ASPECTS OF CONTROVERSIES CONCERNING THE DOCTRINE OF GRACE AROUSED BY THE TEACHINGS OF CLAUDE PAJON

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Abstract

ASPECTS OF CONTROVERSIES CONCERNING THE
DOCTRINE OF GRACE AROUSED BY THE
TEACHINGS OF CLAUDE PAJON

by John M. Pope, A.B., M. Div.

John Cameron highly influenced the development of theology at the Huguenot Academy of Saumur and left an impact on French Reformed thought that continued to the end of the Seventeenth Century. Cameron had modified orthodox Calvinism by softening some of its harsher features in order to answer its opponents more effectively. Claude Pajon was convinced that certain flaws had emerged in the way other disciples of Cameron were interpreting his theology which threatened to undermine Cameron's carefully balanced system. Cameron had introduced the concept that the will always follows the understanding and that man is converted according to his nature through persuasion and reasons without any coercion. Man was understood as possessing natural ability to choose the good; however because of his own voluntary choice, he remains in the grip of a moral inability. He also taught the controversial concept of "hypothetical universalism" or that God wills the conversion of all men and provides the Word for their redemption which is an adequate remedy for man's sinful condition. In the end, however, only those granted a particular grace are actually of the elect and converted.

Pajon vigorously opposed those who argued that there
is a need for an immediate act of grace distinct from the action of the Word before man's mind could be illuminated. To argue that grace is universal and that the Word is an adequate remedy for sin and still to insist on an immediate grace of this nature was considered by Pajon to rob the concept of universalism of any validity and to undermine the entire Cameronian apologetic. Pajon's solution was to propose a method of conversion known as mediate grace or congruism. The Spirit brings about conversion entirely by the secondary means of the Word and its attending circumstances and causes all these influences to converge in such a way and at such a time that the subject is inevitably but voluntarily persuaded and converted. It is essential to the very nature of man to be able to receive the Word of truth which brings deliverance to the soul without immediate grace. Furthermore, man's sin is of a moral nature; nothing physical is involved in it in any way. Therefore, the logical prescription should be a moral remedy for a moral malady. Pajon understood that his concept of grace represented Cameron's own position and was the most coherent interpretation of Cameronianism.
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DOCTRINE OF GRACE AROUSED BY THE
TEACHINGS OF CLAUDE PAJON

By

John M. Pope, A.B., M. Div.

Thesis
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Divinity
at the University of St. Andrews
September, 1974
I affirm that this thesis has been composed by myself, that the work of which it is a record has been done by myself, and that it has not been accepted in any previous application for a higher degree.

I was graduated from Wheaton College in 1948 with the A.B. degree and from Fuller Theological Seminary in 1951 with the M. Div. degree.
I completed six terms of research at the University of St. Andrews and was credited with three other terms that were completed at the University of Geneva.
I was admitted as a research student and candidate for the Ph.D. degree under Ordinance General No. 12 at the beginning of Candlemas term 1958.

John M. Pope

I certify that the conditions of Ordinance General No. 12 and pertinent regulations have been fulfilled by John M. Pope.
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CHAPTER I

HISTORICAL, THEOLOGICAL AND
PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND

Political Setting—Disaster
Overtakes the Huguenots

Claude Pajon was a member of a theological movement that developed at the Huguenot Academy of Saumur in France during the Seventeenth Century.¹

He was born in 1626 and died in 1685.² Some twenty-eight years before his birth, in 1598, the Edict of Nantes was signed bringing a period of peace and toleration to the French Huguenots after about thirty years of war.³ Unfortunately, this peace did not last long; other wars followed which resulted in military defeat and disaster for the Huguenots. By 1629 their military strength was broken and their strongholds were surrendered; they could no longer be considered a state within a state, but they continued to exist as a vigorous and prosperous Protestant minority in a predominantly Catholic state which still granted them limited religious and political rights.⁴ The years passed, and in 1661 Louis XIV began his personal reign of unchallenged political absolutism. Later he became convinced that it would be to the advantage of his country and regime if there were complete religious as well as political unity in France, and steps were taken by his
government to achieve this goal. At first this end was pursued in non-violent ways such as intellectual assaults on the validity of the Reformed Church and promises of monetary gain to those who would return to the Catholic fold. The Edict of Nantes remained in force theoretically but was reinterpreted to the disadvantage of the Protestants. With the passing of time the action against the Huguenots was intensified, various kinds of harassments took place, more and more their rights and privileges were curtailed until at last the Edict itself was revoked in 1685, the year of Pajon's death. Now the fury of an absolute state was unleashed against the defenseless Huguenots. Their temples were ruthlessly demolished, their schools and academies were closed, their right to worship denied, and their pastors banished. Finally the "dragonnades" were brought in and the agony of the Huguenot began in earnest with thousands, no longer able to stand this outrageous persecution and humiliation, fleeing to friendly countries. The once flourishing Reformed Church in France was ruined except for the "Church in the Desert."

Theological Background

Pajon divided the Reformed Church in France at a crucial time in its history, a time when it faced impending disaster; but he also defended it. In fact, the two major published works by Pajon were written in defense of the Reformed Church from attacks being made upon it. However, this research is not occupied primarily with the external
political and religious struggles of the Protestants with the Catholics or the government but with the internal theological controversies brought on by Pajon's doctrine of grace or more specifically his doctrine of the application of grace in the process of conversion. Therefore, it is more significant for this study to survey the pertinent theological background of the period. French Protestantism developed in a Calvinistic mold; in fact, the Gallic confession adopted by the French Reformed Church in 1559 was to a large degree the work of John Calvin who prepared the first draft. Antoine de la Roche Chandier together with the Synod in Paris in 1559 brought it to its final form.  

When the Arminian controversy rocked the Reformed Churches of Europe, the French Church was not left unscathed. Indeed, the Arminians were able to win such able men as Daniel Tilenus, a Professor of Divinity at the Huguenot Academy at Sedan, and Francis D'Or, a minister of Sedan; but the French Reformed Church acted to depose both of these men for their departure from Calvinism. No resident French theologian actually attended the Synod of Dort convened to deal with the Arminian threat to the Reformed world though Pierre Du Moulin had been delegated as the leader of the French representatives. The King, Louis XIII, apparently fearing some political danger from their attendance, forbade the French from going. However, the Reformed Church of France endorsed the decisions of the Synod of Dort at their Synod of Alais and made them binding upon the French ministers. Nevertheless, Arminian ideas
were still propagated in France: Tilenüs wrote a treatise on the origin of evil in which he attributed the orthodox Calvinists with making God the author of sin, and Episcopus, a prominent Arminian leader, visited France and attempted to strengthen the Arminian cause there.

John Cameron

Certain modifications to the orthodox Calvinism of the time were made at the Huguenot Academy of Saumur in an attempt to make it less objectionable to those who were offended by some of its harsher features and to provide an answer to those who were presenting Calvinism in an objectional way in order to undermine the Reformed Church in France and win adherents from it to the Arminians or the Catholics. The individual who exercised the leading role in originating and setting the mold for the Saumurian theology was a restless, brilliant Scot, John Cameron. Cameron began to teach at the Academy of Saumur in 1618 which, significantly, is the same year as the meeting of the Synod of Dort. He stayed at the Academy until 1620 and died in 1625.

Cameron's gives his concept of covenantal theology which is considered by some authors to be the foundation of Saumurian theology. Cameron indicated that the word covenant (foedus) may be understood in two different ways: Sometimes it is thought of as unconditional as in the case of the Noahic covenant; however the usual meaning is hypothetical by which he meant that
God makes a gracious promise that is joined to a corresponding
duty.\textsuperscript{16} He also differentiated between these types of covenants on the basis of a distinction he found in the love of God which may be thought of as "primary or antecedent and secondary or consequent." The primary or antecedent love constitutes the source of all good in the creature; whereas the secondary or consequent is that which the creature receives. The fulfillment of the foedus hypotheticum depends on the recepti on of this secondary or consequent love of God. Thus there is a covenantal relationship in this approach that causes God's action to depend on the response of man; however this response depends in the last analysis on "God's antecedent love which causes any good that may be in a man."\textsuperscript{17}

As to the "foedus hypotheticum, Cameron makes a three-fold distinction: the foedus naturae, the foedus gratiae and the foedus grattiae subserviens or foedus vetus."\textsuperscript{18} Cameron considers the two most important of the three to be the "covenant of grace and the covenant of nature."\textsuperscript{19} He distinguishes, furthermore, between these two by showing that under the covenant of nature God revealed his justice in that he gave man at creation a nature of integrity and justifiably required pure and perfect obedience. Under the covenant of grace God reveals his mercy, providing for man's redemption himself through Christ and providing the faith to believe himself.\textsuperscript{20} Cameron's intent appears to be to point out that there is a progression in the revelation of God's dealing with man and that the covenant of grace aims to stress God's mercy. Armstrong
understands Cameron here to be introducing two elements that will serve as a corrective to orthodox Calvinism—a more historical understanding of God's redemptive activity, and an elevation of God's mercy above his justice—hoping to counteract the tendency of the orthodox to give first importance to his justice. Perhaps he hoped to attempt a solution to this problem which had plagued theologians for centuries: . . . the problem of the tension of God's mercy and justice.  

As for the old covenant or the subservient covenant, it appears that Cameron introduced this idea as a corrective theology to stress the difference between "works-righteousness and faith-righteousness," a distinction he feared was being blurred by the orthodox Calvinism of the day.  

Cameron's covenantal theology served as the framework of thought that led to some very controversial ideas, of which one of the most controversial was "hypothetical universalism." Cameron attributed to God a conditional will or desire to save all on the condition of their believing and the granting to all the external means necessary for faith which would include the preaching of the gospel or the witness of works of creation. On the other hand, this universalistic tendency is revealed in the last analysis to be particularistic in that Cameron attributed to God an absolute will to give only to the elect the internal means necessary for the faith that actually saves. Cameron's structure of decrees may be enumerated as follows: 

1. A decree to restore lost humanity. 
2. A decree to send His Son to redeem all men who repent and believe. 
3. A decree to give grace which is the source of faith and repentance only to certain ones.
4. A decree to save all who believe. 

Although some have attempted to argue that these concepts are basically Arminian, it ought to be noted that the Arminians did not propose a "hypothetical universalism," but held that the grace of God was universal in the sense that the grace of God was active to such a degree that all those who received the message of the gospel externally could appropriate it by faith or reject it if they chose to do so.

Rex makes some pertinent remarks with regards to this matter:

Very often it has been stated that this liberal theology was in reality "disguised Arminianism," or represented a kind of "Arminian tendency" in Calvinism. Yet I think such an interpretation misses the true significance of this development: it would be more accurate to call it "disguised orthodoxy" or "predestination made palatable" or as the Arminians did when they rejected it, orthodox particularism "varnished over."

Furthermore, Cameron did not introduce this doctrine in isolation: it was part of an entire system of thought that was to be appropriated later by Pajon as the foundation of his distinctive doctrine and controversy. One of the most important elements of this system of doctrines that attended Cameron's concept of universalism was his concept of the relationship of the will and the understanding in the process of conversion. It is not easy to understand the distinctions that Cameron made here without being introduced to the assumptions that prevailed in the field of psychology in the Seventeenth Century. A concept of "faculty psychology" was widely accepted at that time which looked upon the "rational soul as having
two faculties, the intellect and the will," both of which were involved in the production of faith. In keeping with Aristotelian tradition, the function of the intellect was, first, to comprehend the data available and to function as though it were an intellectual eye; in the second place, it was supposed to examine and analyze the data and come to a decision as to the truth or falsehood of the matter under consideration. The basic function of the will was the single act of expressing adherence. With regards to the doctrine of conversion, the conservative Calvinist held that there was a two-fold action by which God operated directly upon both the will and the understanding. On the one hand, he acted upon the intellect to bring about a conviction of the truth; on the other hand, he acted separately and distinctly upon the will, bringing about its assent to the truth. This two-fold action was considered to be necessary because it was possible that even though the understanding was convinced of the truth, the will still might rebel against it and refuse to assent to it.27

Cameron made an adjustment to this concept of the operation of God's grace upon the faculties of the soul which might have seemed very slight; however it was to have an important impact on the development of Salmurian theology and became one of the key presuppositions of Pajon's concept of grace.28 This adjustment was concerned with the relationship of the understanding and the will during the process of conversion and established the primacy of the intellect, in that
Cameron concluded that the will always follows the last dictate of the practical understanding. Cameron's opponents argued that this idea served to modify the concept of total depravity because the will was now considered to be corrupt through the ignorance and darkness of the intellect. All that now had to be done was to illumine the intellect and the conversion of the will was automatic; thus the illumination and persuasion of the intellect were the crucial elements in the process of conversion. How this illumination and persuasion took place was to be the crucial issue in the Pajonistic controversies. Did God act immediately upon the intellect in some way to bring about its illumination by providing ideas that persuaded the intellect apart from the means of persuasion and illumination available to men in general? Did the Spirit act immediately to provide some kind of disposition for the rational soul that it would not possibly otherwise possess, consequently making it possible for the intellect to comprehend and be persuaded by the truth? Or did the Spirit serve only to marshal all the evidence and truth available in concert with all the circumstances that could affect the life of an individual to bring about the persuasion of his intellect without any immediate act on either the intellect or the will? Pajon argued at length that the latter case is true and that it was the doctrine of Cameron himself, the Scot who became the fountainhead of Salmurian theology. Cameron believed that he had developed an approach that made it possible for him to refute those who argued that
the Calvinistic approach does violence to the nature and freedom of man. God does not deal with man as if he were a stump or a stone; rather he deals with him according to his own nature. Cameron argued with an evident indebtedness to Aristotle that a thing necessarily desires its end and that the good is the end that all things desire. Mere potentiality is never set in motion by itself and the will should be included in this category; therefore the will is undetermined by its nature and does not determine itself. Thus the will must be determined by its object which is the good and it depends upon the intellect for its knowledge of the good. God thus determines the will through the intellect; but there is no coercion involved in this. The nature of the will is not violated in any way; in fact, it is preserved. It cannot be said to be moved in any physical way as one might be able to argue if he were criticizing the concept of the orthodox Calvinist who insisted on a two-fold immediate action of the Spirit on both the intellect and the will. According to Cameron, the determination of the will takes place by natural processes of an ethical and rational kind through the use of reasons and motives that cause it to choose its proper end which is the good. All this, it does freely and voluntarily according to its nature. A crucial assumption here is that one always chooses what one understands to be the good. Now Cameron had in mind lifting this to the highest personal level of good, "one's sovereign well-being." No one, in other words, would deliberately choose to destroy himself;
no one would choose such a fate for himself knowingly. It is true that some do choose wrongly but they never do this deliberately, fully cognizant of the truth of the matter. Cameron places this on the axiomatic level. It is an absurdity to think that anyone would do such a thing; it is simply not the human way. Thus Cameron was convinced he had demonstrated that the freedom of the will is not incompatible with some kinds of determinism. The will freely chooses its own well-being, yet it is determined to do so by the ethical motives and reasons that are provided through the faculty of the understanding.34

Using arguments like these, Cameron met one of the main Arminian leaders in France, Daniel Tilenus, and debated with him for five days on the subject of grace and the free will. This debate was one of the main events during Cameron's tenure at the Academy of Saumur, and a record of it was published later.35

Closely associated with Cameron's concept of universal grace and his emphasis on the primacy of the intellect in conversion is his distinction between moral and physical inability. This doctrine may be related to his doctrine of universalism in that it provides a basis for the theoretical possibility of all men being converted. Cameron taught that it was physically possible and natural for man to believe but that he did not believe because he voluntarily chose not to do so; thus his inability was moral and voluntary rather than physical, natural or involuntary. Making this distinction was
important to Cameron because, in his judgment, a pure physical inability to believe would render men excusable for their unbelief; whereas he was convinced that the distinction he made preserved the concept of inability but refuted those who argued that such a concept made God unjust in his condemnation of man and eliminated man's responsibility to believe.36

This concept of ability was to have an important place in the Pajonistic controversies because Pajon insisted on the ability of the understanding to receive the truth of the gospel without any prior immediate action of the Spirit upon man's mind or soul in order to sustain the concept that man has natural or physical ability though not moral ability. Pajon was to argue vigorously that any introduction of immediate grace into the process of conversion would make the distinction between moral and natural ability untenable.37

In his judgment, universalism demanded an epistemological method of conversion that was potentially possible to all men by the rational means of persuasion natural to all men.38

Thus when the Pajonistic controversies began, the focus of attention was fixed upon the method by which the intellect, the primary faculty in the process of conversion according to the Cameronian school of thought, was illuminated or persuaded as to the truth of the gospel. This was the crucial point since once the understanding was persuaded, all the rest followed automatically. The will by its very nature would choose what it was informed by the understanding to be the good and conversion would take place.
The problem with which Pajon struggled is not difficult to apprehend. Cameron had introduced the concept of a type of universalism which was, it is true, in the last analysis hypothetical; nevertheless, it was important enough to plunge the Reformed theologians of France and other countries into a long and sometimes bitter controversy. Cameron had enunciated this view with an epistemological base to sustain it. The doctrine that there was some kind of a genuine will in God to save all men and the claim that as to intent Christ had actually had all men in mind and died for all men on the cross, even though in the end it all resolved into a particularism, called logically for the theoretical possibility at least that all men should in some sense be able to believe. Now since this whole process depended upon the understanding, the problem resolved into sustaining a theological universalism by what one might describe as an "epistemological universalism" or be accused of radical inconsistency.

There are records that indicate that some of Cameron's enemies appear to have tried to down-grade him by describing him as a long-winded preacher. However, the results of Cameron's teaching and work certainly verify the fact that he should be considered one of the most stimulating and provocative teachers of his time. This may be supported by observing the influence of this amazing man upon his students and disciples and the remarkable success that was achieved by his teachings in France and Geneva. Indeed, his thought was one of the most influential forces in the Reformed world in the Seventeenth
Century. As for the specific Pajonistic controversy that is the major study of this research, one of Pajon's main arguments was that he is a faithful follower of Cameron; he saw his system as being founded firmly upon the teachings of the Scot, himself. In great detail and with precision revealing a broad and an intensive knowledge of Cameron's works, he attempted to refute anyone who argued otherwise.

Moïse Amyraut

Fifteen years after Cameron's appointment to the faculty of the Academy of Saumur, another notable year should be remembered, 1633, for in that year one of Cameron's students, Moïse Amyraut, was appointed to the faculty of the Academy together with Josué de la Place and Louis Cappel. Indeed it was a fortunate year for these three men through their outstanding ability and brilliance contributed in an important way to the rise of the Academy of Saumur to a place of pre-eminence among the Huguenot academies of France. In fact, its fame spread throughout the entire Reformed world, drawing students from Switzerland, Holland, Germany and England, as well as France. The first of these men, Moïse Amyraut, developed and popularized Cameron's doctrine of "hypothetical universalism" to such a degree that it has often been referred to as "Amyraldianism" after his name rather than Cameronianism. This may be attributed in part to the fact that though Cameron was an original thinker and a very influential teacher, he did not publish many books;
whereas Amyraut was a prolific writer of many published works. Furthermore, Cameron's tenure at the Academy was of short duration lasting only from 1618 to 1620 and he did not live long after that, dying in 1625 at the age of forty-five. Amyraut, on the other hand, lived a long life and his tenure at the Academy lasted until 1664, the year he died, at the age of sixty-eight, a professorial career of over thirty years. Amyraut recognized his indebtedness to Cameron and stated that he considered Cameron to be unsurpassed as an interpreter of the Bible.

In a small doctrinal work written for laymen, Amyraut sparked the great dispute concerning universal grace that was to become of major importance in France and to call forth a large amount of literature. In this volume Amyraut taught Cameron's doctrine that God had compassion on all men, desiring that they should all be saved provided they met the condition of faith, and that Christ had died for all men, not only a limited few. He wrote:

La misere des hommes estant egale et universelle, et le desir que Dieu a eu de les en delivrer par le moyen d'un si grand Redempteur procedant de la compassion qu'il a eue d'eux commes de ses creatures tombées en une si grande ruine, puis qu'ils sont ses creatures egalement, la grace de la redemption qu'il leur a offerte et procurée a deu estre egale et universelle, pourveu qu'aussi ils se trouvassent egalemen disposés à la recevoir. Et, iusques là il n'ya nulle difference entr'eux. Le redempteur a esté pris de leur race ... Le sacrifice qu'il a offert pour la propitiation de leurs offenses, a esté egalemen pour tous; et le salut qu'il a receu de son Pere pour le communiquer aux hommes en la sanctification de l'Esprit et en la glorification du corps, est destine egalemen à tous, pourveu que la disposition necessaire pour le recevoir soit
egale de mesmes ... Et partant ces paroles, Dieu veut
le salut de tous les hommes, reçoivent nécessairement
ceste limitation, pourveu qu'ils croyent.  

However there is a particular efficacious grace
granted to some and not to others which effectually brings
regenerating and saving grace to them and not to the rest.

Le severité de Dieu paroist aussi en ce conseil
en ce qu'il ne fait pas ceste grace icy universelle
comme l'autre, mais la restreint à quelques-uns et
laisse les autres à eux mesmes. Car au lieu que la
grace precedente regarde generalement tout le genre
humain, comme nous l'avons cy dessus déduit, celle
cy ne regarde qu'une partie seulement et en laisse
l'autre destituée.

Amyraut stated that his motive in developing and spreading
his doctrine of grace was to teach the Reformed doctrine of
predestination in such a way as to support the justice,
liberty and mercy of God and refute those who attempted to
make it a horrible doctrine unworthy of God and the gospel.

Amyraut followed Cameron in distinguishing natural or
physical and moral inability. If man cannot do the good or
believe in the same sense that a blind man cannot see or be-
lieve of purely physical causes, Amyraut did not consider
that God could justly condemn him. However, he taught that
man's inability is not of this physical kind; rather it ought
to be thought of as moral inability which does not depend on
a defect in his faculties, but on their abuse. This moral
inability which is brought upon men by their abuse of their
own faculties makes it impossible for them to receive the
light of the gospel and justly merits God's condemnation.
irresistible grace is compatible with human liberty. In the exercise of irresistible grace, God does not violate the laws of man's nature. Man's freedom is violated when he is constrained or coerced into doing something against his own will. Amyraut argued that man is not constrained to believe because faith is a persuasion and persuasion is not accomplished by force. In Cameronian fashion, Amyraut emphasized the importance of reason in all of this. He pointed out that it is a natural thing for man to acquiesce to the truth that is presented with clarity and certainty. The spirit of man is always moved by a consideration of the truth, the delightful and the useful. The Spirit illumines our minds to recognize Christ and his gospel by bringing it to us as a sovereign good that surpasses all others. Amyraut emphasized as Cameron did before him that men naturally and of necessity choose and desire their own sovereign well-being and thus man is irresistibly and naturally without coercion or restraint of any kind converted by the grace of God.\(^5^4\)

As it has already been noted, Pajon's controversy was to occupy itself with the manner in which this illumination took place. All men would believe according to the Cameronian concept of conversion once the mind was illuminated by the truth of the gospel, but some of the Salmurian school of theology took the position that the mind of man was so blinded by sin and corruption that there was a need for an immediate act of the Spirit upon the mind of man apart from the action of the Word before man's mind could be illuminated and
acquiesce to the truth no matter how clearly and persuasively the gospel was presented to him. Pajon recognized that Amyraut, himself, had made statements that could be interpreted as supporting this view, but he attributed this to inconsistency on Amyraut's part and his failure to grasp fully the subtlety of the issues involved.

La Planche concluded that Amyraut took the position that the human mind is totally incapable of receiving the light of the gospel. However, he noted that Amyraut also held that this ought not to be attributed to any obscurity in the word of God which possesses the evident proofs of its truth but only to the blindness of the human faculties.

Much of Amyraut's work and effort was expended in teaching, developing and defending Cameron's doctrine of "hypothetical universalism." Pajon's major effort was to promote a theology of the application of grace that rendered this "hypothetical universalism" as consistent as possible. In Pajon's judgment, to claim that man's inability was of a moral nature and then to argue that an immediate act of God was necessary to remove that moral inability undermined the concept that it was genuinely moral in nature. Holding that man was so blind that he could not possibly be illuminated by the gospel was to place his blindness on the physical level. One could be willing to grant that he was free to choose the good once he saw it to be the good, but if sin had so corrupted him that he could not possibly receive the gospel or be enlightened by it without a particularistic immediate
grace, how could grace be universal and how could man be con­sidered responsible for his unbelief?\textsuperscript{59}

Paul Testard

Another man who should be mentioned in conjunction
with Pajon's controversy is Paul Testard (1599-1650), pastor
of the Reformed Church at Blois at least from 1626.\textsuperscript{60} Testard
studied under Cameron at Saumur and was highly respected and
honored by him. Quick writes:

\textit{... and being one of his most zealous and assiduous
auditors that eminent Professor took a more particular
care of him, and honoured him with a more intimate
friendship and familiarity above any of his other
disciples.}\textsuperscript{61}

In fact, Testard, when still a student of divinity, was chosen
by Cameron to make a record of the debate that he had with
Courcelles over the question of Arminianism.\textsuperscript{62} In 1633,
Testard published a book, \textit{Irenicon seu synopsis doctrinae de
natura et gratia}, in which he followed the principles that he
had learned from Cameron.\textsuperscript{63} He gained prominence through his
arraignment together with Amyraut over the question of "hypotheti­
ical universalism" and other attending Cameronian doctrines
before the National Synod of Alençon in 1637.\textsuperscript{64} Also, Pierre
Du Moulin recognized him as a leader in the Cameronian camp by
attacking him together with Amyraut in his work \textit{Examen de la
doctrine de MM. Amyraut et Testard touchant la prédestination
in 1638}.\textsuperscript{65}

In Pajon's judgment, Testard's thought consistently
supported his concept of grace and he even translated certain
key sections from his *Irenicon* to emphasize this. It appears that Pajon thought that Testard grasped the implications of Cameron's system in greater depth than Amyraut and therefore was able to discuss the process of conversion more consistently than Amyraut.⁶⁶ Pajon married Testard's oldest daughter in 1651, the year following Testard's death,⁶⁷ and this family relationship may have contributed to Pajon's interest in Testard's writings. There is a significant statement in one of Chouet's letters to the effect that Pajon received his concept of grace from Testard; however it is the opinion of this writer that this statement should be taken with caution.⁶⁸

**Louis Tronchin**

Another theologian that figures prominently into the Pajonistic controversies is Louis Tronchin (1629-1705) who studied at Saumur and was highly influenced by its distinctive theology. He pastored at Lyon from 1654 until 1661 when he was called to Geneva as a professor of theology. By 1663 his leadership had been recognized to the extent that he was made rector of the Academy. He was a man of tolerance who zealously defended freedom of thought and was highly esteemed by his students.⁶⁹ An excellent tribute was given to him by Pierre Bayle when he made a comparison of the three professors of theology at Geneva in a letter to his father dated September 21, 1671.

Il reste maintenant à vous parler de l'académie. De trois professeurs qu'il y a en théologie, l'on peut dire que M. Mestrazat est un des plus subtils et déliés esprits; M. Turretin, un homme de grande
In time an intense controversy developed at Geneva over universal grace with François Turretin championing the cause of the older orthodoxy in opposition to Tronchin and Philippe Mestrezat (1618-1690), also a professor of theology in the Academy, who favored Cameronian theology. The quarrel reached a climax in 1669 when a young candidate for the ministry was asked never to teach any new doctrines such as universal grace or the non-imputation of Adam's sin. Tronchin and Mestrezat were aroused by the attempt of the "orthodox" party to squelch Cameronianism and came before the Little Counsel to insist that they be given authority to express freely their convictions on these matters; however Turretin was able to rally the "orthodox" party in opposition to them with the result that the Counsel ordered that all should adhere to the old doctrine of grace or face disciplinary action. Later the rejection of Salmurian theology was made part of the creed in Switzerland with the formulation and approval of the Consensus Helveticus. In this way men like Tronchin were silenced as far as the formal propagation of Cameronian theology; however this political action was unable to prevent the influence of men such as Tronchin, Mestrezat and Chouet from leaving its impact on the coming generation. In fact, Turretin's son, Alphonse, who later succeeded to the faculty of the Academy of Geneva, contributed to the overturning of
the Consensus and the granting of more academic freedom at the Academy.\textsuperscript{72}

Tronchin was embroiled in controversies concerning universal grace at the same time that Pajon was involved in his controversy.\textsuperscript{73} As far as Pajon is concerned, he was aware of the situation at Geneva and eloquently expressed his belief in liberty in the search for truth and sympathy to Tronchin.

Il est fascheux que l'on se partage comme vous m'apprenez que l'on fait sur les disputes de Theologie ou pourvue que nous tenions tous ce qui est essentiel à la foi, il serait bon de laisser à chacun sa liberté, en cherchant sur la verité sans affecter la victoire. Si l'on la cherchoit avec douceur il la trouverait bien plustost. Car la verité est amie de la paix, et elle ne se presente guere à ceux qui se passionnant pour leurs senti­ment qui declarer la guerre à tous ceux qui n'en sont pas.\textsuperscript{74}

Pajon carried on a correspondence with Tronchin from March 27, 1668 until June 19, 1680 and possibly later after having been introduced to him by Jean-Robert Chouet, Tronchin's nephew.\textsuperscript{75} This correspondence was dominated on the whole by Pajon's controversy on the operation of grace, but a series of three letters in 1669 were largely occupied with the contro­versy on universal grace. Pajon discussed various problems in these letters to help strengthen Tronchin's defense and un­derstanding of a doctrine that was of crucial importance to both of them.\textsuperscript{76}

Tronchin, on his part, was later to write a letter to Jean Claude, one of the leading churchmen in France, when Pajon was experiencing ecclesiastical action against his
position in France calling for tolerance to be exercised with regards to those who held Pajonistic convictions on the doctrine of grace.\textsuperscript{77}

**Philosophical Background and Jean-Robert Chouet**

It is not altogether certain to what degree Cartesianism influenced the development of Pajon's thought. As far as the philosophy that was taught at the Academy of Saumur, it appears that Aristotelianism dominated the field until Cartesianism was introduced to the Academy with the appointment of Jean-Robert Chouet to the chair of philosophy in 1664.\textsuperscript{78}

Some information on the possible influence of Cartesianism upon Pajon in his student days may be gleaned from a study of the relationship between the Protestant Academy of Saumur and the Catholic institution at Notre Dame des Ardilliers located not far away and established under the guidance of the Oratorians. This school gained a reputation for brilliance that rivalled or even surpassed that of the Protestant Academy. This Oratorian institution embraced Cartesianism about the middle of the century and adapted it to the prevailing Augustinian theology in such a way as to form a "result that was a curious and sometimes inspiring hybrid of Augustinian-Cartesianism which later received its greatest exposition in *La Recherche de la vérité* by Malebranche."\textsuperscript{79} A version of the *Philosophia Christiana* was published at Saumur in 1652 which constitutes the earliest
evidence of Cartesianism at Notre Dame des Ardilliers. Besides its presence at the Oratorian institution, Cartesianism found other adherents in the city in secular circles of which Louis de la Folge appears to have been the leading light. Consequently as Pajon was concluding his studies at the Academy, it was being encircled by Cartesianism. Furthermore there was an exceptionally close relationship at this time between these two outstanding institutions; in fact, Protestant teachers visited the classes of Father André Martin. Also, some of the Oratorians could frequently be found attending the defense of theses at the Academy and even entering into the discussions concerning the quality of the work. Besides this, Father Morin aided the Huguenot professor Louis Cappel in gaining the printing privilege for his Critica Sacra. In spite of this closeness between the two institutions and its faculty members, there is very little evidence of Cartesianism in the work of Huguenot Salmurian faculty. The rationalism that characterized the Protestant Academy had emerged independently of Descartes' philosophical thought and it was communicated largely in the framework of Aristotelianism. Consequently there was to be found in Saumur a curious situation in which the independent Protestant thinkers at Saumur, who were challenging the conservative Calvinists of the Reformed world with their "new and more liberal" theology, found themselves in the position of continuing to support and propagate the more traditional peripatetic philosophy; whereas the Catholics of the Oratorians, supposedly the representatives
of "tradition," were welcoming the philosophy that was to be the wave of the future. However, the barriers to the new philosophy were to fall in 1664 when a vacancy took place in philosophy and Jean-Robert Chouet was able to win the position. A number of things had been against him; he was very young, only twenty-two, a foreigner from Geneva competing with an older and more experienced Frenchman. His opponent, de Villemandy, however was an Aristotelian and Chouet was able to convince the examiners of the superiority of the "new" philosophy if they were not already persuaded of that fact. Thus Descartes supplanted Aristotle at the Academy of Saumur and the theological rationalism of the Salmurian tradition was joined by Cartesianism. However, Chouet was to remain at Saumur only until 1669 when at the urging of his uncle, Louis Tronchin, he accepted a chair of philosophy at the Academy of Geneva. Pajon received his appointment to the faculty of the Academy of Saumur in 1665, only one year after Chouet received his appointment, and during the time they served together a close relationship developed between them. Though this does not prove that Pajon was becoming an avid Cartesian, it does tend to sustain the assumption that there was a certain degree of compatibility in their thinking to support what became a warm friendship nourished by mutual respect and admiration. The one manuscript available by Pajon on Descartes' thought finds him arguing against Descartes for the primacy of the understanding rather than the will in the nature of God. Chouet wrote a letter to Pajon in response
to this treatise in defense of Descartes' position. In spite of this particular difference of opinion, it is not difficult to sense that Descartes' spirit is present in Pajon's approach to theology and philosophy. Pajon was convinced that the rational powers of the word are adequate to bring a certitude to the mind that eliminates all doubt, and he considered clear and distinct ideas to be the test of truth and reality. Though there are few direct references in the Pajonistic manuscripts to Descartes, the Cartesian spirit that insists on scrutinizing any position that is not built on solid and clear reasons and the certainty that reason can indeed find truth of an absolute nature permeates the works that Pajon has left behind.

Summary

In this introductory chapter, it has been shown that Pajon's controversies arose in a political context of impending disaster for the Huguenot religious minority in France. Pajon was deeply involved in the defense of the Huguenot cause; with a powerful and eloquent pen he fought against the encroachments on their religious rights and the intellectual assaults on the validity of their faith. Also the Huguenot faced the internal crisis that challenged his Calvinistic faith in the form of Arminianism. The Scot Cameron brought to France and Saumur a potent answer to the Arminian challenge in the form of a modified Calvinism that sought to cope with and overcome the criticisms of its opponents. Cameron's thought became so
influential that a school of theology developed at Saumur based on his teachings. Its leading light became Amyraut who defended and popularized Cameron's concept of "hypothetical universalism" and consequently plunged the French Reformed Church into a long and sometimes bitter controversy. However, in Pajon's judgment, certain flaws had emerged in the answer given by members of Cameron's school of thought that came from a failure to fully grasp the subtilty of Cameron's theology. Pajon was convinced that these flaws threatened to undermine the coherence of Cameron's carefully balanced system. Therefore Pajon threw his remarkable talents and keen intellect into a determined attempt to overcome this incoherence and inconsistency, but his answer was to raise grave questions as to his orthodoxy that would even include the charge he was introducing Pelagianism in disguised form into the very bosom of Calvinism. Descartes also appears to have had a hand in the shaping of Pajon's thought even as the young philosopher Chouet who introduced Cartesianism into the Huguenot Academies of both Saumur and Geneva won a close place in Pajon's heart.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER I


8. Gerard Brandt, "History of the Reformation and other transactions in and about the Low Countries from the beginning of the Eighth Century down to the Famous Synod of Dort, Inclusive, IV" (London, 1720), p. 73.


14Axel Hilmar Swinne, John Cameron, Philosoph und Theologe (1579-1625) (Marbourg: N. G. Elwert Verlag, 1968), pp. 27-33. He noted that this work was published in Cameron's Praelectiones ... III (Saumur, 1628), pp. 609-30, and Opera (Geneva, 1642), pp. 544-52. Swinne's work is the most thorough bibliographical study available on Cameron.

15Armstrong, op. cit., pp. 47-48. This work is a valuable addition to Salmurian studies.

16Ibid., p. 49.

17Ibid.


19Armstrong, op. cit., p. 52.

20Ibid. Cameron, Discourse, p. 358.

21Armstrong, op. cit., p. 53.

22Ibid., p. 55.

23Rex, op. cit., p. 89.

24Laplanche, op. cit., pp. 51-52. Armstrong, op. cit., pp. 56-60. Robert Wodrow, "Collections on the life of Mr. John Cameron, Minister at Bourdeaux, Professor of Divinity at Saumur, Principall of the College of Glasgow, and Professor of Divinity at Montauban," Collections upon the Lives of the Reformers and most eminent Ministers of the Church of Scotland, Vol. II, Part II (Glasgow, 1848), pp. 92-105. Though rather unsympathetic, Wodrow's work is probably the most thorough survey of Cameron's theological writings.


Ibid., pp. 91-93.

Infra, p. 159.

John Cameron, "Defensio ... opposita libello ... 'Epistola viri docti ad amicum' ...," Opera, ed. by F. Spanheim (Geneva: In Officina Jacobi Chouet, 1642), pp. 737-38.

Cameron, "Epistola viri docti ad amicum," Opera, pp. 721-22.

Infra, pp. 288-305.

"Itaque ista voluntatis humanae determinatio eius naturam non destruct, sed conservat & ornat. Neque enim physica, est à principiis physicus profecta; sed ethica, pendens à iudico & ratione: nempe, ut finis non potest non appeti (cum tam sponte & voluntariè appetatur), ita nec quae ad finem tendunt, respuit voluntas, aut potest respuerre, comprehensa semel atque agnita." Cameron, "Theses de gratia et libero arbitrio," Opera, p. 333.

Ibid., pp. 332-33. Cameron, "Praelectiones, ad Matth. Cap. XVIII, vers. 7, De necessitate scandalorum," Opera, p. 99. Pajon considered this article, pp. 96-113, to be a key section in proving the primacy of the understanding. He spent little time on the subject being convinced that Cameron had adequately established the matter. In twelve philosophical and fourteen theological arguments, Cameron here developed what is perhaps his most sophisticated case for the primacy of the understanding. He depended heavily on Aristotle in his philosophical treatment of the question.

Ibid., p. 99.2. "Defensio ... opposita libello ...," op. cit., pp. 733-791, the most detailed defense of Cameron's concept of the primacy of the understanding. Ch. XVIII, pp. 775-777, is a key section introduced as follows: "Vindicator ratio qua Camero voluntatem sequi intellectum necessario ex eo ostendit, quod alio qui fieri posset ut homo malum appeteret sub ratione mali, id quod omnino impossible est," p. 775.

Wodrow, op. cit., pp. 142-46. It was published in Cameron's Opera as "Amica collatio de gratiae et voluntatis humanae concursum vocazione ...," pp. 612-708.
"De necessitate scandalorum," Opera, pp. 97-98, in fact the whole section, pp. 96-113, deals with this matter. Pajon cited Cameron in his treatment of the problem of ability: "'Posse,' disoit Mr. Cameron, p. 146.2 [Opera], 'est naturae velle autem est gratiae.'" "De l'opération de l'Esprit de Dieu et de la conversion de l'homme," Budé Family Collection, François Turretin MSS, privately held at Geneva, p. 92; hereinafter cited as Budé MSS. "Amico collatic," Opera, p. 649.1.

Infra, pp. 238-240.

Infra, pp. 256-269.

Ibid.


Infra, pp. 288-305.


Laplanche, op. cit., p. 50.

Ibid., pp. 58, 68.

Ibid., p. 59.

Ibid., pp. 87-88.

Moïse Amyraut, Brief traité de la prédestination et de ses principales dépendances (Saumur: J. Lesnier, 1634), p. 90.
Laplanche, op. cit., p. 88.


Infra, pp. 77-79.

Infra, pp. 310-313.


Infra, pp. 256-258.

John Quick, "Pauli Testardi Icon," London, Dr. Williams Library, Icones Sacrae Gallicanae MS 37, pp. 680, 699.

Ibid., p. 689.


Laplanche, op. cit., pp. 149-64.

Pierre Du Moulin, Examen de la doctrine de MM. Amyraut et Testard touchant la prédestination (Amsterdam, 1638), passim.

Infra, pp. 313-316.
Paris, Bibliothèque d'Ar senal, MS 5633, fol. 244. Fols. 244, 244v give a chronological survey of Pajon's life, n.a. Hereinafter this library will be referred to as BA.

Infra, pp. 39, 315, 316.


Infra, pp. 43-48.


These letters are found mainly in volume 53 of the Archives Tronchin and constitute one of the most important sources of this research. The Archives Tronchin of the Société du Musée historique de la Réformation are a rich collection of manuscripts contained in 135 volumes in the Bibliothèque publique et universitaire, Geneva. Hereinafter cited as Tronchin MSS.

Pajon to Tronchin, July 1, 1669, from Orleans, Tronchin MSS 53, fols. 4-5v. Sept. 24, ibid., fols. 6-7v. Dec. 24, ibid., fols. 10-11v.

Tronchin to Claude, July 22, 1684, Tronchin MSS 57, fol. 84.

Eugène de Budé, Vie de Jean-Robert Chouet, professeur et magistrat (1643-1731) (Geneva, 1899), p. 18. Rex, op. cit., p. 120.

Rex, op. cit., pp. 121-22.
Not knowing the exact dates that he was at the Academy, it is assumed that when he was received into the Consistory of Saumur in 1650 he had recently completed his studies.


Letter, Pajon to Tronchin, Sept. 24, 1669, Tronchin MSS 53, fol. 6. Here Pajon indicated that he intended to write a treatise on universal grace and planned to dedicate it to his friend "l'aimable M. Chouet."

Claude Pajon, "Considerations sur la nature de la liberté de Dieu contre le Sentiment de M. Descartes," Tronchin MSS 53, fols. 62-64.

Chouet to Pajon, Nov. 19, 1678, Tronchin MSS 53, fols. 29-29v.

Claude Pajon, "Defence du iv article de la Confession de Foy des Eglises Reformées de France, contre les objections du Père Maimburg dans son traité de la vraye parole de Dieu," University College, Huguenot Library of the Huguenot Society of London, Charles Le Cene MSS, Vol. VI, No. 13, p. 225. Hereinafter cited as Le Cene MSS. Numerous writings and letters by Pajon and others related to his controversy are to be found in this remarkable collection. The richness of this collection makes its location a great aid to Pajonistic studies; in fact, the Le Cene Collection surpasses in value the combined Tronchin and Budé Collections on Pajon. The Le Cene manuscripts are bound in ten volumes and the manuscripts related to Pajon are found in volumes VI and VII.

Infra, p. 73.
CHAPTER II

A STUDY OF PAJON'S LIFE AND CONTROVERSIES

Since the material on Pajon's controversies makes up the major part of the information available on his life and work, his biography and the history of the controversies will be developed together.

He was born at Remorantin on February 17, 1626. He studied at the Academy of Saumur where he wrote and defended two theses, one under the supervision of Amyraut, "De necessitate baptismi," and another under Louis Cappel, "De ministerii verbi divini necessitate." Besides his studies under Amyraut and Cappel, he also studied under Josué de la Place whom he considered to be one of the finest theologians. He was received on August 25, 1650 by the Consistory of Saumur as a minister and on October 16th of the same year he was ordained. He began his ministry at the church of Marchenoir at the age of twenty-four, and shortly after that, April 23, 1651, he married Catherine Testard.

The Beginning of the Controversy and the Synod of Saumur, 1665

In 1665 he was sent as a deputy by his province of Orleans-Berry to the Synod of Anjou being held at Saumur to take part in the examination of Gaussen, a professor of
theology at the Academy of Saumur. Pajon was invited to preach before the assembly and was himself elected to the faculty of the Academy as a professor of theology. It has generally been held that the Pajonistic controversy on grace began with this sermon; however, the Chouet correspondence indicates that it began earlier. Chouet, when professor of philosophy at Saumur, carried on a correspondence with his uncle, Louis Tronchin, in which he tried to keep him informed of the progress of the controversy that revolved around Pajon. The information in these letters makes it possible to reconstruct the events of the early history of the controversy in greater detail than has been hitherto available. Chouet investigated the origin of the controversy and wrote a brief history of it for Tronchin. He stated that Pajon received the controversial idea from his father-in-law, Paul Testard, and wrote a treatise several years earlier in which he tried to sustain his idea by Scripture and natural reason and to refute any objections. Later Pajon sent this treatise to de la Fond, the pastor at Blois, and supposedly a very close friend. In spite of a promise that he would not show this work to anyone else, he wrote a refutation of Pajon's treatise, and sent it to Guiraud, the pastor at Loudun. Guiraud and his colleagues were very disturbed by de la Fond's interpretation of Pajon's ideas. All this had taken place before Pajon was sent to the Synod of Anjou and before his sermon there had ever been given.

Guiraud was also present at the Synod of Saumur as a
deputy from Loudun and he made it known that he was very unhappy with Pajon's election to the faculty of the Academy. His complaint, however, was not made to the assembly itself but to some of his friends, especially two deputies from Poitou. These gentlemen decided that the proper thing to do was to discuss the matter with Pajon himself, and after they had done this, Pajon felt that he should address the assembly on the subject in order to justify himself. He was able to do it in such a manner that the Synod was satisfied with his explanation and again confirmed and approved his nomination. It is significant that Chouet never once mentioned Pajon's sermon as a disturbing or disruptive factor at the convention. In fact, it would appear from Chouet's reaction to it in a letter to Tronchin that it exercised an important role in Pajon's receiving his appointment.

Le moine et Sauvage, qui se sont aussi faits admirer mais sur tout le premier qui veritablement est un homme extraordinaire; il nous a donné un Preche dont tout le monde est tombé d'accord qu'on n'avoir jamais rien oui de beau; Du Berri, Monsr Pajon est un homme tres sçavant ... Et comme le Synode a pris une ferme resolution de ne point se separer qu'il n'aît mis dans l'Acadmie tout en bon ordre possible, et qu'il ne l'aît mise en estat d'estre aussi florissante que jamais; il se dispose à faire un troisieme Professeur en theologie, et le crois que ce jour ne passera pas qu'il ne soit nommé, tout le monde iette les yeux sur Mons. Pajon ...

A study of the sermon reveals that one could infer from its contents that Pajon was providing a framework for his controversial idea that God never acts immediately apart from the Word in bringing about conversion, but the idea is never specifically stated in the sermon. Those who were aware of
Pajon's controversial ideas could have been disturbed by the message; on the other hand, Chouet and most of the others appear to have been captivated by Pajon's eloquence and brilliance. Indeed, his sermon incorporated Cameron's thought in a fresh and stimulating manner to deal with the problem of freedom.¹⁰

**Early Progress of the Controversy—**
**Alarm and Precaution**

After the meeting of the Synod Pajon decided to answer the treatise written in refutation of his work by de la Fond in order to completely satisfy the men from Loudun of his orthodoxy. He sent his response to Guiraud asking him to show it only to his colleagues. However, they were highly dissatisfied with this response also and began to complain vehemently that his sentiment was extremely dangerous, contrary to Scripture, to the Confession of Faith, and to the Synod of Dort; in fact they even claimed that his sentiment was the same as that of the Pelagians.¹¹

Pajon arrived at Saumur to begin teaching at the Academy on a provisional basis February 14, 1666 not yet having received permission to leave his own province.¹² A series of letters from Chouet to Tronchin during the months of April, June, September, October and December of 1666 give a running commentary on the progress of the controversy. In the April letter, Chouet praises Pajon for his qualities as a person and his ability as a teacher.

*Pour Monsr Pajon, c'est un des plus honnestes Hommes*
However he also reveals that there already was grave concern about the future because of the controversy that was raging about Pajon:

Mais il faut que je vous dite une chose qui nous fait furieusement craindre l'avenir, et que je vous prie très-humblement qui demeure entre nous; parce qu'il est de la dernière importance pour nostre Académie qu'elle demeure secrete, autant qu'il se pourra: c'est que Monsr Paion a ie ne sçay quels sentimens particuliers sur tout sur la maniérie d'agir du St Esprit dans nos cœurs en nostre conversion, qui s'étant fort loin dans la Theologie et qu'il a reçu de seu Monsr Testard qui estoit son Beau Pere: ...  

Chouet describes his understanding of the point at issue and the method by which Pajon had been trying to promote his convictions as follows:

Ce que ie vous en puis dire presentement c'est qu'il croit que le St Esprit n'agit du tout point immédiatement en nous, comme nos Theologiens voulent, mais qu'il agit seulement par Parole: il pretend de prouver son opinion et par l'Escriture et par la Raison, et par l'Authorité du Synode de Dordrecht, et de quelques uns de nos Docteurs, particulièrement de Monsr Cameron: il a fait divers manuscripts là dessus, qu'il m'a fait lire. 

It should be noted that this letter (the earliest available to this research) was written only seven weeks after Pajon took up his teaching duties at the Academy. Chouet already recognized that Pajon was emphasizing that his doctrine was based on Cameron and Testard's theology. The letter containing the early history of the controversy written six months later
mentioned that Pajon had received his controversial ideas from Testard.\footnote{16} Here in this earliest letter the same comment was also made. Should it be concluded then that Testard was the founder of Pajonism? It is a difficult question to answer, but an attempt will be made later in the discussion.\footnote{17}

At the next meeting of the Synod of Anjou held in May 1666 at St. Aignan, a deputy was sent from the church of Loudun with extracts from the writings of Pajon which appeared to be unorthodox. However, the church of Loudun had left it up to the discretion of the deputy as to the kind of action he should take in this matter. He discussed the problem with the deputies of Saumur and a few other pastors and it was their decision that the problem should not be placed before the Synod if some other means could be found to satisfactorily resolve it. It was decided by these men that an attempt should be made to settle the matter privately; consequently, Pajon was approached about it and a number of precautionary measures were agreed upon. Pajon was to hide his controversial writings so that no one would be able to see them, and he was not to speak about his controversial ideas either in public or in private. Besides this, he was to avoid discussing any proposition that was not commonly received among their theologians. Furthermore, he was to sign all the articles of the Confession of Faith, the articles of the Synod of Dort, and the Discipline, article by article.\footnote{18} Pajon agreed to do all these things; however, Chouet, apprehensive of the situation, confidentially advised Tronchin
that it was greatly to be feared that

ce ne soit un peu de cendres jetées sur un grand
feu: car il y a de l'apparence, que les Synodes de
Poitou et de Saintonge, qui doivent se tenir bien
tost, ne laisseront pas la chose là, mais qu'ils
feront quelque opposition, parce que cette opinion
fait grand bruit dans ces Provinces.  

As for the church of Loudun, those aware of the prob-
lem there were dissatisfied with the action of their deputy
at the meeting of the Synod of Anjou at St. Aignan and they
were unwilling to drop the matter. Consequently, they sent
extracts from writings of Pajon concerning his controversial
ideas to a pastor of the province of Poitou. This man brought
the matter before the meeting of his Synod (as was feared by
Chouet) and it acted to appoint four commissioners to study
any of Pajon's writings available. If they concluded that it
was necessary, they were authorized to oppose Pajon's appoint-
ment to the faculty before the academic council. Also the
Synod of Brittany acted on the matter having received an ex-
tract of various propositions taken from Pajon's writings.
A letter had been received from this Synod of a very sharp
nature. They called upon the Academy to obtain from Pajon
the manuscripts from which the extracts which they had seen
had been taken, to examine them themselves and then to send
them to three of their pastors whom they had appointed for
this purpose: Guitton, de la Roche, and de Brais. If these
men found that Pajon's manuscripts matched the extracts that
they had seen, they would be opposed to Pajon's appointment
to the faculty. On the other hand, should the Academy refuse
to comply with their demands for the manuscripts or should Pajon refuse to surrender them, they would have nothing more to do with the Academy. They would refuse to send them any more students from their province; they would refuse to send them any more contributions; in fact, they would not send them the funds that their Synod had agreed upon for that year until they were satisfied.²⁰

The academic council decided in view of the sharp letter from the Synod of Brittany and many other letters, especially from churches in the province of Anjou which voiced opposition to Pajon's appointment, to hand over the whole matter to the synod which was to meet in May 1667. In the meantime Pajon was allowed to continue his lectures, but various precautionary measures were taken. Pajon was made to sign the Confession of Faith, the Catechism, and the Synod of Dort, article by article. He was called upon to promise that he would not teach anything that could be construed to be either directly or indirectly contrary to the teaching of their doctors, that he would not speak in any manner different than commonly practiced by their theologians, and that he would not introduce anything new. Furthermore, there was always to be someone from the academic council present at his lectures and discussions to guarantee that he would not violate any of these agreements.²¹

By this time Chouet was well informed of the controversy, having read various manuscripts concerning the matter. Though an admirer of Pajon, he did not appear willing to
accept Pajon's ideas, at least at that time. Chouet had become aware of the subtilty of the controversy and wrote to Tronchin:

Je vous envoye quelques propositions touchant sa doctrine, telles qu'il les a fait voir au Conseil Académique, et qu'il les a envoyées en divers endroits du Royaume. Mais quoi qu'elles semblent fort expresses, et contenir justement ce qu'on croit communément; cependant elles sont couchées de telle manière, que ceux qui entendent son sentiment, voyent bien qu'il les peut défendre ainsi en general sans abandonner son opinion, dont je pense vous avoir entretenu.\textsuperscript{22}

The Synod of Pruilly, 1667--

Accusation and Acquittal

The academic council, being under considerable pressure, urged that the next synod be held as soon as possible at Saumur;\textsuperscript{23} however, the place chosen was Pruilly on July 14, 1667. Consequently the Synods of Anjou, Touraine and Mayne convened there on that date. Pajon's opponents sent their representatives to oppose his appointment to the faculty and accuse him of heretical views. They were the pastors de Chauffepié from the church of Chadeniers and Charles from the church of Chastelleraut, appointed by the commissioners chosen by the Synod of Poitou to examine the manuscripts written by Pajon. Another opponent was de Brais, pastor of the church of Viellevigne, chosen as a delegate by the commissioners of the Synod of Brittany appointed earlier by this Synod in order to examine Pajon's manuscripts. Though some remarks were made with regards to the irregularity of such a procedure, these men were admitted to the conference as deputies of the
commissioners of these Synods with the right to actively take a part in the deliberations of the conference.  

D'Huisseau as a representative of the academic council, presented Pajon in accordance with the order of the previous meeting of the Synod. He also advised the conference of the actions of the academic council because of the letters and delegations concerned with Pajon's doctrine and its decision that the matter should be given over to the next meeting of the Synod. After that, Chauffepié, Charles and de Brais made statements of opposition in the name of their respective provinces to the confirmation of Pajon's appointment as professor of theology in the Academy of Saumur because of his doctrinal beliefs on matters of great importance which they considered to be "dangereux et contraires a la doctrine des églises reformées." Having made their accusation, they were given opportunity to present their case against Pajon. Pajon defended his views before the Synod though the delegates sent to accuse him stated they had not come to the conference to debate the matter with him but

pour l'accuser d'avoir enseigner une tres mauvaise doctrine en certains manuscripts qu'il a composez et qui ont esté envoyez en divers lieux dont quelques uns estoyent tombez entre leurs mains, et demandé qu'ils eust a les representer afin qu'ils fussent examinez.

The Synod called on Pajon to do this and he was willing to comply, placing before them three different manuscripts: one in Latin by himself, a writing by de la Fond against this manuscript, and a French treatise addressed to Guiraud. The
deputies opposed to Pajon called for the documents to be read in their entirety before the Synod; however the Synod in order to save time decided to have Lespinieres and Guiraud make extracts of the main propositions which they considered to be dangerous from which the Synod would be able to make a judgment with regards to the accusations against Pajon. This being done, the extracts were divided into forty-six articles. After that they were organized into four main divisions with the following headings:

1. de la grace de Dieu qui fleshit le coeur, et de la maniere dont le St. Esprit agit dans la conversion de l'homme.
2. de la nature de la foy si c'est une habitude infuse ou bien aquise.
3. la puissance ou de l'impuissance de l'homme pour les choses qui concernent le salut.
4. du peche originel.²⁷

At this point, Pajon's opponents called for the articles to be presented before the body and a judgment be made on them without any further discussion of the issues by Pajon on the grounds that adequate explanations had already been made by him on the subject. However, the Synod decided that Pajon should be questioned on each of the articles in order to know if they were really his opinions, and also to permit him to make brief explanations if he wished to do so. Pajon did make brief explanations on the articles and also prepared written explanations on each of them.²⁸ After each
of the articles had been considered, the Synod decided that the accusations that had been made against Pajon were invalid and its conclusion was:

*il n'y avoit rien de contraire a la doctrine des eglises de nostre communion, contenues dans nostre confession de foy, dans nos prières publiques, dans nostre catéchisme, dans toute nostre liturgie et dans les décisions du synode de Dordrecht: quoy que lesd. Sr Pajon ait esprimé dans ces escrits des sentimens curieux sur la maniéré dont les St Esprit agit en nous pour nous convertir, et sur celles dont le péché passe des peres aux enfans, se servant de plusiers expressions rudes et different de celles qu'un employe communement pour expliquer cette doctrine. Ce qui neamoins aprés un diligent examen, et les exposition du d. Sr Pajon, a paru innocent et supportable.*

The Synod also concluded that there had not been sufficient grounds established by the representatives and commissioners of the Synods of the provinces of Poitou and Brittany to prevent the confirmation of Pajon at the Academy of Saumur; therefore he was returned to continue as a professor of theology. Finally, he was to prepare for his examination at the next synod on the common subject "De Gratia et libero arbitrio."

Up to this point in the minutes of the Synod, Pajon had been cleared of all charges against him; however the Synod also felt some comments should be made to alleviate the controversy over these matters:

*Néanmoins parce que ses expressions ne sont pas ordinaires, et qu'il ya plusiers qui s'en offensent, il luy a esté expressement défendu de se servir de celles qui ont esté remarquées dans les extraits de ses escrits. Ce qu'il a promis.*

The opposition, however, was very unhappy with this decision.
Chauffepié, Charles, and de Brais said that they were going to appeal this decision and they were joined in this by the deputy from Poitou, de la Sauragerie and the deputies from the church of Loudun. First, they declared that they were going to resubmit their complaint against Pajon at another provincial synod and if they did not receive satisfaction on the provincial level they would appeal to the next meeting of the national synod.

There is a manuscript which appears to have been composed by Pajon among the Tronchin papers in which the controversy over these matters at the meeting of the Synod was thoroughly discussed in twenty-four points. Thus the Synod directly controlling the affairs of the Academy of Saumur refused to remove a brilliant professor at the beginning of his career even though there was much dissatisfaction over his doctrine of grace. It was a victory for Pajon and is in keeping with the tradition of tolerance on the part of this Synod for new, stimulating and controversial ideas arising from the Academy. Pajon's personal eloquence and sweet spirit as well as his popularity with the students no doubt were also factors. Besides, the leadership of the Synod appears to have been in sympathetic hands, and d'Huisseau, representative of the academic council, appears to have been a strong advocate of tolerance and a good friend of Pajon. It is significant also that d'Huisseau was pastor of the important church at Saumur and rector of the Academy, both important and influential positions.
In spite of this victory one can understand why when Pajon received a call to the prominent church at Orleans on August 26, 1667 he accepted, beginning his ministry there the 2nd of October of the same year. It would appear that he decided it would be better for him to accept this fine ministerial opportunity and withdraw from the Academy voluntarily rather than continue in the face of the strong opposition that promised a stormy and uncertain future for him there. At Orleans he succeeded Perreaux, whose daughter, Esther, he married on November 6, 1670,33 his first wife, Catherine, having died in 1660.34

The d'Huisseau Affair

In 1670 a controversy arose over the book La réunion du christianisme ou la manière de rejoindre tous les chrétiens sous une seule confession de foi which as the title indicates attempted to spell out a formula by which Christian unity and tolerance could be attained. The supposed author, Isaac d'Huisseau, was defrocked because, though he would not admit authorship of the book, he would not denounce it. The book itself was proscribed by the Synod of Anjou. The first connection that may be noted with regards to Pajon and this affair is his relationship to d'Huisseau. D'Huisseau's son, in a letter to Elie Benoist, the historian of the Revocation,35 confirmed that d'Huisseau had been sympathetic towards Pajon and had worked to prevent any condemnatory action against him.

Arrive l'affaire d Mr Pajon touchant la manière de l'opération du St Espirit dans la conversion de
l'homme. Comme notre author [d'Huisseau] jugea la question un peu trop métaphysique pour être un fondement légitime de division parmi nous et de la condamnation d'un homme qui avoit de très beaux talents, il employa son crédit et ses raisons pour empêcher cette condamnation.®®

From these statements, one sees that Pajon had already profited from d'Huisseau's spirit of tolerance; in fact, d'Huisseau's son suggested that the support that his father had given Pajon on this occasion had contributed materially to the severe action that was taken against him later because it caused him to lose what friends he still had in the province.®

The next item to be considered is the part that Pajon had in the writing of La réunion. In his day Chauffepié noted that there was an element of obscurity in these matters.®® As far as the obscure points that remain on the subject, one of the most important is concerned with d'Huisseau and Pajon.®® D'Huisseau's son indicated in his letter to Benoist that his father—and his father alone—was the author of La réunion in opposition to the suggestion that the work was beyond his father's ability as a writer and called for the support of some other more able man than himself.®®

D'Huisseau's son admitted that his father sent the manuscript of the work to six men including Pajon. Three of these, Du Soul, de Villemandy, and Cappel, are said to have given the book a rather lukewarm approval which they retracted when they saw that the Synod was moving against it. Of these six men, he mentioned Le Fèvre and Crespin as being the men
responsible for the actual publication of the book without
the approval of his father. His father had always insisted
that he had asked Le Fèvre not to have the book published
until it had been sent to the leading ministers of the
provinces and had their approval.41 D'Huisseau's son admitted
Pajon did not condemn the book but, in fact, wrote to his
friends at the Synod that was acting on the question to get
them to prevent the condemnation of d'Huisseau. However, he
attributed this action on Pajon's part to an act of gratitude
for the support d'Huisseau had given him earlier when he was
himself under attack. He further qualified Pajon's support
by concluding that Pajon "n'étoit point entesté de la réunion,
mais seulement de la grâce médiate dont il parloit à tout le
monde. Et Mr. D'Huisseau de son costé n'avoit dans l'esprit
que la réunion, et point du tout la grâce médiate."

However, is this assessment of Pajon's attitude on
the part of d'Huisseau's son accurate? Was Pajon only in-
terested in mediate grace and not in réunion or tolerance?
Another party may be introduced to help resolve this question,
and it is none other than Pierre Jurieu whose work against
La réunion was to mark the beginning of his career as a
champion of orthodoxy which was to characterize his life.
In this role he was later to become the major literary op-
ponent of Pajonism.42 The relationship between Jurieu and
Pajon was an unusual one. There was a warm personal friend-
ship on the one hand, and on the other, there was a sharp
difference of opinion on matters of doctrine and tolerance.
Two passages from the writings of Jurieu throw some light on Pajon's relationship to La réunion. He wrote, first, in his Apologie ... adressée aux pasteurs et conduiteurs des Églises wallonnes des Pays-Bas (La Haye, 1691) concerning Pajon's attitude towards what he alluded to as the doctrinal corruption of French Protestantism on the eve of the Revocation:

Le première étincelle de ce feu qui parut fut le livre intitulé De la réunion ... C'était l'indifférence des religions toute pure, mais couverte et déguisée, de sorte que tout le monde ne la voyoit pas. J'avoirs dans mon voisinage seu Mr. Pajon qui la voyoit bien et qui faisoit de ce livre ses delices. En effet, il étoit à Saumur quand il y fut composé et il n'y a nul lieu de douter que l'ouvrage ne se fût fait de concert avec luy. Il étoit mon voisin et fort mon ami. Mais je ne pus porter ma complaisance jusqu'à tolérer ses sentiments. Nous eusmes là-dessus des disputes fort échauffées, et comme si Dieu m'eût appelé dès lors à combattre ce monstre de l'indifférence des religions, je pris d'écrire contre ce livre, et je composay le premier de tous mes ouvrages intitulé Examen du livre de la réunion ... *

He indicated that Pajon was very pleased with La réunion, that he was at Saumur when it was written and he had no doubts but that Pajon had a hand in the writing of the book. He also indicated that he had some heated debates with Pajon on the subject.

Another statement by Jurieu is taken from a letter written to Isaac Papin, Pajon's nephew, after Pajon's death in which Jurieu expressed himself in a similar manner on Pajon's attitude toward tolerance and La réunion:

Je l'ay toujours estimé les qualités morales et intellectuelles. Je ne doute point du tout, qu'il ne soit mort d'une manière très-édifiante, et qu'il ne soit à présent avec Dieu. Mais je suis bien
persuadé qu'il s'estoit malheureusement laissé entester de deux opinions très dangereuses, la première de nier l'opération du St. Esprit dans l'homme, l'autre de la Tolerance universelle de toutes les heresies, sans en excepter le Socinianisme; principe sur lequel a esté basty le livre sur lequel Mr. d'Huisseau fut déposé et dont je scay qu'il a eu communication. Ce n'est pas de quoy je puisse douter, après ce qui s'est passé entre luy et moy, et dont il n'est pas besoin que je rende compte à personne, comme aussy je ne l'ay jamais fait.

One would think that the personal knowledge which Jurieu displayed as to Pajon's attitude deserves greater weight than the assumption d'Huisseau's son made as to Pajon's disinterest in La réunion.

Before proceeding further, it will be advantageous to give a summation of the book itself. In the first chapter, the sad state of a miserably divided Christianity is lamented:

N'est-ce pas une chose bien triste, & d'un fâcheux exemple, de voir les Chrestiens si miseremlement divisés qu'ils sont aujourd'huy? ... Il n'y a point d'ame vrayement Chrétienne, qui ne pleure en voyant les effets des aversions & des haines implacables qui sont entre ceux qu'elle regarde commes ses freres ...

The book is divided into three general parts: The first deals with the effects of this division, the second treats the causes of the division, and the third proposes methods by which this division may be resolved. The main effects introduced in the first section are: First, that it causes a turmoil of the spirit and troubles the conscience; second, it undermines the pursuit of sanctification and especially the practice of love among Christians; third, this division contributes and encourages irreligion and atheism; fourth,
it repels those who are outside of the Christian fold and
causes them to be disgusted with the Christian religion;\(^5\)
and fifth, it causes trouble in the Church and in the
State.\(^5\) In the second part, the book deals with the causes
of these divisions: In the first chapter of the section it
points out that the condition of the spirits of men vitiated
by vanity and pride contributes greatly to this evil condi-
tion.\(^5\) Secondly, it notes that there has never been an
adequate distinction made between the essential and funda-
mental and the unessential and non-fundamental in Chris-
tianity.\(^5\) Thirdly, there has been a departure from the basics
of Christian doctrine and a movement toward other less basic
matters that has contributed to the divisiveness.\(^5\) Fourth,
there has been a distaste for the simplicity of the Christian
Religion that has caused men to develop it in such a way that
has moved away from the things that were given in the begin-
n ing.\(^5\) Fifth, there has been a tendency to make religion
serve special interests and to use it for temporal advan-
tages.\(^5\)

In the third part of the work, which is also the
most interesting, the question on methods of bringing about
a remedy to this sorry division is considered. The first
method proposed is that one divest himself of all prejudice
and all self-interest and devote himself solely to the glory
of God and the salvation of souls.\(^5\) This method is related
to Cartesianism in a very clear way reflecting the important
influence of this philosophy in the writing of the book.
The author noted that a new method of reasoning has been proposed in philosophy in order to more adequately find the truth. This philosophical method calls on one to divest himself entirely of all preconceived notions and to receive first of all only the most simple truths that would not be challenged by any rational individual. It is suggested that this would be a very profitable method to employ in the field of religion. Why not set aside all those concepts that one has defended formerly with so much zeal in order to objectively examine them according to the commonly held principle which is Scripture?\(^5\)

The author states that in calling on men to divest themselves of their prejudices he does not wish it to be thought that he is pressing for a state of indifference or indeterminism in religious matters. What he wishes to do is to cause one to question all concepts that are inadequately grounded and to find one that is firm, solid and universally received. This brings one to the sacred Word of God which is accepted as "une lumiere connue et approuve generalment de tous les Chrestiens ... donnee exprés pour estre la regle, & de nostre Foy, & de toutes nos actions en ce qui concerne son service." The essence of the second method of achieving reunion is that it should be based on the known and generally approved light of Scripture and on it alone:\(^6\)

Il est donc absolument necessaire, pour establier une bonne paix dans l'Eglise, de mettre à part tout ce que les hommes ont apporté du leur, & de ne prester l'oreille qu'à Dieu seul parlant en sa parole.\(^6\)
In the third and fourth methods of reunion, the author stresses that there must be a distinction made between those things that involve saving faith and less important things. The question, of course, may be proposed as to just what these crucial and important points are, and the author answers that everything clearly presented in the Word and generally received by Christians should be thought of as a fundamental point of Christianity. On the other hand, with regards to those doctrines that are not this clearly revealed and that bring about differences of opinions on the part of various theologians, all should have the liberty to freely examine these diverse opinions and to accept that which they consider to most fully conform to the true faith.

The author gives what he considers should be included in the first group of fundamental beliefs that all should be willing to receive:

Il est certain que ce sont icy des doctrines fondamentales dans le Christianisme. QU'IL Y A UN DIEU. Qu'il a envoyé son Fils unique au monde, afin que quiconque croit en luy, ait la vie éternelle. Que Iesus-Christ est mort pour nos pechés, & ressuscité pour nostre justification: Qu'il viendra en sa gloire, pour juger les vivans & les morts; & telles autres vérités, que tour les Christiens admettent, comme estant tres-distinctement enseignées en l'Escriture Saincte...

However as far as other controversial doctrines that are not clearly revealed in the Word of God, they should not be considered as being in this class. He has in mind:

... ces doctrines, qui établissent l'ordre des decrets éternels de Dieu: qui disent precisement quel est l'objet de la predestination: qui exposerent comment les deux natures sont unies en la personne
In view of the fact that Pajon's own doctrinal position as to the method by which the Holy Spirit works in the hearts of men was arousing broad opposition, it was to his advantage to have a spirit of tolerance pervade the church with regards to such controversial doctrinal matters; consequently one can readily see how he would find his "delices," as Jurieu described it, in this book. Furthermore, in Pajon's judgment, immediate grace was a confused idea that did not have clear support from Scripture while he was convinced that his view was much more consistent and in harmony with Scripture and the biblically based Cameronian theology. Pajon, even if he had no part in the writing of this book, would approve this call for uniting around those doctrines clearly revealed in the Word and divesting oneself of all preconceived notions in order to calmly and objectively examine one's doctrine according to clear and distinct teachings of the Word. His eloquent and memorable words to Tronchin bear repeating in this context for they seem to strike at the very heart of the message of *La réunion*:

*Il est fascheux que l'on se partage comme vous m'apprenez que l'on fait sur les disputes de Théologie ou pourvue que nous tenions tour ce qui est essentiel à la foi, il seroit bon de laisser à chacun sa liberté, en cherchant sur la vérité sans affecter la victoire ... Car la vérité est amie de la paix ...*  

In a pertinent letter by Mademoiselle de Royere to
Madame Rouph, her sister, Pajon's treatment of the question of authority and freedom of conscience is given and his conclusion on this matter is relevant to the present discussion.

When faced with the question of a final, sovereign authority in controversial matters, Pajon refused to acknowledge any. To the response that one would have thought that he would have named Scripture or the Church, he answered that neither of these should be thought as being sovereign in these matters. Scripture is the sovereign rule and law by which one ought to judge but it is not itself the judge. Also the Church may be thought of as a judge but not as being sovereign. The Church is the judge of controversies in a sense but not in the sense of imposing on everyone the obligation of making the very same judgment; rather, her judgment is one of discernment by which the pastors who are assembled make a declaration of their opinion with regards to some particular matter. However, no one should follow their judgment unless he personally finds it to be in conformity with the truth.

One may answer "mais de cette maniere chaque particulier sera juge souverain des controverses meme au-dessus de l'Eglise car quand l'Eglise aura jugé, chaque particulier examinera le jugement de l'Eglise, le condamnera si elle n'a pas jugé selon son sens et lui, il s'en tiendra à son propre jument?"

Pajon could not agree more: "Il n'y a point de doute que dans choses qui regard la conscience, chaque particulier est juge souverain pour soi-même; parce que la conscience dépend immédiatement de Dieu." Clearly and without hesitation
Pajon emphasized the crucial concept that each man has the right to interpret Scripture according to the dictates of his own conscience. This deep respect for the individual conscience certainly would tend to support a position of toleration in controversial doctrinal matters.\(^6\)\(^7\)

Though one cannot with the evidence in hand at this distance from the actual events fully determine the exact role that Pajon exercised either in the writing of *La réunion* or in the evaluation and criticism of the rough draft of the work; still, with the records available from Jurieu, the specific statements in favor of tolerance and freedom in the discussion of controversial doctrinal matters by Pajon himself, from a study of the contents of the book itself, from the similarity of the book *La foi réduite* ... by Pajon's protege and disciple Papin and the obvious advantages that would have accrued to Pajon if the spirit of *La réunion* would have been accepted, one can certainly discount the claim of d'Huisseau's son that Pajon was not really interested in *La réunion*. There are also good grounds for holding that he had some part in constructively and sympathetically criticizing the book if he did not actually make any contribution to its actual writing. D'Huisseau's son admitted that Pajon saw the manuscript before its publication and volunteered the information that he wrote to his friends to work against d'Huisseau's condemnation. Furthermore, Pajon may have contributed to the literature defending *La réunion*. This was a time when Pajon was in his prime as is evidenced by his
powerful polemical masterpiece published in 1673 only several years after the publication of La réunion and the condemnation of d'Huisseau. It is hard to imagine that a man with all that energy, ability, courage and loyalty to causes he believed in would not act in a time of challenge.

A Defense of the Reformed Faith

Pajon published his two-volume masterpiece, Examen du livre qui porte pour titre, Préjuges légitimes contre les Calvinistes, in answer to a book by Pierre Nicole attacking the Huguenots. This book was very well received by leading members of the Reformed Church. One of the finest tributes was made by the famous author and philosopher Pierre Bayle who wrote:

Le Réponse qui fit cet Auteur au Livre des Préjuges, il y a plus de dix ans, l'a rendu tout-à-fait célébre. Il y témoigna une grande netteté d'esprit, et une adresse merveilleuse à servir de toutes les armes de la Logique, soit pour démêler le foible d'un faux raisonnement, soit pour bien fortifier une preuve.

Chauffepié also commended the book highly:

Cet ouvrage a été universellement estimée l'est encore aujourd'hui surtout pour la force de raisonnement qui y règne; c'est un des livres qui sont marqués au coin d'immortalité.

Jacques Saurin matched these commendations with the words, "Jamais cause n'a été mieux défendue que le nôtre l'a été par M. Pajon."

Nicole's main aim in this book in Pajon's opinion is to cause the Huguenots to submit themselves blindly to the authority of the Catholic Church, arguing that the method
that the Calvinists proposed, the way of examination, "est une voye impossible, et ridicule. De sorte qu'il ne reste plus, ... pour s'assurer de la vérité que de s'en rapporter à l'autorité de l'Eglise qu'il prétendent être infaillible." Pajon inquires whether one is called on to accept the concept of the infallibility of the Church without prior examination and proof or if one is permitted to examine and evaluate the claim before accepting it. If they say that it should be accepted without any examination, they are taking an unreasonable position for that would be the same as saying "qu'il la faut croire sans raison; ce qui seroit fort contraire à la raison." On the other hand, if they allow that it be examined before acceptance, they have permitted an exception to their thesis that men are not capable of examining any controversy of a particular nature for the idea of the infallibility of the Church is such a particular controversy. Pajon insists that Nicole cannot, if he wishes to consistently hold to his major thesis and dispense with all examination as an unfruitful method, establish any grounds at all for accepting his position on the authority of the Church. "De sorte que nous sommes néessairiment réduits par ces raisons-lâ, ou à la croire sans fondement, & sans preuve: ce qui renverse la raison. Car il est contre la raison de croire une chose sans raison." Nicole is also understood to rule out Scripture as a means by which one could support his appeal to authority as the only adequate method of finding religious truth. "Mais
d'un autre costé ces Messieurs nous enseignent, dans leur chapitre 14 que l'usage de cette Ecriture, pour instruire les hommes de la vérité est impossible, & ridicule à proposer."

Pajon concludes concerning this reasoning that the Jansenist's appeal to skepticism concerning man's capability of adequately examining the evidence and thereby being brought to a persuasion of the truth undermines their own faith for it eliminates their having any assurance of the validity of their cardinal doctrine, the infallibility of the Church. Thus in the end it must be considered "comme étant fondé sur rien." 

He sums up the predicament in which Nicole finds himself as contradictory, self-defeating and undermining all religious faith. First, he has impugned man's rational capability to establish by his personal examination what the truth is. Secondly, he cannot escape his predicament by appealing to infallible authority in that he has undermined man's ability to place confidence in any such authority on a rational basis. Thirdly, he has also rejected the use of Scripture as a way to instruct men concerning the truth. In Pajon's words:

"Ce n'est pas-là seulement un renversement de leur dessein, qui est tout fondé sur cette infaillibilité de l'Eglise, c'est un renversement total de tous les dogmes de la foy, & de toute la Religion. Car en nous tenant aux principes de ces Messieurs, nous ne saurions plus être assurés de la vérité ni par la voye de l'examen, puis que nous n'en sommes pas capables; par celle de l'autorité, puis-que nous ne-saurions être certains qu'il y ait
Furthermore, it is argued that Nicole refutes himself by the very writing of his book. If one is to take him seriously in his downgrading the way of reason, he eliminates any value that might come from the study of the very book that he has written. How can one have any assurance that he is reasoning well if his basic premise is true? In addition, Pajon points to the contradiction to be found between the book written by Nicole and Arnauld on logic and the major premise of the book being examined. There they recognize the importance of reason, stating:

que les Maximes & les Axiomes de la raison sont le fondement de la foi. Comme en effet, si on nous avoit ôté ces premières lumières de la Raison, la Foy ne trouveroit plus où se prendre, et elle n’auroit plus aucun fondement solide en nos ames, sur quoy elle se pus appuyer.

As far as Pajon's controversy concerning immediate grace, though this book was not dealing directly with it, the book may be thought of as strengthening Pajon's position in the Reformed Church by bringing him a degree of prestige and celebrity that would cause his opinions to carry more weight in other areas of thought. Pajon's masterful refutation of Nicole’s book now brought him recognition as one of the best apologists and thinkers in the Reformed Church, a theologian to be respected. Consequently his views concerning the application of the doctrine of grace in conversion also gained
in importance because they were the views of a thinker who had left his mark with distinction in defense of the Reformed faith.

**Conferences with Claude--1676**

A crucial event in the history of Pajonism was the series of conferences that were held in 1676 between Pajon and Jean Claude, one of the leading ministers of the Reformed Church in France and pastor of the great Charenton Church of Paris. Paul Lenfant and Pajon learned that a group of students had attacked them in a harsh manner, labeling them as being Pelagian, Arminian and even Socinians and claiming that action was soon to be taken against their doctrines in various places in writing and officially in the Synods. Lenfant and Pajon considered this an outrage that could not be overlooked and decided to seek satisfaction. Consequently, they decided that the most prudent policy would be to make their complaint to Claude and ask him for a redress of their grievance. On July 16th, they met with Claude at his home for the first of three conferences; the other two were held on July 22 and July 29th. He indicated that he was not surprised to hear of the incident because he had heard similar accusations against them from other quarters and produced a letter from de Brais to that effect.

The discussion that followed at first appeared to result in agreement on an eight-point statement by Pajon which generally expresses the Cameronian theology. The first three
points deal with depravity, indicating that men are all born sinners and are corrupt from the very womb of their mothers. This corruption increases more and more by habitual sinning unless it is checked by the power of the Spirit. Furthermore, this corruption is so pervasive that it is impossible for a man to be converted without efficacious grace that produces in him the "vouloire et le parfaire."

The fourth point deals with the efficaciousness and irresistibility of grace. It stresses that that grace does not depend on man's determination but is efficacious by itself "de sorte que la grace étant poseé de la maniere qu'elle l'est en ceux qui se convertissent, il est impossible qu'ils ne soient conversis."

The fifth point indicates that this grace is not to be considered only an external light but it is an internal light that penetrates the understanding and necessarily fills it with the knowledge of the true good. Through this knowledge it draws the will, separates it from the love of the things of this world, and brings it to the love of God. In this point Pajon reveals clearly the Cameronian framework of his thought with regards to the relationship of the will and the understanding as well as stressing that he does not hold that grace operates merely in an external manner.

In the sixth point, Pajon introduces the Cameronian concept of the harmony of irresistibility with freedom and voluntariness.

Que quoique cette grace soit insurmontable, et que
l'homme ne puisse absolument y resister pour en empescher l'effet; Néanmoins la conversion qu'elle opere en nous ne laisse pas d'estre un mouvement tres libre de la volonté parce que la volonté n'est tiré à J. C. et n'est necessité a suivre les preceptes de son Evangile que par la connoissance que cette grace insurmontable nous donne; que c'est nostre souverain bien que de suivre l'Evangile de J. C. Ainsi l'homme pourroit y resister s'il vouloit, mais il est impossible quand cette grace efficace est poseé, qu'il ait la volonté d'y resister.

In the two concluding points Pajon treats the manner in which the knowledge of the true good is given by the Spirit, stressing the usage of the Word and its accompanying circumstances.

Que pour nous donner cette connoissance du vray bien qui opere necessairment la conversion, le St. Esprit se sert ordinairement du minister de la parolle ... Qu'outre la parole Dieu employe aussi au mesme dessein toutes les diverse circonstances dont cette parole est accompaneé, ... et la recontre de toutes ces choses qui l'on scàit estre tres puissantes sur nos ames, et que Dieu dispense avec la parole comme il lui plaist pour la conversion des pecheurs, mais de telle maniere que les eleûs sont necessairment illuminés et convertis par la recontre de tous ces moyens qui sont autant d'instruments en la main du St. Esprit pour produire l'effet qu'il s'est proposé.

In these eight points, Pajon expressed his views skillfully in a way compatible with the Cameronian approach to Calvinism and this appeared to satisfy Claude that there was no essential difference between them. Claude was about to shake hands with Pajon as an indication of their unity when Lenfant spoke up and stated that it was not yet time to do so in that the key issue had not yet been clarified and resolved. With this Pajon proceeded to point out the different questions involved in the debate between the Reformed
theologians and the Pelagians and the Remonstrants, and between certain theologians and himself. First, he notes that there is the question of whether God produces in us the will to be converted ("le vouloir et le parfaire") as was held by Augustine against Pelagius. Second, there is the question of whether the method by which God does this in us is irresistible and non-coercive as the Synod of Dort held against the Remonstrants. Third, there is the question as to whether this irresistible grace operates through the ministry of the Word and other means and reasons which accompany it or whether it is immediate and operates in us without any means or reason. Pajon states that he is in agreement with Augustine against Pelagius, and the Synod of Dort against the Remonstrants, as considered in the first and second points; therefore, the real issue revolves around the third question. Pajon indicates that he cannot understand how our soul

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\text{étant raisonnable, elle puisse estre meuë par une impulsion aveugle, telle que seroit une operation immediate de Dieu qui se deploieroit en nous sans l'entremise d'aucun moyen; et qu'il croit que Dieu n'agit en nous que par la force des raisons et des motifs} \ldots
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With this clarification of Pajon's views, Claude begins to have second thoughts with regards to their unanimity and responds that he could agree with Pajon if man were still in a state of innocence; however, this is no longer the case in that the corruption of sin has brought man into a state of absolute inability to do the good, and this makes it
necessary that the spirit act immediately to prepare men to receive the action of the Word, conversion being a result of this immediate action and the action of the Word.

Pajon makes four observations with regards to Claude's response. First, he states that according to Claude's explanation, the Spirit would only be a partial cause of our conversion merely acting to dispose the heart to receive the Word and the other circumstances which then accomplish the major aspect of one's conversion. Second, according to Claude the Word has nothing to do with the healing of man's inability, whereas the Scripture speaks of the Word as "the seed of our regeneration" and as being a powerful weapon to overcome all obstacles. In his third and fourth observations, Pajon argues that Claude's opinion involves him in either accepting extraordinary revelations beyond the Word and the circumstances that accompany it in order to remove man's inability as acclaimed by the Anabaptists or in accepting man's inability as of a purely physical and involuntary nature, reducing him to the status of a stump or inanimate object.

Puisqu'il suppose que Dieu la guérit sans nostre consentement par une impulsion aveugle qui ne nous present aucune raison pour toucher nos volonté, ce qui est non seulement contraire a la doctrine de nos theologiens mais aussi a celle de Mr. Claude qui enseigne dans son 5ᵉ sermon sur la paraboles des Noces, 'que l'impuissance de l'homme a se convertir consiste seulement en ce qu'il ne le veut pas, et que quand l'Ecriture Sainte se sert des comparisons d'un mort, d'un aveugle, d'un esclave pour exprimer cette impuissance, il n'en faut pas abuser, qu'elle ne veut dire que cela, et que ce seroit abuser de ses expressions que de les porter plus loin.'
Following this series of observations, Claude responds with some further arguments and distinctions regarding inability which are also in turn refuted by Pajon. This brings the first day of the conferences to a close with an agreement to confer again on the 22nd of July. Pajon appears to have had the upper hand in this first day of debate though he was clashing with one of the best minds and authors in the Huguenot Church. One must remember, however, that he had been debating and concentrating on this question for over ten years and this gave him the advantage.

Pajon and Claude are in general agreement at the beginning of the second conference held on the 22nd of July at the home of de la Bastide that the corruption which men acquire and with which they are born is of a moral nature. However, a difference develops between them in that Pajon insists that this corruption

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\text{consistast seulement dans l'ignorance, dans l'erreur, dans les vices ... en un mot dans toutes les vitieuses habitudes d'erreur dans l'entendment, et de malice dans la volonté qui sont nées avec nous; au lieu que Mr. Claude soutint comme une chose constante, qu'outre ces desordres des nos ames, il y a encore autre corruption dont il n'expliqua point la nature, mais qu'il apela le mauvais etat de l'ame,' en qui il dit que consista le pêché originel, qui ne peut consister, ajouta il, en aucune de ces autres choses; parce que toutes ces autres choses sont acquises et non pas nées avec nous, et qu'il est impossible que des habitudes de vice ou d'erreur se proviginent par la generation et qu'elles passant du pere a l'enfant.}
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Pajon states that many theologians including Amyraut were opposed to Claude in this, holding "qu'il y a de mauvaises habitudes nées avec nous ..."
Pajon also argues that Claude's position reduces to a denial of original sin itself for to deny that bad habits can pass from father to child by generation would result in a being without any bad habits who would be in a state of innocence and without condemnation.

Following this preliminary discussion on original sin, Claude launches into a prepared series of objections to Pajon's position. It appears that he had done some hard thinking on the subject in the five days that he had to prepare for this second day of discussions. These included charges of Pelagianism, eliminating any distinction in the operation of providence in the good and the bad, consequently eliminating any responsibility or merit in the actions of men, failing to be able to explain the different responses of men to the same sermons, and being unsupported by Scripture. He also gave and expounded on four passages supporting immediate grace. In conclusion, Claude states that

pour suivre les hypothèses de M. Pajon, il faut changer toutes l'idées de la théologie, donner un nouveau tour à toutes les matières, accoutumer nos peuples à des expressions qui leur sont inouies, s'exposer au reproche de la nouveauté et entrer en des débats continuels qui nuiraient infiniment à l'édification de l'Eglise de Dieu.®

In the third conference held on the 29th of July at the home of de la Bastide, Pajon begins the discussion by calling for an examination of inability. He is convinced that a discussion of the nature of the operation of the Holy Spirit in conversion calls for a clear understanding of the nature of the sickness involved before the proposal of a
remedy which obviously should be compatible with that sickness. This leads Pajon again to emphasize what could be considered his most effective argument against Claude's position. He stresses that if the sickness is of a physical and involuntary nature, it follows that the remedy also should be of a physical nature. This means that it could operate in man without his consent by a blind impulse to heal him. However, that is what the Cameronian school of thought has been firmly denying and steadfastly opposing. Pajon advances his solution as the only logical position open to members of the Cameronian school. If the sickness is considered to be of a voluntary and moral nature, there is only a need for a moral remedy; in other words, reasons, arguments, and motives, to bring deliverance to man. Pajon draws attention to Claude's own words in a sermon where Claude denied the absolute nature of man's inability in such a way that one could conclude "que Mr. Claude ne concevoit pas alors d'impuissance en homme qui ne vint de l'impression des objets." Pajon's reference to Claude's sermons in which Claude exposed his Cameronian framework of thought gave him the wedge that he felt he needed to force Claude to admit that Pajon's system was the only consistent solution to the problems they faced as to original sin and the process of conversion.

After this Pajon examines Claude's concept of original sin as a state that precedes all impression of objects, "une pente, une propension, une inclination extreme vers le mal" which men bring with them upon birth. Pajon rejects
this as being inconsistent with any coherent Cameronian epistemology and anthropology which demands that all human inclinations be of a moral nature depending upon objects. A point is reached here during the conference when Claude becomes aroused emotionally, pounds the table, and cries: "J'ay lu sur cela votre traité du péché originel, mais ces idées ne passeront pas." Pajon's instant reply is that if that is the case, Claude's ideas "ne passeront pas non plus" and he will have to reverse himself and approve what he has condemned in his fifth sermon. This explosive moment was prophetic of the controversy which was to wrack the Reformed Church in the years ahead. Pajon's relentless logic was leaving its mark, but it was not persuading Claude to abandon his position. What it appears to have been doing was to convince Claude of the danger of Pajon's views more and more. It may be that Pajon was in a sense winning the debate but losing the man. Pajon had apparently lost sight of his original goal to persuade Claude to calm the waters of opposition, hold the Church together, and correct the misunderstanding that some had of his views. He was now gripped by the challenge of the debate and his desire to achieve a logical victory. Following this heated exchange Pajon presents ten passages of Scripture which he considers favorable to his view as well as other arguments from reason to support himself. This was followed by discussion and debate on a variety of subjects. When this third conference ended, Pajon indicated that he would like to have another conference
in order to answer the series of refutations that Claude had presented against his position during the second conference, at which time Claude had been unwilling to be interrupted by Pajon. However, Claude felt that enough had been said and that another conference was unnecessary.

Claude's conclusion on the whole matter was that Pajon's ideas could have dangerous consequences but that it was not right to accuse Pajon of holding them because he did not share them. Furthermore, he indicated that he would do all that he could to influence his friends, especially de Brais, in Pajon's favor and promised him their friendship would continue. Pajon on his part indicated that he would follow a course of moderation as was his practice and would attempt to be silent over this matter as far as it was possible in order to preserve peace in the Church unless he was provoked by violent persecutions. Pajon also stated that he would be highly obligated to Claude if he could prevent this from taking place.²⁴

The Secret Conference in 1677
Against Pajonism

Although an apparent display of good will characterized the conclusion of the conference between Claude and Pajon, a later conference held at Paris at the place where Pierre Du Bosc, pastor of Caen, was staying on July 6, 1677, amounted to a council of war against Pajonism.²⁵ The most precise information available on this conference is given in a letter written the next day to Lenfant by Jurieu who had
been present and participated in the discussions. Jurieu indicated that most of the pastors of the church of Paris as well as other clergymen were present. Later Pajon wrote that there were seven individuals present.

At this time Claude made a detailed report on the conference he had with Pajon in 1676 and those in attendance were invited to discuss the matter. After these discussions they arrived at certain conclusions. The first was that though the language used by Pajon was quite similar to theirs in that he used such familiar terms as the operation of the Spirit, internal grace, efficacious and irresistible grace; on careful examination, his doctrine was vastly different. He held that the grace only consisted in the presentation of objects, or in other words, it only amounted to a congruism of the action of the Word and the attending circumstances to overcome the resistance of the will. Furthermore, they were in agreement that, in fact, Pajon denied the internal operation of the Spirit and acted in bad faith in even calling it the operation of the Spirit. Another criticism was that his method of explaining grace actually amounted to its denial in that there was no distinction between making a Christian convert and a convert to some philosophical view. Also they stated that they considered it to be Pelagianism though they recognized that there was some distinction, in that Pajon held to irresistibility, which they, however, noted was contradictory in view of his Pelagian framework of thought. Other criticisms made were that Pajon undermined the concept of original sin and
providence. Claude also criticized Pajon as having failed to keep his promise to be silent on this matter even having written to Germany, Geneva, and other places on the subject. In consideration of all these facts, the men at the conference concluded that quick action should be taken against this doctrine; but on the other hand, they wished to spare the individuals themselves, their brethren who possessed excellent gifts. They would attempt first to use the methods of sweetness and persuasion.

At this point in his letter Jurieu indicates that he wishes to be quite candid and not to be misunderstood. He is convinced that should they consider these methods to be inadequate, they would not hesitate to resort to other methods, each working in his respective province to bring about the condemnation of Pajon's doctrine. The spirit of Jurieu's letter portrays that of a friend who though he disapproves of the teaching still is concerned with the serious consequences that may follow which would be harmful to the best interests of his old, beloved friend, Pajon. This letter amounted to a warning that hopefully would result in a response on Pajon's part that would prevent the necessity of any official action taking place against him.

Both Mesnard, one of the pastors at Paris, in a letter written on October 11, 1677 and Claude, in a letter written October 2nd of the same year, indicated that Pajon knew of the conference shortly after it took place. It appears that Lenfant quickly informed Pajon of his letter from Jurieu on
the details of the secret conference against his views. As one might expect, Pajon condemned what had taken place there and worked to enlist support among his friends against the opposition that was marshalling against him. Shortly after that François Du Vidal, pastor at Tours, one of the most eloquent and wisest ministers of Touraine, wrote a very strong letter against the secret conference to Mademoiselle de Dangeau which came as a surprise and shock to the pastors at Paris. Also Pajon came to Paris himself and complained to a number of persons about the secret conference. When they tried to persuade him to be silent about his doctrine, he refused to do so unless he was not pressed on the subject. He indicated that if someone wished to discuss the matter he would feel obligated to present his side of the issue in order to defend himself against unreasonable charges. Other news that was alarming to the opponents of Pajon at Paris was that a number of divinity students holding Pajon's views were coming to apply in their synod for ministerial status. Even among the pastors of Paris all were not in agreement with the conclusions made at the secret conference, for when Daillé and Claude went to see Pierre Allix, another of the pastors at Paris, about the matter they found him quite unsympathetic.

**Synodical and Academic Action Against Pajonism**

The response of Pajon's opponents at Paris was to move for formal ecclesiastical action against Pajonism. They decided to take the first step of opposition in the
Consistory of Paris without naming any specific person and to have it instruct its delegates to work against Pajonism in the next synod. This Synod of l'Isle de France opened at Clermont on August 26, 1677, and Claude himself was elected moderator. He and his allies were successful in putting through a moderate statement against Pajonism. Claude wrote that there was strong support for this action. Some had wished for even more drastic action and had spoken in favor of requiring all pastors present and absent to sign the act of the Synod on the matter; however, the opinion prevailed not to do that unless the occasion demanded it later. The statement of the Synod is as follows:

Quelque Eglises ayant représente, qu'il s'est ému depuis quelque temps de certaines contestations touchant le Concours de la Providence, & l'Operation du St. Esprit dans la conversion de l'homme, & que ces sortes de disputes pourroient tirer à quelque conséquence. La Compagnie enjoint à tous Fidèles de s'abstenir de toutes disputes sur des questions curieuses, & de se tenir précisément à la simplicité de la Parole de Dieu, & à nostre Confession de foy: defend très expressément à tous Ministres, Proposans & autres, de rien enseigner sur ces matières, & sur toutes celles de la Religion, de vive voix ou par écrit qui répugne directement ou indirectement à la Parole de Dieu, à nostre Confession de foy, & aux décisions de nos Synodes Nationaux, & mesme d'employer des termes & des expressions, qui fassent concevoir ces doctrines sous d'autres idées, que celles que nos Eglises en ont concu jusques à présent.

This was the first official synodical act against Pajonism; however, the statements are not precise in defining what they were against specifically. Pajon could have read these statements and applied them to the concept of immediate grace, holding as he did that his view was the one that was
actually in full conformity to the Word of God and the Confession of Faith. Later when the Synod of Normandy met on the eighth of September of the same year at Rouen, it was more precise in expressing the doctrine it opposed and more detailed in outlining the steps to be taken to suppress the doctrine. It expresses itself as follows:

Le Synode de cette Province, ayant apress avec douleur que l'on repand ca & la de nouvelle opinions, & mesmes des opinions directement contraires à la Parole de Dieu, & à la Confession de foy de nos Eglises, mais particulièrement au Concours immédiat & présent de la Providence, & à l'Opération immédiate du St. Esprit, distincte de l'efficace de la Parole, pour la conversion de l'homme. La Compagnie pour arrêter le cours de cette pernicieuse doctrine, qui dans ses consequences donne atteinte à la doctrine Orthodoxe touchant péché Original, exhorte les Ministres & les particuliers de chaque Eglise de fuir avec soin toutes ces nouveautez, & enjoit aux Consistoires de procéder, par toutes les rigueurs de la Discipline, contre ceux qui enseignent les dites Opinions, soit en public soit in particulier, soit de vive voix soit par écrit; défend expressément aux Etudiens en Theologie d'aller pour advancement de leurs études chez ceux qui pourront estre soupconnex d'avoir ces sentimens, que nous condammns tous unanimement. L'ordonne l'de plus ladite Compagnie, qu'il fera écrit aux Academies de Sedan, Saumur, Puylaurens & Die, afin qu'elles employent tous leurs soins pour empêcher que les Proposans ne prennent quelque teinture de ces Nouveautez.

Later still at the Synod of Anjou held at Saumur on the 28th of October of the same year, the doctrine banned was defined with even greater precision and the precautions against the spread of Pajon's doctrine, especially among the students, were even more stringent, calling for an attestation of orthodoxy before any student could be received into the ministry. The statement of this Synod is as follows:

Sur le rapport qui a esté fait, que quelques
contestations s'étoient émues en divers lieux de ce Royaume sur la matière de l'opération de la grace de Dieu dans la conversion de l'homme. La Compagnie ayant dessein de conserver, autant qu'il luy est possible, la pureté de la doctrine de nos Eglises, & empescher toutes les innovation qui y pourroient prejudicer; après avoir examiné toutes ces choses meurement; & en la crainte de Dieu, a déclaré, conformément à la Parole de Dieu & à la Confession de foy de nos Eglises Réformées, que Dieu n'agit pas seulement par la prédication extérieure de l'Evangile, & les autres circonstances qui l'accompagnent, mais déploye encore au dedans une efficace particulière & immediate de son Esprit, distincte de la parole, & de toutes les circonstances qui l'accompagnent, pour illuminer l'entendement & flechir la volonté à l'obeissance de Dieu & de nostre Seigneur Jésus-Christ; & condamne entièrement le sentiment de ceux qui la nient, & toutes les autres opinions qui y sont contraires, comme opposées à la Parole de Dieu & à nostre Confession de foy, & autres Déclarations publiques de nos Eglises. Et pour empescher que telles opinions se glissent plus avant, elle défend expressément à tous les Ministres de cette Province d'en parler, ni en public ni en particulier, pour l'insinuer dans l'esprit du peuple, ni l'enseigner de vive voix ni par écrit. Enjoint aux Consistoires d'y tenir la main, & de veiller sur la conduite des Ministres à cet égard, & en particulier aux Ministres & aux Professeurs en Théologie, & autres Membres du Conseil de l'Académie de Saumur, d'avoir l'oeil sur la conduite & doctrine des Estudians en Théologia, pour ne pas permettre que ceux qui y sont, ou qui y viendront d'ailleurs, insinuent ce sentiment. Et en général elle a arresté, qu' à l'avenir il ne sera receu aucun Proposant, pour exercer le St. Ministère en cette Province, qui n'ait protesté de tenir la doctrine de la grace intérieure & immediate du St. Esprit, en la conversion de l'homme, & de renoncer à la opinion contraire.102

Thus the Synod of Anjou that ten years earlier had been willing to confirm Pajon as a professor of theology at the Academy of Saumur and had rejected the complaints made against his teaching, now reversed its position and in very precise terms rejected and proscribed his doctrine.

Also the Academy of Saumur itself acted against the
doctrine of Pajon in keeping with the decision of the Synod of Anjou by passing a resolution that no student would be given a letter of recommendation who had not attested to his acceptance of the degree of the Synod concerning the doctrine of immediate grace.\textsuperscript{103}

Furthermore, the Academy of Sedan was very strict in its precautions, refusing to accept any student coming from another school or academy or one who had studied under some particular pastor unless he first attested to his orthodoxy on this matter of immediate grace.\textsuperscript{104}

Later the Synod of Xaintonge which met August 31, 1678, having been informed that a new doctrine was being promoted concerning the operation of the Spirit in conversion

\begin{quote}
 exhorte toutes personnes a fuir les doctrines contraires a la parole de dieu, et a nostre confession de foy, et defend a tous Les Ministres d'enseigner rien qui soit contraire a la sante doctrine de l'operation immediate du St. Esprit dans les coeurs pour les ouvrir, et les disposer a l'impression que la parolle de Dieu doit faire en eux pour leur conversion, sur peine de censure convenables, a quoy les consistoires prendront garde.\textsuperscript{105}
\end{quote}

The author (apparently Lenfant) of the manuscript reporting the above information made the observation that he did not feel the above phraseology should be interpreted as a condemnation of Pajon's doctrine

\begin{quote}
 parce qu'etant bien pris il ne contient rien de contraire de la doctrine de Mrs. Lenfant et Pajon, puisqu'ils ne se sont jamais eloignes de la sante doctrine de l'operation immediate du St. Esprit, mais seulement des visions de ceux qui en posent une dont l'Escriture n'a jamais parlé; ...\textsuperscript{106}
\end{quote}
The Pajonistic Response

Pajon together with Lenfant carried on a vigorous defense of their position and were active, especially in their own province, in attempting to gain converts to their doctrine with a certain degree of success. Bayle comments that in spite of pleas with Pajon that he refrain from spreading his views "il empaume autant de Proposans qu'il peut, si bien qu'il y en a peu qui l'avent approché qui ne se soient piquez dans la suite de défendre son système contres tous venans." The problem was thus intensified by the fact that Pajon was gaining enthusiastic and dedicated followers and defenders.

Lenfant was Pajon's most active supporter, writing letters and articles against the actions of Claude and the decisions of the synods and even sending out a circulating letter to the different academies and principal churches.

Pajon is usually characterized in his writing by sweetness, consideration, and courtesy. Even though Jurieu was to later write the most thorough refutation of Pajonism, still this writer has not found any hostile reference to Jurieu in any of the manuscripts. On the other hand, Pajon's sharpest words were reserved for Claude. Pajon justified the hard-hitting letter he wrote to him emphasizing the contradictions in his position by referring to the fact that Claude had been active throughout the realm and beyond it in accusing him of being a heretic.

Lenfant also held that Claude had the leading role in bringing about the proscription of Pajon's doctrine. Two
works appear to have been by him in which Claude figures prominently. They are: "Examin d'un Jugement rendu par les Synodes des Eglises Reformées de l'Isle de France, Picardie, Champagne, ett. assemblé a Charenton au mois d'avril et de May 1679 Sur Certaines plaintes portées audit Synode par M. Lenfant Ministre de l'Eglise Ref. de Chatillon sur loing, Contre M. Claude Ministre de l'Egl. Ref. de Paris," and "Lettre de M. Lenfant a M. Claude," dated January 1, 1678 at Chatillon.

Lenfant and Pajon's bitterness toward Claude stems to a certain degree from the fact that they felt that he had broken his promises to them to keep the peace. Lenfant's treatment of this matter has special significance because he was the one who had kept a record of the July 1676 conference between Claude and Pajon of a semi-official nature which was read before each new meeting of that conference. Lenfant was careful to stress that at the end of the conference Claude had stated he recognized that they were basically in agreement with regards to original sin and the efficaciousness of grace in the work of conversion and though there were some differences between them over less essential items, they should support each other in love to preserve the peace and be silent with regards to the controversial aspects of this question.

Two major complaints that Lenfant made in "Examin d'un Jugement" with regards to Claude's actions against Pajon were: First, he had broken his promise to keep the matters discussed at their conference in 1676 secret. Second, Claude had acted
in a manner contradictory to his avowal that they both should support each other on what they held in common because the area of disagreement between them was over unessential matters. He had, in fact, proceeded to represent them "comme des heretiques dangereux, et comme des gens de mauvaise foy dans l'assembleé de Paris."\textsuperscript{115}

Lenfant's own summation of his long, bold and blunt letter to Claude was that he first gently rebuked him for his actions in breaking his promise and agreement of mutual support. Second, he complained of the way that Claude had described Lenfant and Pajon's views. Third, he claimed to have proved by various solid reasons that Claude had acted in an unjust, uncharitable, and imprudent manner in this affair. Fourth, he gave a summation of his doctrine directly opposed to the interpretation that Claude had placed on it. Finally, Lenfant called on Claude to explain his own views on the subject of concourse and the immediate operation of the Holy Spirit in conversion and pointed out the great difficulties that one is involved in when holding to the decisions made in the synods against Pajonism.\textsuperscript{116}

In his letter Lenfant also draws attention to the letter that Claude had written to aid the supporters of universal grace who were being suppressed at Geneva. Lenfant no doubt strikes a very sore point when he notes that the ideas of tolerance that Claude advocated in that letter greatly contradicted the recent actions he had sponsored in the French Church. Lenfant must indeed have embarrassed Claude
somewhat as he introduced quotation after quotation from Claude's letter and turned them against him. Claude had written Turretin that "t'out le monde est touché d'une vive douleur de voir une école et un troupeau qui tiennent un si beau rang dans la Réformation, agitez des mêmes désordres, qui ont autrefois troublé nos Églises." Lenfant asks why if he was so troubled by the divisions at Geneva, he was willing to plunge the churches of France into the same predicament. If Claude so deplored the action taken at Geneva against the universalists and was so vocal in calling for charitable treatment of those who differ from one on non-essential matters of faith that are not clearly decided in the Scriptures, why does he not put these wise words into practice in the current controversy over Pajonism which closely parallels the controversy over universal grace? Claude in his letter had recalled how Geneva had been an example of unity and harmony to the other churches since the Reformation and had often attempted to bring peace to other troubled churches. Now it was a scandalous thing for her to take the position of suppressing the natural and Christian liberty of other churches, breaking fellowship with them over matters that were quarrels among doctors which ordinary people did not even understand. Lenfant calls on Claude to apply his own words to Paris where he has been proceeded by so many great men who earlier behaved in such a prudent manner when the French Church was being shaken by the trouble over the doctrine of grace and original sin. It was to their wise and
charitable behavior that the French Church owed much of the peace they had had in their churches. Lenfant calls on Claude to recognize the scandal that has now come to their own church by the suppression of liberty and the rupture of the bonds of fellowship based on the Confession of Faith because of quarrels over doctrines which most men do not even understand. Thus Lenfant castigated one of the great and grand men of the Reformed Church of France.\textsuperscript{117}

Later on March 7, 1678 Claude wrote that he had been shocked by the letter from Lenfant which he considered to have been abusive and haughty. He said that he was especially disturbed by the insolent manner in which Lenfant had treated the decisions of the synods and academies against Pajonism and he brought the letter before the consistory to let them hear for themselves. At this time Claude justified himself and again attacked the Pajonistic concepts, and he was supported in this by his close friend and fellow pastor de Langle. Claude's own description of his words that day are:

\begin{quote}
Et premièremenent je me justifiay de toutes les fausses accusations de Mr. Lenfant. Et en second lieu je fis voir par un très grande-nombre de passages, tirez de St. Augustin, de Bellarmin, de Paraeus, de Calvin, & des Acts du Synode de Dordrecht, que l'opinion qui combat la grace immediate est celle de Pélage; que St. Augustin l'a renversée, qu'elle est des Jesuites; que nos Docteurs l'ont rejetée; qu'elle est des Arminiens; que les Peres de Dordrecht l'ont condamnée. Après cela Mr. de Langle parla, & fit voir que l'opinion dont il s'agit, estoit contraire à la parole de Dieu, & qu'elle estoit pernicieuse dans la Religion.
\end{quote}

Having been given such a dark picture of the dangers lurking in Pajonism, the consistory decided to work against it in
every proper and reasonable way.

About this time the consistory was alarmed by a report that Pajon, who was again in Paris on some court action, was dogmatizing from house to house. This brought about the sharpest confrontation between delegates of the consistory and Pajon of which there is any record. Two elders were sent to tell Pajon that they could not tolerate such behavior on his part, and if he continued they would be forced to act against him according to the Discipline. At the following meeting of the consistory the elders made their report and stated that Pajon had denied that he was dogmatizing but that when people asked him about his opinions he felt that he had the right to explain them, especially since he was being accused of being Pelagian, Socinian and Arminian. Then the consistory sent two other elders to tell him that they did not intend to prevent him from defending himself against such accusations but that he should not use that as an excuse to spread doctrines in their church that the Synod had condemned or they would act formally against him. However, these elders were not able to report back that Pajon was willing to make any commitment to be silent. Claude writes: "Ces seconds Deputez l'ont veu, et n'ont pu tirer de luy aucune positif et nette, mais toujours des equivoques et des faux-fuyans."118

To understand the boldness of Pajon and Lenfant in face of the synodical action against their views, it will be helpful to note Pajon's position in his home province. There
appears to have been a mild attempt to deal with the Pajonistic controversy in Pajon's own province of Orleans-Berry, at least in the opinion of some. Whatever this action against Pajon may have been, it certainly does not seem to have been taken seriously by the Synod of Orleans-Berry at the 1679 meeting at Sancere or at its previous meeting. Indeed, it seems very unlikely that it would have appointed Pajon and Lenfant as its representatives to the Synod of Anjou to participate in the examination of de Brais with regards to his appointment as professor at the Academy of Saumur if they did not continue to hold a position of respect and honor. It must have been a bitter experience for de Brais, who had contributed to the arousal of opposition to Pajon, to find Pajon, himself, and his close supporter Lenfant the two duly elected representatives and examiners from the Synod of Orleans-Berry. Further evidence that Pajon's own Synod was not moving against him is also to be seen in Pajon's election to the position of moderator of his own Synod in 1679 and his appointment as one of its chief representatives to the next national synod. Pajon's Synod definitely revealed by these acts the high esteem in which they held him and their determination that he would have an opportunity to defend himself at a national assembly if it was necessary. It appears that they were attempting in a sense to guarantee him his day in court.

It also should be noted that there appears to be no record of any acts of proscription and condemnation of Pajon's teaching at the other academies, Puylaurens and Die (taken
Returning to the subject of Lenfant’s actions against Claude, one finds him writing a second letter to him on May 14, 1678, when he revealed how really serious he was. He indicated he had waited for four months and had received no reply to his first letter. Now he writes: “Je vous prie par ce billet de me mander si vous avez pensé a reparer le tort que vous m’avez fait en m’imputant des doctrines que je n’ay jamais approuvées ou enseignées.” If Claude intended to sustain his previous actions, Lenfant wished to make it clear that he would move formally against him. This second letter was sent by a mutual friend, Bernard, an attorney in the High Court of Paris, who later gave Lenfant a statement to the effect that Claude had been abusive towards Lenfant on receiving this second letter, accusing him of Arianism and Pelagianism. In October 1678, Lenfant sent his complaint to the Consistory of Paris with such supporting documents as Jurieu’s letter and the declaration of Bernard and formally asked for a vindication of his honor. However, as one might expect, they refused and Lenfant consequently took his case before the Synod of l’Isle de France which met at Charenton in April and May, 1679, with Claude’s good friend de Langle as moderator. According to the minutes of this Synod, it rejected the complaints made against Claude personally, considering them to be “nulles, frivoles et destituées de raison.” It also made a point of noting that the conclusions
made concerning the possible dangerous consequences of his
doctrine were not Claude's alone but of all those who were
involved in the discussions. Furthermore, Lenfant should not
have been upset by this since they had not been attributed to
him personally. The Synod also praised Claude for his con­
duct in this matter since he had preferred to suffer wrong
than again raise matters that could disturb the peace in the
churches. It also expressed concern that anyone would at­
tack one who "est si cher, et qui est si connue sous d'autres
ideés parmi nous." As for Lenfant's attack of the Synod of
Clermont, the response of the Synod was to forgive him, and
it also added the rebuke that it "souhaite que Dieu lui mette
au coeur d'employer plus utilement ses talents qu'a écrire
contre ses frères et espere qu'il travaillera a l'avenir
unanimement avec eux a edifier l'Eglise du Seigneur."\textsuperscript{125}

In his answer to the Synod, the tenacious Lenfant
continued to hammer away at the tragic and harmful results
of the action against Pajonism. They had undermined the
ministry of Pajon and Lenfant in a most unfair manner. They
had caused the consistories to become centers of inquisition
in order to support new doctrines canonized in several pro­
vincial synods. They had failed to recognize that the
academies served all the provinces and that individual synods
did not have the right to dictate how doctrine should be
taught there that was not found in the Confession of Faith
without the concurrence of the other synods. They had
caused severe hardships for students suspected of being
tainted by the opposed doctrine. They had undermined the liberty that theologians had had to discuss matters undecided by the national synod. They had undermined the peace by proscribing a doctrine whose method was a thousand times better in combating the Pelagians, Semi-Pelagians, Anabaptists, and those who sought to make God the author of sin than the doctrine certain synods had endorsed on this question.¹²⁶

### Facing Other Trials

After the synodical action against Pajon in 1678, he indicated that he also had intended to write to the Consistory at Charenton concerning the matter; however, he had been prevented in doing this by his normal responsibilities and some other pressing concerns.¹²⁷ Pajon's second wife Esther wrote a brief biography of the latter part of his life that gives some idea of the various other challenges Pajon faced in these years.¹²⁸ She indicates that from 1670 until 1675 they lived a fairly tranquil life, but after that Pajon was involved in legal proceedings with Mr. le Marquis de Brusac. She does not give the exact cause of this affair but indicates that it was so serious that they were in danger of losing what little they had at that time. It appears to have been this legal affair that brought Pajon to Paris in 1677, 1678 and 1679. On February 21, 1679, he wrote Tronchin, "Il y a près de deux mois que je suis icy à la poursuite d'un procès qui m'a été suscité, il y a près de quatre ans."¹²⁹ During this time Esther says: "Je doit le temoignage a mon
mary qu'il n'en eut aucune inquietude, qu'il ne m'en a jamais
marqué de chagrin et qu'il se soumit a ce qu'il plairoit a
Dieu d'en ordonner." Pajon's Reformed faith gave him
strength in this time of crisis. Fortunately, this affair
turned out well in the end and even worked to Pajon's advan-
tage in Esther's opinion. She felt that Pajon's deportment
during the proceedings had been very impressive and that he
had won the admiration and respect of some important indi-
viduals including Mr. de Brusac himself.  

After this there was some trouble with Salomon Le
Clerc who served as pastor with Pajon at Orleans. Le Clerc
left and was replaced by Grostête Des Mahis and there was
some hope for a period of calm and rest; however, this did
not materialize because Des Mahis was also to bring con-
siderable trouble to the Pajons and the church at Orleans
for he decided to convert to the Catholic Church. This ap-
ppears to have taken place some time in December, 1682 or
early in 1683.  

It was a severe blow to Pajon, outstanding defender
of the Reformed Church, to have his own colleague convert to
the Catholic Church at this critical time. Pajon's concern
over this affair is expressed in a letter probably sent to a
student at the Academy of Geneva.

Nous avons eu icy de l'affliction par la revolte
de Mr. des Malys qui abjura nostre religion il y a
huit jours. Il n'y a jamais eu d'aveuglement comme
le sien. Il est pris par les preingles que que j'ay
refutés, et il croit qu'il me peut refuter moy mesme
démontravement. S'il le fait solidement il me
trompe ou me detrompera beaucoup. Car ie suis bien
Esther states that Pajon now threw himself into the care of his flock like never before fearing that Des Mahis' abjuration would undermine the faith and steadfastness of other members of his flock. She testifies he had this consolation that he did not lose one member of his flock during his life. "Quelles ardentes prières ne fesoit-il point à Dieu qu'elle douleur n'a-t-il pas ressentî pour le triste etat ou s'estoit mis son colleague?" This, in fact, was the only time she ever saw Pajon weep. Indeed, Pajon had been deeply moved by the action of his colleague, Des Mahis.

Douen has taken the position that an anonymous memorandum referring to information received by the French authorities on trouble in the province of Orleans-Berry that could be exploited and used against the Reformed Church had Des Mahis as its source. Certain clues in the memorandum seem to support Douen in this position. Besides the fact that the memorandum was based on information from a Reformed minister who converted to the Catholic Church, there is the suggestion that difficulties would be caused if the members of the synods were required to sign that they would not teach anything that was not taught in the Word of God. Now a key point in Pajon's defense against the statements passed against his doctrine was that they were not clearly taught in Scripture. Also the memorandum suggests that a very affectionate and intelligent man would serve as the moderator of
the Synod of Orleans-Berry and it would be advantageous if this Synod would meet first and pass the requirement. Then this same man should be called on to serve as the moderator of the Synod of the l'Isle of France where he would exercise leadership to pass the requirement there. It appears that if the informant was Des Mahis, he certainly had suggested a line of action that would have caused considerable turmoil in the leading Synod of the l'Isle of France. Having Pajon serve as moderator of the Synod of Orleans-Berry with the passing of a resolution there that would be helpful to his cause and then having him serve as moderator at the Synod of the l'Isle of France itself in order to pass a resolution that could be interpreted as neutralizing the action taken there earlier against his doctrine would have been an incredible thing to Claude and his allies there and in the other synods.  

Pajon, who revealed genuine concern for Des Mahis, could be characterized as an intelligent and affectionate man. Des Mahis in giving information of this kind might have thought, on the one hand, that he could ingratiate himself with his new masters, but still, on the other hand, help Pajon in some sense in his own controversy and thus make up in some small way for the personal tragedy and agony he brought to him and his church by his conversion.
About the time of Des Mahis' abjuration, another disturbing and threatening event took place. In 1682, the clergy of France published *L'Advertissement pastoral* which was addressed to the Protestants of the realm calling on them to turn from their ways of error and to return again to the fold of the true church.\(^{136}\) The presentation of this document to the consistories of the Reformed Church of France was marked by official ceremonies. At Orleans on January 31, 1683, a number of the king's officials and Catholic clergymen came for a meeting with Pajon and his consistory in order to make the presentation to them. At this time the king's spokesman stated that the king wished to call them to return to the church of their fathers and with this end in view he had approved the proposal of the Clergy of the Catholic Church of France to address to them this *Advertissement pastoral*.\(^{137}\) In spite of this blatant display of political power in matters of religion, Pajon responded with great respect and dignity.\(^{138}\)

He distinguished himself later by writing his book *Remarques sur l'Advertissement pastoral, avec une relation de ce qui se passa au Consistoire d'Orleans, assemblé à Bionne, quand il fut signifié; une lettre de l'auteur à Messieurs du Clerge de France, et une réponse à quelques difficultés que l'on fait ordinairement aux protestans* which was published at Amsterdam in 1685. Pajon argues in this work that the
Advertisissement pastoral had not presented any solid arguments to support their case and had ignored the arguments and reasons presented in countless volumes establishing the grounds upon which the Protestants had separated from the Catholic Church. Pajon emphasized that the Protestants had as an unshakeable principle that faith be founded on solid reasons.

Nous avons un principe, que nous tenons inébranlables. C'est que nous avons toujours raison de ne rien croire, que ce qu'on a raison de nous enseigner. Ainsi, c'est à ces Messieurs à nous donner des preuves de ces Doctrines que nous ne voulons croire, ni recevoir, pour nous faire connoître que nous commes en erreur, & pour justifier les anathèmes qu'ils ont prononcez, & qu'ils prononcent continuellement contre nous à cette occasion.

It is added further that the only arguments that they can accept must be incontestably established on Scripture and reason.

Et il faut que ces preuves soient des argumens incontestables, auxquels on en puisse rien repliquer de raisonnable. Car la consiste pas en des probablilitez, & en des apparences, ni en des argumens auxquels on puisse répondre des choses qui s'accordent avec l'Ecriture & avec la raison, mais en des argumens auxquels il n'y ait rien à repliquer qui ne renverse l'Ecriture Sainte, ou le bon sens.

Pajon included an effective section concerning the relationship of the Huguenot loyalty to his religion and his loyalty to the king. He argued that their very steadfastness in holding to a religion which they believed to be the true one should convince him of their genuine loyalty to him.

Nous osons même nous promettre, que nôtre Majesté regardera nôtre fermeté & la constance avec laquelle
nous demeurons dans une Religion disgraciée, parce que nous la croyons vraie, comme une preuve que nous lui garderons à lui-même une inviolable fidélité tant parce que le DIEU qui nous commande d'honner les Rois, & d'être soumis par la raison même de la conscience, aux Puissances supérieures, que, parce que la fermeté que nous avons pour notre Religion, est une marque constante que nous préférons notre devoir aux plus grands intérêts du monde: De sorte que regardon, comme nous faisons, l'obéissance à la fidélité que nous devons à nos Souverains comme un des plus sacrés devoirs de notre Religion, notre Monarque ne peut douter que nous ne lui soyons fidèles, & que nous ne persévérions jusqu'à notre dernier soupir dans l'obéissance que nous lui devons.¹⁴

Later an' address is directed specifically to the Clergy in the following eloquent words:

Vous travaillez à réunir tous les sujets du Roi dans une même Communion. Votre dessein est grand, & digne de vous; & il n'y a point de bonne ame qui ne doive souhaiter qu'il ait un heureux succès.

Mais percez-vous-moi d'y ajouter une condition sans laquelle vous demeurerez vous-même d'accord qu'il ne feroit pas légitime: C'est, qu'en travaillant pour la paix, vous travailliez aussi pour la vérité.

The truth, Pajon stressed, must undergird the unity of the church, the peace, and the authority of the king if it is to endure.

Ainsi, votre propre glorie consite à revenir toujours à la vérité; & si j'ose vous le dire, vous ne devez pas tant penser à triompher du parti qui vous est contraire, qu'à faire que la vérité triomphe de tous les partis.

C'est même l'intention de Roi, pour la glorie du quel vous faites profession de travailler, que vous ne cherchiez que la vérité. Il ne vous acorde sa protection, & il n'apuye nos desseins de son autorité, que parce qu'il suppose que vous lui dites la vérité, & qu'il espere que vous n'enseignerez que la vérité à ses sujets.
Il est de la gloire de ce grand Prince, que l'ouvrage, que vous ferez par ses Ordres & par son Autorité, soit durable; il ne peut être durable, s'il n'est fondé sur la vérité.\textsuperscript{145}

Attention is drawn to the fact that even God does not use force but persuasion to direct the conscience of men; furthermore, men commit mortal sin when they act against their conscience.

Vous vous souviendrez, sans doute, que les consciences ne dépendent que de Dieu; & dans le dessein de vous assujettir les nôtres pour en êtres les Directeurs, vous immitez la conduite de Dieu même, qui ne prétend pas se les soumettre dans cette vie par une autre voye, que celle de l'instruction, & de la persuasion; jusques-là que son Apôtre nous ordonne d'agir toujours selon que nous sommes pleinement persuadés dans nos esprits. Et il regarde comme des crimes, & des offences mortelles, capables de nous faire périr, les actions les plus innocentes, quand nous les faisons contre le mouvement de nos consciences.\textsuperscript{145}

The address to the Clergy concluded with an eloquent and moving plea for tolerance and respect for conscience:

Au nom de Dieu, Messieurs, ayez quelque compassion pour nous, que vous voulez bien honorer du nom de vos Frères. Nous vous en conjurons par les entrailles de la miséricorde de Dieu, par le Sang du Seigneur Jésus notre commun Rédempteur, par la Communion de charité qui doit être entre tous ceux qui font profession de l'Evangile de Jésus-Christ, & par les tendresses, que vous dites vous-mêmes, que la Sainte Eglise notre Mère a pour nous. Epargnez-nous & epargnez-vous vous-mêmes. Epargnez-nous, en nous l'aisissant jouir paisiblement de ce qui nous reste de liberté pour l'exercice de notre religion, jusqu'à ce que vous nous ayez fait connoître qu'elle n'est pas bonne. Epargnez-vous, vous-mêmes, en ne poussant pas les foibles d'entre nous dans des crimes, dont vous seréis responsables devant Dieu: Ce qui arriveroit, si vous leur donniez occasion de changer de Religion contre les mouvemens de leur conscience, par l'espérance de quelques biens temporels, ou par la crainte de quelque disgrace dans ce present siècle.\textsuperscript{146}
Pajon again had defended his church, but his moving and persuasive words could not match the ruthless and determined forces that had arrayed themselves against her to destroy her. Indeed, he too had another personal ordeal to endure perhaps to some degree because he had defended her so well, but before that story is told one's attention should be turned back again to Pajon's controversy in his own church and the Le Cene affair.

The Le Cene Affair

Charles Le Cene (1647-1703), a young minister of about thirty-five with an excellent record in the academies, came to the church at Charenton on a provisional basis from the church at Honfleur in October 1682. On August 1, 1683, de Sartes, formerly a minister at Montpellier, accused him of having given a Pelagian explanation while preaching on the eighteenth section of the catechism in that when he treated the efficacy of the Word in the formation of faith he did not mention the operation of the Holy Spirit. It appears that the consistory at that time tried to persuade him to drop the matter, but he persisted in his complaint and requested that the consistory give him a statement of his charge against Le Cene. On Sunday, August 22nd, Le Cene met with the members of the consistory and tried to blunt the edge of de Sartes' complaint against him by stating that he was an old enemy from student days. Furthermore, he stated that his sermon had been heard and read later by a number of
ministers and elders who could not find anything unorthodox about it. On Sunday, August 29th, the consistory was advised that the pastors Claude and Gilbert had met with Le Cene at the home of de Ruvigny, the Deputy General of the Reformed Church where Le Cene had stated:

*que dans la production de ta Foi, outre la Parole, les Objets, et les Circumstances, il reconnaissait l'opération interieure et secrete du St. Esprit dans les Coeurs, sans laquelle la Parole serait sans efficacite et qu'en cela comme en autres choses, il se conforme et se soumet à ce qui en est déclaré dans notre Confession de Foi et dans les Acts de nos Synodes Nationaux.*

The consistory decided that Le Cene should come before it in order to make this same declaration so that it could conclude the matter. However, on Sunday September 12th, when Le Cene came before the consistory he stated that the period during which he had agreed on to serve at Charenton had expired and he requested that the consistory give him permission to leave and that he be given a testimonial of his services. They agreed to do so, but when Le Cene received his testimonial he was highly dissatisfied and considered it to be unacceptable. In the testimonial they had gone into a detailed narration of all the charges against him and his response to them adding a concluding pledge of orthodoxy to be signed by him. Le Cene requested that they give him a testimonial of the normal kind, but they refused to change what they had done, and, consequently, Le Cene appealed to the next meeting of the synod for a redress of his grievance. Allix supported him in this and joined with him in making
this appeal considering Le Cene to have been unfairly treated by the consistory. However this appeal was never to receive synodical consideration because the king refused to permit any further assemblies.

Later the refused testimonial was sent to the church at Orleans which was interested in having Le Cene there as a pastor, the second position now being vacant with the loss of Des Mahis. However the unsatisfactory conclusion of this matter at Paris interfered with Le Cène’s transfer to Orleans.¹⁴⁷

Claude gives his opinion of the matter in a letter on September 29, 1683 to Tessereau:

Nous avons eu ici pendant un an un nouveau nommé M. Le Cene, qui s’est contenu tant qu’il a espéré être à Paris; mais dès qu’il s’est vu hors de cette assurance et appelé à Orleans par l’intrigue de M. Pajon nous a prêché assez nettement l’arminianisme et a tenu des discours fort scandaleux sur le socinianisme. On a pris toutes les voies douces pour assoupir cette affaire; mais c’est un étrange Monsieur: il nous avait fait quelque déclarations de sa doctrine dans le consistoire qui pour suivait en quelque sorte l’affire; mais quand on lui a demandé qu’il les signât; il ne l’a pas voulu faire. Nous en sommes là.”¹⁴⁸

This letter reveals that Claude personally strongly suspected (if he was not convinced) that Le Cene was not orthodox in the Reformed sense,¹⁴⁹ and one senses a note of hostility towards both Pajon and Le Cene. Claude indicated he was hoping to see the problem resolved without undue disruption of the Reformed community, however, the course of events worked to sadly divide the church at Paris at a critical
time in its history. The pastors Le Cene and Allix had appealed against the decision of the consistory that appears to have had the support of Claude if he was not the main architect. Though the majority of the consistory again sided with Claude on this question, Le Cene and Allix had their supporters in the congregation, which was also divided. Three laymen came to the meeting of the consistory to declare that they were satisfied with Le Cene; however, they were denied admission, advised that it was none of their business, and that justice would be done in the matter. They were: Jacques Conrart, counselor to the king and brother of Valentin; the ambassador Frémont d'Ablancourt; and David Renouard, merchant. Richard Simon tells that "M. de Frémont d'Ablancourt ... disait toujours depuis ce temps-là quand il parlait du ministre Claude, 'l'empereur Claude.'"  

A Letter to the Consistory of Charenton  

It was in this atmosphere that Pajon in February, 1684, wrote his major response to the action of the synods against him in a letter to the Consistory of Charenton. In his letter he indicates that he has wished to write them for a long time concerning the things that took place six or seven years ago that undermined the peace of the churches and which have been greatly stirred up again as a result of the action taken against Le Cene. He observes that the action taken against Le Cene was not on the grounds that he had said anything in opposition to the decision made against Pajonism.
but only on the grounds that he had not expressed himself formally against Pajonism and consequently was accused of being sympathetic towards it. Pajon writes:

D'où vient donc qu'on l'a déchiré, et qu'on le déchiré encore d'une si étrange manière? Tout cela ne vient, que de certaines décisions, que l'on a faites, contre toutes les règles de la Discipline depuis environ six ans ... pour l'établissement d'une doctrine, qui paroit absolument inutile pour le salut, quand même elle ne seroit pas contraire à la vérité, et que néanmoins on veut obliger tout le monde d'enseigner positivement, sous peine de passer pour hérétique, si on oublie à en parler en termes exprès. C'est ce qui est arrivé à Mr. Le Cene. Il n'a rien dit contre cette nouvelle Décision qui ne se trouve dans tous nos Auteurs les plus aprouvez, même dans ceux qui sont aujourd'hui les plus échauffez à l'établir. Mais parce qu'il ne l'a pas enseignée in termes formels, il a passé pour criminel dans l'esprit de ceux qui l'ont accusé, et qui ont entrepris de luy faire de la peine.153

The arguments that Pajon uses in this letter are sketched in his table of contents as follows:

1. Qu'on a banni la paix du milieu de nous pour un sujet très léger.

2. Que la distinction que la nouvelle decision établit, entre l'action du St. Esprit et l'action de la parolle ne sert de rien pour la gloire de dieu et qu'elle lui est contraire.

3. Que la doctrine de la nouvelle decision est moins propre à convaincre et convertir les pécheurs qu'a les endurcir.

4. Que la nouvelle decision favorise l'accusation qu'on nous fait d'un esprit particulier.

5. Que la nouvelle decision favorise les revelations immediates, ou les impulsions aveugles.

6. Qu'on a banni la paix par les plus grandes irregularités; et que la nouvelle decision a esté faite contre toutes sortes de regles.

7. Digressions que la nouvelle decision n'est
In this document as the outline of the major arguments points out, Pajon uses various theological arguments against immediate grace that will be studied in greater detail in later sections of this study; however, Pajon's argument concerning the irregularity of the decisions against him may be noted at this time. Pajon argues that the action taken against him by several of the provincial synods was taken in violation of the Discipline of the church and also was of an unfair nature. They made a decision on a question of faith without examining the matter carefully and without hearing the arguments of those who were on the other side. Furthermore, they made their decision without knowing whether the other synods of the realm were of the same opinion. Pajon emphasizes the point that the Discipline never has given the consistories or the provincial synods the authority to make new decisions on questions of faith. Their authority is limited to upholding that which has already been decided. He mentions as his authority for this statement, chapter five, article thirty-one and thirty-two of the Discipline. The authority to make new decisions in these matters is vested in the national synod.  

These arguments certainly are valid; however, one must in all fairness note that the Reformed Church in France had fallen into difficult times. The last national synod was
held at Loudon and no further national assemblies were permitted. If some kind of official action was to be taken, without permission to call a national synod, the remaining highest authority that still could legally assemble would be the provincial synod. Of course, on this level, unless each provincial synod was in agreement on the action to be taken, no unanimous decision could be imposed upon the church as a whole since one provincial synod could not legislate the action that was to be taken in another province, each possessing parallel authority in its own area.

This was a situation that worked to Pajon's advantage. Strong opposition had developed to Pajon's doctrine, and though he was not without supporters, the information available indicates that they were in the minority. On the other hand, Pajon had been able to marshal enough support, at least in his own province, to make the decisions against his views a dead letter as far as any effective ecclesiastical action against him there was concerned. If, however, a national synod had been held, though it is not certain, it is probable that the decision would have gone against Pajon and some form of ecclesiastical censure would have been taken against his position on a national scale. As it was, at Paris, they acted against Le Cene suspecting him of having sympathy towards Pajon's view; whereas, Pajon was able formally in a writing directed to the very Consistory of Charenton, to attack in detail with force and at length the decision made against his position from his home citadel at Orleans in the
province of Orleans-Berry with immunity and without any apparent fear of reprisal as late as 1684, six years after a series of synods had declared themselves against him.

Last Days--Trials to the Very End

Pajon not only wrote to the consistory but he also made a personal visit to Paris on behalf of Le Cene in spite of very poor health about a month or so after the Day of Pentecost in 1684. There he met with de la Bastide, le Marquis de Ruvigny and Allix and returned in very good spirits, thinking that peace would be re-established in all the churches; however, he was overly optimistic in this; it did not take place.\(^{157}\)

On July 22, 1684, Tronchin with whom Pajon had been corresponding for many years, mostly on Pajon's ideas of grace, wrote a letter to Claude in an attempt to bring about a reconciliation between him and Pajon. He indicated that he had heard of the divisions that had been shaking the French Church and drew attention to the deplorable times in which they lived. He argued that if one held to the essentials of Calvinism such as the doctrine election, the certainty of salvation, and the perseverance of the saints, one should be willing to tolerate diverse ideas on how conversion takes place. He pointed out that Pajon's concept of grace does not take anything away from the glory of God and that all the responsibilities of man are established. Furthermore, he noted that God and Christ are equally the authors of
providence and its effects in Pajon's doctrine as in that of immediate grace.\textsuperscript{158} The many years of correspondence and discussions and the firm friendship that had developed between the two men now brought Pajon some strong support from one of the leading theologians at Geneva.

Pajon's health continued to deteriorate and he began to have difficulty in breathing. However, he continued to preach until Lent 1685, then stopped until Easter when he preached again in spite of the gravity of his condition. Advised to go to Bourbon, he left for it on the 23rd of April when he preached for the last time. Esther describes the occasion in a touching way:

... il expliqua ces paroles de Jesus Christ en St Jean, "Je vous donne ma paix, je vous laisse ma paix et ne vous la donne point comme le monde la donne. Vostre coeur ne soit point troublé." On peut dire que jamais texte n'a esté expliqué avec plus de netteté, ... il l'exorta a se soumettre a la volonté de Dieu, et a sa providence, comme il fesoit que Dieu seul sçavoit s'ils le reveroient dans ce tems la; ... Ce pauvre troupeau desolée tesmoigna par ses larmes la douleur de cette seperation.\textsuperscript{159}

Pajon then parted for Bourbon but the waters did not have the hoped for salutary effect. In fact, trouble followed. It was there that he learned of a personal subpoena on a sermon in which it was claimed that he had made seditious remarks and on the subject of a girl who it was claimed had attended his church unlawfully. In the meantime Pajon's church at Orleans had been closed. Pajon was subjected to intense interrogations upon his return lasting as long as four hours in spite of his serious illness. These
proceedings lasted from the first of June until the third of September, 1685. Esther proudly reported that even in his weakened condition Pajon was able to defend himself against these unjust charges in such a manner that the judges recognized his innocence in the end. During this period Pajon was not allowed to carry on his public ministry except for baptizing and the temple remained closed. Pajon's very last days were disturbed by the persecutions of the time. Two days before his death a government official came to his home to seize all the books in his library not included in the catalogue of the Sorbonne; however, seeing Pajon's critical condition he had the humanity to postpone it.

Pajon's loyal and faithful elders Grosteste, Thuysard, and Margueritte were grouped around their dying pastor at that time; two days later Pajon died.

Devoted Esther eulogizes him:

Le 27 de Septembre 1685 a mydi Mr Pajon mon mary après avoir servy dieu fidellement sur la terre esté retire dans le selour de la gloire. Il a exercé le St. ministère depuis la age de 24 et six mois jusque a 59 accomplis, pendant lequel temps, il a receu des ses freres mesmes bien des traverses mais Dieu qui soutient l'innocence, la protegé et par sa providence, la fait surmonter avec gloire tous ses ennemis. Par la mesme grace de dieu son ministere a esté en grande edification. Ce qu'il a composé d'ouvrages veu une approbation universelle. Ceux de l'une et de l'autre communion l'on estime pour sa douceur sa prudence ses grande lumières et la facilite et la nettété avec laquelle il s exprimoit. Mais c'est a moy a qui il appartient de parler de la pieté et de la grandeur de son courage de la beauté de son ama de la bonté de son egalité et enfin de quelle maniere il estoit soumis a la volonté de Dieu et l'usage qu'il a fait de la vie qu'il en avoir receue.

A few days later on the 7th of October an official
report indicates that eighty-eight of the 300 volumes in his library were seized, piled up in front of the house and burned before Pajon's children and their uncle, Perreaux.\textsuperscript{163} About this time the temple and the house of the consistory were also razed to the ground and the land was leased to a vine-grower for fifteen \textit{livres} a year.\textsuperscript{164} Pajon's valiant efforts to stem the tide of intolerance both in the church and in the state had failed, but he made noteworthy contributions to ideas of tolerance and freedom of conscience that would prevail in another day.

As for his controversy on the doctrine of grace, even on his death bed it was reported that on one occasion when a reliable individual brought to his attention the sad tribulations that the Reformed Church was experiencing, Pajon responded that the important thing to understand was that God was chastising his church because she was refusing to embrace the truth. Jurieu comments: "Il ne faut pas s'étonner si dans cette disposition d'esprit il travailla avec une merveilleuse chaleur à faire des diciples."\textsuperscript{165}

It is true, indeed, that though Pajon never published any specific work directly related to this controversy that dominated his life, he poured a tremendous amount of time and energy in writing numerous treatises directly related to the controversy and carried on an extensive correspondence with leading thinkers which was largely a debate on aspects of the controversy as well as expending much time in face-to-face encounters with prospective followers. Pajon was a man of
intense dedication and zeal with two great missions: first, his greatest expenditure of energy, time, and talent was dedicated to convincing the Reformed Church that his concept of grace was the truth that gave the most coherent and consistent answer to the crisis that the church faced in this crucial theological area. Second, his other great labor of love was to defend his church against the threat that it faced from intense intellectual and political assaults by the Catholic Church and authorities.

Post-Revocation Opposition and Defense—Jurieu and Papin

After the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes and the death of Pajon, the Pajonistic controversy continued in Holland where the Synod of the Walloon churches of the Netherlands meeting at Rotterdam on April 24, 1686 took a stand against Pajonism in their fourth article as follows:

Et quant aux opinions pelagiennes que quelques particuliers ont travaillé à introduire sous le terme de grâce médiate, la compagnie déclare qu'elle n'aura pour de telles doctrines aucune tolérance, et enjoint aux consistoires, et particulièrement aux pasteurs, de veiller à ce que rien de contraire à la doctrine de l'Eglise Réformée ne soit avancé là-dessus, non-seulement en prédications, mais aussi en particulier ... 166

Jurieu, Le Moine, Gaillard, and Spanheim, professors of theology, and Saurin of Utrecht, Pierrot, De Joncourt, and Des Marets, pastors, cooperated in the composition of this article aimed against Pajonism. The Huguenot pastors who had become refugees in the Netherlands were called upon to attest to their orthodoxy and conformity to this act with their
signatures. The majority were willing to sign, a number appeared to have signed with reservations, and a few refused to sign. Among those who refused were Souverain, Colomies, Lombard, Du Temps, Maiou, De Lortie, and Le Cene. In 1690, four years later, when the Walloon Synod met at Amsterdam, a series of doctrines were mentioned as intolerable, and the ninth point was directed against Pajonism as follows:

Que la grâce consiste uniquement dans la proposition de la parole et qu'il n'y a point d'opération interne du Saint-Esprit. Toutes maximes dures et pernicieuses qui blessent l'oreille et l'esprit de ceux qui ont à coeur les intérêts de la vérité.\textsuperscript{167}

In 1687 Pierre Jurieu, Pajon's old friend, by then established as one of the leading theologians\textsuperscript{168} of the times and champion of orthodoxy, published the major work of refutation against Pajonism, \textit{Traité de la nature et de la grace}. Jurieu (almost apologizing) states that he had written this book ten years earlier for his own personal use and that of his students at Sedan and only decided to publish it because those who called themselves disciples of Pajon were covering the world with little booklets against the pure doctrine of grace.\textsuperscript{169} Esther's fervent plea that he not write against Pajon did not deter Jurieu from his purpose of defending the \textit{Faith}, but he did have some good things to say about Pajon; and his whole treatment was characterized by uncommon warmth for one who could strike with such a cutting edge. Pajon's warmth, sweetness, and perennial courtesy lived on to somewhat blunt the heavy blow that Jurieu was
convinced he must levy at the doctrine of his old friend and the whole Cameronian movement of thought. Jurieu lauds his virtues and bemoans his shortcomings:

Mr. Pajon avoit l'esprit beau, le jugement net, et beaucoup de pénétration, il écrivoit bien, et il y avoit beaucoup de finesse et de délicatesse dans son tour & sans ses manières. Les écrits que nous avons de lui font foi de cela. Mais malheureusement il s'étroit entêté d'une nouvelle méthode d'expliquer la grace; & son entêtement étoit si grand là dessus qu'il n'étoit pas capable de parler d'autre chose quand il étoit libre de dire ce qu'il pensoit. Il s'imagineoit que les prétendues lumières qu'il avoit découvertes étoient si grandes & si importantes que tout le reste n'étoit rien au prix.

The fact that Jurieu had dictated his work to his students made it possible for Isaac Papin (1657-1709), a nephew of Pajon, to gain access to a copy and to publish a refutation of the work before the work itself appeared. Papin's book, *Essais de théologie sur la providence et la grace*, also appeared in 1687. The first volume was directed against another book by Jurieu, *Jugement sur tes méthodes rigides et relâchées d'expliquer la providence et la grace*, published in 1686 and later bound together with *Traité de la nature et de la grace* and republished with it. The second volume *Critique de la doctrine de Mr. Jurieu sur les habitudes infuses, autrement appelées la grace immédiate* was directed against Jurieu's attack on Pajonism. It was a work that Papin had composed earlier in 1684 and he claimed he would not have published it, had not Jurieu indicated in his *Jugement sur les méthodes* that he was going to publish his work against Pajon.
In the same year another book by Papin, La Foy reduite à ses veritables principes et renfermée dans ses justes bornes, was published, championing and echoing Pajon's sentiments on toleration. With its publication one sees shades of the d'Huisseau affair being repeated in Papin's finding himself an outcast in the French Reformed ranks. Papin's protest that he had not authorized its publication was of no avail, the deed had been done. His later abject apology for his audacity in writing in a disrespectful way against so eminent a theologian as Jurieu could not save him from the wrath to come. There was no longer any great base of operations as had once existed in the province of Orleans-Berry from which Pajonists could sally forth to press their case in the Reformed world with immunity. Indeed, Papin too had gone beyond his master and abandoned the basic Calvinistic framework of thought that Pajon had always carefully maintained. Jurieu was now able to brand him with the Calvinistic anathema Socinian in his preface to Jugement sur les methodes and to berate him in a contemptuous way. Bayle sums up the affair:

Què gagne Mr. Papin lorsqu'il attaquè Mr. Jurieu l'an 1688? Il eut beau représenter que l'interêt de la Religion Chretienne, et l'amour du prochaine de faisoient agir ... Les Lecteurs furent moins dociles aux solutions qu'il voulut donner qu'à la petite preface oû Mr. Jurieu pour réponse l'accusa de l'Heresie Socinienne après l'avoir traité avec le mépris le plus superbe dont aucun Auteur ait donné d'exemple. C'est un coup dont Mr. Papin ne se releva jamais.

In his La tolerance des protestants, Papin tells
of his life and experience with Pajonism. He began his studies in theology at Geneva where he was given his first occasion to consider the question of tolerance. Two of the most able professors there, supporters of universal grace, were pressing for tolerance and were opposed by the partisans of particular grace who held the upper hand in the academy. Papin felt that these men had the right to expect tolerance from the others and he notes that even Claude himself had written to Turretin complaining of their refusal to do so. After this he found another problem of tolerance at Orleans in Pajonism and states that Pajon believed with Jurieu in original sin and efficacious grace but differed from him in the manner in which the Spirit brings about conversion in the hearts of men. He saw the ministers dividing over the question of Pajonism though they were all pretending to only hold to what was clearly taught in Scripture. Pajon was convinced he was supported by the Synod of Dort, Cameron, Testard, Mestrezat, and many other earlier ministers besides those who of his own time came out in favor of his views. Papin acknowledges that Pajon's opponents were more numerous than his supporters, but he also notes there was a third party holding a mediating position on the controversy that took the position their conscience called for toleration of Pajon's views.184

After Papin completed his first studies in theology at Geneva, he studied Hebrew, Greek, and theology under Pajon himself at Orleans and a very close and warm relationship
developed between the two men. Later he wished to enroll at Saumur in 1683 but there they attempted to force him to sign a statement condemning Pajon's doctrine and he refused. He told them that after having thoroughly studied the question by the Word of God he felt it was not settled in an incontestable way, and therefore his conscience did not permit him to sign a condemnation of either of the opposing positions. Thus Papin had to sacrifice the opportunity to study at the famous Academy of Saumur because of his loyalties to Pajon. From Saumur Papin went to Bordeaux and then after the Revocation he took refuge in England where he was ordained in the Anglican Church. As his writings were unacceptable to the orthodox party and particularly to Jurieu, when he returned to the continent he could not find a place of ministry either in the Netherlands or in Germany. Papin passed from the Netherlands to Hamburg and then to Danzig, but in both of these cities correspondence between Jurieu and the leaders of French Reformed Churches pointed out Papin's heterodoxy. At Danzig they attempted to get him to sign the Act of Uniformity of the Synod of Rotterdam, 1686, but he refused. In all the remaining French Reformed world there seemed to be no place left for this young man who dared to oppose the mighty Jurieu. From Danzig he wrote to Mr. de Meaux (Boussuet) to advise him that he wished to embrace the Roman Catholic faith which he did upon returning to France on January 15, 1690. He was denounced for doing this by Jurieu, but Bayle criticized Jurieu in this matter and
accused him of having made things so difficult for Papin that he had no other way to survive.\textsuperscript{188}

In refuting Pajon and the whole Cameronian movement of thought, Jurieu was to arouse a scholar of stature in Elie Saurin, pastor at Utrecht, which was to result in a flurry of publications over a period of years. Saurin staunchly defended the Cameronian movement and attacked with vigor the fideism that Jurieu had now embraced. Cameronianism had survived the downfall of its Pajonistic branch of thought and an intense analysis of the foundations of faith took place as Cameronian Calvinism struggled with fideistic Calvinism for supremacy in the French Reformed world.\textsuperscript{189}

\textbf{Summary}

In this chapter one finds a brief sketch of Pajon's early life and education. Next one sees him preach his famous sermon at the Synod of Saumur in 1665 which reveals his brilliance and eloquence and convinces the Synod he is a worthy successor to Amyraut and Cameron as professor of theology at the famous Academy of Saumur. It must have been a dream come true to Pajon to find himself in possession of this renowned post of service; however, his joy was blighted by the rumblings of discontent concerning his concept of grace that could not be subdued until at last he found himself at the Synod of Pruilly in 1667 being seriously attacked by various synodical representatives as a propagator of dangerous and heretical theological opinions. Again Pajon
displayed his brilliance and keen logical powers to convince the Synod that his views were acceptable and consistent with the Cameronian-Amyraldian theological movement of theology and he was returned to his post to continue in what was hoped would be a brilliant professorial career. In spite of this victory the tide of opposition was so threatening that Pajon felt it would be wise to resign in order to accept a call to an attractive post as pastor at Orleans, one of the leading churches of the realm. Here one sees Pajon become the beloved pastor of a devoted flock until his death eighteen years later in 1685.

The next event that gains one’s attention is the controversy over the work La réunion, probably by d’Huisseau, Pajon’s former rector at the Academy and pastor at Saumur, who was unfrocked for advocating tolerance. Pajon worked to help, but he could not save d’Huisseau from his adversaries. Consequently, an attitude of tolerance that could have saved the church from bitter divisions was repudiated for fear that it would open the door to heterodoxy. Several years later, in 1673, the full measure of Pajon’s learning and ability was revealed in his scholarly and closely reasoned defense of the Reformed Church against the assault of one of the leading Jansenists, Nicole. Pajon now demonstrated his intellectual leadership in the Reformed community and no one could now take him lightly. Though he published nothing on his own particular controversy, a number of forceful treatises and letters were available by him which were carefully copied
and passed from person to person which together with strong vocal support marshalled a devoted following to Pajon's side, especially among a nucleus of intellectuals. However, Pajon's adversaries continued to work against him and some even became abusive in their opposition; therefore, Pajon decided to confer with Claude in order to gain his help in forestalling further trouble. The conference actually had a serious reverse effect, for Claude became convinced of such lurking dangers for the Reformed faith in Pajon's doctrine as Pelagianism itself in disguised form. Consequently, he used his influence to rally various Reformed leaders to a secret meeting in Paris in July 1677 to oppose the spread of Pajonism. They were able to quickly gain official action against it in 1677 and 1678 in a number of synods and the Academies of Saumur and Sedan.

Still, Pajon, his strong supporter Lenfant, and a nucleus of dedicated followers fought back, and Pajon was able to establish himself in his own Synod of Orleans-Berry to such a degree that any outside synodical action against him was useless. From here Lenfant and Pajon launched their counterattack with the tenacious Lenfant carrying the battle to Claude's own consistory and synod. Pajon continued his voluminous correspondence and boldly challenged the actions that had been taken against him, though various trials and challenges absorbed much of his time at home. With the issuing of the Advertissement pastoral and the abjuration of his own fellow pastor Des Mahis, Pajon again took up his
eloquent pen and wrote a powerful answer to this further assault on his church. For about four years there had been something of a lull in the Pajonistic controversy, but in 1683 one hears of the Le Cene affair in which a new young pastor at Paris was accused of favoring Pajonism in his preaching. The development of this affair was to sadly divide the pastors and congregation of this great and influential church and call forth Pajon's major stinging answer in 1684 to the action that had been earlier taken against his teaching. However, Pajon's hopes for a reconciliation crumbled and he found himself beleaguered in his own city by Catholic authorities, his health failing, his church closed, and his public ministry forbidden in 1685 as the fateful day of the Revocation approached. Pajon was spared from experiencing this final lethal blow to the once flourishing Reformed Church of France by death in September 1685.

After the Revocation the controversy continued in other lands, and Pajonism was proscribed at the Synod of Rotterdam. Jurieu finally published the major refutation of Pajonism and Papin responded. Though he attempted to do so, Jurieu could not bring down the whole Cameronian movement; Elie Saurin answered effectively and massively.
CHAPTER II

1Paris, Bibliothèque d'Arsenal, MS 5633, fol. 244. Hereinafter this library will be referred to as BA.


4BA, MS 5633, fol. 244.

5Chauffepié, "Claude Pajon," loc. cit. BA, MS 5633, fol. 244.

6Letter, Chouet to Tronchin, Oct. 25, 1666, from Saumur, Tronchin MSS 47, fol. 59v.

7Chauffepié, "Claude Pajon," op. cit., n.B., p. 6. He has been followed in this by Frank Puaux, Les précurseurs français de la tolérance au XVIIe siècle (Dole, 1880), p. 82; Haag, loc. cit.; Schweizer, Die Protestantischen, II, p. 570; et al.

8Chouet to Tronchin, Oct. 25, 1666, from Saumur, Tronchin MSS 47, fol. 59v.

9Chouet to Tronchin, May 12, 1665, Tronchin MSS 47, fols. 39, 40. Here one has an on-the-spot evaluation of what was going on.

10This sermon was published as Sermon sur ces mots de la Seconde Epître de Saint Paul écrivant aux Corinthiens, chap. 3. v. 17 ... prononcé à Saumur, le Synode y tenant, le troisième de May 1665 (Saumur, 1666). The sermon will be discussed at length later.

11Chouet to Tronchin, Oct. 25, 1666, Tronchin MSS 47, fols. 59, 60.
12 Paris, Bibliothèque du protestantisme français, Collection Auzière, Anjou, Pasteurs, MS 545², fol. 120.

13 Chouet to Tronchin, April 6, 1666, Tronchin MSS 47, fol. 51.

14 Ibid., fols. 50, 51.

15 Ibid., fol. 50.

16 Chouet to Tronchin, Oct. 25, 1666, Tronchin MSS 47, fols. 59v-60v.

17 Infra, pp. 313-316.

18 Chouet to Tronchin, June 16, 1666, Tronchin MSS 47, fols. 52, 53.

19 Ibid., fol. 52.

20 Chouet to Tronchin, Oct. 25, 1666, Tronchin MSS 47, fol. 60v.

21 Chouet to Tronchin, Dec. 15, 1666, Tronchin MSS 47, fols. 63, 64.

22 Ibid., fol. 63v.

23 Ibid.


25 Ibid., fols. 121, 121v.

26 Ibid., fol. 121v.

27 Ibid., fols. 121, 122, 122v.

28 Ibid., fol. 122.

29 Ibid., fol. 122v.

30 Ibid., fol. 123.


BA, MS 5633, fol. 244v.


Ibid., p. 81.

Ibid., pp. 81, 82. Also in n. 1, p. 82. Stauffer noted that d'Huisseau's son did not take into consideration all the facts in making this conclusion. He stated earlier in n. 1, p. 22, that his research into the vast literature called forth by the publication of La réunion did not result in any confirmation of this claim. This author did not find anything specific to support such a claim either during his research into the Pajonistic literature. However, the Chouet letters and the minutes of the Synod of Pruilly show the strong opposition to Pajon and d'Huisseau's support of Pajon very well might have been highly resented by the opposition.


Stauffer, op. cit., n. 1, p. 22.


Stauffer, op. cit., pp. 82-83.

Infra, pp. 109, 110.

Quoted by Stauffer, op. cit., n. 1, p. 44.


La réunion du christianisme ou la manière de re­­joindre tous les chrétiens sous une seule confession de foi (Saumur, 1670), pp. 8, 9.

Ibid., pp. 9, 10.

Ibid., passim.
Isaac Papin, *Recueil des ouvrages composés par feu M. Papin ...*, III (Paris, 1723), pp. 418-420. Papin was Pajon's nephew, studied under him and was highly influenced by him. He is credited with writing the book *La Foy réduite à ses véritables principes* ... (Rotterdam, 1687), which reflected views on tolerance similar to those to be found in *La réunion*. There is a short history of Papin's life given in Volume I of *Recueil des ouvrages* ... written by his wife in which a pertinent passage reads: "De Geneve M. Papin revint à Blois en 1679, & alla faire à Orleans, en particulier sous M. Pajon son Oncle Maternel, ses premières Études de Théologie & des Langues Grecque & Hébraïque. M. Pajon s'attacha à lui comme à son enfant; & lui comme à son Pere; leur idées se rapportoient parfaitement ensemble; & si M. Pajon trouve dans M. Pajon toute la lumiere, toute la
nettété, & toute l'affection, qu'on peut désirer dans un Maître, M. Pajon trouvoit dans M. Papin toute la penetration, toute la justesse ... qu'il pouvoit désirer dans son Neveu & dans son diciple ... Les Disputes sur les sentiments de M. Pajon faisoient alors grand bruit, ... M. Papin, peut être par prévention pour un Oncle auquel il avoit des obligations singulieres, peut être aussi parce qu'il sentoit que M. Pajon raisonoit beaucoup plus juste & plus conséquemment que ses adversaires, sans prendre ouvertement parti pour lui, penchoit cependant secretement de son coté, avec connoissance de sa cause [Preface, pp. lxxi, lxxii]." Cf. Chauffepié, "Isaac Papin," Nouveau dictionnaire, III, pp. 28, 29 and the preface to La Foy réduite ... 

68. There are three editions of the work in the University Library at Geneva, the original printed in 1673 at Orleans, another printed in 1683 at the Hague, and a third printed in 1761 at Geneva.


74. Ibid., pp. 171, 172.

75. Ibid., p. 173.

76. Ibid., p. 174.

77. Ibid.

78. Ibid., p. 199.

79. Ibid., pp. 201-2. Pajon appears to be referring to Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole's La logique ou l'art de penser which has appeared in numerous editions. This writer used the edition by Pierre Clair and François Girbal (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1965) which states that the first edition was published in 1662 at Paris. P. 4.
Cf. pp. 322, 333 where a series of axioms are given and reference is made to the last three as "le fondement de la foi." Arnauld was another of the great Jansenists.


Chauffepié, "Claude Pajon," op. cit., n. K, pp. 15.2, 16.1 & 2. Two manuscripts were located during this research which give detailed reports on this conference: "Relation de ce qui se passa entre Mr Claude et Mr Pajon dans les conferences qu'ils eurent au mois de Juillet 1676," Le Cene MSS, Vol. VI, No. 4, pp. 111-138 and "Conference touchant la nature et la grace, entre Messrs Claude et Pajon en presence de Messrs de la Bastide, et Lenfant," Le Cene MSS, Vol. VI, No. 3, pp. 91-107. Neither manuscript gives its author; however another manuscript indicates that Lenfant kept a record of the conferences which was read before each new meeting. "Examin d'un jugement renu par les Synodes des Eglises Reformées de l'Ile de France, Picardie, Champagne, etc. assemblé a Charenton au mois d'Avril et de May 1679 . . . ," Le Cene MSS, Vol. VII, No. 2, p. 30. Internal evidence points to Lenfant as the author of No. 4. The other report, No. 3, appears to have been written by de la Bastide unless Claude or Pajon wrote up the conference themselves. Besides Lenfant, he is the only other person mentioned as being present. Marc Antione de la Bastide (1624-1704) was an elder in the church at Charenton and an able lay theologian. He wrote against La réunion, Bousset, and the Advertissement pastoral. Haag, "La Bastide," op. cit., IV, pp. 151.1-152.1.

Claude (1619-1687) served as pastor at Charenton from 1666 till the Revocation. Léonard, op. cit., p. 342. Claude also distinguished himself in responding to Nicole's attack in his La défense de la Réformation contre le livre intitulé Préjugés légitimes contre les Calvinistes (Quevilly, 1673). There is no thorough work on Claude available though there are a number of short theological theses: Jean-Leonce Coyne, Thèse historique et critique sur Jean Claude, sa vie et ses écrits (Montauban, 1856); Elie Bourelly, Jean Claude et la défense de la Réformation (Montauban, 1887); Justin-Louis Bonnal, Jean Claude pasteur et prédicateur (Toulouse, 1868); and Nathanâël Estève, Une conversion au XVII<sup>e</sup> siècle (Mlle de Durac). Conférence entre Claude et Boussuet sur "la matière de l'Eglise" (Montauban, 1894).


Le Cene MSS, Vol. VI, No. 4, p. 111. The de Brais mentioned here appears to be Etienne de Brais who was a professor of theology at the Academy of Saumur and rector in
1674. Douen, *op. cit.*, p. 350. He appears also to have been the de Brais who opposed Pajon at the Synod of Saumur in 1667.


95 Pierre du Bosc (1623-1692) was a most famous Reformed preacher of the period. Léonard, *op. cit.*, p. 341.


125

102 Ibid.


106 Ibid.


109 Infra, pp. 243-256.


112 Ibid., No. 1, pp. 1-27.

113 Supra, p. 123, n. 80.


115 Ibid., p. 32.


117 Ibid., No. 1, pp. 9-14.


120 The minutes of the Synod of Sancere held on June 29, 1679 and the days following, report the matter as follows: "Le dS Pajon quy avoit esté nommé au Synode precedent avec le dS Lefant Ministre à Chastillon sur Loing pour l'examin du dS de Brais professeur en Theology en l'academie de Saumur, a rendu compte tant pour luy que pour le dS Lefant de la commission que leur esté donnée, et après avoir informe la Compagnie des grands dons et riches talens du dS de Brais, Elle a beni de ce qu'il luy a plus adresser un tel personnage à l'academie de Saumur a remercié les dSs Lefant et Pajon loué leur gestion ... " Ba, Ms 7463, fol. 145v.

121 Ibid., fol. 142v.
Two chief deputies were appointed, the other was Girard. The minutes seem to indicate that because of certain reasons the Synod decided that the representation to the next national synod should be changed. One may assume that if Pajon was not chosen to go at the earlier meeting of the synod his Synod now felt that it was of importance for him to be there. However, no other national synod was to be held, the last being that of Loudun (1659-1660). Léonard, op. cit., p. 340.


Ibid., p. 29.

Ibid., pp. 43-44.

Lettre de M. Pajon à Messieurs du Consistoire de Charenton, February 12, 1684, from Orleans, Le Cène MSS, Vol. VI, No. 12, p. 239.

BA, MS 5633, fols. 245-48.

Tronchin MSS 53, fol. 31.

BA, MS 5633, fols. 245, 245v.

Esther writes: "M. des Mahis avait un dessein qu'il cachoit avec soin à M. Pajon et pour l'accomplir il prit la résolution d'aller à Paris. Nous partimes ensemble de 14 de Décembre 1682. Ce fut là qu'il déclara qu'il voulit changer de Religion." BA, MS 5633, fol. 245v.


BA, MS 5633, fol. 245v.

Douen, op. cit., p. 358.


Claude Pajon, Remarques sur l'Avertissement pastoral... (Sur l'édition d'Amsterdam, 1631), pp. 2-3.
Copy of an official report made at Bionne, January 31, 1683, Municipal Library, Orleans, MS 1361, fol. 310.


Ibid., p. 57.

Ibid., pp. 57-58.

Ibid., pp. 92-93.

Ibid., p. 94.

Ibid., pp. 112-13.

Ibid., p. 139.

Ibid., pp. 140-41.


Quoted by Douen, *op. cit.*, p. 359.

Later Le Cene published works that supported these suspicions and brought into question the sincerity of his earlier claims of orthodoxy in 1683. In 1684, he had *De l'état de l'homme après le péché et de sa prédétermination au salut* published in Amsterdam. In it he appears to question the validity of the Reformed concept of predestination (pp. 200, 201, 330). In 1685 together with John Le Clerc he published *Entretiens sur diverses matières de théologie* (Amsterdam), in which he clearly indicated that he was opposed to the concept of immediate grace (pp. 3-26) and supported Pajon in holding that conversion was brought about by the persuasive power of the Word, reason and attending circumstances; however he appears to have rejected Pajon's Calvinistic framework of thought (p. 75). Cf. Chauffepié, "Charles Le Cene," *op. cit.*, pp. 161-63. *Bayle, Oeuvres diverses*, I, p. 100.2. Ed. Saigey, "Le Pajonisme," *Revue de théologie*, XIV (January-June, 1857), 335-55.

Pierre Allix (1641-1717) who had come to Charenton in 1670 had clearly revealed by this time that he was a man of moderation and peace. He had been unhappy with the council of war against Pajon and the negative action against Le Cene. He was a man of stature and had served as the moderator of the Synod of the l'Isle de France held in August 1683 when an official observer evaluated him as the most able man there. This Synod was the last to be held in France during the
period of the Edict of Nantes. Interestingly enough though some spoke of the "Emperor Claude," Claude had come to this Synod not as a delegate but as a petitioner requesting that his son who was a minister at Clermont be transferred to Charenton where there were some vacant places. The Synod refused to do this. Le P. G. Ladeveze, "Le dernier synode provincial sous l'empire de l'Edit de Nantes (1685)," Bulletin, I (1852), 459, 460. "The Escape of Dr. Pierre Allix from France in 1685," material drawn from a paper written by Charles Peter Allix, Proceedings of the Huguenot Society of London, XIII (1929), 625-27.

Douen, op. cit., pp. 361-62, may have a point in suggesting that the persistent refusal of the consistory at Charenton to bring Claude's son to serve as a pastor there could be interpreted as a tacit expression of their disapproval of all the controversies and divisions caused by his warfare against Pajonism.

Solange Deyon, "Les relations de famille et d'affaires de Jean Claude d'après sa correspondance à la veille de la Rèvocation (1683-1685)," Bulletin, CXVI (1970), 154-55. Letter, Claude to the Bishop of London, April, 1684, from Paris, Bulletin, XII (1863), 71, suggests a very warm and close relationship between Claude and Sartre who instigated the proceeding against Le Cene in sharp contrast to Claude's disparaging treatment of Le Cene in his letter to Tessereau. Claude's suspicions extended to Allix also and in 1685, when the utmost cooperation and unity was needed for survival itself, the relationship between these two leading pastors appear to have almost entirely disintegrated. On May 25, 1685 he wrote to his son: "Il n'y a que M. Allix qui ne voie aucun de ses collèques, et qui est pélagien outré et hautement déclaré, et peut-être encore quelque chose de pis." Quoted by Douen, op. cit., p. 361.


154 Ibid., p. 260.

155 Ibid., pp. 247-51.


157 BA, MS 5633, fol. 246.
Esther describes the ordeal vividly: "Il passé depuis le premier de Juin jusqu'au trois de Septembre dans la poursuite du procès se voyant tous les jours près a remettre son ame a son Dieu, et soutenant des confrontations qui auroient été capable d'accabler des personnes en santé et son mal en étoit souvent augmenté ce qui obligeoit de dire a Mf le Lieutenant general. Je n'en puis plus. Et je l'ouis un jour dire vous êtes quatre contre moy donner moy ma femme: ce qui m'obligea d'ouvrir la porte, il estoit au licit. Et je demandai a Mf le Lieutenant general la vie de mon mari que l'on mettoit au tombeau par le grand travail et la persecution qu'il souffroit." BA, MS 5633, fol. 247v.

Cf. Réponse au factum fait pour Claude Pajon ministre a Bionne de la R. P. R. et anciens: ... Contre Mr le Procureur du Roy au Baillage et Siege Presidial d'Orleans demandeur et complaignant. BA, MS 5633, fols. 253, 253v, 255, 256.


It was located in Orleans, rue de la Vieille-Monnaie and was a large and beautiful place known as la Maison du Pasteur. Bionne where the temple was located was six or seven kilometres away and the pastors were provided with a carriage to get there. At this time Pajon as first pastor received a salary of 3600 francs, Des Mahis as second pastor received 1200 francs. At the Revocation Pajon's family had to move out of their home and make place for Monceau, a priest; however for a long time it kept the name Maison du Pasteur. Louis Bastide, "Temples de l'Eglise Réformée d'Orleans, (1561-1685)," Bulletin, XLVIII (1899), 561, 570.


Erich Haase, *Einführung in die Literatur des Refuge* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1959); is useful. Elisabeth Labrousse's *Vol. I; Du Pays de Foix à la cité d'Erasme*, and *Vol. II: Hétérodoxie et Rigorisme de Pierre Bayle* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963-65); and *Inventaire critique de la correspondance de Pierre Bayle* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1961), can be used to advantage since the two men both as one-time friends and then later as bitter foes are linked together in many ways. For the same reason one may consult with profit Bayle's *Dictionnaire* and *Oeuvres diverses*.

Jurièu, *Traité*, p. 7. Loyal Esther wrote him a forceful letter in an attempt to dissuade him from publishing against her beloved husband and drew attention to the close links between their two families. *BA, MS 5633*, fols. 248, 248v.

*Traité*, pp. 3-4

In this form it was entitled "Exam de la doctrine condamnée dans les Synodes de Normandie, de l'Isle de France..."
et d'Anjou sur la providence générale et particulière."
Part of it is in the Le Cene MSS, Vol. VII, No. 20, pp. 395-444.

172 Francfort


174 Traité, avertissement. Jurieu states that it was
written at Blois, May 3, 1684. Papin states in his
avertissement, Essais de théologie ... (Francfort, 1687),
hereinafter referred to as Essais, that it was written three
years earlier. Cf. Letter, Jacques Cappel to Papin, from
Soury, near Blois, July 16, 1684 in Recueil des ouvrages par
feu M. Papin, II, pp. 339-41. He writes about having enjoyed
reading the work: "Je n'ai jamais médité un dimanche comme
aujourd'hui rien qui fit sur moi une plus agréable, plus
utile, & plus forte impression qu'a fait votre écrit; où j'ai
vu étendues & confirmées admirablement tant de pensées que
j'ai sans cesse sur l'obligation où sont tous les Chrétiens
d'appuier mieux qu'ils ne font leur foi par des raisons
solides," p. 339. Cappel's praise is in sharp contrast with
Jurieu's belittlement.

175 Papin, Essais, avertissement.

176 Rotterdam, 1687.

177 Chauffepié states that the book was condemned at
the Synodes des Eglises Walonnes at Blois-le-duc in September,
1687 and it was ordered that the author not be permitted to
preach in the churches in Holland; however in considera-
tion of a relative of Papin's, the action was not put in writing

178 Ibid., n. B., p. 29.2.

179 Papin writes to Jurieu: "Je voudrois, Monsieur,
qu'il me fût aussi facile de me satisfaire moy-même à
l'égard du juste reproche que vous me faites, de n'avoir pas
observé à votre égard des mesures, personne de votre âge, de
votre savoir, & de votre rang ... J'avoué que j'aurais dû
vous faire remarquer par mon tour & par mes expressions
combien je vous honore, & que je vous regarde comme un des
plus grands-hommes de notre siècle. Tout ce que je puis
faire est de vous supplier très-humblement de ne juger pas
du profond respect que j'ay pour vous, par le style de ces
deux Ecrits imprimez; & d'être persuadé que si j'avoir cru
paroître en personne aux yeux de Public, disputant contre un
Docteur aussi illustre que vous, je l'aurais fait d'une
maniére qui aurait fait sentir à mes Lecteurs, que je sai
combien je suis au-dessous de vous, & pour la Littérature &
pour la Capacité: que je n'ay pas oublié que je dois vous regarder comme un maître, & me considérer comme un disciple." Quoted by Chauffepié, ibid., n. C., p. 30.1.

Essais, pp. 109, 110; 121-23; 199-201; passim. Cf., Letter, Papin to John Le Clerc, October 27, 1685, well-known Arminian, University Library, Amsterdam, MS. C 117 in which he writes: "... votre théologie est de notre goût plus je ne puis vous dire. J'ay été ravi de joye de vous voir donner sur les doigts à nos Protestans comme ils le méritent ... " Quoted by Haase, Einführung in die Literatur des Refuge, n. 216, p. 205.

Avertissement, no pagination.

Oeuvres diverses, III, p. 777.

La tolérance des protestants et l'autorité de l'église, ou réponse au libelle de M. Jurieu qui porte pour titre "Lettre pastorale aux fidèles de Paris, d'Orléans et de Blois ... " (Paris, 1692).

Ibid., pp. 18, 19.

"Abregée de la vie, de la conversion et de la mort de feu M. Papin donnée par Madame Papin sa veuve," Recueil des ouvrages par feu M. Papin, I, lxxi.

Papin, La tolérance des protestants ..., pp. 19, 20.


Chauffepié, "Jurieu," op. cit., pp. 75-77. Saurin and Jurieu carried on a virtual literary duel against each other in a series of volumes. Saurin wrote Examen de la théologie de Mr. Jurieu ..., in two sizable volumes in 1694 answered by the indefatigable Jurieu with his Défense de la doctrine universelle de l'Eglise ..., in 1695 and La religion du latitudinaire ... in 1696. The energetic Saurin responded to these volumes with Défense de la véritable doctrine de l'Eglise réformée ..., (a chapter by chapter refutation of Jurieu's Défense de la doctrine universelle ...) and Justification de la doctrine du sieur Elie Saurin ... in 1697.
CHAPTER III

AN EXAMINATION OF PAJON'S CONTROVERSY
AND DOCTRINE

In this chapter there will be a more intensive examination of Pajon's controversy and doctrine beginning with a discussion of Pajon's famous sermon on freedom which gives a good introduction to his general Cameronian approach to theology and apologetics. Following this there will be a study of Pajon's important treatise on original sin which lays the foundation for his whole system of thought. Next twelve controversial Pajonistic propositions will be considered based on Jurieu's analysis. Responses from Papin will be introduced at certain points because there is no formal response available from Pajon himself to the attack on his system by Jurieu. Upon reaching the key eleventh and twelfth propositions that constitutes the very heart of the controversy, one of Pajon's clearest and most thorough presentations of the concept of mediate grace versus immediate grace will be discussed. With this clarification of the issues in mind three significant approaches to the process of conversion are taken up: First, Pajon's own in-depth exposure of the subject followed by two competing viewpoints, the Cameronian anti-Pajonistic position and Jurieu's own
discussion of the matter from his non-Cameronian fideistic point of view. This should help to further clarify the crucial issues and the polarization occurring especially between Jurieu and Pajon's development. This chapter concludes with a pertinent rebuttal of Pajonism by Jurieu though almost all of Jurieu's treatment of Pajon's ideas amount to a critical refutation of his thought.

A Study of Pajon's Controversial Sermon

Pajon's sermon before the Synod of Saumur in 1665 did not begin the controversy but it did bring Pajon to the public notice, helped him gain his position at the Academy of Saumur, and made him more dangerous than ever before in the eyes of those who had already taken exception to his concept of grace. There appears to be no record of any detailed study of this important work which may be considered something of a masterpiece of oratory and concise theological thinking. It is the only published work by Pajon that may be related directly to his controversy. A careful study of the sermon does not reveal any direct statement of Pajon's concept that the Spirit never operates immediately apart from the Word upon man or any of his faculties at conversion; however, the idea may be recognized as implied by the statements that Pajon does make on how the Spirit operates in the lives of men. The sermon is simply entitled *Sermon sur ces mots de la Seconde Epistre de Saint Paul écrivant aux Corinthiens. Chap. 3.v.17.* The version Pajon uses
translates the passage as: "Or le Seigneur est cet Esprit là; et là où est l'Esprit du Seigneur, là est la liberté."  

Pajon indicates that his sermon is to occupy itself with the subject of freedom, and he opens his discourse with the words, "La Liberté est un bien que tout le monde desire, mais que peu de personnes connoissent." After discussing various secular views of freedom that consider it basically as lack of restraint or coercion, Pajon points out that the scriptural view connects it with virtue. Only those really ought to be considered free who know how to choose the true good. Pajon notes that his text gives the locus of this liberty "en nous disent, qu'elle se trouve 'où est l'Esprit du Seigneur,'" and he proposes to consider, first of all, the nature of this Spirit that is the locus of liberty and, secondly, the nature of this liberty itself. Pajon carefully notes that the term Spirit may be interpreted in two different ways—either as the third person of the Trinity or as the gifts and graces that are produced in our heart by this divine person. He calls the first, "L'Esprit qui donne," and the second, "L'Esprit qui est donné." Pajon attempts to establish that in this passage the word is being used in the second sense "pour les dons et les graces du Saint Esprit que Dieu répand dans nos coeurs, et pour les principes de la regeneration."  

Pajon follows the same pattern in considering the term Seigneur, indicating that it, too, may be taken in two senses in the Scripture: first, for the second member of
the Trinity and second, for the image of the Lord.

"Secondement, il se prend pour l'image de cette personne de nostre Seigneur, peinte, dans nos coeurs, par la Predication de l'Evangile." Pajon moves clearly in the Cameronian tradition by emphasizing the primacy of knowledge in conversion.7

Dans ce chapitre meme, Christ est mis pour la connoissance, ou pour l'image de Christ, en nos coeurs, quand l'Apostre dit, que ce voile epais, qui demeure sur le coeur des Israelites, est aboli par Christ: non simplement par Christ presche (car les Israelites avoyent aussi entendu la predication de Christ) mais par Christ connu. Parce que la connoissance de Christ est une lumiere si brillante que, quand elle entre dans une ame, elle en dissipe toutes les tenebres, elle en escarte tous les nuages, elle leve les voiles les plus espais ... 8

Thus Pajon concludes that the word Seigneur in the text should not be taken for the divine person but for "son image, que nous recevrons en nous par la predication de l'Evangile."9

Having established to his satisfaction that both of these terms are used in the secondary sense, Pajon joins the two terms together:

Et ainsi vous voyez evidemment ce que Saint Paul nous a voulu dire, c'est que cette image du Seigneur, que nous recevrons, ce Christ qui est formé en nous par la predication de l'Evangile, est justement l'esprit, cet esprit qui nous est donne, cet esprit dont nous vous avons fait voir que l'Evangile est le ministere. En effet, l'Evangile form le Seigneur en nos ames, et nous communique l'esprit; par une seule et meme action, ce qui montre bien que le Seigneur et l'esprit ne sont en nous qu'une meme chose.10

Again Pajon's distinctive idea is implied by the emphasis he places upon the proclamation of the gospel as the means by which the Spirit is communicated to man. It also is
reflected in the comparison he makes between the effectiveness of the Mosaic message and the gospel:

Quel avantage à ce ministère, par dessus le ministère de Moyse, de peindre tout ensemble le Seigneur Iesus dans nos coeurs et de nous fournir de Saint Esprit? O merveille de la puissance de la predication! O efficace incomprehensible de l'Evangile de Christ, qui forme Christ en nos coeurs, qui l'y fait habiter par la foy, qui nous changer en des temples du Saint Esprit, et qui, par une seule, et simple action, loge la Divinité, toute entiere, dans nos ames, et accomplit en nous tout d'un coup, ces grandes promesses que nos fait l'Apostre saint Pierre, que nous serons rendus participants de la nature Divine.11

It is to be noted that Pajon's concept of the superiority of the new covenant over the old appears to be no more than the superiority of the idea and image of Christ communicated by the power of preaching.

Having considered the nature of the Spirit that communicates true liberty to men and the manner in which it is communicated, Pajon takes up the question of the nature of this liberty itself. The glory of the ministry can be realized only when one is able to grasp the excellence of the liberty that is brought to men by the Spirit. First, Pajon considers the bondage that afflicts mankind and notes that this bondage depends on three things: ignorance, sin, and death. However, Pajon reveals that he is a staunch member of the Cameronian tradition in his emphasis that this bondage has ignorance as its foundation and source. "L'ignorance, qui est la source de la servitude, et le commencement de ce malheureux esclavage ... " In keeping with this, Pajon argues after Cameron that liberty depends
on knowledge. "La liberté dépend tellement de la connaissance, que là où il n'y a point de connaissance, il n'y a point aussi de liberté, et nous mesurons tres-iustement l'estendue de la liberté, par celle de la connaissance." Pajon observes that there are different types of liberty; for instance, a sinner may be said to be free in the area where he has knowledge. On the other hand, this knowledge is limited; consequently he cannot be said to be entirely free. Pajon introduces an analogy by comparing a sinner to a man who is given a town as a prison. In this town the man is free in a sense, he can do whatever he wishes; but he is not absolutely free because he is in a prison, he cannot leave the town. Pajon makes his application: "Le pecheur, non regénéré est aussi par son ignorance, renfermé dans la prison de ce monde, Sa connaissance ne l'eslève jamais au dessus de la terre, et des elémens." He is free in a sense in these things for he can choose between vices and passions which appeal to his whims, he can even use his liberty in various secular pursuits, but his ignorance serves as a limitation. "Il ne peut choisir des biens, qu'il ne conoit pas."

How great, in contrast to the state of the sinner, is the freedom of the faithful. "Mais le fidèle, dont les yeux ont esté ouvers, par le lumiere de l'esprit; qui port, en son coeur, l'image du Seigneur Iesus ... se peut dire absolument libre, sa liberty n'a point d'autre bornes que celle de l'infinity." Pajon, again following Cameron, notes
that even as liberty cannot be considered to extend to un-
known objects, it cannot extend to those objects which are
known to be against our well-being. Pajon repudiates what he
considers to be the false philosophy which considers the will
to be the master of its actions without regards to the dic-
tates of reason. He also repudiates that

fausse Théologie, qui voidroit persuader que l'esprit
du Seigneur qui nous est donné, laisse nos âmes dans
l'équilibre, et dans l'indifférence de se déterminer,
au bien, ou au mal, sans en pouvoir rendre de raison,
sinon qu'il leur a plû ainsi, et que sans cette
difference, il n'y aurait point de liberté.**

Thus Pajon firmly identifies himself with the Cameronian con-
cept of the relationship of the understanding to the will and
rejects what he considers to be the Arminian interpretation
of the extent of the action of grace at the time of conver-
sion. Against the concept that the will is given the power
by grace to determine itself, Pajon proposes what might seem
to be a paradox. The more an action is free, the more it is
necessary.

Oûy, plus une action est libre, et plus il est
impossible de s'empêcher de l'exercer: parce que
la même cause qui la rende libre, est, celle qui
la rend nécessaire. Elle est libre parce qu'elle
est faite avec connaissance; et plus la
connaissance du bien que nous recherchons est
grande, plus l'inclinaison, qui nous porte à le
rechercher, est forte et invincible,

Pajon adds other arguments such as the necessity of God's
actions as well as those of angels being compatible with their
liberty.** He also argues the difference between the holi-
ness of earth and the holiness of heaven depends upon the
perfect knowledge that will prevent our being misled in
heaven. "Et comme nous ne pourrons estre trompés, dans nos connoissances, nous ne le pourrons estre, dans nostre choix! Ainsi toutes nos actions seront éclairées, par l'esprit de Dieu, de la connaissance de la vérité." In this manner, Pajon skillfully and eloquently adopts and expounds the Cameronian solution to the supposed antinomy between irresistible grace and free will. Grace converts the elect irresistibly and necessarily but still freely, without coercion or constraint, and naturally in conformity with the laws of man's nature. "Mais nous disons, aussi, que ceux, à qui l'esprit du Seigneur tient les yeux ouverts, ont une telle connaissance du prix, et de la jütre valeur des choses, qu'il est impossible qu'ils choisissent mal." 

Besides the first paradox and its resolution with regards to the necessitation and freedom of the elect, Pajon has another to propose that is concerned with the non-elect. C'est, qu'une action fait contre les loix de la raison, n'est, ni nécessaire, ni libre. Elle n'est pas libre puis qu'elle n'est pas faite, avec connaissance, mais par erreur. Elle n'est pas nécessaire, puis que rien ne force le meschant à se tromper, et à errer. Even as earlier Pajon emphasized his concept of the direct positive link between freedom and necessity, now he emphasizes the negative element. "Si une meschante action, n'est pas libre elle n'est point, aussi, nécessaire." However, Pajon wishes to avoid being misunderstood and is quick to grant that one might say that it has a form of necessity in a certain sense.
Elle a bien veritablement, cette necessite, que
j'appelleray icy d'un nom barbare, necessite
hypothetique, c'est a dire, pose que le meschant se
trompe, qu'il y est necessaire qu'il choisisse mal.
Mais rien ne force ny oblige le meschant a se
tromper.13

Pajon, however, wishes to carefully avoid any idea of the
necessitation to sin that would undermine the responsibility
of man. Pajon argues that nothing forces the sinner to be
mistaken, nor is he coerced against his will to err and
choose a false good instead of the true one.

Dites-moy, ie vous prie, le mensonge a-t-il quelque
force, pour enlever nostre consentement, en depit
de nous? Qui contraint le meschant a croire que
le monde est souverainement aimable? ... En
conscience, s'il pensoit serieusement a toutes ces
choses; s'il employez ces excellent facultez, qui
luy ont esté donnees, pour connoistre la nature de
ces faux biens ... ne reconnoistroit-il pas
aisement la vanite de tout es ces choses, et ne
s'escrieroit-il pas dans cette meditation, comme le
Sage, "Vanite des vanites; vanite tres vaine, tout
est vanite."20

The very first sin was an act of imprudence brought
about by the failure of the first man properly to consider
his duty and to remember and think upon the warnings he had
received from God. All following sins have been patterned
after this original sin.

Ce premier peché a esté la mesure et la regle de
tous les autres. Ils sont tous faits aussi par une
semblable imprudence; parce que nous ne considerons
pas assez l'excellence de l'honneste, au-dessus de
l'utile; ou, pour mieux dire, l'excellence de
l'utile, et de l'honneste, au-dessus de ce qui est
absolument, et ruineux, et infame.21

As far as his treatment of the subject to this point, Pajon
insists that he has not nor does he intend to destroy that
element of liberty that properly belongs to the nature of man.
What he has rejected as far as the faithful are concerned is that false liberty of indifference that supposedly could draw them again to evil when the Spirit would draw them to the good. What he has rejected as far as the sinner is concerned, is the imaginary powers of the free will to carry him of itself to the good without having received the Spirit of the Lord to deliver him from the power of evil.

Le nécessité, que nous imposons au fidèle, de faire un bon choix, dépend de sa connoissance, et, par conséquent, de sa liberté. La liberté, que nous ostons au meschant, de faire le bien, est un effet de ignorance des choses, qu'il n'a voulu savoir. Now Pajon emphasizes what he wishes to preserve as far as both saint and sinner are concerned. The first is necessitated freely and the second is enslaved voluntarily. Furthermore, the saint owes his deliverance entirely to the Spirit of the Lord, but the sinner has no one to blame except himself. Pajon's words are: "Disons encore, que la fidelé doit son affranchissement, tout-entier, à l'esprit du Seigneur, qu'il a receu, et que le meschant ne doit son esclavage qu'à soy-mesme." Pajon goes into the problem of human responsibility in greater detail at this point, explaining that since there is no absolute necessity involved in the action of the sinner, none of his bondage is based on anything but his own free choice. Pajon has not forgotten that he has based sin on ignorance; but he insists that knowledge is available to deliver the sinner from this ignorance. Unfortunately, the sinner rejects it, remaining of his own free choice in
ignorance, bondage and sin.

Il est esclave, parce qu'il est ignorant, mais il n'est ignorant, que parce qu'il refuse instruction. Il est comme un homme qui se seroit rendu luy-mesme, volontairement, pour estre esclave, et qui ne voudroit pas donner son consentement à un amy qui aurroit dessein de la racheter. La redemption luy est offerte, par I. Christ, mais il est si aveugle, qu'il la refuse. Le biens du ciel luy sont presentes, mais il ne veut, ni les connoistre, ni les accepter.  

Pajon readily admits that this is freedom of a limited sort in saying, "Il luy reste donc encore assez de liberté pour se rendre esclave, bien qu'il ne luy en reste plus pour s'affranchir. Il luy reste assez pour se perdre, bien qu'il ne luy en reste plus pour se sauver."  

In the remainder of his sermon, Pajon considers the second and third aspects of the bondage from which men are delivered by the Spirit of the Lord—sin and death. Following this he discusses the superiority of the gospel over the law; then, in conclusion, he rises to eloquent heights in a number of passages that emphasize his idea of the grace of God operating through such means as the proclamation of the Word.

Il me sembloit, à mesure que ie vous parlois du Seigneur, que ie voyois son image qui se formoit en vos ames. Il me sembloit, en vous parlant de son esprit, que i'en voyons naistre les mouvements en vos coeurs. Il me sembloit, en vous entretenant de la liberté, que ie voyois vos chaines se rompre, et les fers du péché vous tomber des mains. 

Pajon continues his dramatic conclusion, stressing the proclaimed Word as the instrument of the Spirit in conversion and sanctification.

Que nostre parole vous soit, maintenant, le ministere de l'esprit; qu'elle peigne en vos ames
la croix de Christ; qu'elle y face resplendir la
lumière de ses vertus, Qu'elle y allume un feu tout
divin, et que les changeant en des coeurs de chair,
au lieu qu'ils sont naturellement des coeurs de
pierre, e les faisant estre de temples saints, au
Seigneur, vous puissiez dire, "Je ne vis plus moy,
mais Christ vit en moy." 27

The last passage to be considered from Pajon's sermon
is significant because of its stress on the importance of the
activity of the hearer himself to gain the benefits of the
gospel. Pajon here underlines his idea that his type of
Calvinism calls for human activity and responsibility in
conversion and sanctification.

Nous vous en prionsimes freres bien aimez, nous
vous conjurons, par le sang de vostre Sauveur.
Rendez-vous dociles, maintenant, a sa parole.
Nous luy demandons bien qu'il opère en vous, avec
efficace; nous le prions, qu'il touche luy-mesme
la durete de vos coeurs; mais nous vous demandons,
aussi, vostre consentement pour cela. Car, apres
tout, quelque puissance, quelque forte, quelque
invincible que soit la grace de vostre Dieu, elle
ne vous convertira point, en dépit de vous. Elle
n'amolira point vos coeurs, tant que vous luy
serez rebelles, rendez vous donc obeissans à sa
parole. Faites vous maintenant, un coeur nouveau,
et un esprit nouveau, et revestez, aujourd'hui les
sentiment de veritables Chrestiens. 28

In summation, the following observations may be made with
regards to this sermon. Pajon demonstrates himself to be a
devoted and faithful disciple of Cameron by the stress he
places on the primacy of the intellect and the priority of
knowledge in the process of conversion. Secondly, he art-
fully and at times brilliantly exposes and applies Cameron's
ideas as a solution to the problems of predestination, irre-
sistible grace, liberty, and free will. However, Pajon never
definitely expresses the distinctive idea that was to be the
crux of his controversy: his belief that the Spirit of God never acts immediately upon the soul of man but always operates through means, mainly the Word, to bring about conversion. On the other hand, Pajon does express himself in such a way as to reveal that his structure of thought supports this idea. This may be seen, first of all, in the distinction he insists on in the way that the Spirit and the Lord should be understood in the text under consideration, especially in the stress he places on the idea or image of Christ as bringing about true liberty. Secondly, it may be seen in the distinction he draws between the Mosaic message and the gospel, basing the superiority of the gospel on the superiority of the idea or image of Christ communicated by the preaching of the gospel. Thirdly, a hint is given by the stress he places on the significant and meaningful contribution of the preacher and the Word in the process of conversion. His dramatic demonstration of his conviction in this matter through his flights of oratory might serve to place one on notice of the intensity with which Pajon would defend his distinctive idea. In the last place, one might note the emphasis Pajon places on the active receptivity and responsible participation of the hearer in the process of conversion.

The Nature of Original Sin

Among the Tronchin manuscripts there is a treatise that gives a Pajonistic treatment of man's original state and the Fall which is useful. With regards to the creation of
the first man, it teaches that man, being created in the image of God, was given an understanding and free will through which God was able to propose objects and prescribe duties to him commensurate with his faculties and ability. In this state it was within the power of man to judge between the good and evil, and to make a legitimate choice with regards to the challenges that confronted him. By making the right choices he could acquire habits of wisdom, virtue, and holiness through following the truth by his own natural light and powers. It was enough that he make good use of his liberty without having need of any supernatural grace. In the same way, by the abuse of his faculties, he was able to make false judgments, to fail in his duty, and destroy the state of innocence and integrity in which God had formed him in the beginning without any constraint by some exterior force and without being determined by any blind necessity. By a criminal abuse of the light of his understanding, man chose the counsel of the devil to the commandment of God. In doing this he determined his own will by choosing a false good that the enemy of his salvation presented to him. By this act of disobedience, he bound himself to the misfortune of which God had warned him. Thereafter, he regarded God as his judge, turned toward the creatures of this world for his sustenance, and made himself the center and end of all his activities.

At this point it will be profitable to examine Pajon's treatise "De la nature du péché originel et de celle de l'impuissance de l'homme a se convertir" which is his most
thorough treatment of the subject of original sin. It may be recalled that Claude referred to this document in the emotional scene during the 1676 conference; and, fortunately, it was preserved by Le Cene in his collection of Pajon's unpublished works. 

Pajon begins his study by discussing Flaccius' opinion of original sin. Flaccius held that the image of God was entirely lost through sin, and that the faculties themselves, which he considered to be the same as the substance of the soul, were corrupted by sin. Consequently, a new formal substance has been introduced, and man may now be thought of as being the image of the devil as his formal cause in place of the former image of God which once characterized him. Flaccius distinguished between original sin and man's sinful habits and actions as one would distinguish between a cause and its effects, thinking of original corruption as the source of all the evil that is in man. In his view, it should be termed original, not only because it is in man from the beginning, but also because it is the origin of all his sins. Pajon thinks that Flaccius probably thought of the soul as though it were a material body that could be arranged in one way and be thought of as representing the image of God and then be arranged in another way and form the image of Satan. He appears to understand that this corruption is not brought about by addition as when one adds poison to some fluid but by a change of substance as from wine to vinegar.
Pajon notes that opposition developed to Flaccius' views. Many theologians concurred with him that man is corrupt and polluted by sin from his mother's womb, but they also insisted that this is accidental rather than substantial, involving corrupt qualities though not the corruption of his nature or faculties. In response to this, Flaccius spoke of their view as externalizing original sin, man is no longer really corrupt because his soul is still pure, the spiritual force of man has not been extinguished, only crippled. It is not a corruption of man's faculties, only an injury, man is not evil in himself, there is only an evil accident that is associated with him; therefore in order to regenerate man there is no need that the old man die or that the new man be created but only that the evil accident be removed. This could take place by purging the heart but there would be no need for the creation of a new heart which, however, is what Scripture calls for. Scripture uses terms that point to a corruption of a substantial nature rather than of an accidental nature. If one objects that man still has a body and soul or that he is still a reasonable animal and still possesses the same faculties of intelligence and of will, and therefore there is no change of substance in him; his response would be that philosophically he is a reasonable man but theologically even if one were able to remove all his prejudices and place truth before his very eyes with the utmost of clarity, it would still be impossible for him to perceive it until his former faculties were restored.
In chapter two of his study, Pajon introduces the Synod of Dort, and he notes that it made a judgment of this subject though it was not against Flaccius but against the Remonstrants who tended to minimize the extent of man's corruption. The Synod's response, however, was in keeping with the position of Flaccius' opponents who considered original sin to consist in the corruption of his habits without touching the substance of his soul or the essential aspects of his faculties. Pajon understands that the Synod did not deny that the substance of the soul (in that it is spiritual and rational) is a good image of God who is a spiritual substance of infinite intelligence. However, since this part of the image of God remains in man in spite of the Fall, and our corruption has not altered its essential nature (thinking of it precisely as substance) the Synod concerned itself with corruption in relationship to those good and excellent habits added to our faculties to reflect the image of God which were corrupted and destroyed by sin. 

To support himself Pajon turns to the third and fourth chapters of the articles of the Synod which deal with the manner of man's conversion:

*L'homme a esté fait au commencement a l'image de Dieu, rempli dans son esprit de la connaissance veritable et salutaire de son creator et des choses spirituelles, et doute de justice dans sa volonté et dans son coeur, orné de pureté dans toutes ses affections, et ainsi entierelement saint; mais par l'instinct du Diable ...

Pajon states that the Synod is seen to consider that sin robbed man of that element of the image of God which consists
of the knowledge of the understanding, the justice of the will, and the purity of his affections. Man's holiness consisted of these good qualities and not in the faculties themselves since they are not considered holy or impure except in as far as they are the subject of these qualities or their opposites. Pajon concludes that the Synod never thought of any other corruption in our faculties except for the loss of these good habits and the introduction of bad habits into man's being. Without touching on the status of the faculties in themselves, the Synod only says that man deprived himself through his sin of the excellent gifts which it called knowledge in the understanding, justice in the will, and purity in the affections; and in their place he received opposite habits which are darkness, vanity, etc. which should not be regarded as another faculty but as contrary movements of the same faculty which always retains the same essential nature that it had before. 

According to the Synod, from a corrupt father are born corrupt children. Pajon wishes to point out that the nature that Adam has communicated to his descendants does not differ in kind but only in number from that which he himself possessed. Also, the corruption that man gets from him does not differ from that with which he was contaminated except in number, not in kind. If this is not true, he himself would have been corrupted in one way and have passed on this corruption in another way. But from where would this difference have come? Pajon argues, in keeping with his
previous point, that the corruption of the first man resulted in corrupt habits and sinful practices and not in a corruption of his faculties in themselves and therefore man's corruption must be the same. When Pajon considers the problem of the transmission of corruption and sin, he is careful to point out that he does not hold that this takes place by simple imitation as claimed by the Pelagians (even though imitation does increase this corruption continuously), but by the actual propagation of a corrupt nature, though not in its essence but as accident (qualities and habits).

In his consideration of the statement of the Synod concerning "all men being conceived in sin, born children of wrath, and incapable of any saving good," Pajon interprets the Synod to mean that this is not because of the extinction of man's faculties or the change of his nature but because of vicious habits which incline him towards evil. However, this inclination is not of a brutish nature as that of a stone which falls without knowing it, but because of a habit of error which causes the attractions of the world to present themselves to one as his sovereign good. Pajon also cautions that the Synod's reference to men "being dead in their sin," should be understood as a spiritual death consisting of sin itself rather than the extinction of his faculties. In conclusion, Pajon says that he considers Flaccius' concept of original sin to be absurd and that of the Synod to be most reasonable.

In his next section, Pajon turns his attention to
Scripture which often refers to man as being corrupt from birth, but he notes that it speaks of this corruption as consisting of evil thoughts either of an actual or at least habitual nature. He supports himself with Genesis 6:5: "The Lord saw that the wickedness of man was great in the earth and that every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually." He states that the second part of this verse should be taken as the explanation of the first; therefore the wickedness of man consists in the corruption of his thoughts and not of his faculties.
Pajon knows that a question may be raised as to infants, but he states that it is no use to argue that infants do not think in their mother's womb. First, he argues that contemporary thought disagrees with this; furthermore, he adds, John the Baptist should be understood to have thought in his mother's womb for he leaped for joy and that could not have been done without some thought. He admits that an infant does not usually have actual thoughts in the womb of his mother, but he argues that the infant has the disposition to think in a certain manner which demonstrates itself in its actual thinking later. This may be considered the cause of the hardness of heart which Scripture attributes to man from his mother's womb. Pajon also makes reference to Psalms 58:4 and Isaiah 48:8 which he considers to support the fact that infants have bad and false thoughts in the womb.

Pajon also notes that when Scripture speaks of man's natural state, it does not distinguish between his flesh
which often signifies original corruption and man's thoughts. As far as those scriptural passages that speak of man having a heart of stone, etc. (a standard objection) which one could use to support a substantial corruption of man, Pajon insists that this should be taken as figurative language only. As for other passages that speak of the old and new man, of man being a new creation in regeneration, etc., Pajon interprets all these ideas as not meaning anything new or changed as to essence but only in thought, act, and habit. Scripture calls on men to have new hearts and new spirits and to put off the old man, but it does this in order to call men to think new thoughts because this is the method which God uses to give men new thoughts. When God commands men to do what he wishes, He also gives them what He commands. To hold that God calls on man to put off corruption with no regards whatsoever to his thought processes and over which all the persuasion in the world would have no effect whatsoever does not accord with the wisdom of God. James writes that God has regenerated man to follow His will by the word of truth, and therefore he believed that men are made new creatures by the Word. What does the Word do in us if it does not give man new thoughts in place of the bad thoughts that naturally occupied him? It is clear then that man becomes a new creature by the newness of his thoughts.\(^4\)

Also it is clear that to be converted and to have a new heart and a new spirit are the very same thing. Ezekiel\(^4\) does not distinguish between these things for he
states "make in you a new spirit and a new heart," and im-
mediately after he states "be converted." Pajon feels that
these should not be taken as different exhortations. It
should be clear that to quit one's thought and to take up
other new and better thoughts is to be converted. Isaiah
takes these ideas together: "Let the wicked forsake his way
and the unrighteous man his thoughts and let him return unto
the Lord . . . ." There is no change of the substance of
the soul or of the faculties in themselves in all of this,
but the process of thinking is the thing that changes; bad
thoughts change to good thoughts. If man is to stop doing
bad things and turn to do good, it is all based on his
changed thinking; this is being converted."

Having supported his position with the doctrine of
Dort and Scripture, Pajon turns to experience to further
fortify his case. He begins by saying that it is clearly
seen that the thoughts of men are corrupt from birth and
each pursues evil whoever he might be; there is no one who
is not lost and depraved in his actions and his thoughts.
Still, this does not mean that his faculties are corrupt in
distinction from his habits (habitudes), actions, or thoughts.
On the contrary, one sees that man's faculties have very good
capabilities. Flaccius will answer that man is a reasonable
animal as far as philosophy is concerned but not as far as
theology is concerned; however Pajon questions this. What
does this mean? Is it necessary to have a different faculty
in order to make a theological judgment from that with which
one makes a philosophical judgment? Is the object of man's consideration in theology no less intelligible than the object of thought in philosophy? Pajon states that a man may not be considered to be a reasonable animal in the view of a Cartesian because he holds to peripatetic philosophy and vice versa. Furthermore, if there were a true philosophy that understood the nature of reality perfectly, its proponents might say that both the Cartesians and Peripatetics were fools. Would this mean that neither of them had a faculty of intelligence? No! What would be meant would be that neither the one nor the other had a true understanding of nature and that their ideas were far from the truth. Pressing this line of thought further, one may consider the idea that some men are very good theologians as far as theory is concerned but not in practice. How does this come about? Do they operate with different faculties in these two spheres? Decidedly not! It is that their thoughts on practice are corrupt but not their thoughts on theory; the faculty remains the same in either case.

Pajon now takes up the crucial question that the followers of Flaccius may ask as to the source of man's corruption. Where do his corrupt thoughts originate if not in the natural corruption of his faculties themselves? Pajon turns to the case of Adam, the first man. Where did the first evil thought that Adam had come from? Were his faculties corrupt in themselves before this? This is impossible because God is their creator. Did the devil have such physical power over
the soul of Adam as to change his nature and cause his faculties to be depraved and then give him corrupt thoughts after that? Pajon does not think that anyone would accept either of these views. It remains then that his faculties in themselves were capable of receiving false thoughts and to conceive discordant thoughts after that. If then it is true that man with his faculties in a healthy state before the Fall, not having had any evil thoughts, was able to receive bad thoughts and be deceived by false arguments which were not exceptionally difficult to discern, should one find it incomprehensible that men could be born with prejudices or bad habitual thoughts and be susceptible to different errors and corrupt thoughts from birth without one holding that our faculties are corrupt in themselves? Adam was corrupted through his thoughts because he made a bad judgment. Is it credible that the movements of the soul and the acts of the faculties were able to destroy the soul and its faculties and give it different faculties or change the nature of the soul? Pajon finds this incomprehensible.²⁸

Adam had bad thoughts because he foolishly allowed himself to be deceived and men today have bad thoughts from birth because Adam has communicated them to them with their being. Men enlarge the hold that these evil thoughts have on them usually throughout their entire lives because they do not carefully examine the nature of the objects which are presented to them. Men take the world for their sovereign good even though experience teaches them (if they would only pay
attention) that the world with all its advantages is vanity; still they prefer the goods of the body to those of the Spirit even though right reason teaches them (if they would listen) that those of the Spirit are infinitely greater. Pajon argues that it may be logically concluded that to be mistaken in this way only requires imprudence without imagining as a prerequisite some derangement of the faculties in themselves. 49

In his concluding section, Pajon points out that the Synod in its sixteenth article on conversion holds that man does not cease to be man because of the Fall; he still has the same understanding and will as before. Sin has not destroyed human nature but has caused it to be depraved and to die spiritually. Furthermore, this divine grace does not act on him like a stump—that is, in a physical manner. Nor does it take away the properties of the will, nor does it coerce it, rather it bends it sweetly yet powerfully. Pajon, in keeping with his basic Cameronian position, emphasizes as always that this cannot be done except by reasons, and that these reasons are only found in the word of reconciliation. Pajon reinforces this basic point by drawing attention to the seventeenth article of the Synod which states that no matter how powerful and supernatural the operation of the Spirit may be, conversion still requires the ministry of the Word which the Synod considers to be the seed of our regeneration and the sustenance or meat of the soul. Pajon further emphasizes certain specifics: upon examining the terminology, one may note that the Synod does not only refer to the Word as the
meat of the soul as if the Word only serves to maintain our spiritual life, but it also states after Peter and James (I Peter 1:23 and James 1:18) and all the apostles (John 17:17; Romans 10:17, etc.) that the Word is the seed of our regeneration in order to teach us that our regeneration does not begin before we have received the Word. It would be absurd to say that we received the seed of a thing after this thing had begun in us or that the seed did not produce the first beginnings of those things of which it is the seed. As far as regeneration is concerned, it is a subject that will be developed in greater depth later; however these concluding statements give another preview of the importance of Pajon's concept of original sin as a basis for his major controversial idea on conversion.

An Examination of Twelve Controversial Pajonistic Propositions

This study will now proceed to introduce Jurieu's analysis and critique of Pajonistic theology. This should be interesting because Jurieu represents a view that is opposed to the basic Cameronian tenents of thought as well as Pajonism and would no doubt have been equated by Pajon with the opinion of Flaccius which he has so vigorously attacked in this treatise.

It has already been noted that the most thorough attempt to refute the theology of Pajon, *Traité de la nature et de la grace*, was written by Pierre Jurieu. A good part of the work was written at the Academy of Sedan, stronghold of
orthodox Calvinism in 1677 or 1678, though it was not published until 1687. In his work he organized Pajon's entire system into twelve basic propositions as follows:

1. Que Dieu n'entre point dans les actions des créatures par un concours immédiat qui fasse en elles et avec elles les actions qu'elles produisent.

2. Que Dieu s'est contenté de donner une impression de mouvement à toutes les parties du monde; d'ou naissent ensuite nécessairement tels et tels effets.

3. Que la corruption de l'homme consiste principalement et originellement dans de mauvaises pensées, des erreurs et des préjugés.

4. Que même le péché originel consiste dans les dispositions aux faux jugemens et aux mauvaises pensées.

5. Que la corruption de l'homme est un mal purement moral dans lequel il n'y a rien de physique.

6. Que les causes de notre conversion doivent être aussi des causes purement morales, et ne peuvent rien avoir de physique.

7. Que la volonté suit toujours nécessairement le dernier jugement de l'entendement pratique; c'est pourquoi il suffit d'illuminer l'entendement pour entraîner la volonté et les passions.

8. Que le mouvement de notre âme vers les choses spirituelles dépend uniquement de la connaissance de ces choses spirituelles.

9. Que le sentiment des choses spirituelles n'est rien autre chose que la connaissance de ces choses spirituelles.

10. Que la parole de Dieu contient des démonstrations morales, capables par elles-mêmes, sans autre secours, de produire une pleine et une entière certitude sur la vérité des mistères.

11. Que la parole de Dieu prêchée dans de convenables circonstances extémes, ménagées par la Providence, peuvent faire une grace
irrésistible, et surmonter toute la malice du coeur humain.

12. Que le S. Esprit n'entre point dans l'oeuvre de la conversion par une opération interné distincte de la parole.\textsuperscript{51}

Propositions One and Two--The General Concourse of the Providence of God

This study will not occupy itself with any detailed treatment of the first two propositions which express a kind of Deistic Calvinism. In the Pajonistic manuscripts there is little treatment of these ideas except for a series of letters in the Le Cene manuscripts which may be identified from internal evidence as being between Pajon and de Villemandy (who is identified) and one or two others.\textsuperscript{52} In Jurieu's introductory summation of Pajonism, he reduces Pajon's view on the general concourse of the Providence of God into an even more concise form than in the two first propositions in the series of twelve propositions. He states:

Tout cela se réduit à ces 3. propositions. La première, que Dieu a donné une impression à toutes les parties du monde en les créant. La seconde, que par la vertu de cette impression tout les événemens arrivent nécessairement. La troisième, que cette impression étant supposée, on n'a pas besoin de supposer un concours immédiat.\textsuperscript{53}

In one of Pajon's letters there is a good summation of his idea on this subject. He states that when God made the world it was not done out of necessity; furthermore, he could have made the world in an infinite number of other ways. God produced certain impressions and certain movements in the various parts of the world but He could have produced an
infinite number of others. However, having started the movements that He did, it followed necessarily that certain effects would take place which in turn would be the cause of other effects and so on. Therefore, things take place in the way that they do by a necessary chain of events. Pajon does point out that this does not limit the will of God as to what is to take place for He can for extraordinary reasons cause the course of events to run in a different direction as in the case of miracles. Normally, however, if God wished to have things take place differently than they do, He would have given different impressions at the beginning of the whole chain of events in order that these different effects might take place. Pajon, again, is careful to preserve his basic Calvinistic framework of thought emphasizing that nothing takes place in the world or history according to his theory except that which God wills and that these things take place necessarily. Pajon states that it should be clear that his view sustains the sovereignty of God. His words are that God is seen to be "Le Maistre absolu de toutes choses."  

Proposition Three—The Source of Man's Corruption

The third proposition of Pajon's system to be considered by Jurieu is that the corruption of man consists basically and originally in bad thoughts, errors, and prejudices. Jurieu immediately links this with Pelagian thought, arguing that all who are not Pelagian hold that the corruption of man is found in all the faculties of the soul.
It is found in the intellect as false judgments and errors, in the will as bad habits, and in the passions as man's rebellious spirit. The Pajonists' aim, in opposition to this, to establish corruption primarily and originally in the false thinking which brings about the corruption of the will and the passions. Having embraced this principle, it logically follows that the illumination of the understanding will bring about the elimination of error, banishment of the false judgments, and the breaking of corruption's grip in the life of man.\textsuperscript{55}

The Pajonists claim that experience and reason support their view. Observing one's internal processes, it may be noted that objects strike one's senses and the senses conduct these objects to the understanding after which the understanding forms wrong judgments and commits itself to false good. Finally after these judgments, there is born love or hate, fear or desire.\textsuperscript{56} They also support their view from Scripture stating that Scripture speaks of the healing of our false opinions and our bad thoughts clearly indicating that our conversion is principally dependent upon this.\textsuperscript{57} Jurieu admits that our evil desires often arise from our false judgments, but he denies that this is always the case. He feels that a proper study of the nature of man will reveal that our false judgments often arise from our passions. This is especially the case when it is a question of morals. He supports this view with the following observations:

Il me semble que tout le monde sent bien que les
passions répandent des ténèbres sur l'entendement, qui l'empêchent de connoître la vérité; rien n'est si commun & si connu que ce mot ut quisque affectus est, judicat, chacun juge selon ses passions. L'on reproche à ceux qui aiment, que tout leur plaît dans le sujet qu'ils aiment, même Jusqu'aux défauts: la laideur d'une personne qu'on aime n'a rien de choquant; sa conversation est pleine d'esprit, quoi qu'elle ne dise souvent que des soffises; ses manières sont engageantes, quoi que ce soient des afféteries insupportable à tous les autres. Si l'amour s'en va, & céde la place à la haine, aussitôt les jugemens changent du blanc au noir; non seulement cet homme devient éclairé sur le défauts qu'il ne connoissoit pas, mais, il en voit mille autres que personne ne voit que lui. L'aversion que nous avons pour un homme nous dispose à contredire dans tous ses sentiments. C'est assez pour nous empêcher de recevoir une vérité; que de la faire proposer par une personne que nous haïssons & que nous mésestimons. Enfin je ne croi pas que personne sa puisse raisonablement opposer à cette maxime de St. Bernard, Amor et odio judicium veritatis nescit! l'amour et la haine ne sauroient faire un jugement sage et vrai.

Jurieu continues with the argument that if man's passion and covetousness are necessarily born of his errors and false judgments, he never would have any passions which are not preceded by false judgments. Now experience does not bear this out; some of man's most violent passions precede any deliberation whatsoever. Jurieu considers this to be a constantly established fact of experience and a clear refutation of the Pajonistic position. An objection also is lodged against this proposition on the grounds that it actually does away with original sin in children. Jurieu presses this objection in the following words:

Ces Messieurs conviennent avec nous que la corruption que l'Ecriture appelle dans les adultes la chair, la convoitise que séduit, est ce que l'Eglise appelle dans les enfans le pêche originel. Nous leur objections, si la chair & la corruption
des adultes consiste dans la même chose, il s'ensuit que les enfans n'ont point de corruption originelle, parce qu'ils n'ont point encore de pensées, ni de fausses opinions.

Proposition Four—Corruption in Children

This leads to the Jurieu concept of the fourth proposition of Pajon's system which anticipates this objection. Original sin in children only consists in their disposition to false judgments and false thoughts. Thus original sin is not destroyed in children for it exists in this disposition in them which leads them to form false judgments. Jurieu objects that the Pajonists have not properly conceived of the true nature of corruption in children or adults. He gives his opinion as follows:

Car dans les enfans comme dans les adultes, la corruption consiste proprement dans une adhérence de l'âme au corps & dans une attache à toutes les choses sensibles & corporelles, d'où vient l'amour pour les choses charnelles, duquel amour déréglé, aveugle l'entendement, & l'entendement trompé, entraîne la volonté.

Proposition Five—Nothing Physical in Man's Corruption

The fifth proposition to be considered in this chapter from Pajon's system is that there is nothing physical in man's corruption either in adults or children. All corruption is moral. Jurieu recognizes that this proposition is closely linked with the first two and its adoption could logically lead to the conclusion that there is no necessity of a physical operation of the Holy Spirit to deliver man from evil.
Pajonists reason that one only needs a moral remedy for a moral evil and the remedy that they propose is the presentation of the Word or instruction and persuasion. Against those who reject this line of reasoning and insist on a physical operation of the Spirit to deliver man from sin, they argue that they have succumbed to the error of Mathias Flaccius Illiricus who believed that original sin had corrupted the very substance of the soul.\(^6\)

Jurieu admits that there is a certain element of truth in the idea that everything in corruption is moral since corruption is basically concerned with the morals of man. He insists, however, that there is something physical in the corruption of man. He asks whether there is not something physical in the soul besides its substance. Drawing an analogy with matter, one would not say that the physical aspect of matter is only concerned with its substance and extension and not related to its shape or the position of its parts. In the same way, when matter changes its movement and the position or shape of its parts, one does not say that matter has changed its basic substance. Carrying this line of reasoning on to the case of insane individuals, one would not hold that the essential substance of their minds has been changed. Basically and essentially, they are complete in their essence, but their minds have been disturbed by the disorders in their brain and the fantasies that disturb their spirits. It is the same with the sinner. There has been no change in the essential substance of his soul. He is,
however, disturbed in his moral operations and incapable of turning to the good because of the flesh and the continual impressions that the body makes upon the spirit which bind it to the things of this world. Jurieu feels that one cannot deny that there is something physical involved in all of this.62

Having made this reservation concerning the absence of any physical element in corruption, he takes up the delicate matter of moral inability and physical inability. Jurieu agrees that theologians are justified in stating that inability is moral and does not excuse sin. He admits that inability is not physical in the sense that original sin has made man incapable of doing the good. He is, however, thinking of an inability that would come from a corruption of the substance of the soul and the essence of man's faculties. Still he is unwilling to contrast moral inability to physical inability in such a way as to conclude that there is nothing physical in the corruption of man. Jurieu is unwilling to yield this point in an unreserved way since it would place him in a position that would logically demand that he admit the next proposition.63

Proposition Six--Causes of Conversion Purely Moral

The sixth proposition is "that the causes of our conversion are purely moral and have nothing to do with the physical."64 This proposition is related closely to the one just considered that states the corruption of man is purely
moral. The logical conclusion is that the cause of conversion ought likewise to be purely moral and in no way physical. It will be of value to consider the study made by Jurieu of a moral and a physical cause. Moral causes are those that act upon the subject that they influence by means of persuasion or by the presentation of some object that moves the subject to action. This could be a warning, a reason or a motive of some kind. Any presentation of an object to the understanding which moves the will would act as a moral cause.

In an attempt to define a physical cause, Jurieu states that "les causes physiques ce sont celles qui influent véritablement le mouvement dans la faculté qui agit, qui la poussent et qui la meuvent intérieurement." This statement is not very clear; however, the examples which he gives help to clarify his thinking on the subject. A body that moves another body or a spirit that moves a body would be a physical cause. Also, a spirit that moves another spirit would be a physical cause. Jurieu wishes it to be understood that a physical cause is not necessarily a bodily cause or a natural cause because there are physical causes that are spiritual. Understanding physical in this sense, Jurieu believes that the soul can be moved by a physical operation. He adds, furthermore, that the proposition that there is nothing physical about our conversion undermines the manner in which the Bible reveals that God worked in the Old Testament. He writes:
Cela détruirait même les enthousiasmes des Prophètes, & les inspiration extraordinaires dans lesquelles Dieu n’a. point agi par une présentation d’objets externes, mais par une action absolument interne & immédiate. 

He also argues that every cause that produces physical effects upon its inferiors may receive physical impressions from higher causes. Jurieu concludes his examination of the sixth principle by stating that God acts on intelligent creatures in two ways. First, He uses moral causes because He wishes to deal with them in conformity to their nature which is intelligent and reasonable. Secondly, He uses a physical operation that prepares the faculty in order that it may act on the objects that are presented to it. This is what is known as the concourse of Providence or grace. He feels that the objection that the Pajonists make that there must be a relation of proportion in the way God acts upon our soul necessitating that the action be moral is not valid. Man’s corruption is not so completely of a moral nature that one can say there is nothing physical involved. This corruption, indeed, has a physical element and it is consistent for God to operate on the soul by a physical cause.

Proposition Seven--Primacy of the Understanding

The seventh proposition of the Pajonists to be considered is that it is enough to illuminate the understanding to lead the will because the will always follows what is known as the last dictate of the practical understanding. This, of course, is one of the main ideas from Cameron adopted by Pajon.
Jurieu is quick to argue that even if this is the case, it is not a fatal argument against immediate grace. There would still be a need for such an action to gain from the understanding a firm acceptance of the truth in order that the inferior faculties might be guided by it. Jurieu, however, is not about to yield the truth of this proposition. He argues, in fact, that the understanding, far from having the primacy, is a passive faculty. He holds that the understanding is to the mind even as the eye is to the body. The eye only receives images and does not act except as it receives the images. The understanding, in the same way, acts only in a passive way to receive the ideas and objects that come to it. It is true that understanding searches, sorts out, and discovers. It is true that some men have a greater capacity to understand than others, though this should be compared to a mirror that is greater and clearer than other mirrors and can, therefore, receive more and better images than poorer mirrors. But with regards to the degree of application involved, it is the will that causes the understanding to apply itself to contemplate the objects and relationships and other connections that the mind discovers in things and ideas. It is the same as the application of the eye that is also brought about by the will, causing the eye to regard very small objects. Now in the same way that this application of the eye does not prevent sight from being a purely passive operation, so also the application of the understanding to an object does not prevent it from being a
purely passive operation.\textsuperscript{68}

Not only does Jurieu assign the understanding to a purely passive role, he also argues that the understanding is not free since freedom is limited to the active faculties. The eye does not see freely. If something is green, it must see green. It cannot prevent itself from seeing if it is open, in good condition with an object before it. The understanding, likewise, must see the relationships between things in spite of itself. It cannot resist, for instance, seeing that the whole is greater than its part. Having thus impeached the understanding, Jurieu adds that it is hardly a faculty fit to hold the empire that the Pajonists are trying to give to her. To those who argue that the understanding has a two-fold action, one to see the real and true relationships that exist between things and second to assent to this, Jurieu answers that more has been given to the understanding than it is able to accomplish. The consent or assent to the truth of a matter is an act of the will. Here in direct contradiction to the Pajonists, Jurieu asserts that men often believe certain things because they want to believe them and because their passions are interested in those things. One does not believe the mysteries of the gospel because one has been convinced they are true but because one wants to believe, realizing that his highest good and the greatest glory of God depends upon this belief. One with strong worldly interests believes that carnal pleasure is a true good because he wants to believe this. His passions desire this carnal pleasure
and carry the will to assent to this desire.  

A further examination of the problem reveals according to Jurieu that certain objects move the passions of man without the understanding. Some offense, real or imagined, may suddenly inflame the anger of an individual without allowing time for the understanding to be consulted in the matter. These observations point to the fact that, first, the understanding is a passive faculty without freedom and entirely subject to the will. Secondly, the will is master of all judgments, and it often makes false judgments because it is beguiled by passion and prejudice. Indeed, it is true that the will cannot prevent the understanding from seeing certain relationships and connections, but it can prevent certain practical conclusions from being drawn from the observations. With regards to the question of the last dictate of the understanding, Jurieu considers that this is only a debate over the use of words. There is no such thing as the last or ultimate dictate of the understanding unless the will wishes it to be the last and deciding dictate upon which the course of action shall be based. Jurieu feels that he has shown the weakness of this seventh proposition and established that it is not sufficient only to enlighten the understanding to determine the action of the will and the passions.

Having established the primacy of the will over the understanding, Jurieu proceeds to point out that grace must touch the will before it reaches the practical understanding which he considers to be the will in action. This action of
the will, furthermore, is determined by the inclinations of the individual. It should be clear therefore that the will must be inclined to do the good before it acts or it never will act for the good. When the will determines itself to do evil, it is because of the evil inclinations that come to it from the flesh and the body. If it is to choose the good, there must be a good inclination given to it by grace. To the question that naturally arises on how this inclination enters the will in order that it may be determined to do the good, Jurieu answers:

Voici comment; les objects, c'est à dire la predication de l'Evangile, les douces promesses qu'elle fait, les glorieuses espérances qu'elle donne, les vérités importantes & solid qu'elle révèle, se présentent à l'entendement, il reçoit ces idées, il en apperçoit les liaisons & les rapports nécessaires; jusques-là cela ne suffit pas pour le faire changer d'inclination, car il se trouve des savans qui ont parfaitement bien compris ces liaisons, ces rapports des idées évangéliques, qui en voient la vérité, & dont la volonté conserve pourtant les mêmes inclinations pour les choses sensibles & corporelles. Il faut donc que la grace survienne; & la première chose qu'elle fait, c'est qu'elle répand un sentiment de douceur dans la volonté: c'est ce que N.S. J. Ch. signifiait par ces paroles, ils écoutent ta parole & la reçoivent avec joie: cela est dit des temporaires qui ne reçoivent que de lefers effets de cette impression. Mais cela est bien plus vrai des justifiez. Cette joie n'est point un mouvement raisonné, elle est imprimée immédiatement par la grace qui s'applique à la volonté, elle naît pourtant de la vû de l'objet évangélique, mais elle n'en naît pas nécessairement: elle en sort par l'entremise de la grace interne & de Dieu qui survient; car si elle naîssoit précisément de l'objet, elle seroit dans tous ceux qui ont contemplé cet objet, & qui sont persuadez de sa vérité. Cette première impression que j'appelle douceur & voie prévenante, n'est point encore une habitude, ce n'est point une détermination au bien, c'est justement un penchant qui prend la place d'un
Receiving this prevenient grace, the soul is able to apply itself to the motives and reasons presented to it by the understanding. If, however, the motives and reasons presented by the understanding are not accompanied by the prevenient grace, they will be unable to determine the action of the will or understanding. Jurieu is of the opinion that there is actually a need for a two-fold distinct operation of grace on the will and understanding, but this discussion is reserved for later on.\textsuperscript{72}

Papin, Pajon's nephew and disciple, sharply attacks Jurieu's reasoning concerning the relationship of the will and the understanding. He notes that Jurieu's rejection of the primacy of the intellect is in opposition to some of the most noted doctors of the French Reformed Church, mentioning such men as Amyraut and de Brais de Auxiliis. Papin notes that Jurieu has stated that there is a "'un sentiment de douceur, de joye et de plaisir, en un mot un penchant au bien'" that moves the will in the process of conversion. He, however, refuses to accept the validity of this idea and argues that "la volonté est incapable d'un tel penchant, qu'il est contre sa nature, et qu'il implique contradiction." He does not deny that the will can only determine itself by its inclinations. "Cela est vray, mais ces inclinations luy viennent
He lists what seems to him to be commonly accepted truths in opposition to Jurieu.

I. On ne sçauroit vouloir sans vouloir quelque chose.

II. On ne sçauroit vouloir une chose sans sçavoir qu'on la veut.

III. On ne sçauroit sçavoir qu'on la veut sans sçavoir clairement ou confusément pourquoi on la veut.

IV. On ne sçauroit sçavoir clairement ou confusément pourquoi on la veut, sans la connoistre clairement ou confusément.

V. L'inclination que l'on a pour une chose, est proportionnée à la connoissance ce que l'on a, ou que l'on croit avoir de cette chose. On n'aime qu'autant que l'on croit avoir de raison d'aimer.\n
In the light of these ideas, Papin feels that he has a right to conclude that the will and all its inclinations are founded on reasons; and as "these reasons are drawn either from the light of the understanding or from sentiments that objects excite in the soul," it can hardly be argued that the will is the independent and primary faculty that Jurieu proposes. The initial inclination that moves the will toward the good must be through the means of some reason; otherwise the will would be operating in repudiation of its own nature.\n
Papin continues his attack by arguing that the idea that the inclination of the will toward the good comes from a
sentiment that grace pours into the will is contradictory to
Jurieu's assumption of the primacy of the will. He calls on
Jurieu to make a decision in this matter.

Mais, Monsieur, répondray-je encore une fois, ou
vous contre-dites a vous-même, ou vous ne vous
contredites pas. Choisissez une bonne fois:

Ou de dire que la volonté est souveraine;
qu'elle ne depend ni de l'intelligence, ni du
sentiment; qu'elle n'est determinée ni par la
faculté de connoistre, ni par la faculté de
sentir.

Ou de dire qu'elle n'est pas souveraine;
qu'elle est determinée par l'une ou par l'autre
de ces facultés; et qu'en particulier le penchant
dont vous nous parlez vient d'un sentiment de
plaisir, sans lequel la volonté n'aurait pas eu ce
penchant.

Papin anticipates Jurieu's reply to this line of attack. He
will no doubt answer, "Je ne me contredis point, ... puis
que ce sentiment est repandu dans la volonté même & non dans
une autre faculté distincte de la volonté." This kind of an
answer can be shown to be absurd according to Papin. He
sees a two-fold contradiction here. In an interesting
analysis of the relationship of the faculties to the soul, he
writes concerning the first contradiction that he observes:

Je releve la premiere absurdité. Ce n'est pas
que je sois ce ceux qui conçoivent les facultés de
l'ame autant d'entités differentes, dont les unes
ne soient point les autres. Je suis persuadé que
l'entendement, la volonté, & le sentiment ne sont
pas trois êtes, mais seulement trois manières
d'être d'un seul & même être spirituel, c'est-a-
dire, d'une seule & même ame, qui s'appelle
entendement, quand elle conçoit; volonté, quand elle
poursuit les choses, ou qu'elle s'en éloigne; &
sentiment quand elles les sent. Je suis d'accord en
cela avec Mr. Jurieu, comme je vous le feray voir en
quelque endroit. Mais quoy que ces trois mots ne
signifient que cela; quoy que ce ne soient que les
noms de trois operations ou de trois proprietes
d'une ame: il est toujours clair qu'on ne doit pas
les confondre; & que c'est brouiller les idees, &
reverser l'usage d'une maniere estrange, que
d'appeller la volonte sentiment, ou que d'attribuer
un sentiment a la volonte, dans le temps qu'on la
considere par precision, qu'on la distingue de
toutes les autres proprietes de l'ame, & qu'on a
dessein de faire croire qu'elle est independante de
ces autres proprietes.

Tous les sentimens appartiennent a l'ame entant
qu'elle est substance capable de sentir. Toutes les
conceptions, toutes les idees luy appartiennent
entant qu'elle est substance intelligente: & il
n'y a que les actes de volonte qui luy appartiennent
qu'elle est substance voulante. Parler de sentiment
repandu dans la volonte, c'est a peu pres comme si
je parlis de lumiere repandue dans l'odorat, &
apperceu par l'odorat. Si donc la Grace repand un
sentiment dans l'ame, l'ame le reçoit entant qu'elle
'est sensible, c'est-a-dire, capable de sentir; & non
pas entant qu'elle est capable de vouloir. Ou bien
que Mr. Jurieu me permette de dire, que Dieu repand
une faveur dans l'ame considerée comme capable de
voir & non comme capable de favouer. Ce que seroit
ridicule.76

The second contradiction of which he accuses Jurieu
is "qu'un sentiment tout simple, qui ne fait connoistre aucun
objet, & qui n'est excité par aucun objet, fasse pourtant
pencher l'ame vers un certain objet." Papin states that "un
sentiment de douceur et de plaisir ne sçauroit faire pencher
l'ame vers ce qui ne luy paroist en aucune maniere être la
cause de ce sentiment." Therefore he feels he has tied the knot
of the contradiction:

Or l'objet dont il s'agit, le bien spirituel, ne
paroit en aucune maniere à l'ame être la cause du
sentiment de douceur & de plaisir prevenant dont
parle Mr. Jurieu.

Donc le sentiment de douceur & de plaisir
prevenant ne sçauroit faire pencher l'ame vers le
bien spirituel."
Proposition Eight--Knowledge the Basis of Spiritual Movement

The eighth proposition is: "Que le mouvement de notre âme vers les choses spirituelles dépend uniquement de la connaissance que Dieu nous en donne." Jurieu observes that the reason behind this proposition is that the movement towards spiritual things is very reasonable and thus it should be thought of as proceeding from knowledge. Jurieu agrees in a sense admitting that one cannot be drawn to spiritual things by very distinct movement or a deliberate action except through a rational movement involving knowledge and persuasion. However, on the other hand, he insists that there are elements that draw men towards spiritual things that are not strictly dependent on reason and one's judgment such as prevenient grace and the action of grace on the will to overcome its inclination toward evil and sensual things.  

Proposition Nine--Spiritual Sensations Equated with Knowledge of Spiritual Things

The ninth proposition is: "Que le sentiment des choses spirituelles n'est rien autre choses que la connaissance des choses spirituelles."

Pajonists will argue in support of this proposition "que tout de même qu'une épingle ne peut être sentie que par son action sur les organes du sentiment en les piquant, les choses spirituelles ne peuvent être non plus que par leur action sur notre âme que par la connaissance nette, claire, solide et distincte qu'on en a." Again Jurieu refuses to
grant them this proposition because he feels he has established that God is able to give impressions and inclinations to the soul towards spiritual things independent of and before such knowledge.79

Proposition Ten--The Word of God Brings Complete Certitude

The tenth proposition of Pajon's system is: "Que la parole de Dieu contient des demonstrations morales aussi capables de produire une certitude qui exclue tout doute, comme sont les demonstrations geometriques."

In the discussion of this proposition, Jurieu notes that though he cannot accept the validity of the principles proposed by the Pajonists, he must admit that they are well organized. After having demonstrated that God only uses moral causes in conversion, they proceed to argue that spiritual truths are revealed to the understanding only by the Word without any operation of the Spirit distinct from that of the Word. In close support of these propositions, they have pressed for the acceptance of the theory that once the understanding has been persuaded, it automatically moves the will and the passions. With all of these closely knit principles, they introduce this proposition concerning certitude. They sense and Jurieu believes that they do this rightly, "que la persuasion et la certitude de la foi doit surmonter toutes les autres certitudes même celles des sciences et des démonstrations." They believe that this is accomplished by the Word, and is necessary or the faithful
would not be perfectly persuaded of the Evangelical truths.\(^8^0\)

As Jurieu notes, one must realize that the Pajonists do not mean to argue that the mysteries of the faith such as the Trinity have been explained and are made as evident as the mathematical demonstration that two times two equals four. Their idea is that one believes these mysteries of the faith on the authority of the revelation of God. The certitude they press for is "que l'Ecriture Ste. porte des caractères si évidens de la divinité de son auteur, qu'ils sont suffisans étant bien proposez et avec de raisonnables circonstances, de produire par eux-mêmes cette forte persuasion, que l'Ecriture est divine." The crucial question that now needs to be examined is whether Scripture is capable by itself of producing this faith in its divinity apart from any immediate action of the Holy Spirit. Jurieu notes that the faith that is being contended for here is one that "excluë tout doute, & même qui excluë ce que l'Ecole appelle formido contrariilla crainte que le contraire ne puisse être vrai." However, he does not believe that such a certitude can be achieved from the Scriptures alone arguing that, though he does not wish to belittle the power of the Scriptures, not one of the arguments that is presented of their divinity cannot be circumvented in some way by unbelievers. He states that he is willing to admit that a kind of certitude could be produced by the character of the Scripture in the mind of an honest inquirer without prejudice, but he adds that "le monde n'a point de ces gens non
prévenus: tous ceux qui ne sont pas encore convertis sont possédez par les préjugez de la chair." 81

Papin is highly dissatisfied with Jurieu's treatment of the tenth proposition. He examines Jurieu's argument that there is not one argument drawn from the Scriptures that cannot be circumvented by the unbelievers and is unwilling to admit that it is relevant. He allows that it points to the fact that these arguments are not the same as mathematical demonstrations, but he denies that it follows that these arguments are inadequate to establish the facts. Papin argues that the Christian Religion is founded on facts: "C'est la mort, la resurrection et l'ascension de Jesus-Christ, les miracles et les souffrances de ses Apôtres qui ont été ses témoins: c'est encore, que les Livres que nous tenons pour sacrés, ont esté écrits par des hommes inspirés du Saint Esprit. Once one accepts that the proof of these facts is adequate, he places his faith in them, convinced that his faith and hope is well founded on facts adequately proven. Papin answers: As for the unbeliever's rejection of the validity of the case for the Christian Religion,

Hé que m'importe? s'ensuit-il que ceux qui ne sont pas profanes, & touchés de l'importance de la chose s'appliquent à examiner ces argumen, n'en puissent reconnoistre la solidité & la vérité? Tous les esprits ne sont ni également enseignés. Parce qu'un homme qui n'a pas d'attention, qui est distrait ou prévenu, ne voit pas la force de quelques argumen que je luy fals, s'ensuit-il que mes argumen n'ayent point de force, & que j'aye de me fonder dessus? Les profanes sont des gens qui n'ont aucune attention pour les preuves de la vérité de la Religion, qui sont distraits par leurs passions, & que ces mêmes passions previennent contre la Religion." 82
In Papin's opinion their unwillingness to grant the validity of the case for Christianity does not undermine the validity of that case because what really matters is that the case is validly established on solid and factual grounds.

Turning again to Jurieu, it is of value to note how he explains his fideistic tendencies further by introducing Bonaventure's distinctions concerning two kinds of certitude, one which he called speculationis and the other adhaesionis. The "certitude of speculation" is that which comes from a consideration of the evidence of a matter such as two times two equals four or the whole is greater than one of its parts. This is the type of certitude that one has when a proposition of which he was once uncertain is demonstrated to him geometrically. On the other hand, the "certitude of adhesion" is that which does not come from the evidence that is presented but from the importance of the thing. Jurieu states, for instance, that the proposition there is a God may be in a sense demonstrated but not with the certitude that one has that six is less than twelve. However, a believer will attach himself with even greater force to the certitude that there is a God than that six is less than twelve because his eternal welfare depends on this truth.

Jurieu also notes that the assent of the will and the certitude that it possesses does not necessarily match the objective evidence presented in a matter. Oftentimes one has a stronger persuasion of the truth of a matter than the supporting reasons warrant. He draws our attention to the fact
that the schoolmen spoke of this as "la certitude subjective
a plus de degré defermeté, que la certitude objective n'a
de degré dévidence." Now divine faith is a subjective
certitude that must surpass other kinds of certitude.

Applying these ideas to the Scripture and its characteristics, Jurieu states that these characteristics cannot produce a certitude of speculation which equals that of geometry. However, when an individual grasps the importance of believing the truth that Scripture is divine and recognizes the great good that will be his if he believes and the great loss that will come to him if he does not, he will adhere to this truth more steadfastly than he will to any demonstrated proposition. Furthermore, Jurieu adds, since it is certain that the Faith is above reason, it is not inconsistent to say that faith calls for a degree of consent that surpasses reason. Also, why cannot the Spirit do what prejudice does right along? Everywhere one finds prejudice giving individuals a degree of certitude that goes beyond the evidence. The will cannot be carried by itself to give consent to a truth that goes beyond the evidence unless it is drawn to do so by some outside cause. With regards to certitude in the truth of the Scripture, it is the Spirit that draws the will to consent strongly to the evidence of its divinity. He writes:

Cette cause étrangère qui porte la volonté à donner à la divinité de l'Ecriture un consentement supérieur à l'évidence de cette divinité, c'est le St. Esprit qui agit en nous, qui persuade, qui éleve les caractères de la divinité de l'Ecriture au dessus
d'eux-mêmes, qui leur fait produire une plus grande certitude qu'ils ne produiroient naturellement, & faire sentir intérieurement cette douce efficace de la parole.  

Papin refuses to accept the reasoning that distinguishes between the "certitude de speculation" and the "certitude d'adhésion." He expresses astonishment that one would argue that the value one places on something should nominate that thing as true. If one is to follow this kind of validation, it would result in all kinds of fallacies. One individual placing a great attachment on this item, would consider it as true, another placing great value on that item would imagine it as true. Here, Papin reasons, the idea of the primacy of the will gets into logical difficulties. He points out that Jurieu claims that "l'importance de cette vérité, ... fait que le fidèle N'EN VEUT PAS avoir le moindre doute." Caustically, Papin adds:

Comme s'il n'y avoit qu'a vouloir estre asseuré, pour l'estre effectivement! Les Turcs ont à peu près la même raison d'être asseurés des promesses de Mahomet qui regardent l'autre vie.

With regards to the fact that oftentimes men are more convinced of the truth of a matter than is warranted by the evidence, Papin admits that this may be true, but this is true because men are often stupid. Here, Papin tries to draw a fine distinction:

Mais de plus je distingue: Que les raisons de la croire ne sont fortes en elles-même; je l'avoué. Qu'elles ne sont fortes dans nostre esprit, c'est-à-dire, qu'elles ne nous paraissent fortes; je le nie: & elles nous paraissent plus fortes, sans que notre volonté en soit la cause. Car afin qu'elle en fussent la cause, il faudroit que nous eussions le
Papin admits that men often believe beyond the grounds of the evidence, but he adds that though the reasons are not strong in themselves, yet they are strong in our spirit, or they appear strong to us. But this is not caused by our will, because if the will were the cause, it would have been necessary that we had formed the design to see things other than what they are, that is to say that we had formally planned to fool ourselves. This he says is impossible.

Papin also rejects Jurieu's explanation that the reason one can have a subjective certitude that goes beyond the evidence is that the will gives its assent to the truth in a degree that surpasses the credibility of the evidence through the aid of an outside cause which is the Holy Spirit. As far as the Holy Spirit being the "cause étrangère" that causes the will to give its consent in a way that surpasses the quality of the evidence, Papin argues that this would do the Holy Spirit a grave injustice.

Since it cannot be the Holy Spirit, this "cause étrangere" that carries one to a greater certitude than is
warranted by the evidence must be a deceptive cause such as our imagination which often exaggerates the objects of evidence. Papin observes that this is unfortunately the case in many instances with regards to religious convictions. All too often the truth of religion is not built on the solid foundation of good and solid reasoning.®

Papin continues his rebuttal by stating that Jurieu’s argument that the conviction a Christian has concerning the divinity of Scripture goes beyond the degree of evidence that he perceives in its character drives one to the conclusion that this persuasion is to a certain degree “destitute of reason.” Papin also says that some will argue that the Christian certitude is not a certitude of speculation but also a persuasion made up of a certitude of speculation and also of adhesion or attachment.® What is lacking in evidence is supplied by the recognition of the importance of the conclusion. Papin argues that this line of reasoning is opposed to sound logic. A conclusion depends upon the soundness of the principles upon which it is based. There can be nothing in a conclusion that is not found in the premises from which it is derived. The importance of a thing cannot be taken as evidence of its truth. Papin argues, on the contrary, the importance of a thing is based upon its being established as true.

En attendant qu'on me prouve cette consequence, je ne pourray m'empêcher de croire, que bien loin que la vérité soit fondée sur l'importance, c'est au contraire l'importance qui est fondée sur la vérité: Que les choses ne sont grandes, qu'autant
Pajon's preliminary assumptions have now been discussed and are of considerable importance in preparing for Pajon's conception of how conversion actually takes place. He considers that sin and corruption are lodged principally in the evil thoughts and errors of the understanding; therefore sin and corruption are of a moral nature which can only be surmounted by a moral cause. In the process of conversion, the will is subordinate to the understanding and always follows the last dictate of the practical understanding. It is, therefore, only necessary to eliminate the evil thoughts, prejudices and errors of the understanding and to enlighten it with the truth of the gospel to bring about conversion. Everything else will then follow automatically. The will is free in the Cameronian sense to choose its object which is its own well-being. The Word also has a persuasive force that is so great that it can bring a conviction that can reach the level of a moral demonstration that excludes all doubt.

Propositions Eleven and Twelve--Mediate not Immediate Grace

This brings one to the main controversial eleventh and twelfth propositions of Pajon's system that constitute the very heart of the controversy, by now quite familiar to the reader. Jurieu's brief statement of these propositions is:
11. Que la parole de Dieu prêchée dans de convenables circonstances externes, ménagées par la Providence, peuvent faire une grace irrésistible, et surmonter toute la malice du coeur humain.

12. Que le S. Esprit n'entre point dans l'oeuvre de la conversion par une opération interne distincte de la parole.\(^9\)

Jurieu's organization of the major Pajonistic propositions into these twelve basic statements is a very valuable step in the analysis of Pajon's system of thought, and he has given a good, clear statement of the major controversial propositions in these eleventh and twelfth points. However, he has not handled all the sophisticated distinctions that Pajon wishes to make with regards to these ideas; therefore material will now be introduced from Pajon himself to make these distinctions clear.

Pajon in a letter to Tronchin in 1679 presents the heart of the matter to him, hoping that this clarification may help him to realize that there is no real difference between them. It is probably the most thorough clarification of the issues available. First, he points out that it is not a question of whether God plays the primary role in our salvation.

Je dis donc qu'il ne s'agit point de savoir si c'est Dieu qui opère en nous le vouloir et l'action, si c'est luy qui illumine nos entendement et qui flechit nos volonte, si c'est luy qui prepare nos coeurs à recevoir sa parole, et qui donne efficace à sa parole pour penetrer dans nos coeurs, si c'est à luy en mot, qui nous sommes redevables de tout ce que nous pensons, et disons et faisons de bien. Je confess tout cela, contre les Pelagians.

Nor is it a question of efficaciousness.
Nor is it a question whether God uses means.

Furthermore, it is not a question of the immediateness of God's action.

The real heart of the matter is whether this immediate action of God is distinct from the efficacy of the Word and other means God might employ for conversion.

Pajon indicates at this point in his letter that he is afraid that Tronchin may think that he is following a line...
of thought that disguises his real intent and is now depart-
ing for ideas he has expressed elsewhere. To help him make
a just judgment of the matter, he wishes first of all to
clarify his idea of the immediacy of God's operation in man.

Le premier que ce mot immediat et immédiatement
étant equivoque, la meme action de Dieu peut-être
appelée immediate, et non-immediate, sans
contradiction, selon les divers moyens qu'on aura
dessein d'exclure, ou de ne pas exclure par des mots
là. Car quand il sera question des moyens que les
Semi-pelagiens, Jesuites et Remonstrans, pretendent
etre necessaires, de la part de l'homme pour rendre
la Grace efficace comme est le consentement de la
volonté à se laisser flechir par la Grace (venant de
l'homme mesme) par l'entremise desquel ils croyent
que la Grace opère en nous. Je dis sans hesiter que
la Grace de l'operation de Dieu est immediate à cet
égard. Et il ne se trouvera point que j'aye iamais
rien dit qui y soit contraire, ayant toujours
enseigne et toujours cru que l'homme ne contribue
rien de luy mesme à sa conversion, et que ce
consentement qui est necessaire pour cela (car il
n'est pas converti malgré qu'il en ait; Il ne l'est
pas par force) est un effet de la Grace mesme qui
opère en luy.95

Having indicated in which way he considers the grace
of God to be immediate, Pajon proceeds to point out how he
does not consider it to be immediate.

Mais quand il s'agira des moyens qui peuvent
etre employez de la part de Dieu comme sont sa
parole, ses miracles dans le tems qu'il en fairoit,
ses chattimens, les exemples qu'il nous met devant
les yeux, et autres moyens semblables, je dis et
i'ay toujours dit que la Grace n'est pas immediate
à cet egard et que Dieu n'agit pas en nous pour
nous convertir sans l'entremise de tels moyens.96

Pajon proceeds to refute the claim that his opponents
have no intention to exclude the use and ministry of the Word.

Ne me dites pas, s'il vous plait que personne
de ceux qui dispute contre moy n'a iamais c'est
dessein d'exclure l'usage et le ministére de la
parole. Car ie confesse qu'on ne le veut pas
exclure pour l'ouvrage entier de notre conversion. Mais plusieurs le veulent exclure pour la production de certaines préparations et dispositions de nos coeurs, qu'ils croyant que le St. Esprit fait en nous sans y employer le ministère de la parole ni d'autre moyen. Et c'est ce sentiment de ceux qui ont décidé qu'il y a dont la conversion de l'homme une operation immediate du St. Esprit, distincte de l'efficace de la parole, et de tout autre moyen, ce que signifie dans leur pensée que le St. Esprit fait quelque chose en nous à la production de quoy il n'employe ni la parole, ni aucun autre moyen. Et à l'égard de cette chose là, il est clair que l'opération du St. Esprit exclut l'usage et le ministère de la parole.

Now Pajon takes up what he considers to be the crucial question.

Et par la vous voyez encore que la question n'est pas de savoir si l'opération du St. Esprit est immediate ou non ... Mais de savoir, si cette operation du St. Esprit est distincte de celle de la parole et des autres moyens qu'il plaist à Dieu d'employer pour changer nos coeurs. Les synods particuliers qui ont iuge cette matière ont décidé qu'elle en est distincte, et moy ie croy, sauf le respect que ie leur dois qu'ils l'ont décidé sans raison. C'est donc là Monsieur, le point de la question, c'est ce dont nous avons à nous entretenir, pour confère bien avec l'autre, savoir, si l'action du St. Esprit dans notre conversion est distincte de l'action de la parole et de celle des autres moyens que Dieu employe et si Elle est immediate entant que ce mot est destiné à exclure, non seulement l'intervention des moyens que l'homme pourroit fournir de lui même mais aussi le usage et le ministère de ceux qui peuvent être employez de la part de Dieu. Mes adversaires l'affirment et moy, je le nie.

Certain ideas were debated at times in connection with this controversy that were not relevant and only introduced because of a failure to grasp the real issues. Pajon points out that it is not a question of whether God plays the primary role in our salvation, it is not a question of efficaciousness, it is not a question of whether God uses
means, nor is it a question of the immediateness of God's action in our hearts. The real heart of the matter is whether this immediate action of God is distinct from the efficacy of the Word and other means God might employ for conversion. Pajon says that it is not; his opponents say that it is.

Pajon's discussions on the process of conversion, infused faith, revelation and illumination which follow have all been drawn from "De l'opération de l'Esprit de Dieu et de la conversion de l'homme," one of Pajon's major treatises on his controversy written in response to a treatise in support of immediate grace from the Cameronian viewpoint entitled "Articles proposés par un ami à son ami." Pajon does not identify the author of this treatise who supports himself by numerous quotations from Cameron.

This treatise was used by André Mailhet in his La Théologie protestante au XVIIIe siècle: Claude Pajon, sa vie, son système religieux, ses controverses; d'après des documents entièrement inédits (Paris, 1883). Mailhet made an important contribution to Pajonistic studies especially in providing extensive quotations from this manuscript and a number of Pajon's other original writings. However, he appears to have had little interest in Pajon's relationship to Cameron for he omitted any reference to Pajon's extensive discussion of Cameron's thought in "De l'opération" and made no mention of the fact that Pajon devoted a large part of this work to refuting his opponent's claim that Cameron did not support him.
in his distinctive concept of grace. Pajon's discussion of this matter will be treated at length later.

**Pajon's Concept of the Process of Conversion**

As for his treatment of the process of conversion, he writes that, first, one has the objective presentation of the Word either by the reading of the Bible or hearing a sermon or in some other way. Next, the objects pass from the senses to the understanding where there are necessarily formed certain ideas that one would not have had if such objects had never been presented to the subject before. Now the question arises of the willingness of the understanding to accept these ideas presented to it by the Word. According to Pajon's epistemology, ideas of the true and good cannot be rejected by the soul if they are presented to one "sub specie veri vel boni," and in such a situation the will would be moved necessarily "ad assensum" and the affections "ad amorem." The difficulty in all of this, which Pajon readily admits, is to place these ideas in the soul in such a way that one sees the truth of the premises. Pajon believes that this can be done because of the connection that these premises have with the notions communes. Pajon does not define what these notions communes are exactly, but it appears he means either innate ideas or self-evident truths. Through the connection with these notions communes which are undeniable truths to all men or propositions that are established on these notions communes and which can be proved in an irrefutable way by them, it
follows that when these demonstrations are placed in one's soul by the Spirit, it necessarily results that one acquiesces to their truth.

Pajon also gives a study in the overcoming of prejudices by the reason and the Word. Prejudices blind the individual to the truth, but they do not take away his faculty of good judgment which is nothing other than the faculty of understanding. The rejection of the object of the Word takes place because one examines it by his prejudice which one considers to be true. The power of this prejudice is the fact that it is accepted as true. Finding the object of the Word to be in conflict with one's prejudice, the Word is rejected by the law of logic that truth should not be contrary to truth. In a situation of this kind, the action of the Spirit consists in preventing one from being determined by such prejudices. This latter crucial result is accomplished by placing such ideas into the understanding that it is necessary for one to renounce the *notions communes* (which have been given by nature, which one cannot do) or one must renounce his prejudices. It is the Word that gives us these ideas that are linked to the *notions communes*.

But another question may be raised with regards to all this: "How does God awaken the *notions communes* in one's soul and bring them before one linked to the Word in such a way that the necessary connection may be seen?" Pajon answers:

*Le St Esprit a mille moyens en sa main pour le faire, et j'estime que comme sa sapience est diverse en toutes manières, qu'il n'agit point en*
deux hommes de la même sorte, en général, c'est par des objets qu'il leur représente dont les uns précèdent la Parole, les autres l'accompagnent et quelques autres la suivent, comme il paraîtra particulièrement by dessous en examinant notre 14 assertion.

Mais le nombre de ces objets est infini, aussi bien que la manière de les dispenser est infiniment diverse sans que personne la puisse exprimer, tout ce que nous pouvons en dire, c'est que la dispensation de tous ces objets et de toutes les circonstances qui accompagnent la Parole, appartient à Dieu et non point aux hommes.101

Another illustration that serves to clarify Pajon's thought is the comparison he makes between the soul and a scale.

Notre âme est comme une balance qui panche tantôt d'un côté, tantôt de l'autre selon les raisons qui la poussent, et selon la force des idées différentes qu'elle reçoit. Le Monde a ses raisons qui nous portent à le suivre, J. Christ a aussi les siennes qui nous obligent à luy obéir. Celuy en qui les raisons du monde et celle de J. Christ paraissent également fortes demeure comme en équilibre sans pancher d'un coté plus que de l'autre, comme vous le voyez en the première de ces figures, et celuy la est de ces tıedes dont parle l'Ecriture, ... Ceux en en qui les raisons du monde prevalet sont les gens du siecle tels que nous en voyons une infinité; et ceux enfin en qui les raisons Evang. ont plus d'apparence de vérité, sont les vrais fideles, qui penchent les uns plus, les autres moins, du coté de J. Christ, mais qui tous ensemble préfèrent J. Christ au monde. La suasion se fait donc par des raisons qui amenent dans l'équilibre entre les deux points A. et B. ou qui nous laisse meme au dessous d'A. du coté du monde, les uns uns plus, les autres moins, ... Mais la Persuasion se fait par des raisons qui nous amènent au dessous de l'équilibre, c'est à dire au dessous de B. du coté de Christ, les uns au point 1. les autres au point 2. les autres jusques au point 3. selon que les raisons sont plus ou moins fortes dans notre Esprit, c'est à dire, selon qu'elles ont plus ou moins d'apparence de vérité ... Différence que Dieu met entre les hommes soit en diminuant d'un coté la force des raisons du monde, en elignant les tentations, en
nous ôtant les objets qui nous pourroient aveugler en nous faisant comprendre par les châtiments, que nous n'avons rien à séparer du côté du monde, car vous savez qu'en diminuant le poids d'un des côtés de la Balance, vous rendez l'autre plus pesant, soit en donnant de l'autre côté plus de poids aux raisons qui nous tirent à J. Christ, en nous appelant avec plus d'instance avec des circonstances plus efficaces et d'une manière plus insinuante.\textsuperscript{12}\textsuperscript{12}

Still another of Pajon's illustrations of his concept of conversion is to imagine the soul with all its faculties were a ball which would make it possible for it according to the properties of a ball to roll in any direction one might push it. Imagine, furthermore that sin has entered into the picture and given this ball an inclination in the direction of the Occident. Pajon points out, in keeping with his theory of sin, that the impression that this ball has received causing it to roll toward the Occident has not taken away its capacity to receive a contrary impression which could cause it to reverse its direction and to roll toward the Orient. Sin which is a movement of the soul toward the creatures and attractions of the world never eliminates the capability of its movement toward the values of heaven and the spiritual world. On the other hand, Pajon's concept of inability is also clearly illustrated.

Je dis donc que comme l'impression donné à cette boule qui pousse vers l'Occident ne luy a point ôté la capacité de recevoir cette impression contraire qui la pousse vers l'Orient aussi le péché qui est un mouvement de notre âme vers les Créatures et les biens du monde, ne luy a point ôté la capacité d'un mouvement contraire vers les créatures et les biens du Ciel, parce que cette capacité n'est pas moins essentiel à une boule d'être capable de rouler de tous côtés; Il est
vray que comme il est impossible à une boule qui a 
reçu une forte impression vers l'Occident, de 
rouler vers l'Orient, jusqu'à ce qu'une cause plus 
puissante que celle qui la poussé vers l'Occident 
luy ôte l'impression qu'elle a reçue et luy en donne 
une contraire, aussi notre ame ayant reçu par le 
pech un forte impression vers le monde et les 
creatures, n'est pas capable de se porter vers le 
Ciel et vers J.C. jusqu'à ce qu'une cause plus 
puissante que la première, luy ôte cette impression 
qu'elle a reçue vers le monde, et luy en donne une 
contraire vers J. Christ: Mais il est vray aussi 
que comme la capacité que cette boule avait 
naturellement de rouler de tous coté aussi bien vers 
l'Orient que vers l'Occident, ne luy a point été 
ôté par le mouvement qu'elle a receu, mais seulement 
a été determinée à rouler d'un certain coté, tout 
de même cette capacité qui est essentielle à notre 
amé de se porter vers toute sorte d'objets, ne 
sauroit luy avoir été ôté par le mouvement moral 
qu'elle à receu vers un certain objet, mais a été 
seulement determinée à se porter vers cet objet là.

Furthermore, Pajon asks us to imagine that this ball is 
capable of intelligence,

et qu'elle n'ait été poussé vers l'Occident que par 
la force de quelque raison, il faudra que nous 
confessiez qu'il n'y a que des raisons opposeés qui 
la puissent amener de l'autre coté et luy ôter ce 
mouvement qui la porte vers l'Occident, et la 
determine à rouler de ce coté là plutôt que de 
l'autre. Il en est de même de notre ame, elle n'a 
ete portée à juger que le monde est son bien, et à 
le suivre, que par les raisons que Satan nous a 
presentées ... Il n'y a que des raisons opposeés 
plus fortes que les premières qui puissent nous 
opter la pente que nous avons de ce coté là et nous 
ramener à faire un jugement tout contraire. 103

Infused Faith

In his treatise "De l'operation de l'Esprit de Dieu 
et de la conversion de l'homme," Pajon treats the question of 
infused faith in response to a statement by his Cameronian 
opponent who argues that "la foy n'est pas une habitude 
acquise par notre travail et industrie." 104 Pajon is
willing to accept the concept of infused faith in the limited sense that our knowledge depends on the Word, but he denies that there is an infusion of the habit of faith in the particular individual before one believes. Pajon insists that faith comes with the act of believing. He also points out that his opponent admits that faith ordinarily depends upon the ministry of the Word. If this is conceded

la foi n'est donc pas une habitude infuse sans le ministère de la parole, et si la foi est infuse par le Ministère de la Parole, il faut qu'elle soit infuse par le moyen de notre subopération, parce que la Parole ne peut agir en nous sans que nous agissons nous mêmes; ainsi la foi est tout ensemble infuse et acquise par un ou par plusieurs actes de nos entendement.105

Pajon states that the admission that faith is acquired by the act of believing makes it impossible for one to hold that faith can be attained without knowledge. If the habit of faith can be poured into the soul by an immediate action of God without any suboperation of the faculties, this would eliminate the need for any knowledge at all in achieving or exercising faith. A man could believe solely because God created the habit of faith in him without any valid rational basis for his faith whatsoever. Pajon warns that an admission of infused faith in the scholastic sense would be tantamount to the acceptance of sacramental grace which operates without any

subopération de l'homme, au lieu que ni la Parole ni les sacrements n'agissent en nous que par la vertu qu'ils ont de représenter à nos ames certains objets capables de les toucher, et les mouvoir puissamment à la pieté, ainsi n'agissent en nous que lorsque nous suboperons avec eux.106
Pajon notes that his opponent has given a quotation from Cameron in support of his statement in favor of infused faith; however, he questions the validity of this alleged support. The quotation from Cameron is: "'Peruulgatum quidem in Scholis illud est, habitus non nisi per plures actus ingenerari ...'" Pajon understands Cameron's argument is that faith and love are engendered in us by one sole act and that his opponent concludes from this they are, therefore, infused rather than acquired habits. Pajon challenges this reasoning, arguing that instead of being infused, they actually are acquired by that very act. He realizes that his opponent will protest that God is the one who produces this act, but he cautions that there is a need for careful analysis at this point:

Distinguez, ce n'est pas l'homme qui le produit de soi même, sans y être puissamment poussé de Dieu; ce n'est pas l'homme non plus qui le produit en coopérant avec Dieu, mais que ce ne soit pas l'homme qui le produise en suboperant avec Dieu, M. Cameron n'en est pas d'avis dans ses Th. 19.107

The act in question is that of believing and loving, and Pajon admits that God is the cause of one's believing and loving but also points out that it is not God who believes and loves. Rather, it is the individual himself who actually does this, and it is by the action of believing and loving that one acquires the habit of faith and love.

Pajon concludes that if faith is infused by an immediate action as his opponent argues, the will would have to be moved immediately by the Spirit. This, of course, is a
view that his opponent rejects since he has already pronounced himself for the Cameroonian concept of the primacy of the understanding. Consequently, Pajon believes he has shown his view regarding infused faith to be more consistent with the basic Cameroonian presuppositions that both he and his opponent have accepted as valid.\textsuperscript{108}

In his discussion of the problem concerning the difference in the responses of those who hear the same Word preached, Pajon accepts the terminology revelation and illumination as proper terms for describing what takes place in those who respond. The question is not, therefore, whether the difference should be attributed to the revelation and illumination of the Holy Spirit, but rather to what this virtue of the Spirit refers. "Je confesse que Dieu accompagne la Parole à regard de quelques uns d'une Lumiere Spirituelle, ou si vous l'aimez mieux d'un esprit d'Illumination et de Revelation dont il ne l'accompagne pas à l'égard des autres."\textsuperscript{109} The issue that must be faced is whether this virtue with which God accompanies his Word is a quality that God creates immediately in the understanding in order to give one the capability of receiving the impression of the truth or the impression and conviction of the truth which God would, of course, generate by secondary and rational means. Pajon argues that his position, the second, is more in keeping with the meaning of the terms revelation and illumination. Pajon notes that Cameron understands knowledge as "passive illumination" and the action by which
this knowledge is caused as "active illumination." He points out that his opponent's idea of immediate action is that it does not originate this knowledge of itself, but only makes it possible for one to receive it. There are two steps here that could conceivably be separated and result in a situation in which the first step would be taken without the second. In such a case, one would face the problem of a soul made capable of receiving knowledge without it actually being received. One could hardly consider this to be illumination in Cameron's sense; in fact, this type of immediate action would not deserve to be called the spirit of illumination at all. Pajon concludes from this that his view of the Spirit's action is more consistent with the Cameronian concept of illumination.110

Pajon adds that revelation, the other term which his opponent ascribes to his concept of immediate action, is even less suitable than the term illumination. Pajon states that it is conceivable that an idea of illumination might exist that would be physical and independent of any internal or external object, but he cannot conceive of the revelation of any truth without the presentation of some idea to one's soul.111

A Cameronian Opponent's Concept of Conversion

At this point the concept of conversion held by Pajon's opponent who wrote "Articles proposés par un ami à son ami" will be considered. His presentation from the Cameronian viewpoint followed by a treatment of Jurieu's
understanding of the process of conversion will make it possible to grasp more clearly their positions in opposition and contrast to Pajon. He writes that when God wishes to bring about the conversion of the elect He uses the ministry of the Word but accompanies it with the secret power of his Spirit. A comparison is made between the unconverted and a blind man. In the same way that a blind man can see nothing at noontime, likewise an unconverted man cannot be affected by the external presentation of the Word until the internal secret action of the Holy Spirit has given him the capacity to see the light. There is, consequently, a need for a double illumination, one, external, which is given by the Word; in addition, one that is internal which is given by the Spirit. The light of the sun, alone, is not enough to cause the man to see, even as the Word alone is not enough to bring about the conversion of anyone. On the other hand, it is not enough for the blind man to receive his sight; he must also have the light of the sun.

Et comme ceux qui ont de tres bons yeux
n'appercoievent aucune chose visible quand ils ne
sont aidés d'aucune lumiere exterieure; il en
seroit de meme d'un homme qui auroit les yeux de
son entendement illuminés, il n'auroit aucune
connaissance des mysteres de notre Redemption, s'il
n'étoit aidé de la lumière extérieure de la
Parole ...

This accounts for the need of a joint action between the Word and the Spirit.112

Louis Tronchin follows a similar line of reasoning in his debate by correspondence with Pajon. He makes a comparison
between learning mathematics and conversion. Not everyone is able to learn mathematics. It is necessary for God to dispose the mind of an individual in such a manner that he may be able to learn the subject. Without this disposition of the mind, one would be unable to instruct the individual in the rules and axioms of this subject in such a way that he would be able to grasp a demonstration of their validity.

L'une sans l'autre ne suffit pas fait rien; mais jointes ensemble quoi que distincte, elles rendent un homme mathématicien; Ainsi l'opération de dieu distincte de la parole est nécessaire pour le disposer à la conversion et en rendre capable et la parole est nécessaire pour la conversion ... \(^{113}\)

Taking up the argument of Pajon's anonymous opponent again, he states:

Quoique ces deux causes soient toujours conjointes a l'égard des Elûs, et concourent en la production de leur foi, elles ne laissent pas d'être distinctes et d'agir diversement. La parole propose l'objet, mais l'Esprit dispose le sujet, la parole illumine extérieurement, et l'Esprit interieurement. La parole nous est proposée par le ministère des hommes, mais l'Esprit nous vient immediatement du Pere et du Fils.

The causes of conversion also are distinguished as objective and efficient, the Word being the objective cause and the Spirit being the efficient cause. In addition, there is also a double vocation "l'une purement exterieure qui n'est jamais efficace, et l'autre qui est exterieure et interieure toute ensemble, et cette derniere convertit infailliblement ceux qui en sont honorez ... "

The element of teaching also is treated in this series. God teaches in two different ways. One is the
external proposition of the Word, a method that acts indifferently on the elect as well as the reprobate; then there is the secret instruction

au domicile de notre conscience par son Esprit qui nous assure de la vérité des doctrines qui nous sont proposées par la Parole de Dieu. C'est de cette second espece d'instruction dont nous parle NS. quand il entend des seuls Fideles cette Oracle: "Et ils seront tous enseignées de Dieu et quand il dit que qui conque a oüy et a appris du Pere vient a lui."115

The last doublet noted is concerning illumination.

Finalement il y a une double espece d'illumination, l'une exterieure, quand il plait à Dieu de faire luire son Evangelle en les lieux ou on n'avoit jamais veu cette belle lumiere; l'autre interieure quand il plait à Dieu de resplendir dans nos coeurs et de nous donner les yeux de notre entendement illuminés par la vertu puissante de sont Esprit. C'est cette illumination que demandoit je dis le profete ps. 119 "Decouvre mes yeux afin que je voye les verveilles de ta Loy."116

Now Pajon's Cameronian opponent takes up the question of conversion in its entirety. When the Spirit has decided to bring about the conversion of one of the elect, he operates upon the two principal faculties of the soul, namely, the understanding and the will. Both of these faculties have been depraved by sin. The understanding is incapable of knowing the things of the Spirit and the will is unable to subject itself to the law of God. It is necessary for the Spirit to operate upon both of these faculties; but in keeping with the Cameronian tradition, he acknowledges that the Spirit does not operate immediately upon the will but moves it by means of the understanding

qu'il illumine pour lui faire connoitre la verité et l'incomparable utilité des enseignemens de la Parole,
Again, by mentioning that the Spirit moves the will by a purely moral movement, he indicates to what degree he is in agreement with Pajon though not with Jurieu. This is all the further he goes with Pajon, however, for in the next statement he states that it is not the same with the understanding because there is an immediate operation of the Spirit in this case to grant it the capability of receiving the truth "par une action qui n'est ni Morale ni Physique, mais surnaturelle et ineffable." 

Jurieu's Concept of Conversion

Jurieu also has been stimulated by the Pajonistic controversies to consider carefully how conversion takes place. Along with the other supporters of immediate grace, he has been challenged by the Pajonists to explain just what immediate grace is and how it operates. Pajon argues that it is illogical, useless, and dangerous to Reformed theology, but Jurieu claims that it is essential to conversion and repudiates Pajon's position as well as that of others who retain Cameron's basic system of theology. Jurieu advises his readers from the beginning that he does not claim to be able to explain entirely the manner in which grace operates.

Il n'y a pas lieu d'espérer ici qu'on puisse faire cela parfaitement; car la matière dont le St. Esprit agit est impénétrable: St. Augustin l'appelle "occulti miri" et "ineffabiles modi."
He will, however, attempt to clear up part of this mystery; and in doing this, he proposes to avoid the terms of the scholastics and to base his presentation on the common sentiment and experience of all those who are truly regenerate. Jurieu believes that he can describe the movement of grace in the human heart and the results that accompany it. He also believes that he will be able to determine in which steps the Spirit has a part and what that part is.\textsuperscript{116}

First, there is the external presentation of the Word to man's spirit as true and good in the form of preaching. Second, the understanding acts and receives the ideas of the spiritual truths such as the concept of God as existing in three persons, creator of the world, and redeemer in Christ. Third, Jurieu notes that at first this presentation meets with a negative response:

La hauteur des mystères étonne et efforouche l'esprit, il y trouve de la contradiction: les préjugés repoussent fortement la vérité et les erreurs lui font obstacle. Les inclinations de la volonté s'opposent, et la revolte des passions et de toute la partie inférieure combat la vérité qui se présente; parce que l'âme attachée et engagée au corps et aux choses corporelles par une union et physique et morale et d'inclination, ne sauroit souffrir que la vérité la rappelle de cet attachement qui a fait jusques-là tout son plaisir.\textsuperscript{119}

Fourth, in order to overcome these obstacles grace begins to present the truth to the understanding in such a manner that it is able to grasp it and be persuaded by it. Up to now, however, the persuasion is purely intellectual and incapable of moving the will. It is important because of the nature of man that another action of grace operate
upon the will in order to break the hold that the sensations of this world have upon it through its moral affinity with the body and the flesh and to incline it to make a practical choice in favor of the truth. To understand this whole line of thought it is important to remember that Jurieu has repudiated the concept of the primacy of the understanding and considers it as a passive faculty. Acquiescence is an act of the will and depends upon the will. The practical understanding is determined by two things: first of which is the truth that it sees, the second is the order which it receives from the will. Jurieu considers that seeing and understanding the truth alone is absolutely insufficient to determine the practical understanding and the will. He points to the experience of those who say, "'je connois le bien, je l'approve, et je veux suivre le mal. Je consens à la loi qu'elle est bonne mais je suis charnel vendu sou péché.'"120 Jurieu's complete repudiation of Cameron's thought with regards to the relationship of the will and understanding can also be seen from Jurieu's argument that the will is not determined except by pleasure and enjoyment. He emphasizes this point: "Je dis le plaisir non pas vu ou crû, mais le plaisir senti et requ." He agrees with the Cameronian concept that the truth is the object of the understanding and that the good is the object of the will, but he quickly adds that

la bonté ou la béatitude qui remué la volonté est une bonté sentie et qui est appliquée immédiatement à la faculté, tout de même que la vérité qui remué
l'entendement est une vérité appliquée et sentie par l'entendement. Le bien ou la béatitude considérée encore par l'entendement seul ne passe que pour vérité, et il n'est bonté que quand il est appliqué à la volonté par une action qui en cause le sentiment, comme la vérité ne passe pour vérité que quand elle est sentie par l'entendement.  

From this passage it can be seen that Jurieu's idea of the application of grace depends largely on his understanding of how the soul recognizes the good. Pajon and Cameron have based their entire system on the conception that the will could be moved by the judgment of the practical understanding with regards to the good. But Jurieu proposes the principle that the good or the well-being of the soul can only be recognized when it actually senses this well-being. Jurieu supports this assumption by arguing that the soul is born for pleasure: "C'est ce qu'on veut dire quand on dit que la fin de l'homme c'est la béatitude: le sentiment de la béatitude est dans le plaisir et dans la délectation." Before grace acts upon the soul, it receives its pleasure through its union with the body and through sensations of a physical nature. This is why the unconverted soul abandons itself to material things and makes a false judgment with regards to true well-being and that which is false. To overcome this false pleasure and charm "il faut un autre plaisir et une délectation prévenante et dominante afin que la volonté se puisse mouvoir du côté du bien ... et en changeant penchant donner aussi une autre pente à l'entendement pour juger sainement de la bonté de ces choses."
Jurieu admits that this prevenient grace that acts on the will presupposes the knowledge of the good and the gospel because it is a movement that carries the soul to the good. He admits this because he understands that one cannot go toward the good if one does not know it. But he adds to this, as has already been stated, that it does not depend uniquely on knowledge. "Cela est clair premi&egrave;rement parce que plusieurs connoissent le bien et ne s'y portent pas; ... "

To clarify still further just what this <i>d&eacute;lectation pr&eacute;venante</i> is, Jurieu adds that it is not "un mouvement raisonn&eacute;, d&eacute;lib&eacute;r&eacute; et de r&eacute;flexion; c'est un mouvement ind&eacute;lib&eacute;r&eacute;, imprim&eacute;, et un acte d'irradiation qui na& GRACE."

For further clarification, it is also noted that besides this <i>d&eacute;lectation pr&eacute;venante</i> there is another sweetness (<i>douceur</i>) that comes after its action. This is the spiritual joy and the peace of conscience which always comes after the determination of the understanding and the will for the good.

Mais cette autre d&eacute;lection pr&eacute;vient le dernier jugement de l'entendement pratique; c'est la cause de la vertu, et non pas son fruit. La derni&egrave;re d&eacute;lection est parfaite, elle met l'ame en repos: mais la premi&egrave;re est imparfaite, elle met l'ame en mouvement.

Jurieu concludes that this <i>d&eacute;lectation pr&eacute;venante</i> brings about the last determination of the understanding and the will and is the last operation of the soul that brings about conversion. He adds, however, that this "d&eacute;lection pr&eacute;venante et victorieuse" is necessary in all the following acts of the converted individual as well as in the first
actions that bring about one's conversion. "Car il faut toujours que Dieu nous prévienne, nous montre le bien, et nous en applique la douceur par sa grace à chacune de nos actions vertueuses."  

Jurieu makes a further analysis of the part the Spirit plays in this operation of grace, why it must assume this part, and why the Word together with accompanying circumstances cannot do what the Spirit does. In the first place, the presentation of the object cannot be considered the work of the Spirit properly speaking except in a very loose sense. The second thing that happens is the reception of the ideas in the understanding and the comprehension of that which is proposed. This, again, properly considered is not an operation of the Spirit because an atheist or secular individual understands the propositions of the gospel that are presented to him. However, when one comes to the third step, that of exercising faith in the truths that have been presented, such as the Trinity, the incarnation, and the redemption of Christ, there is a need for the Spirit to begin its action. Jurieu notes that an individual may have a kind of intellectual faith that comes because of varying natural reasons, but this can only be designated as human faith. To have the faith that justifies and true spiritual discernment, the Spirit must actively intervene.

A number of reasons are given to substantiate this claim in opposition to the Pajonists: First, there is a great disproportion between the object and man's faculties.
The infinite itself is an object that is disproportionate with the finite; the revealed Christian mysteries, such as a God who is one in essence but exists in three persons accomplishing all things according to His sovereign will, the incarnation, Christ's death and resurrection, are above the reason of man; and it should not be difficult to understand that one cannot have a reasonable persuasion of these things without God's intervention. External circumstances cannot avail to persuade one of all this because of the vastness of the object involved and the limitation of man's faculties that are called on to grasp it.

Jurieu notes that many may agree with him as to the incomprehensibility of the Christian mysteries but insist that the marks of the divinity of Scripture are comprehensible to men, and this can sustain one's belief in the mysteries that are above reason. As has already been seen in the discussion of the eighth proposition, Jurieu challenges this also. He argues that a belief in the divinity of Scripture is not enough to sustain faith in the Christian mysteries as can be seen from the attitude of the Pelagians, the Arians, and the Socinians who believe, generally speaking, in the divinity of Scripture but reject various of the Christian mysteries.¹²

The second reason Jurieu gives to explain why the soul cannot apprehend the truth of Christian mysteries without immediate grace is that prejudice causes the Word to appear foolish to men. The Spirit must do two things to surmount
these two obstacles: First of all, He must give the faculty the power to believe what seems unbelievable. How can this be done? In opposition to the Pajonists, Jurieu states that it certainly cannot be done by means of the Word. The Word, in fact, is the means by which this unbelievable object is presented. The Spirit does it by bending the will. This is necessary because one can only believe things that are unbelievable and inevident because one wishes to believe these things. On the other hand, one believes things that are evident in themselves by an assent of the will over which it has no authority. For example, one readily sees that two times two are four even if one does not want to.

Jurieu takes note of the fact that the enemies of immediate grace will demand that he explain further still just how all this is accomplished but he considers this to be an unjustified question. Who can explain how the soul interacts with the body or the body with the soul? How can they expect him to explain precisely how God acts on the soul?
et s'anéantissent, et qu'il ne faut point à Dieu d'autre vertu.\textsuperscript{125}

The other thing that the Holy Spirit does is to destroy the errors and prejudices. Again he states that this cannot be done by the Word alone. It is the Word that brings about the revolt of these very prejudices. How could it bring about their dispersal? Actually, these prejudices are overcome by the same action that brings persuasion and submission to the mysteries. It may be said that "la reception des mistéres et la rejection des préjuges sont une même action, comme l'action qui introduit la lumière dans l'air est la même qui en chasse les ténèbres." The Word does not accomplish the first; therefore it does not accomplish the latter. To better establish this argument, Jurieu notes that there are two kinds of prejudices. One kind is based on errors of the senses and false reasoning, the other is based on the passions. Many things are believed because one wants to believe these things. It is this latter type of prejudice that creates the greatest obstacle to the reception of truth, and it is overcome primarily by the action on the will and the passions which he calls \textit{la délectation prévenante}.\textsuperscript{126}

The outpouring of this \textit{délectation} is the fourth step in conversion and the Spirit takes an active part in this. Jurieu anticipates that his opponents among the Pajonists will admit that this \textit{délectation} is experienced when the object of the gospel is apprehended. They are in agreement with him that the will has as its object the good, but they
will say that it is the Word or the presentation of the object that causes this délectation. An example of how this could work would be to think of a man being presented with a treasure; the presentation of such an object would certainly bring him an experience of pleasure and there is no need for any other secret action to operate upon him to make him experience this délectation. Jurieu's answer to this is that this could only be valid if the will naturally had the same inclination toward spiritual well-being as it does to carnal well-being. It is not, however, the case and this involves one in a conflict of interest. A good illustration of this is the story of the rich young ruler who, upon being told to sell what he had and to follow Christ, turned sadly away for he had great riches. There was a conflict here between spiritual values and carnal values, and the carnal values won out. Jurieu challenges the Pajonists as follows:

Jugez si la proposition pure et simple d'un objet pour laquelle l'âme corrompuée a naturellement de l'antipathie, la pourroit séparer d'une chose avec laquelle elle est unie par la naissance, et dont l'union avec elle est entretenu par toutes les choses qui passent par ses sens. Je ne saurais souffrir non plus qu'on dise que ce sont les circonstances qui donnent à la parole cette vertu de répandre la délectation prévenante dans la volonté. Car rien d'externe ne peut disposer la volonté à recevoir et goûter les plaisirs célestes que ce qui rompt son union avec les choses sensibles.127

With this, the study of Jurieu's concept of conversion is concluded, and one sees how differently he explains the mysterious process that involves the impartation of spiritual life to man from that held by Pajon and his Cameronian
opponent. It is clear that Jurieu has embraced a fideistic or what one might call a voluntaristic position on the process of conversion. The understanding has been drastically demoted and the will has been given the place of supremacy in his system. It is not entirely clear how great a part Pajonism has exercised in this development; however, it appears that it has been an important element.

A More Detailed Rebuttal of Pajonism by Jurieu

At this point a more detailed rebuttal by Jurieu of the major Pajonistic propositions will be discussed. One of the questions raised by Jurieu in his rebuttal is concerning the difference that should exist between persuading one of some philosophic view and actually making one a Christian. Jurieu takes note of the fact that the Pajonists hold that the object of Christianity is greater and nobler than that with which any purely human discipline is concerned. He also takes note of the fact that the Pajonists hold that God dispenses in a sovereign way the circumstances and events that contribute to conversion. Still, all these differences and others that they may make are unsatisfactory according to Jurieu.

Nous cherchons une différence essentielle entre la manière dont se fait le Chrétien, et celle dont se fait le Philosophe; et ces différences-ci sont moins qu'accidentelles: car elles sont quasi nulles, et ne font point de différence que celle qui se trouve entre une science humaine et l'autre."

As far as the amassing of circumstances in favor of
Christianity such as the nobility and greatness of the objects and motives, Jurieu does not see how that a philosopher cannot approximate these conditions in making disciples. As far as circumstances are concerned, the philosopher is able to create certain ones though not others. "Il fait celles-ci, son éloquence, son tour d'esprit, sa manière de proposer raisons, l'art de leur donner une air d'evidence, l'adresse de tourner les raisons opposées en ridicule, la clarté de sa méthode, la force de son imagination." Such circumstances are very influential and a good philosopher makes himself the master of these arts of persuasion. Other circumstances such as education, temperament, and prosperity which confront the prospective disciples may be beyond the control of the philosopher. However, if he is a good philosopher and leader, he is aware of these circumstances, studies them, and adapts himself to them to the best of his ability.

Jurieu anticipates the objection that a philosopher cannot dispense all these circumstances in the manner that the Pajonists claim that God does in conversion. In admitting this Jurieu also concedes that a philosopher is not always successful in his attempt to persuade, but when the philosopher is successful it is

par l'heureux assemblage de ces circonstances qu'il a cherchées, et qu'il a rencontrées. Ainsi quand il persuade les préceptes de la Philosophie morale, il le fait absolument de la même manière que Dieu persuade les hommes et les fait Chrétiens, c'est par la parole et par les circonstances. From this discussion, Jurieu concludes that Pajon's system
does not account for any definite difference between the methodology by which one makes a Christian or a philosopher. Jurieu emphasizes this by a step-by-step comparison of the manner in which a pastor makes a convert and a philosopher makes a disciple:


2. Le Philosophe porte ses maximes et les préceptes, non pas simplement aux oreilles de son disciple, il va les appliquer immédiatement à l'âme par la voie de l'entendement; dans cet entendement il chasse les préjugés, les erreurs et les fausses opinions. Après avoir persuadé l'entendement, il emmène la volonté par l'entendement, et les passions par la volonté. Voilà justement le progrès que fait le prédicateur de l'Évangile par la parole.

3. Le Philosophe est maître d'une partie des circonstances, ce sont celles qui dépendent de sa manière de proposer les choses. Le Pasteur est maître aussi de sa manière de proposer la parole; c'est pourquoi il étudie et arrête ses paroles dans l'ordre le plus propre à persuader.

4. Le Philosophe n'est pas maître de plusieurs circonstances; et celles là il les étudie et il essaie de les rencontrer. Le Pasteur n'est pas maître des circonstances qui sont hors de lui, et qui sont pourtant nécessaires pour la conversion; il se contente de les observer, de les chercher et de s'en servir, quand il les rencontre; tout de même que le Philosophe.

5. Enfin pour la conversion du Chrétien Dieu ménage un nombre de circonstances qui amènent nécessairement l'homme où il veut.

Jurieu notes that if there is some difference at all between the manner in which a philosopher makes a convert and the Christian pastor makes one, it would be here; but Jurieu feels that he has already pointed out that this is not an
essential difference.

Another argument used against Pajon by Jurieu is that Scripture and experience indicate God has not chosen the most intelligent and penetrating thinkers to be the special recipients of His grace.

En effet il est constant que les premiers chrétiens étoient simples, pieux, dévots et zélez en même tems. L'Eglise fut tirée du sein du vulgaire; peu de Philosophes se firent chrétiens, et il ne nous paroit pas que ces esprits qui se distinguoient dans le monde parce qu'on appelle les lumières et la pénétration, aient embrassé le foi.\textsuperscript{132}

Jurieu, consequently, asks why this is true if conversion is dependent on the understanding of the truth and the understanding itself is the primary faculty of the soul? Should not there be greater success among those who are more intellectually capable than the average or mediocre individual. Jurieu compares the Pajonistic concept of the primacy of the understanding to the spring of a watch in order to emphasize this point:

Selon eux, l'entendement est comme le grand resort de l'ame; touchez-le fortement, il mettra nécessairement en action toutes les facultez inférieures de l'ame. Or selon eux aussi, la connoissance est la seule chose qui soit capable de remuer et de toucher cet entendement. Tout de même donc qu'il est impossible d'appliquer fortement la main sur le ressort d'une montre, que les rouages ne marchent avec vitesse: pareillement il seroit impossible d'appliquer fortement et continuellement la vérité sur un entendement, que toutes les autres facultez ne se remuassent du côte du bien avec une force proportionnée à la connaissance.\textsuperscript{133}

Jurieu, however, is convinced that this is not the case. He concludes that experience and Scripture support his denial
that grace is uniquely dependent upon the presentation of the object. Nor, he adds, can one account for this distinction because of the circumstances of life. If the faith and persuasion of an ignorant individual is not greater than that of a learned and wise individual except for certain variable circumstances such as

\[ \text{parce que cet ignorant n'a pas assez d'esprit pour voir les difficultez, ou parce qu'il a été nourri entre des gens pieux, ou par quelque chose de semblable, ces circonstances destituées de connoissance font une foi établie, ou sur l'habitude, ou sur la foiblesse de l'esprit, ou sur les préjugés: ...} \]

Jurieu concludes that all these things are a poor foundation for faith.

\[ \text{Car c'est une chose claire, qu'une forte persuasion avec peu de connaissance, ou doit avoir une cause supérieure et divine, comme l'inspiration; ou une cause humaine et mauvaise, c'est l'erreur, la foiblesse, l'habitude ou le préjugé.} \]

Another key part of Jurieu's rebuttal of Pajonism is his claim that Pajon is resurrecting the ancient heresy of Pelagianism. He makes a comparison of the two systems of thought as follows: Pelagianism states that the only grace consists of nature and law. Pelagius' concept of nature has reference to the understanding and free will that is man's because of creation. By the law and doctrine, he understands the Word which brings about conversion by various motives such as warning, promises and other reasons which are presented to the spirit of man. Jurieu argues that Pajon's idea of grace is basically the same as that of Pelagius though he admits that there is a distinction in that Pajon holds the
Word with its attending circumstances determines the acquiescence of the elect. However, he holds that Pajon is in agreement with Pelagius at those points where Augustine assailed him most strenuously with the resultant conclusion that Pelagianism was declared to be a heresy by the ancient church.

Various passages are presented by Jurieu from Augustine to demonstrate his position is supported by this great ancient church father. One he gives is:

C'est que personne ne peut accomplir la loi par la loi, par ce que la charité est l'accomplissement de la loi. Or la charité est épandue en nos coeurs non par la loi et la doctrine, mais par le St. Esprit qui nous est donné. C'est pourquoi par la loi soit accomplie par la grace etc. Si l'on veut appeler cette grace enseignement, j'y consens, pourvu qu'on avoué que Dieu par une douceur ineffable la verse intérieurement et profondement, non seulement par ceux qui plantent et qui arrousent extérieurement, mais aussi par soi même, en fournissant l'accroissement d'une manière cachée; en sorte que non seulement il montre la vérité, mais il imprime la charité, etc.  

Jurieu notes from this passage and others that Augustine supports him in holding that God converts men by an operation that is distinct from the Word which gives the Word its efficacy.

It has already been noted that Jurieu acknowledges an attempt on the part of the Pajonists to distinguish themselves from Pelagianism, but he considers it to be inadequate. He gives the Pajonistic argument:

Il y a bien de la difference, disent-ils, entre dire que Dieu fasse quelque chose par le ministère de la parole accompagnée de toute ses circonstances, et dire qu'il ne fasse rien que présenter la parole et en menager les circonstances. Le second est tout externe. Mais le premier signifie une opération interne: Le second étoit proprement le sentiment
de Pélage qui faisoit consister la grace in lege et
in doctrina, et qui d'ailleurs ne nioit pas la
providence, et n'étoit pas à Dieu le ménagement de
toutes les circonstances: Mais qui soutenoit aussi
que l'homme étant libre n'étoit pas tellement soumis
à la providence qu'il fut nécessairement convertit
par là; estimant qu'après que Dieu l'avoit appellât,
et de quelque circonstances que cette vocation fût
accompagnée, il étoit toujours en la puissance de
l'homme de se déterminier au bien ou au mal etc.
Mais le premier, qui est mon sentiment, est
directement contraire à celui de Pélage. Car je
pose que Dieu appelle ses élus de telle manière, et
avec de telles circonstances, qu'il est impossible
après cela qu'ils s'empêchent de connoitre le vrai
bien, et le connoissant de l'aimer.137

Jurieu refuses to accept the distinction that is
made with regard to the Pelagian concept of grace being an
external action while the Pajonistic is internal. To sub-
stantiate this he quotes Pelagius as saying, "'Dieu ouvre les
veux du coeur, qu'il nous découvre les embûches du démon qu'il
illumine ces yeux du coeur par le don ineffable de la grace;
que cette grace ne consiste pas en la doctrine seulement,
mais dans un secours de Dieu; ... '" Jurieu holds that the
Pelagians indicate that they hold that the Word acts inter-
ally by such statements and that their action is just as in-
ternal as that of Pajon. On the other hand, Jurieu admits the
distinction that the Pajonists make between their acceptance
of the determining power of the Word with its attending cir-
cumstances according to the providence of God and the
acceptance of free will on the part of the Pelagians. Jurieu
is not inclined to praise the Pajonists because of this dif-
ference; rather, he argues that the Pelagians are more logi-
cal in their system than the Pajonists. He emphasizes that
the Pajonists are in agreement with the Pelagians on those crucial points which were the issues in the ancient controversy; therefore they deserve the same condemnation. Thus Jurieu was able to resist the inroads of Pajonism by identifying it with the ancient heresy, minimizing the difference between the two systems and emphasizing their similarities.¹³⁸

There is also sharp disagreement concerning the ability of man to be converted without a distinct immediate act of the Spirit. Jurieu brings to his support various scriptural passages:

*L'Écriture dit que "nous étions morts en nos fautes et pechez; que nous étions ténèbres; que nous étions serfs et esclaves du péché et de Satan; le démon était un homme fort qui nous tenoit liez dans sa maison. La chair est inimitié contre Dieu,..."¹³⁹

He questions how these passages can be harmonized with Pajon's concept of grace. He does not understand how that one can be "dead in trespasses and sins" and still retain the ability to receive the impression of the truth as held by Pajon. Jurieu notes that a dead man will not respond to a flame no matter who prepares the circumstances, be it God himself, unless the corpse is given life by internal supernatural power. " Certainement ou l'Écriture est hiperbolique, ou l'hypothése de ces Messieurs est la fausseté meme. " Jurieu cannot see where there is any supernatural operation in the simple proposition of an object. He does not see where this surpasses the normal limitation of men. Consequently, he concludes that Pajon is reducing the divine action to nothing.

*Je ne conçois pas comment on peut supposer et
accorder une extinction totale de forces pour la conversion dans un homme, à qui l'on n'a qu'à faire voir d'une manière convenable pour le convertir. L'homme n'a-t-il pas une entendement capable de comprendre et d'être persuadé; et quand cet entendement est persuadé, selon ces Messieurs, il entraîne la volonté. Il ne lui faut que cela, et il a tout cela selon eux, donc il a tout ce qui est nécessaire pour se convertir. D'où vient que le Saint Esprit en parle comme d'un homme qui n'a aucune disposition à la conversion, et qui est mort? Cette mort spirituelle, dit-on, consiste dans les préjugéz et dans les erreurs, et non dans l'impuissance naturelle de la volonté; levez les préjugéz, dissipez les erreurs, et vous aurez levé l'impuissance de la volonté.\textsuperscript{146}

Pajon's attempt to harmonize his viewpoint with the scriptural passages is considered unreasonable and far removed from their actual meaning. To emphasize his point Jurieu applies the controversy to two men of different philosophic opinions. A follower of Aristotle, for instance, may be considered to be greatly prejudiced against the philosophy of Descartes. The Cartesian, on the other hand, proud of his new insights into various philosophic questions feels sorry for the other considering him to be a slave to certain outmoded presuppositions. One might say that these two philosophers are separated by prejudice and errors of understanding. However, would it make sense to say the Cartesian is dead with regards to the philosophy of Aristotle?

Seroit-ce un langage raisonnable de dire, cet homme est absolument destitué de toutes force pour devenir Cartésien, et cet autre n'a aucune puissance pour devenir Péripatécien, a cause que l'un et l'autre auroient des préjugéz et un entêtment qui les éloigneroit des principes opposez aux leurs?

Jurieu obviously thinks not.

Furthermore, Jurieu asks if it would be proper for a
philosophy student in speaking of his master to say: "'Je ne puis rien de moi-même, ni faire ni penser aucun bien, mais toute ma force vient de mon maître'? Jurieu feels that in holding that God only instructs the understanding by the impression of the truth through the presentation of objects, the Apostle is guilty of misrepresentations. He has belittled himself too much and made God's part too great. Jurieu concludes that Pajon's theory of conversion makes corruption too weak and, in effect, ruins the doctrine of original sin.

Another argument against Pajon is constructed by Jurieu from the scriptural passages that speak of the corruption of infants and the necessity of regeneration. He holds that children are as "dead in sin" as anyone and without sanctification will not enter the kingdom of God. Jurieu adds that Pajon's theory destroys completely the possibility of sanctification in infants. He bases this on the Pajonistic thesis that men can only be sanctified by the knowledge of the truth of which infants are incapable; consequently, they cannot be sanctified. Jurieu assumes that his opponents will not resort to claiming salvation for infants without sanctification because this would involve them in formally ruining the doctrine of original sin. He, furthermore, appeals to Calvin and to Augustine as authorities who supported the necessity of the regeneration of infants. The problem, therefore, that these men face is to account for the sanctification of infants. Seeing they cannot do it by the method they have constructed for adults, they may argue that God
works otherwise in infants than in adults. If they do, Jurieu will ask them if it is done by moral or physical causes. They will not be able to answer that it is by moral causes "car une cause morale n'agit qu'entant qu'elle est connue, et les enfans ne connoissent pas." If they answer that it is by physical causes Jurieu has what he wants to oppose their whole scheme of thought:

S'ils disent le second, je leur demanderai pourquoi Dieu peut sanctifier les enfans par une cause physique, et ne peut sanctifier les adultes que par des causes morales. Si Dieu peut imprimer dans l'ame des enfans de bons penchans qui la détachent de l'union au corps et aux choses sensibles sans aucune connaissance, pourquoi dans adultes ne pourroit-il imprimer ces même penchans dans la volonté antécédemment, ou du moins indépendamment aux réflexions et aux action de l'entendement.

Jurieu observes that out of a thousand men who are born, seven or eight hundred die in infancy. Assuming that sanctification takes place in this way, the most general way of sanctification would be by a physical action. Why should anyone insist that an exception be made of adults and argue as a question of greatest importance that they be sanctified without any physical action by an action that is only moral?

As the reader is aware, Pajon's potential response to this line of criticism has already been introduced in an earlier section that discussed his treatise on original sin. Also in chapter four, Pajon's position on ability and inabilty will be further developed. Pajon, of course, would insist that, in keeping with the basic Cameronian presuppositions, sin is of a moral nature and consequently man's
inability is of a moral nature whether in children or adults and can only be healed by a moral remedy which the Word is able to provide and does provide as the seed of man's regeneration. However, Jurieu has placed his finger on one of Pajon's most difficult problems, the action of grace on infants. One of the problems in this study is that the major refutation by Jurieu was never formally treated by Pajon; therefore a section-by-section answer to his critique by Pajon is not available.

Summary

In conclusion, in this chapter there has been an attempt to examine Pajon's doctrine and controversy in depth. Through a study of his sermon, various treatises and letters, Pajon's understanding of the broad Cameronian apologetics, his own development of the doctrine of original sin, his concept of how conversion takes place as well as his discussions on faith, illumination and revelation have been considered. Also, a sizable part of the chapter has been devoted to Jurieu's astute critique of Pajon's system. Jurieu made a noteworthy contribution to Pajonistic studies through his able analysis of Pajon's system into twelve basic propositions and his skillful explanation of the close continuity between Cameron and Pajon's thought. The dangers he recognized in Pajon's system appear to have served as a catalyst to move him to refute not only Pajon's system but the entire Cameronian approach which he considered to have spawned this
wretched hybrid of Calvinism and Pelagianism that threatened the purity of the gospel. In spite of Jurieu's low opinion of Papin's work against him, a study of his response to Jurieu's critique of Cameron and Pajon reveals that he was an able and perceptive thinker who introduced critical responses that Pajon would have counted worthy of his teaching. This chapter reveals the sharp difference that developed between Jurieu and the Cameronian thinkers which was a preview of the struggle that would take place in the years to come between the Cameronian and Jurieu's fideistic Calvinism for supremacy in the French Reformed Church in exile. An attempt has been made in this chapter to restrict the treatment of the Pajonistic literature (apart from Papin's work) more to the explanatory and descriptive aspects of his system since the next chapter will be devoted specifically to Pajon's defense of his theology of grace.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER III

1Hereafter referred to as Sermon. Published in 1666 at Saumur.

2Ibid., p. 1.
3Ibid., p. 2.
4Ibid., p. 3.
5Ibid., pp. 4-5.
6Ibid., pp. 5-12.
7Ibid., pp. 12-13.
8Ibid., pp. 13-14.
9Ibid., p. 15.
10Ibid., p. 16.
11Ibid., pp. 20-21.
12Ibid., pp. 22-23.
14Ibid., pp. 24-25.
15Ibid., pp. 26-27.
16Ibid., p. 27.
17Ibid.
18Ibid., pp. 27-28.
19Ibid., p. 28.
20Ibid., p. 30.
21Ibid.
^22Ibid., p. 31.

^23Ibid.

^24Ibid., p. 32.

^25Ibid. It may be noted that Pajon has avoided such terms as physical or natural ability and moral inability which may be attributed to the fact that he is speaking to laymen as well as the clergy, students, and professors. Indeed, he stated at the beginning of his sermon that he wished to express himself in such a way that all would be able to follow his thinking though they might not be theologians. However, he has treated the material in such a way that he has been able to arrive at the above conclusion which expresses the distinction made by Cameron and Amyraut before him with regards to natural and moral inability.

^26Ibid., p. 44.

^27Ibid., p. 45.

^28Ibid., p. 46.

^29It is referred to as "Troisième lettre," n.d., n.n., n.p., Tronchin MSS 53, fols. 95-107. It is quite possible that the letter is from Pajon to a student at the Academy of Geneva. It is followed by an item that is referred to as "Autre lettre de M. Pajon." The writer includes a treatise on conversion entitled simply "Extrait d'une lettre d'un protestant à un des ses amis du [sic]" in his letter which is written by one holding Pajonist views other than the writer of the letter which may be assumed to be Pajon; however, the writer of the letter states that he is in complete accord with the ideas expressed in the treatise. Ibid., fol. 95.

^30Ibid., fols. 95v, 96, 96v.


^32Ibid., p. 167.

^33Ibid., p. 168.

^34Ibid.


^36Ibid.

^37Ibid.


(R.S.V.)


Ibid., p. 171.

Ezekiel 18.

Isaiah 55:7. (R.S.V.)

"De la nature du péché originel," p. 171.

Ibid., p. 172.

Ibid.

Ibid., pp. 172-73.

Ibid., p. 173.

Ibid., p. 184.

Pierre Jurieu, *Traité de la nature et de la grace* (Rotterdam, 1688), p. 36. Referred to as *Traité*.

The first letter referred to in the series is described "Extrait d'une lettre a M. de Villemandi sur la doctrine du Concours Immédiat," n.d., *Le Cene MSS*, Vol. VII, No. 11, pp. 187-88. The second letter is described, "Extrait de la reponse de M. de Villemandy a la letter precedente, ..." It is dated Jan 27, 1674, *ibid.*, pp. 188-90. The third letter is simply described as "Extrait de la reponse a la precedente," Mar. 8, 1674, *ibid.*, pp. 190-203. This is the most thorough study of the subject in the series. Following this, there is a letter described as "Extrait d'une lettre a M. D. L." dated Dec. 10, 1676, *ibid.*, pp. 203-4. The last letter in the series is described as "Extrait d'une lettre a M. D. L. [though possibly the L is an S] du Avril 1674 de la usage de la Priere," *ibid.*, pp. 204-5.

*Traité*, p. 183.

55 *Traité*, p. 183.

73 Isaac Papin, *Essais de theologie* ... (Francfort, 1687), pp. 253-54. Hereafter referred to as *Essais*.
Hereafter referred to as "De l'opération." This author considers this to be one of the most important manuscripts used during this research on Pajon and Cameron's theology. He is indebted to M. Gagnebin of the Bibliothèque publique et universitaire at Geneva whose knowledge of manuscript collections in private hands in the area made it possible for this treatise and several others found together in a volume entitled "Ecrits de Pajon" (besides a very interesting copy of Pajon's letter to Claude) to be located in the Budé Family Collection near Geneva. This author wishes to express his appreciation to M. de Budé for her kindness in permitting him to use these manuscripts and M. Gabriel Naville for locating them for him in the collection (a rich source for Seventeenth Century Reformed studies).

This author also has identified Tronchin MS 135 to be a copy of this treatise. However, it is missing a number of
pages at the beginning and the end. Throughout this study, the Budé copy is used because of its superior script and completeness. An advantage of the Tronchin MS is that it gives some references to Cameron in addition to those in the Budé copy in the "Articles proposés par un ami a son ami."

100 It is included at the beginning of "De l'opération," fols. 1-13.

101 "De l'opération," fols. 75-76.
102 Ibid., fols. 55-56.
103 Ibid., fols. 91-93.
104 Ibid., fol. 10.
105 Ibid., fols. 132-33.
106 Ibid., fol. 133.
107 Ibid., fol. 134.
108 Ibid.
109 Ibid., fol. 128.
110 Ibid., fols. 128-29.
111 Ibid., fols. 129-30.
112 Ibid., fol. 3.
113 Letter, Tronchin to Pajon, April 27, 1680, Tronchin MSS 53, fol. 42.
114 "De l'opération," fol. 4.
115 Ibid., fol. 6.
116 Ibid., fols. 6-7.
117 "De l'opération," fols. 7-8.
118 Traité, pp. 299-300.
119 Ibid., pp. 300-301.
120 Ibid., pp. 301-2.
121 Ibid., p. 302.
122 Ibid., pp. 302-3.
123 Ibid., pp. 310-11.
124 Ibid., pp. 315-16.
125 Ibid., pp. 318-19.
126 Ibid., pp. 320-21.
127 Ibid., pp. 321-22.
128 Ibid., p. 265.
129 Ibid., p. 266.
130 Ibid., pp. 266-67.
131 Ibid., pp. 267-68.
132 Ibid., p. 270.
133 Ibid., p. 271.
134 Ibid., p. 272.
135 Ibid.
136 Ibid., p. 257.
137 Ibid., p. 259-60.
138 Ibid., pp. 260-63.
139 Ibid., pp. 275-76.
140 Ibid., pp. 276-77.
141 Ibid., pp. 277-78.
142 Ibid., pp. 279-80.
143 Ibid., pp. 280-81.
144 Supra, p. 132, n. 189.
CHAPTER IV

AN EXAMINATION OF PAJON'S DEFENSE OF HIS SYSTEM

In this chapter, there will be a concentration on Pajon's defense of his system of thought, especially with regards to his main controversial propositions as outlined by Jurieu and amplified by Pajon himself in the last chapter. The first major section in this chapter will be concerned with Pajon's treatment of the problem of ability which will include a detailed study of his important letter to Claude. Following this there will be a study of the discussions between Chouet and Pajon on the subject of universal grace in which Pajon explains in depth how his system is superior to the opposition. Following in order, there will be discussions of the compatibility of Pajonism with basic Calvinistic theology, the internality of Pajon's concept of mediate grace, scriptural and rational support for Pajon's views, the problem of distinction and a study on the value of means in conversion. Next there will be sections on Pajon's explanation of the origin of sin, and a thorough analysis of Cameron's thought by Pajon in order to establish his complete support of Pajon's system of thought. After this there will be a study of Pajon's answer to Maimbourg, which includes a short treatment of Calvin's support of Pajon's views, followed
by a consideration of Amyraut and Testard's thought on these issues. The concluding section in this chapter will treat Pajon's major discussion with Tronchin mainly on the heretical tendencies of Tronchin's position according to Pajon's interpretation.

The Problem of Ability

One of the most important problems with which Pajon interacts is the problem of ability. A key part of Cameron's theology is the concept of natural ability and moral inability. Pajon insists on taking this aspect of Cameron's theology seriously and considers the supporters of immediate grace to be destroying this important distinction. Most of Pajon's debate is carried on with other members of the Cameronian school of thought on this subject; however, there is an interesting letter to Mr. Astruc which gives an introduction to Pajon's method of debate with the Arminians that supplements the discussion on this subject given earlier in his sermon. This letter is of especial value because it reveals Pajon's application of the Cameronian principles in some depth in areas where in his debate with his Cameronian opponents they are presupposed through common agreement.

The Astruc Letter--The True Nature of Ability and Freedom

Pajon begins the letter by observing that Episcopius errs in his discussion on free will. Episcopius defines free will as the ability to act or not to act or the possibility of
one or another line of action. He argues that if man does not have this ability or free will, he is incapable of vice or virtue and does not merit praise or blame. Pajon is willing to concede that one cannot blame a man because he does not do something of which he is incapable, but he does not consider this to be the true issue. Pajon proceeds to make several observations: First, Episcopius did not distinguish between certain things that must be present before action can take place and those things that motivate one to actually act. Pajon wishes to stress the fact that these are two different things. He gives an example:

pour écrire il est nécessaire d'avoir du papier, de l'encre, et de savoir écrire, et autres choses semblables: mais pour estre poussé actuallement a écrire il faut connoistre que si nous n'écrivons pas illen arrivera quelqu'inconvenient: ayant dont toutes les choses necessaires pour écrire, je peux écrire ou n'écrire pas selon les raisons que j'aurai de la faire, ou de ne le faire pas.

Next, Pajon considers Episcopius' use of the word pouvoir (to be able) and states that it is quite ambiguous. He explains that

une grande difference entre la puissance de faire ce que l'on veut, la puissance de vouloir ce que l'on peut, posé qu'on le veuille, et la possibilité de le vouloir actuellement?

Pajon goes on to say that the power to do that which one wishes consists in having faculties that obey the will and being in the possession of all the things that are necessary for these faculties to accomplish this goal. The power to wish that which one is able to do (assuming that one really wishes to
do it) has to do with the faculty of the soul called the will and with the reasons that are able to touch this faculty and to move it to the desired goal. However, the possibility of actually wishing consists in the actual knowledge of reasons which carry one effectively to wish that which one regards as the good.

J'ay dont en tout temps la puissance de faire tout ce que je veux en matière de piété, j'ay mesmo tou-jours la puissance de le vouloir entant que j'ay toujours les faculté de la volonté, et qu'il y a toujours de bonnes raisons qui m'obligent à le vouloir; Mais il n'est pas toujours possible que je le veuille actuellement parce que je ne connois pas toujours la bonté de ces raisons [et] que sans cette connois­sance il ne peut arriver que je le veuille actuelle­ment. Cette impossibilité de vouloir actuellement ne regarde pas la puissance de vouloir qui ne nous peut estre oosteé.®

Pajon continues his explanation by saying we have the general capability of willing something, but we do not have the ability of willing to do or not to do something specific until the proper motives and situation arrives. Pajon, step by step, reveals how thoroughly he has absorbed the Cameronian hypothesis of the primacy of the intellect in dealing with the problem of free will. He writes further:

On concède dis je qu'en quelqu'etat que l'homme soit, il peut toujours vou[loir] tout ce qu'il lui plaist de vouloir, Mais on nie qu'il ensuive de la, qu'il pui[sse] arriver qu'il veuille aussi ce qu'il ne lui plaist pas de vouloir, ou qu'il lui puisse plaire de vouloir ce qu'il regarde comme une chose deplai­sante en toutes manières où qu'il depende de sa volonté de faire une chose qui lui paraist deplaisante en toutes manières, ne lui paroisse pas ainsi."

Pajon continues to develop the Cameronian concept that a man always chooses his own well-being and tells how this can even
lead him to evil acts.

On concède encore que l’homme peut agir brutalement quand il lui pl[aist] qu’il peut quand il veut renoncer aux lumières sa raison, etoufer la voix de sa conscience, et le porter à ce qu’il ait lui-même regardé comme un grand malheur où renoncer a ce qu’il ait regardé comme son souverain bien.

However, Pajon is quick to point out he does not agree that this can take place unless one is misled by some reason to do this. He never chooses to do it unless he somehow interprets it as in his self-interest. In this way Pajon demonstrates his ability to respond to the Arminian accusation that Calvinists undermine man’s freedom. Not so, says Pajon, man is free to do that which he wishes to do but he is a creature that acts according to motive and reason. He has the natural ability to do the opposite of what he is doing, but for him to do so there must be motives and reasons that convince him to desire to do the reverse or otherwise he will not change his behavior.

**Natural Ability to Receive Truth Essential**

From this argument with the Arminian, one gains further insight on why Pajon argues so intensely for his concept of mediate grace. Pajon insists, in fact, that unless one allows man the ability to receive the impression of the truth apart from an immediate action of the Spirit, he has robbed man of something essential to being a human being. He has taken away the meaning of natural ability and undermined the Cameronian answer to the Arminians on the question of freedom.
Pajon asks a Cameronian opponent: "Que pensez vous que soit en nostre ame cette faculté de l'intelligence sinon la capacité qu'elle à recevoir l'impression de la vérité et de la connoitre?" If you deny man this capacity you actually deny him the faculty of understanding. The faculty is not capable of this action by another faculty that can be separated from it, "il est luy essentiellement une telle capacité, de sorte que poser un entendement sans cette capacité, c'est posez un entendement qui n'est plus entendement."

Pajon asks his opponent if he considers that in creating man God would place in him all those things which are essential to his humanity. Then he asks if he considers that he would in that state be capable of the impression of the truth. Pajon warns him that if he denies man's capability of receiving the impression of the truth in his original state he will find himself holding to the same position as Bellarmin who taught that man in his state of innocence had need of supernatural grace in order to be able to accomplish his duty. He will also find himself in the company of the Arminians, according to Pajon, holding with them that man in the state of innocence did not have the power to believe the gospel in order to support their doctrine that there is a subjective universal grace without which man cannot be brought to believe the gospel. On the other hand, Pajon argues that if his opponent agrees that the ability to receive the impression of the truth was essential to the first man, he should
agree that it is still essential, for that which is essential to man cannot be separated from him. Pajon agrees that this ability is hindered by sin, but he denies it has been obliterated. His sin finds its source in the errors of the understanding and man can be set free through the ministry of the Word. To insist on immediate grace before this impression of the truth can be received is to deny man even the ability to choose between good and evil or even to interact meaningfully with the good and the bad.

Pajon turns for support to De la Place, one of his favorite teachers at Saumur at this point, stating that in his work *De Libero Arbitrio*, De la Place définit la liberté essentielle à l'homme et inseparable de sa nature, après avoir montré que les brutes sont déterminées aux d'objects; Il ajoute "In eo igitur consistit naturalis libertatis voluntatis, quod cum à coactione et necessitate materiæ et rerum sensibilium sit libera, tamque materiæ quam immaterialia, tam intelligibilia quam sensibilia, tamque futura quam praesentia tam honesta quam utilia aut jucunda, horumque contraria, omnesque honorum et malorum ordines, gradus, relationes, pro objecto habere possit omni loco et tempore."

Pajon interprets this passage as definitely in his favor. It cannot make sense if it is impossible for a man without the introduction of immediate grace to receive the impression of ideas that represent the truth. Pajon states:

Je n'ay les veritez Evangeliques et les bien du Ciel pour mon objet, que quand j'ay receu les impressions des idées qui représentent ces choses à mon entendement, si donc mon entendement n'est pas capable de recevoir l'impression de telles idées sans la grace immediate, je ne saurois avoir ces choses la pour mon objet et par consequent, ie ne suis pas libre
Scriptural Statements Supporting Physical Inability--Dead and Blind

One of the main biblical arguments against Pajon's position, as has already been presented in earlier sections of this study and especially in Jurieu's refutation, is that Scripture speaks at times as though man is in a state of physical inability. For instance, Scripture speaks of man as being dead by nature. Taken literally, this statement would preclude man from performing any vital or spiritual act such as receiving or comprehending the Word until he had been restored to life. There would have to be some immediate action to accomplish this before any possible interaction with the Word could take place. Pajon answers that one should not press the references to spiritual death to such a degree that it is made to correspond to physical death. Pajon admits that man is dead by nature in sin, but he insists that man can be brought to life by the preaching of the gospel. One who is physically dead cannot hear or choose anything, but according to Scriptures, man is given a choice between good and evil. Therefore to equate spiritual death to physical death is to press the scriptural passages further than intended. In fact, this approach of making man so dead that he can do nothing at all before he has been made alive spiritually by immediate grace contradicts Scripture. Scripture speaks of the Word as the seed of regeneration. However, if one has already received
life and regeneration before the Word has been received, the
Word cannot be considered as the seed of regeneration. 10

Again, the same line of response is made by Pajon to the argument that man is blind and unable to see the light unless the faculty of seeing is first restored by immediate grace. According to the supporters of immediate grace, a double illumination is necessary: One is external and is given by the object, but another is internal and necessary in order that the external object may be received by the faculties. They argue that it would be as foolish to expect the Word alone to dispel spiritual blindness as it would be to expect the rays of the sun to dispel the blindness of one so born from birth. Pajon responds that one must not carry the metaphor too far. Physical blindness is a defect that cannot be overcome no matter how hard one might wish to do so, but spiritual blindness is of a moral nature. It can be overcome if one wishes to do it. This is what Christ means when, on being questioned by the Pharisees if they too were blind, he answered that if they were blind they would not have sin, but as they said that they were able to see, their sin remained. They remained blind of their own volition and that made them responsible. 11

Moral Inability Retained

In stating his case for man's ability to receive the impression of the truth as essential to his humanity, Pajon is careful to point out he does not wish to abandon the con-
cept of inability; he insists that man is incapable of doing anything towards his own conversion. This is why he is careful to distinguish between "la capacité active et la capacité passive, entre la puissance physique et la puissance morale." Pajon is aware of the accusation that he is making it possible for man to save himself by his concept of grace. This distinction, according to Pajon, protects him from this accusation. Pajon conceives of passive ability or physical ability as possession of the faculties of understanding and will. On the other hand, he denies that man possesses moral or active ability which he understands as consisting of knowledge because this knowledge is given only by the ministry of the Word. Consequently, Pajon states it should not be argued that he eliminates the concept of moral inability. Through sin man has lost his moral and active ability which consists of knowledge and he no longer has good thoughts or desires. "Il n'est plus capable de penser au bien non par le deffaut d'entendement mais par le deffaut de connoissance, rendez luy la connoissance vous luy rendez en meme temps la pureté de les desseins et la puissance d'en concevoir de legitimes idées."

All this, Pajon emphasizes again, is done by the ministry of the Word without any immediate, distinct action that precedes the action of the Word.  

The Claude Letter--Inconsistency of the Cameronian Opposition

At this point, it will be of value to turn to Pajon's
letter to Claude concerning ability. This letter is of unusual importance because of its forcefulness and, also, because it uncovers a serious weakness in the highest leadership of the opposition to Pajonism among the followers of the Cameron-Amyraldian school of thought. Claude may be considered, with the exception of Jurieu, to be Pajon's outstanding opponent in the French Reformed Church. Pajon, of course, could not accept the scriptural statements of man as "dead in trespasses and sins" as literal without surrendering his position on the doctrine of grace. Proposing, as he did, that man must be capable of receiving the impression of truth that is able to deliver him from sin, he of necessity had to argue that such scriptural statements were figurative, containing elements of hyperbole. Taking up Pajon's letter, it may be noted, first, that Pajon introduces the topic of discussion by referring to an incident that took place in a recent meeting of one of the provincial synods. A minister arose and presented a number of propositions on the manner in which conversion is accomplished. The first proposition was that

l'Homme est dans une impuissance absolue de se convertir et qu'à moins d'attribuer à l' Ecriture Sainte des hyperboles, et des exaggerations indignes d'elle, il faut tenir comme une vérité constante, que l'impuissance de l'homme à se convertir, est autant grande qu'il est possible de le concevoir.  

Pajon notes that the introduction of this proposition caused trouble in the assembly, and that some were strongly against it. Pajon adds that he was not involved in this affair, but having read Claude's Cinquième Sermon sur la Parabole
des Noces, he could not approve of the proposition. His reason is that, although Claude tries to establish a proposition similar to the one in question, he later refutes it with arguments that are stronger than those that were used for it. Claude proposes in his sermon to refute an objection made by the Arminians who argue that "'si l'homme est dans une entière et absolue impuissance de se convertir' (comme ils supposent que nous le disons quand nous voulons soutenir la grace efficace) 'il ne peut être puni, pour ne s'être pas converti, parce que nul n'est tenu à l'impossible.'" In order to demolish this objection, Claude attempts to do two things: First, he tries to establish que c'est une vérité constante dans l'Ecriture, que l'homme, dans l'état de son péché, est dans une entière impuissance de se convertir. L'autre, de montrer p. 240 et suiv. que cette impuissance entière et absolue, comme l'objection le suppose, est seulement un défaut de volonté, et une obstination à ne pas vouloir, et que la conversion luy est la chose la plus possible du monde, à plusieurs égards, et une chose qui depend de sa délibération et de son choix."

Claude is considered to have strongly contradicted himself in attempting to establish both propositions. Pajon examines Claude's arguments for the first proposition "'que le Pecheur est dans une entière et absolue impuissance de se convertir.'" Claude advances biblical passages in favor of this proposition such as those stating that "man is dead in trespasses and sins, that he is a slave of sin, and that the eyes of his understanding have been blinded." Claude argues that such expressions as these "'marquent toutes une impuissance
absolue de se convertir.'" In answer to those who will object that these statements are only figures of speech and should not be taken literally, Claude answers "'Chicane impertinente!'" To support himself Claude asks a number of questions which Pajon refers to as "diverse interrogations pathétiques."

Claude asks:

"N'étoit-ce donc qu'une exagération populaire, lors-que St. Jean rendant la raison, pourquoi les Juifs ne croyoient pas en Jésus-Christ, encore qu'il fit tant de miracles en leur présence, assuroit qu'ils ne pouvoient croire, parce qu'Esaié avoit dit d'eux; 'Dieu a aveuglé leurs yeux, et qu'ils n'entendent de leur coeur, et qu'ils ne se convertissent?' N'étoit-ce qu'une exagération populaire, quand Jésus-Christ, pour marquer qu'il ne s'étônait pas des murmures des Capernaîtes, leur disoit; 'nul ne peut venir à moi, si le Père qui m'a envoyé ne le tire?' N'étoit-ce qu'une exagération populaire, ou une manière de parler hyperbolique, quand Jérémie disoit aux Juifs; 'le More changeroit-il sa peau, ou le Léopard ses taches? Pourriez-vous aussi faire quelque bien, puisque vous n'êtes appris qu'à mal faire?' Cette interrogation et ces comparaisons du More et du Léopard, ne marquent-elles pas," continuez-vous "une impuissance entière à faire le bien?""

Pajon observes that after all these statements, one ought to have the right to conclude that Claude considers man's inability to do anything toward his conversion to be as great as one could possibly conceive. After all, what could possibly be more difficult than a leopard changing his spots, a Moor changing the color of his skin, a blind man causing himself to see or a dead man resurrecting himself? Now if the inability of the sinner is any less than this, it should be admitted that there is some exaggeration or hyperbole in such expressions of Scripture; therefore, they should not be taken literally and
Claude should withdraw his complaint that in not doing so one is indulging in an act that should be described as "'une chicane impertinente.'"

It is noted that in all of this Claude contradicts himself sharply and also that the contradiction is drawn into clear focus when Claude attempts to respond to the objection that has been made against him by the Arminians. This objection is:

S'il est impossible aux hommes de se convertir, si cette action surpasse leurs forces, Dieu ne les saurait condamner, lorsqu'ils demeurent impénitens; car il n'est ni de la raison ni de la justice d'exiger d'eux une chose qui n'est pas en leur pouvoir, et beaucoup moins de les punir, s'ils ne le font pas.\(^16\)

The case against Claude begins to take shape as Pajon analyzes Claude's answer to this objection. Claude argues that the objection is founded on poor reasoning and an abuse of the term impossible. Claude admits that Scripture asserts that it is impossible for anyone to convert himself, but he holds that the Scriptures do not express this concept of impossibility in the sense assumed by the objection. At this point, Pajon calls Claude's attention to his earlier argumentation concerning man's absolute inability to convert himself or contribute to his conversion and states that the inability that he defended in this earlier debate assumed the same import of the term impossibility as is assumed by the Arminians in their objection. Furthermore, if Claude wishes at this point to define the inability of man not as an absolute inability but a voluntary inability "'qui dépend de sa délibéra-
tion et de son choix, et que la conversion luy est la chose la plus facile du monde à plusierus égards;" then he must wipe out ten or twelve pages of earlier argumentation in which he appeared to be arguing for the contrary. However, Claude does do just that according to Pajon's interpretation of his sermon. Claude states that according to the import of the term impossible held by the Arminians, an interpretation is given to the term that is "'fausse et trompeuse qui surprend l'esprit, et qui corrompt le jugement.'" Pajon argues that Claude is now arguing against himself because of his earlier support of the proposition that the sinner "'est dans une impuissance entière de se convertir.'" Pajon notes that Claude should not have argued so strenuously against those who objected to this proposition if he had not taken the import of the concept of inability to be the same as that of the Arminian objection.

Pajon observes that following passages in Claude's sermons support his claim. Claude continues:

"Les uns s'imaginent que Dieu exige de l'homme, et luy commande des choses, qui n'ont nul rapport à sa nature, et qui sont tellement au dessus de luy, que quand même il les voudroit faire, il ne le peut ne plus ne moins que s'il luy commandoit d'arrêter le cours du Soleil, ou d'empêcher le dérèglement des saisons ..."

Pajon makes an important observation at this point for this entire present investigation. The ideas that Claude has just described concerning absolute inability are not those which are held by the Arminians themselves; rather they are the ideas
which the Arminians impute to the Reformed Church against which they object most strenuously as untenable. Pajon consequently asks:

Qui sont donc ceux qui ont toutes ces pensées que vous rejettez? Ce sont la plupart de nos peuples, et quelque-uns même de nos Théologiens, qui ne sont pas assez éclairés sur la nature de l'impuissance de l'homme à se convertir; ce sont en particulier ceux qui dispu tent contre la Grace universelle, comme on parle dans les Ecoles, pendant qu'ils y disquent, car hors de la chaleur de la dispute ils ne peuvent approuver des sentiments si grossiers.16

It is added that Claude should be commended if his intent has been to show that these theologians are wrong. He senses that Claude is attempting to defend the Salmurian tradition at this point in the sermon as he did when he debated in favor of universal grace in his letter to Mr. Turretin. Pajon, however, brings to his attention that

ce sont aussi ceux qui croyent, comme vous, que l'homme ne peut être converti sans une opération immédiate du St. Esprit, distincte de l'efficacité de la Parole et de tous les autres moyens, dont la Parole est accompagnée; pendant aussi qu'ils disquent pour établir cette opération immédiate du St. Esprit; car hors de la dispute et de la contestation, quand il s'agit d'exhorter les Pecheurs à la repentance, ou de répondre aux difficultez qu'on leur fait, ils entrent dans des sentiments opposez comme vous le faites icy.19

Whereas, Pajon agrees with Claude in his rejection of the opinions that are held by these theologians concerning the lack of proportion between man and the things that God demands of him, holding as they do that even if man wished to do them, he could no more stop the sun or change the season than do them; still, Pajon is unable to see how that Claude is able to reconcile his reasoning at this point in the sermon with his previous
conclusions. He asks Claude:

Mais comment est-ce, qu'en la rejetant, vous vous accorderez avec vous-même, et avec ce que vous venez d'enseigner, "qu'il faut prendre à la lettre, sans exagération et sans hyperbole, ces expressions de l'Ecriture, qui disent que l'homme est 'mort' qu'il est 'aveugle' qu'il est 'esclave,' que c'est un More, qui ne peut blanchir sa peau, et un Léopard qui ne sauroit quitter ses taches."²⁰

Pajon now tightens the noose of the contradiction in asking "if it is easier for a dead man to resurrect himself, or for a blind man to see than a Moor to change the color of his skin or a man to stop the movement of the sun, etc." All are impossible to man with the same degree of absolute impossibility.

At this point in the discussion the question of responsibility is taken up. It has already been seen that leading Salmurian theologians held that natural inability excuses a man; whereas moral inability does not. Pajon asks Claude if he believes that a Moor who has been commanded by God to change the color of his skin and to turn from his sins, in not being able to do one or the other, may be punished with the same degree of justice for not having done one or the other. Pajon assumes that Claude's answer will be in the negative; still he asks why he would answer in the negative. Pajon assumes that Claude would be able to give only one reason:

Vous n'en sauriez rendre aucune, sinon qu'il n'est pas impossible à ce More de quitter son péché, comme il luy est impossible de blanchir sa peau; et cela étant, il faut que vous avoyez qu'il y a de l'exagération et de l'hyperbole dans cette expression de Jérémie, où il compare l'impuissance d'un pécheur à se convertir, à celle d'un More à blanchir sa peau. Pourquoi donc avez-vous entrepris de soutenir le contraire?²¹
Pursuing Claude's sermon further, Pajon finds other related material that he feels strengthens his case against Claude even more:

"Les autres conçoivent," dites vous p. 241. "qu'il est impossible à l'homme de ne pas pécher, à peu près, comme il est impossible au feu de ne pas brûler, ou au marbre de n'être pas dur; qu'il luy est impossible de se convertir de la même manière, que St. Jaques dit qu'un Figueir ne peut produire des olives, ni une Vigne des figures, c'est-a-dire, que l'homme est parté au mal, et eloigné du bien, par une nécessité de nature, dont il n'est nullement le maître, et que cela ne dépend non plus de sa délibération, que la faim et la soif, la maladie et la santé, et les autres choses involontaires qui nous arrivent." 22

Claude denies this and asserts that, on the contrary, "la conversion est la chose du monde la plus possible à tous égards."

Pajon now summarizes the propositions that Claude has proposed which seem to Pajon to be strongly in contradiction to his first proposition concerning man's absolute inability:

Vous y montrez très clairement "1. Que la conversion a une parfaite convenance avec nos facultez naturelles, qu'il n'y a rien de plus proportionné a l'homme, et qu'il est fait pour cela. 2. Que ce n'est point une chose contre laquelle il soit emporté par une nécessité aveugle et brute, qu'elle tombe au contraire sous notre délibération, et qu'elle dépend de notre jugement et de notre choix. 3. Que ce n'est point une chose sur laquelle nous puissions souffrir de la contrainte. Et. 4. Qu'il ne faut pas s'imager, qu'il y ait aucune influence étrangère, qui pénètre jusqu'au cœur pour le corrompre, et de bon qu'il est le faire méchant, pour l'empêcher de croire à l'Evangile et de se convertir." 23

Pajon is in favor of all these propositions, but he asks: "Mais que pouviez-vous dire aussi, qui fust plus opposé à votre première proposition, et à cette impuissance entière et absolue que vous voulez établir au commencement." Pajon is determined
to make his case against Claude unassailable. He proposes to reduce the propositions in question into formal syllogisms in order to show that the contradiction can be formally demonstrated according to Aristotelian logic to be as certain as a mathematical demonstration.

Pajon does not see how Claude can escape the conclusions made above. He ought to recognize he has formally contradicted himself. "Il faut donc en recevoir les conclusions, et en les recevant il faut reconnaître, ce me semble, que vous vous êtes contredit, puisqu'on y conclut, par vous même, le contraire de ce que vous avez enseigné."

This is not, however, the end of the examination; Pajon states that Claude makes further observations that are
even more against him than those already mentioned. Pajon considers that this takes place when Claude attempts to explain in what way it is impossible for man to convert himself. Claude asks: "'Que veut donc dire cette expression de l'Écriture, qu'il est impossible à l'homme de se convertir?'" Pajon notes that Claude answers, "'Mes frères, cela veut dire qu'il ne le veut pas' ce que vous expliquez par d'autres expressions équivalentes, 'qu'il est obstiné dans sa malice, qu'il luy plaise de demeurer dans son crime,' et d'autres semblables." Pajon agrees with this proposition and to support it states it is contradictory to say that one does something when one does not wish to do it; likewise, it is contradictory to say the one is converted when one has resolved not to be converted. But, Pajon adds, that

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comme il n'y a rien de plus facile que de changer de volonté, puisque cela ne depend que de notre délibération et de notre choix, et qu'il ne faut que le vouloir, il se trouve que la conversion, qui est impossible au pécheur, d'une impossibilité de contradiction, entant qu'il ne la veut pas, luy est néanmoins la chose du monde la plus facile, que de changer de volonté, puisque cela ne dépend que de notre délibération et de notre choix, et qu'il ne faut que le vouloir, il se trouve que la conversion, qui est impossible au pécheur, d'une impossibilité de contradiction, entant qu'il ne la veut pas, luy est néanmoins la chose du monde la plus facile, que de changer de volonté, puisque cela ne dépend que de notre délibération et de notre choix, et qu'il ne faut que le vouloir, il se trouve que la conversion, qui est impossible au pécheur, d'une impossibilité de contradiction, entant qu'il ne la veut pas, luy est néanmoins la chose du monde la plus facile, que de changer de volonté, puisque cela ne dépend que de notre délibération et de notre choix, et qu'il ne faut que le vouloir, il se trouve que la conversion, qui est impossible au pécheur, d'une impossibilité de contradiction, entant qu'il ne la veut pas, luy est néanmoins la chose du monde la plus facile et comme vous le disiez n'aguère, "la plus possible du monde," entant qu'il n'a qu'à la vouloir, pour la faire actuellement.
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In this way, Pajon supports Claude in this proposition, but again he asks how Claude is able to reconcile these ideas with the first proposition of his sermon. Pajon continues his attack almost mercilessly and finally concludes with the words:
"Voila, Monsieur, les difficultez sur lesquelles j'attens, s'il vous plaist, vos lumieres. Vous m'obligerez infiniment de me les donner, etc." Chauffepié comments that he is unaware that this letter was ever answered by Claude and that he considers the letter to have been very effectively argued. Schweizer also agrees it was a very effective piece of argumentation and that Pajon here had touched upon a weakness in his opponent's position. It appears that certain complaints were made to Pajon with regards to his rough and embarrassing treatment of a fellow Reformed theologian and leader. One must note this letter was made public and the writer of this study saw a handwritten copy among the Budé manuscripts that was painstakingly written to give emphasis to the various sections. It also appears that this letter may have been widely circulated among the Reformed churches.

In another letter, Pajon mentions he would not have written this letter to Claude had not Claude slandered him throughout the Reformed world as a heretic. He writes on this occasion:

Ainsi Mr. Claude à prouvé plus qu'il ne vouloit et en pensant establi son sentiment il en à prouvé et demonstré la fausseté. Je ne releverois pas ceste contradiction, ni n'aurois pas relevé les autres que ie luy ay obiectées dans ma lettre, si Mr. Claude n'avoit essayé autant qu'il à peu à me desclier et dans le Royaume et hors du Royaume, et mesme à Geneve comme i'en ay esté tres bien informé. Vous pouves respondre cela à ceux qui disant que ie ne devois pas relever un sermon qui paraist une approbation publique. Je ne saurois justifier mon innocence et la verité de mon sentiment, qu'en faisant voir l'absurdité et les contradictions des sentiments de ceux qui me deschirent comme un heretique.
Pajon's letter to Claude was artfully constructed to emphasize that Claude was sharply contradicting himself, and Pajon argues that one of the most important reasons he has worked so vigorously against his opponents' concept of immediate grace is that it undermines the whole Cameronian and Salmurian tradition. Claude, indeed, ought to hold to his first proposition and should not hold to the latter propositions if he insists on holding to an immediate operation of the Holy Spirit distinct from the Word and its attending circumstances. Immediate particular action of this nature rules out the concept of the universality of grace and the responsibility of man. Pajon has constructed his whole system to save the tradition from the attacks of its enemies, both orthodox and Arminian. According to Pajon's system, the means are possible for any man to be converted. The Word is there, the "notions communes" are there, the circumstances are of a normal and possible nature; no one can say he does not have natural ability to be converted. He can if he wishes to. He does not need a supernatural distinct operation of the Holy Spirit in his life, either in his mind or on his will or both, in order to be able to receive the truth that is able to cause him to be converted. He is capable of the impression of the truth. To deny this is to in actuality deny the whole Salmurian scheme of thought, to deny Cameron whose principles support Pajon who is his logical heir rather than the proponents of immediate grace. Pajon proposes to set the Salmurian house in order, to eliminate the
inconsistency that would hold, on the one hand, that conversion is the most possible thing in all the world and, on the other hand, cut the ground from under this concept by saying there must be a distinct particular supernatural operation of the Holy Spirit apart from the action of the Word on each individual who is to be converted or he is incapable of receiving the impression of the truth or acting upon it.

The Question of Universal Grace

The most thorough treatment of Pajon's idea of how his concept of conversion preserved the Salmurian concept of universal grace is found in a series of letters between Jean-Robert Chouet and himself in 1670 fortunately conserved in the Le Cene manuscripts. At this time Chouet had returned to Geneva where he had become professor of philosophy at the Academy. Here his uncle, Louis Tronchin, serving as professor of theology held to the position of universal grace whereas Francois Turretin was strongly opposed. This series of letters is of particular importance because Chouet appears to represent an astute individual who has not made up his mind whether he should take the Salmurian position of universal grace either as represented by Pajon or Tronchin. The series of letters calls forth a penetrating analysis of the whole question and causes Pajon to come to grips with some very searching questions as to whether his position could solve the dilemma of a sovereign God predestinating the elect and still exercising universal grace. It is well known that this
concept is referred to as "hypothetical universal grace," but it should be recognized that its proponents took it very seriously and considered God to be sincere and serious in offering it.

It will be advantageous to follow the historical development of the controversies in six letters written between the 9th of August, 1670, and the 25th of December of the same year. In Chouet's first letter on the subject, he introduces one of the crucial problems with which the defenders of the Cameronian concept of universal grace had to cope. He indicates he always has found it difficult to comprehend why if God wishes the salvation of all, they are not saved even as when God willed the creation of the world and it was created.

In reply to this question, Pajon begins his development of the subject by explaining that a clear distinction should be made between those occasions when God acts "immediately" and when he acts "mediately." Pajon clarifies this, pointing out that by the first term he has in mind those times when God wills to act without means and by the second those times when he wishes to use means. He holds that when God wishes to act without means, it always takes place because it depends on his sovereign will; however, when God wishes to act by the use of means, it does not take place always as in some cases when the means is not efficacious or is not utilized.

In a series of statements Pajon expands on why he considers those holding to immediate grace and universal grace to be in a contradictory position.
Car Dieu ne veut pas sauver ceux qu'il ne veut pas convertir; il ne veut pas convertir ceux qui il ne veut pas donner son Esprit, et il ne veut pas donner son Esprit à ceux a qui il ne le donne pas, S'il est vray qu'il ne le donne et qu'il ne le puisse donner que par une operation immediate, comme le supposent ceux qui la croient, car si Dieu vouloit operer immediatement en tous, tous recevroient l'Esprit, tous se convertiroient et tous seroient sauvéz: Ce que donc il ne veut pas operer immediatement en tous c'est qu'il ne veut pas donner son Esprit a tous; Ce qu'il ne veut pas donner Son Esprit a tous, vient de ce qu'il ne les veut pas convertir tous, c'est qu'il ne les veut pas tous sauver.\textsuperscript{35}

Thus Pajon argues that the proponents of immediate grace are in a hopelessly contradictory position if they also wish to consistently hold to universal grace. However, Pajon has a remedy for the situation which is to eliminate this immediate operation and embrace his concept of conversion. In saying that God does not wish to give His Spirit except by His Word, the objection is void. One should not be astonished if all are not converted even though God wishes to convert them, because He wishes to do it by means which many render useless because of their bias and their voluntary blindness.\textsuperscript{36}

Pajon, at this point, anticipates a strong objection that could be used against him. They may argue that if God wishes to convert all men, he could call all of them with such circumstances that they would be efficacious necessarily. In answer to this possible objection, Pajon argues that God has reasons in keeping with His wisdom for not placing all men in the kind of circumstances that would bring about their conversion. To illustrate this point Pajon explains that in order to bring about the conversion of a prince or a rich man, it
might be necessary to take away the crown of one and the wealth of the other which are things that serve to blind them; however, God does not do it, not because he does not wish to convert them, but because he does not wish to overturn the order which He has established in society. He wishes that there be princes and subjects, rich and poor, because that is something necessary; and He chooses one rather than another to be a prince or to be rich not because He wishes one to be saved and the other not, but for other reasons that go beyond our comprehension. Having said all this, Pajon draws Chouet's attention to the method of immediate grace and argues that one cannot imagine any other reason for not giving immediate grace except that one not be converted.37

In Chouet's second letter to Pajon in this series on universal grace, he raises problems as to Pajon's claim that when God acts without means that which He wishes to take place always does, but when He wishes to act by use of means it does not take place always because men misuse these means. To make this point, Chouet proposes a dilemma. Either God wishes that men misuse means or He does not wish it. Chouet is convinced that Pajon will not say the first; but if he says the second, Chouet will ask why then do they misuse them and why is it that things take place that go against the will of God?38

In Pajon's reply, he draws Chouet's attention to the fact that his question basically is the same as that asked in his first letter. It is based on the principle that nothing can take place in the world against the will of God. Now
since the question is the same, Pajon will give the same answer.

Je repond comme ci devant: que rien n'arrive contre la volonté de Dieu par laquelle il veut faire quelques choses sans moyens; Mais qu'il peut arriver quelque chose contre la volonté de Dieu pour l'exécution de laquelle il employ des moyens dont les hommes peuvent abuser; par exemple Dieu vouloit rassembler en tous les enfans de Jerusalem et ils ne l'ont pas voulu, Matt. 23; 37. Ce que Dieu vouloit n'a donc esté fait, parce que Dieu ne l'a pas voulu faire sans moyens, mais par des moyens dont les Israelites ont abusé.

It is clear that Pajon has not come directly to grips with Chouet's dilemma. Indeed, it is a question that is one of the most puzzling of all for the Calvinists or anyone who believes in the sovereignty of God. Pajon's answer is to point out that there is another side to the picture and that is concerned with what is found in Scripture. Pajon holds that God does not wish to have men misuse the means available for their conversion. Why then does it happen? It happens because God points out that it happens in Scripture. Men misuse means even though God wishes that they would use them properly.

Chouet advises Pajon that he has been discussing the subject with Tronchin also; and Tronchin turns Pajon's argument against Pajon's own position, replying that it would be easy for God to arrange all circumstances in such a way that He would save and convert all men if He wished to do it without disturbing the society of men or the order of the universe. For example, He could convert all kinds as He converts some right along, or all rich and poor, without there being a need that all men be in the same time and in the same place, etc.

In reply to this, Pajon answers that anyone who speaks
in this manner places himself in a position that goes beyond the capability of any creature. How can anyone penetrate into the reason of the divine counsel to such a degree as to know clearly that God could act other than He has, keeping in mind the infinite wisdom He has exercised when He acted. Pajon states he has always held to a contrary opinion with regards to that matter.

J'ai toujours cru que Dieu est infiniment sage dans toutes ses actions, qu'il n'en f[ait] pas une dont il n'aie des raisons tres pertinentes, et que s'il agit plutost qu'autre[ment] il en a des raisons qui ne sont pas moins sages quelles sont incomprehensi­bles, de sorte que s'il agit soitment qu'il n'agit, il faudroit qu'il allast contre les raisons qu'il a d'agir [comme] il agit, et ces raisons etant tres sages, ce serait aller contre sa sagesse.

On dit: Mais si Dieu vouloit agir autrement, il trouverait d'autres raisons aussi [sages] que le premiers; comme si un auteur bien sage cherchoit des raisons de sa volonté après avoir forme sa volonté où comme si la sagesse de Dieu etoit une sagesse capricieuse qui jugeast qu'il est convena[ble] de faire telle où telle chose parce qu'il là veuille ce qu'il j[ugeast] qu'il est convenable de là faire! C'est la visibler renverser la nature des choses qui [vient] que la volonté depende de l'entendement et non pas l'entendement de la volonté!

En un mot, je dis où qu'il y avoit dans l'idée in­finie qui est end[uit] des raisons d'agir autrement qu'il n'agit, aussi sages et aussi fortes que celles qui le font agir comme il agit, où qu'il n'y en ait point! S'il n'y en ait point, on suppose faux en discant: que si Dieu avoit voulu agir autrement qu'il n'agit, il aurait trouvé des raisons aussi sages d'agir autrement qu'il n'agit, que le sont celles qui le font agir ainsi et ains! Car Dieu ne trouve pas ce qui n'est point dans l'idéé infini qui'il a de toutes les choses po[ssibles] et il ne peut juger et trouver vray que ce qui est tel! parce qu'il ne peut errer.

S'il y en ait, on pourroit conclure evidemment, que ce n'a pas esté par sa sagesse mais où par hasard, ou par un caprice tout pur, que Dieu s'est determiné
agir ainsi plutost qu'autrement, et pourquoi il a
acquiescé a ces raisons ici plutost qu'aux autres
[qui] l'on suppose aussi fortes, il ne le pourroit
parce qu'il la fait sans raison. Ce qui est a
mon avis offenser la sagesse de Dieu, et miner
la consolation des fidèles dans toutes leurs
afflictions, qui consiste a croire que Dieu ne
s'est déterminé a les chastier et les affliger
que pour des raisons tres sages qu'ils approuv-
eroient eux mesme s'ils les connoissoient, et aux
quelles il faut acquiescer pleinement, quoique
nous ne les connaissions pas. "

Pajon also draws attention to the fact that Scripture
connects the most incomprehensible judgments to God's wisdom.
In Romans, chapter 4, one reads "'Oh, the depth and the rich-
ness of the wisdom and the knowledge of God; for his judgments
are comprehensible.'" Pajon interprets this passage to sup-
port his argument that God's judgment and his conduct depends
on His wisdom. Continuing the quotation, Pajon adds, "'Who
has known the thought of the Lord or who has been His counsel-
or?'" Pajon observes that God then has thoughts and counsels.
What is counsel if not an examination of various reasons that
are compared with each other in order to choose the best ones
if the counsel is wise or to suspend action if it is deter-
mined that the reasons are equal on each side. However, Pajon
does not wish to attribute this latter line of action to God
for he indicates that this does not happen to an infinite in-
telligence who sees all the differences that exist among things
and judges with exactitude with regards to those things that
are the best. "

Pajon calls to Chouet's attention that in previous dis-
cussions Chouet objected that he has imposed on God a necessity
of acting in one way and not in another. He asks Chouet to remember that he replied that he imposed on God the necessity of being wise and the necessity of acting in such a way because He is wise. With these and other arguments Pajon feels he has answered Tronchin's attempt to turn Pajon's argument against himself.  

In Chouet's second letter to Pajon he also advises him that Tronchin is not willing to grant Pajon's thesis that immediate grace and universal grace contradict each other. Tronchin draws a distinction between two propositions to clarify his position, saying that, first, one might say that God wishes to convert all men, and, secondly, God wishes that all men be converted. Tronchin would argue that the last proposition is true, but the first is false. Tronchin defends this by Scripture holding that it always speaks of this matter in the passive as in the second proposition. Thus it is said that God wishes that all men be saved and come to repentance and the knowledge of the truth; but it is never said that God wishes to save all men and to give His knowledge and repentance to all men. With this distinction made, Tronchin feels that the difficulty that Pajon poses is resolved because though God does not give His Spirit or immediate grace to all that does not mean that He does not wish all to be converted. On the other hand, Tronchin admits that it does apply to the point that God does not wish to convert all, and Chouet also notes that Tronchin supports himself by various Scripture texts where the conversion of certain individuals is tied to the sole will.
Pajon's answer serves to emphasize that there is a sharp disagreement between Tronchin and himself as to the very nature of universal grace. Tronchin's approach certainly would tend to support its being called hypothetical, but Pajon insists on more than that. Pajon regards the distinctions made by Tronchin as unacceptable. Both of Tronchin's propositions are equally true and conform equally to Scripture and, furthermore, both are equally necessary to sustain the concept of universal grace. Pajon speaks with emotion and eloquence:

Car bon Dieu! quelle grace seroit a que Dieu voulust bien que tous les hommes fussent sauvez, mais qu'il ne voulust pas les sauvez? Ce ne seroit pas un volonté ou un amour, ce seroit une simple indifférence, ce seroit dire que Dieu ne veut pas non plus travailler a les sauver et a les convertir. Ce n'est pas là la grace universelle. En effet croiez vous que Dieu veuille qu'ils essaient a se sauver eux meme sans lui? ou qu'ils cherchent d'autres sauveurs que lui? Croiez vous qu'il veuille qu'ils fassent un bien dont ils ne soient obligez a lui rendre graces? qu'ils acquirert des connaissances qu'il ne tienent point de luy? Il le faudroit dire pour soutenir la distinction de M. Tronchin.

Ne puis je argumenter contre lui de cette maniéré? Celui qui a donné son fils a la mort pour sauver le monde, ne veut pas seulement que le monde soit sauvé, mais il veut sauver le monde par son fils, ou bien: celui qui fait prescher son evangile a toutes les creatures pour la conversion de tous ceux qui l'oyent ne veut pas seulement que ceux qui l'oyent se convertissent et viennent a la connaissance de la verité, mais il les veut convertir lui meme et les amener a la connaissance de la verité par la predication de son evangile.

Pajon concludes this section of this letter again emphasizing that immediate grace and universal grace contradict each other and considers that he has thoroughly refuted Tronchin's attempt
to answer him with his distinction between the two propositions. 7

Next, Pajon takes up Tronchin's argument that there are many passages that show that the conversion of some individuals is attributed to the sole will of God. Pajon complains that he has not been given any passages to evaluate on this matter; but without seeing them, he feels that he may reply that this expression "la seule volonté de dieu" is ambiguous because it excludes either the means that God uses to bring about His will or the concourse of the will of man as a partial and collateral cause of conversion. Now, if one intends to exclude the means which God can use to convert men by this expression, Pajon will deny that there is any text that proves that. But if one intends only to exclude the concourse of the will of man as a partial and collateral cause, he is willing to accept this for he does not consider himself to give more credit to man in conversion than the authors of immediate grace. He can hold that the will of God is no less powerful or sovereign when it works by efficacious means than when it works without means. 8

Coming to Chouet's last letter, it is of interest to note that Chouet indicates that he has been convinced that universal grace and immediate grace are incompatible; however, this should not be taken to mean that Pajon has persuaded him that his own position is the one to take. Chouet sums up the controversy saying that in Pajon's first letter he argued that one could say with regards to the hypothesis of immediate grace
that if God wished to convert all men, He would give all of them immediate grace and they would all be converted. However, the objection was made that according to Pajon's hypothesis also if God wished to save all men, He would call them all with such circumstances that they too would all be converted.  

Pajon's answer to this was that there was a definite difference because when God does not give immediate grace to anyone, one hardly could imagine any other reason for it, other than He does not wish to give it; but as to the withholding of circumstances, Pajon argues that there are deep reasons that can be introduced to explain this. One may reply to this that it is difficult to understand why God could not save, for example, all those who are rich in the same manner that He saves some of them. In answer to this, Pajon has replied "que c'est vouloir penetrer dans les secrets de Dieu et que tout ce que Dieu fait, il le fait tres sagement et par une necessite qui est appuye sur des raisons qui lui sont connues."  

In conclusion, Chouet asks, "Tell me, could not one say the very same thing in support of immediate grace—that it is not that He does not wish men not to be saved, but that there are very wise reasons that cause Him not to give it?" Furthermore, he has one more last penetrating question which is: "Can one say that God wishes to save a man at the same time that He sees that He cannot and that He must not give him the circumstances to do it?" As for Chouet's first question, Pajon notes that he has already replied to it on other occasions and gives little that is new in answer to it. As for Chouet's last
question, in its essence it basically is the same question with which Chouet opened the whole matter on the 9th of August; and now six months later he is asking the same question again though in somewhat different phraseology. Also, the way the question is phrased appears to suggest to Pajon that Chouet is using the same argument against him that Pajon has been using against immediate grace. Pajon admits that one cannot say that God wishes it of a will that is clear and complete which one would suppose if He would see the thing as possible in all ways both of a physical and moral nature. But one can say that He wishes it as a "simple desire" ("d'une simple velleitê"). Pajon tries to clarify this by saying that "this simple desire" may be thought of with regards to things that are most impossible providing that they are good in some aspect. Goodness, he adds, is the object "de la velleitê, et la bontê avec la possibilitê physique, et morale connuê, est l'objet de la volontê entiere et parfaite, et cette velleitê est tres sincere quoiqu'elle n'aille pas jusqu'a la volontê entiere et parfaite." 82

Pajon realizes that one may say that God does not seriously wish the conversion of a man if he does not bring certain circumstances to bear without which He well knows that this man will never be converted. One might conclude from this, as Chouet's letter implies, that since God does not introduce these circumstances, knowing that they are necessary for some man's conversion, it is because He does not wish his conversion. Pajon states that he denies the conclusion and will cause Chouet to see a reason that will sustain his position by using a comparison that he has used successfully with many others.
Voila un homme mon inférieur qui m'a cruellement offensé sans que je lui en [avais] aucun sujet, je veux me reconcilier avec lui, et pour cela je veux bien me trouver dans la maison d'un ami commun, je veux commencer a lui parler le premier, je lui demande son amitié, sans lui faire aucun reproche des outrages qu'il m'a fait. Ce miserable ne veut point accepter mes offres, il me fait dire que pour bien vivre ensemble, il veut que j'aille le trouver dans sa maison, que je lui demande pardon a genoux et que je reconnaisses que je lui ay donné un juste sujet de se choquer, il veut de plus que j'aille le trouver a une heure où j'ay une autre assignation, où il s'agit de tout mon bien, et il me fait dire que sans cela il n'y aura point de paix.

Je ne puis douter apres cette declaration que ces demarches circonstanciés comme il les demande ne soient des moyens sans lesquels nous ne serons point reconciliés: direz vous donc si je refuse de les faire que je n'ay pas voulu serieusement la reconciliation! Vous ne serez pas si injuste, vous direz plutost que je l'ay voulu puisque j'ay voulu faire des avances fort considerables pour y parvenir et que si je n'ay pas fait davantage j'ay eu de bonnes raisons.

Appliquez cela a nostre sujet. Dieu appelle les pecheurs a Soy, et il fait toutes ses demarches que la sagesse lui permet o u lui peut permettre pour les attirer; s'il n'en fait pas davantage, c'est que sa sagesse ne le permet pas pour des raisons qui nous sont incomprehensibles; de la vient qu'il dit; qu'y avoit il a faire a ma vigne, que je ne l'ay fait! C'est a dire j'ay fait tout ce que j'ay pu sans aller contre ma sagesse.

Cependant la pluspart au lieu de se convertit s'endurissent davantage, ils pourroient estre convertis s'ils vouloient user des moyens que Dieu emploie pour cela, ils le pourroient estre aussi si Dieu en vouloit employer d'autres, car il ne seroit pas impossible a Dieu d'en trouver qui seroient necessairement efficaces; Mais Sa Sagesse ne lui permet pas de les employer non plus que la mienne ne me permettoit pas toute a l'heure d'aller me jetter a genoux devant mon ennemi, et a une heure où j'avois des affaires de la derniere importance.

Direz vous donc a cause de cela que Dieu n'ait pas voulu serieusement leur conversion? Vous direz
plutost qu'il l'a voulu puisqu'il a fait tant de démarches raisonnables pour y parvenir, et puisqu'il y a employé tant de moyens qui y étoient [prospères] si on n'en eût point abusé, et vous ajouterez, que s'il n'en a pas fait davantage, il faut qu'il en ait eu de sages raisons, qui n'empeschent point qu'on ne doive reconnoistre Sa bonne volonté dans ceux qu'il a employez n'ayant pas tenû a lui ni aux démarches qu'il a faites que les pecheurs ne se soient convertis, mais a leur malice seulement.

With this response to Chouet's last question, Pajon closes his case indicating that he believes this should satisfy him and that he should recognize that the partisans of immediate grace are unable to respond as adequately to the same problems. Did these arguments convince Chouet of Pajon's position? This study is unable to answer that question; however, if he was truly convinced that Tronchin's position was untenable and that immediate grace and universal grace were incompatible, it would appear that his options narrowed down either to the rejection of universal grace or embracing Pajon's solution to the problem. This, in fact, was at the heart of Pajon's whole defense.

This series of letters is of especial value because in them Pajon is pressed to develop his arguments in such detail in response to the probing questions of Chouet and Tronchin.

Predestination, Irresistible Grace and the Spirit's Part

Another of the main concerns of the Pajonistic defense is to explain that Pajon's system preserves the basic Calvinistic framework of thought in such crucial doctrines as the sovereignty of God, predestination of the elect, and the
irresistibility of grace. He emphasizes time and time again that God is able to dispense the circumstances of life and confront man with the truth in such a way that the elect are persuaded invincibly. Pajon admits that the Word does not act with the same efficacy in all hearers, but he attributes this difference in the response of men to the varying circumstances that attend the Word. He, however, denies that this implies that the grace of God is limited in any way. Pajon or one of his supporters writes:

Car quand il luy plaist de deployer cette vertu par les moyens qu'il a destines a cela, comme il la deploye tost ou tard en tous les esleus, il n'y a point de tenebres dans l'entendement qu'ils ne dissipe, point de perversité dans la volonté qu'il ne redress, point de mauvaises qu'ils ne corrige, point de determination qu'il ne change, point de pensées dont il ne dispose, point d'actions qu'il ne conduise, point de tentations qu'ils ne destourne, point d'artifice du Diable qu'il ne destourne, qu'il ne descouvre, point de charmes dans le monde dont il ne monstre la vanité, point d'orgueil qu'il n'abatte, point de peur qu'il ne chasse, point de rebellion qu'il ne dompte, point d'ennemis du dehors ou du dedans dont il ne triomphe. Et le tout par les moyens dont il a esté parlé, et que sa sagesse a destinees et preparés pour cela ...

As far as the question of man's resistance to God's grace, Pajon acknowledges that this takes place; however, he explains that it takes place because of the errors in our understanding from which bad actions and decisions result. If the errors are corrected, the result will be that the bad actions will change and right decisions will take place in keeping with the Cameronian theory of the primacy of the intellect in the process of conversion. Furthermore, these
errors can be corrected by means of the Word because truth is greater than falsehood. Resistance to God's Word can only take place when it pleases God to allow it. In those who are not the elect, He suspends the persuading force of the Word and the attending circumstances; however, in those whom He elects to save, there is no power that is great enough to thwart His purposes. No power within or without can hinder because there is no power that is equal to His; God's omnipotence guarantees success. Of course, Pajon holds that this power is always exercised by God through means of the Word, ideas, and attending circumstances. Also, the power of truth is so great that it is able to guarantee the perseverance of the saints and is the instrument of God to accomplish this purpose. Pajon writes:

Et enfin l'on ne doit pas estre moins persuade de la vertu invincible ou si l'on veut irresistible du St. Esprit et du succes infaillible de la grace qu'il opere par sa parole pour nostre conversion iusqu'a la fin que pour nostre commencement et pour nostre progres dans la carriere du salut.

Another question with which Pajon was confronted is concerning the part the Spirit of God has in Pajon's concept of grace. There is no question of this as far as the supporters of immediate grace are concerned. The Spirit acts internally and immediately as the efficient cause of conversion. But Pajon attributes the conversion of man to the Word and its attending circumstances without an immediate action of the Spirit. Pajon's answer is that though he holds God uses external means such as the Word and circumstances, it does
not follow that God does not work internally. The club which one uses to strike a ball is something exterior to the ball; however, the blow causes an internal movement in the ball for which the one who uses the club is responsible. From this illustration Pajon argues "according to my principles it is as natural for a man to be moved to do the good by the outward address of God as it is natural for a ball to roll after having been struck by a club. God operates interiorly in His own by the exterior or outward call and He is the cause of the interior movement which carries them to the good."\(^5\)\(^6\)

**Support from Scripture and Reason**

Pajon attacks immediate grace on the grounds that it is not supported by Scripture. Pajon points to Psalm 19:8 which reads "the commandment of the Lord is pure, enlightening the eyes." Enlightenment, he adds, must be of a rational nature and it is the Word that conveys truth; therefore this enlightenment must be through the medium of the Scripture.\(^5\)\(^9\)

Pajon notes the Cameronian thesis that once the eye of the understanding is enlightened, the heart will be opened and the sinner will be converted. Pajon also introduces a passage from Acts 26:17 to support this line of reasoning. Paul is sent to the Gentiles "to open their eyes, and to turn them from darkness to light." Pajon infers from this passage that the Word must be the means by which this is accomplished because Paul could not complete this mission empty-handed; it was the instrument of the Word that made it possible.\(^6\)\(^0\)
With regards to passages that attribute conversion to the Spirit, Pajon observes that nothing is ever attributed to the Spirit that is not attributed to the Word also; therefore, it should not be argued that there is a distinct action by the Spirit apart from the Word. Pajon does not wish that conversion is not the work of the Spirit but rather that it is accomplished by the Spirit through the instrumentality of the Word. It is a most effective agent "sharper than any two-edged sword, piercing even to the dividing asunder of soul and spirit" according to Hebrews 4:12.61

Tronchin defends immediate grace though it must be remembered that he is in agreement with Pajon on the Cameronian assumptions of universal grace and the primacy of the intellect. Tronchin argues that his position is supported by the promise of the Holy Spirit to the apostles and other believers. Pajon notes that the Spirit was to teach them all things often without the ministry of the Word because they were enthusiasts, but this is not the case with regards to present-day Christians who are not enthusiasts. Pajon notes that Tronchin attempts to strengthen his argument by introducing the concept of the anointing which is mentioned in the First Epistle of John 2:20 and 27. Pajon argues against this idea on the grounds that this anointing was a special blessing received by the members of the early church and not an action that according to Tronchin would be received by all who are among the elect in every age of the church. Furthermore, argues Pajon, the Scripture speaks of an anointing
that "teaches us all things" whereas the concept of immediate grace adhered to by Tronchin teaches one nothing. It only provides a disposition that makes it possible for one to be taught the truth of the gospel. Therefore Tronchin and the Scriptures cannot be speaking of the same thing.

Next, Pajon takes up another passage utilized by Tronchin from Colossians 2:12 which speaks "de la foi de l'efficace de Dieu qui a ressuscité J. Christ des morts." Pajon answers that this efficacy that raised Christ from the dead should be considered in this passage as the object of faith rather than its cause. However, for the sake of argument, Pajon will assume that this efficacy is the cause of Christian faith. Pajon would then argue that this efficacy does not produce faith by some blind impulse but as an irrefutable argument for the truths of the faith. In support of his view that evidence is efficacious, Pajon refers to Paul's statement that his preaching had not been presented in human wisdom but "en évidence d'esprit et de puissance" which Pajon understands to be the evidence of signs and miracles used to confirm the testimony of the apostles. Pajon uses another passage to support his thesis taken from Acts 17:31:

C'est pour cela aussi que S. Paul dit aux Athéniens, Acts 17:31 que quand Dieu a ressuscité J. Christ des morts, il a donne à tous les hommes, (c'est-à-dire à tous ceux qui en entendront parler) une preuve [sic] "certain qu'il jugera le monde universel avec justice," ce qui doit obliger tous les hommes à se repentir.

Pajon concludes from these passages that Scripture supports him in the thesis that God does not give faith to
men by a purely physical action or by "blind impulse but by means, by reasons, by motives and arguments concerned with those things which we believe." Pajon considers all the arguments that are proposed against him on scriptural grounds to be inadequate. As far as he is concerned, either they are used to prove what is not the issue or beg the question by assuming what is in question.

Pajon also argues that his view of grace is more reasonable than that of immediate grace because the only way that one can be persuaded to believe is by means of arguments and proofs. Why does one believe in the basic axioms of mathematics such as the axiom that the three angles of a triangle equal two right angles? These are believed because they are demonstrated; and Pajon, with his great confidence in reason, holds that it is the same with regards to Christianity. One believes that God wishes to give one salvation because of rational proofs such as the proof of the resurrection. This is why Peter says that "Dieu nous a regenerez en une esперance vive par la resurrection de J. Christ d'entre les morts ... " (I Peter 1:3). Pajon infers that the import of this passage is that the persuasive power of "the resurrection of Christ is the cause of our hope and our faith and consequently of our regeneration." Of course, Pajon is constantly implying that reason supports him in other argumentative sections.

The Problem of Distinction

Another sizable section will be drawn mainly from
"De l'opération" in which Pajon's Cameronian opponent argues that the distinction in the responses to the preaching of the gospel cannot be attributed to specific circumstances that may be observed to accompany the presentation of the gospel object with regards to some of the hearers and not to others. The same sermon is preached to a certain group yet there is a decided difference in response. This appears to have been a major objection made by various individuals and Pajon decides to come to grips with this problem in considerable depth. He states he considers this to be a very weak objection to his system and points out that when he argues that the distinction in response is a result of the divergent circumstances accompanying the presentation of the gospel, he is considering much more than the immediate sermon that is being delivered. He means to include all the circumstances of each hearer's life that may affect his attitude towards the sermon, as well as all pertinent circumstances that may follow. This amounts to an infinite diversity in the various individuals.

Pajon first takes up the circumstances that follow the presentation of the Word:

Il arrive souvent que la Parole qui est la semence de notre Regeneration, ne germe pas incontinent qu'elle est tombée dans le coeur, il faut quelqu'occasion, quelqu'exemple, quelque châtiment qui l'echauffe et qui l'excite afin qu'elle pousse son fruit, comme l'exemple de Manasse dont nous venons de parler, le fait voir a l'oeil. Lisez la Parable de l'évangile, vous trouverez que cette semence tombe dans des coeurs ou elle germe, mais puis après le Diable vient et les sollicitudes de la vie et la
tromperie des richesses qui étouffent cette semence
et la rendent infructueuse; La dispensation donc
de toutes ces circonstances qui suivent la Parole,
des tentations du Diable, des promesses et des
avantages du monde, dépendent de qui y abandonne
ceux que depend aussi la difference de l'effect
qui produit en eux la Parole; et c'est sur cela
qu'est fondu la demande que nous faisons à Dieu
qu'il ne nous induise point en tentation, et qu'il
ne permettre pas que nous soyons tentez par dessus
nos forces.

The circumstances that follow, therefore, are of tremendous
importance. On the other hand, Pajon understands the circum-
stances that precede the presentation of the object to be just
as important. The men who hear the gospel bring different
attitudes because of the different circumstances that have
molded and affected their lives. Pajon writes:

Nous n'apportons pas tous un même cœur à une même
predication, et les différentes dispositions que nous
avons reçues par la différent dispensation des choses
qui ont précédé, font aussi que nous ressentons des
effets différents d'une même predication ...

In connection with this line of reasoning, Pajon ar-

gues that one can hardly attribute the conversion of an in-
dividual entirely to one single object such as the preaching
of the Word on some specific day. Many things that preceded
have made their contribution to the conversion of that indi-

dual. To clarify this idea further, Pajon asks if one could
rightly attribute the fall of a tree to the last stroke of an
ax. How about the other fifty strokes that were made before
the last one? To be entirely correct, one must admit that
each stroke played its part in the final fall of the tree and
the final stroke that preceded that fall could never have ac-
complished it without all the other strokes. In the same way,
many circumstances of a varied nature play their part in one's conversion. An individual may have resisted the claims of Christ on his life year after year in spite of many efforts on the part of many individuals and many different circumstances and situations; then, at last, seemingly by a word, his resistance crumbles and he accepts Christ's claim on his life. One, again, as seen in the example of the tree, would be greatly mistaken to overlook all the circumstances of the past and only credit that one word and honor the one individual who pronounced it as the sole or even the major cause in that particular man's conversion. No, all of them together brought about the man's conversion. The same word spoken to a number of others might be of little value in bringing about their direct conversion. The distinction, therefore, may clearly be seen to come from these diverse circumstances arranged by God in such a way that the elect are converted inevitably. God knows the right combination that will unlock anyone's heart and persuade him, and He insures that the correct combination takes place in those whom He has chosen.

Besides this, it should be understood that the maladies of the soul vary from one individual to the other.

Les maladies de l'âme aussi sont diverses, il faut des remèdes, c'est à dire des predications différentes pour les guérir; Les uns sont aveugles d'un préjugé, les autres de l'autre; vous en avez en votre auditoire des debauchez, des ambitieux, des avarés et des prodigues; Ils ne peuvent pas être tous guérir par une meme predication, et quand vous aurez parlé contre les avarés, et que vous l'aurez fait avec tant de force qu'ils en auront été convertis, le prodigues et le debauché n'en
Pajon admits there is no greater seed of goodness in one man than the other. He wishes to retain the Calvinistic emphasis that man has no good in himself from which he is able to commence the work of conversion. Pajon, however, is not willing to admit that the corruption men inherit from their parents is equal in all men. He holds there is a variation in the degree of corruption. Men are all sinners in the sense expressed by James in that if a man sins he is guilty of all. All are equally dead in their trespasses and faults but Scripture points out that some will be treated better than others in the hereafter, indicating they are not all corrupt to the same extent. Calvin, himself, taught there is a law inscribed in our hearts by nature and a natural knowledge of God. To be sure this knowledge has been diluted by sin and error; yet, Pajon holds this has not taken place in the children of believers to the extent it has among those of some savage tribe that has lost any idea of God long ago. There must certainly be some difference between a child who is continually taught the law of God by godly parents and one who is raised by some degenerate who is constantly reveling in filth and corruption. Does not experience reveal a difference among children? Some are very difficult to manage, rebellious, and disobedient,
while others display a cooperative and obedient spirit that is easily molded into a wholesome character.

Pajon is willing to say the same thing as some of the best theologians of the time who, admitting there is a difference among men, state it must be attributed to the providence of God. This, in itself, is not a point that will decide the issue, but Pajon thinks it makes a contribution towards his side of the controversy. Before conversion takes place, one may note a distinct difference among men with regards to morals. Pajon's opponents argue that the distinction among men with regards to conversion is not the result of parental training or formal education. Pajon admits this does not make all the difference but he would be reluctant to concede that it accomplishes nothing. As far as he is concerned, he plans to train his children as carefully as he can, hoping that God will use this as a means to make them decent individuals. It is a common saying that he who spares the rod, spoils the child. Why is this so if the care that parents exercise over their children amounts to nothing?

Again, the difference among men does not come from chastisements, according to Pajon's opponent. Pajon is also willing to concede this; however, he will not concede it to the extent that he admits it does nothing at all. The opponent argues that one must already possess faith for the chastisements to be of any value. Pajon states this is true "in sensu composito" but not "in sensu diviso." His explanation
is that one has faith at the time he profits from the chastisements but it is not necessary that he have faith before he profits from it. Pajon turns to the story of Manassah to support this point. Manassah and his people ignored the prophetic warnings of impending captivity. Later he was taken into captivity and in his sufferings from oppression he cried for mercy unto his God. "Vous voyez que Manassé après son châtiment respecte les paroles de Dieu qu'il avait mesprises avant que d'être châtié, et s'en fait un bon usage par l'efficace du châtiment."  

Pajon's opponent also contends that the distinction that exists among men with regards to their response to the gospel is not dependent upon the attention they give to the message. Pajon categorically denies this. In the first place, he insists on the truth that if those who reject the gospel had been more attentive to it, they would have found adequate light and proofs of its truths. They would have found such proofs of the vanity of the world and the advantages of following Christ that it would have been impossible that they would not have been converted. Pajon points out that this is consistent with the widely held position shared by his opponent that the sinner is able to believe if he wishes. How could he ever believe without carefully examining the Word that is presented in order to have revealed to him what he ought to believe? Christ, himself, urges men to search the Scriptures and recognize the truth? God, himself,
complains that He has called to sinners but they have not listened. He does not make this complaint concerning the faithful, for they have responded to Him.

Pajon now anticipates the opposition’s objection that man is naturally deaf to the Word; and if some give attention to the Word, this must be attributed to grace. Pajon concedes that grace is the cause of man’s attention but states this does not disprove that the reason one believes and another does not may be attributed to the fact that one was more attentive than the other. Pajon explains:

La première grace que Dieu nous fait, c’est de nous faire prêcher son Évangile d’une maniéré si insinuante et avec des circonstances si afficaçes, qu’il faille nécessairement que nous y soyons attentifs; La seconde est de nous convertir par ce moyen là; Le premier posé est un degré suffisant; Le second suit nécessairement: Ce que l’un donc croit et l’autre ne croit pas, c’est qu’en l’un le premier a été posé, et qu’il n’a pas été posé en l’autre.  

Pajon brings the main controversy into sharp focus by pointing out that the key issue is to determine how God gives one this attention.

La question est seulement de savoir comment Dieu nous donne cette attention, s’il crée pour cela en notre ame immédiatement et sans l’intervention d’aucun objet quelque qualité qui y manquât auparavant, où bien seulement s’il nous insinue de telle maniere la verité dans l’entendement par la proposition interne qu’il nous en fait dans les idées que la Parole accompagnée de toutes ses circonstances forme en nous, qu’il soit impossible que nous n’y soyons pas attentifs, à peu prés de la meme sorte qu’un homme profondément endormi, qui n’entend point un grand bruit que l’on fait à entour de lui, se réveille neanmoins par un coup de cannon qu’on lui tire à l’oreille, cet objet poussant de telle maniere sa faculté que toute stupide qu’elle est, il faut pourtant qu’elle le sente.
Obviously, Pajon is in favor of the latter viewpoint, considering it to be more in agreement with Cameron's teaching and more suitable to the nature of man. He does not feel it takes anything away from the efficacy of the Holy Spirit who is the one in control of the whole operation. With these arguments Pajon believes he has clearly shown that the case against him on distinction is ineffective. Indeed, Pajon's interaction with this question gives some interesting insights into the many influences that may affect an individual in his decisive life, whether one accepts his views or not.

The Value of Means

Pajon also argues his case on the basis of the value of means, primarily the value of Scripture, in bringing about conversion. Does it make any difference what means are used to bring men to Christ? Mr. Desloges is represented by Pajon as holding to the thesis that once immediate grace has been put into operation, conversion will take place no matter what means are used. The logical result of this, says Pajon, could only eventually result in indifference to means on the part of Christian workers. Conversely, he believes that means are of great importance. Caustically, Pajon states he does not feel that any means is adequate for the conversion of various individuals. He does not feel a preacher who throws stones at his congregation will have as great a success as those who preach in an adequate way.

Pajon, furthermore, asks if biblical passages such as
II Timothy 2:5 which encourage Christians "to study to show themselves workmen approved unto God rightly dividing the word of truth: are of any significance? Pajon considers the logic implied in such passages supports the significant value of means in the conversion of men. In addition, Pajon asks why care should be taken in the rearing of children, in the choice of companions, and in avoiding temptation if Desloges' interpretation of immediate grace is true. Could not one just ask God to bring immediate grace into operation in the life of one's child since this is the only action that has any crucial significance in one's conversion? Pajon feels such a disparagement of Scripture and other means undermines any serious action on the part of Christian workers. Pajon states that were he convinced of the truth of Desloges' position he would no longer spend long hours preparing his sermons but would content himself in giving his congregation a short exhortation, trusting to immediate grace to accomplish the work. 77

The Origin of Evil

A serious objection made against Pajon was that he made God the author of evil through his concept of religious epistemology and conversion. Original material concerning the subject is available from copies of Pajon's letters to M. de Beaulieu?8 and M. Thorman. 79 Pajon notes in his letter to M. Beaulieu that the most important question that divides them is whether Adam possessed the power not to sin or whether he was necessitated to sin in some way. Pajon notes
that M. de Beaulieu holds that Adam possessed the power not to sin; whereas he holds that in "a certain sense Adam sinned of necessity." To support this Pajon argues that "when Adam sinned, he did not know or at least he did not think that his highest well-being was involved in not eating of the forbidden fruit." Pajon presented this last proposition to Beaulieu in an earlier letter and Beaulieu has agreed with Pajon with regards to this. But Beaulieu does not consider this to be the solution to the problem because one is forced to consider "'si quand Adam a fait ce mauvais jugement il a esté déterminé et nécessité a iuger mal de la sorte, et s'il n'avoit pas le pouvoir prochain de faire autrement." Beaulieu has also foreseen the answer Pajon could make to the difficulty raised in that he states it is not enough to say that Adam could have made a different decision than the one he made if he had examined the issue more carefully; but that once this lack of attention occurred, he could not have decided otherwise. The reason for this is that one must return to the primary problem of where this lack of attention originated. Did it originate in man himself by an act of his own will or did it come from the objects that confronted him which necessarily determined him not to be as attentive as he should have been?

In response to this difficulty, Pajon answers that this lack of attention in Adam was "not a real thing (un estre réel) but une pure privation qui n'a point de cause de deffaut
d'attention ne peut estre venu que de deffaut d'attention."
As far as Pajon is concerned, this may be considered the origin of evil, and it should not be attributed to any other source.
"Il y a un premier principe du bien il faut aussi qu'il y ait un premier principe du mal; pourquoi ne voulez vous pas que ce premier principe du mal soit aussitost l'en cogitance de l'homme qu'une autre chose?" With this reasoning Pajon intends to stop the chain of cause and effect. "Ainsi vous voyez Monsieur que l'arreste la les questions et que celle que vous faites, 'd'ou vient ce deffaut d'attention n'est pas recevable puis que ce deffaut d'attention n'estant qu'une pure cessation n'a point de cause, et ne vient que du deffaut d'attention."

As for the causes that de Beaulieu has proposed for this "deffaut d'attention," Pajon does not consider them to be valid. First, it cannot be caused by the "force of objects."

Au contraires les obiets et la tentation qui se presentoyent à l'esprit d'Adam estoyent des sujets que le devoient obliged d'eux memes à examiner avec grand soin et ce que Dieu leur avoit dit et ce que leur disoit le Serpent afin de choisir le meilleur et de s'attacher à la verité, puis qu'il s'agissoit ou de perdre la vie ou d'ignorer le bien et le mal qui estoient deux grands maux dans l'esprit d'Adam. Consequently, Pajon concludes that the objects did not bring about this lack of attention.

Secondly, says Pajon, it is not true that the first man brought about this "deffaut d'attention" by himself and by his own will. Pajon holds that it is important to draw a distinction "entre ne vouloir pas avoir de l'attention et
vouloir ne pas de l'attention." In explaining what he means by this, Pajon says it is one thing not to be attentive because of "une pure cessation de nostre ame qui n'estant point un estre reel n'a point de cause de soy meme." It is a different thing, however, to actually wish to not be attentive. This involves an act of the will which would need to be based on some false premise which could not be accepted as true except for a lack of attention not involving an act of the will. If this were not true, this whole process would be carried on *ad infinitum* which would be contradictory. Consequently, when Adam would have determined himself by an act of his will not to have the proper attention with regards to that which he had to decide; this lack of attention of a voluntary nature would have to be preceded by another.

deffaut d'attention qui n'est pas venu d'un acte de la volonté mais qui est venu d'un simple cessation de son Esprit qui n'a pas esté attentif. Ainsi pour remonter jusqu'a la premiere source du mal, il faut toujours redire qu'Adam a peché par un defaut d'attention qui n'est procedé que du defaut d'attention.*

Taking up Beaulieu's argument again, Pajon notes that Beaulieu states that "'comme l'homme se determine de luy meme a ne considerer pas les choses dont il doit faire son iugement par cela meme il pourra s'emprecher de bien iuger, quelque lumiere qu'on luis [sic] presente, s'il ne luis plait pas de luy apporter de l'attention.'" Pajon assumes that Beaulieu is saying this to support the thesis that objects cannot cause man to act of necessity or that at any particular time man acts he also could not act. But Pajon disagrees with this conclusion.
Pajon insists on this because it is vital to his concept of conversion. Pajon argues that this can be supported from experience because one may note that he is sometimes "forced to think of certain things that he would like to banish from his spirit; whereas there are other things that one would like to apply himself to without being able to do it." Because of such experiences, Pajon believes it can be said that attention is not something that is entirely voluntary. "Nous l'avons ou ne l'avons pas par des raisons qui ne dépendent pas de nous ..." However, as far as those reasons that cause one not to be attentive to his duty are concerned, Pajon considers them to be necessarily false. In that they are necessarily false, "they cannot pass for good reasons in one's spirit except by a lack of attention which is nothing less than a pure privation or a cessation of the operation of one's faculties having no other cause but in oneself." That is why Pajon feels he must return to his premise that "l'homme n'a pas esté attentif a son devoir parce qu'il n'y a pas esté attentif."
de Dieu et de la conversion de l'homme," the first section is a presentation of the theory of grace held by a follower of Cameron who held to an immediate action of the Spirit in conversion which is distinct from the action of the Word. This viewpoint has been surveyed already, but in this section the controversy between that school of thought and Pajon concerning Cameron's position with regards to the use of mediate or immediate grace will be studied. Pajon's opponent has supported his position with numerous quotes from Cameron's works, twenty-eight being given in the Bude manuscript. Pajon studied these quotations carefully and much of his material in the manuscript "De l'opération de l'Esprit" is a refutation of the interpretation that these quotations can be used validly against his position. Pajon, in fact, argues at length that Cameron supports his own position and uses many passages from Cameron including many of the passages used by his opponent to support himself.

One of the passages taken from Cameron's works that Pajon uses is: "'Deinde nempe ubique Deus accommodat actionem suam ad captum humanae naturae.'" Pajon argues that Cameron's words indicate that he is not thinking of immediate action.

He is only speaking of the dispensation of the truth.

L'action de Dieu se deploye donc en nous par le moyen des objets que Dieu tempere et qu'il s'accommode à notre nature, et pourquoy cela? quel besoin est-il qu'il s'abaisse s'il faut ainsi dire pour s'accommoder à notre nature, s'il est vray que par une action immediate il eleve notre nature au dessus d'elle meme, et la rende capable des plus sublimes verites.
Pajon examines another passage from Cameron: "'Deus enim non utitur hac ratione agendi apud conversos tantum, sed vel maxime in convertendis hominibus.'" Pajon notes here that Cameron does not draw any distinction between the manner in which the Spirit acts in the first moment of conversion and any later period. If any distinction is made, it is only to indicate there must be a greater effort made to convert a sinner than to insure his perseverance; however, this does not imply that God acts by a basically different method in one situation than in the other.

Another passage from Cameron quoted by Pajon is: "'Seu illorum mentes illustret cognitione veritatis, seu etiam eorum corda emolliat et flectat ....'" Pajon concludes from this passage that Cameron draws no distinction between the understanding and the will, but that he holds God acts in both faculties "by the proposition of the same objects." The last passage in this series from Cameron is:

"Itaque Paulus non statim obicit Atheniensibus recondita illa et abstrusa Religionis Christianae mysteria, sed tanquam inchoans opus, incipit à rudimentis, id est ab is quae non sunt usque adeò remota à captu humanae rationis; consilium eius scilicet fuit (quae ratio procedendi accommodatissima est humanae menti) à notionibus ad ignotiora progressi." 86

Pajon feels he can summarize Cameron's position, especially with reference to the words that have just been quoted, in the following terms: First, he believed that God's action in bringing about the conversion of man was suitable to man's nature and the condition of his faculties. Secondly, Cameron
believed that the dogmas of the Christian religion were not beyond the reach of reason. Cameron's contention that the truth of the Christian religion would be introduced into the soul by proceeding "à notionibus ad ignotiora" leads Pajon to conclude that he did not consider it necessary for an immediate action of the Spirit to take place before conversion could occur. Rather, Cameron's words imply that the force of natural logic plays an important and crucial role in conversion.

Mais par l'usage et la force de la Logique naturelle qui ne souffre pas que nous rejetions la conclusion après avoir admis les premières, comme il a montré cy dessus et le prouve dans la p. 100 de ses œuvres; de sorte qu'y ayant dans l'âme comme il le dit douz lignes après "praeter gratiam verae virtutis semina" (ce que j'entends des notions communes de la connaissance du droit de Dieu. Romans 1 et de l'œuvre de la Loy écrite naturellement dans les cœurs des hommes, Romans 2) qui sont excités comme il le dit aussi, par la force des objets, et ces semences de vertu ou ces notions communes servans de principes nécessaires et immédiats aux etans nécessairement enchainés avec d'autres et ceux la enceor avec d'autres et sic deinceps.

The work of the Spirit consists in awakening the sentiment of the "notions communes" together with the presentation of the gospel and reasons that prove it to be true. This can only be done by means of the idea that is formed in our understanding "mediate tam verbi quam aliorum objectorum verbum comitantius sapientissima dispensatione." The Spirit's action causes the truth of Christianity to be linked together with the "notions communes" in such a way that one realizes necessarily that the rejection of Christianity involves the rejection of these "notions communes."
Another passage that Pajon uses from Cameron's works to support his doctrine of grace is:

"Utillud interim taceamus, non esse verisimile Deum sic agere in Ecclesia, quod vel inde nobis constat, quod non quovis modo vult pradedicari Evangelium, sed requirit ἀρμότομον τόδε λόγον requirit ordinem et methodum, requirit iudicium in seligendis iis quae rudibus, quaeque rerum divinarum peritioribus et doctioribus proponenda sunt frustra, si Deus agit in hominum animis tantum ad praesentiam, (ut ita loquar) soni externae praedicationis, hoc enim pacto etiam iaciendo lapides in auditores Evangelium pradedicari posset."®®

Pajon states that Cameron's words are so clear in this passage that no one should be able to doubt that he believed that the ideas conceived by men determine whether they do or do not believe the gospel. Furthermore, there should be no doubt that he held that

la différente proposition enteme de la vérité soit la cause de la difference des idées que les hommes conçoivent; et si la difference des idées en quoy consiste la proposition interne de la vérité etoiet un effet de l'action immediate de l'Esprit de Dieu agissant seulement "ad praesentiam verbi," Mr Cameron soutiendrait avec raison que "frustra requiritur ὁμοτομία" et remarquez bien son "quovis modo."®®

In the thirteenth assertion of the treatise by Pajon's anonymous opponent included at the beginning of the composition "De l'opération," it is asserted that the Spirit acts immediately upon the understanding to make it capable of the impression of the truth "par une action qui n'est ni Morale ni Physique, mais surnaturelle et ineffable."®® Pajon's opponent again supports this proposition with a number of quotations from Cameron's works; again, Pajon refuses to concede that the passages are against his position. He does note
that Cameron makes a number of statements that pose problems for him, but he argues at length to resolve them. Pajon observes that Cameron writes that he has never designated the Spirit's action on the understanding to be moral. This could be a remark that would refute everything Pajon has said with regards to Cameron being in sympathy with his position. Pajon, however, quickly points out that Cameron has not said that it could not be moral. In fact, according to Pajon, Cameron's line of reasoning sustains the concept that it is a moral action. What Cameron strongly denies, adds Pajon, is that this action is physical. It is important to examine Cameron's own words in the first passage under discussion:

"Respondeo quod res est, nonquam me mentis respectu, eum motum dixisse Moralem, sed voluntatis duntaxat, quamvis etiam respectu mentis nec eum physicum quidem ego dixerim, sed ineffabilem potius, illud quidem verum est, nec bruto motu mentem Deus afficit, sed (ut loquitur Paulus) 'EV ΑΠΟΦΕΙΕΙ ΠΝΕΥΜΑΤΟΣ ΖΩΝΑΤΟΤΑΙΤΗ'T ut ego quidem certe illum locum accipio."

Pajon questions his opponent as to whether he can call his concept of the Spirit's immediate action on the understanding a demonstration. Pajon's opponent has described his concept as an action that only makes it possible for the understanding to receive the impression of the truth. If this is to be defined as a demonstration, it would be the equivalent of saying that a doctor who had cured an insane individual also had demonstrated to him all the axioms of mathematics in view of the fact that he had made him capable of grasping them.

Pajon adds that his opponent's concept, far from being in harmony with that of Cameron, is totally different. In
fact, in Cameron's sense, the action of the opponent would be clearly physical and "'mutatic bruta ac sui nescia.'" Pajon emphasizes the point that Cameron states that the "Spirit acts \( \text{ἐν ἀποστειλεὶ διανομή} \)" and attributes invincible power to these demonstrations and gives one reason to believe that the invincible power that is employed in conversion is attributed to these demonstrations."\(^9\)

Pajon, now, introduces the second quotation in this series that his opponent has used against him with these words:

Voici le second passage où il semble que Mr Cameron leve le masque contre vous, bien loin de favorizer votre cause. "Quod ad me attinet, Iam testatus sum me eam illuminationem, cum ad mentem refertur, motum ethicum nec in editis scriptus, nec in praelectionibus unquam appellasse, ostendique quo jure tamen id, si libuisset, facere potuisset."\(^2\)

Pajon notes that Cameron actually supports him here and adds another quotation from Cameron dealing with the same thought from the preceding column from which he argues that Cameron's reasoning cannot be true if Pajon's premises are not true. The passage reads:

"Sed vero etsi motum Ethicum, etiam respectu mentis hanc persuasionem vocassem, nec tu efficeres quod voluisti, nec esset quod me valde poenitere istius nomenclaturae; Ethicus enim dici possit quia fit per rationes quidem certo modo propositas, cujus nimirum modi Dei spiritus sibi conscius est, sed tamen per rationes quod Ethici generis est."\(^3\)

Pajon adds that the same reason that Cameron uses to prove that this movement is moral also proves that it is neither "physical, hyperphysical or supernatural in the sense that his opponent understands the term." Pajon adds another quotation to further strengthen his position: "'Tu vide quàm
proprie loquaris, qui actionem quae fit in rationes summa cum luce propositas, quae fit in mente, quae tendit ad bonorum morum studium excitandum, physicum appelles."

Pajon wishes to emphasize that Cameron states that the illumination of the understanding takes place "'per rationes summa cum luce propositas,'" and adds that his opponent's concept is different for he understands it to take place without reasons by an immediate action. Pajon concludes that when Cameron says these reasons are joined "summa cum luce" it is evident that this light

n'est pas recue immédiatement dans la faculté pour refléchir de la sur les raisons (car ainsi l'illumination se ferait par l'illumination) et non pas par des raisons, mais dans les raisons mêmes, d'ou elle resplendit dans la faculté; qu'elle est donc cette lumière des raisons qui illumine l'entendement sinon l'evidence et l'apparence de vérité dont elles sont revêtues.

Up to this point in the discussion of the quotations from Cameron, Pajon has appeared quite confident that he could answer his opponent effectively and even turn the passages against his opponent by interpreting them in his own favor. Coming to the fifth passage being used against himself, Pajon acknowledges that it has bothered him. He suggests that the obscurity characterizing these passages may be accounted for in several ways: First, it was written in a time of difficulty. This is his description of the situation:

Peut être Mr Cameron l'a-t-il affectée; il etoit alors dans son examen et vous savez le soupçon qu'on avait contre luy qu'il favorisoit les Pelagiens, afin donc de ne pas choquez ceux qui l'examinoient, il s'est accommodé autant qu'il a pu à leurs termes sans trahir pourtant ses sentimens: Ainsi quand
Other possibilities Pajon mentions are that Cameron may not have been able to avoid the obscurity or may not have edited his material adequately. Whatever the case may have been, it is pointed out that if Cameron did contradict himself in one passage, that passage should not take precedence over the large number of other passages which Pajon feels are clearly for his position. However, what has just been said should not be taken to mean that Pajon has no answer to the troublesome aspects of this passage. Pajon thinks he is able to explain the statements in such a way that they do not appear to contradict him. The opponent will oppose Pajon with Cameron’s words that speak of an action "'quae immediate à solo spiritu Dei proficiscitur.'" Pajon argues that the word immediate is open to interpretation here, and he asks his opponent to distinguish the word immediate as to human intermediates and secondary causes which could act upon the understanding. He is willing to concede that the passage in question excludes the human ministry of the word, but he denies that it "ecludat alia media quibus uti Deo libet."

The following illustration is used by Pajon to make his point:

Imaginez vous que j'aye dessein d'arracher un arbre qui me nuit dans mon jardin, pour cela je commande à mes serviteurs d'attacher une bonne et grosse corde au haut de l'arbre et de tirer
Pajon holds that Cameron has this idea of immediate in mind; and to further clarify the issue he adds:

J'ajouteray pour un plus ample éclaircissement que ce sont bien tous ces moyens particuliers ensemble qui produisent la conversion, mais ils ne la produisent pourtant pas de quelque manière que l'on dispense mais comme Mr. Cameron nous la dit beaucoup de fois étant dispensez "certo quodam modo, et conversis peculiari." 

In denying that the Spirit acts immediately in conversion, Pajon does not intend it to be understood that he also denies the immediate action of the Spirit in the dispensation of the secondary means which He uses to move our faculties. He has denied only that the Spirit acts immediately on our faculties in order to move them without the use of means. 

Another difficult passage which Pajon's opponent presents against Pajon in this last quotation is: "'Cujus spiritus vias saepenumerò ignoramus, effectus tamen persentiscimus.'" Again, Pajon is unwilling to yield and notes, in the first
place, that Cameron says saepenumero and not semper or nunquam. Furthermore, Pajon states that these words should not be interpreted to mean that he excludes the idea that God brings about conversion by proposing reasons internally by the external dispensation of the Word with the attending circumstances; but, rather, that it cannot be specifically known with regards to each particular believer how it has taken place that the truth was proposed to him in such a manner and in such circumstances that he was impelled to believe and could not reject the proposition of the truth at that particular time. Pajon concludes the discussion on this point with the observation: "Les operations de nos esprits sont si delicantes, que bien souvent nous n'en saurions rendre la raison, quoique pourtant nous ne fassions rien sans raison vraie ou apparente."\(^\text{10}\)

Pajon examines the fourth passage used by his opponent in support of his sixth point and again concludes that the quotation supports his own view rather than that of his opponent. The passage in question is: "'Persuasio est cum Spiritus Sanctus tanta vi Evangelii praedicationem comitatur ut fidem gignat ....'\(^\text{10}\) First, Pajon points out that Cameron is arguing against those who believe that faith is created by an immediate action of the Spirit; whereas, he teaches that it is engendered by the preaching of the Word. He notes Cameron states that the power of the Spirit is marshalled to persuade one, but Pajon argues that the implication of the context is that this is accomplished through the Word. To
support himself he quotes the passage: "'Quod in suasione minus virium adhibitum fit quam in persuasione.'" According to Pajon, the two above quotations taken together mean the same thing as though one were to say that a tree cannot be cut down only by a few strokes of an ax but by so many that it falls necessarily.

To further support himself Pajon adds another quotation from Cameron: "'Hoc pacto etsi omnis persuasio sit suasion, attamen non omnis suasion vicissim est persuasion ....'" These words, says Pajon, imply that Cameron understood suasion to be a general term which included two related ideas; first, simple suasion which has a force that only takes one into a state of equilibrium, thinking again of the illustration of the soul as a balance; secondly, persuasion which causes one to incline below the point of equilibrium to a point of conviction. Pajon resumes the quotation from Cameron in which Cameron distinguishes himself from Pelagius:

"Sic suasio simpliciter appellata infra persuasionem multis gradibus subsidit; Itaque non relinquuer ut tu conclusis, Cameramen nihil aliud requirere ad Regenerationem quam quod Pelagius olim requisuit, nam Pelagius vel solam requisuit suasionem externam humanam quae specie differt à suasione interna Divinâ, vel ad summun suasionem internam Divinam requisuit quae gradu differt a persuasione interna Divina quam ego requiro ac statuo esse plenè necessariam ut sequatur conversio, quaque non volo simpliciter impetrari, sed etiam effici conversionem." Pajon adds that the last words of the quotation may be clarified if they are expressed as "non impetrari tantum, sed ef- fici." Pajon notes that his basic point is sustained in all
of this argumentation against Pelagius. He does not see where Cameron alludes to anything but reasons to bring about the persuasion that truly converts, and it is the evidence of these reasons that brings one to a place of conviction with regards to the Christian faith, not some immediate action independent of the Word and its attending reason, evidence and circumstances.¹⁰⁵

The fifth passage used by Pajon's opponent to support his sixth assertion which views the Word as the objective cause but the Spirit as the subjective cause, immediate and distinct from the Word is: "'Neque enim ista sunt seiuagenda quae coniunxit Deus, externum verbi ministerium ab interno Spiritus ministerio.'"¹⁰⁶ Pajon notes that this quotation is from a very difficult passage and cannot be explained without a great deal of subtleness. Pajon admits that Cameron is drawing a distinction between the internal ministry of the Spirit and the external ministry of the Word; and he considers that Cameron understands that the Word does not act in man except by the means of ideas that it impresses on his understanding. Again, these ideas do not persuade unless they are clothed with the appearance of the truth. Cameron compares the ideas that the understanding receives to matter and the appearance of the truth to form. The pertinent passage concerning this comparison is:

"Quammodum igitur in illustratione mentis ad percipienda dogmata religionis Christianae lux interna Spiritus non excludit omnino, im sol, requirit (ut materiam quam veluti informet) externam institutionem, ut sit efficax Dei organum ad mentes nostras"
commovendas .... Ita planè se res habet in intellectu practico, ut is persuadeatur requiritur interna illuminatio necessariò, sed et illa requirit exhortationem, ut materiam quam veluti informet, ut efficax sit apud nos persuasio. ¹⁰⁷

The issue here is the manner in which the "matter" receives its "form" according to this comparison. Pajon holds that to argue that this is done by immediate grace distinct from the operation of the Word is contrary to the intent of Cameron's present line of thought. That the illumination of the understanding does not take place without the external ministry of the Word can be seen from the response that Cameron makes to an objection made against him by one of his opponents. Cameron had argued that the understanding necessarily determined the will and his opponent then answered that it was then no longer necessary to have instructions. Cameron answered, on the contrary, that there was a necessity for instructions in order that the understanding might be illuminated. The passage under discussion is as follows:

"Mens flectit necessariò voluntatem, Ergo non sunt adhibendae rationes. Sic tibi placet colligere? At ego contra dixerim, Mens flectit necessariò voluntatem. Ergo opus est hortationibus ut mens afficiatur ipsa, ita demùm flexura voluntatem." ¹⁰⁸

Pajon comments that by *afficiatur* one ought to understand *illuminetur* because the discussion that follows emphasizes this. "'Posset quidem Deus ita in hominum animis vi Spiritus sui operari, ut hortationinus nihil esset opus ....'" To clearly conclude the thought of this passage, Pajon says that "ad illuminandum" should be added following "opus."

Pajon concludes from these passages that Cameron
understands that this internal light is not received immediately in the soul but first in the exhortations and teachings that are received from the Word. In addition, he introduces two other passages which he feels strengthen his argument even further. The first is:

"Iam sic instituit Ecclesiam suam Deus, et velit intervenire hortationes iisque utatur tanquam organis spiritus sui, quas insonantes per aurem usque ad pectora piroum inspirat, atque (ut ita loquar) animat modo quodam ineffabili."\(^n\)

The second quotation is introduced by Pajon to indicate that Cameron holds along with himself that the preaching of the gospel is the ministry of the Spirit and that the Spirit is given by this preaching of the Word:

"Huc et illud etiam accedit ... quod Deus quibus Spiritum indulget non indulget nisi per praedication Evangelii quo referri potest illud etiam Pauli, Num accepistis Spiritum per praedicationem Evangelii?"\(^n\)

Pajon states that it should not be concluded that the Spirit somehow takes hold of the Word as it leaves the mouth of the preacher though it might seem Cameron's idea from some of the above words. Pajon says this would be absurd:

Mais ce n'est pas sa pensée, cette pensée seroit absurde, et Mr. Cameron luy meme appelle cette lumiere interne, et l'action de l'Esprit qui la communique "ministerialis interum Spiritûs." Mais tant y a que cette lumiere anime et informe les enseignemens et les exhortations de la parole, et ne se recoit pas immediatement dans l'entendement, mais premierement dans ces enseignemens clairs et lumineux de l'Esprit de Dieu, qu'il appelle ailleurs apres S. Paul, une demonstration d'Esprit et de puissance ... ce qui n'est autre chose que des enseignemens accompanzez de lumiere.\(^n\)

At this point Pajon admits that Cameron's answer to a
question concerning how this light of the Spirit molds the teachings of the Word in the soul of the unconverted would be, as Cameron has stated in one of the passages just quoted in this series, "modo ineffabili." Pajon also notes that Cameron is unable to say "quo pacto \textit{spirit\textsubscript{us} comprehenderit}." The statement that Pajon makes at this point is very significant for the entire study of this chapter:

Si je voulis vous dire la meme chose, ce ne me seroit pas un sujet d'heresie, personne n'est heretique pour etre ignorant mais si apres avoir depouiller tous les soupçons ... vous vouler entrer la dessus en une amiable conference avec moy, je vous en diray naïvement ma pensée, je ne renverseray point les fondemens de Mr. Cameron mais je batiray dessus.$^{112}$

Another argument that Pajon utilizes to support his concept of immediate action is concerned with Cameron's reference to \textit{suboperatio}.

Voici encor une autre raison, dans l'action de l'Esprit de l'homme, voici ses propres termes Th. 19. "Igitur ut in prima vocatone, sic etiam in perseverantia nulla est Liberi Arbitrii et Gratia cooperatio; Est tamen, (detur venia verbo) Suboperatio, ut nos conficiamus quidem salutem nostram, sed Deo efficiente in nobis velle et perficere."

Pajon notes that his opponent proposes an immediate action with which there is no \textit{suboperation} of man. Pajon points out that when there is an allowance for man's \textit{suboperation} one is able to say in virtue of this that one has believed, repented or loved God

parce que j'ai suboperè quand Dieu a produit en moy la foy, la repentance et l'amour; il est aisè de concevoir que l'homme subopere a l'action des ideés qui luy font comprendre la verité car comprendre la verite c'est agir, mais il est impossible de s'imaginer qu'il subopere a une action
immediate de l'Esprit qui le rend seulement capable d'agir.\textsuperscript{113}

Pajon states that in the action that Cameron supports "Homo se habet instar hominis qui agit," but his opponent's action assumes that man is like a stump that is acted upon rather than being one that acts. Pajon reminds his opponent that he is now concerned with the immediate action that he poses in as far as it is distinguished from the action of the Word. Pajon's conclusion on suboperation appeals to the natural interpretation of Scripture as being in his favor in support of this point:

L'Ecriture Sainte exhorte les pecheurs à se faire un coeur nouveau et un esprit nouveau Ezech. 18 exhortation qui n'est point vaine envers les elus, parce que Dieu operant en eux avec efficace pour y créer ce coeur nouveau et cet esprit nouveau qu'il leur demande, ils suboperent à son action; Mais elle ne saurait jamais exhorter les pecheurs à se rendre capables de l'impression de la verité, au sens que vous prenez cette capacité parce qu'ils ne suboperent point à cette action de Dieu qui leur donne une telle capacité, il faut qu'elle nous vienne sans que nous y pensions, lors meme que Dieu la produit en nous.\textsuperscript{114}

Pajon has shown a keen mastery of the Cameronian literature in his determined attempt to establish that Cameron's works sustain his concept of grace. Indeed, he considers Cameron to be the very foundation upon which he has built his entire theology of grace. In the opinion of this writer, he has argued effectively and persuasively for his position though he himself admits there are some difficulties in harmonizing some few passages in Cameron with his own distinctive concept of the operation of grace in conversion. This study has also shown further the importance for both Pajonistic and Cameronian
studies of this treatise "De l'operation," certainly one of the most valuable of the Pajonistic manuscripts.

Response to Maimbourg and Support from Calvin

Pajon also wrote a treatise in defense of the fourth article of the Confession of Faith against certain objections made by Louis Maimbourg in his book Traité de la vraye parolle de Dieu. This research shall devote some time to the analysis of this work because it attempts to establish in greater depth than any of the other material available from Pajon the certainty of faith in the Word and also because it introduces Calvin into the discussion in such a way that he appears to support Pajon in his main controversy. Pajon has given very little attention to Calvin in other manuscripts available to this study and the occasion for the special attention he receives in this work is the accusation Maimbourg has made that the first Reformed leaders had appealed to a particularistic spirit to sustain their theology, but that in more recent times the Reformed thinkers have abandoned this approach. The article of the Confession that Pajon refers to as being attacked by Maimbourg in this writing is: "'Nous cognoissons ces livres êstre Canoniques, et la reigle tres-certaine de nostre foy: non par le commun accord et consentement de l'Eglise, que par le tesmoignage et persuasion intérieure de Saint Esprit, que les nous fait discerner ... " Pajon understands Maimbourg to be accusing the early Reformed thinkers of conceiving of the testimony of the Spirit of which this article of the Confession speaks as being an
immediate declaration or an interior voice that says to one:
"Ce livre là est divin, ce livre là ne l'est pas." Pajon denies
that the Confession or any of the reformed theologians, early
or late, have ever held to such an idea. He argues:

Le témoignage du Saint Esprit dont parle nostre
Confession de foi, et dont nos théologiens ont
toujours parlé, consiste comme parle l'Article même
de la Confession une persuasion interieure c'est a
dire en une claire connoissance et un sentiment
que nous avons de la divinité de l'Ecriture Sainte.
Connoissance que nous avons par le Saint Esprit:
C'est pourquoi elle est appelee témoignage et
persuasion interieure du Saint Esprit: de sorte
que l'Article de la Confession se pourroit fort
bien expliquer par ces termes: Non tant par le
temoignage de l'Eglise que par la connoissance que
nous en avons nous mesme par la grace, et par
l'illumination du Saint Esprit, au mesme sens que
les Samaritains disoient: ce n'est plus pour ta
parolle que nous croisons, mais par ce que nous mes-
mes l'avons oui et nous avons connu.\textsuperscript{116}

Should Maimbourg ask how the Holy Spirit gives one
this knowledge and sense of the divinity of Scripture, Pajon
will reply by the Scripture itself; whereas, Maimbourg un­
derstands the early Reformed theologians to have taught that the
Holy Spirit does it immediately without the ministry of the
Word itself. Pajon, of course, is willing to accept that the
Holy Spirit does it through means of various kinds which in­
cludes the ministry of preaching as well as many other dif­
ferent avenues beyond comprehension, but he emphasizes again
as always that the Spirit never does it through an immediate
revelation which excludes the ministry of the Word. This, of
course, is a crucial concept that is at the heart of Pajon's
whole system.

The point of interest here is Pajon's introduction of
Calvin as a supporter of his system. Pajon refers to Chapter Seven of Volume One of the *Institutes* where Calvin discusses the testimony of the Holy Spirit, and Pajon argues that Calvin clearly shows here that he considers the Holy Spirit

se sert de ces characters de verité qui se font sentir dans l'Ecriture pour nous imprimer dans l'esprit le sentiment de la persuasion de la verité de cette divine Ecriture. Et c'est pourquoi il ajoute dans la suite du chapitre, qu'ayant esté illuminez par le Saint Esprit, nous croions tres certainement que l'Ecriture est de Dieu; et cela non pas comme quelques uns recoivent quelquesfois des choses qu'ils ne connoissent pas, pour les rejeter puis apres quand ils les connoissent, mais parce que nous sommes convaincus en nostre conscience que nous tenons une verité invinciblement.\(^{117}\)

Pajon poses a question to Maimbourg on how he considers that one can know the truth of Scripture and be convinced of it if it is not by the Scripture itself. He introduces a series of comparisons to help establish this point:

Car comme il est impossible de sentir la lumiere que par la lumiere, ni la douceur que par la douceur, ou l'amertume que par l'amertume' il est aussi impossible de sentir la verité que par la verité. Puis dont que Calvin a enseigne ces deux choses dans ce chapitre: que c'est le Saint Esprit qui nous persuade de la verité de l'Ecriture, et qu'il nous persuade par le sentiment qu'il nous donne de la verité de cette mesme Ecriture; il faut necessairement que nous concluions que Calvin a creu que le Saint Esprit se servoit de cette mesme Ecriture pour nous faire sentir et pour nous persuader qu'elle est vray et qu'elle est Divine. Il pourroit bien nous le persuader, s'il vouloit, par lui mesme, par une revelation immediate, par une voix qui nous diroit au dedans: C'est la ma parole; Mais ce ne seroit pas nous le persuader par le sentiment de la verité de cette Ecriture; Car ces mots, le sentiment de la verité, expriment quelque chose, qui doit necessairement venir de cette Ecriture mesme, et de l'impression qu'elle fait dans nos esprits, entendez dans le sens de Calvin, lors que le Saint Esprit la rend efficace pour nostre santification. Et voila pourquoi tous ne connoissent
The Scripture is shown, claims Pajon, to establish its truth by its own character according to a logical and sensible interpretation of Calvin's thought. Admittedly, Pajon's study of Calvin on the subject is brief; still it gives one an example of his ability to interpret him as sustaining his own system.

Another point of special interest in this work is Pajon's answer to the possible accusation that his argument is of a circular nature. Maimbourg asks how one can know Scripture is divine and that it should be understood to have some specific meaning. Pajon answers that one can know this by the sense that one has of its divinity; and one can know it should be understood in a specific way by the evidence of the words, which is overwhelming with regards to things crucial to salvation. This makes it impossible for one willing to renounce his prejudices to be deceived.

Pajon, next, indicates that in order to trap him in a circular argument, one should now ask how he can know he has such an impression and how he can know it is true. If
Pajon replies that he knows it by the Scripture, he is trapped in a circular argument; but if he responds in another fashion --as he should-- the fallacy will be avoided.

Nous disons donc que nous avons ce sentiment par le sentiment même, que nous savons que ce sentiment est vrai par l'evidence même de la chose que nous sentons, comme le lapidaire savait que le sentiment qu'il a que cette pierre est vraye et l'autre fausse, est par l'evidence de la chose qu'il sut en remarquant dans l'une de ces pierres des caractères qu'elle est vraye, et dans l'autre des caractères qu'elle est fausse.

De nous demander ici comme on pourroit peut estre le faire, d'ou nous savons que c'est le Saint Esprit qui nous a donné cest sentiments de la divinité de l'Ecriture? C'est une question toute a fait hors de propos. Nous repondons sans hésiter que nous le savons par l'Ecriture même. Mais nous ne tombons pas dans un cercle par cette réponse parce que la persuasion que nous avons que l'Ecriture Sainte est divine sur le sentiment que le Saint Esprit nous a donné de sa Divinité n'est pas fondé sur ce que c'est le Saint Esprit qui nous a donné ce sentiment: Mais seulement sur ce que nous sentons la divinité de l'Ecriture, et ce sentiment est trop vif et trop clair pour que nous puissions le soupçonner d'estre faux; Quand ce sentiment seroit venu d'ailleurs que du Saint Esprit comme cause principale, il ne laisseroit pas d'estre vray, comme le sentiment que nous aurions d'une épée qui nous auroit percé le bras ou la cuisse, que ce seroit une epée, seroit vray, qui que ce fust qui nous eust donné le coup d'epée. C'est donc une reflection qui vient après l'établissement de la Divinité de l'Ecriture, sur le sentiment que nous en avons, savoir, d'où nous vient ce sentiment et quelle en est la cause efficiante principale? une réflexion dis je qui se doit decidé par l'Ecriture; Mais qui ne fait rien a l'établissement de la Divinité de l'Ecriture. 119

Here one notes that Pajon has embraced as his last defense, the Cartesian answer to the perennial problem of the ultimate test for truth--clear and distinct ideas: "... ce sentiment est trop vif et trop clair que nous puissions de
Problems with Amyraut

In the Pajonistic manuscripts there is no thorough discussion of Amyraut's thought related to the controversy as in the case of Cameron; however, during the conference with Claude, de la Bastide raises the point that Amyraut has posed an action of the Spirit which he has described as hyperphysique "qui ne se fait point par le présentation des objets mais qui est immédiate." Pajon's response to this is to point out that if the Spirit makes it possible for man to believe by an action that does not use the presentation of objects (as he admits that Amyraut holds in his seventeenth proposition in his thesis on faith) this would amount to a blind impulse and a pure physical operation by which God would act upon man as though he were a stump—an absolute absurdity. This, Pajon says, is not, in fact, what Amyraut wishes to say. Pajon does not treat Amyraut here with much respect for he goes on to note that Amyraut contradicts himself for in his nineteenth proposition he states that the operation (of the Spirit) that he poses is not physique but hyperphysique. Later in his twenty-first proposition, however, he says that it is of the same nature as that by which sight is given to the blind which he recognizes to be of a physical nature. Pajon draws attention to the fact that the same reasons by which Amyraut attempts to establish in his nineteenth proposition that his concept of the immediate action of the Spirit is hyperphysique and not...
physique can be applied to the situation in which God miraculously gives sight to the blind, which he, nevertheless, calls physique—an another contradiction. Pajon also adds that Amyraut cannot hold (as he does in his twenty-first proposition) to "une illumination de nos entendements toute différente de la connoissance, et qui ne se fait point par la presentation des objets, sans renverser ce qu'il enseigne dans ses theses de testimoniò spiritûs st., où il dit que l'action du St. Esprit sur nos entendements est appelé une illumination et un enseignement" or without reversing what he said "dans son livre de l'elevation du foy où il enseigne que l'illumination de l'entendement n'est rien sinon le bon etat de la raison perfectionné de l'intelligence des doctrines de l'Evangile."  

Furthermore, Pajon observes that Amyraut affirms in his tenth and twelfth propositions that the corruption and powerlessness of man consists of malice, covetousness, and the stain of sin; consequently, he cannot teach in his twenty-first and preceding propositions that the Holy Spirit restores our understanding and delivers it from its corruption that it may believe and be touched by the teaching of the Word without taking the position that man is first delivered of his malice, evil habits, and the stain of sin by the teaching of the Word; otherwise he would contradict Scripture. Pajon also criticizes Amyraut for confusing the good moral disposition of our faculties (which consists in separation from vice and error) with the good physical disposition of our faculties (which consists of a proper constitution of our
organs) when he wrote that to be capable of being touched by
the object of the gospel, it is necessary that we have organs
that are properly constituted. Pajon thinks this would mean
we are neither infants nor fools, but that it would not reflect
that we do not have vices, passions or errors as Amyraut ap­
ppears to hold. Contrary to his statement on this, Pajon says
it is for the very purpose of eliminating vice, passion, and
error from our souls that the gospel is preached. We do not
need the gospel except for our bad moral condition. Thus
Pajon directs de la Bastide's and Claude's attention to the
fact that Amyraut is not carefully and consistently in these
propositions adhering to the basic Cameronian distinction be­
tween moral and physical ability which is, of course, one of
the crucial presuppositions of the Pajonistic position.

In conclusion, Pajon reveals a certain lack of respect
for Amyraut's treatment of this entire subject, stating that
Amyraut's propositions contain so many fallacies, absurdi­
ties, and contradictions that they should not be used against
him. Amyraut enthusiasts may be somewhat perturbed by
Pajon's irreverent treatment of him; however, this part of the
1676 conference explains somewhat why Pajon spends so little
time supporting his position from Amyraut. Though Pajon was
loathe to admit that any of the distinguished Reformed think­
ers did not support him, de la Bastide had introduced a pas­sage that clearly placed one of the most distinguished Sal­
murian theologians sharply against his position. To Pajon
this could only mean that here poor Amyraut had failed to grasp
the subtlety and logic of Cameron's thought in one of the most delicate areas of his entire theological system; therefore, he had stumbled into inconsistencies and incoherence of a most serious kind that Pajon must now carefully rectify or risk seeing the Salmurian system and house collapse.

**Testard and the Question of Origins**

It has already been noted that Chouet reported Pajon received his distinctive concept on grace from Testard who was his father-in-law. To place Pajon's relationship to Testard into perspective, one must note that Testard died in 1650, the same year Pajon was received into the ministry and ordained. Then it was the next year, 1651, that he married Catherine Testard. Pajon never refers to any personal discussions with Testard on his distinctive concept of grace; however, it is true that he believed Testard's written work logically supported his viewpoint. In his letter to the Consistory of Charenton, he introduced the point that Testard had treated the question at issue in his *Irenicon*, Thesis 224 to 242, and handled the matter in harmony with Pajon's approach. "He never recognizes any other action by the Holy Spirit in the process of conversion today other than that which He exercises in men through the ministry of the Word and other means." However, Pajon notes that no action was taken against Testard in any way on this matter. Pajon also notes that Cameron's works were printed with the approval of the National Synod of Castres and that it is easily demonstrated from his works that he is opposed to those who hold
to immediate grace in opposition to Pajon. Pajon mentions here that Testard, who was Cameron's disciple, had received his ideas from Cameron.123

To facilitate the study of Testard's discussions on this subject, Pajon appears to have translated the pertinent passages in Testard's *Irenicon* into French, and, again, fortunately, the Le Cene manuscripts contain them. They are entitled "Les Sentiments de Mr. Testard Sur la Nature de l'impuissance de l'homme a se convertir, et sur la maniere dont le Saint Esprit opere pour la guerir,"124 which translates theses forty-three through forty-nine and fifty-nine; and "De la maniere dont la grace efficace opere La Conversion!"125 which translates theses 224 through 242 and 248 through 256. In these pertinent passages on the subject, Pajon is convinced that Testard consistently expresses himself in such a way that his thought is consistent with Pajon's concept of grace. It has been noted that Pajon admits there are some sections in Amyraut's and Cameron's works that are problem passages for him; however, he makes no such concession with regards to Testard's work.126 A study of these passages would appear to confirm that Pajon is right in this. This writer will not weary the reader with a detailed comparative study of these passages since Testard's work reflects the basic Cameronian concepts that have already been studied at considerable length. However, one example of Testard's approach will be given. In Thesis 224, he makes the point that the grace of God accommodates itself to our nature, it
does not do violence to it; the converting action is of a moral nature in opposition to physical or brute force.

En effet cette operation est appeleé une illumination de l'entendement, une demonstration d'Esprit, un enseignement, une manifestation parce que par cette operation, l'entendement est rempli et penetré d'une lumiere salutaire, c'est a dire, de la connoissance de Dieu et de J.C.127

In some concluding comments to his translation of "De la maniere ... " Pajon points out that Testard is a good Calvinist and Cameronian in that "he recognizes original sin and the inability of man of himself to be converted; he attributes conversion and all those things that depend on it to God; he recognizes the necessity and the efficacy of irresistible grace." Testard's critics might be shocked by two things: "One, because he reduced the inability of the sinner to be converted to a voluntary inability which means he could if he wished; two, because he did not recognize any other operation of the Spirit in the conversion of man except that which is exercised in our hearts by the ministry of the Word and other means which it pleases Him to use."128 Of course, to Pajon this demonstrates the consistency with which Testard was able to explain and interpret the Cameronian theology.

Earlier, this writer promised to deal with the question of origins as to Pajon's distinctive idea on grace. It is well known that the study of the origins of ideas is a most difficult matter because the thinking of a man is influenced by so many different factors and individuals. This writer does not feel that he can deal with this problem except in a tentative manner; however, it is considered that enough study
has gone into this research to say that Pajon has effectively established that the Cameronian concepts, as enunciated by Cameron himself and as communicated by his disciple Testard, support the conclusion that a consistent application of their thinking moves in the direction of Pajon's thought in the matter. On the other hand, they did not develop the issues with the preciseness and clarity that Pajon did; and it is not inconceivable that if they had faced the issues as Pajon spelled them out, they would have drawn back and settled for a position more like that of Amyraut or Claude who appear to have been willing to live with a greater degree of paradox in this area of thought than Pajon was willing to tolerate.

Continuing the concluding comments to "De la maniere," Pajon adds that his doctrine is supported by all their theologians. He is willing, however, to concede that there are elements in their work that could be interpreted as being opposed to his idea, but he points out that this matter is of a very subtle nature. "Earlier the scholastics dealt with the subject in a confused manner and there are few theologians who have thought the matter through clearly enough not to become involved in certain contradictions when treating this subject." Still, Pajon adds that "one will not be able to find any of them who explicitly oppose his view and who do not write in such a way that they may be understood to support and approve it."
A Critique of Tronchin's Position

One of Pajon's methods of refuting his opponents was to identify their position with a view held by groups that were unacceptable to his opponents and to show that it was necessary for them to accept his premises in order to avoid the identification of their position with some unacceptable position. Pajon develops this method in considerable detail during his correspondence with Louis Tronchin. Tronchin, a Cameronian, opposed Pajon and held to an act of immediate grace distinct from the Word. He explained his concept of this immediate grace in a way that corresponds to the view of Pajon's anonymous opponent referred to in the treatise "De l'Opération de l'Esprit." Tronchin illustrated his concept by comparing it to the preparation of a mathematician. A mathematician must have his brain disposed in such a way by the providence of God in order that he may have the capacity to comprehend the discipline of mathematics. Tronchin argued that God must act in a similar way by an immediate act of grace distinct from the operation of the Word or any of its attending circumstances. Pajon notes that Tronchin recognizes two distinct actions: First, God acts to give one a disposition which renders one capable of being converted. Secondly, He then actually converts one. Pajon notes also that they are both in agreement that once the first action has taken place, God produces the second by the ministry of the Word.

Pajon argues against Tronchin on the grounds that he
cannot adequately distinguish himself from the Arminians, the Flaccians or the Enthusiasts unless he abandons his premise of immediate grace in favor of Pajon's concept. Taking up Tronchin's example concerning the acquisition of mathematical knowledge, Pajon states:

Pour moy je considère deux sortes de disposition à apprendre les mathématiques l'une qui est toute physique, qui consiste dans la faculté de l'intelligence, et dans une certaine constitution du cerveau telle qu'elle se trouve en un fait, et qui n'est ni hététe, ni fou; et l'autre qui est en quelque sorte morale en ce qu'elle consiste en des certaines connoissances, qui doivent précéder l'étude de Mathématiques ou qui en l'ont, si vous voulez les premices principes et les Elemens.¹³²

In Pajon's opinion it is the same with conversion; two kinds of dispositions are involved, one is purely a physical matter consisting in the faculties of the soul. The other is of a moral nature

et qui consistent, ou en quelque notions de l'entendement, ou en quelques inclinations de la volonté qui viennent de ces notions de l'entendement et qui rendent la volonté plus capable d'être flechée par les enseignemens et les exhortations de la parole.¹³³

Pajon cannot conceive of any other type of disposition than this.

At this point in the debate, Pajon asks Tronchin which of these two kinds of dispositions the Holy Spirit creates in man without utilizing the Word or any other means. Pajon warns that if Tronchin takes the position that the Spirit acts

ou a créer quelque nouvelle faculté dans nos ames, ou a produire quelque nouvelle disposition physiques dans les organes du corps qui servent à nos facultes vous tomberez dans les erreurs des Arminiens, ou des Flaciens, ou dans quelques autres encore plus grossière que celles-là.¹³⁴
On the other hand, if Tronchin answers that it is a moral disposition and that this distinct action of the Spirit consists in new ideas apart from the Word and other means that produces new inclinations in the will, he then has joined forces with the Enthusiasts.\(^{135}\)

Pajon notes that Tronchin has already compared this immediate action to the good disposition of the brain in several articles of previous letter, and in another article he compared it to the good disposition of the eyes in order that a man might be able to see when light is introduced. These examples tend to indicate to Pajon that Tronchin is thinking of a physical inability which is involuntary

\[\text{que le S. Esprit guerit par une action physique sans que l'homme s'en mêle en aucune sorte. Car l'impuissance d'un homme hâbéte à apprendre les Mathématiques, et l'impuissance d'un aveugle à voir la lumière sont des impuissances physiques et involontaires, qu'il n'est pas en leur puissance de ne point avoir quand ils le voudroyent de toute leur force, et que Dieu peut aussi guérir quand il luy plaier sans qu'il soit nécessaire qu'ils y donnent leur consentement.}\(^{136}\)

If this is Tronchin's real opinion, it appears to Pajon that he has clearly joined the camp of either the Arminians or the Flaccians or some other even worse.

Looking at Tronchin's concept from another viewpoint, places him in the camp of the Enthusiasts according to Pajon. Pajon notes that Tronchin states that the reasons for the necessity of his distinct action is the habit of vice. Tronchin relates this concept to his illustration concerning the acquisition of mathematics in saying that he is persuaded that many who accept the rules of mathematics would be
opposed to them and would seek for ways to undermine them if their acceptance obliged them to go against their own self-interest and pride. Pajon finds no grounds for argument with this concept of the nature of one's inability because they both hold it consists of the same things: "Dans les habitudes du péché, dans l'amour propre, dans les passions ... " Pajon, however, points out now that Tronchin has involved himself in additional difficulties that place him clearly on the road that leads to the heresy of enthousiasme. Pajon supports this accusation as follows: To be rendered capable of conversion, the Holy Spirit must free one of the bad habits of man's lower nature that make conversion impossible. In order to accomplish this, it is essential that one's consent be first gained.

Car un aveugle peut bien cesser d'être aveugle malgré qu'il en ait; un homme fou peut être guéri de sa folie, et une stupide délivré de sa stupidité, sans y apporter leur consentement, parce que ces defaus sont hors de la volonté, et ainsi il n'est pas nécessaire que la volonté consente à leur guérison. Mais un [mauvais] homme ne sauroit devenir homme de bien sans le vouloir et celui qui aime le monde et ses vanitez qui est habitué au vice, ne sauroit renoncer à l'amour du monde, et aux mauvoises habitudes qui le possedent, sans y consentir: parce que ces vices sont dans la volonté et parce que la vonté ne sauroit être changée sans y consentir. Autrement, elle voudroit, et ne voudroit pas en même tems; ce qui est contradictoire. 

Pajon continues his argument in stating that in order for this consent of the will to be obtained it is necessary that the Holy Spirit present some motive or reason because the will cannot be moved as a stone by some blind impulse.

Furthermore, in order to propose thèse reasons, the
Holy Spirit is limited to two methods: either He can use means or accomplish it without means. Pajon states that the first method is the type he supports, and the second method is the sentiment of the *Enthousiastes*. Pajon cannot see how a reason placed in one's soul that moves the will and delivers one of his vices and bad habits without utilizing either the Word or any other means can be anything but a genuine *enthousiasme*.

Pajon, however, does not consider this to be Tronchin's greatest difficulty. Pursuing Tronchin's illustration on mathematics further, Pajon observes he states that he recognizes that the Word has all the qualities necessary to cure the habits of vice and bring about the illumination of the spirit of man even as the rules of mathematics have all that is necessary to make a good mathematician. This would appear to bring him close to Pajon's position except for the qualifying statement; that is only, however, true with regards to "'un Esprit bien disposé.'" Pajon states that this statement troubles him. What does Tronchin mean by "'cet esprit bien disposé?'" If Tronchin understands by this "une disposition opposée aux habitudes du vice et à l'amour qui ôte par elle même ces habitudes du vice et cet amour propre," he is, in fact, saying that he recognizes that the Word has all the qualities necessary to correct the habit of vice; however, this is true only with regards to those who do not have any such habit of vice. Pajon states that this does not appear to make sense. "Ce seroit un admirable remède contre le
parole de Dieu, si Elle ne pouvait guérir que ceux qui n'ont point du vice."

If, on the other hand, Tronchin means by this well-disposed spirit a disposition that does not take the vices away, having some kind of sympathetic compatibility with such vices, but still awaits the help of the Word in order to take away the vices; then he faces other serious difficulties. First, Pajon points out, Tronchin will have to erase everything he has said concerning the reasons that make necessary an action of the Spirit that is distinct from the Word. In such a case, it would no longer be the habits of sin, but other things that would make this action necessary because this immediate action would not be used to remove the habits of vice. From this it would be necessary to conclude that one's inability "[pourra bien n'être pas morale ni volontaire, mais physique et involontaire [comme] de Flacius ou celle des Arminiens avant la grace suffisante." Secondly, Pajon has difficulty in understanding how Tronchin could call such a spirit "bien disposé" since the Spirit would not have yet corrected the habits of vice.

Selon vous celuy qui a recue cette bonne disposition a déjà fait un homme Spiritual, d'homme animal qu'il étoit auparavant. Et néanmoins, il est encore aussi ignorant, aussi débauché, aussi détestable par ces crimes aussi rebelle à Dieu qu'il l'étoit avant que cette action toute puissante de Dieu fust deployée in luı.

In such a position, Tronchin would find himself in the camp of Flaccius. Pajon notes that Flaccius considered original sin not only to be distinct from the actual sins themselves,
"mais aussi des habitudes vicieuses qu'il reconnaissait que
nous apportons du ventre de nos mères et il voulait qu'il con-
sistaient en une dépravation de la nature toute différent ... "
Pajon suggests that Tronchin appears to be of the same opinion.
Pajon admits that Tronchin does not use the same terms as
Flaccius who described this state of depravity as "une forme
substantielle renversée." This, however, does not save Tron-
chin as long as he shares the same ideas; the idea is the
important thing, no matter what the terms. Pajon doubts that
Tronchin wishes to be identified with such a dangerous idea
and advises Tronchin that he can escape the predicament he is
now in by adopting Pajon's point of view and rejecting his
proposition "'que la parole ne peut corriger le vice, qu'à
l'égard d'un Esprit bien disposé ... " He should adopt Pajon's
position and say that

\[ \text{comme la parole, qui nous sanctifie et nous régénère,}
\text{est employée à corriger les habitudes du vice, elle}
\text{le doit être aussi à corriger la mauvaise disposition}
\text{de nos âmes, qui consiste dans ces habitudes}
\text{du vice et à nous en donner une bonne; et par conse-
\text{quent, que le St. Esprit ne fait pas cela, par une}
\text{action immédiate sans y employer le ministère de}
\text{la parole.}^{140} \]

Pajon also warns Tronchin that his concept of grace
may be interpreted in such a way as to show him he is in dan-
ger of falling into Arminianism. He observes, in the first
place, that Tronchin has attempted to distinguish himself
from the Arminians in that the sufficient grace which they
support is universal whereas he supports a concept of grace
that is particular. Secondly, the grace which they hold only
brings one to a place of equilibrium; whereas Tronchin holds
"'que nous sommes determinez infailliblement à la foy lorsque la parole intervient.'"

In examining these propositions, Pajon states that the first distinction made by Tronchin is only of an accidental nature. The two concepts of grace are both only sufficient whether they are considered as universal as by the Arminians or particular as by Tronchin and other supporters of immediate grace. In fact, as far as Pajon is concerned, it is more reasonable to make it universal than particular in order to divest sinners of their excuse that it is not in their power to be converted. As far as Tronchin's second proposition, Pajon doubts that it is valid. To establish his point in the matter, he notes that Tronchin admits that nothing prevents this disposition from being produced by God before the presentation of the Word as is recognized by Tronchin himself in a letter of Pajon. Pajon asks that one imagine a man in such a state that he has not heard the Word and knows nothing of God or Christ, but that he has experienced the good disposition through the action of the Spirit assumed by Tronchin. Pajon asks, "A-t-il quelque chose de plus qu'une grace suffisante?" Pajon brings to Tronchin's attention that he himself has explained in his writings that the Spirit "'ne produit en nous, par son action immediate qu'une simple puissance de vouloir et non pas le vouloir meme ... '" Pajon does not see how this can be interpreted as anything more than the sufficient grace that is held by the Arminians who call it "'vires supernaturales ad credindam.'"
However, if Tronchin prefers the company of the enthousiastes to the Arminians, he can settle for their error according to the following argumentation:

Vous savez bien, Monsier que la faculté est d'elle même indéterminée au bien et au mal et qu'elle ne peut être determinée a l'un ou à l'autre que par les objets et par consequent, que ce qui agit en nous ad modum facultatis, et qui appartient à la faculté entant qu'elle est faculté et non entant qu'elle est prévenue par certains objets, la laisse toujours dans cette indifférence au bien et au mal. qui appartient à sa nature. Ainsi, il faut nécessairement, ou que le S. Esprit nous présente quel-que objets par son action immediate; le qui seroit un Enthousiasme ou que son action immediate ne produise en nous que la grace suffisante des Arminiens, qui nous laisse dans l'indifférence, et dans l'équilibre.142

Pajon also questions the validity of Tronchin's proposition that the action of the Spirit is of such a nature that once it is posed the subject is inevitably converted when the Word is presented. He argues, in the first place, that this action proposed by Tronchin cannot produce anything in one except a simple ability to will to believe. In the second place, he questions Tronchin on how this irresistible conversion takes place upon the presentation of the Word.

"Est-ce que cette bonne disposition la rend infaillible et incapable de se tromper, et de prendre le mensonge pour la verité et la verité pour le bien?" Pajon cannot see how this can be true in view of the fact that the convert does not find himself free from sin which only exists if there is some error. Furthermore, how can one then account for the many disputes that exist among the theologians who have received this good disposition? On the other hand, if this disposition
does not guarantee infallibility "pourquoi ne poura-t-il ar-
river qu'il se trompe et il refuse de se convertir, quand la
parole interviendra."

Pajon also asks in what way Tronchin understands the
words "'quand elle interviendra'?"

Entendez-vous que cela doive faire de quel manièr
que l'on luy présente la parole, et de quelque
circonstances qu'elle puisse être accompagnée, ou
s'il faut pour être infailliblement efficace,
qu'elle soit prêchée d'une certaine manière et
avec de certaines circonstances, accommodées à
la disposition de celuy à qui on la prêche?¹⁴⁹

If it doesn't make any difference in what manner the Word is
presented, then it doesn't make any difference as to the cir-
cumstances. One does not have to bother about the type of
preaching or anything else.

Nous n'avons plus qu'à prier Dieu qu'il donne la
grace immediate à nos enfans les exhorter à bien
vivre et à persever dans le vérité et apres cela
les laisser d'aller dans les plus mechantes com-
pagnées du monde et les exposer aux plus grandes
tentations sans rien craindre. S'ils ont la grace
immediate, ils seront des gens de bien. S'ils ne
l'ont pas nos soins seroyent inutiles.

On the other hand, if Tronchin takes the position
that certain circumstances are necessary in the sense that
his concept of efficacious grace might be rendered ineffi-
cacious in the absence of these circumstances even in those
who have experienced the immediate action that gives one the
disposition which prepares one for conversion, then he must
admit that his concept of immediate grace is nothing more
than a sufficient grace similar to that of the Arminians.
Pajon supports this by saying:
J'argumente contre vous de cette manière. Une grace sans laquelle il est impossible d'être converti; et avec laquelle on peut ne l'être pas, n'est qu'une grace suffisante, et non une grace efficace par elle même fort semblable à celle que pose les Arminiens.

Pajon believes he is justified in making a number of conclusions with regards to these discussions: He does not consider immediate grace distinct from the Word to be necessary. All it does is merely give one the ability to be converted, but this ability is already possessed by man.

Nous pouvons tous nous convertir si nous voulons, La grace immediate ne nous donne, ni la volonté de nous convertir, ni la puissance de la faire quand nous ne le voudrions pas. Qu'ajoute-t-elle donc à cette puissance que nous avons par la nature de nous convertir si nous voulons? 

It may be said that Pajon effectively debated these issues with Tronchin, whose valuable collection of Pajon's letters and writings has contributed so much to this present study. Pajon appears to have been able at least to convince Tronchin (as noted in the second chapter) that his view was one that deserved to be tolerated as a possible method of explaining how the Holy Spirit brings about conversion for he gave Pajon some most welcome support in 1684 through his letter to Claude.

**Summary**

This chapter attempts to give an intensive study of Pajon's defense of his system, especially with regards to his distinctive idea on grace. The first section studies the problem of ability, including an examination of Pajon's answer on this question to Episcopius, the Arminian, and also a severe
critique of Claude's attempt to resolve the problem as an example of the contradictions and paradoxes inherent in the position of the Cameronian-Amyraldian opposition. Pajon is shown to carefully point out how his position preserves the concept of man's moral inability as well as his natural ability to receive the impression of the truth, thereby consistently measuring up to Cameron's basic assumptions on this subject. In the next section, a study is made of the important series of letters between Chouet and Pajon that probes in depth into the problem of universal grace in which Pajon attempts to explain his solution to the paradoxes involved in this question according to his distinctive idea in response to some penetrating questions by the Cartesian philosopher. Following this, there is a shorter section in which Pajon indicates his system is compatible with the theological framework of the Calvinistic system and allows for internal action on the part of the Spirit as well as external action. The next section gives some examples of how Pajon is able to argue that Scripture sustains his concept, followed by a brief explanation of how reason supports him also. After this, there is a thorough section on the problem of distinction in which Pajon is seen to carefully refute this objection against his position. Next, Pajon comes to grips with the delicate problem of the origin of sin, after which his discussion on the value of means and its relevance to the process of conversion is considered. Following this, a major section concerned with the support that Pajon sees in the work of Cameron for
his distinctive concept is discussed. Next, there is a section in which Pajon answers certain accusations made by Maimbourg against Reformed thinkers and also discusses the support he sees for his system in the work of Calvin. After this there is a section that deals with certain problems that confront Pajon in the work of Amyraut, followed by a section that reveals the full support for his views that Pajon finds in the work of Testard. The last section in this chapter deals with Pajon’s critique of Tronchin’s concept of grace where he warns him of the dangers he faces of sliding into heresy if he does not change to Pajon’s position. Pajon constantly reveals himself to be a formidable debater who is quick to discover and exploit any logical weakness in his opponent’s argument. Also, his discussions and debates often bring out some keen observations on the psychology of man, as well as on the theological questions that are at issue.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER IV


2 Ibid., p. 175.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid., p. 176.

5 "De l'opération," fol. 91.

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid., fols. 96-97.

9 Ibid., fol. 97.

10 "De Natura gratiae efficacis ad amicum," Tronchin MSS 89, large copy, secundar obiectio. All references to this work are from this copy. This formal Latin treatise was first located bound together with "De l'opération," and "Estat des questions" with the title on the cover "Ecrits de Pajon" in the Francois Turretin Collection held privately by the Bude family. However, this copy was in an abbreviated style of Latin. Later this writer was able to find two other unabridged copies (one of which seemed because of its small size to be a pocket edition) listed anonymously in Tronchin MS 89. Le Cene also has a copy in his collection and he formally identified it as Pajon's work: "Claudii Pajon de Natura gratia efficacis ad amicum," Vol. VI, No. 2, pp. 29-75. It is written in a formal syllogistic style and is divided into two basic sections, one giving seventeen reasons for sustaining the concept of mediate grace and the other giving a refutation of ten objections.

11 "De Natura gratiae efficacis," qua quarta obiectio.
Pajon, "Estat des questions a disputer entre Monsieur Pajon et ses accusateurs a Saumur au mois d'avril 1667," Tronchin MSS 53, fol. 73v.

Chauffepié, "Claude Pajon," Nouveau dictionnaire, I, n. I, p. 12.1. He gives the entire letter, pp. n. I, pp. 12.1-15.2. It is found in the Le Cene MSS as "Lettre de M. Pajon a M. Claude sur les Contradictions qui se trouvent dans son Explication de la Parable des Noces," Vol. VI, No. 9, pp. 199-208. There is also a manuscript copy in the private Budé collection which is artfully printed to emphasize the points Pajon wished to make.

Chauffepié, n. I, p. 12.1, 2.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid., p. 13.2

Ibid.

Ibid.


Ibid., p. 15.1.

Ibid., p. 15.1, 2.

Ibid., p. 15.2.

Schweizer, Die Protestantischen Centraldogmen ..., II, pp. 591-592.


The series of letters is entitled "De la grace universelle, et que la grace immediate la detruit," Le Cene MSS, Vol. VI, No. 13, pp. 263-73.

Ibid.
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32"Extrait d'une lettre de M. Chouet a M. Pajon, le 9\textsuperscript{e} Aoust 1670," ibid., p. 263.

33Ibid.

34Pajon's reply is referred to as "Reponse du 3\textsuperscript{e} Septemb. 1670," ibid.

35Ibid., pp. 263-64.

36Ibid., p. 264.

37Ibid.

38"Second lettre de M. C. a M. P. du 7\textsuperscript{e} Septembre 1670," ibid., pp. 264-65.

39"Reponse a la Secondre Lettre, du 16 Octobre 1670," ibid., p. 266.

40Ibid.

41"Second lettre de M. C. a M. P.," ibid., p. 265.

42"Reponse a la Seconde Lettre," ibid., pp. 267-68.

43Ibid., pp. 268-69.

44Ibid., p. 269.

45"Second lettre de M. C. a M. P.," ibid., p. 265.


48Ibid., pp. 267-68.

49"3. lettre de M. Chouet," ibid., pp. 269-70.


51"3. lettre de M. Chouet," ibid., pp. 269-70.


53Ibid., pp. 272-74.

54"Troisième lettre," Tronchin MS 53, fol. 102.
"Troisième lettre," fol. 102.

Ibid., fol. 104.

Estat des questions a disputer entre Monsieur Paion et ses accusateurs a Saumur au mois d'avril 1667. De M. Paion, min. d'Orle.," Tronchin MSS 53, fol. 72v, 73.

"De Natura gratiae efficacis," primo ratio.

Ibid.

Ibid., secunda ratio.

Letter, Pajon to Tronchin, from Orléans, June 19, 1680, ibid., fol. 57v.

Ibid., fol. 58.

Ibid.

Ibid., fol. 56v.

Ibid., fol. 58.

"De l'opération," fols. 120-121. Cf. "De Natura gratiae efficacis," primo objectio discusses the problem of distinction thoroughly.

"De l'opération," fol. 121.

Ibid., fol. 122.

Ibid., fol. 123.

Ibid., fols. 116-117.

Ibid., fol. 118.

Ibid., fol. 119.

Ibid., fols. 123-124.

Ibid., fol. 125.

Ibid.

"Extrait d'une lettre de M. Paion à Monsr de Beaulieu du 10 nov. 1671," Tronchin MSS 53, fols. 76-77v.

"Extrait d'une lettre à M. Thorman sur le 1er péché, à Orleans ce 23 juin 1678," ibid., fols. 78-78v.

Lettre à Beaulieu, ibid., fol. 76.

Ibid., fol. 76v.

Ibid.

Ibid.


"De l'opération," fol. 36; quotation from Cameron, Opera, p. 146.1.

"De l'opération," fols. 36-37; quotation from Cameron, Opera, p. 146.


Ibid., fol. 36; quotation, Opera, p. 146.1.

"De l'opération," fol. 36.

Ibid., fol. 8.

Ibid., fols. 105-106.

Ibid., fol. 106; quotation, Opera, p. 745.2.

"De l'opération," fols. 106-107; quotation, Opera, p. 745.1.

"De l'opération," fol. 107; quotation, Opera, p. 745.2.


Ibid., fol. 109; quotation, Opera, p. 332.1.


Ibid., fol. 110.

Ibid., fol. 111.

Ibid.
101 Ibid., fol. 53; Pajon quotes Cameron as from Opera, p. 347 which is inaccurate. The quotation is on p. 743.1.

102 De l'opération, fol. 53; quotation, Opera, p. 743.2.

103 De l'opération, fol. 57; quotation, Opera, p. 743.1.

104 De l'opération, fol. 57; quotation, Opera, pp. 743.1 and 2.

105 De l'opération, fols. 57-58.

106 Ibid., fol. 4; quotation, Opera, p. 764.1.

107 De l'opération, fol. 71; quotation, Opera, p. 764.

108 De l'opération, fol. 71; quotation, Opera, p. 764.1.

109 De l'opération, fol. 72.

110 Ibid.

111 Ibid., fols. 72-73.

112 Ibid., fol. 73.

113 Ibid., fol. 113.

114 Ibid., fol. 114.


116 Ibid., p. 211.


118 Ibid., p. 213.

119 Ibid., pp. 224-25.

120 Ibid., pp. 127-28.

121 Ibid., p. 128.

122 Ibid.
Letter, Pajon to the Consistory of Charenton, from Orléans, Feb. 12, 1684, p. 257. Cf. "Paraphrase des thèses de M. Testard touchant la doctrine de la nature et de la grace," BA, MS 5426, fols. 1233-1294. The author of this manuscript is unknown; however, there are some expressions in it that remind one strongly of Pajon's Sermon. Basically it reflects the Cameronian approach expressing Cameron's concept of freedom (fols. 1237-1239), Cameron's concept of inability and responsibility (fols. 1269-1274), and Cameron's concept of the primacy of the understanding. It understands the will to be free in that it is moved rationally to choose what it considers to be the good and is not constrained to choose the bad by a coercive, physical, brute or animal-like movement (fol. 1271).


Ibid., No. 4, fols. 73-83.

"De la manière," p. 82 et passim.

Ibid., p. 73.

Ibid., p. 82.

Ibid.

Pajon's longest letter to Tronchin develops this subject carefully. Though there is no address, internal study identifies the letter as being to him. It was sent from Orléans, June 19, 1680, Tronchin MSS 53, fols. 46-59.

Ibid., fol. 47.

Ibid., fol. 47v.

Ibid.

Ibid., fol. 48.

Ibid.

Ibid., fols. 48-48v.

Ibid., fols. 48v, 49.

Ibid.

Ibid., fols. 49, 49v, 50.

Ibid., fols. 50-50v.

Ibid., fols. 52v, 53.
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142 Ibid., fol. 53.
143 Ibid., fol. 53v.
144 Ibid., fols. 53v, 54.
CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

One of the most valuable documents related to the Pajonistic controversies is "Modele d'un concordat composé par une personne desinteressée, pour remedier aux troubles qui commencent à s'élever dans nos Eglises, sur les matières de la grace." There is a statement at the end of the document signed by Pajon in which he states, "J'ai lu avec application le présent modèle de concordat et je souscris, de tout mon coeur, à tous les articles qu'il contient. Le 6 febr. 1679. Sic sentio, sic sensi." Probably the document was either written by Pajon himself in its entirety or he collaborated in the writing.

It is a brief but comprehensive attempt to sum up the beliefs of the Pajonists on major doctrinal matters in such a way that the controversy between them and their opponents would be resolved or minimized. One of Pajon's major aims is to reveal the genuine Cameronian and Calvinistic framework of his thought. The first sixteen articles are positive statements of belief, and the last seven articles are concerned with ideas that are rejected.

Pajon begins with an emphasis on man's innocence before the Fall and his responsibility for the Fall. The first
article concerns itself with creation

L'homme ayant été créé dans un état d'innocence est
dechu de de cet état par sa propre faute: quoy que
Dieu luy eut fourni des lumieres suffisantes pour y
perseverer, s'il eut pris garde à luy même, comme
il y etoit obligé."

In the second article he emphasizes the thoroughgoing nature
of man's present depravity which makes him incapable of per­
forming any good whatsoever until he is regenerated by the
Holy Spirit. In the third article he points out that this
corruption takes place by natural generation in all men, with
the exception of Christ. In the fourth he proceeds to ex­
plain the constitution of man's corruption, indicating that
it consists "dans l'amour des choses mauvaises, dans une
forte inclination pour les plaisirs de la chair, dans une
grande propension à commettre le péché, que nous regardons
faussement comme un grand bien." In the fifth he states
that this corruption increases and is compounded as time
goes by in man. In these first five articles, Pajon wishes
to indicate that he supports the basic Calvinistic position
on the doctrine of original sin and depravity, though in the
fourth article he strikes a key Cameronian emphasis on the
moral nature of corruption.

In the sixth article he further indicates that he
follows the Cameronian apologetic by emphasizing that the
inability of man is of a voluntary nature, thus safeguarding
his responsibility and just condemnation. However, he quickly
adds a seventh article that stresses a point dear to the Cal­
vlinistic heart--regeneration is wholly the work of the Holy
Spirit, man being incapable of any good himself. In the eighth article he turns to the important Calvinistic principle—the irresistibility of grace; again, however, he tempers it with the Cameronian emphasis that this irresistible grace does not coerce the will (which is impossible) "mais entant qu'elle remplit nos entendement de la connaissance de notre souverain bien," it inevitably moves and persuades it.® Pajon joins this with a ninth Calvinistic article that declares that man does not contribute in any way whatsoever to this operation of grace since he cannot in any way predispose himself to receive it. Another aspect of this idea is treated in the tenth article that states that the grace of the Holy Spirit does not depend on man's will, but is efficacious of itself.®

Up to this point, Pajon has not said anything that betrays his distinctive idea; it is basically Calvinistic-Cameronianism. However, in the next article, the eleventh, Pajon begins to reveal his own distinctive approach, explaining that there is a passive reception of truth after which active human participation begins.

Nous croyons encore que dans les premiers moments de cette divine regeneration (à regarder l'ordre de la nature et non pas celuy du temps Dieu opere en nous, sans nous, et que quand nous commençons à agir, nous n'agissons pas de nous memes, mais seulement par la force de l'impression que nous avons receue de l'Esprit de Dieu, qui nous pousse à cette action. De sorte que dans ces premiers moments de nature, nous sommes dans une pure passion, ne faisant que recevoir les impressions de Dieu, et selon que ces impressions de l'Esprit de Dieu nous ont rendus capables d'agir.®

Having taken a stand for the primacy of God's action in us
according to what he calls the "order of nature," Pajon proceeds in the twelfth article to explain that according to the "order of time," God's action and man's action are simultaneous. When the grace of God begins to act in us, we also on our part begin to act to receive it, not, of course, of ourselves, but by the force of this grace that has begun to act in us. Pajon wishes to preserve significance for the human response and participation in the process of regeneration. God does not act in us without us; nor can man be considered completely passive in the process of regeneration.

In the thirteenth article Pajon stresses another Cameronian principle that is crucial to his own system. The power of God that works in us operates in us according to the nature of our soul. He respects and does not violate the function of the understanding and the will in man. He does not treat him as a stump or inanimate object by working through blind impulses of an irrational nature. Rather, he deals with man as an intelligent and rational being who can only be moved by a sensible
and intelligent response to further his own well being.\footnote{12}

In the fourteenth and fifteenth articles, Pajon emphasizes his distinctive point concerning the primacy of the Word as God's instrument of conversion together with an infinite number of other means "qui frappent tous les jours tous ensemble leur coup, et neanmoins chacun dans son temps en sa maniere, avec une si merveilleuse efficace qu'il est impossible, que la conversion de tous les elus n'arrive pas dans le temps que Dieu a ordonne pour chacun."\footnote{13} However, he adds a sixteenth article again to point out that these means owe their efficacy uniquely to the Spirit of God to whom must be granted all the glory. Furthermore, he adds that

\begin{quote}
\textit{desorte que comme il est impossible que la dispensation de ces moyens ne convertisse pas actuellement tous les elus, chacun dans son temps, et sa manière, il est impossible aussi qu'il arrive, qu'aucun de ceux que Dieu n'a pas elus soit actuellement converti par la dispensation de ces moyens.}\footnote{14}
\end{quote}

The Spirit guarantees the efficacy of his chosen means of conversion; it is impossible for them to fail in their appointed mission.

In these sixteen articles, Pajon has woven together Calvinistic and Cameronian principles with his own distinctive approach in a skillful, irenic attempt to reveal himself as the proponent of a consistent and relevant theology that should find an acceptable response in thoughtful Reformed circles.

After giving sixteen positive articles around which he feels the Reformed theologians can unite, Pajon turns to
those things that they can unite against. First and foremost is the dreaded Pelagianism. Pajon has been accused of reintroducing Pelagianism into the Reformed ranks. Here he points out how he steadfastly opposes it and how he sees it to differ greatly and fundamentally from the true Faith.

The Pelagians are in error because they deny original sin and teach that God only gives us the knowledge and power to do the good and not the willingness and the action which they claim must be a result of our own liberty. Furthermore, they do not even hold grace to be necessary except to make it easier for us to do the good. This is a very dangerous doctrine because it shifts to man the glory that belongs only to God himself.\(^5\)

Secondly, he rejects the error of the Remonstrants which he considers in the last analysis not to differ from Pelagianism. They recognize the necessity of grace; however, they teach that it is an immediate work of the Spirit on our souls that only communicates to us a supernatural ability to do the good. They argue that the actual will to perform the good depends upon the pure liberty of man and this reduces to Pelagianism for they reserve to man the power of self-determination with regards to the good. The efficacy of grace itself depends in the end on man's own self-determination.\(^6\)

Thirdly, he rejects the errors of the disciples of Flaccius who represent the position that holds original sin consists of some physical quality which means that man is in
the grip of a physical inability that is entirely involuntary and undermines man's guilt and responsibility. It furthermore eliminates any relevance and meaning from man's participation in the process of conversion. This would give sinners a legitimate excuse to neglect the means of conversion.

This, of course, is a position that both Cameron and Pajon have been trying hard to avoid in order not to be reduced to such circumstances.

Fourth, there is a rejection of the errors of the Enthusiasts who hold to extraordinary revelations apart from the Word which Pajon no longer considers to be manifested as an ordinary operation of the Spirit as in other times.¹⁸

Fifth, an article is introduced which appears to be interacting with and rejecting Jurieu's approach to conversion. Jurieu downgraded the place of the Word and intellect in conversion and raised the will and the immediate non-rational operation of grace to the place of primacy.

Pajon states that he rejects the view of certain modern theologians who teach that the Word and the sacraments do not exercise any real effect on our souls. They hold that they only serve as external signs.

À la présence desquels Dieu opère immédiatement notre regeneration, et notre conversion, comme il opérait autrefois la guérison des malades à la présence des
mouchoirs et des autres linges qui avoient été sur le corps de S. Paul, sans que ces mouchoirs et ces linges contribuassent ni comme causes principales, ni comme causes instrumentales à la guerison de ces malades.\(^1\)

Such a view would destroy all the efficacy of the Holy Scriptures which the Word itself witnesses to in countless places with expressions too forceful to allow an interpretation that they are only speaking of external signs in the presence of which conversion takes place without having the Word make any significant contribution.\(^2\)

The sixth article supplements the fifth in refuting those who seek to undermine the efficacy of the Word which, of course, Pajon holds together with the providential ordering of the accompanying circumstances apart from any separate distinct immediate action of the Spirit to be the divine method of conversion.\(^3\)

The seventh and last article is of a summary nature stating that he rejects all opinions of ancient or modern times

qui tendent ou à relacher dans les fideles l'étude de la sainteté, ou à rendre les pecheurs peu ardans à travailler à leur conversion et à leur salut en leur persuand que la grace de Dieu agit en nous comme dans des troncs, sans que nous agissions nous mêmes pour en recevoir les effets, ou à inspirer de l'orgueil à l'homme, comme s'il etoit en partie l'auteur de sa conversion, et qu'il se determinat à suivre la grace, par un mouvement qui vient de lui même et non pas de Dieu, ou à luy fournir quel-que excuse dans son endurcissement, comme s'il etoit dans une impuissance physique et involontaire de se convertir, et qu'il tint à quelque autre choses qu'a ses convoitises, et à ses pechés qu'il ne se soumette à l'Evangile de Jesus Christ, ou comme si l'Evangile n'etoit pas une parole vivante et pleine d'efficace en elle meme, une lumiere suffisante
pour l'éclairer, et pour le conduire dans le bon chemin, s'il ne fermeit pas volontairement les yeux à cette lumière par un mouvement qui ne procède que de lui, parce qu'il aime mieux les ténèbres que la lumière à cause que ses œuvres sont mechantes, et qu'il préfere ces petits avantages de la terre à ces biens infinis, que Dieu presente dans son Evangile à tous les pécheurs qui veulent se repentir.  

This document concludes by indicating that all should be able to unite in signing this concordat and that what remains of a controversial nature is so insignificant that it should not serve as a point of contention among them.  

As in the other Pajonistic letters and manuscripts, Pajon wishes to give the glory to God for the conversion of man, but he also desires to safeguard a place for meaningful and significant participation and response on the part of the human subject in the process. He is entirely convinced, as demonstrated by his tireless and unflagging efforts, to spread his distinctive concept, that his view of the method of conversion is correct and best preserves this ideal.  

In the "Concordat" the major themes of the Salmurian movement are clearly stressed. Cameron, of course, played the leading role in originating and setting the mold for this theological movement. One of the key points in Cameron's thought is his concept of the relationship of the will and the understanding. He made an important adjustment to the orthodox concept that God acts upon the intellect to cause it to be convinced of the truth and separately upon the will to cause it to assent to the truth. By making the intellect the primary faculty in conversion and insisting that the will
always follows the last dictate of the practical understanding, he served to focus attention on the understanding because according to his position all that is necessary is to persuade and illumine the intellect and the conversion of the will follows automatically. There is no need for a separate act of the Spirit upon the will to cause it to choose the good or be converted, once the understanding is persuaded of the truths of Christianity. The Cameronian concept of freedom is that man is free to choose the good and he chooses it of necessity, but freely and voluntarily. This is an incontrovertible law of his nature.

How the Spirit acts to bring about the illumination and persuasion of the understanding became the critical issue in the Pajonistic controversies. Pajon took a very strong stand against any immediate action by the Spirit upon either the will or the understanding, insisting that the Spirit only uses the persuasive power of the Word in concert with all the other circumstances of life to persuade and illumine the mind and bring about conversion.

Closely associated with Cameron's concept of the relationship of the will and the understanding is his distinction between moral and physical inability. Cameron insisted that man has natural ability to believe and that his inability is of a moral, not physical, nature. One cannot blame someone for not doing something that is physically impossible for them; physical inability would undermine man's responsibility. Pajon made this concept an important pillar of his system.
Cameron insisted that man's inability is of a voluntary nature; he does not believe because he does not choose to do so, preferring the things of this world. Pajon insisted that this point be adhered to consistently, arguing vigorously that any introduction of immediate grace into the process of conversion would ruin the important distinction that Cameron had made. True, they might still hold to the primacy of the intellect; once the understanding was illuminated, the will would inevitably choose the good and be converted. However, if there was a necessity for an immediate action upon the understanding before it could receive and be persuaded of the truth, Pajon was convinced that this reduced man's inability to the physical level. It is inconsistent, he argued, to demand an immediate grace of a non-rational nature apart from the action of the Word of God and other persuasive and motivating circumstances before an illumination of the intellect could possibly take place. To insist on immediate grace was to introduce a physical remedy for a moral malady. Pajon argued repeatedly that a moral illness calls for a moral, not a physical, remedy and a moral remedy calls for action of a moral and rational nature such as persuasion, reasons, and motives.

Furthermore, if his Salmurian opponents accepted Cameron's thesis that the will by nature always chooses its object which is the good without grace acting immediately upon it and this involves the essence of freedom, why could they not see the logic of his argument? The object of the
understanding is the truth, Pajon insisted, and it is as essential to the true concept of freedom and ability for man's understanding to be able to receive and discern the truth without any immediate action of grace as for the will to be able to chose what it is persuaded by the understanding to be the good. If one refuses man the ability to receive and know the truth, he denies that he has any true natural ability to choose the truth, the right, and the good.

This all obviously relates to the crucial concept of universal grace. Modern thinkers refer to this theory as "hypothetical universalism." However, Pajon did not use this description; he took his universalism very seriously. One of the things he wished to avoid and fought intensely against was what he considered to be an undermining of a genuine universality of God's grace by the proponents of immediate grace. The case for universalism proposed by Cameron and Amyraut involves the idea that all men at least potentially have the Word and it is an adequate remedy for their sin. Pajon argued that if the Word could not be received and accomplish its work of persuasion without an immediate action of grace, the concept of universalism is made inconsistent; in fact, it is destroyed. To make universalism consistent calls logically for the theoretical possibility at least that all men could believe by the means of persuasion natural and possible to all men. In other words, if the defenders of Salmurian theology wished to press their case for universalism effectively and consistently, they must go all
the way with Pajon, recognize that immediate grace cuts the
ground from under their system and must be in no uncertain
terms repudiated.

Focusing attention on the persuasive power of the
Word as the means of conversion and accepting the Calvinis-
tic doctrine of irresistibility led the Pajonists to embrace
the idea of the Word, and the reasons that accompanied it
could amount to a demonstration that could persuade the mind
with a force that would eliminate all doubt. Pajon's Car-
tesianism appears when he bases his argument on clear and
distinct ideas as the test for truth. Scripture brings us
its truth with such clarity and distinction that all fear is
eliminated that the contrary could be true.

Pajon is convinced and Jurieu agrees that Cameron's
basic concepts such as the moral nature of sin; the primacy
of the understanding with the will always following the in-
tellect; universal grace; natural ability and moral inability;
the voluntary nature of man's bondage; and the natural, persuas-
sive, and moral rather than the physical and non-rational as
the method of conversion all lead logically to Pajon's dis-
tinctive concept of conversion through the Word and its attend-
ing circumstances apart from any immediate non-rational opera-
tion of grace. Pajon, influenced by the Cartesian spirit
that claims as its test for truth clear and distinct ideas, is
driven in his passion to solve the tension and inconsistency
of "hypothetical universalism" to develop his "epistemological
universalism" that guarantees at least in the sphere of
possibility a potential opportunity for all to be saved.

A severe fideistic reaction occurred when Pajon's arch literary opponent Jurieu rose up to resist this development. Fearing that Pajonism was erecting a citadel of straw that could not sustain true faith, he challenged the validity of the whole Cameronian system with its stress on the primacy of the understanding. Jurieu was convinced that the whole Cameronian apologetic is seen in the Pajonistic conclusion to be on the wrong road. It has come in his opinion to the ridiculous position of attempting to amalgamate Calvinism with Pelagianism. In his vigorous response to Pajonism, Jurieu developed his fideistic approach to conversion, making the will primary and downgrading the place of the intellect and reason in conversion in the name of preserving a place for the immediate operation of the Holy Spirit in the process. In erecting his fideistic structure of thought, it appears that Jurieu was to unleash and strengthen an irrationalistic approach to faith that was carried in time to extremes even in his own opinion by his earlier colleague, Pierre Bayle.²⁴ Bayle's relationship to this whole controversy deserves further study.

Jurieu's attack on Pajonism was a serious blow to its survival and few, if any, theologians appear to have embraced it fully after Pajon's death. However, both Papin and Saurin answered Jurieu with vigor and ability. It was Saurin who arose to be a champion of Cameronianism at the end of the Seventeenth Century. The contest between him and
Jurieu deserves further study as it makes available a thorough body of debate between the fideistic and rationalistic wings of Calvinism in the last decade of the Seventeenth Century.²⁵

It will be helpful to review two basic Cameronian positions before evaluating Jurieu's thought further. First, Pajon denies any immediate action apart from the action of the Word and all its attending circumstances—these for him are all rational causes. There is no non-rational action brought to bear on man in any way. However, Pajon does believe that all these rational causes are marshalled by Divine providence in such a way that the elect are converted and those who are not of the elect are not. Secondly, there is the position of Pajon's Cameronian opponents who hold that a disposition to believe is granted by God's immediate grace which overcomes the sinfulness and darkness of the mind so it is able to receive the action of the Word that brings about conversion.

Jurieu's position is that conversion and faith are based upon the testimony or action of the Spirit on man in such a way that he wills to believe—"I believe because I wish to believe." The act of faith does not terminate upon the evidence. Jurieu, in fact, argues that even where there is evidence, faith is not based upon this evidence but on the action of the Spirit. Basing faith on evidence for Jurieu appears to be basing faith on the action of human reason—very inadequate grounds as far as he is concerned and a very dangerous tendency because it unduly exalts human reason to a position of primacy in the production of faith. The written
Word, preaching, and all other actions of communicating propositions about God are not capable of creating saving faith. The arguments are inadequate; they cannot convince the mind with the degree of certitude that saving faith requires. In an earlier treatment it is shown how Jurieu understands the manner in which faith and conversion take place, and it is seen that Jurieu does have a place for reason in the process, though the major role belongs to the will that is moved by the good. This, however, is not by the good rationally understood but by the good actually experienced—by immediate action the Spirit causes us to actually experience the good and only in this way is the grip of sin and lust broken in man's life.

Jurieu rejected the concept that the Word could bring complete certitude, though he was willing to concede it brought probable evidence. It is small wonder that Jurieu's refutation of Pajonism was in time to alarm the Cameronian thinkers who were non-Pajonists, as well as the Pajonists. They had founded their epistemological ground for universal grace on the concept that the unregenerate had the Word and the Word was a sufficient remedy for their sin even though without efficient grace they could never profit from it. This, however, they attributed to the unbeliever's own fault and rebellion—"he could if he would"—it was a moral incapability not physical. However, if the Word could only provide probable grounds and never evident reasons or rational demonstration, one could hardly say that a sufficient grace
was provided by the Word. In fact, logically it could be argued that it was imprudent to believe something that is only probable and not certainly true. In essence, Jurieu's argument against clear demonstration and for only probable evidence undercut the whole Cameronian-Amyraldian structure as well as the Pajonistic position. It torpedoed the epistemological ground from under the whole school of thought. It is small wonder that Elie Saurin rising up as the post-revocation champion of the Salmurian tradition should so vehemently resist the structure of conversion that Jurieu was erecting. Jurieu had refuted too much; he had demolished (if left unchallenged) the whole apologetic and theology of the Salmurians along with his refutation of Pajonism. This called forth a series of volumes exploring in depth the foundations of faith and conversion, locking rational and fideistic Calvinism in what appeared to be mortal combat.

Indeed, one of the main contributions of Pajonism is that it stimulated intense and learned debate on the subject of the application of the grace of God in conversion and the formation of faith. Just what does the grace of God do in conversion? What is the place of persuasion and reason? Is the will primary or is the understanding? This dissertation has not been able to answer these and other questions conclusively, but it has been able to expose and examine possible solutions defended with ability, vigor, passion, and intensity by dedicated and determined men who took their positions with utmost earnestness and seriousness.
Also, there is one lesson Pajon teaches that all might well remember. In all the heat and passion of debate and in all the energy, learning, zeal, and turmoil of intense controversy, he teaches that by God's grace you can be a man of honor and dedication, possessing sweetness and courtesy in the most turbulent times and circumstances.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER V

1 Tronchin MSS 39, fols. 201-207.

2 Ibid., fol. 207.

3 In the Le Cene MSS, Vol. VI, p. 77, there is an indication of Pajon's signing a document in a similar manner.

4 Tronchin MSS 39, fol. 201.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid., fols. 201, 202.


10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid., fol. 203.

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid., fol. 204.

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid.

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid., fol. 205.
2² Ibid.

2³ Ibid., fol. 207.


2⁵ Supra, p. 132, n. 189.

2⁶ Supra, pp. 179, 181, 182, et passim.

2⁷ Elie Saurin, *Défense de la veritable doctrine de l'Eglise réformée sur le princeipe de la foy contre le livre intitulé, Défense de la doctrine universelle de l'église, etc.* (Utrecht, 1697), pp. 43, 44, 57, 58, et passim.

2⁸ Supra, pp. 204-214.
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No. 4. "Relation de ce qui se passa entre Mr. Claude et Mr. Pajon dans les conferences qu'ils eurent," pp. 111-138.

No. 5. "Reponse a l'argument propose par Mr. Pajon avec la refutation de la reponse par Mr. Astruc contre Mr. Courdille," pp. 143-171.

No. 6. "Lettre de Mr. Pajon a Mr. Astruc sur l'indifference de la liberté," pp. 175-181.


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