economic activity and its mutuality. Marx especially sees man's social relations expressed in the inter-relationships of the commodity world, objectified in objects and their relations. But for all, the species comes to be in the union of individuals and their activity, instead of by reference to some third party, such as Christ or money. In all this they are using concepts found in Hegel's philosophy of nature; but unlike Hegel, they find the final form of the species in this same plane of existence, this same sphere of reality, instead of finding it in the higher plane of mental activity.

... Nur in Gott ergaenzet sie den Mangel des Lebens, den Mangel eines wesentlichen Inhalte, den in unendlicher Fuelle das wirkliche Leben der vernuenftigen Anschauung darbietet. Gott ist ihr der Ersatz der verlorenen Welt-- Gott ist ihr die reine Anschauung, das Leben der Theorie. ... Die Religion ergaenzet daher in Gott den Mangel der aesthetischen Anschauung. ... Gott ist daher die reine, unbeschuetzte, d.i. theoretische oder aesthetische Anschauung. Gott ist das Object, zu dem sich der religiöse Mensch objectiva verhaelt; in Gott ist ihm der Gegenstand um sein selbst willen Gegenstand. Gott ist Selbstzweck; Gott hat also fuer die Religion die Bedeutung, welche fuer die Theorie der Gegenstand ueberhaupt hat. Das allgemeine Wesen der Theorie ist der Religion ein Besondres Wesen.¹²³

Man must express his inner nature and when his technical, practical, real existence, his society and cultural development do not allow him to do it in the proper fashion, he must find other means. (In another passage he relates the creation of religious objects to the writing of poetry and fables.¹²⁴) Again, he says that whatever man conceives to be true he conceives to be existing, hence must be projected outside himself.¹²⁵

Above we saw that when man is not himself a proper object for himself by virtue of his development - hence his lack of

123. Feuerbach, 80, VII, 267.

124. Ibid., I, 367 (additions to "Wesen der Religion" of 1845).

125. Ibid., VII, 47.

development prevents his being a proper object for himself-- yet how can he become this without some objectification of what his proper essence is? In the above quotation we saw that God is this true essence of man. In another place he says that religion is the common book of man which concentrates man and gives him a direction which the irreligious man does not have.¹²⁶ From all these indications it appears that religion is a natural necessity for a developing creature whose development consists in becoming his own absolute, and who hence must have his own nature before him in a form comprehensible to his undeveloped mind and understanding. Feuerbach's conflict with religion springs from the fact that men do not surrender it when they reach maturity, when they themselves have become proper objects for themselves, and the species nature of man can be lived by the relation of man to his fellows. True religion is an aid to the development of man but man must continually abstract from God and give to himself until it is outmoded.

Feuerbach's main features have been seen. First, he inverts Hegel and says that Reality, Nature, is primary and Thought or Spirit is secondary. Second, he separates philosophy and religion and thus rejects German Idealism as

126. Ibid., 103, 104-105. Cf. quotation in note 78, and the following from the same work: "... denn Gott ist nichts Anderes als Ur - und Vorbild des Menschen: wie und was Gott ist, so und das soll, so und das will der Mensch sein, oder hofft er wenigstens einst zu werden". (SW, II, 290-P15).

being merely rationalized religion as opposed to true reason and science. Third, his philosophy of religion presents religion as a necessary process of projection or alienation of man's essential self and its history as the history of man's recovery of that essence. The God of religion is the species life which projected as God and Christ (in Christianity), in whom man's proper powers and activities are posited, and by which act the social bonds of men are broken. This projection was necessary when man was undeveloped and had no proper objectification of himself; it served as a guide to man, as a revelation to him of his true self. However, as man has developed his true and proper powers, he has abstracted from God and now in modern times is ready to make himself his true and proper end. Only the belief in the supernatural as opposed to the natural remains as religion, and this is in contradiction to the life of man in an age of railroads, insurance companies, museums of both art and science, and theatres. Man is ready to affirm himself and thereby complete his process of coming-to-be. Feuerbach's system will be seen appearing in Marx with a different content, or to be more exact, with a more concrete content.

vi.

Another key person in the development of Marx's thought

was Moses Hess, the "Communist Rabbi", who supplied an interpretation of Feuerbach. He is said to have converted Engels to Communism in one night¹²⁷ and tried to convert Marx who was not so easily persuaded but who finally accepted it on his own terms; he worked with Marx on the Rheinische Zeitung and portions of the Deutsche Ideologie are said to be in his handwriting.¹²⁸ Hess was an ecstatic messianist whose systematic thought was unified more by his desire to promote social harmony than by formal system. Starting from Spinoza and Hegel, he incorporated Fichte's metaphysics of activity in order to overcome contemplation and then turned to Feuerbach for the "species" to have a social basis for ethics.¹²⁹ Then, using Proudhon and French socialism, he went beyond Feuerbach in calling for new institutions to overcome the evil of private property and money:

The essence of God, says Feuerbach, is the transcendent essence of man, and the real theory of the divine nature is the theory of human nature. Theology is anthropology. That is the truth, but it is not the whole truth. The nature of man, it must be added, is social, involving the co-operative activity of all individuals for the same ends and interests. The true theory of man, the true humanism is the theory of human society. In other words, anthropology is socialism (loc. cit., pp.115-116).¹³⁰

127. Tucker, op. cit., 107; but cf. Cornu, op. cit., 396-397, for Hess' remark about it; it has no mention of "overnight".

128. Hook, op. cit., 186.

129. Ibid., 193-196.

130. Ibid., 196. Hook's references are to Sozialistische Aufsätze, ed. by Zlocisti.

Hess viewed the history of society as conflict between egoism and love. The former has marked all previous society and is the final source of social evils: oppression, exploitation, cruelty, fraud, robbery, feudalism, slavery, wage slavery. The history of society has been the replacement of one form of egoism by another until the capitalist form of society completed it: "... the system of free competition is the last word of egoism. ... Communism is the law Lebensgesetz of love applied to social life...";¹³¹ love is the consciousness of identity of the individual with mankind. Having borrowed all this from Feuerbach, Hess says that one must put love into action in social life:

You have been told that you cannot serve two masters at once--God and Mammon. But we tell you that you cannot serve either one of them, if you think and feel like a human being. Love one another, unite in spirit, and your hearts will be filled with that blessedness which you have so vainly sought for outside of yourselves, in God. Organise, unite in the real world, and by your deeds and works you will possess all the wealth, which you have so vainly sought, in money. So long as you strive to be not human but superhuman and inhuman creatures, you will become inhuman, you will look down contemptuously upon human nature, whose real nature you do not recognise and treat "the masses" as if they were a wild beast. The beast which you see in the people is in yourself. ("Ueber die Not in unserer Gesellschaft und deren Abhilfe," Sozialistische Aufsätze, p.149).¹³²

131. Ibid., 197. No references given by Hook.

132. Ibid., 198.

Hess has identified egoism, capitalism, money; egoism, the seeking to be a super-man or inhuman being is the root of all evil. And egoism has its roots in the system of private property.¹³³

In addition to the use of egoism as a key term, Hess appropriated the idea of productive activity as essential to the species, as the activity in which love and consciousness of identity with the species should reign, but in which, in fact, egoism reigns, and each produces for his own gain. The wealth and power of the species becomes the wealth and power of private individuals who worship money.¹³⁴ Here, then, Hess used Feuerbach's philosophy of religion within economics: man objectifies the species powers in money (Feuerbach: in God) and worships this as the true being, thus losing the unity of the individual with the species. This theme was taken up by Marx, who likewise treated economics as religion, money as god, and capitalism as the alienation of man by the objectification of man's true species powers in money. There was, however, a difference in Marx's system, or the context of his use of it, which prevents any idealistic interpretation of Marx: Marx returned to Hegel and Feuerbach, affirming the necessity and good of this alienation, and thereby locating the ultimate source of evil, not in egoism but in the primary condition of man, as subdued by nature and his lack of development. It is our next task to show this in the development of Marx's thought in 1843-44.

¹³³. Cornu, op. cit., 376. ¹³⁴. Cf. Tacker, op. cit., 108, who refers to an article, "Ueber das Geldwesen".

CHAPTER III

MARX'S DEVELOPMENT: 1843-1844

Following the suppression of the Rheinische Zeitung in the spring of 1843, Marx set to work to read and to write, to develop a criticism of Hegel and to develop his own view. He wrote a criticism of Hegel's political philosophy, several articles, and then in 1844 sought to develop his own system, in the 1844 Mss.

Marx's criticism of Hegel's philosophy of the State, written between March and August of 1843, began with P261 of Hegel's Philosophy of Right and broke off at P313.¹ It proceeds laboriously paragraph by paragraph and contains little of consequence for our study, except its general principle and method, and the fact that in it Marx enters upon a serious critique of politics and denies private property to be the proper basis of the state.

1. MEGA, Bd. I/1, 402, 403, 553. The greater portion of the manuscript is contained in Die Frühschriften edited by Landshut, 20 - 149.

Hegel had started from the Idea; actuality expresses this Idea but the Idea is primary, actuality secondary. The State for Hegel is the concrete form of the Ethical Idea in Objective Mind - "the actuality of concrete freedom"; the State then is the primary reality by which the family and civil society are determined and upon which they are grounded; it is primary, they are derivative (despite their prior temporal existence). Marx overturns this order and declares that civil society is primary and the State secondary.² Hegel's valid truths and facts come from the observation of actual society, smuggled in, and not from the logical unfolding of his philosophic principles; however, he does not proceed on the basis of empiricism and so inverts and mystifies the true relationships of the family, civil society, and State.³

Marx develops his critique by following Hegel through the various sections and pointing out the errors and consequences. On the one hand he follows the above criticism, based upon Feuerbach, criticizing the acceptance of concepts and institutions as primary, in the place of man and his reality: he bases this critique upon man. On the other hand he also makes an immanent critique of Hegel, showing that he does

2. Cf. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, P144, PP260-261; DF, 23-24 (MEGA, 406); H.P. Adams, Karl Marx in His Earlier Writings, 73; Gustav Wetter, Dialectical Materialism, 21-22.

3. Cf. DF, 23-26 (MEGA, 406-408).

not follow his own principles, showing that his logic is not in accordance with his facts: logic and reality are not united.⁴ For our study the significant fact is that here Marx has entered upon a criticism of politics, saying that, as in religion and philosophy, political institutions are derivative from man in his actual social existence, hence that they should reflect man's actual situation and not constitute it (though, as in religion, they do influence man's existence). This easily leads to a doctrine of revolution, and beyond, to the abolition of the state, when man's perfected life no longer needs this external being over him. The transition to this doctrine occurred during the remaining months of 1843 and are reflected in a published correspondence, in the articles on the Jewish question, and in his introduction to a critique of the Hegelian philosophy of State, all published in Paris in the Deutsche-Franzoesische Jahrbuecher in February 1844.

The relevant correspondence is between Marx and Arnold Ruge, the publisher of the annals, during the months between March and September of 1843. It is concerned with German conditions and difficulties which hinder a revolution there. In reply (in May) to a despondent letter from Ruge, Marx admits the mediocrity of the Prussian absolutism, of its philistine ruler and his philistine followers and retainers. Then he says

4. Cf. Adams, op. cit., 84-85; Heinrich Popitz, Die Entfremdete Mensch, 69-73, 78ff.

that the enemies of this system, the thinking and the suffering men are coming to an understanding, that the rupture of society by the economic revolution will bring a situation which will be unbearable for the philistines.⁵ Here, then, in a letter of May 1843, published in February 1844, (and possibly rewritten for publication)⁶ we find the first

5. DF, 166 (MEGA, 565-566):

Ich rede gar nicht von der Unfaehigkeit der Herren und von der Indolenz der Diener und Untertanen, die alles gehen lassen, wie es Gott gefaellt; und doch reichte beides zusammen schon hin, um eine Katastrophe herbeizufuehren. Ich mache Sie nur darauf aufmerksam, dass die Feinde der Philistertums, mit einem Wort alle denkenden und alle leidenden Menschen zu einer Verstaendigung gelangt sind, wozu ihnen fruher durchaus die Mittel fehlten, und dass selbst das passive Fortpflanzungssystem der alten Untertanen jeden Tag Rekruten fuer den Dienst der neuen Menschheit wirbt. Das System des Erwerbs und Handels, des Besitzes und der Ausbeutung des Menschen fuehrt aber noch viel schneller als die Vermehrung der Bevoelkerung zu einem Bruch innerhalb der jetzigen Gesellschaft, den das alte System nicht zu heilen vermag, weil es ueberhaupt nicht heilt und schafft, sondern nur existiert und genieest. Die Existenz der leidenden Menschheit, die denkt, und der denkenden Menschheit, die unterdrueckt wird, muss aber notwendig fuer die passive und gedankenlos geniessende Tierwelt der Philisterei ungeniessbar und unverdaulich werden.

Von unserer Seite muss die alte Welt vollkommen ans Tageslicht gezogen und die neue positiv ausgebildet werden. Je laenger die Ereignisse der denkenden Menschheit Zeit lassen, sich zu besinnen, und der leidenden, sich zu sammeln, um so vollendeter wird das Produkt in die Welt treten, welches die Gegenwart in ihrem Schosse traegt.

6. Adams, op. cit., 92.

formulation of Marx's future system: based upon the social disorder caused by the economic forces at work, drawing its theory and its power out of the developing present, and uniting theory (denkenden Menschen) and human reality (leidenden Menschen).

In August Ruge wrote that he would found a new journal in Paris as his old one had been suppressed and asked Marx's opinion and advice upon it.⁷ Marx replied from Kreuznach in September: he plans to come to Paris as censorship allows him no scope for his work in Germany, and Paris is to be the capital of the new world; the idea of the journal is good, the question is really its viewpoint and policy, the Wohin. In the various reform movements none has a definite formula for the future, and Marx takes this to be their position, not to proclaim a dogmatic position but to find it within the criticism of present reality:

Indessen ist das gerade wieder der Vorzug der neuen Richtung, dass wir nicht dogmatisch die Welt antizipieren, sondern erst aus der Kritik der alten Welt die neue finden wollen.⁸

They must criticise everything without fear of the consequences because philosophy itself must become purified, as it is now verweltlicht and cannot solve its riddles in its study and leave the solutions to the world: it must be involved. They must have no dogmas, not even Communism:

7. DF, 166-167 (MEGA, 572).

8. Ibid., 168 (MEGA, 573).

Ich bin nicht dafür, dass wir eine dogmatische Fahne aufpflanzen, im Gegenteil. Wir müssen den Dogmatikern nachzuhelfen suchen, dass sie ihre Sätze sich klarmachen. So ist namentlich der Kommunismus eine dogmatische Abstraktion, wobei ich aber nicht irgendeinen eingebildeten und möglichen, sondern den wirklich existierenden Kommunismus, wie ihn Cabet, Dezamy, Weitling etc. lehren, im Sinn habe. Dieser Kommunismus ist selbst nur eine aparte, von seinem Gegensatz, dem Privatwesen, infizierte Erscheinung des humanistischen Prinzips. Aufhebung des Privateigentums und Kommunismus sind daher keineswegs identisch, und der Kommunismus hat andere sozialistische Lehren, wie die von Fourier, Proudhon etc., nicht zufällig, sondern notwendig sich gegenüber entstehen, weil er selbst nur eine besondere, einseitige Verwirklichung des sozialistischen Prinzips ist.⁹

Furthermore, this socialism meets only one side of reality, they concern themselves with the theoretical side as well; religion, science and political theory. They will identify themselves with the various parties and engage in the real political struggle, but they will seek their principles from within the struggling world.

Wir treten dann nicht der Welt doktrinar mit einem neuen Prinzip entgegen: hier ist die Wahrheit, hier kniee nieder! Wir entwickeln der Welt aus den Prinzipien der Welt neue Prinzipien. Wir sagen ihr nicht: lass ab von deinen Kämpfen, sie sind dummes Zeug; wir wollen dir die wahre Parole des Kampfes zuschreiben. Wir zeigen ihr nur, warum sie eigentlich kämpft, und das Bewusstsein ist eine Sache, die sie sich aneignen muss, wenn sie auch nicht will.¹⁰

Again here is the denial of doctrinaire programmes; it should not be overlooked by contrasting this with the doctrinaire nature of Marx in later life or of the Marxist parties:

9. Ibid., 168-169 (MEGA, 573).

10. Ibid., 170 (MEGA, 574-575).

it is of fundamental importance to see that in its origins
Marxism grew out of the philosophy of Hegel and Feuerbach and
sought to evolve its programme out of the movement of reality
(however badly it may have failed is beside the point). Thus
Marx goes on to say that reform of the consciousness is none
other than awakening men from his dreams and explaining his
own actions to him; that

Unser ganzer Zweck kann in nichts anderem bestehen,
wie dies auch bei Feuerbachs Kritik der Religion der
Fall ist, als dass die religiösen und politischen
Fragen in die selbstbewusste menschliche Form
gebracht werden.¹¹

Reform of consciousness through analysis of the mystical and
unclear consciousness, will show:

... dass es sich nicht um einen grossen Gedankenstrich
zwischen Vergangenheit und Zukunft handelt, sondern
um die Vollziehung der Gedanken der Vergangenheit.
Es wird sich endlich zeigen, dass die Menschheit keine
neue arbeit beginnt, sondern mit Bewusstsein ihre alte
Arbeit zustande bringt.¹²

These citations clearly reveal Marx's orientation in the
evolutionary philosophy of Hegel and Feuerbach, seeking to
discover the principles of action within the principles of
reality as it is.

It is important to note here that: (1) Marx has a balanced
view of the aspects of reality (as far as their tasks are concerned);

11. Ibid., 170 (MEGA, 575).

12. Ibid., 171 (MEGA, 575).

socialism is only one side of the problem, the theoretical is also important. (2) He therefore has a double task, a revolutionary (political and social) struggle and a theoretical struggle (to bring about clarity of self-understanding for more perfect action). (3) He is following an evolutionary theory of the development of reality and conceives of man's activity in this to be based upon the immanent lines of development, not upon utopian or other unrealistic principles: the future is to fulfil the past. This is a persistent trait in Marx which should be remembered, as it is a direct contradiction of any assertion that Marx started from utopian, romantic, or religious motives or systems and attempted to give them a 'scientific' claim (in the following sections this will become clearer as one sees how he evolved his own system out of Feuerbach's and Hegel's philosophy.)¹³ Here it is evident, and it will become increasingly clear, that Marx started from the philosophy and from the problems of his time and systematically worked his way out of them from within the system, not from within himself, and that his solution is a logical projection of the various strains of thought, not of his own inner drives and feelings.¹⁴

13. Cf. Adams, op. cit., 91-92; H. Popitz, op. cit., 105-108; Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, 258-261.

14. This latter is the view set forth by Robert C. Tucker in Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx, 140-141, 218-220, 221, 222, 228, 229-30.

The two articles contained in the publication to which this correspondence formed an introduction reveal more clearly the aspects of Marx's thought at this time of transition. Of these, Cornu says that that on the Jewish question was written first, as the excerpts for it are found in the notes made in July - August of 1843 at Kreuznach.¹⁵ In it Marx is reviewing and criticizing a book and an article by Bruno Bauer on the subject of Jewish emancipation.¹⁶ In the book Bauer had argued that the demand of Jews for political emancipation was ill-founded and impossible, as even German Christians were not politically emancipated and certainly could not emancipate anyone else; further, so long as each retained his religion they would be opposed: both should emancipate themselves from religion. Marx countered that in some countries political emancipation did occur and religion was separated from political affairs, as in the American constitution. But, Marx continued, political emancipation does not kill religion, rather it seems to allow it to flourish. However:

15. August Cornu, Karl Marx und Friedrich Engels, I, 462, Note 58.

16. Bruno Bauer, Die Juden Fragen (1843), and, "Die Faehtigkeit der heutigen Juden und Christen frei zu werden". Cf. DF, 171-199; 199-207 (MEGA, I/1 576-599; 599-606).

Da aber das Dasein der Religion das Dasein eines Mangels ist, so kann die Quelle dieses Mangels nur noch in Wesen des Staates selbst gesucht werden. Die Religion gilt uns nicht mehr als der Grund, sondern nur noch als das Phänomen der weltlichen Beschränktheit.¹⁷

Therefore to remove the religious trait one must remove the deficiency causing it, not religion itself:

Wir behaupten nicht, dass sie ihre religiöse Beschränktheit aufheben müssen, um ihre weltlichen Schranken aufzuheben. Wir behaupten, dass sie ihre religiöse Beschränktheit aufheben, sobald sie ihre weltliche Schranke aufheben. Wir verwandeln nicht die weltlichen Fragen in theologische. Wir verwandeln die theologischen Fragen in weltliche. ... Die Frage von dem Verhältnisse der politischen Emanzipation zur Religion wird fuer uns die Frage von dem Verhältnis der politischen Emanzipation zur menschlichen Emanzipation.¹⁸

Here Marx is applying the Feuerbachian formula for religion to deficiencies and their phenomenal or chimerical expressions within the social and worldly scene instead of confining it to the worldly versus religious relationship. He says:

Den Widerspruch des Staats mit einer bestimmten Religion, etwa dem Judentum, vermenschlichen wir in den Widerspruch des Staats mit bestimmten weltlichen Elementen, den Widerspruch des Staats mit der Religion ueberhaupt, in den Widerspruch des Staats mit seinen Voraussetzungen ueberhaupt.¹⁹

This practice of placing the worldly-heavenly conflict within the worldly life of man is indispensable in understanding Marx's total system and its presuppositions; it makes more certain the interpretation of points upon which evidence is scanty though suggestive.

17. Ibid., 178 (MEGA, 581).

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid., 178 (MEGA, 582).

Marx explains this conflict as follows: In political life man is emancipated from private property by having the vote; he lives in a community of equal members who share together the life of the community, the species life of man, which corresponds to the heaven of religion. In fact, however, differences of wealth, of birth and of education make themselves felt in the actual life of man, which then make the political life a chimerical life, just as the objectified species life of man in God and its fulfilment in religion is a chimerical life.

Der vollendete politische Staat ist seinem Wesen nach das Gattungsleben des Menschen im Gegensatz zu seinem materiellen Leben. Alle Voraussetzungen dieses egoistischen Lebens bleiben ausserhalb der Staatsphaere in der buergerlichen Gesellschaft bestehen, aber als Eigenschaften der buergerlichen Gesellschaft. Wo der politische Staat seine wahre Ausbildung erreicht hat, fuehrt der Mensch nicht nur im Gedanken, im Bewusstsein, sondern in der Wirklichkeit, im Leben ein doppeltes, ein himmlisches und ein irdisches Leben, das Leben im politischen Gemeinwesen, worin er sich als Gemeinwesen gilt und das Leben in der buergerlichen Gesellschaft, worin er als Privatmensch taetig ist, die anderen Menschen als Mittel betrachtet, sich selbst zum Mittel herabwuerdigt und zum Spielball fremder Maechte wird. Der politische Staat verhaelt sich ebenso spiritualistisch zur buergerlichen Gesellschaft wie der Himmel zur Erde.²⁰

So man is in his actual life an untrue being and the chimerical State allows this condition to exist, just as heaven allows the limited conditions on earth to exist; in the State he is robbed of his individuality and real life and filled with an unreal universality. Just as Feuerbach opposed real man to the religious and chimerical world, of man's species

20. Ibid., 181 (MEGA, 584).

being in the abstract, so Marx opposes man's actual, concrete, egoistic and individualistic life in civil society to the universal but chimerical species life of the State. Thus the life of man is split, divided, and he is "religious" thereby:

Religios sind die Glieder des politischen Staats durch den Dualismus zwischen dem individuellen und dem Gattungeleben, zwischen dem Leben der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft und dem politischen Leben...²¹

It must be emphasised again that Marx is applying Feuerbach's formula of religion to all reality and finding the chimerical realm, not in the world of man's imagination and mind - in the religious consciousness - but in the world of human life itself. The abstract species is objectified in some worldly form, in this case, the State, especially the democratic State. This method will be used by Marx again. And, as Feuerbach called for the union of the individual and the species in love and the relation of each to the other, and the open confession of this, so Marx concludes his review of the book by saying that only when the individual - the individualistic and egoistic man - is identical with the citizen, the species-man, and his personal capacities are realized as social capacities, is man emancipated:

... erst wenn der Mensch seine "forces propres" als gesellschaftlich Kräfte erkannt und organisiert hat und daher die gesellschaftlich Kraft nicht mehr in der Gestalt der politischen Kraft von sich trennt, erst dann ist die menschliche Emanzipation vollbracht.²²

The similarity to Feuerbach is significant.

21. Ibid., 189 (MEGA, 590).

22. Ibid., 199 (MEGA, 599).

In the review of Bauer's article Marx carries his thought further. Bauer had argued that the Christian had only to surmount his own religion, the Jew must surmount his own and that of Christianity, which is an alien development of his own: the Jew is less capable of political emancipation than the Christian. This, Marx charges, is nothing more than a new form of the old question of the possibility of the salvation of the Jews and Bauer of course had said that they must be converted to Christianity before they transcend religion. Marx shifts the crux of the matter to the social question, in keeping with the principles laid down above:

... welches besondere gesellschaftliche Element zu ueberwinden sie, um das Judentum aufzuheben? Denn die Emancipationsfahigkeit des heutigen Juden ist das Verhaeltnis des Judentums zur Emancipation der heutigen Welt. Dies Verhaeltnis ergibt sich notwendig aus der besonderen Stellung des Judentums in der heutigen geknechteten Welt.²³

The religious consciousness is the product of a social condition and hence can be eradicated only indirectly, by removing the social disorder.

Marx now follows up this question with a definition of the Jew--the real, everyday Jew, not Bauer's "Sabbath Jew",-- and says that "... der weltliche Grund..." of Judaism is "... Das praktische Beduerfnis, der Eigennutz".²⁴ Its cult is trading (Der Schnacher) and its God is money. The emancipation from these constitute the emancipation of this epoch: an

23. Ibid., 201 (MEGA, 601).

24. Ibid.

organisation of society which throws off the possibility of money makes Jews impossible. Marx has now pinpointed the chief traits of capitalist society and equates their abolition with the general human emancipation. Thus he has reached the final stage of his criticism—society itself in its economic activity. He has done this by applying the "religious" formula to the socio-economic world (instead of the socio-political world as in the preceding article): the earthly, real condition is that dominated by practical needs and individualism or egoism, a condition in which man is de-humanised; the "heavenly" or the religious expression is that of money and its realm of trade. Money is the essence of man's work which has become an independent being over him, alien to him, it is the jealous God of Israel who will have none other before him.

Das Geld ist der eifrige Gott Isaels, vor welchen kein anderer Gott bestehen darf. Das Geld erniedrigt alle Goetter des Menschen—und verwandelt sie in eine Ware. Das Geld ist der allgemeine, fuer sich selbst konstituierte Wert aller Dinge. Es hat daher die ganze Welt, die Menschenwelt wie die Natur, ihres eigentuemlichen Wertes beraubt. Das Geld ist das dem Menschen entfremdete wesen seiner Arbeit und seines Daseins, und dies fremde Wesen beherrscht ihn, und er betet es an. Der Gott der Juden hat sich verweltlich, er ist zum Weltgott geworden. Der Wechsel ist der Wirkliche Gott des Juden. Sein Gott ist nur der illusorische Wechsel.²⁵

Thus man is alienated from himself in the Feuerbachian religious sense of the word: money is the objectification of man's labour, his essence, and yet this objectification of man's

essence rules over him. (While he does not mention it, it should be remembered that the alienation of man in money has a reason - due to limitations - if he is following his previous method.)

At this point it should be clearly understood that the usage of egoism, (der Egoismus, der Eigenrutz) does not indicate the possibility of interpreting it to mean the egoism of perverted will or a Faustian egoism as has been done by R.C. Tucker in his book, Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx.²⁶ The context and usage of the word indicate that it refers to individualism in the method of meeting the needs of man's practical life and in the conduct of commerce. It roots in Hegel's definition of civil society, which he sees as a complexity of inter-related, mutually dependent, yet individual, members whose bond is the satisfaction of needs (Bedürfnisse).²⁷ As we have already seen, Feuerbach finds the nature of Judaism to be egoism, need, utility, thus linking egoism with practical needs. Only when this egoism completely transcends limitations of nature and the species, does Feuerbach treat it as perverted, and his central concept was that of a union of concern for human need with a proper respect for the objective nature of things. Marx's use of the term appears to be similar. In this article it is

26. R.C. Tucker, op. cit., 136ff.

27. Cf. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, PP 189ff.

invariably qualified by practical needs: "Das praktische Beduerfnis, der Egoismus..." is the principle of civil society; the God of "... des praktischen Beduerfnisses und Eigennutzes..." is money.²⁸ In a number of sentences he describes the essence of Judaism as "das praktische Beduerfnis"; speaks of "das praktische Beduerfnis, dessen Verstand der Eigennutz ist", and says that "Der juedische Jesuitismus, dasselbe praktische Jesuitismus ... ist des Verhaeltnis der Welt des Eigennutzes zu den sie beherrschenden Gesetzen..."²⁹ These numerous sentences and the background in Hegel and Feuerbach show beyond reasonable doubt that Marx does not have reference to a perverted, Faustian will within man, but to concrete, practical needs and the individualistic manner of meeting these needs (which it is true may encourage and produce the perverted will in some individuals).

The ultimate basis of man's alienation and objectification in money and its rule over him can not be finally defined on the basis of this article; however, certain points can be made, which will be expanded later as more facts appear. As we have

28. DF, 204 (MEGA, 603).

29. Ibid., 205 (MEGA, 604). Cf. also: Only under Christianity, which breaks all natural bonds of men, and "... den Egoismus, das Eigenmuetsige Beduerfnis an die Stelle dieser Gattungebande setzen..." Ibid., 206 (604); Christianity was too spiritual, "... um Roheit des praktischen Beduerfnisses anders als durch die Erhebung in die blaue Luft zu beseitigen", Ibid., 206 (604). Only after Christianity's alienation of man could Judaism come to universal mastery and make "... die entaesserte Natur zu vermensuelichen, verlaeuflichen, der Knechtschaft des egoistischen Beduerfnisse, dem Schacher anheingefallenen Gegenstaenden machen." (Ibid.)

seen, the "religious" configuration arises when there is a conflict between man's actual condition and his potential, species character; in religion proper, the potential, species nature is placed into the realm of consciousness and imagination, into Phantasie, and men are ruled by it; in the political-social world, there is a conflict between the actual condition of men in civil society as individualistic and egoistic men and their idealised equality and inter-relationship in the democratic state (the heavenly sphere). Now, within the economic-social sphere, the same configuration arises:

Die Verneuerung ist die Praxis der Entzweiung.
Wie der Mensch, solange er religiös befangen ist,
sein Wesen nur zu vergegenständlichen weiss, in dem
er es zu einem fremden phantastischen Wesen macht, so
kann er sich unter der Herrschaft des egoistischen
Beduerfnisses nur praktisch betätigen, nur praktisch
Gegenstand erzeugen, indem er seine Produkte, wie seine
Tätigkeit, unter die Herrschaft eines fremden Wesens
stellt und ihnen die Bedeutung eines fremden Wesens--
des Geldes--verleiht.⁵⁰

Thus, there must be a discrepancy between the life of the individual and the human species potentiality which causes men to objectify his essence (labour) (and later to be seen, exchange activity - already foreshadowed in Marx's statement that "die Wechsel" is the God of the Jew) in money which becomes an alien power over him. The question is, what is the nature of this discrepancy? Is it mere subjective egoism versus the objective species life, or is it a material

50. Ibid., 205 (MEGA, 605).

deficiency in terms either of sufficiency of quantity or of degree of development?

Utopians and religionists would answer the above question by affirming that individual egoism of will against the objective species nature of man is the cause of the need for money: money, they say, originates from private property which causes the need of barter, exchange, and therefore money; the egoism which demanded private property then uses the power of money to enhance itself.³¹ However, if we follow the original Feuerbachian formulation, this cleavage originates in an actual limit upon man imposed by his lack of ability to achieve his potential being. Since the egoism has been shown to have reference to practical needs, is it not possible that the "Herrschaft des egoistischen Beduerfnisses" refers to the dominion of need caused by insufficiency of production and a system of distribution formed by such a condition (both of quantitative insufficiency and of insufficiency of development)? If this is the case, there is a much more consistent pattern based upon Feuerbach's pattern: man must have an object, is known by his object, and primitive, uncultured, isolated man can only objectify himself in religion; Marx says that under the domination of egoistic needs, man can only objectify himself in practical activities and objects by

31. Cf. R.C. Tucker, op. cit., 107-111, for an exposition of Moses Hess who stressed egoism; also cf. Tucker's own interpretation of Marx which emphasises an acquisitive mania or (need as the basic concept of human alienation. (Ibid., 137ff.)

placing his activity and his object under the dominion of an alien being, money, his own objectified potential nature. Again, we may ask if this is not the meaning of the humanization of needs, and the transcendence of the conflict between the individual sensuous existence and the species existence of man?

/Judaism and Jews will vanish when the empirical basis of their existence is transcended, / ... weil sein Bewusstsein keinen Gegenstand mehr hat, weil die subjektive Basis des Judentums, das praktische Bedürfnis vermenschlicht, weil der Konflikt der individuell-sinnlichen Existenz mit der Gattungsexistenz des Menschen aufgehoben ist.³²

At the moment we can do no more than to state the case and raise the question, but more evidence is forthcoming to justify this interpretation.

In the same publication as the articles on the Jewish question Marx published "Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie: Einleitung", in which his thought is much more systematic, though in truth it supplements rather than develops the former. In the former Marx has located the alienation of man in the socio-economic life, above which stands the political alienation and religious alienation; he has indicated that he is applying the Feuerbachian formula to this reality; he has identified money as the objectified

32. DF, 207 (MEGA, 606).

labour and exchange activity of man; he has indicated that the socio-economic and political conditions must be transformed. Now, he confirms the use of the interpretation of religion and the criticism of religion, politics and economics, and goes on to indicate his thought about the transformation of society, the revolution.

The critique of religion is the basis of all critiques (another indication of his consistent application of its method); in Germany it is all but complete. The critique of religion rests upon the assertion: "Der Mensch machte die Religion, die Religion macht nicht den Menschen."³³ Religion is the self-consciousness of man, the self-estimation (Selbstgefuehl) of man, "... der sich selbst entweder noch nicht erworben und schon wieder verloren hat."³⁴ However, man is not an isolated being, he is society and State, the world of man, and hence society is the basis of religion. Religion is the inverted consciousness of this society,

... weil sie eine verkehrte Welt sind. /It is its logic in popular form, its general theory, its encyclopaedic compendium (all out of Feuerbach)/ ... sie ist die phantastische Verwirklichung des menschlichen Wesens, weil das menschliche Wesen keine wahre Wirklichkeit besitzt. Der Kampf gegen die Religion ist also mittelbar der Kampf gegen jene Welt, deren geistiges Aroma die Religion ist.

Das religioese Elend ist in einem der Ausdruck

33. Ibid., 207 (MEGA, 607).

34. Ibid., 208 (MEGA, 607).

des wirklichen Elendes und in einem die Protestation gegen das wirkliche Elend. Die Religion ist der Seufzer der bedrängten Kreatur, das Gemüt einer herzlosen Welt, wie sie der Geist geistloser Zustände ist. Sie ist das Opium des Volkes. ... Die Kritik der Religion ist also im Kein die Kritik des jammertales, dessen Heiligenschein die Religion ist.³⁵

Thus Marx sees the critique of religion as merely the beginning, designed to bring men to a consideration of their true state, which itself is the cause of religion; "Die Religion ist nur die illuserische Sonne, die sich um den Menschen bewegt, solange er sich nicht um sich selbst bewegt."³⁶ The task of history is, after "... das Jenseits der Wahrheit verschwunden ist, die Wahrheit des Diesseits zu etabliciren;" and now that the critique of religion has been completed and human self-alienation revealed in it, it is the task of philosophy, in the service of history "... die unheiligen Gestalten zu entlarven."³⁷ The criticism of heaven must become the criticism of earth, of law, of politics.

A few remarks and observations are in order before proceeding to the main body of the article itself. First, the progression of criticism from religion to the earthly forms of alienation is clearly shown. Second, Marx has already transferred the seat of religion from the individual to the social unit, if Feuerbach ever had it in the individual

(cf

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid., (MEGA, 608).

37. Ibid.

(cf. the Theses on Feuerbach a year later).³⁸ Third, Marx clearly views religion as arising from the earthly deficiencies, and even more, from the lack of the actual realization of the human essence; in view of the identification of the essence of man with money, with labour and exchange activity, one is justified in asking whether this does not refer to the lack of development, lack of the unfolding of the human powers and potentials, rather than merely the existence of "inhuman", i.e. miserable conditions of human life? Fourth, it is of interest to note that here the description of religion as the opium of the people has no connotation of its being a sedative, to control the oppressed; it is a purely Feuerbachian expression of religion (note the use of Seufzer, which Feuerbach used in his explanation of the rise of religion: a sigh). Compare also the use of halo to describe religion, it is the halo of the vale of woe. In these two, religion is both the expression of, and the protest of man against his actual conditions.³⁹ Fifth, it should

38. Ibid., 340 (MEGA, 635) for 6th. Thesis on Feuerbach. Cf. Tucker, op. cit., 145-149, who maintains that Marx mistakenly shifted from an individualistic analysis of Man's inner conflict to that of a social conflict, in the 1844 Mss.

39. Cf. Hegel, Philosophy of History (Dover Edition), 167, where he speaks of the extravagant, wild unbounded imagination in the abandonment of reason, morality, and subjectivity - annihilation - "... as a man who is quite reduced in body and spirit finds his existence altogether stupid and intolerable, and is driven to the creation of a dream-world and a delirious bliss in opium." (cf. E. Thier, Das Menschenbild des Jungen Marx, 52, for a possible parallel from Moses Hess) It is a fact, however, that in later writings Marx and Engels saw contemporary religion as a tool for the oppression of the masses.

be observed that philosophy or criticism has a positive task to play in the transformation of earth, just as its importance was proclaimed in the correspondence of 1843. This importance of philosophy becomes apparent in the further development of the article. Marx addresses his critique to Germany, but it is to be remembered, "... aus keinem anderen Grunde, als weil sie sich an Deutschland anschliesst."⁴⁰ Germany has done in theory what everyone else has done in practice (from Heine) and now finds itself struggling to freedom after its death (the counter-revolution and restoration period): the struggle against its present is a struggle against the past of other nations. Germany has a philosophy, a theory which is on a par with the conditions of nations elsewhere; its task is to join that theory to its own conditions, and subject both to criticism. Hence the demand that philosophy be negated, which cannot be done without making philosophy a reality. Criticism (as opposed to speculative philosophy, and hence the Hegelian - Left)--theory--becomes a material force to fight material forces as soon as it grasps the masses; this happens when it is radical, when it grasps the root of the matter: when it grasps the fact that man is the root of the matter for man himself:

⁴⁰DE, 209 (MEGA, 608).

Die Kritik der Religion endet mit der Lehre, dass der Mensch das höchste Wesen fuer den Menschen sei, also mit dem kategorischen Imperativ, alle Verhältnisse umzuwerfen, in denen der Mensch ein geknechtetes, ein verlassenes, ein verachtliches Wesen ist...⁴¹

(It should be remembered that Marx is now discussing political conditions, when he speaks of oppression, as opposed to general human unreality in the previous passage concerning the origin of religion.)

But, the argument runs, can Germany have a revolution?

A revolution needs a passive element, a material basis; theory is realized in a people only when it realizes the needs of the people. Will the discrepancy between German thought and German reality be complemented by a corresponding discrepancy between civil society and the State; will theoretical needs be immediately practical needs? No; Germany cannot throw off its specific limitations without throwing off the general limitations of the political present: it must have a total revolution as opposed to a partial revolution. In the latter, one class assumes the task of liberating all classes (provided of course that all others are in its own position!); it assumes upon itself all the good in society and projects into its enemy all the evils of society. But in Germany no such class exists: all classes are too cowardly, too mediocre in outlook, too philistine. In Germany no class has any need or capacity for

41. Ibid., 216 (MEGA, 614-615).

general emancipation, "... bis sie nicht durch ihre unmittelbare Lage, durch die materielle Notwendigkeit, durch ihre Ketten selbst dazu gezwungen wird."⁴² Where then is the possibility of revolution in Germany?

Antwort: In der Bildung einer Klasse mit radikalen Ketten, einer Klasse der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft, welche keine Klasse der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft ist, eines Standes, welcher die Auflösung aller Stände ist, einer Sphäre, welche einen universellen Charakter durch ihre universellen Leiden besitzt und kein besonderes Recht in Anspruch nimmt, weil kein besonderes Unrecht sondern das Unrecht schlechthin an ihre verübt wird, welche nicht mehr auf einen historischen, sondern nur noch auf den menschlichen Titel provenieren kann, welche in keinem einseitigen Gegensatz zu den Konsequenzen, sondern in einem allseitigen Gegensatz zu den Voraussetzungen des deutschen Staatswesens steht, einer Sphäre endlich, welche sich nicht emanzipieren kann, ohne sich von allen übrigen Sphären der Gesellschaft und damit alle übrigen Sphären der Gesellschaft zu emanzipieren, welche mit einem Wort der völlige Verlust des Menschen ist, also nur durch die völlige Wiedergewinnung des Menschen sich selbst gewinnen kann. Diese Auflösung der Gesellschaft als ein besonderer Stand ist das Proletariat.⁴³

The class of the proletariat is being formed by the growth of industry; it is not "... die naturwuechsig entstandene, sondern die kaestlich produzierte Armut..."; it results from the dissolution of society, especially the middle class, not from the oppressiveness of society.⁴⁴ It demands the abolition of private property and thereby merely proclaims as a general principle of society, its own principle which was created by society itself.⁴⁵ (Hence, again Marx is following his method of evolving the principles of the future from the development of the past and present.)

42. Ibid., 222 (MEGA, 619). 43. Ibid., 222-223 (MEGA, 619-620).

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid.

Philosophy and the masses are to be united in the revolution and transformation of society: the proletariat finds its weapons in philosophy, just as philosophy finds its weapons in the proletariat. Thought merely needs to strike into the soil of the people to achieve emancipation.

Die Emanzipation des Deutschen ist die Emanzipation des Menschen. Der Kopf dieser Emanzipation ist die Philosophie, ihre Herz das Proletariat. Die Philosophie kann sich nicht verwirklichen ohne die Aufhebung des Proletariats, das Proletariat kann sich nicht aufheben ohne die Verwirklichung der Philosophie.⁴⁶

Marx ends the piece by saying that "Wenn alle inneren Bedingungen erfuehlt sind...", the German day of resurrection will be announced by the crowing of the Gallic cock (political action).⁴⁷

Here then we have Marx's position:

- (1) The revolution and emancipation of mankind is to come when all the inner conditions are fulfilled. This is not merely when the revolutionary will is agitated; Marx is optimistic here but he has no utopian dreams of automatic revolution - his theory is grounded upon the social and economic development of society, as evidenced by his definition of the proletariat as a product of the modern dissolution of society by industry. Also he says that theory must meet the needs of the people.
- (2) This revolution is to be accomplished by the action of the proletariat, a product of civil society itself, from its own

46. Ibid., 224 (MEGA, 621).

47. Ibid.

essence and it flows from the course of history itself, not from human passion (though this of course may be useful; but the fact that he does not claim the poor per se to be the universal class, proves the point).⁴⁸

(3) The action of the proletariat must be guided by philosophy, of which it is the fulfilment (again showing the deep concern of Marx for the contemporary philosophical problems, as this idea has nettled him since 1837). It must be remembered that this philosophy is the critical philosophy of Marx whose task it is to study and criticise the earthly forms of alienation, hence to make empirical studies of these, a point not to be forgotten when we find Marx forsaking revolution for the study of economics to find the clue to the revolution and to justify it.⁴⁹

(4) He relates any emancipation to a general or universal emancipation based upon the total transformation of society, not merely the shifting of power from one social group to another; he demands a socialist or communist society.

48. This distinction of the proletariat from the poor is repeated with vehemence in the Manifesto where the poor of the older society is called "Das Lumpenproletariat, diese passive Verfaulung der untersten Schichten der alten Gesellschaft..." who are only able to play a reactionary role. (Ibid., 536-537 (MEGA, 535-536)). This contradicts any identification of Marx's compassion for the proletariat with the compassion and esteem for the poor of the prophets or of Jesus; Marx's proletariat is a part of the split society, a product of the course of history which has a special significance rooting in Hegel. It also contradicts the popular stigmatization of Marx as being merely motivated by righteous indignation or covetousness for the wealth of the rich.

49. This shift of emphasis is often used to support the thesis of a radical development or change in Marxism; cf.: Leonard Krieger, "Marx and Engels as Historians", (contd. overleaf)

(5) He is following Feuerbach's formula of religion: man in his unrealised human essence, in his poverty of development of human conditions, creates an imaginary world, a phantasy which is really the reflection of his species nature; emancipation comes when that projection is removed by the realization of it and by criticism of it.

(6) He has already located alienation in the economic realm, in the system of private property; here he draws its solution out of it by means of the action of the proletariat.

(7) He is concerned with society and conceives of man as being a social being. Hence he is not concerned with personal problems per se, and was originally socially oriented.

(footnote contd.) Journal of the History of Ideas, XIV (1953) 381-403. See Tucker, op. cit., 165-176, for a discussion of the problem, and Erich Fromm, Marx's Concept of Man, 69-79.

The 1844 Manuscripts.

The point in Marx's development has been reached at which he attempted the first formulation of his new system, the manuscript written in Paris in 1844. This system did not contain the familiar scheme of historical development but does contain the basis for it and sufficient indications of it to establish the fact that he already had it in mind. It was elaborated in detail the following year in the Deutsche Ideologie. The reason for dwelling upon this early system is that it is often interpreted as the "true" Marx in opposition to the later Marx. Further, work by Professor R.C. Tucker places the relevance of any study of Marx's doctrine of primitive society in question because his thesis is that Marx was projecting the inner personal conflict of man into a social and historical form, or, that Marx's system is a myth.⁵⁰ It is evident from an examination of this work that while it is in many ways an excellent account of Marx's development, that it distorts the facts at several crucial points and that its main thesis is untenable. It is necessary to give a sufficient exposition of the 1844 Mss. to refute this interpretation of it as myth and to establish the viewpoint which underlies our whole study. This viewpoint is that Marx tried to fuse the historical and social data of his time with a philosophy of history inherited from Hegel and Feuerbachs far from projecting man's inner conflict

50. Cf. note 14.

into the social world, Marx was attempting to unite the contemporary situation with this philosophy of man and history.

(This is borne out by his reluctance to accept the communism of Hess and his theoretical grounding of it when he did accept it.) His conclusions may have been wrong (and we believe they were wrong)--that is not our concern, for our concern is not with the validity of his system but with what he thought.

Whatever his validity, it appears that Marx grappled with given factors, not his own or man's own inner conflict; he struggled with the contemporary philosophy and the then accepted facts of economics, society, politics, science, and technology.

It is extremely important to bear in mind the stage of Marx's development at which the writings of 1844 appear, and their fundamental purpose. Marx had already formulated his theory of a revolution accomplished by the partnership of philosophy and the proletariat based upon the breach within civil society; already he had identified the economic alienation as the basis of all alienation and proclaimed its removal as the prerequisite for ending all forms of alienation, and had identified money as the "God" of the capitalist form of economic life. He had already grasped Feuerbach's system of alienation and its transcendence, and presumably the form of "species man" as the positive form of life in the future. In the 1844 writings he is trying to express this new system in a treatise on economics, philosophy, and politics. He is not to be interpreted as still in an idealistic stage of development

to his mature materialistic communism (Moscow's interpretation⁵¹), nor as being at the peak of his development of a humanistic system which he later abandoned - or which others misinterpreted - for the crude historical materialism of modern communism (many non-communist interpreters, both Christian and non-Christian⁵²). The differences between the Marx of 1844 and the Marx of Das Kapital are merely a difference of emphasis, of refinement of theory, a fact which is obscured if the articles on the Jewish question and the introduction to the critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right are not grouped with the 1844 manuscripts. His later preoccupation with economics was merely the fulfilment of the need of criticism of the earthly forms of alienation, a fulfilment of the alliance of philosophy and the proletariat (as is also his political activity). Furthermore, it will be seen that the Feuerbachian scheme of alienation and transcendence of that alienation is never lost in Marx's later writings, even though it does not appear so clearly because of the political and economic emphases, and is not in explicit

51. Cf. Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, (Moscow, 1959), 9 (editors' introduction): "But in spite of Feuerbach's appreciable influence, Marx begins in this early work to lay the foundation of that revolutionary materialistic world outlook which was soon further developed in The Holy Family and, in particular, The German Ideology." This is, of course, "post-thaw", three years after Krushchev's attack on Stalinism.

52. Cf. Alasdair MacIntyre, Marxism, an Interpretation, 68ff; Erich Fromm, op. cit., 69-79.

terminology because of his attempt to abandon the abstractions of philosophy and deal with concrete facts.

Marx's manuscripts of 1844 were first published in 1932 and have since become the focal point of the current discussions of, and attempts to reinterpret, Marxism.⁵³ The complete manuscripts did not survive and they now exist in three parts which originally formed three manuscripts. Ms I comprises four sections on economics (MEGA, III, 31-94, English, Moscow edition, 21-83) of which only the last section on alienated labour is of great importance to us. Ms II consists of only the last four pages of the original manuscript, beginning at page XL (MEGA, 97-103; English, 84-92). Ms III contains: notes to some of the missing pages of Ms II which actually grew into several complete sections in their own right; the Preface; and a section on money (MEGA, III-126; 150-172; 127-144; 33-35--Preface; 145-149--on money; English, 98-114; 142-171; 115-135; 14-20--Preface); 136-141--on money. The displacement of

53. The first complete edition appeared in the Moscow sponsored Marx - Engels Gesamtausgabe, Abteilung I, Bd. III (cited as: "MEGA III" or "M.---" when in parentheses with other editions). In the same year, 1932, Kroner Verlag published a two-volume edition of Marx's early writings, Die Fruchtschriften which contained a portion of the 1844 Mss. in the jumbled order in which they appear in the actual manuscripts. Edited by Siegfried Landshut, it was re-issued in a single volume (used here) in 1953, and is cited in this work as DF. A new edition of the 1844 Mss. (Nationalökonomie und Philosophie) was issued in 1950, edited by Erich Thier, published in Cologne but has not been used, though its introduction (E. Thier, Das Menschenbild des Jungen Marx) has been used. In 1959 Moscow published an English translation (cited in note 51 above) which will be cited as "E" in the parenthesis. Erich Fromm has published an essay along with a translation by T.E. Bottomore which omits the purely (contd. overleaf)

MEGA, 150-172 (English, 142-171) was due to Marx's intentions of placing the section on Hegel at the end, though he had written it earlier.

In the preface Marx makes it clear that he begins with political economy and considers other subjects only in so far as they are touched upon by political economy itself. This study is one of a series of separate critiques which he had projected, each to cover its own field, their inter-relationship to be shown by a concluding pamphlet. This approach has been taken because of the difficulty he encountered in preparing his previously announced critique of jurisprudence and political science: the work became unwieldy because of the intermingling of the criticism of speculation with the criticism of the subject matter itself. He has included the section on Hegel because none of the critical theologians (Bauer, etc.) have been critical of their pre-suppositions taken from Hegel and since questioned by Feuerbach.⁵⁴

The basic method of the critique is that of Feuerbach (as opposed to the subject matter which he says he owes to the economists and the German and French socialists);

(footnote contd.) economic sections of the first manuscript (Erich Fromm, Marx's Concept of Man (1961)). In the references, the edition from which the citation is made will be given first, followed by the others in parentheses.

54. DF, 226-227 (M. 33-35; E. 14-20).

Die positive Kritik ueberhaupt (verdankt) ihre wahre Begrueudung den Entdeckung Feuerbachs. Von Feuerbach datiert erst die positive humanistische und naturalistische Kritik.⁵⁵

That this is not a "sop" to the popularity of Feuerbach is indicated by the fundamental structure of the thought of Marx, which will appear in our survey to follow. We may say, generally, that Marx took the method of Feuerbach and Hess' contributions concerning labour and money, and returned to Hegel for clarification before applying the results to economics and society.

Marx's initial step in the 1844 Mss. is to set forth a summary of political economy in the first three sections of Mss.I: Wages of Labour; Profit of Capital; Rent of Land.⁵⁶ In doing this he starts from the principles, laws, and language of political economy and the real conditions of life described by this science.⁵⁷ Having accepted the laws and concepts of political economy, and its basic fact, the progressive enslavement of the worker as his productivity increases, he wants to go beyond the analysis made by political economy. It, he charges, expresses the abstract

55. Ibid., 227 (M. 34; E. 17).

56. MEGA, 39-80 (E. 21-67).

57. Cf. Ibid., 81, 82-83 (E. 67,69). This is taken from his transition to the 4th section on alienation of labour.

formulae of its material processes, takes these formulae for laws, but does not comprehend these,--how they arise from the nature of private property ("Sie begreift diese Gesetze nicht, d.h. sie weist nicht nach, wie sie aus dem Wesen des Privateigentums hervorgehn.")⁵⁸ It does not disclose the source of the division between capital and labour, and between capital and land: it merely assumes what it is to explain, or explains it from an external circumstance; hence it confuses or evades the real issue, the necessary interconnection of economic facts.

Having disposed of political economy in this fashion (accepting it so far as it goes, but desiring to go further than it does) Marx now reveals his purpose in the study (we should not forget the existence of these initial pages on political economy):

Wir haben also jetzt den wesentlichen Zusammenhang zwischen dem Privateigentum, der Habsucht, der Trennung von Arbeit, Kapital und Grundeigentum, von Austausch und Konkurrenz, von Wert und Entwertung der Menschen, von Monopol und Konkurrenz, etc. von dieser ganzen Entfremdung mit dem Geldsystem zu begreifen.⁵⁹

(We should note that he is concerned with the relation of the whole system of economic alienation to the money system; in the articles on the Jewish question he had equated money with the "God" of the Jews. Here then he reveals the use of the Feuerbachian critique.) Marx proceeds to this comprehension of the inter-relationships of economic categories by

- (1) accepting the fact revealed by his study of economics,
- (2) forming the concept of this fact, (3) analysing the concept,

58. Ibid., 81 (E. 67-68). 59. Ibid., 92 (E. 68).

(4) returning to the real world to see how the results obtained will present themselves in actual fact.⁶⁰

The fact which political economy presents is:

Der Arbeiter wird um so armer, je mehr Reichtum er produziert, je mehr seine Produktion an Macht und Umfang zunimmt. Der Arbeiter wird eine um so wohlfeilere Ware, je mehr Waren er schafft. Mit der Verwertung der Sachenwelt nimmt die Entwertung der Menschenwelt in direktem Verhaeltnis zu. Die Arbeit produziert nicht nur Waren, und zwar in dem Verhaeltnis, in welchem sie ueberhaupt Waren produziert.⁶¹

The concept of this fact is alienated labour, the self-alienation of man in and by his activity, labour. This concept further reveals the Feuerbachian trend of Marx's thought, as the following shows:

Dies Faktum drueckt weiter nichts aus als: Der Gegenstand, den die Arbeit produziert, ihr Produkt, tritt ihr als ein fremdes Wesen, als eine von den Produzenten unabhaengige Macht gegenueber. Das Produkt der Arbeit ... ist die Vergegenstaendlichung der Arbeiter. Die Verwirklichung der Arbeit ist ihre Vergegenstaendlichung. Diese... erscheint in dem nationaloekonomischen Zustand als Entwicklung des Arbeiters, die Vergegenstaendlichung als Verlust und Knechtschaft des Gegenstandes, die Aneignung als Entfremdung, als Entaueserung.⁶²

Hence, the more man gives to the world of his products, the more he produces, the less he has himself, just as in the world of religion the more a man gives to God (the projection and

60. Cf. Ibid., 82-83 (E. 69-70); also 90 (E. 78) where he summarises his procedure.

61. Ibid., 82-83 (E. 69).

62. Ibid., 83 (E. 69).

mental objectification of the human species) the less he gives to himself in terms of attributes and dignity.⁶³

Marx now proceeds to his third step, the analysis of this concept of alienated labour. This he does by considering: (1) the worker's loss of his product, (2) the alienation of the activity, the labour itself, as something which is alien to the worker's nature and which destroys him instead of allowing him to exercise his powers freely, (3) from these two he deduces the loss of the species by man which consists of free creative activity for its own sake instead of as a means to existence and the loss of his objectified world in which man beholds himself and which confirms his nature, and (4) from this he deduces that man alienates himself from his fellow-men by the loss of the species life.⁶⁴ Again we see the centrality of Feuerbach in the placing of the species concept in the centre of his analysis of the concept of alienated labour (an exposition of the species concept itself follows later).

Marx has started from the fact, formulated its concept and analysed it; now he returns to the actual world and seeks to see how this concept and its implications are presented in it. By this he shows that alienated labour must express itself in private property and a class of property owners, as its products must belong to someone (and cannot belong to the gods!).

63. Ibid., 83 (E. 69-70).

64. Ibid., 84-90 (E. 70-78).

Therefore he says that alienated labour is the source of private property, and not vice versa as it might seem:

Also durch die entfremdete, entaussetzte Arbeit erzeugt der Arbeiter des Verhaeltnis eines der Arbeit fremden und ausser ihr stehenden Menschen zu dieser Arbeit, des Verhaeltnis des Arbeiters zur Arbeit erzeugt das Verhaeltnis des Kapitalisten zu derselben, oder wie man sonst den Arbeitsherrn nennen will. Das Privateigentum, ist also das Produkt, das Resultat, die notwendige Konsequenz der entaussetzten Arbeit, des acusserlichen Verhaeltnisses des Arbeiters zu der Natur und zu sich selbst.

Der Privateigentum ergibt sich also durch Analyse aus dem Begriff der entaussetzten Arbeit, d.i. des entaussetzten Menschen, der entfremdeten Arbeit, des entfremdeten Lebens, des entfremdeten Menschen.

It is true that the result was won by analysis of the movement of private property /.... Aber es zeigt sich bei Analyse diese Begriffs, dass, wenn das Privateigentum als Grund, als Ursache der entaussetzten Arbeit erscheint, es vielmehr eine Konsequenz derselben ist, wie auch die Goetter ursprünglich nicht die Ursache, sondern die Wirkung der menschlichen Verstandesverirrung sind. Später schlaegt dies Verhaeltnis in Wechselwirkung um. ⁶⁵

Marx has, then, declared alienated humanity and thus alienated labour to be the source of private property and all other forms of alienation.

After Marx has used this result to elucidate briefly two problems, the second of which touches the question of political emancipation of the workers (hence indicating Marx's concern for this in the midst of the philosophic essay),⁶⁶ he

65. Ibid., 91-92 (E. 80).

66. Ibid., 92-93 (E.82); the second states that political emancipation of the workers is involved in general emancipation as alienated labour is the root of all servitude.

reveals the relation of the sections of analysis to his original purpose of demonstrating the inter-relationship of the economic categories. Just as the concept of private property resulted, by analysis, from the concept of alienated labour, so can all the other categories be derived from these two, are in fact only definite and developed expressions of these two.

Wie wir aus dem Begriff der entfremdeten, entmenschten Arbeit den Begriff des Privateigentums durch Analyse gefunden haben, so koennen mit Huelfe dieser beiden Faktoren alle national-oekonomischen Kategorien entwickelt werden, und wir werden in jeder Kategorie, wie, z.B. dem Schacher, der Konkurrenz, dem Kapital, dem Geld, nur einem bestimmten und entwickelten Ausdruck dieser ersten Grundlagen widerfinden.

Bevor wir jedoch diese Gestaltung betrachten, suchen wir zwei Aufgaben zu loesen.⁶⁷

The significance of this passage is that Marx reveals a consistent plan throughout the whole fourth section of Mss I, and at the same time reveals once again the fact that alienated labour is his first premise; from it he derives private property and from both he intends to derive all other categories of economics. He announced in a previously cited passage (note 59) that he planned to show the relation of all the economic categories to the money system.

Marx intends to return to this problem of the inter-relation of the economic categories after answering two problems. The second of these problems reveals both the primacy of alienated labour and its origin:

67. Ibid., 93 (E. 82).

(2) Wir haben die Entfremdung der Arbeit, ihre Entausserung als ein Faktum angenommen und dies Faktum analysiert. Wie, fragen wir nun, kommt der Mensch dazu, seine Arbeit zu entaussern, zu entfremden? Wie ist diese Entfremdung im Wesen der menschlichen Entwicklung begründet? Wir haben schon viel fuer die Loesung der Aufgabe gewonnen, indem wir die Frage nach dem Ursprung des Privateigentums in die Frage nach dem Verhaeltnis der entaussernten Arbeit zum Entwicklungsengang der Menschheit verwandelt haben. Denn wenn man vom Privateigentum spricht, so glaubt man es mit einer Sache ausser dem Menschen zu tun zu haben. Wenn man von der Arbeit spricht, so hat man es unmittelbar mit dem Menschen selbst zu tun. Diese neue Stellung der Frage ist inklusive schon ihre Loesung.⁶⁸

Unfortunately the manuscript breaks off after a few preliminary remarks toward the answer to the first question. However, the second question itself, and the remark about it indicate that Marx saw the alienated condition of labour as primary and that he related this to man's historical development. He shifts the crucial point to the nature of man himself and his alienated activity. Presumably, in view of the remarks, this is due to the lack of development of man, and the alienation plays a part in this development, as in Hegel's Spirit coming to full self-consciousness by alienation of itself into nature or of Feuerbach's view of religious alienation playing a part in the development of man. Certainly Marx had in mind historical materialism, however undeveloped it may have been when he wrote the 1844 Mss. (which will be seen more clearly when we examine the anthropology underlying Marx's views).⁶⁹

68. Ibid.

69. Cf. H. Popitz, op. cit., 158, for one of the few observations of this passage and its implications.

This brings to an end Ms I.

Ms II appears to be a development of the proposed exposition of the inter-relationships between economic categories by their derivation from estranged labour and private property (cf. quotation - footnote 67 - "Bevor wir jedoch diese Gestaltung betrachten ...") In the surviving pages Marx discusses the mutual relations of private property, labour and capital, the relation of landed property to capital and industry. Hence he says:

Das Verhaeltnis des Privateigentums enthaelt in sich latent das Verhaeltnis des Privateigentums als Arbeit wie das Verhaeltnis desselben als Kapital und die Beziehung dieser beiden Ausdrueke aufeinander.⁷⁰

Der Unterschied von Kapital und Erde, von Gewinn und Grundrente, von beiden, von Arbeitslohn, von der Industrie, von der Agrikultur, von dem unbeweglichen und beweglichen Privateigentum, ist ein noch historischer nicht im Wesen der Sache begruendeter Unterschied, ein fixiertes Bildungs- und Entstehungsmoment des Gegensatzes von Kapital und Arbeit.⁷¹

Das Verhaeltnis des Privateigentums ist Arbeit, Kapital und die Beziehung beider.⁷²

From this no pattern appears which is contrary to the initial plan, and such is its realization.

Ms III consists of additions to passages in the lost portion of Ms II, which, again, appear to follow the original purpose and plan. After these a critical section on Hegel is followed by the Preface and by a section on the nature of money.

70. DF, 304 (M. 98-99; E. 86).

71. Ibid., 305 (M. 99-100; E. 87).

72. Ibid., 209 (M. 103; E. 91).

The addition to page XXXVI of the lost portion discusses the relation of property and labour: labour is the essence of property, as perceived by A. Smith and Ricardo in opposition to the mercantilists and the physiocrats. In the course of this he also touches on the relation of industry and capital to agriculture.⁷³ The addition to page XXXIX touches on (1) the antithesis of lack of property (*Eigentumlosigkeit*) and property which Marx says is a dynamic one, and (2) the transcendence of self-estrangement, which leads to a long discussion of communism's character and qualities, and its various stages of development. The critical study on Hegel (which is not economic in substance but is related to political economy by the concept of labour which Marx imputes to Hegel) - this critical study of Hegel is interspersed with a comparative study of the meaning of human need under private property and socialism, industrial wealth versus extravagant wealth and the division of labour in a bourgeois society.⁷⁴ The final section describes the power of money in terms of Feuerbach's definition of God: money is the all-powerful agent which makes and destroys any and all qualities for its possessor regardless of his own real qualities.⁷⁵

73. Ibid., 228-232 (M. 107-110; E. 93-97).

74. For the interspersed section of writing, cf. Ibid., 248-296. On Hegel: 248-254, 261-263, 269-288 (M. 151-172; E. 142-171). On "Human need etc.": Ibid., 254-261, 263-269, 288-296 (M. 127-144; E. 115-135).

75. Ibid., 296-301 (M. 145-149; E. 136-141).

As the contents of these sections are to be used in an exposition of Marx's thought in the 1844 Man we shall not consider them further here. The purpose of this outline has been to establish that the manuscripts have a unity of thought and purpose which does not permit indiscriminate quotation without regard for context,⁷⁶ (and which to us appears clearly enough to assume it as a guide to interpretation.) Throughout, Marx is assuming that alienated labour is the basic condition of evil or source of all other ills of society; he relates all others to this condition and derives them from it or its derivative, private property. Man's situation of unfreedom and oppression (which Marx plans to analyse in other studies) has at its root estranged economics (cf. Introduction to Critique of Hegel); the foundation of the estranged economic system is estranged labour which flourishes in the soil of mankind's development in history.

⁷⁶R.C. Tucker, op. cit., 134-135, treats all "labour" as an alienation of man's true activity, which is essentially artistic. It is clear that Marx speaks of alienated labour when treating labour as it occurs in capitalistic economy (in the section on estranged labour - "Entfremdete Arbeit", it should be remembered), (MEGA 81ff; E. 67ff). However, in certain contexts he speaks of labour as the life-activity of the species, or as species-life; the object of such labour is to reshape the objective world according to its inherent laws and man's needs and desires - but it is labour. (Ibid., 87-89; E. 74-76). Tucker has failed to take into account the context of the statements he has used.

Relation to Feuerbach

Already it has become clear that Feuerbach is truly the basis of criticism Marx is making of economics. Man alienates himself into his product by alienated labour (instead of into God by alienated mental activity) and the totality of his products becomes an alien force over him, private property. This estranges him from his fellow man as well as from his true activity - free, creative activity for its own sake - man's species being is lost. The alienated state is related to man's development as with Feuerbach, and man's development is really his self-development, self-creation by objectifying himself and then appropriating this objectification, recognising it as human and treating it as such.⁷⁷ It should not be forgotten that these similarities to Feuerbach involve the fundamental concepts of Marx's system, not mere terms or analogies. There are, also, further concrete similarities.

In the articles on the Jewish question it was said that money was the "God" of capitalist society. This is developed further in the 1844 Mss. His section on money clearly portrays it as having divine qualities: it is universal, all-powerful, supplies all desires; it confounds realities and chimeras, overcomes all impossibilities; and is the most desired possession.⁷⁸ Further, money is the objectification of the

77. Cf. this in his remarks on Hegel, DF, 269 (M. 156; E. 151).

78. Cf. Ibid., 296-301 (M. 145-149; E. 136-141).

species nature of man, of the alienated abilities of man.⁷⁹
The limited individual is able to command the powers of mankind out of proportion to his own personal qualities by the possession of this objectification of them. It is, however, more than merely the representative of private property. In some notes on excerpts from James Mill, not included in the actual 1944 Mag but published in the same volume of MEGA, he identifies money as the objectification of the activity of exchange which is a species activity arising from man's social nature;⁸⁰ at the same time he compares money with Jesus Christ⁸¹ who mediated between man

79. "Die Verkehrung und Verwechslung aller menschlichen und natuerlichen Qualitaeten, die Verbruederung der Unmoeglichkeiten - die goettliche Kraft - des Geldes liegt in seinem Wesen als dem entfremdeten, entaeussernden und sich veraeussernden Gattungswesen der Menschen. Es ist das entaeusserte Vermoegen der Menschheit." (II, 299; M. 147-148).

80. MEGA, 531: The essence of money is "... dass die vermittelnde Taetigkeit oder Bewegung, der menschliche, gesellschaftliche Akt, wodurch sich die Produkte des Menschen wechselseitig ergaessen, entfremdet und die Eigenschaft eines materiellen Dings muesser dem Menschen, des Geldes wird." ... money becomes the power superior to man because man is not the mediator for his fellow-man (Feuerbach): "Das dieser Mittler nun zum wirklichen Gott wird, ist klar, denn der Mittler ist die wirkliche Macht ueber das, womit er sich vermittelt."

81. Ibid., 531-532: "Christus repraesentiert urspruenglich (1) die Menschen vor Gott; (2) Gott fuer die Menschen; (3) die Menschen dem Menschen.

"So repraesentiert das Geld urspruenglich seinem Begriff nach: (1) Das Privateigentum fuer das Privateigentum; (2) die Gesellschaft fuer das Privateigentum; (3) das Privateigentum fuer die Gesellschaft."

"Aber Christus ist der entaeusserte Gott und der entaeusserte Mensch. Gott hat nur mehr Wert, sofern er Christus, der Mensch nur mehr Wert, sofern er Christus repraesentiert. Ebenso mit dem Geld."

and God in Feuerbach's system (hence was the species and caused Christianity to identify the individual and the species). (In this comparison one might say that he saw private property - objectified labour - as God, and money as the mediator or Christ. However it is not clear whether or not he had systematised this comparison.)

Money, as the objectification of the exchange of products, as the objective mediator of exchange replacing the human act of exchange, arises from the fact that man as "... ein geselliges Wesen zu Austausch und weil der Austausch--unter der Voraussetzung des Privateigentums--zum Wert fortgehn muss."⁸² Then the actual social relation, the actual relation of exchanging ceases to be a social and human relation and becomes an abstract relation of private property to private property - or value, which has actual existence as money.⁸³ Money is the objectified relation of private property to private property which exists in the action of exchange of products, or objectified value. The activity of exchange is the species act, the social act by which the social

82. Ibid., 532.

83. Ibid., Die vermittelnde Bewegung des austauschenden Menschen ist naemlich keine gesellschaftliche, keine menschliche Bewegung, kein menschliches Verhaeltnis, es ist das abstrakte Verhaeltnis des Privateigentums zum Privateigentum, und dies abstrakte Verhaeltnis ist der Wert, dessen wirkliche Existenz als Wert erst das Geld ist. Weil die austauschenden Menschen sich nicht als Menschen zu einander verhalten, so verliert die Sache die Bedeutung des menschlichen, des personalen Eigentums. Das gesellschaftliche Verhaeltnis von Privateigentum zu Privateigentum ist schon ein Verhaeltnis, worin das Privateigentum sich selbst entfremdet ist. Die fuer sich seiende Existenz dieses Verhaeltnisses, das Geld, ist daher die Entaeusserung des Privateigentums, (cont'd. overleaf)

human being is created; it is, both in production and exchange or commerce, "... deren der Gattungstätigkeit und Gattungsgeist...⁸⁴; it is (in capitalism):

... der gesellschaftliche, der Gattungsakt, das Gemeinwesen, der gesellschaftliche Verkehr und Integration der Menschen innerhalb des Privateigentums und darum der neusserliche, der entzerrte Gattungsakt.⁸⁵

As with Feuerbach, the species life of man is alienated into a power, alien to man, independent of him, and separating men.⁸⁶

Further, this "god" degrades man's activity into inhuman activity: the really human activity - free creative activity for its own sake - becomes merely a means to existence when man is under the dominion of estranged labour and its counterparts property and money.⁸⁷ And as we have seen, in the alienated condition, money separates man from man: as did God in Christ in Feuerbach's view. Feuerbach is seen in the background of all these concepts of Marx concerning man's alienated condition and the resulting "god" - money and its consequences.

A further similarity to Feuerbach is seen in the species relation, in its true form, in which each mediates the species for the other. We have seen that alienation and the objectification of man's essence into god-like objects and powers

(footnote contd.) die Abstraktion von seiner spezifischen, persönlichen Natur.

84. Ibid., 535-536.

85. Ibid., 538: cf. 531

86. Cf. Ibid., 90-91 (E. 78-80); 147-148 (E. 138-139).

87. Ibid., 67-69 (E. 75-76).

separates men and breaks the natural species relationship of man to man: the objectified power acts in the place of men.

The alienated form of this relationship is the activity of exchange and division of labour in the capitalistic society.⁸⁸

In the true society, mutual interdependence of men based upon their needs and products which are mediated by exchange and which represent the objectification and confirmation of their essence (both as objects needed to confirm them and as objects to express them), is the basis of human society. In this situation each finds that his labour expresses his own essence and confirms the essence of another by meeting the other's needs; the resulting community is not a power over them but their own activity, life, and wealth. The following lengthy quotations from the notes on Mill in 1844 are worthy of more notice than they have received previously.

Der Austausch sowohl der menschlichen Tätigkeit innerhalb der Produktion selbst, als auch der menschlichen Produkte gegen einander ist--der Gattungstätigkeit und Gattungsg Geist, deren wirkliches, bewusstes und wahres Dasein die gesellschaftliche Tätigkeit und der gesellschaftliche Genuss ist. Indem das menschliche Wesen das wahre Gemeinwesen der Menschen, so schaffen, produzieren die Menschen durch Betätigung ihres Wesens das menschliche Gemeinwesen, das gesellschaftliche Wesen, welches keine abstrakt-allgemeine Macht gegenüber dem einzelnen Individuum ist, sondern des Wesens eines jeden Individuums, sein eigene Tätigkeit, sein eignes Leben, sein eigener Geist, sein eigener Reichtum ist. Nicht durch Reflektion entsteht daher jenes wahre Gemeinwesen, es erscheint daher durch die Not und dem Bedürfnis der Individuen, d.h. unmittelbar durch die Betätigung ihres Daseins selbst produziert. / Failure to see this as human and the consequent organization of it results in alienation; its existence does not depend upon men's volition.⁸⁹

88. Ibid., 139 (E. 129-130; DF, 289).

89. Ibid., 535-536.

/in capitalistic production each produces with a view to meeting his needs by laying claim on the product of another by the other's need of his own product.

(N. 544-546)/

Gesetzt, wir haetten als Menschen produziert: Jeder von uns haette in seiner Produktion sich selbst und den andren doppelt bejaht. Ich haette (1) in meiner Produktion meine Individualitaet, ihre Eigentunlichkeit vergegenstaendlicht und daher sowohl waehrend der Taetigkeit eine individuelle Lebensausserung genossen, als in Anschauen des Gegenstandes die individuelle Freude, meine Persoenlichkeit als gegenstaendliche, sinnlich anschaubare und darum ueber allen Zweifel erhabene Macht zu wissen. (2) In deinem Gemuss oder Deinem Gebrauch meines Produkts haette ich unmittelbar den Gemuss, sowohl des Bewusstseins, in meiner Arbeit ein menschliches Beduerfnis befriedigt, als das menschliche Wesen vergegenstaendlicht und daher den Beduerfnis eines andren menschlichen Wesens einen entsprechenden Gegenstand verschafft zu haben, (3) fuer dich der Mittler zwischen dir und der Gattung gewesen zu sein, also von dir selbst als eine Ergaenzung deines eignen Wesens und als ein notwendiger Teil deiner selbst gewusst und empfunden zu werden, also sowohl in deinem Denken wie in deiner Liebe / Liebe ?? wvn./ mich bestaetigt zu wissen, (4) in meiner individuellen Lebensausserung unmittelbar Deine Lebensausserung geschaffen zu haben, also in meine individuellen Taetigkeit unmittelbar mein wahres Wesen, mein menschliches, mein Gemeinwesen bestaetigt und verwirklicht zu haben.

...

Meine Arbeit waere freie Lebensausserung, daher Gemuss des Lebens. Unter der Voraussetzung des Privateigentums ist die Lebensentausserung, denn ich arbeite, um zu leben, um mir ein Mittel des Lebens zu verschaffen. Meine Arbeit ist nicht Leben.

Zweitens: In der Arbeit waere daher die Eigentunlichkeit meiner Individualitaet, weil mein individuelles Leben bejaht. Die Arbeit waere also wahres, taetiges Eigentum. Unter Voraussetzung des Privateigentums ist meine Individualitaet bis zu dem Punkte entaussert, dass diese Taetigkeit mir verhasst, ... darum auch eine nur erzwungene Taetigkeit und nur durch eine ausserliche Not, nicht durch eine innere notwendige Not mir auferlegt ist. ⁹⁰

The full meaning of this human community and social life is to be seen after an analysis of Marx's anthropology; here it is already evident that he has transposed Feuerbach's species man into the economic life and found the unity of the individual and the species, the objective and the subjective, as he said in the discussion of communism in the 1844 Mss.⁹¹ In this system, each man is the mediator between the individual and the species by virtue of the product of labour being the objectification of the species—both of powers and of needs: labour and need (or self-interest, Egoism) become the basis of the human community and realization. Free creative activity is the true human activity; this is realized only in the interdependent economic life of man, a life based upon need and egoism. Here Marx has gone beyond Hess, for whom egoism was the basis of all evil; Marx has incorporated this evil into the true structure of human reality; in this is seen a return to Hegel in which reality is a whole, each part has its place and role, and evil is a necessary and passing element or situation. Marx says that Hegel's merit was to see that the self-genesis of man was achieved by the objectification of man's powers, the loss of the object or objectification as alienation, and the transcendence of this alienation; Hegel grasped, though in an abstract form, the essence of man as labour and saw labour as the self-creation of man. This is only possible by the objectification of all the species powers of man

91. Ibid., 114 (DE, 235, E. 102).

throughout the course of history and is possible only in the form of alienation at first: "... was zunæchst wieder nur in der Form der Entfremdung mœglich ist".⁹² This incorporation of the evil or imperfection into the total process as a necessary part of it is not a passing remark by Marx (already confirmed by this reference to Hegel); it occurs repeatedly. Marx speaks of the necessity of private property several times.⁹³ He criticises a crude form of communism which, far from surpassing private property, has not even attained to its level.⁹⁴ It is necessary that man be reduced to miserable poverty in order that his inner wealth be drawn from him.⁹⁵ This concept of necessity is to be discussed shortly; its significance here is to indicate that Marx has returned to Hegel to incorporate the idea of totality and necessity into his system. He cannot say, as Hess, that egoism is the root of all social evil; egoism is a result of

92. DF, 269 (M. 156, E. 151).

93. Ibid., 295 (M. 144; E. 134): "Eben darin, dass Teilung der Arbeit und Austausch Gestaltungen des Privateigentums sind, eben darin liegt der doppelte Beweis, sowohl dass das menschliche Leben zu seiner Verwirklichung des Privateigentums beduerfte, wie andererseits, dass es jetzt der Aufhebung des Privateigentums bedarf."

Ibid., 237 (M. 115-116; E. 103): "Ebenso sind aber sowohl das Material der Arbeit, als der Mensch als Subject, wie Resultat so Ausgangspunkt der Bewegung (und dass die dieser Ausgangspunkt sein muessen, eben darin liegt die geschichtliche Notwendigkeit des Privateigentums)."

94. Ibid., 254 (M. 112; E. 100).

95. Ibid., 240 (M. 118; E. 106): "Auf diese absolute Armut / der Sinn des Habens (W.W.A.) / musste das menschliche Wesen reduziert werden, damit es seinen inneren Reichtum aus heraus gebeere."
Cf. Ibid., 244 (M. 122; E. 110).

the initial situation of man and the social organization that this situation requires, and in time it is itself the basis of a higher stage of development.

Having shown the unity of the 1844 Mss and the continuity of their thought with that of Feuerbach and Hegel, we must now examine their contents to see the nature of Marx's system.

Man in the 1844 Mss.

The key to understanding the 1844 Mss is a clear exposition of Marx's concept of man, which concept is evident in asides and in deductions from the alienated condition of man as depicted by Marx. Marx, the Marxians, and the interpreters of Marx never tire of asserting the naturalistic or materialistic nature of man in the Marxian system. This trait of man will become evident but will be balanced by another characteristic of man shared by idealism and the spiritual view of man's nature. Only by clearly distinguishing these two conceptions and by understanding their inter-relationship can Marx be understood.

1. A Natural Being.

A fundamental fact about man (though not the unique fact) is that "Der Mensch is unmittelbar Naturwesen".⁹⁶ His spiritual and physical life "... mit der Natur zusammenhaengt..." which means simply that "... die Natur mit sich selbst zusammenhaengt,

96. Ibid., 274 (M. 160; E. 156).

denn der Mensch ist ein Teil der Natur".⁹⁷ As a living, natural being, man is endowed with natural powers of life existing in him "... als Anlagen und Fähigkeiten, als Triebe".⁹⁸ Further, as a natural being, he needs other natural objects for the satisfaction of his needs, and the expression and confirmation of his powers and drives: he is "... ein leidendes, bedingtes und beschränktes Wesen...",⁹⁹ as the plants and animals. Hence, hunger, a natural need, requires a natural object, outside the being in hunger, for the integration and expression of the essential being of such a being; or a plant needs the sun, which confirms the plant's life and power, just as the plant confirms the sun's life-giving powers.¹⁰⁰ As a natural being, one is also an object for a third being (as in Feuerbach's mediation of Nature by another person).¹⁰¹ Man is then a thoroughly natural being, requiring objects for existence as all natural beings (and in contrast to Hegel's Spirit whose self-expression and alienation occur in realms of pure consciousness).¹⁰²

97. MEGA, 87 (E. 74).

98. DF, 274 (M. 160; E. 156).

99. Ibid.

100. Ibid., 274 (M. 161; E. 156-157); cf. 272-273 (M. 159-160; E. 155-156).

101. Ibid., 275 (M. 161; E. 157).

102. Cf. Ibid., 254, 261-263 (M. 154-156; E. 149-150).

2. A Species Being.

The second trait of man is that he is a species-Being (Gattungswesen).

Aber der Mensch ist nicht nur Naturwesen, sondern auch menschliches Naturwesen: d.h. fuer sich selbst seiendes Wesen, darum Gattungswesen, als welches er sich sowohl in seinem Sein als in seinem Wissen bestatigen und betatigen muss.¹⁰³

Das wirkliche, taetige Verhalten des Menschen zu sich als Gattungswesen, als der Betatigung seiner als eines wirklichen Gattungswesens--d.h. als menschlichen Wesens...¹⁰⁴

Human Being is here equated with self-determination, self-relatedness--for self (fuer sich - implicit). Marx speaks of species being or species activity as the distinctly human productive life which is conscious, free from the pressure of need or instinct, and free from bondage to the needs of the human species: man's activity as man is to refashion the world in his own image, freely and for its own sake and his own satisfaction in doing it.¹⁰⁵

Free, conscious activity is the Marxian counterpart of Hegelian self-consciousness in which man is aware of himself and his thoughts: man makes his life activity, his production of his life, an act of consciousness and will, and thus his species character, his "Lebenstaetigkeit", is "...die frei bewusste Taetigkeit..."¹⁰⁶ The animal is immediately one with

103. Ibid., 275 (M. 162; E. 158).

104. Ibid., 269 (M. 156; E. 152).

105. This satisfaction seems to be more than mere meeting of needs: it is the satisfaction of the need for Herrschaft, mastery, or self-determination.

106. MEGA, 88 (E. 75).

his life activity: "Es ist nie",¹⁰⁷ but man makes this an object of consciousness and will.

Die bewusste Lebenstaetigkeit unterscheidet den Menschen unmittelbar von tierischen Lebenstaetigkeit. Eben nur dadurch ist er ein Gattungswesen. Oder er ist nur ein bewusstes Wesen, d.h. sein eignes Leben ist ihm Gegenstand, eben weil er ein Gattungswesen ist. Nur darum ist seine Taetigkeit freie Taetigkeit.¹⁰⁸

The further implication of this is that man produces freely from all nature; not merely for his own immediate needs, but when free from need;¹⁰⁹ not merely for himself but for the species; according to the nature of the object (hence as art); universally from all nature, or man makes all nature his inorganic body.¹¹⁰

Marx further defines species-being by saying that it is confirmed, or that man proves himself a species-being, by his production, by his work upon the objective world. By this he constructs an objective world which is a reflection of himself and thereby nature appears as his own work.

107. Ibid.

108. Ibid., cf. "Weine Arbeit waere freie Lebensauesserung, daher Genuss des Lebens." MEGA, 547.

109. A significant statement is that man truly produces only when free from need: "... der Mensch selbst frei von physischen Beduerfnissen produziert und erst wahrhaft produziert in der Freiheit von demselben." Ibid., 88 (E. 75-76).

110. Ibid., 87 (E. 74). cf. Hegel, Werke (Berlin, 1843) VII/1, 609-610 (P 361, Zusatz of Naturphilosophie).

Eben in der Bearbeitung der gegenständlichen Welt bewahrt sich der Mensch daher erst wirklich als ein Gattungswesen. Diese Produktion ist sein werktätiges Gattungsleben. Durch sie erscheint die Natur als sein Werk und seine Wirklichkeit. Der Gegenstand der Arbeit ist daher die Vergegenständlichung des Gattungslebens des Menschen; indem er sich nicht nur wie im Bewusstsein intellektuell, sondern werktätig, wirklich verdoppelt und sich selbst daher in einer von ihm geschaffenen Welt anschaut.¹¹¹

For the full meaning of this statement and of the species-life, it is necessary to understand the meaning of labour for Marx and the nature of man's senses or inner reality.

Marx sees labour as a process, a series of actions (or a single action) in which man incarnates himself in material objects: it is the objectification of his mental and physical powers and of his will, in the product of his labour. Hence:

Das Produkt der Arbeit ist die Arbeit, die sich in einem Gegenstand fixiert, sachlich gemacht hat, es ist die Vergegenständlichung der Arbeiter. Die Verwirklichung der Arbeit ist ihre Vergegenständlichung.¹¹²

And Marx considers that the history of industry is the manifestation of the essence of man.¹¹³ It is in this sense that Marx can say that the world of products is a "human" world, is a reflection of man, and appears as human reality: for Marx, a product is the incarnation of the producer and the powers he employs in the production.

111. Ibid., 88-89 (E. 76).

112. Ibid., 83 (E. 69). Cf. Tucker, op. cit., 130-132.

113. Ibid., 121 (E. 109; DF 243); cf. 145 (E. 136; DF 296).

The product is an embodiment of man in a further sense, that it incarnates man's needs: man cannot immediately use nature in the raw, he must prepare it for his own needs (and as a human being, his own needs are themselves cultivated). This is true, both of needs of subsistence (food, clothing, housing) and of needs for the expression or confirmation of man's inner sensibilities and powers (music, art, etc.).¹¹⁴

For Marx, human reality consists of the world of sensations: they are not merely anthropological characteristics, but are "... wahrhaft ontologische Wesens- (Natur-) Bejahungen...", only affirmed in so far as their object exists as an object of sense.¹¹⁵ The mode of affirmation depends upon the nature of the object and the faculty appropriating it. For this subject-object interaction to be truly an affirmation of man's essential being, the object must be a human object: it must be the objectification of man, objective humanity, the confirmation of a human need or desire, or of a human faculty.

Indem daher ueberall einerseits dem Menschen in der Gesellschaft, die gegenstaendliche Wirklichkeit als Wirklichkeit der menschlichen Wesenkräfte, als menschliche Wirklichkeit und darum als Wirklichkeit seiner eigenen Wesenkräfte wird, werden ihm alle Gegenstaende als die Vergegenstaendlichung seiner selbst, als die seiner Individualitaet bestaetigenden und verwirklichenden Gegenstaende, als seine Gegenstaende; d.h. Gegenstaende seiner selbst.¹¹⁶

114. Ibid., 119-121 (E. 107-109; DF 240-243).

115. DF, 296 (M. 145; E. 136).

116. Ibid., 241 (M. 119; E. 107).

In this we see the fuller meaning of the definition of species-being as the objectification of man in a world of objects in which man contemplates himself.

At this point Marx's anthropology contains the germ of his historicism: man's essence comes into being or develops in the process of creating man's world. The objectified wealth of the created human world cultivates the subjective human sensibility: music awakens the sense for music (and has no meaning for the person who has no sense for it).

... erst durch den gegenstaendlich entfalteten Reichtum des menschlichen Wesens wird der Reichtum der subjektiven menschlichen Sinnlichkeit, wird ein musikalisches Ohr, ein Auge fuer die Schoenheit der Form, kurz werden erst menschlicher Gemuesse und fashige Sinne, Sinne, welche als menschliche Wesenkraefte sich bestaetigen, teils erst ausgebildet, teils erst erzeugt.¹¹⁷

Both the five senses and the finer senses of will, love, etc.,

"... mit einem Wort der menschliche Sinn, die Menschlichkeit der Sinne wird erst durch das Dasein seines Gegenstandes, durch die vermenschlichte Natur."¹¹⁸ The formation of the senses is

a work of the entire previous history: "Die Bildung der fuefue Sinne ist eine Arbeit der ganzen bisherigen Weltgeschichte."¹¹⁹

This is again reiterated when Marx says that the history of industry and the existence of industry are a record of the development of the human essence:

117. Ibid., 242 (M. 120; E. 108).

118. Ibid.

119. Ibid.

Man sieht, wie die Geschichte der Industrie und das gewordene gegenständliche Dasein der Industrie, das aufgeschlagene Buch der menschlichen Wesenskraft, die sinnlich vorliegende menschliche Psychologie ist... In der gewöhnlichen, materiellen Industrie ... haben wir unter der Form sinnlicher, fremder, rassistischer Gegenstände, unter der Form der Entfremdung die vergegenständlichten Wesenskraft des Menschen vor uns. ¹²⁰

By natural science and industry man objectifies his powers and nature becomes anthropological nature. ¹²¹

In these descriptions of labour and "human" activity, it is apparent that (1) the humanism of Marx, while naturalistic, is a definite humanism and not pure materialism. (2) Human activity is the humanization of nature, the re-creation of it into a human world. It is a human world in the double sense that it incarnates human activity (will, knowledge, skill) - hence expresses man's inner nature, and that at the same time it meets man's needs. There is, therefore, a non-material factor in Marx's definition of man - the element of freedom, of self-determination, self-creation, of man who is to assert this self-hood: "... die freie bewusste Tätigkeit ist der Gattungscharacter des Menschen." ¹²² And, this man is a developing, a historically evolving man.

Exchange and Species Being.

There is another facet of the concept of species-being

120. Ibid., 243-244 (M. 121-122; E. 109-110).

121. Ibid., 244-245 (M. 122-123; E. 110-111).

122. MEGA, 88 (E. 75). See the Note at the end of this chapter.

which must be understood in order to see clearly the implications of the concept. If man is to use the whole of nature freely, he must have access to it and to the products of Nature. No individual can hope to do this alone, for time and space limit him. Consequently, it is to be expected--and we are not disappointed--that the division of labour and the act of the exchange of products are themselves species acts, as is production. Exchange and the division of labour are declared to be "species activity" or "human activity" in an alienated form in the capitalist society.

Die Teilung der Arbeit ist der nationalökonomische Ausdruck von der Gesellschaftlichkeit der Arbeit innerhalb der Entfremdung. Oder, da die Arbeit nur ein Ausdruck der menschlichen Tätigkeit innerhalb der Entäußerung, der Lebensäußerung als Lebensentäußerung ist, so ist auch die Teilung der Arbeit nichts anderes als das entfremdete, entäußerte Setzen der menschlichen Tätigkeit als einer realen Gattungstätigkeit oder als Tätigkeit des Menschen als Gattungswesen.

Ueber das Wesen der Teilung der Arbeit-- ... d.h. ueber diese entfremdete und entäußerte Gestalt der menschlichen Tätigkeit als Gattungstätigkeit sind die Nationalökonomien sehr unklar und sich widersprechend. ¹²³

These statements become much clearer in the light of those made in the reading notes on Mill in the appendix to the MEGA volume. There he states that the essence of money is the alienated or objectified form of the social, human act of exchange,

... die Vermittelnde Tätigkeit oder Bewegung, der menschliche, gesellschaftliche Akt, wodurch sich die Produkte des Menschen wechselseitig ergänzen...¹²⁴

123. DF, 289 (M. 139; E. 129-130).

124. MEGA, 531.

Der Austausch sowohl der menschlichen Tätigkeit innerhalb der Produktion selbst, als auch der menschlichen Produkte gegen einander ist - der Gattungstätigkeit und Gattungsg Geist, deren wirkliches, bewusstes und wahres Dasein die gesellschaftliche Tätigkeit und der gesellschaftliche Genuss ist. 125

This comes about because man as a social being must exchange and because exchange under the conditions of private property must be conducted under the form of value.¹²⁶ Behind the alienated form, however, lies the basic human trait of sociality and exchange.

In the above statements it is evident that the true nature of man, a freely creative being using all nature, is possible only in the highly developed economic system of modern times, a historical implication which was revealed in the statements about industry as the objectification of man's essence, and in the implied historicity in the development of human sensibilities. The mutual interdependence of production and exchange of the capitalist system is of the essence of man and are merely in an alienated form--they must be purified and retained. This will be done in the truly human society when production, a man's labour, is not performed with the sole end in view of making money in order to be able to meet one's own needs - hence with a view to impoverishing the other person by creating a new need in him for your product. Then, in the truly human society, each man will produce, expressing his individuality and at the same time meeting the need of another and will be the recipient of the same act in another. In true Feuerbachian fashion, each will mediate the species to the other, without the "god" of money as a mediator.¹²⁷

125. Ibid., 536.

126. Ibid., 532.

127. Ibid., 546-547; cf. quotation in text (cited by note 90).

In the acceptance of the division of labour and exchange as species activities the social or communal element is again expressed in Marx's concept of man (it was already evident in the species concept). "Human", "social" and "species" are used interchangeably in the 1844 Man.¹²⁸ These are linked together by the fact that man's true or species being can be realized only in the social production of human objects: man can freely and universally utilise nature and express his essence and species character by a co-operative productive system in which each has access to the human wealth of productive powers and of the wealth of nature's gifts.

128. Cf. MEGA, 89 (E. 76): alienated labour makes "... das Gattungswesen des Menschen, sowohl die Natur, als sein geistiges Gattungsvermogen, zu einem ihm fremden Wesen ... / it alienates man from his body, external nature / wie sein geistiges Wesen, sein menschliches Wesen." The next result of alienated labour and loss of species life is the loss of social relations, thus revealing a connection between species life, human life, and social life. Cf. also the discussion of the social nature of positively transcended private property, DE, 237 (MEGA, 115-116; E. 103): "Also ist dieser gesellschaftliche Charakter der allgemeine Charakter der ganzen Bewegung; wie die Gesellschaft selbst den Menschen als Menschen produziert, so ist sie durch ihn produziert. Die Tätigkeit und der Geist, wie ihren Inhalt, sind auch der Entstehungsweise noch gesellschaftlich; gesellschaftliche Tätigkeit und gesellschaftlicher Geist. Das menschliche Wesen der Natur ist erst da fuer den gesellschaftlichen Menschen; denn erst hier ist sie fuer ihn da als Band mit dem Menschen ... erst hier ist sie da als Grundlage seines eigenen menschlichen Daseins." The emancipation of the senses, Ibid., 240-241 (N. 118-119; E. 106-107), is explained: "... dass diese Sinne und Eigenschaften menschlich, sowohl subjektiv als objektiv geworden sind. Das Auge ist zum menschlichen Auge geworden, wie sein Gegenstand zu einem gesellschaftlichen menschlichen, vom Menschen fuer den Menschen herrushrenden Gegenstand geworden ist." In these, both context and usage show that species or human existence is social.

We have seen that Marx conceives of man as a conscious or self-conscious, freely active natural being, who transcends the natural order of time and space by virtue of his membership in an objective species which is corporate both in time (historical development and acquisition of skills, senses and knowledge, and of industry) and in space (exchange, transportation and communication). Man in his true being is the realization, in the concrete world, of Hegel's Spirit--a self-conscious (objectified and re-appropriated) and free, autonomous being: Man as such has humanised Nature by the objectification of himself--his will, powers, skills, and needs. This is accomplished in labour, the objectification of man in nature in the form of a product--the purpose of which is simply man's free, self-conscious activity and autonomy (not the mere meeting of needs, though this takes place largely in the realm of meeting needs). This freely active being is the reality which is alienated. (See the Note at the end of this chapter.)

Accordingly, the fact of alienation consists of the "facts of life" of the capitalistic system of economic life (of the early 19th Century). The enslavement and impoverishment of the workers increases as productivity increases, the worker becomes a commodity, the result of competition (caused by the money system) is the increasingly sharp division of society into two camps, the workers and the capitalist who holds in his power the possibility of the workers to exercise their labour and to acquire the necessities of life; the worker becomes

only a commodity.¹²⁹ The concept of this fact is that the worker is confronted by his product as an alien power (capital is the accumulation of the products of labour, hence is accumulated labour, in classical economics). This means that man is self-alienated and is a counterpart of man in the Feuerbachian interpretation of religion.¹³⁰

Marx analyses the concept of alienation and finds four aspects of it: (1) loss of the object, (2) alienated activity in producing the object, (3) loss of the species, and (4) alienation from fellow-men. First: the worker is dependent upon the object of nature, the sensuous world and the products derived from it because (a) it is essential for labour, man's human or essential activity, and (b) it is required for subsistence. When man is alienated from nature and his product he is deprived of his means of subsistence and existence, and of his means to a "human" existence, or the activity of labour.¹³¹

Secondly: proceeding from the result of alienation, loss of the object, Marx probes the activity that produces it, of which it is the objectification.¹³² He finds that the alienation of labour consists in (a) it being external to the labourer, not of his essential being, an activity in which he does not affirm himself but rather denies himself, ruining body and mind: he is

129. MEGA, 81-83 (E. 67-69).

130. Cf. Ibid., 83 (E. 70) where Marx says this explicitly.

131. Ibid., 84-85 (E. 70-72).

132. Ibid., 85 (E. 72).

not at home in his labour but is at home only outside his labour. (b) Labour is forced labour, not voluntary; it is the means to satisfy needs external to it, not the satisfaction of a need (the need to labour to express one's powers, to affirm one's species being.) "Sie ist daher nicht die Befriedigung eines Beduerfnisses, sondern sie ist nur ein Mittel, um die Beduerfnisse ausser ihr zu befriedigen."¹³⁵ This is elaborated in the next two paragraphs, where he says that man (a freely active being) feels himself man only in his animal or biological functions of eating, procreating, dwelling, dressing-up (not necessarily biological!), and becomes an animal in his work (works under the pressure of needs!) which is his truly human function. Hence:

Das Tierische wird das Menschliche und das Menschliche das Tierische.

Essen, Trinken und Zeugen, etc. sind zwar auch echt menschliche Funktionen. In der Abstraktion aber, die sie von dem Unkreis menschliche Taetigkeit trennt und zu letzen und alleinigen Endzwecken macht, sind sie tierisch.¹³⁴

(c) Finally, the external, alienated character of labour appears in the fact that it does not belong to the worker, but to another. It is not the worker's free and spontaneous activity and it is a loss of himself.¹³⁵

In these two aspects of alienation Marx has considered the loss of the product and the result that it confronts its producer as an alien power over him, and the loss of his labour itself

135. Ibid., 86 (E. 72).

134. Ibid., 86 (E. 73). Cf. R.C. Tucker's mistaken interpretation of these passages and the word "egoistic Beduerfniss", op. cit., 136-137; 139.

135. MEGA, 86 (E. 73).

as a truly human activity. He has seen man as self-alienated - his product and his activity are not his as they should be and are opposed to him as alien powers. Now, Marx deduces from these two the third aspect, the loss of the species. In losing the object, man loses his advantage over the animals and suffers the loss of his inorganic body (nature) which is a disadvantage. Further, his life activity, his species life, is torn from him and his labour is degraded to a means to his physical existence.¹³⁶ Fourthly, as a consequence of these three aspects of alienation, man is estranged from man. Contrary to the opinion of some, this is not a forced addition to the thought of Marx but roots in the origins of his thought in Feuerbach.¹³⁷ Feuerbach had already said that a being's relation to itself is revealed in its relation to the object outside itself.

We have followed Marx in the analysis of the concept of alienation, seeing its integral relation to his concept of man: man as a self-determining being is enslaved to his own object (created by his life-activity) which should have been the expression of his self-determination. As a result, instead of free activity and a human world created by man for man, man finds himself enslaved by forced labour which yields only a greater power over him, crippling his life, and strengthening the power of capital. (We must not forget that Marx had

136. Ibid., 87-89 (E. 74-76).

137. Cf. R.C. Tucker, op. cit., 148.

written a considerable portion of the 1844 Mss. as a description of capitalistic economics, a portion which we have ignored except for the summary statement from which Marx proceeded to his analysis.) At the same time Marx saw the distinctive features of capitalism as bearing the true nature of human life in an alienated form: the division of labour, exchange, modern industry - these are the expressions of man's essence and of his truly social and human activity. As Marx said in his remarks on Hegel, man must objectify himself and draw out of himself all his powers in the course of history, which can be done only in the form of alienation at first: the alienated forms of life contribute to the final perfect form. Now we must seek to understand the relation of money to this system (as Marx originally planned) and then seek to see as clearly as is possible in the 1844 Mss the nature of the source of alienation.

Money - the "God" of Economics.

The nerve centre of the capitalist system is money: its availability determines the economic activity; its possession enables its owner to live or to make more money; its acquisition is the motive of all economic activity--it is the veritable God of the system. This is more than a figure of speech, for in Marx's system, money occupies the same position as does "God" in Feuerbach's system: both are the alienation or the objectification of man's essential being, of the species life, in an alien object and abstraction external to man. Money is the objectification of

man's species act of exchange and of his products of labour, his species activity. Just as Feuerbach's God overturned all natural relations, so Marx says that money does this just because it is the alienated ability of man:

Die Verkehrung und Verwechselung aller menschlichen und natuerlichen Qualitaeten, die Verbruederung der Unmoeglichkeiten—die goetliche Kraft—des Goldes liegt in seinem Wesen als dem entfremdeten, entaeussernden und sich veraeussernden Gattungswesen der Menschen. Es ist das entaeusserte Vermoegen der Menschheit.¹³⁸

Money breaks all the natural bonds of mankind and at the same time allows the possessor of it to perform that which his nature is unable to do: to be wise, honest, loved, etc.¹³⁹

The money-system, capitalistic economic life, is the equivalent of the religious system (we have already seen that Marx was applying the religious pattern to various earthly situations): man assigns his proper human functions and human nature to an alien being of his own creation which accomplishes man's desires and functions in an alienated or unreal realm and manner. The suggestive inference from this parallel of the two systems is whether there is a parallel concept of the origin and role of alienation: for Feuerbach religion was both a necessary and a positive contribution to man's progress while he was in a state of immaturity, from which state he progressed by claiming for himself the attributes of the deity. Is this the case with Marx's view of the origin and role of money? Can one say that alienation is a natural condition from which man must escape by

138. DF, 299 (M. 148-149; E. 139).

139. CF. Ibid., 298-299 (M. 147; E. 138-139).

a progress within the alienated form of life? - which makes this alienated form a necessity and a relative good? As already indicated, there is ample indication that Marx conceived of a necessity of alienation and a positive role for it: the following is confirmation of the clues seen so far.

Necessity of Alienation.

In his evaluation of Hegel, Marx said that the real merit of Hegel was that he conceived man's self-genesis as a process, as labour, in which objectification is the loss of the object, alienation, and the transcendence of this alienation. True man is the product of a historical process which requires the alienation of man, hence requires capitalism and private property.

Das wirkliche, taechtige Verhalten des Menschen zu sich als Gattungswesens--d.h. als menschlichen Wesens-- ist nur moeglich dadurch, das er wirklich alle seine Gattungskraefte,--was wieder nur durch das Gesamtwirken der Menschen moeglich ist, nur als Resultat der Geschichte--herausschafft, sich zu ihnen als Gegenstaenden verhaelt, was zumaechst wieder nur in der Form der Entfremdung moeglich ist.¹⁴⁰

Or again he says:

Hegel fasst also, indem er den positiven Sinn der auf sich selbst bezogenen Negation--wenn auch wieder in entfremdeter Weise--fasst, die Selbstentfremdung, Wesensentzueckerung, Entgegenstaendlichkeit und Entwirklichung des Menschen als Selbstgewinnung, Wesensentzueckerung, Vergegenstaendlichkeit, Verwirklichung. Kurz er fasst--innerhalb der Abstraktion-- die Arbeit als den Selbsterzeugungsakt des Menschen, das Verhalten zu sich als fremden Wesen und das Betaetigen seiner als eines fremden Wesens als das werdende Gattungsbewusstsein und Gattungsleben.¹⁴¹

140. Ibid., 269 (N. 156; E. 151).

141. Ibid., 281 (N. 167; E. 165); cf. 113 (N. 125; E.113-114).

The essence of man, his species nature, is only brought into being by the objectification of all man's powers - that is by labour, which in modern times is in the form of industry. Industry is said to be the open book of man's powers, psychology made into a sensuous form; it is a revelation of man's powers.¹⁴² This, of course, has taken form in the system of private property and capitalism, and the logic of Marx's position is that these are necessary.

Marx follows this logic in his actual statements concerning private property and communism. In his discussion of communism he criticised a crude, egalitarian form of communism which merely sought to destroy private property and return to primitive simplicity: it did not surpass private property because it had not attained to it.

Wie wenig diese Aufhebung des Privateigentums eine wirkliche Aneignung ist, beweist eben die abstrakte Negation der ganzen Welt, der Bildung und der Zivilisation; die Ruueckkehr zur unnaturlichen Einfachheit des armen und beduerfnislosen Menschen, der nicht ueber das Privateigentum hinaus, ¹⁴³ sondern noch nicht einmal bei demselben angelangt ist.

The next stage of communism in his developmental scheme of it still has not yet grasped "... das positive Wesen des Privateigentums..." nor understood the "... menschliche Natur des Beduerfnisses..."¹⁴⁴ He attacks an immature communism which grasps at disconnected historical phenomena opposed to private property for its justification (their pastness

142. Ibid., 243-244 (M. 121-122; E. 109-110).

143. Ibid., 234 (M. 112; E. 100).

144. Ibid., 235 (M. 114; E. 101).

discredits them).¹⁴⁵ Instead the revolutionary communistic movement finds its empirical and theoretical basis in the movement of private property, which is the sensuous expression of estranged human life and its positive transcendence is the transcendence of estrangement.¹⁴⁶ This is the embodiment of a man's individuality and his existence for other men and the existence of other men for him. Likewise, the material of labour and man as subject are the beginning and end of the movement, and "... eben darin liegt die geschichtliche Notwendigkeit des Privateigentums."¹⁴⁷

Private property is the basis of the division of labour and exchange (both are species activities of man) and labour is the essence of private property, Marx says. Further:

Eben darin, dass Teilung der Arbeit und Austausch Gestaltungen des Privateigentums sind, eben darin liegt der doppelte Beweis, sowohl dass das menschliche Leben zu seiner Verwirklichung des Privateigentums, wie andererseits, dass es jetzt der Aufhebung des Privateigentums bedarf.¹⁴⁸

Here is a clear statement of the thought of Marx on the nature of Private Property: it was a necessity and a good in its day, promoting the advancement of man's self-creation but has now reached a point of development at which it requires its abolition (as with Feuerbach, religion must be renounced in this latter day). The meaning of private property is the development of man:

145. Ibid., 236 (M.114 E.102).

146. Ibid., 236 (M.114-115; E. 102-103).

147. Ibid., 237 (M. 115; E. 103).

148. Ibid., 295 (M. 144; E. 134).

... erst durch die entwickelte Industrie, id est durch die Vermittlung des Privateigentums wird das ontologische Wesen der menschlichen Leidenschaft sowohl in seiner Totalitaet als in seiner Menschlichkeit; die Wissenschaft vom Menschen ist also selbst ein Produkt der praktischen Selbstbetaetigung des Menschen; 5. Der Sinn des Privateigentums--losgeleest von seiner Entfremdung--ist das Dasein der wesentlichen Gegenstaende fuer den Menschen, sowohl als Gegenstand des Genusses, wie der Taetigkeit.¹⁴⁹

Let it be again noted that Marx has turned to Hegel and incorporated evil into the whole by giving it a positive function in the development of the whole. As opposed to Hess and others (including interpreters Fromm and Tucker) who see evil coming from within the nature of man and as an unnecessary factor, Marx sees it as a necessity and sees the true man as the result of the long historical process in which he must alienate himself and then reappropriate his production for his final humanity. To neglect this essential Hegelianism of Marx is to open the door for the misunderstanding and misinterpretation of Marx which ignores the essentially historical and evolutionary nature of his thought and the necessity of the forms of alienation and evil.

We know from his 1843-44 writings how Marx thought communism was to be achieved by the action of the proletariat. Here we are concerned with his philosophic basis of it in relation to his concept of man. It is to be the outcome of history, the resolution of the strife between the individual and the species, between essence and existence, between man

149. Ibid., 296 (M. 145; E. 136-137).

and nature, between man and man, between freedom and necessity, between objectification and self-activity.¹⁵⁰ Communism is the fulfilment of human being, the appropriation of human development for man:

Der Kommunismus als positive Aufhebung des Privateigentums als menschlicher Selbstentfremdung und darum als wirkliche Aneignung des menschlichen Wesens durch und fuer den Menschen; darum als vollstaendige, bewusste und innerhalb des ganzen Reichthums der bisherigen Entwicklung gewordene Rueckkehr des Menschen fuer sich als eines gesellschaftlichen, d.h. menschlichen Menschen.¹⁵¹

The return of man to himself, should be read in the light of the following statement:

Die positive Aufhebung des Privateigentums als die Aneignung des menschlichen Lebens, ist daher / religion, family and state, etc., are specific modes of production while private property is the sensuous expression of alienated human life / die positive Aufhebung aller Entfremdung, also die Rueckkehr des Menschen aus (?) Religion, Familie, Staat, etc. in sein menschliches, d.h. gesellschaftliches Dasein.¹⁵²

From this we see that return is not the pure and simple idea of returning to a former condition but to come to one's self from a contrary condition (though it is implied that there was a germative condition of this in the idea of the latter condition being richer by its profiting from the development.) This outcome of history is the appropriation of man's alienated and objectified essence, the return of man to himself, to the true species of life which has been prepared. We must now see the relation of

150. Ibid., 235 (H. 114; E. 102).

151. Ibid.

152. Ibid., 236 (H. 115; E. 103).

communism to the previous description of species life. Private property is to be superseded--when this is so, the object (or product) is the embodiment of the individuality of the producer, is his existence for the other man and vice versa.¹⁵³ This is the situation described in the notes on Mill in which one embodies oneself in a product needed by another and in return receives a needed product from the other.¹⁵⁴ Or, this is the division of labour and exchange on the basis of mutual satisfaction of needs and expression of one's powers, not on the basis of profit and the need for subsistence thereby. The object has become an objectification of man--an expression of his essence, his powers, and a confirmation of his needs;¹⁵⁵ in non-subsistence objects they have become human objectification in terms of the wealth of the human senses.¹⁵⁶ The transcendence of private property is the complete emancipation of all human senses and attributes--because they have become human: they emanate from man, for man.¹⁵⁷ The senses have become theoreticians: they relate themselves to the object for the sake of the object - but the object is an objective human relation to itself and to man.¹⁵⁸

153. Ibid., 237 (M. 115-116; E. 103).

154. MEGA, 546-547. 155. DE, 240-241 (M. 119; E. 106-107).

156. Ibid., 239-241 (M. 118-119; E. 105-107).

157. Ibid., 240-241 (M. 119; E. 106-107).

158. Ibid. See the Note at the end of this chapter.

Need and enjoyment lose their egoistical nature and nature loses its mere utility by use becoming a human use.¹⁵⁹ Here we have the species being of man: he doubles himself in the objective world and contemplates himself there.

In the social aspect---or the human aspect¹⁶⁰---the species life of man also appears as in Feuerbach, when each is the mediator for the other---(money, to be abolished, is the objectified act of mediation). Theoretical activity is also united to practical activity.¹⁶¹

Alienation was the positing of self in an object which became a power over the self. In communism alienation is ended: the object (private property or objectified labour, and money or objective exchange activity) has been reappropriated and man has returned to himself because man has so developed his productivity (and so ordered his life accordingly) that the object is no longer an object of need and hence of power over fellowmen: because of his development man's need, and production and exchange are mutual. This assumes (1) sufficiency of production for the basic needs and (2) a social or mutually dependent mode of production and exchange.

This has brought us again to points of similarity to Feuerbach: man has produced under alienation a potentially human life, just as modern man has produced potentially a human life in Feuerbach's view--- and in both cases man needs only to renounce allegiance to the "higher" being - God and

159. Ibid. 160. Cf. word study in note 128.
161. ib., 240-241 (H. 119; E. 107).

money. In Feuerbach the alienation sprang from man's inability to live the human life and from his need for objectification of self as a guide: hence it originated in man's immaturity.

Is this not also the case in Marx's system?

The Cause of Alienation.

In suggesting that immaturity is the cause of alienation in Marx's system, we are going against current interpretations, but it seems impossible to do otherwise in the face of our evidence and conclusions and in the face of errors in the interpretations of others. We must review the course which has led us to this point.

First, we have seen the parallel of structure which exists between Marx and Feuerbach, and that in the latter alienation is a necessary condition imposed by man's immaturity and one which has its benefits to the process of outgrowing this immaturity. In Marx we have also the affirmation of the necessity of alienation (private property and its system): hence is not the other half of the system identical with Feuerbach? Second, we have seen a pattern within Marx's own development, in which he placed the heavenly in some imperfect sphere of earthly life, and we found that money occupies the same place with him as Feuerbach's God. Third, we have seen that he has followed Hegel, and has definitely used Hegel's view of the wholeness and development which incorporates the evil and the good into one process. Fourth, we have seen that he has given ample evidence

of holding private property, and an alienated condition of man's life, to be necessary and instrumental in man's development. Fifth, he had a view of man which required development in its very presuppositions and assumed the human form of existence to be the result of history and development.

It is as a result of all these clues that we feel compelled to say that Marx saw the alienated condition of man as part of the necessary process of development from an incipient or inherent germinal state to an explicit and actual existence in history by a Hegelian process of alienation and reappropriation and that he did not think that man could have developed otherwise.

We must recall the utterances of Marx concerning the source of estrangement. He insisted that alienated labour was the source of alienated forms of life.¹⁶² He further says that the desire to "have"--egoism--is the result of private property (which itself is the product of alienated labour):

Das Privateigentum hat uns so dumm und einseitig gemacht, dass ein Gegenstand erst der unrarige ist, wenn wir ihn haben, (er) also als Kapital fuer uns existiert, oder von uns unmittelbar besessen, gegessen, getrunken, an unserem Leib getragen, von uns bewohnt etc., kurz gebraucht wird... An die Stelle aller physischen und geistigen Sinne ist daher die einfache Entfremdung aller dieser Sinne, der Sinn des Habens getreten.¹⁶³

And in the single statement in which he raises the question of the origin of alienation, he indicates a definite relationship between man's estrangement and the source of his development:

162. MEGA, 91-92 (E. 80).

163. DF, 240 (N. 118; E. 106)

Wie ist diese Entfremdung im Wesen der menschlichen Entwicklung begründet? Wir haben schon viel fuer die Loesung der Aufgabe gewonnen, indem wir die Frage nach dem Ursprung des Privateigentums in die Frage nach dem Verhaeltnis der entaussernten Arbeit zum Entwicklungsgang der Menschheit verwandelt haben. ¹⁶⁴

We must remember that man's development for Marx, as already shown, consisted in drawing out of man all his powers and objectifying them, though in an alienated form, and then re-appropriating them.¹⁶⁵ And in at least one place Marx said that the wealth of man's inner nature could not be drawn out of him except by impoverishing him.¹⁶⁶

This survey exhausts the statements from Marx on the subject. (It should be remembered that in the German Enlightenment which stood back of Marx, there was a similar idea of the drawing out of man the cumulative powers of the race.)¹⁶⁷ On the basis of the 1844 Man it is easy to infer and construct a coherent system upon the basis of an analogy to Feuerbach - that in man's immaturity alienation is a necessary and a constructive condition—but one cannot give explicit statements beyond those given. In later Marxian writings one can find this trend confirmed.


This completes our inadequate account of Marx's intellectual development. (After 1844 he became less philosophical in language and subject matter and devoted more time to political and economic studies. As mentioned before he does not seem to have repudiated his basic philosophical

164. MEGA, 93 (E. 82). 165. Cf. DE, 244 (H.122; E. 110).

166. Cf. note 95 above. 167. Cf. R.G. Collingwood, The Idea of History, 87-88; 89-90; 97-98, 103. Cf. also Erich Fromm, op.cit., 49.

positions but simply to have neglected to express them explicitly. Chapter IV will further reveal the unity in Marx's concepts.) It is hoped that these two chapters have shown that Marx was a philosopher before he became a social critic and that he subjected his social thought to his philosophic principles. He sought to knit together his philosophical heritage and the problems of his time, and did not use his system to express his own inner problems in a mythical form. Further, Marx's basic principles are seen emerging early in his life, a fact which suggests that recent re-interpretations have been misled by the shift in language and subject matter of his later writings, and that they have neglected to consider the whole of his early writings. (Thus the 1843 and the 1844 writings contain his basic concepts of economics, society, revolution and politics, as well as his philosophic position which has been abstracted from these others by modern humanists and existentialists in their search for kindred concepts of existentialism and humanism.) Again, this study has revealed the presence of a considerable body of thought behind the apparent utopianism of Marx, seen in the concept of "species-life" and its background in Hegel and Feuerbach. As invalid as it is, it is mistaken thought, not romantic expectations.

For our more immediate purposes, it has: (1) shown the validity of a study of Marx's system, as it is primarily thought and its confrontation with facts, even though invalid.



(2) It shows the idea of development as fundamental to Marx's concept of true man. (3) It gives strong support for the view that human alienation is a necessary evil stemming from the lack of development and at the same time serving as a means toward development. These latter two will be sought again in Chapter IV and its survey of Marx's later thought on the concept of history.

NOTE

The Theoretical Relation and the End of Egoism;
Labour and the Species-Life in Hegel.

Marx's 1844 Manus use the concepts of (1) "species" or "species-life", (2) the transformation of men into theoreticians in the true human world created by the species activity of man and thus the ending of egoism, in order to describe communism. These concepts were found in Feuerbach but more especially are found in the Naturphilosophie of Hegel's Encyklopaedie der Philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse. A brief survey of them in this work reveals their essential meaning and illuminates further Marx's relation to Hegel.

Man is related to nature practically when the relation is that of one finite object to another and is governed by man's end. This relation is determined through

...die Begierde, welche selbstsuechtig ist; das Beduerfniss geht darauf, die Natur zu unserem Nutzen zu verwenden, sie abzureiben, aufzureiben, kurz sie zu vernichten.¹

The contradiction within the human being - a need - is resolved by destroying the object.

The theoretical relation reverses the practical relation: it is the observation of Nature in itself, to know its powers,

1. Werke (1843), VII/1, 9 (P245, Zusatz).

laws, species, and to set this information in order. It involves stepping back from the object, "sie lassen wie sie sind, und uns nach ihnen richten."² However, it leads to a contradiction in that the mind abstracts certain characteristics from the sensuous object; the mind makes an abstract universal of a concrete particular--and hence does not allow it to remain as it is.³

In these terms of human knowledge, this contradiction is resolved, according to Hegel, in "die begriffende Erkennen" which grasps "die Einheit des Allgemeinen und Besondern".⁴ This constitutes the resolution of the theoretical and practical relations. However, for our purposes, we must turn to the resolution which he works out in the natural world of animals in order to find Marx's position.

Hegel uses "species" (Gattung) to signify the general, the universal, the essence of a thing of which thinking man is able to perceive while yet remaining an individual.⁵ Further, "species" is used to denote the concrete self-contained, self-relating whole. Spirit doubles itself in the human world of endeavour (Objective Spirit) which culminates in the State and

2. Ibid., 12 (P246, Zusatz). 3. Ibid., 12-14.

4. Ibid., 20.

5. See Encyclopedia, P24, Zusatz (The Logic of Hegel (Wallace) 47-48).

in World History: the Idea of the State "is the universal Idea as a genus (Gattung) and as an absolute power over individual states--the mind which gives itself its actuality in the process of World-History."⁶

The Union of the Theoretical and Practical in the Species Concept.

The union of the theoretical and practical mentioned above was in the realm of man and knowledge. The most instructive aspects of it are found in the description of the Animal Kingdom. The animal is the highest form of organic Nature and is so because in the animal the organic individuality exists as a subjectivity, "fuer sich seindes Selbst", by virtue of feeling (Empfindung), which creates an idealized, self-centered universal (fuer sich) in opposition to the external organism and its external world. This is not thought, but feeling or perceiving (Anschauung). This allows the theoretical relation to exist in animals: the organism is able to enjoy a relation to another object or animal and yet allow it to remain itself.⁷

There are three processes or aspects of animal organism: the Gestaltung, the Assimilation, and the Gattungsprozess. The first, the organic entity--a self-relating, self-constituting being (auf sich selbst bezieht und innerhalb ihrer selbst sich mit sich zusammenschliesst) proceeds to relate itself to the external world in Assimilation, and to reproduce itself and relate itself to its species in the Gattungsprozess.⁸

6. Philosophy of Right (Knox), 160(P259).

7. Werke, VII/1, 50-53 (PP350-351).

8. Ibid., P352, Zusatz (558).

In Assimilation the higher animals have a process of digestion in which they set up a division within themselves (digestive juices) in order to meet their needs and resolve the contradiction set up in themselves--while lower organisms merely absorb immediately and maintain their identity thereby.⁹ The animal thus is related to the world in a practical way--it opposes the natural object and destroys it, returning to itself after its satisfaction, scorning its own self-division. (This is very similar to society's alienation in capitalistic economy and society, a necessary alienation which is later forsaken once the necessary material basis has been created by it.)

In the Assimilation the third sub-process is that of the Bildungstrieb, in which the beginnings of the union of the practical and the theoretical are (to be fully developed in reproduction in the Gattungsprozess). The organism relates itself to nature in such a way that its satisfaction is accomplished by allowing the object to remain:

... es findet hier aber nicht blosses feindliches Verhalten der Begierde zur Aussenwelt, sondern eine Ruhe gegen die neussere Existenz statt. Die Begierde ist also zugleich befriedigt und gehemmt; und der Organismus macht sich nur objectiv, indem er die unorganische Materie fuer sich zu recht legt. Praktisches und theoretisches Verhaltniss sind so hier vereinigt.¹⁰

9. Ibid., PP364-365(617-631).

10. Ibid., P 365, Zusatz (635).

This action is purposive action on the level of instinct - building of nests, etc.--only in man does this reach the level of thought.

Here is seen the parent of Marx's concept of ending egoism by making theoreticians of men in a humanly produced world which embodies man's purposes and needs, powers and talents. This is accomplished by the equivalent of Marx's labour. Marx took the activity Hegel conceived to be peculiar to man - free thought - and transposed its character into the activity of Hegel's animal - the Bildungstrieb - to get his true man. Just as Hegel's Spirit alienates itself by positing the world and then transcends this in knowledge and self-consciousness or Absolute Mind, so Marx's humanity or society objectifies itself in a world of objects embodying its needs and allowing it to fulfil itself without egoism.

Further clarification of Marx's species concept comes from Hegel's Gattungsprozess. In this the organism satisfies its needs by being related to a being like itself. Here the union of theoretical and practical is more firmly established, as is the inter-relationship of organisms to their own kind. In the unity of both

... ist das Gattungsprozess, worin das Thier sich auf sich selbst, als auf ein Gleiches seiner Art bezieht; es verhaelt sich zum Lebendigen wie im ersten Prozess / Gestaltung/, und zugleich, wie im zweiten Prozess, zu einem Solchem, das ein Vergefundenes ist.¹¹

11. Ibid., P366, Zusatz (641).

Hegel includes death by battle and illness in the triad, but our concern is with the reproduction of the species. In the sexual type of reproduction (as opposed to asexual reproduction in lower forms of life) the species is only realized by two individuals, constituting a breach of selfhood by this need of another entity outside the organism. However, in the process, the individual becomes related to one of its own kind, and further, produces one of its own kind. Desire or egoism (Begierde) is satisfied by a relation of the organism to itself, not the practical destruction of an object.

Again can be seen the basis of Marx's species-life in which man relates himself to his own self-created world which reflects himself and enables him to establish his being while losing his egoism.

In both the Bildungstrieb and the Gattungprozess Hegel foreshadows Marx's species-life and the ending of egoism by a union of the theoretical and the practical senses of man. In Marx's world the Bildungstrieb--labour--makes the latter possible. (It is not forgotten that Feuerbach also related these two concepts.)

CHAPTER IV

THE MARXIST CONCEPTION OF HISTORY

The Marxist view of history must now be drawn out from the preceding chapter and from the later writings of Marx, as any discussion of the Marxian teaching on primitive society and its dissolution requires a summary of the Marxian conception of history as a whole. Therefore, in the following, the basic elements of this are given in a systematic manner which it is hoped will avoid the usual formally schematic, or merely critical assertions which circulate so widely. Many details will be omitted for the sake of brevity and traditional schemes and approaches are not always followed, but the presentation is grounded upon the Marxist texts and assumes that Marx was a thinker and that his system can be re-thought. This is not a critique or an evaluation of the Marxian view but a summary exposition which seeks to understand what Marx and Engels thought concerning history, not what they should have thought. No attempt is made to justify or to attack the Marxian view.

I. Definition and Content of History

The clearest statement concerning the sphere and content of history is the statement of Engels in the joint work, Die heilige Familie (1845):

History does nothing, it "possesses no immense wealth", it "wages no battles". It is man, real living man, that does all that, that possesses and fights; "history" is not a person apart, using man as a means for its own particular aims; history is nothing but the activity of man pursuing his aims.¹

This anti-Hegelian definition of history is either implicit or explicit in all the writings of Marx and Engels. In the Deutsche Ideologie (1845) Marx assumed that all history is dependent upon the material production of life by man,² obviously his own doing. And in the second paragraph of The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (1852) Marx said:

Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past.³

If this definition of history appears to contradict the traditional view of the Marxist theory of history as an alien power standing over against man, upon which man must wait and with whom he must co-operate, this apparent contradiction can only be resolved by a dissection of the

1. Karl Marx and F. Engels, The Holy Family (Moscow, 1956) 125 (MEGA, III, 265).

2. DE, 354-358 (MEGA, V, 17-21).

3. SW, I, 225. The qualification should be seen in the context that the past is a human heritage, as will be shown later.

Marxian theory and an analysis of its processes. The first step in such a dissection is the definition of man and human nature; the second is a survey of the stages of history as presented by Marx and Engels; the third is a consideration of historical change. This is to be followed by an exposition of Marx's analysis of capitalism as it illuminated his view of history, thus confirming by reference to his mature work, the interpretation given of Marx.

1. The Human Essence or Distinctiveness.

Viewed superficially, the Marxian anti-metaphysical and historical method appears to preclude any definition of the essence of man: man is simply what he is at the given moment of observation and will be something different at the next.⁴ There are, however, statements which indicate a definite concept of man and which provide the necessary link to the anti-metaphysical standpoint. In a footnote in the first

4. This is suggested by certain statements of Marx:

"...all history is nothing but a continuous transformation of human nature." (The Poverty of Philosophy, 165 (MEGA VI, 207))

"... / diese / Summen von Produktionskräften, Kapitalien und sozialen Verkehrsformen ... ist der reale Grund dessen, was sich die Philosophen als "Substanz" und Wesen des Menschen vorgestellt..." (DF, 368 (MEGA, V, 27); from the Deutsche Ideologie) Cf. Ibid., 347 (10-11).

"Aber das menschliche Wesen ist kein dem einzelnen Individuum innewohnendes Abstraktum. In seiner Wirklichkeit ist es das Ensemble der gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse. (Sixth Thesis on Feuerbach, Ibid., 340 (538) and in SW, II, 366) Cf. also, V. Venable, Human Nature, A Marxist View, 19-20 and S. Bloom, The World of Nations, 2.

volume of Capital he gives a clue to this when he refers to "... human nature in general ... and human nature as modified in each specific historical epoch."⁵ There is a definite human nature or characteristic whose form of manifestation is modified in each historical period.

The distinctively human characteristic is conscious productive activity; this we have seen in great detail in the 1844 Mss and it remained a permanent concept in Marx even though obscured by other considerations and materials. In the 1845-46 Deutsche Ideologie he said that one might distinguish man from the animals any way one liked, but "Sie selbst fangen an, sich von den Tieren zu unterscheiden, sobald sie anfangen, ihre Lebensmittel zu produzieren...".⁶ This is merely a shortened expression of the concept developed in the 1844 Mss when he said that free, conscious activity in meeting needs was the human trait as opposed to the instinctive action or activity, dictated by need, of animals. This same basic idea appears again in the mature Marx and in Engels and Soviet Marxists.

In describing labour in Capital, Marx defines it as a process going on between man and nature in which "... man, through his activity, initiates, regulates, and controls the material reactions between himself and nature."⁷ Confronting nature as one of its own forces, he appropriates it in forms suitable to his needs, an activity not to be confused with

5. Capital, I, 671, note 2. Cf. S. Bloom, op. cit., 1-10 and his various references to Marx.

6. DF, 347 (MEGA, V, 10). 7. Capital, I, 169.

primitive forms of labour shared with the animals:

"We have to consider labour in a form peculiar to the human species."⁸ Spiders and bees may put a human architect to shame but human labour has a quality all its own: it actualizes a human vision or idea.

But what from the very first distinguishes the most incompetent architect from the best of bees is that the architect has built a cell in his head before he constructs it in wax. The labour process ends in the creation of something which, when the process began, already existed in the worker's imagination, already existed in an ideal form. What happens is, not merely that the worker brings about a change of form in natural objects; at the same time, in the nature that exists apart from himself, he realises his own purpose which gives the law to his activities, the purpose to which he has to subordinate his own will.⁹

Hence, free, creative labour is the essentially human attribute in the mature Marx. This is confirmed by his criticism of the stunting effects of the division of labour in modern industry¹⁰ and a passage in the third volume of Capital.

In the letter he says that the

"... realm of freedom does not commence until the point is passed where labour under compulsion of necessity and of external utility is required." 11

Within the realm of necessary material production, the only freedom is that of a rationally organised system of production, but this is not the true human freedom, for "Beyond it begins that development of human power, which is its own end, the

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid., 170.

10. Ibid., 373; 384ff.

11. Ibid., III (Kerr edition), 954.

true realm of freedom.../ which is based upon the natural realm of necessity."/ ¹² This is the same concept found in the 1844 Manus in which labour was to be a need in itself, not the means to meet a need, and was to be an expression of the character of man as a free and universal being. This was also expressed in the first drafts of Capital written in 1857-58 when he spoke of one aspect of the nature of wealth as "... Sache, verwirklicht in Sachen, materiellen Produkten, denen der Mensch als Subjekt gegenübersteht... zum Zweck der Herrschaft...". ¹³ When the bourgeois form of wealth is removed, what is it other than:

Die volle Entwicklung der menschlichen Herrschaft ueber die Naturkraefte, die sogenannten Natur sowohl, wie seiner eignen Natur? Das absolute Herausarbeiten seiner schoepferischen Anlagen, ohne andre Voraussetzung als die vorhergegangene historische Entwicklung aller menschlichen Kraefte als solcher, nicht gemessen an einem vorhergegangenen Massstab, zum Selbstzweck macht? ¹⁴

And this is found as late as 1875 in the remarks on the Gotha Program of the German Socialist Party. In these he speaks of a higher phase of communist society to come,

... after the enslaving subordination of the individual to the division of labour, and therewith also the antithesis between mental and physical labour, has vanished;

12. Ibid., 954-955.

13. Grundrisse, 387. Cf.: "Nun ist der Reichtum einerseits Sache, verwirklicht in Sachen, materiellen Produkten, denen der Mensch als Subjekt gegenübersteht; andererseits, als Wert ist er blosses Kommando ueber fremde Arbeit nicht zum Zweck der Herrschaft, sondern des Privatgenusses etc."

14. Ibid.

after labour has become not only a means of life but life's prime want; after the productive forces have also increased with the all-round development of the individual...¹⁵

The ending of the effects of the division of labour played a part in the theme of the Deutsche Ideologie of 1845¹⁶ and the concept of man's alienation consisting of his species life, free conscious productivity, becoming merely a means to existence was uppermost in the 1844 Mss: the unity of the "young" and the "old" Marx on Man's essential nature is certain.

It is obvious that Marx held a consistent view of the "human" characteristic into his later years: man is a unique being by virtue of his conscious and wilful mastery of nature and the natural conditions of his life, and his true nature is to be a free and creative labourer who labours for the sake of self-expression, not because of needs. This did not receive explicit discussion or exposition in the writings after 1844 because these were largely contributions to a programme by which philosophy is to become the science of the real life of man, for example, of economics and politics. But it underlies this science, as we have just shown. And it underlies the thought of Engels and the Russian Marxists.

In 1875 Engels began an unfinished essay on the evolution of man from the animal kingdom by labour. He admits that animals change nature by their presence, but this is

15. SV, II, 23.

16. Cf. DF, 361-362 (MEGA, V, 22-23).

unintentional, while the greater the distance of man from the animal state, "... the more their effect on nature assumes the character of premeditated, planned actions directed toward definite ends known in advance."¹⁷ In spite of the rudimentary thinking and planning of animals, all their planned action

... has never resulted in impressing the stamp of their will upon the world. It took men to do that. / animals use external nature, while / ... man by his changes makes it serve his ends, masters it. This is the final, essential distinction between man and other animals, and once again it is labour that brings about this distinction.¹⁸

Conscious, willed labour toward a preconceived and freely chosen goal, which subjects nature to his will, is man's distinctive quality. In man nature comes to a self-consciousness which is only complete when man subjects his social production to the same control as he subjected nature.¹⁹ That Engels shares Marx's thought is especially evident in a sentence from his original outline of the "Introduction" for Dialectics of Nature:

The normal existence of animals is given by the contemporary conditions in which they live and to which they adapt themselves--those of man, as soon as he differentiates himself from the animal in the narrower sense, has never yet been present, and are only to be elaborated by the ensuing historical development. Man is the sole animal capable of working his way out of the merely animal state--his normal state is one

17. F. Engels, "The Part Played by Labour in the Transition from Ape to Man", in English translation in SW, II, 81.

18. Ibid., 82.

19. F. Engels, Dialectics of Nature (Moscow, 1954), 46, 48-49 (SW, II, 68-69).

appropriate to his consciousness, one that has to be created by himself.²⁰

The Russian Marxists have never deleted this element of Marxist teaching, understandably so, as they have been engaged in social and industrial revolution. Whatever its inhumanity in social and political strife and the re-organisation of society, Soviet Marxism maintains and proclaims the humanism implicit in technology - the elevation of man over nature even while he remains subject to it as a natural biological individual, at the mercy of overpowering cosmic forces and expanses. While we do not intend to discuss Soviet Marxism as such in the thesis, it is important to see that there is a continuity in this fundamental concept in order to establish the relevance of the thesis.

G. Plekhanov, (who is the link between Marx and Engels and the Bolsheviks by virtue of his work in the 1890's) gave clear expression to this concept. His work reflects not only his own view but that of the Soviet government which reprints and translates it: Lenin recommended Plekhanov's works in spite of his Menshevik views and the edition quoted was published in Moscow in 1956.²¹ Concerning man, Plekhanov says:

20. Ibid., 262. Cf. DF, 361-362 for a kindred statement in the Ideologie (MEGA, V, 23-24); this and the basis for it in the 1844 Mss shows that this is no mere vogue for evolution of that time. In fact, Engels repudiated Darwin's basic principle as a guide to human development: the war of all against all was not the dominant factor but rather the social tendency of early man (cf. his letter to Lavrow, 12-17/11/75, Ausgewählte Briefe (Berlin, 1955), 359.

21. G. Plekhanov, The Development of The Nonist View of History (Moscow, 1956; written 1894 and first published 1895), 8.

Our anthropoid ancestors, like all other animals, were in complete subjection to nature. All their development was that completely unconscious development which was conditioned by adaptation to their environment, by means of natural selection in the struggle for existence. This was the dark kingdom of physical necessity. At that time even the dawn of consciousness, and therefore of freedom, was not breaking. But physical necessity brought man to a stage of development at which he began, little by little, to separate himself from the remaining animal world. He became a tool-making animal. The tool is an organ with the help of which man acts on nature to achieve his ends. It is an organ which subjects necessity to human consciousness, although at first only to a very weak degree, by fits and starts, if one can put it that way. The degree of development of the productive forces determines the measure of authority of man over nature.²²

However, the conquest of nature leads to a creation of a complex world of human society which at first eludes human control and enslaves the former slave of nature. As with nature, so with society, men become aware of the enslavement and hence begin to understand its causes.

This provides the opportunity for a new and final triumph of consciousness over necessity, of reason over blind law.

Having realised that the cause of his enslavement by his own creation lies in the anarchy of production, the producer ("social man") organizes that production and thereby subjects it to his will. Then terminates the kingdom of necessity, and there begins the reign of freedom, which itself proves to be necessity. The prologue of human history has been played out, history begins.²³

Lenin gives expression to the same idea, though in the context of an epistemological discussion, not of a discussion

22. Ibid., 271.

23. Ibid., 273-274.

of human production. Freedom is the knowledge of necessity, and knowledge of necessity enables man to control nature and his own nature. Commenting on a statement to this effect in Engel's Anti-Duehring, he says:

For Engels all living human practice permeates the theory of knowledge itself and provides an objective criterion of truth. For until we know a law of nature, it, existing and acting independently and outside our mind, makes us slaves of "blind necessity". But once we come to know this law, which acts (as Marx pointed out a thousand times) independently of our mind, we become masters of nature. The mastery of nature manifested in human practice is a result of an objectively correct reflection (within the limits of what is revealed by practice) is objective, absolute, and eternal truth.²⁴

Stalin, the most "wooden" of the Soviet writers, maintains this point just as strongly. In 1952, in opposition to an excessive emphasis upon man's power over economic laws, Stalin wrote a rebuke which was nevertheless in keeping with the concept of man we have been examining concerning both natural and economic laws.

Man may discover these laws, get to know them, study them, reckon with them in his activities and utilize them in the interests of society, but he cannot change or abolish them. ... / Does this mean that man is powerless in the face of nature? / No, it does not. Leaving aside astronomical, geological and other similar processes, which, even if he has come to know the laws of their development, man really is powerless to influence, in many other cases man is very far from powerless, in the sense of being able to influence the processes of nature. In all such cases, having come to know the laws of nature, reckoning with them and relying on them, and intelligently applying and

24. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism (Moscow, 1952; first published 1908), 192-193. Cf. Lenin, Aus dem Philosophischen Nachlass (Berlin, 1958), 10, 19, 316-318.

utilizing them, man can restrict their sphere of action, and can impart a different direction to destructive forces of nature and convert them to the use of society.²⁵

However much Stalin may have deviated from the teaching of Marx on some points, his doctrine of the nature of man remained true to the technological humanism of the first Marxist.

This tenet has not "thawed" with the advent of Khrushchev. The technological nature of true humanity is seen in the description he gives of communism, the goal of human development.

... under it \angle a classless social system with one form of public ownership, the all-round development of people will be accompanied by the growth of the productive forces through continuous progress in science and technology, all sources of public wealth will gush forth abundantly... in which labor for the good of society will become the prime and vital requirement of everyone, a necessity recognized by one and all, and the ability of each person will be employed to the greatest benefit of the people... \angle Communism insures development of social production, high productivity, it equips man with the best and most powerful machines, greatly increases his power over nature and enables him to control its elemental forces to an ever greater extent.²⁶

With the victory of communism mental and physical labor will merge organically in the production activity of people.

The purpose of Communist production is to insure uninterrupted progress of society and to provide all its members with material and cultural benefits according to their growing needs, their individual requirements and tastes.

Communist society, which is based on highly organized production and advanced technology, alters the character of work, but it does not release the members of society from work.²⁷

25. Stalin, Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R., 6-7.

26. Khrushchev, "The New Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union" in Essential Works of Marxism (ed. A.P. Mendel; Bantam Classic, 1961), 420.

27. Ibid., 421.

Labor and discipline will not be a burden to people, labor will no longer be a mere source of livelihood-- it will be a genuinely creative process and a source of happiness.²⁸

Modern Soviet Marxism sees man's essential nature as that of power over nature by means of labour and technology, ultimately for the sake of man's own power and self-expression.

Man is a natural being, endowed with powers of consciousness and will, and hence a being who breaks his natural bonds and limits by his knowledge of, and manipulation of, material powers. He is a being destined for freedom, self-determination, a condition possible only in a freedom from natural necessity and in the development of technology and the control of nature to the end that man has an abundance of material objects for his needs, that he is protected from the onslaughts of nature forces, and has ample scope for his energies and talents.

2. Labour.

Man is, then, a self-determining (self-conscious) labouring organism: or, true labour--man's distinctively human activity--is the autonomous maintenance and expression of man's life, freed from natural necessity (even though immersed, as it must be, in the natural sphere). It is the creation of man's own world, an objectification of himself in the double sense that it (a) embodies his talents, will and energies--his human powers, and (b) that it is shaped according to his needs and desires. The underlying philosophic concept or structure is that of man

objectifying himself, alienating himself in a world which is his double and then reappropriating this world. This is found in Hegel's view of man and culture, expressed in idealistic terms²⁹; it is again found in Marx in terms of labour and material production.

(a) Labour as Objectification of Man's powers.

After the 1844 Man there is no systematic exposition of the concept of labour and man's self-creation as a process of objectification, but there are sufficient references to it to manifest it as the underlying structure of his thought. It is implicit in the statement that labour is the expression of the life of man, contained in the Ideologie of 1845:

Wie die Individuen ihr Leben neussern, so sind sie.
Was sie sind, faellt also zusammen mit ihrer Produktion,
sowohl damit, was sie produzieren, als auch damit, wie
sie produzieren. Was die Individuen also sind, das haengt
ab von den materiellen Bedingungen ihrer Produktion.³⁰

In the state of alienation he says that "... die eigene Tat des Menschen ihm zu einer fremden gegenueberstehenden Macht wird, die ihn unterjocht, statt dass er sie beherrscht" and this is a crystallisation of social activity, "... diese Konsolidation unseres eigenen Produkts zu einer sachlichen Gewalt ueber uns..."³¹

29. 1844 Man, MEGA, III, 156 (English, 151); Cf. Hegel, The Phenomenology of The Mind (Baillie, 1961 impression), 509, 517, and The Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences, PP 385-386, 483-4.

30. DE, 347 (MEGA, V, 11); cf. 364 (34).

31. Ibid., 361 (22).

In both cases there is implied the objectification of man's inner nature in the product.

In Capital this concept becomes explicit in his discussions of value and labour. Exchange - value is nothing but the quantity of labour time congealed in the commodity:

∟ when stripped of concrete qualities:∟ Nothing is left of them but the before-mentioned unsubstantial entity, a mere jelly of undifferentiated human labour, this meaning the expenditure of human labour power irrespective of the method of its expenditure. ... As crystals of this social substance common to them all, they are values--commodity values.³²

Furthermore, the use-value, ignored in the above considerations, or the specific physical properties of a product, embodies the specific skills of labour as they are incarnated in specific natural materials. Hence he says of viewing items in terms of exchange value:

All the qualities whereby it affects our senses are annulled. It has ceased to be the product of the work of a joiner, a builder, a spinner; the outcome of some specific kind of productive labour.³³

Finally, it is to be noted that in Capital he sees the result of labour as the incarnation of an idea or purpose in man's mind: "The labour process ends in the creation of something which, when the process began, already existed in the worker's imagination, already existed in an ideal form. ... he realises his own purpose..."³⁴

32. Capital, I, 6-7; cf. 16, 20, 35, 47.

33. Ibid., 6, 20, 29, 36, 44, 50.

34. Ibid., 170.

We see that Marx uses the same conceptual structure in Capital as he used in the 1844 Mss: man is incarnating himself in a world of products resulting from his labour on nature. He is creating a human world, which embodies his powers and skills, which is the objectification of his will and purpose. Until the present it has been alienated from man by the prevailing form of the process of distribution and exchange: as in Feuerbach, man's projections of himself become his master.

(b) Labour and the Development of Man.

Labour also develops man's powers as well as objectifying them. We have already seen this in the discussion of the 1844 Mss. In the Grundrisse Marx said that wealth is "Das absolute Herausarbeiten seiner schöpferischen Anlagen..."³⁵ and he accounted for the development of primitive peoples by their experience with the new conditions in strange environments encountered in their migrations.³⁶ In Capital he says:

By thus acting on the external world and changing it, he at the same time changes his own nature. He develops the potentialities that slumber within him, and subjects these inner forces to his own control.³⁷

Hence man's own activity, labour, modifies or develops his powers and inner nature. This development is seen also in the accumulation of knowledge and instruments received from the past and in the social process of production.

35. Grundrisse, 387.

36. Ibid., 370-379.

37. Capital, I, 169.

(c) Social Nature of Labour.

(1) Capitalistic economy rests upon the inter-related system of needs and products: both Hegel and the Marx of 1844 presuppose this.³⁸ Further, Marx saw the truly human situation as involving this but as being motivated by this fact instead of by profit.³⁹ The division of labour and specialisation and world commerce are the bases of this unification of human activity.⁴⁰

Specialisation and division of labour are the means of increasing the productive capacity and output of human labour.⁴¹ Further, by exchange man is able to avail himself of all the powers of the human species and all the gifts of nature.⁴² The result of all this is that man's material life and the process of production become a social process requiring the participation of many: by exchange and by the division of labour within the workshop, no man is responsible for either the whole of his own life's needs or for any one product.

38. Cf. Hegel, Philosophy of Right (Knox), pp182-183, 188, 189-195, 198. Cf. Marx in MEGA, III, 546-547 (notes on Mill).

39. MEGA, III, 546-547; Capital, I, 52.

40. Cf. Marx, "Future Results of British Rule in India", in SW, I, 324; the Manifesto in SW, I, 34, 36, 37.

41. Capital, I, chapter 11, 336-352, especially 344-345.

42. Cf. his account of the origin of the division of labour in society in Ibid., 370-372 and 63.

(This becomes an important basis for the argument for the social ownership and management of industry).⁴³ All labour beyond the purely self-subsistent labour of the primitive or rustic man is to some degree social, even though in the present form of social production, money is the only visible bond.

(2) Furthermore, labour is a social process by virtue of the inter-relatedness of the past and the present in terms of material instruments and conditions of production and in terms of the scientific and practical knowledge of production. The present inherits a material condition of production and knowledge and skills, and then proceeds to build upon this, to modify and advance the material base and the knowledge and skills. In 1845, in the Ideologie, he wrote:

Die Geschichte ist nichts als die Aufeinanderfolge der einzelnen Generationen, von denen jede die ihr von allen vorhergegangenen ueberzuechten Materiale, Kapitalien, Produktionsknaefte exploitiert, daher also einerseits unter ganz veraenderten Umstaenden die ueberkommene Taetigkeit fortsetzt und andererseits mit einer ganz veraenderten Taetigkeit die alten Umstaenden modifiziert...⁴⁴

In Capital he says:

The relation which makes capital a possibility arises, moreover, upon an economic foundation which is itself the product of a long evolutionary process. The now extant productivity of labour, which is the presupposition of

43. Ibid., 344-347; Anti-Duehring, Part III, sect. 2, 369-395.

44. DE, 364 (MEGA, V, 34); cf. 368(27-28).

capital, is not the gift of nature but the outcome of a history lasting thousands of centuries.⁴⁵

In these remarks we see the strong historical emphasis which was central to Marx's view of man and society. History was not merely an argument to be invoked for the sake of supporting his convictions, or for securing conviction, concerning the outcome of the proletarian struggle; it was the presupposition of Marx's thinking about that struggle and it rooted in the historical thought of the German Enlightenment and of economic theory and history.

3. Man as a Species Being.

Marx ceased using the word "species" or "species-being" to refer to mankind, after his early writings,⁴⁶ but the content of his thought about humanity follows the same pattern as when he used the word. We have seen above that Marx still conceived of man as objectifying himself in a world of natural objects, the products of his labour and designs, and the reflection of his needs and desires, as in the 1844 Man. Further, we have seen above that this is to be done in a process of division of labour, specialization and exchange.

45. Capital, I, 555-556; 156. Cf. the import of the chapter "Primary Accumulation", 790ff. and especially 844-847; Grundrisse, 5-6, 375 and the preceding section, 363-374; 79.

46. Cf., however, Capital, I, 345: in co-operation a worker "... transcends his individual limitations and develops the capabilities that belong to him as a member of a species."

This leads Marx to give expression to the species life of mankind as a collective, organic whole, universally using nature, communicating with each part, transporting goods over the whole earth.⁴⁷ For example, in 1853 in an article on India, he closes by saying:

The bourgeois period of history has to create the material basis of the new world--on the one hand the universal intercourse founded upon the mutual dependency of mankind, and the means of that intercourse; on the other hand the development of the productive powers of man and the transformation of material production into a scientific domination of natural agencies.⁴⁸

And in 1857-58 he wrote a similar description, contrasting primitive society's limited and isolated development of productive activity with that of capitalistic and communistic society:

Persoenliche Abhaengigkeitsverhaeltnisse (zuerst ganz naturwuechsig) sind die ersten Gesellschaftsformen, in denen sich die menschliche Produktivitaet nur in geringen Umfang und auf isolierten Punkten entwickelt. Persoenliche Unabhængigkeit auf nachlicher Abhaengigkeit gegruendet ist die zweite grosse Form, worin sich erst ein System des allgemeinen gesellschaftlichen Stoffwechsels, der universalen Beziehungen, allseitiger Beduerfnisse, und universeller Vermoegen bildet. Freie Individualitaet, gegruendet auf die universelle Entwicklung der Individuen und die Unterordnung ihrer Gemeinschaftlichen, gesellschaftlichen Produktivitaet, als ihres gesellschaftlichen Vermoegens, ist die dritte Stufe. Die zweite schafft die Bedingungen der dritten.⁴⁹

In Capital he not only speaks of this inter-relatedness of productive activity but speaks of the individual worker being an organ of the collective worker:

47. Cf. the Manifesto in SW, I, 36-38.

48. SW, I, 324. 49. Grundrisse, 75-76; cf. 79.

To work productively, it is no longer necessary that the worker should be the one who puts his own hand to the work; enough that he should be an organ of the collective worker, fulfilling one of that collective worker's subordinate functions. The foregoing primary definition of productive work, deduced from the very nature of material production, remains permanently true for the collective worker, regarded as a totality. But it is no longer true for the elements of that worker, taken collectively.⁵⁰

When a worker co-operates with others systematically, "... he transcends his individual limitations and develops the capabilities that belong to him as a member of a species."⁵¹

This same reality underlies the argument for the socialization of the means of production in the concluding section of chapter twenty-four of Capital - the socialization of the labour process, the centralization of the means of production in the hands of a few capitalists, and the enmeshing of all the peoples of the world in the net of the world market.⁵²

In all these examples there is discernible the idea of the human-whole, the species, mankind, become one real and actually integrated whole in the essential human activity of the production of a human world. Each part contributes to, and receives from, the whole. The entire past of mankind has produced the present human situation, a past in which man has little by little worked himself out of the animal state of dependence upon, and subjection to, nature and risen to a position of mastery of nature. Now man has only to come to himself, accept the facts of, and master, his own creation,

50. Capital, I, 551-552; cf. 382.

51. Ibid., 345.

52. Ibid., 346; cf. 844-847.

and become lord of all. All this closely parallels the Feuerbach of Das Wesen des Christentums in 1841 and the Marx of the 1844 Mss.

The universal mastery and use of nature by an inter-related and interdependent mankind freely exchanging the varied products of nature and human skills is certainly a close approximation to Marx's earlier "species man" and "species life". In it mankind attains to a full autonomy and freedom--self-determination--in the Hegelian-Marxian sense of the word: he controls and manages his conditions of life to his own ends, drawing upon all the human and natural resources of the world.

II. The Marxist Patterns of History.

One of the most familiar features of Marxism is the set of five stages through which history must progress. It is not so well known that just as basic to the understanding of the Marxist view of history are two more historical progressions: a two stage progression and a three stage progression. The use of various schemes of history should not be considered an inconsistency in Marxism but rather the result of the use of different sets of factors and principles. An exposition of them aids in understanding the Marxist view of history.

1. The Two-Fold Division of History.

The two-fold division of history is based upon the principle of the realization of man's full manhood and essence.

It is found in the preface of 1859: "This social formation of capitalistic society brings, therefore, the prehistory of human society to a close."⁵³ All previous history is seen as pre-history (he included the Asiatic communal mode of production in this pre-history). Engels gave nearly explicit expression to this scheme in Anti-Duehring and the pamphlet extract from it, Socialism: Utopian and Scientific. In this he described the post-revolutionary age and its rational planning and socialized production:

Anarchy in social production is replaced by systematic, definite organization. The struggle for individual existence disappears. Then for the first time man, in a certain sense, is finally marked off from the rest of the animal kingdom, and emerges from mere animal conditions of existence into really human ones. All conditions of life, which hitherto ruled man are under the control of man... who for the first time becomes the real, conscious lord of Nature because he has now become master of his own social organisation. ... Only from that time will man himself, more consciously, make his own history. ... It is the ascent of man from the kingdom of necessity to the kingdom of freedom.⁵⁴

In the 1844 Manus this concept of history is present in the statements referring to previous history as the "Geburtsakt", "Entstehungsgeschichte", or "Erzeugungsakt".⁵⁵ The entire movement of history is "... sein wirklicher Zeugungsakt—der Geburtsakt seines empirischen Daseins..."⁵⁶ Communism, the final product of history is the riddle of history solved, the

53. SW, I, 329.

54. Ibid., II, 140-141 (Anti-Duehring, 392); cf. Capital, III(Kerr), 954-955.

55. DF, 252 (MEGA, III, 152-153; English, 146).

56. Ibid., 236 (114; 102).

realization of man.⁵⁷ Thus the two-fold division of history is found in the early and in the mature Marxism.

2. The Five-Fold Division of History.

The five-fold division of history (primitive communism, slavery, feudalism, capitalism, and modern communism) is equally well-grounded in Marxist usage. It appeared in the Deutsche Ideologie, in the first development of a historical scheme, as: tribal property, antique property (slavery), feudal property, and (by implication and context) capitalist and communist property.⁵⁸ In the 1859 Preface, he listed these, using the Asiatic mode of production to designate primitive communism.⁵⁹ Engels used this implicitly in the Origin of The Family, Private Property and the State in his listing of three forms of exploitation in civilization (slavery, serfdom, and wage-labour).⁶⁰ Soviet theory uses this to the virtual exclusion of all other schemes.⁶¹

The five stages are forms of society, not qualitative conditions of society as in the two-stage view or in the

57. Ibid.; cf. 275 (162; 158): "... so hat auch der Mensch seinen Entstehungsakt, die Geschichte..."

58. DF, 414-417 (MEGA, V, 11-15).

59. SM, I, 329.

60. SM, II, 283-294.

61. Cf. Stalin, "Dialectical and Historical Materialism" in Problems of Leninism (Moscow, 1954), 729, 736; cf. 718-719; however, see his early use of primitive, matriarchal, patriarchal, slaveholding, etc., in "Anarchism or Socialism" (1906-07) in Works, I, 313-314.

three-stage view--both of which may include the five stages. This classification is then more of an evolutionary listing of the forms of society which relate to the fact of gradual progress in the reality underlying the qualitative forms of society. This inter-relation of all three schemes may be seen in the following parallel listing of them.

<u>Two-fold</u>	<u>Five-fold</u>	<u>Three-fold</u>
Pre-history	Primitive Communism	naive unity or, undeveloped unity (pre-capitalistic society)
	Slavery Feudalism Capitalism	Alienation and development (Capitalistic society)
History	Communism	Unity in full development (post-capitalistic society)

3. The Three-fold Division of History.

The three-fold division of history is used explicitly by Marx and Engels in many places and is implicit in the substance of their thought where not explicit. Formally it corresponds to Hegel's pattern of development: simple naive unity, alienation and differentiation, and a higher unity in full development.⁶² While it may be applied to general categories.

62. Cf. the preface to Hegel's Phenomenology of The Mind (Baillie, 1961), 80-82, 86, and also, 509-517, 685ff; also, Encyclopaedia, PP385-386, 483-484.

of social forms (classless society--class society--classless society) it is primarily concerned with the inner process of history and is most helpful in understanding this.

This triadic differentiation of history is first seen in an abbreviated form in the early "Kritik der Hegelschen Staatsphilosophie" (1843) in which Marx sees the natural unity of the Middle Ages broken by capitalism and reunited on a higher basis in the post-capitalistic time.⁶³ It is implicit in the 1844 Mss in which he sees the alienation of man by the loss of his product, forces of production, and the process of exchange, followed by the return of man to himself when he reappropriates this alienated world.⁶⁴ Similarly, it is implicit in Engels' passage in the Ursprung, etc. already mentioned, and is used in Anti-Duehring where communal property is said to return after a series of intermediate stages of development through the condition of private property.⁶⁵ In Marx's drafts of a letter to Vera Zasulich in 1881 he places all forms of communal property in a primary category, all forms of private property in a secondary category, and the future communist property in a third category.⁶⁶

63. H. Popitz, Der Entfremdete Mensch, 83-85.

64. DF, 234-235 (MEGA, III, 113-114; E. 101-102) and 269(156; 151).

65. Anti-Duehring, 191; 190ff.

66. Cf. Chapter V of this thesis, the material containing references 131-134.

The most revealing use of this scheme is found in the Grundrisse and Capital. In the Grundrisse (see note 49 of this chapter on the quotation for the species life of man) Marx enumerates: (1) the stage marked by personal dependence and a low level of production (called natural economy); (2) the stage marked by personal independence but a dependence upon things, and by the development of production and exchange; (3) the stage marked by the universal development of individuals and subordination of their social means of production to themselves, the basis of which was developed by the increased production and exchange of the second stage.⁶⁷ In the second form, the natural bonds of the first are dissolved by the development of exchange and a money economy.⁶⁸ In this use of the scheme Marx has to do with the form of economy and resulting social relations, not property as such, and classifies history as pre-capitalist, capitalist, and socialist. The decisive clue to the various forms is, the relation of the producer to the means of production, and the level of production. This is emphasized as crucial to the existence of the capitalistic form in the Grundrisse and in Capital.⁶⁹ The first form includes primitive communism, slavery, serfdom,

67. Grundrisse, 75.

68. Ibid., 81, 396.

69. Ibid., 375; Capital, I, 154-156, 172, 555-556; 791-792.

and small-freeholder - in all of which the producer is bound to the means of production; the capitalistic form is that in which the producer is detached from the means of production and is free to move about - in fact has to move about wherever he is able to secure the money which he needs to obtain the goods necessary to his life, goods he is unable to have except by labour and money. Finally the third stage is that in which production will be aimed at the needs of all, not production for its own sake (because the foundations have been laid for production by the capital investment of the preceding period.)⁷⁰

In Capital this triadic division of history is found in the already mentioned premises of capitalistic production and in the development of that concept historically in the chapter on primary accumulation. Marx prefaces the details of this development with the statement that capitalistic production requires the divorce of the worker from his means of production, whatever the form of this relation; this is received from the past by nascent capitalism and is continually produced by fully developed capitalism.⁷¹ Following the description of this process and early developments of capitalism, Marx then concludes with the description of the

70. Cf. his description of the task of capitalism at the close of his article on India, SW, I, 324, and his statements in Capital, I, 846; also, the Ideologie, in DF, 362 (MEGA, V, 24).

71. Capital, I, 790-793.

historical tendency of capitalistic accumulation. In this he indicates that there has been a movement from private property based upon the work of the individual owner (which was necessary for the development of free individuality of the worker but which is unable to develop the form of co-operation and division of labour and its wealth of powers) to the capitalistic form of private property which leaves the producers without any property but their labour which must be sold (with all the development of powers of production which are brought about and which are necessary to the final stage) to the socialised form of property in which the social unity doing the producing will control the means of production and the process of production and all will enjoy individual property on the basis of the developments of capitalism.⁷² This process is cast in the Hegelian triadic formula when he says that the final transformation to socialism is the "negation of the negation".⁷³

The two-fold scheme of history indicates the meaning of history and its movement: the fulfillment and development of man which occurs after the decisive transformation. The three-fold scheme points to the internal nature of the process which must take place: that a germinal mankind must alienate itself and thereby develop its latent powers before it can reunite or

72. Ibid., 844-846.

73. Ibid., 846.

re-integrate itself; this is seen in the forms of property and in the forms of production itself. The five-fold scheme gives the concrete forms of society through which mankind goes in order to accomplish these developments: its five forms are capable of being cast in either of the other schemes.

All these schemes contain a decisive turning point, a transformation of human life and society, at the transition to the final stage of socialistic or communistic society. In this final stage truly human history begins, history made by man who is the lord and master of his conditions of existence. This final stage corresponds to Feuerbach's final turning point at which man is to confess that humanity is the supreme being. Both come at the end of a long evolutionary process in which man has been developing his powers. Feuerbach calls for an act of affirmation in the realm of belief and thought; Marx calls for an act of political and economic significance to realize the belief in man as the supreme being.⁷⁴ In this, one sees the similarity of Feuerbach's and Marx's historical schemes: they are both evolutionary up to the final stage, in which there is a radical breach--a revolution.

74. Cf. the later section of this chapter on revolution.

III. Historical Change.

We have seen Marx's fundamental concept of man's nature and the schemes of history used by him: man is an evolving being destined for a corporate autonomy in the face of nature by objectifying himself (powers, needs, will) in a "second nature" by labour. History is the self-creation, or perfection of man by a process of objectification and alienation followed by re-appropriation of this man-made world for its real purpose. It consists of the full development of man's powers over nature (science and industry and trade) and the mastery of his self-created world (society and the ordering of human relations). But now we must ask for the process of change, "history", strictly speaking. To this we now direct our attention.

The basic factors (not stages) in history, as elaborated in the 1845 work, the Ideologie, are: (a) satisfaction of needs, essential to the maintenance of life, (b) the creation of new needs by the process of this satisfaction, (c) the reproduction of human life in the family, (d) social co-operation in the total process of production (Zusammenwirken) which is determined by the nature of the prevailing production, and (e) after all these, consciousness.⁷⁵ In his discussion of the actual historical process, however, Marx (and Engels, also) consistently reduce the factors to three: (a) "Produktionskraft" (labour, machines, working organization), (b) social relations (die bestehenden

75. DE, 354-357 (MEGA, V, 17-20).

gesellschaftlichen Verhaeltnisse), and (c) consciousness

(Bewusstsein - philosophy, theology, ethics, etc., "reinen Theorie")

These basic categories are used throughout the Marxist writings.⁷⁷

These three factors should be understood in terms of a careful definition, as several are misleading to one not versed in Marxist thought. "Produktionskraft", for example suggests the technico-logical factor - tools, machines, etc., - but appears also to include human labour, its organization in working, and its skills.⁷⁸ "Zusammenwirken" or "gesellschaftlichen Verhaeltnisse" suggests at first sight, the co-operation in the actual process of production - productive division of labour; a more thorough reading shows that it also refers to the social division of labour, the class divisions of society viewed as an organic whole, involving as well, distribution and property.⁷⁹

76. Ibid., 358(21).

77. Cf. the Manifesto (SW, I, 38) which uses the first two in an economic discussion, as does Wage Labour and Capital (Ibid., 83-84) and Capital, I, 844-846. See especially the "Preface" to the 1859 work, Critique of Political Economy (Ibid., 328-329) for a complete presentation of all three factors, as well as Anti-Duehring, Part III, section 11, 369-395. See also, Stalin, "Dialectical and Historical Materialism" in Problems of Leninism, 731, 743-745.

78. Capital, I, 170-173. Cf. Stalin, "Dialectical and Historical Materialism", in Problems of Leninism, 730-731.

79. Cf. Wage Labour and Capital in SW, I, 83-84: "In production, men not only act on nature but also on one another. They produce only by co-operating in a certain way and mutually exchanging their activities. ... The relations of production in their totality constitute what are called the social relations, society, and, specifically, a society at a definite stage of historical development, a society with a peculiar, distinctive character. Ancient society, feudal society, bourgeois society are such totalities of production relations... /each denoting a stage of human development/." This social character of the

(contd. overleaf)

Or, consciousness may be taken to refer to bare perception, whereas it really refers to the highly developed forms of thought in philosophy, ethics, religion, political theory, etc. - "reinen Theorie".

With these three fundamental factors before us, how, according to Marx, does historical movement commence and progress? This happens as a result of a conflict between the productive powers (Produktionskraft) and the social relations.⁸⁰ This conflict occurs because of the fact of the division of labour which releases "consciousness" from reality, allows a separation of mental and physical labour, and causes enjoyment and labour and production and consumption to fall on different people.⁸¹ The products of labour and the activity of labour are unequally divided, resulting in property and the division of labour.⁸² Further, there is a conflict of the individual and the general interests, out of which arises an illusory unity in the State, which is really captured by one of the interests and used to promote its control and claims, hence the political struggle is at base a class struggle.⁸³

(contd.) division of labour is also seen in the Ideologie when he says it leads to the sundering of mental and material work, of satisfaction and work, of production and consumption (see DE, 358-359 - MEGA, V, 21).

80. DE, 358(MEGA, V, 21). Cf. also, Anti-Duehring, 369-395.

81. DE, 358-359(MEGA, V, 21).

82. Ibid., 359-360(22).

83. Ibid., 359-360(22-23); cf. 392(63).

To make this more concrete, turn to its application to modern society.⁸⁴ A system of social production (nature capitalism) enmeshing the whole world (a good part of all of it), depending upon the labour of many individuals for the production of any one product, finds that private property and distribution based upon supply and demand are incapable of managing its productive potential. The underlying cause is the growth of productivity and the modification of the mode of production - a change in the Produktionskraft which is not matched by a modification in the social relations - property relations and the ideological reflex or consciousness. The capitalist class finds that it is no longer a class of real property holders (property with which their real efforts and personality are intimately connected) but instead is a class controlling vast concerns employing hundreds and thousands who have no other means of labour than the employment offered by the capitalist, and whose combined efforts are necessary for industry to function. Because of the benefits, the vested interests, and the ideological factor, or false consciousness which ignores the real situation, this class will not forfeit its position of power and leadership and must be fought by the rising class of the industrial proletariat. Hence the proletariat

84. Cf. for this the exposition given in the Manifesto SW, I, 33-43; Anti-Duhring, 369-395; Capital, I, 844-847. See also, Lenin, Selected Works (Moscow, 1950) I/1, 148-150 (What the Friends of the People Are).

represent the real situation of society and press for a communal social order corresponding to the highly integrated productive order. Because of the intransigence of the capitalistic class, a class struggle is necessary in order to accomplish this. Class conflict is the form and the dynamics of the progress in the social relations which arises from man's progress in his relation to nature (itself a dynamic reality).

Here we should summarise Marx's view of society: a base of labouring mankind - a society - prepares its material existence in a manner made possible by the prevailing stage of technology; this requires a certain social division of labour or social differentiation and co-operation—hence a "social relation" (gesellschaftlichen Verhaeltnisse, or Zusammenwirken); the latter causes a splitting of human activity and life and creates conflicts from which result the state and ideology (philosophy, ethics, etc.). Because of changes in the base - labouring society - brought about by the demand for more adequate production, invention and technological advances, increased skill, etc., there is a need for altering the social relations, which are however, maintained by the state and ideology. Class conflict is the only means by which this contradiction is resolved, and man's social life brought into harmony with his real life.

Class conflict is therefore not a mere polar relationship; it is a conflict between an old class and a rising class. Until the advent of mature capitalism, it was always a

conflict between two contending leaders of society: not until the rapid and thorough-going industrialization of the 18-19th Centuries had reduced all society to two classes, both bound into the same process of the mastery of the conditions of human existence, did the struggle become a struggle for the freedom of all society from any controlling class (in theory at least). In the ancient world, amid a number of classes, the important conflict was between slave owner and slave; in the Medieval world, lord and serf, and master and journeyman conflicted; then springing from within this society there arose a class of manufacturers who combined the labour of many in one business in order to meet the demands from the increased market. As this method of production grew and developed, the bourgeoisie struggled against the feudal order of society, seeking political control in order to recreate society fully according to its needs. Then it found itself faced with the class it had created, the proletariat.⁸⁵

It should be remembered that the proletariat, for Marx, is not simply the poor. It is the modern industrial working class, necessary to capitalist economy: a class of workers who have no other means of life save their labour and who are the result as well as the presupposition of capitalism. They represent one part of self-sundered humanity, while the capitalistic class represent the other. The poor are the

85. Cf. the Manifesto, SW, I, 35-34; Capital, I, 844-847.

Lumpenproletariat - that rotting scum.⁸⁶ Lenin also recognised this distinction when he, out of necessity, called for an alliance of proletariat and peasantry but assumed that proletariat would be the dominant party to a temporary alliance.⁸⁷ In this view of the proletariat can be seen Marx's adherence to the Hegelian structure of reality: naive, undeveloped unity, sundered

86. SW, I, 42. Cf. Capital, I, 843 and its footnote No.1 which refers to the poor required by, and produced by, capitalism as the "labouring poor" as opposed to the "idle poor" and calls the free "labouring poor" the "...artificial product of modern history". Cf. also, Engels' "Grundsätze des Kommunismus", an early form of the Manifesto before it was cast in the form of a manifesto; in reply to the question, What is the proletariat?, he answers:

"Das Proletariat ist diejenige Klasse der Gesellschaft, welche ihren Lebensunterhalt einzig und allein aus dem Verkauf ihrer Arbeit und nicht aus dem Profit irgend eines Kapitals zieht; deren Wohl und Wehe, deren Leben und Tod, deren ganze Existenz von der Nachfrage nach Arbeit, also von dem Wechsel der guten und schlechten Geschäftszeiten, von den Schwankungen einer ungehobenen Konkurrenz abhängt. Das Proletariat oder die Klasse der Proletariat ist mit einem Worte die arbeitende Klasse des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts."

And to the question, Has there always been a proletariat? he says:

"Das Proletariat ist entstanden durch die industrielle Revolution, welche in der letzten Hälfte des vorigen Jahrhunderts in England vor sich ging, und welche seitdem in allen zivilisierten Ländern der Welt wiederholt hat."

(MEGA, VI, 503).

87. Cf. Lenin, Selected Works, I/1, 12,14 (editor's preface), 23 (Stalin's remarks at Lenin's death), 165-166 (What The Friends of The People Are) and I/11, 90-91 (Two Tactics of Social Democracy in Democratic Revolution). See E.H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, II, 13ff and 385ff, for a discussion of the peasant problem.

and differentiated reality or alienation, unity based upon the advances of the middle condition (Hegel, self-consciousness; Marx, economic harmony or communism). For Marx, humanity alienates itself by sundering itself into two basic classes, one which manages, thinks, enforces efficiency and accumulation, the other which labours and suffers deprivation. As the reserve of surplus production increases, as the means of production improves, the labouring class takes new forms and finally from its position as the modern proletariat as a part of the highly developed and highly socialized capitalistic system, it is able to dispense with the ruling class and take over its functions. Production, technology, and human development is such as to allow this. Hence, Marx's ending of class struggle is not mere apologetic for the socialist revolution, but springs from his presuppositions - however wrong they may be (they overlook the possibility of non-property bases of class conflict - i.e. Bureaucracy).

History, then, in the sense of phenomenal change in human social life, takes the form of class conflict. However, it is not to be forgotten that this is only one half of the story: this conflict and "history" is the effect of the continually changing mode of production which is just as much the true history of mankind. History has two sides inextricably bound together. Further, having located the form and dynamics of social and political history in class conflict, it should not be overlooked that this arises from division of labour in the

broad social sense. The true origin of the movement of history is to be sought in the cause of the division of labour. The exposition of the rise of the division of labour and the resulting dissolution of the primitive community and rise of social conflict is really one of the tasks of the following portion of the thesis; here we can only anticipate the results in order to round out this brief survey of the total concept of history of Marx.

The division of labour comes about because of its efficiency in the production of the needs of life and is thus tied to the development of mankind.⁸⁸ In the preceding summary of the modern period, we saw that the struggles for power were among the contenders for the leadership of society, each claiming to represent the best interests of society. In the following summary of the capitalistic system this efficiency in production is seen to be the role of the capitalists' dominance. In both these instances there is the fact of a function being performed by the dominant class in a divided society, a function from which the whole of society benefits. In the case of technological division of labour it is an axiom of classic economic theory

88. DF (Ideologie), 413(MEGA, V,11): Marx says that the inner organization of a country depends upon its level of development and that each radical increase in the productive power "... hat eine neue Ausbildung der Teilung der Arbeit zur Folge." Further, the division of labour is at the same time a form of property (Ibid.,414). Also, he says that the ending of the division of labour and the advent of communism demands a high level of production (Ibid.,362(24)) and says that for certain stages of industry private property is a necessity (Ibid.,379(56)). All those statements point to the relation of division of labour to productivity which is the basis of communism.

that division of labour increases productivity, leads to exchange and commerce. It will be seen later that original division of labour and exchange comes, according to Marx, from the exchange of different naturally given products. Hence it is a part of the process of the development of the "species man" -- corporate humanity knit together in one whole.

It is clear from what has been said about the human characteristic -- free creativity or labour free from the pressure of needs -- that one of the essentials of such existence is the building up of a surplus of labour products which will supply the needs of man, or at least of a few men who "pioneer" in the human mode of living, and which will allow man to "invest" time and labour in a humanly shaped world which need not yield an immediate return in products, or which may never do so. Certainly this is implicit in Marx's statement that capital was accumulated labour.⁸⁹ Engels said that a surplus product was the basis of all progress and culture.⁹⁰ It is also certain that Marx saw human history as an evolutionary development (punctuated by revolution it is true) with its main source of progress in Western Europe--

89. SW, I, 83 (Wage Labour and Capital); Capital, I, 232. Cf. Capital, I, 54, where he cites the need for a "... specific material groundwork... which can only come into being as the spontaneous outcome of a long and painful process of evolution."

90. Anti-Duehring, 390; cf. 252.

that is to say that he saw that history did not advance evenly on all fronts and that there is an elite segment (see the section to follow on Marx's view of the contemporary world and our conclusions concerning his world view at the close of our study of Asiatic society). In the same way it appears that Marx saw the social division of labour (managerial and owning-class vs. the labouring masses) as a means whereby society enforced the accumulation of a surplus, guided production to its highest level possible at the time, and received the incentive for further progress.⁹¹ In true Hegelian fashion, the whole must sunder itself in order to become truly what it might become.⁹² This separation within the body of society takes a form determined by the technological stage of the times.

Once again can be seen traces of Marx's underlying assumptions and his basic scheme. As in the 1844 Nss, the alienation which occurs in pre-communist society is a means for the development of mankind. Hence, lack of development is the fundamental cause of alienation.

91. Cf. Capital, I, 650-651 and the following section of this chapter (of the thesis (on Capitalism); cf. 352. Cf. also this quotation from The Poverty of Philosophy, 68 (MEGA, VI, 143): "The very moment civilization begins, production begins to be founded on the antagonisms of orders, estates, classes, and finally on the antagonism of accumulated labour and actual labour. No antagonism, no progress. This the law that civilization has followed up to our days. Till now the productive forces have been developed by virtue of this system of class antagonisms."

92. Cf. the previous note (62 of this chapter) on this and also his description of the Roman period in the Philosophy of History (Tral. Sibree; Dover ed.), 278ff.

Capitalism: necessity of it and its place in the development of humanity

1. Introduction.

Marx's historical scheme has been shown: history is the development of humanity by a process of alienation and reappropriation, in which process the alienation is a necessary part of the total development - that is, it lays the foundations for the final phase. Now it is intended to illustrate this by reference to Marx's view of capitalism found in Capital.

Explicitly, it appears most clearly in a statement about the individual capitalist as a personification of capital, his only right to exist:

To this extent only is his own fleeting necessity implied in the fleeting necessity of the capitalist method of production. But so far as he is personified capital, not only use-value and its enjoyment, but also exchange-value and its increase, spur him to action. Fanatically bent upon the expansion of value, he relentlessly drives human beings to production for production's sake, thus bringing about a development of social productivity and the creation of these material conditions of production which can alone form the real basis of a higher type of society, whose fundamental principle is the full and free development of every individual.

... Competition forces him continually to extend his capital for the sake of maintaining it, and he can only extend it by means of progressive accumulation. ...

... Accumulation is a conquest of the world of social wealth. It increases the mass of human material exploited by the capitalist, and thus amplifies his direct and indirect dominion.⁹⁵

Implicitly, it appears in the exposition of the above and of the basic principles of capitalism as seen by Marx.

95. Capital, I, 650-651. Note well that he says the capitalist is merely the personification of capital (cf. also, 138, and the preface, 864).

2. Definition and Formula of Capitalism.

"Expansion of value" is the primary characteristic and function of capitalism.⁹⁴ This is most clearly expressed in the formulae of circulation in simple exchange and in capitalistic exchange. In the former, commodities are exchanged for money with which to buy other commodities; the process is represented as C - M - C. In the latter, money is used to buy commodities which are then sold for money, a pointless operation unless there is an increase in money; this process is represented as M - C - M.⁹⁵ Further, true capitalism involves production; usury and commercial pursuits are not per se, capitalism, even though capitalism may use them and even grow out of them (they are sometimes called antediluvian forms of capital).⁹⁶ These earlier forms gain value merely for the individual, by sharp trading and lending money; value is transferred from one to another, but it is not created. True capitalism must add value to the commodities so that their value when sold exceeds the money used to buy them. The method and pre-suppositions of producing surplus value are the main features of the historical mission of capitalism.

94. Cf. Ibid., 651, 130, 137-138, 232.

95. Cf. Ibid., 131-141

96. Ibid., 150-152; III(Kerr), 696.

3. Certain fundamental conditions and facts of Capitalism.

Before examining the development and functioning of capitalism, there are certain fundamental facts and conditions presupposed.

(a) It presupposes a money economy: products are exchanged for money with which to buy other products, not bartered for each other.⁹⁷ This further implies a development of exchange and commerce, and the existence of a variety of needs and wants.

(b) Exchange necessitates a development of transportation and communication (to bring together varied natural products) and/or development of industry and specialisation of work (to produce a variety of products by labour).⁹⁸

(c) Commodities are the basic unit in capitalistic economy.

A commodity is an object produced for exchange: its use-value cannot be realized until it is in hands other than its producer's. It is an incarnation of exchange value (based upon the expenditure of labour on it) in an object having use-value (based upon specific physical characteristics).⁹⁹

(d) The value expanded is exchange value (though it of necessity is also use-value) and thus the expansion of value is at the same time an increase of the integration of human life. Exchange value is a social factor, determined by the prevailing development of productivity and necessary labour time.¹⁰⁰

97. Ibid., I, 131. 98. Ibid., 555-556. 99. Cf. Ibid., 3-34.

100. Cf. Ibid., 651: "Accumulation is a conquest of the world of social wealth." Also: "... /the relentless search for expansion of value/ thus bringing about a development of social productivity and the creation of those material conditions of production which can alone form the basis of a higher type of society..."

(e) Marx continues to use a Feuerbachian scheme of depicting human development and alienation. Man's concrete, real life, is alienated or projected into an abstract in human forms which is man's "god"—money. Marx shows how the social relation between men (exchange of products for their needs) is masked by the form of exchange of commodities with money as the objectification of their values.¹⁰¹ He directly relates this to religion:

We are concerned only with a definite social relation between human beings, which, in their eyes, has here assumed the semblance of a relation between things. To find an analogy, we must enter the nebulous world of religion. In that world, the products of the human mind become independent shapes, endowed with lives of their own, and able to enter into relations with men and women. The products of the human hand do the same thing in the world of commodities. He calls this a "fetishistic character" of products becoming commodities. ... The foregoing analysis has shown that this fetishistic character of the world of commodities is the outcome of the peculiar social quality of the labour which produces commodities.¹⁰²

Here then Marx relates his mature critique to his 1844 Man study, and its Feuerbachian structure. Only free men conducting their affairs consciously, will bring this alienation—this "religious" situation to an end:

The life process of society, this meaning the material process of production, will not lose its veil of mystery until it becomes a process carried on by a free association of producers, under their conscious and purposive control. For this, however, an indispensable requisite is that there should exist a specific material groundwork (or a series of material conditions of existence) which can only come into being as the spontaneous outcome of a long and painful process of evolution.¹⁰³

101. Ibid., 45, 49; cf. 43-58. 102. Ibid., 45-46.

103. Ibid., 54; cf. R.C. Tucker, Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx, 205.

Immature man must overcome his alienation by taking command of his collective life: this is possible only after a historical development of human powers of production within the framework of alienation. Again we see the consistency of Marx and the nature of his philosophy of history-- the emergence of man by returning to himself.

4. Labour as a Source of Surplus Value.

The increase in value occurring in M-C-M is based upon the fact that labour is one of the commodities (C) bought with money, and that its use-value is to create value (both use-value and exchange-value: the former arising from its specific skills, the latter from sheer quantity).¹⁰⁴ When it is used under certain conditions it will produce more value than it costs: it can produce more than is required to provide its subsistence and reproduction. By always getting more value from labour than it cost him, the capitalist assures himself of a gain in value. The ability of capitalism to secure the surplus value and its superior methods of doing so mark it as a necessary and culminating phase of man's development toward "human" life.¹⁰⁵

5. Capitalism's Position and Method.

(a) Labour must be for sale in the capitalist economy: the worker can neither be bound to the soil or the workshop as in

104. Ibid., 153-154. 105. Ibid., 352, 650-651.

slavery and serfdom (or primitive communities) nor be self-sufficient as are independent peasants and handicraftsmen. Therefore it is necessary to have a body of workers who either have no means of production of their own or whose condition would be bettered if they sold their labour to the capitalist.¹⁰⁶

(b) This condition means more than merely a supply of labour, important as that is; it means that there is a differentiation of the constituent elements of the productive process. The means of production are controlled by the capitalist, hence manipulated to his ends; labour likewise is not its own master, but once bought, it is under the control of the capitalist (before trade unions): the theoretical element of production is entirely in the hands of the capitalist while the mass of labourers are a passive source of human labour power.¹⁰⁷ This brings about, among other things, enforced co-operation in the process of production and enforced specialization with its increased productivity.

(c) Once in control of production, what possibilities are open to the capitalist for increasing the production of surplus value? There are two possibilities: (1) by coercion he may increase the length of the working day, thus extending the time available for producing surplus value - hence giving what Marx calls

106. Ibid., 154-156; cf. SW, I, 85 (Wage Labour and Capital).

107. Capital, I, 381-382; 346-352.

absolute surplus value, or (2) by reducing the cost of producing the price of labour, by increasing the productivity of labour in producing means of subsistence (and also the means of production - component parts) - hence changing the relative proportions of the components of the working day - or relative surplus value.¹⁰⁸ The concrete means of increasing relative surplus value are seen in the following descriptions of capitalist production as it develops.

(d) Development of Capitalism (1).

The first stage of the development of the capitalistic method of production was the development of the labour forces by division of labour and co-operation in the manufacturing type of production. This method of production allows greater proficiency by each worker in his task, increasing productivity, stimulating the spirits of workers, developing and making available the totality of talents inherent in the species. At the same time it allows the subject matter of labour to be arranged economically (spatially) according to the demands of the process and allows the productive activity to be limited to what is essential by virtue of the single source of management.¹⁰⁹ (Here are seen the advantages, - in fact the necessity - of two features of capitalistic society: (a) mobility and dependence of the workers so that they can be concentrated where needed; (b) the managerial monopoly of the capitalist.)¹¹⁰

108. Ibid., 328

109. Ibid., 344-345; cf. 336-352.

110. Cf. Ibid., 382.

In manufactures, handicraftsmanship is still the basis of production. Either labour is minutely divided into the constituent motions of the task, or a variety of tasks are assembled together in one organic process: in either case there is an increase in the efficiency of production and of management and the worker becomes a part of an organic process.¹¹¹ Hence the dominant fact is the development of human productivity by arrangement and management (which occurs in other societies as well, but not in the same historical situation): the manufacturing phase of capitalism is marked by a revolution in labour power.¹¹² (As in all history, Marx sees a double-edged nature to this development: it stunts the worker, robs him of the theoretical and scientific share in life - a vital "human" element and at the same time it is a human advance.¹¹³)

(e) Development of Capitalism (2) - machinery

The final phase of capitalism is that of large-scale industry marked by machines: it is fundamentally a revolution in the instruments of labour.¹¹⁴ The basis of handicrafts is the use of tools which are extensions of the human body which is itself the source of power; machine manufacture is based upon machinery which is made up of: (a) a source of power whether animal, natural forces or a motor, (b) the transmission of the

111. Ibid., 355-357.

112. Ibid., 391.

113. Ibid., 382, 386.

114. Ibid., 391; cf. 506, 508.

power, (c) a tool to perform the task at hand.¹¹⁵ In this situation the release of productivity is due to overcoming the limitations of the individual human being, allowing a number of simultaneous operations.¹¹⁶ The fully developed system of machinery becomes an objective organism (of which the worker is an appendage) which utilises co-operative labour - in fact demands such labour.¹¹⁷ Thus we see that the means of production shapes the character of labour, bringing about a new form of its social nature. This in turn - this new means, machinery - depends upon man's development of natural science.¹¹⁸

The machine itself is a product of labour - stored labour - and must replace more labour than it costs, to be profitable. Its use (in capitalism) is not for the purpose of lightening human work¹¹⁹ but to increase the amount of goods produced, increasing the surplus value (though the actual price goes down, the volume increases the total value).¹²⁰

The use of machinery increases the amount of human material for exploitation by making possible the employment of women and children; it extends the working day; it intensifies productivity and the degree of exploitation of labour.¹²¹ It thus extends

115. Ibid., 393-394.

116. Ibid., 394-395.

117. Ibid., 408-409.

118. Ibid., 410.

119. Ibid., 391, 417 note 1.

120. Cf. Ibid., 409ff, for whole paragraph.

121. Cf. the summary on Ibid., 447 and also the preceding pages.

man's use and control of nature. At the same time it drains the activity of the workers of all skill and development in its capitalistic employment.¹²²

Manufacture, with its increase in products and markets created demands for products beyond its productivity, thus necessitating or facilitating the development of manufacture. In the same way, the large-scale industry of the machine age brings about certain changes in the total life of societies in pursuing the principle of expanding value which rules the capitalistic system. For this expansion to occur, the commodities must be sold for money - increased money (M') and this can only happen by (1) expanding markets and (2) competitively cutting prices. Therefore modern industry requires revolutionized transportation and communication which reaches into all the corners of the earth, flooding the markets with its goods, thus depriving local industry of its markets and the labourers of their self-sufficiency - hence supplying mere labour for capitalism's productive process.¹²³ Further it promotes the competition between various capitalists which increases the level of productivity and the degree of centralization (as they fail). This issues in the increased use of machinery, the increased development of centralization of control, increased volume of goods.¹²⁴

122. Ibid., 477ff; 451-452; 458.

123. Ibid., 123, 406, 845-846; cf. similar material in the Manifesto.

124. Cf. Ibid., 506ff.

6. The End of Capitalism.

Section 7 of chapter twenty-four of Capital contains the justification of the capitalist expropriation of the peasant and the ruination of petty industry which was, however, "... an indispensable condition for the development of social production and of the free individuality of the worker."¹²⁵

However;

Just as it excludes concentration of these means into a few hands, so does it exclude co-operation, the division of labour within the process of production, the social mastery and regulation of the forces of nature, the free development of the social energies of production.¹²⁶

It is unable to expand productivity adequately and the demand that it has created by its own contribution brings forth capitalism which destroys it by various means. When capitalism is well established it finds that it cannot give the further socialization of economic life which is demanded by the very process of industry itself. Then it is the owning class that is expropriated, by means of the immanent laws of capitalism: centralization of capital, socialization of the process of production, unification of the economic life of the world, diminution of the number of actual owners-- all accompanied by an increase of poverty, oppression and enslavement of the workers:

... but at the same time there is a steady intensification of the wrath of the working class, a class which grows ever more numerous, and is disciplined, unified, and organized by the very mechanism of the capitalist method of production.¹²⁷

125. Ibid., 844.

126. Ibid.

127. Ibid., 846.

Capitalist monopoly is then:

... a fetter upon the method of production which has flourished with it and under it. The centralization of the means of production and the socialization of labour reach a point where they prove incompatible with their capitalist husk. This bursts asunder. The knell of capitalist private property sounds. The expropriators are expropriated.¹²⁸

The new order does not re-establish petty private property based upon individual labour, but does "... re-establish individual property upon the basis of the acquisitions of the capitalist era; i.e. on co-operation and the common ownership of the land and of the means of production (which labour itself produces)."¹²⁹ Here one can see how Marx's final solution of history is drawn out of the movement of history itself and the evil aspects of history are a part of the whole necessary course of history.

Just as with the theme of Capital throughout, so here, the historical development of human productivity and its consequences plays the chief role. The forms of society-- economic systems and political systems--these are all subject to the pressure exerted by the social process of industry as it develops. This tendency toward socialization in its actual workings and its failure to provide continuous employment or livable wages both work together toward a communistic transformation which is possible because of the unification of the working class and its discipline, as well as the decrease of the number of capitalists.

128. Ibid.

129. Ibid.

Revolution

It has often been implied that Marx was a revolutionist who sought to justify his revolution, and also, that his economic studies were to justify the failure of the revolution when first anticipated.¹³⁰ It is further stated that the concept of primitive communism is a mythical one which gives motive power to those who struggle for revolution and communism.¹³¹ This does not appear to us to be a true representation of Marxism. First, Marx accepted the ideal of communism only after he had integrated it with his philosophical system (as seen in chapter II and III). Further, revolution is seen to be an integral part of the system of development which Marx found in Feuerbach's philosophy of religion (and reinforced from Hegel) and is a necessary consequence of finding essential human reality in the economic process while the political sphere represents the "heavenly" or "religiously" alienated sphere of life which must be abolished or transcended by the affirmation of man himself. Revolution has an integral place in the process of history - it is the final transformation at the end of a long process of evolution of the basic human world of technology and economics. It presupposes this

130. Cf. Leonard Krieger, "Marx and Engels as Historians", Journal of History of Ideas, XIV (1953), 381ff.

131. See Helmut Krause, Marx und Engels und das zeitgenössische Russland, 102; cf. H.-H. Schrey, "Geschichte oder Mythos bei Marx und Lenin", Marxismusstudien (1954), 145ff.

development - as was seen in the exposition of the 1843 introduction to a critique of Hegel; at this time, Marx also saw that philosophy - a science - must assist the revolution by making clear to men what their situation is. Revolution is not a mechanistic inevitability (though its pre-conditions are); it is a human act, and as such it must be at the appropriate time and must be properly guided and cultivated. This means that theory must realize the needs of the people - hence there must be certain conditions and there must be an awareness of these on the part of the people who must be rallied for the final act of history.

This evaluation of Revolution means that the economic studies of Marx were in the service of it, to aid it and to justify it in the eyes of the workers, and to enable the leadership of the proletariat to be most effective. Bourgeois ideology conceived of capitalism as being an eternal order which could not, or should not, be changed while Marx sought to show that this was not so, that capitalism was only one of several economic forms which followed a primitive communism, and that capitalism itself was in a state of development toward a modern form of communism. Speaking of bourgeois economic theory, he says:

When the economists say that present-day relations - the relations of bourgeois production - are natural, they imply that these are the relations in which wealth is created and productive forces developed in conformity with the laws of nature. These relations therefore are themselves natural laws independent of the influence of time. They are eternal laws which must always govern society. Thus there has been history, but

there is no longer any. There has been history, since there were the institutions of feudalism, and in these institutions of feudalism we find quite different relations of production from those of bourgeois society, which the economists try to pass off as natural and as such, eternal.¹³²

When conditions were right (full development of productive powers under capitalism and sufficient poverty to raise the revolutionary temper) and the masses sufficiently informed and ably led, this new communism would be inaugurated by revolution. Hence, for the informing of the masses and the leaders, for creating an acceptance of the possibility of revolutionary social change and defending this possibility, economic study was indispensable.

It should be emphasized that much of Marxism's mention of primitive communism is in the function of an apologetic for the possibility of social change or an attack on current theory, not for the future communist forms of society.¹³³

132. Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy, 135 (MEGA, VI, 188); cf. 122-123 (179-180), 128-135 (183-188). See also his remark in the letter to Annenkov, 28/12/46: "None of them understands that the bourgeois form of production is historical and transitory, just as the feudal form was." (Ibid., 213) The Manifesto emphasizes the historical nature of capitalism, though it does not mention the bourgeois habit of viewing it as eternal (cf. SW, I, 34ff.). In the prefaces to Capital Marx both writes and quotes a reviewer, to the effect that Capital seeks to find the law of the economic movement of capitalist society (Capital, I, 863, 864, 871-873). See also his contrasting of the mystified commodity world of bourgeois economics with various other historical systems (Ibid., 50ff) and his remark about bourgeois economic categories (Ibid., 55, 56, and in the footnotes). Cf. Anti-Duehring, 369ff.

133. Cf. references in 132 in general, and particularly: Anti-Duehring, 242-245; 222-226; 204-205; 428-429. See also Lenin, Selected Works, I/1, 134; II/1, 203-206.

This latter is most often deduced from the nature and development of capitalistic society and in this is fully consistent with Marx's asserted principle of developing the future from the whole process of development.¹³⁴

Marx's conception of the world situation

For Marx the world is in movement, heading in the direction of civilization--Western industrial civilization. This movement is universal but not simultaneous nor always indigenous: Western Europe, led by Britain, is the forerunner in whose wake the rest of the world follows. In the Manifesto all this is presented very concisely.¹³⁵

From the serfs of Western Europe sprang the burghers, from whom came the first elements of the bourgeoisie. Their rise was accelerated by the discovery of America and the opening of the Eastern trade routes which greatly expanded trade and stimulated production, replacing the guild system with the manufacturing system. Continued growth caused the development of steam and machinery and Modern Industry. Now with modern industry, the World Market has been established - for the discovery of America paved the way - which has in turn further stimulated the development of commerce, navigation, communication by land. Due to the need for expanding markets

134. Cf. Capital, I, 844-847; Anti-Duehring, 369-395; Lenin, Selected Works, I/1, 134-149 (What the Friends of the People Are) in which he attacks the abstract triadic representation of Marx and its inevitable view of history; II/1, 243-244, 294-306 (State and Revolution).

135. SW, I, 35ff.

and new sources of raw materials the bourgeoisie is driven over the entire globe, drawing it completely into its net of trade, communication, and the universal interdependence of nations in things material and intellectual. By its cheap products, due to revolutionized means of production, it forces its way into all lands, introducing its civilization, creating them in its own image. In all lands it concentrates people in the cities, makes the country dependent on the town, concentrates property, concentrates control of economy.

The universal interdependence of the world, and man's subjection of nature to his own use is the mark of this bourgeois period. This was explicitly stated in the article in the New York Daily Tribune of August 8, 1853. These achievements of the bourgeois period will be mastered by a great social revolution, which, when it has subjected them to the "... common control of the most advanced peoples"¹³⁶ will humanize the system so that it does not thrive on the oppression of peoples as now. Thus, even in the interdependent and unified world there are the dominant and more advanced nations.

As opposed to the West, Asia represents an undeveloped and uncivilized barbarian area which is forcibly being drawn into the new world of trade and production--or civilization. This is accomplished by the rapid improvement of the instruments of production and transportation which allows floods of cheap

136. Ibid., 324.

commodities to force open the doors of Asia, and draw it into the nets of civilisation: "The cheap prices of the commodities are the heavy artillery with which it batters down all Chinese walls, with which it forces the barbarians' intensely obstinate hatred of foreigners to capitulate."¹³⁷ And just as it has made the country dependent on the city, "... so it has made barbarian and semi-barbarian countries dependent on the civilized ones, nations of peasants on nations of bourgeois, the East on the West."¹

Under Britain's leadership, France, certain districts of Germany and Western Europe, and the United States of America are forging ahead in progress. Industrial progress has called forth political progress toward democracy and freedom. Counter to Western Europe and its struggle between democracy and the old regime is Russia: half Western, half Asiatic, and thoroughly reactionary. Ever since the Russian intervention in the Hungarian revolution of 1849 Marx and Engels had depicted Russia as the bulwark of reaction opposed to the revolutionary movement of the West which was to complete the whole modern

137. Ibid., 36.

138. Ibid., 37.

era of progress and the whole movement of Western civilization.¹³⁹
Russia's objective was to expand and consolidate her position
by securing ports, all Slavic areas, and the Dardanelles and
Bosphorus.¹⁴⁰

The latter area is important because of British trade with
India, China and Persia and in its attempts to penetrate Central
Asia. For Marx and Engels trade and industry are civilization
and the extension of British and Western industrial trade into
India, China, and central Asia are the means of civilizing

139. Cf. Krause, op. cit., 13; cf. SW, I, 25 (1832 Preface to the Russian Edition of the Manifesto); 346, 349 ("Inaugural Address of the W.H.I.A."); 444 (The Civil War in France); 449, 450 (same, a second address); SW, II, 303 (Engels, "Marx and the Neue Rheinische Zeitung"); Marx, Engels, The Eastern Question, 220 (an article in the New York Tribune of February 2, 1854). See also the following for expressions of Marx's general anti-Russian viewpoint which placed him in opposition to much of contemporary British diplomacy: Secret Diplomatic History of The Eighteenth Century; Palmerston: What Has He Done?; Palmerston and Russia; The Story of The Life of Lord Palmerston; the many articles in The Eastern Question and The Russian Menace to Europe. Later it appears that Marx became more friendly toward the Russian people and studied the contemporary situation in Russia, exhibiting a restrained appreciation for the mir or village community: see E.H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, II, 388-390.

It should be remembered that Marx was not alone in the dislike of Russia, and, allowing for a certain historical and geo-political nomen, was no prophet of contemporary events as the editors of The Russian Menace to Europe imply he was. He said, in a letter to Lassalle, of May, 1860, that he was of the same opinion as David Urquhart, a powerful anti-Russian figure (Marx and Lassalle, Nachlassene Briefe und Schriften, Bd. III: Der Briefwechsel Zwischen Lassalle und Marx (ed. Mayer), 310-311.)

140. See Marx and Engels, The Eastern Question, 74-75; 35; 14-19.

them.¹⁴¹ Much of this trade must go through Turkey, for Constantinople is the bridge to the East.¹⁴² The contest with Russia is more than a national one - it is a revolutionary one.

An additional access to the Pacific area of Asia is seen through the American development of the west coast of the North American Continent, its transcontinental railways, and the Panama Canal (as was the Suez Canal a means of access to Asia).¹⁴³

Due to interconnections of trade and the delicate balance of the business world, Marx often made a case for the power of events in the East to touch off a crisis and thus a revolution at home.¹⁴⁴ Further, at least once, he raised the question of the effect of a repentant bourgeois East on the revolutionary West.¹⁴⁵ In any event he felt that Asia, while a backward area, must be transformed; he asks: "... can mankind fulfil its destiny without a fundamental revolution in the social state of Asia?"¹⁴⁶ His answer is no, and he justifies thereby the worse forms of oppression of the Eastern peoples by the bourgeois

141. Ibid., 14-17.

142. Marx and Engels, The Russian Menace to Europe (ed. Blackstock and Hoselitz), 168-169; The Eastern Question, 14ff.

143. Marx and Engels, The Russian Menace to Europe, 175.

144. Marx, Marx on China (ed. by Torr), 1-7, 8.

145. Ibid., xviii (a quote from a letter of Marx to Engels, 8/10/58).

146. SW, I, 317.

capitalism as it uproots the ancient societies.

From this brief survey we can see the dynamic concept of world history which Marx used and we can see that he did not hold a formalized and stereotyped view of universal progress as proceeding evenly in all areas. His system is concerned with a particular movement of history in Western Europe; while it is not indigenous to all the world, it is imposing itself on all the world. It is on the basis of this dynamic reality of Western capitalistic life that Marx supposes that he has the key to world history, because it will make all the world like itself whatever the various origins may have been.

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CHAPTER V

PRIMITIVE SOCIETY IN MARX'S WRITINGS

We have outlined Marx's mature philosophy of history and have found that, as in 1844, history is the process of man's development by means of objectifying and alienating himself, then of repossessing himself. More concretely, this is the economic and social process by which man develops his powers and his dominion over nature and the control of the conditions of his life (natural and social): this takes a form of alienation of man (labour, products, exchange activity) because of the immature condition of man's life and productive capacity--necessitating forced accumulation, minority control of affairs, the motivation of self-gain and labour for existence. We have seen that this alienation has a positive part to play in the whole process of human development, a conclusion which is borne out by his Hegelian inheritance and by his explicit statements in his early work and in his mature works.

This preceding study leads us to the conclusion that primitive society was at best a germinal form of human life,

that it had an ideal form of society on the basis of a non-human mode of productive life (a productive life that, however, contained certain "human" traits, as in the all-round development of the individual and the use of his products). Therefore, the dissolution of this society by the division of labour and private property can only be considered an advance, a necessary step in the full development of man. In order to confirm this we now turn to the writings of Marx and Engels on primitive society, in the order of their writing. In this examination of the concept of primitive society and the dissolution of it, it will become clear that Marx and Engels were faithful to their system and saw primitive life as merely the starting point of man's development by alienation and reappropriation.

The discussion will be directed toward the conception of primitive society entertained by Marx and Engels, the nature of its dissolution and its consequences, and the evaluation which they made of primitive society and primitive communism.

1.

Primitive Society in Marx's Writings Prior to 1845

Prior to the Ideologie of 1845 Marx wrote no extended account of primitive society. In the 1844 Mss we have seen that he approached the question of an explicit scheme of history but did not develop it, and that his thought was already historically oriented. However, there are only

a few references to primitive society as such.

In an article published in the Koelnische Zeitung, August, 1842, Marx attacked the historical school of law founded by Hugo and represented by Savigny, Stahl, Haller, Leo, and others of that day. He goes back to Hugo's foundations in the 18th C. Enlightenment and in natural law, which held the fiction of a "natural man" possessing the true human nature. In the romantic movement this belief was expressed in the glorification of primitive or savage peoples which recognized a primitive wisdom in them. According to Marx the correct view is "... dass die rohen Zustaeude naive niederlaendische Gemaelde der wahren Zustaeude sind."¹ In the Einleitung to the critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right (published in 1843) he follows this same thought in ridiculing the Germanic search for the history of freedom in the ancient German forests: the forests only echo the voice directed into them.

Wodurch unterscheidet sich aber unsere Freiheitsgeschichte von der Freiheitsgeschichte des Ebers, wenn sie nur in den Waeldern zu finden ist? Zudem ist es bekannt: Wie man hineinschreit in den Wald, schallt es heraus aus dem Wald. Also Friede den teutonischen Urwaeldern!²

Similarly in the 1844 Mes he rejects the use of primordial fictions which merely assume that which is to be explained-- as does theology in its story of the "fall".³

In the 1844 Mes Marx generally speaks negatively of primitive society. Communism is the fulfilment of history

1. MEGA, I, 251, Cf. S. Hook, From Hegel to Marx, 142-144.

2. DF, 210 (MEGA, I/1, 609). 3. MEGA, III, 82 (English edition, 68)

(and is based upon the full development of man): it cannot rest upon some past section of history for its proof.⁴ A communism which seeks to negate civilization and return to a simple undemanding state is a still immature communism.⁵ In only one instance is the primitive condition depicted as a superior condition to alienated modern life. He observes that in the modern estrangement, man loses the situation which Aeschylus' Prometheus had said made the savage into a human being: men are losing "a dwelling in the light" and regressing to cave dwellings (basements), though contaminated by civilization's plague.⁶ Later he says that in nature the cave dweller at least feels at home in a natural element, while modern man knows his "home" as a hostile dwelling, sucking his blood and sweat, and belonging to another.⁷

In the notes on Mill written at this time, there are a few statements concerning the economic nature of primitive life.

Der Mensch, fuer sich--in wilden, barbarischen Zustand-- hat daher das Masse seiner Production an dem Umfang seines unmittelbaren Beduerfnisses, dessen Inhalt unmittelbar der produzierte Gegenstand selbst ist.⁸

Primitive life is animal life: production is based upon immediate need and immediate consumption. This condition

4. DF, 236(M. 114; E. 102). 5. Ibid., 234(M. 112; E. 100).

6. Ibid., 256(M. 128; E. 117).

7. Ibid., 266(M. 135-136; E. 125).

8. MEGA, III, 543.

precludes a "human" life as defined elsewhere in the 1844 Man (see Chapter 3). So soon as exchange takes place (itself a development of "species-life"--making available the products of the whole range of nature and human talent), this situation ends and surplus production for exchange takes place--in which production for the satisfaction of immediate needs also ends. The productive act is directed toward possession of goods, not the meeting of needs.⁹ In these statements is seen the necessary disruption of a peaceful primitive state in order to develop the truly "human" state.

ii.

Primitive Society in the Deutsche Ideologie (1845).

Marx presents considerably more material on primitive society in the Deutsche Ideologie of 1845 than in the 1844 Man. Yet even this is not a systematic treatise on the subject: its material on primitive society is scattered and often mingled with non-historical material. In addition, the editors of MEGA have confused matters by inserting some concrete historical material into a more abstract and generalized scheme which appears to be based on modern conditions. Before proceeding to the content of the material itself, its context should be noted.

The Ideologie as a whole is a polemic in three parts against the Left-Hegelians, L. Feuerbach, the Bauer brothers, and Max Stirner, of which we are concerned only with that

9. Ibid.

against Feuerbach. Marx is largely concerned to attack their acceptance of Hegelian methodology which allows them to stay in the realm of consciousness and to construct arbitrary systems: they should realize the dependence of consciousness and all ideology (religion, morals, jurisprudence, etc.) upon the actual conditions of life and should write history on the basis of a materialist philosophy of history.¹⁰ He begins by outlining his philosophy of history and historical writing, mingling with it various criticisms, as well as expositions of his view of communism. As the manuscript is printed in Landshut's edition, there are considerable breaks in its continuity but also there is revealed its original structure. The striking fact is that the most concrete section on primitive, slaveholding, and feudal forms of property is placed at the end where it stands alone and incomplete.¹¹ In the MEGA edition this section was placed in the opening pages in the midst of a discussion of the human characteristic of labour and the effect of its manner on the relations of men, which two together determine consciousness.¹² After several pages of discussion of the relation of ideology to reality, a section of non-historical aspects of the historical process is inserted into the material--admittedly in a break in the manuscript. However, this section speaks of "Die erste

10. DF, 344-346 (MEGA, V, 8-10).

11. Ibid., 413-417.

12. MEGA, V, 11-15.

geschichtliche Tat..." (satisfaction of needs), "Das Zweite..." (creation of more needs), "Das dritte Verhaeltniss, was hier gleich von vornherein in die geschichtliche Entwicklung eintritt..." (reproduction)--after which he makes it clear that these refer to "drei Seiten" or "Momente", not "drei verschiedene Stufen" and have existed in all history.¹³ He then adds a fourth, the social relation or co-operation, after which he adds consciousness¹⁴ and then following a discussion of crude forms of consciousness and the corresponding primitive forms of human life¹⁵ he discusses the conflict of the various factors, the formation of the state and the slavery of the individual to the division of labour.¹⁶

By inserting the concrete historical scheme in this more abstract and non-historical material, a false impression of their unity is created, which leads to imputing the characteristics of modern society to the dissolution of the primitive order and introducing the primitive society into the discussion of abstract principles.

The material on primitive society is to be found in the final section as given in the Landslut edition,¹⁷ in the statements scattered through the text, and in the description of primitive life in connection with the development of consciousness.¹⁸

13. DE, 354-356 (MEGA, V, 17-19). 14. Ibid., 356(19).

15. Ibid., 356-358(19-21).

16. Ibid., 358-361(21-23).

17. Ibid., 413-417(11-15).

18. Ibid., 357-358(20-21).

The primitive society discussed by Marx is the tribal society based upon hunting and fishing, pastoral, or agricultural life, and presupposes a large expanse of undeveloped land.¹⁹ The family and the tribe are the social forms of it:

Die gesellschaftliche Gliederung beschränkt sich daher auf eine Ausdehnung der Familie: patriarchalische Stammhaupter, unter ihnen die Stammglieder, endlich Sklaven.²⁰

At this time Marx had no indication of a pre-family state of human existence (which he later accepted, as did Engels): the family is the oldest form of human existence ("... die um Anfänge das einsige soziale Verhaeltnis ist..."²¹) and forms the basis of the tribe. This concept was held by Rousseau and Hegel.²² Each family has its own dwelling, and in agricultural communities, does its own work.²³ The family originates in the third of the basic aspects of human life - reproduction.²⁴

19. Ibid., 414(11-12).

20. Ibid., 414(12).

21. Ibid., 355(18).

22. Cf. J.J. Rousseau, Contrat Social, chapter 2, and Hegel's Philosophy of Right (Knox), PP238,255, 307(pp.148; 154; 281, note 157). A comparison of page and line descriptions of Marx's reading excerpts of 1843 with Contrat Social shows that he copied: "La plus ancienne de toutes les societies et la seule naturelle est celle de la famille..." (See MEGA, Abt. I, B4I/2, 120 and the E. Dreyfus-Brisac edition of Contrat Social (Paris, 1896), 11.)

Cf. also, H. Cunow, Die Marxsche Geschichtes-Gesellschafts-und Staatstheorie, II, 82-83. Cunow says that Marx held this view until 1878-79 when he came upon Morgan's work. He makes the point, however, that Marx saw various types of families, and saw exchange originating between groups, not between individuals, as did Hegel: cf. Ibid., 94-96.

23. DE, 393(MEGA, V, 51).

24. Ibid., 355(18).

Even in the simple, undeveloped economic life of these people there are latent forms of slavery and division of labour, which later develop into the social evils. The women and children are "owned" by the man.²⁵ Labour was originally divided naturally as

... die Teilung der Arbeit im Geschlechtsakt, dann Teilung der Arbeit, die sich vermoege der natuerlichen Anlage (zum Beispiel Koerperkraft), Beduerfnisse, Zufaele etc., etc. von selbst oder "naturwuechsig" macht.²⁶

However, these are very little developed and correspond to the undeveloped state of production.

This simple undeveloped mode of life is marked by a restricted relation of men to each other and to nature--a relation which Marx terms "animal" (tierisch). In his discussion of the development of consciousness, Marx says that while it is a social product which the animals do not know, it is at first mere sensuous awareness of others and of environment ("... bloss sinnliches Bewusstsein ueber die naechste sinnliche Umgebung und Bewusstsein des bornierten Zusammenhanges mit anderen Personen und Dingen dem sich bewusst werdenden Individuum").²⁷ It is the consciousness of nature, which at first is

... als eine durchaus fremde, allmaechtige und unangreifbare Macht gegenuebertritt, zu der sich die Menschen rein tierisch verhalten, von der sie sich imponieren lassen wie das Vieh, und also ein rein

25. Cf. Ibid., 414(12); 359(22).

26. Ibid., 358(20-21); cf. 414(12); 359(22).

27. Ibid., 357(20).

tierisches Bewusstsein der Natur (Natur-religion)
eben weil die Natur noch kaum geschichtlich
modifiziert ist...²⁸

In this crude form of consciousness, man is distinguished from the animals only by having conscious instincts. The restricted relation to nature determines the restricted social relation:

Man sieht hier sogleich--diese Naturreligion oder dieses bestimmte Verhalten zur Natur ist bedingt durch die Gesellschaftsform und umgekehrt. Hier wie ueberall tritt die Identitaet von Natur und Mensch noch so hervor, dass das bornierte Verhalten der Menschen zur Natur ihr borniertes Verhalten zueinander, und ihr borniertes Verhalten zueinander ihr borniertes Verhaeltnis zur Natur bedingt.²⁹

There are none of the human characteristics of man which were discussed in the 1844 Mss: mastery over nature, and wilful, conscious activity for its own sake.

It is clear that at this time, on the one hand, Marx has no elaborate concept of primitive society, and on the other hand, he has no illusions or romantic notions about it. He has taken over the current concepts--except for a greater stress on the social nature of it (though still using the single family unit). Most important for us, he terms this existence an animal existence and shows ^{how} lack of technological and economic development and restricted human relations go hand in hand: the degree of social interrelation is dependent upon the degree of man's development of his relation to nature--is thus a human development.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.

The Dissolution of This Primitive Society.

The ultimate source of growth and decay in the primitive society appears to be the natural growth of population and the increase of needs by this; by the multiplication of needs by the productive activity; by war; and by commerce. Hence he says that the latent slavery is developed "... erst allmählich mit der Vermehrung der Bevölkerung und der Bedürfnisse und mit der Ausdehnung des äusseren Verkehrs, sowohl des Kriegs wie des Tauschhandels."³⁰ The incipient division of labour and consciousness are developed further,

... durch die gesteigerte Produktivität, die Vermehrung der Bedürfnisse und die beiden zugrunde liegende Vermehrung der Bevölkerung. Damit entwickelt sich die Teilung der Arbeit, die ursprünglich nichts war als die Teilung der Arbeit im Geschlechtsakt.../and then by natural abilities/³¹

Also the division of labour is said to rest upon the opposition or clash of families (not, of individuals who specialise and then exchange their products!)³²

The next form of society, "das Antike Gemeinde- und Staatsigentum" originates out of the unification of several tribes in a city, either by war or treaty, and continues by virtue of the necessity of a communal force over against the power of the slaves.³³ Hence he speaks of a "gemeinschaftliche Privateigentum der aktiven Staatsbürger".³⁴ Mobile private property and later, immobile private property developed as an

30. Ibid., 414(12). 31. Ibid., 358(20).

32. Ibid., 359(22). 33. Ibid., 414(12). 34. Ibid.

abnormal form, subordinate to the community property (Gemeindeeigentum). The division of labour develops: it is to be noted that Marx mentions the city versus the country, later in the cities, the sea trade versus industry, and the burger versus slave, antagonisms in this connection.³⁵ It should be noted that in the feudal system he mentions a very low development of the division of labour with handicrafts, and again shows the class division of labour;³⁶ this is in contrast to the description given in the opening sections of the manuscript, which must surely be based upon modern society.³⁷ This shows that Marx thought division of labour did not originate in the form mentioned in the earlier portion of the manuscript-- within the community, but that it originated between town and country, and then within the town between commercial and manufacturing (or handicraft). Further it arose from natural beginnings which were developed by the natural increase in the population and the gradual development of production and its consequences, and war.

In conclusion, it should be remembered that Marx related the development of the division of labour to the development of man. We remember that he had already related the degree of

35. Ibid., 415(12).

36. Ibid., 416(14).

37. Cf., for example, his discussion of the results of specialisation of labour, and the tyranny over men of their own work, in Ibid., 361(22).

development of man's relation to nature to the degree of development of men to each other. He further relates every advance in productivity to an advance in the division of labour.

Die Beziehungen verschiedener Nationen untereinander haengen davon ab, wie weit jede von ihnen ihre Produktivkraefte, die Teilung der Arbeit und den inneren Verkehr entwickelt hat. Dieser Satz ist allgemein anerkannt. Aber nicht nur die Beziehung einer Nation zur anderen, sondern auch die ganze innere Gliederung dieser Nation selbst haengt von der Entwicklungsstufe ihrer Produktion und ihres inneren und aeuesseren Verkehrs ab. Wie weit die Produktionskraefte einer Nation entwickelt sind, zeigt am augenscheinlichsten der Grad bis zu dem Teilung der Arbeit entwickelt ist. Jede neue Produktivkraft, sofern sie nicht eine bloss quantitative Ausdehnung der bisher schon bekannten Produktivkraefte ist (z.B. Urbarmachung von Laendereien), hat eine neue Ausbildung der Teilung der Arbeit zur Folge.³⁸

In summary, we conclude that Marx saw no glorious primitive state of man, but rather an undeveloped animal state, unworthy of being called human, in which man was at the mercy of nature and was relatively isolated from other men. This society decays as man advances in his production and exchange, because of certain incipient forms such as slavery and division of labour, which forms offer more productive modes of existence. Thus the degree of division of labour indicates the development of mankind and increases as civilisation advances, just as surely as it indicates the intensity of class conflict.

38. Ibid., 413(11).

Grundrisse: 1857-1858.

After the reading in the early 1850's on the subject³⁹ it is not surprising that Marx's next description of primitive society was much more complex. In 1857-1858 he wrote a rough draft of his future work, and included a section on primitive society. This manuscript was not published until 1939 when it appeared in Moscow as Grundrisse der Kritik der Politischen Oekonomie.⁴⁰

In this writing Marx is distinguishing primitive forms of society from both slavery and serfdom on the one hand and from the capitalist system on the other. His main emphasis is upon the contrast between the free workers in the capitalist system who have no means of labour or materials of labour - who must work for the capitalist - and the workers who are united with their conditions of labour in the various forms of primitive society - are in fact owners in some sense.⁴¹ For capitalist society to exist, the workers must be "free" from their conditions of labour. (However, it should be clear

39. The "Inventar des Marx-Engels-Nachlasses" of the International Institute for Social History, Amsterdam, had ten titles possibly bearing on the subject, as well as many more on Asiatic society which often related to primitive society as well.

40. Karl Marx, Grundrisse der Kritik der Politischen Oekonomie (Rohentwurf) 1857-1858; Anhang 1850-1859, ed. Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute, Moscow. First published in Moscow, 1939, in two volumes; published in 1953 in Berlin by Dietz, in one volume (this is used in this thesis).

41. Grundrisse, 363-375, especially 365-368, 372, 375.

that Marx also makes a distinction between the primitive forms and serfdom and slavery.) In the primitive forms of society,

... verhalten sich der Arbeiter zu den objectiven Bedingungen seiner Arbeit als seinem Eigentum; es ist dies die natuerliche Einheit der Arbeit mit ihren sachlichen Voraussetzungen. Der Arbeiter hat daher unabhangig von der Arbeit eine gegenstandliche Existenz. Das Individuum verhaelt sich zu sich selbst als Eigentuer, als Herr der Bedingungen seiner Wirklichkeit...

In beiden Formen /of primitive society/ verhalten sich die Individuen nicht als Arbeiter, sondern als Eigentuer--und Mitglieder eines Gemeinwesens, die zugleich arbeiten. Der Zweck dieser Arbeit ist nicht Wertschoepfung - /although this may occur/; sondern ihr Zweck ist Erhaltung der Einzelnen Eigentuers und seiner Familie, wie des Gesamtgemeinwesens.⁴²

It is significant that the context of Marx's exposition was the recognition of the necessity of a different situation for the capitalistic system to operate, not any esteem for the primitive society itself; the exposition of primitive society was a kind of logical necessity to show the course of development of man.

Primitive society (as above defined) is represented by two forms of: "... kleinen freien Grundeigentums sowohl wie des gemeinschaftlichen, auf der orientalischen Kommune beruhenden Grundeigentums."⁴³ There are two forms of the free property, the antique (classical Greek and Roman), and the Germanic. In the oriental commune, the individuals are merely possessors (or occupiers) of the land which is owned by the

42. Ibid., 375; cf. 384.

43. Ibid., 375.

whole community; in the antique form, there is privately owned land alongside the public land (ager publicus), while in the Germanic form there is free private property and the public land appears merely as the extension of the private holdings.⁴⁴ The relationship of these forms is expressed in the following:

Die ursprüngliche Form dieses Eigentums ist daher selbst unmittelbares Gemeineigentum (orientalische Form, modifiziert im slawischen; bis zum Gegensatz entwickelt, aber doch noch als die geheime, wenn auch gegensätzliche Grundlage im antiken und germanischen Eigentum).⁴⁵

In spite of the names, these forms are not the same as the first three forms of the scheme of 1845. They are all forms of the unity of the worker and his conditions of work, requiring a community, and seeking to maintain this community (as opposed to creating value as in a commodity producing society). They are clearly distinguished from slavery and serfdom where the worker is himself a condition of production for a third party.⁴⁶ Further, slavery, large holdings of property, money, and developed productive powers are signs of the decay of this system.⁴⁷

44. Ibid., 375; cf. 379, 380, 382.

45. Ibid., 396-397.

46. Ibid., 395: "Sklaverei, Leibeigenschaft etc., wo der Arbeiter selbst unter den Naturbedingungen der Produktion fuer ein drittes Individuum oder Gemeinwesen erscheint..."ⁿ

47. Ibid., 386-387; cf. 392.

Contrary to Marx's usual formula, the differences in the three forms do not arise entirely from historical development or from the development in means of production: they appear to arise from a combination of historical factors with naturally given conditions. To see this more clearly, we must turn to the peculiarities of the different forms of society and Marx's explanation of them.

The first form, the oriental commune, is based upon the existence of a "naturwuechsiges Gemeinwesen": a family and the extended form of the family, the tribe. In its earliest existence it is a nomadic pastoral group grazing the land at hand, and the natural communal life is not the result but the presupposition of the communal appropriation and use of the land.⁴⁸ The earth provides the materials of life and the place (Sitz) or its basis (die Basis) of the community: it is related to it as the property of the community, not of the individual.

Die Erde ist das grosse Laboratorium, das Arsenal, das sowohl das Arbeitsmittel, wie das Arbeitsmaterial liefert, wie den Sitz, die Basis des Gemeinwesens. Sie verhalten sich naiv zu derselben als dem Eigentum des Gemeinwesens und des in der lebendigen Arbeit sich produzierenden und reproduzierenden Gemeinwesens. Jeder Einzelne verhaelt sich nur als Glied, als member dieses Gemeinwesens als Eigentuemer oder Besitzer.⁴⁹

Later, Marx draws an even more rigid distinction by opposing the German words Eigentuemer and Besitzer: The community is

48. Ibid., 375-376.

49. Ibid., 376.

the owner (Eigentümer) while the individual, as a member of the community, is merely an occupier (Besitzer) whether this be by inheritance or otherwise.⁵⁰ The form of the community may be patriarchal and despotic or democratic, according to the natural and historical conditions.⁵¹ In the oriental commune, the community is the owner of the land while the individual occupies it as a member of the community and this communal life is an essential basis for the use of it.

In the case of the second form, the antique or classical form of property, the owners live together in a town for the sake of protection against external enemies and this constitutes the necessity of the community. The land itself does not require communal appropriation; hence there is both private and public ownership. Ownership of land depends upon membership in the community because defense is the one necessary condition of use of the land. Favourable natural conditions and the experience gained in migration and encounter with strange environment allow the individual appropriation of the land.⁵²

50. Ibid., 380.

51. Ibid., 377; cf. the discussion of Asiatic Society in Chapter VII.

52. Ibid., 378-379: "Je weniger faktisch das Eigentum des Einzelnen nur verwertet werden kann durch gemeinsame Arbeit-- also z.B. wie die Wasserleitungen in Orient--, je mehr der rein naturwuchstige Charakter des Stammes durch historische Bewegung, Wandrung gebrochen; je mehr ferner der Stamm sich entfernt von seinem ursprünglichen Sitz und fremden Boden okkupiert, also in wesentlich neue Arbeitsbedingungen tritt und die Energie des Einzelnen mehr entwickelt ist--sein gemeinsamer Charakter mehr als negative Einheit nach aussen erscheint und so erscheinen muss--, um so mehr die Bedingungen gegeben, dass

In contrast to both the oriental commune and the antique classical forms of property and community, the Germanic form is based upon single family holdings and the assembling together of these in an assembly. The land allows isolated living in safety and common speech and customs allow communal life when desirable. The common ground is treated more as an extension of private ground than as a separate power over against the private owners. Marx emphasises the fact that the community exists by virtue of the act of the individuals: "Die Gemeinde erscheint also als Vereinigung, nicht als Verein, als Einigung, deren selbstaendige Subjekt die Landeigentuemer bilden, nicht als Einheit."⁵³

To return to the original question, the source of the differences of these three forms is to be found in the natural conditions, mingled with historical experiences and situations. Marx says that the various forms taken,

...haengen ab teils von den Naturenanlagen des Stammes, teils von den oekonomischen Bedingungen, unter denen er nun wirklich sich als Eigentuemer zum Grund und Boden verhaelt, d.h. sich seine Fruechte durch Arbeit aneignet, und dies wird selbst abhaengen von Klima, physischer Beschaffenheit des Grund und Bodens, der physisch bedingten Weise seiner Exploitation, dem Verhalten zu feindlichen Staemmen oder Nachbarstaemmen, und den Veraenderungen, die Wanderungen, histerische Erlebnisse etc., hineinbringen.⁵⁴

(footnote contd.) der Einzelne Privateigentuemer von Grund und Boden--besondrer Parzelle--wird, deren besondre Bearbeitung ihm und seiner Familie anheimfaellt."

53. Ibid., 383; cf. 382-383 for the entire section.

54. Ibid., 386.

The naturally given determinations of these forms confirm the warning given that they are all forms of primitive society, not disintegrating developments from it. Hence, the state is seen to originate from common interests and needs, not from class conflicts - both in its Asiatic and its classical forms.

The Dissolution of the Primitive Form

The primitive community described by Marx was one in which the member had the use or possession of the conditions of his work by virtue of his membership in the community. At the same time the community had its existence by virtue of the continued equality of the members who work not for the gaining of wealth but for their own sustenance.

Das Individuum ist placed in such conditions of gaining his life as to make not the acquiring of wealth his object, but self-sustenance, its own reproduction as a member of the community; the reproduction of himself as a proprietor of the parcel of ground and, in that quality, as a member of the commune. Die Fortdauer der commune ist die Reproduktion aller der members derselben als self-sustaining peasants, deren Surpluszeit eben der commune, der Arbeit des Kriegs etc. gehoert.⁵⁵

This resulted in the fact that the ancients never asked which form of landed property was the most productive, but always, "... welche Weise des Eigentums die besten Staatsbuerger schafft."⁵⁶ When trade, luxury, money, and exchange value enter into the life of the community, it begins to decline:

Patriarchalische, wie antike Zustaeude (ebenso feudale), verfallen daher ebensosehr mit der Entwicklung des Handels, des Luxus, des Goldes, des Tauscherts, wie die moderne ⁵⁷ Gesellschaft in gleichem Schritt mit ihnen emporwaechst.

55. Ibid., 380.

56. Ibid., 387.

57. Ibid., 76.

The development of these are possible up to a point but are against the basic premises of the community.⁵⁸

As in the Ideologie, natural factors make the decay of community inevitable; the increase in production and in population seems to be the primary factor, accompanied by the various developments in economic and social life.

Die Produktion selbst, Fortschritt der Bevölkerung (auch dieser gehört zur Produktion) hebt notwendig nach und nach diese Bedingungen auf; zerstört sie statt sie zu reproduzieren etc., und damit geht das Gemeinwesen unter mit den Eigentumsverhältnissen, auf denen es gegründet war.⁵⁹

When the individual changes his relation to the community he changes and destroys the community; on the other hand, there is an inner dialectic in the economic premises of the community which work toward the destruction of the community

... andererseits die Änderung dieser ökonomischen Voraussetzung--durch ihre eigene Dialektik hervorgebracht, Vererbung etc. Namentlich der Einfluss des Kriegswesens und der Eroberung, der in Rom z.B. wesentlich zu den ökonomischen Bedingungen der Gemeinde selbst gehört--hebt auf das reale Band, worauf sie beruht.⁶⁰

In these primitive forms of society, the reproduction of the given relation of the members to each other and to their objective existence is the foundation of the development.

... die von vornherein daher eine beschränkte ist, aber mit Aufhebung der Schranke Verfall und Untergang darstellt. Die Entwicklung der Sklaverei, die Konzentration des Grundbesitzes, Austausch, Geldwesen, Eroberung etc. so bei den Römern, obgleich alle diese Elemente bis zu einem gewissen Punkt verträglich schienen mit der Grundlage und sie teils nur unschuldig zu erweitern schienen, teils als blosse Missbräuche aus ihr hervorzuwachsen.⁶¹

While individuals in a limited circle might develop a great deal, the free and full development of either the individual or society is unthinkable, "...da solche Entwicklung mit dem urspruenglichen Verhaeltnis im Widerspruch steht."⁶² These statements show that the development which destroyed the original communities was the result of necessary natural processes in the development of mankind. Therefore these processes must be seen more clearly, as they contradict the more usual subjective explanation involving avarice.

The increase of population creates a surplus of men, makes impossible the holding of land by all and hence makes some into day-labourers (who are then on their way to becoming a corrosive force in the community).⁶³ Again, the increase of population necessitates colonization and wars of conquest which then result in slavery (of the prisoners of war), the increase of the ager publicus and the patricians who represent the community: hence to preserve the community is to cause its downfall.⁶⁴ If, on the other hand, the community attempts to increase productivity of available ground to meet the needs of the growing population,

...so wuerde das neue Weisen, Kombinationen der Arbeit, grossen Teil des Tags auf Agrikultur verwandelt etc. einschliessen, und damit wieder die alten oekonomischen Bedingungen des Gemeinwesens aufheben. In dem Akt der

62. Ibid., 387.

63. Ibid., 369.

64. Ibid., 393.

Reproduktion selbst aendern sich nicht nur die objektiven Bedingungen, z.B. aus dem Dorf wird Stadt, aus der Wildnis gelichteter Acker etc., sondern die Produzenten aendern sich, indem sie neue Qualitaeten aus sich heraus setzen, sich selbst durch die Produktion entwickeln, umgestalten, neue Kraefte und neue Verstellungen bilden, neue Verkehrsweisen, neue Beduerfnisse und neue Sprache.⁶⁵

The manner of production is a stabilizing influence and where it is self-sufficient, as in the oriental unity of agriculture and house industry, it maintains the form of the community longest:

... je mehr sich gleichbleibend der wirkliche Prozess der Aneignung, um so konstanter die alten Eigentumsformen und damit das Gemeinwesen ueberhaupt.⁶⁶

When the member of the community has become a private owner and this ownership is not bound to membership in the community, he may lose his property in the process of exchange and thereby lose his citizenship. This does not happen in the oriental commune because there membership in the community and the holding of property are tightly intertwined and the individual cannot dispose of property (in fact, as seen previously, does not truly own it).⁶⁷

In oriental communities the manufacturing is bound to the agriculture but in antique communities this does not seem to be the case and the result is that a class of people develops outside the owner-citizen class. This class is involved in the real economic life of the community apart from agriculture and participates in the destructive development of commodity production and commerce.

65. Ibid., 393-394.

66. Ibid., 394

67. Ibid.

Bei den Alten erscheint die Manufaktur schon als Verderb (Geschäft der Libertini, Klienten, Freuden) etc. Dieser Entwicklung der produktiven Arbeit (independent of agriculture and communally conducted labour...die sich notwendig entwickelt durch Verkehr mit Fremden, Sklaven, Lust das Surplusprodukt auszutauschen etc., löst die Produktionsweise auf, auf der das Gemeinwesen beruht und daher der objektiv Einzelne, i.e. als Römer, Grieche etc. bestimmte Einzelne. Der Austausch wirkt ebenso; die Verschuldung etc.⁶⁸

The exchange that results from the development of industry and commodity production results in the individualization of men and hence the decline of the community: "Der Austausch selbst ist ein Hauptmittel dieser Vereinselung. Er macht das Huerdenwesen ueberfluessig und loest es auf."⁶⁹ In this movement, the individual ceases to be bound to the community and is instead bound into the economic structure of exchange and production.

One of the earliest activities and its by-product--war, and the capture of the prisoners of war, or rule over conquered populations - undermine the community because these people are unable to be members of it or to hold property.⁷⁰

The process of dissolution of the primitive society is therefore one that proceeds by the pressures of the natural growth of population and production and their consequences. These render the community either inadequate to control the growing social forces, or impossible, since it depends upon citizenship in it and an equality of its members who are engaged in self-sufficient production.

68. Ibid.

69. Ibid., 396.

70. Ibid., 392.

Summary and Marx's Evaluation of Primitive Society.

The primitive society of which Marx knows in his 1857-1858 writing is a society which ranges from the rawest form of existence to the disintegrating antique classical form with its incipient slavery and commodity production, exchange, money and accumulations of movable property, to the free-holding German form which was private property pure and simple with communal common lands. These are all comprehended together by the fact that the worker is united with the conditions of his labour and livelihood, and are set against the opposite situation in which the worker is free and also separated from his conditions of labour and life. The intermediate conditions of slavery and serfdom, in which some are the means of production for others, receive relatively little attention, except as the forms succeeding the primitive ones. Because of this basis of classification, this primitive form of society includes private property and the early forms of state, not based upon class conflicts. Further, as the latent forces within it unfold, this society decays.

Marx displays no especial esteem for this form of society: it is merely the first form which human life takes, which must be negated in the capitalist form which in turn lays the foundation for the future form in which there is full and free development of the individual in his relations to his fellow-men.⁷¹ This first form is marked by personal dependence and

71. Ibid., 75.

human productivity that is "...nur in geringem Umfang und auf isolierten Punkten entwickelt."⁷² The fully developed man is not a product of nature but a product of history. The great and the beautiful are said to be

... eben in diesem naturwuechsigen, von Wissen und Wollen der Individuen unabhangigen, und grade ihre wechselseitige Unabhangigkeit und Gleichgueltigkeit gegeneinander voraussetzenden Zusammenhang, materiellen und geistigen Stoffwechsel, beruht.⁷³

It is certain that men could not order and control their social relations before they had created them, however:

Aber es ist abgeschmackt, jenen nur sachlichen Zusammenhang als den naturwuechsigen, von der Natur der Individualitaet (in Gegensatz zum Reflektierten Wissen und Wollen) unzertrenlichen und ihr immanenten, aufzufassen. Er ist ihr Produkt. Er ist ein historisches Produkt.⁷⁴

The estrangement in which men exist shows only that they are yet in the process of creation of the conditions of their social life instead of having begun from these.

Es ist der Zusammenhang, der naturwuechsige, von Individuen innerhalb bestimmter, bornierter Produktionsverhaeltnisse. Die universal entwickelten Individuen, deren gesellschaftliche Verhaeltnisse als ihre eigenen, gemeinschaftlichen Beziehungen auch ihrer eigenen gemeinschaftlichen Kontrolle unterworfen sind, sind kein Produkt der Natur, sondern der Geschichte. Der Grad und die Universalitaet der Entwicklung der Vermoegen, worin diese Individualitaet moeglich wird, setzt eben die Produktion auf der Basis der Tauschwerte voraus, die mit der Allgemeinheit die Entfremdung des Individuums von sich und von andren, aber auch die Allgemeinheit und allseitigkeit seiner Beziehungen und Faehigkeiten erst produziert.⁷⁵

The individual appears fully developed in this primitive situation because the fullness of his relations have not been

worked out and opposed to him. It is as ridiculous "...sich nach jener urspruenglichen Fuelle zurueckwuehnen..." as it is to seek to remain in the later alienation.⁷⁶

It is clear that Marx sees man as undeveloped in the primitive form and that any goodness of it is only because of the relative undeveloped state of man: he is not opposed by the alienation necessary for his development. It is "...die kindische alte Welt..."⁷⁷ which appears higher but is not, in fact. Man must unfold his powers and develop his productive life and his social life before he is able to perfect it and free himself. Primitive man is either in an animal existence, or in a childish existence. We see then, that in the Grundrisse, Marx is true to the pattern of his philosophical heritage: man is a developing being who goes forth from childish simplicity in which he is at the mercy of nature, to the troubled and alienated condition of development, after which he will reintegrate himself in the fullness of manhood.

76. Ibid., 80: "So laecherlich es ist, sich nach jener urspruenglichen Fuelle zurueckwuehnen, so laecherlich ist der Glaube bei jener vollen Entleerung stehnbleiben zu muessen. Ueber den Gegensatz gegen jene romantische Ansicht ist die buergerliche nie herausgekommen und darum wird jene als berechtigter Gegensatz sie bis an ihr seliges End begleiten."
Ibid., 387-388:

"/In the bourgeois society the development of human powers appears as total alienation of man and total sacrifice of the individual./ Daher erscheint einerseits die kindische alte Welt als das Hoehere. Andererseits ist sie es in alledem, wo geschlossene Gestalt, Form, und gegebne Begrenzung gesucht wird. Sie ist Befriedigung auf einem bornierten Standpoint; waehrend das Moderne unbefriedigt laesst, oder wo es in sich befriedigt erscheint, gemein ist."

77. Ibid., 387.

iv.

Primitive Society in Capital.

In 1859 Marx published Zur Kritik der politischen Oekonomie and then in 1867 published the first volume of Das Kapital, having already written the first draft of all of Das Kapital during 1861-63. We therefore consider these writings, volumes II and III of Das Kapital, and Theorien ueber den Mehrwert together (this latter was a summary of the doctrines of economics which Marx never finally prepared for publication but which were published posthumously).⁷⁸

In volume I of Capital, Marx says that to study "labour in common", or "directly associated labour", it was not necessary to go back to the "...spontaneously developed form which confronts us on the threshold of the history of all civilized races..."⁷⁹ but rather one could study the patriarchal peasant family. This family provides the same form: it produces its own needs; has its own division of labour based on sex, age and seasonal changes in natural working conditions, but does not turn its variety of products into commodities for exchange, sharing them, instead, among themselves.⁸⁰ Here then is to be found the usual description of life in the primitive community, with especial emphasis upon the fact that there is no commodity production and exchange, and upon the fact that this was a universal form among all peoples.

78. Cf. Capital, II, (Kerr), 8-9 (Engels' preface).

79. Capital, I, 51.

80. Ibid., 51-52.

Marx attached a footnote from his Zur Kritik of 1859 to strengthen the fact of the universality of this, and to oppose the then current Pan-Slavist vogue for asserting this primitive communism to be a product of Slavic genius.⁸¹ He is inclined to trace the European forms to India and to treat the various forms of private property as the results of various forms of Indian communal property, though in the third volume he says it was the original form in China as well.⁸² This emphasis upon Indian origins appears to have its source in George Campbell's Modern India, etc. which Marx excerpted in 1853-1854.⁸³ It is probable that Marx limited himself to the materials at hand and had no detailed information beyond the Indo-European peoples.

81. Ibid., 51:

"Of late a preposterous notion has found general credence, to the effect that primitive communism as a spontaneous development is specifically a Slav, and indeed exclusively a Russian, phenomenon. Really, it is a primal form, which can be shown to have existed among the Romans, the Teutons, and the Celts; while even to-day we find numerous examples (decayed though they be) in India. Careful study of Asiatic, and especially Indian, forms of communism would disclose the way in which, out of the various kinds of spontaneously developed communisms, divergent forms have evolved as results of the break-up of communism. For instance, the various original types of Roman and Teutonic private property are deducible from different forms of Indian communism. Karl Marx, Zur Kritik, etc., p.10."

82. Capital, III (Kerr), 392.

83. Cf. George Campbell, Modern India, etc., 52-53, and the note. In the reading notes in Amsterdam are to be found 12 pages of notes from this book (cf. "Inventar des Marx-Engels-Nachlasses", B66).

As he does mention the Inca state of Peru and China (on both of which he had limited information) it could possibly indicate a preoccupation with the lands concerning Europe whose industrial society he was trying to transform.

In the Grundrisse Marx classified various forms of primitive society under the common denominator of the absence of commodity production and exchange, and money economy. In Capital he does this again, though at times his terminology tends to distinguish between a purely raw primitive form and later developments of it. He repeatedly groups together various types of non-commodity producing forms, as when he says there is no mutual independence (as in commodity production),

...for members of a primitive community, whether this takes the form of a patriarchal family, or that of an ancient Indian commune, or that of the Inca state in Peru, etc. Commodity exchange begins where community life ends...⁸⁴

Again, in Theorien ueber den Mehrwert he groups two main forms together under the unity of the worker and means of production:

Die urspruenglich Einheit zwischen Arbeiter und Produktionsmitteln /slavery is not included because the worker is an objective condition of labour for another/... hat zwei Hauptformen: das asiatische Gemeinwesen (naturwuechsigen Kommunismus) und die kleine Familien-agrikultur (womit Hausindustrie verbunden ist) in ein oder andren Form.⁸⁵

Elsewhere he speaks of small-scale peasantry and handicrafts, which were opposed to manufacturing co-operation, and partially formed the basis of slave-holding and feudal society: to this he adds a footnote:

84. Capital, I, 63. 85. Marx, Theorien ueber den Mehrwert (ed. K. Kautsky), III, 482. (Hereafter cited as: Theorien.)

They were also the economic bases of the classical commonwealth in its palmy days, after the primitive oriental communal ownership of land had disappeared, and before slavery had gained effective control of production.⁸⁶

This indicates that he still follows the scheme of the Grundrisse: purely communal property followed by varying degrees of free ownership based upon non-commodity production.

In addition to these statements, revealing a broader category embracing pure primitive communism and free self-sufficient small holders, there is the fact that Marx is aware of a wide divergence of traits among the forms he groups together. Communal property lived on under cover of feudalism.⁸⁷ The Asiatic communes have paid tribute in kind, "since immemorial days", to a central government;⁸⁸ have a highly developed caste system and division of labour;⁸⁹ and depend upon a central government for water,⁹⁰ while the modern patriarchal family lives amidst modern conditions within a modern society and nation.⁹¹ Marx reveals a distinction between pure primitive communism and modified forms, but steadfastly groups the two types together for his purposes as examples of non-commodity producers possessing their means of production.

86. Capital, I, 351, note 1.

87. Ibid., 802.

88. Ibid., 377; cf. 122-123, 349-350.

89. Ibid., II, 357, 377, 389.

90. Ibid., 557-558.

91. We refer to his description in Ibid., 51-52, which does not explicitly say this.

Description of Primitive Society.

The family is the basic unit of primitive society, as previously: it develops into the tribe.⁹² There is a development of the form of the family: there were oriental forms, classic Greek, classic Roman, Christo-Teutonic, and the new form which is being developed from the decomposition of the family under the impact of modern industrialism.⁹³

The division of labour is a natural one, "...based on a purely physiological foundation..."⁹⁴; it arises spontaneously according to age, sex, and natural ability. In spite of this division of labour there is no commodity production, whether the community be a patriarchal family, Indian commune, or an Inca state in Peru.⁹⁵ In the Indian communes there is a highly developed caste system which perpetuates the division of labour, allowing an efficient development of skills and the transmission of these skills.⁹⁶ There is a communal sharing of the tasks of labour and of its products.

By including the Indian communes, the Inca State, and the classical Greek commonwealth in the primitive form, Marx has allowed the State to be an accompaniment of the primitive form of society. As we have noted, the State is despotic in Asia, exacting tribute since the most ancient times.

92. Ibid., 370.

93. Ibid., 529

94. Ibid., 370.

95. Ibid., 63.

96. Ibid., 11, 357, 377, 389.

The Disintegration of the Primitive Community.

In Capital, the primary trait of the primitive community is its lack of commodity production and exchange, and the accompanying private property and division of labour. There are of course, incipient private property and division of labour within the community--the natural division of labour and the ownership of personal objects. However, these do not of themselves constitute an ill in the community. How does this ill arise?

The spontaneous natural division of labour is the immediate form in which the community disintegrates, but its development depends upon the growth of population and extension of the community (again the natural growth noted before in the Ideologie and the Grundrisse) and interaction with other communities.⁹⁷ This growth of spontaneous division of labour is most stimulated by a second factor, that of exchange between communities. This original or primeval act is based upon the variety of natural environmental factors and natural resources:

Different communities discover in their natural environment different means of production and different means of subsistence. Consequently their methods of production, modes of life, and products are different. It is owing to the existence of these spontaneously developed differences that, when communities come into contact, there occurs an exchange of their several products one for another, so that these products

97. Ibid., 370-371: "The material subjected to this division of labour expands proportionately with the extension of the community, with the increase of population, and above all thanks to conflicts between different tribes and the subjection of one tribe by another."

gradually become transformed into commodities. Exchange does not create the difference between the spheres of production; it brings the differing spheres of production into relation one with another, and thus transforms them into more or less inter-dependent branches of a social collective production. Thus the social division of labour originates through exchange between spheres of production that are primarily distinct from and independent of one another.⁹⁸

Exchange is first between communities in the primitive world:

"Commodity exchange begins where community life ends; begins at the point of contact between a community and an alien community, or between the members of two different communities."⁹⁹

As exchange between the two groups becomes regular, a portion of labour is given over to producing articles for exchange because of a developed desire for articles of alien production.¹⁰⁰ In

the situation of commodity production, the natural division of labour develops and the smaller groups disintegrate and the various kinds of work are connected only by exchange --- "...

the exchange of commodities with alien communities giving the main impetus towards this process of decomposition..."¹⁰¹ Here

is to be noted the simultaneous development of a unity between isolated groups - the formation of "species-life" - and the dissolution of the unity existing in the smaller natural units.

It is clear from this account of the origins of exchange and the division of labour, that these originate from natural situations (physiological division of labour and the variety of natural endowment) and that the exchange resulting from the

98. Ibid., 371.

99. Ibid., 63.

100. Ibid.

101. Ibid., 371.

variety of natural environment (a social exchange) is, along with increase of population and conflict with other tribes, the mainspring of the dissolution of the primitive community by the division of labour and exchange between each community. This is also implicit in Marx's view that the Indian communities do not disintegrate because they are self-sufficient and need no exchange with other communities.¹⁰² Hence, division of labour and private property are the result of natural conditions and forces, and of human need and desire, not of avarice and greed.

Marx's Evaluation of Primitive Society.

In several passages Marx gives a description of primitive society which also expresses his evaluation of it. He clearly characterises it as a low stage of human development which must be outgrown. In Theorien ueber den Mehrwert he says of both the purely communal form and the small agricultural family unity (quoted above):

Beide sind Kinderformen und gleich wenig geeignet, die Arbeit als gesellschaftliche Arbeit und die Produktivkraft der gesellschaftlichen Arbeit zu entwickeln.¹⁰³

Therefore it is necessary that the original unity of the worker with the means of production which characterise these forms be broken: "Daher die Notwendigkeit der Trennung, der Zerreiung, des Gegensatzes zwischen Arbeit und Eigentum..."¹⁰⁴

102. Ibid., 377, 11.

103. Theorien, III, 482-483.

104. Ibid., 483.

The most developed form of this occurs in capitalism, "worin zugleich die produktiven Kraefte der gesellschaftlichen Arbeit aufs maechtigste entwickelt werden..."¹⁰⁵ On the material basis of this high development of human productivity and upon the activity of the revolution and working-class "...kann erst wieder die urspruengliche Einheit hergestellt werden."¹⁰⁶ Here Marx has declared both the low stage of development of primitive society and the necessity of its dissolution before something faintly resembling it can be established upon a truly human basis.

In the passage just given one can see Marx's basic assumption that mature humanity is humanity which controls nature and puts it into the service of its needs, which is not done by primitive society, hence the term, "Kinderformen". The course of history is essential because it creates this "human" situation, making possible the meeting of needs on a more equitable basis by a productive system which both produces a sufficiency and produces and distributes in a social manner. It is to be noted that the condition which returns is the unity of the worker with the means of production, which existed not only in the original communism but also in small private property. This movement of society does not fit the five stage pattern -- primitive communism, slavery, feudalism, capitalism, communism -- but it is rather the triadic pattern of Hegel: immature unity, differentiation and disunity, and finally a mature unity. This same movement of society is to be seen in Capital in the section on "The Historical

105. Ibid.

106. Ibid.

Tendency of Capitalist Accumulation", though here it moves from small private property to capitalism to communism. Capitalism negates the small private property of petty industry:

"...individual private property based upon individual labour."¹⁰⁷

Then capitalism creates its own negation (negation of the negation):

This second negation does not re-establish private property, but it ~~dece~~ establishes individual property upon the basis of the acquisitions of the capitalistic era; i.e. on co-operation and the common ownership of the land and of the means of production (which labour itself produces).¹⁰⁸

In this passage, as in that from the Theorien, etc. there is the affirmation of an immature condition which must be overcome before a condition analogous to the original primitive communism can be established.

These conclusions are borne out by two passages in Capital which explicitly cite primitive society. Speaking of the simpler ancient forms of society in contrast to modern society, he says:

...but they were based, either upon the immaturity of the individual human being (who had not yet severed the umbilical cord which, under primitive conditions, unites all the members of the human species one with another), or upon the direct relations of domination and subjugation. They were the outcome of a low grade of the evolution of the productive powers of labour; a grade in which the relations of human beings to one another within the process by which they produced the material necessities of life, and therefore their relations to nature as well, were correspondingly immature.¹⁰⁹

107. Capital, I, 846. Petty industry prevents the development of social co-operation but is, at the same time, indispensable to the development of the individuality of the worker.

108. Ibid.

109. Ibid., 53.

Here then, in a passage which is duplicated later in Capital, Marx emphasises the low level of development of production in primitive society and the lack of development of the individual, both of which conditions are reversed in modern capitalist society which is the foundation of modern communism. In primitive society men work together because they have not individualised themselves either in relation to each other or in their relation to nature. This is not the kind of co-operation which Marx sees in the present and which he hopes will be improved upon in the future. As described in Capital, this future form requires modern capitalistic development and all that it entails. The life process of future society must be

...a process carried on by a free association of producers, under their conscious and purposive control. For this, however, an indispensable requisite is that there should exist a specific material groundwork (or a series of material conditions of existence) which can only come into being as a spontaneous outcome of a long and painful process of evolution.¹¹⁰

This necessity of the material foundation for a free society and a free and conscious control of it by the people involved is reiterated in volume III of Capital. There, in a well-known passage, he says that freedom begins only after labour under compulsion of the necessity of utility is ended; this necessity is never removed from mankind but its activity can be freely organised and controlled by socialised men under the most human conditions. Beyond this necessity the true realm of freedom begins - that development of human power which is its own end and which requires the shortening of the working day.¹¹¹

110. Ibid. 54. 111. Capital, III(Kerr), 954-955.

It is clear then that Marx's concept of primitive society remained unchanged in its essentials in his major writings of the 1860's. It is an undeveloped state of man which at best can only be said to have a social organization whose form is analogous to modern communism, and in fact, whose basis is utterly the reverse. Its dissolution is essential to the development of true man.

v.

1868 - 1881

In the final period of Marx's life there was a greater concern with the question of primitive society in its own right because of new material found by Marx and because of the question of the Russian mir and its relation to modern communism. During the latter half of the 19th Century there appeared many studies on primitive society which gave new material and theories. The acceptance of Marx's Capital by a circle of intelligentsia of Russia raised questions concerning the future existence and the role of the Russian village community called the mir. Engels also maintained a lively interest in the study of primitive society and marriage.

Marx was first considerably excited by his discovery of the works of Georg Ludwig von Maurer (1790-1872) on German

constitutional history.¹¹² Writing to Engels in March of 1868 he notes first of all that the view of Justus Hoerer is contradicted: the Germans did not settle first by individual families who then formed villages and larger units (as Marx himself seemed to think in the Grundrisse and in his view that the family was the basic unit in primitive society).¹¹³ In 1868 the work of von Maurer led Marx in the direction of an original communal group from which the family emerged, a decade earlier than Cunow indicated¹¹⁴ and the recent work of Helmut Krause assumes.¹¹⁵

A second impression which Maurer's work made upon Marx was that it confirmed his view that the Asiatic or Indian form of primitive communism was the original form from which all others descended, including the Russian mir. The periodic redistribution of land by the Russian communes corresponded to an annual redistribution of land by the Germans in ancient times, the remnants of which were still to be found in isolated districts of Germany in the 18th and 19th Centuries.

112. Cf. MEGA, Abt. III, Bd. 4, 27 (Letter to Engels, 14/3/68). In the "Inventar des Marx-Engels-Nachlasses" of the International Institute for Social History, Amsterdam, it is shown that Marx made 44 pages of excerpts from Maurer's Einführung zur Geschichte der Mark, Hof-, Dorf- und Städte-Verfassung (1854) (cf. B 104). He returned to this book in 1876, making 80 pages of excerpts as 119 pages of excerpts from Geschichte der Fronhöfe and 33 pages from Geschichte der Dorfverfassung in Deutschland (2 Bde., 1863-66) (cf. B122).

113. MEGA, Abt. III, Bd. IV, 27.

114. See note 22 above for Cunow.

115. H. Krause, Marx und Engels und das zeitgenössische Russland, 99-100.

Interessant gerade jetzt, dass die russische Manier der Wiederverteilung in bestimmten Terminen (in Deutschland erst jährlich) des Bodens sich in Deutschland stellenweis bis ins 18. und selbst 19. Jahrhundert erhielt. Die von mir aufgestellte Ansicht, dass ueberall die asiatischen, resp. indischen Eigentumsformen in Europa den Anfang bilden, erhaelt hier... neuen Beweis. Fuer die Russen verschwindet aber auch die letzte Spur eines Anspruchs of originality, selbst in this line. Was ihnen bleibt, ist, noch heute in Formen zu stecken, welche ihre Nachbarn seit lango abgestreift. 116

Maurer, then, provides fresh insights and materials concerning the nature of primitive communism and its spread and at the same time provides Marx with new arguments in his contention against the Pan Slavists who felt the mir to be uniquely Russian and the key to the future. Not only does Marx reject the Pan Slavist argument but he also imputes an archaic character to the Russian mir. He stood by the Indian origin of all primitive type communities on at least two more occasions. 117

In the second letter to Engels concerning the discovery of Maurer's work, Marx links the equality of the primitive order to the socialist equality in a vague way, as he had done in the past. The first reaction against the Enlightenment and French Revolution was to look back to the Middle Ages with Romantic eyes, while the second reaction was to look back to the primitive age of each nation, which corresponds to "der sozialistischen Richtung"¹¹⁸ They have no idea of the

116. MEGA, Abt. III, Bd. IV, 27.

117. ibid., 121 (letter to Engels, 7/11/68) and a letter to Kugelmann, 17/2/70, in Marx, Briefe an Kugelmann (1862-74), (1927 edition), 69.

118. MEGA, Abt. III, Bd. IV, 33.

connection between the two: "Da sind sie dann ueberrascht, in Aeltesten das Heute zu finden, und sogar Egalitarians to a degree, wovor Proudhon schaudern wuerde."¹¹⁹ Here again is the analogical treatment which was found in the Theorien ueber den Mehrwert: it is no more than this in view of the fact that Marx does not base modern socialism upon it and does not call it more than a socialist tendency or Richtung. This evaluation of the phrase is borne out in a second matter relating to the work of another author on the history of climate and vegetation in historical times. Devastation and waste follow cultivation and create deserts, as in Persia and Mesopotamia and other Mediterranean countries. The conclusion to be drawn is that primitive cultivation progressing in a way that "is not consciously controlled" does this; the author does not draw this conclusion but: "here again another unconscious socialist tendency."¹²⁰ Thus not only has Marx revealed the vague comparison he is making but also he has implied a negative character in the primitive life - the lack of conscious control of man's activities.

It should also be noted that Marx and Engels were involved in a study of Celtic primitive society. Marx criticised Haurer for ignoring Celtic materials and thus ascribing all French developments to the German conquerors.¹²¹ A year later Engels

119. Ibid.

120. Marx and Engels, Selected Correspondence (Lawrence, 1934), 237.

121. MEGA, Abt. III, Bd. IV, 28.

wrote Marx concerning Irish communal property still in existence at the time of James I and used as a pretext for confiscation of the land,¹²² and in 1870 Marx wrote Engels on the matter of Welsh communal law which Engels is studying.¹²³

From these letters concerning Maurer's work it is clear that under his influence Marx began to conceive of the communal nature of man's first existence as opposed to the family unit. Further, he has made no change in his evaluation of primitive communism and primitive life.

It has been asserted that Marx changed his view of primitive communism under the influence of Lewis H. Morgan and thereby came to a new position concerning the Russian mir, seeing it as a possible springboard into the future instead of an archaic remnant from the past to be discarded.¹²⁴ However, it does not appear that this is the case. Not until the beginning of 1881 did Marx read Morgan and there is evidence that from 1877 onwards he held the same views that he expressed in 1881. Furthermore, while he admitted the possibility of the mir being able to overleap the capitalistic period and be transformed into a modern socialistic commune, this possibility was dependent upon the progress made in the West: there is no shift in Marx's basic evaluation of primitive society which

122. Ibid., 52(Engels to Marx, 29/11/69).

123. Ibid., 325.

124. Krause, op. cit., 99-100.

directly concerns our argument.

In October, 1877, N.K. Mikhailovsky had published an article in Otechestvenniye Zapiski in which he said that in Marx's view Russia must first dissolve the commune, develop capitalism, and then go on to communism. To this Marx wrote a reply which he never sent for publication but which Engels sent to the Russian émigrés in Switzerland from whence it circulated in Russia (after Marx's death).¹²⁵ The question was whether all peoples must go through the same line of development or whether, in the presence of other highly developed nations, certain primitive groups could eliminate a stage in this line of development. Marx answered that the latter was possible but would not venture to say what was the case at that moment in Russia. If its developments continued as they had since the emancipation of the serfs, it would become capitalistic, but whether it was too late to reverse this trend, he would not say.¹²⁶ (It will be noted that Engels took a similar position in 1875.)

This question was directed to Marx again in 1881 while he was reading Morgan (or had just finished reading him) and his attempts to draft an answer provide us with the last considerable material from him on primitive society. From the

125.Cf. Marx and Engels, The Russian Menace to Europe, 274-275.

126.Ibid., 216-218; cf. Marx and Engels, Ausgewählte Briefe (Berlin, 1953), 365-368, for the original French version.

end of 1880 to March of 1881 Marx read the work of Morgan, Ancient Society (1876) and made 98 pages of notes and excerpts.¹²⁷ In February he received a letter (dated February 16) from Vera Zasulich, one of a group of Russian revolutionary exiles in Switzerland. She asked him to clarify his position on the Russian commune or mir: must it be destroyed and the peasants expropriated, as in the West, to make way for capitalism which will be overthrown for communism?--in which case the task of the revolutionaries is to further this destruction? This was a position taken by many in Russia who called themselves Marxists. Or, on the other hand, is the community capable of being developed into a modern socialist unit, increasing its productive organisation, and being a part of the future order, if it is freed from the oppression which it then suffered in Russia? If this be the case, then the revolutionaries should support a programme which would strengthen the mir.¹²⁸ To answer this Marx wrote four rough drafts of a discussion of primitive societies and the situation of the mir but sent only a short letter in which he said merely that it was possible for the mir to lead in the social regeneration of Russia, if it were freed from its enemies and if it were given normal conditions to allow it spontaneous growth.¹²⁹

127. These are found in the archives of The International Institute for Social History, Amsterdam, Heft B 146 of the Marx-Engels Nachlasses.

128. Marx-Engels Archiv, I, 341; cf. The Russian Menace to Europe, 276-277, for an English translation.

129. Ibid., 341-342(278-279).

It is our purpose to examine the rough drafts and to work out the view of primitive society that Marx held and then to see what his evaluation of it was, in detail. The fact (1) that he repeated this material in its essentials in four drafts and (2) that he did not attempt to use it at all in his final letter, omitting completely this type of discussion, means that for our purposes these drafts are valid; we seek merely to know what he was thinking at this time, not what he was willing to proclaim publicly. The reply to Zasulich involved more than facts and theory about primitive society in general; politics and a knowledge of Russian conditions were crucial. On these Marx was unwilling to commit himself, stating only that he was convinced

...quo cette commune est le point d'appui de la régénération sociale en Russie, mais afin qu'elle puisse fonctionner comme tel, il faudrait d'abord éliminer les influences délétères qui l'assaillent de tous les côtés et ensuite lui assurer les conditions normales d'un développement spontané.¹³⁰

This brief statement was in accord with the views expressed in the rough drafts themselves and we have no reason then to doubt the validity of the rough drafts for our purposes.

Marx's concept of history is placed in a triadic scheme which we have already found in the preceding chapter, even though now he has borrowed terminology from Morgan,¹³¹

130. Ibid.

131. Morgan had said (in Ancient Society, 499-500): "Like successive geological formations, the tribes of mankind may be arranged, according to their relative conditions, into successive strata." Marx said (Marx-Engels Archiv, I, 320): "...comme dans les formations géologiques, il y a dans les formations historiques toute une série de types primaires, secondaires, tertiaires etc." Cf. 332.

and now emphasizes that there is a progressive line of development in a series of types of primitive society. This latter is not a new concept with either Marx or Engels, as both have already held to a development within the primitive type of society. The primitive stage of society is termed "archaïque ou primaire"¹³² The next stage is "La formation secondaire" which "...embrasse la série des sociétés reposant sur l'esclavage et le servage" and is "...fondée sur la propriété privée."¹³³ This stage ends with capitalism; it is a period of successive stages "...toute une série de révolutions et d'évolutions économiques successives, dont la production capitaliste n'est que /la dernière (struck out for)/ la plus récente."¹³⁴ In this scheme, though not mentioned in the discussion, the final stage would be the socialistic or communistic stage.

The final stage in the primary formation is the "commune rurale" (or commune agricole): the Russian mir, the modern Asiatic communes, and the German communities described by Tacitus (whose remnants were still redistributing the land in the 18th-19th Century).¹³⁵ These communities have private property in house and barn and private cultivation of communally owned land which is redistributed periodically, while pastures and forests are communal land. Following this form,

132. Marx-Engels Archiv, I, 320, 322.

133. Ibid., 338; cf. 320, 322.

134. Ibid., 331. 135. Ibid., 332-333, 335-336.

the first stage of the secondary formation was "La nouvelle commune" in which the cultivated land was also privately owned, though pastures and forests were still communal property; this was the German village of the Middle Ages.¹³⁶ Going back from the commune rurale (last primitive form) there was the commune in which the land was redivided between the tribes or gentes and in which agriculture was probably in common within the group.¹³⁷ Behind this was the earliest form, "communautés plus primitives", with common housing and only hunting and fishing, with a transitional form following it in which private occupation of housing was periodically redistributed and pastoral and agricultural life was followed.¹³⁸

The commune rurale in Germany developed there. It was not in existence in Caesar's time (he described the annual redistribution of land among the tribes), was described by Tacitus, and disappeared thereafter in the migrations.¹³⁹ It was not brought out of Asia but grew up in Germany.¹⁴⁰

The commune rurale is distinguished from earlier communities by three traits.¹⁴¹ (1) It is the first community not based upon blood-kinship but rather is an association of free men. (Engels had stressed the fact of blood-kinship in primitive society; see later chapters) (2) Private property exist in the house and barn. (3) Cultivated land is worked privately but is periodically redivided and is communal property.

136. Ibid., 336.

137. Ibid., 335.

138. Ibid., 335-337.

139. Ibid., 335.

140. Ibid., 321.

141. Ibid., 336-337.

Marx's Evaluation of this Primitive Order.

(1) We should note first that Marx attributed a serious defect to much of primitive society, a defect that only modern conditions can remove: it is afflicted by isolation imposed by a naturally given factor, geography, and thereby supports a despotism. This lack of communication and mobility is a serious defect "...qui lui jusqu'ici interdit toute initiative historique".¹⁴² It is geographically imposed; in the Russian situation it

...semble avoir été primitivement imposée par la vaste étendue du territoire, fut en grande partie consolidée par les destinées politiques que la Russie avait à subir depuis l'invasion mongole.¹⁴³

This lack of the development of human unity in communication and intercourse of material life which allows a despot to control the whole can be overcome in modern times in Russia by a popular assembly.¹⁴⁴ This does not alter the fact that Marx sees a serious defect in the primitive community in its original setting and time, a defect which he discusses more fully in the materials on Asiatic society.

(2) In the virtues of the commune rurale there is implied a defect in the primitive community generally and the need for its dissolution and the development of private property. The communal ownership of the land gives a solid foundation for the life of the community as a community, showing that Marx values

142. Ibid., 338-339; cf. 325.

143. Ibid., 323-324; cf. 325, 338-339.

144. Ibid., 324.

this aspect of the primitive community. However, he says that the private property in the house and barn and private tilling of the soil encourage the development of the individual: "...donnent un essor à l'individualité incompatible avec l'organisme des communautés plus primitives."¹⁴⁵ All previous forms of primitive society have limited the development of the individual even though they have had the advantage of social solidarity, and hence are defective. Further, the co-operative production itself was a sign of human immaturity:

Ce type primitif de la production collective ou coopérative fut, bien entendu, le résultat de la faiblesse de l'individu isolé et non de la socialisation des moyens de production.¹⁴⁶

Marx thus consistently distinguishes the communist of the primitive society from that of modern times.

(3) It must be pointed out that in the background of the whole discussion there is the assumption that the primitive community is inferior and must be allowed to die when it is on its own: the gist of Marx's letter is that the only hope of the survival of the Russian commune is its historical circumstance. It exists on a national scale in a time when it may receive the material help of the capitalist production and at a time when capitalism is ripe for revolution.¹⁴⁷ This pre-supposes an inherent weakness of the commune, that it cannot offer the mastery of nature and individual development which characterise mature humanity.

145. Ibid., 357.

146. Ibid., 321.

147. Ibid., 324, 326.

(4) Marx again uses the vague analogical comparison of the primitive communism and the modern communism, limited all the more by the foregoing criticisms of primitive society. In saying that capitalism is ripe for revolution and transformation to socialism (whereby there is hope for the survival of the contemporary primitive communes) he borrows a phrase from Morgan to express a thought he has always held. Morgan had said that the relation of property and state and society would undergo a transformation; a property career is not the end of mankind.

Democracy in government, brotherhood in society, equality in rights and privileges, and universal education, foreshadow the next higher plane of society to which experience, intelligence and knowledge are steadily tending. It will be a revival, in a higher form, of the liberty, equality and fraternity of the ancient gentes.¹⁴⁸

Marx says that the advantage of the Russian mir is that it finds itself in the period of revolution of capitalist society:

Elle le trouve en un mot dans une crise qui finira que par son élimination, par un retour des sociétés modernes au type "archaïque" de la propriété commune forme où ... "le système nouveau" auquel la société moderne tend "sera une renaissance (a revival) dans une forme supérieure, (in a superior form) d'un type social archaïque".¹⁴⁹

In saying that the future will be a superior form of the archaic type of society, Marx is fully aware of the fact that there is a radically different basis for this new form, as we have already shown. It certainly does not appear that Marx

148. L.H. Morgan, Ancient Society, 552.

149. Marx-Engels Archiv, I, 320; cf. 324, 326, 331.

is saying more than he has said in the past, and is certainly no shift in his evaluation of primitive society, as he qualified any high estimate of the primitive commune by its simultaneous existence with the highly developed capitalist society about to be transformed into a modern socialist one.

Conclusion.

In this survey of Marx's expressions on the subject of primitive society we have a consistent view of it to the end of his life. While new materials altered and enriched the content of his thought about it, he persisted in seeing it as an immature form of human existence which had to be dissolved by private property in order to develop the means of production and the life of the individual. Only on the basis of the development of private property and capitalism could mankind hope to find its true existence in a new social form. And in all his writings he recognises the radically different basis of the vaguely similar states of immature and mature man: primitive man must co-operate because of the lack of development, modern man must co-operate because of the fullness of human development.

CHAPTER VI

ENGELS' VIEW OF PRIMITIVE COMMUNISM

The preceding chapter has shown that Marx's writings on the question of primitive society do not contradict the fundamental conception of history which he held: history is the evolving of mature humanity from its raw and immature beginnings in primitive man. Mature humanity is man in control of both his material environment and his social environment. The latter is dependent upon the former, so that the similarity of the earlier social form to the latter is only vaguely analogical: modern communism is based upon sufficiency, the social nature of the system of production, and the consciously controlled communal life, while primitive communism was based upon insufficiency, naturally given - and hence unconscious - community of life, and practically no system of production. The development of the modern maturity of man necessitated the destruction of the primitive communism and the development of mankind by means of private property and its consequent forms of community. Some have felt that with Engels there is a definite return to a romantic or secularised

religious view of history which finds a paradise or a state of perfection in primitive times which is lost and finally regained in the modern proletarian revolution.¹ It is now necessary to examine the writings of Engels and see (a) whether there is an un-Marxian view of primitive history and (b) whether Engels changed his view at the time of his encounter with Lewis Henry Morgan's work.²

I

The first task is to determine whether Engels held consistently to a single doctrine throughout his life and its nature if he did so. The first material of which we take note is not a direct discussion of primitive society but rather a defence of the modern situation which thereby reveals Engels' estimate of the primitive order. This material appeared in 1872 in an attack on a series of articles on the housing question in the Volkstaat, a socialist paper. The writer had deplored the destruction of the home and family by modern industrial society and life and had concluded:

1. Cf. H. Krause, Marx und Engels und das zeitgenössische Russland, 99; G. Mayer, Friedrich Engels: Eine Biographie, II, 437ff.; J.M. Cameron, "Agents and Victims", The Listener, LXIV (No. 1643, 22/9/60), 460; E. Bernstein, "Bemerkungen ueber Engels' Ursprung der Familie", Socialistische Monatshefte, (1900), 451-454 (Bernstein qualifies his assertion).

2. L.H. Morgan, Ancient Society (1877). Marx excerpted this in 1881 and Engels used his excerpts and notes in the writing of Der Ursprung der Familie, des Privateigentums und des Staats in 1884.

In this respect we are far below the savages. The troglodyte has his cave, the Australian his clay hut, the Indian his own hearth, but the modern proletarian is practically suspended in midair...³

Engels replies that the situation of the proletarian is necessary to the development and the final triumph of man (it is noted that he is usually considering the rural peasant and small-holder, not the primitive man). He says that it was "...absolutely necessary to cut the umbilical cord which still bound the worker of the past to the land..."⁴, as the hand-weaver was bound in his life and mentality to the status quo. The economic revolution of large scale industry, transforming the worker into a propertyless proletarian, freeing him from all traditional fetters, has "...created the sole conditions under which the exploitation of the working class in its final form, in capitalist production, can be overthrown."⁵ This homeless condition is not a retrogression but the first condition of the proletariat's "intellectual emancipation".⁶ Modern proletarian conditions are a necessary part of the movement of history toward the development of mankind.

Engels goes on to draw a point from the method of his earliest work, The Condition of the Working Class in England in 1844 and says this work described the process of driving people from their homes to the cities in all its infamy. However, this was not considered a retrogression but a necessary progress.

3. SW, I, 510. 4. Ibid., 511. 5. Ibid. 6. Ibid.

But could it enter my head to regard this, which was in the circumstances an absolutely necessary historical process of development, as a retrogression "below the savages"? Impossible! The English proletariat of 1872 is on an infinitely higher level than the rural weaver of 1772 with his "hearth and home". And will the troglodyte with his cave, the Australian with his clay hut or the Indian with his own hearth ever accomplish a June insurrection or a Paris Commune?⁷

That the condition of the workers is worse since the introduction of capitalism is doubted only by the bourgeois; however:

But should we therefore look backward longingly to the (likewise very meagre) fleshpots of Egypt, to rural small-scale industry, which produced only servile souls, or to "the savages"? On the contrary. Only the proletariat created by modern large-scale industry, liberated from all inherited fetters including those which chained it to the land, and herded together in the big cities, is in a position to accomplish the great social transformation which will put an end to all class exploitation and all class rule.⁸

This abolition of exploitation and class rule is to be accomplished by the very revolution in production which makes the earlier mode of life impossible and which is constantly expanding its dominion over the productive life of mankind by its complex social system of production.

And it is precisely this industrial revolution which has raised the productive power of human labour to such a high level that--for the first time in the history of humanity--the possibility exists, given a rational division of labour among all, of producing not only enough for the plentiful consumption of all members of society and for an abundant reserve fund, but also of leaving each individual sufficient leisure so that

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

what is really worth preserving in historically inherited culture--science, art, forms of intercourse--may not only be preserved but converted from a monopoly of the ruling class into the common property of the whole of society, and may be further developed.⁹

The necessity of a class freed from the production of subsistence had always been the justification for class rule, and now that has been removed, says Engels.

In these passages Engels clearly sets forth the basis of his thought and of the historical view he holds. The immaturity of the primitive condition, the necessity of its death, and the evils accompanying that death are both clearly enunciated, and the superiority of the modern life, in even its worse forms, over the primitive life is affirmed.

This view receives a more complete expression, especially in direct connection with primitive society, in 1874-75 in an article entitled "On Social Relations in Russia".¹⁰ Replying to the idea that Russia could have a revolution much more easily than the West because they had no capitalistic power to overcome, Engels replies in a passage which has direct reference to primitive communism and includes Engels' evaluation of it. The goal of modern socialism, he says, is the victory of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie and the formation of a

9. Ibid., 512.

10. SW, II, 46-56 (see The Russian Menace to Europe, 203ff. for another translation of it and the whole of it; SW omits the opening paragraphs.

classless society, for which victory not only the proletariat is required, "...but also a bourgeoisie in whose hands the productive forces of society have developed so far that they allow of the final destruction of class distinctions."¹¹ A classless society often exists among savages and every people has had such a stage, he says. However:

It could not occur to us to re-establish this state, for the simple reason that class distinctions necessarily emerge out of it as the productive forces of society develop. Only at a certain level of development of the productive forces of society, an even very high level for our modern conditions, does it become possible to raise production to such an extent that the abolition of class distinctions can be a real progress, can be lasting without bringing about stagnation or even decline in the mode of social production. But the productive forces have reached this level of development only in the hands of the bourgeoisie.¹²

Engels thus notes the similarity of the universal form of primitive communism to modern socialism, only to dismiss it because it is necessarily dissolved in the development of productive power. The new communism is a radically different thing requiring the total historical development to institute it.

This view is reiterated by Engels in the same article when discussing the question of the future of the mir in Russia. He mentions the widespread existence of the primitive community among the Indo-Germanic peoples "...on a low level of development from India to Ireland..." and even in Malaya under Indian influence.¹³ It has existed in India down to the present in "...a whole series of forms..." while, in Western Europe,

11. SW, II, 46.

12. Ibid., 46-47.

13. Ibid., 52

Poland and Little Russia, "...at a certain stage in the social development, this communal ownership became a fetter, a brake on agricultural production, and was more and more eliminated."¹⁴ However, in Russia it still exists, "...thereby proving in the first place that here agricultural production and the social conditions in the countryside corresponding to it are still very undeveloped, as is actually the case."¹⁵ Therefore, if this form of society is to be of any value to modern communism, it must be raised to a higher form: the peasants must begin to work collectively (instead of owning collectively while working privately), and there must be a revolution in the West providing the material help for a revolution in the whole agricultural system.¹⁶ Hence even in the event that there is some service for the surviving primitive communes in the modern order, it is dependent upon their acquisition of the benefits of the progress of these areas which have outgrown the primitive order (and

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid., 54: "Nevertheless, the possibility undeniably exists of raising this form of society to a higher one, if it should last until circumstances are ripe for that, and if it shows itself capable of development in such a manner that the peasants no longer cultivate the land separately, but collectively; of raising it to this higher form without it being necessary for the Russian peasants to go through the intermediate stage of bourgeois small holdings. This, however, can only happen if, before the complete break-up of communal ownership, a proletarian revolution is successfully carried out in Western Europe, creating for the Russian peasant the pre-conditions requisite for such a transition, particularly the material conditions which he needs if only to carry the revolution necessarily connected therewith of his whole agricultural system."

which have suffered the consequences of the modern development of industry and social conditions.)

In addition to these deficiencies in the primitive commune there was a positive evil: they are afflicted with isolation and form the basis of oriental despotism:

Such a complete isolation of the individual communities from one another, which creates throughout the country similar, but the very opposite of common, interests, is the natural basis for oriental despotism, and from India to Russia this form of society, where it prevailed, has always produced it and has always found its complement in it.¹⁷

Not only does the primitive state represent the lack of the mastery of nature, it also represents the lack of the inter-connection of mankind and this allows the formation of the most absolute type of State!

It should be noted in passing that Engels holds to a universal occurrence of the primitive form (though he specifies the Indo-Germanic peoples), and that he knows of a whole series of forms in India, where in some cases the land is cultivated in common and the product divided while in others it is cultivated privately. Thus Engels is aware of a progression of the nature of the communes and presumably sees a development in the forms.

In 1875-76 there is clear indication that Engels has followed the lead of Marx's discovery in Maurer that the original social form of mankind was the larger group from which the family developed. This antedates the appearance of Morgan's

17. Ibid., 53.

work, Ancient Society (1877) as well as being before his acquaintance with Morgan's work.¹⁸ In a letter to P.L. Lawrow in 1875 he wrote concerning the Darwinian struggle for existence, that he could not accept it as the first phase of human development:

Meiner Ansicht nach war der Gesellschaftstrieb einer der wesentlichsten Hebel der Entwicklung des Menschen aus dem Affen. Die ersten Menschen muessen in Rudeln gelebt haben, und soweit wir zurueckblicken koennen, finden wir, dass dies der Fall war.¹⁹

The following year he again expresses this concept very clearly when he says that man originated from social animals - bands of apes living in trees, and "...it is obviously impossible to seek the derivation of the most social of all animals, from non-gregarious immediate ancestors."²⁰ Engels definitely followed the lead of Marx, who was influenced by Maurer in 1868, in considering the tribe or band of men as the original unit of society as opposed to the individual family.

It should also be noted that in this writing of Engels he clearly sees human society as originating in the work and progress of human life, not in the original natural grouping of

18. Cf. Marx to Engels, 14/3/68, MEGA, Abt.III, Bd.IG, 27ff., and Engels note in Capital, I, 370, note 2. As we shall see later Engels does not appear to have really known Morgan's work before the beginning of 1884.

19. Engels to Lawrow, 12-17/11/75, in Ausgewahlte Briefe, (Berlin, 1953), 359.

20. SW, II, 76; cf. 74,78. This is found in an unfinished manuscript published first in 1896 in Die Neue Zeit, (XIV, Bd.2, 545-554); cf. Engels, Dialectics of Nature, (Moscow, 1954), 423, note 91. Its title: "The Part Played by Labour in the Transition from Ape to Man."

men. The natural association found in the rawest state of men is increased and expanded by labour which increases the points of mutual contact and dependence.²¹

Here then are found the essentials of Engels' view of primitive communism, a view which he held until his death two decades later. In it, primitive communism (1) occurs in a low stage of productive development, (2) necessarily disintegrates into class society as production increases, (3) is a foundation of despotism where it does not so develop, and (4) its modern remnants cannot be transformed of themselves into a modern communism but must receive the help of the material progress of Western capitalistic society which has given rise to the proletarian revolution and modern communism. This view is thoroughly consistent with that found in Marx, and portrays the development of man into a being controlling his existence, both material and social, which development builds upon its past progress, making this progress and its evils necessary.

11

Beginning the first of the year, 1877, Engels published a series of articles in the Vorwaerts (Leipzig; successor to the Volksstaat) against the views of Eugen Dühring which had appeared earlier. These were published in 1878 as a book

21. Ibid., 76,77-78.

entitled Anti-Duehring (or Herrn Eugen Duehrings Umwaeltung der Wissenschaft).²² The work of Duehring had covered a wide range of subject matter and Engels' writing attacked this; hence the statements about primitive society must be gathered together and systematized. Further, Engels did not consider this a systematic statement on the subject and wished to re-write it but did not because of the existence of the Origin of 1864.²³

As in the previous writings, primitive communism is said to occur from India to Ireland in the early history of all civilised peoples and persists today in India and Russia; though he is still limited to statements about Indo-European peoples:²⁴ Germans, Celts, Slavs. Further he is aware of the fact of a variety of its forms of existence and dissolution: "...seiner verschieden Daseins- und Aufloesungsformen...".²⁵

He definitely holds to a development of the basic primeval form into its final form of dissolution. In at least one place he distinguishes between the primitive communism of the world

22. Anti-Duehring (German edition: 11th., Dietz, Stuttgart, 1921; English edition, Moscow, 1954). Cf. the Preface for the account of its writing (pages vii-x of the German edition and 9-13 of the English edition).

23. Anti-Duehring, xiv(E. 16). In the Origin he says that Morgan was the "... first person with expert knowledge to attempt to introduce a definite order into the prehistory of man..." (S, II, 169).

24. Anti-Duehring, 183, 187, 140-141 (E. 244, 248, 191); also in the preparatory notes printed in the English edition, 487.

25. Ibid., 183(E. 244).

of savagery and that of the later agricultural communities of civilised peoples: "...die noch in den naturwuechsigen, ackerbautreibenden Gemeinwesen der spaetern Kulturvoelker fortduert."²⁶ And in the process of dissolution, there is a series of intermediate stages before the final advent of private property: "Es wird aufgehoben, negirt, nach kuerzern oder laengern Zwischenstufen in Privateigenthum verwandelt."²⁷ It is important to keep in mind the fact of this view of a progressive development within the primitive form itself, in order to evaluate correctly the influence of Morgan on Engels.

Description of Primitive Communism

The descriptive statements made by Engels nearly all refer to the agricultural communities of which he has some knowledge - Slavic and Indian especially. There is a variety of landholding forms in these: some till the land jointly and divide the products, some temporarily distribute the land for individual tilling and maintain common pasture and woodland.²⁸ Common to all of them, however, is the absence of commodity production. Instead, work and products are distributed

26. Ibid., 137(E.248). Cf. 150(204) where he speaks of the recognisable survivals of the primitive forms with which all civilized peoples enter history.

27. Ibid., 141(E. 191).

28. Ibid., 135, 337(English, 244, 431-432).

according to tradition and requirements.²⁹

The communism of these communities is neither perfect nor is it the result of an ideal of equality. Equality of rights did not apply to all members of the commune, only to the male members:

In den ältesten, naturwuchsigem Gemeinwesen konnte von Gleichberechtigung höchstens unter den Gemeindegliedern die Rede sein; Weiber, Sklaven, Fremden waren von selbst davon ausgeschlossen.³⁰

It is not explicitly stated, but is implied in the statements about the dissolution of primitive communism, that the primitive mode of production and resulting scarcity gave rise to the communal form (cf. the latter discussion of this point). There is no complete communism in these communities as private property exists in certain objects.³¹

Within this ancient communal form are to be found the natural beginnings of aristocracy, based upon custom and consent rather than upon exploitation and class rule.

Selbst die Bildung einer naturwuchsigem Aristokratie, wie sie bei Kelten, Germanen und im Indischen Fuenfstromland auf Grund des gemeinsamen Bodeneigenthums erfolgt,

29. Ibid., 334-335 (E.428-429): "Die Warenproduktion ist indess keineswegs die ausschliessliche Form der gesellschaftlichen Produktion. In den altindischen Gemeinwesen, in der suedslavischen Familiengemeinde verwandeln sich die Produkte nicht in Waaren. Die Mitglieder der Gemeinde sind unmittelbar zur Produktion vergesellschaftet, die Arbeit wird nach Herkommen und Beduerfniss vertheilt, die Produkte, soweit sie zur Konsumtion kommen, ebenfalls. Die unmittelbar gesellschaftliche Produktion wie die direkte Vertheilung schliessen allen Waarenaustausch aus, also auch die Verwandlung der Produkte in Waaren (wenigstens innerhalb der Gemeinde), damit auch ihre Verwandlung in Werte." Cf. 167 (E.223-224).

30. Ibid., 100 (E.144; cf. 476 of preparatory notes).

31. Ibid., 167 (E.223): "Es besteht schon, wenn auch unter
(contd. next page)

beruht sunächst keineswegs auf Gewalt, sondern auf Freiwilligkeit und Gewohnheit.³²

State functions also originate naturally from tasks assigned to certain individuals.

In jedem solchen Gemeinwesen bestehen von Anfang an gewisse gemeinsame Interessen, deren Wahrung Einzelnen, wenn auch unter Aufsicht der Gesamtheit, uebertragen werden muss: Entscheidung von Streitigkeiten; Repression von Uebergriffen Einzelner ueber ihre Berechtigung hinaus; Aufsicht ueber Gewässer, besonders in heissen Laendern; endlich, bei der Waldurspruenglichkeit der Zustände, religiöse Funktionen. Dergleichen Beantungen finden sich in den urwechsigem Gemeinwesen zu jeder Zeit, so in den aeltesten deutschen Markgenossenschaften und noch heute in Indian. Sie sind selbstredend mit einer gewissen Machtvollkommenheit ausgeruestet und die Anfänge der Staatsgewalt.³³

In addition to this, these communes, "...wo sie fortbestanden, bilden seit Jahrtausenden die Grundlage der rohesten Staatsform, der orientalischen Despotie, von Indien bis Russland."³⁴ This state does not rest upon a society torn by conflicts between classes and by the division of labour and commodity production.

Discolution of Primitive Society.

In Anti-Duhring there are two phases of the process of disintegration of the primitive community. The first of these might be termed the growth of the "natural state" just mentioned and quoted.³⁵ Following the formation of this natural state, the

(footnote contd.) Beschränkung auf gewisse Gegenstände, in der uralten naturwechsigem Gemeinde aller Kulturvoelker."

32. Ibid., 167(E. 224).

33. Ibid., 187(E.248); cf. 151(205) for a similar statement.

34. Ibid., 190(E. 251). 35. Ibid., 187(E. 248).

following development takes place, within the context of primitive communities: the increase in productivity and population leads to new points of common and conflicting interests between the separate communities and this new grouping into larger communities creates new organs for the promotion of common interests. These find themselves detached from the interests of each particular community and even in opposition at times; then follows an even further development of independence - the offices become hereditary, and they become increasingly necessary because of the growing number of conflicts. With time (and Engels neglects to trace the final stages of the process) the officials gradually become lords and unite into a ruling class.³⁶ Here is a purely communal

36. Ibid., 187(E.248-249): "Allmaelig steigern sich die Produktivkraft; die dichtere Beveelkerung schafft hier gemeinsame, dert widerstreitende Interessen zwischen den einzelnen Gemeinwesen, deren Gruppierung zu grossern Ganzen wiederum eine neue Arbeitstheilung, die Schaffung von Organen zur Wahrung der gemeinsamen, zur abwehr der widerstreitenden Interessen hervorruft. Diese Organe, die schon als Vertreter der gemeinsamen Interessen der ganzen Gruppe, jeden einzelnen Gemeinwesen gegenueber eine besondere unter Umstaenden sogar gegenseetsliche Stellung haben, verselbstaendigen sich bald noch mehr, theils durch die, in einer Welt, wo alles naturwueschsig hergeht, fast selbstaendlich eintretende Erblichkeit der Amtsfuehrung, theils durch ihre, mit der Vernehrung der Konflikte mit andern Gruppen wachsende Unentbehrlichkeit. Wie diese Verselbstaendigung der gesellschaftlichen Funktion gegenueber der Gesellschaft mit der Zeit sich bis zur Herrschaft ueber die Gesellschaft steigern konnte, wie der urspruengliche Diener, wo die Gelegenheit gunstig, sich allmaelig in den Herren verwandelte, wie je nach den Umstaenden dieser Herr als orientalischer Despot oder Satrap, als griecher Stammfuerst, als keltischer Clanschef u.s.v. auftrat, wie weit er sich bei dieser Verwandlung schliesslich auch der Gewalt bediente, wie endlich die einzelnen herrschenden Personen sich zu einer herrschenden Klasse zusammenfuegten, darauf brauchen wir hier nicht einzugehen. Es kommt hier nur

development on the basis of communal conflict and needs, not upon the basis of class conflict: the whole process indeed produces a class conflict. This comes about by the slow working of natural processes and custom. The only division of labour is that of social offices voluntarily created.

Alongside this process Engels finds another, and this one is the classic Marxist one based upon private property and class divisions: "Neben dieser Klassenbildung ging aber noch eine andre."³⁷ This second formation of classes is the development of slavery, which occurred especially in lands where the communal ownership had disintegrated, or at least had developed to the allotment for private cultivation.³⁸ Therefore it is necessary that this process be exhibited up to this point from other sections of the work and then the exposition of this section be continued in its natural place in the sequence.

The beginning of this second process appears to be in the existence of limited private property in the primitive communities and the fact of exchange between different communities, which two inter-acted to bring about the development of private property, division of labour and commodity production. The more exchange destroyed the natural division of labour the more did inequality develop in the property owned by members of the commune and the communal basis of landed property was

(footnote contd.) darauf an, festzustellen, dass der politischen Herrschaft ueberall eine gesellschaftliche Antsthaetigkeit zu Grunde lag; und die politische Herrschaft hat auch darin nur auf die Dauer bestanden, wenn sie diese ihre gesellschaftliche Antsthaetigkeit vollzog."

37. Ibid., 188(E. 249).

38. Ibid., 188(250).

undermined. The peasants found it to their advantage to end the communal property system, as they were doing in the 19th C. on the Mosel.³⁹ This development is intertwined with the development of the economic life of mankind and its increased productivity:

Ueberall, wo das Privateigenthum sich herausbildet, geschieht dies in Folge veränderter Produktions- und Austausch- verhältnisse, im Interesse der Steigerung der Produktion und der Foerderung des Verkehrs-- also aus economischen Ursachen.⁴⁰

This is the same process which Marx gave in Capital and elsewhere - a process which is propelled by the trade between communities and which only later gives rise to exchange within the community.

In another chapter Engels gives a step by step account of this disintegration: (1) money forces the commodity form on nearly all objects, even those for consumption, and thereby dissolves the community into a mass of private producers, (2) then follows the ending of joint tillage, (3) later the joint ownership of the tillage area is terminated, first being periodically redistributed, then by a final distribution, (4) finally the woodland and pasture, or the common ground, is divided.⁴¹ It is at this point that the development has reached the stage of the introduction of slavery mentioned previously:

39. Ibid., 167-168(E. 224).

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid., 337(E. 431-432).

Dies /introduction of alien labour into the family/war besonders der Fall in Laendern, wo der alte Gemeinbesitz am Boden bereits zerfallen oder durch doch wenigstens die alte gemeinsame Bebauung der Einzelbebauung der Bodenanteile durch die entsprechenden Familien gewichen war.⁴²

The productivity of the natural division of labour and the developing commodity production makes possible this enlargement of the labour force: slavery itself makes possible the division of labour between industry and agriculture on a larger scale and thereby brings about the decay of the older communities.⁴³ This development into slavery (to be seen in the paragraphs on evaluation of Primitive society) was again an advance in the development of mankind.

The result of this second development unites with that of the first: "Erstens beruht alle politische Gewalt urspruenglich auf einer oekonomischen, gesellschaftlichen Funktion..." - this is the "natural state" function or the first development of the classes - "...und steigert sich in dem Mass, wie durch Aufloesung der urspruenglichen Gemeinwesen die Gesellschaftsglieder in Privatproduzenten verwandelt," (this is the second or economic process of the formation of classes), "...also den Verwaltern der gemeinschaftlichen Funktionen noch mehr entfremdet werden."⁴⁴ As differences in wealth and in distribution proceed by virtue of the money economy and slavery, economic classes form which are possessors and dispossessed,

42. Ibid., 188(E. 250).

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid., 191-192(E. 253).

exploiters and exploited, rulers and ruled: the state then becomes just as much a means of maintaining these conditions as of providing for those common interests which originally brought it into being.

Mit den Unterschieden in der Vertheilung aber treten die Klassenunterschiede auf. Die Gesellschaft theilt sich in bevorzugte und benachtheiligte, ausbeutende und ausgebeutete, herrschende und beherrschte Klassen, und der Staat, zu dem sich die naturwuchsigsten Gruppen gleichstammiger Gemeinden zunächst nur behufs der Wahrung gemeinsamer Interessen (Berieselung im Orient z.B.) und Wegen des Schutzes nach Aussen fortentwickelt hatten, erhebt von nun an ebensowohl den Zweck, die Lebens- und Herrschaftsbedingungen der herrschenden gegen die beherrschte Klasse mit Gewalt aufrecht zu erhalten.⁴⁵

The dissolution of the primitive society is soon to be closely bound to certain spontaneous natural developments on the one hand, and on the other, to be the result and the further cause, of increased productivity.

Engels' Evaluation of Primitive Society.

We have already seen that Engels saw a limited equality in the ancient commune: slaves, women, and non-members were not direct participants in this equality. The equality itself was based upon the mode of production, not upon principles of justice or concepts of human dignity. Further we have seen that aristocracy and state functions arose within the commune before its dissolution into a commodity - producing unit. In an

45. Ibid., 151(E. 205).

aside he says that war was a characteristic of these communes:

"...und der Krieg war so alt wie die gleichzeitige Existenz mehrerer Gemeinschaftsgruppen neben einander."⁴⁶ In fact man is not far removed from the animals in the first stages of history:

Wie die Menschen urspruenglich aus dem Thierreich—in engern Sinne—heraustreten, so treten sie in die Geschichte ein: noch halb Thiere, roh, noch ohnmächtig gegenüber den Kräften der Natur, noch unbekannt mit ihren eigenen; daher arm wie die Thiere und kaum produktiver als sie.⁴⁷

In addition to this, the primitive forms of property and government themselves lead to the most cruel form of state when there is no development into slavery and class antagonisms with their own state-forms. In defence of slavery he says:

...die Einführung der Sklaverei unter den damaligen Umständen ein grosser Fortschritt war. Es ist nun einmal eine Thatsache, dass die Menschheit von Thiere angefangen, und daher barbarische, fast thierische Mittel nothig gehabt hat, in sich aus der Barbarei herauszuarbeiten. Die Alten Gemeinwesen, wo sie forthaten, bilden seit Jahrtausenden die Grundlage der rohesten Staatsform, der orientalischen Despotie, von Indien bis Russland. Nur wo sie sich auflösten, sind die Völker aus sich selbst weiter vorgeschritten, und ihr mächtigster ökonomischer Fortschritt bestand in der Steigerung und Fortbildung der Produktion vermittelt der Sklavenarbeit.⁴⁸

The only possible means of progress in the arts and sciences when there was so little surplus was a division of labour in society, the simplest form of which was slavery.

Having seen Engels' evaluation of primitive society it is to be expected that when he speaks of the "negation of the

46. Ibid., 139(E. 250). 47. Ibid., 186-187(E. 248).

48. Ibid., 139-190(E. 251).

negation" that he will make clear that it is no restoration. He uses this to illustrate the philosophical principle: the social revolution is to negate the earlier negation of communal property and to restore common property on a higher plane of development. He points out that all peoples had common property but that it was outmoded and had to be transformed into private property in the interests of production. However, today private property has itself produced a situation in which it is a fetter and common ownership must be reinstated.

Die Forderung, es ebenfalls zu negieren, es wieder in Gemeingut zu verwandeln, tritt mit Notwendigkeit hervor. Aber diese Forderung bedeutet nicht die Wiederherstellung des alturspruenglichen Gemeineigentums, sondern die Herstellung einer weit hochern, entwickeltern Form von Gemeinbesitz, die weit entfernt der Produktion eine Schranke zu werden, sie vielmehr erst entfesseln und ihr die volle Ausnutzung der modernen chemischen Entdeckungen und mechanischen Erfinden gestatten wird.⁴⁹

Even in non-economic and non-social discussion Engels does not forget to qualify any statement concerning the similarity of primitive communism to modern communism.

In this exposition of Engels' continuing viewpoint the details of his writings immediately after Anti-Duehring are not given but are grouped together in a later study of the background and writing of the Origin etc. Here we shall only mention several remarks which reveal his continuing evaluation of primitive society. The first of these is in a letter to

49. Ibid., 141(E. 191).

Kautsky, February 16, 1884, when he was reading Marx's excerpts on Morgan and recommending Morgan with enthusiasm. He is recommending J.V.B. Honey's book on Java which Marx also excerpted in the same notebook as Morgan's book and saying that someone should utilise the book in a criticism of state and socialism.

Hier sieht man, wie die Holländer auf Grundlage des alten Gemeindegemeinschafts die Produktion von Staatswegen organisiert... Resultat: Erhaltung des Volkes auf der Stufe naturwuechsiger Dummheit und Einkassierung von 70 Mill. Mark jährlich... Nebenbei Devis, wie der Urkommunismus dort wie in Indien und Russland heute die schönste breiteste Grundlage der Ausbeutung und des Despotismus liefert (solange kein modern - kommunistisches Element ihn aufruehrt), und sich in der Mitte der modernen Gesellschaft ebensowohl als schreiender (zu beseitigender oder aber fortschreitender) Anachronismus bewährt, wie die unabhängige Markgenossenschaft der Urkantone.⁵⁰

First Engels reveals his contempt for the "naturwuechsiger Dummheit" of the primitive order of society, and second he reiterates his view that primitive communism is the basis of despotism and is an anachronism which must either be eliminated or developed further (as he had said in the letter on Russia).

In the Origin etc. itself, after having described in glowing terms the nature of savage men and their gentile organisation with its freedom from oppression and state functions, Engels goes on to say: "This is one side of the picture. Let

50. Marx-Engels, Briefe an A. Bebel, W. Liebknecht, K. Kautsky und Andere (Moscow, 1933), I, 324-325. Hereafter cited as: Briefe an Bebel, Liebknecht, Kautsky.

us not forget, however, that this organisation was doomed to extinction."⁵¹ It never developed beyond the tribe and attempts at confederation to accomplish this, proved its downfall: and, "What was outside the tribe was outside the law," which resulted in continuous warfare where there was no express treaty of peace.⁵²

Further:

The gentile constitution in full bloom, as we have seen it in America, presupposed an extremely undeveloped form of production, that is, an extremely sparse population spread over a wide territory, and therefore the almost complete domination of man by external nature, alien, opposed, incomprehensible to him, a domination reflected in his childish religious ideas.⁵³

Not only does nature seem an alien power, it is also the giver of the form of society: the gens and tribe and their institutions

...were sacred and inviolable, a superior power instituted by nature, to which the individual remained absolutely subject in feeling, thought and deed. Impressive as the people of this epoch may appear to us they differ in no way one from another, they are still bound, as Marx says, to the umbilical cord of the primordial community. The power of these primordial communities had to be broken, and it was broken. But it was broken by influences which from the outset appear to us a degradation, a fall from the simple moral grandeur of the ancient gentile society.⁵⁴

In these statements Engels states clearly that the disintegration of the primitive community was a necessity and that this community was not an adequate form of human existence. There is on the one hand the subservience to nature in the material sense: man has not developed his productive capacity

51. SW, II, 231.

52. Ibid.

53. Ibid.

54. Ibid.

to a truly human point and nature is a power over him, in terms of human need and human ignorance. On the other hand, man's social life is bound by the naturally given: the gens and tribe are sacrosanct social and political forms which keep the individual in subjection. Therefore, the development of the individual and the development of human society as a whole are both in bondage to nature: the tribe is the limit of the intercourse of men and either express treaty or warfare lie beyond it. In such a society mankind can only exist in conflicting pockets of isolation. In all these respects then, man is both unfree and immature in the primitive order of society, according to Engels in the Origin, and this is the basic point of reference for the other statements concerning the "simple moral grandeur" of the primitive savage. (All of which could have been said by Marx in the Grundrisse remarks about the "great" and the "beautiful" in the ancient world.)

Another important point of Engels' view is found in a letter to Kautsky in June of 1884. He is correcting an article by Kautsky and takes exception to the latter's presentation of the inter-relation of means of production and forms of society. Kautsky, said Engels, has made it appear that now, in capitalistic society, the means of production determines society but that this was not so in earlier times. However, Engels asserts, the tool of the savage determines his society just as much as the productive means of capitalism: there is no "Fall" because of modern

instruments.

Die Werkzeuge des Wilden bedingen seine Gesellschaft grade so gut wie die neueren die kapitalische Gesellschaft. Deine Ansicht laeuft darauf hinaus, dass die Produktion zwar jetzt die gesellsch artliche Institution bestimmt, aber vor der kapit alistischen Produktion dies nicht getan, weil die Werkzeuge noch keinen Sündenfall begangen.⁵⁵

Here we see the dependence of primitive communism's form upon the instruments that it used--or upon its mode of production, hence the principle that man's development technologically is the basis of his development socially, as in modern communism. There is no innate nature of man in primitive communism which is lost in the development of property. Engels rejects the idea of a "fall" in his satirical use of it.

iv

In 1894 Engels edited a book of articles entitled Internationales aus dem "Volksstaat" (1871-1875) which included his article of 1875 in reply to Tkachov. He wrote a postscript to this article⁵⁶ reconsidering some of its statements in view of developments since then. It is not our purpose to consider the main argument but to see what he was thinking about primitive society in 1894.

55. Marx-Engels, Briefe an Babel, Liebknecht, Kautsky, I, 345.

56. This is found in translation in The Russian Menace to Europe, 229-241, entitled: "Russia and the Social Revolution Reconsidered".

Communal ownership is common to the prehistory of "... all peoples at a certain stage of development."⁵⁷ The Russian village has existed for years without any impetus to develop a higher form of communal property, hence is similar to the German, Indian, Celtic, and other forms which have always lost their communal nature and disintegrated into private proprietors. "In fact", he says, "agrarian communism, a derivative of gentile society, has never developed anywhere out of its own forces anything but its own disintegration."⁵⁸

The question that now faces them is whether this form of society, in the capitalist era, can make a leap from this primitive communism into a higher form of communism and eliminate the capitalist stage which enriches it with its technological developments.⁵⁹ First of all, if this is to be done, these material resources of the West must be available to the commune, for it to grow and expand. Secondly, there must be a revolution in the West in order that the knowledge of how to organize modern technology on a socialistic basis will be available. This they cannot get from their own experience and situation:

How could it acquire the gigantic productive forces of capitalistic society in the form of socially owned property and instruments of production before capitalistic society itself has brought about this revolution? How could the Russian communities show the world how to operate heavy industry collectively when they have already forgotten how to cultivate their own lands for their common good?⁶⁰

57. Ibid., 229.

58. Ibid., 233.

59. Ibid., 232.

60. Ibid., 233.

This would be impossible because, first, the people who know how to do this are not in the communes while the fifty million people in the communes haven't the slightest notion, and second:

...it is an historic impossibility that a lower stage of economic development would be able to solve the problems and conflicts which have arisen and can only arise on a much higher stage of development. /There is a common characteristic - that of communally owned means of production- in both gentile society and modern socialism./ ... This ~~one~~ common characteristic, however, does not enable the lower form of society to create out of itself the future socialistic society, this uttermost, final product of capitalism.⁶¹

This is an important point. Engels has given expression to the basic premise of this thesis, that the communal form (itself not identical in the two stages when the bases of them are examined) is not the sole determinant of the essence of man and that there is another factor involved, that of technological advance. The primitive and the modern communism represent two different realities. Thus Engels continues:

Each given economic system has to solve its own problems which originate within itself; for one system to seek to solve the problems of other, quite alien systems, would be absolute nonsense. And this goes for the Russian community no less than for the South Slavic, zadruga, for the Indian gentile household, or for any savage or barbaric social system characterized by common ownership of the means of production.⁶²

It is not some abstract ideal or idealized form of society which is to be instituted in the future, but the incipient development of modern society into socialist society which

61. Ibid., 234.

62. Ibid.

Engels seeks and promotes. Primitive society is not modern socialist society and without the presuppositions of modern socialist society to feed it, it must die. It must receive the material benefits of the capitalist stage of society and it must receive the intellectual achievements of this stage, as well as the example of the revolution and its socialist society.⁶³

In addition to the inability of the primitive commune to develop into a higher form of communism alone, Engels again mentions the evils of isolation which afflict it and make it the basis of despotism. (It should be remembered that the original article to which this one refers had a very sharp and explicit attack upon this; this one presupposes the original and the allusion found in it confirms the original.) He says that the first condition of the preservation of the communes is a revolution in Russia which would

...life the great mass of the nation, the peasants, out of the isolation of their villages, of the mir which forms their world, and place them onto the great stage where they will learn to know the world abroad and with it themselves, their condition and the means to emancipate themselves from their present poverty.⁶⁴

63. Ibid., 234-235. Cf. Engels to Danielson, 17/10/93:

"I would go further, and say, that no more in Russia than anywhere else would it have been possible to develop a higher social form out of primitive agrarian communism unless-- that higher form was already in existence in another country, so as to serve as a model. That higher form being, wherever it is historically possible, the necessary consequence of the capitalistic form of production and of the social dualistic antagonism created by it, it could not be developed directly out of the agrarian commune, unless in imitation of an example already in existence somewhere else." (Ausgewählte Briefe, (Berlin, 1953), 554 - the original is in English.

64. Marx-Engels, The Russian Menace to Europe, 241.

Throughout the writings of Engels, over a period of about twenty years, the basic view of primitive society remains constant. Primitive society is imperfect because of:

- (1) its low stage of productivity and human mastery of nature;
- (2) increased production (necessary for human development) causes its decay;
- (3) isolation of the small groups and the lack of the development of an organic relation between them causes them to be the basis of despotism;
- (4) the modern remnants of these must avail themselves of the material and productive achievements of the capitalistic - socialistic era of modern man. Any statements that Engels became a romantic who believed in the original goodness of man in the savage existence must be made on the basis of this persisting view of primitive society, not in opposition to it.

V

In order to assess accurately the influence of Morgan on Engels, we must determine what Engels was thinking before he read Morgan, his comments on the significance of Morgan and his purpose in writing the Origin etc. (From the end of 1880 to March of 1881 Marx was reading Morgan and others on primitive society, and in March he sent the reply to the letter from Zasulich.) From some time in 1881 to 1882 Engels was writing a manuscript on the history of the Germans, only recently

published.⁶⁵ In this he mentions the fact of blood kinship being one of the marks of primitive society.⁶⁶

During the second half of 1882 Engels was also writing a short article entitled "Die Mark" which appeared as an appendix to Die Entwicklung des Sozialismus von der Utopie (1883). He mentions this in a letter to Bebel as early as September 23, 1882, and recommends to Bebel that he secure Maurer's books for a good grounding in all debates relating to landed property and the agricultural question (which questions he related to the primitive conditions in Germany, in "Die Mark").⁶⁷ It is significant that in "Die Mark" Engels specifically states that communal property and social organization upon the basis of blood-kinship were both of natural origin (Zwei naturwuechtig entstehende Tatsachen...)⁶⁸ that there was not only equality of property but also that there was a democracy in government - officials did not make the law or judge the case, but merely presided while the group made the decisions.⁶⁹ And in passing, let it be noted that he speaks of

65. Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin, Zur Deutschen Geschichte, I, 33,34,86.

66. Ibid., 87.

67. Marx-Engels, Briefe an Bebel, Ischlnacht, Kautsky, I, 272-273; cf. "Die Mark" in Der Deutschen Emancipierung (1932 ed.) 137ff., especially the opening paragraph.

68. Engels, "Die Mark" in op. cit., 138.

69. Ibid., 144. This concept is fully developed and expressed in Marx's The Civil War in France, in SW, I, 468ff., written in 1870.

a natural aristocracy of tribal nobles who originated during or after the migrations of the German tribes (...wie alles mit dieser Verfassung zusammen naturwuechsig Entstandens...)⁷⁰ From these things we see that he is beginning to stress the factor of kinship as a ruling factor in primitive communal life and that there is a democracy (which produced an aristocracy out of itself, or naturally). Furthermore, in both the letter and the article, he mentions Maurer as being the best work on the subject; he gives absolutely no indication of being aware of Morgan's work (he said later that Marx mentioned him once but that he (Engels) had "andre Sachen im Kopf und, er kam nicht wieder zurueck"⁷¹ - apparently a true statement.

On November 22 he wrote Marx that he had received Geschichtschreiber der deutschen Vorzeit and proceeds to make several points drawn from "Plutarchs Marius" in relation to Caesar and Tacitus, involving, among other things, the common organisation of agriculture by kinship.⁷² On December 8 he writes that he has read part of Bancroft's The Native Races of the Pacific States of North America (1875-76) (which Marx received late in July 1877)⁷³ and he discusses the proof of

70. Engels, "Die Mark", in op. cit., 144.

71. Marx-Engels, Briefe an Bebel, Liebknecht, Kautsky, I, 325.

72. MEGA, Abt. III, Bd. IV, 573.

73. Ibid., 472 (Marx to Engels, 1/8/77).

his (Engels') view that the "jus primae noctis" is a remnant of communal sexual life.⁷⁴ He also notes the similarity of the American Indians to Tacitus' Germans, which he says is the more unusual in view of the difference in the modes of productive life (Indians: hunting and fishing; Germans: nomadic pastoral life and the beginnings of agriculture): hence proof that not the mode of production, but the degree of dissolution of the "alten Blutbande" and community of sex were the more decisive traits in primitive society.⁷⁵ He says that he will send Marx his article on the Mark, the brevity of which is proving difficult.

On December 15 Engels writes Marx, enclosing the manuscript of "Die Mark", and discusses the proof of a certain point in Maurer and Maurer's faults.⁷⁶ Marx returned the manuscript on December 18 with the remark: "Retour des Manuskripts; sehr gut!"⁷⁷ On December 21, Engels sent the manuscript to the printers in Zurich and wrote Bebel the next day to inform him of this and to tell him he would send the article as soon as he had proof sheets, in order that he might have a clearer introduction to the subject contained in Maurer.⁷⁸ Again is to be noted the preoccupation with Maurer and the complete absence of any reference to Morgan.

74. Ibid., 579 (Engels to Marx, 8/12/82). 75. Ibid.

76. Ibid., 581 (Engels to Marx, 15/12/82).

77. Ibid., 584 (Marx to Engels, 18/12/82).

78. Marx-Engels, Briefe an Bebel, Liebknecht, Kautsky, I, 283 (Engels to Bebel, 22/12/82). ("Die Mark" appeared as an appendix to Die Entwicklung des Sozialismus von der Utopie (Zurich, 1883), and in the Sozialdemokrat, 1883, nos. 12-17 (March-April).

On February 10, 1883, Engels wrote to Karl Kautsky, in reference to the latter's article on "Heterismus", that he (Engels) stood by the old view point (auf dem alten Standpunkt stehen) that the communal sex life was the most primitive, as had been proved in Bancroft's works: "Nicht die Rohheit beweist Urspruenglichkeit, sondern der Grad der Integritat der alten Stammes-Blutbände."⁷⁹ The remnants of this condition appear in the ritual of religious prostitution and the "ius primae noctis" and is based upon the same principle as that which allows the ground of private holdings in the feudal mark to revert to communal uses after the harvest and during fallow periods. This point is repeated in a letter on March 2 when Engels makes a critique of Kautsky's article "Die Entstehung der Ehe und Familie" (Kosmos, 1882; 190-207; 256-272).

Wo Gemeinschaft, sei es des Bodens oder der Weiber oder anderer Sachen besteht, da ist sie notwendig primitive, aus dem Tierreich mit ueberkommen. Die ganze weitere Entwicklung besteht in der Allmaechlichen Aufloesung dieser Urgemeinschaft, nie und nirgends finden wir ein Beispiel, dass aus urspruenglichen Sonderbesitz sich sekundae Gemeinschaft entwickelt haette.⁸⁰

Here then again, is an emphasis upon communal sex life and upon the original bond of blood ties. Also, it appears that the whole question of the history of the family and original communism is widely discussed. (Note also, that community of property or women are both said to be brought out from the animal kingdom -- at a low level of development.)

79. Ibid., 287; cf. 286-287(Engels to Kautsky, 10/2/83).

80. Ibid., 288.

In summary, it should be remembered that there is no indication that Engels was significantly aware of the work of Morgan during the years 1881-83. He fails to mention him in several situations in which he is recommending books upon the subject and he fails to mention him in any other connection. Further, it should be remembered that Engels is using the concept of communal marriage as the original family form, and democracy as the political form, as well as the communal form of property. These are not new concepts taken from Morgan (unless he is unconscious of their coming to him through Marx; but he saw little of Marx in these years except possibly the winter of 1881.)⁸¹ Finally, it should not be forgotten that discussions on this subject were nothing new, as Kautsky's articles indicate (and as in fact the literature cited in the Origin indicates).

Before going on to assess Engels' actual appreciation of Morgan, the conclusion must be drawn that he drew no startlingly new concepts from him; he is already using the main views of Morgan and is already concerned with the general subject matter of Morgan's studies.

81. Ibid., Cf. a chronology of these years: Christmas 1880: Engels visited by Bebel and Bernstein in London; January-March, 1881: Marx excerpts Morgan and others and writes to V. Zasulich; summer of 1881: Marx and his wife go to France and Marx is ill with pleurisy on their return; December 2, 1881: the death of Marx's wife; beginning of 1882: Marx goes to Ventnor, Isle of Wight, and to Algiers (Feb. 20); September 20, 1882: Marx returns to London; November 1882: Marx goes to Ventnor; January 12, 1883: Marx returns to London on death of his daughter; March 14: Marx's death. Cf. F. Mehring, Karl Marx, 550-554; G. Mayer, Friedrich Engels, II, 350ff.

Henry Lewis Morgan

Preliminary to surveying the Origin and Engels' thoughts on it, it is instructive to note the salient facts about Lewis Henry Morgan whose work evoked it. Born in New York State, Morgan "read" law after his graduation from college in 1840. During this period he became a member of a literary society which decided to reorganise as the Grand Order of the Iroquois for the purpose (set forth in its preamble):

To encourage a kinder feeling towards the Indian, founded upon a truer knowledge of his civil and domestic institutions, and of his capabilities for future elevation...⁸²

In order to model their society on the Iroquois organization Morgan became interested in their entire life and customs. Further, the Grand Order became involved in a legal battle against the Ogden Land Company which sought to usurp the rights of the Indians to their lands in New York. This and a friendship with Ely S. Parker, a prominent Seneca Indian, led Morgan closer to the Iroquois and Indian life generally; he was adopted into the Seneca tribe.⁸³

At this time there was much speculation about the origin of the American Indians: Asiatic, European, Hebrew, and indigenous American origins were given. Morgan believed that a study of kinship systems would prove that they were of Asiatic origin (language

⁸². Quoted by Leslie A. White in his introduction to L.H. Morgan, The Indian Journals, 3.

⁸³. Ibid., 4-6.

develops and was of little use, but kinship terminology was more stable and would reveal similarities to the parent society). He sent out questionnaires on the subject and was greatly excited by the reception of one on Tamil kinship which confirmed his view.⁸⁴ The use of government franking privileges for mailing a larger number of questionnaires resulted in a book, Systems of Consanguinity (1871). In 1877, Ancient Society appeared, a much more general work.

It has been customary to designate Morgan as an exponent of 18th Century natural right theory of early society. In 1958 Helmut Krause wrote:

Es ist hier nicht meine Aufgabe, Engels Stellung zu Morgan, der in gewisser Weise das so verpoente naturrechtliche Denken der Sozialschriftsteller der Aufklärung wieder aufnimmt und ihm einen wissenschaftlichen Beweis liefern will, naeher zu umschreiben.⁸⁵

This appears to be based upon Gustav Mayer's biography of Engels in which he speaks of Morgan as the "verspaeteten Schueler Jean Jacques".⁸⁶ Also, Gustav Schmoller thought that Morgan held "doktrinaire demokratische Ideale" which influenced his work and that he gave way to "...socialistischen Traeumen von einem kommunistischen Anfang der Geschichte, zu welchem sie zurueckkehren werde."⁸⁷ Whatever biographical research may

84. Ibid., 6-8. 85. Krause, op. cit., 99.

86. Mayer, op. cit., 438.

87. G. Schmoller, Grundriss der Allgemeinen Volkswirtschaftslehre, Bd. I, (1900), 231; Bd. II(1904), 657.

reveal about Morgan's intellectual inheritance, a reading of the statements of purpose in his book does not bear out this view of him.

The sub-title of Ancient Society reveals the main trend of Morgan's thought: "...or Researches in The Lines of Human Progress from Savagery, Through Barbarism To Civilization." In the preface, this progressive and evolutionary view is expressed more fully. There is now certainty of the great antiquity of mankind and of the facts that savagery preceded barbarism and that barbarism preceded civilization. Hence: "The history of the human race is one in source, one in experience, and one in progress."⁸⁸ Inventions and discoveries, and social and civil institutions are a register of the progress of humanity. They

...have embodied and preserved the principal facts now remaining illustrative of this experience. When collated and compared they tend to show the unity of origin of mankind, the similarity of human wants in the same stage of advancement, and the uniformity of the operations of the human mind in similar conditions of society.⁸⁹

Not only does Morgan assert this evolutionary view but he speaks of the maturing of human institutions in civilization: "The principal institutions of mankind originated in savagery, were developed in barbarism, and are maturing in civilization."⁹⁰ (And it should be noted that Morgan concludes with an appeal to

88. L.H. Morgan, Ancient Society, v-vi.

89. Ibid., vi.

90. Ibid.

Americans to glean what is left of the riches of culture of the dying Indian civilization, which will not be preserved as fossils but will disappear forever.)⁹¹

Morgan repeated this theme tirelessly in the text itself,⁹² and concludes the entire book with the following:

It may well serve to remind us that we owe our present condition, with its multiplied means of safety and of happiness, to the struggles, the sufferings, the heroic exertions and the patient toil of our barbarous, and more remotely, of our savage ancestors. Their labors, their trials and their successes were a part of the plan of the Supreme Intelligence to develop a barbarian out of a savage, and a civilized man out of this barbarian.⁹³

It is clear then that Morgan was an evolutionist describing the advancement of human society--not its decline or corruption--from either a Biblical paradise or a state of primitive immaturity.⁹⁴

This assessment of Morgan agrees with the facts of his life as a friend of the Indians and as a scientist interested in the origins of the Indians and believing them to have originated in Asia. All mankind has been or is going through the same stages of progress; the Indian is of the single human family, stemming from

91. Ibid., vii-viii.

92. Ibid., 4, 8, 255.

93. Ibid., 554.

94. Cf. L. White: "...Morgan specifically repudiated the then current theological explanation of savage cultures, which held that they are the result of degradation after the Fall of Man." (In An Introduction to The History of Sociology, (ed. H.E. Barnes), 140.) Also, White wrote, in the introduction to the Indian Journals of Morgan: "But Ancient Society had a "message". It presented society and culture as an unfolding, developing process: what is today will not be tomorrow." (page 11) Cf. also, Floyd N. House, The Development of Sociology (1936), 361; J.H. Randell, The Making of The Modern Mind (1926), 593, 507.

the Asian branch of it and hence represents our own ancestors in a similar stage of development.

Engels on Morgan

The first mention of Morgan's work in Engels' letters is on February 16, 1884, in a letter to Karl Kautsky in which he said that he had had it on order for five weeks to no avail.⁹⁵ Therefore, he has been reading Marx's notes on Morgan during the first half of January (Marx must have read the book in the British Museum or have had it on loan from elsewhere). Engels said:

*Marx/ sprach davon, aber ich hatte andre Sachen im Kopf und, er kam nicht wieder zurueck, was ihm gewiss/angenehm war, da er selbst das Buch bei den Deutschen einfuehren wollte, wie ich aus seinen sehr ausfuhrlichen Auszuegen sehe.*⁹⁶

As Engels mentions another book excerpted in the same notebook (J. Money's book on Java) he is apparently studying this notebook and his present awareness of Morgan is related to the use of it. In order to evaluate properly the remarks Engels makes about Morgan's discovery and the primitive community, it must be remembered that in the same letter he recommended the book on Java by Money for someone to show the fact that the primitive communism was "...die schoenste breiteste Grundlage der Ausbeutung und des Despotismus..." when there was no element of modern communism in it.⁹⁷ Hence, Engels definitely criticized

95. Marx-Engels, Briefe an Bebel, Liebknecht, Kautsky, I, 325 (Engels to Kautsky, 16/2/84).

96. Ibid.

97. Ibid., 324-325.

primitive communism in the same letter in which he is highly enthusiastic about the discoveries of Morgan: Engels must have been enthusiastic about something other than the ideal nature of the "noble savage" of the supposedly 18th Century doctrines of Morgan.

(Engels states on February 16 in his first letter to Kautsky that he did not have time to consider writing an article on Morgan. On March 24, however, he promised Kautsky three "Bogen", using Marx's notes.⁹⁸ On April 11, he states that it is difficult to summarise a book so rich in content and yet so poorly written.⁹⁹ On April 26 he wrote that he had set himself to play a trick on Bismarck and write something he could not ban, but this was not possible. He cannot write it so that it made use of their viewpoint and relates Morgan's findings to it, and at the same time so that it is compatible with the Socialist Laws. The chapter on monogamy, and the chapter on private property as the source of class conflicts as well as the dissolution of the primitive commune, are the difficult points. However, he promises it for the next week, probably.¹⁰⁰ He also tells Kautsky that it is up to him to decide whether to risk the Neue Zeit on it or to print it as a brochure, because it will not be permissible under the law.

98. Engels-Kautsky, Friedrich Engels Briefwechsel Mit Karl Kautsky (1955), 106 (hereafter, Engels-Kautsky, Briefwechsel), (Engels to Kautsky, 24/3/84).

99. Marx-Engels, Briefe an Bebel, Liebknecht, Kautsky, I, 328 (Engels to Kautsky, 11/4/84).

100. Ibid., 330-331 (Engels to Kautsky, 26/4/84).

However, it was not until May 22, that he sent all except the final chapter.)¹⁰¹

To determine exactly the object of Engels' enthusiasm over Morgan's work, an examination of the correspondence and prefaces concerning the Origin must be made. In the first letter to Kautsky, February 2, 1884, we find this:

Ueber die Urzustände der Gesellschaft existiert ein entscheidendes Buch, so entscheidend wie Darwin fuer die Biologie, es ist natuerlich wieder entdeckt worden: Morgan, Ancient Society, 1877. ... Morgan hat die Marxsche materialistische Geschichtsanschauung in den durch seinen Gegenstand gebotenen Grenzen selbstaendig neu entdeckt und schliesst fuer die heutige Gesellschaft mit direkt kommunistischen Postulaten ab. Die roemische und griechische Gens wird zum ersten Mal aus der Wilden, namentlich Amerik/anischen/Indianer, vollstaendig aufgeklaert, und damit eine feste Basis fuer die Urgeschichte gefunden. ... All der Schwindel von Tylor, Lubbock und Co. ist definitiv kaputt gemacht. Endogamie, Exogamie, und wie all der Bloedsinn heisst.¹⁰²

In this first enthusiasm over Morgan, Engels asserts that Morgan has (1) discovered, within his own limits, the materialistic conception of history independently of them and has drawn communistic conclusions for modern society; (2) cleared up the questions about the Greek and Roman gens by reference to the American Indians; (3) and thereby he has given a firm basis for Pre-History.

On April 26, in the midst of writing the Origin, Engels writes a second indication of his views of Morgan's significance (still to Kautsky):

101. Engels-Kautsky, Briefwechsel, 114 (Engels to Kautsky, 22/5/84).

102. Marx-Engels, Briefe an Bebel, Liebknecht, Kautsky, I, 325-326 (Engels to Kautsky, 16/2/84).

Fuer unsere Gesamtschauung wird das Ding /Engels' Origin, denke ich, besondere Wichtigkeit haben. Morgan erlaubt uns ganz neue Gesichtspunkte aufzustellen, indem er uns mit der Vorgeschichte eine bisher fehlende tatsaechliche Grundlage gibt. Was Du auch vielleicht noch fuer Zweifel ueber einzelnes Urgeschichtliche und "Wilde" haben magst, mit der Gens ist der Kasus /Fall/ in seiner Hauptsache erledigt und die Urgeschichte aufgeklaert.

Ein Hauptpunkt ist noch: ich muss nachweisen wie genial Fourier in so sehr vielen Sachen den Morgan antizipiert hat. Fouriers Kritik der Zivilisation tritt erst durch Morgan in ihrer ganzen Genialitaet hervor. Und das kostet Arbeit. 103

In this letter he says that by (indem) providing the lacking "tatsaechliche Grundlage" concerning primitive history, Morgan allows them to set forth new viewpoints: this is based upon his solution of the gens question. Further, he says that he should show how Fourier's critique of civilization comes to fruition in Morgan's work (but which he views as involving considerable work).

In his private expressions of esteem for Morgan, Engels has given the following five points: Morgan has

- (1) solved the question of the Greek and Roman gens by a comparative study of primitive society and marriage;
- (2) he has thereby given a factual basis for the period of pre-history in the place of intuitions or guesses;
- (3) he has thereby allowed them to set forth new viewpoints (aufstellen--note that he says this, not that he has given them new viewpoints);
- (4) he has discovered the materialistic conception of history independently of them;
- (5) he brings Fourier's critique of civilization to fruition.

In the preface to the first edition (1884) of Origin Engels repeats these with the exception of No. 3. Morgan
103. Ibid., 331-332 (Engels to Kautsky, 26/4/84).

rediscovered in America the materialistic conception of history (No. 4) and in his contrasting of barbarism and civilization (No. 5) he came to the same conclusions as Marx (No. 4). Morgan's great merit was in his discovery and reconstruction of the period of pre-history (No. 2) and in having found the clue to the Roman and Greek gens in the sex groups of the American Indians (No. 1).¹⁰⁴ Engels has mentioned all the points given in his letters except the matter of new viewpoints (No. 3), and it would appear that there is a clue to this in the preface. Thus in the beginning of the preface he says that Morgan has rediscovered the materialist conception of history, and makes a few other remarks, in the first paragraph. In the second paragraph he goes into a definition of the materialistic conception of history: according to it the determining basic factor is "the production and reproduction of immediate life", which is a two-fold process of producing the means of subsistence and the required instruments and of reproduction or the propagation of the species. The social institutions of a given epoch are determined by both kinds of production - by the stage of the development of labour and by the family. Then comes the important statement of Engels:

The less the development of labour, and the more limited its volume of production and, therefore, the wealth of society, the more preponderatingly does the social order appear to be dominated by ties of sex.¹⁰⁵

He then continues:

However, within this structure of society based on ties of sex, the productivity of labour develops more and more; with it, private property and exchange, differences in

104. SW, II, 155-156.

105. Ibid., 156

wealth, the possibility of utilizing the labour power of others, and thereby the basis of class antagonisms; new social elements, which strive in the course of generations to adapt the old structure of society to the new conditions, until, finally, the incompatibility of the two leads to a complete revolution. The old society based on the ties of sex groups bursts asunder in the collision of the newly-developed social classes; in its place a new society appears, constituted in a state, the lower units of which are no longer sex groups but territorial groups, a society in which the family system is entirely dominated by the property system, and in which the class antagonisms and class struggles, which make up the content of all hitherto written history, now freely develop.¹⁰⁶

Engels then says that Morgan's great merit lies in having discovered and reconstructed this prehistoric foundation of our written history in its main features..."¹⁰⁷ and in finding a solution of the Roman and Greek gens riddle. The area of concern then is the dialectical relation of the influence on society of sexual reproduction and technological production and the development of this relation (or the reversal of it): this is the prehistoric foundation of written history and class conflict to which Morgan has supplied the factual basis.¹⁰⁸

106. Ibid.

107. Ibid. (my underlining)

108. Cf. the 1885 Preface to the 2nd edition of Anti-Duehring: "...the history of primitive society, the key to which was provided by Morgan only in 1877." (page 16 of the 1954 English edition) Also in the 1888 English edition of the Manifesto, he says that the inner organization of the primitive communistic society was revealed by Morgan's "...grounding discovery of the true nature of the gens and its relation to the tribe." (SW, I, 35, note b) With the dissolution of these communities, society differentiates into conflicting classes, a process which Engels says he has tried to trace in the Origin.

It appears that Engels believes that Morgan has given a factual basis for a segment of the schematic course of history which had not been given before by them, even though it had been implied. The Marxian triadic scheme of history begins with a purely natural and undifferentiated condition, then embraces a developing but divided and alienated humanity and finally ends in the fully developed and undivided humanity. Previous expositions of this had not been able to make concrete assertions concerning the detailed organization and disintegration of the primitive state, had not been able to demonstrate the process by which the natural succumbed to the human, had not been able to show the dialectical leap from the animal kingdom to the human world. Now the process can be shown in its entirety and on a supposedly sound factual basis. It would appear that this is one of the viewpoints that Engels is now able to set forth, and it will be seen that this process is clearly set out in the text itself, the Russian editor's criticism notwithstanding.¹⁰⁹

109. SW, II, 156, note 1: "Engels is here guilty of inexactitude by citing the propagation of the species alongside of the production of the means of subsistence as causes determining the development of society and of social institutions. In the text proper of the Origin... /etc./, Engels himself demonstrated by an analysis of concrete material that the mode of material production is the principal factor conditioning the development of society and of social institutions.--Ed." Here, it is sufficient to say that this was a safe statement for the editor, as Engels says that after a point the material production does predominate: the editor himself had not made an analysis of the 'concrete material' of Engels' text or he would have seen that Engels did demonstrate the assertion he had made in the preface and that in this process of development it is the growth of the forces of material production that breaks the hold of the purely natural act of reproduction. The economic is the dynamic factor. In his fear of allowing revisionist errors to spring up, the editor has distorted the true Engels,

(contd. next page)

The text of the book itself reveals no new or contradictory note concerning the contribution of Morgan. In Chapter II he treats the solution of the history of the family and the gens and then in Chapter III says:

We now come to a further discovery of Morgan's, which is at least as important as the reconstruction of the primitive form of the family out of the systems of consanguinity. The demonstration of the facts that the /kinship groups of the American Indians were the same as the gens and gentes of the Greeks and Romans, which were later forms... this demonstration cleared up at one stroke the most difficult parts of the earliest Greek and Roman history. At the same time, it has thrown unexpected light on the fundamental features of the social constitution of primitive times--before the introduction of the state.¹¹⁰

The remaining chapters of the book describe the gens among the American Indians, among the Greeks and Romans, and among the Germans, the decay of the gentile society, and a brief contrast between it and civilization.

In the preface to the 1891 edition Engels traces the development of studies on the history of the family and shows that while there was an awareness of a development from promiscuity through monogamy, and from mother-right to father-right, until 1861 there was no effort to demonstrate it. Bringing the ensuing development down to Morgan's work of 1877, he shows that the crucial problem was the explanation of the fact that some tribes were forbidden to marry outside the tribe and others could only marry outside the tribe. Morgan's solution

(footnote contd.) robbing him of his refinement of theory.

was by showing that the gentes were exogamous and the tribes endogamous (taking his cue from the American Indians) and he thereby solved the confusion of early Greek and Roman history.¹¹¹

Further, he says that Morgan criticised civilisation in a manner "reminiscent of Fourier" and spoke of "...a future transformation of society in words which Karl Marx might have used."¹¹²

From the foregoing discussion it is clear that the greatest esteem Engels had for Morgan was for his solution of the theoretical and factual problems in the writing of Greek and Roman history, for his provision of a factual basis of the development of the theory of primitive society which Marx and Engels needed, and for the independent discovery of their conception of history. The first two allowed Engels to complete in detail the historical scheme they had always held, the latter was the natural enthusiasm for independent support for one's thesis: all three touched upon the life-long work and its problems, of Engels. The criticism of civilisation was never fully developed: in a footnote to the next to the last paragraph, he says that he intended to place Fourier's work beside Morgan's and his own -

Unfortunately I cannot spare the time. I only wish to remark that Fourier already considered monogamy and property in land as the main characteristics of civilisation, and that he described them as a war of the rich against the poor.¹¹³

111. Ibid., 166.

112. Ibid., 167

113. Ibid., 295, note 1.

We see from this that Engels did not consider that this aspect had been treated explicitly and that he has only a very general definition of civilisation from Fourier. The frequent acid remarks which occur in the Origin are in keeping with Engels' habit of polemicising, especially at the expense of self-righteous classes and individuals. It does not appear that there is a radically new conceptual indebtedness to Morgan and that the basic thought of Marx and Engels remains unchanged, though perhaps clarified.

The distinctive character of the view of primitive society found in the Origin, as opposed to its predecessors, is its concreteness and detail. By using Morgan and his own researches, Engels produced a detailed scheme and account of the nature and decline of early society. The concreteness is seen in the historical scheme taken over from Morgan. Containing three stages each of savagery and barbarism, it terminates in civilization; hence: lower, middle and upper savagery; lower, middle and upper barbarism; civilization. Fire and the use of fish and shellfish mark the beginning of middle savagery; the bow and arrow mark the beginning of upper savagery. Barbarism is inaugurated by pottery; domestication of animals marks its middle stage; iron marks its upper stage; civilization is marked by the appearance of the alphabet and historical records.¹¹⁴

In more general characterization, savagery is marked by

114. Ibid., 169-173.

appropriation of natural products and the instruments for such appropriation; barbarism is marked by increasing the productivity of nature (cultivation and domestication of animals); civilization by working up natural products as in industry and art.¹¹⁵

The concreteness is to be seen further in the scheme of interaction between the modes of reproduction and of production, in which development the primitive or gentile order of society is dissolved. In order to show this interaction we must first sketch the development of the family and then the economic development, in the course of both of which the natural forces are seen to be dissolving the old order. Except for the new wealth of detail and the complete scheme of human development, there is no essentially new motive in this work.

The history of the family begins with the consanguine family which is the first step beyond the promiscuous sexual life of the original herd group. It is based upon generations and excludes the parents and children from the same reproductive circle.¹¹⁶ It is followed by the Punaluan family in which brothers and sisters are excluded from the same marriage group. This originates, according to Engels, in the limitation imposed on the size of the family by the size of the house and the capacity for

115. Ibid., 174.

116. Ibid., 181-182; 174-176.

sustenance of the location; the method being hit upon, it held its place because of the superior race of inhabitants produced.¹¹⁷ The only possible reckoning of descent is by the female line. This type of family gave birth to the gens, the basic unit of all precivilized forms of social organization: the sisters (natural and collateral), their children, and their brothers (natural and collateral) are placed in a kinship group whose descent is reckoned from a female ancestor, and whose members are forbidden to marry one another.¹¹⁸ The gens developed in the middle stage of savagery.¹¹⁹ However, the complexity of kinship and resulting difficulty in making correct group marriages led to the pairing family (in upper savagery and lower barbarism) which again survived because of a superior race of people. This is not a strict monogamy; the marriages are easily dissolved and exist within the communal household. Descent is still by the female line and the family and community is dominated by women.¹²⁰ There is now a complete line of development from promiscuous sexual life to a weak form of monogamy, developed entirely by natural forces and considerations.

At this point Engels introduces the economic factor as a formative power and sees an upheaval of the natural forces: property in herds had become a fact of life in the middle stage of barbarism.

117. Ibid., 182-183.

118. Ibid., 185-186.

119. Ibid., 278.

120. Ibid., 189-194.

This mode of production made the men dominant and as private property developed, the desires for maintenance of property intact led to the demand for father-right and sons of certain parentage. This was counter to the gentile system with its mother-right but found a foundation in the pairing family which was transformed into pure monogamy. Property became the prime force in the social formation and development.¹²¹ Here then, one sees the role of production and reproduction reversed: after a certain degree of development of man's productive life this life itself shapes his social forms instead of the reproduction of human life itself, as was originally the case. Prior to this point development was due to purely natural and spontaneous forces.

Gentile Constitution

The organization of society which follows from the gens as the basic unit of society is the gentile constitution described by Engels in the succeeding chapters of his work. Engels dwells at greatest length upon the Iroquois and Greek gentes, the former being a pure form and the latter representing a decaying age. The distinctive feature of the gentile constitution, according to Engels, is that there is no "...special authority separated from the totality of those concerned in each case..." which is his definition of the state.¹²² All officials or bodies are subject to the approval of the people. There are various

121. Ibid., 194-198.

122. Ibid., 229.

details of the organization and functioning of the gentile order that are important if we are to understand the decay of it.

The Iroquois gentile order was composed of the gentes, the phratries (originally gentes but later subdivided), tribes, and the confederation. Each gens had a peacetime leader (sachem) and a war chief, both of whom are elected and deposed at will by the gens in a public meeting of all the men and women--the council. No member could marry within the gens and all property must remain within the gens, reverting to brothers, sisters or maternal kin of the deceased. The protection of the interests of the members lay with the gens. The phratry is largely a social and religious organization, except that it settles disputes involving two gentes, and may void an election of a sachem if other gens oppose it.¹²³

The tribe inhabited a certain territory and spoke a dialect which set it apart. It invested the sachems with their office and could depose them over the protest of the gens concerned. The tribal council was composed of the sachems and war chiefs of all the gentes. It met in public, heard any member of the tribe, but then made its own decisions. Its field of authority was only in tribal matters, except for investing and deposing the sachems. Since a state of war existed except where a treaty of peace was in force, raiding by volunteers (in bands similar

123. Ibid., 221-225.

to the German retinues) was continuously in progress.¹²⁴

Beyond the tribe was the confederation, the beginnings of nationhood, a permanent alliance of kindred tribes. Its council was composed of sachems elected by the gentes and removable by them. The vote in the council must be unanimous and was taken by tribes, so that each tribe must agree among itself. There was no head official; a meeting could be called by any one of the tribal councils and there were two war chiefs of equal power.¹²⁵ The confederation was considerably limited by the necessity of unanimity for any action.

The gentile system is based upon the gens, hence is primarily a kinship society, not one based upon territory or property. It is democratic, all have a voice, there is no power separate from the people, except the negative power to depose a sachem in the interests of the whole. The people run their own affairs except as they involve others.

In the Greek gens the higher stage of development has given rise to several changes: (1) father-right has entered; (2) because of father-right, there is marriage within the gens by an heiress to keep the wealth within the gens (as it goes to her husband). This breaks the foundation of the gentile system. (3) Further, in uniting the tribes into larger organizations, the government has undergone changes away from a purely gentile type of system. This was composed of: (a) a council, originally composed of leaders of the gentes, but now, due to increased numbers, an

124. Ibid., 225-227.

125. Ibid., 228-229.

elected body which allowed the rise of an aristocratic element; (b) a popular assembly (agora), composed of all men and women, which voted on all important questions as presented by the council; (c) a military commander, subject to approval by the people, but now becoming hereditary. Thus in the decaying gentile society of Greece, (1) father-right favours the accumulation of property and its opposition to the gens; (2) differentiation in wealth creates the rudiments of hereditary nobility and monarchy; (3) slavery is spreading to include not only prisoners of war but also members of the same gens and tribe; (4) the degeneration of tribal warfare into a systematic raiding or plunder. All these changes stem from wealth which only needs an institution to protect it from the older communal traditions to be supreme in human affairs.¹²⁶

Decay of the Gentile Constitution

We have seen the scheme of development of the forms of the family, and the general form of the social organization of gentile society. The next step is to trace the interaction of these with the economic developments. This begins in the middle stage of barbarism. In this stage the pairing family has developed, and in the preceding stage the gentile organization is at its height of vitality.¹²⁷ In this lower stage of barbarism a sparse population, abundance of land, there

126. Ibid., 232-239.

127. Ibid., 278.

was an economy based upon hunting and fishing and gardening, with a natural division of labour (women working in the house and garden; men hunting and fishing). What little was produced was common property, though tools and utensils were private property. This is the stage at which the products of men are subject to men, not vice versa, in spite of the low level of man's mastery of nature.¹²⁸

Into this harmonious life now came the domestication of animals which led to a pastoral life by certain tribes and the first social division of labour. It resulted in increased food and products which caused a regular exchange to develop in the place of the previous sporadic trade. Also there was a rise of male dominance, a rise of property in herds, a development of agriculture to provide food first for animals and then for man, and a development of weaving and metals. There resulted a surplus of products which allowed the keeping of slaves for added production: hence the first social division of labour led to slavery and class divisions. Thus the classless society is shattered and the gens is undermined by the introduction of father-right and the rise of the monogamous family over against the gens.¹²⁹

Further decay sets in with the upper stage of barbarism when iron makes possible the sword, axe, and plough, and a plentiful food supply. Towns are walled, individual wealth

128. Ibid., 279-280.

129. Ibid., 280-282.

increases rapidly, the crafts and individual branches of agriculture multiply rapidly. A second social division of labour takes place: the separation of agriculture from crafts and industry. This leads to commodity production, exchange, the development of money, and commercial life. The result, a second division by classes, the rich versus the poor.¹³⁰

The final downfall of the gentile society and the rise of the state follow the further developments. The increasing density of population brings closer union internally and externally: the federation and amalgamation of tribes takes place, producing a territory and a single people. Because of plundering, the military commander became an indispensable and permanent official alongside the assembly and the council: the gentile society became a military democracy. The power of the commanders increased and their position became hereditary because of father-right and the custom of election from the same family--hence there was laid the foundations of a hereditary nobility and royalty. With this hereditary character, the commanders and their forces became detached from the people and became the germ of an independent organ to oppress and rule the people.¹³¹

Finally, in the stage of civilization, the third social division of labour takes place in the formation of a merchant

130. Ibid., 282-283.

131. Ibid., 282-284.

class which is detached from production yet gradually gains control of production. Minted money becomes the means of rulership by all who possess it. Landed property and mortgage appear, putting an end to communal land holding. All this leads to a rapid concentration of wealth and the appearance of an aristocracy of wealth.¹³²

It is clear from the above that a succession of natural causes: increasing population, increased human technology and organization of production, have all brought about a revolution in the mode of human social life, namely the end of the gentile system. The formation of the state is marked by the same type of spontaneous necessity. In its Greek form, which Engels insisted was a model for all others¹³³ we may see this development.

The first result of the new economic and social conditions was that the gentile system ceased to be capable of handling the affairs of the people. It required that the people live close together in their own territory with their own kin. This ceased to be the case: the mobility of the population produced by commercial pursuits and the transfer of land both mixed the population. Further, many could not find a place in the gentile order: dependents, foreigners, slaves. Hence the gentes could not meet except for religious and unimportant business.¹³⁴

132. Ibid., 284-286.

133. Ibid., 288.

134. Ibid., 287.

The second result of the new conditions was that new interests and needs had arisen for which the gentile system was unequipped to care: professional groupings of craftsmen and the opposition of town and country. These groups were not constituted according to the gentile division of the population and hence formed new organs to express their interests.¹³⁵ The third result was that all conflicts and interests and classes were combined in the same gens and tribe, whereas its original life sprang from a social group in which all were free and equal.¹³⁶ Finally, the gens could not exert authority because its only power was based upon public opinion, whereas now there was a splintered society and opinion. It needed a third power to stand over these antagonisms and keep them together. The gentile system was unable to cope with this continuous conflict within society: "The gentile constitution has outlived its usefulness. It was burst asunder by the division of society into classes. Its place was taken by the state."¹³⁷

In the above account it is seen that the social results of the new mode of life required a new form of government. It was to be a form based upon territory, not kinship.¹³⁸ It required an independent power, "...a public power which no longer coincided with the population organizing itself as an armed force."¹³⁹ It

135. Ibid.

136. Ibid.

137. Ibid., 288.

138. Ibid., 289; 246.

139. Ibid., 289.

also required power to levy taxes to maintain the public power.¹⁴⁰
This power needed by the state to function, is usually held by
the most powerful of the classes in society, unless there is a
deadlock.¹⁴¹

In Greece and Rome these aspects of the state were acquired
by various reforms, constitutions and crises. However, in German
tribes, the whole impetus came about because of the conquest of
the Roman Empire. Before the conquest the military leaders were
already becoming rulers, and the bands of retainers were
increasing. Also there had been a rise of industrial and
commercial activities, of luxury. The decisive factor, however,
was that because of the conquest, the population was mixed and
kinship ties were weakened, as well as the presence of the
conquered peoples in the territory.¹⁴² Further, there was a
need for government which could only be given by the king who
relied upon his retainers and favourites, and for which the
council of chiefs could no longer be practically convened.
Finally, the army became the king's instrument because the
people were too poor to place themselves in the field as
formerly. This impoverishment of the free peasants also gave
rise to feudalism: title to the land was exchanged for
protection.¹⁴³ Thus, because of a series of practical problems

140. Ibid., 289-290.

141. Ibid., 290-291.

142. Ibid., 273-274.

143. Ibid., 274-276.

resulting from the conquest, the gentile system was no longer serviceable and the state replaced it--out of no economic factors (Engels admits as much but persists in arguing for economic determinism).

In this description of the origin of the State, it becomes evident that Engels is convinced of its necessity. The Gentile constitution cannot operate because of the social changes wrought by the economic developments. Man's advances in technology and production--the essential human activities--undermine the social conditions in which small kinship units could regulate their own social life in a simple and purely democratic manner. They now require some form of government based upon territory and power, to unite the population in one whole. Hence, as with the family and property, the natural forces inherent in human progress in production require a new form of society. Now the natural, primitive world is replaced by the strictly monogamous family, private property, and the State. Engels has given a complete account of the dialectical interaction of the natural and the human in the course of which the human replaced the natural--an interaction which has only natural premises and forces in it. Engels has set forth for the first time the previously missing portion of the entire history of mankind from the viewpoint of dialectical materialism--and naturalism.

Summary and Conclusion

Neither in Engels' writings before the Origin, in his statements about Morgan, nor in the Origin itself do we find any basic shift in his evaluation of primitive society. His entire frame of reference for it remained the same throughout his life. Only in a few passages does he give expression to admiration for the primitive life and then invariably to follow it with a statement that it had to be dissolved to make way for the higher development of human society and life. (It should not be forgotten that he always wrote in an enthusiastic manner and once said that the wrath of the poet was perfectly in order in describing the conditions of modern society, but that it did no good in explaining it.¹⁴⁴) His enthusiasm for Morgan proved to be based upon Morgan's solution to certain theoretical and factual problems regarding the history of the gentile order and the fact that the solution of them allowed him to set forth the materialist view of history in its entirety. His enthusiasm expends itself upon this rather than upon the idea of the goodness of the primitive life and its return in a higher form in modern communism.

In this survey of Engels' thought on primitive communism there has been found no departure from the essentials of either his own view or the view of Marx. Primitive communism is the result of the primitive mode of production. This production or man's level of development was deficient: man was at the mercy of nature on the one hand and relatively isolated on the other.

144. Anti-Duehring, 153(English 207).

Only progress in technology--hence in production and in transportation and communication--could inaugurate a truly human society, and this progress of necessity ended the primitive communal society. There is nothing in it that could be carried over into modern communism, unless some surviving remnant of it is able to appropriate the necessary technological and intellectual progress from modern capitalist society. The wholeness of man--the communal or social solidarity--is something which results from the productive mode of life, not something which is innate in man, may be corrupted and half-hidden, and then resurrected. The interdependence of human life steadily grows with the progress of economic life and this growing "organism", or entity, is the basis of both alienated and communist forms of social solidarity, but only in its most limited form could it underly primitive communism. Engels' Origin did not depart from this viewpoint, nor did any statements made about Morgan or his contributions do so; Morgan gave Engels no radically new facts or theories but merely an order into the confused knowledge of pre-history. We cannot conclude that the so-called "fall" interpretation of the Marxist view of the decay of primitive communism may be substantiated by Engels' work as opposed to Marx's work, the latter having already been shown to be incompatible with this interpretation.

Note to Chapters V and VI

Soviet Marxism's View of Primitive Society

While the primary focus of the thesis has been the views held by Marx and Engels, it is necessary for the sake of relevancy to show that Soviet Marxism has not developed any significantly different view of primitive society. This can be established by a brief survey of the writings of Plekhanov, Lenin, Stalin, a post-Stalinist book. The survey is brief and limited to showing that the Soviet evaluation of primitive society is consistent with that of Marx and Engels; no attempt is made to describe the total view of primitive communism held by Soviet thinkers.

Plekhanov (in a work published in 1895 and republished in 1956) views primitive man as the equivalent of animals, living in the kingdom of physical necessity and "... in complete subjection to nature."¹ The development of productive forces or using tools to act on nature "to achieve his ends" subjects nature to man: "The degree of development of the productive forces determines the measure of the authority of man over nature."² In this development there is a greater or lesser degree of social union, whose characteristics "...are determined at every given time by the degree of development of the productive forces,

1. The Development of The Marxist View of History, 271.

2. Ibid., 271.

because on the degree of development of those forces depends the entire structure of the social union."³ Hence, Plekhanov sees human traits as the products of man's historical efforts, not as deriving from some primitive perfection. In the course of development, man became enslaved to their own system of production and its products. However: "This provides the opportunity for a new and final triumph of consciousness over necessity, of reason over blind law"⁴ The new era comes because of the progress of man beyond his original state and because of his understanding of the laws of nature and society, not because of his appropriation of the form of early society. The mode of production caused the primitive communal ownership and the later changes to private ownership: the form of society is determined by the mode of production, in the interest of the development of greater productivity.⁵

In the writings of Plekhanov, there are no scattered misleading moralist statements as in Engels. The Marxist system is logically expressed and primitive society receives the evaluation given by Marx and by Engels in his more reflective moments. This is the trend followed by Soviet Marxism, as this brief survey will show.

3. Ibid., 272.

4. Ibid., 273-274.

5. Ibid., 196-197; cf. 154-156, 163, 166, 169-170ff., 186, 187-190, 192-193.

Lenin made only a few references to primitive society and these were not discussions of it per se but with reference to other issues. This fact itself indicates that primitive communism played a minor role in the consciousness of the founder of Soviet communist society. Further, it becomes evident that other facts are the positive and real forces in his thought regarding man's essential nature and his future form of society.

One of the most significant of these positive factors is his view of Marx's essential method and theory:

The whole theory of Marx is the application of the theory of development--in its most consistent, complete, considered, and pithy form--to modern capitalism. Naturally, Marx was faced with the problem of applying this theory both to the forthcoming collapse of capitalism and to the future development of Communism.⁶

An emphasis upon development and the placing of the basis of the future in the developments of the present mark Lenin's interpretation of Marx and the view he himself develops. Hence, rightly or wrongly, he affirms a "scientific" view of society as opposed to the moralistic or logically formal views of the form of the ideal society.⁷ The future communism is based

6. State and Revolution, in Selected Works (Moscow, 1951), II/1, 286-287. Cf. Ibid., I/1, 136-138.

7. Cf. What The "Friends of The People" Are And How They Fight The Social-Democrats (1894) in Selected Works, I/1, 103-160; especially 105-110, 113, 127-128, 134-135, 136-138, 141-146.

upon the present developments in capitalistic society—the knitting together into one whole the processes of production.⁸ The form and life of communistic society, needing no state and its power-apparatus, is based upon the Paris Commune of 1870, the social developments in capitalistic society, upon the psychology of habit and the lack of social misconduct (no oppression and poverty, hence no resentment or abuse, etc.), and upon education.⁹ There is no mention of primitive communism in all this.

On one occasion Lenin even defends modern communism against the charge of being "primitive democracy" by saying that it "...is impossible without a certain "reversion" to "primitive democracy...", for how else can the majority, and later the whole population perform state-functions.¹⁰ However, in the same sentence, his second point is

...that "primitive democracy" based on capitalism and capitalist culture is not the same as primitive democracy in prehistoric or precapitalistic times. Capitalistic culture has created large-scale production, factories, railways, the postal service, telephones, etc., and on this basis the great majority of the functions of the old "state power" have become so simplified and can be reduced to such exceedingly simple operations of registration, filing and checking that they can be easily performed by every literate person...¹¹ hence can be stripped of official privilege and power.

Here, then, Lenin makes a definite distinction between primitive communism and modern communism, because of the technological

8. Ibid., 128-129, 142-150.

9. Ibid., II/1, 255-257; 285-306.

10. Ibid., II/1, 243.

11. Ibid., 243-244.

factor and bases modern communism upon this very factor. This is the human mastery of nature and necessity which marks a truly human existence.¹²

While mentioning primitive society in his polemic in Who the "Friends of The People" Are, etc.,¹³ Lenin seriously discusses primitive society in The State and Revolution (1917) and a lecture designed to supplement this work with regard to primitive society (1919). In neither of these does he go beyond using primitive society to show that the state is a historical institution (as opposed to its being an "eternal" entity) and to complete the historically oriented conception of it as a developing entity. The purpose of The State and Revolution was to call Marxists back from revisionism and opportunism with their acceptance of the state as permanent, to the pure Marxian doctrine of revolution: to do this he must show the fallacy of viewing the state as "eternal". Hence he quotes from Engels, "The state is, therefore, by no means a power forced on society from without... Rather it is a product of society at a certain stage of development..."¹⁴ This is the result of class conflicts which require the State and produce it, Lenin says himself. When class antagonisms are no longer, it will be necessary to destroy the state which has acquired a power and life of its

12. Cf. Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, 190-193.

13. Ibid., I/1.

14. Lenin, Selected Works, II/1, 203-204.

own above the needs of society.¹⁵ Hence, Lenin seeks merely to prove the historical or transitory nature of the state and to prove that this is tied to the existence of class conflict, now nearing a resolution, according to Marxism.

In the lecture in 1919 there are many more explicit statements about the nature of primitive society--of its classless, stateless nature. However, he makes it clear that his purpose is to chart the course of action by a consideration of the origin and development of the State:

Das Zuverlaessigste in einer Frage der Gesellschaftswissenschaft, das notwendig ist...ist, den grundlegenden historischen Zusammenhang nicht zu vergessen, jede Frage von dem Standpunkt aus zu betrachten, wie eine gewisse Erscheinung in der Geschichte entstanden ist, welche Hauptstapfen in ihrer Entwicklung diese Erscheinung durchgemacht hat, und vom Standpunkt dieser Entwicklung zu sehen, was das betreffenden Ding jetzt geworden ist.¹⁶

In opening his actual discussion he makes the same point, and continues:

In dieser Frage muss vor allem die Aufmerksamkeit darauf gelenkt werden, das es nicht immer einen Staat gegeben hat. Es gab eine Zeit, wo kein Staat vorhanden war. Der Staat erscheint dort und dann, wo die Teilung der Gesellschaft in Klassen erscheint, wo Ausbeuter und Ausgebeutete erscheinen.¹⁷

And in describing the primitive condition, Lenin speaks of it as occurring when men found themselves "...auf den niedrigsten Stufen der Entwicklung..."¹⁸

There does not seem to be any evidence that Lenin departed from the Marx-Engels view of primitive society. He says little

15. Ibid., 212-213.

16. Lenin, Ueber den Staat(1919, Berlin), 6.

17. Ibid., 5-6.

18. Ibid., 6.

about it and bases none of the modern communistic goals upon it, nor does he derive any element of man's nature from it. He stresses merely that it proves that the state is not eternal and is not to be tolerated. He holds to a theory of human development which is identical with that of Marx: it requires the whole course of human development to bring about "human being".

Stalin makes a few passing remarks about primitive society, usually of an illustrative nature, and appears to follow the view that we have already found. He emphasizes that the forms of society and property depend upon how people work on nature: hence the development of the means of production determines the form of society. Therefore, once there was communism, then there was private property, now, "...production is again assuming a social character--and this is precisely why the consciousness of men is gradually becoming imbued with socialism."¹⁹ He also emphasizes the fact of a historical origin of the State, as Lenin and Marx had done.²⁰ The proof of the inevitability of Socialism rests upon the correspondence of the form of production and the form of society: today thousands of workers gather in collective labour and are dependent upon each other and upon other shops and factories; private appropriation is incompatible with social production and a change will bring the form of

19. Stalin, Works, I, 317(Anarchism or Socialism(1906)).

20. Ibid., 337, 339.

appropriation into correspondence with production.²¹ This correspondence is emphasized again in 1938 in Dialectical and Historical Materialism.²² Also Stalin continually emphasizes the futuristic nature of communism, based upon development of production.²³ He even says that slavery was an advance over the disintegrating communal society.²⁴

In the preface to Marx-Engels, Selected Works (1951), the editor says of Engels' work on primitive society, that it discloses the origin of the family, state, private property, classes, and the State, and that it "...shows the regularity of their development and their dependence upon the material mode of production, and explains why certain social forms are inevitably superseded by others."²⁵ This relating of social forms to the mode of production is again seen in the Politische Oekonomie Lehrbuch (Moscow, 1954; German ed., Berlin, 1955). The struggle against animals and enemies made it necessary that men live together: "Unter diesen Verhaeltnissen war das gemeinschaftliche Leben fuer die Menschen das einzig moegliche und eine unbedingte Notwendigkeit."²⁶ Also, the low level of development of tools necessitated the communal character of society:

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21. Ibid., 340-341. 22. Cf. Problems of Leninism, 732-740.
23. Ibid., 715-719, 724-727, 732. 24. Ibid., 717.
25. SW, I, 16. 26. Ibid.21.

Die Produktionsverhaeltnisse werden durch den Charakter, durch den Stand der Produktivkrafte bestimmt.

In der Urgemeinschaft ist die Grundlage der Produktionsverhaeltnisse das Gemeineigentum an den Produktionsmitteln. Das Gemeineigentum entspricht in dieser Periode dem Charakter der Produktivkrafte. Die Arbeitswerkzeuge waren in der Urgesellschaft so primitiv, dass sie fuer die Menschen der Urgemeinschaft die Moeglichkeit ausschlossen, einzeln gegen die Naturkrafte und die Raubtiere zu kaempfen. "Dieser Primitive Typ der kollektiven oder kooperativen Produktion", schrieb Marx, "war natuerlich das Resultat der Schwache des isolierten Individuums und nicht der Vergesellschaftung der Produktionsmittel." .../from draft of letter to Zasulich/... Hieraus ergab sich die Notwendigkeit der kollektiven Arbeit, des Gemeineigentums an Grund und Boden und an den anderen Produktionsmitteln sowie an den Arbeitsprodukten. Die Menschen der Urgemeinschaft hatten keinen Begriff vom Privateigentum an den Produktionsmitteln. In ihrem persoenlichen Eigentum befanden sich nur einige Produktionsinstrumente, die ihnen zugleich als Waffen zum Schutz gegen Raubtiere dienten.²⁷

This communal character of life is limited to a narrow circle of men--those of each community.²⁸ The productivity is likewise limited--at "...einem ausserordentlich niedrigen Niveau..." and the instruments are primitive.²⁹ Man is oppressed by nature:

In der Epoche der Urgemeinschaft war der Mensch in staerksten Masse von der Ihm umgebende Natur abhaengig; er war durch die schweren Existenbedingungen, durch den schweren Kampf gegen die Natur voellig niedergedrueckt.³⁰

Warfare, hunger, animals of prey--all took a toll of life, and cannibalism developed.³¹ Further lack of esteem for the primitive state is revealed by the fact men create their society and their nature by their own labour: "Durch die Arbeit entstand die Menschliche Gesellschaft und begann sich zu entwickeln."³²

27. 23; cf. 24-28.

28. 23-24.

29. 31.

30. 20.

31. 20.

32. 20.

With the development of new productive powers, the communal form of society fettered further development and gave way to private property.³³ Hence, as with earlier Marxists, the ending of primitive communism is a step forward in the interests of higher productivity.

It does not appear, then, that recent thought has changed any regarding the evaluation of primitive communism. Primitive communism is invoked principally to round out the historically oriented system, and to disprove the bourgeois view that "...das Privateigentum seit Ewigkeit bestehe."³⁴ Man's essential or truly human nature is one that is evolved by man himself through the process of human labour and the increasing of his mastery over nature: the true social form results from the most fully developed system of production and level of productivity. As with Marx, the primitive form resulted from sub-human conditions and the dominion of nature over man.

We see then that in the entire line of Soviet Marxist thought there is no deviation from the thought of Marx and Engels on the value of primitive society. All view it as the result of the primitive system of production rather than of a primal perfection, and all view the modern form of communism as the result of man's own cumulative development of his productive activity. Soviet thought is extremely futuristic in its outlook and one might say that it is even cautious in its

33. Ibid. 28.

34. Ibid. 30.

regard for the primitive state of man. Thus, the conclusions of this study are as valid for the official or "orthodox" Soviet Marxism as they are for the teachings of Marx and Engels.

CHAPTER VII

ASIATIC SOCIETY IN MARX'S AND ENGELS' WRITINGS

To this point the thesis has examined the writings of Marx and Engels on primitive communism, its decay, and their evaluation of it. It has found that primitive life and society was merely a germinal form of humanity and must be transcended before mature humanity is to be reached. The dissolution of primitive communism, far from being a "fall", is a necessary step forward, and the progress of humanity is based upon private property, division of labour and exploitation, exchange, commodity production, money, and all the evils of capitalist society and economy. The new communism of the future is to be based upon the full development of man's productive powers and his dominion over nature, the full development of the individual, and upon the social nature of the interdependent mode of production. The communism of primitive life is based upon the limited production, limited contacts and interdependence, and the lack of development of men out of their pre-human and natural social limits. Further, it has been seen that Marx and

Engels expressly denied any significance to the remnants of primitive communism in the modern world unless they were given access to the benefits of the material and intellectual products of the modern capitalist world. The fundamental question, the concept and evaluation of primitive society, has been answered. There remains, however, the question of a closely related form of society, Asiatic Society, which has received renewed attention recently and which merits consideration in its own right, as well as being essential to the full treatment of primitive society. A study of this will further emphasise the nature of primitive society, its shortcomings, and the nature of Marx's and Engels' entire historical view. Further, it will present new materials on Asiatic Society.

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The most comprehensive study of Marx's concept of Asiatic or Oriental society¹ is to be found in Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power (1957) by Professor Karl A. Wittfogel. Chapter Nine of this work deals specifically with the Marxist use and abuse of the concept of a specifically

1. A very good short treatment of it may be found in G. Lichtheim's Marxism: An Historical and Critical Study (1961), 145-148. A use of the concept may be found in Robert V. Daniels, The Nature of Communism (1963), 6, 238-241. In both cases they are indebted to Wittfogel's work. The bibliography and notes of Oriental Despotism give an indication of the work done in the 1920's by German socialists and communists and by Wittfogel himself, none of which surpasses his latest work.

Asiatic form of society.² The treatment is sketchy and compressed despite the fact that it was originally intended as a separate study;³ it suffers considerably from the author's viewpoint and polemic purposes while being at the same time an invaluable study.

As an anti-communist (also an ex-communist) Wittfogel attacks the Marxist view of a unilinear, necessary development of society which offers no real alternatives and choices. Instead, he argues that in the history of society a multilinear pattern of development is evident which implies alternatives and choices, hence freedom.⁴ He is especially interested in proving that it is not necessary for a ruling class to own property in order to have absolute power, the power of bureaucracy being just as despotic.⁵ The major portion of his work is the historical investigation of the fact that there was such a class and despotism in the Orient and elsewhere, brought about by the need for water. To sharpen his attack and to settle old scores, he charges that Marx, Engels, and Lenin

2. His book is largely an independent study of "hydraulic society" (society depending upon the moving of large quantities of water for irrigation, drainage, or transport) and is not primarily a study of Marx and Engels on the subject.

3. Karl A. Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism, v.

4. Ibid., 7, 369, 412, 447.

5. Ibid., 4.

all held a concept of Asiatic society but abandoned it when its consequences for their own programme became unbearable.⁶

Thus he says:

Marx' and Engels' acceptance of Asiatic Society as a separate and stationary conformation shows the insincerity of those who, in the name of Marx, peddle the unilinear construct.⁷

In chapter 9 he describes the struggle for the complete obliteration of this concept in all orthodox Communist writing-- which is easily confirmed by an examination of any recent publication from Moscow (even the indices do not carry the entry).

There are several faults of Wittfogel's analysis: untured assumptions concerning Marx' and Engels' view of Asiatic society and the nature of their discussion of it, and an inadequate knowledge of the scope of Marx's sources. He assumes that Marx and Engels viewed Asiatic society as "a separate and stationary conformation". This is dependent upon the criteria for formulating a concept of society and will be shown not to be clearly the case with Marx and Engels. It is entirely possible that, given certain presuppositions, they should have done so, but this is not to say that they did do so, which is our concern. Wittfogel also assumes that Marx and Engels were giving a detailed discussion of the Orient and interprets their failure to do so in each instance as a deliberate and significant act. The truth of the matter is that such a discussion plays only a minor part in a small section of the Grundrisse and is mentioned only in passing in Capital and Theorien ueber den Mehrwert (which are concerned with the main-

6. Ibid., 5: Chapter 9, especially 371-372. 7. Ibid., 7.

stream of economic thought and life, hence largely with capitalism); the same is true of Engels' writings. Finally Marx's sources merit a description of their own, which will follow. It is clear that a careful study of Marx's and Engels' views of Asiatic society is in order, in spite of Wittfogel's valuable work.

According to Wittfogel, Marx built his concept of oriental economy and history upon the views of the classical economists Richard Jones and John Stuart Mill, who had developed ideas held by James Mill and Adam Smith.⁸ Further, he gives as Marx's reading on the subject: J.S. Mill, Principles etc. (from September 1850 and on); A. Smith, Wealth of Nations (from March, 1851); Prescott, The Conquest of Mexico, The Conquest of Peru (August 1851); Francois Bernier, Voyages, etc. (May-June 1853); James Mill, History of British India (probably mentioned in the New York Tribune, July 7, 1853).⁹ The truth of the matter is that Marx's sources are far more numerous than is indicated here.

The reading notes preserved in Amsterdam by the International Institute for Social History show the great range of Marx's reading. It would appear that Wittfogel is right in assigning a chief place to Richard Jones whose works have a great number of excerpts. Further, Jones' works gave reference to a number of Marx's further readings. For example, Jones' Essays etc.¹⁰

8. Ibid., 372-373.

9. Ibid., 373, note b.

10. R. Jones, An Essay on the Distribution of Wealth (1831), (hereafter: An Essay) 132: Appendix, 45. (Marx excerpted this book in Heft B51 of the Marx-Engels Nachlasses in Amsterdam, and made
(contd. next page)

mentions: R. Patton's Principles of Asiatic Monarchies (read by Marx in June 1853; three half-pages of excerpts); Bernier, already mentioned.¹¹ His An Introductory Lecture on Political Economy mentioned A.H.L. Heeren, of whose books Marx read several in 1851 and 1853.¹² (Further a book by Jones which was not excerpted by Marx, Textbook of Lectures on Political Economy, mentioned Patton, Bernier, and M. Wilks, Sketches of South India.¹³) J.S. Mill referred to Prescott's works.¹⁴ In addition to these works containing the fundamental theory of an Asiatic type of society as distinct from the Western type, there were numerous other books referring to the problem, either generally or specifically. There were in 1851 and 1853 at least 18 entries and over 70 pages of finely written excerpts made which relate to the Far East¹⁵ and there were a great number of entries on Spain, Russia, and Turkey in 1853 and 1854.¹⁶

(footnote contd.) 11 half-pages of notes, in 1851.) Patton's book is excerpted in Heft B66.

11. Jones, An Essay, 124.

12. R. Jones, in Literary Remains (ed. Whewell), 571. Cf. Marx: in B55(1851), Heeren, Ideen ueber die Politik etc. der alten Voelker(1824), 5 pp. of excerpts; Heeren, Handbuch d. Geschichte d. Europ. Staatensystems u.d. Colonien(1819), 5 half-pages of excerpts; Heeren(in B64, 1853), De la Politique et du commerce des peuples d l'antiquité etc., tome 3(1833), 2 half-pages of excerpts.

13. R. Jones, Literary Remains, 431(Patton); 447, 448(Bernier); 449(Wilks).

14. J.S. Mill, Principles of Political Economy(1848), 244.

15. Cf. "Inventar des Marx-Engels-Nachlasses", B51, B55, B64, B65, B66.

16. Ibid., B63, B67, B68, B69, B70, B72.

From all these readings it is seen how wide was Marx's reading on the subject, in both modern commercial studies and the accounts of the history and institutions, largely of India and the Near East. Marx seems to have had very limited information of China and Japan. While R. Jones appears to be the dominant influence, it should be said that R. Patton's work gives a very well defined concept of Asiatic society in contrast with European society and ante-dates Jones by three decades.¹⁷ Whether Marx

17. R. Patton, The Principles of Asiatic Monarchies, etc. (1801): "At every step, the effects of property are apparent, upon manners, customs, civilization, and government in all nations, and in all ages." (vi)

"The uniform effect which landed property produced upon all those pastoral tribes who subdued the agricultural provinces of the Roman empire, was, by creating inequality of rank among them, to form at last great land proprietors, who, rising into competition with the crown, assumed independence of its authority, and, in process of time, in every state of Europe, sooner or later, abridged all the proud prerogatives of royalty. Of this progress, a detail has been given in the preceding part of this work, comprehending the western empire under the extended government of France, and the peculiar circumstances of the kingdom of England anterior to the Norman conquest, to which the situation of the kingdom of Scotland bore a very near affinity. But in all the kingdoms and empires of Asia, and a part also of Africa, where agriculture and civilization had been systematically established for ages, even previous to the existence of the Roman empire, no such effects have been produced. In all that immense extension of country, as far back as history can reach, perpetual sovereignties have existed with undiminished power and splendour, without the occurrence of any degree whatever of limitation, alteration, or restraint. (1-2)

"...the form of monarchial government is everywhere prevalent; and, wherever agriculture has been established, the property of the land is vested in the prince, and the landrent forms his principal revenue, precluding the possible existence of great land proprietors: and hence, in all those governments, no limitations or restraints have ever been imposed upon the sovereign power, which has incessantly and invariably continued arbitrary and absolute." (3)

was little impressed with this or whether he merely gave more explicit notice of his preoccupation with the more factual sources, hence could have been much influenced by Patton, is a matter of conjecture.

One source of the concept of Asiatic society which Wittfogel formerly recognised but now practically discards is Hegel's writings. This neglect is based upon his recognition of the "...fundamental dependence of Marx upon the classical economists."¹⁸ It is extremely doubtful whether this is an adequate accounting of Marx's sources, unless one is able to show in a thoroughgoing way that Hegel himself is ultimately dependent upon the classical economists: this has not been convincingly done as yet, however much truth there may be in its direction.¹⁹ Therefore attention will be given to both conceptual and literary similarities between Marx and Hegel on Asia.

Hegel understands history as being the development of reason by the historical process in which the particular will and the universal will are united in such a way that the particular will consciously wills the universal instead of having it imposed upon it. This process of history is marked by the original unity being broken asunder and eventually reunited. In history the Oriental world represents the primary immediacy at the beginning of history. It "...arises in

18. K. Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism, 372, note a.

19. Cf. R.C. Tucker, Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx, 123-124, and the note, on G. Lukacs and this interpretation.

natural communities patriarchally governed."²⁰ The ruler is a high priest or god as well, and religion and law are one; the individual personality loses its rights and privileges. Distinctions are developed in customs, classes, states, but are accidents of personal power or the results of nature fixed by the castes: "...nothing is fixed, and what is stable is fossilized..."²¹ This state is the absolute beginning of history. This is because of the fact that

China and India lie, as it were, still outside the World's History, as the mere presupposition of elements whose combination must be awaited for to constitute their vital progress. The unity of substantiality and subjective freedom so entirely excludes the distinction and contrast of the two elements, that by this very fact, substance cannot arrive at reflection on itself--at subjectivity. The Substantial in its moral aspect, rules therefore, not as the moral disposition of the Subject, but as the despotism of the Sovereign.²²

State power in this form of society is not the state power of the modern state:

...oriental despotism is not a state, or at any rate not the self-conscious form of state which is alone worthy of mind, the form which organically developed and where there are rights and a free ethical life.²³

In the following analysis of Marx's view of Asiatic society, Hegel's points about Asia will be seen to be similar to those of Marx.

20. Hegel, Hegel's Philosophy of Right (Knox), 220.

21. Ibid., 219(P349, Remark); cf. 213(P331, Remark).

22. Hegel, The Philosophy of History, (translated by Sibree, in Dover edition), 116.

23. Hegel, Hegel's Philosophy of Right, 173(P270, Remark).

This differentiation of Asiatic society from Europe is seen again in the two contradictory moments of the State: (1) natural mind, the Family, which divides into (2) a society--Civil Society, a society of individuals held together by mutually supplying each other's needs.²⁴ For Marx, one of the distinguishing marks of Asiatic society was its self-sufficiency, the lack of interdependence which results from disintegration which occurs in Civil Society; for Hegel, Asiatic society lacked this development of individuality.

There are also a number of literary phrases which indicate that Marx was using Hegel at the time of writing his articles and manuscripts on the Orient. For example, in the article "The British Rule in India", Marx contrasts the ascetic tendencies with the sensuous tendencies in Indian life and religion: "...a religion of the Lingam and of the Juggernaut; the religion of the Monk, and of the Bayadere."²⁵ Hegel likewise makes this contrast between asceticism, mentioning also the dancing girls (Bayadere) and temple prostitutes, the Fakirs resembling the mendicant friars of the Catholic Church and the suicides by the Juggernaut.²⁶ Or again, Marx speaks of the evils of the village communities of India which have turned the self-developing "social state into a never changing natural destiny, and thus brought a brutalising

24. Ibid., 35-36(P33); cf. 160(P259); 162(P262).

25. SW, I, 312.

26. Hegel, The Philosophy of History, 150, 157.

worship of nature..."²⁷ as in the worship of the monkey and the cow. Hegel says that the caste system subjects the social order to nature, and speaks of "...this natural destiny..."²⁸ and says that the objects of worship are either created forms or natural objects--"Every bird, every monkey is a present god and absolutely universal existence..."²⁹ while there are hospitals for old cows and monkeys. In the Grundrisse Marx described the community of the Oriental form "...als Substanz, von der die Individuen bloss Akzidenzen sind..."³⁰ while Hegel spoke of the East as being the first phase of history where unreflected consciousness, "...substantial, objective, spiritual existence--forms the basis..." and where "Substantial forms constitute the gorgeous edifices of Oriental Empires in which we find all natural ordinances and arrangements, but in such a way, that individuals remain as mere accidents."³¹ And in describing China Marx spoke of the patriarchal relation of the Emperor to the Empire and of "...this patriarchal authority, the only moral link embracing the vast machinery of the State..."³² while Hegel said of the patriarchal state: "On this form of moral union alone rests the

27. SW, I, 317.

28. Hegel, The Philosophy of History, 147; cf. Hegel's Philosophy of Right, 133(P206, Remark).

29. Hegel, The Philosophy of History, 157-158.

30. Grundrisse, 378.

31. Hegel, The Philosophy of History, 105.

32. Marx, Marx on China, 2.

Chinese State..."³³ Further, both Marx and Hegel emphasise the presence of isolation in China and India.³⁴

From the above citations and the similarities of the Oriental world in both Marx and Hegel, it is seen that Hegel is not to be dismissed too lightly as a source of Marx's view of Asiatic society. It may not be possible to assess absolutely the relative importance of Hegel, but it is certain that Marx borrowed considerably from him.

Marx had already formulated a concept of despotism in general in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte written between December 1851 and March 1852.³⁵ In this writing he describes the new French government as a despotism which has severed itself from civil society however, resting upon the atomized rural districts. The French Revolution had broken the various separate units and powers of the old order; Napoleon had continued by developing centralized government power; the Restoration subdivided the various functions and interests of civil society and made every common interest into a general interest under the care of the government. In these periods,

33. Hegel, The Philosophy of History, 121; cf. 166.

34. SW, I, 320: Marx said that isolation was the prime condition of India's stagnation as it was of China's mode of life (cf. Marx on China, 4, cf. 2). Hegel said that China, India, Babylonia all rose to a high level of life but were shut in to themselves and did not receive the element of civilization supplied by the sea. (Philosophy of History, 100-101)

35. SW, I, 311(editors note at end of the article).

this trend was merely the means to the class rule of the bourgeoisie, but under Louis Bonaparte the State had severed itself from society and set itself against it. This was because of the peasant class - the most numerous in France. This class is not strictly a class - it has no common interests, only similar interests, hence it offers no effective opposition to central power, and, being unable to raise up proponents of its desires, expresses its political influence in subordination to authority itself.

The small-holding peasants form a vast mass, the members of which live in similar conditions but without entering into manifold relations with one another. Their mode of production isolates them from one another instead of bringing them into mutual intercourse. The isolation is increased by France's bad means of communication and by the poverty of the peasants. Their field of production, the small holding, admits of no division of labour in its cultivation, no application of science and, therefore, no diversity of development, no variety of talent, no wealth of social relationships. Each individual peasant family is almost self-sufficient; it itself directly produces the major part of its consumption and thus acquires its means of life more through exchange with nature than in intercourse with society.³⁶

In so far as there is merely a local interconnection among these small-holding peasants, and the identity of their interests begets no community, no national bond and no political organization among them, they do not form a class. They are consequently incapable of enforcing their class interest in their own name, whether through a Parliament or through a convention. They cannot represent themselves, they must be represented. Their representative must at the same time appear as their master, as an authority over them, as an unlimited governmental power that protects them against the other classes and sends them rain and sunshine from above. The political influence of the small-holding peasants, therefore, finds its final expression in the executive power subordinating society to itself.³⁷

36. Ibid., 302.

37. Ibid., 303.

Strong government and heavy taxes are identical. By its very nature, small-holding property forms a suitable basis for an all-powerful and innumerable bureaucracy. It creates a uniform level of relationships and persons over the whole surface of the land. Hence it permits of uniform action from a supreme centre on all points of this uniform mass. It annihilates the aristocratic intermediate grades between the mass of the people and the state power.³⁸

Bonaparte would like to appear as the patriarchal benefactor of all classes. But he cannot give to one class without taking from another.³⁹

Hence, we find in the French despotism a lack of internal cohesion: interests, needs, communications, transportation, and commerce are lacking. Further, the central power provides the lacking necessary elements and subordinates the whole to itself. Finally, Marx refers to the position of the ruler as being patriarchal.

11

The specific concept of an Asiatic form of society was developed by Marx and Engels in the spring of 1853 as a result of their writings and discussions on the Crimean War and the Parliamentary debates on the East India Company. It has already been seen that Marx had read widely on the subject in 1851 and after and had used a concept of despotism in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte between December of 1851 and March of 1852. Now, in the spring of 1853 he and Engels read and discussed the history and institutions of Asia in detail as they

38. Ibid., 306.

39. Ibid., 310.

wrote their articles.⁴⁰

The question must have been discussed during a visit of Marx to Manchester sometime after April 28,⁴¹ and is first recorded in a letter of May 18 from Engels to Marx. Discussing a book he had mentioned and later had read, he makes several points concerning Arab history, the most important for us being that the Hebrews were merely a small Semitic tribe, one of many. They developed differently and separately because of the local conditions which, on the one hand permitted agriculture, and on the other separated them from the rest of the Arabs (desert wastes).⁴² Engels has explained the Hebrew life and religion by geography and manner of livelihood.

Marx replied to Engels' letter on June 2 and came to the central point of the issue with the question: "Warum erscheint die Geschichte des Orients als eine Geschichte der Religionen?"⁴³ The eternal nature of the social and political life of the area was due to the fact that the sovereign owns the land. Marx quotes from Francois Bernier's Voyages, etc. concerning the dependence of

40. Cf. MEGA, Abt. III, Bd.I, 445-446: Marx wrote to Engels on March 13, 1853, about the "detestable question orientale" which was not his department since it was "vor allem militarisch und geographisch." Also, on March 12 Engels wrote that he would look up books on Turkey of which there were many at the Atheneum in Manchester.(459)

41. Ibid., 469: Marx said then that he would leave London the following Sunday.

42. Ibid., 470-471. He refers to Charles Forster, The Historical Geography of Arabia, the book, "... von der wir frueher sprachen..."

43. Ibid., 476.

the cities and especially the capital upon the presence of the king (relating a question raised on the decay of Arabian cities) including the statement: "...le roi est le seul et unique proprietaire de toutes les terres du royaume..." (underlined by Marx).⁴⁴ He concludes the discussion:

Bernier findet mit Recht die Grundform fuer saemtliche Erscheinungen des Orients--er spricht von Turkei, Persien, Hindostan--darin, dass kein Privatgrundeigentum /Korr. aus Privatgrundbesitz/ existierte. Dies ist der wirkliche clef selbst zum orientalischen Himmel.⁴⁵

In this letter then, Marx has appropriated one of the key characteristics of Oriental society which were mentioned by Adam Smith, Richard Jones, R. Patton and F. Bernier; the ownership of the land by the state or the sovereign. He also mentioned but did not discuss the peculiar nature of the cities-- that they were based upon the king's expenditure and therefore must follow him.

About this time Marx must have also written the article on China, published June 14 in the New York Tribune. In this he mentioned the patriarchal nature of the Chinese Emperor and the isolation which preserves China's character. Concerning the patriarchal character of the Emperor he says:

Just as the Emperor was wont to be considered the father of all China, so his officers were looked upon as the paternal relation to their respective districts. But

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid., 477. Cf. that throughout his writings Marx contrasts the terms Eigentuermer and Besitzer (occupier, though in ordinary usage this means owner, as does Eigentuermer).

this patriarchal authority, the only moral link embracing the vast machinery of the State.../has been corroded by opium smuggling, etc./⁴⁶

This characteristic of Asiatic society, it is to be seen later, we merely note Marx's utilization of it here. The same is true of the view that isolation is the mainstay of China, the "Celestial Empire" (as opposed to the civilised and "terrestrial world"); "Complete isolation was the prime condition of the preservation of Old China".⁴⁷ Now that British cannon had broken this isolation, Old China would disintegrate as a mummy opened to the air.

Marx has to this point mentioned three characteristics of Asiatic society, (1) ownership of land by the state or sovereign, (2) patriarchal character of the state and ruler, (3) isolation. He has also alluded to the fact that the cities are not stable self-supporting organisms, but are dependent upon the expenditure of the sovereign.

On June 6 Engels carried the concept a step further when he asked why the lack of property was characteristic of the Orient. This condition he relates to the geographical and climatic difficulties in the way of cultivation of the land which necessitate communal and state undertakings for any livelihood to be possible.

46. Marx, Marx on China, 2. Cf. Hegel, The Philosophy of History, 121: "On this form of moral union alone rests the Chinese state..."; cf. 160.

47., Marx, Marx on China, 4,2. On August 8 he wrote the same of India's distance from Europe: "...the isolated position which was the prime law of its stagnation." (SW, I, 320)

Aber woher kommt es, dass die Orientalen nicht zum Grundeigentum kommen, nicht einmal zum feudalen? Ich glaube, es liegt mit den grossen Wuestenstrichen, die sich von der Sahara quer durch Arabien, Persien, Indien und die Tatarei, bis ans hochste asiatische Hochland durchziehn. Die kuenstliche Bewasserung ist hier erste Bedingung des Ackerbaus, und diese ist sache entweder der Kommunen, Provinzen oder der Zentralregierung. Die Regierung im Orient hatte immer auch nur drei Departments: Finanzen (Pluenderung des Inlands), Krieg (Pluenderung des Inlands und des Auslands) und travaux publics, Sorge fuer die Reproduktion.⁴⁸

By this dependence upon irrigation Engels explains the great wastes where earlier civilizations and cities flourished and the fact that a single war could lay waste to an area for hundreds of years. (The British have abused the first two departments of government and abandoned the third, thereby ruining the agriculture,--a view Marx used later in discussing India.⁴⁹) Hence Engels has added another piece to the puzzle of Asiatic society, a view that was found by him in Richard Jones and Adam Smith.⁵⁰

Marx now makes the contribution to the solution of the question with a perhaps original insight. The unchanging life of the Orient has been laid to the lack of property which in turn is explained by the largely desert conditions necessitating communal and state irrigation projects. Now Marx adds a third

48. MEGA, Abt. III, Dd.I, 480.

49. Ibid., 480-481.

50. Cf. Richard Jones, An Essay, 119-126; Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (1904), II, 179, 214, 220-221, 300, 322.

basic factor which is far more specific than the usual explanations found in his reading, namely that centuries of oppression, stagnation, excessive taxation, and lack of private property have confirmed the people in their mind and habits and prohibit change.⁵¹ In his analysis of the situation in India (in an article written June 10 and a letter to Engels June 14) Marx bases the unchangeable nature of Asia upon the uniform, self-sufficient and independent villages, which were the basis of despotism. It is to this article that attention must now be turned.

51. Cf. R. Jones, An Essay, 113 (excerpted verbatim by Marx on page 76 of B51 of Amsterdam Excerpt Hefte): "The experience of many long centuries of monotonous oppression has sufficiently proved the tendency of such a state of things, once established, to perpetuate itself." Cf. 126. Also, Jones blames the Tartar conquests for both the state ownership (the sovereign owns by the right of conquest) and the servile attitudes of Asians (the Tartars must be under absolute authority of the leader during war). (109-113).

Marx also made the following note in June 1853 (in B66, p.7) on the view that over-taxation prevents progress: "It is to the burthensome amount of public imposts that the stationary condition of India is chiefly attributable. (16) .../an incomplete sentence including this phrase on taxation/ according to the ordinary procedure of an annual assessment, increasing or decreasing with every variation in the gross amount of the annual produce of the land...(40)" (from: An Inquiry into the causes of the long continued Stationary Conditions of India and its Inhabitants, London (1830), author anonymous). Cf. also, Jones, An Essay, 115, 117. On the effects of the lack of property, see Jones, Ibid., 138ff. Cf. Bernier, Travels in the Mogul Empire (English translation; Marx used the French ed.), I, 263, 270-271.

Marx is attacking H.C. Carey, an American economist whose views are carried in the New York Daily Tribune, which are critical of British policy and activity in India, especially the tendency toward centralization (really the interdependence of modern economic life) and the consequent destruction of Indian home industries. He carries out this attack by showing that Britain's rule is really revolutionary.⁵² The British have neglected the irrigation system and have successfully competed with the home textile industry of India and have thus undermined the social system for the first time.⁵³ This social system is the village system consisting of small, self-sufficient and independent villages which leave the public works to the central government because of the low stage of civilization and the vast extent of territory (in contrast to other conditions in Italy and Flanders where voluntary association took place).⁵⁴ The people are scattered over the country and held in the small villages

...by the domestic union of agriculture and manufacturing pursuits--these two circumstances /public works by the central government and this dispersal/ had brought about, since the remotest times, a social system of particular features--the so-called village system, which gave to each of these small unions their independent organization and distinct life.⁵⁵

52. MEGA, Abt. III, Bd. I, 486.

53. SW, I, 313-315; cf. 317.

54. Marx had excerpts on Holland, Belgium, and Italy from T.C. Banfield, The Organization of Industry Explained in a course of lectures delivered in the University of Cambridge in Easter term 1844. 2nd Ed. 1848; pp.40-42 on Belgium and Holland and pp.43-59 on Italy, in B64, pp. 23-24.

55. SW, I, 315.

The economic self-sufficiency based upon the union of agriculture and industry is accompanied by a local political form which is also self-contained, functioning regardless of who is the conquering ruler so long as the economic system remains intact.⁵⁶

The indifference toward the ruler is indicative of the general life and outlook of these villages. Marx says that while the British have caused great misery in the disruption of the life of these villages, it should be remembered that

...inoffensive though they may appear, /these villages/ had always been the solid foundation of Oriental despotism, that they restrained the human mind within the smallest possible compass, making it the unresisting tool of superstition, enslaving it beneath traditional rules, depriving it of all grandeur and historical energies.⁵⁷

This view of life allowed them to understand the destruction of empires and atrocities as natural events, while the "...undignified, stagnatory, and vegetative life..." evoked on the other hand ritual murder and aimless destruction.⁵⁸ Further, these communities (contaminated by slavery and the caste system),

56. Cf. Ibid., 316; he quotes from a House of Commons Report used by T.S. Raffles, History of Java, I, 285-286; and by M. Wilkes, Historical Sketches of South India, 118-120. (Even Hegel seems to have used it: cf. The Philosophy of History, 154.) Raffles and Wilkes are excerpted in B66 and Marx uses them in Capital, I, 377-378, 379, note 1.

57. SW, I, 317.

58. Ibid.

...subjugated man to external circumstances instead of elevating man to be sovereign of circumstances...they transformed a self-developing social state into a never changing natural destiny.../and hence brought about the worship of the monkey and the cow by man "the sovereign of nature".⁵⁹

The communities, their economic life and their cultural life are marked by stagnation.

Marx followed this article by another written on July 22 (published in the Tribune on August 8), entitled "The Future Results of British Rule in India". In this he showed how the British were laying the foundations for modern civilized life by introducing private property, breaking up the isolation of the countryside with railroads and the telegraph, and providing water for irrigation from the reservoirs along the railways.⁶⁰ All this is in addition to having broken the self-sufficient economic foundation of Indian villages. It is evident that Marx considers the lack of interdependence and intercourse in the economic and material life of the people as the prime characteristic of the Indian civilization, and thus of Asiatic society.

According to the concept of Asiatic society developed by Marx and Engels in 1853, geography and climate create the need for public works by the central government, and for state or communal property. The union of agriculture and home

59. Ibid. On "natural destiny", cf. Hegel, The Philosophy of History, 147.

60. SW, I, 320-322. Marx had excerpted 2 pages of notes from Indian Railways and Their Probable Results, "By an old Post-master" (London, 1848, 3rd ed.) in B64, pp.47-48. He used much of this in the article.

manufactures results in economic self-sufficiency which, with public works by the central government, produce the village system. This village system produces stagnation and the foundation of despotism (an unresisting source of revenue). The circle is unending: despotism provides the public works necessary to agriculture which is one of the pivots of the self-sufficiency of the villages; each supports the other.

In 1854 Marx used this concept in describing the condition of Spain and there reveals some of the salient points of it again. He contrasts the course of absolutism in Spain with that of Europe, showing a similarity of the Spanish form to that of Asia. In Europe society developed of itself under the influence of absolutism, the towns rising in importance and exchanging the local independence of the Middle Ages for the general influence of the middle classes and civil society. In Europe "...absolute monarchy presents itself as a civilizing centre, as the initiator of social unity", while in Spain the towns lost their power without gaining modern significance.⁶¹ This decline of the towns was because of the decay of commerce, industry, navigation and agriculture, which Marx does not probe at the present, but which in Capital he attributes to the destruction of irrigation maintained by the Moors.⁶² As commerce and industry declined

61. Marx-Engels, Revolution in Spain(1939), 25(article in the New York Daily Tribune, 9/9/54). Marx had read numerous books on Spanish conditions as a source for his views(cf. B68, B69, B70, B72 of Excerpt Hefte).

62. Capital, I, 558.

in the towns, a condition developed which closely resembles Asiatic conditions:

...internal exchanges became rare, the mingling of the inhabitants of different provinces less frequent, the means of communication neglected, and the great roads gradually deserted. Thus the local life of Spain, the independence of its provinces and communes, the diversified state of society originally based on the physical configuration of the country, and historically developed by the detached manner in which the several communes emancipated themselves from the Moorish rule, and formed little independent commonwealths--was now finally strengthened and confirmed by the economical revolution which dried up the sources of natural activity.⁶³

Hence there is an atomized, self-sufficient society with little economic and social intercourse or interdependence, the very stuff of modern Western economic and social life. Absolutism did not plant the seed of a centralized national life and activity as did European despotism, due to the decay of economic activity, and further,

...did all in its power to prevent the growth of common interests arising out of a national division of labour and the multiplicity of internal exchanges--the very basis on which alone a uniform system of administration and the rule of general laws can be created.⁶⁴

Therefore, Marx says, Spanish absolute monarchy only superficially resembles that of Europe and "...is rather to be ranged in a class with Asiatic forms of government."⁶⁵ Spain, like Turkey, remained a collection of ~~of~~ mismanaged republics allowed to pursue their own affairs so long as they did not interfere with the interests of the central government. This

63. Marx-Engels, Revolution in Spain, 25-26.

64. Ibid., 26.

65. Ibid.

situation occurs in a society which has no state in the modern sense of the word.⁶⁶

111

The formulations of Asiatic society in the Grundrisse of 1857-1858 are significant because they are a usage of it in Marx's theoretical writings (hence are not merely a journalistic or polemic device) and because the system there gives a framework for the scattered statements found in his later works. Some of the details and clarity of the 1853-1854 writings are lost in the generalization, but the concept itself remains basically the same. Very important is the orientation of Asiatic society in the scheme of social stages, which was not done previously. (Though Engels said that Asia did not come to private property, not even to feudal property.)

1. Asiatic Society is one type of Primitive Society

This distinctive feature of the Grundrisse scheme is not so systematically done elsewhere, but then, is neither denied nor contradicted in later writings, and as will be seen in the excerpts and notes of his readings in 1881, is the only plausible scheme. As seen previously, the initial form of society is characterized by a unity of the labourer with the conditions of his labour.⁶⁷ This form is subdivided into three types of communal property (and the free small-holder), beginning with the oriental commune

66. Ibid. Cf. 92,96(July 21, August 4, 1854) where he indicated essentially the same.

67. Grundrisse, 375. Cf. chapter 5 of this thesis on this.

which develops into the antique and finally into its complete opposite, the Germanic.⁶⁸ But while this development may take place, in some areas it does not do so, and then the developing life of man takes the form of Asiatic or Oriental society. Hence he says:

Diese Form, wo dieselbe Grundverhaeltniss zugrunde liegt, kann sich selbst sehr verschieden realisieren. Z.B. es widerspricht ihr durchaus nicht, dass, wie in den meisten asiatischen Grundformen, die zusammenfassende Einheit, die ueber allen diesen kleinen Gemeinwesen steht, als der hoehere Eigentuemer oder als der einzige Eigentuemer erscheint, die wirklichen Gemeinden daher nur als erbliche Besitzer.⁶⁹

In the midst of this apparent legal lack of property, "... existiert daher in der Tat als Grundlage dieses Stammesoder Gemeindecigentum..."⁷⁰ This communal entity may appear either as a group of small independent communities which "... unabhængig nebeneinander vegetieren und in sich selbst der Einzelne auf dem ihm angewiesenen Los unabhængig mit seiner Familie arbeitet..." or, as in Peru, Mexico, the old Celts, and a few Indian tribes, "...die Einheit kann auf die Gemeinschaftlichkeit in der Arbeit selbst sich erstrecken, die ein foermliches System sein kann..."⁷¹ (The latter case is seldom mentioned and never discussed. What Marx thought about the highly organised quasi-socialist state of the Incas is not clear.)⁷²

In the Grundrisse the Asiatic system of state property

68. Ibid., 396-397.

69. Ibid., 376.

70. Ibid., 377.

71. Ibid.

72. A study of his excerpts from Prescott's Conquest of Peru might reveal some personal remarks. He made 8 half-pages of excerpts from significant sections of the work.

and village organizations appears as a developed form of the original oriental communal property. The lack of private property and the higher unity in the state are merely extensions of the previous communal form. The advancing forces of society are contained within the communal relations.

This basic classification of the Asiatic form seems to be followed throughout the main works of Marx. In the Theorien ueber den Mehrwert he accepts R. Jones' description of the Orient and then in his own summary of the three kinds of peasants, he calls the first kind "...erbliche Inhaber die selbst den Boden bebauen. /found in ancient Greece and/...in heutigen Asien, besonders in Indien."⁷³ The State is said to be the owner of property, and the surplus labour and product "...dem Grundeigentuerer (in Asien dem Staat) zufaellt..."⁷⁴ The peasants are hereditary occupiers of the land which is owned by the State which collects the surplus labour and product for the public works benefiting the land as a whole and for the income of the State officials.

In volume three of Capital he implies the identity of the communal (organic) order of society and property with the Asiatic when he speaks of the legal conception of free property in land, which

...arises in the ancient world only with the dissolution of the organic order of society and in the modern world only

73. Marx, Theorien ueber den Mehrwert, III, 473. (Hereafter cited as Theorien.)

74. Ibid., 479; cf. 452-453; 501.

with the development of capitalist production. Into Asia it has been imported by Europeans in but a few places.⁷⁵

Similarly in volume one he frequently has reference to the communal villages of India, usually with no mention of a higher unity, though he does state once that the State exacts rent in kind.⁷⁶ While none of these references explicitly places the Asiatic form of society in the primitive communal category, they do not contradict it and do present aspects of this classification.

2. Despotism and State Ownership of Land

Closely related to the classification of the Asiatic form of society as the primitive communal form is the fact of despotism and the state ownership of land. The unity of the whole area exists in the despot or State who controls the whole by virtue of ownership of the land and public works. As in the isolated primitive community there is a unity of property and social functions, so in the Asiatic nation there is the local community and a higher unity of the communities which make up the nation. In fact, Marx uses this term, "hoehern Einheit" (also: hoechsten Einheit, die Einheit, Gesamteinheit). This higher unity "...im Despot realisiert ist als Vater der vielen Gemeinwesen..." or, "...zuletzt als Person existiert."⁷⁷ The despot or State is the owner of the land and the use of it is mediated to the individual through the individual community.

75. Capital, III(Kerr), 723.

76. Capital, I, 373; cf. 11, 51, 63, 376-377.

77. Grundrisse, 377.

Da die Einheit der wirkliche Eigentümer ist und die wirkliche Voraussetzung des gemeinschaftlichen Eigentums-- so kann diese selbst als ein Besondres ueber den vielen wirklichen besondern Gemeinwesen erscheinen, wo der Einzelne dann in fact Eigentumslos ist, oder das Eigentum-- i.e. das Verhalten des Einzelnen zu den natuerlichen Bedingungen der Arbeit und Reproduktion als ihm gehoerigen, als den objektiven, als unorganische Natur vorgefunder Leib seiner Subjektivitaet--fur ihn vermittelt erscheint durch das Ablassen der Gesamteinheit--die im Despoten realisiert ist als dem Vater der vielen Gemeinwesen-- an den Einzelnen durch die Vermittlung der besondern Gemeinde.⁷⁸

From this situation several things result. First, the surplus belongs to the higher unity and is divided in three parts: that for the "hoehern Gemeinschaft", that for the "wirklichen Despoten", and that for the gods, the "gedachten Stammwesen".⁷⁹ Second, the conditions of the expropriating of nature are the work of the higher unity (cf. above quotation).

Also:

Die gemeinschaftlichen Bedingungen der wirklichen Aneignung durch die Arbeit, Wasserleitungen, sehr wichtig bei den asiatischen Voelkern, Kommunikationsmittel etc. erscheinen dann als Werk der hoehern Einheit--der ueber den kleinen Gemeinden schwebenden despotischen Regierung.⁸⁰

This activity of the higher unity gives it a material reality.

The despotism appears as more than merely an exploitation of one part of the population by another, it is the unity which holds the whole together.

In the Theorien ueber den Mehrwert it has been seen that Marx spoke of the State owning the land and receiving the surplus product.⁸¹ In volume three of Capital he says "The owner of land

78. Ibid., 376-377. 79. Ibid., 377. 80. Ibid.

81. Cf. above; also, cf. Capital, I, 658.

may be the individual representing the community, as in Asia, Egypt, etc., ..."⁸² thus nearly repeating the Grundriss formulation. In volume one of the same work, (speaking generally of the stimulation of industry and technology by nature's adversities) he says that the hydraulic works of Egypt, Lombardy, and Holland, and irrigation in Persia and India result from the "...need for the social control of a natural force, the need for economising it, appropriating it on a large scale, or taming it..."⁸³ To this he added a footnote that in

...Hindustan, one of the material foundations of the power exercised by the State over the small and disconnected productive organisms of the country, has always been the regulation of the water supply.⁸⁴

Again, in his major work, he has repeated the formulation of the Grundriss,: the higher unity makes possible the appropriation of nature by undertaking the necessary large-scale works needed for this. The State or the ruler is said to be in possession of the surplus labour or products through taxes in rent, tribute, with which they performed great projects.⁸⁵

3. The Geographical Basis

The basis of the higher unity of the Asiatic form of society is the need for certain activities to make possible the appropriation of nature. As in the 1853 writings, geographic and climatic conditions play an important part in the form society

82. Capital, III(Kerr), 743; cf. 723.

83. Capital, I, 557-558.

84. Ibid., 558.

85. Ibid., 350, 377, 658.

takes. He says, speaking generally of the (originally nomadic) primitive form of society:

Lassen sie sich endlich nieder, so wird es von verschiedenen aeußerlichen, klimatischen, geographischen, physischen etc. Bedingungen sowohl, wie von ihrer besondern Naturanlage etc. abhengen--ihrem Stammcharakter--, wie mehr oder minder diese ursprüngliche Gemeinschaft modifiziert wird.⁸⁶

The antique (classical Greece and Rome) form of society resulted from the fact that the problem of defence was uppermost, hence the dwelling in towns for defense, while: "Die Erde an sich--so sehr sie Hindernisse darbieten mag, um sie zu bearbeiten, sich wirklich anzueignen--bietet kein Hindernis dar..."⁸⁷

Je weniger faktisch das Eigentum des Einzelnen nur verwertet werden kann durch gemeinsame Arbeit--also z.B. wie die Wasserleitungen im Orient.../and with the experience of new environment and adaptation due to migration the more does the individual develop/ sein gemeinsamer Charakter mehr as negative Einheit nach aussen erscheint und so erscheinen muss-, um so mehr die Bedingungen gegeben, dass die Einzelne Privateigentümer von Grund und Boden--Besonderer Parzelle--wird, deren besondere Bearbeitung ihm und seiner Familie anheimfaellt.⁸⁸

The geographical conditions in Asia have never allowed this development of the individual because they impose the need for collective work, whether by the small community or by the central government and despot as public works.

In the third volume of Capital Marx makes nearly as explicit a statement of the geographical influence upon society. While the economic form and stage of development of productive method

86. Grundrisse, 376.

87. Ibid., 378.

88. Ibid., 378-379; cf. 386.

determine the political and social structure, the same economic basis may show "...infinite gradations in its appearance...due to innumerable outside circumstances, natural environment, race peculiarities, outside historical influences, and so forth..."⁸⁹ It has already been noted that in Capital, I, Marx said that the adversities of nature, including the need for hydraulic works, and irrigation in Persia and India stimulated the development of industry and that irrigation was one of the functions of the state in India and Persia.⁹⁰ There he also said that, not the absolute fertility of the earth but the variety of its products stimulate the development of civilisation because it,

...constitutes the natural foundation of the social division of labour, and by changing the natural conditions of his environment, spurs man on to multiply his own needs, capacities, means of labour and methods of labour.⁹¹

Presumably, Asia, with its great distances did not give the variety of products, capable of transport and exchange as did the Mediterranean world.

In all of Marx's major writings, then, the influence of geography and nature is considered important. It is a basis for all later development and leaves its mark upon that development for a considerable time. Presumably, technology will remove much of this, but this is speculation on our part.

89. Capital, III(Kerr), 919. Cf. on race, 922 and Theorien, III, 519.

90. Capital, I, 557-558. 91. Ibid., 557.

4. Economic Self-Sufficiency - Union of Agriculture and Manufacturing

Geographic and climatic conditions are decisive in initial stages of society, but its own forms play the decisive part in the degree of stability or change in it. This is especially clear in the Asiatic form of society where the unity of agriculture and domestic manufactures prevents development, (as stated in the articles of 1853 and 1859), by providing economic self-sufficiency to the individual social units.

The "Stamm-oder Gemeindecigentum" which exists in the midst of Oriental despotism is

...erzeugt meist durch einen Kombination von Manufaktur und Agrikultur innerhalb der kleinen Gemeinde, die so durchaus self-sustaining wird und alle Bedingungen der Reproduktion and Mehrproduktion in sich selbst enthaelt.⁹²

Marx repeats this at least twice,⁹³ and perhaps no other single feature of Asiatic society and despotism is so important in the writings of Marx and Engels. Closely related to this is the fact that the relation of town and country in Asia is "...eine Art indifferenter Einheit von Stadt und Land..."⁹⁴ The separation of town and country is the basis of the development of exchange and with it, of industry, in Adam Smith and in Marx.⁹⁵ Without

92. Grundrisse, 377

93. Ibid., 386, 392.

94. Ibid., 382; cf. 377-378. Cf. Theorien, III, 474, 501.

95. Cf. A. Smith, Wealth of Nations, Bk. III, ch.1(I,355): "The great commerce of every civilized society is that carried on between the inhabitants of the town and those of the country." Cf. Marx, in the Deutsche Ideologie (DF, 378-379, 379-380) and in Capital, III(Kerr), 391.

exchange, private property, and the resulting social changes, there can be little change in the nature of society and little progress.

Marx continues this concept in the Theorien etc. where he quotes from Jones concerning the self-sufficiency of the Asiatic peasants who produce their own tools and clothes and supply their simple and unchanging needs. He then contrasts this situation with that of the capitalist who must consume his capital until he makes a sale. "In der kleinen Agrikulture is daher haeusliche Industrie mit Agrikultur verbunden. Vorrate fuers Jahr usw."⁹⁶

In Capital III, he says that in India and China the

...broad basis of the mode of production is here formed by the unity of small agriculture and domestic industry, to which is added in India the form of communes resting upon common ownership of the land, which by the way, was likewise the original form in China.⁹⁷

This was broken in India by the British position as governmental landlord allowing the disruption of the communes (and of course trade and industrial competition) which is not likely to occur in China, where progress in trade is much slower and Russian trade is contrasted with the destructive British type.⁹⁸ This self-sufficiency of natural economy "...is quite suitable for becoming the basis of stationary conditions of society, such as we see in Asia."⁹⁹

96. Marx, Theorien, III, 513-514; this is not limited to the Asiatic form.

97. Capital, III(Kerr), 392. 98. Ibid., 392-393.

99. Ibid., 924. Cf. also 741, 913, 922, 938 for other expressions of, or allusions to this phenomenon generally.

The Indian communities, as depicted in Capital I, have no commodity exchange in spite of their division of labour.¹⁰⁰ No relations of mutual independence exist for the primitive community (including Peru and ancient Indian communes) and commodity exchange only begins with aliens, implying that for the majority of their needs they are self-sufficient.¹⁰¹ The payment of rent in kind (which implies lack of exchange sufficient to create a money economy) helps to maintain the old method of production and is a secret of the Ottoman durability.¹⁰² Speaking of the Indian communities he says that "...the simplicity of the productive organism in these self-sufficient communities--unlocks for us the mystery of the unchangeableness of Asiatic society..." which contrasts with the many political and dynastic changes.¹⁰³

In the Grundrisse, this economic self-sufficiency is the nearest approach to the statement of the "vollständig diskrete" organization of the Asiatic communities. In Capital I he does speak of "...the small and disconnected productive organisms of the country..."¹⁰⁴ The formulation is to be found later in 1881.

100. Capital, I, 11; cf. 51 for the patriarchal family generally.

101. Ibid., 63. 102. Ibid., 122-123. 103. Ibid., 378-379.

104. Ibid., 558, note 2.

5. Neither Slavery nor Serfdom

The foregoing sections point up the uniqueness of the Asiatic form of society. It appears as communal on the local level (China excepted) as well as on the higher or national level of common activities, or public works.

It is ambiguous, however, due to the fact of the exaction of rent or tribute by the sovereign, which is doubly complicated by the fact that a portion of this is spent upon communal projects. The real significance of the question, however, lies in the fact that present-day Marxists do not use the concept of an independent Asiatic form but place it under feudalism.¹⁰⁵

Marx followed a smaller group of writers who did not refer to the society of the Orient as a feudal society. Jones and Bernier both noted that the Asian system was not like the Western feudal system because the king owned all the land which was only assigned to the benefactors, not owned by them.¹⁰⁶ A feudal system has a hierarchy of interdependent persons culminating in the king. All own their lands, though subject to taxes and fees for the right

105. Cf. Wittfogel, op. cit., 369, 371-372, 376-377, 398, 401, 402-404, 407-411. Also note the absence of it in any Soviet scheme of history, or in the indices of recent publications.

106. Cf. F. Bernier, Travels in The Mogul Empire (transl. Brock, 1826), I, 5, 45, 237-238. R. Jones, An Essay, 8, 115-116 says that taxes or rents are collected by officials who pay them to the sovereign (this is in contrast to feudalism where the lord receives rent from his domains and has certain rents or fees to pay to the king, who also owns certain lands privately). Cf. also, G. Campbell, Modern India, 75ff., on Moslem India; 97-98; R. Patton, Principles of Asiatic Monarchies, 1, 2, 4, 8, 9, 75-78, 133, 136-137, 140, 142, 143. Marx excerpted all these books.

to do so. Hence Marx could say,

It must never be forgotten that even the serf was not merely the owner (though a tribute-paying owner) of the plot of ground appertaining to his dwelling, but was also one of the joint owners of the common land.¹⁰⁷

Marx and Engels did not overlook this fact, in spite of certain similarities in the conditions of the Indian peasants to serfdom.

That the lack of a hierarchy of ownership and the total proprietorship by the sovereign must have been the decisive criterion for Marx is certain in view of his definitions of serfdom which occur in the same section in which he places Asiatic society in the primitive communal form of society. Both slavery and serfdom are conditions "...wo der Arbeiter selbst unter den Naturbedingungen der Produktion fuer ein drittes Individuum oder Gemeinwesen erscheint..."¹⁰⁸ This condition of being natural objects of production "...neben das Vieh oder als Anhaengsel der Erde..."¹⁰⁹ is produced by conquest¹¹⁰ and even Peru's system is imposed by conquerors.¹¹¹ Marx certainly was aware that Asia had had its share of conquerors.¹¹² And when, in addition to this, the sovereign receives rent or tribute for his

107. Capital, I, 795, note 1.

108. Grundrisse, 395, Cf. 368, 389, 392, 397.

109. Ibid., 389. 110. Ibid., 392, 393, 395.

111. Ibid., 393.

112. Cf. SW, I, 319-320, 312-314, on India's conquerors; also R. Jones, An Essay, 110, 112, 114, 127, and G. Campbell, Modern India, Ch. I.

existence (unlike the feudal monarchs who also own their own lands) one might well say that the people were the objects of production for a third person. In fact, only a strict definition of feudalism (as in Capital I) and a strong awareness of the patriarchal and communal nature of Asiatic society could have kept Marx from doing so.

This distinction between Asiatic and feudal society is further confirmed in the listing of the types of relationships of the worker to the means of production: the first is the original communal form, "Verhaltens zur Erde"; the second is that in which the worker is the owner of the tools as in the guilds of the feudal system - but "... (Das altorientalische Manufakturwesen kann schon unter 1) betrachtet werden.)"¹¹³ And the fourth form is that of serfdom and slavery, thus making a clear distinction between Asiatic forms and slavery and serfdom. This appears again in the Theorien etc. where he adds two more categories of wage earners to Jones' three categories: (1) self-produced subsistence by peasants; (2) workers paid by officials, rulers, etc.; (3) workers paid by capital, strictly speaking.) These additional two are (1) "... das asiatische Gemeinwesen mit seiner Einheit von Agrikultur und Industrie..." and (2) "... das staedtische Zunftwesen des Mittelalters, teilweise auch in der alten Welt."¹¹⁴ Capital III also makes this distinction when it says that the owner of land may be the

113. Grundrisse, 396-397. Cf. 399 for a different, and apparently earlier and discarded scheme.

114. Marx, Theorien, III, 474; cf. 499.

individual representing the community, as in Asia, Egypt, etc., or this private ownership in land may be merely accessory to the ownership of the persons of the direct producers by some individuals, as in the slave or serf system.¹¹⁵

While there are some grounds for saying that Asiatic society is similar to feudalism, Marx repeatedly set it apart from feudalism and from slavery.

One further notice should be given to the similarity to slavery. In the Grundrisse he said:

...da der Einzelne nie zum Eigentüemer, sondern nur zum Besitzer in dieser Form wird, ist er au fond selbst das Eigentum, der Sklave dessen, in dem die Einheit der Gemeinde existiert...¹¹⁶

This seeming approval of equating Asiatic society with slavery is repudiated a few pages later when he says that slavery and serfdom (where the worker is a natural condition of production for a third person or community) is not the same as the general slavery of the Orient: "... (diese ist z.B. bei der allgemeinen Sklaverei des Orients nicht der Fall, nur vom europaischen point of view aus)..."¹¹⁷

Having pointed out the various instances of a conceptual distinction between Oriental society and Western slavery and

115. Capital, III(Kerr), 743.

116. Grundrisse, 393.

117. Ibid., 395. Cf. also Capital, III(Kerr), 697, where he makes a distinction between patriarchal slavery in the Orient and slavery in Greek and Roman society. See also, Wittfogel, op. cit., 324, notes 4-8 and note b, for references to similar conclusions by many other scholars. Wittfogel uses this to say that Marx recognised the general slavery of a state controlled society (377).

serfdom, attention should be turned to a number of passing remarks using a sequence of social forms, containing both "patriarchal" or "Asiatic" and slavery and serfdom. Two of these occur in the Grundrisse. In money economy all personal relations are transformed into money relations, "...ueberhaupt aller persoenlichen Leistungen in Gelsleistungen, der partriarchalischen, sklavischen, leibeignen, zuenftigen Arbeit in reine Lohnarbeit."¹¹⁸ Again, he speaks of "...in der Antiken Zeit oder im Mittelalter oder in Asien..."¹¹⁹ In 1859 in the preface to Zur Kritik der politischen Oekonomie he said that "...Asiatic, ancient, feudal, and modern bourgeois modes of production can be designated as progressive epochs in the economic formation of society."¹²⁰ In the Theorien etc. he distinguishes the capitalist mode of appropriating surplus labour in the exchange process from the earlier modes based upon "...gewaltsame Herrschaft eines Teiles der Gesellschaft ueber den andren, daher auch direkte Sklaverei, Leibeigenschaft, oder ein politisches Abhaengigkeitsverhaeltnis."¹²¹ And in Capital III he lists "...the slaveholder, the feudal lord, the tribute collecting state..."¹²² as the owners and sellers of products in primitive conditions. In Capital II the distinction is not so clear but is present.

118. Grundrisse, 65; cf. 75. 119. Ibid., 194.

120. SW, I, 329.

121. Marx, Theorien, III, 451.

122. Capital, III(Kerr), 382-383.

Products of...slavery, of peasants, (Chinese, Indian Ryots), of communes (Dutch East Indies), of state enterprise (such as existed in former epochs of Russian history on the basis of serfdom) or of half-savage hunting tribes, etc. ...are all commodities and circulate in industrial capitalistic circulation when touched by it.¹²³

Later he lists "...some independent labourer, some slave, some serf, or some commune..."¹²⁴ in the same sequence.

In spite of a few ambiguous phrases and our "commonsense feeling", it is clear that Marx separated Asiatic from slaveholding and feudal forms of society.

There is an absence of any material on Asiatic society after the major writings just considered until 1881 in the letter to Vera Zasulich and in some reading excerpts and notes.¹²⁵ In these materials from the closing years of his life, Marx displays a definite awareness of non-Western forms of society, which is all the more significant because he had just read Morgan's work which led Engels to neglect the non-Western forms of society and history in the Origin etc.

Nearly all the material is contained in four rough drafts which were never posted, but the very brief letter itself (dated March 8, 1881, and posted) points to an essential clue to the classification of Russian and Asiatic society. On the question whether Russia must go through the capitalistic stage of society he refers to Capital. There he had said that the basis of

123. Capital, II(Kerr), 125.

124. Ibid., 130.

125. See Chapter V, of this thesis, the paragraph immediately following note 129, for the validity of this material.

capitalism is the separation of the producer from the means of production, which is accomplished by the expropriation of the peasants. This has been done completely in England and is progressing in Western Europe. Then he says:

La "fatalité historique" de ce mouvement est donc expressément restreinte aux pays de l'Europe occidentale. Le pourquoi de cette restriction est indiqué dans ce passage du ch.XXXII:

"La propriété privée, fondée sur le travail personnel... va être supplantée par la propriété privée capitaliste, fondée sur l'exploitation du travail d'autrui, sur le salariat. (l.c., p.340/le Capital, ed. franc./)

Dans ce mouvement occidental il s'agit donc de la transformation d'une forme de propriété privée en une autre forme de propriété privée. Chez les paysans russes on aurait au contraire à transformer leur propriété commune en propriété privée.¹²⁶

In each of three drafts of the letter he had said this and in the second one had said that the West European transformation was "...de la production féodale en production capitaliste..."¹²⁷

Hence it was clear that Russia was not in the same category as feudal Western Europe at the time of the transformation to capitalism. Classic feudalism implies private property¹²⁸ which is not the case in Russia (also Eastern Europe and Asia by implication). This is in keeping with the statement in the Grundrisse that the Slavic form of property is a modification of Oriental communal property.¹²⁹

126. Marx-Engels Archiv, I, 341. Cf. The Russian Menace to Europe, 278, for an English translation.

127. Marx-Engels Archiv, I, 329; cf. 318, 329-331, 334-335.

128. Cf. Capital, I, 795, note 1.

129. Grundrisse, 396-397.

In the drafts of the letter there is conclusive proof that Marx places feudal property above the Russian communal form of property (paying feudal dues or tribute, to be certain) in the developmental scheme of the various social forms. Also, the differentiation of Western Europe from Russia and Asia appears repeatedly. Finally, he makes certain indirect statements which reflect the view of Asiatic society previously found in his writings.

(1) In the drafts of the letter Marx sees all communal forms of property in a first stage, "archaïque ou primaire"¹³⁰ while a secondary stage contains the forms based upon private property, including slavery, serfdom and capitalism.¹³¹ The village community (commune rurale) is the last form in the primary stage: this was the form of the ancient German village which disappeared during the migrations and conquests. It was followed in Germany and the West by the new feudal village ("la nouvelle commune") in which there is also private property in the tilled land, while the common lands continue as before. This is the second stage of society, based upon private property. The Russian commune and the contemporary Asiatic communes are placed in the preceding final form of the primary stage of society.¹³² This clearly marks off the Russian and Asiatic communes from the

130. Marx-Engels Archiv, I, 332-333; cf. previous discussion in chapter V of this thesis.

131. Ibid., 338; cf. 320, 322, 331.

132. Ibid., 320, 321, 322, 331, 335-336, 338.

feudal (and slave-holding) forms of society.

(2) This kinship of the Russian and Asiatic forms over against the European forms is expressed again in the emphasis upon the fact that Russia is the only European country in which the communes are preserved on a national scale.¹³³ They are not in danger of being destroyed by conquerors as in the case of India and the East Indies.¹³⁴ In these remarks, Russia is distinguished from the Western countries of Europe where the commune disappeared centuries ago, and is in circumstances similar to those of Asia, where the communes have not been disturbed by conquering industrial countries. Russia and Asia have a common characteristic.

(3) In addition to placing the predominate social group of Russian national life in the same primitive stage of society as the Asian communes, Marx expresses several of the characteristic traits of Asiatic society. (a) Russian villages suffer from isolation, which (b) originally resulted from the geographical expanse of the land, (c) always resulted in despotism, and (d) prevents all historical progress. Hence:

There is one detrimental character of the communes./
C'est son isolation, la manque de liaison entre la vie d'une commune avec celle des autres, ce microcosme localisé, qu'on ne rencontre pas partout comme caractère immanent de ce type, mais qui partout où il se trouve a fait surgir au-dessus des communes un despotisme plus ou moins central. La fédération des républiques russes du

133. Ibid., 323: "La Russie est le seul pays européen où la 'commune agricole' s'est maintenue sur une échelle nationale jusqu'aujourd'hui." Cf. 324-332.

134. Ibid., 323.

Nord prouve que cette isolation, qui semble avoir été primitivement imposée par la vaste étendue du territoire, fut en grande partie consolidée par les destinées politiques que la Russie avait à subir depuis l'invasion mongole. /Aujourd'hui c'est un obstacle d'élimination la plus facile. (have a representative assembly etc.,)/135

"...qui lui interdit /toute/ l'initiative historique..."¹³⁶

"...qui lui jusqu'ici interdit toute initiative historique..."¹³⁷

Thus most of the features of Asiatic society are mentioned by Marx in his analysis of Russia: stagnation, isolation, despotism, a primitive communal form of society, and a geographical influence upon social development. Public works by the central government are absent, but Russia is not in the main Asiatic area needing irrigation.

(4) Marx's statements above, however, go far beyond Russia.

Wherever isolation is a characteristic of the primitive communes, a despotism is the result: despotism, the most complete form of state power, is a regular product of the primitive social form under certain conditions. There are then two forms of states: the "natural" state which grows up on the basis of isolated communes in primitive society, and the European state produced by class conflicts when primitive society dissolves and society begins to develop into an organic whole initially producing conflicting classes.

In these drafts Marx has placed all social forms in a single scale of development and has also said that if Russia were isolated

135. Ibid., 323-324; cf. 333, 338.

136. Ibid., 325.

137. Ibid., 338-339.

from all other nations, she would have to go through all the phases of development.¹³⁸ However, he has also placed a large area of the earth and a great bulk of mankind in a low and stagnating form in this single scale: the millions of peasants in Russia and presumably the millions of Asiatic peoples. (The entire development of all the forms in the scale occurs independently only in Western Europe (with Britain as the centre) from which it spreads around the world by virtue of the innate character of modern industrial production. It will then react upon the stagnant areas, either hastening their development or allowing them to overleap the series of forms based upon private property.) This great area of stagnation is caused by the geographical and climatic influences upon society. Now, this is an ambiguous conception which is only clarified by the recognition that its unity (coherence) depends upon the principles underlying it. If one is using simply the area of the earth, the size of population, and the span of historical time involved, as the criteria for this conception, then, only a dual or multilinear concept of social development is possible, as Wittfogel has said was the case with Marx and Engels.¹³⁹ However, if one uses the Hegelian type of idea, of development as the criterion, applied to the economic, social and political history of Western Europe, then the bulk of the world may be allowed to be stagnant while

138. Ibid., 332.

139. Wittfogel, op. cit., 7.

the dynamic development takes place which will ultimately react upon it. For Marx there was no problem, for the actual historical reality was that of Western industrial capitalism driving itself around the world and penetrating the life of it.

If it be objected that it is contrary to Marx's ideas of the progressive nature of social forms to conceive of so long a period of stagnation, in a form in which the germs of private property have already been sown, it may be countered that Marx himself laid down the principle of the possibility of it. In the discussion of the possibility of the Russian communities surviving into the socialist period of history, he said that the fact of the death of these communities elsewhere did not condemn them all to death. They have the seeds of decay and the seeds of vitality within them: private property and communal ownership of land. Their development or decay depends upon their circumstances.¹⁴⁰

The reading excerpts and remarks from the 1881 note-books appear to confirm the interpretation just given. There are twenty-seven pages of finely written excerpts from Sir John Phear's The Aryan Village in India and Ceylon (1880).¹⁴¹ In addition to several very important remarks, Marx made heavy marginal lines which indicated the material he considered important (his underlining does not appear to have had any such

140. Marx-Engels Archiv, I, 338. Cf. Marx's closing paragraph in his letter to Zasulich, Ibid., 341.

141. Contained in Heft B46, pp.128-155. The most important of these have been prepared in an appendix to the thesis and may be consulted there.

pattern and is disregarded here). From these remarks and markings may be gleaned the following facts. (1) There is no mention of slavery. (2) Marx excerpted a passage which indicated that a form of state had been in existence for centuries in Ceylon:

Anuradhapura, the classic city of the Mahawansa, for 7-800 Jahre the metropolis der successiv regierenden dynasties ruling over the larger portion of Ceylon, dass for eben so lange Zeit left to decay - is sehr nah d. Mittelpunkt d. neuen Provinz...¹⁴²

(3) There are two remarks in which Marx condemns the use of feudal terms for the social institutions of these villages.

(a) After describing the landholding system in Bengal, based upon state ownership, rent-taxes, a collector who takes his living from a certain region or district assigned to him, and the letting of land at low rents or rent-free to servants who serve the collector or the community, Marx says: "(Dieser Esel Phear nent [sic!] d. construction d. village feudal)".¹⁴³

(b) Later, excerpting the section on the system of landholding in Ceylon, where there is no private ownership strictly speaking, Marx refers to La Touche's work in the following manner:

Mr. la Touche's "Settlement Report of Ajmere and Mhairwarra" recently published, obgleich La Touche nach [noch?] Phear d. facts verfaescht durch phraseology borrowed from feudal Europe. (263)¹⁴⁴

142. Ibid., 146 (J. Phear, The Aryan Village in India and Ceylon, 175-176).

143. Ibid., 136(61-62).

144. Ibid., 154(263).

Clearly Marx objected to feudal terminology for these villages.

(4) There is a great deal of attention given to the primitive and communal organization of the villages and their customs of co-operation. At the same time, it is clear that there is an advanced state of development, including usury (though largely in kind), private tilling of the hereditary plots of ground, a group of persons who have a certain status and privileges based upon custom, some of whom are said to have belonged to the former chieftains (implying a certain degree of development). Further, implying development, Marx says that the Ceylonese method of rendering services instead of payments in kind, indicates an earlier form than the Bengalese form (payment in kind).¹⁴⁵

From these facts and remarks it appears that Marx could only have been placing these villages in the advanced primitive form of the primary stage, as the Russian mir and other village communities. Had he not shown the continual interest in the communal activities, the features of primitive society, it might be possible to say that he held to an entirely separate Asiatic social form. But, having displayed this so clearly, it is difficult to hold this interpretation.

145. Ibid., 148(183-185).

iv

The part that Engels played in the formation of the concept of Asiatic Society has been seen. Following this period there was a silence until 1875 when a series of statements began to appear. The first of these was his article, "Russia and the Social Revolution" which we have discussed previously. In answer to the assertion that the Russians would not need a social revolution to achieve socialism (only a political one) because of their natural tendency to associate (the mir for example), Engels reveals that he still holds to many of the views contained in his concept of Asiatic Society. The communes are common to all peoples at a certain low stage of development and survive today in Russia, proving its low stage of development.¹⁴⁶ The Russian peasant lives in a world to himself: "...only in his community; the rest of the world exists for him only insofar as it intrudes into his community".¹⁴⁷ Hence, mir means "the world" or "community" and Vse mir means the whole of the village community for the peasant. This isolation produces despotism:

Such a complete isolation of the various villages from each other, which produces in the whole country identical, but the very opposite of truly common interests, is the natural basis of oriental despotism, and from India to Russia this type of social structure has always found its completion in this form of government. Not only the Russian state in general, but its specific form, the despotism of the Tsar, instead of being suspended in midair, is a necessary and logical product of Russian social conditions, with which according to

146. Marx-Engels, The Russian Menace to Europe, 211.

147. Ibid.

Mr. Tkachoff, it has "nothing in common".¹⁴⁸

Russia is represented by Engels as being an Asiatic despotism, which is confirmed in his closing statement that the badly disjointed society "...is held together laboriously and externally by an Oriental despotism whose arbitrariness and caprice we cannot imagine in the West".¹⁴⁹ The basis of the despotism of Russia is the same as that of Asiatic despotism described previously and hence Engels is not merely using polemical and derogatory language.

Further remarks about the nature of Russia in the article present a view which contains many of the marks of Asiatic Society. It is a stagnant society in which the mass of the people "...have lived mutely for centuries from generation to generation in a kind of timeless stupor..." which was broken only when the government "...itself set history in motion..." by ending serfdom and personal services.¹⁵⁰ The Czar is viewed as God on earth and revolts are never against the true Czar but only against pretenders, officials and nobles,¹⁵¹ the patriarchal and theocratic characteristics of Oriental despots. The bureaucracy or state machinery is also very prominent in his accounts of Russia.¹⁵²

148. Ibid., 211-212.

149. Ibid., 215.

150. Ibid., 204.

151. Ibid., 214.

152. Ibid., 208. It should be said, however, that this feature was never emphasised by Marx and Engels in their descriptions of Asiatic Society, but is implicit in them.

It is clear then that Engels is employing certain aspects of Asiatic Society in his analysis of Russia. The assertion that despotism is based upon isolated communes and the employment of features such as isolation, stagnation, and patriarchal and theocratic aspects are concrete evidence that Engels has neither repudiated nor forgotten the concept he and Marx worked out in the early 1850's.

In Anti-Duehring Engels makes a variety of scattered statements which again reveal the awareness of the Asiatic mode of society (it should be remembered that Engels is replying to Duehring and his subject matter is determined by Duehring's; there are only asides, not a direct discussion of the matter.) There is communal or state ownership of land in the Orient but not private property, and the Turks were the first to introduce a kind of feudal ownership of land.¹⁵³ The village communes, the primary social unit, have withstood the ravages of nomadic conquests and Oriental despotisms for thousands of years and have only succumbed to the modern industrial and commercial corrosion. They are self-sufficient entities based upon primitive household industry and agriculture.¹⁵⁴ These units, models of primitive communism itself and self-contained, are the basis of despotism, the rawest form of state.

153. Anti-Duehring, 184(English, 244-245).

154. Ibid., 167-168; cf. 334-335, on self-sufficiency generally (223-224; 428-429; cf. 487 for this in preparatory notes)

Die alten Gemeinwesen, wo sie fortbestanden, bilden seit Jahrtausenden die Grundlage der rohesten Staatsform, der orientalischen Despotie, von Indien bis Russland. Nur wo sie sich auflösten, sind die Völker aus sich selbst weiter vorangeschritten, und ihr nächster ökonomischer Fortschritt bestand in der Steigerung und Fortbildung der Produktion vermittelt der Sklavenarbeit.¹⁵⁵

Thus the social form is definitely that of the primitive form of society and the next step to be taken is that of slavery. In the preparatory notes the statement is made that domestic slavery, as in the Orient, does not form the basis of production and is a part of the family,¹⁵⁶ thus repeating Marx's distinction between Asiatic slavery and classical labour slavery. Irrigation plays a part in both the local community and the larger despotic government. The control of water supplies is one of the original tasks assigned to individuals in the smaller community unit.¹⁵⁷ The despots of India and Persia knew that the basis of their power was their maintenance of the irrigation system throughout the river valleys.¹⁵⁸ In all these statements, scattered though they are, there are discernible the main features of the earlier description of Asiatic society. It is especially clear that the communally organised villages are the basis of despotism and that the despotic form of state is not the result of class conflicts caused by private property.

155. Ibid., 190(251; cf. 487). 156. Ibid., (in English text only), 485.

157. Ibid., 187(248).

158. Ibid., 188(249); cf. 151(205). Also he mentions it in Arab Spain, 192(254).

In the preceding paragraph it was seen that the Asiatic despotism is prior to a society and state formed by slavery; it must be in some way in the primitive stage of society. In the chapter on primitive society Engels' concept of a natural state was shown. This was the development of state-like functions within the primitive order, by common consent and tradition until such a time as it became independent of the group. This independence grew until the person involved, "... nach den Umstaenden dieser Herr als orientalischer Despot oder Satrap, als griechischer Stammesfuers, als keltischer clanchef u.s.w. auftrat..."¹⁵⁹ Here then, in spite of not giving the details, Engels holds to a development of state power which is based upon the need for communal undertakings instead of being based upon the conflict of classes giving rise to a need for a restraining power. This latter form of state power comes from the development of slavery, exchange, commodity production, disintegration of the primitive communes, and is the form typical of the Western developments, whereas the persistence of the communes has caused despotism from India to Russia. It is this feature of Asiatic society that appears most clearly in Anti-Duehring. Engels mentioned but did not define the climatic and geographical factors, and merely mentioned the fact of house-industry constituting the self-sufficiency of the communes.

159. Ibid., 188(249)

A short passage in the manuscript on early German history in 1881-1882 reveals the vitality of the concept of despotism and Asiatic society and also reveals the historical relation of the naturally evolved state to the classic state. He has related the dissolution of the kinship bonds of the Germans because of population increase, the resulting predominance of language and common history as the social bonds as they settled in districts called Gaue and finally, the utter dissolution of all bonds save that of residence in the village.

Damit war das Volk aufgelöst in einer Verband kleiner Dorfgemeinschaften, unter denen kein oder doch fast kein ökonomischer Zusammenhang bestand, da ja jede Mark sich selbst genuegte, ihre eigenen Beduerfnisse selbst produzierte und ausserdem die Produkte der einzelnen benachbarten Marken fast genau dieselben waren. Austausch zwischen ihnen war also ziemlich unmöglich. Und eine solche Zusammensetzung des Volks aus lauter kleinen Gemeinschaften, die zwar gleich, aber ebendeshalb keine gemeinsamen ökonomischen Interessen haben, macht eine nicht aus ihnen hervorgegangene, ihnen fremd gegenueberstehende, sie mehr und mehr ausbeutende Staatsgewalt zur Bedingung der Fortexistenz der Nation.¹⁶⁰

The need of an overall power to attend to the common interests of a people who otherwise have no interconnections is the basis of the natural state and also of despotism (in a general way, though a distinction is to be made regarding despotism). The natural question, why did not despotism develop, is answered in the passage following.

Die Form dieser Staatsgewalt ist wieder bedingt durch die Form in der sich die Gemeinschaften zur Zeit befinden. Da wo --- wie bei den arischen Voelkern Asiens und bei den Russen --- sie entsteht zu einer Zeit zuweist, wo die Gemeinde

160. Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin, Zur deutschen Geschichte, I, 88.

den Acker noch fuer Gesamtrechnung bestellt oder doch den einzelnen Familien nur auf Zeit zuweist, wo also noch kein Privateigentum am Boden sich gebildet hat, tritt die Staatsgewalt als Despotismus auf.¹⁶¹

On the other hand, in the former Roman lands taken over by the Germans, the land was held as free property, could be exchanged with the result that the classic development of the dissolution of the communes set in, and the feudal state developed. Hence, communal or state ownership of the land is the determining factor in the type of state-form that develops, (and elsewhere, this is seen to be due to the need of communal projects to make it possible to cultivate it and the lack of exchange.)

In 1884, another short reference to despotism shows that Engels accepts and uses the concept of a despotism in Asia based upon the surviving primitive communes. In his letter to Karl Kautsky of February 16, he comments upon J.W.B. Money's book on Java which shows how the Dutch have utilised the village communities in their colonial exploitation. In addition to unclanking state-socialism it shows how primitive communism is the basis of despotism where there is no modern element in it. Thus

Nebenbei Beweis, wie der Urkommunismus dort wie in Indien und Russland heute die schoenste breitste Grundlage der Ausbeutung und des Despotismus liefert (solange kein modern-kommunistisches Element ihm aufruttelt.¹⁶²

161. Ibid.

162. Marx-Engels, Briefe an A. Bebel, W. Liebknecht, K. Kautsky und Andere, I, 325.

This statement at a time when Engels was beginning to formulate his work on the Origin should balance any assertions concerning the absence of Asiatic Society from this work and the conclusion that he had dropped the concept of it.

In the Origin there is no use of the concept of a separate Asiatic type of society. However, Engels continued to make statements which reveal the use of concepts found in it and descriptions of Russia which fit readily into a description of Asiatic Society. Thus in 1885 he wrote to Vera Zasulich that Russia was a land where all the various stages of social development occur, held together by a despotism: "...depuis la commune primitive jusqu'à la grande industrie et à la haute finance modernes, et où toutes ces contradictions sont violement contenues par un despotism sans egal..."¹⁶³

In 1890 in the article, "The Foreign Policy of Russian Czarism", a number of statements were made which imply a distinction between Asiatic and Western society. In Turkish territory the Christian peasants were not molested so long as they paid their taxes, and they were allowed self rule. Though there is no mention of Communes, the relation of the people to the despotism is similar to the indifference of the people of the Indian communes to their rulers.¹⁶⁴ On the other hand, the Greek

163. Marx-Engels, Ausgewählte Briefe (Berlin, 1953), 457. In this connection it should be remembered that Marx and Engels, in their preface to the Russian edition of the Manifesto (1882), said that "...more than half the land is owned in common by the peasants." (SW, I, 23). This indicates that for them the commune was a considerable factor in the social situation in Russia.

164. Marx-Engels, The Russian Menace to Europe, 40.

merchants were seeking freedom from the heavy hand of the government.

In actual fact Turkish, like any other oriental domination, is incompatible with a capitalistic economy; the surplus value extorted is not safe from the hands of greedy satraps and pashas. The first basic condition of bourgeois acquisition is lacking: the security of the person and the property of the trader.¹⁶⁵

This reflects the Asiatic world in which private property is at most, but lightly esteemed, and in which the rulers and officials have first access to the surplus through their claim to the land.

The description of Russia in the article betrays the use of concepts from the Asiatic concept of society. Russia is portrayed as being increasingly westernised, by the introduction of money economy, by the conquest of its distances, by setting history in motion through the creation of classes, and through the awakening of the population from its passive mood. At the time of the Napoleonic blockade, "Russia was already much too westernised to be able to live without money."¹⁶⁶ After 1856 the social revolution had progressed greatly.

...Russia is becoming daily more westernized: heavy industry, railroads, the conversion of all charges in kind into money payments and the accompanying loosening of the old bases of society are developing with increasing rapidity.¹⁶⁷

The description of mid-eighteenth Century Russia portrays both a population and a country with Asiatic traits: its population is

165. Ibid.

166. Ibid., 38.

167. Ibid., 51.

"...intellectually stagnating, without initiative, but within the limits of its traditional mode of existence unconditionally available for any use...", while the country itself "...was without a vital center, the conquest of which could force a peace. Because of its lack of roads, its expanse... /it was protected from conquest./" ¹⁶⁸ The Crimean war, however, was lost because of the vast distances.

The Crimean war marks the beginning of Russia's internal development. First of all, its sacrifices awakened the passive population from its Asiatic state of mind and development of new classes set its social scene and its public opinion in motion. The Czar could no longer expect,

...the passivity of unthinking obedience. For gradually even Russia had developed further both economically and intellectually; beside the nobility there now stood the beginnings of a second educated class, the bourgeoisie. In short the new Czar had to play the liberal, but this time at home. However, this gave a start to the internal history of Russia, to a movement of minds within the nation itself and its reflex, public opinion, which henceforth could be less lightly regarded, /against which Czarist diplomacy would founder/. For this sort of diplomacy is possible only as long as the people remain unconditionally passive, have no will except that imposed by the government, no function except to provide soldiers and taxes to achieve the objectives of the diplomats. Once Russian internal development, with its internal party struggles had begun, the winning of a constitutional framework within which this party struggle could be fought without forcible convulsions, was only a question of time.¹⁶⁹

Because of this struggle which creates instability of diplomatic policy, the old Russian policy of conquest is broken,

168. Ibid., 27; cf. 46. 169. Ibid., 46-47.

...the ability unconditionally to dispose of the forces of the nation is lost--Russia remains difficult to attack and relatively weak on the offensive, but in other respects it becomes a European country like any other, and the peculiar strength of its former diplomacy is forever broken.¹⁷⁰

In addition to this break with the past there is the presence of railroads which brings in all kinds of heavy industry and the accompanying development of a capitalistic economy and society.¹⁷¹

Throughout this description of Russia runs the assumption that Russia was a passive, homogenous mass held together by the government which was a despotism.¹⁷² There was no development within the population which could give independent direction to the life of the nation or oppose the government, because of intellectual stagnation and the lack of an integrated life based upon common interests, which latter is due to the lack of transportation and communication. This is much like the description of an Asiatic society, and only after these conditions are broken can Russia become "a European country".

The final significant statements on the question were made in 1894 by Engels in the postscript to the 1875 article on Russian social conditions in Internationales aus dem "Volksstaat" (1871-1875). The purpose of the postscript was to bring the article up to date in respect to the recent developments in Russian conditions, especially those relative to the communes

170. Ibid., 47.

171. Ibid.

172. Cf. Ibid., 26, 54.

and their prospects of survival into the future socialist era.¹⁷³ Therefore, the main point of the revision was the consideration of recent developments, and neither a repudiation nor a revision of the statements concerning Asiatic society was made. There is no hint that Engels was dissatisfied with those general statements. (In the article of 1875 it was found that he said the communes were the basis of oriental despotism and that the isolation and the lack of common interests were the reason for this --cf. the earlier section.)

In addition to not denying the statements made in the earlier article, many features of the Asiatic conception of society appear in the article indirectly. The despotism of the Czar is repeatedly maintained.¹⁷⁴ The State is said to be the benefactor of the Cossack military communes (with communal cultivation) in the Urals, implying the exploitation of this form.¹⁷⁵ The agricultural communes are placed in a low state of development¹⁷⁶ and he mentions the presence of home industries which will be disrupted by the presence of railroads and their transport of goods

173. Cf. Ibid., 283-284; especially: "...the reprinting of 'Russia and the Social Revolution' is urgently desired and this makes it necessary for me to supplement that old essay by making an attempt at drawing some conclusions from a comparative historical investigation of recent economic conditions in Russia. These conclusions do not come out fully in favor of a great future for the Russian community..." (284).

174. Ibid., 238, 239, 240, 241.

175. Ibid., 231.

176. Ibid., 229.

(implying that the fact of the former isolation is due to geographical expanse and isolation).¹⁷⁷ (He had already noted that distance defeated Russia in the Crimean War.)¹⁷⁸ The process taking place in Russia involves the disintegration of the natural economy or barter economy by a money economy;¹⁷⁹ hence Engels is aware of the low stage of development of Russian economy.

In the above allusions there are present most of the features of Asiatic society, made in passing remarks in a discussion of another subject. He makes a further, much more direct reference to a feature of it which he stressed in the former article, that of the effects of the isolated and disconnected villages upon the viewpoint of the peasants. He says that the future revolution will

"...lift the great mass of the nation, the peasants, out of the isolation of their villages, of the mir which forms their world, and place them onto the great stage where they will learn to know the world abroad and with it themselves, their own condition and the means to emancipate themselves from their present poverty."¹⁸⁰

This direct allusion to a point more explicitly expressed in the article being reprinted with it strengthens the conclusion that Engels has not abandoned either the concept or the fact of the Asiatic concept of society which sees a despotism arising from the undeveloped and isolated primitive communes. This conclusion is borne out again in the article "The Peasant Question in France and

177. Ibid., 235; cf. 238.

178. Ibid.

179. Ibid., 236.

180. Ibid., 241.

Germany", written in November of 1894. The peasant is an important factor in most European countries and in Russia and is influential because of his apathy, "...which has its roots in the isolation of rustic life."¹⁸¹ This characteristic of stagnant Asiatic society (obviously not confined to it) is the basis not only of corruption in Paris and Rome, "...but also of Russian despotism."¹⁸² Further, the natural economy of original peasant life created a self-sufficiency of the peasants.¹⁸³ Self-sufficiency and isolation, producing apathy, cause political corruption in the West with its free peasant property and despotism in Russia with its background of communal property.

It is clear that Engels used a concept of the origin of the State which did not follow the classical development of Western Europe usually used by Marxism, which depends upon the development of private property and exchange, and money. In addition to a non-class origin of the State, this concept sees the State resting upon the primitive communal economic and social life. Many remarks and aspects of this view of society link it to the Asiatic concept Marx and Engels elaborated in 1853.

v.

The exception to the foregoing usage of the Asiatic concept of society by Engels is the Origin of 1864. It is the difficulty in evaluating Engels' concept of Asiatic society because he did

181. SW, II, 381.

182. Ibid.

183. Ibid., 384.

not mention a distinctively Asiatic form of society or state in it. It is even more significant because the Soviet school of Marxism has followed the scheme presented in the Origin and has denied a separate form of Asiatic society. Did Engels have the distinctively Asiatic form of society and state in mind when he wrote this and hence intend to deny its unique character? Is the historical scheme of the development of, and character of, society and the state presented in 1884 intended to take precedence over the many statements made between 1875 and 1894 which indicated a unique society and state in Asia? Did he really make a new departure here as opposed to the position taken by Marx in 1881? It does not appear so. It appears that Engels neglected the peculiarity of the Asiatic societies, unwittingly or deliberately, and that the statements in the 1884 work do not prevent its possible incorporation into that system, as a peculiar form. It is not proposed here to determine exactly what Engels did or thought, but rather to show (1) what he did not do (or could not have done) and (2) what, on the basis of the Origin, he could have done.

Engels made numerous references to Asia in the Origin but these were limited to the family,¹⁸⁴ to very early events in the development of mankind in Asia,¹⁸⁵ and tribal and primitive social forms.¹⁸⁶ The exceptions to these are: (1) he distinguishes

184. SW, II, 175, 182, 184-185, 195, 199, 201, 203. Also, 158 (the preface to the 1891 edition).

185. Ibid., 172, 195, 280.

186. Ibid., 175, 184-185, 192, 257. Also, 162, 164 (1891 preface).

Oriental domestic slavery from the labour slavery of antiquity¹⁸⁷ (and thereby refers Asia to the earlier beginnings of slavery, or to a unique category); (2) he compares the craftsmen of certain Indian villages (Asian) of today with the craftsmen of the lower stages of barbarism (or earlier) who worked for the community;¹⁸⁸ (3) he spoke of the traces of gentile institutions "...found in the ancient history of civilized nations in Asia."¹⁸⁹

However, it is clear that Engels did not use or discuss the Asiatic forms of society and state as presented in his other writings (and as did Marx): in particular, despotism based upon the undissolved communes was not mentioned. He must have either: (1) denied the fact of such a society and state and relegated all societies to the class-conflict classification of the Origin, or (2) he neglected it, (a) perhaps unwittingly due to his intense desire to appropriate Morgan's findings for the solution of the

187. Ibid., 278; cf. note 117 of this chapter of this thesis.

188. Ibid., 280.

189. Ibid., 257. Here Engels is slavishly following Morgan who spoke of the difficulty of discerning gentile institutions in Asia where "...the period of human occupation has been longest..."; "...here the transformations of society have been the most extended, and the influence of tribes and nations upon each other the most constant"; "The early development of Chinese and Indian civilization..." (Ancient Society, 361-362). Morgan is convinced that "...the whole experience of Mankind from savagery to civilization was worked out upon the Asiatic continent..." (362), and proceeds to find remnants of primitive institutions among the remaining primitive tribes. He covers all Asia in ten pages out of 330 pages on the whole question of gentile organization! --a proportion followed by Engels. It does not appear that Engels gave much thought to his statement and its implication (that civilization would imply an early end to much that still characterized Asiatic society) and was merely following Morgan. He did this in accepting Morgan's designation of the alphabet

problems of classical history, the family, and the enrichment of their total viewpoint, (b) perhaps consciously because he assumed its existence and was concerned only with the Western history which produced capitalism. It remains to show that he could not have done the former, and might have done either of the latter.

It seems impossible that Engels denied the distinctive Asiatic society and state and subsumed all societies and states under the Western type based upon class-conflict, when an attempt is made to incorporate the data on Asia (expressed by Engels) into this system. This lack of correlation between the two is more significant yet when it is considered that Engels continued to use the Asiatic concept and data and made no attempt to revise the Origin at this point in 1891.¹⁹⁰ The more important difficulties follow.

The basic and most obvious contradiction between Asiatic society and the scheme found in the Origin is that concerning the State. In Asiatic society, the state power - despotism - was always said to be based upon the isolated, self-sufficient village

(footnote contd.) and written records as the mark of civilization (SW, II, 173)--and promptly ignored it throughout his book!

190. Cf. the preface to the 1891 edition in SW, II, 157-168. The consideration of the theory of the household community (199-200, 260, 265-266) is merely the introduction of new material upon the subject of the family and early communes. It may have a relevance for a possible solution to the classification of Asiatic society but it was not introduced as a revision of the specific concept of an Asiatic society - or the denial of it.

communes and was the natural complement of this form of society. In the Origin the State was said to result from the dissolution of the communes, by the development of property and the division of labour which resulted in class conflicts: the State was needed for the ordering of such a society and to protect property. Hence, "At a certain stage of economic development, which was necessarily bound up with the cleavage of society into classes, the state became a necessity owing to this cleavage."¹⁹¹ To bring these two forms of state together, one must either deny that the concept of the Asiatic form of state was a valid interpretation of facts, or one must place it in the transitional period before the fully developed typical state form emerges, as a unique form in the conditions prevailing in Asia (as Marx did). Neither of these was explicitly done by Engels, but it will be seen that the latter might have been done, while the continued use of the concept until his death disproves the former. This contradiction underlies all the further points to be made.

The state and civilization are bound together in Engels' view,¹⁹² and have a number of necessary specific characteristics which are not typical of Asiatic society. (a) First, a general characteristic: civilization is the period in which "...knowledge of the further working-up of natural products, of industry property, and of art is

191. SW, II, 292. Cf. 247, 256, 239, and especially 287-288.

192. Cf. for example. Ibid., 241, which gives the conditions of the birth of Greek civilization.

acquired.", while Barbarism was the period in which "...methods of increasing the productivity of nature through human activity was learnt."¹⁹³ This description of barbarism is much more akin to the union of agriculture and home industry which is the basis of Asiatic society, a society in which there is no radical division of labour sufficient to dissolve the communes and stimulate advanced industry. (b) The following summary statement shows the many details which are contradicted by the Asiatic conditions:

The stage of commodity production, with which civilization began, is marked economically by the introduction of /1/ metal money and, thus, of money capital, interest and usury; /2/ the merchants acting as middlemen between producers; /3/ private ownership of land and mortgage; /4/ slave labour as the prevailing form of production. /Monogamy as the family form/...and the individual family as the economic unit of society. The cohesive force of civilized society is the state.../in addition, he says there is; /...the fixation of the contrast between town and country as the basis of the entire division of social labour.../and wills to dispose of property after death./¹⁹⁴

This summary statement is amply illustrated by details in the sections of analysis. It has very little in common with Asiatic society: commodity production, the contrast of city and country, private property in land, and slave labour as the basis of production, are all absent from the typical Asian society. In the Orient, polygamy is still practised by the wealthy and the rulers while the common people live in monogamy, showing that monogamy has not completely triumphed. The village commune or the enlarged household family is the economic unit of society, not the

193. Ibid., 174.

194. Ibid., 274.

individual monogamous family. The essential nature of the Orient self-sufficient and self-contained life organised in the village commune or household family, is diametrically opposed to the essential nature of civilization which consists of interdependence, division of labour and commodity production and exchange of products.

These basic contradictions might be worked out in greater detail but to no really good advantage. The principle of each has been shown and sufficiently referred to the concrete material to prove the point. It is evident from the above that Engels could not have thought that Asiatic society and despotism was identical with Western civilization and state and that it had experienced the disintegration of communes, class conflicts, property, and division of labour, all resulting in the state produced class conflict.

The first possible explanation of Engels' failure to mention Asiatic society, or to incorporate it into the historical development portrayed in the Origin - the denial of it- has been shown to be impossible. This leaves the possibility that he neglected it, deliberately or by oversight, still held to its uniqueness, and that it could have been accommodated in the scheme explicitly expressed in the Origin. This is strengthened by the continued use of the facts and the concept of a specifically Asian society, and by the failure to raise the question in revisions. It is now proposed to show that the system and statements of 1884 do not exclude this possibility (as they did

the first one) and thereby establish Engels' continued usage of the Asiatic concept and a natural state, as valid and consistent with all his work. (Why he neglected it is not the problem.)

First, there are no claims that the European state formation is a universal pattern of state formation which includes Asia. There are claims that the gentile institutions are to be found in all lands: they are to be found either in the ancient history of these lands, or in the surviving remnants of tribal society ("One or the other is met with everywhere.")¹⁹⁵ Further there is no claim that Morgan had found a key to the formation or origin of the state, but rather that he supplied the solution to the history of the family, the relation of the Greek and Roman gens to the tribe and its relation to the primitive mother-right gens, the description of society before the state, and the forms of the transition from gentile society in Greece and Rome to political society.¹⁹⁶ In the 1888 English edition of the Manifesto, he inserted a footnote on the new knowledge of primitive society. Here he says that Morgan discovered the "...true nature of the gens and its relation to the tribe", thus laying bare the inner organization of Communist society; he himself attempted to retrace the process of dissolution of this society into

195. Ibid., 257. Cf. 220: "...the gens is an institution common to all barbarians up to their entry into civilization and even afterwards."

196. Cf. chapter VI of this thesis, the section on Engels' view of Morgan's merit. Cf. also, SW, II, 219-222.

separate and antagonistic classes.¹⁹⁷

That this effort of Engels did not include all societies is seen in the Origin itself. He only discusses the gentile dissolution and the state formation among the Greeks, Romans, and Germans which he described as: "...the three great separate examples..."¹⁹⁸ or "...the three main forms in which the state was built up on the ruins of the gentile constitutions."¹⁹⁹ These statements may imply that these forms are typical for the whole world, or that they are typical for Western developments, which have other variations in areas of less importance. However, they do not explicitly state that all forms of state power are the result of just such developments. In addition to this bare absence of a definite statement is a positive statement which lends support to the inference that he limited his view to the West: slavery made the first breach in society, dividing it into exploiter and exploited, a breach which reached its fullest development in civilization. Then follows the classic formula:

Slavery was the first form of exploitation, peculiar to the world of antiquity; it was followed by serfdom in the Middle Ages, and by wage labour in modern times. These are the three great forms of servitude, characteristic of the three great epochs of civilization; open and latterly, disguised slavery, are its steady companions.²⁰⁰

197. SW, I, 23: "The inner organization of this primitive Communist society was laid bare, in its typical form, by Morgan's crowning discovery of the true nature of the gens and its relation to the tribe. With the dissolution of these primaeval communities society begins to be differentiated into separate and finally antagonistic classes. I have attempted to retrace this process of dissolution..."

198. SW, II, 278.

199. Ibid., 288.

200. Ibid., 293-294.

Slavery, the first form of exploitation, is said to be "peculiar to the world of antiquity",²⁰¹ which implies that the orient did not have fully developed slavery and is in keeping with the statement that Oriental domestic slavery was different from antique labour slavery.²⁰² This statement alone is insufficient evidence for concluding that the three forms of servitude were limited to a description of Western social development, but it certainly strengthens the general trend of evidence in that direction. The absence of the study of other forms of society and this statement together make the following evidence for the possibility of a unique Asiatic form of society much more significant.

Engels not only failed to make statements concerning the form of state power and structure peculiar to Asia, but also did not elaborate his system in such a manner as to exclude the possibility of placing it in a transition stage, held in stagnation by the geographical and climatic influences on the social form of life. (a) It has been seen that Marx apparently saw a universal sequence of forms through which typical developments must all go (all things being equal), but that this development might stagnate in some areas due to the conditions there. He certainly held to a

201. Engels uses "antiquity" and "antique" to mean "classical" or "Graeco-Roman".

202. SW, II, 278. Cf. Anti-Duehring, 190(E.252), where slavery was the only means of advance to a class society in the ancient world, especially Greece.

despotism arising upon the foundation of communes. This is similar to the natural state form in Anti-Duehring and other writings of Engels.

(b) In Engels' 1884 formulations it is possible for a transition period of some length to occur between the first breach of gentile society and the formation of the fully developed state, and this allows for the gradual transformation of certain gentile forms of organization into the state forms. Hence, the struggle between the growing economic forces and the gentile organization is worked out "...in the course of generations..."²⁰³, implying a protracted struggle. In the transformation of the Athenian gentile society into the state he says that some of the organs of the gentile society were "...transformed, some displaced, by the intrusion of new organs, and finally, all superseded by real governmental authority..."²⁰⁴ This allows for transitional forms which resemble the forms of the natural state in Anti-Duehring and is demonstrated in the intermediate developments in the Greek and German gentile society where the military leaders seek to gain absolute power before the class divisions have matured enough to produce a state proper.²⁰⁵

203. Ibid., 156; cf. 183-184. Also, 232, 280-282, the first breach by property is made in the middle stage of barbarism: this is not completely worked out to its full consequences until two stages later, in civilization.

204. Ibid., 239.

205. Ibid., 236-238; 254-255; 267.

Greeks and Romans developed a hereditary aristocracy within gentile society and the kings sought to enlarge their power.²⁰⁶

The Germans developed a tribal nobility of the council chiefs who lived upon gifts from the people, but who disappeared during the migrations. During this time the military chiefs and retainers rose in power and "...began to aspire to despotic power, as among the Greeks and Romans, and sometimes succeeded in achieving it."²⁰⁷ In these three instances can be seen forms of power developing out of the gentile society before it has produced the political state form of power.

(c) In addition to these transitional forms being explicitly used in the Origin, there is also the fact that Engels (following Morgan it is true) made a distinction between the traits of historical epochs in the Old World and in the New World. Due to the lack of domesticable animals in the New World (except the llama) the middle stage of barbarism is marked by the cultivation of edible plants and the use of adobe brick and stone for building, while in the Old World, it is marked by domestication of animals and the resulting pastoral life.²⁰⁸ Hence, by the same logic, a natural condition might also have caused differences in the development of Asia as compared to that of Europe.

206. Ibid., 236-238; 254-255.

207. Ibid., 267-268.

208. Ibid., 171-172.

(d) This possibility of a peculiarly Asiatic form of society, in reality a stagnated form of the universal sequence of forms, is made the more probable by the similarity of the origin of the "natural state" officials to the amalgamation of tribes in the Origin. There, (in the Origin), it is the "increased density of the population" and the resulting need for "closer union internally and externally", in the process of which the military commander "became an indispensable and permanent official".²⁰⁹ This is very like the account of the origin of officials and state functions in the Anti-Duehring. The similarity is carried further by the description of the origin of the state because of conflicting classes in the Origin (and in Anti-Duehring in the classical view of state origin) and because of the conflicting communities in the Anti-Duehring "natural" state. Both conflicts necessitate a new form of government which stands outside or above the conflicts and represents the common interests.²¹⁰

(e) It is entirely possible that Engels held India to be in some stage of barbarism, though this is not capable of exact determination. It is clear that he knew of tribes in a primitive stage over the entire country. He mentions the Dravidians of the Deccan, the Gaura of Hindustan, the Tamils of South India²¹¹; the Tikurs of Oudh (north of the Ganges), hence in Hindustan.²¹² The

209. Ibid., 283.

210. Anti-Duehring, 187(E.248); SW, II, 287.

211. SW, II, 175.

212. Ibid., 184-185.

household communities occur in the Punjab or the Indus valley and the entire Northwestern part of the country.²¹³ Thus the entire country is included.²¹⁴ This does not indicate the proportion of the population involved in these tribes but does allow the possibility of seeing a modified tribal society over the whole, except in the large towns.

(f) The discussion of the patriarchal household communities as a transitional form of family between the pairing family with mother-right and the monogamous (father-right) family of civilization,²¹⁵ and the Semitic patriarchal family as a transitional form,²¹⁶ might provide an additional clue to a transitional category for Asiatic society. The patriarchal nature of these and the incorporation of bondsmen into the Semitic family along with polygamy might correspond to the domestic slavery of the Orient and the polygamy of the ruling classes generally throughout the Orient. Again, these do not prove a transitional classification for Asiatic society by Engels, but do point out the possibility of it.

213. Ibid., 200.

214. Cf. G. Campbell, Modern India, 27, for a map showing the contemporary nomenclature. Three sections make up the entire sub-continent: Punjab and Indus valley; Hindustan (the Northeast and Bengal); and the Deccan or southern part.

215. SW, II, 200-201.

216. Ibid., 198, 200-201.

In the above it has been shown that:

- (1) Engels could not call the Asiatic states the product of a process of formation similar to that producing the states of Greece, Rome, and the Germanic states, and still be consistent with his facts and statements about Asiatic society and despotism.
- (2) Engels did not discuss the state in Asia, but only family forms.
- (3) The process of state formation in Europe has sufficient flexibility in the transitional stages to accommodate the Asiatic state form, if it is viewed as a form stagnated by the influences of geography and climate upon the social forms. The conclusion that is drawn from these three points is that the views of Engels from 1875 to 1894 containing a specific Asiatic form of state and society are to be accepted as considered, valid, and consistent with his total work. While the Origin neglected to discuss the Asian state form, it neither denied it nor excluded the possibility of including it. This means that Engels was in harmony with Marx also. Their scheme of social forms based upon class conflict is drawn from Western history and allows a "natural" form of the state prior to the state form of the West, which, as with Hegel, was probably not considered a proper state form. This also shows the dogmatism and divergence of the Soviet view which insists upon the Western class conflict origin of the State.

Conclusion

This study of the concept of Asiatic Society in the writings of Marx and Engels establishes the fact of their use of it throughout their lifetime. There is no evidence that they rejected

it. Contrary to "orthodox" Marxism, the founders did not have so rigid a scheme for the progress of social forms, and had a "dynamic" view of the progress of society.

Marx and Engels saw that primitive communes gave the opportunity for despotism by virtue of their isolated nature (more in terms of communication and exchange of goods than geography) and their self-sufficiency. This confirms the conclusions of the preceding chapters concerning their evaluation of primitive society. They also saw that a great portion of the world was in a transitional form, a stagnant form, when measured by the historical movement of Western Europe. Their conception of a world history is not endangered by this only because of their concept of a dynamic Western European capitalistic system enmeshing and transforming the whole world. Thus, if one accepts their premises (economic life is the primary criteria of human life and a developing, organic view of history) he may view world history as a whole not as Asiatic and Western. This involves setting the end result as the guiding principle of interpretation throughout: human societies are marked by differentiation, atomized existence in primitive times but tend to expand and become more and more interdependent until the enmeshing of the world appears as the next result, which becomes the norm for evaluation of all previous societies.

CHAPTER VIII

THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF THE FALL AND ITS REINTERPRETATION

Thus far the thesis has sought to establish the nature of the structure and content of the process of history as seen by Marx, with especial reference to primitive communism, its decay, and its relation to modern proletarian communism. We have found that history, for Marx, is a progressive process in which mankind develops by differentiating its primitive simplicity and unity into a stage of increasingly highly developed but conflicting powers and relations - a world of its own - which is followed by a mature or higher unity. The "fall" is a necessary event which is instrumental in bringing about the future Golden Age. This Golden Age is only vaguely analogous to the original undeveloped state and its unity rests upon the opposite foundation from that of the original, namely material plenty, the full human development and mastery of nature, and universal interdependence and communication. The crucial point now is the question: does this structure and process parallel the structure and process of the Christian scheme: Fall - Corruption - Redemption? Is there any

indication in classical Catholic and Protestant theology that the Fall and the resulting evil corruption is instrumental in producing a higher and more perfect state of good than that from which man fell? Or is it not rather the case that, (1) redemption consists in the restoration of the former state, and (2) this restoration takes place by virtue of the Good, or God, alone, not because of sin or evil? If this is the case, there is no more than the vaguest justification for speaking of a "fall" doctrine in Marxism, whose real spirit we have seen to be that of progress, and that from the lowest, nearly non-human state.

The purpose of the present chapter is to examine the classic Christian doctrines of the original state of man, the Fall of man and its consequences, and the relation of redemption to the original state of man and to his fallen state. It is assumed, with Dr. N.P. Williams¹ of the Bampton Lectures, that there is a single and predominant doctrine common to both Roman Catholicism and Protestantism, to Lutheranism and Calvinism, and that it is this doctrine which lies in the background of the various parallels drawn between Marxism and Christianity. It is true, as will be discussed later, that there were attempts to reinterpret or radically alter the doctrine of the Fall in the half-century or more preceding Marx. These reinterpretations, however, are hardly to be called Christian doctrine and are not of the type pre-

1. N.P. Williams, The Ideas of The Fall and Original Sin, London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1929.

supposed by the proponents of the supposed parallels under our scrutiny.

The Bampton Lectures for 1924 by Dr. Williams are based upon the fact of several theories of the Fall and Original Sin in the pre-Augustinian Church and the triumph of one of these in the Augustinian theology, and are a plea for a return to the opposing view which is said to be more adequate for modern thought. In other words, they assume that there is a classic doctrine of the Fall embedded in western theology since Augustine. Further this doctrine teaches that man was created in perfection, fell therefrom, and has suffered the infection of sin ever since, while the opposing view assumed that man was created in innocence and immaturity and will only attain to true manhood in the state of redemption. Clearly, classic Christian theology has taught a persistent doctrine of the Fall, and one which portrays perfect man as losing Paradise and regaining it in Christ. Dr. Williams goes so far as to say that the doctrine taught by Augustine and variously reformulated in the Council of Trent, the Augsburg Confession, the Thirty Nine Articles, and the Institutes of Calvin, "...has stamped itself so deeply upon the imagination of his descendants that it is still very generally believed to be the only Fall-doctrine."² Thus we may disregard both the tendency found in Duns Scotus toward an anti-Augustinian view³ resembling that of Marx, and the very slight modifications of Aquinas.⁴

2. Ibid., 322.

3. Ibid., 408-409.

4. Ibid., 401.

The Reformation reiterated the Augustinian doctrine with renewed vigour. Because of this and the setting of Marxism within Protestant culture (in its origins), we shall concentrate our most detailed examination of the crucial points on the teaching of Calvin, the most systematic of the Protestant thinkers. There appears to be no appreciable difference between Luther and Calvin on these matters⁵ and Calvin has often been paired with Marx.⁶

Dr. Williams designates the classic doctrine of the Fall the "African" or "twice-born" scheme in distinction from the "Hellenic" or "once-born" scheme of Origen and the Greek Fathers.⁷ Among the five points of difference he enumerates are: (1) whether the Paradise-Fall account in Genesis 3 is literal or symbolic; (2) whether the pre-Fall condition of man was a condition of non-moral innocence similar to the animals or whether it was a condition of moral, intellectual and spiritual perfection known as Original Righteousness.⁸

5. Ibid., 487: "The differences between Lutheranism and Calvinism in regard to the doctrine of man and of his sin are inconsiderable, so that it is possible to state the Fall-theory characteristic of the Reformation as a single dogmatic scheme." Cf. 428-429 where he says that the Lutherans held a much harsher view of human nature after the Fall: man is absolutely unable to know, love, or serve God, implying that the Fall is utterly evil. These opinions are borne out by the most cursory reading of Luther's lectures on Genesis; cf. Luther's Works (Concordia, Mo., 1958), I (Lectures on Genesis), on Genesis 2:7(p.86); 2:8(90); 2:9(92-97); 2:15(101-103); 2:16-17(103-115); and especially Genesis 3:1-24 (141-236).

6. H.G. Wood, The Truth and Error of Communism, 3-4.

7. Williams, op. cit., 169,230.

8. Ibid., 168.

Irenaeus was an example of the Hellenic view.⁹ He questioned the historicity of the serpent and the forbidden fruit, though holding to a literal first man and woman, and goes on to say that unfallen man was an imperfect, undeveloped and infantile creature who was therefore not in a state of original righteousness. Perfection was the goal to which man would some day arrive, and he even speculated upon the benefits of the Fall.¹⁰ Origen held this Hellenic view side by side with the African view.¹¹ However, beginning with Tertullian there was a sequence of thinkers culminating in Augustine, by whom the African view was developed and implanted in Christian theology.¹²

Augustine's view prevailed, in a slightly weakened form, in Catholicism and was then vigorously revived in the Protestant Reformation. John Duns Scotus of the Franciscans tended toward the Hellenic view of the original state of man: Adam needed the experience of successful resistance of temptation in order to be confirmed in his goodness.¹³ In Aquinas, Augustine's view is softened slightly but is left "...essentially unchanged..."¹⁴,

9. Ibid., 191-196, 200.

10. Ibid., 193f, n.1. Cf. The Ante-Nicene Fathers (New York: Christian Literature Company, 1896), volume I: The Apostolic Fathers - Justin Martyr. - Irenaeus., 449-450, - Irenaeus against Heresies, Bk. IV, ch. xx, 1, 2.

11. Williams, op. cit., 230.

12. Ibid., 231-314.

13. Ibid., 408-409.

14. Ibid., 400.

while the Council of Trent left the point ambiguous by affirming Adam's original holiness and righteousness but remaining silent about his intellectual attainments.¹⁵ Hence, concerning the original state of man there is no essential change from Augustine's position which was reaffirmed by the Protestant Reformers.

Concerning the historicity of the Fall Augustine had not the slightest doubt. Abandoning an early use of allegorical interpretation, he used literalism consistently, though with spiritual meaning as well, from de Genesi ad litteram onwards.¹⁶ Calvin likewise treated it as a historical fact. In treating Genesis 1:6 he demands a literal interpretation of the dividing of the waters¹⁷ and interprets Genesis 2:8 similarly, insisting that allegorical interpretation is not in order.¹⁸ Further, in treating Genesis 2:10 he expends considerable effort in trying to determine the geographical location of the Garden of Eden.¹⁹

15. Ibid., 420.

16. Ibid., 360 (he cites de Genesi ad litteram, VI. 30-36, 39; VIII.7). Cf. however, De Civitate Dei, XIII.21, where Augustine insists on both a literal and an allegorical or spiritual meaning.

17. Calvin, Opera quae Supersant omnia (ed. Baum, Cunitz, Reuss), Brunsvigae, C.A. Schwetschke et Filium, 1863), LI, 18-19.

18. Ibid., 36-37.

19. Ibid., 38-44. In view of so much effort by Calvin upon this point, it is difficult to see that it is affected by Professor J.K.S. Reid's study and conclusions that Calvin was not a literalist (The Authority of Scripture, ch.2). That Calvin was not a literalist would not prevent his holding to a historical Fall, a point upon which Professor Reid does not specifically touch in his survey of Calvin's expressions indicative of his viewpoint. Further, this was not the same issue in Calvin's time that it is today because of the progress of theory and knowledge of pre-history: Calvin might well have had no question of this point and still have rejected literalism.

There certainly appears to be no question in his mind concerning the nature of the Fall account: the Fall was an actual historical event. Any treatment of the classical doctrine of the Fall involves a historical event and a purely symbolic interpretation cannot be claimed for it.

Augustine's Doctrines of Man's Nature Before and After The Fall, and after Redemption: Nature of Good and Evil.

Augustine portrayed unfallen Adam as a perfect man.²⁰ He was exempted from all physical evils and was endowed with a youth and a health not susceptible to disease and aging.²¹ Immortality, gained without the pains of death, was a possibility had he obeyed God and remained faithful to Him, the source of all Good.²² He was intellectually a mature man enjoying knowledge and wisdom: Paradise was said to represent the life of the blessed and the trees all useful knowledge.²³ There was no immaturity in Adam's nature.

Only in the moral and religious sphere do we find the

20. Williams, op. cit., 361ff.; Eugene Portalie, A Guide to the Thought of Saint Augustine, Chicago, Library of Living Catholic Thought, Henry Regenery Company, 1960, 204ff.

21. Williams, op. cit., 361, citing De Genesi ad lit-
contra Manichaeos, II.8.

22. De Civitate Dei, XII,21; XIII,1,19,22. Cf. Williams' citation of De Genesi ad litteram, VI.36.

23. De Civitate Dei, XIII, 21; cf. XII,23. Cf. also, Williams, op. cit., 361(citing op. Imperf. c. Julian, V.1) concerning Adam's superior intellectual ability evidenced by the naming of the animals, and his note that Bishop George Bull(1634-1710) used this argument.

slightest indication that Adam was not created in the fullest state of perfection possible for man here or hereafter. As in the preceding paragraph, Adam was created in a state of considerable perfection and was made in the image of God.²⁴ Within this context, however, there is a slight deficiency in Adam's nature and an improvement in the nature of the redeemed man, though this does not appear to be of a radical kind. God made man mortal, as opposed to the immortal angels, but with the condition that obedience and faithfulness would produce immortality.²⁵ It is obvious therefore that those who have been redeemed in Christ and have been resurrected, have therefore traversed the step which Adam could have traversed but did not because of disobedience. Even if we confine the comparison to the Christian saint in this life, there is a degree of difference. Adam's actual state was superior to ours, but his certainty, his hope for the future was not certain, as is that of the Christian.²⁶ Further, Adam's benefits were granted to him, not procured by him in spiritual struggle; he did not need the benefits of Christ, because he was not in the conflict that wars within sinful man - that of the spirit versus the flesh.²⁷ Therefore, the saints need a grace more powerful than Adam's, which is supplied in the

24. De Civitate Dei, XII, 23.

25. Cf. note 23 above, and De Civitate Dei, XIII, 1.

26. Ibid., XI, 12.

27. De Correptione et Gratia, XI, 29 (In Patrologia Latina, ed. J.-P. Migne, XLIV (vol. X in Augustine's works), 933-934.

incarnated Second Person of the Trinity, the victor over sin and death.²⁸

This difference is reflected in the nature of the grace which is given to Adam and to Christians: Adam was enabled not to sin and to persevere in obedience if he willed it²⁹; he was not given the impossibility of failure. Hence, the first liberty is to be able not to sin (*posse non peccare*) while the second liberty is not to be able to sin (*non posse peccare*).³⁰ Augustine emphasises that these first blessings of Adam were not trifling ones and also that Adam did not face the same degree of struggle as does the living Christian in a fallen world:³¹ in effect then, he qualifies the difference between the first and the last state of man.

Again, in considering the condition of Adam and that of the resurrected man in Christ, there is a note of a superior condition of the latter, but in dissimilar situations (since Adam never attained the state of immortality, which was a possibility, however). Adam's unfallen body was an animal body, a living soul (though potentially an immortal one), while the Christian, through Christ, has received a quickening spirit.³² Adam was able not to die, Christians are not able to die, though their spiritual bodies will lose their corrupt counterpart in the flesh.³³ Hence, again we

28. Ibid., XI, 30.

29. Ibid., XI, 31; cf. 32(935; 935-936).

30. Ibid., XII, 33 (936). 31. Ibid., XII, 35(937-938).

32. De Civitate Dei, XIII, 23.

33. Ibid., XIII, 24.

have essentially the same result. While it appears that one might easily argue that Adam's fall produces a superior condition for man, it is also true that this condition is merely that of which Adam was capable except for sin.

The primacy of the idea of renewal or restoration of that which Adam once had and lost, is seen in De Genesi ad litteram. There, despite references to an improved body, Augustine repeatedly refers to the renewal (renovatio) of the human soul and the recovery of that which was lost in Adam. For example:

Quomodo ergo, inquiunt, renovari dicimur, si non hoc recipimus, quod perdidit primus homo, in quo omnes moriuntur? Hoc plane recipimus secundum quemdam modum. Non itaque immortalitatem spiritualis corporis recipimus, quam nondum habuit homo; sed recipimus justitiam, ex qua per peccatum lapsus est homo. Renovabimur ergo a vetustate peccati, non in pristinum corpus animale, in quo fuit Adam, sed in melius, id est in corpus spirituale, cum efficiemur aequales Angelis Dei (Matth. XXII,30), apti coelesti habitationis, ubi esca quae corrumpitur non egebimus. Renovamur ergo spiritu mentis nostrae (Ephs. IV,23) secundum imaginem ejus qui creavit nos, quam peccando Adam perdidit. Renovabimur autem etiam carne, cum hoc corruptibile induetur incorruptione, ut sit spirituale corpus; in quod nondum mutatus, sed mutandus erat Adam, nisi mortem etiam corporis animalis peccando meruisset.³⁴

It appears that man's essential nature was present in Adam and is restored in redeemed man and that the improved state of the latter is due to his reaching that state for which Adam was intended but to which he failed to attain because of sin. This essentially negative character of sin in the Fall is borne out by Augustine's teaching on Evil.

34. De Genesi ad litteram, XXIV, 35 (Patrologia Latina XXXIV, 353-354; cf. 38(355); cf. Portalis, op. cit., 205, and 378, n.78.

Augustine's Doctrine of Good and Evil.

For Augustine, Evil is the absence of Good and hence is not an entity itself.³⁵ It is a negative condition resulting from the absence of a connection with the source of Good and in sin it is the condition of pride and self-centeredness or self-trust, self-glory.³⁶ The results of sin or evil do not produce of themselves any good--cannot do so as they are the absence of Good--and are not essential to the nature of, or to the existence of, the good. They may, however, enhance the Good, or may teach men of the desirability of the Good. Augustine says, for example, that God knew that the Devil would fall and become evil, but before he created him, he also knew of what use He would make of him when he had become evil.³⁷ Then he goes on to explain, in terms of the beauty of antitheses in language (as in II Cor. VI : 7-10) that the beauty of the course of the world is enhanced by the opposition of contraries (good and evil).³⁸ However, it is not evident that there is a necessity of evil for the existence of, or for the nature of, the Good.

As regards the question of evil in the form of the evil will or sin, Augustine followed the same principle: evil is nothing, the absence of Good, even though God may use it to bring

35. Enchiridion, XI, in Patrologia Latina, XL, 236.

36. De Civitate Dei, XII, 1-3, 6,8.

37. De Civitate Dei, XI, 17.

38. Ibid., 18; cf. Enchiridion, XI. (Patrologia Latina, XL, 236).

about good. In De natura et gratia he affirmed the original goodness of created nature, its corruption by a free will, and the absolutely gratuitous grace which flows freely from Christ.³⁹ Further, he revealed the negative character of sin and evil by showing that man may sin of his own will, but once in the state of sin he is unable to pass back to the righteousness from which he fell, in the same manner (free will): the death of the soul produces sin and requires the grace of Christ to restore it to life and health.⁴⁰ Or again, he says that none avoid evil and do good without the Spirit of Grace⁴¹ and that the Grace of God through Jesus Christ must be understood "...quo sola homines liberantur a malo, et sine qua nullum prorsus sine cogitando, sine volendo et amando, sine agendo faciunt bonum..."⁴² Further, Christ's death was of His own power and choice, implying that evil is in no wise responsible for the work of Christ and thus is not indirectly productive of good.⁴³ All this places limitation upon an interpretation of any statements concerning the good use that God may make of sin.

Sin and the accompanying evils may be used for good by God, even though evil is itself a lack of good. A punishment is not good in itself but leads to good by being a remedy of pride: it is essential to show a proud and self-sufficient will that it is not

39. De natura et gratia, III, IV (Patrologia Latina, XLIV, 249-250); cf. XXI.

40. Ibid., XXIII(259).

41. De correptione et gratia, I, 2 (Patrologia Latina, XLIV, 917).

42. Ibid., II, 3(917).

43. De natura et gratia, XXIV, 26(op. cit., 260); cf. XXVI, 29(261).

actually so and that it must rely on its creator and sustainer, God, the source of all Good. Hence: "Sunt ergo mala quae prosunt mirabili misericordia Dei."⁴⁴ He even attacked a criticism of the idea that man must sin in order that sin might end, since pride is a sin, by saying that to heal a painful sore an operation which entails more pain must be performed.⁴⁵ God is able to heal all things but uses His own judgement, not the sick patient for His guide; hence He turns away from the sick sinner in order to trouble him in his pride.⁴⁶

Non itaque dicitur homini, Necesse est peccare, ne pecces!
sed dicitur homini, Descrit aliquantum Deus unde superbis,
ut scias non tuum, sed ejus esse, et discas superbus non esse. ⁴⁷

Even this subtle and ambiguous honour to evil is hedged about with the assertion that man is not healed by the same power by which he has been corrupted: "...non superbe iudum, quasi homo eadem potestate sanetur, qua potestate vitiatus est."⁴⁸

In all these we see that Augustine sought ever to retain evil under the power of God (to preserve the sovereignty of God?), even to its use for good by Him. Yet he never allowed it to be necessary to God or to good, nor did he allow it to be an integral constituent of His nature or existence.⁴⁹ We may conclude, then,

44. Ibid., XXIV, 27(260). 45. Ibid., XXVII, 30. (261-262)

46. Ibid., 31(262). 47. Ibid., XXVIII, 32(262)

48. Ibid., XXX (263); cf. De Correptione et Gratia, IX, 23(op cit., 929).

49. Cf. De Ordine, I,7; II,4.

that while Augustine verged on the necessity of, or at least the good of, evil, that he did absolutely refuse it any innate good or any share in producing the Good. The good that may come from evil is the good which God makes of it, God who is the source of all good and who allowed the evil to exist in the first instance (but who did not author it, since it springs solely from free will whose acts are its own). It is a different conception of good and evil (and hence of sin) from that of Hegel and Marx in which the Good realizes itself by means of evil which is of itself a part of the becoming of good. In Augustine, evil merely corrupts, and produces more evil save when the eternal all good and omnipotent God intervenes. We see then that the classic Christian thinker (who may be said to be nearest to Marx because of a monistic system) does not allow one to assert that Marx's doctrine is merely an inversion of the Christian doctrine of the Fall.

Calvin on Man and The Fall.

Calvin sees man as a unity of a created essence, hence on immortal soul and a body created mortal from the dust of the earth.⁵⁰ The soul is itself a unity of two faculties, the intellect and the will (or heart).⁵¹ The intellect or mind is

50. Calvin, Institutio Christianae Religionis (hereafter: Institutio), I, 1-2 (Opera II, 134-136). Cf. his commentary on Genesis 2:7 (Ibid., XXIII, 35-36).

51. Institutio, I, xv, 3 (Opera, II, 142); cf. I, xv, 7.

divided into (a) that relating to heavenly matters and (b) that relating to earthly matters. "Earthly matters" comprise (1) politics and economy, and (2) the liberal arts and the manual arts.⁵² That relating to heavenly matters contains (1) the knowledge of God, (2) the knowledge of his paternal favour towards us (or salvation) and (3) the method of regulating our conduct in accordance with divine law.⁵³ Man is a physical being, possessing a will or heart, and a mind which knows of earthly and of heavenly matters. Man's natural gifts endow him with soundness of mind and integrity of heart; his supernatural gifts provide him with the light of faith and righteousness: faith, love of God, charity to neighbour, the study of righteousness and holiness.⁵⁴

In his original condition Adam was in a state of perfection and happiness which is characterized by saying that he was in the image of God. While the physical form of man is merely an external mark of the spiritual image of God, it does set man apart from the animals and makes him a complete man physically.⁵⁵ The more precise meaning of this term is that man's faculties are sound, regulated by reason (which we saw included divine matters), and that he recognizes his God as such.

52. Ibid., II, 11, 12 (II, 195-196).

53. Ibid., II, 11, 18 (II, 200-201).

54. Ibid., II, 11, 12 (195-196).

55. Ibid., I, xv, 3 (136).

Proinde hac voce notatur integritas qua praeditus fuit Adam quum recta intelligentia polleret, affectus haberet compositos ad rationem, sensus omnes recto ordine temperatos, vereque eximiiis dotibus sui excellentiam referret.⁵⁶

A being enlightened by the mind, with an upright heart, and sound in all its faculties is the original condition of man.⁵⁷

These qualities of intelligence and judgement are adequate for the conduct of his earthly life and for preparing for a future life with God and eternal happiness.

Ergo animam hominis Deus mente instruxit, qua bonum a malo, iustum ab iniusto discerneret, ac quid sequendum vel fugiendum sit, praeunte rationis luce videret. ...Huic adiunxit voluntatem, penes quam est electio. His praeclaris dotibus excelluit prima hominis conditio, ut ratio, intelligentia, prudentia iudicium non modo ad terrenae vitae gubernationem suppeterent, sed quibus transcenderent usque ad Deum et aeternam felicitatem. Deinde, ut accederet electio, quae appetitus dirigeret, motusque omnes organicos temperaret, atque ita voluntas rationis moderationi esset prorsus consentanea. In hac integritate libera arbitrio pollebat homo, quo, si vellet, adipisci posset aeternam vitam.⁵⁸

It is clear that Calvin allowed no idea of an immaturity in Adam. He was a complete man in both his earthly and his spiritual life and endowments.

The Fall from this perfect state began with disbelief and failure to trust God's promises and believe his warnings. This issued in pride and ambition which in turn produced rebellion. The promises and prohibitions of the life in Eden were to test

56. Ibid., (138). 57. Ibid., I, xv, 4(138-139).

58. Ibid., I, xv, 8(142-143); cf. commentary on Genesis 2:16 (XXIII, 44-46).

Adam's faithfulness to God and His commands. The Fall was the assertion of the will against the intellect (already informed of God's truth) and led to the corrupting forces of pride and lust.⁵⁹ This act and its consequences deface the image of God in man and deprive him of eternal life.⁶⁰

Calvin on Adam and Redeemed Man

As regards the relation of the state of man in Adam and the state of man in redemption by Christ, Calvin does not appear to be consistent. However, the ambiguity which occurs in most of his writings but disappears in the Institutio, does not seem to be more serious than that which we noted in Augustine. It is profitable to follow these apparently conflicting statements in each of his commentaries and in the Institutio.

In the commentary on Romans 5:12 he says that Christ redeems men from the corrupt state caused by Adam's fall, and says that what we have in Christ is best seen in that which we lost in Adam, even though they are not exactly similar.

...non possumus clarius perspicere quid habeamus in Christo quam ubi nobis demonstratum fuerit, quid in Adam perdidimus: etsi non omnia sint utrinque similia.⁶¹

Later, in the comments on verses 5:16-17 Calvin elaborates the dissimilarity:

59. Ibid., II,1,4(188-189).

60. Ibid., I,xv, 8(II, 143); II, 1,5(II,179).

61. Opera, XLIX, 95.

Hoc discrimine constituto, constat imple sensisse eos, qui tradiderunt nihil aliud in Christo nos recuperare quam ut ab originali peccato seu corruptione ab Adamo contracta liberemur. The sins after baptism are forgiven also.⁶²

Huc autem summa tendit : quia Christus Adamum superat: huius peccatum illius vincit iustitia: huius maledictio illius obruitur gratia: ab hoc mors profecta illius vita absorbetur.^{62a}

The main force of this is a comparison of Christ and Adam but at the same time it shows that Christ is the source of the redeemed state and that He overcomes the evil of the lost state of man. His grace and life restore the lost condition, and this flows from God, graciously and freely:

At per Christi iustitiam alio modo in salutem restituimur. Neque enim ideo nobis accepta fertur, quia intra nos sit: sed quod Christum ipsum cum bonis suis omnibus patris largitate nobis donatum possidemus. Itaque donum iustitiae non qualitatem, qua nos Deus imbuat, ut perperam quidam interpretantur, sed gratui tam iustitiae imputationem significat.⁶³

Whatever ambiguity Calvin may have had concerning the relation of the two states of righteousness, it is clear that redemption is not due to some working out of evil and sin but flows from God and Christ, the Good, freely and graciously, not by the compulsion of evil.

In treating Ephesians 4:24 Calvin is again ambiguous but stresses that the perfection of man is the same in unfallen man as in redeemed man, even though the manifestation of divine grace may be richer in the latter.

62. Ibid., 99.

62a. Ibid., 100.

63. Ibid., 100.

Nam et initio creatus fuit Adam ad imaginem Dei, ut iustitiam Dei quasi in speculo repraesentaret. Sed quoniam imago illa deleta est per peccatum, ideo nunc in Christo instaurari oportet. Nec sane aliud est regeneratio piorum, quam reformatio imaginis Dei in illis...
/ he refers to II Cor. 3:18 and his commentary on it/
Quamquam longe uberius est ac potentius Dei gratia in hac secunda creatione, quam prima fuerit. Sed hoc tantum respicit scriptura, quod summa nostra perfectio sit conformitas et similitudo, quae nobis est cum Deo. Ad eam vero quum formatus esset Adam, perdidit quod acceperat. Nobis igitur per Christum restitui necesse est. Quare huc spectare docet regenerationem, ut ex errore reducamur ad eum finem ad quem sumus conditi.⁶⁴

The reference to II Corinthians 3:18 reinforces this assertion of the restoration of the original image lost by Adam: the purpose of the Gospel is "...ut Dei imago, quae inducta fuerat per peccatum, repararetur in nobis, atque huius instaurationis progressionem tota vita esse continuam..."⁶⁵ However, his commentary on I Corinthians 15:45 brings out the superior state of the redeemed Christian.

In summa, hoc vult Paulus, conditionem, quam per Christum consequimur, longe potius esse quam fuerit sors primi hominis: quia Adae collata fuerit suo et posterorum nomine anima vivens: Christus autem nobis attulerit spiritum qui vita est. Quod autem Christum vocat novissimum Adam, haec ratio est, quod sicuti in primo homine conditum fuerat humanum genus: ita in Christo instauratum fuit.⁶⁶

In the commentary on Genesis these conflicting statements are still to be found. Concerning Genesis 2:7 he says that Paul taught in I Corinthians XV:45 that perfection was not in Adam's original condition but is granted by Christ.

Paulus prioris ad Corinth. cap.15,45 antithesin statuit inter hanc animam viventem, et spiritum vivificantem, quem fidelibus confert Christus: non alio fine nisi ut docet non fuisse in persona Adae absolutum hominis statum: sed hoc

singulare esse beneficium Christi ut renovemur in coelestem vitam, quae etiam ante lapsum Adae non nisi terrena fuit: quia non habebat stabilem fixamque constantiam.⁶⁷

However, in treating Genesis 1:26 Calvin seeks the nature of the original man by referring to redeemed man. The original nature was lost in the Fall and is not in existence to be known, but "...ex reparatione iudicandum est qualis fuerit."⁶⁸ He says further:

Dicit Paulus nos per evangelium transfigurari in imaginem Dei. Et secundum ipsum regeneratio spiritualis nihil aliud est quam eiusdem imaginis instauratio (Col. 3,10 et Ephes. 4,23). Quod autem eam constituit in iustitia et sanctitate veraci, est synecdoche: nam quamvis illud praecipuum sit, non tamen est totum. Ergo hac voce designatur totius naturae integritas, quum Adam recta intelligentia praeditus foret, affectus haberet compositos ad rationem, sensus omnes sanos et ordinatos, vereque bonis omnibus excelleret.⁶⁹

This same trend is found in the comments on Colossians 3:9 where he says that the new man is that which is renewed to obedience of righteousness by the Spirit of Christ, or "...natura in veram integritatem restituta per eundem spiritum."⁷⁰ There is no lessening of the ambiguity, except in the Institutio.

The only resolution of this ambiguity is in assuming that the image of God is the governing concept and does not involve the constancy or gift of perseverance. This latter is lacking in Adam and is present in the redeemed man, giving him his limited superior state. This resolution gives some reason to the conflicting statements which Calvin repeatedly makes on the

67. Opera, XXIII, 36.

68. Ibid., 26.

69. Ibid.

70. Opera, LII, 121.

subject. This would also explain the absence of such statements in the systematic work, the Institutio and in a confession of faith. The lack of constancy is mentioned but it is not implied that the redeemed state is a vastly superior state.

According to the Institutio Adam was made in the image of God which consisted of a right intellect, affections governed by reason, senses duly regulated, and faithfulness to God.⁷¹ The regenerate man has the restoration of the original image which was lost in the Fall and this original image is best deduced from the character of the new man in Christ: this he does on the basis of Colossians 3:19 and Ephesians 4:24. Even though Paul contrasts the life in Christ with the life of unfallen Adam (quickeningspirit vs. living soul), Calvin says, he does not contradict the fact that the renewal of the image of God is the purpose of regeneration.

Quamvis enim vivificantem spiritum quo donantur a Christo fideles, opponens Paulus (I Cor. 15, 45) animae viventi in qua creatus fuit Adam, uberiorem gratiae mensuram in regeneratione commendat, non tamen alterum illud caput tollit, hunc regenerationis esse finem, ut nos Christos ad imaginem reformet.⁷²

In the beginning the image of God was manifested "...in luce mentis, in cordis rectitudine, partiumque omnium sanitate..."⁷³

He cannot allow the principle to be discarded that the leading feature of the restoration must have a similar place in original creation:

71. Institutio, I, xv, 3 (Opera, II, 138); cf. note 56 ob.

72. Ibid., I, xv, 4 (138).

73. Ibid.

Quamquam enim fateor synedochicas esse loquendi formas, non potest tamen principium hoc convelli, quod in renovatione imaginis Dei praecipuum est, in ipsa etiam creatione tenuisse summum gradum.⁷⁴

Accordingly Christ is the perfection of the image of God in which the Christian is renewed so that he bears the image of God in "...vera pietate, iustitia, puritate, intelligentia..."⁷⁵

There is no imperfection in the human nature possessed by Adam, constituted by the image of God which has been partly restored in the elect and will be fully obtained in heaven:

Ergo, quum Dei imago sit integra naturae humanae praestantia, quae refulsit in Adam ante defectionem.../was left ruined by the Fall/ nunc aliqua ex parte conspicitur in electis, quatenus spiritu regenerati sunt, plenum vero fulgorem obtinebit in coelo.⁷⁶

The only hint of imperfection in Adam was the fact that his will was pliable and he had not received the constancy to persevere, which led to his Fall,⁷⁷ but which does not appear to have qualified the perfection of Adam's nature in Calvin's thought. The image of God thus emerges as the controlling concept in Calvin's concept of man's essential nature and he insists that it must be the same in both the original and the redeemed state.

This conclusion is confirmed in a short confession of faith, which we assume contains the essentials of the faith as Calvin saw it. In this there is the absolute affirmation that man was perfect in Adam and is corrupt because of his Fall, and that redemption comes because of the infinite love of God and Christ.

74. Ibid.

75. Ibid., (138-139).

76. Ibid., (139).

77. Ibid., I, xv, 8(142).

Je confesse aussi que l'homme a esté cree a l'image de Dieu en pleine integrité de son esprit, volonté, et toutes les parties, facultez et sense de son ame: que toute la corruption et les vices qui sont en nous, sont procedez de a qu' Adam nostre pere s'est aliéné de Dieu, por sa rebellion: et en delaissant la source de vie et de tous biens s'est asservi a toute misere.

...

Je confesse aussi que por le bonte inestimable de Dieu Jesus Christ nous a esté donné pour remede, a fin de nous ramener de mort a vie, et restaurer ce qui estait decheu en Adam: et que pour ce faire, luy qui estait la sagesse eternelle de Dieu son pere et d'une mesme essence, a vestu nostre chair, tellement qu'il a esté faict Dieu et homme en une seule personne.⁷⁸

Redemption is simply the recovery, by the goodness of God in Christ, of that which was lost in the Fall of Adam. God's goodness does not depend upon the existence of evil: it is infinite.

We may conclude then that for Calvin the Fall is productive only of evil and in no wise does evil result in any greater good of an essential sort. Man's nature was complete in Adam - the image of God - and this is restored in the final redemption, even though the Christian in this life may experience a greater measure of grace than Adam (the fullness of the image, which is the essential does not come until the final state in heaven). And, as with Augustine, God is the sole source of good and He Himself does not depend upon evil's existence for His own existence or glory.

In both Augustine and Calvin, despite certain tendencies to the contrary, the essential doctrine about the Fall is that it

78. "Formulaire de confession de Foy, que les escoliers aurent a faire et soubscrire entre les mains du Recteur", Opera, IX, 723.

produced evil and that evil is overcome and the good restored - not developed or matured - by God in Christ and His redemption. There is no development of the good out of evil, nor is there any dependence of the good upon evil.

II

Reinterpretation of the Christian Doctrine of the Fall

We have examined the classical doctrine of the Fall and Original Sin and have found that it lacks certain traits essential to the Marxist system: Good and Evil are strictly distinguished and Evil does not of itself produce the Good: man is created in perfection instead of in immaturity and innocence. This means that there is a fundamental difference in the structure of the two systems which does not warrant a simple description of them as being parallel. This conclusion does not, however, end our study. There is a line of development of this doctrine from Rousseau to Marx which on the one hand confirms our evaluation of Marx's doctrine and on the other indicates a far less direct relationship of Marx's system to Christianity than the usual view suggests.

It has been said that Marx received the reinterpretation of the Fall as the division of labour and private property from Rousseau via Hegel.⁷⁹ While this points in the right direction,

79. Friedrich Delekat, "Vom Wesen des Geldes", in Marxismusstudien(1954), 61.

it does not represent the truth clearly. The purpose of this portion of the final chapter of the thesis is to trace the basic facts of this development and show that Marx reinterpreted an already secularized Fall-doctrine.

The most pertinent of Rousseau's writings on this subject were the two essays for the Academy of Dijon, the first in 1749 on the influence of the Arts and Science on morals and the second in 1753 on the origin and foundation of the inequality of mankind.⁸⁰ These are not positive or constructive writings, being written in a rhetorical style and being short, competitive essays. However, one discerns some of Rousseau's mature thought in them.⁸¹ Further, whatever Rousseau later thought, these became a part of European thought and discussion - a part of history.

Rousseau side-steps the Biblical account of the Fall and the Christian doctrine of it. His thought is oriented to the problems of social evil and its cause and development, not to a reinterpretation of Christian theology. The Holy Scriptures teach that men were never in a state of nature and Religion teaches that men were taken out of it immediately upon creation.⁸² Rousseau seeks to know what man would have been if left to himself, finding

80. "Discours Si Le Retablissement Des Sciences et Des Arts a contribue a Epurer Les Moeurs", and "Discours Sur L'Origine Et Les Fondements De L'Inegalite Parmi Les Hommes."

81. Cf. G.D.H. Cole in the "Introduction" to The Social Contract and Discourses (Everyman's Edition, No.660), xi, xiii-xiv.

82. The Social Contract and Discourses, 175-176(essay on inequality).

the answer to this by abstracting from man in society the nature of man before his progress to civilization. He seeks to understand man and things as they are rather than to give historical facts.⁸³ Therefore, one can only compare the structure and content of Rousseau's thought with that of Christianity; there is no definite handling of Christian doctrine to study.

It is clear that Rousseau did not believe with certainty that the state of nature had ever existed. Further, he did not advocate a return to it, but sought to ameliorate the evils of civilized life by reviving some of the qualities of the state of nature and by using the arts and sciences more wisely.⁸⁴ Ultimately, in the Emile, the state of nature comes to mean simply the fullest development of man's good faculties.⁸⁵ From this it is clear that Rousseau himself had transformed the literal concept of a definite historical period of Good and perfection into a hypothetical ideal and innate tendency deduced from the present life of man. This does not mean that all his followers realized this, but it does show what was occurring in the history of ideas.

A second observation to be made is that Rousseau has linked social evils or ills to human progress. In the first part of the first essay this is seen in his contrasting of civilized peoples

83. Ibid., 175-176; 206; 238; cf. Introduction, xii, xiii.

84. Cf. Ibid., xii-xiii, and 245-246 in the Appendix to the essay itself.

85. Ibid., xvii.

and their poets and artists with the energetic barbarians (early Persian, Scythians, early Romans, Germans). In the second part he shows that the arts and sciences owe their origin to the vices of men and says that the evil origin is reproduced in the objects produced by them.⁸⁶ He says:

Tandis que les commodités de la vie se multiplient, que les arts se perfectionnent, et que le luxe s'étend, le vrai courage s'énervé, les vertus militaires s'évanouissent; et c'est encore l'ouvrage des sciences et de tous ces arts qui s'exercent dans l'ombre du cabinet.⁸⁷

The illsof society stem from the departure from the natural state, which in turn stems from the arts and sciences.⁸⁸ In the Preface to the second essay, discussing the problem of knowing man's true nature, he says that "...tous les progrès de l'espèce humaine l'éloignent sans cesse de son état primitif..."⁸⁹ And in his conclusion to the second essay he says:

Il suit de cet exposé que l'inégalité, étant presque nulle dans l'état de nature, tire sa force et son accroissement du développement de nos facultés et des progrès de l'esprit humain, et devient enfin stable et légitime par l'établissement de la propriété et des lois.⁹⁰

While Rousseau did not, as Marx, make the Evil the production of the Good, he does link the Evil to the development of human capacities. Hence, two things have been done: first, he equates the origin of the race with immaturity and innocence (which he calls good) and second, he has prepared the way for Kant and Hegel

86. Ibid., 140-141.

87. Oeuvres Completes de J.J. Rousseau, I, 22.

88. Cf. Ibid., xi.

89. The Political Writings of Jean Jacques Rousseau, (ed. C.E. Vaughan), I, 135.

90. Ibid., 196.

to equate the Good with human development and thereby find evil producing the good.

In the second essay, the role of the arts and sciences is apt to be overlooked if one fastens too eagerly on the role of private property. We have seen above in the quotation from the end of the essay that Rousseau himself has attributed the origin and growth of inequality to the growth of human faculties and he attributes only the permanence and legitimacy of it to the establishment of property and laws. In the text itself this is the course of his thought. The first part describes the natural state of man: an undeveloped, unsocial, animal-like state which is marked by indolence, self-sufficiency, and the lack of communication of ideas or inventions.⁹¹ In the second part he seeks the events and factors causing the development of moral inequality and the present state of evil. The origin of private property in land is the source of civil society, but it itself is due to the progress of mankind.⁹² This progress originated in the difficulties encountered in obtaining sustenance from nature: difficulties stimulated man's thinking, language, inventions, the development of his industriousness, the family, and of leisure.⁹³ Leisure was used to provide conveniences which became necessities without at the same time pleasing men, and to develop mental and social life still more. Consideration and esteem developed so that

91. Ibid., 177-206; cf. especially his summary, 203.

92. Ibid., 207.

93. Ibid., 207-211.

injury became an affront. In all this there is a considerable development beyond the state of nature and yet there is not the presence of the ills which afflict society. This stage is that of savagery and is considered a "golden age" by Rousseau: it is a deteriorated state of nature with diminished natural compassion but this is compensated by the fact that there is a balance between the indolence of natural man and the excessive activity of civilized man. It is the youth of the world while all later advances lead to the perfection of the individual but the decrepitude of the species.⁹⁴

This "golden age"--already a great way beyond the state of nature--disappears when men begin to attempt tasks that require the cooperation of men, making it advantageous for one man to have the provisions needed for two. Then began property, necessary labour, cultivated fields, slavery and misery: this was brought about by the advent of metallurgy and agriculture⁹⁵ (we note again the primacy of human progress). Cultivation brought the division of the land into property.⁹⁶ With the advent of property, natural inequality (strength, endowment, etc.) was transformed into social inequality since strength produced more and this "more" was cumulative.⁹⁷ These developments in the faculties of men precede the final establishment of right and law in property and government and their evil results.

94. Ibid., 214.

95. Ibid., 214-215.

96. Ibid., 216.

97. Ibid., 217.

As men developed abilities and possessions, possessions became essential, either as needs or as affectations.⁹⁸ Interests began to conflict, land became scarce, lust for gain by the labour of others set in. Natural compassion was stifled by usurpations by the rich and by robbery by the poor, and by the passions of both.⁹⁹ The war of all against all caused the rich to propose a civil society in which all would be subject to the same law, but a society in which the rich would be stronger.¹⁰⁰ In various ways offices became hereditary and inequality grew and became institutionalized. This may even develop to such a point in despotism that men are again reduced to a state of nature, to a new war of all against all.¹⁰¹ Rousseau closes the essay by contrasting the savage with the civilized man: the former breathing peace, liberty and indolence, the latter always working, and seeking to find still more laborious occupations. This is summed up: "...le sauvage vit en lui-meme; l'homme sociable, toujours hors de lui,..."¹⁰² It is not possible to divorce the origin of property and civil society with their evils from the development of the human faculties: private property is the origin of inequality but the progress of humanity is the origin of private property.

In this doctrine of the "fall" of man and the origin of social evils, it is clear that social evils are a result of the

98. Ibid., 217-218.

99. Ibid., 219.

100. Ibid., 219-221.

101. Ibid., 230-231; 235.

102. The Political Writings of Jean Jacques Rousseau, I, 195.

progress of mankind out of a "state of nature" which is absolute immaturity. However, the "golden age" is not that state but a later one in which the forces of good and evil are balanced. Unlike Marx, original man is non-social and the corrupting development is a development of social activity of all kinds (though it is to be remembered that Marx saw primitive life as non-social relative to the developed state of either class society or the future society of mankind; and saw that in spite of the shattered primitive community, a more complex social interdependence of men was developing in the economic life of class societies). In Rousseau there is always the implication that while civilization is inevitable, it is not good, and can be made bearable only by reintroducing some of the virtues of the natural/state. This is shown most clearly in the phrase that there is a perfection of the individual but a deterioration of the species. There is then in Rousseau both the linking of progress and evil and the affirmation that original man (whether literal or potential) was good. He has not equated the arts and sciences (human labour broadly speaking) with the true essence of man and thus made possible the production of the good by evil. This remained for Kant to perform, who at the same time stigmatised the primitive state of man.

B. Kant

Kant's handling of the Fall and Original Sin takes two routes: he finds the source of evil in a non-temporal Fall occurring in each individual, and he reinterprets the Biblical account of the Fall somewhat in the manner of Rousseau, though

with different content. By this approach he intensified the tendency to see the departure from the primitive state as a progress.

The Fall as the real source of evil is the fact that the noumenal self (transcendent ego) adopts sensual aims received from the phenomenal self (the self enmeshed in the deterministic, phenomenal world). This concept removes the Fall from history and makes it a series of "Falls" or transcendental acts of the noumenal ego. The Fall becomes a metaphysical ground of evil, and evil is an innate tendency in man: "...ein radikales, angebornes, (nichtsdestoweniger aber uns von uns selbst zugezogenes) Böse..."¹⁰³ Hence as Dr. N.P. Williams has said, Kant has transformed the Christian doctrine of Good and Evil into a dualism which is incompatible with the Christian doctrine.¹⁰⁴

In keeping with this denial of the temporal Fall, Kant interprets the Biblical accounts of the Fall as indications of man's historical development and not as the source of evil itself: it becomes the account of the emergence of man from the animal state of existence and hence may be said to be made into a "fall upwards", though for the individual it is a painful progress. In the article "Mutmasslichen Anfang des Menschen-Geschlechts"

103. Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, in Immanuel Kants Werke (Cassirer ed.), VI, 171. For the treatment of Kants position as a whole see, Williams, op. cit., 497-503. Cf. F.R. Tennant, Origin and Propagation of Sin, 50-54.

104. Williams, op. cit., 502-503.

(1786) he gives an exposition of human origins in terms of chapters 2-6 of Genesis. He opposes Rousseau's early view that culture and civilization are absolutely opposed to human nature as it should be and was, before their origin, and he seeks to show that the evils that afflict the individual are the means of developing the species (the reverse of Rousseau's view!) which he says Rousseau sought in his later writings.¹⁰⁵

Man's progress from his original animal state is a progress into a life governed by reason and self-will. In gathering food, instinct was broken and reason aided in the knowledge of the various kinds of food, and desires were multiplied with the help of imagination.¹⁰⁶ This self-assertion which makes man into an independent being brings anxiety and dread and an infinity of desired objects. The animal sexual life is likewise overcome so that human sexual life is not bound to certain limited periods but is free and at the command of the imagination, and at the same time gives rise to a sense of shame, love, beauty and morality.¹⁰⁷ Expectation of the future, giving rise to anxiety and fear of death, as well as the preparation for the future, marks another step in the development beyond animal life.¹⁰⁸

105. Immanuel Kants Werke, IV, 334-336; cf. Hoeffding, History of Modern Philosophy, II, 77-78.

106. Immanuel Kants Werke, IV, 329-330.

107. Ibid., 330-331.

108. Ibid., 331.

Finally, man's recognition of himself as the goal of nature (Zweck der Natur), making himself at once the master of the animals and a co-equal with his fellowman completes the transition to human life.¹⁰⁹ In this recognition of the claim "selbst Zweck zu sein" and not merely to be means to other ends, is the ground of the claim to equality with a higher being and to arbitrary power over lower beings - not in reason.¹¹⁰

This progress out of the natural state of existence is filled with many dangers and ills, and will be looked back upon as a progress out of a Paradise.

Dieser Schritt ist daher zugleich mit Entlassung desselben aus dem Mutterschoosse der Natur verbunden, eine Veraenderung, die zwar ehrend, aber zugleich sehr gefahrvoll ist, indem sie ihn aus dem harmlosen und sicheren Zustande der Kindespflege, gleichsam aus einem Garten, der ihn ohne seine Muehe versoergte, heraustrrieb (V.23) und ihm die Muehseligkeit des Lebens oeffter den Wunsch nach einem Paradiise, dem Geschoepfe seiner Einbildungskraft, wo er in ruhiger Untaetigkeit und bestaendigen Frieden sein Dasein vertraeumen oder verstaenden koene/?/ ablocken.¹¹¹

However, between man and this imaginary place of bliss there is the restless reason which seeks to develop his latent capacities:

...die rastlose und zur Entwicklung der in ihn gelegten Faehigkeiten unwiderstuehlich treibende Vernunft und erlaubt est nicht, in der Rohigkeit und Einfalt zurueckzukehren, aus dem sie ihm gezogen hatte (V.24).¹¹²

Clearly then, Kant sees the Biblical Fall as a development out of animal innocence and immaturity, or as he says:

109. Ibid., 332.

110. Ibid., 332-333.

111. Ibid., 333.

112. Ibid.

...nichts anders als der Uebergang aus der Rohigkeit eines bloss tierischen Geschoepfes in die Menschheit, aus dem Gaengelwagen des Instinkts zur Leitung der Vernunft, mit einem Worte: aus der Vormundschaft der Natur in den Stand der Freiheit gewesen sei.¹¹³

This fallen situation of man is really an advance for the species, even though it is not so for the individual.

However, the history of freedom begins from evil because it is the work of man. Rousseau saw the evil of man's work in his early writings, and, according to Kant, sought later to solve the conflict of civilization and human nature. Kant finds the resolution of the conflict in the fact of the development of the species at the expense of the individual.¹¹⁴ This sacrifice of the individual to the development of the species is seen in the disparity between the physical age of maturity and the social age of maturity in modern society; in the truth of the saying of Hippocrates, ars longa vita brevis, or in the cumulative nature of human knowledge and development and the fact that man must die when he is most ready to live; in the inequality among men resulting from civilization and its law.¹¹⁵ This view of human progress in spite of, and even because of the ills that afflict man leads Kant to the following:

...Zufriedenheit mit der Vorsehung und dem Gange menschlicher Dinge in Ganzen, der nicht vom Guten anhebend zum Boesen fortgeht, sondern sich vom Schlechtern zum Besseren allmaehlich entwickelt; zu welchem Fortschritte den ein jeder an seinem Teile, so viel in seinen Kraefte[n] steht, beizutragen durch die Natur selbst berufen ist.¹¹⁶

113. Ibid.

114. Ibid., 334-336.

115. Ibid., 335-336 in a footnote.

116. Ibid., 342.

Not only is the Biblical Fall really an advance, but the whole of human history, in spite of its evils, is advancing.

In this exposition of the Biblical account of the Fall Kant has divorced it from the concept of evil per se and made it merely the first of human history. In it man's present state is a result of this original stepping out of the animal world of instinct and simplicity; the evil of civilization is really evil only for the individual since the human race is developing thereby; the progress is out of the bondage to nature into freedom. The connection between evil and progress is discussed more thoroughly in "Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbuergerlicher Absicht" (1784).

In this earlier writing he had said that man must develop his human, non-instinctual, non-natural capacities from within himself. This is done in the history of the species by means of the conflict of these capacities in society--the conflict of the tendencies toward social life and towards individualism. Man has a tendency toward society because in it his capacities as man develop, but he also has an innate tendency toward individualization and it is from this conflict that mankind is developed.

Der Mensch hat eine Neigung, sich zu vergesellschaften; weil er in einem solchen Zustande sich mehr als Mensch, d.i. die Entwicklung seiner Naturanlagen fuehlt. Er hat aber auch einen grossen Hang, sich zu vereinzeln (isolieren); weil er in sich zugleich ungesellige Eigenschaft antrifft, alles bloss nach seinem richten zu wollen und daher allerwaerts Widerstand erwartet, so wie er von sich selbst weiss, dass er seinerseits zum Widerstande gegen andere geneigt ist. Dieser Widerstand ist es nun, welche aller Kraefte des Menschen erweckt, ihn dahin bringt, seinen Hang zur Faulheit zu ueberwinden, und getrieben durch Ehrsucht, Herrschaft oder Habsucht, sich einen Rang unter seinen Mitgenossen zu

verschaffen, die er nicht wohl leiden, von denen der aber auch nicht lassen kann. Da geschehen nun die ersten wahren Schritte aus der Rohigkeit zur Kultur, die eigentlich in dem gesellschaftlichen Wert des Menschen besteht...117

The development of the species requires a society combining the fullest possible freedom and the strictest regimentation. All "Kultur und Kunst" and the "die schoenste" social organization

...sind Fruechte der Ungeselligkeit, die durch sich selbst genoetigt wird, sich zu disziplinieren und so, durch abgedrungen Kunst, die Keime der Natur vollstaendig zu entwickeln.118

For this reason man must have a master so that they will not misuse their freedom.¹¹⁹ We note that society is productive of the development of man instead of the degradation of him as with Rousseau and that this causes man to tend toward society. Secondly, we note that evil traits in men have been assigned a constructive role and produce good (cf. Habsucht!).

In Kant we find that evil itself is a metaphysical fact which has no historical origin, hence eliminating the actual historical or Biblical Fall as the source of evil. However, he then reinterprets the Biblical Fall as the emergence of man from the animal world and as the beginning of progress toward freedom. The original state of man is not a perfection from which man falls, but at best an immaturity from which he advances. Only the evils which result for the individual make the past appear as a Paradise, and these evils are in fact the means of progress. Here we find a counterpart to the Marxist scheme of history with its mixed

117. Ibid., 155.

118. Ibid., 157; cf. 156-157.

119. Ibid., 157-158.

content of evil and a progress by means of the very evil - a progress toward the full development of human nature. In Hegel all this receives a much more systematic form and it is a matter of record that Marx set out from Hegel. Hegel represents a reinterpretation which was itself "inverted" or filled with new content by Marx, placing Marx one step further from the Biblical and Christian doctrines of the Fall.

C. Hegel

To understand Hegel's doctrine of the Fall, one must first note the outline of his entire system and its key concept. Hegel seeks to encompass all reality and to see it as a living, unified whole which he terms Spirit.¹²⁰ This Spirit is self-contained, self-subsistent, and its own end: it is freedom and self-consciousness. In it are three spheres or aspects (German: Moment): (1) the abstract principles of reality which culminate in the Idea (the field of Logic); (2) Nature, which is the "other" of Spirit, being the realm of finitude and necessity (the Philosophy of Nature); (3) Concrete Spirit in individual mental life (Subjective Spirit); social or political institutions (Objective Spirit); and in Art, Revealed Religion, and Philosophy (Absolute Spirit).¹²¹

120. Cf. H.A. Reyburn, The Ethical Theory of Hegel, 9, 18, 37-38; Georg Lasson, Einfuehrung in Hegels Religionsphilosophie, 2-3; Sir James Baillie, The Phenomenology of Mind, 21 (Baillie's introduction).

121. Sir James Baillie, Introduction to Hegel's The Phenomenology of Mind, 27-29.

The essential nature of Spirit is freedom, which is seen in the ego and in its act of thinking.¹²² The natural world is a world of finite individuals or particulars which mutually determine each other--a world of necessity. On the contrary, the ego is not moved from without, but is self-contained, shaping into thoughts the sensations and sense impressions received from the natural world, creating its own self or content. Spirit combines universality and difference;

...it is at once a conscious unity in all its processes and the conscious source of endless differences and distinctions within itself. It is supremely an identity which maintains itself through its differences and refers them to itself.¹²³

Spirit is a process which proceeds from the universal (implicit) into concrete difference and then on to a concrete universal.¹²⁴

In the Preface to the Phenomenology Hegel says that in his view the important thing is to grasp the ultimate truth as subject as well as substance. This living substance

...is that being which is truly subject, or, what is the same thing, is truly realized and actual (wirklich) solely in the process of positing itself, or in mediating with its own self its transitions from one state or position to the opposite. As subject it is pure and simple negativity, and just on that account a process of splitting up what is simple and undifferentiated, a process of duplicating and setting factors in opposition, which /process/ in turn is the negation of this indifferent diversity and of the opposition of factors it entails. True reality is merely

122. Reyburn, op. cit., 77-78; cf. Hegel, Encyclopaedia PP.17-24, especially P24, where he describes philosophy.

123. Baillie, op. cit., 29.

124. Cf. Ibid., 27-29.

this process of reinstating self-identity, of reflecting into its own self and from its other, and is not an original and primal unity as such, not an immediate unity as such. It is the process of its own becoming...
[my underlining/ 125

Further, Hegel speaks of the real nature of the divine life
"...which consists in its being objective to itself, conscious of itself on its own account (fuer sich zu sein)..."¹²⁶ The truth is the whole, but a whole which is

...merely the essential nature reaching its completeness through the process of its own development. Of the Absolute it must be said that it is essentially a result, that only at the end is it what it is in very truth; and just in that consists its nature, which is to be actual, subject, or self-becoming, self-development.¹²⁷

Truth, the Absolute as subject is a process of becoming, of self-development.

The form of this self-development is the process of Spirit's becoming objective to itself and yet being conscious of its objective form as itself. It must pass from its implicit (an sich) form to its explicit (fuer sich) form, or it must become objective for itself and still maintain its identity or self-consciousness.

Hence he says:

Spirit is alone Reality. It is the inner being of the world, that which essentially is, and is per se; it assumes objective, determinate form, and enters into relations with itself-- it is externality (otherness), and exists for self; yet in this determination, and in its otherness, it is still one

125. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind (trans. Baillie), 80-81.

126. Ibid., 81.

127. Ibid., 81-82.

with itself--it is self-contained and self-complete, in itself and for itself at once. This self-containedness, however, is first something known by us, it is implicit in its nature (an sich); it is Substance spiritual. It has to become self-contained for itself, on its own account; it must be knowledge of spirit, and must be consciousness of itself as spirit. This means, it must be presented to itself as an object, but at the same time straightway annul and transcend this objective form; it must be its own object in which it finds itself reflected.¹²⁸

(We note the similarity of this to Marx's species man !)

It is from this nature of spirit that Hegel has drawn his system, structure and method, and even the dialectic is primarily the triple movement of growth from implicitness through differentiation to reintegration. Already one can see the impossibility of a Fall in the Christian sense of a loss of perfection, as there is none in the beginning; the good is something which must be produced by the whole of the movement of reality.

In the life of man, Spirit comes to know itself, hence man in his own spiritual life must duplicate the nature and process of Spirit. Implicit in Nature, Spirit unfolds its true nature in the mental, social and intellectual life of man and thus beholds itself. Subjective Spirit objectifies itself in social institutions and the State and is then recognised as itself in Art, Religion, and Philosophy or Absolute Spirit.¹²⁹ In this process of man's objectification of himself and then return to himself, the Absolute is able to behold itself.

128. Ibid., 86.

129. Cf. Ibid., 514, 685ff; cf. Encyclopaedia, PP385-386, 483-484; cf. Reyburn, op. cit., 118-120.

It is within the context of this scheme of development that Hegel's doctrine of evil and of the Fall lies. Spirit is present in nature - in natural man--in an implicit form (an sich), but of this it is not conscious and is not yet good but merely innocent.

In order that in fact it may be self and Spirit, it has first to become objectively an other to itself, in the same way that the Eternal Being manifests itself as the process of being self-identical in its otherness.¹³⁰

Now this immediate existence must turn into thought,

...sense-consciousness turns round into consciousness of thought; and, moreover, because that thought has come from immediacy or is conditioned thought, it is not pure knowledge, but thought which contains otherness and is, thus the self-opposed thought of good and evil.¹³¹

This is represented pictorially by the religious mind in the account of the Fall in which man loses the unity with himself by eating of the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil, losing thereby his innocence, the Garden and its bounties free of toil.¹³²

In the Encyklopaedia (2nd ed. 1839), Paragraph 24, "Zusatz" 3, Hegel relates the Fall to types of knowledge.¹³³ The

130. The Phenomenology of Mind, 770.

131. Ibid., 131.

132. Ibid., 770-771.

133. This material did not appear in the 4th ed. (Rosenkranz, 1845) and did not appear in Lasson's Sammtliche Werke. However, as the editor's preface to the 2nd edition is dated 1839 (Werke (Berlin, 1843), VI, viii) it appears that Marx could have used this edition. In any event the material is not unique to this work but is given at much greater length in the Religionsphilosophie, as the following citations will show.

first stage of knowledge is simply experience (Erfahrung), the next is reflection (Reflexion), followed by pure thought (Denken) which is the most complete form of knowledge.¹³⁴ The first form of knowledge is immediate knowledge and easily appears "...als die angemessenste, schoenste und hoechste..."¹³⁵ and includes all which is termed "Unschuld" while the other two forms emerge out of this immediate natural unity. It may appear that this separation is the origin of all evil and that reconciliation demands the abandonment of thought and knowledge since nature knows no such separation and does no evil. This is the case in the traditional interpretation of the Biblical Fall account, which is a Mosaic myth forming the basis of the doctrine of sin and the need of help against this sin.¹³⁶

In opposition to this traditional view of the Fall, Hegel says that it expresses the relationship of knowing (Erkennen) to the spiritual life. Spiritual life (das geistige Leben) in its immediateness appears as "Unschuld", but the essence of Spirit demands that it be discarded and the implicit spirit become explicit:

...nun aber liegt es im Wesen des Geistes, das dieser unmittelbare Zustand aufgehoben wird, denn das geistige Leben unterscheidet sich dadurch vom natuerlichen und naeher vom thierischen Leben, das es nicht in seinen Ansichtsein

134. Werke, (2nd ed., Berlin, 1843), VI, 53.

135. Ibid., 54.

136. Ibid., 53-54. For the mythical nature of Genesis 3 cf. Religionsphilosophie, Werke, XI, 269, 279; XII, 265-266.

verbleibt, sondern fuer sich ist. Dieser Standpunkt der Entzweiung ist demnaechst gleichfalls aufzuheben und der Geist soll durch sich zur Einigkeit zurueckkehren. Diese Einheit ist dann eine geistige und das Princip jener Zurueckfuehrung liegt in Denken selbst. Dieses ist es, welches die Wunde schlaegt und dieselbe auch heilt.¹³⁷

Hegel says that Adam and Eve are types of men (der Mensch ueberhaupt) and are forbidden to eat of knowledge of Good and Evil: man should remain in the state of innocence (Unschuld) and unity (Einigkeit), a conception shared by many peoples. However, says Hegel, the "human" (menschliche) is found neither in the Entzweiung nor in the natural unity or immediate life: Spirit is not "...bloss ein Unmittelbares, sondern er enthaelt wesentlich das Moment der Vermittelung in sich."¹³⁸ The Fall takes place in each man on the awakening of consciousness, which is necessary for his manhood.

The separation of man from nature is seen in the shame of nakedness, pain at childbirth, the necessity to prepare nature instead of using what is immediately given as do the animals.¹³⁹ Further, God admits that man has succeeded and has become as 'one of us'; he has obtained knowledge and the divine life as the serpent promised.

Das Erkennen ist hier bezeichnet als das Goettliche und nicht wie frueher, als das was nicht sein soll. ...erst durch das Erkennen ist der urspruengliche Beruf des Menschen, ein Ebenbild Gottes zu sein, realisiert worden.¹⁴⁰

137. Ibid., 55; cf. XI, 271; XII, 258.

138. Ibid., 56; XII, 258-259.

139. Ibid., 57.

140. Ibid.; cf. XI, 271; XII, 265.

Here it is clear that for Hegel the "Fall" is a "fall upwards" toward the divine life. Only in knowledge does this occur in spite of its accompanying evil.

This is brought out again when he says that the nature of man is evil.

In der That liegt es im Begriff des Geistes, dass der Mensch von Natur boese ist und man hat sich nicht vorzustellen, dass dies auch anderes sein koennte.¹⁴¹

Man is not as he should be when he regards himself as a natural being: "Der Geist soll frei und das was er ist, durch sich selbst sein. Die Natur ist fuer den Menschen nur der Ausgangspunkt, den er umbilden soll."¹⁴² Hence man must emerge from the natural harmony and unity and this takes place in the separating of the self-conscious being from his external world, a position inherent in the concept of Spirit, but one in which he should not remain. Man here makes himself the end of his activities and in so far as he excludes the universal he is evil: he is not a natural being so far as he is spirit and to live as though he were a natural being is to be evil.

Hegel's antipathy to primitive life is seen clearly in the section on "unmittelbar Religion" in his Religionsphilosophie, in which he repeats much of the preceding material but also makes some incisive observations and statements. He disagrees with the idea that in undisturbed natural life man is in possession of all his faculties and the arts and sciences: that his intelligence and

141. Ibid., 57-58; cf. XII, 258.

142. Ibid., 58; cf. XII, 258-259.

will were perfect.¹⁴³ This false idea rests upon confusing a close knowledge of the details of nature (approaching to instinct, as possessed by savages) with a knowledge of the inner laws of nature which is only possible by science.¹⁴⁴ It further fails to take account of the selfishness found in childhood and the harshness found in the relationship of savages toward each other (as opposed to their reactions toward outsiders)¹⁴⁵ and makes false claims concerning the remnants of high culture among the most ancient of peoples.¹⁴⁶ In reality the state of man in nature is not one of innocence, "...sondern der Rohheit, der Begierde, der Wildheit ueberhaupt."¹⁴⁷ Finally, the fact that the first state was lost proves its imperfection: the truth could not be contained in something arbitrary or contingent and that something has been lost proves that it lacked necessity and truth (an argument used in 1844 by Marx against the revival of primitive communism).¹⁴⁸

Throughout this section he shows that natural simplicity and unity are in antithesis to the nature of Spirit and that it must be broken, as the Fall account relates, though with different results.

Es steht ihm entgegen die Natur des Geistes. Der Geist ist nur das wozu er sich macht. Diess Hervorbringen dessen, was an sich ist, ist das Setzen des Begriffs in die Existenz.

143. Ibid., XI, 263-265. 144. Ibid., 273-275.

145. Ibid., 272-273. 146. Ibid., 277-278. 147. Ibid., 269.

148. Ibid., 271-272; cf. Marx, MEGA I, 111, 114(E. 102; Landshut ed., 236).

Der Begriff muss sich realisiren, und die Realisirung des Begriffs, die Thaetigkeiten, wodurch er sich verwirklicht, und die Gestalten Erscheinungen dieser Verwirklichung, die vorhanden sind, haben einen andern Anschein, als was der einfache Begriff in sich ist. Der Begriff, das Ansich, ist nicht Zustand, Existenz, sondern die Realisirung des Begriffs nach erst Zustaeude, Existenz, und diese Realisirung muss von ganz anderer Art sein, als was jene Beschreibung von Paradies enthaelt.

Der Mensch ist wesentlich als Geist; aber der Geist ist nicht auf unmittelbare Weise, sondern er ist wesentlich diess, fuer sich zu sein, frei zu sein, das Natuerliche sich gegemeber zu stellen, aus seinem Versenktsein in die Natur sich herauszuziehen, sich zu entzweien mit der Natur und erst durch und auf diese Entzweigung sich mit ihr zu versoehnen, und nicht nur mit der Natur, sondern auch mit seinem Wesen, mit seiner Wahrheit.

Diese Einigkeit, die durch die Entzweigung hervorgebracht ist, ist erst die selbstbewusste, wahre Einigkeit; das ist nicht Einigkeit der Natur, welche nicht des Geistes wuerdige Einheit, nicht Einigkeit des Geistes ist.¹⁴⁹

There can be no doubt about Hegel's position on this matter when we recall that essentially the same statements were made in the Phenomenologie and in the Encyclopaedia.

Hegel's positive view of the doctrine is that it contains the necessary idea of divine self-consciousness: "...es ist darin enthalten die notwendige Idee des goettlichen Selbstbewusstseins, des ungetruebten Bewusstseins von dem absoluten goettlichen Wesen."¹⁵⁰ This signifies that man is not a natural being, "...kein Thier ist, sondern Geist..." and has the instinct to know this and to know that nature is implicitly rational, as is God who must be known as well as nature: Spirit knows it must find its essence in God.¹⁵¹ The mistake of the account is to imagine this implicit state as a

149. Ibid., 268.

150. Ibid., 267.

151. Ibid.

temporal state, while it is really an inner aspect or tendency. ¹⁵²

...das ist aber der Begriff, das Ansich, und indem die Menschen zur Vorstellung kommen von dem, was Begriff, Ansich ist, kommen sie gewöhnlich darauf, das als etwas Vergangenes oder Zukunfftiges vorzustellen, nicht etwas Inneres, das an und fuer sich ist, sondern in Weise aeusserliche, unmittelbar Existenz als Zustand. Es handelt sich also nur um die Form der Existenz oder die Weise des Zustandes, der Begriff ist das Innere, das Ansich, aber als noch nicht in die Existenz getreten.¹⁵²

This is a false presentation of the truth because of the nature of Spirit, on which we have already presented Hegel's view.

We see then that Hegel follows the principle of Rousseau and Kant in reinterpreting the Biblical Fall and the Christian doctrine of Good and Evil. The Good must be produced by the activity of the Spirit and this involves Evil which is a part of the process. He rejects a temporal Paradise and points out the evils of the natural states of human life. The truth in the idea of a Paradise and state of perfection is that it is a symbol of the implicit Good or Divine Being which must be brought forth into actuality and concrete existence. In so far as men are, or were, in the simple natural state they must come forth out of it through the state of disunion marked by knowledge of Good and Evil, self-consciousness and the accompanying ills. This condition of evil is a necessary one and the so-called "fall" is a necessary act - parts of the total process of the development of the Good. Hence

152. Ibid., 267-268.

Hegelianism ends in an amoral position.¹⁵³ This is the final product of the reinterpretation of the Fall, for our study. Feuerbach did not discuss the doctrine in his Wesen des Christentums and in an earlier work he merely used it as an example of the contradiction between Hegel and Christianity.¹⁵⁴

In Hegel Marx found a reinterpreted fall-doctrine which was a part of a doctrine of human progress. It had already abandoned the idea of a real "fall" into absolute evil and had "translated" the account into a "fall upward", into the human situation and into human progress. It was set in the medium of abstraction—mental life and self-consciousness. But above all it was an account of the self-development of man (extolled by Marx in his 1844 Mss.¹⁵⁵) This doctrine Marx reinterpreted into economics and social life (after the fashion of Kant). This involves a "temporalising" of it, which Hegel had rejected, but with a difference: this original state is an undeveloped state, not a state of perfection. This marks the doctrine of Marx as a reinterpretation of Hegel, not a return to a former secularised Christian doctrine. As with Hegel, Marx's natural man is only an implicit humanity: he must objectify himself, develop his powers and social life which is only done by alienating them and then recognising them as his own and

153. N.P. Williams, op. cit., 505-506; cf. his reference to McTaggart's similar conclusion on 504, n.1; 505, n.1. Cf. also F.R. Tennant, op. cit., 63-65, and J. Loewenberg, "The Exoteric Approach to Hegel's "Phenomenology", in Mind, XLIII('34), 429.

154 L. Feuerbach, Saemtliche Werke, I, 75-77.

155. Cf. MEGA, I, 111, 156.

reappropriating them for himself (in the development of technology and economic life and the system of private property and money followed by communism). Marx's reinterpretation is not a step back into the rejected Biblical view or into the Romantic view, but the placing of new content into the structure of Hegel's system.

The result of this survey of the reinterpretation of the Christian Fall-doctrine is the establishment of the fact that Marx reinterpreted an already secularized Fall-doctrine, and accepted the essential change in its structure. Already Good and Evil had been linked together in a process of the development of the Good, and Evil had become necessary, which is incompatible with the classic Christian doctrines and which nullifies any scheme of "fall-return" or "Paradise lost-Paradise regained". This reinterpretation was accepted by Marx who simply placed the total process in the realm of man's technological-economic and social life. Hence it is false to assert that Marx reinterpreted the Christian doctrine of the Fall and that Primitive Communism, division of labour, and private property are equivalent to the Original Righteousness, the Fall and Original Sin, when in fact he reinterpreted the Hegelian doctrine of the Fall and retained a radical change introduced by Hegel. One may only say that Marx was heir to a secularised Christian doctrine, and this - for the sake of clarity and understanding - should be explained if the truth is to be promoted.

CONCLUSION

Throughout the thesis it has been assumed that Marx and Engels had a system beneath their loosely phrased utterances and that this system expressed their true sentiments. This was confirmed by the strenuous philosophical efforts of Marx as a student and prerequisite to his acceptance of Communism at the urging of Moses Hess. Communism had to have a place in Marx's philosophical system, a system which turned to the concrete world in search of actuality, not of theoretical or religious phantoms. And when Communism was accepted its nature was sought as the immanent result of the tendencies of the present, not as based upon the past or upon ideals. The basic structure of Marx's system came from Hegel and German idealism complete with humanism, historical development, and the concept of the "act" in which man embodies his powers and will in an object, develops himself, develops a power opposed to him, and finally completes himself by mastery over himself and his object. The content of the system came from 18th century materialism and modern technological and economic developments: man, a finite natural creature in this world, is destined to assert his will or fulfil himself by mastery over the material world, in terms both of physiological satisfaction and the labour of recreating it according to his wishes and talents. He is to behold himself in it. This means that man's essential nature is dependent upon his scientific and technological progress just as much as upon his communal solidarity, and further, the particular form of community is dependent upon the nature of his

productive activity (the fact of it steadily increases as he develops economic life) and Communism is based upon the total economic integration of human life and its release from bondage to need (which has been intensified by the necessity of "capital investment" by mankind). All this found expression in the "species-man" or "species-life" of the 1844 Mss and was found to be present throughout his writings. Emphases shifted but fundamentals remained.

This system, deeply rooted in Marx's philosophical inheritance and the contemporary reality, the beginnings of it antedating his contact with the working class, dispels the possibility of a moralistic or religious interpretation of Marx. He is not projecting a primary prophetic and moralistic urge, nor is he projecting the struggle that goes on within himself. He is fusing together into one coherent system his philosophical, political, social and economic heritage - projecting man's historical struggle, man's quest for himself as the lord of his being. "Becoming", progress, evolution, change, self-assertion or mastery - these are the primary factors of reality for Marx. Hence, the various social evils are necessary in their time, helping to bring about the final goal or the good. They are not evil per se, their advent is progress, only their untimely existence is evil. The truly Marxian morality is to know and serve man's true nature and destiny - a changing, dynamic, becoming nature whose destiny is to do, to master - to be autonomous. Sin can only be to oppose change when it is due, to seek security in that which is, to substitute for autonomy the inner mastery of contemplating the

past or a theory. The "fall" can only be that act of sinning - of so forsaking the advancement of, or enjoyment of, human being. It may occur when men seek to maintain the time honoured primitive communal form with its mastery of the human mind, just as readily as it may occur when modern bourgeois philistines fear a transformation of their property and society into a communist world. This is the only valid doctrine of evil that is possible for Marx: one based upon the timeliness of an action or the quality of it, not upon the form or content of it.

True to this system, Marx, and Engels, view the primitive communism as an immature form of human life which must be transcended. Nowhere did it appear that they abandoned this view. Engels was found to be true to this in all his writings, and the traditional interpretation of him as a "natural right" romantic was found to be without basis, even in the Origin. The concept of Asiatic society was found to be consistently held, by analysis of printed materials and by presentation of new materials. These show also that it was probably viewed as a transitional form between primitive communism and the later forms, held stagnant by geographical influences, but destined to be transformed by capitalism. The criticism of the evils of this form of society confirm the views of primitive communism. Further, analysis of this problem in Engels has shown the Western orientation of his Origin and the lack of attention to Asia as well as a lack of denial of the Asiatic form in it. These conclusions accentuate the dynamic character of Marx's scheme of history in which a dynamic

Western Europe (led by Britain) lays the foundations for a human world and reacts upon the stagnant or at least slowly developing world. On the basis of Marx's assumptions (technology, world-wide commerce and communications) his view of a universal history is valid.

All this points to the fact that superficial comparisons with Christianity, or claims for a kinship between it and Marxism, are ill founded. Marxism is based upon the transformation of already secularized Christian doctrines, hence is several degrees removed. Classic Christianity views Good and Evil as separate entities, and views the Good as from God, the Evil as opposed to Him and as vanquished by His Goodness. Marxism has blurred this so that Good and Evil are part of a whole, the Good being promoted by the Evil. It is clear from this that statements about the Marxian use of the Christian doctrine of the Fall and Original Sin are at best analogical and do not serve the advancement of the truth. They conceal the true nature of Marxism (its technological and evolutionary humanism) and they distort, for all but the specialist, the true relationship between Marx and the Christian tradition. It is ironical that Christian theologians have been the most notorious in this act of distortion which obscures Christianity's most pertinent contribution to an age obsessed with, and besmeared by, its own power—a sound doctrine of evil and of human limitations.

APPENDIX: INTRODUCTION.

In the excerpts and notes which follow one can see Marx grappling with the facts of Asiatic village communities. They are strongly marked by primitive communal traits (which he notes by marginal markings) as in their co-operative work, lack of ownership of land, and lack of money. At the same time they have the characteristics of advanced societies: taxes, a state form, and the village "capitalist" who, in a barter economy, thrives on usury! The Asiatic traits are emphasised by both Phear and by Marx's excerpting, by his marginal marks, and by his own remarks: these villages, in their true condition, did not have private ownership of land, did not pay taxes but land-rent to the ruler, and they are not feudal. We see certain remarks indicating that Marx is trying to place these forms in a line of development. It is not possible on the basis of these few pages to say just what Marx thought about the problem of classification of these forms of society, but they do offer evidence of the usage of the Asiatic concept and the refusal to classify them by European standards. They also offer evidence of the possible classifications of Asia as a transitional form. Only further study of the entire notebook can offer more definite conclusions which would be valid.

It is interesting to note that in his reading of various books, with which he disagreed on many points, Marx was trying to sift out the facts he could find in them. This is seen in the remark that Phear should leave off with theory and give some concrete examples from the government reports he has in hand, (see remark to p.234 of Phear).

APPENDIX

Reading Excerpts and Notes by Marx in 1881

These excerpts and notes are taken from Excerpt Heft B46 of the papers of Marx in the International Institute for Social History in Amsterdam and may not be reproduced in any way without the permission of the Institute and the writer of this thesis. The notes and excerpts are found on pages 128-155 of B46 and are taken from Sir John Phear, The Aryan Village in India and Ceylon, London, Macmillan, 1880. The numbers in brackets in the margin are for the pages of B46. Words in brackets are from Phear, used either to give the meaning of the excerpts or to fill a gap caused by illegible writing. This writer's words are initialled "WWA" unless they are obviously his. Many mistakes of grammar, punctuation, and even spelling, occur in Marx's mixture of English and German, but these have been left as they are, without notice.

/134/Zamindar and Mahajan /Chapter II, 45ff. WWA/

The wooded dwelling area (des village) is skirted by waste or common land of very irregular breadth and beyond this again comes the cultivated land of the open plain (math). Up to a certain line of immemorial origin but ordinarily well ascertained --- all the land both waste and cultivated, reckoned outwards from the village, belongs to the village (als possession) on the otherside of the line begins another community lands. In Teilen von Bengal wo portions der country in a state of nature the limits des village territory include jungle and ...?.... unappropriated land. (48,49)

The village and its land als ganzes heissen mauzah.(49) Des Land des mauzah cultivated in small patches by

| the resident ryots on payments of dues,| according to the nature

of the soil, and the purpose of the cultivation, to the Zamindar: they are most universally variable and capable of adjustment from time to time zwischen Zamindar and Ryot. (50) Are classified mit extreme minuteness according to characters attached to the land by custom, not all concrete. (51) So: Sali - land wholly submerged during periods of rains - of different grades /; WWA / Suna , not submerged, also of different grades; Nakdi, land for which rent is paid in cash per bigah; Bhaoli, land for which rent paid in kind, part of the produce; --- ebenso Bhoali: land for which rent is paid in cash per crop per Bigah.

Bhiti --- raised house-site. (51) Khudkasht, land which the residents of the village are entitled to cultivate; Pahikasht -- land which outsiders may cultivate. (52)

These characters adhere almost permanently to the same land; for each village a recognized rate of rent (nirakh) properly payable according to them. When the occupation, and meist der Fall mit Sunaland, an utbandi jama (rent according to the land actually tilled, when land tilled one year is allowed to be fallow the next) and d. cultivation is by alternation of cropping and fallow, Zahlt d. Ryot nur so viel von jeder Sorte of lands as he actually tills. In most villages by far the larger portion of land Khudkasht. (52)

Also the open lands der village divided up among the resident ryots in small allotments, oft consisting of several scattered pieces, generally comprehending land of various qualities ---

rarely ueber 10 acre in total and is oft viel weniger, Zahlung
d. Rent of each ryot to Zamindar nach shifting scale, depending
upon more or less of the elements mentioned. (53)

.....

∟ Marx inserts a table of kinds of land, rent, etc., from page
285, with a line of explanation from 285-286. WWA/

.....

Matter of fact that the Bengal ryot little disposed to move and
for generation after generation, from father to son, the same
plot of land, or approximately so remain in the hands of the
same family. (53)

The zamindari is an aggregate of many entire mauzah. (54)

D. jaehrliche Rente most generally in 3 or 4 kists (install-
ments) d. collection dieser Rents.

∟135/

∟ 55-57 - an account of the book-keeping of the system, of
which Marx makes 17 lines of notes; 57-58, a further
description of which Marx makes 10 lines of notes. WWA/

D. Zamindar is d. superior lord der ryots ("subjects", both by
habit and feeling glebae adscripti;∟Marx notes description
of an office and the court system, or lack of it; 59-60. WWA/

∟136/

Residiert der Zamindar in Dorf, so oft d. barber who shaves the
members of his family, the dhobi who washes for them, the head
darwan(porter) and other principal servants — sind hereditary,
haben portion of village land zur relative low rent or rent free,
der dhobi and barber have the right to be employed at customary
rates of pay by all the ryots; oft carpenter and blacksmith in
gleicher Leger: d. hereditary watchman (chaukidar) erhaelt sein
Land rent free; ebenso Brahman priest, whether of Zamindar's
family, or maintained for the village pujas etc. (61,62)

∠ Phear says: "We have thus before us in the Bengal village community, a social structure which, for want of a better term, may in a certain qualified sense be called feudal." To this "qualified" statement Marx pens his acid objection: WVA

(Dieser Esel Phear nent ∠sic/ d. construction d. feudal)

Ausserhalb dieser construction ∠ is the / d. mahajan, der vill-
age capitalist. D. village ryot muss periodisch Geld auslegen:
z.B. a Huette der Homestead neu zu bauen or to repair, flug oder
anderes Instrument zu ∠ to be made/, Paar bullocks zu kaufen,
Seed for ∠sowing/ noetig, endlich Reis for himself and family,
several kists of his rent to be paid before all his crops
can be secured and realized. Im western part der Delta ∠ his
savings are seldom sufficient to tide him wholly over the time/
to tide him ganz ueber die Periode der verflossen muss bevor
seine jaehrliche Produktion completed.

∠ He is obliged/ also zum mahajan gehn for money and for paddy
as he wants them. ∠ The commonest course of dealings between
the parties is as follows: / d. paddy for sowing and for food and
auch andrer Saamen, und geliefert unter Bedingung dass er die
dies /? returns + 50% in quantity zur harvesting zeit; geld
andererseits to be repaid, auch at harvest time, mit 2% per
monat /Interet/ entweder in form von Equivalent of paddy,
reckoned at Bazaar prices, or in cash at the option of the
lender. Als security for Execution dieses ∠ the mahajan
frequently takes an hypothecation of the ryots future crop/ and
helft sich selbst to the stipulated amount on the very threshing
floor, in the open field. (63, 64)

D. Zamindar -?.....? / who at first sight appears to fill the place of an English landlord is/ merely a rentchager.

D. ryot a field labourer, living from hand to mouth; d. mahajan der farming capital liefert d. arbeit zahlt und allem Profit enthielt ist ein stranger having no proprietary interest in the land; a creditor only, whose sole object is to realize his money as advantageously as possible. After setting aside in his golas (gola - a hut meists circular in form in which grain is stored.) as much of the produce come to his hands, as he is likely to need for his next years business he deals with the rest simply als contractor, sending it to the most remunerative market. A thriving mahajan may have a whole mauzah or more under his hand ---- and yet he has no legitimate proprietary status in the community, while these who have ---- the ryot and the zamindar --- for different reasons are apparently powerless. (64, 65)

Diese /?/ d. unprogressive character of an agricultural village, so beschrieben by a young Zamindar, Babu Peary Chund Mookerjee Beng. Soc. Trans. vol IV, sect. 4, p.1.

"A husbandman of the present day is the primitive being he always(!) has been. With a piece of rag round his loins for his clothing, bare feet, a miserable hut to live in, and a daily fare of the coarsest description, he lives a life which, however disturbed it may be by other causes, is unruffled by ambition. If he gets his two meals and plain clothing he is content with his lot, and if he can spare a few rupees for purchasing jewellery for his wife and children, and a few rupees more for religious ceremonies, he will consider himself as happy as he can wish to be. He is the greatest enemy of social reform / (Marx's brackets) !?.....?..... enemy by getting himself the rent he pays to Zamindares, old or young! /, and never dreams of throwing off any of the trammels which time or

superstition has spun around him. He will not send his son to school for fear \angle (Marx's brackets) and a very just one, too! \angle of being deprived of his manual assistance in the field; he will not drink the water of a good tank because he has been accustomed to use the water of the one nearer his house; he will not sow a crop of potatoes or sugarcane because he forefathers never did it; he will himself to be unmercifully fleeced by his hereditary priest to secure the hope of utter annihilation after death. the ryots too poor(!), too ignorant, too disunited among themselves to effect improvement."(65-67)

\angle All underlining is Marx's. He placed quotation marks at the beginning of each line; these have been omitted.WWA/ \angle

\angle 139/ \angle

Administration and Land Law. \angle Chapter VI, pp.124ff. of Phear;

this copy begins 7 lines from bottom of manuscript p. 139. WWA/ \angle

No tax gatherers in India (save those recently introduced ...?...

imposition of a license tax); all taxes sind land revenue,

stamps (needed for every proceeding in a court of justice or

public office or copy of any paper filed in a court or office or

document of agreement or receipt etc), customs, excise. (d. tari

in \angle very unclear; text from Phear: "The excise tends

to make the tari dearer to the ryot than it otherwise would be,

a result which is hardly a grievance." \angle

\angle a page later in Phear(WWA): \angle durch imposition of a road cess,

a small rateable addition to the rent of each ryot, which he

pays to his rent receiver, dieser an government. (128, 129)

A portion of the rent, \angle which/ every cultivator of the soil

pays for his plot, goes to government as land revenue: etc

....?.... \angle In the whole, the Government of India receives/about

20 1/2 millions L. St. per annum in the shape of land revenue (133)

Vor d. Bengal settlements of 1793 d. Zamindar nur Steuer-collector, nicht landlord. Bursche Pear says: "The area of his zamindari

covered large districts of country and was reckoned not in bighars but in communities of men - mauzahs." diese "Money proceeds" / of the zamindari/ nicht "spoken of as rent, sondern als jamas of the zamindari's village kachari (....?.... vor d. Englandern) was an office in each mauzah, with a head man, an accountant, and a field officer.

.....

/146/ /II. The Agricultural Community in Ceylon (Phear, 171-229; Marx, 146-153; WVA)/

II The Agricultural Economy /sic!/ in Ceylon (171)

1) The Village Economy. (173)

Island of Ceylon = a Pear: the circular portion of the Pear occupied by a mass of mountains rising ...?... /in some instances/ to 7-8000 feet. bordered at its base with a margin of lower land which continues to the coast on all sides (173)

The New North Central Province, constituted on 6. Sept. 1873 for administrative purposes, covers the mid-Island portion of the northern plain .. interminable jungle in a state of nature,

dotted very sparsely with tiny specks of yellow-green cultivation and mit some few pools of water or tanks .. the surface nicht absolutely flat, sondern mit considerable undulation on einigen Stellen, on andern broken by low ridges or rounded bosses of gneiss. In d. Regel d. pools seem by origin nur accumulations of water in natural depressions of the ground as have no outlet

sufficiently low to drain them, aber their

Depth in size in most instances | artificially increased durch
an earthen bund or embankment, thrown across the lower side of
the depression. In d. drier seasons des Jahres, as the water
bulk shrinks back towards the bund, i.e. towards the deeper side,
it withdraws from the greater portion of the tank space, so that
the jungle is enabled to flourish there (as it also does on the
embankment itself) ebenso vigorously als ueberall in the surround-
ing tracts. Daher so / it is no easy task / den Tank
zu sehen, elbst wenn man in seiner Naeh. Und when d. tank
voll, much of it closely resembles a circuit of flooded forest.

(173-75)

Amuradhapura, the classic city of the Mahawansa, for 7-800
Jahre the metropolis der successiv regierenden dynasties ruling
over the larger portion of Ceylon, dass for eben so lange Zeit
left to decay is sehr nah ...?... / nearly the middlepoint/
d. Mittelpunkt d neuen Provinz ---: Ihre Bevolkerung (1871 war
16 to \square m., the inhabitants of the rural villages in the modern
bazar counted together) for sehr lange Period, but lately,
preserved by the remoteness & inaccessibility of its situation
von disturbing action of foreign influences of any kind, daher
dort a living specimen typical sehr primitiver agricultural
economy and civilization. (175-6)

D. People are Singhaless and class themselves with the Kandyan
or highlanders in Unterschied von d low country Singhaless who

border on the coast of either side; sehr verschieden von d. comparatively slight-limbed black-complexioned Tamils, who constitute the population of the Northern portion d. Island (176,77)

D. Singhalese language belongs to the

/147/ Aryan group, apparently sprung from a root closely allied to the Sanscritic prakrits of Northern India; aber d. Singhalese people haben themselves?... /generally have the appearance of being the result of at least an / intermixture of an Aryan mit some other, yellow tinted, coarsely built, ethnic element; sind broadshouldered, deepchested, muscular, with a pronounced calf to the leg like all Mongolian peoples, unlike the Aryans of India: schlagendste peculiarity -- excessive hairiness of both male and female. Dies ...?... / extraordinary capillary development is certainly the reverse of what we see / bei d. best bekannten Mongolischen peoples aber d. Ainos, a Turanian race on the extreme east of Asia, possess this extraordinary capillary development in hoehern Grad. (177-78)

The Tamil inhabitants der Northern Province, sind ununterschiedbar von their brethern of the mainland of India, with their slight build, black skin, thick lips, open nostrils, course hair: they belong unmistakably to the Dravidian race. (179) Exceptionally, auf d. grenzmarken der Tamil and Singhalese districts, to be found loweaste villages, wo no pure type of either kind preserved. (l.c.)

Ausser d?... distribution der population des Districts by agricultural villages?... /The distribution of the population of the district is by agricultural villages, except only

the cases of / of petty and often ephemeral bazars
sprung up at convenient places along the highways -- gradually
as these have been opened out through the forest, perhaps never
by the Kandyans, sondern nur durch low country Singhaiese,
Moormen or Tamils. (l. c.)

Controlling element d. village -- the paddy tract or paddy field
which is itself "a function of the supply of water. (179, 180)
Usually d. attached, or appended to, a tank and ist oft
strikingly tiny in Verhaeltniss zum size des entire tank, es ist
irrigated by the flow of water passing out from the tank
through a masonry culvert (Absungskanal) piercing the lowest
part of the retaining bund is offer noch through a breach or
cutting made in the bund itself. d. Lage (the lie) d. Feldes so,
dass the outflow of water can be made to flood the whole of it
in a succession of flats, to the lowest and most remote from it;
the line of soil surface from side to side being almost
always horizontal throughout. Denoch dem local character des
ground hat d. field more or less irregular shape, with its
longer extension stretching away from the tank bund. Most it is
a single clearing in that universal jungle that prevails on all
sides. slebst bedeckend the actual bund of the tank, and very
much of the tank bottom itself. (180)

Jedem Feld entspricht a gama or village, i.e. group of house-
holds wo d. cultivators live; selten hat a village mehr als ein
field: d. gruppe steht in Jungle neben d. field, obscured by
trees and next the bund: exhibits gewoehnlich no order of

arrangement. Die einzelne homestead, wenn its owner well to do, a low thatched, mud-wattled hut, of perhaps 2 unlighted rooms opening upon the diminutive veranda, deren floor die earthplatform der hut, and deren roof its projecting eaves; in front dieser hut small, mud plastered attawas, or roofed cylinders of wickerwork, raised upon supports for storage of grain (ist equivalent der golas of Bengal) auf einer Seite auch a large open shed, with its little loft for cattle (if the cottier has any), implements, curry grinder, rice pounder (the dhenki of Bengal), etc. Under the back eaves of hut such a place for ploughs, surface-smoother, harrow etc. abutting upon the little homesteads curtilage, or partially enclosing it, — a garden or loosely cultivated plot for fruit trees, condiments, curry vegetables (sāg of Bengal) etc.; the whole meist ill kept and neglected; d. different homesteads d village group von einander getrennt durch irregular, ill defined, muddy tracts. (181, 182) /The people constitute the inhabitants of such a village are related and subordinated, in a peculiar connection with the land, to / a territorial head, und in diesen modern days?..... proprietor des village genannt; er Nachfolger des primitive Chieftain; er mag /take the shape of the / d. Krone (engl.), or a religious foundation, or a private Singhalese gentleman. (182)

D. village field, or paddy tract, divided into portions by parallel balks drawn across it from side to side at right angles to the line of water-flow; each such portion hereditary share of

some one person or family resident in or belonging to the village. The principal portion or share -- genannt a Mottettuwa (Zivaat in Bengal) gehoert dem head des village; alle anders share holders / are charged / to make some contribution of produce in kind, or to render him some defined and specific service, domestic or agricultural. Dies distribution of tenure --- produce in kind oder ander service entspricht genau dem raiotti in lakhiraj conditions

/148/ of holding in Bengal. Nur d. Unterschied: In Bengal d. raiotti holding (holding by contribution of share of produce is the prevalent form & lakhiraj holding d. exception; in Ceylon the holding by rendering service nilakariya is (or rather was) all but universal, and the other the exception. (Diese beweist,?... dass Ceylon. form d. primitiver; d. d. Dorfuher or village chief?....landlord, both here rent zu besohn, obgefunden durch services.)

In Bengal the service or the lakhiraj holding stets free and honourable, such as that of the priest, doctor, watchman etc; / but in / Ceylon that of the nilakariya is usually menial. (183, 184) Meist a plurality of villages have a common head, in fruehrer the household establishment of a wealthy native chieftain kept up by means of menial service discharged by villagers, drafted from the many villages in due order upon the footing of their land tenure obligation. Jetzt the service tenure has so to say become freehold (!) Wo a Buddist Vihara, or temple, was oft in d. North Central Province, d. personal

service der hier special forms takes / as: maintaining illuminations, thatching or doing other repairs to the pansala (The Buddhist' priests' residence) etc. noch in vollen gang/in full activity/. (184, 85)

D. Administrative organization, zur Perception d. services for d. head of the village, best and aus 1 or 2 officials, the Gamerale (the village man), the Lekham (writer or accountant) etc | some of the more wealthy of the shareholders in the village field, probably by reason of family origin of the same blood with the chieftain, hold their share by the service of filling hereditarily one of these offices, or of yielding hospitality to the head of the village, when he comes, or to any visitors whom the village receives (185-86).

Einige dieser services bestehn in doing smiths, carpenters, dhobis' work or even that of the Doctor (Vederale) In village selbst diese persons

paid in their turn by their fellow villagers for their professional or artisans functions, either by labour done for them in the tilling of their shares of the village, or by a quota of the paddy on the payer's threshing floor, measured out and delivered when the harvest completed. Other service consists in supplying the village head mit oil, betelnuts, honey from the jungle, game etc. (186)

/Besides services such as have been mentioned/ the combined action on the part of the villagers for their joint benefit, necessitated by the exigencies of cultivation under primitive

conditions obtaining in the North Central Province and indeed allge⁵in in Ceylon z.B. fencing the village field every season against the wild animals of the jungle which surrounds it :

/The whole work much exceeds anything that / einzelner sharehold- er /could/ unaided execute the whole work; and wenn ein Ross /?/ (mangel, flaw) in it irgendwo so ist every shareholder's plot open to invasion; jeder shareholder so direct interessiert in the work, has to bear his portion | of it in proportion to his share in the field ebenso wenn a breach in bund (Damm) to be filled up, or some repair to be done to it, dies done by all the shareholders jointly furnishing out of their families or dependents, each in due proportion, a continual supply of labour in successive relays until the work is done. (187)

Obgleich jeder shareholder in the village paddy field, hat erb - liches Recht in his plot in right of cultivating it exclusive ly dennoch the mode of cultivation which is generally pursued connects him /whether he will or no / in almost every step of his tilling with his neighbors, above and below, either in a dominant or a servant character. D. Process der Vorrbe- reitung in clearing the soil for the seed sowing or planting, of killing the weeds and keeping them down, and of promoting the growth of the paddy plant, is from beginning to end in a large degree effected by the aid of successive submersions of the plot which have to be varied as regard the depth of water according to the process and the stage of it. Commonly 3 prolonged submersions in the course of tilling, and 7 shorter

ones during the growth of the plant. Da d. submergence of a relatively lower plot generally means the submergence of the plots above it, while the paddy plant cannot be depended upon to grow equally fast in all the plots, therefore / in order that there be / kein risk of one shareholder's operations destroying the young plants of his neighbors, usual rule dass the shareholder of the lower end of the field should commence the operations of the tilling season in his plot before any one else, and so get a safe start of the man next above him.

Selbe oder followed by all the others in succession. (188-89)

Wenn in einem Jahr, von Mangel von Wasserfuhr / or other / Grund | mur ein Teil der village paddy field can be effectively cultivated, that limited portion taken as the whole. / and / is divided ueber d. village shareholders as the original entirety was. D. Entscheidung darueber genommen / by / d. shareholders as a body. Dies geht nicht ueberall known in practice, aber ist oft vorgesetz in the newly framed gansabawa rules, at the instance of the villagers themselves, to indicate that it was a deeply rooted ancient custom (189)

/149/Unabhaengig v.d. relations zum head of the village daher in each village of the North Central Province?.... fast

prevailling universally | Beamter, the | vel vidahne and | others chosen by the shareholders to control and carry out the system of fencing, ploughing, shifting of allotment, when necessary etc. or generally the internal agricultural economy d. village, (190)

D. Reis production d. irrigated fields nicht gemegend to form

even the principal portion of the shareholders' support in d. Mehrzahl der villages dieser Province. D. ordinary staple of life the dry grain, korakkan, grown upon the upland, i.e. on merely unwatered ground, or ground /which/ the flow of the water cannot be made to reach. A piece of the forest which surrounds the village and the village paddy field, is felled and burnt, and a crop of korakkan is raised there upon for a couple of consecutive years at most, when the clearing is allowed to relapse into jungle again; and the process is not repeated on the same plot for another 10 years at least. (190-91)

XXX

The process of chena clearing is often done in (XXX) the North Central Province by the joint action of the village shareholders, under the management of their own officers; and sometimes the whole course of cultivation which follows is also joint, with a partition only of the produce. Mal / Sometimes/ aber auch, nachdem the clearing effected, the land is divided and allotted previously to the cultivation: dies immer in

T case of the plots required for the growth of each household's vegetables or curry stuff (191) (Village garden) -- In dem Maritime Provinces erscheint diese system of joint clearing unbekannt; jeder who has chena land erscheint to own it absolute-ly, cultivates it and clears it himself at long intervals, or gets this done for him on some terms of aneda letting. (191-92) In einzigen instances, it is said, forest and chena ground recognized as appurtenant to the village in d. Sinn d. shareholders des village paddy field koennen ohne Erlaubniss of head of

village ed. Government clear and cultivate in /manner just described / oben beschreibner Art any portion on the foundation of, and in proportion to their village holdings. Generally the Crown (John Bull) asserts a paramount claim to all jungle and waste land wherever situated, which hasnot been before appropriated to actual use; no tree (!) can be felled or chena cultivated there ausser mit got. liscence.(192)

D. actual work of tilling meist verrichtet durch jeder villager by the hands of his family; paddy cultivation so respectable, fast of sacred character, dass women / even are not worthy enough to take part in all its operations, and in particular / duerfen nicht /be seen / on the threshing floor, /at any rate / wenn d. so-called hill paddy, or more highly valued sort of rice grain grain, is being threshed (192-93)

Wenn der shareholder ist weibeperson ohne Kinder, oder er ander?... beschaeftigt, oder gutgemug dran /? / well enough off / to be able to abstain from

manual labour d. common arrangement dasshis share cultivated for him by another person | upon the terms of this latter, d. dann renders dem shareholder a specified share of produce; dies benanst | a letting in ande, i.e. half share; meist, vielleicht fast immer, the agreed upon share = 1/2 the produce both in straw and paddy;

der cultivator muss ausserdem give a share to the responsible servant usually sent by the shareholder to remain on the ground and look after his interests from the day of reaping to the day

of partition, and having moreover to feed this man during the interval. (193-94)

Fast alle vicarious cultivation assumes this shape: not known: letting the land for money rent; existiert no class of agricultural labourers, working on the land of another for money hire.

In fact, in d. rein agricultural village of Ceylon there is

X) practically no money in use. Vielleicht Mehrzahl der Villagers haben nicht paddy enough to last them for food till next season of harvest or for seed, oder haben no plough or no oxen.

Diese erhalten these they obtain vom Capitalist des village, on the terms of setting apart for him on the threshing floor a certain stipulated quantity or share of the produce in return for each item of loan. Ebenso remunerated the services

des Vederale, village blacksmith and other artisans. Selbes mag manchmal vorkommt sometimes in the matter of landlabour, aber general custom for neighboring shareholders to mutually assist one another in this particular when needed. (194-95) Der

head of the village mit Bezug auf his muttettuwa has this cultivated umsonst under Aufsicht of his officers by the terms of tillage service due to him from those of the villages whose tenures involve the service: cultivation in this way, so gehoert ihm d. ganze Produkt der harvest. Aber auch er sieht

150/vor to dispense with these services and to let out the

muttettuwa land in ande (ande on terms of receiving a specified, originally half, share of the produce (195)

Der gegebene?..... The form and condition of village

economy and of agricultural industry, which has been here treated as typical, and which has been mainly described from examples furnished by the North Central.../

in North Central and Kandyan provinces.(196) Erst errichtet

a regal(!) hierarchy on the basis of the village; aber d.

sovereign power(!), when once constituted wird in the course of

time the instrument for generating and developing gz /ganz/

neue conditions and notions(!) of property in land.(l.c.)

/Alongside of it (modern disintegration in village) by a process which may be termed the converse of that which led to the establishment of a regal hierarchy on the basis of the village, the sovereign power, when once instituted, in course of time became the instrument.../

2) Land Tenure and State Economy

To Adigars, Dessares, etc. and his chieftains by the kings

conferred ---nicht tracts of land (....?.... fuer military and

....?.... civil services sondern grants of dominion over

populations. / It is very commonly supposed that the king, as

theoretical proprietor of all land, from time to time granted to his chieftains such as Adigars, Dessares, etc. tracts of land in consideration of the grantees rendering him military and civil services./

Der grantor / was to confer upon/ the chieftains customary

rights over the villages and unappropriated lands; daher

Nidegama (village unter private ownership) as opposed the royal

or Gabada-gama. (197,198) Sub-infuedation nicht in Ceylon to

any considerable extent (198) /(Marx's brackets) Even the Bengal

subtenures did not attain their extra-ordinary modern development

until after the Permanent Settlement had given the zamindars

an absolute right of property in all the land of their Zamindar-

ies, a right without parallel in Ceylon/(199) Einige grants--
royal or durch private seignior -- became cultivating settlements
having the grantee (nicht the grantor) as their head: Der grant-
or had no connection mit der new community ausser the link of
service which bound the grantee to him and which often of
course of time wore out, became unenforceable. Others perhaps
were from the beginning exclusive and free of continuing
obligation. (199,200) Daher will Phear ablasten /?/ /To these
several origins may perhaps be referred with some degree of
probability the very numerous cases of / die sehr zahlreichen
cases of cultivators and even of non-cultivating proprietors
who own lands by a right of independent character, to be found
in all parts of the country, especially in the maritime provinces
obgleich hier the Dutch dominant authority probably effected the
larger part of the change which has taken place in modern
times. (200)

To /?/ /And in a sense an agricultural labourers' class is now/
now coming into existence and agricultural agricultural
labourer's class; denn wealthy native gentlemen, der Geld auf
andren Weg als agriculture genommen, found themselves able to
obtain the labour of the poorer village proprietors for daily
money wages and so to "farm" their lands extensively in the
English Sinn des term. (200, 201)

Joint family system ebenso conspicuous in Ceylon and Bengal,
doch in ersten selten of so large dimensions; besdrs /besonders/
/ distinguished by a very remarkable feature/

T in Ceylon joint family system: 2 or probably more brothers
living together under one roof T will have one wife between them
practice discouraged by English legislation, aber keineswegs
extinct; still enters as a curious factor in the law of inheri-
tance which has to be administered by the civil courts. (201)
Enjoyment der property der joint family managed by agreement,
express or implied, aller adult joint sharers in the family
property, who often separate themselves to smaller groups each
taking his own plot of land; jeder dissentient sharer can claim
to have his share divided off for him. (202) Im Faellen von
cocoa-nut or areca nut plantations, of jak trees and selbst of
paddy fields, usual that every gathering of the crop should be
made in the presence of all the sharers, and the produce then and
there divided according to the shares. In such cases verichten
T all the sharers together the necessary work incidental to the
cultivation or the keeping up of the plantation and constitute
in fact a cooperative society. Eine andre Praxis ist dass d.
sharers let out the land or plantation in anda, entweder to an
outsider, or to one or more of themselves. Duerf alle sharers
to be present at the division of the produce, which is effected
in two steps, i.e. first division moities und dann a division
of one moiety/?/ among the sharers. (202, 203)

Manchmal the enjoyments of the property by tatta maru succession;
erst geteilt ...?....., in every sharer obtaining his proper
number of parts, dann takes the entirely for the same number
of seasons as he is entitled to parts, giving it up at the end

of such period of the time to the sharer who stands next in the rota etc. Z.B. A.B.D. jointly entitled to a paddy field in undivided shares proportionate to 2,3, and 4, i.e. to a $2/9$, $1/3$, $4/9$ share of the whole respectively, then A would take the whole field for 2 years, B for 3, and schliesslich C for 4, and then the set of turns repeated in the same order, for successive periods of 9 years, until some sharer insists upon having an actual partition of the field (203,204)

Aehnliche Sorte of Reihenfolge adopted in einigen villages on d. Kuste zum enjoyment by the villagers of the

/151/ fishing grounds belonging to the village: diese are divided into localities; and d. recognized boats of the village fish these localities by turns which are settled by gansabawa arrangements. Jeder dieser boats mit its nets is a valuable property, belonging to many co-sharers jointly, who are commonly members of one family, and have become entitled to their shares by inheritance. On a day's fishing the produce is drawn ashore, divided in sufficient number of lots, each estimated to be worth the same assigned value, and diese lots then so distributed, class: $1/50$ to the owner of the land on which the fish are brought ashore; $1/4$ to those engaged in the labour; $1/5$ for the assistance of extra nets etc, rendered by third parties in the process of landing and securing the fish, which together $\frac{2 + 25 + 20}{100} = \frac{47}{100}$; die remaining $53/100$ go to the owners of the boat and net according to their shares therein. (204,205)

∟ III. Ceylon and Bengal ∟

Panguwa = share of the village paddy field, das dem Singhalese nilkaraya?..... ∟The Singhalese nilakaraya with his panguwa or share of the village paddy field is the Bengalese ryot with his jot .../(206) The cultivation in ande ∟ of the ∟ Singhalese ist precise counterpart der batai cultivation der Bengalese.

The disputing of the right to cultivate the soil, as distinguished from the letting out land as a commodity in beide agricultural systems. The usufructuary mortgage, flowing from the conception, is the prevailing form of dealing mit the panguwa and the jot respectively, as commodities.(207,208)

In Ceylon as in Bengal double set of village officers, one?.....∟on the one hand/ both relations der members der little village republic to each other, andere relation"with their(!) Lord"; d. gamerale, lekham, kankaname entsprechen dem Bengal. naib, patwari, gomashta : anderseits der vel vidane equivalent dem mandal.(208) (3. Ceylon and Bengal p.206-213 ∟a chapter heading WVA/) batai agreement (Bengal), under which the tilling is done by a person not the owner -- in consideration of a definite share of the produce being yielded to the owner. (237 ∟ in "From the Joint Family to the Village"(WVA)/

4) The Grain Tax ∟ Chapter IV(214-229)/

Obligation des cultivators to pay to the Crown a tithe or share of his paddy crops if he has any and in some parts der

country, also of his other grain crops. (214)

In vielen instances villages were kept on hand by the Crown (held khas as it is phrased in India) for the especial support of the central establishments: the muttetuwa darin was service-tilled, or let out in ande, under the direction of royal servants: the produce accruing was deposited in kind in royal storehouses (gabedawa), arsenals (awudege), or treasures (arramudale), according to its sort, and d. personal services due were rendered at the palace or elsewhere, to meet some immediate royal requirements. D. Crown villages or lands were known under various designation, as ratminda or ande, original crown lands hillapalla, those which had fallen into the crown from failure of the office to which they were attached: malla-palla, those reverted to the crown from death of the grantee. (216,

Unter Portugese?....Herrscfts. / The whole period throughout which the Portugese exercised any authority in the island.../ several native powers at times maintained a separate simultaneous existence in the different provinces: but little continuity of general municipal administration of any kind. Village system still in activity, even in Teil d. Land most effected by foreign influence and other disturbing forces, in the low part of the country near the coast, durch d. services and contributions derivable from this source, first the native powers of the low country and nach them the Portugese, recruited their military forces and obtained means of govt. The Portugese, when became supreme over the southern maritime circuit of the island, took

up the position der native kings, whom they superseded, and adopted their fiscal and administrative machinery as it stood. (217,218)

D. Hollaender, having turned out the Portugese, ditto == in power ueber d. maritime provinces, displaced all the native local heads and officials; d. Govt. uebernahm the direct collection and benefit der various dues, cesses and services, frueherer upon the holder of the land to whomsoever they had been rendered. (218,219) Englaender, in their turn, assuming the got. der maritime provinces, fogend ...?... Vorgang der Dutch /at first merely stepping into the shoes of their predecessors/, brauchen d. services, deren der land on tenure of service halten (and on that account duty free) nahmen auch an d. store-houses etc., the seignior's share of produce in kind non der Mallapalla, Nillapalla, Ratninda, or Ande lands / and thirdly taking immediately / nahmen

/152/ such benefits as were derivable from holders of land or other uncertain tenures, inclus. the payment of quotas of produce and of measures of paddy. (219)

Diese letzte /third/ sort of dues converted by Royal Proclamation of 3 May, 1800, into tax of 1/10 des Produce, so / it would seem that they had respect / auf d. residue of lands nach /exception made of / der government lands and der lands held on tenure of service to government offenbar waren seignior and the vihara headship. /both/ verschwunden vor den Dutch. (219,220) 3 September 1801 durch Proclamation d. obliga-

tion to service on tenure of land in d. Maritime provinces
abgeschafft (af /?/ von 1 Mai 1802 and solches land unterworfen

T to payment to Got of 1/10 des produce if highland, 1/5 of
produce of low and. Zugleich the payment of 1/4 of the produce
for Mallapalla, Nillapalla, Ratminda or Ande lands reserved.(220)

Obleich so d. obligation to service divorced from land, /still/
dem Gouverner the power reserved to exact it by special order von
persons aller castes and conditions for adequate /pay/ to be
given therefore. D. exigencies of the Kanyan war gaben den Got
dem den?..... to renew a general claim to the services of
the people nicht mit Bezug auf Grundbesitz, sondern of custom
and caste, payment to be made at rates fixed by Got.: 1809 made
Wegban too gratuitous service geraten on the inhabitants des
districts through which they passed.(221)

Disese enactments applied nur to the maritime provinces acquired
von d. Dutch. 1815 /However/ d. Britischers durch conquest
and treaty auch d. government of the Central or Kandyan Province,
/ which up to that time/ daher solely under the administration de
der native powers. 1818, durch Proclamation von 21 November
alle duties daher payable in /into/ royal storehouse, treasury,
or arsenal and alle andern duties and taxes abgeschafft, ersetzt
durch tax of 1/10 of the produce on paddy lands, reduced to
1/14 in /certain/ specified Korles.(221,221/sic!:222/)

Zugleich die services die in respects of service tenure lands
(auf?revenue tax fiel / on which mainly this new tax must
have fallen as well as on others/) retained obgleich stipulated

that the services generally should be paid for at an established rate; aber repair and making of roads wie in d. maritime provinces, gratuitous service geraten.(222) Durch Proclamation v. 21 Nov. 1818?.....d. liability of certain inhabitants of temple lands to perform service to Got. also retained.(l.c.)

Auf Report v. 24 December 1831 des Lt. Colonel Colebrook, (nämlich dieser and a Mr. Cameron waren commissioned when die Administration von Ceylon to ...?...into) an order of council d /dated/ d. 12 April 1832 erklärte, dass keiner of /His Majesty' native or Indian subjects in island liable to render any service in Bezug auf ihre land tenure, oder / in respect /ihrer Caste oder otherwise welcher / to which/ d. subjects of European birth were not liable, aber auch diese Proclamation enthält the reservation of services to the Crown of holders of land in royal villages in the Kandyan provinces and dieselbe for vihara and private owners in the same provinces.(l.c.)

According to Ribeyro, Knox and Valentyn in the Portugese and earlier times there was almost no money in the country. All trade which was not a crown monopoly was effected by barter. | Paddy was the commodity which commonly filled the place of coin. Die meisten presents which accompanied all service, took the form of paddy, and nearly all obligations by the way of remuneration or duty were discharged by a measure of grain drawn from the contents of the threshing floor at harvest.(225)

In dem librarian of the Malagava, Kandy, dem "learned" Suriyagoda

Unanse erhielt der Bursche Phear?.. /flyde?? or flygde??/
bemerkenswerte Notiz: /this is note 1, 227. WWA/ D. fruhest
Erwaehung irgendener tax or contribution des Volks fuer support
of a royal person to be found in the historical books

I of Ceylon, occurs in the Aggauna Sutta (a sermon by Buddha him-
self) Digha Nitraya, and in the commentary thereon called
Sumangala Vilasani by the learned Buddhist divine Buddhagasha.
Der passage des sermon lautet "We shall give a portion of our
paddey." Daran commentiert Buddhagasha: "we shall give you at
the rate of ammunan of paddy from each field of ours. / (Marx's
brackets) Das word "Sali" in original is literally a particular
kind of

T rice, sollaber hier stand for all grain produce/ you need not
follow any trade but be you our chief." (227,228)

Wieder ...?... /no other/ tax or obligation as / toward the/
governing power erwaehtet: ...?... von Diensten; diese meint
Phear, spaeteren Ursprungs; in the paddy cesses ultimately often
again superimposed upon the services, come in later still, with
and increase in the central power of exaction. (227,228) D. Sing-
halese word "otu", which Got. tax or claim meistens benannte/?/
heisst "one", also equivalent only to one portion of one share
ohne indication irgendener Proportion der share zum ganzen. (228,2

Also d 1/10 in English impost scheint founded upon the practice
of the Dutch in granting out Crown lands. D. grain tax
folgleich nicht aelter als the Century; in a certain sense
return to earliest and most widely prevalent form of national

T revenue developed from the basis of the village organization, aber characteristic dass d. T Ceylon Aryans from the same basis produced service system in its stead. (229)

III Evolution of the Indo-Aryan Social and Landed System./233-72/

At the present time every settlement report sent to the government (in India) will be found to furnish instances and to describe the circumstances of newly created agricultural communities.(234. Phear haette besser ge...?... statt seines hypothetischen Kopf Description solcher instances zu geben!) Dieser respectable Esel bildet?.....dass there grew up even from the commencement, a gradation of respectability and employment within the village itself.(!) (Der as...?...laesst auch alles dass private families gruenden(p.238) The proprietary conception went no further than this, namely, that the particular plot of land which the family or the individual claimed was the part of the village land, which he or it was entitled to cultivate, or to have cultivated for his own benefit. The business of allotment (so long as the practice of allotting remained), the order of cultivation, the maintenance of the water supply, the keeping up of fences, and all other affairs of common interest to their little community, were managed by the heads of families, entitled to their share of the village lands, in the panchayat assembled.(241)

Each little colony or abad.(242) Nij or private lands.(243) Kshatnia caste nur mentioned in Brahmanical pages, and it certainly has no reality now. (See Growse's Mathura

(p.246) Ebenso the existence of the Vaisya (Kaufman /derkly/)
Kaste nur evidenced by Brahmanical writers.(248) The great bulk
of the descendents of the original settlers (speaking of vill-
ages in the mass) less careful of purity of blood, or of
preserving any mark of descent from the immigrant race.?..
/ With them gradually came to be intermixed/ gradually intermixed
people of all kinds, aborigines, run-aways from other abads for
cause of pauperism, feud, or otherwise, some of whom come to be
even allowed a portion of the village lands.(248,249)
Probably the Brahman, Kshatria, Vaisya and Sudra der Brahmanical
codes blos Utopian class distinctions of a Prehistoric More.(250)

In allem there is at most conceived only the right to cultivate
land, and a deputing of that right to another in consideration
of a share in the produce(255) Selbst in seiner private land or
nij d. chief had only the right to cultivate by himself, or to
get somebody else to do it on condition of dividing the product
(256) The share of product which the chief could take from the
cultivators was not regulated by his own pleasure, or by the
making of a bargain, but by custom, or practice in regard to
which the village panchayat was the supreme authority
and the chief had no power to turn the cultivator out of poss-
ession(257) D. Verwandlung dieser quotas of produce into money
payments, or their equivalents (an event which has not happened
universally even yet)...?... /they still did not become
rent/ nicht?... rent paid for occupation and use of land.
As an article belonging to and at the disposal of the person

paid, but were dues payable to a superior ruling authority in d. chief, through zamindar of all the land within the zamindari, was at most landlord (and dass nur als one merely having the right to dispose of the occupation and tilling of the soil) of his nij lands, and in some instances probably of the wastes. Seine machinery was sein kachahri, the center of local authority, side by side / with which was /?... the panchayat, i.e. the old abad self-government. (257,258)

In Mamu's Institutions nowhere a mention of land as a subject of property in the modern English sense of Private ownership of cultivated plots in recognized, aber simply the ownership of cultivator; the land itself belongs to the village; no trace of rent; owner is only another name for cultivator. Er ist under obligation

to cultivate lest the Rajah's lord's dues in kind be shortcoming, aber er nicht to cultivate by servants, or arrange with someone else to cultivate on a division of crops

/154/ (the batai system a form of metayer) in another place of Mamu, everyone enjoined to keep a supply of grain sufficient for his household for 3 years. Almost everybody so supposed to be an actual cultivator. The practice of batai did not in fact lead to the letting of land; and rent in any form unknown to Mamu (258,259) Selling of land, or even of use of land, irgenwo directly alluded to. Appropriating a field, giving a field, siezing a field / have all a place in Mamu's pages / alle bei Mamu, aber nicht buying or selling a field(259,

260)

Etwas spaeter, nach the Mitakshara, separated kinsmen had acquired uncontrolled power of disposing of their respective shares of the family allotment; dies was a mere transfer of a personal cultivating right, incidental to personal status in the village community, and subject to an obligation to render to the lord his share of the produce. Daher the transaction to be accompanied by specified public formalities; and an out-and-out sale discontinued except for necessity. Ausserdem, when the transfer not absolute, but conditioned by way of security for the repayment of a debt, it always took the form of what is now called a usufructuary mortgage.(260,261) The usufruct of land by actual tillage on the footing of a right of partnership in the village cultivating community, and not the land itself, constituted the object ...?.../to which/ d. word "ownership" in the Hindu law writers bezieht.(261) Dies auch bestaetigt durch copper plates of title, old sanads and aehnliche evidence: d. disclose the pretty frequent grant or assignment of the right to make collections and other zamindari rights proceeding from a superior lord/or the gift of a plot from the waste, or out of the zamindar's Zivaat, to a Brahmen or other person; but no instance of private transfer by purchase and sale of actual land, or even of the lease of land for a term of years in consideration of a rent.(261,262) D. Sanchi tablet, wovon a translation given in the journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal v. VI (p.456, bericht?. nicht auf purchase and sale of land as

between private owners; sondern an enfranchisement of some sort (such as redemption of liability to pay revenue to the lord) with the view to the land becoming bebattar. (262, nt.1)

Mr. La Touche's "Settlement Report of Ajmere and Mhairwarra" recently published, obgleich La Touche nach /? noch / Phear d. facts verfaelscht durch phraseology borrowed from feudal Europe. (263) /Phear says of La Touche: "Mr La Touche, I admit,

appears to employ these words "right of ownership" in their widest English meaning; but I do not think that his facts require anything near so large...and I cannot help thinking that he has been misled by an analogy which his phraseology borrowed from feudal Europe suggests, and which, to say the best of it, is only imperfect." WWA/

D.....??.....: /As I understand the report, the gene

result may be stated thus: / Certain members of the village

community enjoy the permanently cultivated or improved lands of the village by some recognized hereditary or

customary right of cultivation, sometimes proprietorship; zahlen

...the customary share of the produce to the person entitled to

receive it. So they consider themselves entitled to continue

undisturbed in the occupation and cultivation of their land, or

even to transfer it to another; no such thing as the letting of

land on terms of profit; private sales of land practically

unknown and the sale of land by the civil court (an English

innovation) has been prohibited because so opposed to

ancient custom as to be incapable of being carried into effect:

Mortgages are almost all of usufructuary

kind, and in Mhairwarra | kind of metayer system established

between the mortgager and the mortgagee: the State -- the

representative of the former superior chief --- collects the revenue (the modern equivalent to the old customary share) from the cultivators by a certain agency machinery etc passer over lands, wo the chief's rights to collect dues, and of other kind were assigned by him to minor chiefs, -- istamardars or jaghindars --- on conditions of military service, or for other consideration; unter rights so exercised by the State and its assignees, was the right to dispose of waste land; obgleich within the State area of collection the revenue is settled in the form of a money payment in all jaghir estates the revenue collected by an estimate of the produce, and money assessments are unknown. (263-265) and sagte La Touche selbst "the land revenues are, as might be expected, extremely analgous to those prevailing in the adjacent Native States".(p.266)

/155/ In Europe, in Unterschied von East, in place of the produce tribute was substituted a dominion over the soil -- the cultivators being turned out of their land and reduced to the conditions of serfs or labourers (366,367)

In the East, under the village system, the people practically governed themselves, and the contest for power among the chiefs of the noble class was mainly a struggle for command of the kachahri tabils. (271)

/ (Marx's brackets) kachahri tabils, the contents of which were sp for personal living etc = Phear/

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"Excerpt Heft B146", by Marx, in the International Institute for Social History, Amsterdam. A bound notebook with pages numbered to 260 and with 55 unnumbered pages in back and one page unnumbered in the front. 201 pages have been used as well as one side of the front unnumbered page, inside the front cover, and a table of contents on back cover. Approximately 64 bibliographical notes on inside of front cover and first unnumbered page. Notes in the remainder as follows:

- 1-98: notes and excerpts on L.H. Morgan, Ancient Society.
- 99-127: J.W.B. Money, Java, or How To Manage a Colony.
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