

Networking for the Ban: Network Structure, Social Power, and the Movement to Ban Antipersonnel Mines

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ABSTRACT:

The ban on antipersonnel mines is rightly regarded as a major humanitarian achievement. Yet the successful creation of a legally binding treaty is not reducible to the properties of actors or the quality of ideas in isolation, but is rather the product of the patterned relations among constituent units and the empowering effects these interactions produce. I argue that the position of key actors as hubs within the mine ban network provides them with disproportionate influence in reshaping the policy agenda concerning antipersonnel mines. These actors acquired their hub position, though, based in part on their promise in accomplishing particular governance tasks. The relational structure of the mine ban network thus created the conditions of access necessary to facilitate persuasion and social pressure noted in previous studies. This account helps explain how the goal of a complete prohibition won-out in the face of sustained opposition, and why global military powers led by the United States were unable to generate support for an alternative framing that retained antipersonnel mines as legitimate weapons of war. To demonstrate this, I map the key actors and ties within the mine ban network, and illustrate their development in two distinct phases, concerning the negotiation of the Mine Ban Treaty and its subsequent implementation, respectively. The network has adapted to new governance challenges inherent in promoting an existing treaty—rather than advocating for its creation—with the addition of a new hub. This structural shift has meant that certain actors have increased their relative importance while others have decreased in stature.

Introduction

The international movement to ban antipersonnel (AP) mines is often cited as among the most successful recent governance processes in global politics. This coalition of transnational civil society groups and “like-minded” states allied together to seek a legally binding prohibition, which culminated with the creation of the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT) in 1997.¹ The treaty is rightly regarded as a diplomatic and humanitarian achievement as it constitutes the first international prohibition of a weapon that was in extensive contemporary use (Goose and Williams, 2008: 181). Moreover, the MBT was negotiated in a short period of time and against the wishes of the leading powers of China, Russia and—especially—the United States of America. This outcome poses a puzzle for many theories of IR that would expect materially powerful states to dictate the international diplomatic agenda, especially in areas that bear upon the conduct of warfare.

Scholars have previously traced the emergence of the mine ban movement and its successful realization of a legally binding treaty and parallel norm via mechanisms of persuasion and social pressure (Herby and Lawand, 2008; Price, 1998; Rutherford, 2009). While convincing in many respects, these (largely constructivist) accounts are less able to explain where the agency of this broad coalition came from in the first place, and thus the prior conditions that enabled a conception of AP mines as legally and morally unacceptable to win-out in the face of an alternative framing—promoted by the United States—which regarded the weapons as legitimate military technologies. Indeed, a key question in this episode is why the US was unable to leverage its superior diplomatic and material resources to either block the emergence of a pro-ban constituency or achieve a favourable outcome in the subsequent negotiations.

¹ Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction. Ottawa, December 3, 1997. <http://www.icbl.org/index.php/icbl/Treaty/MBT/Treaty-Text-in-Many-Languages>.

Building on the framework developed in this volume, the present chapter applies insights from the literature on social networks to shed greater light on how network relations have facilitated and constrained entrepreneurial efforts in the mine ban case. My most fundamental contention, as advanced in the framework paper by Avant and Westerwinter and echoed in other empirical chapters, is that power is best conceptualized as residing in relationships not merely material resources. The position of actors within networks—as measured by the quality, density, and distribution of connections—empowers agency to reshape governance structures. Thinking in network terms thus offers a different take on power as an exercise in the management of social relationships, and provides a vital insight into the puzzle that underlies the emergence of the antipersonnel mine ban. Like other authors in this volume (e.g., Westerwinter), I show how network centrality offers a means by which weaker actors can generate effective governance. A constellation of less materially powerful states and transnational civil society groups were able to generate extensive ties with other actors which in turn generated informational and relational advantages that allowed them to successfully promote a new international conception of appropriate behaviour despite sustained resistance from the US and other sceptical military powers. Conversely, the United States was much less successful in building relationships among key actors as the mine ban network developed, and was consequently less able to exploit these connections in conjunction with its material advantages to advance its policy goals. In this sense, social network analysis can provide insights into the structural preconditions that empowered the norm entrepreneurship so well described in previous scholarship.

I begin by introducing the mine ban network, and outlining the key concepts that inform my analysis. I then turn to mapping the network's structure: while a diverse collection of actors participate in the network, relations are organized around a few hubs—composed of both state

and non-state actors—that dominate policy development and execution. As anticipated in earlier accounts, the centrality of these actors is instrumental in bestowing distinctly social forms of power to shape governance outcomes by acting as norm entrepreneurs in raising the profile of an issue (agenda-setting), shaping appropriate responses (issue framing) and promoting new norms to generate changes in actor behaviour (socialization) (Carpenter, 2011; Goddard, 2009; Kahler, 2009: 3; Price, 2003: 583). Yet I also show that network position is itself generated in part by the capacity to achieve specific governance tasks and hence, that participation in networks can have recursive effects over time.

The balance of the article then illustrates the impact of network structure by examining forms of social power in two distinct phases in the mine ban effort, concerning the creation of the MBT, and its subsequent implementation, respectively. Key actors utilized their positions within the network to re-frame the debate concerning the legitimacy of AP mines and shape the content of the resulting treaty, and this influence has continued during the ongoing efforts to secure widespread adherence. Crucially, the success of these diplomatic initiatives was determined not by the raw material power of prospective entrepreneurs, or the content of their ideas in isolation, but rather by the structural conditions of the network itself, which provided certain actors with disproportionate access and brokerage opportunities in which to advance their claims. This account helps explain both the successful diplomacy of less materially powerful actors and the consequent US inability to get its way. In sum, power is understood not as an attribute or commodity, but rather a function of social relations and the resulting network position.

The AP mines case reinforces two further salient points in the study of networks that are taken up by the contributors to this volume. First, networks aim to address real-world policy issues and are often created and modified in reaction to a perceived governance need. In the case

of the MBT, actor roles have evolved in response to new challenges implied by the formalization of the mine ban in a legally binding treaty: while early efforts focused on identifying the problem and advocating for a particular solution, attention has increasingly shifted to technical assistance and monitoring of state compliance with MBT commitments. Actors thus respond to their environment even as they are re-shaping it, which draws attention to the importance of strategic action in network politics. Second, while structural position is critical to actor power within the network, this power is reinforced through the performance of functional roles and provision of individual or collective goods. Structure and agency are thus interactive and dynamic properties of networks (Kahler, 2009: 6–11). Taken together, these insights provide further evidence that the properties of networks are of central importance in understanding norm diffusion in world politics.

Network Structure and Norm Entrepreneurship

The Antipersonnel Mine Ban Treaty

Like the other case studies presented in this volume, the ban on antipersonnel mines represents a hard case for global governance. First, the Mine Ban Treaty prohibits the use, development, production, stockpiling and transfer of AP mines, and thus constitutes a direct intervention in the war-fighting capacity of the state.² It is typically assumed that states will resist highly restrictive international obligations that implicate core matters of national security policy. Yet the MBT seeks to overturn a well-established international social standard that regarded AP landmines as unproblematic tools of war on par with other conventional military technologies like artillery shells, rockets, and personal infantry weapons (Price, 1998: 617–618). This amounts to a

² The MBT contains additional positive obligations to clear known mined areas and provide assistance to mine victims, though I do not address these features systematically here.

fundamental reversal of the burden of proof that has typically privileged claims of military necessity in the first instance against concerns for humanitarian impacts (Gard, Jr., 1998; International Committee of the Red Cross, 1997; Jacobs, 2004; Morgan, 2002). In the negotiations that led to the Mine Ban Treaty, these expansive legal obligations were rejected by key military powers including China, the Russian Federation and the United States (among others) who favoured less stringent rules regulating but not eliminating AP mines. In this second respect, the MBT would again seem unlikely to spur significant international change, since prominent theories of International Relations hold that the leadership of materially powerful states is necessary to underpin international cooperation (Downs et al., 1996; Goldsmith and Posner, 2005; Mearsheimer, 1994). Third and relatedly, it is expected that transnational civil society influence will be felt principally on issues that fall outside of the core security prerogatives of the state (Price, 1998: 613).

For these reasons, the achievement of a legally binding global treaty was more contentious than is often realized in retrospect. Yet the ban movement has also been hailed as a model for a new kind of diplomacy in which like-minded governments and transnational civil society may ally together to bypass the resistance of materially powerful states in order to negotiate international rules (Axworthy, 1998; Behringer, 2005; Cameron, 1998; Dolan and Hunt, 1998; Goose and Williams, 2008). Gaining greater purchase on how this outcome was achieved thus has important implications for the study of governance in the field of international security and more broadly.

Previous studies have provided important theoretical insights and empirical detail concerning the emergence of the mine ban movement and its successful negotiation of a legally binding treaty despite the opposition from leading states (Herby and Lawand, 2008; Price, 1998;

Rutherford, 2009). Price's seminal study of the issue, for example, demonstrated that transnational civil society, in concert with allies from middle power states, deployed persuasive argumentation and social pressure to promote a radically new conception of antipersonnel mines in which "their military utility is outweighed by their humanitarian costs, thus introducing a moral calculus into the definition of national interest." (Price, 1998: 614) Price suggests that the impact of the socialization effort is a function of the content of the normative claim itself: emergent norms that involve "the bodily integrity of innocents," and that can be associated with existing moral taboos in related issue areas, are far more likely to generate widespread appeal (Keck and Sikkink, 1998: 204; Price, 1998: 639–640). Other studies have emphasized the diplomatic innovation associated with the mine ban movement, and have identified the strategic use of a non-traditional negotiating forum as vital to the movement's success (Axworthy, 1998; Cameron, 1998; Dolan and Hunt, 1998).

Yet these accounts do not address how civil society actors and less powerful states gained privileged access to the relevant international actors in order to promote their ideas in the first place. This is important, since for the view of antipersonnel mines as illegitimate weapons to gain widespread appeal, it first had to reach an audience of a critical mass that could generate a "cascade" towards widespread acceptance of the mine ban norm and its core causal claims (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). Moreover, the norm entrepreneurship of the pro-ban coalition did not take place in a vacuum, but was in direct competition with an alternative framing—promoted by the United States and supported by other major military powers like China, India and Russia—that regarded AP mines as militarily useful and acceptable weapons, sought more modest legal restrictions on their continued use. What explains the substantial disparity in impact between supporters of an AP mine ban and their opponents?

Studying Social Networks: Centrality and Governance

Social network analysis provides means of addressing this issue that locates the source of influence in the structural relations among actors, rather than the properties of the agent or issue itself (Knoke and Yang, 2008: 4). A network approach seeks both to describe the actors and relationships in a defined social domain, and to provide a theoretically informed account that links network structure via mechanisms and processes to phenomena of interest. In basic terms, a network is composed of a series of actors (nodes) and connections (ties) between them through which resources flow. Ties may be represented by the exchange of material goods (e.g., trade, technology or aid), affiliations (e.g., shared membership in intergovernmental organizations or alliances) and information and ideas (e.g., norms or values) (Borgatti and Lopez-Kidwell, 2011: 43–45; Hafner-Burton and Montgomery, 2006: 24). The patterns of these interactions have aggregative effects by bestowing some actors with more extensive and robust connections to other network members, making them hubs in the network (Maoz, 2011: 9). Network position, in turn, provides central actors with capabilities to influence policy choices and reshape international structures.

A key advantage of network theories, therefore, is their ability to address the interaction of structural and agentic aspects of governance. Network structures offer permissive environments for entrepreneurs to promote new norms in the international system (Avant; Carpenter; Cooley and Nexon; Westerwinter, all this volume). The interpersonal and inter-organizational ties embodied in network connections facilitate the dissemination of ideas and practices via mechanisms of learning, persuasion and social pressure, and are therefore instrumental to processes of socialization that are widely studied in IR (Cao, 2010; Dorussen and

Ward, 2008; Valente, 2005). It is in this sense that networks enable social power, by which I mean the ability of actors to shape meanings and resulting interests and behaviours in the international system. These capacities are not inherent to the actors themselves, but are “embedded” in the network (Goddard, 2009: 258). The distribution of ties, position of actors and the quality of their connections thus mediate the agency of norm entrepreneurs, enabling action while imposing crucial constraints on which initiatives may disseminate widely (Avant and Westerwinter, this volume).

More specifically, the more connected an actor is within a network, the greater its potential to shape governance outcomes. Two conceptions of structural position encapsulate the most important forms of entrepreneurial power in the mine ban network. First, an actor may possess high *degree centrality*, meaning that it has a large number of direct ties to other nodes, and is therefore well connected overall. This form of centrality is closely associated with heightened access—in both qualitative and quantitative terms—to resources flowing through the network, and hence informational advantages that can be translated into social power to influence policy. By virtue of their location along principal lines of communication, hubs may also shape or limit the volume and destination of resources passing through the network, which provides them with an additional source of influence (Hafner-Burton et al., 2009: 570). Highly central nodes may utilize these asymmetries to identify governance challenges in need of response (agenda setting), propose solutions in the form of new norms and legal rules (negotiating influence) and finally to assess compliance (monitoring and enforcement).

Second, well-connected actors may serve as a bridge between other nodes that lack direct ties, in which case they are said to possess high *betweenness centrality*. This measures the extent to which a given actor lies along the pathway between any two other actors, and can be

understood as a generic gauge of brokerage potential, meaning the extent to which a particular actor facilitates transactions between otherwise disparate members of a network. The gaps that develop in network connections—known as structural holes—generate dependencies that can be exploited by hubs to increase their own influence (Goddard 2009; Hanneman and Riddle 2011b, 360–362). Betweenness thus provides a means of translating social capital into entrepreneurial power to shape collective action in two distinct ways. On the one hand, brokers can act as gatekeepers, selectively permitting or restricting the flow of resources and thereby activating or denying relationships between actors. On the other hand, hubs in brokerage positions may interpret and present information differently to various audiences, thus increasing the diversity and resonance of their entrepreneurial efforts (Goddard, 2009: 265–266). Brokers are thus vital to the diffusion of ideas, norms and even material resources, giving these actors heightened influence in promoting certain conceptions of appropriate behaviour and their preferred responses.

Conceiving of international policy arenas in network terms adds further nuance to our understanding of how norm entrepreneurship operates in practice. The structural conditions of networks bestow upon some actors disproportionate capacity to introduce new ideas and direct the social and material resources necessary to steward these ideas towards widespread acceptance and adoption. These advantages have recursive effects over time, as the association with a variety of network functions generates legitimacy that allows hubs to reinforce and extend their central positions. Undoubtedly the content of actor claims matters as well: incipient norms must appear to accord with previously endorsed standards, and certain types of norms are better suited to such grafting efforts (Keck and Sikkink, 1998: 204; Price, 2003: 584). Yet the ability to

engage in norm advocacy, and the authority to have these entrepreneurial efforts taken seriously, is a product of the empowering effects of network relations.

Mapping the Mine Ban Network

The Scope of Inquiry

A key consideration in network analysis is choosing the relevant social setting and boundaries of study (Knoke and Yang, 2008: 15–20). I focus on the international effort to eliminate antipersonnel mines that culminated in a multilateral legal prohibition in the form of the Mine Ban Treaty.³ Actors are included in the analysis on the basis of their participation in the policy debates surrounding this global initiative, though not all endorse the outcome of the MBT. The issue area is characterized by regularized interactions among a multiplicity of governmental and non-governmental actors in which the MBT provides an institutional structure for the development of network pathways. And, with few exceptions, the principal nodes have formed associational bonds on the basis of a shared commitment to the complete elimination (as opposed to limitation) of AP mines.⁴

Network relations are particularly relevant since the mine ban regime lacks the formal secretariat and enforcement structures found in many international organizations. Governance, then, remains the responsibility of the participating actors, rather than a central authority. In this regard, the mine ban network reflects the informality characteristic of many networks in the security field explored in this volume (Avant and Westerwinter, this volume). Despite this, the

³ The MBT does not represent the only international effort to address the humanitarian impact of AP mines, as the 1996 Amended Protocol II (APII) to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons places restrictions on the use of these weapons. However, APII is fundamentally aimed at regulating the weapon's use, rather than their outright elimination, and thus represents a different policy goal and regime structure.

⁴ I further restrict my analysis by focusing on the negotiation of the legal text and subsequent compliance issues, rather than the much wider universe of humanitarian responses to mine contamination, survivors, and the like. This decision is a pragmatic one designed to retain the scope of inquiry within manageable limits, and does not imply a judgement regarding the relative merits of either field of activity.

mine ban regime is substantially institutionalized, most notably in the form of regular diplomatic meetings, a dedicated Implementation Support Unit and annual transparency reporting mechanism (Brinkert, 2008; Brinkert and Hamilton, 2004). These institutions include both formal State Parties and observer delegations from non-party states as well as extensive participation by civil society actors. Inclusion in institutional venues creates ties and a framework for interaction through which actors may establish, reinforce and extend their influence within the network (Cao, 2010; Dorussen and Ward, 2008: 192–193; Hafner-Burton and Montgomery, 2006: 4). At the same time, the network also exhibits considerable diversity in terms of the types of actors, the volume and density of their connections, and hence the relative positions they occupy. Mapping these linkages and identifying relative power distributions is thus a valuable exercise in its own right, and provides a necessary first step to the subsequent goal of demonstrating the effects of networks on global political outcomes (Hafner-Burton et al., 2009: 583; Hollstein, 2011: 406–409).

Measuring the Network

This chapter relies on close case study analysis to ascertain the structure and properties of the mine ban network (Hollstein, 2011). The qualitative data is derived from expert interviews, archival research and participant observation at diplomatic meetings of the Mine Ban Treaty. My focus here is on characterizing and assessing the network at its highest level of abstraction (Knoke, 2011: 210). I therefore include nodes for each UN member state, the principal civil society actors and intergovernmental organizations focused on the creation and implementation of the MBT.⁵ In order to measure the structure of the mine ban network globally, I developed a

⁵ Some nodes—such as those dealing principally with mine clearance and victim assistance—have little direct responsibility for the legal and policy dimensions of the antipersonnel mine ban, and have been excluded here in

binary sociomatrix that details the presence or absence of connections between dyads of actors (Carrington and Scott, 2011: 4; Hanneman and Riddle, 2011a: 336–339; Knoke and Yang, 2008: 49).⁶ Network ties are conceptualized here as direct communication (including the transmission of ideas, values or technical information) and material transactions (principally financial assistance) between nodes that specifically concern mine ban policy. The dyadic ties are undirected, meaning that they are treated as symmetrical and reciprocal. I model the network in two distinct phases of its evolution, representing (a) the emergence of the mine ban movement culminating in the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty (1990-1997); and (b) the subsequent implementation phase (1998 – present). This allows me to capture changes in network structure that have important consequences for governance outcomes. There are a total of 189 nodes in the first network dataset, and 197 in the second; this reflects the addition of a new organization (discussed below), along with a slight increase in the total number of UN member states between 1998 and 2013.

The data reveal some important attributes of the mine ban network. First, the network is very sparsely connected overall, with only 3.4% of possible dyadic ties actually in existence.⁷ The vast majority of nodes have few if any direct ties, while a very few nodes possess extensive connections to the vast majority of weakly connected others. Hence, a second key feature of the mine ban network is the extent to which it is dominated by a few centrally positioned hubs (Carpenter, 2011; Lake and Wong, 2009). This structural inequality has continued across time, as

order to simplify the network analysis. Subsequent research will aim to integrate these important actors in order to situate the currently portrayed network within the wider humanitarian space. On this see footnote 4, above. A complete list of nodes, along with related network data, is available from the author upon request.

⁶ The analysis was conducted with UCINET 6 (Borgatti et al., 2002). The software is available at <https://sites.google.com/site/ucinetsoftware/home>.

⁷ This is the average of the density scores for the pre-1998 network (3.3%) and 1998-2013 network (3.5%). This measure refers to the number of actual dyadic ties observed in a network divided by the total number of possible ties (if every node were directly connected to every other node). Since the numbers are so similar, I use the average of the two networks for illustrative purposes.

the introduction of new network actors has only altered these measures insignificantly at the margins. This can be further demonstrated in terms of both degree and betweenness centrality.

Table 1: Top Normalized Centrality Scores for Pre-1998 Network

	Degree⁸	Betweenness⁹
ICBL	1.00	32.41
ICRC	1.00	32.41
CORE GRP	1.00	32.41
USA	0.16	0.50

Table 1 presents the most central nodes in the mine ban network during the negotiation of the MBT. Three hubs—the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Core Group of states—are directly connected to all other nodes, and lie on just under one third of all the possible shortest pathways between any two other nodes. These three are joined by one modestly connected actor, the United States of America (USA), which possesses direct ties to 16% of nodes, and is situated along 5% of the pathways between dyads. As I discuss further below, the United States is most connected individual state in this network analysis, but is much less central than the Core Group states which leveraged their collective ties to enhance their relative position and power.¹⁰ The remaining 158 states are extremely weakly connected, with direct ties only to the ICBL, ICRC

⁸ Freeman degree centrality, with symmetrical out-degree and in-degree, calculated with UCINET. I use the normalized scores here and in Table 2, which expresses the total direct dyadic ties for each node as a percentage of the absolute number of possible ties given the size of the network (n-1).

⁹ Freeman betweenness centrality, calculated with UCINET. In Table 1 and 2 I again employ the normalized scores, which account for the extent to which (as a percentage) a given node sits on the shortest pathway between two other nodes, given all of the possible shortest paths in the network.

¹⁰ Individually, states in the Core Group are not well connected, with scores of 0.021 and 0.000 for degree and betweenness centrality, respectively in the pre-1998 network, and the slightly higher scores of 0.026 and (again) 0.000 for the 1998-present iteration. One of the core contentions of this chapter, however, is that these states vastly increased their power within the network by pooling their resources under the auspices of the Core Group.

and Core Group, and betweenness scores of 0 (they do not lie on pathways between any other actors).

The structural shift that followed the creation of the MBT is apparent in Table 2. Particularly notable here is the emergence of a new network hub and the consequent diminishment of others.

Table 2: Top Normalized Centrality Scores for 1998-2013 Network

	Degree	Betweenness
ICBL	1.00	32.31
CORE GRP	1.00	32.31
ISU	1.00	32.31
ICRC	0.16	0.37
USA	0.16	0.37

While the ICBL and Core Group remain comparably situated in absolute terms, their relative structural position is reduced by the advent of the ISU, which has become a co-equal hub both with respect to degree and betweenness measures. This reorientation of network structure is even more dramatic in the case of the ICRC, as the extensive ties established with states during the negotiation of the MBT have been largely supplanted by the emergence of the ISU as a dedicated focal point for state engagement on technical matters of treaty compliance and implementation. I consider the implications of this realignment in the analysis below.

Hubs in the Mine Ban Network

The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) was founded in October 1992 by a collection of prominent international non-governmental organizations¹¹, with the aim of mounting a coordinated global campaign to achieve a legally-binding prohibition of AP mines (Warmington and Tuttle, 1998; White and Rutherford, 1998). Today the ICBL has dedicated national campaigns in over 100 countries, with members drawn from the disarmament, human rights, development and refugee fields. Despite this internal diversity, the Campaign is treated as a discrete node in this analysis. This decision is justified by the role that the ICBL plays as the international face of civil society efforts on the antipersonnel mines issue. Internally, the central Campaign management—represented by a Governance Board and permanent staff in Geneva—serves as the focal point for incoming information (including updates on local advocacy and data on government policy) and material resources (including financial and technical assistance) from campaign members, and directs these resources to constituent actors within the ICBL orbit. This gives the central ICBL staff a privileged role in setting the strategic direction of civil society advocacy, while the execution at the domestic level is largely left to the national campaigns.¹² Externally, as the recognized international embodiment of civil society in this issue area, the ICBL acts as the chief spokesperson for the NGO movement with governments and international organizations. As will be demonstrated below, this position at the centre of the network has given the ICBL important power in shaping the content of the international response to AP mines.

Much like the ICBL, the International Committee of the Red Cross's (ICRC) central position in the mine ban movement rests in its role as a source of technical expertise. As I show

¹¹ Handicap International (France), Human Rights Watch (United States of America), Medico International (Germany), Mines Advisory Group (United Kingdom), Physicians for Human Rights (US) and Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (US) (Williams and Goose 1998, 22; Chabasse 1998, 60–67).

¹² Telephone Interview with senior official from the International Campaign to Ban Landmines. February 5, 2013. See also (Bernstein, 2008: 35; Hubert, 2000: 32; Williams and Goose, 1998: 22–23).

in the proceeding section, the ICRC's ability to marshal information concerning the humanitarian consequences of AP mines—drawn largely from its own field hospitals in conflict zones—was vital in generating early interest in a ban. This was greatly facilitated by the ICRC's existing status as the recognized “guardian” of the Geneva Conventions and broader corpus of international humanitarian law. The ICRC's international profile and scope gives it a degree of access to governments that far exceeds what is available to other civil society actors, making it a highly suitable broker.

State influence in the mine ban network centres around the so-called Core Group of states that partnered with the ICBL and ICRC in championing the cause of a legally binding prohibition on antipersonnel mines.¹³ The Core Group is defined by the shared goal of a binding legal ban on AP mines—the acceptance of which is a precondition for membership—and dense inter-governmental linkages. I therefore argue that the Core Group can be conceptualized as a cohesive subgroup within the broader system of states, and is recognized as a more-or-less distinctive entity by other actors within the mine ban network (Hanneman and Riddle 2011b, 346–348; Hafner-Burton, Kahler, and Montgomery 2009, 565–566). Previous research has suggested that participation in network hubs may offer less materially powerful states an important means of generating social capital and influence (Hafner-Burton and Montgomery, 2006). This finding is reflected in the mine ban network, as individual state members of the Core Group are weakly connected—possessing only direct ties to other hubs—but have been able to

¹³ This group emerged in 1996 and subsequently expanded to include 28 members, notably by adding greater representation from developing and mine-affected regions. Members of the Core Group are recognized as: Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Cambodia, Canada, Colombia, Croatia, Denmark, Germany, France, Ireland, Jordan, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, Mozambique, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, the Philippines, Slovenia, South Africa, Switzerland, Thailand, the United Kingdom and Zimbabwe (Goose et al., 2008: 3; Lawson et al., 1998: 166–168; Maslen, 2005: 27–28).

greatly expand their connections and resulting power by virtue of their collaborative participation in, and connection to, this exclusive club.

A final and much more recent addition to the network architecture is the Antipersonnel Mine Ban Treaty Implementation Support Unit (Brinkert, 2008: 91–93, 99–100). The MBT did not create a formal secretariat, but the challenges associated with ensuring effective implementation convinced State Parties of the need to institutionalize existing knowledge and best practices in a permanent entity. To that end, the ISU has become a central node in the distribution of technical and financial assistance from donor governments, inter-governmental organizations and civil society experts to states facing implementation challenges. Yet in these roles the ISU is at least formally distinct from other network hubs in that it is envisioned mainly as an agent of states facilitating implementation of the MBT, rather than a principal advancing its own independent policy goals.¹⁴ As will be suggested below, this special status poses interesting implications for theoretical expectations concerning network power.

It is also worth briefly noting the absence of some key actors as central nodes. First, major military powers like China, India and the Russian Federation are almost entirely excluded from the network; the United States is better connected by virtue of its associations with Core Group states, but its overall centrality is modest by comparison with the principal hubs. This outcome is surprising since we might typically expect these actors to be deeply involved in governance initiatives that bear on the use of military force. The limited influence of the United States in particular deserves further explanation, which I undertake below. The United Nations also plays a more modest role in the mine ban network than might be anticipated given its prominence in the wider international system. The UN has virtually no presence in advocating

¹⁴ Interview with senior official from the Implementation Support Unit of the Antipersonnel Mine Ban Convention. Geneva, October 30, 2009.

for the specific aims of the Mine Ban Treaty, and is instead focused on the provision of technical expertise and funding for mine clearance and victim assistance projects.¹⁵ Practitioners have suggested that these resource-based ties do translate into significant influence, particularly with respect to humanitarian mine action.¹⁶ More broadly, though, I find that the UN is largely isolated from the policy debates that constitute the mine ban network, and hence that its impact on governance is modest when compared against other actors. A final, notable aspect of the mine ban network is the absence of corporate actors, unlike other issue areas (Westerwinter, this volume; Haufler, this volume). The principal reason for this is material, as “landmines were not a highly profitable industry.” (Hubert, 2000: 37) Companies involved in the production of AP mines were therefore unable to build linkages to powerful actors within the network either because they remained isolated from larger corporate defence contractors (who might have served as effective advocates for the continued use of AP mines), or because they operated as state-owned entities and were therefore subject to the political decisions of their home governments.

Selling the Ban: Norm Entrepreneurship and the Creation of the MBT

The literature on the emergence of the antipersonnel mine ban makes clear that the initial impetus came from transnational civil society in the form of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and the International Committee of the Red Cross. Yet as noted already, this account

¹⁵ Brinkert (2008, 98) has suggested that this ambivalence may be due to the fact that “not all UN members are party to the treaty”. Interview subjects have reported that UN field agencies were more engaged in efforts to seek a ban treaty than the UN Secretariat in New York. This is owing to the field agencies’ more direct, first-hand experiences with the effects of AP mines, and the fact that the UN bureaucracy (Department of Disarmament Affairs most especially) was heavily invested in disarmament efforts pursued through established diplomatic processes. Telephone interview with senior official from the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), January 29, 2013.

¹⁶ Telephone interviews with UNIDIR and ICBL officials, January 29, February 5, and February 6 2013, respectively.

fails to fully explain the conditions for entrepreneurial success, and particularly how these materially weak actors were able to counter the substantial diplomatic and coercive efforts of the United States in order to achieve a comprehensive ban. Attention to the dynamics of access and brokerage manifested in network relations can help to allay this gap. While many actors were engaged in the issue area, only a very few were sufficiently connected to the range of relevant stakeholders to be able to effectively shape global policy. The centrality of the ICBL and ICRC thus allowed them to advance a new conception of antipersonnel mines that placed the humanitarian impact on civilian populations at the centre of the calculus over their legitimacy, in a process similar to the one identified by Avant (this volume) in her study of the military and security services industry. This initial agenda setting could then be endorsed and promoted by the Core Group through its own substantial diplomatic relations.

Network structure thus facilitated two specific modes of influence. On the one hand, the ICBL and ICRC possessed direct access to the relevant stakeholders—including peace activists, military and civilian demining personnel, doctors and relief workers, aid agencies and international lawyers—with firsthand knowledge of the impact and scale of the AP mine problem. In isolation, these various actors had limited ability to shift the international agenda because they lacked the direct ties needed to form a holistic conception of the issue area. As central hubs, however, the ICBL and ICRC could draw on technical expertise from a host of disparate sources, dramatically increasing the volume and quality of available information concerning the humanitarian impact of AP mines, their utility in contemporary military practice and the international legal context for their use and regulation (Africa Watch, 1993; Coupland and Korver, 1991; Fine, 1992; International Committee of the Red Cross, 1992; McGrath, 1992;

McGrath and Stover, 1991; Stover and McGrath, 1991; The Arms Project and Africa Watch, 1993; The Arms Project and Physicians for Human Rights, 1993).

Data compiled by the ICRC and distributed in conjunction with the ICBL was used to challenge the conventional wisdom concerning the role of antipersonnel landmines in contemporary conflict. First, the organizations reviewed evidence on the operational deployment of AP mines in battle, and concluded that their military utility was exaggerated: AP mines were less decisive than often claimed, and often caused substantial “friendly” casualties to the forces that initially laid the weapons. Second and crucially for the alternative narrative of the ban proponents, the ICRC and ICBL used extensive case studies to suggest that the horrific effects associated with AP mines were not the result of correctible mistakes—for example, human error or the irresponsible use by rebel groups—but were an inherent feature of the weapons themselves. For this reason, the humanitarian crisis of AP mines could not be addressed through a more stringent regulation on their use, as the US and its allies suggested, but only through a comprehensive prohibition. The vast majority of states existed as isolated nodes within the wider network, meaning that they lacked access to comparable sources of empirical evidence by which to interpret or challenge these emerging claims. The ICBL and ICRC exploited these information asymmetries to recast the conception of antipersonnel mines as “a humanitarian scourge” that were fundamentally incompatible with established international legal principles relating to military necessity, proportionality and discrimination (Gard, Jr., 1998; International Committee of the Red Cross, 1997; Maslen, 1998; Price, 1998: 623).

On the other hand, early engagement meant that the ICBL and ICRC were best equipped to act as a bridge between the wealth of state and institutional actors with potential interest in the issue. The organizations convened numerous conferences, symposia and seminars that brought

together a variety of state and non-state representatives to discuss AP mine policy on the terms set by the hosts (International Committee of the Red Cross, 1993; Maslen, 1998: 84–89). The dependencies that emerged from this process generated brokerage opportunities that were leveraged to promote a particular vision for the global response to AP mines. As gatekeepers, the ICBL and ICRC were able to determine what claims received the greatest attention in international fora, and to strategically target their arguments to different audiences, thereby reinforcing their centrality to subsequent discussions over the merits of a prohibition.

Both organizations were therefore principal conduits for the flow of information between the range of relevant civil society, institutional and governmental stakeholders in international disarmament and the emerging field of human security. These relational advantages proved vital to their norm entrepreneurship. In the absence of alternative sources of information, state representatives became reliant on the information provided by civil society. Many governments were therefore persuaded by ICBL and ICRC arguments that the effects of AP mines on civilian populations rendered them illegitimate from the perspective of accepted international law, and consequently, that a prohibition was a logical response to this crisis. Just as importantly, actors that sought to oppose the emerging ban movement were impeded by their lack of access to network actors and resources, meaning that they were unable to effectively counter the arguments advanced by transnational civil society actors with their own narrative. These factors proved instrumental in shaping the domestic political conditions in favour of a prohibition in a number of states that had formerly been major producers and users of the weapons. Hubert (2000, 37) has suggested for example that “[h]ad comprehensive studies on the military utility of mines existed, the split between ministries of defense and foreign affairs that was critical to the success of the campaign would have been less easily achieved.” As the process gathered

momentum, social pressure led prominent states such as Australia, France, Japan and the United Kingdom to endorse the mine ban in order to benefit from status considerations (being identified as among the “club of responsible states”) and avoid further criticism. Hence the early control of information was a precondition for the socialization processes noted in previous academic accounts (Herby and Lawand, 2008; Price, 1998; Rutherford, 2009), and provides a clear demonstration of network effects in mobilizing norm entrepreneurship.

This agenda-setting power translated into substantial influence over the content of the resulting Mine Ban Treaty. The ICBL and ICRC were given official status in the negotiations, a rarity in the usually closed world of multilateral arms control and disarmament diplomacy (Kmentt, 2008: 25; Williams and Goose, 1998: 34–35). The organizations made substantial contributions to strengthening the final treaty text on issues ranging from the legal definition of AP mines, the absoluteness of ban (whether to permit any exceptions or exemptions), the timelines for stockpile destruction and mine clearance, compliance provisions and state responsibility for assisting victims (Goose et al., 2008: 2; Maslen, 1998: 92–94, 2005: 29). Network position thus gave the ICBL and ICRC a degree of social power in shaping the international security agenda that greatly exceeded their organizational or material capacities.¹⁷

While civil society actors were the key catalysts of the movement to ban AP mines, the impetus towards a formal diplomatic effort was greatly aided by the access and brokerage of the Core Group. First, as early advocates of a prohibition, Core Group states were well positioned to use their existing diplomatic ties to promote the aims of mine ban. Internally, its members established dense reciprocal relationships based on a shared commitment to the principle of a

¹⁷ This influence was well appreciated at the time. Indeed, when “[a]sked to identify the factors that influenced their country’s decision to sign the Convention, delegates most frequently cited the pressure exercised by NGOs, particularly as a presence at the table during the treaty negotiation process.” (Cameron, Lawson, and Tomlin 1998, 10; Rutherford 2009, 131)

complete prohibition. Externally, Core Group states were well connected in regional and global fora, conducting extensive consultations to generate support for the ban policy (Lawson et al., 1998: 173–175). The Core Group thus served as a clearinghouse for state interactions and possessed a huge informational advantage vis-à-vis the majority of poorly connected states. This was most valuable in determining the current views of relevant foreign ministry, defence and government officials, and identifying actors that would be susceptible to persuasive efforts. Membership in the Core Group thus greatly magnified the diplomatic impact of any of these states acting in isolation. Second, the Core Group served as a link between states and their civil society counterparts, and consequently played a primary role in mediating the distribution of technical, financial and informational resources. The diversity of the Core Group also allowed its members to tailor diplomatic initiatives to suit the particular perceived needs of governments. These brokerage roles were particularly valuable in drawing otherwise isolated states into pro-ban discussions and in connecting the ICBL to governments in instances where direct ties were previously underdeveloped.

This entrepreneurship was most consequential in establishing the diplomatic strategy, and in shaping content of the treaty itself. With regard to the former, the Core Group members used their central position to successfully direct political energies towards a legally binding prohibition outside of the normal diplomatic venues, and resist pressures from major international powers like the United States to retain a dominant influence over the process. The solution was to develop an ad hoc negotiating procedure that was not bound to the lowest-common-denominator consensus decision making which continues to stall progress at the Conference on Disarmament and its framework treaty, the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (Axworthy, 1998; Cameron, 1998). Here the Core Group was able to use its position as

a gatekeeper in discussions between states and civil society to monitor the positions of governments vis-à-vis the proposed ban, and strategically direct diplomatic resources to address concerns and shore-up support for the pro-ban position. These informational asymmetries gave the Group a distinct advantage over other states that were advocating a more gradual approach via UN diplomatic fora.

With international opinion turning in favour of a prohibition, the Core Group played an equally crucial role in determining the main features of the negotiations. First, by linking full participation in the diplomatic discussions to an acceptance of the principle of a total ban on AP mines, the Group acted as a gatekeeper in setting the basic goals of the diplomacy on its own terms. In other words, rather than considering the views of all states on equal footing, the Core Group at the outset restricted the decision-making constituency to only those states that had already accepted the outcome it was advocating. Just as important was the ability of the Core Group to use its position to shape the structure of the diplomacy, by instituting a two-thirds majority decision rule, the election of the highly supportive South African diplomat Jacob Selebi as chair of the negotiating conference, and the full inclusion of the ICBL and ICRC in the discussions (Williams and Goose 1998, 43; Hubert 2000, 37; Maslen 2005, 41–42).¹⁸ These institutional features were widely regarded by observers as being instrumental in ensuring the pro-ban constituency could continue to dominate the diplomatic negotiations.

Finally, as the organizer of the diplomatic conference, the Core Group—in concert with the ICBL and ICRC—again leveraged its privileged access to set the terms of the final treaty. This was done by strategically positioning an Austrian draft text as the *de facto* language forming the basis of final negotiations, and delegating the task of resolving contentious issues in

¹⁸ Draft Rules of Procedure, Diplomatic Conference on a Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mine and on Their Destruction. APL/CRP.2. Oslo, September 1, 1997. (Maslen 2005, 42, fn. 206)

the draft treaty text to a small sub-set of their members, known as the “Friends of the Chair.”¹⁹ In so doing, the Core Group was able to exploit its position as the fulcrum of negotiations to anticipate diplomatic challenges from sceptical states and their allies (Lawson et al., 1998: 176–177). Hence the Core Group’s structural position provided it with the resources and political power to resist intense political challenges—most especially from the United States delegation—and steward the negotiations to a favourable conclusion.

The critical development in the success of the mine ban movement was shifting global opinion of the weapons such that antipersonnel mines came to be regarded as “already” illegal, making the prospect of a ban more conceivable to policymakers (Price, 1998: 622). While the initial impetus came from a small group of actors, the diplomatic process ultimately enjoyed widespread buy-in: 89 states (plus 32 observer delegations) participated in the final treaty negotiations, while 122 signed the resulting Mine Ban Treaty. This outcome can be traced to the centrality of key hubs in the mine ban network: privileged access to weakly connected actors allowed the ICBL, ICRC and Core Group to set the terms of the antipersonnel mine debate, and thus change state views via the mechanisms of persuasion and social pressure highlighted in previous studies. Yet network analysis also provides vital insight into how this process was achieved in the face of countervailing pressure from materially powerful opponents of a ban. Rather than relying on traditional forms of coercive or instrumental power, transnational civil society and a collection of middle power states leveraged their superior connections to gain access to key constituencies and control the flow of information between them. This, in turn, gave these hubs a diplomatic advantage that they exploited in order to strategically promote their preferred policy outcome, and finally to maintain support amongst a diverse group of states during the final intense negotiations. The ability to generate governance outcomes in the face of

¹⁹ Austria, Brazil, Canada, Ireland and Mexico (Lawson et al. 1998, 176–177; Maslen 2005, 41, fn. 205).

resistance from the most materially powerful actors is the essence of the concept of social power advanced in this volume. As the above discussion demonstrates, it was not just the content of moral claims, but the structural conditions under which they were made, that provided the conditions for the successful advancement of the mine ban norm.

This relational view also helps explain why the United States was ultimately unable to gain widespread concessions to its demands, despite its material preponderance and active role in the diplomacy. While better connected than most states, the US did not build the same extensive relationships with other actors within the emerging network developed by the ICBL, ICRC and Core Group, preferring instead to deal directly with other hubs and focus on more traditional forms of bargaining and coercion. In large measure this can be explained by an assumption among American representatives that any successful diplomatic process must necessarily involve the US as a central player – they did not appreciate the extent to which *new* social relationships could be built to bypass the US's more usual predominance in international negotiations. Despite its traditional power advantages, therefore, the United States lacked the direct ties to the majority of states held by the network hubs. As a consequence, US representatives were unable to gain the depth and breadth of information concerning shifting government positions, or to effectively present their own alternative solution that emphasized the continued use of mines within legal restraints. Hence, while typically used to being able to dictate terms in multilateral negotiations, the United States was unprepared for the rapid change in international opinion concerning AP mines and the subsequent diplomatic resistance it faced during the negotiations.

This outcome points to two facets of power within networks that I return to in the final section of the paper. First, as Avant and Westerwinter have suggested, the social forms of power manifest through network relations may in some circumstances supplant more traditional

material power capacities. Ultimately, a more modest network position meant that the United States was unable to effectively challenge the agenda setting and issue framing by the better-connected pro-ban constituencies. Recognizing that the United States may sometimes be outflanked by other, weaker, actors through the deliberate construction of network pathways was identified by the editors as a key contribution of this volume. Second, the US reliance on traditional power politics appears to have been counterproductive in this case, a finding that is reflected in the framing paper and many of the substantive chapters. Considerable anecdotal evidence suggests that the aggressive bargaining by US representatives served to harden the resolve of pro-ban actors, and had the unintended consequence of further reinforcing ties among civil society and Core Group hubs and the broader universe of states. Here again the relational view of power at the heart of network analyses helps account for this surprising outcome.

Implementing the Mine Ban Treaty

The successful conclusion of the Mine Ban Treaty²⁰ ushered in a second phase in the development of the mine ban network. This is distinguished by the emergence of new governance tasks, which in turn generated change in the network structure and led to the further centralization of power with some hubs (the ICBL and ISU) and comparative diminishment of others (ICRC and Core Group). The evolution of the mine ban network thus provides an important example of how nodes may strategically adapt to new political conditions, reinforcing the dynamic view of networks that is at the heart of this project. I illustrate these changes through a brief discussion of governance efforts surrounding treaty universalization, monitoring, and institutional development. However, this implementation phase has received considerably less

²⁰ The Mine Ban Treaty was adopted on September 18, 1997 in Oslo, and opened for signature on December 3, 1997 in Ottawa. The treaty entered into force on March 1, 1999.

scholarly attention than the treaty-making efforts (Bower, 2015; Bower and Price, 2013), and so I also note some areas where further research is warranted.

The unprecedented success of the movement to ban AP mines raised questions as to the continuing relevance of the civil society campaign, as many observers felt that the most pressing challenges had been effectively addressed with the advent of the treaty (Bernstein, 2008: 40; Goose et al., 2008: 3). Yet instead of disbanding as might have been anticipated, the structural position of the ICBL has been reinforced during the implementation phase, and as a consequence the organization's influence over mine ban policy has become further entrenched. The Campaign leveraged its central brokerage role to great effect in managing the distribution of technical assistance and financial resources to facilitate state ratification of the MBT (Bernstein, 2008: 34; Smith, 2008: 69). The ICBL was thus able to utilize its extensive relationships with civil society campaigners, international organizations and governments as a platform for promoting the MBT via the same social mechanisms identified above. The political impact of this strategy was substantial, as a cascade effect saw states rushing to be among the first to ratify the treaty. The Mine Ban Treaty entered into force on March 1, 1999 and "thus became international law more quickly than any other major multilateral treaty in history." (Goose et al., 2008: 4) The intervening 15 years have witnessed a rapid expansion in membership; as of June 2015, 162 states are full parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, a figure that compares favourably with other related institutions.²¹

The ICBL's most important source of power remains its informational advantage born of its direct access to mine ban stakeholders. The inauguration of the *Landmine Monitor* in 1999 was a watershed moment in this respect, as the yearly publication presents a public accounting of

²¹ Most pertinently, 102 states are full parties to Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. <https://www.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/575>

global landmine policy for all states and territories (Wareham, 2006, 2008).²² Here again the ICBL's position between many diverse actors is vital to its influence, as the *Monitor* draws on the resources from its extensive web of national campaigners and its close relationships with governments. In the absence of formal verification measures, *Landmine Monitor* has become the *de facto* monitoring mechanism for the Mine Ban Treaty and the authoritative resource on the international response to AP mines. By virtue of its control over information, therefore, the ICBL holds the primary, if informal, responsibility for adjudicating state compliance with the treaty (Goose et al., 2008: 8). This political power is augmented by the fact that the ICBL does not share the constraints on public advocacy faced by the ICRC and ISU.²³ There is considerable evidence that this monitoring—in conjunction with private consultations and public naming-and-shaming—has been effective in generating state change in the MBT case (Bower, 2015; Bower and Price, 2013; Goose, 2008; Herby and Lawand, 2008), but the linkages between micro-level theoretical mechanisms and specific empirical examples could be further established. Additional research in this regard would also help to connect the mine ban case with a broader literature on NGO impact in the human rights sector (Bell et al., 2012; Hafner-Burton, 2008; Hendrix and Wong, 2013; Murdie and Davis, 2012). At the same time, the Campaign was only able to have this impact because of its existing position at the centre of the mine ban network, with control over the collection and dissemination of information. A key insight from the ICBL case is thus that the positional advantages that made the organization so influential in mobilizing the mine ban movement have carried over into the subsequent implementation phase, suggesting that network power is a potentially fungible commodity.

²² <http://www.the-monitor.org/index.php>.

²³ Telephone interview with senior ICBL official, February 6, 2013.

The Core Group has been similarly involved in implementation, principally as a broker linking disparate state actors to governmental and non-governmental resources. Its influence in this regard is twofold. First, the Core Group states established a Universalization Contact Group that sought to centralize information on state positions concerning MBT ratification and coordinate strategy in targeting states for diplomatic engagement (Brinkert, 2008: 94; Smith, 2008). Second, the Mine Ban Treaty provided for only a general institutional architecture, so the Core Group used its extensive inter-governmental connections to promote new bureaucratic structures—such as a formal transparency reporting mechanism, informal working groups, and the Implementation Support Unit—to further perpetuate the diplomatic model of the mine ban movement.

In recent years, however, the Core Group has seen its position within the mine ban network wane, as a consequence of declining funding (International Campaign to Ban Landmines, 2012: 49) and reduced engagement—by many members, at least—in the bureaucratic operations of the MBT regime. Interview subjects have suggested that this political withdrawal is driven by a variety of factors. On the one hand, the successful development of a series of disarmament processes beyond the Mine Ban Treaty—including on cluster munitions, explosive remnants of war and the trade in small arms and light weapons—dramatically increased the workload for representatives in Geneva and generated competing priorities without commensurable increase in diplomatic resources. On the other hand, shifting foreign policy priorities occasioned by changes in government and the global financial crisis have also drawn attention elsewhere.²⁴ This finding points to the domestic sources of international political outcomes, and the multi-level nature of network structures. Yet the Core Group retains considerable perceived influence among many network actors, and information sharing appears

²⁴ Telephone interviews with senior UNIDIR and ICBL officials, January 29, February 5 and 6, 2013, respectively.

to have remained relatively constant even as material transactions have declined.²⁵ This hints at an interesting hypothesis that different forms of ties—and the social power that flows from them—may endure or decay at different rates, a possibility that is contemplated by Avant and Westerwinter in their framework chapter and by some other contributors.

The most significant change in network structure has been the emergence of a new hub in the form of an Implementation Support Unit. As noted briefly above, the ISU was created in 2001 by State Parties to the MBT, at the initiative of the Core Group, in order to address perceived gaps in the international community's capacity to implement the treaty.²⁶ As such, the ISU has established itself as a central player in the network due to its high betweenness linking the numerous actors involved in mine ban policy and humanitarian mine action more generally. The rise in prominence of the ISU is further explained by the relative decline in interest by many formerly active states in the day-to-day operations of the Mine Ban Treaty. This has generated a partial vacuum that has been filled by the ISU in taking initiative for defining future regime goals (agenda setting) and pursuing their operational implementation. As a conduit for the distribution of goods, the ISU has a central role in connecting states facing implementation challenges (concerning the legal process of ratification, destruction of AP mine stockpiles, clearance of deployed mines, and assistance to mine survivors) with other governments, international organizations and civil society capable of providing material and technical assistance. In this sense, the ISU sits astride the most important lines of communication and material transactions, and acts as the central repository for information concerning state obligations and opportunities

²⁵ Telephone interview with senior ICBL official, February 6, 2013.

²⁶ Final Report of the Third Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and On Their Destruction. APLC/MSP.3/2001/1. January 10, 2002, para. 33, at pg. 7. <http://www.apminebanconvention.org/meetings-of-the-states-parties/3msp/final-report/>.

with respect to the AP mine ban.²⁷ Relatedly, the ISU's sponsorship program provides funds for representatives from less-developed states to attend MBT meetings. These material incentives have "been key in getting and keeping numerous countries involved in the treaty's operations." (Goose, Wareham, and Williams 2008, 7–8; also Brinkert 2008, 93–96; Kmentt 2008, 26–27)

Anecdotal evidence indicates that that control over the distribution of relationships and resources have given the ISU considerable power in shaping the contemporary development of AP mine policy globally (Smith, 2008). Interview subjects in civil society, for example, have identified the ISU Director as a key individual player with considerable personal and institutional influence.²⁸ Yet the ISU is officially an agent of state interests, and is not intended to conduct independent advocacy; this renders it a peculiar type of actor in the wider mine ban network. The precise linkages between ISU centrality and governance outcomes could therefore be further developed, especially by examining the potential existence, and impact, of socialization processes in this case. This offers the potential to draw causal connections between the provision of material incentives and changes in actor behaviour – a key concern of rationalist approaches in International Relations.

Arguably the more significant consequence of the ISU's emergence, however, is its impact on the position of other network hubs (Table 2). In relational terms, the inclusion of the ISU has resulted in the creation of new network ties, most especially with states, and thus the duplication of dyadic connections or their wholesale reorientation. It has been suggested, for instance, that the ISU has taken over many of the network roles formerly administered by members of the Core Group, with the latter consequently possessing degraded links to other

²⁷ Interviews with senior ISU official, Geneva, October 2009 and December 2010.

²⁸ Telephone interviews with senior ICBL officials, February 5 and 6, 2013,

states.²⁹ Hence while the ICBL and Core Group remain comparably situated in absolute terms, their relative structural position is diminished by the advent of the ISU. This reorientation of network structure is most noticeable with respect to the ICRC. While the organization established extensive ties to states during the negotiation of the MBT as a focal point for the dissemination of information concerning AP mines and the legal arguments for their abolition, much of the technical and material assistance now flows via the ISU. The ICRC maintains an active role in aiding states with matters of treaty compliance and implementation, but this new actor has largely supplanted its central position within the network.

The findings with respect to structural shifts thus also speak to a concern in the literature regarding the durability of highly centralized networks. Here the view is that networks may be more prone to disruption in the event of the removal of a key hub (Hafner-Burton et al., 2009: 569; Knoke and Yang, 2008: 49). Yet the case of the mine ban network suggests that the decline of particular hubs may in fact result from the emergence of others: rather than degrading communications within the network, the creation of the ISU has merely shifted ties to a different focal point, while at the same time generating a set of redundant pathways between states and the wider network. A key question for the future of the mine ban network, therefore, is whether certain pathways come to be used for the transmission of particular types of resources, and what impact such specialization might hold for the enduring power of network hubs.

Conclusion: Networks and Social Power

The international effort to ban antipersonnel mines is a prominent recent example of security governance through networks, albeit one that has not been studied in such terms previously. The mine ban movement “showed that civil society can wield great power but, more importantly,

²⁹ Telephone interview with senior ICBL official, February 6, 2013.

demonstrated the power of partnerships, and of common and coordinated action by NGOs, like-minded governments, the ICRC, and UN agencies. (Goose et al., 2008: 11) This, in turn, speaks to the value of network analysis in making the positions of actors and their inter-linkages—and the power this bestows—explicit.

In keeping with the overall theme of this volume, my most fundamental finding is that the structural features of the mine ban network conditioned the prospects for successful norm entrepreneurship and subsequent governance (Montgomery, this volume). Extensive ties to other nodes allowed a few network hubs to control access to information, actors and resources that translated into political influence—as brokers and gatekeepers—in establishing the ban agenda, shaping diplomatic negotiations and implementing the resulting treaty. These actors acquired their hub position, though, based in part on their promise in accomplishing particular governance tasks. These processes have feedback effects over time, wherein establishing centrality early on gave certain actors disproportionate influence over the subsequent development of policy, further reinforcing power disparities. Equally, the absence of similar centrality greatly impeded the ability of the United States to influence the trajectory and content of the mine ban. The lack of direct ties to the majority of other states meant that US positions in the negotiations could not be distributed as efficiently; as a result, US diplomacy was less persuasive when compared against the sheer density of ICBL, ICRC and Core Group appeals. Material and social power resources are therefore not directly interchangeable. Avant and Westerwinter (this volume) have suggested that economic forms of influence such as financial transfers or other side payments may be less effective at generating new collective action than relational modes of power that emphasize social capacities like expertise and values. This assumption would seem to find strong support in the present case. Hence it is not just the content of ideas, or the raw material power of their

advocates, that determines the success of entrepreneurial efforts; rather, the structural position of actors has a key role in generating social forms of power to shape international governance outcomes (Goddard, 2009: 273).

Yet while networks facilitate the accumulation and enactment of power, they are themselves the product of deliberative action, as actors deploy material and social resources to improve their positions within the network and advance their policy goals. The power manifest in networks can therefore include the capacity for established nodes to alter the network to suit changing conditions as a means through which they may further extend their power. Indeed, the notion of a “new power politics” is premised on the view that actors strategically construct and re-construct their network position, and as such the present volume is ideally placed to contribute to an ever-growing dialogue between instrumental/rationalist and social/normative theories of action in world politics. In the present case, this form of strategic action is particularly notable in the shift from advocating for a mine ban to implementing the resulting treaty, as central actors sought to promote new role competencies and institutional structures. In certain circumstances, therefore, the forms of power manifested in networks may be fungible across time and governance roles. Yet the mine ban example also offers evidence of instances where the restructuring of network relations can lead to the diminishment of actor position, as most clearly seen with the ICRC. The specific parameters and mechanisms for translating network power into new areas remain underdeveloped, though the mine ban case suggests a few ways of conceptualizing this problem. Here I briefly offer some avenues for future research to attend to these issues.

Real world networks often overlap, and ties thus interpenetrate across a series of issue areas and personal and organizational affiliations (Avant and Westerwinter; Cooley and Nexon;

Haufler, all this volume). One way that network power may therefore prove fungible is through the re-purposing of ideas and relationships to attend to new governance challenges. For example, a large number of the individuals and groups at the heart of the mine ban movement were subsequently involved in the successful effort to ban cluster munitions (Borrie, 2009). These actors employed their established connections to generate a parallel international diplomatic initiative through the same forms of social influence. As a direct consequence, the network now encompasses cluster munitions, explosive violence and, more recently, autonomous weapons issue areas. Carefully mapping the wider network of actors involved in disarmament and human security could uncover the extent of this “mission creep.” While substantively important for capturing the totality of these overlapping networks, such research would also provide valuable evidence for refining existing theoretical insights and generating new hypotheses concerning the ways that networks preserve and extend their influence. Relatedly, Avant and Westerwinter have suggested that changes in the composition of a network will have important implications for how power is deployed since ties will be created or strengthened, while others will be severed. This study has already demonstrated that the inclusion of new network hubs inevitably alters existing structures and resulting power dynamics. Yet the specific processes of relational realignment—most especially the deliberative construction or destruction of ties—could be examined in greater detail. While the addition of new hubs may improve the efficiency of network transactions and the achievement of governance tasks, incorporating actors that do not share core expectations and diplomatic norms may equally disrupt existing procedures to the detriment of network performance.

Second, the mine ban network is conceptualized here at its highest level of aggregation, yet we know that individual nodes are composed of, and influenced by, sub-units including

constituent individuals and organizations (Carpenter, 2011; Hafner-Burton et al., 2009: 584; Kahler, 2009: 6). In effect, the mine ban community is a “nested network” (Maoz, 2011: 375), raising the question of how internal dynamics at one level affect outcomes at other levels. Future research should therefore look “inside” this macro-level network, to carefully explicate processes through which network power at the micro (individual) and meso (organizational) levels is aggregated into globally relevant governance outcomes. A key question in this respect is how the inevitable change in bureaucratic actors will affect institutional memory and network dynamics. Brinkert (2008: 102) has suggested that “[i]ndividuals move on and if newcomers do not continue the unique and successful working practices there may be a return to traditional multilateralism that is flavored more by a culture of inertia than of action.” Examining these various hypotheses empirically would offer interesting insights into the evolution of network power over time.

Third and finally, network analysis holds important implications for debates over how to manage revisionist challenges within networks, particularly whether and how to integrate potentially ambivalent or hostile actors more deeply into network structures. The United States is the largest single donor to mine action globally, and frequently attempts to use its material resources to direct focus away from the MBT as the centrepiece of the international response to AP mines.³⁰ Hence despite an implicit assumption in much of the literature that networks are rooted in shared expectations, actors may instead seek to use their network position to engage in counter-socialization. The preceding analysis has shown that US material predominance has not translated into substantial influence within the network. As anticipated by Avant and Westerwinter (this volume), coercive power has been superseded by social forms of power in shaping global governance over AP mines. Yet it is conceivable that the US could change its

³⁰ Telephone interviews with senior ICBL officials, February 5 and 6, 2013,

strategic approach, and instead seek to build ties as a means of gradually shifting the network focus. More attention is therefore warranted in unpacking the influence of actors that seek to challenge or undermine fundamental network goals and promote their own alternative policies. This, too, would help to reveal the sources of network durability as well as the means through which the social power manifest in networks may be augmented, translated or resisted.

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