# AUTONOMY AND ITS IMPLICATION FOR THE CONTENT AND METHODOLOGY OF RELIGIOUS EDUCATION FOR ADOLESCENTS IN STATE SECONDARY SCHOOLS IN ENGLAND AND SCOTLAND

Wallace Allen Shaw

A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD
at the
University of St Andrews

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AUTONOMY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CONTENT AND

METHODOLOGY OF RELIGIOUS EDUCATION FOR ADOLESCENTS

IN STATE SECONDARY SCHOOLS IN ENGLAND AND SCOTLAND

by

Wallace Allen Shaw

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANDREWS,

IN FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE DEGREE OF:

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

St. Andrews,
Scotland.
1975.

Tu 8665

I hereby declare that the following thesis is based on the results of research carried out by myself, that it is my own composition, and that it has not been presented previously for a higher degree. The research was undertaken in St. Mary's College, St. Andrews University.

_____

January, 1975.

STATEMENT OF RESEARCH

I was admitted as a Research Student under Ordinance 350 (General No. 12) and as a candidate for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy under Resolution of the University Court, 1967, No. 1, with retrospective effect to 1st October, 1969.

CERTIFICATE

I certify that Wallace Allen Shaw has fulfilled the conditions of the resolution of the University Court, 1967, No. 1, and that he is qualified to submit this thesis in application for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.).

Mr. J. D. Trotter,
St. Mary's College,
University of St. Andrews.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The thesis is dedicated to Andrew, Fiona, and Alison. At present they are at the respective Eriksonian ages for "initiative", "identity", and "industry". As they enter adolescence, travelling further on the road towards autonomy, I hope they receive the kind of religious education which will help them in growth towards "love", "care", and "wisdom".

PREFACE

"OUT OF THE MOUTHS OF BABES..." (Ps. 8)

The way of uninhibited exploration is the way of learning. It is the way of the infant as he draws his first breath of air; but then come the inhibitions, thrust upon him as he lives in a world of the patterns and values of other people. In adolescence the person must become himself again, developing his own patterns and his own values. It is the Age for Autonomy as Responsible Freedom.

OUTLINE

B./

INTRODUCTION

I. PURPOSE OF THE THESIS

The purpose of this thesis is to examine selectively

(1) the meaning and method of autonomy from the three perspectives of philosophy, theology, and psychology;

(2) the nature of adolescence and the role of the "teacher";

(3) the role of religious education in state schools if autonomy is to be a primary aim;

(4) the content and methodology of a particular syllabus so that autonomy as an aim of religious education can be put to the test in a practical way;

(5) the meaning, method, value, and implications of autonomy as a primary aim of religious education in these schools.

II. METHOD OF THE THESIS

The presentation of the thesis is in five sections - (I) "THE MEANING AND METHOD OF AUTONOMY"; (II) "THE NATURE OF ADOLESCENCE AND THE ROLE OF THE 'TEACHER'"; (III) "THE IMPLICATIONS OF AUTONOMY AS AN AIM OF RELIGIOUS EDUCATION IN SECONDARY SCHOOLS"; (IV) "DEVELOPING A SYLLABUS THAT AIMS TOWARDS AUTONOMY"; and (V) "SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS OF THE THESIS". These are not distinctive and their relationship means that there will be certain cross references. In presenting theory, the practical application will be anticipated. And the practical application will reflect the theory that has been presented. The method itself will reflect the thesis itself, otherwise there would be what Abraham Maslow called "Overstress on Technique".[1] If this thesis on autonomy were to be inhibited, it would violate the very principle it examines for the educational process.

SECTION ONE of the thesis, THE MEANING AND METHOD OF AUTONOMY, examines certain philosophical, theological, and psychological

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1.

"Inevitable stress on elegance, polish, technique, and apparatus has as a frequent consequence a playing down of meaningfulness, vitality, and significance of the problem and of creativeness in general. Almost any candidate for the Ph.D. in psychology will understand what this means in practice. A methodologically satisfactory experiment, whether trivial or not, is rarely criticised. A bold, ground-breaking problem, because it may be a 'failure', is too often criticised to death before it is ever begun. Indeed criticism in the scientific literature seems usually to mean only criticism of method, technique, logic, etc. I do not recall seeing, in the literature with which I am familiar, any paper that criticized another paper for being unimportant, trivial, or inconsequential.

"The tendency is growing therefore to say that the dissertation problem itself does not matter - only so it be well done. In a word, it need no longer be a contribution to knowledge. The Ph.D. candidate is required to know the techniques of his field and the already accumulated data in it. It is not usually stressed that good research ideas are also desirable. As a consequence it is possible for completely and obviously uncreative people to become 'scientists'." (From Maslow, Motivation and Personality, pp. 11-12.)

definitions of autonomy. The moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant is examined to bring a philosophical definition to autonomy. The teaching method of Plato is briefly considered for the dialectical method it offered. The theology of Paul Tillich is presented in its bearing on autonomy as one of the key words in his systemmatic approach to religion. The greater part of SECTION ONE is devoted to a psychological basis, principally through the theories of Abraham Maslow and Erik Erikson as they represent two approaches to the psychological definition of autonomy - as a goal in maturity and as a rudiment in infancy. SECTION TWO of the thesis; THE NATURE OF ADOLESCENCE AND THE ROLE OF THE "TEACHER", broadly examines adolescent character and personality with special reference to testing intellectual, emotional, social, and moral maturity that affect the adolescent's ability to grow towards autonomy. The pastoral role of the "teacher" in assisting the development of autonomy is presented as including the psychological assumptions of Carl Rogers. (Within this thesis the word "teacher" will often appear in quotation marks because its meaning is being changed.) The method of autonomic development through group dynamics is presented as a contribution of sociometry. Sociology itself is not given as an isolated heading; but some of its implications upon autonomy are integrated into the whole of this section.

SECTION THREE of the thesis, THE ROLE OF RELIGIOUS EDUCATION IN SECONDARY SCHOOLS, presents the historical background to the present situation in England and Scotland and some of the problems which must be confronted. The problems selected include the relationship between religious and moral education, the role of school and church, the relationship between religion and autonomy, interpreting the

Bible, and the place of humanism and Christianity. Numerous assumptions are examined including the present writer's view of hermeneutics.

Five educationalists who have made particularly significant, critical contributions to the situation of religious education in Britain are considered. They are Ronald Goldman, Richard Acland, Harold Loukes, Ninian Smart, and Peter McPhail.

SECTION FOUR of the thesis, DEVELOPING A SYLLABUS THAT AIMS TOWARDS AUTONOMY, examines a syllabus so that autonomy as an aim in religious education can be put to the test in a practical way. It analyses the content and then describes the package, or autonomic method, in which this content is presented. Living Bible[2] is critically evaluated, its violations of the principles of autonomy exposed, and the positive aspects of its contribution highlighted. Proposals are made for the restructuring of religious education within a humanities framework. It is shown how this is essential if further syllabus development is not to block the road to autonomic inquiry.

SECTION FIVE of the thesis, SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS, brings the thesis to a close, correlating its conclusions within the categories

2.

The syllabus being introduced and examined has already been published by Holmes McDougall (Edinburgh) under the series title Living Bible and is in four volumes: Book 1, "Adventure in Religion", 1965; Book 2, "Has Life a Purpose?", 1966; Book 3, "Encounter with Love", 1968; and Book 4, "Commitment", 1970. The series was written by the writer of this thesis. In the conclusion at the end of the thesis, ideas will be presented as to the writer's view of what would make an improved situation for the presentation of religion in Secondary schools if it is to assist the adolescent more in growth towards autonomy. Although the books are being used in countries beyond Britain, and although they are being used in churches as well as schools, they were originally written for the Secondary school in Britain. It is in this context, therefore, that they will be examined in SECTION FOUR.

of the meaning, method, value, and implications of autonomy as an aim of religious education in State Secondary schools.

The appendix includes further discussion methods and techniques that can be used to add variety to the religious education classroom methodology, be observed in a school assembly, or otherwise extend the dialectical base for autonomic growth.

The rather loose methodology and composition of this thesis is the result of a purposeful attempt to make an unhibited approach to the adolescent's needs. The writer considered this the best way to construct a thesis on the quest for autonomy. The present writer had to seek to discover what it means

> "... to be autonomous, what it means to be
> creative, what it means to put forth disciplined effort
> to reach one's own goals, what it means to be a
> responsible free person, and most important what
> it means to appreciate the satisfactions which come
> from these experiences."[3]

3.
    C.R. Rogers and B. Stevens, _Person to Person_. p. 59.

SECTION ONE:

THE MEANING AND METHOD OF AUTONOMY

INTRODUCTION TO SECTION ONE

"Autonomy" means different things to different people. The
immediate image may be "autonomy of object". One may think about
the autonomy of a country, its freedom from external rule. One may
think about the autonomy of an organisation, its independence from
the control of any other organisation. One can think about the
autonomy of a field of study, its quality of isolation which makes
it a subject unto itself. But the word "autonomy" in this thesis
nowhere refers to "autonomy of object". It is used, rather, with
reference to "autonomy of person". "Adolescence: Age for Autonomy"
refers to freedom from external rule, independence from external
control, and isolation which makes one a person unto himself at a
particular stage in life. "Adolescence: Age for Autonomy" also
refers to responsibility for a life style that is considerate of
others, with the marks of fairness, sympathy, acceptance and other
qualities which mean that one does not gain at the expense of others
nor does one ignore their needs. The autonomous person is a free
agent acting on his own authority and with his own responsibility.
To be responsibly free is to be autonomous.

This is a general definition and too much must not be read into
it. It does, however, assume that a certain amount of freedom is
possible. Alternatively, it can be argued that human freedom in any
form is illusory. This thesis examines freedom in the context of
the freedom of the will. Against this there is the challenge of
fatalism (whatever is, is to be) and the challenge of determinism
(for every event or effect there is an earlier event or cause which
necessitated this effect). If someone is to be held responsible for
a belief or action it must be assumed that he was free to have

believed or acted otherwise. It is this freedom to believe or act
in another way that the fatalist denies. This thesis assumes that
such freedom is an assumption of education and therefore will be
accepted as a premise. Determinism implies that all events are
causally related to earlier events. But the determinist does not
necessarily threaten the concept of freedom, since the acceptance
of causal relationships in no way implies any necessary connection
between events. The fact that A caused B does not mean that it
could not have caused C instead. But the limits on freedom,
particularly those that are psychological, will be taken seriously.

To call a person autonomous does not mean that he is completely
responsible and free just as to call a person wise or handsome does
not mean that he knows all or is the epitome of beauty. One should
not think of the autonomous person as a myth any more than one should
think of the wise or handsome person as a myth. There are learned
and good-looking people and one calls them wise and handsome. There
are responsibly free people and one calls them autonomous. The
point is that autonomy is a worthy aim even though in practise it
may be severely limited.

However, to understand the extent to which anyone can be
autonomous requires a more technical definition. To call someone
responsibly free is to make a value judgment. What are the
ingredients of autonomy? Are they desirable qualities? Should
autonomy be an educational aim? Should it be an aim of religious
education? What is its educational methodology? Such questions can
only be answered through a more technical definition of autonomy.
These definitions come through viewing autonomy through the
disciplines of philosophy, theology, and psychology. These have
been selected for their insights into human values. Philosophy,

theology, and psychology do not delineate all the perspectives to
autonomy nor do the individuals being considered within these
fields hold the normative appraisals. There are so many perspectives
and so many "schools of thought" within each perspective that one
must be selective. But this selectivity will at least make possible
a deeper appreciation of autonomy and a greater awareness of its
qualities, which are important if one is to approach the meaning and
method of autonomy that is essential for a base of operations.

To avoid confusion, three words will be used when necessary to
differentiate between autonomy as defined by these three
perspectives: they are, PHIL-AUT, THEO-AUT, and PSYC-AUT. In all
other usages, autonomy will either refer to responsible freedom as
a general term or its meaning will be clear from its context, such
as when it appears in a quotation.

I A PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATION FOR AUTONOMY

Having already stated that by autonomy is meant the responsible use of freedom to act, it is necessary first of all to consider whether in philosophical terms such a statement can be considered credible. Rather than take a panoramic view, the philosophical perspective will concentrate on Kant for the meaning of autonomy and Plato for the method of autonomy.

A. THE THEORY OF IMMANUEL KANT

The philosophical aspect of autonomy can best be introduced by showing how Immanuel Kant defined the concept. It is an involved argument but one that is fundamental to this thesis. This may become apparent only after the argument has been presented and evaluated in terms of the theological and psychological definitions of autonomy which follow. Therefore since the idea of autonomy is central to this thesis, the development of this idea in the writings of Kant must be presented. For this, two of his works are of particular importance: the Fundamental Principles (sometimes called the Foundations or the Groundwork) of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) and the Critique of Practical Reason (1788).

The religious aspect of Kant's theory is contained in his reference to the "divine lawgiver". As will be shown later, one's reverence, according to Kant, should be for the moral law rather than for the divine lawgiver.

According to Kant, man is a creature of two worlds: the empirical and the intelligible. By "intelligible" Kant meant that which can be apprehended by the intellect independent of experience. As a creature of the empirical he follows impulse. But as a creature of the

intelligible world he can modify his behaviour through reason. The
ultimate purpose of reason, according to Kant, is not to modify
behaviour towards some particular end but to produce a will "which
is good not as a _means_ to some further end, but _in itself_."[1]

One's duty to the moral law does not bring an obligation to the
divine lawgiver. If it did, Kant's theory would aim towards
heteronomy rather than autonomy. Duty is _from_ the divine lawgiver to
the good will. It is not a duty _to_ the divine lawgiver.

For an act to be morally good, it must not only be consistent
with duty but it must be done from _duty_ and not from inclination.
One must attempt to fulfil one's duty whether or not the
consequences are believed to be desirable. (The goodness of an act
which leads to helping a neighbour is derived from its being done out
of a sense of duty, however inconvenient, rather than when it is done
through natural inclination when one has time on one's hands.)

Duty must be understood as _a priori_ or prior to all experience
of the senses. Therefore, the basis of obligation must not be sought
in the nature of man or in the circumstances in which he is placed
but _a priori_ solely in the conception of pure reason. In other words,
the will that is absolutely good cannot be evil. That-is-to-say,
the maxim of an absolutely good will could never contradict itself.
And the only way in which this non-contradiction is possible is if
the maxim can be willed to be a universal law. If the maxim can be
willed to be a universal law, this is the same as saying that the will
in every action should be a law unto itself. Thus freedom and
morality are indivisible. To be free is to act as if the will is a

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1.
   Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, translated by H.V.
Paton under the title The Moral Laws, p. 7. (Marginal page references
will be used identifying location in the second edition of the original
German work.)

law to itself, which is the same as saying, act "on no other maxim than the one which can have for its object itself as at the same time a universal law."[2] This Kant called the "categorical imperative".

The idea that a certain principle is binding upon the will is a command of reason, and the formula statement of such a command is an imperative. An imperative can be either hypothetical or categorical. An imperative which is good only because it is a means to something else is hypothetical. An imperative that is conceived to be good in itself - as a necessary principle of a will that in itself conforms to reason - is categorical. The categorical imperative declares that an act which is morally right is an end in itself or is good in itself, irregardless, as stated above, of its consequences. This imperative is a command which an individual gives himself while a hypothetical imperative is an order which he receives from another person or source. Therefore, a categorical imperative must be actively based on a person's reason rather than passively accepted from someone else even if that someone else were the divine lawgiver. The idea of freedom makes one a member of the intelligible world, if one were only a member of the intelligible world one would as a matter of fact always act in conformity to the autonomy of the will. One is also a member of the empirical world and as such a member one's actions ought to conform to the autonomy of the will.[3]

Duty is basically the necessity and obligation to act from reverence for a universal law. One cannot have reverence for any natural inclination or for that which is not derived from one's own

2.
   Ibid., p. 98.
3.
   Ibid., pp. 111-12.

will. The only thing one can reverence from being under an
obligation is the law which is concerned with the good will. As
a connecting factor, reverence links the objective factor of the
law with the subjective principle or maxim, a principle of conduct.
To will rationally is to be consistent with universality. An action
cannot be both right and wrong. It cannot be right when one person
does it and wrong when someone else does it, or right under one
condition and wrong under another. This is the basis of morality.
One is good when one does not seek to satisfy one's own desires or
gain one's own happiness (though these may result), but when one
seeks to obey a law valid for all rational beings and to follow an
objective standard not determined by physical need or emotional
desire. And one must seek to avoid rationalising behaviour out from
under the sometimes harsh demands of duty.

With the above conceptions of the good will, duty, reverence,
self-consistency and the maxim, Kant stated his first formulation of
the categorical imperative, the Formula of the Universal Law:

> "Act only on that maxim through which you can at
> the same time will that it should become a
> universal law."[4]

An essential condition of morality, this law announces, is that one
must judge oneself with the same universal standards as one judges
others.

4.
  Ibid., p. 52. The Old Testament laws appear to be based on
this principle, as also Jesus' "Do to others as you would want
them to do to you."

Since Kant believed that the universality of the law is what is meant by nature, he made a second statement of this first law:

> "Act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a universal law of nature."[5]

Kant also derived this formula from his conception of rational beings. It is only rational beings who have a concept of the law which enables them to trust themselves as ends in themselves. Rational beings are called persons for it is their very nature that shows them to be ends in themselves. Any supreme, practical principle, a principle which when concerned with the human good will yields the categorical imperative, must be an objective principle. The first law commands a universal respect for selfhood. When one performs an act which one cannot will as a universal law, one gives preference to one's own self and therefore treats other people only as a means. (This is to treat another person, as Martin Buber would express it, as an "it" and not as a "Thou".)

In this way is developed the second law, the Formula of the End in Itself:

> "Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end."[6]

The word "simply" is important in this law. Kant did not mean that one should never use another person as a means; but that if another person is used as a means, he must also be used as an end.

According to Kant the supreme principle of morality is the principle of the autonomy of the will, to distinguish it from all

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5.
  Loc. cit. This maxim and the next are quoted in Moral Education in the Secondary School, p. 47. See below, SECTION THREE, II, E, the presentation of "Lifeline".
6.
  Ibid., pp. 66-67.

other principles which Kant considered to be principles of heteronomy.
The moral value of a will lies in its autonomy, judged by the character
of its motivating principle rather than by its effects. Since duty is
the impelling motive of the good will, the categorical imperative is
autonomous, i.e. a law which one as a rational being imposes upon
oneself. Hypothetical imperatives are heteronomous. The autonomy of
practical reason, the pure self-determination of the rational will,
is expressed in the categorical imperative. Autonomy is the foundation
of the moral value of man. This idea is set forth in Kant's third law
which is called the Formula of Autonomy:

> "Act in such a way that the will can regard itself
> as at the same time making universal law by means
> of its maxim."[7]

In relationship to this, freedom, belonging to all rational
beings, is the guide to the autonomy of the will. Reason must also
be free. All persons who are rational individuals must be considered
as being free or as ends in themselves. Thus Kant made a second
statement of his third law. This is called the Formula of the Kingdom
of Ends:

> "Act in such a way as you share in the making of
> universal law and which therefore fits you to be
> a member in a possible kingdom of ends."[8]

By "kingdom" Kant meant the systematic bringing together of various
rational beings through the medium of common laws.[9]

From the way Kant developed his second law from the first and his
third law from the second, one might believe that he intended them to
mean different things; but he believed that they were all different

7.
　Ibid., p. 76.
8.
　Ibid., p. 79.
9.
　This use of "kingdom" relates to what later will be called the
ground rules in group discussion.

statements of the same law. And he believed that each implied the other two.

The main idea of his moral philosophy was that this one categorical imperative is an unconditional moral obligation which one entrusts upon oneself.

> "For nothing can have a value other than that determined for it by the law. But the law-making which determines all value must for this reason have a dignity - that is, an unconditioned and incomparable worth - for the appreciation of which, as necessarily given by a rational being, the word 'reverence' is the only expression. <u>Autonomy</u> is therefore the ground of the dignity of human nature and of every rational nature."[10]

It is at this point that Kant's meaning of autonomy can become clear. He claimed that autonomy of the will is the supreme principle of morality and in contrast that heteronomy of the will is the source of all spurious principles of morality.[11] It is now necessary and only now possible to begin to arrive at a Kantian definition of the autonomy of the will.

> "Autonomy of the will is the property the will has of being a law to itself (independently of every property belonging to the object of volition.) Hence the principle of autonomy is 'Never to choose except in such a way that in the same volition the maxims of your choice are also present as universal law.' ... Analysis finds that the principle of morality must be a categorical imperative, and that this in turn commands nothing more nor less than precisely this autonomy."[12]

Besides being in the context of a categorical imperative, autonomy is also linked to freedom. In the chapter that forms a transition from

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10.
  <u>Ibid</u>., p. 79.
11.
  See R.M. Hare, <u>The Language of Morals</u>, p. 30. He commented, "The reason why heteronomous principles of morality are spurious is that from a series of indicative sentences about 'the character of any of its objects' no imperative sentence about what is to be done can be derived, and therefore no moral judgement can be derived from it either."
12.
  Kant, <u>op. cit</u>., pp. 87-88.

a metaphysic of morals to a critique of "pure practical reason",

Kant claimed that

> "THE CONCEPT OF FREEDOM IS THE KEY TO EXPLAIN
> AUTONOMY OF THE WILL
>   "Will is a kind of causality belonging to
> living beings so far as they are rational. Freedom
> would then be the property this causality has of
> being able to work independently of determination
> by alien causes ......
>   "The above definition of freedom is negative
> and consequently unfruitful as a way of grasping its
> essence; but there springs from it a positive
> concept, which, as positive, is richer and more
> fruitful. ... Hence freedom of will, although it is
> not the property of conforming to laws of nature, is
> not for this reason lawless: it must rather be a
> causality conforming to immutable laws, though of a
> special kind; for otherwise a free will would be
> self-contradictory. ... What else then can freedom
> of will be but autonomy - that is, the property which
> will has of being a law to itself? ... This is
> precisely the formula of the categorical imperative
> and the principle of morality. Thus a free will and
> a will under moral laws are one and the same."[13]

In other words, one cannot ascribe freedom of will to oneself without

attributing the same freedom to all rational beings. Real freedom is

not lawless, it is responsible. The will's enactment of its own laws

is autonomy. They are reciprocal concepts by which Kant meant that

they apply to the same objects. But they are not identical. He used

the analogy that fractions (such as 3/9 and 2/6) may apply to the same

object (1/3) but are not identical.[14] They make use of different

figures. Not only is it impossible to define freedom but reason cannot

explain how it is possible. But freedom does concern man as an

intelligent being. And autonomy follows from the will of an

intelligent person being free. Freedom, then, is the necessary

presupposition of action as well as thinking. Will, action, freedom,

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13.
  Ibid., pp. 97-98.
14.
  A mathematician might disagree. But in practical application 3/9
of a cake could be three pieces while 1/3 could be one.

responsibility, and autonomy are all intimately related. Autonomy, therefore, could be called an enactment or commitment to responsible freedom.

Much of the above ground is covered in the Critique of Practical Reason. Kant there, however, further developed the idea that the truly free will is wholly independent of all empirical conditions.

> "That independence, however, is freedom in the negative sense, while in intrinsic legislation of pure and thus practical reason is freedom in the positive sense. Therefore, the moral law expresses nothing else than the autonomy of pure practical reason, i.e. freedom."[15]

Through freedom the moral law is a law of the possibility of a supersensuous nature. This does not mean that one should avoid sensuous living. The Critique of Practical Reason makes quite clear that man lives in empirical as well as intellectual worlds. But the one side of his nature must be brought under the control of the other. Passion must be held in check by reason. He must be humble before the moral law. It is here that he, however, gets his worth as a human being. Because of the autonomy of his freedom he is the subject of a holy moral law. He humbles his sensuous nature beneath duty. Behind the law is the divine will. To give reverence to duty is to show love to God and to love one's neighbour as an end in himself. For "God" Kant used the phrases "a supersensuous being", "the Supreme Being", "a moral Author", "the Govenor of the world".[16]

It is responsible freedom that keeps one from being a marionette. It is responsible freedom, as a capacity for following the moral law,

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15.

Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, translated by Lewis White Beck, p. 33 (inserted page reference identifying the location in the Prussian Academy edition.)

16.

Ibid., pp. 57, 118, 145, 147, and explanation, pp. 125-29.

which can take one beyond sensuous happiness and the satisfaction of inclination of intellectual contentment.[17]

> "Freedom itself thus becomes in this indirect way capable of an enjoyment. This cannot be called happiness, since it does not depend upon a positive participation of feeling; nor can it be called bliss, because it does not include complete independence from inclinations and desires."[18]

Autonomous freedom is not completely independent from desire, but it should seek to be in complete control of desire. The motive of the autonomous will is independent and free from the control of the motive or incentive of desire.[19]

Kant interpreted the Christian principle of morality as being

> "... autonomy of pure practical reason itself, because it does not make the knowledge of God and His will the basis of these laws but makes such knowledge the basis only of succeeding to the highest good on condition of obedience to these laws; it places the real incentive for obedience to the law not in the desired consequences of obedience but in the conception of duty alone ...."[20]

17.
   See *Ibid.*, pp. 117-18.

18.
   Ibid., p. 118. In Matthew 5, the New Testament uses blessedness, happiness, or bliss as the result of, rather than the aim of, meekness or humility under the divine law of love. See *Living Bible*, Book 2, unit 5. According to Jesus, one should not become meek in order to be happy. Happiness is the by-product of meekness. Kant had the same realisation. In a footnote he wrote that "... 'blessed' is the word which reason uses to designate a perfect well-being independent of all contingent causes in the world." (*Ibid.*, p. 123) He further stated that the doctrine of Christianity gives "... a concept of the highest good (the Kingdom of God) which is alone sufficient to the strictest demand of practical reason. The moral law is holy ...." (*Ibid.*, pp. 127-28)

19.
   In *The Groundwork of Christian Ethics*, N.H.G. Robinson claims that Kant seemed to abolish desire altogether (p. 41). This is not really true, but only appears to be the case due to Kant's criticism of hedonism and utilitarianism. Kant was not altogether consistent, but the overall impression of his ethics is that he did not really abolish desire. He only emphasised the need to control it. Also Robinson suggested (p. 115) that Jesus practiced heteronomy ('My meat is to do the will of him that sent me'; 'There is none good but one, that is God.'). But according to Kant this would still be autonomy, i.e. Jesus' reverence for the moral law, and his autonomous acceptance of the will of the divine Lawgiver. Robinson also concluded, "... the Christian life must be conceived in terms of moral autonomy." (p. 157)

20.
   Kant, *op. cit.*, p. 129.

Kant did not argue from Christianity to morality. He argued from
reason, through the moral law with its autonomy and freedom, to
Christianity. (There must be this rational foundation to the moral
principle behind religious education in the Secondary school.)

The concluding chapter of the <u>Critique of Practical Reason</u> is on
educational methodology. There Kant claimed that, initially,
persuasion or compulsion might be necessary to prepare the uneducated
or degraded mind. But whatever method is used, its purpose should be
to help the individual to understand his own worth rationally and to
free himself from dependence on sensuality. So there must be
discipline, if necessary, to encourage the development of movement
towards autonomy, <u>responsible</u> freedom. But eventually the method
becomes dialogue or "arguing":

> "Now of all arguments there are none which excite
> more ready participation by those who are otherwise
> soon bored with all subtle thinking, or which are
> more likely to bring a certain liveliness into the
> company, than one /sic/ about the moral worth of
> this or that action from which the character of
> some person is to be made out. Those who otherwise
> find everything which is subtle and minute in
> theoretical questions dry and vexing soon take part
> when it is a question of the moral import of a good
> or bad act that is recounted...."
> "I do not know why the educators of youth have
> not long since made use of this propensity of reason
> to enter with pleasure upon the most subtle
> examination of practical questions put to them....
> They would find that even very young people, who are
> not yet ready for speculation of other kinds, would
> soon become very acute and not a little interested,
> since they would feel the progress of their power
> of judgment...."[21]

Kant's educational method, like that of Plato, was through dialogue.
He believed that young people should play "a game of judgment" in which
they would consider illustrations of praiseworthy and blameworthy

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21.
   <u>Ibid</u>., pp. 153-54.

actions and draw their own verdicts. But he would have educators avoid contaminating young people with noble, but meritorious examples from sentimental writings, for this would assume a heteronomous, sensuous behavioural aim. It is obligation to duty, not search for merit, that should be the motivating factor. Repeated exposure to autonomous judgment-making would help the young person[22] sharpen his ability to differentiate moral qualities in the same way as he learned to differentiate between his left and right hand. In this way the young person becomes conscious of an inner freedom.

R.M. Hare endorsed this quest as being central to moral maturity:

"'If I refuse to make my own decisions, I am, in merely copying my fathers, showing myself a lesser man than they; for whereas they must have initiated, I shall be merely accepting.' This plea of the subjectivist is quite justified. It is the plea of the adolescent who wants to be adult. To become morally adult is to reconcile ... two apparently conflicting positions by learning to make decisions of principle; it is to learn to use 'ought' - sentences in the realization that they can only be verified by reference to a standard or set of principles which we have by our own decision accepted and made our own. This is what our present generation is so painfully trying to do."[23]

Kant assumed rationality as a prerequisite for autonomous thought. There is much variation in the degree of rationality in young people. Those who are less rational, and are not able to proceed beyond heteronomy, can easily confuse freedom with licence. Moral action must be responsibly intentional.

The implication of this is that a psychopath, amoral and asocial in behaviour, is incapable of responsibility through indifference to the needs and feelings of other people and indifference to the rules of

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22.

Kant imagined in terms of his society a boy as young as ten being thus exposed.
23.

R.M. Hare, The Language of Morals, pp. 77-78. See also E. Kant, op. cit., p. 196.

society. His relationship to other people may be merely that of a cat with a mouse. Other people are merely objects to be used for his own advantage. Between the psychopath on the one hand and the morally mature autonomous person on the other, there is a whole spectrum of degrees in rational, moral responsibility. A psychopath cannot commit "first degree murder" because he cannot act intentionally. Murder here means "killing by rational intent". One cannot lie by mistake because lying assumes rational knowledge by a morally responsible person. The rationally responsible person knows what he is doing and does it, as is said, by his own free will.

There is a place for conditioning (manipulating) action. Murder cannot be tolerated and society is responsible to do all it can to make the less rational individual follow certain rules. The person incapable of acting autonomously is not therefore free to drive a car on any side of the road and at any speed he wants to drive. And he must be conditioned to be able to make emergency stops and turn the wheels into a skid by reflex action. This has moral implications. For it can be said that one who has not been thus conditioned ought not to drive a car. Kant was not abolishing conditioning. He was showing that conditioning is inadequate as the ultimate method of moral education.

There must be a pre-conditioning before one is prepared for autonomy. This implies that educational and social discipline of young children and emotional security through childhood and adolescence are prerequisites. The mathematician must know by heart his multiplication tables without having to resort to using blocks or coloured rods. The writer must know his spelling and not have to use a dictionary for every word. The musician must be able to play scales

without having to look at each note and think about which one comes
next. And so the pedestrian instinctively carries out his kerb drill
before crossing the road because he has been conditioned. This does
not block the road to autonomy. It allows him to live long enough to
be able some day to arrive nearer moral autonomy. The adolescent
whether or not he is limited in rationality must be disciplined. The
young child is not able to think through the "why" of looking
right-left-right (or left-right-left, as the case may be). Yet this
is an illustration of how autonomy is essential in a changing society
as well as in a society needing change. The person will probably not
spend every moment of his life in a country where vehicles travel on
the left.

Kant's approach to the teaching of autonomy to the young was the
way of dialogue. But there are certain ground rules to dialogue: if
everyone talks at the same time, dialogue cannot function. And it is
an obvious precondition that Albert does not hit Aileen every time she
tries to speak. At the same time conditioning must not become the
means whereby the teacher inflicts all his social/political attitudes
upon the student. Both extremes are harmful - the doctrinaire liberals
who believe in "leave them alone to fend for themselves" and the
doctrinaire authoritarians who believe in "either you learn the
Beatitudes or I'll give you the belt."

> "A parent or teacher may have the most liberal
> aims, and yet use forms of upbringing which
> might appear very tough-minded and authoritarian:
> thus he might give stern orders, be shocked, use
> corporal punishment and so forth. What makes
> him a liberal is that he will assess these various
> forms in the light of his objective - his desire to
> turn his children into real adults who can think
> for themselves."[24]

24.

Wilson, Williams, and Sugarman, _Introduction to Moral Education_, p. 154.

This perhaps helps to resolve the apparent dichotomy between freedom
and conditioning. Kant was pointing to the aim of moral education
for the rational being. This can be qualified by stating that most
people are incapable of thinking things out for themselves or are not
intelligent enough to act responsibly according to their own will.
But in saying this one must be careful to avoid implying that only
oneself has the right to decide what is good for others, that people
fall neatly into two categories - those who are rational enough to
make their own moral judgments and those who are not, and that the
right to autonomy is entirely a matter of intelligence.[25]

Nevertheless, the one who helps condition children and
adolescents is not necessarily a tyrant or a self-appointed authority.
But he must be careful lest conditioning (manipulating action) lead to
indoctrination (manipulating beliefs). He must be careful lest letting
"the end justify the means" become treating "people as means and not as
ends", a violation of the categorical imperative. To indoctrinate is
to block the road towards autonomy:

> "For here we have taken over, or put to sleep, a
> central part of the child's personality - his
> ability to think rationally in a certain area.
> To put it dramatically: there is always hope so
> long as the mind remains free, however much our
> behaviour may be forced or our feelings conditioned.
> But if we occupy the inner citadel of thought and
> language, then is it difficult to see how a person
> can develop or regain rationality except by a very
> lengthy and arduous course of treatment. To
> indoctrinate is to take over his personality in a
> much more radical way than anything we do by way of
> force or conditioning: it is, in effect, to take
> over his consciousness."[26]

Indoctrination (manipulating beliefs) is the method of heteronomy.
If religious education is to lead towards responsible freedom, towards

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[25]
   See *Ibid.*, p. 156.
[26]
   Ibid., pp. 174-75.

growth in autonomy, its method must include such awareness as treats
other people as ends in themselves and not as puppets on the strings
of one's extending personality. For Kant, autonomy was a self-enactment
or a self-commitment to freedom. And it was reason which gave this
freedom its responsibility.

B. THE METHODOLOGY OF PLATO

On methodology, the philosopher who has the most valuable
contribution to make is Plato. The dialectical method he attributed
to Socrates in his Dialogues lies also behind the methodology of Harold
Loukes: the teacher is a "midwife" in the learning process and
knowledge comes through the synthesis arrived at in discussion. For
Plato, dialogue was a means to an end. And since for him knowledge at
its best was not knowledge of something in itself but an understanding
of how it related to other things, discussion was both the pooling of
ideas challenging each other through thesis and antithesis to synthesis
and the pursuit of the implications of a statement leading to the
question, "If you hold the original statement are you prepared to go
along with the implications of that statement whether or not they are
favourable?"

This can be illustrated by a quotation from The Republic:

> "Let me ask you now: – How would you arrange goods –
> are there not some which we welcome for their own
> sakes, and independently of their consequences, as,
> for example, harmless pleasures and enjoyments, which
> delight us at the time, although nothing follows
> from them?
> "I agree in thinking that there is such a class,
> I replied.
> "Is there not also a second class of goods, such
> as knowledge, sight, health, which are desirable not
> only in themselves, but also for their results?
> "Certainly, I said.
> "And would you not recognise a third class, such
> as gymnastics, and the care of the sick, and the
> physician's art; also the various ways of money-making –

these do us good but we regard them as disagreeable;
and no one would choose them for their own sakes, but
only for the sake of some reward or result which flows
from them?

"There is, I said, this third class also. But
why do you ask?

"Because I want to know in which of the three
classes you would place justice?

"In the highest class, I replied, - among those
goods which he who would be happy desires both for
their own sake and for the sake of their results.

"Then the many are of another mind; they think
that justice is to be reckoned in the troublesome
class, among goods which are to be pursued for the
sake of rewards and of reputation, but in themselves
are disagreeable and rather to be avoided.

"I know, I said, that this is their manner of
thinking, and that this was the thesis which
Thrasymachus was maintaining just now, when he
censured justice and praised injustice. But I am too
stupid to be convinced by him.

"I wish, he said, that you would hear me as well
as him, and then I shall see whether you and I
agree ....."[27]

What is of interest here is not only what Socrates was alleged to

have uncovered as the criterion of morality, but the methodology by

which this criterion was unveiled, i.e. dialogue. That is, Socrates

(as portrayed by Plato) used the dialectical method. Modern

developments of this method will be examined later in this thesis.[28]

It is within the scope of this thesis to develop a moral

philosophy that is the basis of the philosophy of religious and moral

education. What is more important than methodology is the

philosophical aim. This thesis is an attempt to establish that for

the adolescent the aim of religious education is growth towards

autonomy through the means of informed dialogue. Informed dialogue

is discussion that makes use of various resource materials including

the ideas, experiences, and viewpoints of other people. Autonomy then

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27.
   Jowett, translator. The Dialogues of Plato. vol. 1, pp. 621-22.
28.
   See below, especially SECTION TWO, II, B and C, SECTION FOUR, II,
D, and appendix.

itself becomes the means by which the individual best makes religious and moral judgments and actions.

This is a philosophical foundation of autonomy (PHIL-AUT); autonomy now will be defined theologically (THEO-AUT).

II   A THEOLOGICAL FOUNDATION FOR AUTONOMY

A.   THE THEORY OF PAUL TILLICH

Out of the basic perspective of Immanuel Kant the philosophical foundation of autonomy (PHIL-AUT) has been presented. Paul Tillich's thought is the most appropriate framework for a theological foundation of autonomy (THEO-AUT). In the examination of autonomy his Systematic Theology follows naturally the Critique of Practical Reason. It also anticipates the psychological perspective and sociological and educational implications which will subsequently be considered. His theology is grounded in ontology, the knowledge of being, the philosophy of the origin and development of the individual. It is this fact which makes his theology such a natural link in the preceding and following deliberations. Following a general study of his theory, ontology and theonomy, education and religion will more specifically be considered.

Tillich's contribution to the role of autonomy is contained in his theory of the "New Being". The New Being is a being that is free in the existential situation and not bound to the past. As Kant believed that philosophy is valid if and only if it aims to enhance the autonomy of the person, so Tillich believed that theology can find validity in an aim to create the matrix for the New Being who is free and autonomous. But Tillich believed that this matrix is "theonomy" (God as law), from which autonomy does not stand on its own but with which it is an integral part. Therefore, a distinction must be made between the two definitions and uses of autonomy as caused by the two perspectives. The terms PHIL-AUT (philosophical autonomy as defined by Kant) and THEO-AUT (theological autonomy as defined by Tillich) are

being used to acknowledge this distinction.

Tillich rejected European theological orthodoxy which, from its biblical basis, confuses the eternal aspect of truth with the existentially past situation of Bible times. It interprets the finite in one period of history as having infinite validity.

The kerygmatic theology of the Barthian school is an enlightened form of orthodoxy where theology is biblically based but not biblically contained or delineated. But such neo-orthodoxy still builds a barrier isolating the existential situation from having any impact on religious truth. Religious truth is assumed to be a pre-wrapped package in which the contents must not be changed. To attempt to do so would be heresy. Those who try are considered by kerygmatic theologians to be humanists or at least not Christians. The truth is not in them: they are enemies of "the Faith".

Dogma which is kerygmatic needs only apologetics and this only for communication purposes. For the kerygma contains the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. It is already eternal truth relevant to every situation and those who do not understand its relevance must simply study its complementary apologetics. But such apologetics does not bring an open dialectic with the modern mind, for a synthesis would contaminate the unique, static character of the theology it represents. The kerygma is the answer to all theological questions raised by all human situations. But to Tillich kerygmatic theology and its corresponding apologetics suffers from (in Whiteheadian terms) "misplaced concreteness". To Tillich for one to accept the kerygma is for one to surrender to its apologetics which offers no alternative and therefore demands (in Kantian terms) a "heteronomous", passive acceptance.

In rejecting orthodoxy and neo-orthodoxy, Tillich assumed that there was a philosophical element in theology that gave it a point of contact with the sciences which shared this element. However, he believed that the neo-Kantian thought of the Nineteenth century attempted to reduce philosophy to epistemology and ethics, and the logical positivist thought of the Twentieth century attempted to reduce philosophy to logical calculus. Tillich sought to raise the ontological question which these avoided. As Plato identified the idea of the good with the idea of being, Tillich believed that value-judgments had an ontological foundation essential to their validity. Value-judgments have no transcendent validity, they have only ontological value. Tillich's metaphysical viewpoint, unlike Plato's, was that reality was in the concrete situation and not in the abstract "form". His epistemological viewpoint was that the known can only be the existential with an ontological basis. Epistemology cannot be transcendent. Philosophy is irrelevant if it is not expressed in "definite ontological terms such as life, growth, process, experience, being (understood in an all-embracing sense), etc."[1]

Kant's categorical imperative had a teleological emphasis. Tillich's quest for a new being had a soteriological character, the theological equivalent. Philosophy and theology ask the same question of the structure of being. But Tillich took the question beyond metaphysics. To be is to belong to reality as a whole. But more than this it is what concerns one ultimately. Being is not static, it is movement. The "New Being" is an opening to becoming, growth towards greater knowledge, fulfilment, and freedom. The ground of being, the

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1.

Paul Tillich, _Systematic Theology_, I, p. 23.

power of being, is existential. Biblicism attempts to avoid
ontological terms. Philosophy which does this creates transcendent
metaphysics and epistomology, disregarding the existential. Biblicism
creates a transcendent theology which disregards the existential.
Kant's "practical reason" philosophy and Tillich's "ground of being"
theology make such concepts as "autonomy" and "becoming" possible.

To Tillich, the Bible is the basic source of Christian theology
because it is the nearest to an account or interpretation of certain
events. But it is not a sealed record, however much it contains
edited accounts of witnesses to some of these events. The fullest
inspiration of these writers was their acceptance of Jesus Christ as
the New Being who brought a gospel of the possibility and urgency of
change, growth, and becoming, who called his followers his friends
when they preferred to be his servants, and who treated them as adults
when they sought to submit to his will heteronomously as children.[2]
Biblicism, whether orthodox or neo-orthodox, presents heteronomy as
the only Christian option. In rejecting this, Tillich valued a
dependence which was more teleological. For example, Schleiermacher's
"feeling of absolute dependence" was "teleological" dependence which
included freedom and, as Tillich himself claimed,[3] came close to
ultimate concern about the ground and meaning of one's being. This,
however, was still a kind of dependence which, unlike Kant's reverence
for the divine law, submitted the will to external authority. Religion
(whether philosophically Kantian or theologically Tillichian) can

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2.
  Eric Berne's appraisal which relates directly to this is presented
below in SECTION TWO, II, C, 6, as a further contribution to a
psychological approach to autonomy.
3.
  Ibid., I, p. 47.

conflict with autonomy. If autonomy is to be an aim in religious education, this dilemma must be resolved. Religion and autonomy are the horns of the dilemma of this thesis. But in his theory of the New Being, Tillich did not dismiss autonomy.

To avoid abstracting the phrase from its definitive context, it is best to quote in full the two paragraphs in which Tillich defined the "New Being".

> "It is not an exaggeration to say that today
> man experiences his present situation in terms of
> disruption, conflict, self-destruction,
> meaninglessness, and despair in all realms of life.
> This experience is expressed in the arts and in
> literature, conceptualised in existential
> philosophy, actualised in political cleavages of
> all kinds, and analysed in the psychology of the
> unconscious. It has given theology a new
> understanding of the demonic-tragic structures of
> individual and social life. The question arising
> out of this experience is not, as in the
> Reformation, the question of a merciful God and the
> forgiveness of sins; nor is it, as in the early
> Greek church, the question of finitude, of death
> and error; nor is it the question of the personal
> religious life or of the Christianisation of
> culture and society. It is the question of a
> reality in which the self-estrangement of our
> existence is overcome, a reality of reconciliation
> and reunion, of creativity, meaning, and hope. We
> shall call such a reality the "New Being", a term
> whose presuppositions and implications can be
> explained only through the whole system. It is
> based on what Paul calls the "new creation" and
> refers to its power of overcoming the demonic
> cleavages of the "old reality" in soul, society,
> and universe. If the Christian message is
> understood as the message of the "New Being", an
> answer is given to the question implied in our
> present situation and in every human situation.
> "But this answer is not sufficient. It leads
> immediately to the further question, 'Where is this
> New Being manifest?' Systematic theology answers
> this question by saying: 'In Jesus the Christ.'
> This answer also has presuppositions and implications
> which it is the main purpose of the whole system to
> develop. Only this must be said here--that this
> formula accepts the ancient Christian baptismal
> confession of Jesus as the Christ. He who is the
> Christ is he who brings the new eon, the new reality.

> And it is the man Jesus who in a paradoxical
> assertion is called the Christ. Without this
> paradox the New Being would be an ideal, not a
> reality, and consequently not an answer to the
> question implied in our human situation."[4]

This statement Tillich believed represented the most adequate

in the contemporary apologetic situation. "The 'New Being' as

manifest in Jesus the Christ" can be understood as ultimate concern

and as the answer to the questions implied in the human situation.

But to what extent did Tillich avoid falling into making a neo-orthodox

kerygmatic statement? He believed that it was non-kerygmatic. But it

can only be understood as such in its existential aspect as describing

the "New Being" as the reality of "reconciliation, creativity, and

meaning". Otherwise, acceptance of "Jesus as the Christ" becomes

heteronomous submission.

Out of the encounter between the Bible and the Church, Luther

selected justification through faith as the interpretive and critical

criterion of the Bible and theology. By this criterion, James became a

"right strawy epistle". It is fair criticism to state that Luther

used too limited a perspective. One could say that autonomy was too

limited a perspective for Kant to use in the practical reason of

philosophy. One could state that Tillich was too narrow in his

perspective of theonomy. But any form of "misplaced concreteness" is

valuable if it is recognised as such but forcefully examined to form

a critical dialectical alternative to popularised, narrow viewpoints.

Justification by faith was a perspective needed to hold in check

justification by merit. Theological liberalism has refuted the idea

that James is a "right strawy epistle". Equally, heteronomy is not a

"right strawy idea". As Kant believed that heteronomy was necessary

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4.

 Ibid., I, pp. 55-56. Underscoring added.

in some circumstances, so Tillich believed that transcendent theology must not be ignored. Kant's belief in the divine lawmaker and Tillich's belief in the law of God (theonomy) have transcendent aspects which conflict with autonomy. But neither heteronomy nor transcendence should be ultimate concerns.

Transcendental theology makes as questions of ultimate concern such issues as Christology and the existence of God. "Ground of being" theology does not produce an object of ultimate concern by logical procedures through reason. Therefore, Tillich considered concrete "arguments for the existence of God" to be mistaken theology. This did not leave the question unanswered. To Tillich, the term "God" meant "being-itself". The "New" in New Being connotes creativity, maturity, and eschatology - the end towards which humanity is moving. Therefore, no systematic theology can be complete for the New Being cannot be contained.

Having considered Tillich's ontology and use of "New Being", it is now appropriate to introduce his use of "autonomy". The use he made of this phrase in his <u>Systematic Theology</u> will be quoted in its context.

> "The analysis of the human situation employs
> materials made available by man's creative
> self-interpretation in all realms of culture.
> Philosophy contributes, but so do poetry, drama,
> the novel, therapeutic psychology, and sociology.
> The theologian organises these materials in
> relation to the answer given by the Christian message.[5]
> In the light of this message he may make an analysis
> of existence which is more penetrating than that of
> most philosophers. Nevertheless, it remains a

5.
   The school likewise should integrate into the religious education classroom and school assembly all the creative elements of other subjects and extra-curricular activities. How <u>Living Bible</u> uses drama, art, poetry and how religious education should encounter psychology and sociology within the framework of autonomy will be discussed later.

philosophical analysis. .... The difference between
the philosopher who is not a theologian and the
theologian who works as a philosopher in analysing
human existence is only that the former tries to
give an analysis which will be part of a broader
philosophical work, while the latter tries to
correlate the material of his analysis with the
theological concepts he derives from the Christian
faith. This does not make the philosophical work of
the theologian heteronomous. As a theologian he
does not tell himself what is philosophically true.
As a philosopher he does not tell himself what is
theologically true. But he cannot help seeing
human existence and existence generally in such a way
that the Christian symbols appear meaningful and
understandable to him. His eyes are partially
focused by his ultimate concern, which is true of
every philosopher. Nevertheless, his act of seeing
is autonomous, for it is determined only by the
object as it is given in his experience. If he sees
something he did not expect to see in the light of
his theological answer, he holds fast to what he has
seen and reformulates the theological answer. He is
certain that nothing he sees can change the substance
of his answer, because this substance is the 'logos'
of being, manifest in Jesus as the Christ. If this
were not his presupposition, he would have to
sacrifice either his philosophical honesty or his
theological concern."[6]

To accept passively and uncritically another system - the
philosopher accepting in this way a theology or the theologian a
particular philosophy - is heteronomy. For the theologian to feel
free, and to move toward greater freedom, and to reformulate his own
answer in light of new experience, is to make an autonomous act.
With kerygmatic theology this freedom would be inhibited. The
substance of the answer in Tillich's theology is the "logos" of being
manifest in Jesus the Christ. The extent to which this puts integrity
towards truth below the acceptance of any formula or statement is the
extent to which it is kerygmatic.

The flexibility of Tillich's theology, the liberation it
encourages, is exemplified by the following statement.

6.

Ibid., I, p. 71. Underscoring added.

> "If anxiety is defined as the awareness of being
> finite, God must be called the infinite ground of
> courage. In classical theology this is universal
> providence. If the notion of the Kingdom of God
> appears in correlation with the riddle of our
> historical existence, it must be called the meaning,
> fulfilment, and unity of history. In this way an
> interpretation of the traditional symbols of
> Christianity is achieved which preserves the power
> of these symbols and which opens them to the
> questions elaborated by our present analysis of
> human existence."[7]

This is apologetics, and it accepts a Christian position. But in
contrast to the kerygmatic type, Tillich's apologetics demands that
questions be open and that critical appraisals and changes be made in
terms of the existential situation. The structure of theology must
use the method of correlation in which an analysis of the human
situation contributes. Otherwise the system itself is
heteronomous.

Man's being is finite as is his reason. His reason is
circumscribed by his being, his epistemology by his ontology; for
knowing is an event within the larger circle. The finitude of
reason has its most profound and comprehensive expression, according
to Tillich, in Kant's critiques.

> "The only point at which the prison of finitude is
> open is the realm of moral experience, because in
> it something unconditional breaks into the whole of
> temporal and causal conditions. But this point
> which Kant reaches is nothing more than a point, an
> unconditional command, a mere awareness of the
> depth of reason."[8]

The finitude of reason tended to be disregarded in post-Kantian
metaphysics. After Hegel, pure reason and practical reason were
dethroned by technical reason with a consequent loss of depth in

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7.
  Ibid., I, p. 72.
8.
  Ibid., I, p. 91.

ontological reason.[9]

The importance of reclaiming this depth is to underline the interdependence of knowing and changing, of grasping and shaping. If being is examined metaphysically but not ontologically, the primary question is one of existence rather than change and growth.

> "Grasping and shaping the world are interdependent.
> In the cognitive realm this has been clearly
> expressed in the Fourth Gospel, which speaks of
> knowing the truth by doing the truth.[10] Only in
> the active realisation of the truth does truth
> become manifest. In a similar way Karl Marx
> called every theory which is not based on the will
> to transform reality an 'ideology,' that is, an
> attempt to preserve existing evils by a theoretical
> construction which justifies them."[11]

Marx had a practical grasp of ontology in which being was not idealised towards a form but realised towards becoming. The will to transform is the courage to be, in the sense of an urge towards becoming. What Tillich added to Marx was the element of infinity transcending morality in its ultimate concern. However, this going beyond morality also engulfed morality. Religious education has moral elements—forbid that ultimate concern should by-pass morality—but it is not limited to moral education.

In a footnote (which must be included here in the main text because of its appropriateness), Tillich wrote:

> "It is unfortunate that Kant is often
> interpreted only as an epistemological idealist
> and an ethical formalist—and consequently
> rejected. Kant is more than this. His doctrine
> of the categories is a doctrine of human finitude.
> His doctrine of the categorical imperative is a
> doctrine of the unconditional element in the depth
> of practical reason. His doctrine of the

9.
   Fortunately, since the publication of Tillich's Systematic Theology, and in part certainly due to his influence, ontology has been given new depth.
10.
   John 3:21.
11.
   Ibid., I, p. 85.

> teleological principle in art and nature enlarges
> the concept of reason beyond its cognitive-technical
> sense toward what we have called 'ontological
> reason'."[12]

Tillich believed that he shared with Kant an enlarged concept
of reason, ontological reason. This was an important shared basis on
which they developed their two theories of autonomy. (To distinguish
them, the term PHIL-AUT will continue to be used when referring to
Kant's philosophical perspective of autonomy and the term THEO-AUT
will continue to be used when referring to Tillich's theological
perspective of autonomy.)

Tillich believed that Kant is totally mis-represented by those
who interpreted him to mean by autonomy, "the freedom of the individual
to be a law unto himself".[13] Neither PHIL-AUT nor THEO-AUT is that.
Both rather imply "obedience of the individual to the law of reason,
which /one/ finds in himself as a rational being".[14] In both, this
is how it is understood. Tillich submitted the existential situation
to the analysis of ontological reasoning by which the individual
engages in correlation (of the Christian message with the analysis of
the human situation) and engages his action. Both Kant and Tillich
tried to avoid "ungrasped impressions" and "unshaped strivings". Both
considered the law of reason in autonomy to be associated in divine
law. What Kant called "the rationality of the divine lawgiver" Tillich
called "reason rooted in the ground of being itself".

But because they were separated by 200 years and working from two
disciplines there are differences. PHIL-AUT was in conflict with
heteronomy. Tillich believed that this was dangerous because he

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12.
  Ibid., I, p. 91.
13.
  Ibid., I, p. 93.
14.
  Loc. cit.

believed that there is a conflict between autonomy and heteronomy only if disunited from their depth. To him, heteronomy could be submission to external laws which are an element in the same depth of reason governing autonomy. For him the weakness of heteronomy (THEO-HET) is not that of submission to external laws which are themselves an element in the depth of reason. The real problem is that of an external authority which claims truth over against actualisation.[15] Tillich believed that heteronomy without depth is usually a reaction against an autonomy which has become empty and powerless by being shallow-in-reason. Similarly Kant believed that heteronomy had its value for those whose rational faculties were inadequate. It is helpful that Tillich did not place autonomy and heteronomy in antithesis, for this anticipates an important factor in PSYC-AUT (the psychological interpretation of autonomy presented later in this thesis.) This factor is that autonomy is never complete because self-fulfilment is never completely realised.

The main distinction between PHIL-AUT and THEO-AUT is that the latter is rooted, together with heteronomy (THEO-HET), in theonomy.

> "Theonomy does not mean the acceptance of a divine
> law imposed on reason by a highest authority; it
> means autonomous reason united with its own depth."[16]

Tillich made a summary of Church history showing autonomy versus heteronomy and how autonomy has never been in a fully realised form:

15.
   Tillich actually used the term "autonomous actualisation." It relates to Maslow's "self-actualisation" and is a link in this thesis between THEO-AUT and PSYC-AUT (autonomy defined psychologically) presented below in SECTION ONE, III. But Tillich meant the autonomous actualisation of reason. His priority of concern was reason, not autonomy or heteronomy.
16.
   Ibid., I, p. 94.

"Seen in a world historical perspective the
conflict between autonomy and heteronomy is the key
to any theological understanding of the Greek as well
as of the modern development and of many other
problems of the spiritual history of mankind. The
history of Greek philosophy, for example, can be
written as a curve which starts with the still
theonomous pre-philosophical period (mythology and
cosmology), the slow elaboration of the autonomous
structures of reason (pre-Socratic), the classical
synthesis of structure and depth (Plato), the
rationalisation of this synthesis in the different
schools (after Aristotle), the despair of reason in
trying autonomously to create a world to live in
(skepticism), the mystical transcending of reason
(Neo-Platonism), the questioning of authorities in
past and present (philosophical schools and religious
sects), the creation of a new theonomy under
Christian influence (Clement and Origen), and the
intrusion of heteronomous elements (Athanasius and
Augustine). During the high Middle Ages a theonomy
(Bonaventura) was realised under the preponderance
of heteronomous elements (Thomas). Toward the end
of the medieval period heteronomy became
all-powerful (Inquisition), partly as a reaction
against autonomous tendencies in culture and
religion (nominalism), and destroyed the medieval
theonomy. In the period of Renaissance and
Reformation the conflict grew to new intensity.
The Renaissance, which showed a theonomous
character in its Neo-Platonic beginnings (Cusanus,
Ficino), became increasingly autonomous in its
later development (Erasmus, Galileo). Conversely,
the Reformation, which in its early years united a
religious with a cultural emphasis on autonomy
(Luther's reliance on his conscience, and Luther
and Zwingli's connection with the humanists), very
soon developed a heteronomy which surpassed even that
of the later Middle Ages in some respects (Protestant
orthodoxy). In the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, in spite of some heteronomous remnants and
reactions, autonomy won an almost complete victory.
Orthodoxy and fundamentalism were pushed into the
corners of cultural life, sterile and ineffective.
Classical and Romantic attempts to re-establish
theonomy with autonomous means (Hegel, Schelling) did
not succeed, producing radical autonomous reactions
(post-Hegelians), on the one hand, and strong
heteronomous reactions (revivalism), on the other
hand. Under the guidance of technical reason autonomy
conquered all reactions but completely lost the
dimension of depth. It became shallow, empty, without
ultimate meaning, and produced conscious or
unconscious despair. In this situation powerful

> heteronomies of a quasi-political character entered
> the vacuum created by an autonomy which lacked the
> dimension of depth. The double fight against an
> empty autonomy and a destructive heteronomy makes the
> quest for a new theonomy as urgent today as it was at
> the end of the ancient world. The catastrophe of
> autonomous reason is complete. Neither autonomy nor
> heteronomy, isolated and in conflict, can give the
> answer."[17]

Tillich's reservations about autonomy show how he was more
realistic through seeing autonomy as an approach towards
self-realisation rather than as the arrival at pure self-realisation.
Another difference between PHIL-AUT and THEO-AUT is that the former
tends to be idealistic and the latter realistic or actualised in the
existential situation. In real life situations, autonomy is so often
empty. But, then, heteronomy is so often destructive. To add depth
to reason is to help avoid these negative qualities.

What was earlier said concerning fundamentalism, orthodoxy, and
neo-orthodoxy - as being transcendent in contrast to Tillich's New
Being which is existential - is shown in its historical consequences.
Conventional formalism, whether religious or humanist, requires
automatic obedience to accepted ways of behaviour.

> "Its tremendous power in social relations, in
> education, and in self-discipline makes it a tragic
> force in all human history. It tends to destroy
> the inborn vitality and creativity of every new
> being and of every new generation. It cripples life
> and replaces love by rule. It shapes personalities
> and communities by suppressing the spiritual and
> emotional substance which it is supposed to shape.
> The form destroys the meaning. Emotional reactions
> against conventional formalism are especially
> explosive and catastrophic. They have a 'blind
> spot' with regard to the supporting, preserving,
> and directing power of convention and habit; but
> they are right in opposing its formalistic
> distortion with passion and sacrifice."[18]

17.
   Ibid., I, pp. 94-96. Underscoring added.
18.
   Ibid., I, p. 101.

THEO-AUT with its depth of reason opposes this distortion without
the catastrophes of emotional reactions. It offers a grasping
awareness of the existential situation in a way that seeks a new
shaping. It interprets the world but with a view to changing it.
"God so loved the world..." (John 3:16) not for the purpose of giving
his own Son but for the purpose that men would "do the truth" (John
3:21). God's action, therefore, was not from any transcendence but
through his eminence in the existential situation. This is the
implication of Tillich's new theology in its biblical interpretation.
"The Word became flesh" was not a transcendent "God" taking on being
but Being itself revealing its existential characteristic thought.
To know the truth by doing the truth (John 3:21) does not mean to
come to know a packaged, static set of maxims by acting upon them.
It means that truth cannot be formalised because truth cannot be
contained. It is not a tank of water but a running river. To know
truth means to recognise its changing substance in a changing world.
To do truth by identifying with the change and seeing oneself as a
being existentially in the change is to know truth as dynamic. To do
truth autonomously is to let the will influence the human situation
rather than to let the human situation control and determine the will.
But, as explained above, the human situation must be taken into
account or else one is left with heteronomous, kerygmatic formalism.

Resurrection can be interpreted not as a return to transcendence
but a letting loose in the world that which was never contained in a
Person but, at most, was revealed in a Person.[19] There is a mystery
behind identifying this Person (the New Being in Christ) not because

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19.

  Living Bible interprets Resurrection in this way, as a letting loose
in the world an unfinished story. (See Book 1, unit 8.)

such mystery protects a transcendent nature ("the Son of God") but because it produces a creative factor in his nature ("the way, the truth, and the life"). The recorded claim of Jesus to be the truth, coupled with the way and the life,[20] should be interpreted as **Jesus** himself seeing truth as dynamic, and himself as not being truth in a package. The language of transcendence protects mystery but in a way which can delineate truth as finite. God-out-there can imply that God is dead in the sense of not being the ground of creative truth. Divinity-transcending-humanity is not the correct imagery to depict becoming-transcending-being. The way to depict this is the imagery of "God" as the ground of being, the theonomic force upholding the existential New Being. The transcendental law-giver, as described in kerygmatic theology, requires the response of heteronomy (PHIL-HET). The ground of being urges the response of autonomy (THEO-AUT) and a kind of heteronomy (THEO-HET) which are not in conflict.

THEO-AUT implies fulfilment as a quest in the New Being. It also implies transformation and wholeness. Healing of mind, body, and relationships (reconciliation) is part of wholeness. Reason in depth, true knowledge, includes union and willingness to receive that which unites. As depth psychology aims at existential knowledge (not detached knowledge of one's past in psychoanalytic terms but insights through a well-guided reliving of one's past), so reason in depth – which, for Tillich, is the Christian message – is a force in the reconstruction of being (valuable personality characteristics from the past) and in the construction of becoming (valuable new qualities).[21]

20.
    As in John 14:6.
21.
    Eric Erikson's psychological use of autonomy which **relates to this** is presented below in SECTION ONE, III, B.

Theonomy is the fundamental theory behind THEO-AUT. Theonomy presents God as non-transcendental and non-supranaturalistic.

> "The supranaturalistic theory of miracles makes God a sorcerer and a cause of 'possession'; it confuses God with demonic structures in the mind and in reality."[22]

Illumination, not supranaturalistic inspiration, is Tillich's term for the rationalistic aspect in the process of actualising the New Being. Revelation requires existential participation. The final revelation

> "... is universal without being heteronomous. No finite being imposes itself in the name of God on other finite beings. The unconditional and universal claim of Christianity is not based on its own superiority over other religions. Christianity, without being final itself, witnesses to the final revelation. Christianity as Christianity is neither final nor universal. But that to which it witnesses is final and universal. This profound dialectics /sic./ of Christianity must not be forgotten in favour of ecclesiastical or orthodox self-affirmations. Against them the so-called liberal theology is right in denying that one religion can claim finality, or even superiority. A Christianity which does not assert that Jesus of Nazareth is sacrificed to Jesus as the Christ is just one more religion among many others. It has no justifiable claim to finality."[23]

Tillich claimed that final revelation is universal and complete. It is ultimate fulfilment of truth, known and done. Christianity, then, is not final revelation; its strength is in its pointing toward final revelation. When Jesus claimed to be the truth He was not meaning metaphysically. Jesus was not ultimate revelation but He pointed to the Father, his way of pointing to the ground of being. He could not have claimed to be ultimate revelation because as He continued to live He continued to reveal further insights. The Word of God is not

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22.
 Tillich, op. cit., I, pp. 129-30. (See Living Bible, Book 2, unit 6.)
23.
 Ibid., I, p. 150.

delineated by the Bible. Much in the Bible is not the Word of God.[24]
The Bible is the Word of God when it points beyond itself, not making
false claims to its own authority. In the same way Jesus pointed
beyond himself. On one level He was acclaimed as being the truth
(John 1), but on a deeper level He himself merely witnessed to final
revelation in time (his references to an eschatological age) and in
being ("I came that you might have life abundant"). Christology
traditionally has concerned itself with such questions as "Was Jesus
Perfect?" "Was He the Son of God?" "Was He divine?" "Was He perfect
revelation?" Christology should now concern itself with existential
questions concerning the New Being in Christ as a power of growth,
fulfilment, and creativity.[25] His personal achievement, his
historicity, is not his claim to final revelation; his person was not
his finality. His claim to doing the will of the Father was not a
heteronomous submission of his will. His sacrificial struggle was an
autonomous act of his will. Such struggle by anyone for identity with
the ground of being (in the Tillichian sense) has just as much
possibility of being an autonomous act as does reverence for the law
(in the Kantian sense). Neither Tillich nor Kant valued passive
submission to a transcendent deity.

But fulfilment as a separate individual is limited. No one is

24.
Hermeneutics will be considered further in SECTION THREE, III, E.
25.
Then perhaps sermons on "Who do men say that I am?" would not leave
congregations cold. Then perhaps the question "Who was Christ?" in
religious education classrooms would not leave the students
de-vitalised. As two ministers left an Edinburgh production of the
musical "Godspell" (the pop version of Matthew's Gospel) they observed
the buoyant reaction of the crowd which had packed the theatre. Across
the road was a dark, empty church. One minister referred to the
Christological heresy of the musical. The other referred to the
Christological heresy of the Church in regard to its lack of interest
in the arts.

separate from others as no one is separate from the whole of reality. Jesus applied salvation (from "salvus"; healthy or whole) to every manner of sickness--mental, physical, spiritual, demonic possession, and submission to evil. The social implications of salvation as a universal quest means that fulfilment is a universal not only within the individual but also within society. The social aspect of fulfilment, related to the essential existential quality of final revelation, was shown in the social ethic of Jesus. Vital aspects of social and moral education are contained in religious education especially if the theological insight of that education is "God" as the ground of all being, the bond of unity which reconciles, and the ground of ultimate salvation and revelation. The social aspect of salvation is that self-fulfilment must not be sought at the expense of other-fulfilment. Kant emphasised the social consciousness through such maxims as "treating other people as ends and not means". One must not seek fulfilment in a way that inhibits the fulfilment of another person. Such social awareness can best be communicated in groups seeking to understand and perpetuate the social and moral qualities of the New Society, the collective New Being.[26]

Reason itself is integral to revelation in its existential connotation.

> "Revelation overcomes the conflict between
> autonomy and heteronomy by re-establishing their
> essential unity. ... Final revelation includes
> two elements which are decisive for the reunion
> of autonomy and heteronomy, the complete

26.

See _Living Bible_ Book 1, units 6 and 10; Book 2, unit 11; Book 3, units 7 and 12; and Book 4, units 1,5,9 and 10. This is the theological thought behind the content and method of religious education in the classroom use of _Living Bible_ presented below in SECTION FOUR, II. It also has implications for the role of the chaplain in the school assembly, see below SECTION THREE, III, B.

transparency of the ground of being in him who is
the bearer of the final revelation, and the
complete self-sacrifice of the medium to the
content of revelation. The first element keeps
autonomous reason from losing its depth and from
becoming empty and open for demonic intrusions.
The presence of the divine ground as it is manifest
in Jesus as the Christ gives a spiritual substance
to all forms of rational creativity. It gives
them the dimension of depth, and it unites them
under symbols expressing this depth in rites and
myths. The other element of final revelation, the
self-sacrifice of the finite medium, keeps
heteronomous reason from establishing itself
against rational autonomy. Heteronomy is the
authority claimed or exercised by a finite being
in the name of the infinite. Final revelation does
not make such a claim and cannot exercise such a
power. If it did, it would become demonic and
cease to be final revelation. Far from being
heteronomous and authoritarian, final revelation
liberates. "He who believes in me does not
believe in me,' says Jesus in the Fourth Gospel,[27]
destroying any heteronomous interpretation of his
divine authority."[28]

Revelation "overcomes the conflict" between THEO-AUT and THEO-HET

and may reunite them, but final revelation is not "heteronomous and

authoritarian". Revelation liberates one from a heteronomous divine

authority. (And liberation is a basic quality of PSYC-AUT as defined

later.) Tillich saw the Church as the community of the New Being

with actualised theonomy immersed in the conflicts of existence.

But the "almost irresistible temptation" was to become heteronomous.

The theonomous periods of the Church in history are those times in

which

"... rational autonomy is preserved in law and
knowledge, in community and art. Where there is
theonomy nothing which is considered true and just
is sacrificed. Theonomous periods do not feel
split, but whole and centered. Their center is
neither their autonomous freedom nor their
heteronomous authority but the depth of reason
ecstatically experienced and symbolically

27.
   John 12:44.
28.
   Ibid., I, p. 164.

> expressed. Myth and cult give them a unity in
> which all spiritual functions are centered.
> Culture is not controlled from outside by the
> church, nor is it left alone so that the
> community of the New Being stands beside it.
> Culture receives its substance and integrating
> power from the community of the New Being, from
> its symbols and its life."[29]

This should be the role of the church in society. But the situation

of the Secondary school in Britain, the objective concern of this

thesis, is different. The state school is not part of the church.

The school makes its contribution to society independently of the

church. Concern for theonomy is not its remit. It must not present

Christianity in its religious education classes or assemblies

theonomously. To give THEO-AUT and THEO-HET a unity in the use of

myth and cult "in which all spiritual functions are centered" is the

church's role. The school is not the place which functions to

actualise theonomy. But the school seeks to develop reason in depth,

an aspect of theonomy. The school cannot liberate reason from the

THEO-AUT / THEO-HET conflict by assuming the validity of theonomy.

If that is final revelation, the nearest the school can come to it is

to try to share with the church (within the life of the community)

the attempt to avoid "the almost irresistible temptation of becoming

heteronomous." It is the premise of this thesis that this aim is

essential. But Tillich's use of "autonomy" was not as a religious

term. An abstraction of THEO-AUT would violate his interpretation.

He raised an important warning. However concerned he was over "the

almost irresistible temptation of becoming heteronomous", he also

feared the danger of abstracted autonomy which could be devoid of

responsibility. Freedom without responsibility was not what Kant

meant by autonomy (PHIL-AUT). But Tillich's use of autonomy included

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29.
  Ibid., I, p. 165.

the possibility of irresponsibility. Therefore he did not believe that autonomy should exist independently of heteronomy. This did not help to avoid "the almost irresistible temptation of becoming heteronomous" but it did seek to avoid the equally almost irresistible temptation to be irresponsible.

However, theonomy must not be presented as the only option in interpreting religion. The consideration of religion in state schools must be objective, comparative, and critical in a way that avoids indoctrination however subtle.

"God" is the traditional, religious word which the new theology defines as "ground of being", while still using the word "God". Tillich wrote before the "death of God" debate developed.[30] Staff and students in Secondary school, unless closely associated with the Church, often find "God" an off-putting word. But a "ground of being" as the power of creativity and as the source of autonomy (PHIL-AUT) which is part of a goal in self-fulfilment (PSYC-AUT), can be explained in a non-cultic, non-mythological manner. It should be done in the school, however, not as an apologetic but as awareness of that aspect of religion which can help in the understanding and development of THEO-AUT. This would not be by Tillich's definition of "ground of being" because autonomy was not his aim. He would require revelation and correlation. In the school assembly, myth and powtry can be used to examine the language and mystical aspect of religion. But they must not be used with the assumption that worship is or should be a valuable experience for every student. The purpose

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30.

The writer of this thesis was a student at Wabash College in Indiana when Thomas Altizer was a lecturer there. Altizer was the main initiator of the "death of God" concept.

should be the deepening of wisdom through exposure to what some
people believe is valid. There is a difference between exposure to,
and indoctrination in, religion. The latter violates autonomy as
an aim in state education. Nevertheless there is much shared common
ground in PHIL-AUT and THEO-AUT (and PSYC-AUT examined later in this
thesis). Reason is a common denominator.

Inquiry into the nature of freedom has PHIL-AUT and THEO-AUT
implications. Tillich made this examination through ontological
inquiry in interdependence with "destiny". He rejected the dichotomy
of freedom and determination, for in their normal antithesis "will"
is interpreted as an object rather than as an existential quality.
Freedom is not a mechanistic, causeless function but an existential
part of a being in liberated action. Determinism is PHIL-HET in its
complete isolation from PHIL-AUT. Growth towards freedom is growth
towards PHIL-AUT, THEO-AUT, and THEO-HET. PHIL-HET is the will
yielding irresponsibly to an external control. THEO-HET in its
deepest rational form is the will choosing to be externally controlled
which has the quality of responsibility Kant included in his theory of
autonomy. Determinism implies total lack of freedom and also implies
that man is devoid of reason in depth. This interprets man as an
object, a thing. To treat another person in such a way is to seek to
control him as a means to one's own end. This is to treat him as a
thing rather than as a person. The relationship, in Buber's
terminology, is "I-it" rather than "I-Thou". Kant's imperative
stated that one ought to treat other people as ends and not as means.

"Freedom is experienced as deliberation, decision, and
responsibility."[31] Freedom was an essential characteristic of autonomy

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31.
   Ibid., I, p. 203.

both for Kant and Tillich. For a person to be responsible is for him
to act on his own will, to expect no one else to respond for him or to
answer for him. One is responsible for one's own freely-enacted
behaviour; no one else can assume this. Following on this, "destiny",
as Tillich used it, refers to

> "... body structure, psychic strivings, spiritual
> character. It includes the communities to which
> I belong, the past unremembered and remembered,
> the environment which has shaped me, the world
> which has made an impact on me. It refers to all
> my former decisions. Destiny is not a strange
> power which determines what shall happen to me.
> It is myself as given, formed by nature, history,
> and myself. My destiny is the basis of my
> freedom; my freedom participates in shaping my
> destiny.
> "Only he who has freedom has a destiny." [32]

Freedom is essential to destiny. Destiny, therefore, is not
the opposite of freedom but designates the limits and conditions of
freedom. PHIL-HET and PHIL-AUT are in inverse correlation, as are
determinism and freedom. As the one increases the other decreases.
But THEO-HET and THEO-AUT are not in this relationship. Rather, they
are bound together in theonomy.

The extent to which one can change one's own existential situation
is the extent to which one is free and the extent to which one feels
responsible. THEO-AUT in its relationship to theonomy interprets the
New Being as containing potential infinity within the actual finite
situation. For Kant, the divine lawmaker is the unconditioned within
the self's practical reasoning. For Tillich, the divine ground of
being has this unconditioned quality. The influence of Plato upon
both thinkers caused them to interpret this unconditional element in
the practical or shaping function of reason as a form, the "good-itself",

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32.
    Ibid., I, p. 204.

i.e., the norm of all approximations of goodness.

But the ontological argument of Tillich emphasised becoming.
PHIL-AUT is a goal. THEO-AUT is a process. This is an
over-simplification and without forcing either into a stereotype
this distinction will be useful later in distinguishing two
psychological approaches to autonomy (two forms of PSYC-AUT).
Maslow, it will be shown, defined autonomy in terms of goal.
Relating this to Kant's examination will create the term PHIL-PSYC-AUT.
Erikson it will be shown defined autonomy in terms of process.
Relating this to Tillich's examination will create the term
THEO-PSYC-AUT.

What must be stated at this point, however, is that both PHIL-AUT
and THEO-AUT imply that the underlying premises of Kant and Tillich
define "autonomy" as a religious concept as well as a moral concept.
The "divine lawgiver" and the "ground of being" give religious aspects
to their considerations of "autonomy". Yet Kant could have developed
the categorical imperative without a religious base. And for Tillich,
the religious base was beyond autonomy. For him, autonomy on its own
was empty apart from theonomy. Therefore, as far as autonomy is
concerned, Tillich believed that full consideration should not be
given within moral education abstracted from religious education.
But this was because he interpreted autonomy to be inadequate outwith
a theonomous framework. If THEO-AUT is to be seriously considered,
religious education is essential.

This does not imply that the religious foundation of autonomy
must necessarily be accepted. That would block the road to inquiry.
THEO-HET cannot be a means to PHIL-AUT or THEO-AUT. Religious
education that accepts God as a priori limits reason to a PHIL-HET

means and a THEO-HET conclusion. Religious education can show how
many do accept God as a priori. Tillich believed that the Christian
framework for autonomy was essential. But the student must be free
to accept or reject, otherwise his autonomy is violated as a goal
or process. The means would violate the end. The method would
prohibit the end result becoming growth towards autonomy (PHIL-AUT).
If the student rejects belief in the divine lawmaker, Kant would
not be concerned because it is the law and not the lawgiver which he
believed was a priori. However, if the student rejects belief in
the "ground of being" and does not aim towards theonomy (that is,
seeing the law as being the law of God), Tillich would be greatly
concerned. This, for Tillich, would be an example of autonomy
lacking depth.

In any case, the argument for the reality of God must not become
the ultimate issue of religious education. Tillich believed that
Augustine and Kant presented respectively theoretical and practical
observations of the unconditional within self and world. They did
not construct arguments for the reality of God.[33] Behind them was
Plato seeking elucidation of truth through the open dialectic.

Tillich was not arguing for belief in God but he did face the
question of ultimate concern. To avoid taking that seriously would
avoid his ontology and would misrepresent him. The issue of belief
in God as based on the unconditional should lead ontologically to
the question of theonomy and not to abstract theory. Abstract
arguments for the existence of God avoid the existential situation.

Tillich interpreted autonomy as a concern of religion. But the
direction was from reason in depth towards autonomy, not from

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33.
    See Ibid., p. 206.

autonomy towards reason in depth.

There is an overlapping between religious and moral education; neither entirely contains the other, neither is entirely distinctive from the other. A humanist might argue that religious education is irrelevant and unnecessary to moral education; a biblicist might argue that moral education is irrelevant and unnecessary to religious education. If so, both illustrate how eliminating either religious education or moral education would beg even larger questions. Augustine and Kant did derive from the unconditional the concept of "God". For one, this concept is the God of the Church, for the other it is the divine lawgiver. But Kant's ethics was not an apologetic for God any more than was Tillich's. Kant did jump in an Anselmian manner from an unconditional ethical command to an unconditional divine being. Tillich, with the advantage of 200 years of philosophical and theological reflections, did gain the insight that the ground of being and not a divine co-ordinator, was the foundation of moral principles. The greater ontological emphasis of Tillich means that to accept God as a "strange body" is heteronomous subjection. Kant implied that to accept God as transcendental would be heteronomous rejection of the existential concept of the ground of being.

In spite of Tillich's emphasis on theonomy, religious education in Secondary schools can, and should, be orientated towards autonomy. If it is not, arguments for its abolition are substantial. If it is, arguments for its inclusion are substantial. The direct implication of THEO-AUT for religious education in British Secondary schools is that they must not present kerygmatic theology as the Christian theology. This would close the road to inquiry and block the way to

autonomy. Kerygmatic theology should be included only as one of
many options within comparative religious studies to be considered
by the student. Tillich presented God in existential terminology
as an ultimate concern. He and Kant sought to avoid the purely
emotional grounds on which acceptance or rejection of belief in God
are so often based. The school is a place where pure practical
reason should be developed in as much depth as possible. This, for
Tillich, would involve consideration of theonomy and Christian
involvement. But although the school should get beyond biblicism or
kerygma to ultimate concerns, it must not aim for commitment to a
prescribed religious position. The kerygmatic image of "God" and its
correlation with the orthodox image of the church, Tillich believed,
are barriers to theonomy. They also, if presented dogmatically, are
barriers to autonomy. Kerygma lends itself to the criticism that
"God" is a construct. Existentialism avoids "God" as a detached
object. Existentially, faith has a concern and not an object, though
Tillich believed that this concern is nurtured in Jesus. The concern is
with people, existentially, and ultimate concern goes beyond Jesus
just as ultimate revelation goes beyond him. The I-Thou relationship
is between persons as well as between the individual or group and the
ground of being.

To be a person

> "... means both to be rooted in the creative
> ground of the divine life and to actualise
> one's self through freedom. Creation is
> fulfilled in the creaturely self-realisation
> which simultaneously is freedom and destiny."[34]

Human creativity is "to bring the new into being", not the essentially

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34.
    Ibid., I, p. 284.

new (essence) but the existentially new (actualised freedom). To be
a person means to have the potential ability to autonomously interrupt
- by deliberation and decision - the stimulus-response (cause and
effect) relationship which behavioural psychology interprets as
unbreakable. The extent to which this is difficult or impossible is
the extent to which autonomy is a myth. But going beyond Tillich, it
can be stated that to resist the return to the ground of being may be
to actualise one's freedom. What if one autonomously decides to reject
this ground? In Tillich's view this would make freedom irresponsibly
broken from, what he believed to be, its unity with the whole of
reality. Man's structural independence means that he is free. But
unity with all of reality means that he has cause to be responsible.
To be responsibly free is to seek actualisation of autonomy within
oneself and others. For Tillich, this necessitated going beyond
autonomy to theonomy. But the creativity of the ground of being is
the sustaining creativity of the New Being; it is not the sustaining
faith in kerygma. Faith is not the ultimate concern. Belief in a
transcendent God is not the ultimate concern. The depth of religious
experience is the depth of every personal encounter, actualised in
the freedom-to-freedom relationship. This is the connection between
THEO-AUT and PSYC-AUT to be developed later. This is the connection
between THEO-AUT and social psychology with implications for all
inter-personal, person-group, and inter-group relationships. Teachers
should try, in the religious education classroom and the school
assembly, to realise the potentiality of the individual and the
group. But Tillich interpreted this actualisation in terms of depth
and New Being. For him real religious education would be concerned
with one's use of existential reason beyond autonomy (THEO-AUT) which

he considered powerless and shallow. But this beyond (theonomy)
implies the kind of religious community which the state school is not.

Tillich believed that all truly theological statements are
existential; "they imply the man who makes the statement or asks the
question".[35] Therefore, religious education must take existentialism
seriously and thereby show as much concern for the person _who_ is
groping and as much concern for _why_ he is groping, as for _what_ he is
groping. The social context of this was anticipated by Kant. The
categorical imperative implied that individual fulfilment must be
part of universal fulfilment. To treat another as an end (a "Thou,"
not an "it") means to show social responsibility. The ground of being
is socially creative.

The existential aspect of being implies that self-creativity
and creative relationships are basic ontological categories.
Being-itself ("God") is the ground of both. There are two directions
in which being-itself unifies. It urges the bringing together of
potentiality and actuality (individual creative direction) and it
binds individuals together (socially creative direction). The urging
towards change is an urging towards I-Thou, we-Thou, awareness. "Thou"
is the matrix and foundational ground of New Being. But the "Thou" is
to be found in the depth of the horizontal person-to-person as well as
the vertical man-"God" relationships. The ground of being takes one
into both dimensions existentially at the same time.

This, then, is the relationship between religious, moral, and
social education. To abstract any of these as containing ultimate
truth is to reduce it to "misplaced concreteness". The creative

35.
  Ibid., I, p. 299.

ground of being is the correlation within these but not an element that can be abstracted. Each person is an individual (the freedom aspect of autonomy). By his ontological nature he is also one who yearns to return to his unity with all reality (the responsibility aspect of autonomy). This yearning is recognising the mutual ground of being with another person and all other people. This yearning is love. "God", the ground of being, is love. The movement towards what fulfils need within oneself is part of PSYC-AUT. To seek to fulfil the longing of another being, to long for his ultimate fulfilment, is an aspect of universal "agape". Love seeks justice to avoid destroying the freedom of another. The other is treated as an end, as part of the kingdom of ends, protecting the freedom of the one who loves and the one loved (acceptance). Creative love is through an independent, autonomous, self entering the relationship from both sides (empathy).[36] "God" as "Father" preserves man by his sustaining creativity (acceptance; grace) and drives him towards fulfilment by his directing creativity (THEO-HET).

> "But the God who is only the Lord easily
> becomes a despotic ruler who imposes laws on
> his subjects and demands heteronomous obedience
> and unquestioned acceptance of his sayings.
> Obedience to God prevails over against love of
> God. Man is broken by judgments and threats
> before he is accepted. Thus his rational
> autonomy as well as his will are broken. ...
> This is the authoritarian distortion of the
> symbol of God as Lord; ..."[37]

God as "Lord" (divine lawmaker) and God as "Father" (Love) are symbols

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36.
   This is a theological approach to these qualities presented below (SECTION TWO, II) as examined by Carl Rogers and as qualities that should be sought by any teacher of religious education wanting to encourage the development of autonomy within members of the class and within himself.
37.
   Ibid., I, pp. 318-19.

complementing each other, according to Tillich, for psychological

as well as philosophical and theological reasons.

What, then, is the theological foundation of autonomy? While it

is true that Tillich saw beyond autonomy to theonomy and raised

warnings against autonomy abstracted from its depth, it is nevertheless

also true that he agreed with Kant that the moral imperative must be

self-imposed.

> "The reason for the unconditional character
> of the moral imperative is that it puts our
> essential being as a demand against us. The
> moral imperative is not a strange law, imposed
> on us, but it is the law of our own being. In
> the moral imperative we ourselves, in our
> essential being, are put against ourselves, in
> our actual being. No outside command can be
> unconditional, whether it comes from a state,
> or a person, or God—if God is thought of as
> an outside power, establishing a law for our
> behaviour. A stranger, even if his name were
> God, who imposes commands upon us must be
> resisted ...."[38]

Theonomy, the law of God, is existential. God is not an external

power. Autonomy linked to its depth is, in terms of morality, the

self-affirmation of one's essential being. Apart from its depth it is

affirmation of one's desires and fears without real self knowledge and

without concern for others. Therefore, without depth it is not really

autonomy in the Kantian sense. For Kant the divine lawgiver did not

require obedience in a heteronomous sense. Duty was to the moral law

rather than to the lawgiver. For Tillich obedience was to the divine

law, theonomy, and not to the lawgiver. This he developed through

the existential aspect of the law. The categorical imperative and

theonomy are related.

Where theonomy, however, does go beyond PHIL-AUT is in grace. The

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[38]

Tillich, _Theology and Culture_, p. 136.

"ought" of the moral imperative points to the difference between actuality and potentiality. It creates conscience, and, if powerless, the feeling of guilt and despair. According to Tillich, even with earthly or heavenly rewards, or fear of punishment, the law is not able to create its own fulfilment.[39] Being must precede ought-to-be in the same way as "the good" must precede "the good fruit". Otherwise, ought-to-be remains an impossible goal. Morality in Christian terms is through grace and not through the law.

> "Without the reunion of man with his own essential nature no perfect moral act is possible. Legalism drives either to self-complacency (I have kept all the commandments) or to despair (I cannot keep any commandments). Moralism of law makes pharisees or cynics, or it produces in the majority of people an indifference which lowers the moral imperative to conventional behaviour. Moralism necessarily ends in the quest for grace."[40]

Grace unites the overcoming of guilt (forgiveness--"accepting acceptance though being unacceptable") and the overcoming of estrangement (regeneration--"entering into the new being").

> "Love is the source of grace. Love accepts that which is unacceptable and love renews the old being so that it becomes a new being."[41]

Included in grace is forgiving and accepting love. Love implies justice and the moral imperative. Nevertheless the Christian doctrine of salvation and grace has much in common with psychotherapy. Kant's categorical imperative is transcendent morality, Tillich's moral imperative is existential. Tillich went beyond the "ought" to the motivation without which obligation is legalistic.

The theological foundation of autonomy as presented by Tillich gives it depth and breadth. Its depth has been described. Its breadth

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[39]
   See Ibid., pp. 141-42.
[40]
   Ibid., p. 142.
[41]
   Ibid., p. 145.

is shown in his capacity to link, correlate, and integrate what seems
isolated. This he did with philosophy and psychology.[42] The freedom
aspect of autonomy can be coupled with guilt. This Tillich claimed was
his experience in the boundary between heteronomy and autonomy.

> "I was able to reach intellectual and moral
> autonomy only after a severe struggle. My
> father's authority, which was both personal
> and intellectual and which, because of his
> position in the Church, I identified with the
> religious authority or revelation, made every
> attempt at autonomous thinking an act of
> religious daring and connected criticism of
> authority with a sense of guilt. The age-old
> experience of mankind, that new knowledge can
> be won only by breaking a taboo and that all
> autonomous thinking is accompanied by a
> consciousness of guilt, is a fundamental
> experience of my own life."[43]

It was on this experience that he based "the need for a theonomy,
that is, an autonomy informed by a religious substance."[44]

This was the theological foundation for autonomy and it was not
a new heteronomy. Tillich claimed that he found his way to autonomy
through his protest against Protestant orthodoxy or any form of
religious dogmatism:

> "... as when a book, person, community,
> institution, or doctrine claims absolute
> authority and demands the submission of every
> other reality; for no other claim can exist
> beside the unconditioned claim of the divine.
> But that this claim can be grounded in a
> finite, historical reality is the root of all
> heteronomy and all demonism."[45]

42.
  See J.R. Lyons, ed., <u>The Intellectual Legacy of Paul Tillich</u>, pp. 19f.
and 79f. "Above all he wanted to be understood, to reach those immune
to the language of traditional theology—or of German philosophy." (p.24)
"He recognises no neat line dividing philosophy from theology." (p.35)
Our "...thinking... is broken and requires 'justification', and...
dogmatism is consequently the intellectual analog of phariseeism."
(pp. 103-04)
43.
  <u>The Boundaries of our Being</u>, p. 312. The psychological implications
are discussed below in SECTION TWO, II, C, 6 with the theory of Eric Berne.
44.
  <u>Ibid</u>., p. 313.
45.
  <u>Ibid</u>., p. 314.

The categorical imperative, therefore, would itself be demonic if it were treated as an absolute authority avoiding existential factors. Theonomy is essential if one is not merely to believe in the categorical imperative but is actually to live accordingly. Christianity, in Tillich's appraisal, goes beyond right belief to right action. For him, Kant's abstraction of autonomy from heteronomy is dangerous: autonomy does not contain the motivation for action and where the categorical imperative is enacted, pride can result. If autonomy is the aim in state school religious education, awareness of this danger is important.

Tillich's stand on the boundary between autonomy and heteronomy found, he believed, its symbol "...in the New Testament picture of the crucified Christ".[46] However, Tillich did not intend this phrase to be a limiting definition. He considered Heidegger's "emphatic atheism" to be "theonomous philosophy".[47]

The ambiguity of this boundary between Christianity and humanism is carried on into an ambiguity between Christian and religious education. But before considering this ambiguity, Tillich's theory of theonomy must be further examined in the light of his ontology.

B. ONTOLOGY AND THEONOMY

In The Courage to Be, Tillich distinguished between 'the courage to be as oneself" and 'the courage to be as a part' (of a group) and emphasised the importance of both aspects of ontology. These relate to his use of the word "autonomy". The person who is obedient to his

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46.
  Ibid., p. 315.
47.
  See Ibid., p. 324.

own commanding may be autonomous but unless he dares to risk himself
in being a part he is cowardly autonomous. What he can avoid through
autonomy (THEO-AUT) is being submissive to the part. He avoids
heteronomous conformity.

"The obedient self, on the contrary, is the self which commands
itself and 'risketh itself thereby'."[48] To command oneself is autonomy.
To risk oneself within the group draws attention to the responsibility
aspect of autonomy; assuming that it is not submissiveness in disguise.

Tillich interpreted "being" in terms of life, process, and
becoming.[49] "Man tries to actualise all his potentialities; and all
his potentialities are inexhaustible".[50]

> "Man is essentially 'finite freedom'; freedom not
> in the sense of indeterminacy but in the sense of
> being able to determine himself through decisions
> in the centre of his being. Man, as finite freedom,
> is free within the contingencies of his finitude."[51]

Man's freedom is in his ability to make deliberate decisions.
Self-affirmation is the courage to be as oneself. But there is a
relationship between self-discovery and group participation.

> "Self and world are correlated and so are
> individualisation and participation. For this
> is just what participation means: being a part of
> something from which one is, at the same time,
> separated."[52]

To be free is to be independent from the group. To be responsible
is to participate in the group. Responsible freedom implies certain
conditions to this participation. It must not be for the purpose of
conformity. Integrity can be maintained only if the courage to be is

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48.
  The Courage to Be. p. 39.
49.
  See Ibid., p. 41. It is through Tillich's ontology that THEO-AUT can
be linked to PSYO-AUT. See below SECTION ONE, II.
50.
  Ibid., p. 106.
51.
  Ibid., pp. 58-59.
52.
  Ibid., p. 91. The implications of this in group dynamics is developed
below in SECTION TWO, II, O, and SECTION FOUR, II, D.

not betrayed by the courage to participate. Participation must be in terms of partial identity and not total identity. On this basis, a humanist could be part of a group examining religion or sharing a religious practice as a learning experience without its violating his integrity. Self-affirmation within "the courage to be as a part" is autonomy seeking responsibility. Without this self-affirmation, the group can suppress, indoctrinate, or otherwise heteronomously control the individual. It can play on the weakness of the will, the desire to live under the protection of a larger whole. To be submissive is not to be free. To encourage submissiveness in others is to discourage the development of autonomy. However to participate or even to belong to a group does not necessarily imply the violation of autonomy. In fact, for Tillich, the courage to be and the courage to be as a part are interdependent and integral to each other.[53]

Therefore, it is in community that one affirms oneself. In a democratic group, each individual can affirm himself in a way which assists the development of autonomy in all concerned. Democratically arriving at a verdict need not violate the integrity of any person even if his views should be over-ruled. He has made his point and he need not deviate from it, but if moved by the argument he may be moved to reconsider his position. Such a verdict encourages participation, identification, and responsibility while avoiding conformity. If decisions are arrived at democratically, it is only the courage to be as oneself which can keep the decision from being mere conformity. The fulfilment of the group must not violate the fulfilment of the individual. And yet for the individual to have a feeling of ultimate meaning, he must feel he is participating in the creative process of

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53.
   See *Ibid.*, p. 92.

the universe. This involves risks and failures as in any productive process.

What the group must do is accept a person and his self-affirmation, and he, himself, must do this for each member of the group. "This is the way in which the courage to be as a part of the productive process takes the anxieties of guilt into itself."[54]

For Tillich, self-affirmation and participation should not be isolated from each other. The consequences would be individualism (autonomy without depth) and collectivism (heteronomy without creativity). The courage to be as oneself emphasises the freedom aspect of autonomy. The courage to be as a part emphasises the responsibility aspect of autonomy. Each is a corrective for the other.[55]

To participate in a situation with the whole of one's existence is the most radical form of the courage to be as oneself. "The knowledge of another person, the knowledge of history, the knowledge of a spiritual creation, religious knowledge—all have existential character."[56] There is a time and place where objective knowledge is important for objective detached evaluation. But this is not the same as really knowing the person, identifying with him, breaking through into the centre of his being. To see yourself as others see you is no more important than to see others as they see themselves. Empathy is as important as self-awareness.[57]

But if empathy reduces the individual to submissiveness, self-affirmation is violated: autonomy (PHIL-AUT) yields to heteronomy (PHIL-HET). Tillich warned against religious submissiveness from the

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54.
  Ibid., p. 112. For comment on the importance of acceptance in religious education see below SECTION TWO, II, A, 1.
55.
  See Ibid., p. 140.
56.
  Ibid., p. 125.
57.
  For comment on the importance of empathy in religious education see below SECTION TWO, II, A, 2.

boundary situation between the correlation of autonomy (THEO-AUT) and heteronomy (THEO-HET) in the quest for theonomy. (Kant's abstraction of autonomy and heteronomy - which forced them, by his definition, into polarity - was to avoid such submissiveness.) Group discussion must promote self-affirmation, and this must be done without dogmatism and with open inquiry.

> "Man cannot receive an answer to a question he has not asked. (This is, by the way, a decisive principle of religious education.) Any such answer would be foolishness for him, an understandable combination of words—as so much preaching is—but not a revelatory experience. The question, asked by man, is man himself. He asks it, whether or not he is vocal about it. He cannot avoid asking it, because his very being is the question of his existence. In asking it, he is alone with himself. He asks 'out of the depth,' and this depth is he himself."[58]

This "decisive principle of religious education" makes such education existential. Here one should be encouraged to identify in the human predicament through "being as a part". In terms of Tillich's Christian esistentialism, one must participate in man's estrangement from God.[59] But there is a difficulty in his view of religious education. His form of answer does not take into account the varieties of religious experience, or lack of any, and the many forms that questions concerning religious issues take. What he called "religious education" would better be called "Christian education" for he begged the question of whether Christ is the New Being with his assumed answer. What he called an "apologetic theology"[60] is too dogmatic, however existential,

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58.
  Tillich, Systematic Theology, II, p. 15.
59.
  See Ibid., II, pp. 16-17. (Tillich considered Kant, in terms of emphasis and not of exclusiveness, as an essentialist rather than an existentialist, and Socrates as an existentialist rather than an essentialist. See III, pp. 216-17.)
60.
  See Ibid., II, p. 18. See below, SECTION THREE, II, D for the reason why Ninian Smart believed that "theology" is not a broad enough base for religious education.

for those who are humanist or otherwise non-Christian. He showed the importance of answers being relevant to the questions posed through self-affirmation. But some questions outflank the answer of theonomy, however much broader and more relevant Tillich's new theology is than neo-orthodoxy.

Concerning the etymology of existence, Tillich correlated two aspects of the Latin "existere" with the words "outstanding" and "to stand out". To be outstanding is to be above average in power and value. To stand out means to share common characteristics with all that is. To exist is to stand out of non-being, to stand out of nothingness. To stand out implies to stand out of something in which one has stood in. He who is outstanding rises above that in which he still stands in, of which he is still a part. To exist is to stand out of non-being. What was potential becomes actual.[61]

But from this a corollary should be added. With this actuality there is more potentiality. For what is actual is a non-being of its own potentiality. A piece of wood shares being with the chair which it has the possibility of becoming. But it is not yet a chair and therefore in terms of the chair it has non-being in spite of its own existence as a piece of wood, an existence it shares with the chair it becomes. In this way, a child shares being with his adult but he also has non-being in respect of his adult until he becomes an adult. In the same way a person shares existence and non-existence with his possibilities. In his state of becoming he is and he is not what he is to become. It is here that Tillich's ontology links with the psychological aspects of autonomy and heteronomy presented later.[62]

61.
　See Ibid., II, pp. 22-23.
62.
　See below, SECTION ONE, II.

Tillich criticised the principle of motivation towards fulfilment as exemplified by Kant as being an isolating extraction of morality from religion.

> "If religion in the narrower sense is separated
> from morality, both are forced to defend their
> mutual independence: morality must defend its
> autonomous character against religious
> commandments imposed on it from outside, as, for
> example, Kant did in a monumental way, and religion
> must defend itself against attempts to explain it
> as an illusionary support of or a destructive
> interference with autonomous morals, as
> Schleiermacher did most impressively. There is
> no such conflict in the Spiritual Community."[63]

Also Tillich believed there is no such confusion in the Spiritual Community between morality and religion. They are interdependent but also independent.

> "The term 'Spiritual Community' itself points to
> the personal-communal character in which the New
> Being appears. It could not appear in any other
> character, and it would destroy itself if it
> imposed religious commands that were external to
> the act of moral self-constitution. This
> possibility is excluded from the Spiritual
> Community because religion in the narrower sense
> is excluded from it. On the other hand, the
> unity of religion and morals expresses itself in
> the character of morals in the Spiritual Community.
> Morals in the Spiritual Community are 'theonomous'
> in a twofold sense. /1/ If we ask for the source
> of the unconditional character of the moral
> imperative, we must give the following answer:
> that the moral imperative is unconditional because
> it expresses man's essential being. ...
> /2/ "If we ask the question of the moral
> imperative's motivating power, the answer in light
> of the Spiritual Community is not the law but the
> Spiritual Presence, which, in relation to the
> moral imperative, is grace."[64]

This assists in basic clarification between the theories of Kant and Tillich. Tillich agreed with Kant that religious commands external

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63.
  Tillich, op. cit., III, p. 169.
64.
  Loc. cit.

to the act of self-constitution must not be imposed. But he went beyond Kant when he delineated the New Being as coming from and only from the Spiritual Community. But then this is a development of Tillich fundamentalising theonomy and not autonomy. For Tillich it is the Spiritual Presence which makes one aware of his infinite value ("his belonging to the transcendent union of...the Divine Life").[65] And for Tillich it is the Spiritual Presence, and not the law, which is the motivation of the moral imperative, and again within the Spiritual Community.

The question arises whether it is really true that the Spiritual Community has a monopoly on moral motivation and whether within the Spiritual Community this motivation is guaranteed. The humanist would answer no to both questions. But regardless of the answer, the Secondary school in England and Scotland, the eventual focus of concern in this thesis, is not a Spiritual Community. And it is assumed in this thesis that the religious education classroom in this setting cannot claim to be such a community - certainly not by Tillich's definition of the Spiritual Community as "that element in the concept of the church which is called the 'body of Christ' by the New Testament and the 'church invisible or Spiritual' by the Reformation."[66] And although he made room for inclusion of "a social group of individual Christians" with "all the ambiguities of religion, culture, and morality", he still considered the Spiritual Community as being the Spiritual essence of the churches.[67]

The Secondary school in England and Scotland is not a Spiritual

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65.
  Loc. cit.
66.
  Ibid., III, p. 173.
67.
  See Ibid., III, p. 174.

Community in the above sense. It is rather an open society.
Therefore, Tillich's thoughts concerning humanism and the idea of
theonomy are particularly relevant:

> "In the discussion of the humanist aim of the
> self-creation of life, we asked the question, <u>Into
> what, for example, does the educational guidance
> towards this aim actually guide?</u> The development
> <u>of all human potentialities, the principle of
> humanism, does not indicate in what direction they
> should be developed.</u> This is clear in the very
> term 'education' which means a 'leading out,'
> i.e., out of the state of crudeness, but which
> does not indicate into what one shall be led. We
> indicated that 'initiation' into the mystery of
> being could be this aim. This, of course,
> presupposes a community in which the mystery of
> life, particularly expressed, is the determining
> principle of its life. There the idea of
> humanism is transcended without being denied.
> The example of education and the necessity of
> transcending humanism in it brings us to a more
> embracing consideration, namely, the question:
> <u>What happens to culture as a whole under the impact
> of the Spiritual Presence?</u> The answer I want to
> give is summed up in the term 'theonomy.' ...
> On the basis of my Religious Socialist experience
> and theory, I keep the term 'theonomy.' ... At
> this point the word is used for the state of
> culture under the impact of the Spiritual Presence.
> The 'nomos' (law) effective in it is the
> directedness of the self-creation of life under the
> dimension of the Spirit toward the ultimate in
> being and meaning. It is certainly unfortunate
> that the term 'theonomy' can indicate the subjection
> of a culture to divine laws, imposed from outside
> and mediated by a church. But this disadvantage is
> smaller than those connected with the other terms,
> and it is balanced by the possibility of using the
> word 'heteronomy' for a situation in which a law
> from outside, a strange law ('heteros nomos') is
> imposed and destroys the autonomy of cultural
> creativity, its 'autos nomos,' its inner law. Out
> of the relation of theonomy to heteronomy, it
> becomes obvious that the idea of a theonomous
> culture does not imply any imposition from outside.
> Theonomous culture is Spirit-determined and
> Spirit-directed culture, and Spirit fulfils spirit
> instead of breaking it. <u>The idea of theonomy is
> not antihumanistic, but it turns the humanistic
> indefiniteness about the 'where-to' into a direction
> which transcends every particular human aim.</u>"[68]

68.
    <u>Ibid.</u>, III, pp. 264-65. Underscoring added.

Perhaps, as Tillich claimed, the idea of theonomy is not antihumanistic. But neither would it be accepted as a meaningful concept by all humanists. Tillich carefully differentiated between heteronomy and theonomy, but for a humanist the one could be as unacceptable as the other. The aim of theonomy is as unacceptable to some humanists (and perhaps not only humanists) as the aim of "the development of all human potentialities" is to some Christians (and not only Christians). As far as the religious education classroom is concerned, if it is to be an open society without pre-suppositions, Tillich has begged the question. This does not mean that the non-church-related school should seek the lowest common denominator for its aim. It does mean that its aim must not be so specific as to beg any question--Christian, humanist, or other. Religious education must instead offer a consideration of the possibility of religious answers. To assume the answer of Christ as the New Being is one of many possible answers. If it is offered as the answer, then it is specifically Christian education (and one form at that) and not religious educational inquiry.

Nevertheless, Tillich has made an essential contribution by differentiating between theonomy and heteronomy. The first quality of the theonomous culture is that it seeks to communicate "something ultimate in being and meaning in all its creations."[69] This Tillich considered to be the communication of "the experience of holiness". But he believed there is a second quality of a theonomous culture and it is this aspect which can and should be accepted as an aim in religious education and gives a warning to irresponsible autonomy:

69.
    Ibid., III, p. 266. Underscoring added.

"The second quality is the affirmation of the autonomous forms of the creative process. Theonomy would be destroyed the moment in which a valid logical conclusion was rejected in the name of the ultimate to which theonomy points, and the same is true in all other activities of cultural creativity. There is no theonomy where a valid demand of justice is rejected in the name of the holy, or where a valid act of personal self-determination is prevented by a sacred tradition, or where a new style of artistic creation is suppressed in the name of assumedly eternal forms of expressiveness. Theonomy is distorted into heteronomy in all these examples; the element of autonomy in it is removed—the freedom which characterises the human spirit as well as the divine Spirit is repressed. And then it may happen that autonomy breaks through the suppressive forces of heteronomy and discards not only heteronomy but also theonomy."[70]

And so Tillich further claimed a third characteristic of theonomy: "its permanent struggle against both an independent heteronomy and an independent autonomy."[71] Irresponsible autonomy leads to a reaction of heteronomy. It is theonomy which liberates autonomy and allows the development of potentialities within culture. It is theonomy which gives, according to Tillich, philosophy, literature, the arts and sciences their transcendent foundation essential to "depth, unity, and ultimate meaning".[72] It is theonomy which gives responsibility and liberation respectively to autonomy and heteronomy (THEO-AUT and THEO-HET). Empty, irresponsible autonomy lacks the experience of the ultimate which religious tradition expresses. Heteronomy offers a necessary warning against an autonomy which has been reduced to a shallow freedom.

This is the reason why religious educational inquiry is so important in the Secondary school. Irresponsible autonomy and embondaging heteronomy are both dangerous. Although theonomy relates

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70.
 Ibid., III, pp. 266-67. Underscoring added.
71.
 Ibid., III, p. 267. Underscoring added.
72.
 See loc. cit.

to the New Being in Christ and is a specifically Christian apologetical answer to the dilemma of isolated autonomy and heteronomy lacking depth, Tillich gave a broader interpretation to "Word of God". "Word of God is the Spirit-determined human word."[73] But here religious educational inquiry is neither Christian nor non-Christian, for it must not be bound to a narrow definition of religion in content or form. Here in group discussion each person must be free to disclose himself and hopefully find acceptance in the existential situation. The power of the Spiritual Presence can break through to link the centres of speaker and listeners to encourage honesty and genuineness, to avoid deception and distortion. The end becomes not to win the argument but to make a clearer discovery of the truth. It is this openness which unites being with being in non-verbal as well as verbal communication and makes a collection of people a purposeful group. Subject-object (I-it) relationship becomes subject-subject (I-Thou) relationship. Discussion is encouraged in this way to lead beyond conclusions to existential insights. This can move to a state of being which Tillich called "the transcendent unity".[74]

> "Such Spirit-determined cognition is 'revelation,'
> just as Spirit-determined language is 'Word of God.'
> And as 'Word of God is not restricted to the Holy
> Scriptures, so 'revelation' is not restricted to the
> revelatory experiences on which all actual religions
> are based. ... The biblical imagery describing
> Wisdom and Logos as being 'with' God and 'with'
> men makes the point quite obvious. ... Theonomy
> never contradicts autonomously created knowledge,
> but it does contradict a knowledge which claims to
> be autonomous but is actually the result of
> distorted theonomy."[75]

What one believes autonomously may be "distorted theonomy". Autonomously held belief which is self-righteous is autonomy without

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[73.]
Ibid., III, p. 270.
[74.]
See ibid., III, p. 272.
[75.]
Loc. cit.

depth. An individual with such an attitude is in a subject-object
and not a subject-subject relationship with his group members. In
the search for truth it is vital "... that, under the principle of
autonomy, all potentialities of man's cognitive encounter with
reality are developed." [76]

The search for autonomy is the search for identity. It is part
of the courage to be. And Tillich believed it is part of the search
for the Spiritual Presence. For him, only this avoids the split
between a controlling (autonomous) subject and a controlled
(heteronomous) object. The reunion is given, not commanded.

> "The self which has found its identity is the self
> of him who is 'accepted' as a unity in spite of his
> disunity.
> "The split between subject and object also
> produces the ambiguities of educating and guiding
> another person. In both activities it is necessary,
> though impossible, to find a way between
> self-restriction and self-imposition on the part
> of the educator or guide. Complete self-restriction,
> as exemplified in some types of progressive
> schools, leads to complete ineffectiveness. The
> object is not asked to unite with the subject in a
> common content but is left alone in bondage to
> himself and to his ambiguities as a person, while
> the subject, instead of educating or guiding,
> remains an irrelevant observer. The opposite
> attitude violates the object of education and
> guidance by transforming him into an object
> without subjectivity and therefore incapable of
> being educated to his own fulfilment or guided
> toward his ultimate aim. He can only be controlled
> by indoctrination, commands, tricks, 'brainwashing,'
> and so on, and in extreme cases, as in concentration
> camps, by methods of dehumanization which deprive
> him of his subjectivity by depriving him of the
> necessary biological and psychological conditions
> for existing as a person. They transform him into
> a perfect example of the principle of conditioned
> reflexes. The Spirit liberates both from mere
> subjectivity and from mere objectivity. ...

76.
 Ibid., III, p. 273.

"The same is true of the other person to
person encounters. The other person is a stranger,
but a stranger only in disguise. Actually he is an
estranged part of one's self. Therefore one's own
humanity can be realised only in reunion with him—
a reunion which is also decisive for the
realization of his humanity. ... Neither surrender
nor subjection are adequate means of reaching the
other one. ... Only through the impact of the
Spiritual Presence is the shell of self-seclusion
pierced. The stranger who is an estranged part of
one's self has ceased to be a stranger when he is
experienced as coming from the same ground as one's
self. Theonomy saves humanity in every human
encounter."[77]

This gives implications to the psychological aspects of autonomy

and the educational content and form which will be considered in later

sections of this thesis. But before stating more clearly the

educational implications of Tillich's theory and before leaving the

philosophical and theological foundation of autonomy that has been

stated, this must be said: Kant would protest vigorously against the

idea that his own theory of autonomy lacked depth. He would consider

Tillich doctrinaire and too specific in a definition of autonomy. For

Kant, autonomy had depth and breadth. To him, THEO-AUT would be

autonomy without responsibility and THEO-HET would be responsibility

without freedom. His fear of Tillich's view of autonomy would be that

it might crush spontaneity. The self is not really liberated.

Tillich's fear of Kant's view would be that it might lead to

self-seclusion, and that PHIL-AUT avoids "the courage to be as a

part".

For Tillich, autonomous reason is reason without depth. But he

believed that its depth does not come so much from the protest of

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77.
Ibid., III, pp. 276-278. Underscoring added. The relationship
between "subject" and "object" in the role of the teacher is presented
below in SECTION THREE, III, A.

heteronomy (which is too destructive) as from theonomy being the aim.
There is a submissive element in Christian faith, but for Tillich it
is a liberating submissiveness. His fear of autonomy without depth was
that it leads to despair. Certainly abstracted THEO-AUT leads to
self-centred irresponsibility. Hence the need for empathy, discipline,
and what will be called "subjective-subjectivity". Tillich's fear of
heteronomy was that in isolation it is destructive. Psychologically,
the term inhibiting or embondaging would be appropriate.

By autonomy Kant meant responsible freedom. What Tillich did
was to give a warning against autonomy without depth. But his use of
theonomy can be just as doctrainaire as the neo-orthodoxy which he
disliked. The New Being in Jesus Christ must not be interpreted in
this way. His view of the New Being in Jesus Christ has value as an
aim for Christian education in the church or Church school but not for
religious education in the State school. For it would violate the
open-ended approach necessary for liberal education. It would beg the
question. But subjective-subjectivity can make education encounter
what Tillich would consider to be the religious aspect. And this is
the existential framework of theonomy.

To consider this more closely it is necessary to consider
Tillich's view of education before bringing this section on a
theological consideration of autonomy to a conclusion.

C. THE EDUCATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF TILLICH'S THOUGHT

In his essay on "A Theology of Education"[78] Tillich delineated
three educational aims: technical, inducting, and humanistic.

78.
   Theology of Culture, pp. 146-57.

Technical education is primarily concerned with developing skills such as reading and writing (general skills), and art, craft, and music (special skills).

Inducting education, as exemplified in medieval culture, is education for adjustment: induction into family, community, church, and nation with their traditions, symbols and demands. Inducting education is education for adjustment to the actualities of a group. Medieval Christianity influenced individual and social life in this way.

Humanistic education is primarily concerned with "the development of all human potentialities, individually and socially."[79] As with technical and inducting education it requires discipline and critical subordination to the demands of the expert and the community. Tillich placed the roots of humanistic education in the religious experience of the early Renaissance. The presence of the infinite came to be seen in everything finite. Mirroring the universe and its divine ground, the individual is given significance and the freedom to develop his creative possibilities. Education has therefore the aim of actualising these potentialities as fully as possible.

Public education has been basically technical and inducting. The developing complexity of society has meant that specialist skills are increasingly needed. But care has been taken to make certain that education has included an induction into the morals and beliefs of bourgeois society. During the Nineteenth Century technical education over-shadowed humanistic education. Creativity was no longer a development towards a potentiality but a possession with value

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79.
Ibid., p. 146. PSYC-AUT as portrayed later takes humanistic education seriously but not necessarily with a critical approach to culture.

equivalent to material possessions.

According to Tillich, there has been in American society

> "... a kind of permissiveness which makes it
> possible for young people to express their
> willfulness and aggressiveness uninhibited by
> a stern discipline, but in such a way that
> after several years an astonishing adjustment
> to the demands of contemporary society has
> taken place and the revolutionary spirit of
> the young has evaporated."[80]

To whatever extent this is the case in Britain today, the point is
that education tends to be education for adjustment rather than for
change, and adjustment to the less creative aspects of society. At
least in the Middle Ages induction was into a community—the "corpus
Christianum" which embraced politics and culture: "induction was
initiation into the mystery of human existence."[81] In countries
where the Church has dominated education, this mystery has been an
aim. But induction tends to make use of the mystery for conserving
rather than changing society.

This leaves humanistic education with its assumed purpose of
developing all potentialities of the individual and the group.
According to Tillich, it has lost its religious substance and has
become empty. To him it proclaims culture without ultimate
seriousness. But many would say that humanistic education has the
possibility of being radical without religious substance, and having
depth, going to the roots, leaving nothing beyond questioning. Indeed,
it was Tillich's emphatic criticism of humanism which makes his theory
just as dogmatic as much of humanism's criticism of religion.

On the surface, humanism appears as opposite to religious faith.

80.
  Ibid., p. 150.
81.
  Ibid., p. 151.

With some statements of religious faith this is true. But for Tillich faith is defined not – as in dogmatic orthodoxy – in an antithesis to doubt, but in its link with risk. Faith must be dynamic and not static.

Tillich believed that a rational understanding of religious symbols could destroy their power.

> "The great art of the religious educator is to transform the primitive literalism with respect to the religious symbols into a conceptual interpretation without destroying the power of the symbols."[82]

Tillich wanted religious symbols introduced early in the child's life even before the ability to conceptualise has been developed, for symbols, he believed, open up the subconscious levels for the ultimate mystery of being. However, the child needs help in making the necessary transition from literalism through symbols into conceptual thinking. The symbols must not be the end of the educational process but they are an important part.

> "The conquest of literalism without the loss of symbols is the great task for religious education. It brings the humanistic element into the Church School and enables the pupil to remain in the unity of the Church as a mature, critical, and yet faith-determined personality."[83]

But to be faith-determined through symbols which are intended to open up the subconscious level before the ability to conceptualise and critically evaluate has been developed, would be seen by many to be heteronomous indoctrination at its worst. In the first place, if an individual does not have the rationality or spiritual awareness to come to theonomy through autonomy with understanding, he is left with

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82.
 Ibid., p. 155. For one humanist's approach, see O.B. Hardison, Toward Freedom and Dignity.
83.
 Ibid., p. 156. Goldman presented a view contrary to this. See below, SECTION THREE, II, A.

the kind of heteronomy Tillich sought to avoid. He did not allow for the fact that most people, not least children, are unable to go beyond literalism. (Ronald Goldman's concern with this problem in religious education is developed later in this thesis). In the second place, if the child is presented with a "fait accompli" before he is able to evaluate it critically, the aim of education is indoctrination rather than the encouragement of autonomous thought. One has only to replace the Christian symbols with Communist symbols to see the effect. If in religious education symbols are encountered, they should be symbols offering a variety of religious views. And linked with other studies in a humanities department, religious education itself would not claim to offer all the options.

Tillich realised that he was referring to a particular cultural situation, the Church school in America in the late 1950s. The Church school had carefully to relate Christianity and culture (generally) and Christianity and education (especially). "The problem is infinite and must be solved again in every generation."[84]

How then is it to be solved in the Secondary school in Britain today? There is a difference between the situation of the state school in Britain and the situation of the Church school in America. How does this effect religious education?

In the American Church school there is no problem; it is in the same situation as the Church in Britain: religious education can be Christian education. Both can accept theonomy as their goal and no one would take exception to theonomy being a possible goal.

Whether this type of approach is used in British schools as part of religious education is, at the present time, largely the

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84.
    Ibid., p. 157.

responsibility of the headmaster and the particular teachers involved.
However, if it is taught it should be offered not as _the_ answer but
as one of many possible answers to questions of ultimate concern.
Theonomy is not the aim of the state school nor the primary aim of
religious education in such schools. Autonomy (PHIL-AUT) should be
an aim of state education. Tillich went beyond this. But what he
called religious instruction should more correctly (at least in the
terms of this thesis) have been called Christian Education. For, as
Tillich himself claimed, the quest for theonomy can only be fulfilled
through final revelation in the unity of the Church. He was
highlighting the importance of the Church's understanding its purpose.
He was not defining the task of state education.

Tillich was concerned over that which "Threatens /one's/
spiritual freedom by driving the contemporary mind into irrational
and compulsive affirmations or negations of religion."[85] Yet he
endorsed this heteronomy by driving religious education into the
smaller circle of Christian education. He obviously wanted endorsement
of a religious mentality. As Kant believed that anyone who did not
accept the categorical imperative was being irrational, so Tillich
believed that anyone who did not accept theonomy was lacking
perception.

It is very important to this thesis to understand and accept the
meaning of religion as "ultimate concern":

> "Religion, in the largest and most basic sense of
> the word, is ultimate concern. And ultimate
> concern is manifest in all creative functions of
> the human spirit. It is manifest in the moral
> sphere as the unconditional seriousness of the
> moral demand. Therefore, if someone rejects
> religion in the name of the moral function of
> the human spirit, he rejects religion in the
> name of religion. Ultimate concern is manifest

85.
 Ibid., p. 3.

in the realm of knowledge as the passionate
longing for ultimate reality. Therefore, if
anyone rejects religion in the name of the
cognitive function of the human spirit, he rejects
religion in the name of religion. Ultimate concern
is manifest in the aesthetic function of the human
spirit as the infinite desire to express ultimate
meaning. Therefore, if anyone rejects religion in
the name of the human spirit, he rejects religion
in the name of religion. You cannot reject
religion with ultimate seriousness, because
ultimate seriousness, or the state of being
ultimately concerned, is itself religion. Religion
is the substance, the ground, and the depth of
man's spiritual life. This is the religious
aspect of the human spirit."[86]

This is a very general definition of religion. It suggests no

division between the religious and the secular realms. Religion is

all-embracing.

"But now the question arises, what about
religion in the narrower and customary sense of
the word, be it institutional religion or the
religion of personal piety? If religion is
present in all functions of the spiritual life,
why has mankind developed religion as a special
sphere among others, in myth, cult, devotion,
and ecclesiastical institutions? The answer is,
because of the tragic estrangement of man's
spiritual life from its own ground and depth.
According to the visionary who has written the
last book of the Bible, there will be no temple
in the heavenly Jerusalem, for God will be all
in all. There will be no secular realm, and for
this very reason there will be no religious
realm. Religion will be again what it is
essentially, the all-determining ground and
substance of man's spiritual life.
"Religion opens up the depth of man's
spiritual life which is usually covered by the
dust of our daily life and the noise of our
secular work. It gives us the experience of the
Holy, of something which is untouchable,
awe-inspiring, an ultimate meaning, the source
of ultimate courage. This is the glory of what
we call religion. But beside its glory lies its
shame. It makes itself the ultimate and
despises the secular realm. It makes its myths
and doctrines, its rites and laws into
ultimates and persecutes those who do not subject

86.
Ibid., p. 8. Underscoring added.

themselves to it. It forgets that its own
existence is a result of man's tragic
estrangement from his true being. It forgets
its own emergency character.

"This is the reason for the passionate
reaction of the secular world against religion,
a reaction which has tragic consequences for
the secular realm itself. For the religious and
the secular realm are in the same predicament.
Neither of them should be in separation from the
other, and both should realise that their very
existence as separated is an emergency, that
both of them are rooted in religion in the
larger sense of the word, in the experience of
ultimate concern. To the degree in which this
is realised the conflicts between the religious
and the secular are overcome, and religion has
rediscovered its true place in man's spiritual
life, namely, in its depth, out of which it
gives substance, ultimate meaning, judgment,
and creative courage to all functions of the
human spirit."[87]

This means not only that there should be religious education in
the state school but also that there should be secular education in
the church. Why not then a state church? Without forcing too much of
a logical conclusion onto Tillich's thinking, this must be said within
the confines of this thesis: the state school should expose young
people to that which is significantly religious and the consideration
of religious answers to life's basic questions. If religion is about
what concerns man ultimately it cannot be avoided within the state
school. But didactic teaching about what the Church may consider one
ought to believe must be avoided. Otherwise the school itself will
perpetuate the shame of religion. For the image of the institutional
Church is that it represents religion in its narrower sense. The
school must therefore avoid over identifying with the Church in the
narrower sense of religion while at the same time avoid separation
from it in the larger sense of religion.

[87.]
    Ibid., pp. 8-9. Underscoring added.

But further, the only way to avoid separation of the religious from the secular, and to make possible the broader definition of religion as ultimate concern, is to place religious education within a humanities department of the state school. This would not guarantee this automatically; but if religious education stands as an isolated subject, the old image is more likely to prevail.

A TRANSITION FROM PHIL-AUT and THEO-AUT to PSYC-AUT

There is the danger that Kant's ethics implies that a categorical imperative depends upon belief in a divine lawgiver. For, then, those who reject belief in the lawgiver could reject autonomy.

Tillich, by linking the religious aspect of autonomy to theonomy, could be interpreted as protecting the possible independence of autonomy from religion. He did not believe that this should be done. But one could do the extracting; to reject his religious base is not necessarily to reject his view of autonomy. Indeed, he defined autonomy (THEO-AUT) apart from this base. But he believed that autonomy (THEO-AUT) thus extracted was without depth and was dangerous. Because he believed that theonomy is necessary, he emphasised the depth as being religious, indeed as Christian. He so related the ground of being to the New Being in Jesus Christ that however liberal he was in his rejection of orthodoxy, however much he believed that Jesus Christ is not himself ultimate revelation, he nevertheless held to a strong Christology. He did not want to permit a humanist interpretation of ultimate concern within his theology.

Kant was open to non-Christian interpretations of the divine lawgiver. Tillich was not open to non-Christian interpretations of theonomy, even though his liberal theology claimed dialogue with other religions and with humanism in a way that orthodoxy inhibits.

Because Tillich was explicitly theological in his approach, it is therefore more difficult initially to permit the option of a humanist interpretation of his use of ultimate concern. But the options should be open for the humanist to abstract non-Christian and non-religious insights from both Kant and Tillich. If this is not permitted, then those unwilling to make a "leap of faith" could be

inhibited, if they were to encounter Kantian and Tillichian theories, from pursuing autonomy. To be specific, if autonomy is assumed to be a specifically religious concept, then it must not be an aim in the state school system of religious education. This appears a contradiction, but it is not. If religious education aims at the development of autonomy, it need not—and must not—imply that it has a monopoly on autonomy. Religious education can imply that religion might contribute to an understanding of autonomy. And, indeed, it can show how some would contend that real autonomy, real responsible freedom necessitates religious qualities. But if religious education were to state categorically that only religion can develop autonomy (PHIL-AUT), then it would be begging the question of the validity of religion. This would be a violation of an aspect of autonomy, responsible freedom, which depends upon open options. Once the state school assumes or implies that ultimately only the religious view is the valid view, then autonomy is violated. By the same argument, if the educator assumes or implies that ultimately only humanism is valid, autonomy is violated. In both instances there is a begging of the question that encourages indoctrination, however subtle. Neither Kant nor Tillich claimed to offer open options. They were too systematic for this. But their honesty in stating the religious format of their thinking at least frees them from the charge of subtle indoctrination. Yet both were too dogmatic in their systematic approaches to show how autonomy could also be non-religious in context.

Simply because religious education in state Secondary schools is the area of application for autonomy in this thesis does not mean that non-religious approaches should not be considered.

It is for this reason that psychology must be brought to bear on

the argument and why eventually (in SECTION THREE) it more clearly will be argued that religious education, if it is to aim towards autonomy, must be structured as part of a more general humanities department in the state school.

The things that psychology has to offer are insights into the adolescent as a person in general rather than as a religiously orientated person in particular. After two psychological approaches are made to define autonomy (two forms of PSYC-AUT), adolescent psychology must be generally considered. By maintaining growth towards autonomy as an aim, the use of psychology as a means to Christian (or even generally religious) doctrinaire apologetics hopefully will be avoided.

III. A PSYCHOLOGICAL FOUNDATION FOR AUTONOMY

It is necessary to consider the definition of autonomy beyond philosophical and theological bases, for modern psychology has brought new light revealing greater intensity and larger scope in meaning. Psychologically, autonomy (PSYC-AUT) can mean not only the individual's direction by maxims of his own decision (self-government, self-discipline, and self-responsibility), but also his moving towards growth and maturity in personality and character. In modern psychology the emphasis is not on "having a self-imposed morality" but upon "becoming a self-fulfilled person". Psychologically, autonomy is a process of becoming <u>free from</u> being helplessly determined by others and becoming <u>free for</u> developing one's own potentialities (self-realisation, self-fulfilment).

A behavioural psychologist would raise a doubt as to whether this is possible. It must be acknowledged that conscience can be "the voice of one's grandmother" or response to social pressures even when one believes one is acting autonomously. But unless all of life is determined, there is at least a certain amount of scope for autonomy to develop. A pre-destined, mechanistic view of human nature would invalidate the possibility of autonomy. The contribution of psychology – even behavioural psychology – to autonomy, however, need not be so extreme. It can help one to be more fully aware of the difficulties to be overcome. Every person is to a large extent a product of heredity and environment. When he believes he is free he may really be embondaged, or, as Berne would explain it, he may be coming on "Parent" or "Child". (Berne's view of psychology will be considered later in terms of autonomy, for increasing awareness of ego states can aid liberation.)

Since autonomy for Tillich was a process, continuity in the argument will be maintained by looking at this process through the perspectives of Eric Erikson (autonomy as a rudiment in infancy) and Abraham Maslow (autonomy as a goal in maturity).

A. THE MOTIVATION THEORY OF ABRAHAM MASLOW

The development of autonomy in the adolescent depends upon increasing self-realisation and fulfilment. Abraham Maslow, one of the proponents of humanistic psychology, interpreted this as a goal in the process of maturation. He believed that every individual has certain basic needs that must be met before he can begin to actualise his potentialities, and he elucidated the motivation behind this process.

Maslow divided the development of personality into two stages: needs and metaneeds. His theory of motivation and metamotivation can be interpreted as a kind of psychological development of Kant's heteronomy and autonomy. It can be diagrammed thus:

Metaneeds	Metamotivation (Autonomy)
Aesthetic Needs (etc.)	
Self-actualisation Needs (fulfilment)	
Esteem Needs	
Love Needs (and belonging)	
Safety Needs	Motivation (Heteronomy)
Physical Needs	

MASLOW'S THEORY OF PERSONALITY GROWTH

1. Motivation (Heteronomy)

Selected quotations can best summarise Maslow's presentation of needs revealing the movement of heteronomy as it progresses towards autonomy.

(Physical Needs)

"The needs that are usually taken as the starting point for motivation theory are the so-called physiological drives. ... Undoubtedly these physiological needs are the most prepotent of all needs. What this means specifically is that in the human being who is missing everything in life in an extreme fashion, it is most likely that the major motivation would be the physiological needs rather than any others. A person who is lacking food, safety, love, and esteem would most probably hunger for food more strongly than for anything else."[1]

(Safety Needs)

"If the physiological needs are relatively well gratified, there then emerges a new set of needs, which we may categorize roughly as the safety needs (security; stability; dependency; protection; freedom from fear, from anxiety and chaos; need for structure, order, law, limits; strength in the protector; and so on). All that has been said to the physiological needs is equally true, although in less degree, of these desires. The organism may equally well be wholly dominated by them.

"The healthy and fortunate adult in our culture is largely satisfied in his safety needs. The peaceful, smoothly running, stable, good society ordinarily makes its members feel safe enough from wild animals, extremes of temperature, criminal assault, murder, chaos, tyranny, and so on. Therefore, in a very real sense, he no longer has any safety needs as active motivators."[2]

(Love Needs)

"If both the physiological and the safety needs are fairly well gratified, there will emerge the love and affection and belongingness needs, and

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[1] Abraham Maslow, Motivation and Personality, pp. 35-37.

[2] Ibid., pp. 39 and 41.

the whole cycle already described will repeat
itself with this new center. Now the person will
feel keenly, as never before, the absence of
friends, or a sweetheart, or a wife, or children.
He will hunger for affectionate relations with
people in general, namely, for a place in his group
or family, and he will strive with great intensity
to achieve this goal. He will want to attain such
a place more than anything else in the world and
may even forget that once, when he was hungry, he
sneered at love as unreal or unnecessary or
unimportant. Now he will feel sharply the pangs
of loneliness, of ostracism, of rejection, of
friendlessness, of rootlessness."[3]

(Esteem Needs)

"All people in our society (with a few
pathological exceptions) have a need or desire for
a stable, firmly based, usually high evaluation of
themselves, for self-respect, or self-esteem, and
for the esteem of others. These needs may
therefore be classified into subsidiary sets.
These are, first, the desire for strength, for
achievement, for adequacy, for mastery and
competence, for confidence in the face of the
world, and for independence and freedom. Second,
we have what we may call the desire for
reputation or prestige (defining it as respect or
esteem from other people), status, fame and glory,
dominance, recognition, attention, importance,
dignity, or appreciation."[4]

(Self-actualization Needs)

"Even if all these needs are satisfied, we may
still often (if not always) expect that a new
discontent and restlessness will soon develop,
unless the individual is doing what he,
individually, is fitted for. A musician must make
music, an artist must paint, a poet must write, if
he is to be ultimately at peace with himself.
What a man can be, he must be. He must be true to
his own nature. This need we may call
self-actualization.

"Boredom, loss of zest in life, self-dislike,
general depression of the bodily functions, steady
deterioration of the intellectual life, of tastes,
etc. are produced in intelligent people leading
stupid lives in stupid jobs. ... I have seen many
women, intelligent, prosperous, and unoccupied,

3.
  Ibid., p. 43.

4.
  Ibid., p. 45.

slowly develop these same symptoms of intellectual
inanition. Those who followed my recommendation to
immerse themselves in something worthy of them
showed improvement or cure often enough to impress
me with the reality of the needs."5

(Aesthetic Needs)

"In some individuals there is a truly basic
aesthetic need. They get sick (in special ways)
from ugliness, and are cured by beautiful
surroundings; they crave actively, and their
cravings can be satisfied only by beauty. It is
seen almost universally in healthy children. Some
evidence of such an impulse is found in every
culture and in every age as far back as the
cavemen."6

(Functional Autonomy of Higher Needs)

"Higher basic needs may become, after long
gratification, independent both of their more
powerful prerequisites and of their own proper
satisfactions, i.e., an adult who was love-satisfied
in his early years becomes more independent than
average with regard to safety, belongingness, and
love gratification at the present time. I prefer
to think of the character structure as the most
important single instance of functional autonomy
in psychology. It is the strong, healthy,
autonomous person who is most capable of withstanding
loss of love and popularity. But this strength and
health have been ordinarily produced in our society
by early chronic gratifications of safety, love,
belongingness, and esteem needs. Which is to say
that these aspects of the person have become
functionally autonomous, i.e., independent of the
very gratifications that created them.

"Although it is generally true that we move
to higher need levels after gratification of lower
needs, it yet remains an observable phenomenon that
once having attained these higher need levels and
the values and tastes that go with them they may
become autonomous, no longer depending on lower
need gratifications."7

The higher needs, then, are determined, according to Maslow, by

the gratification of previous, more basic needs. The meeting of the

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5.
   Ibid., pp. 46, 49.
6.
   Ibid., p. 51.
7.
   Ibid., pp. 58 and 72.

more basic needs is through other people. Maslow's view of PSYC-AUT
implies that autonomy develops from heteronomy. This is a very
different concept from PHIL-AUT where autonomy and heteronomy are in
entithesis. And it is very different from THEO-AUT which presented
autonomy and heteronomy as offering checks on freedom and responsibility.

2. Metamotivation (Autonomy)

The qualities of self-fulfilled, self-motivated people in Maslow's
theory include the above feelings of physical well-being, security,
belongingness, loving and being loved, and self-esteem. But beyond
these are feelings of

>"Autonomy
>Self-actualization, self-fulfilment, self-realization
>Development of potentialities
>Awe, value commitment
>Satisfied beauty need
>Greater intensity of excitement, happiness
>More frequent peak and mystic experiences
>Changes in aspiration level
>Changes in frustration level
>Acceptance - less destructive of self and others
>More creativeness
>Less rubricizing
>Calmness, serenity, peace of mind, relaxation
>Kindness, sympathy
>Healthy generosity
>Friendliness (opposite of character based hostility)
>Courage
>Genuineness
>Enjoyment of responsibility
>Better interpersonal relationships
>Less authoritarian
>Respect for minorities or groups with less power
>Less unwarranted hostility - easier identification with
> others
>Better judge of people
>Redefinition of the good life, success and failure
>Movement toward higher values, higher 'spiritual life'
>Less coping behaviour - more spontaneity and aliveness
>High morale - less apathy
>Adventurous - unfrightened by the unknown"[8]

8.
  Ibid., Selected from lists on pp. 72-75. These qualities are not equal
or isolated. Maslow's list is mixed, repetitive, and clumsy but therefore
is less over-simplified. "We should give up the attempt once and for all
to make atomistic lists of drives or needs." (Ibid., p. 25). This view
of autonomy also influenced his attitude towards the writing of theses.
(See Ibid., pp. 11-12.)

Further to these, Maslow elsewhere emphasised constructive habits, acceptance of unchangeable circumstances, self-discipline (not expecting others to have to correct one's own behaviour), appreciation, being unaffected by unfair criticism, initiative (not waiting to be asked), and greater concern for the big issues in life (injustice, prejudice) and unconcern over trivial issues. Indeed, the self-fulfilled individual not only copes with, but puts to good use, encounters of struggle, conflict, sadness, anxiety, tension, guilt, shame, illness and bereavement. For he is other-centred rather than self-centred, indulging in constant mental reflection on his own problems.

The self-fulfilled individual expresses gratitude for his indebtedness to others but is not dependent upon them.

The gratification of basic needs is essential but not in itself sufficient to fulfilment of metaneeds:

> "One of the possible consequences of need gratifications may be boredom, aimlessness, anomie and the like. Apparently we function best when we are striving for something that we lack...."[9]

Environment can diminish the possibility of potential fulfilment, not only by need deprivation but also by need gratification. Both can have desirable and undesirable consequences.[10] It is the desirable consequences of need gratification which make possible the positive qualities of character:

> "It seems quite clear that many traits characteristic of the healthy adult are positive consequences of childhood gratification of the love needs, e.g., ability to allow independence to the loved one, the ability to withstand lack of love, the ability to love without giving up autonomy, etc.

9.
  Ibid., preface XIV - XV.
10.
  See Ibid., pp. 60-62.

> "... The best way to teach a child to go seeking
> in all directions for affection and to have a constant
> craving for it is partially to _deny_ him love. This is
> an illustration of the functional autonomy principle
> that forced Allport to be sceptical about contemporary
> learning theory.

> "... The neurotic organism is one that lacks
> basic need satisfactions that can come only from other
> people. It is therefore more dependent on other
> people and is less autonomous and self-determined,
> i.e., more shaped by the nature of the environment
> and less shaped by its own intrinsic nature. Such
> relative independence of environment as is found in
> the healthy person does not, of course, mean lack of
> commerce with it; it means only that in these contacts
> the person's _ends_ and his own nature are the primary
> determinants, and that the environment is primarily a
> means to the person's self-actualizing ends. This
> truly is psychological freedom."[11]

The self-actualising ends of the autonomous person are not
self-ends. They are self-initiated ends based on human need that is
other-centred. With one's own basic needs having been met one is able
to be free to be concerned and empathetic with other people whose
quality of life is being or has been degraded. But unlike PHIL-AUT
and THEO-AUT, Maslow's view of autonomy virtually places "caring",
which he did not list under metamotivation, as a by-product of mental
health.

> "Let people realize clearly that every time they
> threaten someone or humiliate or hurt unnecessarily
> or dominate or reject another human being, they
> become forces for the creation of psychopathology;
> even if these be small forces. Let them recognize
> also that every man who is kind, helpful, decent,
> psychologically democratic, affectionate, and warm,
> is a healing force even though a small one."[12]

The autonomous person, in his freedom, shares responsibility for
helping others to move from heteronomy to autonomy by helping to meet

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11.
   Ibid., pp. 65 and 68. "Our censure should be reserved for those who
would close all doors but one." (Allport, _Becoming_, p. 17)
12.
   Ibid., p. 254.

their lower need gratifications. But he does not treat others as
ends (rather than means) for their benefit only — nor does he
seek corporate fulfilment through being grasped by the ground of
being — but aims for the fulfilment of self. He is more interested
in the positive correlation between autonomy and mental health. But
then it is true that anxiety, fear, domination by others, or feelings
of rejection — from lower needs being unmet — can lead to
psychological and psychosomatic illnesses.[13] And these then can
become barriers to autonomous growth.

The social implications of Maslow's theory raises observations.
The autonomous individual, because he is independent of the opinions
of other people, can in his detachment become independent of their
feelings. If he _is_ sensitive to their feelings, however, his own
empathy and kindness can lead to mistakes — marrying out of pity
rather than love, getting too involved when unable to cope (with
neurotics, bores, scoundrels, parasites, and psychopaths).
Sensitivity, therefore, can be in conflict with responsibility.

There is a difference between motivation and metamotivation as
there is between PHIL-HET and PHIL-AUT. Metamotivation is growth
motivation rather than deficiency motivation. Growth motivation is
internal and deficiency motivation is external. Here PSYC-AUT is
interpreted as internal motivation and therefore in its purest sense
is self-motivation.

Maslow listed what he called metaneeds (or B-values). He drew
attention to their antitheses and to the resultant metapathology of
metaneed deprivation.[14]

13.
  See _Ibid._, p. 98.
14.
  The following is selected from Maslow, "A Theory of Metamotivation",
Journal of Humanistic Psychology. 1967, 7, pp. 93 - 127.

Metaneeds	Environmental Conditions antithetical to gratification of metaneeds	Metapathology (Consequence of specific metaneed deprivation)
Truth	Dishonesty	Disbelief, mistrust, cynicism, scepticism, suspicion
Goodness	Evil	Utter selfishness, hatred, disgust, repulsion
Beauty	Ugliness	Vulgarity, loss of taste, tension, fatigue
Unity	Chaos, atomism	Disintegration
Dichotomy-transcendence	Black and white dichotomies	either/or thinking
Aliveness, process	Deadness	Deadness, loss of emotion, boredom, loss of zest, emptiness
Uniqueness	Sameness	Anonymity, not really needed
Perfection	Shoddiness	Discouragement, hopelessness
Necessity	Inconsistency	Chaos, loss of safety
Completion	Incompleteness	Hopelessness
Justice	Injustice	Insecurity, anger, lawlessness, total selfishness
Order	Authority breakdown	Insecurity, loss of safety, tension, being on guard
Simplicity	Confusing, complexity	Over complexity, bewilderment, depression, loss of interest in world
Comprehensiveness	Poverty	Depression, loss of interest in world
Effortlessness	Effortfulness	Fatigue, strain, awkwardness
Playfulness	Humorlessness	Depression, cheerlessness, loss of ability to enjoy

Metaneeds	Environmental Conditions antithetical to gratification of metaneeds	Metapathology (Consequence of specific metaneed deprivation)
Self-sufficiency	Contingency	Dependence upon the perceiver
Meaningfulness	Meaninglessness	Despair, senselessness of life

From this it can be seen that adolescent alienation can be caused by deficiency of needs. Alienation can also be caused, in a different way, by deficiency of metaneeds caused by the social structure blocking or inhibiting growth towards actualisation. Unfortunately, these higher values are often discouraged in various ways by society, institutions (including schools and churches), and individuals. If the school is to aim at autonomy, then it must enhance the opportunities for higher motivational factors.

There is a difference between the psychological goals of heteronomy and the goals of autonomy:[15]

$$
\begin{array}{ccc}
\text{Doing} & \longleftrightarrow & \text{Being} \\
\text{Coping} & \longleftrightarrow & \text{Growing} \\
\text{Achieving} & \longleftrightarrow & \text{Becoming} \\
\text{Striving/obedience} & \longleftrightarrow & \text{Fulfilment} \\
\text{Motivated action} & \longleftrightarrow & \text{Unmotivated action} \\
\text{PSYC-HET} & & \text{PSYC-AUT}
\end{array}
$$

These can be classified under the headings of psychological heteronomy and psychological autonomy. This does not imply that PSYC-AUT is some kind of passive, meditative uninvolvement. It does attempt to

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15.
    See Motivation and Personality, pp. 229-239.

differentiate between the goal of striving-to-make-up-deficiencies and growing-towards-fulfilment. Autonomous growth involves breaking old habits that have been heteronomously induced and either destroying them if they are unnecessary or making them one's own if they are still valuable, yet doing so in a way in which they too can be broken if reason demands it (for example, in terms of new awareness).[16] At the same time the individual who is in the process of becoming autonomous should seek to help others to grow towards and through this process.

It must therefore be stated again:

> "Let people realize clearly that every time they
> threaten someone or humiliate or hurt unnecessarily
> or dominate or reject another human being, they
> become forces for the creation of psychopathology,
> even if these be small forces. Let them recognize
> also that every man who is kind, helpful, decent,
> psychologically democratic, affectionate, and warm,
> is a psychotherapeutic force even though a small
> one."[17]

Such a sweeping statement does not mean that the Secondary school classrooms provide a therapeutic group in the technical sense. However, every gathering of people — where two or three or more are together — is a positive or negative encounter. And religious education must assume responsibility for pastoral care. Its concern is with relationships and developing behaviour patterns which enhance one's own autonomous growth and that of other people. Applying this to social psychology means taking justice, a concern of moral and religious education, seriously.

As the motivation in meeting basic needs comes from the environment, so religious education classrooms provide opportunities

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16.

Autonomously held habits, however, must be critically examined as one moves further from heteronomy towards autonomy. For this reason, decision making in the classroom should be tentative. See below, SECTION FOUR, II, C.

17.

Ibid., p. 254.

to help meet these needs - students helping students. The classroom as a caring community is the matrix of motivation and metamotivation towards autonomy. The healthy classroom is need-gratifying in a way which makes possible the metamotivational development necessary for PSYC-AUT. The sick classroom is need-thwarting, making such growth more difficult. However, there must be growth pains. The classroom should not be the kind of caring community which overly protects the individual with a kind of cacoon.

How the teacher can help the religious education classroom become an autonomy-aiming growth group will be examined later.[18] It means certain qualities as goals in the teacher's own personality development. It implies an empathetic understanding of what it means to be an adolescent so that the help given is appropriate. The psychological needs of the adolescent should influence the methodology and content of religious education.

Although the teacher is not a psychiatrist and must not pretend to be one, he must be a lay helper towards psychological health within himself first and then within the classroom. Autonomy is his goal as well as the goal he is seeking to perpetuate in others. He must be observant. He must also seek self-approval and fulfilment in a way which does not violate the real needs of the class. If winning the approval of the headmaster (and/or professional colleagues) is his foremost goal, then his dependency inhibits his own autonomous development and that of the class.

These are some of the implications of Maslow's thought not only upon autonomy in general but also upon religious and moral education

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18.
   See below, SECTION TWO, II.

in the secondary school.

B. THE MOTIVATION THEORY OF ERIK ERIKSON

The contribution of Erik Erikson gives rise to the placement of autonomy at an early age in childhood. A presentation of his Freudian views brings a warning to looking at autonomy merely in the limited philosophical Kantian perspective, the limited theological Tillichian perspective, and the psychological perspective of Maslow. Due to necessary selection, although at some expense to breadth; PHIL-AUT can be defined through Kant and THEO-AUT through Tillich. But PSYC-AUT requires breadth which considers others besides Maslow.

For Erikson, autonomy belongs second in his "eight ages of man". It is important to consider his perspective for it brings enlightenment to the psychological definition of autonomy and its motivation. Adolescence may be the age for autonomy; but so is adulthood and so previously is childhood.

1. The Eight Ages of Man

Erikson's eight ages of man are

1.	Oral sensory:	basic trust v. mistrust
2.	Muscular-anal:	autonomy v. shame, doubt
3.	Locomotor-genital:	initiative v. guilt
4.	Latency:	industry v. inferiority
5.	Puberty and adolescence:	identity v. role confusion
6.	Young adulthood:	intimacy v. isolation
7.	Adulthood:	generativity v. stagnation
8.	Maturity:	ego integrity v. despair

a. Trust.

> "The first such /decisive/ encounter occurs when the newborn, now deprived of his symbiosis with the mother's body, is put to the breast. His inborn and more or less co-ordinated ability and intention to feed him and to welcome him. At this point he lives through and loves with his mouth; and the mother lives through and loves with her breasts. For her this is highly dependent on the love she can be sure of from

> others, on the self-esteem that accompanies the
> act of nursing - and on the response of the
> newborn."[19]

The oral zone then is the first relationship area. Emotional development begins with the taking in, the retaining, the spitting out, and other "modes". Disturbance caused by biting or other causes of interruption affect the interpersonal relationship. The warmth and mutuality of the shared activity in feeding brings libidinal pleasure. The infant, taking what is given and learning through crying to get someone to provide, is a groundwork to becoming a giver. When he does not receive as needed, he exhaustingly thrashes about, finds his thumb and "damns the world". (The prevention of frustration at this stage is better than the substitutes of being held, talked to, rocked - when these are but substitutes.)

> "The infant's first social achievement, then, is
> his willingness to let the mother out of sight
> without undue anxiety or rage, because she has
> become an inner certainty as well as an outer
> predictability."[20]

This is the foundation of trust not only of a person's developing relationship with other people but also within himself. This becomes the basis on which self-confidence can be built. The absence of this trust can be studied in infantile schizophrenia. It also can lead to adult schizoid or chronic depressive states where the basic requirement for therapy is the re-establishment of a state of trust. Lack of trust in childhood is also the origin of the dangerous defence mechanisms of projection and introjection - blaming others for one's own weaknesses and praising oneself for the goodness of others.

In adolescence, projection could be illustrated by prejudice in all

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19.
 Erikson, _Childhood and Society_, p. 66.
20.
 Ibid., p. 239.

its forms, including using parents, teachers, clergy, police (the institutions of home, school, church, society) as scapegoats for one's own failings. Introjection could be illustrated by taking the personal benefits from the efforts of other people for granted, avoiding responsibility and commitment.[21] Erikson's point is that the irrationality of these attitudes is caused by the unmet need of trust during infancy which, without necessary compensation in childhood and youth, overshadows the rational basis of autonomy (such as that examined by PHIL-AUT and THEO-AUT). The need to justify attitudes unconsciously based on lack of trust warps reason. Reason becomes rationalising when emotional needs control mental faculties.

b. Autonomy.

The second relationship area, according to Erikson, is the anal zone. He linked this to the former with acknowledgement to Freud's suggestion that the libido, at the beginning of life, links itself with the need for survival. In the oral area this is by sucking and biting.

> "What would be the self-preservative function of
> anal eroticism? First of all, the whole procedure
> of evacuating the bowels and the bladder as
> completely as possible is made pleasurable by a
> feeling of well-being which says, 'Well done'.
> This feeling, at the beginning of life, must make
> up for quite frequent discomfort and tensions
> suffered as the bowels learn to do their daily
> work. Two developments gradually give these anal
> experiences the necessary volume: the arrival of
> a better formed stool and the general development
> of the muscle system which adds the dimension of
> voluntary release, of dropping and throwing away,
> to that of grasping appropriation. These two
> developments together suggest a greater ability to
> alternate with-holding and expelling at will."[22]

21.
  Living Bible, Book 4, was entitled "Commitment" and concentrated on themes that relate to the responsibility aspect of autonomy.
22.
  Erikson, op. cit., p. 75.

This "voluntary release" developed through muscular maturation is the stage for developing "two simultaneous sets of social modalities: holding on and letting go". Conflict here can lead ultimately to either "hostile or benign expectations and attitudes". "Holding on" can become a destructive restriction or a constructive caring. "Letting go" can become a release of destructive aggression or it can become a relaxing of unnecessary concern: "to let be". Or aggression can be constructive and benign attitudes can be destructive.

"Outer control at this stage, therefore, must be firmly reassuring. The infant must come to feel that the basic faith in existence which is the lasting treasure saved from the rages of the oral stage, will not be jeopardized by this about-face of his, this sudden violent wish to have a choice, to appropriate demandingly, and to eliminate stubbornly. Firmness must protect him against the potential anarchy of his as yet untrained sense of discrimination, his inability to hold on and to let go with discretion. As his environment encourages him to 'stand on his own feet', it must protect him against meaningless and arbitrary experiences of shame and early doubt.

"The latter danger is the one best known to us. For if denied the gradual and well-guided experience of autonomy of free choice (or if, indeed, weakened by an initial loss of trust) the child will turn against himself all his urge to discriminate and to manipulate. He will overmanipulate himself, he will develop a precocious conscience. Instead of taking possession of things in order to test them by purposeful repetition, he will become obsessed by his own repetitiveness. By such obsessiveness, of course, he then learns to repossess the environment and to gain power by stubborn and minute control, where he could not find large-scale mutual regulation. Such hollow victory is the infantile model for a compulsion neurosis. It is also the infantile source of later attempts in adult life to govern by the letter, rather than by the spirit."[23]

Here is stated the need for the child, even in infancy, to have

23.
    Erikson, op. cit., p. 243-44.

"... the gradual and well-guided experience of the autonomy of choice ...." (Although Erikson used "autonomy" in its general sense, because of his perspective the definitive term "PSYC-AUT" is appropriate.) Erikson emphasised that the infant is a person and not an object. The firm reassurance through trust is essential. External control in being reassuring is liberating and begins the "learning-to-be-free process". He interpreted autonomy as a gradual process. But one grows towards autonomy (the PSYC-AUT interpretation of responsible freedom) by being autonomous (trustfully treated as being a free person). It will be shown later how Berne meant by autonomy Adult/Adult transactions.

   c. Initiative.

When the infant feels that he is being treated with freedom for self-control, there is given a sense of pride and healthy self-esteem and dignity. When he feels he is not being treated in this way, the seeds for doubt and shame are sown. It is in his second year of life that the opposition between independence and dependence makes him ready for an encounter with his environment which can add initiative or self-motivation through a resolving of crisis. A relaxed, brighter, activating personality emerges by working through or "attacking" a crisis. And the child anticipates or welcomes the next crisis. On the other hand, if shame and doubt are dominant, guilt develops with deep regressions and lasting resentments. Thus, either PSYC-AUT with initiative or PSYC-HET with prohibition becomes the dominant endeavour.

   d. Industry.

The outlet for initiative becomes industry during the school years. The danger at this stage is shame that has led to guilt now becoming a sense of inadequacy and inferiority. What Freud called the

latency stage Erikson considered to be only "a lull before the storm of puberty"[24] when the earlier drives reform under the dominance of genitality.

e. Identity.

The industry age must open new horizons. Otherwise the child becomes a prisoner of vocation. "For the carpenter who is _only_ a carpenter, the world is made of wood."[25] A fundamental danger is that work becomes the only criterion of worthwhileness.

With puberty, childhood comes to an end and youth begins. The adolescent re-fights many battles of previous years in his search for identity. With the shadow of adulthood looming over the horizon, the adolescent reflects who he feels he is, against who he appears to be in the eyes of others.

A fundamental danger in this stage is role confusion. Over-identification with the peer group or certain idols can be an attempt to avoid self-identification. However, the adolescent can be helped to clarify his identity by reflecting his confused ego-image off other people. This is one benefit of conversation and group discussion.

f. Intimacy.

The young adult grows out of the search for identity with an eagerness for intimacy. If this is healthy growth, he wants to assume the compromises and commitment that this requires. Fear of ego-loss, however, may cause him to avoid such experience and be driven into a deep sense of isolation and self-preoccupation. Threat to his own identity can cause him to avoid group affiliation, intimate friendship, and sexual union. This alternative is distantiation, the tendency to

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24.
 See _Ibid._, p. 252.
25.
 Maslow, _Motivation and Personality_, p. 234.

disassociate from, and even to destroy, those forces which try to
invade one's own "territory" of personality.

g. Generativity.

Intimacy, however, is not possessiveness. Intimacy develops
beyond a love for the other person and oneself to a love for humanity
or what Erikson called "belief in the species" and a "trust of the
community". Mither a person develops towards the elevation of
"ultimate concerns"[26] or else he regresses to an obsessive need for
pseudo-intimacy with often a sense of stagnation. The cause of either
direction often has roots in early childhood impressions and whether
or not other-centredness has been developed. Erikson's "belief in
the species" and "ultimate concerns" can be interpreted as a humanistic
parallel to Tillich's "ground of being" and "theonomy".

h. Ego integrity.

The fruit of the preceding seven stages ripens into a state of
what Erikson called "ego integrity". Through appropriate care of
things and people, adaptation to triumphs and disappointments, there
can come love of the human ego as part of the one life cycle in total
history. Upon failure of this there is the tendency towards despair,
often hidden by disgust or "a thousand little disgusts". Cultural
institutions are important in making the positive fulfilment of this
age.

Erikson understood his eight ages with their eight possible ego
values as building progressively stage upon stage, but with variations
in tempo and intensity between different individuals. But also a
circle is completed: for trust in infancy is dependent upon another's

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26.
See Erikson, op. cit., p. 259. He does not define the term. "Trust
born of care is, in fact, the touchstone of the actuality of a given
religion." (Ibid., p. 242.)

integrity — the first stage in oneself is dependent upon the last

stage in others. Erikson's PSYC-AUT (one's own rudiment in infancy)

is dependent upon Maslow's PSYC-AUT (the goal of maturity) in

others. Erikson concluded:

> "And it seems possible to further paraphrase the
> relation of adult integrity and infantile trust
> by saying that healthy children will not fear
> life if their elders have integrity enough not
> to fear death."[27]

This reveals that Erikson did not interpret autonomy in adulthood in

quite the same way as did Maslow. This must be stated for the sake of

accuracy and is due to the emphasis that Erikson gave to autonomy

being a rudiment rather than a goal.

Psychological growth, according to Erikson, proceeds by critical

steps or turning points in "... moments of decision between progress

and regression, integration and retardation."[28] However, this is not

an achievement scale. The eight negative ego values are never absent.

They remain the dynamic counterparts throughout life whether or not

they, or any of them, dominate in any stage. As the body constantly

copes with decay, so the mind constantly copes (consciously and

unconsciously) with both sides of each age.

These are not meant to be clearly defined stages. But they can,

according to Erikson, be the seeds of basic virtues, as italicised:

8. Ego Identity v. Despair: Renunciation and <u>Wisdom</u>
7. Generativity v. Stagnation: Production and <u>Care</u>
6. Intimacy v. Isolation: Affiliation and <u>Love</u>
5. Identity v. Role Confusion: Devotion and <u>Fidelity</u>
4. Industry v. Inferiority: Method and <u>Competence</u>
3. Initiative v. Guilt: Direction and <u>Purpose</u>
2. Autonomy v. Shame & Doubt: self-Control and <u>Willpower</u>
1. Basic Trust v. Basic Mistrust: Drive and <u>Hope</u>[29]

27.
   Erikson, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 261.
28.
   <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 262.
29.
   <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 266. Underscoring added to identify the basic virtues.

For Erikson, the roots of each virtue exist before its critical
time of arrival. It also lingers after its time of arrival.
Therefore, wisdom does not suddenly emerge in maturity. Nor does autonomy
suddenly disappear with childhood. But each stage can increase the
development of maturation or stunt personality growth. Each stage has
growth effects as well as non-growth side effects.

2. The Influence of Autonomy as the Second Stage in Childhood

So when Erikson defined adolescence as the age for identity he
considered this to be the emphasis of a particular need. But needs
at previous stages are still present. To meet the need for identity
it is necessary for the adolescent to develop a sense of his own
purpose in life, a self-identity. Without this the adolescent remains
heavily dependent on the judgment and control of others. Therefore
identity diffusion - the unwanted symptom, is a result of continued
heteronomy (PSYC-HET), a continued life of inhibiting shame and doubt.
Therefore autonomy (PSYC-AUT) is an important foundation quality in
adolescence and must be present before the identity discovering can
be made.

> "If I say, for example, that a favourable ratio
> of basic trust over basic mistrust is the first step
> in psychological adaptation, a favourable ratio of
> autonomous will over shame and doubt the second, the
> corresponding diagrammatic statement expresses a
> number of fundamental relations that exist between
> the two steps, as well as some facts fundamental to
> each. Each comes to its ascendance, meets its
> crisis, and finds its lasting solution during the
> stage indicated. But they all must exist from the
> beginning in some form, for every act calls for an
> integration of all. Also, an infant may show
> something like 'autonomy' from the beginning in the
> particular way in which he angrily tries to wriggle
> himself free when tightly held. However, under
> normal conditions, it is not until the second year
> that he begins to experience the whole critical
> opposition of being an autonomous creature and being
> a dependent one; and it is not until then that he

is ready for a decisive encounter with his
environment, an environment which, in turn, feels
called upon to convey to him its particular ideas
and concepts of autonomy and coercion in ways
decisively contributing to the character and the
health of his personality in his culture. It is
this encounter, together with the resulting crisis,
that we have tentatively described for each stage.
As to the progression from one stage to the next,
the diagonal indicates the sequence to be followed.
However, it also makes room for variations in tempo
and intensity. An individual, or a culture, may
linger excessively over trust and proceed from A1
over A2 to B2, or an accelerated progression may
move from A1 over B1 to B2. Each such
acceleration or (relative) retardation, however,
is assumed to have a modifying influence on all
later stages."[30]

C locomotor
  genital

B muscular-
  anal   autonomy
                                   v.
                              shame, doubt

A oral   basic trust
  sensory   v.
                 mistrust

              1   2   3...

ERIKSON'S THEORY OF PERSONALITY GROWTH[31]

C. COMPARISON OF THESE TWO VIEWS OF AUTONOMY

The different interpretations which Maslow and Erikson gave to

autonomy (PSYC-AUT) can now be compared and contrasted.

1. Normal versus Healthy Behaviour

Both Maslow and Erikson made a distinction between normal and

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30.
 Erikson, op. cit., p. 262-63.
31.
 Part of his diagram. (op. cit., p. 263.)

healthy behaviour. Normal behaviour can be heteronomous (motivated externally) passive acceptance of the jurisdiction of others over one's own life. The healthy individual is able to relate to his environment, deal effectively with personal relationships, and accept an adjustment to certain social conventions. But when he lets himself be forced into accepting what he believes is wrong or adjusting to what he believes is bad, he may become more normal but less healthy. Only autonomy can keep him from submitting to exploitations, domination, and a life of imprisonment in the whims of others. Morality is more than mores; virtue more than custom.

Therefore, assuming that everyone lives in an imperfect society, moral health will presume a certain amount of emotional anxiety. For in this society there are attitudes which the healthy individual will not accept and which he will go out of his way in seeking to correct. Autonomy (PSYC-AUT) encourages an objectively critical appraisal of society's conventions and ability to cope constructively with dissatisfactions.

But Maslow's metamotivation theory and Erikson's life cycle theory are different methodologies of describing healthy, mature behaviour. Maslow's quest for self-actualisation perceives mental health as the outcome of growth and development aimed at independence from control by culture or environment. Erikson's quest for ego integrity perceives mental health as the outcome of integration of the individual with himself and his environment through different stages of growth and development but with autonomy as a form of freedom initiated in infancy.

2. Autonomy in Metamotivation and in the Life Cycle

The qualities composing self-realisation and ego integrity are

related. The connected lines are dotted to suggest that the

relationship is similar rather than congruent:

Autonomy as a form of
freedom initiated in
infancy.

Autonomy as independence of
control by culture and
environment.

Creativeness

Unhostile humour

Democratic

8. Ego integrity

Greater interpersonal relations

7. Generativity

Gemernschaftsgefuhl
(Genuine desire to help the
human race)

6. Intimacy

5. Identity

Appreciation

Autonomy

4. Industry

Detachment

3. Initiative

Problem-centred rather than
ego-centred

2. Autonomy

Spontaneity

1. Basic sense of trust

Acceptance of self and others

Efficient perception of and
relatedness to reality

ERIKSON'S EIGHT AGES OF MAN

MASLOW'S QUALITIES OF
SELF-REALISATION[32]

These connecting lines are quite hypothetical because Maslow did

not mean his qualities of self-realisation as being "atomistic items

in a list of drives or needs". And Erikson did not mean his eight

ages to be independent. But there is some correlation between the two.

Adolescence is a developmental stage in personality. Personality

is in constant flux. There are some aspects of society, institutions

(i.e., schools), and individuals which conspire against personality

needs. Only if adolescence is seen as an age for autonomy can the

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32.
   See Maslow, "Self-Actualizing People, The World of Psychology,
p. 214-17.

individual rise above these pressures and realise his metaneeds, of
which autonomy itself is one. The seeds of autonomy in infancy must
be planted if the fruit of autonomy in adolescence is to ripen.

3. A role for the Secondary School Classroom

The need for belonging, so vital to the adolescent if he is to
be free for fulfilment, can be met in part through affiliation to
groups, formal and informal, of which the school classroom and its
discussion sub-groups are a part. Here the adolescent is helped to
identify himself through his personality and viewpoints being
reflected from other members of the class and through seeing theirs
being reflected from himself. But the need to belong can cause the
adolescent to accept heteronomously the views of the group rather
than to develop his own views autonomously.

If as a child he has been forced into accepting heteronomously
the decisions of others and lacks trust in himself, if he has been
taught to be acquiescent and do as others say, then the opening of
the way towards autonomy by the Secondary school is urgent. The
alternative is a vegetative existence, a state of non-being with
destructive social and psychological alienation.[33]

But alienation need not be destructive. The idealism of
adolescence can be the source of a positive and honest kind of
alienation. This should be welcomed by parents and teachers, however
difficult it may be to do. For alienation based upon autonomously
held ideals is healthy. The responsibility of the Secondary school
is to see that growth toward autonomy does not conflict with the need
to belong. This means that acceptance is a necessary quality.

33.
See Mitchell, _Adolescence: Some Critical Issues,_ pp. 46-57.

Maslow showed how autonomy rests upon heteronomy. Erikson pointed out, however, the importance for the roots of autonomic growth to be understood as being in childhood. They were looking at the same tree (autonomy); but while Maslow focused his attention on the leaves, Erikson focused his attention on the trunk.

These two psychological definitions of autonomy point to the need to understand the adolescent as a person. The implications of PSYC-AUT for the Secondary school involve a psychological look at the student himself. For PSYC-AUT means development in adolescent character and personality towards the maturing of responsible freedom (Maslow) from the qualities present in childhood (Erikson).

SECTION TWO:

THE NATURE OF ADOLESCENCE

AND THE ROLE OF THE "TEACHER"

INTRODUCTION TO SECTION TWO

By considering certain philosophical, theological, and
psychological perspectives, the meaning of autonomy as "responsible
freedom" has been given detail which will be summarised in the
conclusion of this thesis (SECTION FIVE). It is now necessary to
survey the nature of adolescence and to consider the role of the
"teacher" before autonomy can be applied to religious education in
the Secondary school.

The nature of adolescence can be seen in the impact of puberty.
This is a psychological approach which must be taken seriously. But
the use of the psychology of adolescence must not have an explicit
or hidden agenda of persuasion towards the acceptance of a religious
outlook. Nor should the use of psychological observations be
primarily for developing a methodology of teaching techniques. The
primary purpose should be to form a foundation for understanding the
adolescent's existential situation by which his needs can be
identified more clearly. To gain some understanding of the nature
of adolescence is an essential step towards more fully understanding
autonomy and more fully appreciating the importance of the purpose
of religious education being "child-centred". The nature of
adolescence will be surveyed for this purpose and not as an end in
itself. This survey, therefore, is more an inquiry than a documented
study.

After considering the nature of adolescence, the role of the
"teacher" will be examined with the ideas of Carl Rogers (et al.)
forming the framework because he took autonomy seriously and offered
autonomic characteristic goals which can be applied to the "teacher".
"Teacher" is in italics because the characteristics in terms of

autonomy mean that the role suggested is not one of teaching in the
normal sense of helping the student to learn academically. The role
is rather that of facilitator, adviser, counsellor—a leadership
role that offers psychological dimensions to the role of "midwife"
in Plato's dialectical process. The practical implications of this
role will then be found in an examination of sociometry. Sociometry
is an aid to understanding the dynamics of group discussion, the
basic classroom method which will be considered further in SECTION
FOUR.

The present section, therefore, is itself a transition between
the philosophical, theological, and psychological meanings and methods
of autonomy which have been given in the preceding section and the
area of religious education to which they will be applied in the
next section.

I. ADOLESCENT CHARACTER AND PERSONALITY

There is a large variety of psychological theories. Two among them which appear to be in conflict are behavioural psychology and existential psychology. The behavioural school tends to emphasise that human behaviour is predetermined by previous experience. The existential school emphasises that the individual is free to make his own choices of behaviour. If a person's will is totally predetermined, the will is not free and autonomy (whether PHIL-AUT, THEO-AUT, or PSYC-AUT) is impossible. Autonomy should make allowances for behaviourism; any individual's will may be less free than he thinks. But autonomy assumes that there is a certain amount of freedom by which the rational individual can determine his own beliefs and actions. The implications of this assumption become obvious when considering adolescent character and personality.

Adolescence is a time for exploring, discovering and living (experiencing). In terms of behaviour it never leads to a complete transition from childhood to adulthood, but there should be growth towards maturity. Adolescence is the time for developing the process, for learning to be free and responsible. The prominence of crying, anger, and rejection are indications of the child determined to assert himself. The quest for autonomy in adolescence creates conflicts and frustrations, but hopefully it will lead to increasingly more positive and constructive behaviour with the adolescent anticipating the responsibilities of adulthood.

A. PROBLEMS AND IMPLICATIONS OF PUBERTY

Puberty is the basis of adolescence but refers to the shorter period of physiological change in which the sex organs become mature.

For girls this change takes place over approximately six months; for boys it may take two years. There are late and early developers; those who pass through puberty in the latter part of adolescence and those who pass through it very early. The adolescent in both situations may have special problems of adjusting.

Adolescence:

"Pre-adolescence, ages 11-12 (girls); ages 12-13 (boys)

Early adolescence, ages 13-14 (girls); ages 14-15 (boys)

Middle adolescence, ages 15-17 (girls); ages 16-18 (boys)

Late adolescence, ages 18-20 (girls); ages 19-20 (boys)"[1]

Girls usually mature physically one or two years earlier than boys. The stages are not meant to be sharp divisions, and the length of time the young person stays in any particular stage varies. Adolescence is normally characterised by puberty; but adolescence should be interpreted as a broader term that includes developments in intellectual capabilities, moral attitudes, emotional adjustments, and general interests. As the last stage before adulthood it is the last opportunity for preparation in adult responsibilities and emotional maturity. The learning and developing process does not end with adulthood. But as the hereditary factors, experiences and environmental influences of childhood are an inheritance which carry over into adolescence, so the personality and emerging "self" of adolescence becomes the inheritance of adulthood. The reactions of the adolescent are expressions of his desire to discover himself and to live his own life. The general acceptance of outside authority by the child can become intolerance of outside restraint by the

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1.

Cole and Hall, Psychology of Adolescence, p. 3.

adolescent. In Western Society, the natural desire for independence in the weaning process normally comes into conflict with the regulations and behaviour patterns accepted by adult authority.

On the way to adulthood, the adolescent must attempt to achieve some degree of independence, develop self-motivation, establish his own set of values and enough self-control to adhere to those values, relate positively to a variety of groups and individuals, and acquire the skills necessary for a vocation in life. Some of the needs which make these possible (or, if unmet, difficult) can be identified but are inter-related.

1. Special Needs related to Physical Characteristics

The physical characteristics of an adolescent influence his social and emotional adjustment. Obvious problems are thrust upon a young person who is severely physically or mentally handicapped. But all adolescents in their uniqueness have some physical or mental characteristic with which they must come to terms. It may be a blemish on the face of a girl or a slight impediment in the speech of a boy. Or more generally it may be dissatisfaction with something about their particular size or shape: feeling too tall or short, too fat or thin. Advanced or retarded puberty can create further conflict. It can come as early as nine in a girl or eleven in a boy or as late as seventeen in either because of the time the pituitary gland becomes hyperactive or for other reasons. And there is a recorded incidence of a girl who began menstruation at age seven months and who by the age of six years had the figure of an adolescent girl.[2]

2.
   See W.W. Greulich and S.I. Pyle, Radiographic Atlas of Skeletal Development of the Hand and Writs (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1950), p. 9.

The early physically maturing boy or girl has an advantage that often encourages leadership and participation in sports, clubs, and activities which enhance the prospect of social maturity. But the boy or girl who feels a pigmy among giants can more easily develop an anti-social attitude or sense of inferiority or rejection.

The influence of physical characteristics upon personality can be great. There is a tendency for girls whose sexual maturity comes early to be conservative, trustful of others, relaxed, uncritical, and dependent upon their peer group.[3]

The outstanding change during adolescence is sexual maturity. Adolescents need help to integrate sex into their attitudes toward life. They need reassurance if they have developed early or late that this will be balanced out by the time they have reached adulthood. The physically handicapped adolescent needs sympathetic acceptance and understanding, perhaps in inverse proportion to the obviousness of the handicap.

2. Special Needs related to Mental Characteristics

Neural growth, together with the continuous accumulation of knowledge and experience, leads to increases in reasoning, judgment, comprehension, and memory throughout adolescence. There are at least three theories about intelligence:

> "1. Intelligence is a separate entity consisting of inborn elements only, and is independent of emotional, educational and environmental factors.
>
> "2. Intelligence is a separate entity consisting of inborn elements but it can be influenced by emotion, education and environment.

3.
  See W.O. Shipman, "Age of Manarche and Adult Personality", _Archives of General Psychology_. 10:155-159, 1964.

"3. Intelligence is an integral part of the total dynamic functioning unit called personality and is interdependent with emotion, education and environment."[4]

In recent years, the first view has been disputed.[5] Illness, boredom, emotional problems or lack of adequate diet can lower IQ, the only - although admittedly inadequate - standard test of intelligence. And good health, life stimulation, and good emotional adjustment apparently can increase it, although not beyond what is permitted by the original heredity. Adopted children sometimes have an IQ much closer to adoptive parents than original parents, particularly if that of their adoptive parents is lower. There have been tests taken after a child has suffered the divorce of his parents showing a marked decrease in IQ.

IQ, as the ratio between a child's chronological age and his mental age, is difficult to ascertain accurately. The tests for mental age depend upon many factors: among these are health, emotional state, home situation, interest in school work, attitude to the tester, and even room temperature at the time of the test. It is impossible to hold constant all conditions and influences except the independent variable, the matter being tested. Most tests are based on material suitable for urban children of a particular culture; and young people with a rural background or another cultural heritage are under a handicap. Recent research has shown that IQ is not static; on the contrary it can increase even after the age of fifty, especially among those with superior initial ability.[6]

4.
  E. Fromm and D.L. Hartman, Intelligence: a Dynamic Approach (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1955), p. 2.
5.
  See Cole and Hall, op. cit., pp. 148f.
6.
  See N. Bayley, "On the Growth of Intelligence", American Psychologist, 10: 805-11, 1955.

Therefore, it is more accurate to believe that intelligence is merely one part of the total personality and as such is highly sensitive to a variety of environmental influences. And over the years the IQ difference between those with higher and lower intelligence tends to increase. An IQ can show ups and downs especially during adolescence. This may correlate with the emotional disturbances of this somewhat turbulent time in a person's life. The measure of intelligence at best can be only approximate. During adolescence there often is a marked growth in mental ability, apparently awaiting the right stimulus.

Contrary to much popular opinion, the adolescent has greater ability than the child to memorise.[7] But he also tends to have a greater resistance to memorising, preferring logical to rote learning. This tendency continues to increase into adulthood. Material should be so interesting and meaningful as to make memorising unnecessary. Memorisation does not ensure understanding and may be a stumbling block to learning.

The mentally gifted adolescent usually excels in rapid learning, retention, curiosity, and reasoning. But he also may be restless, mischievious, overly critical, inattentive, and careless in responsibility (i.e. not handing in homework on time). Kept under reasonable control, negative traits can be relatively harmless; but if they become dominant they can be disastrous. The mentally gifted adolescent must come to terms with boredom and show diligence with matters which fail to absorb interest. He must develop creative relationships with less gifted young people and use their criticism for constructive purposes. The more gifted he is, the more likely he

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7.

See Cole and Hall, op. cit., p. 164.

will score high on personality tests in such areas as courage, sympathy, self-confidence, and honesty.[8] But he can become introverted, developing his mind at the expense of his personality. He has a great need to discuss in groups and work on group projects.

The mentally gifted adolescent who considerably underachieves in school usually comes from a home where parents are negative or uninterested in education or, at the other extreme, where parents are overly ambitious and exert too much pressure. Or his parents may be too protective, or have a marital relationship which causes their child to be disturbed. Such an adolescent tends to avoid all forms of competition.[9]

At the opposite end of the scale, the mentally inferior adolescent, there are groupings according to descending IQs: dull normals (70-85), mild retardation (53-69), moderate retardation (36-52), severe retardation (20-35), and profound retardation (below 20).[10] Those in the last two groups may spend their lives in institutions. Even a dull normal adolescent, however, is not able to cope with Secondary school courses. His mental inferiority may allow him to cope with the simpler forms of factual material in Primary school but not the theoretical knowledge of Secondary school. The adolescent of low mental ability who enters Secondary school may be socially and emotionally equal to many of his more able peers. He may also progress well in non-academic courses. But he may become unhappy and overanxious because too much is expected of him. And an outcome of this can be his total rejection of the school authority and its values.

8.
   See B.M. Horrall, "Academic Performance and Personality Adjustment", *Genetic Psychology Monographs*, 55: 3-8, 1957.
9.
   See J.C. Gowan and G.D. Demos, *The Guidance of Exceptional Children*, New York: David McKay Company, 1965, pp. 63-66.
10.
   See Cole and Hall, op. cit., pp. 233f.

123.

His inferior mental ability may cause him to feel inferior generally. He may be rejected by his parents in a way that would not appear if his handicap was physical rather than mental.

The religious education teacher needs to be aware that the dull adolescent may appear amoral simply because he does not have the mental ability to grasp the generalised principles of behaviour or to solve moral problems. He cannot think abstractly. But he needs to find acceptance and security and a sense of having value if he is to overcome the feeling of being the least desired in the family or classroom. He needs to find success in as many areas of life as possible. Encouraged in adequate social relationships, equipped with vocational skills however limited, assisted with developing habits of honesty and fairness, and given an area in life in which to play his role, the dull adolescent can make his own contribution to humanity. He need not be a liability. Autonomy need not be entirely beyond his reach, however, much as it requires a certain mental aptitude. He should be given the opportunity for self-expression and assisted to attain as much responsible freedom as lies within his ability. But the limitation on his ability to reason is a limitation on his autonomy.

3. Special Needs related to Emotional Characteristics

Emotional maturity, as part of PSYC-AUT, should be one of the aims of Secondary education. An emotion is the human reaction that accompanies the fulfilment or the frustration of a basic need. The "autonomic nervous system" produces physical changes that form the initial automatic reactions to an emotional experience. This system of the anatomy is not under voluntary control. It is the central nervous system that can be voluntarily controlled. Thus an insulted person feels angry automatically through the "autonomic nervous system".

His reaction in speech or action can otherwise be controlled. But feeling can be so powerful that if response is blocked in one direction it must be released in another. This is why the angry person who controls his emotions may feel sudden exhaustion after the event. The "autonomic nervous system" has released extra adrenalin and sugar. If it is not used up in some form of action it will create internal conflict and eventually discharge itself through other channels, perhaps through even some form of psychosomatic illness. Emotions can be classified into three types:

1. "Aggressive states: anger, jealousy, hatred, and hostility

2. "Inhibitory states: fear, worry, dread, anxiety, sorrow, embarrassment, regret, and disgust

3. "Joyous states: love, affection, happiness, excitement, and pleasure."[11]

There are different developments of emotions at different ages. For example, anger, in early childhood usually comes from conflicts over things; but in adolescence the primary causes of anger are social, and in adulthood the primary causes are interference at work or leisure. Lack of awareness that the three general ages of development cause different reactions is a cause of misunderstanding the reaction of another person in a different age group. This is a factor in "the generation gap". When an adolescent reacts by kicking or stamping his feet, he is reacting as a child. The adult releases tension verbally. The worst way of reacting is through suppression which stores up tension. At no age is it desirable.

The anxieties of adolescents may be grouped under six main

11.
L. Cole and I.N. Hall, op. cit., p. 257.

heads:

> "1 worries related to the problem of emancipation
> from home
> 2 those related to maintenance of social status
> 3 those concerned with educational adjustment
> 4 those concerned with vocational selection
> 5 those related to problems of sex
> 6 and those that offer a threat to existence."[12]

Worry can interfere with accomplishment and can eventually cause serious maladjustment. The adolescent needs to learn how to deal with it constructively.

The most important need of the adolescent is to determine what kind of a person he wants to be and what he wants to do with his life. This should be part of his "ultimate concern". He should come to understand realistically his own abilities and learn to develop a wholesome way of looking at himself and his relationships with other people. His goals should be within his capabilities and his values constructive. In a rapidly changing society, which has many inconsistencies in its system of values, it is difficult for him to understand the environment to which he must relate. Only with a fairly accurate concept of himself can he determine how to relate to the outside world. There are times in which he is disgusted with the world in which he lives. It is important that he learn acceptance – of himself and others. Those aspects of himself and others which he dislikes he must learn to deal with creatively. He must learn how to avoid the sense of helplessness and futility in life or else he may suffer an anxiety neurosis.

He must learn to avoid destructive ways of escaping from worry. Repression is perhaps the worst thing he can do; for when emotions

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12.

Ibid., p. 260. These are compared with the need categories of Havighurst and Taba, Kuhlen, and Loukes in the examination of Living Bible, below in SECTION FOUR, I.

are suppressed they emerge, to some extent disguised, in another form. Using another person as a scapegoat is hardly less destructive. The adolescent needs guiding questions to ask in judging an emotion or a way of expressing it. Is it relatively healthy for the individual? Does it lead to a better relationship with others? Does it interfere with a constructive goal or value in life? If a group with whom the individual identifies offers him realistic, sensitive, and responsible adjustment to life, it advances his mental health with a model for self-expression. But mature emotional growth comes through something further - the individual deciding for himself, and assuming responsibility for the consequences of his thought and action. Such autonomy affects the emotions by the will controlling all the actions of the "central nervous system". However, it must be realised that many of the emotions have unconscious factors affecting them.

4. Personality Development

Personality is composed of the inherited and the acquired tendencies from which behaviour emerges. The acquired factors of personality are the responses to environmental pressures, stimuli and stress, to which the person is subjected. It may be that the core of personality is relatively fixed in early childhood - experiences may be forgotten but the reactions to them remain, leaving habits of response. The driving force of psychic energy (sometimes called "the libido") has an energy pattern which may be inwardly focused (introverted) or socially, outwardly focused (extraverted). It is difficult, without over-simplification, to describe further the composition of personality. Technical words are used with different colouring by different psychologists. It is perhaps sufficient to

draw attention to the term "ego-ideal" which usually refers to the individual's understanding of the role he desires to fulfil in his internal life and in his relationships to people and to the whole structure of his environment. If the ego-ideal is too idealistic and too far beyond reach, the individual can suffer such frustration as to be engulfed by depression. There is always tension between what a person wants to be and what he is, between what he wants to do and what he is able to do or actually does. The failure to achieve what a person unconsciously, as well as consciously, desires can be a cause of mental illness. The feeling of "no purpose in life" in an adolescent may really be a feeling of too high a purpose in life which is beyond all possibility of attainment. Too low an ego-ideal leaves abilities unchallenged, inhibiting their development. The adolescent should be helped to seek realistic goals and to try to meet them with his abilities.

Personality can be appraised with a degree of accuracy, although perhaps no more accurately than intelligence. Many of the same difficulties arise. A test taken one day may vary from a test taken on another occasion. Personality tests are most useful in indicating the deviation of seriously abnormal personalities, i.e. the paranoid and the schizophrenic. The day may come, however, when most adolescents will be helped to come to terms with themselves and their relationships through the use of tests followed by some form of group-therapy. This could be a most valuable part of their education. Such tests could have special advantages in helping a couple to understand themselves and each other before marriage. It is unfortunate that so many adolescents and adults have nervous breakdowns or become confined to institutions before personality tests are

administered and _before_ any form of therapy is employed. Every
individual has a need for understanding his personality and some of
the reasons behind his not-always-normal behaviour. It is during
adolescence that a person first begins seriously to evaluate himself.
He should be helped to evaluate as accurately as possible and then be
assisted to make a constructive response to that evaluation. This
cannot be forced; but the less an adolescent wants help, the more he
may need it. Personality test results might not be of use by the
average teacher and might be used dangerously by some who look upon
themselves as amateur psychologists. But if tests were given to all
students in Secondary schools, those who needed professional help
could receive it, hopefully, _before_ they developed too severe an
emotional deviation or illness.

5. Social Development

Tests are available for determining social age as well as mental
and emotional age. Personality is best defined in terms of the whole
person and his environmental relationships. Adolescents reveal aspects
of a childish or infantile social age through extreme noisiness,
covetousness, and destructiveness. A socially mature person is aware
of his role in the various groups of which he is a part and is
desirous of responding fairly and considerately to those with whom
he relates.

The peer group is most important for giving its members a sense
of belonging and security. It is often the most powerful force in
setting standards of behaviour and attitudes. Within this matrix and
the whole of his environment, the adolescent, however, should
increasingly decide his own attitudes so that they are his own rather

than passively accepted from the group. He must decide where to draw the line and when to take a stand that is not that of his friends. The social cabbage is not mature. Yet there may be a conflict between social maturity and moral maturity. One can have the social qualities that allow one to get on well with others while at the same time hold destructive moral principles such as in certain gang cultures. Damaging moral principles can be heteronomously inflicted by a destructive group.

Peer groups create opportunities for social development. But these developments can be just as easily destructive as constructive. Unfortunately those adolescents who need constructive development most are those who may have the greatest difficulty in becoming part of a constructive group. Isolates are by definition rejected, or at least not chosen, and thereby become all the more isolated. Those who have become integrated into creative peer groups are those who are already more socially mature.

Heterosexual friendships normally become increasingly important through adolescence and make a necessary contribution to social maturity. Because girls physically mature earlier than boys, their need for wholesome friendships with those of the opposite sex develops earlier.

The qualities of social maturity include: enthusiasm, self-confidence, ambition, initiative, persistence, dependability, integrity, responsibility, sociableness, kindliness, approachability, co-operativeness, adaptibility, and the capacity to mix with subordinates without making them feel subordinate.[13]

13.
    See Ibid., p. 374. The last in this series of qualities relates to the ability to make Adult-Adult transactions. See below SECTION TWO, II, C, 6.

Leadership falls into two categories, "group-centred" and "leader-centred". The former type is an asset to autonomy for such a leader encourages the expression of responsible freedom by staying in the background, encouraging as much response from the group as possible. He seeks to work himself out of a job. On the other hand, the "leader-centred" type dominates and inhibits, imposing his ideas on the group as much as he can, leaving the other group members further from autonomy than they were before he undertook leadership.

A leader does not need to be liked to be followed. His acceptance by the group does not need to rest upon affection. Likewise, a person who is liked and admired may not be chosen as a leader. And an effective leader of one group may not be effective if given the leadership of another group. There are many factors involved.

Personality can be defined as "the whole person in all his relationships". Part of the social environment which may have less effect on the adolescent than on the child is the home. The modern family has new and changing patterns of life, with the adolescent having a different view of authority in the home from the view of his parents when they were young. But still the mother's complex relationship to her children is dominant for at least the first two years of life. Many modern families continue to have maternal rather than paternal domination in the years that follow. A boy's reaction of toughness in childhood or adolescence may be a revolt against feminism in the home or school. Within limits this revolt is healthy and desirable.

Another characteristic of the modern family is its mobility. Many families move several times during a person's childhood and

adolescence. This may aid adaptability, but possibly at the
expense of security. The young person reflects in part, through
acceptance or rejection, the home in which he grew. The child who
has been neglected, or believes he has been neglected, creates a
desperate quest for attention, affection, and status. Children of
demanding parents tend to score high in intelligence and school
achievement; children of overanxious parents tend to score high in
intelligence but low in achievement; and children of unconcerned
parents tend to score low in both intelligence and achievement.[14]

Two important qualities of a good home background for
adolescent development (as well as childhood heritage) are the
ability of parents to avoid the extremes of too firm and too loose
discipline and the extremes of encouraging too much or too little
social activity. Control that is too dominant can lead to childish
submission or active rebellion. The adolescent should be encouraged
to get himself out of his own difficulties and assume responsibility
for his actions. He should be able to profit from his own errors.
Over-protection hampers personality development and prolongs
childishness. Discipline should be accompanied by an explanation
and the opportunity of the adolescent to express his own views.
And parents should demonstrate within themselves the standard they
expect of their children. Social activity should match the needs
of the young person rather than the ambitions of parents. There is
no substitute for warmth from parents but it must not be possessive.
The adolescent increasingly should be permitted to assume

14.
See N. Kent and Q. Davis, "Discipline in the Home and Intellectual
Development", British Journal of Medical Psychology, 30: 27-33, 1957.

responsibility for different aspects of his life. The home must help prepare for, and open the way for, autonomy.

The community in which the home exists helps to suggest standards of conduct and provides, together with the world situation, the matrix in which home and school can work together. Further aspects of social psychology will be examined later, but here it must be stated that it is important for the "teacher" to have a healthy and active relationship to the community and to see the class as a group and collection of groups that should not be indifferent to groups outwith the school and to community life in general. The adolescent must be helped to see the class not as an isolated group but as a group needing integration into the life of the community.

6. Moral Development

Moral maturity does not necessarily imply belief in God. Psychologically, however, a mature (as against an infantile) belief in God can give a measure of security and relief from guilt if there is trust in a God of forgiveness. The immaturely religious person can be extremely rigid and dogmatic, but the non-believer can also have these characteristics. Those who hold firmly to religious beliefs tend to be less needlessly worried, less introverted, and better in social relationships.[15] Affiliation with a religious group can assist social adjustments. Religion may offer an important contribution to mental health.[16] But a sense of right and wrong does

15.
   See L. Cole and I.N. Hall, op. cit., pp. 502-11.
16.
   See L.G. Fein, "Religious Observation and Mental Health", Journal of Pastoral Care, 12: 99-101, 1958.

not, in itself, produce moral behaviour. There must be motivation, which in terms of autonomy, is self-motivation.

Among the different ways moral development can be described, are those of Piaget, Kohlberg, and Bull.

Jean Piaget's four stages were based on the point of view of rules and the way in which these rules are acquired:[17]

(1) "Motor and Individual Character". The young child's play is purely individual. His rules are dictated by his desires and motor habits. At this stage, morality has no social awareness.

(2) "Egocentric". This stage begins sometime between the ages of two and five when the child observes examples of the codified rules of others and applies them to his own play, imitating these examples. He plays by the rules he observes, but if he appears to be playing with others he is really "on his own", because he is applying his rules only to himself. His rules still have no social application.

(3) "Cooperation". This stage begins sometime between the ages of seven or eight when the child begins to "play to win" and acknowledges mutual control and application of rules. But his understanding of the rules may be very different from that of the other person or persons with whom he is playing, even if they are of the same age.

(4) "Codification of Rules". This stage begins between eleven and twelve with concordance in the understanding of rules and the mutual acceptance of them as laws to be respected. The rules can be altered but only by general consent.

17.

   See The Moral Judgment of the Child, pp. 1-103.

Piaget believed that autonomy, as the conscious self-imposing of a rule cannot be found below the age of eight. By rule, Piaget meant "nothing but the condition for the existence of a social group".[18] It is communal life which gives to the individual obligation to the rule and the feeling of respect. Out of cooperation comes the feeling of mutual respect which Piaget believed was the intellectual and moral condition of autonomy. He realised that the stage development not only varied with individuals but also showed differences within the same individual in different moral areas. It will be shown later how Goldman applied Piaget's stages to religious education.[19]

L. Kohlberg suggested three levels of moral development, each with two types of motivation:[20]

(1) "Premoral Level". At this level, the young child begins an orientation towards moral concepts through the motivation of punishment ("Type 1: Punishment and obedience orientation") and then through the motivation of reward ("Type 2: Naive instrumental hedonism").

(2) "Morality of Conventional Role-Conformity". At this level the child is motivated by his desire to avoid disapproval ("Type 3: 'Good-boy' morality") and his desire to win approval, developing a sense of guilt when he is censured by those he accepts as being in authority over him ("Type 4: Authority-maintaining morality").

(3) "Morality of Self-Accepting Moral Principles". At this

18.
  Ibid., p. 96.
19.
  See SECTION THREE, II, A.
20.
  See L. Kohlberg, "The Development of Children's Orientation towards a Moral Order", Vita Humana, 6: 11-33, New York: S. Karger Basel, 1963.

level, the child/adolescent is motivated by the desire for respect by the community ("Type 5: Morality of democratically accepted laws") and the desire not to suffer self-condemnation by breaking his own self-constructed standard of behaviour ("Type 6: Morality of individual principles of conduct").

In this analysis based upon reactions to problem situations, autonomy does not begin to emerge except in "Type 6" and even here there does not feature what Maslow called "metamotivation". Self-condemnation does not necessarily imply self-motivation. Even "Type 6" can still be heteronomy. Maslow's theory of metamotivation or something equivalent is necessary if one is to consider the possibility of autonomy.

Something directly equivalent was presented by Norman Bull[21] in his examination of the four stages of McDougall:

(1) "Anomy". The young child begins in a state of lawlessness, without rules or laws, at the mercy of instinct. Pain and pleasure are the sole sanctions of behaviour. This is the pre-moral stage.

(2) "Heteronomy". Then the child comes under the imposition of external rules which control or limit his impulses. Punishments and rewards are the sanctions of the rules. This is the external morality stage. Such heteronomy was presented as a necessary stage in moral development. Piaget considered heteronomy as an obstacle, Bull considered the imposition of discipline essential to self-discipline. Kant recognised heteronomy as a necessary stage and essential for those without the rational ability to engage in games of judgment, but he

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21.
Moral Judgment from Childhood to Adolescence, pp. 26-35. See W. McDougall (1908), An Introduction to Social Psychology. London: Methuen University Paperbacks, 1960.

insisted on going beyond it. A value of heteronomy is its discipline, but this is also its danger. Heteronomy is dangerous when it becomes an end in itself, when external discipline is considered to be sufficient as an ultimate goal.

(3) "Socionomy". (From *socius*: comrade, friend--hence "society") Towards the age of eight, the child becomes aware of the need for "give and take" in his relationship with other children. Out of this comes the development of a sense of reciprocity, "it isn't fair". Social praise and blame are motivating sanctions but so also are the desires to put into practice external rules. Parental authority is succeeded by public opinion or peer group opinion. Its qualities differentiating it from heteronomy are the child's decreasing egocentricity, his increasing awareness of being part of a community, and self-respect replacing fear as the motivation in behaviour.

(4) "Autonomy". About the age of eleven, self-rule can begin to emerge. Internal morality requires independence from fear, blame, or a craving for praise. But autonomy goes beyond self-blame to self-decision. This stage includes emotional independence, and independence in value-judgment and behaviour. McDougall's theory is a helpful way at looking at autonomy. "Adolescence is, therefore, the key period in the development of autonomy...."[22]

B. TESTING MORAL MATURITY; OXFORD RESEARCH UNIT

One way of assessing the "morally educated" person is the method devised by the Research Unit under the Farmington Trust.[23] It used

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[22]
  Ibid., p. 34.
[23]
  See Wilson, Williams, and Sugarman, *Introduction to Moral Education*, pp. 192-94.

the first few letters of several classical Greek words to identify
several attributes of what it considered to be the truly morally
educated person. They are PHIL, EMP, GIG, DIK, PHRON, KRAT, AND ARI.
The following is a brief definition with illustrations in parenthesis.

PHIL refers to the extent to which a person identifies with
another person or group of people. A high rating might be given to
this identification with the feelings and interests of one group of
people and a low rating for the lack of identification with another
group. (A white person who feels hurt when someone shows prejudice
against a negro would be given a high PHIL rating.)

EMP refers to the knowledge of feelings both towards oneself and
towards others, the former being AUTEMP and the latter being ALLEMP,
making a distinction between self-awareness and other-awareness. (The
recognition that negros feel pain in the same way as white people do.)

GIG refers to the factual knowledge necessary for correct moral
decisions. (The recognition that negros have the same number of nerve
endings as white people.)

DIK refers to a set of moral principles or rules, relating to
other people's interests, to which the person commits himself. (Act
so that you treat immigrants as human persons with the same rights as
other human beings.)

PHRON refers to a set of moral principles or rules, relating to
one's own life and interests, to which the person commits himself.
(Treat yourself with the same respect as you treat immigrants. Don't
consider taking your own life as you would not want anyone else to
take his.)

KRAT refers to the action of a DIK or PHRON moral principle. (A
man goes to the help of a negro who is being attacked by a mob of

whites. A drug addict signs himself into a hospital.)

ARI refers to the over-all "moral education" rating.

> "Thus a typically 'morally educated' person
> would act as follows: he is driving a car, for
> instance. He identifies with other people
> sufficiently for their sufferings or inconvenience
> to count with him (PHIL). He knows how
> aggravating it is if a road-hog crowds one into
> the side of the road, or if one is held up by an
> unnecessarily slow driver (EMP). He knows that
> if, say, he drives his car at a steady 30 m.p.h.
> on a crowded main road, most people will want to
> pass him, because most cars cruise at more than
> 30 m.p.h. (GIG). Putting these together, he
> formulates and commits himself to a rule ('It is
> not right to drive at only 30 under these
> circumstances /sc. either for me or for anyone
> else/'), or ('One shouldn't crowd people into the
> side of the road') (DIK). He is then capable of
> acting on this principle, not carried away by
> fear of going too fast, or a desire to be
> obstructive or anything of that sort, and
> increases his speed (KRAT). Some average of
> these might perhaps be made to give a general
> 'moral education' rating (ARI)."[24]

Certain factors in the moral education of the adolescent cannot
be changed. For example, little can be done about his basic IQ
(which presumably would affect the GIG rating) and his experiences of
infancy or childhood cannot be changed. Some factors that can be
changed are the training of teachers and their selection according to
personality and character, and the organising of the methodology and
content of the religious education classroom process.

It is now necessary to look more closely at several attitudes of
the "teacher" or worker with youth in order to underscore some
qualities that assist the development of autonomy.

24.
  Ibid., p. 194.

II. THE ROLE OF THE "TEACHER"

Any worker with youth, whether in school or church, needs to see himself as an adviser or counsellor or simply as a resource person, rather than as a "teacher". This is necessary if the way is to be opened for an advance to increased autonomy in the adolescent. Such would appear to be a psychologically sound view of one's leadership role.

A. AUTONOMIC CHARACTERISTIC GOALS - CARL ROGERS et al.

Carl Rogers[1] drew attention to the tendency to impose one's value patterns on other people:

> "Sexual desires and behaviors are mostly bad. The sources of this construct are many - parents, church, teachers.
> Disobedience is bad. Here parents and teachers combine with the military to emphasize this concept. To obey is good. To obey without question is even better.
> Making money is the highest good. The sources of this conceived value are too numerous to mention.
> Learning an accumulation of scholarly facts is highly desirable.
> Browsing and aimless exploratory reading for fun is undesirable. The source of these last two concepts is apt to be in school, the educational system. ..."[2]

Rogers believed that

> "... the majority of adult values are introjected from other individuals or groups significant to him, but are regarded as his own."[3]

Psychological maturity is related to autonomy. It is something other

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[1]
Formerly a professor of psychology and psychiatry at the University of Wisconsin and organiser and head of the Counselling Centre, University of Chicago (among other professional posts). To add to his credentials, it should be mentioned that Rogers was also Past President of the American Association for Applied Psychology, the American Psychological Association, and the American Academy of Psychotherapists.

[2]
Rogers and Stephens, Person to Person, p. 10. (Pocket Book Edition, 1971.)

[3]
Ibid., p. 11.

than simply entering adulthood.

> "I have observed changes in the approach to
> values as the individual grows from infancy to
> adulthood. I observe further changes when, if
> he is fortunate, he continues to grow toward
> true psychological maturity."[4]

Rogers described discovering what it means to be autonomous as

discovering

> "... what it means to be creative, what it means
> to put forth disciplined effort to reach one's
> own goals, what it means to be a responsible free
> person, and most important, is appreciating the
> satisfactions that come from these experiences."[5]

1. Acceptance

The way to autonomy does not lead along the road of introjected

values. On the contrary, it comes through the ability to think and

act apart from these. For example, a group of prospective teachers

at a training college were asked to list two or three values which

they wanted most to pass on to children. Among the chief aims listed

were "to do things according to instructions".

> "One explained her hope that 'when I tell them
> to write their names in the upper-right hand
> corner with a date under it, I want them to do
> it that way, not in some other form.'"[6]

This is an illustration of an introjected value. The lack of

autonomy in a teacher was introjected into his students as it had

been introjected into himself by his source of learning. "To do

things according to instructions" is not a chief aim in education,

even though it may have minor importance. Certain "rules of the game"

in the learning process are subservient to autonomy and must be seen

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4.
  Ibid., p. 5.
5.
  Ibid., p. 59.
6.
  Ibid., p. 9.

in this context.

Only if the "teacher" has himself attained a certain degree of psychological maturity can he hope to break the chain of introjected values. This means that he does not "teach" the values that have been handed down to him: he advises. To advise is to become a "midwife" in the sense that Socrates (according to Plato) saw himself. The "Socratic Method" – a learning process which is as valuable today as it was in ancient Athens – has as its chief aim the autonomy of the learner.

The "teacher" should consider himself to be part of the learning team. He has an opportunity of being a catalyst in learning.

Does he avoid imparting a value system, a code of ethics? Is there then no content? Is the student placed in a vacuum and then prodded as if to say to him, "Go on, be autonomous; I know what I believe to be the right answer but you must try to guess it for yourself"? There must be external content; a vacuum is not suggested by "midwifery". There is content. The "teacher" is a resource person and should be as informed as possible on the factual basis behind learning. He can assist with true or false statements (concerned with fact), but must play a different role when it comes to right or wrong statements (concerned with belief).

For example, consider the choosing of a vocation, a subject in which the adolescent is already involved. It may be that his parents are beginning to bring pressures to bear upon him because they have already decided that they wish him to become a doctor. They are trying to introject a certain vocational choice value. It may be that this adolescent is suffering much tension due to the fact that he does not want to be a doctor. In this situation, the "teacher" is

placed in a position of adviser. Obviously, it is not his role
to be formally a vocational adviser – there are those professionally
trained to assume this role – but he can assist the youth to look at
vocations in terms of his own choice, regardless of the boy's
qualifications, which, of course, are not unimportant. He can help
him to deal with the question, "What do I really want to do with my
life?"[7]

The fact that someone is helping the boy to look objectively at
vocations without trying to introject a certain selection can do
much to relieve unnecessary tension as well as to aid development
towards autonomy. Many people suffer from feelings of guilt because
they have not become what their parents wanted them to be in terms of
vocation. The parents have introjected the values attached to a
certain vocation and this introjection is a block in the road to
autonomy.

Amateur though he be, the adviser can assume a parallel role
to the psychotherapist. It is a therapeutic relationship. The
teacher does not add a further observation on vocation but opens the
way for the student to make up his own mind. The outcome could be a
realisation on the part of the adolescent, "I don't want to be a
doctor, even though my parents want me to. I don't want that kind of
life for myself and I'm not a failure for having these feelings."

Regarding the valuing process, Rogers wrote:

> "One way of assisting the individual to move
> toward openness to experience is through a relation-
> ship in which he is prized as a separate person,
> in which the experiencing going on within him is
> emphatically understood and valued, and in which he
> is given the freedom to experience his own feelings
> and those of others without being threatened in
> doing so."[8]

7.
  See Living Bible. Book 3, unit 3.
8.
  Ibid., pp. 16-17. Italics are his.

He claimed that this is

> "... a brief statement of the essential qualities
> in the therapeutic relationship."[9]

It is this kind of relationship which the adviser should seek with

his students.

Autonomous growth and psychological maturity go together. These

are the value directions which the "teacher" should seek to inspire

in the adolescents. One could simply replace "client" with

"adolescent" in the following quotation:

> "They tend to move away from facades. Pretence,
>   defensiveness, putting up a front, tend to be
>   negatively valued.
> They tend to move away from 'oughts.' The
>   compelling feeling of 'I ought to do or be
>   thus and so' is negatively valued. The client
>   moves away from being what he 'ought to be,'
>   no matter who has set that imperative. ...
> Self-direction is positively valued. The client
>   discovers an increasing pride and confidence in
>   making his own choices, guiding his own life. ...
> Sensitivity to others and acceptance of others is
>   positively valued. The client comes to
>   appreciate others for what they are, just as
>   he has come to appreciate himself for what he
>   is.
> Finally, deep relationships are positively valued.
>   To achieve a close, intimate, real, fully
>   communicative relationship with another person
>   seems to meet a deep need in every individual,
>   and is very highly valued."[10]

A rational extension of the thinking behind autonomy is the right

of others to autonomy on the same grounds that one claims the right for

himself. By the "teacher" of the adolescent seeing himself as an

adviser or counsellor means that he no longer views the student from a

height but sees himself alongside as a "midwife" to learning. He

accepts the student with a personal regard as having a right to make

9.
  Loc. cit.
10.
Ibid., pp. 18-19.

his own decisions. This acceptance is shown through sympathy,
understanding and sensitivity. And these qualities are passed on.
This is not, however, merely another form of introjection; for these
values are discovered rather than indoctrinated.

2. Empathy

> "When someone understands how it feels and seems
> to be me, without wanting to analyze me or judge
> me, then I can blossom and grow in that climate."[11]

This is a basic relationship attitude, endorsed by Christianity,
which needs to be shown by an adviser. Professor William Barclay
translated the fifth beatitude of Jesus

> "O the bliss of the man who gets right inside
> other people, until he can see with their eyes,
> think with their thoughts, feel with their feelings,
> for ... that is what God in Jesus Christ has done."[12]

This means that when the adolescent says, "I can't do this", the
adviser does not necessarily say, "But of course you can". The
reply, "It does look quite difficult, doesn't it?" might be more
empathetic.

There is an ancient saying,

> "No one should condemn another until he has
> walked in his moccasins for ten days."

Empathy means to so identify with other people that one does not
judge them from without but from within their situation.

3. Freedom

A corollary of acceptance and empathy is freedom. If the "teacher"

11.
  Ibid., pp. 48-49.
12.
  Gospel of Matthew (The Daily Study Bible Series) Volume 1, p. 100.
Exposition of "Blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy."
This saying of Jesus should be seen in the light of the introduction
to the Sermon on the Mount, "And He taught them REPEATEDLY", (imperfect
tense), Matt. 1:2. Empathy was central to the teachings of Jesus.
See Living Bible, Book 2, unit 5.

accepts the adolescent as having the right to believe independently what he responsibly wills to believe, then the young person is put in a free position.

However, behavioural psychology would suggest that there is no such thing as a free person. It emphasises how much one is motivated by forces outside his control - cultural forces outwith and unconscious forces within. For the adolescent, the peer group is one external force. And internally, conscience can be "the voice of one's grandmother", through what will later be described as the "Parent" ego state acknowledged in transactional analysis.[13]

Contrary to believing that autonomy is a myth, Rogers argued that acceptance itself within a learning situation can encourage, at least with some success, the freedom to be one's own self. In psychotherapy it is

"... the experience of becoming a more autonomous, more spontaneous, more confident person."[14]

No longer is the adolescent under pressure to come up with the "teacher's" answer. He is encouraged to move

"... toward being a person in his own right, with feelings, goals and ideas of his own."[15]

If fully accepted, he is given the opportunity of learning to be free, at least in relationship to this one individual. And this can open the way to the feeling of freedom being transferred to other relationships. It may mean greater tension in these relationships. If an attempt to check the "weaning process" is made by a dominant father or mother, for example, there comes a point of tension. But

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13.
  See below, SECTION TWO, V, C, 6.
14.
  Rogers and Stephens, op. cit., p. 40.
15.
  Ibid., p. 41.

the adolescent has been offered encouragement to break from this dominance.

One adolescent when asked to describe how he felt towards his parents replied, "They make me feel as if I'm in a box that's too small for me." And when asked how he felt towards his youth leader in the church he replied, "He gives me room to move, as if I can breathe."[16]

In the same youth group where this young person felt he was being given fresh air and room to move, there were numerous instances of isolation from parents where communication had broken down completely. This could even have been encouraged by the freedom given in the group. It contrasts with the inhibitions in a number of homes where parents came to the minister with complaints of "he/she never seems to talk at home, never tells us what he's been doing or where he's been."

Parents can help by appreciating the situation. "If we can't match up to his expectations at home we're at least grateful to learn that he is relating openly in the group here." Barriers of communication in the home in late adolescence can be created by good relationships outside as a backlash. These barriers must be brought out into the open through discussion. The process from bondage to liberation in certain relationships increases tension, rejection, confusion, and the withdrawn feeling from breakdown in communications in the home. The school should help the adolescent come to terms with this constructively.

A teacher has the advantage of coming suddenly on the scene with no previous domestic association. He is not part of an attachment

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16.
    From an observation at St. Margaret's Church, Glenrothes.

the young person is trying to get free from in the "weaning process". But the fact that the teacher represents an institution can be a barrier, particularly if the young person is led to believe that his adviser is uncritical of the establishment he represents. The "teacher" as an adviser must show credibility. As an adviser he can show himself to be free-thinking, and himself seeking to grow towards autonomy.

The

> "... current trend in education is away from freedom.
> There are tremendous pressures today - cultural and
> political - for conformity, docility, and rigidity. ...
> Personal feelings, free choice, uniqueness - these
> have little or no place in the classroom. One may
> observe an elementary school classroom for hours
> without recording one instance of individual
> creativity of free choice, except when the teacher's
> back is turned. And at the college level we know
> that the major effect of a college education on the
> values of the student is to 'shape up' the
> individual for more comfortable membership in the
> ranks of college alumni."[17]

Rogers continued to highlight the attitude that he believed was sadly missing as an important goal of education:

> "I am, therefore, quite aware that, for most
> educators, the goal of learning to be free is not
> an aim they would select, nor toward which they
> are actually moving."[18]

Acceptance means sharing confidence and trust in the adolescent to develop his own potentiality, to choose his own way of behaviour, and to define his own beliefs. This means that the teacher should hesitate to criticise unless the young person desires evaluation.

17.
  Rogers and Stephens, op. cit., pp. 50-51. This must be seen, of course, against the background of the American educational system. Primary and university education in Britain are more progressive, generally speaking. Though the extent to which their progressiveness has affected Secondary education appears limited.
18.
  Ibid., p. 51.

And then it should be given more as a personal comment perhaps even

emphatically but never as a final authoritative last judgment.

Otherwise the teacher plays the role of what in transactional analysis

is called "the critical Parent", a negative role in contrast to the

valuable role of the nurturing or standard bearing Parent.[19]

Such hesitation on the part of the "teacher" may initially be

frustrating to a young person who may wonder, "Just where do I stand?"

But gradually there should come initiative, creativity, and

responsibility within the framework of a new sense of freedom.

Care should be taken by the "teacher" when he feels he has valid

answers to questions and issues. If he is too eager to give these,

inquiry is stifled and the young person discouraged from developing a

flexible, adaptive position to the changing social and moral situation

he is currently encountering and will be encountering in the future.

> "An awful thing about what I am _taught_ is that
> it doesn't grow. In school, I was taught that the
> past had changed – and for the better – but the
> present was 'the end.' We had arrived. So the
> longer I lived, the more misinformation[20] I had in
> my head – like 6% maximum legal interest, a country
> named Bohemia, the chief exports of Japan, and the
> English economic system ...."[21]

The equivalent in religious education is giving predominance to

information about Deuteronomy as the fifth book of the Bible, a town

named Tiberias, and a cloak left at Troas.

19.
  Again, see below SECTION TWO, V, C, 6.
20.
  Sic., relatively unimportant information.
21.
  Ibid., p. 75. Of course, the English economic system would not have
been so irrelevant had he lived in Britain, but even it changes. His
point was that, besides being relevant and emphasising vital issues,
one must "teach" in a way that does not lead to stereotyped thinking
as if life is statu.

4. Congruence (Genuineness)

To be genuine and without a facade in one's approach to young people is to meet them person-to-person. This is discouraged by the current image of the teacher. It is felt that in teaching, one must assume the temperament that is commensurate with a position of "authority".

If one feels one should temper one's attitudes, annoyances, anger, and impatience, to assume an appearance worthy of this "holy office", then one is attempting to hide one's real self and avoid congruence. Young people are not so easily deceived. Their teacher can easily be found out for what he is. It would be better for them to notice his incapabilities and limitations, to see that he is not one who thinks of himself as having "arrived".

Congruence can be illustrated by a radio address given by a negro minister, Dr. Abernathy. He was speaking to a large crowd of southern negroes.

> "He really tore into them about their sycophantic
> relations with the southern whites. But he also
> said, 'I know I'm being hard on you, but I'm just
> not feeling soft tonight.' His words and voice
> matched, clearly expressing both the 'hard' that
> he was feeling and his regret that he was not
> feeling 'soft.' 'Tonight' indicated his awareness
> of change, leaving other possibilities open for
> the future."22

Congruence can be tactful and can help encourage a sympathetic attitude towards the seeming harshness of other people. It would have been even more helpful if Abernathy had gone on to describe why he was "not feeling soft". Openly exposing one's own feelings does

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22.
Ibid., p. 109.

not hurt other people if one is being honest with oneself and if one explains why one has these feelings. It shows young people the influencing factors that make one feel the way one does, and it encourages them to consider the causes of their own feelings.

When the teacher plays a role without explanation, he loses spontaneity within himself and this has the effect of discouraging spontaneity in others. It is like so many apples bobbing in a tub of water, skin touching skin with no encounter of core with core. As has been said of the Church, it has too many meetings where nobody meets.

But to seek to take on the qualities of acceptance, empathy, freedom, congruence — and all they encompass — can itself be a form of role playing. Care must be taken lest this seeking creates a conflict of barriers. The quest for congruence does not easily lead to congruence.

Wilson Van Dusen, an American psychiatrist, gave an example that illustrates this dilemma:

> "... two pseudo-trained non-directive therapists came to dine with my wife and me. They practiced their subtle art of reflecting everything back to her. It annoyed her because it was an artificial game by which they remained free of even meeting us."[23]

Here were non-directive therapists being bound by "directing" themselves to be non-directive. Autonomy does not come that way.

Van Dusen wrote something which suggested a comparison between the relationships of psychotherapist with client, and adviser with adolescent:

23.
Ibid., p. 215.

"Psychotherapy (and living) is the process of
wandering over boundaries to enlarge the scope
of one's land. Carl Rogers encourages the other
self to come forth, gives it heed, lets it live.
This autonomous other self is heard in silence,
whispers in feelings, comes calling as a neighbor,
modestly stands as background to all that vaunted
ego does. When ego sleeps it speaks clearer and
implies lands beyond the bounds of the limited
self-identity. It is restful for us to contemplate
how our thoughts are given, history is given,
awareness is given, how it is all given."[24]

By late adolescence, unless there is a severe handicap, the
young person is physically mature. He may, however, be mentally,
emotionally, socially, or morally immature. The Secondary school
teacher must share responsibility in assisting the adolescent in
the whole of personality development. The religious education
classroom offers a special opportunity to encompass this objective.
The classroom is not necessarily quiet. Creativity in achievement
and personality through encouraging responsible freedom may mean
that the classroom is a hive of activity. The adolescent finds
himself to be a vital part of the classroom groups as a whole and
a vital part of sub-groups. The strict, domineering teacher creates
unnecessary emotional problems for himself and his students. There
should be abundant opportunities for conversation within the class.
Committees creating joint reports and projects for action can lead
the individual and the class as a group towards responsible freedom.

B. SOCIOMETRY: ANALYSING PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS

Sociometry, the science of analysing interpersonal relationships,
can be helpful to the teacher in devising groups that bring about the
best participation and accomplishments. A sociogram is a way of


24.
  Ibid., p. 239.

depicting acceptances and rejections. The students are asked to write down the names of classmates with whom they would prefer to work and the names of classmates with whom they would prefer not to work. One, two, or three names in each instance might be sufficient. Then a diagram is made using squares for boys and circles for girls, solid arrows for preference and broken arrows for rejection (in the direction of feeling). Isolates are those not chosen by anyone and perhaps rejected by several. Stars are those chosen the most by others (positive stars) or rejected the most by others (negative stars).

The following are sociometric illustrations:

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
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
MUTUAL PAIRS

TRIANGLES

CHAINS

POSITIVE STAR   NEGATIVE STAR

Sociograms can be extremely useful as is substantiated by the following example. It is important enough to warrant quoting in full in the body of this thesis. It is included here with its two sociograms:

"A few years ago one of the writers made a sociogram of a class containing 32 students. For a first demonstration, four committees were so selected as to bring into play as many rejections and antagonisms as possible. There was, A_1, a good group; B_1, a group that was composed of small cliques; C_1, a group that contained many antagonisms; and D_1, a group in which the members had relatively few contacts with each other. The inter-relationships are shown Figure 1. The groups were given a list of a dozen topics, any one of which they might choose to work on, their first task being to select their subject. As far as the academic result was concerned,


Figure 1

groups A_1 and B_1 turned in good reports. The report from C_1 was poor, while D_1 never finished any joint report. Girl 11 became the leader of group A_1 from the start. For a few days, boy 10 tried through his general popularity to whip the cliques in B_1 into line, but not without a good deal of resistance. Whenever he stopped prodding, the group fell to pieces. In the end, he broke the work up into units and assigned one unit to each clique – showing that his popularity rested upon the foundation of an insight into social behavior. Group C_1 was full of discord and argument, as might have been expected, since

there were three mutual rejections and three cases in
which a liking in one direction was met by a dislike
in the other. There was no leader, and twice the
teacher had to intervene to keep the peace. If
anything, the antagonisms among the members were
deeper at the end of their joint effort than at the
beginning. Group D_1 discussed the selection of a
topic in a listless and desultory way for nearly two
weeks but never came to an agreement. In the end, the
group simply disintegrated; a few members wrote
individual reports of varying merit.

"For the next assignment, the students were
grouped to the best possible advantage, as shown in
Figure 2. One student with some qualities of
leadership was placed in each group; most of the
cliques were broken up; and the isolated and disliked
pupils were so distributed that there were no more
than two in each group. They were soon drawn into
at least a slight degree of activity by their more
socialized mates and by their leader. Aside from the
isolates, positive bonds held the members of each


Figure 2

committee together. All four groups worked through
several projects in harmony and with excellent results
academically. It should be noted that in this second
series of committees, there is not a single expressed
antagonism to interfere with the progress of the
work in hand.

"It is to everyone's advantage that the social
inter-relations within a class be used as much as

possible, if only for purposes of getting the work
done better. Moreover, if the rejected pupils lose
some of the antagonism directed against them, they
have less need for hostile, aggressive defense
reactions. The isolates and neglected ones begin to
establish contact with the world. Even if they
learned no more, and they often do, such results in
character development would make the procedures
worthwhile. The intelligent use of a sociogram
permits a teacher to work with adolescent society
instead of against it, as he is likely to do if he
ignores the social behavior of his students."[25]

There is value in a young person's experiencing a variety of

groups. He must learn to function creatively in whatever kind of

group he is a part. But self-expression, constructive release of

emotion, and responsibility can be achieved best in a group where he

feels at home. So also is the acquiring of a philosophy of life and

a zest for living. To mix isolates in with other groups does

comparatively less harm to those groups than the effect on isolates

of being in their own group. The same could be said of those who

are, or border on being, negative stars. Isolates and negative stars

need the experience of security through being accepted by a group.

Leadership training opportunities need to be given to those who have

the necessary qualifications. But all adolescents need to experience

the weight of leadership responsibility. An effective group can

diminish the reticence of shy, self-conscious, repressed students.

"A class is a social unit, the members of which
are related by bonds of attraction or repulsion.
These social pressures are very powerful, and usually
a teacher should try to work with them, although
small, tight cliques and closely bound mutual pairs
are sometimes better off if the members do not work
together. A sociogram is a most useful device in
revealing to a teacher the social and emotional
forces that are operating in the schoolroom.

25.
L. Cole and I.N. Hall, op. cit., pp. 563-65.

> "... The academic and non-academic work of a
> school should be so correlated that each reinforces
> the other and they become two related means by which
> pupils may best realize their possibilities, develop
> their talents, expand their horizons, pursue their
> interests, and obtain practice in democratic
> procedures. These objectives cannot, however, be
> reached if students are prevented from learning
> democratic responsibility by overcontrol from
> above."[26]

The "teacher" should take special care in the setting up of
discussion/working groups, trying out various combinations and
observing the results on each individual. But overcontrol is a
stumbling block to autonomy.

The "teacher" has needs. His is a vocation that requires
dedication. But because he has a sense of mission, he needs the
feeling of accomplishment. This may violate helping the
adolescents to work for themselves rather than to work for him.
They are not there for his benefit, he is there for theirs. They
need to discover what determines their acceptance or rejection,
leadership or dependence, responsibility and opportunities,
frustrations and needs, values and objectives, beliefs and
motivations.

C. SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND AUTONOMIC GROWTH WITHIN GROUPS

Michael Argyle[27] wrote an important book which reflects the
activities of a "Social Skills research group". Consideration
must be given to some of his observations which are relevant to

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26.
  Ibid., pp. 574-75. Living Bible attempted to avoid overcontrol and
instead give adolescents the weight of leadership responsibility by
putting the verdict into the vote of the students and by giving them
the leadership direction of the units as specified in Book 4. This
is appraised in SECTION FOUR.
27.
  As a leading British social psychologist associated with the
Department of Experimental Psychology at Oxford, Argyle directed the
initial surveys on which the "Lifeline" project was based. See
below, SECTION THREE, II, E.

classroom and group dynamics.

    1. Social skills: Comment on the Oxford Research Group

Argyle was concerned with

> "... one particular aspect of social psychology – the
> ways in which people behave to each other. It is
> difficult to think of anything which has more
> relevance to everything one does while not actually
> asleep or unconscious."[28]

If interpersonal behaviour even begins to approach this importance,

then everyone involved in the educational process must be aware of

it and help his students become aware of it. His findings through

this research group are especially relevant to religious education

if it is to have autonomic growth as an aim.

His provisional list of seven motivational sources of

interpersonal behaviour reveal the following needs:[29]

> 1.   "Non-social drives which can produce social
> interaction" (such as what Maslow called the needs
> of security and self-preservation)
> 2.   "Dependency" (including what Rogers called
> "acceptance")
> 3.   "Affiliation" (including what Maslow called
> "the need to belong")
> 4.   "Dominance" (including what Maslow called
> "esteem needs")
> 5.   "Sex" (related to what Erikson called "intimacy")
> 6.   "Aggression"
> 7.   "Self-esteem and ego-identity" (also presented
> by Maslow and Erikson)

The quotations that follow are some of his observations from

his research.[30] They will be commented upon individually. All are

necessary aspects of awareness which, as will be described later,

Eric Berne considered one of three characteristics of autonomic growth.

28.

  The Psychology of Interpersonal Behaviour, p. 9.

29.

  Ibid., p. 16. The comments in parentheses have been added.

30.

  The quotations are numbered for page references to The Psychology of
Interpersonal Behaviour.

1. "Dominant people want to talk a lot, have their ideas attended to, and to be influential in decisions."

Therefore, if discussion is to be balanced, with all in the classroom or group having the freedom to express themselves and being encouraged to do so, there must be certain ground rules to keep the dominant personalities in check and to encourage the submissive personalities to participation.

2. "... children of high status parents are more dominant — no doubt because they see their parents more often in dominant situations."

If this is true, the teacher must be aware that groups of young people with mixed social backgrounds may have a particular liability in, and offer particular problems for, group dynamics.

3. "Aggression can be physical attack or verbal insult, i.e. attacks on self-esteem."

The leader must be as much concerned over the one as the other. In group discussion within the classroom there is seldom physical attack; but verbal (or non-verbal) insult or rejection can be just as damaging, if not more so, to the recipient. The school must help the student to discover constructive releasing of aggression. It is not helpful merely to suppress it. The recipient must learn to cope with aggression, or rather learn how to keep the suffering of aggression from blocking growth towards autonomy. But the student who is constantly the receiver of aggressive action, physical, verbal, or non-verbal, may be the one who needs self-esteem most.

4. "If A sits near B, it makes a difference whether there are other places where A could have sat, whether he is directly facing B or at an angle, and whether there is any physical barrier. Closer distances are adopted for more intimate conversation."

1: p. 30.   2: p. 31.   3: p. 33.   4: p. 37.

There is a cultural factor here. For example, Americans are supposed to be more gregarious than British and seek closer proximity. In a nationally pluralistic group there are different norms of proximity for different cultures as well as varieties among individuals. Further, if a group contains a clique, this clique can arrange its position to give close proximity in a way that forces remoteness on others.

> 5. "It is found that people sit or stand closer to people they like."

They therefore force others into a more distant position or keep them at an impersonal angle.

> 6. "When a person is emotionally aroused he produces diffuse, apparently pointless, bodily movements. ... More specific emotions produce particular gestures - fist clenching (aggression), face-touching (anxiety), scratching (self-blame), forehead-wiping (tiredness), etc."

The meaning of these expressions may be too definitive, but the point is that the awareness of non-verbal response is as important as the awareness of verbal response. These may be in conflict. One may verbally say "yes" while non-verbal communication may imply "no". Both communications can be easily misunderstood. It is as important to observe non-verbal communication (NVC) as to attentively listen to verbal communication (VC). It is further important to acknowledge that the other person, consciously or unconsciously may be expressing in VC/NVC what he does not believe or how he does not feel. He may not himself be aware of how much his VC/NVC is being wrongly interpreted.

5: p. 39.   6: p. 42.

7. "In Britain a nod gives the other permission to carry on talking, whereas a rapid succession of nods indicates that the nodder wants to speak himself."

Synchronising usually is done by non-verbal signals. But a nod or a rapid succession of nods may mean, "I am not listening to you but I want you to think that I am", or a number of other things. Perhaps NVC must not be as tightly stereotyped as Argyle suggested.

8. "Facial expression works rather better as a way of providing feedback on what another is saying. The eye-brows provide a continuous running commentary, going from:

fully raised	— disbelief
half raised	— surprise
normal	— no comment
half lowered	— puzzled
fully lowered	— angry."

Since these are basically the only positions eyebrows can make, and since there are many other emotions that one expresses, these positions should not have been limited to these specific emotions. Also by this criterion, if one is merely suffering from a headache one may be interpreted as being angry. Specific areas of NVC must be less stereotyped and seen within a more general matrix.

9. "Several aspects of voice quality are correlated, though not perfectly, with emotional states. For example, an anxious person tends to talk faster than normal and at a higher pitch. A depressed person talks slowly, and at a lower pitch; an aggressive person talks loudly."

There are many variations on this theme. One who speaks slowly may simply be thinking very carefully about what he is saying and taking time to select words carefully, or he may be trying to calm an anxiety provoking relationship. Again one aspect of NVC must be correlated with other aspects.

7: p. 42.   8: p. 43.   9: p. 45.

10. "'Non-ah' errors like changes of sentence, repetitions, and stutters are caused by anxiety; 'ah's and 'er's are not, and seem to be used to create time to think and decide what to say next."

An anxiety provoking situation, however, may underlie the reason why a person is taking time to think. He may be in a tense relationship that is making him fearful of not expressing his ideas carefully. Argyle was too categorical.

11. "An open-ended question requires a lengthy explanation rather than a choice between alternatives; the best way to get someone to talk is to ask this kind of question."

But in a large group or a classroom setting it may be better, at least occasionally, to get all to participate in a selection of alternatives rather than one or two to speak at length.

12. "Interviewers commonly ask questions in a carefully prepared order; the more intimate ones come last, the most open-ended ones first."

But young people sometimes respond more to a personal, intimate question, particularly if they are at the concrete rather than conceptual stage of thinking.

13. "Each person wants the other person to respond in an affiliative, submissive, or dominant manner, according to his own motivational structure."

But such a motivational structure may encourage manipulation which inhibits the other person's growth towards autonomy.

14. "To get another person to talk more the best techniques are (1) to talk less, (2) to ask open-ended questions, (3) to talk about things he is interested in, and (4) to reward anything he does say."

15. "A should resist the influence of B. He must be able to ignore B's reactions of displeasure when he fails to do as B wants."

The last two quotations show a possible conflict between getting a

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10: p. 45.   11: p. 46.   12: p. 55.   13: p. 63.

14: pp. 66-67.   15: p. 76.

person to talk more and helping him to grow towards increased

autonomy. If A speaks more by being rewarded he may not be learning

to ignore B's reactions of displeasure in other situations.

> 16. "A number of studies have been carried out to find
> whether gaze varies with personality traits. Extraverts
> are found to look more than introverts, and with longer
> glances. People high in the need for affiliation Look
> more, but only when the situation is a friendly or
> cooperative one."

The observer must raise the question of the relationship between

introversion, shyness, and cultural characteristics, and simply

being ill at ease in a particular group.

> 17. "It used to be thought that an individual's social
> behaviour was directly related to his personality.....
> However it has been realized during the last few years
> that this is not what happens, since the same individuals
> can behave in a wide variety of ways on different
> occasions. His behaviour will vary with ... the
> particular individuals he encounters, since the
> behaviour he displays depends on the personalities of
> the others, as well as on his own. Personality appears
> to be much less consistent than was previously realized;
> the same person may be dominant or submissive, a
> conformist or a deviate, popular or unpopular, in the
> course of the same day."

It is necessary, then, for a worker with adolescents to observe them

in a variety of groups if he is to discover something of the range of

their behaviour patterns. He must not project behavioural

possibilities from a personality stereotype.

> 18. "Introverts and extraverts need to be handled
> differently. Experiments with school children show
> that introverts respond better to praise, while
> extraverts respond better to blame:... blame is
> ineffective with introverts. ... One may need a
> strong leader, another a submissive follower, a third
> needs acceptance of his self-image, and so on."

However, the one who needs a strong leader must be helped to grow out

of his dependence. The one who needs a submissive follower must learn

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16: p. 92.   17: p. 94.   18: pp. 104-05.

how not to use another person for his own benefit. The submissive
follower, if he is to grow towards autonomy, must grow out of
submissiveness.

> 19. "If B talks more than usual, this will be met by
> interruptions and negative reactions on the part of
> others, resulting in a period of silence by B. If C
> talks less than usual, others will address questions
> to him, and in other ways prompt him to talk more."

If discussion is to be balanced, this should be the case. But often
if B talks more and has a high status in the group, he will be
permitted to continue dominating. Also the Cs who talk less are
often ignored by the group.

> 20. "A normally silent person talks more with silent
> people, a normally talkative person talks less with
> normally talkative people."

The first part of this somewhat conflicts with the views of Cole and
Hall presented above. A conclusion of their observations was that
isolates should be separated and put into groups with positive stars.
Isolates are not necessarily silent but if they are, their
participation, according to Argyle, will not be enhanced by putting
them with more talkative people. Probably both courses of action
are appropriate in different stages of the development of isolates.
The first step, to make them more talkative, is to place them in a
group of similarly quiet people. The second stage, to encourage
participation with others, is to place them in a group which contains
positive stars. There is value in isolates having the experience
of both types of groups.

> 21. "A person may be under conflicting pressures from
> different groups of people.... There may also be
> ambiguity about what the role is,... There can be
> conflict between role and personality; for example,
> an authoritarian personality in a democratic organisation.
> ... Role conflict leads to anxiety, withdrawal, illness
> and inefficiency, and to attempts to resolve the role
> conflict."

19: p. 109.   20: p. 111.   21: p. 136.

The school must expose young people to experiencing role conflict and help them work through this conflict within group situations as well as one-to-one relationships. If the purpose of religious education is religious knowledge, the classroom situation can be unchallengingly destructive.

> 22. "Parents are a most important source of both self-image and self-esteem for children: those who are rejected come to reject themselves and have a low self-esteem in later life."

Teachers and other workers with youth, as indeed members of the peer group, can also be a source of low self-esteem.

> 23. "It is found that some people consistently see themselves as observed, particularly males who are insecure and dependent. It is interesting to find that females feel observed, especially by males."

Therefore, if a person does not speak in a group it may not be because he does not want to speak but because he does not want to be observed.

> 24. "Those who have low self-esteem are shy, easily embarrassed, eager to be approved of, and are easily influenced by social pressures; they are clearly taking the observed role. ... Those who have achieved an integrated identity are no longer so bothered about the reactions of others, and are not upset if others mistake their identity, or react negatively to them."

Low self-esteem may lead to shyness and shyness to "introversion". High self-esteem is autonomy enhancing, leading towards social maturity. If autonomy is an aim in religious education, then religious education must not be interpreted as unrelated to social education.

> 25. "People will reveal more to people they can trust not to reject them.... ... If an interviewer makes some self-disclosures, the other is more likely to do the same."

22: p. 155.   23: p. 161.   24: p. 162.   25: p. 165.

There is value in the teacher revealing his own personality. But
he must do this not primarily for his own benefit but for the
benefit of others. He must seek to be genuine if he is to encourage
others to do the same.

> 26. "There is a good deal of token rebellion against
> parents during adolescence, more to establish an
> independent ego-identity than through genuine rejection;
> most adolescents return to embrace the parental outlook
> and way of life by the age of seventeen to twenty. For
> these reasons adolescents require very careful handling."

Adults should not over-react to rejection of authority. This
rejection is necessary for weaning and essential for growth towards
autonomy. But this growth is blocked if later rejection does not
yield to acceptance.

> 27. "T (training)-groups were first developed in the
> National Training Laboratories at Bethel, Maine, in
> 1947, and they have rapidly grown in popularity, first
> in the U.S.A. and more recently in Europe. The members
> of a T-group spend their time studying the group and
> the processes of social interaction that take place in
> it. ... The explicit goals are: greater sensitivity to
> what is happening in social encounters, and emotional
> reactions in others; clearer awareness of how others see
> one; greater self-acceptance and understanding; more
> effective skill in dealing with social situations;
> acceptance of the virtues of the democratic style of
> behaviour, with widely-shared delegation and participation
> in decisions; learning how to learn, making use of
> feedback and seeking the help of others. Of these it is
> sensitivity which has been stressed the most...."

The rudiments of T-groups should be encouraged in Secondary school
classroom situations. But mishandled, they can be extremely harmful.

> 28. "One problem about group methods is that there may
> be little input of new information to the group."

This can have the effect of a pooling of ignorance. But the input
of new information can come prematurely and inhibit the discovery
process of the group.

26: p. 245.   27: p. 238.   28: p. 244.

> 29. "Training in social skills has long been a goal
> of education, and it was hoped that it would be
> attained by the prefect system, team-games and other
> group activities. Recently there has been a growth
> of interest in the development of more specific
> training. Methods of classroom work, making use of
> suitable reading materials and exercises have been
> described. ... Some training will be needed for the
> teachers involved, and there is a need for suitable
> reading material."

Training in "awareness" of the dynamics of the class is essential

for all teachers. Nevertheless, it is but a beginning.

> 30. "It is no longer necessary for a sizeable
> proportion of the human race to be lonely, isolated,
> miserable or mentally ill through lack of social
> skills. Many thousands have already been trained
> by one technique or another, and training could
> easily become available to all. The most useful
> step would be to include social skills (or 'human
> relations', or 'moral education') training in the
> school curriculum."

The apparent identification here of social skills training with

'moral education' implies that they belong together. If initially

they appear to be distinctive, 'human relations' bridges the gap.

Social skills training assists the constructive development of human

relationships. And healthy human relationships are essential for

the morally educated person. Therefore, moral education requires

training in social skills. And this area of education must not be

omitted from the school curriculum. But religious education should

not be isolated from social and moral education; for this would

imply that religion is unconcerned with human relationships.

In the above quotations from, and comments on, Argyle's psychology

of interpersonal behaviour a transition has been made from the

perspective of the adolescent as an individual (an island unto

himself) to the perspective of the adolescent as a social being —

29: p. 247.   30: pp. 248-49.

from psychology to sociology. However, these are not distinct and
both are different positions from which one can look at social
psychology.

2. Some Implications of Size on the Effect of a Group

The individual lives in a multiplicity of groups -- the family,
the school, the club, perhaps the church, and most certainly a
variety of other groups, formal and informal. There are small primary
groups within, and apart from, larger secondary groups. Groups
range in size from two to many millions. The adolescent must relate
to other individuals, discover himself as part of humanity in all
its vastness (identifying himself as a person rather than as some
other animal), and take his place in a wide variety of groups between
these two extremes.

First, then, there is the group of two persons, the dyad.
Even this, the simplest of relationships, can be exceedingly complex.
No two dyadic relationships are identical nor do they remain static,
but broadly speaking two people either cooperate or they compete.

This, however, is not a sufficient appraisal of their encounter.
Nor is their relationship necessarily reciprocal. A may cooperate
with B while B competes with A. As has been shown in sociometry, A
may choose B as a friend while B may ignore or reject A. Further,
A may find B enlightening or deadening, liberating or inhibiting,
encouraging or discouraging, rewarding or penalising, arousing or
repulsive, soothing or anxiety provoking, warm or cold, esteem
gratifying or esteem diminishing. There are many other relationship
definitives and the extent to which any are present varies with each
relationship and each moment and situation of that relationship.

In the group of three persons, the triad, the relationship situation is different and considerably more complex. A may find B friendly when they are on their own, not quite as friendly when they are with C, ignored when they are with D, and rejected when they are with E.

As the size of a group increases, there is greater variability and range of behaviour due to increased differences between members of that group. There is the creation of sub-group permutations. In a triad there are three dyadic relationships and in a quadrad there are six dyadic relationships and four triadic relationships. As size increases, the permutations can become extremely numerous, making the dynamics of the group extremely complex.

The larger the group, the more difficult it becomes for most members of that group to engage in verbal communication. A half hour discussion by two members can be balanced with each having approximately fifteen minutes for verbal expression. By three members this is reduced to ten minutes, by thirty members this is reduced to one minute. If a group is dominated by one or two members, there is even less time available to the others for verbal communication. The larger the group, the more likely non-participation in verbal communication becomes. Those who do not want to speak can feel more secure in a large group where they can hide. But those who do want to speak become frustrated because "you can't get a word in edgeways". But this can be true of a small group where no opportunity is given for speaking or where discussion is not at least relatively balanced. This lack of participation inhibits the social aspect essential for identification which is part of autonomy. Generally, the smaller the group, the more likely a person

will speak. But in a classroom these must obviously be more groups if each is to be smaller. This may make it more difficult for the teacher to be aware of the class dynamics.

3. VC Diagram: Depicting Verbal Communication

As the sociogram illustrates choice and friendship selection/ rejection within a group, so the VC diagram illustrates verbal communication.

The above is a VC diagram of a particular quadradic discussion, squares for boys and circles for girls. The only fact that this diagram shows, however, is that the discussion was not balanced. A was dominant and D was passive.

More sophisticated diagrams are needed if verbal communication is to be analysed. The same discussion could have been more thoroughly depicted with the following symbols:

≡	Length of line shows length of contribution (time)
———	Solid line shows statement to group
— — — —	Dotted line shows statement to individual to whom line is pointing
——◄	Reverse arrow shows question requiring reply
——►	Arrow shows reply to question

Here further information is shown. A dominated the discussion not only in number of contributions but also in length of time of almost each one. B responded to A submissively, wishing to win his approval (a sociogram showed that B had chosen A). C made a comment to B in the form of a question to try to attract B's attention (the sociogram showed that C had chosen B). C also was concerned over the fact that D, an isolate, was not speaking. D replied to the question but directed it to C rather than to the group. This was an unstructured group but C tried to assume leadership to improve the balancing of the discussion.

Even a more sophisticated diagram is necessary if one is to record the dynamics of a group. The quality of each comment is more important to illustrate than the quantity. And there must be other ways of evaluating each statement. A long statement may suggest that the individual loves to talk and cannot listen. It may be "much ado about nothing". Some members of a group can say more in ten seconds than others do in ten minutes. On the other hand, a long statement may be necessary and valuable. This depends in part upon the role which an individual plays or is needing to play in a particular group at a particular time.

In the above illustration A played the role of a task leader and C played the role of a socio-emotional leader. Ideally, in a

discussion group with a task, there is someone who is given, or who
assumes, the role of task leader and seeks to encourage the group to
produce productive ideas and action. This role may be shared by
several or all. Every group needs at least one socio-emotional
leader who seeks to keep harmony, reduce tension, and bring emotional
benefit to all members of the group. (There are, of course, times
in carefully screened T-groups where it may be necessary to create
emotional stress. And every parent, teacher, and youth leader knows
that at times there are positive benefits from stress.)

In the above diagram, there is shown a conflict between the
task leader and the socio-emotional leader. The task leader was
the most resourceful of the members. As far as the task was
concerned there was no need for discussion. The others had little
to contribute that was of value to reaching the best solution. The
task leader, as far as the task was concerned, should have been a
committee of one. But by dominating the discussion, he inhibited
the socio-emotional needs of the other members of the group. His
dominance kept them from making verbal contributions. Their
exclusion from this caused frustration within themselves. C was
aware of this, sought to bring B and D into the discussion by
directing questions to them, and by avoiding responding to A's
comments. B tried to enter into conversation with A but for his own
benefit which, in this case, was to earn A's approval. D opted out
of the discussion and her own verbal reply was a forced response to
C's direct question to her. D, as an isolate, had the greatest
need to be an active part of the discussion. She also had the least
interest, however, in doing so. She was overwhelmed by A's dominance
and, being naturally shy, she felt all the more threatened by the

discussion. Another possibility, however, was that D did not want
to contribute and was more disturbed by C's attempt to encourage
her to participate than by A's dominance. If this was the situation,
then D was not overwhelmed by A's dominance but felt that it eased
the pressure of C's attempt to involve her.

The observer, in this case a religious education teacher, had
made a sociometric conclusion even before the discussion took place.
A chose C. B chose A and C. C chose A and B. D chose C. C was a
star and D an isolate.

The leaders had not been appointed in advance. If the teacher
had praised the group when it completed its task, A would have
become a "star of the moment" because he had been the most
instrumental in getting the task accomplished. The teacher could
have had the four discuss how they felt about the dynamics of the
discussion. This would have been a lesson in empathy and awareness.
To learn how to make VC diagrams is within the ability of most
adolescents. Such instruction belongs to the social education
dimensions of religious education with an aim of growth towards
autonomy. Awareness is an ingredient of caring. Caring is a
characteristic of responsible freedom.

4. Group Leadership and Autonomy

One of the ground rules for a good discussion is that it should
be well balanced, with everyone sharing in the discussion; otherwise
the one who dominates keeps the rest from having a sense of belonging.
Maslow has shown that the need to belong is essential in growth
towards autonomy. Kelvin made a further comment:

> "If 'the sense of belonging' means anything at all,
> it means belonging to, being part of, some relatively
> enduring system of orderly relationships; one does not
> 'belong' to a random collection of passing
> acquaintances."[31]

The "teacher" is the "institutional leader". He symbolises the stability of a community or society of which the group is a part. But he can appoint, or let the group appoint, other leaders to give them growth experience. To be given responsibility is essential for growing towards responsibility and this is essential for autonomy. It is a form of Kant's game of judgment making.

When the group member is formally given a role by a teacher or by the group itself he must take care not to dominate the group he is leading. There must be an evolution in working himself out of the central position. Too many discussion group leaders are centres of a "wheel".

The spokes of this wheel show the lines of verbal communication. The task leader collects information, but in doing so can be the centre of focus in the discussion. As he receives information, the other members can off load responsibility onto him. He is the central link. But he benefits at the expense of the other group

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31.
    The Basis of Social Behaviour, p. 224. One must also acquire, however, the ability to belong in a transient society and be at home among strangers.

members who may contribute but lose interest. Therefore, the able leader tries to create lines of communication between individuals other than himself.

The dotted lines in the above diagrams show how the leader has weakened the lines of communication between himself and the group members in order to create lines of communication among the other members. In the right hand diagram, the solid lines show that with a good discussion leader the basic communication is between the other members of the group. The task leader is no longer the centre of the group but part of the circle. This allows him to become a task master who sees that the job is done but also a socio-emotional leader to see that the task is not accomplished at the expense of social development and emotional needs being unmet. He wants to encourage communication to flow in all its possible ways. The wheel blocks the road towards higher stages of autonomy for most members of the group because it focuses responsibility on the hub rather than on the rim. However, a group without a task leader may never get down to its task.

The discussion group lies between the rigid structure of the bureaucratic organisation and the lack of structure of the crowd. The educational and ecclesiastical structures of authority are well

defined. The school and church are organisations with their
well-defined structures of professional leaders. The classroom and
sanctuary often physically position the professional in an
authoritative position - the desk and pulpit are at the focal ends
of the buildings with rows of chairs or pews facing towards them.
There is no question who in either building is in authority over the
group. This physical arrangement may be best for "teaching" and
"preaching" for it is the best place to be seen and heard, but it
puts the teacher/minister in the position of being the hub of a
wheel.

If groups are not formed, and if the basic relationship in
school and church is that between the teacher/minister and individual
members of the class/congregation, then a wheel is formed. A task
may be accomplished, but in socio-emotional terms it is the
teacher/minister who benefits most.

H.J. Leavitt, in his "classic" experiment on group structure,
communication patterns and their effect on performance (which has
dominated much research over the last twenty-five years) described
two extremes of communication flow. One extreme is the wheel, where
the flow of communication passes through a centre link (as already
described), and the other extreme is the circle where each group
member communicates with only two people, the one on either side
and where the flow has no central link. But as described in the
diagram above, the circle does not need to be so extreme. Leavitt
was only concerned with two consequences of structure: efficiency
of solving a problem and satisfaction of group members. His
conclusion (within the limits of a relatively simple problem) was
that the wheel is the more efficient but also the less satisfying.

The link-man in the hub of the wheel is the most satisfied of those in that kind of a group. The circle is less efficient but more satisfying, though it tends not to produce a leader.[32] Present structure of school and church suggests that their pastoral benefits are meant for the teacher/minister.

If growth towards autonomy is for the class/congregation then the teacher/minister must relinquish their leadership authority by encouraging groups to emerge with their own leaders. These leaders themselves must utilise their authority for the socio-emotional growth benefits of the group members. When a group member, even momentarily, exerts influence, he is at that time the leader of the group. The members must themselves be helped to assume task and socio-emotional responsibility. The discussion leader does this by having the primary task of reporting the findings of the group. Balancing discussion, encouraging expression, and giving expression to the inarticulate feelings of the group is secondary. By being an observing reporter, he accepts the group as it is and does not assume its responsibility for balancing.

There is often

> "... a difference between leaders appointed by some
> external authority ... and leaders selected by their
> own group members: the appointed leader tends to see
> himself as a coordinator, the selected leader tends to
> be more inclined to impose his own ideas. The
> appointed leader (and, by implication, his group) is,
> of course, appointed to do a particular job: the aims
> of the group have been laid down; the task of the
> leader is to coordinate the group's activities to
> realise that aim. The 'selected' leader of an informal
> group often has to define its aims in the first place.
> The nature of the influence process is thus rather
> different in these two cases."[33]

32.
   See Leavitt, "Some effects of certain communication patterns on group performance","Journal of Abnormal Social Psychology, 46: 38-50. The greater the complexity of the problem, however, the greater, according to Leavitt, is the effectiveness of the circle over the wheel.
33.
   Kelvin, op. cit., p. 207.

The leader, then, who is appointed rather than selected is less likely to dominate. But his dominance is still determined more by the type of person he is than by how he is selected. There is value in an adolescent group not selecting its own leader for the additional benefit that when it comes to leaving school and taking employment the young person will have had additional experience of working under leadership somewhat imposed upon him. There is value in a group having a leader it would not normally select imposed upon it. It perhaps must work through the anxiety of bad leadership. Also the appointed leader might, otherwise, not have the opportunity of being a leader.

But there is an over-all greater value in a group's not having a leader externally appointed. It experiences the process of selecting a leader and until that is accomplished it experiences the frustrations of not having a leader.

If a group does not achieve its goal, the leader, whether appointed or selected, can be treated as a scapegoat. This unpleasant experience is a growth opportunity but it can be disastrous. It is the responsibility of the group to show socio-emotional leadership qualities under such circumstances.

Although the discussion leader may have the primary responsibility of coordinating and reporting, there is a tendency to put onto him the task and socio-emotional responsibilities. Therefore when a teacher/minister assists with the selection of a leader and transfers authority for a particular task to that leader, the leader must try to pass the responsibility on to the group, who respond and articulate. The leader reports back, the teacher/minister receives the report and then hands back the responsibility for the report to the group and to

individuals in that group. The balancing of conversation-flow

requires leadership skill in every situation. Although this thesis

is concerned with the school situation, it can be seen how religious

education in the church could equally be affected by a less

authoritarian role taken by ministers and youth leaders.

It is important that all members are encouraged to identify with

the group through participation. Social awareness (i.e. identification)

is a factor in maturity and therefore in autonomy. Peter Kelvin

compared this to driving a car:

> "Strictly speaking, interaction is a type of skill
> in its own right; it does, however, have greatest
> affinity with perceptual-motor skills such as
> driving a car. It is, for instance, both
> meaningful and reasonably justifiable to talk of
> 'handling' people just as one 'handles' cars or
> horses; and whether we are concerned with man or
> machines, effective handling depends on 'getting
> to know', on 'getting the feel of' whatever is
> being handled. And the skill consists of
> handling it smoothly."[34]

The analogy with driving was also used by Eric Berne. After

claiming that the release or recovery of awareness is a capacity

essential to autonomy, he wrote further:

> "Awareness requires living in the here and now,
> and not in the elsewhere, the past or future. ...
>
> "The man whose chief occupation is being on time
> is the one who is furthest out. With his body at the
> wheel of his car, his mind is at the door of his
> office. ... While he is driving, he is almost
> completely lacking in autonomy...."[35]

A "feeling" for people implies an awareness of the relationship

situation, the dynamics of the group, in which this "feeling for"

takes place. This requires living in the here and now. Living in

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34.
  Ibid., pp. 26-61.
35.
  Games People Play, pp. 158-59.

the past stereotypes the other people in the group in such a way as
to inhibit change which is necessary for growth in relationships.
Living in the future anticipates changes which have not and perhaps
may not take place. Of course one must acknowledge the past and
anticipate the future. Any knowing of the other person depends upon
past association and any flexibility depends upon anticipating the
future. But the present must be the dominant time factor. Otherwise
one is not involved empathically in the present discussion - one's
mind is really in another time zone.

5. Group Discussion and Social Education

It has been shown how a sociogram depicts liking/disliking
relationships and how the VC diagram depicts the verbal communication.
But the star and the isolate may be chosen or rejected for
situational as well as personality reasons. "I don't like him" may
mean "I don't like the relationship."

Social education is the process which allows a human being to
grow in ability to live in the company of other people. It reflects
his own needs, and the needs of others, for growth towards autonomy.
This teaching by parents and others is often coupled with rewards.
Discussion holds the rewards of approval and encouragement. Rewards
can bind the person to the viewpoint or action being rewarded. To
help check this,

> "... the capacity for conceptual thought, the
> ability to handle concepts of value, and the
> process of internalisation, may be said to
> liberate the individual from undue dependence
> on expectations derived from particular
> relationships."[36]

36.
   Kelvin, op. cit., p. 282.

It is necessary to differentiate two levels of socialisation. In the narrow sense one internalises (makes one's own) those norms of behaviour which are the ground rules for communicating and relating to other people. In the broader sense one internalises attitudes and values. The first is healthy and essential. The second can block the road towards autonomy.

> "Parents, deliberately or unaware, teach their
> children from birth how to behave, think, feel
> and perceive. Liberation from these influences
> is no easy matter, since they are deeply
> ingrained and are necessary during the first two
> or three decades of life for biological and
> social survival. Indeed, such liberation is
> only possible at all because the individual
> starts off in an autonomous state, that is,
> capable of awareness, spontaneity and intimacy,
> and he has some discretion as to which parts of
> his parents' teachings he will accept."[37]

Group discussion offers an opportunity to help differentiate these two levels of internalisation. Discussion has ground rules which represent the norms that permit communication and verbal relationship. For example, one obvious ground rule is that speaking should be limited to one person at a time. But beyond these ground rules is the broader level of internalisation. Bold expression of ideas should be encouraged. And the concensus of ideas in any decision (verdict) reached by the group beyond these ground rules should not bind the deviate into acceptance. The value of discussion is the mirrored reflection in verbal and non-verbal responses which take place. The concensus reveals the majority attitude of the particular group of people to the ideas expressed. Groups should help sharpen social perception. The extent to which the school is a closed community (structured according to general age and culture and

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37.
   Berne, op. cit., p. 161.

perhaps also mental ability, social standing or even sex) is the
extent to which it is not representative of the human situation.
And each group within any particular classroom is even less so.
The value of a large group is that it represents more - not
necessarily really broader - views and personalities. There needs
to be a mutual regard for differing attitudes. Concensual validity
is only concensual validity - the majority decision is not
necessarily the best decision. A group verdict measures only the
popular vote. It no more measures right decision than a ruler
measures the strength of a cup of coffee. Exposure to different
groups helps the individual experience a variety of group verdict
norms. To hold a view autonomously is to decide independently of
the norm in spite of pressures.

Kelvin distinguished between "passive" and "active" conformity
in that

> "... passive conformity arises when the individual
> modifies his own behaviour or judgment on noting the
> behaviour and judgments of others; active conformity
> results from positive pressures on the individual to
> adopt the behaviour demanded by the group."[38]

There are, however, various forms of passive conformity which, whether
they are conscious or unconscious, may undermine the nature of
responsible freedom. One may agree with others for "political"
reasons: "I'll go along with you this time in the hope that you'll
go along with me next time." One may conform for "ego gratifying"
reasons: "I'll agree with you and you should like me for doing so
and that will make me feel good." One may conform for "peace keeping"
reasons: "I don't feel up to arguing and in any case I don't like

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38.
  Kelvin, op. cit., pp. 94-95.

strife. Therefore, I'll agree with you." Whether conscious or
unconscious these are examples of passive conformity which show
how it can inhibit growth towards autonomy. Actively, the more
pressure, however subtle, a group exerts on its members the less the
group provides a matrix for autonomy. Passive and active pressures
in group dynamics can be harmfully inhibiting. On the other hand
there is the antithesis which may be the game of the irrational
deviate. "I am going to disagree with the norm of this group,
whatever it is, because this will prove my independence and suggest
how autonomous I am." The accepting, honest, group can make game
playing unnecessary.

The fact that a person is in a group does not mean that he is
accepted by that group. If he is a rational deviate he is a cause
of conflict within the group. This is healthy so long as he accepts
the ground rules which allow discussion to take place. There is
some evidence that a group communicates with a deviate, whether
rational or irrational, more than with a conformist.[39] The deviate
may be in a somewhat privileged position and this may encourage him
to keep to his deviation for the primary reason of maintaining this
position. If so, he is role playing rather than being genuine.
Such a deviate is a potential source for harmful anxiety and may be
seen by some to be a threat to the group. This may limit his ability
to raise the tolerance level of the group.

If heteronomy underlies the behaviour of an individual, he
conforms in order to have approval and only when he feels assured of
this approval is he free to deviate. Once he begins to lose his
feeling of being approved, he starts conforming again. His action

[39].
See Kelvin, op. cit., p. 102-03.

is dependent upon the attitude of others and to that extent he is never really free.

If autonomy underlies the behaviour of an individual, his action tends to be independent of any need for conformity or irrational deviation. He acts independently upon his principles.

6. Berne Diagram: Appropriateness and Autonomy

Appropriateness is an important measurement in verbal interaction. Eric Berne has been the significant contributor to this area of analysis of human relationships. This interjection of his method of analysis is introduced by a form of measurement which could be called a "Berne diagram". As a VC diagram measures the quantity of verbal contribution and logical appraisal measures part of the quality of verbal contribution, so a Berne diagram measures appropriateness.

Agent   Respondent

(Parental Ego State)   Parent

(Adult Ego State)   Adult

(Child Ego State)   Child

Structural Diagram   Simplified Form

BERNE DIAGRAM

The above diagram shows the possible permutations of the tripartite psychological relationships between two people. According to Berne, every person can be said to have three states of mind:

> "...(1) ego states which resemble those of parental figures; (2) ego states which are autonomously directed towards objective appraisal of reality and (3) those which represent archaic relics, still-active ego states which were fixated in early childhood. Technically these are called respectively, exteropsychic, neopsychic, and archaeopsychic ego states. Colloquially their exhibitions are called Parent, Adult and Child, and these simple terms serve for all but the most formal discussions.

> "The position is, then, that at any given moment each individual in a social aggregation will exhibit a Parental, Adult or Child ego state, and that individuals can shift with varying degrees of readiness from one ego state to another. These observations give rise to certain diagnostic statements. 'That is your Parent' means: 'You are now in the same state of mind as one of your parents (or a parental substitute) used to be, and you are responding as he would, with the same posture, gestures, vocabulary, feelings, etc.' 'That is your Adult' means: 'You have just made an autonomous objective appraisal of the situation and are stating these thought-processes, or the problems you perceive, or the conclusions you have come to, in a non-prejudicial manner.' 'That is your Child' means: 'The manner and intent of your reaction is the same as it would have been when you were a very little boy or girl.'"[40]

This implies that everyone has a Parent, Adult, and Child that he carries around with him. The fact that an autonomous Adult is present, even within children and the mentally retarded or ill, somewhat clashes with the theory of Maslow where autonomy is part of the goal towards maturity and never fully achieved in any individual. Erikson claimed that only the foundation of autonomy is in infancy and that this is only a possible foundation with the antithesis of

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40.
Berne, op. cit., pp. 23-24.

shame/doubt. Berne claimed that there is no such thing as an "immature person" and that one can only identify appropriate/ inappropriate or productive/unproductive states in the agent or respondent. In his concluding chapter he referred to the "attainment of autonomy as consisting in the overthrow of irrelevancies" and that such overthrow is never final.

Berne identified complementary transactions as appropriate. That is, when the agent (stimulator or initiator of the transaction) speaks as Adult to the respondent as Adult, the respondent replies as Adult to the agent as Adult. When the agent, as Child, speaks to the respondent, as Parent, the appropriate reply is respondent, as Parent, to agent, as Child. Psychological equals are Parent-Parent, Adult-Adult, and Child-Child interactions (agent to respondent and respondent to agent). These also are appropriate.

All other transactions are crossed and therefore inappropriate. For example, the agent initiates an Adult-Adult stimulus and the respondent replies with a Child-Parent or Parent-Child response.

Transactions may be complex, involving two or three ego states simultaneously. This is the basis for games and to illustrate this, Berne differentiated between social and psychological levels of transaction. For example:

> "Salesman: 'This one is better, but you can't afford it.'
>
> Housewife: 'That's the one I'll take.'"[41]

The salesman's statement is Adult-Adult at the social level. It is Adult-Child at the psychological level. The housewife's response is

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41.
   Ibid., p. 31.

Child-Adult at the psychological level. But at the social level it is Adult-Adult and it is this that is accepted by the salesman when the purchase is made or contract signed.

"The attainment of autonomy is manifested by the release or recovery of three capacities: awareness, spontaneity and intimacy.

"<u>Awareness</u>. Awareness means the capacity to see a coffeepot and hear the birds sing in one's own way, and not the way one was taught..... But most of the members of the human race have lost the capacity to be painters, poets or musicians, and are not left the option of seeing and hearing directly even if they can afford to; they must get it secondhand. The recovery of this ability is called here 'awareness'. ...

"Awareness requires living in the here and now, and not in the elsewhere, the past or the future. ...

"<u>Spontaneity</u>. Spontaneity means option, the freedom to choose and express one's feelings from the assortment available (Parent feelings, Adult feelings and Child feelings). It means liberation, liberation from the compulsion to play games and have only the feelings one was taught to have.

"<u>Intimacy</u>. Intimacy means the spontaneous, game-free candidness of an aware person, the liberation of the eidetically perceptive, uncorrupted Child in all its naivete living in the here and now. ...
"Because intimacy is essentially a function of the natural Child (although expressed in a matrix of psychological and social complications), it tends to turn out well if not disturbed by the intervention of games. Usually the adaptation to Parental influences is what spoils it, and most unfortunately this is almost a universal occurrence. But before, unless and until they are corrupted, most infants seem to be loving, and that is the essential nature of intimacy, as shown experimentally.

"Parents, deliberately or unaware, teach their children from birth how to behave, think, feel and perceive. Liberation from these influences is no easy matter, since they are deeply ingrained and are necessary during the first two or three decades of life for biological and social survival. Indeed, such liberation is only possible at all because the individual starts off in an autonomous state, that is, capable of awareness, spontaneity and intimacy,

and he has some discretion as to which parts of his
parents' teachings he will accept. At certain
specific moments early in life he decides how he is
going to adapt to them. It is because his adaptation
is in the nature of a series of decisions that it can
be undone, since decisions are reversable under
favourable circumstances.

"The attainment of autonomy, then consists of the
overthrow of those irrelevancies which block the road
to game-free relationships. And such overthrow is
never final: there is a continual battle against
sinking back into the old ways."[42]

The implication of Berne's attitude towards social psychology
is that autonomy is impossible to attain but vital as a goal
towards which one should seek to grow. This is in line with the
view of Maslow. Berne believed that "love needs" and "esteem needs"
(Maslow's terms) pointed to emotional deprivation. And the "physical
needs" (Maslow) were also in this category. "Stimulus-hunger" has
the same relationship to the survival of the human organism as
food-hunger. "Strokes" are verbal or non-verbal acknowledgments of
another person's presence.[43] "Stimulus-hunger" requires "strokes"
(relating to Maslow's "love need"). An exchange of strokes verbally
or non-verbally constitutes a "transaction". "Structure-hunger"
is the need to structure time in order to avoid boredom.

But autonomy as a rudiment in childhood, such as emphasised by
Erikson, was also acknowledged by Berne:

"Parents, deliberately or unaware, teach their
children from birth how to behave, think, feel and
perceive. Liberation... is only possible at all

42.
  Ibid., pp. 158-61.
43.
  "Stroke" is an important word in Berne's theory: "'Stroking' may be
used as a general term for intimate physical contact; in practice it
may take various forms. Some people literally stroke an infant; others
hug or pat it, while some people pinch it playfully or flip it with a
fingertip. These all have their analogues in conversation, so that
it seems one might predict how an individual would handle a baby by
listening to him talk. By an extension of meaning, 'stroking' may be
employed colloquially to denote any act implying recognition of
another's presence. Hence a _stroke_ may be used as the fundamental unit
of social action. An exchange of strokes constitutes a _transaction_,
which is the unit of social intercourse." _Ibid._, pp. 14-15.

> because the individual starts off in an
> autonomous state, that is, capable of awareness,
> spontaneity and intimacy, and he has some
> discretion as to which parts of his parents'
> teachings he will accept."[44]

Berne believed that the capacity for autonomy could be further
developed by structural analysis, to help uncover and activate the
Adult. He endorsed Erikson in putting emphasis upon the early
years of childhood, the formation of personality. The happenings
of these years he believed are recorded and the brain functions
like a tape recorder. The Parent is a huge collection of these
recordings of external events as perceived by the person in his
childhood. The Parent is hooked and the original feelings of
identity with the parent are repeated when this data is played back.
At that moment, the person becomes the parent. The Child also is
such a collection of recordings. He can be hooked and the original
feelings of frustration, rejection, depression, or anger can be
replayed. For both the Parent and Child there is the other side of
the recording which is positive: the nurturing Parent, the curious
Child.

Therefore, the Parent and Child ego states have necessary roles
to play within the personality. The Adult should not be developed
at the exclusion of either. A Parent-contaminated Adult can exclude
or block-out the Child. A Child-contaminated Adult can exclude or
block-out the Parent. These can be diagrammed:


PARENT-CONTAMINATION   CHILD-CONTAMINATION

44.
Ibid., p. 161.

The Parent and Child have roles to play; but, when either contaminates the Adult, a form of heteronomy is produced. The Adult contaminated by the Parent is the Adult inhibited by heteronomous indoctrination or manipulation from the Parent. The Adult contaminated by the Child is the Adult inhibited by heteronomous indoctrination or manipulation from the Child.

Heteronomy can be internal or external. Internal heteronomy itself can be in three forms. It can be, (1) the Adult contaminated by the Parent, (2) the Adult contaminated by the Child, or (3) the Adult contaminated by both the Parent and the Child. These can be diagrammed:

THREE FORMS OF INTERNAL HETERONOMY

The Adult contaminated by the Parent is oppressive heteronomy yielding an "I'm not OK" feeling, perhaps with the feeling of misery or inferiority. The Adult contaminated by the Child creates a self-assertiveness which yields a "You're not OK" feeling, perhaps expressed as aggressive manipulation in an attempt to get one's own way. In both, the Adult may make the misery or manipulation seem rational, and justify inflicting heteronomy onto others. In the third form of what is being called "internal heteronomy", the contamination is total, yielding an "I'm not OK - You're not OK" feeling. Autonomy is required for the Adult ego state to draw from

the Parent and Child those feelings and forces which will meet external situations appropriately. This is "internal autonomy" of an uncontaminated Adult. The essential quality is appropriateness leading to responsible freedom in relationships.

There is also what can be called "external heteronomy". An example of this in a school situation is Parent-Child stimulus from the teacher and a Child-Parent response from the student. The "complementary transactions" subject the student to an externally induced heteronomous position. This example can be diagrammed:

EXTERNAL HETERONOMY   (Alternative Form)

To encourage autonomy, the teacher should seek to make Adult-Adult stimuli and seek Adult-Adult responses. And yet a sign of autonomy is the ability of the student to respond Adult-Adult regardless of what stimulus he receives.

A special aspect of transactional analysis is game analysis. By "games" Berne meant transactions with concealed motivation, basic dishonesty, and dramatic outcome. Such games are a blight on autonomy. They are a mixture of the need to get "strokes" and the determination to avoid intimacy. Adolescents could be taught transactional analysis and be given the ability to identify as many of these as possible by the use of concrete illustrations. They are described in detail in Games People Play. Some are listed here as

transactional examples of heteronomy:

"If it Weren't For You" (IWFY)
"Try and Collect" (TAC)
"Try and Get Away With It" (TAGAWI)
"Why Does This Always Happen To Me?" (WAHM)
"Now I've Got You, You Son Of A Bitch" (NIGYSOB)
"Ain't It Awful" (AIA)
"See What You Made Me Do" (SWYMD)

All these games can appear in marriage. They also have their
classroom equivalence. For example, "If It Weren't For You":

Teacher: "If you weren't such a stupid class,
I'd be able to be a good R.I. teacher."

Student: "If you weren't so boring, I might
learn something."

Such IWFY games can be verbal comments or non-verbal thoughts or
feelings.

An illustration of "Why Does This Always Happen To Me?" (WAHM)
is:

Teacher: "Why do I always get the worst class?"

Student: "Why am I always put in the worst
discussion group?"

Party games are pastimes, but the adolescent can play these
between classes, or before and after school, as well as on social
occasions:

"Ain't It Awful" (AIA)
"Blemish"
"Schlemiel" (making messes and then apologising)
"Why Don't You—Yes But" (YDYB)

Party games can appear in the classroom itself. Consider, for
example, "Ain't It Awful" in a discussion group:

Student A: "Look, the sun's out and we have to
stay in here."

Student B: "Yes, isn't it awful. And since having
had jaundice I need the fresh air even more than you
do."

Student C: "This is terrible. I think I'll be sick
if I don't get some fresh air."

"Blemish" is a game with the simple purpose of finding a fault in another person. The depressed Child position is protectively transformed into the critical Parent position. For example, a new student arrives in a class and is watched with curiosity by the teacher and the class members who are looking for a blemish or weakness. The winners are those who are able to focus attention on the weakness of the new student (you are no good) and thereby avoid confronting their own feelings of inferiority (we are/I am no good).

Autonomy requires game free relationships. Sociologically, the adolescent is neither a child nor an adult. Psychologically, he is both a Child and an Adult, as well as a Parent. The purpose of transactional analysis is to help one change rather than to help one adjust, but not to change through heteronomous manipulation. It also develops responsibility by helping the individual to be aware of his evasive games. The school should accept the responsibility of encouraging genuineness and awareness in interpersonal relationships and Adult-Adult transactions.

The Adult ego state is the one which brings together the appropriate feelings and behaviour of the Parent, Adult, and Child to meet external situations. This ego state gradually emerges during the early years of life through exploration and testing. This development, essential to autonomy interpreted as an aim, can be diagrammed:

THE DEVELOPING ADULT EGO STATE IN AUTONOMY

The Parent receives the taught concepts of life; the Child receives the felt concepts of life. As the Adult develops, the Parent and Child are distinguished in other people and in oneself. The Adult becomes increasingly able to examine the Parent and Child. The healthy Adult is free from their contamination. He is unable to erase the recordings of the Parent or Child, but he can learn to turn them off by keeping his emotional expressions controlled and appropriate.

Thomas Harris, in his exposition of Berne's theory, presented what he called "the four life positions" with respect to oneself and others:

> "1. I'M NOT OK--YOU'RE OK
> 2. I'M NOT OK--YOU'RE NOT OK
> 3. I'M OK--YOU'RE NOT OK
> 4. I'M OK--YOU'RE OK"[45]

1. "I'm not OK--You're OK" is the cry of the Child ego state which is endorsed by the critical Parent. This position is a result of the dialogue between the Parent and Child ego states from the early experiences of the real child in relation to the real parents. The behaviour in adolescence may be withdrawal and depression. Early in life the child's helplessness and small size gives him a feeling of inferiority (I'm not OK), but the "stroking", even if little more than attention during feeding and changing, by his parents gives him a positive attitude towards them (You're OK).

2. "I'm not OK--You're not OK" is also gained through the Child ego state. But the child has now been receiving fewer strokes, perhaps no longer needing to be personally fed or changed, and he

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45.

Harris, I'm OK--You're OK, p. 66.

feels neglected (I'm not OK), but this time he apportions blame
(You're not OK either).

3. "I'm OK—You're not OK" is gained by the child flipping
from the Child ego state to the Parent ego state (I'm OK), but the
hurt feelings felt by the child cause him to blame others for his
miseries, generalising beyond those who could have been held
responsible (You're not OK).

4. "I'm OK—You're OK" is gained through the Adult ego
state drawing upon the best of the Parent, the Adult, and the Child.
This shows acceptance towards oneself (I'm OK) and others (You're
OK also) which is a factor in PSYC-AUT.

Harris believed that before the end of the third year of life,
the child has decided upon one of the first three positions. He
believed that position 1 is the first tentative decision and that
during the second year it is either being confirmed or is giving way
to position 2 or position 3. Position 4 can be entered only by
conscious change. Without this consciousness, one of the first three
positions continues throughout life and the one it is is determined,
according to Harris, totally by "stroking" and "non-stroking".[46]
Only position 4 offers the possibility of autonomy because it alone
is based upon a conscious decision.

> "The first three positions are based on feelings.
> The fourth is based on thought, faith, and the wager
> of action. The first three have to do with why.
> The fourth has to do with why not?"[47]

This stage is possible through an emancipated Adult. The goal of
transactional analysis is to liberate the Adult so that the person

46.
   Ibid., p. 67.
47.
   Ibid., p. 74.

has freedom of choice and freedom to change.

The basic vocabulary of the Adult includes

> "... why, what, where, when, who, and how. Other
> words are: how much, in what way, comparative, true,
> false, probable, possible, unknown, objective, I
> think, I see, it is my opinion, etc. These words
> all indicate Adult data processing."[48]

To encourage the expression of opinions is to encourage the
development of autonomy.[49] However, opinions can be derived from
the Parent or Child, verbally replaying the old tape. The Adult
can be by-passed. The person can adopt the role of Parent or Child.
In all transactions the question is, "Who gets there first?" If it
is the Parent or the Child, the response is heteronomous. If it is
the Adult, then it is autonomous. The more one's Adult is aware of
his own Parent and Child, the more in control is his Adult and the
more autonomous he is as a person. Education that aims at autonomy
is education that helps one identify "That is my Parent" and "That
is my Child". Otherwise the Adult is contaminated by unexamined
data which are externalised as true.

An uncontaminated Adult is able to foster the better side of
both the Parent and the Child. There is the nurturing Parent which
is essential to growth and the critical Parent which can leave a
legacy of irrational feelings of shame, remorse, and guilt. There
is the natural Child who is creative, curious, aware, spontaneous,
and free of fear. There is the adaptive Child that adapts to the

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48.
   Ibid., p. 92.
49.
   Living Bible encourages such expression in Introductory Questions,
Group Discussion, and Class Vote. See below, SECTION FOUR, II.

critical Parent tape. Only an emancipated Adult allows the natural Child to emerge. Only an emancipated Adult allows the nurturing Parent to emerge.

Too many adolescents at school and at home are still receiving Parent-Child transactions. The problem may be complicated by the adolescent confusing his present external real parent with the internal Parent which is the legacy of his childhood.

P-A-C can and should be taught to adolescents in Secondary schools.[50] To be able to identify his Parent and his Child helps a person develop his Adult control and is thus a movement towards maturity. The more sensitive he is to his Parent and Child the more aware he becomes of the Parent and Child in others. The school should use P-A-C as preparation for marriage plus the whole spectrum of social education.[51] But this relates to religious education in determining whether certain feelings of shame, remorse, or guilt are the result of one's Parent recording or the result of an autonomous awareness of wrong. Religious education should help the adolescent determine when words like "should" and "ought" are Parent words and when they are Adult words. A moral judgment is autonomous only when the adolescent makes his decision free from the Parent recording. This requires rational consideration of a broad spectrum of answers to the questions, "What should I believe?" and "What should I do?" Adjustment psychology raises the moral question, "Adjustment to what?" Further, "What in society should be preserved and what should be changed?" "Is there a universal 'should'?" in the sense that Kant

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50.
  For an example of adolescent use of P-A-C see I'm OK — You're OK, pp. 216-26.
51.
  See Games People Play, chapters 7 and 9; I'm OK — You're OK, chapter 10; and Born to Win, chapters 7 and 8.

believed one's maxims "ought" to be put to the test of universality?[52]
The link between PSYC-AUT as portrayed by transactional analysis and
PHIL-AUT is reason. Reason is also its link with THEO-AUT. The
cultural Parent (a society's maxims passed through the Parent) can
inhibit autonomy. Religious views are internally presented to the
adolescent through the Parent. He must be liberated from endorsement
of, or rebellion against, this presentation through his Adult if his
views are to become autonomous. "I'm OK" must not depend upon
endorsement of the attitude towards religion by his Parent. "You're
OK" must not depend upon the recipient in a transaction heteronomously
agreeing with the other person's Parent.

Harris believed that a form of Christian existentialism has
offered a religious endorsement of his views:

> "The central message of Christ's ministry was the
> concept of grace. Grace is a 'loaded' word, but it
> is difficult to find a word to replace it. The
> concept of grace, as interpreted by Paul Tillich,
> the father of all the 'new Christian theologians,'
> is a theological way of saying I'M OK—YOU'RE OK.
> It is not YOU CAN BE OK, IF, or YOU WILL BE
> ACCEPTED, IF, but rather YOU ARE ACCEPTED
> unconditionally."[53]

The importance of bringing P-A-C to bear on religion in education
can be stated clearly and categorically. The I'm OK—You're OK
concept, according to Harris,

> "... is incomprehensible to many 'religious persons,'
> because it can only be perceived by the Adult, and
> many religious persons are Parent-dominated."[54]

This is another illustration of why THEO-AUT in religious education

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52.
  Harris believed that human dignity depends upon the Kantian test.
See op. cit., pp. 252-53.
53.
  Ibid., p. 261. Tillich illustrated this, as Harris presumably
acknowledged (loc. cit.), in Jesus' attitude towards the woman who
washed his feet. See The Boundaries of Our Being, pp. 153f.
54.
  Harris, loc. cit.

must be correlated with PSYC-AUT.[55] The heteronomous non-Adult
transmission of "Christian" theology violates the Christian doctrine
of grace. Belief in a transcendent God through orthodoxy being
heteronomously inflicted either internally through the Parent or
externally through certain forms of evangelism is an inflicting of
"Not OK" feelings. A function of the Adult is to block out the
critical Parent in order to permit the natural Child to release joy,
spontaneity, and the self-esteem essential in an "OK" attitude. The
"faith of our Fathers" has value existentially only if it creates an
"I'm OK" Adult autonomous decision of one's own faith or one's own
belief. Acceptance of religion as mere acceptance of the critical
Parent is not autonomous. To confuse the "will of God" with the
"will of the internal Parent or external corporate (society's)
Parent" is insidious heteronomy. To be struck by grace can be
psychologically expressed as to be struck by awareness of an "I'm
OK—You're OK" position.[56] The courage to change depends upon the
ability to use reason to avoid coming on Parent or Child outwith the
Adult control. The autonomous Adult is not constant or isolated
from the Parent or Child; he is rather free to determine their
reference responsibly.

Transactional analysis is a tool with which the school can
prepare the adolescent for life situations. Preparation for marriage

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55.
    Harris earlier endorsed the view that people can be divided into two
groups: "... those who suffer the tormenting desire for unity and those
who do not. Between these two kinds an abyss—the 'unitary' is the
troubled; the other is the peaceful." (_Ibid._, p. 151) Selection
necessary in this thesis does not permit examination of this in relation
to William James' "once-born" and "twice-born" categories as described
in _The Varieties of Religious Experience_. But these endorse the
necessary relationship between religion and psychology in religious
education.
56.
    See Harris, _op. cit._, pp. 271-72.

is one already referred to.   Preparation for work, too often

limited to academic knowledge of subjects chosen for their relevance

to a particular vocation, requires this as essential to the

educational process.

> "As one young male executive with a large firm put
> it, 'I have a Master's degree in accounting. When
> I went to work with this firm, I thought my problems
> were going to be accounting problems. But they're
> not. They're "people" problems.'"[57]

For Secondary education to prepare the adolescent for work means that

the school must prepare him for interpersonal relationships.

Transactional analysis aims for an "I'm OK--You're OK" disposition

and a "Born to Win" attitude. An understanding of P-A-C can help one

to appraise "What's going on here?" (developing game-free Adult

response).

> "Autonomy does not frighten a winner.
> "Everyone has moments of autonomy, if only fleeting.
> However, a winner is able to sustain his autonomy over
> ever-increasing periods of time. He may lose ground
> occasionally. He may even fail. Yet, in spite of
> setbacks a winner maintains a basic faith in himself.
> "A winner is not afraid to do his own thinking and
> use his own knowledge. He can separate facts from
> opinion and doesn't pretend to have all the answers. He
> listens to others, evaluates what they say, but comes
> to his own conclusions. While he can admire and respect
> other people, he is not totally defined, demolished,
> bound, or awed by them."[58]

To maintain "a basic faith" in oneself in this context is to realise

that the critical Parent, a source of "I'm not OK", must be kept in

check by one's Adult. The internal critical Parent track need not be

played and external critical Parent responses (from other people)

need not force the individual into Child submission. Religious

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57.
   James and Jongeward, Born to Win, p. ix.
58.
   Ibid., p. 2.

education should help the adolescent develop the kind of autonomy which rejects the manipulation of his critical Parent and rejects the false authority of others over him. But "I'm OK" must be kept from implying "You're not OK". One's own autonomy in transactional analysis respects the autonomy of others. A winner

> "... does not get his security by controlling others. He does not set himself up to lose.
> "A winner cares about the world and its people. He is not isolated from the general problems of society. He is concerned, compassionate, and committed to improving the quality of life. Even in the face of national and international adversity, he does not see himself as totally powerless. He does what he can to make the world a better place."[59]

What is the source of this responsibility aspect of autonomy? It is from the Adult universalising (in Kantian terms) his maxims, recognising that he must not seek to win at the expense of others. There is a PHIL-AUT assumption behind winning even in this psychological approach. But to say that autonomy is responsible and that a person is autonomous is not to guarantee that the motivation which causes the autonomous person to be responsible operates in every case.

Kant emphasised that autonomy must contain a maxim that demands treating other people as ends and not as means. Tillich defined autonomy in such a way as excluded in itself this caring aspect which he included in theonomy, requiring autonomy and heteronomy in correlation within this depth. Transactional analysis interprets autonomy and heteronomy neither as a warp and woof antithesis (Kant) nor as requiring a depth synthesis (Tillich) but as a developmental process (Maslow) in which the direction is from dependence through

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59.
  Ibid., p. 3.

independence to interdependence. This is possible because of the application of P-A-C beyond diagnosis of one's own ego states to all social transactions. The responsibility aspect of the autonomy it seeks is social as well as personal. It is a tool to help the individual avoid repeating ancestral mistakes (through the internal Parent) and a tool to help him avoid, in interpersonal relationships, adding to society's repeating its own cultural mistakes (through the external, corporate Parent). The direction is from self-fulfilment, to group (two or more) fulfilment, to the fulfilment of society.

In Born to Win, James and Jongeward claimed that gestalt therapy[60] helps one make the transition "from dependency to self-sufficiency" and from "authoritarian outer support to authentic inner support". Having inner support means

> "... that a person is able to stand on his own two
> feet. He is no longer compelled to depend upon
> external support--his spouse, academic degrees, job
> title, therapist, bank account, and so forth--to
> hold him up. Instead he discovers that the capacities
> he needs are already within himself, and he can
> depend upon them."[61]

But this is far too strong a statement and far too idealistic. Such autonomy is a myth. It rejects interdependence and does not take seriously enough what Maslow called "physical needs", "love needs", and "esteem needs". Such a view of autonomy Tillich would have considered dangerous and Maslow would have considered impossible.

What must be differentiated are the needless and needful dependencies of one person upon another. Increasing emotional and rational maturity increases the possibility of the Adult's being able

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60.
   Roughly translated "the forming of an organized, meaningful whole".
The aim is "to help become whole". See Ibid., p. 7.
61.
   Loc. cit.

to be independent from the needless control of the critical or even nurturing Parent within himself or within another person.

Born to Win itself contains a concrete situational method of applying P-A-C understanding to situations:

> "Imagine you've gone to work as usual. The boss is
> there to meet you. His expression is tense and angry.
> He immediately lights into you for something you
> forgot to do.
>   "What are your feelings and thoughts? What
> would you do?
>   "How would you have felt as a child if the boss
> was a parent or teacher? Do you feel this now?
>   "What would your parents have done? Would you
> be like either of them?
>   "What do you think is the 'best' thing to do?"[62]

This is a form of Kant's game of judgment applied to feelings and social relationships. It is a concrete, situational method for basic teaching of P-A-C for social education. It is comparable in methodology to the "What would you do?" type of question in "Lifeline" for moral education.[63] It is comparable in methodology to Living Bible Discussion Questions and Verdicts in religious education.[64]

To aim for genuineness is important in transactions. Strokes can be positive or negative. Human need for positive strokes is no greater than need for honest criticism. Positive strokes lacking genuineness may be discounted and ineffective. A "discount", which is rejection or the lack of attention, is harmful. Discovering how to give and receive strokes honestly is essential to integrity and acceptance. Empathy is essential if criticism is not to have devastating results. Since no one can completely identify with another person, genuineness must be tempered by tact. To criticise

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62.
  Ibid., p. 42.
63.
  See below, SECTION THREE, II, D.
64.
  See below, SECTION FOUR, II, D.

another person may be less harmful than ignoring him, but it can be
a poor substitute for empathetic communication. A person may claim
to be giving honest criticism when what he is really doing is
revealing an "I'm OK—-You're not OK" position or submitting the other
person to an "I'm not OK—-He's OK" feeling. This is insidious
heteronomy under the guise of genuineness. This is a Parent-Parent or
Parent-Child transaction. Alternatively, criticism can be Adult-Adult,
showing objective data-processing and responsibility expressed with
sensitivity. This implies an integrated Adult. And it is not a
data-processing machine, cold and calculative, but an executive of
personality, drawing on the nurturing Parent and the natural Child.

Transactional analysis is a tool to help develop an "I'm OK—-You're
OK" position where everyone is helped to win in growth towards
responsible freedom. P-A-C analyses appropriate transactions which
contribute to PSYC-AUT.

7. Three-Dimensional Diagram: Depicting Genuine Communication towards Autonomy

Communication between persons, then, is non-verbal and verbal.
It can in both cases be stimulating or inhibiting. Among the causes
of emotional deprivation are: for one to be in a group which is
itself uncreative or unstimulating and for one to be unable to
express oneself within the group. The need for recognition is as
essential for the adolescent as for the infant. No adolescent has
arrived at the pure state of autonomy, where he can live without
external stimulus, where he is totally self-motivating, as well as
self-deciding.

The measurement of verbal communication is at least three-
dimensional. Two of these dimensions have already been presented

and a third will now be added.

Breadth
(Appropriateness)
Berne Diagram

Depth
(Quality)
Logical Validity and
Mental Level

Length
(Quantity)
VC Diagram

THREE-DIMENSIONAL DIAGRAM OF COMMUNICATION

A "teacher" with such a three-dimensional representation should be
able to help a class to understand the significance of a contribution.

For discussion to be stimulating it must inspire. To inspire
and to be genuine, it must be psychologically appropriate. But
before adding this third dimension, it is advantageous to see where
it relates to what has been stated.

The value of a statement is determined by length (quantity),
depth (quality), and breadth (appropriateness).

Length is the important factor in recognition - for it is the
amount of verbal participation a person makes. But discussion must
be balanced. Otherwise the participation by one individual can be
at the expense of excluding or severely limiting and inhibiting
others in the group. In a fast-moving discussion where the length
of individual contributions is short, and the number of
interactions is greater, the length is increased. For example, five
statements of one minute each may give the participant the feeling
of making a longer contribution than one statement of five minutes.

Briskness may also increase the quality of discussions because the person will gain more verbal response. Without these reactions, a person could speak for five minutes only to discover at the end that he had lost the attention or understanding of the others in the group at the end of the first minute. Some people are able to communicate verbally in ten seconds what others take ten minutes to achieve and at the expense of boredom and loss of recognition. They might not sense the loss of recognition in that discussion (through lack of awareness of non-verbal response) but this may have the effect of creating distance, a factor in becoming an isolate. There are times when discussion should not be balanced. This is because the one who has the greater need for recognition (at that moment) has the greater need to speak. The nearer one is to autonomy the more his awareness and responsibility encourages others to speak and himself to listen. His role becomes that of a socio-emotional leader. In a task group, it is the goal of task fulfilment that should determine who speaks, when, and for how long. Otherwise there is a pooling of ignorance and the group arrives at a poor conclusion well below its capabilities. However, there is value for adolescent groups to be democratic (not tightly dominated by a task leader) using them to meet the socio-emotional needs of the group members than to achieve a task. However, the quality of discussion is determined by its task fulfilment value as well as by its socio-emotional fulfilment value. Autonomy is mental and socio-emotional maturity, two aspects of total personality.

SECTION ONE of this thesis has made a particular philosophical, theological, and psychological examination of autonomy in order to

reveal some of the complex facets of its meaning. SECTION TWO has

given consideration to the nature of adolescence and the role of

the "teacher". SECTION THREE will now examine the situation and

problems of religious education as a framework through which autonomic

growth should be encouraged. Then, SECTION FOUR will examine a

syllabus and methodology to help meet the needs for such growth.

And finally, SECTION FIVE will correlate the conclusions.

SECTION THREE

THE ROLE OF RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

IN SECONDARY SCHOOLS

INTRODUCTION TO SECTION THREE

EDUCATION FOR WHAT?

In his memoirs, Lord Butler described the climate, situation,
and events which led to the 1944 Education Act that included the
provisions for the teaching of religious education that are still in
force today. He described how, in March, 1943, he was asked by
Churchill to advise on the drafting of an important speech for
Parliament.

> "There was a portion about the need for refreshing
> the House of Commons as soon as Hitler was defeated,
> at which time it would be necessary to put before
> the country a four-year plan, involving such subjects
> as agriculture and education. ... Then he read four
> pages on education, which were in a flowing style and
> derived from Disraeli's view that a nation rules either
> by force or tradition. His theme was that we must
> adhere to our traditions, but that we must move from
> the class basis of our politics, economics and education
> to a national standard. There were some sharp words
> about idle people whether at the top or bottom, some
> very pungent remarks about the old school tie (the time
> for which, he said, was past), and a definite assertion
> that the school-leaving age must be raised to 16. He
> remarked that his daughter Mary had told him he must
> say 16, 'because it had been promised', and that he
> agreed with her as this would keep people off the labour
> market where 'blind-alley occupations' started so fair
> and often ended so foul. I said that I agreed with Mary
> too, but that perhaps I had better have a good look at
> the wording later on."[1]

Without reading too much into these words, there is at least the
impression that Churchill considered that the purpose of education was
to help the nation to rule by tradition, that certain traditions (such
as class distinctions) should be removed and that all people should be
made aware of their potential contribution to the labour market. The

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1.

   The Art of the Possible ("The Memoirs of Lord Butler"), pp. 113-14.

raising of the school leaving age was intended to decrease the
saturation of the labour market, and at the same time improve the
fourteen-fifteen year olds' vocational prospects.

Lord Butler told[2] how, later that same evening in 1943, he did
considerable rewriting, added a few paragraphs on "religion and its
place in the schools", and a few lines on "further education and
part-time release from industry". The next morning, as he expressed
it,

> "... I produced my handiwork which was critically
> surveyed. He did not agree at all with my wording
> about religion, but allowed that there were people
> in the country who would have noticed its omission.
> I observed mildly that there were quite a lot. The
> P.M. said he would rather express the idea in his own
> way, if I would allow him to; whereupon he began to
> expatiate on the subject of freedom of conscience,
> toleration, consideration of the other man's point of
> view, and the kindly character of our country--into
> which pattern the schools must fit themselves. ...
> 'You will have to make a great statement when the
> time comes--a State Paper or a speech, a great
> speech.' So I said I was drafting a Bill, with the
> aid of my colleagues. ...
> "The sequel to my visit to Chequers was that in
> April I sent a memorandum on educational reconstruction
> to the Cabinet, in July I published the White Paper,
> decorated by a quotation from Disraeli ('Upon the
> education of the people of this country the fate of
> this country depends'), and in January 1944 I moved
> the Second Reading of the Education Bill in the House
> of Commons."[3]

In his Second Reading speech, Lord Butler suggested replacing
the emphasis on the three R's by "a continuous process of education
conducted in successive stages and suited to the three A's, 'the age,
ability, and aptitude' of each child."[4] The central political issue
that emerged from this landmark of legislation was the extent to which

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2.
  See *Ibid.*, p. 115.
3.
  Ibid., pp. 115-17.
4.
  Ibid., p. 119.

public schools would be associated with or integrated into the general educational system.

But twenty-five years later it was the quality of religious education (made obligatory by the Act) that caused Lord Butler greatest concern.

> "Most important of all, in the long run, the
> perfunctory and uninspired nature of the religious
> instruction provided in all too many local authority
> and controlled schools had begun, in the opinion of
> people well qualified to judge, to imperil the
> Christian basis of society."[5]

And his observations from these years give the challenge "to take another look at the agreed syllabuses and ask whether they are really good enough for adolescents."[6]

A critical examination of the implications for religious education of the 1944 Act will be considered later.[7] What must be raised here is the question, "Education for What?"

What form should education take if it is to enable the student to make a meaningful and relevant study of an encounter with religion?

While maintaining certain premises behind the educational system, the Butler Act also created new dimensions. One such dimension was created by the insertion of certain religious clauses. These were included to make certain that of the two alternatives offered by Disraeli, it would be tradition and not force by which the nation would be ruled. But are these the only two options? And was religious education included in such a way as to make certain that the tradition would be a Christian tradition?

5.
  Ibid., p. 125.
6.
  Ibid., p. 126.
7.
  See below, SECTION THREE, I. "The Situation in England and Scotland".
A similar Act for Scotland was passed in 1945.

These are real, essential questions which have direct bearing on the question, "Education for what?" The 1944 Education Act carried with its reforming character an acquiescent character. "Education for rule by tradition", is that the answer? And if so, what does this mean? To what extent do Churchill's words quoted above, "freedom of conscience, toleration, consideration of the other man's point of view", imply that rule by tradition does not mean a packaged tradition but an open-ended quest?

Harold Loukes suggested that for political reasons the Butler Act was imprecise in the purpose and method of religious education.

> "The situation was delicate, for the activitists
> on both the religious and the anti-religious side
> could well have blocked all progress towards a
> national system of education if they had taken
> fright about the place of religious education within
> it. The church schools would have easily mobilised
> opinion against sectarian instruction. At such a
> moment, the British empirical temper is seen at its
> best. Do not be too explicit, it says, about what
> you hope to do: simply secure agreement on the next
> step; and then see where you can go. Where there
> can be no agreement on ultimate aims, there may be
> agreement on immediate action."[8]

But if there was no agreement on ultimate aims, there was an implied aim.

Historically it seems the Act desired education for rule by tradition, and Christian tradition at that. This implies that one purpose of education is acceptance of that tradition and adjustment to it. Should the purpose of education be to indoctrinate the student in the beliefs of society? And if so, in what beliefs of society? Or was the purpose exposure and not indoctrination? If so, was the exposure heavily loaded in one direction? Does this bias the ability of the student to think freely? Does society not only have the right

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8.

New Ground in Christian Education, p. 19.

but also the obligation to give priority to what it thinks is best
for the student? Would not the alternative in its extreme be to
abandon education entirely and let the developing child "learn" with
no guidance whatsoever?

"Education for what?" must be answered before "religious
education for what?" can be answered. The Butler Act was a reforming
Act. Now, after more than a generation, there is a need to reconsider
the Act, its purpose and its method, and to suggest what, if any, new
Act is required. If a new Act were today being authorised, what
changes would and should be made? To what extent do the ambiguities
or imprecision of the existing Act allow changes in action without
changes in the law? Indeed, to what extent does the lack of
enforcement of the Act (there are schools which do not have religious
education as prescribed by the law) create the opportunity to
experiment or seek alternative aims and structures for education?

One hypothesis examined in this thesis is that a central aim of
education should be to assist growth towards autonomy, and that
particular concept of autonomy that can be called "responsible freedom".
The second hypothesis is that religious education should contribute
towards this quest.

But education in general has other aims which relate to autonomy
or are important ingredients of autonomy. And these must be examined
too. Factual knowledge is important if responsible freedom is to be
based upon informed reasoning. But the encouragement of original
thinking rather than puppet like rote learning has importance. The
ability to distinguish between deductive and inductive reasoning and
when to use each is important. The abilities of the student to
examine for himself the purpose of education and the purpose of his

own life are related--otherwise he is simply carried along in the
educational system and carried along in society without finding
meaning for his life.

Loukes saw the concrete implications of lack of factual knowledge
and the inability to use reason in religion.

> "We should all be alarmed if the teaching of
> mathematics resulted in a generation of young
> people who not only got their sums wrong...but
> did not know how to begin to think about them;
> and we must view with equal alarm a religious
> education that results in a total inability to
> think about religion. The orthodox appealing
> to one authority and the atheists appealing to
> another are in no better case than the
> bewildered, trying hard to think but denied
> the tools of thought."[9]

What, then, is religious education for? As mathematical logic
exposes the student to deductive reason and science exposes the
student to inductive reason, religion can expose the student to what
William James called "the leap of faith". This is committed living
based upon deductive and inductive reason to ideas and ideals which
take one beyond reason into what concerns one ultimately and even
into a consideration of the dimension of mystery.[10] Religious
education, then, should help give one "the tools of thought" for
inquiry into religious issues.

After the above quoted paragraph Loukes continued by showing the
consequence of religious education being generally ineffective:

> "In this situation voices are beginning to be
> raised in protest against the whole venture.
> Conferences of humanists pass resolutions demanding
> the abolition of religious education. Christians
> argue that the task should be passed back to the
> churches. Educationalists begin to discuss the
> possibility of a moral education divorced from
> religion. Yet our young people themselves do not

9.
  Ibid., p. 12.
10.
  See J.W.D. Smith, Religious Education in a Secular Setting, pp. 43f.

go so far.
"'You wouldn't do away with R.I.?'
"No.
"'So you just want to change it?'
"Yes, it needs some radical changes."[11]

This may be a fallacious argument of universalising a particular,
but perhaps the greater fallacy is that it is concerned with what
young people think they want without asking what they may need.
Loukes' point, however, was that the ineffectiveness of religious
education may not call for its abolition but for its radical change.
If some educationalists are calling for the divorcing of moral
education from religion, there are others who have treated religious
education as divorced from morality. What Loukes openly called "New
Ground in Christian Education" included moral education within the
statutory religious education remit. He assumed a Christian dimension
and an ethical dimension to religious education and this does seem
to be what was intended by the 1944 (England)-1945 (Scotland) Acts.
Should the subject have been called Christian education? Its purpose
seemed to be to assume that the nation should be ruled not by force
but by tradition, and religious education was included to enhance the
possibility that that tradition should be Christian in belief and
morality. No wonder humanists pass resolutions. But is the divorcing
of moral education from religious education and abstracting morality
from any religious base an improvement on the opposite direction of
including moral education within Christian education and calling it
religious education? The former assumes the humanist context to no
less extent than the latter assumes the Christian context. There are
other possibilities. One of them is to have moral and religious

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11.
   Loukes, op. cit., pp. 12-13.

education related but not interdependent. The term "moral and religious education" would be an improvement on the title "religious education" and also on its possible replacement by "moral education". To separate moral education from religious education and to have both as separate subjects would be to suggest that morality is basically humanist and religion is basically non-ethical.

Another possibility is to include "social education" within the heading producing "social, moral, and religious education", in which case "social education" would include the study of personality development, group dynamics, and interpersonal relationships. Group dynamics has become a science and can be analysed just as clearly as personality characteristics. Psychology and social psychology belong within an educational system and are related to, but not dependent upon, what has been generally called religious education. And another possibility is to include philosophy which relates both to ethics and religion. It gives a vast variety of options, some of which are within the circles of humanism or Christianity and some which go beyond.

One could be left with a clumsy title like philosophical-psychological-social-moral-religious education and P.P.S.M.R.E. could replace R.E. But even that would not be all embracing if one were to consider "what concerns one ultimately" as a definition of religion in its broader sense.

The point is that the inclusion of autonomy makes the study of religion open-ended. The aim of "rule by tradition" then would no longer mean education for mere adjustment. For an important aspect of that tradition is "freedom of conscience, toleration, and the consideration of the other man's point of view". Freedom with

consideration of others is responsible freedom. The "consideration" affects but does not control the "freedom". The "freedom" affects but does not control the "consideration". Freedom without responsibility is selfish behaviour. Responsibility without freedom is embondaged behaviour. Churchill's statement itself comes out of the tradition he wanted education to preserve. It is an open tradition which desires liberation and not indoctrination.

This is a principle of education and it should be a principle of religious education. Religious education still remains in the Act as a separate subject. Religion has not been specifically defined in the Act but it could not have been very easily defined in any case. Religion means different things to different people. What the aim of autonomy does is allow it to mean different things to different people. Religious education includes a quest for understanding what different people believe about religion. Loukes posed the question, "What is religious education _for_?" By what standards can successful religious education be tested?

> "We cannot even begin to look for 'successful'
> schools without erecting arbitrary standards.
> But what standards? Knowledge of the Bible? An
> understanding of the religious debate at the
> present day? Orthodoxy or belief? Conformity
> to ethical principle? Maturity of character?
> The capacity for original thought? Loyalty in
> church membership? Depth of personal Christian
> dedication? ... No subject can justify its
> place in the crowded curriculum of today merely
> by being diverting and provocative. The subjects
> must also be important: they must have an effect,
> in terms of useful knowledge, or practical skill,
> or enlargement of the personality; they must
> have 'outcomes'."[12]

In order not to miss the wood for the trees, Loukes gave his own assessment of what happened in a particularly good school. The

12.
   Ibid., pp. 13-14.

'outcomes' depended as much upon the staff as they did the curriculum, but in an unexpected manner; for all the rules of 'good' teaching were broken.

> "What is there about this place, that has made somebody in the neighbourhood say the religious education was particularly distinguished? For a time I was deeply puzzled. They were not succeeding in teaching the Bible. They were not succeeding—or for the most part attempting to teach—modes of religious and moral thinking. They were not, with a few delightful exceptions, even 'teaching' particularly well, by standards acceptable in other subjects. The teachers were talking too much, the classes were too passive and uncomprehending, and were not working very hard, for there was little work for them to do. These are hard things to say, but they were hard things I saw, and reflect no discredit on teachers saddled with the impossible. Then how, I wondered, had anyone come to think of all this as 'good'?
>
> "After a time I began to stumble on the clue, as I found myself listening not to what the teachers said so much as to the tone in which they said it, not watching what they did but watching the expression on their faces, and the look in their eyes. Then I listened to the tones of the pupils' voices, and watched their faces and eyes. And I began to be aware, on the one side, of concern, and on the other of assurance. These teachers, I began to feel, really cared. <u>They were persons engaged in the nurture of persons</u>. Whatever they thought they were doing, what they were really doing was <u>moving over to their children's side</u>, trying to give them a faith to live by because life is hard to live without faith that it is worth living, seeking to build up their pupils in hope, <u>to give them a source of inner-direction to stand against external pressures</u>. They were, in a word, loving them: asserting their value, both their value 'now', in this direct personal relationship, and their value 'then', when the world begins to search them out. ...
>
> "Our general judgement on religious education at its best is therefore that the means are on the whole mistaken, but that even these means have proved a vehicle of communication for an ill-defined but moving ideal of human personality. Beneath the conceptual muddle, in some indescribable way, persons are speaking to persons."[13]

13.
 <u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 90-92. Underscoring added. For further consideration of Loukes' theory specifically, see below, SECTION THREE, II, C.

This source of inner-direction to stand against external pressures, this sense of having value as a person, of accepting and being accepted, requires constructive interpersonal relationships, persons speaking to persons with regard to mutual autonomy. It is such autonomy which this thesis has examined. Now the situation to which it is being applied, state religious education, will be surveyed.

I. THE SITUATION OF STATE RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

A. IN ENGLAND

The 1944 Education Act made religious instruction a legally required subject in the English state school curriculum. Section 25 - (2) states:

> "Subject to the provisions of this section,
> religious instruction shall be given in every
> county school and in every voluntary school."

The Act previously states that each school day is to begin with collective worship unless the premises make this impracticable. It is subsequently stated that attending or abstaining from Sunday School or even the school service must not be a condition of enrolment at any particular school. The parent of any student can request that he be excused from the school religious service or religious instruction class or both. There is implied provision made for what in some American state schools is called "Released Time": that is, that the student can be released from school at the beginning or end of any day to receive instruction at the place of worship of his choice, such as chapel, church, or synagogue. Religious instruction of a particular denomination or faith can be arranged in the school provided it is done without cost to the school authority. The religious service is not to be distinctively denominational nor is the religious instruction to include any catechism or creed which is distinctive to a particular denomination.

Section 29 - (1) makes provision

> "... with respect to the preparation, adoption,
> and reconsideration, of an agreed syllabus of
> religious instruction."

The local education authority can set up an "advisory council on

religious education" to devise an agreed syllabus, and to select
methods of teaching, choice of books, and arrange special training
lectures for teachers.

This 1944 Act was followed in 1946 by another Education Act
which made provision for collective worship, on special occasions,
to be held outwith the school. This permits such services to be
arranged in a neighbouring church or churches.

Much authority is given to the headmaster who may leave it
entirely to specific teachers to select material and arrange their
own syllabi. In implementing the Act, an advisory council may deal
more directly with individual schools or teachers than with the
education authority, particularly through teacher training
conferences. In practice, special efforts have been made by a
number of advisory councils to bring together Religious Education
Masters, teachers who take part in religious education, school
chaplains and other clergy, and parents in order that the whole
framework of the adolescent's encounter with religion in school,
church, and home can be evaluated and each be informed of the
others' efforts and problems. The overall effect of the Education
Act should be interpreted as not limiting but rather expanding the
possibilities of the school's involvement with religious education.

Some education authorities in England have done much more than
others in establishing advisory councils and some advisory councils
have done more than others in carrying out their work. Some have
published Agreed Syllabi, some have been content to adopt a syllabus
of another authority - the ones of Cambridgeshire, Surrey, and
Sunderland being extensively used - and many have organised
conferences for displaying and presenting textbooks. The general

situation, however, is that advice, and not legally binding instruction, has been made. The London "Agreed Syllabus of Religious Instruction (1947)" states:

> "It cannot be overstressed that the syllabus
> is intended to be suggestive rather than
> compulsory."[1]

This Agreed Syllabus then

> "... defines the material that may be taught.
> How it is taught, when it is taught, and in
> what order it is taught, is for the teacher
> to decide."[2]

Unfortunately, the Agreed Syllabi may have limited the scope of education. With the exception of studying the lives of the saints (particularly in England) and certain Christian heroes (such as Schweitzer and Livingstone), most syllabi have been so Bible based as to equate religious education with Bible knowledge.

Basically the syllabi have been Bible-centred and knowledge-centred—that is, they contain factual information to be learned. There is little, if any, allowance for the student's rejection of the Bible or critical appraisal of it. Religious education is treated as any other subject—the acquiring of knowledge, the learning of information. The role of the teacher is to "teach" and the role of the student is to "accept".

B. IN SCOTLAND

Only the general situation can be pursued within the bounds of this thesis. However it must be pointed out that Scottish and English education systems differ. A separate Act in 1945 was necessary to deal with Scottish educational reform. This was followed

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1.
   Page 29.
2.
   Edwin Cox, _Changing Aims in Religious Education_. p. 15.

in 1946 by an Act consolidating all previous enactments about Scottish education which still remained in force. The Comprehensive Secondary school which in England was new and controversial, was neither in Scotland. It was instead part of the tradition dating back to John Knox. Scotland was the first country in Europe to enter the Industrial Revolution because at the time it had the most widely educated "proletariat". While it can be claimed that education in Scotland developed out of the Reformation, its history is in fact older: it can be traced back

> "... to at least the fourth century A.D. when the coming of Christianity to Scotland heralded also the arrival of a new era in the liberation of men's minds. The Christian Church was the first great founder, teacher and administrator of schools. The story of their growth and progress is the story of the Church's efforts to awaken in the community and the State a sense of their value and importance. From being a function of the Church, education came to be recognised as a function of the State. So Scottish education was first tribal, then catholic and finally, from the time of the Reformation, it has tended to become national in every sense. From being confined to one class, namely, the clergy, it has gradually extended its scope to supply the educational needs of the whole community."[3]

Monks founded the first "parish schools" and Education grew out of the Church setting, from the Celtic Church in the Fourth Century, through the Roman Catholic Church in the Eleventh Century, and then through the Reformation in the Sixteenth Century. In England, however, the development of education was largely non-religious, although contributed to by Church of England schools. Today in appearance there is little difference between the two State school systems, but the different heritages leave their impact.

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[3]
  M. MacIntosh, _Education in Scotland_, p. 19.

After criticising the emphasis on academic education in Scotland for causing "a corresponding neglect not only of 'non-academic' pupils but of 'non-academic' subjects and activities as well", M. MacIntosh (Department of Education, Glasgow University), in her authoritative book on Scottish Education, wrote that on the credit side

> "... we can claim a tradition of unity and uniformity in administration. Unlike the American system, Scottish education is relatively homogeneous. There is much less variety, administrative, curricular or methodological, in Scottish than in English or American schools."[4]

The term "Public School" in England means private or independent, that is, fee-paying. "Public School" in Scotland means just that, non-fee-paying. At her time of writing (1961) Mrs. MacIntosh stated that $2\frac{1}{3}$ percent of Scottish students, as against 8 percent in England and 15 percent in America, were being educated in fee-paying, independent schools.

> "Scotland is justifiably proud of the remarkable degree of unity achieved between Protestant and Roman Catholic educational interests. ... Since 1918 the denominational schools have been fully integrated into the public system of education while yet retaining their special character."[5]

However, the retaining of special character has meant a separation which has seriously limited the extent of unity and has caused "Celtic-Rangers" type animosity of which Scotland should not be proud.

An Advisory Council on Education produced three reports (Primary, Technical, and Secondary) on Scottish education. The one on Secondary

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4.
   Ibid., p. 6.
5.
   Loc. cit.

education (1947)

> "... firmly rejected the false assumption ...
> that, at 12 years of age, children can be neatly
> categorised as suitable for grammar, technical,
> or modern schools. The failure of the tripartite
> system to ensure parity of esteem and stigma
> attached to the English modern school condemned
> this organisation in Scottish eyes. The
> multi-lateral school, it was felt, could not on
> account of size hope to achieve the desired
> organic unity. Yet it was felt that the junior
> secondary school, with its connotations of
> inferiority in its name, must go.... The compromise
> of an omnibus type of school serving about 900
> pupils was felt to be the answer."[6]

This 900 may be a viable administrative and sociological size, but too often the actual enrolment has become inflated, with increased problems of alienation and discipline.

In 1968 the Secretary of State for Scotland appointed a committee with the following remit:

> "Within the existing framework of the statutory
> provision governing the obligation to continue
> religious instruction, the responsibility for
> its content and the question of inspection, to
> review the current practice of Scottish
> Schools (other than Roman Catholic schools)
> with regard to moral and religious education and
> to make recommendations for its improvement."[7]

Popularly called the "Millar Report",[8] it limited its remit to religious education in schools, rather than considering moral education in the wide sense as being the basic function of what goes on in a school – that is, education in general. Nor did the committee consider moral education apart from religious education although it can and does exist separately. It made an important

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6.
   Ibid., p. 38.
7.
   Scottish Education Department, Moral and Religious Education in Scottish Schools, p. 5. Living Bible, however, is also being used extensively in Catholic schools.
8.
   After its chairman, Professor W. Malcolm Millar, Professor of Mental Health, University of Aberdeen.

initial statement that

> "... if religious education is to play the
> **vital** part in education which it ought to have,
> the changes must come at the level of the
> school and the classroom."[9]

The report was comprehensive, based upon questionnaires (running
to thirty pages in the report's appendix) sent to education authorities,
Primary and Secondary schools, and Primary and Secondary school
teachers. The headings of those filled out by Secondary schools were

   I. Religious Education
      School Assemblies
      House Meetings or Meetings of Similar Groups
      Form Meetings or Class Meetings
      Classes in Religious Education
      Bible, Textbooks and Aids
      Examinations in Religious Education
      Teachers of Religious Education
      Attitudes to Religious Education

  II. Moral Education
      Advice and Counselling
      Sex Education
      Additional Questions

Among its findings were the facts that 86% of Scottish Secondary
schools held school assemblies with the content being mainly
devotional. Of the 82% of the schools which had chaplains, 89% of
these chaplains conducted the assemblies. House meetings (or meetings
of groups of classes) were held in 19% of the schools, usually weekly
and including discussion of religious and moral questions. Generally,
religious education was alloted between half an hour and two hours a
week, but the length of time tended to diminish with the advancing
age of the students. Less than half the schools (49%) used religious
education textbooks beyond the Bible and only 41% set aside a
definite sum of money for procuring such books. Only 24% had a
specialised teacher of religious education. Half the schools had

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9.
  Ibid., p. 6.

religious organisations such as Scripture Union or the Christian

Education Movement.

Of the students, only 20% were receiving moral education in

terms of

> "... education specifically aimed at developing
> an understanding of moral issues and personal
> relationships and the formation of a code of
> behaviour, distinct from religious education
> (though not necessarily exclusive of a religious
> viewpoint) and in addition to the general
> responsibility of every school and every teacher
> for the development of pupils' character and
> personality."[10]

Although this has been called "moral education", this is a definition

of religious education worthy of the name if it is to take the moral

and social needs of the student seriously and if autonomy is taken as

a goal.

Only about 20% of the schools indicated that there was a student

council or similar representative group (other than the prefect

system) and most of these were being planned or merely under

consideration rather than in existence.

Among other points made in reply to the questionnaire were:

> "More cross linking with other subjects needed."
> "Often regarded as a subject which does not matter."
> "Requires well-illustrated simple book for the
>   lowest streams."[11]
> "I think more people would take notice if it is a
>   discussion."
> "Some pupils just talk and don't really have facts
>   to support what they say."[12]

The "Millar Report" accepted without criticism the gradual

development of autonomy as an educational foundation of moral judgment.

10.
   Ibid., pp. 21-22.
11.
   All four volumes of Living Bible are recommended as "An adaptation for
lower streams" in "Secondary school Syllabus", published by the Scottish
Joint Committee on Religious Education in 1969. Unfortunately they were
recommended for the teacher rather than the class.
12.
   Moral and Religious Education in Scottish Schools, pp. 30 and 32.

It referred to the four stages of McDougall (1908): (1) instinctive behaviour modified by pain and pleasure; (2) behaviour modified by rewards and punishment; (3) behaviour modified by praise and blame; and (4) conduct independent of praise or blame (autonomy). It acknowledged the contribution of Piaget (1930s) in the four stages of (1) anomy (without law); (2) heteronomy (law imposed by others); (3) co-operation (the emergence of fair play); and (4) autonomy (praise and blame controlled by oneself).[13] Unfortunately, the "Millar Report" did not expand on the idea of autonomy as an educational aim. Nor did it emphasise the importance of the quest for autonomy.

The report acknowledged the ideas of Peck and Havinghurst, Erikson, and Goldman. It also sought advice from Harold Loukes, J.W.D. Smith, and John Wilson. (All of these are referred to in this thesis.)

The report introduced a reference to Living Bible by stating:

"In later paragraphs we go on to suggest that the best way to deal with religious education is for it to be the responsibility of a team of teachers who could also deal with other related aspects of what could be described as personal development. But we doubt if this is generally practicable in the first two years, so we set out below the kind of ways in which a teacher using this general approach might handle religious education. At this stage grand abstractions are outwith the grasp of the pupils, but they are still ready for wonder and exploration. The subject must be given a unity and meaning, for it is vital at this stage to win the motivational battle – i.e. the pupils must be introduced to the kind of subject that they will want to explore. Their own creativity should be stimulated and an atmosphere developed in which they feel free to discuss frankly what seems to them to be of importance. The use of projects, both long-term and short-term is an important part, as are thematic approaches both for

13.
See Ibid., pp. 55-56.

class and individual pupil."[14]

Evidence given by the Association of Teachers of Religious Education in Scottish Secondary Schools (ATRESSS) stated the primary aim of religious education in this way:

> "It is an essential part of the school curriculum, presenting individuals with important questions and challenges. It plays a part in the total aim of education which seeks to enable young people to recognise and develop their own talents and aptitudes as they learn how to integrate the knowledge they acquire of the world around them and as they learn to relate to their fellow men. Religious education is concerned with the character and quality of the young person's response to life in his growth towards maturity."[15]

Religious education is not alone in concerning itself with an aim of growth towards maturity. It has no monopoly on this but it does offer (in terms of Tillich's definition of religion), "What is one's ultimate concern?" This can be given a philosophical instead of a religious answer. And even a religious answer need not be Christian to be given serious consideration. For this reason, religious and moral education are related and belong to an enlarged humanities field of interest.

On the purpose and method of religious education, the Millar Report made certain observations, but in conclusion it left six pages of questions under "Problems on Future Development". These can be summarised as follows:

14.
   Ibid., pp. 80-81. (However, unless the subject content is intrinsically interesting, the attractive packaging is of no avail. Kerygma attractively packaged is still kerygma and the packaging cannot itself make it existential.) Books 3 and 4 of Living Bible were only in limited use in Scotland when the "Millar Report" was being drafted. The only reference, therefore, is to the earlier volumes. "The Living Bible (Books 1 and 2): the adventure of religion. Problem of communication." (Moral and Religious Education in Scottish Schools, p. 81.)

15.
   Ibid., p. 38.

"Which aspects of current /teaching practices/
are most useful in achieving these aims?"

"Is current teaching practice in religious
education appropriate in the light of the
stages of children's development...?"

"What is the best way of dealing with the smart,
sophisticated senior pupils who dismiss
religious and moral education, often
aggressively, as 'fairy-tales', 'emotive
language', 'the done thing', 'an insecurity
complex' and other labels?"

"Are we to link morals closely with religion?"

"What is the best method of approach to the
subject?"

"Is a recommended syllabus desirable?"

"What kind of discussion is most effective?"
How should it be organised?"

"What is the role of the teacher if it is
assumed that religious education should
encourage an enquiring attitude and raise
questions and challenge pupils to find and
explore a new dimension in life?"

"Can the roles of church and school be
effectively (or usefully) distinguished?"

"Are our teacher-pupil relationships and
patterns of school organisation and
activities compatible with the moral values
we talk about?"[16]

These questions and many others were raised at the conclusion

of a thorough report. "Religious education in the past has tended to

concentrate on what is given in religion...."[17] This was the "Millar

Report's" appraisal of the Scottish situation. Religious Education

has been a teaching of knowledge, an "academic exercise" but without

the status of being an academically examinable subject. It

suggested consideration of modern educational theory and psychological

needs of the student being given greater priority. These are also

major concerns of this thesis.

It is now necessary to look at some of the positive concern for

the situation of state religious education.

16.

See Ibid., pp. 118-123. The reference to "the best way of dealing
with the smart, sophisticated senior pupils who dismiss religious and
moral education" may suggest an attitude which begs the question of
defensive, heteronomous manipulation. One can pay lip service to
autonomy and yet revert to heteronomy when the "right" conclusions are
being challenged.

17.

Ibid., p. 120.

II. POSITIVE CONCERN FOR THE SITUATION

Criticism, not so much of the Education Acts but of the way they have been implemented in the classroom, has been extensive. There have been many contributors to this. Five will be singled out: Ronald Goldman, Sir Richard Acland, Harold Loukes, Ninian Smart and Peter McPhail. Although they were writing about the English situation, their arguments have had relevance for the whole realm of religious education in Britain.

A. REACTION BY RONALD GOLDMAN

Ronald Goldman attacked the assumption that children of all ages think about the Bible in the same way. His ideas, an application of Piaget's stages in the child's learning, are concerned with the need for religious education to be developmental in terms of the child's thought patterns.

Piaget had divided the thinking process of the child into three stages. Stage one (2-7 years) he called "intuitive" or "pre-operational" thinking, when the child is unable to relate ideas or draw logical conclusions from them. Stage two (7-11 years) he called "concrete operational thinking", where the child is able to relate ideas and draw conclusions from them but is still unable to think abstractly. Stage three (12 years upwards - the age of adolescence and post adolescence) he called "formal operational thinking", where the young person or adult is able to draw deductive conclusions and understand symbolic and abstract terms.

Goldman did detailed research on the religious thinking process of 200 children and young people from the Midlands and Southern England representing a cross-section from schools carrying out the

requirements of the English 1944 Education Act. Goldman told the
children three stories from the Bible - Moses and the burning bush,
the crossing of the Red Sea, and the temptations of Jesus. He
ascertained intermediary stages between the three described by
Piaget thus giving a five-fold developmental process which can be
illustrated by selective answers to questions about these stories.

> Stage one: "Intuitive Religious Thinking." ("God
> had a funny face." "The ground was holy because it
> had grass on it.")
>
> Stage two: "Intermediate Stage between Intuitive
> and Concrete Religious Thinking." ("God wears a
> beard and Moses didn't like beards.")
>
> Stage three: "Concrete Operational Religious
> Thinking." ("Moses was afraid of being burned or
> blinded." "The Red Sea was parted by God's
> hands.")
>
> Stage four (11-13 years): "Intermediate Stage
> between Concrete and Abstract Thinking." ("The
> flame was a holy, non-burning flame." "Jesus was
> trying to prove he could live without food.")
>
> Stage five (age 13 and over): "Abstract Religious
> Thinking." ("Moses feared looking at God because
> of his sense of sin." "God wanted to put Jesus to
> the test.")[1]

There is value in being able to identify these five stages. However,
they do not go far enough. Indeed, in stage five, such phrases as
"looking at God" and "God wanting to..." can be abstractions of an
infantile nature. And certainly this level of religious thinking,
even if abstract, does not necessarily imply growth towards autonomy.
It can be just the kind of heteronomy which Kant and Tillich sought
to guard against.

Goldman concluded that

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[1] See Religious Thinking from Childhood to Adolescence.

> "... religious thinking employs the same modes and
> methods as thinking applied to other fields."[2]

He also observed that the more intelligent children passed from one
stage to another at an earlier age, but that generally the religious
thinking developed more slowly than the thought development of other
fields and that this might be due to the retarding effect of teaching
too much Bible at too early an age. The intermediate stage 4,
roughly between the ages of 11 and 13, was particularly confusing
because young people at this age are attempting abstract thought
about religion but find it difficult to break away from concrete
thinking. One of the purposes of religious education for adolescents
is to lead them away from earlier inadequate concrete thinking to a
more mature thinking. They need help in systematically thinking
through their religious ideas, but they need this help in a way that avoids
heteronomously induced beliefs or the infliction of an external
authority.

To avoid biblical references in the Secondary school would be to
leave the Bible as a barrier to the understanding of the Christian
religion. Goldman exposed the fact that, until the age of 13, the
overwhelming majority of young people interpreted most of the Bible as
literally true. During the next two years this drops to just over 50
percent and over age 15 it falls to 15 percent.

Goldman introduced his second volume[3] with concern for the effects
of bad religious teaching upon the 1944 (England) Act when it comes
up for revision, that

2.
  Ibid., p. 66.
3.
  Readiness for Religion. This book was published in 1965, a year after
Religious Thinking from Childhood to Adolescence.

> "... the debate is already beginning in public and
> in private as to whether the religious clauses of
> the 1944 Act should be continued or abandoned.
> "The debate is not due entirely to pressures
> from humanist, agnostic or other groups who are
> opposed to the teaching of religion compulsorily
> and who wish for a completely secular system of
> education. ... The major cause is simply the
> ineffectiveness of much current religious education.
> After twenty years of this kind of teaching the
> results achieved are depressingly meagre."[4]

Many teachers have felt incompetent or uninterested but have
taught religion because they have felt forced into doing so at a time
when there is a chronic shortage of teachers qualified and trained
for this work. Some teachers who have been eager to take on the
subject have been conservative "fundamentalists" believing in the
divine inspiration of each word in the Bible - and in the Authorised
Version at that - and who have had complete disregard for biblical
criticism or informed biblical scholarship. And yet, even this is not
necessarily any teacher's fault. Nor is it necessarily the fault of
hard-working members of advisory councils, which have been made up,
at least in part, by teachers. For there has been limited resource
material available in a form understandable by the average teacher as
well as too limited school budgets to provide text books in sufficient
quantity for all members of the class. The tendency has been to place
religious education far down the list of priorities in a school
curriculum, and the R.I. class has often been the first to lose time
and money, particularly where it has not been an examinable subject.
This low status of religion is one reason why it is not taken
seriously by the student as well as by the teacher, and this affects
the adolescent's attitude towards religion, whatever its ultimate aim,

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4.

Readiness for Religion. p. 3.

and even where Goldman's principles have been seriously considered.

But religious education does not deserve higher status if its ultimate aim is to make the biblical religion the criterion of readiness for religion. Misinterpretation of the Bible does provide a barrier to understanding the Christian religion. But religious education should have a larger remit than merely that of correcting this.

B. REACTION BY RICHARD ACLAND

Sir Richard Acland saw further into the difficulties of religious instruction. As Goldman was primarily concerned with Primary school learning, Acland concentrated on the Secondary school level. In fact, Acland was not troubled by the failures of the syllabi and methodology of religious education for the Primary school pupil.

> "For example, since just over a year ago I have
> been taking, as a Bible Class, four boys who came
> up to me from a first-rate village Primary school
> and a very creative Sunday school. They had no
> hesitation or difficulty in telling me, in their
> own words, that there is no historic truth in the
> first few chapters of Genesis and that these early
> stories have value for us now as allegorical
> expressions of eternal truth about man and God.
> I mention this fact because, contrary to what is
> often said by many, it is simply untrue to suppose
> that young and tender faith is destroyed by early
> exposure to modern Christian knowledge."[5]

For Acland to generalise on such an exceptional illustration is unrealistic. The only inference that should be drawn is that one

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5.
Richard Acland, We Teach them Wrong, pp. 42-43. (Underscoring has been added.) It is interesting that Acland did not consider the possibility that he may have been the influence for this conclusion by the young adolescents he was teaching. The present writer is reminded of a story about Prof. James Stewart speaking at a ministers' conference. He made the statement that, contrary to general feeling in modern Scotland, it was not true that church attendance was low for wherever he went, up and down the country, he found packed congregations. It did not occur to him that he may have been the cause on each of these occasions.

must work with adolescents in the Secondary school regardless of their Primary school religious nurture. It raises the question, however, of what "young and tender faith" really is. Is it elementary kerygma heteronomously induced in such a way as to stunt growth towards autonomy?

Acland's main reason why a "revolution" must be made in religious education was environmental - the secular society in which adolescents live.

> "Remembering how many families there must be among us whose ancestors moved even more recently into the egalitarian and technological environment, may it not very well be that it is only now - or at the most only in the last one or two generations - that we rather suddenly begin to meet in our Secondary schools great 'masses' of children who have effectively shaken off the characteristic and long-persisting feelings of the great epoch that is closing, so that their thought-patterns are now conditioned, far down into the depths, by the new age in which we have all so recently embarked? Putting it very crudely: As far as concerns anything that has importance for religious education, Christian missionaries are suddenly confronted with 'a different kind of animal'."[6]

How can this revolution come about? Acland considered his book merely to be

> "... an exploration to discover, if possible, the general direction, or some of the directions, in which we may have to move if the revolution is to be made. It is not, as it were, an 'A.A. Route Map' showing every detailed twist and turn of the road that will lead us from where we are to the revolution's final consummation. Indeed we never find out 'exactly' how to make revolutions by sitting down and thinking out every detail in advance; we find out how to make revolutions by making them. That is to say, in this case, that we shall start to hack out the actual road and to find our way in detail around particular obstacles when a fairly large number of teachers, in

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6.
   Ibid., p. 26.

> classrooms and in pulpits, perceive the need and
> experimentally set off in the indicated direction
> so as to see what happens."[7]

Acland suggested that there was one initial change that must be made

if this "exploration to discover" was to be encouraged. It was to

call the R.I. class "Religion and Life Discussion Period" or something

equivalent. This may be contrived and in any case does not go far

enough; but there is much value in his emphasis upon the word

"discussion". The era is past when someone else's proclamation is

enough. Now young people want to find out for themselves. Regardless

of

> "... what we choose to put before them by way of
> religious instruction, the children in the Primary
> schools are inescapably recapitulating the living
> experience of the authoritarian, pre-scientific
> muscle-driven stage of evolution.
> "But our adolescents are not like that.
> Already, by the age of twelve or thirteen, they
> begin to be affected by the spirit of our age -
> and the greater their intelligence and vitality
> and integrity, the more surely they are affected
> by it. Several centuries of triumphant
> rationalism - using that word in all its noblest
> and most glorious meanings - have led us to
> isolate Reason from the other faculties of
> perception, and to give it such a place that
> nothing seems acceptable unless it commends
> itself and establishes itself, beyond possibility
> of rational disputation, to Reason alone."[8]

Many adolescents do not seem to be interested in discussion,

Acland explained, because their older relatives and the "whole outside

world" imply that religion does not really matter. One must be

careful not to suggest to them that their fathers and uncles are wrong

and the Church is right. However, Acland believed that it would have

been better if the adolescents

7.
  Ibid., pp. 31-32.
8.
  Ibid., p. 62.

> "... understood us to say: 'Had your fathers and
> uncles been slightly more perceptive, they might
> have found religious truth despite the Church.
> Nevertheless it is partly the fault of out-of-date
> teaching that they did not do so."[9]

After explaining that George Adam Smith in 1896 was interpreting

the Book of Jonah as inspired parable, Acland emphasised that young

people

> "... must have it explained to them often, clearly
> and joyfully, that being a Christian does not involve
> their believing in all the queer things that would
> have to be believed if we stuck to the old view about
> the verbal inspiration of the Bible."[10]

Acland described how he came to go beyond the boundary between

agnosticism and atheism which had kept him bogged down for years. It

was through what he took out of a reading of Good God. by Dr. James

Parkes:

> "'God intends you to be free; free above all
> else to believe in Him or not. A proof is a
> process that compels assent. Therefore, not
> through the weakness of Christians, but by the
> grace of God, there is never never never going to
> be proof of His existence.'
> Of course Parkes did not compel me to believe;
> but for the first time in years he laid my mind
> open and allowed me to believe...."[11]

A corollary of this is that God intends the atheist to have a

right to believe or not. It is this assumption of freedom that is

essential to autonomy.

Acland was so critical of the present teaching of religion in

Secondary schools that he believed that over-all it does more harm

than good. He agreed with the statement that it

9.
  Ibid., pp. 69-70.
10.
  Ibid., p. 85.
11.
  Ibid., p. 108.

"... would do religion no harm, and perhaps a
great deal of good, if it could be cut right
out of the State school curriculum, at any rate
after the primary stage."[12]

But this would leave young people with an equally bad Primary
school view of religion, assuming Goldman is right that the
pre-adolescent is incapable of conceptual ideas. The accumulative
conclusion could be drawn that religion should not be taught in
school at all. This decision would be accepted by many and left at
that, because they either believe religion is not a meaningful area
of educational pursuit or that such teaching is invariably
heteronomous. All subjects at one time or another have been badly
taught: present changes in the nature of Primary school education and
in the field of mathematics (now taught in relationship to logic)
suggest that drastic changes are possible in the teaching of any
level of any subject.

It is interesting that one who has brought a considerable amount
of benefit to religious education in British Secondary schools should
believe that such education should be discontinued. It may reveal
his pessimism in the possibility of change. Certainly it does the
adolescent no harm if he is taught religion by someone like Richard
Acland, and there must be many former pupils who are in debt to his
inspiration for at least part of whatever autonomy they have.

The irony is that many who, if they were honest with themselves,
should be against religious education in schools are not. Parents
who have left their own religious development behind even before they
left school are often adamant that religion be taught to their
children. The 1944 Act is supported by a vast number of parents of

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12.
    This is a quote from Arthur Barton but no specific source of
reference was given. See Ibid., p. 115.

whom only a minority participate in any form of religious practice.
Among others who do not object are those who want religion to continue
to be taught in schools because it _is_ being poorly taught. It allows
them something to point to when they say, "Of course, religion is
irrelevant." For them there is no difficulty in re-affirming religion
in school so long as it is a poor cousin to all the other subjects.

One of the problems of justifying religion in school arises when
it comes to putting down on paper the content of what is to be taught.
The easiest solution is with a Bible-centred curriculum. Now there
is content! And there is certainly plenty of material to teach! And
it comes already packaged!

But the starting point is not the Bible, is not God, is not
even Jesus. And it is important that content not be considered until
after the starting point is focused upon.

> "Start from the known and work to the unknown;
> start from where the children are; start with their
> actual ideas, their actual knowledge, their actual
> feelings and their actual interests; and from these,
> help the children to go forward to whatever-it-is
> that needs to be known."[13]

Acland reiterated a theme he had heard continually from his superiors
in teacher training college. For the concern of many teachers is,
"If only these children would get down to learning the material!"

But if any class at school should be "child" centred it should
be the religious education period.

> "The starting-point for religious teaching
> is in the adolescents themselves."[14]

Two comments must be made, in the light of autonomy, about what
Acland was saying or at least about the way in which he said it.

13.
   Ibid., p. 116. The term "children" should not be used when
referring to adolescents for reasons explained in the paragraphs below.
14.
   Ibid., p. 117.

First, the term "child" should never be used for "adolescent". Adolescence is the turbulent transition between childhood and adulthood. To call them children can allow one to treat them as children. And to do this is to place a barrier in the road to autonomy.

Second, the term "religious teaching" contradicts the "child-centred" starting point. If one begins with the adolescent and is seeking to develop his autonomy, then one does not begin with, or lead into, teaching. It should be more of an encounter:

> "What is religion as such? It is not a store
> of information or knowledge. It is not a set
> of intellectual abilities. Religion is a
> relationship."[15]

And, indeed, it can be seen as being more than a relationship. Tillich defined religion in terms of what concerns one ultimately. But what so many "teachers" want is a complete set of lesson notes, and for academic presentation. Neither relationships nor ultimate concerns feature.

The misuse of "child" and "religious teaching" were also ignored by Matthews in his chapter on Acland in Revolution in Religious Education. Matthews, however, rightly praised Acland's ability to provoke valuable discussion with his adolescent students in areas of moral development[16] and it is here that the fruit of autonomy can truly be developed.

Acland made a plea for an open-minded and open-hearted subjection to the possibility of religious truth. But in his closing paragraph he begged the question of divine revelation:

15.
  Loc. cit.
16.
  Revolution in Religious Education, pp. 73-74.

> "If, by the time they leave school, the
> adolescents know that the Church is not asking them
> to believe the impossible; if they are not waiting
> for a 'Proof'; if they know something about
> themselves, and particularly that there is 'something
> wrong with us as we naturally stand'; if they have
> courageously looked at life in the world today with
> all its glory and horror, and answered with a
> heart-felt thankful 'Yes'; if therefore they stretch
> out in the hope of being aligned with whatever may
> be active at the heart and core of Life; if they
> have been given even an elementary insight into
> what may be involved in the quest for the Christ
> Within; if they have often looked at verses, chapters
> and books in the Bible that are relevant to all this
> learning; and if the teacher then stands out of the
> way; is there not a fair chance that they will be
> found by the Truth of God?"[17]

Acland implied that religious education in school is incomplete

unless it leads to Christian conversion. This is not a valid aim

for the school. He may not have believed that the end justifies the

means. He may not have believed that conversion must be sought as

an aim even if heteronomously induced. He may not have violated the

categorical imperative. But he was acknowledging what Tillich would

have called theonomy as a hopeful by-product if not an aim. And he

was assuming that religion is a valid experience. This assumption

violates autonomy as an aim and perhaps also as a means.

C. REACTION BY HAROLD LOUKES

Harold Loukes[18] was chairman of the study group of the

Institution of Christian Education set up in 1958 to inquire into

the state of religious education in the Secondary modern school. It

did not use statistical methods partly because work had already been

done in that area.[19]

17.
   Ibid., p. 191.
18.
   Reader in Education in the University of Oxford.
19.
   See for example, Religious Education in Schools, (SPCK, 1954.)

Its concern was to discover how far the adolescent was making sense of Christianity in terms of his own human situation rather than how much objective biblical knowledge he would accumulate before leaving school. The study group believed that facts did not give understanding unless seen to be relevant to life. The inquiry was directed towards the fourteen year old school leaver to find out, in the final stages of his formal religious education, if there was realism and relevance.

With the starting point that religion is usually tied up with Sunday and Church, the following statements were made by members of a class discussion group:

"We pray when we're in trouble."
"If somebody is ill we pray for them to get better." (Majority agreed.)
"I think you should pray to thank God for things at times, instead of just asking for them."
"God is a kind of person who has the character of understanding...a friend...Father...Healer...Leader."
"I don't think war is anything to do with God."
"If given the choice of being made to be good or being allowed to be bad if I wanted to, I'd rather be bad." (Majority agreed.)
"The Bible's not forced to be true, we don't know ourselves that it's true. It could be something that's made up quite a long time ago."
"Scientists and people have studied the Bible. It's not been proved to ourselves, to our own personal lives."
"I don't think that a teacher can prove that God is."
"I don't think it can be true what is written in the Bible...."
"I have always thought of God up above the clouds in heaven."
"I think God is everywhere around us...."
"It's too isolated, the Church - it doesn't come into everyday life."
"I don't think Christianity should be forced on people."
"Scripture lessons are totally boring."
"One is inclined to sit back and let the teachers do the work."[20]

20.
Loukes, _Teenage Religion_, pp. 14-36. (The questions or comments by the "teacher" which provoked these responses have been omitted.)

After ten years of religious education in school, plus whatever else anyone in the class had from a church, it is of concern that so many attitudes are based on misinformation, in spite of the fact that Loukes declared that the adolescent retains biblical knowledge

> "...rather better than he retains other knowledge
> of a comparable kind: his 'scripture' is 'better'
> than his history."[21]

Perhaps part of the difficulty is that this biblical knowledge has been heteronomously induced as a matter of policy in the Primary school.

A number of typical quotations from the taped discussion were then selected and presented to about five-hundred fifteen year olds for written comment.

The quotations were classified under the headings of the Bible (including the creation, the character of God, belief in Jesus Christ), the value of Christianity, attitude towards "goodness", life after death, the problem of suffering, prayer, churchgoing, and the attitude towards religious instruction.

The conclusions that Loukes made can be condensed. There was a readiness to pursue the subject of Creation further, with the young people realising that their understanding was limited. There was desire to have the Bible "proved", with the assumption that it was really concerned only with the distant past and that therefore it could not be relevant to, or judged by, contemporary experience. About one in three viewed God in anthropomorphic terms through the influence of Old Testament language and Christian art. God is like Neptune, only He is in Heaven instead of in the sea. The sceptics or

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21.
   Ibid., p. 9. But Matthews took a different view: "How little of the spirit and teaching of the New Testament has been absorbed by those who made these comments." (Revolution in Religious Education, p. 52.)

unbelievers assumed that God was "a figment of man's imagination".
The majority conformed to the pattern of concern over the problem
of "miracle" in Jesus' life rather than his moral and spiritual
insight. About a tenth discarded Jesus' birth with other biblical
legends they had confidently rejected. The others divided themselves
equally between an orthodox view and a critical humanist view to
explain, or explain away, the supernatural elements of Jesus.
Whether or not there is belief in God or Jesus, by any definition,
many considered them too remote from the contemporary world to have
any influence today.

Loukes considered two critical questions of any system of
values to be:

> "Are they worth dying for? And are they
> worth living by?"22

He was not romantising; he was emphasising commitment, which is an
important element in autonomy.

About a third rejected the call to sacrifice on either
utilitarian or agnostic grounds. Some failed to see the issue.
Half believed that Christianity involves supreme values and half
thought it was found wanting, or at least less important, than the
claims of life itself.

The quest for autonomy could be shown by the young people
choosing "to be free to be bad" over "being made to be good". The
former suggests adult status while the latter suggests remaining
under the authority of the school situation with its rules and
prohibitions. "Is it boring to be good?" or, as Loukes believed
the question could have been better framed, "Is it inhibiting to be

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22.
   Ibid., p. 53.

good?"[23] Being bad is adventurous as it violates the system of adult authority. "To be good" is ambiguous. It can mean goodness in terms of one's own definition of right and wrong or goodness in terms of the accepted mores in the adult society. To be good can mean to do what you are told to do. This is goodness without one's own autonomously held views, which alone can make being good adventurous.[24]

Loukes believed that it is important to challenge adolescents to find the meaning of life, and a way of doing this is by asking: "Well, then, what meaning does it have when it is over?" But this does not necessarily follow. Life can have meaning without necessarily continuing beyond the grave. A more direct question, "Has life a purpose, and if so what?" would avoid having to beg the question of life after death and would avoid begging the question of the existence of God.[25]

The problem of suffering, in terms of religion, can well be studied within the framework of the story of Job.[26] In looking at the problem of suffering, Loukes referred to remarks by "our children". Again, as with Acland and Matthews, Loukes classified the adolescents in the category of "children". To call adolescents "children" can encourage treating them as children. Parent-Child stimuli encourage Child-Parent responses. Unfortunately, Teenage Religion did not mention the goal of helping the adolescent to develop autonomy. However, a hint on how the adolescent generally feels towards religious instruction was shown by the over-whelming favour of "more 'adultishness' in content and more discussion in class".

23.
  Ibid., p. 58.
24.
  An attempt to define religion in this way is found in Living Bible, Book 1, unit 1.
25.
  See Living Bible, Book 2, Introduction, p. 11.
26.
  See Living Bible, Book 2, unit 3, pp. 30-39.

> "To the adolescent 'adult' is a highly coloured
> word, representing his hopes of status and
> importance, seriousness, the hope of becoming.
> He values his experience as it comes in adult
> form: his clothes, his freedom, his
> responsibility; and though he knows he is not
> really grown up, he is always conscious of
> being a little more grown up than older people
> seem to think."[27]

To assist this hope of becoming, Loukes should have taken more
seriously the psychological implications.

Hints on areas of content were shown by some adolescents'
appreciation of a particular method of "teaching".

> "In the school I attend they have explained that
> the Bible may not all be true, that the stories
> may only be based on the truth. And I think
> that is the way most girls and boys would like
> to be taught."[28]

This, however, was not critical enough. It may be the comment of
someone who has been heteronomously indoctrinated into accepting
a particular evaluation of Scripture. And however interpreted, the
Bible is still assumed to be the sourcebook on religion, limiting
the definition of religion.

Much concern at repetition was given. In some schools the
parables and miracles are apparently repeated from Primary school
through to Secondary school. Mere variety of theme and treatment
does not help. And some themes appear too difficult while others
are too childish. One particular view requires quoting:

> "Well there is not much in the Bible that is
> childish, but I think the main trouble is the
> way in which its /sic./ taught makes it
> 'unadultish'."[29]

27.
  Loukes, op. cit., p. 78.
28.
  Ibid., p. 79. See Living Bible. Book 2, Conclusion, pp. 89-95.
29.
  Ibid., p. 80.

Method may make the content appear childish. And it may have been
this that caused some adolescents to want the Bible lessons
discontinued altogether as being "babyish", "irrelevant", and
"serving no purpose in adult life". Perhaps the contemporary
adolescent is generally unwilling to be limited to biblical studies
however much they are life-centred.

Recent studies of adolescence make use of categories of
"developmental tasks" which in the process of maturing the
adolescent must perform. Loukes claimed that the adolescent

"...wants religion to solve his personal problems
for him, as he wants his English or his mathematics
to solve his vocational problems."[30]

Loukes anticipated what he believed to be a new frontier to the
whole educational process. His study was an attempt to move

"... closer to the human situation of the adolescent,
to discover what the pupil received from religious
instruction, and what went on in his mind. It was
not concerned with how much, in terms of sheer fact,
the school leaver knows about the Bible, but with
how far Christianity makes sense to him, and helps
him to make sense of his own human condition. ...
But although a knowledge of the Bible is an
essential preliminary to Christian understanding,
it does not give understanding until it is seen
to be relevant to life. How far is this perceived
by boys and girls of fourteen?"[31]

The study assumed the importance of biblical knowledge for students
in Primary and early Secondary education but concluded that for the
students it is

"... more important that the final stages of their
religious education should be conducted in an
atmosphere of realism and relevance."[32]

30.
 Loc. cit.
31.
 Harold Loukes, Teenage Religion, p. 9.
32.
 Ibid., p. 11.

The influence of Loukes' themes upon and correlation with _Living Bible_ will be mentioned later.[33] It is sufficient here to state that he made a plea for a more informed and directly involved class teacher to make certain that the discussion method developed interest and was not allowed to fall into uncontrolled debate. (These are necessary ground rules, but care must be taken lest they are passively accepted and encourage heteronomy.)

> "To this end, the teacher needs to be more fully
> and widely prepared than is necessary for a
> straight lesson. He cannot be content with a
> set piece - a chapter of the Bible, a journey of
> St. Paul, or the life of a saint, to be 'done'
> between one bell and the next. He needs to be
> ready to shift his ground, to twist and turn with
> the 'rascally fox of an argument' and to know at
> least the contours of any country in which he may
> find himself at the end of a gallop."[34]

This makes heavy demands upon the teacher and few are perhaps able to rise to the occasion unless they are fully qualified teachers of religious instruction. Even then they might not have Loukes' ability to lead a discussion and supply resource material at the same time, or as his recorded interviews show, the ability to lead the young person to self-discovery. As a method it is difficult to exercise. One of his insights is very important to pursue:

> "It is generally true that the adolescent,
> half child, half adult, will respond with the
> half that is appealed to. Treat him as a child
> and he slips back a few years; treat him as
> older than he is, and he takes on a little
> extra maturity. The risk is real, but it is a
> risk worth taking."[35]

An even greater risk is putting information before the class in written form for the students to devour and discuss on their own.

33.
  See below, SECTION FOUR, I, A.
34.
  Ibid., p. 114.
35.
  Ibid., p. 115.

But if it has illustrations to make it vivid and provocative and has been revised in light of classroom encounters, then even more is that risk "worth taking". This is what Living Bible attempted to do. One of its advantages is that less direction is required from the teacher and more opportunity is given to the class members. Such a syllabus can have some of the values of Loukes' "Anti-method".[36]

In his conclusion, Loukes explained that the method he presented should be reserved for the last year.

> "A four-year programme of ill-informed talk would not constitute a means to religious education.
> "At the same time, the last year, with its new, adult point of view, needs preparation beforehand. Religious instruction is bound by the same laws as other instruction: there must be continuity and progress, unity and development. While the first three years must continue to be based on the Bible, it will be necessary to begin during that time to view it as a book about the human condition, rather than a book about remote history."[37]

In this way Loukes brought his conclusions to a close:

> "A four-year course would thus make two different approaches. For the first three years, the Bible would provide the themes, historical moral and spiritual, pressed as far as may be /sic./ towards the contemporary historical, moral and spiritual situation. In the last, the present world, as immediately experienced by our young people, would provide the themes, which would be pressed back to the Bible where these same themes were originally, and so profoundly, explored.

36.
See Ibid., pp. 145-149. Living Bible does not determine the lines which discussion will follow and it does not necessitate predetermined orthodox conclusions. It is true that extempore lessons may be the best teaching on certain occasions. But then those using Living Bible can have the wisdom to know when to interrupt it, when and how to make its Introductory Questions more relevant, and when to let a problem event in the world, nation, community, school or personal circumstance replace the particular unit (chapter) altogether. This is more fully presented below, in SECTION FOUR.
37.
Ibid., p. 150.

> "If the work is well done, the young adult
> will take into his new life something in which
> he must believe and by which he must stand."[38]

For the second time since the 1944 Education Act Britain has raised the school leaving age. There is value in the final year's being completely different in methodology, but it is not necessary to create a dichotomy between a Bible-centred and Life-centred course, or between a syllabus and what Loukes called an "Anti-syllabus" method. Living Bible assumed that even for the young adolescent "the present world, as immediately experienced by our young people" should be considered in the selection of themes even during the first three years. At no time should Bible study be seen as an end in itself or merely as a storing up of knowledge that becomes relevant only at a later time. The aim of religious education in early adolescence is more than to prepare young people for becoming responsible citizens, workers, husbands/wives, and parents. They have to cope with life now. And they are forming even now the basis for finally taking decisions concerning job/marriage/community responsibility. Adolescence is not only an age of preparation for life, it is an age for living.

But this does not in itself go far enough. It still assumes that the Bible is the primary source material. For Loukes, it was the primary source material. In Living Bible 1 and 2 this was also the case. In volumes 3 and 4 non-biblical material was included as the basis for discussion. If the purpose of religious education is basically to use Christianity as the foundation for life themes, then this is justified. If, on the other hand, growth towards autonomy is

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38.
  Ibid., p. 152. /sic.: possible/

a serious aim, then there is no reason for the Bible to be given such priority. Nor should religious education itself be given priority as the area in which such development towards autonomy is sought. Instead, religious education should be seen as part of the humanities in such a way that makes certain that the adolescent is exposed to many options, and not all of them religious ones, in the content that is examined. This implication will be further considered in the conclusion of this thesis.

D. REACTION BY NINIAN SMART

Positive concern for the situation of religious education by Ninian Smart[39] differed from Goldman, Acland and Loukes in that he was primarily concerned not with methodology but with content. For Smart, how religion should be taught belonged to the realms of educational technology. Rightly he began with aims, although he did not begin with the aims of education in general but with the aims of religious education (for universities, but also for colleges of education and schools) in a pluralistic society. He believed that such a society was "a religiously neutralist one—where men can make up their own minds about religious and ideological matters."[40]

Using what he called "the logic of religion", Smart rightly questioned the (sometimes hidden) assumption that theology is Christian theology. Further he rightly questioned the use of "theology" as being the relevant term for the theory of religious beliefs because, for example, Buddhism does not entail belief in God for it has no

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39.
Professor of Religious Studies, University of Lancaster.
40.
Secular Education and the Logic of Religion (Healington Lectures, University of York, 1966), p. 7.

theo-logos. So instead he used a phrase that logically would be
inclusive, embracing even the quasi-religion of Marxism, "doctrinal
inquiry".

And then he unfolded logically and accurately the various
dimensions of religious education. It must go beyond descriptive
accounts such as history and doctrine because the atheist and the
preacher and others who talk for or against a particular religious
view do more than make descriptive remarks. He used the term
"parahistorical" to refer to arguments of evaluation in religion.
To ask if Jesus died on a cross is to raise an historical question.
To ask if he died for men's sins is to raise a "parahistorical"
question.

By logic, he argued that the nature of religion is
six-dimensional:

            (1) "doctrinal dimension"
            (2) "mythological dimension"
            (3) "ethical dimension"
            (4) "ritual dimension"
            (5) "experiential diemnsion"
            (6) "social dimension"[41]

The first three represent the teachings of a religion, including its
"parahistorical" claims, the last three represent the phenomena of
religions in history. But the "parahistorical" and the historical
aspects tend to merge, and the two groups form a unity. For example,
doctrine is "parahistorical" but one can make a statement on the
history of doctrine. Various interpretations of a religion are given
by highlighting or by omitting any of these dimensions. Smart

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41.
    See Ibid., pp. 15-18.

illustrated this in Christianity with the Christ-event as
transcendent, historical, and experiential having the historical
subtracted by Bultmann and the existential subtracted by unitarianism.
Religious education, he believed, must be comprehensive and balanced
but without prejudice to the beliefs of those who ultimately reject
all or part of this. Religious education must encompass all the
dimensions.

> "Preoccupation with doctrinal issues, Biblical
> studies and early Church history has meant that
> from the theological side many important
> inquiries into religion have been skimped;..."[42]

The main conclusion for this thesis that Smart made is that by
its own inner logic, religion drives theology outwards into
philosophy, history, and comparative religion. Unfortunately his
concern for the logic of religion, from the standpoint of autonomy,
over-shadowed his concern for the logic of education which might have
encouraged him to have included other subjects and other dimensions.[43]
However, when put to the test of autonomy, he rightfully believed that
religious instruction designed to impart faith, as a "teaching that",
should be avoided in secular education.

> "Undoubtedly, the assumption of many people
> involved in religious and theological education
> has been that a main function of theirs has been
> the transmission of what the Church or Bible
> teaches. They have looked on their task as a
> form of authoritative teaching that. But the
> essence of education, I would suggest, is
> teaching how."[44]

This "teaching how" involves imparting information, and as education goes
beyond this so should religious education. But to transcend the

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42.
  Ibid., p. 94.
43.
  See below, SECTION FIVE, III.
44.
  Ibid., p. 95.

informative with faith, Smart warned, is to evangelise. The
alternative is to give

> "the capacity to understand religious phenomena,
> to discuss sensitively religious claims, to see
> the interrelations between religion and society
> and so forth."[45]

But this capacity requires certain skills for the teacher, and
certain skills to be imparted to the student. Smart called for
"the world of dialogue rather than the sphere of judgment".[46] He
recognised that this means initiation into questions about the
value of religion. He recognised that the degree of indoctrination

> "depends upon a number of criteria, to do with
> the degree with which a teacher fails to mention
> alternative beliefs, the tone of voice used, the
> lack of sympathy for the criticisms levelled at
> Christianity or Humanism and so on."[47]

It is the "and so on" which must be spelled out, especially in terms
of social skills. Effective dialogue does not just happen. It is
as important to have readiness for social encounter as for religion.
Acland believed that one begins not with religion (or the logic
thereof) but with the adolescent. Loukes appealed for a life-centred
curriculum. Smart recognised in his content-centred proposals the
danger of indoctrination and the need for dialogue. But until social
psychology and methods of appraising group dynamics are encountered
by teachers and adolescents, such dialogue will be ineffective.
Smart emphasised the content. Without this, discussion, however much
its methods and techniques are known, is a pooling of ignorance. It
is as important to avoid this as to avoid blocking the road to open
inquiry. Ignorance is as dangerous as indoctrination.

45.
  Ibid., p. 96.
46.
  Ibid., p. 98. His own contribution towards this includes his method
in World Religions: A Dialogue.
47.
  Loc. cit.

How religion should be taught does not belong just to the realms of educational technology. The methods of autonomy (games of judgment and the dialectical process) require social skills which themselves become part of the content. The merging together of the content and method of autonomy as an aim in religious education is analogous to the merging together of the historical and the "parahistorical" aspects of religious education.

E. REACTION BY PETER McPHAIL et al.

Positive concerns for the situation by Goldman, Acland, and Loukes have been examined as reactions coming directly from within the camp of religious education. Concern for the situation by Peter McPhail (and those with whom he worked) relates directly to religious education even though the reaction is within the camp of moral education. One of the problems of the 1944/45 Acts is that they established religious education as a specific subject rather than develop a more general humanities approach. Loukes enlarged the circle of religious education to include ethical problems. McPhail used the religious education Acts to encompass a moral education project.

The project, entitled "Lifeline", has been issued by the Government-backed Schools Council directed by McPhail with a sixteen member consultative committee, six working parties, and the help of numerous teachers and students. Several clergy also gave assistance. The reaction, therefore, is not that of one person but of many. An examination of "Lifeline" is included at this stage in this thesis for it is a programme being used in many religious education classes.

> "At the last count, in November 1969, 40
> percent of those using our materials were doing
> so in time allotted to religious education, and
> 60 percent were doing so in other contexts. We
> do not believe that what we are trying to do can
> only be done through religious education. On
> the other hand we accept that some believe it
> can be done most effectively through religious
> education. ... Provided our approaches are used
> as intended and not for indoctrination of any
> kind from whatever source we rest content."[48]

The dilemma of "Lifeline" is that

> "... whereas good religious education has moral
> effects and good moral education may stimulate
> interest in religion, moral education and religious
> education are not identical; are not, or ought not
> to be, in any sense in competition."[49]

Religious and moral education are related and yet distinct. Their

relationship includes the assumption that religious convictions can

provide motivation for moral behaviour and moral behaviour can

provide motivation for religious commitment. Their distinction

includes the assumption that not all good moral behaviour is enacted

by religiously committed people nor do all religiously dedicated

people live morally good lives. "Lifeline" broadly defined good

moral behaviour as "a considerate style of life". This was its

educational aim. And yet autonomy also featured. The project team

was critical of those who would censor "alien" influences and ideas

to create a conformist, restrictive, status quo society:

> "We also see such a retreat as an admission of
> defeat--an admission that society was abandoning
> the generation of <u>enthusiasm and autonomy as aims
> for education</u> and cannot cope with the challenge
> of new ideas and new ways, that we have lost our
> faith in the 'self-authenticating' nature of truth,
> our belief in our ability to use wisely both what
> we have inherited and what we ourselves have
> created."[50]

48.
  McPhail, Ungoed-Thomas, and Chapman, <u>Moral Education in the Secondary
School</u>. p. 20.
49.
  <u>Loc. cit.</u>
50.
  <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 11. Underscoring added.

Here is a clear statement that autonomy should be an aim for education. It means that the adolescent should be encouraged to make self-decisions. To this statement, however, there must be added what Berne called "appropriateness". Indeed, as McPhail **et al.** believed that religious education was inadequate to contain the humanities, so Berne implied that religious and moral education together were still insufficient in the education for constructive relationships. Social psychology including transactional analysis has a contribution to make. Otherwise moral education, even taking autonomy seriously, could still fall into the trap that "Lifeline" sought to avoid:

> "... the dangers of attempting the re-establishment of a super-authority, of control, ... that to educate morally would be to mould society; to attempt social conditioning, to interfere with individual choice."[51]

But there is no Act which formally gives Secondary schools a "humanities department" that could establish religious, moral, and social education as distinct but correlated subjects. "Lifeline" assumed that education should be "for change, for greater autonomy, for richer experience".[52] It assumed that religious, moral, and social education should contribute to this aim.

Into this must be injected an introduction to philosophy. "Lifeline" itself is heavily Kantian:

> "An education in the considerate style of life is not one which relies exclusively on rationally persuading schoolboys and schoolgirls to accept that it is right to treat others as ends in themselves, to treat them with consideration. It is not even that which goes further and educates the children in what consideration is in many

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51.
  Loc. cit.
52.
  Ibid., p. 9.

> situations. Effective education is learning to
> care; also, and most important, it demonstrates
> the considerate style of life in action and
> motivates children to adopt it because it is a
> rewarding and attractive way to live."[53]

Such reward McPhail claimed was not a violation of Kantian ethics.

Kant, he rightly believed, did not reject rewards so long as they

were side benefits and not the motives. The good act is good in

itself because it is done from a sense of duty and not inclination.

Its goodness does not come from its effects.[54] However, the

motivation of reward Kant rejected as heteronomous and only

appropriate to those who are incapable of autonomy.

Maslow considered the meeting of certain needs essential in

growth towards autonomy. As Teenage Religion (Loukes) sought to take

the needs of the adolescent seriously, so "Lifeline" claimed to offer

> "... a method which not only helps secondary
> school children to find and implement answers
> to their difficulties, but which does so
> while at the same time preserving their
> autonomy. To provide such help is the
> principal purpose of this Project."[55]

The first survey on which the work for "Lifeline" was initiated

was made under the guidance of Michael Argyle[56] in 1966-67. The

Project members concluded that adolescents need opportunities for

examining behaviour in a way that Kant would have called "games of

judgment". Such opportunities, the Panel believed, assist

self-criticism and charitable understanding of the failures of other

people. This first survey concerned adolescent-adult relations.

53.
  Ibid., p. 18. Kant's first and second maxims were endorsed by
McPhail et al. in Ibid., p. 47.
54.
  See Ibid., pp. 74-75.
55.
  Ibid., p. 27.
56.
  Reader in Social Psychology in the University of Oxford. His
contribution to social skills has been considered above in SECTION TWO,
II, C, 1.

> "What adolescents are primarily saying when they
> describe freedom as good is that they need to
> develop autonomy in adolescence if they are ever
> to become adults. They need practice in taking
> decisions, and not just verbally either. The
> important things are freedom to decide to do
> something affecting your life, and then freedom
> to do it."[57]

The findings also showed that many of those who failed did not want

to win (a focal idea in Born to Win), and that teachers and children

need to feel valued and accepted (Maslow's "esteem needs"). The

need for autonomy

> "... to enable young people as far as possible
> to learn to live with, and become more
> independent of, the unhelpful experiences they
> suffer at the hands of others..."

appears to be correlated with the heteronomous situation

> "... that treatment by others during childhood
> and adolescence is the greatest formulative
> influence on an adolescent's style of life."[58]

"Lifeline" aimed at putting Kantian ethics into practical, existential,

moral decision making. The method sought to develop a "morality of

communication", the four abilities of (1) reception (to be aware),

(2) interpretation (to be accurate in understanding what the real

message is), (3) response (to give appropriate reaction), and (4)

message (to reply clearly). This requires looking at the "is" before

the "ought", which means to react initially with non-judgmental

empathy.

One danger of transactional analysis is that it is so easy

constantly to over-examine oneself and one's relationships to the

extent of destroying spontaneity. Seeking to maintain spontaneity,

"Lifeline" emphasised a considerate life style more than an analytical

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57.
  Ibid., p. 32.
58.
  Ibid., p. 42.

one. Psychology must be delineated as a means to an end. The end includes maintaining critical control of oneself, autonomously programming oneself and controlling this self-programme with reasoned decisions for change and supplementation when required.

The "Lifeline" project contains an explanatory guide (Moral Education in the Secondary School), pamphlets, display cards, dramatic material, slides, and a handbook on how the school organisation itself can encourage moral behaviour (Our School). There are three sets of curriculum material: "In other people's shoes", "Proving the rule?", and "What would you have done?" All the materials make use of actual situations with an endorsement of Tillich's phrases, "we cannot separate ourselves at any time from the world to which we belong" and we require a "courageous participation in the situation."[59] In method, this means keeping to the concrete and moving from the simple to the complex with Piagetian concern for age appropriateness. It took seriously what might be called "readiness for morality". The theme of "Sensitivity" contains a practical method of teaching empathy, an exercise in feeling. The theme of "Consequences" contains a practical method for encouraging awareness of moral and social consequences of behaviour and action, an exercise in reason such as Kant intended his games of judgment to be.

The display cards in the "Lifeline" series readily provoke such games towards the aim of a considerate life style. The relationship between teacher and students is changed from the dominant authority

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59.
  See Ibid., pp. 82-83.

of the teacher (inflicting heteronomy) to the teacher as part of the learning team (encouraging autonomy). They work together identifying and meeting need.[60] The display cards lack comprehensiveness and vary in relevance, but innovations and appropriate changes are encouraged. "Lifeline" is necessarily selective and, in any case, it is more important to encourage students to identify and discuss moral issues of their own situation and observations.

The use of the curriculum is carefully explained with detailed, practical suggestions for timetabling in three ways. With moral education, as with religious education, the presentation can be (1) isolated, (2) correlated, or (3) integrated.

Isolated, moral education is timetabled as a separate subject. This makes it free to develop its own particular methods and objectives independently.

Correlated, moral education is timetabled with subjects which have intrinsic moral features and similar methods and objectives. Religious education, modern studies, health, and social education might be correlated in this way. Introductory psychology, sociology, and philosophy could be included in this series and the department could be called "humanities".

Integrated, moral education is timetabled with all subjects, especially history, English, and science, but also all others including art and music, as well as those listed above under "humanities".

It will be a conclusion of this thesis that a "humanities

60.
    Two differences from the method of *Living Bible* are that "Lifeline" encourages more direct teacher participation and does not lead on to a tentative group verdict. The *Living Bible* method is described below in SECTION FOUR, II.

department" should be established and the 1944/45 Acts revised accordingly.

Having considered five reactions, there now must be considered several problems that concern religious education as it is at present under the 1944/45 Acts.

III. PROBLEMS AND PREMISES

In the attempt to implement the Education Acts of 1944 and 1945, many problems have arisen. The following problems are interrelated but will be separated to highlight them.

A. THE ROLE OF RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

The first problem concerns the role of religious education in state Secondary schools. If autonomy is an aim, is there any justification for the inclusion of religion as a specific subject? Autonomy has been defined philosophically, theologically, and psychologically. The emphasis, however, has been on meeting the students' needs in terms of character development and interpersonal relationships. Is there anything in the definition of autonomy which is specifically religious? Cannot autonomy as an aim be completely met by moral and social education? Why include it in religious education?

An answer that already has been stated is that if autonomy is a general educational aim then it must be represented within every aspect of the educational system. Autonomy becomes an aim of religious education.

A second answer comes from the above philosophical and theological definitions of autonomy. Although the emphasis of PHIL-AUT is upon applying games of judgment to moral behaviour, there is an underlying base of the moral law assuming a divine lawgiver which should be given consideration by religious education. THEO-AUT, in its warning against autonomy without depth, relates autonomy to theonomy, and ultimate concerns to religion. If a broad definition of religion can be given as "that which concerns one ultimately", consideration of

religion belongs to the educational process. Otherwise, education
is limited to a humanist bias.

A third answer comes from other possible aims which derive from
a consideration of religious education. What is the specific aim of
religious education? It could be Scripture knowledge or even
Christian conversion. Autonomy as a basic aim reveals how the
former as the content of R.I. is too narrow for it limits the options,
and how the latter is heteronomous because the aim would condone
manipulation to this end. Edwin Cox rejected these, together with
moral teaching, as being inadequate aims in religious education.
He suggested instead the aim of helping the students "to have a
religious view of life and to make up their own minds on religious
questions."[1] By religious view he meant such attitudes as man being
bound to, and needing to show respect for, "the whole complex of
creation", as having the same consideration for others as he gives
himself, and showing awareness of a general purpose in life.[2] This
is, of course, a broad definition of religion. To accept it does not
necessitate giving any particular religious answer. In state
education it must not assume that the Christian answer is the only
explanation. For then it could become an attempt to indoctrinate
into a general religious outlook if not a particular religious view.

But there are possible religious answers and they should be
considered in state education. The above aim becomes more acceptable
in the second part of Cox's phrase, "to make up their minds on
religious questions". By this he meant questions regarding a spiritual

[1]
Changing Aims in Religious Education, p. 66.
[2]
See Ibid., pp. 66-67.

reality behind creation and the significance of life. J.W.D. Smith
preferred the term, "the dimension of mystery in human life", for
which the great religions of mankind have offered channels for
expression. But religion means different things to different people.
To define it as "the dimension of mystery" could disregard the
ethical dimensions many would give to it. The six dimensions which
Ninian Smart suggested, as already presented, are more comprehensive.

There are four popular reasons why religion should be studied
in schools: (1) that most parents, teachers, and many students want
it included, (2) that it has helped shape the tradition of national
life, (3) that it is concerned with discernment and commitment, and
(4) that it offers a genuine search for meaning in life.[3]

However, these must be challenged or augmented. Indeed, there
may be areas in Britain where parents, teachers, and/or pupils do not
want religion taught. This may be due to the image, or the way it has
been taught in the past. On the other hand, among those who do want
it taught the question must be asked, "Why?" Do parents want it
taught because they believe religion represents tradition and might
influence their children to live as they have lived? This is in
conflict with the development of autonomy and makes use of religion
as an opiate. However, some see religion, and Christianity in
particular, as being a radical view of life. If Christianity has
shaped the tradition of national life, should it be observed
historically in the way British imperialism shaped British life? If
it is something out of the past that has historical value only, then

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3.
  See Religious Education in Secondary Schools, the Schools Council
Working Paper 36, pp. 15f.

it should be the concern of the history class. Its specifically literary value could be covered by the English class.

But religion (like history, English, science, and art) has its own distinctive mode of understanding. In its call to discern the purpose of life and to develop commitment to that purpose, it offers an aim that is distinctive and vital. Its method cannot be limited either to the inductive reasoning of science nor the deductive reasoning of mathematics. The added ingredient it offers for consideration is faith or unproven belief. A classroom of young people will not hold precisely the same "faith" and some may not have any. But only religious education as a distinct subject (not necessarily isolated) will offer insight into this area.

The Social Morality Council (which includes Catholics, Protestants, Jews and Humanists) has written:

> "The aim of religious education in a county school is to enable a boy or girl to have a proper understanding of what is meant by a religious approach to life, and for most children in this country the centre of this understanding will be the Christian approach. It is not the purpose of religious education in the county school to bring about a commitment to the Christian faith, but rather to help children to understand what the Christian faith means in the context of other beliefs sincerely held by men and women of integrity and goodwill who do not find it possible to accept a Christian commitment as the basis of their lives. One of the results of religious education should be to create in boys and girls a more sensitive understanding of their own beliefs and of the different beliefs by which others govern their lives; such a sensitive understanding is not the prerogative of Christians."[4]

4.
Moral and Religious Education in County Schools. S.C.M., 1970, p. 13. (Quotation included in Schools Council Working Paper 36, p. 18.)

A more sensitive understanding of belief means commitment to the search for meaning in life which includes the consideration of religious views.

> "If the teacher is to press for any conversion,
> it is conversion from a shallow and unreflective
> attitude to life. If he is to press for
> commitment, it is commitment to the religious
> quest, to that search for meaning, purpose
> and value which is open to all men."[5]

At present the purpose of education reveals itself heavily as helping the pupil adjust to society as it is. Subjects may have implicit ultimate perspectives which hopefully contribute towards developmental autonomy. But explicitly the ultimate perspectives seem to be lost. History is history, English is English, and science is science. If religious education were to disappear either as a separate subject or as part of a new department of humanities, no one would be responsible for fostering religious apprehension.

At present universities offer a variety of courses in religion. The argument against use of state money for religious education would logically have to be extended to include them. But this thesis is not merely trying to substantiate the value of religious education but to clarify one particular aim.

If the aim is intellectual or cultural indoctrination, then the dogmatic approach is appropriate. Traditionally, churches have used this method. Acceptance of certain kerygmatic doctrines has been the goal.

If the aim is purely academic, then "religious education" should be thought of as "religious knowledge" and be objectively conceived.

5.

The Fourth R. (National Society and SPCK, 1970, p. 103.) Quoted in Schools Council Working Paper 36, p. 19.

But if the aim is to go beyond objective knowledge and not accept that a particular religion is true (as the dogmatic approach does), then that aim can include, among others, the quest for autonomy. The tools of reason can be brought to bear upon experiences of faith and belief between individuals within the classroom group, to become aware empathetically of what each regards as supremely valuable or what Tillich called of "ultimate concern".

To clarify this phenomenological approach, it is of value to identify four possibilities in the relationship of objective and subjective views.

(1.) Objective objectivity. This is the academic extreme. Here, a person, avoiding all forms of commitment, observes and appraises religious beliefs without seeing behind them believing people.

(2.) Objective subjectivity. This is explicit education. Here, a person, avoiding all forms of commitment, observes and appraises religious beliefs but sees behind them believing people.

(3.) Subjective objectivity. This is implicit education. Here, a person, seeking commitment, observes and appraises religious beliefs but does not identify with other people who share these views or have done so in history.

(4.) Subjective subjectivity. This is the existential extreme. Here, a person, seeking commitment, observes and appraises religious beliefs and sees behind them believing people or non-believing people with whom he identifies.

It is in the existential extreme that religious education as a separate subject or as part of a humanities department can make its most significant contribution towards the aim of autonomy.

B. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RELIGIOUS AND MORAL EDUCATION

Religious instruction must not assume that it can provide a totally satisfactory framework for moral education. The secular setting in which the adolescent lives and the likelihood of his sharing the general unbelief of modern society can make religion a stumbling block to morality. If morality is taught solely with a religious foundation, and that foundation is rejected, then the morality that it supports is in jeopardy.

However, to "teach" religion without showing its moral perspective is to be unfair and too narrow in interpretation, not least in the consideration of Judaism and Christianity. Neither the Old Testament nor the New Testament can be divorced from ethics. They are not abstract theological treatises however much theology they contain. They present religion as a way of life. They also define life as having spiritual overtones or perhaps even a spiritual core. Religious education of the adolescent should therefore be concerned with examining the possibility of a spiritual dimension to life. But there is an immediate issue of selection. As British and Western culture is concentrated on in history classes at the expense of other areas of historical study primarily because of the limitation of time, so the religion that is the heritage of Britain should be concentrated on at some expense to other religions. But as the history of the world is taught, so also should the religions of the world be taught.

It is not the purpose of religious education to indoctrinate the student in any particular view of religion or even in a general religious outlook. An open-ended approach where the adolescent draws his own verdict and an emphasis on autonomic development can

help avoid indoctrination. Exposure to religion is not
indoctrination any more than exposure to recent Russian history is
necessarily indoctrination to Communism or a communistic outlook.
No timidity or apology is necessary for either exposure. Those who
call for a more authoritarian teaching of Christian belief and
specific moral standards could not justify this in religious
education and then deny history teachers the right to authoritarian
teaching of Communism. In any case, the psychological nature of
adolescence in the tendency to rebel against indoctrination would
undermine the purpose of those who want a more evangelistic aim for
religious education in Secondary schools.

If religious education is to be open-ended, include the moral
aspects of religion, and yet not claim that religion has a monopoly
on morality, then the relationship between religious and moral
education suggests that they be part of a larger circle of
"humanities".

C. THE ROLES OF SCHOOL AND CHURCH

Some suggest that moral education is sufficient for the school
and that religious education should be left to the church. The
argument is that religion is chiefly confessional and its chief aim
is commitment. But this argument avoids the problems rather than
faces up to them. Religion is not the only possible approach to
morality, but it is one. Religion is concerned with the meaning and
purpose of life. A purely rationalistic view of life is one option
but not the only one. Education should expose the adolescent to
considering other options. Introductions to art, music, and drama
are not excluded from the school curriculum. Yet these subjects and
experiences go beyond reason to emotion and beauty. Religion can

add the dimensions of mystery and motivation. Has not education
been too rationalistic? Would not Kant's categorical imperative
as a purely rational argument for moral fairness be too calculative?
Indeed, it was his belief that the moral "ought" depended upon the
existence of a Will beyond human rationality. It is this that Kant
believed was the motivation behind autonomy. There should be common
recognition of what J.W.D. Smith called "the dimension of mystery
in educational planning".[6]

Immanuel Kant called for young people playing "a game of
judgment to consider illustrations of praiseworthy and blameworthy
actions and draw their own verdicts."[7] All Christians and many
humanists would consider that the life and death of Jesus was the
supreme example and inspiration of self-giving love. An understanding
of the teachings of Jesus should not be avoided within the moral
education of the adolescent. This cannot be done accurately without
a consideration of his view of religion. And this cannot be
understood without viewing the context of the Hebrew situation in
which Jesus saw himself or the motivating effect that he had on the
early Christians. But Christian education has as part of its aim
Christian commitment. Part of this commitment is outwith the
jurisdiction of the state school. Jesus of Nazareth, the focal point
of Christian education, can be given serious consideration by
religious education in school. This can give the adolescent an
introduction to the dimension of mystery, an introduction to the
religious aspect of life which this great – some would say uniquely

6.
  See Religious Education in a Secular Society, pp. 43-54.
7.
  Critique of Practical Reason, pp. 153-154.

great - teacher offered. But if religious education is really limited to one religion, it suggests that this is the only religion worth studying. And this violates autonomy as an aim by limiting the option.

A critical, liberal approach to the Scriptures should be coupled with an equally critical approach to the Church. The Church as an institution is a stumbling block for many adolescents. But the statement, "I would believe in the teachings of Jesus if it were not for the Church" does not allow for the fact that, were it not for the Church one would know little (if anything) of him.

Acland believed that if any of his colleagues was to make a success of his "religion and life discussion periods" he

> "unconditionally must go to church. If he never, or hardly ever, goes to any church or chapel... he will be 'saying' to them more clearly than words: 'This, which I tell you is more important than all else, is not worth forty-five minutes a week."[8]

But the teacher does not have the right to state categorically and to encourage heteronomously the belief that anything is more important than all else.

In any case, if the Church offers "childish dogma" to teachers' as well as to adolescents' minds, religion will be presented as a millstone.[9] If when young people go to church they find dingy old rooms and tattered old pictures, and boring old dogma, the image presented is that religion is dingy and tattered.

This adds to

8.
Op.cit., p. 40.
9.
  See Ibid., p. 41.

> "... the problems of religious teaching during the
> years when the child begins to move into adolescence -
> years when all the problems and questions of
> individual maturity within our modern world will
> begin to loom ahead.
> "It will be assumed that the adolescents we are
> talking about will have had some kind of experience -
> not, perhaps, as full and vigorous as it ought to
> have been, but at any rate some experience - of the
> childlike stage of spiritual evolution."[10]

The teachers, however, must remove many obstacles which stand

in the way of his group assuming a receptive view of religion -

receptive in the sense of being willing at least to take an objective

look at the Bible and the Christian view of ethics, and an objective

look at religion in general.

The fact that there is religious education in the church should

not be used as a reason for the school avoiding serious responsibility.

Religious education is necessary in both. But the reason is not

because then there is a double chance for some form of success (If

the Church fails, perhaps the school can succeed; if the school fails,

perhaps the Church can succeed). The reason is that both have a role

to play in religious education. The role of neither is more important

than the other. The Church must not assume that only it can give

real religious education. The school has an equally justifiable

role to play.

> "Enlightenment rather than conversion, understanding
> rather than discipleship, are the aims of the school
> whether in the classroom where religious knowledge
> is taught, or in the periods of worship it conducts."[11]

10.
  Ibid., p. 44.
11.
  Niblett, Christian Education in a Secular Society, p. 96. There is
a conflict, however, between avoiding conversion and conducting
services of worship which will be considered next in the role of the
chaplain and later in the conclusion of the thesis.

Classroom and assembly study and worship, would be greatly changed
if these aims were pursued. Such aims would encourage autonomic
growth.

D. THE RELATIONSHIP OF SCHOOL AND CHURCH IN THE ROLE OF THE CHAPLAIN

The appointment of ministers as honorary school chaplains
presents a problem. They officially represent a particular view of
Christian faith however tolerant they may be of the beliefs of those
of other religious viewpoints or of none. Of course, if the chaplain
takes advantage of a captive audience in the school classroom or
assembly he could become guilty of attempting indoctrination. But as
an honorary member of the school staff, and particularly if he is
seen to be really a part of that staff rather than an outside
invader, he does not necessarily jeopardise the autonomy of the
adolescent to a greater extent than does the history teacher or
teacher of modern studies who is seen to be a member of the Communist
Party — or the Labour, Liberal, National, or Conservative Party. The
difference is that the political adherent is not seen to be in the
school as a representative of a particular political party. He is a
member of the staff chosen by the education authority. The school
chaplain can never be seen in the same light even if he does not
misuse his privilege. In politics or religion any teacher can be
guilty of indoctrination, wittingly or unwittingly. The relationship
between church and school must not imply that it is the school's role
to evangelise. School assemblies, however, can easily suggest an
evangelical aim. To avoid this, services of worship in the school
should be abolished. They can have educational value by exposing
young people to an aspect of experience. But this violates the aim

of growth towards autonomy if Christian worship alone is the means.
Therefore, if a school chaplain is appointed, the school should take
great care to see that religious or philosophical views other than
those held by the chaplain are also presented in the assembly.

E. THE PROBLEM OF LANGUAGE

A basic problem in the teaching of religion is vocabulary - the
use of religious language. J.W.D. Smith considered this to be of
vital concern:

> "Religious language cannot be truly meaningful
> without religious commitment. Traditional
> religious language has become a private language
> in the modern world because traditional religious
> commitment is a minority experience. This is the
> basic problem of religious education today."[12]

Such commitment is the responsibility of the church, however, and not
the state school. Nevertheless, if religion is to be taught in
school considerably more importance and time must be given to it.
When one realises how much learning must take place before the
language of science can be understood and how this is most nearly
accomplished by those committed to a scientific vocation - and when
one considers how much the language of science is contemporary and in
what various ways, in school and out, the student is exposed to this
language - then one can see the disadvantage under which religion is
taught.

Religious language is not the language of secular society.
Religious language can appear quite meaningless and irrelevant to
the adolescent. He may think in the scientific idiom of secular

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12.

Religious Education in a Secular Setting, p. 33. J.W.D. Smith was
formerly Principal Lecturer in Religious Education at Jordanhill
College of Education, Glasgow.

humanism or materialism. This presents a particularly difficult task in communicating religious thought. Traditional religious language in Britain is biblical language. A basic, however elementary, understanding of biblical thought is important. Many adults who are antagonistic to religion or at least want to avoid commitment tend to help define religious language in a way that makes it irrelevant and even appear ridiculous. Part of the responsibility of the Secondary school and part of the aim of religious education should be to present truthfully and accurately some of the possible definitions and usages of religious language. Bishop John Robinson would not have had to write Honest to God or But That I Can't Believe if religious language were not falsely stereotyped with closed, rigid definitions by so many people. Many adolescents do not get close to an objective study of religion because they have stereotyped "God", "Heaven", and "Hell" with definitions that would be unacceptable to any but the most conservative biblical literalists. That is not the only view of the Christian religion any more than Ptolemy offered the only view of the universe. Modern biblical scholarship supercedes literal biblical interpretation not only because it is more modern (based, for example, on recent archeological findings) but because it is a more accurate portrayal of the meaning of Scripture through the help of linguistic scholarship and theological studies.

F.   THE PROBLEM OF INTERPRETING SCRIPTURE (HERMENEUTICS)

Then what role should the Bible take in religious education in the Secondary school? This will be considered now in the light of further assumptions on the authority and interpretation of Scripture.

In 1859, Darwin struck a near-fatal blow to popular literal acceptance of the Bible. With the acceptance of evolution, the creation stories in Genesis were challenged and the overall authority of the Bible was seriously affected. Agreement to co-exist was found through separating the combatants and saying that the methods of each, revelation and inductive reasoning, were too different to be allowed in the same ring.

Then at the beginning of the Twentieth Century science again entered the ring, challenging the Bible to a bout by questioning the psychological validity of the religious experience of biblical characters.

But even before the Reformation, biblical criticism was teaching that the Bible was a book of inconsistencies and fallacies, somewhat unscientific and unhistorical. Textual criticism had been practiced widely in the Church of the Middle Ages but mainly in an attempt to arrive at a perfect original "Bible-X". Later there was an attempt to divide the Bible into two parts, the true and the false, awarding the former to the divine inspiration of God and the latter to the human limitations of man.

The Reformers made a critical (however limited) approach to the Scriptures. Luther held that the later prophets wrote, on the foundation of Moses and the earlier prophets, much that was stubble and not gold. He suggested that the Fourth Gospel's account of Peter's denial contained many inaccuracies and he called James "an epistle of straw". Calvin was aware of such errors as the crediting (in Matthew 27:9) of Jeremiah with words he apparently never spoke. Luther and Calvin were not so naive as to overlook purely human characteristics and impurities in the Bible. It was not their intention to make the Bible a kind of "paper Pope". But they were

not the first to take a critical view.

> "Before the Reformers, many errors had already been
> detected. Thus Irenaeus argues against the literal
> meaning of the story of the Fall. Gregory of Nyssa
> denies that the opening chapters of Genesis are
> historical. St. Chrysostom is aware of
> incongruities in the story as told by the
> evangelists and maintains that only the cardinal
> facts of the narrative remain intact. With
> Clement of Alexandria and Origen, the allegorical
> method of interpretation is employed without
> restraint, and its employment seems not merely to
> obscure the literal meaning of Scripture, but to
> conceal their doubts concerning its truth."[13]

Before Copernicus had presented his theories on the universe, there
were those who regarded the first chapters of Genesis as containing
poetical rather than scientific truth. And Thomas Hobbes in the
middle of the Seventeenth Century claimed that the Pentateuch was
not written by Moses but sometime later and that the present form of
the Old Testament dated after the Jews returned from exile in
Babylon.

The fundamentalists' charge that the liberal interpretation of
Scripture is a modern heresy is false. It is neither modern nor a
heresy. Its basis dates well back in history and belongs to a main
stream of Catholic and Protestant heritage. It is true that
Augustine claimed that the writers of Holy Scriptures were preserved
from any error in writing them and this may have been and may still
be the general assumption of many Catholics and Protestants, but it
is not the only school of thought that has developed down through
the ages.

When Jerome in Bethlehem, c. 400 A.D., began collecting Jewish

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13.
   J.K.S. Reid, The Authority of Scripture, p. 24. Irenaeus (- c. 200),
Gregory of Nyssa (- c. 400), St. Chrysostom (- 407), Clement of
Alexandria (- 215), Origen (- 254).

and Christian writings that became the canonical list of the Latin
Vulgate on which the Authorised Version was based, he must have been
aware that he was committing a human act. The Jews had equated
inspiration with verbal infallibility and this idea was carried over
by the early Church. But Paul would have been surprised to learn
that his letters would eventually become part of "Holy Scripture".

The Bible must be studied like any other book with the same
forms of criticism which were first applied to secular literature,
not only to search for a purer text but to discover more of the
sources and circumstances from which the Scriptures came. This means
that one must see the Bible as an anthology of writings containing
a variety of types of literature, from narrative to allegory, myth
to poetry, and find its authority not in the letter (as Augustine
postulated) or in the meaning (as Luther postulated) but in the
contribution of moral and spiritual insight it brings to the
situations it illuminates.

In the early Nineteenth Century the first three Gospels were
compared; and scholars decided that Mark was the first to be written,
containing source material common to the other two. At about the
same time the repetitions and inconsistencies of the Old Testament
were highlighted, particularly the Pentateuch and especially Genesis
(which itself begins with two different stories of the creation). The
finding of four documentary sources in the Pentateuch denied the
traditional view of Mosaic authorship. To assign the Bible to divine
verbal inspiration is to assume that God stuttered (repeating himself)
and lied (saying one thing to one person and something contradictory
to another). A better interpretation is that the Bible contains a
chorus of human voices, from different ages and in different
circumstances.

Jesus himself was critical of the Scriptures and his "you have heard in times past ... but I say to you ..." lends his own judgment and condemnation of much of Scripture considered today to be sacred literature but considered by him to be superseded by a new Gospel. This in itself makes the rationalising of those who hold the view of verbal inspiration unacceptable. Whether Catholic or Protestant, the views that apparent discrepancies are copyists' errors, or that they occur for a reason which ultimately will be seen as part of the divine plan, is not credible.

The interpretation of Scripture must be carefully made. Calvin's industrious reading of the New Testament into the old is not acceptable. The Old Testament must be seen not in the light of the New Testament but in the light of the situation to which it spoke and the parallel situation, if any, of today's world. Christ and his disciples studied and used the writings found in the Old Testament and this in itself gives these writings importance, however secondary, to understanding the Christian Faith. The Gospels contain numerous Old Testament quotations. The ministry of Jesus cannot be appreciated fully without understanding the prophets whom he quoted. Paul quoted repeatedly from the Old Testament and whole sections of his writings cannot be understood apart from the interpretation he gave to the passages he quoted.

> "Paul almost nowhere argued apart from the
> O.T. in his letter to the Romans. The theme of
> Romans, 'justification by faith', can be
> understood only through comprehending the theme
> of the O.T., 'the righteousness of God'."[14]

14.
W.A. Shaw, "An Inquiry into Paul's use of the Old Testament in his Letter to the Romans", B.D. Thesis, Union Theological Seminary, N.Y.C., 1959, p. 3.

The Christian Church in the same way has made use of New Testament Scripture; and therefore the understanding of what Christianity is best made through reference to this Scripture. It is the textbook on which Christian faith, life, and work has been based. An extremely liberal interpretation of Scripture, while lessening its intrinsic authority, does not make its study any less important to religious education.

The Bible is a resource book for moral and religious discussion. This is not to suggest that <u>learning</u> Bible facts diffuses into <u>living</u> the good life through some form of osmosis. But there is no virtue in religious ignorance. Thousands of young people in the Twentieth Century

> "... are left to drift one step nearer to the
> point at which they will slam the doors of their
> minds against religion on the grounds that 'a
> Christian is the sort of man who believes such rot
> as that a man lived three days in a whale'."[15]

All the time spent in the English classroom on analysis of types of literature somehow does not spill over into an understanding of the Bible.

How the Bible was brought down through oral and written tradition and various translations, especially the way the Gospels came into being, in itself is a necessary introduction to understanding the difficulties of interpretation. The Old Testament being seen as including an attempt to record history (rather than being a direct voice of God) and including a variety of other types of literature (such as allegory, story-telling, and myth) should help the adolescent keep from throwing out the baby with the bathwater. And

15.

    Acland, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 19. This comment was prompted by 200 answers Acland received from Secondary school students to the question, "What do you think of the story of Jonah and the Whale?" The comment does, however, use the word "religion" where "Christianity" would have been more accurate.

there is much bathwater and not all of it is in the Old testament.
It plainly must be admitted that at least some parts of the Bible
need not be considered as "Sacred Literature".

The difficulty in the modern scientific era is accepting the
authority of teacher, Bible, and Church. But this difficulty is an
advantage to autonomy. If the adolescent will not accept uncritically
what is given to him as truth, he may be demonstrating a yearning for
autonomy and for making up his own mind in preference to accepting
as truth the opinion of another person or source. Today, the phrase
"you can take it from me" is irrelevant. And even if a hundred other
names were added, the authority is not enhanced as far as many
adolescents are concerned.

> "It's no use your telling me what you believe,
> or what other people have believed; the question
> is whether I can be persuaded of it now?"[16]

In the pre-scientific age, "proclamation" was enough. Belief
came from endorsing the sayings of others "in authority". And the
explanation of events was pre-scientific.

> "It snowed. Why? No one really knew. So:
> 'He sends the snow in winter.' Water babbled from
> a spring. From where? No geologists drew them a
> sectional diagram showing the rock formations
> between the spring and the uplands where the water
> fell perhaps five or ten miles away. So a nymph
> was pushing it up. And when the supply failed, the
> nymph was angry and needed the right kind of
> propitiation. And if that failed, it showed that
> there was something wrong with the ceremony. Why
> not?
> It is not easy for us to believe that there
> was a day — in fact there was a long age — when
> adolescent boys and girls vividly believed in a
> world peopled with all kinds of queer beings —
> fairies, nymphs, angels, pixies, witches, devils,
> leprechauns and ghosts."[17]

16.
  Ibid., p. 56.
17.
  Ibid., p. 57.

The fact that the Bible and many hymns were written in a pre-scientific age (and in a rural environment of a different culture or cultures) adds a difficulty complicated by perhaps whatever sermons, classroom talks, or school assembly addresses the adolescent has heard. The fact that the Bible is interpreted as "the Living Word" forces young people to make an unnecessary jump and ask, as if directly, "What is this passage saying to me today?" It is saying nothing directly. The Bible is not literature written for the adolescent today any more than Hamlet was written for today. If anything, it is less. Neither biblical writers nor Shakespeare were writing for the Twentieth Century, nor were they concerned over helping young people to prepare for coping with the Twenty-first.[18] Indeed, it is more likely that Shakespeare was aware of the possibility of his works living on through the end of the Second Millenium than any of the biblical writers could have been. Paul wrote to specific individuals or communities seemingly without expectation of his letters being copied, circulated, and even incorporated into "Sacred Scripture". The Old Testament had much more authority for him than he ever intended his own writings to have. The question is not, "What does Paul say to the adolescent today?" The question can only intelligently be stated, "What was Paul saying to X Christians in Y community under Z circumstances?" The question, "What would he say to us?" is an impossible question to answer when one considers that Paul, for all his wisdom, was a man of

[18]
   It is a not altogether irrelevant fact to mention that many who are today Secondary school students will be living most of their lives in the Twenty-first Century.

his day - a pre-scientific day.[19]

The

> "... children in the Primary schools are
> inescapably recapitulating the living
> experience of the authoritarian, pre-scientific
> muscle-driven stage of evolution.
> "But our adolescents are not like that.
> Already, by the age of twelve or thirteen,
> they begin to be affected by the spirit of
> our age - and the greater their intelligence
> and vitality and integrity, the more surely
> they are affected by it."[10]

To get over the hurdle of the Bible is one thing; to get over the hurdle of the Church is quite another. But with both there is little encouragement from the environment to help open the way to new discoveries in religion and morality.

> "Why should they be? Teacher stands there
> saying it matters; the whole outside world says
> it does not. And teacher does not seem to know.
> Teacher prattles on as if the outside world did
> not exist. ...
> "And which of two alternative impressions
> do we want to establish in the adolescents' minds.
> Do we want them to have the impression that we
> are saying: 'Your fathers and uncles are dead
> wrong. The Church is and always has been right'."[21]

Until the Church comes of age - that is, brings its theology and language into line with a scientific era - the very least that must be clearly communicated to the adolescent is that being a Christian does not necessarily mean that one has to believe all the strange

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19.
   The present writer recalls a conversation with the publishers of _Living Bible_ over the proposed title. His argument was: the title implies that the Bible was written for today's world and also suggests that Bible knowledge is the essence of religious education. The author won the argument (against this title) but lost the fight. The series was published under the title _Living Bible_ and this was extended to Books 3 and 4 even though they contained scarcely any quotes from the Bible or references to it.
20.
   Ibid., p. 62.
21.
   Ibid., p. 69.

things in various creeds in terms of the old view of the verbal inspiration of the Bible - for example, that one cannot be a Christian without believing that Jesus is sitting at the right hand of God.

To a certain extent, hermeneutics must leave unanswered the question, "What is the role and authority of Scripture in the religious education of the adolescent?" The reason for this is that if the role is too specifically defined, the adolescent is given no real freedom in clarifying the authority and interpretation of Scripture in his own mind. He must be free to make his own verdict and his own discovery. This is much more important than giving a specific view of Scripture which may become dated just as Luther's and Calvin's views have been superseded by much of more modern scholarship.

But if a circle has to be drawn to delineate the role of Scripture this must be said: at the very most the revelation one can receive through the reading of Scripture is but one of many forms of revelation; however, at the very least Scripture is the basic literature used by Christians through the ages and the importance of encountering it in the educational process can be too lightly viewed. But it must not be given in the school any greater authority than that of other literature. It does hold a certain amount of historical authority in so far as it is a book that leads one into, leads one through, and leads one on from the life of Jesus of Nazareth. That he is a person of importance in the story of mankind is a statement requiring little if any defence.

Within the pluralistic society of the school setting, the Scriptures must not be used for the ulterior motive of Christian

conversion. Nor should they be given special authority. For by the above argument it can equally be said that Plato, Mohammed, Marx, and many others have had considerable influence upon the world. For any influence to be given priority virtually to the exclusion of others is for it to be given the kind of special authority which blocks the road to open inquiry and growth towards autonomy.

G. THE PLACE OF HUMANISM AND CHRISTIANITY

Religion can be a opiate. It apparently is so for many who claim to be religious or even Christian. But it clearly was not so for Jesus of Nazareth. Religion was an essential ingredient in his personal development. Christian commitment is a goal of _Christian_ education. Integrity, freedom, and responsibility are goals of _religious_ education. Religion was not a way of escape for Jesus. Humanism does not have, as some believe, a corner on the integrity market. Education in state schools should not be limited to a humanistic view of personal maturity. The advantage of the state school should be the presence of the interplay of various perspectives on life. The possibility of autonomy is not enhanced by narrowing the field. It is not enhanced by religious education being reduced to Christian education. Religious education is a lower common denominator, but not the lowest possible one. It is not broad enough in itself, but its presence does help avoid humanism being considered as a common denominator. Humanism is not the lowest common denominator, and therefore is not the basic formula for education. It is as precise a view of life as any religious one. No view should be given sole squatters rights to British education. If any is intolerant of the presence of another, it is inhibiting the

development of trust and fairness which is essential to personality
development, mental and emotional maturity, and autonomy. And
this is true whether education is interpreted as knowledge-centred
or life-centred. Christianity claims that knowledge and life both
have religious dimensions. Humanism denies this.

The school is not a Christian community. Religious education
is only part of the total educational need. Religion is not the
core of education in the state school. Whether the religious view
of life is accepted (and in whatever way) or rejected, there
should be adequate allocation in the time-table for encountering
an open-ended approach to religion and other options to encourage
provocative thought about the meaning and purpose of life. The
school staff must come to trust one another and be involved in
dialogue - rather than being isolated from each other. Only then
can they help young people to take an unprejudiced view towards
religion and humanism and to work together through the uncertainties
and insecurities of life, trustfully and courageously, without
aggression, withdrawal, self-righteousness, or a chip-on-the-shoulder.

What are some of the areas of common concern to Christian and
humanist views?

> "Adolescent boys and girls need opportunities
> to talk freely together about matters of
> genuine adolescent concern - vocational
> problems, problems of personal relationships,
> current social and international problems,
> problems of meaning and purpose in human
> living, problems of personal belief. Such
> discussions must begin where the pupils are.

They must be 'pupil-centred'."[22]

Christians and humanists should agree. Several Christians and
humanists did agree in a joint pamphlet circulated in 1965 that
young people should be permitted in state schools to study "the
Christian religion as part of their cultural heritage."[23]

Only if this is done objectively can the adolescent be helped
to accept or reject out of a maturely developed autonomous personal
decision, and to see the implications of this decision.

It is probably true that a large percentage of adolescent boys
and girls will be married in churches. Some will do so for
traditional or sentimental reasons even though they are humanists.
Many who consider worship to be meaningless will be among those who
ask for a special service of worship at their time of marriage.
Some who do will base their decision on superstition. Some who do
not get married in a church will base this decision on prejudice.
It is important that the school help the adolescent think through
the implications of his belief in terms of integrity.[24]

22.
  J.W.D. Smith, op. cit., p. 99. All of these are presented in Living
Bible. Among the important concerns omitted from this list are
preparation for marriage (Book 3, unit 11) and preparation for parenthood
(Book 4, unit 8). But Smith saw also specific biblical themes that
should be covered by religious education in school. Those that he
mentioned as important are also presented in Living Bible, as is shown
by the following references: "the Hebrew prophets' interpretation of
history", p. 107 (see Book 2, unit 2); the attitudes of the "Pharisees,
Essenes, Zealots, and Sadducees", p. 108 (see Book 1, unit 7); "the
emergence of the Christian movement within the Roman world", p. 108 (see
Book 1, units 9, 10 and Book 2, unit 8); "comparing and contrasting the
ways in which the four Gospel writers have introduced their theme",
p. 110 (see Book 1, unit 5 and 2, unit 4); "the inner meaning of the
resurrection", p. 111 (see Book 1, unit 8); "the appropriate relation-
ship between law and love", p. 112 (see Book 2, unit 9); and "the cross",
p. 113 (see Book 1, unit 7). See below, SECTION FOUR, I.
23.
  "Religious and Moral Education: Some proposals for County Schools",
a pamphlet published privately in October, 1965 by a representative
group of Christians and humanists and circulated by H. Marratt, Borough
Road College, Isleworth, Middlesex.
24.
  For this subject of marriage see Living Bible, Book 3, unit 11.

It is a good thing to have a variety of outlooks represented by the staff of a school. Censure should be reserved for those who would close all doors but one. Particularly the Christian who claims to be free and the humanist who claims to be open-minded should want as many doors to be open as possible.

H.J. Blackham, a director of the British Humanist Association, has at length presented the argument against assuming "... that the school itself is, or ought to be, a Christian community."[25] He did not, however, go to the same length to argue against the equally strongly held argument by others that the school is or ought to be a humanist society. The latter assumption is as invalid as the former. Instead he drew attention to the importance of seeing this as an open society in which persons and groups take various views of human life, choosing different ways of living, and are justified in doing so.

> "In so far as education is more than technical,
> is concerned with the whole child and his whole life,
> there cannot be total acquiescence in total unconcern
> about true views and right ways of living. And if it
> cannot be simply assumed that Christian beliefs and
> the Christian life are alone worthy of any
> consideration, education must eventually be an
> education for choice and an education in choice.
> In the public schools of an open society there is
> room only for an open educational approach to what
> religion stands for."[26]

This is true whatever the social environment of the school. The case for teaching religion in school is dependent upon the need for making up one's mind in an open society. It is not dependent upon the fact that society is Christian or even religious. And for this

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25.
  Religion in a Modern Society, p. 90. See also the whole of chapter 5.
26.
  Loc. cit.

reason, if Britain were what could be called an atheistic nation
there would still be grounds for teaching religion in school. If
Britain could be called a Christian nation there would still be a
need for religion to be taught as if the school were part of an
open society.

> "If the educational value of religion is to show
> the cleansing and transforming power of religion
> in human lives, and if the religious value of
> education is to encourage and enable the child
> to reach for himself responsibly held
> convictions to inspire and regulate the conduct
> of his life, then these aims cannot be achieved
> on false assumptions about the character of the
> Christian faith, of our culture, and of our
> society."

Therefore H.J. Blackham - even as a humanist - rejected, though with
appreciation, the view of Diana Dewar in Backward Christian Soldiers
that because the present practice in schools is so bad the 1944/1945
Education Acts should be abandoned and the responsibility for religious
education laid squarely upon the churches. Instead, Blackham claimed
that to "... taboo religion in schools is at least as bad as to
establish it."[28]

The above, SECTION THREE, has examined the role of religious
education in state Secondary schools by looking at the historical
background, the reactions by five contributors, and several problems
which must be taken seriously. In the next section, autonomy as an
aim in religious education will be put to a practical test through
the examination of a particular syllabus, Living Bible.

27.
   Ibid., p. 94. (Also perhaps Christian education in the church should
be seen within the same context of an open society.)
28.
   Ibid., p. 93. This would be then a rejection of the Edinburgh
Humanist Group's view that schools should be secular and religious
education in schools stopped. (See Moral and Religious Education in
Scottish Schools, p. 39.)

SECTION FOUR:

DEVELOPING A SYLLABUS THAT AIMS
TOWARDS AUTONOMY

INTRODUCTION TO SECTION FOUR

The aim of growth towards autonomy was not clearly appreciated or sought in the initial stages of the writing of <u>Living Bible</u>. Instead, particularly for Books 1 and 2, the assumed aim was making Christianity real and meaningful. The writer was influenced by the ideas of Goldman, Loukes, Acland, and Sutherland. In <u>Godly Upbringing</u> Sutherland was concerned with the falling off in numbers of children enrolled in Scottish Sunday Schools and Bible Classes. The present writer was aware, in school and church, of an alienation between religion and the adolescent. <u>Living Bible</u> was an attempt at correct Scriptural interpretation within the existential situation of the adolescent. To begin with the "here and now" to get to the "there and then" is good communications but it assumes that the answer is to be found in the "there and then". The biblical liberalism of the writer questioned the confinement of revelation to the Scriptures. Since the Bible did not hold the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, the Scriptures were open to critical appraisal. This doctrine of Scripture as explained above (SECTION THREE, III, F) became the factor which opened the door towards autonomy. The adolescent is encouraged in <u>Living Bible</u> to add his own observations and come to his own verdict.

With the succeeding volumes of <u>Living Bible</u> catering for the increasing age of adolescence (Book 1 for S1, Book 2 for S2...), the author became aware of a corresponding increase in alienation from authority. This alienation was, at least in part, because of the adolescent's own frustrated quest for autonomy. Thus, religion in its dogmatic form, or authoritatively offered as the only option, was strongly rejected except by those students who used religion as an

opiate.

Living Bible was written for British Secondary schools primarily in England and Scotland, within the existing framework of the Education Acts of 1944 (England) and 1945 (Scotland). It is, however, being used in other sections of Britain and in such countries as Australia, New Zealand, Swaziland, Italy, Sweden, the United States, and Canada. It is having extensive use in Catholic schools and has been formally adopted by the British Army for religious education in its cadet training programme.

In the appraisal of the earlier volumes it will be shown how the author's own thinking on the aim of religious education developed with the writing of the units and the testing of them in the classroom. It will be shown how Books 1 and 2 at the beginning of this evolutionary process have inadequacies when put to the test of autonomy. It will be shown, however, how Books 3 and 4 evolved naturally in the direction of autonomy as an aim and how their weaknesses can be avoided.

There are two things that must be considered—content and packaging of each unit—before the volumes are appraised in terms of autonomy. Then proposals will be made for reforming religious education to make possible an approach which does not violate autonomy.

I. CONTENT

Moral and religious education in both school and church tend to be adult dominated, with usually a lecture-type presentation of material for the adolescents' learning. This can block the road to autonomy, and yet there must be some kind of content, something that comes into the discussion from the outside. Otherwise discussion is merely a pooling of ignorance. There must be content, for only then can there be a validly educational encounter between the "class" and the "teacher", and more important, among the class members themselves.

Goldman, Acland and Loukes have shown how adolescents in recent years generally have had limited and faulty knowledge about religion. The stepping stone has become a stumbling block. Factual knowledge has been extremely limited.

But this factual knowledge even if abundant must be related to the psychological needs for maturity and for autonomy. The question, therefore, must later be asked of _Living Bible_. "To what extent does it make these needs basic and biblical studies subservient to these ends?"

A. COMPARISON WITH HAVIGHURST AND TABA, COLE, AND LOUKES

Havighurst and Taba listed ten of these needs which Loukes rearranged in order to correspond to his classification. Alongside these can be listed Cole's seven adolescent needs. The lines suggest general correlation.

ADOLESCENT CHARACTER AND PERSONALITY (Havighurst and Taba)[1]	PSYCHOLOGY OF ADOLESCENCE (Cole)[2]

Personal Relations

1 Achieving emotional independence of parents and other adults

2 Achieving new relationships with age-mates

3 Achieving a masculine or feminine social role

4 Preparing for marriage and family life

5 Desiring and achieving socially responsible behaviour

1 Emancipation from home control

3 Interest in the other sex

2 General social maturity
4 General emotional maturity

Personal responsibility

6 Achieving assurance of economic independence

7 Selecting and preparing for an occupation

8 Accepting one's physique and using body effectively

1 Emancipation from home control

5 Selection of an occupation

6 Appropriate uses of leisure

Problems of meaning

9 Developing intellectual skills and concepts necessary for civic competence

10 Acquiring a set of values and an ethical system as a guide to behaviour

7 Philosophy of Life

Kuhlen listed four areas of adjustment.

1. "Sex-social adjustment
2. Ideological adjustment
3. Vocational adjustment
4. Adjustment consequent on attaining freedom from parents"[3]

From this Loukes concluded

1.
   See R.J. Havighurst and H. Taba, Adolescent Character and Personality, pp. 286-87.
2.
   L. Cole and I.N. Hall, Psychology of Adolescence, pp. 10-11. ("Emancipation from home control", 1, relates two of Havighurst and Taba's "needs", 1 and 6.)
3.
   R.G. Kuhlen, The Psychology of Adolescent Development, p. 5.

> "Christianity if it is to be relevant to the
> life of the teenager, must be seen to bear on
> these problems, not in a spirit of negation or
> repression, but in illumination of their meaning
> and hope of their solution."[4]

With this in mind, Loukes set up what he called a "problem syllabus" of interest to fourteen-year-olds. These he arranged under three headings, as he did with the "developmental tasks" of Havighurst and Taba, set out above. Side-by-side with this will be listed the correlating references of Living Bible, subject by subject. McPhail would appreciate most of these as good use of the religious education classroom for consideration of moral problems.

TEENAGE RELIGION	LIVING BIBLE (Book/unit)
Problems of Personal Relations	
1 Authority	1/3, 2/9
2 Friendship	1/11, 3/7
3 Sex and Marriage	3/10, 3/11, 4/3, 4/7
4 Snobbery	1/11, 2/7
Problems of Personal Responsibility	
5 Money	3/5
6 Work	3/3, 4/3
7 Leisure	2/5, 4/4
8 Prayer	2/6 (Reference only)
Problems of Meaning	
9 Suffering	2/3
10 Death	1/7
11 Learning	1,2,3,4/Introductions

Under these three headings there are other subjects covered by Living Bible. Parentheses show selective correlation with Maslow,

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4.
    Loukes, Teenage Religion, p. 105.

Erikson, and Rogers.

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LIVING BIBLE
(Book/unit)

</div>

Problems of Personal Relations

Freedom	1/2 (Rogers)
Happiness	2/5 (Maslow)
Sharing	2/6 (Empathy: Rogers)
Interpersonal relationships	3/1 (Intimacy: Erikson)
Preparation for old age	3/8

Problems of Personal Responsibility

Community responsibility	1/4 (Generativity: Erikson)
Justice	1/6 (Maslow)
Integrity	1/12 (Genuineness: Rogers)
Preparation for Parenthood	3/2, 4/8 (Empathy: Rogers)
Care of body – drink and drugs	3/4 (Less destructive: Maslow)
Care of old people	3/8 (Empathy: Rogers)
Caring for those in need	3/9 (Generativity: Erikson)
Concern over nuclear weapons	3/concl. (Less destructive: Maslow)
Assuming initiative	3/1 (Less apathy: Maslow)

Problems of Meaning

What is the purpose of life?	2/1, 11 (Higher values: Maslow)
Faith	2/2 (Higher spiritual life: Maslow)
Who am I?	2/4 (Identity: Erikson)
Problem of Communication	2/8
What is the good life?	2/10 (Redefinition: Maslow)
Superstition	3/6
Being oneself	4/9, 10 (Genuineness: Rogers)

For these, and the others listed above, the Bible is an excellent literary sourcebook (at least, if nothing further) and these are some of the problems which loom largest within its pages. To use it as the only sourcebook, however, impedes autonomy. In any case, these problems primarily are areas of concern not because they are starting points for the relevant communication of Christianity but because they themselves are related to the goal of growth towards autonomy.

Content beyond that which meets psychological and sociological

needs includes an understanding of why the Scriptures came to be written, how they were written, and the highlights of what they have to say. As far as Bible knowledge is concerned, Living Bible includes some content on the following subjects, with Books 1 and 2 for early adolescence being more "Bible-centred" in content than Books 3 and 4 for later adolescence. Tillich, Goldman, Acland, and Smart would appreciate all of these as properly belonging to religious education.

Questions	Book/unit
How were the Gospels written?	1/5, 2/4
Why did Jesus die?	1/7
What is truth?	1/8
How did the Church begin?	1/9
How were some of the New Testament letters written?	1/10, 1/11, 2/8, 2/11
How did we get the Bible?	1/conclusion
What about Science and Religion?	2/1
What are some of the translation problems?	2/4

Loukes made use of the Bible as a reference book in working out the Judeo-Christian framework of an answer to problems. But he was writing his syllabus for age fourteen. More general knowledge about the Bible can and should be known before that time. This is necessary if it were for no other reason than to help correct earlier developed mis-conceptions of religion in general and the Bible in particular. However, this is not sufficient justification.

Matthews agreed with Loukes that

> "... the religious search of teenage children
> /sic./ does not begin with the Bible but with
> the problem in life which the Bible seeks to
> meet."[5]

5.

Revolution in Religious Education, p. 58. sic.: youth.

But Matthews went beyond this in endorsing A. Victor Murray's five

focal points in religious education. There is something

> To learn (on a basis of fact)
> To feel (religion is emotive)
> To choose (moral choice)
> To do (action in service and worship)
> To belong to (membership in the Christian community)[6]

Matthews claimed that most concern has been with the first of these

and that Loukes could help to discover the place of the other four.

But he believed that Loukes placed too much of an emphasis upon the

solving of problems in belief and conduct. There is a "givenness" in

Christianity which can be overlooked in modern teaching. "Call this

'theology' if you must."[7] This "givenness" is presented as an

option especially in Books 1 and 2.

But even if there is "givenness", it must be based upon questions

or problems real to the adolescent or that can be made real. But not

only that, in terms of a quest for autonomy it must be one among many

options. And, in any case, the extent to which the school should

pursue the need "to belong to" (membership in the Christian community)

is questionable. It is the first four that are the concern of Living

Bible. And where it is used in churches, the fifth can be added.

But this must come within the church setting.

"To do" (action in service and worship) is partly covered by

Further Work, that appears at the close of certain chapters in

Living Bible. But it already has been stated that worship should be

eliminated from the school assembly. "To choose" (moral choice) is

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6.

See Education into Religion, pp. 14-18. These relate to Smart's
six-dimensions. "To learn": for a list of the themes of Living Bible
with their relationship to Smith's suggested content in the study of
Christianity, see above, SECTION THREE, III, G, p. 288, foot-note 22.

7.

Matthews, op. cit., p. 60.

partly covered by the Verdict or Class Vote. This choice, however, must permit the possibility of non-Christian options being valid. "To feel" (religion is emotive) is encouraged through Group Discussion. But this feeling must be in terms of Maslow's "greater interpersonal relations", Erikson's "intimacy", and Roger's "empathy". To do, to choose, and to feel are aspects of autonomy, but only in a different way than that intended by Matthews. "To learn" (on a basis of fact) is also an aspect of autonomy. And this "learning", if it is to be autonomous, must be content seen in the larger package of open, critical evaluation.

B. OUTLINE OF CONTENT OF MATERIAL IN LIVING BIBLE

Part of the content of Living Bible is biblical, but it is not an end in itself. It is to be encountered because it adds to the factual basis upon which feeling, choosing, doing, and, perhaps, belonging can be developed.

Even as part of content, the biblical references cannot be listed on their own. They must appear under the theme they illustrate. They will be listed in order of appearance. In Living Bible, those Bible passages are quoted in full as the verses denote. They are listed here to give an impression of the biblical content before making comment.

THEME
Reference. Translation. (Identification) Unit: page.

BOOK 1: ADVENTURE IN RELIGION

BOOK 3: ENCOUNTER WITH LOVE

FAMILY TENSIONS
      Gen. 4:1-16. R.S.V. (Adam and Eve) 1: p. 15.

WHEN CHILDREN ARE NOT LOVED
      Ps. 23. R.S.V. parallel with Burke. (Good Shepherd) 2: p. 21.

HOW CAN WE LOOK AT WORK?
      Ephes. 4:1-7, 11-16. Jerusalem (Variety of vocations) 3: p. 26.

DRINK AND DRUGS
      (No biblical quotations. To have made one would have suggested
      that the Bible contains the ultimate authority on all modern
      situations. Instead, the questions, "Can religion help the drug
      taker? In what ways?" are asked in Group Discussion.)

MONEY MATTERS
      Matt. 25:14-30. Phillips. (Parable of the Pounds) 5: p. 43.

ARE YOU SUPERSTITIOUS?
      Hosea 6:3-6. R.S.V. (Steadfast love) 6: pp. 52-53.
      Acts 17:22-23. R.S.V. (Unknown God) 6: p. 53.
      Romans 8:35, 37-39. R.S.V. (No power separates) 6: p. 53.

OPERATION FRIENDSHIP
      (No biblical quotation.)

OUR SENIOR CITIZENS (on facing up to old age)
      John 3:1-11, 14-16. Phillips. (Nicodemus) 8: pp. 65-66.

CHRISTIAN AID (on meeting human need)
      Matt. 25:31-43. Phillips. (I was hungry and...) 9: p. 72.

ENCOUNTER WITH LOVE (What is it? How can it be used?)
      Mark 12:28-34. R.S.V. (Great Commandment) 10: p. 78.

WHOM SHALL I MARRY?
      John 2:1-10. Barclay. (Wedding at Cana) 11: p. 84.

THE WAR GAME
      Is. 2:1-4. R.S.V. (Into ploughshares) Concl.: pp. 93-94.

BOOK 4: COMMITMENT

FOREWORD (To set general theme of book.)
      Matt. 25:41-46. Good News. (I was hungry but...)

THE "NOW" GENERATION
      Amos 5:7, 10, 11-14. Jerusalem. (Justice) 1: p. 16.
      Luke 20:45-47. Good News. (Beware of hypocrisy) 1: pp. 16-17.
      Matt. 21:12-17. Good News. (Money-lenders) 1: p. 17.

SHELTER
      (No biblical quotation)

SING LIFE
(No biblical quotation)

PLAY IT COOL, MAN (Vandalism)
Psalm 90. Burke. (God checks us out) 4: pp. 38-39.

ENTERPRISE YOUTH
Matt. 27:27-32. Moffat. (Simon carries cross) 5: p. 45.

EASTERHOUSE
(No biblical quotation)

MARRIAGE ON THE ROCKS
(Biblical reference only)

WHAT'S THE MATTER WITH KIDS? (on raising a family)
(No biblical quotation)

COUNT ME OUT, I WANT SOMETHING BETTER
Is. 2:1-4. R.S.V. (Swords into ploughshares) 9: pp. 78-79.

COUNTED OUT
(No biblical quotation)

YOU AND THE WORLD COUNCIL OF CHURCHES
Matt. 25:31-46. Barclay. (I was hungry and...but...) 11: pp. 90-91.

Besides these quotations, there are the following biblical references for "Group Discussion" or "Further Work". That is, these are passages referred to rather than quoted; and although they come at the end of the unit, they form part of the "content". They are listed here to emphasise further the importance given to the Scriptures, especially in Books 1 and 2.

THEME
    Reference.   (Context)   Book/unit: page.

THE TWO RESPECTS
    Deut. 5:6-21. Compare with Exodus 20:1-17. (The role of law) 1/3: p. 29.

MAN AGAINST SOCIETY
    Gal. 2:10-24. Compare with I Kings 19:1-13 and
      Matt. 3:13 - 4:11. (Wilderness experience) 1/10: p. 77.

WAS MAN AN ACCIDENT?
    Ps. 8 (What is man?) 2/1: p. 22.

HOW CAN WE MAKE BASIC DECISIONS?
    Ex. 34:27-28. Compare repetition of phrase in Luke 4:1-2.
    (Forty days and nights) 2/2: p. 30.

WHY IS THERE SUFFERING?
    Job 8:20; 9:27-28; 11:4-6; 12:23. Illustrate with modern
      events. (Suffering) 2/3: p. 39.

WHEN CHRISTIANITY SEEMS TO MISS THE MARK
    Acts 13:14f. (Compare with method in Athens) 2/8: p. 73.
    Acts 14:8f. (Compare with method in Athens) 2/8: p. 73.

WHEN CHILDREN ARE NOT LOVED
    Luke 15:11-32. Compare with Ps. 23 (The good Father) 3/2: p. 22.

MONEY MATTERS
    Mark 12:41-44, (The widow's mite); Luke 6:38, (Good measure);
      Luke 10-35, (Good Samaritan); Luke 15:11-14, (Prodigal son).
      3/5: p. 45.

WHOM SHALL I MARRY? (Reference is contained in content.)
    Gen. 2:24. Matt. 19:4-6. (One flesh) 3/11: p. 85.

THE "NOW" GENERATION (Jesus, the rebel.)
    Mark 2:16-17, Matt. 9:9-13, Luke 5:27-32 (with outcasts);
      Matt. 19:16-30, Mark 10:17-31, Luke 18:18-30 (with rich
      man); Mark 11:15-19, Luke 19:45-48, Matt. 21:12-17,
      John 2:13-22 (Temple row); Mark 12:28-34, Matt. 22:34-40,
      Luke 10:25-28 (commandments); Mark 12:38-40, Matt.
      23:1-36, Luke 20:45-47 (with Church leaders) 4/1: p. 20.

MARRIAGE ON THE ROCKS
    Ps. 127. ("Unless the Lord build...") 4/7: p. 62.

    C.   COMMENT ON THE PRESENTATION OF BIBLICAL QUOTATIONS

    In Book 1 there are thirty-two biblical quotations, Book 2 has

twenty-six, Book 3 has twelve, and Book 4 has eight. Although the

title Living Bible was used for Book 4 (because it continued the

series of themes of the other three volumes), biblical passages were not used unless illustrative of the theme. This does not suggest that young people should grow out of using the Bible, but that, as the foundations of basic Bible knowledge are established, the Life-centred content of the syllabus should become more in evidence - particularly as the school leaving age is approached. At the same time, however, it must be acknowledged that, as young people pass through adolescence, they become more sophisticated and it is more difficult to arouse interest in the Bible, at least among most of them. The figures above show how Living Bible became less biblically orientated after volume two.

A variety of translations was used for the biblical quotations, and each translation was selected because it seemed to be the most meaningful one of the particular passage. However, effort was made to introduce the adolescent to a variety of translations and on two occasions[8] two translations of the same passage were placed in parallel columns so that the young person might come to appreciate that the meaning and not the particular words is what matters. There is nothing sacred in the words of the A.V. in spite of the fact that some refer to it as the "Saint" James Version.

The translations used were The Torah (official Jewish Translation), the one by Monseignor R.A., Knox and The New Jerusalem Bible (both official Roman Catholic translations), the Authorised Version, the Revised Standard Version, the New English Bible, Prof. William Barclay's Translation (and the Daily Study Bible Series), The

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8.

See Living Bible, Book 2, pp. 50-51 (Matt. 5:3-12 A.V. and Barclay) and Book 3, p. 21 (Ps. 23 R.S.V. and Burke's paraphrase written in an American borstal).

New Testament in Modern English (J.B. Phillips' Translation), Good
News for Modern Man, and Moffat's translation - in all, eleven
translation sources.

Professor William Barclay[9] was consultant for Books 1 and 2.
In his Foreword to each of these he wrote that the units begin

> "...with the here and now to get to the there
> and then."

It should be added that each unit attempts to return to the "here and
now". The purpose is not to teach the Bible but to help the
adolescent encounter what the Bible "teaches". There is a real
difference. Merely to teach the Bible is to assume that the content
of religious education is Bible knowledge. To help the young person
encounter what the Bible "teaches" is to see the content as being
"encountering life situations creatively". The purpose is not to
take the adolescent back to the Bible and abandon him in the "there and
then" but to help him see the Bible as living and relevant, where it
deals with problems and situations meaningful to modern society.

Certain units do emphasise understanding the Bible as literature.
A certain amount of background material is necessary before one can
grasp the biblical situation. How each of the Gospels introduces the
life of Jesus,[10] the synoptic problem,[11] and the problems of
interpreting Greek[12] are basic to understanding the literary
authenticity to the life of Jesus. Obviously this could be treated

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9.

  The present writer is highly indebted to the many hours Prof. Barclay
gave to reading the manuscripts and offering suggestions for their
revision, and giving many of his lunch hours to this consultation.
Others who gave assistance are listed on the acknowledgment page in
each volume.

10.

  See Book 1, unit 5; Book 2, unit 4.

11.

  See Book 1, unit 5.

12.

  See Book 2, unit 4.

in more depth with older or more able students. The complex problem
of interpreting Hebrew must also be reserved for a later stage. But
a beginning at least was attempted, as far as Hebrew is concerned, in
presenting the creation narratives of Genesis,[13] the story of
Elijah,[14] and the story of Job.[15]

Also in his foreword to Books 1 and 2, Prof. Barclay mentioned
that the material

> "...is systematic. A line of development runs
> through the book and it goes from chapter to
> chapter and page to page."

Books 1 and 2 are each divided into three parts so that the
biblical material appears in the order of Old Testament, Gospels, and
Letters. There was no need to confuse the young people by mixing
these up, and a thread can be seen to run through the books. Another
reason for this was out of appreciation of the three school terms
with the Old Testament leading naturally up to Christmas, the Gospels
from Christmas to Easter, and the Letters in the Spring Term
following Easter.

It seemed wise, however, to make a diversion from this in Books
3 and 4 so that the "Life Situation" could be seen to prevail over
the Bible as the substance of content.

The content in the first two volumes consists of a series of
biblical passages with commentary which seeks to explain the meaning
of the passage, but which brings the adolescent to the parallel
situation in today's world.

13.
See Book 2, unit 1. Although the opening passage of the Bible, this
subject was left to Book 2 because of its complexity. In any case,
the Creation narratives were later additions to Scripture.
14.
See Book 1, unit 2.
15.
See Book 1, unit 3.

And so Genesis 17 (the Abraham Story) is explained in terms of the age of the astronaut and venturing into the unknown today. This analogy is given its necessary reservations by the closing paragraph of that unit:

> "But let us not believe that, like space travel, the Christian adventure means leaving the earth for the moon. That may some day be easy. Christianity is not an adventure into another world. It is, as the examples of St. Francis and Albert Schweitzer have shown, leaving a comfortable 'other-worldliness' for service 'in this world'."[16]

The experience of the Hebrew people in Egypt is compared with the Negro quest for freedom today.[17] The laws of Exodus 20 are compared with rules in modern groups.[18] The Parable in Luke 10 (the Good Samaritan) is described in the light of what makes people today feel immune to the plight of others, with the suggestion that

> "... in a world where there is bad feeling between people because of social, racial, political, religious, and national barriers, this is what we must do. We must not try to make others into members of our group. Instead we must break down the walls that surround our gang, by thinking of ourselves not as Protestants or Roman Catholics, or White /sic./, or Conservative or Socialist, or Scottish, English, Welsh, Irish, or even as British. Primarily, we must think of ourselves as human beings. Then and only then will all people be our neighbours."[19]

The content of each unit is in a form to be read by the class, not to be read out by the teacher. Coupled with the modern, vivid illustrations of John Dugan,[20] an Edinburgh free-lance artist, the text attempted to arouse the imagination of the adolescent and let

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16.
  Book 1, unit 1, p. 16.
17.
  Book 1, unit 2.
18.
  Book 2, unit 3.
19.
  Book 1, unit 6: p. 49. /Sic.: White or Coloured/
20.
  The publishers and author felt very fortunate in having the work of Mr. Dugan in laying out and illustrating all four volumes.

the Bible live, not to take him back to the times of the Bible and abandon him there.

The question, "Why did Jesus die?", is answered in the form of a "who-done-it" using passages of Scripture to elucidate the role of the teachers, the clergy, the traitor, the crowd, and the judge: hypocrisy, ambition, materialism, conformity, and evasion.[21] But what each member of the class considers is not just why Jesus died but the characteristics of life that are inhumane, and what the student must be prepared to deal with when he leaves school. The theme of religious education should go beyond academic knowledge of the Bible to responsible citizenship.

At the other extreme, there are those who come away from school and church with what could be called "bibliolatry", the worship of the Bible. Seemingly, the logic is

> The Bible is the Word of God.
> Jesus is the Word of God.
> Therefore, the Bible = Jesus.[22]

The words of the Bible are looked on as being divine. There is the old story about the person who was in a desperate situation and wanted to take the literal advice of the Bible, the Word of God. He opened it at random and read the words, "And Judas went and hanged himself." Being dissatisfied, he decided to try again, only to read, "Go, thou, and do likewise."[23]

There appears a lack of even the basic rudiments of biblical

21.
    Book 1, unit 7.
22.
    The fallacy is both an "undistributed middle" and the using the same term "Word of God" to mean two different things.
23.
    The present writer learned about a class in a certain Scottish Junior High School being taught the biblical account of Adam and Eve being a literally true account of an actual event. Unless the purpose was to keep the young people from eating apples, he did not see the point.

310.

criticism and modern scholarship in many Secondary schools and
church youth groups. A science teacher who knew nothing about
Copernicus and who taught that a flat earth was the centre of the
universe would be hauled before the headmaster and education
authorities and perhaps lose his job. Today discoveries of
archeologists and linguists can help one to know more about the
Bible than man has ever known before. Their discoveries must be
acknowledged. What young people believe depends upon themselves.
But they must at least be privileged to consider modern biblical
scholarship; otherwise the term "Religious Education" is mocked.

Further to this, the content must be relevant to life
situations. The content of the lesson should make certain that
when the class divides for discussion the syndicate groups will
neither be pooling ignorance nor involved in irrelevancies.

II. PACKAGING: THE STRUCTURE OF EACH UNIT IN LIVING BIBLE

Prof. William Barclay stated the value of beginning with the "here and now" to get to the "there and then". It is equally important to return to the "here and now" so that the adolescent is not abandoned in the past but encouraged to discover the relevance of the "Things to Think About" that compose the content of each unit.

Therefore, each unit (chapter) of each Living Bible volume is divided into three basic parts: (1) "Introductory Questions", (2) "Things to Think About", and (3) "Group Discussion" followed by reports, and a Class Vote. Many of the units suggest "Further Work" for follow up projects.[1]

A. FORMAT AS EXPLAINED IN THE INTRODUCTION TO EACH BOOK

Each book has an "Introduction" which explains this format and the purpose and method of each part. Each "Introduction" to a book is itself divided into these three parts so that working through the "Introduction" gives the student an experience of the method used by each of the individual units. The Introduction helps the student anticipate the subjects, questions, and problems he will be encountering as he progresses unit by unit through the book. The Introduction at the front of each book also explains the manner in which the encounter will take place.

There is a development in this, for it can be assumed that older students using Books 3 and 4 are able to use more refined

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[1]

In Book 4, "Further Work" is included at the end of each unit since the adolescent by then should be able to cope with further development of each subject and should be encouraged to do so. Book 4 also divides each unit into four parts instead of three - the fourth being "Class Vote". But this can still be considered as part of "Group Discussion".

methods of discussion and more difficult projects for further work.
The Introduction to Book 4 suggests that at that stage in the students'
development of autonomy, in age and experience, they should be free to
handle the unit on their own. The instructions are addressed to the
students and not to the teacher:

> "The most exciting way to treat a unit is
> in the form of a 'do-it-yourself' assignment,
> when the class and not the teacher organises
> the presentation. Why not volunteer in advance
> to direct one of the units? If this is in the
> form of an interview, have two members of the
> class play the roles of the two people. Then
> give the class time to read through the interview
> to pick up the points which may have been missed.
> In advance, think through the unit carefully.
> You will probably need to ask for more than one
> class period to complete it. But make certain
> the pace is fast-moving and the encounter as
> dynamic as possible. You might want to
> persuade one or two in the class to make posters
> or 'objects of art' to set the atmosphere. You
> can also make use of newspaper clippings as
> dramatic readings at appropriate places.
> "Now over to you."[2]

It is this fourth volume which most fully attempts to get the
class members to accept self-responsibility while admitting in the
Introduction the difficulty of the age of adolescence:

> "You are in the 'twilight zone', the
> frustrating time of being neither a child nor an
> adult. You are at the age of 'becoming' and the
> tension is aggravated because you have already
> arrived, at least in some ways. But society
> says, 'Wait!'
> "You are able to be a parent. Society says,
> 'Wait!' You have certain political views and
> want to vote for a Government that expresses them.
> Society says, 'Wait!' You want to run your own
> life. Society says 'no' to this and 'no' to
> that - 'Wait!'
> "A world is hungry.... A world is greedy....
> A world is diseased....

2.

    Book 4, Introduction, p. 11.

"You can respond in several ways. You can
simply count yourself out and tell society to
'get lost!' Or you can give in, regress into
childhood, and expect to be told what to do for
the rest of your life. Or you can get involved
in protest against injustice - and take action.
"You are, perhaps, at the school leaving
age. You are having to decide whether to leave
school and take a job or continue at school for
some time longer, perhaps going on to a college
of further education or university. If you
choose to stay on at school, the decision on
what to do with your life will be even more
difficult.
"When you do come to take a job, what will
you do with all your other hours, your leisure
time? Not all of this time will be
recreational. Much eventually may be taken up
with marriage, family, and, outside your new
home, with community activities, social service
(service to the people), and perhaps even
international service. Such is the concern of
this book.
"You are part of a learning and action
team that includes all members of your class."3

This Introduction to Book 4 contains no reference to the role of

the "teacher". By this time the "teacher" hopefully will have worked

himself/herself out of an involved role. He is not now really part of

the learning-action team. The less involved he is at this stage the

more successful he will have been in earlier stages to work himself

out of a job. For this is the ultimate result of the development of

autonomy in others: they can now cope creatively on their own.

In all subjects, not least religious education, this fourth year

should be one where the adolescent develops an ability to work

independently and responsibly, whether or not he will be leaving

school.

Having explained the format as described in the Introduction of

each volume, it is now necessary to look at the parts in order: (1)

3.
   Book 4, Introduction, pp. 9-10.

"Introductory Questions", (2) "Things to Think About", and (3) "Group Discussion".

B. "INTRODUCTORY QUESTIONS": THE FIRST PART OF EACH UNIT

Each unit of Living Bible begins with "Introductory Questions". At the beginning of each book there is an Introduction which explains the importance of these "Introductory Questions" and the kind of open, uninhibited initial responses that should be given to them. The Introduction to Book 1 expresses it this way:

> "The form of this book may seem a little unusual. You will find each unit to be in three parts. The first part of each consists of 'Introductory Questions'. While using the book in class, feel free at this point to speak openly. No final answer is expected to these questions. So do not hesitate to talk about them. To these Introductory Questions there is no such thing as a wrong or false answer. Every answer is acceptable if it honestly voices your own feeling or if you would like it to be considered by the class. You and other members of the class should come up with as many and varied answers as possible. The purpose of each Introductory Question is to help you find out that yours is not the only possible approach to the particular subject and to help you open your mind to benefit from the second and third parts of the unit."[4]

The Introduction to Book 2 adds this:

> "These are questions which can help you discover what you believe. Only you can say what you believe. ...
> "For example, one of the 'Introductory Questions' to the present unit is no. 7, 'What do you believe about the purpose of life?' If you put B (Happiness) down first in your order of preference, while the person sitting next to you put E (Travel) at the top of his list, you were both right. For both of you were expressing your own beliefs."[5]

4.
   Book 1, p. 12.
5.
   Book 2, pp. 11-12.

The Introduction to Book 3 adds that

> "... you will want to express openly your
> immediate and tentative attitudes."[6]

And the Introduction to Book 4 goes further to explain that the
students and not the "teacher" are in charge of the study:

> "First, there are 'Introductory Questions'
> or 'Introductory Situations'. The purpose is
> to launch the subject with you at the helm. ...
> If you give your honest opinion, then what you
> say will be true to your self. Do not hesitate
> to be provocative and arouse the reaction of
> the class. Get off to a lively start. Help
> the conversation to involve all members of the
> class and to revolve round their experiences."[7]

This approach at first might appear objectionable. A protest
could be lodged that answers are either true or false. But this is
not the case with these answers for they concern belief. For example,
one unit begins with the question, "What do you believe death is?"
Then after asking, "What are the various reasons why people die?" it
moves on to "Why do you think Jesus died?" It begins with the "here
and now" to get to the "there and then". Someone in the class could
say that Jesus died because he fell out with his disciples. This may
not be the true fact but that does not make the answer false; for it
is the particular student's belief. If that is what he believed but
he gave another answer, he would be wrong and dishonest with himself
however much the answer might seem more true to the "teacher".
Therefore, this approach is not objectionable but, indeed, essential
if the aim is growth towards autonomy.

This does not mean that the student's answers to these initial
questions should be uncritically accepted. But unless he gets them

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6.
  Book 3, p. 11.
7.
  Book 4, p. 10.

out in the open, they cannot be looked at. Yet still the main
criticism should be self-criticism. And it is wrong to encourage a
person to say he believes something – whatever it is – if he does not
really believe it. There is no virtue in this form of dishonesty.
For if the "teacher" uses religious education as an opportunity merely
to tell young people what he wants them to believe, then he is blocking
the road to inquiry and blocking the way to autonomy. The Church
should not tell young people what they ought to believe and the school
must not tell them what to believe.

To begin with the "here and now" means to begin with present,
tentatively held viewpoints. It means to begin with Munro and
Margaret, not with Moses or Matthew.

A variety of methods have been used under the heading of
"Introductory Questions": questions, questionnaires, pondering real
life and imaginary situations, dramatic sketches, word association
tests, experiments, surveys, and inquiries.

Out of context and without their illustrations, the Introductory
Questions appear too bland, but below is a selection.

Introductory Questions	Book/unit: page
"What is your view of religion?" (Word association test)	1/Intro.: pp. 10–11
"Where would you like to go?"	1/1: p. 15
"Who are those in search of freedom today?"	1/2: p. 19
"What are the rules your friends live by?"	1/3: p. 24
"What are some of the problems facing nations today?"	1/4: p. 30
"Why are there different views of the same person?" (An exercise)	1/5: p. 36

"Want to be a hippy?" (Talk-in)   4/9: p. 73

"What is your attitude towards this tramp?"   4/9: p. 74
(Talk-in)

"Care to be like this outdoor hermit?"   4/9: p. 74
(Talk-in)

"What about these sleep-ins?" (Talk-in)   4/9: p. 75

"What is your attitude towards this   4/9: p. 76
anarchist?" (Talk-in)

(Unit 10 is a sequel to unit 9 and has no Introductory Questions.)

"Which of these are true of the Church?"   4/11: p. 85
(Quiz)

The purpose of these questions is to introduce the subject, set

the scene, and involve the young people, from the beginning, with a

personal encounter with the theme. The questions prepare the way for

a personal encounter with the content that follows, which is generally

entitled "Things to Think About". (The use of "Talk-ins" will be

described below.)

C. "THINGS TO THINK ABOUT": THE SECOND PART OF EACH UNIT

The second part of each unit is referred to as "Things to Think

About", although it is given a different, particular title according

to the content theme of each unit.

The themes and Bible quotations of this second part to the units

have been listed above. And it already has been explained how Books

3 and 4 are more Life-centred with fewer biblical references,

especially Book 4. In each unit the illustrations were carefully

created to illustrate and make vivid the written material. The purpose

was to attempt to excite the imagination.

It is now necessary to show how this second part fits into the

"packaging" of each unit.

In the Introduction to each book the purpose and method of using this second part is explained.

The Introduction to Book 1 states:

> "In the second part of each unit, 'Things to Think About', the main theme of the Introductory Questions is developed. This, it is hoped, will add content to your preliminary discussion. You can spend one, two, or three class periods on each unit depending upon your interest and available time."[8]

Book 2 is more bold in its Introduction.

> "The second part of each unit is material to be studied. It develops the main theme of the 'Introductory Questions' and challenges your beliefs. You will notice that in each case some portion of the Old or New Testament is presented. The school has no right to tell you what to believe, but it makes sure that religion is taught as a subject. We cannot overlook religion. To understand religion is as important as understanding history or maths or language or science. If you know all about history but do not understand Christianity - the religion which has influenced Western civilization - you cannot really understand history. Similarly, if you know all about rockets and outer space but do not understand the purpose of creation, of what value is your knowledge of science?"[9]

These are direct comments and rhetorical questions. But the purpose of the content section of each unit is to provoke response.

"Things to Think About" is described in Book 3 as containing

> "... facts to be pondered as well as real life situations that others have had to face when they left school. These should make certain that the discussions that follow will neither be a pooling of ignorance nor a collection of irrelevancies. You might want to carry them over into a second class period on another day so that as much time as possible can be given to it."[10]

8.
  Book 1, p. 12.
9.
  Book 2, p. 12.
10.
  Book 3, pp. 11-12.

Book 4 is more provocative in describing "Things to Think About":

> "This may be in the form of an interview with someone who is an authority on the particular subject. This should be read carefully and if you disagree violently or agree enthusiastically with any point, do not remain passive. Interrupt the reading time by letting your voice be heard. Do not limp apathetically along. Some of the units have 'Talk-ins'. Talk-ins are half-way between individual replies and group discussion. They are informal interruptions when the class says, 'Wait, let us examine what we have just read'."[11]

The teacher is not involved at all in the content section of any unit. This is material to be read. In certain cases where it is in the form of an interview, it could be presented as dramatic readings. But under no circumstances should the teacher present it. For one reason, this would leave out the illustrations which are an integral part of the content. But more important is the fact that it should be handled in a way that lets it be "discovered" by the student. The teacher's role is at most that of a resource person who might, for further consideration, want to add material not included in the content. The only exception to this role would be to help the class review the material after it has been read and, if this is necessary, to make certain that the material has been understood and digested.

D. "GROUP DISCUSSION" AND "VERDICT": THE THIRD PART OF EACH UNIT

In presenting the third division of the learning process used in each unit of Living Bible, it is first necessary to preview the setting in which this part is placed.

11.
    Book 4, p. 10.

"Group Discussion" is preceded by "Introductory Questions" (which set the scene and present the theme) and "Things to Think About" (which form the basic content of the subject). Each unit, therefore, begins with the attitudes, ideas, and immediate reactions to the theme being voiced by the class members in response to a question or questions, a questionnaire, a real life or imaginary situation, a sketch, a word association test, an experiment, a survey, or other inquiry. This is followed by a study of illustrated material that gives substance to the subject being encountered. It is only after these two stages have been achieved that "Group Discussion" should be introduced.

The difference between the class participation now in "Group Discussion" and the class participation previously in "Introductory Questions" is two-fold. First, the response now is in the light of an encounter with the content of "Things to Think About" rather than an initial response. It should, therefore, consist of informed observations. Second, the setting is different. "Introductory Questions" were answered by several members of the class voicing their own initial personal opinions and ideas in the presence of the whole class. But in "Group Discussion", the class is sub-divided to make possible the participation by each individual in the context of a smaller group.

In the Introduction to Book 1, "Group Discussion" and the value of its tentative verdict is presented in this way:

> "The third part of each unit is called 'Group Discussion'. The class members should be divided into four groups and move so that they are seated in four circles that are as far apart as possible. Each circle should quickly select a leader to read the question for that group, take note of the answers given, and report to the class. The class

> is then free to give comment on each answer given.
> The conclusion of each unit is a final verdict
> called 'Class Vote'."[12]

The explanation of "Group Discussion" in the Introduction to
Book 2 suggests that the class members return to their seats before
the group leaders give their reports.[13] Of course, depending upon
the size of the room, the reports can be made from each of the four
circles without moving back. But since each group is a committee
working on behalf of the whole class, and since several members of
the other three groups might want to comment on a group's report,
the identification with the whole class can best be shown by the class
being reunited before the reports are made and a verdict taken.

The Introduction to Book 3 explains that the reason for moving
to the corners of the room is to be "as free from the disturbances by
other groups as possible."[14] Noise can be a difficult problem in a
small room with large numbers. In some situations another classroom
or even a staff room can be made available for one or two of the
groups. (Or the assembly hall could be used with even several classes
meeting together.)[15]

The volumes of <u>Living Bible</u> subsequent to Book 1 give, in order,
increasing information in the Introductions on the qualities of good
discussion methods. Thus Book 2 adds:

12.
  Book 1, Intro., p. 12.
13.
  Book 2, Intro., pp. 12-13.
14.
  Book 3, Intro., p. 12.
15.
  An ideal setting for this is the new hall accommodation at St.
Margaret's Parish Church, Glenrothes, which was primarily designed
for this method with adolescents and permits moving into discussion
groups in isolated rooms, pre-set and making the moving of chairs
unnecessary.

"What are the qualities of a good
discussion? It is 'well balanced' with every
member of the group participating and no one
dominating the discussion. It is 'based on
fact' with the members of the group making use
of the material they have studied rather than
pooling ignorance. It is 'brisk' with the
rapid movement of many ideas holding the
attention and enlarging the attitudes. And
a good discussion is 'bold' with no
conclusion tossed aside if it is honestly
arrived at."16

Each unit contains four discussion questions, one for each

group. Below is a selective sampling of these, even though it

appears as a long list:

Group Discussion Questions	Book/unit: page
"What are the things you hope to get out of this study of religion? Draw up as long a list as possible."	1/Intro.: p. 13
"Compare the risks involved in Abraham's journey with the risks of space flight today."	1/1: p. 18
"What do you think of the statement, 'I can do anything I want to anytime I want, and nobody's going to stop me'? What would it be like if everyone could do anything he wanted to do at school, at home, at work, in the government?"	1/2: p. 23
"If you and a group of people went to a small uninhabited island to live the rest of your life, what kinds of laws would you set up? Would you include any of the Ten Commandments? Would you include all of them? Would you add other laws? Draw up as complete a list as possible."	1/3: p. 28
"You have been chosen the leader of a new nation. You are going to plan a church for your people just as Solomon did. What will you make it look like? ... What kinds of things will you put into the church? ... Why?"	1/4: p. 35
"What do you think would be the best way to introduce a book about Jesus Christ today that young people would understand? ... What kind of language would you use?"	1/5: p. 44

16.
   Book 2, Intro., p. 13.

"Draw up a list of hobbies and social activities which you think would encourage an attitude of neighbourliness among people of various backgrounds. ... How can you make sure these activities do not encourage further cliques?"   1/6: p. 49

"... If hypocrisy means 'pretending to be something you are not', can you give examples of hypocrisy from your own experience of other people or in your own life?"   1/7: p. 56

"... Have you ever betrayed another person? If so, do you think you were in the right or in the wrong?"   1/7: p. 56

"... Give examples of how a crowd often stops asking whether it is doing the right thing or not. When you are out with the gang, do you think you sometimes forget your independent judgment? Give some examples."   1/7: p. 56

"... Do you sometimes try to avoid your duty in your home, at school, or while out with the gang? Give some examples."   1/7: p. 56

"What are the various things the Resurrection means to members of your group?"   1/8: p. 65

"What would be missing if we did not have the Church today? What do you think needs to be changed in the Church today? Draw up two lists, call one 'Good points' and the other 'Bad points'."   1/9: p. 71

"Who are the people who stand against society today? Which ones are creative in doing this? Which ones do you think are destructive? Can you list some principles we might use to help us to decide when, and when not, to stand against the habits of the majority?"   1/10: p. 77

"... Discuss some of the popular songs. Which ones do you think comes the closest to defining 'true' love? Why?"   1/11: p. 83

What is your own new definition of religion in light of your study of the book of James?   1/12: p. 88

"... Can the study of religion help us to understand that man can become a better person and improve the future of this world? In what ways is this true?"   2/Intro.: pp. 13-14

"... What is the task of religion in the use of Atomic Energy?"   2/1: p. 22

"... How do you go about making decisions?   2/2: p. 29
..."

"What are the organisations which exist   2/3: p. 39
today for the primary purpose of relieving
suffering? ... What specific things do they do?"

"... Describe Jesus' personality. In what   2/4: p. 45
ways do you think he was intelligent, authoritative,
dedicated?"

"Who are the merciful and the pure in heart   2/5: p. 56
today?"

"Your group is the executive committee that   2/6: p. 62
directs the Relief Fund for the British Council
of Churches. Draw up an outline of what you think
your programme should be for the coming year."

"How do you go about choosing a job? To   2/7: p. 67
what extent do you think money or power should
effect your choice? What other things should be
taken into consideration?"

"Some people question the effectiveness of   2/8: p. 72
the sermon today as the means of communicating
Christianity. What are the good points and bad
points about sermons today? If you were asked to
preach a sermon to this class, what would you
say? How would you go about saying it?"

"... He lived apart from religion, doing what   2/9: p. 78
he wanted to do with absolute peace of mind and no
concern for the effects of what he did on other
people. Are there people like that today – at
school, in business, in politics? Give some
examples."

"Keeping in mind the points that have been   2/10: p. 87
made, what do you believe is the best definition
of: 1. A good parent? 2. A good job? 3. A
good system of government? 4. A good husband or
wife?"

"... What do you now think is meant by the   2/11: p. 95
question, 'Has Life a purpose'? What benefit have
you received from this study of religion? Does it
encourage you to believe anything new or do
anything different? If so, what?"

"'There are two extreme attitudes towards
religion — the first is to believe everything and
the second is to believe nothing.' To what extent
do you think these are positions that block the
road to inquiry and truth, that is, to what extent
do these reveal closed minds?"

"... Now what is your reply to the letter?"

"What is the greatest problem parents have in
understanding their children and what should
parents do about it?"

"Choose a job and decide how an applicant
can find an answer to these four questions: 1. Is
it what I really want? 2. Am I big enough for it?
3. Is it big enough for me? 4. Is it really worth
doing?"

"How can the alcoholic best help himself?"

"Can religion help the drug taker?"

"... Study their budget and comment."

"What do you believe is the relationship
between superstition and religion?"

"In order of importance, what are the
benefits that you believe come from giving or
receiving international hospitality?"

"What are the specific needs of old people
you know?"

"In all cases Christian Aid seeks to help
others help themselves. How important is this?
What are some of the best ways this can be done?"

"... What is this song saying about
'encounter with love'? Be sure that you discuss all
sides of the issue."

"What do you think are some of the basic
questions a couple should discuss before getting
married? Why?"

"Do you think the H-bomb will ever be used?
Why or why not? List your reasons."

"Love is one ingredient of peace. What are
others?"

"'That's their problem, not ours.' What   4/Intro.: p. 11
are the possible dangers of this attitude? What
are the dangers in trying to help other people
with their problems?"

"What are the ways that you as class members   4/Intro.: p. 12
can organise the study of each unit without
leaving all the planning to the teacher?"

"What tasks would you like to get cracking   4/1: p. 19
on in your local community - and why? Present a
plan of action for one of these.

"Think up a new kind of fundraising activity   4/2: p. 28
that you and your friends could launch for
SHELTER. What kinds of things would your group
be willing to do?"

"What is your opinion of paragraph C, the   4/3: p. 33
loneliness and insecurity of many young people?"

"What is your reaction to Larry's advice?"   4/4: p. 39

"What projects mentioned in this unit would   4/5: p. 47
you like to take part in? Why? How?"

"If Jesus came to your community where   4/6: p. 56
would you find Him?"

"Under what specific circumstances should a   4/7: p. 62
couple seek the help of a Marriage Guidance
Council or Catholic Marriage Advisory Service?"

"Discuss what you remember of your early   4/8: p. 70
childhood and consider what effect it had upon
you. 1. Things that made you sad. 2. Things
that made you puzzled. 3. Things that made you
frightened. 4. Things that made you happy."

"Who do you think is right among those we   4/9: p. 79
have talked to, and why? Harvey, George? Preben?
Pete and Liz? Steve? Jennifer? Carol? John?
Janette? Alex? Pete?"

"How can you help people like Ian who have   4/10: p. 83
been counted out?"

"The third Assembly of the World Council of   4/11: p. 91
Churches that met at New Delhi, India, in the
winter of 1961, declared in its report:... What
are some of the ways the churches in your community
are working together? What are further ways in
which you think they should be working together?"

The value of open, group discussion is that it encourages the class members to react personally to the material they have studied, it enhances the possibility of their acquiring beliefs in a mature manner, and hopefully it induces responsibility for - and action on - their attitudes. Good discussion results in self-expression and a breaking down of inhibitions.

At an age when young people are passing through a physical, mental, and social revolution, authoritarianism in religion is intolerable. Further, the discussion makes certain that in the study of religion the student is not taken back to Bible times and abandoned there.

The four B's of good discussion have already been mentioned: (1) well balanced, (2) based on fact, (3) brisk, and (4) bold. These are encouraged by the good discussion leader who also respects each idea so it is presented, allowing the group to reach its own conclusions whether or not he agrees with it. Otherwise he takes on the same false role as the domineering "teacher". Finally, he reports faithfully the findings of his group.

The "Class Vote" is based upon the reports of the four discussion groups with each individual making his own verdict.

In the Introduction to Book 3, the Class Vote is described as

> "... important because it gives the class a peg
> on which to hang the unit. It records the
> majority view, although it may not necessarily
> be unanimous. Respect for personal belief is
> maintained. And although the verdict is not
> final, it forces each member of the class to
> decide on his own conclusion. Later on, with
> new knowledge and new experiences, you should
> be prepared to change your conclusions.[17]

17.
  Book 3, Intro., p. 12.

The scope of these verdicts is shown by the following list of "Class Vote" questions.

Verdict Questions	Book/unit: page
"Do you think you should be encouraged to express your own personal attitudes to religion?"	1/Intro.: p. 13
"Which do you think is more of an adventure – the kind of thing Abraham did or what the first man to journey to Mars will do?"	1/1: p. 18
"What do you think is the most important freedom of all?"	1/2: p. 23
"Which one of the Ten Commandments do you think should be considered most important today?"	1/3: p. 29
"Would you enjoy being in charge of the church you have just described?"	1/4: p. 35
"Having read the introduction to each of the three Synoptic Gospels, which one do you think would be most interesting to read – Mark, Matthew, or Luke?"	1/5: p. 44
"Do you believe it is more important for you to look upon yourself primarily as a human being rather than as a member of certain groups?"	1/6: p. 49
"Who do you think was most responsible for the death of Jesus Christ?"	1/7: p. 56
"Do you believe in the Resurrection, that is, do you believe that Jesus Christ is alive in a unique but very real sense today?"	1/8: p. 65
"Do you think that the good points about the Church today outweigh the bad points?"	1/9: p. 71
"Would you call Paul 'a great man'?"	1/10: p. 77
"Do you believe that the churches in Great Britain will ever unite?"	1/11: p. 83
"If you were drawing up a list of books to be included in the Bible, would you do what Martin Luther did: would you omit the book of James?"	1/12: p. 88

"Which of the people interviewed are you   4/9: p. 79
willing to be counted in with and support? Which
receive the majority vote of the class? Who
receives the highest vote?"

"Is Ian in a hopeless situation?"   4/10: p. 83

"Are you willing to give 1 percent of your   4/11: p. 92
income to meeting human need? Are you willing
seriously to consider giving 1.5 percent (one
year) of your life in ... some form of
international voluntary service?"

The Verdict at the end of Book 1, unit 8 is:

> "Do you believe in the Resurrection, that
> is do you believe that Jesus Christ is alive
> in a unique but very real sense today?"

It could be argued that the fact of the Resurrection does not depend

upon a class vote and that young people have no right to believe that

they can vote something true or false. But in the "Class Vote", as

with the "Introductory Questions", the point is that they are voting

not on a fact but on their belief.

And they have the right to decide for themselves what they

believe. To give freedom to exercise this right is to encourage

autonomy in other areas of life situations. Such a right induces in

them greater responsibility in making their decisions on such things

as the job they desire, the person they want to marry, and the way

they are going to vote. These are important applications of Kant's

"game of judgment".

In any case, it is not the role of the school to tell young

people what they must believe or what they ought to believe.

The vote is important because it gives the class a peg on which

to hang the unit. It records the majority view of the class, although

it may be noted that not all agree with the verdict. Respect for

personal belief is maintained; and although the verdict is tentative,

it forces each member of the class to draw his own conclusion.

In the Introduction to Book 4, it is further suggested that

> "... each unit should go beyond discussion
> revolving round the class to 'Further Work'
> involving action. All projects suggested
> should be considered by your class, but they
> do not exhaust the list of possibilities.
> Committees should be appointed to explore
> further avenues of involvement."[18]

The ultimate purpose of each unit is to encourage development of beliefs, to see the implications of these beliefs in terms of real life situations, and to act on these beliefs while at the same time showing tolerance and understanding of the beliefs of others.

18.
   Book 4, Intro., p. 11.

III. A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF LIVING BIBLE IN TERMS OF AUTONOMY

It has been mentioned how Books 1 and 2 of Living Bible did not primarily aim at the development of autonomy in the adolescent. Instead, the aim was succinctly stated by William Barclay in his forward to each of these first two volumes:

> "... I am certain that it will enable young
> people not only to discover the Bible but also
> to discover the meaning of Christian life and
> living."

It is only with Books 3 and 4 that autonomy begins to emerge as a central aim. Even so, they too have weaknesses in the light of this aim. Relevant to autonomy, certain observations can be made of these volumes and must be taken into account if certain pitfalls are to be avoided in future developments of religious education in Secondary schools.

A. A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF LIVING BIBLE 1 AND 2

The general observation on the first two volumes is that to open the door to biblical studies is to open the door to one of many specifically religious options. And, in any case, religion itself must be seen as one of many general options. Therefore, Living Bible must not only be placed alongside comparative religious studies but alongside philosophical and humanistic inquiry as well. Had the Education Acts called for "humanities studies" instead of religious studies with assumed Christian emphasis, these textbooks would have needed to contain these options.

Book 1 opens with "Test your attitude to Religion." It asks "How do you feel about studying religion?" (1, p. 11) But it assumes that the student has found religious words to contain meaning. "We often

hear or use the word 'God'. What do we mean by it?" This assumes,
however, that "God" is an essential religious word, that one cannot
talk about religion without talking about "God", and that "God" has
some kind of meaning. Even in comparative religious terms, this begs
a question: for the Buddhist avoids "God talk" and the theory of
Christian atheism suggests that "God is dead" or, as logical
positivism suggests, semantically, "'God' is meaningless." The
Living Bible series does have a realistic beginning which attempts to
bring out into the open the emotive aspect of religious language and
attitudes: "How do you feel about studying religion?" But it assumes
that one should feel favourable towards it when many adolescents not
only do not feel drawn to a religious attitude but also do not feel
that they should be or are under obligation to be so drawn. Autonomy
is encouraged only where conclusions are not drawn in advance. Living
Bible attempts to avoid this by raising questions for discussion, but
the questions are not always unbiased. "State whether you think
religion should be taught in schools..." is followed by the question
"In what ways do you think the teaching of religion in the school
should differ from the teaching of religion in the church?" (1, p. 13)
This assumes that religion should be taught in the school and assumes
that religion is an isolated subject like science or language. If
autonomy is a basic aim, then religion must not be isolated but must
be presented as one option among many and offered alongside others in
the humanities.

"To people who prefer to stay where they are, the history of the
Hebrews asks the question, 'For what purpose are you casting your
life?'" (1, p. 15) This is a valuable question and the quest for
purpose lies behind Maslow's idea of growth towards autonomy. But the

way the question is raised in a textbook for religion (as an isolated subject under the Education Acts) almost suggests that the only way to find an answer is through religion. A liberal definition of religion is "anything which answers the question, 'What is the purpose of life?'"; but this is a very broad definition. There is a vital difference between defining religion as "that which answers the question concerning the purpose of life" and "that which alone answers the question concerning the purpose of life". The latter definition is either too broad a definition of religion or too restrictive a definition of the purpose of life.

The first two volumes also tend to assume Christian commitment as the ideal or as the situation of the reader. "Abraham was not a perfect man. The Scriptures do not attempt to whitewash him. At least once he laughed at God...." (1, p. 17) This makes a moral judgment that to laugh at God is a sign of imperfection. It assumes that the reader should believe in the reality of God. And it is ambivalent to the image which the word "God" has upon the reader. If the reader believes that the word "God" refers to "a kind of divine Santa Claus who lives up in the sky", then, by the writer's hermeneutics, "to laugh at God" could be a sign of the rational aspect of autonomy. It would be to laugh at the idea that there is such a being. On the other hand, to laugh at God publicly in order to ridicule the religious beliefs of other people could be a violation of acceptance, sensitivity, and empathy which are emotional aspects of autonomy (PSYC-AUT). But unfortunately these issues are avoided in the unit. Awareness of these issues is important if autonomy is to be developed. Instead, the first unit almost assumes that faith is a goal of religious education and by religious education is implied

Christian education. "Faith means taking Christianity seriously...."
(1, p. 18) Does it? It certainly can, but not necessarily. Judaism
and other religions also give meaning to "faith".

By aiming at an understanding of the Bible, certain more basic
issues were avoided. When the writer was considering the entrance of
the Hebrew people into Palestine he could not avoid referring to the
moral issue of taking land from other people. But by concentrating on
the biblical story, he side stepped the issue. "Whether or not it was
right for the Hebrew people to fight for land is not for us here to
decide." (1, p. 31) At least the issue was raised, but those who
believe that exploitation is too often the result of religious zeal
or that injustice must not be covered up by religious story-telling
would not be satisfied. That the Hebrew people were the chosen people
of God and therefore had the right to claim Palestine for themselves
is a direct violation of PHIL-AUT. It suggests that religious people
have the right to treat other people as means and not as ends. It
gives religion special exemption from the jurisdiction of the
categorical imperative. By later Hebrew prophetic standards — and by
Christian standards — Israel's early history could be judged and this
should have been done in Living Bible by its own acknowledged objective
of "discovering the meaning of Christian life and living." But
appraisal of Israel's early history should also have been encouraged
through other perspectives or options if autonomy is to be taken more
seriously as an aim. The teacher with this insight would bring such
weaknesses to the attention of the class or, better still, help the
class members make this discovery themselves. Such a teacher would
be actively taking on the role of "midwife".

It is ironic that this section was called "Do we want something

for nothing?" The Hebrews certainly took something for nothing when they moved into the occupied areas of Palestine. Perhaps, however, it could be said that the Canaanites should have shown concern for the welfare of the nomads' plight with an invitation to share their land of milk and honey. Or it could be said, in any case, that the Jews should not have been forced to be slave labourers in Egypt and that that was the greater evil.

But the real point of "Do we want something for nothing?" was even evaded within its biblical emphasis. The writer praised David for not accepting Araunah's gift of land for the temple. He wanted it to cost him and his people something. This suggests the responsibility aspect of autonomy. One is responsible when one is not a bargain hunter but wants to pay a fair price so that someone else may have a fair wage. But one could also object that even to pay a "fair" price for the temple site is immoral on the argument that a place of worship is a wasted place. In other words, the praise of David gives a value judgment on an act which could rationalise a corrupt existential situation or bad stewardship. The writer's assumptions are further revealed by his condemnation of Solomon for spending more time, money, and energy on the building of the palace than the building of the temple. "Seven years for the House of God, thirteen years for the house of Solomon. His own house was almost twice as important as the temple." (1, p. 33) This makes numerous value judgments, not only that a temple is more important than a palace but that there is nothing wrong in stewardship spending on such buildings so long as one spends more money on the temple than on the palace. The argument endorses uncritically monarchal rule and religious observance. In terms of the moral aspect of autonomy,

Solomon could be criticised for claiming religious devotion and not practising this. The unit does observe critically that Solomon's building programme was done by slave labour. But it should have been pointed out that such slavery is a violation of a categorical imperative type moral law as well as a religious law. Such observations illustrate the necessity of PHIL-AUT as an important aim in religious education.

The Group Discussion questions at the end of this unit are based on the situation of the class member being chosen as the leader of a new nation who is going to build a church. It virtually assumes that a national leader would want a church, halls, and services of worship. This begging the question of "Should a community have a church?" could be a violation of autonomy and lead to heteronomous, passive acceptance or rejection. Those who give value to the Church might give answers which are thoughtlessly traditional. Those who are apathetic towards the Church could be encouraged to believe that something would be wrong with them if they questioned the value of the Church. Those who have rejected the Church could be alienated even more without bringing reason to bear on their attitude. Then the outcome respectively would be (1) reinforcing heteronomy, (2) encouraging heteronomy, and (3) reinforcing heteronomously imposed alienation. The perceptive teacher should therefore ask, "What's going on here?" "What are individual members of the class feeling towards these discussion questions?" "Why are they reacting this way?" The varieties of attitude towards religion should not be prejudiced. This could have been avoided by asking as the initial question, "Does the new national leader want a church? If so...." As it stands, the teacher must compensate - but this is part of his role as a "midwife".

The issue is presented more adequately in the closing unit of Book 1 and these questions should have been asked earlier:

> "What enters your mind when you hear the word religion? ...
> "Does the word appear to be dry and unimportant to you or does it arouse interest and curiosity?
> "What do you think there is in your background that has given the word this meaning to you?" (1, p. 84)

This final unit in Book 1 does draw attention to the import of words being positive, neutral, or negative. But this is so basic to helping language enhance the development of autonomy that the point should have been highlighted earlier and also fuller. This is important to the "awareness" aspect of autonomy.

The unit on why Jesus died asks as the basic question, "Who was to blame?" (1, pp. 51f.) This exercise in judgment-making is valid for PHIL-AUT as an example of Kantian methodology. But it could encourage stereotyped thinking and blame appropriation which avoids empathy and acceptance required for PSYC-AUT. And it could lack the consideration of grace Tillich included in his theology, which appears in what he believed was an essential depth to THEO-AUT. It also contains statements which suggest that the real value judgment has already been made: "Judas, the traitor par excellence" (p. 53), "Judas was in search of power as such extremists always are" (p. 54), "It was Pilate who, in the end, had Jesus crucified" (p. 55), "It was as if Jesus had decided that He wanted the Cross to become the symbol for His followers." (p. 56) It would have been better if these statements had been in the form of questions. But even questions can be loaded. "Do you sometimes try to avoid your duty in your home, at school, or while out with the gang? Give some examples." (p. 56) The statement should have been phrased, "If you do, give some examples."

For as it stands, the statement assumes that the answer is, "Yes." This may be hypercritical, but the student, and not the book, should make the judgment.

The class vote for this unit is, "Who do you think was most responsible for the death of Jesus Christ?" (p. 56) But why this question? Of what value is this judgment making? Is it to evaluate biblical data? It does that. But a student need not have much cynicism or apathy to give the reaction of another question, verbal or non-verbal, "So what?"

And the student who asks the question which forms the title of one of the other units, "What is love?" (p. 78), is not necessarily wanting to be limited to considering the answer it suggests. A more accurate and honest title would have been, "What is the Christian exposition of love found in Paul's first letter to Corinth at chapter 13?" In reflection, the aim seems to have been to have a look at love from a theonomous perspective. From the perspective of autonomy it can imply manipulation.

But there is one unit in Book 1 where autonomy breaks through: "Man against Society". (pp. 72f.) It begins with a quotation by Albert Einstein:

> "What is truly valuable in our bustle of life
> is...not the nation, I should say, but the creative
> personality—he who produces the noble and sublime
> while the common herd remains dull in thought and
> insensible in feeling." (1, p. 72)

And a discussion question at the end asks:

> "Who are the people who stand against society
> today? Which ones are creative in doing this?
> Which ones do you think are destructive? Can you
> list some principles we might use to help us to
> decide when, and when not, to stand against the
> habits of the majority?" (1, p. 77)

The categorical imperative offers an answer. Is autonomy the aim of this unit? It certainly is featured. But the unit goes from the "here and now" back to the "there and then" and returns to the "here and now". If autonomy is the aim, why go to the "there and then"? PHIL-AUT would reply, "To play the game of judgment." THEO-AUT would answer, "Because the life of Paul was a life that saw deeper than autonomy to theonomy and to the ground of being." But PSYC-AUT could answer with another question, "So what?" Again, this may be hypercritical but the book should have taken this question into account.

The class vote for this unit is, "Would you call Paul 'a good man'?" Constructive answers could give varying emphases on a variety of forms of autonomy. What is important is not the answer itself but why the answer "yes" or "no" is given by different individuals. In terms of various forms of autonomy, what is meant by 'the good man'? PHIL-AUT: did Paul treat people as ends and respect their convictions or did he treat them as means to the aim of Christian conversion? Does argumentation or attempts at persuasion to one's own viewpoint imply heteronomy? THEO-AUT: did Paul aim at theonomy or did he aim at the imposition of heteronomous orthodoxy? PSYC-AUT: did Paul move towards self-fulfilment and seek the same for others? THEO-AUT and PSYC-AUT in conjunction: is theonomy the only ultimate way to self-fulfilment? Must the good life necessarily be the religious life and if so what kind of religious life? Bringing PHIL-AUT to bear on these questions means that the answer must be rationally honest.

If it has the aim of growth towards autonomy, one of the values of religious education is that it should be able to shed light on these questions. It has been shown how Living Bible 1 violates this aim

to some extent. It assumes theonomy, the religious depth of autonomy, which emphasises THEO-AUT at the cost of under-valuating PHIL-AUT and PSYC-AUT. This can be justified only if religion itself is related to philosophy and psychology in the Secondary school.

Living Bible 2 continues many of the same violations of autonomy as the previous volume. In the Introduction the question is asked, "What do you believe about God?" (2, p. 7) The multiple choice answers all assume that it is a meaningful concept. "Which of the following statements do you believe best describes God?" This begs the whole question of religious validity. For the agnostic or atheist, none of the statements would have value. The question must be interpreted and should have been phrased, "Which, if any, of the following statements...?"

"Has life a purpose?" (p. 11) This is a question of ultimate concern. It can have a religious answer. Some believe that questions of ultimate concern must have religious answers because this is what religion—and only religion—is all about. Others would reject this. Living Bible is concerned with such questions. But it should have raised such questions in a way which made non-religious answers acceptable. The purpose is stated in a way which does not make this a completely open option.

> "Some may think that what they believe makes
> no difference. But the fact is that what they
> believe makes all the difference in the world.
> This is why religion is a subject studied in
> British schools. The school cannot—and, indeed,
> must not—tell the student what he must believe.
> The school can, however—and, indeed, must—help
> the student examine his beliefs." (p. 11)

But this assumes that his beliefs correlate with religion or even, indeed, are religious. The very next paragraph reveals the fault openly:

345.

> "For this purpose, this book has been written.
> You will notice that it is divided into twelve
> units, four on the Old Testament, four on the
> Gospels, and four on other parts of the New Testament.
> This is done to help the student examine his beliefs.
> It is not done to tell the student what to believe."
> (p. 11)

But how can religious education help the student examine his beliefs
if they are not religious? And when religious education is delineated
within a study of the Judeo-Christian Scriptures, how can it help the
student whose views are religious but not Christian?

A positive answer would be that such a study would in Kantian
terms sharpen the critical nature of the game of judgment. The warp
of one's own views would be interwoven with the woof of alternative
views in dialectical examination leading to a more enlightened
synthesis. But this would mean that the view of the committed
Christian might not be so engaged, and, if heteronomously held, would
be merely uncritically re-inforced? Fortunately such a student would
probably be in a classroom where the majority, if not the overwhelming
majority, would not share his views. The real warp and woof dialectic
is not in personal encounter with the content of *Living Bible* but in
the inter-personal encounter with the other class members. The book
can and must take some possible beliefs and examine them critically.
Otherwise, the discussion may have no external frame of reference.
The students otherwise would be offered no alternative to the belief
that they are the measure of all things.

There is, however, a negative answer to "How can a study of
Judeo-Christian Scriptures assist the growth of autonomy of the
student who does not share these views?" He might become so alienated
that his rejection of Judeo-Christian beliefs would be re-inforced.
This could undermine whatever autonomously rational foundation he had

to his views. It could raise the height of the hurdle that forms a hazard to travelling the road of open inquiry. And the Judeo-Christian advocate could find himself with a higher wall of protection from external critical encounter which would cut him off from the dialectical process so basic to the rational foundation of autonomy. The fact that the religious bias is in print gives it all the more authority and emphasis for bias. This strongly implies the need for religious education to be part of the humanities and the larger educational process. But this link with the humanities is avoided:

> "To understand religion is as important as understanding history or maths or languages or science. If you know all about history but do not understand Christianity—the religion which has influenced Western civilization—you cannot really understand history. Similarly, if you know all about rockets and outer space but do not understand the purpose of creation, of what value is your knowledge of science?" (p. 12)

Individually, these sentences may be true. It may be important to understand religion. But religion is a larger category than Christianity which, in any case, is not the only religion to influence Western civilisation. And, in any case, to understand the purpose of creation may mean not only to "understand" Christianity but to "understand" the broader category of religion and perhaps even beyond that. But to go beyond that is to go into the humanities. Further, one must not avoid the question as to whether there is any purpose to creation.

Put to the test of PHIL-AUT as an aim, the general weaknesses of Living Bible Book 1 are carried over into Book 2. But among the assets are the illustrations which through their encouragement of identification and empathy aid the use of games of judgment. Unit 3 introduces the story of Job by a contemporary situation of suffering (see p. 32).

"Why is there suffering?" yields to the more basic question "What does one do when suffering occurs?" Such empathy should not only help one make constructive use of his own suffering but help him to help others through awareness, identification (a feeling for), empathy, and caring. In this way PHIL-AUT is linked to PSYC-AUT.

The unit on the Beatitudes (pp. 47-56) comes close to a direct consideration of the categorical imperative. The Beatitudes are treated as a religious formulation of the moral law. But again, the good points leading towards autonomy are contained within a religious education framework. Adolescent alienation against religion may be transferred into alienation against any valuable aspects of religion rather than transformed by any discovery of how to get rid of the destructive aspects of alienation.

The unit on "Why have Laws?" (pp. 74-79) could also so identify the moral law with a religious formula that the one could be thrown out if the other is rejected.

> "It is the law that shows us what is right and what
> is wrong. If we did not know the Ten Commandments,
> we would not know that it is wrong to covet." (p. 77)

But there are other systems of belief which are against covetousness.

Paul's four stages of men's relationship to the law, used in Group Discussion at the end of the unit (pp. 78-79), show a parallelism between the religious perspective of the law (THEO-AUT) and the moral perspective of the law (PHIL-AUT). The first stage is living with no law. It is called the stage of the "Happy Pagan". But by paganism is meant agnosticism and agnosticism is not necessarily amoral. It may have been right to portray Paul as believing that the moral person must be the religious person, but the adolescent should be presented with other options.

> "Paul said that he was once alive apart from the
> law. It was a happy life for he did not bother
> with moral duty. He lived apart from religion,
> doing what he wanted to do with absolute peace of
> mind and no concern for the effects of what he
> did on other people." (2, p. 78)

To "not bother with moral duty" is virtually equated with living
"apart from religion". And because Paul was a Jew at that time, he
was not really living apart from religion but living apart from
Christianity. "Religion" is equated with "the Christian religion",
and this creates the same kind of ambiguity Tillich had when he used
the term "religious education" but mean "Christian education".

The second stage in man's relationship to the law is presented
as the stage of the "Schoolmaster".

> "It took a schoolmaster to point out the difference
> between right and wrong. What is the value of the
> law today?" (2, p. 79)

A more basic question should have been asked "Should laws ever be
inflicted; if so can they have bad side effects?" But as it stands,
this second stage at least shows the necessity of heteronomy when
reason is undeveloped and the necessity of ground rules even in the
quest for autonomy.

Stage three is called the "Unhappy Legalist". If stage two did
not point out the dangers of inflicted heteronomy, stage three does.
The law lacks power and motivation and can become an object of worship.
Tillich's criticism of Kant's not appreciating this weakness in his
categorical imperative was one reason for the importance he gave to
theonomy.

Stage four is "Life in the Spirit".

> "Paul finally discovered that Christianity went
> beyond the law to the gift of the Spirit. The
> Spirit helped people to give value to the human
> personality of others." (p. 79)

Tillich appreciated this point so much that he felt one had to go beyond autonomy. This is a statement of theonomy as the aim and not PHIL-AUT. There is no reason why in the school such an aim should not be shown as basic to Christianity. But when Christianity is presented as the only position that really aims at autonomy, the effect is insidious heteronomy.

One unit in Book 2 presents biblical material without this presumptuous insidious heteronomy: "What is the good life?" (pp. 80-87) The Introductory Questions are based on an effort to create empathy with a family situation:

> "Did Anne really do something wrong? She
> believed that she had done something wrong because
> her conscience made her feel bad. What is our
> conscience? Where does it come from? Is it ever
> wrong?" (p. 81)

This raises questions related to PSYC-AUT. It is open to many possible answers, such as: Erikson's programmed stages, Berne's parental indoctrination, or Freud's "voice of grandmother" which (the last) is directly referred to within the unit.

The questions are not loaded and they give room for anti-religious sentiment:

> "Is going to church a good habit? Is it ever
> wrong to go to church?" (p. 81)

A further question, "Is it ever _right_ to go to church?" would have balanced the options but at least church going is critically appraised with an example suggesting a circumstance in which church going was presumably wrong. "How do we decide the right thing to do? ... If our guide is reason, we need some principles to help us." (p. 82) This implies a PHIL-AUT quest for a categorical imperative type answer. PHIL-HET passive acceptance of external biblical authority is humorously criticised. (pp. 82-83) One's hermeneutic can make the

Bible a heteronomous imposition.

One of the criticisms made against autonomy as an aim is that it makes one too self-centred. PSYC-AUT defined in terms of self-fulfilment could imply a disregard for the well-being of other people. PSYC-AUT can be self-fulfilment at the expense of others. This must be avoided. In a unit of Living Bible entitled "The Case of the Counterfeit Christian", issues concerning PSYC-AUT are put along side PHIL-AUT and THEO-AUT:

> "It is about people who claim to be good, but are
> totally mistaken because they have not considered
> the advice of others. The young person who
> ceases to give a hearing to the advice of his
> parents may later be forced to listen to the
> advice of a magistrate or judge. The good life
> does not come through a man doing only what he
> wants to all the time. He must consider how his
> actions affect other people. He must learn to
> respect the sincerety of their ideas. He must
> ask, 'Is this really fair to others?'" (p. 86)

The autonomous person does not close his ears to the advice of others. He is aware of the social aspects of autonomy. To be controlled by external advice is heteronomy. But to consider it is not necessarily to accept it heteronomously. On the other hand, autonomy is not "doing one's thing" without regard for others. The "test of universality" is the test of a categorical imperative. Another way of stating it is, "One should do to others as he would want them to do to him." To reflect on fairness is a preliminary introduction to a study of the categorical imperative. One might ask, "But should Christianity be used to gain insight into Kantianism or should Kantianism be used to gain insight into Christianity?" As far as autonomy as an aim is concerned, both have value. Neither should be prohibited from study in the Secondary school. But religious education must present the insights of other religions in order to show that

Christianity does not necessarily have a monopoly on "fairness".
And in its relationship to the humanities, religion is not isolated
from philosophy, psychology, or sociology or even political science
which normally comes under modern studies or history. For the
humanities relate to other subjects. The practical situation of
considering "fairness" in a particular unit of Living Bible shows
how the aim of autonomy is part of a broader educational aim, not
only within the Secondary school, but in the total nurture of the
adolescent and the individual through all his ages. It also shows
how religious education can contribute to this aim.

Books 1 and 2 have the same general weakness if one is to take the
aim of autonomy seriously. By emphasising biblical material with a
Christian perspective and not having a more balanced presentation of
other religions and philosophies of life, there is a danger of
PHIL-HET, THEO-HET (abstracted), and PSYC-HET being unchallenged in
spite of group discussions and open verdicts. The student who accepts
or rejects uncritically the authority of Jesus of Nazareth can do so
heteronomously. By assuming previous Christian association on the
part of the student the units can reinforce favourable or unfavourable
reaction. Books 1 and 2 thereby lessened the possibilities of Books
3 and 4 leading towards autonomy. When the questions and content are
somewhat loaded, discussion only gives the impression of self-decision-
making.

B. A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF LIVING BIBLE 3 AND 4

Book 3 begins with a dialogue sketch "to set the scene". The
temperament and mood of the dialogue could become dated, and coming
at the beginning of the book it does not permit time for revision or

preparation. But it puts the book into the participating hands of
several class members to introduce the syllabus to the class rather
than the teacher having to do it. (It will be shown later how Book
4 attempts to put the responsibility for each unit in the hands of
the class to help develop initiative.) At the beginning, Book 3
acknowledges what Books 1 and 2 did not take into account—alienation:
"This religion stuff just doesn't go down with me at all. I couldn't
care less about it." (3, p. 9) It acknowledges, though in perhaps too
loaded a manner, a basic concern—irrelevance: "The Bible doesn't
have anything to say about dog races and cigarettes—and hydrogen
bombs and delinquents and depressed parents, and road accidents. And
even if it did, I wouldn't be interested in it." (3, p. 10)

Relevance was an important concern of Book 3:[1]

> "We will be considering questions young people
> today are asking and the problems to be faced
> when you leave school. These include family
> tensions and personality conflicts, and the
> transition from school to job, whether on the
> factory floor, in the kitchen, or elsewhere.
> We will take a look, too, at the ingredients of
> failure and success, the fear of nuclear war,
> the growing illegal use of drugs, the spending
> of money, the various ways of choosing a husband
> or wife, and raising a family, and what it means
> to be old. Along the way we are going to meet
> Angry Ian, Jealous Janet, Worried William, and
> Lonely Lindsay, not to mention a dope addict, a
> mother incapable of loving, a father who refuses
> to go to his son's wedding reception because
> "it's bingo night", a pop singer's views on love
> songs, a young unmarried mother, and an old age
> pensioner who has found a clue to happiness." (3, p. 11)

1.
  Books 1 and 2 were written between 1961 and 63. But Book 3 was not
started until 1964 nor finished until 1967. Unlike the previous volumes
it (and also Book 4) was written while the author was a parish minister.
The hard data of Bible knowledge became less important than the hard
core circumstances of life. Life themes were no longer introductions
or conclusions to which biblical material should be offered as meat in
a sandwich. The contents of each unit, the "Things to Think About",
were not biblical data but life data. Life in the raw of a New Town
into which people (including adolescents) from all over Britain were
moving gave a new importance to the factor of relevance.

To cover this, less emphasis was placed on biblical material.
The title Living Bible was continued only because the form of the
units made Book 3 a sequel. But the content emphasised the "Living"
rather than the "Bible". It was written for the religious education
classroom but not with the overtones of Christian education as
evident as in the earlier volumes. It was a movement towards the
perception of religious education as part of a humanities department.

> "Has anyone the right to tell us what to
> believe about religion or must we decide for
> ourselves?" (3, p. 12)

This Class Vote at the end of the Introduction placed the answer "no"
of autonomy against the answer "yes" of heteronomy. But it could
be critically stated that this comes after devoting the first two
volumes to telling the students what to believe in an insidous way,
giving them the vote but not providing them with the options of
sufficient scope. This is criticism not only from the humanist left
but also from the liberal Christian viewpoint which believes that any
form of heteronomous manipulation is at least as repulsive as overt
indoctrination. The criticism from the fundamentalist, orthodox, or
neo-orthodox right, coming from the opposite direction, is that Books
1 and 2 should never have permitted the adolescent to question
"religious truth". "Religious truth" from this direction is defined
as the "Christian Gospel". And Living Bible 1 and 2 are criticised
as not offering real religious education (meaning Christian education).

Liberal Christians (and those of other religious views),
humanists, agnostics, and atheists, in their unsophisticated
adolescent form, exist in Secondary schools. Yet, so too do the
conservative Christians. And there are the teacher counterparts on
both sides. What then is to be done with religious education?

Living Bible 3 and 4 move in a direction that is more conducive to trying to bring all these groups into dialogue but by almost avoiding religion altogether, if by religion is meant Bible study or "God talk". Comparative religion is not introduced. On what grounds, then, are Books 3 and 4 religious texts? If religion is broadly defined as "what concerns one ultimately" then there is no problem because the above quotation contains what many adolescents would consider ultimate issues and certainly what the writer, out of pastoral experience, believed could be considered as ultimate issues. If the issues are relevant and important, then presenting them is not heteronomy so long as the answer options are open.

Book 3, unit 1 begins with a quiz. Through questions about the real family situation of the reader an attempt is made to assist with self-awareness and awareness of interpersonal relationships. "I (always, usually, sometimes, never) get enough attention at home" (3, p. 11) is a question Maslow would have considered important to motivation towards autonomy. "I _____ sulk when I don't get what I want" and "I _____ lose my temper when I can't have my own way" (p. 11) could reveal Parent-Adult-Child awareness as Berne emphasised. (Religious education as part of a humanities department could present the PSYO-AUT implications of such feelings.) The rest of the unit, including commentary on a biblical passage, is meant to increase the awareness of worry, anger, jealousy, and loneliness within families and the social unrest, racial and political conflict, tension and friction within and between countries. The positive qualities highlighted are good humour, tolerance, unselfishness, and patience. (Religious education as part of the humanities could present the qualities of acceptance, empathy, freedom, and congruence (genuineness) as

highlighted by Carl Rogers. This would bring PSYC-AUT to bear more openly on PHIL-AUT and THEO-AUT.)

The moral law of Kant could have been introduced into the following unit which examined the impossibility of legislating for morality: "The Government cannot simply legislate that.... An eleventh commandment could be..., but how could it be enforced?" (3, p. 20) The problem of trying to create autonomous behaviour or heteronomous laws was indirectly considered and an example given. PHIL-AUT could be more directly examined by older students. PSYC-AUT also could be related directly by raising questions of motivation. This unit does come within reach by concluding with a reference to being "helped on the way to maturity". (p. 22)

The next unit refers to a good job being one which, among other things, "challenges you to develop yourself". (p. 26) PHIL-AUT and PSYC-AUT are present in the reference to looking on work "as part of the larger service to the community" which leads one "well on the way to attaining maturity" (p. 27), although Maslow would object to maturity being really attainable. The situation of people of various vocations working together as part of a team is presented as important while those who cut themselves off from each other are considered to "remain children". (p. 27) The larger social implications of Berne's Parent-Adult-Child concept are indirectly presented. This unit concludes with an exercise in arranging an interview which requires the kind of initiative which assists development towards autonomy.

Several units are almost entirely devoted to interviews which, as is most dramatically done with a drug addict, give real answers based upon discovering and confronting facts. In each case the interview is followed by discussion which attempts to keep the student

from feeling that he necessarily must arrive at the same conclusions.
The need for acceptance emphasised by Maslow and Rogers and the weaning
process basic to adolescent psychology arise naturally in the drug
addict interview:

> "These /attempts to escape from emotional problems/
> were mainly caused by a lack of communication
> between myself and my parents. My feelings of
> loneliness and rejection by my father in particular
> and the very disturbing, almost suffocating,
> attention which my mother lavished upon me caused
> me to seek some form of release from the tension
> which was overwhelming me." (3, p. 35)

Describing the effects of dexedrine, the addict acknowledged his
discovery the hard way that freedom from is not the same thing as
freedom for. (Both are important for autonomy.)

> "The pure joy of bubbling over with freedom—from
> haunting personal problems, was liberating. ...
> But when the drug had worn off after about
> twelve hours, I began to experience feelings of
> uneasiness and depression, and physically felt
> washed out. My problems had returned and the
> pain of living with them was greater." (3, p. 35)

Later came the attempt at being autonomous, an idea which parallels
the standing against the crowd in "Man against Society" (Book 1,
unit 10). But this time a "here and now" contemporary situation
replaces the "there and then" biblical one:

> "In the evenings I would visit friends whom I
> knew could supply me. I did try to stop and
> come to terms with myself. I had no friends
> who did not take drugs. I had to go it alone."
> (p. 36)

One of the interactions between psychology and religion raises
the whole issue of whether religious experience is always based on
psychological need. The addict suggested that at least in his
situation he felt that there was a relationship which he reflected
on after using marihuana:

357.

> "I also experienced something akin to a religious
> experience. I felt as if I were moving towards
> God and I remember trying to look for God's face.
> But somehow it escaped me. I now believe that
> the God I was looking for was simply the kind of
> father I never had. One who cared for me. But
> the unapproachability of God was similar to the
> relationship I had with my father. I'm sure there
> must be a connection here." (p. 38)

But what kind of a connection? "Talk-in" type questions could have
been asked at this important place in the interview: "Do you believe
one can get religious insights through taking drugs?" "Does this
quotation merely show the pathetic consequences of a lack of love?"
"Is the quotation a dangerous, home-made psycho-analytic
rationalisation?" "What bearing does psychology have on religion
and religion on psychology?" But if religious education is to take
important questions like these seriously, it must appeal to other
subjects.

The unit on "Money Matters" takes a practical subject and brings
autonomy and heteronomy indirectly to bear. The point of the unit is
self-decision:

> "Unless we decide to spend it carefully,
> however, money has a way of spending itself. If
> we do not decide for ourselves, we will let
> others decide for us." (3, p. 44)

The content of this unit attempts to show some of the areas of concern
if financial decisions are to be based upon reason. The following
unit tries to bring a rational base to beliefs by showing the origin
of various "superstitious" beliefs and motivation. But it needlessly
begs certain questions.

> "The prophet Hosea wanted the motivation in worship
> to be love and the search for the knowledge of God,
> not superstition.
> "To live by love and knowledge does not bring
> good luck. The reward is rather freedom from fear
> over what might happen in the future. To believe
> in a sovereign God is to believe that there is a

> power which has control over events. And this
> means freedom from what John Calvin, the Reformer,
> called 'The misery which man must feel, if he be
> subject to the dominion of fortune.' Belief in
> providence means freedom from fear." (3, p. 53)

The rational grounds for rejecting superstition in motivation in worship is a valid point, but an avoided option which arises is that worship itself is a superstition. Religious belief may be freedom from misery felt in "the dominion of fortune." But what about freedom from responsibility which religion, interpreted as the "opiate of the people", is considered by many to be? Does even total freedom from religious superstition necessitate freedom with justice? "The New Testament suggests that the Christian can expect something of greater value than good luck:..." (p. 53) But what if the adolescent rejects the authority of the New Testament? What about those who are not Christians? A less loaded, more objective, statement would have been, "Many Christians believe not that one should seek good luck, but that one should not let tribulation, distress, or persecution overwhelm them for they believe they can find sustenance through what the New Testament calls "the love of Christ". Religious education must not assume the validity of theonomy if autonomy is its remit.

The next unit, on Operation Friendship, shows how a group of young people organised an international youth movement on their own initiative and how the class could undertake the same venture. Initiative, one of the important stages in Erikson's view of human development, is itself a method of growth towards autonomy by Maslow's definition. Initiative is an expression of freedom. Creative, constructive initiative is an expression of responsible freedom. There is no biblical reference in this unit. But there is a question at the end which, had the book had any other title, would have been different:

"Where do you think 'Operation Friendship'
will go from here? What contribution can it make
to the hope expressed by Robert Burns for a day
when '...Man to Man the world o'er, Shall
brothers be...'? What does this have to do with
the Bible?" (p. 60)

The last sentence should have been, "What does this have to do with

religion?" Or better still, "Do you think there is any relationship

between religion and the encouragement of international friendship?

If so, what? Many see Christianity and other religions as containing

international fellowship and encouraging international justice and

friendship. In what ways, if any, do religions do this? In what

ways, if any, do they violate this?" Such questions would have more

specifically and yet open-endedly raised religious issues without

assuming that there necessarily was a theonomous aspect. The same

approach would mean revising the project at the end of the unit. It

suggests examining the possibilities of an international exchange as

a class project. "Your school chaplain, headmaster, and other

community leaders should be kept informed." (p. 60) Without appearing

over-critical, it would have been better to suggest getting the

permission of the headmaster before even starting. He is the one in

authority. And yet what if the headmaster was uninterested,

unapproachable, or refused to accept such an idea? This is the

dilemma of autonomy as an aim. To what extent is initiative to be

encouraged? (The opening unit of Book 4 encourages the class members

to usurp authority as part of the "now generation".) The chaplain

is included among the leaders in the community, as one of the link men,

and for a class to give such regard increases the relationship between

the school and the other community institutions. This raises

underlying questions which could have been included: "To what extent

and in what ways should the school be related to the general life of

the community? To what extent, if any, does relating to an
institution mean endorsing the work of that institution?"

The next unit concerns "our senior citizens". The Introductory
Questions are in the form of "Here is a situation, how does it feel?",
in much the same way as the "Lifeline" series raised the question,
"Here is a situation, what would you do?" Imagination, empathy, and
awareness are ingredients of autonomy. After describing real
situations from the encounters of a parish minister, the biblical
story of a senior citizen, Nicodemus, is quoted. The theonomous
aspect of Christian interpretation is shown:

> "Could this be an analogy? The Spirit of
> God is like a lump of clay that existed before
> we were born and continues after we die. Jesus
> was fashioned out of this clay. Belief in Him
> somehow links us to this clay and makes our own
> life part of it." (pp. 66-67)

This is a throwback to the dogmatic statements of Books 1 and 2. Even
though it is put in the form of a question, it is not included as part
of discussion. It should not have been stated without the use of
"Talk-in" found in Book 4. Even so, it should have been put into the
form of "Christians believe in 'the Spirit of God' and some might
interpret this, by analogy, as like a lump of clay...." Empathy with
senior citizens at the beginning of the unit is put in jeopardy for
those who cannot identify with the Christian position.

The next unit contains an example of how rebuff by two members of
a church youth fellowship while raising money for Christian Aid led to
a study of this charity by a school religious education class. A
committee was appointed to gather information and present a report to
the class. The content of the unit is actually a revised version of
their report. The verdict of the committee was very direct:

> "Surely no one who has too much food, a packed
> wardrobe, an attractive home, and the best of
> medical attention and who claims to be a
> community leader can guiltlessly say, 'I don't
> believe in Christian Aid.' The obvious reply to
> that presumptuous statement is clearly expressed
> in the Gospel of Matthew..." (p. 72)

This is an extremely judgmental statement. It reveals how strongly the committee felt in support of Christian Aid. It does not, however, show concern for the reason why the community leader gave a rebuff which may have had nothing to do with their fundraising. Perhaps the real lesson to have been examined is that they should have done their "homework" before going out collecting. Their reaction was in one sense as aggressive as the rebuff they had received. A "Talk-in" on this judgmental statement is required before the Group Discussion questions are asked. The biblical quotation suggests that the man was cursed and condemned. The statement should have been allowed to provoke an open reaction (as the same quotation does in Book 4, just inside the cover at page 4). The Kantian game of judgment is better presented in the discussion questions which request verdicts on a novelist's quotation and situational participation in a Christian Aid decision making. (pp. 72-73)

The unit on "Encounter with Love" introduces a certain amount of adolescent psychology which is an asset in forming a rational basis for autonomy. If autonomy depends on reason, religious education must not be so categorised as to divorce it from other areas within the humanities. Reason is many dimensional. It should require a search for facts and information. Linguistic analysis is used in this unit to help clarify the different forms of love. It is the Greek language which is used for this. The fact that the Bible is quoted is incidental and certainly it was not used as authoritative. But Christianity is

given the last word:

> "Christian love is not doing what one wants
> to do without being hindered. Christian love is
> doing what helps others without being coerced."
> (p. 79)

There are non-Christian forms of love which hold the same ideas. The quotation could imply to one not versed in logic, and few adolescents are, that Christianity has a monopoly on real love. Some would claim that it has a monopoly on the motivation for love. To help others without being coerced, to show initiative, is an extremely valuable quality to have. Erikson and Maslow would have agreed. To encourage initiative the class is asked to arrange for a doctor to speak on "facts about sex". See p. 79. Other ways of using such resource persons (meaning consultants or experts) are found in the appendix to this thesis.

In the unit with the title question, "Whom shall I marry?" the class is asked at the beginning to consider individual varieties of opinion and then to try to substantiate them. The writer included this unit through encountering pastorally the agony caused by marriage breakdowns. But his impediment as a parish minister is shown by the loading of an answer to the question, "Where should we get married?":

> "Is it right for a couple who have no interest in the
> church to let custom, tradition and social pressure
> persuade them to ask for a church wedding? The church
> wedding ceremony is a service of worship where often
> the words are sung, '...and in God's house for
> evermore my dwelling place shall be.' Is it honest
> for a couple to use this kind of a service when they
> have no intention of stepping inside again, until,
> of course, the time to have their child baptised?
> According to this service of worship, the wedding in
> the church signifies '... the mystical union between
> Christ and His Church.' If a couple do not believe in
> this, is it hypocrisy for them to request a church
> wedding? ..." (3, pp. 83-4)

This issue requires a "Talk-in" based on a variety of attitudes if Kant's game of judgment (PHIL-AUT), empathy with other people's feelings (PSYC-AUT), as well as the religious implications (THEO-AUT) were to be developed. As it stands, it asks questions posed redundantly. The author's feelings and attitudes represent the perspective of many people. "How does a minister feel when he is conducting such a wedding? In what way is the committed Christian Church member offended when he feels that the church is 'taken for granted'? How would a couple feel if the church wedding were refused? Should the church be a 'closed shop'? How can mutual regard be developed for the feelings and beliefs of all concerned?" Role playing would have been an ideal way of creating empathy for the feelings of all concerned. The unit suggests that the school chaplain be interviewed to explain the wedding service in his church. But the chaplain's double role in school and church might be in conflict. The main purpose of the unit is to help the adolescent think through the selection of a marriage partner. "What are the qualities of a good marriage?" (p. 86) Respect is listed as one of the possibilities. The unit rightfully suggests that marriage is more than a relationship between two people--there is a new relationship with the community.

Book 3 concludes with a unit using religious education to raise the vital issue of the possibility of nuclear war. The moral implications of science included in a religious textbook show how, educationally, religion must be seen as part of the humanities and the humanities themselves not being detached from other subjects including chemistry, physics, and biology. Isaiah is quoted at the end as a provocative literary passage without exposition. To use the Bible in such a way is to avoid begging the question of its authority.

In itself, this does not violate the aim of autonomy. But had space permitted, it would have been better to have used other literary sources as well.

Because of its dearth of biblical quotations and religious references, Book 4 can be criticised as not being a textbook on religious education but on moral education.[2] But it interpreted religious education as being so much akin to moral education within the humanities that the dichotomy was blurred. This was fortunate. What makes religious education religious is not its references to the Bible or any other sacred literature, nor to religious history or doctrine. What makes religious education religious is its concern for ultimate questions—for what matters most—for values, purpose, and "for that worth giving one's life to." These issues it shares with moral education. It does not have a monopoly. But the 1944/45 Education Acts did not create a humanities department with moral, social, as well as religious educational aspects. Living Bible, especially Book 4, was an attempt to bring these areas of vital educational concern within religious education if there were no humanities department to contain them.

The Introduction to Book 4 begins with an appreciation of what today would be called moral and social concerns with multiple choice answers to the readers' existential situations and relationships:

2.

   Books 1 and 2 were written with a Bible-centred approach. The emphasis of Book 3 was not on biblical exposition but was more life-centred. As stated in the previous footnote, Books 1 and 2 were written together between 1961 and 1963, and Book 3 was written between 1964 and 1967 while the author was a parish minister and school chaplain. Under the same environment Book 4 was begun and completed within the year 1969. The time lapse included considerable experience with alienated youth and secular society. Book 4 therefore broke away even further from the first two volumes than did Book 3. It had to in any case: what is meaningful and acceptable to twelve year olds would not have "connected" with fifteen year olds.

> "When things are not right in the country I ⸺
> A. blame the government
> B. blame the people
> C. blame myself
> D. do something about it" (4, p. 7)

The Schools Council Project in Moral Education, In Other People's Shoes – teacher's guide (part of the "Lifeline" Project) would categorise the answers of A and B as "Avoidance", C as "Passive" or "Passive-emotional", and D as "Experimental" or "Mature" depending upon the details. The psychological term of projection might be just as appropriate for A or B and introjection could be the cause of choosing C which moral education does not make allowance for, and D could have various psychological appraisals depending upon what one actually would do and why he would do it. PHIL-AUT is enhanced by the probing of such questions which require the game of judgment. PSYC-AUT is enhanced if the adolescent is helped to evaluate his answer in terms of psychological qualities developing responsible freedom. In the light of Berne's P-A-C, to blame others is a way of avoiding responsibility (Child). And to blame oneself is a way of assuming responsibility or it could be the sign of a sick Adult (contaminated by the Parent ego state).

> "When I have a personal problem I ⸺
> A. keep it to myself
> B. talk it over with a teacher
> C. tell my mother
> D. tell my father
> E. confide in a brother or sister
> F. talk to a youth leader
> G. visit my doctor
> H. ask a friend for advice
> I. go to a minister/vicar/priest
> J. write to a problems page
> K. forget about it" (4, p. 8)

Here, appraisal by moral education such as "Lifeline" must be coupled by the awareness of psychological factors if valuable help towards autonomy is to be given. "Lifeline" could classify the answers of

B,C,D,F,G,I, and J as "Dependent-adult", E and H could be "Dependent-peer", and A and K could be "Avoidance". But depending upon the problem and the way the adolescent approaches it, almost any of the answers could be "Experimental-crude", "Experimental-sophisticated", "Mature-conventional", or "Mature-imaginative" and reveal the responsibly free quality of autonomy. To seek advice may or may not mean heteronomy. It may be using another as a resource person rather than as one on whom one is dependent. There is danger in classifying the answers without real existential awareness, just as amateur psychology can so easily give a false diagnosis. (And this is why it is so important to have "Talk-ins" which this volume initiated.) Within the framework of Introductory Questions and Group Discussion, each unit of Living Bible Book 4 encourages self-discovery and increasing understanding of the existential situation of other people. Book 4 makes greater use of the interview which assists this. It refers to the adolescent as part of today's world, as the "Now Generation":

> "In all communities there are at least some adults
> who consider it important to help young people
> assume responsibility in, and give service to,
> some aspect of community, national, or international
> life. There is no reason why you should be
> pampered. Youth initiative should be encouraged.
> You probably have had the experience of finding
> adults standing in the way at times when the way
> should have been cleared." (4, p. 8)

Therefore, the presentation of the fourth volume is explicitly given to the class members in the form of a "do-it-yourself" assignment, "... when the class and not the teacher organises the presentation. ... Now, over to you." (4, p. 11)

The fourth volume contains something new in methodology to help make certain that the class and not the teacher does the organising. It is called a "Talk-in". The student is encouraged not to remain passive:

> "Interrupt the reading time by getting your voice
> be heard. Do not limp apathetically along. Some
> of the units have 'Talk-ins'. Talk-ins are half-way
> between individual replies and group discussion.
> They are informal interruptions when the class
> says, 'Wait, let us examine what we have just
> read.'" (4, p. 10)

Unfortunately, the first "Talk-in" does not appear until the latter

part of the book. But it is used effectively in the interview with

the Marriage Guidance counsellor to help the student examine the state

of a marriage as the interview unfolds. (4, p. 60) It helps the

student almost to role play the part of a counsellor as the interview

proceeds. The "Talk-in" method is used again with each of the six

interviews in the "Count me out" unit (4, pp. 72-76). Here its

purpose is empathy and appraisal. These are characteristics of

PSYC-AUT and PHIL-AUT respectively.

PSYC-AUT vocabulary is to be found in this volume. For example,

> "You are at the age of 'becoming' and the tension
> is aggravated because you have already arrived,
> at least in some ways." (4, p. 9)

But Maslow would have questioned whether one could really "arrive"

in any aspect of self-fulfilment and Erikson would have considered

the adolescent to be too programmed in whatever stage ("age") he is

in to let the "becoming" naturally unfold. Psychology has much more

insight to give to the adolescent's situation. (Psychology, as one

of the humanities, belongs with religion in a humanities department.)

The alternatives of heteronomy and autonomy are existentially

described:

> "You can respond in several ways. You can
> simply count yourself out and tell society to
> 'get lost!' Or you can give in, regress into
> childhood, and expect to be told what to do for
> the rest of your life. Or you can get involved
> in protest against injustice—and take action."
> (4, p. 10)

This statement unknowingly identifies one form of the Child ego state in Berne's P-A-C with heteronomy; and it identifies the liberal social protest, which Tillich's theology insisted must be a part of religion, with autonomy. The initial alternatives are "counting yourself out" and "telling society to 'get lost'!" The "Lifeline" series would respectively call these two responses "Passive" and "Aggressive".

A quotation from a philosopher (Aristotle, p. 16) shows how non-religious interpretations of life should be presented, linking religious education to other fields in the humanities and drawing on ideas beyond the sacred literature of comparative religion. But only one quotation from a philosopher and none other from outwith the Judeo-Christian heritage prejudices the options of autonomous thought. Secularism, however, is well represented and with an international flair: Britain's "mods" and "rockers", Sweden's "Raggare", Holland's "Nozum", Germany's "Halbstarke", Italy's "Vitelloni", and the philosophical ecologists of Holland are acknowledged (see p. 18). And the Group Discussion of unit 1 raises questions phrased for awareness, empathy, and the game of judgment in a more sophisticated and autonomy-enhancing manner (see p. 19).

The units on SHELTER, Enterprise Youth, Marriage Guidance, child psychology, and the World Council of Churches give factual information necessary for informed discussion. PHIL-AUT emphasises reason and reason requires a root of facts. But the fruition of autonomy is self-instigated action. These units were written to encourage participation in the solution-making process of the problems they raise. And solutions should not be mere mental exercises but concrete action. "What would you do if..?" (p. 28) should become "What are you doing because...?" Decision making must not be hypothetical. The extent that one acts on his beliefs is the extent to which his autonomy

is effective. The ultimate is not knowledge of Enterprise Youth, International Voluntary Service, the United Nations' Association Work Camps, and voluntary hospital work (see p. 47). The aim in growth towards autonomy is autonomous action. Autonomous action is what one actually does because of his autonomously held beliefs?

Non-verbal participation and expression of autonomy are shown in posters and "objects of art" (p. 11), writing folk music (p. 34), getting speakers (p. 47), and arranging visits (p. 70). Kant based judgment too much on reason alone. Plato's dialectic depended too much on verbal arguments.

The "Easterhouse" unit uses an interview with a minister to show how he believed that the role of the Church is to encourage people to care and to care especially where the need is the greatest. Religious education and moral education have an overlapping remit.

PSYC-AUT has a responsibility factor. Growth towards maturity is growth towards the assuming of responsibility. The Marriage Guidance counsellor refrained from "giving advice" because his advice could be wrong and because his advice could infringe on the responsibility of the married couple (see p. 59). The immature husband had never had "a healthy rebellion against parents" (p. 59) essential in the weaning process and the independence aspect of autonomy that is shown in responsibility. But his immaturity (PSYC-HET) was linked to rational unpreparedness (PHIL-HET). The unit on the marriage interview is perhaps the most important unit in the Living Bible series. Important because it is concerned with such a vital issue. Important because, although it does not refer to autonomy, it has that as its aim. The fact that the Marriage Guidance Council (unlike the Marriage Advisory Service set up independently by the Roman Catholic Church) is

independent of the Church does not mean that it is not the concern of the Church or of religion in general. Religious education must acknowledge such interests.

The counsellor was a minister; this is not mentioned in the book for it is incidental and in any case such a fact would have been concealed by a counsellor. But a unit which on the surface appears to be concerned with moral and social education rather than religious education is not justified for inclusion in a religious textbook because the interviewer happened to represent the religious community. And yet such a fact might have caused some who wonder what Marriage Guidance has to do with religious education to have been satisfied. Preparation for marriage is a responsibility of the school. For it to be assigned specifically to moral education would be compartmentalised thinking or "misplaced concreteness". The vying for position between religious, social, and moral education is unfortunate, unnecessary, and destructive. They all come under the humanities. What matters most is not "Who does what?" but "Is it done?"

The same holds true of the following unit on "What's the Matter with Kids?" It gives an introduction to child psychology in an existential, practical manner. For Jan and Bill to have "learned their lesson" in a church or from religious thinking would have more clearly justified, for some, the inclusion of this unit in a religious textbook. But that would have violated autonomy by implying that the real answer must be a religious answer. "Jane became pregnant in order to compel her parents to consent to her marriage." (p. 66) This was a real violation of autonomy by any of the definitions being presented. It treated another person (the child) as a means (PHIL-HET). It avoided the search for "ultimate concern" in marriage (THEO-HET). It was the

consequence of the effect of her parents' quarrels (PSYC-HET). The situation did not reveal responsible freedom:

> "He found marriage a humiliating experience and he started going off to the nearest pub to drink and keep big in his eyes." (p. 66)

The situation did not reveal responsible freedom:

> "They were quite unaware of the heavy responsibility of bringing a new person into the world. Jane referred to the baby as 'it'!" (p. 67)

"Count Me Out I Want Something Better" is a unit which went beyond religion to other motivating options. Book 4 begins by branding Jesus of Nazareth as a protestor and rebel. This unit ends by presenting the prophetic element in the Judeo-Christian heritage illustrated by Isaiah as a rebel and protestor against greed, oppression, and corruption. But contemporary, presumably humanist, views are also represented by a pacifist, a hippy, a tramp, a naturalist, a couple of sleep-ins, and an anarchist.

> "This is Frances in real life. 'I'm not a Christian. I'm sceptical about all those archbishops with conflicting views. I don't see the CND having much effect in my lifetime. But.... People get the impression we demonstrators are irresponsible louts.'" (p. 72)

The general approach of the unit is a question, "Must some people come to autonomy through the means of rejecting family, school, church, government, and society?" To encourage autonomy one might need to be anti-establishment or at least not explicitly pro-establishment. The unit attempts to present various views as objectively as possible but with empathy which is the method of subjective-subjectivity. The value judgments are left to the reader through the means of "Talk-ins".

> "Is this going too far? /Is this freedom without responsibility?/" (p. 72)
> "Do you think Harvey's right?" (P. 73)
> "Do you agree with George the Tramp? If so, why? If not, why not?" (p. 74)

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"To what extent are they being fair to
themselves, to each other, to society, and to
their possible children?" (p. 76)
"Where do you stand with Steve?" (p. 76)

In reflection, the writer sees the unit pondering whether autonomy is

the golden mean between responsibility and freedom in the same way as

Tillich interpreted theonomy as the interplay of autonomy and

heteronomy. The freedom aspect of autonomy creates the image of

anti-establishment. The responsibility aspect of autonomy creates

the image of establishment. This unit encourages provocative thought

on the possible dangers of either as an extreme without the other as

a check. Responsibility is too burdensome when it is abstracted

heteronomy. On this Kant and Tillich agreed. But Tillich went on to

believe that freedom is too dangerous when it is abstracted autonomy.

The irresponsible freedom of the sleep-ins was through their

abstracting autonomy away from heteronomy, by Tillich's theory, and

theonomy is their only answer. But when put to the tests of PHIL-AUT

and PSYC-AUT it is the unity of responsibility and freedom which is

the answer. And psychologically, the sleep-ins may have rebelled

against heteronomous pressures. Why do some count themselves out of

society and others count themselves in? Psychology offers special

insight to autonomy, whether defined by theology or philosophy? Many

who appear to count themselves out autonomously really count

themselves out heteronomously. That is, they are really counted out.

The final unit on the World Council of Churches leaves the

reader with a religious taste in his mouth. "Yes, it has been

religious education after all." But with due respect for the

importance of understanding the W.C.C., the ultimate issues also

include those which only obliquely appear religious.

So the Living Bible series prepares the way for further ideas

and acts as a barrier at the same time. For if further work is to aim at growth towards autonomy, preparation for this aim in Living Bible has been a mixture of clarification and confusion, an opening of the way but not without creating certain hurdles. For some parts enhance and other parts violate this aim.

C. A FURTHER PROGRAMME FOR RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

Further programming in religious education should put into effect those qualities of Living Bible which enhance growth towards autonomy and yet avoid the qualities which violate this aim. This will now be applied to a further programme for the final year students.

The Introductory Questions of Living Bible put the decision-making process in the hands of the students from the beginning. Ideally, these initial questions should make the student think about the issues and realise the need for basic factual and existential information. This should create an anticipation of the "Things to Think About" content section. But question begging must be avoided. The questions must not be loaded. This is even more important with older students. It has been shown how the Introduction in each volume of Living Bible encourages students to give their initial reactions freely to these questions and yet the appraisal of many of the questions has shown how insidious heteronomy could result by the questions presupposing a particular type of answer. The content part of the format should be kept on the same conditions. The content must present "factual" information but show how different interpretations can lead to different conclusions. The various schools of philosophy, theology, psychology and sociology give different insights into "hard data" and sometimes reject the data. For example, it may be a fact that a

particular man refused to give money to Christian Aid (see Book 3, unit 9), but in his circumstances he may have been justified in so doing. The content sections should go beyond a black and white dichotomy in value judgments to insights into the shades of grey which compose the spectrum of the moral interpretation of data. This does not necessarily endorse relativism. It does ensure that judgment-making is done with as much empathy as possible. PHIL-AUT must be amended by encouraging the PSYC-AUT insights of awareness, identification, and genuine caring in relationships. The Group Discussion and Verdict sections at the close of each unit should also be kept. But the dangers of black and white judgment making should be avoided. Greater use should be made of "Talk-ins" in order that opinions or interpretations of hard data not be given categorically as facts. "Talk-ins" are

> "... half-way between individual replies and group
> discussion. They are informal interruptions when
> the class says, 'Wait, let us examine what we have
> just read.'" (4, p. 10)

In Book 4 this method was introduced but only given limited use in two units, in the one for the purpose of role play identification and in the other for the purposes of empathy and appraisal. Further programmes of religious education should use them for other purposes as well, such as awareness ("What's going on here?") and the game of judgment ("Do you think this was the right choice?"). But the "Talk-in" should lead towards encouraging the student to form the specific question himself.

The content of further programmes should give information which provides data on which a responsibly free life can be based. This means that it should deal with the issues which are vital to this age group. Living Bible 1-4 was written for 12-15 year olds. They have

been used by lower stream students as well as the more academic
students preparing for certificate examinations. Programmes beyond
this age group can be for the student of above average mental ability
since at this age only those wanting leaving certificates will be
involved. This means that the subtleties and effects of beliefs and
viewpoints can be more critically exposed. Furthermore, the issues at
stake are likely to have abstract factors in the reasoning process.
Kant emphasised the rational base of autonomy. He developed the
categorical imperative as a practical set of maxims from pure reason.
Further programmes in religious education should help the student
develop his own set of maxims on which to base his beliefs and see
the implications of his beliefs in evaluation and action. Ultimately,
pure reason must be existential, as Tillich believed.

But man is irrational as well as rational. He lives by emotion
as well as reason. Therefore the rational data of PHIL-AUT should be
balanced by insight into the PSYC-AUT factors which take into account
the irrational, emotional aspect of man's nature. Man does not act
by reason alone. Psychology offers data which is vitally important
if the individual is to be helped towards the freedom ingredient of
autonomy. Therefore the ideas of Erikson, Maslow, Rogers and others
concerned with motivation should be examined. The research of this
thesis has uncovered ideas which should be presented directly to the
students. If growth towards autonomy is to be the aim of religious
education, the older students should be taken through the discovery
process of the facets and implications of autonomy by studying those
who have wrestled with its concept. For example, as this thesis has
examined the importance of Rogers' ideas and applied them to the
teacher's role, so a programme for older youth could take Rogers' ideas

and let the student encounter them directly.

Living Bible Books 1-4 dealt with the concerns appropriate to the particular age groups. By 16, the adolescent is at an age to be treated as a person with adult concerns. These concerns are found in the various branches of the humanities: such as Philosophy, theology, psychology, and sociology. The student should be introduced to comparative studies in these fields to show the scope, contradictions, and perceptions they offer internally and in relationship. The student should be given the lie of the land and the opportunity to proceed in depth in any specific areas he chooses. Each field of the humanities has its own internal conflicting theories. In relationship, the different fields have many permutations of conflict. The student should encounter some of these directly. This is essential if there is to be a solid rational base to responsible freedom and the growth towards autonomy.

> "How do we decide the right thing to do? ...
> If our guide is reason, we need some principles
> to help us." (2, p. 82)

It has been mentioned in the comment on this quotation how this implies a PHIL-AUT quest for categorical imperative type answer and how a PHIL-HET passive acceptance of external biblical authority is criticised. Books 1 and 2 tried to avoid making the Bible hermeneutically a heteronomous imposition. The future programmes of religious education must be in a direction that avoids making religion itself a heteronomous imposition as Kant believed it need not be. This means that the new direction of religious education should move from the biblical emphasis of Living Bible 1 and 2 and from the life themes of Books 3 and 4 to a search for principles on which to base beliefs and behaviour.

Book 3 introduced indirectly the categorical imperative in looking at family relationships (units 1 and 2) and job selection (unit 3). Throughout Books 3 and 4, autonomy and heteronomy are brought indirectly to bear on decision making. (See, for example, 3, p. 44: "Unless we decide how to spend money, others will decide for us.") Future programming should help the student to examine directly the principles of autonomy in conflict with heteronomy, and then how to decide in what way either of these principles should provide a foundation for living. For if inflicted, the aim of growth towards autonomy becomes itself a form of insidious heteronomy.

Autonomy as an aim in religious education means that ultimately the programme must be developed through the humanities. The format of this thesis offers an outline (from PHIL-AUT to THEO-AUT and PSYO-AUT) for such a programme; and the content of this thesis offers guidelines in resource material for such programming.

As with this thesis, future programming in religious education could begin with a consideration of Plato's dialectic as a method for using the rational ideas of different people to arrive at a synthesis in value judgments. Then Kant's theory simply and openly presented with Talk-ins providing the students opportunity to evaluate critically their ideas. The views of other philosophers and the literary equivalent of their ideas in novels, poetry, biography, and drama should be included. A variety of philosophical ideas could be proposed, but they must be made existentially relevant. History could afford illustrations for games of judgment to decide whether, when put to the test, certain philosophical principles really make the individual and society more autonomous, and, if so, whether this is valuable. The dialectical materialism of Marx and the Beatitudes

of Jesus could be among many illustrations. It has been mentioned how religious education is not Christian education but must include the options of comparative religion. So, too, must philosophy be considered comparatively with an attempt to give the student an introduction to philosophy. Plato's dialectic as a method for using the rational ideas of different people to arrive at a synthesis in value judgments should be explained.

The next section should bring theology to bear on philosophy. Tillich's theory of theonomy could be introduced as a Christian depth to autonomy in a different relationship from heteronomy than that of Kant's. But other options within Christian theology and beyond, into comparative religion, must be included. A brief outline of the history of religion and its effect on societies could be presented, again with Talk-ins. And again, the appropriate literary illustrations could be quoted. Discussion on the value or relevance of superimposing the religion of one culture on an alien culture should be examined. For example, Alistair Cook, in America, told how an Indian refused to be converted to Christianity by a persecuting Spaniard and how, as he was being burned at the stake he refused his last offer of liberation through baptism by saying that he did not want to "go to heaven and meet there only Christians" (p. 36). Does Eastern mysticism have anything to offer Western Civilisation today? Are there any bad side effects to mysticism in Western society? Why do people believe what they believe? A quotation from William James' Varieties of Religious Experience could be useful. In what ways is religion used to justify and protect the status quo? In what ways is it used to change society? How does one decide whether religious rationalisation or religious protest is good? How does religion come

from or effect the unconscious? Victor White's God and the Unconscious
could be selectively quoted.

This could develop into a section on psychology. It is not
simply that PSYC-AUT adds dimensions to autonomy omitted by PHIL-AUT
and THEO-AUT. Psychology itself raises the question, "Is man merely
a rational being?" Adolescent psychology, as presented in this thesis,
has considered the character and personality of the student and has
raised questions concerning his matrix as a human being. Erikson and
Maslow offered interpretations of motivation and autonomy. These
should be examined with allowances for other psychological schools of
thought, including that of Eric Berne. Once again existential
situations from literature, history, and contemporary events can show
how philosophical value judgments that are made without psychological
awareness and the consideration of religious answers, can be
inadequate or even inaccurate. This adds an essential, new dimension
to the data on which value judgments are made. Conversely, apparently
illogical behaviour which cannot be explained purely in rational
terms can be more clearly understood with the help of psychology. At
this point, the autonomic characteric goals of Rogers could be
presented with Talk-in appraisal.

Such a programme for older youth would be organised by the
students themselves. Awareness in verbal and non-verbal communication
of the interpersonal relationships within the class must be sought
along with other responsibilities that are normally assigned to the
teacher. Social psychology should be studied together with group
dynamics to consider ways in which there can be autonomic growth within
the class and society, as well as the individual. To assist this in
practical methodology, the further discussion methods and techniques

appendixed to this thesis could be introduced as ways in which further areas of ultimate concern could be examined.

Each student should be encouraged to decide tentatively what his perspective is on life and how he intends to incorporate it into his personal life style, relationships, and commitments.

In this way, a programme for older youth could assist with the development of responsible freedom, and go beyond mere concern for self-realisation to concern for the realisation of human potential beyond the individual.

Such a programme would cover the humanities, it would truly aim at autonomy, it would help the older adolescent to discover and be more aware of what it means to be responsibly free.

SECTION FIVE:

S U M M A R Y   A N D   C O N C L U S I O N S   O F   T H E   T H E S I S

INTRODUCTION TO THE CONCLUSION

The purpose of this thesis has been "to examine selectively

> (1) the meaning and method of autonomy from
> the three perspectives of philosophy, theology,
> and psychology;

> (2) the nature of adolescence and the role of
> the "teacher";

> (3) the role of religious education in state
> schools if autonomy is to be a primary aim;

> (4) the content and methodology of a particular
> syllabus so that autonomy as an aim of religious
> education can be put to the test in a practical way;

> (5) the meaning, method, value, and
> implications of autonomy as a primary aim of
> religious education in these schools."

The method of this thesis has been to create five sections to correspond to the five purposes stated above. The first three sections have been necessarily selective. Their relationship required the making of certain cross references. The fourth section has been a concrete examination of a practical application of autonomy. And this fifth section is the conclusion.

The selectivity has made it possible to give serious consideration to certain views for the purpose of depth, while at the same time attempting to cover enough ground on which to appraise autonomy adequately in the specific area of state school religious education.

SECTION ONE: THE MEANING AND METHOD OF AUTONOMY was selective in the perspectives chosen (philosophy, theology, and psychology) as well as in the theories representing these perspectives.

The philosophical theories chosen have been (A) Kant in the

meaning because of his claim that the only valid maxims are autonomous (his development of the categorical imperative), and (B) Plato in methodology because of the dialectical process (his use of the "midwife" metaphor) with its underlying assumption of the individual making his own decisions. For this thesis, although Kant's basic contribution was in meaning, he assumed a certain methodology; and although Plato's basic contribution was in methodology, he assumed a certain meaning of what could be called "autonomy".

The meaning behind Plato's use of the dialectical process was his underlying assumption of self-decision. The method of Kant's development of the meaning of his maxims was through "pure practical reason". His suggested method of using these maxims was through drawing verdicts by "games of judgment". The dialectic as a possible experience of self-decision is an aid to the method of education towards autonomy. The categorical imperative is one possible approach to an understanding of the philosophical definition of autonomy. The writings of both Kant and Plato combine the theory and practice of what they taught and to this end they can be so aptly applied to religious education.

The theological theory chosen was Tillich. It could have been others in place of or alongside him, but he is the one who most clearly confronted the horns of the dilemma arising out of any application of autonomy to religious education in state schools. The dilemma is the conflict between the self imposing its own law (autonomy) and the self accepting the law of God (theonomy), a dilemma which Tillich believed could be resolved through the "new being in Christ". This he did by rejecting autonomy as the aim of religious education. But as this thesis has sought to elucidate, his use of "religious

education" can only be interpreted as "Christian education" and to
narrow the definition of religious education as much as this is to
close possible dimensions which legitimately should be explored in
any quest for autonomy in state schools. According to Tillich
autonomy (abstracted from its correlation with heteronomy in theonomy)
implies freedom without responsibility. But it has been the argument
of this thesis that autonomy can mean responsible freedom apart from
a Christian theological definition. It is concluded that the dilemma
arising out of the application of autonomy to religious education in
state schools can be avoided only by rejecting Tillich's definition
of "autonomy" or his definition of "religious education", or by
rejecting both.

If it is assumed that autonomy is a primary aim in the state's
educational process, then it must be an aim in any and every aspect
of that process. (This is why, even though religious education was
the concern of this thesis in the application of autonomy, the
surrounding experiences of the adolescent within the school - such
as other subjects and the assemblies - had to be briefly considered
and new subjects had to be more seriously considered such as philosophy,
psychology and social psychology.) Of further value to the presentation
of autonomy was the grounding of Tillich's theology in ontology. This
offered a transitional link between the philosophical and psychological
definitions of autonomy.

The psychological perspectives that were selected define autonomy
in the terms of a goal (Maslow) and a rudiment in childhood (Erikson).
The meaning and method of autonomy was developed for application to a
specific area of education.

Therefore, in SECTION TWO: THE NATURE OF ADOLESCENCE AND THE ROLE

OF THE "TEACHER", adolescent character and personality was surveyed in anticipation of a "child-centred" approach to religious education. Rogers' use of autonomy was included as presenting characteristic goals in the role of the "teacher". (As explained, quotation marks have been used when "teacher" has been given the new meaning of "midwife".) Group dynamics and social psychology have been examined for the aids they offer to the "teacher" as methods for developing autonomy through interpersonal relationships, in, for example, sociometry (Cole and Hall) and "game"-free "Adult"-controlled "transactions" (Berne).

SECTION THREE: THE IMPLICATIONS OF AUTONOMY AS AN AIM OF RELIGIOUS EDUCATION IN SECONDARY SCHOOLS was also selective in its application. The Secondary schools referred to were the state schools in England and Scotland. The situation under the 1944/45 Education Acts was presented with the reactions of Goldman, Acland, Loukes, Smart, and McPhail (et al.). Then certain problems and premises of religious education arising out of the Parliamentary Acts were considered. The problems selected included the role of religious education, the problem of language, the relationship between religious and moral education, the roles of school and church, interpreting Scripture, and the place of humanism and Christianity.

SECTION FOUR: DEVELOPING A SYLLABUS THAT AIMS TOWARDS AUTONOMY examined Living Bible. It compared the content of this syllabus with Havighurst and Taba, Cole, and Loukes — with references to others including Maslow, Erikson, and Rogers — and then outlined the content with comment on the biblical quotations. The methodology of Living Bible was examined through the three parts in the structure of each unit: "Introductory Questions", "Things to Think About", and "Group

Discussion" with "Verdict". A critical appraisal then was made in terms of autonomy, and a further programme was proposed in a way that sought to avoid heteronomy.

In this final section, SECTION FIVE: CONCLUSIONS OF THE THESIS, the research is correlated under the headings of (I) the meaning, (II) the method, (III) the value, and (IV) the implications of autonomy as an aim in religious education in state Secondary schools in England and Scotland. (All quotations in this final section have been footnoted previously in the thesis.)

I. THE MEANING OF AUTONOMY (anticipating its use as a primary aim
in religious education in state Secondary schools)

Autonomy as a general term has been used in this thesis to mean
freedom from external rule, independence from external control, and
isolation which makes one a person unto oneself. But it also includes
responsibility for a life style that is considerate of others, with
the marks of fairness, empathy, acceptance and other qualities which
mean that one does not gain at the expense of others nor does one
ignore the needs of others. Therefore, the autonomous person is a
free agent acting on his own authority and with his own responsibility.
The extent to which a person has responsible freedom is the extent to
which he is autonomous.

But a more technical definition is required if autonomy's
methodology, value, and implications for religious education are to
be examined. The three perspectives selectively examined have given
the terms (1) PHIL-AUT, (2) THEO-AUT, and (3) PSYC-AUT.

1. PHIL-AUT

Kant related the two basic qualities of autonomy, responsibility
and freedom. PHIL-AUT is (1) the will having the property of being a
law unto itself, independent of "determination by alien causes", and
(2) the will having the property of responsibility in "the making of
universal law". PHIL-AUT defines freedom from external rule as being
through reason: "to will rationally is to be consistent with
universality". To universalise is to treat others with the same
respect as one treats oneself. Through reason, the categorical
imperative implies a considerate life style. But desire can thwart
this process. Reason can indulge in sophistry "to rationalise
behaviour out from under the sometimes harsh demands of duty". Kant

only identified the problem which has been examined theologically
and psychologically. Tillich called this rationalisation "reason
without depth", and Berne called it "blocking off the nurturing Parent
or natural Child".

There is yet another danger which Kant did not identify. Besides
being mere rationalisation, "reason" can also be an unconscious
external voice. The "harsh demands of duty" can be themselves the
"voice of one's grandmother", which Berne identified as the Adult
contaminated by the Parent ego state. Without the psychological
quality of self-awareness, what one believes to be autonomy is really
heteronomy, the unaware playing of a "critical Parent" tape or an
"adapted Child" tape. Responsible freedom, then, is reason with
depth and awareness. But the autonomous person is not the one who
merely makes universal maxims but the one who acts upon them.

2. THEO-AUT

Tillich's criticism of kerygmatic theology and its corresponding
apologetics must be accepted as valid. Kerygma demands a heteronomous,
passive acceptance because it claims ultimate truth and does not
submit to the dialectical process. Thus kerygma denies the possible
validity of any alternative view of truth. Tillich's existential
approach to philosophy and theology was expressed in terms such as
growth and process. He believed that the theologian must truly feel
free, must truly move towards greater freedom in reformulating his
answer through the encounter of new experience. This freedom is
necessary for autonomy.

Tillich rejected Kant's use of autonomy, "the freedom of the
individual to be a law unto himself", as being epistemologically
idealist and ethically formalist. But neither PHIL-AUT nor THEO-AUT

is that. Rather, both imply "obedience of the individual to the law of reason" found within oneself as a rational being. Indeed, Tillich credited Kant as "enlarging the concept of reason beyond its cognitive-technical sense" towards what Tillich called "ontological reason".

Nevertheless, PHIL-AUT created a conflict and a dichotomy between autonomy and heteronomy. Tillich believed that this conflict only arises when they are separated from their depth. In such a case autonomy is powerless. This criticism has been accepted as being valid. This is why motivation and PSYC-AUT are so important. But Tillich was too definitive in expounding autonomous reason as united with its own depth. For he went on to define this "theonomy" as the "new being in Christ". PHIL-AUT is too "empty", but THEO-AUT is too precise. Both PHIL-AUT and THEO-AUT reflect weaknesses in each other. PHIL-AUT claims to be responsible, but the rational base for self-decision is instead always too shallow. No one has perfect knowledge or awareness and therefore there is always the need for seeking the opinions of more knowledgeable individuals and sometimes submitting (autonomously) to their authority. THEO-AUT in its unconflicting relationship with THEO-AUT (through depth of reason) can encourage such submission too uncritically. But reason in depth must encourage the willingness to accept that which unites and makes possible reconciliation in human relationships. Tillich believed that the Christian message is this reason in depth. However, the obverse is not true, for reason in depth can be given other philosophical or religious interpretations. (The material equivalence of "the Christian message" and "reason in depth" would be rejected by a humanist.) Tillich rightfully believed that "Christianity, without

being final itself, witnesses to the final revelation". For a finite being or theory to claim ultimate authority, even in the name of the infinite, reflects heteronomy.

PHIL-HET and PHIL-AUT are in inverse correlation in the same way as are determinism and freedom. As the one increases the other decreases. But THEO-HET and THEO-AUT are not in this relationship; rather they are bound together in the depth of theonomy.

To be a person, Tillich believed, is "to be rooted in the creative ground of the divine life and to actualise one's self through freedom". But apart from its depth, he believed that autonomy affirms one's fears and desires without real self-knowledge and without real concern for others. He believed that creative love is through the self entering the relationship from both sides. Kant included this empathy and justice in his concept of the categorical imperative.

Tillich's ontology linked self-affirmation with participation. He sought to avoid individualism (autonomy without depth) and collectivism (heteronomy without depth). "The courage to be as oneself" emphasises the freedom aspect of autonomy. "The courage to be as a part" (of a group) emphasises the responsibility aspect of autonomy. Each is a corrective for the other.

3. PSYC-AUT

PSYC-AUT means not only the individual's direction by maxims of his own decision, but also his growing towards maturity in personality and character. In one's state of becoming, one partly is and one partly is not what one is to become, in the sense of Erikson's stages of human growth. One is not what one is to become, in the sense of Maslow's interpretation of autonomy as a goal in self-realisation.

The psychological perspective interprets "making self-imposed decisions" as "becoming a self-fulfilled person". PSYC-AUT is a process of becoming free from being helplessly determined by others and being free for developing one's own potentialities. Maslow's view of PSYC-AUT implied that autonomy develops from heteronomy. The higher needs of metamotivation are determined by the gratification of previous, more basic needs by other people. This is a very different concept from PHIL-AUT where autonomy and heteronomy are in antithesis. And this is a very different concept from THEO-AUT which presented autonomy and heteronomy as offering checks on the "misplaced concreteness" (Whitehead) of freedom and responsibility. For Maslow, the autonomous person is self-determined rather than environmentally-determined. This is psychological freedom. PSYC-AUT, unlike PHIL-AUT and THEO-AUT, places caring as a by-product of mental health.

Metamotivation is growth-motivation rather than deficiency-motivation. The former is internally controlled, the latter externally. PSYC-AUT in its purest sense is self-motivation. PSYC-AUT concerns "being, growing, becoming, fulfilment, and self-motivated action". PSYC-HET concerns "doing, coping, achieving, striving, and motivated action". This does not mean that PSYC-AUT is passive, meditative uninvolvement. It does mean that it is free from striving-to-make-up-deficiencies and free for growing-towards-fulfilment. PSYC-AUT means breaking from heteronomously induced habits, views, and actions, and either changing them or, if they are still valuable, making them one's own.

But PSYC-AUT is not only a goal in maturity. It is also a rudiment in childhood. Erikson placed autonomy in the second of his eight ages

of man. Adolescence is "the age for autonomy" in the sense that it is the age between autonomy as a mature goal in adulthood (Maslow) and a preliminary quality in childhood (Erikson). The fruition of autonomy in human development hopefully comes through "initiative", "industry", "identity", "intimacy", "generativity", and "ego identity". Erikson's goal was "belief in the species" and the elevation of "ultimate concerns" (a humanistic parallel to Tillich's "ground of being" and "theonomy").

Erikson's eight stages can be seeds of basic virtues in psychologically mature growth. The first is "hope" out of the first age of trust. The second is "willpower" out of the second age of autonomy. From these, if positively developed, come "purpose", "competence", "fidelity", "love", "care", and "wisdom". But each stage can either increase the development of maturation or stunt personality growth. Autonomy is a necessary factor in the adolescent's age for "identity". But adolescence, as the age between childhood and adulthood, must combine the best rudiments of one and the best aims of the other. It has been shown how the qualities of Maslow's "self-realisation" and Erikson's "ego identity" correlate. They were looking at the same tree, only Maslow focused his attention on the leaves and Erikson focused his on the trunk.

Autonomy has also been defined in terms of "acceptance", "empathy", "freedom", and "genuineness" together as autonomic characteristic goals (Rogers). A provisional list of seven sources of interpersonal behaviour in autonomy has also been given: "non-social drives which produce social behaviour", "dependency", "affiliation", "dominance", "sex", "aggression", and "self-esteem and ego identity" (Argyle). And these have been related to Maslow, Erikson, and Rogers.

Eric Berne emphasised that autonomy was "manifested by the release or recovery of three capacities: awareness, spontaneity and intimacy". He shared Maslow's concern for emotional deprivation, but focused his views on the importance of giving "strokes" - and "implying recognition of another's presence" - and developing appropriate verbal and non-verbal "transactions" which are, by Berne's definition, "exchanges of strokes". He acknowledged Erikson's view when he wrote that "Liberation...is only possible at all because the individual starts off in an autonomous state". The Adult ego state, if uncontaminated by the Parent or Child ego states, is in a position to make an objective appraisal of reality and react in a responsible manner. Any transaction with concealed motivation, a mixture of the need for "strokes" and the need to avoid intimacy, inhibits autonomy. "I'm OK—You're OK" (Harris) is the attitude of the autonomous Adult accepting himself and others. He neither blames others for his faults (projection) nor credits himself with their accomplishments (introjection). It is the only position that offers the possibility of autonomy because it alone is based upon a self-imposed, conscious decision. It is the stage of the emancipated Adult. Autonomy is the goal of transactional analysis, to liberate the Adult so that the person has freedom to choose and freedom to change. Otherwise, the person heteronomously replays the old tapes of the "critical Parent" or "adapted Child". The source of responsibility in PSYC-AUT is through the Adult universalising his autonomy, recognising that his acceptance of himself means his acceptance of others, and that he is "born to win" (James and Jongeward) but not at the expense of others. Psychologically, the direction of autonomy is from dependence (heteronomy), through independence (freedom), to interdependence (responsible freedom).

Autonomy as responsible freedom requires rational and socio-emotional maturity.

II. THE METHOD OF AUTONOMY (anticipating its use as a primary aim
        in religious education in state Secondary schools)

The methods of autonomy that have been presented are basically
(1) dialogue and games of judgment to which have been added
theological and psychological dimensions and (2) the method of
Living Bible.

  1. Dialogue and Games of judgment

Plato's Dialogues portray the "Father of Philosophy" using
dialogue as the method for helping people work through their beliefs.
The Socratic method is to work through thesis and antithesis to
synthesis. The method is dialogue with the "midwife" as the
facilitator in decision making and not as the one who actually makes
the decisions.

Kant endorsed this method when in one of his statements of the
categorical imperative he wrote that one should act as if one is a
member of "a possible kingdom of ends". By "kingdom" Kant meant the
systematic bringing together of various rational beings through the
medium of universal laws. The universality of his imperative, the
treating of others as ends and not as means, implies that the method
of growth towards autonomy must be a method that enhances responsibility
which includes caring for others, and consideration of their points of
view. External discipline must give way to dialogue or rational
arguing, the playing of "games of judgment", by the students
considering illustrations of praiseworthy and blameworthy actions and
drawing their own verdicts. Indoctrination (manipulating beliefs) is
the method of heteronomy.

To avoid this, the role of the "teacher" in a religious education
classroom is to make certain that the synthesis (verdict) is made by

the class itself. He assumes the role of Socrates, that of "midwife" in assisting the class members to play their own Kantian "games of judgment".

Tillich added an existential dimension to the method of dialogue and judgment. He sought to avoid indoctrination by his criticism of kerygmatic theology and its accompanying apologetics. Such apologetics is manipulative, it claims that it holds the complete answer. It blocks the road to open inquiry so essential to dialogue. The ontology behind Tillich's existential theology highlights "the courage to be oneself" and "the courage to be as a part" (of a group). The person who is obedient to his own commanding (through freedom) must also risk himself (through responsibility). One's freedom is developed through making deliberate decisions that lead to self-discovery. One's responsibility is developed through participation that leads to group awareness. One is a part of that from which one is also, at the same time, separate. To be submissive or to encourage submissiveness is to discourage the development of autonomy. But "the courage to be" is interdependent on "the courage to be as a part".

Group discussion that promotes self-affirmation and other-awareness without dogmatism and with open inquiry is the method of autonomy. The goal of discussion is not to win the argument but to move towards a further discovery of the truth. With its existential dimensions discussion has an openness which unites being with being in non-verbal as well as verbal communication. Subject-object (I-it) relationships then become subject-subject (I-Thou) relationships (Buber). To go beyond conclusions to existential insights is to move towards "the transcendent unity" (Tillich). Autonomously held belief which is self-righteous is autonomy without depth. An individual with such an

attitude is in a subject-object (I-it) relationship with others.
Self-expression is important. The search for autonomy includes the
search for identity. In the emphasis on "identity" (Erikson), the
"midwife" tries to find a role that lies between passive observation
and dominant imposition.

Basic needs (Maslow) must be met if autonomy is to develop within
oneself or in others. The meeting of these needs is the psychological
method of growth towards autonomy. The "midwife", in his freedom,
accepts responsibility for helping others to move from heteronomy to
autonomy by helping to meet their lower need gratification. But to
avoid their dependence upon him, these needs are met unconditionally,
with no ulterior motive. They are not offered as rewards for "right"
answers.

The "teacher", as a resource person, should be as informed as
possible on the facts of the matter under consideration. He can assist
with true or false statements concerned with fact; but when it comes to
statements concerned with belief, he must take care lest he manipulate.

The "teacher" as an observer, shows "acceptance" (Rogers) of the
group and of the individuals. He takes care when he feels he has
valid answers to questions and issues. If he is too eager to give
these, inquiry is stifled and the adolescent is discouraged from
developing a flexible adaptive position to his beliefs and to the
changing social and moral situation he is currently encountering and
will be encountering in the future. For the day will come when the
teacher, even as "midwife", will no longer be available to assist
with "games of judgment".

Sociometry, the science of analysing interpersonal relationships,
can be helpful to the teacher in devising groups that bring about the

best participation and accomplishments of growth towards autonomy.
This requires that each adolescent has the opportunity to experience
the weight of responsibility that group leadership offers. Such
leadership should aim at developing task fulfilment and socio-emotional
development.

VC diagrams can help the "teacher" to be aware of the verbal
aspect of group dynamics. One of the ground rules for a good
discussion is that it should be well balanced, otherwise those who
dominate keep the rest from having a sense of belonging. The meeting
of this "need to belong" (Maslow) is essential in growth towards
autonomy. All should be involved in the "game of judgment" (Kent).
The wheel and the circle both have value. The wheel may be best for
task accomplishment and it offers the leader the feeling of the weight
of responsibility. But it blocks the road towards higher stages of
autonomy for most members of the group because it focuses responsibility
on the hub rather than on the rim. The circle, therefore, is best for
socio-emotional benefits for it encourages balanced participation by
all.

The experience of belonging comes through receiving "strokes"
(Berne). Discovering how to give and receive "strokes" honestly is
essential to belonging, integrity, and acceptance. Empathy is essential
if criticism is not to have devastating results; genuineness must
sometimes be tempered by tact. This is all part of developing autonomy
as a considerate style of life. The ability to understand
transactional analysis can assist the adolescent to make, autonomously,
an "objective appraisal of reality". Berne believed that the capacity
to understand P-A-C structure could help activate the Adult ego state.
This has been accepted and, therefore, the method of growth towards

autonomy must include an ability to be able to identify the types of VC and NVC transactions being made. The development of genuineness in autonomy is enhanced by the ability to understand the concealed motivation, basic dishonesty, and dramatic outcome of "game" transactions. Such "games" are a blight on autonomy. The way to avoid them is for one's Adult to become more aware of one's own Parent and Child. The greater this awareness is the freer one is to grow towards autonomy. Without this awareness the Adult can be contaminated by unexamined data rather than being able to "play" purposefully his nurturing Parent and natural Child "tapes" through his Adult in initiating the stimulus and response to transactions.

The experience of applying judgments to feelings and to social relationships through P-A-C appraisal is a concrete, situational method in autonomy. It is comparable in methodology to the "What would you do?" type of question in "Lifeline" (for moral education). It is comparable in methodology to Living Bible Discussion Questions and Verdicts (in religious education).

"Lifeline" itself claimed to offer "a method which not only helps Secondary school children to find and implement answers to their difficulties, but which does so while at the same time preserving their autonomy." The method is through what Tillich called "courageous participation in the situation". In method this means to keep to the concrete and to move from the simple to the complex with Piagetian concern for age appropriateness. This is the method of teaching empathy. The school should offer exercises in feeling as well as in reasoning. The method of "Lifeline" differs from that of Living Bible by encouraging teacher participation and avoiding tentative group verdicts. But the teacher can so dominate that autonomy is blocked.

To avoid tentative Group Discussion Verdicts is to make "games of judgment" (Kant) without assisting "the courage to be as a part" (Tillich).

2. The method of Living Bible

The method of Living Bible as explained in the Introduction to each volume, emphasises the dialectic as a process. Introductory Questions to each unit encourage genuineness ("Every answer is acceptable if it honestly voices your opinion") and openness ("The purpose... is to help you open your mind"). Specific questions aim towards empathy ("What is it like to be old?"). But the emphasis is upon responsible freedom. The students are encouraged by "games of judgment" in autonomous belief, opinion, and attitude. "What do you think?" (reason) and "How do you feel?" (emotion) are the basic categories.

In Group Discussion, Living Bible offers further "games of judgment", but this time not in terms of initial reaction but in terms of reflection on the content which has been read. There are examples of examining what Rogers called "congruence" ("'... pretending to be something you are not,' can you give examples ... from your own experience of other people or in your own life?"). There are examples of identifying heteronomy ("Do you think you sometimes forget your independent judgment? Give examples."). The leader is chosen to assure that certain ground rules of discussion are maintained, to respect each idea as it is given (allowing the group to reach its own conclusion whether or not he agrees with it), and to report back to the class. The emphasis here is upon "acceptance" (Rogers). The leader is encouraged to lead the discussion without leading the group, thereby remaining as passive as possible. Otherwise, he would take

on the same false role as a domineering teacher. He is part of a
circle, not the hub of a wheel.

Each unit attempts to work from freedom to responsible freedom,
from independency (one's own opinion) to interdependency (Group
Verdict). The value of open, group discussion is that it encourages
the class members to react to material they have studied, enhancing
the possibility of their "games of judgment" being based on reason.
But encouragement is given to accept the verdicts as tentative:
("Later on, with new knowledge and new experiences, you should be
prepared to change your conclusions.")

The ultimate purpose of each unit is to help the adolescent
develop his own beliefs, to see the implications of these beliefs in
real life situations, and to act on these beliefs while at the same
time showing tolerance and understanding of the beliefs of others.

Variations on the method of Living Bible are included in the
appendix. But the main criticism of the books in this thesis has not
been on their method but on their content. Critical appraisal of
Living Bible has shown how numerous questions were "loaded" and how
the content ("Things to Think About") in the centre of each unit has
not considered all the possible options. It has been shown how both
of these can subject students to insidious heteronomy. In fairness,
however, it must be stated that no book has the space nor any class
the time to consider all the options. These practical limitations are
unavoidable. Therefore, it has also been shown how a further
programme in religious education can, with the general methodology
of Living Bible, at least increase the number of options.

The possibility of a more comprehensive list of options is
strengthened by religious education, within a humanities department,

being in correlation with options that are non-religious. Within and outwith the religious education classroom, non-religious views should be offered as antitheses, together with a variety of religious ones, as making possible real dialogue. This is the concern of the final part of this conclusion: "IMPLICATIONS". Penultimately it is now necessary to examine the "VALUE" of autonomy as a primary aim in religious education.

III. THE VALUE OF AUTONOMY AS AN AIM IN RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

Before arriving at this point in the conclusion, it has been necessary to define autonomy summarily, and to explain its method through the research that has been made. The purpose of this thesis has been to show why autonomy must be taken seriously as an aim in religious education. Justification can now be made as to the meaning and method of autonomy offering a basic principle and theory on which religious education should be "taught" in state Secondary schools.

The value of autonomy lies in its inter-related but essential applications to (1) education, (2) reason, (3) ontology, (4) emotion, and (5) open-endedness.

1. Education

Autonomy takes seriously religious education as a part of the educational process. The question has been asked, "Education for what?" It has been shown how in 1943 Churchill wanted educational reform to incorporate Disraeli's view that "a nation rules either by force or tradition". That night at Chequers, in response to Butler's notes on religious education, Churchill "began to expatiate on the subject of freedom of conscience, toleration, consideration of the other man's point of view, and the kindly character of the country—into which pattern the schools must fit themselves." Butler's reflections on what happened over the next quarter of a century included: "Most important of all, in the long run, the uninspired nature of the religious instruction provided in all too many /state schools/ had begun...to imperil the Christian basis of society". He believed that it was in terms of the weakening of this Christian basis of society that the question must be asked whether "the agreed syllabuses...are really good enough for the adolescents".

This should be interpreted as a severe contrast of conflicting ideas. The value of education (including its religious portion) in state schools intended by Churchill was for the maintenance of the tradition of freedom, toleration, and consideration. (And all of these have been included in the definition of autonomy.) But for Butler who promoted the 1944 Act it was not an open-ended quest but a packaged tradition which, from the definition of autonomy, would imply heteronomous indoctrination.

Autonomy as connoted by "responsible freedom" and with the technical PHIL-THEO-PSYC perspectives of meaning has value, in general, in a critical examination of the purpose of education and, in particular, in an exploration of that part of education which is religious education. The importance of taking autonomy seriously as an aim is that it reveals the dangers of education for adjustment to a tradition which, by its very nature of violating autonomy, is not interpreted as being basically freedom, toleration, and consideration. Further it reveals the dangers of any form of indoctrination (rather than exposure) of the student into the beliefs of society whatever they are interpreted to be. Autonomy is essential in a changing society as well as in a society needing change. If the purpose of education is exposure and not indoctrination, that exposure becomes indoctrination insofar as it violates autonomy. To violate PHIL-AUT means to treat other people as means and not as ends. This denies their freedom, treats them with intolerance, manipulates them, and rejects consideration of their point of view. To violate THEO-AUT is to use autonomy without its depth of reason (in theonomy) and breadth of responsibility in THEO-HET. To violate PSYC-AUT is to avoid acceptance, empathy, and identification: evasions which lead to

intolerance, manipulation, and inconsideration. The right criterion
must be selected for re-examining the aim of religious education.
The Butler Act was a reforming Act. Now the Act must be reconsidered,
and the meaning and method of autonomy as an educational aim must be
brought to bear upon it, not least in whatever new religious education
clauses are formulated.

What autonomy does as a general educational aim and as an aim
specifically in religious education is make education open-ended.
Only then is the aim of rule by tradition kept from becoming education
for adjustment. If autonomy as an aim of education in general is
violated, then the student is indoctrinated into a particular kind of
life style. This is "Adult-contamination" (Berne) by the critical
corporate "Parent"-society. This is what autonomy as responsible
freedom seeks to avoid. Of course state education should not be so
libertine as to raise a generation of licentious "lords of the flies".
For by autonomy is meant responsible freedom, "to treat others as ends
in themselves", to make and enact universal maxims. But if it can be
easily acknowledged that such autonomy as defined in this thesis should
be an aim of education in general, one should accept its value as an
aim in religious education. It is "misplaced concreteness" to divorce
the aim of religious education from the general aim of education.

But religious education does have a particular remit. That
particular remit shows its difference from other subjects. The value
of bringing autonomy as a general educational aim to bear upon
religious education is that it keeps education in religion from really
being indoctrination in a Christian or even religious attitude to
life. Churchill wanted to preserve an open tradition which desires
liberation and not indoctrination. Butler wanted "a continuous

process of education conducted in successive stages and suited to the three A's" (age, ability, and aptitude). Piaget's contribution to education in general and Goldman's contribution to religious education in particular has taken this seriously. But Goldman represented others who have made contributions to the content or methodology of religious education but who have not done so within the context of taking autonomy seriously. Loukes posed the question, "What is religious education for?" His observation of a "good" class in a "good" school gave the answer that the teachers were "persons engaged in the nurture of persons". They were "moving over to their children's sides". They were giving them "a source of inner-direction to stand against external pressure". Respectively, these phrases suggest the autonomic qualities of respect, identification, and self-decision. But Loukes violated autonomy when he assumed that the Bible was the primary source material. The value of autonomy as an aim in religious education is that it itself becomes a critical method of evaluating the content of religious education and has implications also for the structure of religious education within the educational system. This will be examined in the final part of this conclusion. What pertains at this point, however, is that autonomy has value in that it itself becomes the means by which the individual best evaluates beliefs about religious and moral judgments, in the state's Secondary schools.

2. Reason

Another value of autonomy is that, through the dialectical process, it adds breadth to one's own reasoning. And this breadth itself adds to the depth of one's own reasoning in the synthesis he arrives at in discussion. The state school as an educational institution must make

certain that reason is developed with these two dimensions. They form the logic of education.

Kant argued from reason, through the moral law with its autonomy, to theism and indeed to Christianity. It is true that he believed that the doctrine of Christianity gives "a concept of the highest good which is alone sufficient to the strictest demand of practical reason." He could be criticised for not taking the "logic of religion" (Smart) seriously enough. The categorical imperative began with the logic of reason rather than the "logic of religion". The state school as an educational process should bring the logic of reason to bear upon religion before it considers the implications of the logic of religion upon religious education. The value of PHIL-AUT is that it offers the logic of "pure practical reason" to define the aim of religious education before the logic of religion is applied. Otherwise, the logic of religion becomes the primary rational base, as it was for Smart. The value of autonomy is that it adds depth to reason through the breadth of a dialectical approach to an encounter with religion as part of the general educational process.

Tillich as a theologian defined theonomy as "autonomous reason united with its own depth". The weakness, however, comes through using theology to define the aim of religion in the educational process. This leads to two errors. The first is the mistake of defining religious education as Christian education. The second is the mistake of limiting the religious inquiry to theism and, through over-emphasis, to Christianity. THEO-AUT gives too strong a Christian delineation to religious education. Theonomy, to Tillich, ultimately meant man's new being in Christ. This may be valid beyond a mere

definition, but it must not be assumed as true in the sense that
"London is the capital of Britain" is true and taught as such. The
value of THEO-AUT is that it shows the danger of religious education
not taking the depth of reason seriously. But this could be applied
to not taking any approach to beliefs seriously, whatever they be—
including Christian, Buddhist, and humanist. Any form of "misplaced
concreteness", however, is valuable if it is recognised as such but
critically examined as a dialectical alternative to popularised,
superficial viewpoints. No form should be given an exclusive or
privileged position in state education.

A value of autonomy (PHIL-THEO-AUT) in religious education is that
it emphasises reason. Without reason, heteronomy prevails and must
prevail for without reason there is no foundation for self-responsibility
in moral actions. Freedom must not be confused with licence.
Heteronomous control is necessary if otherwise an adolescent is not
rationally responsible. The value of autonomy as an aim is that it
emphasises the importance of information to avoid its dialectical
method being a "pooling of ignorance". But if indoctrination into a
general (if not a specific) religious assumption is to be avoided, the
depth of reason must be based upon as broad a spectrum of information
as possible.

3. Ontology

A value of autonomy as ontological rather than metaphysical in its
approach to religious education is that its primary concern becomes
one of change and growth rather than of static existence. Conventional
formalism in religious education, "shapes personalities and communities
by suppressing the spiritual and emotional substance it is supposed
to shape" (Tillich). To formalise truth is to assume falsely that it

can be contained. To know truth is to recognise its changing substance in a changing world. To do truth by identifying with the change and seeing oneself as a being existentially in the change is to know truth as dynamic. To do truth autonomously is to let the will influence the human situation rather than let the human situation control and determine the will.

A further value of autonomy as it has been ontologically defined is that self-affirmation within "the courage to be as a part" is autonomy seeking the extension of responsibility. Without this self-affirmation, however, the individual is suppressed, indoctrinated, or otherwise heteronomously controlled by the other members of the class. The religious education classroom seeks to avoid this if it takes autonomy as an aim. Participation or even formally belonging to a group does not necessarily violate autonomy. Participation that maintains "the courage to be" is autonomy seeking the extension of freedom. "The courage to be" and "the courage to be as a part" are interdependent and integral to each other. Together they effect the development of freedom and responsibility bound together. Psychologically, they bind self-awareness and empathy together, so that hopefully the one is without arrogance and the other without the exterior, heteronomous contamination of the Adult. For if empathy reduces the individual to submissiveness, self-affirmation is violated. This is particularly dangerous when considering the "parahistorical" factor of religious belief. Within the group, with autonomy as an aim, the end becomes not to win the argument but to make a clearer discovery of the truth, and to be motivated towards doing it. Autonomy encourages discussion to lead beyond formal conclusions to existential insights. The search for autonomy within a group is the search for its identity and that of each individual and of all the group

permutations. The search for autonomy is necessary for the development of "the courage to be".

In terms of ontology, religion as ultimate concern focuses upon the goals of autonomy, "being, growing, becoming, fulfilment, and unmotivated action" (Maslow). A value of autonomy as an aim is that it accepts the adolescent as a person in his own right rather than requiring him to be a religiously orientated person before he is acceptable. Such acceptance and encouragement in genuineness are among the qualities of PSYC-AUT. The use of adolescent psychology in religious education must not have an explicit or hidden agenda of persuasion towards the acceptance of a religious outlook. The extent to which these are avoided is the extent to which autonomy is valued.

4. Emotion

The emotional needs of the adolescent are so great that the religious education classroom must assume responsibility for helping to meet these needs. The classroom as a caring community is a matrix of motivation and metamotivation towards autonomy. The students must not become unconcerned for each other's feelings. This is why group dynamics is so important. And with PSYC-AUT valued as an aim, the classroom is need gratifying in a way that contributes to healthy emotional development.

PSYC-AUT emphasises the importance of the classroom being child-centred, especially in adolescence which begins with "a lull before the storm of puberty" (Erikson) when the earlier drives re-form under the dominance of genitality. Erikson believed that shame can so easily lead to guilt with the result of a sense of inadequacy and inferiority. Autonomy, lingering from its rudimentary stage in childhood, encourages self-affirmation and self-acceptance. Throughout

puberty, the adolescent re-fights many battles of previous years in his search for identity. At such an age, it is so important that religious education contribute to meeting the student's emotional needs. Autonomy encourages the treating of people as ends. The adolescent can be helped to clarify his identity by reflecting his confused ego-image off other people. This is a benefit of conversation and group discussion, part of the method of autonomy. The content and methodology of religious education is selected in terms of meeting these needs only to the extent that PSYC-AUT is highly valued. Only autonomy can keep one from submitting to exploitation, domination, and a life of imprisonment to the whims of others. If religious education does not value this, then it suggests that religion itself does not have an ultimate concern in need-fulfilment.

Religion as ultimate concern links with PSYC-AUT in the critical integration of the individual with himself and his environment through different stages of growth and development. In these different stages autonomy as a form of freedom is initiated in infancy (Erikson) and is also the outcome of growth and development aimed at independence from control by his culture and environment (Maslow). Ultimate concerns include the metaneeds of the individual. These needs are taken all the more seriously when PSYC-AUT is valued with the realisation that adolescence is the last stage before adulthood and therefore the last opportunity for preparation in adult responsibilities and emotional maturity. Therefore, reason, the emphasis of PHIL-AUT and THEO-AUT is balanced by emotion, the emphasis of PSYC-AUT. The academic emphasis of religious education is correlated with emotional needs. It cannot be overstated that the religious education classroom offers special opportunities of accepting its own responsibility in assisting

the adolescent in the whole of personality development.

For this development, the religious education classroom uses social psychology for autonomic growth within groups. Argyle wrote, "It is difficult to think of anything which has more relevance to everything one does while not actually asleep or unconscious." He was referring to the ways in which people behave towards each other. Religious education using social psychology shows that it seeks to encourage growth and awareness of constructive interpersonal relationships. This means, among other things, helping the one who needs a strong leader to grow out of his dependence and helping the one who needs a submissive follower to stop using others for his own benefit. Therefore, the religious education classroom exposes adolescents to experiencing role conflict and to work through this within group situations. Religious education values autonomy and recognises that it "is no longer necessary for a sizeable proportion of the human race to be lonely, isolated, miserable or mentally ill through lack of social skills" (Argyle). If religion is ultimate concern then religious education must share this concern. It offers a feeling for people, an awareness of the relationship situation and the dynamics of the group in which this "feeling for" takes place.

Another contribution to the emotional needs which PSYC-AUT can make is in the development of awareness through, for example, transactional analysis. Autonomy checks the destructive Parent-Child stimulus from the teacher and the Child-Parent response from the student. For such an externally induced heteronomous position develops emotional subjection rather than liberation. Religious education must accept responsibility for encouraging the development of genuineness, spontaneity and awareness in interpersonal relations and Adult-Adult

transactions. Only an emancipated Adult allows the natural Child to emerge. Only an emancipated Adult allows the nurturing Parent to emerge. And only the autonomous "I'm OK--You're OK" (Harris) acceptance of oneself and others is conducive to this.

5. Open-endedness

Another value of autonomy as an aim is that it is open-ended and does not presume one form of answer. Goldman in applying Piaget to the development of religious thinking presumed that the final stage was the ability to understand abstractly the "givenness" of religion. In terms of autonomy, this final stage could be to understand abstractions but within the confines of a narrow view of religion. If "abstract religious thinking" means understanding that "Moses feared looking at God because of his sense of sin" and "God wanted to put Jesus to the test" (Goldman), theism and the Judeo-Christian heritage is assumed as the "givenness" of religious truth in an over-simplified form. This is the kind of heteronomy which Kant and Tillich sought to guard against. It is without depth of reason because it is not open-ended. Without other options making possible the dialectical process, there cannot be the kind of depth of reason which comes through a synthesis. Misunderstanding of the Bible builds a barrier to understanding the Christian religion. But religious education should have a larger remit than correcting this. It must offer the freedom to reject Christian belief even when reasonably understood.

Acland did not believe that too much exposure to Christian knowledge too soon destroyed "young and tender faith". But what is this "young and tender faith" which is so important to maintain through religious education? Is it elementary Christian kerygma heteronomously induced? If so, it stunts growth towards autonomy, it

violates religious freedom. Acland's emphasis on discussion and using life themes is important, but they should not be used for the aim of maintaining a "young and tender faith". Although he made a plea for the possibility of religious truth being open-ended, he believed that this is incomplete unless it leads to Christian conversion. He may not have believed that conversion must be sought as an aim even if heteronomously induced. He may not have violated the categorical imperative, but he assumed that the purpose of life involves some discovery of belief in "God". This must not be assumed in state education.

Autonomy as an aim in religious education means that the open development of beliefs should be encouraged, that these should be understood in terms of real life situations, and that decisions should be acted upon but with understanding and tolerance of the beliefs of others. But this means encouraging the consideration of as many options as possible as answers to questions of ultimate concern.

If repeatedly it has been stated that religious education must be truly open-ended, this is because so many who even have been the advocates of open-ended discussion have given priority to Christianity virtually to the exclusion of other doctrinal views. To support this impression, it is sufficient to draw attention again to the findings of the "Millar Report": less than half the Scottish Secondary schools were using any other textbook for religious education beyond the Bible.

IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF AUTONOMY AS AN AIM OF RELIGIOUS EDUCATION
IN STATE SECONDARY SCHOOLS

This thesis has examined autonomy as an aim of religious education
in state Secondary schools. Unfortunately, the term "religious
education" is popularly used without recognition of its internal
conflict. "Religion" and "education" cannot be incorporated in state
education as a unified phrase without looking at the particular
emphasis each of the words itself gives to the term. By religious
education is meant the focus on religion as part of the general
educational process. By religious education is meant the focus on the
teaching of religion as a specific subject within this educational
process.

Autonomy has been defined generally as "responsible freedom"
and more specifically from selective views within the perspectives of
philosophy, theology, and psychology. These various approaches have
revealed both conflict and correlation. The conflict has been
clarified by the use of PHIL-AUT, THEO-AUT, and PSYC-AUT. The
correlation is clarified by the use of the permutations of those
terms: PHIL-THEO-AUT, PHIL-PSYC-AUT, THEO-PSYC-AUT, and PHIL-THEO-
PSYC-AUT.

So far in this concluding section, autonomy has been defined
summarily, its method elucidated, and its value as an aim in religious
education has been stated. But what are the implications? What
changes must be made? What must be done if autonomy as an aim is to
be brought to fruition? An examination of this thesis offers answers,
some elementary and some far-reaching. Some of the implications can
be put into effect immediately; some require reform of the Parliamentary
Acts if they are to be effectively implemented. The headings under

which these implications will be gathered are (1) The implications
for religious education, (2) The implications for religious education,
and (3) The implications for reform of The Parliamentary Acts.

1. The implications for religious education

Educationally, the responsibly free person must accept beliefs
other than his own as having possible credibility. For if he does not
consider other views as having possible authenticity, he will be
treating those who hold these views as "means rather than as ends".
That is to say, it is one thing to conclude that Christianity is the
best statement of belief and one can use the categorical imperative
to justify this. But it is quite a different thing to conclude that
Christianity should be taught dogmatically as the only answer, for
that would be inflicting heteronomy. Kant believed that Christianity
offered the best logical answer but, in education, such answers must
be submitted to other choices. What did Kant mean by "Christianity"?
If he interpreted "Kingdom of God" (his criterion of judgment) to mean
"kingdom of ends" then the argument is circular if not a tautology.
If it means more than this it goes beyond an a priori nature. The
implication is that, even by Kant's reasoning, "games of judgment"
must not, in state education, become games of Christian judgment except
in the sense that Christianity is accepted autonomously. "To accept
autonomously" means that the logic of education, with its dialectical
process, must be applied to "games of judgment". Religious education
is necessary to make certain that one's beliefs are syntheses and not
theses. They must have passed through the dialectical process or
else, where they go beyond the categorical imperative, they revert to
heteronomy.

This is an implication of PHIL-AUT. As far as religion itself
is concerned, Kant accepted a theistic view and claimed that the
doctrine of Christianity gives "a concept of the highest good (the
Kingdom of God) which is alone sufficient to the strictest demands of
practical reason". That was his own conclusion of belief. But since
his argument commenced with duty to the law, and since he believed
that the ultimate purpose of reason is to produce a will good in
itself, his religious belief was a development of his reason but must
not be taken (even though he may have intended it as such) as a
necessary development. For him, it was duty -- not religious belief --
that is a priori. One is under obligation to act from a universal
law. But the application of pure practical reason within education
goes beyond a priori statements. Games of judgment can be mistaken
use of the categorical imperative.

PHIL-AUT as defined brings the Socratic method of the dialectic
to bear on Kant's games of judgment. This is using the logic of
education which must precede the logic of religion, as one must
consider religion as part of the general educational process before
one considers it as a specific subject within this process. The logic
of religion must itself submit to the critical appraisal of the logic
of education. Otherwise there can be, for example, psychological
deception. The educational implications of PHIL-AUT when put to the
test of PSYC-AUT are that reason can be a rationalisation through
contamination by the critical Parent. Kant's religious views could
have been influenced prejudically by his pietistical Christian
background.

It is at this point that Tillich's theological perspective helps
one see the general educational implications of autonomy. Christianity

should not be interpreted kerygmatically and - certainly not within
the state school - solely as the answer. Biblicism, whether orthodox
or neo-orthodox, presents a form of heteronomy as the only Christian
option. Theonomy as depth of reason checking the equally dangerous
submissiveness of heteronomy interprets the new being in Christ as
the ground of one's own being. Religion engulfs what concerns one
ultimately. But the same educational arguments apply. Christian
education in the state institution must be enlarged into the circle
of religious education in its broadest sense. If this violates the
depth of reason which Tillich insisted upon, it is unfortunate. But
the implication should be the importance of the Church carrying out
its educational mission. For the Church can be interpreted as the
congregation of believers in Christ. The state school, on the other
hand, cannot be for it includes non-believers. This statement appears
pedantic but unfortunately it too often is missed. School assemblies,
if balanced with other religious and non-religious themes, can offer
the myth and poetry to present the language and mystical aspect of
religion. But the purpose should be the broadening of wisdom through
exposure. There is a vast difference between exposure to religion and
indoctrination in religion. The latter violates autonomy as an aim
in state education. Therefore, the school assembly can include
statements such as "Let us listen to these words from Christian/Jewish/
Hindu/Buddhist Scriptures/writings/prayers". But in the state school
assembly there must not be the words "Let us hear the Word of God" or
"Let us pray".

Tillich acclaimed Christ as pointing towards ultimate revelation
which he believed overcame the conflict between autonomy and heteronomy.
But he defined heteronomy as "the authority claimed or exercised by a

finite being in the name of the infinite". The implication for state
education is that truth is never completely known. This dynamic
element of truth is an important aspect of religion as part of state
school education. The school must take the breadth of reason as well
as its depth seriously. It is the dialectical method which gives
this breadth to reason. Tillich interpreted this in terms of
correlation.

To learn is not only to understand in depth but also to understand
in the breadth of the relationships with other aspects of knowledge
which contribute to this depth. Vital aspects of social and moral
education are among those that must relate to religious education
especially if the theological insight of that education is "God" as
the ground of all being, the bond of unity which correlates and
reconciles, and the ground of ultimate revelation. But the state
school is not the place which functions to actualise theonomy. It
cannot liberate reason from THEO-AUT/THEO-HET conflict in this way.
What it can do is try to help the individual avoid "the almost
irresistible temptation of becoming heteronomous" (Tillich).

The ontological theology of Tillich created a matrix in which
the emphasis was on becoming. PHIL-AUT is a goal and THEO-AUT is a
process. This is an over-simplification but without forcing either
into a stereotype it does give a particular way of distinguishing the
relationship of PHIL-AUT with psychology from the relationship of
THEO-AUT with psychology. Maslow defined autonomy in terms of goal.
Relating this to Kant's examination emphasises PHIL-PSYC-AUT as a goal.
Erikson defined autonomy in terms of process. Relating this to
Tillich's examination emphasises THEO-PSYC-AUT as a process. This
over-simplification does highlight how, educationally, one way of

looking at autonomy implies the acceptance of one's views as they stand and another way of looking at autonomy implies the challenge of one's views through the dialectical process. Kant's game of judgment was the giving of an answer on already held criteria. Tillich's ontology put the growth aspect as primary. He was concerned not only with "being" but also with "new being" or becoming. He looked beyond the givenness of Christianity, even the being of Jesus, to the pointing towards fuller revelation.

Religious education must be conscious of the being and the becoming nature of the adolescent. There is a difference in emphasis between (1) games of judgment and (2) entering into the dialectical process. The practical implications are illustrated by Living Bible in the difference between (1) the individual's answers to the Introductory Questions and (2) the corporate answers, through the dialectic, in the Group Discussion questions and the final, but tentatively held, Verdict.

Again it must be stated that autonomy as an aim in religious education means that the logic of education, the dialectical process, must precede the logic of religion. The former has been used in this thesis with the dialectical process applied to the different perspectives of the definition of autonomy. For example, PHIL-AUT as a thesis and PSYC-AUT as an antithesis gives the synthesis of PHIL-PSYC-AUT. The presence of a religious quality in the synthesis depends upon it being present in either the thesis, the antithesis, or both. PHIL-AUT and THEO-AUT have been defined with religious aspects to their consideration of autonomy. Respectively, these are the "divine lawgiver" and the "ground of being". But PSYC-AUT has been defined without this quality really being in evidence. Therefore,

autonomy as an aim in religious education would be more readily
acceptable if it were defined in terms of PHIL-AUT, THEO-AUT or
PHIL-THEO-AUT. Initially, it might be more difficult to use PSYC-AUT
as an aim in religious education because, as defined above, it does
not have within itself this religious dimension. The basic dichotomy,
therefore, is not between PHIL-PSYC-AUT and THEO-PSYC-AUT which both
include a religious factor. The basic dichotomy is between
PHIL-THEO-AUT on the one hand and PSYC-AUT on the other.

But this dichotomy would not be so pronounced if PSYC-AUT were
to be defined more comprehensively. For there are psychologists --
Jung, for example -- who have believed that psychology has a religious
dimension. Further, Kant could have developed the categorical
imperative without a religious acknowledgment. And Tillich was able
to view autonomy without its religious aspect, although he believed
that it was empty when abstracted from theonomy.

What this argument implies is that autonomy as an aim in religious
education does not and must not assume either the presence or the
absence of a religious dimension to life, except phenomenalogically.
Further, religious education must give consideration to the moral and
social questions in a way that needs not depend upon any particular
type of answer requiring "God talk". If religion is ultimate concern
and is stated theologically as such then the answer to "religious"
questions can be in terms of "ultimate concern" rather than "religion"
as normally defined. In state education this is a necessary extention
of, or departure from, Tillich's definition of "ultimate concern".
Religious education that accepts God _a priori_ limits reason to a
PHIL-HET means and a THEO-HET conclusion. The means is a heteronomous,
hypothetical imperative and the conclusion is a heteronomous, dogmatic

kerygma. Religious education in state schools can show that many do accept God a priori. But the students must be free to accept or reject, otherwise their autonomy is violated both as a goal and as a process.

An implication of PHIL-PSYC-AUT, as defined above in a specific manner, is that individual fulfilment must be part of universal fulfilment. To treat another person as an end means to show social responsibility. To seek self-actualisation means to seek self-initiated ends based on human need that is other-centred rather than to seek self-ends. Social psychology can give practical development to this philosophical maxim and to this psychological theory.

An implication of THEO-PSYC-AUT, as defined above, is that there should be more concern for the person who is groping and more concern for why he is groping, than for what he is groping. The ground of being should be seen as being socially creative. And expressed in another way, the rudiment of autonomy should develop towards "intimacy", "generativity", and "ego integrity". Social psychology can give practical development to this theological statement and to this psychological theory.

Objective knowledge is important for objective, detached evaluation. But also subjective knowledge is important for knowing the feelings of a person. To see oneself as others see one is no more important than to see others as they see themselves. Empathy is as important as self-awareness. Tillich believed that the "decisive principle of religious education" is that "Man cannot receive an answer to a question he has not asked." The implication is that one should be encouraged to identify in the human predicament through "being as a part". This suggests a child-centred curriculum. In

interpersonal I-Thou relationships this means subjective-subjectivity, the existential extreme required for empathy.

An implication of autonomy as an aim for religious education is that theonomy can be considered as an option of belief but must not be an aim. Again it must be stated that Tillich applied his educational principles to the idea of a "Spiritual Community". This the state school is not. He believed that the repression of the divine Spirit permits autonomy to break through "the suppressive forces of heteronomy and discard not only heteronomy but also the depth of theonomy". But such education is either "inductive" into adjustment to a society with particular religious assumptions or "humanistic" with a particular Christian answer to society's ultimate concerns. Humanistic education should show the variety of religious and non-religious answers which claim to have depth, to be radical, and to seek to leave nothing beyond questioning. This is an implication of faith being defined in its link with risk, as Tillich did, rather than in antithesis to doubt.

Humanistic education in the state school, to which Tillich did not apply it, should interpret religion in its largest and most basic sense as ultimate concern. But if religion is all-embracing, religious education should reach out into all the frontiers of spiritual, moral, and social inquiry. For if it avoids these frontiers, religious education can claim to offer one form of religion as the answer – it makes itself ultimate and disregards the secular realm. For Tillich, if they are estranged, "the religious and the secular realms are in the same predicament". For both are rooted in religion by its larger definition as ultimate concern. He wanted Christianity to carry this enormous responsibility.

The problem for the state schools is religion being ultimate

concern without offering one answer as the answer. The solution is
the establishing of a humanities department in which religious
education would be a part. The narrower definition of religion would
encourage it to accurately understand religions which accepted this
narrower definition. It would take religious education seriously by
its "doctrinal inquiry" (Smart). This makes absolutely necessary the
inclusion of non-Christian and even non-religious beliefs. The broader
definition of religion would encourage it to seek the breadth of its
relationship with other subjects in its ultimate concern. It would
take religious education seriously. It would not use other subjects
for its own end. For example, it would not use psychology as a means
to selling itself, for influencing students prejudicially. It would
not engage in psychological warfare. That is, it would not consider all
other doctrines as enemies of Christianity. Religious education within
the humanities would use psychology to understand the adolescent's
existential situation in which his needs could be more identified.

Religious education would then contribute to meeting these needs.
The class would understand the importance of the gratification of the
basic needs and thereby enhance the opportunity for metamotivational
factors (such as value commitment, creativeness, and courage). The
classroom would aim towards the PSYC-AUT (Maslow) goals of "being,
growing, becoming, fulfilment and self-motivated action", it would
seek to avoid the PSYC-HET goals of "doing, coping, achieving,
obedience, and motivated action" as ends in themselves. Religious
education would reach out towards psychology and in doing so would
bring to the adolescent the insights of psychology. The classroom
would aim at growing-toward-fulfilment having hopefully gone beyond
the need for striving-to-make-up-deficiencies. The syllabus would
be, by necessity, both content-centred and child-centred. It would

not merely discuss the answers to human need that various doctrines have claimed to offer. It would lead the classroom itself to assume responsibility as a caring community for meeting these needs.

The implications of PSYC-AUT (Erikson) are that religious education takes seriously the danger in adolescence of shame and guilt developing a sense of inadequacy and inferiority just as Tillich believed that autonomy without depth could develop a sense of arrogance.

Theonomy as the answer can create such a content-centred systematic answer that religious education is encouraged to conspire against the personality needs of the adolescent. The implications of PSYC-AUT for the state Secondary school involve a psychological look at the student himself, the need for his character and personality to mature towards responsible freedom from the rudimentary qualities of autonomy in childhood.

An implication of autonomy as an aim is that the teacher must not only have a healthy relationship with the class but also show a healthy and enacting responsibility to the community. The class is a group and a collection of groups which should not be indifferent to groups outwith the school. PSYC-AUT as an aim implies that the religious education classroom is not an isolated group but a stage of integration into the life of the community. The extent to which the school is a closed community (structured according to general age and culture and perhaps also mental ability, social standing or even sex) is the extent to which it is not representative of the human situation.

An implication of autonomy as an aim in religious education is that the whole role of the teacher must be changed. His most directive interventions in a class should be as a facilitator, adviser, counsellor, and resource person. His most non-directive role is as an

observer. As a resource person he may speak with authority on matters of fact, but as a facilitator he must not speak with authority on matters of belief for that would inflict heteronomy. The students are not there for his benefit, he is there for theirs – to help them discover what determines their beliefs and motivations, values and objectives, frustrations and needs, responsibilities and opportunities, successes and failures, and areas of independency and dependency.

Tillich's broad definition of religion in terms of ultimate concern and Argyle's belief that nothing is more important than healthy human relationships together imply that religious education should take training in social skills seriously. Argyle's inclusion of this concern under moral education implies a relationship between religious, moral, and social education. The research of this thesis reveals a strong argument for religion in state education to be seen to be part of a humanities-type structure. Social skills must be applied to religious education if the "teacher" as an "institutional leader" is to be able to relinquish his authority so that class members can assume leadership. To be given responsibility is essential for growth towards responsibility which itself is part of autonomy as defined. The heteronomous adolescent is submissive. His submissiveness, however, may be a result of his need for approval. If the class can be an accepting community, the heteronomous base can be transferred into an encouragement to act independently upon principles. In this way, religious education, taking PSYC-AUT seriously, should help develop and make use of social skills.

So far the argument implies that a humanities department including religious education should use the content and methods of such social skills as group dynamics and transactional analysis in its teaching.

Autonomy requires "game free" relationships. P-A-C relates to
religious education in determining whether certain feelings of shame,
remorse, or guilt are the result of contamination by one's critical
Parent or the result of an autonomous awareness of wrong. Religious
education must help the adolescent determine when phrases like "I
believe that..." are internal or external contamination of the Adult
(as diagrammed in this thesis). Apart from this awareness, religious
belief cannot be discerned as autonomous or heteronomous. "I believe"
can really mean "my Father believed" or "I know that you want me to
believe this, and I want your acceptance which I think you make
conditional, and therefore I am saying 'I believe...'." Such agreement
in belief is not through the dialectic to an autonomous synthesis but
through heteronomous Adult-contamination. (There can also be rebellion:
"I know you want me to believe this, therefore I'm not going to.")
The lack of transactional awareness means that "What do I believe?" and
"What should I do because of this belief?" can so easily be given
non-rational answers. If reason lacks breadth by being unrelated to
psychological awareness and social skills, then the depth is affected.
Religious education must be "game free". THEO-AUT in religious
education must be correlated with PSYC-AUT. The autonomous believing
Adult, whatever he believes, must be free to determine his Child and
Parent references responsibly. Religious education itself must accept
the responsibility to help the adolescent develop the kind of autonomy
which rejects the manipulation of his critical Parent and rejects the
false authority of others over him. The three-dimensional diagram
presented in this thesis is a type of representation which a teacher
of religion within a humanities department could use to help the
members of a class develop authentic, autonomous beliefs. For beliefs,

whether religious or otherwise, are not authentic if they are psychologically inappropriate, rationally illogical, or socially immature.

2. The implications for <u>religious</u> education

So far this presentation of the implications (of autonomy as an aim in state religious education) has been external through the examination of religion as part of the educational process. It has been looking at the implications of religious <u>education</u>. This has meant certain implications for the content and methodology of R.E. if it is to be educationally authentic. Now the implications will be examined internally by putting the emphasis on <u>religious</u> education. Factual knowledge is important if responsible freedom in belief is to be based upon reasoning. The manner in which this is used depends upon the ability to distinguish between inductive and deductive reason — but further, to be able to distinguish between narrative, poetic, and mythological use of language.

Goldman's research revealed that until the age of thirteen the overwhelming majority of young people interpret the Bible as literally true. His application of Piaget in the five-fold developmental process of "readiness for religion" showed growth towards understanding abstract religious ideas. But this did not necessarily imply growth towards autonomy. The ability to understand abstract religious ideas can retain the kind of heteronomy which Kant and Tillich sought to guard against.

Part of the responsibility of religious education, as a separate subject, should be to present truthfully and accurately some of the definitions and usages of religious language. But a consideration of Christian literature must be without the ulterior motive of Christian

conversion. And a delineated knowledge-centred curriculum is not sufficient. Religious education is more comprehensive than Bible knowledge.

So Acland suggested calling the R.E. class "Religion and Life Discussion Period" or its equivalent. He used discussion as a method to help young people to think for themselves. His view implied that God intends the atheist to have a right to believe or not. This assumption of freedom is essential to autonomy. But his argument was from religion to freedom. The implication is that the atheist is mistaken. Autonomy must not be based on the assumption that religion is true a priori. His statement that religion could be "out right out of the State school curriculum, at any rate after the primary stage", avoided the insight of Goldman that the pre-adolescent is incapable of conceptual ideas. If the Primary school is to contribute to religious education, R.E. must be continued in the Secondary school. Therefore, Acland's first suggestion must be rejected. His alternative, cutting religion out altogether, would satisfy those who believe that religion is not a meaningful aim of educational pursuit or that such teaching is invariably heteronomous. This thesis has implied that religion is educationally meaningful in a secular society if and only if it seeks to avoid heteronomy. Acland's "encounter" rather than "didactic" method of teaching tended to avoid heteronomy, although he did not imply the development of group dynamics or social skills that are so necessary for this. He did show, however, that religious education must be more than Bible knowledge.

Loukes sought a balance between content and discussion but he still assumed that the Bible is the main sourcebook of religion, thereby limiting the encounter to Christianity. But as Goldman urged readiness

and Acland urged genuineness, Loukes sought relevance. His aim was
to prepare young people for becoming responsible citizens, workers,
husbands/wives, and parents through an "anti-syllabus" approach. But
although these are important aims and relate to autonomy, they do not
take seriously enough the psychological contribution that adolescence
is not only an age of preparation for life, it is an age for living.
The adolescents' immediate needs for character and personality growth
are vital.

Smart's six dimensions to the nature of religion are comprehensive
and valid for a "doctrinal inquiry" approach to Christianity, other
religions, and quasi-religious views such as Marxism and humanism.
Such an academic content-centred approach is open-ended and does not
assume the validity of one view over another. Further, Smart
recognised the need for dialogue if indoctrination is to be avoided.
But again it must be said: this requires social skills and methods of
appraising group dynamics. Yet without content, discussion is a
pooling of ignorance. And ignorance is as dangerous as indoctrination.
What this implies is that the methods of autonomy (games of judgment
and the dialectical process) require social skills which themselves
must become part of the content. To give a subjective element
adequately to Smart's objective emphasis means the merging together
of the content and method of autonomy as an aim in religious education.
This is analogous to, and as important as, his merging together the
historical and "parahistorical" aspects of religious education.

The examination of "Lifeline" has shown how a moral education
programme has been used in many religious education classes. The
educational aim of "Lifeline" accepted "autonomy" and the
"self-authenticating" nature of truth. It interpreted good moral

behaviour as "a considerate style of life". Its method was heavily
Kantian. It did not imply that autonomous persons cannot make mistakes.
It did imply that, challenged by a variety of interpersonal behavioural
possibilities, the students should be educated to choose rationally and
emotionally. To this there must be added "readiness" because McPhail's
moral inquiry requires Piagetian insights into "readiness for morality".
"Lifeline" in a practical way encouraged awareness of moral and social
consequences of behaviour and action through exercises in reason such
as Kant intended his games of judgment to be. The ethical challenge
endorses what Tillich called "courageous participation in the situation".
"Lifeline" offered a programme for "teaching" empathy through
exercises in feeling. Of all the programmes examined, it took
autonomy most seriously. But of all the programmes examined, it took
religious education least seriously.

The implication is not that autonomy is an aim of moral education
only and that religious education should be completely isolated and
thereby free to develop its own particular methods and objectives
independent from the aim of autonomy. Research into the use of
"Lifeline" has shown that it has made use of religious education periods.
The arguments against the isolating of religious education from moral
education are overwhelming. This does not mean that they do not have
distinctive features. It does mean that they overlap too much to be
isolated from each other. What religious education requires is
neither a marriage to, nor a divorce from, moral education. What it
requires is to see itself as part of a commune in which it co-habits
with moral education but also is able, by mutual consent, to enjoy an
intense relationship with social education, health education,
introductory philosophy, psychology, and sociology in a humanities

commune. And beyond this co-habitory correlation is the extending integration of religious education as the humanities commune is timetabled on an equal basis with all other departments.

Religious education can benefit from being established in isolation as a subject in itself, in correlation within a humanities department, and in integration within the total school curriculum. At the present time, even without the 1944/45 Acts being revised accordingly, the fact that religion can be taught in state schools makes it possible for a school to timetable religious education accordingly. But until the Acts are revised and Colleges of Education encouraged to train teachers for the humanities, such programming depends upon schools which are interested, teachers who are willing to prepare themselves, and publishers who are progressive enough to produce appropriate textbooks and resource materials.

Justification for including religion as a separate subject depends upon its having a unique contribution to make to education. Many have found religious answers in their search for meaning in life and have developed commitment to that purpose. Only religious education can consider the possible validity of a spiritual dimension in life. Without this consideration, humanism is heteronomously assumed. The Social Morality Council which included Catholics, Protestants, Jews, and humanists has been quoted as going even further by stating that the "understanding of what is meant by a religious approach to life" should have the result of granting to adolescents "a more sensitive understanding of their own beliefs and of the different beliefs by which others govern their lives". This rightly questions the aim of intellectual or cultural indoctrination which makes appropriate the dogmatic approach. It rules out the purely academic aim which would

treat religious education objectively as "religious knowledge".
Therefore, tools of reason should be brought to bear upon the beliefs
of individuals within the classroom in order that they may become
aware empathetically of what each regards as of ultimate concern.

To clarify this phenomenological approach, four possibilities in
the I-Thou relationship have been suggested.

(1) There is the academic extreme, objective-objectivity, in
which a student is encouraged to avoid involvement by rationally
appraising certain beliefs of others without seeing behind them
believing people and without taking them into himself. If education
were non-existential, religion could be an isolated subject. For the
purpose of academic depth, this would be justified. (2) There is the
existential extreme, subjective-subjectivity, in which a student,
seeking commitment, observes and appraises doctrinal beliefs but sees
behind them believing people with whom he identifies. In between
these two extremes there are two mediatory possibilities which draw
on both in two different ways. (3) There is objective-subjectivity,
explicit education, in which the student avoiding commitment observes
and appraises beliefs and sees behind them believing people. And (4)
there is subjective-objectivity, implicit education, in which the
student, seeking commitment, observes and appraises beliefs but does
not identify with other people who share these views or have done so
in history.

Objective-objectivity can be purely rational. Subjective-subjectivity
can be purely emotional. The other two possibilities link the rational
and the emotional, the academic and the existential. Education should
not be cold and calculative, for this makes it a mere academic exercise.
Nor should it be controlled by feelings, for this makes it a mere
emotional exercise. The two extremes have value in taking respectively

reason and emotion seriously. But to bring them together, the intermediary stages contribute. Religious education, then, can begin with the feelings of the individual, bring his reason to bear upon his own feelings, observe the beliefs of another person, and then see behind these beliefs the believer with whom he identifies and whom he accepts. This relates to the "I'm OK--You're OK" position which has been defined as the only autonomous one. It alone permits the acceptance of the other person essential for responsibility towards him while at the same time frees one from necessarily having to accept the other person's ideas. The appraisal of belief is thus free to be critically rational while the relationship with the believer is free to be warmly accepting. Responsible freedom as an aim in religious education thus implies that both content-centred syllabi with their emphasis upon objectivity and child-centred syllabi, or "anti-syllabus" approaches, with their emphasis upon subjectivity have contributions to make. Religious education, however, should bring the two extremes together. Autonomy concerns beliefs and believers.

3. The implications for reform of the Parliamentary Acts

The 1944 (Butler) Education Act made religious instruction a legally required subject in the English state school curriculum. Section 25-(2) has been quoted:

> "Subject to the provisions of this section, religious instruction shall be given in every county school and every voluntary school."

The 1945 Act made equivalent provision for Scotland.

The implications of autonomy as an aim is that the ineffectiveness of religious education calls not for its abolition but for its reform in state schools. Generally, Smart would agree with these proposals although they have been approached primarily from the logic of education

rather than the logic of religion and they imply much more emphasis
upon group dynamics and social skills not only in method but also in
content.

First, the aim of autonomy implies that the structure should be
changed. If provision is made for the teaching of religion, that
provision should establish a humanities department which should
include social and moral education, an introduction to philosophy and
psychology, and the study of social skills, group dynamics, and
interpersonal relationships. This thesis has shown how autonomy is
violated when religion is taught without relationship to these. The
term "religious instruction" should be changed for it can imply
indoctrination into either specific or general religious beliefs.

Second, the aim of autonomy implies that religious education
should be open-ended. Section 29-(1) of the 1944 Act makes provision,
as already quoted,

> "...with respect to the preparation, adoption, and
> reconsideration, of an agreed syllabus of religious
> instruction."

The overall effect should be interpreted as not limiting but rather
expanding the possibilities of the schools' involvement with religious
education. This does not mean that the Bible should not be taught.
It does mean that the Bible should not be taught to the exclusion of
other religious writings or other statements of doctrinal inquiry.
Religious education must not be equated with Scripture knowledge. And
its content must go even beyond doctrinal inquiry to extensively
incorporate group dynamics.

Third, provision for a religious service or religious assembly
which can imply indoctrination into either specific or general religious
beliefs should be withdrawn. This does not mean, however, that

assemblies cannot include exposure to the kind of religious education valid for the classroom or that religious music, readings, and prayers cannot be used. It does mean that they must not be used within the context of worship. "Let us pray" becomes "Let us listen to this prayer" and is read unprejudically. An assembly can expose students to a variety of religious and non-religious practices. But the purpose must be limited to exposure and this exposure must be as comprehensive as possible. Worship, as such, within the state school must be abolished. The "Released Time" type provision would therefore be unnecessary for it has value only to offer an alternative religious instruction of a particular nature.

Fourth, the aim of autonomy implies that although religious education within the humanities has a subjective element, it also has an objective element. The objective element is examinable and the ability to relate subjectively to this knowledge is examinable in the same way as knowledge of English and the ability to use English are both examinable without prejudice to the beliefs of the individual. But the aim of religious education should place growth towards autonomy above Smart's six dimensions of doctrinal inquiry.

Fifth, the aim of autonomy implies that clergy should not be appointed as school chaplains and the Acts should be reformed accordingly. Clergy can, however, be used as resource persons in the same way as policemen, marriage-guidance counsellors, doctors, bankers, and others in vocations who have a contribution to make to education and who afford a link between the school and the community. The school should have the right in classroom and assembly to call upon individuals to give information, to explain what they believe, and what they are doing because of it. But there must be balance in their

selection so that a variety of views are represented. And anyone who enters a classroom or assembly should accept the same role as the "teacher": a resource person, a facilitator, a counsellor, an adviser--but never as a manipulator or indoctrinator. His aim should be to enhance growth towards autonomy rather than to inflict submissive heteronomy. Religious education in state schools must not be used by clergy as an opportunity to ensnare a captive audience. Religious education has a special opportunity to help the school avoid isolation from the community. But the appointment of school chaplains is a misuse of the relationship between Church and State. It implies an area of heteronomous subjugation of the State to a generally, if not particularly, religious affiliation. If the implications of autonomy as an aim in religious education are to be taken seriously, the Church should, but the State must, renounce this privileged position.

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APPENDIX

FURTHER DISCUSSION METHODS AND TECHNIQUES. (Written in the style of Living Bible and concentrating on the mechanics of group dynamics to which social psychology should be applied.)

Your studies in Living Bible have made use of Group Discussion. You have been part of a learning team. Soon you will be leaving school and now is the time for you to get on with your own further studies of religious and moral issues. This unit should help you with a do-it-yourself programme for even more dynamic encounters with subjects of vital importance to your life and the well being of the wider community.

In the Introduction to each book of Living Bible there have been hints on how to benefit from Group Discussion: to keep it from being a pooling of ignorance or an irrelevant waffling. The duties of the discussion leader, the scribe, and the group members have been listed. These should be kept in mind as you consider using the following methods in your classroom or school assembly.

But before we consider the various discussion methods and techniques, we must first raise some questions about group discussion and its place in the life of your school today.

1. Why seek new methods? Because the old methods are too inhibiting. You may believe that some methods of teaching (the talk by the teacher or school chaplain) assume that your school has the answer to all questions and problems and all you should do is sit and listen.

2. What are the specific benefits of group discussions? They actively involve you in learning. They stimulate the group members to seek more knowledge. They achieve results. This makes religious education relevant and real. This is why the process is called "group dynamics". The result should be a mature faith expressed in how we

live and work together in the numerous sub-groups of which we are formally or informally members. (People passing each other in the street compose a group; even if they don't realise it, they are reacting to each other.) Group dynamics may be unconscious. And some psychologists contend that we carry on psychic conversations with people even when we aren't with them.

3. <u>What part are we being asked to play?</u> All participating in this form of education become part of THE LEARNING TEAM: LEADERS, READERS (resource persons), AND SEEDERS (Participants).

4. <u>What are the qualities and duties of a good leader?</u> A) He leads the discussion without leading the group. That is, he allows the group to reach its own conclusion whether or not he agrees with it. B) He sees that all issues are raised. C) He respects all attitudes as they are presented. D) He reveals hidden agendas. (A "Hidden Agenda" is a person's unrevealed ulterior motive for being in a group. An extreme example is a spy.) E) He encourages all to participate and discourages anyone from dominating the discussion. F) He sees that participants are comfortable and in the appropriate seating position. G) He is mentally alert but leads only when necessary. H) He introduces the discussion, identifying the problem, setting the time limit, and making sure that the participants know each other. I) He brings the discussion to a close, summarises and states the verdict. Or if no decision is reached and the discussion lasts for more than one time, he may appoint a committee. J) He keeps notes on the discussion, or appoints a scribe, and makes certain that an oral or written account of the discussion is given to the chairman.

5. <u>What are the qualities and duties of a good reader or resource person?</u> He is an "authority" on the subject to be discussed. This

does not mean he has to be a professor. Anyone can read up a subject and become a resource person. He must A) know as much about the subject as possible, B) know the specific subject to be discussed, C) know the type of discussion it is to be, D) make a contribution only when it is needed, E) refrain from using the occasion to promote his own "hidden agenda" or ideas irrelevant to the specific subject, F) make brief, direct comments, G) use a non-technical language geared to the group, H) refrain from scoffing at ideas presented and, I) do all he can to help participants participate.

6. What are the qualities and duties of a good seeder or group participant? And what do you mean by "seeder"? I mean unless ideas are planted by the group participants, nothing will grow. Every member of the group should A) be uninhibited, willing to express his ideas openly, B) be curious, C) be willing to change his opinions midstream, D) refrain from dominating the discussion, E) seek new viewpoints rather than rehash old ones, and F) be a good listener.

7. What is a good topic and how should it be phrased? Make sure it is A) timely, B) worthwhile, C) limited in scope to the time available, D) challengingly phrased, E) multi-sided, to encourage discussion rather than debate, F) questioning policies, facts, or values, G) within the grasp of being solved by the particular group, H) with a final verdict possible, I) with resource information available, and J) with a possible conclusion that can be acted upon.

8. How do we know what we say is of value? Refrain from A) namecalling, B) opinion based on prejudice, C) assertions without examples, D) generalities without facts, E) predictions without statistics, and F) stereotyped thinking: a fixed mental impression of a person (or idea) determined by some general characteristic of the

group he belongs to (religious, political, racial, social) before you have got to know him (or it) - for example, "He's a Catholic therefore...." But the greatest error we can make in a group is to say nothing and remain inhibited. If we take an active part in the learning team, most of what we have to say will be of value. The following pages help us to look at some different ways in which we can do this.

These methods are presented in the following order:

1. Group Discussion
2. Committee
3. Interview
4. Role Play
5. Field Trip
6. Speech
7. Demonstration
8. Seminar
9. Panel Discussion
10. Colloquy
11. Ancient Symposium
12. Modern Symposium
13. Forum
14. Quiet Meeting

There are listed eight subtechniques.

15. Audience Reaction Team
16. Buzz Session
17. Free-Wheeling
18. Listening (and Observing) Groups
19. Question Period
20. Screening Panel
21. Film or Television - "A Look-in"
22. Formal Debate

1. Group Discussion

A conversation about a topic of mutual interest by usually 6-20 participants under the guidance of a leader.

Group discussion offers maximum opportunity for each person to participate. The smaller the group, of course, the more time each person has to speak. If used by an untrained leader or by a group which does not understand this technique, group discussion will quickly become a series of short debates or a pooling of ignorance.

Group discussion can be used to help participants A) become aware of the multi-sidedness of a problem and the complexity of its solution, B) learn the ideas of others, C) decide a plan of action, D) develop a nucleus of responsible leaders, E) improve interpersonal relationships, and F) acquire a team spirit.

3. Interview

A 5-30 minute presentation in which one or two resource persons respond to systematic questioning in the presence of an audience. Those interviewed direct their comments to the interviewer and to the class. Suggested questions may be turned in by the class. The advantage is that the interviewer can select and order the most important questions. He can also include spontaneous questions as they are needed.

The interview can A) eliminate the pit-falls of hap-hazard forums, B) succeed when only two or three are trained as a learning team, C) make greatest use of a guest-speaker's limited time and assure that his comments are relevant, and D) stimulate interest which might not be aroused in a speech.

Examples: At the close of a group discussion, an observer is interviewed to get his outside reaction. At the close of a committee meeting a sponsor is interviewed for a final impression. A guest is interviewed rather than invited to speak.

4. <u>Role-Playing</u>

An unscripted acting out of a situation by selected members of a group to study relationships between people of different backgrounds, responsibilities, attitudes, or jobs. It reveals their feelings and attitudes. It is usually followed by another technique.

Role-playing can A) help a person to see an alternative viewpoint by acting as if it were his, B) pinpoint a problem, C) breakdown stereotypes, or D) reveal hidden agendas.

Those participating should always have time to prepare for their role. The situation or problem must be lucid and forcefully presented by the moderator. Role-players can move about if they wish.

Examples: "Family tensions", "Responsibilities of parents", "Factory conflicts".

5. Field Trip

A carefully planned tour in which a group visits a place for first-hand observation and study. It should be preceded or followed by other techniques such as a group discussion or a panel-forum.

A field trip can A) stimulate enthusiasm not only in a subject but also in a year's programme, B) illustrate a course of action, C) relate theory to practice, and D) provide a common experience that will help the group members know each other and become a learning team.

Examples: Attend a wedding service. Attend a County/District Council meeting. Trip to a factory, law court, museum, university, or college.

6. Speech

A carefully prepared oral presentation. A speech can A) provide the maximum material in the minimum time limit, B) create a learning situation when only one person is trained in communication, C) stimulate and inspire, D) permit the speaker the maximum amount of presentation time, E) accommodate large numbers in the smallest possible space, and F) present information to a group that cannot (or will not) read.

7. Demonstration

A carefully prepared presentation on how to perform an act or use a procedure. It explains and illustrates a method and answers questions.

The demonstrator should first find out what the group already knows on the subject and he should know the expected size of the group so that this demonstration will be the seen by all.

Examples: "How a wedding is conducted".

8. Seminar

Authority-
Leader

A group of 5-30 engaging in specialised study with the assistance
of an authority or authorities. Individual study and oral or written
reporting is assigned by the authority himself.

The seminar can A) maintain the interest of those members of a
group who want "to get on with it", B) explore subjects of limited
interest or that requires a disciplined mind, C) provide free exchange
of ideas when all in the group or sub-groups are interested in
becoming resource persons.

Examples: A sub-group of the class studying a particular religion.
A sub-group studying a certain poem, religious folk song, pop song, or
protest song.

9. Panel Discussion

A group of 3-6 who carry out a purposeful conversation in the presence of the class. Each panel member is chosen for his special knowledge, variety of background, or experience.

A panel can A) pinpoint several views, B) stimulate interest, C) bring factions together, and D) make use of several resource persons. It is best used when followed by some form of class participation.

Examples: "Our school, which way?" "Our community, which way?"

10. Colloquy

A modification of the Panel Discussion using 6-8 persons, half representing the general class. The others are resource persons or experts; although it is possible to have only one or two resource persons. The class representatives ask questions, express opinions and raise issues. The class may occasionally participate if opportunity is given by the moderator.

The colloquy can A) stimulate interest in a new subject, B) clarify a problem and prepare it for solution, C) explore issues, D) bring expert knowledge to bear on problems as they arise from discussion, E) reduce the barrier that sometimes holds back the general group from participating, F) help the expert to know the thought patterns of the class and thereby keep comments relevant and meaningful, and G) be followed by Buzz Groups or direct audience participation.

Examples: "What is the purpose of education?" with the headmaster and a college lecturer among the experts. "Where parents (or families, children) go wrong" with child psychologist, welfare officer, a marriage guidance counsellor, and a minister or priest as experts.

The moderator must remember to introduce and give the qualifications of the resource persons and names of audience representatives, explain how the audience may participate, state the time available, and introduce

the topic, showing its relationship to the larger programme or project. He must also remain neutral.

The audience representatives present topics in the **form of comments**, quotations, problems, and questions.

11. Ancient Symposium

Moderator

A group of 5-20 persons who meet informally over a meal for fellowship, entertainment, and conversation.

The Ancient Symposium can A) serve the widest possible social as well as mental and physical needs of a group, B) encourage self expression, C) break down inhibitions, D) provide the most pleasant atmosphere, and E) encourage attendance.

After the food is served, the moderator introduces the subject. This method can be combined with an informal speech to keynote conversation. In the Early Church, this method was called the "Love Feast" and preceded what are now in most churches formal services of Communion. Some Churches still have "Love Feasts". Part of the success of an Ancient Symposium lies in the atmosphere that can be achieved and in its expression of hospitality. It should be totally informal.

Examples: An ideal method for a class to use to welcome new members and introduce them to the life and fellowship of the school. It can be followed by a concert or sketch or become an important part in launching a youth and community venture such as an ecology project or Christian Aid programme.

12. Modern Symposium (or "teach-in)

A series of short related speeches by 2-5 persons on aspects of one subject or related subjects.

A Modern Symposium can A) present information and enlightened opinion formally, B) reveal the relationship of problems or activities, stimulate more interest than one long speech (assuming that speakers stay within their alloted time).

Examples: Following a seminar composed of a keen sub-group, your class has a modern symposium in which members of the seminar make short talks covering the findings that have taken perhaps several weeks of study. A priest, a minister, a Salvation Army officer, a social worker, a doctor, and a nurse talk about how they together serve the community.

13. Forum

Moderator

Resource
Person

Audience

A 15-60 minute open discussion between a group usually exceeding
25 and one or more resource persons. It is directed by a moderator.
The larger group is free to raise questions or make comments to the
resource person and to one another. It is best used when it follows
a speech, panel, symposium, interview, demonstration, or role-play.
It should never follow group discussion, colloquy, or Ancient Symposium
which share many of the same qualities and would make it redundant.
It is less formal than a question and answer period and more formal
than group discussion.

The forum can A) clarify and explore information presented by
another technique, B) give everyone a chance to speak, C) permit
answers to be openly challenged, D) put the resource person more in
the limelight than he would be in a group discussion, and E) encourage
the audience to listen more closely to preceding presentations since
it knows it must participate.

The class asks questions, offers information, requests
clarification, gives examples from experience, pitches in to help
those having difficulty in understanding, makes certain that the
moderator prevents monopoly, debate, and any comments that are clearly
off the subject.

14. Quiet Meeting

A period of 15-60 minutes of reflection with limited speaking but including meditation, concentration, and study. When a participant has an idea he wants to share, he expresses it simply as an independent contribution. There is no logical sequence of ideas building upon each other. Each comment is totally independent.

The quiet meeting can A) relieve group tensions, B) reveal the depths of personality and "soul-searching," C) prepare a group for serious formal discussion, D) encourage productive study, and E) strengthen psychic and sub-conscious links for strong group dynamics among those who have initiative. (The subject to be put on a black board or poster where it can be seen at anytime during the meeting.)

Examples: A class is given a variety of books and magazines which they read and spontaneously make comments on. Group meditation in a time of crisis. Printed readings which are reflected on during a school assembly. A dramatic film, skit or recitation is presented and followed by a quiet meeting. A quiet meeting following discussion and preceding an important verdict or action.

EIGHT SUBTECHNIQUES

15. <u>Audience Reaction Team</u> which interrupts the speaker to prevent obscurity, or to raise doubts, or to elucidate. (This method was used in ancient synagogues where the men were permitted to interrupt the rabbi.)

16. <u>Buzz Session</u>, an audience divided into small groups in totally informal discussion for a short period of time. Given a simple task such as "make two suggestions" or "choose one activity".

17. <u>Free-Wheeling</u>, a buzz group with a spontaneous outpouring of ideas such as "list as many programmes as possible".

18. <u>Listening</u> (and Observing) Groups, are asked to look for a particular thing during a presentation.

19. <u>Question Period</u>, where the audience questions expert.

20. <u>Screening Panel</u>, where the audience reaction team precedes the speaker in order to give him clues and the level and interest of the audience.

21. <u>Film</u> or <u>Television</u> — "A Look-in".

22. <u>Formal Debate</u> — consult a textbook on this highly technical method.

The above methods can be used as follow-up programmes for themes in <u>Living Bible</u> as well as further subjects selected by the class. They can be used in the classroom, in the school assembly, or outside the school as, of course, the "Field Trip" makes obvious.