


**CONSERVATISM IN CRISIS :
THE PROVINCIAL ESTATES OF UTRECHT 1576-1590**

Joan Helen Bannatyne

A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD
at the
University of St Andrews



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I hereby certify that the candidate has fulfilled the conditions of the Resolution and Regulations appropriate to the degree of Ph.D. of the University of St. Andrews and that she is qualified to submit this thesis in application for that degree.

Signature of the supervisor

12 May 1982

Date

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | |
|--|-------|
| Declarations | i-iii |
| Acknowledgements..... | iv |
| Notes on currency and dates..... | v |
| I: Prelude: the Estates of Utrecht 1528-1577..... | 1 |
| II: The Structure of the Estates..... | 20 |
| III: The Estates at Work..... | 54 |
| IV: The Estates' finances..... | 85 |
| V: The Estates and the Reformation..... | 120 |
| VI: The Estates and the outside world..... | 152 |
| VII: The Estates in Crisis 1586-1588..... | 190 |
| VIII: The Estates and the Revolt of the Netherlands..... | 221 |
| Appendix I..... | 230 |
| Appendix II..... | 235 |
| Abbreviations..... | 264 |
| Notes..... | 267 |
| Bibliography..... | 322 |

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Note on currency and dates

All sums of money are given in guilders, or pounds of 40 Flemish groats. One guilder contained 20 stuivers. All dates are Old Style unless otherwise stated: as Holland and Zeeland adopted New Style in 1582, the proceedings of the Estates-General were conducted in New Style. The year began on 1 January. Where there is an English version of a place-name or a personal name (e.g. Antwerp, William of Orange) I have used it: otherwise, all names appear in the standard Dutch version in use at the time.

Chapter I

Prelude: the Estates of Utrecht 1528-1577

The province of Utrecht lies in the centre of the northern Netherlands, between two much larger neighbours, Holland and Gelderland. In the sixteenth century, it also shared borders with a number of independent lordships, such as Ysselstein, Buren, Culemborg, Langerak and Vianen.(1) Until 1528, it was ruled by the bishops of Utrecht with the province of Overijssel, to the north-east; together, they formed what was known as the Sticht: Utrecht was the lower or Nedersticht, and Overijssel the upper, or Oversticht. By the later sixteenth century, however, the name 'Sticht' was applied only to Utrecht. It was a small province, both in geographical area and in population. No reliable population figures exist for the 1570s and 1580s, but some estimates based on the available sources can be made. The total population seems to have been in the region of 70,000 to 75,000 people, of whom perhaps almost half lived in the city itself, and perhaps 8,000 or 9,000 more in the small towns.(2) Needless to say, the vast majority of these people had no say in the province's political life: the following chapters are concerned with the minority who formed the political community in the Sticht.

Caught between the Habsburgs and the Dukes of Gelderland in the bitter and destructive wars of the early sixteenth century, the bishop of Utrecht was forced in 1528 to transfer the temporal authority over Utrecht and Overijssel to the Emperor Charles V, as security for Imperial loans he had no hope of repaying. By that time, the Sticht

was so war-weary and impoverished that the 'transfer of the temporality' met with no resistance. All the same, it represented a turning point in the province's history.(3) The bishop's political power, already severely limited, disappeared entirely, and was replaced by Habsburg authority, which paid little heed to any restrictions. The new regime was symbolised by the citadel of Vredenburg, which Charles V built and garrisoned to dominate the city of Utrecht.

Habsburg rule introduced changes in all branches of government: in 1529 the five collegiate churches in the city yielded to the Emperor the right to appoint the bishop, and thenceforward merely endorsed his choice.(4) Likewise, the appointment of the Utrecht city council was now firmly in the hands of the Emperor or his representative, the Stadholder, whereas, before 1528, the city's powerful guilds had had considerable influence over the choice of magistrates. Thereafter the elders of the guilds were permitted to concern themselves only with guild business, and a member of the magistracy had to attend all their meetings. The magistracy in its turn was subject to supervision by the Emperor's appointee, the Schout or sheriff.(5) At a provincial level, Utrecht's financial affairs were henceforward dealt with by the Chamber of Accounts in Holland; and, most important of all, the independence of the provincial Estates was severely curtailed.

The Estates had originated in the medieval bishops' "great council" or "chapter general", in which sat prominent clergy and nobles, and occasionally representatives of the city. This assembly was consulted by the bishops long before the Stichtse Landbrief, which is regarded as the Estates' founding charter, was issued by Bishop Arnold van Hoorne in 1375: indeed, 20 years earlier, Bishop Jan van Arkel had even promised not to conclude peace with Holland without the consent of what were to become the three Estates.(6) In the century and a half following the Landbrief, the Estates achieved considerable power and independence, culminating in the early sixteenth century, when they, rather than the bishop, conducted the policies undertaken to pay off debts incurred in Utrecht's war with Ysselstein in 1511.(7) The extent of the Estates' self-confidence is indicated by one of their most prized privileges: the right to assemble without a summons from the bishop.

Much of this independence was lost after 1528. Within two years, the Emperor had set up a provincial Hof, or Council, officially headed by the Stadholder, and consisting of a President, three extraordinary and four ordinary councillors.(8) As in the other Habsburg provinces, the Hof combined considerable governing powers with its judicial functions: indeed, it acted as the instrument of Habsburg government in the Sticht. After 1528, the Estates were subject to convocation by the Stadholder and Hof, who also had the right to approve their decisions. To reinforce this control, the Estates' meeting-place was moved from the cathedral chapter-house to the chancellery of the Hof.

Politically, the Habsburg hold on the Sticht was strengthened in 1534, by the Union of Toledo, in which Charles V laid down that "we hereby unite, annexe and join our land and county of Holland, and our city, towns and land of Utrecht...with the five churches, gentry and citizens of the same towns and lands...so that they from this henceforth shall be governed by one Governor and Stadholder on behalf of us and our heirs."(10) In the years which followed, it became clear that the town of Amersfoort, traditionally at odds with the bishops and the city, had not altogether severed its connection with Gelderland, which dated from the late fifteenth century. After Charles V's final victory over the Duke of Gelderland in 1543, however, the Emperor withdrew all Amersfoort's distinctive privileges, took over the appointment to all municipal offices, and threatened death or confiscation of property to anyone who accepted a pension from a foreign power.(11)

Despite the Union of Toledo, Utrecht was still not fully integrated into the Habsburg Netherlands. Like Friesland, Groningen, Overijssel and Gelderland, the Sticht was not among the 'patrimonial provinces' which Charles V had inherited, such as Brabant, Holland and Flanders. These so-called 'newly-acquired' provinces were not summoned to the Estates-General at all before 1549, and even after that, attended only on special occasions like the Emperor's abdication in 1555. Moreover, unlike the patrimonial provinces, they were not 'accustomed to contribute together' to the financial aids voted by the Estates-General to the prince. Utrecht's ambiguous political and fiscal status is clearly illustrated by the meeting of the

Estates-General which debated the Nine Years' Aid in 1558: the Sticht's deputies arrived in Brussels three weeks after the first session, prepared to grant much less than was demanded of them.(12)

Within Utrecht itself, the Estates continued fairly submissively under Habsburg rule, but the Church retained enough determination to put up a spirited resistance to the introduction in the 1560s of the Tridentine decrees, which would have greatly limited the freedoms enjoyed by the five collegiate churches in the city. At the same time, the chapters objected to Philip II's new bishoprics scheme, which threatened their incomes and wide archidiaconal powers. Although the chapters yielded on this point, after some concessions by the government, and installed Frederick Schenck van Toutenberg as the new Archbishop, the question of the Tridentine decrees had still not been settled when the troubles broke out in 1566.(13)

In June of that year, citizens of Utrecht began to attend open-air Calvinist services in Culemborg, an independent lordship south of the River Lek, whose Count was a noted Calvinist. The first Reformed services in the province itself were held in the middle of August; by the end of the month several parish churches in the city had been sacked. The Reformed obtained various concessions from the frightened civic authorities, including permission to worship in one city church, but soon lost these under the terms of the Accord between the Confederate nobles and the Regent, Margaret of Parma. In the autumn of 1566, attempts by the Stadholder, Prince William of Orange, to grant certain rights of worship to the Protestants were not approved by the Hof, and lasted only a few months: in February 1567,

Margaret sent troops to Utrecht, to guard against attack from Protestant Vianen. There was no more Calvinist preaching.(14) Shortly afterwards, Orange was replaced as Stadholder by the Count of Bossu.(15)

The king's new governor general, the Duke of Alva, received a suitably ceremonial welcome to Utrecht in August, 1568, from the deans and chapters of the five churches.(16) Nevertheless, like the other provinces which had been involved in the iconoclasm, Utrecht suffered retribution at the hands of Alva and the commission he set up to inquire into the events of 1566-67, the Council of Troubles: 103 Stichtenaars were sentenced to banishment and confiscation between 1568 and 1570, and at least three were executed.(17) But it was the new taxes proposed by Alva in 1569 which brought him into direct political conflict with the Estates. These were the notorious Hundredth, Twentieth and Tenth Penny taxes, of which the first (a single 1 percent tax on all capital) was the only one to be granted by the Estates-General. The others - a permanent 5 percent levy on sales of landed property, and a 10 percent tax on all other sales - were rejected, because the provincial Estates would have no control over them.(18) Although it appears that only the patrimonial provinces took an active part in the March 1569 session of the Estates-General, Utrecht sent two deputies to Brussels and acted on their report. From April onwards, the Estates protested vigorously against these impositions, on the grounds of the Sticht's smallness and poverty. In June 1569, they offered a lump sum - 100,000 guilders - in lieu of the taxes over a number of years, and in July they moved from economic to constitutional objections, arguing that Utrecht, as a non-patrimonial

province (unlike all the others where the Tenth Penny was to be levied) was not liable for these taxes at all. The clergy even pointed out that all who consented to the secular taxation of ecclesiastical property could be excommunicated.(19)

Alva's response to this opposition was, first, to quarter the tercio of Lombardy in Utrecht in August 1569: for three years, according to a perhaps prejudiced commentator, the soldiers terrorised the province, committing rape, murder and extortion, unchecked by the Duke.(20) Secondly, in December, the Estates were summoned to appear before the Council of Troubles in Brussels, ostensibly to answer for their conduct of the 1566 crisis. Despite their protests, in July 1570 the Estates and the city were declared guilty of lèse-majesté for their 'abominable' agreement with the Reformed: the five colleges were deprived of their position as First Estate, and lost their vote in the Estates, as did the gentry; the city lost all its privileges, and it, Amersfoort, Rhenen and Wijk-bij-Duurstede lost their place in the Estates. The clergy led the resistance to this sentence, sending the dean of St. Pieter, Willem Veusels, to Madrid to join the chorus of protest to Philip II. Though he stayed in Spain for six years, his mission failed. The city's delaying tactics were rather more successful: for months the council refused to hand over to the Hof the originals of all municipal charters and privileges, until forced to deliver them to Vredenburg in February 1572.(21)

The Duke's victory was short-lived, however. In fact the city government was left to function much as usual, and the revival of war against Orange and his followers, after April 1572, meant that Alva had to concentrate on the military situation. The tercio of Lombardy was withdrawn; the armies of both sides marched back and forward across the Sticht; Amersfoort was held briefly by the Beggars in 1572; and in the following year Alva was succeeded by Don Luis de Requesens. In March 1574, 46 companies of Spanish, Walloon and German infantry, as well as six companies of cavalry, were quartered in the province, 'robbing the churches, abbeys and monasteries and all the farmers even worse than if they had been enemies or Turks'. The Count of La Roche, Utrecht's third Stadholder within a year, could not keep these men under control, and, moreover, imposed heavy financial burdens on the countryside to feed them.(22) Thus when Requesens, in his increasingly desperate quest for funds, provisionally cancelled the sentence against the Estates of Utrecht in April 1574, this was the background to their first action: a bitter complaint to La Roche about the depredations of royal troops on their way through Utrecht from the siege of Leiden to the battle of Mook. By the beginning of May, the Estates were even more bitter, as the same troops, unpaid for eighteen months and now mutinous, set fire to the outskirts of the city on their way back to Holland, after missing the battle.(23)

The cancellation of the sentence restored the Estates to 'such a state as they had previously been' (that is, before Alva's arrival).(24) Shortly afterwards, recognising that Utrecht had to be treated differently from the patrimonial provinces, Requesens asked

the Estates to send a special deputation to join his negotiations with the Estates-General for an extraordinary aid of two million guilders. These negotiations opened the way for a flood of demands for the redress of grievances from all the provinces, especially from Brabant and Utrecht.(25) Requesens wanted 200,000 guilders from the Sticht; in return, the Estates wanted Alva's sentence to be formally quashed, all troops to be withdrawn from Vredenburg and the province, and a return to the pre-1528 customs of the Estates. There followed two years of virtual deadlock: with his troops in a state of mutiny and the king about to declare himself bankrupt, Requesens needed money more than ever, especially after the breakdown of the peace talks at Breda, in July 1575, but as that year wore on, the Estates demanded more concessions for less cash. By the summer of 1575, Requesens was willing to agree to some of the Estates' conditions (though he thought them 'impertinent') if they would grant him 50,000 guilders, but he would not give way on the Estates' ancient privileges, which, he said, had no bearing on the present negotiations.(26) Requesens' threat to increase the number of troops quartered in the Sticht brought the Estates to 'understand from various letters that his Excellency does not take kindly to this long delay' and to placate him, they agreed to advance the 50,000 guilders, less some 22,000 they had already paid to Baron Hierges, the then Stadholder. Yet they continued to procrastinate, to urge the king to make full restitution of Utrecht's privileges, and to maintain that the Sticht could not afford to pay such large sums.(27)

This impasse lasted till Requesens died in March 1576. The Council of State, which took over the government, was in no position to bargain, and in June accepted the Estates' offer of an equivalent sum for the aid (i.e. a total of 200,000 guilders to buy off all the Hundredth, Twentieth and Tenth Penny demands) in return for substantial concessions, allowing the Estates to administer the aid for themselves and to assemble independently of the Hof.(28) Although this document remained a dead letter - the Estates could not begin to raise the money until 1577, and they were still convened by the President of the Hof - it undoubtedly represented a significant psychological victory for the Estates, and gave them useful experience which helped to prepare them for their part in the events of the autumn of 1576.

Throughout the negotiations about the aid, Utrecht had continually protested against the presence of royal troops in the province. In June 1576, the Estates asserted that the citizen militia companies and the garrison of Vredenburg were sufficient protection for a city as loyal as Utrecht had always been.(29) Certainly, in September, the rural areas of the Sticht were more or less drained of troops to deal with the mutineers at Aalst, but Hierges was still afraid of an attack from Holland or the loss of his Spanish troops to the mutineers, and on 12 September he brought into the city three companies of German infantry, whom he considered loyal, and installed artillery in Vredenburg, because he knew that the Estates of Brabant

were pressing the Estates of Utrecht to join their confederation'.(30)

He was right. On 6 September 1576, the Estates of Brabant wrote to Utrecht's deputies, in Brussels for the aid negotiations, inviting them to attend the meeting of the Estates-General which was about to take place. Hendrik van Essesteyn, the gentry's representative, was entrusted with this letter for the Estates of Utrecht, and managed to have it delivered to the Domdeken (the dean of the cathedral chapter) despite being arrested by Hierges on the way. The letter was intercepted by the President of the Hof, however, and it was not until 28 September that he permitted the Estates to send delegates to Brussels. After a further summons from the Council of State, the Estates were finally convened for 16 October.(31) When Utrecht's deputies, already in Brussels, were received by the Estates-General on 19 October, they found that their powers, like those of Namur, Artois, Lille-Douai-Orchies, Mechlin, Tournai and Valenciennes, were too limited to allow them to resolve on the terms of the Pacification. They therefore sent back to their principals a copy of the powers later granted to the Namur delegation, which the Estates debated and approved on 31 October, authorising the self-same deputies to take the final decision. Thus when the Pacification of Ghent was proclaimed on 8 November, Utrecht was the only province north of the Maas to be officially a party to the peace treaty with Holland and Zeeland.(32) Ironically, just a few days before, on 30 October, Philip II had eventually rescinded the Council of Troubles' sentence against the Sticht - too late.(33)

The signing of the Pacification was by no means the end of the Estates' problems. The principal object of the Pacification - and undoubtedly the Estates' principal motive in signing it - was the removal of all foreign troops from the Netherlands. To Utrecht, that meant Hierges' three German companies, and, more particularly, Vredenburg's garrison of 170 Spaniards, commanded by Fernando de Avila. Worried by Utrecht's rapprochement with the Estates-General, de Avila stocked and strengthened the citadel, while disclaiming any intention of harm to the city. Towards the beginning of November, the troops began to clamour for their back pay, and the townspeople, fearing a repetition of the sacks of Antwerp and Maastricht by mutinous Spanish soldiers, became increasingly restive, and threatened to take matters into their own hands if no money was forthcoming from the government for the troops.(34) But there was no money to pay either the companies in the city, or the regiments of Bossu, Hierges and his brother Meghen, which were still billeted in the Sticht. Nor was there any artillery which could be used against Vredenburg if de Avila should fire on the city, and he refused to leave the castle until he received orders to that effect from Don John of Austria, the new Governor-General, who was then on his way to the Netherlands.

Early in November, therefore, Floris Thin, the Estates' advocate, went to Brussels to ask the Estates-General for help.(35) Although some members - the deputies of Artois, for example - appreciated the urgent need for payment to the troops in Utrecht and neighbouring provinces, the 200,000 guilders which the Estates-General promised, out of the expected contribution from Flanders, never materialised,

and the Council of State suggested that the city should storm Vredenburg with women and children if there was no other force available.(36) At the end of November, Hierges begged the Council of State to send money to Utrecht, pointing out how important it was to safeguard the city against seizure or sack by mutinous soldiers; a few days later, Thin and his fellow deputies finally secured official sanction for a siege of the castle, by mentioning a rumour that William of Orange's men had been admitted to the city.(37) Fears that Utrecht would share Antwerp's fate were reawakened when the garrison made a sally from Vredenburg on 21 December, and was driven back by the armed citizenry and the German companies. Hierges and Bossu, released from captivity after the Pacification, arrived in Utrecht shortly afterwards, and began a proper military siege of the citadel with artillery lent by Gelderland and Overijssel, Delft and Gouda, and, in the end, by the Estates of Holland themselves. (Powder and shot were still in short supply, however.)(38) In January 1577, de Avila disobeyed Don John's orders to hand the castle over to Hierges, but by 8 February he was discussing surrender terms, and three days later, the Spaniards evacuated Vredenburg, which was promptly occupied by 100 members of the militia. The city's secretary recorded the general feeling of relief when he wrote, on 11 February, 'Praise be to God who has delivered us out of the hand of the Lion'.(39)

The resolution of the immediate military crisis on their doorstep left the Estates more time to consider the problem of a Stadholder for the province. In December 1576, there seemed to be three candidates for the position, but appearances were deceptive. Hierges' claims to the office had lapsed when Bossu was released in November 1576, and, in any case, he had told the Council of State as early as May that he wished to be relieved of a thankless and expensive responsibility to devote himself to his other duties (he was also Stadholder of Gelderland).(40) Though Bossu was - to some - the obvious man for the job, and in the dark days of December 1576 the Estates were eager for his leadership, he found the government of Utrecht unattractive without Holland and Zeeland, which were to remain under Orange by the terms of the Pacification. Bossu therefore offered himself for the Stadholdership of Friesland, Groningen and Overijssel instead.(41) The third possibility was Prince William of Orange, who had been Stadholder of Holland, Zeeland and Utrecht from 1559 to 1567, and de facto governor of Holland and Zeeland since 1572.

The position with regard to Orange was complicated by the ambiguity of Article VII of the Pacification, which referred to 'the towns and places included in [Orange's] commission from His Royal Majesty which are at present not under the authority of His Excellency [Orange]', and provided for him to give them 'satisfaction on those matters which are of importance to them when they come under his government, either with regard to the exercise of religion or otherwise'.(42) Between January and April 1577, Haarlem, Weesp, Schoonhoven, Goes and Tnolen concluded satisfactions with Orange in

accordance with this article. Utrecht had to decide whether the obligation as expressed in Article VII applied to an entire province.

Opinions, then and later, differed profoundly on this point, and the Estates received contradictory guidance from the Council of State and the Estates-General, to which they applied for a definitive declaration on the meaning of Article VII. The Council of State put forward an interpretation unfavourable to Orange, after first seeming to support the need for a Satisfaction; the Grote Raad in Mechlin backed the Council of State with powerful legal arguments; and after the failure of his negotiations with Orange at St. Geertruidenberg, Don John naturally opposed any extension of William's sphere of influence. The Estates-General wavered for months, finally declaring in Orange's favour only after Don John seized Namur and attacked Antwerp in July/August 1577.(43)

Meanwhile, in Utrecht itself, opinions were deeply divided. In February 1577, a considerable group in the Estates supported Bossu, on the grounds that he was a Catholic, and could keep the troops quiet better than anyone else. Indeed, on 24 February, the Estates wrote to Floris Thin and Floris Heermale, their deputies at the Estates-General, with instructions to apply to the Council of State for a commission for Bossu as Stadholder. This desire was by no means unanimous, however, and the majority of the city council dissociated themselves from these instructions a few days later, as they believed that both Hierges and Bossu had abandoned the city to the unpaid soldiery (Bossu intended to go to Brussels in person to raise money for the ever-present problem of demobilisation pay).(44) The city

council clearly preferred Orange as Stadholder, and it was not alone: by March, William could count on three of the five chapter churches which formed the First Estate, particularly on the chapter of St. Jan, which resolved in mid-March that the disputed Article VII was self-explanatory, and that the Sticht should negotiate the terms of a Satisfaction with Paulus Buys, Orange's emissary. Buys assured the Estates that the Prince would do nothing to change the religious situation, and supported his case for a Satisfaction with the Union of Toledo, which required Utrecht to have the same Governor as Holland and Zeeland. On 16 March, Buys reported optimistically to his master that the three Orangist chapters had overruled the other two, and that the Estates had agreed in principle to accept William as their Stadholder. Moreover, 'the people here all show happy faces and are very pleased at the idea of once again coming under your Grace's government'.(45)

Yet all this was not sufficient to outweigh the opposition of the Council of State, which still looked on Bossu as the rightful Stadholder, by virtue of his 1567 commission from Margaret of Parma. Orange sent another deputation to plead his cause in Utrecht at the beginning of May, but the Estates still wanted the Council of State and the Estates-General to take the responsibility.(46) In the end, the matter was decided by two violent events, one in Utrecht, and one apparently unconnected with it.

The first of these events was the climax of the Estates' most pressing difficulty: the payment of the troops. Bossu's threat to leave the city to the mercy of his men drove the Estates into promising an immediate payment of 10,000 guilders, with 9,000 more to follow after the soldiers' departure. By the beginning of April, however, it was clear that this was far from sufficient, and the Estates voted a further payment of 600 guilders to each of the nine companies still inside the city and the six outside it. But the city council refused to increase any taxes to raise this money until the troops had actually left.(47) On 27 April, therefore, the German companies tried to hold the city to ransom for their arrears, but were beaten off by the citizen militia, without bloodshed. Three days later, there was another, more serious, 'commotion', during which some houses outside the walls were set on fire, several lives were lost on both sides, and the officers of the companies were imprisoned.(48)

With the city at long last free of Habsburg soldiers, the citizens embarked on the demolition of the Habsburg citadel, to demonstrate that they could hold the city without a garrison of any kind, even one installed by Orange, which might introduce 'novelties'. The demolition was seen as a recognition of the townspeople's contribution to the siege and capture of Vredenburg, and despite objections from the Hof and the city council, the citizens had soon knocked enough of it down to render it useless as a fortress.(49)

The troops in the countryside had still not received their arrears, however. In June 1577, the money to pay them came from Holland (which was always concerned about Utrecht's military establishment) on condition that the Sticht placed itself safely under Orange's authority. Even the Estates-General were swayed towards a Satisfaction by the dangers to Utrecht from unpaid troops, and the opportunity to dictate his own terms which Orange would gain if he arranged for them to be paid.(50)

The final decision on the Satisfaction was precipitated by the news of Don John's coup at Namur. This presented Utrecht, and the other provinces in the Estates-General, with a stark choice between a war in alliance with Don John against Holland and Zeeland, and a war against Don John as the allies of Holland and Zeeland. In Utrecht, as in Brussels, Antwerp and Ghent, the citizens made their views unequivocally clear to the authorities.(51) On 30 July, the eight militia captains appeared in the city council's meeting to demand a speedy conclusion to the Satisfaction negotiations. For once, the Estates acted quickly: four days later a deputation was on its way to Brussels with instructions which reflect the Estates' fear of being forced to accept Orange unconditionally as their Stadholder, in which case he might alter the province's religion. It would be far better to exact a favourable set of conditions from the future governor than risk a possible war with him and Holland and Zeeland.(52) Two months later, after a state visit by Orange and his wife to Utrecht which did much to increase his popularity there, the Satisfaction was signed on 9 October 1577. The Estates (except for Amersfoort and Rhenen, who

saw it as another attempt by the city to dictate to them) thereby recognised Orange as their Stadholder and revived the personal union with Holland and Zeeland.(53) At the same time, they asserted their own autonomy by moving out of the chancellery of the Hof and into the cathedral chapter-house. Although the Estates tried to stress the continuity between the Satisfaction and the Pacification of Ghent - which they had signed in desperation to rid the Sticht of the occupying forces - the Satisfaction nevertheless marked another turning-point in Utrecht's history, almost 50 years after the transfer of the temporality to Charles V.

Chapter II

The Structure of the Estates

The meeting of the Estates which took place on 17 February 1577 provides a good starting-point for an examination of their institutional structure as it emerged from the Habsburg era, and as it developed over the next fifteen years, until it reached a fairly stable form by the end of the century. This meeting is significant for several reasons: it was the first to take place after the Pacification of Ghent for which formal records are available, and it represented a high point in the Estates' history. The threat from the citadel of Vredenburg was past, 'by the grace of Almighty God', and the Estates were looking to the future. Hoping to build on the unity established at Ghent, and in words which sometimes echo the first Union of Brussels, all those present promised 'on our oath and Christian word, to live and die as true countrymen, patriots and members of one body, together in close cooperation, association and unanimity'.(1)

Those present were the Stadholder of the province, the Count of Bossu; President Rattaller and other members of the Hof of Utrecht, who formally gave their approval to the union which the Estates had sworn to uphold; nineteen deputies from the three Estates: the clergy, who were the first to take the oath, the gentry, and the city of Utrecht. (No deputies were present from the four small towns, however.) In addition, the meeting was attended by a number of burgerhoplieden, or militia captains, 'representing the corpus and all inhabitants of the

city of Utrecht'.(2) This chapter will analyse the role of Stadholder, Estates and burgerhoplieden in the institutional developments of 1576-1590.

The Stadholder, Bossu, had urged this expression of unity on the Estates at a time when his own position was uncertain. Indeed, until the conclusion of the Satisfaction in October 1577, the province was effectively without a Stadholder to act as the representative of the king's authority. The problem of who was to fill the office was solved by the Satisfaction which was, in fact, the only commission or instruction William of Orange ever received from the Estates as Stadholder, and as time went by, he found it increasingly difficult to uphold several of its provisions, even if he wished to.(3) The religious terms in particular were rendered obsolete by developments in 1579, and the ordinances which permitted Protestant worship in the city. Protests by the Catholic clergy that this contravened the Satisfaction were fruitless, and Orange had to give his approval to the city's religious measures.(4)

Orange held so many other offices that his dealings with Utrecht were conducted for the most part by correspondence, or through intermediaries. (Apart from his visit in August 1577 mentioned on page 18 above, it appears that he came to Utrecht only briefly sometime in 1580: at least, he is said to have admired a sermon by Duifhuis.)(5) What survives of this correspondence largely consists of requests for money and exhortations to send deputies to the various bodies of central government. Nevertheless, Utrecht did take part, if

somewhat reluctantly, in the project to make Orange the 'High Authority' (Hoge Overheid) over Holland, Zeeland and Utrecht, in 1582-84. The Estates had never had a very high opinion of the Duke of Anjou's ability to defend the Netherlands, even before the shock of the French Fury in Antwerp in January 1583, and had indicated their preference for Orange as early as February 1580.(6) The reluctance about the High Authority question stemmed from the Sticht's age-old distrust of Holland, and from a fear that Utrecht's eastern neighbours, Gelderland and Overijssel, would be offended at a closer connection inside the Union of Utrecht.(7) Indeed it was partly Utrecht's tardiness which delayed the offer of sovereignty to Orange so long that nothing could come of it before his death in July 1584.

The Sticht's fears of Holland revived immediately. Within three weeks of Orange's assassination, the Estates were considering 'a separate governor'.(8) (Indeed, even before Orange's death, Utrecht had maintained the right of every province to choose its own Stadholder.[9]) A month later, the name of the only candidate was put forward: Joost de Zoete, lord of Villers, 'Fieldmarshal of the Army'. His advantages were that he was near at hand, and that by virtue of his military command, he was expected to free the Sticht from the oppressive quartering of government troops.(10) This, however, he failed to do before he was captured at the battle of Amerongen (23 June 1585), leaving Utrecht once more without a Stadholder.

It is difficult to evaluate Villers's term in office, since it was so brief. Its two most notable features were the introduction of the shortlived Erfraad, or hereditary council, in the city (see below, p. 49), and the purge of April 1585, when 16 men, considered by the city council and the burgerhoplieden to be a potential fifth column, were told to leave by sunset of the following day. This was not as radical a measure as it appears, however, as most of them were readmitted to the city within a few months.(11) Whereas Orange had been preoccupied with events all over the Netherlands, Villers was the Stadholder of Utrecht alone, and actually attended several meetings of the Estates, in an effort to intervene personally in the dispute between the Estates and the towns over the imposts (12)(see chapter IV, p. 91).

When Villers was captured, Utrecht was still not prepared to rejoin Holland and Zeeland, and renew the Union of Toledo by adopting Orange's son Maurice of Nassau as Stadholder. Perhaps because of common defence problems, or in order to create a counter-weight to the maritime provinces, the Sticht tended more towards its eastern neighbour, Gelderland, whose German Stadholder, the Count of Nieuwenaar, was known to be an ardent Calvinist, whereas Villers is said to have been a member of the 'libertine' congregation of the church of St. Jacob.(13) It was probably this that made the burgerhoplieden so eager to have Nieuwenaar installed as Stadholder: he took the oath of office less than a year after Villers had done the same, and his appointment was confirmed in January 1586, as there seemed to be no likelihood of Villers' release.(14) The

burgerhoplieden stipulated that Nieuwenaar should accept the Stadholdership on the same terms as Orange, as regards the appointment of the city council.(15)

The instruction drawn up for Villers and Nieuwenaar shows how much the task of the Stadholder had changed since the Satisfaction, especially in the emphasis on his duty to uphold the exercise of the true Evangelical Religion (now the only officially permitted worship in the province). Indeed, Nieuwenaar's instruction was more Protestant in tone than that of Villers, although even he was prepared, in 1585 at least, to tolerate the existence of the congregation of St. Jacob.(16)

The enthusiasm of the burgerhoplieden and the townspeople for Nieuwenaar had waned by February 1588, since he had changed sides in the party struggle, and seemed to be becoming more sympathetic to the exiled 'aristocrats'.(17) His new instruction, drawn up at that time, was much more rigorously Protestant and restrictive of the Stadholder's powers.(18) These restrictions undoubtedly rankled with Nieuwenaar, whom Bor describes as 'jealous of his authority'; in any case, he was already resentful at the usurpation of his rights in October 1586, when the Count of Culemborg and Lord North renewed the Utrecht magistracy, acting on a commission from Leicester.(19) One observer commented that Nieuwenaar was 'discontent not a little, with fear to be thrust out of his government of Utrecht and those provinces [Gelderland and Overijssel]. He hath protested... that were it not for Her Majesty, he would depart, for their ingratitude, to some other country'.(20) In the end, he took steps, in September 1588, to restore

his authority, and received his reward in the shape of an advance of 9000 guilders towards his salary from the Estates of Holland.(21)

In October 1589, Nieuwenaar was killed by an explosion in Arnhem, and Utrecht was once again Stadholder-less. Shaken by their experience of 'going it alone', the Estates drew nearer to Holland, urged on by Oldenbarnevelt, who did his utmost to ensure the reunion of the two provinces, having seen the dangers of separation.(22) The instruction for Maurice of Nassau, who was elected Stadholder without much opposition, echoed his father's Satisfaction in several respects, but retained enough of the old dislike of Holland to stipulate that the prince would 'govern the city, towns and province of Utrecht separately, and by themselves, as they have been governed up till now'. Several of the more Reformed Protestant provisions were removed, while the Stadholder's influence on the appointment of the city council was also reduced, enabling the Estates to secure the appointment of their nominees, particularly in the small towns, where Maurice would merely approve the names sent to him.(23)

In the years after 1577, the role of the Stadholder had changed since the reign of Charles V, when the Stadholders were great Netherlands nobles, often resident (at least partly) in the province, doing their best to increase their personal authority as far as the central government would allow them.(24) In fact, with the Abjuration of Philip II in 1581, the office had strictly speaking lost its meaning, as there was no longer any need for a representative of the sovereign. The emphasis shifted to the Stadholder's role as 'captain-general' of the province's forces. As Stadholders of several

provinces - Nieuwenaar held office in three, Maurice in five - and active military commanders, it was impossible for them to be resident, administer justice and uphold the privileges as they had sworn to do. (Nieuwenaar did spend a considerable amount of time in Utrecht, however.) Nor could it be said that Villers was a 'great Netherlands noble', although he did have a distinguished record of service to the Revolt. It was perhaps his comparative insignificance that enabled the city to pressurise him into abdicating a considerable part of his power over appointments (though without the approval of the Estates).(25) His successor, Nieuwenaar, struggled against becoming a tool, whether in the hands of the 'democrats', or in those of the English governor-general, with whom he had been on good terms at first. Nieuwenaar reacted violently to opposition: in February 1589, for example, Amersfoort refused, on grounds of poverty, to accept 80 of his cavalry, whereupon the Stadholder threatened to set fire to all the farms round the walls of the town, 'as he would by no means be humiliated and scorned like this'.(26)

Yet some aspects of the Stadholdership had not altered. Opportunities for patronage, for instance, were still plentiful: in 1565, Orange had tried to obtain the proostdij of Oudmunster for his younger brother Henry, while in 1580 he secured the confiscated cathedral prebend of Bucho Aytta, Viglius's nephew, for his protégé Jean Théron.(27) Both Nieuwenaar and Maurice similarly took advantage of the chance to reward their friends, often with ecclesiastical benefices, though these were not an unlimited source of patronage, even in Utrecht.(28)

The importance of the clergy as the First Estate distinguished Utrecht from the neighbouring provinces, where clergy had long since ceased to play a significant part in politics. (Even in Overijssel, the 'upper' Sticht, which had also been part of the bishop's temporal possessions, there was no ecclesiastical Estate.[29]) The eminence of this clerical body naturally derived from Utrecht's history as an ecclesiastical principality, where the Estates developed from the bishop's chapter general (kapittel-generaal). The first Estate did not, however, represent the entire clergy of the province, but only the five chapter-churches, or colleges, in the city: the Dom (the cathedral church of St. Maarten), Oudmunster (St. Salvator), St. Pieter, St. Jan, and Ste. Marie. The 'secondary clergy' (tweede clergie, that is all priests, monks, nuns and canons without a prebend in one of these five chapters) were without a voice in the Estates unless the chapters chose to give them one.

At the beginning of the period under consideration, the representatives of the chapters were the most numerous element in the Estates. The five churches disposed of a total of 140 prebends, some of which were not in the possession of a canon, but were used, for example, for the repair and maintenance of the buildings. At no time were all the canons resident in Utrecht: many held other benefices; some were sent on diplomatic missions, like Willem Veusels, dean of St. Pieter, who was in Spain from 1570 to 1576, protesting against Alva's sentence.(30) Thus perhaps only half of the canons were on call at any one time. Of these, a fairly high proportion attended the Estates' meetings: on 20 May 1575, for example, four canons were

present from the Dom, three from Oudmunster, four from St. Pieter and five each from St. Jan and Ste. Marie; this included all the available deans.(31)

This pattern continued in the years immediately following the Pacification of Ghent, when at least two canons from every chapter commonly attended the Estates' meetings. Twelve canons, for example, swore to uphold the union of 17 February 1577, on behalf of their chapters.(32) But there does not seem to have been much continuity of representation: between February 1577 and April 1582, when the chapters as such stopped attending the Estates, a total of fifty-four canons are recorded as having been present at least once. Nineteen of these were members of the Dom, a figure which reflects the leading role of the cathedral chapter. Its secretary was at the same time the secretary of the Estates (until January 1582) and the chapterhouse of the Dom was the site of the joint meetings of all five chapters to deliberate on Estates' business. From October 1577 until July 1581, moreover, it was the meeting place of the Estates themselves.(33) Until 1528, the Domdeken had the right to convene the Estates' assemblies, and he continued to preside over them when this right had passed to the Stadholder and the Hof, striving to regain it all the while.(34) The meeting of 17 February 1577 was the last over which dean Johan van Bruhesen presided: in March, he fled the city to protect himself against the rage of the furious people, who held him responsible for the opposition of some members of the first two Estates to Orange as Stadholder.(35) His flight left a gap at the head of affairs which, it would appear, did not seriously interfere with the Estates' business for four and a half years, during which time the

Domdeken's place was taken by the senior canon of the chapter, Ausonius van Galama. In September 1581, the chapter finally elected a new dean, because of the continual absence abroad of Mr. Jan van Bruhesen, and Galama's advancing years.(36)

Even the alteration of the First Estate in 1582 did not immediately rob the Domdeken of his importance: the new dean, Johan van Duvenvoorde, was one of the seven Geeligerden, and continued to preside over the Estates' meetings as the most senior of their number, although from February 1587, summonses were being sent out in the name of the Standing Committee.(37) Furthermore, the Domdeken acted as a mouthpiece of the chapters' grievances when they could no longer speak for themselves in the Estates.(38) The Dom's pretensions were resented from time to time by the other chapters, especially in connection with the rotation of appointments.(39)

In this and in other ways, the impression of unity given in February 1577 was contradicted by the true state of affairs: there were divisions between chapter and chapter as well as internal divisions within the individual colleges, so that it can be misleading to speak of 'the chapters' or 'the clergy' as a homogeneous body. The most obvious example of these divisions is the attempt by some canons, led by Jacob Cuyntorff, scholaster of Oudmunster, to keep Utrecht out of the Closer Union towards the end of 1578.(40) The Union would lead, claimed these 'conspirators', to a takeover by the Calvinist provinces of Holland and Zeeland, who 'have always had quarrels and wars against [Utrecht] and have desired to bring [it] under their yoke...'(41) and this at a time when Reformed Protestantism was

gaining ground in the city and to a certain extent in the province. They believed that religious differences would lead to political discord; Cuyntorff had already declared against the Religious Peace, proposed by Orange and the Archduke Mathias, on much the same grounds.(42) In order to quash this opposition to the Union, which had led to some unrest in the city, the Utrecht magistrates arrested Cuyntorff (illegally, since he was subject only to ecclesiastical jurisdiction) and detained him until the Union was safely signed and sealed.(43) Nevertheless, Oudmunster, St. Pieter and Ste. Marie put up stiff resistance to the signing of the Union in January 1579: indeed, the dean of Oudmunster, Willem Taets van Amerongen, left the city in order to avoid signing, while his colleague of Ste. Marie, Lambert van der Burch, was forced to sign only by the threat of banishment and confiscation of his property.(44) Apart from these leading ecclesiastical figures, and a few others who were part of Cuyntorff's 'conspiracy', it appears that there were many canons who preferred to swim with the pro-Union tide and salvage what they could out of an unfavourable situation.(45) The attitude of the majority of canons is perhaps best summed up by an anonymous note on a contemporary copy of the Union in the cathedral's archive: 'It is true that a forced consent is still a consent, but it is commonly said that he who is forced to sing seldom sings a good song'.(46)

As well as those who opposed the Union, and those who were indifferent to it, there seem to have been some ardent 'patriots' in most of the chapters, who worked to promote the Union and who later served it for many years. Such a man was Adriaan van Zuylen, dean of St. Jan from 1565 to his death in 1599, and a well-known adherent of

Orange.(47) Yet even St. Jan, which is always regarded as the strongest supporter of the Revolt among the five colleges, harboured dedicated Catholics like Johan van Renesse, who was arrested with Cuyntorff, and who openly stated his absolute opposition to any measure harmful to the true Catholic religion, as he later considered the Union to be.(48) The records of St. Jan, which are perhaps the most easily accessible of all the chapters, clearly reveal the extremes of opinion present within this one small body.(49) The vote in favour of the Union of Utrecht, for example, was passed at a meeting of the chapter attended by only four canons, including the dean, all of whom had previously shown themselves to be supporters of the Union, whereas an earlier meeting, attended by seven canons, had voted unequivocally against it.(50)

The defeat of conservative opinion in the chapters over the Union of Utrecht signalled another stage in the decline of the political role of the clergy in the Estates. From January 1579 onwards, despite repeated protests and appeals to higher authority, the clergy were fighting a losing battle against Calvinism and secularisation. In January and June of 1579 the city council provided for legitimate Protestant worship in first two, then all four, of Utrecht's parish churches; within a few years the chapter churches themselves had to permit Reformed services within their walls.(51) Moreover, the chapters even had to pay the salaries of the ministers who conducted these services, from the funds formerly used for the wax, oil and wine required by the Mass.(52) The chapters had to submit to having their new members nominated by secular bodies, the Ridderschap and the city council in turn. New canons were to be adherents of Reformed

Protestantism, and acceptable to the Estates.(53) Nevertheless, it was not until 1622 that all Catholics were eliminated from the chapters.(54) Nor could the chapters do anything to prevent the Estates' secularising Church property, however much they tried, although their politically privileged position helped to protect their own extensive land-holdings from the fate of property held by other ecclesiastical institutions.

As the next stage of the process, in 1580 the clergy lost their monopoly of the chairmanship of the Standing Committee; the following year the number of clerical deputies in the Committee was reduced from five (one from each college) to two for the First Estate as a whole.(55) Once again the clergy did not present a united front in opposition to this latter measure: St. Jan was quite willing to supply two of its canons as deputies until the other chapters could be brought into line. Four months later, in July 1581, the rest of the clergy gave way.(56)

The chapters' political eminence had never been popular with the Third Estate, especially with the townspeople of Utrecht, led by their burgerhoplieden, who had already made one unsuccessful attempt to have the First Estate abolished, in March 1580.(57) Not even the chapters' past record of opposition to Alva - 'in resisting the hundredth, twentieth and tenth penny taxes demanded by the Duke of Alva, as well as in the law-suit brought by the clergy against the Duke's sentence... and in the maintenance of a commissioner in Spain through whom the sentence was suspended and not carried out' - could outweigh the arguments against their involvement in government, in the eyes of

the city council.(58) The latter body feared popular unrest if recognised Catholics, under oath to the Pope, were to share in government; it argued that no other province - not even Brabant - contained an ecclesiastical Estate; and it pointed to the canons' anti-Union sentiments and connections with enemy sympathisers.(59) Under pressure from the burgerhoplieden, the city council declared the First Estate 'abolished' on 28 March 1582, but this was too radical a step for the Ridderschap and the small towns, who put forward alternative proposals for a new format for the Estates.(60) When these ideas were to a large extent incorporated in the settlement laid down by the Landraad, the city had to agree.(61)

From then on, the First Estate, 'which used to be called the clergy' was formed by seven Geeligeerden: members of the chapters 'elected' by the Ridderschap and the small towns from a list of ten or twelve put forward by the city. These seven had to be well-trusted patriots, belonging to, or adherents of, the Reformed religion. They were not permitted to discuss with their chapters any questions of defence or government, conduct of the war, or law and order.(62) The seven canons 'elected' did in fact come from all five colleges: three who had voted for the Union of Utrecht from St. Jan (which was, with Oudmunster, the smallest, with twenty canons) and one from each of the others. St. Jan was once again split on this issue: the three canons nominated as Geeligeerden dissented from the majority, who refused at first to accept the Landraad's ruling.(63)

The arrangement of 1582 brought an end to the chapters' active participation in the Sticht's political affairs. The business of their meetings was now restricted to the administration of their property, the admission of new canons, and the exercise of their ius patronatus, which enabled them to exercise some influence on the province's religious development. For ten years after 1582, they administered the Hieronymus School in the city.(64) Yet they were still occasionally consulted by the Estates on matters which ought to have been outside their competence, like the submission to the king of France, and the Estates-General and the Council of State continued to address themselves to the chapters on a few important questions.(65) What is more, the chapters survived as institutions, providing sinecure incomes for the sons of the gentry and the urban patriciate, as well as a lucrative source of patronage for the Estates, until they were finally abolished in 1811.(66)

The new First Estate acted, not as representatives of the clergy, but as a body of seven individual laymen, each of whom took a very active part in the Estates' business: in February 1583, for example, one Geeligeerde (Johan Rengers, of St. Jan) was the Estates' representative at the Landraad, and one (Floris Heermale, of Oudmunster) was their permanent delegate to the Estates-General. Nevertheless, a scheme to increase their numbers came to nothing, despite the approval of the Estates, and in fact the Geeligeerden had to survive a number of attempts to remove them altogether.(67) Even after the Landraad had reached its decision in 1582, for instance, the city wrote twice to Orange asking for his approval of the abolition of

the First Estate, so that for two and a half months the city's attitude to the Geeligerden was ambivalent, to say the least. Orange would not co-operate however; in July 1582 he upheld the Landraad's pronouncement and forbade anyone to make any changes in it.(68)

Several years later, after Orange's death, the existence of the Geeligerden became an element in the power struggle which took place in Utrecht under Leicester.(69) The burgerhoplieden, concerned as ever about a possible leakage of information to Parma and about "Roman" influence on the Estates, brought about a purge of the First Estate in 1586-87.(70) Once again, the city council declared the Geeligerden abolished, and again the Ridderschap prevented their complete removal. The number of Geeligerden was reduced to five, of whom only three were the originals (Duvendoorde, Zuylen and Rengers). No canons were left from Oudmunster, St. Pieter or Ste. Marie, the chapters which had always been most suspected of pro-Spanish leanings; the two additional members came from the Dom.(71) These five were always very conscious of their precarious position, and occasionally joined the Third Estate in voting against the Ridderschap.(72)

The changes made in 1586-87 were repealed in October 1588, when the arrangement of 1582 was restored.(73) Thereafter, though existing more or less on the city's sufferance, the Geeligerden retained a certain amount of influence within the Estates: the most senior of them presided, and individuals, particularly Heermale with his long political experience, were frequently consulted on important issues.(74) In 1618, when the government of the province was in a state of flux, Maurice of Nassau made the final change in the

composition of the Geeligerden: he increased their number to eight (four nobles and four burgers of Utrecht), to be chosen by the Ridderschap and the small towns from a list of sixteen nominations made by the city and approved by the Stadholder.(75) In that form, the Geeligerden lasted until the upheavals of the late eighteenth century.

The First Estate, as was demonstrated above, owed its continued existence in large measure to the Second. There are far fewer records for the history of the Ridderschap than for that of the clergy, but all the same it can be seen that certain parallel developments took place within both bodies.

The Second Estate of Utrecht consisted of the nobles and gentry of the province. Utrecht differed from some of its neighbours in having no 'magnates' to speak of among its nobles: though men of the standing of the Count of Egmont held some lordships in the province, their involvement in the Sticht's affairs at this time was minimal.(76) The great majority of the members of the Second Estate were, as S.M. Wyntjes points out, 'lesser nobility'.(77) The one exception to this rule was the Burggraaf of Montfoort, traditionally the first noble of the Sticht.

The medieval Burggraven had played an important part in the politics of several provinces, and had striven to build up Montfoort into an independent lordship.(78) This ambition was frustrated in 1546, however, when Charles V redeemed the 'high jurisdiction' during the minority of Burggraaf Johan IV.(79) Nevertheless, the land of

Montfoort and the town of the same name (situated in the south-west of the Sticht on the border with Holland), still enjoyed a peculiarly privileged position within the province, and the town in particular took advantage of this to evade the Estates' demands.

As the first noble, the Burggraaf was automatically summoned to attend the Estates' meetings, and during the 1560s and 1570s Johan IV did so quite frequently. The Ridderschap occasionally used his town house for their deliberations.(80) After the Pacification of Ghent, however, the Burggraaf seems to have withdrawn to a large extent from political developments that were clearly not to his taste; and in fact he is recorded as having been present at only one session of the Estates between February 1577 and his death in 1583. He was accused of being implicated in the anti-Union conspiracy of 1578 and there is no doubt that he was opposed to any closer alliance with other provinces than that embodied in the Pacification.(81) Indeed, an issue of such seriousness was the only thing that would bring him to make the journey to the city.(82)

The Ridderschap were not, therefore, receiving the leadership which they might have expected from their head, whose views remained conservative in a time of great change. Johan IV believed, for example, that Utrecht should take the opportunity offered by the Abjuration of Philip II to return to the jurisdiction of the Holy Roman Empire, and his Catholicism enabled Montfoort to continue as a Catholic enclave in a nominally Reformed province, sheltering fugitives such as Brother Wouter Jacobsz.(83) This latter problem was compounded when the Burggraaf was succeeded in 1583 by his sister

Philippota, whose husband, Johan van Merode, lord of Moriamez, was 'a Papist and vehement assister off the Prince of Parma'.(84) The future first noble, Philippota's son, was thus being brought up 'in false idolatrous superstition and enmity to this country's liberty'. The scandalised Estates did not succeed in educating the heir as they wished, however: a year later, he was in the king of Spain's service.(85) The inheritance eventually went to Philippota's daughter Anna, and continued in the Merode family until the Estates bought the lordship from them in 1649.(86)

The history of the Second Estate during the 1570s and 1580s can thus be considered quite separately from that of its first noble. The qualifications for membership of the Ridderschap were similar to those in other provinces: that is, according to the Verbandbrief of Bishop Frederick van Baden (1512), members must be of the 'lawful Ridderschap and must possess a fortified house with a drawbridge. A closer definition was laid down between 1536 and 1539, when lists were drawn up of the recognised ridderhofsteden (as these houses were called), which were exempt from the increased house-tax introduced by the Regent, Mary of Hungary.(87) By 1600, there were 56 of these, whose holders, if they were adult males of good birth, were eligible to be summoned to the Second Estate. During the period under consideration several men appeared as lords of ridderhofsteden inherited by their wives (Reynier van Aeswijn, lord of Brakel, is a case in point: he married the heiress of Sterkenburg) while one fairly prominent member of the Ridderschap attended on behalf of his nephew.(88)

Membership of the Ridderschap conferred certain privileges and exemptions: the gentry, for example, were not compelled to answer the village alarm bell, or to billet troops as ordinary farmers were. At one point the Estates threatened forfeiture of these privileges in an effort to produce a better attendance of the Ridderschap: the threat succeeded on that occasion, since the matter in question - negotiations with France after Orange's death - was sufficiently important to bring the 'outside' Ridderschap into Utrecht from their country houses.(89) For the most part, however, only the members of the 'inner' Ridderschap, who lived more or less permanently in the city, attended the Estates' meetings regularly. Indeed, of a total of 46 men who were summoned in 1580, only 25 are recorded as present at one meeting, at least, between 1577 and 1590.(90) Numbers fluctuated considerably (early in the period only two gentlemen represented the whole Second Estate) and several attempts were made to secure a better attendance, and to bring the register of those summoned up to date.(91) At one point, during the crisis of the mid-1580s, it appears that the city council thought of packing the Second Estate as it had the First, to its own advantage.(92) This was possible only temporarily, however, and towards the end of the 1580s, a pool of about ten regular attenders became apparent, out of which between five and eight were present at every meeting. (A parallel tendency was visible in the other Estates.)

With the clergy, the Ridderschap - supposedly - represented the rural interest in the Estates. The 'first two members' as they were called, tended to stick together and outvote the Third Estate, at least until the advent of the Geeligerden. It was the Ridderschap, along with the small towns, who saved the clergy from total abolition: not out of reverence for their ecclesiastical status, but out of a feeling of solidarity, because the clergy had always held their place as the First Estate, being 'the principal landowners in the province'.(93) The gentry did occasionally speak in favour of reductions in the taxation of the countryside, or threaten to keep for themselves taxes levied in the villages (when the towns were withholding imposts), but by and large they did not consistently champion the rural interest vis-à-vis the towns, unless it was to their own advantage.(94) Thus the Estates' assembly once accused the bulk of the Ridderschap of 'taking the protection of the countryside [against the Estates-General's troops] so little to heart in that so few of them came [to the meeting], although they and the colleges are the most affected by this [i.e. the troops' raids]'.(95)

On the other hand, it would not be true to say that the Ridderschap identified with the towns' interests, however strong their urban connections were. Many of them lived in the city for much of the time, and took an active part in its politics: throughout the sixteenth century, members of the gentry families served on the city council and held municipal office in the other towns. The family van Oostrum, for instance, had a monopoly of the office of schout in Wijk.(96) Similarly, between 1577 and 1590, eight nobles are recorded

as having represented both the Ridderschap and the city in the Estates: half of these were among the most regular attenders. Three spent some years as burgomaster; one, Niclaes van Zuylen van Drakenburg, succeeded his father as the Schout of Utrecht.(97)

It is a fairly common assertion that the gentry were also connected by blood and marriage to the urban patrician families.(98) There is, however, little evidence to suggest that this was the case to a substantial degree: rather, members of gentry families married into other gentry families, some members of which held municipal offices.(99) Even the purchase of a ridderhofstad by a member of the city council did not guarantee him admission to the Second Estate - at least until the next generation.

What is more, these connections were not strong enough to prevent open hostility between the Ridderschap and the city, which several times produced serious political conflicts within the Estates. In the summer of 1583, for example, the Ridderschap withdrew from the Estates altogether for two months (and for even longer from the Standing Committee) until arrangements can be made so that they may advise and give their opinion for the common good of the provinces, freely and with a good conscience.(100) In a declaration made later of their reasons for this withdrawal, the gentry stated that their lives had been threatened - and even endangered - by the townspeople, because the Estates had hired two companies of waardgelders for the province's defence, which the burgerhoplieden considered to be quite safe in their own hands.(101) The normal workings of the Estates came to a halt until the autumn, when the dispute was settled by a delegation

from Orange and the Estates-General.(102)

In this case the gentry were unanimous in their withdrawal from the Estates. Four years later, in 1587, the quarrel between them and the city was much more serious, resulting in a split of the gentry into two factions. The members of the larger took refuge across the provincial border and laid their grievances before the Estates of Holland and the Estates-General (from whom they received powerful support).(103) The smaller faction was composed of the three former burgomasters: Lubbert van Parijs van Zudoort, Johan van Abcoude van Meerthen and Reynier van Aeswijn, lord of Brakel, together with his brother-in-law, Floris van den Bongard, lord of Nyenroode.(104) This quartet threw in their lot with Leicester's party in the city council and continued to act as the legally constituted Second Estate. Although their legality was naturally challenged by the exiles from their base at Woerden in Holland, the Estates continued to function as usual, since a minority of the Ridderschap was always present. Personal enmities came to the fore, and a violent confrontation took place between two members of the opposing factions, each with different ideas on how to uphold the privileges of the Ridderschap, who had to be prevented from coming to blows.(105)

This situation was reversed when Nieuwenaar, now in sympathy with the exiles, made a successful bid to recover power in September 1588. The leaders of the opposite faction were banished; the exiles returned. Thenceforward, the first burgomaster of Utrecht was always a member of the Ridderschap. It remained only for the majority of the gentry to ensure that the Leicestrian quartet would no longer be

summoned to the Estates. They accused the four of conspiring with refugees from the South to bring in an 'absolute tyranny' under Leicester, to the oppression of all the inhabitants of the Netherlands and the subversion of the provinces' welfare. Brakel was said to have been principally responsible for taking over the government of the Sticht.(106) The complete change of attitudes that took place between 1586 and 1588 is illustrated by the charges of misappropriation of funds levelled by the Ridderschap against Brakel, whom they had defended in 1583 against similar accusations by the burgerhoplieden and the citizens of Utrecht. At that time he was cleared of the charges, and the slanders against him were attributed to personal enmity.(107) After 1588, however, the Estates continued to demand a full accounting for the sums which had passed through his hands as commissioner for Utrecht's troops; an accounting which he refused to give until 1598, when his accounts were audited and found to be 'defective'.(108)

The Second Estate was thus no more united than the First. And its disunity continued into the next century and the next generation: Brakel was a leading figure in the revolutionary movement of 1610, while in 1618, his son, Antonius, was added to the Ridderschap when the sons of several Woerden exiles were expelled from it.(109) Even individual families were divided: the family of de Wael van Vronesteyn is a case in point. Adriaan de Wael van Vronesteyn signed the Compromise of Nobles and was executed in August 1568 for allegedly helping the iconoclasts in Utrecht in 1566, though there is considerable doubt as to the truth of this charge.(110) His brother Willem was on the city council from 1578 to 1579, and frequently

represented the Ridderschap in the Estates until 1584. On the other hand, one of Adriaan's two sons, Lubbert, was a captain of foot in the Spanish service, and was threatened with the confiscation of his property in June 1580, while the other, Frederick, was expelled from Utrecht in the purges of April 1585 and July 1586, presumably for suspected sympathy with the enemy.(111)

These purges and expulsions were conducted partly at the instigation of the city of Utrecht, the most important element in the Third Estate, which, in its turn, was in some ways the most important of the three Estates at this time. It was composed of the five voting towns: the city, and the four so-called 'small towns' - Amersfoort, Rhenen, Wijk-bij-Duurstede and Montfoort. As early as 1375, Amersfoort and Rhenen were mentioned in the Stichtse Landbrief as belonging to the Third Estate; Wijk, the site of the bishop's country residence, the Huis te Duurstede, was added after 1459, and Montfoort in the sixteenth century.(112) The pre-eminence of Utrecht is reflected in the Estates' terminology, where the towns were always described as 'stad en steden van Utrecht'. This pre-eminence, though much resented by the small towns, particularly Amersfoort, the 'second town' of the Sticht, is not to be wondered at: the population of the city was far greater than that of the other four towns combined; moreover, it was the seat of provincial government and the residence of a majority of those involved in the Estates.(113) It is not surprising, therefore, if historians have tended to concentrate on events and developments in the city, neglecting the rest of the province.

In view of the relative size of the city, how much importance should be attached to the small towns? Generally speaking, their nuisance value appears to have been greater than their power to exert a definite influence in any direction: they could, and did, make things awkward for the Estates, and take up a disproportionate amount of time at meetings, particularly Amersfoort, by virtue of its size, its position as second town, and its long tradition of anti-Utrecht feeling. Similarly Montfoort, because of its unusual position under the Burggraaf's protection, was able to defy even the Stadholder over the appointment of its magistrates in 1588.(114) Rhenen's economic decline in the sixteenth century, however, coupled with the loss of its military significance as a frontier fortress against Gelderland, meant that its political activity was limited to more or less token participation in the Estates' assemblies.(115)

In the later Middle Ages, the small towns sent deputies to the Estates' assemblies only for very important political, financial or military questions in which they were, or could be, concerned, as well as for business concerning the Landbrief itself, or in time of war. In 1493, for example, delegates from Amersfoort attended six meetings, though it is not clear what proportion of the total this represents.(116) In 1569-1570, on the other hand, it was quite common for deputies from several small towns to attend, while on a number of occasions all four sent delegates to help in the struggle against Alva and the Tenth Penny. Five years later, however, after the restoration of the privileges, the small towns were seldom represented: at most, one burgomaster from Amersfoort attended, with occasional support from

one other town.(117) In the late 1570s and the 1580s the towns did make an effort to be present, insisting that the letter of summons for each meeting should reach them the statutory three days in advance.(118) Although the towns would sometimes respond to a direct request to send deputies to a particular session, as the years went by this became increasingly difficult because of enemy activity and poverty. In 1587, for instance, Rhenen excused itself from one meeting, even though it would lose its vote by absence, because of the 'danger' of the roads.(119) Deputies from the city were always present, however (unless they absented themselves in protest at some intention or policy of the Estates), and it is hardly surprising, therefore, that the city council very often considered itself alone as the Third Estate, especially as the small towns rarely sent deputies to the Standing Committee, to which they had originally objected strongly on grounds of expense and violation of their privileges.(120) Thus the small towns were able to exert little influence on the day-to-day running of the Sticht's affairs. Nor was their financial contribution to the Estates' funds large enough for them to gain an advantage by threatening to withhold it, as they did for much of the period under discussion (see below, Chapter IV).

Although there was usually little love lost between the city and the small towns, they would occasionally join forces against the other two Estates, especially if a question of finance or privilege were concerned. One example of this is the continuing dispute over the administration of ecclesiastical property in the towns. The first two Estates appointed a steward responsible to them for the whole province, whereas all the towns maintained that the religious houses

within their boundaries came under their jurisdiction.(121) Moreover, when they were offered the chance to sever the connection with the city, and become a separate Estate on their own, the small towns would have none of it, and helped the Ridderschap to bolster up the First Estate.(122) Even in 1586, after the city had declared the Geeligerden abolished, the Amersfoort magistracy believed that the city and towns should have a joint vote in the Estates, as hitherto.(123) In view of the towns' jealous attitude towards their rights as members of the Third Estate (shown, for instance, in their insistence on representation at the audit of the Estates' accounts), this reluctance to break away from the city seems at first sight inexplicable. It is possible, however, that the towns were actuated by an innate conservatism, or by motives of economy, since full-time representation at the Estates would have been expensive, and the small towns did often follow the city's lead in minor matters anyway, or by a belief that they had a better chance of influencing Utrecht on more important questions from within the same Estate.

This is not to say that the towns were not prepared to act independently of the city. Amersfoort, at least, pursued a separate course wherever possible: its feud with Utrecht dated back to the mid-fifteenth century.(124) The town's refusal to sign the Satisfaction, for example, shows its resentment at the city's attempts to involve the entire province in the expense of the siege and demolition of Vredenburg, and its determination to assert its own identity, by negotiating with Orange as the town of Amersfoort had treated separately with His Majesty the Emperor (Charles V)... in the year '28'.(125) The city later accused Amersfoort of inciting the

other towns to cut themselves off from the rest of the Estates, by refusing to admit garrisons at a time of military crisis.(126) But the most outstanding example of Amersfoort's resistance... to the resolutions taken by the Estates of Utrecht was the town council's refusal to accept the Union of Utrecht in January 1579, on the grounds that other provinces had not yet agreed to it.(127) (In fact, the council probably feared the Union's anti-Catholic potentialities.) This recalcitrance gave rise to a great suspicion... that they have an understanding with the enemy, which led the city to arrest Amersfoort's deputation to the Estates, as a preliminary to an embargo on the town's trade with other parts of the country.(128) This was followed by a full-scale siege in March 1579, conducted by Orange's brother, John of Nassau, Stadholder of Gelderland.(129) The magistracy was changed after the siege, although it was by no means a root-and-branch purge: out of twenty-six men on the new council, at least ten had served on it in the few years preceding 1579.(130) Nevertheless, Amersfoort became more docile after the siege, and abandoned its efforts to revive the old system of choosing the municipal government by lot, which had been in force before Charles V punished the town for its alliance with Gelderland in 1543.(131) From 1579 onwards, the right to appoint the magistrates lay with the Stadholder, as it did in Utrecht itself, and in Wijk and Rhenen.

The composition of the city council of Utrecht was also a matter of dispute at this time. Since 1528, the two burgomasters, twelve schepenen, two treasurers and twenty-four councillors had been chosen by the Stadholder, but the urban patriciate wanted control of the selection of the council for itself.(132) In 1577, however, the

council was forced to yield to popular pressure, and allow Orange to include twenty of his own nominees in the pool of one hundred men from whom he chose the council.(133) (The other eighty were the outgoing council and forty other citizens approved by it.) In fact, Orange installed twenty-four 'new' men in the first council he appointed after the Satisfaction: two-thirds of the old one were sent home.(134) After Orange's death, the city council seized its chance to make itself exclusive and self-perpetuating: Villers permitted the establishment of an Erfraad, or hereditary council, in which vacancies caused by death would be filled by co-option. His successor, Nieuwenaar, clung to his right of appointment, as far as possible (pp. 24-25 above), and a later attempt to introduce the Erfraad was rejected by the Estates in 1598 because 'the memory is still fresh' of the trouble it had caused in 1584.(135) The city council finally achieved its aim after the troubles of 1618, when Maurice set up a hereditary body, very much on the 1584 pattern, in order to reduce the Estates' influence on appointments.(136)

The city council was usually represented at the Estates' meetings by one or both of the two burgomasters, supported by various other members of the council. The delegation was sometimes headed by the Schout. Of all the Estates (apart, naturally, from the Geeligeerden) the city achieved the greatest continuity of representation, particularly towards the end of the 1580s when the same four men - the burgomasters Dirck Canter and Dirck de Goyer, and the schepenen Jan Spruyt and Roetert van Lanscroon - attended almost every session.

The relatively closed nature of the municipal government in Utrecht was one of the main issues over which the city council and the burgerhoplieden were in dispute. Indeed, the citizen militia of Utrecht - eight companies, each of two hundred men - under the leadership of their captains, might almost be considered as a fourth Estate, frequently at odds with the other three. As far as Utrecht was concerned, the militia was a new force in politics: it is usually stated that the companies were formed in 1573 by the Stadholder Bossu, but one contemporary was of the opinion that they were first armed, at least, by Noircarmes, who succeeded Bossu when the latter was captured by the Beggars in 1573.(137) In any case, in the late 1570s and 1580s, Utrecht's tradition of popular unrest was carried on by the citizens and their captains, who saw themselves as 'tribunes of the people', and took a hand in most of the major political developments of the time(138): the decision to adopt the Satisfaction, the establishment of the Geeligeerden, the provisional appointment of Nieuwenaar as Stadholder and his confirmation in office; the offer of sovereignty to Queen Elizabeth of England; the repeated expulsions of suspect persons; the arrest of Paulus Buys in 1586 - on these and other occasions the burgerhoplieden played an active role. The captains sometimes attended the Estates' meetings (as they did on 17 February 1577), whether or not they were invited to do so; indeed, if the Estates did permit them to be present, it was always with the proviso that no precedent had been established for future attendance.(139) More frequently, the burgerhoplieden exerted pressure on the deliberations of the city council. They went so far as to attempt interference in the affairs of other provinces, and took

particular exception to Amsterdam's trade with the enemy, driving the Amsterdam burgomaster Reynier Cant to describe them as 'not far-seeing, and with little experience of policy'.(140) At all times the militia companies greatly resented the introduction of military forces other than themselves to protect the rural areas from raids by enemy - or Estates-General - troops. Despite their protestations that they had guarded the city for years at great financial cost to themselves,(141) it seems that the companies were in fact significant more as a political than a military force, with, as their most effective weapon, the threat of popular action, and, occasionally, the fulfilment of that threat. As the captains were officers of the wijken, or districts into which the city was divided for tax-collecting purposes, they were consulted about the introduction of new taxes, and their opposition could bring armed men out into the streets to protest.(142) After the 'great commotion' of August 1583, which frightened the city council into withdrawing increased levies, the proposed taxes were reintroduced a few days later, with the goodwill of the burgerhoplieden, who disclaimed all responsibility for the riots, which, however, they had done nothing to quell.(143)

The appointment of the burgerhoplieden lay, for the most part, with the city council or the Stadholder, though there is evidence that the inferior militia officers sometimes chose their own captains.(144) In 1581, Orange laid down that the captains were to be renewed annually at the time of the change of the magistracy, and that no more than two or three at a time were to sit on the council.(145) In accordance with this pronouncement, the eight captains did appear before the council on 30 October 1581, to be confirmed in office or

replaced as the magistracy saw fit.(146) Nevertheless, a number of men continued to combine a position on the council with a captaincy in the militia, despite Nieuwenaar's efforts to keep the two apart. In 1585, Nieuwenaar replaced four of the captains in the council, despite warnings that all eight of them were 'upset' by his intention to do so, and would resist any such change.(147) It is, however, indicative of the relative power of a captaincy and a seat on the city council that the Utrecht secretary, Gosen van der Voort, believed that most of the burgerhoplieden would give up the latter position if faced with the choice.(148) Following his coup d'état in 1588, Nieuwenaar replaced seven of the captains - presumably those who had taken the opposing side - after which the burgerhoplieden retired for a while from political activity. They even refrained from expressing an opinion on the release from prison of three leading members of the pro-Leicester faction.(149) But ten years later they could still exert sufficient pressure, with irate citizens behind them, to achieve the suspension of an unpopular house tax.(150)

The basic structure of the Estates had thus been established after the upheavals of the 1580s, and it endured in its essentials until the Batavian Revolution of the 1790s. It did undergo certain lesser alterations in the course of two centuries, when later political and religious conflicts - for example in 1618-19 - temporarily altered the balance. But a trend begun in the formative years after the Satisfaction continued: the transfer of influence from the First Estate to the Third became so marked that by 1654 it could be said that the city and the towns, despite recurrent differences, were 'more than half the Estates in weight'.(151) The

question of how the Estates functioned within this structure will be considered in the next chapter.

Chapter III

The Estates at Work

Under the Habsburgs, the Estates of many of the provinces in the Netherlands had developed bureaucracies of some complexity, and permanent committees for current affairs.(1) In Utrecht since 1530, however, these functions had been carried out primarily by the Hof, or by the Chamber of Accounts in Holland, with the Estates occupying a secondary position. Thus when the Estates assumed effective government of the province in 1577, they had to conduct their business according to rules and customs which had evolved over the previous two centuries, and were perhaps not best suited to the demands of an unprecedented situation. Nevertheless, the Estates continued to operate - in appearance at least - within the age-old procedural framework, although radical changes were taking place beneath the surface. It is sometimes difficult to establish the Estates' routine procedures, since these were often taken for granted and have to be deduced from mentions in the records of what was new, or exceptional in some way. However, the years between 1576 and 1590 saw much that was both new and exceptional in the governing of the Sticht, and these changes contributed a great deal to the development of definite, regular procedures by the Estates.

The invariable preliminary to every full meeting of the Estates was the beschrijving or summons. This took the form of a letter convoking the separate Estates to meet on a certain day, in order to discuss and resolve a number of items which the members of the Standing Committee thought too weighty to be dealt with by themselves alone. Once the Estates had won their fight to summon themselves, independently of the Stadholder or the Hof (that is, about 1578), these letters were sent out in the name of the Domdeken until February 1587, when one of the conditions in the compromise between the Third Estate and the rest was that the letters should go out in the name of the Standing Committee.(2) In any case, the Committee had for several years enjoyed the right to examine the terms of the summons, and to issue one on their own authority in an emergency: for example, if the enemy were at hand, or indeed if the Sticht needed protection from the Estates-General's own forces.(3)

In November 1577, the Estates resolved that the summons was to be made no more than three days in advance of the date fixed for the meeting. Three months later, it was laid down that the five chapters, the Ridderschap and the city and towns were to meet separately on the day before the appointed date, and send their delegates to the full assembly, to deliver the decisions of the individual Estates, and arrive at a final resolution.(4) The First Estate and the Third had ready-made meeting places in the chapter-houses (the colleges used that of the Dom for their joint sessions) and the town halls respectively. The clergy's deliberations can be found in the Dom's records, while those of the Amersfoort town council on each agenda are

set out point by point in its resolution books. Letters from the other small towns informing the Estates of their decisions have been preserved. After 1579, however, except in unusual circumstances, the city council confined its comments on the agenda to a note that 'the summons was dealt with as recorded in its margin', with the result that its opinions must be inferred from the Estates' own account of their meetings. The members of the Second Estate, on the other hand, scattered as they were throughout the countryside, had no such focal point. Accounts of separate meetings of the Ridderschap are few, and, for the most part, record their response to exceptional situations, such as the Abjuration of Philip II in 1581, or the Ridderschap's own withdrawal from the Estates in 1583.(5) The gentry were aware of the problem, but their attempts to solve it - for instance, by a plan that all those in the city should meet once a month to discuss political matters - seem to have come to nothing, or, at any rate, to have left no record. Instead, the resolutions of the Estates or their Standing Committee mention occasional meetings of the Ridderschap at one of which, it is interesting to note, two members exercised their vote by proxy.(6)

In 1580, the Estates' instruction for their secretary incorporated a provision that summonses should be sent out six days in advance, in order that they might arrive at their destination three days before the meeting; the small towns later complained, however, that they were not being given a full three days to deliberate on the agenda.(7) In fact, the prescribed arrangements were often not put into practice: the cathedral chapter was of the opinion that the five churches ought to meet at 8 a.m. on the day prescribed for the

Estates' meeting (which started at 9 a.m.); the city council also quite frequently discussed the agenda early on the morning of the assembly.(8)

Meetings did not always commence on the appointed day, or at the proper time, therefore, and the Estates made periodic efforts to enforce punctuality on their members.(9) On one occasion, gentry who came from outside the city, and other members of the first two Estates, protested at the lateness of the city's deputies, and suggested that if any delegate had failed to appear by 10 a.m., the meeting should go ahead regardless. (The Estates ordered this idea to be included in a forthcoming agenda, but, like many other proposals, it was lost in the confusion surrounding Nieuwenaar's coup in September 1588.[10]) One method of compelling a full attendance was the threat that any element of the Estates which did not send representatives would lose its right to vote when the final resolution was taken. This threat was most frequently used, naturally enough, when the meeting was called to discuss matters of great importance, such as the Satisfaction, the Union of Utrecht, the reform of the Hof, or the treaty with England.(11) Occasionally, the threat had to be repeated, and strengthened: on 6 March 1578, for example, the Estates were summoned for the third time, to discuss the introduction of new taxes for the gemene zaak 'on pain of the forfeiture of their vote'. Since no decision was reached, another summons had to be sent out, eleven days later, 'to resolve finally and without separating [until a resolution has been achieved] on pain of forfeiture of the vote'. This time, they managed to reach a decision: to contribute 2500 guilders per month to central funds.(12) In a serious crisis such as

followed Orange's assassination, however, the Estates could and did waive these attendance requirements: in July 1584, they met with the unusual provision 'that those present may resolve without the absentees, so that business may not be delayed'.(13)

Until October 1577, the Estates assembled in the chancellery of the Hof, as they had done since the creation of that body by Charles V in 1530. With the signing of the Satisfaction, however, they returned to the great chapter-house of the Dom, which they had used from time immemorial, and which was much more convenient, having separate chambers where the individual Estates could consult in private.(14) As the role of the chapters in provincial government decreased, it seemed appropriate that the Estates should have a meeting place of their own, independent of the Catholic clergy as they were now independent of the royal Hof. In April 1581, therefore, it was decided to leave the Dom for the now vacant Franciscan church, where the Estates continued to meet until the eighteenth century.(15) From the account of an English representative who asked audience of them, it appears that each Estate sat at a table of its own.(16)

The Estates began each meeting by dealing with the items of business on the agenda, turning later to any requests from individuals or other business that had not been included in the summons. If an important question was raised at this stage in the proceedings, the Estates would order a meeting to be held expressly to discuss it.(17) In the early years of the period, resolutions were usually reached, as the secretary noted, 'after long discussion and mature deliberation', and, on at least one occasion, 'after lengthy disputation as

well. (18) In some cases, however, discussion seems to have been merely a formality. The summons to a meeting for 6 June 1580 casts a revealing light on the procedures of the Estates, and on the dominant part played by the chapter clergy, particularly those of the Dom in the process of decision-making. Three successive sets of comments in the margins of this document record first, the reactions of the members of the Dom, followed by the First Estate as a whole (these differ only in minor ways from the Dom's comments). Finally, the resolutions of the full Estates' assembly were noted, and these had been significantly altered from those of the clergy in only one particular: the canons thought that complaints from landholders near the Holland border about encroachments from Holland on their dyke rights were no concern of the Estates; the full assembly, however, decided to send an official letter of protest to their colleagues in Holland. (19) Since rural taxation was the main item on the agenda, a meeting of the Ridderschap also took place, at which it became clear that the first two Estates were in accord about the measures to be adopted. (20) After April 1582, when the clergy lost their political power, the initiative in the Estates shifted to the city of Utrecht: some agendas sent to the Geeligerden after that date have survived, with no apostils to indicate how the new First Estate arrived at its conclusions, while from others it is clear that the Geeligerden usually agreed with the other two Estates. (21)

Naturally enough, it was not always possible for the Estates to complete all the business on the agenda in one day. Delays occurred for a wide variety of reasons: sometimes, for instance, a meeting had to be postponed because the members were not present in sufficient

numbers. Although it was never stipulated exactly how many representatives constituted a quorum, some inferences can be drawn from the meeting of 4 October 1583, which was attended by five Geeligerden, three members of the Ridderschap, three deputies from the city, one from Amersfoort and one from Montfoort. Since the Second and Third Estates were so poorly represented, another summons was dispatched for 8 October, and produced a slight increase in attendance: six Geeligerden, four gentry, three from the city and 'deputies' from Amersfoort, Wijk and Montfoort. This was considered sufficient for the meeting to go ahead.(22) There was no hard and fast rule, however, and it was quite normal for business to be conducted in a much smaller or a much larger gathering: the Estates' next two sessions, of 29 October and 19 November 1583, illustrate this point. The former was attended by four representatives of the First Estate, five of the Second, four from the city and two from Amersfoort. Three weeks later, on the other hand, only three Geeligerden were present, but the Second and Third Estates turned out in force, with twelve nobles (an unheard-of number), the same four deputies from the city, and two each from Amersfoort, Wijk and Rhenen. Admittedly this session was convoked to discuss the important question of closer links between Holland, Zeeland and Utrecht, following the conference at Dordrecht.(23)

More frequently, business was delayed because one Estate had not reached a decision on part of the agenda, with the result that the meeting had to be prolonged until the deputies received instructions from their principals, or else the items in question had to be carried over to the next meeting, so that the deputies could return home to

seek advice. This practice of ruggespraak, on which the Estates also insisted in their dealings with the Estates-General, frequently caused annoying, indeed crippling, delays.(24) The Amersfoort town council, for example, often instructed its representatives to hear proposals at the Estates' meetings and return for consultation; and the deputies of each Estate were liable to refer back to the main body on matters which concerned it particularly closely: the clergy on a plan to tax tithes, for instance, or the small towns on a suggestion that they should raise a force to help the farmers in case of enemy attack.(25) At times all three Estates at once would avail themselves of their right of consultation, as they did in 1580 on the difficult question of accepting the Duke of Anjou as the Netherlands' protector, and before 'choosing the better and more bearable of two evils' to raise money for the war effort in 1588.(26) In some cases, ruggespraak was nothing but a formality, as it was when the Estates nominated the Lord of Villers as the Stadholder of Utrecht in September 1584: the deputies of Amersfoort and Wijk had to report to their respective principals, who had not considered Villers for the position. But the Amersfoort town council raised no objection to the appointment, and simply conformed with the decision of the first two Estates, the city and Rhenen.(27) On other occasions, ruggespraak provided a useful opportunity for the individual Estates to discuss points not included in the original summons, or, as with extremely important decisions such as the Abjuration of Philip II, to consult a wider constituency: in November 1581, the 'most notable' citizens of Amersfoort and Wijk were called in to consider this question in accordance with custom.(28) Nevertheless, the practice of ruggespraak was so habitual that the Estates - just like the Estates-General - found it necessary

to ask the towns to grant their deputies full powers to resolve important matters without reference to their principals. But just as the Estates themselves were extremely reluctant to authorise their delegates to the Estates-General to take decisions without referring back, so the individual Estates clung to their right of ruggespraak, and a proposal to give the assembly the power to resolve important questions was rejected in 1581 by a majority vote.(29)

Decisions formally taken in this way - that is, by a majority of two Estates to one, not by a majority of those present - occurred on average once a year.(30) This practice, which was known as overstemming, was nothing new in the Sticht: apart from the Estates themselves, the five chapters employed this 'ancient and laudable custom' in arriving at their decisions. (In 1577, during the Satisfaction controversy, for instance, the Orangist colleges of St. Jan, St. Pieter and the Dom had overruled their two more conservative fellows.[31]) A resolution from early in the period illustrates how overstemming usually worked in the Estates: in November 1576, the clergy and the gentry forced through a tax on trade to pay the 200,000 guilders promised to Philip II in lieu of the Tenth Penny and its associated taxes. The city magistrates, representing those most likely to be affected, protested that the two-to-one rule did not apply in this instance, but they had no hope of carrying this point or of introducing an additional tax on tithes and land rents, which would have fallen on the first two Estates. The city council consented to the tax on trade, therefore, with a face-saving provision that 'the other two Estates can never use this present agreement against the city in any way in the future'.(32) It was not always the Third Estate

which gave way, however: a year later, the clergy, under compulsion, agreed to the candidate supported by the Ridderschap and the city for the stewardship of the domains, on condition that in similar circumstances the magistracy would also bow to the will of the majority.(33) For much of the time, the resolution of the majority was accepted without question: the Amersfoort town council regularly instructed its delegates to 'conform with the most votes'; in other cases dissenting voices have simply gone unrecorded. Sometimes there was no ill-feeling involved in the process of overstemming: when the first two Estates resolved to grant a yearly allowance of 1000 guilders to Prince Maurice of Nassau, in 1583, 'the deputies of the city and the towns, seeing that they were outvoted by the [other] two Estates, readily agreed'. Similarly, after Orange's death in 1584, the Ridderschap, city and towns voted in favour of opening negotiations with Holland and Zeeland about the government of the provinces; the Geeligerden conformed 'although they hold the opposite opinion'.(34) Matters were not always so amicably settled, however; in 1580, the chapters accused the Ridderschap and the towns of forcing 'eternal servitude' on them, by forbidding the clergy to fill the various prebends left vacant by the recent death of Archbishop Schenk van Toutenberg.(35) In case willing agreement was not forthcoming, a resolution was passed in 1582, to the effect that whatever was decided by any two of the Estates, after lawful convocation and mature deliberation, would be binding on the third. This resolution was later cited by the Geeligerden and the Ridderschap, in August 1588, to enable them to overrule the city at a time when the Third Estate appeared virtually all-powerful.(36) The practice of overstemming continued to cause dissension within the Estates until 1645, when the

Stadholder, Prince Frederick Henry, laid down that unanimity was obligatory in major decisions, such as those on war and peace, and alterations in the government of the province or its long-established customs and privileges.(37)

This then was how the Estates arrived at their decisions: but how, and by whom were they carried out? Ever since the transfer of the temporality to Charles V in 1528, the Estates had appointed temporary ad hoc commissions, usually composed of one or two deputies from each Estate, to put their resolutions into effect. In the 1570s and 1580s they continued and expanded this system to deal with numerous short-term problems.(38) At the same time, the increase in the volume of Estates' business described below (pp. 70-71) made it necessary to set up a number of more permanent commissions, to deal with particular aspects of the work of government.

Perhaps the best example of this delegation of authority is the commission for ecclesiastical property, which first came into being in June 1580, when the secularisation of Church estates began. The three original members of this commission - who included the dean of Oudmunster - were to forbid all monasteries, convents and similar foundations to alienate or mortgage their property without the Estates' permission, and to order them to submit a full statement of all their assets and obligations within two weeks.(39) In the spring of the following year, the commission was put on a more permanent basis, in order to correct the 'untidy' administration of ecclesiastical property. The members - again, one from each Estate - were to serve for one year, from Easter to Easter, with an

annual salary of 100 guilders, and the secretary of the chapter of St. Jan was to receive 150 guilders per annum for acting as secretary to the commission. These sums were to be paid out of the incomes of the property in the deputies' care.(40) A full and detailed instruction was provided, covering every aspect of the administration (only the five colleges were exempt from the commissioners' authority), and, in 1582, the commission's position with regard to its superiors was defined. Problems arising in the administration of ecclesiastical property were to be submitted first to the Standing Committee, for its advice; if this was not sufficient, the commissioners might seek guidance from the Estates themselves.(41) Within certain limitations - its authority was never recognised by the towns - the commission worked quite successfully, although it occasionally met opposition from lay patrons jealous of their rights over church property within their jurisdiction.(42) It advised the Standing Committee on the takeover of the administration of the Regulars' monastery in such a way that the property was handled by a paid lay administrator, the incomes were devoted to the maintenance of orphans, and provision was made for the remaining inmates of the monastery. The commission also assisted various religious houses to dispose of their property at the best possible price.(43) Changes in the commission's personnel under the Prouninck régime led to accusations of abuses in its work and its eventual dissolution by the Estates in October 1588. But there was such a great need for a permanent body to supervise the Sticht's ecclesiastical property that a new commission was set up shortly afterwards, with duties which included arranging for the payment of rural ministers.(44)

Where the Estates had not delegated the work of enforcement to a specialised commission, each of their decisions was translated into an order, and made known to the province's inhabitants through a 'placard', publicly proclaimed in the towns and villages, usually after the ringing of the town bell. Since 1530, publication of such decrees had been done in the name of the Stadholder and the Hof. The latter's refusal, in September 1578, to allow the Estates to announce the introduction of certain taxes, necessary to pay off the Sticht's debts, marks a turning-point in the history of the government of the province. The Estates, in full assembly, decided that in these circumstances they had no alternative but to publish the relevant placard in their own name, and to follow it immediately with an edict concerning the introduction of generale middelen to finance the United Provinces' war effort. The Standing Committee then drafted a placard describing the new taxes and authorising one Gerrit van Water, in the name of the Estates, to inform all those concerned of the terms of the ordinance. At the same time, it was resolved to petition the Stadholder, William of Orange, that the Estates might initiate and administer all the province's taxes through officials appointed by themselves, and not by the Hof. The Hof was then 'requested' to ensure that none of these officials suffered any hindrance in the execution of his duty and, shortly afterwards, arrangements were made for the publication of the placard throughout the Sticht, with or without the Hof's consent. In the end, the Hof gave its consent, perforce.(45)

Although, for the next few years, placards were still sometimes issued in the name of the Stadholder and Hof, the relative political positions of the Estates and the Hof had been reversed.(46) This change was firmly established in the new instruction for, the Hof - replacing that of 1530 - which the Estates drew up in 1583, stipulating, among other things, that the Hof would publish no placards without the consent of the Estates or of the Standing Committee.(47) The Estates were always quick to take advantage of this regulation, as they did in May 1586, when Leicester and his Council of State tried to circumvent normal procedures by publishing the famous edict prohibiting trade with the enemy through the Hof alone. The Estates insisted on receiving certain assurances before agreeing to issue the placard in June.(48)

To execute these placards outside the towns, the Estates looked to the four Marshals, one at the head of each of the four 'quarters' into which the province was divided, and to the schouten who represented the government in the rural administrative units - gerechten - which made up each quarter. There were 131 of these, varying enormously in size: sixty-three in the Nederkwartier (roughly speaking, the western half of the Sticht), thirteen in Montfoort (the extreme south-west corner, round the town of that name), eighteen in Eemland (the north-eastern quarter, centred round Amersfoort) and thirty-seven in the Overkwartier (the south-eastern quarter, containing Wijk and Rhenen).(49)

The Marshals were usually members of gentry families appointed, before the Abjuration of the king, by the Stadholder on the Estates' advice, and by the Estates themselves after 1581. They took their oath of office to the members of the Chamber of Accounts resident in Utrecht (50) (the Chamber, which served both Holland and Utrecht, fled from the Hague to Utrecht in 1572, and left some of its members behind when it returned after 1576). The Chamber was also concerned with the installation in office of the schouten in those lordships held by 'the [king's] Majesty', and later by the Estates themselves, although in 1580, the Estates claimed the right to approve of the men appointed to these posts, and occasionally spent some time deciding on the best man for the job.(51) In lordships which were held by private individuals, however, the Estates could not control the appointment of schouten in the same way, though they could, and did, exercise a great deal of influence on the chapters' administration of their lordships.(52) An attempt to tighten up procedures in this matter, and to remove the possibilities of corruption was made in 1580, when the Estates forbade the farming-out of the office of schout, in both kinds of lordship; instead, the most suitable local resident was to be appointed, without any payment on his part. It soon became clear, however, that this system was unworkable, and the custom of leasing the offices continued, carried out by special deputies. The cost of one such post (in the villages of Bunnik and Vechten) was 36 guilders a year; by 1588, it was calculated that all of them together yielded less than 400 guilders annually, but even this comparatively small sum could not be spared, since the fund of the province's domains was chronically short of money.(53) Much larger sums - in one case as much as

3000 guilders - were placed by the schout as surety for his ability to fill the office and to collect the fines involved in his administration of justice: these bonds were also a welcome addition to the domains' revenues.(54)

Another attempt to streamline administrative procedures was made in 1582, when, on the death of one of the Marshals, the Estates decided not to replace him, and to amalgamate the four quarters into two larger districts. The three remaining Marshals came to an arrangement about the division of the province, but within two years it became apparent that there was too much work in a double district for one man, quite apart from the fact that the Marshal was supposed to reside in his quarter. It was therefore decided to return to 'the old system', and in 1584 a new Marshal of Eemland was chosen: Maximilian van Baexen, a prominent member of the Second Estate.(55) Although the city approved this appointment at that time, three years later, under Prouninck, the city's representatives insisted that Marshals should not be admitted to the Estates' meetings, 'as they are the servants of the Estates and should not sit together with their masters'. This was not so much an effort to enforce the separation of powers, as an attack by the city on Baexen himself as a member of the Ridderschap, which was intensified when he joined the exiled gentry in Woerden, at the end of 1587.(56) In the following year, the Estates declared that he had forfeited his office through his failure to reside in Eemland (though notice of this decision seems to have been delivered to him at his official residence in the quarter). Baexen himself did not recognise the authority of the Estates, acting in the absence of almost all his fellow gentry, to deprive him of his post,

however, and the issue was still in doubt when Nieuwenaar's coup of September 1588 confirmed Baexen in office, and prevented the Estates from reducing the number of Marshals to two once again.(57)

Even when there were no political circumstances driving men into exile, non-residence of officials was a common problem in the Sticht. It was usual for the Marshals to have assistants, or 'substitutes', who appear to have done much of the work of administration. A deputy was particularly necessary, for example, for an earlier Marshal of Eemland, Gysbert van Hardenbroek, who was put in command of a company of infantry on condition that he installed a 'substitute' to carry out his civilian duties. If the substitute was unsatisfactory, however, the Estates would urge the Marshal to fulfil the duties of his office in person, or at least to appoint a more suitable assistant.(58) Absenteeism also caused problems, about which the Estates could do little, at a lower governmental level: the Estates' intentions to replace an absentee schout of Rhenen, first expressed in September 1588, had still not been carried out by January 1591, when the members of the outgoing town council complained that they could not hand over to their successors unless the schout was there to administer the oath of office in the name of the Stadholder.(59)

These commissions and officers of the Estates had to cope with a volume of business which increased steadily from 1577 onwards. A simple comparison will illustrate this point. In the first three months of 1578, thirteen separate summonses were sent out, that is, an average of one each week. Only three of these meetings lasted more

than one day. In the comparable period of 1584, six assemblies were convoked (or one every two weeks), four of which were continued: indeed, the meeting which began on 27 February lasted for eight days. During the first three months of 1589, however, only one summons was actually sent out, for 3 February (the Estates had not met since 29 October 1588), but the assembly continued, with almost daily sessions, until the end of March, and some items on the agenda were not resolved until January 1590. Moreover, the attendance at meetings became similarly concentrated: when separate sessions were convened on individual issues, almost any qualified member could be deputed to attend, with specific voting instructions. But when one meeting could last for two months, and deal with all manner of business not included in the original agenda, the instructions of deputies had to become more general. A fairly small group of regular, experienced attenders therefore developed; and ruggespraak and the threat of 'forfeiture of the vote' were very seldom used by the end of the 1580s.

This increasing business in turn required the development of a new agency to supplement the Estates' existing procedures. Even in the late 1570s, when the Estates were meeting once a week, it was felt that there ought to be a more permanent body which could act in emergencies. As early as February 1570, there had been meetings of 'the Estates residing in Utrecht' [i.e. in the city] or 'inner Estates' as they were called, but these had not been held regularly.(61) In the autumn of 1576, however, similar meetings began to take place more often, with separate records kept by the Estates' own secretary, Willem van Lamsweerde. It was decided 'to depute a small number [of men] who would discuss all possible contingencies

that might arise in these worrying and troublesome times, and resolve, if the matters required haste and would not admit of delay. (These men took part in the negotiations with the Stadholder Bossu about the demobilisation of his troops in the early months of 1577.[62]) These 'inner Estates' were succeeded by a body which grew, in time, into the Gedeputeerde Staten or Standing Committee of the Estates.(63) Initially, this was a rather clumsy affair: its first meeting was attended by eighteen men (two from each chapter with one extra from the Dom, two from the Ridderschap and five from the city) but it had an advantage over the Estates proper in that it met from the beginning in the cathedral chapter-house and not under the shadow of the Hof.(64) In the early stages of the Committee's existence, there was no clear-cut distinction between its work and that of its parent body: the important decision to complete the demolition of Vredenburg was recorded in the resolutions of the Standing Committee, and not in those of the Estates, although the latter were in session at the time.(65)

In the following year, 1578, an attempt to create a more manageable committee met with considerable opposition from Amersfoort (which, it must be remembered, had not yet signed the Satisfaction, and was thus technically not aligned with the rest of the province under the Prince of Orange). The small towns felt that the new scheme - for a body composed of one representative from each chapter, two from the Ridderschap and two from the city - robbed them of their right to be informed of every aspect of the government of the Sticht. Amersfoort's delegates protested that the proposal 'was directly contrary to their privileges and old usage, and that therefore they

would by no means consent to... the draft'.(66) Although the small towns took their case for full representation to the Estates-General, the clergy, Ridderschap and city did not grant the request as they were ordered to do. Such objections did not significantly interfere with the Standing Committee's development: even the Amersfoort town council, though steadily refusing to recognise 'certain alleged deputies' of the Estates, cooperated in practice with these deputies on several occasions.(67)

After the siege in March 1579, which brought Amersfoort into line with the rest of the province, the small towns did send deputies to the Standing Committee's meetings from time to time: indeed, in January 1582 the Committee instructed the Amersfoort magistracy to keep in close touch with its proceedings through the town's representative, Hendrick Both, 'so that nothing is done which might harm the town [and] he [Both] has as much of a vote as the city of Utrecht'.(68) Nevertheless, the relationship between the Standing Committee and the small towns continued to be somewhat uneasy: it was expensive to keep a permanent representative in Utrecht and Amersfoort argued that the Estates should pay Both's expenses 'as otherwise it would seem that they want to shut the small towns out'.(69) The towns' deputies complained, in December 1582, that the daily twenty stuivers (one guilder) allowed them for their attendance expenses was not sufficient 'in these expensive and costly times while the days are short'. A proposed increase of this allowance to thirty stuivers (1 1 2 guilders) provoked a demand for parity of payment from the rural gentry, and a claim from the city's representatives that their allowance (which was less, since they had no travelling to do) should

be increased to compensate them for the extra time they devoted to 'the province's affairs [which] multiply more and more each day'. As this would have removed the differentials in pay between deputies from inside and outside the city, the matter was shelved.(70)

At a time of increasing secularisation of the provincial government, it was not likely that the Ridderschap and the towns would continue to tolerate a built-in clerical majority of five to four against them in the Standing Committee. By March 1580, the Dom had lost its right to preside over all the Committee's meetings, and in the same year the city began to campaign for equal representation, of two deputies from each Estate, the clergy's representatives to be 'good patriots', nominated by, and acceptable to, the other two Estates.(71) Although four of the chapters (St. Jan being the exception) objected strongly to this idea, and boycotted the Standing Committee's sessions for several months early in 1581, in the end they were forced to acquiesce. By July 1581, the clergy had accepted a new ordinance, whereby each Estate had three deputies on the Standing Committee, and every three months the canons from the two most senior colleges stepped down in favour of the deputies from the two unrepresented chapters.(72)

A similar system of rotation operated for the other Estates. The Ridderschap ensured the continuity of its representation on the Standing Committee by resolving that one of its three deputies should remain in office at each three-monthly changeover. This was later reversed, so that one deputy retired every three months.(73) Both the

first two Estates found it difficult to adhere strictly to this system, however: after April 1582, there was a choice of only seven Geeligerden (six after April 1585, when Johan Proeys died), at least two of whom were almost permanently occupied elsewhere on the Estates' business, with the result that there were not enough Geeligerden to replace those who retired from the Standing Committee. A similar situation arose in 1588 for those of the Ridderschap who did not go into exile.(74) Even when there were plenty of potential deputies available, those in office sometimes served much longer than their three-month term.(75) Within the Committee itself, the chairmanship rotated on a weekly basis, each Estate taking it in turn to provide the president.(76)

The composition of the Standing Committee remained unchanged until 1610, when the Council of State laid down that each Estate should have four representatives at the 'daily meetings', including two from the city, one from Amersfoort, and one from each of the other small towns in turn.(77)

The Committee's duties and powers are set out in its instruction, which dates from 1593, but appears to be substantially similar to that in force in the 1580s.(78) Its primary function was to deal with routine business and minor requests from individuals or institutions, in order to leave the Estates proper free to attend to 'matters of greater importance... which might concern anyone, particularly the individual Estates'. To this end, incoming letters were usually opened by the Committee, which answered them unless the contents were considered important enough to be referred to the main body of the

Estates.(79) A commission was set up in 1580 to grant or refuse requests as its members saw fit: they were always to be answerable to the Estates, who created a similar body ten years later.(80) In addition, the Standing Committee gradually took over responsibility for the day-to-day financial administration of the province: the voting of taxes was always done by the full assembly, but the collection of all internal taxes (that is, those not destined for the gemene zaak) was in the Committee's hands, and three of its members were periodically deputed to authorise payment of all the Estates' normal obligations.(81) It was the Standing Committee which settled the problems of the Estates' tax-farmers, gave judgment in disputes between tax-farmers and tax-payers, and dealt with a multitude of claims for reduction of taxes because of flooding or damage by troops.(82)

It was left to the Standing Committee's discretion to decide which matters merited a summons of the Estates, and which could be dealt with at a lower level. In an emergency, the Committee would occasionally act on its own authority, as it did when it agreed to pay the Estates-General's troops a month's wages, since the Landraad, which should have been responsible, was, as always, desperately short of cash. On the other hand, the Estates imposed a limit on such expenditure by the Standing Committee: a limit which they themselves would exceed after a full convocation.(83) Moreover, if the Committee did decide to summon the Estates, it could do a great deal to influence their final decision by framing the agenda in such a way as to put the words of the resolutions into the Estates' mouths. On at least one occasion, however, the Geeligerden and the Ridderschap

retained enough independence of mind to state firmly 'that they were not bound by the terms of the agenda as it had been worded by the Standing Committee, but that they were free to take whatever resolution they found advisable'.(84)

Lastly, it was the Standing Committee's business to dispatch to the three Estates copies of any documents which were to be debated at the assembly, such as each member's contribution to the provincial funds. The Amersfoort magistracy, however, frequently complained that, as they never received their copy, they were unable to reach a conclusion: this neglect argued a lack of respect for the town council, and also caused delays to the common cause. (This may well have been a convenient excuse for Amersfoort's failure to pay up.)(85)

The keystone of this institutional structure in these years was unquestionably the Estates' advocate, Floris Thin, 'a learned, clever and intelligent man', as Bor called him.(86) From his beginnings as secretary to the chapter of Oudmunster, with a legal practice, Thin became the advocate used by the Estates in all their cases before the Hof. Although he and his brother Gijsbert (later secretary of the city) appeared before the commissioners of the Council of Troubles in 1567, no sentence was passed against them, and Thin was sent by the Estates on various diplomatic missions over the next ten years. In 1575, his requests for a permanent salaried position as the Estates' advocate were twice refused, 'for fear of the consequences', although the Estates freely admitted that they 'could ill spare his services'.(87) In the autumn of 1577, however, when the Estates were

taking over the full-time government of the province, they needed full-time officials, and Thin was sworn in as the Estates' advocate on 24 September. A few months later, it was laid down that he should attend all the Estates' sessions to take note of their resolutions. (The chapter of Ste. Marie, always conservative, objected to this proposal, but was overruled by the majority; St. Jan was firmly in favour of Thin's appointment.[88]) The city council stipulated that Thin's salary - then 600 guilders per annum - had been granted to him in recognition of his long and loyal service, and his unrivalled knowledge of the Estates' affairs: it was to cease at his death. In other words, the post of advocate was not to be regarded as a fixture.(89)

As the business of government increased, Thin worked his way into a position of such indispensability that the Estates reacted with considerable alarm to his occasional threats to resign from their service. They promised him an increase in salary - to 1,000 guilders a year - with special payments for particular tasks, such as 1,000 guilders for his work in drawing up the Hof's new instruction. Finally, in 1584, they appointed an assistant advocate, Hendrick Lyster, to ease Thin's work-load.(90) By this time, Thin's legal duties were minimal: the Estates' business had grown to such an extent that he had abandoned his own legal practice, and cases before the Hof were conducted by another advocate under Thin's direction. Lyster was appointed to help Thin by attending meetings of the Estates, the Standing Committee and some of the permanent commissions, by assisting at the audit of the Estates' accounts, drafting letters, placards, orders for payment and other documents, and by taking part in the

execution of the Estates' resolutions.(91) The advocate himself did all these things, and more: at various times in his career, he had drafted and signed all documents concerning the domains, acted for the city in its cases before the Hof, and spoken on behalf of the Ridderschap during their absence from the Estates.(92) Like his counterpart in Holland, Thin was the Estates' spokesman in their relations with the outside world: from November 1576, soon after the Pacification of Ghent, he was one of their most frequent delegates to the Estates-General, and he was often employed on negotiations with Utrecht's neighbours, in which he was given considerable latitude to use his own discretion, though he could not make commitments for the Estates without their permission.(93) As one of the main instigators of the Closer Union of Utrecht, Thin was a significant force in the affairs of all the United Provinces.(94) By 1585, the Estates were so dependent on him that he could virtually dictate his own terms of employment: the Estates agreed to pay his full salary for the rest of his life if he should be prevented by any circumstance from living in Utrecht or from carrying out his duties.(95)

The Estates' esteem for their advocate was not shared by the whole political community, however: a few months after this contract was concluded, Thin was suspected of delaying Nieuwenaar's permanent appointment as Stadholder. The burgerhoplieden warned Thin that people in the city were abusing him as 'a scoundrel, a traitor, not fit to be hanged by the neck, who should be hanged by the heels'.(96) These opinions, and popular dislike of his tolerant religious views, were undoubtedly reflected in Thin's expulsion from Utrecht, with 59 others, in July 1586, less than a month after he had been entrusted

with some rather delicate dealings with Holland, about Oudewater's interference with Stichtenaars.(97)

The absence of such an important and active official contributed greatly to the Sticht's administrative confusion under the Prouninck régime, the more so because Thin took with him into exile the registers, papers, muniments and other documents of these Estates and this province, which he repeatedly refused to send back to Utrecht. Early in 1587, in response to a request from Thin for his salary, the Estates cancelled the agreement of March 1585, and resolved never again to admit pensionaries to their meetings: henceforward, an advocate's place was to be in court. So strongly did the city council feel on this point that it was made one of the terms of the compromise with the other two Estates in February 1587, after which the council went on to engineer Thin's dismissal from his post. Faced with unemployment, Thin promised to hand over the papers in his keeping, in return for a pension of 200 guilders per annum.(98) The advocate's exile lasted only until September 1588, however: with the rest of those banished in July 1586, he returned to Utrecht, and was reinstated in office, to resume his duties according to his instruction. He died less than two years later, in August 1590.(99)

While Thin was in exile, much of his routine work was carried out by the Estates' secretary, Johan Strick, the first holder of this office who did not combine it with the secretaryship of the Dom chapter.(100) The secretary's own duties were many and varied: he was responsible for the dispatch of letters of summons to meetings of the Estates, and for the secrecy of the Estates' records, for it is not

desirable that the protocols should fall into many hands'.(101) A further memorandum instructed the secretary to keep note of those present at the meetings of the Estates and the Standing Committee and to compile registers of the instructions, commissions, minutes of letters and orders for payment issued by his masters.(102) Moreover, the secretary drew up and presented the Estates' accounts for audit: in this, as in some of his other work, he was helped by the secretary of the city council. Although the secretaryship was not as well paid as the post of advocate (Lamsweerde earned 500 guilders a year), it was possible to use it to influence the Estates' policy and decision-making, as did Strick's successor, Gilles van Ledenberg. He entered the Estates' service as Thin's clerk, and became their secretary when Strick was dismissed for his part in the Leicestrian government (see Chapter VII, p. 217 below). After Thin's death, the position of advocate remained unoccupied for two years, leaving the way open for Ledenberg to fill the gap thus created in the administration. Furthermore, when the Estates failed to appoint Francois Vranck, the active and able ex-pensionary of Gouda, as their advocate, because of his personal objections to moving to Utrecht, they employed instead one Anthonis Kuyck, who proved unable to achieve the dominant position which Thin had held. In fact, he was appointed on the express condition that he should never attend a meeting of the Estates except at their invitation. On the death of the next advocate in 1610, the Estates decided to leave the post vacant, whereupon the office of secretary grew in importance and became more lucrative.(103) This decision may well reflect the city's abiding dislike of the office of advocate and the power its holder could exercise over provincial government: perhaps the citizens feared the possibility of

another Oldenbarnevelt in the Sticht. Instead, for nearly thirty years, Ledenberg was Oldenbarnevelt's loyal follower.(104)

Although certain individuals - Thin, Prouninck or Ledenberg, for instance - could sometimes exert considerable influence over the Estates, they could do little to speed up the workings of the somewhat cumbersome procedures outlined in this chapter. The debate over the elevation of William of Orange to hold the 'high authority' over the Sticht illustrates the Estates' leisurely methods of dealing with even such important matters as this. The issue was first raised in 1581, as a corollary to the Abjuration of Philip II. Several months passed before any positive action was taken; then, in November, an ad hoc commission was, as usual, delegated to examine the conditions on which the offer would be made.(105) In March 1582, the assembly decided to put these terms to each Estate separately: the colleges on 12 March, the city on 13 March and the Ridderschap, at a specially summoned meeting, on 14 March. Deputies were also to be sent to the small towns to discover their views. As might have been expected, however, it took a little longer than that: the Ridderschap did meet as planned, and voted to give Orange the authority on more or less the proposed terms, but, in the city, the question of the abolition of the First Estate intervened, so that the council did not consider the 'high authority' issue until 23 April.(106) Similarly, as the chapters were being excluded from the political sphere, they could not be allowed to examine an important document like these draft terms: St. Jan, naturally enough, said that in those circumstances it could not resolve on the matter. In Amersfoort, the sitting magistrates

consulted a number of their predecessors.(107) A deputation was eventually sent to Orange, in June, to discuss both the 'high authority' and the abolition of the First Estate. But nothing more was done about the former, for fear that closer connections with Holland and Zeeland would alienate the Sticht's eastern neighbours.(108)

On the other hand, the Estates could sometimes take speedy and effective action in an emergency, though it must be admitted that this was the exception rather than the rule. In November 1582, for example, a serious crisis arose when four ensigns of cavalry and eight infantry companies in the Estates-General's service descended, unpaid, on the Sticht. A full meeting of the Estates, with representatives from all four small towns, assembled on 7 November, and continued in daily session until 14 November, concentrating almost exclusively on making arrangements for the payment and billeting of these troops, and for their removal from the province, 'willy-nilly'. The Estates blamed this invasion on the other provinces, which, they claimed, had failed to produce their quota in the troops' wages. Nevertheless, after consultation with the Landraad, which was nominally responsible for military finance, the Estates agreed to advance the substantial (for Utrecht) sum of 16,075 guilders to pay the men off. Even the small towns, which were notoriously late with their contributions, paid up in a hurry to prevent the soldiers from extorting the money in their own way. Indeed, the Estates went so far as to resolve to take on extra troops, partly at their own expense, to preserve the Sticht from 'all further invasions and depredations from troops and soldiers', which were expected daily.(109)

Money and troops - these were the Estates' principal and inseparable problems. Because the war was so close and the need for money so pressing, the institutional development of the Estates could not take place in its own time; instead, circumstances forced them to undergo piecemeal change, at a perhaps unnaturally accelerated pace. Nevertheless, in the years under review, the Estates visibly changed from a part-time institution with a varying membership to a permanent governmental organisation, with its own executive committee, made up of much more experienced administrators. Yet, while on the surface this structure may have appeared to function fairly smoothly, in fact the Estates faced almost insuperable difficulties in what became their primary purpose: the raising of money to pay the troops. Their struggle to meet the demands made on them by this aim is the subject of the next chapter.

Chapter IV

The Estates' finances

From their earliest beginnings, representative institutions in the Low Countries, as elsewhere, were principally pre-occupied with finance and taxation.(1) The Estates of Utrecht were no exception: from the outset of their independent existence, they were concerned above all else with the collection and disbursement of money. The first full session for which records survive (17 February 1577) was convened to discuss certain immediately pressing financial obligations (the 50,000 guilders demanded by Bossu to pay off his troops; the costs of the recently successful siege of the fortress of Vredenburg; and the 200,000 guilders promised to Philip II in lieu of the Tenth, Twentieth and Hundredth Pennies) and to consider proposed new taxes to meet these obligations. That meeting established a pattern of delay and procrastination in financial matters, a pattern which could be broken only in times of extreme emergency: Bossu's soldiers were driven out of the city in April 1577 by the irate townspeople; the payments for the siege remained an item in the Estates' accounts for years, and the 200,000 guilders for the king provoked a serious internal dispute.(2)

The prospects for new taxation were far from bright. The Sticht had suffered so severely from the ravages of war in the 1570s, that a plough can hardly go freely in the fields, nor can the land be sown nor the corn harvested in peace; no ox, nor cow, nor horse, nor pig,

nor sheep can graze in the fields without being taken by soldiers of one side or the other.(3) While the Estates undoubtedly had an interest in making themselves out to be as poor as possible, the royal governor, Hierges, who had no such axe to grind, described the situation in the towns in equally gloomy terms: he protested to the Council of State that the two companies of Spanish cavalry billeted in Wijk were the reason that most of the citizens must now beg their bread in God's name, for they have sold all their pewter, copper and garments, like the other small towns in the district, without hope of improvement.(4)

Moreover, the Estates' existing financial resources were quite inadequate for their new needs. Habsburg revenues derived from the Netherlands as a whole were of two kinds: firstly, the 'domains', or income from the sale of natural products (grain, cattle or poultry) and of certain rights, for example to mill or to collect tolls. After 1552, these domains were increasingly burdened with pensions and interest payments, and were also sold off for lump sums to private individuals to finance the French wars. They were therefore of little use to the Estates when they took over the administration of the domains from the Hof in 1584: between 1571 and 1575, for instance, interest payments owed by the domains amounted to nearly 17,500 guilders, and by January 1580, the debt had increased to 40,000.(5) Secondly, Charles V and Philip II counted on the 'aids' voted to them by the 'provinces accustomed to contributing together' in the assembly of the Estates-General. The other, 'non-patrimonial' provinces, Utrecht among them, contributed to only some of these aids.(6)

Since these aids were levied by the provinces not in proportion to the ability to pay, but in inverse proportion to the ability to resist, the rural population usually had to pay more than their fair share. In Utrecht, as in most of the provinces, patrimonial or otherwise, a general assessment of landed property formed the basis of the system.(7) The oudschildgeld, as it was called in the Sticht, had originally been introduced by the Regent Mary of Hungary in 1539, for an initial period of ten years, to pay off debts incurred by the bishop before the transfer of the temporality to Habsburg rule in 1528. From then on, it was levied at a rate of nine Flemish groats per oudschild, or unit of land value, payable by the user; in the case of rented land, half the tax was paid by the owner and half by the tenant.(8) In effect, this represented about the ninth penny [about eleven percent] of the entire income of the rural areas of Utrecht, out of which the Estates, as they informed the king, were often accustomed to pay their extraordinary expenses and obligations.(9) Not surprisingly, the land tax was extended indefinitely after the ten years were up, and furnished the security for the grants made by Utrecht to Charles V and Philip II. But by October/November 1576, the oudschildgeld was hopelessly inadequate for the Sticht's financial needs. For one thing, it was intended to yield a fixed annual sum: just over 23,669 guilders, of which approximately half was already earmarked for interest payments on loans raised between 1527 and 1575.(10) Moreover, the land register on which it was based was not fully comprehensive even in 1539, and had not been revised since, with the result that this yield could not be increased by the inclusion of newly reclaimed or cultivated land.(11) In addition, the first two

Estates reckoned that over the years 1571 to 1576 so much of the land had been left uncultivated that one-third of possible income had not been received, so that even interest payments could not be met.(12)

This serious shortage of cash, when it was believed that the mutinous Spaniards might descend on the city at any moment, clearly called for desperate measures. In November 1576, a deputation from the Estates appealed to Archbishop Schenk van Toutenberg for a temporary loan, offering an interest rate of 6 1/4 percent. The Archbishop, who had a reputation for parsimony, refused, threatening to protest to the Pope, the king of Spain, and other Catholic potentates and princes. The deputation then forced an entry into the palace and seized nearly 42,000 guilders from the archiepiscopal coffers. Schenk's complaints got short shrift from the provincial governor, Hierges, who pointed out that the prelate had come off lightly in comparison with the inhabitants of Antwerp and Maastricht. Apparently the Archbishop was so subdued by this response that he made no objection when the Estates 'borrowed' 20,000 guilders' worth of silverware from him three months later.(13) Indeed, the treasures of the Catholic Church were such an obvious source of funds that it is surprising that the lay authorities made no attempt to use them until early in 1578, when an order came from Archduke Mathias, the Council of State and the Estates-General, instructing the city's churches and religious houses to hand over all their 'unconsecrated silver'.(14) The five chapters, as the Church's political mouthpiece, naturally protested against this measure both to the Hof, as the body representing the Brussels government in the Sticht, and to the

Archduke himself.(15) But at least two of the chapters had already secretly taken steps to convert many of their valuables into currency for their own use, thus reducing greatly the treasure available to the government: the Dom, for example, melted down silver and gold objects worth 12,560 guilders, to pay off its own debts, before the order was published, and a further 3,626 guilders' worth afterwards.(16)

Expedients such as this could be no more than temporary, however, and very early in their recorded proceedings, the Estates resolved to explore all possible ways of raising money.(17) In keeping with the Sticht's fiscal tradition, they turned first to direct taxation: a capitation, 'of each according to his quality' was levied in the city in 1577. Although this apparently met little outright resistance, it was not promptly paid, and a similar scheme later in the year was unsuccessful.(18) This was the attempted introduction of a chimney tax, which had a useful by-product in the chimney-count discussed above (Chapter II, note 2), but collected very little money, as the city council refused to carry out the imposition (which was designed to raise demobilisation pay for Bossu's soldiers) until the troops had left Utrecht.(19) In any case, the Estates intended to reimburse the chimney tax payers from future revenues once the soldiers had been paid off. The principle of direct taxation suffered another blow in 1578, when the Estates-General called for a levy of a Hundredth Penny (1 percent) on all incomes, just as Alva had done in 1569. The Estates hoped to use this money to pay their debts to the province of Holland, but their efforts to raise it met with determined opposition in many rural areas, particularly in the quarters of Montfoort and Eemland.(20)

Whether or not these attempts were successful, they were clearly no more than temporary expedients, like sequestering the Archbishop's silver. The real need, in the autumn of 1576, was for a reliable, permanent tax to supplement - and indeed supersede - the oudschildgeld, to supply the 200,000 guilders promised to the Council of State in lieu of the Tenth, Twentieth and Hundredth Pennies. This was the main subject of discussion in the months following the Pacification of Ghent, and the nature of the proposed new 'securities' (i.e. for loans) immediately became a political issue with the Estates divided two-to-one, as usual. As landowners, the clergy and gentry favoured the introduction of indirect taxation, in the form of a levy on 'goods and merchandise', or consumer commodities such as wine and beer, in view of the 'poverty of the countryside'.(21) The city and towns, on the other hand, maintained that this would discriminate against them, and called for a tax on tithes and landed property as well, to spread the burden more equitably. Faced with a majority in the Estates, the towns were forced to give way, insisting meanwhile that these new 'imposts' were to be employed only to pay off the 'aid' of 200,000 guilders.(22)

The imposts were finally decreed by an ordinance of January 1577, whereby all inhabitants of the province - rural or urban, cleric or lay - were to pay a specified sum when purchasing a wide range of commodities, from wheat and rye to soap and silk, and from peat to beer (foreign and domestic), wine and brandy.(23) These duties continued to cause dissension, however: very soon the income from them was being used to discharge other debts, much to the annoyance of the

small towns, who later used this as an excuse for non-payment.(24) Nor were the disputes over the imposts merely a division between the first two Estates and the Third: there was a rift between the city and the other towns as well, since the former did at first hand over most of the proceeds to the provincial treasury, albeit reluctantly, while the small towns kept the money firmly under their own control, and refused to treat the imposts as a provincial tax at all. The accounts for 1580-81 record that no imposts were received from the four towns 'because of their notorious opposition'; for their part, the city magistrates soon grew tired of bearing more than their share of the tax burden, and also decided to appropriate the imposts for their own use: for the fortification of the city, for instance.(25) Despite repeated attempts by the Estates to resolve this dispute by arbitration (either by a committee nominated by the towns or by a higher authority such as the Stadholder), the towns would not compromise or submit to intervention from outside the province. Moreover, since it proved impossible for the Estates' officials to collect the imposts in rural areas, because of 'the passage and billeting of our own troops and the violent incursions of the enemy', the imposts ceased to figure significantly in the Estates' incomes, and became 'without any controversy, the concern only of the towns'.(26)

One of the principal reasons for the towns' intransigence over the imposts was the fact that the municipalities needed them to pay for another fiscal innovation of the 1570s and 1580s - the so-called 'monthly quota', contributed by some of the provinces to finance the

war. Not that the quota system itself was new: in fact, the oldest known allocation of contributions to the aids dates from 1462, and as new provinces came under Burgundian or Habsburg rule, they were assigned a proportion of the aid as their quota. (In the 1540s, Flanders and Brabant contributed 62.5 percent of the aids between them; Utrecht's share was one-tenth of Holland's, or about 1.3 percent of the total.[27]) At that time, the contributions were raised as each province saw fit; after the Pacification, however, the Estates-General tried to introduce general excise duties - the generale middelen - which were to be levied at the same rate in all the provinces.(28) Utrecht was not alone in objecting to this scheme, in spite of the advice of two of the Sticht's most experienced politicians, Floris Thin and Floris Heermale, who pointed out that the new taxes were quite tolerable, and, in any case, would probably outlast their lifetime.(29) No province was willing to introduce these duties until it was sure that all the rest would introduce them too: Utrecht, for instance, was afraid of losing trade and craftsmen across the border to Gelderland.(30) Besides, the Estates felt that to be treated as a patrimonial province, like Holland and Zeeland, would leave...a bad after-taste.(31) Even when the generale middelen were finally put into effect in the Sticht, for a provisional three-month period in 1578, the city council insisted that the money should not be released until neighbouring provinces had taken the lead.(32)

The principle of uniformity was firmly re-stated in the Union of Utrecht, in January 1579: "it is agreed that in all the united provinces there shall be imposed, levied, and either publicly let out to the highest bidder...or collected...uniformly and on the same

footing, for the general defence of these provinces, certain duties on all sorts of wines, foreign or domestic beers, the grinding of corn or cereals, on salt, gold, silver and woollen clothes, on horned cattle and seeded fields, on slaughtered beasts, on the sale and exchange of oxen and horses, on goods brought to the weigh-houses, and such other duties as may be agreed upon by common advice and consent. (33) Yet provincial particularism defeated this scheme as well, and these duties were never implemented on a federal basis. Most of them were, however, introduced into Utrecht at a provincial level, under the name of generale middelen (those on horned cattle and seeded fields being an exception), and were administered by the Estates themselves, not by officials of the Estates-General. Although the Estates conceded that the generale middelen were 'the most equitable tax one could imagine, and the least hurtful to the community and to each individual', they would never agree to increase the rate at which they were levied to equal the rate in Holland and Zeeland - not even to please the Earl of Leicester. (34)

It was from these generale middelen that the Estates met most of their share in the monthly quota. This began in 1578 as an agreement to pay 2,500 guilders, monthly, for six months; after the Union of Utrecht, the amount increased to 6,000 per month; later in 1579, it doubled to 12,000 guilders, though that level could not be maintained, and in December of that year, it fell to 10,000 guilders each month. As Parma achieved increasing military and diplomatic success in the South, the Estates-General's need for money grew, and the burden fell on fewer and fewer provinces: by September 1581, the Sticht had to find as much as 13,000 guilders every month. (35) In 1584, the four

remaining 'contributing provinces' - Holland, Zeeland, Utrecht and Friesland - resolved on a joint monthly budget of 200,000 guilders, in which Utrecht's allocation amounted to about 13,290 guilders, or one-tenth of Holland's.(36)

Despite an increase of over 100 percent in the Sticht's revenue from the generale middelen between 1579-1580 and 1585-1586, the Estates could never satisfy the Estates-General's demands for money. Six weeks after their first promise in 1579 to pay 12,000 guilders within a month, they had collected no more than 950 guilders towards this total.(37) Special committees were set up to devise ways of meeting the Sticht's obligations. The revenues from other taxes (the imposts, the oudschildgeld) were pressed into service to make up the deficits.(38) At one point in 1581, the central authorities seem to have taken it for granted that Utrecht's quota for June would still not have been fully paid by August, but towards the end of September, pressure on the Estates to pay June's contribution was increasing.(39) It soon proved so difficult to put the standard generale middelen into effect outside the towns (and, in any case, the estimated yield was so small) that the Estates decided instead to impose first a surcharge on the basic land tax, then a fixed levy on craftsmen and tradesmen in the rural villages (known as the consumption tax) and finally, an extra land tax at twice the usual rate.(40)

Still it was not enough: when Leicester's arrival in 1585 brought new financial demands, the Estates protested that their 'coffers are empty and bare from paying previous monthly quotas and other extraordinary costs'.(41) In September 1585, only two-thirds of the

monthly quota could be obtained; the Estates therefore entered into negotiations with the towns and with certain individuals, to raise a loan of 40,000 or 50,000 guilders. If this could not be done by the usual methods, a representative was to be sent to the Amsterdam money market, to 'pledge all the Estates' property and revenues, as well as the persons and property of the [province's] inhabitants'.(42) Thus the generale middelen became mortgaged to pay the interest on these loans, and yet more fiscal expedients had to be sought to relieve this ever-increasing burden, especially as it was estimated in January 1588 that the yield from the generale middelen was about to fall considerably, even in the towns.(43) The situation became so serious that the Estates warned the Estates-General that they could not pay their ordinary quota, and debated 'whether it would not be advisable to accept no higher obligation than we have means to pay'. Finally, in May 1587, they resolved unilaterally to reduce their contribution by half, to one-twentieth of Holland's, a reduction which remained in effect for about a year.(44) After the return of the exiles in 1588, however, the Estates were anxious to show their loyalty to the 'common cause' by resuming their 'old quota' in the regular monthly 200,000 guilders. For this purpose, they increased the rates of some duties, especially those on beer, because 'it is easier and less hateful for the community to increase existing taxes than to introduce new ones'.(45)

But not even this display of patriotism could bring the Estates to agree to another in a long series of 'extraordinary' levies, proposed by the Council of State or the Estates-General to raise money for specific objectives. In March 1589, the goal was the defence of

Bergen and Tholen; ten years earlier, a 'voluntary generous extraordinary contribution' had been required for the relief of Maastricht, for which the Estates had to float a special loan, since, even in 1579, their other revenues were all committed.(46) In 1585, when Antwerp was under siege, the Estates-General suggested another 'voluntary contribution' (and a day of prayer) from all the provinces to save the city from Parma. But the Estates of Utrecht, thinking 'that only the willing would burden themselves with this', preferred to finance directly a number of troops to go to Antwerp's aid: unfortunately, no money could be raised for this purpose before the news reached Utrecht, secretly, that Antwerp had decided to negotiate with Parma.(47) Shortly afterwards, Leicester demanded an extra 400,000 guilders from the provinces for a field army, of which the Sticht's share was to be 26,581 guilders.(48)

Since the regular generale middelen were not sufficient even for the routine expenses of the war, these extraordinary requirements had to be met by various extraordinary expedients. Private individuals sometimes had to advance money to the Estates out of their own pockets, and hope for payment from future revenues: indeed, at one time the Estates held a list of wealthy men and women who would always keep certain sums to hand, for the Estates to borrow, interest-free, in an emergency.(49) At other times, the Estates would raise loans from merchants, using the credit either of individuals (soon exhausted) or of the city council, or the Amersfoort magistracy: the latter was considered to be good for only 2,000 guilders, however.(50)

Loans were necessary to meet even the Estates' ordinary obligations, and were floated in time-honoured fashion, by the sale of renten or annuities. Indeed, the whole structure of provincial finance, in Utrecht as in the other provinces, was dependent on annuities, since the city and towns used the same method to raise money for the Estates. An annuity has been defined as 'a single lump sum paid to the [Estates] by an investor who in return received...payments at an agreed rate for a pre-determined time'.(51) The investor could be an individual or a corporate body such as a town, a village, or a religious institution, and the annuities were usually of two kinds: redeemable annuities and those issued for the lifetime of one, two or three persons. In the first case, the government had to continue its interest payments until the entire principal had been repaid, a process which could take generations (in the 1580s, the oudschildgeld was still paying off annuities sold some fifty years earlier). For that reason, it is understandable that governments generally preferred to sell life-annuities, since these had a foreseeable limit, although they usually carried higher interest rates, and were often attached to the lives of very young children.(52)

As the years passed, and the Estates' need for money grew more desperate, ever-larger loans were raised by the sale of annuities; the Estates got further into debt and more and more revenues were mortgaged in advance, or indeed handed over as security (in December 1589, for example, the Estates gave the city council control of the generale middelen in return for a loan of 25,000 guilders, to

be raised by the sale of annuities of both kinds at a variety of interest rates. As the city council considered this security sufficient only for a loan of 10,000 guilders, the Estates were compelled to offer the single oudschildgeld as well - the only revenue still unencumbered enough to underwrite emergency loans).(53) By that time, the Estates had found that annuities issued in their name were no longer regarded as a worthwhile investment. Interest rates had been forced upwards: whereas, before the Revolt, 6 1 4 percent (the 'sixteenth penny') was the norm (indeed, the Habsburg government sometimes insisted on even less), during the financial crisis surrounding the fall of Antwerp in 1585, the Estates could not sell life-annuities at 12 1 4 percent, and had to offer over 14 percent (the 'seventh penny'). In 1589, redeemable life annuities were offered at the still higher rate of the 'sixth penny'.(54) The Sticht was not alone in this: in Holland, at the same time, a rate of 12 percent to 13 percent was common for annuities. Yet it appears that during the late 1570s and the 1580s, the Estates never formally suspended payment on their renten, unlike their hard-pressed neighbours in Holland, who stopped paying all interest in 1575, for two years.(55) It is clear, however, that the Estates often fell behind with their interest payments, since, under pressure, they would call on their available resources to discharge arrears, or even to redeem some annuities completely, as they did after the riots in the city in August 1583.(56)

While these three taxes - the oudschildgeld, single and double, the imposts, and the generale middelen and their substitutes - formed the bulk of the province's regular income, the Estates did at times derive revenue from certain other sources as well. Customs duties, which had been levied on goods exported to Amsterdam, for instance, were ruled out by the Union of Utrecht.(57) Nor could the Sticht profit very much from the 'convoy and licence' dues introduced by the Estates-General, because Holland insisted that duties on goods coming down the Rhine should be collected only at the final destination (i.e. Holland), and not at any intermediate point of trans-shipment such as Utrecht.(58) The domains did not yield a great deal of money either: apart from their inherited debts, the domains were supposed to be responsible for the salaries of important officials like the Stadholder. Orange's salary rose from 1,200 guilders per annum in 1578, to 4,000 in 1581, of which the domains could pay only one quarter. Other revenues therefore had to be called upon to discharge the domains' debts.(59)

In addition to the royal domains, the Estates took over all the incomes from the Archbishop's 'tithes' (tienden). These were not tithes in the sense of one-tenth of crops or livestock given to the Church; rather they were the revenues from certain areas of land in various parishes, on which specified crops were traditionally grown.(60) The tithes belonging to the five collegiate churches could not be so easily acquired, however, as the chapters' possessions were exempt from the otherwise general secularisation of Church property.

The Estates did their best to tap what the Amersfoort magistracy called 'the principal wealth' [of the Catholic Church] by taxing the tithes, by an amount which increased from 10 percent in 1578 to over 14 percent in the mid-1580s. Since many tithes had fallen into lay hands over the years, a tax on them affected members of the Ridderschap as well. To begin with, the chapters cooperated - sometimes willingly, sometimes under pressure - but by 1587, the tax on tithes was considerably in arrears.(61)

The city and the towns were at all times enthusiastically in favour of a tax on tithes which would strike at the first two Estates. Equally naturally, on the other hand, the Third Estate consistently opposed another of the Estates' fiscal schemes: a resolution in September 1579 that the towns should jointly contribute one thousand guilders each month, over and above all other taxes, the money to be administered along with the generale middelen. Although the city originally approved this proposal, it never produced its full share of the levy (600 guilders) on time, while the small towns, particularly Amersfoort, repeatedly objected to their assessment relative to Utrecht's.(62) The city continued to pay its share, after a fashion, until 1584, usually with the money from the imposts: the city council was prepared to grant the Estates either the imposts or its monthly 600 guilders, but not both; the small towns, however, contributed no more than an occasional lump sum in exceptional circumstances.(63) Indeed, out of a supposed income of 12,000 guilders from this source for the year 1585-86, the Estates' receiver recorded only 754 guilders, most of which came from Montfoort, usually much the most difficult of the towns.(64) Like the imposts, the issue of the

division of this forced loan among the towns became extremely contentious: committees of arbitration, which were supposed to represent all parties concerned, were summoned but never met, and the dispute interfered with the Estates' financial administration to such an extent that the Estates-General finally intervened in 1589. In the end the towns accepted the judgment of the new Stadholder, Maurice of Nassau.(65)

These, then, were the sources from which the Estates derived their income. Each tax was known as a 'chamber' or 'fund' (comptoir) and had its own 'receiver' (ontvanger) who was responsible to the Estates, usually through the Standing Committee, for its collection and administration. Quite often one man was the receiver for several chambers at once: in the mid-1580s, for instance, Niclaes van Berck, a canon of St. Jan and a member of the Geeligerden, held the chambers of the single and double oudschildgeld, the consumption tax and the Archbishop's tithes.(66) In theory, receiverships were meant to change hands annually, and to be held by a member of each Estate in turn, but in practice the same man would continue in office for years, like van Berck, or else the same Estate would nominate his successor, as the city council appointed the receiver of the imposts in 1581 and 1582. In some cases, the office of receiver was handed down from father to son, and if a receiver died, his heirs were held responsible for closing his accounts.(67)

As far as the method of collection is concerned, it seems that the oudschildgeld, like its predecessor the morgengeld, was supposed to be paid directly to its receiver in the city. In practice, since this was often difficult for tenants in outlying districts, it is probable that the schout gathered the money for his area and took it to the receiver.(68) The newer taxes (and the Archbishop's tithes), on the other hand, were farmed out to the highest bidder, on a three or six monthly basis, at public auctions held in each district at the beginning of each season.(69) The tax farmer, usually a local man, paid over to the receiver an agreed estimate of the yield of the tax, and the Estates found, on at least one occasion, that no amount of pressure would force one particular tax farmer to increase his bid above his own estimate of the revenue.(70) The tax farmer was then responsible for the collection of the duty at the point of sale, or at the mill or the weighhouse.

The alternative to farming out the taxes was direct collection by a representative of the Estates. Since the town council of Wijk had not introduced the generale middelen by November 1580, the toll-keeper there was authorised by the Standing Committee to collect the duties; when the town council continued uncooperative, a fixed monthly levy of 250 guilders was imposed on Wijk until the generale middelen 'are raised calmly and quietly, without any obstruction'. An attempt to return to tax-farming failed when the magistrates resisted payment of their own taxes, and the farmers asked to be relieved of their obligations.(71)

Whether the taxes were farmed or collected, the money had to be accounted for to the Estates. The tax-farmers' bids formed the receivers' estimated income: a receiver whose receipts fell short of this target had to make good the deficit out of his own pocket or see it carried forward into his accounts for the next year. If he paid up, he could do no more than hope for recompense from the following year's receipts.(72) Each receiver or tax-farmer had to have two guarantors, who were held liable if he defaulted.(73)

The administrative confusion prevalent in the 1580s is reflected in the delays - often as much as five years - before receivers presented their accounts for audit. Special commissions, which were periodically appointed to inquire into the Estates' finances, usually found that most receivers were seriously in arrears with the collection and expenditure of their chambers: in 1583, for example, it was revealed that money was still owing to the Estates from as far back as 1578, and a total of 20,200 guilders (a considerable sum by Utrecht's standards) was still outstanding just on the accounts which had been audited so far. In December 1589, a commission found that, every year, about 18,000 guilders from the funds destined for internal provincial obligations had to be devoted to the gemene zaak (the common cause).(74)

The procedure for auditing receivers' accounts also posed problems for the Estates. Under the Habsburgs, this had always been done by the President of the Hof, the chief accountant of Holland, and sometimes the Holland Chamber of Accounts (Rekenkamer) which took refuge in Utrecht in 1572.(75) After the disappearance of these royal institutions from the political scene, the Estates had to take the accounts into their own hands. At first, it was proposed to set up a committee with five representatives from the clergy and five from the Ridderschap, both burgomasters from the city and a representative from each of the small towns. This was thought to be too expensive an arrangement, however, and a later scheme recommended only three gentry "to avoid the great costs of these times", and a reduction in the number of town deputies.(76) As ever, the small towns protested that they were being excluded from the audit, and demanded two representatives at the accounting of all taxes; the Estates, on the other hand, held that the towns should have no representation at the audit of taxes to which they did not contribute.(77)

After 1590, the Estates' accounting procedures seem to have become more systematic, perhaps under the influence of Secretary Ledenberg, as the interval before audit was reduced to as little as one year, and the same experienced deputies regularly attended the audit. In the mid-seventeenth century the provincial bureaucracy swelled to include a Chamber of Accounts, similar in its functions to the Rekenkamer in Holland.(78)

The problems of auditing the accounts faded into insignificance beside the difficulty of collecting the money from the tax-payers, inside and outside the towns. Far from improving after the mid-1570s, the plight of the farmers seems on the whole to have deteriorated; at any rate, in the late 1580s the Estates stepped up their protestations of rural poverty. In 1587, they declared that heavy taxation and the depredations of troops had produced a situation where 'the land itself, the very substance on which the wealth and the inhabitants of this province used to depend...has been almost reduced, may God improve it, to the same state as Gelderland and Overijssel'.(79) There certainly was severe and widespread devastation; the problem is - how was it caused and how far did it extend? Two examples, from the north-western and south-eastern corners of the province respectively, may help to answer this question. The villages of Kortenhoef and Ankeveen informed the Estates in 1586 that their land had been flooded in 1570 and 1571; since then they had been repeatedly raided by the enemy; the previous year, the villages had been plundered and their livestock stolen: they asked for a reduction of their taxes 'so that they could breathe a little'. At the same time the land around Rhenen was described as 'a desert and unusable'.(80) Although the Estates' scorched-earth policies were not quite all-embracing, some of the devastation in the Sticht was undoubtedly self-inflicted: in 1585, when the Spanish general Verdugo was about to invade the Veluwe, all mills in the Eemland quarter were rendered useless, and all stocks of grain were stored inside walled towns.(81)

In such circumstances, the Estates were sometimes prepared to grant remission of certain taxes, in whole or in part, or at least to extend the time allowed for payment, if a claim was submitted in the proper form.(82) To take an admittedly extreme example, in May 1587, eighteen individual inhabitants of the village of Amerongen claimed a total of 17,107 guilders in compensation for damage to property, crops destroyed, livestock lost or ransomed, and personal inconvenience such as capture by the enemy or forced moves into the towns: all this had been sustained in the two years since the Spanish victory nearby in June 1585. It is not clear how much compensation was awarded.(83) Land that had been rendered uncultivable by the troops of either side was freed from the double oudschildgeld in 1587, while uninhabited villages were decreed to be no longer liable for the consumption tax.(84) In the harsh financial climate of 1590, however, the oudschildgeld was demanded from villages previously exempt, but to no avail, as Eemland and the Overkwartier were still heavily in arrears: indeed, the Overkwartier, previously known as 'the grain-store of the Sticht', had been 'thoroughly laid waste'.(85)

Devastation was not the only reason for the failure of the rural areas to pay their taxes. In January 1584, the Estates learned that parts of Eemland and the Overkwartier, the districts closest to the 'no-man's land' between the two armies, had been paying protection money (verdinggeld) to the enemy.(86) Extortion of this kind by the armies of both sides was nothing unusual - indeed, from 1579 onwards, a regular 'contributions system' in the southern provinces played an important part in financing Parma's army - but it seems to have been

practised very efficiently in the later 1580s by Thomas Grammaye, Philip II's 'steward' (rentmeester) for the Veluwe.(87) From his base at Deventer, he sent demands for cash to villages in vulnerable areas of Utrecht, threatening to hand recalcitrant Stichtenaars over to the king's troops for ransom.(88) The Estates reacted by issuing a stringent prohibition of any payment of protection money, imposing a fine of four times the sum involved, and arresting those who acted as go-betweens in the negotiations, such as the priest of Kortenhoef, who was said to have gone to Zutphen on behalf of several villages.(89) But these measures were fruitless: as the eastern villages continued to reach agreements with Deventer, the Estates could only wish, with resignation, that they received as much in taxes as the enemy did in protection money. By January 1590, 'seeing that there are as yet no means available to protect the farmers', the Estates were compelled to turn a blind eye to the Overkwartier's dealings: indeed, they soon came to accept that some of their own members had paid Grammaye, with the Stadholder's knowledge and permission. It was not thought advisable to appoint these men to office, however, and the Estates-General were kept in the dark.(90)

As well as the Spanish soldiers, the Estates-General's own unpaid troops terrorised the countryside from their bases in the towns, 'taking from the farmer not only the means of paying his taxes, but almost all he has to eat in his house and making it difficult for him to take in his crop at this time of harvest'. When Nieuwenaar's cavalry were let loose in the Sticht, 'much blood was shed in various places'.(91) In response to this problem, the Estates evolved a scheme whereby selected villages paid their consumption tax and double

oudschildgeld directly to certain nearby military commanders, who in turn undertook to protect 'their' villages from raids by other troops. It appears that this plan, for all its good intentions, was limited and unsystematic in its application.(92)

Since 'the best and greatest part of the Sticht is entirely spoilt and lying desolate', the Estates had to look to the towns for much of their revenue.(93) In many ways this was a vain hope, however: protected as they were by long-standing privileges, the towns could not really be forced to pay against their will: the monthly levy of 1000 guilders (p. 100-101 above) is a case in point. Moreover, the towns shared in the province's general economic problems, since much of their income was derived from the marketing of farm produce, and must have suffered from the rural devastation.(94) In any case, Wijk, Rhenen and Montfoort were very small, and the first two were undoubtedly in a state of decline. Although Wijk still collected a toll from ships on the Lek, it had lost much of its *raison d'être* with the disappearance of the bishops from the provincial scene (Wijk was their country seat). Rhenen's river trade had suffered a death blow when its toll was moved to Wijk in 1483, and the Estates knew they could not demand much from it after a serious fire in 1585. On one of the rare occasions when the burgomaster of Rhenen brought some money to the Estates on the town's behalf, much of it was foreign coin, and therefore useless.(95) It is true that Amersfoort was significantly larger than its fellows, and at one time had a flourishing brewing industry, but the magistracy complained bitterly, after the introduction of the generale middelen, of the loss of Amersfoort's

trade, industry, and indeed population, to lower-taxed places across the provincial borders in Gelderland, for example.(96) The bulk of the Estates' urban income therefore had to come from Utrecht itself, which had retained a certain amount of brewing, textiles and service industries, though it had lost its principal medieval function, as ecclesiastical capital of the Netherlands. For these and other reasons, tax-collecting in the towns was no easier than it was in the countryside. The city council's initial efforts to levy a chimney tax, to defray Utrecht's share of the monthly thousand guilders, provoked unrest among the townspeople, and was abandoned, at least temporarily. A proposed house tax for the same purpose met the same fate.(97) As far as the provincial taxes were concerned, the towns frequently deducted at source revenues claimed by the Estates, to pay troops billeted on them.(98) Furthermore, the magistrates refused to cooperate with the Estates' officials or to protect them from the anger and, occasionally, violence of the citizenry.(99) Riots, such as those in Utrecht in August 1583, made the city council reluctant to increase taxes for fear of further commotion, while at the same time the farmers of the taxes on beer and milling protested that they dared not collect the money for fear of their lives. These riots frightened the magistrates of Utrecht and Amersfoort to such an extent that, a few months later, they 'would not dare to suggest' bringing the generale middelen up to the level of Holland and Zeeland.(100)

The Estates had various powers at their disposal to compel individuals or whole communities to pay their taxes. (It appears, however, that these powers were exercised more often in the early part of the period: towards the end of the 1580s, the granting of remission became more common.) The schout and the village court faced loss of office if they did not inform the Estates of the names of defaulters.(101) The Estates' officials could be assisted in the collection of arrears by the city militia; if villages still proved unwilling, the Estates would threaten to billet troops on them. (This could be self-defeating, however, since it cost the villages so much to maintain the troops that they could pay no taxes for as much as six months after the soldiers left.[102]) More frequently, goods or livestock belonging to an individual or to a village could be seized in lieu of tax arrears, or until the money was forthcoming.(103) Alternatively, private citizens such as tax farmers could be imprisoned until their guarantors paid up, while village officials and town magistrates could be arrested as surety for the taxes owed by their communities or to force them to declare the taxable resources of their jurisdictions.(104) Even the Vice-domdeken was placed under house arrest in 1581 to enforce the Estates' tax on the cathedral's tithes.(105) And when Amersfoort was seriously behind with the payment of the double oudschildgeld, the Estates' Standing Committee stopped livestock entering the town; to enable the market to proceed freely, Hendrick Both and Herman Joostensz were held in the city while Amersfoort raised the first instalment of the debt. They swore a solemn oath to return to custody if later payments were not made on time. Their confinement does not seem to have been too harsh,

however: not only were their expenses paid by the town council, but Both was able to act as Amersfoort's representative in the Estates.(106) Seizure and imprisonment were unsatisfactory as sanctions, however: for one thing, they incur high costs and produce little friendship, as the deputies of Amersfoort and Wijk put it in 1583; for another, imprisonment was ineffective, at least in the case of one Willem van Rijswijck, who was relieved of his farm of the generale middelen in February 1589, and was still pleading for his release from gaol in August 1590.(107)

Whether or not the taxes were collected, there were financial obligations to be met. It appears that at the beginning of the period under consideration, expenditure was not very well organised, for in 1579, possibly in response to pressure from the city, the Estates laid down that no payment was to be made without a written authorisation, signed by three specially deputed members of the Estates.(108) This system worked adequately until the general breakdown of government caused by the dispute over the abolition of the Geeligeerden in 1586-87, when the city and towns took it upon themselves to send money to the garrison in Deventer and the Zutphen fort just as if the order had been signed as usual by a representative of each Estate.(109) Normally, however, these authorisations, coupled with the receipts (for example, from the Estates-General's treasury) formed the basis of the receivers' accounts.(110)

The most important of the Estates' financial obligations was their commitment to the gemene zaak, i.e. their monthly quota. This was met in two ways: firstly, by direct payment to the Estates-General's treasurer or his assistant; secondly, by supplying the commanders of the troops which were Utrecht's particular responsibility with cash for the soldiers' wages, or, more frequently, by reimbursing those who supplied them with food, drink or fuel. The 'repartition' system, introduced in 1578, was intended to give each contributing province a direct feeling of responsibility for the welfare of a section of the army. By 1592, Utrecht's repartition consisted of eleven companies of infantry, one of cavalry, plus their powder, shot and food. The resultant costs amounted to all but 3,527 guilders of the Estates' ordinary quota for that year.(111) The repartition payments were charged up to the monthly quota in the accounts: sometimes, however, money destined for the Sticht's own troops did not pass through the Estates' hands at all. The scheme for assigning the taxes from particular villages to local military units has been mentioned above (p. 107), but even when this arrangement was not in force, towns and villages understandably found it advisable to placate the troops on their doorsteps, rather than send the money to the Estates. This practice led, in turn, to claims from the towns and villages for tax-reductions.(112)

Compared with the monthly quota, the Estates' other financial commitments were small, though far from negligible. They included the servicing of annuities, the payment of officials' salaries, including a percentage of the income of each chamber for the receivers; and the

costs of administration, such as payments to the Secretary's clerks for copying the accounts and to the deputies who were present at the audit. Occasional lesser expenditures could be met out of a surcharge on the regular taxes, as the salaries of a number of Reformed ministers were paid from the generale middelen of 1585-86.(113)

Each of these financial obligations was assigned to a particular chamber, or fund, to be paid by its receiver. In 1581, for instance, the single oudschildgeld was made responsible for the interest on the annuities for which it was the security, and for the salaries of the permanent officials of the Estates and the Hof; the imposts were supposed to take care of their interest payments, subsidise deputies for attendance at meetings, and repay the loans made to the Estates by the Catholic clergy and the city for the relief of Maastricht; the general levy on the countryside (which had replaced the imposts there) was responsible for certain companies of cavalry, while the rest - the double oudschildgeld, the tithes, the generale middelen and the towns' extra thousand guilders a month - were required to discharge the monthly quota.(114) In an emergency, however, all chambers could be called upon to satisfy the Estates-General's demands, but in many cases there was very little left over after their assigned obligations had been met: of the 23,670 guilders expected from the single oudschildgeld in 1585-86, only 1,446 were reckoned against the monthly quota.(115)

This division of funds created certain problems, however. As the Estates admitted in 1587, 'the contributions [i.e. the province's taxes] are not paid every month, although the consented quota [to the Estates-General] must be paid every month'.(116) The receivers therefore operated by, so to speak, 'robbing Peter to pay Paul'. If, when a payment had to be made, there was no money in the designated chamber, the receiver responsible would borrow from another chamber against a promise of future repayment from his own. The promises of repayment were sometimes over-optimistic: in November 1580, for instance, Bernt Stell, the then receiver of the imposts, advanced 1,000 out of the 8,000 guilders granted for the relief of Steenwijk. By July 1586, when he rendered his accounts for audit, he still had not been reimbursed from the generale middelen as intended.(117)

This practice is only one of the factors making it extremely difficult to estimate the Estates' annual income and expenditure with any degree of accuracy. Another is the confusion of a private individual with his public office, so that receivers were sometimes held personally liable for the deficits of their chamber.(118) A third is the limitations of the archives themselves: the post-1550s accounts of the domains, for example, were destroyed in the nineteenth century, and even the best documented taxes, such as the generale middelen, are not available as complete series throughout the period.(119) The peculiarities of the Estates' accounting methods add to the confusion: in the first place, each chamber had its own fiscal year: the Archbishop's tithes ran from January to December; the single oudschildgeld was traditionally collected on the feasts of St. Martin

. John (11 November and 24 June); the imposts were reckoned from one Candlemas (2 February) to the next; and the tax year for the generale middelen finally settled down as May to April. In any case, money recorded in the accounts for one tax year was very often received or expended in another. Moreover, the accounts themselves may not always be reliable: at an investigation in 1583, it was found that the receiver Loef van der Haer had been misappropriating the oudschildgeld by delaying interest payments to the holders of annuities.(120) And if they were usually honest, the receivers were not immune from arithmetical errors, although none was as serious as the extra 10,000 guilders which Niclaes van Berck calculated he had paid to the army from the double oudschildgeld and consumption tax for 1585-1586.(121)

Nevertheless, it is possible to gain an impression, nothing more, of the sums involved for the year 1585-86, by which time neither the imposts in the towns nor the monthly thousand guilders contributed a significant amount to the provincial treasury. The following figures emerge, and it must be remembered that the actual total must have been considerably higher, since these represent only the income from regular sources, excluding the various extraordinary levies:

Income 1585-1586 [122] (to the nearest guilder)

| | |
|-----------------------------|--------|
| <u>Generale middelen</u> | 80,213 |
| Single <u>oudschildgeld</u> | 20,805 |
| Double <u>oudschildgeld</u> | 42,955 |
| Tithes | 5,258 |
| Consumption tax (country) | 30,456 |

TOTAL 179,678

Turning to the other side of the ledger, almost 144,873 guilders, or just over 80 percent of the income, was paid out in one way or another to the 'common cause'. A comparison of this figure with Utrecht's assigned annual quota of 159,840 guilders shows that the Sticht fell short by relatively little of the Hague's demands.(123)

All these figures, partial as they are, must be viewed in the wider context of the war. Although Utrecht's contribution seems like a drop in the ocean of the Estates-General's annual war budget (3.2 million guilders in 1591), it was nevertheless significant - and somewhat unusual - that the Sticht contributed to the gemene zaak at all, since several of its neighbours did not.(124) Utrecht, like the other provinces and towns, considered its own interests to be of paramount importance in determining how the money was to be raised and spent.(125) Some of the towns of Holland - Gouda was an extreme example - strongly objected to paying for the defence of the lost southern provinces, while Holland as a whole was in financial difficulties in the mid-1580s, and resented having to shoulder the

main burden of the war effort alone. Yet Holland was prepared to help the Sticht, its "bulwark" against Parma, to prevent a repeat of the early 1570s; after the fall of Antwerp, for instance, the Estates of Holland responded to a plea from Floris Thin, by promising money and supplies for the garrisons in Utrecht.(126) By the same token, the Sticht occasionally advanced small sums to Gelderland, in the rather vain hope that the enemy could thus be kept at a distance.(127)

The problems of the Sticht reflected the problems of the Netherlands as a whole: as the military situation deteriorated, more and more money was required from ever-shrinking resources. Some reference has already been made (p. 94-95 above) to the increased financial demands in the years of Leicester's régime: even before the Earl's arrival, deputies were being harassed in the streets of the Hague by the Estates-General's creditors.(128) In 1586, Leicester's trade embargo cut off one of the provinces' main sources of revenue, the "convoy and licence" duties on trade with neutral or hostile countries. Nor did the English subsidy, irregular and late as it usually was, go far to compensate for this loss.(129) This shortage of funds provoked mutinies and defections in the army, for example at Deventer and the fort near Zutphen, which were betrayed to Parma by the Irish garrison in February 1587, and at St. Geertruidenberg, sold to Spain in April 1589, after prolonged negotiations, a threatened siege by Maurice of Nassau and the failure of the Estates-General's strenuous efforts to raise the troops' wages.(130)

In the early 1590s, when Parma's forces were diverted to the civil war in France, Maurice of Nassau began to carry the war into the enemy's camp, and achieved a series of successes, beginning with the capture of Breda in 1590. Admittedly, this change from the defensive to the offensive reduced the areas affected by Spanish protection levies in Gelderland, Overijssel and Utrecht, but it also entailed increased financial demands on the provinces.(131) The fiscal load on the Sticht grew far beyond its level in the 1580s, as the Estates turned once more to direct taxation to meet their increased quota. In 1598, for instance, they attempted to introduce a 5 percent tax on the rentable value of all houses, but this aroused such widespread opposition that it had to be 'suspended... for two or three months' in favour of a further duty on beer, salt and renten. That year saw other desperate measures: a supplementary oudschildgeld, a fixed levy on every village in the province, and (a new departure), a levy of 20,000 guilders on ecclesiastical property, including that of the five chapters.(132)

Even the addition of Groningen to the ranks of the contributing provinces in 1596, and the varying sums produced by Gelderland and Overijssel for the gemene zaak did little to relieve the over-burdened Estates of Utrecht, since the war grew more expensive every year. As the century drew to a close, the Estates' secretary lamented that he did not know where the next year's money was to come from.(134) The Estates themselves complained bitterly that 'in their singular zeal they have burdened themselves far beyond their capacity by their contributions to discharging the obligations of the war, and that they

are already so deep in debt that they can see no way out". The only consolation was that at last they had something to show for their money, as they could declare themselves extremely grateful to the Lord God Almighty for the great successes the United Netherlands have enjoyed, particularly in the last year (1597). (134)

Chapter V

The Estates and the Reformation

All over the Netherlands at this time civil authorities were preoccupied with the development of Reformed Protestantism. A number of circumstances combined to make the course of the Reformation in the Sticht different in some ways from the one it followed elsewhere, although there were certain marked similarities of timing between Utrecht and its neighbours. One of these circumstances was the city of Utrecht's position as ecclesiastical capital of the Netherlands, which it held until the reorganisation of the bishoprics in the 1560s. Although the Catholic Church in the province had resisted the Council of Trent's efforts towards internal reform, and was therefore vulnerable to attacks from outside, nevertheless the political predominance of the chapter clergy in the Estates must have done much to delay the advance of Protestantism in its early stages.

The religious troubles of 1566 left their mark on the Sticht: there were Reformed services in the countryside and in the city in August, and the city's four parish churches had their images broken. The inability of the Estates and the city council to deal effectively with these outbreaks, and the leniency of the agreement they made with the Reformed, were the main charges brought by the Council of Troubles under Alva.(1) The impact of the events of 1566-1567 was, however, largely confined to the city, although some villages were affected: in January 1567, for example, the priest and congregation of Nigtevecht,

in the extreme north of the province, turned Protestant: the priest was killed at the siege of Naarden, and the village was later ravaged by Spanish troops.(2)

Protestantism disappeared, or at least went underground, for the next ten years: outwardly, Utrecht was among the most Catholic of provinces, though a Reformed congregation 'under the cross' in the city did survive the persecution of the Spanish regime.(3) The changed political circumstances created by Utrecht's adherence to the Pacification of Ghent - even though the Estates entered into it 'salva religione Catholica'(4) - and, more importantly, by the Satisfaction with Orange in October 1577, gave the Reformation its chance. It is significant that the Satisfaction as it was signed was by no means as explicitly anti-Catholic as its original draft: Orange promised only 'not to hinder or prevent...the Roman religion as it has been observed and maintained from time immemorial until the present'.(5)

The first signs of the Reformation in the city became visible about this time, deriving not from the underground Reformed congregation, with its separate small groups meeting in private houses, but from one of the Catholic parish churches, St. Jacob, and its priest, Hubert Duifhuis, who preached openly in 1577 against images and other 'abuses' of the Papacy (6) It was Duifhuis and the congregation of St. Jacob - 'a union of non-Catholics who did not belong to one of the Protestant churches'(7) - who gave the Utrecht Reformation its peculiar character. His assertion that 'he would always exhort his flock to peace and subjection to their rulers' strongly recommended Duifhuis to the city council, which decided 'that

such a preacher is exceedingly useful to this city in these dangerous times, and paid him a salary from January 1578 onwards.(8) After a short absence from Utrecht in the summer of 1578, Duifhuis was asked to return by the city council, and was taken under its official protection. From August 1578, Catholic Mass and Reformed preaching existed side by side in St. Jacob, and the services, which combined elements of both, were, it appears, well attended by many members of the magistracy and the Estates.(9)

The particular appeal of Duifhuis's brand of Protestantism for the authorities lay not in the dogma taught in St. Jacob, which in 1581 was found to agree sufficiently closely with orthodox Calvinism, but in his views on church government and discipline, which he held to be 'a remnant of the Papal yoke'.(10) St. Jacob, therefore, had no elders or deacons, and no consistory: indeed, Duifhuis was officially forbidden to establish such a body in 1579.(11) But there was also another Reformed community in the city whose views on church discipline were much more stringently Calvinist than those of Duifhuis and his adherents. Under the leadership of Petrus Dathenus, who was on a short visit to Utrecht, this congregation asked the city council in August 1578 for a church in which to hold their services, but the request was refused until Archduke Mathias and the Estates-General should come to a decision on the proposed Religious Peace. Nevertheless, Dathenus' followers occupied the empty church of the Franciscans that night, and he preached there the following morning. Although this congregation received no official recognition until January 1579, when the appointment of Wernerus Helmichius was confirmed, and did not hold its first communion service until March of

that year, from then on there were two competing Protestant congregations in Utrecht, both increasing in numbers and employing more ministers to cope with their needs.(12)

While Reformed Protestantism was on the advance, Roman Catholicism was being forced into retreat. In January 1578, the Jesuits were asked to leave the city because of 'murmurings among the people' and a check was made on all monasteries to prevent the spreading of 'treasons' by itinerant monks.(13) The Franciscans were expelled later in the year, in response to pressure from a crowd which held the Catholic clergy responsible for Duifhuis's temporary absence: besides, in the autumn of 1576, there had been rumours of close contact between the Franciscans and the Vredenburg garrison.(14) This left the Franciscan church available for Reformed services.(15) The five chapter churches and other ecclesiastical institutions were also on the defensive in that year, being forced to give up many of their valuables to be melted down for the gemene zaak or the fortification of the city.(16) Furthermore, in April, the first of a series of expulsions from the city took place, of men (including the dean of St. Pieter, Willem Veusels, and two canons of Ste. Marie) who were suspect for political reasons, and were also staunch Catholics.(17)

The Roman clergy's increasingly feeble efforts to resist Reform were closely bound up with the political resistance of some of them to the Union of Utrecht (see Chapter II, pp. 29-30 above). Cuyntorff, the leader of the anti-Union movement, warned his fellow canons against Mathias's Religious Peace, which would, he thought, open the gates to Reformed Protestantism in Utrecht.(18) To begin with, the

five churches firmly opposed the scheme put forward by the city council for a 'union' with those of the 'allegedly reformed religion' but three weeks later they agreed to enter into negotiations with the magistrates.(19) The chapters' feeling of powerlessness in the face of hostile political and religious developments can be seen in the record of their meeting of 1 January 1579, when they resolved to request Cuyntorff's release 'with all civility'. If they could not resist such a serious violation of their clerical immunity from lay jurisdiction as the arrest of one of their number, how much less were the canons able to prevent the publication, on 11 January, of Utrecht's first 'religious peace'.(20)

The preamble to this document (which was issued on the city council's own authority, without reference to the Estates or the central government), attributed the growth of Protestantism to the war against Don John of Austria and his supporters after the Pacification: this had forced the Estates-General to implore 'many lords and surrounding provinces and a great multitude of foreign soldiers to come into these lands, who were almost all of other religions than the Roman, which has caused a great change in all things, and principally in the said obedience to His Majesty and the state of the Roman religion'. Its purpose was to remove discord by regulating the relations of the two religions within the city: it granted the Protestants the free use of the St. Jacob and Franciscan churches, with which they were to be satisfied; no insults or injuries were to be committed on religious grounds, and no worship of either kind was to be hindered.(21) The clergy's main objections, naturally enough, were to the provisions requiring them to pay excise taxes like laymen,

and to observe all ordinances and statutes of the magistrates, a point which was particularly resented in view of Cuyntorff's imprisonment.(22)

It is hardly surprising that the 'peace' did not last long, however 'politic' it may have been.(23) The Dominican friars were the next focus for popular dislike: on 2 June 1579 they were forbidden to preach, in the interests of public order. An appeal to the city council against this decision, by a Catholic deputation, who asked that 'everyone might be left free in his religion', provoked fighting between Catholics and Protestants just outside the town hall. According to the official record, bloodshed was narrowly averted; to pacify the angry Protestants, the Dominicans and a number of other 'suspect' persons were asked to leave the city. This, the most serious religious riot so far, coupled with the iconoclasm which followed in three of the city's churches, including that of the Dominicans, frightened the five chapters into asking the city council to revise the religious peace 'according to the circumstances of the time,...for the peace and welfare of the inhabitants of the city, both clerical and lay, of both religions'.(24) The new agreement was published, in haste, on 15 June, five days after the riot: it granted the Reformed the use of an additional two churches (including the Dominicans') for their services, and exhorted everyone to keep the peace.(25)

For the next nine months, Roman Catholicism, 'consistorial' Reformed Protestantism, and the hybrid religion practised in St. Jacob existed, somewhat uneasily, side by side in the city. Elsewhere in the province, the Reformation had not made such rapid progress, although the images of the principal Amersfoort churches were broken immediately after the siege in March 1579, and again in June: two churches were taken over for Reformed worship and two predikanten appointed.(26)

The final blow to Catholicism came in March 1580, with the news that Count Rennenberg, the Stadholder of Groningen and Friesland, had joined the side of Spain, and that Protestants had been ill-treated and killed in Groningen. In Utrecht, as in Friesland and Overijssel, the religious peace collapsed: a crowd attacked the Dom, hitherto unaffected by iconoclastic outbursts.(27) The burgerhoplieden urged the city council to introduce a Protestant programme, involving the Reformation of the orphanage and the Latin school, the prohibition of public Catholic worship and the exclusion from the Estates of all Catholics, with an end to the meetings of the chapters.(28) The clergy's protests to the Estates that they had always upheld the religious peace, and their appeals to Orange for support, were futile: the city council resolved to forbid the public exercise of Roman Catholicism within its jurisdiction.(29) Orange did his best to secure two churches for Catholic worship, and to preserve the last remnants of the religious peace, but in vain; three months later, on 18 June, Catholic worship was finally forbidden in the city and its environs.(30) The last public display of Catholicism took place on

30 August, at the funeral in the Dom of Archbishop Frederick Schenck van Toutenberg, when some of the onlookers sang the Protestant battle-song, Psalm 130 ('Out of the depths have I cried unto thee, O Lord') much to the displeasure of the Catholic clergy present.(31)

Again, the rest of the province followed, rather slowly, where the city led. After iconoclasm in Wijk, the church was taken over for Reformed services in March 1580; shortly afterwards, the magistracy appears to have opposed public worship for Catholics by stating that it was 'not at all advisable to introduce two different religions'. In October, the town council arrived at an amicable agreement with the clergy of Wijk's chapter church, St. John the Baptist.(32) In Amersfoort, Roman Catholic worship was also stopped, following more image-breaking, although, to begin with, this was seen as a purely temporary measure.(33) In Rhenen, the efforts of the magistracy to introduce Reform met with considerable opposition from the priest of the beguine convent, who was, in the end, expelled from the town.(34) (Montfoort, which as usual differed from the other towns, will be discussed at more length below.)

Outside the towns, the progress of the Reformation was slower still. The city council insisted that Catholicism should be prohibited in the countryside as well, but the Estates did nothing to this end for a year.(35) The placard was finally published in August 1581, but later violations necessitated its renewal at fairly frequent intervals.(36) The measures taken to introduce Protestantism to rural districts did not, however, meet with the approval of the Calvinist

predikanten in the city, who feared that the Reformation would not be introduced in the right way and according to the rule of the Holy Gospel.(37) It is clear that the Estates themselves distinguished between, on the one hand, ministers who were genuinely of the Reformed religion and, on the other, ex-priests who adhered to the placard of August 1581, gave no offence to the Reformed, preached God's word unadorned from the Old and New Testaments, and conducted baptisms according to Christ's institution.(38) The Estates did, however, demand certain minimum standards of Protestant practice from village ministers, in the administration of the sacraments of Holy Communion and Baptism, as we do not intend to permit any priests of the Roman religion.(39) The city's consistorial predikanten objected principally to the Estates' intention of reforming the countryside by sending three ministers such as (are) in the St. Jacob church here to the most Papist villages, in order to win the inhabitants away from Catholicism.(40) The authorities' lack of success in this direction is illuminated by a report from the Marshal of the Nederkwartier(41): hiding in a dry ditch before dawn one morning in the village of Maarssen, the Marshal's clerk observed the village priest hear the confessions of a man and a woman, before marrying them in the Roman manner, in the choir of the church.

Meanwhile, in the city itself, the opposition of the five chapters to another aspect of the Reformation - the secularisation of ecclesiastical property - was being steadily overcome by the Ridderschap and the towns, who do not believe that they should let the property of the clergy be lost because of the obstinacy of one

Estate'.(42) The chapters found that they could not rely on the help of their usual allies, the Ridderschap, when there was property at stake, as there was in the case of the five prebends (one in each chapter) vacated by the death of the Archbishop.(43) A declaration by the clergy that they considered the Estates' 'Order on ecclesiastical property' null and void was ignored, and when the colleges disregarded its provisions about presentation to confiscated benefices or prebends, their members - even the Domdeken himself - were arrested and held until they co-operated.(44) In the end, there was nothing for it but to acquiesce, however reluctantly, by promising to administer the chapters' property under the Estates' supervision and likewise to alienate nothing without permission from the authorities. Moreover, the other two Estates had the upper hand: to support their measures on ecclesiastical property, they could quote the Union of Utrecht, which allowed the individual provinces to 'introduce...such regulations as they consider proper...for the preservation of all people, either secular or clerical, their properties and rights'.(45) And after the establishment of the Geeligerden in April 1582 robbed the clergy of the political means to protest against such arrangements, it is not as remarkable as one Utrecht historian thought that a decision on the ecclesiastical property commission should have been taken in August of that year by all three Estates unanimously.(46) Perhaps the chapters recognised, as the towns and the Ridderschap pointed out, that they had no real reason to complain, considering the much more far-reaching measures enforced on the Catholic clergy in other provinces.(47)

Despite these victories over Catholicism, the progress of Protestantism was hampered by disputes between the ministers of the city's two Reformed communities. The consistorial predikanten, led by the fiery Herman Modet, preached against the 'Latitudinarian Libertine church' of St. Jacob, sent spies to find faults in Duifhuis's own teaching, laid complaints against him in neighbouring classes, such as Amsterdam, Delft and Schiedam, and were offended when Orange said that 'he did not remember he had ever heard a better sermon' than the one preached by Duifhuis in St. Jacob.(48) The magistrates, on the other hand, concluded a 'remarkable' contract with Duifhuis, whereby he was free to leave his post should they ever consent to religious persecution, 'as he has stated that he can not agree to any persecution for the sake of conscience, so as not to make his soul bloodstained...in the sight of God'.(49) When Duifhuis died, in 1581, the city council hastened to appoint a like-minded successor, Hermannus Elconius; he was joined in the following year by a second minister, and in 1585, when the St. Jacob congregation took over the chapter church of Ste. Marie as well, by a third.(50) Nevertheless, the consistorial community was more numerous, being served by four predikanten, in spite of a magistracy which exhibited what one consistorial minister called 'such great perversity, such great contempt for pure religion, such obstinate hatred for the purer administration of the Church'.(51) For their part, the authorities justified their attitude by saying that the days of prayer held by the consistorial predikanten, to pray for the advancement of God's cause, were used 'to slander and abuse the Estates and the magistrates and to incite the congregation against them'.(52) It was no doubt for this

reason that, when the consistorial predikanten asked the city council in 1584 for the salary for a fourth minister, to replace one who had been dismissed, they were told either to cancel some of their services or get help from St. Jacob. Although the salary was later granted, and Johannes Uytenbogaert appointed (by the magistrates, thus giving the predikanten another grievance), Modet and his colleagues did not cease to hope for what they called a 'good union' with their rivals - that is, one to their own advantage.(53)

Their chance came in 1586. Shortly after his arrival in the Netherlands, the Earl of Leicester wrote that the Stichtenaars 'begynne exceedingly to encrease in relygyon, who were lately the worst of all these provinces'.(54) Committed as he was to the cause of international Protestantism, his first action to promote 'the glory of God, the Christian religion, and the peace and unity of the churches and congregations'(55) was to bring about the amalgamation of Utrecht's two Protestant communities, on terms which clearly favoured the consistorials. The kirk session, which was to include members of the city council, was to look after 'all church matters', and to choose ministers (who were, however, still to be approved by the magistracy). Where Duifhuis had asked no confession of faith from those who attended his communion services, the agreement of April 1586 laid down that 'no one shall be admitted to the church service unless he has been found by a previous examination to be suitable in his doctrine and way of life'. The requirement that all attending the service should sign the Confession of Faith of the Netherlands churches proved to be too much for one of the St. Jacob ministers, Taco Sybrandsz, who could not in conscience subscribe to the article

on predestination, and was therefore forbidden to preach.(56) His two colleagues, however, were found to be sufficiently sound on 'Godly doctrine and the use of the sacraments', so that they were permitted to continue their work.(57) Few of the St. Jacob congregation attended church thereafter, no doubt because they disliked 'the Genevan inquisition', which had 'laid on our shoulders a new burden, not inferior in many points, as it it generally apprehended, to that of the Papists'.(58)

The amalgamation opened the way for an attempt by the consistorial predikanten to impose orthodox Calvinism throughout the province. In this they had the enthusiastic support of Leicester, who considered that the division between the two congregations had been fostered by 'the very principal officers of all this town, and men seeming to favour this religion (i.e.: Reformed) to avoid suspicion and to get authority'.(59) A month after this opinion was expressed, the expulsion of 60 men from the city removed a number of these 'principal officers', along with several prominent Catholics, who were suspected of being in contact with the enemy, and a number of members of the St. Jacob community, whom the Calvinist burgerhoplieden believed to be equally dangerous, because 'they conducted themselves hypocritically as if of the Reformed religion, to deceive the world, attending services, but nevertheless having their children baptised by papistical priests'.(60)

Similar developments took place in Amersfoort, where, in 1586, the town council ratified the kirk session's dismissal of a minister, whereas five years earlier the then magistrates had considered it unlawful for the kirk session to meet without its authorisation, and had angered orthodox Calvinists by an attempt to instal a 'Libertine' in the pulpit. The magistrates appointed by Nieuwenaar early in 1586 had a different outlook, however, and had been praised by Herman Modet, 'the chiefest stickler for the Leicestrian faction'.(61)

Thanks to Leicester's influence, the Church ordinance adopted by the National Synod at the Hague, in the summer of 1586, was pushed through the Estates, although the Ridderschap accepted it only with the proviso that villages need not accept predikanten who subscribed to the ordinance unless they wished.(62) It was impossible to enforce the ordinance throughout the province, although during the Prouinck régime the Estates deprived a number of village ministers of their office (including Erasmus Backer, formerly of St. Jacob), replacing them with others more orthodox in their views.(63) The Estates also hoped to spread Calvinism throughout the country areas through the influence of the schout of each village, but this scheme was thwarted by the fact that many schouten were 'of contrary religion', as were their superiors, the Marshals; the Estates realised that 'it would be in vain to reform the schouten if the head officers in the countryside are not Reformed'. One of Leicester's supporters put the problem more forcefully: the Marshals 'and all Under-officers be meere Papists and lewdly affected off whom a just Reformation is to be required'.(64)

In order to finance this increased religious activity, the Estates passed another ordinance for ecclesiastical property, the so-called Redressement op de geestelijke goederen of October 1586. This was an effort to tighten up the administration of the secularised funds, to find money for the salaries of rural ministers, sextons and schoolmasters, particularly in those villages where an endowment of property formerly sufficient to maintain one priest fell far short of the sums required for at least two men and their families. It included various other provisions, such as a resolution to set up a seminary in the city for Reformed education, but like the Hague Church ordinance, it remained very much a dead letter, and the administrative body it established, the 'Chamber of Direction', was dissolved as soon as Nieuwenaar's coup in September 1588 brought back the exiles of 1586.(65)

In the political field, the drive towards orthodox Calvinism can be seen in the purge of the Geeligeerden carried out in the winter of 1586-87. The militia captains pressed for the removal from office of anyone connected with the five chapters, 'creatures and sworn members of the anti-Christ', and anti-Catholicism was so strong in the city council that some magistrates said they would never tolerate Catholic clergy in the government 'even if the whole State depended on it'.(66) One observer, however, was of the opinion that the burgerhoplieden objected not to the canons personally, since most of them were married and professed the Reformed religion, but to their possession of lucrative prebends: 'lyvinges, which they (the burgerhoplieden) mean to convert to some other uses'.(67)

Although Helmichius denied that he and his fellow predikanten had advised or known of the attempt to abolish the First Estate, they did supply Nieuwenaar and the city council with scriptural arguments against the involvement of the clergy in political government,(68) to support the magistrates' contention that the ecclesiastical Estate 'has no other foundation but the possession of church property by virtue of the authority of Papal and tyrannical decrees, contrary to the word of God and all political laws'.(69) English commentators, on the other hand, were in no doubt that Herman Modet, at least, had played an active part in the movement to abolish the Geeligerden.(70) The scriptural arguments of the predikanten did not, it seems, apply to their own political activities: they saw it as their duty to speak out on questions involving the common good, 'which concerns all citizens equally, and the welfare of the Republic brings with it the welfare of the Church'.(71) Modet's mission to England in 1587, to inform Leicester of the situation in Utrecht, was therefore justified, as was the later mission of his colleagues, Helmichius and Sopingius, to offer Elizabeth the sovereignty of the Netherlands on behalf of the Calvinist clergy of Utrecht, Gelderland, Overijssel, Friesland and Zeeland, in the hope of safeguarding the Reformed faith at the peace negotiations in Ostend.(72)

With the change in the Sticht's political climate brought about by the events of September/October 1588, came a corresponding change in the religious climate. This change was, naturally, not popular in some quarters: one contemporary wrote that 'the papists, having gotten

the staff in hand, will use the same at their pleasures'.(73) And certainly the new city government issued a plain statement of its views in November: the consistory might discuss Church matters and religion as it pleased, but two members of the city council would attend all these meetings to ensure that there was no question of any interference by the consistory in politics. Nevertheless, no obvious action was taken, for the time being, against the consistorial predikanten in the city, in spite of Helmichius' preaching against the régime of the exiles, shortly after their return.(74) Rather, the Estates concentrated on providing ministers for the rural parishes, taking steps against overtly Catholic priests or outspoken Calvinists, and installing replacements of whom they approved. Some villages, however, - Soest, for example - objected to the dismissal of their predikanten: 'now we can see what these new arrivals are trying to do: to introduce libertine religion everywhere and suppress discipline', to quote the Amersfoort town council, which had not yet been changed by the Stadholder.(75)

It was not until late 1589 that the city council was forced to act by pressure from the members of the former congregation of St. Jacob, who were agitating for the restoration of their church's separate position. The council was of the opinion that a return to the situation as it had been before 1586 would only exacerbate religious divisions in the city. Instead, it chose to dismiss all four consistorial predikanten, on the grounds that their presence and activities were hindering the full union of the two Reformed communities.(76) The burgomaster, Dirk Canther, was perhaps nearer the truth when he said, ten years later, that Helmichius and his

colleagues had been dismissed, not because of any wrongdoing or faults in (their) doctrine or lives, but purely for political considerations'.(77) The members of the consistorial congregation, however, did not welcome the new moderate ministers imported from Holland by the city council, with Oldenbarnevelt's help, and stayed away from church. They preferred to attend secret conventicles, or to travel to Ysselstein (a nearby independent lordship held by the Orange family, and ecclesiastically a part of South Holland) to hear what they considered to be true Reformed preaching.(78) They took their grievance to Maurice of Nassau, the new Stadholder, but the Estates advised him to refuse the request of 'some calling themselves elders and deacons of the Reformed Church in Utrecht'. According to the authorities, the new ministers were known to be upright in their personal lives and to preach the true Christian religion, which the magistrates had solemnly sworn to maintain. Any objections to these ministers, therefore, 'spring not from Christian zeal, but from obstinacy'. In fact, at least two of them, Johannes Gerobolus and Gerard Blockhoven, were hardly orthodox in their views.(79)

The installation of these amenable new ministers was evidence of the Estates' intention to assert their authority once and for all over the Reformed Church in the Sticht. Their chosen instrument was the Church Ordinance of 1590, which put the power to call ministers and to appoint elders and deacons entirely into the hands of the Estates, the magistrates of the towns and lay patrons in the countryside. Meetings of the kirk sessions and the appointment of schoolmasters were similarly placed under secular control. Finally, no meeting of a classis or synod was to be held without the Estates'

authorisation.(80)

At the same time, and in the same spirit, the Estates and the city council issued a number of placards against illegal religious services, showing how seriously they regarded such widespread flouting of their authority by those who attended the conventicles.(81) In 1593, the discontented consistorial congregation appealed for help to the synod of South Holland. This resulted in an invitation from the city council to Johan Uytenbogaert and Franciscus Junius, known for their moderate opinions, (though the former had been dismissed with his consistorial colleagues in 1589), to act as mediators. Although Uytenbogaert clearly disapproved of Gerobolus' doctrinal position, he counselled the Utrecht congregation to behave with modesty and prudence for the time being.(82) Uytenbogaert and Junius were able to achieve a compromise in one provision of the 1590 ordinance: the call to a new minister was thenceforward to be made by a committee of four magistrates and four ministers or elders of the Reformed Church, and not by the secular powers alone. Thanks to their efforts, many people were reconciled to the established Church, but 'no small number' remained outside the fold. Two predikanten from the Palatinate, presumably strict Calvinists, were called to Utrecht to serve these hard-liners, who were the most ready to respond to the appeal of Counter-Remonstrantism in the early seventeenth century.(83)

To fulfil their responsibility to the Church outside the towns, the Estates appointed a commission in 1593 to report on the state of religion in the countryside. Its members belonged to the 'latitudinarian' wing of the Utrecht Church: besides the ministers

Gerobolus and Blockhoven, the lay commissioners were Hendrik Buth and Frederick van Zuylen van Nyevelt, respectively prominent members of the Geeligerden and the Ridderschap. Their findings show how little success the efforts of the authorities to spread the Reformation had enjoyed. Of a total of forty-eight clergymen in the villages of the Sticht, only twenty were approved by the commission; eight, including one who baptised in the Lutheran manner, were prepared to adopt Reformed teaching and practice; six would have to be allowed to continue in their posts for want of anyone to replace them; and fourteen - that is, nearly 30 percent - were wholly unsuitable. These last ranged from a Flemish friar in the village of 't Goy who wished 'to keep to the old ways and the oath he had taken to his bishop', to a Catholic exorcist at De Meern, who claimed to have given up preaching after two or three sermons. Even the approved ministers were competing in many cases with priests who conducted Catholic marriages and baptisms and held Mass in secret. In Abcoude there were still candles on the altars, and in the notoriously Catholic district of the Proostdij of St. Jan, the Reformed inhabitants of Wilnis had to cross the border into Holland to attend services.(84)

Ten years later, Sasbout Vosmeer, the Catholic vicar-apostolic, was pleased to report that Catholic services were taking place in broad daylight, and in full view of the Reformed ministers, while in the early 1600s, dozens of people went on an annual pilgrimage to the Virgin Mary in Kockengen. Nor was this the case only in the countryside: from the 1630s onwards, the Catholics of Wijk were served by a Jesuit priest of the local gentry family of Rhede van Amerongen, despite all efforts to drive him out of the town.(85)

Yet Reformed Protestantism in the Sticht was very slow to organise itself to combat this threat, partly because the spirit of Hubert Duifhuis lingered on, and partly because of the Estates' determined opposition to the idea of Calvinist organisation. The first provincial synod, which was not held until 1606, was actually summoned by the Estates, and was attended by a delegation of four on their behalf. By that time, at least, there were thirty-five active Reformed ministers in the province, although the synod still deplored the continued prevalence of Catholicism in the towns and much of the countryside, and called on the secular authorities to improve the situation.(86) The Sticht was not divided into classes, to compare with other provinces, until August 1619, in the aftermath of the Synod of Dordrecht, when the Counter-Remonstrant Calvinism of those who had supported Modet and his colleagues triumphed over the Remonstrant heirs of Duifhuis.(87)

The developments outlined above had profound implications for the province's political life, and were a constant source of conflicts between and within the different political communities, as well as between the civil authorities and institutions of both religions. The city council, for example, struggled to assert itself against the kirk sessions and the consistorial predikanten, by affirming its right to appoint and dismiss ministers. The magistrates failed, however, in December 1584, to dismiss Herman Modet, always a disturbing element in the body politic, on the ostensible grounds of his age and indisposition (he was perhaps 64, although there is considerable doubt about his date of birth and he may have been much younger[88]). This

failure no doubt reinforced the city council's Erastian views, which were fully expressed in the Church ordinance of 1590.

For their part, the predikanten looked to the 'godly magistrate' to 'uphold the true worship of God and to prevent and root out idolatry and false religion, and to overthrow the kingdom of the anti-Christ'.(89) To achieve this end, they could use popular agitation to put pressure on the Estates and the city council: indeed, each stage along the route to the exclusive domination of Protestantism was marked by the authorities' declaration of the need to maintain public order.(90) The 'libertines' of the city council found this excuse turned against them, when the ardently Reformed burgerhoplieden justified the expulsions of July 1586 by saying that they had acted to 'remove the causes of the misunderstandings, bitternesses and dissensions that were about to be sown among the citizens'.(91)

On the other hand, the threat 'that some commotion by the people in the city might take place' could be a useful tool for the city council in their efforts to subdue the five chapters' resistance to, for example, the ordinance on ecclesiastical property.(92) There can be no doubt that the authorities seized the opportunity given by the Reformation to put an end to the legal immunities still enjoyed by the members of the chapters: henceforward, for instance, they would have to keep watch on the city walls like ordinary citizens, or pay someone to take their place. No longer were the five colleges to occupy a special position, as a 'state within a state'.(93) They were even forced to pay 1,400 guilders a year, to maintain the city's Reformed

ministers, from the money previously used to provide wine, oil and candles for the Mass, because 'no one had any advantage or profit from this, nor was God served by it'. The canons protested that wax, wine and oil cost them no more than 900 or at most 1,000 guilders each year, but in vain: indeed, the Prouninck régime forced them to double this contribution to the furtherance of the Reformation.(94)

The appointment of relatives of members of the Ridderschap and the city council to prebends which fell vacant through death or confiscation was another method of keeping the chapters in line, as well as a means of ensuring a sufficient supply of suitably qualified Reformed Protestants for the Estates' service.(95) It must be said, however, that these new canons did not always fulfil the conditions laid down in August 1580 for the admission to prebends: one man was admitted to St. Pieter, for example, 'provided he shall renounce the Roman religion', in spite of the Ridderschap's opinion that he was unsuitable and politically suspect. Other prebends were awarded to boys under the age of eighteen - the nephew of a canon of the Dom, and the son of a leading member of the Ridderschap, for instance - whose potential political service to the Estates lay very much in the future.(96) Under the Prouninck régime, however, a determined effort was made to ensure that prebends were conferred only on men of orthodox Protestant views and the correct political allegiance.(97)

The presentation to prebends was one form of patronage that could be used to further the Reformation; the ius patronatus laicalis (that is, the right held by local lords to appoint ministers in the villages) posed other problems for the Estates, of which the village of Maarssen is a good example. Here the Estates came into conflict with Gerrit van Zoudenbalch, lord of Urk, a prominent member of the Ridderschap (among other things, he was dijkgraaf of the Lekdijk). In 1583, without the Estates' permission, he appointed a minister who had left his previous living because he did not have the Estates' approval. The Standing Committee, who were responsible for the appointment of ministers, provisionally allowed this man to preach in Maarssen over Easter 1583, but were later informed that his doctrines did not conform to the placard which stipulated how the Scriptures were to be expounded. A replacement, one Pieter Daemsz, was appointed by the Standing Committee: at this point, Urk took possession of the keys of the church, to prevent Pieter Daemsz from preaching there. The Standing Committee ordered the deputy Marshal of the Nederkwartier, in which Maarssen lay, to use whatever means necessary to open the church door, so that the villagers might hear the Gospel; Urk was told to let Pieter Daemsz preach in peace. The former minister remained in the neighbourhood, however, baptising children and turning the villagers against the new incumbent, to such an extent that the supporters of the rival ministers came to blows, and at least one man was seriously wounded. The Marshal, it appears, succeeded in restoring order, and Pieter Daemsz continued to preach at Maarssen until he was suspended from his post by the Standing Committee in 1587, because he was not Calvinist enough for the Prouninck

government's more stringent standards.(98) When Urk returned from exile in 1588, he promptly installed another minister, who later refused to submit himself to the Estates' examination on doctrine.(99)

The report of the 1593 commissioners shows clearly how many of the 'unsuitable' ministers in the countryside had been appointed by lay patrons, or by the five chapters in the many villages where they held the rights of patronage. Yet even in the strictly Calvinist atmosphere of 1587, the Estates preserved the appearance, at least, of presentation by patrons, allowing them to put forward candidates for vacant livings, who must then be approved by the Estates - and not by the consistory. This decision naturally outraged the Calvinist predikanten in the city, who accused the lay authorities of 'usurping' too much authority over the Church: the ius patronatus was 'unsound and instituted by Papists', and 'directly contrary to the word of God [and]...the Church ordinance of these provinces' (that is, the Hague ordinance of 1586).(100) Nevertheless, the limited rights of patrons remained in force for the time being, and the series of clerical appointments in the spring of 1589 wed a complete return to the powers previously enjoyed by lay patrons: so much so, that the Estates declared in January 1590 that town magistrates should have patronage rights equivalent to those possessed by lords in the country.(101)

The Estates were quite willing to allow the town councils to appoint their own ministers: on the other hand, they did not wish them to administer the ecclesiastical property within the towns' boundaries. The long-running dispute on this question provides an

illustration of one way in which the side-effects (so to speak) of the Reformation divided the political communities in the Sticht.

The issue was first raised in February 1579, following the Union of Utrecht, which provided for the maintenance of monks and nuns who left their religious houses, from the funds of those institutions. The city council was quick to assume responsibility for this task, and warned the Estates not to interfere.(102) Shortly afterwards the city council received the support of the town council of Amersfoort, after the siege which compelled it to sign the Union.(103) Thereafter, the towns claimed the right to administer all the property of all religious houses (except the five chapters) situated within their jurisdiction: indeed, the city council began to exercise this right even before the Union, with the sale of the moveable goods of the expelled Franciscans: again, this was done to prevent disorder and looting.(104)

The other two Estates, however, argued that since the greater part of all ecclesiastical property was actually situated outside the towns' jurisdictions, in the countryside, its administration ought to be the responsibility of the Estates.(105) They had sound practical reasons for this attitude: if the Sticht towns succeeded in achieving control over their ecclesiastical property, other towns, in other provinces, might follow suit and secularise property within their boundaries which belonged to Utrecht's religious houses, and the Estates would thus lose a great deal of potential revenue.(106) This fear perhaps explains the severe measures, including seizure of the personal property of the magistrates and citizens, which the Estates

threatened to take against the town council of Wijk, if it did not co-operate over the property of the chapter of St. John the Baptist.(107) To gain their ends, the Estates tried to play the city off against the small towns, but ecclesiastical property was one of the few issues where this was not possible, since all the towns were equally determined to resist the Estates' encroachments.(108) Amersfoort, in particular, angered the first two Estates by calling on outside authorities, such as Orange or Leicester, for support: in 1582, for example, Paulus Buys, acting for Orange, appointed one Herman Jansz as the steward of convent property in the town, and gave him a commission which, the Standing Committee contended, had been "surreptitiously" obtained from the Stadholder without the Estates' knowledge or consent: the property ought to come under the administration of the Estates' commission for ecclesiastical property.(109) Even the appointment of a member of the Amersfoort town council as steward of the province's ecclesiastical property did not sway the rest of the magistrates, who remained firm in their determination to keep the town's religious houses under their control. In this they had Leicester's support, since the ecclesiastical property revenues were one of the few financial resources the Estates would not hand over to the Governor-General.(110) Nor did the situation change after September 1588: Amersfoort still refused to let the Estates take over, and there was very little the Estates could do about it.(111)

The Amersfoort magistrates were, however, divided among themselves on the policy to be followed with regard to the Reformation of the municipal orphanage. The majority, who were of the Reformed religion, decided that the children should be made to attend Reformed services every Sunday, but this decision was opposed by a vocal minority of the council, whose spokesman thinks that no one should be forced [to go] to the service, but everyone should be left with freedom of conscience.(112) In this case, the 'libertine' section of the magistracy appealed to the Estates for support, but without success. Instead, the Estates backed the majority, and the orphans were sent to church willy-nilly, even though that entailed the dismissal of the orphanage superintendents.(113)

A more striking illustration of the Reformation's effects on relations between the Estates and one of their component parts is provided by Montfoort. In the early stages of Protestantism's advance, the Catholics in Utrecht looked to the Burggraaf as their natural leader, although he could not prevent the Calvinists from being given a church, and expelled priests were none too welcome even in this Catholic refuge.(114) Yet the town's peculiar position, and the prestige and privileges enjoyed by the Burggraaf as the Sticht's first noble, enabled Montfoort to resist the Reformation with a great deal of success. Both the Estates and the Calvinist predikanten in the city were alarmed about Montfoort's spiritual state, while the Estates also resented the ease with which one town could thus evade their authority. As the Standing Committee put it: 'it is too great a scandal that only one town in all the united

Netherlands should allow the exercise of the Roman religion".(115) Neither the Burggraaf nor the magistracy responded to orders from the Estates to dismiss a "chaplain" who was holding Mass daily in the town; the Marshal of the Montfoort quarter was reluctant to stamp out the Catholic services, complete with candles and images, which were being held in the town's church.(116) In 1586, one sympathiser with Leicester described the people of Montfoort as "open Papists and ill enclyned"; even by 1588, it appears that there were not enough respectable Protestants to fill the town council: the Standing Committee asked Nieuwenaar to appoint men of the Reformed religion "or at least those who are not its enemies".(117)

The Calvinist clergy were no more successful in introducing Reform to Montfoort. One of the first ministers to be called there was rumoured to be a Lutheran; another, of whom Modet and his colleagues approved, deserted his flock, and "exposed them as the prey of the wolf". In place of this Mathias Dijckman, the Estates preferred one Henricus Bulckius, who was quite unacceptable to the predikanten; he had been recognised as a heretic in Holland, and Helmichius called him a Pelagian.(118) The next predikant, Abraham Jansz, was so unpopular that a number of the inhabitants attacked his door at the beginning of Lent because he would not drink with them to honour Bacchus.(119) In 1593, the incumbent at Montfoort was described as "a person who has not only been publicly expelled as a rotten member of the body of Christ's community here in Utrecht, for his continual and incurable godless evil life (which has never been tolerated in any Church, not even by Papistry), but also still behaves as a common vagrant, to the great scandal and disparagement of the

government of this province'.(120) Given the poor quality of the Reformed clergy, and the town's reluctance to pay them a full salary, it is hardly surprising that as late as 1606 there were only thirty Reformed communicants in Montfoort.(121)

At the same time as the Estates were putting pressure on the towns to advance the Reformation, they were themselves under similar pressure from outside. Their resentment of Holland's interference in the Sticht's religious affairs is described below (Chapter VI, pp. 176-177). Likewise, the Estates opposed a move by their allies east of the Maas to alter article 13 of the Union of Utrecht to the effect that religious changes could be made by one province only with the consent of the others. And the Estates were not prepared to impose the penalty of banishment, suggested by the allies, on those who would not take the oath to maintain the Union stipulated by articles 24 and 25 for all office-holders in the United Provinces: they feared the trouble which would arise 'if we wished to force those of the Roman religion, of whom there are still many in the province, to swear against their conscience to uphold the Union'.(122)

This resolution displays two aspects of the Estates' approach to the Reformation: their determination to keep it under their own control, and their comparative tolerance towards the Catholic population. Provincial governments had an essential role to play in the spread of the Reformation, since the decisions of even a national Church synod had no force until they had been ratified by the Estates of the individual provinces. In fact, the civil authorities were

virtually in a position to decide Christian doctrine (123), and in Utrecht they resented any interference, whether it came from neighbouring provinces or their own consistory. The government in Utrecht was by no means alone in its Erastian attitude towards the Reformed Church: even in Holland, the civil authorities rarely gave the Church their fullest support.(124) In their religious policy, the Estates tried to steer a middle course between the available extremes. There seem to have been few zealous Catholics in positions of authority, or even in the five chapters.(125) Certainly, as early as November 1576, no profound respect for the Archbishop's office hindered the Estates from commandeering nearly 42,000 guilders in cash from his palace and some 20,000 guilders worth of his silver, to rescue them temporarily from their financial difficulties.(126) This middle course also involved a certain tolerance towards Catholics, unless they represented a positive political danger, or unless popular pressure to take action against them became too great. The predikanten naturally, and probably correctly, attributed this tolerance to a lack of genuine Protestant conviction in the members of the Estates: 'among all the nobles, there is not one who makes proper profession of the Religion, and for the most part they are its enemies'.(127) Between 1586 and 1588, however, the Calvinist Church and the civil authorities worked together to impose orthodox Calvinism on the Sticht, but two years were not long enough to make much headway against the province's general indifference to Calvinism, in spite of the absence in exile of most of the leading parishioners of St. Jacob. When the exiles returned, they were determined not to let themselves be governed by the 'new monks' under Modet, 'a Pope of Geneva, not of Rome'.(128) This determination was expressed in the

Church ordinance of 1590, and in the six articles drawn up by the city council in the same year, governing baptism, communion and marriage, examination, discipline and preaching. All ministers were ordered to sign these articles, which committed them to the pursuit of the Reformation very much in the spirit of Duifhuis and St. Jacob.(129) Once again, official policy was what has been called "de-Catholicisation" by degrees, rather than "Calvinisation" by edict.(130) The relationship of Church and State was dominated by the latter, and the Church did not recover until after the Synod of Dordrecht.

Chapter VI

The Estates and the outside world

VI.1 Utrecht and the central institutions

On 23 January 1579, delegates of the Estates of Utrecht were among those, along with representatives of Holland, Zeeland, Gelderland and the Ommelanden of Groningen, who signed the Union of Utrecht with the avowed intention of strengthening the alliance established in 1576 by the Pacification of Ghent. Henceforth, the signatories of the Union were known as the 'Provinces of the Closer Union' (Nadere Geunieerde Provinciën), or, more simply, as the 'allies' (bondgenoten). But, for all its good intentions, the Treaty of Union encapsulated the essential paradox which bedevilled relations between the provinces for over 200 years: article 1 states that 'the aforesaid provinces shall ally, confederate and unite - and are allying, confederating and uniting herewith - to hold together externally as if they were but one province...however, this is agreed without prejudice to the special and particular privileges, freedoms, exemptions, laws, statutes, laudable and traditional customs, usages and all other rights of each province, and of each town, member and inhabitant of those provinces'.(1) The story of Utrecht's relationship with its fellow United Provinces is a pointed illustration of the difficulty of reconciling the common cause with provincial interests.

Since coming under Habsburg rule in 1528, Utrecht had always emphasised that it was different from the 'patrimonial' provinces (Holland, Zeeland, Brabant, and so on) which Charles V had inherited from his Burgundian grandmother.(2) Under the Habsburgs, Utrecht and the other non-patrimonial provinces, such as Overijssel and Gelderland, defended their autonomy against the Brussels government as far as possible, sheltering behind their remaining privileges.(3) Not surprisingly, Orange's instruction as Stadholder of Holland, Zeeland and Utrecht in 1559 reminded him always to 'bear in mind that [Utrecht] is newly acquired'.(4) This sense of a separate identity continued to influence the Estates' thinking: the Sticht entered into the negotiations for the Pacification of Ghent only on condition that Utrecht retained its 'right to be considered and counted with the other newly-acquired provinces', and even after the Estates had signed the Pacification, they protested to the Estates-General against being treated on the same basis as the rest of the provinces.(5) Later still, Utrecht's separate status was a useful argument against the acceptance of the Duke of Anjou as sovereign lord.(6)

Nevertheless, the Sticht's adherence to the Pacification and the Union of Brussels, its acknowledgement of William of Orange as Stadholder, and its signing of the 'Closer Union' of Utrecht, meant that the province's fate was bound up with that of its allies. By the same token the Estates were required perforce to take part in the business of the Estates-General, and all the various bodies that were created to conduct the government of the provinces in the late 1570s and 1580s: the College of the Closer Union and its successor the

Landraad, as well as the various Councils of State.(7)

From its earliest dealings with these bodies, Utrecht's attitude to them was ambivalent. At times it seemed as if the price for the help and support to be gained from union with the other provinces was too high. The Estates-General had hardly met in the autumn of 1576 before they wanted money from the Sticht: the Estates of Utrecht were 'amazed' at a request for a Hundredth Penny tax, similar to that levied by Alva, and it seemed as if the Estates-General would give nothing in return.(8) Despite Utrecht's frequent appeals for money to pay off the German and Walloon troops in the city and to carry on the siege of the castle of Vredenburg, the Estates-General did nothing but raise the soldiers' hopes with false promises they were not prepared to fulfil.(9) In the months after the Pacification, the correspondence between the Estates and their representatives in Brussels showed the angry disillusionment felt in Utrecht at the central government's neglect: the Estates-General 'pay no attention to what is far away from them, but are interested only in what is before their eyes' - so much so that to point out the Sticht's plight was 'like knocking on a deaf man's door'.(10) Most wounding of all, perhaps, the delegates to the Estates-General would merely shrug their shoulders in response to Utrecht's pleas and say, 'it's a great pity'.(11) If Utrecht wanted help from Brussels, it must first introduce the new 'general tax' (generale middelen)(12). Nor did the Estates-General and the Council of State provide the political guidance which Utrecht sought on the question of the Satisfaction in 1577 (see pp. 15-16 above).

Notwithstanding its initial disappointments about the benefits of alliance with the other provinces, Utrecht took an early part in the preliminary negotiations for a Closer Union in the summer of 1578. Indeed, the very phrase 'as if they were but one province' in the final text was derived from a memorandum drafted by Floris Thin, the Estates' advocate, and a delegation from Utrecht was instrumental in persuading the Landdag of Gelderland to favour the negotiations.(13) As already mentioned in Chapter II, however, support for the Closer Union was far from unanimous within the Sticht's political community. First of all, Jacob Cuyntorff and his fellow conspirators had to be detained until the treaty was signed. Then, in March 1579, Amersfoort had to be forced to accede to the Union by John of Nassau's siege, which was not likely to inspire wholehearted support for the new order, and in any case led to a dispute about whether the Estates or the town would defray the expenses of the siege.

Relations between Utrecht and the Provinces of the Closer Union did not improve with the years. Demands from the central government for money became increasingly urgent as the war progressed and the contributions received from Flanders and Brabant fell drastically. These demands were the more resented because they sometimes seemed to ignore the time-honoured rights and privileges which had been guaranteed by the Union of Utrecht: even in 1579, for instance, the Provinces of the Closer Union, in an effort to find 600 cavalry for Count Rennenberg, renounced, for the provinces and their inhabitants 'excuses and all other exceptions, favours, privileges, reliefs and assistance of laws' which might stand in the way of the efficient

collection of the required sums.(14) Moreover, the College was prepared to use whatever methods were necessary to constrain unwilling provinces to pay up.(15) The Estates' records are full of protests to the effect that they simply could not produce the sums demanded of them, while if they did consent to allow the revenues raised here to go out of their own hands, it was always on condition that the other provinces did likewise. Nor would they ever consider increasing their contribution to the gemene zaak unless their allies did the same.(16) Since the rest of the provinces made similar stipulations, it is not surprising that delays in collecting the quotas were frequent.

There was one exception to this general rule, however: the Landraad to the east of the Maas, which was set up in 1581, at the time of the Abjuration of Philip II, to act as the executive in the absence of Anjou. After a year's bargaining, the Estates gave their support to the establishment of this latest Council, though originally Gelderland, Utrecht and Overijssel had urged that a quite separate government should be set up for the eastern provinces: they argued that since the war was now being fought as much in Friesland, Gelderland and Overijssel as in Brabant and Flanders, there should be a government resident in the north-east, to co-ordinate the war effort and to ensure that the Sticht's money was not spent only in defence of the south.(17) Orange's threat to resign finally persuaded the three eastern provinces to agree to a single Landraad, whose jurisdiction was divided at the Maas, but the Estates' preference for a separate authority was confirmed by the news of the French Fury at Antwerp in January 1583.(18) Despite occasional doubts about the accuracy of the Landraad's accounts, Utrecht was the only province to come to its aid

September 1583, with a much-needed loan of 3,000 guilders.(19) The Estates' generosity went unrewarded, however: seven years later, they were still pressing for the repayment of the loan, and indeed claiming that the Generality owed them between 60,000 and 70,000 guilders on the Landraad's behalf.(20)

Apart from financial demands, the bodies of central government made other claims on Utrecht's time and resources. The Estates-General continually urged the Estates to send their deputies 'with full powers and absolute authorisation' to decide and resolve matters 'without its being necessary to write back or receive a fuller commission from you'.(21) The practice of ruggespraak, or referring back for authorisation to vote, is perhaps the most outstanding example of the practical problems forced upon the United Provinces by the very liberties for which they were fighting.(22) Like their fellows in the other provinces, the Estates of Utrecht usually insisted on the observance of ruggespraak by their delegates to the Estates-General, particularly where money was involved. At the same time, within the Sticht, the representatives of the three individual Estates insisted on consulting their principals in their turn. Both at provincial and national level, this helped to protract the proceedings and reduce the effectiveness of all organs of government. Only very occasionally would the Estates empower their delegates to take decisions without reference to themselves, as they did just before Leicester's arrival in November 1585.(23) Even in moments of national emergency, the Estates were very wary of letting their delegates off the leash: in the confusion following Orange's

assassination in July 1584, they responded guardedly to a call from Holland to strengthen the bond between Holland, Zeeland and Utrecht, by sending plenipotentiaries to a meeting in Delft. At first the Estates said that it would not be suitable to give anyone powers to decide on the government of the country, especially since 'nobody of intelligence could be found in the said province who would wish or would dare to accept such absolute power'.(24) A week later, however, the Estates did grant their four deputies 'absolute and complete power', with the proviso that 'if time allows', the deputies must still consult their masters.(25) The Estates thought that the need for full powers was further reduced when the Estates-General took up permanent residence in the Hague, only '11 miles' from Utrecht, so that communication became quite easy.(26) In fact, letters from the Hague could take three or four days to reach Utrecht, and presumably took as long in the opposite direction, not counting the time occupied by the Estates' deliberations, so that ruggespraak could mean delays of up to two weeks in the Estates-General's business.

But the Estates could only insist on consultation with their deputies when they had actually sent deputies in the first place, and very often they were reluctant even to do that. It was expensive to maintain permanent representatives on the various governmental bodies: hence, for example, the Ridderschap's objections to the Sticht having a representative at the Landraad to the west of the Maas, and the reduction from two men to one of Utrecht's delegation to the Landraad on its own side of the river in 1584.(27) Furthermore, the members of the Estates were frequently unwilling to serve on these bodies for long periods, and would refuse to accept the Estates' commissions,

protesting their unworthiness for the responsibility or stating that they would not serve alone. If they did grudgingly agree to represent their province, it would usually be for a maximum length of time, sometimes one month, sometimes three.(28) This reluctance can be understood in some cases, depending on the destination involved: the Estates' representatives at Nieuwenaar's funeral in Arnhem in 1589 were told to take their own precautions against capture by the enemy.(29)

On the other hand, not all the Estates' deputies were like Frederick Uten Eng, who wrote from Brussels in November 1577, asking for his recall on the grounds that he had not brought his winter clothes with him when he arrived at the beginning of October.(30) Several members of the Estates served as officials of the central authorities: the lord of Brakel, for example, was the first receiver-general of the Provinces of the Closer Union, and Johan van Renesse, lord of Wilp, was their commissioner-general in charge of arms and ammunition.(31) Floris Heermale, one of the most regular delegates to the Estates-General, occasionally even received payment for his services.(32)

Membership of the Estates-General and the Union of Utrecht also entailed maintaining their troops and suffering from the depredations of unpaid companies. For much of the period, indeed, it seems as if the Estates spent more time and effort in trying to free the province of their own side's troops than in trying to resist the enemy. The higher authorities continued to billet large numbers of troops on the

province, despite protests that the army treated Utrecht's rural population worse than the Spaniards had.(33) The Estates used the billeting of troops to justify reductions in their contribution to the gemene zaak as compared to other provinces which did not presently suffer as much in this way and had not been equally devastated in the 1570s.(34) A similar resentment was an important element in the Sticht's relationship with its eastern neighbour, Gelderland, which was considered too poor to make any regular contribution to the central finances. Amersfoort, in particular, situated close to the frontier with Gelderland, and subject to much the same conditions, complained bitterly of losing its trade and industry to lower-taxed places across the border, and frequently petitioned, without success, to be freed from its obligations to the central treasury.(35)

In general, the Estates believed that the central authorities did not understand or sympathise with Utrecht's circumstances. This feeling is reflected in the recurrent attempts, particularly from 1586 to 1588, to induce the Council of State to move its seat to towns nearer the front line than those of Holland and Zeeland, such as Deventer, Arnhem, or Utrecht itself, where the Council could better appreciate the military situation and at the same time be removed from Holland's influence.(36) Part of the Landraad's attraction for the Estates undoubtedly lay in its practice of meeting in Utrecht or other suitable venues such as Wageningen.(37) What is more, the Estates-General met in Utrecht in April and May 1586, in deference to Leicester.(38) But, for the most part, the Estates' attitude was indicated by their comments on the 1588 instruction for the Council of State, which laid down that it should meet wherever was best for the

good of the provinces: the Estates expressed their disapproval of the advantages accruing to Holland from the Council's permanent residence there.(39) This feeling had existed before the Prouinck régime (immediately after Orange's death in 1584, the Estates did not think Delft a suitable location for a council to direct the war) and it lasted beyond Prouinck's fall in 1588, when the Estates were still reluctant to send deputies to the Council of State unless it moved nearer the fighting.(40) In 1590, the suggested meeting places included Harderwijk, Wageningen, Amersfoort and Wijk; if the Council did not act on this suggestion, the Estates threatened, Utrecht and its neighbours would have to take defence measures of their own. (Gelderland, for instance, clearly shared the Sticht's sense of neglect.[41]) Yet at the same time, the Estates were quite prepared, on the one hand, to connive at the Overkwartier's secret evasion of the Estates-General's placard forbidding the payment of protection money to the enemy, while on the other they assured the world that they intended to do nothing without the Estates-General's knowledge and consent.(42) After all, since 1576, the Hague was not likely to be devastated by the enemy.

In short, Utrecht strongly resented interference of any sort from above, even when it came from Orange in his capacity as Stadholder: he had no more success than the Estates-General in persuading the Estates to part with delegates or money. Moreover, his efforts to influence two important provincial appointments in 1579 aroused ill-feeling in the Sticht, especially as the Satisfaction laid down that offices in the Stadholder's gift should be conferred only with the advice of the Estates.(43) In the first case, Orange won: his nominee, Willem de

Ridder van Groenesteyn, was made Marshal of the Overkwartier, despite the Estates' preference for Frederick van Zuylen van Nyevelt, who eventually received the post in 1595.(44) In the other case, however, the Estates' candidate (their secretary, Willem van Lamsweerde) was appointed steward of the domains, notwithstanding sustained pressure, from Orange and the Archduke Mathias, in favour of Thomas Sosius, a member of the provincial Hof.(45) The Estates went so far as to order the Sticht's administrative divisions to recognise Lamsweerde and to ignore any instructions they might receive from the Hof in support of Sosius.(46) By January 1581, Lamsweerde was being referred to as the steward (rentmeester), and later in the same year Orange tacitly admitted defeat by suggesting that Sosius should become President of the Hof, instead.(47)

Not all aspects of the relationship between Utrecht and the higher authorities were negative, however: the province accepted the arbitration of delegates from Orange or from the Council of State in internal disputes, and appealed for help in possibly awkward dealings with foreign governments, such as the Duke of Cleves, or neighbours within the Union, like the Count of Culemborg.(48) Even the Prouninck régime, normally at odds with all institutions based in Holland, occasionally found it expedient to work through the proper Estates-General assembly, whether it was to prevent a reduction of Leicester's authority or to object to the proposed peace talks with Parma.(49) Nor must it be forgotten that the Sticht did contribute to the gemene zaak - albeit grudgingly and usually late - a proportion of its income which approached 80 percent.(50) And the Estates could

never forget that Utrecht, being a small province and situated in the middle of the said [united] provinces, could not maintain itself without them.(51)

A reasonable working relationship thus seems to have existed until November 1586, when a serious break occurred in the relations between Utrecht and all governmental bodies except those connected with Queen Elizabeth and the Earl of Leicester. This was the Estates-General's famous refusal to admit Gerard Prouinck van Deventer as Utrecht's delegate, on the grounds that he had been unlawfully appointed burgomaster of the city by Leicester. In this instance, the Estates-General posed as the champion of provincial privileges according to the Union, in order to exclude one of Leicester's most dedicated adherents from their assembly.(52) The consequent wrangles within the Sticht over Utrecht's representation in the Estates-General lasted until early in 1587, when two new delegates, Gerard van Domselaer and Johan van den Berg, took their seats. Although these men were, as far as can be established, loyal supporters of the Prouinck régime, the Estates seem to have kept them on a tighter rein than usual, except for granting them full powers to deal with the new English ambassador, Lord Buckhurst: the Queen must not be offended by any delays on Utrecht's part.(53)

At the same time, the Sticht made several attempts to circumvent the Estates-General proper, by bringing the eastern provinces closer together to discuss their common problems of defence and the security of the borders at meetings held in Utrecht.(54) Although Holland and Zeeland did not for the most part respond to the invitations sent to

them, the unoccupied sections of Gelderland and Overijssel sent delegations (in spite of some support for reconciliation with the king among clerical circles in Overijssel). What is more, Dordrecht in Holland and Oostergo in Friesland were known to be in correspondence with Prouninck.(55) The Estates-General reacted angrily to the form of address used in Utrecht's letters: 'the deputies of the Estates-General of the United Netherlands provinces', and pointed out that they, and they alone, were the proper forum for the discussion of such problems. They then took action by arresting Hessel Aysma, the President of the Hof of Friesland, for allegedly treasonable dealings with Prouninck.(56) Fears of an alternative assembly persisted for several months, and the eastern provinces were again in separate communication a year later, in the spring of 1588, when the enemy had invaded the Sticht as far as the gates of Amersfoort.(57)

Whether or not this activity can be ascribed, as Bor surmised, to Prouninck's desire to be revenged on the Estates-General for his exclusion, there can be no doubt that it gave some contemporary observers grounds for their fears that Utrecht would break away from the Union, and indeed go over to Spain, however much the Stichtenaars might protest their preference for an honourable death on the city walls to dishonourable life under the enemy's yoke.(58) Thomas Wilkes reported in December 1586 that 'all men of judgement here are of opinion' that the abolition of the Geeligeerden would take Utrecht in the direction followed by Groningen and Nijmegen - extreme Calvinism followed by a Catholic reaction - and 'hazard the losse of the towne and consequently the whole province'.(59) Yet, a year later, the picture could appear reversed: in February 1588, Sir Henry Killigrew

commented that Utrecht was devoted to the Queen, and that it was Holland and Zeeland that seek to disjoin themselves from the rest - by governing through the Estates-General without reference to England.(60)

Despite a temporary improvement in the spring of 1587, brought about by mediation from the Council of State and the Estates-General,(61) relations deteriorated again over the next year, reaching new depths early in 1588, when the Estates-General's support for the exiled Utrecht gentry completed the Prouinck régime's disillusionment with all institutions based in Holland. Both the Estates and the city council attacked the Estates-General in comprehensive terms: contrary to the Union of Utrecht, its sessions were becoming permanent; it was usurping the authority given to the Council of State under the Treaty of Nonsuch; the Estates demanded that all placards should include a statement that Utrecht had not consented to their publication; the Estates would order the inhabitants of the Sticht to disregard all orders coming from the central government, although they did not intend to withdraw from the Union.(62) The city council summed up its opinion as follows: the Estates of the province of Utrecht have sovereign government no less than other provinces, so that no one, and therefore not even the Estates-General, has authority over them, or the right to introduce laws, except in matters with which they [the Estates-General] were expressly charged by the united provinces, after lawful convocation, deputation and commission: and they [the city council] do not recognise the Estates-General since they lack such instructions.(63)

This theory of provincial sovereignty, however vehemently expressed, could not prevail at a time when Oldenbarnevelt was concerned to defend the sovereignty of the Estates-General even over that of the Estates of Holland.(64) In any case, the change of government achieved by Nieuwenaar's coup d'état in 1588 reversed Utrecht's attitude to the Estates-General and the Council of State, as it did so many other elements of the Sticht's affairs. In contrast to their previous refusal to co-operate, 'the Estates of Utrecht will accommodate the Estates-General in all things'; they even paid the expenses for Hendrick Buth, one of the disputed delegates to the Estates-General in 1586 to 1587.(65) Similarly, the Estates were now prepared to submit to the Council of State their dispute with Holland over the jurisdiction of the town of Oudewater, whereas before they had maintained that such cases should be decided by the individual provinces.(66)

Nevertheless, the Estates still insisted on a substantial amount of consultation with their delegates to the Estates-General, especially in financial matters, and proceedings in the Hague were still being held up for lack of Utrecht's resolutions.(67) Moreover, although the Sticht was now willing to recognise the Council of State as the government of the provinces, it was not until February 1590 that Niclaes van Berck was actually delegated as Utrecht's representative on the Council, and his reluctance to accept the commission shows that the attitudes of individuals, at least, to central government bodies had not changed.(68) In the 1590s, it seems that Utrecht's representatives were likely to use the Estates-General

and the Council of State to promote the province's own ends, contrary to their oath of office.(69) Fears of Utrecht's separatist tendencies had not entirely disappeared, but after 1590, the danger that it would pursue an entirely separate course from its allies was gone.(70)

VI.ii Utrecht and its 'allies'

The Estates' relations with their neighbours were not confined to those conducted through the Estates-General. Indeed, central governmental institutions played only a minor role in Utrecht's dealings with one of its closest neighbours, the county of Culemborg and the Count, Floris van Pallant. This can to some extent be explained by Culemborg's status outside the Union of Utrecht: the Count had signed the Treaty in April 1579, but only for some of his other lordships, not for the county itself. Relations between him and the Estates had never been friendly: indeed, during the Regency of Margaret of Parma, only her intercession with the king had saved Culemborg's lordships on the Archbishop's territory from being taken over by the Estates.(71) Despite the Count's rather fulsome protestations of friendship soon after the Pacification, the quarrel continued throughout the 1570s and 1580s.(72) Several distinct issues were involved, of which two (the questions of the River Lek and the village of Honswijk) were long-standing disputes.

Both the Sticht and Culemborg, as well as Gelderland, claimed sovereign rights over the stretch of the River Lek that formed the boundary between their respective territories,(73) with the result that whenever the Count had a breakwater built, projecting into the

river, the Estates would order its demolition, claiming that it would cause damage to land on the Utrecht bank. The Count would then rebuild his breakwater, whereupon the Estates would again demolish it. This happened at least four times in 1580-81, until the Count seized property belonging to Stichtenaars in the Nederbetuwe district of Gelderland, and the Estates replied with an order that goods passing along the Lek to Culemborg were to be seized and taken to Wijk.(74) After a settlement was apparently reached in January 1582, the area of dispute shifted to the village of Honswijk, situated on the north bank of the river opposite Culemborg itself. The village had been in the possession of the lords of Culemborg since the fourteenth century, and since 1443, it had involved them in quarrels with the bishops, and then the Estates, of Utrecht.(75)

The Estates did not dispute the Count's claim to the high, middle and low jurisdiction in Honswijk, but they maintained that the village was on Sticht territory, paid Sticht taxes (including contributions to the generality, from which Culemborg was free) and should therefore not be subject to the billeting of troops.(76) When the Drost of Culemborg stationed cavalry in Honswijk, the village complained to the Estates about the troops' extortions, and the Estates gave orders for the troops to be put back across the river, by force if necessary.(77). The following year, the Count complained that Utrecht was exercising high jurisdiction in Honswijk, and took the matter to the Council of State.(78)

The ill-feeling already in existence was exacerbated in June 1586 when the Count and his son were arrested and held for fifteen days in Utrecht, apparently on Nieuwenaar's orders, because the Count would not admit a certain company of cavalry to Culemborg; the Standing Committee was afraid that if he and his son returned home, they would join the enemy,(79) improbable though this may seem for such an ardent Calvinist and rebel as Floris van Pallant. After this insult, it is hardly surprising that the Count supported the opposition to the government which had arrested him: he had always had a leaning towards England, and he became one of Leicester's most devoted adherents.(80) Moreover, the Count was said to have had a hand in stirring up the dispute which paralysed the Estates in the winter of 1586-87, and he certainly sheltered Prouninck and his fellow-exiles after September 1588.(81)

Nevertheless, it was during the Prouninck régime in Utrecht that the next stage of the quarrel began, with an order from the Estates to Captain Meetkerken to collect the money his men were owed by Honswijk, no matter what the Count might say. In return, Culemborg arrested three citizens of Utrecht in Buren; Utrecht then arrested citizens of Culemborg and their livestock in the Sticht. The danger of bloodshed led the Estates to call in Nieuwenaar, whose intervention brought about a temporary agreement, reached on neutral territory at Vianen.(82) The Count continued to arrest inhabitants of the Sticht, however, including official messengers (boden) of the Estates and the Hof, who (according to the Estates) were allowed to deliver legal summonses in Honswijk.(83) At the beginning of 1590, the Estates had

the horses of a Honswijk man sold to pay off tax arrears, taking no notice of the Count's objections.(84) He took the next step by ordering the seizure of certain tithe crops situated in the county and belonging to the chapters of the Dom, Oudmunster and St. Jan, whom he calls Papists.(85) After fruitless attempts at mediation by the Estates-General and the Council of State (not even Elbertus Leoninus could secure concessions from either side in the dispute [86]), the Estates authorised the chapters to collect an equivalent amount of grain from Honswijk, and sent a military escort to help in the collection of this grain, at the Steenweerd, a small island in the Lek between Honswijk and Culemborg. In their accounts of the ensuing events, each side blamed the other for precipitating the violence which followed: the Estates said their men had merely defended themselves against artillery and musket fire from over the river and inside the Steenweerd farmhouse; the Count asserted that his tenant's farm had been burned down, even though his men were ready to parley, and that those of Utrecht were worse enemies to him than the Spaniards.(87) Apart from the deaths on both sides, the treatment of two of the prisoners taken by Utrecht in the affray stood in the way of a truce for some time (they complained that they were likely to die of cold after 28 weeks' imprisonment). Meanwhile, the Estates-General took Utrecht's side, and ordered Culemborg to allow the chapters full possession of their tithes.(88) By August 1592, it appears that both sides were at least prepared to negotiate, but the issue was not finally resolved until 1615, when the Count's son, Floris II van Pallant, yielded his claim to Honswijk to the Estates, in return for the addition to his county of the same Steenweerd, and a substantial annuity for himself.(89)

Culemborg was a special case, where long-standing quarrels came to a head in the 1580s. It was impolitic for Utrecht to be on such bad terms with all its neighbours all the time, and the Estates' disputes with Gelderland and Friesland, for example, were on a much smaller scale, being limited to heated arguments with Friesland's deputies in the Estates-General's assembly about precedence on the forthcoming embassy to France: the question was decided, in Utrecht's favour, by the drawing of lots. (90) As far as Gelderland was concerned, there were minor economic disagreements about the taxation of peat and beer;(91) apart from these, and the Sticht's resentment at the duchy's comparative freedom from taxation (see above, p. 160), the raids of troops back and forth between the two provinces were a more or less permanent irritant, which could not be alleviated by promises from the Estates or Gelderland's Landdag.(92) In contrast to the Estates-General and the Council of State, Gelderland had offered Utrecht help against the Vredenburg garrison in 1576, and during the 1580s the Sticht's tendency towards the east became increasingly apparent: Holland recognised this fact when it tried to use Utrecht's influence with Gelderland to persuade the duchy to adhere to the Union of Utrecht after Orange's death.(93) The same inclination is shown in the Estates' choice of Nieuwenaar, already the Stadholder of Gelderland and Overijssel, as their Stadholder, in preference to Maurice of Nassau, who held the same office in Holland and Zeeland. It was not only during the Leicester era that Gelderland, Utrecht and Overijssel took joint action: in November 1580, they held separate discussions about the forthcoming establishment of the Landraad, and

in August 1581, they resolved to ask Anjou to appoint a deputy to Orange as Stadholder to administer justice and conduct the war in the three eastern provinces.(94) Gelderland and Overijssel shared the Sticht's distrust of the Holland-dominated Estates-General, and in fact were even more reluctant to send delegates to the Hague: Overijssel was completely unrepresented in the Estates-General throughout 1585 and 1586.(95)

The strongest bond between Utrecht and its eastern neighbours was their common danger from the enemy and their common problem of defence. Most of the meetings between representatives from Utrecht and Gelderland met to discuss action against Parma's forces: this was the subject of the talks with Gelderland and Overijssel in 1587, for instance (see above, p. 164). The frequency of commissions like the one on which even Amersfoort was represented argues that they were not very effective,(96) and indeed all three provinces remained extremely vulnerable to the enemy, though the Sticht's position was improved by Maurice's victories in the 1590s.

Despite these links with the east, the Estates could never ignore the even stronger bonds which connected them to Holland. It was, after all, the more densely populated and fertile western district of the province which shared a boundary with Holland, whereas the border with Gelderland ran through the sparsely peopled sandy regions north and south of Amersfoort. Moreover, while the Sticht had suffered considerably until 1543 from the wars between the Habsburgs and the dukes of Gelderland, it had been under one government with Holland

from the Union of Toledo of 1534 until 1572. From then on, however, Holland and Utrecht were actually at war, and the west and south-west of the Sticht, particularly the land of Montfoort, had undergone raids and devastation at the hands of the Beggar garrisons in Gouda, Oudewater and Woerden.(97) Utrecht had entered into the Pacification of Ghent in 1576 under pressure from Holland (and Zeeland), but had received only limited help from them for their most serious problems, the siege of Vredenburg and the payment of the troops in the city. Although the Estates of Holland advanced a loan of 14,000 guilders, and the Noorderkwartier one of 20,000, a deputation from the city of Utrecht to Amsterdam returned empty-handed, and relations between the two provinces were not improved by Utrecht's failure to repay these loans at the proper time.(98)

As with Gelderland, there were economic disputes with Holland, for instance about the toll levied at Schoonhoven on peat being transported down the Lek from Utrecht into Holland, or the tax imposed by the Sticht on beer produced in Delft.(99) Where Utrecht resented Gelderland's comparative freedom from the Estates-General's taxes, Holland for its part objected to the lower rates of taxation in force in Utrecht, and repeatedly urged that the generale middelen should be levied at the same rate in all the contributing provinces. The Estates refused even to consider this question, on the grounds that the Sticht could not afford it, nor would they ever increase their quota in the monthly contribution to the gemene zaak, whatever Holland or the Estates-General might say.(100) It is hardly surprising, in these circumstances, that Holland sometimes felt that the Sticht was not pulling its weight in the communal war effort.

Relations between Utrecht and Holland were further strained by disagreements over jurisdiction in the border areas, particularly the claims made by the town of Oudewater over the inhabitants of certain districts in Utrecht in its immediate vicinity. Oudewater had originally been in the Sticht, having received its town charter from the bishop in the thirteenth century, but since the fourteenth century it had belonged to Holland. The town appears to have been strongly anti-Utrecht in the years that followed: this feeling was doubtless intensified when Hierges' troops razed Oudewater to the ground in 1575.(101)

There were two issues involved in the dispute: first, could Oudewater claim jurisdiction over the inhabitants of districts such as the Langeweide and Ruigeweide, and were these people obliged to pay levies imposed by, for example, the bailiff (baljuw) of Oudewater? Secondly, were farmers from Utrecht who took refuge behind Oudewater's walls still liable for provincial taxes on the land they continued to use in the Sticht?(102) Both the town and the Estates arrested and held people from the other side, pending payment of the sums claimed; while the Estates of Holland were willing to submit the dispute to a higher authority, and ordered the magistrates of Oudewater to release the Stichtenaars they were holding, it was not until after the change of government in Utrecht in 1588, and yet more arrests, that the Estates agreed to arbitration from outside.(103)

In the early 1580s, Utrecht had a rather variable political relationship with Holland and Zeeland. Holland, it would appear, was eager to strengthen its ties with Utrecht by elevating William of Orange from his present position as Stadholder to the status of hereditary lord with 'high authority' (hoge overheid) over the three provinces. This question was first raised soon after the Abjuration of Philip II, and in 1582, the Estates were prepared to offer the high authority to Orange, with some limitations on his powers (it must be remembered that they had not acknowledged the Duke of Anjou as their lord).(104) A year later, however, they had changed their minds, partly because they suspected that Holland's additional proposal to make Orange its Count would constitute a breach of the Union of Utrecht, and that the same would be true of stronger bonds between Holland, Zeeland and the Sticht which would alienate the eastern provinces, Gelderland, Friesland and Overijssel.(105) The issue of the double elevation of Orange was delayed throughout 1583 by internal differences in Holland; but at a meeting of delegates from Holland, Zeeland and Utrecht in November 1583, the Sticht expressed its approval of Holland's determination to offer Orange the Act of Presentation as Count, but was still very cautious about making any changes in Utrecht's own status quo, in view of the dangerous situation in Flanders. In general, Utrecht viewed its collaboration with Holland and Zeeland as a basis for the rest of the allies to join: any separate councils for these three provinces would probably alienate the others.(106) The assassination of Orange (still officially neither Count nor 'high authority') in July 1584, roused the Estates into renewed negotiations with Holland and Zeeland (see

pp. 157-158 above) but the pendulum of the Sticht's primary loyalties soon swung away from the west. The first sign of a short-lived attempt to 'go it alone' was the choice of Villers as Stadholder, and it is significant that Holland tried to delay the Estates-General's confirmation of his appointment.(107) What is more, at the time of Nieuwenaar's election as Stadholder, the Estates of Holland issued a document requiring Utrecht to rejoin the government of Holland and Zeeland immediately. The Estates of Utrecht replied that they had no intention of putting themselves under the same government as the other two provinces: for the time being, the pendulum had swung towards the east.(108)

Holland's attempts to influence the Sticht were not confined to the strictly political sphere. Utrecht resented its neighbour's interference in its religious life as well: the notoriously Catholic district of the Proostdij of St. Jan, situated between the two provinces and enjoying certain protective privileges, evoked several expressions of disapproval from Holland, especially when the priest at Kudelstaart preached in support of a conspiracy by certain 'malevolent' persons in Holland.(109) Similarly, Holland accused the Estates of being 'too lax' in furthering the Reformation in Montfoort. In February 1583, this interference went too far for the Estates' liking, when over twenty soldiers disturbed a Sunday service at Hagestein, a village on the south bank of the Lek which belonged jointly to the chapters of the Dom and Oudmunster. They robbed the congregation of their coats and arrested the ministers (who had always preached in accordance with the placard on acceptable Reformed doctrine, according to witnesses) - all this, somewhat improbably, in

the name of the Prince of Orange. The Standing Committee pointed out to the officers of the company involved that any religious unorthodoxy in Hagestein was a matter for the Estates of Utrecht, and for no other body, to decide. Even when the two provinces were politically in agreement, the Reformed Church in Holland protested in 1601 to Prince Maurice and to the Estates-General that "abuses and Papist superstitions" were crossing the border from the Sticht, and that ministers who had been disciplined in Holland could find employment in Utrecht.(110)

The Sticht's sometimes latent, sometimes overt dislike and distrust of Holland were not appeased by expressions of friendship such as a letter from the city council of Amsterdam, protesting that Amsterdam and Utrecht "have long been as two souls in one body in the common defence of the provinces and resistance to the enemy".(111) On the contrary, in the midst of the crisis of 1586-88, when Holland gave shelter and support to the exiled opposition to the Prouinck régime, the Utrecht towns made their views quite clear: they would rejoin the first two Estates only on condition that "it shall be declared by a solemn everlasting resolution that the government of this Sticht is a separate government, and that no lawful union, agreement or usage is recognised whereby Holland, Zeeland and Utrecht should be ruled by one Governor".(112) English observers, who were also suspicious of the Holland regents, were convinced that the Estates of Holland, in collusion with Nieuwenaar and Count Hohenlohe, who were disenchanted with Leicester's rule, would use all means "by hook and by crook" to win Utrecht away from its English loyalties and safely into Holland's orbit.(113)

Yet, at a lower level, farmers from both sides of the Holland/Utrecht border could unite in occupation of the St. Maartensdijk to resist the passage of cavalry and wagons across their lands, forcing the Estates to send the troopers to another part of the Sticht.(114) The following year (1588), some villages of the Sticht, together with farmers from Hilversum and the surrounding district of Gooiland, put up armed opposition to increases in taxes proposed by Utrecht. In such circumstances, the Estates of Utrecht had no hesitation in appealing to their colleagues in Holland for help, in the name of the Closer Union. Holland responded with a prohibition of any seditious communication between its farmers and those of Utrecht.(115) Threats from inside or outside would drive the Estates to assure their neighbours of their own devotion to the common cause, and their willingness to share a common fortune with the other provinces, as a prelude to an appeal for help.(116)

Thus, even when the Sticht was politically on very bad terms with Holland, mutual need and dependence bound the two provinces together. None of the other provinces could answer Utrecht's appeals: Friesland and Zeeland were too far away; Gelderland could not afford to defend itself, far less its neighbours. Holland was the Sticht's only hope. And Holland, for its part, could not forget the dangerous military establishment maintained by Alva in the city and province of Utrecht. The Estates knew that they could use these memories: on one occasion, when Parma was advancing ever closer to the Sticht in 1586, the Estates pointed out that the fortification of Wijk, Amersfoort and Rhenen, which they could not afford themselves, would be of particular

benefit to Holland, 'whose bulwark we are'.(117) No matter how strained political relations between the provinces might become, Holland would usually take steps to protect its own frontiers, as it did when the imminent fall of Antwerp threatened to shift the main theatre of war to Gelderland, and, by extension, to Utrecht.(118)

The years after 1588 saw a distinct rapprochement between Utrecht and Holland, signalled in minor ways, such as co-operation in the guarding of areas of mutual concern, like Goiland, and in major matters like the choice - albeit not without opposition - of Maurice of Nassau as Stadholder of Utrecht in February 1590, with the stipulation that he was to govern the Sticht as a separate province.(119) Yet to all intents and purposes, the Union of Toledo was restored, and the uncompromising assertion of the Prouinck government that 'Holland and Utrecht had nothing in common' was forgotten - to such an extent that a seventeenth-century commentator could declare that 'the Province of Utrecht has of old been, and is at this day, the most faithfull ally of Holland'.(120)

VI.iii Utrecht and foreign princes

The Estates' relations with the outside world did not stop at the borders of their immediate neighbours, whether to the east or the west. Sometimes, like their allies, they looked beyond the confines of the Netherlands for help in the struggle against Spain, admitting that 'these provinces cannot defend themselves without help from a foreign lord or ruler'.(121) While Utrecht had never backed Orange's pro-French policy, it seems to have shared, in some measure, the

preference felt in other provinces, especially Gelderland and Flanders, for certain German Protestant princes, in particular Gebhard Truchsess von Waldburg, the Elector-Archbishop of Cologne.(122)

In the early 1580s, Truchsess married, turned Lutheran, and seemed about to establish a Protestant principality of great international significance in the Rhineland. This was contrary to the Religious Peace of Augsburg (1555), which ordained that Catholic spiritual princes must abdicate if they converted to Protestantism. Accordingly, from January 1583 onwards, Truchsess was at war with his Catholic rival for the electorate, Ernest of Bavaria, who was supported by the Emperor, the duke of Bavaria, and, more importantly, by part of Parma's army from the Netherlands, which played a decisive part in the eventual Catholic victory.(123) Nieuwenaar, whose own lands were nearby, was one of those German Protestant nobles who persuaded Truchsess not to abdicate on his marriage, and he, John of Nassau and John Casimir of the Palatinate were among Gebhard's earliest supporters.(124) Soon after the war began, Nieuwenaar appealed to the Estates of Utrecht to give the Elector and his allies financial support, on the grounds that they were of the same religion, and that 'this cause will in a short time be a common cause with that of the Netherlands'. In order to keep on good terms with Nieuwenaar, the Estates decided to advance him, and the Elector, as much as possible of the 6,000 guilders he requested. Later, they endorsed the decision of Orange and the Estates-General to assist the Elector's impoverished war-effort, in recognition of the services rendered by Truchsess's men to the defence of the Netherlands.(125) Despite this somewhat meagre Dutch subsidy (100,000 guilders), the Protestant cause

achieved little: Nieuwenaar's castles fell into Catholic hands; Truchsess and his wife were forced into exile in the Netherlands; and Ernest of Bavaria was recognised as Elector of Cologne several years before the last of the Protestant garrisons surrendered in 1589.(126)

Although Nieuwenaar continued to wage war in the ex-Elector's name, and the Estates continued to contribute to his personal expenses, Gebhard made no further direct impact on the Sticht until Leicester's arrival, at the end of 1585, with instructions to advance his cause.(127) Truchsess became one of Leicester's close advisers, mediated in some of his disputes with Dutch leaders, and was an eye-witness of much of the party struggle in Utrecht; he was, for example, invited to the banquet given to welcome Lord Buckhurst in April 1587.(128) Indeed, according to Bor, he helped to avert a 'terrible bloodbath' when the troops in the city mutinied against Nieuwenaar's authority, in May of the same year.(129) In return, Leicester thought very highly of Truchsess: he praised 'his wisdom, his behaviour, his languages, his person' and his 'verie noble mind';(130) on a practical level, he authorised the city of Utrecht to pay Gebhard's debts from its ordinary taxes, as a contribution to the gemene zaak. Even after Leicester had finally left the Netherlands, the city still used the generale middelen for this purpose.(131)

An exiled Elector, whose debts the Estates had to pay, was scarcely the foreign ruler to whom they looked for help in their difficulties. The Estates' relationship with Cologne was therefore of minor importance; the same can be said of their involvement with

France, which they kept, whenever possible, to a minimum. The Estates had never been eager to accept the help offered to the Netherlands by the Duke of Anjou, brother of Henry III of France: as early as February 1580, they had expressed their preference for William of Orange, a preference shared even by the canons of the five chapters, who might have been expected to incline towards the Catholic Frenchman.(132)

The Sticht's distrust of Anjou was not overcome by the Estates-General's treaty with him in September 1580, which the Estates thought was contrary to the Union of Utrecht, so that they were not obliged to sign it. Their reluctance to acknowledge Anjou as their lord was partly financial, since his arrival in 1581 increased the ordinary quota to pay for his troops.(133) Nor could the Estates be swayed by emotional appeals from the Council of State to recompense Anjou 'as you hold dear your freedom and the welfare and protection of your wives, children and descendants' for the expenses incurred in the capture of Cambrai. Even Orange's eulogy of Anjou and his enthusiasm for the Netherlands' cause - 'we should think ourselves fortunate and praise God that it has pleased Him to grant us such a prince and champion' - could not persuade them to entrust their resources willingly to the Duke.(134) Although the Estates did agree, in the end, to pay the usual tenth of Holland's share in the sums granted to Anjou, it was only because Utrecht was 'bound to the other provinces by virtue of the Union'. Moreover, the Sticht's representatives were authorised to take the general oath of submission to Anjou only as far as the war was concerned.(135) In short, throughout the early 1580s, the Estates consistently maintained that they had entered into no

agreement or contract with Anjou, and were therefore not obliged to send delegates to his Council or contribute against their will to his finances. Even the Estates-General recognised this distinction between Utrecht (and Gelderland) and the other provinces: a distinction which enabled the Sticht to dissociate itself, a trifle smugly, from the Estates-General's troubled debates about Anjou following the French Fury in January 1583.(136)

After the death of both Anjou and Orange, however, the Estates were prepared, somewhat reluctantly, to negotiate with King Henry III, on condition that any French Governor-General of the Netherlands would be a Protestant: if not, they would enter into no treaty with France. In fact, the question did not arise, since Henry III refused the United Provinces' offer of sovereignty in the spring of 1585. Shortly afterwards, the Estates disavowed everything their delegates had negotiated in France, and, like the rest of the provinces, turned their attention to the prospects of a treaty with England.(137) Nor were the Estates any more eager in 1589 to conclude an agreement with Henry IV, the new king of France, despite his Protestant faith. Even in the disillusionment with England which followed the Leicester era, the Estates were unimpressed by the argument that 'the cause of France [i.e. Henry IV's war against the Catholic League, assisted by Parma] is a common cause with [that of] these provinces'.(138) Once again, the problem was financial: as Utrecht could not afford to meet its ordinary obligations, it refused to pay its share of the funds promised to Henry IV by the Estates-General, unless the Sticht was freed from enemy exactions. Since that was impossible, in 1590 the other provinces assumed Utrecht's quota in the debt, which amounted to

no more than 6,000 guilders.(139)

Utrecht had always been much more enthusiastic about negotiations with Protestant England than it was about dealing with Catholic, and probably treacherous, France. As early as 1584, the Estates declared their belief that England was better able to help the Netherlands than France, and their preference for negotiations with Queen Elizabeth if Henry III should prove unreasonable.(140) They were willing to concede much greater powers to a representative of the Queen than to a French Governor-General: during the talks with France, the Estates stipulated that the provinces should, if at all possible, appoint their own "Governors, councillors and principal officers", whereas they wanted Leicester to choose part of his own Council of State without reference to the provinces.(141)

The Sticht's relationship with England was at its most obvious during the years of the Prouinck régime (1586-1588), but it began when Utrecht joined the other provinces in offering the sovereignty to Elizabeth in 1585, and - in marked contrast to the earlier discussions with Anjou - went so far as to offer her any of the towns in the Sticht as security for the projected treaty, if she wanted them.(142) Any delay in the ratification of the Treaty of Nonsuch was not, therefore, caused by Utrecht's reluctance to share with Holland and Zeeland the risks involved in granting England a cautionary town, as A.M. van der Woude claimed.(143) It is true that the Estates debated the Treaty the day after their deputies should have been in the Hague to ratify it, but the decision to endorse the agreed terms was taken surprisingly quickly, considering that the Estates had several other

pressing problems on their hands at the same time: the burgerhoplieden were clamouring for Nieuwenaar's appointment as Stadholder; the province was in the middle of a serious financial crisis; and 45 to 50 companies of unpaid soldiers were on the loose in the towns and villages of the Sticht.(144)

Undeterred by Elizabeth's refusal of the sovereignty in 1585, the burgerhoplieden, the city council and the small towns resolved to repeat the offer to Her Majesty of 'the absolute Government of the provinces...without any restrictions or limitations...preserving the true Christian religion, the provinces' privileges, the glory of God and Her Majesty's authority'.(145) The burgerhoplieden's attempt to gain the support of the Gouda schutterij failed, but later in 1586 the Estates themselves urged the Queen to accept the sovereignty of Utrecht alone, if not of all the provinces, on much more generous terms than those originally proposed by the Estates-General.(146) Overijssel and Friesland both supported this offer, and pressure (for example, by the Utrecht burgerhoplieden) was exerted on the English ambassador, Buckhurst, to persuade Elizabeth to accept it.(147) After Leicester's resignation as Governor-General, the Estates declared that 'the state of monarchy is the best, indeed the only, means to remove all confusion and disorder and to preserve these provinces'. In line with this conviction, the Estates sent another envoy to England in the summer of 1588.(148) All these efforts were to no avail, however: the Queen remained fixed in her resolve not 'to intermeddle with the souveraintie', and the Estates had only alienated their fellow provinces by violating article 10 of the Union of Utrecht, which forbade the conclusion of separate alliances by individual

provinces.(149)

Despite Elizabeth's repeated refusals of the sovereignty of the Sticht, a definite relationship did exist between the province and the Queen. Utrecht was fully aware of its dependence on her help: if they were abandoned by her Majesty, wrote the city magistrates, they could find no lord, ruler, or prince upon the earth who had both the will and the power to take up their cause.(150) The Estates wrote to Elizabeth that they desired to live and die at her feet. For her they would even send deputies to the Estates-General, so that her ambassador would have no cause to report to the Queen that Utrecht intended to withdraw from the Closer Union or from the Treaty of Nonsuch.(151) Indeed, the Estates under Prouinck saw themselves as the only true adherents of the Treaty among the provinces, and did their best to shield it against attacks such as the 1588 instruction for the Council of State.(152) For her part, Elizabeth knew that it was in her interests to have a provincial government in Utrecht which was so well-affected towards her: she therefore strongly recommended that Prouinck be reappointed burgomaster in the autumn of 1588.(153) Moreover, the Queen took the side of the Sticht in its dispute with Holland, and urged that the quarrel should be submitted to her for settlement under the terms of the Treaty, calling on the Council of State to stop Holland "persecuting" Utrecht, on pain of losing her support.(154)

This special relationship made Elizabeth's efforts towards peace with Parma particularly painful to the Sticht. Although the negotiations had already been secretly under way at the time of Leicester's triumphal progress through the Netherlands early in 1586, and although the city council had forbidden the spreading of all rumours of peace at the end of that year, the Estates still displayed confidence that the Queen would never negotiate anything to the Netherlands' disadvantage.(155) In their opposition to peace, if in nothing else, the Estates were at one with Holland and the Estates-General.(156) Yet, when it became clear that Elizabeth was determined to go ahead with the peace conference at Ostend, the Estates reluctantly agreed to send representatives, from Utrecht, Gelderland and Overijssel, with or without the consent of the other provinces: these delegates were to fight for the inclusion in any peace treaty of points such as the establishment of the Reformed religion to the exclusion of all others, and the maintenance of all the provinces' privileges and rights. And the Estates further maintained that no matter what Elizabeth might do, the provinces should not enter into any agreement with Henry of Navarre without her knowledge.(157) In the end, however, they were not forced to take part in distasteful peace talks, since the Ostend conference was rendered meaningless by the arrival of the Spanish Armada in the summer of 1588. In the face of this threat to their most powerful ally, the Estates were prepared - rather late, as usual - to advance 10,000 guilders to fit out ships for Elizabeth, despite Utrecht's chronic shortage of funds.(158)

The unruly English troops in the Sticht represented a more immediate aspect of Utrecht's relationship with England. Even before Leicester arrived, the Estates had to pay these troops to prevent damage to property and livestock; all the same, the soldiers committed excesses and pillaged the leper house at Zuylen and the village of Maarssen; they minted counterfeit money and drew their weapons against some of the Amersfoort magistrates.(159) Yet the Prouinck régime was anxious to keep the English garrison, which helped to maintain it in power.(160) (Buckhurst recognised that it was in the interests of Holland and Zeeland to keep the English garrison out of Utrecht [161]). Indeed, in 1588, the city gates were kept locked to stop the garrison leaving; the troops were refused transport to Bergen-op-Zoom, which was under siege by Parma; and both the city and the Estates paid the troops out of their own pockets. As one English officer phrased it: 'we have nothing but what the burgers of Utrecht will lend us...for love of Her Majesty and His Excellency [Leicester]'.(162) All attempts to recover this money - from Leicester's treasurer, from Norris or Willoughby, or even from Elizabeth herself - were unsuccessful.(163)

By the time of Nieuwenaar's coup in September 1588, however, it appears that most of the English garrison had left the city to take part in the siege of Bergen-op-Zoom. Whether or not this had any influence on the events of 25-26 September, the new city council was found to be 'in a rather worse humour against the English than before'.(164) Similarly, the Estates sent a deputation to 'divert' Elizabeth's new ambassador, Sir John Norris, from coming to Utrecht,

by assuring him that the Sticht's internal disputes had all been resolved without reference to the English. The delegates were also instructed to secure the reduction of the English garrison to 300 men, on the grounds that the previous figure (650 in January 1588) was unnecessarily high, and had been maintained by the members of the former government purely for the safety of their own persons.(165) Yet some of the personal loyalty felt in the Sticht to Leicester and England must have remained: by November 1588, after Leicester's death, the Estates had still not published the announcement of his resignation from the post of Governor-General.(165) Otherwise, the special relationship between the province and the Queen was at an end; and henceforward the Estates had no separate dealings with Elizabeth. They would seem to have tacitly endorsed the policy of Oldenbarnevelt and the Estates-General in the 1590s: grateful acceptance of English military and financial assistance, coupled with a refusal to make concessions in England's favour, for example, on trade with the enemy.(167)

Chapter VII

The Estates in crisis 1586-1588

The two years between 1586 and 1588, the 'Leicester era', have attracted more attention than any other comparable period in Utrecht's history during the Revolt. The reason for this is quite clear: during these two years, events in Utrecht had an important bearing on developments elsewhere in the Netherlands and even beyond. For once, the Sticht occupied the centre of the stage, and observers commented freely on its performance. The comparatively greater volume of historical analysis has created its own problems, however, since this attention has largely been directed, naturally enough, towards the effects produced by Utrecht on the rest of the provinces, and has followed the tradition, established by Bor, of hostility to Leicester and his adherents in the Sticht.(1) The Earl himself has been the target of a good deal of abuse from historians. Fruin called him 'a haughty, hot-tempered foreigner, without understanding of men or affairs', while Rogier described him as 'the dictator of a Calvinist totalitarianism'.(2) Contemporary opinions were divided, however: Joris de Bye, the Estates-General's treasurer, probably spoke for his masters when he wrote that Leicester was 'better suited to England's monarchical government than to a republic'. The city council of Utrecht, on the other hand, eulogised the Earl in 1587 as follows: 'if there have ever been God-fearing, good-natured, kind, sincere, religious, dedicated, magnanimous rulers, princes or Governors in this country, His Excellency [Leicester] should indeed be recognised as one

of them.(3)

Controversy about Leicester has tended to obscure the activities of his adherents in the Sticht itself, although P.L. Muller acknowledged that their leader, Gerard Prouninck van Deventer, was without doubt a sincere patriot and a man of talent, who displayed more honesty and firmness of character than his patron.(4) As burgomaster of Utrecht, Prouninck played a leading role in the drama, which was centred, perhaps even more than usual, in the city itself. Yet no aspect of provincial life remained unaffected by the series of crises which shook the Sticht between 1586 and 1588: internal politics and administration, the composition of the Estates and the municipal councils, the province's relations with its neighbours and with England, its religious life and financial arrangements - all suffered upheavals which seemed fundamental, but proved in the end to be temporary disturbances only.

Like the rest of the United Netherlands, in the autumn of 1585 Utrecht had high hopes of the new Governor-General, and his determination 'to rule others and not to be ruled...to make laws for others on what they should do, and not to accept laws, as he is a lord who has come here not to gain money or property, but out of pure zeal for the true Christian religion, and to free these provinces from the tyranny of the Spaniards'. Such a strong man was to be welcomed in the chaos prevailing after the fall of Antwerp.(5) The city's bells were rung for joy at the news of Leicester's acceptance of the wide powers - in theory as great as those enjoyed by the Governors-General

under Charles V - which were conferred on him in January 1586 by the Estates-General.(6) Leicester lost no time in trying to exercise these powers in the Sticht: in January, he asked the town council of Amersfoort to postpone the annual renewal of the magistracy until he reached Utrecht and could attend to it himself. In fact, the council was changed on 7 March, two weeks before Leicester arrived in the city, by the Stadholder, Nieuwenaar.(7)

The Earl's triumphal entry into Utrecht, in March 1586, was marked by lavish celebrations, during which a representative of the city council expressed the province's expectations, in a poem addressed to Leicester:

Repos, tranquillité, secours allégément
Trouverons vraiment, par sa prouesse,
Desiré sans cesse, avons longuement
Voir ici présent, sa très noble hautesse
DROIT ET LOIAL, muer en aage en sagesse.(8)

These prophecies of peace and tranquillity were not fulfilled, however. The Estates-General soon regretted vesting such generous powers in the Earl, and Queen Elizabeth regarded his exalted title as an insult to herself. Very shortly after Leicester's arrival in Utrecht, there arose one of the major dilemmas of his period in office, an early indication of the divergence in attitudes between the Sticht and its western neighbours, Holland and Zeeland. The occasion was the publication on 4 April 1586, of the placard forbidding all trade which might benefit Spain or her allies. Whereas this measure

angered the trading interests of the maritime provinces, the Estates, and particularly the city, of Utrecht, on the other hand, feared that the provisions allowing for the payment of 'convoy-money' were not stringent enough, and would still permit a certain amount of trade with the enemy. Not until Leicester had assured deputations from the Estates of Utrecht and the Hof of Gelderland (which shared the Sticht's fears), that his decree was designed to prevent all foodstuffs from reaching the enemy, would the Estates consent to the publication of the placard, some ten weeks after it was originally issued.(9)

To clamp down on the evasion of these trading regulations, Leicester set up, on his own authority, a separate Chamber of Finance, and asked Paulus Buys, among others, to serve upon it. Buys, the former provincial advocate of Holland, had long been a leading member of the pro-English party in the Netherlands, and had in fact helped to negotiate the Treaty of Nonsuch. Leicester had chosen him, as a native of Amersfoort, to represent the Sticht in the Council of State. Since then, however, Buys had become an outspoken critic of Leicester's government, and he refused to take office under the head of the Chamber of Finance, Jacques Reingout, a southerner from Brabant with a dubious past (he had been Requesens' clerk).(10) This provoked Leicester into abusing Buys as 'a devill, an atheist, and the onlie boulsterer of all papists and ill men', 'a most lewd man as ever lived and a most hated man to all sorts here'. But, the Governor-General promised himself, 'his head shall pay'.(11)

The day after Leicester left Utrecht for the Hague, 9 July 1586, Buys was arrested by the city's burgerhoplieden. According to Bor, they acted on instructions from Leicester's agent, Thomas Webbes, and Jacques de Pottere, a schepen of Utrecht. This account of the incident, coupled with the Earl's known dislike of Buys, has often been taken as proof of his responsibility for the arrest.(12) Leicester certainly denied any prior knowledge of the arrest, admitting however that he did not regret it: perhaps Fruin was right to surmise that the burgerhoplieden probably knew they were acting in accordance with his wishes, though not actually with his consent.(13) In any case, they thought it necessary to justify their action to Leicester at some length, listing the reasons which had convinced them of the need to arrest Buys: among these were the illegality of his appointment to the Council of State (he had not been nominated by the Estates); his lukewarm religious views and his opposition to the election of Nieuwenaar as Stadholder of Utrecht; his alleged sympathy with those who wanted to make peace after the enemy's victory at Amerongen in 1585; his attempt to retain a Catholic magistracy in Amersfoort; and, most important of all, the incriminating evidence of high treason in his secret correspondence (Buys was believed to have been intriguing with the king of Denmark).(14) As no mention was made of orders having been received from any higher authority, this apologia would seem to cast doubt on Leicester's involvement in the arrest.

Whatever may be the truth of the matter, the fact remains that the arrest of Buys, leading to his six months' imprisonment, marked the next stage in the estrangement between Utrecht on the one hand, and the Estates-General and the Estates of Holland on the other. The Estates of Holland and the towns of Amsterdam, Gouda and Leiden were outraged, and demanded the immediate release of Buys (who had been pensionary of Leiden before becoming Advocate of Holland in 1572).(15) The Utrecht city council ignored these repeated protests, however, and refused to release the prisoner, although examination of his papers, which were confiscated at the time of his arrest, sealed in a chest and entrusted to Nieuwenaar for safe-keeping, showed that the seals had been broken and the damaging documents removed.(16) Meanwhile, the burgerhoplieden, who had not long before attempted to dictate trading policy to Amsterdam, were indignant at such uncalled-for interference in Utrecht's internal affairs: according to them, they had never meddled in Holland's business.(17)

Although there may be some doubt about Leicester's role in the arrest of Paulus Buys, the Governor-General was responsible for the expulsion from Utrecht, shortly afterwards, of a very good number of Papists, or those in the [public] eye, for evil-doings among the people. Rumours had reached England of correspondence between the enemy and Catholics and 'malcontents' in Utrecht, and Leicester sent Nieuwenaar to the city council with instructions to rid the city of this internal menace, in order that 'the enemy's hopes should be frustrated'. The original list of those to be expelled, nineteen in number, included the city's Schout, Niclaes van Zuylen van Drakenburg;

Floris Heermale, one of the Geeligeerden and frequently a delegate to the Estates-General; Willem van Lamsweerde, the steward of the provincial domains and a former secretary of the Estates; two other prominent members of the city magistracy, Johan Robbrechtsz van Druenen and Albert Foeck; and Adriaan van der Burch, the secretary to the provincial Hof. This list was then augmented at the request of the magistrates and the burgerhoplieden until a total of sixty was reached. The later additions, for the most part, were less important politically (they included, for example, a tailor, two millers, and a former militia captain), except for the last name on the list, that of Floris Thin, the Estates' advocate, who played a vital part in all their business. The city's dislike and distrust of the chapters is illustrated by the inclusion of sixteen canons and ten other clergy, who were obvious targets for a purge of possible 'Papists'. (18) Orders to leave the Sticht before sunrise for 'neutral places' were sent to the houses of all of these men; neutral places being defined as small states outside the Netherlands such as Cleves or Munster.(19)

This order could not be enforced. It is not possible to trace the movements of all the expelled men, but some of them certainly did not retire meekly to Cleves. Thin, Nicolaes van Zuylen and Johan van Druenen went first to Montfoort, from where they immediately appealed to the Estates of Holland for help. The nobles and the towns of Holland responded with a formal protest to Leicester, now in the Hague, and a testimony to the loyal services rendered to the country by the leading exiles, in which they received the support of Maurice and the Council of State. At the same time, they granted the exiles permission to enter Holland, and offered them hospitality in

Gouda.(20) Thin took his case directly to Leicester himself, in the Hague, and incidentally secured the release of his baggage, which his wife had sent after him from Utrecht, and which had been seized by the Montfoort garrison.(21) Towards the end of July, the Estates-General offered the exiles all possible assistance. Thin and his fellows appealed to Leicester to cancel the order for their expulsion, which he denied having authorised; under pressure from all sides, the Earl took the five foremost exiles (Thin, van Zuylen van Drakenburg, Foeck, van Druenen and Robbrecht van Honthorst) under his personal protection, though they were still unable to return home.(22) When, in August, the banished men were again ordered to leave the United Provinces, on pain of confiscation of their property, the Estates of Holland sent a distinguished deputation to protest in very strong terms to the Utrecht city council, and then promised the exiles compensation from the property of Stichtenaars situated in Holland. It appears that for once the burgerhoplieden were within their rights to complain that the Estates of Holland were meddling in something which did not concern them, since this promise of compensation had only a very dubious legal foundation.(23)

Meanwhile, the positions made vacant by the expulsions had to be filled. The manner in which these new appointments were made paved the way for later political dissension in the Sticht. The most objectionable of them was the replacement of the exiled Schout, van Zuylen van Drakenburg, by Karel van Trillo, an ardent adherent of Leicester from Brabant. Initially, the city council would not recognise him; a month later, however, the annual renewal of the

magistracy was carried out by Count Culemborg and Lord North, acting on a special commission from Leicester, while Nieuwenaar was in Germany, raising troops.(24) Sixteen (out of forty) new members of the city council were appointed, foremost among them the new burgomaster, Gerard Prouninck, called van Deventer, who was to become the undisputed leader of the Leicestrian party in Utrecht, and the moving spirit behind many of the attempts at radical change in the provincial government over the next two years.(25) The new magistracy immediately installed Trillo in the office of Schout, granting him burgerschap a month later for appearances' sake.(26) The first two Estates, however, and particularly the Ridderschap, still objected strongly to this, and to Leicester's other appointments in the Hof, such as Hendrick Agylaeus, a compatriot of Prouninck's from den Bosch, who had left for the north when Parma captured Maastricht in 1579.(27) The Geeligeerden and the gentry claimed that all these appointments had been made without consulting them, so that Leicester had exceeded the powers given to him as Governor-General, and violated the province's privileges, which had been guaranteed in the Treaty of Nonsuch. In order to remain on good terms with the city and the towns, which had no objections to the appointments, the first two Estates agreed to accept the new members of the Hof, for this once only. And in spite of a request to Leicester not to infringe the privileges of the province for one individual, who did not even hold property in the Sticht, Trillo remained, de facto, in office.(28)

It proved very difficult, however, to maintain good relations between the first two Estates and the Third. On 28 October, for example, when the Geeligerden and the Ridderschap refused to submit complaints about infringements of the privileges to Leicester, to be settled 'by his authority', the representatives of 'the city and the towns, who were displeased, stood up and walked out of the [Estates'] meeting'.(29) Thus the three Estates could not present a united front to attacks from outside, such as the Estates-General's refusal, on 1 November, to admit Prouinck as one of the Sticht's delegates: 'a day and hour which the country will bemoan and lament', to quote Prouinck himself. Holland, as might have been expected, took the lead, backed by Zeeland and Friesland.(30) Before his departure for England, Leicester demanded an explanation of this treatment of his protégé (and while he was in England, he denied that the appointment of Prouinck was illegal). The Estates-General replied that it was their duty to uphold provincial privileges, which had been violated by Prouinck's appointment as burgomaster, since he came from Brabant (den Bosch, to be precise), had not been a burger of Utrecht for sufficiently long, and owned no property in the Sticht. Moreover, he was still in debt to the generality from his days as receiver-general, and, worst of all, he was said to have threatened 'bloody heads' for members of the Estates of Utrecht who defended the privileges.(31) Prouinck's impassioned denial of these charges: 'to maintain the privileges is a fine thing, but to use them as a cover for conflict, postponement, misunderstanding and disunity...when we have so many thousands of unhappy widows and orphans to protect...seems to me entirely senseless' was to no avail. The Estates-General would not

admit him as Utrecht's legitimate representative, although they had no objections to the pensionaries of Dordrecht and Amsterdam, who also came from the southern Netherlands.(32) In this case, however, the anti-Prouninck party cited a privilege granted by king Philip II in 1555, to the effect that no one born in a province which excluded Stichtenaars from office (as Brabant did) should be admitted to office in Utrecht.(33)

Although Leicester expressed the rather optimistic hope that the ensuing dispute between Utrecht and the Estates-General could be settled in half an hour, in fact it took two years before amicable relations were restored.(34) The city and the towns refused to acknowledge the Estates-General's proceedings until Prouninck was permitted to take his seat, and deplored the time wasted on this relatively unimportant matter when the provinces ought to have been offering the sovereignty to Elizabeth. At the same time, the Third Estate wanted to recall from the Hague the Sticht's other two deputies, Hendrick Buth and Bartholomeus de Wael, lord of Moersbergen, who had not protested against Prouninck's exclusion. While supporting the city's demand for Prouninck's admission to the Estates-General, the Geeligerden and the Ridderschap considered that such a gesture of protest would only cause further bitterness and dissension. It was only at the earnest insistence and urging of the magistracy of Utrecht and the burgerhoplieden, together with the [representatives] of Amersfoort that the first two Estates agreed to the recall of Buth and Moersbergen, which was not, however, carried out for two and a half months. Until February 1587, therefore, only two Estates were represented in the Estates-General, on Nieuwenaar's wishes.(35)

Meanwhile, the city renewed its attack on the Geeligeerden in such a way as to paralyse the workings of the Estates until the Stadholder negotiated a compromise in February 1587.(36)

The proposed abolition of the First Estate precipitated the next major crisis in Utrecht's internal politics. On his return from the Hague, Prouninck pointed out to the city council that such a step would be inexpedient at that juncture, because disunity in the Sticht would dissuade Elizabeth from accepting the sovereignty. There were other reasons for postponing constitutional upheavals, said the burgomaster: before his departure for England, Leicester had particularly admonished Prouninck to allow no changes to be made in Utrecht during his absence; the Estates-General, already on bad terms with Utrecht, would be yet further alienated; the enemy would not fail to take advantage of the opportunity to exploit internal division; and, finally, Prouninck did not want it to be said that he had abolished the Geeligeerden to revenge himself on those in the Hague who had done him the injustice which is known to all. Ignoring these warnings, the city council declared the First Estate abolished, whereupon the Ridderschap refused to attend the Estates' meeting to hear Prouninck's report on his experiences in the Hague, unless the Geeligeerden were also present.(37)

The Estates-General's immediate reaction was to send Nieuwenaar to Utrecht, to try to pacify the dispute; in December 1586, he was joined by the vrijheer van Hohensaxen, governor of Venlo, the lord of Brakel, Adolf van Meetkercken, president of the Flanders Hof, and

Leicester's confidential representative, Jean Hotman, who was sent to warn the bürgerhophlieden of Elizabeth's displeasure. Although in the Hague it seemed that "there is some hope and good issue expected", in fact the efforts of these gentlemen met with no success: the city council would not do business with the Geeligerden, and continued to urge their abolition, believing itself to be supported in this stance by the Queen and Leicester, thanks to a letter from William Herlle, Elizabeth's ambassador in the Netherlands.(38) The magistracy professed itself willing, however, to agree with the Ridderschap "on all reasonable, fair matters": if the gentry were truly concerned for the public welfare, they could do nothing but accept this offer of co-operation.(39)

The provincial government was, in effect, at a standstill. Between 15 November 1586 and 4 January 1587, the Estates did not meet, and the city council still refused to send delegates to the first session of the New Year unless Buth and Moersbergen were recalled from the Estates-General. Since this condition was not met, the council made a separate statement, in answer to the Estates' summons to discuss the repair of breaches of the privileges and the Treaty with England: in the council's opinion, no such breaches had taken place in the Sticht. Rather, the fault lay in the limited powers granted to Leicester: without "sovereign temporal authority", he could do nothing to settle "the quarrels and disputes which have arisen or will arise among the provinces on account of the sovereign government belonging to each of them".(40) The remaining Geeligerden and a substantial number of the Ridderschap promptly closed ranks, and declared that if the city council would not attend the Estates' meetings, it was not to

be informed of the resolutions taken there.(41) Two days later, on 8 January, all those magistrates who were present at the time entered the Estates' chamber, where they found the dean of St. Jan, two members of the Ridderschap and the Estates' secretary, whom they informed of their determination to read the records of the session of the Estates between 4 and 6 January. When their request was refused, the magistrates had a hole made [by the city locksmith] in the door of a small room where they understood the resolutions were kept, removed the minute concerned, attached it, with the Estates' own seal, to the record of their own deliberations, and took both documents away for consideration at their leisure.(42)

In reply to this challenge, the first two Estates swore an oath of mutual support and assistance, and resolved to meet outside the city, at Wijk, where they would be free from further interference. The city council immediately put a stop to this scheme by forbidding anyone who attended such a meeting to return to his residence in the city afterwards.(43) This was deadlock: there was nothing for it but for the Geeligeerden and the Ridderschap to appeal to Nieuwenaar for mediation. Finding that they received no sympathy from the Council of State, to which they sent a full account of the whole affair, and that the towns alone could not claim to function properly as the Estates, the city magistrates agreed to negotiate, still on condition that Buth and Moersbergen were recalled.(44)

On 4 February, the representatives of the city and the towns returned to the Estates, and a settlement of the dispute was finally reached four days later, with a compromise which, in theory at least, removed several of the towns' most pressing grievances (45): the number of Geeligerden was reduced to five who met with the city's approval; the first two Estates would not interfere with the appointment of magistracies in the city or the towns; there was to be no political union between Holland and Utrecht (46); henceforward the Estates' advocate was not to attend the Estates' meetings (as Floris Thin was in exile, this presented no immediate problem); and notice of meetings would henceforward be given by the Standing Committee instead of the Domdeken. Thereafter, the Estates met and carried on their business, apparently normally, until the autumn of 1587, although the Ridderschap's grievance about breaches of the privileges had not, in fact, been redressed.

Meanwhile, relations between the Sticht and the Estates-General had deteriorated still further after the latter's order for the release of Paulus Buys, on 25,000 guilders bail. Since the order was sent to the deputy schout in whose custody Buys was, and not to the city council or the bürgerhoplieden, who had originally arrested him, the release was just as illegal as the arrest had been.(47) The city council's vehement protest to the Estates-General at what it called the insult of this prison-break was unanimously echoed by the Estates when they discovered that Buys had resumed his seat on the Council of State, as Utrecht's representative: a position for which, they

insisted, they had never nominated him.(48) In March, the province's distrust of the Estates-General was increased by the return of Philip Rattaller (the new secretary of the Hof) and Herman Modet from England, where they had been sent to inform Leicester of the situation in Utrecht. They brought with them a copy of the Estates-General's famous letter of 4 February 1587 (NS), summing up all their grievances against Leicester's régime, and accusing him of complicity in the betrayal of Deventer to Spain in January. Shocked at such ingratitude, the Standing Committee denied all previous knowledge of this letter, which had undoubtedly been sent by the Estates-General without reference to the provincial authorities of Zeeland, Friesland or Gelderland. It seems very probable that Utrecht indeed knew nothing of the letter: the Sticht's official delegate to the Council of State, Brakel, was not in the Hague when the letter was composed, and the Estates were out of touch with the Estates-General throughout January 1587. When Utrecht was once more represented in the Estates-General, in April, the denial was repeated, and echoed by delegates from Gelderland, whose masters had also been kept in ignorance of the Estates-General's attack on the Earl.(49)

It was clear to the city magistrates that the only remedy for the situation was the immediate return of the Governor-General: they begged him to follow 'the example of that great captain and leader of the Israelites, Moses, and the king and brave warrior, David' and lead the Queen's true servants out of their difficulties.(50) In Leicester's continuing absence, the Sticht turned to the new ambassador from England, Lord Buckhurst, in the hope that he would persuade Elizabeth to accept the sovereignty of the Netherlands.(51)

Buckhurst proved to be a broken reed, however: not only did he refuse the sovereignty, he also demanded that the exiles be allowed to return to Utrecht. In fact, he took the part of Oldenbarnevelt and the Estates-General, thereby alienating Elizabeth who was still angry at the letter of 4 February (NS). Buckhurst also refused to have anything to do with Prouninck's scheme for an alternative assembly of provincial representatives.(52)

Although, in the spring and early summer of 1587, there was a comparative lull in the crises which affected the Estates, this time was marked by a good deal of uncertainty in the position of the Stadholder, Nieuwenaar. Once a loyal adherent of Leicester - he had suggested further expulsions in July 1586, for instance - Nieuwenaar had gradually withdrawn his allegiance, to the point where "forgetting all the honours and favours done him by your Lordship [Leicester]", he "publicly in his drinke used speaches in disgrace of our nation [England]".(53) Nor was he as zealous as Prouninck wished in securing the abolition of the Geeligeerden, with the result that what Leicester's secretary called "ye best sorte" grew to hate the Stadholder as much as they had formerly loved him.(54) Nieuwenaar resented the city council's issuing orders for the movement of troops without his knowledge, and, at the same time, became involved in a quarrel with Herman Modet, the city's leading Calvinist minister. It appears that Modet tried to undermine Nieuwenaar's authority, and may even have tried to have him replaced as Stadholder by the Englishman, Lord North, whose well-known Puritan convictions and devoted support of Leicester made him highly esteemed in the Reformed community of

Utrecht. Things came to a head on 26 May 1587, when Nieuwenaar tried to have Modet arrested, the citizens resisted, and a massacre was averted only by the mediation of the Elector of Cologne and Sir John Norris.(55) In the end, Modet was suspended from preaching for a few weeks, and then reinstated at the insistence of his fellow predikanten. Relations between him and Nieuwenaar improved, but the Stadholder remained on bad terms with Captain Cleerhagen, the Leicestrian commander who had tried to transfer his men into the city.(56)

Nieuwenaar was not satisfied. As one observer noted, he was 'awaiting the opportunity to take his revenge' and assert his authority as Stadholder.(57) He began early in 1587 by trying to win over the burgerhoplieden, but was only half successful, as four out of the eight remained loyal to England and thus to Prouninck.(58) Later in the same year, the renewal of the city council on 1 October seemed to offer him his chance. The council itself thought otherwise, however, and sent a list of eighty names to Leicester, who had recently arrived in the city, for him to choose forty men to serve on the magistracy for the year 1587-88. Nieuwenaar's protests, made by his representative Engelbertus van den Berch, were futile, as were his appeals to the provisions in the Satisfaction for the renewal of the magistracy by the Stadholder. Leicester, said the city council, was Nieuwenaar's superior as well as its own; the Satisfaction was now irrelevant, since Orange was dead and the municipal government no longer Catholic.(59) Nor did the Estates-General's support benefit Nieuwenaar: Leicester thought their arguments 'ill-informed'; he was in Utrecht 'in person, to instal the magistracy, as the privileges and

praiseworthy customs of [the city] permit. And that is what he did, retaining twenty-six of the members of the previous year's council: Prouninck was still burgomaster.(60)

Leicester's presence in Utrecht seemed to offer the Ridderschap the opportunity for which they had been waiting. During the summer of 1587, they had made several attempts to enlist support from the Estates-General and the Estates of Holland for their campaign on behalf of the provincial privileges, and in September, these efforts met with a favourable reception: Nieuwenaar and deputies from the other provinces were to remonstrate with the Governor-General on this question.(61) Eight members of the Ridderschap then determined to lay their grievances before Leicester himself, but before putting anything in writing, they canvassed the Geeligerden and the remaining nobles individually for their opinion. The response to this question (which was put in the presence of a notary and witnesses) varied: three Geeligerden gave their support - as Johan Rengers said, the provinces had originally taken up arms in defence of their privileges - but the other four members of the Ridderschap led by Reynier van Aeswijn, lord of Brakel, took the view that redress of the privileges was unnecessary, and, in any case, the eight nobles had no right to speak for the Second Estate as a whole. The minority formally dissociated themselves from the majority's remonstrance, and asked the Estates to suppress it, or to disqualify the eight nobles from attending the Estates' meetings.(62)

Nevertheless, the remonstrance was presented to Leicester, on 28 September 1587; it called for the dismissal from office of all foreigners (such as Trillo, the Schout and Agylaeus, the procuror-general of the Hof) who had been appointed by Leicester without nomination by the Estates; the reinstatement of the men exiled in July 1586; a return to the composition of the First Estate as laid down by the Landraad in 1582; an end to interference in politics by the Reformed ministers; the repeal of all resolutions taken under duress or contrary to the privileges; and better co-operation with the Estates-General.(63) This remained the programme of the dissident gentry throughout their period of exile. On the same day, Prouinck ordered the arrest of three of these nobles: Bartholomeus de Wael, lord of Moersbergen (the former deputy to the Estates-General), Willem van Rijsenburg, and Frederick van Zuylen van Nyevelt. That evening, however, Trillo, drawn sword in hand, apprehended six gentlemen as they sat drinking at an inn, but later released the three about whom no order had been given. The incident provoked unrest in the city; on the following day, 29 September, Leicester, angry that the arrest should have been made without his knowledge (though Trillo had acted "in the name of His Excellency") had Moersbergen and his two fellows released.(64)

Shortly afterwards, the majority of the Ridderschap withdrew from both the Estates proper and the Standing Committee, leaving the field for the time being to the smaller faction dominated by Brakel.(65) Some time in October or November 1587, they left the Sticht, to join Niclaes van Zuylen van Drakenburg in exile, across the provincial

border in Holland. Before leaving, they refused to appear before the city magistracy in answer to Trillo's summons, on the grounds that its members had been illegally appointed, and, besides, were not impartial in the case, since the arrest of the six nobles had been a direct consequence of their objections to the magistrates.(66) By the end of November, Moersbergen and van Zuylen van Nyevelt had asked the Estates-General to consider their case in the absence of the Utrecht deputies, so that a fair decision might be reached; at the same time, the Estates of Holland took the exiled Ridderschap under their protection and 'safeguard', promising that they, the nobles, might recover compensation for any damages sustained by them or their property as a result of their remonstrance to Leicester, from the persons or goods of any inhabitant of the city of Utrecht who was within Holland. (The Estates-General issued a similar document in March 1588, applying to all the United Provinces, and ordering local officials to assist the exiles in the seizure of other Stichtenaars' property.[67])

In December 1587, the exiles took up residence in Woerden, just over the Holland border from the Sticht. There they issued the definitive statement of their grievances against the 'pretended magistracy' of the city of Utrecht, and had it witnessed by representatives of the town. The eight nobles, and Niclaes van Zuylen, the former Schout, declared that they were the lawful representatives of the Second Estate, as they formed the majority of those summoned in that capacity. Beginning with the expulsions of July 1586, they outlined all the subsequent misdeeds of the city council, dominated as it was by 'foreigners'. Although the city was

with the other towns, only the third and last Estate of the province, it had subverted the First Estate, with the result that its members did not dare to disregard the magistrates' wishes, some because they agreed with them, some from fear that they too would be expelled from the city. The nobles went on to discuss the raid on the Estates' records, in January 1587, and their own arrest in September, all for no other purpose but that the magistracy could, through the said foreigners rule absolutely over the whole province and the first two Estates at their pleasure. The exiles invited the Geeligerden and the small towns to join with them and hold legitimate meetings of the Estates at a place of their choice, and finished by saying that, if this invitation were refused, all further proceedings of the Estates were, in their opinion, null and void.(68)

Those members of the Ridderschap who had remained behind in Utrecht, and the Geeligerden, would not join the Woerden gentry's protest, denying that there was any cause for complaint against the city council. January and February 1588 were filled with efforts to mediate by Nieuwenaar and two members of the Council of State, Jacob Valcke and Elbertus Leoninus, which met with no success, and produced only a much longer and more detailed protest from Woerden. The exiles now accused the city council of unchristian, inhuman, unnatural and unreasonable conduct, in submitting the province to oppression, tyranny and barbaric government by foreigners.(69) Despite all this diplomatic activity, there was no hope of a reconciliation between the two sides, since the Woerden Ridderschap's case was based on the contention that the magistracy had been appointed illegally and had acted illegally in arresting several nobles: a charge to which

Prouninck and his colleagues would never admit. They, for their part, continued to regard the exiles as private individuals (and not as a duly constituted Estate of the province), who had tried to conspire against the provincial government under cover of preserving the privileges.(70)

This impasse continued for several months, with both sides refusing to yield an inch. If anything, their attitudes hardened, particularly after the Estates-General's 'letters of reprisal' in March 1588 showed the remnant of the Estates how little support they had from elsewhere.(71) Recent events had not favoured Leicester's party anywhere in the Netherlands: a conspiracy to take over Leiden in Elizabeth's name had failed, in October 1587.(72) Leicester's resignation at the end of February 1588 increased the Sticht's sense of isolation, especially when renewed efforts to persuade Elizabeth to accept the sovereignty of Utrecht were unsuccessful. The new Council of State seemed to ignore the Treaty of Nonsuch entirely, despite Utrecht's protests.(73) In the spring of 1588, the last outpost of support for Leicester fell, when Diederik Sonoy, commander of Medemblik in the Noorderkwartier of Holland, submitted to Maurice after a siege of the town.(74)

This feeling of isolation perhaps made Utrecht's provincial government slightly 'milder of mind' with regard to its differences with Holland, but it would still not tolerate interference from the Estates-General in the Sticht's internal disputes. This interference had now extended to aiding and abetting the German general, Count Hohenlohe - always an enemy of Leicester, and now Nieuwenaar's

drinking companion - in his military occupation of the fortress at Brakel in Gelderland, belonging to the leader of the minority Ridderschap faction. When Hohenlohe's men behaved badly, Brakel thought that the exiled gentry were behind the insult to him. In June 1588, after much urging from Utrecht, the Council of State ordered Count Hohenlohe to evacuate the castle, at a time when Leoninus and Valcke were making another attempt at mediation. They came to the conclusion that a major concession - the cancellation of the 'letters of reprisal' - was necessary to induce the Estates of Utrecht to send a deputy to the Council of State and to pay their quota in both ordinary and extraordinary contributions.(75) This concession was not made, however, and the Sticht remained unrepresented in the Council of State.

So far, the events discussed above were centred in the city: the rest of the province was, apparently, relatively unaffected. But under the surface, discontent was on the increase, and in June 1588 it showed itself in the open, when a market boat on the Vecht was held up and robbed, by men from Westbroek, one of several villages in the Nederkwartier which refused to pay the increased consumption taxes, introduced to meet the greater war expenses of Leicester's régime. The villagers also declared that they would deduct from their normal payments compensation for the cost of maintaining the troops billeted on them. This was outright defiance of the Estates' authority, compounded by an alliance, dating back to December 1587, between these Sticht farmers and the inhabitants of Gooiland, a nearby district of Holland.(76) The Estates-General were sufficiently alarmed to send Nieuwenaar post-haste to restore order, since reports had reached him

of 3,000 peasants under arms, encouraged by Parma's governor in Deventer, Count Herman van den Berg, who was said to be amassing forces for an attack on Gelderland and the Sticht.(77) Although the number of farmers involved was actually much lower - between 300 and 600 from Gooiland and perhaps 300 from Utrecht according to interrogations made afterwards, though even these estimates seem rather high - Nieuwenaar and his troops met armed opposition in Westbroek. Some soldiers and some farmers were killed, and several houses burned. The rebellion lasted only a few days at most, however, and the farmers soon sued for pardon. In view of the serious military danger in which the Nederkwartier stood, they were treated with leniency, and were permitted to keep their weapons, to protect themselves against enemy raids, provided that they cancelled all alliances with other villages, promised never again to flout the Stadholder's authority, and co-operated with all provincial officials in the future.(78)

Although this rural unrest had been suppressed, the remainder of the Sticht's internal problems were still unresolved, and the enemy was growing more dangerous. Utrecht made a final appeal to Elizabeth for help: apart from the deputation of the ministers in 1587, Captain Niclaes van Meetkerken was sent to England in July 1588, to obtain permission to raise troops from, and at the expense of, the Dutch in England, to protect the vulnerable eastern provinces from Parma. At the same time, the burgerhoplieden sent one of their number, Frans Gerritsz, to England, ostensibly to collect money advanced by the Estates on behalf of English troops, but in reality to ensure the continuation in office of a sympathetic provincial government.(79)

Both Elizabeth and Leicester urged Nieuwenaar to re-appoint Prouninck, although he himself wanted to be relieved of his responsibilities as burgomaster.(80) Leicester's death, in late September, robbed Prouninck of his last outside source of support, except for the Queen herself.

There was thus nothing to stand in Nieuwenaar's way. He began by asking for the authority to exact obedience from the English troops in the city, and on 19 September he ordered all but three companies, one of which was English, to leave.(81) Two days later, there was a demonstration against Prouninck outside the town hall, and the burgomaster was warned that the Stadholder was planning to arrest him, Captain Cleerhagen (whose company was still in Utrecht) and other leading supporters of Leicester. When taxed with this, the Countess of Nieuwenaar neither admitted nor denied the truth of the charge, but simply said, 'A man who does not feel guilty has nothing to fear from my husband, who will do nothing for which he cannot answer.' These words made Prouninck foresee 'a greater disaster than I can express'.(82)

As the time for the renewal of the magistracy approached, the city's burgerhoplieden were ready for trouble. Nieuwenaar's adherents, who included former militia captains, were also prepared, and kept guard independently in the streets. On the night of 25 September, rumours were circulating that the Stadholder intended to restore the hereditary council and hand the city over to the Hollanders. Fighting broke out, artillery was brought into use, and the remaining troops were prevented from reaching the town hall to

guard Prouninck and his colleagues. Cleerhagen, Nieuwenaar's old opponent, was seriously wounded, and taken prisoner, whereupon his men surrendered, and were sent out of town on peat boats. The other companies acknowledged Nieuwenaar's authority. Prouninck, Trillo, and Frans Gerritsz were arrested; their supporters saw which way the wind was blowing, and submitted to the Stadholder, who thus became master of the city.(83)

The following day, 26 September, Nieuwenaar delivered his ultimatum to a joint meeting of the city council and the Estates' Standing Committee: 'to avoid the trouble and bloodshed which was likely to arise in the city, because of the assembly of the citizens...[the Count] knew no way...to make the people go home and lay down their weapons', unless he was permitted to instal the new magistracy by the method laid down in his 1585 instruction. There was nothing for it but to agree. The new council contained twenty-one men - more than half - who had not held office at all under Prouninck. Seven new burgerhoplieden were also appointed; two days later, since 'the previous banishment took place against the wishes of the majority of the magistracy', the new council agreed to the reinstatement of Niclaes van Zuylen van Drakenburg as Schout.(84)

Over the next few days, the other exiles returned, and took up their positions in the provincial government again. On 17 October, 'the Estates of the province of Utrecht, restored by God's grace to their first and proper state', resumed normal meeting.(85) Their first task was to cancel all 'illegal' appointments made during the past two years, from the procurator-general of the Hof to the schout of a small

village, and either to re-appoint the previous office holder, or to instal a right-minded successor. Even then, however, there were many vehement words between the nobles and the deputies of the city and the towns, when the former called for the dismissal of Johan Strick, the Estates' secretary, who had co-operated with the Prouninck régime, while the latter thought he should be continued in office.(86) Various other measures introduced under Prouninck were also reversed, and relations with the Hague improved immediately: the new city council even cancelled the 25,000 guilders owed by the Estates-General as bail for Paulus Buys.(87)

The victorious exiles now attempted to exclude from politics all those who had driven them out in 1586 and 1587. Brakel's faction was prevented from sitting in the Second Estate, and he himself was accused of financial speculation (as early as March 1588, one observer considered that 'Brakel and Deventer [i.e. Prouninck] respect their particular profit too much').(88) Trillo was tried for his share in the arrest of the nobles, and the other breaches of the privileges, but was released after three months as he could produce authorisation from the city council or some other higher authority for all his acts as Schout.(89) The charges against Prouninck were much more detailed, referring to everything from his alleged correspondence with Reingout to his approval of the demolition of the Oudmunster church. But no drastic steps could be taken against him if the Sticht wished to retain Elizabeth's favour: she wrote to the city council on Prouninck's behalf and sent an envoy to the Estates to further his release, while Essex urged Nieuwenaar to treat Leicester's protégé with leniency, for the late Governor-General's own sake. In the end,

a sentence of banishment was pronounced, on 11 July 1589. Prouninck, forbidden to hold office ever again in Utrecht, left for Culemborg, and finally for England.(90)

Several historians have seen Prouninck, his associates, the burgerhoplieden and their followers in the citizen militia as 'a people's party' (Fruin), or as 'democrats' (Geyl), working to bring about a 'Calvinist democratic theocracy' (Wilson).(91) More recently, it has been recognised that the word 'democrat' must not have too many modern notions attached to its use.(92) Oosterhoff's neutral phrase 'the opposition movement' is probably the most appropriate description of the alliance of certain forces which already existed within the Sticht.(93) Calvinism was undoubtedly one of these forces - the citizens declared in 1586 that the true religion 'is the only cause of the war' - but their Calvinism was more political than religious in its inspiration.(94) A long anti-clerical tradition, natural enough in Utrecht with its many clergy, coupled with resentment at the privileged position of the five colleges, and a real fear that the crypto-Catholic clergy would act as a fifth column for Parma, made most of the citizens anti-Catholic, rather than positively Reformed Protestant, in their attitude. Nor is it advisable, as Oosterhoff points out, to call the movement 'democratic' (or even 'anti-aristocratic', to quote Vijlbrief): it was nothing so definite.(95) Rather it was the expression of a long-standing and continuing opposition to the government of the province and the city, which was by no means confined to the two years of Leicester's régime. It is true, however, that the Earl's arrival, and his wish to

govern without the delays and restrictions inherent in the Estates-General's system, gave the opposition movement a chance to make more effective protests than usual. The movement was thus far from being 'a blind tool' in Leicester's hands, as Broersma called it: indeed, sometimes it appears that the opposition used the Governor-General rather than the other way around.(96) Although Prouninck and his associates genuinely wished to advance Leicester's interests and increase his powers, they were also able to take advantage of his presence and support for their own ends, for example, to reduce the Stadholder's influence on appointments. Under Prouninck's able leadership, the opposition movement strove to strengthen the central government, in the person of the Governor-General, while at the same time advocating provincial autonomy when it was in their own interests. Both these points of view posed a threat to the position of the Estates-General, and particularly to its domination by Holland (which under Oldenbarnevelt could also put forward contradictory arguments about provincial sovereignty to suit its own book).(97) The Estates-General and Holland therefore took up the cause of the exiles, and thereby contributed greatly to the defeat of the opposition movement.

By 1589, the Estates had weathered a period of severe crisis and upheaval, and had emerged virtually intact, except for the enforced absence of a few members of the Ridderschap from their meetings. Yet the previous two years had left their mark, and not only in cosmetic procedural changes. The Stadholder, for example, had reasserted his powers of appointment, though Nieuwenaar himself lived long enough to use them only once more. For their part, even before the coup of

September 1588, the Estates had suppressed the claims to political power made by the Hof which Leicester had tried to use as a rival governmental institution, by filling it with southern exiles who supported him.(98) After 1588, the city's first burgomaster was always at the same time a member of the Ridderschap who might be expected to sympathise with the first two Estates. The opposition movement did not cease to exist: it emerged again on to the political scene in 1610 and 1618, but the events of the latter year confirmed the patrician magistracy in its hold on government. Meanwhile, the men who were restored to power in 1588 were now aware of several potential dangers to their position, and, perhaps most important of all, had realised that a rapprochement with Holland was the best way to maintain the stability they had so recently achieved.

Chapter VIII

The Estates and the Revolt of the Netherlands

The province of Utrecht has not been entirely neglected by historians of the Dutch Revolt. In 1579, after all, it was the scene of the signing of the Closer Union of Utrecht, the 'founding charter' of the Dutch Republic. It has also attracted some attention as the 'headquarters' of the Earl of Leicester between 1586 and 1588.(1) And while Amersfoort is usually mentioned simply as the birthplace of Johan van Oldenbarnevelt, one of the United Provinces' greatest statesmen, the city of Utrecht was the site of one of his last reverses, at the hands of Maurice of Nassau in 1618. But, on the whole, these are rare exceptions to a rule which has been aptly stated by H. Wansink: "Dutch history itself has often been 'Hollandized' and as a result the contributions of the other provinces to the history of the Republic have been overlooked". The preponderance of Holland, which was fully recognised by contemporaries in the years after 1588, is hardly surprising in view of its overpowering political and financial contribution to the Revolt, and its later commercial wealth.(2) Yet, however small, however insignificant the activities of the 'allies' may seem in comparison, it must be remembered that Holland did not represent the norm, and that 'every province, even every town, to a large extent constituted an autonomous system, each with its peculiar socio-economic and political structures'.(3) The preceding chapters attempt to describe these political structures for the Sticht.

It has been generally recognised that the Dutch Republic was a Ständestaat, but the nature of the Stände has been less frequently examined. Variety was the main characteristic of the constitutional picture in the mid-sixteenth century Netherlands, a country which, it has been well observed, could boast not only of both two-chamber and three-curial systems in its different provinces, but also of unicameral ones and of all sorts of others, as well as of a States-General.⁽⁴⁾ So wide was this variety that Utrecht was, in fact, the only one of the eventual seven United Provinces to have an assembly of the traditional Three Estates: clergy, gentry and towns. In the maritime provinces, individual towns each had one vote (in Holland, after 1572, there were eighteen voting towns; in Zeeland, six) with a token representative of the nobility, nor did any of the other 'northern' provinces include the clergy in their assemblies. Even in the 'southern' provinces, which fell back under Spanish rule, there was no ecclesiastical Estate in Flanders until 1598; as far as composition is concerned, Brabant and Artois offer perhaps the closest parallel to the Sticht elsewhere in the Netherlands.⁽⁵⁾ It is therefore not strictly accurate to say, as one historian has done of the period before the Revolt, that 'the provincial Estates which chose the deputies to the Estates-General were mostly composed of nobles, clergy and towns in the usual way'.⁽⁶⁾ On the other hand, it is equally misleading to apply the post-1572 constitutional formation of Holland to all the United Provinces.

This latter practice has led to a generally accepted picture of 'regent oligarchy' as the typical form of Netherlands political life: a picture which, in reality, fits Utrecht only slightly better than it fits Friesland or Gelderland.(7) Again, because of Holland's supremacy, 'regent oligarchy' in the voting towns, as justified in Franchois Vranck's famous 'Short Exposition', became the dominant form of political life, simply because the representatives of the other provinces in the Estates-General usually allowed themselves to be persuaded by the urban oligarchy of Holland and their advocate, Oldenbarnevelt. In this connection, it is unfortunate that there seems to have been little or no awareness within the Estates of Utrecht of the contemporary debate on sovereignty which has so interested modern historians.(8) Although Gerard Prouninck proclaimed the sovereignty of the people (as against the sovereignty of the Estates) to reinforce his efforts towards a stronger central government under Leicester, his victorious opponents found no need to articulate an alternative theory when they returned from exile in 1588. Rather, without formal theoretical acknowledgement, the Estates, like their fellows in the other provinces, gradually assumed the provincial sovereignty which became the foundation of the Dutch Republic's somewhat vague constitution.(9)

Indeed, the political life of the Republic can be properly understood only in the light of this provincial diversity. To quote Wansink once more, 'as there was an interaction between the provinces and the Union, so there was one between the parts of a province and the whole of it'.(10) Utrecht provides a good illustration of these

interactions, as well as of the problems caused both by provincial particularism and by the individualism of a province's component parts. In the years after the Pacification of Ghent, the Estates of Utrecht appear to present a picture of factionalism and disunity. At one time or another, each Estate was divided against itself: the chapters over the Satisfaction and the Union of Utrecht; the Geeligerden and the Ridderschap over the alleged violation of their privileges under Prouninck; the Third Estate by age-old differences between Utrecht and Amersfoort, and by more recent conflicts within the city itself. The province of Utrecht was far from unique in this: at times it must have seemed that each of Holland's eighteen voting towns had its own ideas as to the policies which the Estates of Holland should adopt; and the disputes between the city of Groningen and the Ommelanden, and among the quarters of Gelderland, were notorious.

Yet in the Sticht, as elsewhere, there was more to this picture than mere factional in-fighting. Genuine religious and political differences added an extra dimension to these quarrels. Much of the recent historiography of the Revolt has drawn inspiration from the work of Dr. J.J. Woltjer, beginning with his book on Friesland in Hervormingstijd (1962) and continued in articles such as 'Kleine oorzaken, grote gevolgen' (1975) and 'De Vredemakers' (1976). In these he divides political forces in the Netherlands into those of 'the left', 'the right' and 'the centre'- respectively, a small, Reformed Protestant minority who wanted independence from Spain; a small, Counter-Reformation Catholic minority on the other side; and the great majority of the rest of the population, caught between these

two extremes, and including those leading moderates who hoped to pursue a conciliatory policy towards the other provinces while still maintaining 'due and limited obedience' to the king.(11) This explanation is clearly applicable to the situation in Holland, Zeeland, Friesland, and many of the southern provinces such as Artois. Although it has been suggested that it has little or no relevance to Gelderland, with slight modifications it does illuminate the course of events in Utrecht, particularly when Dr. Woltjer's other concept - of a difference in timing between 'the north' and 'the south' - is taken into account.(12) Indeed, not only was there a time-lag between the 'developed' south and the 'backward' north in the crisis of 1566-1567, there was also a chronological difference in the later development of the Revolt in 'the north', between the maritime provinces and the landward ones, such as Utrecht and Friesland.

Although the events of the autumn of 1576 are widely regarded as a turning-point in the history of the Netherlands - indeed, as the inception of a 'Third Revolt' - they were apparently not perceived as such in the province of Utrecht. Peace with the other provinces, both 'rebellious' and 'loyal' was undoubtedly a significant step, but it did not, in November 1576, mean war against the king or his representative, Don John. The Sticht was driven into adherence to the Pacification of Ghent by its fear of the army in the city and the garrison in Vredenburg, because the alliance meant that help would be available, from Holland and elsewhere, but it was an act of expediency: Utrecht still saw itself as a loyal subject of Philip II. After nearly ten years of Spanish occupation, a change of attitude in the Sticht could begin only with the fall of Vredenburg and the final

departure of the royalist forces in the spring of 1577. Much more important than the Pacification in Utrecht's development towards fully-fledged membership of the United Provinces was the Satisfaction, by which the Sticht placed itself under the governorship of William of Orange, the unquestioned leader of the Revolt. And, to begin with, this was perhaps as far as a large section of the political community was prepared to go. But events were moving too fast for these moderates: the progress of the Protestant Reformation (even in its diluted Duifhuisian form), the resumption of open war against the Spanish forces and the consequent demands on the provinces for money: all these forced the Estates to abandon the Pacification and the Satisfaction as their point of reference. Soon appeals to their terms (especially their guarantees for the maintenance of the Catholic religion) were being made only by the remnants of the 'centre', and 'the right'.

It is, of course, very difficult to pinpoint the moment at which the Estates moved from loyalism to outright revolt against their lawful sovereign: in many ways there was no such moment; it was a gradual process. For the two years after the Pacification, what might be called the 'centre-right' played an important part in Utrecht's political life: it was personified in, for example, many members of the chapters of Oudmunster and Ste. Marie, the Burggraaf of Montfoort and the pre-1579 Amersfoort magistracy. But, with the failure of the 'conspiracy' against the Union of Utrecht in 1578-1579, the initiative passed decisively to the 'left', in the persons of men like Floris Thin and Adriaan van Zuylen, the dean of St. Jan, who were convinced supporters of Orange and - as far as can be ascertained - only

moderately Reformed in their religious views. This move was confirmed by the banning of Catholic worship after Count Rennenberg's defection to Spain in March 1580. Thereafter the 'right' gradually withered away as a political force, partly through voluntary exile, partly through the occasional 'purging of some bad patriots and suspect persons', but, until 1586, this policy was not pursued with genuine vigour.(13)

In that year, however, Utrecht took a lurch to the 'far left', mainly under the leadership of men from outside the province (it was notorious that Prouninck and Agylaeus came from Brabant, and though Brakel was born in the Sticht, his family origins were in Gelderland). Their uncompromising devotion to the Revolt, and their determination to extirpate Catholicism, pro-Spanish feeling, and moderate religious attitudes which they saw as nothing but Catholicism and pro-Spanish feeling in disguise, their belief that the war should be conducted by stronger central direction without the delays inherent in the Estates-General's cumbersome workings: all these led them to jeopardise, for a short while, the fragile unity which was the provinces' only chance of survival. But circumstances worked against the 'far left', as they had defeated the 'far right', and, by 1590, Utrecht was back in the 'moderate left' fold, so firmly that even the death of Floris Thin in that year did not disturb the Sticht's new-found stability, particularly as he lived long enough to see Maurice of Nassau accepted as Stadholder.

The years between 1576 and 1590 were thus a decisive period for the Sticht, in much the same way as the years from 1566 to 1580 were for Holland, Zeeland and the southern provinces.(14) It was during this time that lasting lines of political and religious division were drawn. Moreover, these were formative years for the Estates as an institution: an institution which, in the midst of upheavals all around it, still possessed an inbuilt resistance to change. A certain innate conservatism is indicated by the Estates' first concern in the new era: they wanted to recover the right to summon themselves which they had lost under the Habsburgs. Simply because of the upheavals of these years, however, the Estates had to adapt in order to survive. This process of adaptation to changing circumstances was normally fairly gradual, except for the two-year long aberration between 1586 and 1588, which did not, in fact, reorganise the institutional structure, although it did temporarily alter the balance within that structure. It cannot be denied that changes did take place in all aspects of the Estates' life: there were procedural changes, such as the development of the Standing Committee; structural changes like the replacement of the chapters by the Geelingeerden; fiscal changes to cope with the ever-greater financial burden on the province; changes in the Sticht's relationship with its neighbours; and, finally, a transfer of sovereignty (perhaps still not consciously admitted in 1590) from Philip II as lord to the Estates themselves. Yet none of these changes went further than was strictly necessary at the time: even the Estates' religious policy was designed to follow a middle way between doctrinal extremes. In short, the Estates would very probably have endorsed the dictum of the Duke of Cambridge, Commander-in-Chief

of the British Army three centuries later: 'There is a time for all things: there is even a time for change; and that is when it can no longer be resisted'.(15)

It has become a commonplace to point out that every province in the Netherlands had its own Revolt, just as every province had its own form of government. It is thus extremely difficult to synthesise the history of a country which could not even agree about the date: from 1582 until 1700, after all, Holland and Zeeland (having adopted the Gregorian calendar) were ten days ahead of their allies. It may eventually prove possible to write a fully comprehensive history of the Dutch Revolt, but the example of Utrecht suggests that it will be neither short nor simple.

Appendix I

The Estates and the Abjuration of Philip II

On 26 July 1581, the Estates-General approved the text of what is generally known as the Plakkaat van Verlatinge, an edict declaring that the king of Spain had forfeited the government and sovereignty of the Netherlands. The final paragraph ordered the authorities in all the member provinces of the Union of Utrecht to put this edict immediately into force, and to administer a new oath of allegiance to the Estates-General against the king of Spain and his followers. In many ways, this was no more than a formal recognition of a situation which already existed: as Kossmann and Mellink point out, Philip II had clearly lost his sovereignty well before that date.(1) But while the passage of the resolution may have been a routine matter for the Estates-General, it caused a good deal of doubt and difficulty elsewhere in the Netherlands.(2)

During the Estates-General's debate on the Abjuration in June 1581, Utrecht's deputies stated categorically 'that neither the name nor the seal of the king should be used any longer...and that each province should, for the time being, use whatever other seal it pleases'.(3) Nevertheless, it was several months before measures to this effect were actually taken in the Sticht: in August of the same year, the Estates resolved to follow in the footsteps of Holland and Gelderland, which had by that time officially 'abjured the king and abandoned his name and seals'.(4) As usual, however, the issue had to be referred to the individual Estates, and as usual this proved to be

a recipe for delay. In October, the city council set forth a lengthy account of the Sticht's particular case against the king, covering all the wrongs done to the province and the city in Philip's name over the previous fifteen years - from the refusal of the Confederates' Request, to the arrival of the Duke of Alva, the depredations of his troops, the tyranny of the Tenth Penny and the destruction of the privileges of both the Estates and the city: in short, said this document, the king had violated all the terms of the treaty by which the Estates had accepted his father the Emperor, and then himself, as their lord. Consequently, the Estates and all the inhabitants of the Sticht declared themselves no longer bound by their oath of loyalty to him, since he had ipso jure forfeited his sovereignty over Utrecht.(5) Although the city council adopted the draft of this proclamation, the provisions were never executed, and the Estates-General's own Act of Abjuration was not published in the Sticht until December 1581, because the Estates had to exert considerable pressure on the small towns, particularly Montfoort, to induce them to consent to such a radical measure. (Montfoort hoped to insure itself against the possibility of royal retribution by waiting until the edict had been published in the other provinces and the other towns of Utrecht, and added that the Abjuration should not infringe upon freedom of conscience - i.e., in Montfoort, freedom of Catholic conscience.) Only a threat to inform Orange and the Landraad of the towns' contumacy and recalcitrance did the trick.(6)

Perhaps surprisingly, no resistance to the Abjuration came from the clergy of the five chapters, who declared that they had no right to oppose a decision taken by the Estates-General, the Ridderschap and the city council. Ste. Marie, usually the most conservative of the five, resolved to conform with the decision of the other chapters; St. Jan's vote in favour of the Abjuration was passed by six of the chapter's Orangists, in the absence of four others who had attended the previous day's meeting.(7)

Amersfoort, however, was not so docile, especially when it came to the new oath of allegiance to the Estates as the provincial government: in the spring of 1582, eight members of the town council refused to take the oath unseen, and each demanded a copy of its terms, notwithstanding 'several methods of persuasion' which were 'put before them'. 'Great confusion and disorder' then arose in the town, because those 'good men' who did take the oath would have no part in the government of Amersfoort until the 'defaulters' had either been forced to swear allegiance to the Estates, or had been replaced in office. Since no further mention was made of this issue in Amersfoort's records, it would seem that the town council's intention to charge the defaulters for any costs incurred by the delay in business was sufficient to change their minds. It is interesting, however, that six of the defaulters did not reappear on the 1583 town council, and at least two of them were still considered to be of doubtful loyalties in 1585.

In the minds of the Estates-General, the corollary to the Abjuration of Philip II was intended to be the acceptance of the Duke of Anjou as the Netherlands' lord. But since Utrecht, like Holland and Zeeland, did not acknowledge Anjou, the Estates were placed in an awkward position. After the removal of the higher power in whose name they acted, the Estates tried, at first, to confer this power elsewhere. Despite Utrecht's initial support for the Landraad, such a body could never fill the gap, and the 'high authority' which the Estates considered granting to Orange was encumbered with conditions. Nor would Queen Elizabeth accept the unconditional sovereignty of the Sticht which the Estates were so eager to offer her during the Prouninck régime.(9)

The Estates thus found themselves compelled to act on their own authority. In some areas, the transition was painless enough: in October 1581, for example, the new city council took its oath of office 'in the name of the Estates of Utrecht'.(10) Yet in other matters, the Estates could not bring themselves to assume the sovereignty completely: in 1583-1584, during their dispute with Rutger van den Boetzelaer over his claim to the high jurisdiction in Langerak, the Estates authorised the Marshal of the Nederkwartier to arrest the murderer in the case, and assert the jurisdiction of the Estates of Utrecht 'as representing the sovereign lord'.(11) Even in 1589, the Estates still regarded themselves as being only in temporary possession of the high authority and still claimed only to 'represent' a sovereign who did not in reality exist. Nevertheless, they exercised this authority in fact, even if they would not admit it in

name, in matters ranging from jurisdiction over tax cases (to be heard by the Estates, not by the Hof) to ecclesiastical appointments formerly in the gift of the bishop or the Pope.(12) Imperceptibly, and almost without realising it, the Estates had stepped into the gap left by the Abjuration.

Appendix II

Biographical notes on persons mentioned in the text

Note: abbreviations explained on pp. 264-266.

Johan van Abcoude van Meerthen 1529 or 1530 - 1595

Schepen of Utrecht 1576-1581; burgomaster 1581-1582. Thereafter attended the Estates as a member of the Ridderschap.

1581 Nominated to represent Utrecht in the Landraad.

1582 Nominated to represent Utrecht in the Council of State.

1587 Quarrelled with Maximilian van Baexen.

Remained in Utrecht with the minority faction of the Ridderschap.

1588 After the return of the exiles, omitted from the Ridderschap summons.

Hendrick Agylaeus 1533-1595

Active as a Protestant in den Bosch, where he organised a consistory in 1566. Banished in 1568; returned to den Bosch, 1577.

1579 After helping to secure the adherence of den Bosch to the Union of Utrecht, left Brabant for the northern Netherlands.

1585 (November) One of the delegates sent by the Utrecht burgerhoplieden to the Estates-General to protest against Amsterdam's trade with the enemy.

1586 (October) Appointed Councillor and Procurator-General of the Hof of Utrecht. Closely associated with Prouninck.

1589 Dismissed from his post in the Hof. Left Utrecht for England.
BNB, I, 135-138.

Goert van Reede, lord of Amerongen 1516-1585

Member of the Ridderschap. Regular attender at the Estates from 1577 to just before his death.

1581 Deputed to represent Utrecht in both the Estates-General and the Landraad.

Erasmus Backer

Minister of the Reformed Church

1579 Called to St. Jacob, Utrecht, to join Hubert Duifhuis.

1581 City council granted him 'protection'.

1582 Resigned from St. Jacob. Became minister at Breukelen.

1587 (March) Suspended from preaching by the Standing Committee.

1589 'Reformed' predikanten petitioned the Estates that he should not be allowed to preach.

Maximilian van Baexen ?-1606

Member of the Ridderschap. Regular attender at Estates 1578-1587 and 1588 onwards.

1583 Deputed to represent Utrecht in Estates-General at Middelburg.

1584 Appointed Marshal of Eemland.

1587 Quarrelled with Johan van Abcoude van Meerthen. A member of the exiled Woerden group of the Ridderschap, 1587-88.

1588 Attempt by the city council to deprive him of the office of Marshal.

1590 Deputed to represent Utrecht in the Estates-General.

Niclaes van Berck ?-1618(?)

Canon of St. Jan. Member of the Geeligerden 1582-1587; 1588 onwards.

From 1583, receiver of oudschildgeld, Archbishop's tithes, consumption tax, etc.

1587 (February) Omitted from the five Geeligerden installed by Nieuwenaar.

1588 (October) Reinstated in Geeligerden.

1590 Deputed to represent Utrecht in the Council of State.

Johan van den Berg ?-1609

Canon of the Dom. Member of the Geeligerden 1587-88. Regular attender at Estates 1577-81, on behalf of the Dom.

1587 (February) Installed as one of the five Geeligerden by Nieuwenaar.

1587-88 Represented Utrecht in Estates-General.

1588 Not continued in Geeligerden after the exiles' return: they refused to do business with him.

1600 Elected dean by the chapter, but never recognised by the Estates.

Gerard Blockhoven

Minister of the Reformed Church. Preached in Gouda and Heusden, but had differences with these consistories and with the provincial synod of South Holland.

1590 Called to Utrecht by the city council.

1593 A member of the commission inquiring into the Church in rural areas.

1601 Before the provincial synod of South Holland, confessed to teaching unsound doctrine and to improper behaviour while in Utrecht. Promised to reform.

Rutger van den Boetzelaer, lord of Asperen, Langerak, etc. 1534-1604.

Signatory of the Compromise. Close associate of William of Orange.

1587 Became lord of Langerak after transfer from one Hendrik van Zuylen.

1588 In dispute with the Estates over sovereignty of Langerak.

NNBW, VIII, 161.

Maximilian de Henin, Count of Bossu 1542-1578

Stadholder of Utrecht 1567-1573

1567 Temporarily appointed to replace William of Orange as Stadholder of Holland, Zeeland, Utrecht and Friesland.

1573 Captured by the Beggars.

1576 Released after Pacification of Ghent. Became commander in the Estates-General's army.

1577 Took part in siege and capture of Vredenburg. Problems over payment of his troops.

NNBW, IX, 90.

Hendrick Both

Schepen of Amersfoort 1580-1585. Attended the Estates for Amersfoort

1581-1585.

1583 Imprisoned in Utrecht for Amersfoort's tax arrears.

Attended meetings of Standing Committee: acquired a knowledge of political affairs.

Reinier van Aeswijn, lord of Brakel 1544-1620

Member of the Ridderschap. Burgomaster of Utrecht 1580-1581.

1579 Signed the Union of Utrecht on behalf of the Ridderschap.

Appointed receiver-general for the Provinces of the Closer Union.

1580-81 Deputed to represent Utrecht at the Estates-General.

1583 Represented Utrecht in the Landraad

Accused by the citizens of Utrecht of misuse of funds designated for troops in the Estates' pay. His request to resign was not granted because his appointment had been endorsed by the Provinces of the Closer Union and the Landraad.

1585 A member of Leicester's Council of State.

1586-88 Closely associated with Prouninck. Leader of the minority faction of the Ridderschap which stayed in Utrecht 1587-1588.

1588 (October) Faced serious allegations of financial speculation from the returning exiles. Excluded from Estates.

1590 Petitioned the Estates-General to allow him to put his case (and that of Johan van Abcoude van Meerthen and Lubbert van Parijs van Zudoort) to Maurice of Nassau, the Stadholder.

1610 Leader of the uprising in Utrecht against the Estates and the city council.

1611 Banished by the restored magistracy.

NNBW, VI, 54.

Johan van Bruhesen 1527-1600

Canon of the Dom. Domdeken

1567 Appointed treasurer of the chapter of the Dom.

1572 Secretly elected Domdeken, in opposition to the
Hof's wishes.

1577 Fled Utrecht, to escape the citizens who held him
responsible for the opposition to Orange as Stadholder. Went to Cologne,
where he lived until his death.

Appointed Bishop of Groningen and then Archbishop of Utrecht, but
never took either seat.

NNBW, II, 264.

Lambert van der Burch

Dean of Ste. Marie

- 1579 Forced to sign the Union of Utrecht for his chapter
1585 Expelled from Utrecht
1586 (July) Expelled from Utrecht

Hendrick Buth

Canon, and later treasurer, of Ste. Marie. Member of the Geeligerden
1582-1587; 1588 onwards.

Attender at Estates 1577-1581, on behalf of Ste. Marie.

- 1583 Deputed to represent Utrecht in the Estates-General
1586 Deputed to represent Utrecht in the Estates-General
1586-87 One of the deputies (with Bartholomeus de Wael van
Moersbergen) at the centre of Utrecht's dispute with the Estates-General.
Recalled from the Hague. Left the Estates-General February 1587.
1587 (February) Omitted from the five Geeligerden
installed by Nieuwenaar.
1588 (October) Reinstated into the Geeligerden.
1592 Resigned his prebend.

Paulus Buys 1531-1594

Pensionary of Leiden; then advocate of Holland, 1572-1584. Born in Amersfoort.

- 1577 Negotiated on Orange's behalf with the Estates about the Satisfaction.
- 1579 Negotiated with Amersfoort on behalf of the Union of Utrecht. A leading member of the pro-England party c. 1584-1585. Quarrelled with the Earl of Leicester.
- 1586 (July) Arrested and imprisoned in Utrecht.
- 1587 Released on the orders of the Estates-General, who chose him to represent Utrecht in the Council of State.

NNBW, I, 519

Dirk Canter 1545-1616

Schepen of Utrecht 1575-1577; Burgomaster 1588-1590.

- 1590 Active in passing the Estates' Erastian Church ordinance. Excluded from the city council.
- 1610 Leader of the uprising in Utrecht against the Estates and the city council. Briefly held office of burgomaster. Imprisoned.
- 1611 Exiled from Utrecht and the United Provinces.

NNBW, I, 558.

Juliaen Cleerhagen c. 1555- c. 1598

Military commander in service of Estates-General.

- 1587 Governor of Gorcum. Appointed by Leicester, dismissed by Philip van Nassau. Loyal adherent of Prouninck. Quarrelled

with Nieuwenaar.

1588 (September) Wounded and imprisoned in the fighting over Nieuwenaar's coup.

1589 Recovered from his wound; went to England.

NNBW, III, 235

Floris van Pallant, count of Culemborg 1537-1598

Leading Protestant nobleman. Member of the Confederation of the Nobility.

Banished by the Council of Troubles. Returned to the Netherlands after Alva left.

1580-81 Dispute with the Estates over the River Lek.

Continuing dispute over jurisdiction in the village of Honswijk.

1586 (June) Arrested in Utrecht for refusing to admit troops to Culemborg.

(October) With Lord North, renewed the Utrecht city council, on Leicester's instructions. Fervent supporter of the Prouninck régime.

1589 Offered Prouninck shelter when he was banished.

NNBW, V, 424.

Jacob Cuyntorff ?-1582

Scholaster of Oudmunster. Occasional attender of Estates on behalf of Oudmunster 1574-1575 and 1577-1578.

1577 One of Utrecht's deputies at the St. Geertruidenberg negotiations.

1578-79 Instigated 'conspiracy' against the Union of Utrecht.

With Johan van Renesse, drafted 'Counter-Union'. Arrested and imprisoned until the Union was signed. Objected because of his ecclesiastical

immunity to secular justice. Released after pressure from Count Rennenberg.

NNBW, II, 361

Petrus Dathenus

Reformed Protestant minister

1578 (August) On a visit to Utrecht, preached in Franciscan Church.

BWPG

Gerrit van Domselaer

Schepen of Utrecht 1586-1588

1585 (November) One of the delegates sent by the Utrecht burgerhoplieden to the Estates-General to protest against Amsterdam's trade with the enemy.

1586-88 Deputed to represent Utrecht in the Estates-General, instead of Hendrik Buth and Bartholomeus de Wael van Moersbergen.

Johan Robbrechtsz van Druenen ?-before October 1588

Raad of Utrecht 1576-1577; Schepen 1578-1581; burgomaster 1582-1585

1580 Deputed to represent Utrecht in the Estates-General, and again in 1581 and 1585.

1586 (July) Expelled from Utrecht. With the other leading exiles appealed to the Estates of Holland, and was taken under Leicester's protection.

Died in exile.

Hubert Duifhuis 1531-1581

Minister of the St. Jacob church.

- 1572 Left Rotterdam when Bossu captured it. Lived in exile in Cologne.
- 1577 Called to the St. Jacob church in Utrecht. Conducted Catholic services, but preached in the Reformed manner.
- 1578 After a brief return to Rotterdam, came back to Utrecht at the city council's request. Faced objections from the consistorial congregation to his doctrinal position, e.g. on baptism.
- 1579 Forbidden to establish a consistory in St. Jacob.

BWPG

Johan van Duvenvoorde 1530-1600

Canon and Scholaster of the Dom. Domdeken. Member of the Geeligerden.

- 1581 Elected Domdeken on the recommendation of Ausonius van Galama, the retiring acting dean.
- 1582 Appointed to Geeligerden.
- 1585 Member of the commission in the Hague which negotiated the treaty with England.
- 1587 Continued as a member of the Geeligerden.

Hermannus Elconius

Minister of the St. Jacob church.

- 1581 Called to St. Jacob after Duifhuis's death.
- 1586 Agreed to the amalgamation with the consistorial congregation.
- 1589 Left Utrecht for Harlingen, where he died.

NNBW

Albert Foeck

Raad and schepen of Utrecht. Raad: 1576-1577, and 1584-1586;
schepen: 1577-1580 and 1581-1584.

- 1580 Deputed to represent Utrecht in the Estates-General.
Again in 1584.
- 1586 (July) Expelled from Utrecht. Later taken under
Leicester's protection.
- 1589 Utrecht's deputy in the Admiralty of Rotterdam.

Ausonius van Galama ?1524-?1584

Canon of the Dom. Vice-domdeken; acting dean 1577-1581, in the
absence of Johan van Bruhesen. Attended the Estates regularly in 1569 and
1577-1581, on behalf of the Dom.

- 1579 Signed the Union of Utrecht for his chapter.
- 1581 Asked to be replaced as dean because of age and
failing memory.

Johannes Gerobolus 1540-1606

Minister of the Reformed Church.

- 1566 Preached the Reformed gospel in Delft. Fled to Emden.
1573-1590, preached in Vlissingen, Harlingen, Deventer,
Harderwijk.
- 1590 Called to Utrecht by the city council. Remained there
until his death, on good terms with the civil authorities.
- 1593 A member of the commission inquiring into the Church in
rural areas.

NNBW, I, 929

Syphridus van Grovesteyn ?-1589

Canon of the Dom. Member of the Geeligerden 1587-1588. Attended the Estates occasionally 1577-1581, on behalf of the Dom.

1587 (February) Installed as one of the five Geeligerden by Nieuwenaar.

1588 (October) Not continued in office.

Loef van de Haer ?1540-?

Member of the Ridderschap. Treasurer of the Lekdijk 1567-1578.

Attended the Estates regularly 1574-1575 and 1577-1580. Receiver of the single oudschildgeld.

1583 Doubts raised about his accounts.

Floris Heermale ?-1608

Canon and treasurer of Oudmunster. Member of the Geeligerden 1582-1587; 1588 onwards.

Frequently deputed to represent Utrecht in the Estates-General. Attended the Estates regularly 1577-1586, and 1588-1590.

1577 Negotiated the Satisfaction.

1581 Represented Utrecht in the Landraad.

1586 (July) Expelled from Utrecht.

1588 (October) Reinstated in the Geeligerden.

1592 Appointed proost of Oudmunster.

Wernerus Helmichius 1551-1608

Reformed Protestant minister.

1578 Called temporarily to Utrecht.

1579 Appointed permanently to preach in Utrecht to the consistorial congregation.

- 1581 Held the first Reformed service in the Dom.
- 1586 Acted as clerk to the National Synod, in the Hague.
- 1588 (May-August) On the mission of the predikanten to England.
- 1589 Dismissed. Never preached in Utrecht again. Called to Delft.

BWPG

Gilles de Berlaymont, Baron Hierges ?-1579

Stadholder of Utrecht 1574-1576. Military commander in Spanish service.

- 1572 Appointed Stadholder of Friesland and Gelderland.
- 1574 Appointed Stadholder of Holland, Zeeland and Utrecht.
- 1576 Joined the Estates-General party.
- 1576-77 Took part in the siege and capture of Vredenburg.
- 1578 Joined Don John in the seizure of Namur.

Philip, Count Hohenlohe-Langenberg 1550-1606

Military commander in the service of Orange and the Estates-General.

Quarrelled with Leicester. Became ally of Nieuwenaar.

- 1588 His men occupied the fortress at Brakel. Dispute with the lord of Brakel.

NNBW, V, 239.

Robert van Honthorst

Canon of Oudmunster.

- 1586 (July) Expelled from Utrecht. Later taken under Leicester's protection.

Abraham Jansz ?-1602

Minister of the Reformed Church. Quarrelled with his congregation in Vlaardingen and Pynacker, until the classis of Delft declared him unworthy to preach.

1586-87 Minister at Montfoort: a notorious drunkard.

Willem van Lamsweerde

Secretary of the Dom 1567-1582. Secretary of the Estates.

1578-79 Acted as secretary in the Union of Utrecht negotiations.

1579 Involved in dispute over the post of steward of the domains.

1581 Had to choose between secretary-ship and stewardship of the domains.

1582 (January) Resigned from post as secretary.

1586 (July) Expelled from Utrecht.

1588 (November) Provisionally reinstated as steward of domains.

Roetert van Lanscroon

Schepen of Utrecht 1580-1582; 1585-1587 and 1588-1591. Raad 1582-1584.

1585-86 Deputed to represent Utrecht in the Estates-General.

1588 (October) Deputed to represent Utrecht in the Estates-General.

Gilles van Ledenberg ?1548-1618

Secretary of the Estates. Worked as clerk to Floris Thin.

1588 Appointed secretary of the Estates.

Close associate of Johan van Oldenbarnevelt.

NNBW, VI, 905

Hendrick Lyster ?-1586

Assistant advocate of Utrecht.

1584 Appointed to assist Floris Thin.

Nicolaas van Meetkerken 1562-1591

Captain in the service of the Estates-General. Follower of Leicester.

1588 (July) Sent to persuade Elizabeth and Leicester not to withdraw or reduce the number of English troops in the Netherlands.

1589 Joined the Anglo-Dutch expedition to support Don Antonio of Portugal.

NNBW, IV, 965.

Herman Modet ?1520 (or 1530/40) - ?1603

Reformed Protestant minister.

1566 Active in outdoor preaching.

1567 Fled to England. Thereafter travelled in Germany. From 1574, active in the Netherlands.

1580 Called to Utrecht, as minister to the consistorial congregation.

1584-85 Attempt by the city council to dismiss him. He was reinstated after protests from the consistory and the appointment of Nieuwenaar as Stadholder.

1586 Attended National Synod in the Hague. (December) With Philip Rattaller, sent to England by the city council, to assure Elizabeth of Utrecht's loyalty to her and to urge her to continue to support the Reformed Church.

- 1587 (March) Returned to Utrecht
(May/June) Quarrelled with Nieuwenaar. Suspended from preaching; reinstated after protests from his fellow predikanten.
- 1588 (December) Dismissed by the city council.

NNBW, III, 862.

Bartholomeus de Wael, lord of Moersbergen ?-1592

Member of the Ridderschap. Attended the Estates regularly 1577-1587 and 1588-1590.

- 1579 Signed the Union of Utrecht on behalf of the Ridderschap.
- 1583 Accused (with Brakel) of misuse of funds for the troops' pay. His request to resign was not granted.
- 1586 Deputed to represent Utrecht in the Estates-General.
- 1586-87 With Hendrick Buth, at the centre of Utrecht's dispute with the Estates-General. Recalled from the Hague. Left February 1587.
- 1587 (September) Arrested by Trillo. After his release, went into exile: a member of the Woerden group of the Ridderschap.
- 1588 After his return from exile, again represented Utrecht in the Estates-General.

Johan, Burggraaf van Montfoort ?-1583.

First Member of the Ridderschap.

Attended the Estates occasionally 1569-1570, and 1575.

- 1578-79 Possibly implicated in the movement against the Union of Utrecht.

Maurice, Count of Nassau 1567-1625

Military commander. Stadholder of Holland, Zeeland, Utrecht, Gelderland and Overijssel. Son of William of Orange.

- 1584 (August) Appointed head of the Council of State.
- 1585 (November) Stadholder and captain-general of Holland and Zeeland.
- 1590 Appointed Stadholder and captain-general of Utrecht, Gelderland and Overijssel. From 1590 onwards he had a string of military successes against Spain.

NNBW, I, 1315.

Adolf van Solms, Count of Meurs and Nieuwenaar ?1545-1589

Stadholder of Utrecht 1585-1589. Also Stadholder of Gelderland and Overijssel.

- 1583 Supported Gebhard van ~~T~~^{Waldburg}, Elector of Cologne, in his war against the Catholic princes.
- 1584 Installed as Stadholder of Overijssel.
- 1585 (September) Took the oath of office as Stadholder of Utrecht.
- 1586 (January) His appointment as Stadholder was confirmed by the Estates-General.
- (October) Angry at the renewal of the Utrecht magistracy by Culemborg and North.
- 1587 Became more and more anti-English.
- 1588 (September) Restored his authority in Utrecht by a coup d'état.
- 1589 (October) Killed by an explosion in Arnhem.

NNBW, V, 374.

Philip de St. Aldegonde, lord of Noircarmes ?-1574

Stadholder of Utrecht 1573-1574. Military commander in Spanish service.

1566-67 Governor of Hainault. Adviser of Margaret of Parma.

Captured Valenciennes, Tournai, den Bosch and Maastricht
from the rebels.

1573 After Bossu's capture, appointed Stadholder of Utrecht.

1574 (March) Died at Utrecht, of wounds received at the
siege of Alkmaar.

BNB

Roger, Baron North 1530-1600

Close associate of Leicester.

1585 (December) Came to the Netherlands with Leicester.

1586 (October) Renewed the Utrecht magistracy with
Culemborg

1587 Possibly involved in a plot to oust Nieuwenaar from
the Stadholdership.

Floris van den Bongard, lord of Nyenroode ?1526-1602

Member of the Ridderschap. Attended the Estates regularly 1577-1588, and
very occasionally thereafter.

1587-88 A member of the minority faction of the
Ridderschap. Remained in Utrecht.

Nicolaes van Oostrum

Schepen and burgomaster of Utrecht. Raad 1580-1582; schepen

1582-1585 and 1589-1590; burgomaster 1590-1591.

Lubbert van Parijs van Zudoort ?-1607

Schepen and burgomaster of Utrecht. Also member of the Ridderschap.

Schepen 1577-1578 and 1581-1583; burgomaster 1579-1580 and 1585-1586.

Attended the Estates for the Ridderschap 1586-1588.

1586 Represented Utrecht in the Estates-General.

1587 Remained in Utrecht with the minority faction
of the Ridderschap.

1588 After the return of the exiles, omitted from
the Ridderschap summons.

Jacob de Pottere ?-1586

Schepen of Utrecht 1585-1586

1583 Awarded burgerschap of Utrecht

1586 (March) Delivered a Latin oration on Leicester's
entrance to Utrecht.

(July) Arrested Paulus Buys

Johan Proeys ?-1585

Canon of St Pieter. Member of the Geeligeerden. Attended the Estates
occasionally 1577-1581, and regularly 1582-1585.

Gerard Prouninck van Deventer ?-1610

Burgomaster of Utrecht 1586-1588. Born in den Bosch, active as a Protestant
there until he left in 1579.

1581 Receiver-general for the United Provinces.

1586 (October) Appointed burgomaster of Utrecht, by

Culemborg and North. Emerged as leader of Leicestrian party in Utrecht.
(November) Refused admission to the Estates-General as Utrecht's representative.

1587 (September) Reappointed burgomaster, by Leicester.

1588 (October) Arrested after rioting in the city.
Imprisoned.

1589 (July) Exiled from the Netherlands. Travelled to Culemborg, and then to England.

1590 Returned to the Netherlands. Lived in Culemborg, 1591-1594.

NNBW, II, 1134.

Philips Rattaller ?-1595

Secretary of the Hof of Utrecht 1586-1588(?)

1586 Appointed secretary of the Hof.

(December) Sent to England with Modet, by the city council, to assure Elizabeth of Utrecht's loyalty.

1587 (March) Returned to Utrecht.

NNBW, II, 1164.

Jacques Reingout

Financial official. Worked for Berlaymont, Alva and Requesens. Treasurer of the provincial council under Anjou. Left the southern provinces after an enquiry into his conduct. Was admired by Leicester, who proposed to put him at the head of his Chamber of Finance.

1586 Arrested for treason.

Returned to Brussels.

BNB, XIX, 1-4.

Johan van Renesse 1540-1619

Canon and later dean of St. Jan.

1578-79 Involved in Cuyntorff's 'Counter-Union' conspiracy.

Arrested by the city council but soon released.

1581 Elected substitute-dean to act in Adriaan van
Zuylen's absence.

1605 Appointed dean of St. Jan.

Johan Rengers ?-1616

Canon of St. Jan. Member of the Geelgeerden. Attended the Estates
regularly 1582-1590.

1582 Nominated to represent Utrecht in the Council
of State.

1583 Nominated to represent Utrecht in the
Landraad.

1585 Utrecht's deputy in the negotiations with France.

1588 Represented Utrecht in the Estates-General.

1598 Member of the Admiralty of Friesland.

Willem van Cuylenborch van Vianen van Rijsenburg, lord of Rijsenburg

?-1596.

Member of the Ridderschap. Attended the Estates regularly 1577-1587 and
1588-1590.

1587 Represented Utrecht in the Estates-General.

A member of the exiled Woerden faction of the
Ridderschap 1587-1588.

Fernand de Lannoy, count of La Roche 1520-1579

Stadholder of Utrecht 1574. Military commander in army of Charles V and Philip II.

- 1574 Ineffective as Stadholder; e.g. April, unrest caused by troops passing through Utrecht. Anxious to give up the office.

BNB

Ansem Ruysch ?1547-1614

Schepen of Amersfoort 1586.

- 1586 Appointed steward of ecclesiastical property under the Redressement. Unpopular with the city and the towns.

Frederick Schenck van Toutenberg 1503-1580

Archbishop of Utrecht 1561-1580.

- 1565 Summoned council of the Archbishopric to put the Tridentine decrees into effect, but unsuccessful.
- 1576 Forced to lend money to the Estates against his will.
- 1580 His funeral was the last public expression of Catholic worship in the city.

NNBW, II, 1280.

Nicolaes Sopingius ?-1592

Minister of the Reformed Church.

- 1579 Called to the consistorial congregation of Utrecht. In dispute with Hubert Duifhuis.
- 1588 A member of the delegation sent by the

predikanten to Elizabeth.

1589 Dismissed from his post in Utrecht.

1590 Left for Breda where he died.

NNBW, V, 778.

Thomas Sosius ?-1598

Procurator-general of the Hof of Utrecht.

1572 Appointed to the Hof.

1578 Acting steward of the domains.

1579 Involved in controversy over the stewardship.

Lost to Willem van Lamsweerde.

1583 At the instigation of Paulus Buys, appointed
as professor at the University of Leiden.

1584 Left Utrecht for Leiden.

NNBW, III, 1520.

Johan Strick

Secretary of the Estates.

1582 (January) Appointed secretary to succeed Lamsweerde.

1586-88 Took over much of Thin's work while he
was in exile.

1588 Dismissed because of his collaboration with
Prouninck. Replaced by Ledenberg.

Taco Sybrandsz ?-1615

Minister of St. Jacob church

1581 Called to St. Jacob in Utrecht.

1586 Resigned because he could not sign the

confession of faith, and so could not agree to the amalgamation with the consistorial congregation.

1589 Became the minister at Medemblik.

NNBW, V, 868.

Floris Thin ?-1590

Advocate of the Estates of Utrecht. Began his career as the secretary of the chapter of Oudmunster. Acted more and more for the Estates.

1567 Appeared before the Council of Troubles' commissioners.

1574-75 Two unsuccessful attempts to secure a permanent salaried appointment.

1577 A frequent delegate to the Estates-General, onwards and other governmental bodies.

1577 Appointed advocate. Negotiated the Satisfaction.

1578-79 Instrumental in bringing about the Union of Utrecht.

1583 Drew up the new instruction for the Hof.

1585 Unpopular with the citizenry, who accused him of delaying Nieuwenaar's appointment as Stadholder.

1586 (July) Expelled from Utrecht. Took refuge in Holland. Removed important documents.

(August) Appealed to the Estates-General for help.

Kept in touch with events in Utrecht.

1588 (October) Returned from exile. Restored to office.

NNBW, I, 1495.

Karel van Trillo

Schout of Utrecht 1586-1588. Military commander in Orange's service
1573-1583. Adherent of Leicester.

- 1586 (October) Appointed Schout of Utrecht,
after city council had rejected him in August.
- 1587 Arrested six nobles, who then went into
exile in Woerden.
- 1588 (October) Dismissed from his post, and
imprisoned. Released after trial.
- 1598 Secured an allowance from the Estates-General,
despite opposition from Utrecht's delegate, Heermale.

NNBW, I, 1503.

Gebhard Truchsess von Waldburg 1547-1601

Elector-Archbishop of Cologne 1577-1583.

- 1584 Went into exile in the Netherlands after
unsuccessful war against Imperial Catholic forces.
- 1586 Close associate of Leicester. Received
financial help from Utrecht.
- 1587 (May) Helped to avert a massacre after a
mutiny in Utrecht.

ADB, VIII, 457-470.

Gerrit van Zoudenbalch, lord of Urk ?-1599

Member of the Ridderschap. Attended the Estates regularly 1581-1587 and
1588-1590.

- 1583 involved in controversy about his
collation to the parish of Maarsse.

1587-88 A member of the exiled Woerden Ridderschap.

Frederick Uten Eng, lord of den Engh ?-1582

Member of the Ridderschap. Marshal of the Nederkwartier.

1577 Represented Utrecht in the Estates-General.

One of Utrecht's deputies at the St. Geertruidenberg negotiations. Negotiated the Satisfaction with Orange.

1579 Signed the Union of Utrecht on behalf of the Ridderschap.

1581 Requested permission from Orange to resign from his post as Marshal.

NNBW, II, 438.

Johan Uyttenbogaert 1557-1644

Minister of the Reformed Church

1578 Secretary to Count John of Nassau.

1580-84 Studied theology at the city of Utrecht's expense.

1584 Called to Utrecht to be minister to the consistorial congregation.

1589 Dismissed from his post.

1591 Became court preacher in the Hague.

1610 Led the Remonstrance.

1619 Founded the Remonstrant Brotherhood, in Antwerp.

1621-26 Lived in France.

NNBW, II, 1469.

Willem Veusels ?-1614

Dean of St Pieter 1569-1580

1570-76 On a mission to Madrid on behalf of the
the Utrecht chapters, to protest to Philip II about the Tenth, Twentieth
and Hundredth Penny taxes.

1578 (April) Expelled from Utrecht.

Joost de Zoete, lord of Villers ?-1589

Stadholder of Utrecht 1584-1585.

A member of the Confederation of the Nobility. Military commander -

'Field Marshal' - in Anjou's army and later in Orange's service.

1584 Appointed Stadholder of Utrecht.

1585 (June) Captured at the Battle of Amerongen.

1587 Released after ransom.

Willem de Wael van Vronesteyn ?-1596 or 1597

Member of the Ridderschap. Schepen of Utrecht 1578-1579. Attended
the Estates regularly 1578-1584, on behalf of his nephew, Frederick, son
of Adriaan de Wael van Vronesteyn.

Johan van Renesse, lord of Wulven and Wilp ?1537-?1584

Member of the Ridderschap. Attended the Estates regularly 1578-1583.

1566 Requested Orange and Margaret of Parma
for a church in Utrecht to house Reformed services.

1579 Commissioner-general for munitions, for
the Union of Utrecht.

1584 Nominated to represent Utrecht in the Estates-General.

Adriaan van Zuylen ?-1599

Dean of St. Jan 1565-1599. Member of the Geeligerden. Attended the Estates regularly 1577-1590.

- 1577 (March) Delegated to negotiate with Buys about the Satisfaction.
- 1579 Signed the Union of Utrecht for his chapter. Represented Utrecht on the first commission of the Province of the Closer Union
- 1581 Willing to accept reduced ecclesiastical representation on the Standing Committee.
- 1586-88 Continued as a member of the Geeligerden throughout the crisis.

Niclaes van Zuylen van Drakenburg, lord of Zevender and Drakesteyn

Schout of Utrecht. Member of the Ridderschap. Attended the Estates for both the Ridderschap and the city.

- 1579 Signed the Union of Utrecht.
- 1586 (July) Expelled from Utrecht. Took refuge in Holland.
- (August) Appealed to the Estates-General for help.
- 1587-88 Associated with the Woerden Ridderschap.
- 1588 (September) Reinstated in office.

Frederick van Zuylen van Nyevelt, lord of Hindersteyn ?-1597

Member of the Ridderschap. Marshal of the Overkwartier 1595-1597. Attended the Estates regularly for the Ridderschap 1577-1587 and 1588-1590.

- 1587-88 Member of the exiled Woerden Ridderschap

group.

William, Prince of Orange 1533-1584

Leader of the Revolt. Stadholder of Holland, Zeeland and Utrecht.

1559 Appointed Stadholder of Holland, Zeeland and Utrecht.

1567 Went into exile after the failure of the first revolt.

1572 led the revolt in Holland and Zeeland.
Recognised as their Stadholder.

1577 (August) Visited Utrecht.

(October) By the Satisfaction, became Stadholder of Utrecht.

1584 Assassinated in Delft.

NNBW, I, 1539.

Abbreviations

GAA: Gemeentearchief Amersfoort

GAU: Gemeentearchief Utrecht

GAU Stad: Stadsarchief

GAWbD: Gemeentearchief Wijk-bij-Duurstede

RAU: Rijksarchief Utrecht

AKD: Archief van het Domkapittel

AKJ: Archief van het Kapittel van St. Jan

AKM: Archief van het Kapittel van Ste. Marie

AKP: Archief van het Kapittel van St. Pieter

Staten: Archief van de Staten van Utrecht

RA: Rechterlijke Archieven

AAU: Archief Aartsbisdom Utrecht

AGN: Algemene Geschiedenis der Nederlanden (12 vols., Utrecht, 1949-58).

BGN: Bijdragen voor de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden

BMGN: Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden

BMHG: Bijdragen en Mededelingen van het Historisch Genootschap

BNB: Biographie Nationale de Belgique (27 vols., Brussels, 1886-1938).

Bor: P.C.Bor, Nederlantsche oorloghen beroerten ende borgerlijke oneenicheyden (5 vols., Leiden and Amsterdam, 1621-1630).

Brandt: G. Brandt, The history of the Reformation and other

ecclesiastical transactions in and about

the Low Countries (4 vols., London, 1720-1723).

BVGO: Bijdragen voor Vaderlandsche Geschiedenis en Oudheidkunde

BWPG: J.P. de Bie and J. Loosjes, eds., Biographisch Woordenboek

van Protestantsche Godgeleerden in Nederland (the Hague, 1919)

CSP Foreign: Calendar of State Papers Foreign 1585-1588.

Dotd van Flensburg: J.J. Dotd van Flensburg, ed., Archief voor

kerkelijke en wereldsche geschiedenissen,

inzonderheid van Utrecht (7 vols., Utrecht, 1839-1848).

HMC: Historical Manuscript Commission Reports

Hora Siccama: D.G. Rengers Hora Siccama, De geestelijke en kerkelijke

goederen onder het canonieke, het gereformeerde en het

neutrale recht: historisch-juridische verhandeling,

voornamelijk uit Utrechtsche gegevens samengesteld, I

(Utrecht, 1905).

KHG: Kroniek van het Historisch Genootschap

Kossmann and Mellink, Texts: E.H. Kossmann and A.F. Mellink, Texts

concerning the Revolt of the Netherlands (Cambridge, 1974).

NAK: Nederlands Archief voor Kerkgeschiedenis

NNBW: Nieuw Nederlandsch Biografisch Woordenboek (10 vols., Leiden,

1911-1937).

RSG: N. Japikse and H.H.P. Rijperman, eds., Resolutien der

Staten-Generaal 1576-1609 (14 vols., the Hague, 1915-1970).

Tegenwoordige Staat: Tegenwoordige Staat der Vereenigde Nederlanden,

vols. XI and XII (Amsterdam, 1758 and 1772). Also published as

Nederland in vroeger tijd, vols. VIII to XI (Zaltbommel, 1965).

TvG: Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis

van de Water: J. van de Water, ed., Groot placaetboek, vervattende

alle de placaten, ordonnantien en edicten der
edele mogende heeren Staten 'sLands van Utrecht

(3 vols., Utrecht, 1729).

WMV: Werken der Marnix-Vereeniging

Note: where a passage from an article is cited, the full page references are given first, then the pages of the relevant passage.

NOTES

CHAPTER I

1. R. Fruin, 'De vrije heerlijkheden gelegen in de grensgebied tusschen Gelderland, Holland en Utrecht' in: Verslagen en Mededelingen van de Vereeniging tot uitgaaf der bronnen van het Oudvaderlandsche Recht, VIII (1925), 352-374, passim.

2. The sources for estimates of population are as follows:
a. The results of a rural census in 1632, held as a preliminary to a poll tax, which omitted babies aged less than one year:

Nederkwartier 19412 (including 300 extra for the Nedereind of Jutphaas)

Eemland 5778

Overkwartier 5922

Montfoort 1281

32393

Since the rural population appears to have been increasing in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, especially in the north-west peat-digging areas and along the Rivers Vecht and Ijssel, it seems reasonable to suppose that the figure for the 1580s must have been considerably less than 32393, particularly when depopulation due to the war is taken into account. (P.J. Vermeulen, 'Bevolking van het platteland der provincie Utrecht in 1632', Tijdschrift voor oudheden statistiek... van het bisdom, de provincie, en de stad Utrecht, I (1847), 198-208; E.P. de Booy, De weldaet der Scholen (Utrecht, 1977), 343; J. de Vries, The Dutch rural economy in the Golden Age, 1500-1700 (New Haven and London, 1974), 97-99.

b. A chimney count conducted in all the towns except Montfoort by the Estates for the abortive chimney tax in 1577, the result of which, multiplied by a coefficient of 4.5, produces the following table:

| <u>Town</u> | <u>Chimney count</u> | <u>Estimated population</u> |
|-------------|----------------------|-----------------------------|
| Utrecht | 8860 | 39870 |
| Amersfoort | 1683 | 7573 |
| Rhenen | 405 | 1822 |
| Wijk | 382 | <u>1712</u> |
| | | 50977 |

This estimate may err on the high side, however, particularly for the city with its large clerical population. In any case, the Estates did not consider these figures satisfactory for their purposes, but unfortunately they did not record the results of any recount (RAU Staten 231:1, 23 May 1577).

In the mid seventeenth century, the city's population was about 30,000 and Amersfoort's about 8000 (de Vries, The Dutch rural economy, 97).

3. 'Stukken betreffende de overgave der temporaliteit door Bisschop Hendrik van Beijeren aan Keizer Karel de Vijfde' in Dodt van Flensburg, I, (2), 17-39. G. Brom, 'Een protest tegen de overdracht van het wereldlijke gebied der Utrechtsche bisschoppen', BVGO, 3rd series, X (1899), 125-155, 125-128.

4. M. Dierickx, De oprichting der nieuwe bisdommen in de Nederlanden onder Filips II, 1559-1570 (Antwerp and Utrecht, 1950), 132.

5. J.S. Theissen, De regeering van Karel V in de noordelijke Nederlanden (Amsterdam, 1912), 190-191.

6. C.A. Rutgers, 'Van Standen tot Staten' in Van Standen tot Staten: 600 jaar Staten van Utrecht, 1375-1975 (Utrecht, 1975), 19-39, passim.

7. C.A. van Kalveen, Het bestuur van bisschop en Staten in het Nedersticht, Oversticht en Drenthe, 1483-1520 (Utrecht, 1974), 401-403.

8. Tegenwoordige Staat, XXI, 256.

9. R. Fruin, Geschiedenis der staatsinstellingen in Nederland tot den val der Republiek, 2nd edn., ed. H.T. Colenbrander (the Hague, 1922), 89; S. Müller and G.A. Evers, De vergaderplaatsen der Staten van Utrecht 1375-1915 (Utrecht, 1915), 4.

10. van de Water, I, 31.

11. van Kalveen, Het bestuur van bisschop en Staten, 58, 94, 122; R. Fruin, ed., De middeleeuwse rechtsbronnen der kleine steden van het Nedersticht van Utrecht, I (the Hague, 1892), 317, 323.

12. H. Smitskamp, 'Van lotwissel en menigerlei geval (1555-1593)' in S.J. Fockema Andreae and H. Hardenberg, eds., 500 jaren Statengeneraal in de Nederlanden: van Statenvergadering tot Volksvertegenwoordiging (Assen, 1964), 28-63, 29; G. Griffiths, Representative government in Western Europe in the sixteenth century (Oxford, 1968), 303, 356, 364-365.

13. L.J. Rogier, Geschiedenis van het Katholicisme in Noord-Nederland in de 16e en 17e eeuw I (2nd ed., Amsterdam, 1947), 263-264; Dierickx, De oprichting der nieuwe bisdommen, 132-135.

14. A. van Hulzen, Utrecht in 1566 en 1567 (Groningen, 1932), passim.

15. William of Orange was appointed Stadholder in 1559; in 1567, Maximilian de Henin, Count of Bossu, was appointed 'temporarily' in his place. On Bossu's capture by the Beggars in October 1573, his place was taken by Philip de St. Aldegonde, lord of Noircarmes, who died in March 1574. The next Stadholder was Fernand de Lannoy, count of La Roche, who was followed later in 1574 by Gilles de Berlaymont, Baron Hierges.

16. RAU AKD 1:19, 8 August 1568.
17. J. Marcus, Sententien en indagingen van den Hertog van Alba, uitgesproken en geslagen in zynen Bloedtraedt (Amsterdam, 1735), 106ff.
18. G. Parker, The Dutch Revolt (London, 1977), 114-116.
19. Resolutions of the Estates, 1569: Dodt van Flensburg, II, 4-6, 10-11, 13-14.
20. S. Muller, ed., 'Verhaal van het beleg van het kasteel Vredenburg te Utrecht in 1576 door een ooggetuige' BMHG, VI (1883), 147-216, 169ff.
21. W. van Iterson, 'De stedelijke privileges van Utrecht op last van Alva overgebracht naar het kasteel Vredenburg aldaar, 1572-1575' in Jaarboekje van 'Oud-Utrecht' (1965), 43-56, 44-52.
22. H. Brugmans, ed., 'Utrechtsche Kroniek over 1566-1576' in BMHG, XXV (1904), 1-258, 134-136. For the unusually high turnover in Stadholders, see note 15 above.
23. A. le Cosquino de Bussy, Het ontstaan der Satisfactie van Utrecht (Amsterdam, 1910), 17. For two conflicting versions of this incident see Francisco de Valdez (commander of the regiment which lodged in Utrecht after missing the battle of Mook) to Requesens, Utrecht, 2 May 1574, and La Roche to Requesens, Utrecht, 2 May 1574: L.P. Gachard, ed., Correspondance de Philippe II sur les affaires des Pays-Bas, III (Brussels, 1858), 68-70. Valdez blames La Roche for failing to feed the men and to keep good order, and accuses the citizens of provoking the troops with 'insolences'; La Roche claims to have exercised effective vigilance, and blames Valdez's men for setting the fire. Requesens adopted Valdez's version in his report to the king: Requesens to Philip II, Antwerp, 15 May 1574, ibid., 81.
24. Brugmans, 'Utrechtsche Kroniek', 137.
25. Requesens to Stadholder and Hof of Utrecht, Brussels, 13 June 1574: Gachard, Correspondance de Philippe II, III, 550-551; P.L. Muller, 'Stukken betreffende de onderhandelingen tusschen de Staten van Utrecht en de hooge Regeering, over het aandeel van Utrecht in de buitengewone bede 1574-1576' in BMHG, X (1887), 64-145, 67.
26. Requesens to deputies of Estates of Utrecht, Antwerp, 23 April 1575, in P.L. Muller, 'Stukken betreffende de onderhandelingen', 110-115.
27. Resolutions of the Estates, 30 July and 19 September 1575, Dodt van Flensburg, II, 161 and 166-167.
28. Act of acceptance, in P.L. Muller, 'Stukken betreffende de onderhandelingen', 130-145.
29. Ibid., 133.
30. Hierges to Council of State, Utrecht, 30 August 1576, C. Piot,

ed., Correspondance du Cardinal de Granvelle 1565-1583, VI (Brussels,), 414; Cosquino de Bussy, Het ontstaan der Satisfactie, 23; Brugmans, 'Utrechtsche Kroniek', 257.

31. Deputies of Utrecht to Council of State, 2 October 1576 (copy): RAU Staten 1035:1, C6. President Rattaler of the Hof originally forbade the Estates to meet, since it would constitute lèse-majesté to take part in a session of the Estates-General which had not been authorised by the king. He gave way only after the Hof had received instructions from the Council of State, now the puppet of the Estates-General, to allow the Estates to send deputies: Hof of Utrecht to Council of State, 16 October 1576, Piot, Correspondance de Granvelle, VI, 468-469; Council of State to Domdeken of Utrecht, Brussels, 4 October 1576, L.P. Gachard, Actes des Etats-Généraux des Pays-Bas 1576-1585, I (Brussels, 1861), 430-431. Note that the Stadholder of Friesland also prevented Brabant's invitation to that province from reaching its destination: M. Baelde and P. van Peteghem, 'De Pacificatie van Gent (1576)' in Opstand en Pacificatie in de Lage Landen: bijdrage tot de studie van de Pacificatie van Gent (Ghent, 1976), 1-62, 31.

32. H.G. Koenigsberger, 'The powers of deputies in sixteenth-century assemblies' in his Estates and Revolutions: essays in early modern European history (Ithaca and London, 1971), 176-210, 197; Engelbert van Bruhesen, Hendrik van Essesteyn and Jan Taets van Amerongen to the Domdeken, Brussels, 21 October 1576: RAU Staten 1035:2, F13; RAU AKD I:20, 24 and 31 October 1576; J.J. Woltjer, 'Het Noorden en de Pacificatie van Gent' in Opstand en Pacificatie, 79-98, 88. Overijssel did not ratify the Pacification until 16 December: M. Baelde, 'De pacificatie van Gent: hoop en twijfel in de Nederlanden' in BMGN, XCI (1976), 369-393, 392-393.

33. Private instruction to Don John of Austria, 30 October 1576: Gachard, Correspondance de Philippe II, IV, 458-459.

34. S. Muller, 'Verhaal van het beleg van het kasteel Vredenburg', 182-183.

35. Cosquino de Bussy, Het ontstaan der Satisfactie, 26-28; S. Muller, 'Verhaal van het beleg van het kasteel Vredenburg', 183.

36. Deputies to Estates of Artois, Brussels, 7 November 1576: Baelde, 'De pacificatie van Gent: hoop en twijfel', 390-391; Engelbert van Bruhesen and Jan Taets van Amerongen to the Domdeken, Brussels, 6 November 1576: P. Bondam, Verzameling van onuitgegevene stukken tot opheldering der vaderlandsche Historie, (5 vols., Utrecht, 1779-1781), I, 77-83. Cf. chapter VI, p. 154.

37. Hierges to Council of State, Venlo, 28 November 1576: J. van Vloten, ed., 'Onuitgegeven brieven van Gillis van Berlaimont, heer van Hierges' in Codex diplomaticus Neerlandicus, 2nd ser., IV (2), 264-319, 316-318; Cosquino de Bussy, Het ontstaan der Satisfactie, 28-29.

38. Woltjer, 'Het Noorden en de Pacificatie van Gent', 89; Estates to deputies in Brussels, 27 December 1576: Bondam, Verzameling van onuitgegevene stukken, I, 289-292.

39. GAU Stad I, 13, 20-21 January, 8-11 February 1577.
40. Hierges to Council of State, Arnhem, 29 May 1576: van Vloten, 'Onuitgegevene brieven van Gillis van Berlaimont', 281-282.
41. Estates to deputies in Brussels, 4-5 December 1576: Bondam, Verzameling van onuitgegevene stukken, I, 221-232; Woltjer, 'Het Noorden en de Pacificatie van Gent', 88-89.
42. E.H. Kossmann and A.F. Mellink, eds., Texts concerning the Revolt of the Netherlands (Cambridge, 1974), 129.
43. Cosquino de Bussy, Het ontstaan der Satisfactie, 56-61, 85-89; Council of State to Estates of Utrecht, Brussels, 20 and 21 March and 3 April 1577: RAU Staten 285:1; Parker, Dutch Revolt, 182-183.
44. Estates of Utrecht to Heermale and Thin, 24 February 1577: RAU Staten 1035:1 A2; Bor, X, 219v-220v.
45. RAU AKJ 1:4, 11-16 March 1577; Paulus Buys to Orange, Utrecht, 16 March 1577: G. Groen van Prinsterer, ed., Archives ou correspondance inédite de la maison d'Orange-Nassau, 1st series, VI (Leiden, 1839), 11-12; Bor, X, 226v-227.
46. RAU Staten 231:1, 3 and 12 May 1577: P.L. Muller, De Staat der Vereenigde Nederlanden in de jaren zijner wording 1572-1594 (Haarlem, 1872), 165.
47. RAU Staten 231:1, 2 April 1577; 261, 18-27 February, 6, 10 and 12 March 1577; GAU Stad I, 13, 5 April 1577.
48. Verbaal van den aanslag op de Stad Utrecht 27 April 1577: Dodt van Flensburg, 327-365; GAU Stad I, 13, 27 and 30 April 1577.
49. Ibid., 3 May 1577; Bor, X, 233; memorandum to Orange by Estates of Utrecht, 20 May 1577: Bondam, Verzameling van onuitgegevene stukken, II, 333-337.
50. Cosquino de Bussy, Het ontstaan der Satisfactie, 173; Utrecht's deputies in the Estates-General to the Estates, Brussels, April (?) 1577: Bondam, Verzameling van onuitgegevene stukken, II, 236-241.
51. J.J. Woltjer, 'De Vrede-makers' in S. Groenveld and H.L.P. Leeuwenberg, eds., De Unie van Utrecht: wording en werking van een verbond en een verbondsacte (the Hague, 1979), 56-87, 79-80.
52. Instructions for Thin, Heermale, Hendrik de Voogt van Ryneveld and Peter Foeyt [2 August 1577]: Bondam, Verzameling van onuitgegevene stukken, III, 68-73; GAU Stad I, 13, 30 and 31 July 1577.
53. Cosquino de Bussy, Het ontstaan der Satisfactie, 193-194, 202; van de Water, I, 47-51; GAA Dagelijxboek, I, 5 September 1577.

CHAPTER II

1. RAU Staten 231:1, 17 February 1577.
2. Ibid.
3. Text of the Satisfaction in van de Water, I, 47-51, and Bor, XI, 300v-302.
4. For the 1579 ordinances, see Chapter V, pp. 124-125. GAU Stad II, 1, no. 22, 3 May 1579.
5. Brandt, I, 371.
6. RAU Staten 261, 25-26 February 1580. Cf. chapter VI, p. 182.
7. RAU Staten 231:2, 4 January 1584.
8. RAU Staten 231:3, 23 July 1584.
9. RAU Staten 264:2, 4 January 1584.
10. RAU Staten 231:3, 20 August 1584. For Villers's earlier career, see biographical appendix. Geyl ignores Villers completely, and states that Nieuwenaar became Stadholder in 1584 (The Revolt of the Netherlands, 1555-1609, [2nd. ed., London, 1970], 210).
11. GAU Stad II, 121, 8 April and 9 November 1585.
12. RAU Staten 231:3, 1-3 February 1585.
13. R. Fruin, 'Motley's Geschiedenis der Vereenigde Nederlanden' in his Verspreide Geschriften, III (the Hague, 1901), 118-224, 145.
14. RAU Staten 231:3, 8 and 10 September 1585, 8 October 1584, 29 January 1586.
15. Hendrick Lyster to Floris Thin, Utrecht, 31 August 1585: RAU Staten 1036:2. P.L. Muller (De Staat der Vereenigde Nederlanden, 350) and Fruin ('Motley's Geschiedenis', 146) state that Nieuwenaar enjoyed much wider powers than Villers with reference to the appointment of magistrates. But article 19 of their instruction (van de Water, I, 158-160) allows both to renew the magistracy as Orange had done: Villers is subject to a possible alternative arrangement, i.e. the hereditary council, Nieuwenaar is to submit to any changes made by the new English Governor-General, Leicester. Cf. Tegenwoordige Staat, XI, 227.
16. Lyster to Thin, 31 August 1585, as note 15.
17. See Chapter VII, pp. 206-207.
18. van de Water, I, 160-162, especially articles 1, 19 and 21.
19. Bor, XXVI, 56. GAU Stad II, 121, 30 September 1586. See also Chapter VII, p. 198.

20. Willoughby to Burghley, the Hague, 12 January 1588. CSP Foreign, XXI (4), 13.
21. For Nieuwenaar's coup, see Chapter VII. J. den Tex, 'De Staten in Oldenbarnevelts tijd' in Van Standen tot Staten, 51-81, 65.
22. Bor, XXVII, 14.
23. Bor, XXVII, 16-17. See for typical cases, Maurice to Estates of Utrecht, 16 April 1590 (Amersfoort): RAU Staten 293:1; same to same, 15 March 1591 (Rhenen) and 29 October 1591 (Wijk): RAU Staten 278:1.
24. P. Rosenfeld, 'The provincial governors from the minority of Charles V to the Revolt', in Standen en Landen, XVII (1959), 1-63, 45-46.
25. S. Muller, 'Het oprichten eener vroedschap te Utrecht' in BMHG, II (1879), 73-94, 81-82.
26. RAU Staten 231:4, 6 February 1589.
27. Margaret of Parma to Orange, Brussels, 30 January 1565: L.P. Gachard, ed., Correspondance de Guillaume le Taciturne, Prince d'Orange, 6 vols. (Brussels, 1847-1866), II, 81-82; RAU Staten 261, 7 July 1580. Orange worked hard to get Théron's services to the Revolt properly rewarded: cf. his letter to the magistrates of Ghent, 17 October 1580, P. Kervyn de Volkaersbeke and J. Diegerick eds., Documents historiques inédits, 2 vols. (Ghent, 1848-9), II, 165-166.
28. Reference to 'numerous applications [for prebends] which have been made at the instance of His Excellency [Orange]': RAU Staten 231:2, 13 December 1582. For Nieuwenaar, Staten 231:3, 19 April 1586. Maurice to Estates, 6 February and 5 April 1591, Staten 278:1.
29. J. Acquoy, 'De admissie in de ridderschap van Overijssel gedurende de Republiek' in BVGO, 4th series, VI (1907), 258-276, 259.
30. J.J. Dodt van Flensburg, 'Eenige minder bekende bijzonderheden aangaande Willem Veusels' in Utrecht, voorheen en thans 2nd series, III (1846), 201-209.
31. Resolution of that date, Dodt van Flensburg, II, 159.
32. See above, note 1.
33. S. Muller and Evers, De vergader-plaatsen der Staten van Utrecht, 4-7.
34. Estates of Utrecht to Margaret of Parma (undated minute), RAU Staten 1035:2, F4. The right to summon themselves was one of the Estates' principal demands in the negotiations with Requesens and the Council of State, 1574-76. See above, p. 9 and P.L. Muller, 'Stukken betreffende de onderhandelingen', passim.
35. I.H. van Eeghen, ed., Dagboek van Broeder Wouter Jacobsz, 2 vols. (Groningen, 1959-60), 653.

36. RAU AKD 1:21, 25 September 1581. St. Pieter also had an interregnum of 2 years between the expulsion of Veusels in April 1578 and the election of Johan Bogart as dean in July 1580. Dodt van Flensburg, 'Eenige minder bekende bijzonderheden', 204.
37. RAU Staten 231:3, 8 February 1587. Also see Chapter III, p. 74ff.
38. RAU Staten 231:3, 21 September 1586.
39. Eg. RAU AKD 3478, 6(?) May 1579.
40. Oudmunster contained several of the most conservative, or even pro-Spanish canons, eg. Philippus Morus, who left Utrecht in 1578 to join Sebastian of Portugal's crusade against the Moors: see P.M.M. Geurts, De Utrechtse Kanunnik Philippus Morus, Neolatijs dichter (Nieuwkoop, 1977), 40ff, 90.
41. Article 20 of the so-called 'Counter-Union' (Contra-Unie) in P.L. Muller, 'Stukken over den tegenstand der Utrechtsche Katholieken tegen de Unie van Utrecht' in BMHG, IX (1886), 393-472, 402-411.
42. Cuyntorff to the five chapters, Antwerp, 26 July 1578. RAU AKD 3475.
43. GAU Stad II, 121, 29 and 31 December 1578, 2 January 1579, etc. See also Oudmunster to Adelbert van den Nieuwburch, 1 January 1579, in P.L. Muller, 'Stukken over den tegenstand', 446-448.
44. S. Groenveld and H.L.P. Leeuwenberg, 'Die originale unie metten acten daernaer gevolcht' in De Unie van Utrecht, 5-55, 18-20.
45. P.L. Muller, 'Stukken over den tegenstand', 394-395. See also P.L. Muller, 'De partijstrijd te Utrecht over de Nadere Unie 1578-9' in BVGO, 3rd series, III (1886), 327-381.
46. RAU AKD 3478.
47. Groenveld and Leeuwenberg, 'De originale unie', 19.
48. RAU AKJ 1:4, 1 August 1577.
49. Important entries from the chapter's resolutions were transcribed in the 18th century by P. Bondam (RAU AKJ 6), and some have been printed in A. Hallema, 'De Utrechtsche Kapittels tijdens en na de hervorming. Bronnen voor de geschiedenis van het kapittel van St. Jan' in AAU, LVI (1932), 129-342.
50. RAU AKJ 1:4, 28 December 1578, 23 January 1579.
51. The Dom in January 1581, St. Jan in January 1583 (in French). GAU Stad II, 121, 14 January 1583.
52. 1400 guilders a year, divided as follows: Dom, 400; Oudmunster, 300; St. Pieter, 200; St. Jan, 150; Ste. Marie, 350. RAU AKD 1:21, 5 January 1582.
53. Provisions for the months where nominations had previously been made by the Pope in the agreement of 9 June 1579, van de Water, I,

215-216.

54. I. Vijlbrief, Van anti-aristocratie tot democratie (Amsterdam, 1950), 56.

55. RAU AKD 1:20, 11 March 1580; Staten 231:2, 28 February 1581.

56. RAU Staten 261, 10 March 1581. AKJ 1:4, 3 March 1581; AKD 1:21, 21 July 1581.

57. Vijlbrief, Van anti-aristocratie tot democratie, 55; Bor, XIV, 190-191.

58. RAU AKD 1:20, 5 May 1580.

59. Statement by city of Utrecht, RAU Staten 1035:2, H2, March 1582.

60. GAU Stad II, 121, 23 and 28 March 1582. Meeting of Ridderschap and small towns, 28-29 March 1582: RAU Staten 1035:2, H23.

61. The settlement is in van de Water, I, 184-185.

62. As note 61, articles 1 and 2.

63. RAU AKJ 1:4, 7 and 9 April 1582.

64. L. Miedema, 'Pogingen, van katholieke en protestantsche zijde aangewend tot oprichting van een seminarie te Utrecht' in AAU, XXVI (1900), 451-467, 451-452.

65. RAU Staten 231:3, 2 October 1584; AKJ 1:4, 3 October 1584. RSG, V, 739, 19 December 1587 (NS).

66. Oudmunster, for example, had to pay the Estates 600 guilders for the right to nominate to a vacant prebend. GAU Stad II, 121, 16 August 1580.

67. RAU Staten 231:2, 13 February and 3 April 1583.

68. GAU Stad II, 121, 17 April and 26 June 1582. Stad II, 1 no. 43, 14 July 1582.

69. See Chapter VII, pp. 200-204.

70. Request of burgerhoplieden to city council, 21 November 1586, GAU Stad II, 3.

71. Of the original seven, Johan Proeys, of St. Pieter, was dead; Heermale had been exiled; and Hendrick Buth, of Ste. Marie, was the First Estate's disputed delegate to the Estates-General. See further, Chapter VII, p. 201.

72. Eg. RAU Staten 231:3, 6 June 1587.

73. RAU Staten 231:4, 19 October 1588.

74. As note 33 above. Heermale acted as go-between in the long and unsuccessful negotiations with Franchois Vranck, whom the Estates

wished to appoint as advocate of Utrecht after Thin's death in 1590. See the Aerssens-Heermale correspondence in KHG, XVIII (1862), 315-335.

75. Tegenwoordige Staat, XI, 170.

76. For the involvement of the Count of Culemborg, however, see Chapter VI, pp. 167-170.

77. S.M. Wyntjes, The lesser nobility of Utrecht in the Revolt of the Netherlands (Tufts University Ph.D. thesis, 1972).

78. M.P. van der Linden, De burggraven van Montfoort in de geschiedenis van het Sticht Utrecht en het graafschap Holland (+1260-1490), (Assen, 1967), *passim*.

79. van Eeghen, Dagboek, 756 (note).

80. J.C.J. Kleijntjens and J.W.C. van Campen, eds., 'Bescheiden betreffende den beeldenstorm van 1566 in de stad Utrecht' in BMHG, LIII (1932), 63-245, 136-137.

81. Johan van Montfoort to Estates, Oudwijk, 20 October (?) 1578. Copy in RAU Staten 293:1.

82. van Eeghen, Dagboek, 754.

83. Brother Wouter noted on 7 September 1578, however, that 'even here [i.e. in Montfoort] expelled priests are not too welcome'. Ibid., 749.

84. From the analysis of Utrecht personalities by an English follower of Leicester, printed in H. Lindeman, 'Kerkegoederen te Utrecht gedurende de beroerten in de Nederlanden' in AAU LXI (1937), 621-639, 631.

85. RAU Staten 231:3, 29 October 1586; 231:4, 26 January 1588.

86. 'De Heeren van Montfoort en hun archief' in Verslagen omtrent's Rijks oude archieven (1893), 241-247, 243. According to another historian, the lordship was bought by the Estates in 1648: J.L. van der Gouw, 'Korte geschiedenis van de grenzen van de provincie Zuid-Holland' in Verslag over het jaar 1962, gedaan door Gedeputeerde Staten aan Provinciale Staten van Zuid Holland, 11-55, 34. I owe this reference to Mw. Dr. E.P. de Booy.

87. Tegenwoordige Staat, XI, 190-191. For Overijssel, see Acquoy, 'De admessie in de riddershap van Overijssel', *passim*. For Holland, H.F.K. van Nierop, 'Het Quaede Regiment. De Hollandse edelen als ambachtsheren, 1490-1650', TvG, XCIII (1980), 433-443, 434-435.

88. J. Kleijntjens, 'Aantekeningen over het geslacht de Wael van Vronesteyn' in De Navorscher, LXXI (1922), 193-208 and 265-285, 271.

89. RAU Staten 231:3, 2 October 1584.

90. van de Water, I, 283.

91. Utrecht to Heermale and Thin, 28 February and 1 March 1577: RAU Staten 1035:1, A3; article 19 of the Satisfaction (van de Water I, 50), and RAU Staten 231:2, 13 September 1581 and 27 July 1582.
92. RAU Staten 231:3, 30 December 1587.
93. Statement by the Ridderschap, 3 April 1582, RAU Staten 1035:2.
94. RAU Staten 231:3, 3 February 1585; statement by the Ridderschap, 24 September 1583, RAU Staten 379.
95. RAU Staten 231:2, 5 March 1583.
96. E.B.B.F. Wittert van Hoogland, Bijdragen tot de geschiedenis der Utrechtsche Ridderhofsteden en Heerlijkheden, 2 vols. (the Hague, 1909), II, 265-266.
97. It seems to have made little difference to him whether he was listed under the Second or the Third Estate, until he was expelled from the city in 1586, and joined his fellow nobles in exile. See Chapter VII, 195 and 209ff.
98. Eg. Vijlbrief, Van anti-aristocratie tot democratie, 53; Wyntjes, The lesser nobility of Utrecht, 162, note.
99. Compare the situation in Holland, where nobles almost never married outside their class: van Nierop, 'Het Quaede Regiment', 439.
100. RAU Staten 231:2, 21 June 1583.
101. Ibid., 13 June 1583; RAU Staten 379, 24 September 1583.
102. Bor XVIII, 17v-26v. This account demonstrates the connection between the dispute over the hiring of waardgelders and the tax riots of August 1583.
103. RSG, VI, 259, 5 March 1588 (NS), etc.
104. Cf. F.G. Oosterhoff, The Earl of Leicester's Governorship of the Netherlands, 1586-1587 (University of London Ph.D. thesis, 1967), 171, where van Abcoude van Meerthen is wrongly listed as 'van Meerle'.
105. RAU Staten 753, article 36; Bor, XXIII, 43; J. den Tex, 'De Staten in Oldenbarnevelts tijd', 64.
106. RAU Staten 1035:1, A43. These events are discussed in more detail in Chapter VII.
107. RAU Staten 231:2, 17 January 1583 and GAU Stad II, 121, 17 January 1583.
108. Brakel to Council of State (undated copy), RAU Staten 1035:2, H19, and Gilles van Ledenberg to Anthonis Kuyck, Utrecht, 2 December 1594, KHG, XX (1864), 518; RAU Staten 231:6, 3 February 1598.
109. D.A. Felix, Het oproer te Utrecht in 1610 (Utrecht, 1923), 10; W. Bezemer, ed., 'De magistraatsverandering te Utrecht in 1618' in

BMHG, XVII (1896), 71-106, 100.

110. Kleijntjens and van Campen, eds., 'Bescheiden betreffende den beeldenstorm', *passim*, and Wyntjes, The lesser nobility of Utrecht, which relies heavily on the documents they printed.

111. Kleijntjens, 'Aantekeningen over het geslacht de Wael van Vronesteyn', 271, and J.W.L. Raven, ed., 'Kronijk van Utrecht 1576-1591' in KHG, XXI (1865), 530-576, 543, 556, 562.

112. Text of the Stichtse Landbrief in Van Standen tot Staten, 11-14; van Kalveen, Het bestuur van bisschop en Staten, 26. There were two other towns, Vreeland and het Gein, with charters allowing the dispensation of justice within them, but these did not have the right of representation in the Estates. A.J. Maris, 'Coenraet van Diepholt, maarschalk van het Nederkwartier van Utrecht' in Verslagen en Mededelingen: Vereeniging tot Uitgaaf der Bronnen van het Oud-Vaderlandsche Recht, X (3), (1950), 370-424, 371, 373.

113. See Chapter I, note 2.

114. J. Putman and A.A.J. van Rossum, 'Invoering der zoogenaamde Hervorming en eenige stukken over de eerste predikanten te Montfoort' in AAU, IV (1877), 1-15, 1-2. Cf. p. 37 above.

115. W. van Iterson, De stad Rhenen, de resultaten van een rechtshistorisch onderzoek (Assen, 1960), 135, 157.

116. van Kalveen, Het bestuur van bisschop en Staten, 26 and 428.

117. Dodt van Flensburg, II, 1-24, 147-168.

118. See Chapter III, p. 56 above.

119. RAU Staten 231:3, 27 October 1587; Wijk to Floris Thin, 1 January 1580, RAU Staten 1036:2.

120. See Chapter III, pp. 72-73 above.

121. GAU Stad II, 121, 6 May 1580, 15 April 1588; GAA Dagelijxboek (4), 21 July 1587.

122. See notes 60 and 61 above.

123. GAA Dagelijxboek (4), 9 December 1586.

124. J.E.A.L. Struick, Utrecht door de eeuwen heen (Utrecht and Antwerp, 1968), 104.

125. GAA Dagelijxboek I, 5 September 1577. The conditions on which Amersfoort was prepared to negotiate with Orange are printed in J.B.J.N. de Ridder van der Scheuren, ed., Brieven en onuitgegeven stukken van Jonkheer Arend van Dorp, Heer van Maasdam enz., (Utrecht, 1887), I, 221-226. I owe this reference to Prof. K.W. Swart.

126. RAU Staten 231:2, 21 November 1582; GAU Stad II, 121, 20 November 1582.

127. GAA Dagelijksboek, III (2), 2 February 1579.
128. GAU Stad II, 121, 10 February 1579.
129. Groningen was also brought into the Union by a siege, but defected a year later, in March 1580. J.J. Woltjer, 'De wisselende gestalten van de Unie' in Groenveld and Leeuwenberg, eds., De Unie van Utrecht, 88-100, 99.
130. A. van Bommel, Beschrijving der stad Amersfoort, 2 vols. (Utrecht, 1760), II,
131. J. Hovy, 'De regeringsverandering te Amersfoort in 1703' in BGN, XV (1959-60), 177-216, 181-183.
132. Fruin and Colenbrander, Geschiedenis der staatsinstellingen in Nederland, 88.
133. GAU Stad I, 13, 30 October 1577; article 7 of the Satisfaction: van de Water I, 48.
134. Struick, Utrecht door de eeuwen heen, 175.
135. RAU Staten 231:6, 23 August 1598.
136. S. Muller, 'Het oprichten eener vroedschap', *passim*.
137. E.g. Oosterhoff, The Earl of Leicester's Governorship, 163-164; Francisco de Valdez to Requesens, Utrecht, 9 May 1574, in Gachard, ed., Correspondance de Philippe II, III, 69. Note that a militia of 1600 represented a higher proportion of the adult male population than was in the case in Holland: J.C. Grayson, 'The civic militia in the County of Holland, 1560-81: politics and public order in the Dutch Revolt' in BMGN, XCV (1980), 35-63, 39. For the changes in the Stadholdership see Chapter I, note 15.
138. 'Tribunes of the people' was a title assumed by the captains: see Bor XVIII, 18, and Burgerhoplieden to Leicester, 25 January 1587, GSP Foreign, 1586-87, 336.
139. E.g. RAU Staten 261, 27 February 1577.
140. Bor, XX, 76ff; Reynier Cant to Floris Thin, Amsterdam, 27 November 1585 (copy), RAU Staten 1036:2.
141. RAU Staten 231:2, 13-15 June 1583.
142. [H.M.A.J. Asch van Wijck], 'De Graaf van Leicester in Utrecht' in Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis, Oudheden en Statistiek van Utrecht, II (1836), 1-40, 14.
143. GAU Stad II, 121, 20-21 August, 2 September 1583.
144. Oosterhoff, The Earl of Leicester's Governorship, 168-9: note that this was during the Leicester era, and may have been exceptional.
145. GAU Stad II, 1, no. 36c, 29 July 1581. Printed in Bor, XVI,

38-39v.

146. GAU Stad II, 121, 30 October 1581.

147. Ibid., 9 and 22 October 1585.

148. Gosen van der Voort to Floris Thin, Utrecht, 6 October 1585: RAU Staten 1036:2.

149. GAU Stad II, 121, 26 September and 13 December 1588.

150. Ibid., 3-4 April 1598.

151. Johan de Witt to van Beverningk, 6 February 1654. Quoted in Fruin and Colenbrander, Geschiedenis der staatsinstellingen in Nederland, 246.

CHAPTER III

1. J.W. Smit, 'The Netherlands Revolution', in R. Forster and J. Greene, eds., Preconditions of revolution in early modern Europe (Baltimore and London, 1972), 19-54, 34.
2. RAU Staten 231:3, 8 February 1587. During the interregnum which followed the flight of dean Johan van Bruhesen in March 1577, meetings of the Estates took place 'by the convocation of the Vice-Domdeken': RAU Staten 231:1, 11 January 1578.
3. RAU Staten 419, 3 October 1580; 231:2, 27 February 1583.
4. RAU Staten 231:1, 2 November 1577 and 22 February 1578.
5. RAU Staten 261, 20 October 1581, and 231:2, 26 September and 14 October 1581; RAU Staten 264:1, 14 October 1583.
6. RAU Staten 231:1, 10 February 1581; 231:4, 18 June 1590.
7. RAU Staten 419, 3 October 1580; 231:3, 22-23 June 1584.
8. RAU AKD 1:20, 16 September 1579.
9. E.g. RAU Staten 231:1, 24 October 1580.
10. RAU Staten 231:4, 10 August 1588. See Chapter VII, pp. 215-217.
11. RAU Staten 231:1, 15 March and 3 May 1577; 20 December 1578 and 20 January 1579; 1 September 1580; 231:3, 6 September 1585.
12. RAU Staten 231:1, 6 and 17 March 1578.
13. RAU Staten 231:3, 23 July 1584.
14. Cf. Chapter I, p. 19. Estates of Utrecht to Estates-General, 10 October 1577, RAU Staten 1035:1, A22. It took six months before the Estates' secretary realised that there had been a change of venue: as late as April 1578, he still had to delete 'in the chancellery of the Hof' and substitute 'in the great chapter-house of the Dom' at the head of his record of several sessions: RAU Staten 231:1, 7 December 1577, 22 February and 12 April 1578.
15. RAU Staten 231:2, 4 April 1581; S. Muller and Evers, De vergaderplaatsen van de Staten, 7.
16. Stephen le Sieur to Willoughby, Utrecht, 24 March 1588, HMC Ancaster 104.
17. RAU Staten 231:1, 24 October 1580 and e.g. 27 February 1578.
18. RAU Staten 231:1, 10 December 1577.
19. RAU AKD 3474, 6 June 1580 (the different stages in the document's progress can be distinguished by the different inks and the handwriting used).

20. RAU Staten 261, 6 and 7 June 1580.
21. RAU AKD 3503.
22. RAU Staten 231:2, 4 and 8 October 1583.
23. RAU Staten 231:2, 29 October and 19 November 1583. See Chapter VI, p.
24. On ruggespraak in general, see Koenigsberger, "The powers of deputies", *passim*, especially pp. 190-210. See also Chapter VI, p. 175.
25. RAU Staten 231:1, 30 April 1580; 231:2, 27 February 1583. On the binding mandates issued to the delegates of the towns to the Estates of Brabant (the representatives of the prelates and nobles enjoyed full powers), see L. Wils, "De werking van de Staten van Brabant" in Standen en Landen V (1953), 3-19, 4, 12-13.
26. RAU Staten 261, 25 February 1580; 231:4, 26 January 1588.
27. RAU Staten 231:2, 9 September 1584; GAA Dagelixerboek no. 3, 10 September 1584.
28. GAA Dagelixerboek III (2), 14 November 1581; Wijk to Estates of Utrecht, 24 November 1581, and Amersfoort to Estates of Utrecht, 27 November 1581, RAU Staten 279:1.
29. RAU Staten 231:2, 19 April 1581.
30. E.g. the decision to enforce the placard against Catholic worship, RAU Staten 231:2, 4 April 1581; the decision against the inclusion of an extra member of the consistory in the chamber of direction of ecclesiastical property (October 1586): Hora Siccama, 336.
31. RAU AKD 1:19, 27 June 1570; Chapter I, p. 16.
32. GAU Stad I, 13, 16 November 1576. Cf. Chapter IV, note 16.
33. RAU Staten 231:1, 10 December 1577.
34. RAU Staten 231:2, 25(?) July 1583; 231:3, 9 July 1584.
35. RAU AKD 1:20, 11 September 1580.
36. RAU Staten 231:2, 27 June 1582; 231:4, 6 August 1588. Cf. the taunt of the two secular Scottish Estates to the clergy:
"We set nocht by quhider ye consent or nocht
Ye are bot ane estait and we ar twa
Et ubi maior pars ibi tota"
from "The Thrie Estaitis" by Sir David Lindsay, quoted in G. Donaldson, The Scottish Reformation (Cambridge, 1960), 133.
37. Moorrees and Vermeulen I, 763, 12 May 1645. As early as 1585 in the Estates of Holland a two-thirds majority of the towns was not

sufficient to decide on financial, religious and constitutional matters, questions of war and peace, and similar important matters concerning the state of the country'; Koenigsberger, 'The powers of deputies', 203.

38. P.L. Muller, 'De oprichting van het college van Gedeputeerde Staten van Utrecht' in BMHG, X (1887), 337-375, 343.

39. RAU Staten 261, 6 and 11 June 1580; cf. Hora Siccama, 279.

40. RAU Staten 231:2, 28 February and 6 April 1581.

41. RAU Staten 231:2, 7 March 1582; Hora Siccama, 297-305.

42. Count Culemborg to ecclesiastical property commissioners, 24 August 1581, RAU Staten 288.

43. RAU Staten 261, 5 October 1581; 231:2, 11 January 1582; 231:3, 24 February 1586.

44. Hora Siccama 343-346.

45. RAU Staten 231:1, 9 September 1578; 261, 9 September to 3 October 1578 *passim*.

46. E.g. van de Water, II, 547-548, 18 December 1579.

47. van de Water, II, 988 (xlv), 3 April 1583.

48. RAU Staten 264:4, 18-19 May 1586; Chapter VII, pp. 192-193.

49. van de Water, I, 154-156.

50. RAU Staten 231:1, 31 July 1578.

51. RAU Staten 231:1, 2 May 1579; 231:2, 25 July and 21 November 1583; 261, 19 July and 19 August 1580.

52. RAU Staten 261, 6 August 1580.

53. RAU Staten 231:1, 6 June 1580; 261, 28 July and 22 October 1580; 264:2, 4 April 1584; 231:4, 26 June 1588.

54. RAU Staten 231:2, 21 November 1583; 231:4, 23 March 1588.

55. RAU Staten 231:2, 26-27 April 1582; 231:3, 6 October 1584.

56. See Chapter VII, pp. 209-210.

57. GAU Stad II, 121, 6 June 1587; RAU Staten 422; 231:4, 6-8 August 1588; the Estates issued a placard against the absenteeism of officers, 30 December 1587 (just after the gentry had gone into exile): van de Water, II, 1064.

58. RAU Staten 261, 7 and 11 November, 8 December 1581; RAU Staten 231:2, 13 June 1581.

59. RAU Staten 231:4, 20 September 1588; Rhenen to Standing Committee,

16 and 21 January 1591, RAU Staten 280:1

60. A similar increase took place after 1572 in the number of meetings of the Estates of Holland: den Tex, Oldenbarnevelt, I, 13.

61. Dodt van Flensburg II, 21, 5 and 11 February 1570.

62. RAU Staten 261, 1 November 1576; P.L. Muller, 'De oprichting van het college', 342; GAU Stad I, 13, 19 February 1577.

63. An unsuccessful attempt to set up a similar body in Gelderland was made in 1585, with the aim of providing for continuity of government. Colleges of Gedeputeerde Staten were set up in the individual quarters, however, before the end of the century: H.L. Driessen, 'De oprichting van een college van Gedeputeerde Staten in Gelderland in 1585' in Bijdragen en Mededelingen Gelre, XXXVI (1933), 119-125. I owe this reference to Mr. J.S. Coonan. In Brabant, however, a Standing Committee developed gradually after the mid-sixteenth century, for the convenience of the prelates and nobles who were able to delegate attendance at less important meetings of the Estates to the most active of their number: Wils, 'De werking van de Staten van Brabant', 10-11.

64. RAU Staten 261, 2 April 1577; P.L. Muller 'De oprichting van het college', 346; Dodt van Flensburg, II, 164 ff., September 1575.

65. P.L. Muller, 'De oprichting van het college', 345; RAU Staten 261, 16 September 1577.

66. RAU Staten 231:1, 12 April 1578.

67. RSG, I, 572-573, 1 December 1577; GAA Dagelixerboek, III (2), 28 December 1578 and 14 January 1579.

68. RAU Staten 261, 8 January 1580; 13 January 1582.

69. GAA Dagelixerboek, III (2), 16 February and 1 August 1582.

70. RAU Staten 231:2, 13 December 1582.

71. RAU AKD 1:20, 11 March 1580; RAU Staten 231:1, 24 October and 27 December 1580.

72. RAU AKD 1:21, 26 July and 31 October 1581. See Chapter II, p. 32

73. RAU Staten 231:2, 26 April 1582, 30 April 1584.

74. RAU Staten 231:2, 13 February 1583; 231:4, 28 June 1588. See Chapter VII, p. 211.

75. E.g. RAU Staten 231:3, 21 March 1587.

76. E.g. RAU Staten 264:1, 2 and 9 January 1583; van de Water, I, 322 (xviii and xix).

77. van de Water, I, 321 (i).

78. van de Water, I, 321-324. P.L. Muller, 'De oprichting van het

college, 92-93.

79. van de Water, I, 321 (iii and v); GAU Stad II, 121, 13 February 1581.

80. RAU Staten 261, 23 July 1580; RAU Staten 231:4, 5 March 1590.

81. van de Water, I, 321 (ix and x); RAU Staten 264:2, 24 June 1584. For further details of financial administration, see Chapter IV.

82. RAU Staten 264:2, 11 March 1584; 264:1, 4 August and 1 November 1583; 231:3, 20 August 1584.

83. van de Water, I, 321 (vii); RAU Staten 264:1, 28 June 1583; 231:2, 19 February and 4 March 1584.

84. van de Water, I, 321 (iii); RAU Staten 231:4, 6 August 1588.

85. GAA Dagelijxboek, III (2), 4 October 1579, 5 December 1580.

86. Bor, XXVII, 27. See Appendix II, p. 258.

87. NNBW, I, 1495; Dodt van Flensburg, II, 1, 11 December 1568; 154, 8 November 1574; 156 and 161, 12 January and 30 July 1575.

88. RAU Staten 231:1, 24 September 1577 and 1 February 1578; AKD 1:20, 1 February 1578; AKJ 1:4, 17 August 1577.

89. GAU Stad I, 13, 12 August 1577. Note that the salary paid to Paulus Buys and Johan van Oldenbarnevelt, successive advocates of Holland in the 1570s, was 1200 guilders per annum: den Tex, Oldenbarnevelt, I, 50.

90. RAU Staten 231:2, 11 January and 15 October 1582, 28 February 1584; RAU Staten 264:1, 19 August 1583.

91. Instruction for Hendrick Lyster, [?March 1584], RAU Staten 419.

92. RAU Staten 261, 27 June 1579; 231:2, 19 June 1583; GAU Stad II, 121, 7 September 1579.

93. den Tex, Oldenbarnevelt, I, 49.

94. Woltjer, "De wisselende gestalten van de Unie", 91-92.

95. Negotiations with Thin, 18 March(?) 1585, RAU Staten 1034.

96. RAU Staten 231:3, 8 September 1585.

97. RAU Staten 231:3, 24 June 1586; cf. Chapter VI, p. 174.

98. RAU Staten 231:3, 7 September 1586, 8 February, 20 April and 30 December 1587; RAU Staten 231:4, 9 February and 2 March 1588; GAU Stad II, 121, 23 January 1588; cf. Chapter VII, p. 204.

99. RAU Staten 231:4, 24 October 1588; NNBW, I, 1495.

100. See Chapter II, p. 28 above. Strick succeeded Willem van

Lamsweerde in 1582: RAU Staten 231:2, 12 January 1582.

101. Instruction for Lamsweerde, 3 October 1580, RAU Staten 419.

102. Undated memorandum, RAU Staten 419.

103. Correspondence between Floris Heermale and Cornelis Aerssens, November-December 1590, in KHG, XVIII (1862), 315-335; Tegenwoordige Staat, XI, 218.

104. den Tex, 'De Staten in Oldenbarnevelts tijd', 66ff.

105. RAU Staten 231:2, 10 August and 15 November 1581.

106. RAU Staten 231:2, 8 and 14 March 1582; GAU Stad II, 121, 23 April 1582.

107. RAU AKJ 1:4, 12 March 1582; GAA Dagelijxboek, III (2), 27 March 1582.

108. RAU Staten 231:2, 21 June 1582. See Chapter VI, p. 175.

109. RAU Staten 231:2, 7-14 November, *passim*.

CHAPTER IV

1. G. Griffiths, 'The Low Countries', The Americas, XII (1956), 234-245, 235.
2. RAU Staten 231:1, 17 February 1577. Bor, X, 229-231. Cf. Chapter I, pp. 13 and 17 above.
3. Petition of the Estates of Utrecht to the king, 21 May 1576, in P.L. Muller, 'Stukken betreffende de onderhandelingen', 127. Similar petitions from Soest, in the east of the province, and Vreland and Wilnis, near the Holland border, for compensation for losses inflicted by both armies, in K. Heeringa, 'Utrechts oorlogslasten (1572-1577)', BMHG, XLIV (1923), 125-186, 172-180. For the similar depopulation and devastation suffered in Holland in the 1570s, see A.T. van Deursen, 'Holland's experience of war during the Revolt of the Netherlands' in A.C. Duke and C.A. Tamse, eds., Britain and the Netherlands, VI (the Hague, 1977), 19-53, 23-24, 26.
4. Hierges to Council of State, Utrecht, 2 July 1576 in van Vloten, ed., 'Onuitgegeven brieven van Gillis van Berlaimont', 294-295.
5. M. Baelde, 'Financiële politiek en domaniale evolutie in de Nederlanden onder Karel V en Filips II (1530-1560)', TvG, LXXVI (1963), 14 33, 20, 28; M. Baelde, De domeingoederen van de vorst in de Nederlanden omstreeks het midden van de zestiende eeuw (1551-1559), (Brussels, 1971), 47ff; RAU Staten 231:1, 22 June 1579; 261, 5 January 1580.
6. E.g. at Christmas 1549 and 1550, RAU RA 401, 10 December 1548. For Utrecht's fiscal position with regard to the other provinces, see Chapter I, p. 4.
7. Griffiths, 'The Low Countries', 241. In Holland the land tax was known as the verponding, in Friesland as the florentaux: J. de Vries, The Dutch rural economy in the Golden Age, 190.
8. For the bishop's debts, see van Kalveen, Het bestuur van bisschop en staten, passim; ordinances for the introduction of the oudschildgeld, 2 and 20 August 1539, RAU RA 401.
9. Petition to the king, 21 May 1576, in P.L. Muller, 'Stukken betreffende de onderhandelingen', 126.
10. RAU AKP 1231:8 (accounts of oudschildgeld for 1579-80).
11. RAU RA 401, 13 March 1541, etc.; RAU Staten 231:1, 16 January and 20 October 1578. Later attempts to bring the register up to date also failed: RAU Staten 231:3, 29 December 1587; 231:4, 19 May 1590.
12. Clergy and Ridderschap to Council of State, autumn 1576, RAU Staten 1035:1, B9. This estimate is confirmed by the oudschildgeld accounts for 1574-75, which show that 8,545 guilders, or over one-third of the expected income, had not been received by May 1578: RAU AKP 1231:7.
13. Bor, X, 215v. (In spite of the Archbishop's death in 1580, the

Estates felt responsible for his money, and finally discharged the debt, to his creditors, in 1619.); Hierges to the Estates, Arnhem, 20 November 1576, RAU Staten 278 1.

14. RAU Staten 231:1, 22 February 1578. The Estates did not debate the matter until 17 March.

15. RAU AKD 3475, 1 March 1578.

16. Dodt van Flensburg, I, 257-262; S. Muller, 'Inventaris van het goud-en zilverwerk der Utrechtsche geestelijke gestichten in 1578', AAU, VII (1879), 284-350.

17. RAU Staten 231:1, 12 March 1577.

18. GAU Stad I, 13, 17 January, 15 and 23 February and 17 May 1577.

19. RAU Staten 231:1, 12 March, 20 April, 17 and 23 May, 15 June 1577; GAU Stad I, 13, 30 March and 20 April 1577.

20. RAU Staten 261, 13 August, 27 September, 23 October 1578; 18 April 1579. For the loans from Holland, see Chapter VI, p. 173.

21. Many of the patrimonial provinces, Flanders, Brabant and Holland among them, had already changed earlier in the century to a system of indirect taxation on commodities: Smit, 'The Netherlands Revolution', 34; J. Dhondt, Estates or powers: essays in the parliamentary history of the southern Netherlands from the 12th to the 18th century (Courtrai, 1977), 43-44; M.-A. Arnould, Les dénombremens de foyers dans le comté de Hainaut (Brussels, 1956), 13-14.

22. GAU Stad I, 13, 16 November 1576; Clergy and Ridderschap to Council of State, autumn 1576, RAU Staten 1035:1, B9. The question of the aid was complicated by Utrecht's claims, made retrospectively in 1576, to have advanced large sums to the king's troops from 1572 onwards, sums which should now be deducted from the amount agreed on for the aid: over 106,000 guilders from the clergy, the Estates and the towns, as well as some 14 000 from the Overkwartier: Heeringa, 'Utrechts oorlogslasten', 125-186, note the error of 29 guilders too little in the final total, p. 143.

23. van de Water, II, 629-630.

24. RAU Staten 231:1, 8 July 1577; 231:4, 1 March 1589; 261, 17 February 1578. Some of the revenue from the imposts did go to pay off the aid; e.g. GAU Stad II, 3599, f63.

25. GAU Stad II, 121, 19 January 1580, 7 April 1584; GAU Stad II 3599, under 'income'. It must be remembered that the sums at stake in the small towns were not very large: in Wijk, the impost on wine was estimated to yield 18 guilders for 6 months in 1580, compared with 6,031 guilders for a year's wine imposts in the city: GAU Stad II, 3599; RAU Staten 261, 6 February 1580.

26. RAU Staten 231:2, 3 April and 2 May 1583; 231:4, 8 and 23 November 1590; 231:2, 30 January 1584; GAU Stad II, 121, 8 March 1589.

27. Fruin and Colenbrander, Geschiedenis der staatsinstellingen in

Nederland, 50; Dhondt, Estates or powers, 270.

28. R. Fruin, 'Belasting bij quoten en bij gemene middelen in 1577' in his Verspreide Geschriften, IX, 29-36, 30-33. I owe this reference to Dr. C. Hibben. See also Council of State to Estates of Utrecht, Brussels, 18 December 1576, RAU Staten 285:1.

29. Thin and Heermale to Estates, Brussels, 26 March 1577, Dodt van Flensburg, I, 196.

30. RSG, II, 367-370, 30 August 1578; GAU Stad II, 121, 28 April 1578.

31. Estates to their deputies in Brussels, 26 April 1577, RAU Staten 1035:1, A16.

32. GAU Stad II, 121, 22 September 1578. For the initial problems of administration, see van de Water, II, 633.

33. Kossmann and Mellink, Texts, 167.

34. RAU Staten 231:3, 6 May 1586, 14 and 22 September 1587. The first two Estates agreed in principle to increase the rate, but the city and towns prevented this from being implemented. Ibid., 29 December 1587; RAU Staten 231:4, 26 January 1588.

35. RAU Staten 231:1, 17 March 1578; 16 March and 28 December 1579; RAU Staten 261, 18 November 1579; 231:2, 9 September 1581.

36. RAU Staten 231:3, 20 August 1584. Sometimes Utrecht was assessed for as much as 15,327 or 14,500 guilders (ibid., 9 February 1585, Staten 231:4, 30 May 1589). On the introduction of the fixed ratio, see A.T. van Deursen, 'Tussen eenheid en zelfstandigheid' in Groenveld and Leeuwenberg, eds., De Unie van Utrecht, 136-154, 146-147.

37. RAU AKD 3488·2 (accounts of 1579-80) and GAU Stad II, 3602 (accounts of 1585-86); RAU Staten 231:1, 20 July 1579.

38. RAU Staten 231:1, 24 October 1580, 231:2, 2 March 1581; 261, 18 November and 9 December 1579.

39. Landraad to Estates, 2 August and 30 September 1581, RAU Staten 285:1.

40. The 'double oudschildgeld', which was usually administered with the consumption tax, was carefully distinguished from the old 'single oudschildgeld' although the two were sometimes collected by the same man: van de Water, II, 547-549, 18 December 1579, 7 January and 26 November 1580.

41. RAU Staten 231:3, 15 October 1585.

42. RAU Staten 231:3, 6 September 1585. The shortfall was reckoned to be about 5,000 guilders every month: ibid., 19 April 1585. In the spring of 1586, even Holland's magistrates had to pledge their personal credit for a loan to the provinces: A.M. van der Woude, 'De Staten, Leicester en Elizabeth in financiële verwickelingen', TvG, LXXIV (1961), 64-82, 69.

43. RAU Staten 231:4, 26 January 1588.
44. RAU Staten 231:3, 4 and 5 January, 19 May 1587.
45. RAU Staten 231:4, 9, 10 and 14 March 1589.
46. RAU Staten 231:4, 20 March 1589; RAU Staten 231:1, 29 June 1579; GAU Stad II, 121, 5, 6 and 8 May 1579. The Maastricht loan was repaid unusually quickly: GAU Stad II, 3599 (1580-81).
47. RAU Staten 231:3, 31 May and 26 June 1585.
48. Ibid., 1 March 1586.
49. RAU Staten 231:3, 21 February 1587; 261, 9 March 1581. For the repayment of such loans out of the generale middelen, see accounts in RAU AKD 3488:2, (1579-80).
50. RAU Staten 231:1, 11 April 1579; GAA Dagelijxboek, III (2), 8 April 1582. The city council's credit was considered to be more reliable than that of the Geeligeerden or the Ridderschap: RAU Staten 231:3, 15 October 1585.
51. G. Parker, 'The emergence of modern finance in Europe', in C. Cipolla, ed., Fontana Economic History of Europe, II (Glasgow, 1974), 526-594, 567.
52. For the system as it worked in Holland, see D. Houtzager, Hollands lijf-en losrenteleningen voor 1672 (Schiedam, 1950), 5-10. See also J.G. van Dillen, Van rijkdom en regenten (the Hague, 1970), 282-283.
53. RAU Staten 231:4, 13 and 22 December 1589; GAU Stad II, 121, 17 December 1589.
54. RAU Staten 231:4, 6 and 17 February 1589; 231:3, 5 June 1585; RAU RA 401, 24 July 1545 and 21 February 1551.
55. van der Woude, 'De Staten, Leicester en Elizabeth', 69; Houtzager, Hollands lijf-en losrenteleningen, 45. Payment of arrears of interest had been suspended in Utrecht for a total of seven years by Imperial decree: RAU RA 401, 20 August 1539 and 4 October 1541. By 1598, however, it was necessary for the Estates to suspend interest payments for at least a year: RAU Staten 231:6, 4 January 1598.
56. GAU Stad II, 3599 (1583-84).
57. Kossmann and Mellink, Texts, 171, article XVIII.
58. RAU Staten 231:2, 15 May 1583 ff. The 'crooked Rhine' which ran through Utrecht was unsuitable for large ships because of bridges and sluices.
59. Estates to Archduke Mathias (minute) 16 June 1578, RAU Staten 334; RAU Staten 231:1, 21 September 1578; 231:2, 12 September 1581; GAU Stad II, 3599, f. 64.
60. RAU Staten 231:2, 31 May and 13 June 1581; definition of tienden

in Wyntjes, The lesser nobility of Utrecht, 114, note; cf. GAU Stad II, 3574.

61. GAA Dagelijxboek, III (2), 3 November 1580. RAU AKD 1:20, 16 July 1578; AKD 3475, 17 March 1581; RAU Staten 231:3, 21 February 1587.

62. GAU Stad II, 121, 7 December 1579 and 5 May 1580; RAU Staten 231:2, 28 June 1581 and 2 May 1583; GAA Dagelijxboek, no. 3, 23 August 1584.

63. RAU Staten 306:1, 6(?) February 1588; Staten 231:2, 9 November 1582, 15 March 1583; Staten 231:4, 27 February 1589; GAA Dagelijxboek, no. 4, 9 March 1589.

64. GAU Stad II, 3602 (1585-86).

65. RAU Staten 231:4, 9 March 1589 and 26 November 1590.

66. RAU Staten 231:3, 5 December 1587.

67. GAU Stad II, 121, 30 January 1581 and 30 January 1582. After Frans Both's death in 1586, his sons Cornelis and Volcken administered the generale middelen and Cornelis presented his father's accounts in 1591: RAU Staten 231:3, 28 October and 15 November 1586; GAU Stad II, 3602 (1585-86).

68. For the morgengeld (a morgen was a unit of land area, which varied in size from province to province) see J.G. Avis, De directe belastingen in het Sticht Utrecht aan deze zijde van de Ijssel tot 1528 (Utrecht, 1930), 122-123.

69. An early example is the auction of the imposts for the season 22 July to 13 October 1577 in RAU AKD 3478.

70. Although the Standing Committee wanted 1,700 guilders for one month's generale middelen on beer in the city, Loef Thonisz van Everdingen refused to offer more than 1,550. RAU Staten 264:4, 15 and 16 July 1586.

71. RAU Staten 261, 4, 9 and 25 November 1580; Staten 264:1, 21 February, 11 April and 16 July 1583.

72. E.g. RAU Staten 231:1, 3 January 1581.

73. RAU Staten 261, 16 March 1579.

74. RAU Staten 801; GAU Stad II, 3557; RAU Staten 231:4, 20-22 February and 11 December 1589.

75. Tegenwoordige Staat, XI, 245; RAU RA 401, 11 September 1559 and 25 June 1576; RAU Staten 231:1, 12(?) August 1577.

76. RAU Staten 231:1, 28 June 1580; GAU Stad II, 121, 28 January 1581; RAU Staten 231:2, 13 May 1584. (Deputies from outside the city received higher expenses than those who lived in it.)

77. RAU Staten 231:2, 13 May 1584; 231:3, 18 June 1584, 23 June 1586. See also Staten 264:2, 12 June 1584.

78. Tegenwoordige Staat, XI, 245.
79. RAU Staten 231:3, 20 April 1587.
80. RAU Staten 231:3, 27 May 1586. There were many precedents for granting tax remission on such grounds, e.g. during the wars with Gelderland: Avis, De directe belastingen, 130.
81. In 1584, on the other hand, the Estates-General proposed to lay waste almost the entire province of Overijssel: J.H.C. de Pater, 'Leicester en Overijssel', TvG, LXIV (1951), 245-276, 267ff; RAU Staten 231:3, 1 July and 17 November 1585.
82. E.g. RAU Staten 231:2, 10 August 1581; 231:3, 17 March 1584.
83. A claim of this size for two years does not seem quite so exaggerated when compared with the tax remission of 8,000 guilders awarded to Alkmaar after two months of visits from Beggar troops, in December 1572 and January 1573: van Deursen, 'Holland's experience of war', 26. It must also be remembered that Amerongen was a relatively large and wealthy village, with valuable peat resources; the total assessed land value used for calculating the oudschildgeld was about 35,325 guilders at 1539 prices (GAU Stad II, 3603). Though most of the specific claims were in round figures, they were itemised in detail: RAU Staten 589.
84. RAU Staten 231:3, 7 June 1587.
85. RAU Staten 231:3, 14 September 1587; 231:4, 2 June 1590. GAU Stad II, 3603 (1589-90).
86. RAU Staten 264:2, 22 January 1584.
87. G. Parker, The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road (Cambridge, 1972), 142-143.
88. Jodocus(?) Grammaye, on behalf of Thomas Grammaye to Werkhoven, Odijk and Sterkenburg, Deventer, 18 November 1588 (copy). KHG, XVI (1860), 184-185; cf. the copy of a similar threatening letter, dated Zutphen, 12 February 1584, RAU AKD 3503.
89. RAU Staten 231:3, 20 April 1585; van de Water, I, 496.
90. RAU Staten 231:3, 25 September 1587; Staten 231:4, 21 and 25 January, 18 June 1590. The particular member was Frederick van Zuylen van Nyevelt, lord of Hindersteyn.
91. RAU Staten 231:3, 6 August 1585 and 22 September 1587.
92. RAU Staten 231:3, 6 August 1585 and 5 January 1587. A detailed account of the scheme at GAA Dagelixboek, no. 4, 2 January 1588.
93. RAU Staten 231:2, 29 April 1584.
94. This point was made by Montfoort in an attempt to have its share of the 1,000 guilders per month reduced: Montfoort to Standing Committee, 17 April 1581, RAU Staten 279:1.

95. van Iterson, De stad Rhenen, 249; RAU Staten 231:3, 4 June 1585; 264:1, 29 May 1583.

96. Tegenwoordige Staat, XII, 41-42; GAA Dagelijxboek, III (2), 23 August 1578; Dagelijxboek, no. 3, 2 March 1584; no. 4, 3 March 1587, etc. Cf. GAU Stad II, 121, 28 April 1578.

97. GAU Stad II, 121, 5 and 11-13 May 1580, 3 June 1581.

98. E.g. RAU Staten 264:2, 15 February 1584.

99. RAU Staten 261, 2, 20 and 26 May 1581.

100. GAU Stad II, 121, 20-23 August 1583. (The most objectionable tax seems to have been that on milling.) RAU Staten 231:2, 4 January 1584.

101. RAU Staten 231:2, 18 June 1584; Staten 261, 2 and 11 June 1580.

102. RAU Staten 261, 20 October and 23 November 1580; 20 and 25 November 1581; RAU Staten 231:3, 1 August 1586.

103. E.g. the six cows removed from 's Gravesloot by night to enforce the surcharge on the oudschildgeld: RAU Staten 261, 12 August 1581.

104. RAU Staten 261, 15 December 1578, 17 November 1579, 10 August 1581.

105. Dom to Estates (minute), 17 March 1581, RAU AKD 3475.

106. RAU Staten 231:2, 12 October 1582; GAA Dagelijxboek, III (2), 7, 10 and 11 October 1582.

107. RAU Staten 231:2, 2 May 1583; 231:4, 4 and 12 February 1589; Ryswyck to Floris Thin, Hasenberg (the city prison), 3 August 1590, RAU Staten 1036:2.

108. GAU Stad II, 121, 31 July 1579; RAU Staten 231:1, 21 October 1579. In the accounts, items of expenditure are always listed by the date of the authorisation and the names of the three deputies responsible.

109. RAU Staten 306:1, 25 December 1586.

110. A series of these receipts for 1587 is at RAU Staten 321:2.

111. A. T. van Deursen, 'Staat van oorlog en generale petitie in de jonge Republiek', BMGN, LXXXVI (1976), 44-55, 49; 'Staat van de kriegsbelasting der Provincie Utrecht over het jaar 1592', KHG, XIX (1863), 547-548. In Holland, the payment of local troops was done regularly on a local basis: Hibben, Particularism and Revolt, 240-241.

112. E.g. RAU Staten 231:2 25 March 1584; Staten 264:2, 15 February, 12-14 April 1584.

113. GAU Stad II, 3602 (1585-86).

114. RAU Staten 231:2, 2 March 1581; for a similar allocation of funds, see RAU Staten 261, 30 May 1580.
115. RAU Staten 231:2, 3 April 1583; W.F.N. van Rootselaar, ed., 'Rekening van het oudschildgeld 1585-86', BMHG, IV (1881), 23-97, 71ff.
116. RAU Staten 231:3, 14 September 1587.
117. GAU Stad II, 3599 (1580-81); RAU Staten 261, 6 and 16 November 1580. In 1583-84, for example, Frans Both, as receiver of the imposts, paid out 2,502 guilders to those who were owed money by the domains, and at the same time repaid 1,433 guilders which had been advanced in 1576 by the city to a group of creditors: GAU Stad II, 3599 (1583-84), fos. 64-65.
118. See p. 103, n. 72 above. The Estates-General's treasurer, Joris de Bye, was threatened with the seizure of his possessions by the Estates-General's creditors: A M. van der Woude, 'De crisis in de Opstand na de val van Antwerpen', BGN, XIV (1959-60), 38-57 and 81-104, 102.
119. The fullest available accounts for the generale middelen are at GAU Stad II, 3601 and 3602.
120. RAU Staten 801; GAU Stad II, 3557.
121. GAU Stad II, 3603 (1585-86), fo. 71ff.
122. Suitable deductions have been made for the unpaid arrears. The figure for the tithes is the mean for the years 1585 and 1586. GAU Stad II, 3602 (1585-86); van Rootselaar, 'Rekening van het oudschildgeld'; GAU Stad II 3603 (1585-86); Stad II 3574 (1585 and 1586).
123. RSG, V, 51, 12 May 1585 (NS).
124. G. Parker, 'War and economic change: the economic costs of the Dutch Revolt' in J.M. Winter, ed., War and economic development (Cambridge, 1975), 49-71, 58-59.
125. E.g. RAU Staten 231:2, 6 and 15 February 1581.
126. RAU Staten 231:3, 3 August 1586; H. Wansink, 'Holland and six allies: the Republic of the seven United Provinces' in J.S. Bromley and E.H. Kossmann, eds., Britain and the Netherlands, IV (the Hague, 1971), 132-155, 147-148; Bor, XX, 51v-52.
127. GAU Stad II, 121, 13 May 1578; RAU Staten 264:1, 6 November 1583.
128. van der Woude, 'De crisis in de Opstand', 101.
129. van der Woude, 'De Staten, Leicester en Elizabeth', 75.
130. Parker, The Dutch Revolt, 219-222; den Tex, Oldenbarnevelt, I, 146-150.

131. den Tex, Oldenbarnevelt, I, 170ff.

132. RAU Staten 231:6, 21 March, 7 and 15 November 1598; GAU Stad II, 121, 4 April and 6 November 1598.

133. van Deursen, 'Staat van oorlog', 50; Ledenberg to Estates-General(?), 22 November 1599, in Dodt van Flensburg, VII, 326.

134. RAU Staten 231:6, 26 January 1598.

CHAPTER V

1. For a narrative account of these events, see van Hulzen, Utrecht in 1566 en 1567, passim. Cf. Wyntjes, The lesser nobility of Utrecht, and Chapter I, above.
2. Hora Siccama, 260.
3. L.J. Rogier, Geschiedenis van het Katholicisme, I, 519.
4. RAU AKD 3506, 16 October [1576].
5. Rogier, Geschiedenis van het Katholicisme, I, 518; van de Water, I, 48.
6. H.J. Royaards, 'Proeve eener geschiedenis der Hervorming in de stad en provincie Utrecht', II, Nederlandsch Archief voor kerkelijke Geschiedenis, VI (1846), 145-288, 163. Together with part I in vol. V (1845) and part III in vol. VI (1847), this is one of the few chronological accounts of the development of Protestantism in the city (the rest of the province is virtually ignored, despite the title) told with a marked Protestant bias. A shorter and more recent account can be found in B.M. de Jonge van Ellemeet, 'De organisatie der Utrechtse Gereformeerde Kerken voor de invoering der Dordtse Kerkenorde', NAK, new series, XXXVI (1948-49), 247-263. On Duifhuis see Appendix II, pp. 243-244.
7. P.L. Muller, 'De partijstrijd te Utrecht', 335.
8. Brandt, I, 348. Royaards, 'Proeve eener geschiedenis der Hervorming', II, 166.
9. Ibid., 178; G.J. Hoenderdaal, 'Uytenbogaert in Utrecht', Nederlands Theologisch Tijdschrift, XXII (1967-68), 3-12, 6.
10. Royaards, 'Proeve eener geschiedenis der Hervorming', II, 187.
11. GAU Stad II, 121, 22 April 1579.
12. GAU Stad II, 121, 16 August 1578; Royaards, 'Proeve eener geschiedenis der Hervorming', II, 193-195; J.W.L. Raven, ed., 'Kronijk van Utrecht, 1576-1591', KHG, XXI (1865), 530-576, 539.
13. GAU Stad II, 121, 16 January and 3 February 1578.
14. GAU Stad II, 121, 27 June 1578; S. Muller, 'Verhaal van het beleg', 185.
15. In many towns the Protestants took over the churches of the preaching orders, which clearly met their requirements better than other Catholic churches: for Ghent, see J.J. Woltjer, 'De vredemakers' in Groenveld and Leeuwenberg, eds., De Unie van Utrecht, 65-87, 82.
16. S. Muller, 'Inventaris van het goud-en zilverwerk der Utrechtsche geestelijke gestichten', passim.

17. Raven, ed., 'Kronijk van Utrecht 1576-1591', 536.
18. Cuyntorff to the five chapters, Antwerp, 26 July 1578, RAU AKD 3475.
19. RAU AKD 1:20, 10 November and 3 December 1578.
20. RAU AKD 1:20, 1 and 9 January 1579. Cf. P.L. Muller, 'De partijstrijd te Utrecht', 345.
21. P.L. Muller, 'De partijstrijd te Utrecht', 363. GAU Stad II, 1, no. 21; van de Water, III, 4ff.
22. GAU Stad II, 1, no. 23; van de Water, III, 8. See also Oudmunster to Adelbert van den Nieuburch (minute), January 1579: P.L. Muller, 'Stukken over den tegenstand', 454-457.
23. Orange's approval of the religious peace, Antwerp, 3 May 1579: GAU Stad II, 1, no. 22.
24. GAU Stad II, 121, 2 June and 10-15 June 1579.
25. GAU Stad II, 1, no. 25; van de Water, III, 9f.
26. W.F.N van Rootselaar, 'Beeldenstormerij te Amersfoort in 1579', AAU, XXVI (1900), 134-138; GAA Dagelixerboek, III (2), 14 June and 18 September 1579; van Bommel, Beschrijving der stad Amersfoort, I, 154.
27. GAU Stad II, 121, 7 March 1580.
28. Bor, XIV, 189v-190; Royaards, 'Proeve eener geschiedenis der Hervorming', II, 241.
29. RAU Staten 231:1, 18 March 1580; Bor, XIV, 190-190v; GAU Stad II, 121, 18 March 1580.
30. Orange to the city council, Amsterdam, 23 March 1580: GAU Stad II, 1, no. 27; GAU Stad II, 121, 18 June 1580; van de Water, III, 466.
31. Rogier, Geschiedenis van het Katholicisme, I, 281; Tegenwoordige Staat, XI, 136; H.A. Enno van Gelder, Revolutionnaire Reformatie (Amsterdam, 1943), 148.
32. M.J. Gasman, 'Strijd tegen Paapsche stoutigheden te Wijk-bij-Duurstede', AAU, XXXVIII (1912), 111-131, 111; GAWbD 445, 29 March 1580; RAU Staten 261, 28 October 1580.
33. GAA Dagelixerboek, III (2), 18 March 1580.
34. Rhenen to the Standing Committee, 6 October 1580, RAU Staten 279:1.
35. GAU Stad II, 121, 19 May 1580; RAU Staten 231:2, 12 July 1581 (although there is an earlier mention of a ban on Catholicism in the rural areas: ibid., 4 April 1581).
36. van de Water, I, 350; RAU Staten, 231:2, 3 April 1583; 231:3, 6 October 1584.

37. RAU Staten 231:2, 2 May 1583.
38. RAU Staten 231:2, 10 August 1581; 3 April 1583.
39. RAU Staten 264:1, 15 August 1583.
40. RAU Staten 231:2, 3 April 1583; Hora Siccama, 322.
41. Frederick Uten Eng to the Estates (?), Utrecht, 28 October 1581: RAU Staten 280:1.
42. Hora Siccama, 309.
43. RAU AKD 1:20, 11 September 1580.
44. RAU Staten 231:1, 24 October 1580; 231:2, 2 March and 4 April 1581. On the arrest of the Domdeken and others, see the series of documents from March to December 1581 in RAU AKD 3478.
45. Kossmann and Mellink, Texts, 169.
46. RAU Staten 231:2, 3 August 1582; Hora Siccama, 315 and 322-324. Royaards, 'Proeve eener geschiedenis der Hervorming', III, 222-223, points out that with the Landraad's decision in 1582 the Roman Catholic Church in Utrecht had lost its political character.
47. Hora Siccama, 308.
48. Brandt, 350 and 371; Royaards, 'Proeve eener geschiedenis der Hervorming', II, 262-263.
49. GAU Stad II, 121, 1 February 1580; Brandt, I, 370.
50. Royaards, 'Proeve eener geschiedenis der Hervorming', II, 270-273 and III, 232; GAU Stad II, 121, 13 June 1582; Hora Siccama, 243-244.
51. Wernerus Helmichius to Arnold Cornelisz, Utrecht, 10 September 1583: H.Q. Janssen and J.J. van Toorenbergen, eds., Brieven uit onderscheidene kerkelijke archieven (Werken der Marnix-Vereeniging, 3rd series, IV, Utrecht, 1880), 41-42.
52. RAU Staten 264:1, 27 December 1583.
53. Helmichius to Arnold Cornelisz, 3 May 1584, Janssen and Toorenbergen, Brieven, 48-49; Royaards, 'Proeve eener geschiedenis der Hervorming', III, 241-242.
54. Leicester to Walsingham, the Hague, 27 February 1586 (NS?): J. Bruce, ed., Correspondence of Robert Dudley, Earl of Leycester...in the years 1585 and 1586 (London, 1844), 141.
55. Leicester to Nieuwenaar, Utrecht, 8 May 1586,: H. Brugmans, ed., Correspondentie van Robert Dudley Graaf van Leycester en andere documenten betreffende zijn Gouvernement-Generaal in de Nederlanden, 1585-1588, 3 vols. (Utrecht, 1931), I, 138-139.
56. Bor, XXI, 111v-112; GAU Stad II, 121, 9 May 1586.

57. GAU Stad II, 121, 19 May 1586.
58. Bor, XXI, 112; Brandt, I, 379 (quoting from a letter from the city council to Orange, 8 August 1581). P.J. Vermeulen, 'Eenige Utrechtsche paskwillen uit den tijd van Leycester', Tijdschrift voor oudheden...en andere delen der Geschiedenis van Utrecht, I (1847), 64-90, 71.
59. Leicester to Elizabeth, Utrecht, 26 June 1586: CSP Foreign XXI (2), 53-54.
60. Lord North obviously agreed with this judgment when he observed that 'the whole country is full of treason by these Papists': North to Burghley, Utrecht, 26 June 1586, CSP Foreign, XXI (2), 55; bürgerhoplieden to Leicester, 27 July 1586: Brugmans, Correspondentie van Robert Dudley, I, 195. See Chapter VII, p. 195.
61. GAA Dagelixboek, no. 4, 16 August 1586; Amersfoort to the Estates, 12 November 1581, RAU Staten 279:1; Helmichius to Arnold Cornelisz, Utrecht, September to December 1581: Janssen and Toorenbergen, Brieven, 10-20; Modet to Leicester, Utrecht (?), 27 February 1586(?): R. Broersma and G. Busken Huet, 'Brieven over het Leycestersche tijdvak uit de papieren van Jean Hotman', BMHG, XXXIV (1913), 1-271, 38-40; Brandt, I, 407.
62. RAU Staten 231:3, 6 and 21 September 1586. On the reluctance of the other provinces to adopt the Hague ordinance see RSG, V, 460, 7 November 1586 (NS).
63. RAU Staten 264:5, 17 February and 15 March 1587; cf. Brandt, I, 407.
64. RAU Staten 231:3, 30 December 1587, and 231:4, 28 June 1588; Lindeman, 'Kerkegoederen te Utrecht', 630.
65. RAU Staten 231:3, 22 October 1586. The text of the Redressement, with the Estates' comments, is printed in Hora Siccama, 332-340. See also RAU Staten 231:4, 24 October 1588.
66. Bürgerhoplieden to Leicester, December(?) 1586: Brugmans, Correspondentie van Robert Dudley, I, 356; Hotman to Leicester, the Hague, 1 January 1587: Broersma and Busken Huet, 'Brieven over het Leycestersche tijdvak', 111.
67. Wilkes to Walsingham, the Hague, 24 December 1586: Brugmans, Correspondentie van Robert Dudley, II, 11.
68. Helmichius to Arnold Cornelisz, 10 January 1587: Janssen and Toorenbergen, Brieven, 67; R. Broersma, Het tusschenbestuur in het Leycestersche tijdvak (Goes, 1899), 74.
69. From a proposition made by the city and towns of Utrecht to William Louis of Nassau and the Gedeputeerde Staten of Friesland, 6 January 1587: GAU Stad II, 3.
70. George Gilpin to Leicester, Leiden, 16 December 1586, Brugmans, Correspondentie van Robert Dudley, I, 333-334; Wilkes to Walsingham as

note 67 above.

71. Helmichius to Arnold Cornelisz, as note 68 above.

72. Bor, XXIV, 74v-75; Brandt, I, 424-427.

73. John Sparhawk to Willoughby, Utrecht, 7 October 1588, HMC Ancaster, 197.

74. GAU Stad II, 121, 14 November 1588; RAU Staten 231:4, 22 October 1588.

75. RAU Staten 231:4, 21-22 March 1589; Cornelis van Duverden to Floris Thin, Amersfoort, 21 October 1588, RAU Staten 1036:2.

76. GAU Stad II, 121, 21 November 1589; Helmichius to Arnold Cornelisz: Janssen and Toorenbergen, Brieven, 77-78.

77. Bor, XXI, 118v. All four were soon called to other churches: C. Hooijer, Oude kerkordeningen der Nederlandsche hervormde gemeenten (1563-1638), (Zaltbommel, 1865), 287.

78. Royaards, 'Proeve eener geschiedenis der Hervorming', III, 261; Bor, XXI, 114; den Tex, Oldenbarnevelt, II, 437-438.

79. RAU Staten 231:4, 12 November 1590; E.P. de Booy, De weldaet der scholen (Utrecht, 1977), 7; Brandt, I, 447.

80. Hooijer, Oude kerkordeningen, 288-289; the views of the city council on controlling the kirk session are expressed in two letters from Dirk Canter to Thin, 20 and 24 February 1590(?): RAU Staten 1036:2.

81. An example of these placards in van de Water, I, 356, 29 May 1590.

82. Uyttenbogaert to Cousijn Jacobsz, 2 August 1590 (NS); same to Vincent Vincentssen Lambrechts, 7 February 1595 (NS): H. Rogge, ed., Brieven en onuitgegeven stukken van Johannes Wtenbogaert, I, 1584-1618 (Utrecht, 1868), 6-7 and 26-27.

83. Brandt, I, 446-447. Cf. the Collegium Qualificatum, a body composed of an equal number from the civil authorities and the consistories in Zeeland: R.L. Jones, 'Reformed Church and civil authorities in the United Provinces', Journal of the Society of Archivists, IV (1970), 109-123, 116.

84. 'Visitatie der kerken ten platten lande in het Sticht van Utrecht, ten jare 1593', BMHG, VII (1884), 186-267 passim., especially the summary of the commission's findings at pp. 253-258.

85. Rogier, Geschiedenis van het Katholicisme, I, 522; de Booy, De weldaet der scholen, 12; Gasman, 'Strijd tegen Paapsche stoutigheden', 112-113.

86. J. Reitsma and S.D. van Veen, eds., Acta der provinciale en particuliere synoden...1572-1620, 8 vols. (Groningen, 1892-1899), VI, 294-328.

87. Ibid., 424-425. It is significant that a Remonstrant synod held in Utrecht in 1618 was attended by 25 ministers, including all six of those based in the city; a Counter-Remonstrant synod held at the same time mustered 19 predikanten: ibid., 345f., 360f.
88. W.J. Brutel de la Riviere, Het leven van Hermannus Moded (Haarlem, 1897), 113-114; NNBW, III, 862.
89. Quoted from the Belgic Confession by Jones, "Reformed Church and civil authorities", 120.
90. For a similar situation in Holland, see ibid., 116.
91. Burgerhoplieden to Leicester, 27 July 1586: Brugmans, Correspondentie van Robert Dudley, I, 195.
92. The town council of Wijk used the same threat against the chapter of St. John the Baptist there: Estates to Wijk, 23 March 1579 (minute), RAU Staten 328.
93. Ordonnantie van d'Wachte...den sevenden Februarij anno 1578. The chapters protested against this in an undated letter, probably of March 1578, to the Estates-General: RAU AKD 3475. Cf. the remark of the city council eight years later: the Geeligerden "in their private life [are] subjects of this city": GAU Stad II, 121, 21 November 1586.
94. GAU Stad II, 121, 14 December 1580, 19 December 1581; RAU Staten 231:4, 19 August 1589; RAU AKD 3477, 12 November 1581; Hora Siccama, 312.
95. RAU Staten 231:2, 2 March 1581.
96. RAU AKD 1:20, 11 September 1580; RAU Staten 231:2, 27 July and 30 October 1582; 231:3, 31 December 1584 and 10 February 1585.
97. RAU Staten 231:3, 21 March 1587.
98. RAU Staten 264:1, 21 and 28 March, 16 and 22 November, 19 and 24 December 1583; RAU Staten 264:5, 15 March 1587.
99. "Visitatie", 223.
100. RAU Staten 231:3, 22 April 1587; protest by the predikanten, of 18 June 1587, in RAU Staten 231:3, at 26 July 1587. Cf. Gilles van Ledenberg to Thin, Utrecht, 26 April 1587, RAU Staten 1036:2.
101. RAU Staten 231:4, 30 January 1590.
102. RAU Staten 231:1, 14 February 1579; GAU Stad II, 121, 27 March 1579.
103. GAA Dagelijxboek, III (2), 30 May 1579.
104. GAU Stad II, 121, 19 December 1578.
105. RAU Staten 231:1, 14 April 1579.

106. RAU Staten 261, 6 May 1580; Hora Siccama, 277-278.
107. RAU Staten 231:2, 27 April 1582.
108. RAU Staten 231:3, 6 October 1584, 18 October 1586; GAU Stad II, 121, 15 April 1588.
109. GAA Dagelijxboek, III (2), 21 May and 5 October 1582; RAU Staten 231:2, 3 August and 21 November 1582; 13 February 1583.
110. RAU Staten 231:3, 6 September 1586; RAU Staten 264:5, 6 September 1587; GAA Dagelijxboek no. 4, 10 October 1587, 29 February 1588. Cf. RSG, V, 226, 10 August 1586 (NS).
111. RAU Staten 231:4, 25 October 1588.
112. GAA Dagelijxboek, III (2), 21 February, 1-2 March 1583.
113. RAU Staten 231:2, 9 March 1583.
114. van Eeghen, Dagboek, 744 (5 August 1578) and 749 (7 September 1578).
115. Standing Committee of the Estates to the Burggraaf, 20 February 1583: Putman and van Rossum, "Invoering der zoogenaamde Hervorming", 5.
116. RAU Staten 231:2, 13 December 1582, 13 February 1583; RAU Staten 264:1, 10 January 1583; 264:2, 9 October 1584.
117. Lindeman, "Kerkegoederen te Utrecht", 631; RAU Staten 264:6, 1 February 1588.
118. RAU Staten 264:1, 28 February 1583; RAU Staten 231:2, 31 July 1583. Helmichius to Arnold Cornelisz, 10 September 1583 and 4 January 1584; Janssen and Toorenbergen, Brieven, 41-43. By 1586, Bulckius had left Montfoort and was living in Gouda without a post; a pamphlet by him was condemned as unsound in doctrine by the National Synod of 1586: F.L. Rutgers, ed., Acta van de Nederlandschen synoden der zestiende eeuw (Utrecht, 1889), 589-592.
119. RAU Staten 264:4, 23 February 1586. Abraham Jansz had already quarrelled with his congregation in Vlaardingen, and was declared unfit to preach by the classis of Delft in 1583. His drunkenness was notorious: J. Hania, Wernerus Helmichius (Utrecht, 1895), 169ff.
120. "Visitatie", 241.
121. RAU Staten 264:4, 23 February 1586; Reitsma and van Veen, eds., Acta der provinciale en particuliere synoden, 299-300.
122. RAU Staten 231:2, 15 May 1583; Royaards, "Proeve eener geschiedenis der Hervorming", III, 224-227; Kossman and Mellink, Texts, 172.
123. Hora Siccama, 203-204, 243.
124. A. Duke and R.L. Jones, "Towards a Reformed polity in Holland,

1572-1578^r, TyG, LXXXIX (1976), 373-393, 374. For control of the Reformed Church by individual town governments in Holland, see Hibben, Particularism and Revolt, 134ff. (Gouda); Jones, 'Reformed Church and civil authorities', 120-123; and R.L. Jones, 'De Nederduits gereformeerde gemeente te Leiden in de jaren 1572-1576', Leids Jaarboekje LXVI (1974), 126-144, 135-139 (both on Leiden).

125. P.L. Muller, 'De partijstrijd te Utrecht', 333-334.

126. Bor, X, 215v. The Council of State condemned this act as 'not only unbecoming and improper, but also very scandalous': Council of State to Estates, Brussels, 29 March 1577: RAU Staten 285:1. See Chapter IV, p. 88.

127. Helmichius to Arnold Cornelisz, 20 December 1586: Janssen and Toorenbergen, Brieven, 62.

128. Dirk Canter to Floris Thin, 24 February 1590(?), RAU Staten 1036:2; Vermeulen, 'Eenige Utrechtsche paskwillen', 83.

129. Hooijer, Oude kerkordeningen, 291.

130. Duke and Jones, 'Towards a Reformed polity in Holland', 374.

CHAPTER VI

1. Kossmann and Mellink, Texts, 166.
2. See further: Woltjer, 'De wisselende gestalten van de Unie', 89-90.
3. Smitskamp, 'Van lotwissel en menigerlei geval (1555-1593)', 29; K. Verhofstad, De regering in de Nederlanden in de jaren 1555-1559 (Nijmegen, 1937), 144-145.
4. A. Gordon, De potestate Gulielmi I, Hollandiae sub Philippo II gubernatoris cum ordinaria tum extraordinaria (Leiden, 1835), 167.
5. GAU Stad I, 13, 25 October 1576, 1 January 1577; protest by Thin and Heermale to the Estates-General, 15 April 1577: Bondam, Verzameling van onuitgegevene stukken, I, 262-264.
6. Jacques Rossel to Walsingham, 15 May 1580: CSP Foreign, 1579-1580, 266.
7. For a summary of the history of these bodies, see P.F.M. Fontaine, De Raad van State: zijn taak organisatie en werkzaamheden in de jaren 1588-1590 (Groningen, 1955), 7-16.
8. Council of State to Estates of Utrecht, Brussels, 26 October and 10 November 1576, RAU Staten 285:1; Estates to their deputies in Brussels, 4 December 1576, Bondam, Verzameling van onuitgegevene stukken, I, 224-225.
9. Instruction for Adriaan van Zuylen and Loef van der Haer, deputed to Orange by Estates of Utrecht, January 1577(?): RAU Staten 1035:1, C17.
10. Thin and Heermale to Estates of Utrecht, Brussels, 7 April 1577: Dotd van Flensburg I, 198 and 200.
11. Thin and Heermale to Estates of Utrecht, Brussels, 24 April 1577: Bondam, Verzameling van onuitgegevene stukken, II, 278.
12. RSG, I, 481, 3 May 1577.
13. A.E.M. Janssen, 'Het verdeelde Huis: Prins Willem van Oranje en graaf Jan van Nassau bij de totstandkoming van de Unie van Utrecht' in Groenveld and Leeuwenberg, eds., De Unie van Utrecht, 101-135, 121-123.
14. Resolution of the deputies of the Provinces of the Closer Union, Utrecht, 30 July 1579. Copy in RAU AKD 3478.
15. Deputies of the Provinces of the Closer Union to Estates of Utrecht, Amsterdam, 16 June 1581. Copy in RAU AKD 3478.
16. RAU Staten 231:2, 5 March 1584 and 21 September 1583.
17. Ibid., 15 February 1581; P.L. Muller, De geschiedenis der

regeering in de nader geunieerde provincien tot aan de komst van Leicester (1579-1585) (Leiden, 1868), 146-147, 153-154; de Pater, 'Leicester en Overijsel', 261.

18. RAU Staten 231:2, 17 January 1583.

19. Ibid., 15 November 1581; P.L. Muller, De geschiedenis der regeering, 236.

20. RSG, VII, 214, 8 April 1590 (NS).

21. The High Authority and its councils to the Estates of Utrecht, Ghent, 17 August 1581: RAU Staten 285:1.

22. Koenigsberger, 'The powers of deputies', 198.

23. RAU Staten 231:3, 5 November 1585.

24. Instruction for Floris Heermale, Nicolaes van Zuylen van Drakenburg, Johan van Druenen and Floris Thin, 15 July 1584 in M.L. van Deventer, ed., Gedenkstukken van Johan van Oldenbarnevelt en zijn tijd (3 vols., the Hague, 1860-1865), I, 50-53. See also Koenigsberger, 'The powers of deputies', 201.

25. RAU Staten 231:3, 23 July 1584.

26. Ibid., 27 October 1586.

27. RAU AKD 3478, 20 October 1581; RAU Staten 231:2, 31 January 1584.

28. Goert van Reede, lord of Amerongen, to the Ridderschap, 23 March 1581: RAU Staten 742:1; RAU Staten 231:4, 6 February 1590.

29. Ibid., 14 November 1589.

30. Frederick Uten Eng to Floris Thin, Brussels, 22 November 1577: RAU Staten 1036:1.

31. P.L. Muller, De geschiedenis van de regeering, 43; Bor, XIII, 90.

32. 779 guilders in 1589-1590: GAU Stad II, 3603, (1589-90).

33. Standing Committee of the Estates of Utrecht to Archduke Mathias and the Estates-General, 24 January 1579 (minute): RAU Staten 334.

34. RAU Staten 231:3, 12 July 1585; memorandum to Orange by Estates of Utrecht, 20 May 1577: Bondam, Verzameling van onuitgegevene stukken, II, 333-337.

35. GAA Dagelijxboek, (4), 31 August 1588, 26 May 1589.

36. Broersma, Het tusschenbestuur, 50-51.

37. RAU Staten 231:2, 14 February 1582; 264:1, 31 October 1583. The Council of State also met at Utrecht in December 1584: RSG, IV, 451.

38. den Tex, Oldenbarnevelt, I, 160.

39. Bor, XXIV, 66v, article 25; RAU Staten 231:4, 18 May 1588.
40. Instruction for Floris Heermale, et al., 15 July 1584, in van Deventer, Gedenkstukken van Johan van Oldenbarnevelt en zijn tijd, I, 50-53.
41. RAU Staten 231:4, 6-7 February 1590; instruction for Bartholomeus de Wael, lord of Moersbergen, 7 February 1590: KHG, XVIII (1862), 47-49.
42. RAU Staten 231:4, 25 January 1590.
43. van de Water, I, 48 (article 8).
44. RAU Staten 231:1, 2 June 1579 (the Estates ask Mathias and Orange to approve the appointment of Frederick van Zuylen van Nyevelt); 15 August 1579 (Orange replies in favour of Willem de Ridder); van de Water, II, 1071.
45. Orange to the Estates of Utrecht, Antwerp, 7 May 1579, and Archduke Mathias to the Estates, 9 October 1579: RAU Staten 285:1; Orange to the Estates, Antwerp, 11 October 1579: RAU Staten 278:1.
46. Estates of Utrecht to the four towns and the four Marshals, 2 May 1579 (minute), RAU Staten 328.
47. RAU Staten 231:1, 31 January, 6 February 1581; Orange to the Estates of Utrecht, Ghent, 25 October 1581. It is interesting that in both cases the Estates backed the man indicated by the outgoing holder of the office.
48. Estates of Utrecht to the Landraad, 2 December 1581 (minute): RAU Staten 334. On Culemborg, see pp. 169-170.
49. RAU Staten 264:5, 10 July and 22 October 1587.
50. See Chapter IV, p. 116.
51. RAU Staten 231:3, 2 October 1584.
52. RSG, V, 236-238 and 434, 11 November 1586; van Deursen, 'Tussen eenheid en zelfstandigheid', 140-141.
53. RAU Staten 231:3, 21 February and 21 April 1587; 264:5, 31 March 1587.
54. Prouninck to Leicester, Utrecht, 17 February 1587; Gilpin to Leicester, the Hague, 25 February 1587: Brugmans, Correspondentie van Robert Dudley, II, 116 and 136-137.
55. van der Woude, 'De crisis in de Opstand', 51-52; Hotman to Leicester, the Hague, 27 February 1587 (NS): Broersma and Busken Huet, 'Brieven over het Leycestersche tijdvak', 165.
56. RSG, V, 494, 17 February 1587 (NS); Bor, XXII, 38v-39v; van Deventer, Gedenkstukken van Johan van Oldenbarnevelt en zijn tijd, I, 150-153.

57. RSG, V, 553, 22 June 1587 (NS); RAU Staten 264:6, 15 and 27 March 1588; Staten 231:4, 23 March 1588.
58. Bor, XXII, 43, 40.
59. Wilkes to Walsingham, the Hague, 24 December 1586: Brugmans, Correspondentie van Robert Dudley, II, 11; Bor, XXII, 3v.
60. Killigrew to Burghley, 15 February 1588, GSP Foreign, (1588), 92.
61. Council of State to Leicester, 8 April 1587 (NS): Broersma and Busken Huet, "Brieven over het Leycestersche tijdvak", 184.
62. RAU Staten 231:4, 9 April and 29 May 1588.
63. GAU Stad II, 121, 28 May 1588. For the decisions which provoked this outburst, and that by the Estates on 29 May, see RSG, VI, 266-267, 3-4 June 1588 (NS).
64. G. de Bruin, "De soevereiniteit in de republiek: een machtsprobleem", BMGN, LXXXXIV (1979), 27-40, 28.
65. RAU Staten 231:4, 19 October 1588; 264:6, 23 November 1588.
66. Estates of Utrecht to Estates of Holland, 9 August 1588 (minute), KHG, XVI (1860), 155-157; RAU Staten 231:4, 9 July 1588 and 28 February 1589.
67. Ibid., 4 February 1589.
68. Ibid., 6 February 1590; Council of State to Estates of Utrecht, 1 December 1589 (NS), RAU Staten 285:1.
69. A.T. van Deursen, "De Raad van State en de generaliteit (1590-1606)", BGN, XIX (1964-65), 1-48, 14-15.
70. RAU Staten 231:4, 6 February 1590; Fontaine, De Raad van State, 126.
71. G.D.J. Schotel, Floris I en II van Pallant, Graven van Culemborg (Arnhem, 1846), 97-98, 116.
72. Count Culemborg to Estates of Utrecht, 17 March 1577: RAU Staten 288.
73. M. van Vliet, Het hoogheemraadschap van de Lekdijk Bovendams (Assen, 1961), 575-576.
74. E.g. RAU Staten 261, 7 October 1580; 24-25 November 1581.
75. A.P. van Schilfgaarde, Het archief der heeren en graven van Culemborg, (3 vols., the Hague, 1949), Introduction, 25.
76. RAU Staten 264:1, 25 June 1583.
77. RAU Staten 264:2, 1 and 24 September 1584.
78. RAU Staten 231:3, 6 August and 2 December 1585.

79. RAU Staten 264:4, 14-18 June 1586; GAU Stad II, 3603 (1585-86), which seems to indicate that earlier orders to detain Culemborg in February 1586 came from Leicester; RAU Staten 231:3, 3 March 1586.
80. Count Culemborg to Leicester, 13 March 1587, CSP Foreign, XXI (2), 409.
81. Wilkes to Leicester, the Hague, 12 December 1586: Brugmans, Correspondentie van Robert Dudley, I, 319-320; Schotel, Floris I en II van Pallant, 110-111.
82. RAU Staten 264:6, 17 January, 7 and 11 June 1588; GAU Stad II, 121, 10 June 1588.
83. Estates of Utrecht to Count Culemborg, 30 December 1587 (minute), RAU Staten 336; RAU Staten 231:4, 23 April 1589.
84. Justification of Count Culemborg, 22 July 1590 (copy): RAU Staten 1034.
85. Estates of Utrecht to Council of State, 7 September 1590 (minute): RAU Staten 334.
86. Elbertus Leoninus, Johan van Mathenesse and Christoffel Arentsma to Estates of Utrecht, Culemborg, 13 April 1590 (NS): RAU Staten 285:2.
87. For the two different accounts of these events see notes 84 and 85 above; Schotel, Floris I en II van Pallant, 118, relies largely on the Count's justification.
88. Council of State to Estates of Utrecht, 18 and 23 August 1590 (NS?): RAU Staten 285:2, and the collection of copies of relevant correspondence from 1591-92 in RAU Staten 1034, especially Estates-General to Count Culemborg, 1 July 1591 and Claes Jansz and Aert Willemsz de Man to Estates of Utrecht, undated.
89. Schilfgaarde, Het archief...van Culemborg, Introduction, 25.
90. RSG, IV, 501-502, 6 December 1584 (NS); RAU Staten 264:2, 26 and 29 November 1584.
91. E.g. RAU Staten 261, 4 September 1578.
92. RAU Staten 231:4, 24 February 1589; Standing Committee of Utrecht to Archduke Mathias and Estates-General, 24 January 1579 (minute): RAU Staten 334.
93. Deputies...of the duchy of Gelderland and the county of Zutphen to the Estates of Utrecht, Arnhem, 23 December 1576: RAU Staten 1035:2, F24; RAU Staten 264:2, 7 July 1584.
94. van Deventer, Gedenkstukken van Johan van Oldenbarnevelt en zijn tijd, I, 29-35. At the meeting in November 1580, Overijssel suggested approaching the Diet of the Holy Roman Empire for protection, as an alternative to the proposed negotiations with Anjou, but the three 'provinces which belong under the Empire' went no further in this

direction.

95. van Deursen, 'Tussen eenheid en zelfstandigheid', 150.
96. RAU Staten 231:4, 18-21 November 1589.
97. S. Muller, 'Verhaal van het beleg van het kasteel Vredenburg', 179.
98. Bor, X, 216v; GAU Stad I, 13, 15 March and 13 June 1577.
99. RAU Staten 261, 29 February and 8 August 1580; GAU Stad II, 121, 3-4 May 1587.
100. See Chapter IV, pp. 93-95.
101. S.J. Fockema Andreae, 'Aen't ende van den Lande: de Hollandse-Utrechtse grensstreek bij Woerden' in Zuid Hollandse Studien, I (1950), 83-94, *passim*.
102. RAU Staten 264:4, 24 January and 9 June 1586; 231:3, 24 June and 22 September 1586; 231:4, 15 July 1589.
103. Estates of Holland to magistrates of Oudewater, the Hague, 25 May 1588, KHG, XVI (1860), 140-141; RAU Staten 264:6, 30 December 1588. See note 66 above.
104. P.L. Muller, De staat der Vereenigde Nederlanden, 309-320; RAU Staten 231:2, 15 November 1581, 18 April and 23 June 1582.
105. Ibid., 31 July and 19 November 1583; Hibben, Particularism and Revolt, 260.
106. P.L. Muller, De Staat der Vereenigde Nederlanden, 312; RAU Staten 231:2, 25 March and 30 April 1584.
107. RSG, IV, 694-695, 11 October and 10 November 1584 (NS).
108. CSP Foreign, XX, 143-144, 4 November 1585; RAU Staten 231:3, 29 January 1586.
109. RAU Staten 264:1, 10 February 1583; 231:3, 6 October 1584.
110. Standing Committee to Burggraaf of Montfoort, 20 February 1583: Putman and van Rossum, 'Invoering der zoogenaamde Hervorming', 3-5; RAU Staten 264:1, 18 February 1583; J.P. van Dooren, 'Kerkelijke toestanden in de provincie Utrecht omstreeks 1600', NAK, new series, XLIX (1968-69), 183-193, 186: this was probably a reference to Gerard Blockhoven: see Appendix II, pp. 237-238.
111. Burgomasters and councillors of Amsterdam to council of Utrecht, 19 December 1585 (NS), GAU Stad II, 3.
112. RAU Staten 231:3, 8 February 1587.
113. Killigrew to Burghley, the Hague, 9 February 1588, CSP Foreign, XXI (4), 71; Wilkes to Queen Elizabeth, London, 12 July 1587: Brugmans, Correspondentie van Robert Dudley, II, 398.

114. RAU Staten 264:5, 12 September 1587.
115. RAU Staten 264:6, 16 June 1588; Estates of Holland to Estates of Utrecht, 7 July 1588 (NS?), KHG, XVI (1860), 153-155.
116. Estates of Utrecht to Estates of Holland, 4 September 1588 (minute), KHG, XVI (1860), 171-173.
117. RAU Staten 231:3, 1 August 1586.
118. Bor, XX, 51v-52; RAU Staten 231:3, 23 July 1585.
119. Estates of Utrecht to Estates of Holland, 17 January 1589 (minute): RAU Staten 334; Bor, XXVII, 14v; P.L. Muller, De Staat der Vereenigde Nederlanden, 490.
120. RAU Staten 231:4, 9 April 1588; repeated RSG, VI, 263-264, 26 April 1588 (NS); Pieter de la Court, The True Interest and Political Maxims of the Republick of Holland and West Friesland, quoted in Wansink, "Holland and six allies", 148.
121. RAU Staten 231:3, 2 October 1584.
122. Groen van Prinsterer, Archives...de la maison d'Orange-Nassau, 1st series, VIII, 217.
123. G.D. Ramsay, "The Austrian Habsburgs and the Empire" in The New Cambridge Modern History, III (Cambridge, 1968), 319-346, 340-343.
124. Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie, (56 vols., Leipzig, 1875-1912), VIII, 460.
125. RAU Staten 264:1, 3 and 30 March 1583; Staten 231:2, 27 February, 5, 17 and 23 March 1584.
126. Ramsay, "The Austrian Habsburgs and the Empire", 343; Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie, VIII, 467.
127. Ibid., 468; RAU Staten 231:3, 1 June and 2 December 1585; Abstracts of the earl of Leicester's instructions: Bruce, Correspondence of Robert Dudley, Earl of Leycester, 15.
128. RAU Staten 231:3, 21 April 1587.
129. Bor, XXII, 92. RAU Staten 231:3, 22 September 1587. See Chapter VII, p. 207.
130. Leicester to Walsingham, the Hague, 29 July 1586: Bruce, Correspondence of Robert Dudley, Earl of Leycester, 373. Groen van Prinsterer, on the other hand, thought Truchsess showed improvidence, thoughtlessness and inconsistency in his religious views: Archives de la maison d'Orange-Nassau, 1st series, VIII, 193.
131. GAU Stad II, 121, 14 October 1587; RAU Staten 231:4, 29 May 1588.
132. RAU Staten 261:1, 25 and 26 February 1580; AKD 1:20, 26 February 1580.

133. RAU Staten 231:1, 22 July 1580; 261:1, 9 December 1581.
134. Council of State to Estates of Utrecht, Ghent, 26 August 1581, RAU Staten 285:1; Orange to Estates of Utrecht, Middelburg, 12 February 1582, RAU AKD 3478.
135. RAU Staten 231:2, 21 June and 13 December 1582; RSG, III, 395, 2 October 1582 (NS).
136. RSG, III, 451-452, 24 March 1582 (NS); RSG, IV, 122-123, 234, 27 January 1583 (NS).
137. RAU Staten 264:2, 21 November 1584; GAU Stad II, 121, 21 November 1584; RAU Staten 231:3, 6 May 1585; den Tex, Oldenbarnevelt, I, 37.
138. Council of State to Estates of Utrecht, 6 January 1590 (NS), RAU Staten 285:2.
139. RAU Staten 231:4, 1 April 1590; RSG, VII, 54, 30 April 1590 (NS); den Tex, Oldenbarnevelt, I, 169.
140. RAU Staten 231:3, 20 August and 3 October 1584.
141. Ibid., 10-11 November 1584 (inserted after 15 May 1585); RSG, V, 731, 18 September 1587 (NS). Cf. Gilpin to Wilkes, the Hague, 19 September 1587, CSP Foreign, XXI (3), 326-327.
142. RSG, V, 45-49, 11-27 April 1585 (NS); RAU Staten 231:3, 19 April and 15 May 1585. Cf. the draft commission from the Estates for Paulus Buys to negotiate with England, 19 April 1585, RAU Staten 1035:1, A35 (1).
143. van der Woude, 'De crisis in de Opstand', 42-43.
144. RAU Staten 231:3, 6-10 September 1585, *passim*.
145. GAU Stad II, 121, 20 June 1586; Bor, XXI, 31-32.
146. RAU Staten 231:3, 6 September and 27 October 1586; Wilkes to Walsingham, the Hague, 19 January 1587; Brugmans, Correspondentie van Robert Dudley, II, 50.
147. Ridderschap of Overijssel and deputies of Kampen and Zwolle to [city of] Utrecht, Zwolle, 27 March 1587; proposals to William Louis of Nassau, Stadholder, and Gedeputeerde Staten of Friesland, 6 January 1587, GAU Stad II, 3; RAU Staten 264:5, 1 April 1587; Gilpin to Wilkes, Utrecht, 25 April 1587; Brugmans, Correspondentie van Robert Dudley, II, 221.
148. RAU Staten 231:4, 9 April 1588; Bor, XXIV, 114v-115.
149. Gilpin to Wilkes, Utrecht, 25 April 1587, as note 147 above; Fruin and Colenbrander, Geschiedenis der staatsinstellingen in Nederland, 189.
150. GAU Stad II, 121, 16 October 1587.

151. Governor and deputies of Estates of Utrecht to Elizabeth, 29 August 1588; CSP Foreign, XXII, 164; RAU Staten 231:3, 5 December 1587, 231:4, 20 September 1588.
152. RAU Staten 264:6, 15 March 1588; 231:4, 18 May 1588. Fontaine points out the constitutional difficulty in the Treaty's stipulation that there should be a Council of State on which England was to be represented: Utrecht was anxious to maintain the Treaty to the letter, but thought the Council arrogated too many powers to itself, and insisted that it should not interfere in the Sticht's affairs unless asked: Fontaine, De Raad van State, 12, 18; RAU Staten 231:4, 19 July 1588.
153. Elizabeth to Nieuwenaar, 4 September 1588; Elizabeth to city of Utrecht, 4(?) September 1588: CSP Foreign, XXII, 181.
154. Elizabeth to Council of State, February(?) 1588; CSP Foreign, XXI, (4), 153-154; cf. Willoughby to Estates-General, the Hague, 1 March 1588 (NS), HMC Ancaster, 92.
155. R. Strong and J.A. van Dorsten, Leicester's Triumph (Leiden and London, 1964), 43; GAU Stad II, 121, 24 December 1586; RAU Staten 231:3, 3 November 1587.
156. RSG, V, 501, 23 October 1587 (NS); den Tex, Oldenbarnevelt, I, 101.
157. RAU Staten 231:4, 23 March, 24 April and 17 May 1588.
158. RAU Staten 231:4, 7 and 10 August 1588.
159. RAU Staten 231:3, 9 September and 16 October 1585; 264:4, 15 April 1586; GAA Dagelixerboek, no. 4, 26 April 1587.
160. So thought Sir John Norris: statement 15 July 1587, CSP Foreign, XXI (3), 178.
161. Buckhurst to Walsingham, the Hague, 2 June 1587: Brugmans, Correspondentie van Robert Dudley, II, 307.
162. Laurence Benyon to Willoughby, 7 June and 6 September 1588, HMC Ancaster, 151, 184; Arthur Champernowne to Walsingham, 20 December 1587, CSP Foreign, XXI (3), 460.
163. Instruction for Niclaes Petersz van de Vogelaer to Athey, 8 August 1587: GAU Stad II, 3; Estates of Utrecht to Willoughby, referring to loans of 2,700 guilders of which "not a penny" had been repaid, 22 March 1588: HMC Ancaster, 103; RAU Staten 231:4, 28 June - 9 July 1588.
164. John Sparhawk to Willoughby, Utrecht, 20 November 1588, HMC Ancaster, 216.
165. Instruction for Heermale, Moersbergen and van Lanscroun, 21-22 November 1588, RAU Staten 1029:A.
166. Council of State to Estates of Utrecht, 5 November 1588 (NS), RAU Staten 285:1.

167. den Tex, Oldenbarnevelt, I, 182ff.

CHAPTER VII

1. A recent biographer of Leicester, more sympathetic to the Earl than most Dutch historians, states 'it is doubtful whether England could have produced a statesman-general sufficiently gifted to emerge with credit and success from what was a virtually impossible situation': D. Wilson, Sweet Robin (London, 1981), 272.
2. R. Fruin, 'Motley's Geschiedenis der Vereenigde Nederlanden' in his Verspreide Geschriften, III (the Hague, 1901), 118-224, 158; L.J. Rogier, Paulus Buys en Leicester (Nijmegen and Utrecht, 1948), 12.
3. Joris de Bye quoted in Fontaine, De Raad van State, 13; Bor, XXIII, 62v.
4. P.L. Muller, De Staat der Vereenigde Nederlanden, 374, 484-485.
5. Floris Heermale, Peter Ruysch, Roetert van Lanscroon and Floris Thin to Estates of Utrecht, the Hague, 19 January 1586 (NS?) (copy), RAU Staten 231:4, at 13 July 1588; van der Woude, 'De crisis in de Opstand', 81.
6. GAU Stad II, 121, 11 January 1586; Griffiths, Representative government in Western Europe, 528-529.
7. Leicester to Amersfoort, Leiden, 29 January 1586 (NS), (copy), GAA Dagelixboek no. 3, 24 January 1586; Dagelixboek no. 4, 7 March 1586.
8. Strong and van Dorsten, Leicester's Triumph, 102.
9. RAU Staten 231:3, 28 May and 2 June 1586; GAU Stad II, 121, 18 June 1586; Memorandum of the Hof of Gelderland and the magistracy of Arnhem to Leicester, 25 May 1586; Leicester's decision on a remonstrance by the Standing Committee of Utrecht, Arnhem, 25 May 1586; Brugmans, Correspondentie van Robert Dudley, I, 146-153.
10. den Tex, Oldenbarnevelt, I, 61, 70.
11. Leicester to Walsingham, 10 and 18 June 1586: Bruce, Correspondence of Robert Dudley, Earl of Leycester, 303 and 310.
12. Bor, XXI, 33; den Tex, Oldenbarnevelt, I, 64-65.
13. Leicester to the Lords of the [English] Council, the Hague, 15 July 1586: Bruce, Correspondence of Robert Dudley, Earl of Leycester, 352; Fruin, 'Motley's Geschiedenis', 176.
14. van Dam van Noordeloos, ed., 'Stukken betreffende de arrestatie van Paulus Buys, 1586', KHG, XV (1859), 331-338; W. van Everdingen, Het leven van Mr Paulus Buys, advocaat van den lande van Holland (Leiden, 1895), 148; CSP Foreign, XXI (2), 36 ([19] June 1586) and 82, 9 July 1586; NNBW, I, 519.
15. Estates of Holland to city council of Utrecht, the Hague, 13 September 1586 (NS); Burgomasters and council of Amsterdam to Utrecht, 30 August 1586 (NS?); Schout, burgomasters and council of Leiden to

Utrecht, 6 September 1586 (NS?), GAU Stad II, 3; Hibben, Particularism and Revolt, 297.

16. van Dam van Noordeloos, 'Stukken betreffende de arrestatie', 336; Oosterhoff, The Earl of Leicester's Governorship, 201-202.

17. Burgerhoplieden of Utrecht to Leicester, 26 July 1586: Bor, XXI, 39.

18. GAU Stad II, 121, 21 July 1586. There is another list of the expelled men in Raven, ed., 'Kronijk van Utrecht 1576-1591', 561-563, which does not distinguish between the original nineteen and the rest. It differs on one or two names from the city council's own list, but supplies some personal information about each man.

19. GAU Stad II, 121, 22 July 1586.

20. Statement by Leicester, the Hague, 2 August 1586 (NS?): RAU Staten 1041; Dirck Jansz Lonck and Francois Vranck to Gerrit Kegeling, the Hague, 2 August 1586 (NS?), KHG, V (1849), 355-357. See also Hibben, Particularism and Revolt, 297.

21. Thin to Leicester, the Hague [27] July 1586, KHG, XXX (1874), 169-171.

22. RSG, V, 451, 9 August 1586 (NS); van Zuylen, Thin, et al. to Leicester, August(?) 1586, and statement by Leicester, the Hague, 2 August 1586: RAU Staten 1041; Bor, XXI, 39v-40. See also Sir Thomas Sherley to Walsingham, Utrecht, 11 August 1586, CSP Foreign, XXI (2), 126: 'this day my lord [Leicester] hath taken into his protection five or six of those that were expelled out of Utrecht'. The earlier date is more probable.

23. Estates of Holland to Schout and city council of Utrecht, 30 August 1586 (NS), GAU Stad II, 3; GAU Stad II, 121, 13 August 1586; P.L. Muller, De Staat der Vereenigde Nederlanden, 403-404.

24. GAU Stad II, 121, 25 August and 30 September 1586.

25. Oosterhoff, The Earl of Leicester's Governorship, 206-207.

26. GAU Stad II, 121, 1 October and 3 November 1586.

27. W.C. Ackersdijck, 'Bijdrage tot het medegedeelde...onder het opschrift "De Graaf van Leycester in Utrecht"' in Tijdschrift van Geschiedenis Oudheden en Statistiek van Utrecht, II (1836), 205-228, 223-225.

28. RAU Staten, 231:3, 6 and 8 October 1586.

29. Ibid., 28 October 1586.

30. RSG, V, 236-237, 11 November 1586 (NS); Bor, XXI, 67.

31. RSG, V, 434, 12 November 1586 (NS); Bor, XXI, 67v; Leicester to Wilkes, London(?) 24 December 1586: Brugmans, Correspondentie van Robert Dudley, II, 2.

32. Prouninck to city council of Utrecht, the Hague, 8 November 1586, KHG, XI (1855) 234-238; P.L. Muller, De Staat der Vereenigde Nederlanden, 410.
33. van de Water, III, 93, 2 November 1555.
34. RSG, V, 451, 22 November 1586 (NS).
35. RAU Staten 231:3, 14 November 1586, 4 February 1587.
36. See Chapter II, p. 35.
37. GAU Stad II, 121, 23 November 1586; Bor, XXI, 69.
38. RSG, V, 453-455, 5 and 8 December 1586 (NS); Gilpin to Leicester, the Hague, 6 December 1586 and Wilkes to Walsingham, the Hague, 24 December 1586; Brugmans, De correspondentie van Robert Dudley, I, 302 and II, 10-11; Bor, XXII, 4; GAU Stad II, 121, 6 and 13 December 1586; Broersma, Het tusschenbestuur, 67-68.
39. GAU Stad II, 121, 19 December 1586; Broersma and Busken Huet, 'Brieven over het Leycestersche tijdvak', 118-119.
40. GAU Stad II, 121, 5 January 1587; II, 3, 30 December 1586.
41. RAU Staten 231:3, 6 January 1587.
42. GAU Stad II, 121, 8 January 1587; Bor, XXII, 5v.
43. GAU Stad II, 121, 11 January 1587; Bor, XXII, 5v-6.
44. GAU Stad II, 121, 27 January 1587; Bor, XXII, 11v-13v; Broersma, Het tusschenbestuur, 84-85.
45. RAU Staten 231:3, 8 February 1587; the agreement was ratified on 13 February.
46. See Chapter VI, note 112.
47. RSG, V, 709, 17 January 1587 (NS); den Tex, Oldenbarnevelt, I, 86.
48. Schout and city council of Utrecht to Estates-General, 16 January 1587; Bor, XXII, 27; RAU Staten 231:3, 4 February 1587.
49. Broersma, Het tusschenbestuur, 107-108; RAU Staten 264:5, 26 March 1586; Bor, XXII, 77; den Tex, Oldenbarnevelt, I, 93-94 and 103-104.
50. Utrecht to Leicester, 4 April 1587; Broersma and Busken Huet, 'Brieven over het Leycestersche tijdvak', 186-187.
51. RAU Staten 264:5, 1 April 1587.
52. Gilpin to Wilkes, Utrecht, 25 April 1587, CSP Foreign, XXI (3), 29-30; Broersma, Het tusschenbestuur, 120-121 (Broersma calls Buckhurst's refusal to co-operate with Prouninck 'one of the most important facts of 1587'); cf. Elizabeth to Buckhurst, Croydon, 3 May 1587, CSP Foreign, XXI (3), 48-50; den Tex, Oldenbarnevelt, I, 106-107.

53. Bor, XXI, 39; Wilkes to Leicester, the Hague, 4 January 1587: Brugmans, Correspondentie van Robert Dudley, II, 21.
54. Jean Hotman to Leicester, the Hague, 7 January 1587: Broersma and Busken Huet, 'Brieven over het Leycestersche tijdvak', 121-122.
55. Prouninck to Buckhurst(?), Utrecht, 20 May 1587 in ibid., 214-215; Broersma, Het tusschenbestuur, 131-133; Brutel de la Riviere, Het leven van Hermannus Moded, 120; Buckhurst to Walsingham, the Hague, 2 June 1587: Brugmans, Correspondentie van Robert Dudley, II, 307. The whole episode remains somewhat obscure, however. I am grateful to Dr. Simon Adams for information about Lord North.
56. GAU Stad II, 121, 20 May and 3 July 1587.
57. Gilpin to [Walsingham?], Dordrecht, 21 August 1587, CSP Foreign, XXI (3), 264.
58. Wilkes to Leicester, the Hague, 12 March 1587: Brugmans, Correspondentie van Robert Dudley, II, 147.
59. GAU Stad II, 121, 21 and 28 September 1587.
60. The members of the council are listed in Raven, 'Kronijk van Utrecht 1576-1591': only thirty-seven names are given for 1587. At least one of the men of the 1586 council had died by the end of that year. RSG, V, 753, 9 October 1587 (NS); Leicester to Estates-General, Utrecht, 2 October 1587: Brugmans, Correspondentie van Robert Dudley, III, 199-200.
61. J.A. Grothe, 'Handschrift betreffende de Leycestersche twisten te Utrecht in 1587 en 1588', KHG, XIV (1858), 156-189, 161-162; RSG, V, 751-752, 22 September 1587 (NS).
62. RAU Staten 231:3, 22 September 1587; Bor, XXIII, 43; Grothe, 'Handschrift', 164-165.
63. Bor, XXIII, 43v-45.
64. Bor, XXIII, 43v-45; Grothe, 'Handschrift', 165-166. Both these accounts are from the gentry's point of view. For Leicester's version, see Leicester to Council of State, Utrecht, 29 September 1587: Brugmans, Correspondentie van Robert Dudley, III, 186-189. Note that p. 187 note 3 wrongly identifies 'van Nijvelt' as the Holland nobleman, Willem van Zuylen van Nyevelt, lord of Aartsbergen.
65. RAU Staten 264:5, 5 October 1587.
66. Grothe, 'Handschrift', 170ff, 180.
67. RSG, V, 753, 7 December 1587 (NS) and RSG, VI, 259, 5 March 1588 (NS); Grothe, 'Handschrift', 181-182. The originals of the 'letters of safeguard' or 'reprisals' are in RAU Staten 753.
68. A copy of this protest, and all the correspondence which followed, in RAU Staten 231:3, after the resolutions for 1587. It is printed in Bor, XXIII, 100v.

69. Declaration by the Woerden Ridderschap to Nieuwenaar, Leoninus and Valcke, 14 February 1588, in RAU Staten 231:3, loc. cit.
70. Memorandum by Nieuwenaar, Leoninus and Valcke to the Woerden Ridderschap, 16 January 1588, RAU Staten 231:3, loc. cit.
71. RAU Staten 231:4, 9 and 25 April, 29 May 1588; RSG, VI, 264-265, 26 April 1588 (NS).
72. den Tex, Oldenbarnevelt, I, 119-121.
73. RAU Staten 231:4, 18 May 1588.
74. den Tex, Oldenbarnevelt, I, 127-129, 134.
75. Gilpin to Willoughby, Delft, 17 May 1588; HMC Ancaster, 144; Bor, XXIV, 116-117; RAU Staten 231:4, 29 May 1588; Wilkes to Leicester, the Hague, 4 January 1587, as note 53 above; RSG, VI, 271, 19 July 1588 (NS).
76. RAU Staten 264:6, 16 June 1588; 231:4, 29 June 1588.
77. Killigrew to Burghley, the Hague, 2 July 1588; Killigrew to Walsingham, the Hague, 9 July 1588, CSP Foreign, XXII, 2 and 19; Webbes to Willoughby, Utrecht, 30 July 1588 (probably NS), HMC Ancaster, 174.
78. RAU Staten 231:4, 5-8 July 1588 *passim.*; cf. 19 July 1588.
79. Declaration of the Estates, 14 August 1588, in CSP Foreign, XXII, 134-136; Bor, XXIV, 114v-115v; XXV, 14v.
80. Elizabeth to Nieuwenaar, 4 September 1588; Leicester to Nieuwenaar, 4(?) September(?) 1588, CSP Foreign, XXII, 181-182; Ackersdijck, "Bijdrage tot het medegedeelde", 218.
81. Nieuwenaar to Willoughby, Utrecht, 17 September 1588, HMC Ancaster, 190; GAU Stad II, 121, 19 September 1588; Standing Committee of Utrecht to Willoughby, 19 September 1588, HMC Ancaster, 192.
82. Prouninck to Willoughby, Utrecht, 19 September 1588, and Prouninck to Killigrew, Utrecht, 21 September 1588, HMC Ancaster, 191, 194.
83. Bor, XXV, 25-26. There is an account by one of Nieuwenaar's supporters in CSP Foreign, XXII, 224-225, and a version by the new magistracy in their letter to Willoughby of 3 October 1588, in Bor, XXV, 29-29v, which blames an attempted coup by Prouninck for the riots.
84. RAU Staten 246:6, 26 September 1588; GAU Stad II, 121, 26-28 September 1588.
85. RAU Staten 231:4, 17 October 1588.
86. RAU Staten 231:4, 24 and 29 October 1588, 14 January 1590.
87. GAU Stad II, 121, 20 January 1589.

88. Stephen le Sieur to Willoughby, Arnhem, 28 March 1588, HMC Ancaster, 109. See Chapter II, p. 43.
89. Bor, XXV, 29v; 'Proces van Trillo, 1588' in KHG, XXX (1874), 177-179. Ten years later, the Estates still had enough of a grudge against Trillo to oppose an allowance of 50 guilders per month voted to him by the Estates-General. Heermale to Estates of Utrecht(?), the Hague, 7 March 1598, in Dotd van Flensburg, VII, 286-287.
90. 'Proces van Prouninck, 1588', KHG, XXX (1874), 172-177; Elizabeth to city council of Utrecht, St. James's, 17 October 1588; Essex to Nieuwenaar, St. James's, 15 October 1588, copies in RAU Staten 1029:A; RAU Staten 231:4, 17 February 1589; Prouninck to Willoughby, Utrecht, 17 February 1589, HMC Ancaster, 256-257; Bor, XXV, 31v.
91. Fruin, 'Motley's Geschiedenis', passim.; Geyl, Revolt of the Netherlands, 210; C. Wilson, Queen Elizabeth and the Revolt of the Netherlands (London, 1970), 97.
92. den Tex, 'De Staten in Oldenbarnevelts tijd', 57.
93. Oosterhoff, The Earl of Leicester's Governorship, chapter 5, passim.
94. Burgers of Utrecht to Leicester, 29 March 1586(?): Brugmans, Correspondentie van Robert Dudley, I, 356 (wrongly dated December 1586).
95. Oosterhoff, The Earl of Leicester's Governorship, 170; Vijlbrief, Van anti-aristocratie tot democratie, 55ff.
96. Broersma, Het tusschenbestuur, 46; cf. Fruin, 'Motley's Geschiedenis', 142-143.
97. den Tex, Oldenbarnevelt, I, 106; Kossmann and Mellink, Texts, 48.
98. RAU RA 4:1, 12 September 1588.

NOTES

CHAPTER VIII

1. Parker, The Dutch Revolt, 220.
2. Wansink, 'Holland and six allies', 133; J.C. Boogman, 'Die holländische Tradition in der niederländischen Geschichte', Westfälische Forschungen, XV (1962), 96-108, 96.
3. Smit, 'The Netherlands Revolution', 29.
4. H.G. Koenigsberger, 'Monarchies and Parliaments in early modern Europe', Theory and Society, V (1978), 191-217, 198.
5. Dhondt, Estates or powers, 42; Wils, 'De werking van de Staten van Brabant', *passim.*; C. Hirschauer, Les Etats d'Artois de leurs origines à l'occupation française 1340-1640, 2 vols. (Paris and Brussels, 1923), chapter 1.
6. A.R. Myers, Parliaments and Estates in Europe to 1789 (London, 1975), 79.
7. E.g. Parker, The Dutch Revolt, 244-246.
8. Kossmann and Mellink, Texts, 44ff; P. Geyl, 'An interpretation of Vrancken's Deduction of 1587 on the nature of the Estates of Holland's power' in C.H. Carter, ed., From the Renaissance to the Counter-Reformation: essays in honour of Garrett Mattingly (London, 1966), 230-246, 235-236. Geyl points out Vrancken's stress on 'the representative character of the Estates [of Holland]'.
9. de Bruin, 'De soevereiniteit in de republiek', 32 and 40. See also Appendix I.
10. Wansink, 'Holland and six allies', 135.
11. J.J. Woltjer, Friesland in Hervormingstijd (Leiden, 1962); 'Kleine oorzaken, grote gevolgen' (Inaugural lecture, Leiden, 1975); and 'De vredemakers', especially p. 75.
12. J.S. Coonan's forthcoming thesis (University of St. Andrews); Hirschauer, Les Etats d'Artois, I, 266; Woltjer, 'Kleine oorzaken', 5ff.
13. RAU Staten 231:3, 26 June 1585.
14. Woltjer, 'De vredemakers', 86-87.
15. M.E. Howard, Soldiers and governments: nine studies in civil-military relations (London, 1957), 29.

Notes to Appendix I

1. Kossmann and Mellink, Texts, 216-228, 37.
2. Cf. Parker, The Dutch Revolt, 197-200.
3. RSG, III, 284, 10 June 1581.
4. RAU Staten 261, 2 August 1581; 231:2, 10 August 1581. Not all the delay was the fault of the Estates: the text of the new oath and the order to re-appoint all acceptable officials did not arrive in Utrecht until 10 September: Council of State to Estates of Utrecht, Ghent, 24 August 1581, RAU Staten 285:1.
5. "Plakkaat op het afzweren van den koning van Spanje" in KHG, XXII (1866), 78-102.
6. GAU Stad II, 121, 12 October 1581; RAU Staten 231:2, 6 September, 14 October, 20 November 1581; 261, 12 and 16 December 1581; Montfoort to Estates, 23 November and 15 December 1581: RAU Staten 279:1.
7. RAU AKD 1:21, 3 November 1581; AKM 41:1, 12 September 1581; AKJ 1:4, 11 and 12 September 1581.
8. RAU Staten 231:2, 18 April 1582; 231:3, 26 June 1585. GAA Dagelijxboek, III (2), 17 April, 15 and 17 May 1582; van Bommel, Beschryving der stad Amersfoort, II.
9. See Chapter VI.
10. GAU Stad II, 121, 28 October 1581. Note, however, that even before the Abjuration, the Standing Committee's oath made no mention of the king: RAU Staten 261, 5 January 1581.
11. RAU Staten 264:1, 11 September 1583; 264:2, 1 March 1584. Ten years later, the Estates and the Hof were obliged to remove the gallows erected in Langerak by its lord, who had also angered the Estates by his use of the title vrijheer. Ledenberg to Heermale, 14 April 1594, KHG, XX (1864), 171-172; RAU Staten 264:6, 5 April 1588. In 1599, Gideon van den Boetzelaer finally recognised the Estates' sovereignty over Langerak: Fruin, "De vrije heerlijkheden", 374.
12. RAU Staten 231:4, 15 July, 11 October and 30 December 1589.

ARCHIVAL SOURCES

This thesis is based principally on sources in the Rijksarchief Utrecht (which houses the archives of the Estates, the Hof and the five chapter churches); the Gemeentearchief Utrecht, where the records of the city are to be found, and the Gemeentearchief Amersfoort. The most important of these sources were the records and resolutions of the various institutions discussed in the text: the Estates themselves, their Standing Committee, the city council, the five churches and the town council of Amersfoort. In addition, the accounts of several receivers of tax, and several collections of correspondence were consulted. The latter included letters to and from central bodies such as the Estates-General, and some correspondence of the Estates' advocate, Floris Thin.

The references for these principal collections are as follows:

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231 (nos. 1-4,6): Resolutions of the Estates 1577-1590, 1598.

261: Resolutions of the Gedeputeerde Staten 1576-1582.

264 (nos. 1-8): Resolutions of the Gedeputeerde Staten 1583-1590.

285: Letters from the Council of State, the Governors-General, the Landraad, etc., 1576-1685 (N.B. there are no letters between December 1581 and March 1586.)

1035 and 1036: Incoming letters (including those to Thin) and minutes of outgoing letters.

B.: S. Muller, Catalogus van het archief [van de stad Utrecht]:

Section I

13: Proceedings of the city council 1569-1577.

Section II

1: Collection of numbered documents, including material on the exercise of Roman Catholic and Reformed worship, and on disputes between the city and the chapters.

3: Collection of documents on the crisis of 1585-1588.

121: Proceedings of the city council 1577-1590, 1598.

3599: Accounts of the receivers of the Estates' imposts 1580-1581, 1583-1584.

3602: Accounts of the receivers of the generale middelen 1585-1586, 1589-1590.

3603: Accounts of the receivers of the double oudschildgeld 1585-1586, 1589-1590.

3574: Accounts of the receivers of the Archbishop's tithes 1585 and 1586.

G.: K. Heeringa, Inventaris van het archief van het kapittel ten Dom (Utrecht, 1929):

1:20,21: Proceedings of the chapter 1574 1587 (including the joint deliberations of the five chapters).

D.: B.M. de Jonge van Ellemeet, Inventaris van het archief van het kapittel van St. Jan:

1:4: Proceedings of the chapter 1577-1585.

E.: [Reynders], Inventaris van het archief van het gemeente Amersfoort (Amersfoort, 1903):

38: Dagelixboek, I: Proceedings of the town council 1544-1577.

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Dagelixboek no. 3: Proceedings of the town council 1580-1586.

Dagelixboek no. 4: Proceedings of the town council 1586-1589.

Dagelixboek no. 5: Proceedings of the town council 1589-1594.

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