JULIAN, BISHOP OF AECLANUM: EXEGETE AND THEOLOGIAN

Edmund Samuel Philip Jones

A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of St Andrews

1965

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JULIAN, BISHOP OF AECLANUM;

EXEGETE AND THEOLOGIAN;

being a thesis presented by

EDMUND SAMUEL PHILIP JONES

to

The UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANDREWS, SCOTLAND,

in application for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DECLARATION.

I hereby declare that the following thesis is based on the results of research carried out by me, that the thesis is my own composition, and that it has not previously been presented for a Higher Degree.

The research was carried out in St. Mary's College, in the University of St. Andrews, and in the Scottish National Library, Edinburgh, under the direction of the Revd. Professor J. H. Baxter.

Signed
CERTIFICATE.

I certify that EDMUND S. P. JONES has spent nine terms in Research Work at St. Mary's College in the University of St. Andrews, that he has fulfilled the conditions of Ordinance No. 16, and that he is qualified to submit the following thesis in application for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Signed
STATEMENT.

I was educated at Campbell College, Belfast, and the Royal Belfast Academical Institution, proceeding from there to Trinity College, Dublin where I graduated Bachelor of Arts (First Class). During divinity studies at New College, Edinburgh, and Fitzwilliam House, Cambridge, I prepared a thesis and passed examinations to qualify as Bachelor of Divinity at Dublin. After a period of practical work in a parish I matriculated at St. Mary's College, St. Andrews in October, 1962, and prepared this thesis.
DEDICATION

Eden Grove Bond

TO MY PARENTS.

TUB-SIZED - AIR DRIED
The first problem facing a post-graduate student is finding a theme which affords genuine possibilities for fruitful research. The topic itself must be of sufficient moment to warrant prolonged study, profound enough to exercise the critical faculty, and stimulating enough to maintain that interest without which research degenerates into a dull collection of data. That I found myself furnished with a topic meeting these requirements is due to the Regius Professor of Ecclesiastical History, the Rev. J.H. Baxter, D.D., D.Litt. His wide learning and shrewd judgement leave me in great debt.

I was fortunate to be in residence at St. Andrews while a course of Gifford Lectures were being delivered by the Rev. Professor Henry Chadwick, D.D., of Christchurch, Oxford. His quiet erudition and perceptive comment are well known to many generations of students.

The Rev. J.K. Cameron, Ph.D., gave me much help in avoiding many infelicities of style and expression. To him and all the members of Staff at St. Mary's College I tender esteem and gratitude.

The generous scholarship granted by the University authorities left me free to pursue studies unhindered by financial anxieties.

I am deeply grateful to Miss C. Baird and the Librarian assistants for their untiring efforts to secure material not available in Scotland.

My final acknowledgement goes to Mrs. C.W. Hay for typing the entire manuscript. With diligence and cheerfulness she carried out a task which must often have been onerous and difficult.
INTRODUCTION.

Whatever may distinguish the fifth from the twentieth century each shares this characteristic—that it is an age not simply of languid doubt and degenerate rationalism, but also of genuine theological tension. The debate between Augustine and the Pelagians is often formal and artificial. Yet it centres on a profound inner religious tension, which still defies a theological formulation doing justice to contemporary convictions regarding self-initiated moral activity, and the traditional conception of divine grace. The issues raised in the stormy debates of the fifth century still compel attention to-day.

It is possible to remember the rancour between the adversaries and forget that Christianity itself gains from a heightening of moral ideals and deepening of moral earnestness. Few would deny that the diagnosis of the Pelagians was inaccurate, their prognosis faulty and the recommended treatment inadequate. Much the same could be said of the Augustinian position. Nevertheless, though their statements often seem antithetical and their solutions contradictory their aims are identical—to ensure the advance of Christ’s Kingdom among men and the continued growth of the Body of Christ into mature manhood.
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CHAPTER I

THE RISE OF PELAGIANISM
CHAPTER I

THE RISE OF PELAGIANISM

1. Need for Reform.

The burning of Rome in A.D. 70 heralded an era of religious persecution which lasted for almost four centuries. Emperors such as Decius (d. 251 A.D.) and Galerius (d. 311 A.D.) vied with one another in efforts to crush the Church. Even in the more favourable political climates associated with the Rescript of Galliano (280) and The Edict of Milan (313)\(^1\) the Christian minority was tolerated rather than accepted. Thus the favour of Constantine culminating in the 'sententia cordiale' of Theodosius I at the close of the fourth century found the Church unprepared for the subsequent influx of nominal members, and the corresponding growth of monasticism with its concomitant of a double standard of morality.

\(^2\)See S.H. Baynes: "Constantine The Great and the Christian Church" (Proceedings of the British Academy, Vol. XV., 1929), p. 11. "The Edict of Milan may be a fiction, but the fact for which the term stood remains untouched."
Asceticism became the ideal rather than the preferential mode of Christian living, and sanctity lost its corporate sense as a sharing in the gift of the Spirit. Pelagius felt called to raise a prophetic voice against the increasing secularization and spiritual degeneracy of the Church. He was convinced that his contemporaries were sheltering from the rigorous and imperious demands of the Christian code by the doctrine of man's radical corruption. Augustine's first impression of him was that of "a man fired with a burning indignation against those who instead of laying the blame for their sins upon their human wills put it upon their natural constitution as men and seek to make that nature their excuse." Any formula such as 'da quod jubes' could only inculcate an enervating sense of the futility of all human endeavour. Thus his purpose was not to compose a "Summa Theologica," but to initiate a reformation. We do him an injustice if we demand primarily a perfectly consistent theological system; his aim was to recall to a high quality of Christian living even at the risk of untidy

1Augustine; De Natura et Gratia l. P.L., XLIV, 247. cf. De Pecc. Merit., iii. 5. (XLIV, 133). 'bonum et praedicandum virum.'
Theological sutures.

The reformer is essentially a product of his age. Therefore it is important to form an accurate estimate of the inner tone of society in Western Europe at the beginning of the fifth century. Such an undertaking is fraught with peril partly because contemporary accounts are often unbalanced and partly because it is "rarely safe to make broad assertions about the morality of a whole people." Long lists of vice and misdeeds do not, of themselves, exclude the presence of real moral perceptions. Indeed they may attest them. Furthermore the relapse of believers into the dress and customs of secular society are scarcely a grave moral offence however regrettable they may appear to their contemporaries. The extravagant denunciations by Clement of Alexandria and Tertullian of the use of artificial hair invest the strictures of Ambrose, Jerome and Gregory Nazianzen with less critical import. Nevertheless the description of Roman society by Ammianus Marcellinus, of Marseillian life by Salvianus, and of conditions

In Asia Minor by Chrysostom together with numerous allusions from other sources, exhibit a depravity which no judicious estimate can legitimately disallow. The Agapē had become such an occasion for drunkenness and riot that even frequent condemnation by councils at Laodicea and Carthage failed to inhibit participants. The commemoration of martyrs degenerated into scandalous dissipation and gross licentiousness. Priestly celibacy was often a cloak for widespread sexual licence. Salvianus contrasts the debauchery of the Christians in Aquitaine with the high moral standards of the Goths and Vandals, and Jerome comments, "Nostris peccatis Barbari fortes sunt. Nostris vitiiis Romanus superatur exercitus." The shameless search for ecclesiastical preferment, and personal aggrandisement reached such scandalous proportions that a law passed under Valentinian forbade acceptance by the clergy of legacies. Certainly there was less open cruelty and violence than under the Caesars, but there was fiercer

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2 Jerome: Epist. LX. 17 (P.L. XXII. 601).

3 Jerome Epist. LII. (P.L. XXII, 527-40). ref. Codex Theodosianus XVI.
partisanship, acrimonious falsehood, intellectual suffocation and moral lassitude. The Christian faith, planted in the dissolute cities of Asia Minor may have produced many strange ascetics and some illustrious theologians, "indagatores veri," but it had only a limited effect upon the mass of society. Sometimes it introduced a more acrimonious principle of dissension without appreciably tempering sensuality and indulgence.¹

Yet the Christianization of the Empire was not entirely superficial. As Dill reminds us; "Men will often rise above the level of a bad religion, just as they constantly fall below the standard of a good one."² The victorious Church which brought paganism to its knees was a long way from the simple piety of the groups in the catacombs; but though evil men might be insensible to the moral culture inherent in Christianity they were still haunted by the imposition of its sanctions. Outside the walls where indecency and immorality flourished public

¹Basil: "De Spiritu Sancto" XXX, 76.

opinion never entirely jettisoned the imperatives of the Christian faith, and the unseemliness of the clergy was itself contrasted with the simplicity of the Nazarene. Though the ideal of the anchorite was often distorted and his practices perverted, yet he did represent a thorough going rejection of the pernicious compromise evident in nominal church membership. In this lies the real significance of the monastic movement. The excitements of the circus, the indecencies of the arena, the turpitudes of the theatre, the indelicacies of the Flora lia, and the insincerities of the sanctuary were balanced by a genuine humanitarianism. Even if it is true that the transformation of Christianity from a martyr-attested faith to a politically significant institution corroded her simple tenets; even if militarism gradually superseded the initial practice of non-violence; even if the 'vis inertia' of the world and the increasing substitution of the nominal and sensuous for the vital and spiritual accelerated the general moral decline, the effect of Christian principles on the imagination of the age can scarcely be over-emphasized. The true quality of a society is often more evident in its latent ideals than in its
patent acts. While slavery inoculated society with a moral poison fostering cruelty and indulgence, the Eucharist proclaimed the basic spiritual equality of bond and free, and contributed to the virtual recognition of full civic rights subsequent to manumission. If the 'fabulae palliatae' of Plautus and Terence continued to encourage a facile toleration of vice, a pervasive sentimentality and gross indolence, Christianity was still aware that true greatness consists not in the position one occupies but in the service one renders. Constantine initiated the state support of destitute children and in 374 A.D. Valentinian made infanticide a capital offence. The clerical acquisition of inordinate wealth arose in part from their position as trustees of the poor, monasteries opened their doors to the oppressed and afflicted, and criminal executions were abolished during the Lenten season. That most outrageous disregard for human life, the arena, was constantly opposed by the Christian conviction that bloodshed was an unqualified evil. This mass exploitation of the basest sadistic impulses was a cancerous growth feeding on the most sacred principle of society - the sanctity of human life. Through the
brave intervention of the monk Telemachus the last gladiatorial show in the West was celebrated at Rome in A.D. 404 under the Emperor Honorius. "There is scarcely any other single reform so important in the moral history of mankind as the suppression of the gladiatorial shows, and this feat must be almost exclusively ascribed to the Christian Church."¹

Even then it is well to remember that men of genuine humanity frequented, instituted, and applauded the gladiatorial games. Such moral anomalies are by no means confined to antiquity. It is not difficult to realize that to a Briton reared in the rural simplicities of a remote province, Roman senatorial life and wealth presented a rude awakening. Fastidious young men had lost the sense of discipline which built the Empire and young women absorbed in the glitter of metropolitan life must have seemed shallow in outlook and even shallower in morals. Considerations such as these must temper an uncritical acceptance of the strictures of Christian moralists. We must remember that a figure as influential as St. Jerome was not only a monk but

also an orator. His sensitiveness to sin, his passion for rhetorical effect and his deep religious conviction mark him out as a powerful preacher rather than a dispassionate observer. His occasional literary extravagances are a salutary reminder that only the highest ethical standards are consonant with the integrity and claims of the Galilean. Into this disquieting religious scene Pelagius came as a reformer persuasive in logic, captivating in oratory, challenging in ethics and distinguished in piety.

2. The Pelagian Answer.

Pelagianism was based on two axioms - the righteousness of God and the full moral responsibility of man. The vital and distinguishing characteristic of a person is moral autonomy. Sin is strictly speaking predicable only of the Self, and guilt has meaning only as related to each individual's volitional acts. Augustine's teaching of an evil nature exercising a determinative influence on the function and destiny of the personality seemed to introduce fatalism, deny a constitutive part of human nature and annul the conditions of a righteous judgement. What we cannot do, no 'ought' can impose
upon us. The problem was how to preserve the gratuitous nature of salvation without endangering the moral autonomy of man. Augustine had isolated the dilemma in his epistle to the monks of Adrumentum: "If there be no such a thing as God's grace, how can He be the Saviour of the world? If there be no such a thing as free-will how can He be its Judge?"\(^1\) Responsibility requires that freedom be not an addendum to the moral life, but its chief postulate. Pelagius perceived that unless the Self is the ultimate author of its own acts moral responsibility becomes an ethical fiction.\(^2\) No one can be regarded as a proper subject for moral predicates if his external circumstances or internal nature necessitate a specific course of action. "It seems plain enough that if there are any other determinants of the act, 'external to the Self' to that extent the act is not an act for which the Self can be held morally responsible ... his moral responsibility can logically extend only to those elements within the

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\(^1\) Augustine: *Epist. CCXIV. 2. (P.L. XXXIII. 969)*.

act ... of which he is the sole author."¹ On the other hand the religious man ascribes his loyalties wholly to God's grace. He is saved not because of himself, but in spite of himself. The sinner knows he is pleasing to God not because of some vestigial integrity or persistent intrinsic merit, but simply because a gracious God is made freely his in Christ. The problem was how to reconcile religious dependence with equally real moral independence - how to speak of grace without implying moral nihilism - how to affirm faith in justification by grace alone without sacrificing the moral and rational men. Pelagius' answer rests on the assumption that the relation between God and man is permanently and decisively judicial. He believed grace is environmental not constitutive, being expressed in the Law,² in doctrine.³


²Pelagius: On Romans, 8.2 in "Texts and Studies" vol. IX (1926) Souter, p. 60. "Notandum quia gratiam legem appellat."

³Cf. Augustine: De Gratia Christi, I, 8; (P.L. XLIV, 364). "Hoc est ergo gratiam Dei ponere in lege atque doctrina."
and in the remission of sins. The soul is turned to Christ through illuminating grace. This environmental action of God is so intimate and personal that we may refer to it as immanent not in our willing, but in our lives. Since it has this intimate relation to the Self, it is the cause of right discernments by our will. When we do evil, we know by what Sidgwick was to call 'the simple affirmation of consciousness in the moment of deliberate action' that we are freely making a choice between two or more possible courses of action. The realization that we could have chosen the alternative intuitively conveys the reality of the responsible self. "Man feels within himself this irrational and unfathomable freedom in the very

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1Souter op. cit. p. 48. "Manifesta est enim quantitas peccati, ut sciretur gratiae magnitude et redderemus competens debitum caritatis."

2Cf. Augustine En. in Psalm, 25 (II), 11; (P.L., XXXVI, 193): "Quare illuminatus es? Quia convertisti te ad alium quod tu non eras. Quid est alium quod tu non eras? Deus Lumen est. Non enim tu lumen eras quia peccator eras."


fibre of his being."¹ Pelagius felt that this immediate deliverance of consciousness no theological dogma could rationally withstand. This conviction 'ab intra' of our worth as moral persons is confirmed in the Biblical idea of divine righteousness. Here there was a frank acceptance of legal categories. Christian duty, the inescapable "ought," is not simply a unique non-analyzable notion whose meaning and reference we perceive intuitively. It is the direct and immediate application of the moral law in a concrete situation. Sin is the deliberate transgression of a known standard. God distributes rewards according to merit— and merits are self initiated acts which lay God under obligation to the performer. This religious legalism was strengthened by the increasing ecclesiastical influence of Jewish proselytes with their deep-rooted predilection for the categories of the Mosaic codes. The Jewish patriarch at Jerusalem had an influence not less impressive than the Roman pontiff himself,² and Sabbath observance once more


became a living issue.¹ Love to God, which means Christian perfection, is not a mystical emotion nor a sacramental endowment, but a willingness to keep the commandments.² Hence the need of that 'contemptus mundi' which is the very essence of righteousness. Absolute renunciation becomes the highest and most complete expression of Christianity: "radix enim omnium malorum est avaritia."³ This renunciation with its twin idea of chastity is the keystone of Pelagian ethical teaching.


Pelagius's ascetic disposition was affected by the prevailing spirit of monachism. Theodoret's "Philotheus" shows the widespread appeal of a strictly eremitical life in Syria and Mesopotamia. Jerome's "Vita Pauli" (c. 374 A.D.) witnesses that even the most orthodox theologians found a challenge in the monastic ideals. Ambrose the acute statesman,

¹Augustine: Ep. 55, 13 (P.L. XXXIII, 210). "In servitute autem veteris populi etiam multa celebravi impereta sunt, quae nobis tantum-modo intelligenda traduntur."

²Pelagius: Exp. Rom. VIII, 39 (Souter p. 72).

³Pelagius: "De Div." 17.
Basil the ambitious scholar, and Chrysostom the distinguished preacher, each admired the life of solitude and prayer. Dom Butler finds the grounds for this in the fact that "asceticism and mysticism are the expressions of a deeply seated instinct of human nature." Unfortunately asceticism was often dominated by the principle that salvation depended entirely on individual moral energy. The deep spirituality of Cassian's "Conferences" tended to be the exception rather than the rule. The common focal point was the unceasing vigilance to duties by a sheer act of will. The will remained free and sought to master the turbulent passions. Sin was an incident in human nature which may be conquered by discipline and renunciation. The body was to be subdued by fasting, the mind trained by devotions, and the instincts annulled by celibacy. It was tacitly assumed that the deserts of Egypt and the cloisters of Gaul were nearer the Galilean spirit than the tensions of pastoral care and the pressures of political responsibility.

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2 Macarii Aegyptii Opera, Hom. 15 et saepe (P.G. XXXIV, 449-322).
ultimate ideal was an ascetic theocracy dependent on
the maintenance of individual virtue.

Cyril of Jerusalem's "Catechetical Lectures"
(ca. 350 A.D.) are a clear example of the emphasis
laid by preachers on moral self-discipline. Sin
derives primarily from a weakness of will;¹ self-
mastery is obligatory for all who seek Christian
perfection.² Through the sacramental rite the moral
impulse which is proper to the natural man, and which
is awakened through catechetical instruction, is
transformed into a Christian effort rewarded by God:
"Thou has no need to fear Him if thou hast bravely
wrestled and laboured. Nothing of that effort is lost.
In the Book is the record of every prayer, every psalm,
every almsgiving, every fast, every true marriage and
every widowhood borne for God's sake; virginity and
continence are crowned with honour.... Now is the
time to live according to Christ's everlasting
commandments."³ The monastic ideals of humility,

¹Procatech. 2, 1-4.
²Catech. 2, 1-2; 4, 18-21.
³Catech. 15, 23. 26. Quoted by Lietzmann,
op. cit. See p. 19.
renunciation and continence are expounded at length by the renowned Messalian theologian-ascetic, Symeon of Mesopotamia. Christ's Passion is primarily exemplary. The highest Christian life will be an effortless performance of religious exercises — the perfect coinherence of will and ability in the contemplation of God. Human nature is inherently capable and inescapably responsible for moral conduct. Clearly monasticism was endangering the specific New Testament insight that in salvation the initiative lies wholly with God. Our activity in faith is simply response to the prior call of God. We acknowledge that the gulf between ourselves and God has long since been bridged — that it can never really have existed since there was never a time when His Love would recognize it. While asceticism sometimes excelled in a spirit of genuine self-sacrifice, moderation, and renunciation, and though it openly broke with every pleasure-seeking compromise, it never really grasped the wholly gratuitous nature of salvation: "it was essentially a religion of self-redemption, depending on one's strength of will when supported by grace as given by God ... the crucial factor was a man's own free-will, and his own faithful
continuance in steadfast prayer.\textsuperscript{1} Concerned to discover an inner relation between 'contemptus mundi' and 'justitia,' Pelagius forgets that the basal principle of the New Testament is reconciliation mediated and guaranteed in the person of Christ. Renunciation can have no specific Christian contour if it is divorced from this central Pauline theme. What was particularly repulsive to Augustine was not the emphasis on personal endeavour and voluntary renunciation, but the diminution of the 'sola gratia.' Similar anthropological tenets had long been current in both West and East. Pelagius being aware of the inherent opposition of his ethical premiss to the dogmas of the West, was anxious to avoid public controversy. "Non est dogma."\textsuperscript{2} It was left to his less wary disciple Cælestius to spotlight the contradiction. The actual breach was occasioned by the sacramental practice of baptism "for the remission of sins," evidenced in the ethical idea of 'impeccantia,' and developed in the theological implications of a

\textsuperscript{1} H. Lietzmann; "The Era of the Church Fathers," pp. 133-139.

\textsuperscript{2} De gest. Pel. 6.
primal sin.

4. History of Events.

The historical course of the controversy need not detain us. Pelagius probably came to Rome as a young man "of holy life and no small attainments as a Christian,"¹ to prepare himself for a civil career; but he found his vocation in the exercise of a layman’s mission to the upper circles of contemporary pseudo-Christian Roman society. An orthodox treatise on the Trinity was followed by a book of Eulogiae, in which he insisted that self-despair is not the Christian attitude. We ought and can do what is right. Duty is not a 'vox nihil.' These tenets were privately circulated in a commentary on the Pauline Epistles. Caelestius 'auditorialis Scholasticus' was an early convert to this austere moralism. The approach of the Gauls induced the two ascetics to leave Rome in 411 A.D. for Africa via Sicily. While at Carthage, Caelestius applied for ordination as a presbyter. Accused by Paulinus of Milan he was condemned for

¹Augustine: "De pecc. merit." III, 1. (P.L. XLIV, 185).
heresy at a synod presided over by Bishop Aurelius.¹ Little is known of his defence except that he rejected the Traducianist theory of the transmission of sin and admitted the propriety of pedobaptism - probably on the basis of a distinction between eternal life and the kingdom of heaven. Meanwhile Pelagius had arrived in Palestine, and before a synod at Jerusalem (415 A.D.) successfully defended himself against Jerome and the young Spanish ecclesiastic Paulus Orosius. A few months later a similar ruling was given at Diospolis, the "synodus miserabilis" pronouncing against Heros of Arles and Lazarus of Aix. The matter was also under consideration in Rome. The untimely death of the perceptive pontiff Innocent I resulted in Zosimus, 'natione Grecus,' attacking Augustine and his supporters for their opposition to men 'absolutae fidei.' Powerful ecclesiastical pressure and the 'obtestatio' of the North African bishops forced Zosimus to adopt a more cautious attitude, and Augustine won the day by

¹ Only a fragment of the official record of this council is preserved; see "De gratia Christi," ii, 3 (P.L. XLIV, 336-7).
enlisting the civil support of the Emperor Honorius. 1

Faced with a 'fait accompli' Zosimus hastily concurred with the Imperial edict in his 'Epistola Tractoria.' With exemplary ruthlessness Pelagianism was now outlawed. "Pelagianism was stifled by force rather than by argument." 2 Eighteen bishops refused to subscribe to the 'tractoria,' and with their deposition coincides the rise of the brilliant young articulate disputator, Julianus Aeclanensis. The letter of Pope Leo to the bishop of Aquileia (ca. 444 A.D.) and the correspondence of Pope Gelasius show that Pelagianism survived in an attenuated form as late as the close of the fifth century.

5. Theological Background.

Although the writings of the early Fathers have many references inspired by the thought of free and undeserved pardon, the assumption that man must

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1 Augustine clearly regretted the use of repressive measures in outlawing heretics; cf. Op. Impf. 1, 10 (P.L. XLV, 1054): "Quod enim propter Donatistas factum est, eorum violentissimae turbae fieri coegerunt, ignorantes quid ante sit gestum, quod eis fuerat ostendendum."

in some way merit saving grace obstinately persists: "From the time of his baptism onwards the believer is thrown upon his own resources; in the main he is left to redeem himself ... the doctrine that faith alone is sufficient, which was an assumption in the earlier Christianity, becomes now a settled and almost a reasoned conviction." Pelagius certainly believed that in his reiteration of man's moral autonomy he was supported by traditional Christianity. The constant appeal by both sides to men "holy and learned" suggests that neither the Pelagian nor Augustinian viewpoint represents a radical break with traditions which were themselves fluid. Tixeront goes so far as to say: "from all their affirmations one can hardly draw a single precise and well-connected theory."  

(a) East - Athanasius, The Cappadocians, Theodore. Less than a century before the great Athanasius had effectively synthesized Platonic metaphysics and Biblical mythology. His basic theme is the contrast  

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between nature and endowment which enables him to
explain the paradox of human existence—man's
involvement in finiteness and his transcendence over
it. To human nature, in the strictest sense of the
term, belongs the creaturely and sensuous state of
being. Moral and rational capacities are divine
gifts inseparable from human nature. Man is a creature
tending to non-being, yet able to participate in the
divine call. All are "by nature corruptible, but
destined, by the grace following from partaking of
the Word, to have escaped their natural state, had
they remained good." "For transgression of the
commandment was turning them back to their natural
state." Athanasius fails to make explicit just
how Adam's sin passed to all mankind. Sometimes
Adam seems to be the Representative Man, at other

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1 "De Inc. Verb. Dei" 5. 'For if, out of a
formal state of non-existence, they were called into
being by the Presence and loving kindness of the Word,
it followed naturally that when men were bereft of the
knowledge of God and were turned back to what is not....'

2 ibid. 3.

3 ibid. 5.

4 ibid. 4.
times the physical progenitor of sin; yet original
sin is not identified with concupiscence. Had sin
not intervened man would have transcended his
mortality. The effect of this lapse was the reversion
of mankind to the 'natural state.' Prior to the Fall
man had an intuitive knowledge which is now mediated
through the divine Law. This capacity of the 'simplex
intuitus,'¹ this effortless apprehension of the
spiritual, has been replaced by the power of
discursive examination, the ratiocinative function
which forms the content of all intellectual
comprehension. By Adam's free volition the
disintegrating forces latent in human nature have been
released.² There follows a gradual deterioration of
moral ability, a progressive dimunition of the 'visio
Dei.'³ Forfeiting moral integrity and bodily

¹Athanasius uses a diversity of terms to
express this divinely bestowed ability: e.g. γνώσις,

²In his later anti-Arian writings Athanasius
considers the rational spirit (ψυχὴ λογικὴ) as
constitutionally immortal.

³Contra Gentes 8: "Now the soul of mankind,
not satisfied with the devising of evil, began by
degrees to venture upon what is worse still."
immortality all are henceforth subject to \( \phi \Theta \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \) and return \( \epsilon\iota\varsigma \; \tau\omicron \; \kappa\alpha\tau\; \phi\omicron\omicron\omicron \). The true knowledge of God can be regained by self-effort - by a willingness to cast off the bonds of sensuality:

"For they are able, as they turned away their understanding from God, and feigned as gods things that were not, in like manner to ascend with the intelligence of their soul, and turn back to God."\(^1\)

Yet this universality of sin does not imply equal culpability; perfect moral integrity remains possible.\(^2\) Sometimes Athanasius speaks as though the divine likeness can only be restored through Christ.\(^3\)

By the grace of God the truncated faculties of knowing, rationality and true freedom may be renewed.\(^4\) In his later writings a distinction is drawn between the creative act of God through which our existence is

\(^1\) Contra Gentes 34.

\(^2\) Contra Ar. III: 33. 'Many for instance have been made holy and clean from all sin.'

\(^3\) De inc. 14: 'For as, when the likeness painted on a panel has been effaced by stains from without, he whose likeness it is must needs come once more to enable the portrait to be renewed on the same wood.'

\(^4\) De inc. 4.
established, and the adoptive event by which we become sons of God.\(^1\) He clearly conceives of Adam's sin passing to posterity, but fails to make the mode of propagation explicit: "All men were lost in Adam's transgression."\(^2\) "Human nature arises in sin and receives the consequences of sin."\(^3\) But Athanasius's references to the effect of this primal disobedience tend to suggest a change in status rather than any inherent disability of will.

The Cappadocians - in particular Gregory of Nyssa - reproduce and develop the Athanasian teaching. Adam enjoyed the beatific vision unmarred by mortality and ignorance.\(^4\) This natural state was one of perfect intercourse with the Creator and freedom from physical evils.\(^5\) All men possess that freedom of choice which is an inalienable part of human

\(^1\) Contr. Ar. II. 59. 'We are not begotten first, but made ...'

\(^2\) Contr. Ar. II. 61. cf. ii. 60.

\(^3\) Contr. Apoll. I. 15.


nature. God's image consists in the sum-total of all wisdom, virtue and liberty: "the earthly and sensuous side of man was ἐπιγεννηματικός, a subsequent creation, that accordingly, the spiritual in man was conceptually the primary, and his sensuous and bodily nature the secondary part of him. Sexual life is connected with shame and derives its origin from the Fall, bisexuality itself being a consequence of the Primal Sin. Hence Niebuhr's comment: 'On the whole Greek side of Christianity, sex is regarded as a special symbol and consequence of sin.' The locus of the 'imago Dei' is human nature as a whole rather than

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1 Greg. Nyss., "De Hom. Op. 16. 'Then there is in us the principle of all excellence, all virtue and wisdom, and every higher thing that we conceive: but pre-eminent among all is the fact that we are free from necessity, and not in bondage to any natural power, but have decision in our own power as we please; for virtue is a voluntary thing, subject to no dominion; that which is the result of compulsion and force cannot be virtue.' cf. Basil, "Ep." 233.


3 Both Gregories allegorise the coats of skin in the Genesis saga, interpreting them as types of the sensuous life (Greg. Nyss: "De Virg" 12: Greg. Naz. "Or." XXXVIII. 12). Gregory Nyssa later revises his views on the moral significance of copulation. cf. "Or. Cat." XXVIII. 'The whole organization of the body is of equal value throughout.'

specific concrete persons.¹ The whole human race was created ideally beforehand by God.² 'Adam' signifies the nature common to all men. The Fall is due solely to the misuse of the will, and to this failure is attributed all the subsequent evils of man, including ignorance, mortality, sensuality and social injustice.³ This strong sense of the mystical unity of the race does not imply that all men share in Adam's culpability. Children dying in infancy will not stand before the Judgement Seat.⁴ Because they have done no evil retribution can have no relevance.⁵ Yet side by side with this emphasis on personal volition as the source of sin there appears the germ of the later doctrine of transmitted evil: "He who partakes


⁵Ibid.
of Adam's nature partakes also of his Fall. Sin is inseparable from our nature: "Now since by a motion of our self-will we contracted a fellowship with evil, and owing to some sensual gratification, mixed up this evil with our nature, like some deleterious ingredient spoiling the taste of heresy, and so, falling away from that blessedness which is involved in the thought of passionless, we have been viciously transformed." Nevertheless, Tennant overstates the case when he comments that Gregory of Nyssa 'witnesses, in fact, to the readiness now existing within the Eastern portion of Christendom to assimilate the more essential features of the theory which was soon to dominate the thought of the Church as a whole with regard to the origin and propagation of human sin." As yet the central question of the necessity and mode of grace had scarcely arisen in the East, and this was the basic problem in the later Western controversy even more
than the cognate idea of free-will.

Perhaps it is Theodore of Mopsuestia who most closely resembles the teaching of Pelagius. His doctrine of man is based upon the empirical data derived from the observable facts of human nature. Man is the connecting link (Συνάφεια, Σύνδεσμος) between the spiritual and material which compose the universe. The harmonization of body and spirit represents the goal towards which each man is called to strive. Corresponding to this two-fold condition are two stages (Καταστάσεις) of existence. In the epoch of creation man is unstable and mortal. His finiteness, dependence and mortality are part of the divine plan of creation. In the epoch of redemption, heralded by the incarnation, man becomes immutable and immortal. From that first imperfect state with its concomitant of mutability he is led by Christ to the perfect state of divine sonship. The Fall of Adam marks a stage in the moral growth of the race: "God

1 "Non ait Deus 'mortales eritis,' sed 'morte moriemini,' prorsus existentibus natura mortalibus inferre mortis experientiam comminatus ... non quod tune mortales fierent, sed quod digni essent qui mortis sententiam per transgressionem referant." P.G. Migne, LXVI. 1005.

gave the command in order to raise Adam above the stage of childhood, and it necessarily provoked conflict and defeat. It does not occasion any constitutional change in the nature of man. Sin is the consequence of mortality rather than its cause. Slomkowski maintains that for Theodore primal man possessed both innocence and immortality. Yet he acknowledges that the 'naturalis mortalitas' is involved in the condition of creatureliness. Gross interprets death as the natural 'exordium' of life which, because of sin, assumes a penal character. Devrèesse identifies the first with Adam's fallen state. Norris points out that the double emphasis upon death both as a physical event and a moral effect occurs in the "Catechetical Lectures"


2 Certum est enim quia si eum immortalem esse voluisset, ne ipsum quidem intercedens peccatum Dei sententiam commutasset, quia nec diabolum fecit ex immortali mortalem, et quidem cunctorum malorum existentem principium." P.G. LXVI, 1011.


and the "Commentaries." This pattern of systematic ambiguity cannot obscure the repeated insistence on unimpaired and universal freedom of choice. Man achieves moral stature only by the wise use of his free-will. Hence freedom is not simply a faculty possessed 'in vacuo'; rather it is an attitude of mind and disposition gradually achieved by moral discipline.

Was Theodore a Pelagian? Whether the Conciliar Fragments utilised by his opponents to discredit him are false or not, it is clear that the tenor of his utterances were sufficiently congenial to Pelagianism to invoke Mercator's bitter denunciation in 431 A.D. The "Collectio Palatina" contains a specific rejection of the Augustinian doctrine of transmitted sin. The belief that the

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3R. Devréesse, op. cit., p. 105 maintains they are false.
righteous men of the Old Testament were subject to retributive punishment for Adam's sin is expressly repudiated. By maintaining a clear distinction between 'nature' and 'will,' Theodore could accept that all Adam's posterity inherits a similar mortal nature but not a common guilt. An evil disposition of will cannot be inherited. Though the will itself is uncontaminated man's physical constitution is weak. This infirmity of nature may become the occasion for sin. Now clearly the insistence on creaturely mortality, the stress on free-will, the denial of inherited sin, the call to moral discipline and the doctrine of foreseeable merit are consistent with classical Pelagianism. Yet similarity of language does not imply identity of thought.† Theodore's idea of redemption is profoundly religious. Only through Christ can man hope to attain that perfection of life and character which constitutes the goal of

† Chrysostom is closer to Pelagius than Theodore. He describes our first parents as immortal, impassible, full of wisdom and surrounded with glory (Ad pop. Ant. hom. XI, 2). Mortality is the effect of Adam's sin (Rom. in Gen. XIII, 4), but there is no transmission of guilt. The body remains good and concupiscence has no moral significance (In epist. ad Rom. hom. XIII), cf. C.J. 1.21, 22, 26. Pedobaptism is purely benefictory. Theodoret also follows the Antiochenes in emphasizing man's freedom of choice. There is no evil nature, only an evil will. Rom. 5.12 refers to the actual sins of Adam's descendants.
his existence.\textsuperscript{1} Human effort alone is insufficient to bring salvation.

Divine grace is as integral to Theodore's concept of redemption as human effort. He develops a doctrine of sin and grace which incorporates the insights of both Pelagius and Augustine without falling a prey to the exaggerations of either.

Can the Pelagian claim to be the true successor of the Eastern Fathers be substantiated?\textsuperscript{2} In the first place, all Eastern writers speak of man as made in the image of God.\textsuperscript{2} For some it is an inalienable part of man's constitution, expressed in his rationality and liberty. For others it is a special gift to man restored in the laver of baptism. We are all involved in the effects of Adam's rebellion. Basil can say that in the Garden of Eden our obedience was put to the test.\textsuperscript{3} Secondly, they appreciate that persistent wrongdoing paralyses the moral nature. Human nature is pervaded by a moral

\textsuperscript{1}See Harnack, op. cit., p. 283.

\textsuperscript{2}Epiphanius refuses to specify in what the 'imago' consists. cf. Anc. 55 (P.G. XLIII, 113-116).

\textsuperscript{3}Hom. 9.9, cf. Greg. Naz.
Impotence. ¹ Man is now affected by concupiscence. ² Occasionally the idea of an actual transmission of sin occurs. Gregory of Nyssa explicitly says: "Evil was mixed with our nature from the beginning ... through those who by their disobedience introduced the disease. Just as in the natural propagation of the species each animal engenders its like, so man is born from man, a being subject to passions from a being subject to passions, a sinner from a sinner."³ Thirdly, grace does not abolish free-will, but co-operates with it.⁴ We remain personally morally responsible for our acts. Nevertheless there is no trace of the later Pelagian tenet of a "liberum arbitrium indifferentiae." Clearly the problem of sin and grace, of man's moral responsibility and God's free justification had not yet arisen in an acute form and hence there was no need for an authoritative pronouncement. As Bethune-Baker

²Chrysostom: In Rom. hom 13, 1.
³De beat. Or. 6 (P.G. 44, 1273). Quoted by Kelly, op. cit., 351.
⁴Greg. Naz: Or. 37. 13 sq.
"Free-will and guiding grace went side by side in the thought, as in the life, of Christian man."  

Perhaps the heart of the matter is that while the tenor of Pelagianism is frequently reminiscent of the Cappadocians and Theodore of Mopsuestia, there is lacking that comprehensiveness of outlook which characterized the Eastern Church - a comprehensiveness which, let it be admitted, rarely exhibited complete logical consistency, but was a serious attempt to do justice to the spiritual experience of man.

(b) West - Hilary, Ambrose, Ambrosiaster. The main sources from which we deduce the anthropological tenets of the fourth century Latin writers are Hilary, Ambrose and the anonymous Roman exegete, Ambrosiaster.

Though Hilary of Poitiers did little to elaborate the doctrine of sin and grace in the Western Church, he attests the general tenets of the Western tradition in the fourth century. Despite his rejection of the soul as the medium of transmitted sin he retains the doctrine of 'vitium originis.'  


2 Tract. in Ps. CXVIII (P.L. IX, 599). Cf. Tract. in Ps. CXXII, 6 (P.L. IX, 670). Cf. DTC. vol. VI, col. 2418 on the exact meaning of 'corporalis.'
mode of the propagation of sin, so the will is its source of defection: "sed ex appetitu voluntatis et oblectatione vitiorum peccati usus arripitur." Yet grace is necessary for salvation. Only God can build an edifice strong enough to resist the storm.

Consonant with his Philonic background is Ambrose’s eulogy of Adamic beatitude: "Nam utique Adam cum in paradiso esset, coelestis erat." Adam enjoyed free access to the Father, and exhibited perfect moral excellence. Resplendent with celestial grace he possessed the sincerity and simplicity of a sound and uncorrupt nature, and was potentially

1 Com. in Matt. X, 23 (P.L. IX, 976).
2 Tract. in Ps. LXVIII, 9 (P.L. IX, 475).
3 Tract. in Ps. CXLII, 7 (P.L. IX, 340).
4 Tract. in Ps. CXXVI, 10-12 (P.L. IX, 697-70).
5 In Ps. CXVIII, 36 (P.L. XV, 1422).
7 Ep. LVIII, 12 (P.L. XVI, 1131): "Denique Adam ante peccatum nudus erat ... sed non erubescebat, quia erat plenus jucunditatis et spiritualis laetitiae."
8 De Elia 7 (P.L. XIV, 700).
9 De Par. 63 (P.L. XIV, 307).
immortal.¹ From this 'Paradisi felicitas' man fell by a voluntary defection from the divine laws:
"Igitur qui non obedivit, erravit, quia praevaticatio peccatum est."² The motive was pride or "sensuality" - "Adam would not have descended from Paradise, if he had not been deceived by sensuality."³ He was "cast away from the face of God."⁴ Yet "the sinner is not cast out, he casts himself out."⁵ The effects of the Fall are grave. Man has become earthly, irrational, and a prey to animal instincts.⁶ He has forfeited

¹De Par. 35 (P.L. XIV, 290).
²De Par. 30 (P.L. XIV, 238). Usually Ambrose refers to the primal sin as a transgression, 'praevaticatio' (e.g. De Par. 30. P.L. XIV, 238: 'Oportuit autem hominem obedire mandato, non obediendo autem praevaricatus est.') Occasionally he uses the stronger term 'lapsus' (e.g. Hex. VI, 42. P.L. XIV, 258: 'sed ubi lapsus est, depositum imaginem coelestis...') Further references are given by F.H. Dudden in his important study: "The Life and Times of St. Ambrose," vol II, p. 614. cf. N.P. Williams: "The Ideas of the Fall and of Original Sin," p. 303. "It is not until the close of the patristic period that "lapsus" takes the place of "praevaticatio" as the technical designation in Latin of the primordial sin."
³De Fuga 3 (P.L. XIV, 371).
⁴Apol. prop. David 69 (P.L. XIV, 879).
⁵In Ps. XLIII, 25 (P.L. XIV, 1103).
'justitia originalis' and become the victim of a progressive disintegration of personality. ¹ "Death was not originally in human nature, but became part of human nature; for God did not institute it in the beginning, but gave it as a remedy."² The most grievous result is that all men now inherit an inner propensity to sin: "Unde reor iniquitatem calcanei magis lubricum delinquendi quam reatum aliquem nostri esse delicti."³ Despite the conception of concupiscence as the 'haereditaria peccata,'⁴ Ambrose explicitly

¹ Exp. ev. Luc. VII, 141 (P.L. XV, 1736).

² De Exc. Sat. II, 47 (P.L. XVI, 1327). Also quoted by Dudden, op. cit., 617.

³ In Ps. XLVIII, 9 (P.L. XIV, 1159). cf. In Ps. XLVIII, 8 (P.L. XIV, 1158): "They all go limping."

⁴ Often Ambrose's views herald virtually identical passages in Augustine. e.g. Apol. Prop. David, 56 (P.L. XIV, 373): "Antequam nascamur, maculamur contagio; et ante usuram lucis, originis ipsius excipimur injuriam, in iniquitate concipimur: non expressit utrum parentum, an nostra. Et in delictis generat unumquemque mater sua; nec hic declaravit utrum in delictis suis mater pariat... Nec conceptus iniquitatis exors est, quoniam et parentes non carent lapsu. Et si nec unus dies infans sine peccato est, multo magis nec illi materni conceptus dies sine peccato."
formulates the idea of Adam as Representative Man. His transgression is the sin of human nature in general: "In Adam I fell, in Adam I was ejected from Paradise, in Adam I died." 1 Much of this will seem familiar to the student of Augustine, but there is no identity of emphasis between the two men. As Tixeront remarks the views of Ambrose "must be interpreted with the utmost care." 2 Even in sinful man freedom of decision and genuine moral responsibility remain: "Assuredly it is in our power to regulate our impulses, to bridle our anger, to curb our desires ... Why accuse nature, o man?" 3 We are not constrained by servile necessity, but act by free will (voluntate arbitra), whether we turn to virtue or are inclined to vice." 4 Yet the true freedom, which depends on revelation and grace, is available only within the redeemed community. Hereditary sin is an injury which causes us to stumble, but at the Great Assizes

3 Hex. 1, 31 (P.L. XIV, 140).
4 De Jacob 1, 1 (P.L. XIV, 599).
judgment will be on the basis of our personal misdeeds. Only when we willingly abet the inner propensity to sin do we become guilty before God. This two-fold emphasis offers scope for both Pelagius and Augustine to claim the support of the Bishop of Milan.

Of particular interest is the Ambrosiaster’s commentary on the Pauline Epistles, probably written during the pontificate of Damasus (366-384 A.D.). Relying on the text current in Rome between 370-390 A.D., he ignores the variant Greek rendering of

1 In Ps. XLVIII, 9 (P.L. XIV, 1159).


3 "But listen again (Julian), to another excellent steward of God, whom I reverence as a Father, for in Christ Jesus he begat me through the Gospel, and from this servant of Christ I received the love of regeneration. I speak of the blessed Ambrose, whose grace, constancy, labors, dangers, whether in works or in speech, for the Catholic faith, I myself have experienced ..." (C.J. 1, 10). cf. De Grat. Chr. 43 (P.L. XLIV, 381): "Beatus Ambrosius episcopus, in cuius praecipue libris Romana elucet fides, qui scriptorum inter Latinos flos quidan spectosus emuit, cuius fidem et purissimum in Scripturis sensum, ne inimicus quidum ausus est reprehendere."

Rom. 5, 12 and follows the tradition of Tertullian, Victorinus and Cyprian. His comment is strongly Augustinian in character: "Manifestum itaque est in Adam omnes peccasse quasi in massa; ipse enim per peccatum corruptus, quos gemuit, omnes nati sunt sub peccato."¹ By Adam's wilful disobedience the body is contaminated and becomes the occasion for sin: "Per id ergo quod facti causa manet, inhabitare dicitur peccatum in carne, ad quam diabolus accedit quasi ad suam legem, et manet quasi in peccato peccatum; quia caro jam peccati est, ut decipiat hominem suggestionibus malis. Ne homo faciat, quod praecepit lex."² Yet personal responsibility is not a fiction: "You perceive that men are not made guilty by the fact of their birth, but by their evil behaviour."³

There is no consensus of opinion among the

¹P.L. XVII, 92.

²In Rom. VII, 18 (P.L. XVII, 113).

Latin writers on the necessity of grace for the beginning of faith and meritorious works; but there is unanimity on the need of human co-operation to make grace efficacious: "It is for God to call and for us to believe," says Jerome.\(^1\) Ambrose writes: "In everything the Lord's power co-operates with man's efforts;"\(^2\) but he can also affirm that grace is given simply according to the hidden Will of God.\(^3\) Victorinus, Ambrose and Jerome agree that we cannot perform any work conducive to salvation and pleasing to God without the assistance of divine grace: "Vides itaque quia ubique Domini virtus studiis cooperatur humanis; ut nemo possit aedificare sine Domino, nemo custodire sine Domino, nemo quidquam incipere sine Domino."\(^4\)

Not only are there different streams of thought in the West concerning the condition of men and the

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3. *Exhort.* virg. 43.
appropriation of salvation, but mutually exclusive views occur in the same writer. There can be no doubt that they wished to underestimate man's part in salvation as little as they desired to deny the gratuitous nature of salvation.
CHAPTER II.

JULIAN OF ECLANUM -

HIS LIFE AND WRITINGS.
CHAPTER II.

JULIAN OF ECLANUM

1. His Life.

What Calvin was to the Reformation, Julian of Eclanum was to Pelagianism: "Truly if you had not learned these things, the Pelagian system would have lacked the architect it needed." His dialectical skill, profound erudition, and vigorous literary career, produced an opponent whom even the great Augustine could not easily contain. In the ultimate analysis he may have failed to do full justice both to the moral dictates and spiritual convictions of the Christian, but his acute relentless probing of the weaknesses implicit in Augustinianism resulted in a dogmatic disquiet which orthodoxy has never

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entirely forgotten. His failure in ecclesiastical circles helped to give impetus to that 'via media' which characterized the doctrine of sin and grace in the mediaeval Church.

Julian was born into a highly respected family probably in the year 336 A.D. His father, a friend and correspondent of St. Augustine, was an Italian bishop called Memor holding episcopal office at Capua, his mother a noble lady called Juliana:

"Indeed, I do not forget Memor, your father of blessed memory, who was joined with me in no slight friendship through literary pursuits, and caused you to be very dear to me." Concerning his personality Prof. Baxter writes: 'In temperament he resembles most of all Tertullian; he has the same fiery mind, the same legalistic narrowness ... the same passion and intensity.... But there is in addition a greater versatility, a warmer and more human sympathy, a wider field of interests.' During his term as a

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1 Marius Mercator: Subnot. iv. 4.


lector at his father's church he married a lady called Ia, who may have been the daughter of Aemilius bishop of Beneventum (A.D. 404-415). By about 409 A.D., he had become a deacon and had acquired a reputation modest enough for Augustine to express the hope of an early introduction: 'I do dare to say that I long for him more than I do for you (Memor). It may seem strange how I long for him more, for I love you both equally; but this is the result of the greater hope I have of seeing him ...' About this time he visited Carthage and met Honoratus, a friend of Augustine. Yet in spite of such a phrase as, 'the love I have for you,' there is no clear evidence of a meeting between this "most confident young man" and the aged bishop of Hippo. Soon a widower, Julian was elevated by the able pontiff Innocent I (d. 417 A.D.) to the episcopal centre of Aeclanum in Apulia.

1 Paulinus of Nola: (Poema' XXV: but against this the Ballerini Noris, op. iv. 382 and the Muratori, Anecdot. Lat.,i.diss.8. cf. DGB iii.470. Paulinus' 'Epithalamium' reveals a close attachment to the family.


4 C.J. i. 35.

5 C.J. ii. 30.
Northern Italy.¹

Probably not wholly in sympathy with Innocent’s condemnation of the Pelagians,² his first open protest was elicited by the ‘Epistola Tractoria’ of Pope Zosimus (417-418 A.D.), reversing a previous decision and inviting renewed condemnation of Pelagius and Coelestius.³ Julian was one of the eighteen dissenters whose refusal led to their being relieved of ecclesiastical duties and exiled under the imperial edict of Honorius in March 418 A.D. Julian now wrote three important letters in his defence. The first two were addressed to Zosimus,⁴ though only fragments of the earlier one have come down to us.⁵ The third was addressed to Rufus, bishop of Thessalonica (410-431 A.D.), whose arch enemy was the vigorous but somewhat

1OdCC, p. 752. Theo. of Mopsuestia, praef. 2; (P.L. XLV, 1043).

2C.J.1,13. ‘If you (J) had been willing to listen to the Head of that Church, blessed Innocent, you would already have withdrawn your perilous youth from the Pelagian snares.’

3Mercator Liber, subnot. vii. 2: ‘Meminimus sénim ... peccatum’; see Bruckner op. cit. p. 12.


5Mercator, ”Subnot.” vi.10-13; ix.3. Garnier’s contention that the "Libellus Fidei" represents the record has been contested by Noris. There is a marked similarity between this work and the ‘libelli’ submitted for Papal approval by Pelagius and Coelestius.
ineffectual opponent of Pelagianism, Atticus, patriarch of Constantinople (d. 425 A.D.). Probably Julian and his fellow-recusants believed they would receive a hearing in this quarter. This letter, together with another published in Italy (alleged by Julian to be spurious), reached Augustine by way of the new Pope Boniface (418-22 A.D.) and he issued a direct refutation in the "Contra duas epistulas Pelagianorum" (420 A.D.). From this source we learn that it contained a biting attack on the lack of doctrinal insight among the Roman clergy, the evils of Manichaeanism, the vacillation of the Pope, and the vacuity of courageous candour among the Western bishops. Meanwhile Julian had taken the offensive, dedicating a work to a fellow-Pelagian, Turbantius, in which he attacked the alleged Manichaeanism of the first book of Augustine's: "De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia." Quoting extensively, the African

1Op. Impf. i.19 (P.L. XLV, 1058). The dispute with his papal rival Eulalius prevented Boniface from assuming office until 10th April 419 A.D.

2C.1.1.13. 'Yet you (J) accuse his successor (Zosimus) of prevarication because he was unwilling to oppose the apostolic doctrine and the judgment of his predecessor.' Garnier finds Rufus' influence in this letter, as well as in the first 2 epistles of Zosimus.

3Retract, ii.53. The date of the work is probably late 418 A.D., or early 419 A.D.
bishop replied in the second book of the "De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia," and later more fully in the six books of the "Contra Julianum haeresis pelagianae defensorem" (421 A.D.).

Banished to the East, Julian travelled to Cilicia and stayed for about four years (i.e. 418-22 A.D.) with the renowned leader of the Antiochene School, Theodore of Mopsuestia (d. 428 A.D.). There was such a remarkable affinity of outlook and teaching between the two that Mercator treats both as doctrinally unsound. The fruit of this sojourn was the "Eight Books to Florus" copiously quoted by Augustine in the 'Opus Imperfectum' (429-430 A.D.). In these writings to Turbantius and Florus (418-422 A.D.), we glimpse that scientific learning, rigorous intellect and crusading zeal which sets Julian apart as a most formidable theological disputant. After the death of Theodore Julian seems to have left

1 The fragments of this "Libri IV ad Turbantium" have been collected by A. Bruckner: "Die vier Bücher Julians von Eclanum an Turbantius" (Berlin 1910).

2 Praef. ad. Symb. Th. Mop. 72: "Julianum ... secutum esse Theodorum, ad quem peragratias terris et exarato mari atque oriente lustrato cum sociis et participibus et συνταξιαντιπρος sino magno nisi tamquam ad Christianorum dogmatum praedicatum magistrum tetendit." Quoted by H.B. Swete, DCH, IV (1887) p. 936.
Cilicia and made contact with the exiled bishops Florus, Orontius and Fabius in 429 A.D., probably at the palace of Nestorius recently appointed patriarch of Constantinople. Yet it is becoming increasingly clear that his most productive period of scholarship coincides with the later exile in Sicily from 424-431 A.D., and the protracted attempt to influence the Eastern Churches in Constantinople, Antioch and Ephesus. The exact succession of events is difficult to trace. It seems that on the succession of Celestine I (422-432 A.D.) Julian left Mopsuestia hoping for re-instatement at Rome. Failure to achieve this, coupled with condemnation in Cilicia, forced him to make for Constantinople, only to receive a further rebuff from the ecclesiastical authorities there. At this juncture the patriarch Nestorius and his patron the Emperor Theodosius II tried to re-instate him with Celestine (429 A.D.); but after some initial success


3Theodore concurred in the condemnation.
they were forced to banish him as the result of an imperial edict, largely elicited by Mercator's "Communitorium." Julian and Nestorius now went to Ephesus where a General Council headed by Memnon, "Episcopus civitatis," and the wily Cyril of Alexandria formally issued a condemnation (June 431 A.D.). The Pelagians had lost the crucial battle. Julian is said to have set sail for the island of Lerins, from where he made further fruitless attempts to redeem his status under Sixtus III (432 - 440 A.D.) and Leo the Great (440 - 461 A.D.).

One of the most important areas for further research lies in the period which elapsed between Julian's arrival in Lerins and his death about twenty years later (circa 455 A.D.). It seems likely that Semi-Pelagianism continued to draw much of its vigour from his incisive leadership. Perhaps he attracted a group of young intellectuals and formed his own

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1 Part of the Synodal Letter sent to Pope Celestine by the Council reads as follows: "When the records were read in the Holy Synod, of the things done towards the deposition of the impious Pelagians and Coelestians, of Pelagius, Coelestius, of Julian, Persidius, Florus, Marcellinus, Orentius, and those who agree with them, we thought good that the decisions of Your Holiness should remain firm and steadfast; and we unanimously agreed to hold those persons as deposed." Quoted by Jauncey op. cit. p. 283.
Academy in Sicily. Certainly it is impossible to doubt that he continued to write prolifically, thus providing material from which the Anti-Augustinian party at Marseilles and Lerins derived much inspiration. Even if there is no direct link between the Massilians and the original Pelagian movement the ascetic origins of both and their common disquiet with the doctrinal rigidities of Augustinianism suggest some interaction. A thinker of such exceptional ability might be condemned. He could never be ignored.
It had long been obvious that one as resourceful in thought and incisive in style as Julian must have exercised literary gifts in a broader field than that immediately revealed by a perusal of Augustine's writings. The past fifty years have witnessed the exacting and rewarding efforts of scholars to identify his writings by recourse to lexicographical data and theological content. As Baxter puts it: 'the re-constitution of his legacy of written work has been one of the great successes of recent criticism.'

In 1834, shortly before his death, Faucher had drawn attention to the scholarly pseudo-Rufinus commentary on the minor prophets, and suggested that the literary evidence pointed to

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1 Extrait de L'Archivum Latinitatis Medii Aevi (Bulletin du Gange), xxi. (1951); 'Notes on the Latin of Julian of Eclanum,' p. 5.
Julian the Pelagian as the author. In comparison with the known works of Orosius the writer on the Minor Prophets reveals a more vivid, expressive, vigorous and simpler style of language. The attribution of the commentary to Rufinus of Aquilea had rested on the uncertain evidence of a solitary manuscript of the twelveth century. Neither Gennadius nor Cassiodorus mention it. Mediaeval scholars such as Ribera and Tillemont suspected that the style, the failure to use the Septuagint, and the scarcity of references to Origen placed the accepted authorship in considerable doubt. Vallarsi put forward the name of Paul Orosius, the Spanish priest, to whom a commentary on the prophets had been attributed by the anonymous writer of Melk. Yet though the didactic tone and an incorporated version of the Psalms strikingly similar to the Mozarabe Psalter gave some grounds for this conjecture it raised new difficulties.

1G. Faucker: "Kleine Studien" (Berlin 1884), iii. p. 53: 'venit in mentem Juliani Pelagiani, hominis ingeniosi neque ineruditi, sed de eo videro si forte alias.' See P.L. XXI, 959-1104.

Why did some readings diverge from the Mozarabe Psalter? why was the writers knowledge of the Holy Land so fragmentary and uncertain; and most important of all, why did the language betray a strong antipathy to notable Church Fathers, principally Jerome? Even Vallarsi was forced to ask: 'Fuerit ergo, ut vulgo creditur, huius Commentarii auctor Rufinus, qui gravissimas in eum inimicitias exercebat?' In 1903 Morin hesitantly proposed the name of Vigilantius. Unfortunately the extant fragments of Vigilantius' work were too sparse to allow a balanced comparison with the commentary. There things rested.

In July 1912 it was noted that the rare word 'profanitas' which occurs in Augustine's "Opus Imperfectum" is also found in the commentary of Pseudo-Rufinus. Style also pointed to identity of...
authorship. Accordingly in 1913 Morin returned to the discussion with an article supplementing and developing Paucher’s original suggestion, and to this event may be traced the final succession of insights which culminated in the solution of the problem. Pointing out that the disputed work was first edited in Paris in 1530 by Rene Laurent de la Barre from a manuscript in the monastery of Chartreux de Mont-Dieu, he deduced common authorship for the commentary and those quotations of Julian specifically accredited by Augustine. This thesis was convincingly upheld by a scholarly examination of some rarer words occurring in both writings, among them the following:

**CONSULENTIA:**

Pseudo-Rufin in Am 5, 13 - 20:

‘dies, inquit, ille squalabit adeo angorum tenebris, ut nullum consulentiae lumen relinquat, sed a pernici in perniciem discurrent.’ 9. 7. ‘me alias gentes a mea consulentia repulisse (Syn. providentia). In Joel, 1, 5: ‘eiulatu nimio consulientiam perdidistis,

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ut non iam providere, sed tantum-modo sentire possitis.

In Os. 2. 3, 'dominus noster consulentiae suae pandit affectum. 13. 9 - 11 'nunc ergo consulentiae tuae fructus appareat.' cf. Op. Impf. 5. 15. 'ingens contumelia est ... dicere adfuisse deo fortitudinem, sed defuisse consilium. Pertingit omnino ad negationem potentiae reprehensio consulentiae: non omnia potest, si ordinare bene non potest.'

CONCINENTER:¹ Ps - Rufin: in Am. 9. 11 - 12:
'sicut omnes pene prophetae concinenter praedixerunt.'

Op. Impf. 1. 77. 'sin autem omnia concinenter.' 3.
9. 'concinenter totius naturae voce resonabat' (syn. convenienter found in Claud. Mam. anim. p. 75. 1.).

CONSEQUENTER:² Os. 10. 10. (1013D): 'optima est exponendi regula, quae de consequentia lectionis assumitur.' In Job. 7. 17. 'quantum ad consequentiam dictorum pertinet.' Op. Impf. iv.l. 'quorum exemplis talis styli consequentia vindicatur.' 4. 29. 'iam

¹Thesaur. ling. lat. vol. iv. p. 54. l. 22 - 24.
Baxter adds in ps. 1 (f. 14 d), in ps. 18, (f. 42 d).

²Important for hermeneutics. op. cit. p. 30 - 90. Bouwman gives a detailed and scholarly examination of this term and here, as so often elsewhere I am indebted to Baxter's authoritative study of Julian's Latinity which supplements both Morin and the Thes. ling. lat.
There is also a frequent use of the verbal supine with - ire, 4th declension nouns ending in -us, and nouns ending in 'tas' or 'tio.'

Morin's investigation was not solely confined to the literary characteristics of the commentary. Drawing attention to the realistic Antiochene exegesis with its rejection of allegorism, the kinship of ideas with Theodore of Mopsuestia, the disrespect for Jerome as an expositor and the general tone of the writings, he concluded: 'le Pseudo-Rufin n'est autre que l'évêque...

1 There are many other examples e.g. obsceneitatis: Pseudo-Rufin. 964 A.B. 'filios alienae obsceneitatis ... obsceneitates aliorum arguendas'; 965 A 'obsceneitatis vitia!'; 996 A 'in nomine obsceneitatis'; 1085 D 'obsceneitatis operi et saepe.' Op. Impf. 1. 53. 'de obsceneitatis tuae impugnatione.' 3. 73. 'morum obsceneitatem.' appendice: The Thesaur. quotes Hier. in Dan 5. 25; Op. Impf. 1. 74; 2. 140; 2. 141; 6. 16. Job. 20. 2. 'quod se non praejudicio odioi, sed de partium dicit appensione colligere.'

2 Also nouns ending in 'tor' or 'trix.' Similar rhythmic patterns occur.

3 See the Preface on Hosea.

4 The etymological research of Jerome on the proper names of Joel 1. 1. is treated as "puerilia et ineptas." However he often follows Jerome's text: e.g. on Hosea 14. 6. 'Ero quasi ros, Israel, germinabit, where the Vulgate has: 'Ero quasi ros, Israel, germinabit. Ct. on Hosea. 11. 12.
Julien d'Eclanum l'adversaire dédaigneux d'Augustin, le plus brillant adepte et propagateur de l'hérésie pelagienne.¹

The date of the commentary was reckoned by Vallarsi to be shortly after the death of Jerome in 420 A.D. We know that towards the end of 421 A.D. Julian was forced to leave Italy and seek asylum in Cilicia. During his sojourn in Sicily he composed the Eight Books to Florus reproduced in the 'Opus Imperfectum.'² The clear similarities between the commentary by Theodore and the present work suggest the interval 421 - 423 A.D. as the most likely period for its composition.³ The author's poignant memories evoked by war and captivity correspond with what


²Bouwman dates the Opus c. 423 A.D.

³Yet it is doubtful whether Julian had Theodore's commentary on the minor prophets before him, for he fails to note differences between the Septuagint on which Theodore relied and the Vulgate which he himself used. e.g. on Hosea iv. 14 he reads: 'et populus non intelligens vapulabit,' where Theodore has: 'et populus intelligens adhaerebat meretrici.'
Julian would himself have experienced. It is an age of violent change: 'Quae omnia mala hostili evenire victoria, annuis magis cladibus, quam annalibus literis comprobamus.' The outlook is not promising. This coincides with what we know of conditions in the early part of the fifth century. We also know that the writer had some knowledge of Syria, though no precise details of the geography of Palestine.

The content of the commentary is reminiscent of classical Pelagianism. The Church is degenerate and its ministers corrupt: 'Nillum virtutum curam habere conspexeris; immo ipsius altaris ministros

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1e.g. 1006 C: 'Quod autem subicit, Desiderabile argenti eorum urticae hereditabunt, ex usu captivitatis evenire, utinam nos lectione tantum, et non etiam experimenta docuissent. Constat quippe, vel sedes magis sumtibus fabricatas, cum defecissent incolae siluis suksse contectas, vel plerumque etiam auri et argenti defossos thesauros, his qui occuluerant, interemptis in continuam oblivionem perisse.

21068 C.

31095 A: 'Quod totum tempore captivitatis obtingere, utinam, lectione tantum indicante, nossemus. Sed tam frequens nostris temporibus eiusmodi est facta conditio, ut quidquam melius sperantium miremur audaciam.'

ambitioni tantum luxuriaeque famulari, miseranter atque indignanter exclama ... Hic autem ecclesiarum status, qualem hac potissimum tempestate conspicimus, illam indignationem Dei, quam intremuit propheta succedidit.¹

The real virtues are spiritual and moral.² Judgement is inescapable, the commandments binding. Election is due to merits foreseen by God.³ Sin is a fault of nurture, not nature: 'Cuius (status) ut pondus exponeret, antiqui recordatus est exempli. Ubi sane notanda est elocutio prophetae, multis eiusmodi loci explanationis lumen adportans. Ait enim: "Sicut Adam transgressi sunt pactum: Ibi praecaricati sunt in me." Non utique quod isti in paradisco praeveri- cationem admisisse videantur; sed quoniam dixerat, ita illos, sicut Adam, praeceptum fuisse transgressos, subdidit, eos ibi peccavisse, in eadem nimirum


²Amos VII. I1 (1091C): 'Quod etiam in nostrorum temporum negotiis experimur, quia pars gentis humilior, id est, quique popularis quo minus habebant de nobilitate superbiae, hoc etiam prophetarum dictis facilius movabuntur. Sacerdotes vero et optimates cum regis vitiiis favere contendorient respuebant, immo criminabantur, et, si liceret, interficiebant salutares magistros.'

³Hosea. XII 3 - 6 (1032 B).
Adam’s guilt is only as 'temerarius praecipi.' The Christian life is a composite of rationalism, Stoicism and mysticism perfected by a high and exacting moralism. It is a life lived according to the 'lux pietatis et virtutum disciplina.'

Julian starts by relating the prophetic insights to the historical events recorded in the Book of Kings, and particularly those connected with the reigns of Rehoboam and Jeroboam. Thus the Book of Hosea is viewed as a poetical transposition of events up to the time of the captivity, including the reign of Hezekiah and the invasion of Sennacherib.

This attempt to set prophecy firmly within an historical context comes out most clearly in the Book of Joel. The four plagues may be allusions either to the Assyrian, Chaldean, Macedonian and Roman invasions, or to the passions of the soul which herald trouble

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2 Hosea, X. 12 (1014C) cf. (1023A).

3 Hezekiah has a parallel importance in Theodore’s commentary on the Psalms.
(spes, gaudium, timor, dolor).\(^1\) The 'gens locustarum' are the invading armies.\(^2\) Julian maintains that the true nature of the plagues is revealed in key passages or texts such as chap. 3.2.

Amos, too, is little more than the herald of physical plagues. The trembling of the earth which he prophesied is accepted as an historical event, even though no reference to it occurs in the Book of Kings.\(^3\) Gaza and Edom refer to the immoral idolatry of the Gentiles.\(^4\) Yet the destiny of Israel is safe: 'per te vero stabit utrum ista multiplex castigationem emendationem proficiat an potius ultioni.'\(^5\) The prophets are describing contemporaneous events, even though God in His mercy may postpone the impending evils: 'prolatas sententias per longa tempora.'\(^6\) Obviously it becomes increasingly difficult to identify each

\(^1\) Bouwman, op. cit. p. 112.
\(^2\) Joel 1.4. (1036-1042).
\(^3\) Amos 1.1. (1058 C-D).
\(^4\) Amos 1.3-5 (1060-64).
\(^5\) Amos 4.12-13 (1073 C).
\(^6\) Amos 5.3 (1075).
symbol. For example, who are the horses and oxen of chap. 6:12? When does the reckoning actually take place? Purely from a religious point of view one might well ask, what value the prophecies can have for us to-day if the writer is simply commenting on the sin and idolatry of his contemporaries. Is there no authentic word from the Lord?

Now that the first positive criteria for literary identification had been made it seemed likely that further research would extend the list of works attributed to Julian. The assumption proved right.

In 1897 there had appeared in the third volume of the 'Spicilegium Casinense' a commentary entitled: "Expositio Philippi presbyteri discipuli beati Hieronymi." This commentary had been edited from ms. 371 in the library of Mont Cassin. The publication passed virtually unnoticed - partly because some three hundred and seventy years previous a commentary on Job had appeared at Basle by the humanist John Richard. It was called, "Philippi presbyteri viri longe eruditissimi in historiam Job Commentariorum libri III."

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\(^{1}\)Vaccari believed that Cassiodorus knew this commentary on Job, but attributed it to Hilarius.
The name of the author, Philip the Presbyter, created a presumption in favour of identical authorship. Though both commentaries make use of Jerome's translation of Job they are works from different authors. The commentary edited by Sichard is quoted by Faustus of Riez at the end of the 15th century under the name of Jerome; and by Bede at the end of the 18th century under the name of Philippus. To-day it is found in manuscripts at Rome, Paris and Oxford. On the other hand, the 1397 commentary is known only through a single manuscript of the 11th or 12th century (Cod. Cassin 371), and Vaccari identified it as belonging to Julian of Eolanum.

The content of the "Commentarius in Job" is defiantly Pelagian with its constant eulogy of the 'bonum naturae.' Belief in the 'virtus congenita'

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1 See Migne P.L. XXIII. 1401 ff.

2 Words like 'genus, species, qualitas, quantitas' occur frequently and there is the same predilection for exact legal terminology like 'criminationes, accusatoris, advocare testes, testimonium, advocare probationes, censura, allegationes, interpellatio' ref. Baxter, op. cit. p. 13-54. The metrical rhythm of the Exp. in Job is examined by Vaccari, op. cit. p. 74 f. and cf. d'Ales, op. cit. p. 318 f.
appears in the comment on Job. 31.18. In the first chapter, having noted the value of sanctity, he speaks of Job's piety: 'Sancta itaque Job vita laudatur ut in eo bonum humanae naturae posse agnosci, quae tam ad repulsem peccatorum quam ad sectationem virtutum omnium, quippe ita a Deo condita, etiam sine lege magisterio ostendit se sibi posse sufficere. There follows a rejection of Augustinian pessimism represented by Eliphaz. Original sin means simply following a bad example: 'Adesse dicimus primo Dei providentiam mortalibus antequam peccant; demide, cum coeperint a simplicitate naturali malorum imitatione discedere, curam monitoris od esse.... We also find the same wide interest in the different sciences which we have

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3 Exp. in Job p. 365b-366a: 'Bene sanctum Job de hominis natura sensisse, Elifaz reprehensione convincitur, qui, accusando naturam hominis, non culparet sanctum Job si eadem et non diversa dixisset. Vult Elifaz, ob hoc quod passibilis est natura hominum, sit etiam ad peccandum proclivis ac prona.'

4 Exp. in Job p. 403b 4 ff.
come to expect from Julian. Physics, astronomy, cosmography, metallurgy and agriculture appear. The author is well versed in both Greek and Latin usually translating directly from the former. It is interesting to note that though elsewhere Julian quotes the OT 'vetus itala' he makes an exception in the case of Job which is quoted according to Jerome's translation. Vaccari's examination of the Greek sources of the commentary shows that of the fifty-seven passages where the original is accessible, thirty-four can be attributed to Polychronius of Apamaea (died c. 431 A.D.), twelve to Olympiodorus deacon at Alexandria during the early part of the sixth century, and eleven to other sources particularly Chrysostom. The name of Olympiodorus might seem fatal to Vaccari's thesis since Julian lived a century earlier; but it is reasonable to suppose that both men compiled from a common source.

Vaccari also investigated a Commentary on the Psalms, based on an Irish manuscript taken from the monastery at Bobbio in 1606 to the Ambrosian library at Milan and first published by the eminent philologist

1 Augustine calls him 'naturae scrutator acerrimus' C.J. vi. 7.

G.I. Ascoli in "L'Archivio glottolico italiano" Vol. V. under the title 'Il codice irlandese dell'Ambrosiana.'

It is Pelagian in tone and content. Thus original sin is rejected: "Hic sane parvulorum commendatur integritas, naturalisque simplicitas, cum (dicitur) de peccatoribus pro exaggeratione quod tam corrupti depravatique sint studiis ut nec tempore exortus sin, quo salvi innocentes fuerunt, irreantur vacasse criminibus. Quem invectionis colorem naturalis mali conscius omnino non tangeret si necessitatis ingenitae nomine vindicarentur rei." The comment on Leviathan follows almost word for word Julian's exposition in Job. 'Leviathan ergo sum mediterranea maria capere non possent, molis illius magnitudinem non ferentio, indicco oceano eluctatus omnes Augustias.'

1 The press-mark is G301 inf. The ms. can be divided into seven sections; viz. At the beginning are two poems, followed by Jerome's Preface to the Psalter (Incipit prae fatio ... ); then Bede (Incipit prologus psalmorum) with Jerome again (Incipit prologus Hirunimi ad Suffronium); after that comes Basil (Incipit prae fatio psalmorum vel laus psalterii), a fragmentary commentary on the Psalms xvi.xxi-xl.5. and finally the commentary on the whole Psalter with glosses. See R.I. Best: "The Commentary on the Psalms with Glosses in Old-Irish preserved in the Ambrosian Library (Ms. C301 inf.) Collootype facsimile, with introduction, published by the Royal Irish Academy, Dublin/London 1936 cf. Morin RB. 33 (1926) p.164-177. M. Exposito, JTS, 32 (1931) p. 337-344.

libere exultat.\textsuperscript{1} It would seem therefore that the question of authorship is simple. In fact, the reverse is true.

An inventory of the ancient library at Bobbio, compiled in 1461, assigned the ms. 89 'Liber Sancti Columbani de Bobio' to Jerome probably on account of the Prologue prefixed to the Psalter. In 1740 Muratori rejected this and almost immediately Vallarsi suggested that it might be attributed to Columbanus (540-621 A.D.) whom we know had written a commentary on the Psalms. Its antecedents at Bobbio and its latinity\textsuperscript{2} seemed to provide further proof of this possibility.\textsuperscript{3} In 1896 Mercati, the 'scriptor' at the Ambrosiana,

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{1}On Ps.p.503,4-9, cf. with Exp. in Job.p.341, 23; 415b,14.
  \item \textsuperscript{2}Keywords like 'concinenter' occur: Morin quotes Ps. Ruf. 1103A = in Am. 9.11-12, and Op. Impf. 1.77. Baxter adds Op. Impf. 3.9: in ps. l. (f. 14d); in ps.18 (f.42d). Also 'concinentie': Op. Impf. 4.104: 5.15: 0s. 2.5.(975A); in ps. 135 (f.133d). in ps.150 (f.146d). 'Consulentia': in Ps. 35 (f.55d); Op. Impf. 5.15. The use of the supine in 'tum' with the verb '-ire' in place of the simple future is frequent (f.89\textsuperscript{b}7; 93\textsuperscript{d}34; 103\textsuperscript{b}26). These are frequent reminiscences of classical literature e.g. Ps. 106.23 = f.125\textsuperscript{d} 14 is adapted from Horace's "Carm." 1.3, 9-12; cf. Ps. 113.9.f. 129\textsuperscript{d} 19. with Ovid Ep.13,201. Note the similarity in rhythm: Op.Impf.iv. 114: 'Tota contra vos felle moverentur.' Exp.in Iob.335,25: 'Ad ae quae patiebatur toto felle moveretur.'
  In Ps. p.215,2: 'Ad impiorum prosperitate tota felle commotus.'
  \item \textsuperscript{3}Peyron Nigra and Ascoli accepted the case as proved by Muratori.
\end{itemize}
discovered that both the commentaries preserved in the manuscript derived from Theodore of Mopsuestia, but were subsequently lost after the condemnation in 553 A.D., at Constantinople. Mercati held that the first, fragmentary commentary was a slightly condensed version of the original work on the Psalms which had been condemned by the Oecumenical Council, and was the work of an Italian circle favourable to the Antiochene school. The main work had an Irish rather than Italian background. Ramsay followed Lietzmann in accepting this fuller work as an accurate though cautiously condensed version of Theodore, and surmised that Columbanus was the reviser. Vaccari then wrote a learned article contending with great resource that the main commentary is essentially an imitation of Theodore's work by Julian of Eclanum, in which he has drawn from Greek sources, and recast the finished product in his own unique style and thought-forms. It seemed that the identification problem had at last been solved. However, in 1926, Morin raised the issue again, claiming that Julian's influence was not uniform in the commentary, that in the last twenty-five Psalms it is virtually absent, and that Columbanus must still be associated with the
He contended that three Latin texts are discernible, the first agreeing generally with the Roman Psalter, the second of a similar character forming the main text and traceable to Julian, and the Biblical texts cited which exhibit a Gallican text. Vaccari still maintained that both recensions are essentially Roman. Two years later Devreesse compared in detail the two Latin commentaries with the fragments of Theodore's work that survive. He agreed with Mercati that the first fragmentary commentary (ff. 4\(a\) - 13\(b\)) together with Psalms xiv - xvi.11 are an early translation of Theodore, as is the main commentary from Ps.1 - xiii. (ff. 14\(a\) - 35\(b\)). He rejected completely the assertion that Theodore's work is the basis of the main commentary. Baxter points out that 'there is no distinction between the two sections which Devreesse's theory postulates.' Together with Best he maintains that the real author is Julian of Eclanum. There the question rests.

The date of the commentary is also in doubt.

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1RB, xxxviii (1926) p. 164-177.

2op. cit. p.10.
Morin\(^1\) places it during the exile in Sicily, that is, between 421-424 A.D., Pinna\(^\text{1}\) suggests a decade later, perhaps 432-436 A.D.,\(^2\) and Bouwman places it at the end of Julian's career, that is prior to 455 A.D., Mercati is certainly right in placing the authorship in the sixth century. Assuming that it is a composite work drawing from several sources we can perhaps go on to conclude that Julian made use of Theodore's commentary on the psalms, as he had already done with the commentary of Polychronios on Job. Yet he was not content simply to reproduce his patron's ideas. He absorbed them and penned a work which fittingly expressed his own personal views.

The three commentaries mentioned above, together with the material quoted in the "Opus Imperfectum," the "Contra Julianum," and the "De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia" form the bulk of the considerably augmented 'Corpus Julianicum.'\(^3\) According to Bede\(^4\) Julian also wrote two further commentaries in

\(^1\)op.cit., p. 164-177.

\(^2\)RSR, 47 (1959) p. 345-366.

\(^3\)The fragments have been collected by A. Bruckner: 'Die vier Bucher Julians von Eclanum an Turbantius' (Berlin, 1910) p. 24-103.

\(^4\)Quotations appear in 'Cantica Cantorum' P.L., 91, 1065-1236. Epistle to Demetria.
defence of free-will, viz. 'Liber de constantiae bono
contra perfidiam Manicheei,' and 'Liber de amore,
sive commentarius in Cantica canticorum.'\(^1\) Whether
other works such as the three books of the 'Prae-
destinatus,' the 'De induratione cordis Pharaonis,'
the pseudo-Augustinian tracts 'De praedestinatione
et gratia' and 'De praedestinatione' can safely be
attributed to Julian remains an unsettled question,
and provides an exciting investigation for scholars.\(^2\)

3. Exegetical Principles.

The floodtide of patristic exegesis occurred
in the fifth century. The great Antiochene master,
Diodorus of Tarsus, was virtually overshadowed by
famous pupils like Theodore, Chrysostom and Augustine
in the West, and Cyril of Alexandria in the East.
Furthermore, one of the great merits of Pelagius
himself had been to initiate a fresh return to
detailed study of the Biblical text itself.\(^3\) Against

\(^1\) Bouwman op. cit. p. 6-7.

\(^2\) Baxter op. cit. p.11-12; Morin: "Etudes,
cit. p.17-22.

\(^3\) The Testimonia, the commentaries on the
Canticles and Pauline Epistles, the translations of
Annianus deacon of Celede, the commentary on Job and
the 'Speculum' bear witness to this.
this background Julian developed a hermeneutics more concrete, historical and philological than either of his teachers at Mopsuestia or Apamea. With his vast knowledge of Greek and Latin, his excellent memory and a richly endowed mind, the valuable commentaries of Jerome, and a natural gift for the expressive turn of phrase it seemed natural that he would produce impressive exegetical works. As Baxter puts it: 'His ear is very sensitive to the cadences of words and phrases ... his sentences are all marked by the careful observance of prose rhythm and have therefore a harmoniousness and dignity which is always pleasing.'

He describes the Biblical writings as 'Scripturae sanctae,' 'stemma sacrum,' or 'sacra volumina,' and divides the canon into four parts, namely, the Law, the Prophets, the Gospel and the Apostles. Occasionally he simply refers to the Law and the Gospel. He makes use of chapter divisions especially in the Epistle to the Romans. He has no knowledge of the techniques of literary criticism, of course, though he declares

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that Sirach or Philo could be the author of the Book of Wisdom,\(^1\) and that 1 Cor. 15.29 may refer to a baptism of the dead.\(^2\) The strength and weakness of his exegesis is shown by the treatment of Rom. 4.13-6.19,\(^3\) and 1 Cor. 15.22.\(^4\) Painstakingly he develops the Apostles' argument often with a pedantic insistence on the literal and verbal meaning. His exegetical method usually leads to a direct consideration of the text of scripture, with a comparison of the Greek and Old Latin. He does not seem to have had a working knowledge of Hebrew, but relied on Theodore and Hieronymus: yet he recognises that the Septuagint throws light on the textual problem of Amos 5.12 (hostes iusti).\(^5\) Bouwman gives nearly

\[^1\text{Op. Impf. iv, 123. (P.L. XLV, 1420).}\]

\[^2\text{Op. Impf. vi, 38. (P.L. XLV, 1597).}\]

\[^3\text{Op. Impf. ii, 152. sq. (P.L. XLV, 1206-1213).}\]

\[^4\text{Op. Impf. vi, 31. (P.L. XLV, 1583).}\]

\[^5\text{"Quod sane duobus modis intelligi potest, ut 'iusti' quasi genitivo singulari justitiae pronuntientur inimica (...........), vel certe 'hostes iusti' per nominativum pluralem appellati (sic!) esse credantur (...........). Locutio est autem (B.vero) familiaris disertis, qui et justos exercitus justas provincias videlicet (B. i.e. statt.vid.,) magnas appellare consuerunt (B. consueverunt) (1079 AB). Quoted by Bouwman op.cit. p.124.}\]
twenty instances where his exegesis is original and stimulating e.g. Os. 8.9. "Quia ipsi ascenderunt ad Assur: Cui tantum eminentiae in viribus collatum esse perspicient, ut ad eum qui pervenit, ascendisse dicatur" (1003A). Jl. 1.14: "Santificate jejunium: id est, indicite sub ea denuntiatione, et si quis forte contemperit, quasi sancta violaverit, argatur" (1040A). In all his exegesis Julian is convinced that Augustinianism is doing violence to the intention of the Biblical writers, and that he alone is interpreting the true apostolic kerygma. It is not simply that certain key texts support him, but that the whole tenor of scripture affirms that each man must inherit eternal life through the judicious exercise of his free-will. Ambiguous parts are to be understood in the light of the clearer passages, but apart from the 'regula rationis' there seems to be no central principle of interpretation and paradoxes are often artificially resolved.

1 Bruckner, op. cit., p.115.


Julian's exegesis rests on two main insights. Firstly, if a word in scripture has a number of related meanings reason must provide a guide to the true interpretation: "Et ideo ubi verborum communitas ingerit quaestionem, adhibeatur regula rationis, ad cuius aequalitatem, quae putabantur deflexisse, tendantur."¹ The meaning of 'liberty' in John 8.33 is a case in point. Reason is the final court of appeal: 'catholica vero fides neque iurgare adversum se legem Dei credit, neque ullam auctoritatem in exitium rationis admittit.'² Even clearer is an earlier statement: 'quod ratio arguit, non potest auctoritas vindicare.'³ Baxter translates in Job 3.6. 'in all these expressions it is not reason, nor sustained and logical thought that is finding voice, but only the bitterness of a soul that is deeply wounded.' Like scripture, tradition also has value only as an explication of what reason has


already approved. As Bruckner remarks Julian treats scripture and tradition primarily as a "Gesetzeskodex" in which validity is determined solely by rational content.

Secondly, it is held that other passages clarify whether a term is used literally or metaphorically. For example, in 1 Cor. 15.50 'flesh' and 'blood' are metaphorical terms for sin, since if they are understood literally, the doctrine of a bodily resurrection would have to be jettisoned. In Col. 3.5f. the Apostle refers to limbs as symbols of wrongdoing. Perhaps Julian's greatest contribution to the study of scripture was his insistence on a true understanding of the historical-grammatical background of the Bible. This "Hauptprinzip," derived from Theodore, is developed most clearly in the repeated use of consequentia in the commentary.


on the minor prophets:1 'optima est exponendi regula, quae de consequentia lectionis assumitur.'2 It means that one must adhere to the logical sequence of ideas and remain faithful to the historical events depicted. Alexandrian allegorising ignores this basic exegetical principle.3 Thus although Hieronymus is praised as an industrious scholar, his failure to observe the 'consequentia' deprives the work of much value: 'de perquirenda consequentia nihil aut voluit aut potuit sustinere curarum.'4 Julian is aware how well the narrative has been constructed by the writer. He sometimes seeks to uncover the basic structural harmony, though the re-arrangement of the prophetic aphorisms by the redactor does not always make this

1Consequenter appears over 40 times; consequentia some 14 times, cf. Job. 7.17; 38.3.; In ps. 5 (f. 81b), 12 (f. 346); In Os. 8.11.; In Am. 6.2.; In Joel. 1.4. et ssepe.

2Os. 10.10. (1013D).

3'Origines autem proprio tenore decurrens, allegoriarum magis lepida, quam historicarum explanationum solida et tenenda componit!' (962A). cf. Exp. in Job. XVIII.15 (p. 372a, 25f): 'Longe est a consequentia lectionis expositio quae eum qui non est, diabolum aestimat dictum.'

4Quoted by Bouwman op. cit. p. 32 (962A).
Sometimes the prophet may briefly summarize a whole book seeking to balance the judgment-salvation theme throughout. But the use of 'consequentia' does not mean that passages have no Christological reference whatever. 'Excessus' or 'excursus' is the principle by which the future may impinge on the historic present, so that ultimately the prophet may be describing not merely contemporary events but fore-telling divine redemption. This leads to the second main hermeneutical principle, namely, theoria. Theoria corresponds to the principle enunciated in the fourth rule of Tychonius.

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1 Hosea 2.1-3 may be out of place and form a parallel to ch. 2 vs 16-25.
2 1024 c.
3 See on Amos. 9.11 f.
4 Vaccari says 'excessus' refers only to a subjective impression; Merx says it is a linguistic hyperbole; Baxter translates it 'digression'; Bouwman says it relates to the of mystical theology.
5 In ascetic literature 'theoria' stands in contrast to the 'vita activa.' Cassian uses it 19 times. Bouwman defines it as 'primarily a spiritual vision and secondarily knowledge derived therefrom' (p. 95). It is the grasping of a higher reality by considering a reality which in form and content is less important. 'Theoria est autem (ut eruditis placet) in brevibus plerumque aut formis aut causis, earum rerum quae potiores sunt, considerata perceptio.' Quoted by Bouwman, op. cit. p. 90, (P.L. XXI, 971B).
and adopted by the Antiochene school. Augustine feels that injunctions directed to Jerusalem or Tyre may be applied to other cities and the same is true of individuals. What is remarkable is the way in which Julian restricts this principle, used so freely by Ambrose and Augustine, to certain key passages (e.g. Joel iii. 8., Amos ix. 12). Thus on Hosea 1.10 f (= Rom. 9.26) he says that although the Apostle is aware of the fulfilment of this prophecy in New Testament times, he appreciates its prior reference to the end of the captivity in Babylon. Similarly Hosea XIII. 14 speaks not only of the defeat of Sennacherib and the victory of Israel, but 'cumulatius et gratius' of the incarnation and victory by the Cross. The term 'forma' is related to theoria as a symbolical action which may either be factual, mystical or literary. Sometimes it is used in the sense of model: 'Imitare ergo et tu formam Judicis tui.'

God surrounds not only the words but also the deeds of the prophet with dignity and meaning. The marriage of Joel is thus not a purely literary representation.

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1cf. De Doct. Chr. III. 47 (P.L. XXXIV-V, 34): 'ea quae de Salomone dicuntur, excedunt ejus modum, ea potius ad Christum vel Ecclesiam ejus ilius pars est, relatae eclareseunt et rossunte.'

2Job. 407b. 39.
(Origen), nor an historical fact (Theodore). It is a vision (imago, figura). Similarly the dialogue in Job between God and Satan is not purely literary nor historical, but a vision conveying spiritual reality.

The weakness of Julian's exegesis is not hard to discover. Too often he leaves the reader with a bare narrative, confirmed in historical events, from which one may occasionally draw moral conclusions about such things as wealth, idolatry and vice. There is lacking the intensity of an intimate personal religion where each man is savingly confronted by the living God. Too often he violates scripture by introducing reason as the ultimate adjudicator. Yet Julian did stress the historical reference over against the allegorical, contributed to the acceptance of the Vulgate, and often reveal an integrity and originality, without which, no-one can claim to be a good exegete.

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1 See Vaccari's definition - amended by Bouwman, op. cit., p. 95 f.
CHAPTER III.

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I. Justitia Dei.

The central principle of Julian's theology is the righteousness of God:¹ "ita concinenter totius naturae voce resonabat, inseparabiliter Deo adhaerere justitiam, ut facilius inveniretur qui substantiam ejus, quam qui aequitatem negaret."² All other 'proprietates' must be consistent with this formal constituent of deity without which moral relationships are impossible. It is the 'augusta virtus' which exists entitatively in God Himself: "in ipso vero Deo, omnium quae sunt ex nihilo conditore, immense et claro per aeternum orbe resplendet. Origo ejus divinitas est, actas ejus aeternitas, et aeternitas ullo citro nescia vel desinere vel coepisse. Ut


ergo genus ejus (quod nomine nihil aliud quam originem intelligi volo) Deus est.\(^1\) "God who is utterly fair-minded would cease to be God without 'iustitia'.\(^2\) Justice is not one quality among others, but simply an alternative way of describing the 'simplex multiplicitas' which exists in God: "tunc quoque nobis plurimum praebebit auxilii, cum docuerit, nec prudentiam, nec fortitudinem, nec temperantiam posse sine justitia contineri.\(^3\)

Julian realises that since there are no extrinsic differentia to being the function of definition must be descriptive rather than logical. It is in God that justice truly exists: "Ut igitur prima fidel fundamenta cognoscas, noster Deus, Ecclesiae catholicae Deus, substantia nobis ignotus est, et ab aspectu simuliter remotus; quem vidit nemo hominum, nec videre potest (I Tim.vi.16); ut aeternus sine principio, ita sanctus justusque sine vitio, omnipotentissimus, aequissimus, misericordissimus, omnipotens, aequus, misericors.

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\(^2\) Op. Impf.II.124; (P.L. XLV, 1194); cf.III.9 (P.L. XLV, 1250); cf.I.133 (P.L. XLV, 1132); 'Facit quod vult ... ubi ergo inseparabiliter voluntas cohaeret aequitati, quamcumque de illis nominavero, utramque signavi.'

\(^3\) Op. Impf. 1.36 (P.L. XLV, 1063).
Despite this promising start there is no clear understanding that the precise nature of the 'justitia Dei' can only be interpreted in terms of the revelation given in Christ: "You (Julian) tried to prove that even those who are strangers to the faith of Christ can have true righteousness." Justice is defined in uncompromisingly Aristotelian terms: "Justice, as it is wont to be defined by the learned and as we can understand, is (if the Stoics will allow us to prefer one to the other) the greatest of all virtues, discharging diligently the duty of restoring his own to each, without fraud, without favour." Julian appreciates that no term can be

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2 C. J. iv. 23.

applied univocally to God and man: legal justice is not synonymous with divine righteousness.\(^1\) Since we cannot transcend the finite by an idealization of the creaturely, we must turn to scripture for a clear understanding of what God's justice means.\(^2\) We shall presently see that this insight is vitiated by the primary categorisation of justice in terms of Old Testament legal concepts rather than by reference to the life of Christ. Julian is convinced that at stake in the controversy is the fundamental premiss on which religion rests—namely, that ethical values are not simply subjective descriptions of acquired preferences, but mirror the corresponding reality in God:

"Exsecramur quod exsecratur Deus, intelligimus quod exponit Deus, disserimus quod disputavit Deus, credimus propter quod juravit Deus."\(^3\) An unjust God would not be God: "... si probari posset justus non

\(^1\) Op. Impf. II. 22 (P.L. XLV, 1149).


\(^3\) Op. Impf. III. 49 (P.L. XLV, 1270); cf. III. 93 (P.L. XLV, 1287); cf. Aug. C.J. i. 22: "But this matter about which we are now speaking pertains to the very foundations of the faith."
esse, convincetur Deus non esse. Here the dual influences of Pelagianism converge. On the one hand Stoicism provides the framework for that concept of religion in which "the apprehension of God meeting man in an absolute claim or demand takes the dominant, controlling place." On the other hand Hebraism, with its thought of God as the Source and Sustainer of ethical values provides the content. Since our experience is ethically conditioned, this knowledge of a just God is given intuitively in the structure of moral awareness. As a universal experience of transcendent obligation it provides the paradigm for a true understanding of God's relation to the world.


4 cf. H.H. Farmer: "God and Men," (London, 1948) p. 20: "If by God we mean that final reality of righteousness and love, from which all things, including ourselves, depend for their existence, their nature, their coherence, their unfolding history and final outcome, then the whole meaning of our existence is at stake in Him, and nothing less than the whole breadth of our experience could be the appropriate and sufficient content for thinking about Him."
This immediate conviction elucidates everything religion can say. Nevertheless the doctrine of God does not derive its distinctive character solely from the human experience of morality. Otherwise one could never be sure that it was an authentic experience of a transcendent Subject. The Divine Reality is mediated to man not only in the unconditional imperative of the conscience when face to face with the moral law. It also comes through scripture and tradition: "sed est pius, justus, et verus Deus, qualem omnis sancta Scriptura, omnis lex et fides nostra veneratur."¹ The justice of God is both immediately intuited and analytically inferred from the revelatory historical events attested in scripture. The Law as the elucidation of divine commands and human equity is the supreme expression of justice: "Ergo Deum et justum et plum credimus et veracem, ac per hoc nihil impossibile mandasse legem ejus tenemus, nihil falsum confirmare testimonia, nihil iniquum pronuntiare judicia."² The essence of the religious relationship is obedience to the moral law.

Giver. Julian is not thinking here of a knowledge of God consisting simply of general abstract norms of conduct. Rather each individual is personally addressed by God and called to obey, and though this imperative has its ground in a reality more ultimate than the phenomenal world, it receives expression in the Decalogue: "Deus justus legem devotionis homini non poneret, si sum nosset pati peccandi necessitatem.... Posuit autem Deus justus legem homini, quen ulturum se, si fuisset praevericatus, apopondit." The Law embodies the primary orientation between God and man because it expresses those basic principles of obligation and loyalty which inhere in the personal relationship itself. A similar pre-occupation with juridical ideas appears in the relation existing between the Law and God's providential actions: "atque ideo inter praecepta et judicia Dei nihil esse pugnarum." Seldom do either Augustine or Julian appreciate that a forensic justice which we know to be sadly barren in human relationships, cannot exhaust what we mean by the righteousness of God. Vitiated by

\[1\text{Op. Impf. vi. 15 (P.L. XLV, 1533).}\]

\[2\text{Op. Impf. iii. 36 (P.L. XLV, 1263).}\]
an inadequate definition of justice neither theodicy can evolve a doctrine of providence which finds the cohesive element between power and love, between justice and pardon, in that stark symbol of tragedy, the Cross of Christ.

Starting off from the same basal principle - "we both confess God is just" - Julian speaks of this justice as revealing itself in three ways. Firstly: divine justice is attested in a good creation:

"Deum quoque talium hominum assere conditorem, quales manibus ejus justitiaeque conveniant." A single misdemeanour cannot pervert human nature: "Nec potuit aliquando esse, si potest aliquando non esse; quia naturalia ab initio substantiae usque ad terminum illius perseverant." Natural properties are not

\[1\] C.J. vi. 31.

\[2\] Julian often cites the perfect heathens, and sneers at Augustine's 'spendida vitia.' If the virtues of the heathen are not virtues, their eyes are not eyes (C.J. iv. 26-30) ... he always held the opinion that there was no difference between a good Christian and a good heathen." Harnack, op. cit., p. 201.


converted by accident.\footnote{1} Because character is the cumulative effect of countless decisions of the willing Subject no isolated failure suffices to pre-determine subsequent behaviour. To impute a depraved nature to newborn infants on the basis of Adamic disobedience is to impugn the honour of God and imperil the moral basis of true religion: "Accusas enim parvulos, sed cum Deo; incessis innocentiam, sed cum acquisitatis injuria; inficiaris veritati, sed cum ejus criminatione quem Deum tuum fateris. Ac per hoc, et si nos deficeremus rationis auxilio, abunde tamen tradux peccati assertorum suorum deformitate corrueret."\footnote{2} As a contemporary writer puts it: "A just God cannot blame a man for a condition of will and heart for which he is not responsible.\footnote{3} It follows that since infants are only potentially moral "sanctity must be ascribed to the new-born,"\footnote{4} for the works of God are not

\footnote{1}{Op. Impf. 1.61 (P.L. XLV, 1031).}
\footnote{2}{Op. Impf. vi.24 (P.L. XLV, 1157).}
\footnote{4}{C.J.III.60.}
evil and the judgments of God are not unjust.\(^1\) No one is punished for another's sin: "Quam vehementer inculcat, apud justum judicem Deum aliena peccata alia non nocere...\(^2\) Thus death is not punishment for sin, as Augustine says,\(^3\) but the natural cessation of our animal existence: "apparet quoque mortalitatem non ad praevaricationem spectare, sed ad naturam ad quam spectare leguntur et nuptiae. Illa ergo lex quae promulgata est, id est, Quacumque die ex interdicto ederis, morte morieris: poenalis mors intelligitur, non corporalis; peccatis, non seminibus imminens; quam non incurrit nisi praevaricatio, non evadit nisi emendatio.\(^4\) Even the saints experience it: "Non est enim tanti unius meritum, ut universa quae naturaliter sunt instituta perturbet.\(^5\) Salvation means deliverance from spiritual death.\(^6\)


\(^2\) Op. Impf. ii.163 (P.L. XLV, 1210); cf. iii.12 (P.L. XLV, 1252); 'unusquisque in peccato suo morietur.'


\(^4\) Op. Impf. vi.30 (P.L. XLV, 1580); cf. vi.36 (P.L. XLV, 1591); 'ergo et morte non supplicialis est, sed naturalis.'


so that the inevitability of natural decay should no longer hold any terror for us. The natural dissolution of man as a corporate entity, the 'mors corporalis,' must not be confused with the deadness induced by sin, the 'mors poenalis.' The earthly and heavenly man are only metaphors expressing the characteristic activities of the Self. Even Adam in his pristine innocence did not possess immortality: "Adam factum esse viventem, sed non immortalem." A physical event must not be confused with a moral fact: "Non possunt parentum peccata ad filios decurrere per naturam, quia res arbitrii seminibus non ligatur: sed peccatum Adae, quod de voluntate conceptum est, transit in omnes homines per naturam, quia res arbitrii seminibus illigata est." The grave is not a punishment for this life but the

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2 Bruckner: op. cit., p.146.


gateway to a better life: "Donee convertaris in terram ex qua sumptus es; quoniam terra es, et in terram ibis. Haec sane pars extrema sententiae, sicut illa mulieris, ad indicium, non ad supplicium respicit: quin imo, ut res indicat, promisso fine consolatur hominem ............. procul dubio non iniquitatis, sed naturae mortalis fuit, ut qui aeternus non erat, in corporis parte solveretur." 1

Secondly divine justice reveals itself in the just and reasonable demands of the Creator. 2 The exercise of responsibility which is the salient characteristic of human existence requires that the commandments be possible 'prima facie' for all to obey: "Nec ea hominibus praeceperet, quae per naturam eorum sciret non posse servari; nec pro rebus naturabilibus reum quemiam judicaret. 3 To maintain that God makes impossible demands is to deny the reality of personal

1 Op. Impf. vi. 27 (P.L. XLV, 1567-8).


accountability: "Quoniam conatus omnimoda honestatis exstinguit; quoniam morum obscenitatem, operum Dei, id est, naturae humanae, consolatur et auget infamia; quoniam omnia mandata legis, reatui impossibilitatis, id est, iniquitatis addicit." 1 Indeed transgression can have no meaning apart from the Law. 2 Now this is not simply a narrow legalism. Julian is just as aware as Augustine that sin in its essence is far more than the contravention of an external standard. It is disloyalty to one's own worth as a child of God. The commandments of God are an expression of His mercy and patience towards mankind: "Ipsa gratia legem in adjutorium misit (Isa. viii.20, sec. LXX); ad ejus spectabat officium, ut rationis lumen, quod

1Op. Impf. ii.i.73 (P.L. XLV, 1279); cf. Exp. in Iob.13.12. 'justitia expunctrix (= assessor) meritorum.'

2Op. Impf. ii.i.187 (P.L. XLV, 1222): "Quoniam ea judicante justitia, quae non imputat peccatum, nisi a quo liberum est abstinere, hi qui sine lege peccaverunt, sine lege judicabuntur"(Rom.ii.i.12). Quod autem ait Apostolus, Sed regnavit mors ab Adam usque ad Mysen, etiam in eos qui non peccaverunt, in similitudinem praevacricationis Adae; fecit translucere quod senserat, id est, Judaeos sub lege peccantes simili ter ut Adam praevicicatos fuisse definiens, quia et illi primo homini, licet non libris, auribus tamen commenda lex fuerat abstinendi a Gustu arboris: in quo obedientiae explorativ fuit; de qua contra praevpectum edendo, praeviacricationis crimen incurririt." cf. E. Brunner: "The Mediator" p. 414: "The Law is the backbone, the framework, the granite foundation of the spiritual world."
pravitatis exempla hebetabant et consuetudo vitiorum, multimodi eruditionibus excitaret, atque invitatua suorum reveret.¹ Thus obedience to the law conceived, not as the arbitrary demands of a sovereign will, but as the true expression of man's being, is essentially moral. The codex is binding because it elucidates the innate moral and social dictates of reason: "Ut quibus lex data non est, intelligatur non esse praeccepta transgressi; rei autem convincantur, quoniam negligentes rationem, quam proprie in unoque protestantur affectus, vel humanae societatis vel pudoris jura temeraverint; atque ideo mutua quidem imitatione, non tamen legis, quae necum lata erat, dicuntur transgressione peccasse. Usque ad legem ergo peccatum fuit, non praevaticatio; post legem autem, non solum peccatum, sed etiam praevaticatio."² 'It is time to use the authority of the Law in addition to the evidence of nature.'³

³ C.J.iV.79.
The Decalogue is simply the codification of the rule inherent in the nature of rational creatures whereby they duly order their behaviour to God, themselves and society. The relation to God remains moral and not simply legal because this willing acceptance of duty as dictated by conscience is identified with the divine will. This leads the argument away from the definition of sin as a violation of the divine will to the equation of reason and righteousness.  

Julian had too keen a mind to permit a hasty identification of the inner sense of moral obligation with a specific code of conduct. The former exists independently of concrete embodiment, as an inalienable principle of man's nature. Furthermore, when he says we can keep the commandments if only we are willing, he has in mind the deep Christian conviction that failure to do so is attributable solely to ourselves. The free causality of the Self is not identical with its characteristics (good or bad as they may be), for the Self is neither a substance over and above its experiences nor a nexus in a pre-determined sequence; otherwise the seriousness of

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\[1\text{Op. Impf. 11.218 (P.L. XLV, 1236).}\]
the moral struggle becomes a fiction. We do indeed need God's help to keep the Law, but this 'adjutorium' is given in the structure of being, the ordering of society, and the incarnation of Christ. Part of the theological confusion arises through Julian's tendency to give grace a much wider connotation than Augustine:

"Quod enim alis, ad collendum recte Deum sine ipsius adjutorio, dicit nobis, sufficere unicuique libertatem arbitrii, omnino mentiris. Cum enim cultus Dei multis intelligatur modis, et in custodia mandatorum, et in exsecratione vitiorum, et in simplicitate conversationis, et in ordine mysteriorum, et in profunditate dogmatum, quae de Trinitate vel de resurrectione, multisque alius similibus fides Christiana consequitur; qui, fieri potest, ut nos in confuso dicamus, sine adjutorio Dei liberum arbitrium sufficiens ad ejus esse culturum, cum legamus in Evangelio dicentem Dominum, Confiteor tibi, Pater ... (Mt. xi.25-26)" Augustine' contention


2Op. Impf. iii.106 (P.L. XLV, 1291); cf. Op. Impf. ii.188 (P.L. XLV, 1223): Augustine writes 'Sed in hanc absurditatem cecidistis, dum defenditis esse potuisse per naturam legemque justitiam: utrumlibet autem si verum est, ergo Christus gratis mortuus est.' The whole point is that Julian is not severing the bond between 'justitia' and 'gratia' here. He places Christ within the event of grace, not grace within the event of Christ. cf. C.J.iv.16; cf. Bruckner, op. cit., p. 133.
is that if righteousness comes through the Law the promises of the gospel are in vain.\(^1\) His opponent replies that it is one and the self-same grace which is given in both Law and Gospel. The scripture which speaks of righteousness through faith alone,\(^2\) also says that Abraham's faith was expressed not in a quietistic acceptance of prophetic insights but in good works,\(^3\) and to this pattern of religious activity we are all committed.\(^4\)

**Thirdly,** God's righteousness is shown in the Example of Christ. As Adam is the archetype of the sinner so Christ is the archetype of the New Creation.\(^5\) In Him righteousness is shown in its truest form: "Qui Adam forma dicitur futuri, id est, Christi:

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\(^{1}\) Op. Impf. 11.160 (P.L. XLV, 1210). "Immo destrueretur promissio, si ex lege quisquam justus esset."

\(^{2}\) C. J. iv.17.

\(^{3}\) Op. Impf. 11.156 (P.L. XLV, 1207).


\(^{5}\) Op. Impf. vi.39 (P.L. XLV, 1598): "Ergo hoc utramque sententiam fine discrivi, ut ostenderet Adam factum esse viventem, sed non immortalem; Christum autem in spiritum, non solum viventem, verum etiam conferentem resurrectionem, suis gloriosam, omnibus aeternam."
verum forma a contrario, ut sicut ille peccati, ita
hic justitiae forma credatur. Sed sicut incarnatio
Christi, justitiae fuit forma, non prima, sed maxima;
quia et antequam Verbum caro fieret, ex ea fide quae
in Deum erat, et in Prophetis et in multis alis
sanctis fulsero virtutes; veniente autem temporum
plenitudine, exalta in Christo justitiae norma
resplenduit, et qui praedictus fuerat pater futuri
saeculi, tam praecedentium sanctorum, quam etiam
sequentium remunerator eminuit."

1 The 'opitulatio
divina' consists not in a mysterious infusion of
divine power, but in providing the inspiration of a
truly human person engaging in genuine moral struggle
and overcoming at last: "You (Julian) say: Remove
the cause of the example and you take away its value
for us. No wonder you find nothing but an example in
Christ."2 Christ is 'Homo verus, vir perfectus.'3

Inspired by this Example the life of man receives a


2C.J. v.53.

new impetus towards holiness: "vita hominum virtutum illius imitationis dirigitur." As sin is due solely to a faulty environment so grace is found in living as children of the New Kingdom. Christian virtue is essentially obedience to the moral precepts inherent in our nature and Jesus shows us that this can actually be achieved rather than directly enabling us to do it. In accepting this challenge and acknowledging this gift we become disciples: "The fullness of the divine love, which gave things their existence, revealed itself in this, that the Word became flesh and dwelt among us. When God required an answering love on the part of those created in his own image, he showed how he had done everything out of His ineffable love towards us, that so we might finally love Him in return, who evinced His love to us, in

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1 Op. Impf. 1v.54 (P.L. XLV, 1371).

2 Op. Impf. 1v.129 (P.L. XLV, 1425-6); cf. 11.49 (P.L. XLV, 1162): "Deinde omnes scripturae Veteris Testamenti commentant Israelem, ne ritum profanae gentis imitetur. Quae igitur necessitas id cogebat, ut Apostolus, si imitationem vellet intelligi, diabolum magis quam hominem nominaret, cum et hominem et diaboli nosset imitatione delinquit? Aut ergo tu proba, non posse hominem imitatione peccari, nec hoc in lege uspiciam contineri, et sic esse suspicione tuae locum paratum; aut certe si manifestum est, nulla magis re quam imitationem vitiorum involuisse peccata, grandi imperitia collegisti Apostolum de diabolo professus dicturumuisse, si imitationem voluisse intelligi."
that He spared not His own Son, but gave Him up for us; promising us that, if from henceforth we would obey His Will, He would make us joint-heirs with His only-begotten Son. Divine righteousness is shown not only in the demands made upon us, but in the provision of a concrete Example to confirm that nothing in our human constitution prevents us from godly living. 'Justitia' becomes virtually synonymous with 'gratia.'

The greatest weakness in Julian's doctrine of God is his failure to relate love to righteousness. His strong sense of moral demand is not sufficiently tempered by the distinctive New Testament witness. We wait in vain for an essentially ethical theodicy consonant with the fact of physical evil. Faced with the question, "Why then are little children afflicted if they are altogether without sin," he counters by enquiring whether baptism is the efficacious sign of

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1 Op. Impf. 1.94 (P.L. XLV, 1111).


3 Op. Impf. 1.72 (P.L. XLV, 1097); cf. iii.163 (P.L. XLV, 1309).

4 Op. Impf. 11.81 (P.L. XLV, 1175); cf. ii.95 (P.L. XLV, 1179).
regeneration and if so why infants are not made alive 'de facto' in Christ.\(^1\) If nature transmits sin it must equally be the vehicle of virtue: "Paremque conditionem justitiae facit atque peccati, asserens vitia generantium ita non ire per semina, sicut non quesunt ire virtutes."\(^2\) Convinced that a just God cannot punish us for other mens sins\(^3\) it was a short step to the insight that suffering is not divine retribution at all. Unhappily Julian seldom makes this explicit except, perhaps, in his treatment of death; and certainly he does not work out its implications. Since newborn infants partake of Adamic innocence\(^4\) paradise must include some elements of discomfort and suffering. As Augustine asks "Quod et si Scriptura non diceret, quis tam caecus est mente, qui non videat misericordiam generis humani a fletibus

\(^{1}\)Op. Impf. ii. 90-91 (P.L. XLV, 1177-8).
\(^{2}\)Op. Impf. iii. 46 (P.L. XLV, 1269).
\(^{3}\)Op. Impf. iii. 30 (P.L. XLV, 1258) "...non morientur patres pro filiis, nec filii pro patribus"; cf. iii. 12 (P.L. XLV, 1252).
\(^{4}\)C.J. iii. 36. "The only endowment of infancy is innocence."
"You (Julian) speak as though you were able to prove, or were insolent enough to suspect, that in the first creation of man, before the merited condemnation followed his guilt, such carnal concupiscence existed in paradise." Pain and suffering are integral to an animal nature and simply part of the 'instituta naturae.'

Nascuntur enim exigui, debiles: qui non solum ali proprio labore non possint, verum nec implorare queant opem parentum: qui tam multis casibus obnoxii sunt, ut


2C.J. iii.27.

3Comm in Iob. Exp. 403b; 4ff.
The universe is composed of a plurality of systems which may occasionally interfere with one another. When this happens we refer to it as physical evil, and when it leads to spiritual failure we call it moral evil. The clearest example of this is the sex instinct. Though good in itself, excessive indulgence in the sensuous inhibits that mental discipline which characterizes the perfect man. Pain can have no ethical significance since the animal creation, devoid of moral aptitude, experiences it: 

> "... ut omnia animalia nullo maculata peccato, hos angores, hos gemitus in parturitione patiuntur? Per quod apparat, argumentum non esse peccati, quod inveniri etiam sine peccato potest ... sed non illa ampliatio miseriae parsimoniam modi naturalis evertit." The sufferings of childbirth are the common lot of all creation including man.

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3. G.J. iv. 52; cf. v. 16. "non modo, verum solo peccaret excessu."

and death is a natural and predictable phenomenon: 1

"Mortality as a law of nature would have continued
as the lot of man, even when Adam himself after a
long life had passed into eternity." 2 As we have
already noted Julian is not unaware that death is
connected with moral issues in the New Testament.
Accordingly he distinguishes between death as a
physical event and death as a rejection of spiritual
values. The cessation of life, the 'mors corporalis,'
is a physical event, but dying this death, the 'mors
poenalis,' has an ethical significance. 3 The logic
of this position is resignation in the face of the
unalterable constitution of the Universe. Misfortune
and calamity are concomitants of our natural habitat
from which we have no right to seek redemption. The

1 0p. Impf. vi. 25 (P.L. XLV, 1559); 'Non enim
esse, iniquitis (Augustine), dolor in pariente, nisi
in nascente esset peccatum.' Cf. Bruckner op. cit.,
p. 144.

2 0p. Impf. vi. 30 (P.L. XLV, 1580). Julian
points out that Christ accepts this fact in Matt. 22.29.

3 0p. Impf. vi. 30 (P.L. XLV, 1580); 'Quacumque
die ex interdictione ederis, morte morieris; poenalis
mors intelligitur, non corporalis; peccatis, non
seminibus imminens; quam non incurrit nisi praevirica,
non evadit nisi emendatio.'
result is to uphold God's love at the expense of His power, and even the reality of this love is endangered by the barely concealed deism of Julian's theology. As one writer puts it: "It is an accident common to organic existence that weak, puny and imperfect examples of any given species should sometimes be produced. It is a problem for medicine, not for theology."¹ The question remains whether Christianity is concerned at all with bodily renewal and, if not, in what sense can we meaningfully speak of the redemption of the total personality?

Augustine agrees with Julian in the centrality of the 'Justitia Dei': "we hold it to be certain and everlastingly firm that there is no injustice with God, so that He should condemn anyone who had done no wrong, and that there is goodness with God by which He delivers many without personal merit."² As Burnaby says: 'Doubt of God's justice is to Augustine the


sure road to atheism. 1 "God is good, God is just" is the constant theme of the polemic against Pelagianism. 2 He further protests against giving a preclusive force to descriptive terms: "Ubi si a te quaeratur, quae sit justitia ista; profecto in illo dialectico et philosophico sermonem, quod tibi videris de justitia Dei diligentissime disputasse, non invenis eam" 3 - yet has no clear principle of analogy between divine and human epithets. It is simply "consider (discerne) divine and human judgments and you will find that there is no contradiction between the two." 4 They modify and interpret each other. 5 The juristic definition of justice 'giving each man his due' occurs

1 "Amor Dei" p. 197, (London, 1933).
2 C.J. i. 35, cf. Op. Impf. ii. 16 (P.L. XLV, 1143). "quia ita Deus justus, ut si probaretur justus non esse, convinceretur Deus non esse; conclusumque est, non Deum aequissimum in Trinitate venerari."
4 Op. Impf. i. i. 37 (P.L. XLV, 1623).
5 Op. Impf. i. i. 27 (P.L. XLV, 1257). "Ab humana justitia discerne divinam."
frequently, even though a cavil is entered when Julian offers a similar definition. The real problem 'quomodo est justus Deus,' is never adequately investigated. Justice at its simplest means retribution: "Under the just and almighty God, these evils would not be visited upon His image - evils that could not lead to the practice of virtue in infants - if nothing calling for punishment were contracted from parents." Divine justice is nothing more than the religious counterpart of equality before the Law. Its essence is submission to God and His demands:

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1 De Civ. Dei. xix. 21 (P.L. XLI, 649). cf. De Lib. Arb. i. 27 (P.L. XXXII, 1235). cf. De Mor. Ecc. Cath. i. 25 (P.L. XXXII, 1322). 'justitia, amor soli amato serviens, et propterea recte dominans.' Augustine is aware that 'equitable dealing' is an inadequate definition of divine justice: "Nam et malum pro malo reddere, justitia videtur; sed non est ejus de quo dictum est. Qui facit oriri solem suum super bonos et malos; ... ergo punit Deus, ut judex punit eos qui legem praetereunt, non eis inferens de seipso malum, sed in id quod elegerunt eos expellens ad complendam summam miseriarum. Homo autem cum malum pro malo reddit, malo voto id facit: et ob hoc prior ipse malus est, dum punire vult malum." (En. in Ps. V, 10. (P.L. XXXVI-VII, 87). Yet even here the idea of legal accountability is not altogether absent.


3 G.J. iii. 9.

4 De Lib. Arb. i. 13 (P.L. XXXII, 1231), cf. i. 2 (P.L. XXXII, 1241). '(Deus) non solum in nos benignissimus in praestando, sed etiam justissimus in vindicando est.'
"He punishes none who do not deserve it." The "Exposition of the Psalms" is a reproduction of the views of Job's friends towards suffering: "they are perverse of heart, corrupt and crooked, who say that all the evils they suffer, they suffer unrighteously." Suffering becomes synonymous with punishment for 'without the judgement of God no-one is slow in mind or crippled in body.' God does not chastise unjustly: "cum justissimus Deus poenas immeritas nec infligat alicui, nec infligi sinat." The 'tot ac tanta vitia naturalia' are manifestations of that original sin inherent in the heart of every man.

"You can find no way in which the evil could have befallen them under a just God, if children do not

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1 C. J. v.13.

2 Op. Impf. vi.27 (P. L. XLV, 1573) 'ideo convincuntur rei esse, quoniam sunt miseri.'

3 En. in Ps. cxviii. vi. 2 (P. L. XXXVI-VII, 1515).

C. J. iii.11. 'If there were no such sin, then infants bound by no evil, would suffer nothing evil in body or in soul under the great power of the just God.'

contract from their parents something deserving punishment."¹ Augustine is forced into a massive attempt to harmonize the conflicting data of experience with the concept of fair-dealing: "look at infants: see how many and how great are the evils they endure; in what vanities, torments, errors and terrors they grow up ... we must, then, hold that the reason for these evils must be either the injustice or impotence of God, or the punishment for the first and ancient sin."² The correlation of physical evil and moral wrong occurs frequently: "quid enim aliud facit, si nullo male reis parvulis tanta mala vel ingerit, vel ingeri sinit?"³ "If he contracted no evil from his origin, he would never be born even with bodily faults. For God, who is the creator of souls, is also the creator of bodies, and He would never undeservedly inflict faults on human nature in its

¹ C. J. vi. 1.


³ Op. Impf. v. 64 (P. L. XLV, 1506).
very creation."¹ Augustine does see that Divine justice is a way of saying that God is not mocked, that His Call is serious, that disobedience affects the total man. This postulate of a cause and effect relation between misfortune and guilt² is reinforced by reference to the death of infants in the flood and at the destruction of Sodom.³ The ground of the argument shifts during the discussion. Sometimes it is argued that divine justice has its analogue in the ordering of human society. Its descriptive use establishes a constellation of concepts which belongs to the 'regulae virtutum' inherent in the moral order of the universe. There is a principle 'observable in our human business and mundane contracts: did we not retain in them the print of certain vestiges of the higher justice, our weak view could never rise and fix itself in the most holy and pure sanctuary

¹O.J. 111.13.

²Op. Impf. 111.5 (P.L. XLV, 1250). 'Quod utique injustum esset, si peccatum originale non esset.'

³Op. Impf. 111.12 (P.L. XLV, 1252), cf. 1.120 (P.L. XLV, 1126). 'vos autem qui Deum omnipotentissimum non negatis, in gravi jugo parvulorum credi multis injustum, negando originale peccatum.'
of spiritual commands.\textsuperscript{1} Part of this principle is the right to enforce by sanction the fulfilment of obligations. This transposition of attributes is not an uncritical attempt to reason from social or psychological data to the Ultimately Real. No-one is more aware than Augustine of the radical distinction between God and man.\textsuperscript{2} Rather it is the assertion that where true justice is found in human society, it is not inconsistent with what is meant by calling God just. At other times divine justice is viewed as the prototype with human judgement the ectype. Because God is the 'fons justitiae',\textsuperscript{3} no empirical evidence must be allowed to impugne His justice: "it is just because it is the act of God."\textsuperscript{4} The deliverances of conscience and intellect become irrelevant. Even the most blatant inequities of life would disappear if we could see the total picture.

\textsuperscript{1} De Div. Quaest. ad Simpl. i.ii.16 (P.L. XL, 120). Also quoted by Burnaby, op. cit., p. 196.

\textsuperscript{2}Enchir. xii.4 (P.L. XL, 236).

\textsuperscript{3}De Civ. Dei. xi.10.3 (P.L. XLII, 326). Cf. De Trin. vi. 8 (P.L. XLII, 929).

\textsuperscript{4}En. in Ps. lxi. 21f. (P.L. XXXVI-VII, 744).
of God's relation to men: "agnoscamus judicium, occultissimum quidem, sed sine ulla dubitatione justissimum.\(^1\) The result is the evacuation of transcendent justice of all recognisable content and the virtual denial that any meaningful definition can be given: "to believe a lie ... comes from the blindness of heart which by a hidden but just judgement of God is also a punishment for sin.... It is not in vain that the Apostle exclaims: "O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and of the knowledge of God; How inscrutable are his judgements, and how unsearchable are his ways."\(^2\) Yet we must remember that Augustine's main concern is to safeguard the basic moral structure of life. Human accountability is the correlate of divine justice. "If the just God imposed evils so great I cannot at present recount them, upon infants who contract no sin, He would rather seem unjust."\(^3\) This 'poena parvulorum' occupies Augustine constantly and is a recurrent theme in the anti-Pelagian writings.

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\(^1\)Op. Impf. i.48 (P.L. XLV, 1071). 'Inscrutabilia sunt judicia ejus' - a recurrent theme in Augustine.


\(^3\)C.J. ii.33, cf. Op. Impf. ii.139 (P.L. XLV, 1199): 'Punire enim nullius peccati meritum habentes, scut etiam ipse confiteris, non potest sine eversione justitiae.'
It is scarcely an overstatement to say that it is the empirical verification on which the doctrine of original sin relies: "God supremely just and supremely good, would not permit His image in infants to endure these evils if there was no original sin."\(^1\) It is argued that either trouble benefits us or it is the just penalty for our sins. The 'jugum grave' is the evidence of divine justice\(^2\) - a statement which draws from Julian the biting retort: "Your God is a criminal."\(^3\) Since "many are born deformed, many diseased, many horrible and monstrous,"\(^4\) there must be some grounds for this 'poena flagelli.' It cannot be the injustice of God, nor the obtuse will since infants do not exercise moral choice: "there is no other origin of sin but an evil will."\(^5\) Hence it must be located in the transmitted sin of the first man.\(^6\)

\(^1\) C.J. vi. 4.

\(^2\) Op. Impf. i. 50 (P.L. XLV, 1073).

\(^3\) Op. Impf. i. 43 (P.L. XLV, 1070); cf. v. 54 (P.L. XLV, 1487) 'malum igitur per Deum.'

\(^4\) C.J. vi. 30. cf. iii. 25.

\(^5\) C.J. iii. 11.

\(^6\) Op. Impf. i. 110 (P.L. XLV, 1137).
Certainly little children are personally innocent: "the state of the new-born is not damaged by the will of those who generate them ... nothing is more perfect than the ignorance of infants"; yet we must "answer why such great innocence is sometimes born blind, sometimes deaf ... sometimes feeble-minded." The Augustinian solution lies in the concept of seminal guilt: "ideo per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum, quia per semen generationis intravit, quod a viro exiiciens concepit femina: quo more nasci noluit, qui solus sine peccato est natus ex femina." Hence the need for the sacrificial offerings at the birth of a child and circumcision as the sacrament for cleansing. The attempt to justify providence in these terms comes close to justifying evil itself. If children are in a state of innocent perfection they would possess the Kingdom of God already without

1C.J. iii.36.

2C.J. iii.10; cf. Op. Impf. iii.48 (P.L. XLV, 1269); cf. 11.61 (P.L. XLV, 1175). "Propter quid ergo affliguntur parvuli; si nulium habent omnino peccatam?"


5C.J. v.45.
any need of a Saviour: ipse est Adam, in quo si parvuli non moriuntur, profecto nec in Christo vivificabuntur. Salvation means nothing less than being incorporated into Christ through the sacramental ordinances of the Church.

Yet punishment is not only retributive. It is also remedial; the last thing desired for an erring child is the just award for a sinful life. The love of the Father banishes the legal equivalent. It is good because it is just: "all the misery in which the world groans ... is a healing pain (dolor medicinalis), and not a penal sentence." No price is too high to reclaim that reverence for the moral life which is the gateway to true religion. Pain becomes the medium for greater moral sensitivity and integrity of character. It refines rather than pollutes life. Nowhere is this more evident than in

1C.J. vi.32.
4En. in Ps. cxxxvii.15 (P.L. XXXVI-VII, 1793).
that fear of death which leads men everywhere to repent.\textsuperscript{1} The loss of God co-terminous with sin is the real punishment;\textsuperscript{2} subsequent misery is the medium of God's plea for repentance: "to every man his own sin is made the penalty, and his iniquity is turned into punishment."\textsuperscript{3} God whispers in our pleasures, calls in our disappointments and shouts in our pains: 'Without Me, ye can do nothing.' The real problem concerns those aspects of evil and pain which issues in events obviously dysteleological to human personality and destructive of human relationships. Augustine never really faces this problem for he fails to perceive clearly that corrective action is not punishment at all, that the forensic sense of justice is the very idea which the gospel rejects, and that suffering is only redemptive in so far as it becomes the medium for that growth of personality without which a Kingdom of right relationships remains superficial. Pain, in itself, is not nature's

\textsuperscript{1} Op. Impf. vi.41 (P.L. XLV, 1605); cf. vi.21 (P.L. XLV, 1549).
\textsuperscript{2} C. J. v.10;
\textsuperscript{3} En. in Ps. vii.16 (P.L. XXXVI-VII, 107).
punishment, but its way of saying that we are more than nature - that we are moral and spiritual beings.

Anguish can enrich the personality in a way that the moment of trial is seen to be integral to the good. As Burnaby says: 'the worst effect of the confusion in Augustine's teaching about punishment is not his theory of original sin: it is rather to be found in the resulting confusion of the ethical motive.'

Attention is directed to the sanction imposed by the injured party rather than to the severance of personal relations. The justice of God in the New Testament is not primarily a judicial term at all. It refers to the sacrificial act of atonement in which God Himself bridges the gulf and insists on calling sinful men Sons and Daughters of the Most High. In the Cross the categories of distributive justice are forever broken. According to Augustine God chooses a few to

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1 cf., "The Principle of Individuality and Value," p. 245: "The question cannot surely be how many moments of pain you have experienced, and whether you have had enough moments of pleasure, allowing for the intensities on each side to outweigh them, but whether the experience has done its work and returned you to yourself a complete, or at least a completer being." Quoted in W. Temple: "Nature, Man and God," (London, 1934) p. 509.

elective salvation. Justice is 'absoluta,' mercy only 'ordinata.' God cannot be other than just though He may withhold His mercy from some. The relationship between God and man is depersonalised. The significance of the Cross as the place where the categories of retributive punishment are transcended is not fully explored: "sine gratia vero si justitia Dei esset, nunquam Christus pro impis, id est, pro nihil boni et multum mali merentibus mortuus fuisset." The great bishop never fully appreciated that God loves us regardless of our intrinsic worth. He loves us just for being there. The Kingdom of God and the "justitiae Dei" represent different aspects of the same reality - the outgoing, sacrificial and dying love of God Himself.

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1 As Julian puts it - To glory in grace you suppress justice and to dishonour nature you accuse its Creator. We speak both of mercy and justice: "cum nos laudemus quidem clementiam remediorum, sed legum manente justitia." Op. Impf. 1.72 (P.L. XLV, 1097).

2 Op. Impf. iii.2 (P.L. XLV, 1249).
The debate between Julian and Augustine reached its climax in the discussion on the implications of a Christian anthropology. Cradled in the Academy, Augustine never completely succeeded in doing justice to the corporal nature of man. His tendency to equate body as the vehicle of behaviour with 'flesh' as the symbol of sinfulness convinced Julian that Augustinian doctrine was simply dormant Manichaeanism.¹ "Videamus ergo quid ipsi dicant. Manichaeus scribit naturale esse peccatum: anmit Augustinus naturale esse peccatum."² Certainly this was an oversimplification. Even if Augustine had

¹ "That Augustinianism is identical with Manichaeanism runs through Julian's polemic like a red line." Harnack, op. cit., p. 203.

once been attracted by its intellectual appeal, philosophical scepticism had long since destroyed this belief. Phrases such as "Manichaeos detestor," "Manichaeus insanus" occur frequently. Indeed it seemed to Augustine that the Pelagians themselves were dangerously close to positing a self-subsistent principle of evil: "Manichaeos tu adjuvas, quibus inducendix aliam naturam malam das locum, negando in originali malo esse causam miseriae parvulorum." Like Marius Mercator, Augustine recognised that the phrase 'peccatum naturale' could easily be construed as correlating original sin and physical evil. Anxious to evade this fatal identification and the cognate idea of 'naturalia crimina' he posited a

1De Utilitate Credendi, 1.2 (P.L. XLII, 66) 'apertum et sincerum verum tenere atque haurire cupientem?'

2Op. Impf. I.52 (P.L. XLV, 1075); I.95 (P.L. XLV, 1105). passim. cf. C.J. 1.3. 'The damnable and abominably impious error of the Manicheans.'

3Op. Impf. II.110 (P.L. XLV, 1187); cf. II.207 (P.L. XLV, 1230); IV.70 (P.L. XLV, 1379); IV.94 (P.L. XLV, 1394); V.1 (P.L. XLV, 1431); VI.5 (P.L. XLV, 1435-6). cf. C.J. 1.40.

4"Committorium" n.5, p.8. Schwartz: 'Ita nos non dicimus naturam vel naturale esse peccatum, sed originis causa addictae serviliter per peccatum.'
'peccatum originale' referring back to a primal Fall. The Adamic disobedience is the key to his refutation of the Manichaean charge. Though we are all 'lamed by that wound' it is an accident of our existence whose effects are overcome in the laver of regeneration. Julian's reply is that the doctrine of 'tradux peccati' though differing in emphasis from Manichaeanism is based on the same misconception. "Ames Manichaeum, in cordis tui secreto ..." He insists that the body as the symbol of man's creaturehood and finiteness remains essentially good. Natural propensities

1 Op. Impf. V.9 (P.L. XLV, 1438). "Originale peccatum propterea significatius quam naturale dicimus, ut non divini operis, sed humanae originis intelligatur; maxime propter illud significandum, quod per unum hominem intravit in mundum."


6 Op. Impf. iv.7 (P.L. XLV, 1343): "Quid putas remansisse, propter quod diabolo tot Dei opera transcribas?"
cannot be transformed by a solitary misdemeanour.¹ The very idea of congenital sinfulness is sheer folly.² Sin is essentially a completely personal and individual act. It is a specific decision against God: "The condition of sinfulness prior to personal sin in replaced by personal sins which each person commits for himself in his own lifetime, though certainly in imitation of Adam.³ The origin of sin does not lie in the nature of man or in the quality of the paradisical fruit, but solely in the violation of a divine command: "Causa enim peccati haud in qualitate pomi erat, sed in transgressione mandati."⁴ Judicial culpability for Adam's sin is self-contradictory.⁵ "Apparet igitur crimen


voluntatis esse, non seminis." The primal sin has a representative rather than an historical character. We do not sin in Adam, but as Adam. Sin is a momentary self-determination which in no way effects a constitutional change: "Just as the character of my body or mind cannot be attributed to any act of will on my part ... so the evil tendencies of my will cannot be imputed to my human nature." It is the will freely and deliberately choosing that which justice forbids: "... cogimusque ut explicet, quid putet esse peccatum, quod claret nihil esse aliud,quam voluntatem appetentem quod justitia vetat, et unde liberum est abstinere." 

How far is character affected by repeated wrongdoing? Julian fails to give a precise answer. On the one hand he must maintain that the faculty of

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2 Exp. in Iob. p.403b; 4 sq. "... deinde, cum coeperint a simplicitate naturali malorum imitatione discedere, curam monitoris adesse ..." cf. RSR vol. 52, no. 1, p. 64.


will is unaffected by the sinful act: “Hic ergo ubi
dixit Dominus, Si vos Filius liberaverit, vere liber
eritis; promisit indulgentiam reis, qui peccantes
non arbitrii libertatem, sed conscientiam justitiae
perdiderunt. Liberum autem arbitrium et post peccata
tam plenum est, quam fuit ante peccata.”¹ Transgression
cannot destroy that essential freedom (mera capacitas
utriusque) which is implicit in the notion of
personality. It can only determine deserts: “Nos
dicimus peccato hominis, non naturae statum mutari,
sed meriti qualitatem; id est, et in peccante hanc
esse liberis arbitrii naturam, per quam potest a peccato
desinere, quae fuit in eo ut posset a justitia deviare.”²
On the other hand he is not unaware of the power of
‘consuetudo.’ We may so habitually sin³ that it
becomes second nature to us: “Ille enim in membris
legem per flagitiorum usum sanctis consiliis inter
principia tamen emendationis rebellem, consuetudinem
malem vocabat, quae ab eruditis etiam saeculi dicit

¹ Op. Impf. 1.91 (P.L. XLV, 1108).
solet secunda natura."\(^1\) The immediate result is a diminution of our rational abilities - an increasing inability to discern how reprehensible moral failure is.\(^2\) Yet the integrity of the individual will remains intact.\(^3\) Unhappily, Julian never tells us how 'ratio' is related to 'liberum arbitrium.'\(^4\) Character becomes little more than a synonym for the individual pattern of behaviour. The bias toward evil is located outside both will and nature, within the objective historical continuum in which all acts take place. Sin becomes virtually synonymous with consciousness of sin. It is a false judgement. This recrudescence of the irrational Self expresses itself objectively in a perverted course of action, and subjectively in an uneasy conscience.

\(^1\) Op. Impf. 1.69 (P.L. XLV, 1091).


\(^3\) Op. Impf. iii.95 (P.L. XLV, 1238).

(a) Liberum Arbitrium -

In the "De Libero Arbitrio" Augustine had shown that the Self's desire to know and enjoy is not evil in itself. It becomes evil only in so far as man, failing 'adhaerere Deo,' tries to become a principle to himself, and abandons the one principle to which the soul should cleave.¹ Sin arises from the free choice of a spiritual being: "the whole human race limps because of the wound made through the free choice of two human beings."² By that 'perverse exaltation' man forfeited his true freedom and freely chose the thraldom of darkness.³

¹De Civ. Dei. XIV.13 (P.L. XLI, 420): "Quid est autem superbia, nisi perversae celsitudinis appetitus? Perversa enim celsitudo est, deserto eo cui debet animus inhaerere principio, sibi quodammodo fieri atque esse principium ... Spontaneus est autem iste defectus."

²C.J. iv.16.

³De Civ. Dei XIV.11 (P.L. XLI, 418): "Mala vero voluntas prima, quoniam omnia mala opera praecessit in homine, defectus potius fuit quidam ab opere Dei ad sua opera, quam opus ullum."
Original sin finds its possibility and expression primarily in the will of Adam: "per liberum arbitrium Deum deseruit." By affirming a moral union between Adam and his descendants, Augustine could maintain 'haeret per contagium, non per arbitrium.' "Because they were clothed with the flesh of him who sinned in his will they contract from him the responsibility (reatum) for sin ... just as children who put on Christ ... receive from Him a participation in justice." We cannot discover a moment of origin for evil in the empirical life of the individual. There is an inborn tendency to evil: "But the flaw, which darkens and weakens all those natural goods, it has not contracted from its blameless Creator ... but from that original sin which it committed of its own free-will. Accordingly nature having become guilty, most righteously deserves

\[1\text{C. J. VI. 23; } \text{"There can be no sin of man without the act of free-will."} \]

\[2\text{Op. Impf. IV. 98 (P.L. XLV, 1396).} \]

\[3\text{Op. Impf. VI. 22 (P.L. XLV, 1552-3).} \]
punishment. It is not merely particular acts, but the nature, dispositions and affections of man which are sinful. Sin is not mere caprice of will. Human nature is permanently and decisively changed by the first man’s false self-determination. Unfortunately in expounding the generic aspect of evil Augustine comes close to equating the moral solidarity of the race with physical generation. Frequently nature is ranked higher than personality. All men exist seminally in the loins of Adam. Ultimately sin as the 'poena peccati' is identified with natural impulses, We must add however, that when sin is viewed as sensuality it is not simply as the expression of physical impulse, but as that inordinate quality made tragically possible by Adam’s indiscipline. "If any man says that the flesh is the cause of the

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2Op. Impf. V.12 (P.L. XLV, 1442): 'Sic enim fuerunt omnes ratione semen in lumbis Adam, quando damnatus est, et ideo sine illis damnatus non est.'

3In Op. Impf. 11.71 (P.L. XLV, 1172) he distinguishes between sin in the strict sense and instinct which merely furnishes the occasion for sin.
viciousness of the soul, he is ignorant of man's nature, for the corruptible body does not burden the soul.... The corruptible flesh made not the soul to sin, but the sinning made the flesh corruptible.\(^1\)

The doctrine of man was developed by the two protagonists within the context of three cardinal themes, viz: The Liberum Arbitrium, Concupiscetia and Impeccantia. To these we now turn.

I. The Liberum Arbitrium - Julian's starting point is the Stoic concept of human nature. The completely autonomous individual is essentially good\(^2\) and his essence is expressed in finite rationality. The idea of inborn sin is replaced by the 'virtus congenita': "Ubi continuum sili et satis famillare studium beneficentiae ostenderet, virtuem sili humanitatis dixit esse congenitam."\(^3\) Since virtue

\(^1\)De Civ. Dei, XIV.3. cf. also XIV.5.


\(^3\)Exp. in Iob, p.399\(^b\), 19-23: cf. Op. Impf. iv.129 (P.L. XLV, 1426) "Servatur autem hic idem mos etiam in bonorum parte, ut cum videtur homo per omnia probus congenitis dicatur florere virtutibus. Unde et beatus Job misericordiae affectum quo subveniebat indigentibus, de uberibus se traxisse, imo de utero matris suae secum confirmat egressum."
is closely allied to knowledge, moral excellence consists in the fullest possible expression of rationality in thought and activity. The divine will is characterized as 'rationabilis.' Klasen goes so far as to hold that reason rather than will is primary: but Bohlin rightly says that they are two sides of the self-same reality. Julian specifically states: "Haec libertas est, in qua se ratio exercet, propter quod ad imaginem Dei homo factus asseritur, per quam creaturis ceteris antecellit." He seldom appreciates that if faith depends solely on our rational state, it is ultimately faith in ourselves, not in God — unless by "God" we mean the sum total of our rational possibilities. The Pelagian rejoinder would have been that our rational nature has a common origin with the Reason that creates and rules the cosmos. A man's true Self, the imago Dei,


is that Reason which is conceptually perfect in God. By nature (naturaliter) man has his reason (intellectum). To obey the 'lex Dei' is to live rationally (rationabiliter). Faith is not really spiritual unless confirmed by our own rational processes, won by our own insight, and received by the free consent of our own wills. Reason is the vehicle and expression of true virtue: "Sed de illis ego virtutibus dico, quas usu jam perfectae rationis adipiscimus."¹ The moral self must be a moral achievement. Whatever satisfies the reason ultimately satisfies also the demands of the moral Self.

But what does Julian mean by 'reason'? He means quite simply logical consistency - the grasp of universal concepts whose particularity arise in the actual experience of the soul. This is not "mere rationalism." Julian fully accepts doctrines resting on revelation such as the trinity, redemption, and the

¹ Op. Impf. III, 166 (P.L. XLV, 1316). In the name of reason he rejects the angels as a sort of divine body-guard: "Quod in moren stipatorum angeli adsistant Deo, nec ratio nec fides patitur." Exp. in Icb. 339a, 26.
It is the conviction that a specific article of faith must clearly be consistent with what is already accepted. Christian doctrine must be a cohesive unity doing justice to that immediate experience and awareness, which is prior to every intellectual formulation. Theology is not an aggregative science - a succession of separate points of doctrine. It is an intelligent and consistent view of the relationship between God and man. What distinguishes man from the animal world is that ability for reflective judgement and more particularly self-awareness, which ushers him into the eternal world of unchanging ideas and relations. We may reject our divine sonship, but we cannot deny it. Hence the defence of the truth requires not merely 'fortitudo' but also 'scientia.' The whole emphasis in religion...

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moves from commitment to contemplation, from union with Christ to understanding through Christ. Yet mere human speculation is not enough. True reason is the 'divine scientia' - the ability to see ourselves as God sees us. Only as we reach our new state by means of a rational relation to God is it truly religious. This state is gradually reached because there is only a progressive deterioration of the beatific vision. Adam is the 'vestibulum peccati.' The Fall makes no constitutional change in human nature; indeed many of the patriarchs were saints (naturaliter iusti). For Julian, the relation between reason and grace is best explained in terms of the intimate relation between sin and irrationality. To be freed from mere animal feelings, to realize our true possibilities as persons in a responsible relationship to our Creator is, at one and the same time, to be in a state of grace. Salvation is right discernment - the rehabilitation of all our rational powers. Faith is intellectual before it is moral, the assent of the mind leading to the surrender of

\footnote{C.J. v.2. cf. v.4.}

\footnote{Op. Impf. II. 153-4 (P.L. XLV, 1206-7).}
the heart. It is the wholehearted acknowledgement of the immediate relation between the soul and its divine source. Reason is the empirical evidence of our inner spiritual relation to God.

Basic to Julian's concept of the 'liberum arbitrium' is the positing of nature and will as distinct though inseparable orders of reality. In drawing this clear distinction between the animal and rational elements in character he differs from Augustine and herein lies the basis for the verbal confusion which often clouds the issues. Though Julian does not precisely define what is meant by 'natura' frequent references reveal his meaning: "Certe in ejus potestate, naturalium nulla conversio est. Nemo enim in se sensum unquam mutavit officia, verbi gratia, ut voces naribus, aut auribus susciperet odores: nemo sexus sui convertit proprietatem ..." 'Nature' refers to that constitutive principle which

\[\text{\textsuperscript{1}}\text{Op. Impf. v. 56 (P.L. XLV, 1489): "Jam voluntas quidem in his exoritur, sed non de his. Capacia voluntatis sunt quippe, non plena; nec faciunt, sed accipiant diversitatem meritorum." cf. vi.9 (P.L. XLV, 1516). cf. vi.14 (P.L. XLV, 1525-6).}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{2}}\text{Op. Impf. iii.109 (P.L. XLV, 1293).}\]
is synonymous with the essence of an object:

"Omne ergo quod naturaliter habet homo, a necessarii parte sortitus est; quia non potuit aliter esse quam factus est."  

Hence it stands in opposition to all that is transitory and accidental. It is the autonymn of the contingent: "Transiit ergo in necessitatem conditi, quod venerat de possibilitate condentis. Fecit etiam diversas naturas diversasque species in naturis, custodito eo ordine qui a rerum fluebat exordio, ut alia essent necessaria, alia possibilia. Quid quid ergo habent creaturae naturaliter, a necessarii parte sortitae sunt."  

Whatever may happen to an object its 'natura' remains constant and unalterable: "imperturbabilis ratio naturae est."  

Human nature

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1 F. Refoulé: RSR Vol. LII, No. 1, p. 69.


5 Op. Impf. iv.134 (P.L. XLV, 1428). Refoule also makes this important point but gives the reference wrongly as Bk. vi.134.
is assumed to be identical in all men, the variable being the individual active principle incarnate in the faculty of will. By the universal faculty of reason and personal volition we transcend our creaturely existence and affirm our divine destiny.

Now since man's nature is attributed solely to God it must be good: "naturam Deo adscribimus conditori. Est igitur natura humana bonum opus Dei." The idea of a natural state of enlightenment is prominent. Sin is accidental to our existence and cannot essentially efface God's creation. "Illud ergo quod ei de proprio venit, peccans quisque sauciare potest; hoc vero quod de Dei opere suscepit, decolorare non potest." The assumption that defects of the will indict the primary cognitive and conative appetites of man's constitution leads directly to Manichaeanism; "Infamatio autem naturae ad Manichaeum via est." Sin affects our merits not our natures. Man is intrinsically neither good nor evil but a bundle of


anoral impulses awaiting development: "Infants are born neither just nor unjust; those qualities will appear later in their actions; the only endowment of infancy is innocence ... man born replete with innocence, but only with capacity for virtue and he will deserve praise or blame according to his later intentions." Each person retains his total integrity until seduced by the temptations of the world. A sinful 'natura' would destroy the possibility of choosing good: "non suppetebat facultas eligendi boni et cavendi mali, si naturalis reatus fuisset." Thus for Julian nature is good but man may be evil; while for Augustine nature is evil but man may be good.

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1 C.J. 111.36.


Augustine's use of the concept 'natura' is ambiguous. Though he sometimes contrasts 'nature' and 'will,' the conception of 'voluntas' as an inalienable human endowment is an integral part of his thought: "The will (voluntas) is always free, but it is not always good. It is either free from righteousness (justitia) when it serves sin, and then it is evil; or it is free from sin when it serves righteousness, and then it is good. But the grace of God is always good, and through this it comes about that a man is of good will who before was of evil will." Thus all faults are 'contra naturam.' Augustine thought of man's nature as a constant pre-determined pattern of appetites, aptitudes, and powers corrupted by Adam's Fall. This instinctive dispositional state is similar in all men, grace supplying the variable element and decisively affecting the disposition, temper and destiny of the elect man. In speaking of 'rerum natura' sometimes he means the whole frame of


3 De Civ. Dei. XXI.1.
things, at other times the differentiated parts of
the whole. 1 Nature depends on God as its Creator.
"Omnis quippe natura vel Deus est, qui nullum habet
auctorem; vel ex Deo est quia ipsum habet auctorem." 2
While sometimes polemically using 'nature' in the
Manichaean sense of that which is self-existent and
coeternal with other existences, he also uses it in
a realistic sense to distinguish the essential "man"
from the essential "dog." It comes to mean a class
of individuals distinguished by common qualities with
an ambiguous reference to both general and particular.
Like Julian, Augustine ordinarily thinks of natures as
fixed, but occasionally he oscillates between will as
part of nature and as distinct from it. It one place
he likens vitiated nature to a cripple trying to
walk. 3 The inability is 'natural' only in a
secondary sense.

1 See T.A. Lacey; "Nature, Miracle and Sin,"

2 De Anima II.3 (P.L. XLIV, 497).

3 De Natura et Gratia, 49 (P.L. XLIV, 275).
"Of a man, indeed, who has his legs strong and sound,
it may be said admissibly enough, that whether he will
or not he has the power or capacity of walking; but
if his legs be broken, he has not the capacity or
ability, however much he may wish to walk."
Unaware of these different nuances of the term 'nature', Julian accuses Augustine of linguistic casuistry. On the one hand he finds his aged opponent saying: "I am concerned with a fault, not a nature."\(^1\) or again: "I said that in one and the same man the nature is good, the fault evil."\(^2\) On the other hand he can refer to men as evil by nature: "sed eorum ipsorum semen dixit maledictum, quos naturaliter malos volebat intelligi,"\(^3\) or even as possessing "corpora vitiosa."\(^4\) When Augustine argues cogently that the cosmos is good his thought is closely allied to Julian's "If God were unable to create good things, there would be no power in Him; if He were able and yet created them not, there would be great jealousy. Since, therefore, He is all-powerful and good, He has created all things very good."\(^5\) The definition

\(^1\) C. J. VI. 34.

\(^2\) C. J. III. 47. Cf. IV. 33: "Man's nature owes nothing to the Devil."


\(^4\) Op. Impf. III. 95 (P.L. XLV, 1288). Cf. De Natura et Gratia, 3 ' ..., nature having become guilty ...'

of will is the key to his understanding of nature: "Voluntas est animi motus, cogente nullo, ad aliquum vel non amittendum vel adipiscendum."¹ A man is evil in the sense that the will is often creative of qualities contrary to the divine law - these qualities being not only expressed in bodily behaviour but giving rise to the unseemly cravings of the animal instincts.

Most commentators have signally failed to do justice to the profound motifs of Julian's polemic against the teaching of a vitiated nature. Fundamental to the whole Pelagian case is the identity of the God who creates and the God who redeems. Manichaeanism rested on a fatal dualism which destroyed the "una operatio" of the Godhead and reduced Christ to a 'salvator spiritualis.' Julian's basic contention is that God is good by nature and in creation He truly communicates Himself to men: "si mali essent natura, Deus eos creare non posset."² This God-given nature far from denying dependence on

¹De Duabus Animabus, 14 (P.L. XLII, 104).
divine grace at all times asserts it. Students of dogma have been quick to seize upon the statement that 'the freedom of the will is that by which man is freed from God' (emancipatus a Deo). But it is as unfair to judge Julian's theology on one statement as it is to isolate the more extreme assertions of Augustine. Every human nature is derivatively good because its ground of existence is God Himself.

"Nullum est in Deo crimen. Non igitur creat malos." The idea of an evil nature is a betrayal of the Christian doctrine of creation. Because the 'totus homo' comes from the creative hand of God, the body must be essentially good: "Si per Deum materiam corporum, per Deum genitalia corporum, per Deum commiotionem genitalium, per Deum etiam vim seminum, per Deum quoque omnium nascentium formam atque vitam existere confiteris; quid putas remansisse, propter quod diabolo tot Dei opera transcribas?"

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an incorrigible nature but a rebellious will which leads to transgression. Sin is a matter of personal 'reatus' rather than a corrupting 'vitium.' Though a person may become a sinner, his God-given nature remains intact: "Vitiari autem in unoquoque jam suo arbitratu vel bonum agente vel malum, personae meritum dicimus, non naturae." What is accidental cannot effect a substantial change.

Thus the 'posse non peccare' refers not so much to redemption (as in Augustine), but to the nature of the creative act. In Julian's eyes, the only alternative is the irreconcilable dualism between matter and spirit evident in Stoic fatalism and given systematic expression in Manichaean determinism.

This raises an important question, namely, whether Julian is right in levelling the Manichaean charge. Did not Augustine expressly refute the claim "that evil itself is nature, and, what is more senseless, a nature everlasting?" Clearly he wished

\[ \text{Op. Impf. II.135 (P.L. XLV, 1221).} \]
\[ \text{Op. Impf. 111.208 (P.L. XLV, 1335).} \]
\[ \text{Op. Impf. v.63 (P.L. XLV, 1500).} \]
\[ \text{Op. Impf. 111.160 (P.L. XLV, 1313).} \]
\[ \text{C.J. 1.38.} \]
to emancipate himself from false presuppositions, but it is doubtful whether he was completely successful.\(^1\) The confession of the Catholic 'sanctimonialis' in the diocese of Constantine, the extraordinary affair of the incumbent in the village of Mallia,\(^2\) and the correspondence to Quintasius indicate that Manichaeanism persisted in an attenuated form within the Christian Church.

In the "De Libero Arbitrio" (A.D. 394-5) neo-Platonism leads Augustine to conceive of sin as not simply a perversion of what is fundamentally sound, but the introduction of an organic change into human nature.\(^3\) This thesis is developed in the "De Diversis Quaestionibus ad Simplicianum" and the collection "De LXXXIII Quaestionibus." But it is the phrase "massa peccati, massa luti, massa damnationis" which most clearly invites the Manichaean charge. "Massa damnata" is idiomatically peculiar, because 'massa' originally

\(^1\)A. Bruckner: "Julian von Aeclanum, sein Leben und seine Lehre" (1397), p. 66 f. cf. J. Oman; "Honest Religion" (C.U.P., 1931) p. 111; "The real source of the prominence it (total depravity) came to have is Augustine and his views on concupiscence and the evil of matter, which were relics of his Manichaeanism and not due to the teaching of Christianity."

\(^2\)Epist. 236.

\(^3\)De Lib. Arb. III. 54.
specified simply an indistinct amalgam of inorganic elements. Thus in Quaestio 63.5 of the "De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus" a Manichaean charge is clothed in Pauline language. Augustine writes: "Ex quo in paradiso natura nostra peccavit ... non secundum spiritum, sed secundum carnem, mortali generatione formamur, et omnes una massa luti facti sumus, quod est massa peccati. Cum ergo meritum peccando amiserimus ... nihil aliud, peccantibus, nisi seterna damnatio deservatur." 1 The Pauline metaphor of the potter and clay is obviously in the background. But such an ideological description of spiritual realities in terms like 'massa' ignores the fact that the metaphor was originally merely the Apostle's pedagogical phrase to remind his readers not to rely overmuch on historical privileges. In Augustine the metaphor has become a simile. In the "De gratia Christi et de peccato originali" a tentative synthesis of Christian and Manichaean concepts is achieved. The "concupiscencia carnalis" becomes the vehicle of original sin. Even more definite is the designation in the

1 (P.L. XL, 71). Cf. "De Diversis Quaest. i.16."
Epistle to Paulinus (417 A.D.) of 'massa' as a conglomerate of perversity.\(^1\) Hence one writer concludes: "there is a close relation between Manichaean anthropology and Augustine's soteriology as finally formulated by him during the Pelagian controversy.\(^2\)

Julian clearly regards the problem as a discussion on the nature of volition, 'free' being simply a descriptive or evaluative adjective. Quoting John chap. 3 vs. 31-42 he shows that he is aware of the distinction between the freedom conferred by Christ (sanctitas), and the commoner meaning 'ad distinctionem ... servitutis.'\(^3\) Truth leads us into the highest kind of freedom, the 'libertas major,' but freedom as 'libertas minor' is a precondition for the acceptance of this truth. The voluntariness of an action means that it is not wholly

\(^1\)Epist. 186, 18. cf. C.J. VI. 24 "... all men have sinned ... in the oneness of the mass." cf. v.14 'the same mass of perdition and condemnation.'

\(^2\)E. Bonaiuti: Harvard Theological Review, Vol. XX (1927) p. 117. I am indebted to this writer for many of these references. cf. Harnack: op. cit. p. 217: "The doctrine of original sin leads to Manichaean dualism, which Augustine never surmounted." This is too sweeping an assertion.

\(^3\)Op. Impf. 1.37 (P.L. XLV, 1106).
explicable by reference to material causes. Hence free-will is defined as the ability of the soul to accept either good or evil without prior coercion:

"Voluntas itaque motus est animi, in jure suo habentis utrum sinisterior ad prava decurrat, an dexterior ad celsa contendat." It signifies 'immunitas a necessitate': "In quo est hoc: inquam arbitrium liberum; quod ut Manichaeos negare certum est, ita Catholicos assere etiam tu fateris? Sine dubio, in eo ut possibile sit homini voluntatem suam, sine aliquo inevitabili naturalium coactu, vel immittere in crimen, vel a crimine cohibere." Perhaps there is a certain artificiality in thus trying to define will without any reference to the historical, social or psychological background. The idea of a total and natural


3Op. Impf. 1.79 (P.L. XLV, 1102); "Factum est enim animal rationale, mortale, capax virtutis et vitii, quod possit ex concessa sibi possibilitate vel servare dei mandata, vel transgrede, vel magisterio naturali conservare ius humanae societatis, liberumque haberet alterutram velle partem, in quo peccati et justitiae summa est." Also quoted by A. Bruckner: "Quellen zur Geschichte des Pelagianischen Streites." (Tubingen, 1906), p. 36.
indeterminism is seldom investigated by Julian. When he does seek to analyse it the result is not very illuminating.¹

Sometimes it simply seems to mean the principle of self-determination: "Accipit etiam arbitrii libertatem; aequa adeo necessarii linea continetur; sed jam necessariorum finis est; hinc finduntur in contraria voluntates.... Ita fit ut etiam possibilitas peccandi capax boni malique, sed voluntarii sit; quoniam boni proprii capax esse non poterat, nisi capax esset et pravi."² One writer comments: "Si nous ne nous trompons, Julien d'Eclans doit concevoir la décision comme l'écllosion sous la lumière du jugement de la raison d'un mouvement de la volonté, celle-ci empruntant à la précédente sa liberté."³ The ability to do evil is not the effect of a misuse of free-will, but the evidence that the faculty of choice remains unimpaired. "Voluntas ergo mala non quidem fructus,

¹Op. Impf. v.38 (P.L. XLV, 1473): 'Haec libertas est, in qua se ratio exercet, propter quod ad imaginem Dei homo factus asseritur, per quam creaturis ceteris antecellit.'


³Refould, op. cit., p. 77.
To Julian Augustine's concept of religion is morality on crutches. The essence of salvation is not a sudden unverifiable ontological change in the soul, but a gradual moral rehabilitation of the will and conscience. Failure to experience this progressive transformation open to all results in the personal indictment of the individual.

Augustine is just as sure as Julian that full moral responsibility can be maintained only on the premis of genuine free decision: "there would be no sin if no evil will came first." In the 'defensio' of the first book of the "Retractiones" we encounter the two-fold premis on which he relies. Firstly, there is the psychological statement that free-will is integral to human nature simply because 'will' is a synonym for the active subject. "If I am compelled I do not will." It is the direction of our personal activity. "Nothing is better known to us than our own


2C. J. iii.55.

3Op. Impf. 1.101 (P.L. XLV, 1117). Yet he can also say: "praeperatur voluntas a Domino" Retr. 2.1.10 (P.L. XXXII, 630). Retr. 1.21.
will, for I should not know that I wish for a thing if I did not know what will is."¹ This immediate deliverance of consciousness is reinforced by our sense of moral propriety: "Sin is so entirely a voluntary evil that an act is not sin at all if it be not voluntary."² The identity of subject means that the personal act falls into a pattern prefigured by prior behaviour. Responsibility always involves continuity of character. Yet because it embodies the irreducibly unique and singular it ultimately defies complete prefiguration by its antecedents.

It is at this point that Augustine runs into difficulties. His interpretation of freedom as 'immunitas a servitate,'³ his concept of divine omnipotence, and the subtle distinction between a spontaneous reaction and a completely free act make it difficult to allow fully for an inevitable element of contingency. Man is so inwardly orientated to evil that only grace can really set him free: "Ad bonum

¹De Duabus Animabus 14 (P.L. XLII, 104).
autem liber est, qui voluntate bona agit bona, etiam
ipse aut opere, aut sermone, aut certe sola cogitatione;
seh hoc sine Dei gratia nullus hominum potest." He is
free in the sense that there is no external constraint
to evil actions. He is not free from the compulsive
patterns of behaviour arising from a depraved nature.
Since this nature is indistinguishable from man in
his concrete, historical predicament, Julian rightly
complains that the fact of freedom of decision is only
formally maintained. A will determined wholly by
innate propensities is not free. 'Each individual,'
says Augustine, 'is bound by contagion from his carnal
generation.'

Augustine confuses two related concepts -
the conception of freedom as a stage of moral
development ('libertas') and the faculty possessed in
common by all rational minds ('liberum arbitrium').
Certainly he develops a more profoundly religious
view of freedom in the former sense with his teaching

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1 Op. Impf. iii.120 (P.L. XLV, 1293).
2 Op. Impf. iii.103 (P.L. XLV, 1299).
3 C. J. vi.79.
on the principle of the divine life. "Arbitrium
igitur voluntatis tunc est vere liberum, cum vitis
peccatisque non servit."¹ As Niebuhr puts it: "The
ultimate proof of the freedom of the human spirit is
its own recognition that its will is not free to
choose between good and evil."² Christian freedom
is the ability to choose and do the right; but this
"beata necessitas non peccandfi" was lost in the Fall.³
Its restoration depends wholly on grace: "Hoc si
intelligat, non aliud intelligitis esse arbitrium
laudabiler liberum, nisi quod fuerit Dei gratia
liberatum."⁴ Hence man is free only as a possibility
of grace, not as a reality of nature. Freedom is
synonymous with salvation, that liberty wherewith
Christ hath made us free.⁵ The forfeiture of

¹De Civ. xiv.11 (P.L. XLI, 413).
²"The Nature and Destiny of Man," vol.I, p. 274,
(London, 1941).
³Ench. XXX (P.L. XL, 246-7). "For it was by
the evil use of his free-will that man destroyed both
it and himself. For as a man who kills himself must,
of course, be alive when he kills himself, but after
he has killed himself ceases to live, and cannot restore
himself to life; so, when man by his own free-will
sinned, then sin being victorious over him, the freedom
of his will was lost.

Arb. III.52 (P.L. XXXII, 1296).
'libertas' does not mean the loss of that inner self-determination, the 'liberum arbitrium.' As Loofs says: "The libertas arbitrii in the psychological sense he never denied." Unfortunately Augustine does not fully appreciate that properly speaking the debate centres on the 'liberum arbitrium' - that freedom of decision implied in the term 'voluntary.'

Secondly, there is the important theological distinction between the abstract concept of sin concretely realized in Adam's transgression (peccatum), and the actual condition of mankind as a result of that transgression (poena peccati). Adam is both the historical and the symbolical Man enjoying the "gaudium verum" characteristic of paradise, and exercising full self-determination. "God made man upright from the beginning of the human creation, and there is no unrighteousness with God. And thus the

1 "Leitfaden zum Studium der Dogmengeschichte," p. 411.

first depravity, whereby God is not obeyed, is of man because, falling by his own evil will from the rectitude in which God at first made him, he became depraved. From that primal state of blessedness and immortality, Adam falls through self-love and arrogance. Rejecting the 'prima gratia' he becomes subject to the 'perturbationes animorum.' The 'status mirabilis' gives way to disharmony and inner self-contradiction: "Noli ergo vinci, quando pugnas. Videte quale bellum proposuit, qualem pugnam, qualem rixam, intus, intra te ipsum.

The precise nature of this traitorous act is interpreted in various ways by Augustine. It is the violation of a command given to ensure obedience. Since man's bodily desires and his willing Self complement one another in an harmonious relationship, 

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1"On Rebuke and Grace" p. 9.

2De Gen. ad. litt. VI. 36.

3C.J. V.17 "In Paradise, rebellion certainly began in the soul."

4Serm. 123. 9. (P.L. XXXVIII-IX, 716).

5De Civ. Dei. xiv.11,2: 'Vivebat itaque homo secundum Deum....'
the cause of evil resides wholly in the will (voluntas) which seeks to be a principle-unto-itself (principium). This sin of rebellion is so radical that the sinner does not even repent, but takes refuge in self-justification. 'The serpent deceived me, and I ate the fruit.' The result is a vitiated nature, a rupture between reason and appetite, a profound antinomy introduced into the core of man's existence.

The entire man is affected by this initial derangement, and the congenital weakness passes to all men by natural procreation.

Julian has little difficulty in showing the moral indefensibility of maintaining a biological transmission of sin. But we need to remember that the 'primus homo' often has a symbolical as well as an historical dimension for Augustine. He is the tragic representative of that disaffection lodged at the very centre of human existence. It is not simply

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1C.J. 1.36. cf. v.65. "we must confess that in our nature there is something like a wound."

2C.J. V.23.

3Ench. xxiii-iv (P.L. XL, 244).

4E. Dinkler: "Die Anthropologie Augustins" (Stuttgart, 1934), p. 61.
that man cannot do the good, but that he will not. Not only has his status changed but also his nature. From this inner perversity divine grace alone can deliver us: "by this grace of God there is caused in us ... not only to be able to do what we will, but even to will to do what we are able."¹ It is the Ego, the soul itself, which has forfeited its unity.² Yet there remains a vestigial trace of former greatness, 'index generositatis suae.'

If only Adam's representative character had remained central and determinative rather than peripheral and occasional in the ensuing debate, Augustine would more easily have developed an anthropology doing justice to the 'sola gratia' without endangering personal accountability. Under the exigencies of acute theological debate he lays increasing stress on the historical significance of Adam and the sin inherited by physical propagation. Too often he takes refuge in epigram than in argument. Hence his doctrine of grace though often deeply moving gives rise to inconsistencies which it is no part of our duty to condone.

¹"On Rebuke and Grace," p. 32 and p. 38.

²Conf. VII. 24. En. in Ps. 43, 1, 6. (PL XXXVI-VII, 548).
(b) Concupiscencia -

The need to define terms becomes acute in the protracted discussions on the theological significance of concupiscence. Julian interprets "concupiscencia naturalia" as any kind of conative potency forming a constitutive part of human nature. It is the raw material of morality.\(^1\) It is the spontaneous self-determination (appetitus naturalis) within consciousness which precedes free decision - that sensitive desire which forms a common link between man and the lower orders of sensible creation. "Ut enim imaginem Dei mentis ratione suscepmus: ita communione pecudum carnis affinitate sentimus."\(^2\) As such it can have no inherent moral value, except the essential one of procreation.\(^3\) As Augustine says: "Lust is natural, since every man is born with it: you, indeed state

\(^1\) Op. Impf. 1.71 (P.L. XLV, 1094).
\(^3\) Op. Impf. iv.35 (P.L. XLV, 1357-9).
this more fully, since you say the first man was created with it.... Since we both say lust is natural and conquerable, our dispute concerns whether we must overcome good or evil." Moral evil is essentially a specific volitional activity so intimately related to personal accountability that involuntary propensities inherent in human nature are non-ethical in themselves.

Moral evil is derived from a moral cause, not a physical one. In place of the "peccatum naturae" - the factor prior to the free personal decision of the subject - Julian sets the 'peccatum personae' man's negative self-determination when faced with the Good.

Independent and prior to the 'dictamen rationis,' concupiscence is wholly a-moral in character: "ostendi, prius in homine concupiscentiam carnis quae speciem irritat saporis et oculorum fuisse, quam culpam." Constitutionally fixed modes of consciousness have no essential ethical significance.

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1 G.J. V. 27.

except as 'materia exercendae virtutis' providing the reason and will with the occasion for moral decision. "Non modo, verum solo peccaret excessu."¹

Concupiscence cannot be synonymous with sin because it existed prior to the Fall.² As Tennant puts it: "These emotional and conative tendencies inherent in our psychical constitution are the primary material out of which he will construct sin."³ Sin is not the presence of innate impulses that need controlling, but the failure of man to control them. "God does not condemn either concupiscence or its usage, but he condemns the excesses of the man who knowing that he possesses freedom of choice consciously evades responsible self-discipline."⁴

Having set the 'fomes peccati' firmly within the context of a given disposition, Julian refuses to identify this original endowment of appetite and instinct with culpability.⁵ Passionate sensuousness

¹Op. Impf. v.16 (PL XLV, 1449).


⁵C.J. IV. 8.
is part of the good conjugal act. It is proper to the appetite and thoroughly praiseworthy. "Potuit ergo facere Deus,... set nonuit nisi ut de sexibus nascertur. Nunc ergo quaeritur quid fecerit, non quid potuerit." Sensuousness is not a synonym for sensuality. The spontaneous seductive impulse is indispensable to procreation, and is an aspect of God's good creation: "invictissime conferentum est, nec fecunditatem primorum hominum a diabolo fuisset corruptum, nec nasci ullam posse peccatum." This interpretation of concupiscence as a purely instinctive spontaneity escapes Augustine's artificial distinctions between 'nuptia' and 'concupiscensia' and does justice to the fact that the individual is instinctive before he is volitional and volitional before he is immoral. Sexual passion (ignis vitalis) is not in itself the expression of sin, though it may provide the occasion for it.


2C.J. III.45. Augustine says: 'You contend that it is good.'
Blameworthiness can be predicated only within the context of the individual in society, and so the temperate use of sex in marriage is not simply legitimate but commendable: "Et quamvis jam pro concupiscientia vel voluptate carnis, quae etiam libido dicitur, quae sexibus ob virilitatem propagationis insit up est..." by this 'affectio naturalis et innocens' the procreation of the race is assured. Man's inner disharmony does not arise from concupiscence as an ontologically lower principle at variance with the spiritual faculty. It is not the flesh itself, but the 'sensus carnalis' which is opposed to God. The sole source of sin is the will which in the evil man condones excessive indulgence: "an solum excessum, qui non naturalis, sed voluntarius deprehenditur." Thus: "natural concupiscence is good ... which, when it is kept in its moderated way, cannot be degraded by any aspersions of evil." 

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2Op. Impf. iv.24 (P.L. XLV, 1351); cf. III.45 (P.L. XLV, 1263). Cf. Augustine's remark: "But you, with your sharp sight, censure and think execrable not the mode, not the genus, but only the excess of this pleasure." C.J. V.61.

3C.J. iv.52; 73.
Excess alone is culpable: "non modo, verum solo peccaret excessu." But how does this harmonise with the emphasis of Scripture on denying the flesh? Julian's answer is clear. Firstly, Rom. chap. VII refers to the basic conflict between cognitive and conative tendencies, between instinct and reason which constitutes a pre-condition for moral behaviour. He maintains that Augustine disastrously confounds the non-moral source of sin with its sole specific source in volition, so that he is forced to speak of the 'caro corrupta' as the effect and vehicle of primal sin. If this were true baptism would take away all sensual feelings: "Id est, ut in nuptiis baptizatorum neutiquam sentiretur libido; nec eodem modo, quam etiam ceterarum gentium, genitalia moverentur." No fact of nature external to the moral intention of the will can defile the personality. With telling effect Julian notes that the sexual organs are named in scripture with the same unselfconscious simplicity as the feet. Spontaneous psychical processes and

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1 C.J. V.16.


involuntary physical activities only become sinful when they are willingly endorsed by a subject consciously recognising them to be contrary to those ethical norms of conduct which derive from the divine law and the dictates of conscience. Cravings can only properly be termed lustful after a personal choice: "libido exorta est post peccatum."\(^1\)

Secondly, the Pauline concept of 'flesh' (σαρκός) has a purely religious connotation signifying the whole man in so far as he is subject to the divine wrath and the strictures of the rational Self.\(^2\) It is not identical with the sensuous side of man's nature, but stands for the opposition of the perverse will to the divine Law. Julian stresses the theological and moral connotation of the scriptural terms "world" and "flesh": \(^3\) "Mundi ergo nomine, mores hominum nihil post hanc vitam esse autumantium, diversasque mortalium tam pompas quam luxurias indicavit."\(^4\) It is the wrong use of a good gift.

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\(^3\) Bruckner: op. cit., p. 121.

"He who holds to the mode of natural concupiscence uses a good well. He who does not hold to the mode uses a good evilly."¹ The primal conative and appetitive tendencies operate independently of moral ends and are in no way attributable to a primal derangement of human nature.

Imbued with the asceticism of his age, Augustine feels that the highest conception of the good life involves continence: "restraint of carnal concupiscence by virtue of continence is more laudable than its use for the fruits of marriage. The evil of carnal concupiscence is so great that it is better to refrain from using it than to use it well."² Perhaps this arises from his own experience of conversion in which the rejection of sexual pleasure plays an unusually prominent part: "For my soul's freedom I resolved not to desire, nor to seek, nor to marry a wife."³ The very desire for sexual gratification is repulsive to him and is evidence of that 'iniquitas' present in every man. "I say

¹C.J. III.42. cf. Refoulé, op. cit., p. 71.
³Solil. i.10 (17). (P.L. XXXII, 879).
lust must be overcome, and to be overcome, must be opposed.\(^1\) He speaks of that 'damnable craving’ which issues in 'bestial movements' unregulated by conscience or will. Failure to distinguish between 'libido' as an integral part of the animal structure of man, and that inordinate appetite which oppresses man in the depths of his being lead him to deny that concupiscence existed in the 'status naturae purae': "in paradise ... they would not have had the activity of turbulent lust in their flesh, however, but only the movement of peaceful will by which we command the other members of the body.\(^2\) There are frequent crude references to the physical transmission of sin.\(^3\) The spontaneity proper to the appetite is confused with that sensitive desire which stands in opposition to the spiritual dictates of a man's redeemed self. But it is important to recall that Augustine sometimes uses 'concupiscentia' to signify not simply sexual passion, but the fact that man is no longer master of himself.\(^4\) Concordance

\(^1\) C.J. V.27.
\(^2\) C.J. i11.57.
\(^3\) Op. Impf. 11.30 (P.L. XLV, 1154).
is inseparable from sin but not identical with it: "Concupiscence can remain in its action and pass in its guilt."¹ "In Augustine’s vocabulary concupiscence stands in a general way, for every inclination making man turn from God to find satisfaction in material things which are intrinsically evanescent."² This lack of control is most universally experienced in the abandonment of the sex act.³ Hence his treatment of the bodily movements of coitus as an occasion for shame.⁴ The ultimate aim of the believer is freedom from the animal instincts: "Non enim est nisi in corpore mortis hujus, de quo liberari cupiebat Apostolus."⁵ Augustine’s early neo-Platonism means that the purely religious concept of ‘flesh’ is interpreted as implying that the ontologically less perfect element in man, his animality, is, ‘co ipso,’ farther away from God. "Concupiscensia vero carnis

¹C.J. vi.60.

²Kelly, op cit., p. 365.


motus est malus. The opposition of 'flesh' to 'spirit' is transposed into an opposition of man's sensibility to his intellectuality: "Concupiscence is so proper to a living and sentient nature that it does not cease even when restrained by the chastity of a eunuch." It is forgotten that "regarded in its full theological sense concupiscence is just as capable of working in a positive sense as a resistance of nature to the bad moral decision." Yet Augustine is anxious to maintain the sanctity of the body: "None of us accuses the substance of the body; none accuses the nature of the flesh." This confusion of the natural spontaneous seductive impulse with spiritual disorder prevents him from evolving a satisfactory doctrine of marriage. It is good only as ordained by God for the propagation of the race: "I say that marriage should be praised ... and he who denies this strives to overturn the very


2 C.J. vi. 41.


foundations of Christian faith.\textsuperscript{1} Coitus is formally good; "the union is good in itself, since it is natural";\textsuperscript{2} but its value derives solely from its relation to procreation and not as the consummation of wedlock. "I do not say that the activity in which married persons engage for the purpose of begetting children is evil. As a matter of fact, I assert that it is good."\textsuperscript{3} The high doctrine of marriage as a mutual surrender of personality at its deepest levels is disastrously ignored. Wedlock is reduced to an economic and social necessity for the continuance of the race.\textsuperscript{4} But the difficulties do not cease there. Because he identifies the sensuous with sensuality and also acknowledges that "not even honourable procreation can exist without lust,"\textsuperscript{5} it follows that every concrete act of copulation is evil:

\begin{itemize}
  \item[\textsuperscript{1}] C.J. i.4; cf. ii.9. cf. De grat. Chr. et de Pecc. Orig. ii.38 (P.L. XLIV, 406).
  \item[\textsuperscript{2}] C.J. iii.16.
  \item[\textsuperscript{3}] C.J. iii.15. cf. iv.38; 'We do not say ... the union of the married for the purpose of generating is a diabolical act.' cf. ii.20.
  \item[\textsuperscript{4}] C.J. iii.59. At one point he even demands that Julian 'deny that marriage is to be called a good tree, and admit you erred in saying this.' C.J. i.39.
  \item[\textsuperscript{5}] C.J. v.37. cf. v.62.
\end{itemize}
"what concupiscence itself does is evil, whether the
goal for which it burns is lawful or unlawful."¹ It
is a sickness indicative of a moral failure: "Why
do you (Julian) acknowledge a necessary remedy for
concupiscence, yet contradict me when I say
concupiscence is a disease."² Thus every man is born
in sin: "our very origin is in a fault."³ Baptism
may remove the guilt (reatus), which the origin of
generation contracts, but the impulse (actus) and shame
remain.⁴ Julian shows the difficulty of maintaining
that concupiscence remains evil, but baptized parents
blameless.⁵ He is quite clear that if evil is centred
in nature itself, a Christian doctrine of marriage is
impossible. Even God could not deliver us from a sin
of nature. On the other hand Kirk is too severe when

¹C.J. iv.6. Elsewhere this view is modified, particularly in the reference to the uses of wine; See 0p. Impf. iv.21 (P.L. XLV, 1343).

²C.J. iii.29. cf. vi.53 'it is an affection, an evil quality, like sickness.' cf. iv.6.

³C.J. ii.5. cf. ii.32.


⁵Op. Impf. v.7 (P.L. XLV, 1437).

he concludes: 'Neither Augustine nor Alypius recognised anything honourable in marriage in itself. Apart from its honourable name, it was merely sustained libertinism.' Had not the 'De Bono Conjugal' been composed to show that an espousal of virginity is consistent with a high regard for marriage? If Augustine does not succeed in reaching a fully consistent theory it is due to an erroneous and inadequate initial premiss, which often leads him to think of concupiscence as sinful lust.

Yet Julian is surely wrong in representing his opponent as simply saying that union is a cause of original sin. In the "Retractationes" we find Augustine saying: "As if the sin which we say that infants derive from Adam through their origin, that is, because implicated in his culpability and consequently subject to punishment, could be anywhere but in the will, since it was committed by the will when the divine precept was transgressed."

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3 Retr. I.15.2. (P.L. XXXII, 603).
Portalié comments: 'This culpability is by itself precisely and formally the whole essence of original sin; concupiscence, ignorance and so forth are properly its effects. ¹

By recourse to the concept of 'concupiscence,' Augustine is feeling after the empirical fact that the act of free personal self-determination does not exhaustively determine the operative subject through the whole extent of his being.

(c) Impedimentia -

The definition of sin as ethical imperfection, the centrality of the moral man and the ascetic origins of Pelagianism combine to imbue it with strong perfectionist sympathies. According to de Plinval it is here that the first open conflict arose. Personal perfectibility had long been a live issue especially in the Eastern Church. The gnostics had affirmed a metaphysical perfection which those redeemed from the bondage of matter attained through knowledge. The influence of this idea appears clearly in Clement of Alexandria. St. Chrysostom believes that "grace touches the soul itself and tears up sin by the roots ... the soul of him who is baptized is purer than the rays of the sun." This is not simply the belief in an immediate metamorphosis of the soul by the reception


2 Hom. In Epist. 1. and Cor. XV. 1-2. cf. Hom. 13 in Matt. V: 'Let us not therefore suppose His injunctions impossible. Nay, for besides their expediency they are very easy, if we are sober-minded.'
of divine grace, though that was a common idea in the Graeco-Roman world. It is the conviction that the divine sacramental action cannot have a partial and superficial effect on the soul. Irenaeus had summed up the universal Christian ideal in a single epigram: "The glory of God is a living man, and the life of man is the vision of God." Jerome could write: "We maintain also that, considering our time, place and bodily weakness, we can avoid sinning if we will, as long as our mind is bent upon it, and the string of our harp is not slackened by any wilful fault." Julian's concept of perfectibility rests on the idea of the vision of God as empirically attainable through self-discipline. Faith and conduct are so indissolubly one that moral perfection is a demand which devolves upon each believer. "No height of virtue is so lofty a believing mind cannot reach it with God's help." 


2Iren. adv. haer. iv. 20.7.

3Dial. against the Pelagians iii.4: cf. i.27-32.

4C.J. iii.64.
The natural faculties are succoured by education, favourable circumstances, and the example of Jesus. This is immediately inferred from the reduction of the 'fomes peccati' to the rebellious will: "nihil est peccati in homine, si nihil est propriae voluntatis, vel assensionis." Sin is the failure to realize attainable moral values: "Constituto ergo peccatum nihil esse aliud quam pravae voluntatis electionem." Its sole cause lies in the volitional life of the individual. Thus the rational man alone is capable of sin: "cum praeter rationabile animal, neminem peccare posse manifestum sit?" Each child is born into a state of primitive innocence similar to that of Adam, except that the Primal Man alone immediately exercises full rational powers. This prior possibility of doing right (mera capacitas) is original innocence - a beatitude not of

1 Op. Impf. 1.60 (P.L. XLV, 1081).
gradual costly victory but of *perfecta ignorantia.*¹
Adam by falling from this 'naturalis sanctitas' becomes
the type but not the source of sin. His misdemeanour,
though resulting in temporary privation, ultimately
brings him great blessings.² Yet grace is not superfluous:
"Augmenta beneficiorum divinorum utilia esse et
necessaria omnibus in commune actatibus dicimus."³
Consisting in 'illuminatio et doctrina' it facilitates
rather than inspires the right operation of the will.

Augustine was aware that in his early days
of Platonic idealism he too had entertained sanguine
hopes of perfectionism, but gradually these had given
way to a more sober estimate of man's involvement in
history. Prior to the Council of Carthage (418 A.D.)
perfectionist sentiments frequently emerge.⁴

¹C.J. 111.36.

 ignorantia quam profunda, quam patiendi ejus dura
 conditio, ut liberari ab ea nisi praevachione non
 posset: scientiam quippe boni malique, absque ausu
 condemnabili nequaquam capessiturus." cf. vi.23
 (P. L., XLV, 1554).

iv.15: Man is "given aid towards obtaining perfection."

Epis. 157, 2,4 (P. L., XXXIII, 675).
Retr. 1.7 he rejects the belief that the 'possessio beatitudinis' is attainable through contemplation. He does not question the sanctity of those listed by Pelagius, but distinguishes between holiness as empirically verifiable and eschatologically present. Perfection is not a goal which we may attain but a way by which to travel: "That man, however, is not unreasonably said to walk blamelessly, who has not yet indeed reached the end of his journey, but who is pressing on towards the end in a blameless manner, free from damnable sins, and at the same time not neglecting to cleanse by almsgiving such sins as are venial. For the way in which we walk, that is, the road by which we reach perfection, is cleansed by holy prayer." Though willing to grant the sinlessness of Mary, the concept of moral perfection is disassociated from the search for actual sinlessness of conduct: "it is by

2 On Man's Perfection in Righteousness, ix.20 (P.L. XLIV, 302).
4 Serm. 181 (P.L. XXXVIII-IX, 979-984).
the same baptism here received that a man reaches the perfection hoped for.\textsuperscript{1} Evidences of inordinate self-love and lawlessness are never entirely eradicated though they do become peripheral and incidental. The believer's self-obsession is driven from the centre of action not from the sphere of influence. "Now, justification in this life is given to us according to these three things: first by the laver of regeneration by which all sins are forgiven; then, by a struggle with the faults from whose guilt we have been absolved; then third, when our prayer is heard in which we say: "Forgive us our debts, because however bravely we fight against our faults, we are men."\textsuperscript{2} Perfection is not sinlessness of behaviour but totality of trust. The 'humilitas Christi' is the primary Christian attitude: "Haec est doctrina Christiana, humilitatis praeceptum, humilitatis commendatio."\textsuperscript{3}

Unfortunately, Augustine does not always

\textsuperscript{1}C.J. vi. 40.
\textsuperscript{2}C.J. ii. 3.
\textsuperscript{3}Serm. 160.5 (P.L. XXXVIII-IX, 876).
maintain the religious rather than the ethical connotation of sinlessness. There persists a curious equivocation between perfection as an attitude of the spiritual man and perfection as a goal of the moral life: "Let us as many as are running perfectly, be thus resolved that, being not yet perfected, we pursue our course to perfection along the way which we have thus far run perfectly."¹ Since grace acts "indeclinabiliter et insuperabiliter," sinlessness is affirmed on 'a priori' grounds: "Nor is the perfection of virtue to be despised of through the grace of Him who can change and heal a nature vitiated from its origin."² Because concupiscence remains to the end no concrete example of perfection can exist. Perfection is possible as a religious attitude but not practical as a moral goal. Augustine's most important divergence from Julian lies in his conviction that not merely the inclination but also the ability to do good comes from God: "You (Julian)

¹On Man's Perfection in Righteousness; xix.40 (P.L. XLIV, 314).
²C.J. ii.3.
wish to say that the effort for sanctity comes first in man's will, without the help of God, and that God's aid is not gratuitous but justly due. Thus you think a man can be without sins in this miserable life, so that he has no personal reason for saying: Forgive us our trespasses. You seem to have put it a little more reticently, since you did not say he can be without all sins, yet neither did you say you meant only some sins, not all.¹ And again: "You (Julian) go on to say, By all means, then, a man can be without sins, by his effort for holiness without God's help."² Augustine senses far more clearly than Julian the tenacious mystery of evil in human existence. The power of egoism cannot be decisively ruptured by moral suasion; it needs a creative act of forgiveness.

¹ C.J. iv.29.

3. Salvator Mundi.

Julian's doctrine of the atonement starts with a clear grasp of the unity of the divine revelation in the Old and New Testament. The incarnation is not a disparate act of divine grace, but the culmination of a long process to secure the allegiance of men. When the Law, the prophetic exhortations and the light of reason had all failed to win men from the 'consuetudo vitiorum,' God made His final plea in the appeal of Christ's love: "The fullness of the divine love, which gave things their existence revealed itself in this, that the Word became Flesh and dwelt among us. When God required an answering love on the part of those created in His own image, He showed how He had done everything out of His ineffable love towards us, that so we might finally love Him in return, who evinced His love to us, in that He spared not His own Son, but gave Him up for us; promising us that, if from henceforth we would obey His Will, He would make
us joint-heirs with His only-begotten Son. Jesus is our Example because in Him divine love moves towards us and pleads for our response. The exemplarism of the Pelagians is not a static and lifeless concept, but an active and redemptive event vitally affecting the experience of the man addressed by God. Ultimately this love will win the day: "Abundantia ergo praeecedentium peccatorum, tam abundantia misericordiae exexit auxilium." Here grace is interpreted as favour, 'divinae benevolentiae,' and seen as the cause of all salvific events. Its efficacy depends on man's free co-operation: "verum arbitrio libero omne adjutorium cooperatur." There follows a strong insistence on the complete humanity of Jesus in temperament, instinct and emotion: "Nunc autem Christus non minus verus homo, quam verus Deus de Adam stirpe generatus, factus ex muliere ..."

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Christ's manhood is not fictitious, phantasmal or abridged, but essentially identical with ours: "Certe hanc vim in disputando Apostolus non haberet, si secundum Manichaeos et eorum discipulos Traducianos, carnem Christi a naturae nostrae communione distinguenter."¹ Failure to accept the full implications of his generic manhood leads to Apollinarianism.² The Virgin Birth does not indicate any biological modification of this wholly human life. His body is flesh and blood like ours with a similar sensitiveness to the contacts of life, instinctive recoil from pain and genuine bodily fatigue: "The flesh of Christ, because He was born of Mary, whose flesh like that of all the rest came from propagation from Adam, will not differ from sinful flesh."³ Like other men he shares the natural endowment of an


² Op. Impf. iv.47 (P.L. XLV, 1365). "Videbit enim Apollinaristarum haeresim ... et dixit, animam quidem humanam in Christouisse, sed sensus in eo corporis nonuisse, atque impassibilem eum pronuntiavit universis exstitisse peccatis." cf. iv.49 (P.L. XLV, 1567) "Quid enim fuit laude dignum, contentere illecebras sensorum, quorum incapax erat beneficio naturae? Quid mirum ... Quae autem gloria castitatis, si virilitas magis aberat quam voluntas, et quod putabatur fieri de vigore animi, veniebat de debilitate membrorum?" cf. iv.50 (P.L. XLV, 1368).

³ C.J. v.52.
animal constitution perfectly harmonised with the spiritual obligations of the individual: "Nihil ergo me pudet in Domino meo; in quae propter salutem meam venit; teneo veritatem membrorum, ut exempli ejus soliditatem arcemque suscipiam."¹ There is a total integration of personality so that even the instincts of sex and self-preservation are woven into a perfect pattern by the dominance of a mind and will perfectly attuned to the will of God.² We see in Him the One who truly conquered all carnality by the grandeur of a victorious soul: "Christus igitur non minus homo verus, quam verus Deus, nihil de naturalibus minus habuit: sed justum erat ut qui debat perfectionis exemplum, omnibus virtutum studiis antecelleret, castitasque ejus continua integritate celsa, nullo permota libidinis appetitu, quae virgo sanctae mentis exstiterat, et omnium sensuum domitrix animi magnitude, et superatrix dolorum, cunctis fidelibus, et humanitate


imitabilis fieret, et sublimitate mirabilis." 1 With this pre-condition of authentic humanity Julian develops the content of Christ's moral experience. Each day the same energies of duty and devotion were demanded of Him. Each hour brought its own temptations and self-fulfilment. Though the orthodox teaching on Christ's two natures is reproduced, "Jesus is the man chosen by God and united with the Logos 'secundum merita. The 'filius homini' gradually becomes the 'filius dei' by self-discipline and moral growth. 2 Christ's sonship is on a deeper level at His death than at His baptism because its essential mark is fidelity to His vocation. "The scriptures show quite clearly that the righteousness of this man is due to the direction of His will, not to His dual nature." 3 Insight, courage, patience and loyalty are not a supernatural endowment but an active costly achievement. In this quality of life and dedication we find a pattern to


2 Op. Impf. vi. 36 (P.L. XLV, 1591). Nevertheless Julian often distinguishes between deeds attributable to His humanity and those attributable to His divinity.

3 Op. Impf. iv. 84 (P.L. XLV, 1386). Harnack comments: "Accordingly, unless Augustine has greatly exaggerated, this might still be taught with impunity at that time in the West." op. cit., p. 201.
follow: "Prolinde incarnatio Christi opus suae divinitatis tueit, qui afferens ad me naturam meam et voluntatem suam, cujus mihi speculum offerebat et regulam, pronuntiansque nihil in se diabolum invenisse peccati, ostendit culpam non de carnis conditu, sed de sola suscipi voluntate."¹ A further implication of Christ's true manhood is the human character of His religious life. He is as vulnerable as we are in all the normal instincts and shades of emotion. Since temptation is integral to every human life he too experiences the genuine opposition of duty and inclination: "Ipse etiam ei causa tentandi fuit Christum; quoniam mori artis suae volebat capere persuadendo, cum neminem posset vitiare condendo."² Sinlessness is not an inalienable endowment but an attitude maintained and a direction of life secured by constant effort and discipline. He never suffers from any obliquity of vision or indulges in any moral

¹Op. Impf. iv.84 (P.L. XLV, 1386).

evasion. Only because Christ shares our real humanity does his sinlessness have significance for us:

"postremo si carnis ejus substantia aliqua naturalium creptione tenetur, universa evanescit pompa virtutum."¹ Involved in the same tensions as we and sharing in the same agonies of spiritual decision His words of counsel have relevance and meaning: "Qua enim dicetur gravitate, qua fronte, dolus in ore illius non fuisset; cum si in alia conditione carnis, quam quae est nostra, venisset, non solum docendo, quod levius est, sed etiam nascendo, quod est gravius, dolum malum convinceretur egisse?"² What guarantee of triumph in glory can we have if the reality of His moral victory is questioned? "Quae enim esset ratio docendi, quae gravitas exempli, si nature in nobis dissimilis, et spe conregnandi, et vi careret imitandi?"³ He is the supreme Example of a man who lives totally for the Father's will and longs simply that men and women

¹Op. Impf. iv.54 (P.L. XLV, 1371) cf. vi.37 (P.L. XLV, 1393): "Ad quod indicandum, sufficit apostolo Petro dicere, nullum sum fecisse peccatum; docens quia qui non fecerat, habere non poterat... Et ideo constat innatum non esse peccatum, quando illud Christus non habuit, qui salvo quoque honore deitatis suae, ob hoc factus est carnalis, ut nobis esset imitabilis."


"Ac per hoc, in ea natura non potest esse peccatum, cum in illo in quo tota est, nihil iniquitatis inventum est."\(^1\) Nowhere is the reality of Christ's manhood as fundamental as in the doctrine of the resurrection.\(^2\) As 'bone of our bone and flesh of our flesh' His risen life guarantees our own: "Nunc autem Christus ex mortuis resurrexit primitiae dormientium, quoniam quidem per hominem mortem, et per hominem resurrectio mortuorum."\(^3\) The Pauline argument in I Corinthians about Christ as the 'first-fruits of them that sleep' rests on the identity of His true humanity with our own. His victory over death is prophetic and indicative of ours.\(^4\) "Id est, si confitemini ejusdem illum secundum hominem, cujus

\(^{10}\)Op. Impf. iv.60 (P.L. XLV, 1375).


One of the burning issues in the controversy is the significance of baptism. Pelagius places baptism at the very centre of his teaching on the Christian life, though in the 'Libellus Brevissimus' he denies any direct relation between pedobaptism and the remission of sins. Julian freely admits that as a sacramental ordinance of the church baptismal grace is essential to all: "Nos igitur in tantum gratiam Baptismatis omnibus utiliorem aetatis confitemur, ut cunctos qui illam non necessarium etiam parvulis putant, aeterno feriam anathemate." In the waters of baptism God bestows spiritual gifts. "Verum cum nihil horum quae diximus, baptizatorum constet evenire

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2 T. Bohlin, op. cit., p. 32 f.
3 See "De pecc. merit. iii. vi 12, (P.L. XLIV, 193).
4 Op. Impf. i. 53 (P.L. XLV. 1076) of. i. 54 (P.L. XLV. 1077): "Ecce quanta confessionis luce ... reprobavi." of. i. 56 (P.L. XLV. 1078): "Non ergo unitate Sacramenti rea monstratur infantia, sed veritate judicii nihil aliud quam innocens approbatur."
corporibus"; but while baptism is a pre-requisite for entrance to the 'regnum caelorum' it is not necessary for 'vita aeterna'.

The doctrine of baptism is dominated by the distinction between 'dona naturalia' and 'dona spiritualia'. Though little children are not personally culpable yet they need to be adopted into the family of God. "Christ also died for infants."

"Quae tamen gratia, quoniam etiam medicina dicitur, salva lege justitiae facit alios ex malis bonos; parvulos autem quos creavit condendo bonos, reddit innovando adoptandoque meliores." Baptismal grace takes varied forms according to the need of the

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1Op. Impf. 11.94 (P.L. XLV, 1178) cf. 11.116 (P.L. XLV, 1190): 'Graviter quippe nos in fidel commississe jactabas, qui dicitus gratiam quidem Christi uniformiter esse tradendam, nec debere verba ejus et institutse concutii; sed aequaliter cunctis a se imbutis adoptionis et sanctificationis et promotionis dona conferre."


4C.J. 111.57.

subject. "The grace of the mysteries of Christ is rich in many gifts."¹ As the spiritual needs of adults and children differ so do the effects of baptism: "Christus enim qui est sui operis redemptor, auget circa imaginem suam continua largitate beneficia, et quos fecerat condendo bonos, facit innovando adoptandoque meliores. Hanc igitur gratiam, per quam reis venia, illuminatio spiritualis, adoptio filiorum Dei, municipatus Jerusalem coelestis, sanctificatio, atque in Christi membra translatio, et possessio regni coelorum mortalibus datur, qui aliquibus negandam putat, omnium bonorum exsecrationem meretur."² To the sinner it brings forgiveness and adoption; to the guiltless infant it grants the grace to lead a better life. "The grace of baptism ... dispenses its gifts relatively to the capacity of those who approach it."³ To the privilege of creaturehood is added the wonder of sonship: "Nos vero renasci omnes Baptismate debere, et opere nostro et sermone testamur; sed non ut hujus impertitione beneficii, de jure videantur.

¹C.J. vi.6.
²Op. Impf. i.53 (P.L. XLV, 1076).
³C.J. iii.8.
diaboli plagati: verum ut qui sunt opera Dei, flant pigiora Dei; et qui nascentur viliter, non tamen noxie, renascantur pretiose, non tamen calumniose; quique prodeunt ex institutis Dei, provehantur mysteriis Dei; et qui afferunt opera naturae, dona gratiae consequantur; ac Dominus suus qui eos fecit condendo bonos, faciat innovando adoptandoque meliores."¹ Even unbaptised infants are not outside the orbit of God's mercy.² They enjoy a life of beatitude rather than suffer the misfortunes accredited in orthodox theology.³ We dedicate them to God in baptism so that as He has blessed them in creation He may again bless them in adoption: "quos jure Baptismatis consecramus, ut qui eos fecit condendo bonos, faciat innovando et adoptandoque meliores."⁴ Only by understanding what is involved in the 'dona naturalia' can we appreciate the munificence of the 'dona spiritualia.' Nature needs to be perfected by

¹Op. Impf. v.9 (P.L. XLV, 1433).
²Op. Impf. i.43 (P.L. XLV, 1069-70). They are consigned to a 'tortium locum.'
³Op. Impf. i.50 (P.L. XLV, 1072). cf. i.57 (P.L. XLV, 1079).
grace, birth perfected by re-birth. Baptism means the adding of a new spiritual dimension to our existence. "Ut possessione aeternitatis amissa (quam quidem nunquam eam per exortum sui constat habuisse), voluntas appetendae jugiter pravitatis incumberet."  
We are baptised into the death of Christ so that we may rise in the newness of His resurrection life: "Consecpti illi sumus per Baptismam in mortem (Rom. vi.4): id est, Qua gratia, tali ad Baptistam susceptionem animo accedimus, ut membra nostra mortificemus in posterum, et pro mortuis omnino degamus, si spes non est, quia post mortem vivamus?"  
This theme of adoption occurs frequently and is one of the recurrent ideas in Julian's doctrine of baptism.

The second main benefit accruing from baptism is the remission of sins: "in remissiones vero peccatorum non in omnibus est una taxatio."  

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disclosed the Father's willingness to pardon us and this declaratory event reconstitutes the relationship by showing man that he alone builds the barriers. In the presence of Jesus from Nazareth we are told that the love of God is not dependent on the moral condition of man, but is eternal and unchangeable. Because Jesus believed this to the end of life He is our Example and the Pioneer of our faith: "Pervenire autem et ad Innocentes gratiam Christi ... in contrariis studiis indicet imitationem."¹ Face to face with Christ we dare to believe in the kind of God He trusted. Julian fails to give much substance to the concept of forgiveness. The incarnation is treated primarily as revealing God's antecedently pardoning love rather than actually creatively conveying it.

As early as the "Ac Quantitate Anima" (337-8 A.D.), Augustine had been puzzling over the significance of baptism. Since all children are

¹Op. Impf. 11.147 (P.L. XLV, 1202-3).
born culpable before God, baptism must be an efficacious means of grace. Yet how can grace be received if there is no faith? He starts by drawing a clear distinction between the moral and the sacramental: "Quibus rebus omnibus ostenditur alius esse sacramentum Baptismi, alius conversionem cordis; sed salutem hominis ex utroque completeri: Nec, si unum horum defuerit, ideo putare debemus consequens esse ut et alterum desit; quia et illud sine isto potest esse in infante, et hoc sine illo potuit esse in latrone, complente Deo sive in illo, sive in isto quod non ex voluntate defuisset. The universal practice of the Church points to the reality of original sin: "ad quam medicinalem gratiam non pertinent parvuli, si nullum habent." In sin there are two elements - the guilt (originalis reatus) and the punishment (concupiscientia). Baptismal grace is the 'signaculum' which removes the former and brings us into fellowship with God: "All past guilt of these evils is washed away in the sacred font.

1 De bapt. cont. Don iv.xxv.32 (P.L. XLIII, 176).

They are remitted in the reborn; diminished in those making progress."¹ It is powerless to deal with the latter. "The concupiscence of the flesh, however, is such that it remains in men warring against it through incontinence, even though its guilt which was contracted by generation, has already been completely ended by regeneration."² Punishment is not coterminus with guilt. Baptism is a necessity: "Baptizandos esse parvulos, nemo dubitat ... sed non dicimus eos aliter salutem et vitam aeternam non habituros, nisi baptizentur in Christo."³ The congenital disease must be cured by the divine medicus."⁴

¹ C. J. vi. 50.

² C. J. vi. 60. cf. vi. 44: "Every man at birth is necessarily answerable by the guilt of this concupiscence."


⁴ De pecc. mer. I, xix, 24 (P. L. XLIV, 122) "Vocat eos igitur medicus, qui non est ... ."
But if 'every sin is cleansed by baptism'\(^1\) and infants are baptised does not faith become irrelevant? By no means. There remains an indissoluble link between baptismal grace and human response.\(^2\)

Here the key is the essential solidarity of the human race. The faith of the Church, expressed through the sponsors, becomes the means whereby grace is made effective: "It is another's work when he believes through another, just as it was another's work when he sinned in another."\(^3\) Unde credunt? Quomodo credunt? Fide parentum. Si fide parentum purgantur, peccato parentum polluti sunt. Corpus mortis in primis parentibus generavit eos peccatores; spiritus vitae in posterioribus parentibus regeneravit eos fideles. Tu das fidem non respondenti, et ego peccatum nihil agenti."\(^4\) "Therefore, both adults.

\(^1\)C.J. vi.29.

\(^2\)De pecc. merit. I, xix.25 (P.L. XLIV, 123).

\(^3\)C.J. cf. Op. Impf. i.56 (P.L. XLV, 1095).

through their own heart and voice, and infants, through that of another, believe and confess so they may be reconciled to God through the death of His Son, lest the wrath of God rest upon them whom their vitiated origin makes guilty.\textsuperscript{1} This 'fides parentum' is not simply the bond of kinship. It is the sacred bond created by the Spirit within the Redeemed Community. Hence infants receive baptism not only validly, but also 'salubriter': 'Etiam si fidem nondum habeat in cogitatione, non ei tamen obiciem contrariae cogitationis opposit, unde sacramentum eius salubriter percipit.'\textsuperscript{2} Both disputants agreed that baptism is necessary as an efficacious means of grace. The recipient actually receives the 'virtus sacramenti.'

The controversy centres on the exposition of Rom. 5.12 - 21.\textsuperscript{3} Exegesis of this passage raises two distinct questions. Firstly, does Paul mean that death

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1}C.J. vi.79.
\item \textsuperscript{2}Ep. xciii.10 (P.L. XXXIII, 364).
\item \textsuperscript{3}It is well to remember, however, that the exegetical questions were not confined to one crucial passage. Gen. 1 - 3; Psa. 6.50 and 119; Job; Jn. 3.3 - 5; Eph. 1.3 are only a few of the other important passages. See DTC xii. p. 388; Serm. 170,2. (P.L. XXXVIII-IX, 928).
\end{itemize}
passed to all men simply because all have sinned personally, or because all sinned 'in Adam'? Secondly, what does he conceive to be the mediating link between the sin of Adam and that of his descendants? Is it the effect of a bad Example; is it the seminal existence of posterity in Adam; or is it that Adam is simply a synonym for each individual?

Julian’s exposition is clear and unequivocal: "You (Julian) offer a new interpretation ... declaring that by these words he meant us to understand the one in whom all have sinned.... By your reasoning, we must not hold that all men have sinned by way of origin in one man, as it were in common, in the oneness of the mass, but that all have committed their sins because of the wilful act of the first man, that is when they imitate him, not when they are generated from him.... You say, if Paul was talking about the transmission of sin (tradux peccati), it would have been more fitting to say that sin has passed to all men because all men have been generated of the pleasure of the spouses; and he would have added that it passed to all men in that they have come from the corrupted flesh of the first man."¹ Since sin does not come 'per formam

¹C. J. vi. 75 - 77.
corporis' each man enters the world untainted by the wrongdoing of his forefathers: "ac per hoc tam integrum esse liberum arbitrum, quam ante voluntatis propriae usum innixiam in unoquaque naturam."\(^1\) Parental sin cannot justly be imputed to offspring: "defendimus peccata parentum ad filios pertinere non posse."\(^2\) Adam's sin does not involve us in condemnation or render us naturally vicious.

Original sin is a metonymical expression indicating the primal act which was followed by repeated transgressions. Indeed the Pauline reference to 'one man' rather than to the procreative pair clearly indicates that Adam was the 'vestibulum peccati' only in the sense of an evil example: "atque imitationem accusatus gravaret, nec fecunditatem numeratus argueret ... peccatum autem Apostolus intrasse pronuntiat, sed per unum."\(^3\) "Aut ergo de communi morte locutus est, et naturam indicavit: aut de

\(^1\)Op. Impf. 11.20 (P.L. XLV, 1149) cf. 11.141 (P.L. XLV, 1200): "non tamen continuo noceret culpa nascendibus qui nihil ad eam assensionis admoveire potuissent."


\(^3\)Op. Impf. 11.56 (P.L. XLV, 1186).
peccato, et imitationem accusavit."¹ If we are
seemingly involved in Adam's Fall then the parallelism
of the passage is lost since it is evident that all
are not regenerated through the advent of Christ:
"Si haec, inquam, cuneta in Dei imaginem primi hominis
invexit iniquitas; manifestum est nimis esse imbecillam
Christi gratiam in suis muneribus, quae nihil quod his
tot trabalibus malis mederetur invent: aut si invent, 
affirma."² Baptism is rendered ineffective.³ Christ
Himself shows us that the only basis for a moral
judgement lies in the quality of a man's life: "Ibi
ergo personam de operibus suis Christus jussit
agnoscì."⁴ Each man is the architect of his own
destiny:⁵ "None is condemned except from faults of
his own will."⁶ Salvation is a privilege open to all

¹Op. Impf. vi. 31 (P.L. XLV, 1584).
²Op. Impf. 11. 90 (P.L. XLV, 1177-8) cf. 1. 52
(P.L. XLV, 1074).
quotes Matt. xii. 33.
⁵Op. Impf. 1. 134 (P.L. XLV, 1134) cf. 1. 95
(P.L. XLV, 1111-2).
⁶C. J. vi. 63.
Julian speaks in glowing terms of the reality of grace: "Hanc igitur gratiam, per quam reis venia, illuminatio spiritualis, adoptio filiorum Dei, municipatus Jerusalem coelestis, sanctificatio, atque in Christi membra translatio, et possessio regni coelorum mortalibus datur, qui aliquibus negandam putat, omnium bonorum exsecrationem meretur." This grace, 'ad faciulis operandum,' is any event or circumstance which incites the individual to a life of virtue. No-one is set free from the bondage of sin except by the grace of God: "Nec quisquam nisi per gratiam Liberatoris isto solvitur vinculo servitutis." This grace does not create that freedom of the will which is an inalienable part of our constitution. It facilitates its judicious function.

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1 Op. Impf. ii.117 (P.L. XLV, 1191) "postremo nihil eam efficere, si non in omnibus uniformiter praedicetur operari."

2 Op. Impf. i.53 (P.L. XLV, 1076).


4 Op. Impf. i.74 (P.L. XLV, 1100).
"Adsumt tamen adjutoria gratiae Dei, quae in parte virtutis nunquam destituunt voluntatem."¹ Christ comes as the true man for all men, the Pioneer of a new quality of life, the Example of a new total dedication to God even unto death.² The end of all true religion is to love and obey God. By doing that within the compass of a fully human life, Christ is the Supreme Example for all believers: "... ut siue nemo praemia virtutis meretur, nisi qui ad ea, post incarnationem tamen Christi, sanctitatis ejus imitatione contenderit; ita in Adam praevaricator nemo teneatur, nisi qui in transgressione legis primi hominis imitatione deliquerit."³ It is not the nature but the inclinations which are affected by sin, and since these depend on knowledge and insight Christ comes as the Supreme Revealer, the 'exemplum' of the new Age: "Eodem plenus spiritu, quo etiam Petrus, scit Christum pro nobis ob hoc mortuum, ut nobis

¹Op. Impf. iii.114 (P.L. XLV, 1296) cf. i.95 (P.L. XLV, lilll-2); "haec inquam, gratia, meritum mutat reorum, non liberum condit arbitrium ... verum arbitrio libero omne adjutorium co-operatur."

²C. J. v. 59.

³Op. Impf. ii.146 (P.L. XLV, 1202) cf. ii.52 (P.L. XLV, 1164); "His ergo verbis, tam adhortantibus, quam deterrentibus ostenditur imitationis affectus, qui utique si esse non posset, non indicaretur cavendus."
The coming of grace is not a mystical event operative only in the lives of a few elect persons. It is the insight that the moral grandeur of Jesus, the totality of His faith, the generosity of His sympathy, and the dimensions of His love act in society as an immensely potent and redemptive force, and give us a startlingly new concept of God. Living in our world of mystery and tragedy, having no other avenues of faith than we have, He discovers that the Father's love is utterly sufficient in the agonies of living and the crisis of dying: "... et sui imitatione, qui erat virtutum forma et norma, correctis gloriis beatae aeternitatis indulsit." He is the supreme Pioneer in the field of religious knowledge because He shows that only in the darkness, only in dying to the deeper calls of self-interest can we rise to the resurrection life: "atque ideo munera memores debere sic vivere, ut Christo consepti esse doceamur; atque resurrectionem ejus conspicua sanctitate

1op. Impf. vi.34 (P.L. XLV, 1537).

2op. Impf. ii.152 (P.L. XLV, 1206).
Augustine may be right in saying that the Pelagians accept grace only 'qua demonstrat et revelat deus quid agere debeamus, non qua donat atque adjuvat ut agamus,' but it is quite misleading to dismiss this as 'mere exemplarism.' Julian is trying to say that because men find in Jesus a God who comes in mercy and forgiveness there is awakened within them that penitence and peace which herald personal salvation. Any other concept of grace which is less personal, less ethical, or less experiential than this is simply a figment of the intellect and divorced from life. Because this 'gratia Christi' is not a mysterious influence but the exhibition of a personal life through the proclamation and witness of the Church it is limitless in scope. "You (Julian) cite an apostolic testimony, saying that God, who wishes all men to be saved and come to the knowledge of the truth, opens to those who knock. You intend us to understand by your teaching, that the reason all men are not saved and do not come to the knowledge of the truth is that they do not wish to ask, although God

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1 Op. Impf. 11.223 (P.L. XLV, 1240).

wishes to open." God desires to have mercy on all men: "Sed imaginem suam, id est, omnes homines bonos condere, qui etiam demolitos studiorum pravitate, reformare remediorum desiderat largitate. Ipsi quidem cantat Ecclesia misericordiam et judicium (ps. c. 1); quia et illis est benignus qui nihil deliquerunt, et justo punit judicio eos qui boni a Deo conditi suapte voluntate peccarunt, ac misericordiae subsidia respuerunt. Hanc igitur misericordiam, et hoc judicium cantat Ecclesia Catholicorum." The final judgement will be based solely on how a man has lived. Jacob was chosen before Esau not because of any racial distinction, but simply because he proved "quietus et mitis, obediens parentum praeceptis, et sanctificationum appetentissimus." The promise of forgiveness depends on faith alone. Julian rejects altogether the idea of prevenient grace: "It is

\[1\] C.J. iv.42.

\[2\] Op. Impf. i.130 (P.L. XLV, 1130) cf. i.134 (P.L. XLV, 1134).

\[3\] Op. Impf. i.131 (P.L. XLV, 1130-1).


therefore by his own will that man does good or evil. But the good which he does he owes to God, who without anticipating him yet grants divine help."¹ Like Augustine, he is prepared to affirm concurrence: "God, knowing how to work his just judgements not only in the bodies of man, but also in their very hearts, acts in marvellous and ineffable ways; not causing evil volitions, but using them as He wishes, since He cannot will anything unjustly."² It is quite false to imply that Julian denies either the need of God's grace or the reality of man's sin.³ Rather he feels that the Augustinian interpretation of grace as power fails to do justice either to the New Testament witness or the basic convictions of the moral man.

In his monumental work on the history of dogma, Harnack traces the salient characteristics of

¹Op. Impf. v. 48 (P.L. XLV, 1484) cf. v. 41 (P.L. XLV, 1477): 'If something precedes it, it is destroyed.'


³Op. Impf. iii. 106 (P.L. XLV, 1291) "sed affirmamus a Deo fieri hominem liberì arbitrii, eumque innumeris divinae gratiae speciebus juvari, cui possibile sit vel servare Dei mandata, vel transgredi." cf. i. 52 (P.L. XLV, 1074).
Augustine's teaching on grace to St. Ambrose.

Certainly, the authority of the great Milanese bishop is often invoked in the ante-Pelagian polemic. Yet it seems more likely that the decisive influence comes not from Ambrose but from Ambrosiaster, the anonymous writer of a commentary on Romans. The Biblical exegesis of Augustine's "Tractatus in Paulum" is strikingly different in method from the "Enarrationes" of Ambrose. Under his influence Augustine turns away from the Platonic speculation and allegorical exegesis of Origin to the realism of the Antiochenes. His Neo-Platonic background leads him at first to conceive of sin as introducing an organic change into human nature, not simply perverting what remains essentially good. Later the 'carne subditi' is replaced by the cognate idea of the 'concupiscentia subditi.' From the time of the "De Diversis Quaestionibus ad Simplicianum" the 'concupiscentia carnalis' becomes the vehicle of original sin. Mankind is so deeply implicated in a radical perversion that only a creative act of grace can set him free. 

1 Op. Impf. i.52 (P. L. XLV, 1075) C.J. ii.4; 111.2: 111.47 et saepe.

2 See "De Lib. Arb." 111.54 (c. 394 - 395 A.D.)
Bethune-Baker puts it: "he held the Fall of man to have been complete, so that the power of spiritual good is entirely lost, and ever afterwards he wills nothing but evil and can do nothing but evil."\(^1\) This initial failure of man is attributable solely to the autonomous and free Self\(^2\) which "turns towards its own private good ... and this aversion and conversion, being voluntary and not compelled, is followed by the fit and just punishment of misery."\(^3\) The ensuing atrophy of native capacity manifests itself in enfeeblement of the mind (ignorantia) and paralysis of the will (necessitas).\(^4\) Man becomes a slave to sin. The initial endowment of freedom is viewed by Augustine sometimes as a mental power, and sometimes as a gift of grace which, nevertheless does not prevent


\(^2\) Op. Impr. ii1.57 (P.L. XLV, 1278); cf. vi.22 (P.L. XLV, 1550-1).

\(^3\) De. Lib. Arb. ii.53 (P.L. XXXII, 1269).

\(^4\) In the Enchir. 45, Augustine analyses more fully the effects of the Fall, viz., - sacrilege, murder, fornication, greed and theft. cf. De. lib. Arb. iii.52 (P.L. XXXII, 1296). "He who against his better knowledge does not act rightly loses the knowledge of what is right; and he who has refused to do right, when he could, loses the power to do right when he will. For in truth there is for every sinning soul a double penalty, loss of knowledge and loss of power."
Yet he is unable to show why the primal man, despite being morally perfect, lacking any evil example, wrapped around with divine grace, possessing immortality and all other coveted blessings, capitulates so easily to Satanic wiles. Whence arises the stronger disposition to sin? His answer is that we are unable to understand the nature of that 'antiquum peccatum.' It is senseless perversity. Four points are particularly significant in his exposition of sin and grace.

Firstly: the guilt and consequences of the Fall are laid on us by the identification of our embryonic will with Adam's volition: "in the misdirected choice of that one man all sinned in him, since all were that one man, from whom on that account

1 De Sp. et Litt. 58 (P.L. XLIV, 233): "The freedom of choice which the Creator has conferred in the way of nature upon the natural soul is a neutral power which can either be exerted to faith or sink into unbelief" ct. De Corr. et Grat. xi.29 (P.L. XLIV, 933): "Quid ergo? Adam non habuit Dei gratiam? Imo vero habuit magnam, sed disparom."


they all severally derive original sin."¹ This seminal identity of posterity in Adam is the keystone of Augustine's teaching on original sin: "non est igitur imitatio, sed generatione, qua per peccatum mortis omnes homines pertransiit."² Just as a man who habitually sins is held responsible for the progressive deterioration of character which issues from initial wrongdoing, so mankind is responsible for the sin of Adam because it is the source and cause of the universal corruption and viciousness of the race.³ The Fall results in the dimming of man's faculties leading to intemperance and concupiscence,⁴ and

¹De Nupt. et Concup. 11.15. Also quoted by Kelly op. cit., p. 364, cf. Op. Impf. 11.163 (P.L. XLV, 1211); "Quia non eis, sicut putatis, peccatum debet unum et olim defuncti hominis imputari."

²Op. Impf. 11.137 (P.L. XLV, 1223) The realistic notion that Adam's personality and not just his nature is shared by posterity also occurs in Augustine - alas, too infrequently! e.g. De Civ. Dei. xiii.14 (P.L. XLII, 396) "Omnes enim solum in illo uno... nasceretur.

³Only the Virgin Mary escapes the general corruption of nature: "De Nat. et Grat." xxxii.36 (P.L. XLIV, 264).

⁴Op. Impf. iv.104 (P.L. XLV, 1399); vi.17 (P.L. XLV, 1539-41); vi.22 (P.L. XLV, 1551-4).
ultimately issuing in the dissolution of death.\(^1\)
The sensual abandon in the act of generation is the
evidence and medium of original sin.\(^2\) The physical
lack of control points to moral flaccidity.\(^3\) The
body becomes a rebel, and this 'libido carnalis'
reveals itself most clearly in the carnal excitement
accompanying sexual intercourse. Despite this inner
perversity man is not totally evil.\(^4\) A 'scintilla
rationis' remains.\(^5\)

**Secondly:** Augustine was misled by the
factivitive significance of 'justum facere.'
Justification is used in the sense of making rather
than accounting righteous - sanctifying power rather
than virtue.

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\(^1\) [*Op. Impf. ii.186 (P.L. XLV, 1222)*]: "si autem anima separat am corpore naturaliter non vult, ipsa mors poena est, quamvis eam in usum bonum gratia divina convertat."

\(^2\) [*Op. Impf. ii.218 (P.L. XLV, 1236)*].

\(^3\) [*Op. Impf. ii.226 (P.L. XLV, 1243)*].

\(^4\) [*Ench. 12.4 (P.L. XL, 236)*].

\(^5\) [*De. Civ. Dei. xxii.24 (P.L. XLI, 789)*]: 'The
spark, as it were, of reason in virtue of which he
was made in God's likeness had not been completely
extinguished.' cf. *De. Sp. et Litt.* 49 (P.L. XLIV,
231). ' ... the relics of the divine image ...'
than primary absolution. It signifies the gradual restoration of the rule of the Spirit over the disorder of the flesh.\(^1\) This subordination of sanctification to justification exerts a commanding influence over subsequent definitions of the problem.\(^2\) Thus the 'gratia Dei' comes to mean not merely the favour which God feels towards the elect, but the power which is infused into the soul to effect moral rehabilitation and spiritual regeneration. Only occasionally is this sanctifying grace identified with the organic self-expression of God Himself: "Gratia quippe Dei, donum Dei est; donum autem maximum ipse Spiritus sanctus est: et ideo gratia dicitur."\(^3\) Too often grace is interpreted simply as power: "God however brought this to pass solely through the wills of men themselves, inasmuch as He assuredly possesses a most almighty power of inclining human hearts whithersoever it may

\(^1\)Op. Impf. 11.165 (P.L. XLV, 1212).


\(^3\)Serm. 144.1 (P.L. XXXVIII-IX, 733). cf. De Sp. et Litt. 5 (P.L. XLIV, 203). 'he receives the Holy Spirit, whereby there arises in his soul the delight in and the love of God, the supreme and changeless Good. This gift is his here and now, while he walks by faith ...'
please Him."¹

Thirdly: Without grace no-one can be saved from this radical and universal corruption: "Hoc si intelligatis, non alium intelligetis esse arbitrium laudabiliter liberum, nisi quod fuerit Dei gratia liberatum."² All true righteousness is due solely to grace in its varied forms.³ There is prevenient grace by which God inaugurates every good thought and noble act; there is grace 'adjutorium sine qua non' given to those whose profession of faith seems sincere; and there is grace 'adjutorium quo' which leads men to eternal life. In each case grace is a free gift: "Grace would no longer be grace, because it is not given gratuitously but rendered as something done."⁴ Prior to 396 A.D., Augustine ascribes the 'ortus bonae voluntatis' to human effort, but subsequently he was

¹De. corr. et Grat. xiv. 45 (P. L. XLIV, 944).
²Op. Impf. i. 79 (P. L. XLV, 1102).
⁴C. J. iii. 2.
to see that even the initial stirrings of faith come from God: "visita Dei gratia."\(^1\) Does then the whole idea of merit become meaningless? No. Merit becomes the effect of grace not its ground: "the grace of God is not given according to our deserving; for we see that it was given and is given every day, following not only upon no good deserts, but upon many evil. But, assuredly, when it has been given, there begin to be good deserts of our own yet through grace."\(^2\) In this way he can maintain that election rests solely in the sovereign freedom of God who, in mercy, calls some to salvation: "De nonduo natis enim agebatur, quorum non ex operibus, sed secundum proposittum suum Deus unum dilexit, alterum odio habuit."\(^3\) Sometimes he speaks as though the reasons for predestination are inscrutable rather than arbitrary.\(^4\) Elsewhere he seems to suggest that some

\(^1\) *Retr., ii.1* (P.L. XXXII, 629).

\(^2\) *De, Grat., et Lib., Arb., 13* (P.L., XLIV, 829).


\(^4\) *De, Grat., et Lib., Arb., 45* (P.L. XLIV, 910).
are actually predestined to damnation: "We can recount many other events clearly showing that from a hidden judgement of God comes perversity of heart." Faced with the moral issues of reprobation he can only exclaim: "Dare honorum Deo; altitudini judiciorum ejus ..." The faulty conception of grace as omnipotent power sometimes results in textual violence. Thus, 'God willeth all men to be saved' is interpreted as: "the all means the many whom He wishes to come to the grace." Bonner comments: 'In view of Augustine's repeated insistence that the lost are justly condemned ... it is not that God deliberately damns anyone; the worst we can say - and no-one is likely to underestimate how terrible it is - is, that for St. Augustine God has not an absolute will to save all men.'

Forthly: Augustine seeks to maintain that while fallen man has forfeited 'libertas' he

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nevertheless still enjoys the 'liberum arbitrium.'

The sinner is not an insensate object. This distinction between freedom and free-will occurs frequently: "Redimuntur autem in libertatem beatitudinis sempiternam, ubi jam peccato servire non possint. Nam si, ut dicis, boni malique voluntarii possibilitas sola libertas est; non habet libertatem Deus, in quo peccandi possibilitas non est. Hominis vero liberum arbitrium congenitum et omnino inamissibile si quierimus, illud est quo beati omnes esse volunt, etiam hi qui ea nolunt quae ad beatitudinem ducunt." Now motives determine the direction of volition and clearly these motives are limited by the character of the subject. Hence we are free to do what we like, but not free to like what we ought to do. The will itself is not a single

1De. Corr et Gratia xi.133 (P.L. XLIV, 936). "The ultimate liberty of the saints is the loss of freedom to sin" cf. Gilson, op cit., p. 163: "free choice always remains essentially intact and grace makes a liberty of it once more."

2De. Pecc. Merit. ii.1.3 (P.L. XLIV, 154).


self-sustained faculty, but a composition of conflicting impulses: "it is no strange anomaly partly to will and partly to be unwilling." In the 'Ad Simplicianum' (396 A.D.), the emergence of this will to do right is attributed both to the divine Call and to the human response. Augustine sometimes thinks of God as acting immanently on the will, so that we do not will in spite of ourselves, but our will to believe is itself evidence of the divine gift. Yet later we find that man's response has fallen into the background. The clear distinction between freedom and volition is endangered by an inaccurate terminology. At first the 'liberum arbitrium' is viewed as a "neutral" power belonging to the very constitution of man. God will judge according to its use. Elsewhere he speaks of this freedom of decision as conferred by grace and hence synonymous.

1 Conf. viii.19 (P.L. XXXII, 758).

   C.J. v.15.

3 Ad Simpl. i.ii.10 (P.L. XL, 117). "Ut velimus enim et suum esse voluit et nostrum suum vocando, nostrum sequendo." See Burnaby, op. cit., p. 229 sq.
with 'libertas'.

Augustine needs to realise that ultimately grace is more than a gift. It is a relationship within which faith is the will's response. Since this relationship is primary grace is prevenient. God loves us before we learn to love Him. It is irresistible only in the sense that no rebellion of ours can destroy it. Finally it is co-operative because within this new situation we can do what previously we had neither the will nor the ability to do.
CHAPTER IV

ESTIMATE AND CONCLUSION
What estimate should we make of Julian, Bishop of Aegidium? Clearly it is insufficient simply to call him a Pelagian; to identify a man is neither to evaluate the cogency of his thought nor appreciate the relevance of his insights. Yet this is precisely what often happens. The majority of traditional opinions regarding Julian derive from a scanty acquaintance with his works and an even scantier appreciation of his acute perception. Forget writes:

"Les mêmes considérations, les mêmes griefs d'ordre pratique ou théorique revenaient sans cesse sous la plume; les termes seuls variaient, devenaient de jour en jour plus durs, plus hautains ... Augustin répondant en détail aux difficultés, opposant à l'aveugle et discourtoise passion un calme et une sérénité inaltérables."\(^1\)

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\(^1\) DTG Vol. viii, cols. 1929-30 of R. Hedde and E. Amann vol. xii, col. 702-7.
Both Marrou\(^1\) and de Plinval echo this adverse comment. Julian is "une personnalité de second plan qui n'a déployé toute sa puissance que dans la controverse et le dénigrement."\(^2\) His work betrays "un esprit superficial."\(^3\) Harnack says: "he seems, like so many precocious geniuses, never to have got beyond the stage reached by the clever youth,"\(^4\) and Tixeront complains of "this harsh and proud naturalism."\(^5\) In contrast, Baxter counsels a "more sympathetic evaluation of Julian's theories in the light of modern Biblical scholarship and modern psychology."\(^6\) Bruckner refers to his genuine concern for true religion,\(^7\) and


Bouwman pays tribute to his exceptional literary ability.\(^1\) J. de Blic says that Julian's system foreshadows mediaeval scholasticism,\(^2\) and Refoulé instances frequent parallels with Aquinas.\(^3\) Cayre's comment is one of the most judicious. He describes Julian as 'a fine humanist, keenly interested in all matters of speculation, somewhat pedantic, who exalted the rights of reason to the detriment of faith.'\(^4\) One thing is clear - neither side has a monopoly of courteous comment. Though Julian may commend his opponents erudition\(^5\) he can be appallingy rude at times.\(^6\) Perhaps this is due to a growing realization


\(^3\)Op. cit., p. 44.


\(^5\)Op. Impf. i.43 (P.L. XLV, 1069): "laudamus prorsus ingenium tuum; apparat eruditio ..." cf. i.1 (P.L. XLV, 1051).

\(^6\)Op. Impf. i.66 (P.L. XLV, 1039): "Conscius enim forte esse potes matris tuae morbi alicujus occulti, quam in libris Confessionis, ut ipso verbo utar, meribibulam vocatam esse signasti."
of the hopelessness of his position, and resentment at the repressive measures used to silence him. Likewise Augustine can be magnanimous, and offensive. Each side claims the support of scripture, and the authority of the Fathers. On the one hand, Augustine believes that he alone is contending for the historic faith: "Ecce quod dicimus, ecce cui catholicae veritati contradicitis: sed magis contra vos, quam contra illam dicitis, quidquid haereticis disputationibus dicitis." On the other hand, Julian is convinced that orthodoxy tragically underestimates man's power of moral initiative and ignores God's peremptory Call to a serious search for Christian

holiness: "pro Christo legatione fungimur, et pro
virili portione quantum valemus opis ad defensionem
catholicae religionis afferimus; nec piget mandare
litteris remedia, quae contra errorum venena
conficimus."\(^1\) The voluntary consent of the individual
is an essential factor in determining guilt: "The
origin of all virtue is located in the rational soul,
and all the affections through which we are good
effectively or ineffectively are in our mind as in
their subject."\(^2\) Therefore it is by his own will that
man does good and evil."\(^3\) Sin is always a personal
attitude which estranges a man from God."

In Julian, Augustine meets an opponent who
is his equal if not his peer, in intellectual
resourcefulness and academic brilliance. Not only is
he schooled in Aristotle and Zeno,\(^4\) but he is also
thoroughly versed in the teachings of the ancient
classical schools of philosophy. After reviewing a
list of thirteen authorities adduced by Julian,


\(^2\) C.J. iv.19.

\(^3\) Op. Impf. v.43 (P.L. XLV, 1434).

\(^4\) C.J. ii.34; vi.36; vi.64. Op. Impf. ii.51
(P.L. XLV, 1163).
Augustine asks: "Who can hear this list and not be frightened by the clamour of names and the banding of schools, if he, as the majority of men, is not a scholar and think that you who know such things must be really important?"¹ There is a constant search for an accurate terminology and a willingness to give precise definitions of technical terms: "Omnis quippe, ut sit ille, quae ratione suspicatur de aliqua re disputatio, debet a definitione proficiere, ut intelligatur quid sit id de quo disputatur."² He defines key terms like justice,³ sin,⁴ free-will⁵ and concupiscence.⁶ He deals at length with affection as a principle of qualities,⁷ the import of logical contraries,⁸ the meaning of contradictory.⁹ the

¹ C.J. iv.75.
⁵ Op. Impf. 1.73 (P.L. XLV, 1102); 1.82 (P.L. XLV, 1103).
⁷ C.J. vi.54.
⁸ C.J. vi.60.
difference between the literal and figurative sense, \(^1\) and the function of the syllogism. \(^2\) Herrnack demurres at this 'mania for definitions,' but there can be little useful discussion so long as complex issues are needlessly clouded by imprecise terms: "Ad quid ergo persuadendum aut Scripturas releges, aut conscios nominabis, qui adhuc quod sentis non potes definire?"\(^3\) Ironically enough, it is this rigorous search for an accurate terminology which becomes the focus for Julian's weakest point. His definition of free-will is too narrow and abstract. That we have some freedom of action is unquestionably true; but it is equally true that we do not have that absolute equipose of moral choice which Julian finds himself defending.\(^4\) Voluntary is not a synonym for indeterminacy. Not only are we faced with the raw material of impulses, capacities and instincts which constitute our hereditary endowment, but environment also influences what we will to do. Indeed Julian implicitly acknowledges this in his

\(^1\) Op. Impf. 111.37-38 (P.L. XLV, 1234-35); 111.92 (P.L. XLV, 1237).

\(^2\) C.J. 111.14-16.

\(^3\) Op. Impf. 11.30 (P.L. XLV, 1154).

\(^4\) Bruckner, op. cit., p. 129.
conception of grace as 'exemplum.' The dominant social mores profoundly influence individual behaviour. If only the meaning of social solidarity had been worked out more clearly, a definitive doctrine of grace might well have emerged. As it is grace is too conceptualised, too intellectual and too external. Hence the absence of any deep sense of creative forgiveness and the overtones of nominalism.

Nevertheless, though Augustine's cavil is perfectly valid— that volition is always motivated— it is insufficient simply to include motives as determining volitional behaviour. We must go farther and admit that they are not the complete proximate causes of human action. It is this conviction that lies at the very centre of Julian's opposition to the Augustinian exposition of the relation between grace and free-will.

The laxity of conventional piety had given Pelagianism its initial impetus. Its aim was to arouse the dormant conscience and the indifferent will by rejecting the differential in Christian behaviour implied in the double standard of morality. Perfection is simply total obedience to the deliverances of

\[\text{\textsuperscript{1}}\textsuperscript{0p, Impf. 1.12 (P.L. XLV, 1055): 'in ecclesia quoque Dei aedepa est stultitis et turpitude dominatum.}\]
conscience and the teachings of Jesus. Responsible character - which is the sphere of holiness - pertains to the will alone. Hence the 'sumnum bonum' is right intent. Now, given a denial of the "languor naturae" and Julian's definition of sin restricting it solely to specific acts of will clearly some form of perfectionism is inescapable. As F.R. Tennant says: 'If we deny that sin is, like mere imperfection, a necessity for any individual, we can never be sure that in favourable circumstances, there have not been cases in which a longer or shorter life has wholly escaped being marred by sin.'¹ The real problem is how far Christ ultimately sets us free from ingrained weaknesses of character. "You (Julian) say no height of virtue is so lofty a believing mind cannot reach it with God's help."² As a just man will not ask his slave to complete a four day journey in one, so God does not require a man to be perfect if it is morally impossible. The divine command to live without sin is meaningless if it is constitutionally impractical.


²C.J. 111.64.
and superfluous if it is natural. The whole economy of salvation finds its fruition in that 'impeccantia' which is itself the state of grace. Unhappily, on the basis of an imaginary discrete and atomic individual life, Pelagian perfectionism tends to become a synonym for doing one's best: Deum diligit qui suis in omnibus mandatis obtemperat; Deum diligit qui legis eius et praecepta custodit; Deum diligit qui, ut illle sanctus est, ipse se sanctificat. Each man is abstracted from the society in which he lives and the constant factors of historical existence are treated as irrelevant. Yet this does conserve the insight that sanctification can have no ethical significance unless it is the personal achievement of the active subject. The danger lies in making the moral quality of life the primary interest of faith. Christian moral action is reduced to bare conformity with the prudential rules of conduct elaborated in the general consensus of opinion. "For the Pelagians dare to say even this: that the righteous man in this life has no sin at all...." The minima of

1Pel. Vita. 9.

obligations is given concrete expression in scriptural laws, particularly the Decalogue, and in the gospels teaching. Attention is drawn away from the perfection of absolute trust in Christ, and focused on the beating of the spiritual pulse. Perfection becomes identified with pietism. Julian comes close to finding the capacities for self-fulfilment in human life itself, complemented simply by those external natural means of grace most evident in a favourable environment. Augustine can say: "you are in a hurry ... For you wish man to be perfected here, and would have that indeed by the gift of God - not a free gift, but one dependent on the decision of man's own will." The gift of the Holy Spirit comes to represent little more than the framework of religious and ethical experience.

In Pelagianism, the specific character of Christianity as a promise rather than a law becomes obscured. Redemption becomes virtually the statement that God has revealed an ideal towards which man should strive. The New Testament conviction that God breaks

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1 C. J. 11.8.

2 "Man can live without sin and observe the commandments easily because even before the coming of Christ men lived without sin and the Law guided them to the kingdom of heaven as well as the gospel." (see Council of Ephesus and speech of Pelagius cited by Mercator in Commonitorium 49, 82-89).
creatively into our lives and enables us to make the appropriate act of faith and obedience is ignored. God's kingdom comes, not in so far as individuals succeed in cultivating private virtues, but rather in that society where right personal relationships are fostered and the Spirit of Christ is shown in mutual concern and service. Julian forgets that coincident with the call to Christian completeness there is a ferment of perverted instincts and obtuse tendencies which inhibit the will and darken the understanding. The moral incapacity of St. Paul remains the tragic inheritance of every man. Hence Augustine's reiteration of the need of divine grace: "Qui dicit, Non quod voto ago; sed quod odi, illud facio (Rom. vii.15), possibilitatem perfectionis suae in Dei gratia ponit, contra vos; non in sua virtute confidit, ne sit vanus ut vos." As Bouyer says: "When we think we are seeking God with our whole being, we continue, the old man in us continues, to flee from him secretly and despairingly. That alone creates the darkness; that alone creates the

\[1\] Op. Impf. iii.73 (P. L. XLV, 1279). cf. Serm. 128,9: 'Spiritus Dei est qui pugnat in te.'
distance. But when we think we have overtaken him we shall recognize that it is he who has overtaken us and that throughout our quest he had never ceased to be not so much before us as behind us ... the discovery of grace, the discovery of love which loves us without looking for any return, which loves us although we are sinners, which loves us in our sin, but which alone will lead us, by obscure ways known to him alone, from sin to sanctity, that is, in the last analysis, the great discovery.¹

Perhaps the most original and perceptive part of Julian's exposition of the Faith is his uninhibited acceptance of the primary conative tendencies and his assertion of the moral neutrality of the elemental instinctive passions. He maintains that the seat of sin cannot be transferred from the self-determining will to elements in our mental or physical constitution over which we have no control. Furthermore, if procreation is a commandment of God then the instinct indispensable to copulation must itself be

good. 1 A "distinction between 'nuptia' and 'concupiscientia' is socially untenable and psychologically unsound." 2 "only the excesses of lust are censurable." 3 The sex instinct is not evil in itself. 4 Failure to appreciate this leads Augustine to sneer at this 'laudator concupiscientiae,' and complain: "You say ... the good of sanctification is added to its natural goodness and the concupiscence of the flesh is a holy daughter of God." 5 Julian appreciates that only a free personal decision can give rise to a formal moral quality. A spontaneous appetite or instinctive drive cannot in itself ethically determine the subject. By constant spiritual discipline and responsible decision each

10p. Impf. iv.5 (P.L. XLV, 1344); "Commixtionem sed non minus benedictionis quam institutionis privilegio vindicatur. Vox enim Dei est, Relinquet homo patrem et matrem, et adhaerabit uxori, et erunt duo in carne una: Vox Dei est, crescite, et multiplicamini, et replete terram."


3C.J. iv.6.

4C.J. iii.49. "I (Augustine) am referring to this evil, you to this good." cf. Op. Impf. v.20 (P.L. XLV, 1452); 1.65 (P.L. XLV, 1084).

5C.J. vi.51.
man's nature may become the obedient and co-operative vehicle of his personal self-fulfilment until he reaches the goal of complete integration—and integration is simply another name for holiness without which no man can see God. Julian distinguishes clearly between the non-moral occasions for sin, those hereditary propensities which are entirely spontaneous and inalienable, and the specific source of sin in a morally reprehensible choice. By contending that sinfulness can be predicated only within the context of the total interests of life, he can secure an honourable place for the appetites without falling a prey either to the artificial distinctions of puritanism or to the excesses of sexual depravity. Failure to maintain a distinction between physical endowment and moral culpability forces Augustine to interpret the spiritual life as a constant struggle with instinctive drives. He relates, almost exclusively in terms of opposition, the needs pertaining to organic being over against those which relate to spiritual ideals. Pleasure remains unintegrated with moral values.

Having rejected the instinctual life as the locum of original sin, Julian proceeds to locate the bias to evil firmly with the objective historical
continuum. Unhappily he fails to recognise fully that the social and cultural situation in which we grow up is not simply external to us. Unconsciously accepted social values and prohibitions are emotionally effective and powerfully directive in actions prior to the evolution of a stable moral conscience. This explains the profound theological significance of baptism into the community where the norms of Christ are honoured. Julian's whole work is an explicit rejection of Augustine's doctrine of limited atonement and elective salvation. Each man stands wholly and unconditionally responsible to the God who has graciously revealed Himself in Jesus Christ.

Ironically enough it is in his doctrine of the person and work of Christ that Julian's interpretation is most satisfying and most patently inadequate. His frank acceptance of the genuine humanity of our Lord is expressed with a candour and incisiveness refreshingly at variance with the uncertain tone of much patristic exposition. Jesus is a man subject to those physical, mental and spiritual pressures which constitute the experience of all men. As He lived by

\[1\] Bruckner op. cit., p. 174.
faith in God so He calls us to do the same thing. His faith is great not because of any constitutional difference, but solely because of its unique insight into the nature of God and obedience to the divine claims. It is a faith forged in days of disappointment and darkness and death, and on at least one occasion it comes perilously close to disintegration. In the end it stands supreme and unshaken. As men meditate on the quality of that life they are led, independently of particular historical situations, to rest on the sureness of that Love which is self-authenticating in experience. The personality of Jesus, which is identical with the revelation of God, calls forth faith in us. Unfortunately, Julian's fine development of this theme is vitiated by an inadequate treatment of the human predicament. The efficacy of the prognosis depends on the accuracy of the diagnosis. Too little attention is given to the fact that we are estranged from God and this estrangement is perpetuated by our own self-will. According to the Pelagians the worse the patient the lower his chances of recovery. "Grace is grace precisely because, though wholly concerned with moral goodness, it does not at all
depend on how moral we are. Our supreme moral defect is not that we fail to follow Christ, but that we do not wish to try. It is not that we lack a good conscience but that we possess one in circumstances where penitence alone ought to be the only possible attitude. A new situation must be created within us prior to any change in outward actions. This deep intuition of a creative forgiveness is the most serious omission in Julian's system, and ultimately places the whole edifice in jeopardy. On the other hand, he would have argued that forgiveness does not rest on a depreciatory estimate of our moral worth. Forgiveness is coterminous with that moral sincerity which is evoked in the presence of Jesus Christ. Had he made this more explicit Christian people down the centuries might well have had fewer reservations about his powerful and often moving tribute to a relationship which is religious simply because it is moral, and moral because it has become religious.

We must admire that high sense of vocation, rigorous scholarship, critical acumen, and intellectual integrity which leads Julian to expose the

\[1\] J. Oman: "Grace and Personality, p. 194."
inconsistencies implicit in the orthodox doctrine of grace. The actual historical emergence of an Augustinian Church with Pelagian members witnesses to the inadequacies of both systems, but provides a field for faith and duty. If the false prophet is an echo of the spirit and indulgences of his age, and the true prophet a man who matches the moods of his contemporaries with high principles and their rationalizations with genuine insights, then the Church has yet to acknowledge its debt to Julian, Bishop of Belanum.
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