NORTH WESTERN APPROACHES : OPERATIONAL ASPECTS OF SCOTLAND'S MARITIME ROLE IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR Andrew Jeffrey A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of St Andrews 2001 Full metadata for this item is available in St Andrews Research Repository at: http://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/ Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10023/13775 This item is protected by original copyright ApproagiÈ ProQuest Number: 10166861 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com p le te manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. uest ProQuest 10166861 Published by ProQuest LLO (2017). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code Microform Edition © ProQuest LLO. ProQuest LLO. 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.Q. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346 NORTH W ESTERN APPROACHES OPERATIONAL ASPECTS OF SCOTLAND’S MARITIME ROLE IN j THE SECOND WORLD WAR ] Copyright © Andrew Jeffrey, 2001. The moral right of the author has been asserted. . ' S-il. -À L .../)RTH WESTERN APPROACH^ I, A ndrew Jeffrey , hereby certify th a t th is thesis has been w ritten by m e, th a t it is the reco rd o f w ork carried o u t by m e and th a t it has n o t been subm itted in any prev ious application fo r a h igher degree. / D ate: ^ ^ ^ O I S ignature o f candidate: ^ I was adm itted as a research s tuden t under O rd inance 12 on 22 ^September 1997 and as a cand idate fo r Ph .D . in Sep tem ber 1998. T he h igher study fo r w hich this thesis is a reco rd was carried o u t a t St A ndrew s betw een 1997 and,j2û04^ Date: q / j 0 f S ignature o f candidate: I hereby certify th a t th e cand idate has fulfilled th e cond itions o f 'th e R eso lu tion and Regulations app rop ria te fo r degree o f Ph .D . in the U h lv e rs i ty ^ f St Andrew s and th a t the cand idate is qualified to subm it th is thesis in app lication fo r th a t degree. D ate: ^ S ignature o f supervisor: ^ In subm itting th is thesis to the U niversity o f St A ndrew s I w ish access to it to be sub jec t to the cond ition tha t, fo r a p e riod o f tw o years from the date o f subm ission , i t will be w ithheld from use. I understand , however, th a t the title and ab strac t o f the thesis will be pub lished during th is period o f res tric ted access; and th a t a fte r the expiry o f th is p e riod the thesis will be m ade available fo r use in accordance w ith the regu la tions o f the University L ibrary fo r the tim e being in force, sub jec t to any copyrigh t in the w ork n o t be ing affec ted thereby , and a copy o f the w ork may be m ade and supplied to any bona fide lib rary or research worker. Chapter One Chapter Two Chapter Three Chapter Four Preface Introduction Distortion and B^ ceived Wisdom - The Case fora Study. The Uterature. Scope and Presentation. Containment and Petreat— The Nortb Sea to April 1940, The Introduction of Convoy. The Northern Patrol. The Northern Mine Barrage. The Montrose — Obrestad Patrol. Attacks on the Nome Fleet and its Scottish Bases. Naval War in Northern Waters to April 1940 in Betrospect. First Challenge on the Norway Ponte, U boat attacks on the Scotland-Norway convoys. Trawlers in thefirst A ir Attacks. U boatpatrols nsume off Scotland, A ir Attacks Intensiff Scandinavian convoys in Bstrospect. Battle of the Atlantic I — Scottish Coastal Convoys to Mcy 1943. First Baids. Magnetic Mines. Convoy Attacks. A ir Attacks on Clydeside. Coastal Convoys - March 1941-May 1943. German Signals Intelligence. Scottish Coastal Convoys in Betrospect. Battle of the Atlantic II — North-Western Approaches 1940-41, Wolfpacks in the North-Western Approaches. 'Lufiwaffe operations over the North-Western Approaches. Balance Sheet in the North-Western Approaches. HMS Western Isles— Escort Group Training. Scotland's part in Breaking Enigrna. Coastal Command’s U boat War from Scotland. The Schnorchel and the end of Scotland’s U boat War. Scotland’s Gateway — The Bdver Clyde. Scotlarrd’s Atlantic Bj)le in Bjtrospect. 9 19 22 24 27 34 38 41 4=2 45 50 57 60 Anniversary (1943-1993). (Brodie Pubiisliing 1993). North Western Approaches T h e L i t e r a t u r e Any critical review of published writings with direct relevance to wartime Scotland is con­ strained by the fact that such works are, to say the least, thin on the ground. And of those that do exist, too many evoke what Calder refers to as ‘The Myth o f The Blitz’.^ Among the earliest titles with a direct relevance to Scotland’s war, Caulfield’s melodramatic account o f the loss o f the Afhenia (Caulfield ; 1958) has a narrow focus. One o f the few post-war publications to consider aspects o f Scotland’s maritime role, A River Runs To War (Drummond : 1960) is worthy, if propagandist. Cast/e Commando (Gilchrist : 1960), an anec­ dotal account o f the author’s experiences at the Commando Basic Training Centre, Achna- carry Castle, is another product o f its period. Terror of Tobermory (Baker : 1972) describes the career of Admiral Stephenson o f Western Isles, the Western Approaches working up base at Tobermory, yet, by concentrating on one larger than life character, it less informa­ tive on the wider significance o f the Tobermory base. The Clydebank (Macphail : 1974) is a detailed account of the heavy air raids on Clydeside as they affected the town o f Clyde­ bank. But Dr. Macphail, who taught history at Clydebank High School, misrepresents the real story o f the Clydeside raids by making little reference to events outside Clydebank, thus contributing to the widely held and fallacious belief that only that town was bombed, a distortion enshrined in the generic term ‘Clydebank Blitz’ that has come to encompass all air raids on Scotland. The 1980s brought a rash of titles on the wider history of the Second World War, but again nothing o f real merit on Scotland. Journalists Ian Nimmo and Paul Harris produced Glas­ gow and The Clyde at War (Harris : 1986), Aberdeen at War (Harris : 1987) and Scotland at War (Nimmo ; 1989). Heavily dependent on the photo archives o f the Glasgow Herald and The Scotsman these largely pictorial accounts contain little beyond images approved by the war­ time censor. But carefully posed photographs o f happy evacuees, grinning rescued seamen, ostensibly cheerful Scottish-Italians being herded aboard ships bound for Canada and ap­ parently joUy air raid survivors absurdly and self-consciously giving thumbs-up signs from the ruins o f their homes are, at best, unhelpful. And despite the fact that the 1970s had seen the release o f much archival material on the war, where Nimmo and Harris do offer editorial it is generally of the ‘Finest Hour’, brave Clydesiders can ‘take it’ variety. This is not to suggest that the historiography o f the war should ignore patriotism and courage, but, faced since 1945 with seemingly relentless decline, the British have demonstrated a pervasive propensity for belief in their own propaganda. The Myth of The BHt^ (Calder : 1991) appeared in 1991 and, notably in a chapter entitled Celts, Reds and Conchies, but also elsewhere throughout this thought-provoking book, the North Western Approaches author includes much o f relevance to the Scottish experience o f war and its lingering effect on the national psyche. In his preface, Calder writes o f his ‘anger’ at the sentimentahsation o f the myth o f 1940, notably by politicians, and he is unable in his chilly, leftist analysis to keep his all-too-evident detestation o f Margaret Thatcher entirely under control. While lit­ tle work has been done on the Right in Scotland, Voices From War (1995) edited by Ian MacDougall, a leading light in both the Scottish Labour History Society and the Scottish Working People’s History Trust, is a must for anyone wishing to understand what made the Scottish working class tick during both world wars. By the end o f the 1980s it was apparent to this author that, although a raft o f titles was being produced on the Second World War in general, there was almost no published work on what happened in Scotland, when it happened, where it happened and why. So, between 1991 and 1993, I published three titles on Scotland’s war. The first attempt to introduce primary source material into narrative studies o f Scotland during the war, these were, nev­ ertheless, commercial ventures with limited scope. Also at that time, Scottish Television’s Scotland’s War series, which echoed the earlier World A t War even down to the sonorous delivery o f its voice-over, was being screened. This too represented a welcome break from the hitherto ‘couthy’ representation o f Scotland’s war. Thus, at the end o f a century which saw two truly global wars, sizeable conflicts such as the Boer, Korean, Falklands and Gulf Wars, not to mention the Cold War, in all o f which Scottish forces and bases were involved, it is surprising to find that the historiography of Scotland in at least one o f these global conflicts is so sparse. Indeed, a reading list for a course of academic study on the subject would be an unimpressive document as the stu­ dent would be forced to rely heavily on cherry-picking from titles with a wider ‘British’ or ‘World’ interest. All too many of these, in particular American titles, refer to Britain as England, but this irritating habit is by no means confined to US authors; for example in Williams’ 1997 Fleet Sweepers at War, the Moray Firth is referred to as being off the English coast! There is, o f course, no shortage o f published texts on the wider history o f the Second World War at sea. RoskiU’s prodigious output, notably his The War A t Sea series, must un­ derpin any study of the period. Maund (1949) and Fergusson (1961) both make reference to the work o f the Combined Training Centres on the Clyde in their respective works on Combined Operations. Ashworth (1992), Buckley (1995), Nesbit (1995) and Franks (1995) and others include material on Coastal Command operations from Scotland and numerous accounts o f Arctic convoys have been published. Padfield’s fine study o f submarine war­ fare, War Beneath the Sea (Padfield : 1995), is comprehensive, yet it is an example o f the dis- 5 Calder : 1991. North Western Approaches interest shown by historians in Scotland’s role for it largely ignores submarine operations in northern waters and, in particular, the work o f the Scottish flotillas. Evidential sources, often biographical, must be appraised in terms o f the context in which they were written and derivative reference works based on primary sources. The seminal A x is Submarine Suc­ cesses of World War Two (Rohwer : 1999) to name but one, are vital but offer little guidance for the broader consideration o f diverse facts. The fundamental point is that none o f these titles attempts to place Scotland’s unique and vital operational contribution to the war at sea, or even the wider war, into perspective. On the other hand, as the most intensely organised period in British history, the Second World War generated a vast archive o f primary sources. These range from the Western Approaches War Diaries, a sweeping chronicle o f events over millions o f square miles o f Atlantic Ocean, to the Queensferry ARP Post Log which offers a remarkably intense ac­ count limited only by the visible horizon. Some, compiled over a lengthy period, bear the mark o f many hands, others were written in the immediate aftermath of combat. Most are remarkably free o f prejudice and self-interest. Critically, however, as the bibliography for this theis shows, there are numerous primary sources on the part played by Scotland in the war, and on how the war affected Scotland. As the research for this thesis progressed, it was apparent that many of these documentary sources had rarely been examined since 1945, some o f them not at all. S c o p e a n d P r e s e n t a t i o n In his introduction to Maritime Supremacy and the Opening of the Western Mind (Padfield : 1999) writes o f maritime supremacy as, ‘the key which unlocks most, if not all o f the questions o f modern history,’ and o f geography as, ‘the defining factor in the growth o f both territorial and maritime power[s] and their opposing systems of government.’*^ This has long been true o f the British Isles, and never more so than during both world wars when, by dint o f geography. Great Britain’s principal strategic significance was maritime. And this was im­ measurably enhanced in 1940 when, with the sole exception of the Rock o f Gibraltar, the entire European littoral from the Aegean to the North Cape was either in enemy hands or neutral. In seeking to define the importance o f Scotland’s maritime role, this thesis addresses three fundamental questions. First, as so little is known of the course o f events around Scot­ land’s maritime fringe, what actually happened and how did her maritime infrastructure aid the war effort? Second, in what maritime and amphibious operations of the wider war did ^Padfield : 1999 pp. 1-5. North W estern Approaches Scotland play a part, and, third, how strategically significant was Scotland’s maritime role in these operations to the wider Allied effort? No single work could, or arguably should, attempt a comprehensive, omniscient study o f Scotland’s Second World War, even her maritime war. The subject is just too complex, and so little is yet known about it, that no such study could hope to be coherent. And, as the written word invariably trivialises military history, in an effort to avoid superficiality this thesis confines itself to distinct operational aspects o f Scotland’s sea war. Selected to cover a range o f maritime activity, these include the early use o f the Home Fleet based on Scot­ land to contain the Kreigsmarine inside the North Sea and Scotland’s role in the Atlantic trade war, including convoy battles both in the North Western Approaches and the coastal convoy route around Scotland. The performance o f the Clyde, Scotland’s principal port and one the two principal UK ports, is examined and placed in context. And the role o f the Combined Training Centres and other training establishments around Scotland in the de­ velopment of the amphibious warfare capability that would ultimately see the Allies ashore in Normandy is discussed. Finally, the thesis looks at the role o f the Scottish-based Home Fleet surface ships and submarines, along with aircraft o f Coastal Command operating from Scottish airfields, in the maritime war in Northern Waters. This includes considera­ tion o f their part in fighting convoys through to the Soviet Union, in the defeat o f the U boats and the Kreigsmarine surface fleet, and in the campaign o f deception and sabotage that tied down an Axis garrison of 350,000 men in Norway, well away from the main bat­ tlefield in Europe. The decision to concentrate on these areas o f study has been driven by the need to place Scotland's role in the context o f a world war, yet keep the resulting work within manage­ able proportions. And, while it may be that maritime history is too important to be left solely in the hands o f seamen, my own seagoing background was also a factor. But such is the enormous scope offered by study o f Scotland in the war, one o f the more frustrating features o f this project has been the amount o f material that has had to be left out. So the project aims to be more than merely an intellectual exercise in historical writing. In shed­ ding light on a neglected area o f Scottish, and indeed British, history, it is hoped that it will stimulate further study o f Scotland’s wartime experience. Photographs can, as noted above, be misleading if used indiscriminately, but this should not mean that all historical writing should take purely textual form. This thesis is illustrated throughout both to illuminate adjacent text and to carry discreet information, though the images used have been selected with a critical eye. Maps accompanying the text are in Mer­ cator projection. It should be borne in mind that this has an increasingly distorting effect in northern latitudes as meridians o f longitude are opened out to allow the earth’s surface North Western Approaches to represented as a flat surface and meridians o f latitude are stretched to compensate. While this makes charts navigationally accurate, it has the effect, particularly noticeable on large scale charts, o f making land masses appear disproportionately large the further north one goes. (Navigators in polar regions use gnomonic projection charts centred on the magnetic north pole and much pioneering work in polar navigation was carried out by war­ time RAF navigators operating from SuUom Voe on patrols to the far north.) For the sake o f continuity, naval date-time groups are used throughout the text and are presented as x x x x /x x being time/date. Unless otherwise stated, all times given are local. Otherwise, and in line with contemporary practice, Greenwich Mean Time is given as x x x x Z /x x , British Summer Time as x x x xA /x x and British Double Summer Time as x x x x B / x x . Central Euro­ pean Time is annotated (CET). North Western Approaches L.Da'Dfer une CONTAINMENT AND RETREAT - THE NORTH SEA AND NORTHERN WATERS TO APRIL 1940 Over-extended and unwieldy, by 1939 the British Empire lacked homogeneity and its oceanic trade routes had become all but impossible to defend. The Empire was also then a much looser confederation than it had been in 1914 and the whole-hearted support o f the dominions for another war was by no means assured. Meanwhile, the United States, pursuing a Pacific agenda, had insisted on the ending of the Anglo-Japanese alliance that had brought Japan into the First World War on the Allied side. British interests in the Far East were left dangerously exposed before increasing Japanese bellicosity, but sending a fleet to the new base at Singapore would leave the Royal Navy in home waters seriously denuded. Australia, New Zealand and India were thus all but indefensible. Britain had made a tentative start on rearmament in 1934 but, notably in respect o f the RAF and Royal Navy, this was essentially defensive in nature. Not that, at least in respect o f the Navy, this was anything new. Britain’s maritime Empire began to decline in the early years o f the century as her economic and naval dominance was challenged by younger, dynamic powers, notably the United States and Germany, and after the near-disastrous Boer War did so much to expose its vulnerability. This brought a gradual change in British maritime policy from defending far-flung Imperial trade routes to facing, in alliance with France, a rapidly rising military superpower across the North Sea. As the naval arms race that would culminate in the First World War reached a crescendo in January 1912, First Sea Lord Winston Churchill said, ‘The purposes o f British naval power are essentially defensive,’ and suggested that the British fleet was a necessity for a maritime power while the then nascent German Navy was a luxury’.^ The British Army in 1939 was small and, while an expansion programme had been approved, this would take time to have any effect. These widely-known military weaknesses lay behind many o f the apparent political failures in the 1930s and forced the British government into a policy o f containment when war broke out. There may have been no 1 Padfield : 1993 p. 820. North Western Approaches other option, but British policy was also over laden with much wishful thinking. Intelligence assessments in the late 1930s had suggested that a fragile German economy had been over-extended by rearmament and that the population was restless as a result. A naval blockade, the principal British maritime strategy for almost 300 years, would, it was beheved, bring about a coUapse similar to that of 1918 in under two years.^ This sort of wholly fallacious strategic intelUgence, offering as it did the prospect of a quick fix, held considerable appeal for a British administration wrestling with an intractable conflict of worldwide strategic interests, uncomfortable economic reaUty and mihtary weakness. Though it must be said that German strategic intelligence about Britain and the United States in particular was even more at odds with reality. German territorial gains in 1940 would render the whole concept o f their economic weakness obsolete.^ T h e I n t r o d u c t io n o f C o n v o y Addressed Admiralty Naval Wireless. From Malin Head Radio. 3 /9 /3 9 . Important Important. Admiral Rosyth. Intercept 2059. Jamming near. SSSS SSSS SSSS Athenia GFDM torpedoed 5644 1405.4 The Glasgow hner Athenia (13,581T) left Princes Dock in the Clyde at 1200/1 September 1939 and, having called at Belfast and Liverpool, set course through the North Channel for Montreal. Among her 1,102 passengers were 469 Canadians, 311 Americans and 150 European refugees. At 1939/3, some 150 miles west of Ireland, Kapitanleutnant Fritz- JuHus Lemp in \J-30 fired four torpedoes, one o f which hit Athenians port side at the bulkhead between the engine room and no. 5 hold. Two men were killed in the engine room, but much of the blast vented upwards through the hatch cover, kilhng and injuring women and children on the deck above. The Norwegian tanker Knute Nelson, the Swedish yacht Southern Cross and the American steamer City of Flint responded to Athenia’s distress message, arriving just after 0001/4, and the destroyers Escort, Electra and Futy came up at daybreak after being detached from the Home Fleet at sea west of the Hebrides. Athenia sinking early on 4 September 1939. 2 The Economic Blockade. History of the Second World War Civil Series, W. N. Medlicott. HMSO 1952-1959. vol. 1 p. 24-37. ^See Strategic IntelUgence and the Outbreak of the Second World War article by Richard Overy in War in Histoty vol. 5 no. 1. 4 ADM 199 140. North Western Approaches One hundred and twelve o f Athenia’ passengers and crew died. Since overshadowed by the wider war, in September 1939 the impact o f U~30's torpedo did more than just sink one ship; it caused a worldwide reaction comparable to that which followed the sinking o f the Lusitania. German memories o f how unrestricted submarine warfare had done much to bring the United States into the First World War were only too clear, and various steps, including the crude faking o f U-30’s log, were taken to conceal Kriegsmarine involvement.^ In America, news o f the sinking shrieked from the front pages alongside news o f the British declaration o f war. In Glasgow, as elsewhere in Britain, the reaction was a mixture o f shock and revulsion. Most importantly, however, the Admiralty concluded, wrongly as it turned out, that unrestricted submarine warfare had begun and extended convoy arrangements without delay. (The first convoy had sailed Gibraltar for Cape Town on 2 September, the day before war broke out.) Britain’s Merchant Navy, and those o f her dominions, began the war in a seemingly dominant position with 32.5% of world tonnage, but this apparent strength concealed fundamental weaknesses.^ The interwar years had been difficult for world shipping, and particularly fraught for British shipowners who had to cope with economic depression, unfavourable exchange rates and increasing competition. British non-coal exports fell from a peak of 17 million tons in 1929 to 9.8 million tons in 1933, though it did recover to 13.5 million tons in 1937. But, again excluding coal, in 1938 British exports were running at 68% o f their 1913 tonnage. Not only did British liner owners suffer from declining traditional industries, but they were also increasingly exposed to aggressive competition, most notably from Scandinavia. And British shipowners failed to build new tonnage, or reconstruct older tonnage, to meet the requirements o f new markets. By way of a comparison, in 1939 some 62.2% o f Norway’s merchant tonnage comprised modern, economical, diesel-powered ships as opposed to just 25.6% of the British merchant fleet.? British-owned tramps lagged even farther behind, the typical British tramp being then still a 9-knot coal burner. As a result, British share o f world seaborne trade had declined from 52% in 1912 to 40% in 1936, a decline that was particularly marked outwith the Empire.® Against a background of frequent disarmament conferences and constant financial constraints, in 1932 the Admiralty was operating on the principle, established in 1925, that the Royal Navy in home waters should be strong enough to hold the Une against a ^Fregattenkapitan Gunther Hesslet saw a BdU document, later destroyed, in which Lemp stated that he had believed Athenia was an Auxiliary Cruiser. But Vause : 1997 su^ests tliat Lemp made, . .a stupid mistake; it broke every rule in the book and put the U-Bootwaffe and the Reich Propaganda Office on tlie defensive immediately.' Caulfield : 1958. Rohwer : 1999. Dunnett : 1960 p. 76. See also Brassey ; 1948 p. 39. *> Merchant Shipping and The Demands of War. C. B. A. Behrens. HMSO 1978 p. 17 for comparative tables o f world tonnage over 100 tons gross in 1914 and 1937. See also 1939 figures for registered sliipping over 500 tons in British Shipping and World Competition Sturmey : 1962 pp. 139-140. ’ Sturmey op. cit. p. 84. 8 Ibid. p. 89. North Western Approaches European aggressor until reinforcements could be brought home from the Far East. But the political and strategic landscape across Europe and in the Far East was changing radically and, faced with the bleak prospect o f simultaneous hostilities with Germany, Italy and Japan, Chatfield’s Admiralty, like its political masters, placed excessive, even naïve, faith the 1935 Anglo-German Naval Agreement. Not until the end o f 1937 was it acknowledged that only Germany could deliver a decisive blow at the heart of the British Empire. The two-power strategy was evolved whereby the Navy at Singapore should be strong enough to act as a deterrent to the Japanese and the Navy at home should be capable o f taking on Germany.^ The Navy’s newest capital ships. Nelson and Rodney, themselves less capable than originally intended, were 12 years old. With the exception of Hood which, though laid down in 1916, was not commissioned until after the 1918 armistice, all the other capital ships were First World War veterans. Considerable sums were spent, from 1933, on reconstructing four Queen EUtyaheth class battleships, yet Nelson, Rodney and the reconstructed Warspite were still slower than their German counterparts.^® Only the battlecruisers Hood, Renown and Repulse could have caught even the German ‘pocket battleships’ in a straight chase, and they would still have been out-gunned. The contest for the elderly but reconstructed Renown and the superannuated Repulse in the albeit unlikely event o f a straight fight against the German battlecruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau would have been even more unequal. In anti-submarine warfare the picture in 1939 was just as depressing. The Navy had ended the First World War with 477 escort vessels, but, while Britain’s dependency on maritime trade had altered little, the number o f escorts had reduced to 201 by 1939.^^ It would be too easy to lay the blame for British unpreparedness for a trade war in the Atlantic at the door o f a parsimonious Treasury, but, as Peden writes; .. .nothing can be more certain than that Treasury officials were under no illusions as to the danger posed by Germany, Japan and Italy.. .Deterrence o f Germany was seen as the key, but a world-wide Empire and dependence on commerce inhibited concentration o f defence resources against Germany.^2 And, as Kennedy writes: The final irony o f British defence policy in the inter-war years was that the Treasury, cursed by the “rearmers” at the time and alm ost universally scorned in historical literature, was in 9 See Roskill : 1976 ch.s XI and XIII, also Peden : 1979 p. 113 et passim and The First Sea Lords (M.H. Murfett (ed) : 1995), in particular ch. 11 by Eric Grove on Admiral Sir Ernie Chatfield. The Queen Elii a^beth class rebuild programme first came under active consideration following machinery surveys in 1928. Detailed planning o f the reconstruction o f 34,000 ton Warspite, the first ship to be taken in hand, got under way in June 1933 and the modernised Warspite began trials in August 1936 just as tlie new 64,170 ton Japanese battleship Yamato armed with 18” guns was nearing completion. O f the seven planned part or complete reconstructions, four had been carried out before war began. ADM 1 18774. Roskill : 1976. 11 Tliis does not include 20 Asdic-equipped trawlers. See Naval Folicy between the Wars monograph by Roskill. 12 Peden : 1997 p. 113. North Western Approaches fact perfectly correct in its Cassandra-like forebodings.!^ Wilmott takes a different line, suggesting that the Royal Navy was, in fact, not badly placed to meet the threat to trade in 1939, indeed better placed to defend British trade than Germany was to undertake an offensive against it. Any attempt to have built up British anti-submarine forces before die last couple o f years prior to the outbreak o f war would have b een .. .financially irresponsible and strategically irrelevant. In Britain’s straitened interwar circumstances any attempt on the part o f the Royal Navy to have developed anti­ submarine forces would have encountered a very predictable response from the Treasury.!'! At the core of Wilmott’s argument is his peculiar assertion that, until 1938, the Navy had no enemy in Europe. But, as Ranft et al point out, reports o f German naval expansionist intentions first reached London in April 1934 and further intelligence, some from the Deuxieme Bureau, followed at regular intervals. Notably, in January 1935, the British Naval Attaché in Berlin referred to conversations with Raeder and others and reported that Germany was concealing the construction o f two battleships which were over the treaty limits. These became Scharnhorst and Gneisenaud^ There were many other indications of German rearmament, notably in March 1935 when a kite-flying Hitler revealed to the British press the existence o f the Luftwaffe and, six days later, announced an imposing new German army of 36 divisions based on conscription.!® Politicians, particularly in Britain and France were merely reflecting the national mood when, from 1935 onwards, they sought to avoid war, even if this meant ignoring the writing on the wall. But the Admiralty, which was receiving regular and clear intelligence o f German Naval rearmament, including U boat construction, both overestimated the effectiveness o f British Naval technology and underestimated the trade protection capability that would be required. From 1932, it was planned to build three cruisers and just two A /S escorts annually, then, in 1936, First Lord Sir Bolton Eyres Monsell assured Ministers that submarines would be less important in a future conflict than they had been in the First World War.!? That year’s estimates included two new battleships, the 1937 estimates included three more battleships, two carriers and seven cruisers along with 34 destroyers, 12 sloops and 15 submarines. As Grove writes, the then First Sea Lord Sir Ernie Chatfield accepted that he failed to fully recognise the true scale o f the U boat menace, and only in the 1939 estimates do escort vessels appear in numbers.!® Thus, in 1939, the most immediate shortages lay in long-range escort vessels with sufficient Kennedy : 1976 p. 297. !4 Paper by H, P. Wilmott in Battle of the Atlantic — 50*^ ‘ Anniversaiy International Naval Conference. Howarth and Law (ed. s) see pp. 181-182. Ranft etal : 1977 p. 138. !** Home : 1990 p. 87. !!' Peden : 1979 p. 166. !8 Murfett (ed.) : 1995 p. 167. 12 North Western Approaches speed, technology and hitting power to catch and destroy U-boats, and in tactics and training. Much of the responsibility for this must He with the Admiralty which, faced with the competing imperatives to defend both the centre and imperial trade routes, gave A /S warfare low priority between the wars. New construction priorities and the attendant personnel and training programmes may appear, with the benefit o f hindsight, to have been ill-judged, yet it is possible to sympathise with Admirals for whom the capital ship was the ultimate representation o f naval might. All their experience pointed to the torpedo and the bomb being erratic weapons o f dubious effectiveness, and the addition o f anti­ torpedo bulges was thought to have rendered capital ships all-but invulnerable to torpedo attack. This is not to suggest that the Royal Navy in 1939 was a paper tiger; it was after all much larger the Kreigsmarine, but it was scattered around the world in penny packets to protect imperial trade routes and meet the emergent threats from Germany, Italy and Japan. There were sloops, minesweepers and modern fleet destroyers, but capital ships dare not move witliout drawing on this already over-stretched force. Britain still led the world in shipbuilding, but the depression had wrought considerable damage to heavy industry and the sudden growth in warship building had a knock-on effect on merchant vessel construction, using up yard capacity. Then the Treasury, keenly aware that the confHcting demands o f all three services were coming up against physical Hmits o f production, were concerned at the inflationary effect of naval expansion on the wider economy. New construction used up capacity hitherto used to manufacture export goods and demand for scarce raw materials and speciaHst machine tools, for example, meant rapidly rising imports. For example, 20 Hunt class destroyers were ordered in the 1939 estimates. These small, Hghtly-built ships had insufficient endurance for ocean escort duty, but they did draw on scarce, generally imported special steels used in the manufacture o f turbine blades. The forming o f these blades and similar precision finishing work was increasingly dependent on machine tools imported from the United States.!^ It was the consequent need for an escort vessel with reciprocating machinery, which could be built quickly in large numbers, that led to the Flower class corvette. Based on a commercial whalecatcher design. Flowers were simpler, faster and cheaper to build than sloops or destroyers, and orders for 60 were placed in July and August 1939 with 16 shipbuilders, few of whom had experience o f warship construction. Flowers were originally conceived as a coastal convoy escort as it was not considered that close escort would be required for ocean convoys which would, in theory, be beyond the range o f aircraft operating from Germany and U boats bottled up in the North Sea by the British blockade. Only capable o f 15 knots, almost four knots slower than a surface-running U boat, they Kennedy : 1976 p. 297 et passim. North Western Approaches were lightly armed with a single 4” gun and 40 depth charges. And, while they did have the range for ocean escort work, particularly in their earliest form, they were notoriously uncomfortable, their endurance being limited as much by the need to rest their crews as by effective range. As the Staff History o f the North Atlantic Campaign states, by the end of 1940 it was apparent that neither sloops nor corvettes could stand up to the North Atlantic in winter.2o Losses in Norway, at Dunkirk and elsewhere meant that, by mid-July 1940, the escort force available to Western Approaches Command comprised just 10 sloops, 22 destroyers and corvettes and ‘a number o f trawlers’. Additional ships were available from other commands, but that meant either reducing anti-invasion defences or abandoning convoy on, for example, the Gibraltar run.^i Asdic, the underwater sound ranging device with its characteristic heterodyne pinging, was seen by many before the war as a panacea. Such was the confidence in its abilities, when the 1936 Naval estimates were presented to Parliament, MPs were reassured that, thanks to the introduction of what was euphemistically referred to as modern equipment, ‘...fewer destroyers could do the work formerly done by many.’ Whether this work was to be trade protection or protecting the fleet was not specified. But Asdic, particularly in its early manifestations, had serious shortcomings well-known to Royal Navy submariners; it had limited range, it could not determine the depth o f targets and it was readily deceived by, for example, fish, temperature layers and Asdic sets in other ships. And Asdic was only as good as the people operating it. Anti-submarine warfare had held little appeal for naval officers attracted by more glamorous branches o f the service. Little had been done to develop the tactics and teamwork that would bring success from 1941 onwards, but so evidently lacking in 1940. Vitally, however. Asdic was unable to detect surface-running U boats. The Admiralty was aware o f this, yet the one thing that, as had been proved in 1918, would force U boats into Asdic’s operational envelope, namely maritime aviation, had been all but abandoned. With Kriegsmarine crews training for surfaced night attacks and maritime radar in its infancy, herein lay its most fundamental deficiency.^ Naval aviation, handed over to the RAF in 1924 and the subject o f prolonged demarcation disputes until it was returned to the Admiralty in May 1939 after a two-year campaign initiated by Chatfield, had withered on the vine and the Fleet Air Arm would play Uttle part in the Battle of the Atlantic until the appearance o f escort carriers in 1942.^ The RAF’s 28 The Defeat of the Enemy Attack on Shipping 1939-1945 p. 19, 21 ADM 199 6. See also The Defeat of the Enemy Attack on Shipping 1939-1945 ch. 5. 22 Hackman : 1984 for Royal Navy Asdic development. 2) Van der Vat : 1988 p. 72, 94,111-112. North Western Approaches Coastal Command was principally expected to act as the eyes of the fleet in the event o f a German surface raider break-out from the Baltic to the Atlantic, this being seen from the mid-1930s as the greatest threat to trade. Oddly, it was also expected to offer unspecified cooperation to Bomber Command in the strategic air offensive and this subservient role to Bomber Command would hamper Coastal’s development throughout the war.24 But, there were more immediate problems to be faced. As Buckley writes; Coastal Command began the war with a whole host o f failings and deficiencies. These were largely as a result o f a lack o f resources allocated during the rearmament process; o f the influence o f the doctrine o f the flying boat; and o f the strategical and political debate over the ability o f aircraft to sink major naval vessels.^® In 1937, the Joint Planning Committee had set a target o f 339 operational aircraft for Coastal Command, but only 194 were available in April 1939. But the actual number o f aircraft was not, at the outbreak o f war, the main problem. The Kriegsmarine was, after all, small with few ships or U boats operational. The real issue lay in the standard o f equipment, much o f it, like the inadequate Anson and the 20-year-old Vildebeest, hopelessly obsolete. The procurement process for new, operationally capable aircraft had failed with contracts being awarded to companies like Blackburn which had dubious track records. New types such as the Botha, Bolingbroke and Lerwick flying boat had failed and their programmes had collapsed. The Beaufort had more promise, but its programme had been delayed. For trade protection and reconnaissance duties, the Hudson landplane and the Catalina flying boat, imports from America, would act as a stop-gap until the long-range Liberator, an American-built Bomber Command reject, came forward in numbers. Coastal Command’s procurement programme had become the subject o f a long running dispute, that would continue through the war, between backers o f the bombing offensive and advocates o f trade protection. Invariably, Coastal Command came off worst and, in September 1939, its order o f battle was ten squadrons of Ansons, one o f Hudsons and two o f Vüdebeests. In flying boats, there was one squadron o f obsolete Stranraers, another of the equally useless London and just two squadrons of the relatively modern Sunderland. But Shorts had turned over their lines to the new Lerwick flying boat which was rushed into production and proved a failure. Thus, when war broke out, production of the Sunderland, the one successful long-range aircraft available to Coastal Command, had stalled and was having to be hastily restarted.^® Initially, the defence o f ports and coastal shipping was to have been the responsibility of 24 Terraine : 1985 p. 225. Buckley : 1995 The RAF and Trade Defence p. 117. 25 Buckley op. «/p. 113. 28 Tei-raine : 1985 p. 228. North Western Approaches Fighter Command. Four squadrons were transferred from Fighter Command for trade protection duty in December 1939 as losses in coastal waters mounted, but progress was agonisingly slow. And, in addition to North Sea patrols including what was then its most important task, the patrol between Leuchars and Norway, Coastal was now required to patrol the enemy-held coastline from Norway to the Bay of Biscay and to cover Iceland, the Denmark Strait and the North Western Approaches. In 1940, it was to provide support for the RAF in the Battle o f Britain and mount attacks on enemy invasion shipping assembling in French and Belgian Channel ports as German successes heaped new priorities on an already overstretched Command. If the situation as regards ships and aircraft was poor, the condition o f the principal naval bases in Scotland was, if anything, worse. Rosyth, vital at least until 1917 as it was better placed than Scapa Flow for getting heavy units into the central North Sea, had closed in 1928. It had since been used as a shipbreakers’ scrapyard by Metal Industries Ltd and had not been modernised, though it was being reactivated as war broke out. Scapa Flow would be the Navy’s main base in northern waters, but its defences had been allowed to run down to a dangerous degree, as would soon be exposed by Prien and U-47. As the Navy moved onto a war footing, the battleships Royal Sovereign, Royal Oak and Ramillies lay at anchor in Scapa Flow on 21 August 1939. Surveying the defences. Captain Tom Baillie-Grohman of Ramillies recorded a lamentable picture of neglect: the Hoxa boom was in place and the gate through which he had just brought his ship was marked - but there was no gate. None o f the other boom defences were even that far advanced, there were no patrol vessels, nor was there any covering fire. Badlie-Grohman wrote: It appeared that the BDO , who had been working on the booms for about a year, had, in spite o f frequent requests, been refused permission to work overtime. As it was only possible to work in the strong tides for a few hours round slack water, progress was extremely slow. This all seemed an appalling state o f affaks, and it was with a sense o f urgency that I instructed the BDO to work overtime, and at fuU speed, and at the same time made a signal dkect to the Admkalty repeated to all concerned that this had been done, 'failing instructions from Thek Lordships to the contrary', thus putting the responsibility squarely where it belonged. I found tliat two batteries o f four o f the latest AA guns had lately been mounted at Lyness. These .. .had been manned for exercise between 12®* August and 18®* August by Territorials, who had, on the latter date, returned to the mainland whence they had come. A t the moment (2F ‘ August and the following days) the guns were plugged, ammunition and breech blocks returned to some rather distant magazine, and no crews were available.. .1 then inspected the Boom Defence Vessels at the Hoxa entrance and found the crews to be civilian RFA, mostly from the Orkneys. Between the two crews there was one World War One army artilleryman, who now knew just enough to go over the single 3-inch AA gun in each vessel with an ok can. The guns were plugged, and there was no ammunition on board.^? And all this while, as Peden points out, large sums were being spent on the defences o f Singapore.28 Baillie-Grohman took his concerns to Rear Admiral Harold Blagrove, though 27 NhW Rgmw vol. XXXIII pp 63-66. 28 Peden : 1979 p. 167. North Western Approaches just how much urgency registered with the latter is a matter for speculation as, ironically, he drowned when Royal Oak was torpedoed inside Scapa on 14 October 1939. Control o f merchant shipping was taken over by the Admiralty on 26 August 1939 and Naval Control o f Shipping Officers were in place in all major ports. The first outbound convoy sailed from the Clyde on 5 September.29 HX and OA /OB series Atlantic convoys began in mid-September, the first inbound Atlantic convoy sailing Halifax, Nova Scotia, on 16 September. As the speed o f any convoy is limited to that o f its slowest ship, it was decided that only vessels capable of between 9 knots and 14.9 knots were to be included in ocean convoys. Faster ships could safely sail independently but slower ships were left to fend for themselves and suffered heavy losses. By March 1940, the Atlantic convoys had settled down to a four day cycle. The Admiralty Staff History offers an optimistic gloss by implying that HX and OA /OB convoys were, 'brought across the Atlantic by an anti-raider ocean escort' when, in practice, this rarely amounted to more than a single Armed Merchant Cruiser, one o f the misleadingly titled converted liners hastily equipped with obsolete guns. But, such was the shortage o f escort vessels and aircraft as detailed above, close anti-submarine escorts were only provided east o f 12° west and occasional Coastal Command aircraft operated out to 8° west.^® Later, in July 1940, the Ministry o f Supply increased its import requirements by 1,000,000 tons per month and, as it would clearly be better for imports to arrive late than never, urgent consideration was given to providing escorts for slower ships.®! The first 8-knot SC convoy, SCI, sailed Sydney, Cape Breton, on 15 August 1940.®2 The shortage of escort vessels meant that only one sloop, Rentrance, was available and she was the first ship lost from the convoy, sunk by U-37 on 24 August. From the outbreak o f war until June 1940 transatlantic traffic had been principally routed through the Western Approaches south of Ireland to ports in southern England, but German troops entered Paris on 14 June 1940 and the French government asked for an armistice three days later. The Rosyth war diary for 17 June opines, ‘At last we are fighting this war on our own. Provided the French Fleet falls into our hands, no particular difficulty should be encountered.’®® However, with France now enemy territory and ports in the south coast o f England untenably close to Luftwaffe airfields, all Atlantic convoys were rerouted through the North Channel. Outbound OA convoys from Southend continued until 24 October 1940, though they were diverted northabout round Scotland, 29 The Defeat of the Enemy Attach on Shipping 1939-1945. Ch. 5 for convoy organisation. 30 Ibid. p. 30. 31 ADM 199 6 for minutes of discussion in A. V. Alexander’s office on 18 July 1940 on the introduction of SC convoys. Rohwer : 1999. 32 ADM 234 372. The Defeat of the Enemy Attack on Shipping chapter 5 ss. 25 and 26. 33 ADM 199 363. 17 North Western Approaches Five converted merchant ships with a total capacity o f 2,600 mines formed the 1st Minelaying Squadron based at HMS Trelawnej in the Kyle o f Lochalsh Hotel, which was selected because it had a railhead and was well away from danger o f air attack.®'! The plan was to lay 60,000 mines in six months, out o f a total required o f 181,000. But the effectiveness o f the barrage was evidently dependent on the Norwegian government agreeing to its eastern end being closed up to their coast, and this was not thought to be likely. Before laying could begin, the Shetland-Norway scheme was abandoned when the German invasion o f Norway meant that the barrage would have been footed in enemy territory. The effort was shifted to the Shetland-Faroe-Iceland gap, a distance o f 500 miles, almost twice the original length, where depths o f over 500 fathoms were common, weather conditions were worse and currents stronger. Indeed, as Cowie writes, there were many places between Scotland and Iceland where it was physically impossible to damage a U boat with an antenna mine.®® Laying began in June 1940 and, as in 1918, much trouble was experienced with premature firing, so many mines were laid with the antenna system sterilised. The schedule of almost 10,000 a month proved hopelessly optimistic, partly because there were not enough escorts available for the minelayers and partly due to transport difficulties between the factories in England and Kyle, then there were air raids, in one o f which the mine assembly plant at Wolseley Motors in Birmingham was flattened. Minelaying continued, driven partly by the number o f mines that were being produced and the lack o f storage space ashore. In January 1943, however, the barrage scheme was abandoned in favour o f strategically-placed deep fields of moored magnetic mines. Two of these of these had, by then, been laid off the North Channel and north o f Cape Wrath to cover the ocean and coastal convoy routes.®® The 1*^ Minelaying Squadron was disbanded late in 1943.®? Some 81,000 mines were laid in the Northern Barrage, 31% o f the British minelaying effort in the war. The scheme was hugely wasteful, costing £S million and tying up five modern merchant ships and numerous escort vessels that could have been more profitably employed elsewhere.®® The Admiralty Staff History concedes that. 54 The squadron comprised Southern Prince (10,917T — capacity 560 mines), Port Napier (5,936T - 550 mines), Port Quebec (5,936T — 550 mines), Agamemnon (7,593T — 530 mines) and Menestheus (7,494T — 410 mines). At 1335/27 November 1940, Port Napier went on Great Kyle o f Lochalsh after oil &om a fractured breather splashed onto a donkey boiler and ignited. The fire was soon out o f control and Captain Tait ordered her 580 mines jettisoned, but the anchor cable of a collier which had fouled the port screw the previous evening also obstructed the port mine trap. This was cleared and local inhabitants were evacuated amid fears o f a vast explosion as Port Napier yr/as towed towards the Skye shore and cast adrift. At 1540/27, the first o f a series o f explosions took place and, at 1630/27, after one particularly violent explosion, part o f her superstructure landed on the beach. Cowie : 1949 p. 132 for squadron details. ADM 178 249, Macdonald : 1993 pp. 65-76 and Baird : 1995 pp. 230-231 for loss o f Port Napier. Mines still in Port Napier vrexe dumped in 137 fathoms west o f Kyle o f Lochalsh AF/62 2632. 55 Cowie : 1949 p. 133. See also Roskill : 1960 pp. 48-49. 58 Cowie : 1949 p. 137. Roskill ; 1954 p. 264. 57 Roskill : 1962 pp. 48-49. 58 Article by John Cowie in Nami Review no. 54 (1966) pp. 120-124. North Western Approaches N o evidence has come to light that this barrage affected enemy surface or U-boat operations. One U boat was destroyed by it.®^ T h e M o n t r o s e - O b r e s t a d P a t r o l The southernmost element in the blockade was put in place when the 2"® Submarine Flotilla depot ship, HMS Forth, secured alongside Dundee’s King George V Wharf on the morning of 25 August 1939. Forth was joined the following morning by Seawolf, Swordfish and Sterlet, five o f her brood having already taken up patrol positions off south-west Norway on 24 September. Flag Officer (Submarines) Rear Admiral Bertram Watson opened his headquarters in Corriemar, Aberdour, on 31 August.®® Coastal Command Ansons o f 233 Squadron based at Leuchars were to operate an endless chain patrol between Montrose and Obrestad, but the Anson had insufficient range so five boats o f the 2"® Flotilla were stationed 12 miles apart off south-west Norway to fill the gap. The patrol was established too late to intercept Graf Spee or Deutschland which had sailed Wilhelmshaven on 21 August and 24 August respectively, but it was also directed against U boats making for the Atlantic.®! The necessity to employ submarines on the Montrose-Obrestad patrol arose from the inadequate range of Coastal Command’s obsolete Anson reconnaissance aircraft. But submarines have a low height of eye, making them a poor reconnaissance tool, and, as the Ox/ey incident highlighted, there are inherent dangers in operating submarines so close together in a sensitive area. Oxley sailed Dundee at 2000/4 September, followed 24 hours later by Triton which was to take up the adjoining billet. Surfacing eight miles off Kvasseim at 2004/10, Triton’s watchkeepers sighted another submarine about one mile off and more than four miles inside her sector. Triton made three challenges by flashing light and fired a rifle grenade, but got no response, so torpedoes were fired and there was one explosion. When Triton closed the area there was no sign of the submarine, just oil-covered water in which three men could be heard shouting for help. Oxlefis Lieutenant Commander Bowerman and a rating were picked up.®2 Oxley was the Navy’s first loss o f the war, though two other Dundee-based submarines came close to sharing her fate. On 4 September Seahorse was attacked off the Tay by a 233 59 The Defeat of the Enerry Attack on Shipping 1939-1945. Naval Staff History, Second World War CB3304 (voL's lA and IB). Revised edition published by the Navy Records Society 1997 p. 152. 80 The house had been earmarked in June 1939 as Aberdour was close to the Combined HQ at Donibristle and no accommodation was available in Rosyth. ADM 199 277. 8> Dundee Harbour Trust Wharf Books. Ashworth ; 1992 p. 20. Padfield : 1997 p. 70. ADM 234 380. 82 Neither Steele or Bowerman, who had just been called to the bridge when Triton’s torpedo hit, were blamed although it was apparent that Manley and Oxl^s lookouts had been slack. Following the sinking o f Oxley the boats on the Obrestad line were stationed further apart. Evans : 1986 pp. 195-199. ADM 234 380. 24 North Western Approaches Squadron Anson. Her after planes jammed, Seahorse had to surface, but Pilot Officer Yorke attacked again so the submarine dived out o f control and hit bottom at 240 feet. Yorke’s aircraft was riddled by shrapnel from its own bombs and ditched in St Andrews Bay as another Leuchars-based aircraft attacked Sturgeon also off the Tay, but did no damage.^^ Then, off Aberdeen early on 14 September, Smrdftsh was mistaken for a U boat by her sister Sturgeon and attacked. Swordfish dived and the torpedoes missed, one passing close over her stern casing. She resumed her passage to Dundee, berthing on ¥orth at 0740/14.'^^ Speatfish, patrolling off Hautsholm late on 24 September, was depth-charged and severely damaged. Surfacing after dark, she signalled for help at 0510/25 and Nelson, Kodney, A rk Royal, Renown, the 18‘^ ' Cruiser Squadron and 11 destroyers sailed Scapa to bring her in. Southampton, Aurora, Sheffield, Glasgow and six destroyers sailed Rosyth and three Hudsons mounted patrols from Leuchars. Speatfish was met by Somali and Eskimo at 0100/26 and all ships turned for home.^^ At 0220/30 H-34 on passage to Scapa missed a U boat with two torpedoes 15 miles north of Kinnaird’s Head.^'' Seawolf missed the German cruiser Nürnberg in the Skagerrak at 0105/6 October and Sturgeon missed U~23 on 14 October. In addition to the 233 Squadron chain patrol on the Scotland-Norway patrol line itself, the Coastal Command reconnaissance which began on 23 August included dawn patrols north o f the patrol line by London flying boats o f 201 Squadron operating from the depot ship Manela in SuUom Voe, and by Stranraer flying boats o f 209 Squadron from Invergordon. South o f the patrol line, dusk patrols were flown by 224 Squadron Hudsons from Leuchars.^^ The first encounter with the enemy came on 4 September 1939 when a 224 Squadron Hudson returned to Leuchars damaged after an engagement with a D 018 flying boat over the northern North Sea. On 8 October 1939, during attempts to intercept German heavy units that had been sighted off south-west Norway, another D 018 o f 2Kfg/506 was shot down by 224 Squadron Hudson 15 miles north-east of Aberdeen. Its four aircrew were ^ The investigation revealed that the aircraft was off track, but tire route used by submarines entering or leaving tire Tay was moved and arrival and departure times were adjusted to take place at night. AIR 25 232. ^ Stufgeotis CO Lieutenant G. D. Gregory was deemed partly to blame for not having acquainted liimself with other submarine movements, but Captain (S2) William Stevens was held mainly responsible for having sent inbound and outbound submarines along the same track, a recipe for disaster. Kemp : 1995. “ See Roskill : 1954 pp. 68-69 for air attacks on the Home Fleet returning to Scapa. RN Submarine Museum. ADM 234 380. Rohwer and Hummelchen : 1972 p. 6 According to Rohwer, U~10 reported two torpedoes that missed, although Wynn states it was U-22 which herself reported carrying out an unsuccessful attack on a British submarine while on patrol off Orkney. Rohwer appears to confuse this attack with another one reported by U~3 at 2245/30 in 5745N 0800E wliich he credits to H-34 even though she was nowhere near tliis position. H-34 began patrolling off the Hebrides as protection for the fishing fleets but was required for training duties and replaced by H-43 at die end o f October. This patrol had no success and, after intermittent implementation, was withdrawn in May 1940 as more aircraft were then available. ADM 234 380. Wynn : 1997. Rohwer : 1997. AIR 41 73. Ashworth : 1992 pp. 35-36. 25 North Western Approaches picked up by a Danish steamer and interned.^® By mid-October 1939, 233 Squadron had re-equipped with Hudsons which had the range to reach Norway and the submarines were withdrawn from Norwegian coastal waters. The Admiralty were also concerned that Dundee and Blyth were inadequately protected against air attack, so the 2'^ ^ and 6**’ Flotillas were ordered to Rosyth. Forth and the boats not on patrol left Dundee on 14 October, ironically arriving in Rosyth just in time for the first air raid o f the war on 16 October.^o GREENLAND Northern Patrol Air Patrols FINLAND letiiMUHiNn> rnSsoÊLHome Fleet sweeps ggm ggm gQKg" tIaiMf'wu I Bticay Pfttroh from summer 1 9 ^ by submarines from the Clyde with forward base a t Falmouth a^ r OF ti}>CAY Scotland’s geographical position placed her naval and air bases at the heart of Allied maritime strategy in the North Atlantic as seen here with the principal blockade patrols of 1939-40. Blockade may have been flawed, but it was then the only strategy open to Allied naval planners concerned with keeping the sea lanes open in the North Atlantic and elsewhere. And, from mid- 1940, as the Allied supply route moved to the North Western Approaches, so the strategic importance of Scotland’s bases increased. “ AIR 28 459. Asworth op. cit. p. 21. Ramsay et al. : 1989. ™ The 6* Flotilla returned to Blyth on 21 November and were established ashore in HMS Elfin. DHT Wharf Books. ADM 234 380. 26 North Western Approaches The Montrose-Obrestad Patrol was hardly an impregnable barrier, not least because none o f the air patrols flew at night and, such was the paucity o f aircraft, just one going unserviceable was enough to leave a gap in cover. And patrols were often hampered by bad weather as, in November 1939, when Schamhorst and Gneisenau were returning from the sortie which included their engagement with RaimlpindiA In one notable encounter on 10 January 1940, a 233 Squadron Hudson engaged an H E l l l over the east coast convoy route and, having run out of ammunition, attempted to down the Heinkel by dropping bombs on it from 100 feet above.?^ Then, on 24 February 1940, it was Hudson Q /224 out o f Leuchars that found the Graf Speeds supply ship Altmark hidden in a Norwegian fjord. A ttacks o n T h e H o m e F l e e t a n d its Sco ttish Bases 1939-1940 Much on the principle o f using a sledgehammer to crack a nut, in the early weeks o f the war the Royal Navy deployed its limited aircraft carrier strength on anti-submarine patrols in the Western Approaches.?® The foUy o f this strategy, a child o f Churchill’s relentlessly offensive approach, would be demonstrated by the near destruction o f A rk Royal off the Hebrides on 14 September and by the loss o f Courageous in the South Western Approaches three days later. These sweeps clearly placed the valuable carriers at risk and subjected ships and crews to much wear and tear for httle return. By the end o f October the trade­ off in naval vessels was Courageous sunk and A rk Royal near missed from the carrier force, the battleship Royal Oak sunk, the battleship Nelson only saved by the torpedoes that struck her failing to explode and the submarine Oxley lost to friendly fire while, on the German side, U-39 and U-27 had been lost, the latter due largely to slack lookouts. But Churchill was also advocating CATHERINE, the sending o f a naval squadron into the Baltic, partly to attack German shipping and partly to give the Soviet government pause for thought before, as then seemed likely, it entered the war in alliance with Germany. CATHERINE was never attempted, but Vice Admiral Edward-Collins sailed Rosyth on 22 September in Southampton with Glasgow, Aurora, Sheffield and destroyers o f the and Flotillas for a raid into the Skaggerak. Sir Charles Forbes sailed Scapa with units o f the Home Fleet as distant cover but this operation was aborted when the destroyers Javelin and Jersey collided.?"^ On 8 October the German battlecruiser Gneisenau and cruiser Koln, on a foray to tempt the Home Fleet across a U boat line and into range o f the Luftwaffe, were sighted off southern Norway by a 224 Squadron Hudson from Leuchars. Bomber Command Wellingtons were Denis Richards, The Riyal A ir Force 1939-1945. AHB Narrative HMSO p. 57. 72 AIR 28 459. 73 The foUy of using fleet carriers in this role was demonstrated when V-29 sank Courageous (22,5001) soutli-west of Ireland at 2000/17 September 1939. Courageous w&nt down in 18 minutes, taking 519 o f her 1,202 crew with her. 74 ADM 186 799. 27 North Western Approaches sent out but failed to make contact in heavy snow. Forbes sailed Scapa with Hood, Nelson, Rodney, Furious, Aurora, Belfast and nine destroyers and, despite being attacked by enemy aircraft the following day, returned unscathed on 10 October without sighting the enemy. Too slow to keep up with her more modern counterparts, the battleship Royal Oak was sent on a sweep across the Fair Isle Channel.?® On 13 October, once again leaving the obsolete Royal Oak behind, Forbes sailed for Loch Ewe. Meanwhile, intelligence from a neutral merchant skipper diverted to Kirkwall by the Northern Patrol, a Luftwaffe reconnaissance flight on 26 September and a patrol by \J-16 had shown that the eastern entrances to Scapa Flow were open and, late on 13 October, Kapitanleutnant Gunther Prien took L7-47 through a gap between the blockships in Kirk Sound. The main fleet anchorage south o f Cava was empty so he turned north to Scapa Bay where lay Royal Oak and the seaplane tender Pegasus which they misidentified as the battlecruiser Repulse. Prien fired three torpedoes at 0058/14, one o f which struck Royal Oak's bow. U-47 then fired another torpedo from her stern tube but this missed. No reaction was detected so the forward tubes were reloaded, then three torpedoes ripped the bottom out of Royal Oak at 0118/14. The battleship capsized and sank, and 833 men died.?^ On 26 September 1939 the Home Fleet sailed Scapa to cover the return to Rosyth of the damaged submarine Spearfish, which had hit a mine. At 1100/26 a Swordfish from Ark Royal sighted three Dornier 18 flying boats shadowing the fleet. A flight of 803 Squadron Sea Skuas from Ark Royal intercepted them and DO 18 KY+YK of 2/506 was shot down. Leutnant zur See von Reitenstein and his crew were picked up, as above, by Somali. That afternoon, nine HE 11 Is of I/KG26 and four jU88s of I/KG30 attacked the Ark Royal group, one bomb falling off the carrier’s port bow. Ark Royal was undamaged though German propaganda credited Unteroffizier Karl Francke with having sunk her. An unexploded bomb glanced off Hood’s port bulge. The next evening, 15 October, Repulse was steaming down the east coast o f Scotland towards Rosyth. Her progress was being monitored by the Luftwaffe who, like Prien's lookouts, misidentified her, this time as the battlecruiser Hood. But she was clearly an 73 Ashworth : 1992 p. 21. Ramsay et al : 1989. 76 ADM 199 158. The U Boat War in the Atlantic HM.SO 1989 p. 32. Published sources on Rcfyal Oak include McKee's Black Saturde ^and Weaver's Nightmare at Scapa Flow. See also Padfield : 1984 pp. 201-202, Vause ; 1997 for the planning o f the operation and After The Battle no.72 on Scapa blockships. 28 North Western Approaches important target and, on 16 October, Hauptman Helmut Pohle commanding the new JU88s o f 1/KG30 received orders to attack her. Also off the east coast was HNO, a seven- ship convoy inbound from Norway for the anchorage at Methil. Drone Hill RDF station at Cockburnspath detected Luftwaffe reconnaissance aircraft off Fife Ness and St Abbs Head between 0935/16 and 1129/16.?? Spitfires o f 602 Squadron scrambled from RAF Drem intercepted a reconnaissance H E l l l ten miles east o f the Isle of May at 1021/16 but the Heinkel escaped into cloud.?® Pohle led his 12 JU88s over East Lothian at 1420/16.?^ He wrote: The order is quite definite; do not attack if she is in dock. The powers in Germany were still hoping there could be an agreement with England and civilian casualties should under no circumstances aggravate propaganda.. .1 could see the Hood [sic] already in the lock of Rosyth. However, in the Firth lay HMS Southampton and HMS Edinburgh at anchor. I attacked.. .the Southampton, but during the dive the top part of the canopy came off.®® Two 602 Squadron Spitfires shot Pohle down near Fife Ness at 1453/16 and the destroyer Jervis, escorting HNO off Fife Ness, picked up the injured Pohle and the body one o f his crew.® ^ Red Enemy aircraft appeared over Britain for the first time on 16 October 1939 to attack Royal Navy ships at Rosyth. This German photograph shows the cruisers Southampton (left) and Edinburgh (centre) raising steam to get under way as bombs fall around them. One has just passed through Southampton’s deck and hull to explode alongside, sinking her pinnance and the Admiral’s barge. Three men were wounded. section of 603 Squadron had earlier shot down another JU88 into the sea off Port Seton,® ^Spitfires chased raiders across Edinburgh at rooftop height and bombs damaged Southampton at Queensferry and the destroyer Mohawk off EUe Ness.®® Thirteen died in Mohawk.^ 77 Information from Ian Brown of the Historic Radar Archive, 12 January 1995. 78 This was Fighter Command's first engagement with enemy aircraft. AIR 25 232. AIR 27 2073. 79 Hugh Barkla was in the Filter Room at Fighter Command Headquarters, RAF Stanmore, during the raid. He recalled that, despite the problems at Drone HiU, the raid was tracked by other RDF stations including Ottercops Moss in Northumberland and Douglas Wood near Dundee. Unidentified aircraft were also reported by Observer Corps posts in East Lothian. Letters to the author from Hugh Barkla 27 October 1994 and 15 November 1994. WO 166 2127. 80 Letter to the author from Helmut Pohle 4 May 1992. 81 AIR 25 232. AIR 27 2073. AIR 28 166. Information from the late Group C^tain George Pinkerton. ADM 53 109405. See also Observer Corps logs held by The Museum o f Flight, East Fortune Airfield. 82 By some seven minutes, this was the RAF's first victory of the war. AIR 27 2079. AIR 50 167. Jeffrey ; 1992 pp. 19- 20. Information from the late Group Captain George Denholm, May 1992. 83 Information from Air Vice Marshal Sandy Johnstone and Wing Commander Hector MacLcan. HH50/5. Jeffrey : ■ ( >, in t’d I'lverlc-11 29 North Western Approaches 1/KG30 returned the following day, this time to Scapa where they damaged the only large warship present, the training ship Iron Duke3^ Unlike Rosyth the day before, there was no fighter cover for Scapa, but one JU88 hit by anti-aircraft fire crashed on Hoy. Unteroffizier Ambrosius baled out and survived being shot at by gunners in the depot ship Voltaire Three hours later, at 1400/17, a second formation approached Scapa.®? Luftwaffe reconnaissance flights ranged across Scotland searching for the Home Fleet which had clearly left Scapa. 603 Squadron shot down a reconnaissance F IE lll of 1(F)/122 four miles off St Abbs Head at 1435/22 October and three crewmen were picked up by Gurkhaft^ Early on 28 October an H E l l l crossed the coast at Craü, went west to the Clyde, then followed the Forth and Clyde Canal eastwards untü, at 1010/28, it came under anti-aircraft fire between the Forth Bridge and Inchcolm.®^ It was intercepted by 602 and 603 Squadron Spitfires over Tranent and brought down south-west o f Haddington.®*? Two o f its crew died and the pilot was injured.®? Forbes had long been aware o f the vulnerability o f his ships to air attack and o f the inadequacy of the Scapa defences. On 7 September 1939 he had been told that there were 800 German bombers within range o f Scapa and ordered to disperse his ships.® ^ Some units were sent to Loch Ewe, though despite hurriedly laid anti-submarine nets, this was even less well defended than Scapa.®® Rosyth, its 40-mile approach channel vulnerable to mining, was never considered as a principal Home Fleet base.®'* It was, in any case, 150 miles from where the ships really needed to be - the northern exit from the North Sea. So, following the loss o f Royal Oak, with Scapa clearly unusable, the only alternative base for the homeless Home Fleet was the Clyde. At first light on 29 October the 3*^'? Anti-Aircraft Division began removing guns from Rosyth and Glasgow to cover the Clyde Fleet Anchorage. Eight 3.7” statics from Glasgow and 16 from Edinburgh and Rosyth were moved to positions at Cloch Point, Loch Thom, Port Glasgow, Cardross, Helensburgh and Kilcreggan. The final layout had forty 3.7” statics covering the Clyde Anchorage with just 1992 p. 21. Edinburgh Evening Nem 17 October 1939. See also Queensferry ARP Log held by Edinburgh City Arcliivcs. 84 ADM 1 10091. 85 listing, and witli open scutdes awash. Iron Duke was beached in Ore Bay. Patched with concrete, she remained there as a depot ship until December 1945. ADM 199 362. ADM 1 18096. Ramsay et al : 1989. 86 Ramsay et al : 1989. McKee : 1978 ch 11. 87 Glass : 1994. 88 AIR 25 232. AIR 27 2079. AIR 50 167. See also transcript o f Ml.l.a eavesdrop on conversation between Unger and an Unteroffizier Grimm on 7/11/39 in WO 208 4117. 89 WO 166 2127. 90 AIR 25 232. 9* Seven montlis later, an apparent blind-landing receiver from this aircraft was recognised as the Knickebein radio bombing aid. 92 This nonsense reflects the wider terror o f air attack prevalent at the time. Roskill : 1954 p. 68. 93 ADM 1 9852. ADM 186 799. Roskill : 1960 pp. 48-49. 94 Roskill: 1954 pp. 77-78. 30 North Western Approaches eight guns left around Glasgow.®® At the end of October, the Royal Navy came close to another disaster to rival Royal Oak. Reasoning that the Home Fleet would be wary o f entering the North Sea and bound by rules of engagement that made warships his principal targets, Donitz had stationed U-boats west of Orkney.®^ On 30 October lJ-56 was 45 miles north o f Cape Wrath when Nelson, Rodney and Hood hove into view while returning to the Clyde after covering the inbound ore convoy NARVIKl. Kapitanleutnant Zahn fired three torpedoes, two of which hit Nelson with loud clangs clearly audible in the U boat. But they failed to explode and the ships sailed on, unaware o f the incident until 1945.®? HEl l l IH+JA of Stab Staffel KG/26 operating from Luneberg was brought down near Tranent while on a shipping reconnaissance to the Forth and the Clyde on the morning of 28 October 1939, the first enemy aircraft to crash on mainland Britain. Credit was shared by 602 and 603 Squadrons though the aircrew said that anti-aircraft fire from ships in the Forth had sealed their fate. Remarks overheard on hidden microphones at the Cockfosters POW cage led Air Ministry scientists to take a second look at the communications equipment aboard both this aircraft and the Heinkel shot down at North Berwick on 22 November 1939. It was discovered that the Lorenz blind-landing receiver (stub mountings for the aerial just visible under the aircraft pictured on page 36) was far more sensitive than would normally be required for that purpose. Thus was the puzzle of Knickebein, the first German radio beam navigation system, unravelled. Forbes was keeping his ships on the move, but German observation of the Home Fleet’s wanderings had pointed to places where mines might profitably be sown by U boats and the longer nights meant that they could be accurately laid within the approaches to naval bases. On 27 October, \J-31 laid 18 TMB magnetic bottom mines in the entrance to Loch Ewe after first hitting the net barrage while trying to get inside the anchorage.®® Frauenheim's 0-21 laid mines in the Firth o f Forth the following day and Kretschmer's U- 23 laid another field off Invergordon.®® 93 The withdrawal of heavy ships from the North Sea greatly concerned Churchill who, unable to shake off the strategic imperatives of 1916, wrote to First Sea Lord Dudley Pound asking, “Why then should we chose the Clyde at the cost o f uncovering the island. Churchill was also concerned at the presence o f ‘Irish traitors in the Glasgow area’ who would pass news o f the fleet’s arrival by telephone to the German delegation in Dublin. WO 166 2127. Gilbert 1989 p. 71. 96 The U Boat War in the Atlantic : HMSO 1989 p. 32. 97 Roskill : 1954 p. 82. Rohwer : 1999. Van der Vat 1988 p. 141. 98 The TMB mine, specifically designed for use by U boats, tvas an unearthed, magnetic pistol seabed mine with a 1,276 lb warhead, twice the explosive charge of contemporary torpedoes. 99 The U Boat War in the Atlantic p. 12. 31 North Western Approaches At 1052/21 November Be fast was five miles west o f Fidra in the Forth, on a practice shoot with Southampton, when one o f U-2Vs mines exploded on her port side abreast the foremast. Captain George Scott tried to beach Belfast in shallow water at Inchkeith, but she lost steerage way. Her engines had been knocked out of line, turbine bearers twisted and fractured and boilers distorted. Lighting and power failed and every telephone in the ship jumped from its cradle, jamming the exchange. All four turrets had jumped, the roofs o f A and B turrets were open to the sky, gunpowder lay on the deck o f A turret and shell hoists and training and elevation mechanisms were distorted. Dozens o f nose-fused 6” and 4” shells were damaged and fuses had to be thrown overboard. The upper deck was buckled and cracked right across, the foremast was bent back, snapping aerials, and wireless sets were wrecked. Nineteen crewmen were injured and the listing cruiser was dry-docked at Rosyth that afternoon.?*?® Nelson was entering Loch Ewe 0754/4 December to refuel her escorting destroyers after the abortive sweep to find the ships that sank Rawalpindi, when an explosion under her starboard bow whipped the fore part o f the ship violently upwards three times. She had detonated one o f the mines laid by 0-31 on 21 October and, listing to starboard and eight feet down by the head, she anchored in the lee of Ewe Island, Divers found 70 feet o f plating and frames dished four feet inboard and, just abaft station 60, there was a large hole.?®? Seventy-four men were injured, one officer and 45 ratings seriously, and there were numerous fractures due to concussion. The Rosyth war diary laments; This littering up of the fairways with mines is having a wider effect than was at first expected. The damage done to Nelson is offset by the alleged sinking of a submarine by an aircraft, but the menace is stUl of a serious character. A day of rumours of more fidghtfulness.?®^ In thick fog eight miles north-west o f the Mull o f Kin tyre on 12 December the battleship Barham rammed and sank the destroyer Duchess, and 129 of the destroyer's crew were lost.?®® Barham, however, was scarcely damaged and, within hours, she was outbound with Hood and Warspite to escort TCI, the first troop convoy from Canada.?®'? At 1449/28 December she was off the Butt o f Lewis as distant cover for the ore convoy HN5 when a torpedo from 0-30 struck her port side. Her forward shehrooms and magazines flooded and four men drowned.?®® 780 Her back broken, Belfastve&'s out o f action for two years. ADM 199 362. ADM 1 10670. Rohwer : 1999. 701 ADM 1 109897. Rohwer : 1999. 702 The 'rumours o f firightfulness* referred to supposed enemy sabotage o f dockyards and oil installations. Churchill told the War Cabinet that Nehon had been damaged but the news was kept secret for as long as possible, even from the Dominion Prime Ministers. Nelson crept out o f Loch Ewe on 4 January 1940, every hand who could be spared mustered on the upper deck in case o f another explosion, and rejoined the fleet in August 1940. ADM 199 362. 103 ADM 199 362. 104 TCI with 7,450 troops o f tlie 1“‘ Canadian Division vbo&sd Aquitania, Empress of Britain, Empress of Australia, Monarch of Bermuda and Duchess of Bedford arrived safely in the Clyde on 17 December. ADM 199 362. Roskill : 1954 p. 89. 70S Barham reached Liverpool the following day. Earlier, at 0230, Lemp had shelled and sunk the minesweeper trawler Barbara Robertson 35 miles west o f the Butt of Lewis. One o f the sweeper's crew was killed. See ADM 199 362. ■'( ( ,n i'd < crk Ï 32 North Western Approaches Meanwhile, on 22 November, nine enemy aircraft had attacked the RAF depot ship Manela in Garth Voe, Shetland. The anti-aircraft guardship Coventry opened up and the raiders scattered, reformed over Sullom Voe and tried again without success. They then dropped 16 bombs in North Harbour and strafed a flying boat. Raiders also appeared over Scapa Flow and Max Horton signalled the Admiralty: This tnorning, 22"*? November, an enemy aircraft circled the anchorage at about 3,000 feet for some time disregarding a few shots fcom the Bofors gun at Hatston airfield. The absence of any air activity on our part with an air station in full view of the anchorage must counteract our propaganda as the numbers of British fighters. If importance is attached to neutral opinion, or to information reaching Germany, it is unfortunate that this state of affairs should exist at a base where a large number of neutral observers is always present.. .It is also natural that some misgivings should be felt by local inhabitants,?®** ___ An enemy reconnaissance aircraft was engaged by two Spitfires o f 602 Squadron over North Berwick at 1100/7 December. These flights often preceded a raid and, at 1251/7, Spitfires o f 72 and 603 Squadrons intercepted raiders near Fife Ness, 603 Squadron claiming two as damaged.?®? At 1023/1 January 1940, two JU88s attacked the guardship Coventry in Sullom Voe. Near misses caused extensive minor damage but no casualties.?®® A Gladiator from Sumburgh pursued one raider for 90 miles, but had to return for lack of fuel. A JU88 of 1/KG30 did not return to base and the other raider escaped over Lerwick and a Dornier reconnaissance aircraft appeared soon after.?®® By March 1940, Scapa Flow’s fixed defences were deemed sufficiently strong to allow the Home Fleet to return. Fighter cover was being reinforced, 14 Group Fighter Command was being set up as operational control and RDF Chain Flome cover north o f the Tay was being improved.??® On 1 March, the Hurricanes of 43, 111 and 605 Squadrons arrived at Wick to cover the return o f the capital ships to Scapa.??? Hood and ValiantX^d the return on 7 March. Then, intent on disabling Royal Navy capital ships ahead of the German invasion o f Norway, 15 enemy aircraft raided Scapa at 1950/16 March. One bomb fell through No)folk's quarter deck to explode in a fuel tank, killing three officers died and injuring one. The training ship Iron Duke was damaged by two near misses and bombs fell close to R o d n e yOn land, 113 bombs fell, including nine UXBs.??® Churchill told the War Cabinet Rohwer : 1999. Showell : 1989. 706 Chalmers 1954. 107 Two H E llls did crash 40 miles east o f Leuchars. Two bodies were found at sea and one came ashore at Belhelvie on 16 December. AIR 25 232. ADM 199 362. Ramsay et al. : 1987. 108 ADM 199 377. 109 ADM 199 377. Ramsay et al : 1989. 110 a ir 41 73. The 14 Group Headquarters went to France in May 1940, returning to the north o f Scotland in tlie autumn o f 1940 when it was based at Inverness. 111 Ibid. 112 Norfolk suffered a direct hit through her quarter deck on port side abaft Y turret The explosion left a 16’x l2 ’ hole in her starboard side below the waterline, much buckling of bulkheads and compartments flooded. ADM 199 377. ADM 199 362. ADM 199 1050. 113 Cottages at Bridge o f Waith, four miles east o f Stromness, were damaged. Jim Isbister, killed when he went to help a neighbour and took the full blast o f a bomb, was tlie first civilian air raid fatality in Britain of the Second World'( oni'ti fA('i)(:iS 33 North Western Approaches on 18 March, ‘There is considerable feeling in the country that, while the Germans use bombs, we only drop leaflets.’??'? The following day, an air attack was mounted on Hornum air base and List harbour, both on the island o f Sylt. The raid o f 16 March resulted in the fleet being ordered to sea during the next moon period between the 19 and 26 March. So it was that Rodney, Warspite, Renown and Repulse and 29 destroyers returned to Scapa on 27 March, just as the Luftwaffe began closely monitoring Home Fleet movements ahead o f the German invasion o f Norway. A reconnaissance H E l l l o f 1(F)/122 was brought down off Wick at 1230/28 by 43 and 605 Squadrons. That evening, two trawlers and ON23 and HN22 were attacked in the Fair Isle Channel. Four fighters were scrambled but no interception was made.??® N a v a l W a r i n N o r t h e r n W a t e r s t o A p r i l 1940 i n R e t r o s p e c t Whüe the British Merchant Navy was still dominant, albeit though in decline, the Royal Navy that went to war in September 1939 in the North Atlantic and Home Waters was, by dint o f conflicting strategic priorities, defence cuts and poor planning, singularly ill- equipped to both blockade Germany and maintain the supply route, vital even then before the fall of France, to North America. But the principal strategy o f the period was to blockade Germany, thus, it was hoped, bringing about an economic collapse and forcing a surrender. A product o f wider political irresolution and wishful thinking, this strategy was doomed to failure from the start, not least because the blockade was at best only partial and was rendered even less effective by the need not to offend powerful neutrals, notably the United States. Thus, for example, US oil companies were able to continue trading freely with Germany both by the North Atlantic route, and via eastern Europe. One major German import which the blockade could do nothing to stop, was the 10 million tons o f iron and other ores bought annually from Sweden. Almost half the yearly German requirement and vital to their war effort, this running sore for the Allies and Churchill’s Admiralty would, as we shall see in Chapter 5, be at the centre of the first major clash o f arms o f the war in western Europe. The Northern Patrol, the Mine Barrage and the Montrose-Obrestad Patrol all involved a huge effort, particularly in the North Atlantic in winter, but the verdict must be that they achieved little. And weak naval preparedness and strategy had been exposed by notable setbacks in Northern Waters. There was the loss of the submarine Oxley off Norway, the War. HH50/160. HH50/20. "4 War Cabinet 1130/18 March 1940 quoted in Gilbert ; 1983 p. 192. "5 AF62/1339. ADM 199 362. ADM 199 377. ADM 199 1050 North Western Approaches sinking o f Royal Oak inside Scapa, the raids on the cruisers at Rosyth on 16 October and on Scapa the following day, the retreat o f the Home Fleet to the Clyde and Loch Ewe, the mining o f Belfast in the Forth, the loss o f Rawalpindi, the mining o f Nelson at Loch Ewe, the loss o f the destroyer Duchess, the torpedoing o f Barham and the mining o f the submarines Spearfish and Triumph. The destroyer Exmouth, the fleet minesweeper Sphinx, the Admiralty oiler Gretafield and the destroyer Daring had all been sunk and the cruiser Norfolk had been bombed in Scapa. Then there had been some notable near-misses such as the torpedoes that exploded in the wake OÎ A rk Royal on 14 September, the air attack on the Home Fleet on 26 September and on the destroyer Valorous the following day, the raid on the depot ship Manela and Coastal Command aircraft at Sullom Voe on 22 November, Zahn’s faulty torpedoes that hit Nelson on 30 October, Prien’s torpedoes that exploded close astern o f the cruiser Norfolk on 28 November and the bombs that near-missed the cruiser Coventry in Sullom Voe on 1 January. And, as we shall see in the next chapter, U boats and aircraft had reaped a rich harvest o f merchant shipping, both allied and neutral, during this period in Northern Waters while themselves suffering few losses. The balance sheet hardly favoured the Allies, though with a preponderance of maritime power, they could afford to sustain relatively high loss rates. Matters were, however, about to take a decided turn for the worse as both Allied and Axis forces turned their attention to Scandinavia. 35 North Western Approaches C'Dobter 1 a A t t a c k s o n S h ip p in g off S c o t l a n d a n d t h e S c a n d in a v ia n C o n v o y s S ep tem b er 1 939 -A p r il 1940 The Athenia had provided proof, if it were needed, that U boat patrols were in place off the coast o f Scotland and the North Channel at the outbreak o f war. Allied and neutral ship­ ping was vulnerable, particularly when in not in convoy. But U boat operations in the late 1939 were hampered by restrictive rules o f engagement, reinforced after the Athenia epi­ sode, and by the fact the there were too few operational U boats. Nor was there any effec­ tive cooperation between the Kreigsmarine and the Luftwaffe in their anti-shipping war. This last was to dog German efforts in the trade war until 1945. In the first weeks o f war, Raeder was exercised by the passage of 'contraband' across the North Sea to Britain and, following a meeting with Hitler on 23 September 1939, the rules o f engagement imposed after the Athenia incident were relaxed. U boats were authorised to use force against any Allied ships that tried to send an SSSS signal and those carrying 120 passengers or less could be sunk in accordance with the Prize Rules. But this led to a sharp increase in sinkings o f neutral vessels, particularly in convoys to and from Norway, and brought loud protests from Oslo, Copenhagen, Stockholm and Helsinki, so the restrictions had to be reimposed a few days later. Raeder’s wish for a ‘Siege of England’ which would allow the sinking on sight o f neutral shipping in British waters led him to advocate, from late 1939, the occupation o f Norway.? Britain, meanwhile, was engaged in a diplomatic offensive in Stockholm that resulted in the December 1939 Anglo-Swedish Trade Agreement which restricted raw material exports from Sweden to the belligerent powers to ‘normal’ prewar levels. Having gone to some lengths to secure this agreement, and with iron ore and timber exports a vital part of the Swedish economy, it was thus incumbent on the British to continue their share o f the trade.2 As seen in Chapter One, the Royal Navy was ill-prepared to meet the challenge o f a trade 7 See Führer Conferences on Naval Affairs, September to November 1939 in Brassey : 1948. Also Blair 1997. 36 North Western Approaches war. But, despite early successes in what van der Vat has termed, ‘...a shooting gallery full o f Aunt Sallies’,® in the first months o f the war U boat commanders found that time and again their torpedoes misfired or failed to detonate. U-27 was sunk on 20 September 1939 after misfires by two o f her torpedoes alerted destroyers then, on 22 September U-21 re­ ported a misfire when she fired at destroyer off Berwick on Tweed.'* Prien reported that, while sinking Roja/ Oak in Scapa Flow, three o f U~47’s torpedoes misfired and, on 30 Oc­ tober, U-36 hit the battleship Nelson with two torpedoes, both of which failed to explode. By January 1940, Donitz was claiming that over 300,000 tons o f shipping would have been sunk but for faulty U boat torpedoes.® Torpedo problems continued into 1940, hampering U boat operations during the Norway campaign when, for example, U-48 ought to have hit the battleship Warspite. German torpedoes were fitted with two pistols, one contact and one magnetic, one o f which the U boat commander selected before firing. It was found that the magnetic pistol was too sensitive and the contact pistol would only work against a straight surface. Against a curved surface, the torpedo could glance o ff without exploding.® Early Luftwaffe anti-shipping operations were also hampered, in their case by by lack of suitable aircraft and the fact that they were operating at extreme range from airfields in Germany. As with the RAF, the Luftwaffe lacked suitable aircraft, effective weaponry and specially trained aircrew in sufficient numbers. Having been principally intended to work closely with an advancing army over mainland Europe, its maritime capability was wholly inadequate and lacked coordination with, for example, the U-bootwaffe. And, mirroring the dispute between Coastal Command and Bomber Command in the RAF, the Luftwaffe’s contribution was dogged by a turf war between Goering and Raeder. As a direct result, there was no clear policy for an air war against seaborne trade. Again like the RAF, the Luftwaffe lacked a specific anti-shipping weapon, the most com­ mon bomb it dropped over the Scottish shipping lanes being the 250kg Sprengbombe- Cylindrische, or SC for short. Thin-skinned SC bombs o f various weights had a high charge ratio but were designed for maximum blast effect in general demolition, not for sinking ships.? Aside from the torpedo, the one anti-shipping weapon that did offer the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine a real chance o f making an impact in the shipping war was the magnetic mine, but these were in desperately short supply. Discussing the planned German declared area off eastern Scotland, Raeder told Hitler on 22 November that, while mines were not actually to be laid, 'In this area our submarines wiU be able to sink ships without warning 2 The Economic Blockade. W. N. Medlicott. HMSO 1952-1959 vol. 2 p. 173 et passim. 3 Van der Vat: 1988 p. 172. 4 Wynn: 1997. Blair: 1997 5 Van der Vat : 1988 p. 173. 6 Wynn : 1997. Blair : 1997. Jones : 1986. 7 Ramsay et al : 1989 vol.l p. 157. 37 North Western Approaches and it will appear that they struck a mine.' It was hoped that this would paralyse traffic off the east coast and, on 1 December, the following warning to shipping was transmitted, The German Government hereby gives warning that, in the course of operations against British forces and bases on the east coast of Britain, mines have been laid in an area bounded on the north by the latitude of Kinnaicd's Head up to 0“ 30' W and on the south by the latitude of St Abb's Head up to 1° 30'W and on the east by the line connecting the above points.® Meanwhile, the secrets o f the magnetic mine had been exposed when one was made safe after falling on mudflats at Shoeburyness at the end o f November 1939.® U B o a t A t t a c k s o n S c o t l a n d - N o r w a y C o n v o y s The waters between Scotland and Scandinavia were dangerous, yet trade with Norway and Sweden included important exports of coal and vital imports o f timber and, above all, iron ore. It had to continue and despite the fact that almost all o f the ships involved were neu­ tral, given the German reaction noted above, convoy was essential. The first Scandinavian convoy, HNO, had sailed from Norway on 14 October and arrived o ff the Forth two days later only to steam into the first air raid on Britain o f the war. The 12-ship NARVIK 1 fol­ lowed on 26 October, ten o f them arriving safely at Methil on 31 October, the other two proceeding independently to the Clyde. The first outbound convoy for Norway, the five- ship ON I, sailed Methil on 4 November 1939.?® Methil and Bergen were assembly points and the routing and escorting o f Scandinavian convoys was the responsibility o f the Rosyth escort force.?? The cycle varied with the weather and the volume of trade and, in the early days, two convoys were run on a 16-day cycle. By early February 1940 this had reduced to two convoys, one inbound and the other outbound, every four days. ON convoys sailed Methil during the afternoon, passed through the Moray Firth west o f the normal track to bring the convoy under fighter cover, and were timed to pass the Fair Isle Channel, a focal point for U boats, in darkness. Arri­ vals off Norway were timed carefully to avoid twilight, the best time for U boat attack. The escort would then loiter offshore for four hours to await a Methil-bound HN convoy.?^ First victim on the Norwegian trade was the British collier Tmro (974T) sunk by U-36 at 1830/15 September.?® U-32 sank the Norwegian Jem (875T) off Skudesnes on 28 Septem- 8 Brassey : 1948. 9 Ibid. 18 ADMT86 799 appendix G, - __ 1? Captain Ralph Kerr commanding the Rosytli Escort Force took command o f Hood on 15 February 1941 while she was in minor refit at Rosyth, and lost his hfe when she was sunk on 24 May. 12 ADM 186 799. 13 Truro's crew was handed over to a neutral Belgian steamer. Uojds War Tasses'vo\, 1. Rohwer : 1999. Wynn ; 1997. Survivors' accounts in The Scotsman 18/9/39. 1 OH North Western Approaches ber. Then, at 0550/4 October, Kretschmer’s U-23 sank the Glenfarg (876T) off Wick.?'* The Swedish Vistula (1,018T) was sunk by U-37 on 8 October 45 miles north-east o f Unst.?® U- 34 was outbound for patrol at 0732/20 October when she sank the Swedish Gustav Adolf (926T) 40 miles north-east o f Shetland, killing two of her crew and injuring six. Later that day, at 1410/20, coastwatchers on Unst reported a vessel being shelled 20 miles to the north-east. Aircraft were diverted to the scene but were too late to save the colher Sea Ven­ ture (2,327T), outbound for Tromso, sunk by U-34A Ten days later, on 30 October, the Caimmona (4,666T) was torpedoed three miles off Rattray Head by U-13A That same eve­ ning the patrol trawler Northern Rover was sunk off Orkney by U-393^ U-18, U-21 and U-22 operated off the ^ Moray Firth during November and U-22 sank the KirkwaU-bound collier Parkhill (500T) 17 miles north o f Troup Head at 2200/17. U-18 sank the Grimsby trawler Wigmore, part o f an Iceland-bound fish­ ing convoy, 25 miles north of Rattray Head at 2230/18.?® The destroyers Imo­ gen, Impulsive and Imperial were sent on a sweep of the area but found nothing. On 20 November a torpedo fired by U-18 at the tanker Athelking exploded in the wake of Inglefteld off Rattray Head. Four U boats operated in Scottish waters during November: U-47 in the Minch, U-35 in the Pentland Firth and U-31 and U-48 off Orkney. The operation was planned in conjunc­ tion with the sortie by Schamhorst and Gneisenau and the four boats formed a trap for Royal Navy units tempted out after the German ships.2® A large explosion in the wake of the cruiser Norfolk east o f Shetland on 28 November, assumed to have been caused by an air- I SCANDINAVIAN CONVOYS (OUTWARD) Approximsfe Soahes 14 One o f Vistulds boats reached Norwich the following morning and two drifters sailed Lerwick to search for the other which had nine aboard. But a south-easterly gale blew up and they had to run for shelter in Whalefirth without finding the missing men. One o f Glenfarfs crew died, the other 16 were picked up by Forester. ADM 199 2057. Robertson : 1981. Uqyds War Lasses vol. 1. Rohwer ; 1999. Wynn : 1997. 13 ADM 199 377. Rohwer 1999. Uqyds WarLassesvol. 1. 16 Lerwick Lifeboat picked up all Sea Venturis crew. ADM 199 2057. ADM 199 377. Services ty the Lifeboats of the Royal National Ufeboat Institution 1939 - 1946. 17 Three o f her engineers died and 42 survivors were picked up by the Aberdeen trawler River Lassie, then transferred to the Peterhead Lifeboat. Rohwer ; 1999. British Vessels Last at Sea. 18 Northern Rover's loss remained a mystery until after the war. Uqyd's WarLassesvol. 1. Rohwer ; 1999. Wynn : 1997. m All nine aboard Parkhills and all 16 aboard Wigmorrv/e t^c. lost. ADM 199 362. Uqyds War Usses vol. 1. Rohwer : 1999 gives the time o f this sinking as 1330/18, but this is a probable misprint.. 28 Blair : 1997. The U Boat War in the Atlantic p. 13. 39 North Western Approaches from a raft twelve hours later and ten more Fram survivors were found after 36 hours on a raft. Ten of the Fram's crew were lost.®'? A ir A t t a c k s I n t e n s if y Luftwaffe reconnaissance of the Scandinavian convoy route continued in all weathers. At 0938/29 January, in snow showers and a south-easterly gale, 609 Squadron Hurricanes scrambled from Drem and chased off an H E l l l that had attacked a trawler in the Tay estu­ ary. This raider had also bombed and strafed Imperial Monarch (5,831T) and Otterpool (4,876T) off Montrose. Otterpool landed two injured crewmen at Dundee and Imperial Monarch reached Grangemouth badly holed. At 1200/29 four bombs fell at Sullom Voe, none o f which did any damage, then at Scapa Flow shortly afterwards.®® The collier Giralda (2,178T) was bombed and sunk off South Ronaldsay on 30 January. Her 23 crew were seen in a boat drifting towards Water Sound but it hit rocks and capsized leaving no survivors.®® Thirty miles to the east, the same raiders An He 111 shot down near North Berwick by 602 Squadron during a series of attacks on the east coast convoy route between Aberdeen and Cromer on 9 February 1940. Attacks by aircraft such as this one from 5/KG26 were flown with great determination, often In dreadful weather, but the Luftwaffe assault on coastal convoys off Scotland and eastern England lacked coordination. Traffic on the route was all but continuous with long, two-column convoys almost merging Into each other, and convoys passing on opposite headings causing large con­ centrations of shipping In a narrow swept channel In which they had no room to manoeuvre under attack. It vvas also discovered In mid-19 4 1, after the worst attacks were over, that the Luftwaffe had been getting clear and accurate Intelligence of coastal convoy movements from the German decryption service, B-delnst. Yet Allied shipping losses on the coastal route, though serious, were never as bad as they ought to have been, had the Luftwaffe accorded the antl-shlpping raids sufficient priority. 34 ADM 199 362. Macdonald ; 1993 pp. 123-137. Rohwer : 1999. 53 AIR 25 232. AIR 27 2102. ADM 199 362. ADM 199 377. HH50/160. Uoyds W arUssesvol 1. Ramsay et al : 1987. 36 ADM 199 377. Uqyds War Losses vol. 1. Services ly the Ufeboats of the Rqyal National Ufeboat Institution 1939 - 1946. 45 __a North Western Approaches sank the inbound Bancrest (4,450T) and damaged the naval trawler UllswaterN In St Andrews Bay, bombers attacked City of Bath (5,079T), Stancourt (563T) and the Hull trawler Lady Shirley. A 111 Squadron Hurricane engaged these raiders near the Isle of May, but they disappeared into a snowstorm, then were intercepted again near Coquet Island by 43 Squadron Hurri­ canes and one Heinkel was shot down.®® Convoy ON 10 was due to sail for Norway on 5 February and the S*?* Minesweeping Flotilla sailed Invergordon on 3 February to sweep its route across the Moray Firth. At 0912/3 the fleet minesweepers Sphinx, Speedwell and Skipjack were off Kinnaird's Head when two raid­ ers attacked Sphinx. One bomb ripped through her bridge and foredeck to explode in the forward messdeck. The foredeck was folded back against the bridge, four o f her crew were killed and three seriously injured. Return fire was opened, albeit late, and a JU88 of 2/KG30 crashed in the Moray Firth. When its crew was picked up, they reported that they had been hit by return fire from a minesweeper. Also in this raid, the patrol trawlers Hugh Walpole and Arctic Explorer and the coaster Rota were bombed. None suffered serious dam­ age. The tanker British Eoyalty was attacked off Arbroath but escaped undamaged and the Norwegian Tempo (629T) was bombed and sunk near the Isle of May at 1000/3.®® Speedwell took Sphinx in tow for Inver­ gordon at 1050/3 but the tow parted repeatedly in worsening weather. At 0300/4 Sphinx was forced to abandon ship and Speedwell crashed alongside three times, picking up four men. The destroyer Boreas then made repeated attempts to go alongside and managed to take off another seven before, at 0455/4, Sphinx capsized. Boreas picked up 30 survivors from the sea many of them choking on oil. Forty-six survivors were picked up in all; five officers and 49 ratings had been killed. Thirty bodies were washed ashore near Wick and at Walls in Orkney.®® % Her foredeck torn up by the explosion and her fore ends open to the sea, Sphinx wallows in wors­ ening weather as Speedwell closes to pass a tow. 37 ADM 199 377. O f Banarsls crew, one was killed; the other 31 were picked up by the destroyer Jape/in out of Scapa. 38 ADM 199 362. ADM 199 364. AIR 25 232. AIR 27 2102. Information from Tayside Police Museum. Services ty the Lifeboats of the Royal National Lifeboat Institution 1939 - 1946. 39 Five o f Tempo's crew died and the tug Brahmin came across a lifeboat with her survivors off Elie Ness that afternoon. ADM 199 362. ADM 199 377. Uqyds War Losses vol. 1. Ramsay et al. : 1987. 68 Sphinx drifted ashore north o f Lybster on 5 February. The Board of Enquiry, held in Invergordon, found that the first attack had gone unopposed as it had taken three minutes for the guns’ crews to close up. Sub Lieutenant An­ thony BeUars said that the delay was due to officers being, ‘doubtful as to whether it was a test or a proper alarm. Sir.’ The ships’ armament had been poorly maintained, close range weapons had jammed after just a few rounds and the fuses of shells in the ready-use racks were not set. The fuse settii^ keys could not be found and fire was opened ( f n i r d ■ i-' C r l o a t , 46 .North Western Approaches The tanker Gretafieid, a straggler from HX18, was torpedoed by U-57 at the eastern end of the Pentland Firth on 14 February 1940, She drifted ashore, still burning, near Dunbeath. Her loss, and that of eleven of her crew was a sharp reminder of the vulnerability of unescorted vessels on the coastal route. That a tanker fully-laden with Admiralty fuel oil should be al­ lowed to proceed alone through waters known to be dangerous was a notable lapse. At midday on 10 February the trawler Theresa Boyle was bombed and sunk by HE115 sea­ planes 115 miles north-east o f Aberdeen. Skipper Bell and his crew were picked up 20 miles off Peterhead at about 1400/12.®? U-9 laid mines off Invergordon on 9 February.®^ U-50 sank the Swedish Oriana (1,854T), Buenos Aires for Malmo, north o f Muckle Flugga on 11 February.®® Shortly before midnight on 15 February, U-14 sank the Danish colliers Rhone (1,064T) and Sleipner (1,066T) in the Moray Firth with heavy loss o f hfe. On the fol­ lowing evening, Wolfarth sank the Swedish colhers Uana (1,664T) and Osmed (1,526T) off Kinnaird's Head.®"? The Panamanian colher E l Sonador (1,406T) sailed Methil on 16 Febru­ ary in ON 14, then disappeared with her 17 crew, sunk by U-61 east o f Shetland on 18 Feb­ ruary.®® U-61 then sank another ship in ON14, the Norwegian Sangstad (4,297T).®® \J-23 was patrolling east o f Orkney on 18 February in the path o f the Methil-bound 30- ship HN12 when she torpedoed the escort destroyer Daring. From the 162 in Daring, only one officer and four ratings survived.®? In the Fair Isle Channel on 19 February, a torpedo from U-19 exploded off the starboard bow o f the naval oiler Daghestan then, on 21 Febru- with unfuzed shells. Officers were also criticised for not getting the wounded off before the weather worsened as this had contributed to the heavy loss o f life. ADM 1 10785. ADM 199 362. ADM 199 365. 61 ADM 199 365. 62 At 1955/4 May 1940 the tanker San Tiburcio (5,995T) struck a mine laid by U-9 in 165° Tarbat Ness 4.2 miles. She sank, but all 40 crew were saved. Other mines were swept in the area between May and August 1940. ADM 199 365. ADM 199 477. Macdonald : 1993 pp. 107-121. 63 Oriana sank and 14 o f her crew died. ADM 199 362. ADM 199 377. Wynn : 1997. Rohwer ; 1999. Uqyds Warljosses vol. 1. 64 The trawler Uch Hope picked up 17 survivors from Uana and Osmed from a raft in 5807N 0212W, and landed them at Scrabster. Eight from the Uana were being taken home aboard the Swedish tramp Santos, but she too was torpe­ doed on 24 February and six of the Uana survivors were among the dead. In all, 10 were lost from Uana and 13 from Osmed. ADM 199 362. ADM 199 377. Glass ; 1994. Rohwer : 1999. Wynn : 1997. Uqyds War Losses vdL 1. 65 Rohwer : 1999. Uoyds War Losses vol. 2. 66 Sangstads master was the sole casualty. The rest of her crew were picked up by the destroyer Inglefield after being spotted on a raft by a 233 Squadron Hudson. ADM 199 377. AIR 28 470. Rohwer ; 1999. Uqyds War Losses vol. 1. 67 Daring was the first loss in convoy to be publicly acknowledged as the result of a torpedo attack. Her survivors were picked up by the submarine Thistle. ADM 186 799. ADM 199 362. ADM 199 377. ADM 234 380. Rohwer : 1999. Robertson : 1981. 47 North Western Approaches ary, U-37 torpedoed the Glasgow steamer Uoch Maddy (4,996T) south-east o f Copinsay.®® The Anti-Submarine Flotilla swept the area but found nothing, losing one o f their number to air attack in the process.®® Royal Archer (2,266T) detonated a mine and sank off Gullane in the Forth on 24 February.?® That afternoon, the Asdic trawler Ijich Tulla reported a contact outside the Hoxa entrance to Scapa Flow. The destroyer Inglefield and more trawlers joined the hunt. Coventry City at­ tacked a contact in the Pentland Firth, another contact was depth-charged east o f South Ronaldsay and Ivanhoe, Gallant and Griffin were hunting another U boat reported in the Fair Isle ChanneL But that night, at 2154/24, the Swedish Santos (3,840T) was sunk east of Orkney by U-65. Santos had not been in convoy but was well illuminated with navigation lights burning and two floodlights shining on a Swedish flag. U-63 chased her for 90 min­ utes, then sank her with one torpedo.?? The following morning, at 0755/25, the submarine Narwhal escorting HN14 sighted U-63 on the surface five mites astern o f the convoy, turned towards the U boat and worked up to full speed. The destroyers Inglefield, Imogen, Escapade and Escort joined the chase and dropped depth-charges. At 0950/25 U-63 surfaced and, as Inglefield and Imogen opened fire, scuttled herself. Oberleutnant Lorentz and all but one o f his crew were taken prisoner.?^ Enemy aircraft appeared off the east coast on 27 February and, at 1300/27, the trawler Aurora was attacked off Buchan Ness. Another trawler, Ben Vurie, was bombed and strafed by an enemy aircraft off Rattray Head.?® Meanwhile, 609 Squadron Hurricanes were east of St Abbs Head on one o f the new standing convoy patrols instituted after 602 Squadron’s successful interception on 9 February. An H E l l l o f 2/KG26 dropped out o f cloud and was shot down to crash off Fife Ness at 1305/27. Four airmen were taken to Dundee.?'* German preparations for their invasion o f Norway brought an increase in Luftwaffe moni­ toring of naval movements, particularly around Scapa Flow, in March 1940. There was also 68 Six of Loch Maddjs crew died and 33 survivors were found by the destroyer D/dm. D/am stopped, and was about to pick them up,when she too was near-missed by a torpedo, and left. Shortly afterwards they heard two heavy explo­ sions as Inglefield, Imperial, Imogen and Diana hunted two submarines (actually 11-19 and U-22) in the Fair Isle Channel. Loeh Madefi broke in two and the stem half was towed to Inganess Bay by St Mêlions. The other half was sunk east of Copinsay by U-23 on 22 February. ADM 199 362. ADM 199 377. AIR 28 470. Rohwer : 1999. Wynn r 1977. 6^ HM trawler Fifeshire was bombed and sunk 50 miles east o f Copinsay. One o f her 22 crew survived. HM trawler Ayrshire vias strafed, though her crew escaped injury. ADM 199 364. ADM 199 377. 78 R/yalArche/'s crew o f 28 were landed at Leith by the trawler Tourmaline. Anodier mine victim in the same area was the trawler BenAttow early on 7 March 1940. ADM 199 362. ADM 199 364. ADM 199 365. AF62/2632. Rohwer : 1999. Johnstone : 1986. Baird : 1993. Dundee CWwr (various from March 1940). 71 Twelve survivors were spotted on a raft in 5970N 0042W by a Hudson which directed the destroyer Gallant to pick them up. Santoshad been carrying eight survivors from Uar/a (see above), two o f whom survived the second sinking. ADM 199 362. ADM 199 365. Jones : 1986 p. 30. 72 U-63’s operational career had lasted five weeks and she appears to have been an unhappy ship. Her survivors, three officers and 20 ratings, were landed at Leitli by Inglefield and I/nogen on 27 February. Under interrogation, two officers blamed Lorentz for die loss, citing poor sliip-handling. ADM 199 362. ADM 199 377. Jones : 1986 p. 30-34. 73 AF62/1339. Glasgow Herald 21 ]anvtaiy 1942. 48 North Western Approaches an increase in attacks on the Norwegian convoys.?® Though there were few successes, at 0615/1 March the trawler Star of Uherty picked up 19 survivors from the Norwegian collier Vestfos (1,388T) which had been bombed and sunk off Auskerry.?® 603 Squadron Spitfires shot down an H E l l l off Aberdeen on 7 March.?? Three raiders dropped bombs into Scapa Flow the following afternoon, and two bombs fell close to the Kirkwall portion o f ON 18. U boats were being withdrawn from southern North Sea and Atlantic patrols for Norway, and reconnaissance lines, principally aimed at detecting British warships, were set up off Orkney and Shetland and in the Moray Firth from mid-March. Schepke's U-19 intercepted ON21 in the Moray Firth late on 19 March and sank the Danes Minsk (1,229T) and Charkow (1,026T), both Methil for Esbjerg. At 0457/20, east of Wick, he sank two more Danes, Viking (1,153T) and Botha/ (2,109T) from HN20.?® Aircraft were seen over Shetland that afternoon and, between 1830/20 and 1950/20, three air attacks were mounted on HN20 and ON21. The Norwegian collier Svinta (1,276T) in ON21 was damaged and aban­ doned, but taken in tow for Kirkwall. Thistlehrae (4,747T), the anti-submarine trawler Windermere and the Northern Coast (1,21 IT) were also bombed, strafed and damaged.?® The attack on ON21 east of Orkney on 2 1 March 1940. The Oslo-bound collier Svrnto is ablaze and the oiler Daghestan has been damaged. Svinta was torpe­ doed and sunk by U- 5 7 off Copinsay at 2210/22 March. Two more Danes, Algier (1,654T) and Christianborg (3,2701’), both Philadelphia for Copen­ hagen, were sunk north o f Shetland by U-38 early on 21 March, and, in the same area on 25 March, the Danish Britta (1,146T) was torpedoed and sunk by U-47. At 2013/25, off Copinsay, U-57 torpedoed the naval oiler Daghestan (5,742T) which had sailed Scapa Flow earlier that evening for Sullom Voe. Four died and 29 survivors were picked up by the na­ val trawlers Northern Dawn and Brontes.^ Then, at midnight, the Norwegian Cometa (3,7941’), 74 This was 609 Squadron’s first successful combat of the war. Another HEl 11 from the same raid was shot down off Coquet Island by Spitfires of 152 Squadron. AIR 25 232. AIR 27 2102. ADM 199 364. Ramsay et al. : 1986. 75 Roskill : 1954 p. 143. 76 AF62/1339. ADM 199 362 Uqyds War Usses vol. 1. 77 Ernst Breiler was picked up by RAF HSL 272 at 1853/7 and taken to Leuchars. ADM 199 362. ADM 199 364. AIR 25 232. AIR 28 459. WO 208 4117. 78 Eleven of the 20 aboard Minsk were killed as was the entire crew o f the Charkow. Fifteen o f the Viking's 17 crew died as did 15 o f Bothats 20 crew died. Wick Lifeboat picked up survivors spotted by an aircraft. Uqyds War Losses vois. 1 and 2. ADM 199 362. Wynn : 1997. Glass : 1994. 74 Thistlehrae reached Trondheim only to fall into the hands of invading German troops on 9 April. 88 ADM 199 377. Rohwer : 1999. Glass ; 1994. Uoyds War Losses vol. 1. 49 North Western Approaches Oslo for Buenos Aires, was stunk by U-38 north-west o f Noup Head.®? Intense air activity continued and the Northern Coast was again bombed and strafed on 29 March off Kinnaird's Head. A reconnaissance o f Scapa Flow caused an air raid alert in Wick at 0840/31 and the anti-aircraft barrage opened up from Kirkwall. The cruiser Shef­ field was attacked by H E l l l s east o f Orkney on 2 April and, at 2030/2, two enemy aircraft passed over John o' Groats on their way to Scapa. The Leith trawler Rafapiko was attacked o ff Copinsay. Duncansby Head Lighthouse was strafed and bombs fell on Flotta. A U boat sighted west o f Fair Isle was U-38 which had earlier that day sunk the Swedish Signe (1,540T) from HN23. Twelve Aberdeen trawlers fishing east o f Muckle Flugga were at­ tacked at 1420/3 April. Sansonnet took a direct hit and her ten crew crew were all lost. Gor- spen suffered two near misses, one o f her crew was injured and she was abandoned. Braemar cut away her gear as she made her escape. Delila was attacked for the second time in a week in the Moray Firtli, and her wheelhouse roof was shattered by gunfire. But she returned fire, claiming hits on one o f the raiders.®^ Two groups o f U boats were in position o ff the north o f Scotland by 6 April, the 6* Group (U-13y U-57, U-58 and U-5S7) west o f the Pentland Firth and around Shetland, the 9‘?‘ Group (17-7, U-10 and U-19) east o f Shetland. A t 0250/6 JursFs U-59 sank the Norwe­ gian collier Navarra (2,118T) about 25 miles west o f Orkney. Ten o f her crew died and 14 survivors were picked up by the Finnish steamer Atlas and landed at Kirkwall.®® A t t a c k s o n Sh i p p i n g o f f S c o t l a n d a n d t f ie S c a n d i n a v i a n C o n v o y s Se p t e m b e r 1 9 3 9 t o A p r il 1 9 4 0 i n R e t r o s p e c t For the first winter o f the war, Scandinavia was the centre o f strategic interest for Allies and Axis alike, the latter then including the Soviet Union. Scandinavian convoys have to be set against the background o f Allied and Axis interventionism. Admiralty attention was initially directed mainly towards the Baltic, and British interests lay principally in negotiat­ ing trade limitation agreements with strongly isolationist Norway and Sweden, in particular agreements that would limit Scandinavian exports to Germany. But Norway and Sweden in particular were heavily dependent on trade with both belligerent blocs, so negotiations dragged on inconclusively. While Churchill’s Admiralty correctly identified the supply o f Swedish iron ore as o f cru- 8* Cometa had eariier beea intercepted by the Northern Patrol vessel Kingston Peridot which put an armed guard o f one officer and four ratings on board to take her into Kirkwall. Shortly before midnight Cometa was again stopped, this time by U-3S, witich sank her with a torpedo after the crew and passengers had abandoned ship. Three lifeboats were found by die patrol vessel Northern Sky on 26 March and the survivors were landed at KitkwaD. ADM 199 377. Uoyds WarLossesvol. 1. Roliwer : 1999. 82 ADM 199 363. AF62/1339. CE87/4/41. Ritchie : 1991. G/asgoP Hera/d 21 January 1942. Uoyds War Losses vol. 1. 83 ADM 199 363. Rohwer : 1999. 50 North Western Approaches cial importance to the German war effort and proposed measures to block it, Minister of Supply Leslie Burgin pointed out to the War Cabinet that Britain was dependent on Swe­ den for supplies o f ferro-chrome and calcium-carbide.®'? And there was also important trade in timber, paper and coal to consider, along with the likely loss o f supplies o f Danish foodstuffs that would follow on from an intervention. Much of the trade between Norway and Scotland was, in any case, carried in neutral ships and their losses to U boat attack served a perceived political purpose in driving neutrals forther towards the Allied camp. Aside from the economic importance o f commerce and the strategic importance o f raw materials, for both Axis and Allies ahke the maintenance of maritime trade as a form of diplomacy was essential. Britain, for example, was negotiating the chartering o f a large part o f the Norwegian merchant fleet, in particular its 150 modern tankers. As Salmon writes, the tense and difficult shipping negotiations were one o f the principal factors that acted as a brake on Churchill’s interventionist schemes, first mooted on 19 September 1939.®® And among the cargoes carried out from Britain were carefully disguised packages o f aid for Finland, then engaged in the Winter War with the Soviet Union. So the Scandinavian con­ voys organised from Rosyth remained, for the time being, a necessity. The Luftwaffe contributed little to German efforts to stop sailings between Scotland and Norway. The main German effort was undertaken by U boats and it is noteworthy that among those honing their skills in the waters off Scotland, practising the night attacks from within convoys that would prove so successful in the autumn o f 1940, were future aces such as Kretschmer, Moehle, Rollmann, Schepke and Prien. U boats on their own were too few in number to make an appreciable difference over a sustained period in coastal waters, but had there been closer coordination with the Luftwaffe, the German anti-shipping offensive off Scotland would have been considerably more effective. There is little evidence that the Royal Navy learned much from its experience on the Nor­ way run. But their convoying o f neutral shipping, along with the sinking, by 8 April 1940, o f 55 Norwegian ships by German forces, contributed much to the speedy arrival o f Nor­ wegian tonnage in Allied ports in April 1940.®® Willmott suggests that the accession o f Norwegian merchant shipping to the Allied cause represented the most significant German failure in their 1940 Norway campaign. Certainly, in 1941, 40% o f ah foreign flagged ves­ sels entering British ports were Norwegian.®? By the end o f March 1940, the Home Fleet was back at a reinforced Scapa and military 84 Minutes o f War Cabinet no. 122 o f 22 December 1939 quoted in Gilbert : 1989 p. 110, 85 Salmon et al. \ 1995 p. 10. 86 Papers- by Atie Thowsen and 0ivind Schau in Salmon et al r 1995 Chapters 7 and 8. 87 From Neutrality to NATO - The Norwegian Anmd Forces and Defense Policy 1905A955 Ph.D dissertation by David G. Thomson, Ohio State University 1996. p. 214. North Western Approaches forces were massing in Scotland, France and in north-western Germany. Increasing Ger­ man activity ahead of their invasion o f Norway led to a sharp increase in sinkings o f mainly neutral vessels both in and out of the Norway convoys. Thus was the stage set for the first major collision o f the war in western Europe, the campaign in Norway, Scotland’s role in which is examined in detail in Chapter Five. I I 52 North Western Approaches f 7vrer i oree B a t t l e o f T h e A t l a n t i c - P a r t I L u f t w a f f e O p e r a t i o n s a g a i n s t S c o t t i s h C o a s t a l C o n v o y s a n d C o a s t a l T a r g e t s J u n e 1940 t o M a y 1943 Prior to the Allied collapse in Norway and France, the main outbound OA series convoys assembled off Southend and steamed round the south coast o f England collecting ships from Southampton and other ports before heading into the Atlantic via the South-Western Approaches. Outbound convoys from Liverpool and the Clyde, the OB series, rendez­ voused with OA convoys in the South Western Approaches. Inbound convoys followed the reverse route but, from July 1940, most ocean traffic began using the North Channel and the North Western Approaches. This route kept the convoys as far away as possible from Axis-held territory and Luftwaffe airfields, but it also caused massive disruption, par­ ticularly for traffic to and from British east coast ports. Pre-war British imports had exceeded 50 million tons, but this figure was cut from the out­ set. Behrens compiled the following table showing imports and net consumption of im­ ported supplies in millions o f tons from Ministry o f War Transport data: First year of war Second year of war Calendar year 1941 Calendar year 1942 Calendar year 1943 Calendar yearl944 Imports44,2 Changes in stock level Net consumption Î ^ .3 : 31.5 +1.9 29.6 ! 30.5 +1.4 29.1 ' 25.3^ " :22.9 -2.:^ 26.4 ! +2.8 23.6 ' 25.1 -1.9 27.Ô 1 Merchant Shipping and the Demands ofWarWASO 1978 p. 201 Dramatic reductions in imports there may have been, but, even at full capacity, the princi­ pal west coast ports on the Clyde, the Mersey and at Avonmouth could only handle about two thirds of trade in 1940 in addition to military traffic. So, under pressure from the Min­ istry o f Shipping, the Admiralty began escorting coastal convoys around the north o f Scot­ land to and from east coast ports. FS and FN convoys between the Thames and Forth be­ gan on 9 July when FN l sailed Southend for Methil. From there it became EN l for the passage northabout to the Clyde, eventually to feed Atlantic convoy OA180. WN convoys from the Clyde to Methil began immediately, though the OA /OB series continued into S3 North W este rn Approaches October 1940. The MT/TM series between Methil and the Tyne began running in Decem­ ber 1940. However, from 10 September 1940, only ships o f less than 6,500 GRT were al­ lowed to use east coast ports as far south as the Humber, coasters only being allowed south o f the Humber. The tonnage limit was later raised to 8,500 GRT though restrictions on types o f cargo and ships remained. For example, diesel-powered vessels were barred from the east coast as they were more likely to detonate acoustic mines.? As noted in the previous chapter on the Scandinavian convoys, conditions o f the coastal route were very different to those on the Atlantic, one writer who was there describing it as the ‘quick-fire corner o f the war’ .2 Between the Pentland Firth and the Forth, and on to the south, the convoys had to keep to a narrow swept channel that only allowed them to run two abreast. This meant that a 50-ship convoys frequently straggled out over many miles, making it impossible for the few, ill-armed escorts available to protect the whole convoy. In one respect at least, coastal convoy schedules were dictated by the tide and the need to ensure a safe passage o f the notorious Pentland Firth where the tide can run at eight knots and the weather can be appalling, particularly when a gale blows against the tide. It was common for the Commodore o f a strung-out convoy could find that only some o f his ships had got through, the rest being trapped and at the mercy o f the Luftwaffe until the tide turned. Navigation had to be precise, yet the swept channel was marked only by occasional dimly lit buoys. All shore lights had been blacked out, though they could be shown briefly if a convoy was in the vicinity. After an air raid in August 1940, Peterhead NOIC Captain Hewett wrote, Tt is considered that Buchan Ness Light is being used by enemy aircraft as a landfall and departure...Buchan Ness Light, the only light remaining lit for the use of shipping locally, is doused by me on receipt o f Air Raid Warning “yellow” for so long as is considered necessary.’ Following the raid, the light was only shown for a maximum of five minutes in every thirty minutes.® Unlike in the Atlantic, o ff the east coast there was no margin for error. A case in point was WN7, a 35-ship convoy that had experienced dreadful weather as it passed through the Pentland Firth on 3 April 1941. The convoy was bombed as it passed Rattray Head, then, as it passed Aberdeen, two steel derricks on the Commodore ship Stuart Queen, weakened by seas when dodging the air attack, crashed to the deck. This induced a 10° compass error which, due to bad visibility, was not noticed until, as Commodore Harry Rogers wrote. * Belirens, Merchant Shipping and the Demands of War, HMSO 1978 p. 136. 2 Nicholas Monsarrat in Three Corvettes (Cassell 1945). 3 ADM 199 365 North Western Approaches At 2000/3,1 made the Bell Rock on the port bow instead of passing three miles outside of it. As soon as I saw this I did an emergency away, but owing to the gale, bad visibility and straggled condi­ tion of the convoy, aU ships did not obey this and it was later reported to me that the SS Erne Frank- ham [sic] (nationality unknown) had collided with the BeU Rock.. The Belgian Emile Franqui had, in fact, struck the unlit Bell Rock, and then freed herself only to run ashore on the nearby Abertay Sands.^ Outside the swept channel, a British offshore minefield stretched from Shetland to the English Channel and a particular hazard facing shipping off the east coast was British mines that had broken loose, often during easterly gales. One victim was the Fleet Air Arm target ship St Briac ^ a former passenger steamer working as a radar training ship for the FAA training establishment at HMS Condor, Arbroath, which blundered into the minefield during a storm on 12 March 1942 and sank.^ For coastal convoy survivors taking to boats there was at least the consolation that, unlike in mid-Atlantic, traffic on the coastal route was all but constant and RNLI Lifeboats, pa­ trol craft, air-sea rescue launches, minesweepers and convoy escorts were never far away. But being caught on a lee shore in bad weather was highly dangerous. In the case o f the St Briac, Lifeboats from Broughty Ferry, Arbroath and Montrose launched and the Free French tug A.hielle JL" sailed Aberdeen. One o f S t Briads boats was found by the tug Empire Earch, but the other ran ashore near Collieston and 14 o f the 17 aboard were drowned.^ The destroyer Kockingham was another victim, heavily damaged by a British mine off Aber­ deen in September 1944.® The U boat effort having concentrated in the Atlantic by mid-1940, Scottish east coast convoys were up against the Luftwaffe. Convoys constrained within the narrow swept channel were, on the face o f it, easy targets and, with the growing demands on the east coast ports, shipping traffic off the east coast was, by 1941, almost continuous and not hard to find. But the Luftwaffe was designed for operations with, or immediately ahead of, the Wehrmacht, so neither its aircraft or its crews were suited for anti-shipping operations over long distances such as those between Norway and Scotland. And, as Coastal Com­ mand’s anti-shipping Strike Wings were to find operating off Norway from 1943, operating o ff enemy territory brought the Luftwaffe’s unescorted bombers close to British Chain Home RDF stations and Fighter and Coastal Command airfields. The Luftwaffe’s greatest handicap, however, was that it’s anti-shipping operations off the British east coast were a 4 ADM 199 14. 5 Emile Franqui % passengers and all but 18 o f her crew were taken off by the Broughty Ferry lifeboat Mona, then she was refloated and made Methil under tow. ADM 199 14. ADM 199 400. ADM 199 401. ADM 199 412. 6 ADM 199 401. Forty-seven died in the St Briac incident ADM 199 401. 8 Baird : 1993. 55 North Western Approaches side-show conducted without coherent poHcy. As Bletchley Park discovered in 1941, the Luftwaffe had excellent intelligence o f convoy movements, yet were powerless to intervene decisively.® From mid-1940, the principal Luftflotte 5 units operating across Scotland from Stavanger Sola in Norway and Aalborg in Denmark were 2/KG26 (H e lll) and 2/KG30 (Ju88). Re­ connaissance was the responsibihty o f the H e l l ls , Dol7s and Ju88s o f 2(F)/22, 3(F)/22, 1(F)/120 and 1(F)/121, and there were regular weather reconnaissance flights west of Shetland by Wekusta-Kette X’s H e l l ls . These were chiefly intended for operations against, and to support operations against, land targets. But three designated anti-shipping staffeln of Kfg/506 (H e ll5) based at Stavanger achieved a higher strike rate per sortie than the landplane Luftwaffe units, thus demonstrating the need for appropriate training. What the anti-shipping campaign off Scotland in 1940-1941 did achieve was to provide Luftflotte 5 units with experience that would prove invaluable in their operations against the Arctic convoys from 1942 onwards. Ranged against the German units |Iwere 13 and 14 Groups, Fighter | t !Command. 13 Group had been j covering the north of England and the base An isolated sector was set up at Protection for convoys around Scotland and the east coast of England vyas provided by Fighter Command Wick to provide fighter cover for aircraft such as the 602 Squadron Spitfire shown the Home Fleet base when Scapa ' Twhich had been fitted with high-angle anti-aircraft Flow was reopened in March 1940. armament. This left the coast between the Forth and Caithness undefended so detachments o f fighters were sent to Coastal Command airfields at Leuchars, Montrose and Dyce. But this was an imperfect solution, not least because the Coastal Command fields were not linked to the Fighter Command control system, so 14 Group was established on 1 August 1940 with its headquarters at the Drumossie Hotel, Inverness, to cover the whole area between the Tay and Shetland. Sector HQs were at Dyce, Wick and Kirkwall and among the first opera­ tional units were 603 Squadron’s Spitfires and 141 Squadron’s Défiants at Dyce and Mon­ trose and the Hurricanes o f 504, 232 and 3 Squadrons at Castletown and I n v e r n e s s . 9 ADM 223 2. ’8 The BoyalAirForce 1939-1945 vol. 1 The Fight at Odds. Denis Richards (HMSO 1974) p. 68-69. AIR 25 250. 56 North Western Approaches Approval for the first 20 Chain Home RDF stations was given in August 1937 with a target date for completion o f April 1939. In Scotland, the first Chain Home stations were built at Drone FIUl near St Abbs Head, Douglas Wood near Dundee, School HiU near Aberdeen and Netherbutton on Orkney to cover Scapa Flow, the latter two passing plots to the iso­ lated sector HQ at Wick while the others passed plots to the main Fighter Command Filter Room at Stanmore. Due to the earth’s curvature, Chain Home was ineffective against low- flying aircraft, so the network was enhanced by Chain Home Low stations to fill the gaps beneath and on either side o f Chain Home transmissions, the first Scottish CHL stations being at Cockburnspath and Doonies Hill north o f Aberdeen. Given that the use o f the east coast ports was essential, the east coast convoy route around northern Scotland was a vital artery. While the Luftwaffe offensive was at its height be­ tween July 1940 and June 1941, some 111 vessels totalling almost 400,000 tons were sunk or damaged in the swept channel between the Pentland Firth and Berwick-upon-Tweed. Had not the east coast route been kept open, an intolerable load would have been placed on the principal west coast ports in the Clyde and Mersey. Military operations around the world would have been hampered, if not abandoned altogether, and industry, particularly in the hinterland o f river ports like the Tees, Tyne and Humber, would have been severely disabled. But the Luftwaffe did not confine their attentions to the east coast. Raids were mounted against coastal towns and across Scotland against Clydeside. This chapter considers, there­ fore, the hitherto untold story o f the Luftwaffe air offensive against Scottish coastal con­ voys and targets on the Scottish maritime periphery from 1940 onwards. F i r s t R a i d s The first post-Dunkirk air raids against Scotland were directed at coastal land targets, prin­ cipally Rosyth naval base, in late June 1940, Operating from newly acquired bases in Nor­ way, 15 H e l l l bombers of 3/KG26 launched a raid against Rosyth late on 25 June. At 0020/26 an H e l l l was shot down into the river off Grangemouth by FHght Lieutenant Ken MacDonald o f 603 Squadron. Another H e l l l plotted over Glasgow and Ardeer was intercepted near Turnhouse by 603 Squadron Spitfires and jettisoned its bombs south of Edinburgh, then was intercepted by 602 Squadron’s FHght Lieutenant Johnstone and crashed in the sea off Barns Ness at 0204/26.^^ 3/KG26 returned the following night, scat- " MacDonald's victory was the second successful night interception by a Spitfire. One body was recovered. HM trawler Kathleen picked up three survivors from Johnstone's victim and the body of Gefrieter Wahner was later re­ covered from sea. WO 166 2128. AIR 25 232. AIR 27 2074. AIR 27 2079.14H50/160. ADM 199 363. ADM 199 400. HO 198 198. Information from the late Air Vice Marshal Sandy Johnstone, the late Group Captain George Denholm and the late Group Captain George Pinkerton. 57 North W este rn Approaches tering bombs atound Dalmeny and Cramond, and again in the early hours o f 28 June when bombs fell south o f the Forth and near Dundee. At 0030/30 Aberdeen Harbour was bombed and the Empire Henchman was attacked off Peterhead. Early on 1 July incendiaries fell on a timber yard and a school in Torry, Aberdeen, and bombs fell in the Tay.^^ None o f these poorly directed attacks had caused casualties but, at 1635/1 July, a raider dropped two bombs beside Wick harbour, killing 14 and injuring 22.*3 At 1930/1 four Ju 8 8 s o f 3(F)/121 approached the Forth, two o f them being chased out to sea by 602 Squadron after dumping bombs in Belhaven Bay.^4 6 0 3 Squadron shot down a Ju 8 8 of 8/KG30 off Aberdeen on 3 July,^^ and another 8/KG30 Ju 8 8 o ff Stonehaven that eve- ning.^^ Enemy aircraft were plotted off the east coast late on 5 July and again the following night. At 1813/7, 602 Squadron intercepted two 1/KG30 Ju 8 8 s o ff St Abbs Head and shot one d ow n .L a t e on 8 July, mines were dropped into the Forth and bombs fell near Grail, at Lossiemouth and Forres.^® 602 Squadron claimed one Ju 8 8 down in flames off Fife Ness at 1750/9 and another damaged.^® Despite these early successes for 602 and 603 Squadrons, the Spitfire was no nightfighter and, despite the short hours of darkness, raiders were able to roam across Scotland at night almost with impunity. One raider plotted 45 miles east o f Arbroath at 2248/10 July crossed the coast near Leuchars, crossed Perthshire, Stirlingshire, Loch Lomond, Helensburgh and Dunoon, then dropped five bombs on Mull and attacked a trawler off Tiree before return­ ing to Norway completely unchallenged.^^ Costliest among these early air raids on coastal targets was that which began at 1253/12 July when H e l l l s o f 9/KG26 dropped 19 bombs across Aberdeen. Two fell in the boiler shop at HaU Russell’s and two more exploded outside. Twenty shipyard workers were killed and 50 were injured. Yellow section, 603 Squadron, shot down one o f the raiders on South Anderson Drive at 1255/12, but the crash resulted in further casualties on the ground. In all, 29 died and 103 were injured 21 12 w o 166 2128. HH50/160. 13 HH50/160. ADM 199 377. Glass ; 1994. 14 AIR 25 232. AIR 27 2074. WO 166 2128. 13 Tlifee aircrew were killed and Unteroffizier Heringlehner was picked up unhurt by a trawler. Bordfunker Friedrich Rabe’s body was recovered later and buried at Dyce. AIR 50 167. AIR 27 2079. Ramsay et al : 1987. i<* Gourdon Lifeboat Margaret Dawson found the bomber off Foulshaugh Cliffs, north-east o f Gourdon. It was almost submerged and none o f its crew had survived, AIR 27 2079. Ramsay et al ; 1987. Services bj the Lifeboats of the Boyal National Lifeboat Institution 1939-1946. 1^ AIR 27 2074. Ramsay et al : 1987. Information from Wing Commander Hector McLean. 18 AIR 25 232. HH50/160. 19 AIR 27 2074. 20 WO 166 2128. ADM 199 362. ADM 199 377. HH50/160. HH50/161. Ramsay et al : 1987. 21 Muddle gripped the emergency services and Medical Inspector Dr J. Nairn Hay wrote that, despite the police being inundated with calls for ambulances, only two were sent. Then a policeman refused to allow the first ambulance near the scene, so lorries were commandeered and Nairn Hay’s report describes dead, dying and grievously injured lying'( ii\ erica) North Western Approaches Thirteen enemy aircraft were plotted over Scotland in the early hours o f 13 July, some penetrating to the west coast. One raider passed over Edinburgh, Hamilton and Barrhead, then followed the railway through Bridge o f Weir to Greenock, dropping bombs at Bar­ rhead, Paisley and Bridge o f Weir. Seven 50kg bombs fell in Greenock where one man died. Other enemy aircraft scattered bombs across Renfrewshire, Angus, Fife and East Lo­ thian. 22 An H e l l l seen o ff Rattray Head at noon on 15 July was shot down off Peterhead by 603 Squadron.23 That evening, among 12 bombs to fall in Leith, one demolished a tran­ sit shed at Victoria Dock, one burst in Portland Place and one, a UXB, was discovered in Nicoll Place.24 Another raider appeared at midnight on 15 July, dropped bombs on remote country between Fort William and Mull, then went south over the Clyde. Enemy aircraft were active over the convoy lane off Kinnaird’s Head on the afternoon o f 16 July and, at 1557/16, two bombs fell at Peterhead Prison. Twenty-six people were in­ jured when six bombs were dropped on Fraserburgh five minutes later and, at 1620/16, 18 bombs fell on Portsoy, injuring two. Meanwhile, an H e l l l of 9/KG26 that had attacked naval vessels 25 miles to the north was shot down by 603 Squadron. Another enemy air­ craft circled off Gourdon at 1802/16 and a ship was bombed off St Abbs Head.2<5 The ICI explosives plant at Ardeer and Irvine Harbour were targeted at 1452/17 July, then two more raiders laid mines o ff Montrose that afternoon and a 603 Squadron Spitfire dis­ appeared while attempting to i n t e r c e p t .A raid on Leith on 18 July killed seven and the first raid on Glasgow the following morning killed three and injured 31.2® At 0140/20 a Ju88 dropped two mines off Gourock and another mine between Irvine Shipyard and Ar­ deer Dock. Mines were also dropped in the Forth off Inchkeith. Two mines exploded at Stirling at 0220/20 injuring 32, three o f them seriously, and leaving 29 families homeless. Three bombs exploded at Peterhead Academy and one was reported on the shore at on mattresses and improvised stretchers being driven at high speed to the Royal Infirmary. Those still alive on arrival at Woolmanhill had suffered greatly from a lack o f essential first aid and terrible wounds to the head, trunk and limbs had been left exposed. Rapid transportation in heavy vehicles had a^avated injuries and increased shock. The four aircrew in the Heinkel o f 9/KG26 were buried in the Old Churchyard at Dyce. For Nairn Hay's report see HO 199 197. See also ADM 199 364. HH50/162. Ramsay et al : 1989. 22 HH50/160. HH50/161. WO 166 2128. AIR 25 232. HO 198 198. Gmnack Telegraph. Glasgow Herald 23 Obergefreiter Reinhardt killed. Oberleutnant HoUmann, Unteroffizier Walz, Obegefreiter Probst and Obergefreiter Trefzger were sighted in their dinghy by a 224 Squadron Hudson, then came ashore near Fraserburgh on 17 July. ADM 199 365. AIR 27 2079. Ramsay et al : 1987. 24 The Bomb Disposal Section from Dreghorn Barracks made tlie UXB safe by 0837/17. HH50/160. AIR 25 232. WO 166 2128. ADM 199 363. HO 198 198. 25 This raider dropped two mines into the Kyles o f Bute off Tighnabruich Pier. One exploded immediately, the other detonated at 2245/17 July. ADM 199 363. WO 166 2128. 26 Two men were injured during the fighter attacks and believed killed. Oberleutnant Lorenz unliurt and Unteroffizier Beer took to their dinghy and were picked up by an RAF HSL. James ‘Black’ Morton’s Spitfire was lût by return fire, but returned to base safely. AIR 25 232. HH50/160. ADM 199 377. Ramsay et al ; 1989. 27 WO 166 2128. HH50/160. AIR 25 232. 28 WO 166 2128. HO 198 198. HO 199 201. AIR 25 232. HH50/160. Edinburgh Corporation War Damage Records. 59 j North W este rn Approaches Strathbeg Bay.2® A Ju88 appeared over Leith at 0559/22 July and dropped a 1,000kg bomb in the river off Seafield and another beside Albert Dock. A shed and AFS station were de­ molished, one fireman was killed and eight injured. Banff and Macduff were also bombed.®® Air activity began again in the early hours of 23 July with the laying o f mines in the Forth at 0005/23. At 0023/23 around 100 incendiaries were scattered over Granton Harbour, bombs fell across Fife, near St Abbs Head, and in the sea off Arbroath.®^ M a g n e t i c M i n e s Mines laid by U boats had scored two notable successes in Scottish waters, namely the near destruction o f the cruiser Belfast and the damaging o f the battleship Nelson, both in 1939. Luftwaffe mine laying sorties in Scottish waters during 1940 and 1941 used mainly the 500kg Luftmine A magnetic ground mine.® ^ These were dropped off Aberdeen and the Tay, but the Forth with its heavy commercial and naval traffic was a particular target, as was Scapa Flow. Few vessels o f note were sunk, though even the merest suspicion that mines had been dropped was enough to close harbours and major rivers until they could be swept. The disruption to tightly organised convoy schedules could be considerable. Air-dropped magnetic mines first appeared off Scotland in the summer o f 1940, notably off Montrose on 17 July and in the Forth on 23 July. Then three were dropped at the en­ trance to Aberdeen at 0200/26 July 1940 and the sweepers Eldorado and Neofhaven took al­ most ten days to clear the channel during which time shipping movements were re­ stricted.®® The loss of the Salvesen tanker Salvestria (11,938T), inbound for Grangemouth from HX55 with 12,000 tons o f oil the following day, amply demonstrates the vulnerability o f vessels in a narrow swept channel. She was heading up the swept channel for Inchkeith gate with three other ships when, at 1749/27, she detonated a mine and settled, burning fiercely, by the stern. The swept channel was marked by a line o f buoys topped with white flags and both Captain Jamieson and Pilot Flockhart were adamant that they had passed within 100 feet o f the buoys. The Enquiry found that the buoys marking the centre line of the channel became, ‘displaced either to east or west o f the charted position owing to the direction o f the tidal stream.’®'* Two mines fell in the Tay on 28 July and, later that day, the 29 WO 166 2128. AIR 25 232. ADM 199 363. HH50/160. HH50/161. Stirling Observer. 30 WO 166 2128. AIR 25 232. AIR 27 2074. Edinburgh Corporation Air Raid Damage Repairs records held, unindexed at the time o f consultation, by Edinburgh City Archives. 31 WO 166 2128. WO 166 3261. AIR 25 232. HH50/160. 32 Ramsay et al : 1989 p. 147-149. 33 ADM 199 364. 34 Ten o f her crew died. ADM 1 10775. ADM 199 363. AF62/2632. JJoyds War Lasses vol. 1. 60 North Western Approaches sweeper Gadfly was badly damaged when her ‘M’ sweep exploded one o f the electrically- fired British defensive mines laid in the Tay to deter unwanted visitors.®® The coaster Orlock Head (1,563T) was bombed, strafed and set on fire west o f Scrabster at 0200/28 July. Six o f her 25 crew died and Orlock Head sank off Strathy Point.®® An 8/KG26 H e l l l was shot down off Montrose at 1205/30 July by 603 Squadron.®? At 2350/2 August the coaster Highlander (1,216T) was attacked by three H e l l 5 seaplanes off Tod Head and shot two of them down.®® Sirens sounded in Lerwick at 2354/2 as a small number o f bombs fell in open country, then, at 0045/3, the 42-ship WN4 came under air attack off Cape Wrath. Two enemy aircraft attacked the leading ships with bombs and ma­ chine gun fire and an unexploded bomb lodged in White Cresfs stokehold.®® A bomb ex­ ploded close to Autocyclus and another hit the mainmast of Somali, then fell on deck without exploding. Fierce fires started aboard Statira (4,825T).4® Raiders dropped mines into the Forth early on 4 August, the Tay on 5 August, and the Forth again on 7 August. At 0012/8 August two raiders dropped nine bombs in the Clyde between Inverkip and Cloch Point, two more on the beach at Lunderston Bay and three close to Ardgowan House and, early on 13 Au­ gust, aircraft mined the Clyde between Port Glasgow and Dumbarton Rock.'** At This Hel 15 seaplane of l/Kfg 506 from Stavanger flew into a hill near Arbroath at 0355/15 August 1940 after being blinded by a searchlight during anti-shipping sortie to the Tay. Generally commanded by Kreigsmarine officers, these aircraft were employed on minelaying and anti-shipping mis­ sions off Scotland. 35 Grandage MS, IWM Department o f Documents ref. 87/61/1. ADM 199 364. ADM 199 400. 36 Twenty-five survivors were rescued by Thurso Lifeboat. ADM 199 377. Services the Lifeboats of the Bjyal National Lifeboat Institution 1939- 1946. 37 AIR 27 2079. 38 The first Hel 15 was hit by anti-aircraft fire and crashed. The second dropped bombs which missed, then it too was hit, lost height, struck Highlanders port lifeboat and crashed onto her deck. Highlander made Leith the following morning with the wreckage still aboard and, to protect her from reprisals that might arise from the widespread pub­ licity, was renamed St Catherine. ADM 199 363. 39 White Crest dropped back while her crew hauled the UXB on deck, ditched it over the side, then rejoined the convoy the following day with a hatch cover secured over the hole in her side. ADM 199 13. 46 Statinf s crew were saved and she was beached, still burning, at Stornoway. Lieutenant Stannard commanding Arab made a ‘strong plea’ for better HA armament. James Nelson also recommended that at least six machine guns should be fitted to ships in coastal convoys and that these should be manned by the Army. The idea was taken up with the Admiralty by Lawrence Holt and led directly to the formation o f the Maritime Anti-Aircraft Regiments of the Royal Artillery. ADM 199 13. ADM 199 363. Roskill : 1962 p. 50-51. Uoyds War Losses vol. 1. 41 ADM 199 365. ADM 199 372. AIR 25 232. HH50/160. D-TC 8/10 76. 61 North Weste rn Approaches 2245/13 August 12 raiders dropped bombs across Peterhead and Fraserburgh where three died and five were injured. The raid spread south over Aberdeenshire and, though the alert did not sound over the city, bombs fell around Aberdeen harbour.42 Four raiders dropped mines at Scapa Flow early on 20 August, one exploding on land near Kirkwall. Six raids entered Scottish airspace late on 21 August, two of them unsuccessfully attacking a convoy at anchor off Methil.43 Four bombs in Peterhead at 2139/22 left four dead and six in- jured.44 C o n v o y A t t a c k s Torpedo-carrying Hel 15 seaplanes attacked OA203 twelve miles off Wick at 2200/23 Au­ gust 1940, damaging the Beacon Grange and sinking Makalla (6,667T) and Elanishen (5,053T).45 Three days later, at 2055/26 August, HX65A was attacked six miles off Kin- naird’s Head by eight Ju88s and four Hel 15s. Cape York (5,027T) was set on fire and Re- meura (11,445T) was torpedoed and sunk, though her crew were all saved. Cape York sank in flames off Rattray Head while under tow of Saucy.^ A raid on Peterhead at 0017/27 Au­ gust left three dead and five injured, then, at 0015/28 eight bombs fell at Monifeith east of Dundee, one kill­ ing one and injuring four. Sirens sounded in Aberdeen at 0045/28, just as bombs began to fall at Nigg, Cove Bay and St Fergus. Twelve bombs exploded at Invergordon at 0250/28.47 Makalla 42 At 0003/14 an enemy aircraft passed over Lochwinnoch heading towards the Clyde. The raider was one of several dropping transmitters and bogus instructions to non-existent agents. The New British Broadcasting Service an­ nounced later that day that agents were being hidden by Fifth Columnists. According to the OKW war diary, *We dropped pack assemblies in order to feign a parachute landing, which caused great excitement in the British press.' 14 Bttn. Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders recorded; ‘Report from Whitecraigs Post, Home Guard. Plane dropped leather suitcase, later that two or three parachutists had landed on Eaglesham Moor. Subsequent action by various units left something to be desired.’ ADM 199 364. ADM 199 377. HH50/160. WO 166 2128. WO 166 4126. 43 Two fighter patrols took off from Turnhouse but were unable to intercept. At 2355/21 Ju88A-l 4D+LT of 9/KG30 crashed 40 miles east o f Berwick after its engines overheated and caught fire. Two crewmen died and two were cap­ tured after 12 hours in their dinghy. AIR 25 232. HH50/160. Ramsay et al : 1989. 44 ADM 199 365. HH50/160. 45 Twelve o f Makallds 84 crew died and 17 were injured. Survivors from Makalla and Uanishen were landed at Lyness by HMS Leith and SS Kylehrvok Beacon Grange, with 26 crew missing, anchored off the Caithness coast to await a tug. Still burning, she was towed to Kirkwall the following day by Buccaneer and Salvage King and beached. Once the fire was out, she was refloated and arrived Dundee on 11 September 1940 where her cargo was discharged. ADM 199 363. ADM 199 372. ADM 199 377. Uoyds War Losses vols. 1 and 2. Sendees ly the Ufeboats of the Bayal National Ufeboat Institution 1939 - 1946. 46 ADM 199 363. ADM 199 364. ADM 199 365. Baird. Ueyds War Losses vol. 1. 47 ADM 199 365. HH50/160. HH50/162. 62 North Western Approaches Lagosian on fire after being bombed during the attack on OA208 off Peterhead on 2 September 1940 with the res­ cue tug Seaman standing by. At 2310/2 September OA208 was attacked 10 miles south-east of Peterhead and Lagosian (5,412T) was left burning fiercely and aban­ doned. The Dutch Delftdijk (10,220T) was bombed and torpedoed but reached Aberdeen under tow o f Saucy and Lagosian was towed, still burning, to Peter­ head by the tug Seamanf^ The col- Her Ashby (4,868T) was also dam­ aged but made Leith.4® SL44A was bombed off Cruden Bay at 2120/6 September and St Glen (4,647T) was sunk and three o f her crew killed. Dorrington Court was damaged and towed to Peterhead by Seaman, and the coaster Gannet was abandoned. Peterhead Lifeboat found a boat with 24 men from the Gannet whom she took back to their ship, then stood by as she was towed in.®® WN14 was attacked by an H e l l l in the Moray Firth at 2110/11 September and the tanker Alexia (8,016T), outbound for Curacao in ballast, was damaged by near misses.®* At 2230/11 the trawler Beathtuood was bombed and sunk while at anchor off Montrose Coastguard Station. Six o f her eight crew were lost.®^ A mine laying and bombing raid on the Forth began at 2130/15 September. Explosions and gunfire could be heard over Methil at 2140/15 as an Hel 15 dropped a torpedo into the convoy anchorage. A convoy was attacked near the Isle o f May and the fishing boat Sunbeam was damaged by a mine near Inchkeith. The coaster Halland (1,264T) was bombed and sunk eight miles east o f Dunbar and an Hel 15 was shot down by a naval trawler 7.5 miles north-east o f Eyemouth at 2156/15.®® At 2230/15 Nailsea River (5,548T) was hit by an aircraft torpedo four miles east o f Montrose and sank with the loss o f six o f her crew.®4 Two days later the Norwegian Augvald (4,81 IT) was damaged when she detonated a mine 48 Saucy (5791) sailed Aberdeen at 2330/3 with Delfidijk in tow bound for the Forth. At 1935/4 she had just cast off the tow 1.25 miles north-west o f Inchkeith when she detonated a mine and sank. ADM 199 364. Baird : 1993. 49 ADM 199 363. ADM 199 364. ADM 199 365. British Vessels Lost A t Sea. Uoyds War Losses vol. 2. Services ty the Ufe­ boats of the Kqyal National Ufeboat Institution 1939 - 1946. 50 ADM 199 195. ADM 199 363. ADM 199 365. ADM 199 377. ADM 234 372. Services fy the Ufeboats of the Rqya/Na­ tional Ufeboat Institution 1939 - 1946. Uoyds War Losses vol.s 1 and 2. 51 Alexia had been torpedoed and badly damaged by \]-99 on 2 August (see below). ADM 199 13. ADM 199 363. ADM 199 377. Ucyds War Usses vol. 1. Ramsay et al : 1989. 52 The Aberdeen trawler Star of the North lying nearby slipped her anchor to escape. Engineer James Ruddiman, lost with Beathmod, had been aboard the Dorothy Gray (Minesweeping Trawler 96) when she and the destroyer Garry rammed U-18 off Hoxa Sound on 23 November 1914. ADM 199 364. CE87/4/41. Baird ; 1993. Ritchie : 1991. 55 Halland sank in three minutes and 17 of her 22 crew died. Hauptman Bergman, Oberleutnant Lucas, Feldwebel Kali- nowski and Hauptman Kreipendorf were all rescued unhurt by a fishing boat and landed at Eyemouth. ADM 199 365. ADM 199 364. AIR 25 232. Uoyds War Losses vol. 1. Baird : 1993. Ramsay et al : 1989 54 ADM 199 363. ADM 199 364. British Vessels Lost At Sea. Utyds War Losses vol. 1. Baird ; 1993. 63 North Western Approaches off Methil. Then, at 2352/18, the coaster St Catherine, formerly the Highlander that had steamed into Leith with the wreck o f a Heinkel on her deck, was unsuccessfully attacked by an enemy aircraft off Stonehaven. Meanwhile, at 2215/18, an enemy aircraft passed over a small convoy in the Moray Firth and continued towards Invergordon. The convoy included the coastal tanker Shelbrit 1 (1,025T) bound for Inverness with petrol and aviation fuel. At 0735/19 Shelbrit 1 passed the Whistle Buoy off the Sutors and set course for Nav- ity Buoy. Seven minutes later Captain McGurk, battery commander at South Sutor, heard; .. .a dull explosion, and on looking up observed the vessel approaching Inverness Firth partly lifted out o f the water and covered with a cloud o f grey smoke. Within about four seconds there was a flash o f flame and the ship and the surrounding sea went on fire. About a quarter o f an hour later, at about 0800, part o f the vessel appeared for a few seconds outlined in the flames, and then disap­ peared again.®® Shelbrit 1 sank slowly and her crew of 21 were lost.®® Three raiders appeared over the Tay at 0200/25 September, bombs fell in Dundee and the trawler Strathfinella was strafed off Cruden Bay.®7 In another air attack six miles north-east of Peterhead at 2005/26 Fort Deni­ son (8,043T) in OA220 was hit first by a torpedo and then strafed. A signalman was seri­ ously injured and many crew to jumped overboard to escape. Sixteen died and Port Denison sank.®® In the same attack, Welsh Prince (5,248T) and Suva (4,873T) suffered bomb damage. Two days later, at 2020/28, HX73A was attacked by aircraft 15 miles north o f Kinnaird's Head. Hit by two bombs, Dalveen (5,193T) sank and Queen City (4,814T) was damaged.®® The raid continued into the early hours of the following morning, one bomber starting a huge fire at the Caledonian Distillery bonded store in Duff Street, Edinburgh, and Port Denison, the Commodore ship In OA220, with a complement of 86 and outbound for Liverpool and Auckland, was hit by an air-launched torpedo, then strafed and set on fire, before sinking off Rattray Head. 55 ADM 1 10778. 56 One body, that of Third Engineer E. McVicker, was recovered. Doubts were expressed about the cause of the ex­ plosion, but the balance of opinion at the Enquiry was that it was caused by a mine dropped by the aircraft that had crossed the previous night. ADM 1 10778. ADM 199 363. 57 AIR 25 232. WO 166 3261. HH50/260. ADM 199 363. 58 Peterhead Lifeboat found Port Denison sunk and Naval vessels picking up survivors. The escort trawler Pentland Firth took 40 survivors to Lyness. At 0200/27 Bluebell transferred another eight survivors to the Lifeboat which landed them at Peterhead at 0300/27. ADM 199 363. ADM 199 364. ADM 199 372. Services hy the Lifeboats of the Payai Na­ tional Lifeboat Institution 1939 - 1946. Naval Review vol. XXXVI - XXXVII pp. 191. 59 Thirty-two survivors from the Dalveen's 43 crew were landed at Lyness. Two of Queen City's crew died and Fraser­ burgh Lifeboat picked up her Master and 14 others from a boat. Another 20 survivors were landed at Thurso by the escort trawler Windermere. Queen City was towed to Aberdeen by Abeille IV. See statement by Chief Officer McQueen of Dalveen in ADM 199 2134. See also ADM 199 363. ADM 199 364. Services ty the Lifeboats of the Rjyal National Life­ boat Institution 1939 - 1946. Uoyds War Losses vol.s 1 and 2. 64 . J North Western Approaches scattering incendiaries towards Leith.®® OA222 and SL47A were attacked five miles off Peterhead at 2020/30 September and Mountpark (4,648T) and Empire Success (6,009T) were damaged. A reconnaissance Dol7 flew down the port side o f WN19 off Wick at 1430/1 October. The convoy continued towards Rattray Head until 1930/1 when two raiders attacked, dropping torpedoes which missed two Dutch ships, Mijdrecht oxià OtterlandA HX74A was attacked by three H el 15s five miles east of Peterhead at dusk on 2 October. The Heinkels approached from the north at 50 feet, damaged the Trehata (4,817T), then were themselves attacked by Hurricanes o f 145 Squadron and one was shot down.®2 Bombs also fell at Fraserburgh, Montrose and Crail. Flares were dropped over Dunbar and two ships were attacked at Methil.®® A mine exploded under its parachute over Inchkeith early on 8 October,®4 then a Dol7 reconnaissance aircraft crashed off Rattray Head at 1500/8 following engine failure.®® That evening, Bellona II (840T) was set on fire in a seaplane attack off Inverbervie.®® At 0025/16 October a raid circled south o f the Clyde then dropped four bombs south o f Greenock. Incendiaries fell at Port Glasgow.®? At 1055/18 October a Ju88 dropped bombs off North Berwick, damaging an Observer Corps post, and on the foreshore at Crail.®® Three raiders attacked OA232 off Aberdeen at 1835/20 October, torpedoing the Conakrian (4,876T).®® Four days later, at 0150/24, seven UXBs fell around the examination trawler H. E. Strood off Aberdeen. Two Ju88s laid mines in the Clyde at 0500/25 and, at 1830/25, 13 enemy aircraft crossed the east coast. Bombs and incendiaries were dropped around Montrose harbour where a factory was wrecked and the examination drifter Duthies was sunk. At the airfield, the officers' mess, two hangars and eight aircraft were destroyed. Six died and 21 were injured. A train was strafed between Montrose and Arbroath, the Naval Air Station at Arbroath was attacked, bombs were dropped close to the CHL station at Anstruther, at 60 HH50/160. WO 166 2128. AIR 25 232. WDA 1844 939. 61 ADM 199 363. ADM 199 364. ADM 199 13. 62 Hel 15 S4+AH of 1/506 made off to the south streaming smoke and flames. It crashed five miles south-east o f Kin- naird’s Head and three men were picked up from a dinghy. ADM 199 364. Ramsay et al : 1989. 65 HH50/160. WO 166 2128, AIR 25 232. 64 The patrol craft Persevere was blown up by a mine near Inchkeith on 27 October 1940, HMS B/acM Swan was damaged by another in the same area on 1 November and another patrol vessel. Goodwill, was sunk off Inchkeitli the following morning. Ten more mines were discovered in the Forth during November and early December, along with one off die Tay. ADM 199 363. ADM 199 365. ADM 199 400. 65 Leutnant von Eickstedt, Hauptman Hardt and Oberfeldwebel Freund from D017P 4N+GK o f 2(F)/22 were picked up by fishing boat ADM 199 363. Ramsay et al : 1989 66 Nine died in Bellona II. Gourdon Lifeboat rescued 10 from the burning ship and took another eight off a Dutch ves­ sel that had picked them up from a small boat. Another survivor was found by a trawler and landed at Fraserburgh She went ashore the following day, still burning, in Strathlethen Bay and was declared a total loss. ADM 199 364. ADM 199 ?m. Services by the Ufeboats of the Royal National Ufeboat Institution 1939-1946. Uoyds War Losses vol. 1 67 AIR 25 232. WO 166 2128. HH50/160 68 HH50/160. WO 166 2128, 65 Conakrian came ashore at Bridge o f Don and was further damaged in air attacks as she lay beached but was refloated on 23 September 1941 and towed to tlie Tyne for repair. ADM 199 363. ADM 199 364. AIR 25 250. Services ty the Ufeboats of the Royal National Ufeboat Institution 1939 -1946. Uoyds War Losses vcA. 2. 65 North Wes te rn Approaches Boarhills and in St Andrews.^® The raid ended at 1915/25 with an unsuccessful torpedo attack by a Hel 15 on the examination drifter Avance off Aberdeen^* Enemy aircraft dropped flares over the Forth and Tay between 0200/26 and 0400/26 Oc­ tober, then bombs fell in and around the Forth and searchlight posts at Methil and Ar­ broath, East Linton and a train on the east coast main line were aU strafed. Little damage was done, but, at 1820/26, three H e l l l s approached Wick and seven bombs fell at the airfield, only one o f which exploded, wrecking a hangar. In the town, 14 bombs killed three and injured 20.72 Another three Heinkels from 3/KG26 attacked Lossiemouth air­ field ten minutes later. One Heinkel blew up over the airfield, three RAF personnel were killed, five injured and one Blenheim destroyed.7® Later that night a parachute mine ex­ ploded prematurely over Ayr Harbour. At 2202/28 October a raider over the Forth was picked up by a searchlight on Inchkeith and engaged by the anti-aircraft battery there, then a vivid flash lit the night sky. Two H e l l l s strafed the examination trawler off Aberdeen five minutes later. Like the raider over the Forth, these aircraft were mine laying, but once again their mines exploded in mid-air.74 WN29 was attacked by torp e do -carrying aircraft o ff Kinnaird's Head at 1930/3 November. Kildale (3,877T) was sunk and Fraserburgh Life­ boat found Eros (5,888T) hit in the engine room with the escort Challenger standing by.7® Bombs were dropped across Aberdeenshire and Fife between 1850/3 and 2008/3, then there was a lull until, at 0231/4, Queens ferry ARP post logged anti-aircraft fire over the Forth. Flares were dropped over St Andrews at 0240/4 and Dundee at 0310/4. Five bombs in Torry, Aberdeen, killed four and injured 44, and nine bombs fell near North Berwick at 0345/4.7® That night, bombs were scattered across Scotland, some falling on Speyside, others near Dunbar and in Fife. Bombs and flares fell along the Clyde valley, in particular at Coatbridge and MaryhiU, six damaged Edinburgh Zoo and four fell at Dun- d e e .7 7 Twelve raiders appeared the following night, the most serious incident being eight 70 One bomb at Anstruther killed two and, in St Andrews, 12 people were injured. AIR 25 232. AIR 25 250. AIR 27 866. WO 166 2128. WO 166 3621. ADM 199 363. 71 ADM 199 364. 72 Some 140 houses in Wick, were damaged and two bombs fell at Tlirumster. ADM 199 377. Glass : 1994 73 Four German airmen died instantly. The otlier H e llls were damaged by ground fire but returned to base, each with one injured crewman. AIR 25 250. HH50/160. Ramsay et al ; 1989. 74 It seems likely that the bright flash over Inchkeith was also the premature explosion o f a mine as Luftwaffe records quoted in Ramsay et al : 1989 do not show any casualties for tiiese raids. The Heinkels at Aberdeen dropped bombs close to the derelict Conakrian. AIR 25 250. HH50/160. ADM 199 377. Ramsay et al ; 1989. 75 Two o f Eroi 46 crew had died and 26 were in Challenger. The Lifeboat transferred the rest, then helped pass a tow and Challenger brought Eros in to Aberdeen. ADM 199 377. Services by the Ufeboats of the Royal National Iceboat Institu­ tion 1939 - 1946. Uoyds War Losses vol.s 1 and 2. 76 AIR 25 232, AIR 25 250. HH50/160. HH 50/161. Queen ferry A RP Log. 77 Ibid. 66 North Weste rn Approaches 250kg bombs across Dundee that killed three and injured 14. Bombs also fell at Dyce, Buckie, Fraserburgh and Corpach.?® An enemy reconnaissance aircraft was plotted passing along the convoy route west from the Pentland Firth at 0940/6. Messages from the aircraft were intercepted and showed that it had reported the position o f WN31. At 1818/6 WN31 had just completed its passage o f the Pentland Firth in single file and was at its most vulnerable, reforming into two col­ umns. Unable to see the raider despite being in the centre o f the convoy, the escort sloop Hastings logged; At 1818, Hastings vras about two miles from Duncansby Head, and abeam o f the tenth ship in the convoy which had just started to form two columns. Four rapid explosions were heard and smoke and flames were seen coming firom one o f the ships near tlie head o f the convoy. Tracer was seen coming from the escort trawlers. N o aircraft was heard or seen until 1825, when one was heard and indistinctly seen about 2,000 feet and flying 340 degrees.. .Tracer was being fired intermittently by ships ahead, and at 1855 two more explosions followed by smoke and flames from another o f the leading ships. Aircraft was not seen by Hastings vAio was by then about two miles off.7® Four bombs left the Commodore ship C/an Mackinlay (6,365T) ablaze and sinking with five dead.®® In the second attack, a bomber approached the convoy from eastward and badly damaged Harborough (5,415T), injuring two o f her crew.®* EN23 was attacked off Aberdeen at 1815/11. One bomb hit Trebartha (4,600T), killing four. The rest o f her crew, including 10 injured, were strafed as they took to the boats.82 Creemuir (3,997T) was sunk and Harlaiv (1,141T) reported one glancing hit by a bomb, and two near misses, and entered Aberdeen for repairs.®® WN35 was southbound five miles north o f Rattray Head at 1800/13 when it was attacked by two low-flying H el 15s and the Belgian Anvers (4,398T) was sunk.®** An H e l l l bombed Aberdeen Harbour at 1900/13 and two H e l l l s mined the convoy anchorage at Methil.®® S t Catherine II ex-High/ander (1,216T), which had shot down two Heinkels in August 1940 and had survived another attack the following month, sailed Aberdeen on 14 November to 78 HH50/160. HH50/162. HO 199 204. 79 ADM 199 13. 80 ADM 199 13. ADM 199 377. 81 Lieutenant Hughes in Blackjly had been advised diat an air escort o f Blenheims would join tire convoy at 1600/6 but it was, ‘at no time in evidence.. .About five minutes after the initial attack one o f our fighters appeared and replied correctly to our challenge. The rest o f the convoy fired on him, however, and we were later advised that merchant­ men have no means o f distinguishmg friend from enemy at night’ Harbon>ugbv/&s towed to Scapa by Buccaneer, Bandit and Abeille 21 and arrived in the Tyne on 5 December 1940 for repair. ADM 199 13. ADM 199 377. AIR 25 250. Uoyds War Losses vo\.s 1 and.2. 82 At 1820/11 Gregness Coastguard reported flares south-east o f Findon and Aberdeen lifeboat found the abandoned, burning Trebartha at 2000/11, then SS Oberon with survivors. A transfer was deemed unsafe, so the Second Coxswain o f the Lifeboat boarded Oberon and piloted her into Aberdeen. Trebartha went ashore on 12 November at Cove Bay. 83 Creemuir sank in tliree minutes, 26 o f her crew died and her 13 were picked up. ADM 199 364. CE87/4/41, Services by the Ufeboats of the Royal National Ufeboat Institution 1939 - 1946. Lloyds War Losses vo\.s 1 and 2. 84 One oiAnveri 37 crew died. ADM 199 364. 85 The Forth was reopened after being swept at 1616/14. ADM 199 121. ADM 199 363. 67 North Wes te rn Approaches join EN25 for Kirkwall. Still just off the harbour entrance at 1800/14, she was torpedoed by an H el 15 and sank in four minutes. One passenger and 14 o f her 24 crew died.®® WN40 was attacked off Rattray Head on 19 November and an H el 15 attacked WN55 in the Mo­ ray Firth at 1720/20 December.®? The coaster Bay Fisher (575T) was bombed and sunk off the BeU Rock with the loss o f eight o f her crew at 1100/7 February.®® A raider passed over Scapa Flow at 1935/11 Feb­ ruary and bombed the trawler Eamont off Dunbeath Harbour. The trawler Arnold Bennett was strafed off Lossiemouth, the trawler John Dunkin (202T) was bombed off Buckie and the coaster Cantick Head (488T) was strafed nortli o f Kinnaird’s Head.®® Hurricanes o f 111 Squadron intercepted a raider over Montrose at 1745/13, but it escaped in bad visibility. EN71 was attacked by H e l l l s o ff Aberdeen 35 minutes later and a bomb exploded close to Cape Rodney (4,512T). Oregoni was hit by a bomb and other ships were strafed. Two bombers appeared over Aberdeen an hour later, dropping bombs in and around the har­ bour, one of which caused 15 casualties.®® EN72 sailed Methil at 0600/15. Two reconnais­ sance flights were detected o ff the east coast in a southerly gale and snow, bombs were dropped at Stonehaven and Wick and a ship was strafed off Sarclet Head. At 1810/13, when EN72 off Peterhead, a H e l l l dropped three bombs, none o f which did any dam­ age.®* The naval trawler Ormonde was sunk off Cruden Bay at 1830/16.®^ EN73 was in the convoy anchorage at Methil on 17 February, its saiUng delayed by bad weather, when a Ju88 dropped three bombs at 1115/17.®® Another Ju88 flew up the Cro­ marty Firth to Invergordon at 200 feet and dropped two bombs on naval oil tanks, three o f which were damaged. This raider also strafed a moored Sunderland and a patrol trawler.®4 A Dornier 17 dropped four bombs near Lerwick at 1220/17, kilUng two and injuring four, then strafed the naval trawler Beaconsfieldf^ ^EN74 was passing the Isle of May at 1030/19 when a Ju88 dived out o f a snow squall and dropped two bombs that near-missed Athelsul- tan which Umped back into Leith with two holes in her side. A Ju88 appeared out o f fog at 1021/21 February and strafed the naval signal station at Buddon Ness in the Tay, then flew 86 ADM 199 364. AIR 25 250. Aberdeen Harbour Commission Minutes vol. 20/2/56. Uoyds War Losses vol. 1. j 87 ADM 199 13. I 88 Four survivors were taken to Dundee in the naval trawler Heliopolis. ADM 199 400. Ucyds War Losses vol. 1. 89 Eamonfs crew were landed by the naval trawler Harmony and she drifted ashore (he following day next to Dunbeath Coastguard Station which was hurriedly evacuated as a UXB was still aboard. Eight o f the nine aboard John Dunkin were rescued when she sank under tow. ADM 199 412. ADM 199 397. AIR 25 250. CE87/4/41. Services by the Ufe­ boats of the Royal National Ufeboat Institution 1939 -1946. Uoyds War Losses vol. 1. 98 One o f the raiders was claimed damaged by a 111 Squadron Hurricane. ADM 199 16. ADM 199 401. AIR 25 250. 91 ADM 199 16. 92 There were no survivors. ADM 199 401. 93 ADM 199 16. ADM 199 412. 94 One o f tlie bombs, a 500kg UXB, pierced no. 17 tank but was made safe. Tliousands o f gallons o f oil spilled onto die railway and into the Firth. ADM 199 412. HH50/160, AIR 25 250. 95 ADM 199 401. HH50/150. 68 North Western Approaches into a hill at Pitaklie Wood, north o f Dundee.®® Four enemy aircraft were plotted over northern Scotland on the evening of 22 February, then Out Skerries and Stroma Light­ houses were strafed and two bombs were dropped at Portsoy. At 1840/22 two 111 Squad­ ron Spitfkes engaged an Hel 15 off Peterhead, then, at 1856/22, an H el 15 dropped a mine in the path of EN75, also off Peterhead. WN90 was southbound across the Moray Fkth in a storm at 1135/26 when a Ju88 bombed the straggler Empire Steelhead (7,744T) which was towed to Invergordon. On 27 February an H e l l l attacked trawlers off Peterhead and shipping off Stonehaven and the coaster Noss Head (438T) disappeared while on passage to Kirkwall.®? Two reconnaissance flights by Ju88s flew along the east coast on 1 March, one strafing the trawler S t Agnes No.1 o ff Kin­ naird's Head at 1350/1, killing two o f her crew. EN79 and WN91 were about to pass each other off the Aberdeenshke coast that evening when both convoys were attacked. From EN79, the Atheltemplar was hit by two bombs and set on fire. Another bomb hit the Tewkesbury, coming to rest unexploded on gratings in the engine room from where it was extracted by her crew and ditched over the side.®® The 24-ship WN91, meanwhile, was at­ tacked by an H e l l l and Commodore Cashmore in Forthbank wrote; Enemy aircraft was first sighted about 1925 flying about 320® distance about 2 miles on my port beam. HMS Curacao was then engaging her. Aircraft was engaged from time to time by escorts and vessels in the convoy and reappeared flying up the two columns being engaged continuously, then flying out o f sight. At 1944 (approx) enemy was observed flying towards leaders o f columns athwart convoy at an altitude o f about 150 feet. Aircraft was engaged, dropped a stick o f two or three bombs, disappearing in a steep climb in the poor light. One bomb appeared to make a direct hit on the wire­ less cabinet, demolishing it, the Second Radio Officer, Mr L. J. Moser, undoubtedly being instantly killed although no trace o f him was found. One or two other bombs striking the vessel in the same vicinity exposing engine room and No. 4 hold, placing main engines, steering and lighting out o f ac­ tion.®® Forthbank (5,057T) burst into flame. She lost fke main pressure and a bucket chain had to be organised, then Gavotte came alongside and got hoses across. Forthbank'^ midships ac­ commodation was burnt out and she had four dead and five injured. One of her attackers, an KG26 H e l l l , crashed in the sea off Melrose Head.*®® Another KG26 F le ll l was lost 96 Tlie Junkers probably lost its way in bad visibility as examination o f the wreck revealed it was on a mission to Kin­ naird's Head. Four crewmen killed. AIR 25 232. ADM 199 400. Ramsay et al : 1989. 9? Noss Head was Leith 25/2 for Kirkwall with coal and bricks and 12 crew. She sheltered in Gardenstown Bay &om 1000/26 until 0830/27 and was not seen again, but two rafts, each with one body, were washed ashore at Deerness on 1»!: March, and Tarracliff Bay on 2"® March. The cause o f her loss has never been established, though EN78 did hear explosions and firing near the Pentland Firth at 2100/28. Uoyds War Losses vol. 2. ADM 199 16. 98ADM199 16. 99 ADM 199 13. 108 Oberleutnant Huhn, Unteroffizier Grossardt, Gefrieter Hanel and Unteroffizier Mannling were taken prisoner. Salvage work on tlie aircraft revealed that one wing had been damaged by a kite wire and a ship in the convoy con­ firmed that her kite cable had been carried away. Several holes caused by macliine gun fire were also evident. ADM 199 13. See also ADM 199 401. ADM 199 412. Ramsay et al ; 1989 69 Nor th Wes te rn Approaches when, at 2002/7 March, it hit the mast o f the trawler Strathblane in the Tay and crashed, leaving two unexploded bombs on the trawler's deckd®^ EN83 sailed Methil at 0230/9 March and, at 1440/9, was attacked by one aircraft which o o o o '% vmm *. fig. 22 Commodore Cashmore’s sketch of the attack on WN9I illustrates how coastal convoys forced into two straggling columns by the narrow swept channel were so hard to defend. It was impossible to provide the whole convoy with anti-aircraft cover, and the Commodore lost sight of most of his charges whenever the lead ships rounded a headland. At the Pent­ land Firth, where spring tides run at over eight knots, the lead ships could make it through while stragglers were trapped on the wrong side of the race where, unescorted, they were vulnerable to attack. dropped two bombs that did no damage. EN83 was attacked again off Tod Head at 1807/9 but once more no damage was done. At 1955/9 a bomber attacked the Commodore ship Esmond and dropped four bombs, one o f which was a direct hit disabling her engines and steering gear and setting her on fire.^ ®^ At 2030/9 WN95 was abeam o f Rattray Head in bright moonlight, and southbound towards EN83, when an aircraft flew down the convoy and several ships opened fire. Another aircraft flew over WN95 at 0545/10 March as it passed the Bell Rock, but did not attack. EN84 was off Tod Head at 1935/11 March when an aircraft showing navigation lights ap­ proached the convoy. Commodore Macmillan in Jamaica Producer wrote: 101 The four aircrew from H e lll IH+HH died and the trawler crew were uninjured. AIR 25 233. ADM 199 400. Ram­ say et al ; 1989. 102 Esmond h id seven wounded. The fire was put out, jury steering was rigged and she proceeded to anchor seven mUes south o f Peterhead at 2335/9. ADM 199 16. ADM 199 401 103 ADM 199 13. ADM 199 16. ADM 199 401 70 North Western Approaches When at a distance o f 2 or 3 cables the pilot gave his engines full throttle, maintaining an altitude of about 20 feet and heading straight towards my funnel. I considered that the pilot could not possibly clear masthead height now and would turn to port after attacking. I ordered the helm to be star­ boarded with the intention o f fouling the plane with the foremast, or at least upsetting his plan o f at­ tack. As soon as the ship's head began to move he opened fire with all his forward machine guns at close range and at the same time climbed steeply.. .Seeing that he might not clear, the plane at­ tempted to swerve to port and in so doing fouled the foretopmast with his tad. A terrific jolt was felt on board as the tad struck the upper crows nest. The foretopmast backstay and wireless aerial came crashing down on deck and the kite, which was braded up at the masthead (there being insufficient wind to fly it) was carried away. At the same time, great pieces o f aircraft came hurtling down on the bridge, maindeck and into the sea. As the ship steadied on her course, the plane was seen to side slip round my stem in an unstable manner and tracers firom the rear ships were seen attacking him. Very soon afterwards, a huge column o f water was seen to spout up about a mde away, on the port quarter of the convoy. It is considered that this was caused by the plane diving into the sea.^ ®'* Ten minutes later another aircraft approached the convoy and dropped bombs that shook the Poyal Star (7,900T). Lieutenant Commander Aubrey, escort commander in Foiuej, re­ ported that this raider was last seen heading towards the coast, pursued by anti-aircraft fire and losing height. At 1954/11, another enemy aircraft under heavy barrage fire passed within 20 feet o f Royal Star, flew up the convoy from astern, then headed towards the coast. An H e l l l , it was attacked by a 42 Squadron Beaufort from Leuchars and, at 2200/11, Coastguards reported flares in St Andrews Bay. Three survivors were picked up by the minesweeper Gadfly and taken to D u n d e e . Lieutenant Commander Bob Aubrey (left) commanded the escort for WN95 and two of the Luftwaffe aircrew brought down during the attack on that convoy are seen (right) under escort in Dundee 104 ADM 199 16. 105 ADM 199 401. 71 North Western Approaches A ir A t t a c k s o n C l y d e s i d e a n d S c o t l a n d ’s M a r i t i m e F r i n g e The first serious night raid on Glasgow began at 0102/18 September 1940 when an H e l l l scattered bombs and incendiaries east o f the city but did httle damage. At 0207/18 another H e l l l dropped bombs and incendiaries which started fires around Queens Dock and cra- tered Kelvin Wharf. At 0236/18 a third raider dropped bombs onto the fires at Queen’s Dock and incendiaries into Dumbarton Road. A bomb exploded between the underground railway tunnels below Meadowside Park, another damaged Yorkhill Quay. In Yorkhill Dock, the cruiser HMS Sussex was hit by a 250kg bomb that exploded among oil tanks abaft the engine room. As burning oil flowed through the ship towards the stern, attempts to flood magazines failed and there was clear danger of a massive explosion that would have devastated Partick, Yorkhill and Govan. Evacuation zones were created on either side o f the river and then, at 0440/18, just as the evacua­ tion was getting under way, another bomber scattered incendiaries and bombs across the centre of Glasgow. The after magazine in Sussex was eventually flooded, but torpedoes and depth-charges lined the burning cruiser's upper deck so the Govan Ferry with mobile pumps aboard was manoeuvred alongside the cruiser. The evacuees were allowed home later that morning, but fire fighting in Sussex continued through the day and not until 2100/18 was the situation under control. Two charred bod­ ies were found in the gutted cruiser's gyro compartment. Twenty-nine officers and men had been injured. A Ju88 was caught in searchlights over Govan Iron Works at 0055/19 September. In Glas­ gow, bombs fell beside Paisley Road West and at Maryhill, and the Clyde was closed due to m sJJi Detail from a Luftwaffe reconnaissance photograph of the upper Clyde showing Yorkhill Dock where the cruiser Sussex was severely damaged during an air raid on 18 September 1940. 106 That night’s Glasgow Etvning Citityn quoted an official communique which stated that, ‘A few enemy aircraft dropped bombs in the Glasgow area, where slight damage was done to industrial premises.’ Despite the smouldering, listing cruiser lying in full view of morning commuters, the Glasgow Herald was only able to describe Sussex as, ‘A burning structure.’ Sussexvsas repaired and the Japanese surrender at Singapore was signed on board in 1945. HH50/160. D- CD 9/9/28. D-TC8/10/96. T-CN 657/1-13. WO 166 2128. AIR 25 232. Ramsay et al : 1987. Drummond : 1960. 72 North Western Approaches suspected mine la y in g d ® ? Raiders appeared over Clydeside at 0244/24 October and bombs fell near Paisley and in Greenock where a tenement was hit, killing seven and injuring ten.ios At 1830/6 November a raider dropped four bombs on Campbeltown which hit the pier and the Royal Hotel, killing seven and injuring fived09 At 1930/20 December, enemy aircraft were plotted coming up the Irish Sea towards Clydeside and, at 2040/20, bombs fell across the east end o f Glasgow, injuring 17. Two 500kg UXBs were dropped into the British Aluminium plant at Corpach at 0850/22 December. The Ju88 responsible then at­ tacked the Icelandic trawler Arinbjorn Hersir (32IT) three miles north o f Rathlin Island."O Fourteen enemy aircraft were plotted flying up the Irish Sea on the evening of 9 February 1941 and, at 2300/9, four o f them dropped mines, bombs and incendiaries on Campbel- town.i^^ With the compromising o f the German radio navigation and ranging systems, Knickebein, X-Gerat and Y-Gerat that had done much for the accuracy o f early air raids over southern England and the Midlands, what Professor Jones calls the Battle o f the Beams had been won by February 1 9 4 1 . And Luftwaffe Enigma messages, their encypherment relatively insecure conipared with Naval Enigma, were read from May 1940 until the end o f the war almost without interruption. But this did not mean that the entire Luftwaffe bombing campaign was rendered ineffective, if for no other reason than that, once a raid was in progress, there was almost nothing that the minuscule British nightfighter capability and anti-aircraft barrage could do about it. In the case o f the first heavy air raid on Clydeside which began on the evening o f 13 March 1941, there is clear evidence that the attack was expected. Aside from possible decrypts, none o f which appear to have survived, Luftwaffe reconnaissance flights following a well-established pre-raid pattern were detected over cen­ tral Scotland that morning. Accounts o f the Clydeside raids may be found in This Time of Crisis (Jeffrey : 1993) and The Clydebank Blil^ (Macphail : 1974), so this thesis will concern itself with the effect o f the raids on maritime activity on and around the Clyde. The first waves o f bombers began crossing the coast o f East Lothian at 2112/13 and, at about 2125/13, the first bombs be- This was at the height o f die invasion scare and, at 0111/19, a Mr Reid reported parachutists descending on Max­ well Park. Armed search parties found nothing. WO 166 4054. HH50/160. D-TC9/10/96. D -CD9/9/26 Mines were dropped in die Forth and the Clyde, one exploding off North Berwick during the raid and another off Greenock at 0111/25.HH50/160. HH50/161. WO 166 2128. Hamisli Mackinven accounts to author 3 January 1994 and 31 January 1994. ADM 199 372. AIR 25 232 110 The raider went east over Aberdeen. The UXBs were made safe by a party from 91 Bomb Disposal Section. An­ other attack on Corpach was made by a Ju88 at 0815/15 January 1941, but the bombs fell some distance firom the factory and did no damage. AIR 25 233. AIR 25 250. WO 166 2128. WO 166 4054. HH50/160. Allen : 1996. 111 Two o f the mines exploded on hitting the loch. Two people were killed and 15 injured. Hamish Mackinven account 31 January 1994. ADM 199 658. AIR 25 250. 112 Jones : 1978 ch.s 11-22. 112 Sebag-Montefiore : 2000 p. 82. 73 North Western Approaches gan to fall. Among these were bombs and showers of incendiaries which set alight to a timber yard at Singer’s works in Clydebank, a distillery in Yoker and oil tanks at Dalnottar. It was this, and not a predetermined targeting o f Clydebank, that led to such a heavy weight of attack falling on that burgh over the two nights. The raid continued into the fol­ lowing night and, at 1800/15, some three hours before the first bombers appeared, the Ministry o f Home Security were able to warn Civil Defence authorities on Clydeside. Û Clydebank (above) seen from the north, and Glasgovy Road, Yoker, (right) on the night of 13-14 March 1941. Air raids on Clyde­ side were principally targetted on the maritime-related concerns that together formed an inte­ grated arms industry. But, despite the widespread destruction, docks, shipyards and other mari­ time industries escaped serious damage. This was in sharp con­ trast to Merseyside where air raids left the docks and other industries in chaos. 74 North Western Approaches f Despite the concentrated nature of the attack on that burgh, it is unfortunate that the air raids that spread across Central Scotland in 19 4 1 have been lumped together under the ge­ neric ‘Clydebank Blitz’. The heavy raids of March, April and May that year were primarily di­ rected against targets in the Forth-Clyde valley with maritime significance such as docks, ship­ yards and associayed engineering works. Indeed, some of the worst incidents during the raids did not even take place in Clydebank. A land mine in Paisley killed 92 and here, beside King­ ston Dock in Glasgow, at least 110 are known to have died when a land mine exploded be­ tween a tram and a tenement in Nelson Street late on 13 March. By the time raids ended at 0300/15, some 1,095 missiles not including incendiaries had been dropped on Clydeside, around 700 o f them within a 2Vz mile radius of Clydebank Town Hall. In Glasgow, 647 died, 1,680 were injured and over 10,000 were homeless, 6,835 homes having suffered major damage, almost 700 of them beyond repair. In Clyde­ bank, then a separate burgh, there were 346 known dead and more than 12,000 homes damaged or destroyed. But, despite the loss of life and destruction, industrial damage was sHght. In Glasgow, the Fairfield and Alexander Stephen shipyards had been hit, but pro­ duction at either yard was little affected. Denny’s Shipyard in Dumbarton was hit by two parachute mines, one o f which damaged two ships under construction. Nearby, at Dalnot­ tar Tank Farm, seven oil tanks had been set alight along with one at the Admiralty Oil De­ pot, Old Kilpatrick. At the Yarrow shipyard, however, a parachute mine at 2335/13 brought an office building down onto a shelter which, in turn, collapsed killing 67 workers and injuring 80. Another mine two hours later destroyed the electrical and paint shops and production was slowed for six months. Singer’s Clydebank works, largely involved in arms production, had been heavily damaged, yet the great prizes, the shipyards, had scarcely been touched. John Brown’s reported that, despite a large fire, they had sustained only minor damage and could have continued nor­ mal production had their 10,000 workforce been available. But post-raid trekking to safer areas meant that, late on 15 March, the Ministry o f Home Security estimated that, from a 75 North Weste rn Approaches pre-war population o f 48,118 which had been inflated to almost 60,000 by war workers, barely 2,000 were left in Clydebank. A major effort involving feeding arrangements and housing repairs was mounted to bring vital workers back and subsequent estimates of Clydebank population were; 1 4 /4 /4 1 4881 2 6 /4 /4 1 7154 1 0 /5 /4 1 6969 1 9 /6 /4 1 11877 2 3 /8 /4 1 19431 The second heavy raid on Scotland began at 2130/7 April 1941 with an attack on Leith Docks that killed three but did no significant damage. The raid was poorly directed, bombs being scattered across Scotland, but Rosyth Dockyard and Queen’s Dock, Harland and Wolff's and Connell’s Shipyards and Meehan's Ironworks, all in Glasgow, were hit, none o f them seriously. Four bombs fell close to the Torpedo Trials Range in Loch Long, Renfrew and Abbotsinch airfields were hit and other bombs fell from Thurso to The Borders, but, as the Regional Commissioner reported, ‘Little or no industrial damage was done.’^ ^^ Casu­ alties on the ground were 95 killed, 98 seriously injured and 415 slightly injured. One en­ emy aircraft was shot down. The third and final large-scale air attack on Scotland took place over two nights, 5-6 and 6- 7 May 1941. The first raiders appeared over Clydeside shortly after 0001/6, bombs falling in Maryhill and south o f Glasgow. At 0117/6 the first o f 80 bombers detailed to attack Greenock with 112 tonnes o f high-explosive and 80,146 incendiaries dropped its bombs. Visibility was bad and, once again, the attack was poorly concentrated with bombs falling across Scotland from Argyllshire to Fife and Ayrshire. Twenty nine died in Greenock but the worst incident was in Paisley where 90 died when a First Aid Post took a direct hit. Some damage was done at Rothesay Dock in Clydebank and a major conflagration at Mil­ ton petrol storage depot was averted by three quick-thinking Argyll and Sutherland High­ landers. The raids resumed the following night at 0030/7 with a heavy attack on the ICI explosives plant at Ardeer, Irvine, where 64 bombs and hundreds o f incendiaries fell in the factory. More bombs and incendiaries fell across Irvine Harbour and town. The Clyde was blocked by mines east o f King George V Dock and mines fell in John Brown’s Shipyard at Clyde­ bank. But by far the heaviest concentration o f attack was on Greenock where among the first targets to be hit were Ardgowan Distillery with its 3,000,000 gallons o f whisky, Del- Hngburn Power Station and the neighbouring Westburn Sugar Refinery. All electric power "4 HH50/1. 76 North Western Approaches failed, rivers o f burning spirit ran down the hill towards Victoria Harbour, setting buildings alight, and rescue workers at the Sugar Refinery had to contend with pools o f boiling syrup. As in the case of Clydebank in March, these massive fires acted as a beacon for fol­ lowing raiders and the east end o f Greenock was heavily damaged. Considerable damage was done at Greenock Harbour where quays were cratered, the pumping machinery for the important East India Graving Dock was wrecked and two vessels were destroyed in a di­ rect hit on Lamont’s Dry Dock. But it was soon apparent the most o f the damage in the harbour had been caused by blast effect and that cranage and other cargo handling equip­ ment remained intact. One notable feature o f this raid was the success o f the STARFISH decoy sites across central Scotland in diverting a considerable weight of attack away from vital industrial and mari­ time targets. STARFISH sites around Greenock and Clydebank attracted 565 bombs and mines, though the position o f one site west o f Loch Lomond resulted in 63 bombs, three UXBs and a parachute mine falling in and around the village of Cardross. On the night of 5-6 May 1941, the main weight of attack fell on and near Greenock. One large bomb destroyed the coaster Blue Stone in Lamont’s dry dock, hurling the Admiralty drifter Gowan Hill against the dock wall. Repairs to the heavily damaged shipyard were well in hand by 26 May. At John Brown’s Clydebank shipyard damage was restricted to two timber stores and a pattern store destroyed during the March raids. Despite much of its 10,000 workforce having been made homeless, by I April, Brown’s were able to report that all but 650 men were back at work and production was almost normal. And it was the same story elsewhere across Central Scotland with damaged industrial concerns being speedily repaired and normal production being restored. While air raids on Scotland, indeed Britain generally, never reached the intensity of the attacks on German cities by Bomber Command and the USAF, the resilience of industry on Clydeside and elsewhere appears to have made little impression on Al­ lied advocates of area bombing. 77 North Weste rn Approaches Over the two nights raiding on the west o f Scotland, 455 people died, 328 o f them in Greenock, and 434 were seriously injured. At the time of the raids, the population o f Greenock was estimated at 95,000 including war workers and service personnel. About 8,000 o f the 18,000 homes in the town were damaged, a considerably smaller proportion than in Clydebank in March. Some 5,575 people were evacuated from the town by 8 May and there was a what one report describes as, ‘a considerable unofficial exodus o f people.’ Before the raid, the prospect o f an attack on Greenock had been viewed with official ap­ prehension, not least because there were only two main roads in and out of the town. As foreseen, though the main road through Port Glasgow did stay open, road and rail links were indeed badly disrupted and this helped to prevent a repeat o f the trekking evident at Clydebank. While much of the workforce remained in Greenock, industrial targets had suffered heav­ ier damage than in the March raid. Yet the effect on production was much less severe than expected. By 26 May, Greenock and Port Glasgow’s principal maritime-related undertak­ ings damaged in the raids were reporting: Name A. &. C. Head, Alexander Tough & Sons. Mamifacturing Boatbuilders. Ropeworks. Blast damage. Damage Blast damage. Aluminium Castings Ltd Heavy castings Barr & Co. George Brown & Co Gourock Ropework Co. Ltd, Port Glasgow and Greenock. Greenock Dockyard Ltd Jas. Lamont & Co. Ltd John G. Kincaid Ltd. Port Glasgow & Newark Saüclotli Co. Ltd.______ Rankine & Blackmore Ltd. Brassfounders. Shipbuilders. Ropes etc. Buildings destroyed by fire. Plant not badly damaged. _______________ Blast damage. I State of Production I N ormal._____ : Normal. Some production restored. Normal. Blast damage. Shipbuilders. Scott’s Shipbuilding & Engineering Ltd. Ship Repairers. Marine Engineers. Canvases. Marine Engineers. Shipbuilders. Fire and blast damage to roof of flax store, net works and ropewalk. Blast damage.___________________ Normal. Two heavy bombs exploded in dock, i Apart from wrecked and damaged I vessels, severe damage to buildings j including macliine and engine shops, j dock pump house, joiners shop and 1 qf&es.________________ „ I Extensive damage to buildings. I ^lax tow store destroyed by fire. Fire 1_ and blast damage to otlier buildings. I Brass finishing and pattern shops I destroyed. Boiler shop, smithy and I upper machine shop damaged. Normal. Normal. Scottish Aviation Ltd | RAF flying boat maintenance. I Severe damage to around 200,000 sq j feet o f walls and roofs, main offices I and drawing offices destroyed, boüer ! house, power house and electrical j plant badly damaged.______________ j Severe damage to sheds and fitting [ and macliine £hops. Will be some time before normal production re- ' stored but repairs well in I hand. I Production returning to normal. Normal. Production to recommence j in latter three on 26 May, ! repairs to others under i way. Production to be affected for some time. Normal. And, outwith Greenock, 78 North Western Approaches Ayrshire Shipyard Ltd, Irvine______________ Babcock & Wilcox Ltd, Dumbarto n __ Babcock & Wilcox Ltd, Renfrew.___________ Clan Line Repair Work, Glasgow._____ Dawson Downie Ltd., Clydebank.______ Dennystoun Forge Co. Ltd, Dumbarton. Shipbuilders.Ferguson Bros., Port Glasgow . _ ICI Ltd., Ardeer, Irvine. | Explosives manufac- Shipbuilders Tubes and brass parts. Boilers and arma- ments._________ Sliip Repairers. Pumps. Heavy forgings. turers. Blast damage Blast damage and canteen de- stroyed. Blast damage Blast damage to works, gates, roofs and v ^ s o f 14 departments. Brass Foundry badly damaged and blast damage to buildings. Blast damage to buildings. Blast and fire damage. Sixty-four bombs and hundreds of incendiaries. Twenty buildings de­ stroyed and over 100 damaged. Normal. Normal. Normal Nomial. ; Production almost normal. I Normal. I Normal. John Brown Ltd, Clyde­ bank. Litligows Ltd., Port Glasgow._______ Lobnitz Ltd., Renfrew. R. McAlister &.. Son, Dumbarton._____ Wm Hamilton & Co. Ltd., Port Glasgow._ Wm. Denny Bros, Dum- Wrton. _ Wm. Simons &. Co. Ltd., Renfrew. Shipbuilders Shipbuilders. Shipbuilders. Boatbuilders. Shipbuilders. Sliipbuilders Shipbuilders Slight damage. Slight blast damage. Slight blast damage. Blast damage. Slight blast damage. Production almost normal, j Cliief casualty was nitrates, j cordite production at 70% I and most repairs to be i completed within a mqntli. } Normal production, except j as affected by earlier r^aid. _ | Normal. ii Wormaï. s Normal. Extensive blast damage. Slight blast damage. Normal, i Production almost normal. | I Normal. i Sources: HH/50 1-5. HH 50 92. HO 198 198. HO 198 205. HO 199 410. HO 207 1089. During this peak period o f air raids on and around Scotland between March and May 1941, the Luftwaffe mounted at least 940 sorties and lost 12 aircraft over Scotland or during sor­ ties to Scotland. While the small number o f German aircraft shot down illustrates the inef­ fectiveness of the British defences, it is also clear that the raids on Scotland had little little real effect on the war effort. There were still sharp raids, notably over Edinburgh on 6 Au­ gust 1942, Edinburgh and Glasgow on 25 March 1943 and lastly at Aberdeen on 21 April 1943 when 113 died and 235 were injured. But the Luftwaffe effort had lacked coherence and judicious planning throughout, it had neither the training nor the aircraft to mount a strategic bombing offensive and, particularly in 1941, it was subject to constantly changing priorities. C o a s t a l C o n v o y s - M a r c h 1941 t o M a y 1943 Wick was bombed at 2037/17 March 1941 and then, at 2050/17, the Norwegian Einar Jar/ (1,858T) was hit by an air-launched torpedo and sank near the Bell Rock.^^^ On 22 March a wreck was bombed off Aberdeen, an Observer Corps post at St Fergus was strafed and "2 One Greek fireman was lost and 21 survivors were landed at Aberdeen. ADM 199 400. ADM 199 401. ADM 199 412. Baird : 1993. 79 North Western Approaches bombs fell in the Tay and on Shetlandd^^ At 1134/23 March one o f two ZG /76 MEllOs attacking Suhom Voe was shot down by shore batteries, then two raiders flew down the Caledonian Canal shortly after 1300/23, one bomb narrowly missing a vessel at Cullochy Lock and, at 1815/23, the trawler E/mra was bombed and sunk west o f Shetlandd^? On 24 March the Beaverbrae (9,956T) was bombed and sunk off Shetland and a 111 Squadron Hur­ ricane damaged a JuSB off Montrosed^® On 26 March the Chain Home station on Unst was strafed and bombed, two trawlers were attacked o ff the Bell Rock and the Empire Mermaid was bombed west o f the Hebrides4^ ^ Unst Chain Home was attacked again at 0814/27 then, at 0750/28, a Ju88 strafed Fair Isle North Lighthouse and again bombed Unst Chain Home.^^o Later that day, Staffordshire (10,638T) was bombed and set on fire west o f Shetlandd^i The Norwegian Veni (2,982T) was bombed and damaged west o f Shetland on 29 March. ^ 22 0850/30 Unst radar site was attacked yet again, as was another Chain Home site at Wick, then, that afternoon, a Ju88 bombed the submarine Seawolf off Dunbar and strafed BeU Rock Lighthoused^s At 2120/30, bombs fell at Crah and Kingsbarns in Fife and, at 2140/30, a Kondor dropped four bombs at RAF Sumburgh424 The trawler Ontario was bombed and sunk off Shetland on 31 March. 125 Bell Rock Lighthouse was strafed again at 0823/1 April, then a Ju88 sank the patrol trawler Cramond Island off Eyemouth at 1404/1 and another trawler, Fortuna, dis­ appeared when sent to assist, Two bodies were washed ashore at Berwick.^26 Cruden Bay Brickworks was bombed at 1525/2 and was attacked off the Bell Rock at 2000/2, returning to Methil with two UXBs aboard .^27 WN7 was southbound, off Rattray Head at 0757/3 April when the Filliegh was strafed by a Do215. Another Do215 attacked the convoy off Aberdeen that afternoon and the Har- was damaged by a bomb. 2^8 EN94 was attacked near the Bell Rock at 1512/3 and the Geddington Court (6,903T) was holed by a bomb. Three coasters were also attacked off Mon­ trose; the Assuan (499T) ran for shelter in Montrose and went aground at Scurdie Ness, the "c AIR 25 250: ADM 199 397. 117 HH/50 160. AIR 25 233. AIR 27 866. 11® Beavethrai ^entire crew o f 84 were landed at Lyness by Tatfar. ADM 199 397. in' Empire Memaid sank on 28 March. Twenty-one (Red, AIR 25 250- ADM 199 397. 120 ADM 199 401. HH/50 160. 121. Fourteen passengers and 14 crew died. S ta ffo rdsh irebeached at Loch Ewe on 29 March and repaired on the Tyne. U<^d‘s War Losses vol, 1. ^'^Uojd's War Losses vol. 2. 123 a ir 25 233. ADM 199 412. 124 HH/50 160. ADM 199 401. AIR25 250. 125 Lfoyd s^ War Losses vcA. 1. 126 St Abbs Lifeboat picked up survivors from Carmond Island. Four of her crew died. St Abbs MFV M/%/ Way picked up die men on the raft. The raider was intercepted and damaged near Alnmouth by Flight Lieutenant Young of 317 Squadron. ADM 199 400. ADM 199 412. Services ly theUfsboats of the Hojal National Ufeboatlnstitutiotr 1939-1946. 127 HH/50 160. ADM 199 412. 128 ADM 199 14. AIR 25 250. 80 North Wes te rn Approaches collier Cairnie was sunk and the Greenmm (784T) disappeared with ail 14 h a n d s R o s e - hearty, an Observer Corps post at Inverallochy and the village o f St Combs were strafed at 1120/4 and a Ju88 was sighted over Helmsdale that afternoon by a civil m a i l p la n e d ^ ® The Bell Rock was strafed again at 1000/5 April and bombs in Fraserburgh killed four and injured 194®^ The Orkney steamer S t Clement (450T), outbound from Kirkwall to rendez­ vous with WN9, was sunk by two near misses off Girdleness at 2150/5 and Rattray Head (496T), which had straggled from the convoy, was also sunk in this a t t a c k d 2^ A Ju88 passed over Scapa at midday on 6 April, then five raiders attacked EN95 o ff Aberdeen at 2134/6433 Also on 6 April, the Faroese trawler Naeraberg, Dnnstan (5,149T) and Olga (2,2521) were bombed and sunk west o f S h e t l a n d 4 3 4 Bombs fell near Stonehaven at 0338/7, a Ju88 was plotted off Aberdeen at 0800/7 and the trawler Sylvia was sunk at 1 0 0 0 / 7 4 3 5 That evening, as raiders crossed central Scotland to Glasgow, bombs fell near Thurso and a trawler was bombed and strafed off Buchan Ness435 A Ju88 strafed trawlers off Fraserburgh at 1442/84^ Hurricanes o f 43 Squadron intercepted at Ju88 over North Berwick at 0645/9 and, at 1212/9, the Naval trawler Invertay was attacked off Girdleness43® The Aberdeen examina­ tion trawler and Torry Battery opened fire, damaging an H e l l l , and the sloop Hastings was diverted from W N ll to pick up four German airmen from a dinghy off Peterhead435 A north-bound convoy was attacked that evening off Wick and a trawler was strafed off Ab­ erdeen. The tanker British Workman (6,9941) and Bandorian were damaged.^^o That night, trawler and a convoy were attacked off Copins ay, two more trawlers were attacked off Fra­ serburgh and Thirlby (4,8871) was bombed and strafed west o f the Hebridesd^i Five trawl­ ers were strafed west o f Shetland at 1600/11 and the Swedish Kexholm (3,8151) was bombed and sunk west o f Shetland on 12 Aprild'^^ WN14 was approached by an enemy aircraft off Aberdeenshire at 1330/15, but the raider was driven off by AA fire from HMS J a s o n Bombs fell at North Berwick and Greenock 129 All seven from Cairnie wete picked up. AIR 25 250. ADM 199 362. ADM 199 400. ADM 199 401. ADM 199 412. 3^0 A small boy received gunshot wounds at St Combs. AIR 25 250. 131 HH/50 160. ADM 199 412. 132 St elements, Chief Engineer and three crew from Battrcy Head were lost. AIR 25 250. ADM 199 397. ADM 199 401. 133 ADM 199 16. HH/50 160. 134 aDM 199 397. IJojds War Losses vol. 1. 135 Ibid. 136 ADM 199 397. 137 a ir 25 250. 138 AIR 27 442. ADM 199 401. 139 The aircrew insisted that they had had engine failure during a training flight the previous night, but Hastings signalled that, ‘It is not considered they had been so long in the water.’ ADM 199 401. Ramsay et. al. ; 1988. 140 ADM 199 397. ADM 199 412. 141 ADM 199 658. ADM 199 372. L/ojds War Losses vol. 2. 142 ADM 199 397. L/qyds War Losses vol. 1. 143 ADM 199 14. North Western Approaches early on 16 April, then the Norwegian Favorit (2,826T) was bombed and sunk o ff Shetland at 1130/16AW A Ju88 dropped two bombs in Fraserburgh at 1522/17, killing seven and injuring six seriously.^ ^^ ® Ju88s operated over the Northern Isles on the morning o f 18 April, one strafing Fair Isle North Lighthouse and another circling over HMS Frince of Wales west o f Hoy. The steamer Fothdale was slightly damaged by one of five raiders plot­ ted off Fraserburgh that evening and eight bombs were dropped near T h u r s o . A Ju88 strafed a convoy off Fraserburgh at 1610/20, then bombed and strafed the streets, kiUing one and injuring four s e r i o u s l y .A convoy was attacked off Montrose at 1335/21, then the Naval trawlers Dorothy Famhert and Chrysolite were strafed o ff Cruden Scaurs at 1500/22 and the Skipper o f the Dorothy Lambert killed. At 2145/22 the 14-ship WN17 signalled for fighter cover after it was attacked six miles south of Girdleness. The convoy was attacked again at 2154/22 and this time the Silverlarch was strafed from bridge to stern and near missed by b o m b s . A t Peterhead, bombs fell in a fish curing yard and the North H a r b o u r .Shipping was again attacked off Aberdeen­ shire the following night and bombs fell on land at Old Deer.^® ^ Enemy reconnaissance aircraft appeared over the Pentland Firth and Fair Isle Channel on the morning o f 24 April.132 At 2120/24, the 26-ship WN18 was southbound off Auchmithie when a raider appeared and repeatedly attacked the convoy in the face of heavy barrage from the escorts. Dolius was escorted into Largo Bay with her shaft tunnel and one hold fioodefi^# On 25 April, five raiders attacked shipping off the east coast and the Norwegian mine­ sweeper Boertund was bombed and strafed in the entrance to the Tay. Two bombs fell at Pittenweem.^®'^ Mountpark (4,648T), inbound for Manchester with grain, was bombed and sunk west of the Hebrides on 26 A p r i l .W N 1 9 was east o f Wick at 2145/27 when an H e l l l dropped five bombs around the Dutch Meliskerk, one a direct hit that failed to ex­ plode. As the Dutchman made frantic signals for help, another raider dropped bombs close to the port column, but did no damage. An H e l l l first plotted east o f Montrose at 0324/28 strafed a goods train, shot up an army post near the Bullers o f Buchan, injuring an officer, and strafed St Fergus. WTSfl9 continued its passage towards Methil until a Ju88 144 w o 166 2129. HH/50 160. AIR 25 233. [ 145 AIR 25 250. HH/50 160. j 146 AIR 25 250. ADM 199 397. 1 147 ADM 199 412 AIR 25 250. HH50/160. | 148 ADM 199 401. 149 ADM 199 14. I 150 ADM 199 401. I 151 ADM 199 397. HH/50 160. ' 152 ADM 199 397. f 153 ADM 19914. ; 154 AIR 25 250. ADM 199 400. I 82 lorth Western Approaches found it off Rattray Head at 0851/28. The raider was beaten off by intense AA fire, then strafed Cruden Bay and dropped two bombs at Newburgh that left one injured seriously. Raiders continued to follow the convoy throughout the day, but kept out o f range. WN19 reached the Forth late on 28 April. G e r m a n S i g n a l s I n t e l l i g e n c e In a report entitled Continued Compromise of British Convoy Movements dated 20 August 1941, Bletchley Park Naval Section provide an insight into German advance knowledge of coastal convoy sailings off Scotland.^®? This intelligence, derived from decrypts o f Luft­ waffe signals traffic, showed that, from 24 July 1941, German decrypts o f British signals traffic were giving Luftwaffe units in Norway as much as 12 hours notice o f British convoy sailings. Among the decrypts o f Luftwaffe signals to their base at Stavanger were; 1215/6/8 According to sailing schedule 6 /8 , presumably in the early afternoon, since the | convoy is leaving the Firth o f Forth. ___________________________ _ i 1845/7 /8 1441/8 /8 1316/11/8 According to sailing schedule, WN59 will be proceeding south at 0100 /8 /8 in the ] Pentland Firth. According to sailing schedule, WN60 will be off Wick southbound at 0200/9 /8 . | According to sailing schedule, proceeding south, WN61 will be o ff Wick at 0400/12/8. 1316/12/8 1816/12/8 1319/14/8 According to sailing schedule, WN62, southbound, will be in Moray Firtli, latitude \ o f Dunbeath, at 0400/13/8.___________ J B report: Northbound convoy at 1200/Î2 /8 in square 1548,15 west (bomber I - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - JAs the convoy is proceeding to the Atlantic northabout it will, according to schedule, presumably leave the Firth o f Forth in the early afternoon o f 14/8 . 1600 /1 4 /8 [_ B report^ Fighter pmtection^for ccmvoy PATTERN took off at 1528. Decrypted intelligence such as this is generahy fragmentary, often revealing only one side o f a conversation, but it was clear to Bletchley that the Germans had precise knowledge of some shipping movements off Scotland and that this was derived from British signals, though it is noteworthy that the decrypts refer principally to the WN convoy schedule, in­ telligence on northbound EN convoys clearly emanating from air reconnaissance. And, while this report only refers to the first two weeks o f August 1941, it is intriguingly titled Continued Compromise..., thus inferring that this had been the case for some time. A search o f relevant files at the Public Record Office has not yielded information on the situation prior to August 1941. But, despite this excellent intelligence, Luftwaffe attacks on shipping were increasingly rare as German air strength was concentrated in eastern Europe for Operation BARBAROSSA 155 Six o i Mountpark’s 41 crew died and survivors were landed at Oban by Umtali. ADM 199 658. Uoyds War Losses vol.l. 156 Meltskerk was escorted into Kirkwall by the tug Buccaneer anA the trawler Preston North End Her UXB was removed and dumped in deep water. ADM 199 14. ADM 199 397. HH/50 160. AIR 25 250. 83 North Western Approaches and later in Northern Norway to counter the Arctic convoys. Two reconnaissance sorties, clearly searching for WN59, did pass up the east coast from Montrose to the Pentland Firth early on 8 August, but failed to find the convoy and turned back southwards to drop bombs at RAF Dyce and in Aberdeen. Two JU88s looking for WN 62 appeared off the east coast at Stonehaven and Cruden Bay on 13 August, one damaging a ship off Port- lethen and strafing fishing vessels. With Luftwaffe appearances over the coastal convoy route off Scotland increasingly rare, it became hard to keep crews, even o f naval vessels, at a high degree o f readiness. The haz­ ards o f complacency were illustrated at dusk on 8 December 1941 when H e ll Is attacked a Naval trawler off Aberdeen, injuring three ratings, then bombed and strafed four trawlers o f the 41 Minesweeper Group off Lunan Bay, sinking the sweepers Milford Earl and Bhi- neas Beard. All 11 aboard Bhineas Beard were lost, as were six from Milford EarlA^ A l l t h e A d d i t i o n a l R is k S c o t t i s h C o a s t a l C o n v o y s i n R e t r o s p e c t The mathematical case for keeping the east coast convoy route open was clear. In 1939 Britain had imported 55 milUon tons of goods including all o f her oil, much o f her raw ma­ terials and half o f her food. Imports were dramatically reduced from the first year o f war and successively thereafter but, even at full capacity, the principal west coast ports on the Clyde and the Mersey could only handle around 20 million tons. And, even were that pos­ sible, landing everything on the west coast would place an intolerable strain on the trans­ port infrastructure. Thus, without the use o f the port facilities on Forth, the Tyne, the Tees, the Humber and the Thames, shipping could only opoerate at greatly reduced effi­ ciency, much o f British industry would grrlnd to a halt for want o f raw materials, food supplies would dwindle and, given the narrow margin that then lay between survival and collapse, defeat would have been inevitable. And later, without these port facilities, the Al­ lied military build-up that would culminate in Normandy would have been impossible. 157 ADM 223 2. 158 NOIC Dundee, Captain Hurt, wrote that Lieutenant F. R. D. Corbett RNVR, First Lieutenant in Milford Earl, . .assumed command when his commanding officer was killed at the beginning o f the action. Although suffering from considerable facial injuries, he worked indefatigably to save liis sliip and to keep all available armament in ac­ tion. ..he took all possible steps succour o f the wounded and tlie safety of his crew.’ Corbett was awarded a DSC. Hurt also recommended Leading Telegraphist L. E. Welch RNVR o f Milford Earl who salvaged a Lewis gun from the wreckage, improvised a mounting and, ‘although he had not handled this weapon before, opened an accurate fire on the aircraft, thus helping to prevent the accurate aiming o f a second salvo of bombs.’ Welch received a DSM. But the Admiralty Board o f Enquiry found that, ‘These ships were not in the required state o f readiness to meet attack by enemy aircraft, but they did eventually put up a strong, if not very effective, resistance to the deter­ mined attacks o f the enemy aircraft of which there may have been more than one.’ Lieutenant W. M. Morrison, the senior officer o f the group, lost in Milford Earl, was blamed for the unpreparedness and Captain Hurt was instructed to improve the gunnery o f all minesweepers operating from Dundee. ADM 1 12310. ADM 199 400. AIR 25 250. North Weste rn Approache; But one incident illustrates top-level nervousness about the east coast route. Ellerman’s Ciiy of Calcutta was due at Loch Ewe in 2 March 1941 with a munitions cargo and was to continue round the north o f Scotland to Methil and Hull. On 28 February, however, the Prime Minister intervened personally, minuting First Lord A. V. Alexander; This ship must on no account be sent to the east coast. It contains 1,700 machine guns, 44 aeroplane engines and no fewer dian 14,000,000 cartridges. These cartridges are absolutely vital to the defence o f Great Britain. Churchill’s minute points out that sending a ship such as this down the east coast, ‘with all the additional risk’ would be, ‘abominable’.^ ®° Two weeks later, on 11 March, as attacks on the east coast convoy route intensified, the Lend-Lease Bill passed its final hurdle in the House o f Representatives. Then, in Washing­ ton on 27 March, the first formal United States and British Commonwealth (USBC) staff conversations concluded with the Joint Basic War Plan Number One, while, that same day in London, the ‘Destroyers For Bases’ was signed. Lend-Lease was by no means the ‘most unsordid act’ o f ChurchilUan oratory, but it did give Britain’s beleaguered war economy far greater access to American productive capacity than hitherto. Now, more than ever, would have been the time for the Kreigsmarine and the Luftwaffe to mount a decisive and coor­ dinated attack on British convoy routes and the vulnerable east coast convoys should have been a prime target. Yet, despite the obvious importance o f the east coast route, the Ger­ man effort against the all but endless lines o f shipping off Scotland was too little, too late and largely ineffective. Some disruption to convoy sailings was caused and ships were sunk, but there was never any danger o f the east coast being closed to shipping. To be fair, however, the Luftwaffe and Kreigsmarine were operating at several disadvan­ tages. The Kreigsmarine, like the Royal Navy, remained heavily committed to its capital ships, and the German tactic in spring 1941 was to maintain pressure on the Royal Navy with a series o f Atlantic operations, o f which ROSSELSPRUNG, the foray by Bismarck was but one, while pursuing operations in the Mediterranean basin alongside the Italians. In the end, however, both the Axis and the British, in particular the Royal Navy, were excessively committed to the Mediterranean for three years. For example, while the German interven­ tion in the Balkans induced an ultimately fatal delay in the start o f BARBAROSSA, the British wasted resources and threw away ships pointlessly in the strategically irrelevant defence o f Crete. But the British could absorb naval losses with greater equanimity than the Kreigs­ marine for whom the loss o f Bismarck was not only a disaster in itself, but it also effectively put an end to hopes for a capital ship strategy in the Atlantic. 459 Gilbert : 1989 p. 1017. 160 Ibid. North Weste rn Approaches The Luftwaffe, heavily committed to the air war over southern England in 1940, then forced to husband resources for the invasion of the Soviet Union and the Mediterranean, had insufficient suitable aircraft in the North Sea and Atlantic theatres. In 1940-41 its crews were largely untrained in long-range anti-shipping warfare and its weaponry was un­ suitable. British coastal convoys were restricted to a narrow lane where slow-moving ships were strung out like targets in a coconut shy. But they were also relatively close to RAF fighter bases and, increasingly through 1940 and 1941, radar cover, and this made them easy to defend. Perhaps most significantly, however, over the North Sea, as elsewhere, the Luftwaffe suf­ fered from ever-changing strategic imperatives and a lack o f clear direction. In one respect, however, Luftflotte 5 units in Norway did gain much from their attacks on the Scottish convoys. A year later, when these same units were committed to the air offensive against Allied convoys on the Arctic route, experience gained off Scotland made them a more formidable adversary. In its attacks on Scotland’s maritime periphery, the Luftwaffe could never bring enough strength to bear to be decisive. While the loss o f life and property was often appalling, in­ dustry and society in general proved notably and unexpectedly resilient to bombing. Ar­ guably, this was a factor that should have had greater influence on British thinking when the RAF strategic bombing offensive against Germany was being planned early in 1942, and on the long-running dispute between Coastal and Bomber Commands over long-range aircraft allocation. By 1943, much of the Luftwaffe had been expended over the Soviet Union and, as if to emphasise the changed balance o f air power over the North Sea and Atlantic, a Ju88 night fighter crew sent from Stavanger to attack the BO AC flight between Leuchars and Stock­ holm on 9 May 1943 signalled their controller that they had engine failure, then headed for Aberdeen to defect. Spitfires found the bomber with its undercarriage down and firing flares and escorted it in to Dyce. The aircraft was hidden in a hangar and an immediate security clampdown was ordered, but there was intense local excitement, not least because many believed its appearance heralded another Hess-style peace mission. Some 2,578 let­ ters posted in the area between 10 and 12 May were examined and 400 referred to the arri­ val o f the Junkers. ‘Helen’ in the Met Office wrote, I should not be telling you this, so keep your thumb on it or I’ll get shot. We were aroused by Flor­ ence yelling through the door “Air Warning Red”. . .we looked out and Maisie said, “Oh, its only a Mosquito,” when o ff went the ack-ack, and, shepherded by the new fighter flight the thing came in and landed!!! And out stepped three Jerries complete — and I think this is pukka gen — with a des­ patch case. '^’^ The Junkers was extensively evaluated and is now in the RAF Museum, Hendon. AIR 15 413. 86 North Wes te rn Approaches Chapter tom Battle of The Atlantic - Part II The N orth Western Approaches 1940 -1941 German forces crossed into Luxembourg and France at 0430/10 May 1940 just as the cruiser Berwick arrived at Reykjavik from Scapa Flow. Marines went ashore to prevent German use of Iceland for airfields and U-boat bases. German successes in Norway had made it seem nicely that Iceland might be next and, in any case, spare U-boat crews were living there as welcome paying guests. Icelanders were reluctant to reveal the whereabouts o f U-boat men; they were paying good money and some had formed relationships with the wives and daugh­ ters o f absent fishermen, but a few well-placed bribes soon had them rounded up. Iceland's importance as a naval and air base in the Battle o f the Atlantic, and, later, for the Arctic con­ voys, was incalculable and the bloodless capture o f the island paid handsome dividends.^ While Donitz had recalled aU ocean-going U boats from the Atlantic in April 1940 for the invasion o f Norway, the Type IICs were still successful in Scottish coastal waters. lJ-13 sank the Swainbj (4,935T) off Shetland on 17 April and damaged the tanker Scottish American (6,999T) in the Pentland Firth on 28 April.^ \J~5S sank Astronomer (8,401T) off Kinnaird's Head at 2253/1 June® and, on 27 June, lJ-62 sank the trawler Castleton off Orkney.'^ At 1250/10 July the Canadian destroyer S t Laurent escorting OA180 reported the Dutch Alwaki (4,533T) sinking 12 miles north-east o f Cape Wrath after she had been torpedoed by U-61.^ As noted in Chapter Three above, following defeat in Norway and France, from July 1940 4 While Quill and barrister Pen Slade were interrogating German Consul Gerlach, die Marines smelt burning and were just in time to prevent Frau Gerlach from incinerating diplomatic cyphers and odier documents in the bath. ADM 199 377. McLaclilan : 1968. 2 Scottish Ametican was not, as claimed by Schulte, and as stated in Rohwer, sunk, but was found by the trawler Bracon- dem and towed into Loch Eriboll where her cargo o f Admiralty fiiel oil was discharged. ADM 199 363. Rohwer : 1999. CE87/4/41. 3 In the crew's quarters aft cots, tables and sleeping men were hurled against the deckhead. Casualties had to extracted from the debris in pitch darkness as the water level rose Leicester City and Stoke City landed 109 survivors. U-58 was pursued for 43 hours before making her escape and returned to Kiel on 17 June after an otherwise uneventful patrol. ADM 1 10237. ADM 199 363. ADM 199 364. ADM 199 377. Rohwer : 1999. Wynn ; 1997. 4 On 28 June HMS White escorting ShoalfisheravA the Admiralty oiler Carindak through tlie Minches reported at­ tacking a U boat contact in 5828.3N 0535W. The U boat was reportedly blown to the surface by depth charges, tlien sank again. Wynn : 1997. ADM 199 363. ADM 199 377. HO 198 198. 3 Alwakh crew were picked up by tlie cruiser Coventry which was escorting minelayers into Kyle o f Lochalsh. ADM 199 363. ADM 199 377. Wynn : 1997. Rohwer : 1999. Sims : 1972. 87 North Wes te rn Approaches British convoys were rerouted through the North Channel and the North Western Ap­ proaches, as far as possible away from enemy held territory and particularly his airfields. But this concentrated shipping into a narrow funnel, the North Channel, seemingly ideal conditions for U boat warfare. When U boat anti-shipping operations resumed in mid-May, however, there were just 24 ocean-going boats in commission, three less than in September 1939 and, at Raeder’s behest, six o f these were diverted to positions around Scapa Flow. At this, arguably the only point when the U boat could have been a decisive, war-winning weapon, once again the Kriegsmarine’s lack o f war preparedness meant that they were un­ able to bring sufficient strength to bear.*» First out in the Atlantic post-Norway was U~37 which sank the Swedish Erik Frisell (5,066T) west o f the Hebrides. Also west o f the Hebrides and in the North Channel, U-48 sank Stancor (798T) on 5 June, then sank Frances Massey (4,212T) and damaged Eros (5,888T) on 7 June. Three AMCs, Carinthia (20,277T), Scotstoun (17,046T) and Andanta (13,950T), were sunk between 6 and 15 June, the tanker Scottish Minstrel (6,988T) was tor­ pedoed by XJ-61 on 16 July and the Swedish O. A . Brodin (1,960T) and Fellside (3,509T) were sunk on 17 July. That night, at 2317/17 and six miles off Cape Wrath, U-37 sank Ma­ nipur (8,652T) from HX55A. The Norwegian Gyda (1,591T) was sunk east o f Islay by U-38 on 18 July, U-62 sank the Pearlmoor (4,581T) nearby at 1828/19 and Empire Conveyor sunk 40 miles west o f Iona, probably by U-122, on 20 June.^ With the exception o f Andania, these early sinkings had all been within 10° west, that is within 50 miles west of the Butt o f Lewis. But even the few Coastal Command aircraft then available were becoming more troublesome with U-37, for example, having come un­ der attack in the Fair Isle Channel on her outward passage in May. Now the Royal Navy and RAF were escorting convoys to 17° west, and this took them out o f what were then 'British Waters' in the terms o f the U boat rules o f engagement. Donitz knew o f the change in poHcy from B-deinst decrypts, but operating U boats that far west posed prob­ lems as the older Type VIIs had only half the range o f the later VIIBs. Donitz flew to Lorient on 22 July to confer with Lemp, RoUmann, Salmann and Kretschmer, four o f his most experienced commanders. Inspections o f Lamp's U-30, RoUmann's U-34, Salmann's U-52 and Kretschmer's U-99 revealed that only U-99 was in good condition. The other three were in urgent need o f refits and were to be patrolled back to Germany.® RoUmann left first on 23 July and attacked OB I88 west o f the North Channel sinking Accra 6 ADM 199 363. ADM 199 371, ADM 199 377. Rohwer : 1999. 7 Ibid, 8 Blair ; 1997 p. 177 88 North Western Approaches (9,337T), Vinemoor (4,357T), Samhre (5,620T) and the tanker Thiara (10,364T).^ Kretschmer took a more westerly course off Scotland and, between 0500/28 July and 1324/31, and, from OB191, sank Auckland Star (13,212T), Clan Mentfes (7,336T), Jamaica Progress (5,475T) and Jersey City (6322T) and damaged the tankers Strinda (10,973T), 'Lucema (6,556T) and Alexia (8,016T), all from OB1914® The three tankers hmped into Greenock at 2125/4, but these attacks by just one U boat had cost OB I91 some 32,345 tons sunk and 25,545 tons damaged. And the only counter-attack that came even close to being effective was by a Sunderland from Oban. The escort achieved almost nothing beyond picking up survivors. Type Ils were still mounting inshore patrols and, at 0720/3 August, U-57 sank the Swedish Atos (2,126T) off Islay." The Type VII and IX boats were posi­ tioned astride the route into the North Channel. Early on 4 August, the Type VII \J-52 sank Gogovale (4,586T), King Alfred (5,272T) and Geraldine Mary (7,244T) from HX60 then, as HX60 approached the North Channel that evening, the Type IIC U-58 on inshore patrol sank the Greek Pindos (4,360T)." OB I93 was outbound west of Islay the following morn­ ing when U-56 torpedoed Boma (5,408T).^4 The trooper Mohammed AH E l Kebir (7,290T), Avonmouth for Gibraltar in HX61 with 607 troops and 162 crew, was sunk in 5522N 1318W at 2025/7. Ten crew and 50 troops were lost.^® U-30 sank the Swedish Canton (5,779T) near Tory Island on 9 August and, at 0012/10 some 60 miles west of Islay, yet another AMC, Transylvania, was torpedoed by U-56 A On 13 August, U-60 sank the Swed­ ish Nils Gorthon (1,809T) 40 miles west o f Islay." At 2200/14 August, 30 miles to the Her cargo of newsprint and sulphide spilling out and three of her crew dead, Geraldine Mary, inbound for Manchester in HX60, sinking west of the Hebrides after being torpedoed by U-60. 9 All 32 aboard Vinemoor vrere reported safe. Twelve crew and 12 passengers were lost (lom Accra. Twenty-five died from Thiara. ADM 199 372. Slader : 1988. Rohwer : 1999. Uqyds War Lasses vol. 1. 10 ADM 199 372. ADM 199 372. Rohwer ; 1999. Robertson : 1981. Lloyds War Losses vol. 2. 42 Six died. ADM 199 372. Rohwer : 1999. 43 Vanoc sank the stem half of King Alfred by gunfire after picking up all but seven o f her crew. At 2152/5 Sandunch had 31 survivors from Geraldine Maiy, another four were in Vanoc. A boat from Geraldine M ay landed on Lewis at 2030/8 August. Two engineers and a passenger died. ADM 199 372. Rohwer : 1999. Uqyds War Losses vol. 1. 44 Three of Boma's crew died. ADM 199 371. Rohwer : 1999. Slader : 1988. 45 ADM 199 372. ADM 199 377. Slader : 1988. Rohwer : 1999. Uqyds War Losses vol. 1. 46 Englishman and Salvonia sailed but Transylavania sank at 0438/10. Fifty of her crew were lost and her Captain, 42 officers and 229 ratings were rescued by Havelock. ADM 199 372. Wynn : 1997. Rohwer : 1999. 47 The naval trawler St Keenan picked up nine from Nils Gorthon. A raft with eight aboard was sighted by an aircraft and Anthony picked them up. Four of Nils Gorthon's crew died. ADM 199 372. Rohwer : 1999. Uqyds War Lasses vol. 1. 89 North Western Approaches south, U-59 sank Betty (2,339T)4® The tanker Sylvafield (5,709T) reported a U boat shadow­ ing HX62, then, at 2230/15, that she had been torpedoedd^ There were clear signs that aircraft were becoming the most effective U boat deterrent. Empire Merchant (4,864T) was sunk by U-100 at 0740/16 in 5521N 1340W.^‘^ At 1415/16 Sunderland H /210 from Oban was escorting OA198 and searching for boats from Empire Merchant ysPnen a conning tower was sighted in 5635N 1255W and Flight Lieutenant Baker dropped two depth charges which appeared to blow the Lf boat right out o f the water. A further attack was made with four 2501b bombs and U-51 rolled over and sank. The air­ craft alighted Oban 1849/16 and Baker was awarded the DFC. U-51, clearly damaged, was returning to Lorient on 20 August when she was sunk by the British submarine Cachalot A The first coordinated wolf-pack attack in the North Western Approaches began when the Swedish collier Hedrun (2,235T) and Alcinious (6,198T) in OBI 97 were hit by U-48 and U- 46 respectively shortly after the convoy dispersed south-west o f Rockall at 1100/16 Au- gust.22 Lemp's U~30 then moved in on OB I97 and, at 1906/16, torpedoed Clan MacpheeA" ^ A t 2030/20 the Greek Leonidas M. Valmas (2,080T), a straggler from HX64, was torpedoed by \J-46 west o f the Bloody Foreland and left derelict. 4^ JJ-57 attacked the 28-ship OB202 some west o f Islay at 2310/23, torpedoing Cumberland (10,939T), Havildar (5,407T) and St Dunstan (5,618T), all within five minutes.^® The tanker Ea Brea (6,665T), Aruba for Dundee in HX65 with fuel oil, was torpedoed by U-48 in 5720N 1115W at 1233/24 and two o f her crew died.^ ^^ An Oban-based Sunderland spotted U-48 on the surface astern o f the convoy at 1919/24 and dropped three bombs which missed. The convoy split o ff the Butt o f Lewis, HX65A heading for east coast ports, and HX65B making for the Clyde and Mersey. At 0145/25 U-48 attacked HX65A, sinking 48 Betty's Chief Officer, Second Engineer, Radio Operator and one Chinese crewman, the only survivors from her 34 crew, were landed at Belfast on 18 August. ADM 199 371. ADM 199 372. Rohwer : 1999. Wynn : 1997. 49 Sylvafield was sunk by U-51. Three o f her 39 crew died and 16 were landed at Tobermory by tlie trawler Neivlands. Another boat was sighted by an Oban Sunderland. ADM 199 371. ADM 199 372. Rohwer : 1999. Wynn ; 1997. 28 Boats from Empire Mervhartt wiûi more than 30 survivors aboard were sighted by an Oban Sunderland that afternoon. Another was sighted the following day and Salvonia picked up the five aboard that. Thirty four more survivors were picked up by the Yugoslav Supetaraxxà the destroyer Warwick. Seven o f Empire Merchants crew were lost. ADM 199 13. ADM 199 371. ADM 199 377. Rohwer : 1999. Ucyds War Lasses vol. 1. 24 AIR 28 615. AIR 27 1298. ADM 199 371. Franks : 1995. 22 Hedrun sank hut Alaniousma.de Greenock at 2050/18. Salvonia also carried 17 survivors from Hedrun. Rochesterland&d another three from Hedrun. ADM 199 371. Roskfil : 1962 p. 53-54. 23 SS picked up '13 Europeans and 38 natives' from ClanMacphee, but was herself sunk in 5446N 2030W by U A early on 19 February. Survivors, including some from the Clan Maphee, were picked up from two rafts by tlie de­ stroyer Wellington. ADM 199 372. Rohwer : 1999. Uoyds WarUrssesvol. 1. 24 Seven survivors were taken off by Folkestone at 1640/23 and two men sighted on a raft by a 210 Squadron Sunder­ land were picked up by Arrow. Sixteen o f Leonidas M Valmad crew died abandoning in panic. She was towed to the Clyde but was broken up in Karnes Bay. ADM 199 371. Wynn : 1997. Rohwer : 1999. Uoyds WarLassesvcA. 1. 25 Cumberland sank off Malin Head while under tow of Englishman, Havildar vras towed in by Salvonia and repaired. St Dunstan was reported 40 miles west o f Islay at 0736/24. Fourteen Lascars from her 63 crew had died while attempt­ ing to launch a boat, but the survivors were stiU aboard. Schelde took her in tow, but she sank in 068° Pladda Light 4.25 miles at 0837/27. ADM 199 371. ADM 199 372. ADM 199 2057. Rohwer : 1999. Lloyds WarLossesvol. 1. 26 One boat widi 14 survivors from La Brea reached Loch Boisdale at 2100/25. The other landed at Islivig on the west coast of Lewis at 2100/26. ADM 199 371. ADM 199 372. Rohwer : 1999. Wynn : 1997. 90 North Western Approaches Empire Merlin (5,763T) and the tanker Athelcrest (6,852T). That evening, at 1848/25, U-57 sank the tanker Pecten (7,468T) from HX65B,2? then U-124 attacked HX65A off the Butt of Lewis torpedoing Stakeshy (3,900T) which stayed afloat on her timber cargo, Godetia counter-attacked at 2307/25 but U-124 still managed to torpedo Fircrest (5,349T) and Har- palyce (5,196T) at 2351/25.2® HX65A continued through the Pentland Firth and, as de­ scribed in Chapter Three, came under air attack north of Kinnaird’s Head. Meanwhile, U- 100 was west o f the Hebrides and, at 1820/25, 140 miles west of Barra, torpedoed the Ja­ maica Pioneer (5,471T).2^> WOLFPACKS IN THE NORTH WESTERN APPROACHES 1940-41 The first SC convoy, SCI, was approaching the Hebrides at 1530/27 August when U-28 torpedoed the Norwegian Eva (1,599T), inbound for Sharpness with timber, in 5750N 1115W. One crewman died. Leith reported another ship torpedoed at 0332/28, then picked up 28 crew from the Finnish Elle (3,868T), inbound for Ardrossan with spoolwood, which had been torpedoed by U-101. Leith sighted a periscope in 5702N 0953W at 1613/28 and the destroyers Hurricane, Witch, Sabre and Scimitar w ett sent to sweep the area.®° U-101 intercepted OA204 west of Islay at 2330/28, damaging Hartismere (5,498T) and sink­ ing Dalblair (4,608T), Astra (2,393T) and the Swedish Alida Gorthon (2,373T). Schepke's final victim in OA204 was the Empire Moose (6,103T), sunk at 0330/29.®^ Baltisan (6,803T) was damaged when the convoy came under air attack at 1203/29.®^ Meanwhile, at 2007/28, HX66 was attacked by U-28 in 5806N 1434W and l^no (3,946T) was sunk. The convoy split west o f Barra Head at 1200/29, then U-32 fired a torpedo through the North Channel section, HX66B. Mackay counter-attacked, but U-32 escaped and, at 0130/30, torpedoed Mill Hill (4,318T), Chelsea (4,804T) and the Norwegian Nome (3,971T) from HX66A 25 miles north-west o f the Butt o f Lewis.®® 27 ADM 199 372. ADM 199 377. Rohwer : 1999. Wynn : 1997. Lloyds WarLossesvol 1. 28 Godetia stood by Stakesbj until tlie tug Thames arrived and took her in tow for Stornoway where she was beached still ablaze in four holds on 27 August. Firmst sank immediately and all 40 o f her crew were lost. ADM 199 372. ADM 199 377. Rohwer : 1999. Wynn : 1997. Uqyds War Losses vo ls 1 and 2. Jamaica Pioneer satik at 0100/26. At 1256/26 an aircraft from Oban sighted two lifeboats in 5648N 1018W, signalled the lifeboats their position and gave tliem a course to nearest land. Anthony picked up 11 officers and 29 crew firom two boats. One boat with 15 survivors was still missing but, at 1400/27, Wanderer found this boat which contained Jamaica Pioneer's master and 13 crew in 5609N 0839W and took the survivors to Belfast. The only casualty had been the Cliief Officer lost when the ship sank. ADM 199 371. Rohwer : 1999. Wynn : 1997. The U boat War in the Atlantic. 30 ADM 199 372. Rohwer : 1999. 34 Flartismere suffered no casualties and reached tire Clyde two days later under her own power. Five o f û it Astra's 26 crew were lost. From Dalblaits 42 crew, tiiree were killed in the initial explosion and 24 were picked up by Alida Gor­ thon. When she too was sunk, 11 o f her crew died along witli 20 of the survivors from the Dalblair. All 36 aboard the Empire Moose were saved. ADM 199 371. ADM 199 372. Rohwer ; 1999. Uoyds War Losses vols 1 and 2. 32 Ibid. 1 33 Chelsea and Mill Hill were botli afloat at 0300/30 but the tugs Thames and Superman found nothing due to dense fog I and were recalled at 1701/30. Eleven survivors from Chelsea were landed at Thurso by the trawler Lord Cedi on 31 | August, leaving 24 missing. All 34 aboard Mill Hill died. ADM 199 377. Rohwer : 1999. Uoyds WarLossesvol 1. j North Western Approaches Escorted by a 210 Squadron Sunderland from Oban, troop convoy TC6 Inbound for the Clyde from Halifax on 3 1 August 1940. Nearest the camera is Duchess o f York, leading the centre column is HMS Revenge and furthest from the camera, from left, are Empress of Australia, Monarch o f Bermuda and Samaria. U-59 and U-60 had attacked OB205 west of Tiree the previous evening, U-S9 damaging two freighters and U-60 damaging the liner Volendam which was carrying, among 884 pas­ sengers, 3 17 evacuee children. Also off the North Channel were U-38, which sank Har Zion (2.508T) from OB205 on 3 1 August, and U-46 which sank Ville de Hassek (7 ,4 61T) west of Lewis. U-IOI was off the Bloody Foreland. U-47 and U-32, the latter having dam­ aged the cruiser Fiji on I September, were west of the Butt of Lewis. U-lOO had just left the area after sinking four ships totalling 15,277 tons and damaging Hartismere (4.608T). That night, OB205 was attacked 130 miles west o f Islay, U-59 torpedoing the tanker An- darra (8,009T) at 2100/30, the Greek San Gabriel (4,934T) at 2130/30 and the Dutch hner Yolendam (15,434T), outbound for New York with 884 passengers, including 317 seavacs, at 2330/30. The British Har Zion (2,508T) was sunk by U-38 at 0100/31 and the Greek straggler EJploia (3,876T) was picked off by U-101. Meanwhile, the Belgian Yille de Hasselt (7,461T), independent at 14 knots for New York, was sunk 100 miles to the west by U- 46.^ Yille de Hassells sister ship Yille de Mons (7,463T), inbound independent west of the Hebrides at 1500/2 September, was torpedoed by Prien’s At 0215/3 U-60 sank the Gibraltar-bound collier Ulva (1,40IT) 180 miles north-west of Inistrahull.®® Prien then tor­ pedoed Holt’s Titan (9,034T) in OA207 in 5814N 1515W at 0028/4.®? Four days earlier, on 30 August, B-deinst had decoded details o f the rendezvous between the 34 Andarra reached Greenock on 1 September. Thames beached San Gabriel at Cardross, but she was later declared a total loss. Two of her 24 crew had died. One died in Volendam which was towed to the Clyde by Salvonia. All but one of the 37 aboard Har Zion died, but 27 from Ejploia were aboard Anthony and the Belgian trawler Transport picked up 13 from Ville de Hasselt. The Icelandic Hihnir picked up another boat and the rest o f the Ville de Hasselt s crew were aboard Fleetwood trawlers. ADM 199 371. ADM 199 372. ADM 199 377. Rohwer : 1999. Wynn : 1997. Uqyds War Losses vois 1 and 2. 35 Twenty-one crewmen from the Ville de Mons were landed at Roag, Lewis, by the trawler Ben Aden at 0700/7. Another boat with 14 survivors landed on Lewis the following morning and 17 were picked up near Cape Wrath by the trawler Querria. One man died of exposure. ADM 199 372. ADM 199 377. Uqyds War Losses vol. 1. 36 Three o f Ulva's crew died and 17 survivors were landed at Castlebay. ADM 199 372. Rohwer : 1999. Uqyds War Losses vol. 1. 37 Titan sank quickly. St Laurent and Godetia picked up 23 Europeans and 66 Chinese. Prien wrongly claimed to have damaged another 4,000 ton steamer. ADM 199 377. ADM 199 372. Roskill : 1962 p. 54-55. Rohwer : 1999. Uqyds War Losses vol. 1. 92 î - l . C /> û ) — CPoQ), ■o CO CD O 3r fi II ^ & North Western Approaches 53-ship SC2 and its eastern escort at 1200/6 September in 5700N 1950W. Donitz disposed U-47, U-28 and U-65 across the convoy’s track and it was first sighted by U-65 late on 5 Sep­ tember. The Western Approaches escorts Scimitar, Skeena, Scarborough, Perimnkk, Apollo, West- cott and Berkshire under Commander Arthur Knapp in Uomstoft joined on 6 September and Coastal Command patrols were mounted, but five ships were still sunk.^^ Von Stockhausen followed the convoy and, despite worsening weather and being briefly forced away by Skeena and Perimnkle, reported its position until Prien sank Neptunian (5,1551), Jose de Lamnaga (5,3031) and the Norwegian Gro (4,2111) at 0430/7. Just then a Sunderland from Oban forced Prien to dive, but he gave chase and, at 2124/8, sank the Greek Possidon (3,8401) in 5642N 0933W.3^ At 0345/9, however, U-28 moved in and sank Mardinian (2,4341), then headed west until, at 0235/11 in 5534N 1556W, she intercepted OA210 and torpedoed the Harpenden (4,6781) and the Dutch Maas (1,9661).40 Late on 14 September, the 41 ship SC3 was in 5640N 1504W. It was a calm night with a full moon and an oily swell when, at 2328/14, the escort sloop Dundee’s .st&tn was blown o ff by a torpedo from Bleichrodt’s U-48 A Bleichrodt then sank the Greek Alexandros (4,3431) and Empire Volunteer (5,3191), then left the convoy and, at 0915/15, came across the straggler Kenordoc (1,7801) and despatched her with his deck gun.^z Kretschmer's U-99 was closing the North Western Approaches from a sweep out to 5824N 2501W where, at 2053/14, he had torpedoed the Norwegian Hird (4,9501), a straggler from HX70. Late the following day he sank another Norwegian, Eotos (1,3271), west o f Rockall, then, on 17 September, he and Stockhausen attacked HX71 and sank one ship each.43 Prien, having been sent westwards on weather reporting duty, sighted HX72 on 20 Sep­ tember.'^ Bad weather meant that Commodore Rogers had had great difficulty persuading his 42 elderly charges to keep station even at SYa knots. HX72's sole ocean escort was the AMC Jervis Bay until sunset on 20 September when, with the convoy still 500 miles west of 38 The U boat War in the Atlantic^. 40. Padfidd 1997 p. 92. Showell ; 1989 pp. 40-41. 39 All 36 aboard Ueptunian were lost. Jose de Uarringa sank quickly and her 40 crew died. Eleven o f the 32 aboard Gro died. Seventeen o f the Possidon's crew died and 31 were picked up firom rafts. ADM 199 372. Rohwer : 1999. Wynn : 1977. Showell : 1989 p. 41. Van der Vat : 1990 pp. 219-220. Edwards : 1996. Uoyds WarUosses^o\.% 1 and 2. ^ Maas sank immediately with the loss o f all but two o f her crew. Harpenden stayed afloat and Marauderh&à her off Ailsa Craig at 1615/15 after a difficult, four-knot tow escorted by Jason and Hibiscus. All but one o f her 29 crew sur­ vived. Harpenden was moored in the Gareloch and her machinery was fitted to a new ship. Her hulk was repaired in Glasgow and renamed Empire Stour, ADM 199 372. Rohwer ; 1999. Uoyds WarUossesYoX. ^1 and 2. V passed a tow but Dundee sank at 1250/15 in 5646N 1426W. Dundeds Captain and OOW were censured for tlieir 'grave error' in not immediately commencing pumping operations as die inflow could have been controlled wliile steam was still available. ADM 178 250. ADM 199 372. Rohwer : 1999. 42 Five o f the 30 aboard Alexandros died, as did six of the 39 aboard Empire Volunteer. Thirteen survivors from the 21 aboard Kenordoc vrete picked up hy Anthony, ADM 178 250. ADM 199 372. ADM 199 377. ADM 199 1976. Rohwer : 1999. Wynn : 1997. Uoyds War Losses vol. 1. 43 Hird was towed in to the Clyde by Marauder, All her crew survived. Eight survivors from Latos came ashore at Borve at 1730/20. From HX71 Kretschmer hit sank the Crown Arun (2,3721) after allowing her 25 crew to take to the boats. Stockhausen's victim, another straggler, was Tregenna (5,242*1) and again all her crew were saved. ADM 199 372. ADM 199 377. Rohwer : 1999. Slader : 1988. U yd s War Losses vol.s 1 and 2. 44 Showell : 1989 p. 42. 93 North Western Approaches Ireland, Jems Bay was diverted to a westbound convoy. The Western Approaches escort was not expected to join until the afternoon of 21 September so, for 20 critical hours, HX72 would be undefended. Prien signalled the convoy's course and speed and Donitz ordered a wolf pack consisting o f U-29 (Schuhart), U-32 (Jenisch), U-43 (Ambrosius), U-46 (Endrass), U-47 (Prien), U-48 (Bleichrodt), U-63 (Stockhausen), U-99 (Kretschmer) and U-100 (Schepke). Prien shad­ owed the convoy until the next day when he, Kretschmer, Bleichrodt and four other boats formed a wolf pack, later joined by Schepke in U-1003^ HX72 was stiU well out to sea at 2024/20 September, when U-138 (Luth) attacked the out­ bound OB216. New Sevilla (13,801T), Boka (5,560T) and Empire Adventure (5,145T) were aU torpedoed in quick succession ten miles north-west o f InistrahuU.'*^ Luth followed the con­ voy for four hours, then, at 0124/21, City of Simla (10,138T), outbound for Bombay, was torpedoed on the starboard side abreast the mainmast. She took on a heavy hst to star­ board, but righted herself and began to settle rapidly by the stern.^^ The sloop Scarborough dropped three patterns o f depth charges on an asdic contact, but Luth escaped unharmed. Meanwhile, at 22° west, from HX72, 11 ships were sunk, two were damaged and more than 100 merchant seamen died. Time Ship Tons Cargo Bound Crew Lost 0112/21 Jnvershannon 9,154 13,241 tons o f Admiralty fuel oil. Curacao - Scapa 47 16 0319/21 Baron Blythsivood 3,668 5.450 tons o f iron ore. Wabana - Port Talbot 35 34 0349/21 Elmbank 5,156 Timber and metals. Cowichan - Bel­ fast. 56 1 04Î4/21 Blairangus 4,409 1,852 fathoms o f pit props. St John’s - Methil. 34 7 2210/21 Canonesa 8,286 7,265 tons o f refrigerated and general cargo Montreal - Liver­ pool 63 1 22ÎÔ/2Î1 Torinia 10,364 13,815 tons o f Admiralty fuel oÜ Curacao - Clyde ^ 55 L 52213/21 Dalcaim ^ 4,608 8,000 tons o f wheat. Montreal - HuU 42 0 2238/21 Broompark 5,136 5,136 tons o f lumber and metals. Vancouver - Glas- 1 2322/2"r Empire Airman "6,586 7,000 tons o f iron ore Wabana - Cardiff 3 7 ' 33 2330/21 Ftederick S. Fales 10,525 13,849 tons o f Admiralty fuel oil. Curacao - Clyde 48 16 2350/21 Scholar 3,940 5,484 bales o f cotton, 2,023 tons o f steel, 965 tons o f timber and otlier general cargo. Galveston - Man­ chester 42 0 0114/22 Simla (Nor) 6,013 4,120 tons o f scrap and 2,023 tons o f steel. Philadelplria — Tees. 5 U-99U:9l AjJ V Ï / Î TU-/00 U-100 u-ido UA8 u-100 u-100 45 Ib id . 46 jsjgjK/ Sevilla sent an SSSS at 2025/20, then sank nine miles west o f the Mull o f Kintyre at 2310/21 while under tow of Salvonia and Seaman. New Sevilla carried 285 crew, two o f whom died. Amble picked up 107 survivors and others were aboard Salvonia and Superman. Empire Adventure vem taken in tow by Superman, but sank west o f Islay at 0350/23. Her Second Officer, Second, Third and Fourth Engineers and 16 crewmen were missing, though Uoyds War Losses gives 21 killed. Two survivors from Boka died after being picked up by Vanquisher making eight lost Eom her 34 crew. ADM 199 372. ADM 199 377. Rohwer : 1999. Uojds WarLossesvol. 1. 47 One crewman and two passengers died. Thirty-two survivors were picked up by a trawler, others were landed at Lough Foyle by Vanquisher and 146 were picked up by the SS Guinean. UGD 131/1. ADM 199 372. ADM 199 377. Rohwer : 1999. Allen : 1996. Slader : 1988. Lloyds WarLossesvol. 1. 94 North Western Approaches At daybreak on 22 September a litter o f broken and sinking ships, wreckage and oil marked the track o f HX72. Shikari was proceeding to Londonderry with survivors from Torinia and Scholar vài&ix, at 0615/22, Collegian (7,886T) signalled that she was exchanging fire with a surfaced U boat. At 0749/22 Collegian signalled that the U boat, actually U~32, had disap­ peared. Skate, Shikari, Towestoft and Heartsease came up and Lowestoft depth-charged a con­ tact, but U-32 got away.^® The survivors o f HX72 straggled into the Clyde over the following two days, among the last to reach safety being Pacific Grove (7,117T) and Broompark which were together in the North Channel on 24 September escorted by the corvette La Malouine when they were at­ tacked by an enemy aircraft. La Malouine was overcrowded with 118 survivors and was lucky to escape damage. Broompark and Pacific Grove suffered minor bomb damage."*^ There was httle U boat activity in the North Western Approaches during the ensuing fort­ night, though U-137 did intercept OA219 late on 25 September and sank Manchester Brigade (6,042T) with the loss o f all but four o f the 62 aboard and the tanker Stratford (4,753T), and damaged Ashantian (4,917T). Finally, at 0310/26, U-137 sank the Norwegian Asgerd (1,308T). In bad weather, Scimitar yrr&s unable to find any survivors.^o At 0520/30, while escorting OA220, the destroyer Rochester collided with a lifeboat from Marbriton (6,694T) which had been torpedoed 300 miles west o f Islay on 24 September. Seven survivors were picked up, but another boat with 16 aboard had last been seen sailing east on the 26* so air sweeps were mounted to find them. The missing boat was sighted in 5647N 1102W and the survivors were picked up by the sloop Jason A U-58 sank Confield (4,956T), a straggler from HX76, in 5648N 1017W at 2030/8 October.^z SC6 was attacked at 2110/9 in 5811N 1357W by U-103 and the Greek Zannes Gounaris (4,407T), Craigwen (3,697T) and the Greek Delphin (3,816T) were torpedoed at intervals o f one minute. 3^ British listening stations picked up a U boat signalling from 5657N 2000W at 1259/11 Oc­ tober and deduced that a U boat had sighted the 32-ship HX77. The signal came from Bleichrodt's U-48 and his attack on the convoy began at 2050/11 with the sinking o f the 48 Tlie BdU KTB for 22 September 1940 quoted in Padfield : 1983 pp. 219-220 states, 'Because o f accurate shadowing reports, this convoy was attacked altogether by five boats which were originally up to 350 miles away from die point o f first sighting.. .The actions o f the last few days have shown that the principles established in peacetime for using radio in contact with the enemy and training the U-boat arm to attack convoys were correct' This conclusion was wrong, at least in respect o f radio communication, which was to prove the U boat's Achüles heel. 49 Btvompark suffered one man dead. ADM 199 372. Uqyds WarLossesvol. 2. 50 ADM 199 372. Rohwer : 1999. Uqyds War Losses vo\.a 1 and 2. 51 Marbriton had been torpedoed by U-32 (Jenisch) and sank in about 30 minutes. The boat run down by Loehestervraz overcrowded with 19 men. Ibid. ADM 199 142. 52 Thirty-one survivors from Conjieldwete. picked up by Periwinkle. At 1210/9 Weston reported Confield still afloat on her timber cargo and with Captain Sage and four men aboard, but awash as far aft as amidships. The men were taken off at 1330/9 and Conjieldveaz despatched. ADM 199 372. ADM 199 1707. Wynn : 1997. Rohwer : 1999. 55 Delphin was last seen drifting towards Rockall by Hastings at 1230/12. AH of her crew survived. Craigwen carried 34 crew o f whom seven were lost. She stayed afloat until despatched by a torpedo from U-123 late on 10 October. One \ man was lost from Zannes Gounaris. ADM 199 372. Wynn : 1997. Rohwer : 1999. Uqyds WarLossesvol, 1. j 95 I North Western Approaches Norwegian Bradanger (4,624T). Another Norwegian, Emma Bakke (4,72IT) was torpedoed and sunk at 2100/11, then Port Gisborne (8,390T) was sunk nine minutes later. The Norwe­ gian tanker Davanger (7,102T) was torpedoed at 2314/11, and, at 2340/11, the Commodore ship Empire Audacity signalled that she too was being attacked, but she survived and was found proceeding alone in 5622N 1154W by Periwinkle at 1515/13.^ Bleichrodt's sighting report brought more U boats towards HX77 and, at 1919/12, Pacific Ranger (6,856T) was sunk in 5620N 1143W by U-59. U-101 torpedoed and sank the Canadian St Malo (5,779T), a straggler from HX77, at 2225/12. U-103 sank the Estonian Nora (1,186T) at 0746/13, U-138 torpedoed and damaged the Norwegian Dagrun (4,562T) at 1432/13 and U-37 sank Stangrant (5,804T) at 1957/13.55 The AMC Cheshire (10,552T) sighted oil and wreckage from HX77 some 120 miles west o f the Bloody Foreland at 2000/14 and began searching for survi­ vors. From D /F fixes it was known that U boats were in the vicinity, so she steered a zig-zag course, but was torpedoed at 2028/14. The torpedo from U-137 tore a 36-foot hole in her starboard side, but Skeena and Gladiolus escorted her safely into the North Channel.5^ In addition to their anti-submarine duties, in fine weather the Oban-based Sunderiands undertook air-sea rescue operations. Stangrant was inbound for Belhist with steel and scrap in HX77 when whe was torpedoed and sunk by U-3 7 on 13 October 1940. A Sun­ derland found 21 of her crew in a boat west of the Hebrides on 15 October and, as seen above, brought them to Oban. That night, OB227 was attacked west of the Butt of Lewis by U-93 (Korth) and U- 138 (Luth). Korth sank Hurunui (9,331T), then Luth sank Bonheur (5,327T) and hit the tanker British Glory (6,993T) at 0410/15. Pirouette picked up 43 survivors from British Glory 54 Six o f BradangeH crew were lost, 24 survivors were picked up by Clarkia. Salvonia searched for the Emma Bakke but found only wreckage. Port Gisborne carried 64 crew, 26 o f whom died. Survivors were picked up by Salvonia on 21 October - see below. Twelve were picked up from Davanger, 17 died. ADM 199 372. Uqyds War Losses vol. 1. 55 Pacific Rangedz 53 crew were picked up, 19 o f them hy Antelope escorting OB230. Sixteen o f St Male's 44 crew were picked up, along with survivors from Port Gisborne, by Salvonia on 20 October. Nords Master and 18 o f her crew were picked up by Uith, which was escorting SC7, on 18 October. Dagmn reached the Clyde under her own steam. Leith also found 17 Stangrant survivors while the action around SC7 was at its height. Another 21 were picked up by an Oban Sunderland, but a boat with 16 aboard was lost despite having been sighted by a Sunderland on 16 October. ADM 199 59. ADM 199 372. Rohwer ; 1999. Wynn : 1997. Uqyds War Losses vol.s 1 and 2. 56 Rohwer : 1999. Wynn : 1997. 96 North Western Approaches and the trawler Sphene picked up Bonheuds crew of 39. Later that afternoon, at 1615/15, the convoy was attacked by U-103 and the Thistlegarth (4,747T) was sunk.57 At 0003/16 October, half way between Iceland and the Hebrides, Leith gained a contact 1,200 yards ahead o f SC7, then sighted a hastily submerging U boat and fired three pat­ terns o f depth charges before Asdic contact was lost. Leith’s target had been Bleichrodt's U-48 and, on the basis o f her sighting report, Donitz ordered U-38 (Liebe), U-46 (En­ drass), U-99 (Kretschmer), U-100 (Schepke), U-101 (Frauenheim) and U-123 (Moehle) to converge on the convoy.5* SC7 had comprised 35 ships but, while Leith was attacking U-48, U-124 had found the straggler Trevisa (1,813T), a 25-year-old Canadian Laker unsuited to the North Atlantic. Fourteen survivors were picked up at dawn by KeppelA That afternoon, another U boat was D /Fd west o f Shetland in 60N 15W, in the track of OB228. Later, at 2020/16, an air patrol reported a U boat in 5956N 1500W. This was Korth's U-93 and, at 0217/17, he sank the Norwegian Dokka (1,168T) and Uskbridge (2,1\SV)A Leith, a Grimsby class sloop under Commander Roland Allen, was part of the es­ cort for SC7 In October 1940. Capable of 20 knots and well armed, these 1,000 ton ships appeared to be ideal convoy escorts. But they proved too fragile for the North Atlantic in winter and were employed thereafter on more tem­ perate, stations. Bleichrodt, meanwhile, followed the 34 ships and four escorts of SC7 past Rockall until, at 0400/17, he torpedoed the tanker Languedoc (9,512T), Haspenden (4,678T) and Scoresbj (3,843T).^^ At 0817/17 a Sunderland attacked U-48 in 591 IN 1750W with two depth- 57 Hit by one torpedo, Hurunui sank in 18 minutes, one man dying in the explosion, another drowning while abandon­ ing ship. The other 72 were picked up by SS St Margaret helote being transferred to Fowey. Englishman and Schelde sailed Greenock to British Glory then 30 miles west o f Barra Head. The tanker was beached in Karnes Bay on 18 Oc­ tober, then dry-docked for repairs. Heartsease picked up nine survivors from Thistlegarth on 18 October. The survivors said that another boat containing 29 crew and one gunner was making for the shore. ADM 199 59. ADM 199 372. ADM 199 377. ADM 199 397. ADM 199 1707. Rohwer : 1999. Wynn : 1997. Uqyds War Losses vol.s 1 and 2. 58 Flotillenadmiral Otto Kretschmer recalled the attack on SC7 for the World A t IFar television series, part 10: Ü Boats in the Atlantic 1939-1944. 59 HMCS Ottawa sank Trevisa by gunfire. The survivors were landed at Greenock at 1705/17 by KeppeL ADM 199 372. Uqyds War Losses vol. 1. Rohwer : 1999. 60 Ten died in Dokka and seven survivors were picked up by Folkestone. Uskbridge's boiler exploded and her crew aban­ doned shortly before she sank. ADM 199 1707. Rohwer : 1999. Uqyds WarLossesvol. 1. 6' Langredods 79 crew got away in boats after firing a distress rocket and were picked up by Bluebell. Scortsbfis crew got away in four boats and were picked up at dawn by Bluebell which then closed the still-floating Uinguedoc which was beyond saving and, at 1127/17, Bluebell sank her. ADM 199 121. ADM 199 372. ADM 199 377. ADM 199 1707. Rohwer : 1999. Lund & Ludlam : 1973. Slader : 1988. Uoyds War Losses vol. 1. 97 North Weste rn Approaches charges and a 2501b bomb, and a patch o f oil was seen five minutes after the second attack. The aircraft signalled the position to Scarborough but the response by the escorts was mud­ dled and U-48 got away. The pack attack on SC7 began that evening and first to be hit was Matheran (7,653T), torpedoed and sunk by U-38 (Liebe). Second to go was the Dutch Bilderdijk (6,8561) immediately astern o f Matheran and hit as she altered course to avoid her. Five minutes later the Uganda (4,966T), Montreal for Milford Haven with 2,006 tons o f steel and 6,200 tons of lumber, and immediately astern o f Bilderdijk, was also torpedoed by U-38 A As Whitehall and Arabis swept down the starboard side o f the convoy and Jason swept down between the eighth and ninth columns, the convoy made two emergency turns, first 40° to port, then, at 2155/19, the original course o f 080° was resumed. By 2150/19, however, a steady drizzle had reduced visibility and the tanker Shirak (6,0231) did not see the signal to resume 080° and became separated from the convoy and, at 2235/19, was torpedoed by UA7. Blackfly was picking up Shirak’s crew from three boats at 2326/19 when Shirak was hit by another torpedo, this time from Bleichrodt’s U-48. Lieu­ tenant Commander George Cooper in Sturdy wrote that, '...the torpedoed tanker suddenly blew up and lit up the whole o f the western and northern sky for miles.'*’5 Meanwhile, to the south-east, two tankers, the Swedish Caprella (8,23OT) and Sitala (6,2181) had been torpedoed by U-100. Sitala was Manchester-bound with 8,444 tons o f fuel oil and one o f her 45 crew died. Caprella carried 11,300 tons o f fuel oil and the explo­ sion near the main pumproom on her starboard side amidships broke her back. The star­ board lifeboat was hurled across the deck and smashed, sheets o f flame shot up over the bridge and her bow and stern began to rise as she settled. The Chief Officer was lost, but 52 others were picked up by Lady Elsa.^^ The convoy made another emergency turn 40° to port but Wandby (4,9471) was torpedoed by U-46 (Endrass) at 2322/19. A minute later, another o f Endrass' salvo found the Ruperra (4,5481). Lieutenant Commander Russell in Whitehall heard a heavy explosion at 2326/19 and reported that Ruperra burned fiercely for four hours, 'making the firing o f star shell unnecessary'. At 2337/19 La Estancia (5,1851), Methil-bound with 8,333 tons o f sugar, was sunk by two torpedoes from U-47.^^ Following SC7 inbound was 48-ship HX79 which was joined early on 19 October at 20° W by the escort from OB229- The convoy was attacked that evening by U-38 which sank Matheran (7,653T) and Uganda (4966T) in quick succession. By 0620/20 attacks by four U boats including Prien’s U-47 and Schepke’s U-100 saw twelve ships torpedoed, eleven o f 62 Rohwer credits Prien with the Bilderdi/k, but the KTB derived timings given in Rohwer : 1999 do not correspond with the convoy report In addition, her position in die convoy and the fact that the attack came from the same side and general area, would tend to indicate that liebe was responsible. ADM 199 2057. Rohwer : 1999. 65 Cooper's report and Bkckjljz actions in ADM 199 59. Rohwer : 1999. Utyds WarLossesvol. 1, 64 The trawler put a crew aboard the Sitala at 1200/21 and she got under way, then sank at 0700/22, the volun­ teer crew being rescued by carley float. ADM 199 59. ADM 199 1707. ADM 199 2057. Lund and Ludlam : 1973. 65 Ibid. ADM 199 2057. Rohwer : 1999. 98 North W estern Approaches which, totalling 65,104 GRT and including four tankers, sank. Meanwhile, the escorts were once again reduced to the role o f Hfeboats, picking up survivors. Counter-attacks were im­ peded by the inclusion o f the Dutch submarine 0-14 as part o f the ocean escort and Lieu­ tenant Commander Russell, SO escort in Whitehall, wrote that her presence astern o f the convoy, ‘hindered the escort vessels considerably’.^ ^ One rare counter attack began at 0005/20 when the corvette Hibiscus sweeping down the starboard side o f the convoy gained asdic contact. Depth charges were dropped, but contact was lost.5? Lieutenant Commander Cooper in Sturdy wrote, 'Further attacks were expected on 20* October, but none materialised. A large diversion to the S.E. after dark was an effective counter­ measure.'^^ Operational difficulties meant that only one more large-scale attack was mounted in the North Western Approaches in 1940. This pack attack, on HX90 between 1 and 3 Decem­ ber, left 12 ships totalling 78,316 GRT sunk and one ship of 3,862 tons damaged. Among the losses with HX90 were two tankers and the AMC Fotfar. A week later, Kapitanleutnant Lehmann-Willenbrock in U-96 mounted a lone attack on HX92 west o f the Hebrides, sink­ ing four ships totalling 26,111 GRT and damaging the tanker Cardita (8,237T).'59 Throughout this period, while B-deinst, the German decryption service, had provided ex­ cellent intelligence o f British sailing schedules, U boats were still spending too much time looking for convoys. And open-ocean reconnaissance was something for which U boats, unstable platforms while surface running and with poor height-of-eye, were singularly ill- suited. This wasteful deployment o f scarce assets was only necessary as cooperation from the Luftwaffe in the reconnaissance role was negligible. 66 Sturdy z Lieutenant Commander Cooper wrote that, early in that night's attack, he had seen a submarine off to star­ board of the convoy. 'This looked like 0-141 he wrote, ‘but diere were doubts at the time.’ It is likely tliat this was indeed 0-14 as, after the Shirak was torpedoed, the submarine had turned 90° to starboard and narrowly missed be­ ing rammed by the SS Induna who tliought her hostile. 0-14'z inclusion as part o f tlie ocean escort was ill-advised. ADM 199 59, ADM 199 1707. 67 At 1402/21 Whitehall signalled survivors accounted for from HX79 were, Uganda: three in Whitehall and 38 in Jason; Bilderdijk: 39 in Jason; Whitford Point, tiiree in Sturdj, Buperra: 35 in Coreopsis and two in Courtier, Caprella. 52 in Lady Elsa; Sitala. 43 in Lady Elsa, Janur. 33 in Hibiscus; La Estancia. seven in Courtier, Matheran: two in Loch Lomond since torpedoed. It was separately reported that 37 survivors from Shirak were in Blackjly. ADM 199 59. ADM 199 372. ADM 199 1707. ADM 199 2057. ADM 234 372. Rohwer : 1999. Wynn : 1997. 68 Cooper's report is in ADM 199 59. Sturdy did not long outlast HX79. On 26 October she sailed Londonderry to escort SC8, Shikari and Sturdy searched for the convoy but were unable to find it in appalling weatiier. During the night o f 28-29 October the two destroyers lost sight o f each other and Sturdy was low on fuel, so Cooper turned for home. With a fuU gale blowing, and the ship Hght, speed was reduced to 516 knots. At 0420/30 Sturdy ran ashore on the west side o f Islay. Distress signals were sent, giving the wrong position, and Tobermory Lifeboat found nothing. Five men died taking lines ashore. Cooper was initially cleared o f blame by C-in-C Western Approaches but Their Lordships disagreed stating that he should have established an echo sounder watch and should have requested a D /F fix. An acrimonious exchange o f letters led to a Court Martial at which Cooper was found guilty. ADM 1 11542. Moir & Crawford : 1994 p. 194. 69 ADM 199 377. 99 North Western Approaches L u f t w a f f e O p e r a t io n s o v e r t h e N o r t h W e s t e r n A p p r o a c h e s On 6 January 1941, the Luftwaffe reluctantly handed over control of the Focke Wulf 200s o f 1/KG40 to the Kreigsmarine. In an uncanny parallel with the British dispute over Coastal Command, the Luftwaffe’s maritime capabihty had, by then, been the subject o f a six-year wrangle between Goring and Raeder, with maritime interests invariably coming off worst. Early Luftwaffe interventions against shipping targets around Britain, and Scotland in particular, were poorly directed and httle more than irksome. Then a long-range recon­ naissance wing, 1/KG40, was formed at Merignac in Brittany in July 1940 with the fragile FW200 Kondors, albeit stiU firmly under Luftwaffe control. Two Kondors appeared over the North Channel early on 16 September, one setting the trooper Aska on fire off Rathhn Island, the other damaging City of Mobile A At 1000/8 Oc­ tober a K G /40 Kondor sighted five ships north-west of MaUn Head and attacked the largest of these, the trooper Oronsaj, with four 250kg bombs, one of which hit. Oronsay eventually made the Clyde with four dead and 12 injured. Three weeks later, on 26 October, a Kondor scored one of the most significant anti­ shipping victories during the Battle o f the Atlantic when it set the Canadian Pacific hner Empress of Britain (42,348T) as she approached the North Channel.^’ OB234 was attacked outside Belfast Lough the following day by another Kondor, one ship being damaged, and this aircraft reported that the Empress was StiU burning fiercely throughout her length as it passed.^^ Empress o f Britain, first bombed and set on fire, then torpedoed and sunk, off the North Channel, was the largest Allied merchant ship lost in the war. A Kondor attacked HX84 west o f the North Channel on 8 November, damaging the Empire Dorado (5,595T) which made the Clyde safely, and the Swedish Vingaland (2,734T) which was sunk the following day by the ItaUan U boat Marconi. The coaster Sandra (1,028T) was 70 Eleven o iA skds 186 crew died along with 19 of the 358 French Colonial troops aboard. Survivors were picked up by Hibiscus and Jason, the Dutch MV Princes Irene and several trawlers. The abandoned Aska drifted ashore on Cara Island, still burning, the following day. ADM 199 372. Uqyds War Losses vol.l. Laxon and Perry : 1994 p.l74. 71 Twenty five crew and 20 passengers died, then the gutted derelict was torpedoed and sunk while under tow for the Clyde. ADM 199 372. Seamer : 1990. Uqyds WarLossesvol.!. 72 Uqyds War Losses vol. 2. Allen : 1996. 100 North Western Approaches missed by bombs from a Kondorneat Rathlin on 16 December and the Trevarrack was badly damaged by another Kondor on 29 December. The rescue tug Englishman and the steamer Temple Mead were bombed and sunk near Tory Island on 21 January, all 18 aboard the tug and 14 o f the crew of the Temple Mead died.^5 Two convoys were attacked west o f Islay on the morning o f 28 January and the steamers Pandion and Baron Renfrew were damaged. A Coastal Command Sunderland engaged this Kondor and both aircraft retired damaged. Fur­ ther west, the Grelrosa (4,574T) was sunk by two near misses from another Kondor and five of her crew were lost.^ ** l/KG40’s Fw200C Kon­ dors ought to have played a more signifi­ cant role in the Battle of the Atlantic, but they were all but neutered by a turf war between Donitz and Goring over who should have opera­ tional control over these valuable aircraft The sinking o f the Grelrosa at 15° west was possible only because the Kondors were by then operating from France and Norway, thus affording them a considerably increased operat­ ing range over the Atlantic. This combined with the transfer to Kreigsmarine control meant that the aircraft could be used to gather effective intelligence for U boats in the North Western Approaches. An early example o f this new coordination of effort came when, at 1206/22 February 1941, a Kondor attacked OB288 in the Minch shortly after the convoy had left Loch Ewe. The destroyer Malcolm, leading the escort, reported that no ships were damaged, but the sighting report from the aircraft led to a patrol Une of six U boats being estabUshed across the convoy’s expected Une o f advance. OB288 lost seven ships sunk in the ensuing battle. Prien’s L-47 returned the complement four days later, homing Kondors onto OB290. Two ships were damaged and Holt’s Anchises (10,000T) was sunk with the loss o f 13 crew and three p a s s e n g e r s . ^5 Then, at 1435/2 March 1941, Hurricanes o f 3 Squadron claimed to have damaged a Kondor east o f Sumburgh. But this aircraft reported OB292 west of the North Channel and U-70, U-47, U-95, U-99, U-108 and U-552 were directed to form a patrol Une west o f Rockall across its expected Une o f advance. At 1350/4 a JU88 was intercepted by 253 Squadron six miles south west o f Sumburgh and claimed as damaged. This aircraft reported OB292’s latest position, leading to the repositioning o f the U boat patrol Une formed on 2 March, 75 ADM 199 658. Uqyds WarLossesvol 1. 74 ADM 199 658. Military Archives, Freiburg, RL7 Ic 28/1/41 quoted in Allen : 1996. Uoyds WarLossesvol 1. 75 Ibid. North Western Approaches but the convoy was routed away and not sighted. The U boats did find the following con­ voy OB293, sinking three ships from that convoy and damaging three more."^ *^ Cooperation between the Luftwaffe and U boats in the North Western Approaches was never properly exploited and, from April 1941, losses of fragile Kondors began to mount. On 18 April Kondor F8+AB attacked OB346 and hit Pilar de Laringa with one bomb, but the ship’s gunners returned fire and the aircraft crashed. l/K G 40 ’s Staffelkapitan Fleigel was a serious loss as he had been continuously in action against Allied shipping since the unit moved to Bordeaux in July 1940.'^’^ B a l a n c e Sh e e t in t h e N o r t h W e s t e r n A p p r o a c h e s 1 9 4 0 The first table below gives sinkings, due to enemy air and U boat activity, in Scottish coastal waters and the North Western Approaches, o f ships o f all nations during the last seven months of 1940 when the trade war was at its most intense o ff the Hebrides. It in­ cludes data on sinkings o f AMCs, principally as the loss o f tliese ten large liners, ideal troopships as they were, would have serious consequences in 1942 and thereafter. Merchant Ship s o f all nations 1940 Number sunk Gross Tonnage June 8 30,274 ' J«iy 19 100,343August 42 211,559 September 53 265,772 October 65 ^ 336,970 November 35 147,431 December 23 142,298 Tota l 245 1,235,347 Royal Navy A M C s__ Number sunk3 . . 3 A ' 10 GrossJTonnage " "51 ,273 — — . ± . . 10,552 "447202 LS,402 143,807 J Included in the above are 67 non-British flagged vessels weighing in at 250,753 GRT sunk in Scottish coastal waters and the North Western Approaches during this period, among them 17 Norwegians, 14 Swedes, 10 Dutchmen and 13 Greek vessels. This table gives data on British-flagged tonnage only. 1940 June _ÎÂ_Au gu s t___ September October British flagged ships sunk in NWA 16 Total of British flagged ships swik " "67......... 68 28 41 November December Total 45 25 16 178 52eC 68 ' 63 467 %age of total sunk lost inNm __ " i0%' 7 7" 47%""Y^% " 66%...... British tonnage sunk in NWA 2^168 ” 25% 38% 92,259 162.742^ 221J20 "250,758 115 ,298 Total British flagged tonnage lost 283,400 275,700 279,100 “3247800 302,400 113,249 984,594 313,100 257,400 2,035,900 %age of British tonnage sunk lost ioNWA ' 9^ " ......." 333^ " 60% 6 ^ % 8^ 37% " "4 3% ' ’ " 48% ! Principal sources; Various ADM and AIR series files. Rohwer : 1999. Statistical Digest of The \ IP’grHMSO 1955 table 158. L.lqyds War Losses vol.s 1 and 2. Both tables demonstrate the intensity o f the trade war o ff Scotland and in the North Western Approaches that followed on the German acquisition o f French U boat bases 76 AIR 25 250. ADM 199 397. Rohwer ; 1999. Dunnett : 1960 p. 77. JJojds Warhossesvolz 1 and 2. 77 Ramsay et al. : 1985. 102 North Western Approaches and Norwegian air bases. During the last seven months o f 1940 almost half the total sinkings o f British shipping due to enemy action took place either in Scottish waters or west o f the Hebrides and North Channel. This war o f attrition peaked in October with the battles around HX77, OB227, SC7 and HX79 when over 80% o f total British ton­ nage sunk was lost in the North Western Approaches. GREENLAND HX72 OA232C SL44A^ OA205 J BAY OF BISCAY t l r + : r ; - r I T - : - r m - iT T I The principal convoy attacks off Scotland and in the North W estern Ap­ proaches, September to D ecem ber 1940. Sustained actions against convoys are shown as solid lines along its general line of advance. Air attacks are shown in red and italic type. Losses at this level could not be sustained, but neither could the level o f effort put in by the U boats in that month. November gales, crew exhaustion and poor U boat ser­ viceability brought a respite for the British. Then, perceiving that convoys were being routed further north and that the British seaborne and airborne A /S forces were be­ coming more o f a threat in the North Western Approaches, from November 1940 Donitz began moving the U boat operational area north and then west, first beyond 15° 103 North Western Approaches west and then, in April 1941, to the Newfoundland Bank.^* But this brought its own prob­ lems. By early 1941 there were fewer operational U boats available than there had been at the outbreak o f war and, when these went to sea, they were operating further from base and in far more inhospitable conditions. Then there was the difficulty o f finding convoys when Luftwaffe co-operation was minimal.’^ For the British, pack attacks, and the resultant shipping losses at the end o f 1940, came as a severe shock, but, as Padfield observes, ‘...in November 1940 a minor revolution in method was in t r a in .L e s s o n s were being learned, or, more to the point, expensively re­ learned. There was a clear need for more effective central control of the anti-U-boat war to ensure the best use o f scarce resources both in hardware and intelligence. Ports had to work more efficiently, turnaround times had to be reduced and ships, once at sea, had to be properly protected. Aircraft capable o f longer range and armed with effective radar and weapons were needed, though had there been a staff history o f the 1914-18 trade war, the effectiveness o f aircraft against submarines would have been readily apparent. In the intelligence field, and thanks to the work o f its Submarine Tracking Room which had begun hypothesising future U boat dispositions using direction-finding and traffic analysis o f then stüi undecrypted Kreigsmarine signals®^ by the end o f 1940 the Admiralty Operational Intelligence Centre had begun diverting convoys away from known concentra­ tions o f U boats.®2 It was also apparent that, to counter the wolfpack, escort vessels must be trained and organised to operate as a group, using synchronized tactics that whenever possible, should also inviolve aircraft. ASV and surface ship radar, albeit primitive and un­ reliable, was coming forward, as was VHP radio equipment which allowed greater coordi­ nation between escort vessels themselves and between escort vessels and aircraft. The first escort groups began forming at Greenock, Londonderry and Liverpool in Octo­ ber 1940 and, as we shall now see, Scotland’s role in working up the new escort groups, and in developing new A /S tactics, was crucial. Further, as wül be demonstrated later in this chapter, Scotland played a significant role in the naval intelligence war and in the air war against the U boats, and the role o f her main port complex on the River Clyde was crucial to the eventual Allied victory. ™ Roskill : 1960 The N a^ at Warp. 93. The U Boat Warm the Atlantic HMSO vol. 1 pp. 57-58, 62-64 and 73. Padfield : 1995 p. 101-120. van der Vat : 1988 pp. 254-259. *0 Padfield : 1995 p. 104. German Naval Enigma signals were not decrypted with any useful currency until April 1941. See section below enti­ tled Scotland’s Tart in Breaking Enigma. 82 Padfield 1995 pp. 103-104. 104 North Western Approaches HM S W e s t e r n Is l e s - E s c o r t G r o u p T r a i n i n g Losses in the Atlantic convoys at the end o f 1940 had exposed serious shortcomings in the training and tactics of the naval escorts which, as described above, often found themselves reduced to the role o f lifeboats, picking up survivors from sunken merchant ships they were seemingly powerless to protect. But the interwar years had seen the Royal Navy’s anti-submarine warfare branch starved o f resources. Excessive faith was placed in Asdic and A /S personnel were derided as ‘Fingers’ a soubriquet derived from the heterodyne pinging employed in Asdic to make the system audible to the human ear. Restrictions on fuel consumption had meant that A /S warfare exercises were conducted around well- rehearsed fleet manoeuvres rather than ill-disciplined merchant convoys. A /S attacks prac­ tised then were designed to counter the established British submarine tactics and British submariners who proposed night attacks on shipping were ignored. Such was the shortage o f escorts and trained personnel to man them when war broke out, at first there was no time to develop effective countermeasures to the U boat threat. In April 1940, First Sea Lord Dudley Pound instructed 62-year-old retired Admiral Gilbert Stephen­ son to set up a training establishment for British and French escort vessels at Lorient in France. By July, however, with the enemy lodged across the Enghsh Channel, too close for comfort to existing naval establishments in southern England, Stephenson set up shop at Tobermory on the Isle of MuU.®^ Tobermory offered a large, sheltered anchorage close to the railhead at Oban, with easy access to the sea. Above all, however, there the business of training could be conducted well away from possible enemy interference. While elements o f the Tobermory syllabus would be instantly familiar to present-day Royal Navy sea trainees, from the first Stephenson had to adapt pre-war sea training to take ac­ count o f dilution by hostilities-only personnel. Nothing was taken for granted and every aspect o f the newly commissioned ship’s capability from machinery, navigation, ship- handling and administration to weapons and sensor systems came under scrutiny. In the case o f a corvette, for example, Stephenson and his staff had just 16 days to turn the ship into an effective fighting unit capable o f working as part o f an escort group. So there was no time, as Baker notes in his biography o f Stephenson, for emphasis on Naval traditions so much a part of peacetime tra in ing .S tephenson said, I decided we must have priorities — and my number one priority was Spirit this was the first essential, the determination to win. Next came Discipline: it is no good being the finest men in the world if you are not going to obey orders. T)îàx.à—Administration: making sure the work of the ship was evenly di- 88 Signal in ADM 1 13255 dated 11 July 1940 from Admiralty to Cs-in-C, Captain A /S /W et al: Arcangements have been made for tlie A/S working up practices of newly commissioned ships to be carried out at Tober­ mory under the orders of Commodore Stephenson, who will be accommodated on shore at first and shortly in HMS Western which has been fitted out as an A/S training ship. Hunt class destroyers will however continue to work up at Scapa for the present. 8“^ For Western Isles syllabus, see ADM 199 1729. 105 North Western Approaches vided; that meals were in the right place at the right time; that the whole organisation of the ship was both stable and elastic. Then, lastly — and this may surprise you — lastly. Technique — how to use the equipment. That would have been quite useless unless the spirit was right in the first place.®^ The first fall day began with an inspection of the ship by Stephenson and his staff, then as many of her crew as could be spared went ashore for a film, aptly titled Escort Teams A t Work to reflect the teamwork-based approach, and a pep-talk by Stephenson. The rest of that day, and the ensuing four days were taken up with intensive training in basic seaman­ ship, boatwork, signaUing, gunnery, depth charge and hedgehog drills, radar and A /S war­ fare instruction. On day six, ships sailed from Tobermory for two days o f exercises with a submarine which had been relegated to training duties or a newly commissioned boat itself working up. Boarders were repelled, navigators worked out search patterns, engineering staff reacted to a series o f notional disasters and seamen practised HAGGIS, the Tober­ mory-devised drill for boarding a surfaced U boat, trapping her crew inside and towing it to port.® ^Two further days o f harbour training were followed by three days o f A /S exer­ cises in the Minches, the ships anchoring for the night in Loch Lathaich, then three more days at Tobermory which included night firing practice. His staff may have missed little, but Stephenson’s primary concern throughout was the ba­ sic procedural training o f the men who would fight the ship, namely the A /S warfare com­ mand team and specialist weapons ratings. The programme was intensive, though not to the point of crew exhaustion, and one who went through the Tobermory scheme recalled how: .. .every moment was packed with tension and exertion. Damage control crews leamt the position of every valve so that they could be located blindfolded in the total darkness of a closed compartment below the waterline. Gun’s crews learnt to get off six broadsides in thirty seconds, on a rolling wet deck with another turret firing over there heads. Towing warps were rigged and taken over to ‘damaged’ flotilla mates in sea boats under oars. Steer­ ing engines broke down. AH electrical circuits failed. The cypher officer lost his cypher books. The galley stove was put out of action. High pressure hoses knocked ammunition parties off their feet. The ship’s boats fell off their davits. Heavy depth charges were manhandled flom ship to ship. Lad­ ders between decks went missing. . ..Fire in the Transmitting Station. Fire Number One thrower set to shallow. Torpedo starboard! Lower the port seaboat. Rig scrambling nets. Clear lower deck, hoist the starboard whaler. Wire round the port screw. Ship not answering her helm, - head paying off to starboard. Stream a fog buoy. Echo-sounding broken down, take a sounding with lead line and report the nature o f the bottom. Depth charge adrift on the port side aft. Doctor required for an emergency operation on another ship. Rum jars broached by a near miss, what’s your first action? Periscope to starboard. How far? Thirty yards. Open fire! Five rounds bearing green five-oh.. .And when you’ve done that lot and are climbing into your hammock - Get out and do it again, but this time faster. You heard the pipe, get fell in .,. For the young recruit who had just completed his three months’ shore training, it might have seemed that the instructors were being unnecessarily bloody-minded, but at this stage of the war there were enough people around who had seen and heard a tanker go up in a sheet of flame, or had been picked out of a freezing bog of oil fuel on a dark Atlantic night, to convince him that the effort was worthwhile.®^ By early 1943, with the convoy battles in the Atlantic and Arctic reaching a crescendo, To- 85 Baker ; 1972 p. 121. 86 Operation HAGGIS described in Bum : 1998 p. 192 fn. 17. 87 Bum : 1998 pp. 13-14. i 06 North Western Approaches bermory was working at full capacity. That January, the Director of Anti-Submarine War­ fare noted that, while Fleet destroyers were working up at Scapa Flow and Western Ap­ proaches destroyers were working up at Londonderry; Tobermory is the only working-up base available for new construction and recommissioned sloops, corvettes, trawlers, whalers and yachts and it is considered that, in general, these are in more need of concentrated working up than are destroyers.®® Sloops and frigates were coming forward in large numbers, then destroyers began arriving at Tobermory due to a lack o f facilities at Londonderry and Scapa but a lack of berthing space and staff meant that Stephenson had to turn them away. As Stephenson wrote on 2 February 1943, If, for instance, Tobermory has a full complement of vessels working up, including trawlers and whalers, and a signal is received requesting that a destroyer be accepted for a week’s work up, West­ ern Isles has no option but to decline. This means that time, energy and space is being devoted to the working up of a trawler or whaler whose duties may be confined to escorting coastal convoys or the defence of Reykjavik harbour, in preference to a destroyer or corvette who may be required for the escort of ocean convoys, on the safe arrival of which out victory in this war is so largely dependent.®^ First Lord A. V. Alexander suggested cutting the training programme but the reaction of the Director of Minesweeping was typical. He wrote that he, .. .would view with horror any relaxation of the already scanty training of A/S and M/S vessels.^ Stephenson suggested that Loch Lathaich on the Ross o f Mull some three miles east o f the Sound of Iona, already in use by Western Isles as an anchorage, should be developed with facilities ashore at Bunessan. While Tobermory could deal with 240 vessels annually, the addition o f Loch Lathaich would increase this to 350. But the scheme was abandoned in August 1943 when it was found that it would cost /[100,000 and take nine months to com­ plete. A former Coastal Forces establishment at Stornoway was about to be vacated and offered facilities in place. HMS Mentor^ the Stornoway base, commissioned on 14 Decem­ ber 1943 under Commander D. M. Cann whom Stephenson seconded from Tobermory. Mentor was mainly to work up corvettes and smaller craft, leaving Western Isles free to con­ centrate on corvettes, frigates and Western Approaches destroyers. In addition to existing exercise areas west o f Mull, two new exercise areas, necessarily also submarine sanctuaries, were established in the Minch. Area A for daylight exercises lay be­ tween Stornoway and Lochinver and Area B for night exercises stretched south from Rubha Reidh into the Sound of Raasay. Here ships exercised their AA guns in close range work against kite targets towed by an ML, submarines acted as radar and asdic targets and 8® ADM 1 13255. 89 Ibid. 90 Ibid. 91 There were teething problems at Mentor as, when the base commenced operations on HMS Pluc^ on 16 December, there was no Gunnery Officer, other key personnel had not arrived, only two obsolete radar sets were available for instruction and ammunition was in short supply. ADM 1 13255. 107 ... . North Western Approaches MLs played the part o f E boats.^^ As Coastal Command’s Sunderlands began operating from Lough Erne in Northern Ire­ land in 1941 and long-range, shore-based aircraft began operating from airfields in the Outer Hebrides in 1942, so RAF Oban was relegated increasingly to a training role. On 17 May 1942 Wing Commander Tom Moseley met Stephenson at Tobermory to set up a pro­ gramme o f joint exercises involving aircraft from Oban and ships from Western Isles and Mentor. The first exercise took place two days later when 228 Squadron Sunderlands carried out radar approaches and dummy attacks on a submarine and escort vessels west o f lona.^^ The diminutive Stephenson was a larger than life character and his dynamism and eccen­ tricities are legendary, so perhaps it was inevitable that his personal achievements at To­ bermory would be overshadowed by anecdote. Western Isles and Mentor were in a difficult position in that, geographically at least, they came under Flag Officer Greenock, but in many respects Stephenson was directly responsible to the Director o f A /S Warfare at the Admiralty, and C-in-C Western Approaches. Stephenson used this to his advantage, gain­ ing a great deal o f independence as a result, but his unconventional, forthright approach exasperated fellow officers and often got him into hot water. '^^ At 2201/20 October 1944, Stephenson signalled C-in-C Western Approaches Max Horton: H1VIS Clover the thousandth vessel to be worked up at Tobermory sailed at 2200 today. Horton replied: Hearty congratulations on the thousandth vessel. The unique methods o f training employed and die high standards you have set have been o f the utmost value in defeating the U-boat and preserving the old traditions. HELEN OF TROY’s historic achievement was no greater although possibly gained with considerably less effort.^® Mentor h&d to pay off on 15 November 1944 when the submarine sanctuaries in the Minch were closed after U boats began operating close inshore off the west o f Scotland.®* ^ But training at Tobermory continued after the end o f the war in Europe with sloops and Bay class frigates being prepared for service in the Pacific. In all, 911 ships had passed through Western Isles by the time it closed, some o f them more than once. Start hay^ her crew the last o f 1,139 to work up at Western Isles, sailed on 30 September 1945 and the base paid off on 5 November. By that time Stephenson had gone, his departure marked by 560 signals of thanks from ships that had worked up at Tobermory and Stornoway. 92 Ibid. 93 Two months later, on 25 August 1942, Moseley died when a 228 Squadron Sunderland taking the Duke o f Kent from Invergordon to Iceland crashed in Caithness. AU aboard the aircraft except for tail gunner Sergeant Andrew Jack were kiUed. AIR 15 656 for the joint exercises. AJier The Battle magazine no. 37 for the Sunderland crash. 94 ADM 1 12817 for successive interventions by Admirals Noble and Horton in 1942 and 1943 respectively. 95 ADM 1 13255. 96 The closure o f Mentor did not take place due to a faU-off in demand, as stated by Goldrick in his paper (Chapter 12 Work Up) on Tobermory and other training in The Battle of the Atlantic 1939-1945 — 56<^> Anniversaiy International Naval Conference. Stephen Howarth and Derek Law (ed.s) published by Greenhill Books in 1994. 108 North Western Approaches Tobermory and Stornoway provided sea training designed to weld an escort’s crew into an effective fighting unit, and worked escorts together in groups under conditions as close as possible to those they were to meet with the convoys. Meanwhile, at Campbeltown, the A /S Training Flotilla based at HMS Nimrod gave officers and specialist ratings training in the use of asdic and radar equipment. The Nimrod syllabus was biased towards tactical A /S training in the most effective deployment o f sensor arrays and weapons systems and the Campbeltown training staff establishment at 49 officers and 442 ratings was considerably larger than that at T o b e rm o ry .In late 1943, the Campbeltown fiotilla comprised 14 vessels including the large, modern A /S yacht Shemara, two elderly ex-French torpedo boats and several ancient trawlers. But the older vessels did not behave like modern escorts, having neither the turning circle, speed, acceleration or layout, and all but Sbemara and the yacht StModwen were fitted with obsolete A /S equipment. The older vessels were also unreliable, being defective as much as 60% of the time.^® The flotilla was re-equipped early in 1944 to include two destroyers fitted, like Sbemara and St Modwen, with Type 145 asdics and up-to-date radar, and four corvettes. Six trawlers fitted with earlier Type 123 and Type 127 asdics were retained for RN Patrol Service training. A steady stream o f worked-up ships and trained personnel were coming forward from To­ bermory, Stornoway and Campbeltown, and escort and support groups based at Greenock, Londonderry and Liverpool were practising new tactics developed at sea and at the West­ ern Approaches Tactical Unit in Liverpool. From late 1941 there was an ever-increasing emphasis on group training, that is training the escort group to operate as a team, all doing the same thing at the same time in response to an attack and with the minimum of sig­ nalled instructions. But, as we shall see later in this chapter, arguably the principal weapon in the A /S armoury would always be air cover. S c o t l a n d ’s P a r t i n B r e a k i n g E n i g m a As Sebag-Montefiore rightly points out in his book on Enigma, the cryptanalysts at Bletchley Park who broke the German Naval codes could have done little without the Brit­ ish seamen who, at great risk to themselves, captured manuals and codebooks. And, from February 1940, Naval forces based in Scotland played a central role in successive ‘pinches’ o f Enigma intelligence material. 97 The Tobetmoiy establishment was 230 all ranks. ADM 112918. ADM 113255. 98 Tliis meant that numerous extra engineering staff were required to keep the ships at sea, thus contributing to the high complement maintained at Campbeltown. The two French TBDs 1m Cordelien and L,’Ineomprise, though 40% and 30% defective, still required 66 personnel each to keep them available for day running. This was at a time when, for example, Combined Operations was desperate for such personnel to man its assault craft and it was this need to release manpower that principally drove the decision to modernise the flotilla. ADM 1 12918. 99 Ibid. too Sebag-Montefiore : 2000. 109 North Western Approaches U-33 was laying mines in the Clyde at 0300/12 February 1940 when lookouts in the mine­ sweeper Gleaner spotted her on the surface south o f Arran. Kapitanleutnant Hans von Dre- sky dived but Gleaner gained asdic contact and fired a pattern o f four depth charges. Von Dresky ordered \J-33 to the bottom and Lieutenant Commander Hugh Price in Gleaner turned figure eights overhead while the throwers were reloaded. At 0501/12 Gleaner dropped a pattern at slow speed and, at 0522/12, the badly damaged \3-33 was seen on the surface. Price ordered gun action and turned to ram in position 150° Pladda 4.& miles. Five rounds were fired then, at 0530/12, the U boat scuttled. Gleaneris boats rescued nine and the naval trawler Kingston picked up 22, o f whom 20 later died. Fishing trawlers picked up ten, two of whom died. Survivors revealed that U-33*s first lay o f five mines had been completed near the Mull o f Kintyre. Von Dresky, who did not survive, had distributed rotors for U-33's Enigma encyphering machine among his crew with orders that they be ditched when the sailors went over the side. But three rotors were discovered in the pocket o f one survivor and sent to Bletchley Park. U~33’s rotors gave British cryptanalysts the wiring pattern for two o f the eight rotors used by Kreigsmarine signallers, but they did not provide the decisive breakthrough that would allow Naval Enigma to be read. Documents taken from the German patrol trawler Polares o ff Norway on 26 April 1940, and brought back to Scapa Flow, provided a limited break into Enigma, but a breakthrough would not come for almost a year^^i During CLAYMORE, the March 1941 Combined Operations raid on the Lofoten Islands launched from Scotland and described in detail in Chapter Five, a boarding party from the destroyer Somali took Enigma settings for the Home Waters network valid for February 1941 from the German trawler Krehbs. These allowed February messages to be decrypted, and, consequentially, the reconstruction o f the all-important bigram tables which indicated message settings to the recipient. On 9 May 1941, in what has become arguably the most famous naval operation o f the war, U-flO was captured along with a complete Enigma and a treasure trove of supporting documents. U-110 sank under tow, but the hoard o f Enigma material, which filled two packing cases and included a full set o f bigram tables and an Offif^/-equipped U-247 heading for the Butt o f Lewis was one o f the first boats out. 143 Pof the Mitte Gruppe see The U boat War in the Atlantic HMSO vol. 3 pp. 55-56, 59 and 69. See also Padfield ; 1985 p. 424. For 333 Squadron, see AIR 27 1731 and Wynn : 1998. 144 U-990 was sunk by a 59 Squadron Liberator west o f Trondheim on 5 June. Fifty-one survivors from both crews were picked up by V-5901. Wynn : 1998 p. 207. Rohwer and Hummelchen : 1974 p. 415. 145 XJ-675 and U-292 both carried crews o f 51 and all were lost Wynn : 1998. Roskill ; 1960 voL p. 261. 146 Flight Lieutenant Sherman was immediately awarded a DFC on his return to Wick, Two days later, again on patrol from Wick, his crew reported a U boat, then were never heard from again. 147 jJ-998 was in such a bad way that she had to be scrapped. AIR 27 1731. AIR 41 74. Wynn : 1997. 146 Two airmen had died by the time they were picked up by an HSL 21 hours later. Flight Lieutenant Homell was awarded a posthumous VC. The five survivors were awarded one DSO, two DFC and one DFM. Wynn : 1998. 149 Around 30 seamen were seen swimming, but ah 52 aboard U-478 were lost AIR 41 74. Wynn : 1998. 150 BdU KTB quoted In AIR 41 74. 122 North Western Approaches But passages were slow as, armed with excellent and early intelligence o f enemy move­ ments, Coastal Command responded by giving close air support to shipping in danger ar­ eas, flying patrols over areas where U boats were known to be operating and patrolling the Northern Transit Area which gave access to the Atlantic from Norway. From 27 June, all U boats on Mitte patrol, in the Northern Transit Area and off British shores were ordered to submerge by day and only schnorchelhy night, thus greatly slowing their progress. To meet the increased U boat threat in the north, a gradual reinforcement o f 18 Group, which included the transfer o f Scottish airfields to Coastal Command, had began early in July 1944, with the arrival of 206 Squadron Liberators at Leuchars and detachments o f 59 and 120 Liberators Squadrons at Tain. While some aircraft were subsequently transferred back to 15 and 19 Groups to deal with attempted U boat incursions to the South Western Approaches, Coastal Command’s U boat war would now principally be fought in the area bounded by Shetland, Iceland and Norway, and controlled from the Combined HQ at Pitreavie. And, in a move presaged by the patrols in THE MOORINGS in 1943, Western Ap­ proaches Command allocated surface Support Groups to Pitreavie to work with aircraft. By the end o f 1944, 18 Group had eight squadrons with 107 aircraft to cover the Northern Transit Area and inshore patrols around Scotland. For convoy escort duty and A /S patrols around Ireland and west o f the Hebrides, 15 Group had seven squadrons with a total of 111 aircraft. And, with the largest volume o f ocean traffic by then restored to the South Western Approaches, 19 Group covering this area had lOVz squadrons with 147 aircraft. [7-77/, inbound from Mitte duty, was unsuccessfully attacked off Bergen by Liberator Q /206 on 13 July, then, off Bergen at 0900/15 July, U-317 was attacked by Liberator E/206. Both aircraft and U boat were lost in this action at a total cost o f 60 lives. U-299 was damaged by R/206 that same night, then Mosquito L/333 strafed and damaged U-994, again off Bergen and, on 18 July, K /333 damaged U-286 close inshore o ff Stadlandet. With the vulnerability of the Mitte boats all too clear, BdU bowed to the inevitable and began withdrawing the patrols. Three non-Mitte U boats, U-863, U-244 and U-865 were also dam­ aged by patrols from Scotland in July, the first two by 333 Squadron Mosquitoes from Leuchars, the latter by an 86 Squadron Liberator from Tain. Unable in 1955 to give credit for its efficiency to Enigma decrypts, the staff history notes: Considering that, during July, only 18 U boats were at sea in N o. IB Group’s area, it speaks well for the efficiency o f air patrol that ten o f them were sighted and eight attacked resulting in one being sunk and six damaged sufficiently to compel a return to harbour. Only one U boat (U-8SS) cleared through into tire Atlantic.^®® 151 A daily run of 30-40 miles was average under schnorchel conditions. AIR 41 74 p. 19. 152 AIR 41 74 pp. 192-193. 153 Ibid. p. 55. 23 North Western Approaches Further reinforcements to 18 Group in August 1944 included 311 (Czech) Liberator Squadron moved to Tain, 422 and 423 Squadron Sunderlands to Sullom Voe along with a detachment of 202 Squadron’s Catalinas. The Wellingtons o f 407 Squadron moved to Wick while 162’s Cansos went to Iceland, and 58 Halifax Squadron moved to Stornoway. During August, some 4,373 hours were flown in the northern area, but only nine U boats were sighted, six were attacked and one was damaged. One aircraft. Mosquito E /333, was lost. By 31 August, eight U boats had passed through the Northern Transit Area unscathed, and another 11 were then passing through. The schnorchel was proving its worth in open waters, particularly now that U boat crews were learning how to use it in relatively bad weather. Meanwhile, BdU’s response to the Normandy invasion had been a costly and demoralising failure for its increasingly inexperienced crews. Nineteen U boats were lost in the English Channel and 16 in the Bay of Biscay by the end of August when the Biscay bases, and Channel operations were abandoned."'^ But the schnorchel allowed BdU to place U boats close inshore off the Scottish coast, into the area patrolled jointly by Coastal’s aircraft and the Navy’s Support Groups under the Combined FIQ at Pitreavie. T h e S c h n o r c h e l a n d t h e e n d o f S c o t l a n d ’s U b o a t W a r Sufficient schnorchel boats were coming forward by the end o f August to mount patrols north o f the Minch, in the North Channel and in the Moray Firth."® First in this new series and one o f the first boats equipped with schnorchel, Kapitanleutnant von Matuschka’s U- 482, reached the North Channel on 27 August 1944 and, at 1544/30, attacked the five-ship Loch Ewe section o f CU36 west o f Islay. The convoy had no air escort and, hit by a tor­ pedo, the American tanker Jacksonville (10,448T) with 14,300 tons o f petrol was instantly a mass o f flame."® An A /S sweep was mounted by Coastal Command and Force 33 from the Clyde led by the frigate Helmsdale with the destroyer Ambuscade and the corvettes Oxford Castle and Hurst Castle. Early on 1 September, Liberator Q /120 reported the dim outline o f a surfaced U boat in poor visibility off Islay. Force 33 closed the area and, at 0825/1, Hurst Castle was hit by an acoustic torpedo from U-482 and sank in just six minutes. One hun­ dred and five survivors were picked up by Helmsdale.'^ '^^ U-482 stayed west o f Islay and, at 0020/3, sank the Norwegian collier Ejordheim (4,115T) in ONS251, killing three o f her 38 crew."® At 0355/8 September lookouts in HMCS Dunver escorting FIXF305, sighted two flashes in the convoy. Once again, Matuschka had waited 154 Padfield ; 1995 p. 431. 155 The U boat War in The AtlanticHMSiO vol. 3 p. 80. 156 Two of her 78 crew survived and were landed at lisahally by the destroyer USS Toole. Rohwer : 1999. ADM 217 685. ADM 199 1392. Information from Tlieron P. Snell. 157 AIR 41 74. ADM 217 685. ADM 199 1392. Wynn : 1997. Rohwer : 1999. 158 Ibid. 124 North Western Approaches until the convoy was at its most vulnerable while splitting into Loch Ewe and Nortli Channel sections before attacking. Hit by two homing torpedoes, the tanker Empire Heritage (15,702T) sank in minutes. The rescue ship Pinto (1,346T) stopped to pick survivors, but was herself torpedoed and sunk. U-482 got clear and was detected homeward bound on 11 September."® Matuschka’s sinkings stirred up a hornet’s nest o f A /S activity in the North Channel and, early on 4 September, Sunderland H /330 had just left convoy UR134 off the Butt o f Lewis to return to Sullom Voe when it picked up a radar contact. The dim outline o f a surfaced U boat appeared, then the aircraft came under fire and the U boat, probably U-484 which followed U-482 into the North Channel, disappeared. On 9 September, the frigates Porchester Castle and Helmsdale found U-484 and attacked with squid and depth- charges until oil, wreckage and human remains surfaced at 1145/9."® In the Northern Transit Area, 18 Group flew 8,526 hours during September, but U boat traffic was slight. Two U boats were lost and one damaged. U-867 was attacked by a 248 Squadron Mosquito on 18 September, and probably damaged, as the next day she was caught on the surface off Stadlandet, apparently unable to dive, by a 224 Squadron Libera­ tor and appeared to scuttle."^ U-1228 was damaged by a 224 Squadron Liberator on 18 September and U-855 disappeared, possibly having struck a mine in the Iceland-Faroe Is­ lands passage. U boat pens at Bergen were attacked by Bomber Command on 4 and 28 October and four U boats were wrecked. U-1006, first reported by Coastal Command patrols north o f Shetland on 13 and 14 August while bound for the North Channel, was caught on the surface and sunk by the Canadian frigate Annan and EG6 west of Shetland on 16 October. U-1004 was strafed in Bergenfjord by Mosquito E /333 on 23 October, but escaped undamaged and, early on 29 October, two 311 Squadron Liberators wrecked U-1060 which had been run ashore during an attack by FAA aircraft the day before. U-1061 was heavily damaged in attacks by 407 and 224 Squadron aircraft on 31 October. On 1 November, the British frigate Whittaker was damaged by a torpedo from U-483 north o f Malin Head."^ West of Shetland, a U boat was reported by Sunderland G /330 from Sullom Voe at 2157/24 November. EG17 was di- 159 One hundred and thirty-four died in the double sinking. This incident generated controversy when it was discov­ ered that Pinto had D /Fd a transmission from U-482 at 2259/7. Tliis had been reported to SO Escort Group C5 Commander George Stephen RCNR in Dmvsr, but he omitted to pass this on to Western Approaches Command. When the attack took place, Stephen ordered a ‘Pineapple’ counter attack but Max Horton condemned this as un­ suitable, being designed to deal with a pack attack rather than an single U boat. Horton wanted Stephen sacked, but Commodore (D) George 'Shrimp' Simpson at Londonderry spoke up for him. U-482 is believed to have been lost in a deep minefield off the North Channel on or around 7 December 1944. ADM 1 16168. The Battle of The Atlantic and Signals Intelligence p. 450. Wynn : 1997. Rohwer : 1999. See also Schofield ; 1968. 160 AIR 41 74 p. 86. ADM 199 1392. ADM 199 2062. The Battle ofThe Atlantic and Signals Intelligence p. 450-452. 161 AIR 41 74. Wynn ; 1998. 162 Wynn : 1998. The Battle of The Atlantic and Signals Intelligence p. 469. 25 North Western Approaches rected to the area and, at 0300/25, HMS Ascension sank U-322 with all her 52 crew."® In an effort to deal with the Allied carriers sweeps that had been causing considerable dis­ ruption to German coastal convoys off Norway (see Chapter Six), BdU ordered U boats to Scapa in the hope o f sinking the carriers as they passed in or out. U-775 was sailed Bergen on 18 November and was ordered to Hoy Sound, but the 19" Escort Group were already on an A /S sweep of the area. The destroyer Bullen was seven miles north of Strathy Point at 0948/6 when a torpedo from U-775 broke her back."^ Assisted by Sunderland Y/201, Goodall, Loch Insh and Antigua swept along the coast and attacked a contact north of Tongue, bringing up splintered wood, wreckage and oil at 1130A/6. Initially thought to mark the end of U-775, it was discovered post-war that U-297 had also been ordered to the Hoy Channel only to blunder into the A /S sweep."® The prefebrication of Loch class frigates, like Loch Insh (above) which was involved in the destruction of U-297 off Cape Wrath, was pioneered on the Clyde. A specialist team of 30 naval architects was installed in Glasgow and created designs based around 1,300 compos­ ite parts which could be prepared outside the shipyards, thus easing the demand for yard space. The lead yard was John Brown’s at Clydebank and ship sections were prekibricated off site by, for example, Motherwell Bridge Engineering Ltd. Cheap to produce, seaworthy and well-armed, these modern escorts were manpower efficient. This was welcome as, from 1943, the Royal Navy, like the other services from 1944, was coming up against a manpower shortage at all levels. None of the 50 U boats passing through the Northern Transit Area in December 1944 were sighted by Coastal Command. The only confirmed sighting in coastal waters cane on 31 December. U-1021 had been ordered south to attack convoys in the Moray Firth and, at 1030/11 January, Liberator A /224 sighted smoke and the wake o f a schnorchel north of Banff. The wake and smoke stopped as the aircraft turned to attack, so no attack could be 165 AIR 41 74 p. 103. Wynn ; 1997. The Battle of The Atlantic and Signals Intelligence p. 496. 164 Goodall dropped her whaler to pick up survivors, but it was swamped and two Goodall ratings and at least two of Bulletin survivors were lost. Four officers and 93 ratings survived. The Enquiry criticised disorganisation in Bullen, in particular the fact that, despite U boats being known to be in the area, all her officers with the exception of the Sub Lieutenant OOW were in the wardroom for a conference about a forthcoming inspection. The Enquiry also noted poor damage control and that injured men were abandoned below in the rush to abandon ship. ADM 1 18039. 165 U-775 escaped and returned to Bergen on 21 December. BdU listed U-297 as missing on 3 January 1945. Her wreck was found and identified by divers in May 2000. ADM 199 1392. Roskill : 1961 vol. 2 p. 164. 26 North Western Approaches made.i®® As the Coastal Command staff history notes ruefully: The U boat war had gradually changed since August 1944 into a condition o f stalemate in the inshore operational areas and a state o f frustration in the transit areas.. .Both sides had made technical ad­ vances which tended to cancel each other out. The U boats had adopted the schnorchel and possessed an efficient search receiver which together nullified the improved airborne radar and the increased concentration o f flying. Although the schnorchel undoubtedly lowered the capacity o f U boats to sink ships, it was the ace of trumps against vkual and radar location except in flat calm weather.. .Sinking due air action dwindled to one in the last quarter o f 1944.^ ®^ Thanks to the schnorchel, U boats were, by late 1944, almost immune from detection while on passage and, when they reached their inshore billets off the British Isles, they were largely safe as long as they did not attack. Aircraft, once the prime weapon for sinking U boats, were, by then, acting as little more than scarecrows, ensuring that U boats stayed submerged. In January 1945, Naval Intelligence estimated that 32 U boats had passed through the Northern Transit Area outbound and 16 had made the passage inbound. 18 Group aircraft flew 2,656 hours during the month, but there was only one genuine sighting when, on 11 January, Wellington P /172 homed in on a radar contact and Leigh Light illu­ minated a s c h n o r c h e lof the Hebrides in 5715N 1030W. The subsequent attack, carried out in bad visibility, was not a success.^®® U-1172 was passing through the North Channel southbound for the St George’s Channel when, at 1300/15 January, she torpedoed the Norwegian tanker Spinanger (7,429T) and the escort carrier Thane with f^aunkonig acoustic torpedoes."® At 0846/16 the EG22 sloops Star­ ling, Peacock, Hart and Amethyst and the frigate Loch Craggie carried out 37 attacks, 13 of them with squid, on a contact west of Machrihanish. Some oil surfaced, though this was analysed as furnace oil."® U-1014 sailed Bergen on 18 January 1945 for the North Channel and was found on the bottom off Lough Foyle by the frigate Loch Scavaig on 4 February. Loch Shitty Nyasaland and Papua joined the attack and a two-mile slick o f oil surfaced along with a German sailor’s cap, clothing and German forms."^ U-989 was depth charged and sunk north o f Shetland on 14 February by the EGIO frigates Bayntun, Braithwaite, Loch Dun- vegan and Loch EckA^ U-1019 was damaged by Wellington Q /304 some 130 miles west o f 166 AIR 41 74 p. 208. Wynn : 1997. The Battle of The Atlantic and Signals Intelligence p. 496. 1 167 AIR 41 74 p. 109. I 168 This was probably eidier U-1051 or U-1199, both o f wWch were outbound for patrols off the English coast from si which both failed to return. The other two boats then in tlie North Western Approaches, U-825 and U-1017, re- ported no such attacks on return from patrol. AIR 41 74 p. 208. Wynn : 1998. 169 Three died in Spinanger mà. she was beached in Karnes Bay. Ten died in Thane wbida had a 30-foot hole in her star­ board quarter. U-1172 continued her patrol into the Irish Sea, sinking three ships including the SS Viksnes and the destroyer Manners, then was herself sunk in St George's Channel on 27 January 1945 by EG5. All 52 o f her crew were lost. ADM 199 1443. Loyd’s War Losses'vcA. 2. Drummond : 1960. Rohwer : 1999. 170 A further investigation o f the site was carried out by HMS Bentinck on 8 March and more depth charges and squid were fired, but no wreckage surfaced. It was thought that EG22 had sunk Matuschka's U-482, but recent research by Wynn and otliers disproves tliis. Ametlystvs«& to write her own chapter in Naval liistory with her role in die Yangtse Incident in 1949. ADM 1 17668. Wynn 1997. 171 All 48 in U-1014 were lost. ADM 199 1443. 172 Wynn : 1998. 127 North Western Approaches the Hebrides on 16 February, this being Coastal’s only U boat attack in February. U-309 sailed Horten for the Moray Firth on 8 February and had just arrived there on 16 February when she was sunk with aU hands by the Canadian frigate St John o f EG9 after attempting to attack WN74."® Bayntun and Loch Eck were in action again on 17 February, sinking U- 1278 north o f Shetland. The Icelandic Dettifoss (1,564T) was sunk o ff Corsewall Point at 0721/21 February and 12 o f her passengers were lost. U-1064 had been spotted in the area the previous afternoon by an aircraft and EG19 attacked a contact nearby immediately after the sinking. Air attacks on schorchel sightings were carried out on the three following days but U~1064 got clear and was sent into the Atlantic on weather-reporting duty where, possibly due to the air attacks, her schnorchel gave constant trouble. "® One feature o f this period was the first operational sailing o f the new Type XXIII coastal U boat. Streamlined and fitted with quiet ‘creeping’ motors, these Elektro boats were ex­ ceptionally difficult to detect submerged. Naval IntelUgence had been monitoring the de­ velopment o f the Type XXIII and its larger cousin, the Type XXI, since early summer 1944, largely through decrypts o f messages between Berlin and Tokyo. More recently, in­ formation had come from Norway on trials being conducted there."® The Type XXIII U- 2J24 operated undetected in the Firth o f Forth for much o f February before firing two torpedoes at a ship on the 18" of the month. The torpedoes failed to run and, having used up her only armament, U-2324 left patrol. On 25 February, the (1,317T) was sunk off Eyemouth by C7-2J22 while Leith for London in FS1739.. From her 23 crew and three gunners, five, died."? Also off the east coast, the Norwegian minesweeper Nordhav I I was torpedoed and sunk off Montrose on 10 March by U-714A^ U-714 sank the Swedish Magne (1,226T) off Eyemouth on 14 March, but was herself sunk off St Abbs Head that afternoon. The new South African frigate Na/a/ sighted rafts and a lifeboat îtom Magne and then made two at­ tacks on. a bottomed contact in 111° St Abbs Head: 7 miles, bringing up large quantities of oil before contact was lost."® The Admiralty believed there were six U boats around coast between the Tyne and the Clyde in mid-March and one, U-722 sank the steamer Inger Toft (2,190T) three miles south west o f 173 ADM 234 416. Wynn : 1998. 174 adM 199 1443. The Battle of The Atlantic and Sigmh Intelligence pp. 541-543. Wynn: 1998. 175 Rohwer : 1999. Wynn : 1998. ADM 199 1443. 176 ADM 1 16848. Fadfield 1995 p.. 456.. RoskiUl 196.1 vol. 2.. p. 292.. 177 Rohwer- : 1999. Lloyd’s War Losses, vol. 1. Baird : 1993. The Battle of The AtlanUc and Signals Intelligence p. 547. 178 Five men were lost and 17 survivors were picked up by the sweeper Syrian. The seven-ship Norwegian Mine- sweeping Flotilla had been operating from Dundee since late 1942 and was responsible for much o f die sweeping carried out off tlie east coast. Rohwer : 1999; Bârd Helle in Salmon (ed) : 1995 p. 79; 179 ADM 234 417. Baird : 1993. North Western Approaches Neist Point, Skye, at 0920/16 March.i®° Late on 20 March 1945, an 86 Squadron Liberator dropped sonobuoys on a radar contact north o f Cape Wrath, then attacked unsuccessfully with two acoustic torpedoes. At about the same time, a lookout in the Canadian frigate Neii ^ Glasgow ^ in bright moonlight off InistrahuU sighted a schmrehel on a collision course. Three feet of the schnorchd was protruding above the surface partly obscured by a cloud of exhaust smoke and it struck N w Glasgoiv on her port side immediately below the bridge. In U-1003 water rose to knee-height in the control room before the flow could be stopped. Oberleut- nant Striibing bottomed Ü-1003, then surfaced at dusk on 22 March to charge batteries and replace the air in the boat, but approaching ships forced him to dive again. Soon afterwards, the pumps which had been running constantly since the collision failed and, with the batter­ ies exhausted, Striibing surfaced and ordered his crew to abandon.^^^ The 1»‘ Division, EG21, were patrolling the North Minch at 0918/27 March when Conn, the centre ship, obtained an Asdic contact. The echo was lost, regained, classified as fish, lost again, then regained. The sounder trace showed an object 220 feet long at 226 feet depth with the bottom clearly visible underneath and, at 1015/27, Conn attacked with hedgehog. The set missed and exploded on the bottom. Depth-charge attacks at 1046/27 and 1104/27 and another hedgehog set at 1134/27 brought large quantities o f air and oil to the surface. Further attacks brought more wreckage including a German rubber dinghy and pieces o f flesh which were picked up for analysis. U-965 and her crew of 50 were all lost.^®2 That afternoon, at 1630/27, Byron, Fits^roy and Bedmill, the 2"^ Division of EG21, were off Loch Seaforth when Bedmill, the starboard wing ship, obtained an asdic contact and attacked with hedgehog. A stream o f small bubbles and oil was seen coming to the surface which continued for some hours. In all, five hedgehog attacks and 15 depth-charge attacks were made during the night and, by dawn, the oil slick extended for several miles, but no echo sounder trace or material wreckage were obtained. Further depth charge and squid attacks were made at the site on 1 April brought up some wreckage from U-7223^^ EG21 was escorting EN83 through the Minch on 30 March when, at 1710/30, Rupert ob­ tained asdic contact off Lochinver and attacked with a 10 charge pattern. Once the contact was clear of the convoy, Rupert attacked again, this time with hedgehog. Two were heard to explode after four and five seconds, and the rest exploded on hitting the bottom seven seconds later. A small streak o f light was seen and oil bubbles surfaced. At 1808/30 Conn 180 The estimate o f six U boats was close to tlie tnitli: four were on patrol, three were passaging homewards and two were heading for the west coast o f Scotland. The U Boat m r in the Atlantic HMSO diag. 28, The Battle of The Atlantic and Siÿtals Intelligence p. 559. Baird : 1995 p. 236. Rohwer : 1999. 181 Thirty one survivors were picked up 16 miles north o f InistrahuU on 23 March by HMCS Thetford Mines. Eighteen died, including Striibing. Wynn : 1998. ADM 199 2056. 182 Also recovered were a locker lid, a German flag, a German jacket, an identity disc with the name Hans Fischer, a wooUen sock, a box o f matches made by Nitedals o f Oslo, a tin o f 100 Avus cigarettes, some cigars and packets of Orient cigarettes. ADM 1 17608. Wynn ; 1998. RosldU : 1961 vol. 2 p. 296. 183 AJi 4 4 crew aboard U-722 were lost. Five bodies later floated to the surface and were buried at Portree. Ibid. 29 North Western Approaches missed with another hedgehog set then, at 1849/30, Conn made a hedgehog attack which brought a large air bubble and much oil. Further attacks at 1440/31 and 1700/31 produced wreckage including a locker door, a tin o f Nescafe, two brushes and 11 photographs o f a U boat crew. U-1021 and her 43 crew were lost.^ ®'* U-1206 was on the bottom ten miles east o f Peterhead on 14 April while the forward heads were being repaired. An inboard valve was removed and, as the outboard one either had not been closed properly or was faulty, the U boat began to flood. Tanks were blown and all tubes fired to lighten the boat, and she surfaced long enough for the crew to abandon in four d i n g h i e s . Two days later, on the evening o f 16 Aprh, U-1274 sank the tanker MV Athdduke (8,9661] off Berwick and was then herself sunk by the destroyer Viceroy7^ ^On 20 April the trawler Fthel Crawford (200T) was lost to one o f a field o f magnetic mines laid off the entrance to Loch Ryan by U-218 on 18 April. The first indication o f the sinking was the discovery o f floating fish boxes and a kitbag belonging to one o f the crew. Skipper Scales and his nine crew were all lost. German minclaying o ff Scotland all but ceased in March 1941, though U-218 did lay a field o f magnetic mines off Loch Ryan on 18 April 1945. The Ardrossan trawler Ethel Crawford was the only victim, sinking two days later with the loss of her ten crew.^®^ U-636 was sunk west o f the North Channel on 21 April by ships o f EG4 and, at 0729/23 April, Liberator V /86 picked up a radar contact immediately on reaching its patrol area west o f Shetland, but lost it after closing to within half a mile. A sonobuoy pattern was laid but neither it nor the torpedoes dropped indicated a positive result. U-396, on her way home from weather reporting duty, had however been destroyed.^®® A 120 Squadron Lib­ erator from Tain sank U-1017 west of the North Channel at 1650/29 A p r i l . A s the war ended, several U boats were known to be making a bid to pass through the Kattegat and reach Norway. An 86 Squadron Liberator caught U-534 on the surface in the Kattegat on 5 May 1945 and sank it, then another 86 Squadron aircraft sank the new Type XXI U-3523 north east o f Skagen on 6 May.^^o With Hitler dead, Donitz was appointed Führer on 1 May and immediately began negotia- 184 ADM 1 1.7608. Wynn : 1998. 185 Two o f the dinghies were spotted and the occupants landed at Aberdeen. Another dinghy witlt ten survivors and one dead rating was driven ashore twomiles south o f Buchan Ness lighthouse, where two o f the ten who had sur­ vived thus far were drowned. Near Dunbuy Rocks, Captain Sclilitt and 12 o f his crew were picked up from die fourth dinghy by the Peterhead fisliing boat Reaper. ADM 199 2056. 186 pive died iaAtfoe/duke and 44 in U-1274. Vkerof^ attacks brought no immediate proof o f success, but she returned to the area eight days later and made further attacks on die bottomed contact which produced wreckage o f German origin, including, '...a dinghy container in which were stowed six dozen of good brandy, fortunately none of them broken.' ADM 199 2056, Wynn : 1998. Rohwer : 1999. 187 Rohwer : 1999. The Scotsman 23 April 1945. ADM 199 1443. 188 ADM 239 416 189 Ibid. 190 ADM 199 2056. 30 North Western Approaches tiens with the Allies. On 4 May he broadcast a surrender order to the U boats, though there was some doubt that all would receive it. Finally, at 0241 /5 May, the German sur­ render was signed at Eisenhower’s HQ in Reims. But the convoy system was still operating and, that evening, just after 2000/7, EN91 sailed Methil for Belfast as five merchantmen escorted by the trawlers Angle, Wolves and Leicester City. At 2250/7 the convoy was two miles south May Island when the Avondale Lark was hit by a torpedo. Three minutes later another torpedo hit the Norwegian Sneland I. Despite being unable to gain an Asdic con­ tact, Leicester City dropped a pattern o f depth charges to deter further attacks, then moved to pick up survivors from the stricken ships. Two died in Avondale Park. From Sneland 1, a survivor o f the SC7 disaster in 1940, seven died. Fifty-five survivors were landed at Methil. The torpedoes had come from U-2336 and Kapitanleutnant Emil Klusemeier told Allied investigators that he had not heard the surrender order transmitted three days earher.i^i S c o t l a n d ’s G a t e w a y - T h e R i v e r C l y d e In 1933, with air attacks on British ports and not U boats or surface raiders seen as the prin­ cipal threat to supply, the Headlam Committee was established to consider requests from the Royal Navy and RAF that, in the event o f war, as much as 75% of shipping should be di­ verted away from east coast ports vulnerable to aircraft based in Germany or the Low Coun­ tries. The committee’s report presented in April 1937 was over-simplistic, but it did point to underused capacity both in the West coast ports and on the railways that served them .^^2 The River Clyde, and the principal ports o f Glasgow and Greenock, began preparing for war in August 1936 when, the provisional Port Emergency Committee was formed to coor­ dinate port operations in time o f war.i^® Design work on the Clyde A /S boom, which would run from the Cloch Point to Dunoon, began in 1937. The boom may have been in­ stalled speedily at the outbreak o f war, but otherwise little had been done by September 1939 to prepare Scotland’s most vital port for the demands o f war. Clyde Navigation Trust, responsible for Glasgow and Clydebank, could boast 360 acres o f dock area with 12 miles o f quayage, seven 25/175 ton heavy-lift cranes, nine coaling cranes and hoists of at least 32 tons capacity and ninety 5-ton cargo cranes. There were thirty-two 10-ton coahng cranes and three 35-ton coaling cranes privately owned within the port. And 191 JJ.2336 and returned to Keil on 14 May 1945. Not until October 1945, after BdU records had been examined, did it become apparent that U-2336 vjÿs responsible. Klusmeiet revealed that he had been in the vicinity o f the Isle o f May between 2000/7 and 0600/8 and tliat, after the attack, he circled the Isle o f May. This caused great consterna­ tion as his approach had apparentiy gone undetected by the indicator loops. Tlie loops to the north o f the Isle of May were controlled from the Fixed Defence Station on tine Isle o f May and those to the south were controlled from Canty Bay. While the records for Canty Bay had, by then, been destroyed, those for the Isle o f May revealed that U-2336 had indeed been detected passing eastwards over No.4 Loop at 0452/8 and No.l3 Loop at 0516/8, but her passage had been ignored, or had gone unnoticed in tlie euphoria surrounding victory. ADM 199 139. Calvert MS IWM Department o f Documents ref. 84/36/1. 192 Merchant Shippingand The Demands of War. C. B. A. Behrens. HMSO 1978. p. 24. 193 MT 69 32. 131 North Western Approaches there were 71 acres o f transit sheds, 58 miles o f quayside railway, timber-handling facilities at Shieldhall, a 54,000-ton capacity granary at Meadowside, nine acres o f covered animal lairage at Merklands capable o f handling 250,000 head o f mainly catde per annum. Govan dry docks could handle vessels o f up to 880 feet LOA and 83 feet beam with a best depth over the sill at No. 3 Dock of more than 26 feet. But the jewel in Glasgow’s crown was King George V Dock. Planned as one of a series of deep-water berths at Shieldhall, construction had begun in 1929, partly as a government- subsidised anti-unemployment measure and partly for large new merchant ships planned by Alfred Holt & Co. Building work had however been halted by the economic slump in 1931 when only the half-mile east quay had been completed with sheds, sidings and 16 c r a n e s . While the dock was underused before the war, as Riddell writes '...th e value o f its con­ struction was realised many times over with the outbreak o f the Second World War.’ Among King George V Dock’s many advantages was the fact that its transit sheds stood 55 feet back from the quay edge, ideal for handling bulky military cargoes such as cased vehicles and aircraft, while, at the older Prince’s and Queen’s Docks, the sheds were just 15 feet from the quay edge.^^® On the face o f it impressive, nevertheless these facilities hid serious shortcomings apparent when small-scale diversions o f shipping from the east coast took place in September and October 1939.^^ ^ The Ministry o f Transport and others in mid-1940 painted a disturbing picture o f port facilities on the Clyde. The port o f Glasgow had developed, ‘by process o f accretion largely directed to immediate needs,’ and, as it was largely concerned in servicing industry in west central Scotland, road and rail links to the rest o f Britain were poor. There was only one adequate timber berth at Shieldhall and another was urgently required. Prin­ cipally, however, it was clear that the west side o f the 20-acre King George V Dock had to be completed speedily as it was the only dock on the Clyde capable of handling the largest ocean vessels. Liverpool’s Gladstone Dock offered similar accommodation on the west coast, as did Swansea Docks, but both were held by locks and therefore both vulnerable and less efficient. At Greenock, controlled by the Greenock Harbour Trust, there were five berths for ships o f up to 6,000 tons with adequate shed accommodation. James Watt Dock was, however, vulnerable as it was held only by a single caisson. Great Harbour had good berthing, but a critical shortage o f railway sidings. Rothesay Dock at Clydebank, principally used for scrap. ‘94T-CN 16 74/18. 195 Riddell : 1979 p. 257. Bird : 1963 pp. 83 et passim. 196 The October diversion involved 68 ships, just 25% o f those destined for east coast ports, yet it brought near satura­ tion on the west coast; Behrens op. cit. p. 80 and Appendix XIII. 197 MT 63 200. 132 North Western Approaches iron ore and coal, was described as, ‘old and inadequate,’ and had weak cranes. Headlam had envisaged the diversion o f 75% o f traffic from east coast ports to the west coast, but failed to adequately consider the transport problems this would pose. How, for example, were the 2,000,000 tons o f ore required annually at Middlesbrough to be moved across country, and what was to be done with refrigerated cargoes given that there was nowhere near enough cold storage accommodation on the west coast?^^^ Road transport into and out o f both Glasgow and Greenock harbours was described as ‘chaotic’ with a large number o f small firms operating without coordination. In Glasgow, there were be­ lieved to be between 500 and 600 horse drawn vehicles and between 800 and 1,000 motor vehicles engaged in dock traffic, and, in July 1940, around 4,00 loads were being take out o f the docks daily. But already, goods handled by Glasgow docks had risen by 28.8% from 6,189,158 tons in the year to 30 June 1939, to 7,975,141 in the year to 30 June 1940 with the largest proportion o f this increase being in iron, iron ore, steel and coal.^oo Initial projections drawn up at the beginning o f July 1940, for iron ore, pig iron and steel landings in the Clyde and Mersey were: ________________ Cargo_________________Port Clyde Ships 11 5 5 Total 21 Mersey 21 r 2 TqW 24 34,192 tons o f steel. 13,841 tons o f scrap ^ c l. 1 ship for Ardrossan). 36,257 tons o f pig iron_______ _ 84,290 tons (17% of UK total) 39,041 tons o f steeL 4,619 tons o f scrap. 10,300 tons o f pig iron. [ UKTot^ ! 134 j 496,260 tons of steel, scrap and pig iron, j These figures were hastily revised on the diversion o f shipping away from the south coast. With much tonnage still unallocated, at the beginning o f August the new traffic estimates were: Clyde 21 12 76,377 tons o f steel. 37,683 tons o f scrap (incl. 3 ships for Ardrossan). 5 30,577 tons o f pig iron Total 32 144,637 tons (26% of UK total). Mersey 43 102,375 tons o f steel.... . . . . 1 4,205 tons o f scrap. 2 10,361 tons o f pig iron. 46 116,941 tons (22% of UK total). |_150 I 539,176 tons of steel, scrap and pig iron. _ .J 198 T-CN 16 74/16. 199 Behrens op. \ c r k ’ r t f 156 North Western Approaches lamshke Battalion of the Yorks and Lancs Regiment in Chroby. Embarking in Devonshire, Berwick, York and Glasgow at Rosyth, and bound for Bergen and Stavanger, were the 1 /4 Royal Lincolns, 1/4 King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry and the 1 /8 Sherwood Forest- ers.22 The R4 troops were never intended as an assault force, it being assumed that they would make unopposed landings and garrison the ports, so they had, for example, no ar­ mour and no artillery. Then a Coastal Command Hudson sighted a German naval squadron steaming north in the Skaggerak at 0805/7. Assuming they were only exercising, the aircrew did not report the ships until they landed at Leuchars at 1100/7A3 The Admiralty concluded that the German ships were heading for the North Atlantic. The Home Fleet sailed north-east from Scapa by 2015/7 and, just after 1200/8, the four cruisers assigned to Force R4 were ordered to 'March Troops Ashore' and join the fleet. The Lincolnshires returned from the Rosyth sports field to find Berwick^s crew dumping their stores and weapons on the jetty. The Leicesters and Yorkshires were bundled ashore from Devonshire and York in under an hour, then watched the cruisers pass under the Forth Bridge with much o f their equipment.24 The troops at Greenock were left without escort when the cruiser Aurora and six destroy­ ers were ordered to join the Fleet. The R4 plan had been abandoned, and with it the last chance to gain a secure foothold in Norway. Glowworm had detached the previous evening to look for a man lost overboard and, at about 0815/8, encountered the cruiser Hipper w&iting to enter Narvik with troops. Glow­ worm was overwhelmed and sunk, but not before she had rammed Hipper and torn away 150 feet o f her starboard bulge. Thirty-eight o f her crew survived.^s Glowworm’s enemy re­ ports faded at 0855/8 but were enough to persuade the Admiralty to send the destroyers o f Force WV to join Renown. Vestfjord and Narvik were thus left completely unprotected.^^ German warships were sighted in Oslo fjord and off Trondheim, Bergen and Stavanger in the early hours o f 9 April. At 0337/9 Renown sighted the battlecruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau north o f Vestfjord and, in a brisk action, scored four damaging hits on Gneisenau before the German ships used their superior speed to escape. But German troopships had akeady swept past the Vestfjord minefield bound for Narvik and, at 0430/9, MI6 handed over 1,000 aircraft for Wesentbung, 571 o f them JU52 transports, against which the pitifully small RAF contribution could make little impression. Jefkey ; 1992 p. 110. Brookes : 1977 pp. 21-22. Terraine : 1985 p. 115. 22 Winton : 1986 pp 102-103. Adams ; 1989 p. 13. 23 RoskiU blames the Admiralty for the delay, but the fault lay with the aircrew. Roskill : 1954 p. 159- AIR 28 459. AIR 28 465. Derry : 1952 p. 28. 24 Believing tliat another surface fleet action was imminent, and thus demonstrating the outdatedness o f his strategic thinking, Churchill took it upon himself to order the R4 troops ashore. Quoting General Sir Ian Jacob, Roskill writes of the War Cabinet’s astonishment at the First Lord’s unilateral decision which was telephoned to Rosyth by the First Sea Lord. Neither Churchill nor Pound saw fit to consult or even inform C-in-C Home Fleet Admiral Forbes. Roskill : 1977 pp. 98-99. Jeffrey ; 1992 p. 114. 25 Moulton : 1966 pp. 76-77. 26RoskiU: 1954 p. 160. 157 North Western Approaches the Admkalty aa intercepted telegram from Norwegian Foreign Minister Halvdan Koht to their Legation in Spain stating that the German Minister in Oslo, Kurt Brauer, had de­ manded the surrender of Norway. The surrender demand was refused.^^ At 0630/9 MI6 told the British Chiefs of Staff that the Norwegian Government was evacuating Oslo.^» The War Cabinet met at noon and learned that a small German force was ashore at Narvik. Churchill said that naval forces had been ordered to force their way into Narvik and Ber­ gen, but that Trondheim would be left until the situation clarified^® Then the assault on Bergen was cancelled as the British force would be too small to deal with two German cruisers reported there.^° Allied planning became ever more muddled and British com­ manders, following the uncertain lead given by both War Cabinet and Admiralty, changed tack on the most important objective three times in twelve hours. First Trondheim was the priority, then Narvik and Bergen, then Narvik alone - but worse was to follow. The Su­ preme War Council decided late on the 9*^ that two British battalions should sail for Nor­ way that night. A further five battalions and French Alpine troops would sail within three days and four more battalions were to be ready within two weeks. Churchill pushed for these forces to be directed towards Narvik while others promoted Trondheim and Bergen. In the face o f disagreement, the Council dithered, ordering merely that the troops should be sent to Norwegian ports without specifying what these were to be.^^ That night the British Military Co-ordination Committee decided unilaterally that the Al­ lied forces available would be unable to dislodge the Germans from more than one point on the Norwegian coast, and that the attack must be concentrated on Narvik. The Chiefs o f Staff were ordered to prepare an attack on Narvik, although they were also to examine the possibility o f securing a foothold at Namsos and Aandalsnes with a view to mounting a pincer attack on Trondheim. Churchill, having driven this decision through in the face o f the Supreme War Council's hesitancy, appealed for the 'utmost expedition'. Late on 10 April, the 1/4 Lincolns and the 1 /4 Yorkshires entrained at Dunfermline for the Clyde where, with little more than they stood up in, they embarked in Empress of Australia. Troop convoy N P l comprising Empress of Australia, Monarch of Bermuda and Reino del Pacifica was joined off Cape Wrath by Bafoy and Chrohy. Escorted by Manchester, Birmingham, Cairo and five destroyers, N P l was initially bound for Narvik, but, as minimal opposition was ex­ pected at Narvik, the force was then split with Chrohy and Empress of Australia making for 27ADM 116 4471 quoted in Gilbert ; 1989 p. 217. 2« MI3/6519 in PREM 1 419 quoted in Gilbert : 1989 p. 217 29 CAB 65 6 Minutes o f War Cabinet No.85 at 1200/9 April 1940. 30 Recollections o f Eric Seal quoted in Gilbert r 1989 p. 219 31 CAB 99 3 Supreme War Council No.7 quoted in Gilbert : 1989 p. 221. 58 North Western Approaches Namsos with 146 Brigade. The assault on Trondheim was on .22 At dusk on 14 April, seamen and marines from Sheffield 2tXid Glasgow landed by destroy­ ers at Namsos, the first British force to land in Norway. They secured the quays and the road to Trondheim ahead of the arrival o f the troops from the Clyde. But Namsos harbour was too small for troopships, so when 146 Brigade arrived in Chrobty and Empress of Austra­ lia on 16 April, it had to be transhipped under air attack off LiUesjona, then brought to Namsos by destroyers. A further 300 tons o f equipment was lost in the process.^) French reinforcements arrived on 20 April and a week o f heavy fighting followed as General Carton de Wiart attacked south towards Trondheim. The Luftwaffe reduced Namsos to ruins, and de Wiart signalled that holding the town without air cover would be impossible.^'* Meanwhile, on 14 April, another scratch force o f 680 marines and 45 officers had sailed Rosyth in Auckland, Black Swan, Flamingo and Bittern to land at Molde in support of a larger landing at Aandalsnes.^^ A gate drove the overloaded sloops into Invergordon and, by the time they sailed again on 16 April, they had been diverted to Andalsnes itself. They landed successfully the following night as the remaining elements o f R4, renamed SICKLEFORCE, were being loaded into the transport Orion and Galatea and Aretbusa at Rosyth. These troops were to follow the Marines into Andalsnes, then someone realised that Orion was too large to enter the harbour so the Territorials had to disembark again, this time in the pitch darkness and a gale, and board the cruisers Curacao and Carlisle. Colonel Dudley Clarke described the scene: The hatches were off now and the scene below decks had become a sort o f storeman's infemo, with shadowy figures burrowing in the semi-darkness o f shaded lamps and torches. In the original haste to get o ff to a quick start, goods o f every kind had been stowed in the holds in the order to which they arrived, with each following consignment piled in on top. Now reserves o f food and ammunition were mixed with unit equipment and skis for the Norwegians; bicycles and sappers' tools lay with medical provisions, while such thin^ as long-range wireless equipment as often as not was split be­ tween two holds. There was never a chance o f sorting this out in the dark and getting it into the ships in time, so the plan was being adopted o f skimming the top layers from every hold and loading them in turn into each warship as she came alongside.^^ SICKLEFORCE sailed at 0700/17 and only when they were at sea did the full extent o f the 32 The rest o f NPl continued north to Vestfjord and landed troops at Harstad. The planned assault on Narvik had to be abandoned due to deep snow and tlie fact that the ships had not been tactically loaded. Roskill : 1954 p. 190. 33 General Adrian Carton de Wiart wrote that; ‘The officers had little experience of handling men, although they had an able commander in Brigadier G. P. Phillips.’ In fairness, though, the Brigade could be excused a certain amount of confiisioru Movements Officer Colonel H. E. Yeo describes the chaos that attended their embarkation on 14 April: One lot of MT drivers arrived &oxn Leith that morning, but before it embarked at KGV was ordered back to Rosyth.. .Plans were amalgunated, scrapped and then fresh plans erected for the same parties. Large liners could not get in, and troops taken in small lots off to them jhad] to go to Norway in warships so that these liners became floating hotels. Smaller liners (particularly tire three splendid Polish ships Chrobry, Baforf&oà Sobieskt} still went to and fro, till a stand-still set in on 27th April. Yeo MS, IWM Dept, o f Documents ref 95/6/1. Carton de Wiart : 1950 p. 168. Moulton : 1966 p. 168. 34 Carton de Wiart : 1950 p. 174. 35 This force was drawn mainly from the refitting Hood, Barham and Nelson. Also included was a searchlight regiment which, due to yet another shp-up, sailed without its searchlights. Winton : 1986 p. 111. 3«CIark: 1948. | 159 North Western Approaches chaos become apparent. Half a battalion had been left behind along with much of the communications equipment, all the range-finders and searchlights for the anti-aircraft guns, ail the mortar shells and most o f the vehicles. The brigade would land with one truck and three motorcycles. There were no maps o f Andalsnes, only three o f the officers had been in action and the men had received only the most cursory training, usually around 30 hours of evening courses. SICKLEFORCE began landing at 0300/19 with orders to move 60 miles inland from Andalsnes to Dombas, block the railway there, link up with Norwegian forces in the Lillehammer area and then attack north towards Trondheim - a tall order indeed for Brigadier Morgan's 1,000 ill-trained, poorly equipped Territorials. Even were SICKLEFORCE to reach all its objectives, it would be spread desperately thinly and would be at the mercy o f the Luftwaffe. At Dombas, Morgan was told that marching on Trondheim would be suicidal, so SICKLE­ FORCE was deployed in waist-deep snow near Lillehammer railway station. More than a hundred men were captured and the survivors, along with three companies of Norwegian dragoons, retreated to make a stand at Tretten, 19 miles north of Lillehammer, but were again heavily defeated and the nine officers and 300 men who remained were evacuated to the coast. Meanwhile, like Namsos, the Luftwaffe was bombing Andalsnes almost daily. Reinforcements for SICKLEFORCE were sent, notably on 22 April when Galatea, Sheffield, Glasgow and six destroyers sailed Rosyth with 2,200 men successfully landed the following day at Andalsnes and Molde. Another 1,600 men were carried across from Rosyth on 24 April. What Morgan and de Wiart had not been told was that HAMMER, the direct naval assault on Trondheim, which they were to support, had been effectively abandoned on 19 April largely because air cover could not be p r o v id e d .Galatea, Arethusa, Sheffield, Southamp­ ton, Somali, Mashona, Sikh, Wanderer, Walker and Tartar and the transports Ulster Prince and Ulster Monarch arrived off Andalsnes late on 30 April and, by 0200/1, around 2,200 men, survivors o f SICKLEFORCE and General Paget's 15’*^ Brigade were taken off. A similar number were taken o ff the folowing night by Manchester, Birmingham, the destroyers Ingle- field. Delight, Diana, Somali and Mashona?'^ Some 5,400 men o f de Wiart’s Namsos force were evacuated after dark on 2 May by three French ships, the cruisers Devonshire, York and Car­ lisle, the French destroyer Bison and four destroyers o f the 5’*’ Flotilla. Bison was bombed and sunk on the morning of 3 May and the destroyer Afridi took off her survivors. But that afternoon Afridi too was bombed and capsized with the loss o f 49 officers and men, around 30 Bison survivors and 13 men o f the Yorks and Lancs Regiment.'*® 37 Kersaudy : 1990 pp. 114-115. Roskill : 1954 p. 183. 38 Derry :1952 pp. 78-82. 39 RoskiU : 1954 : pp. 188-189. Kersaudy : 1990 p 179. Brookes : 1977 pp. 134-135 4«Vian : 1960 pp. 47-49. RoskiU : 1954 : pp. 189-190. 160 North Western Approaches The wretched campaign in Norway dragged on until June 1940. On 8 June the Group One evacuation convoy was escorted into Clyde with 15,000 troops.'** Valiant and a screen of destroyers had escorted the convoy to a point abeam of Shetland, then turned north to meet the following Group Two convoy comprising Oronscy, Ormonde, Arandora Star, Duchess of York, Royal Ulsterman, Ulster Prince and UIster Monarch escorted by Southampton, A rk Royal and five destroyers which had sailed from Harstad on 8 June with 10,000 men. Unwittingly, however, the convoy was steaming right into the path o f Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and HipperA^ The German ships had earlier sunk Oil Pioneer, the trawler Juniper and the almost empty trooper Orama, then allowed the hospital ship Atlantis to proceed. At 1545/8, some 300 miles west o f Narvik, Scharnhorst sighted the carrier Glorious, which, deplorably, had been detached early for Scapa so if that her martinet Captain could court-martial his Commander (F). Valiant, some 250 miles away to the south-west, received the car­ rier’s signal reporting an enemy force shortly after 1600/8.'*^ Glorious and the destroyers Acasta and Ardent were sunk with the loss of 1,519 lives; a disaster only marginally exceeded by the 1,523 believed lost with TitanicA R\xX. Acasta had torpedoed Scharnhorst, flooding her centre and starboard engine rooms and putting a turret out of action.'*^ Valiant learned o f the loss o f Orama from Atlantis on the morning o f 9 June, then hurried north to rendezvous with Group Two at 2200/9. But Scharnhorst had made for Trondheim to repair the damage inflicted by Acasta, otherwise she and Gneisenau could well have inter- The entirely avoidable destruction of Glorious ranks as one of the worst naval disasters of the war 41 ADM 199 363. ADM 199 371. 42 For the evacuation convoys see Brookes : 1977 pp. 171-172. 43 ADM 199 371. 44 Controversy has surrounded the loss of Glorious ever since. She was an unhappy ship and had detached to return to Scapa so that Captain D ’Oyly-Hughes could court-martial his Commander (F) with whom he had had a dispute over tactics. D ’Oyly-Hughes’ failure to fly off patrols is, at best, inexplicable and was probably linked to the dispute. The Admiralty had ignored warnings &om Bletchley Park that German heavy units were leaving the Baltic. It was alleged that the distress signal, also received by Devonshire was garbled, but it was clearly heard in Valiant. Admiral John Cun­ ningham in Devonshire was handed a complete copy of the signal, but his orders regarding safe conduct of the Norwegian Royal Family meant he was unable to respond. ADM 199 371. Winton : 1986 for the state o f Glorious and the sinking. Smith : 1998 p. 56. Macintyre : 1971 pq>. 41-42. Roskill : 1960 pp. 69-70. 45 Derry gives the number o f lives lost in the three ships as 1,515, Roskill gives 1,470 but does not appear to include RAF aircrew lost, and the figure of 1,519 is the author’s to include those who died after being picked up. ADM 199 363. ADM 199 371. Derry : 1952 p. 225. Roskill : 1977 pp. 107-108. Brookes : 1977 pp. 175-176. 161 North Western Approaches cepted Group Two ahead o f the rendezvous with Valiant. The carnage would have been appalling/'* W i t s a n d L o w C u n n i n g Enterprises must beprepared with spedallp trained troops of the hunter class, who can develop a reign of ter­ rorfirst of all on the ’butcher and bolt’ policy. The passive resistance war, in which we have acquitted our­ selves so well, must come to an end. I look to the Chiefs of Staff to propose me measuresfora vigorous enter­ prising and ceaseless offensive against the whole German occupied coastline.'^ Many eminent historians have discussed the failure in Norway, and most point to the Luftwaffe having established air superiority from the outset, thus countering British sea power/s Moulton cites a ‘national complacency’ that the strength o f the Royal Navy could make up for the known weakness o f the other two services and suggests that the root cause lay in the Inability o f the three services to understand the need for an integrated land, sea and air strategy/® Anotlier historian has lamented, 'From beginning to end the Allied operations in Norway...display an amateurishness and feebleness which to this day can make the reader alternately blush and shiver/^o Ultimately, though, the real lesson was that it is unwise to make mihtary commitments that cannot be followed through with sufficient force to ensure success. N ot is it prudent to signal one’s intentions to the enemy with such clarity as was offered by the British and French in 1939-40. And, in the conduct o f the campaign, one need look no further than impatient politicians ignoring mihtary advice, divided command, muddled planning, inade­ quate intelHgence assessment and dissemination, contradictory orders and ill-trained troops being sent into action in an environment for which they had been neither prepared or equipped. AU this has to be set against the fact that the AUies had months in which to pre­ pare for their Scandinavian adventure. The lessons of GaUipoh and countless other cam­ paigns were having to be relearned. During the momentous Norway debate on 8 May, which ushered ChurchiU into power. Admiral Sir Roger Keyes dehvered a devastating indictment of the campaign. The MP for Portsmouth and a national hero following his exploits in the First World War, Keyes was regarded as a speciaUst in Combined Operations. His ice was chiefly directed at the Admi­ ralty, and it is true that the Home Fleet was wrong-footed in the early stages. Sir Charles Forbes had to bear the sobriquet ‘Wrong-Way Charlie’ even if much o f the blame did he 4« Winton : 1986 p. 183. Brookes ; 1977 p. 175. 47 Churchill minute o f 5 June 1940 quoted in Messenger ; 1985 pp. 26-28. 48 Notably Roskill : 1960 p. 62 et passim. 49 See Moulton : 1966 pp. 291-298. 50Terraine : 1985 p. 115. 162 North Western Approaches with Naval Intelligence, but the Navy had got the troops to where they were supposed to be, then brought them out again, all with minimal ait cover/* There were some aspects of the Norway campaign from which the British could take com­ fort in June 1940. Independent Companies of 20 officers and 275 men had been formed as self-sufficient, ship-borne units in April 1940 to be taken to and from operations in their floating base. The five companies that reached Norway were told their mobility depended on requisitioning local craft and that they should, 'Use wits and low cunning'.52 They were to prevent the Germans occupying Bodo, Mo and Mosjoen. No. 5 Independent Company ambushed an enemy column near Mosjoen on 9 May.^^ Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 Companies were involved in a fire fight on 22 May near Mo, but, by then the Germans had reached so far north that there was Httle for the Independent Companies to do and they returned to Scot­ land. '^* The Independent Companies had promise, and, on 9 June, the War Office began seeking volunteers to form new Army Commandos.^^ Initially envisaged were operations 'o f the Zeebrugge type downwards' and irregular, cloak and dagger operations. While the Inde­ pendent Companies were trained to fight as individuals, Commandos were to operate as self-contained units.^^ The Independent Companies remained in being and 2 Commando was raised as a parachute unit with volunteers from all commands. 3 and 4 Commandos were raised from Southern Command, 5 and 6 Commandos from Western Command, 8 Commando from the Household Division and 9 and 11 Commandos from Scottish Com­ mand. Lieutenant General Alan Bourne, Adjutant General Royal Marines, was appointed Com­ mander (Raiding Operations) on 12 June and Captain L. E. H. Maund RN, Captain Nevill Garnons-Williams RN and Major Alan Hornby RA were appointed to his staff. Bourne was 'double-hatted' as Director Combined Operations and Adjutant General and asked to re­ linquish the latter post, but Churchill appointed Keyes as DCO on 17 July, asking Bourne 5’ General Carton de Wiart recalled that, after teaching Scapa on 5 May and hastening to London, one o f his first visi­ tors was Roger Keyes who was gatliering evidence for his Commons speech and was under the impression that tile General felt let down by the Navy. Carton de Wiart assured him that the opposite was die case. Carton de Wiart ; 1950 pp. 174-176. 52 Equipment included Arctic clothing, snowshoes, 30 days’ rations and five days’ emergency ration o f pemmican. The companies were each given £4,000 in sterling and Norwegian currency to help then live off the land. Moulton : 1966 p. 237. WO 106 1944. 53 The ambush was carried out in classic Pathan style. Eight Indian Army officers had been flown home to join tire Independent Companies at Gourock on 4 May. Moulton : 1966 fn. p. 237. 54 Messenger : 1985 p. 23 quoting Lieutenant Colonel J. R. Paterson. See also Adams : 1989 pp. 65-89. 55 Ibid. p. 26. 55 Ibid. pp. 26-28. 57 CAB 106 3. In October 1940 an attempt was made to reorganise these Commandos into Special Service Battalions within a Special Service Brigade, but this proved unweüdy and tire Commandos reverted to their former status. 163 North Western Approaches to coatkLue as his deputy/® Churchill was eager for raiding to begin and wrote to Keyes on 25 July asking for four ampliibious raids employing between 5,000 and 10,000 men, the first to take place within three months/® But there were neither the men nor the ships to carry out the Prime Minister's request. G r o w i n g P a in s One of Bourne’s first concerns had been finding suitable bases for training the Army and the Navy in landing operations. South coast bases were vulnerable to air attack from occu­ pied France so, as Maund writes: We had now to find a place as far distant as possible from attack but yet within the umbrella o f some fighter organisation. It was finally decided that the only possible place was Inverary [sic]. Here the rains might fall almost contiauously, but it gave sheltered water and was, as it were, behind the de­ fences o f the Clyde.«® The first reconnaissance of Inveraray had taken place on 6 July and the decision to set up a Combined Training Centre there had been reached by 10 July.*** There was some discussion over the name to be given to Inveraray, but, immediately on his appointment on 17 July, Keyes insisted on Quebec, a reference to the successful combined assault on the Heights o f Abraham in 1 7 5 9 .^ 2 ^ Combined Operations memorandum written just after Keyes’ ap­ pointment notes that Inveraray CTC; .. .win be the training centre for Combined Operations on a large scale and the LCA and LCM carriers wiU be stationed there. In addition LCA, LCS and LCM not required for carriers will be housed two miles from Inveraray. It is intended to train as many Brigades o f the Army as pos­ sible in landing attacks beginning as soon as the carriers arrive at Inveraray. 9. The base and the landing craft carders will be under the command of Vice Admiral Hal- lett.. .He will live ashore in Inveraray (Tigh-na-Rudha) and will have on his staff Naval and Mili­ tary staff officers for instructional purposes. 10 The base will consist o f the following:- The War Office is constructing a camp for 1200 men in Inveraray Park. The Admiralty is building a canteen at Inveraray for about 1500 men and a camp for 400 Naval ratings near the boatshed (see (d) below) 2 miles from Inveraray.. .A boat- shed, workshops and slipways for 60 LCA and LCS two miles south o f Inveraray. Also a tubu­ lar pier and a trot for the use o f craft. A trot for LCM not hoisted in a carrier in Loch Gair.«3 Training began with 475 officers and men o f 3 Commando and 391 officers and men o f 8 Commando on 11 October 1940. '^* Captain Peter Young commanding H Troop, 3 Com­ mando wrote; 58 Bourne interview quoted in Messenger : 1985 p. 32-34. See also The Keyes Papers vol. Ill, Paul G. Halpern (ed.), pp. 86-88 for the Directive to Bourne, a document drawn up in the heat o f the moment and one that was to cause no end of trouble during Keyes’ tenure as DCO. j 59 Fergusson : 1961 p. 55. | ® Maund : 1949 p. 75. j «DEFE 2 815. i «2 Ibid. j «3 DEPE 2 698. 64DEPE 2 814. DEFE 2 1317. i 64 Noith Western Approaches On our first morning in Inveraray we were introduced to the Assault Landing Craft, Sir Roger Keyes bad succeeded in producing two o f tliem. Armoured, and with a low silhouette, they could do about six knots - a big improvement on the crash-boats in which we had raided Guernsey. H ie Colonel soon had each troop in turn rushing in and out o f these craft like madmen. Before long thirty men, fuUy armed, could clear one and double up the beach to cover in about fifteen seconds. Night and day we trained - there was nothing else to dot The long treks over the craggy hills soon broke anyone who was not fit. It was a good way o f weeding out the unit.«5 An early recruit to Keyes’ staff was Commander Bill Fell, later to command the midget submarine flotilla that attacked the Fell wrote, ‘I had served under Sir Roger in the Dover Patrol in War Î, when he was in his prime, and when we met in Glasgow I was shocked to see how old and ill he looked.’ After a landing exercise at Arisaig during which Keyes fell asleep in the heather and was ‘captured’ thus by the landing force, the two went on to Inveraray where; .. .commando units were Kving in a swamp in shocking conditions, and doing long, boring training schemes. Here tliey had no weapons at all, no craft to work with, and no real plan to work to. This first visit to Inveraray was depressing and it was plain that the three services were not working to­ gether. In fact the RAF was conspicuous by its absence and the Navy was very thin on the ground.«« Fell’s first task was to get craft and men to Inveraray to form a Naval training unit to work with the army. O f the 90 landing craft built, or in course of construction in February 1940, some 27 had been lost in Norway and France and just 19 completed craft remained.'*^ O r­ ders for another 74 landing craft o f various types were placed immediately and 136 Higgins Eureka boats were ordered from America as a stop-gap. Christened ‘R Boats’, these wooden vessels were far from ideal assault craft, but they could land 25 men at 12 knots onto a beach and get off again.**® Clearly there would eventually be a cross-channel assault, but more immediate operations would involve landing limited forces anywhere on the coast o f Europe or in the Mediterra­ nean. R boats and landing craft were capable o f only short sea crossings on their own so, if military force was to be projected anywhere beyond a small portion o f the French coast, ships equipped to carry both landing craft and assault force would be needed. Three 18 knot, 10,000 ton Glen liners, Glengyle, Gleneam and Gknroy were converted to Landing Ships Infantry (Large) capable o f landing a battalion-sized unit o f 850 troops by November 1940. The withdrawal o f a fourth Glen ship meant it would be impossible to carry an assault «5 Young : 195& p. 23. Maund refers top these two LCAs having been brought to Inveraray fiom the Tyne via the Cale- | donian Canal, and having been closely inspected by a German aircraft off Kinnakd Head. Maund : 1949 p. 106. ««Pell : 1966 pp. 72-73. I «7 Naval Bevimno. 48 p. 443. The KyesPapersNoi. I ll p. 77. | «« Fell writes that the Eurekas were, had boats, but better than nothing... ’ Fell ; 1966 p. 73. Maund : 1949 p. 63. | 165 North Western Approaches force o f two brigades, so the 3,000 ton Dutch passenger ships Queen Emma and Princess Beatrix were taken up, each o f which could land a half battalion/® Maund had been impressed by Japanese assault landings in China where landing craft laden •\s c , ^ " The Landing Ship (Sternchute) Princess iris, a converted cross­ channel train ferry, here being demonstrated to the Prime Minis­ ter at Inveraray in 1941, was de­ signed to carry light tanks in LCMs which could then be launched down a ramp in the stem . As with several of the early Combined Operations improvisa­ tions, she never saw operational service. with vehicles, stores and men were launched from larger vessels. Two Harwich-Zeebrugge train ferries were taken up, renamed Iris and Daffodil after the Mersey ferries used at Zee­ brugge, and converted to carry landing craft launched down a slipway in the stern. Primar­ ily intended for landing vehicles and stores, these Landing Ships (Sternchute) had a range o f just 1,000 miles and were o f Httle use beyond cross-channel operations. Three Admiralty oilers were converted, the latter to carry 14 landing craft.^® Operational craft based in the Glen ships were three flotillas of 12 LCAs, two LCMs and one fast launch, one flotilla to each ship. The two former train ferries each carried a flotilla of 13 LCMs and the Dutch ships each carried six LCAs, 4 LCMs and two fast launches. The Belgian cross-Channel ferries Prince Charles, Princess Josephine Charlotte, Princess Astrid, Prince Leopold, Prince Phillipe and Prince Albert were substantially if only partially successfully reconstructed, and fitted with davits for eight minor landing craft.^* Fell brought the first converted Belgian ferries, Prince Charles and Prince Leopold, to Invera­ ray in the summer o f 1941. He wrote. Living conditions were better than when I had last seen them, but it appeared to us simple sailors that the confusion in the minds o f the three services ashore could never be straightened out. A big fleet o f ships now lay in Loch Fyne o ff Inveraray. It consisted o f liners between 12,000 and 20,000 «9 DEFE 2 698. Fergusson : 1961 p 41 and pp. 55-56. Naval Bevietv no.48 p. 443. Maund : 1949 p. 66. 79 The shallow-draught ‘Maracaibo’ oilers were Dewdale, Ennerdale and DermntdaU. Naval Rmew no.48 p. 443. Maund ; 1949 p. 67. 7( Letter from Director o f Military Training to Scottish Command, 10 August 1940, in DEFE 2 814. For the Belgian steamers see Fell : 1966 pp. 74-78. 166 North Western Approaches tons. They had been converted to troopships and repair ships, motor transport carriers and assault sMps. Ideas for their use were not lacking, but they were conflicting, and changed so often, that co­ ordinated training never reached a practical stage. We did, however, embark one commando after another and with them gained experience in handling our landing craft and in teaching the soldiers the elements o f boat work. T h e Ra i d i n g P h a s e - P a r t 1 W o r k s h o p , C l a y m o r e a n d H e m is p h e r e Keyes and the Prime Minister first discussed WORKSHOP, a plan for an assault on Pantel- laria, in September 1940 and saw it as but the first of series of similar operations to take the Dodecanese Islands and perhaps knock Italy out of the war before the Germans could intervene. WORKSHOP envisaged 2,000 men o f 3, 7, 8 and 11 Commandos saihng from the Clyde as part of Malta convoy WS5(a), the assault ships leaving the convoy under the cover o f darkness to seize Pantellaria from its Italian garrison. Intensive training for WORKSHOP was carried out on Arran with 7 Commando at Lochranza, 9 Commando at Whiting Bay and 11 Commando at L a m l a s h . ^ 2 jp November, Keyes’ son Geoffrey, a Captain in 11 Commando, wrote to his father o f the difficulty o f keeping highly trained men motivated: .. .the men are longng for a show.. .One troop has gone away for a boating holiday, and the rest are pretty jealous and excited. If we have to wait until January, we wiU be a flop, for an absolute certainty. Men are asking to go back to their units so that they can go to the Middle East to fight. It is all dis­ appointing, so fix us up Pop.®5 The Chiefs o f Staff were unenthusiastic but, for several days at the beginning o f December, it appeared that WORKSHOP might take place and Commandos waited aboard ship in Lam- lash Bay. Keyes was at the Douglas Hotel in Brodick when, to his evident fury, the Cabinet effectively abandoned the operation on 17 December, the day before it was due to sail.*^ '* As his son’s letter highlights, troops had trained on the promise, assiduously bolstered by Keyes, o f action and the cancellation o f WORKSHOP led to a drop in morale. Training con­ tinued, in dreadful weather, but much o f the zeal had gone. Then, on 31 January, 7, 8 and 11 Commandos sailed from Lamlash for the Middle East aboard the Glen ships, in part as a response to intelligence that a German invasion o f Greece or Turkey was imminent.*'^ Those left behind were particularly dispirited and, as Lovat notes, ‘I t appeared pretty hope­ less: good men went back to their regiments and morale at every level slumped accord- 72 Black Hackle — The Story of 11 (Scottish) Commando paper by Prof Graham Lappin. 73 Ibid. p. 8. 74 SeeThe Keyes Papers pp. 100-115 and 119-131 for WORKSHOP wliich was not, as Fergusson, Horan and others sug­ gest, abandoned because Stokas had arrived in Sicily (the airccaft did not arrive there until January 1941). It and con­ current plans to seize the Azores (BRISK) and the Canaries (SHRAPNEL) were killed off by First Sea Lord Dudley Pound, who disliked Keyes, and Naval C-in-C Mediterranean Sir Andrew Cunningham. The latter pointed out that his resources were already over-stretched and tliat he would be unable to maintain a garrison on Pantellaria. Chur­ chill always regretted having abandoned the operation, believing that many ships in the 1942 Mediterranean convoys could have been saved had an air base been available on Pantellaria. 75 Gilbert : 1989 p. 978 and fn. 2. Smith : 1998 p. 69. Decrypts from German railway Enigma showed the movement of Luftwaffe signals personnel into Bulgaria. Keyes was not privy to the ULTRA secret. 167 North Western Approaches ingly’, Keyes had lost his only completed assault ships and three o f his finest units/^ The Mediterranean had become the main theatre o f war and, with his best forces tied up there for the foreseeable future, Keyes was forced to look for targets nearer at hand where the short-range assault ships could operate. Norway was the obvious choice and several proposals were examined, among them CASTLE, a return in strength to Jossingfjord. What­ ever happened, an operation to Norway would have to wait until the assault ships Princess Beatrix and Queen Emma completed at the end o f February. Operation CLAYMORE as approved by Churchill on 27 January 1941 involved four landings on the Lofoten Islands off Narvik to destroy fish oil factories which produced, amongst other things, what were beheved to be vital supplies o f vitamins. Trawlers and fish-carrying ships were to be sunk, though not local fishing craft, and Germans and Quislings were to be rounded up.2® Keyes was unenthusiastic about what he deemed a ‘side-show’, and the plan had been urged on the Prime Minister by SOE head Hugh Dalton who had his own agenda to pursue.?® But Norwegian Foreign Minister in London Tryggve Lie was ‘most en­ thusiastic’, particularly when told that the Norwegian communities would be provided with sugar, coffee and clothing.?® 05*00" E rack ihart for the CLAYMORE for The CLAYMORE naval force was under Commander Clifford Caslon and he and landing force commander Major General J. C. Haydon were in the destroyer Somali. Bedouin, Tartar, Eskimo and Legion escorted the landing ships Queen Emma with 250 men o f 4 Commando under Lieutenant Colonel Dudley Lister and Princess Beatrix with 250 men o f 3 Commando under Lieu­ tenant Colonel John Durnford-Slater. Also in Princess Beatrix was a section o f 55 Field Company, Royal Engineers and an SOE party o f 62 Norwegian troops. The subma­ rine Sunjish sailed ahead o f the assault 7« Lovat : 1978 p. 190. The K^esPcpers'Ç^. 137-142. A CTC was established atKabretin die Great Bitter Lakes but the war in tlie Middle East turned against the British. 7 and 8 Commandos were disbanded after being badly mauled in Crete. 77DEFE 2 140. 78 Keyes and Tovey hoped that the CLAYMORE force would tempt enemy heavy units out from Norway, so Tovey put to sea with Nelson, King George V. Despite his feelings about the value o f CLAYMORE, Keyes wanted to command tiie landing force, but his offer was politely refused. The Kyes Pcpers-çç. 153-157. 79DEFE2140. 168 North Western Approaches force to act as a navigational beacon.^o Troops embarked at Gourock on 21 February and the force sailed for Scapa where practice landings were carried out in bad weather and a number of LCAs damaged. The force sailed Scapa at 0001/1 March, refuelled at the Faroe Islands then reached the Lofotens at 0000/4 March. It proceeded up Vestfjord, then di­ vided with Queen ^mma^ Somali^ Tartar and Bedouin making for Svolvaer and Princess Beatrix with "Eskimo and Eegion for Stamsund. According to a naval report. The weather was ideal for our purpose, a slight sea and overcast sky which cleared at intervals and al­ lowed sights to be taken. This simplified the approach to Vest Fjord and, with the assistance o f Sun- fish's D /F beacon transmission, the entrance was made as planned.®' fig. 46 Svolvaer t a r m map used in CLAYMORE The following shipping was destroyed during CLAYMORE: Sunk By _swj> TonsSomali Knbbs 1Tartar Hamburg j 9,870 ’ Tartar Felix 2,047 ; Tartar Heumann ■ 1,079 j Tartar Eilenau ] 1,404 ; Tartar Paseÿes j 1,900 i Tartar Rissen \ 250 : Bedouin Mira (Not) 1 1152 1 Princess Beatrix Ando i 300 : Princess Beatrix Groto i 200 : Demolition Parties Bernhardt Scbulte^ e ! 1,500 1 Total j 20,002 Sources: DEFE 2 140 and Witthoft : 1971 80 Ibid. 81 ADM 234 380. 169 North Western Approaches Eighteen factories were destroyed along with 800,000 gallons o f oil, 225 prisoners were taken, and 314 Norwegian volunteers were embarked along with the British manager of Allen & Hanbury’s fish oil factory rescued from Brettesnes. Fourteen German sailors had been killed in the engagement between Somali and Krehhs; the only British casualty being an officer in 4 Commando who slipped and shot himself in the th igh .V aluab le experience was gained and many lessons learned. One report describes the difficulties experienced by the LCAs heading for Henningsvaer directly into a head wind: The effect o f the cold on tibis particular party gave the opportunity to Reuters correspondent Mr J. R. N. Nixon, who happened to be on board this destroyer [Eskimo], o f recording afterwards that it had so intense that spray breaking over the boats froze as it fell on them. Commander Brunton o f Princess Beatrix wrote that when the men landed all their guns were frozen up, icicles hung from their caps and beards and the men were so stiff with cold that in the words o f an Officer they crawled out like sleepy flies. The Commander doubted whether they would have been able to fight and found it a clear case for some protection for LCAs in a head sea in such temperatures.®^ It was indeed fortunate that the landing was unopposed. 4 LCAs during CLAYMORE and (below, left) some souvenirs. CLAYMORE had, on the face o f it at least, been an operation with, ‘...an object mainly economic, partly political and only in a very remote degree military’.®'* A Norwegian historian has written that the British elation at the success o f CLAYMORE was not shared in Norway where the factories destroyed were the only source o f employment, and where the Germans exacted heavy reprisals following the raid. The Nor­ wegian view, to some extent shared by the Norwe­ gian troops who had taken part, was that the raid 82 For narratives of CLAYMORE, see reports by Brigadier Haydon and Lt Col Parkes-Smith in DEFE 2 140, also Lovat : 1978 chapter 12 and Young : 1958 chapter 2. 83 DCO’s summary of CLAYMORE in DEFE 2 140. 84 DCO’s summary o f CLAYMORE in DEFE 2 140. 70 North Western Approaches had no military value and had done nothing to restrict the German capacity to wage war.®^ But CLAYMORE was no stunt as an unstated aim o f the operation was to capture German Enigma signalling equipment and intelligence. Documents found in the Harbour Control Office at Svolvaer included an appreciation o f the political situation in Norway by von Falkenhorst, information on German control over the Norwegian press and details o f powers o f arrest enjoyed by the Gestapo and Wehrmacht.®^ Commander Skipworth in Tar­ tar came in for criticism for sinking the tanker Hamburg before she could be boarded and searched. A party from Somali had, however, boarded Krehbs and found her wheelhouse wrecked with Oberleutnant Kup finger and a rating lying dead by the wheel. Caslon wrote that the party searched Kupfinger’s cabin and: ...all available documents, official and private, were removed and a locked box discovered in a locked drawer was also retrieved. This was later found to contain spare wheels for a cypher machine.. .There was no trace in the ship o f the cypher machine itself.®^ The Prime Minister was undoubtedly aware o f the material recovered from Krehbs when he minuted Keyes on 16 March: The unqualified success o f CLAYMORE says much for the care and skill with which it was planned, and the determination with which it was executed. Pray accept for yourself and pass to all concerned my warm congratulations on a very satisfactory operation.®® A month later, 11 Unge Kompani men sailed Lerwick aboard the Norwegian destroyer Mans­ field for HEMISPHERE, the destruction o f a herring oil factory at 0ksfjord. The objective had been chosen by SOE as it had a large capacity and the Finnmark herring fishery, from which it drew its supplies, was about to start. HEMISPHERE, which was carried out on 8 April, was a success, the only incident o f note concerning a Quisling who shot his wife by accident. Mansfield returned to Lerwick on 15 April, but the success o f the raid was marred by further tension between the British and the Norwegian government in exile who were not informed o f the raid, not even as a courtesy after it had taken place.®^ PiLGRiM^s P r o g r e s s - T h e F a l l o f R o g e r K e y e s British troops were evacuated from Greece at the end o f April 1941 and, on 28 April, Enigma decrypts revealed that a German air and sea attack on Crete was imminent. The battle for Crete began on 20 May and 16,500 British troops were evacuated between 27 and 29 May, leaving 13,000 to surrender. The loss o f Greece in April and Axis tactical superior­ ity in the Mediterranean compelled the British Chiefs o f Staff to consider the vulnerability Amfmn Moland in Salmon (ed.) : 1995, chapter 15. See also Cookridge ; 1966 p. 528-529 and Baden-Powell : 1982. 88 Vansittart papers VNSTII 2/30, Churchill College Archives, Cambridge University. 8^ Report by Caslon in DEFE 2 140. 88This is not to su^pst tliat Keyes was ‘in on’ the Ultra Secret - he was not. HS 2 224. 89 HS 2 224. Baden-Powell : 1982. 171 North Western Approaches of Gibraltar. The Spanish government had been under considerable pressure to allow German troops across its territory to attack the British colony which commanded the western gateway to the Mediterranean. Demonstrating a wireless set at Inveraray in 1941. Roger Keyes peers over the Prime Minister’s shoulder on this, the last occasion on which Churchill and his old friend saw eye-to-eye. The prospect o f losing Gibraltar led the War Cabinet to approve, on 24 April, a plan to seize the Spanish Canary Islands, an objective first promoted by Keyes eight months ear­ lier.^ At Las Palmas, the Canaries had the only facilities on any of the Atlantic islands re­ motely comparable to Gibraltar. The plan, christened PUMA, was to involve a force of 12,000 men, its nucleus being the troops newly returned to Inveraray from CLAYMORE. Rehearsals were carried out in Loch Fyne and shipping was assembled. Loading o f the 29'^ Infantry Brigade, four battalions o f Royal Marines, four Commandos, a squadron of tanks and artillery began at Inveraray, Greenock and Troon early in May with a view to sailing on the Then the schedule was thrown into disarray by the Greenock Blitz and finally, what Fergusson aptly describes as, ‘...the familiar and heart-breaking business of post­ ponement after postponement,’ began.^^ On 9 May Keyes lamented that PUMA would not sail until 22 May, and this was followed by further delays, each o f a month as the attack could only take place during a no-moon pe- 90 Gilbert : 1989 p. 1142 and fn. 9> Maund : 1949 p. 108. 92 Colonel Yeo, Clyde Movements Officer, describes the difficulties experienced with WS8C, the PUMA convoy, thus; Cargo and MT for stores ships had to be loaded in on a pre-stowage plan with almost every commodity in a marked spot; troops on personnel ships had to be embarked on lines similar to those laid down for that prototype of embarkation officers, Noah; and finally the personnel ships had a mixed bag of landing rations, water tins, petrol, ammunition and other small gear to be put on in quantities varying with the number to embark. As these numbers themselves varied, vhilst some of the ships were embarking as far off as Inveraray (north) and Troon (south), and the Force HQ thought nothing of charging its tactical plans in the midst of the job, barge loads of equipment floated in all directions all the time... As soon as the work of recon­ ciling paper numbers to bodies got started, a series of air raids on Greenock started (5/6/7 May) that taroke the telephone system and cut the railway beyond Port Glasgow; all through the night of 6 May the Committee and Port staff sat round the table with details of train loads, ship allotments and unit compositions...while increasing evidence came in that the rail tables wouldn’t work since the lines were cut. ((.i.iu'i.! ovcrh-iit'^ 172 North Western Approaches liod.^^ The forces allocated to PUMA grew to almost 20,000 with the addition o f the 36* Infantry Brigade, the operation was rechristened PILGRIM and a new land force commander. Lieutenant General Harold Alexander, was appointed. Finally, it was decided that PILGRIM would sail in September, but Alexander and Naval Force Commander designate Rear Ad­ miral Louis Hamilton, whose relations with Keyes had soured over the summer, felt strongly that a full-scale dress rehearsal was required. Thus was born Exercise LEAPFROG.^'* Keyes wanted LEAPFROG held on Arran but Alexander and Hamilton insisted on sailing the force from Inveraray to Scapa and carrying out a landing there. It is a measure o f Keyes’ waning influence that he was overruled and the exercise did indeed take place at Scapa in bad weather on 10 -11 August 1941.^® LEAPFROG was a shambles and it was abun­ dantly clear that, as Fergusson writes, ‘Against a stubborn Spanish opposition there would have been a d isa s te r .L an d in g s were lamentably slow, beaches became clogged with stores, troops failed to move off inland and communications between ship and shore, and within the assault ships themselves, failed utterly.^^ Keyes wrote that the proceedings, ‘...disclosed a deplorable lack o f organisation to overcome the hazards and difficulties o f such a formidable enterprise.’^ ® Lieutenant W. S. Knight, a signaller with 229 Battery, 58 Field Regiment RA, wrote that LEAPFROG: j ., .proved disastrous, with everything that could go wrong doing so. Landing craft were stuck on the j shore with an ebb tide, wireless sets failed to function, motor vehicles got seawater in their engines Î and failed to move, to mention just a few o f the horrors. When it ended and we all got back to Inver­ aray the Director o f Combined Operations, Admiral Sir Roger Keyes, was most caustic about every­ thing. At a large post-mortem meeting he was scathing about our efforts and passed the comment that we were nowhere near the quality o f the previous generation whom he had led on the Zeebrugge | raid in 1918, There were those present who, while admitting that there were obvious lessons to be j learned, felt that a helpful and constructive criticism together with encouragement for the future :[ would have been infinitely preferable.'*'' | Few of the deficiencies were actually Keyes’, or Combined Operations HQ ’s, fault. The j Navy was preoccupied with the Battle o f the Atlantic and accorded Combined Operations i low priority. Thus one o f the major shortcomings was the poor standard o f landing craft j crews whom Keyes had long been recommending should be trained at Inveraray alongside i the units they were to land. The Army, on the other hand, were less heavily extended and, :| ias Keyes fairly pointed out, Alexander had had PILGRIM Force under his command for two I months, yet had refused help from Combined Operations HQ. Hamilton and Alexander | submitted a report on LEAPFROG direct to the Chiefs o f Staff^ by-passing Keyes, in which I Yeo MS, IWM Department of Documents ref. 95/6/1 . Fergusson ; 1961 p. 79. 93 Letter Keyes to Churcliill 9 May 1941 in The Keyes Papers pp. 166-167. 94 Ibid. pp. 82-83,188-193. 95 Ibid. p. 191. 9* Fergusson ; 1961 p. 82. 97 Ibid. p. 82. Report on LEAPFROG in DEFE 2 869. 98 Keyes memorandum o f 19 August 1941 in DEFE 2 869. 99 Knight MS, IWM Department o f Documents ref. 97/7/1. 73 North Western Approaches they exonerated themselves and blamed Combined Operations for the deficiencies. Keyes, meanwhile, recommended that PILGRIM should be dropped in favour o f YORKER, a plan to capture S a rd in i a .A f t e r refusing to accept a reduced directive in September, Keyes was replaced by Captain Lord Louis Mountbatten whose revised role o f Adviser on Combined Operations reflected the nervousness o f the Chiefs o f Staff after the divisions that marked Keyes’ time.'®' King George Vi’s visit to Invera- ray on 9 October 19 4 1 v/as un­ doubtedly avYkward for Keyes (centre left) who had been sacked five days earlier. Vice Admiral Teddy Hallett (centre right) was appointed Vice Admiral Com­ bined Training on I September 1940. Next to Hallett is the Army Commandant at Inveraray, Briga­ dier Cyrus Greenslade. The pho­ tograph was taken outside Hal- let’s headquarters at Tigh na Rudha, then a Campbell dower house and now (2001 ) the Loch Fyne Hotel. Mountbatten told Roskill that he inherited ‘absolutely nothing’ of value from his predeces­ sor, but this is self-serving n o n s e n s e .K ey e s ’ appointment may have been a mistake and evidence of a tendency displayed by both Churchill and Pound to appoint senior officers with reputations earned over 20 years before, but he had achieved a much against the odds.'®) At a time when mihtary hardware was in desperately short supply and subject to a range o f competing demands, Keyes had contrived to set up CTC Inveraray and other training estabhshments, improvise landing ships and craft, and recruit, train and equip ten Commandos. He estabhshed Combined Operations as a separate headquarters, organised a planning staff and mounted operations. '90 In a Lees Knowles lecture given at Cambridge in 1943 and quoted in Aspinall-Oglander : 1951 pp. 380-409, Keyes castigated those who, .. .organised a full scale rehearsal, but declined any assistance from the Directorate of Combined Operations or its Train­ ing Centre. A number of shocking miscarriages occurred in the direction and conduct of the exercise which took no ac­ count of the realities of modem war. Fortunately the operation never took place.. .The moral of this unfortunate episode is that it is not sufficient to train and temper and Amphibious Striking Force unless those who are to command, lacking practical experience, closely study former operations and make use of experience already gained. '9' The intrigues that surrounded Keyes’ dismissal are discussed in the article Too Old or Too Bold - The Removal Roger Keyes as Director of Combined Operations in Imperial War Museum Review no. 8 (1993) pp. 72-84. Undoubtedly Keyes’ ag­ gressiveness, tactlessness and immodesty were partly to blame, as were the terms of the Directive he inherited from Bourne. But as Fergusson writes, ‘Every hesitancy recalled for him the lost opportunities o f Gallipoli and the seized opportunity of Zeebrugge.’ Then there was the simmering discontent among both the Chiefs of Staff, still seething at Keyes’ criticism of them following defeat in Norway and France. And his fellow Admirals disliked the fact that, the First Sea Lord included, they were all technically outranked by him. Ultimately, however, the fault lay with Churchill who hastily appointed a friend as DCO without considering the implications. Fergusson : 1961 p. 84. i92Roslrill; 1977 p. 111. '93 Such appointments presupposed that no younger officers of such calibre were coming forward and thus had a de­ moralising effect on those passed over. !74 North Western Approaches C o m b i n e d T r a i n i n g ( N a v a l ) Keyes may have achieved a great deal but, such was his vanity, he had seen Combined Op­ erations as a private army that would become the means to take the war back into Europe, naturally under his command. Conveniently isolated from the Whitehall machine that he despised so openly, Inveraray was to be the base from where this amphibious force would reach out anywhere on the coast o f Europe and beyond. Mountbatten, with his revised Di­ rective, changed the emphasis to developing all-arms assault techniques, equipment and training that would see large formations ashore on enemy-held territory to stay. The train­ ing organisation was recast with this in mind. PILGRIM was finally abandoned in October 1941, not least because it was apparent that the Spanish threat to Gibraltar had receded with the German invasion o f the Soviet Union. PILGRIM Force, augmented by the 1st Guards Brigade, moved to Largs. Maund writes. Being the only trained Combined Operations force in the country, with most o f the ships and most o f the craft, it very naturally usurped, if such a word can be used, the functions o f the CTC and it was this force which discussed technique, tried it out and laid it down.'®* But Combined Operations training had to be standardised and thus the syllabus had to re­ main the sole responsibility o f the CTCs. Command was centralised under Vice Admiral Theodore ‘Teddy’ Hallett and Major General James Drew who set up shop in HMS Warren, the Hollywood Hotel in Largs, where they were joined by Hamilton and Alexander.'®® In February 1941, immediately prior to CLAYMORE, there had been some 20 LCMs and 36 LCAs available, but the PILGRIM Force had left Inveraray for Largs with every available craft, even those allocated for training. When, in October 1941, Inveraray began training the 4* Division by brigades, only the LSI(L) Ettrick was available, and not a single landing craft. Folding army boats and naval cutters were pressed into service but, as Maund ac­ knowledges, ‘The training was not very realistic...’.'®® Mountbatten, a naval ‘communicator’, made one o f his first tasks dealing with the signal- LCAs on Loch Fyne. Early in the war, every landing craft was commanded by an officer. This was later reduced to one officer per sub-division of three LCAs. Crews then comprised a Cox­ swain, usually a Leading Seaman, a stoker to look after the two V8 petrol engines and two seamen. '94 Maund : 1949 p. 108. 195 Fergusson r 1961 p. 91. '96 Maund : 1949 pp. 108-109. 175 North Western Approaches ling failures that had been so apparent during LEAPFROG. An inter-service signals commit­ tee that had been addressing the issue, was absorbed into Combined Operations HQ and became the new Combined Operations Signals Staff. One of the most pressing needs was for Beach Signallers and a school for Beach Signals Units o f one officer and 32 ratings opened at Inveraray on 1 November 1941. Four Beach Signals Units had completed train­ ing by 1 January 1942. Once again, the facilities at Inveraray were soon outgrown and, on 26 April 1942, the Combined Signal School moved to Auchingate Camp, Ayr, then renamed HMS Dundonaldf^^ Commandos landing under smoke during an exercise at Inveraray in 1941. The Higgins R Boat being used here vyas an unsuccessful assault craft, not least be­ cause it was unarmoured and very noisy. Leading the practice assault is Major jack Churchill. No relation of the Prime Minister, ‘Mad jack’ was nevertheless an­ other of those swashbuck­ ling characters for vdiom wars might have been in­ vented. Demand for landing craft was far outstripping the capacity of British shipyards already fully committed to replacing losses incurred in the Battle of the Atlantic. Further, ideas for new types of landing craft, like the LST were coming forward from Inveraray and Largs. Clearly, only American yards could build the craft required so a Combined Operations Mission went to Washington in November 1941, but, by 6 December, just seven LST had been agreed under Lend-Lease. Then the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor and, overnight, this figure increased to 400 landing craft o f various types. The British mission also visited Andrew Higgins, supplier o f the Eureka boats ordered in 1940, at New Orleans. Higgins was working on a design, based on a shallow-draught tug built for the Peruvian Govern­ ment, that would become the 50-foot LCM. Ten thousand of these were built and Maund describes them as, ‘...one o f the best minor landing craft ever built.’ The British mission ordered the first 250.'®® '97 Auchingate Camp had been built pre-war and the accommodation was lavish by comparison with Inveraray. The can^ was centrally heated, there was running hot and cold water and a 725 seat cinema. It had a edacity of 1,720 men 45 Warrant Officers and Sergeants. Expansion meant that 72 Nissen huts with a capacity o f 840 men were constructed on the adjacent golf course, but several were ‘blown away and deposited on the barrack square’ during a storm in the winter o f 1940-41. DEFE 2 814. DEFE 2 856. Fergusson : 1961 pp. 92-93. '9* Maund : 1949 pp. 82-85. Fergusson : 1961 pp. 110-115. For the development of various types o f assault craft see Maund : 1949 Ch. 4. and Ladd ; 1976. 176 North Western Approaches Rear Admiral H. E. Horan was appointed Rear Admiral Landing Craft and Bases and Com­ modore Guy Warren was made Senior Officer Assault Ships and Craft. Both joined the staff at the Hollywood Hotel and, on 21 January 1942, a maintenance and training es­ tablishment, Dinosaur, opened at Troon with personnel based at nearby Dundonald, LCM training bases were established at Castle Toward, which became Brontosaurus, and Lam­ lash. Despite the early shortages, however, hardware was never the greatest problem facing Combined Operations Headquarters. While for the Army and the RAF, combined opera­ tions represented a military science, for the Navy it was a specialised branch o f the service, and a uniquely unpopular one at that. The Joint Planners had begun considering a future invasion o f the continent in October 1941 and a month later the forecast requirement for trained landing craft crews by May 1943 had risen to 1,500 officers and 20,000 ratings. Combined Operations was responsible for landing craft crews though, by February 1942, just 5,200 men had been trained, and most o f those had only received basic instruction in craft handling. Then the demands o f the wider war meant that many o f these trained men were drafted to fill vacancies in the fleet and most were only too keen to go as Combined Operations was seen as a dead-end. Intakes o f active service ratings had aU but ended by July 1941, so crews were then drawn from the RNVR, the RN Patrol Service and hostili- ties-only ratings. From February 1942 a regular fortnightly draft brought of 12 officers and 150 seamen from Northney, where they received basic training, to Quehac at Inveraray for training alongside the Army."® An acute shortage o f officers led to the opening o f a further training establishment at Lo- chailort in 1943.'" Candidates were drawn from hostilities-only ratings already selected for officer training in the RNVR, but their commissions were not applicable to general service. The peak requirement was around D Day and until the French ports fell into Allied hands and, by June 1944, some 5,500 RNVR officers, 500 RM officers, 43,500 naval ratings and 12,500 RM ORs had been trained at the CTCs for landing craft service."^ This was in addi­ tion to beach personnel, maintenance staffs, hard parties and sundry other personnel which took the total involved to some 113,000 men and women."® 109 Also at Lamlash, based on HMS. Coronia, Royal.Marine Beach Battalions began training in May 1942. DEFE 2 856. Maund : 1949 pp. 103. no Per Mars spring 1946 article entitled HMS Qusbscpp. 175-176. See also Maund : 1949 p. 101. 1" Naval Review no. XXXIII (1945) article entitled Some Naval Aspects of Combitted Training pp. 29-32. 112 Ibid. and Maund : 1949 p. 105. 113 Maund : 1949 p. 99. For background, see also Edwards : 1946. 77 North Western Approaches C o m b i n e d T r a i n i n g (M i l i t a r y ) From its opening in October 1940, CTC Inveraray continued an unbroken programme of training until it reached a peak o f activity early in 1944 as preparations were made for OVERLORD. In addition to training Commandos in their unique amphibious role, the CTC trained Brigade groups in the assault role and other units in the ‘follow-up’ and ‘build-up’ roles. Port Operating Companies, squadrons o f the RAF Reghnent and RAF Servicing Commandos were also trained. While Hallett and Drew at Largs had overall responsibility for Combined Training, CTC Inveraray was the responsibility o f an Army Commandant. The Army organisation was di­ vided into four wings namely a Brigade Group Wing, an Army Tank Wing, an RE Wing and an REME Wing. The Army Tank Wing and the RE Wing carried out their own train­ ing and, aside from the allocation of craft and shore facilities, and participation in exer­ cises, were independent o f the main Brigade Group Wing. The REME Wing, on the other hand, worked under the Brigade Group Wing."'* The Naval training staff at Inveraray op­ erated under a Captain RN responsible to the Commandant primarily to teach Army for­ mations how to work with the Navy. This was a quite separate estabUshment hom Quebec which provided and maintained assault craft, and trained their crews."® As Fergusson writes, in the early days, the RAF took the view that, ‘one bit o f air being pretty much like another bit o f air, there was nothing particularly tricky in supporting an amphibious operation.’"® Inter-service divisions were not easily broken down and one of the lessons of the Rl-conceived Dieppe landing in August 1942 was the need for massive fire support, not only from the sea, but also from the air. But not until the Alamein cam­ paign later in 1942 did true co-operation begin to develop.'" Even in 1944, the RAF pres­ ence at Inveraray was small, though co-operation had gone further than this suggests. Seven camps to accommodate permanent staff and troops under training were laid out around Loch Fyne, the most northerly being Shira Camp which housed an 800-man battal­ ion, up to 250 other Brigade Group troops and was permanent home to the RASC Motor Boat Company. Castle Camp housed another battalion and other small units, Duke’s Camp accommodated Brigade Fleadquarters and Town Camp housed some 1,100 men and women including CTC administrative personnel, the transport pool, REME workshops and other facilities. A building programme initiated in mid-1941 increased capacity to 5,150 ORs and included the new Avenue Camp built next to Town Camp to house the Army H4DEFE 2 1318. Per Mars pp. 175-176. 116 Fergusson : 1961 p. 82. 117 Terraine : 1985 p. 343-344 and 559-562. North Western Approaches Tank Wing. Two requisitioned houses, Tigh na Rudha (Admiralty House), the CTC Head­ quarters, and Rudha na Craig, normally the home of the Duke of Argyll’s ailing sister, pro­ vided officers accommodation. Two and a half miles south o f the town were Chamois and Kilbride Camps around the na­ val establishment at HMS Quebec with engineering workshops, boat slips and two steel piers. From 1942 several o f the 'lines’ in Town Camp were taken over by the Navy for ac­ commodating landing craft crews under training. But the pressure on accommodation dur­ ing training for the Normandy invasion was such that the old American passenger liners Northland and Southland were supplied under Lend-Lease as accommodation ships and moored offshore. Additional to the training staff, a small staff was maintained at each of the seven camps for maintenance and hand-overs. Soalm - P o u r I i r i h — t o O œ S t» t u t « UlXe Bpa* orflo* to: Mnwl Canqi PzamtciM Omt J^EUbda* OMzg fig . 5 3 Military camps around Inveraray in 1942 (not to scale). MI5 wanted to declare Inveraray and other training areas in the w est of Scotland a Protected Area, thus barring public access. The area extended from Spean Bridge to the Mull of Kintyre and included the Loch Lomond road to Arden, Helensburgh and the Isle of Arran. Keyes suggested this would merely draw attention to the place, and imposing a permit system would be impossible, not least because so many Helensburgh residents travelled to work in Glasgow. So, in July 1941, most of Argyll and Bute was made a 'Controlled Area'. While no permits would be re­ quired to go there, the Admiralty or War Office could close the area at a mo­ ment's notice. That summer, however, Teddy Hallett wanted the County Council to pass bye-laws that would stop ‘picknicking on parts of Loch Fyne- side, charabanc tours to or near Inveraray, steamer trips to Inveraray and loi­ tering by visitors.’ 179 North Western Approaches Brigade Groups were moved to Inveraray either by road, rail or ferry. Rail moves were to Arrochar or Dalmally, with vehicles arriving by rail going to D aim ally where there was a ramp for unloading. Moves by ferry generally involved troops being taken to either Green­ ock, Ardrossan or Wemyss Bay by rail, and from there by sea. Training facilities ashore in­ cluded a large lecture room in the Drill HaU which could seat 150 and two smaller lecture rooms in the Drill Hall each fit­ ted with tiered seating and a model o f a section o f the Loch Fyne coastline. There was an­ other more basic lecture theatre in a hut next door which could seat 80 and the Main Cinema in Duke’s Camp could seat 750, though this was primarily a recreation facility. A Briefing Room in a Nissen hut in Duke’s Camp was equipped with two scale models o f the training areas. Four 25 foot scrambling towers on the golf course were intended to give troops con­ fidence before they were asked to climb down the side of a ship and, at the quarry behind the town, ropes were set up for practising cliff-scaling. Six wooden dummy LCAs and a concrete mock-up LCT complete with deck, ramp and water-splash were built beside the Main Cinema. At Dubh Locb field firing area there were another five dummy LCAs made o f scaffolding and canvas. Ladyfield field firing area was dotted with defence points and miles o f dannert wire, as were Hell’s Glen and Newton Bay. Operational requirements meant that the number of ships and craft available for training at Inveraray varied constantly. There was endless competition between the Army and Navy for the use of craft and, in March 1942, and despite the desperate shortage o f trained crews, Inveraray’s naval wing were complaining that, ‘The lack o f craft for naval training classes has very seriously affected the training.’” ® The CTC could generally rely on there being one LSI(L) with 24 LCA, one LSI(S) with 18 LCA and one LST available for train­ ing, though this was subject to operational requirements. At its peak, in 1943, the resident a Duke’s and Castle Camps next to Inveraray Castle under construction in 1941. 118DEFE2 715. 180 North Western Approaches training flotilla comprised 104 craft, and this was generally made up o f 25 LCA or LCV, two flotillas o f LCT, one LCI(L), six LCS(M) and two LCA(HR), though again this could change due to training requirements elsewhere.” ^ The scale and type o f training offered at Inveraray varied somewhat with the resources available. In general terms, however, and as the Inveraray training manual has it, assault battalions were given training in: (a) General knowledge o f what is involved in a combined operation. (b) Marching personnel in embarking and disembarking from LSI. (c) Infantry company groups in tire capture o f the assault company objective. (d) Infantry companies in the role o f reserve companies. (e) Drivers in waterproofing and wading their vehicles, in embarking and disembarking from landing ships by day and by night (f) The whole battalion in a battalion group assault. Battalion officers and specialists should receive certain additional training. Training films were used along with lectures using the models in the lecture rooms to give a general knowledge o f Combined Operations. AH marching personnel were then given ‘LSI Drill’ involving both lectures and practical exercises. Troops would parade at Invera­ ray Pier for transport by drifter out to an LSI, then messing arrangements were concluded and a short talk on the landing was given over the ship’s address system. The LSI was then darkened and the procedure for boarding the LCAs was rehearsed, often in bad weather, with fully laden troops slipping on wet decks. It was found that, with a LSI(S) carrying six LCAs, to complete this routine with two companies would take a minimum of half a day. With an LSI(L) carrying 24 LCAs a battalion group could be trained in a day. Further prac­ tice in LSI Drill was given during each course as, wherever possible, aU landing exercises were started from an LSI.^^^ Training then moved on to battle driUs by company for opposed assault landings. First, officers and senior NCOs were given a demonstration on the beach models, then company groups were given a half day’s training in the mock-up LCAs. Practice landings from real LCAs followed over two and a half days, during which bangalore torpedoes, smoke bombs and smoke grenades were used, but not small-arms ammunition. A dryshod landing exer­ cise with all company group weapons and supported by artillery representing LCG(M)s and machine guns was then carried out at the mock-up LCAs. Following this, a wetshod com­ pany assault from landing craft was carried out at Newton Bay with full sea and air sup­ port. Finally, the company would return to the mock-up LCAs to correct any faults noted during the preceding exercises, they then reformed into Battalion Groups for a battalion- scale landing exercise, and finally into Brigade Groups for full-scale landings by day and 119DEFE2 713. 120 DEFE 2 1318. 121 Ib id . 181 North Western Approaches night. (See Appendix 1 for Admiralty chart no. 2382 Upper Loch Fyne giving the Inveraray beaches and training areas and notes on their use.) Equally important to the success o f an assault landing were follow-up formations and these too trained at Inveraray. Here, in addition to a general understanding o f combined opera­ tions and embarking and disembarking from landing ships and craft, they were taught to pass across beaches, through transit areas to the assembly area and on to deployment for attack. The Inveraray training cycle for a follow-up brigade took eight working days: Training Lecture: General Aspects of Combined Operations^ _______ _ ____ FHm: Combined Operations. Lecture: Naval Aspects (in two parts). Lecture : Military Aspects._________ Lecture: Combined Operations. Lecture: The ^ ya l ~Navy.___ Fiïtti: Beach Organisation.__ Demonstration o f landing ships and craft. ____________ ___ __ LSI Drill. Time % hr. ' % hr. IV2 hrs. _ i hr. ' % hr. “ Remarks Officer’s Cadre course. Officer’s Cadre course. Officer’s Cadre course. Officer’s Cadre course. Each Battalion. ÿz hr . IV4 hrs. Each Battalion. Each Battalion. Each Battalion. LCI(L) Drin. LCA Drill. Demonstration o f beach signs and personnel and vehicle transit areas. 1 hr. 2Jirs. 2 hrs. Scrambling nets and rope pulUng. Exercise NOCTURNE. Each Battalion. Similar to the drill given to assault formations as above, but took into account that troops may have to disembark, not only into LCAs, but also into LCI(L)s and LCTs.___ Each Company. Each Company. Each Battalion. Exercise STRACHUR. !.. Exercise FURNACE. Exercise HARR.OW. Driving on and off landing craft. Two V2 days and one i%ht Practice for drivers. Each Battalion as time permitted. _ The object o f fids Battalion exercise was: (a) To practice troops in embarking in an LSI in the dark. (b) To practice disembarking in the dark. (c) To practice landing on a prepared beach and _ passing through a transit area by night. The object o f this Company exercise was: (a) To practice each company in landing on a shal­ low beach. (b) To carry out a field firing exercise after passing through transit and assembly areas. (c) To particularly emphasise the need to take care o f weapons and equipment during a wet land­ ing where troops are to go into action shortly after hmc^g. _______________________ The object o f this Battalion exercise was: (a) To practice embarking troops and vehicles from an LST. (b) To practice landing on a prepared beach by day, passing through the transit areas and as­ sembling in the assembly area. (c) To practice moving through the covering posi­ tion and subsequent deployment for attack. Exercise witli siinüar objects to Exercise FURNACE, but for three battalions operating together. 182 North Western Approaches Lecture: handing Tables. 1 hr. Commanding Officer, Second-in-Command, Adju- ! tant and Intelligence Officer. Lecture: Beach Organisation. \Vz hrs. Each Battalion’s officers. ‘ Lecture: handing Ships and Craft. % hr. Each Battalion’s officers. Lecture on aU types o f | ships and craft, including those not available at In- | veraray, but which were to be used in, for example, i O V E R L O R D . ; Model Démonstration: The Brigade Group in the Assault. 1 hr. Each Battalion’s officers. : i Lecture: Air Aspects of Combined Op- r 1 hr. Each Battalion’s officers. • erations. As the 4^' Division began training by brigades at Inveraray in October 1941, it was appar­ ent that there was not enough room to train both armoured formations and infantry bri­ gades. Alongside brontosaurus^ the LCM training base at Castle Toward, Nissen huts were constructed and the 6^ ^Armoured Division moved in to commence training. CTC Toward was commissioned on 1 June 1942. Newton Bay was too small to allow practice assaults by units larger than one battahon so, by April 1943, as training for OVERLORD gathered pace, CTC Toward had grown to include much o f the Ardlamont peninsula for advanced assault training. Sections o f the Atlantic Wall were replicated at Kilbride Bay and the exercise area, which included Portavadie and Glenan Bay, stretched almost into Tighnabruich and Kames. The area was evacuated o f civilians by 21 June 1943 and here, under hve firing conditions, brigade-sized units undertook the final stage o f their assault training. Inchmar- nock Island was also cleared o f civilians on 17 November 1943 so it could be used as a range by Royal Artillery Field Regiments firing from LCTs under way o f f T i g h n a b r u a i c h .^22 On 7 June 1943 the 3'^ '^ Division, one o f the assault divisions for D-Day, began training at Inveraray, each brigade being given a three-week course, and were followed into Inveraray by the 3*^*^ Canadian Division, another D-Day assault formation. In 1944 CTC Inveraray comprised 370,000 acres o f land, with CTC Dundonald taking up another 6,000 acres around Ayr and Troon. At Glen Caladh in the Kyles of Bute a Beach Pilotage School ap­ propriately christened fames Cook was opened to improve pilotage skills which would en­ sure landing craft reached the correct b e a c h . ^^ 3 At Ardentinny on Loch Long a former For­ estry Camp became Armadillo where Beach Commandos were trained in breaching anti­ invasion o b s t a c l e s . 1 24 Qn Kintyre (9,344 acres) and Arran (960 acres) there were linked ranges used for naval bombardment practice. A 28,400 acre range at Anderside Hill was used for artillery practice and training pilots and observers in artillery co-operation.i^s 122 The Admiralty, as did many at Combined Operations HQ, thought die selection o f the isolated Ardlamont penin­ sula a ‘blunder’. It was litde used and both it and die Inchmamock range were closed in January 1944 to allow X craft midget submarines which were to act as navigational beacons on D-Day to use Ettrick Bay for training. DEFE 2 1049. Maund : 1949 p. 109. 123 Fergusson : 1961 p. 183. 124 Ibid. 1 2 5 D E F E 2 1 1 1 7 . 183 North Western Approaches At the peak o f activity in 1943, the principal Combined Operations establishments in Scot­ land wered26 HMS Wamn The Hollywood Hotel, Largs. HQ of Rear Admiral Combined Operations. I RACO was responsible for the training and mounting operations like TORCH. j He was also responsible for the planning and organisation of large-scale com- I bined exercises. Warren also contained an Aircraft Recognition Section. j Troon Harbour Operational and Training Headquarters of the LCT organisation. In 1943 some | 30 LCTs were held for training and the course consisted of two weeks instruc- | tion, partly at Dundonald and partiy at sea, in ship-handling, beaching, flotilla ma- i noeuvres, gunnery etc. ; HMS Dundonald and Dundonald Camp was used for an accommodation and instructional centre for | HMS Dundonald II LCT crews, the Beach Organisation Course, the Beach Signals Course and tlie I Forward Observation Course. Beach Organisation courses trained officers in | movement control so they could act as Military Landing Officers ÇVlLOs). The | Beach Signals Course run by Dundonald II trained units firom the Army, Navy and j Marines in the signals organisation to be set up after a landing. The Forward Ob- i servation Course trained Gunnery Officers and NCOs in forward observation 1 and bombardment. Royal Engineers courses in mine clearance and road work, \ tank training and RAF Instructors courses were mounted as required. | HMS Brontosaurus Castle Toward, Dunoon. Working up base for LCT flotillas with also a repair and I maintenance establishment. Armoured units of the Army were trained in loading j and landing vehicles from LCTs. Included much of Ardlamont Peninsula as a j combined training area with replicas of sections of German coastal defences in | nortliem France. Inchmamock used as a gunnery range by gunners in LCTs fit- ! ing from Tighnabruich. | CTC Inveraray and HMS Quebec Base for the initial training of minor landing craft crew afloat, a course lasting 1 four weeks and including aircraft recognition, weapon training and anti-gas j measures. Also combined training with Army units including full-scale battalion | exercises and landings and the training of repair and maintenance parties. RAF i Servicing Commandos, Air Formation Signri Units and RAF Regiment Anti- | akcraft Squadrons given assault training. Port Operating companies of the Royal j Engineers were trained in Loading and unloading ships, the discharge of stores, | and manhandling stores and vehicles onto beaches and into craft. | Dodin House Special training courses for up to 200 navri personnel at a time who were spe- I cially trained and hardened for raiding. Aso used for basic assault training at i company level. I HMS fames Cook Establishment at Glen Caladh for the training of landing craft officers in beach 1 pilotage. The course lasted 16 days, half of which were spent in instruction i ashore, the other half in continuous training afloat. (Instruction in radio naviga- I tion aids was given as a separate course at HMS Nortbney, Hayling Island.) I HMS Amadilh Centre for the initiai training of Naval Beach Commandos at former Forestry | Commission camp in Glenfinnart. On completion of their training. Beach Com- | mandos went to Dundonald vrhese they joined up with the Beach Group and j Beach Signallers for Beach Group training. i HMS Pasco Establishment at Glenbranter House (prewar home of Sir Harry Lauder and a | former POW cage) for Advanced Signals Training for Landing Craft ratings and ! senior rates. i HMS Louisburg HMS Stopford Camp and dockyard facilities built at Rosneath by the US Navy under Lend- | Lease from March 1941. Originally to be used by USN escort groups which were j to have brought convoys right across the Atlantic. Never used as such and ! handed over to the RN as HMS Loulsbufg in 1941. Used for afloat training until | handed back to the Americans in August 1942 for TORCH. Used by both US I Navy and Army and by Combined Operations at intervals for the rest of the war. j Assembly and working up base at Bo’ness for LCT Flotillas constructed at yards I on the east coast, and on passage to the west coast. j 126DEFE2 714. North Western Approaches T h e R a i d i n g P h a s e - P a r t 2 G a u n t l e t , A n k l e t a n d A r c h e r y While CLAYMORE, the unopposed descent on the Lofoten Islands in March 19 4 1 , had little apparent military significance, the raid did convince Hitler that a British attack on Norway would follow BARBAROSSA, the German attack on the Soviet Union. He immediately or­ dered 160 coastal artillery and anti-aircraft batteries to N o r w a y .^27 The British had indeed been considering a plan, codenamed DYNAMITE, for a landing by four divisions in the Sta­ vanger area with a view to closing the northern exit to the North Sea and breaking German lines o f communication in Norway. Lack o f resources meant that this never got beyond the planning stage, but the strategic picture changed radically following BARBAROSSA. 128 German forces invaded the Soviet Union on the night o f 21 June 1941 . Churchill, with an eye to the new strategic position, advocated immediate British military reaction. ‘Now the enemy is busy in Russia,’ he said with customary vigour and, with an eye to the summer weather, ‘is the time to, “Make hell while the sun s h i n e s . ’” ^29 The political imperative was to give visible support, and one area where that could be done quickly was on the Soviet Union’s Arctic flank. On 15 July 1941 Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov suggested to British Ambassador Staf­ ford Cripps that British and Soviet troops should occupy Spitzbergen and Bear Island with a view to eventually expelling German troops from northern N o rw a y . T h e Norwegian authorities in London were enthusiastic and, on 27 July 1942 , Admiral Vian sailed Scapa in Nigeria with Aurora^ Punjabi and Tartar to investigate. Arriving at Spitzbergen on 31 July, he found the coal mining settlements at Longyearbyen (Norwegian controlled) and Barents- burg (Soviet controlled) free o f German occupation though both the Norwegian and So­ viet administrators doubted that this would continue. He then sailed for Bear Island, mid­ way between Spitzbergen and Norway, where a party from Nigeria destroyed the weather station of value to the Germans. Vian reported that the scheme to use Spitzbergen or Bear Island as a base was impractical as there were no suitable facilities o f any kind, and the fjords were, in any case, iced up for much of the year. The islands were well-nigh impossible to defend and the Admiralty, faced with the demands of Arctic convoys, was keen to curtail any responsibility for t h e m . ” 2 Ausjuhrungen desFiihrers auf dem Betghofam 12.3.41 ^tirhage (US National Archives T-312 reel 993 9186140 and T-77 reel 1432 436.) and Abwehr report 15 March 1941 (T-77 reel 1027 2499058) quoted in From Neutrality to NATO - The Norwegian Armed Forces and Defense Policy 1905-1955 by David G. Tliomson. 128 Thompson op. cit. p. 224. 129 Gilbert : 1989 pp. 1122-1123. 130 DEFE 2 228. 131 ADM 199 730. 132 Vian : 1960 pp. 67-69. Roskill : 1954 p. 488. 185 North Western Approaches Canadian troops board­ ing Empress o f Canada at Inveraray for Opera­ tion GAUNTLET Thus, after a false start on 6 August when a force embarked in Empress of Canada at Glas­ gow and sailed to Inveraray for training, the idea of occupation was dropped in favour of evacuation and the destruction of coal mines on Spitzbergen to deny them to the enemy. Empress of Canada returned to Glasgow on 11 August and the troops disembarked. A smaller force of 46 officers and 599 ORs, mostly Canadian but including a detachment of 36 Norwegians, re-embarked on 17 August and Empress sailed north the following day.” ^ From Scapa, the liner was joined by Vian with Nigeria, Aurora, Icarus, Anthony and Antelope and, after refuelling at Hvalfjord, entered Gronfjord, Spitzbergen, at 0800/25 August to carry out G A U N T L E T .By the following day 1,969 Russian miners and their famiUes had been taken aboard and, escorted by Nigeria, Icarus, Antelope and Anthony, Empress of Can­ ada sailed for Archangel where she disem­ barked her passengers and took on board 192 Free French volunteers.” ® She returned to Spitzbergen, where demoHtions were all but complete, and, after embarking the Norwegian mining community o f 570 men, 195 women and children, 500 tons o f bag- The power station at Kongsfjord, which gage and 14 d o g , sailed for the Clyde ’33 According to a report by landing force commander, Canadian Brigadier Arthur E. Potts, loading of the expedition­ ary force was completed at Glasgow on 17 August though. There was some pilfering of stores by dockworkers at Glasgow...' DEFE 2 228. 134 ADM 199 730. Vian ; 1960 pp. 70-71. 135 Loading took place under a cloud of mutual suspicion, the Russians determined to take aboard a large quantity of stores that feU outwith the evacuation plan, even scrap metal. Many Russians looted their own stores and the Soviet Consul at Barentsburg got ever drunker until, during a conference with landing force commander Brigadier Potts, he passed out and had to be stretchered aboard covered with a sheet.DEFE 2 228. ADM 199 730. 186 North Western Approaches which she reached at 0200/7 September.” ® Meanwhile, the Admiralty signalled Vian with intelligence that a German convoy was at the northern end of the Leads. Vian could not leave Empress of Canada unprotected by sending the destroyers, so he took Nigeria and Aurora and, at 0123/7, Nigeria's lookouts sighted two transports carrying the Mountain Division escorted by the former gunnery training ship Bremse and several smaller escorts. One ship passed down Nigerians side too close to be fired on, then there was a heavy crash. According to Vian, this was caused by Nigeria run­ ning down Bremse which sank with the loss of all but 37 of her crew. The troopships es­ caped and Vian's cruisers arrived Scapa on 10 August, Nigeria heavily damaged.” ^ During the summer o f 1941, as German troops advanced deep into the Soviet Union, Lon­ don and Washington were debating whether the Russians would be defeated before the United States entered the war. Arctic convoys were begun and, to take the pressure off the Red Army, British forces annexed Persia and its oil fields. In North Africa, Auchinleck was being nagged by the Prime Minister into an early offensive against strengthening Axis forces. Then, in September 1941, Churchill ordered the Chiefs o f Staff to start planning a landing by four divisions in Northern Norway. AJAX envisaged the seizing of Tromso as a naval base to cover the Arctic convoys, though it was also intended to give the impression : o f a second front. The plan was killed off on 12 October when the Navy insisted that they must have land-based air cover.^ ®® 1 Commando raids into Norway had been suspended during the consideration o f AJAX so as S to avoid drawing German reinforcements into an area where British forces would be oper- j ating. But with the demise o f AJAX, raids could begin again. A number o f proposals were considered during October and early November 1941, among them ASCOT, a landing in 1 force in central Norway. On 17 November, however, this was dropped in favour of two j smaller, simultaneous raids, one a return to the Lofoten Islands (ANKLET) and the other a j landing on the islands of Vâgso and Maloy near Bergen in south-west Norway (ARCHERY). |i The raids were to be carried out by Combined Operations with a significant input from j SOE. ANKLET has been characterised as merely a diversionary attack to cover ARCHERY, j but tlie Navy’s report on the operation offers a different interpretation: 136 Ibid. See also Yeo MS, IWM Department o f Documents ref. 95/6/1. : 137 Kemp su^ests that Nigeria may have hit a drifting Soviet mine. Vian : 1960 pp 71-73. Kemp 1993. ! 138 Given the weakness o f tlie German garrison in Finnmark, AJAX might, as Thompson su^ests, have met with initial ! success. But the Navy’s reluctance is hardly remarkable given their losses at Crete in May 1941. Witliout adequate | carrier- or land-based air cover, it is likely that the maintenance of a foothold at Tromso would have involved heavy :j losses. The plan, in any case, depended on the intervention o f a large Norwegian Resistance Army which was tlien | little more than a figment o f Churchill’s imagination. See Prvm Neutrality to NATO - The Norwegian Armed Forces and | Defense Polity 1905-1955 by David Thompson p. 225. See also Salmon (ed.) : 1995 paper by Einar Grannes, p. 110, j 187 North Western Approaches 'The inteation was to use Skjel^ofd. as a temporary anchorage and Kirke^ord as a temporary fuelling base for our forces operating against the enemy's lines of communication in North Norway as long as conditions render this possible.' A direct assault by 12 Commando was to be carried out on the towns of Reine and Moskenes, the village of Tind and the hamlet of Napp.^ ®^ And, in a memorandum written two weeks before the force sailed, the ANKLET naval commander. Rear Admiral Hamilton, wrote. It is intended during the progress o f Operation ANKLET to inflict the maximum possible damage to tlie Norwegian fishing industry. This industry is force [sic] to supply much fish, fish oü and meal and essential vitamin products to Germany. The policy I intend to adopt is to destroy such fish oil facto­ ries as come my way, to capture or sink fish carriers and factory ships and sail such fishing boats as can make the passage back to the United Kingdom.”® Oddly, in view of the range of targets to be destroyed, Hamilton continues, ‘The above should have the effect of causing the least harm to the Norwegians and the most to the Germans.’ Prior to the arrival o f the ANKLET force, SOE intended that. About six Norwegian fishing craft wiU proceed from the Shedands to penetrate the Qords from Bodo south to Raneni^ord with the object of destroying the navigational facUities in the inner leads. These operations will be timed to take place on the night previous to the arrival of Force J in Vest^ord. Those fishing craft wiU subsequendy proceed to Reme.” ^ SOE suggestions for ANKLET included the destruction of ferries, rallying fishermen around Reine, ’to commit every form of nuisance and hindrance to the enemy...to provide guides and thugs for any operations the Force Commander may wish to undertake.' Navigation lights in the Leads and the observation post and the wireless station at Rost were to be de­ stroyed. After the arrival o f the ANKLET force, SOE planned to land a wireless operator at Hameroy to report on shipping m o v e m e n t s . ^ '* ^ Force J for ANKLET comprised the cruiser Arethusa, the destroyers Somali, Ashanti, Tartar and Matahele, the Hunt class destroyers Krakomak, Kugawiak, J^uimerton and Wheatland, the Norwegian corvettes Acanthus and Eglantine, the sweepers Hartier, Halcyon and Speedwell, the survey ship Scott, the tug Jaunty and the oilers Black Ranger and G ry Ranger. The assault force was made up o f 223 officers and men of 12 Commando and included 3 officers and 62 ratings o f the Norwegian Navy and one British officer and two ORs all under the SOE banner, and six officers and 72 ORs o f the Norwegian Army. It was to be carried in Prince Albert and Princess Josephine Charlotte each o f which carried three LCAs, one LCS and four R boats. Gudrun Maersk carried supplies including 1,000 tons o f naval ammunition, 500 tons 139 ADM 116 4381 140DEFE2 73. 141ADM 116 4381. 142HS2198. 188 North Western Approaches o f victuals, mooi'ings, camouflage and 50 tons o f supplies for the locals such as flour, chocolate and cigarettesd'^® While ANKLET was not expected to meet heavy resistance, Vagso and Maloy islands were known to be defended. The ARCHERY force from 3 Commando was carried in the assault ships Prince Charles (Lieutenant Colonel John Durnford-Slater with 14 officers and 190 ORs) and Prince Leopold (Major Jack Churchill with seven officers and 132 ORs and Lieu­ tenant R. A. Clement with two officers and 43 ORs). The force was led from the cruiser Lenya by Rear Admiral Harold Burrough with Brigadier Charles Haydon, Brigade HQ and a signal section. Captain R. A. Hooper with two officers and 64 ORs were aboard Kenya and Orihi, one o f four escort destroyers, carried a landing party o f one officer and 43 ORs. The balance o f the escort comprised Onslow, Offa and Chiddingfoldd^ The ANKLET force boarded Winchester Castle at Greenock on 12 December and sailed for Inveraray, anchoring in Loch ] Fyne at 1300/13. The Advance HQ and A, B, and E troops comprising 14 officers and 210 | ORs were then transhipped to Prince Albert and the Rear HQ and C, D and F troops com- jjprising 10 officers and 176 ORs boarded Princess Josephine Charlotte. Also taken aboard Prince Albert were one officer and 10 naval ratings from the new Combined Operations Signal School at Inveraray to act as beach signal parties. The assault ships sailed for Scapa the following afternoon, but Princess Josephine Charlotte was forced to turn back due to engine trouble and was towed upriver to Plantation Quay for repair while Prince Albert continued north. The ARCHERY force sailed down Loch Fyne aboard Prince Charles and Prince Leopold on the afternoon o f 19 December after a brief period o f training at Inveraray. They too were bound for Scapa where landing rehearsals were to be carried out by both forces, but the four days at Scapa were dogged by dreadful weather. The weather was still bad when the ARCHERY force left Scapa Flow at 2100/24 and Captain BiU Fell commanding Prince Charles wrote: West of Orkney we ran into extremely heavy weather, which reduced our speed to 12 knots.. .The ship was labouring badly and the soldiers were once again reduced to a state of collapse.. .1 felt the ship could easily break her back and accordingly eased down to eight knots. Prince Leopold overtook us and, passing along our port beam, happened to roll towards us as we rolled towards her. We were able from our respective bridges to see down each other’s funnels to the furnaces below, and it was not a very pleasant sight.”® Her fore ends filling due to strain on the huh. Prince Charles limped into SuUom Voe, the rest of the force following suit in search o f shelter. After a two-day delay which threw out the synchronised timetable for the two operations, the ARCHERY force saÜed again at ” 3 DEFE 2 73. ADM 116 4381. 144 HS 2 225. ADM 234 380. ”®Fell: 1966 p. 84. 189 North Western Approaches 1 4 0 0 / 2 6 . Ahead o f them, from Scapa on 23 December, had gone the submarine Tuna which was to act as a navigational beacon off Vâgsfjord.^'*^ Tuna commenced transmitting at 0605/27 and, at 0739/27, the OOW in Trince Charles sighted her conning t o w e r .Prince Charles and Prince Teopold hove to in Hollevik Bay at 0840/27 and, in two minutes, sixteen fully-loaded land­ ing craft were waterborne and under way.^ '^ ^ Kenya and the destroyers bombarded batteries on Mâloy and Rugsundoy, though Rugsundoy bat­ tery returned fire on Kenya just be­ fore 0900/27. Brigadier Haydon called in RAF Hampdens to drop 601b phosphorus smoke bombs ahead of the landing craft, but one fell short, causing 20 casualties in one LCA one of whom later died. One Hampden was shot down in flames close to Prince Teopold at 0852/27. Three men were picked up, one conscious, but two died.^^ Maloy Battery o f four ex-Belgian 75 mm field guns having been given what Young describes as ‘a severe plastering’ by Kenya, was swiftly taken by Group 3 under Churchill and, following his signal at 0920/27, VAAGSO TMt JOINTS O f A S S k u i r 0f i I 9 fig. 57 146 Ibid. p. 85. 147 Tuna carried an American observer. Lieutenant D. G. Irvine USN. Information from the Royal Navy Submarine Museum, HMS Dolphin. 148 ADM 234 380. 149 Young : 1958 p. 37. Fell ; 1966 p. 86. 150 The part played by RAF aircraft, which provided continuous cover for seven hours, was a model for later amphibi­ ous assaults. Aside from the initial wave o f Hampdens from Wick, Blenheims and Beaufighters from Wick and Sumburgh mounted sorties over the area during the day and carried out a bombing raid on Herdla airfield. The first sortie o f four Blenheims took off from Wick at 0657/27 and lost two 254 Squadron aircraft. One crashed soon af­ ter take off and one simply disappeared. The two survivors, both from 404 Squadron, returned to Wick at 1257/27. The second sortie by four 235 Squadron Beaufighters from Sumburgh drove off a JU88 over Vâgso, but was en­ gaged by Mel09s which shot one of their number down. The third sortie of three 236 Squadron Beaufighters dam­ aged an Mel 10 at 1255/27, but lost one aircraft, and the fourth sortie was uneventful. The final sortie by four 248 Squadron Beaufighters took off from Sumburgh at 1321/27 and relieved the third at 1445/27. Ten minutes later it engaged a force o f three Mel 10s escorted by three Me 109s, claiming two destroyed. This sortie escorted the naval force out to sea and returned to Sumburgh at 1715/27. HS 2 225. DEFE 2 83. Fergusson : 1961 pp. 106-108. 190 North Western Approaches r A Onslow leading Oribi, under fire, through the narrows between Vâgso and Maloy. They moved up Ulvesund, landed a party of Commandos north of the town, then engaged the merchant ships Reimar Edzard Fritzen and Norma, the armed trawler Fohn and a former Dutch schuyt Eissmeer. And, as described in Chapter Four, under fire from the shore, Bletchley Park cypher specialists carried aboard Onlow boarded the armed trawler Fohn and retrieved two sackfuls of signals intelligence including two sets of Enigma bigram tables and five rotors. Oribi and Onslow passed through taking Group 5 to land at North Vâgso at 1020/27. Group 2 under Durnford Slater landed at the south end of Vâgso and, as they moved into the town, met stiff resistance from infantry in houses and snipers on the hillsides above. Casualties, as usual in street fighting, were heavy and Norwegian Captain Martin Linge was killed while attacking the German HQ in the Ulvesund Hotel.^^i Meanwhile, a half-troop under Captain Peter Young were crossing Ulvesund from Mâloy in an LCA, ordered by Churchill to help the main body in South Vâgso who were taking casualties. Their officers and NCOs killed or wounded, men had taken cover behind houses and the advance into the town had halted in the face o f determined opposition. At a hurried conference oppo­ site the burning Ulvesund Hotel Durnford Slater ordered Young to lead an advance through the warehouses between the road and the fjord. Young wrote: •51 Sergeant Ruben Larsen reported that he, Private Vedaa and Linge landed from the LCA that had been hit by the smoke canister. Linge and Larsen took a party towards the German HQ, taking what Larsen described as 'consider­ able risks' in order to get there before the Germans could destroy documents and other valuable intelligence. Linge ordered his men to throw grenades and rushed the building. Larsen wrote; Captain Linge was very keen on doing this, but he did not take into consideration that the troops did not like the idea at all. When we reached the hotel we discovered that there were still a lot of Germans there. We retreated and went round a comer where we stopped for a few seconds. Suddenly, without any warning, a bullet hit Captain Linge. I tried to get away when an­ other shot was fired, probably meant for me, which also hit him. I then took cover behind the entrance to the hotel. HS 2 225. 191 North Western Approaches lU o vj Sff^uttr Utnai' I FXoff Ammo Seioifa • y »<*«5Aik«64 w o 218 28. i65Lovat: 1978 p. 227. 95 North Western Approaches Chief of Combined Operations Commodore Lord Mountbatten aboard Prinz Albert In Loch Fyne during preparations for BITING. That autumn, In nearby Loch Long, Royal Marine canoeists trained for FRANKTON another operation to occupied France In which the Scottish CTCs played a central role. The Inspiration behind this raid on German blockade runners In Bordeaux, came from Major Roger Courtney, whose role In the affair has never received the attention It deserves. In 1940, Courtney paddled out unobserved to the assault ship Qengyle off Inveraray and painted marks on her side to represent mines. Later, to prove his point that canoes had an operational role, he paddled down Loch Fyne to Strachur, portaged to Loch Eck, paddled to the south end, then portaged across to the Holy Loch where, still unseen, he left painted marks on the side of the depot ship Forth. Chapter Six). He also ordered an anti-invasion patrol of six U-boats between the Hebrides and the Faroes, thus depleting the U boat force available for the Atlantic.^^^ For the Norwegians, however, ANKLET proved a bitter pill when German reprisals, denun­ ciations and arrests were visited on the Lofoten islanders. Commander Frank Stagg o f the SOE Scandinavian Section wrote; The population had been told that the British force had come to stay.. .All these people were hoping that the moment had at last come when the fight would be taken up once more, although the major­ ity were rather sceptical as regards present operations developing. N one were, however, prepared for the news that the forces were to flee without even having tried to fight; therefore when the news came about retreat it did not cause only deep disappointment, but also indignation and fury. The general opinion was that once more propaganda had been successfully been achieved with nearly 100 per cent security for the military, whereas the landing would once more bring upon the heads o f the remaining population the horrors o f German reprisals. Combined Operations, meanwhile, wanted a swift return to Norway, so swift that Prince Charles was back in Loch Fyne late on 1 January 1942 to embark men of 6 Commando for KITBAG, a raid on coastal targets and shipping at Floro. Prince Charles left Inveraray on 5 January and, after pausing in Yell Sound, Shetland, sailed for Norway escorted by Inglefteld, Intrepid, Wheatland and Eamerton. Owing to a poor landfall, the force arrived too late to at- >66Roskill: 1977 p. 125. >67 Minutes of Führer Naval conferences 29 December 1941, 12 January 1942 and 22 January 1942 in Brassey : 1948 pp. 246-260. Also Wynn : 1998 p. 149. 168 RVPS report quoted in Cookridge ; 1966 p. 531 196 North Western Approaches tack shore targets at Floro. It did penetrate Hellefjord, but found it clear o f shipping and returned to Inveraray without engaging the enemy. Then it emerged that Combined Opera­ tions and SOE had used Norwegian personnel, including Linge Company commandos, without consulting Prime Minister Nygaardsvoid’s Norwegian government-in-exile. This caused much resentment but new Defence Minister Oscar Torp created the Forsvarets Overkommando (FO) in February 1942 and military liaison begin to improve. Also that month, SOE and the FO began working in closer harmony through the Anglo-Norwegian Collaboration Committee (ANCC).^^^ Large-scale raids to Norway ended with ANKLET and ARCHERY, but Inveraray played a central role in the planning and training for other important raids in 1942. Late in 1941, Air Ministry scientists identified a Wiirff>urg radar station at Bruneval near Le Havre, and proposed a raid to steal parts of the equipment for analysis. Combined Operations HQ came up with a plan for the 2"^ Battalion, the Parachute Regiment, a section o f 1«> Para­ chute Field Squadron, Royal Engineers, and an RAF Flight Sergeant Radar Mechanic to drop east of the installation, remove the equipment and make their way down to the beach from where they would be picked up by LCAs from Prins(^ Albert. Major John Frost and the BITING force o f 120 men undertook a short course at Inveraray before the raid was launched on the night o f 27 February 1942. The paratroopers successfully removed much of the apparatus under fire and took two prisoners, then made their way to the beach and the landing craft. Two were killed and seven w o u n d e d . ^ ^ o On 17 January 1942, decrypts revealed that the new German battleship Tirpits^ had arrived at Trondheim. The threat to the Atlantic convoy routes was clear, but this could be signifi­ cantly reduced if the battleship was denied docking facilities in France. A raid on the Nor­ mandie Dock at St Nazaire, the only facility on the French Atlantic coast capable o f taking Titpitf(^ had been considered during Keyes’ time as DCO when the threat was Tirpitt^ sister Bismarck, but had been abandoned as, to carry out worthwhile demolitions, the force would have to be several hundred strong and the shoals in the Loire estuary made a night ap­ proach by large vessels all but impossible. Now the new danger posed by Tirpit^ meant that CHARIOT was born. Combined Opera­ tions originally planned a clear-cut operation to ram the outer caisson of the Normandie Dock with a destroyer fitted with a demolition charge. Her crew would then be taken off by another destroyer. The assault force o f 257 commandos was mainly drawn from 2 Commando based at Ayr with the addition o f specialist demolition teams who trained for 169 See Thompson op. at. ch. 7 section entitled The Njgaardsm/d Government in Crisis and ch. 8 section entitled Commando Raids and Special Operations 1942-43. Also Stafford : 1980 pp. 83-84. I’o In September 1944, Frost would lead the defence o f Arnhem Bridge during Operation MARKET GARDEN. Frost ; 1980 pp. 37-55. Jones :1978 pp 302-321. Combined Operations In HitlePs War 'tsi Naval ReviewvoX. 48 1960 p. 440-453. 197 North Western Approaches the raid at Burntisland and Rosyth. But, while the initial CHARIOT concept was good, the plan grew rapidly to include a complex range o f secondary demolition targets in the dock area for which the assault force was neither sufficient nor adequately equipped. And, de­ spite the fact that the raid would be o f principal benefit to them, the Admiralty refused to allocate two destroyers, only reluctantly parting with the old, ex-American Campbeltown. A second destroyer was refused, so the parties assaulting secondary targets had to rely on inadequate motor launches. Bomber Command was asked to soften up the defences just before the attack went in at 0130/28 March, but the RAF commitment to Combined Operations in general, and CHAR­ IOT in particular, was less than wholehearted and the small raid that was mounted failed completely, though it did alert the d e fence s .Desp i t e this, Campbeltown was successfully rammed into the caisson and blew up, putting the dock out o f action until 1948. But the secondary assaults by the parties from the MLs failed totally, all but three being sunk, most before landing troops. CHARIOT was a success in that its primary objective, the Normandie Dock, was out o f action and Tirpitt^ was thus confined to northern waters. This would, as seen in the following chapter, have a fundamental influence on Allied and Axis naval strat­ egy, but the raid had been a costly affair with 169 of the 611 who took part being killed and another 200 captured. Amid the euphoria at the destruction o f the dock and the din of propaganda that followed, alarm bells that should have warned against attacking well- defended ports with inadequate forces and insufficient tactical air support went unheard. This would have terrible consequences at D i e p p e . Singapore had fallen on 15 February 1942 and Rangoon followed on 8 March. These disas­ ters in the Far East led to the revival o f a plan for the capture o f Vichy-held Madagascar which had been considered, then dropped in January 1942. Operation IRONCLAD, as it was known, was to be carried out by the 29* Infantry Brigade and 5 Commando supported by the 17* Infantry Brigade and the force sailed with WS17 from the Clyde in the assault ships Winchester Castle, Karanja, Keren and Sobieskt at the end of March. The landings began at dawn on 5 May and were a complete success.^?^ BITING, CHARIOT and IRONCLAD boosted confidence to a dangerous degree and, under pressure from Moscow, Washington and vocal left-wing elements at home advocating a second front to support Russia, Churchill ordered another operation. A large-scale landing •71 Air Cliief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris took over at Bomber Command on 22 February 1942. Harris had little time for Combined Operations and was more concerned witli strategic bombing and securing the resources to win the war on his own. Tlie night after CHARIOT, 234 aircraft destroyed much o f Lubeck. Terratne : 1985 pp. 468-480. Dor- rian : 1998 pp. 112-115. >72 Dorrian : 1998. Roskill : 1956 p. 168-173. Article entitled The Raid o h StNa^aire in After The Battle magazine no. 59, 1988. Horan op cit. For German reaction see Brassey : 1948 pp. 269-272. >73 Fergusson : 1961 pp. 156-168. 198 North Western Approaches on Alderney was considered, then rejected when Harris refused RAF bomber support. The assault on Dieppe, initially codenamed RUTTER, had its genesis early in 1942 and a meeting just over two weeks after CHARIOT considered two alternative plans, one for landings on either side o f Dieppe and one for a frontal assault by, for the first time, troops from the regular army with commandos in support on the flanks. At a subsequent meeting on 25 April, Mountbatten, who was in the chair, came down in favour o f the frontal assault.^ '^ ^ RUTTER was planned for 24 June 1942, but muddled planning and inadequate training led to a postponement until 8 July. Finally, on 7 July, with the assault ships fuUy loaded in the Solent, and commanders considering a further postponement due to bad weather, four German aircraft attacked the convoy. Two assault ships were hit, though the bombs passed through without exploding. The air raid and the bad weather led to the cancellation o f the assault, and the troops, who had been fully briefed, were d i s p e r s e d , But, even before RUTTER was formally abandoned, Mountbatten, who was eager to make good on his extravagant promise o f regular large-scale raids, was arguing for the operation to be r e m o u n t e d . 7^6 And Churchill was due in Moscow on 12 August when he would have to teU Stalin that there would be no second front in Europe in 1942. He needed to be able to sweeten this bitter pill and at least appear to be taking pressure off the Red Army so, on 27 July, with American encouragement, the Dieppe operation was revived.^^^ Security had been compromised by loose talk from troops disembarked a month earlier and Montgom­ ery, originally to command RUTTER but now appointed to relieve Auchinleck in the desert, protested that it should be abandoned.^?^ He was ignored, then the already risky plan, now rechristened JUBILEE, was altered in two fundamental and ultimately fatal respects. First the aitrborne landing to silence gun batteries ahead of the assault was replaced by flank at­ tacks by Commandos, then the ait bombardment, which Montgomery had insisted on, was dropped. As the Navy refused to commit cruisers or battleships in the Channel, bombard­ ment would be restricted to the four-inch guns o f the eight escorting destroyers. The story o f bloody, disastrous Dieppe Raid is well known and needs no recounting here.^®° O f 4,963 Canadians involved, 907 died and 1,874 were captured, and 586 returned wounded. British casualties were 226 killed and 475 missing or captured. Twenty-eight >74 Roskill : 1954 pp. 239-243. Lovat : 1978 pp. 238-246. Lamb : 1993 pp. 171-172. Horan op cit. >75 Ibid. 176 Prelude to Dieppe. Thoughts on Combined Operations Policy in The Raiding Period. Paper by Barry Hunt and David Schurman in Naval Warfare in The Twentieth Century. Gerald Jordan (ed.) (Crook Helm 1977) >77 The British Chiefs of Staff Committee and the preparation for the Dieppe Raid, march—August 1942. Did Mountbatten really evade the Committee^ s authority? Henshawin War in Histoty vol. 1 no. 1 (1994). >78 Lamb : 1993 p. 171. >79 Ibid. Roskill ; 1954 p. 243 for naval forces. >80 Lovat : 1978 has four chapters (15-18) on die Dieppe Raid, the last o f which is probably the best analysis o f why it went so badly wrong. A North Western Approaches GREENLAND GAUNTLET August 1941 rT-r-rJ*-x-tT-t r o j i - c i - r z t t i HEMISPHERE April 1941 4 TORCH November 19421 i i ; i ! t l-.TTI xttt : xx T YMORE March 1941 December 1941 I HUSKY June-Jui^l943 Of B/iCBY Amphibious raids and major landinngs mounted direct from Scotland during the Com­ bined Operations raiding phase and up to HUSKY, the Sicily invasion. This does not show landings like IRONCLAD, CHARIOT and JUBILEE mounted indirectly by, or heavily dependent on, Scottish based naval and land forces. Churchill tanks were left behind, at least one in full working order, as were landing craft, radio sets and weapons.’®^ Despite the efforts o f Mountbatten and his apologists, and even with the benefit o f hindsight, Dieppe was an eminently avoidable disaster. The raid was never the dress rehearsal for OVERLORD it has since been passed off as, nor did it forestall a potentially disastrous disastrous foray into France in 1943. Churchill had decided to press for the abandonment o f American plans for cross-channel assault after RUTTER was aban­ doned, but before JUBILEE was l a u n c h e d . ^ ^ s initiated on a whim to appease Stalin, it was badly planned, the lessons of previous operations were ignored and it was expected. The flotilla seen by enemy aircraft in July could only have had one purpose and the enemy i«i Casualty figures from Roskill : 1954 pp. 247 and 250 and firom Dieppe 1942 article in After The Battle magazine no 5 1974. '•*2 Prelude to Dieppe. Thoughts on Combined Operations Polity in The Raiding Period. Paper by Barry Hunt and David Schurman in Naval Warfare in The Twentieth Century. Gerald Jordan (ed.) (Crook Helm 1977) 200 North Western Approaches was perfectly capable o f divining when and where such a raid might be mounted. Indeed, as Lovat writes, enemy troops were on special alert against possible landings during suit­ able tides between 10 and 19 August.^®® But one o f the principal failings of JUBILEE lay in the fact that the wrong troops were used. While the established services were reluctant to release their best formations for raids. General McNaughton was eager to prove his 1st Canadian Army in the operation. The Ca­ nadians had not, however, been to Inveraray for assault training and many of the failings on the Dieppe beaches arose as a direct result. T h e M a i n E v e n t T o r c h , H u s k y , T h e R a t t l e C o n f e r e n c e a n d O v e r l o r d . As you have been told, I am here incognito — and that is something quite contraty to my usual habit. Ijust want to tell you that you are the luckiest bunch of guys in the world to have arrived herejust now. And, as you well know, not a God-darned son-of-a~hitch could have arrived butfor the N a^ and A ir Force who*ve brought you across safelg. You won’t have long to wait before you start to do what you came here for, and that is to kill Germans, h/fy only advice to you at this moment is thereforejust to go in and kill the bastards. Thank you. General George Patton to US Army officers, Greenock, 28 January 1944.^ 84 For most of 1941 and, in particular, since BARBAROSSA in June, Churchill had been advo­ cating a risky invasion o f Norway under the codename JUPITER to take pressure off the Red Army. But the entry o f the United States into the war in December 1941, immediately prior to ANKLET and ARCHERY, changed everything. At the ARCADIA conference in Wash­ ington at Christmas 1941, Churchill secured American agreement for a ‘Germany first’ pol­ icy and the creation o f a Combined Chiefs o f Staff. He also floated JUPITER with the Americans but, much to the relief o f their British counterparts who were equally unenthu- siastic, the plan attracted no support. GYMNAST, a proposal for an invasion o f Vichy North Africa, was also discussed. Stalin, meanwhile, continued to pressure for a second front and, as protracted discussions between the British and Americans ground on into 1942, two main options emerged. The Americans promoted ROUNDUP, a plan for an invasion of Europe in 1943 which would then allow concentration on the Pacific, and SLEDGEHAMMER, an emergency cross- Channel assault in 1942 should the situation in the Soviet Union deteriorate dangerously. And, as seen above, in scaled-down form, SLEDGEHAMMER became the catastrophic JUBI- 18Î Lovat : 1978 p. 478. At a Chequers dinner party shortly after Dieppe, and in Churchill’s presence, CIGS General Sir Alan Brooke clashed with Mountbatten, telling him that the planning for Dieppe had been aU wrong. The row sim­ mered on but was hushed up. In his Lees Knowles lecture given at Cambridge in 1943 and quoted in The Keyes Papers part III fn. 88, Keyes was unusually restrained in his comment on JUBILEE. He said: This generation was taught afresh at Dieppe the lessons which were indelibly impressed on the memories o f all who wit­ nessed at Gallipoli, on 25 April 1915, the heroic but unsuccessful and costly efforts to capture in daylight a much less heav­ ily defended beach than that of Dieppe. 8^4 Patton quoted in Yeo MS, IWM Department o f Documents ref. 95/6/1. 201 North Western Approaches LEE, ostensibly at least a measure to reduce pressure on the Red Army. There were not enough landing craft to mount an attack in sufficient strength to have any bearing on events in Russia. On the other hand, supply lines to India and the Middle East would be considerably shortened were the whole North African coast to be in Allied hands. Malta would be saved and shipping would be released for BOLERO, the build up of American forces ahead o f the invasion o f France. The Americans viewed the possibility of German control o f West African ports with alarm, not least as this would threaten their eastern seaboard supply routes. Above all, though, Roosevelt wanted his inexperienced forces in action as soon as possible. Ignoring the advice o f military chiefs who believed, correctly as it turned out, that TORCH would make ROUNDUP impossible in 1943, Churchill and Roosevelt pushed the North African operation through in July 1942. Churchill per­ sisted with JUPITER into 1942 but, without American support, the plan was reduced to a deception to cover TORCH, the renamed GYMNAST. As discussed in Chapter 6, the threat to Norway was maintained as a series o f deception operations, naval operations and minor raids until OVERLORD in 1944.1®® The Vichy authorities harboured deep resentment against the British for the sinking of French ships at Oran and Mers el Kebir in 1940, but Roosevelt in particular believed that they would offer minimal resistance to an American force. The British thought this naïve, though dressing British troops in American uniforms was considered, then rejected.i®® BO­ LERO movements of US troops to the Clyde had reached almost 82,000 by July and a fur­ ther 260,000 were expected by the time TORCH was launched.i®^ Three landings were planned and D-Day was set for 8 November. The all-American West­ ern Task Force would come direct from the United States to land on the Atlantic coast near Casablanca. An Eastern Naval Task Force o f British and American ships under Rear Admiral Harold Burrough would land 9,000 American troops followed up by two brigades o f the British 78‘*' Division and 1 and 6 Commandos to attack Algiers. Military Command o f the eastern assault was given to an American, Major General Charles Ryder.i®® The Cen­ tre Naval Task Force under Commodore Tom Troubridge was to land 18,500 men o f the 18^', 26^, 39**' and 168**' US Regimental Combat Teams under Major General Lloyd Fre- dendall at Oran.*®® The GIs had no experience o f amphibious operations, so the 168*** and the 26**' were 185 Lamb : 1993 pp. 166-168. Salmon (ed.) : 1995 papers on JUPITER by H. P. Willmott and Einar Grannes pp. 97-117. *86 Sainsbury 1976 p. 132. 187 MT 63 570. 188 Fergusson : 1961 p. 201. 185 The placing o f American ships and men under British naval command was done in the face o f bitter opposition from the anglophobic American C-in-C Admiral Ernest King who wanted priority for the Pacific 202 North Western Approaches brought to Inveraray, the 168**' arriving on 20 August and the 26*** on 22 September.*®** The standard assault brigade groups syllabus was followed, though, perhaps in an effort to make the GIs feel at home, the landing exercises were renamed BROADWAY, BRONX and MANHATTAN.*®* Despite this faintly patronising gesture, or perhaps even because o f it, there was little meeting of minds with CTC staff. According to Morrison, the 39***, ‘shoved off for the Mediterranean without having had a real landing rehearsal,’ and Captain Camp­ bell Edgar o f US Naval Transport Division II found Inveraray ‘not well suited for this type o f training,’ as the Argyllshire coastline had little in common with North Africa. He wrote that all the ships got out o f the exercises was badly needed experience in hoisting and low­ ering assault craft.*®2 Training in Scotland for TORCH culminated in MOSSTROOPER and FLAXMAN, dress re­ hearsals for the Centre and Eastern Task Forces. The schemes were, ‘to exercise fuUy all ships, units and RAF units taking part in the assault in Combined Operations,’ a veiled ref­ erence to TORCH, and the exercise orders refer to both the Centre and Eastern Task Forces as such. Special attention was to be paid to communications as, for the first time, British and American forces were to work together. Scotland was ‘hostile’ territory and Oban and Loch Gilp were heavily defended ports from which U-boats were attacking Allied convoys. ‘Enemy’ aircraft, actually Lysanders, Ansons and Mustangs, were operating from ‘airfields’ at Dalmally and Tyndrum. The MOSSTROOPER force was largely made up o f units that would form the Centre Task Force for TORCH. An armoured task force was to land on the west side o f the Gareloch, then seize airfields at Arrochar, Dalmally and Tyndrum before joining up with other forces attacking Oban. The 26**' RCT was to land at Minard and take Loch Gilp, reducing coastal artillery positions on the way. The 18*** RCT and a battalion of US Rangers was to land at Duror and march south to Oban, seizing a coastal battery at Port Appin on the way. The 16*** RCT and an Armoured Task Force was to land at Kentallen and move inland to join up with the forces attacking Tyndrum and Dalmally. The enemy was believed to comprise two regiments o f infantry with battalions disposed at Dalmally, Loch Gilp and in the Ap­ pin area and a regimental HQ at Oban which was ‘strongly defended’. The FLAXMAN force was made up o f units destined for the Eastern Task Force for TORCH. It included the 11**' (British) Infantry Brigade which was to land between Toward Quay and *50DEFE2 713. *91 Ibid. 192 In fairness, the 39th only reached Belfast in Samuel Chase, Almaack and Leedslom on 6 October. There is also evi­ dence tliat many of die Americans, in particular their officers, were unwilling to learn, and attitude that began to change on die beaches o f North Africa. These were the last American formations to pass through Inveraray, though the 1st US Rangers also underwent training at the Commando Basic Training Centre, Achnacarry, and the Com­ bined Operations boatwork school at Dorlinn in 1942. DEFE 2 713. DEFE 2 714. Morrison : 1947 vol. 2 Operations in North African Waters p. 193. 203 t J i f i { > > s g : # W € IV| ■X m > o COrts 7 ï X Z > q> c u«5 V KI#I r S' w 5 P<-iAF ’ 4 JO'fiAlirk* T ^ CCf. ^ E/> *C K* €■» If - 4t&AULT "T. O^' #6T* C'OA^r _0 North Western Approaches _ _ ^ Port Lament, capture the supposed airfield at Blairmore, then march north to the Whistie- field Inn from where they were to be ready to link up with the American 39‘^ RCT which was to land at Ardno and march south to capture an airfield at Lochgoilhead. The meanwhile, was to land between Ardmarnock Bay and Kilfinan Bay and move north via Glendaruel, destroying coastal batteries on the way, then link up with the other assault troops and attack the ‘port’ o f Lachlan in Lachlan Bay. ‘Hostile’ forces consisted o f two battalions and artillery in the Lachlan area with detachments at Glendaruel and Strachur, another battalion near Dunoon and coastal defence batteries at Kilfinan and Lephinchapel. As in MOSSTROOPER, defending forces were provided by the British Division.^^^ Exercise Directors for MOSSTROOPER were Commodore Troubridge and American Lieu­ tenant General Hartle in the Headquarters Ship Largs, those for FLAXMAN were Rear Ad­ miral Burrough and British General K. A. N. Anderson in the Headquarters Ship hulolo. The two exercises were co-ordinated by Rear Admiral Harold BaiUie-Grohman at HMS Warren, Largs, and Major General James Drew at Inveraray. Both Eisenhower and Mount- batten visited Inveraray in the days following the exercises to assess results.^^^ MOSSTROOPER and FLAXMAN forces began landing at 0100/19 October though the original plans had been curtailed somewhat when it was realised that full-scale landings would re­ sult in an unacceptable attrition o f scarce landing craft and vehicles. Troops were to go ashore in a limited number o f landing craft for an assault exercise lasting around 12 hours. Every effort was to be made to safeguard equipment and only equipment and vehicles for which replacements were available were to be landed. The 26* RCT landing at Minard on Loch Fyne would take just eight trucks across the beach. Speed was not essential and the limitations caused by the lack o f vehicles, communications equipment and inadequate beaches had to be explained to the t r o o p s . Morrison opines that the TORCH forces, British troops included, lacked adequate training in amphibious operations. He quotes the commanding officer o f the 3^ ^Battalion Landing Team of the 168* which took part in FLAXMAN as reporting that, ‘landing crews were somewhat confused,’ and that the exercise did more harm that good as different landing craft were used from those to be used in TORCH. In fairness, though, the Americans had much to learn about amphibious operations and both the tight TORCH schedule and the critical shortage o f equipment meant that training was always going to be inadequate. A great deal was being left to chance and the hope that the Vichy forces would offer only token resistance. I93DEFE 2 204. 194DEFE2 713. I9SDEFE2 204. 204 North Western Approaches Alongside the considerable assemblage o f ships for the assault convoys, an even larger number of ships were gathering in the Clyde for the logistics convoys. The first advance convoy, KX l, of five ships and seven escorts sailed from the Clyde on 2 October. Troop and supply convoys during the assault phase of TORCH were as follows, with the assault convoys shown in red: Convoy Composition and escort Sailing date Departure port Due Gi­ braltar Remarks KXl Five ships and seven escorts 2/10/42 Clyde 14/10/42 'Ti71b742~“ Incl. three colliers and an A /S trawler group. KX2 18 ships and 13 escorts 18/10/42 Clyde Included five ammunition ships, three ships with cased aircraft and four tankers. KX3 One ship and two escorts 19/10/42 Clyde 27/10/42 Personnel for Gibraltar only. KX4A 20 ships and e i^ t escorts 21/10/42 Clyde 4/11/42 Included three LSTs. KMS(A)1 KMS(0)1 47 ships and 18 escorts 22/10/42 lx3ch Ewe and Clyde 5/11/42 6/11/42 Included 39 MT/Store ships and the escort carrier A v e n ^ - Algiers and Gran sections to divide west of Gibraltar. KMS2 52 ships and 14 escorts 25/10/42 Loch Ewe and Ctyde 10/11/42 Included 42 MT/Store ships. KX4B Eight ships and two escorts 25/10/42 Milford Haven 3/11/42 Included tugs, trawlers, four fuelling coasters and cased petrol ships. Slower ships sailed at 6 V2 knots to join with the 7V2 knot KX4A from the Clyde. KMF(A)1 KMF(0)1 39 ships and 12 escorts. 26/10/42 Clyde 6/11/42 Included HQ ships Bulok and Lar s^, the escort carrier Bifer And 31 LSI s. Sailed at 11V2 knots, Algiers and Oran sections to divide west of Gibraltar. KX5 32 ships and ten escorts 30/10/42 Clyde 10/11/42 Included 15 coasters, three tankers, five colliers and seven cased petrol ships. Included 13 personnel ships for Oran and Algiers. Sailed at 13 knots. KMF2 18 ships and e i^ t escorts 1/11/42 Clyde 10/11/42 In addition, warship movements began with the departure o f the carrier Furious and three destroyers from the Clyde on 20 October. Kodney and her escort sailed Scapa on 23 Octo­ ber and the carriers Argus and Dasher with the cruisers Jamaica and Delhi and four destroy­ ers left the Clyde on 27 October. On 30 October the main covering force comprising Duke of York, Nelson, Renown, Argonaut and eight destroyers sailed Scapa to be joined by Victori­ ous, Formidable and eight destroyers from the Clyde. Norfolk, Cumberland and five destroyers followed from Scapa on 31 October. Movements for the assault phase involved 31,000 men, 3,800 tons o f assault stores, 1,600 vehicles and 112 guns. The follow-up phase, which was largely loaded alongside the assault phase, involved 36,500 men, 11,000 tons o f stores, 1,600 vehicles and 70 guns. A gale on 14-15 October stopped embarkation for one day and the Greenock war diary for 27 Octo­ ber laments: During the last fortnight, the port facilities at Greenock have been severely strained. At times, all berths, including those in Loch Long and the Gareloch, have been occupied and both HM ships and merchant vessels have had to be diverted elsewhere. Ships o f KMFl, which were Combined Opera­ tions ships, had to remain in their exercise areas until the sailing o f KMSl made berths available in­ side the boom. The subsequent servicing o f KMFl, in order to get them ready to sail for an opera­ tion in the short time available, put a heavy strain on the services o f the Clyde, particularly on the wa- 205 North Western Approaches ter boats and the boats o f the boat pool7^ And this was only the beginning — convoys to North Africa would run on a 14-day cycle throughout the winter and on through the build up and assault phase o f HUSKY, the inva­ sion o f Sicily the following summer. On 4 November, while still 400 miles west of Gibraltar, the slow and fast assault convoys split into sections des­ tined for the landings at Oran and Algiers. Every ship had to pass through the Straits of Gibraltar in a precisely ordered sequence and some warships had to enter harbour to refuel. The timetable for ships passing Europa Point was tight, some 340 ships passing through in 32 hours. Neither the Germans nor the Vichy French correctly de­ duced the destination of shipping they knew was passing through the Straits, German intel- hgence believing this was another operation to relieve Malta, which, in a sense, it was. Axis thinking was influenced by Montgomery’s offensive at El Alamein which had begun on 23 October. As a result, the initial landings passed off without interference from Axis air and naval forces which had been held in the central Medi­ terranean. TORCH fast assault convoy KMFI outbound from the Clyde. TORCH fast assault convoy KMFl outbound from the Clyde. Rather than mount frontal attacks on Oran and Algiers, which were thought to be too heavily defended, troops would come ashore on either side o f these main ports and attack them from the landward side, the object being to secure their use for the Allies as quickly as possible. Not only was this a re-run o f JUBILEE, it also made sense o f FLAXMAN and On 12 November 274 merchant ships were in the Clyde awaiting their place in the TORCH supply train and on 11 December 70 ships and 21 escorts sailed the Clyde for North Africa as KMS5 and KMF5. ADM 199 419. See also Yeo MS, IWM Department of Documents ref. 95/6/1. 206 North Western Approaches MOSSTROOPER schemes as, once again, troops were to neutralise coastal artillery, capture ports and strike inland against airfields. The landings began in the early hours o f 8 November. After a 4,500 mile passage, the Western Task Force landings around Casablanca spread over 200 miles o f Atlantic coast but met little r e s i s t a n c e . ^ ^ ? The Eastern Task Force landings around Algiers were the most complex undertaken in TORCH, but met with little resistance, which is just as well as intel­ ligence on the state o f the beaches proved inadequate. One beach supposedly 2,000 yards long proved all but useless, yet avoidable congestion elsewhere in the sector led to MT ships being diverted to this beach. A detachment o f 1 Commando met friendly Vichy troops and was driven to capture Blida airfield only to find that Fleet Air Arm Martlets from Victorious had beaten them to it. Meanwhile, US Rangers who had scrambled ashore at Cape Matifu captured Maison Blanche airfield and RAF fighters were operating from there by 0900/8. An attempted coup-de-main operation to capture Algiers by the Royal Navy destroyers Broke and Malcolm was repulsed by Vichy gunners. A similar operation to take Oran ahead o f the Central Task Force landings by the ex-American Coastguard cutters Hartland and Walnej was again beaten off by artillery, this time with heavy loss o f life. And, as Fergusson writes, ‘At each of the three Oran landings, something went wrong.’ At the westmost beach, the second wave o f landing craft reached the beach ahead of the first. At Les Andalouses the 26* RCT found that beach intelligence was again inadequate and did not reveal the pres­ ence o f a sandbar on which landing craft damaged their sterngear and inside which vehicles landed too soon were drowned. East o f Oran, at Arzew, rather than come ashore together, the initial wave of assault craft with the 16* and 18* RCTs arrived over a period of 20 minutes. Then the beach became so clogged with men and equipment that the planned move inland fell hours behind schedule. Algiers was surrendered to General Ryder at 1900/8 and the port was open for Allied shipping the following morning, one o f the early arrivals being Burrough’s flagship Bulolo. At Oran, where resistance had been stiffer and more prolonged, the harbour was littered with 25 sunken and scuttled ships and three scuttled floating d o c k s . A n American Naval Base Unit of 94 officers and 779 enlisted men had trained at the American base at Ros- neath to clear and operate Oran, Arzew and Mers-el-Kebir and the avant port at Oran was '5^Maund writes that die Americans, . .learnt by experience many lessons that they had been a bit too proud to learn from us.’ One such lesson was the need for a HQ Ship for each landing. Patton disregarded British advice to use a designated vessel for this purpose and searode in USS Augusta only to find himself being carried away from his com­ mand when Vichy cruisers appeared. He did not get ashore until 10 November. Maund 1949 p. 115. Morrison : 1947 vol. 2 Operations in North African Waters pact 1. Fergusson ; 1961 pp. 206-208. Roskill : 1956 pp. 328-332. 198 Morrison : 1947 vol. 2 Operations in North African Waters p, 251. 207 North Western Approaches operational within hours o f its capture, although it took until 7 January 1943 to fully return the harbour to normal operationsA^^ On 28 October Churchill was shown an Ultra decrypt that described the German position as ‘grave’ and, by 3 November, Rommel was signalling that his forces faced ‘a desperate defeat’.200 On 5 November the Daily Mirror headline read, ‘Rommel Routed. Huns fleeing in disorder.’ What made TORCH different from previous Combined Operations was that, this time, the troops were going ashore to stay. As one writer put it: TORCH did not involve a really large-scale landing. The resources for such were not in exis­ tence. . .The vastness o f Operation TORCH lay in the follow-up arrangements which were planned, af­ ter the capture o f Algiers, Oran and Casablanca, to pour ground and air forces into Nordi Africa to establish the Allies firmly on the southern Mediterranean coast and open that sea to shipping.^^ Two amphibious operations on the grand scale, one direct from the United States and one from Scotland, each involving the landing of more than 35,000 men had been successfully concluded and the Allies were firmly established ashore in Morocco and Tunisia. This was greatly encouraging, but TORCH succeeded to a large extent in spite o f itself. Had it not enjoyed total surprise, had it been mounted against sterner opposition, had the Mediterra­ nean been tidal, had it taken longer to get the ports operational, then it would have been a far more costly affair. As with JUBILEE before it, TORCH demonstrated that, while elite as­ sault units such as the British Commandos were well trained, there was a shortfall in am­ phibious assault training among regular forces. This would have implications for the CTCs on the Clyde and at Kabret. And Maund writes that among the lessons learned was the need for sufficient craft to unload the ships and an efficient organisation ashore to move men a materiel across the beaches. Navigational aids were too few in number and ineffec­ tive, beach intelligence was inadequate and an organisation to recover stranded landing craft was needed.^®^ The decision to go for TORCH meant that a cross-Channel invasion would be impossible in 1943 and, on the face o f it at least, thus prolonged the war by a year. But TORCH also ex­ posed shortcomings in men and materiel that would, in all likelihood, have made a cross- 159 Construction o f the American base at Rosneath had begun in March 1941, nine months before die US entered the war. It was originally envisaged as an eastern terminus for USN destroyers escorting transatlantic convoys and an as­ sociated flying boat base was planned for Loch Ryan. Duplicate bases were also under construction at Lough Erne and Londonderry. Facilities at Rosneath included 4,750 feet o f deepwater berthing, four submarine slipways, work­ shops, a 200-bed hospital and accommodation for 4,500 officers and men. The facilities impressed FOIC Greenock who was astonished to see luxuries such as refrigerators and central heating in every hut. Prior to TORCH die Ros­ neath base had been used by Combined Operations for landing craft repair. It was handed back to the USN for SubRon 50, a squadron o f submarines which were to co-operate with die Royal Navy in the Atlantic. Associated with die base were two seven-mile fuel oil supply pipelines which connected with another American-built pipeline between Finnart and Old Kilpatrick serving die safe deep-water tanker berdi in Loch Long. Tliis, in turn connected with a British pipeline which ran alongside the Fordi and Clyde Canal between Old Kilpatrick and Grangemouth. Building the N aty’s Bases in World WarII (US Government Printing Office, 1947) vol. II pp. 68-71. ADM 199 419. 200 Lamb : 1991 p. 215. 201 London Gas t^te 22 March 1949. 202 Maund : 1949 p. 116. 208 North Western Approaches Channel assault in 1943 a disaster. In September 1942, even before the North African land­ ings had taken place, Mountbatten wrote that TORCH was already taking up more landing craft than Combined Operations could produce crews for, and that the standard of training o f those crews was, ‘not high enough for a tough and protracted a s s a u l t . ’^03 i t would not be possible to train an adequate force for another assault before the summer o f 1943. Roosevelt and Churchill may have been optimistic in their belief that Allied forces could mount the North African landings, clear Tunisia o f the enemy and recover in time for ROUNDUP in 1943. But the decision in favour o f TORCH was entirely correct, even if it did commit the Allies to a Mediterranean strategy in 1943. The two leaders met for the SYM­ BOL conference at Casablanca in January 1943, Churchill still believing that the Germans could be pushed out o f North Africa early that year and that, as he had promised Stalin, ROUNDUP could go ahead that August or September. However, as Lamb writes, ‘...Montgomery won an historic victory at Alamein, but bungled the aftermath.’^ o^ Chances to wipe out the Afrika Korps at Alamein and El Agheila were missed and they withdrew into Tunisia where they prolonged the North African war into May 1943. Even were the necessary assets available for ROUNDUP in 1943, this alone would have scuppered the plan. Thus, the 48 divisions US planners believed necessary for a cross-Channel assault were not available in Britain, and disruption to the BOLERO shipping programme caused by TORCH had further aggravated the situation. There was only one way to go and that was further into the Mediterranean and, after protracted debate, HUSKY, the invasion of Sicily, was fa­ voured. This decision, forced on the British and Americans by their limited amphibious capability, had two lasting effects; it poisoned relationships with the Soviet Union, who felt left in the lurch, and it cemented what would become known as the ‘Special Relation- ship\205 Planning for HUSKY began in February 1943 and the final plan was agreed at a conference chaired by Eisenhower in Algiers in May. Shipping movements had however begun some weeks earlier when Troubridge in Bulolo left the Clyde with Force W for Egypt via the Cape o f Good Hope. Force W was to carry Major General Dempsey’s 13 Corps to land near Syracuse where they would be supported by the British Airborne Division.^o^ To the west, between Scicli and Licata, the US 5* Army was to land supported by their 82"'* Air­ borne and the British 30 Corps was to land in the middle o f the assault area, around Cape Passero. The Canadian 1®' Division under Major General Guy Simmonds and 40 and 41 Comman- 203 Combined Operations in Hitler’s War by Rear Admiral H. E. Horan, part 2 in Naval Review vol. 49,1961, pp. 18-29. 204 Lamb : 1993 p. 215. 205 Sainsbury : 1976 pp. 167-171. 209 North Western Approaches dos under Colonel Robert Laycock were to sail from the Clyde to land on the Costa dell’ Ambra west of Cape Passero in a sector codenamed Bark West. The 1®' Canadian Infantry Brigade was already at Inveraray when the decision to mount HUSKY was taken. They were followed through the CTC by the 2"*^ and 3'** Brigades in February and March 1943 and then, with HUSKY planning at an advanced stage, the three Brigades returned to Inveraray in May for another short c o u r s e . T h e HUSKY assault convoy from the Clyde, all bound for Bark West with the T ‘ Canadian Infantry Division, the T ' Canadian tank Brigade, 40 and 41 Commandos and the 73'** AA Brigade Royal Artillery, were: Cqnv^ mSlSA KMSISB KMSl 9 KMFl 8 KMF19 From Clyde Clyde Clyde Clyde Clyde Date 2076743 24/6/43 25/6/43 28/6/43 1/7/43 I Compositioii 8 kts I Eight LST, one LSG, one petrol carrier. 8 kts 7 kts 12 kts 12 kts 17 MT store sh^s, one LSG and joined Iç seven LST A l g i e r s . ___ 31 MT store ships, six LST, five petrol carriers and one collier, joined by nine MT store sh ^ for the Western Task Force fix>m A^i/œ. One HQ ship {Hilary, Rear Admiral Phdip Vian), diree LST and eight LSI. _ Nine troop transports and one LSI. Joined by four troop transports for Western Task Force from A lg iers .____________ __________________ Three ships from KMSISB were sunk by U boats, but Vian’s force arrived off the assault area at 0100/10 July. There were some difficulties in getting ashore due to difficult sea conditions and the late arrival o f LCTs from Tripoh, but the landings met only token resis­ tance and the Canadians speedily secured Pachino airfield, their initial objective.^* At 1000/28 June, as, further up the Clyde, KMFl 8 was preparing to sail, a remarkable gathering convened at HMS Warren, the Hollywood Hotel, in Largs for what was to be one of the seminal conferences o f the war. Codenamed RATTLE, it was originally intended as a course for staff officers ! likely to be involved in an I invasion of Europe. But OVERLORD planning was becoming muddled and in urgent need of clear direction, so Air Chief Mar­ shal Trafford Leigh- Mallory, AOC-in-C Fighter Command, suggested that the Commanders-in-Chief designate should attend Fast assault convoy KMF 18 outbound from the Clyde for ^ HUSKY A , # ## A -4* - 5” . 206 Fergusson : 1961 pp. 242-243. 207DEFE2 1317. 208 Roskill : 1960 The War at Sea vol. 3 part 1 p. 123 for the convoys and p. 132 for the assault. 210 North Western Approaches Mountbatten was in the chair and among the senior commanders present were General Sir Bernard Paget who commanded 21 Army Group, senior OVERLORD planner Lieutenant General Frederick Morgan, Leigh-Mallory, Air Vice Marshal Basil Embry, C-in-C Ports­ mouth Admiral Sir Charles Little, General Humfrey Gale of the 6* Airborne Division, Ma­ jor General Bernard Freyberg, Commanding General ETOUSA Lieutenant General Jacob Devers and General Andrew McNaughton from Canada. So eminent and numerous were those attending RATTLE, the conference was christened 'The Field o f the Cloth of Gold'. In all, there were 20 generals, 11 air marshals and air commodores, eight admirals and nu­ merous brigadiers, among them five Canadians and 15 Americans. Ever the showman, Mountbatten arranged for the delegates to visit Dundonald and the dummy HQ ship ashore there and set up ‘the best possible beach landing demonstration at Troon.’ Having pre­ vailed upon Lord Lovat to bring all the latest German weapons captured by the Comman­ dos, he wrote ‘I understand they are prepared to lay on a demonstration o f these weapons with men dressed in captured German uniforms... The agenda included discussion o f the German defensive system, naval aspects including the availability o f forces and navigational aids, air aspects including reconnaissance, soften­ ing up, assault craft requirements, the scales o f personnel, transport and equipment, the marshalling o f naval and air forces prior to D-Day; the training o f assault forces; the at­ tainment o f air superiority; the use o f airborne forces; the pros and cons o f a day or night assault, the neutralisation o f coastal batteries by naval and air bombardment, fire support, the follow-up phase, signals organisation, artificial harbours, the supply o f petrol and train­ ing requirements.^**) The conference room had been the Hollywood Hotel swimming pool, the pool itself hav­ ing been floored over. It had a tin roof and, as the weather was very hot, the room quickly became thoroughly uncomfortable. The first day did not go well and there were many who thought OVERLORD impossible. But that evening, right on cue, KMF 18 steamed past Largs on its way to Sicily and McNaughton signalled his good wishes to the Canadian troops. Perhaps it was the sight o f the assault convoy escorted by Vian’s cruisers and destroyers that brought about the change, perhaps not, but on the second day a more positive atmos­ phere prevailed. It began to appear that OVERLORD was feasible and, in the ensuing three days, vital decisions were reached on a wide range o f issues fundamental to the operation. Two crucial questions had to be answered — where should the assault go in and should it be in daylight or at night. Some wanted to go for the shortest sea crossing in the Pas de Calais, but Morgan, as COSSAC, argued cogently and ultimately decisively that the assault 209 DEFE 2 529. 210 Ibid. 21 North Western Approaches One item developed on the Clyde for what Fergusson aptly calls the ‘Combined Op­ erations Toy Cupboard’ was this operations room in the Combined Signals School at HMS Dundonald. This was a near replica of those aboard the British headquarters ships Bulolo and Largs and Mountbatten was keen to show this off to the RATTLE delegates as the Americans in particular had been reluctant to accept the need for such designated vessels. During the TORCH landings, a furious Patton was borne away from the land­ ings he was supposed to be commanding when the American flagship Augusta had to deal with a force of French cruisers. Conferences like RATTLE were normally held in secure location, well away from the public gaze, so trailing a large contingent of senior Generals, Admirals and Air Marshals around Clydeside was, on the face of it, indiscreet. But, while conference was entirely genuine, it was also part of an elaborate deception plan. Operation TINDALL, designed to maintain the impression that the Allies were about to invade Norway. must go in, ‘between the Cotentin Peninsula and Dieppe’. The soldiers, both British, American and Canadian, preferred a night assault, but Admiral Little insisted that the Navy, ‘could not guarantee to assemble the force off the beaches and get the men ashore in the right place in the dark.’ Once all the issues had been aired, a dawn attack came near­ est to meeting everyone’s needs. The fundamental decisions had been taken and, as Fer­ gusson writes; In many ways, RATTLE was the summit o f COHQ's achievement. It was at RATTLE that the final selection o f the lodgement area was approved to the fuU satisfaction o f those who, at that time, looked like bearing the personal responsibility for the greatest operation ever carried out.^* * 211 Fergusson ; 1961 p. 274. DEFE 2 529 and DEFE 2 530 for RATTLE and Morgan : 1950 p. 143 et passim. 212 North Western Approaches - : . One of the lessons learned at Combined Operations from Exercise LEAPFROG onwards had been that landing craft were apt to land either at the wrong beach en­ tirely, or at the right beach, but late. In particular this had been a feature of the Dieppe landing in 1942. A Beach Pilotage School, fittingly called HMS James Cook, was opened that September at Glen Caladh in the Kyles of Bute to train what came to be known as Navigation Leaders. Craft like these LCNs were equipped with the best navigational equipment available including H^S sets normally fitted to heavy bombers. Two weeks after RATTLE, General Morgan presented his outline OVERLORD plan to the British Chiefs o f Staff and, on 4 August, he sailed from Greenock in Queen Mary with the Prime Minister and the British delegation bound for the QUADRANT conference at Que­ bec where, broadly speaking, the plan was accepted by the Ameri­ cans. The plan evolved into one where there were two main task forces; an American Western Task Force and a British Eastern Task Force. The British Naval Task Force under Vian was to land the British 2"'* Army com­ manded by Lieutenant General Miles Dempsey consisting of three assault forces, G, J and S, and a follow-up force. Force L. Assault Force S under Rear Admiral G. J. Talbot in the Headquarters Ship iMrgs was to land the British 3*^ ^ Division comprising the 8*, 9* and 185* Brigades, which had begun training at Inveraray in June 1943, with Commandos and Free French Fusiliers Marins on Sword Beach near Ouistreham at the eastern end of the in­ vasion area. This was considered the most vulnerable assault because o f its proximity to en­ emy shore batteries around Le Havre.^*^ While the existing combined training areas were working at full stretch, there was a need for beaches where landings could be practised on a much larger scale than in, for example. Loch Fyne. In Scotland, beaches similar to those of Normandy and capable o f handling a division-sized assault were found at Tarbat Ness, Culbin Sands and nearby at Burghead Bay. At Tarbat Ness some 900 residents were summarily ordered out o f the area by 1 December 1943 when training for Force S and the 3*^'* Division commenced.^*^ The official history states: The training o f this force was seriously handicapped by the restrictions in its assault training areas; not until the final exercise at the end o f March, for example, could close support fire and the assault be practised at the same beach. Another great difficulty was the stormy winter weather o f the Moray Firth, but this Rear Admiral Talbot subsequently considered ‘a blessing in disguise.’ Putting aside the 212 Operation Neptune — Landings in Normandy, June 1944. Battle Summary No. 39 reprinted by HMSO in 1994 section 17. See also Roskill : 1960 The War at Sea vol. 3 part 2 pp. 22-23 and 44-45. 213ADM 116 4736. 213 _ North Western Approaches cancellation o f exercises and the losses o f craft and personnel the experience gained under these conditions stood them in good stead in the actual operation. Five full-scale exercises were carried out at Burghead, which, from a hydrographical point o f view, closely resembled the beach which was to be assaulted in Normandy.***'* Captain Gillies o f the 1®* Battalion King’s Own Scottish Borderers describes an assault ex­ ercise which began at Burghead Bay on 1 January 1944: It was abundantly clear that our waiting period was coming to an end. My thoughts were then inter­ rupted by the caU to start the assault and I threw myself into the uninviting swell and struggled ashore, followed by my company. During the next three days o f the exercise my clothes froze on me, but it illustrates our high state o f fitness that I did not even get a cold.^*^ But Brigadier Lord Lovat offers a more pessimistic view: No. 4 Commando stepped up their training in street fighting. Then they went north on an exercise in the Moray Firth with the 3rd Division, whose 8th Brigade were to land before Robert Dawson on D Day. I sent Derek [Mills-Roberts] as an observer. They both gave gloomy accounts o f hesitant and badly led troops.***® During this period the combined staffs o f Force S and the Division were based at Cam­ eron Barracks, Inverness, though, in March, the planners moved to Aberlour House, Spey- side. Force S moved south to Portsmouth during April 1944.^* ^ D Day was originally planned for 5 June 1944 and, led by the battleship Rodney and the cruiser Belfast, the East­ ern Bombardment Force sailed the Clyde three days earlier only to have to loiter in the Irish Sea after the invasion was delayed by 24 hours due to bad weather.^*^ On Sword Beach, the first wave o f 32 landing craft touched down at about 0730/6 June and the entire assault brigade was ashore by 0943/6, just 18 minutes behind schedule.^*^ The official his­ tory records that considerable opposition was encountered, particularly by the 2"'* Battal­ ion, the East Yorks Regiment, but Lovat suggests that progress by the 3'(* Division was less than impressive, the poor showing in the Moray Firth being repeated on the battlefield: The 3rd Division, in spite o f the good record before Dunkirk under Monty, proved very sticky throughout the landing. They had become muscle-bound mentally and physically after four years training in the United Kingdom .220 At Inveraray and elsewhere on the Clyde, the period between HUSKY and OVERLORD had been one o f intense activity. The 3'^ '* (Canadian) Division, which landed on Juno Beach, had first formed up with its embryonic naval element in October 1942. Its reserve group, the 9* (Canadian) Infantry Brigade arrived at Inveraray in July 1943 and was followed that August and September by the 7* and 8* Brigades, the assault formations for Juno. On 214 Operation Neptune — Landings in Normandy, June 1944. Battle Summary No. 39 section 28. 215 Gillies MS, IWM Department o f Documents ref. 90/26/1. 2i6Lovat: 1978p. 295. 217 Fergusson : 1961 p. 324. 218 Operation Neptune — Landings in Normandy, June 1944. Battle Summary No. 39 sections 20, 39 and appendix F(2). 215 Roskill : 1960 The War at Sea vol. 3 part 2. 220 Lovat : 1978 p. 313 fn. See also Operation Neptune — Landings in Normandy, June 1944. Battle Summary No. 39 section 55. North Western Approaches Gold Beach, the westmost beach in the British sector, Force G landed the 50* Division comprising the 6*, 231»‘ and 56* Infantry Brigades. Thia force had only formed on 1 March 1944, when it began training at Inveraray, then moved south and carried out four brigade landing exercises in Studland Bay.™ -«4K & Shortly before D Day,. 70 mamly British and American vessels assembled in the Firth of Lome. Codenamed CORNCOBS, these ancient ships were to be scuttled to form the GOOSEBERRY breakwaters behind which the MULBERRY artificial har­ bours would operate. With the greatest distance to travel to Normandy, and thus being among the first ships to sail for the assault, sailing orders for the CORNCOBS had to be issued at D-B They were already at sea when, at 0515/4 June, D-Day was postponed by 24 hours and d ie convoy was diverted to anchor in Poole Bay. The sinkir^ of the blockships, among them the redundant battleships Centurion and Courbet (French) was completed under enen^ fire and in p>oor weather by D+4 From a peak at the end o f 1943, Combined Training in the Clyde had begun to wind down as D Day approached. One o f the first training areas to close was the Advanced Assault Training area at Kilbride with its copies o f German coastal defences. Culbin Sands, Burghead Bay and Tarbat Ness were all cleared o f unexploded ordnance by 24 May 1944 and residents had returned within three weeks. S c o t l a n d ’s C o m b i n e d O p e r a t i o n s R o l e i n R e t r o s p e c t For the disastrous 1940 campaign in Norway and, following defeat there and in France un­ til 1943, it was chiefly from Scotland, and the Clyde in particular, that Allied military power was projected into the European and African theatres o f war. And it was principally at training establishments in Scotland, most notably at Inveraray and elsewhere around the Clyde, that amphibious capabilities were developed both to see Allied armies ashore on a defended coastline and sustain them there. 221 Operation Neptune — handingy in Normandy, June 1944. Battle Summary No. 39 section 28. Roskill : 1960 vol. 3 part 2 pp. 22-23 215 North Western Approaches Scotland trained the troops and was the base for the first Combined Operations raids to Norway in Î94 Î, it was a Scottish-based and trained force that carried out the St Nazaire raid in 1942 and, later that year, it is no. coincidence that troops trained at Inveraray were the only successful element o f the ill-fated- Dieppe raid^ Training and rehearsals, for the largest and arguably most vital elements o f TOKGH, the first large-scale Allied amphibious landing o f the war, were conducted in the Clyde and the Centre, and Eastern Task Forces sailed from there for the assault. In 1:943 it was from the Clyde that a. large,, mainly Cana­ dian, task force sailed for HUSKY, the invasion o f Sicily. Much o f the British and Canadian force destined for OVEKLORD undertook initial assault training, at Inveraray and vital deci­ sions. affecting the. landings in Normandy-were taken a t a conference convened in Largs. At the end of 1943 and in early 1944, one o f the three main British sector landing forces re­ hearsed its assault in the Moray Firth. In June 194.4, as the Allies went ashore in Normandy, Inveraray was giving a course to Norwegian mountain troops and, in May 1945, it was giving jungle warfare courses to troops bound for the Far East. Training continued until after VJ Day, then, in October 1945, the CTC ceased to function. Over 130 battalions, among them 29 Canadian, and: six American had passed through Inveraray by mid-1944 and some 62,000= landing craft per­ sonnel had been trained, mostly on the Glyde.222 In all, at least 250,000 men and women had passed through Inveraray by the end o f the war.™= Clearing up the 37O=,000= acres at Inveraray, the 6,000 acres held by Dundonald, the 28,000 acre bombardment range at Anderside Hill, no t to mention the 150,000 acre Commando Training Centre a t Achnaearry would take many m on th s . 224 But perhaps, most impressive is that between 1939= and 194:5 movements, o f military per­ sonnel in and out of the Clyde totalled 4,963,072 and, in the peak period between 1942 and 1945, some 2,775,70=3 tons o f military stores were handled.22s- I t m ight be argued th a t these facilities eouid=, at least hr part, have been provided elsewhere. But the consequent loss o f shipping efficiency, as vast numbers of troops were ferried around" the world, would have fundamentally affected strategic decision-making and lengthened the war by years. So, without the facilities offered by the Clyde at a relatively safe distance from enemy-held ter­ ritory, none o f the major amphibious operations in the European and Mediterranean thea­ tres would" have been possible within anything approaching their historical timetable, in­ deed many could not have taken place at ah. 222 Fergusson : 1961 p. 324. Maund ; 1949 p. 105: 223 Infennation. &om.the Combined Opérations Museum, Inveraray. 224DEFEZT117:. 225 YeG"MS, IWM Department o f Documents, ref. 95/6/1. 216 North Western Approaches Chat)ter Six OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN WATERS BY SCOTTISH-BASED MARITIME FORCES 1941-1945 Norway’s long, deeply indented coastline and poor road and rail communications meant that German occupation forces there were heavily dependent on sea communi­ cations. Thus, they were vulnerable to Allied attempts to break their maritime supply lines using submarines, surface craft and aircraft. The story o f the Mediterranean submarines o f the 8* and 10* Flotillas is well known. Less well documented are the Scottish 2"'*, 3^ "*, 7* and Flotillas. Operating from the Clyde and Tay, with forward bases at Lerwick and Falmouth, their boats disrupted German seaborne traffic o ff Norway and in the Bay of Biscay. They also patrolled north o f the Arctic Circle to cover Arctic convoys, sank U-boats and damaged heavy surface units. From SOE bases in Shetland, Norwegian-manned fishing boats and submarine chasers undertook clandestine m issions into Norwegian waters. Scottish-based submarines also played their part, closing the enemy coast at night to land personnel and supplies. And based in Lerwick were Norwegian and British MTBs which would hide in the Inner Leads, appear as if from nowhere to attack a German convoy, then dash for home. But throughout the war, and in particular from the sailing o f the first Arctic convoy in August 1941, the primary concern remained the presence o f German heavy ships in Northern Waters. Tirpitt^ that most potent example o f the concept o f a fleet in being, and her cohorts tied down many o f the most modern ships of the Royal Navy at Scapa Flow when they were desperately needed in the Mediterranean and Far East. In the lat­ ter stages o f the war powerful carrier, groups o f the Royal Navy based at Scapa swept up the Norwegian coast to attack the Tirpits( ^and coastal convoys. 217 North Western Approaches S c o t t i s h S u b m a r i n e F l o t i l l a s E s t a b l i s h e d During the 1930s, as British naval planners wrestled with conflicting strategic commit­ ments, political interference and forced economies, the surface warship was still seen as the ultimate weapon in naval warfare. In the Atlantic, Mediterranean and Pacific theatres, submarines were principally viewed as the eyes and ears of the fleet, reporting on enemy surface ship movements either against the British east coast ports, the Atlantic trade routes or Singapore. But the submarine was not viewed as a vital weapon of war and the subma­ rine branch suffered to a disproportionate degree during the retrenchment o f the 1920 and 1930s. The result was that, at the outbreak o f war, the submarine force was far too small, too much o f it like the H class was obsolete or inadequate, training and tactics were inade­ quate and there was a lack o f specialist building capacity to provide new tonnage.* A powerful flotilla o f some o f the Navy’s most modern submarines was, as noted in Chap­ ter One, stationed at Dundee in August 1939 to close the gap at the Norway end o f the Montrose-Obrestad Patrol. Once Hudson aircraft became available in sufficient numbers at RAF Leuchars, the 2"^ Flotilla moved to Rosyth and, despite winter weather, undertook patrols off the Skaggerak and Fleligoland Bight to warn o f an enemy break-out from the Baltic. On. the afternoon of 20 November, Sturgeon scored, the first British submarine suc­ cess o f the war when she sank the A /S trawler Gaulieter Tehchow (428T) off Heligoland.^ On Boxing Day Seahorse sailed Rosyth for patrol off the Elbe, but nothing further was heard o f her.^ And, on 28 December, Triumph limped into Rosyth, heavily damaged after hitting a mine. Three more British submarines were lost in quick succession in the Heligo­ land Bight in January 1940. For the submarine branch, it had no t been a good beginning. Salmon’s, Edward Bickford who had sunk U-36 and damaged the cruisers Teipt^g and Nürnberg and George Phillips o f the 6* Flotilla’s Ursula were celebrated as national heroes, but this was not enough to save FO(S) Admiral Bertram Watson who was made scapegoat for the poor state of the subma­ rine service and relieved on 22 December 1939. Mars writes that Watson was 'most dis- * See British Submarine Policy 1918-1939 pApet by David Henty in Ranft etal : 1977. 2 Information from RN Submarine Museum. Rohwer : 1997. Witthoft : 1971 p. 263. 3 At 1318/7 (CET) the German I®' Minesweeping Flotilla attacked a contact in 5419N 0730E and their report states^ At 1318 a submarine was sighted and the alarm wa& given. The submarine's- location was obtained and nine depth charges dropped. Success not observed. Submarine noises were heard through the echo ranger and re­ volving directional hydrophones. Buoy was dropped. After the attack a further clear echo was obtained and three depth charges: dropped. U / anchored near the position, but heavyfog prevented further attack. She depth charges each of the double throws had been dropped on the located position o f die submarine, but no proof of success was obtained. As no such attack was reported by any other submarine, this may well have been Seahorse, though die possibility re­ mains that she could have been caught in one o f the anti-submarine minefields in her patrol area on or around 30 December. RN Submarine Museum. Evans : 1986 p. 205. 118 North Western Approaches tressed' as he felt that much o f the responsibility lay with Sir Charles Forbes. Hamstrung by restrictive rules of engagement, submarines were being ill-used as a reconnaissance arm of a Home Fleet unable to comprehend that there would be no repeat o f Jutland. And re­ porting enemy warship movements was, for older boats with inadequate wireless equip­ ment, all bu t impossible.'* As the German invasion force made its way towards Norway on 8: April 1940, new FO(S) Max Horton read the runes better than his superiors and disposed 19 submarines off Denmark and southern Norway. First contact came when the Rosyth-based Polish subma­ rine Ort^l torpedoed the Rio de Janeiro (5,261T) o f the German 1®‘ Sea Transport Echelon o ff LiUesand at 1100/8 and Commander Jan Grudzinski watched men in Wehrmacht feldgrau being rescued by fishermen. The Germans told their rescuers were on their way to protect Bergen from British aggression but, caught between two super-powers, the supine Norwegian government took no action. ^ Reuters published news o f the sinking of RJo de Janeiro at 2030/8, but the Admiralty omitted to tell Sir Charles Forbes who, fooled by the temporary westerly course o f Hipper, headed north-west and away from the German inva­ sion force. Forbes was only told o f Or^eHs success at 2255/8.® Meanwhile, at 1215/8 in the Skaggerak, the German tanker Posidonia (8,036T) scuttled when Trident from the 2"'* Flotilla out o f Rosyth, opened fire on her, and another Rosyth boat, Triton, missed Lutt^om, B/ücher and Emden with a salvo of ten torpedoes that evening. Triton surfaced to make a sighting report at 1915/8 and the cruisers Galatea and Arethma sailed Rosyth with 12 destroyers on an abortive mission to intercept the the German ships.^ And three Hudsons fitted with ASV mk.l radar took off from Leuchars at 1930/8 but failed also to find them.® O ff Kristiansand at 1900/9, the Rosyth-based Truant S2tiak. the cruiser Karlsruhe. On 22 May 1940, with the Norwegian campaign at its height, submarine flotilla strength in Home Waters was: Rosyth: 2”^ Flotilla with HMS ¥orth\ eight T class, one minelayer and the Polish Orr^l and W ilk. One o f tlie Ts and W ilk were in refit, the latter at Dundee. Rosyth: 3®® Flotilla with HMS Maidstone and six S class boats. Rosyth: 10* Flotilla with six boats, one o f which was in refit. Btyth: 6* Flotilla at HMS Fdfin with three S class and one minelayer in. commission and one U class in refit. 4 Forbes had been Jelficoe’s Flag Commander in Iron Duke, at Jutland. Rear Admiral Shrimp’ Simpson, no admirer o f | Forbes, writes o f the unreality of pre-war Fleet exercises and o f the latter’s blind faith in the big gun. Watson, a First World War submariner, was 'charming' but not strong enough to stand up to Churchill, Pound and Forbes and was j replaced by Max Horton. The Admiralty relented on the issue of retirement and Watson was a success as Flag Officer | Greenock. Simpson r 1972 ch. 6. Mats r 1971 pp. 35-37. i 5 Ofxelh&d no gun and was thus compelled to sink the German ship with a torpedo. Ibid. p. 87. Roskill : 1954 p. 111. | Derry : 1952 p.. 30. i ® HipperAnd her consorts were loitering ofFTrondheim before landing their troops early the following morning. j 7 Rowher : 1997. Information from the Royal Navy Submarine Museum I ® Air to Surface Vessel radar was then still in its infancy. AIR 28 465. 1 I 219 i North Western Approaches Dundee: 9^ ^Flotilla at HMS Ambrose with two River class and four French boats including the mine­ layer Rubis. Harwich: 3") Flotilla with HMS Cyclops and two L class boats. Portsmouth: 5* Flotilla at HMS Dophin with 15 boats o f various classes.^ Clyde sailed Dundee on 4 June and, on 20 June, attacked Gneisenau, Hipper and Numberg as they left Trondheim, hitting Gneisenau with one torpedoJ® The German squadron returned to port and, as there were no suitable docking facilities in Norway, Home Fleet and subma­ rine dispositions were made to catch Gneisenau as she returned to Germany. But Gneisenau remained at Trondheim for a month, finally sailing on 24 July 1940. O ff Stavanger on 26 July, the Dundee-based Thames fired at Gneisenau but hit one of her escorts, killing over 100 o f her crew. Thames failed to return to Dundee on 3 August and was assumed lost in a German mine­ field.** fig.7t Lost while operating with the 9* Flotilla from Dundee, Thames was thought to have struck a German mine. Other Scottish submarines lost during and after the Norway campaign included Thistle tor­ pedoed by U-4 off Skudesnes on 10 April and the Dundee-based Dutch 0-13 which was probably lost in a German minefield.*2 Salmon sailed Rosyth on 4 July, but failed to return. Shark sailed Rosyth to relieve Sealion off Skudesnes and was sunk by an enemy aircraft on 5 July.*^ Spearftsh sailed Rosyth on 31 July, but was torpedoed and sunk by U-34A 0-22 sailed Dundee on 5 November to relieve Sturgeon off Lister and disappeared.*® 9 ADM 234 380. 10 Cfydis signal was received by the Admiralty at 0226/21 but it was also intercepted by the Germans who, believing that their counter attack had put Ctydi% wireless out o f action, thought there must be another submarine in the area. They were correct, albeit for the wrong reasons, as Porpoise had heard Code's enemy report at 0045/21 and, when it was not acknowledged, relayed it successfitUy. ADM 234 380. RN Submarine Museum. Blair : 1997 p. 171. 11 Lieutenant Commander Dunkerley and 61 crew were lost with Thames. Gneisenau was unfit for service until 18 De­ cember 1940. ADM 234 380. Rowher : 1997. Evans : 1986 pp. 241-244. RN Submarine Museum. 12 It has been suggested, by Rohwer and others, that 0-13 may have been rammed by the Polish Wilk at 0025/20 June. But, when Wilk returned to Dundee on 26 June, Boris Kamicki and his crew were adamant that they had rammed a boat fitted with a deck gun. 0-13 was not fitted with a gun. Rohwer : 1997. ADM 234 380. 13 Her crew were picked up by a German trawler. Evans : 1986 pp. 233-240. Roskill : 1954 pp 266-267. RN Submarine Museum. I'* Rollmann surfaced and picked up Able Seaman Pester, a lookout and one of the first to reach the bridge when she surfaced. Evans : 1986 pp. 244-246. Jones : 1986 pp. 59-61. 13 The wreck of 0-22 was thscovercd off Lister in 1W3 and bore no apparent external damage, so it is possible that she succumbed to a technical problem. AH 46 aboard were lost. On 8 August, FO(S) Max Horton had written that he believed Ors^ el, Salmon and Shark were all lost to air attack, 0-13 to surface craft, Thames to air attack or mine and Narwhal to cause unknown. Post-war research however, suggests that On^ el, 0-13, Salmon and Thames all fell victim to mines and Horton was placing undue weight on enemy A /S capabilities. These minefields remained unknown to the Admiralty until U-370 (HMS Graph) was captured and her charts revealed their positions. ADM 234 380. Informa­ tion from Bram Otto, Holland. 220 North Western Approaches As the war moved into the Atlantic, patrols were mounted off enemy-held Biscay ports. Cachalot laid mines south o f Penmarc’h on 19 August, then sank Ü-51 o ff Lorient.*® Tigris sank a trawler on 1 September, then Tuna sank both the Norwegian Tirrana (7,320T) off the Gironde on 22 September and the German Ostmark (1,280T) off Port Royan on 24 September.*7 Taku damaged the tanker Gedania (8,923T) off Lorient.*® Talisman captured a tunny boat to be used to monitor U boat movements and, at 0830/15 December, Thunder­ bolt sank the Itahan submarine Tarantini o ff the Gironde and Tuna sank the tug Chassiron (172T) off the Gironde.*^ Dispositions in early 1940 had been influenced by the need to warn o f an invasion force breaking out o f the Skaggerak, but the dramatically altered strategic position that summer led to a reorganisation o f submarine flotillas. After Devonport, Pembroke Dock, even Queenstown (Cobh) had been considered as possible bases, Forth transferred from Rosyth to the Holy Loch for the 2"'* Flotilla, Cyclops was based at Rothesay for the 7* Flotilla, Tita­ nia was sent to Rosyth to replace Maidstone with the 3* Flotilla and Maidstone went to Scapa to act as a destroyer repair ship. Woolwich, which had been at Scapa, was released for duty in the Mediterranean. New dispositions around Scotland effective 8 September 1940 were thus: Holy Loch; Flotilla depot ship Forth (Captain George Menzies) with escort vessel White Bear and Trident, Tribune, Tuna, Tigris, Talisman, Taku, Porpoise and Cachalot. Operational fiotUla for Biscay Patrol and Atlantic with forward base at Falmouth, Submarines doing trials and work-up were also attached, Rothesay; 7* Flotilla depot sliip Cyclops (Captain Roderick Edwards) with escort vessels Breda and Alecto, submarines Oheron, Otway, H-28, Fl-31, H-32, H-33, H-34, H-44, H-49 and H-50, Dutch O- 9 and 0-10, and Norweg^n B-1. Training and A /S flotilla. Rosyth; 3* Flotilla depot ship Titania (Captain H. M, C. lonides) with the Sealion, Sunfish, Snapper and Seawolf. Operational Flotilla North Sea. Dundee, 9* Flotilla shore base Ambrose (Captain James Roper) with Clyde, Severn, T-23, Lr26, the Free French Rjtbis and the Dutch 0-21, 0-22, 0-23 and 0-24. Operational flotilla North Sea with forward base At Ambrose II, Lerwick, and A /S training flotilla for the Home Fleet. Forth and four ‘T ’s went to Halifax, in early 1941 to protect Atlantic convoys against enemy heavy ships, but returned to the Clyde in December 1941 when the 2»'* and 3* Flotillas were combined at the Holy Loch and sea training was transferred to HMS Eljin at Blyth. After acting as navigational beacons fo r the Western Task Force in TORCH, the American SubRon 50 boats were based at Rosneath. While flotilla strength was continually varied by 1® At 1415/16 August Flying Officer Ernest Baker in Sunderland H/210 escorting OA198 sighted U boat conning tower in 5635N 1255W. The Sunderland attacked with two depth charges which blew the U boat out o f tlie water and onto her side. A further attack was made with four 2501b bombs, then the U boat rolled over and sank trailing oil and bubbles. The akcraft alighted Oban 1849/16 and Baker was awarded the DFC. AIR 28 615. AIR 27 1298. ADM 199 371. ADM 234 380. Franks : 1995. Rohwer : 1997. Jones : 1986 pp. 67-71. 17 Rohwer 1 1997. RN Submarine Museum. 1» Ibid. 1® Tunde, victim was originally believed to have been the Ita (250T) but Rohwer identifies her as Chassiron. Ibid. See also Warren and Benson : 1953. 221 North Western Approaches refits and the demands o f other theatres, notably the Mediterranean, this organisation re­ mained in place for much o f the war.20 T h e B i s m a r c k B K E A K O u r - M ay 1941 The Royal Navy had, since 1939, concentrated in northern waters against a possible break­ out into the Atlantic by German surface units. Wliile the Kreigsmarine could not contem­ plate a main fleet action along the lines o f Jutland in 1916, both British and German plan­ ners were ahve to the fact that the small but powerful German surface fleet could, if skill­ fully handled, be formed into effective task forces for operations against the Atlantic trade routes. On 2 December 1940, amid indications that a German heavy unit was heading for the At­ lantic, the Rosyth- and Dundee-based submarines 0-21, Sturgeon, Sealion and Sunfish were positioned off Utsire, Utvaer and Stadlandet. But they were too late to intercept Hipper which broke through the Denmark Strait, reached Brest on 27 December, then sailed again on 1 February 1941 for the Sierra Leone convoy route. On 18 February 1941 Tigris sailed the Clyde to try to catch Hipper as she returned to Brest, but did not succeed.^* Hipper was joined at Brest on 22 March by Scharnhorst and Gneisenau and North Sea submarine flotillas were denuded to form part o f a naval blockade, bu t Hipper sailed on 15 March and reached Keil via the Denmark Strait on 28 M a r c h .22 While Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were trapped in Brest, the new battleship Bismarck and Prinz Eugen were ready for operations in the Atlantic and despite this being a far weaker task force than originally envisaged, these two ships were sighted passing out o f the Baltic on the morning o f 19 May, though advance warning o f German movements had come from Swedish intelligence sources.^® The French submarine Minerve out o f Dundee missed the German squadron as it passed up the Norwegian coast, but, within two hours o f arrival at Bergen, it had been photographed by PRU Spitfires from Wick. From Scapa Flow, C-in-C Home Fleet Sir John Tovey began making dispositions to intercept the German ships if they made for the Atlantic. The cruisers Norfolk and Suffolk, already patrolling the Den­ mark Strait were alerted. Hood and Prince of Wales sailed Scapa for Iceland to fuel and await developments, and the cruisers Arethusa, Birmingham and Manchester were ordered to fuel in Iceland then patrol the Iceland-Faroe Islands strait. The bulk of the Home Fleet including King George V and the carrier Victorious remained at Scapa. 20 ADM 234 380. RN Submarine Museum. Roskill : 1954 p. 334. 21 Rohwer su^ests Tigris sank the coaster Jacobsen (523T) and the Guihenec (3,273T) in4448N 03t0W at 0245/19, but there is no record o f this. Rohwer : 1997. ADM 234 380. Roskill : 1954 p. 390. 22 ADM 234 380. Roskill : 1954 ch. XVIII. 23 McLachlan : 1968 pp 146. Sebag- Montefiore : 2000 p. 200. 222 North Western Approaches The German ships’ departure for the North Atlantic late on 21 May went unseen for al­ most 24 hours until a 771 Squadron Maryland from Hatston in Orkney found them goneA^ Tovey sailed Scapa with the main body of the Home Fleet late on 22 May, Repulse was re­ called from convoy duty in the Clyde, and Hood and Prince of Wales were sent south of Ice­ land. The Geman attempt to break through the Denmark Strait unseen was foiled by the cruisers Suffolk and Norfolk, the latter sending a sighting report at 2032/23. Unknown to Admiral Wake-Walker in Norfolk, some of his signals were being intercepted, decrypted and retransmitted back to Bismarck less than two hours after original transmission. That eve­ ning, as Prin; ^ Eugen escaped southwards, Bismarck rounded on Wake-Walker’s cruisers, then contact was lost for about six hours. Another sighting report from Suffolk was de­ crypted and retransmitted back to Bismarck at 0421/24, just over an hour before Hood and Prince of Wales made contact.^® Hood was sunk, then Bismarck was lost, found by a Coastal Command Catalina, crippled by aircraft and finally sunk at 1037/27 after being cornered by Home Fleet ships from Scapa, Force H from Gibraltar and other ships including Rodney2^ Again, during this stage o f the operation, British signal traffic was intercepted and retransmitted back to the German bat­ tleship. This was discovered from Enigma decrypts detailed in a 4 July 1941 report by the Naval Section at Bletchley Park; British activity during the first stages o f this operation were known to the Germans ficom decypher o f naval tactical signals.. .The second stage, the contacting o £ Bismark [sic] by air reconnaissance, was clear to them from decyphered air traffic.^? Ruhls and Tuna sailed the Clyde on 1 June, but missed Prin^ Eugen as she joined Scharnhorst and Gneisenau in Brest where all three were damaged in air raids.^® Euts^pw was in Keil re­ pairing damage inflicted by Spearftsh during the Norwegian campaign. Also in the Baltic, and then the only German heavy units in full commission, were Hipper and the light cruis­ ers Emden and l^iprfgP The oft-told story o f the Bismarck operation, while it resulted in the loss o f Hood, had pro­ vided a graphic illustration o f the insecurity o f British naval signalling. And it had been principally naval forces based in Scotland that had brought about the final destruction o f the German ship, then arguably the most powerful warship in the Atlantic. But Bismarck 2*1 Lieutenant Goddard’s telegraphist was unable to raise anybody on the Coastal Command frequency, so passed his message to tlie Hatston Target Towing Flight on their frequency. Winton : 1988 p. 27. McLachlan : 1968 p. 149 25 ADM 223 2. 2® See WinWaredi : 1998 for an account o f the Bismarck chase. See also paper on HW by Paul Kemp in IWM Review no.4 1989 pp 96-102. Winton : 1988 p. 28-29. German account, signals and survivor's report o f the action in Brassey : 1948 p. 201 et passim. 27 ADM 223 2. 28 Information from ex-Sous-Maitre Mechanicien Jean-Pierre Babin. 29 McLachlan : 1968 pp. 158-159. Roskill : 1954 p. 487. Schofield : 1977 pp. 10-11. 223 North Western Approaches had scarcely beea sunk when, the start o f BARBAROSSA, the German invasion o f the Soviet Union introduced new strategic imperatives to the naval war in the north, and new naval threat in the form of Bismarck’s sister, Tirpits .^ F i r s t A r c t ic C o n v o y s The German invasion o f the Soviet Union was followed by an immediate, if perhaps hasty, offer o f British assistance. Churchill proposed sending a task force to operate in the Arctic and, on 12 July 1941, Rear Admiral Vian flew to Moscow for discussions with the Soviet Navy. Vian recommended that no ships be sent, not least because there was no fighter cover, but that submarines should be considered. Tigris and Trident were recalled to the Clyde from Biscay Patrol and sent north to Polyarnoe. In subsequent patrols o ff the North Cape, Tigris sank 1,397 tons o f shipping and Trident sank 15,403 tons and damaged one ship o f 4,713 tons.®® Meanwhile, in a gesture o f Allied solidarity, the carriers Furious and Victorious sailed Scapa on 23 July for Operation EF, attacks on German bases and shipping at Kirkenes, Petsamo and Varengefjord. The force was to fuel at Seidisfjord on 25 July, but that morning the de­ stroyer Achates was mined and 65 o f her crew killed. EF was delayed by 24 hours, then, just as the carrier strike was about to take o ff on the morning o f 30 July, the force was spotted by enemy aircraft. But the attack went ahead anyway, results were negligible and 16 aircraft were lost. Aptly described by Roskill as ‘unprofitable’, the operation was a costly set­ back.®* The first Arctic convoy, DERVISH, sailed Liverpool on 12 August and was escorted to Bear Island by Victorious, Devonshire, Suffolk and three destroyers from Scapa. The Naval force then turned back to meet STRENGTH, a delivery o f Hurricanes aboard Argus which had sailed Scapa with Shropshire and three destroyers. DERVISH reached Archangel on 31 August and Argus flew off her Hurricanes on 7 September. By the end of 1941, 53 ships had reached north Russia and 34 had been brought back. None had been lost, despite weak escorts, and deliveries included 750 tanks, 800 aircraft and 1,400 vehicles.®^ German reaction had been muted but, on 17 December, a Naval Intelligence report clearly based on decrypts stated that a German ‘Admiral Commanding Northern Waters’ had been appointed, Luftwaffe reinforcements (II/KG30 with the latest JU88 A4) for reconnais­ sance o f the ‘Scotland to East Iceland convoy route’ were about to arrive and a German 30 For these patrols by Tigris and Trident see Rohwer : 1997. Witthoft : 1971. ADM 234 380 . RN Submarine Museum. Kemp : 1993. Lamb : 1993 pp. 129-134. 31 Kemp : 1993. Roskill : 1954 p. 486. 32 Schofield ; 1977 p. 14. 224 North Western Approaches signals unit had moved north to KirkenesA® On 17 January 1942, decrypts revealed that the new battleship Tirpitii had reached Trondheim with four destroyers, though another de­ crypt on 19 January showed that these destroyers had left for Germany, so Tirpifti could only remain where she was. An air watch was kept on the ship as weather allowed.®** Fur­ ther decrypts revealed that Kondors o f 7/KG40 reached north Norway at the end o f Janu­ ary 35 As Tuna and Unbending kept watch off Trondheim, convoys QP6 from Murmansk, PQ9 and PQIO from Hvalfjord and P Q ll from Loch Ewe all got through unscathed.®® But then, in the famous ‘Channel Dash’, Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Prinsi Eugen passed up the English Channel on the night o f 11-12 February with the intention of joining up with Tirpiti^ at Trondheim. The planned German concentration was diminished when Scharnhorst and Gneisenau struck mines off Terschelling, though Admiral Scheer axsB Prin^ Eugen still posed a threat. ®7 QP7 sailed Murmansk on 12 February and, fearing a sortie by Tirpitf(^ Tovey sailed Hvalfjord at 0600/19 with King George V , Victorious, Berwick and seven destroyers. Enigma decrypts warned at 1020/20 that more German units were heading for Trondheim to ren­ dezvous with Tirpits^ and, sure enough at 1100/20, air reconnaissance found Prin^ Eugen, Admiral Scheer and five destroyers steaming north off Jutland.®® Trident and Minerve closed the entrance to Trondheim and, at 0551/23, Trident sighted the German cruisers and fired seven torpedoes, one o f which struck Eugen’s stern. Her rudder jammed, Prin^ Eugen reached Trondheim at 2200/23.®® PQ12 and QP8 were due to sail, so Seawolf a.nd Junon sailed Lerwick to reinforce Minerve and off Trondheim.**® PQ12 was found by a 7/KG40 XoWor near Jan Mayen Island on 5 March and, at 1730/6, Tirpits^ was reported leaving Trondheim by Seawolf A Tirpitsi passed between the convoys south o f Bear Island and, at 1630/7, one o f her destroyer es- 33 ADM 223 3. 34 Tirpit:(p commissioning trials and move to Wilhelmshaven had been monitored by Bletchley Park. Winton ; 1988 pp. 54-56. 35 ADM 223 3. 35 Schofield ; 1977 app. 1. Roskill ; 1956 p. 116. 37 Gneisenau played no further part in the war and was stripped o f her turrets for shore defence batteries in Norway and Holland. Brassey : 1948 p. 275. 38 Winton : 1988 p. 56. 39 Prim ^Eugen's steering gear was wrecked beyond the scope o f the repair facilities at Trondheim, the centre shaft tun­ nel was split; the armoured deck and 20 transverse frames were badly distorted. Fuel and fresh water tanks were open to die sea. Nine men had been killed and 25 wounded. Emergency repairs were carried out and she left Trond­ heim for the Baltic on 16 May, but full repairs were not completed until January 1943. ADM 234 380. Rohwer : 1997. 40 ADM 234 380. 41 Ibid. Information from the RN Submarine Museum. 225 North Western Approaches corts sank the QP8 straggler Isrfora.^^ Armed with Ultra intelligence o f the returning Tirpittf intentions, Tovey had reconnaissance sorties flown off Victorious and these found Tirpitr^ west o f the Lofoten Islands at 0802/9. But an attack by torpedo-carrying Albacores at 0915/9 failed and reached Narvik that evening. Further decrypts showed that Tirpit^ was to return to Trondheim as soon as possible, so Seawolf, Sealion, Junon and Trident were stationed off the fjord and the Norwegian Uredd was hurrying north from Dundee. But, while Trident heard strong HE at 1549/13, the battleship got past the submarine patrols and reached Trondheim that night.**® Hipper )o'med the German squadron in Trondheim on 21 March, the day after PQ13 sailed Iceland and QP9 left Murmansk, but there was no further German movement due to a shortage o f boiler fuel. The deisel-powered Admiral Scheer was sent north to Narvik to cover the iron ore convoys."*** PQ13 arrived Murmansk on 31 March having lost five out of 19 merchantmen and QP9 reached Iceland unscathed.**® PQ14 sailed Reykjavik on 8 April and, on the same day. Rubis sailed Dundee to lay mines off Trondheim while Trident pa­ trolled off Fro Havet. The mines and submarine patrols yielded nothing and 16 of the PQ14 ships were forced to turn back due to weather damage. One was sunk and seven reached Murmansk on 19 April. A close submarine watch on the German squadron in Trondheim was no longer possible due to long hours of dayhght so, for the PQ15/QP11 cycle. Minerve, Uredd and the Polish Jastr^ab took up patrol areas south o f Jan Mayen Island. Unison was also diverted from her patrol off Norway. Tirpitt^ and her consorts did not sail, however, and PQ15 arrived Mur­ mansk on 5 May after losing three ships. Q P ll was heavily attacked by aircraft, destroyers and U-boats and, on 2 May, the escorts St Albans and Seagull depth-charged Jastrs^ab which had strayed 95 miles from her allotted area. Five ratings were killed and the survivors were taken off before Jastrs(ab was sunk.**® *12 The one survivor picked up from I^bora was tlie subject o f Very great interest in Abwelir circles’ attempting to glean intelligence on the Arctic convoy cycle. ADM 223 3. *13 Raeder briefed Hitler on Tirpit^ sortie the following evening. It was agreed tliat tlie Kreigsmarine should be more circumspect about using its heavy ships, that the Luftwaffe in Norway should be reinforced for attacks on British carriers, and that work on the carrier Graf Zeppelin should be accelerated. Apparently becoming aware o f the impor­ tance o f air power at sea and balanced naval forces. Hitler admitted that, 'Everything must be done toward the early formation o f a German task force composed o f the Tirpite ^Scharnhorst, one aircraft carrier, two heavy cruisers and twelve to fourteen destroyers.' Graf Zeppelin was never completed, partly because there were no suitable aircraft to operate from her. Two German aircraft carriers were laid down and their on-off construction programme illustrates Hitler’s inability to take a decision on naval matters and stick to it. The Tirpitv^ sortie o f 6-13 March 1942 is described in Roskill : 1956 pp. 120-123. See also Schofield : 1977 p. 27, Winton : 1988 pp. 57-59 and ADM 234 380 for sub­ marine dispositions. 44 Raeder told Hitler on 16 April 1942 that the passage o f the Brest Squadron tiirough the Channel in February had consumed 20,000 tons o f oH and that reserve stocks amounted to 150,000 tons. Brassey : 1948 p. 274. 45 ADM 223 3. 45 The difficulty o f maintaining position in nortliern waters was blamed. Lieutenant Commander Romanowski had been unable to obtain any sights for six days. ADM 234 380. Schofield : 1977 p. 37. 226 North Western Approaches The fact that destroyers had attacked Q P ll indicated that the Germans were about to base heavy units, in particular Tirpitf^ in north Norway. Air reconnaissance on 12 May showed Tirpit^ and Prin^ ~Eugen still in Trondheim, then, on 16 May, Lufiioiv was spotted northbound west o f the Skaw. Unbending sailed Lerwick at 1300/16 to intercept her off Ut- vaer, but she reached Vestfjord at 1700/25 after a roundabout passage. Earher, Prin;(^Eugen had been spotted steaming southbound from Trondheim. An attack by 14 Beauforts o f 86 Squadron from Wick faded, though air dropped mines slowed her progress and she was located again off Karmoy at 1540/17. That evening. Coastal Command committed its most experienced units to its largest operation o f the war to date. Twelve 42 Squadron Beauforts left Leuchars at 1802/17 followed by another twelve 86 Squadron Beauforts from Wick at 1813/17. Escort was provided by four Beaufighters and six Blenheims from Leuchars, and four Beaufighters and 13 Hudsons from Wick, Seven Beauforts and one Beaufighter were lost, but the strike failed.^? PQ16 sailed on 21 May with Seamlf çixià Trident as part of the close escort to meet the in­ cipient threat o f enemy capitaal ships based in north Norway. Unbending, P-614, 0-10, P-46 and Uredd sailed Lerwick for cover patrols but sighted nothing and the patrols were aban­ doned on 28 May.”^® There was much debate about the best position for escorting subma­ rines, not least because Trident and Seam lfh 2id lost the convoy repeatedly in fog, but the reaUty was that this was an idea that had been tried before in the North Atlantic and failed. Seamlf was too slow to deal with anything other than an attack from astern o f the convoy and submarines are useless close escorts; they lose tactical advantage and their presence hampers the escorts in counter-attacks on attacking U boats. It is hard to understand why Tovey and Horton persisted with this waste of resources for so long. The PQ17/QP13 cycle was unable to sail until late June as much o f the Home Fleet was in the Mediterranean for HARPOON, an attempt to run a convoy to Malta. When PQ17 sailed Hvalfjord on 27 June, the close escort included P-614 and P-615. Submarine cover was provided by Ursula, Tribune, P-212, Sturgeon, Minerve, Unrivalled and Unshaken, which were carrying magnetic torpedoes specially for attacks on Tirpitt(P^ From Polyarnoe, Seawolf Trident to join the covering force, the latter after escorting QP13, which sailed on 26 June, as far as 23°W.^^ The disaster that befell PQ17 is well known and needs no recount­ ing here other than to consider the part played by Scottish-based submarines. Dispositions were initially made on the basis that the Tirpiri^ group would head north from the Lofotens to intercept PQ17 east o f Bear Island. But Tirpitf( ^and Hipper ]oined Scheer at 47 Ashworth : 1992 p. 58. 48 ADM 234 380. 4® Convoys to Murmansk article in NavalBjevleivvol. XLV no. 4 (October 1957). 227 North Western Approaches Altenfjord on the morning o f 4 July, so Ursula ^ Tribune, Seawolfz.nà Trident moved eastwards to the North Cape.^^ T--- □ Dispositions by submarines of the 3"* and 9*^ Flotillas from the Clyde and Tay for the PQ17 convoy operation. the Believing the German squadron was closing the convoy, Dudley Pound infamously ordered the escort to withdraw and, at 2124/4, the convoy to scatter. P-212, Sturgeon, Minerve, Unri­ valled and Unshaken had begun to move eastwards at 2000/4 but, after the convoy was or­ dered to scatter, submarines were placed along the Hkely track o f the ships heading for the Soviet coast. At 0700/5 a Luftwaffe aircraft reported the Home Fleet about 500 miles away from the scattered PQ17 and the Tirpitfs^^roM^ began putting to sea. Decrypts allowed the Admiralty to monitor the German ships’ progress and, at 1517/5, they were able to signal 50 ADM 199 1858. 228 North Western Approaches The 3"^ Submarine Flotilla early in 1942. Furthest from the camera is Unbroken which had a dis­ tinguished career with the 10'*' Flotilla in the Mediterranean. Centre is Graph, the former U-570 captured by a Coastal Command Hudson south of Iceland on 27 August 1941. She arrived at the Holy Loch to begin trials on 19 March 1942 and, that October, carried out a patrol off Finisterre, firing a salvo of torpedoes which narrowly missed her sister, U-333. Graph was also involved in Arctic patrols, covering the JWSI /RA51 series and missing German armed trawlers with torpe­ does off Trondheim on I January 1943. But there were constant problems with her engines and spares, not surprisingly, were hard to obtain. She hit the entrance to Camperdown Dock, Dun­ dee, in June 1943 and misaligned her submerged foreplanes. Due for destruction in depth-charge tests. Graph was being towed bare-boat down the west coast of Scotland in a gale on 20 March 1944 when the tow parted and she was wrecked on Islay. Outboard boat alongside the depot ship Forth, from where the photograph was taken, is Sturgeon which was transferred to the Dutch Navy in 1943. Renamed Zeehond, she then operated with the 9'*’ Flotilla from Dundee. Tovey that they would reach the western exit from Altenfjord at 1430/5. The Soviet sub­ marine K-21 attacked Tirpitn ^and her consorts at 1700/5, and claimed two hits on the bat- tleship.52 Unrivalled sighted smoke at extreme range at 1912/5, but thought it came from a trawler and made no report. Unshaken also sighted the smoke and closed sufficiently to identify Tirpiti^ and Hipper close astern at 2013/5, but was put down by German air cover. Unshaken never got closer than 10 miles and her attempts to send a sighting report were interrupted by enemy aircraft. She could not complete her signal until 2157/5, just as the German squadron was ordered to return to Altenfjord.^^ Tirpitt^ had never been closer than 300 miles to the convoy but she had secured a major victory by inducing Pound to deliver the scattered merchantmen up to the Luftwaffe and U boats. Submarines were in the unusual position o f having every signal repeated to them, a 51 Convoys to Murmansk article in Nava/ Review vol. XLV no. 4 (October 1957). 52 Convoys to Murmansk article in Naval Review vol. XLV no. 4 (October 1957). Broome : 1972. 229 North Western Approaches them, a privilege not extended to even the close escort commander, and, when Pound gave his scatter order, it was apparent to them that Tirpitv ^could be no nearer the convoy than 200 miles. Tirpitz, Hipper and Scheer sailing for ROSSEL5SPRUNG, the German sortie against PQI7. There was still the possibility that the German ships would return south to Narvik, or even Trondheim. Hipper and Scheer could pass down the Leads and were thus beyond submarine attack, but Tirpitt^ would have to pass outside the Lofoten Islands. Sturgeon and Minerve were already homeward bound as, short o f fuel, they had been relieved on the patrol line off the North Cape. At 1157/6 FO(S) ordered them to keep a watch and watch patrol off the south entrance to Vestfjord.^ Neither boat sighted anything and when Minerve with­ drew for Dundee on 8 July, the German ships had reached Narvik. Sturgeon, meanwhile, narrowly missed intercepting Uutr^ow inbound for T ron d h e im . 5^ The dark hours still too short for inshore patrols off Norway, so submarines were sent on anti-U boat patrols across the Northern Transit Area. Saracen sailed Lerwick for her first patrol midway between Iceland and Norway on 29 July where, at 2128/3 August, she sighted a surfacing U boat in 6248N 0012W and fired six torpedoes, one o f which hit U- 335. One survivor was pulled aboard and Saracen landed her POW at Lerwick on 9 August, then returned to the Clyde.^ Sturgeon and Unshaken had sailed Lerwick on 4 August after decrypts indicated Uuts^w was about to leave Trondheim for home. The boats were posi­ tioned off Egeroy and Lister, but Uutn^w passed them close inshore in bad visibility early on 11 August. Both boats were then free to attack merchant shipping and, on 12 August, Sturgeon sank the Boltenhagen (3,335T). Unshaken attacked a convoy thirty minutes later and 53 Once again, the poor surfaced speed of British submarines was to blame for lJnshaken'% inability to attack. Unshaken was bombed after being forced to dive by enemy aircraft at 2247/5, then the destroyer Z-27 circled her position until 2350/5 but did not mount an attack. ADM 234 380 pp. 140-142. ADM 199 1858. 54 Owing to the need to surface and charge batteries, and the almost non-existent hours of darkness in northern lari- tudes in summer, submarines were unable to operate close inshore within range of enemy airfields. Two boats would thus operate a watch and watch patrol allowing one to move offshore and charge. ADM 199 1858. 55 Sturgeon’s two inshore patrols, mounted with her crew exhausted after a long period in northern waters, were a re­ markable achievement and she came within two hours of finding herself in a position to attack LutS(ow. 56 Forty-three died in U-335. Jones : 1986 pp. 80-87. ADM 234 380. 230 North Western Approaches sank the George L. M. Russ (2,980T). Sturgeon and Unrivalled returned to Lerwick on 16 Au­ gust, the same day that air reconnaissance found Uutt^w alongside at Sw inemunde.^? T h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n E f f e c t . Desperate to keep the Soviet Union in the war, Churchill wanted the PQ18/QP14 cycle to sail in July 1942 but it had become imperative that a relief convoy be got through to Malta and the escort would have to be largely drawn from the same Home Fleet ships that would otherwise have covered the next Arctic convoy. The PEDESTAL convoy sailed the Clyde for Malta on 2 August 1942, so PQ18 was unable to sail Loch Ewe until 2 September. The close escort, including P-614 and P615, sailed on the same day to meet the convoy north of Iceland. Every available submarine was called on for this cycle; Tribune, Tigris, Unshaken and Uredd patrolled off Gimsostrommen, Gavlfjord and Andfjord and a covering force of Shakespeare, Unique and Unrivalled sailed Lerwick in 7 September for zones between the North Cape and the convoys. Five further submarines disposed to attack heavy units should they get past the patrol force were also ready to move north and join the covering force should that prove necessary. Rubis, in refit at Dundee, would be available to lay mines off the Lofotens in the path of a retreating enemy. Coastal Command mounted Op­ eration ORATOR to provide continuous cover for the convoy off north Norway, 210 Squadron CataUnas flying 18-hour patrols from Invergordon that ended on Lake Lakhta in northern Russia, and Hampdens flying patrols from Soviet airfields.^» | On 10 September, Unshaken and Tribune sighted heavy units too far off to attack and sur- j faced once the coast was clear to pass a sighting report. Tigris sighted the German ships off I Gavlfjord at 1340/10, but bright sunlight and glassy calm were the worst possible condi- | tions for an attack and five torpedoes fired at long range missed.^^ Unshaken and Uredd also i sighted the German squadron, but again too far o ff to attack. Horton ordered Uredd, Un- I shaken, Tigris and Tribune north to join the covering f o r c e .® ^ While the reports from Tribune | and Tigris mentioned Tirpit/^ it was still unclear which enemy ships were on the move, or where they were going. Tirpit^ had not left Vestf)ord and the German squadron had com- | prised Hipper, Admiral Scheer and Koln. They did not operate, as intended, against QP14 and Rubis sailed Dundee on 10 September to lay mines across their probable return t r a c k . j PQ18 lost 10 ships to air attack and three to U-boats, and the QP14 lost three merchant- I 57 ADM 234 380. Rohwer : 1997. Witthoft ; 1971 p. 232. j 58 Ashworth : 1992 p. 62. ! 59 This proved to be the last occasion on which Allied submarines were in a position to attack the German heavy sliips -j at sea. ADM 234 380. j 68 Uredcts patrol report in ADM 199 1852. ! 231 North Western Approaches men, two destroyers and the oiler Grey RangerP- Submarine patrols o ff the North Cape were withdrawn on 20 September, though Tigris and Tribune were diverted to patrol off Andoy in case the enemy ships did appear, but sighted nothing and returned to Lerwick on 1 October.^^ With longer hours o f darkness allowing sufficient time to surface run at night and charge batteries, normal submarine operations off Norway resumed after a short break to refit boats and rest crews. On 12 October, Uredd and Junon sailed Lerwick, Uredd for Stadlandet and Utvaer, and Junon for Trondheim. Junon claimed successful attacks on 16, 17 and 18 O c t o b e r . Off Vilnesfjord at 1548/18, Uredd hit the German hibau (3,713T) which was beached on Araldan Island from where salvage proved im p o ss ib le .Junon and Uredd re­ turned to Lerwick on 24 October and 28 October respectively. Meanwhile, the involve­ ment o f Home Fleet ships in TORCH precluded Arctic convoys in October, but independ­ ently routed ships had sailed in August and another 13 were to go in the moonless period between 28 October and 9 November.'’'^ Tuna and 0-15 sailed the Holy Loch and Dundee respectively on 23 October to provide cover off the North Cape. On 24 October the Soviets reported that enemy radio traffic indicated a move by surface units was hkely, so the submarines, with time in hand, were diverted to patrol off Utvaer and Stadlandet for 48 hours, but saw nothing and were ordered north on 27 October. On 26 October the Shetland Bus fishing boat Arthur had sailed Lunna Voe with human torpe­ does attached for TITLE, an unsuccessful attempt to sink or disable Tirpit^^’^ Hipper sortied from Altenfjord on 5 November to attack the Russia-bound independents, but her only success was the sinking of a tanker by one o f her escorting destroyers. Bletchley Park and the OIC had been following HippePs progress and, on 7 November, Tuna was ordered to Soroy to intercept her, but sighted nothing. Trespasser iLtid Seadog came north from the Clyde to relieve Tuna and 0-15, and Uredd sailed Lerwick on 11 November, all three boats to cover the passage o f QP15, 28 merchantmen that had to be brought home before they were iced in. QP15 had a weak close escort of 61 Thirty-one mines were laid at 1040/19 September, and it was claimed tlrat the Norwegian SS Nordland (J65T) sank after detonating one o f these mines, but Rohwer found that Nordland was sunk by Junon on 19 October 1942. ADM 199 1852. ADM 234 380. Information from the late ex-Sous-Maitre Mechanicien Jean-Pierre Babin. Rohwer : 1997 62 Roskül : 1960 p. 230. Schofield : 1977 App. 1 for losses. 63 ADM 199 1852. 64 Rohwer was unable to substantiate Junon’s claims in his research io t Allied Submarine Attacks oj World War 2. Rohwer : 1997. 65 ADM 199 1852. ADM 234 380. Valvatne : 1954 pp. 49-50. Witthoft : 1971 p. 299. Rowher : 1997.66 Padfield su^ests that the break in Arctic convoys allowed Max Horton, the newly appointed C-in-C Western Ap­ proaches, to begin forming the Support Groups o f frigates and destroyers that would prove so successful in the final stages o f the U boat war. But the concept whicli dated firom tire time o f his predecessor. Admiral Noble. Padfield : 1997 p. 327. 67 HS 2 235. 68 R.P. Raikes papers. IWM Department o f Documents ref no. 96/56/1. 232 North Western Approaches four corvettes, five minesweepers, the anti-aircraft ship Ulster Queen and a trawler. A planned reinforcement of the escort in the Barents Sea failed when storms scattered the convoy. Decrypts revealed that Hipper and Koln were preparing to sail Altenfjord and that U boats were in the Bear Island area, but they also revealed that Luftwaffe bomber units being sent from Norway to the Mediterranean so, denied air cover and reconnaissance, Hipper and Koln did not sail. Two QP15 ships were torpedoed by U boats near Bear Island and 26 reached Loch Ewe. The PQ17 debacle had marked the nadir o f Allied fortunes in the Arctic, but the relative success o f PQ18, QP14 and QPÎ5 was greeted with relief in London and Washington, not least because there was a considerable element of good luck involved on the Allied side. Only in their attacks on PQ17 had the Luftwaffe and Kreigsmarine achieved anying like the level of cooperation needed and the demands o f the Mediterranean, particularly after the success o f Operation TORCH led to a haemorrhaging of Luftwaffe strength to that theatre. Thus a large-scale amphibious operation launched largely from Scotland, namely TORCH, had combined with a major naval operation in northern waters to inflict what amounted to a double defeat on the Axis. As Roskül writes: Though the Admiralty could not possibly have realised it at the time, we now know that the success achieved in the passage o f PQ18 and QP14 was, in a way, decisive. Never again did the enemy deploy such great air strength in the far north. Before the next pair o f convoys sailed, events in North Afeica had forced him to send south his entire bomber and torpedo striking forces o f Ju.88s and He. I l l s. Thus did a strategic success obtained thousands o f miles away.. .have favourable repercussions inside the Arctic Circle.^^ T h e B a t t l e o f t h e B a r e n t s S e a a n d T tk ph z d i s a b l e d After the enforced break during TORCH, Arctic convoys restarted with the new JW /RA series when JW51A sailed Loch Ewe on 15 December 1942 and Seanymph, Taurus, Torbcy and Sokol provided cover off the North Cape. Trespasser, Seadog, Unruly, Graph and 0-14 saüed Lerwick on 20 December to cover JW51B which saüed Loch Ewe on 22 December. JW51B was joined, from Scapa, by the 17'^ * Destroyer Flotüla on Christmas Day and the cruisers Sheffield and Jamaica escorted by Opportune and Matchless had covered the passage o f JW51A to Kola and now returned to escort JW51B. Distant cover was provided by units of the Home Fleet from Scapa led by the battleship AnsonP From decrypts, the Admiralty was aware that Tirpitr^ was unfit for operations, Numberg had replaced the refitting Scheer as guardship at Narvik and that the repaired Lut^oiv had joined Hipper, Koln and six destroyers in Altenfjord on 18 December. Ultra signals on 28 and 29 69 Roskill : 1956 p. 288. 70 ADM 199 77. ADM 234 380. 233 North W estern Approaches December gave Rear Admiral Burnett in Sheffield the position of the ice edge as reported by U boats and the news that the Germans were expecting the convoy through the Bear Is­ land Channel. Hipper, Hutt(OW and six destroyers sailed on 30 December and Unruly sighted, but appears not to have reported, three dark shapes leaving Altenfjord at 0142/31.^* The subsequent failure o f the hesitantly led German heavy units at the Battle o f The Barents Sea was a disaster for the Kreigsmarine. For the loss of two escorts, JW51A, JW51B and RA51 all got through unscathed, Hipper hsid been heavily damaged by the cruisers Sheffield and Jamaica before escaping in a snowstorm and the destroyer Freidrich Eckholdt had been sunk. A planned Atlantic sortie by Lutf^oiv was cancelled, morale plummeted and Raeder was replaced by Donitz.^^ On 5 January 1943, as it was thought Tirpits^ was about to sail Trondheim, submarines re­ turning from the Arctic were diverted to Norway. Seadog and Unruly went to Vestfjord and Graph and Trespasser covered the northern exit from Trondheim. Unsparing was already on patrol off Utvaer and Uredd sailed Lerwick for Stadlandet on 6 January in case German heavy units in the Baltic sailed north as reinforcements. But, following the Barents Sea de­ bacle, a furious Hitler had ordered that the German heavy ships be scrapped. In February, the damaged Hipper and Koln made their way south to home ports unscathed despite an intensive effort to find them by Coastal Command Mosquitoes, Hampdens and Beaufight­ ers from Leuchars and Wick.73 When JW53 sailed Loch Ewe on 15 February, Luti^otn and two destroyers were at Altenfjord, Tirpits^ was at Trondheim, Hipper and Koln were in home ports and Scharfihorsl And Vrintj^Fugen were on the safe side o f the Kattegat. S cheer vjas refit­ ting at Wilhelmshaven and Nürnberg at Narvik was not a major threat. Seanymph, Sportsman, Simoom and Truculent sailed Lerwick for Altenfjord but saw nothing.74 Donitz prevailed on Hitler to withdraw his order that the entire German fleet should be scrapped, not least because this would have placed an intolerable and entirely unproductive burden on German shipyards already overstretched by the U boat building programme. Meanwhile, a concentration of Luftwaffe fighters in southern Norway, noticed by the Al­ lies on 6 March and similar to those that had presaged previous moves by heavy units, was taken to indicate a move by German warships was in the offing. Beaufighters o f 235 Squadron from Wick began patrolling between Stavanger and Bergen and, by 7 March, it was known that Scharnhorst was moving north. Coastal Command reinforcements came north, then, early on 8 March, the pilot o f a BOAC flight from Sweden to Leuchars re­ ported large ships heading north in the Skaggerak. Sunderlands and Catalinas from SuUom 71 ADM 234 380. Winton : 1988 pp. 75-76. 72 ADM 234 369. Roskill : 1956 pp. 292-199. 73 AIR 41 48 PP. 347-350. 74 ADM 234 380. 234 North Western Approaches Voe covered RA53 and Beaufighters from Wick searched the Leads but Scharnhorst reached Narvik unmolested on 13 March.75 By 24 March 1943, Tripits^ Scharnhorst And their destroy­ ers had moved north to AltenfjordJ^ The Germans were expecting another Arctic convoy that spring, but the Royal Navy was preoccupied with the U boat war in the Atlantic and the Home Fleet was in the Mediterra­ nean for H U S K Y .77 These factors, combined with the German concentration in the north beyond the range of regular air reconnaissance, led to the suspension o f the Arctic con­ voys. Dangerous submarine patrols o ff the German bases in north Norway were no longer necessary but, with a powerful enemy surface force concentrated in Altenfjord evidently capable o f breaking out into the Atlantic, patrol zones were established between the Lofo­ tens and Spitsbergen. Stubborn and Severn sailed the Clyde on 1 April followed by USB Barb, one of the SubRon 50 fleet submarines from R o s n e a t h . 7 8 At 2105/7 April Tuna patrolling a line south-east from Jan Mayen Island sighted U-644 lying in wait for the next, non­ existent, Arctic convoy in 6938N 0540W and sank. Tuna unsuccessfully attacked two more U boats before she was relieved by Stubborn and returned to the Holy Loch on 22 April.79 As the ice edge receded, a new patrol in the Denmark Strait, involving mainly the Ameri­ can SubRon 50 boats from Rosneath, was instituted at the end o f April. In addition, an anti-U boat patrol was organised across the general track o f U boats outbound for the At­ lantic beyond the area covered by Coastal Command, though an RAF signal ordering a bombing restriction had been intercepted by B-Deinst and U boats had been warned.^o De­ spite this. Tuna missed a U boat with eight torpedoes on 30 May, then Truculent, which had 75 AIR 41 48 p. 344-345. 76 Brassey : 1948 Conferences for 1943, Ch. 1 Crisis in the German Na^. 77 For tlie 1943 Atlantic crisis see Gannon : 1998 and The Defiat of the Enemy Attack on Shipping, Grove (ed) ; 1997 pp. 90-97. ADM 234 380. 78 Barb, Herring Bkckpsh, Gurnard, Shad and Gunnel, had arrived at Rosneath on 25 November 1942 after acting as navi­ gation beacons for die TORCH Western Task Force. These boats formed Submarine Squadron 50 (SubRon 50) op­ erating under FO(S). They were assigned patrol areas in tlie Bay of Biscay where tliey intercepted blockade runners operating between Spanish and French Biscay ports- SubRon 50 boats carried out nine Biscay patrols before they were moved to patrols off Norway and returned to tlie US late in 1943. ADM 199 1859. ADM 234 380. Roscoe : 1949. Rohwer : 1997. 79 The U boat patrol line was moved 50 miles north, but the BDU Norway KTB notes; The U boats south o f Jan Mayen Island have been in this area since 24*** March. Since the enemy has [sic] at­ tacked in two cases at least \U-339 by Catalina on 26 March 1943 and U-302 by Tuna on 14 April 1943], he must suspect the convoy route Iceland - Murmansk to be patrolled off Jan Mayen Island. In spite o f this, it is tlie most suitable line for intercepting a PQ convoy. It is the only suitable position besides Bear Island where traffic con­ verges. U boat Command was unaware of the loss o f U-644 and the sighting of U-2S1 untd 21 April, and even then the fate o f U-644 could only be guessed at. But this patrol was o f great importance to the Germans as a shortage o f aviation fuel had led to a temporary cessation o f long range air reconnaissance in northern Arctic waters, as well as nottiiern European waters. ADM 234 380 80 ADM 199 1859. 235 North Western Approaches sailed Lerwick on 2 June, sank U-308 in 6428N 0309W on 4 June.^^ The Home Fleet was weakened during the summer o f 1943 by operations in the Mediter­ ranean, in particular HUSKY, though on 8 July Anson, Duke of Yark, Malaya, Furious, two cruiser squadrons, three destroyer flotillas along with a US task force comprising Alabama, South Dakota and the cruisers Augusta and Tuscaloosa carried out an sweep off Norway to divert German attention from the Sicily landings due on 10 July. The ships were not seen by Luftwaffe reconnaissance, so the deception failed. The operation was repeated at the end of July when Illustrious and Unicom also took part and Martlet fighters shot down five BV138s.®2 Meanwhile, on 11 September 1943, six submarines sailed Loch Cairnbawn, each with an X-craft midget submarine in tow for Operation SOURCE. Secured to the sides o f the X-craft were drop charges containing two tons o f torpex, then the most powerful ex­ plosive available, which were to be laid under Tirpitf^ Scharnhorst and JLutf(pu>, Scharnhorst had sailed on gunnery trials, but two X-craft attacked Titpitt^ early on 22 September. Enigma decrypts revealed that damage to Tirpitn ^was serious, though it did not give exact details. Further decrypts in the ensuing months showed that many o f her crew had been sent on leave and that repairs would not be completed until March 1944 at the e a r h e s t . ^ 3 The commitment o f Alhed naval strength elsewhere also meant that dealing with enemy heavy unit movements off Norway fell to Coastal Command, yet, by their own admission, Coastal’s inexperience in anti-shipping strikes meant that they were far from successful.®^ The hght cruiser Numberg, o f little use in the Arctic, moved south from Narvik for the Bal­ tic at the end o f April 1943. She was spotted by a 540 Squadron Mosquito from Leuchars and Beaufighter strikes were mounted against her from Wick and North Coates on 1 May. Both strikes were intercepted by ME109s and FW190s and seven Beaufighters were shot down. No hits were scored on NumbergP As fighter reinforcements reached Bodo and Bergen towards the end o f September, a southward move south by one o f the heavy units at Altenfjord was expected. Uutt^ow sailed on 24 September, and once her movements were known, the Home Fleet planned an op­ eration against her with the American carrier Ranger, but it was soon apparent that Ranger could not reach a flying-off position in time. Coastal Command was short o f aircraft, so it was decided to mount an operation with 12 Tarpons of 832 Squadron from the carrier Vic­ torious escorted by Coastal’s Beaufighters. JLuti^ oiu and five destroyers were sighted at 8* Surfacing 11 minutes after the attack, Tmcuknt found a large patch o f oil and wreckage. U-308 sailed Kiel on 29 May for her &st patrol and her 44 crew were all lost. The Germans attributed her loss to air attack while passing Iceland. Jones : 1986 pp. 136-141. 82 Rohwer and Hummelchen : 1974 p. 338. 83 Information from RN Submarine Museum. Rosldll : 1961 pt. 1 pp 64-68. Mitchell : 1993. 84 AIR 41 48. 85 AIR 41 48 p 350 et passim. 236 North Western Approaches 0624/27 off Kristiansund and 832 Squadron took off from Sumburgh to intercept her but did not sight their target. 'L.ute^ ptv avoided mines air-dropped on her expected route and reached Gdynia on 1 October.®** Despite her having been disabled in SOURCE, at the end o f 1943 repairs to Tirpitei were progressing, albeit slowly, under the cover o f winter darkness and she remained a potent threat. The JW54A/RA54A and JW54B/RA54B convoy cycles sailed in November, en­ countering no enemy action, but these were the first Arctic convoys since March. Aside from SOURCE, movements of enemy surface units including ZITRONELLA had gone largely unchallenged by either the Royal Navy, or the RAF. At ranges in Loch Cairnbawn, Loch Striven and elsewhere. Bomber Command were having problems with HIGHBALL, an anti­ shipping version o f the bouncing bomb to be used against large warships including Tir~ In reviewing their contribution. Coastal Command concluded that, ‘The results o f air action against enemy major naval units...can hardly be called successful.’®® Scharnhorst had been forced to abort a passage to Norway in January 1943 on being spotted by Coastal Command aircraft, but only one ship had been damaged; Fut^w in June 1941. B a t t l e o f T h e N o r t e i C a p e At the end o f 1943, Scharnhorst and the damaged Titpit^v/ese the only German heavy units left in the Arctic.®^ But the disabling o f Tirpits^ the departure southwards o f Lutf^ojv and the dissipation of Luftwaffe strength on the eastern front and in the Mediterranean had a dra­ matic effect on Alhed naval strategy. Arctic convoys could resume against a background of a much reduced surface and air threat and the Home Fleet could concentrate more on at­ tacking enemy shipping off Norway.^*) As if to prove the point, Fraser sailed Scapa on 2 October with Duke of York, Anson, USS Tuscaloosa, three British cruisers, ten British and US destroyers, and the American carrier Ranger for LEADER, an air strike on Bod© where de­ crypts had revealed there was a promising collection o f shipping. This was the first carrier attack o ff Norway since 1940.^^ Ranger t&Ached her flying-off position, 140 miles o ff Bod©, before dawn on 4 October. Twenty Dauntless dive bombers, 10 Avenger torpedo bombers and fighter escorts caught the enemy by surprise. Four ships were sunk and six vessels, among them the troopship Skramstad (4,3OOT), the mhitary storeship Ta Plata (8,056T) and 86 Ibid. p. 355 et passim. 87 Sweetman : 2000 p. 51. 88 AIR 41 48 p. 368. 89 Wtaton ; 1988 p. 78. Rohwer and Hummelchen : 1974 p. 355. w ADM 234 369. Roskill ; 1960 pt. 1 p. 69. 9* Rohwer and Hummelchen ; 1974 p. 359. Roskill : 1960 pt. 1 p. 102. 237 North Western Approaches Operation LEADER the tanker Schleswig (10,243T), which Enigma had identified as northbound with fuel for Scharnhorst, had to be beached. Three aircraft were lost.®^ JW55A sailed Loch Ewe on 12 December 1943 and, on 18 December, decrypts revealed that the enemy knew a convoy was at sea. Patrol areas had been allocated to U boats, air reconnaissance had been ordered and Scharnhorst in Altenfjord had been brought to three hours notice. Donitz told Hitler that Scharnhorst and destroyers would attack the next con­ voy if a successful operation seemed assured.^® JW55B sailed Loch Ewe on 20 December and was sighted by a Luftwaffe Zenit meteorological flight at 1045/22. Luftwaffe signals about the convoy were decrypted and communicated to Fraser, who had taken the Home Fleet north from Scapa Flow to Iceland, by Ultra signal at 0146/23. Meanwhile, RA55A was about to sail Kola Inlet with a close escort that included Belfast, Sheffield and Norfolk. Fraser sailed Iceland in Duke of York with Jamaica and four destroyers at 2200/23.^4 Over the ensuing 24 hours, he was provided with a stream of Enigma-based intelligence to the effect that Scharnhorst had come to three hours notice at 1300/22, that the Germans first suspected that the convoy was a landing force heading for Norway and that eight U-boats had been ordered to a patrol hne south-west o f Bear Island. An Ultra message to Fraser at 0130/26, based on decrypt of a 1527/25 signal from Admiral North­ ern Waters to Scharnhorst, stated, 'Most Immediate. OSTFRONT 1700/25/12.' This was fol­ lowed at 0217/26 by another Ultra signal that told Fraser the Admiralty beheved Scham- horst had sailed.^® Donitz had taken the bait. Fraser ordered JW55B to turn north, clear o f what would be the battle zone, and at 0834/26 Norfolk’s radar picked up Scharnhorst just over six miles west o f her. Intermittently engaged during the day by Burnett’s cruisers, Scharnhorst headed south, away from the con­ voy, but straight into the path o f Fraser’s battle group. Regular radar plots from Belfast 92 OIC Intelligence Summary in ADM 223 8. Roskill : 1960 pt. 1 p. 102. 93 Brassey : 1948 p. 374. 94 ADM 234 369. 238 North Western Approaches fig. 76 The Kreigsmarine went to war with some of the world’s fastest, most modern and best­ armed warships, not least among them the Scharnhorst (above), but they were too few in number to be decisive. Hitler inherited a naval expansion programme in 1933, including early concepts for Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, which he expanded into what became known as the Z Plan. This was predicated on a possible war with Britain and France in 1944, by which time it was hoped that the Kreigsmarine would be strong enough to meet the Royal Navy on something like equal terms, at least in the North Atlantic. But the Z Plan took insufficient account of in some measure consequent British naval expansion and almost immediately came up against limits of production and inter-service rivalries. Two German aircraft carriers were planned and one, the Graf Zeppelin, was launched in 1938, but never completed. Naval aviation would have provided the Kreigsmarine with a more balanced fleet and would have made the Royal Navy more circumspect in engage­ ments such as that with Bismarck. Ultimately, Germany could not compete with British, and later Allied, warship building capacity. And the crews of the ships she did deploy suf­ fered from a chronic lack of sea time in part due to fuel shortages and in part to the overwhelming superiority of the Royal Navy which forced the Kreigsmarine to fall back on the ‘fleet in being" concept, even though this latter was effective in that it tied down a large part of the Royal Navy’s strength in Home Waters. The destruction of Scharnhorst can be partly attributed to Enigma decrypts (using intelli­ gence gained by Scottish-based naval units), partly to the German battleship allowing her destroyer escorts to lose touch and partly to poor shiphandling, but it was inexperience that allowed her to be taken completely by surprise. allowed DuÆe of York to gain contact at 1617/26. Scharnhorst vj2lS taken completely by sur­ prise, her turrets trained fore and aft, and sank at 1945/26 after sustainiung at least thir­ teen 14” hit, around 12 hits from Burnett’s cruisers and eleven torpedo hits, a testament to the strength of her construction. Just 36 o f her company survived.’^ Tirpitn ^ was repairing damage inflicted during SOURCE, but never again would there be a credible surface threat to the Arctic convoys. This was another victory for naval forces based in Scotland. Winton : ml 988 pp. 80-81. % Roskill : 1960 pt. 1 pp. 80-89. 239 North Western Approaches C a r r i e r O p e r a t i o n s a g a i n s t T i r p it z Repairs to Tirpitt^ were the subject of close Allied interest, particularly when, on 3 March 1944, an agent at Altenfjord reported the battleship test firing her main armament. On 15 March the SIS agent reported Tirpit^ had undertaken sea trials and JW58 sailed Loch Ewe on 27 March. A decrypt on 1 April revealed that Tirpits(^ had delayed her full power trials by two days and would sail on 3 April. Fraser was by then aware that JW58 had been a suc­ cess, the escorts sinking four U boats and shooting down six aircraft, and the weather was favourable, so TUNGSTEN was set for 0530/3 April. The Fleet Air Arm had trained for this operation at Loch Eriboll where a range represent­ ing Tirpitr^ berth in Kaafjord had been constructed and a full-scale rehearsal was con­ ducted on 28 March. Duke of York, Anson, Victorious, Belfast five destroyers sailed Scapa at noon on 30 March followed by Royalist, Sheffield, Jamaica, Furious, five destroyers and the escort carriers Searcher, Emperor, Pursuer and Fencer. Early on 3 April the first strike com­ prised 18 Barracuda bombers from Victorious and Furious with a close escort o f 20 Wildcats from Searcher and Pursuer, 16 Corsairs from Victorious as top cover and ten Hellcats from Emperor for flak suppression. The second strike force was made up of 24 Barracudas from Victorious and Furious with a similar escort. Seafires from Furious and Wildcats from Fencer flew GAPs over the force and Swordfish from provided A/S cover for the fleet.^® Barracudas inbound for Op­ eration TUNGSTEN The first attack at 0529/3 took Tirpitr^ by surprise as she was shortening in her cable. Fighters strafed her upper decks, nine bombs hit and another near miss caused hull dam­ age. Tirpitv ^had begun to move back into her net defences when the second strike arrived 97 The attack on Tirpita^wzs originally scheduled for between 7 and 16 March, but Victorious virzs delayed in dockyard hands. Moore’s report in ADM 199 844. 98 Ibid. 240 North Western Approaches at 0630/3, and was partly obscured by smoke floats, but another four bombs hit. Fighters also strafed shipping in the fjord and set a tanker on fire. In Tirpitt^ 122 died and another 316 men, including Kapitan Hans Meyer, were injured. Her upperworks were badly dam­ aged but most of the bombs had been dropped too low and failed to penetrate her vitals. She would be out of action for only three months. One Hellcat and three Barracudas were lost.^^ Sir Andrew Cunningham, who had taken over as First Sea Lord from the dying Dudley Pound on 15 Oc­ tober 1943, urged Fraser to repeat TUNGSTEN, hitting the enemy when he was already down. There followed an extraordinary spat between two of the Royal Navy’s senior flag officers. A ‘truculent and obstinate’ Fraser, correctly believing Tirpitt^ impervious to bombs then carried by the FAA, wished his carriers to revert to anti­ shipping sweeps off Norway and threatened to resign if ordered to carry out another attack. The two men had an uneasy relationship but, as Cunningham wrote, ‘wiser coun­ cils [sic] prevailed,’ and the carriers sailed Scapa on 21 April for PLANET, though the operation had to be can­ celled due to bad weather.^^o rikNDHOR,N A B C f-JOfLD M.WlN q b FtMWS R. . C aftt l r . , R .M. , 5 C - r r l e r Borne Air L i-1 sen S ec t ion , Following the cancellation of PLANET, the carriers attacked Bodo and a convoy off Sandhorn as above. Two ships were sunk for the loss of one Barracuda, two Corsairs, one Hellcat and one Wildcat TIGER CLAW, another strike against Tirpit:^ by Victorious and Furious on 28 May failed due to bad weather, but the force moved south for a secondary operation, LOMBARD, on the eve­ ning of 1 June when a convoy reported by a Mosquito strike earlier in the day was attacked o ff Alesund. The ammunition ship Hans Feonhardt (4,174T) blew up and the freighter Flor­ ida (5,542T) and the escort Sperrhrecher 181 were set on fire.^°’ 99 Ibid. Sweetman : 2000 pp. 58-73. Winton : 1988 p. 86-89. '00 Roskill : 1977 p. 237-238. '01 Winton : 1988 p. 90. Rohwer and Hummelchen ; 1974 p. 410. 241 North Western Approaches Victorious left for the Far East with Indomitable on 12 June and, two days later. Sir Flenry Moore succeeded Sir Bruce Fraser and C-in-C Home Fleetd°^ Anson and King George V were refitting for the Pacific, so Moore was left with Duke of York and, from early July, the fleet carriers Indefatigable and Implacable. He also had the superannuated Furious and the escort carriers. And it was the escort carriers Striker and Fencer that sailed Scapa with Royalist, Shef­ field and six destroyers on 20 June to steam along the Arctic convoy route until close to known U boat concentration areas, then go into radio silence. Strikes were then flown off in the hope o f catching U boats on the surface. Nothing was sighted, so the force made a feint towards Norway hoping to be sighted by enemy aircraft. WANDERERS was intended to encourage the enemy to maintain a large force o f U boats in Norway and well away from the invasion area in the Channel, but the enemy failed to take much notice.^®^ On 14 July Moore sailed Scapa in Duke of York with Devonshire, Kent, Jamaica, Bellona, de­ stroyers and the 20*^ ' Escort Group to cover Formidable, Indefatigable and Furious as they car­ ried out MASCOT, an attack by 44 Barracudas, 18 Hellcats, 18 Corsairs and 12 Fireflies on Tirpit^. As Winton writes, there is evidence that B dienst was listening to the carrier wire­ less traffic and had warning o f a sweep. But an OP on a hilltop overlooking her anchorage gave Firpitr^ 15 minutes warning o f the attack and she was completely shrouded in smoke when the strike arrived overhead. No hits were obtained and two aircraft were lost.^ ®'* JW59 was to sail Loch Ewe on 15 August and, three days earlier. Rear Admiral (Carriers) Rhoderick McGrigor took his ships north from Scapa for OFFSPRING. Avengers laid mines off Storholm, a radar station was destroyed on Haro Island and Gossen airfield was at­ tacked. After OFFSPRING, McGrigor joined Moore with the main strength o f the Home Fleet to cover the passage o f JW59 and launch another strike against Tirpitr^ Decrypts had revealed that the damage inflicted on Tirpit\ in MASCOT had been minor and that she had carried out sea trials on 31 July and 1 August. Indefatigable, Formidable, Furious, Nabob and Trumpeter launched a series o f attacks, GOODWOOD I-IV, between 22 and 29 August involv­ ing up to 60 aircraft at a time, but only one bomb hit Tirpitr^ and that failed to explode. And, while the ships were retiring after GOODWOOD I, U-354 sank the frigate Bickerton and badly damaged Nabob. But JW59 had a largely uneventful passage with the escort carriers able to keep the U boats in the Barents Sea at bay. Only the sloop Kite was lost to a tor­ pedo from U-344.^^^ 1With the failure o f GOODWOOD, it was clear that the FAA could not bring heavy enough | ordnance to bear to disable Tirpittr ^ so she was left to the Lancasters o f Bomber Command 1 {102 Roskill : 1977 p. 254. j 10Î ADM 199 844. 1 104 Winton : 1988 p. 91. Rohwer and Hummelchen : 1974 p. 437. ADM 199 844. I1 2^ 2 North Western Approaches to deal with. On 15 September, in Operation PARAVANE, 27 Lancasters o f 9 and 617 Squadrons took off from Yagodnik near Archangel. Twenty-one o f the aircraft carried 12,0001b Tallboys and the others carried 4001b Mk. 2 mines. It was known that Tirpitrr^ could be covered with smoke in 1 0 minutes but it was calculated that a surprise approach from the landward side would give the Germans only three minutes warning. Tirpitt^ was almost obscured by smoke when the Lancasters arrived, and only 16 Tallboys were dropped. No definite results could be seen, but one had passed through her foc'sle without exploding, then detonated below the waterline. PRU flights and SIS agents’ reports con­ firmed that she had been seriously damaged. On 16 October, however, a decrypt disclosed that Tirpit^i had moved to a new berth off Hâkoy Island near Tromso. This brought her within range of Lancasters from Scotland and aircraft o f 9 and 617 Squadrons operating from Lossiemouth, Kinloss and Mültown finally sank her on 12 N ovem ber.B e tw een 1940 and 1944, either in harbour or at sea, the RAF and FAA had carried out 33 operations against Tirpitri involving over 700 a irc ra f t .A n d , for more than four years, numerous submarines, including the midget X-craft, and much of the Royal Navy’s modern warship strength had been tied down at Scapa Flow by the threat o f her wreaking havoc among Arctic or Atlantic convoys. As the OIC concluded: Thus ended the A dm iral von Tirpitri [sic] just four years and two days after her completion. Through­ out the whole o f her career she neither sank nor damaged a single British warship. She did, however, succeed by her mere presence in Nortliem Waters in pinning down important British Naval forces during a critical period o f the war.^ °® And, as with her ill-fated sister, once again her containment and eventual destruction had principally involved naval and air forces based in, or operating from, Scotland. S e a b o r n e Sp e c i a l O p e r a t i o n s f r o m S c o t l a n d AGAINST TARGETS IN NORWAY In 1939 responsibility for Special Operations was vested in three separate organisations; MI(R) at the War Office was responsible for guerrilla warfare. Section D o f the Secret In­ telligence Service (MI6 ) for espionage and Department EH at the Foreign Office for propaganda. These were reorganised into one body, the Special Operations Executive (SOE), in July 1940. Churchill, searching for gestures o f defiance that would impress, in particular America, with British determination to fight on, famously if melodramatically charged SOE with setting Europe ablaze. 105 ADM 234 369. Schofield : 1977 pp, 127-128. 106 Sweetman : 2000 ch. 5. Bennett : 1986 pp. 108-110. Teriaine : 1985 p. 674 and f.n. 9. 107 Sweetman ; 2000 p. 161. 108 ADM 223 87. 243 North Western Approaches SOE’s Norwegian Section grew to become the Scandinavian Section in November 1940 under Sir Charles Hambro. At first, as Thomson writes, SOE had a feeble grasp o f the realities o f occupation; SOE inherited.. .a sense o f unrealistic optimism regarding die prospects o f a general revolt against the Germans in Norway. With virtually no sources o f information other than their own imaginations, British planners envisioned co-ordinated uprisings at key points early in 1941 aimed at overthrowing the occupation entirely, essentially unaided by Allied forces. At best the scheme was impractical; and at worst, it threatened to plunge die Norwegian people into a bloodbath for no worthwhile pur- pose.i®^ A steady stream of potential SOE recruits had begun arriving in Scotland within weeks of the Allied evacuation from Norway, small boats bringing patriotic Norwegians keen to continue the fight. Viking arrived at Aberdeen in August 1940 with Konrad Lindberg, Frit- jhof Petersen and Odd Starheim who were among SOE’s earliest recruits. Lindberg and Petersen were sent back to Norway in November 1940, but their indiscretion soon got them arrested. 1^0 In January 1941, with the code name CHEESE, Starheim was landed by the submarine Sun- fish to organise resistance around Kristiansand South. He monitored German oil stocks in Norway, a contact in Stavanger reported on German shipping and another recorded Luft­ waffe movements at Sola airfield. Messages from Starheim’s radio post at Flekkefjord be­ gan on 25 February and, on 10 June, a signal that German warships had passed up the coast referred to the Bismarck, though it was too late to be of value. The CHEESE mission sent around 100 messages in five months and, with the Gestapo closing in on his radio post, Starheim went to Oslo where a courier told him that the Soviet Union was to be in­ vaded on 29 June. Bearing what he believed was vital intelligence, Starheim escaped to Sweden on 27 June and was flown to L euchars .S ta rh e im returned to Norway on 3 Janu­ ary 1942 and, on 21 January, escaped from a German patrol by jumping from a window. On 15 March, he led a party that hijacked the coaster Galtesund and made for Aberdeen. After a prolonged search in thick weather, a Hudson from Leuchars found the ship at 1315/16 and they secured in Aberdeen at 1230/17. 109 ~Prom Neutmlity to NATO - The Norwegian Armed Forces and Defense Foliy 1905-1955. Ph.D. dissertation by David G. Thomson, Department o f History, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, USA, 1996, p. 222. 110 Victims of SOE’s naivete, they were executed on 11 August 1941 .Cookridge : 1966 p. 508. 111 Starheim’s account o f the first CHEESE mission is in HS 2 150. 112 One o f Starheim’s party aboard Gatiesund was Einar Skinnarland Ccom Vermork. Information that the Germans had ordered a considerable increase in the production o f heavy water at the Norsk Hydro plant in Vermork had reached London six months earher, so Skinnarland, with his intimate knowledge o f the area, was a considerable find. He went to London and, with SOE Scandinavian Section Head Colonel John Wilson and Professor Leif Tronstad, be­ gan planning Operation GROUSE, the attempted destruction o f the heavy water plant at Rjukan. He volunteered to return to Norway to prepare for the parachuting in of a party o f four saboteurs and, after just 11 days training, he parachuted from a Hahfax over tlie Hardangervidda on 29 March. Less than diree weeks after disappearing, he was back at work and explained liis absence to tfie Germans as being due to illness. GROUSE failed when,die ghders carrying Commandos crashed in bad weadier. An account o f the second CHEESE mission is in HS 2 151. 244 North Western Approaches At 1540/16 August 1942 . , y Starheim and Sergeant An- _ W , , „ , AV < ' dreas Fasting (christened k o 5 c« -^266 ^ , CHEESE 15/ 3//I2 1901! 15/ 3 /42 1930 rBISCUIT to Starheim’s >cxq 11 s .0 .2 . U R q E N T M O CPIEESE) left Dundee e l e v e n o f i 5t h k a n c h . 5JE HAVE CAPTURED A COAST SHIP OF 6 00 TOMS OFF EQERSUNDaboard the French subma- rine Minerve to reconnoitre THE s h i p h a k e s ii i : n o t s . we h ak e f o r A b e rd e e n , p l e a s e GIVE AIRCRAFT ESCORT BECAUSE l'ÎE EXPECT ATTACK FROM QERHAN the ground for CARHAMP- a i r c r a f t tom o rrow MORMiiiq. TON, an SOE operation to steal ships from one of the noTE b y c o d e s , i d e n t i t y c h e c k q i v e n . German convoys that an- TP AT 2 0 .5 0 1 5 /3 /4 2 HO chored for the night at the Starheim’s signal notifying SOE of the capture of the Gakesund, entrance to Flekkefjord. incident dramatised in the feature film The Heroes o f Telemark. They landed by folbot early on 20 August and Minerve returned inshore two days later to pick them up.^i^ CARHAMPTON proper began on 31 December 1942 when the whaler Bode left Aberdeen with a party o f 40 Norwegian Commandos and sailors led by Starheim. Bode reached the coast off Eigeroy on 2 January and the party established themselves in a de­ serted house at Televik.^^" ^The first hijack attempt having failed, another was made on a convoy on 11 January, but the Germans had been alerted by cut power and telephone Hnes and mittens and wire-cutters left behind during the first attempt, and had doubled sentries. The Norwegians got into a firelight with some very alert Germans and were fortunate to escape. Sixteen o f the CARHAMPTON party including Starheim took another coastal steamer, Tromsosund, in an attempted repeat o f the Galtesund escape, but German aircraft sank her and all aboard were lost. Another 19 o f the CARHAMPTON party headed for Aber­ deen in fishing boats, but steered an erratic course and made landfall at Redcar. Two oth­ ers escaped through Sweden.^i^ CARHAMPTON failed because o f poor planning and discipline, and better results could have been obtained at less cost by simply limpeting the ships.^^^ Earlier, after ARCHERY and AN­ KLET in December 1941, it had become clear that this unwieldy and costly operations were, ‘neither worthwhile for the Allies nor welcomed by the local population who longed for liberation, but not large-scale disappointments with reprisals in their t r a i n . The Brit- 115 ADM 234 380. 114 Bofife set out to return to Aberdeen but struck a mine. Two of her 35 crew survived. Starheim's body came ashore near Goteborg in April 1943. Cruikshank : 1986 p. 109. 115 HS 7 178. 116 Cruikshank : 1986 pp. 107-113. 117 HS 7 178. 245 North Western Approaches ish had operated in Norway without reference to the Norwegian government in exile or the Norwegian military staff. A post-war Norwegian investigation concluded that; The situation at the end o f 1941 was such that the British presumably were making plans affecting vi­ tal Norwegian interests, without the Norwegian authorities having any knowledge of, or influence on, the planning. Even more serious from the Norwegian perspective was the fact that several hundred Norwegians belonging to the so-called Linge Kompanie were directly under British command.^i® The nascent Norwegian resistance, Milorg, bitterly resented that they and the government in exile were being kept in the dark about SOE operations in Norway, and Finge Kompanie Commandos had begun openly questioning their role.^ ^® This could not continue so, in December 1941, Norwegian Defence Minister Oscar Torp and Charles Hambro initiated the Anglo-Norwegian Collaboration Committee and Torp established a unified Norwegian High Command, the Forsvarets Overkommando. The need for greater co-operation between SOE and Combined Operations had been rec­ ognised for some time and a joint policy paper was issued on 21 September 1942. First fruit of this new spirit o f cooperation was CARTOON, an ambitious January 1943 raid on Litlabo pyrites mine and associated harbour installations at Sagvâg.^^o November 1942, shortly after the Norwegian 30th MTB Flotilla had formed at Lerwick for operations in The Leads, a detachment o f Norwegian and British Commandos under Captain F. W. Fynn arrived at Voxter Camp as the Combined Operations North Force, Fynnforce for short.^^i The CARTOON force sailed Lerwick in seven Norwegian MTBs at 0800/23 January: Lieutenant Knut Bogeberg Lieutenant Ragnvald Tomber (Naval Force Commander) Lieutenant Shaw (12 Commando) _____ Lieutenant H Henriksen. Major Francis Fynn (Military Force Commander) Lieutenant Aksel Prebensen (2"4 in-command Naval Force) Major Ian Collins (Combined Operations HQ) Lieutenant Hallet (12 Commando) _ Lieutenant Erling Madand Captain Harald Risnes j Lieutenant Karl Hjellestad Lieutenant Alv Andresen Lieutenant A. Hâvik 12 men o f 12 Commando as Force D 14 men o f 12 Commando as Force C 13 men o f 12 Commando as j Force B * 12 men o f 12 Commando as | Force A. _ _ _ | Minelaying and Commando I Reserve Force A2. I Target 24 Target 24 The Commandos transhipped for the assault. Forces C and D on 626 and Forces A and B and the A2 reserve, mainly British troops, on 627. These two MTBs took the lead with 620, 631 and 625 following as cover to the south and east. 618 and 623 for the northern flank and a diversionary attack on a coastal battery at Marstenen. 118 Den norske regierings virksomhet IV.76 quoted in Thomson op cit. 119 Joachim Ronneberg, who was direcdy involved, describes relations between die Norwegians and SOE after AN­ KLET / ARCHERY and Linge’s deadi, as being at ‘boiling point’. Salmon (ed) : 1995 pp. 152-157. 120 Up-to-date information on the German dispositions in the area was essential so the Shedand Bus boats Gullbotg and Sjolmtsuess. sent to land men posing as fishermen. DEFE 2 616. Reynolds : 1998 p. 37. 121 DEFE 2 617. 246 North Western Approaches Sagvag harbour was sighted at midnight and, at 0011/24, 626 fired two torpedoes at the quay from 300-400 yards range. One hit rocks below the quay, the other missed. 626 closed the quay and, under fire, Lieutenant Borrigsen went over the side with a rope along which troops reached the shore. 627 landed her troops on the north side o f the bay. The quay was cleared o f enemy troops, Commandos marched to Litlabo and demolitions were complete by 0230/24. The force had re-embarked by 0320/24 after destroying installations on the quay and the MTBs left to rendezvous with 625, 620 and 631. Meanwhile, 625 had laid mines on the east side o f Stord and 620 and 631 entered Leirvik harbour, set the steamer Use M. Russ ablaze and engaged shore positions. 618 and 623 had been heavily en­ gaged with the battery at Marstenen and set course for home, arriving Lerwick at 1200/24. The main force spHt at 0930/24 when 620 lost an engine due to battle damage, 626 and 627 proceeding ahead to reach Lerwick 1600/24. The three remaining MTBs were punch­ ing into a southerly gale when a JU88 dived to attack. 631 returned fire and shot the Junk­ ers down. The last o f the CARTOON force reached Lerwick at 1 8 1 5 / 24.^^2 CARTOON had been well planned and was a notable success. The mine, which had pro­ duced 160,000 tons o f pyrites in 1942, was out o f action for a year, a ship had been gutted and sunk, shoreside facilities had been wrecked and a German watch post burned down. Three prisoners had been taken and a JU88 had been shot down and its crew killed. One Commando had been killed and two others injured along with eight naval personnel, one o f whom was seriously hurt. Three MTBs were damaged. T h e Sh e t l a n d B u s a n d Sp e c i a l O p e r a t i o n s 1 9 4 2 -4 3 Many Norwegian fishermen had seized the opportunity to escape across the North Sea and several had been persuaded to return to Norway with agents and supplies. In a rare display of cooperation between the two organisations, in December 1940 MI6 officer Major L. H. Mitchell went to Shetland to establish a joint SOE/M I6 base. Base ME7, and six Norwe­ gian fishing boats manned by Norwegian volunteers were formed into the Shetland Naval Unit, better known as the Shetland Bus. Sadly, despite the fact that, between 1941 and 1945 the Shetland base made 41 trips to Norway on behalf o f MI6, landing 37 agents and picking up 18, inter-departmental rivalry meant that; In spite o f repeated attempts, the SOE Norwegian Section never succeeded in establishing real co ­ operation w ith the SIS Norwegian s e c t i o n . ^^ 4 122 Report by Major Collins in DEFE 2 617. Reynolds : 1998 pp. 37-38. Dakell-Job : 1992 pp. 54-55. 123 Ibid. This raid produced serious reprisals. Around 200 arrests were made by the Gestapo in Bergen including, for some reason, the entire membership o f a temperance society. Cookridge : 1966 pp. 544-545. See also Irvine : 1988. Dalzel-Job ; 1992. Ladd 1983 p. 48. 124 HS 7 178. 247 North Western Approaches In its first season o f winter sailings, between December 1940 and May 1941, Shetland Bus boats made 14 trips to take in 15 agents and pick up 18 along with 39 refugees. The 1941- 42 winter season saw the boats make 40 trips, landing 43 agents and picking up nine along with 46 refugees. One hundred and twenty-nine tons o f stores were also carried that winter but, while enemy patrols were then still inefficient, there was no organisation to get the munitions and supplies away from the coast. Following the CARHAMPTON failure, SOE elected to concentrate their efforts against tar­ gets, ‘o f real and present value to the e n e m y . ’^ 6^ Foremost amongst these was the Orkla Pyrites Mine at Trondelag in Northern Norway that in 1941, had produced 526,327 tons of pyrites used in the manufacture o f sulphuric acid. The plan, codenamed REDSHANK, was to destroy the generators and transformers at the Bârdshaug power station, thus disabling both the mine and the electric railway that carried the ore to Thamshavn for shipment. A party o f three saboteurs led by Lieutenant Peter Deinboll, whose father worked for the Orkla company, was drawn from the Linge Kompanie. The REDSHANK party. Deinboll, Fenrik Per Getz and Sergeant Thorlief Grong, left Shet­ land in the Bus boat Harald (Skipper Per Blystad) on 17 April 1942 and carried out RED­ SHANK on 4 May. They broke in, overpowered the guard and laid their charges. Getz and Grong left on bicycles while DeinboU stayed behind to watch as a considerable explosion wrecked the power plant. After various misadventures, all three escaped to Sweden and were flown back to L e u c h a r s . ^^ 7 Meanwhile, on 21 April, Arne Vaerum (PENGUIN) and Emil Hvaal (ANCHOR) were landed near Nesvik from the Shetland Bus boat Olaf to destroy Luftwaffe installations at Sta­ v a n g e r . ^ 28 The two men contacted a local Milorg group at Sotra but, on Sunday 26 April, they were betrayed by a Quisling while with Milorg leader Lars Telle at Televag, and an SS squad appeared. A fire fight ensued in which two SS officers and Vaerum died and Hvaal was taken alive, though severely wounded. In what became known as the Televag Reprisal, the entire community was destroyed and 260 men and boys between 16 and 65 were rounded up. Seventy-six o f them died in Sachsenhausen. Hvaal, Lars TeUe and another 18 125 Ibid. See also Howarth : 1991 and Thompson op. at. for the early liistory o f die Shedand Naval Unit. 126 HS 7 175. 127 HS 7 175. Cruickshank : 9186 pp. 192-193. 128 SOE case officer Malcolm Mnnthe wrote o f Hvaal; He had litde English, which accounted for misunderstandings. He found liimself married to an English girl in England, and an Irish girl in Ireland during a short holiday there. I agreed to send him home - it seemed only fair that he should see again his Norwegian wife and children. Mundie ; 1954 248 North Western Approaches Norwegians previously arrested for attempting to escape to Scotland were taken to Bergen, tortured, then e x e c u t e d d ^ 9 The success of REDSHANK led to further attacks on industrial targets accessible from the sea, the next being Glomfjord power station south o f Bodo which supplied electricity for Haugvik aluminium plant. Codenamed MUSKETOON, this raid was carried out by a party of ten Commandos and two Unge Kompanie men who were to land from the Free French sub­ marine Junon in Tennholmfjord, destroy the power station and escape overland to Sweden. Demohtion training was carried out at Fort William in August, then Junon went north from Dundee to Shetland for practice landings with the new ‘Cow Boat’. Bad weather meant there was only time to carry out one practice. But MUSKETOON got off to a muddled start when the Linge Kompanie men. Corporals Sverre Granlund and Erhng Magnus Djupredt, asked for a change of landing place as the planned route to the target passed through popu­ lated a r e a s . Captain Graeme Black commanding the landing party approached Lieutenant An air reconnaissance photograph of Glomfjord The approach route from the Svartlsen was from the right of the photo­ graph. The pipeline breached by the Com­ mandos (highlighted on the original) can be seen behind the power station (centre left). Black’s party was captured at the foot of the valley beyond the Fykan Lake. 129 Further arrests were made in Bergen, Stavanger and Harlanger. Two SOE men, Erling Marthinson and Christian All, who had arrived on 8 April 1942 and set up the MALLARD radio transmitter near Bergen, were also betrayed by a quisling and executed at Trandum. This tragedy caused much resentment in Norway where it was felt that the civilian population was paying too high a price for SOE operations which either went wrong or produced meagre results. Kjeldstadli wrote; The Norwegians blamed the British for acting arbitrarily, provoking terrible reprisals against civilians in Norway and making it difficult for the Norwegian Resistance to continue its work. Both the Norwegians and the British had underestimated their German adversary, the skill o f the German police, and the part played by the Norwegian quislings, informers and agents provocateurs. The consequences were soon felt; the Resistance suffered heavy losses, many Norwegian patriots were imprisoned, killed or had to leave the country. On the other hand the British said that the Norwegians must leam the hard lesson of security and that this could only be learnt in the bitter school of experience. At the end o f 1941 both SOE and Milorg realised that their work during eighteen months had almost been in vain. The Anglo-Norwegian controversy in London again became bitter and acrimonious. Kjeldstadli : 1959 p. 326 et passim quoted in Cookridge ; 1966 pp 533-534. Cruickshank : 1986 pp. 176-177. Salmon et al\ 1995 p. 145. 130 Once again, Norwegians had been excluded from the planning and a poor route had been chosen. The U n^ Kompa­ nie men were only known to the rest o f the MUSKETOON party by their aliases Christiansen and Hogvold, this to ( ( o n t ’d I A 11 l e a I 249 North Western Approaches Querville o f Junon and the landing place was moved to Bjaerangsfjord, but the submarine would have to penetrate 40 miles up a fjord and the approach march would now involve crossing the Svartisen glacier. Junon sailed Lerwick on 11 September and, at 0220/15, after putting a good charge in her batteries, commenced her long dived passage up Lyngvaerfjord, Ottvaerfjord and Skars- fjord to Bjaerangsfjord. At 1230/15 Querville bottomed the boat in Bjaerangsfjord to wait for darkness then surfaced at 2030/15 on a clear, calm night to find that numerous lights could be seen from houses along the shore. The Naval Staff History is heavily critical; Captain Black's statement that his crew was well versed in the art of rigging the boats and disembark­ ing by night was not borne out in practice; one of the boats was useless as the inflation cock was missing while the second boat was eventually rigged by Junon's crew. The disembarkation took 55 minutes.^ ^i The party rowed up the fjord, hid the boat, then, after a difficult approach march, arrived at the power station on the night o f 18 September and attacked just after midnight on Monday, 21 September. Three men climbed the north side of the valley to place collar charges on the pipelines that fed the power station while the rest made for the main build­ ing and placed charges on the three 24,500 kV generators. Norwegian guards said there were no Germans present, but a German NCO appeared whom Granlund shot dead. The charges in the generator hall exploded 12 minutes after the Commandos left, then the col­ lar charges shattered the pipe lines and millions o f gallons of water crashed down onto the power station, bearing with it thousands o f tons o f r u b b l e . The Commando party be­ came split up in the darkness and Black and seven others ran into a party o f Germans. Af­ ter a firefight in which a German was killed and Djuprdet fatally wounded. Black’s party was surrounded and captured. Granlund, Guardsman John Fairclough, Sergeant Richard O'Brien and Private Fred Trigg escaped to Sweden and were flown into L e u c h a r s .T h e seven prisoners were taken to Oslo, Colditz and then Berlin. On 23 October, in Sachsen­ hausen, they were shot, the first victims o f the Kommando Befehiy^^ The power station was wrecked, but there had clearly been serious shortcomings because, yet again, British planners ignored local knowledge. The apparent condescension, actually a concern for security, behind the British assumption that only they could mount an opera­ tion like MUSKETOON infuriated Norwegian commanders and politicians in London, but protect their families should any o f the party be captured. Their part in the raid, under tlie auspices o f SOE, carried the codename Operation KNOTGRASS/UNICORN. DEFE 2 364, DEFE 2 365 and Schofield ; 1964. «1 ADM 234 380. 152 Swiss engineer Gottfried Loertscher’s report on the destruction at Glomfjord reached London tlxrough an MI6 channel and is summarised in DEFE 2 364. 153 Reports on tlie escapes, along with Granlund’s account o f the operation are in DEFE 2 364. 154 The fate o f the MUSKETOON prisoners is recorded in Schofield : 1964 and Stevens : 1949. Other sources on the raid include Cruickshank : 1986 pp 203-204 and Messenger : 1985. 250 North Western Approaches the planners had also failed to consult British mountaineering and demolitions experts. Then there was a mighty row when it was discovered that Junon had penetrated deep into enemy-held territory without anyone bothering to inform either the Admiralty or FO(S). It was also apparent that the Commandos were insufficiently fit and that Black carried brief­ ing photographs and drawings o f the target into Norway. The party was too large to pass unnoticed through enemy territory and a British explosives specialist said afterwards that the demolitions could have been carried out with a Lighter load o f exp losives.B rigad ier Robert Laycock wrote that the failure o f the seven to escape had been, 'mainly due to fa­ tigue and might have been avoided by more careful training and equipment.'^^^ The Naval Staff History concludes; Admiralty criticism that this operation had been badly planned by Combined Operations Headquar­ ters was hotly countered by them, observing that the power station had been blown up extremely thoroughly and four of the party had escaped to Sweden. They did agree however that, in future, the necessity of training and checking details of equipment should be stressed.^ ^^ KESTREL, in which Per Getz and Thorleif Grong were taken by the Shetland Bus boat A k - sel (Skipper Bard Grotle) to destroy ore installations at Fosdalen in Trondelâg in early Oc­ tober, resulted in severe reprisals in Trondheim, Grane and Nordland. Thirty-five civilians, none with resistance connections, were shot. But GRANARD, a return to the Orkla Mines raided in REDSHANK eight months earlier, by a party comprising Lieutenant Per DeinboU and Sergeants Pedersen and Saettem sailed Shetland in the fishing boat Aksel on 6 Decem­ ber 1942, was a success. Deinboll's father gave them the latest intelligence on the security arrangements and the plan to burn the loading tower was abandoned in favour o f sinking a ship. The Nordfahrt (5,000T) arrived on 26 February 1943 and the three stole a boat, at­ tached limpets then escaped to Swden. Nordfahrt was heavily damaged and beached. Getz, Grong and Sverre Granlund were among the SEAGULL I party that sailed Lerwick on 5 February 1943 in the Norwegian submarine Uredd to raid the Sulitjelma mines only to be lost in a German m in e f i e l d . ^ 3 9 Shetland Bus boats were initiaUy Norwegian fishing boats untU, after five were lost in the 1942-43 season, they were deemed too dangerous and were replaced in October 1943 by three US-buUt submarine chasers. The table o f Shetland base results for 1941 to 1945 as below shows the drop in successful operations in 1942-43, and the dramatic rise in effi­ ciency afforded by the new submarine chasers. And from 1941, when there were just two 155 The photographs and drawings were supplied by Glenfield & Kennedy Ltd o f Kilmarnock. After tlie war, it was discovered that the MUSKETOON party had been spotted on the Svartisen by a German topographical party who were able to follow a trail o f easily identifiable items such as Senior Service cigarette packets across the glacier. But the Germans failed to alert the GlomQotd garrison to the approaching threat. Schofield ; 1964. 156 Laycock letter 10 November 1942. DEFE 2 364. 157 ADM 234 380. 158 Thompson op. at. p. 261. Cruickshank : 1988 pp. 192-197. Cookridge : 1966 p. 545. 2 5 ! North Western Approaches SOE transmitters in Norway, until May 1945 when there were 69, a total o f 8,720 messages were received from SOE agents in Norway, principally at the SOE Belhaven House listen­ ing station near Dunbar. Such was the scale o f the SOE network in Norway by 1944, in that year alone some 3,668 radio messages were sent to Norway and 2,878 were received from there.^40 Most o f the latter concerned German shipping movements and played a vital part in the Allied anti-shipping offensive mounted, as detailed below, in 1943-45. Season T94Ï-42 ' 1942-43 1943-44 1944-45 Trips made Agents landed 40 40 43 34 19 41' 80 87 Total 194 190 Agents picjced up 9 .1'l i ' 30 54 Refugees picked up 46 14 20 ' 251 331 Stores I landed I 129 36% j Ï83 ' j 384% j Seaborne special operations by submarine and Shetland Bus boats from Scotland were all part of the wider resistance and sabotage strategy in Norway. And, taken as a whole, this strategy was highly successful in that it helped disrupt enemy shipping movements off Norway, it caused damage to vital targets ashore and it helped to maintain the perception of a looming Allied military threat to Norway, thus tying down a large Axis garrison. By and large these operations were sensible, well planned and well executed, and they were carried out at relatively small cost. And, unlike in other less inherently stable theatres, the Allied support for the Norwegian resistance movement did not result in post-war schisms and political instability. A n t i - s h i p p i n g o p e r a t i o n s b y S c o t t i s h -b a s e d N a v a l a n d A ir F o r c e s o f f N o r w a y a n d t h e V u l n e r a b i l i t y o f G e r m a n C o a s t ­ w is e S h i p p i n g Road and rail communications the length o f Norway were limited, the only sure way to travel being by sea. As a Coastal Command from 1943 report states succinctly, ‘The en­ emy’s whole existence in Norway depended on their seaborne s u p p l i e s . I n the far north, the war on the Russo-Finnish border between the Axis and the Red Army had, in 1943 and 1944, developed into something o f a stalemate. But it was o f vital importance to both sides as vital supplies were brought, albeit at great cost, to the Soviet Union via the Arctic route while the Wehrmacht sought to take Murmansk and the entrance to the Kola Inlet. On 9 June 1944, three days after D Day, the Red Army began a strategic offensive against the Germans and their Finnish allies in the north. As in the 1939-40 Winter War, the Finns inflicted grievous losses on the Red Army, but the writing was on the wall and, on 19 Sep- «9 HS 1 175. 140 HS 7 178. >4» AIR 41 74 p. 125. 252 North Western Approaches tember 1944, a Russo-Fintiish armistice was signed. But there were still some 220,000 German troops on Finnish, Norwegian and Soviet territory in the far north and, in Octo­ ber, the Soviets began an offensive that drove the Wehrmacht over the Norwegian frontier into the Finnmark. Another often forgotten factor that had a fundamental bearing on land and sea strategy in the far north was the position of Sweden. Given its geographical position, Sweden had lit­ tle option in 1940 but to take a pro-German stance, concluding a transit agreement that allowed the Wehrmacht the use o f Swedish railways and German ships the use of Swedish territorial waters. In 1941 a complete Wehrmacht division had been granted passage from Oslo across Swedish territory to Finland, and reinforcement and supply o f Axis forces in the far north was carried out via this route until 1944. The trade in iron ore with Germany that had so exercised Churchill’s Admiralty in 1940 continued unabated. In 1941 some 600,000 tons was supplied, in 1943 1.8 million t o n s . '^‘^2 As long as the Swedish port o f Lulea and the Gulf o f Bothnia remained ice-free, much of this traffic passed out of Allied reach. After Stalingrad, however, the war was clearly going against the Axis so, like Finland, Sweden began repositioning itself towards the Allies. In 1944, while still happy to continue supplies o f ore, she withdrew the traffic concessions and seaborne shipments to and from northern Norway, including iron ore, now had to fol­ low the Norwegian coastal route. This brought them in range o f Allied MTBs, submarines and aircraft operating from S c o t l a n d . Usually around eight German convoys were at sea off south-west Norway daily, one in each direction between Kristiansand South and Stavanger, between Stavanger and Bergen, between Bergen and Aalesund and between Aalesund and Trondheim. Admiralty OIC in­ telligence about enemy shipping movements was good and the convoys had already begun crossing open water, such as that between Kristiansand South and Stavanger, in darkness. Until 1943, largely for political reasons but also so as not to waste valuable vessels, aircraft i and weaponry, there had been a restriction on attacking unescorted ships off Norway o f | Iunder 1,500 tons. I Allied strategy before and immediately after D Day favoured encouraging the Wehrmacht 1 to withdraw troops from Norway into the battle in mainland Europe but, the failed Sep­ tember 1944 MARKET GARDEN airborne assault in Holland presaged further Allied re­ verses. Allied strategy changed to bottling up as many German troops in Norway as possi- |Ible and, despite a protest from the Norwegian government-in-exile in London, on 10 Oc- j 142 Kersaudy : 1990 p. 226. 143 For Swedish position, see Salmon etal :1995 pp. 201-204 and 206-207. 253 North Western Approaches tober 1944 SHAEF stated that all shipping in Norwegian waters was liable to attack without warningd'*'^ Then, after the setback in the Ardennes in December 1944, the Allies became increasingly anxious lest the 330,000 Germans in Norway form the basis o f a Vestung Nor- mgen last stand which would be difficult and costly to break. Allied concerns also extended to the need to keep the Soviet Union out o f Scandinavia, in particular Norway and Den­ mark. MTB ANTI-SH IPPING OPERATIONS South o f Bergen on 1 October 1941 Lieutenant Per Daniels en and the crew o f MTB 56 cast o ff from the Norwegian destroyer Draug which had towed them across from Scapa and moved into the Leads. Hidden by camouflage netting and bushes, the MTB waited un­ til the night o f 3 October when Daniels en sank the tanker Borgnj (3,015T) which was bound for Bergen with Luftwaffe aviation fuel. '^ s^ Danielsen and other Norwegian officers had been advocating The Leads as a hunting ground for MTBs. The operation by 56 had proved their point and, in November 1942, eight Fairmile D class MTBs arrived at Lerwick to form the 3Qi'i (Norwegian) FlotiUa.^ '**^ MTB operations were best undertaken during longer winter nights when they could ap­ proach the Norwegian coast in relative safety, slowing and fitting external silencers as they passed the outer islands. Piloted in through narrow, undefended passages by men with lo­ cal knowledge, the boats went straight to a ‘lurking place’, often a creek on one o f the off­ shore islands, where they could He beneath camouflage nets while crewmen or Fynnforce commandos landed to watch for approaching German ships. But the need to operate in winter brought its own hazards and, while MTBs were not permitted to leave Lerwick in anything above a Force 4, nothing could be done once an operation was under way. Many boats suffered damage and aU had to be specially s t r e n g t h e n e d . ^ ^ ? Fairmile Ds had a range of 500 miles at maximum revolutions and even the shortest round trip to Norway from Lerwick was around 400 miles. On most patrols extra petrol had to be carried in cans on deck and, on longer operations, this could amount to 4,000 gallons in addition to the 5,000 gallons in the boat’s main tanks. Naval Review Yol XXXIII pp. 276-277 145 Reynolds : 1998 pp. 29-31. 146 The soil’ Flotilla was renamed the 54**> Flotilla, a nominal change under the Coastal Forces reorganisation wliich came into effect on 1 October 1944. DEFE 2 616. Lambert and Ross : 1990. Irvine : 1988 pp. 115-124. Reynolds : 1998 pp. 31-32. 147 619 and two others returned to Lerwick on 27 December 1942 after being caught in a storm. A Royal Navy report quoted in Irvine : 1988 p. 131 states, ‘. . .that all tire boats returned safe and sound on 27* December says a lot for the boats and their commanders. It is now certain that these hulls are seawortliy enough, which lends weight to the argument that it was wise to strengthen them, even if it means the loss o f a little speed.’ i4s Reynolds : 1998 pp. 35-36. See also Lambert and Ross : 1990 p. 90 et passim for details of the Fairmile D class. 254 North Western Approaches t^ iwHini miifsi MTBs of the Norwe­ gian Flotilla on opera­ tions from Shetland. Fairmile D class MTBs were christened ‘Dog Boats’ after the war­ time phonetic for the letter D. The camou­ flage scheme was de­ signed specially for the Norwegian fjords. 6/P, 626 and 631 sailed Lerwick on 22 November 1942 for the flotilla’s first operation. No targets were found off Stord and Bomlo and they returned to Lerwick after passing at high speed through Haugesund Harbour. There followed a series of anti-shipping operations jointly carried out with Fynnforce commandos. VPl sailed Lerwick at 0815/26 November, 618 with seven Commandos to make for Floro and 620 and 623 with a 12-man party were to patrol Askvold. 631 carried Captain Fynn and six ORs for Bommelofjord. The inshore navigation hghts were lit, so the 620 and 623 had no difficulty in entering the Askvold har­ bour, a German convoy assembly port, where they torpedoed two ships totalling 12,000 tons. The other MTBs lay under camouflage for two days but found no targets and all boats returned to Lerwick on 29 November. 619 and 627 sailed Lerwick at 1330/22 February 1943 for Sognefjord and Operation CRACKERS. 619 picked up an agent off Krakhellehavn and laid mines in Krakhellesund, then, at 0500/23, the boats moved to a lurking place on the western side of Gjeitero Is­ land. A party of Commandos went to the German coastwatching post at Tungodden but found it deserted, damage from when it had been shelled by 631 and 626 on 20 January still clearly v i s i b l e .Ano th e r party reconnoitred Kletten watchpost overlooking Stensund and returned to the MTBs to plan simultaneous assaults on the Kletten post and the Ger­ man billet in a Quisling’s house in Stensund. But a storm made it impossible to get ashore, so the operation was abandoned. The force 12 gale continued until 28 February and food began to run out. An attempt to return to Lerwick was made on 1 March, but huge seas forced the boats to turn back. Finally, after a rough passage, the boats reached Lerwick at 1830/3, nine days after they left.^^i 149 Fynn’s report on VPl in DEFE 2 616. 150 Two Germans in the post on that occasion had been killed. DEFE 2 616. 151 Waggett’s report in DEFE 2 617. Herlofsen’s report in DEFE 2 616. See also Irvine : 1988 p. 195. 255 North Western Approaches Mines were laid o ff Olaskjaer on 6 March, then 619 and 631 sailed Lerwick at 1 2 3 0 /1 2 March 1943 for OMNIBUS. They made landfall at Skorpen and were secured under camou­ flage by 0 1 0 0 /1 3 . On 14 March, an OP overlooking Floro Harbour reported a destroyer and two merchantmen and, that night, the MTBs raced into the harbour dropped mines and 619 torpedoed the German Optima (1,249'IJ. 631 missed a larger vessel, one o f her torpedoes hitting the quay below a German gun position, then ran onto rocks below a German battery and had to be hurriedly abandoned into 6193^'^ Bressay Light was shown, a searchlight was shone skywards from Ness o f Sound, then a Spitfire gave d/P a course for Lerwick where she secured at 1400/16.^^3 618 and 627 left Lerwick at 0610/22 March for ROUNDABOUT, an attack on enemy ship­ ping at Dragsund. At 0120/23 the MTBs landed their Commandos at Dragsund, two of whom were to open a lifting bridge to allow the boats to pass through, but the bridge party found the power to the lifting mechanism switched off. As they went to find the bridge keeper, they ran into two German sentries, one of whom was killed. More Germans were heard approaching, so the bridge party retired and the MTBs withdrew, arriving Lerwick at 1 6 2 5 /2 3AM On 11 April, 626 sailed Lerwick for Skorpen to pick up Leif Larsen and the crew of the Shetland Bus boat Bergholm which had landed three agents and four tons of supplies at Traena, before being sunk by two enemy aircraft. After a brush with a Quisling fishing skipper, they were picked up from their smallboat by another skipper who took the seven survivors to Skorpen from where they were picked up by 6263 '^^ 626’s next mission, on 24 April, was to Karmoy. The plan was for Sub Lieutenant Joe Godwin and six men to use canoes to attach the limpets to German vessels in Karmsund or Kopervik. The MTB sent to recover Godwin’s party from Urter Island on 9 May missed the island in thick fog. An­ other rendezvous was attempted, but the island was deserted. The party had been on the island by 9 May after sinking a minesweeper in Kopervik, but had been betrayed by a Nor­ wegian informer. Godwin and four men were shot on 2 February 1945, the other two died in Belsen.^56 620 and 633 unsuccessfully attacked a convoy in the Leads on 1 May, then, on 4 June, after lurking for two days outside Bergen, 626 and 620 attacked a convoy. 626 sank the German 152 Norwegians who had visited 631 while she was in her lurking place had brought newspapers and magazines aboard which were left lying around, many with the names o f those who had given them on die cover. And a Norwegian rating left behind a letter from his family. OMNIBUS report in DEFE 2 617. Reynolds : 1998 p. 39. 153 The Admiralty signalled, ‘Bring to the officers, crews and base personnel of 54* Flotilla their Lordships congratula­ tions on the recendy carried out operation in the Norwegian Qords.' DEFE 2 617. Reynolds ; 1998 p. 39. I r ^ e : 1988 p. 137-139. Rohwer and Hummelchen ; 1974 p. 308. 154 DEFE 2 616. 155 Howarth : 1991 ch. 14. Irvine : 1988 p. 139. 256 North Western Approaches Altenfels (8,132T), which was carrying 8,000 tons o f iron ore, then both MTBs came under fire from the escort, M-468^ and shore batteries. The German vessel was damaged, but two men were killed in 620 and several were wounded.^®? Driven by a heady mixture o f aggression and optimism, MTB operations continued into the almost continuous daylight o f summer 1943, far beyond the limits o f prudence, MTB 345 was an experimental 55-foot boat sent to Lerwick for specific missions where her small size would be an advantage. But she had very limited range so, for her second mis­ sion sailing Lerwick on 24 July, 620 refuelled her o ff the Norwegian coast. But they were spotted by a coastal lookout station and, while 620 returned to Lerwick, 345 lurked at Aspo Island north o f Bergen until a German party attacked the boat from the shore on 28 July. The boat was captured and her crew was taken to Bergen for interrogation. Despite the fact that they were in uniform, and despite the fact that Kriegsmarine officers thought they should be treated as POWs, Lieutenant Alv Andresen and his crew were shot on 30 July. The bodies were taken out to sea, attached to depth charges and thrown over the side.^^^ Later that summer Lerwick-based MTBs began a series o f SOE anti-shipping operations codenamed VESTIGE, For VESTIGE I, Corporal Harald Svindseth, Sergeant Ragnar Ulstein and Corporal Nils Fjeld were landed with kayaks and limpet mines near Gulen on the night o f 3-4 September. On 23 September Svindseth limpeted the Hertmut (2,713T) which was beached with a large hole where the two limpets had exploded next to each other. The party was picked up by MTB on 16 November, For VESTIGE III, the only other successful operation in this series. Corporals Synnes and Hoel were landed by MTB on the night o f 9- 10 September and planted six limpets on the collier Jantt^e Frentf^n (6,582T) at Alesund. Two exploded prematurely and the remaining four mines were removed by the Germans, despite their having been fitted with anti-tamper devices, and the collier was. repaired at Bergen. The VESTIGE III party were picked up at Skorpen on 17 November by a Shetland Bus submarine chaser.^^^ S c o t t i s h - b a s e d C o a s t a l C o m m a n d A n t i - s h i p p in g S t r i k e s 1943-44 Operation HUSKY, the Allied invasion o f Sicily, was due to 10 July 1943 and, on the first of that month, as one of the myriad deception schemes devised to divert German attention away from Sicily, six rocket-armed Beaufighters o f 235 Squadron, four Beaufighters o f 404 156 Irvine : 1988 pp. 139-141. Dalzell-Job : 1992 pp. 55-57. 157 Report by Lieutenant Patrick Dalzell-Job in DEFE 2 616. Irvine ; 1988 p. 141. Reynolds ; 1998 p.39. Witthoft : 1971. 158 The shooting o f 345^ & crew was cited as a war crime in the case of Donitz at die Nuremberg trials. Numbetg Trial PtveeedingsYol. 13, Friday, 10 May 1946, morning session. See also Reynolds : 1998 : pp. 41-42. 257 North Western Approaches Coastal Command Beaufighters operating against shipping the Norwegian Leads. Squadron and two Mosquitoes of 333 Squadron arrived at RAF Sum- burgh in Shetland for anti-shipping operations off Norway. The plan was for 333 Squadron’s Mosquitoes, manned by Norwegians, to fly re­ connaissance missions and the Beaufighters would then take off and strike at any enemy shipping sighted by the Mosquitoes. In the event, the Mosquito reconnaissance proved o f httle value and the Beaufighters began flying ROVER patrols along with torpedo-armed Hampdens of 489 Squadron. In the first operation on 4 July, despite heavy flak and the attentions o f two ME109s, a 4,000 ton merchant vessel was rocketed and set on fire near Stadlandet. One aircraft was lost. The second operation on 10 July saw a merchantman strafed, and again one aircraft was lost. On 17 July, in the third operation, eight Beaufighters attacked a con­ voy near Bergen and sank one o f the escorts, the trawler UJ17053^ Coastal Command anti-shipping sorties to Norway continued through August 1943, though at a reduced rate and with no positive result, not least because 455 and 489 Squad­ rons were under instruction to husband torpedoes which were in short supply. Meanwhile, MTB operations had been extended north to Trondheim by towing the boats part o f the way across. On 10-11 September, 618 and 627 torpedoed Ociç. Anke (3,81 IT) in Trondheim- fjord. On 22 October 1943, 653, 686, 688 and 699 {686 and 699 were from the British 58'* Flotilla) shelled and sank the coaster Kilstraum north o f Trondheim. Fighters attacked the MTBs as they headed out to sea, setting 699 on fire, killing one man and injuring five. 699 was abandoned into 688 which survived another attack and reached Lerwick safely.^^^ Wick-based Hampdens attacked a convoy off Lister early on 16 September and sank the Norwegian Grat^ella (2,137T). Tanker movements attracted particular Allied attention, one example being the Schleswig which sailed Kiel on 21 September 1943 bound for north Nor­ way with fuel for Firpita ^ and Schamhorst newly returned from Operation ZITRONELLA, an attack on Allied positions on Spitsbergen. Schleswi^s movements were tracked both by 159 SOE anti-shipping operations in HS 7 175 and HS 2 208. 160 AIR 41 48 p. 277. 161 On 22 November an explosion took place aboard 686 which was alongside the Norwegian 626 at the Anglo- Scottish Quay, Lerwick. Four British and one Norwegian were killed immediately and another three died later. Both boats burned furiously and were sunk where they were by gunfire. Irvine : 1988 p. 142 258 North Western Approaches Coastal Command, by agents ashore and by Enigma decrypts until she reached Bodo on 28 September. There she was heavily damaged by aircraft from the carrier USS Banger operat­ ing with the Home Fleet from S c a p a . ^^ 2 Then, on 30 September, 404 Squadron Beaufighters attacked a convoy off Stadlandet, rocketing a destroying the Norwegian Sanct Svithun (1,376T). Anti-shipping sorties to Nor­ way fell from 102 in September to 49 in October 1943, largely due to aircraft being with­ drawn for anti-U boat operations in the Northern Transit Area, but rose again to 116 in November, 18 attacks being made and two small ships sunk. The principal change in No­ vember, after the experiments o f July to September, was Coastal Command’s commitment to operations off Norway with the formation o f the Wick Strike Wing of torpedo Beaufighters, or, as they were universally known, Torbeaus, o f 144 Squadron with 404 Squadron’s cannon-armed Beaufighters for flak suppression. Two days later, on 24 November 1943, Coastal Command submitted proposals for attack­ ing shipping off Norway which referred to a Ministry o f Economic Warfare paper that de­ scribed Norway as Germany’s heaviest merchant marine commitment which then involved 600,000 tons o f s h ip p ing .W h i l e southbound shipping principally carried iron ore and fish products, northbound convoys carried supplies and reinforcements for German troops fighting the Red Army in northern Norway. One o f the main objectives for the Strike Wing was that it should operate more closely with MTBs from Lerwick and submarines from Dundee, in particular since the X-craft at­ tack in September 1943 had disabled Tirpits^ ^ thus releasing 9^ ^ Flotilla submarines for anti­ shipping work. The first Wick Strike Wing operation had already taken place on 22 No­ vember when six 144 Squadron Torbeaus escorted by eight 404 Squadron aircraft attacked a convoy off Stadlandet. The Norwegian Gol (985T) and Kari 'Louise (800T) were damaged, one Torbeau ditching on the way home with engine failure. This operation illustrated the potential of coordinated anti-shipping operations off Norway when, that afternoon, at 1417/22, the Norwegian submarine Lia attacked the same convoy and sank Arcturus (1,651T). Two days later, Lia sank the MV Lisstrom (928T) off Bredsund.^^'* December 1943 saw 121 sorties by Wick Wing during which 32 attacks were made and five Iaircraft lost, all without tangible result. The 9^ ^ Flotilla submarines fared better with the | Dutch 0-15 attacking a convoy inside Skudesnesfjord on 26 December and claiming hits i on three ships, though an escort reported two torpedoes that missed. Lieutenant Pim I Kiepe recalled that the boat escaped only after taking, ‘a good hammering from the es- | 162 ADM 223 8. Wintoix ; 1988 p. 77-78. Rohwer and Hunnunelchen : 1974 p. 359. Witthoft : 1971 pp. 296 and 332. 163 AIR 41 48 p. 282. ADM 223 8. 259 North Western Approaches The attack by 144 Squadron Torbeaus on the convoy off Stadlandet on 22 November 1943 which left two ships damaged. The convoy was attacked again that afternoon by the Norwegian submarine Ula and the German freighter Arcturus was sunk. By early 1944 the combined effect of Coastal Command, FAA, MTB and submarine attacks was forcing German convoys off south-west Norway to take refuge in fjords during the hours of daylight, thus greatly hampering their shipping operations. cort’.^ 5^ U/a, Seadog and Liking sailed Dundee for patrol at 0900/23 December and, on 28 December, Via unsuccessfully attacked the Norwegian steamer Fan (3,000T) off Skudesnes. At about the same time, Seadog sank the German Oldenburg (8,537T) off Stadlandet with two torpedoes. On 2 January, Seadog unsuccessfully attacked a three-ship convoy with two escorts off S ta d la n d e t .Seanjmph made a rendezvous south of Bodo to transfer o f per­ sonnel and stores to a fishing vessel.^^^ Seadog attacked another convoy without success on 3 January and Sceptre was ineffectively depth-charged after missing a convoy with torpedoes off Foldafjord on 4 January. January 1944 brought better results for the Strike Wing, 186 sorties being flown and 65 attacks being made. Four ships were sunk and two damaged for the loss o f five aircraft. On 14 January Wick Wing struck at two convoys off Lister, sinking the German Wittekind (4,029T) but losing three aircraft after the Wing was attacked by seven ME109s. Mean­ while, 489 Squadron from Leuchars, newly returned to operations after converting to Beaufighters, attacked another convoy, sinking the Enterios (5,179T). Both the ships sunk had been carrying iron ore, part o f the 111,000 tons shipped to Germany by the Norwegian coastal route in January. Then, on 20 January, Beaufighters from Wick sank the Emsland 164 ADM 199 1851. Valvatne ; 1954 pp. 111-119. 165 Rohwer ; 1997. Kiepe MS, IWM Dept of Docs ref. 96/6/1. 166 was assumed that the E.msland (5,170T) was sunk in this attack but Rohwer found that she was struck by an air- launched torpedo at 1130/20 January 1944 west o f Stadlandet and beached near Ervik. There is also a claim that, in this attack, Seadog sank the ex-Dutch torpedo boat K-2, but this vessel was damaged by an air-launched torpedo on 9 October 1944 off Egersund and became a wreck. It seems that Seado^ % attack on 2 January 1944 must have been the detonation that V-5308 reported north o f Stadlandet on that day. Rohwer : 1997. Witthoft : 1971 p. 313. RN Submarine Museum. 167 RN Submarine Museum. 260 North Western Approaches (5,170T) off Stadlandet and 489 Squadron from Leuchars attacked a convoy off Egersund, sinking the minelayer Skagerack I (1,281T) and damaging the Susanna (810T). Beaufighters and Mosquitoes from Wick and Leuchars were in action again on 26 January, damaging shipping off Stadlandet. On 1 February the Wick Wing attacked a convoy off Stadlandet and, despite heavy flak, sank the escort trawler UJ-1702 (500T) and damaged Lalencia (3,096T).^‘^ ^ Seadog also at­ tacked this convoy at 1150/1, but missed. On 5 February Sceptre torpedoed the beached wreck of the Emsland at Stadlandet, MTBs 618 and 619 engaged a patrol vessel in Sognes- joen and left it on fire and Radbod (4,354T) was sunk in air attack at Selbervik. Taku sank the collier Bheinhausen (6,298T) in Skudesnesfjord on 7 February, Stubborn attacked a seven- ship convoy off Namsos on 11 February, sinking one ship and damaging two others, and Taku sank Harm Frit^en (4,818T) off Skudesnes on 12 February. Stubborn attacked a convoy of five ships and five escorts off Namsos on 13 February; her torpedoes missed and she was heavily counter-attacked by the escort, but escaped. That same evening, off Stavanger, Taku sank Hans Bombofen (2,130T) and, off Hustadvikka, MTBs 627 and 632 sank Irma (1,392T) and Henry (634T). Ula left Lerwick on 16 Febru­ ary, attacking convoys off Lister on 20 and 25 February without success. On 1 March Seanymph missed a 5,000 ton merchantman off Bodo then, on 2 March, Venturer sank Thor (2,526T) off Stadlandet and, on 3 March, the steamer Levante reported being missed by torpedoes, actually fired by Se­ anymph, off Bodo. By March 1944 the 489 and 455 Squadron Beaufighters and 333 Squad­ ron Mosquitoes had formed the Leuchars Strike Wing and both it and the Wick Wing flew 309 sorties that month. On 5 March 489 Squadron Beaufighters attacked a convoy three On patrol west of Namsos on 11 February 1944, Stubborn attacked a convoy, sinking the Makki Faulbaums (I.907T) and damaging the Felix D (2,047T). Two days later, at 1155/13, she missed a southbound convoy of five ships and five es­ corts with six torpedoes. The escorts NO-12, V- 5 7 1 5 and M- I5I conterattacked and Stubborn was badly damaged by more than 70 depth charges and forced down to 540 feet, 200 feet below her test depth. She was eventually able to surface but was trapped on the surfece perilously close to enemy territory. Home Fleet destroyers sailed to bring her in and she secured alongside Duke o f York at Scapa. She was towed to Green­ ock by M usketeer and Scourge arriving, as seen here, on 25 Februarv 1944. 168 Rohwer : 1997. RN Submarine Museum. 169 Rohwer and Hummelchen : 1974 p. 384. Witthoft p.354 261 North Western Approaches miles west of Lindesnes and sank one of the escorts. On 6 March the Leuchars Wing at­ tacked a 16-ship convoy off Obrestad and sank the Kabe (994T). Sceptre arrived off Kya Light on 2 March 1944 and, at 0913/3, sighted an HE115 seaplane approaching. Air pa­ trols often heralded the arrival o f a convoy and, sure enough, four merchantmen and five escorts appeared. Two torpedoes fired at 250 yards range passed under the convoy. Sceptre tried to attack another convoy at 1405/6, then ran into fishing nets that were cleared with difficulty. Early on 7 March Sceptre sighted minesweepers and a Heinkel operating ahead of a southbound convoy, penetrated the escort screen and, at 1115/7, sank the Uppe (8,340T). unsuccessfully attacked convoys on 12 and 13 March, then arrived Lerwick on the afternoon of 16 March. On 22 March Syrtis on patrol off Bodo sank the Narvik by gunfire, then disappeared, probably lost in the German offshore minefield. Beaufighters of the Leuchars Wing on a ROVER on 23 March sank the Norwegian Byfylke (898T). On 24 March Taku missed the tanker Moshill (5,3221’) off Namsos, sank the Nordnorge (340T) off Stadlandet and Terrapin damaged the tanker Worth (6,256T) and the aircraft catapult ship Schwabenland off Flekkefjord. R/} d i -X -Ar />Jr ¥-V- 44 ^ a£// a. r 4 Am 1944 At the end o f March, Coastal Command and submarines mounted a combined search for the Monterosa (13,882T) which was southbound off Norway after acting as depot ship during repairs to Tirpitr ^ following the X-craft raid. An intelligence source, probably SOE’s coastwatch­ ing service, placed her off Narvik at 0800/25, then she was reported off Skorpen at 0900/29 but a Beaufighter strike from Wick that eve­ ning failed to find her. Mosquitoes o f 544 and 333 Squadrons found the ship in Grimstadfjord at 1145/30, then tracked her south. Wick Wing took off at 1700/30 and, despite a strong escort of three minesweepers, nine ME109s and FW190s, five MEllOs, two Arados and one BV138, the 18 Beaufighters heavily damaged Monterosa for the loss o f two aircraft. That night, at 0010/31, 489 Squadron Beaufighters from Leuchars attacked her, causing further damage. fig. 85 J J L A , / At 0 6 15/4 April 1944 Ula torpedoed the valuable German tanker III (7,603T) as It passed Stadlandet (above). Two days later she torpedoed the German transport Wesergau (l,923T) which was beached but became a total loss and was scrapped in situ. 262 North Western Approaches then she was sighted approaching Kristiansand South by a 333 Squadron Mosquito at 0825/31. Monterosa finally reached Aarhus on 6 April.^’o On 10 April Venturer and Taku sailed Lerwick to penetrate the Skaggerak mine barrier and attack enemy shipping between southern Norway and Germany. But Taku hit a mine and was lucky to survive heavily damaged. She returned to Lerwick and Venturer was diverted north to patrol off Egersund. She missed a northbound merchantman early on 15 April, but sank the Freidrichshafen (1,923T) that evening, then went deep as two escorts counter­ attacked. Venturer secxxted at Lerwick on the evening o f 18 April having been relieved off Egersund by the Norwegian Ula. At 0645/19 Ula, about four miles o ff Kvitingsoy Light, torpedoed and sank U-974. On 22 April she sank the Bahia (4,117T), then returned, on 27 April, to Dundee.i '^ 2 C a r r ie r Sw e e p s o f f N o r w a y in 1944 Submarine anti-shipping patrols off the Norwegian coast closed for the summer at the end o f April 1944, Ula, Unshaken and Satyr the last boats to withdraw to Dundee before beginning anti-U boat patrols in the Northern Transit Area particularly directed against Mitte Gruppe boats. MTB operations from Lerwick also ended in March and the Norwegian boats moved to Great Yarmouth for operations in the lead-up to D-Day.^^a Much of Coastal Command’s anti-shipping strength in Scotland was also withdrawn to the south for D-Day. But the last Arctic convoy cycle, JW/RA58, had sailed in March so air operations continued with Home Fleet carrier groups not required for convoy operations. There was, however, a subtext to these carrier sweeps off Norway that had nothing to do with Tirpits^ and coastal shipping, and of which Fraser was unaware when he clashed with Cunningham. Playing on German paranoia about an Allied invasion o f Norway, British deception planners had, since 1941, been mounting a series o f feints towards Scandinavia as cover for real operations elsewhere. The first. Operation HARDBOILED, involved a no­ tional assault on Stavanger in 1942 by a force then training at Inveraray, but actually des­ tined for IRONCLAD, the landing at Diego Suarez on 5 May. SOLO I later in 1942, and a cover for TORCH, was again designed to convince the enemy that the troops concentrated in the Clyde were destined for Norway. Double agents controlled by the Twenty Commit­ tee reported that snow chains were being provided, Lascar seamen on the Clyde were being offered bonuses to sail north o f 60° north and that troops were being trained in mountain warfare. And, as seen above with the arrival o f the first Coastal Command strike wing air- ™ AIR 41 48 p. 506. 171 ADM 234 380. ADM 199 1813. Rohwer : 1997. 172 ADM 199 1851. Wynn : 1998. Rohwer : 1997. 263 II North Western Approaches craft at Wick in July 1943, at the time of HUSKY, TINDALL suggested that the Allies were about to land at Stavangerd^'i As part o f the deception plans surrounding OVERLORD, FORTITUDE NORTH posited another landing in Norway in summer 1944 so that the Germans would be encouraged to maintain a large garrison there rather than reinforce their land forces in the main thea­ tre. Shipping was concentrated at Methil in the hope that a Luftwaffe reconnaissance aircraft would spot it. Dummy aircraft were set up on airfields like Montrose, Peterhead and Forres and a largely non-existent British Fourth Army under GOC Scottish Command, General Thorne, began filling the ether with bogus radio messages. Few of those involved in the invasion exercises at Burghead early in 1944 (see ch. 5 above) were aware that the 3^*^ Division and Force S were playing their part in FORTITUDE NORTH. A much-inflated version o f military move­ ments in Scotland was being transmitted to German mihtary intelhgence by double-agents hke GARBO, Spaniard Juan Pujol.'^^ The difficulties of operating carrier aircraft in northern waters were illustrated when a force of escort carriers under Rear Admiral Bissett in Royalist had sailed Scapa at 0900/13 April 1944. PITCHBOWL ONE on 14 April was to have been an attack on shipping between Utvaer and Svino Island, and PITCHBOWL TWO the following day was to have seen further anti-shipping attacks between Hvidingso Island and Egero. And the carrier strikes were to have been carried out alongside Wick Strike Wing Beaufighters, but the whole operation had to be cancelled due to bad w e a t h e r . T h e same fate befell PLANET, though the carri­ ers did undertake a secondary operation, RIDGE ABLE, an attack on shipping at Bodo and in the Leads to the south early on 26 April. Two Barracudas and fighters penetrated into Bodo harbour where they hit a large merchantman. Two strikes attacked a convoy off # Dummy aircraft at Forres for Operation FORTITUDE NORTH 173 Reynolds : 1998 pp. 104-105. 174 See Howard : 1990 and Wheadey : 1980. 175 For FORTITUDE NORTH see Hesketh : 1999 and in particular ch.s. VII, VIII, XVIII and XIX, and Howard 1992. See also Pujol and West ; 1985 for the GARBO network. 176 ADM 199 844. 264 North Western Approaches Sandhorn and direct hits were claimed on the first and third merchantmen and one of the escorts. The iron ore carrying Itauri (6,838T) and Lotte Leonhardt (4,167T) were sunk. One Barracuda, two Corsairs, one Hellcat and one Wildcat were lost and one aircraft crashed on landing on Emperor, killing the pilot. ^ 7? CROQUET and HOOPS began when a Home Fleet force commanded by Captain H. V. Grace in Berwick with the carriers Furious and Searcher escorted by Savage, Wit^rd, Wakeful, Algonquin, Piorun and Blyskawica sailed Scapa at 2230/3 May 1944. The strike comprised 18 Barracudas from 8 Wing in Furious escorted by 20 Wildcats from Searcher began taking off at 0642/6 to search for enemy shipping between the village o f Bud and Smolen Island. A two-ship convoy with three escorts was sighted north-east of Bud at 0801/6 and, while Wildcats went in to smother flak, four Barracudas, three armed with bombs and one with a torpedo, attacked. The torpedo-carrying Barracuda was shot down, but after torpedoing the larger ship. The rest o f the strike force attacked another convoy o f a freighter, a tanker and a coaster and three escorts west o f Kristiansand at 0808/6. The Wildcats were unable to silence heavy flak from the escorts, some having to shoot down one o f two BV138 air­ craft orbiting the convoy, so the Barracudas had a difficult time during their attack and one was shot down. The tanker Saarburg (7,913T) sank after being hit by two torpedoes and the ore Almora (2,522T) sank after being bombed, The CROQUET force turned for home after the last aircraft were recovered at 0944/6, but Berwick and Searcher detached off Noup Head to join the HOOPS force o f Royalist, Jamaica, Striker, Emperor and six destroyers which sailed Scapa at 0600/7. The plan was, once again, to attack shipping off Bud and two flights o f 800 Squadron Hellcats began taking off from Emperor at 0730/8. Escorted by 882 Squadron Wildcats, they sighted first two trawlers which they left alone, then a passenger steamer with the Norwegian flag prominently painted on her sides which opened fire on the strike force. Lieutenant Commander Hall was about to order an attack, when a convoy of five merchantmen and escorts was sighted off Kristiansand. The convoy was attacked but not hit and two Wildcats were shot down. The force was returning to the carriers when, about 15 miles offshore, it was bounced by six enemy fighters. Two ME109s and one FW190 were shot down. After making landfall at Gossen Island and failing to sight any shipping, the second strike, HOOPS DOG, went south, shot down two BV138s caught in the act of taking off, then bombed oil tanks near Alesund and a herring oil factory at Fosnavâg before strafing a ship off Alesund. Two aircraft were lost.^^^ HOOPS was the first time the Hellcat had been used 177 Ibid. 178 ADM 199 844. Naval Review yoL XXXIII p. 183. Rohwer and Hummelchen : 1974 p. 410 179 ADM 199 844. 26! North Western Approaches as a fighter-bomber and this accounted for the poor marksmanship o f 800 and 804 Squad­ rons. POTLUCK, the next carrier operation sailed Scapa at 1730/12 May as Sheffield, Royalist, Emperor, Searcher, Onslow, Obedient, Ursa, Wakeful, Piorun and Blyskawica. Bombing practice was planned for that evening at Stackskerry but this had to be abandoned due to insuffi­ cient wind and a heavy swell. Thus, most o f the pilots had only dropped two bombs, one during training at Hatston on 5 May and one during HOOPS three days later. The POTLUCK ABLE strike on 14 May attacked shipping and aircraft off Rorvik and Stad­ landet, claiming four enemy aircraft destroyed, escort vessels strafed and a direct hit on a merchantman. Sub Lieutenant Holloway returned to Striker vjith undercarriage damage and baled out. He was seen clear o f his parachute harness in the water, but was dead when found by Wakeful. At 1757/14 six HE115 seaplanes appeared, their approach not seen on radar due to rain clutter, and made ‘half-hearted attacks’ on the carrier group. Hellcats, Wildcats and Sea Hurricanes were scrambled but the Heinkels escaped in cloud towards Trondheim. POTLUCK BAKER began taking off at 0400/15, but weather conditions along the coast were poor and no shipping was sighted. Two armed trawlers were strafed and set on fire and the fish oil factory at Fosnavâg was bombed again. Two aircraft received flak damage, but all returned safely. Meanwhile, at the same time, a Home Fleet force under Sir Henry Moore in Anson with Victorious and Furious had launched Operation BRAWN, a strike against Tirpitv ^at Altenfjord which had to abort due to cloud cover over the target. Carrier sweeps off Norway generally involved minelaying missions in the Leads by Avengers from escort carriers and fighter and fighter-bomber strikes by Seafires and Fireflies from fleet carriers. Home Fleet carriers led by Implacable undertook a sweep in the Bodo area between 26 and 28 September 1944, and while Avengers laid mines, fighters at­ tacked a six-ship convoy off Lodingen (left) and sank a seaplane tender (over­ leaf top). U -1060 was driven ashore dur­ ing this sweep and destroyed two days later by Coastal Command. One result of these sweeps was that U boats were stationed off Scapa to catch the carriers as they put to sea. But the principal out­ come was that German shipping and, notably, U boat traffic, was unable to move in daylight. 180 Ibid. 266 North Western Approaches A i r a n d S e a o p e r a t i o n s i n w i n t e r 1944-45 Submarine operations off Norway recommenced with the shortening daylight hours in Au­ gust 1944, Satyr attacking a convoy off Skudesnes on 20 August without success. Coastal Command operations over the Bay of Biscay and the southern North Sea had been much reduced by late August 1944 and, on 1 September, 235 and 248 Mosquito squadrons and 144 and 404 Beaufighter squadrons formed a new Strike Wing at Banff for anti-shipping operations off Norway. The Banff Wing, in September the sole strike force in 18 Group, was responsible for the coast o f south-west Norway from Kristiansand South to Aalesund, but, the only reconnaissance aircraft available were from the 333 (Norwegian) Squadron Mosquito flight at Leuchars. As the AHB narrative states; These were quite invaluable as the pilots knew well the maze o f ^ords and islets which made the lo­ cation o f shipping so difficult along this indented and precipitous coastline. They were consequently almost worked o ff their feet and it was largely through their daily flights that any strike action could be planned.1®' Submarines, carrier-based aircraft and 16 and 18 Groups, Coastal Command, carried out the following effective attacks off south-west Norway in September 1944 (naval attacks in blue); '81 AIR 41 74 p. 117. 267 North Western Approaches "bate Vessel F lag l Sunk (tons) | Darn’d (tons) Sqdn/Ship Position 8 /9 Coaster He»g/o Du 195 236, 254, 455, SW Norway J _______________......................... 48911/9 'Floating Dock Ger Bergen SS Kong Oscar II Nor 941 Bergen SS Sien Nor 1464 X-24 Bergen M426 Ge 750 236,254, 455, Off Kristian­ M462 Ge 750 489 sand South Coaster Vang Nor 678 Venturer Off Lister ^ 12/9 VPS307 1 Ge 260 Aircraft from Off Stadlandet VP3103 Ge 260 Furious and VP5105 Ge 260 Tmmpeter SS Ostland Ge 5^74^ Ï4 /9 VP1608 Ge 144, 404, 235, Off Kristian­ MV Iris Ge 3,323 1 248 sand South 19/9 MV lynx Nor 1,367 1 144, 404, 235 Sognefjord MV Tyrifford Nor 3,080 i 20/9 Coaster Ve/a Nor 1,184 Sceptre Off Egersund L __________ M132 Ge L 685 Sceptre} 21/9 Coaster Vangsnes Nor 191 r 144,404, 235, Off Lister Coaster Vygia Nor 104 2481 Fishing vessel Nor 75 i 1 24/9 NB02 1“ Ge 168 1 ^ : Hjeltfjord ! Coaster Storesund Nor 563i1 Tanker Kjiute Nelson Nor 5,749 Minefield laid Egeroyi MV C/dtv Hugo Stinnes I Ge 5,295 by ! UJ1106 Ge 447 Rjéis I UJ1715 Ge 489 J 28/9 NK02 Ge 80 248 1 Off Kristian- _ ____________________________ ; .................... _ i sand Southj Total 17 ships 7 Ships r 1 (19,942 tons) (11,649 tons) To sink 11 ships totalling just 7,024 tons Coastal Command aircraft had flown 443 sorties during September with 154 aircraft actually carrying out attacks. The kill rate was poor but, aside from inexperienced aircrew, a serious problem to beset Strike Wing operations off Norway in 1943 and 1944 was assembling a large formation o f aircraft at a precise location after the long flight across the North Sea, particularly as anti-shipping strikes were gener­ ally carried out at either first or last light. German convoys were generally small but power­ fully escorted, and were increasingly passing vulnerable stretches o f coastline in the dark and taking refuge in secluded fjord anchorages during the day. Squadrons in training at RAF Drem in East Lothian had developed the DREM attack, a variation on the Pathfinder tactic used by Bomber Command in which, just before dawn, a rendezvous over the target area would be illuminated by flares. Another critical problem for Coastal Command off southern Norway was the total absence in 1943 and early 1944, o f fighter escort. There were only three short stretches where German convoys had to cross open water outside The Leads, thus exposing themselves to attack, the most profitable o f these being between Stavanger and The Naze. Not surpris­ ingly, this too was where Luftwaffe fighter strength was concentrated. Beaufighters could 182 Ibid. pp. 118 and 125. 268 North Western Approaches not be sent unescorted against single-engined fighters such as ME109s and FWT90s unless the 333 Squadron Mosquitoes on reconnaissance reported cloud cover in which the strike aircraft could hide. On 12 December 1943, for example, 110,000 tons o f German shipping was known to be at sea between Haugesund and Kristiansand South, and Beaufighters were available at Wick and Leuchars but, as there was no cloud cover, no attack could be made. Representations were made to Fighter Command for the allocation o f Spitfire Vs and Mustangs with long range tanks, but just 28 fighter sorties were flown in support of 443 strike sorties off Norway in September 1944. Pitifully few fighters were made available until early 1945 and this resulted in a high loss rate among 18 Group strike aircraft.^®^ The first DREM operation began at 0417/9 October when a Warwick o f 281 ASR Squadron took off from Banff. At 0610/9 this aircraft dropped seven flares, 17 flame floats and 50 drift lights in a three-mile radius circle o ff Skudesnesfjord. Meanwhile, eight 404 Squadron Beaufighters, ten 144 Squadron Beaufighters and eight cannon-armed Mosquitoes o f 235 Squadron had left Banff between 0456/9 and 0529/9 and they formed up on the flares at 0630/9. As dawn broke the Wing wavehopped south for 30 minutes, then sighted a convoy o f five merchantmen and six escorts off Egersund. While three Mosquitoes circled over­ head as fighter cover, cannon-armed Mosquites and Beaufighters attacked the escorts and merchantmen, then rocket armed Beaufighters took on the leading escorts and merchant­ men and finally four Torbeaus attacked the two largest merchantmen. Despite intense flak, the strike was over and all aircraft were on course for Banff in under five minutes. Rudolf Oldendorff (1,953T) and the escort UJ1711 (485T) were sunk and Sarp (1,116T) was seri­ ously damaged. After the action, Coastal Command noted that; ...it will be seen that the continual thought, training and exercise tliat had been given to Wing opera­ tions since early in 1944 had not altered the basic conception which was to smother, put off aim or otherwise neutralize the intense flak put up from a convoy by a first wave o f cannon fire followed immediately by SP so as to allow the torpedo carriers a relatively unmolested run in. In narrow fjords or other places where torpedoes could not be used, RP was the main weapon and the cannon ele­ ment was increased so as to blast a temporary respite in which carefiiUy aimed shallow RP attacks could be made. Each element had to be timed to the split second... Thus Coastal Command, and the Banff Strike Wing in particular, maintained its anti­ shipping strikes off Norway until the end of the war. And, as evidence o f greater coopera­ tion between forces operating from Scotland, Coastal Command had also begun mining The Leads to force enemy shipping out into open water where they could be attacked by submarines and MTBs. Meanwhile, its involvement in D Day at an end, the Norwegian 54‘^ MTB Flotilla had returned to Lerwick at the end o f September 1944 and recommenced operations a week later. By January 1945 Admiralty Intelligence summaries were conclud­ ing that, ‘Increased alarm on account o f MTB attacks,’ had led to convoys being sailed with 183 AIR 41 48 p. 282. 269 North Western Approaches stronger escorts. But air attack by day was still considered a greater threat to the convoys than MTB attack. On 8 October, 712 and 722 drove the coaster Freikoll (236T) ashore near Floro.i®' ^ On 1 November 712 and 709 sank the patrol boats 1^-5525 and V-5531 in Sognefjord. 688 and 627 attacked a convoy in Sognefjord on 13 November, but the two merchantmen evaded the torpedoes. One escort, UJ-1430, was hit and the other two were engaged in a fire- fight.i®5 On 27 November 713 and 623 unsuccessfully attacked patrol boats off Sognefjord and 7 /7 sank the Welheim (5,455) bound Bergen for A a l e s u n d .653 and 7 /7 crossed to Norway on 6 December and, at about midnight, sank the DitmarKoel (4,479T) in Korsfjor- den.i^^ Three pairs o f MTBs sailed Lerwick on 23 December, 722 and 712 sinking the minesweeper M-489 in Bommlofjord then shelling a coastwatching station nearby and 7 /7 and 627 sinking the small tanker Buvi off F r o s j o e n . ^ s s On 6 January, 722 sank the Dora RAVNEN TRACK OF OWN FORCE;----- TRACK OF ENEMY APPENDIX 1 M T » 7Vf ■ MT# S’!* ENGELEN2329^ t iws/ao-osoo/jiNVO, '4 , » , BREMSNES 0" ^ HENDO fig. 8 9 The track chart for Operation VP79 described overleaf shows a classic ‘lurking’ operation in which the two MTBs ran in through the Leads to wait, in this case for two hours at Ekilso, then dash out at high speed to attack enemy shipping before escaping by another narrow channel. 184 Rohwer and Hummelchen : 1974 p. 446. 185 Ibid. 186 Reynolds : 1998 p. 110. Witthoft : 1971. p.361. Irvine : 1988 p. 143. Rohwer and Hummelchen : 1974 p. 468 187 Reynolds : 1998 p. 111-112. Irvine : 1988 p. 143. Rohwer and Hummelchen : 1974 p. 473 188 Rohwer and Hummelchen : 1974 p. 475, Reynolds : 1998 p. 113. 270 North Western Approaches Ffitf(en (6 8 8 8 T) with her cargo o f iron ore and 709 damaged the Nikolaifleet (5,158T). This convoy was attacked again off Sognefjord early on 9 January and Nikolaifleet and Viola (991T), both ore carriers, were sunkd*^ On the evening o f 31 January, 717 and 715 missed M381 but sank M-382 south o f Trondheim (see chart on previous page). M-381 was sunk when 717 returned to the area twelve days later^^o 7/7, 715 and 711 were lurking west of Karmoy on 12 March when a convoy appeared and 711 sank the 5,000 ton liner Early on 30 March two German patrol vessels were shelled in Bommelofjord by 7 /7 and 716. VP-5532 was hit repeatedly and driven ashore, the other was damaged but escaped. As they withdrew, the MTBs shelled a coastwatching post on Slottero.^^^ \K7ith the end o f the war clearly imminent, 711, 723, 713 and 719 left Lerwick early on 25 April. Enemy movements by this time were almost non-existent, so 713 and 719 sighted nothing. On 26 April, however, 711 and 723 were west o f Karmoy when a U boat surfaced close by. Both boats fired torpedoes, but missed, then the MTBs opened fire and and 711 dropped four depth charges, badly damaging the U boat which was last seen limping towards the shore and on fire. The MTBs left when a German patrol boat appeared and U-637 hmped into S t a v a n g e r . F in a l s u b m a r in e p a t r o l s On 14 October, Viking sank the Standard (1,286T) near Bodo. At 2233/21 October, Sceptre attacked a large convoy off Lister, sinking the escort U /- /111 (510T). Venturer sailed Dun­ dee on 2 November to patrol o ff Andoy and carry out Operation HANGMAN, the landing o f stores for SOE’s coastwatching service. She was submerged off Andoy at 0839A/11 when the OOW sighted a U boat conning tower. Lieutenant Launders fired four torpedoes at 0845A/11 and, 90 seconds later, there was a loud explosion followed by breaking-up noises and a smaller explosion as the U boat’s batteries exploded. Venturer \\iiA sunk U-771 which had sailed Hammerfest on 14 October to attack JW61, but without success. All 51 aboard the U boat were lost. HANGMAN was carried out that night and Venturer returned to Lerwick on 24 November and Dundee on 26 November. Venturer and PMhis sailed Dundee on 13 December, Venturer for an uneventful patrol o ff Egersund between 18 and 26 December, and Pathis to lay mines o ff Stavanger. During the minelay she had to dodge a convoy o f barges which passed about a cable astern o f her, but, on 21 December, a convoy consisting o f five merchantmen, one U boat and six escorts 189 Witthoft: 1971 p. 313. i®8 Reynolds : 1998 p. 115. 191 ADM 199 997. 192 Ibid. Reynolds : 1998 p. 116-117. 193 Wynn : 1998. ADM 199 997. Reynolds : 1998 p. 117. 271 North Western Approaches 3k— H F in « m S E A fJA /iworv/opojrw fig. 90 Detail from Venturer's track chart covering the sinking of L/-77 / and Operation HANGMAN steamed into the minefield. The escorts UJ-1113 (830T), UJ-1116 (830T), the minesweeper K-402 (1271} and the supply ship V^eichselland (5,1901} were all sunk.^ '^* Utsira sailed Dundee on 6 January 1945 and sank the patrol vessel 1^-6408 off Namsos on the 16*h.i95 attacked three ships and four escorts off Skudesnes at 2342/22 Janu­ ary, sinking the Stockholm (6181}. And, on 9 February, it was Venturer carried out one o f the most noteworthy submarine attacks o f the war, the only known occasion when a submerged submarine has sunk another submerged boat. Faint but increasing HE was heard from 0932/9 then a periscope was sighted on the hydrophone bearing and course was altered to intercept. The periscope was sighted again at 1115/9. The U boat was plot­ ted by Asdic and Lieutenant Launders was assisted by a generous view of its periscope at 1122/9. At 1212/9, Launders brought Venturer onto a firing course and fired four torpe- Rubis secured Dundee on 24/12/44. On her return Rubis was in urgent need o f a complete refit, but she was not taken in hand as the refit would take at least six mondas. 9th Submarine Flotilla Monthly Letter dated 4 February 1945 (from RN Submarine Museum). ADM 234 380. Rohwer : 1997. Rohwer and Hummelchen : 1974 p. 486. 272 North Western Approaches does set to run at 40 feet. Two minutes later U-864 exploded and sank in 6046N 0435E with all 73 hands. Venturer surfaced and found a large patch of oil and wreckage. Utsira sailed Lerwick on 29 March 1945 for patrol off Frohavet. On the morning o f 5 April Lieutenant Val­ vatne tried to attack a tanker but could not get close. That evening, off Folia, he attacked a four-ship convoy escorted by 10 armed trawlers and sank Torridal (1,381T). Utsira broke surface on firing due to a faulty vent but a counter attack by the escorts did no damage. Once again, it was becoming dangerous to operate close inshore patrols off Norway due to the limited dark hours. On this patrol, which ended when Utsira returned to Lerwick on 16 April, 75% of her time in the danger area was spent submerged.^^^ At 0730/11 April, detected a U boat off Bergen and, at 0753/11, Lieutenant Rox­ burgh fired a salvo of eight torpedoes. Two minutes later an explosion was heard and Rox­ burgh saw the U boat hit amidships. A column of brown smoke rose 500 feet and, from the unexpectedly large explosion, Roxburgh considered that he must have hit some high- explosive in the U boat. Tapir hsid destroyed U-486d^^ 7 apfr was relieved by Venturer on 14 April 1945 and, amid rumours that Printi Uugen was about to make a dash for northern wa­ ters, Venturer and Vame were ordered to patrol Egersund and Lister respectively and other submarines were brought to short notice for sea. But nothing materiaUsed and Venturer, by then the last Alhed submarine off Norway, was recalled on 25 April. O p e r a t io n s in N o r t h e r n W a t e r s in R e t r o s p e c t Prior to the German invasion o f Norway and Denmark in April 1940, the Royal Navy op­ erating from the Clyde, Scapa and Rosyth was principally concerned with blockading the northern exit to the North Sea and thus protecting the Atlantic convoys from German sur­ face warships and raiders, then still seen as a greater threat than U boats. From mid-1940, and with the Atlantic hfehne under growing U boat threat and Western Approaches Com­ mand placing increasing emphasis on anti-submarine warfare, the Scottish-based surface ADM 199 1813. ADM 234 380. Jones : 1986 p. 187-197. Information from ex-Leading Stoker Albert Hamilton. ADM 199 1852. 9* Submarine Flotilla Monthly Letters dated 4 April and 4 May 1945. ADM 234 380. Jones : 1986 pp. 211-215. Wynn ; 1997. ADM 234 380. 9* Submarine Flotilla Monthly Letter (from RN Submarine Museum). 273 North Western Approaches ships and submarines of the Home Fleet were principally concerned in the containment o f enemy capital ships based in Norway. This commitment became all the more vital once the Arctic convoy route opened late in 1941, the Arctic convoys themselves being a Home Fleet responsibility quite distinct from the Atlantic convoys for which Western Approaches was responsible. O f the 40 outbound PQ and JW convoys that sailed to the Soviet Union, 27 (67%) sailed from either Scapa Flow, the Clyde or Loch Ewe and o f the 37 inbound QP and RA convoys, 27 (73%) sailed to Scotland. In terms o f actual numbers o f merchant ships sailed, 646 sailed from Scotland (77% of the total) and 592 returned (80% of the total). Most o f the PQ /Q P cycles were principally to and from Iceland and these convoys were heavily dependent on feeder con­ voys to and from Scotland, in particular Loch Ewe. That the percentage o f the total num­ ber of ships sailed appears disproprtionately high reflects the fact that the larger JW /RA convoys sailed almost exclusively to and from Scotland.^oo At least in the early days, when the Royal Navy was at its weakest, the Germans were able to bring such a potent threat to bear in the Arctic, both in terms o f surface ships, U boats and air power. Yet their performance was notably poor, their strategy was ill-considered and their command structure disjointed, thus they failed to break this strategically impor­ tant and highly symbolic supply route. The winter ore trade from Sweden via Narvik that had so exercised Churchill’s Admiralty in 1939-40 continued to be a factor in naval strategy in northern waters, as did other coastal traffic off Norway. But, with the writing on the wall for Germany following the Axis defeat at Stalingrad and with American pressure on Stockholm growing, it was an­ nounced on 23 September 1943 that ore exports would be reduced from 10 million tons in 1943 to 7 milhon tons in 1944 and that ball-bearing exports would be cut from 45 million kronor to 21 million kronor .201 Also passing along the convoy route through the Norwe­ gian Leads were supply and reinforcement convoys for German garrison troops, for the Kriegsmarine units in the northern fjords, for the Luftwaffe in northern Norway and for the Wehrmacht fighting the Red Army in the far north. Until 1943, alhed attacks on this traffic were necessrily hmited by either a lack o f assets in theatre, or by the primary need to contain enemy heavy naval units. But from late 1943 onwards, with the formation o f the Coastal Command Strike Wings, the start o f MTB op- erstions off Norway and the release o f submarines and carrier groups which had been principally concerned in fighting through the Arctic convoys, sinkings on the coastal route 200 Schofield : 1977. Browning : 1996. Campbell & McIntyre : 1958. Rohwer : 1999. Smith : 1975. Various ADM series files. 274 North Western Approaches off Norway increased dramatically. Between June 1940 and May 1941 just 12 vessels in convoy totalling 16,434 tons had been sunk off Norway and two had been damaged, all of them either by submarine-laid mine or by submarine torpedo. The picture for June 1944 to May 1945, as seen in the chart below, is radically different and shows clearly how, off Norway as elsewhere along the enemy-held coasthne, the RAF had become the most effec­ tive ship-killers. Non U-boat sinkings ( 144 vessels) by Allied forces off Norway June 1944 - May 1945 as tonnage by cause Surface Vessels' 10% fig. 92 Submarines 9% O f 144 ships totalling 307,125 tons known to have been sunk on the Norwegian coastal route in the last year o f the war, 93 were the result o f attacks by Scottish-based Coastal Command aircraft of, 24 were sunk by carrier-based aircraft of the Home Fleet operating from Scapa Flow, 14 were sunk by MTBs operating from Lerwick and 13 were sunk by submarines based on the Clyde and at Dundee. In addition, 58 ships totalling 162,844 tons were seriously damaged, 47 o f them in air at­ tacks. A chart of total effective attacks on ships in convoy in the 1944-45 period, demon­ strating a steadily rising monthly trend, is given overleaf. In the case of Norway, it must be stressed that the German garrison, Luftwaffe and Kreigsmarine were all entirely dependent on coastwise shipping, road and raü communica­ tions being poor or non-existent. Thus, with the possible exception of the seaborne supply effort mounted to support Axis forces in North Africa in 1941-43, the Norwegian convoys remained the largest single commitment o f Axis merchant shipping. And in the June 1940 to May 1941 period period, not one U boat had been sunk off Nor­ way. But in the June 1944 to May 1945 period some 14 were sunk, six by Coastal Com­ mand, four in a Bomber Command raid on U boat pens at Bergen in October 1944, three 201 The Economic Blockade. History of the Second World War Civil Series, W. N. Medlicott. HMSO 1952-1959. 275 North Western Approaches Effective attacks on German shipping off Norway from June 1944. 25 20 IS 10 5 0 Jun-44 Jul-44 Aug-44 Sep-44 Oct-44 Nov-44 Dec-44 Jan-45 Feb-45 Mar-45 Apr-45 May-45 I Sunk Damaged ‘Linear (Sunk) ‘Linear (Damaged) fig. 93 by Allied submarines and one by carrier aircraft. Another three U boats were seriously damaged, two by Coastal Command and one by MTB. All o f the Allied forces concerned were operating from Scotland. Further adding to Axis difficulties were seaborne special operations mounted from Scot­ land by SOE and MI6 against shipping, harbours and coastal installations in Norway. While these were generally on a small scale, they added considerably to the overall impres­ sion given by Combined Operations and strategic deception operations described in Chap­ ter Five, and by larger-scale naval operations described above, that the Allies retained an interest in land operations in Norway. This played on known German paranoia about the vulnerability of Norway and helped to ensure that a large garrison was maintained there. And, even had the German High Command accepted that Norway was, from 1944 on, a strategic side-show, attempts to transfer the 350,000 troops found there in 1945 to the eastern front or western Europe would have been rendered all but impossible by the qual­ ity of Allied intelligence and their consequent ability to deploy naval and air assets against shipping off Norway to good effect. By and large, from late 1942 onwards, Allied maritime operations in northern waters were intelligently handled and strategically effective. But this has to be set against the fact that Axis naval and air operations in the same theatre were ineptly managed from the outset, not least because o f the irreconcilable strategic imperatives that arose out o f Hitler's deci­ sion to invade the Soviet Union without first knocking Britain and her Royal Navy out of the war. At the time in 1941-1942 when the Axis were in the ascendancy and should have, for example, broken the Arctic supply route to the Soviet Union, they did not. The loss of the Arctic route would not have brought about the defeat of the Soviet Union, but it 276 North Western Approaches would have had major political and symboHc consequences and prolonged the war, so the German failure here was serious. The aptly named Operation JUDGEMENT on 4 and 5 May 1945 was the last Home Fleet op­ eration of the war. Norfolk (Vice-Admiral Rhoderick McGrigor), Searcher, Queen. Trumpeter, Diadem, Opportune, Zambesi, Carysfort, Scourge and Savage sailed Rosyth on I May to strike at the U-boat Arctic flotilla base at Kilbotn near Harstadt in Vestfjord. Twenty-eight Wildcats and 17 Avengers attacked the depot ship Black Watch (5,035T) and U-711 (Kapitanleutnant Hans-Günther Lange) lying alongside. Both were sunk as above. A tanker was also claimed as sunk and an AA ship damaged for the loss of two aircraft. Type VIIC U-711 was the last U boat sunk by the Fleet Air Arm in the war; 32 of her crew died and 11 survived. 277 North Western Approaches Chapter Seven A p p a r e n t l y T h e W a r I s O v e r On 5 May 1945 Spitfires o f 603 Squadron staged an early victory fly-past over Edinburgh. The German surrender was signed at SHAEF HQ, Reims, at 0241/7 May and that after­ noon the squadron ORB records laconically, ‘Apparently the war is over.’^ That evening, as victory bonfires were ht and celebrations began, and as described in Chapter Four, V-2336 sank the Avondale Park and Sneland 1 in the Forth. On 8 May Swedish radio reported that A hied envoys had reached Oslo and, on 10 May, in accordance with the Reims surrender terms, Kapitanleutnant Kruger’s party flew into Drem with charts o f German minefields, swept channels into Norwegian ports and U-boat dispositions. The last outbound Arctic convoy, JW67, sailed the Clyde on 12 May still under war condi­ tions in case there was a U boat commander keen to fight. U-boats in the North Atlantic and northern North Sea had been ordered to surface, fly a black flag and take one of two routes into Loch EriboU so as to arrive between sunrise and three hours before sunset.^ On 9 May, a surfaced U-boat not showing a black flag was attacked west of Shetland. lJ-2326 had unsuccessfully attacked a convoy off Arbroath late on 23 April, returned to Stavanger for reloads, then sailed again on 4 May to patrol off the Forth. She received the surrender order at 2115/9 but, understandably keen to reach home, Oberleutnant Jobst ignored the order to proceed to Loch EriboU and set course north to Peter­ head, then east for Kiel. Two aircraft passed over and, on both occasions, Jobst pretended he could not read their signals. Finally, at 1030/12, a 206 Squadron Liberator dropped a bomb alongside and, from 60 miles off the Danish coast, the abruptly compliant Jobst was told to steer west and was escorted into Dundee at 0930/14.3 Fur- ê U-2326 at Dundee > AIR 27 2080. 2 Ibid. 3 ADM 199 139. ADM 1 17761. 278 North Western Approaches ther north, on 16 May, the Norwegian destroyer Stord on passage to Narvik met a convoy of 15 U-boats heading down Vestfjord to a rendezvous with EG9 which had detached from JW67 to escort them to Loch EriboU. On 11 May, Crown Prince O laf and Norwegian Government Ministers sailed Rosyth in the minelayer Ariadne and reached Oslo two days later. General Andrew Thorne wrote; Everyone who had a boat or could get into someone else's did so and came out to cheer him and the squadron. The only one who didn't appreciate it was the German naval officer pilot who came on board off lista Lighthouse. It must have been very humiliating for his feelings to see the real joy and gladness in the faces o f the people.^ The Norwegian Brigade reached Tromso on 26 May to take control o f north Norway where Soviet troops were proving difficult to dislodge from territory they had taken from the Wehrmacht. British warships and American troops were sent to the area and the Sovi­ ets withdrew. New battle-Unes were being drawn.^ Sy n t h e s is This thesis set out to consider aspects o f Scotland’s operational role in the Second World War at sea, and this on the basis that maritime and Scottish historians aUke had, hitherto, been neglectful of this period in Scotland’s past. But some might argue that the lack o f in­ terest shown by historians is down to Uttle o f consequence having happened in or around Scotland, or involving forces based in Scotland, so let us first consider the evidence, cohe­ sively studied in this thesis for the first time, that proves otherwise. In analysing Scotland’s role, some might advocate counter-factual scenarios to imagine how things might have turned out had circumstances been different. And it is true that such debate can occasionaUy help recapture the uncertainties that surround military deci­ sion making. But this process generally involves speculation about an individual’s or a group’s thought processes, so counter-factuals are often flawed, if not actually inane, and, as H. P. WiUmott writes in characteristically blunt fashion: There are some historians who, it would seem, cannot put pen to paper without subtracting from the sum o f human knowledge. I have always experienced too many difficulties trying to understand what did happen to worry myself about imaginary scenarios.^ So these concluding remarks will confine themselves to the facts and let the evidence speak for itself. 4 U boat surrenders at Loch EriboU, Scapa Flow and Kyle o f Lochalsh included U-244, U-255, U-293, U-516, U-668, 0-716, 0-764, 0-802, 0-826, 0-956, 0-997, 0-1009, 0-1010, 0-1058, 0-1105, 0-1109, LT-/i(?5. ADM 199 2056. 5 One o£ Ariadne’s escorts was the cruiser Devonshire which had brought King Haakon, his family and much o f his gov­ ernment out o f Norway to Scotland in 1940. On 5 June 1945 Devonshire escorted Flaakon into Oslo aboard the cruiser Norfolk, Scotsman 14 May 1945. Roskill : 1961 pp. 263-264. See also Russell ; 1987. <5 Ibid. 7 WiUmott in Battle of The Atlantic 1939A5 — Anniversary International Naval Conference Howarth & Law (eds) 1994 Ch. 9 The Organisations, The Admiralty and the Western Approaches. 279 North Western Approaches At the outset, ftom its strategically vital position controlling the northern passages, Scot­ land played a principal role in the ‘blockade’ o f Germany as Chamberlain’s policy o f ap­ peasement was translated into military strategy. While the English Channel might easily be closed, Scotland’s naval bases at Rosyth, Scapa Flow, Loch Ewe and in the Clyde were all heavily involved in the effort to shut off the northern passages to German warships and merchantmen. The Northern Mine Barrage was footed on Scotland and air patrols in sup­ port of the blockade were mounted from Scottish air bases at Leuchars, Invergordon, Hat­ ton and Oban. Fundamentally flawed the blockade may have been, but it was only possible to conduct this strategy from Scottish bases. The Royal Navy’s Home Fleet based at Scapa Flow and Rosyth on the outbreak o f war was ill-equipped to meet the challenges o f a new trade war in the Atlantic, the protection o f the Empire and the containment o f a modern, albeit small, enemy surface fleet. Having spent the inter-war years as a pawn in the greater game of politicians seeking unworkable disar­ mament treaties and under constant pressure from the Treasury, the assets needed to fight a trade war simply did not exist. However, while the Battle o f the Atlantic, reduced to its barest essentials, was a tonnage war, it was never quite the near run thing described by some. The late winter o f 1940-41, when virtually all shipping making for British ports was funnel- ing through the North Channel, was the only critical period when the Kreigsmarine and Luftwaffe could have forced the issue on the North Atlantic supply route. While the Kreigsmarine may have regarded the Atlantic battle as war-decisive, the eyes o f Hitler and the German high command were fixed on the east and Operation BARBAROSSA. The loss o f Graf Spee, Blucher and Bismarck by mid-1941, the damaging o f other ships and the non- appearance o f its planned aircraft carriers, all but ended the Kreigsmarine’s ambitions for an Atlantic strategy involving capital ships. And Donitz started the war with a pitifully small force o f U-boats, too few for the sustained effort necessary to put a stranglehold on the North Western Approaches. Further, Luftwaffe cooperation was negligible when it was needed most, a portent o f Axis failures in northern waters later in the war. Thus, in the winter of 1940-41, while the maritime war was principally being played out off Scotland, and largely on the Allied side by naval and ait forces operating from Scotland, the Royal Navy managed not to lose the battle but the Kriegsmarine neglected to win it. From mid-1941, the combined effects o f British technological advances and cryptanalytical success. Allied shipbuilding capacity and improved ship management along with the in­ creased availability of escort vessels and aircraft manned by properly trained crews and the growing support o f the United States ensured that the U-boats never stood a chance. Scot­ tish-based naval and seaborne commando units played a leading role in the securing of 280 North Western Approaches Enigma encypherment machine intelligence that played a vital role in beating the U boats from 1941 onwards. But the winter o f 1940-41 had demonstrated the inadequacy o f British counter-measures to meet the U boat threat and one o f the Scotland’s principal contribu­ tions to Allied victory in the trade war came from the Western Approaches escort group sea training establishments at Tobermory and Stornoway, along with the anti-submarine training schools on the Clyde, in particular at Campbeltown, Some 1,139 escort vessel crews worked up at Tobermory alone and, without in any way belittling the training work o f the Western Approaches Tactical Unit at Liverpool and sea training establishments elsewhere modelled on Tobermory, the sea training o f so many escort vessels was a unique and ultimately vital Scottish achievement. Then, from mid 1942, Coastal Command long- range aircraft operating from Scotland played a key role in closing the Atlantic Gap and the final defeat of the U boats. Scotland’s other major involvement in the maritime trade war lay in the contribution o f the port complex and shipbuilding yards on the Clyde. The port of Glasgow and the other fa­ cilities on the river formed one o f two principal eastern termini for the Atlantic supply chain, Liverpool and the Mersey being the other. The ability of the Clyde to absorb steadily increasing volumes o f traffic was essential to the Allied cause, as was the success o f Scot­ tish-based sea and air forces in fighting the coastal convoys around the north of Scotland to east coast ports reopened in late 1940. The securing o f the trade route, the increasing commitment o f the United States once Lend-Lease passed in March 1941 and the entry of the Soviet Union into the war that June meant that, from the middle o f that year, British military power could again be projected around the world, albeit in a small way at first. Following defeat in Scandinavia and France in 1940, it was to Scotland, and, in particular the Clyde, that the Royal Navy, Army and RAF turned to develop the inter-service coop­ eration and amphibious warfare capability that would be central to future operations. And it was from the Clyde that amphibious expeditions reached out to Scandinavia, Africa, the Indian Ocean and the Middle East during 1941 and 1942. Further, troops prepared on the Clyde for other significant operations at, for example, Bruneval, St Nazaire and Dieppe. Then, at the end of 1942, the first large-scale AUied invasion force trained in Scotland and sailed from the Clyde to North Africa. The TORCH force was followed out o f the Clyde in 1943 by a substantial element o f the Sicily invasion force, and it was amphibious warfare techniques developed on the Clyde that were to see Allied land forces successfully ashore in every theatre of war, most notably Normandy. In northern waters, AUied warships and submarines operating from Scottish bases, princi- paUy Scapa Flow, Loch Ewe, the Clyde and Dundee, were ultimately able to secure the Arctic convoy route to the Soviet Union against Axis heavy naval units, U boats and the 281 North Western Approaches Luftwaffe. Hugely costly, Dudley Pound’s ‘most unsound operation’ was nevertheless a pohtical imperative entirely justified in that it cemented a thoroughly shaky coahtion with, when it was conceived, Britain’s only confirmed ally. The vast majority o f sailings for the Soviet Union departed from Scotland, mainly from Loch Ewe and the Clyde. And, while Bismarck, Tirpitt( ^and their consorts exercised a powerful influence on Allied maritime strat­ egy in the north, on occasion with tragic consequences, it is one of the ironies o f war that they also probably saved a considerable portion o f the Royal Navy from the same fate as befell Prince of Wales and Pjipulse. The bleak expanse of Loch Ewe was the starting point for most Arctic convoys about which, on 18 April 1942, First Sea Lord Admiral Dudley Pound wrote that. The whole thing is a most un­ sound operation with the dice loaded against us in every direction.’ But the need to get these convoys through dictated much Allied naval strategy both in northern waters and elsewhere. And it is at least arguable that the Kriegsmarine did the Allies in general, and the Royal Navy in par­ ticular, a considerable favour by maintaining their capital ship threat in northern waters. Had this not been so, it is highly likely that Churchill would have forced the Admiralty to strip the Home Fleet for the Pacific in late 1941, and there is no reason to assume that, with little or no air cover, they would have fared any better than Repulse and Prince o f Wales. The Kreigsmarine could avoid the costly development of an amphibious capabihty and air­ craft carriers, but the Scandinavian theatre was the one place where it remained vital for them to maintain an effective surface-ship trade protection capability. Yet from 1941 on­ wards, and especially from 1943, Allied naval and air forces operating from Scotland con­ ducted an increasingly effective offensive against Axis merchant shipping off Norway. This greatly hampered German land, sea and air operations in the Scandinavian theatre. It also slowed the passage of ore supplies to Germany from Sweden, not least because, by late 1944, German convoys off Norway were unable to move in daylight for fear o f attack. Then, as the war drew to a close, Scottish-based Allied naval operations off Norway, along with deception schemes aimed at that country from Scotland, helped to ensure that some 350,000 Axis troops were still there in May 1945, not having played a role in the main European battlefield. While this may not have materially affected the outcome, or 282 North Western Approaches perhaps even the length o f the war, it certainly reduced the casualty rate on both sides A And more importantly in the longer term, the inability of the Wehrmacht to draw down reinforcements from Norway through Denmark allowed Montgomery’s 2T ‘ Army Group to race north from the Elbe to Wismar on the Baltic in just two days at the beginning of May 1945, thus forestalling by a matter o f hours a Red Army occupation o f Schleswig Hol­ stein and Denmark. We have already discussed in the introduction to this thesis the paucity o f academic study and published material on the subject o f Scotland’s wartime experience. So why then, with all this evidence o f Scotland’s key role in maritime events during the Second World War, have historians shown hitherto so little interest in this and the wider study o f Scotland’s wartime experience? A n d T h e F u t u r e . .. This thesis has demonstrated that Scotland played a pivotal role in maritime operations throughout the Second World War, but this first study of just one aspect of Scotland’s wartime history must not be the last. And one o f the most frustrating aspects o f this study has been the vast amount o f excellent material that has had to be left out. I first began re­ searching this subject ten years ago, in 1990, when the history o f wartime Britain was still heavily larded with mawkish sentimentalism, in no small measure the result of a tendency to believe in one’s own propaganda. Now, perhaps, is the optimal time to begin serious work on the period. Many aspects o f wartime Scotland invite further study: transport, port operations, industry, agriculture, politics, industrial relations, propaganda and the media to name but a few. A sound, film and image archive would be an attractive proposition and there is a clear need to determine what documentary resources are available, and where. This study has also highlighted other issues such as the need for a comprehensive study o f British port opera­ tions in wartime, not least in respect o f Liverpool. But one pressing need is for a well-directed survey o f the archaeology o f the Second World War in Scotland. Some work has been done by the Royal Commission on Ancient and His­ torical Monuments, the Fortress Study Group and others, but too many wartime sites are being swept away or allowed to decay without being recorded or their importance being assessed. A prime example o f this is at Inveraray where, during the life o f this project, the wartime Wrennery at Dalchenna House was razed to the ground by Argyll Estates for quite the oddest of reasons. And, north o f Dundee, a POW camp with important wall murals has only recently been demolished. Just a few of the many other sites worthy of study are the 8 For the liberation o f Norway and the problems that arose from it, not least what to do with the 350,000 Germans, see 283 North Western Approaches Among the many important, yet ne­ glected, of Scotland’s wartime sites are the Combined Training Centres around the Clyde. Much remains to be recorded, not least the three LST hards (left) and the camp at HMS Quebec pictured from the roof of the sickbay in 1945 (below left) and the same view in 2000 (below right). The large Recreation Hall in the middle distance is a notable survivor, as are several other brick buildings. naval establishments at Rosyth, Greenock, Dundee, Lerwick, Campbeltown, Ardrishaig, Fort William and the torpedo range in Loch Long along with its associated camp site. Then there are the combined training sites at Rosneath, Dundonald, Castle Toward, Largs, Tigh- nabruaich, Lochailort and Burghead. And then there are important airfields such as Prest­ wick, Benbecula, Tiree, Wick, Lossiemouth, Banff, Drem and Turnhouse. It is just as well that Scotland’s seaward defences were never tested in anger. Two scenarios appear to have influenced planning. One was the notion that a large German invasion force could somehow be transported unseen across the North Sea to land on the east coast. The other was the equally absurd premise that Scotland would still be resisting after England had been subdued following a cross-Channel invasion. Elaborate and wholly asi­ nine plans were drawn up for the defence o f northern Glasgow in the event of the enemy having reached the south bank o f the Clyde. Few seem to have stopped to consider the harsh reality that it would all have been over long, long before the Wehrmacht reached Carter Bar, never mind Govan.^ Plans for the defence of Scotland may have bordered on the ludicrous, but they involved a large portion o f the population in, for example, the Home Guard, Glasgow’s twelve battal- Salmon (ed.) : 1995 Ch. 22 for a paper by Sir Peter Thome, the son of General Andrew Thome. 9 D-TC 8/10 83 to D-TC 8/10 86. 284 North Western Approaches ions alone mustering some 23,000 men. So this aspect of Scotland’s wartime his­ tory must also be worthy o f serious aca­ demic study. And what o f the Luftwaffe? In popular mythology, the numerous air attacks on Scotland have been reduced to the so- called Clydebank Blitz. This thesis has gone some way to redressing the balance by examining raids on shipping and coastal towns, but a study o f the full ex­ tent of aerial activity over Scotland is long overdue. & GOC Scottish Command General Andrew Thorne and officer cadets armed with fire- work-tipped arrows during an anti-invasion exercise at Musselburgh in 1941. The North Western Approaches thesis has shone new light into a neglected corner o f Scottish 20^ *^ century history. But there is a great deal still to be done. 285 North Western Approaches NORTH WESTERN APPROACHES PRIMARY SOURCES PUBLIC RECORD O FFICE , KEW , LONDON ADM Series ► 1 Admiralty Secretariat cases. 3574 Naval air stations in Scotland. Report 1942-43. 9760 SS Athenia - denial o f enemy allegations. 9847 Forth anti-submarine defences 1938-39. 9852 Organisation o f Port A, Loch Ewe. 9855 Forth anti-submarine defences following the mining o f HMS Belfast. 9858 Rosyth anti-aircraft defences 1939. 9860 Defences o f Scapa Flow. 9899 Capture o f Cap Norte by HMS Belfast. 10033 Report on sinking o f SS Athenia. 10091 Awards to crew of HMS Mohawk for 16/10/39 Forth Raid. 10141 Details from POWs taken horn ÏT-27 and 0-39. | 10237 Loss o f SS Astronomer- Admiralty Board of Enquiry. , I10252 Combined Operations Base, Inveraray - supply o f machine tools. Î —------ 1025410566 Combined Operations Base, Inveraray - pier. _______ __ ______ Loss of French destroyer Maille Brer^ e - Board o f Enquiry. 10670 Mining o f HMS Belfast 1939. 110720 Merships abandoned after air attack - danger to navigation. 1 10733 Loss o f HMS Exmouth - Board o f Enquiry. 1 10773 Loss o f HM drifter Apple Tree - Board o f Enquiry. 10775 Loss o f Salvestria - Board o f Enquiry. 10778 Loss o f Shelbrit 1 - Board o f Enquiry. 10785 Loss o f HMS Sphinx - Board o f Enquiry. 11009 Destroyer repair bases at Fort William and Oban. 11065 Commander Donald MacIntyre’s report on HX112. 11133 Attack on OB318 and the capture o f 0-110. 11138 Port War Signal Stations at Aberdeen and Dundee. 11153 Refloating o f 0-570 an passage to the UK. 11180 Loss o f Empress of Britain - Board o f Enquiry. 11215 Loss o f AMCs Tatroelus and Laurentic - Board o f Enquiry. 11275 U-570/HMS Graph. 11519 Awards to Athenia personnel. 11529 Award to Captain D. F. Harlock o f SS Helmond for t&pox\ki^AltmarMs arrival in Norway. 11542 Loss o f HMS Sturdy - Board o f Enquiry. 11588 Salvage o f Trevarrack. 11657 Awards to the crew o f San Demetrio. 11676 Passage through secret minefields, 11713 Greenock Boat Pool. 11770 RAF Typex encoding machine. 11826 Construction o f replica control room o f O-570IOMS> Graph for training boarding parties. 12310 Loss o f HM ships Milford Earl and Phineas Beard - Board of Enquiry. 12332 Awards to crew o f Superman following air attack. 12700 Trinity House light Vessels transferred to war stations. 12817 Commodore Western Isles. 12880 X Craft of 12Ü1 Flotilla. 286 North Western Approaches » 12882 Caledonian Canal - traffic flow arrangements 1940-43. 12918 Campbeltown Naval Base. 13082 Fast water boats for the Clyde. ------- 1311913217 Cape Wrath Signal Station. ______________________________________________________________ Berthing for Combined Operations vessels in Scotland. 13255 Tobermory and Stornoway. 13269 MTB bases in Shetlands. 13410 Craft for training at Loch Caimbawn. 13430 Berths iox. Queen Maty Queen Elie(abeth\a. the Clyde. 13555 Transport for Merchant Navy personndi on shore leave in Orkney. j 14981 Labour disputes at John Brown Shipbuilders. j 15090 Lifeboat crews - responsibilities in tlie event o f invasion. j 15100 Pilotage in the Firth o f Forth - Methil and Burntisland 1942-43. J 15478 Loss o f HM submarines Vandal eeaà Unfamed - Boards o f Enquiry. 15549 Rescue Tug Service. 16009 Letter to Flag Officer Greenock re Subsistence trials 1944, ------- 1615016168 Loss o f HMS Rockingham September 1944. Loss o f Empire Heritage and rescue ship Pinto - Board of Enquiry. 16464 Acquisition o f helicopters for Fleet Air Arm anti-submarine work 1942-44. 16848 U boat shelters in Norway and production o f Types XXI and XXIII - info ex secret sources. 16873 Loss o f HMS Breda - Board o f Enquiry. 16908 Mines in the Clyde - injuries during dredging operations. ------- 1712617347 Advisability o f using Greek crews - recent mutinies and unrest 1944.______ ___________________ ___ Arming o f RNLI Lifeboat crews. 17423 Royal Naval air stations in the Highlands and Islands. Post-war policy. 17608 21st Escort Group 1944-45. Bridge logs and reports to C-in-C Western Approaches. 17661 U-2326 surrendered at Dundee - interrogation o f Captain, 17668 Sinking of UA82 - information from German records. 18039 Loss o f HMS Bullen - Board o f Enquiry. 18096 HMS Iron Duke 1945. 18193 Loch Lathaich working up base. 18915 Report on sinking o£ Athenia. 19038 Derequisitioning o f Perth Ice Rink 1945. 53 109405 HMS Jetvis October 1939, 109897 HMS Nelwn December 1939. 107660 HMS Barham December 1939. 108641 HMS Fame August 1939. 116 Admiralty and Secretariat Cases. 3831 Scapa Flow Photo index. 3876 Proposals for the defence of the Scottish coast 1935-39. 4052 Yachts requisitioned. 4121 HM sliips. Auxiliaries and Allied submarine losses 1939-40. 4295 Censorship in the area north o f the Caledonian Canal. 1 4381 Operation ANKLET. 4509 Operation GRAPH - refloating HMS Graph. 4539 Greenock Memoranda. 4548 HMS Graph - model and experiments. 4591 HM Naval Base Rosneath - transfer to tlie US Navy. 4736 Torpedo research and Coastal Forces, Greenock 1941-44. 5432 Protected Areas including Inveraray 1941-45. 5790 Scapa Flow Photo Index, 178 Secretariat cases. 194 Loss o f HMS Oxley. 195 Loss o f oiler Birchol. 226 Loss o f R.J. Cullen etc. in 1942. 246 Loss o f Empress of Britain. 249 Loss o f minelayer Port Napier. 250 HMS Dundee - grave error in being abandoned too soon (pic). 186 Files on Naval Control o f Shipping, 798 Naval Operations during the Norway Campaign 1940. 799 Naval Operations in Home Waters September 1939 to April 1940. 805 Interrogations o f German Naval survivors. 806 Interrogations o f German Naval survivors. 807 Interrogations o f German Naval survivors. 287 North Western Approaches 808 Interrogations o f German Naval survivors. 809 Interrogations o f German Naval survivors. 189 Torpedo and anti-submarine school reports. 142 History o f net defence - photographs oiAmndora Star 1940. 176 Technical History o f A /S weapons. 195 85-97 Rosyth Dockyard. 2195-2326 War Diary Summaries. 199 2130-2148 1-5 Survivors reports (Merchant vessels). Convoy system introduction and organisation. 6 7 East Coast convoys - policy, routes and discipline 1939-41. East Coast convoys - assembly and routing 1939-41. 13 EN and WN convoy reports 1940-41. 14 WN convoys 1941. 15 EN and WN convoys 1940-41. 16 EN and WN convoys 1940-41. 20-40 Various convoy reports, mainly coastal, including FN, FS, OA, TM, MT etc. 43 EN and WN convoy reports 1941-42, 45 EN and WN convoy reports 1941-42. j 49 HX convoy reports 1940. j 51 HX convoy reports including HX72. 55 HX and SC convoy reports 1940-42. 59 SC convoy reports including SC ll. 66 Anti-aircraft defence o f ports and naval establishments 1939-40. 74 Enemy air attacks on HM ships and Merchant vessels. 75 Enemy air attacks on HM ships and Merchant vessels. 76 Enemy air attacks on HM ships and Merchant vessels. 77 JW and RA convoys. 80-84 British and Allied ships sunk. 92 Various convoy reports. 99 - 103 Enemy air attacks in home waters. (Photographs CN 1/32-1/34) 121 Convoy reports and attacks on U boats \J-31, U-32. (Good source) 122 Attacks on U boats U-63. 123 Attacks on U boats U-33. 126 Attacks on U boats XJ-27. 127 Attacks on U boats XJA7. 128 Attacks on U boats U-35. 139 U-2336 (sinking o i Avondale Park and Sneland 1 in May 1945). 139 Anti-U boat war - final stages 1945. 140 Loss oiA tlm ia. ------- 141 Enemy submarine attacks on merships 1939-40.142 Enemy submarine attacks on merships 1939-41. 143 Enemy submarine atUicks on merships 1939-41. 144 Enemy submarine attacks on merships 1939-41. 145 Enemy submarine attacks on mersliips 1939-41. 158 Loss o f HMS Rqyal Oak. 172 Enemy air attacks on merships 1942-43. 173 Enemy air attacks on mersliips 1942-43. 174 Enemy air attacks on merships 1942-43. 197 Anti-U boat operations 1945. 198 Anti-U boat operations 1945. 199 Anti-U boat operations 1945. 203 Anti-U boat operations 1945. 220 HM and merships - reports o f loss by mining 1939-41, 221 HM and merships - reports o f loss by mining 1941-44. 233 Operation RANKIN B (Norway). 234 Operation RANKIN B (Norway). 246 HM submarine patrol reports 1945. 247 HM submarine patrol reports 1945. 248 HM submarine patrol reports 1945-46. 249 HM submarine patrol reportsl944-45. 250 HM submarine patrol reports 1944-45. 251 Minelaying by enemy aircraft in coastal waters. 252 Minelaying by enemy aircraft in coastal waters. 270 Operations by Norwegian Coastal Forces, 1943-45. North Western Approaches 277 Submarine flotilla organisation (3rd and 7th flotillas), training, policy, patrols etc 1939-41. 278 Losses and damage to HM submarines 1939-41. 279 Submarine flotilla orj^iisation (3rd and 7th flotillas). 280 Altmark - interception and boarding. 281 Altmark ~ interception and boarding. 285 Submarine patrol reports 1939-41. 286 Submarine patrol reports 1939-41. 288 Submarine patrol reports 1939-41, 292 Submarine patrol reports 1939-41. 294 Submarine patrol reports 1939-41. 300 Submarine patrol reports 1939-41. 311 Submarine patrol reports 1939-41. 362 C-in-C Rosytli War Diary 1939. 363 C-in-C Rosytli War Diary 1940-41. (See re Norway and Forth Fhced Defences) 364 Aberdeen, Methil, Dundee War Diaries from 1/2/40. 365 Leith, Peterhead, Invergordon War Diaries from 1/2/40. 371 Western Approaches War Diary 1940. 372 Western Approaches War Diary 1940. 373 Vice Admiral Submarines War Diary 1939-40. 377 Aultbea, Stornoway, Scapa, Shetland War Diaries, 28/12/39-1940. 397 Orkney and Shetland War Diaries 1941. 400 Dundee, Admiral Submarines War Diaries 1941. 401 Rosyth, Methil, Aberdeen, Peterhead and Lerwick War Diaries 1941. 412 Peterhead, Invergordon War Diaries 1941. 418 Aberdeen, Dundee and Blyth War Diaries 1942. 419 Scotland and Northern England War Diaries 1942. 423 Western Approaches War Diary 1942. 450 Operations to enemy occupied Norway 1940-41. 482 Military Operations (Norway) 1940. 483 Military Operations (Norway) 1940. 529 Operation TORCH. 531 Naval operations off Norway 1944. i 557 Start o f series on Convoy Reports. | 614 Free French units with Royal Navy. j 627 Admiral Submarines War Diary 1943. i 631 Western Approaches War Diary 1943. | 637 Operation TORCH. | , 646 Invergordon, Orkney/Shetland, Rosyth and Glasgow War Diaries 1942. 654 Nortli Atlantic Command War Diary 1939-40. (Gibraltar; Admiral Dudley Norflij j 658 Western Approaches War Diary 1941. 659 Western Approaches War Diary 1941. 684 HX Convoy Reports. 690 Rescue Tug Service reports 1941. 730 Operation GAUNTLET - Spitsbergen 1941 - Report of Proceedings. 770 Various Home Areas War Diaries 1943. 771 Various Home Areas War Diaries 1943. 111 Losses o f British warsliips, auxiliaries and small vessels 1940-41. 844 Naval Air operations off Norway 1944. 866-71 Operation TORCH. --- - --- 807852 Polish units widi Royal Navy - administration. ' Opération TORCH. 854 Operation TORCH. 885 Home Commands memoranda etc. 899 Submarine patrol reports, various 1940-45. 904 Operation TORCH - reports and war diary. 997 Norwegian Coastal Forces, Lerwick - operations, 1945. 1050 Glasgow War Diary. 1051 Various Home Commands War Diaries. 1081 Western Approaches convoy schedules 1942. 1097 9 til Submarine Flotilla patrol reports including Rubis and Minerve. 1118 Submarine patrol reports, various 1941-42. 1120 Submarine patrol reports, various 1941-42. 1128 Attacks on U boats; U-651. 1129 Operation GRAPH and other submarine reports. --------- — —-------------- North W estern Approaches 1139 U-2326 surrender at Dundee. 1150-55 Submarine patrol reports, various 1941-42. 1167-1172 Enemy mining and minesweeping 1939-45. 1173-1176 Enemy air attacks in home waters. 1180 Enemy air attacks in home waters - coastal convoys 1941. 1181 Enemy air attacks in home waters - coastal convoys 1941. 1205 Submarine patrol reports, various 1941-42. 1237-1239 Rescue Tug service 1940-41. 1340-48 Submarine patrol reports, various 1941-42. 1391 Various Home Areas War Diaries 1944. 1392 Western Approaches War Diary 1944. j 1443 Western Approaches War Diary 1945. i 1444 Various Home Areas War Diaries 1945. 1707 Convoy HX72 Reports. 1729 HMS Western Is/es, Tobermory. 1 1793-1803 Rear Admiral Scapa (including Lyness). 1813 HMS PfAA/wpatrol reports. 1827 HMS Graph patrol reports. 1838 HMS Jg/yr patrol reports. I 1842 HMS Sterlet pntrol reports. 1846 HMS faku patrol reports. Ï851 Norwegian submarine patrol reports 1940-44 including U/a, Uredd. 1852 Norwegian submarine patrol reports 1940-44 including Ula, Uredd. 1853 Polish submarines patrol reports 1940-44. 1855 Dutch submarine patrol reports 1940-44 including Dolftjn, Zeehond. Ï856 Dutch submarine patrol reports 1940-44 including Doljyn, Zeehond. 1857 French submarine patrol reports 1940 including Antiope, Achille, Sfax. 1858 French submarine patrol reports 1940 m.àaâk^Antiope, Achille, Sfax. 1859 US submarine patrol reports 1942-43 including Barb, Blackfish, Gunnell. 1877 HMS Clyde patrol reports. 1878 FIMS Severn patrol reports. 1879 Dutch submarine patrol reports including 0-23, 0-24. 1881 Various submarine patrol reports. 1887 Loss o f Empress of Britain. 1893-1903 Rear Admiral Scapa (Lyness). 1904 Rescue tugs and Naval establishments at I'hurso and Scrabster. 1890 Midget submarine patrol reports. 1905-14 Daily state reports by Admiral Submarines. 1921 Various Dutch and US submarine patrol reports 1940-45. 1939 Daily Operations Reports 1939. 1976 Start o f series on U boat attacks on convoys. (1976 for SC3,1977 for HX79) 2030 HMS Satyr paxxdl report. 2032-56 Series on U boat incidents 1939-45. 2057 Monthly A /S warfare returns including convoy attack reports etc. (9/39-12/40) 2058 Monthly A /S warfare returns including convoy attack reports etc. (1/41-12/41) 2059 Monthly A /S warfare returns including convoy attack reports etc. (1/42-12/42) 2060 Monthly A /S warfare returns including convoy attack reports etc. (1/43-12/43) 2061 Monthly A /S warfare returns including convoy attack reports etc. (1/44-12/44) 2062 Monthly A /S warfare returns including convoy attack reports etc. (1/45-12/45) 2073 Start o f series of monthly Admiralty Trade Division Reports. 2149-2154 Rescue ships. 2158-2163 Survivors reports (Merchant vessels). 2165 Rescue tugs. 205 First Sea Lord papers. 11 Batde o f the Atlantic Committee minutes 18/4/41 - 26/7/41. 21 Special studies - convoy system ex 1939. 23 Battle of the Atlantic Committee minutes 2 /9 /41 - 30/6/42. 59 First Sea Lord Records Index, 217 ' î Western Approaches Station Records incl. rescue ships and convoy reports from 1942. 686 Residual Material on Western Approaches. 695 Residual Material on Western Approaches. 696 Residual Material on Western Approaches 223 Naval Intelligence reports 1939-47 including Ultra. 2 Information derived by the Germans from decyphered British signals. 290 North Western Approaches 15 Ultra - weekly U boat sitreps 20/12/41 - 28/6/43. | 16 Ultra - U boat appreciations and convoy battles 12/41 -11/43. ; 36 Signals connected with the sinking o f the Schamhorst, j 88 Special study - special intelligence in Battle of the Atlantic. 152 XJ-570 capture and technical surveys. 172 Ultra - weekly U boat sitreps 20 /3 /44 - 10/9/44. 234 332 Battle Summary - Norway April to June 1940. 333 Battle Summary - Norway April to June 1940. 369 Battle Summary - Arctic Convoys 1941 to 1945. 372 Naval Staff History - Home Waters and the Atlantic April 1940 to December 1941. 380 Naval Staff History - Submarines in Home, Northern and Atlantic Waters. 239 Royal Navy reference books. 150 Examination Service Traffic Regulations Scapa Flow and Kirkwall 1940-41. 162 Examination Service Traffic Regulations Clyde 1941-44. 166 Examination Service Traffic Regulations Aberdeen 1940. 167 Examination Service Traffic Regulations Firth o f Tay 1940-42. 169 Examination Service Traffic Regulations Aultbea, Loch Ewe. 170 Examination Service Traffic Regulations Buckie, Lossiemouth and Macduff. 171 Examination Service Traffic Regulations Peterhead. 172 Examination Service Traffic Regulations Lerwick. 296 Chart Z48 - Scapa Defences 1941. 297 Chart Z48 - Scapa Defences 1943. 304 Chart Z46 - North Sea minefields. 350 Lessons learned from Dieppe operation. 358 U -S70/H m Graph. 1 AIR Senes 2 2720 Typex coding machine - offer to RN. | 10 4038 Air Stations in the UK. j 4039 Air Stations in tlie UK. j 15 Coastal Command. j 171 Intelligence report on Ï/KG40 Condor operations in NW Approaches. j 178 Convoy protection in Western Approaches 7/40-9/41. 184 Proposed Area Combined HQ, Orkney, 5/40-8/40. 185 Division o f Western Approaches into two commands. 186 A /S operations — Air co-operation widi Admiral commanding Orkney and Shetland 1/40-11/40. 202 Operation DUCK - bombardment o f Stavanger Sola airfield 4/40. 205-209 Operations to Norway 1940. 320 STARFISH policy. 413 Landing o f enemy aircraft at Dyce 5/43-7/43. ^ 656 Training exercises with HM ships from Tobermory 5/42. 670 Flying boat bases in Shedand 11/38-8/40. ------- 676682 Air-Sea Rescue 8/40-7/44. Operations Room at SuHom Voe — photos taken 2/46. 694-701 RAF Tiree diary and log 12/40 — 9/45. 16 Fighter Command. 127 Defence o f die Firth o f Forth 7/39-11/39. ------- 128150“ Defence o f die Firth o f Forth 10/39- 4/40. Scapa Flow Defences — policy 11/39-1/40. 155 Establisliment o f Fighter Sector at Wick 11/39. ------- 156 “ 189 Establisliment o f Fighter Sector at Wick 11/39. Defence o f Scapa Flow 9/39-3/42. 578 Formation o f 14 Group 5/40-11/40. 689 Defence o f Scapa Flow 12/40-12/44. 915 13 Group Wick 1944-46. 19 176 Air Defence o f Great Britain Plans. 207 Air warning system and defence measures. 20 1027 Directorate o f Naval Co-operation. 1050 Operation ARCHERY. 1079 Nordi-west Scodand and outer isles - extension o f radar cover. 1091-94 HIGHBALL trials. 1322 HIGHBALL proposed operations. Air stations in the UK.7585 291 North Western Approaches 7586 Air stations in the UK. 25 Group Operations Record Books. 232 1 13 Group Operational Record Book 1939-40. 233 13 Group Operational Record Book. January 1941- December 1943. 234 13 Group Operational Record Book January 1944-46. 235-242 13 Group Operational Record Book Supplements. 250 14 Group Operational Record Book 1/40-7/43. 251 14 Group Operational Record Book Appendices 1/40-7/42. 252 14 Group Operational Record Book Appendices August - December 1942. 253 14 Group Operational Record Book Appendices January - July 1943. 380 18 Group Operational Record Book 9/39 — 12/43. 381 18 Group Operational Record Book 1/44 -12 /4 4 . 382 18 Group Operational Record Book 1/45 ~ 12/45. 383-452 18 Group Operational Record Book Appendices. 27 Squadron Operational Record Books. 441 43 Squadron Operational Record Book 1940. 442 43 Squadron Operational Record Book 1941. 592 65 Squadron Operational Record Book. 624 72 Squadron Operational Record Book. 866 I l l Squadron Operational Record Book. 969 141 Squadron Operational Record Book. 1293 209 Squadron Operational Record Book. 1294 209 Squadron Operational Record Book. 1298 210 Squadron Operational Record Book. 1731 333 Squadron Operational Record Book. 1732 333 Squadron Operational Record Book. 2073 602 Squadron Operational Record Book to 12/39. 2074 602 Squadron Operational Record Book to 12/40. 2079 603 Squadron Operational Record Book to 12/43. 2080 603 Squadron Operational Record Book to 8/45. 2081 603 Squadron Operational Record Book Appendices. 2102 609 Squadron Operational Record Book. 2130 618 Squadron Operational Record Book. 2265 929 Barrage Balloon Squadron Operational Record Book (Queensfetry). 2266 929 Barrage Balloon Squadron Operational Record Book (Queensfetry). 2294 948 Barrage Balloon Squadron Operational Record Book (Rosyth). 28 Station Operations Record Books. 49 RAF Banff Operational Record Book 1944-1945. 181 RAF Dallachy Operational Record Book 9/44-11/45. 182 RAF Dallachy Operational Record Book Appendices 9/44-11/45. 219 RAF Drem Operational Record Book 1939-1945. 220 RAF Drem Operational Record Book 1939-1945. 289 RAF Fraserburgh Operational Record Book 12/44-6/45. 328 RAF Greenock Operational Record Book 9/40-7/45. 397 RAF Invergordon Operational Record Book 8/39-6/41. 398-402 RAF Invergordon Operational Record Book 8/39-6/41 Appendices. 440 RAF Lossiemoutli Operational Record Book 1945-1946. 459 RAF Leuchars Operational Record Book 8/38-12/40. 460 RAF Leuchars Operational Record Book 1/41-12/41. 461 RAF Leuchars Operational Record Book 1/42-12/42. 462 RAF Leuchars Operational Record Book 1/43-12/43. 463 RAF Leuchars Operational Record Book 1/44-12/44. 464 RAF Leuchars Operational Record Book 1/45-12/45. 465 RAF Leuchars Operational Record Book Appendices 10/39-4/40. 466 RAF Leuchars Operational Record Book Appendices 5/40-12/40. 467 RAF Leuchars Operational Record Book Appendices 1/41-12/41. 468 RAF Leuchars Operational Record Book Appendices 1/42-12/42. 469 RAF Leuchars Operational Record Book Appendices 1/43-1/44. 1 470 RAF Leuchars Operational Record Book Appendices (photographs) 10/39-5/40. 471 RAF Leuchars Operational Record Book Appendices (photographs) 6/40-1/44. 615 RAF Oban Operational Record Book 9/39-12/42. 616 RAF Oban Operational Record Book 1/43-11/45. 617 RAF Oban Operational Record Book Appendices (narrative) 10/39-6/40. 618 RAF Oban Operational Record Book Appendices (narrative) 7/40-12/40. 291 North Western Approaches 619 RAF Oban Operational Record Book Appendices (narrative) 1/41-12/41. 620 RAF Oban Operational Record Book Appendices (narrative) 1/42-12/42. 621 RAF Oban Operational Record Book Appendices (narrative) 1/43-4/45. 712 RAF Skeabrae Operational Record Book. 775 RAF Sullom Voe Operational Record Book 1/40-12/43. 776 RAF Sullom Voe Operational Record Book 1/44-12/45. 777-781 RAF SuUom Voe Operational Record Book Appendices. 782 RAF Sumburgh Operational Record Book 5/40-9/45. 783-786 RAF Sumburgh Operational Record Book Appendices (786 Anti-U boat reports). ^ 804 RAF Tain Operational Record Book 11/41-2/46. 848 RAF Tiree Operational Record Book 11/41-8/44. 849 RAF Tiree Operational Record Book 9/44-5/46. 850 RAF Tiree Operational Record Book Appendices 4/42-3/44. 861 RAF Turnhouse Operational Record Book 8/36-12/42. 862 RAF Turnhouse Operational Record Book 1/43-12/45. 863-865 RAF Turnhouse Operational Record Book Appendices. 915-917 RAF Wick Fighter Sector HQ Operational Record Book 1939-1945. 9Ï8-940 RAF Wick Fighter Sector HQ Operational Record Book Appendices. 941-944 RAF Wick Fighter Sector HQ Operational Record Book (photographs) 1939-1944. 29 Operational Record Books o f miscellaneous units such as OTUs. 570 13 Flying Training School Drem Operational Record Book. 683 56 Operational Training Unit RAF TeaHng Operational Record Book. 684 58 Operational Training Unit Operational Record Book. 696 132 Operational Training Unit Operational Record Book. 41 48 The RAF in the Maritime War (Atlantic and Home Waters) Tlie Offensive Phase 1942-44. 73 The RAF in the Maritime War (Atlantic and Home Waters) The Defensive Phase 1939-41. 74 The RAF in the Maritime War (Atlantic and Home Waters) The Victorious Phase 1944-45. 50 166 602 Sq. Combat reports. 167 603 Sq. Combat reports. WO Series 106 1812 Operations to capture Narvik 11/4/40. 128 28 12 Commando War Diary 1940-41. 166 114-139 Scottish Command War Diaries. 135 RA Scottish Command HQ 1941. 136 RE Scottish Command HQ 1941. 1708 506 Coast Regiment RA. 1743 543 Coast Regiment RA. 7163 543 Coast Regiment RA 1942. 2127 3«) AA Division War Diary 1939. 2128 3'^ AA Division War Diary 1940. 2129 3“* AA Division War Diary 1941. ---- - 7514 “ 2591™ ' 147 Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment RA. 321 Heavy Anti-Aircraft Battery, Bahnore Road, Glasgow 5/40-3/41. 1025 155 Brigade. 1026 155 Brigade. 1155 Glasgow and District HQ 1939-40. 1198 Edinburgh Area HQ 9/39-12/41. 1199 Edinburgh Area HQ ftom 1/42. ------— 1204 Glasgow and District HQ 1941.1205 RASC Glasgow HQ 1941. 1255 Ayr sub-area HQ 1940-41, 1259 Angus sub-area 1940-41. 1274 Clyde sub-area HQ 1941. 1284 Fife sub-area HQ 10/40-12/41. 1288 Gareloch CRE 1940-41. 1302 Lothian sub-area HQ 3/41-12/41. 1310 Perth sub-area. 2058 Forth Fixed Defences. 3261 417 Searchlight Battery RA. 3552 Fortress Companies Renftewsliire 1939-40. 3553 Fortress Companies Renftewshire 1939-40. 3745 276 Field Coy RE 1939. 293 North Western Approaches 3746 RE Movement Control, Glasgow 9/41-12/41. 4054 91 Bomb Disposal Section RE. 4055 92 Bomb Disposal Section RE. 4056 93 Bomb Disposal Section RE. 6698 Edinburgh Area HQ/Polish forces. 6698 Exercises and defences. 6699 Edinburgh Area HQ/Polish forces. 6699 Exercises and defences. 6701 Glasgow HQ 1942. 6716 Angus sub-area 1942, 6717 Argyll sub-area HQ 1942. 6718 Ayr sub-area HQ 1942. 6732 Clyde sub-area HQ 1942. 6740 Fife sub-area HQ 1942. 6759 Lothian sub-area 1942. 6777 Stranraer sub-area HQ 1942. 6833 West o f Scotland District HQ 1942. 4125 13 (HD) Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders 1941 (Dunbartonshire 1941). 4126 14 (HD) Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders 1941 (Renfrewshire 1941). 4363 4 King’s Own Scottish Borderers. 4364 5 King's Own Scottish Borderers. 6884 Faroe Islands garrison 1942. 199 Flome Headquarters series. 807 Polish Forces 2175 Defence of aerodromes. 2676 Defence o f ports against minelaying. 2677 Glasgow air raids. 2680 Flame barrage at sea. 2712 Decoy sites 1940-43. 2772 Faslane defences. 2805 Defence o f die Fordi and Clyde Canal. 2878 Bullion defence Royal Bank o f Scodand. 2879 Anti-invasion measures. 208 Directorate o f Military Intelligence - includes reports on POWs. 4117 Information ex POWs 1939-40. 257 War Diaries Ships Signals Section. 7 Sliip Signals Section HMS Dundonald II etc 1943-45. 11 Ship Signals Section HMS Dundonald II modified 1944-45. HS Series i 2 Special Operations Executive series. \ 1 3... Operation FORTITUDE. W /T stations in Norway and PWE operatives. Air operations missions and supply drops. 6 Air operations missions and supply drops. 130 Shetland Bus and Operation BALDER (USAF Liberator ops, Leuchars to Stockliohn.) Ï36 Televaag Reprisals as a result o f ANCHOR and PENGUIN 1942. 150 151 Operation CHEESE. Operation CHEESE. 194 Operation GRANARD. Ï98 199 T 02 ™ 203 Operation ANKLET. Operation ANKLET. Operation TITLE 1942-Î943. Operation TITLE 1942-1943. 208 Operation VESTIGE 1943-1944. 209 Operation VESTIGE 1943-1944. 1 ! 210 Operation VESTIGE 1943-1944. i"...... 224 i 225 Operation CLAYMORE. Operation ARCHERY. t 235 r ' 240 " 1 243" ' Shedand Bus operations. Shetland Bus operations. Operation VESTIGE 1943-1944^ ....... ...................... ............ ......... ........................... 246 Honours and decorations for Norwegian agents 1942-1945.i ! 247 Honours and decorations for Norwegian agents 1942-1945. 294 North Western Approaches 248 1 Honours and decorations for Norwegian agents 1942-1945. 252 Statistics on Shetland Bus and other SOE operations. ^ 253 Operation RUBBLE 19^-1942. 258 Stockholm-Scotland air service 1944-1945. 270 Stockliolm-Scotland air service 1944-1945. 1 7 175 SOE Norwegian Section War Diary appendices. ------- 174178........ SOE Norwegian Section War Diary maps to appendices._______________ SÔE Norwegian Section evaluations 1940-1945. DEFE Series 1 Postal and Telegraph Censorship Dept. 134 Rudolf Hess. 303 Censorship in Scotland. 310 Censorship in Scotland. 311 Censorship in Scotland. 312 Censorship in Scotland. 2 Combined Operations HQ records. 73 Operation ANKLET. ------- 7480 Operation ANKLET - photographs. Operation ARCHERY. 81 Operation ARCHERY. 82 Operation ARCHERY - photographs. ^ 83 Operation ARCHERY - narrative. 140 Operation CLAYMORE. 141 Operation CLAYMORE. 142 Operation CLAYMORE. 204 Exercises FLAXMAN and MOSSTROOPER. 228 Exercises FLAXMAN, MOSSTROOPER and Operation GAUNTLET. 269 Operations Orders - Operation HUSKY. 364 Operation MUSKETOON. 365 Operation MUSKETOON. 529 RATTLE Conference. 530 RATTLE Conference. 597 Operation TORCH - Naval Commanders' Reports. 602 Operation TORCH - Naval Commanders' Reports. 616 Operation VP. 617 Operation VP. 698 Keyes correspondence and early history o f Combined Operations. 713 Establishments, ships etc - monthly progress reports. 714 Establishments, sltips etc - montlily progress reports. 715 Establishments, sltips etc - monthly progress reports. 716 Establishments, ships etc - montlily progress reports. 814 Visit o f King to Combined Training Centre Inveraray on 9/10/41. 815 Inveraray Combined Training Centre. 816 Inveraray Combined Training Centre. 817 Inveraray Combined Training Centre. 834 Conversions o i Queen Emma and Princes Beatrix. 856 Appledore and Dundonald Comb. Trg, Centre and Beach Experimental Establishment. 869 Navigational Unit, Inveraray. 900 Transfer to USN of Rosneath base. 929 Naval Beach Commandos. 934 Beachmasters; selection etc. 961 RN Beach Commandos. 1049 Combined Training Areas (Castle Toward). 1101 Pilotage Patties. 1111 Pilotage Parties. 1117 Combined Training Areas (UK). 1118 Combined Training Areas (UK) - maps. 1152 Pilotage Parties. 1317 Combined Training Centre Inveraray - units trained 1940-41. 1318 Combined Training Centre Inveraray - organisation 1940-44. 1319 Combined Training Centre Inveraray - précis o f lectures. 1320 Combined Training Centre Inveraray - précis o f lectures. 1321 Combined Training Centre Inveraray - Instructors course. 295 North Western Approaches 1322 Combined Training Centre Inveraray - training 52(L) Division. 1323 Combined Training Centre Inveraray - training 52(L) Division. 1324 Combined Training Centre Inveraray - training 50(N) Division. 1777 Operation TORCH - Naval Landing Parties. 1778 Operation TORCH - Naval Landing Parties. 1778 Operation TORCH - reports. ■ 1780 Operation TORCH - reports. INF Series 1 162 Proposed Scottish Programme. 188 Regional censorship. 264 Daily Reports 1940. 267 Rumours o f invasion 1940. 268 Rumours o f parachute landings 1940. 269 Secret weapons 1940. 282 Home Intelligence reports 1941-45. 284 Reports on home morale 1942-43. 292 Weekly Home Intelligence Reports 1940-44. 293 Special reports. 294 Public meetings. 308 Glasgow Information Committee 1940-43. 315 Regional censorship 1940-41. 844 Censorship re air raids. 845 Censorship re air raids. 846 Censorsliip re air raid casualties. 887 Evacuation o f coastal towns. 912 Rudolf Hess. HO Series 198 139-140 STARFISH. 198 Daily raid summaries 10/39 - 4/42. 211 UXBs in Clydebank 1941. 212 UXBs in Glasgow 7-8/4/41. 213 UXBs in Greenock 12-13/7/40. 199 — 197198 Aberdeen - poor casualty handling during raid on 12/7/40. Western District air raid incidents 6/40-9/41. 199 Aberdeen raids 29/6/40 - 4/11/40. 205 Kincardine air raid incidents to 7 /8 /40, Orkney 2-3/8/40, Pitlochry 3-4/8/40. 201 Glasgow 18/9/40. 202 Edinburgh 7/10/40. 203 Dunfermline 4 /1 1 / 40. 204 Air raids 5/11/40. 205 Clydebank raids 3/41. 206 Leitli raid 8/4/41, 207 Glasgow raids 7 /4 /41-8/5/41. 208 Kilmarnock raid 6 /5/41. 410 Regional Commissioner’s Monthly Reports. 428 Regon 11 air raid incidents 5/42-1/43. 429 Chief Constable’s Reports 12/4/40-27/9/40. 482 Rudolf Hess. 202 1-10 Daily and Weekly reports. 203 ■■'205™ 1-16 ™241 Daily Reports, Shelters. 207 1087 Reorganisation o f Civil Defence personnel. 1088 Air raid shelters including Dundee. 1089 Clydeside raids and salvage in Edinburgh. 1090 Gallowgate Tunnel Shelter. -------------------- 1091 Paisley deep shelter at Oakshaw Hill. CAB series 65 War Cabinet Minutes. 6 Cabinet minutes 1940 99 3 Allied Supreme War Council 1939-40. 296 North Western Approaches BT series 261 Awards for gallantry at sea. 10 Gallantry Awards 1935-41. 11 Gallantry Awards 1941-43. 12 Gallantry Awards 1942-44. 13 Gallantry Awards 1944-46. ________ . - ____ _ MT series 40 60 Operation TORCH cargo tonnage allocated. 61 Operation TORCH cargo tonnage allocated. 62 TORCH and BACKBONE cargo tonnage allocated. 130 Rescue sliips — history by Lt Cdr Martyn RNVR. 59 19 Operation BOLERO 1943-44. 63 169 Overside discharge (Forth). 193 Overside discharge o f cargo - Clyde 1940. 194 Overside discharge o f cargo — Clyde 1940-44. 1 195 Overside discharge o f cargo — Clyde 1944-46. 200 Port Operations (Clyde) 1940 - report. 202 Port Operations (Forth) 1940 — report. 204 Port Operations (Faslane) ~ report. 303 Operation BOLERO 1942-45. 274 Loch Ewe - use as a convoy assembly anchorage 1941-44. 492 Ore shipments from Narvik. 570 Operation BOLERO schedules. 3389 Personal effects from SS Athenia — war risks insurance. PRO series [ 30 92/2 S. S. Wilson paper on port organisation in 1940-41. r 20 Section on Ultra material. SCOTTISH RECORD OFFICE AD57 19 Death Sentence in wartime. ! 30-34 Various wartime measures. j AF43 465 Dept of Agriculture and Fisheries Memoranda. ; AF56 1278 Control o f fish supplies in wartime, 1281 Clyde Fishermen in the event o f war. 1285 Laying up o f near water trawlers and their purchase by the Admiralty. 1287 Laying up o f near water trawlers and tlieir purcliase by the Admiralty. AF62 1339 Decorations for Fishermen 1940-54. 1342 Decorations for Fishermen 1940-54. 1343 Decorations for Fishermen 1940-54. 1344 Decorations for Fishermen 1940-54. 2179 Damage to fisliing boats and gear 1930-42. 2181 Agriculture and Fisheries Officers reports on damage to boate and gear 1932-51. —------------ 2212/6 Dumping o f explosives and destruction o f mines.2223 Warnings and damage to ships - mines left over from WWl. ------ - ------- 2228/1"2228 /2" ' Gunfiring affecting^fishing in the Forth 1940. Gunfiring affecting fishing in the Forth 1941-49. 2233 Rifle and machine gun range at Fort George 1930-49. 2234 Black Dog rifle range 1931-41. 2235 Cape Wrath Bombardment Range. 2237/2 Bombing and Firing Practice Areas 1939-52. 2240 Admiralty Exercise Areas Orkney and Shetland 1942-61. 2409 Aerial gunnery ranges at Leuchars and St Andrews Bay. 2411 Bombing practice Moray Firth 1938-40. 2412 Bombing practice Moray Firth 1940-44. 2413 ARP for merships and fishing vessels. —— --------- 2425-292632 Arming o f fishing vessels. Clearance o f wrecks from fisliing grounds. DD12 496 Rosyth and Port Edgar post-war future. IG D 229 /1 110-116 Leith Dock Commission Directors' Minute Books. GD229/2 159-231 Leith Dock Commission Port Registers 1939-1945. 197 North Western Approaches GD229/11 4 Leitlî Dock Commission - Damages to Works 1930-1949. GD229/14 31 Leith Dock Commission ARP. HH36 3 Air Raids. —----------— 5 Air Raids.6 Air Raids. 13 Air Raids. HH41 453/1 Scottish Regalia. 453/2 Scottish Regalia HH45 121 Conscientious Objectors. 159 Scottish Office War Diary reports. HH50 1 Clydebank air raid damage and casualties. 2 Clydebank air raid damage and casualties. 3 Haddington and Clydebank ait raid damage and casualties. 4 Clydebank air raid damage and casualties. 5 Rosyth air raid damage and casualties. 6 Athenia. 7 Scottish Office ARP Circulars. 20 Scottish Home and Health Dept. War Diary Reports 1939-40. 48 Evacuation. 63 Conscientious Objector tribunals. 64-65 Civil Defence. 66-67 Disposal o f dead in wartime. | 79 Land for Civil Defence purposes. | 83-90 Government War Book, Hospital scheme. j 104 Evacuation - survey o f sending and receiving areas. r 91-103 Series o f files on the Clydeside raids. | 106 Emergency wireless broadcast | 107 Aged and infirm. j 109 Evacuation leaflet ‘^ ^y and How*. j 115 CW Defence Training Officer conferences. j 116 Mental services. 117 Mental services. 118 Montrose Royal Asylum air raid damage and casualties. 119 Protected Areas - removal o f persons contravening Defence Regulation 13. 120 Protected Areas including Orkney and Shetland. 121 Protected Areas including Orkney and Shetland.122 Protected Areas including Orkney and Shetland. 123 Protected Areas including Orkney and Shetland. 126-127 Burial o f dead in wartime. 128-135 Regional Commissioners reports. 136-143 VE and VJ Days. 159 War Diary 1939-40. 160 Record o f missiles dropped Districts 1-4. — - ---,—- --- 161162 Records o f missiles dropped District 5. Records o f missiles dropped in cities and large burghs. 163 Plots o f missiles dropped. 164 Plots o f objects dropped. 165 Bomb census reports. 199 Prestwick. 202 Regional Commissioners. HH51 1-2/004 Evacuation. 11 Medical Stores. 13 Record o f civilians killed. 16 Honours to Civil Defence personnel, particularly Clydeside. HH52 25-34 Police circulars. HH55 650-652 Billeting in Orkney. HH57 989 Admission to civil prisons o f German and Italian POWs sentenced by military court. 990 Admission to civil prisons o f Polish prisoners sentenced by military court. 991 Admission to civil prisons o f US prisoners sentenced by military court. 992 Conscientious Objectors imprisoned 1941-1943. 995-7 Military Detention Centre, Barlinnie. 115 Escapes from military detention. 1025 Prisons - Indian Seamen employed by the Clan Line. 1026 Prisons - Indian Seamen employed by the General Steamship Navigation Co. 298 North Western Approaches 1030-3 Prisons. 1057 Colonial Prisoners Removal Act 1884. Prisoners removed to colonies. MD6 various Territorial Army Minutes. MD7 27 County of Fife Territorial Army Minute Book. MDÎ1 11-27 Various Territorial Army Minutes. ABERDEEN CITY AND COUNTY ARCHIVES CE87 4/41 1 Customs and Excise Aberdeen - Depositions o f Wrecks. , HR/1 1/4 Alexander Hall & Co., Minutes o f Board Meetings. : 1/5 Alexander HaH & Co., Minutes o f Board Meetings. ‘20/2 56 Aberdeen Harbour Commission, Minutes o f Meetings 1939-40. ; 57 Aberdeen Harbour Commission, Minutes o f Meetings 1940-41. ' 58 Aberdeen Flarbour Commission, Minutes o f Meetings 1941-42. ] ____59____ Aberdeen Harbour Commission, Minutes o f Meetings 1942-43. j DUND EE CITY ARCHIVES CE70 1/68 Customs and Excise, Dundee - Letter Book (Collector to Board 1940). | CE70 ' 2/159 Customs and Excise, Dundee - Letter Book (Board to Collector 1930-1957). ; CE70 4/80 Customs and Excise, Dundee - Collectors Report Books 1939-43. j 4/81 Customs and Excise, Dundee - Collectors Report Book 1940. 4/82 Customs and Excise, Dundee - Collectors Report Book Ï941. \ 4/83 Customs and Excise, Dundee - Collectors Report Book 1942-1943. | 4 /84 Customs and Excise, Dundee - Collectors Report Book 1944-1945. î 4/163 Customs and Excise, Dundee - Pier Head Book Tayport 1938-67. \ ___ A /1 22 Dundee Harbour ARP Organisation - General. 1 26 Dundee Harbour ARP Organisation - HARPO Journal 1940-45. | 28 Dundee Harbour ARP Organisation - Decontamination. 1 D /2 11 Dundee Submarine Base 1908-14. Miscellaneous papers. | Dundee Harbour Trust Wharf Books 1939-45 (not indexed) ; ED INBURGH CENTRAL LIBRARY YDA1844 939 Diary o f Chas Boog Watson, ARP Warden. j YDA2410 B21271 Leith at War - File o f press cuttings etc. 1 NATIONAL LIBRARY, ED INBURGH ACC 4303 Barnton Fire-fighters minute book. | 6174 7 Polish Workshop Coy 1940-47. | 8802 115-118 R.J.B. Sellar Home Guard Papers. 1 MS 3816-22 Home Guard in Scodand. | Microfilm files o f The Scotsman. | Hard copy files o f the Edinburgh Evening News. | STRATHCLYDE ARCHIVES AGN 1818 List o f bombs dropped in Glasgow. CO 1/61 15-17 ARP warden’s logbook, Lanarkshire. CO 2 /3 /4 65 Start o f series on ARP etc. in Renfrewshire. 73 Bombs on Renfrew. G1 3/44 Athenia Disaster Fund. D-AP6 15 Details o f damaged properties in Glasgow. D-AP8 D-CC2 14 1/74 Map o f damaged areas in Glasgow. Glasgow City Council Financial Accounts 1945-1946. b -C D l Air raid casualties 3/41-1/42. D-CD7 1-3 Registers o f dead. D -CD8 Photograph album - Clydebank dead. D-CD 9/9 20 Incidents in Marine Division 7/40-43. 299 North Western Approaches I 21 Incidents in Marine Division 13-14/3/41. 22 Additional Reports. 26 Incidents in Southern Division. 28 Incidents in Eastern Division. 30-33 Incidents in Maryhill Division. 35-36 Incidents in Maryhill Division outwith air-raids. 37-38 Incidents in Central Division. 39-40 Incidents in Govan Division. 21-35 General on casualty services. 5-9 Anti-gas measures. 4 ARP for animals. D-TC 8/10 r 61-62 Evacuation. 74 Co-ordination o f action to meet heavy attacks. 75 Lessons from heavy raids. 76 Lighting restrictions. 83-4 Invasion defences and invasion committees. 85-6 Key Points. 79 Co-operation with employers. 87 Public lighting restrictions. 90 ~1 Reports on air raid incidents etc. 96 Special reports including HMS Sussex and other incidents on 18/9/40. 114 Awards for gallantry. 115 Requisitioning o f Barrowland. 116 Mortuary Service. 144 ARP Service HQ and training centre at 6 Beech Ave. 148 War damage claims. 158 Raid spotters. 175-6 Rescue service reports - raids. 179 Rescue services. 191-2 Salvage o f valuables. Clyde River Patrol, letter & photographs 5 /2 /93 per Mrs McAughtrie Hakewill. T-CN 6/5 6 Clyde Navigation Trust Annual Report 1942. T-CN16/74 14 Clyde Navigation Trust ARP. 15 Clyde Anchorages 16 Monthly imports 17 Dumb Barges 18 Battle o f the Atlantic. 22 Short sea shipping control. 24 Admiralty Berthing Officer, Greenock. 25 Berthing for invasion ships. T-CN 19 555 General photograph Glasgow Harbour including Manipur. 609/1 Photo^taph Athenia sailing Glasgow 1935. 656/2 Photographs o f gas exjslosion damage aboard HMS Fi/i at No.3 Graving Dock. 657/1-13 Photographs HMS Sussex at Yorkltill and UXB at Rothesay Dock 1941. 658 General area photographs o f Glasgow Harbour 1943. T-CN 58 87-93 Series o f Greenock Harbour Trust minutes. TD 554/4 Material relating to Kelvindale and Kelvinside. 575/4/5 Staff duties at Browrtiie and Murray. 1129/1-4 Records o f 22nd Ward Kelvinside ARP. 1226 Tickets, menus and otlier memorabilia hom Athenia, GLASGOW ROOM , M ITCHELL LIBRARY, GLASGOW Microfilm files o f tlie Glasgow Herald. Microfilm files o f the Daily Record. GLASGOW UN IVERSITY DEPT . O F BUSINESS RECORDS UGD 3 Denny Shipbuilders. 49 Scottish Coal and Iron Masters Federation. 55 J.M. Campbell Shipowners. 131/1 Ellerman Shipowners re City of Benares and City of Adelaide. 300 North Western Approaches 151 Butter’s Cranes. 176 Clyde Shipping Co. (Tug and Sliipowners). 223 Lithgow Sliipbuilders. 266 Yarrow Shipbuilders. 299 Redpath Dorman Long/Colville's Ironworks. DEPARTM ENT O F DOCUMENTS , IM PERIAL WAR MUSEUM, LONDON . Surgeon Lieutenant Commander H. M. Balfour. MS reference no. 95/23/1 Lieutenant P. Calvert MS reference no. 84/36/1. Colonel LI, S. Gillies. MS reference no. 90/26/1. Lieutenant Commander Pirn Keipe RNN. MS reference no. 96/6/1. Second Lieutenant W, S. Knight MS reference no. 97/7/1. ColonelH. E. Yeo. MS reference no. 95/6/1. NAT IONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADM IN ISTRATION , W ASH INGTON Information from POW survivors U-1003 sunk in North Western Approaches 20/3/45, Held by the National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, USA. Record Group 38, Subject File 1942-1945, OP16Z (from Algiers to British N ID /1 PW), British Final Reports, Box 2. Information from POW survivors 11-1206lost in diving accident offPeterhead 14/4/45, National Archives and Records Adnoinistration, Wasliington, USA. Record Group 38, Subject File 1942-1945, OP16Z (from Algiers to British NID/1 PW), British Final Reports, Box 2. Records Relating to U-boat Warfare 1939 - 1945, Guide to the M icrofilmed Records o f the German Navy. A guide produced by Timothy Mulligan at the National Archives and Re­ cords Administration, Washington, in 1985. US NAVAL H ISTORICAL CENTER , W ASH INGTON The U-47*s Scapa Flow Undertaking. Monograph by Wagner Fuerbringer held by US Naval Operations Arcliive at the US Naval Historical Center, Washington. (Microreel T-47). War Diary (KTB) Summary U-106 attack on Zealandic 17/1/41, Translated into English and held by US Naval Operations Archive at the US Naval Historical Center, Washington. (GNR BoxT-78) War Diary (KTB) Summary U-26 First patrol 16/9/39. Translated into English and held by US Naval Operations Archive at the US Naval Historical Center, Washington. (GNR Box T- 81) War Diary (KTB) Summary U-28 attack on Sliedrecht 16-17/11/39, Translated into English and held by US Naval Operations Archive at the US Naval Historical Center, Washington. (GNR Box T-82) War Diary (KTB) Summary U-30 First patrol 16/9/39. Translated into English and held by US Naval Operations Archive at the US Naval Historical Center, Washington. (GNR Box T- 81) War Diary (KTB) Summary U-31 First patrol 16/9/39. Translated into English and held by US Naval Operations Archive at the US Naval Historical Center, Washington. (GNR Box T- 81) 301 North Western Approaches Wat Diary (KTB) Summary U-34 First patrol 16/9/39, Translated into English and held by US Naval Operations Archive at the US Naval Historical Center, Washington, (GNR Box T- 81) War Diary (KTB) Summary U-35 First patrol 16/9/39, Translated into English and held by US Naval Operations Archive at the US Naval Historical Center, Washington. (GNR Box T- 81) War Diary (KTB) Summary U-48 attack on City o f Benares 17/9/40. Translated into Eng­ lish and held by US Naval Operations Archive at the US Naval Historical Center, Washing­ ton. (GNR Box T-78) War Diary (KTB) Summary U-94 attack on Florian 20/1/41. Translated into English and held by US Naval Operations Archive at the US Naval Historical Center, Wasliington. (GNR BoxT-81) War Diary (KTB) Summary U-96 attack on Almeda Star 17/4/41. Translated into English and held by US Naval Operations Archive at the US Naval Historical Center, Washington. (GNRBoxT-82) MAP COLLECTION , NAT IONAL LIBRARY OF SCOTLAND Admiralty Fleet Charts - Searched Channels-. F 0154 A2 - Loch Ewe. F 0177 A2 - St Abbs Head to Aberdeen. F 0178 A2 - Aberdeen to Banff. F 0179 A2 - Peterhead to the Pentland Firth. F 0180 A3 - Orkney Islands. F 0181 A2 - Thurso Bay to the North Minch. F 0183 A2 - Western Approaches to the Firth of Clyde. F 0188 A2 - The River Forth. F 0300 Al - North Sea Gridded Chart SECONDARY SOURCES PUBLISHED WORKS Abbazia, Patrick : 1975. M r RoosevelFs Navy: The Private War o f the US Atlantic Fleet 1939-42. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis. Adams, Jack : 1989. The D oom ed Expedition — The Norway Campaign o f1940. Leo Coo­ per. Allen, T : 1996. The Storm Passed By: Ireland and the Battle o f the Atlantic. Irish Academic Press. Andenaes, Johannes, Olav Riste and Magne Skodvin : 1974. Norway and the Second World War. Johan Grund Tranum Forlag, Oslo. Anderson, G. D. : 1983. Fascists, Communists and the National Government London. 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H appy O dyssey Cape Caulfield, Max : 1958. A N ight o f Terror, Frederick MuËer. Chadwick, Steven : 1996. Inch Ewe during World War Two, Wüderness Guides. Chalmers, W. S. : 1954. Max Horton and the Western Approaches. Hodder & Stoughton. Churchill, Winston : 1948-1953. The Second World War. Cassell. Clarke, Colonel Dudley : 1948. Seven Assignments. Cape. Coles, Alan and Briggs, Ted : 1985. Flagship Hood. Robert Hale, Connell, G. G. : 1987. Mediterranean Maelstrom - HMSJervis and the 14th Flotilla, WiUiam Kimber. Cookridge, E. FI. ; 1966. Inside SOE - The story o f Special Operations in Western Europe 1940-45. Arthur Barker. Costello, John and Hughes, Terry : 1977. The Battle o f the Atlantic, Collins. Cruickshank, Charles : 1979. Deception in World War 2. Oxford University Press. Cruickshank, Charles : 1986. SOE in Scandinavia, Oxford University Press. Dalzel-Job, Patrick : 1992. From Arctic Snow to D ust o f Normandy. Nead-an-Eion. Denham, Harold M. : 1984. Inside the N azi Ring, John Murray. Derry, T. K. : 1952. The Campaign in Norway HMSO. Dinklage, Ludwig : 1971. D ie Deutsche HandelsHotte 1939-1945- Unter besonderer Berucksichdgung der Blockadebrechervol. 1. Musterschmidt Gottinger, Frankfurt. Dorrian, James. : 1998. Storming St Nazaire. Leo Cooper. Douglas, W. A. B, : 1988. The R C N in Transition: 1910 - 1985, University of British Columbia Press, Vancouver. Drummond, John D. : 1960. A River Runs to War. W. H. Allen. Drummond, John D. : 1958. H M U-boat. W. H. Allen. Dunnett, Alastair M. : 1960. The Donaldson U ne - A Century ofShipping 1854-1954. Jack­ son & Co. Durham, Philip : 1996. The Führer L ed But We Overtook Him, Pentland Press. Edwards, Bernard : 1989. Fighting Tramps - The Merchant N avy Goes To War. Robert Hale. Edwards, B. : 1996. D onitz and the Wolf Packs. Arms and Armour Press. Edwards, Kenneth : 1946, Operation Neptune. Collins. Evans, A. S. : 1986. Beneath the Waves. William Kimber. Fairfield Shipbuilding Co. Ltd. : 1960. Fairfield 1860-1960. Barbour McLaren, Glasgow. Farr, A. D. : 1973. L et N ot The D eep - The Story o f the Royal National U feboat Institu­ tion. Impulse Books. Fell, W. R. : 1966. The Sea Our Shield. Cassell. 304 North Western Approaches Ferguson, David M. : 1991. Shipwrecks o f North-East Scotland 1444 - 1990. Mercat Press. Fergusson, Brigadier Bernard : 1961. The Watery M aze - The Story o f Combined Opera­ tions. Collins. Fisher, David E. : 1987. A Race on the Edge o f Time: Radar, The Decisive Weapon o f World War Two. McGraw Hill, New York. Foot, M. R. D. ; 1984. SOE 1940 - 1946. BBC Publications. Franks, Norman L. R. : 1995. Search, Find and K ill - The RAF^s U boat Successes. Grub Street. Originally published in 1990 by Aston Publications as Search, Find and K ill - Coastal Commandos U boat Successes. Frost, Major General John : 19H0. A Drop Too Many. Cassell. GaUacher, Thomas : 1980. Against all Odds. Ulverscroft. (Originally published as The X Craft Raidh^ Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York, in 1970.) Gannon, Michael : 1998. Black M ay — The E pic Story o f the Allies^ D efeat o f the German U boats in M ay 1943. Aurum Press. Gibson, John Frederick : 1953. Brocklebanks 1770-1950. Henry Young. (In two volumes - vol­ ume 2 refers) Gibson, John S. : 1985. The Thisde and the Crown. Edinburgh, Gübert, Martin : 1989. Finest Hour — Winston S. Churchill1939-1941. Minerva. Gilchrist, Donald : 1960. Castle Commando. Oliver & Boyd. Glass, Norman : 1994. Caithness and the War1939 - 1945. North of Scotland Newspapers. (Originally published by Peter Reid & Co in 1948) Glover, Michael : 1990. Invasion Scare 1940. Leo Cooper. Goralski, Robert and Freeburg, RusseU W. : 1987. O il and War: H ow the D eadly Struggle for Fuel in World War II M eant Victory or Defeat. William Morrow & Co., New York. Gretton, Admiral Sir Peter : 1964. Convoy Escort Commander. Cassell. Hackman, Willem : 1984. Sonar, Anti-Submarine Warfare and the Royal N avy 1914-1954. HMSO for The Science Museum. Hampshire, A. Cecil : 1978. Secret Navies, William Kimber. Harper, Stephen : 1999. Capturing Enigma. Sutton Publishing. Flarris, Paul : 1986. Glasgow and The Clyde at War. Archive Publications. Harris, Paul : 1987. Aberdeen and the North-East a t War. Archive Publications. Herwig, Prof. Holger H. : 1976. The Politics o f Frustration — The United States in German Naval Planning 1889-1941. Little Brown, Boston USA, Hessler, Günter (assisted by Hoschatt, Alfred and Rohwer, Jurgen) : 1989. The U-boat War in the Atlantic 1939 -1945 (VoLs 1 to 3). HMSO. j Hesketh, Roger : 1999. Fortitude — The D D ay Deception Campaign. St Ermin’s Press. j Higham, R. (ed.) : 1972. Guide to the Sources o f British M ilitary History. Routledge. Sup- | plement (ed.) G. Jordan, Garland 1988. | HiU, Roger : 1975. Destroyer Captain, William Kimber. j Hinsley, Prof. F. H. and Simkins, C. A. G. : 1979-1988. British Intelligence in the Second World War (VoU 1 to 3), HMSO. Hodges, Andrew : 1983. Alan Turing - The Enigma. Hutchinson. 305 North Western Approaches Holden, Herbert D. : 1996. Incidents in the Life o f a Wartime Sailor. StockweH. Horne, Alistair : 1990. To Lose a Battle -F rance 1940. Papermac. Houlder Bros. ; 1946. Sea Hazard. Houlder Bros. & Co. Howard, Michael : 1990. Strategic Deception in the Second World War. HMSO. Howarth, Stephen, and Law, Derek, (eds.) : 1994. The Batde o f the Atlantic 1939-1945: The 50th Anniversary International N aval Conference. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis. Howse, H. Derek : 1993. Radar a t Sea: The Royal N avy in World War II. Macmillan. Humble, Richard : Aircraft Carriers. Michael Joseph. Humble, Richard : 1983. Fraser o f the North Cape. A Life o f Admiral o f the Fleet Lord Fra­ ser 1888 -1981. Routledge and Keegan Paul. Hyde, Prof. Francis E. : 1971. Liverpool & The M ersey—An economic history o f the Port David & Charles. Irvine, James W. : 1988. The Waves Are Free - Shetiand-Norway Links 1939-1945. Shetland Publishing Co. Irvine, James W. ; 1991. The Giving Years - Shetland and Shetlanders 1939-1945. Shetland Publishing Co. Jarvis, Adrian ; 1996. The Liverpool D ock Engineers. Sutton. Jefferson, David : 1996. Coastal Forces at War - Royal N avy Little Ships in World War Two. Patrick Stephens. Jeffrey, Andrew : 1991. This Dangerous M enace - Dundee and the River Tay at War 1939 - 1945. Mainstream. Jeffrey, Andrew : 1992. This Present Emergency - Edinburgh, the River Forth and South- E ast Scotland in the Second World War. Mainstream. Jeffrey, Andrew ; 1993. This Time o f Crisis - Glasgow, the West ofScotland and the North Western Approaches in the Second World War. Mainstream. Johnson, Brian : 1978. The Secret War. BBC. Johnstone, Air Vice Marshal Sandy : 1986. Spitfire Into War. William Kimber. Jones, Geoffrey : 1986. D efeat o f the W olf Packs. William Kimber. Jones, Geoffrey : 1986. Submarines versus U-boats. William Kimber. Jones, Geoffrey : 1989. U-boat Aces. William Kimber. Jones, Prof. Reginald V, : 1978. M ost Secret War. Hamish Hamilton. Jowitt, The Earl : 1954. Some Were Spies. Hodder and Stoughton. Kahn, David : 1980. HitleFs Spies. Arrow. Kahn, David : 1991. Seizing the Enigma - The Race to Break the German U Boat Codes 1939-1943. Souvenir Press. Kahn, David : 1967. The Codebreakers. Macmillan. Kee, Robert : 1984.1939 - The World We Left Behind. Weidenfeld and Nicholson. Kee, Robert : 1985.1945 - The World We Fought For. Hamish Hamilton. Keegan, John : 1988. The Price o f Admiralty: War at Sea from Man o f War to Submarine. Hutchinson. Kemp, Paul : 1993. Liverpool and the Battle o f the Adantic 1939-45. Maritime Books. 306 North Western Approaches Kemp, Paul : 1993. Convoy!Drama in Arctic Waters. Arms and Armour Press. Kemp, Paul : 1995. Friendly Fire. Leo Cooper. Kemp, Peter : 1958. N o Colours, N o Crest. CasseU. Kennedy, Ludovic : 1979. The Life and Death o f the Tirpitz. Sidgwick and Jackson. Kerr, J. Lennox (ed.) : 1953, Touching the Adventures o f Merchantmen in the Second World War. Harrap. Kersaudy, Francois : 1990. Norway 1940. Collins. Kerslake, S. A. : 1984. Coxswain in the Northern Convoys. William Kimber. Kimball, Warren F. : 1969. The M ost Unsordid Act: Lend-Lease 1939-1941. John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore. Kjeldstadli, Sverre : 1959. Hfemmestyrkene. Aschenhoug, Oslo. Konings, Chris : 1985. Queen Elizabeth at War1939-1945. Patrick Stephens. Kremer, Peter and Brustat-Naval, Fritz : 1984. U 333: The Story o f a U boat Ace. Bodley Head. Ladd, J. D. : 1976. Assault From The Sea 1939-45. The Craft, The Landings, The Men. David & Charles. Laird, Dorothy : 1961. Paddy Henderson. George Outram. Lamb, Gregor : 1991. Sliy Over Scapa 1939 -1945. Byrgisey. Lamb, Richard : 1993. Churchill as War Leader—Right or Bloomsbury. Lambert, John and Ross, A1 ; 1990. A llied Coastal Forces o f World War II. In two volumes by Conway Maritime Press. Laxon, W. A, and Perry, F. W. : 1994. B. I. - The British-India Steam Navigation Company Ltd. World Ship Society. Lenman, Bruce : 1977. An Economic H istory o f M odem Scotland1660-1976. Batsford. Lenton, Henry : 1968. The Royal Netherlands N avy in World War II. Doubleday. Lewin, Ronald : 1982. Ultra Goes To War. Hutchinson. Lovat, Simon Fraser, Lord ; 1978. March Past. Weidefeld and Nicholson. Lund, Paul and Ludlam, Harry : 1972. Trawlers Go To War. New English Library. Originally published by Foulsham in 1971. Lund, Paul and Ludlam, Harry : 1973. N ight o f the U-Boats - Convoys SC7 and HX79. Foul- shamn. Macdonald, Rod : 1993. Dive Scotland's Greatest Wrecks. Mainstream. Macintyre, Donald : 1956. U-boat Killer. Weidenfeld and Nicholson. MacIntyre, Donald : 1961. Battle o f the Adantic. Batsford. McLachlan, Donald ; 1968. Room 39 - Naval Intelligence in Action. Weidenfeld and Nichol­ son. McKee, Alexander : 1966. Black Saturday Souvenir Press. MacPhail, I. M. M. : 1974. The Clydebank Blitz. Clydebank District Libraries. Manus, M. : 1953. Underwater Saboteur. William Kimber. Mars, Alastair : 1971. British Submarines at War: 1939 - 1945. William Kimber. Massie, Robert K. : 1992. Dreadnought - Britain, Germany and the Coming o f the Great War. Jonathan Cape. 307 North Western Approaches Maund, L. E. H. : 1949. Assault From The Sea. Methuen. Messenger, Charles : 1985. The Commandos 1940-1946. WiUiam Kimber. Miller, Joan : 1986. One GirVs War. Dingle, Dublin. Mitchell, Pamela : 1993. The Tip o f the Spear. Richard Netherwood. Moir, Peter and Crawford, Ian : 1994. Argyll Shipwrecks. Moir Crawford. Morgan, General Sir Frederick E. : 1950. Overture to Overlord. London. Morrison, Samuel EHot : 1947. The Batde o f the Adantic - Septem ber1939 to M ay 1943. Vol. 1 in the FUstoy of United States Naval Operations in World War II series. Oxford University Press. Morrison, Samuel Eliot : 1947. Operations in North African Waters - October 1942 to June 1943. Vol. 2 in the Histoy of United States Naval Operations in World War II series. Oxford Uni­ versity Press. Moulton, Major General J. L. ; 1966. The Norwegian Campaign o f1940. Eyre &. Spottis- woode. Mountfield, Stuart : 1965. Western Gateway, A H istory o f the M ersey Docks and Harbour Board. Liverpool, Munthe, Malcolm : 1954. Sweet is War. Duckworth. Murfett, M. H. (ed.) : 1995. The First Sea Lords. Praeger, Conn, USA. NeUlands, Robin : 1989. The Raiders, Wiedenfeld and Nicholson. Nesbit, Roy Conyers : 1995. The Strike Wings - Special Anti-shipping Squadrons 1942-1945. HMSO. Nimmo, Ian : 1989. ScodandAt War. Archive Publications. Nock, O. S. : 1971. Britain^s Railways at War. Ian Allan. Oakley, C. A. : 1967. The Second City. Blackie. Owen, Sir David J. ; 1939. The Ports o f the United Kingdom. Allman & Son. Pack, S. W. C. : 1978. Invasion North Africa 1942. Ian Allan. Padfield, Peter : 1984. D onitz - The Last Führer. GoUancz. Padfield, Peter : 1995. War Beneath The Sea - Submarine Conflict 1939 - 1945. John Murray. Partridge, R. T. ; 1983. Operation Skua, Fleet Air Arm Museum. Poolman, Kenneth : 1970. The CataSghters and Merchant Aircraft Carriers. WiUiam Kimber. Poohnan, Kenneth : 1988. A llied Escort Carriers o f World War Two in Action. Blandford Press. Price, Alfred : 1980. Aircraft versus Submarine — The Evolution o f the Anti-Submarine Air­ craft 1912-1980. Janets Publishing. Pujol, Juan and West, Nigel (pseud, for Rupert AUason) : 1985. Garbo. Weidenfeld and Nicol- son. Quigley, David J. : Under the Jolly Roger - British Submariners a t War 1939 - 1945. Ports­ mouth Publishing and Printing Co. Ramsay, Winston et aL : 1989. The B litz Then and iVbiv(Vol.s 1 - 3). After the Batde Publica­ tions. Ranft, Bryan : 1977. Technical Change and British Naval Policy 1860 - 1939. Hodder and Stoughton. Rayner, Denys Arthur : 1955. Escort - The Batde o f the Adantic. WiUiam Kimber. 308 North Western Approaches Reid, Max : 1990. DBMS A t War. Ottawa. Reynolds, L. C. : 1998. D og Boats A t War - A H istory o f the Operations o f the Royal N avy D Class Fairmile M otor Torpedo Boats and M otor Gunboats 1939-1945. Sutton Publish­ ing. Riddell,John : 1979. ClydeNavigation.]d!ün Donald. Ritcliie, George F. : 1991. The Real Price o f Fish - Aberdeen Steam Trawler Losses 1887 - 1961. Hutton Press. Ritchie, L. A. : 1992. The Shipbuilding Industry - A Guide to Historical Records. Manches­ ter University Press. Ritchie-Noakes, Nancy : 1984. UverpooPs H istoric Water&ont— The world*s first mercan­ tile dock system. Merseyside County Museums and RCHM. Robertson, Terence : 1981. N ight Raider o f the Atlantic. Evans Bros. First published as The Golden H orseshoehj Evans Bros, in 1955. Rohwer, Prof. Jürgen : 1997. Allied Submarine Attacks o f World War Two. GreenhUl Books. Rohwer, Prof. Jürgen : 1999. Axis Submarine Successes 1939-1945. Greenhill Books. Rohwer, Prof. Jürgen : 1977. The Critical Convoy Battles o f March 1943. Ian Allan. Roskill, Stephen W. : 1954. The War at Sea 1939-45 Qlo\. 1). Collins. Roskill, Stephen W. ; 1956. The War a t Sea 1939-45(yol. 2). Collins. Roskill, Stephen W. : 1957. HMS Warspite. Coffins. Roskill, Stephen W. 1959. The Secret Capture, Coffins. Roskill, Stephen W. : 1960. The War at Sea 1939-45(Vol. 3 part 1), Coffins. Roskill, Stephen W. : 1960. The N avy at War 1939-1945, Coffins. Roskill, Stephen W. : 1961. The War at Sea 1939-45 (Vol. 3 part 2). Coffins. Roskill, Stephen W. : 1962. A Merchant Fleet in War - Alfred H olt & Co, 1939 - 1945. Coffins. RoskiU, Stephen W. : 1976. Naval Policy Between The Wars — The Period o f Reluctant Re­ armament 1930-39. (Vol. 2) Collins. Roskill, Stephen W. : 1977. Churchill and the Admirals. Coffins. Rossler, Eberhard : 1981. The Uboat. Arms and Armour Press. Russell, Andrew : 1987. The Forgotten General - A U fe o f Andrew Thome. Wilton. Rutherford, Iain W ; 1946. A t the Tiller, Blackie. Sainsbury, Keith : 1976. The North Autiican Landings 1942 Davis-Poynter. Salmon, Patrick (ed.) : 1995. Britain and Norway in the Second World War. HMSO. Saunders, Hilary St George : 1948. Valiant Voyaging - The British India Steam Navigation Company in the Second World War. Faber & Faber. Schofield, Vice-Admiral B. B. : 1977. TheAutctic Convoys. Macdonald and Janes. Schofield, Vice-Admiral B. B. and Martyn, Lt Cdr L. F. : 1968. The Rescue Ships. Blackwood. Schofield, Ernest and Conyers Nesbit, Roy : 1987. Arctic Airmen - The RAF in Spitsbergen and North Russia in 1942. William Kimber. Schofield, Stephen : 1964. Musketoon. Jonathan Cape. Scott, Sir Peter M. : 1945. The Battle o f the Narrow Seas. Country Life. 309 North Western Approaches Saelen, Frithjof : 1974. None But The Brave - The Story o f Shetlands Larsen CGM DSO DSC DSM and Bar. Elmfield Press. Seamer, Robert : 1990. The Floating Inferno. Patrick Stephens. Sebag-Montefiore, Hugh : 2000. Enigma — The Battle for the Code. Weidenfeld and Nicolson. ShoweM, Jak Mailman : 1979. The German N avy in World War 2. Arms and Armour Press. ShoweU, Jak Mailman : 1989. U-boat Command and the Battle o f the Atlantic. Conway Mari­ time Press. Simpson, George : 1972, Periscope View. Macmillan. Sims, George : 1972. HMS Coventry, Anti-Aircraft Cruiser. HMS Coventiy Old Hands Associa­ tion. Slader, John : 1995. Fourth Service: Merchantmen at War 1939-45. New Era. Slader, John : 1988. The R ed Duster a t War: A H istory o f the Merchant N avy during the Second World War. William Kimber. Slaven, Anthony ; 1975. The Development o f the West o f Scotland 1750-1960. Routledge and Keegan Paul. Smith, David : 1983. Action Stations 7. Patrick Stephens. Smith, Michael : 1998. Station X - The Codebreakers ofBletchleyPark. Channel 4. Smith, Peter C. : 1968. Destroyer Leader. William Kimber. Smith, Peter C. : 1975. Convoy PQ18 — Arctic Victory. William Kimber. Smith, Peter C. : 1987. Pedestal - The Malta Convoy o f August 1942. WiUiam Kimber. First pubUshed by Kimber in 1970. Revised and expanded for the 1987 edition. Smith, S. E. : 1969. The United States N avy in World War II. BaUantine, New York. Stafford, David ; 1980. Britain and European Resistance 1940-1945 - A Survey o f the Special Operations Executive, with Documents. MacmUlan. Stem, Robert C. : 1991. Type V IIU boats. Arms and Armour Press. Stevens. E. : 1949. The Trial o f Nikolaus Von Falkenhorst. Hodge. Syrett, David : 1994. The D efeat o f the German U Boats. University of South CaroUna Press, USA. Tall, Commander J. J. and Kemp, Paul : 1996. H M Submarines In Camera 1901 - 1996. Naval Institute Press, AnnapoHs, USA. Terraine, John : 1989. Business in Great Waters: The U-boat Wars 1916-45. Leo Cooper. Terraine, John : 1985. The Right o f the Line: The RAF in the European War. Hodder and Stoughton. Thomas, David A. : 1990. The Atlantic Star 1939-45. W.H. AUen. Thomson, WiUiam & Co. ; 1948. The Ben Line - The Story o f a Merchant Fleet at War 1939- 1945. Nelson. Valvatne, Sigurd ; 1954. M edN orske Ubaater i Kamp.]. W. Eides Forlag, Oslo. van der Vat, Dan : 1990. The Atlantic Campaign. Grafton. van der Vat, Dan : 2000. Standard o f Power - The Royal N avy in the Twentieth Century. Hutchinson. Vause, Jordan : 1997. Wolf - U Boat Commanders o f World War II, AirUfe. Vian, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Philip : 1960. Action This Day. Frederick MuUer. 310 North Western Approaches Walker, Fred M, : 1984. Song o f the Clyde. Patrick Stephens. Walker, Graham : 1988. Thomas Johnston, Manchester University Press. Wallis, R. Ransome : 1973. Two R ed Stripes -A Naval Surgeon at War. Ian Allan. Warlow, Ben ; 1992. Shore Establishments o f the Royal Navy. Maritime Books. Warren, Charles E. T. : 1973. We Will N o t Fear - H M Submarine Seal. White Lion. Warren, Charles E. T. and Benson, James : 1953. Above Us the Waves. Harrap. Warren, Charles E. T. and Benson, James : 1997. Thetis - The Admiralty Regrets... Avid Pub­ lications. (Reprint) Waters, Sydney D. : 1961. Shaw Savill Line —100 Years o f Trading. Whitcombe & Tombs. Watkins K.M. : 1963. Britain D ivided Nelson. Watts, Anthony J. : 1976. The U Boat Hunters. Macdonald and Jane’s. Weaver, Harry J. : 1980. Nightmare at Scapa Flow. Cressrelles. Wemyss, D. E. G. : 1955. Resdess Pursuit - WalkeFs Groups in the Western Approaches. William Kimber. (Originally published in the Uverpool Echo in 1948) West, Nigel (pseud, for Rupert AUason) : 1981. MIS - British Security Service Operations 1909 - 1945. Bodley Head. Wheatley, Dennis : 1980. The Deception Planners. Hutchinson. Wiggan, Richard : 1982. H unt the Altmark. Robert Hale. Wiggan, Richard : 1986. Operation Freshman - The Rjukan H eavy Water Raid, 1942. WU- Uam Kimber. Williams, J. A. and GrayJ. B. : 1993. H M Rescue Tugs in World War II. Privately pubUshed by HM Rescue Tugs Veterans Association. Williams, Jack ; 1997. Fleet Sweepers at War—Fleet Minesweepers o f the Royal N avy 1939- 1945, Blackpool. WUUams, Mark : 1979. Captain Gilbert Roberts R N and theAnti-U boat School. CasseU. Winklareth, Robert J. : 1998. The Bismarck Chase - N ew Light on a Famous Engagement. Chatham PubUshing. Winton, John ; 1983. Convoy: The Defence o f Sea Trade 1890-1990. Michael Joseph. Winton, John : 1986. Carrier Glorious. Leo Cooper. Winton, John : 1988. Ultra at Sea. Leo Cooper. Witthoft, Hans Jürgen : 1971. D ie Deutsche HandelsBotte 1939-1945 - Unter besonderer Berucksichtigung der Blockadebrechervol. 2. Musterschmidt Gottinger, Frankfurt. Wynn, Kenneth : 1997. U Boat Operations o f the Second World W ar-Yo\, 1. Career H isto­ ries U-1 to U-510. Chatham Publishing. Wynn, Kenneth : 1998. U Boat Operations o f the Second World War - Vol, 2. Career H isto­ ries U-511 to UIT25. Chatham PubUshing. Young, Edward : 1952. One o f Our Submarines: War Memoir o f a British Submarine Offi­ cer. Hart Davis. Young, Brigadier Peter : 1958. Storm From The Sea. WiUiam Kimber. New edition with addi­ tional material pubUshed by Lionel Leventhal Ltd in 1989. North Western Approaches MONOGRAPHS Black Hackle — The Story o f I t (Scottish) Commando. Prof. Graham Lappin, University of Illinois, USA (2000). British Rearmament and The Treasury 1932-1939. G. C. Peden. Scottish Academic Press, 1979. British Shipping and World Competition, S. G. Sturmey. The Athlone Press, University of London, 1962. British Vessels L ost A t Sea 1939-1945, HMSO 1947. Reprint published by Robert Stephens 1976. Building the N avy's Bases in World War H - H istory o f the Bureau o f Yards and Docks and the Civil Engineer Corps 1940-1946(Vol. 2). United States Government Printing Of­ fice (1947). Inverkeithing, Queens ferry and Rosyth - the Construction o f the Naval Dockyard. Study dated 1903 by Andrew Cunningham. Lloyds Shipping Index. Lloyds of London Press. Lloyds War Losses: The Second World War. VoLs 1 and 2. Lloyd's of London Press 1989. Merchant Shipping and The Demands o f War. Histoiy of the Second World War Civil Series. C. B. A. Behrens. HMSO 1978. Merchant Shipping and War - A Study in Defence Planning. Martin Doughty. Published by the Royal Historical Society in 1982. Naval Policy Between The Wars. Transcript of lecture by Captain Stephen Roskill CBE DSC RN at the National Maritime Museum on 20 April 1977, Published by the National Maritime Museum in 1978 as no.29 in a series of monographs and reports. Prelude to Dieppe. Thoughts on Combined Operations Policy in the Raiding Period. Pa­ per by Barry Hunt and David Schulman in Naval Warfare in the Twentieth Century. Ge­ rald Jordan (ed.) published by Crook Helm in 1977. ■]North American Supply. History of the Second World War Civil Series, Hessel Duncan Hall. HMSO | 1955. ] 1Operation N eptune-Landings in Normandy, June 1944. Battle Summary No. 39. HMStO | 1994. I Port A t War— The story o f Liverpool, its ordeals and achievements during the war 1939- 1945. Mersey Docks & Harbour Board, 1946. Queensferry ARP Log. Held by Edinburgh City Council Archives Department. Services by the Lifeboats o f the Royal National Lifeboat Institution 1939 -1946. Mono­ graph published by the Royal National Lifeboat Institution in 1956. Souvenir o f the Clyde Anchorages Emergency Port Scheme. Privately published by Scrut- tons Ltd in 1947. Held by the National Library of Scotland. St Andrews ARP Log. Compiled by Arthur Scroggie, Communications Officer, Civil Defence, St Andrews Area. Held by St Andrews University Library, Department o f MSS. Statistical D igest o f The War. Histoy of the Second World War Civil Series, Central Statistical Of­ fice. HMSO 1955. The Applications o f Radar and other Electronic Systems in the Royal N avy in World War 2. F. A. Kingsley (ed.) for the Naval Radar Trust in 1995. 12 North Western Approaches The Batde o f the Atlantic and Signals Intelligence: U-Boat Situations and Trends, 1941- 1945. Prof. David Syrett (ed.) Published for the Navy Records Society (publication no. 139) by Ashgate in 1998. The British WarJEconomy. Hktoy of the Second World War Civil Series-, W. K. Hancock and M. M. Gowmg.-HMSO 1949.- The Church- and the Sailor. Journal of the Missions to Seamen Vol. XXIX no.338, March - April 1940. The Control o f Raw Materials. Histoy of the Second World War Civil Series, Joel Hufstfield. HMSO 1953. The D efeat o f the Enem y A ttack on Shipping1939-1945, Naval StaffHistoy, Second World War CB3304 (Vol.s lA and IB). Eric J. Grove (ed.). Revised edition published by the Navy Re­ cords Society 1997. The Defence o f the United Kingdom. Histoy of the Second World WarMilitay Series, Basil Col­ lier. HMSO 1957. The Economic Blockade. Histoy of the Second World War Civil Series, W. N. MedHcott. HMSO 1952-1959. The Keyes Papers (Vol. III). Paul G. Halpern (ed.). Published by George Allen & Unwin for the Navy Records Society in 1981. The IM S at War. George C. Nash. Privately published by the LMS Railway Co. in 1946. The Polish N avy in the Second World War - An Historical Sketch. Monograph compiled for the Polish Naval Association by Michael Alfred Peske. 1989. The Port o f Glasgow. Monograph compiled in 1947 by William French on behalf of the Clyde Navigation Trust. The Royal Air Force 1939-1945. Official history of the Royal Air Force in the Second World War in tliree volumes. Vol. 1 The Fight a t Odds Denis Richards (ed.), vol. 2 The Fight Avails Denis Richards and Hilary St George Saunders (eds.), and vol.3 The Fight is Won Hilary St George Sanders (ed.) first published in 1953 and republished by HMSO in 1993. The U Boat War in the Atlantic 1939-1945. HMSO 1989. ULTRA and the campaign against the U-boats in World War II. Paper (1980) by Com­ mander Jerry C. Russell USN. From Studies in Cryptolo^, document SRH-142, record group 457, records of the National Security Agency, Washington, USA. United States Submarine Operations in World War II. Theodore Roscoe, published by the Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, USA, in 1949. SPECIALIST ARTICLES Air Power and the Battle o f the Atlantic 1939-45. John Buckley in The Journal of Contemporay Histoy vol. 28 (1993). British plans for Economic Warfare against Germany - The problem o f Swedish Iron Ore. Prof. Patrick Salmon in Journal of Contemporay Histoy vol. 16 (1981). Combined Operations 1939-1945. Rear Admiral FI. E. Horan CB DSC in the "Royal United Ser­ vices Institute Journal, February 1953. Combined Operations in H itler's War. Rear Admiral H. E. Horan CB DSC in Naval Review vol. 48 (1960). Construction and Operation o f the M ilitary Ports in Gareloch and Loch Ryan. Sir Bruce G. White in Transactions of the Institution of Engineers and Shipbuilders in Scotland 1948-1949. Convoys to Murmansk. Kalapani (pseud.) in Naval Review vol. XLV no. 4 (1957). 313 North Western Approaches HM S Quebec. Unattributed article in Per Mare magazine. Spring 1946. N aval Intelligence, the Atlantic Campaign and the sinking o f the Bismarck,^A study in the integration o f intelligence into the conduct o f Naval Warfare. Article by Donald P. Steury in The Journal of Contemporary History vtA. 22 (1987). Some N aval Aspects o f Combined Operations. ’Amphibian’ in NavalReview vol XXXIII (1945). Strategic Intelligence and the Outbreak o f the Second World War. Richard Overy in War in Histoiy v(A. 5 no. 1. The British Chiefs ofStaff Committee and the preparation for the D ieppe Raid, March — A ugust1942, DidM ounfbatten really evade the Committee^s authorityFPetet J Hen- shawin War in Histoiy vol. 1, no. 1 (1994). The Dawn o f M odem Anti-Submarine Warfare: A llied Responses to the U Boats, 1944-45. Dr Marc Milner in the Riyal United Services Institute Journal (March 1989). The First Headquarters Ship. A. Cecil Hampshire in the Royal United Services Institute Journal (Mayl966). The Führer Conferences on N aval Affairs In Brassy's Naval Annual (1948). Rear Admiral H. G, Thursfield (ed.). William Clowes & Sons. The N avy's Part in Combined Operations. Transcript of a lecture by Rear Admiral T. H. Troubridge DSO in Royal United Services Institute Journal (February 1945). The Operational Intelligence Centre, Naval Intelligence Division. Three part article by P. B. (pseud, for Patrick Beesly) in Naval Review vol. 63 (1975). Was SOE any good? Article, by M. R. D. Foot in The Journal of Contemporary Histoy vol. 16 (1981). ACADEM IC D ISSERTATIONS From Neutrality to NATO - The Norwegian Armed Forces and Defense Policy1905-1955. Ph.D. dissertation by David G. Thomson, Department of Flistory, Oliio State University, Co­ lumbus, Ohio, USA, 1996. (Ch.s 4 to 9 on the Second World War) Iceland and the Struggle for the North Atlantic 1940-41. MA dissertation by Thor Whitehead, University of Georgia, USA, 1972. DOCUMENTARY AND FEATURE FILMS Squadron 992. Propaganda short on the Forth Raid October 1939. IWM. The Lion has Wings. National Film Archive. Scotland Speaks. (1941). IWM. The Shortest Route. Polish Paratroops. IWM, The White Eagle. Po&h Paratroops. IWM. Strangers. (1944) Poles in Scotland. IWM. The Silver Fleet (1943) Some scenes shot at HMS Ambrose, Dundee. 314 North Western Approaches f / Iy A/if Fig. no. r 10 11 12 13 14 I s Ï6 11 20 21 22 23 24 25 28 29 30 "3Ï" 32 33 34 35 36 37 40 41 42 43 44 45 Impérial Wat Museum, Dept, of Photogtaphs, Author’s collection. Glm^w Herald md Evening Times. Author’s collection. Author. Imperial War Museum, Dept, of Photographs. Imperial War Museum, Dept, of Photographs. The Scotsman and Edinhu/gbEveningNews.____ ADM 234 332.' ... ......................... ADM 234 332. Imperial War Museum, Dept, of Photographs. 602 Squadron Museum, Glasgow. The Scotsman and Edinburgh Evening News. Author’s collection. AIR 28 470. Author’s collection. 602 Squadron Museum, Glasgow. 18 Dundee Courier mà Evening Telegraph. Caption: WO 166 2128. 19 1 Bob Baird, Crossford, Dunfertriline. AIR 28 471. Bob Baird, Crossford, Dunfermline. ADM 199 13. Imperial War Museum, Dept, of Photographs. Dundee Courier Evening Telegraph, Imperial War Museum, Dept, of Photographs. 2 6____Clydebank library Local History Collection. 27 Clydebank Library Local Flistory Collection. Glasgow Herald and Evening Times, Greenock Library Local History Collection. Caption: HH/ 50 1-5. Mike Hughes. Imperial War Museum, Dept, of Photographs. Caption: ADM 199 369. ADM 199 371. ADM 199 371. Wynn 1998. Rohwer : 1999. Mike Hughes. Caption: ADM 199 59. ADM 199 372. AIR 27 1298. Imperial War Museum, Dept, of Photographs. Author’s collection. Author’s collection. Author. Author’s collection. 38 Author. ___ 39 Authoris collection. Imperial War Museum, Dept, of Photographs. Imperial War Museum, Dept, of Photographs. The Scotsman and Edinhurgh Evening N ews. Author’s collection. Imperial War Museum, Dept, of Photographs. DEFE 2 140. J North Western Approaches 46 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 66 67 6 8 69 70[ 71 72 74 76_ '77 Ts" 79 80 81 82 85 86 87_ 89 90' 91 92 "93 DEFE 2 140 47 Imperial War Museum, Dept, of Photographs. j48 Glasgow Herald and Evening Times , ________ 49 Imperial War Museum, Dept, of Photographs. 5 0 Imperial War Museum, Dept, of Photographs.. 51 Imperial War Museum, Dept, of Photographs. 52____Imperial War Museum, Dept, of Photographs. '53 I DEFE2815. Caption: DEFE 2 713. _____ ^ __ Royal Commission for Ancient and Historical Monuments, Scotland. 55 Imperial War Museum, Dept, of Photographs.______________ Imperial War Museum, Dept, of Photographs. Combined Operations 1940-1942 HMSO N 942. Imperial War Museum, Dept, of Photogtaphs. DEFE 2 83. Author’s collection. Imperial War Museum, Dept, of Photographs. Imperial War Museum, Dept, of Photographs. 63 Imperial War Museum, Dept, of Photographs. Author. __ ________ ______ 65 Imperial War Museum, Dept, of Photographs. Imperial War Museum, Dept, of Photographs. Imperial War Museum, Dept, of Photographs. Imperial War Museum, Dept of Photographs. Imperial War Museum, Dept, of Photographs. Imperial War Museum, Dept, of Photographs. Royal Navy Submarine Museum, HMS Dolphin, ADM 234 380. Imperial Wat Museum, Dept, of Photographs. Author’s collection. Author’s collection. Author’s collection. 94 Imperial War Museum, Dept, of Photographs. ÂDMT99 844’ HS 2 151. DEFE 2 365. Royal Norwegian Navy Museum, Horten. Author's collection. 83 Royal Norwegian Navy Museum, Horten. 84 Royal Naval Submarine Museum, HMS Dolphin, ADM 199 1851. Imperial War Museum, Dept, of Photographs. Imperial War Museum, Dept, of Photogtaphs. Imperial War Museum, Dept, of Photographs. ADM 199 99T 1 _ ADM 199 Î8Ï3. Author’s collection. Author. Author. Imperial War Museum, Dept, of Photographs. North Western Approaches IWO AMC ARP Asdic ASV B deinst BDO BdU BDV Bletchley Park BOAC BST CAP Captain (D) Captain (S) CCO CET C-in-C C-in-C (HP) C-in-C (WA) COHQ COPP COSSAC CP CTC DA DCO Decrypt D/F DNI Doppler EG EN Enigma First Watch Officer (i.e. First Lieutenant) aboard a U-boat. Armed Merchant Cruiser. Air Raid Precautions. Sliipbome sound-ranging device that could determine the range and bearing of a submerged contact. Air-to-Surface-Vessel radar. (See also LRASV) Abbreviation for Funkbeobachtungdeinst, the German radio interception and cryptanalysis service. Boom Defence Officer. Abbreviation for Befehlshaber der Unterseeboote, the German C-in-C U-boats, but also commonly used to refer to U boat Headquarters. Boom Defence Vessel. Buckinghamshire mansion which was the HQ of the Government Code and Cypher School, the British cryptanalysis service. British Overseas Airways Corporation. British Summer Time. Combat Air Patrol. Captain of a destroyer flotilla. Captain of a submarine flotilla. Chief of Combined Operations. Central European Time. Commander-in-Chief. Commander-in-Chief (Home Fleet). Commander-in-Cliief Western Approaches. Combined Operations Headquarters. Combined Operations Pilotage Party. Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander. Communist Party. Combined Training Centre. Director Angle. Used by submarines in calculating an attack solution. Director, Combined Operations. A decyphered message. Direction Finding by establishing the bearing of a station transmitting a radio signal. By triangulating two or more bearings on the same signal, it is possible to calculate the position from which it is being transmitted. Director of Naval Intelligence. In Asdic, the observed effect of the changing wavelength of sound waves reflected from a moving submerged object, i.e. a U-boat. Escort Group. Series code for coastal convoys firom Methil to the Clyde. The German Scliltissel M encryption machine, the naval version being the Marine FunkscWussel Machine M. The term was also used by the British to refer to encrypted texts that emanated from the machine. .317 North Western Approaches ETOUSA European Theater of Operations, US Army. FAA Fleet Air Arm. Flak An abbreviation for the German Flugzeugabwehrkanone or anti-aircraft gun. Used by both sides to refer to anti-aircraft gunfire. FN Series code for coastal convoys fiom the Thames to Methil. FO Forsvarets Overkommando. Norwegian High Command. FO(S) Flag Officer (Submarines) FS Series code for coastal convoys from Methil to the Thames. GMT Greenwich Mean Time. GOC General Officer Commanding. Gruppe Group (i.e. of U-boats). HaS Airborne radar sets also fitted to LCN. HA High Angle. Often used to describe anti-aircraft or dual-purpose armament. HE Hydrophone effect. HE High explosive. HEl 11 Heinkel 111 bomber, HE115 Heinkel 115 seaplane. Hedgehog. Ahead-throwing anti-submarine multiple mortar that fired depth charges 250 yards in front of an escort vessel, tlius closing the gap between the loss of an Asdic echo at close range and the normal method of fitting depth charges over the stem. (See also Squid) HMT His Majesty’s Trawler. HN Series code for convoys from Bergen to Methil that ran until 9 April 1940. HSL High-speed launch. HX Series code for inbound convoys from North America. HXF Series code for fast inbound convoys from Canada. JU8 8 Junkers 8 8 bomber. JW Series code for convoys outbound to the Soviet Union from December 1942. Kfg Kuestenfleigergruppe. KMF Series code for fast outbound military convoys to the Mediterranean. KMS Series code for slow outbound military convoys to the Mediterranean. Knickebein German radio beam bombing aid. Kriegsmarine The German Navy prior to 1945. Kriegstagebuch Daily log kept by German ships at sea and shore headquarters. KTB See Kriegstagebuch. KX Series code for outbound military supply convoys to the Mediterranean. LCA Landing Craft (Assault) (also referred to as ALC) LCG Landing Craft (Gun). LCM Landing Craft (Mechanised) (also referred to as MLC). LCN Landing Craft (Navigation). LCS Landing Craft (Support). LCT Landing Craft (Tank). LCV Landing Craft (Vehicle). LSI Landing Ship (Infantry). LOA Length Over All (of a ship) LRASV Long Range Air-to-Surface-Vessel radar. LSS Landing Ship (Sternchute). LST Landing Ship (Tank). Luftwaffe German Air Force. LWOST Low water, ordinary spring tides ME109 MesserschmittBf 109 fighter. MEl 10 Messerschmitt Bf 110 fighter-bomber. MFV Motor Fishing Vessel. 318 North Western Approaches MI5 MI6 ML MT MTB MV NCSO NOIC OA OB OIC ON ONS OOW OP OR ORB PPI PQ PRU QP Quisling R Boat RA RACOB RDF SBNO SC Schnotchel SHAEF SL SO SOE Squid SS Ultra UXB VANP VP WN WS Würzburg XDO Security Service. Secret Intelligence Service, Motor Launch. Motor Transport. Motor Torpedo Boat. Motor Vessel. Naval Control of Shipping Officer. Naval Officer in Charge. Series code for outbound convoys from the Thames. These passed tlirough the English Channel until 3 July 1940, then were diverted to join FN and EN convoys before passing outward thtough the North Western Approaches. Series code for outbound convoys from Liverpool which, from 7 July 1940, were diverted through the North Channel. Operational InteUigence Centre (Admiralty). Series code for convoys from Methil to Bergen that ran until 9 April 1940. Code letters used, from 15 July 1941 and in pkce of OB, for outbound 9 knot convoys to North America. Series code for IVz knot outbound convoys to North America from 15 July 1941, Officer of the Watch. Observation Post, Other Ranks (non-commissioned). Operations Record Book kept by RAF squadrons, stations, groups and commands. Plan Position Indicator (radar display). Series code for convoys outbound to the Soviet Union to November 1942. Photo Reconnaissance Unit (RAF). Series code for convoys inbound from the Soviet Union, to November 1942 Norwegian followers of the fascist puppet dictator Vidkun Quisling. American designed wooden assault craft. Series code for convoys inbound from the Soviet Union from December 1942. Rear Admiral Combined Operations Bases, Radio Direction Finding. British cover name for radar. Senior British Naval Officer. Series code for slow inbound convoys from North America. A breathing tube that could be rrised above the surface to allow a U-boat to run submerged on diesel engines, thus conserving battery power. Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force. Series code for inbound ocean convoys from Freetown, Sierra Leone, to UK Senior Officer. Special Operations Executive. Ahead throwing anti-submarine mortar, which fired a battery of three contact-fuzed depth charges. Employed larger charges than Hedgehog (q.v.). Steam Ship. Disguised form in which Enigma decrypt-derived intelligence was transmitted to operational commands. Unexploded bomb (also used to refer to unexploded air-dropped mines). Vice Admiral Northern Patrol. Series code for MTB anfi-shippmg operations off Norway. Series code for coastal convoys from the Clyde to Methil. Series code for outbound convoys to the Middle East and India via Suez or the Cape, Also known as Winston’s Specials’. German parabaloid radar system. Extended Defence Officer. 319 APPENDIX 1 ADMIRALTY FLEET CHARTS SHOWING SWEPT CHANNELS AS USED BY COASTAL CONVOYS OFF THE EAST COAST OF SCOTLAND- APPENDIX 2 TRAINING BEACHES AT CTC INVERARAY Furnace Beach Creggans Beach P.M.’s Beach RE Beach Cambrai Hards RAC andREME Beach Admital’s Beach Gash Beach Salmon Beach Auchnatra Beach Castle Beach Dunderave Beach Rubha Mor Beach Noble’s Beach Ardkinglas Beach Bathaich Blian Beach Ardno Beach Ard na Slaite Beach Ard na Gailich Beach A 300 yard shingle beach with access to the main road used for driving vehicles on and o ff craft in exercises with follow-up formations. Usable at all states o f tide. ______ _____ _______ A 120 yard beach o f mud and stones with access to a track leading to the main road. Unusable for craft equipped, like LCTs, with kedge anchors due to the presence of a submarine cable to Strachur. Usable at all states of tide. Little used other than for embarking troops for Exercise NEWTON BAY. A shingle and sand beach with three prepared exits to the track leading round the loch to the main road. Usable at all states o f tide. Used for loading and unloading vehicles for exercises . __________ _ __ A beach some 200 yards south o f the RE Pier, tlie soutlimost pier the HMS Quebec, with prepared exits for wheeled and tracked vehicles. Usable at all states o f the tide for the same purpose as P.M.’s Beach. Three concrete hards each capable o f taking one LCT or LST, though not usable two hours either side o f I low water. U sed for loading and unloading tanks, SP guns and vehicles o f all types for exercises. _ _J Not used for trainiag as such, this 60-yard sand beach was used for the beaching o f landing craft and a | fairway past the rocky spit at the north-eastern extremity was marked by spars.______ _______ Eighty yard beach o f sand and stones with direct access to the main road, but with, at its northern end, a dangerous spit marked by a buoy. Most landing craft could beach here at all states o f the tide, though LSTs were restricted to four hours either side o f high water. Used for loading and unloading veMcles and troops for exercises. A small beach immediately south o f Inveraray Pier normally used for loading personnel in minor landing craft for unit training and exercises. _________________________________________ __ _______________ A 100-yard shingle beach with direct access to the main road. Used for loading and unloading vehicles and personnel. Larger landing craft restricted to two hours either side o f high water. N ot used during the salmon season. A 75-yard stone beach with two exits, one for wheeled and one for tracked vehicles, to the main road. Used for loading and unloading vehicles and personnel._________ ____ _ ______________ A 50-yard shingle beach west o f Dunderave Castle suitable only for minor landing craft. N o exit for vehicles. A 100 yard shingle beach with two exits, one for wheeled and one for tracked vehicles, to the main road. Used for loading and unloading vehicles. ___ ___________ _____ A 100 yard shingle beach suitable for aU types o f landing craft three hours either side o f high water with a vehicle exit to the road. Approved for the use o f 2” mortar smoke and flares, 4” Naval smoke mortar, no. 77 smoke grenades, bangalore torpedoes and small explosive charges. Used for training assault company groups in assault landings, deployment exercises for tanks or SP guns, exercises for follow-up formations, exercises for Assault Battalion Groups and sometimes used in Assault Brigade Group exercises. Beach of fine shingle used for wading vehicles from LCTs. A semi-circular 75-yard beach with a prominent spit at the south west end used for training Assault Company Groups, re-embarking vehicles waded ashore at Noble’s Beach, exercises for Assault Battalion Groups and sometimes used in Assault Brigade Group exercises._________ _ Strachur Beach Rosebank Beach Stucreoch Beach Newton Bay Beach A 150-yard beach of fine shingle used for exercises for Assault Battalion Groups and sometimes used in Assault Brigade Group exercises. Approved for the use o f 2” mortar smoke and flares, 4” Naval smoke mortar, no. 77 smoke grenades, bangalore torpedoes and small explosive charges._______ ___ A 200-yard beach o f fine shingle with easy access to the main road used for exercises for Assault Battalion Groups and sometimes used in Assault Brigade Group exercises. Approved for the use o f 2” mortar smoke and flares, 4” Naval smoke mortar, no. 77 smoke grenades, bangalore torpedoes and small explosive charges. Care had to be taken that no bombs fell on Ardno Farm and that Bangalore torpedoes were not detonated too close. A 150-yard loose shingle beach with access to the main road used for exercises for Assault Battalion Groups and sometimes used in Assault Brigade Group exercises. Approved for the use o f 2” mortar smoke and flares, 4” Naval smoke mortar, no. 77 smoke grenades, bangalore torpedoes and small explosive charges. Care had to be taken that no bombs fell on the main road.___ A 100-yard shingle beach with easy access to the main road. Used for craft training and sometimes used in Assault Brigade Group exercises. _ j_______ Muddy sand and shingle beach used for wet landings by troops and wading vehicles. A 200-yard beach o f stones with access to the main road used for driving vehicles on and o ff craft. A 200-yard stone beach with two exits to the main road for wheeled or tracked vehicles. Used m conjunction with Exercise NEWTON BAY. A 175-yard beach used for Exercise NEWTON BAY. Usable by LCAs and LCTs two hours either side o f high water. Hinterland very boggy and this prevented the movement o f vehicles off the beach. Ammunition and explosives used he r e . __ APPENDIX 3 MAP OF THE COAST OF SOUTH-WEST NORWAY SHOW ING THE INNER LEADS PASSAGE AS USED BY GERMAN SHIPPING. (AIR 41 74) 5 6 7 THE COAST OF NORWAY PLACE NAMES 1 tIF IN NI n U 'A hS I’ASSAC.l Namsos Fro Û ° Fiavet b 0 RONDHEIMGriphokn KHISTIANSUNDJ^TH . o >$^LESUND SLvdUanUtl IGoÿîO / Uremanger ojsjoen , Ut \ i \ r r LiqM fcje I t.jhl y^i *1 Jp 'f OSLO MosseHAUGF.^N^nil'A^ Harmo HORTE L arv ik - Tv- ^ STAVANGER, .3^^ 0 B A Y !ddrnl i(p)l * / ' J oederen s Poin ObresLod Ti^E gcrau iH r;o BreMKeata ^% ^^ _K ^K R IST IA N SUND SOUTH o P TheSkaw Goteborg irshnls CZT Laâso/. Hanbsholm . \ V ' 9° . a 't to A.H.B.l D IA G .N U 2 I7