The eponymous Jacquerie: making revolt mean some things

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Labelling an activity makes it mean something. The decision to term a group of actions a ‘revolt’ or an ‘uprising’ today has profound implications for interpretation, just as calling them ‘rumours’ or ‘takehan’ went to the very heart of the perception and reception of contentious political acts 600 years ago. The word ‘jacquerie’ is no exception. In English, as in French, the word has meant ‘a peasant revolt, especially a very bloody one’ since the nineteenth century. But what the modern term’s medieval eponym, the French Jacquerie of May–June 1358, actually meant to its observers and participants is a curiously underexplored subject. Only one scholarly monograph, published in the nineteenth century, has ever been written, and since then fewer than a dozen articles have appeared, the most cogent of them written by Raymond Cazelles over 30 years ago.

In the intervening decades, historians’ understanding of later medieval uprisings has changed considerably. While earlier scholars saw events like the Jacquerie as explosions of economic misery, social hatreds, or millenarian mania, there has been a general shift to interpreting popular protests as rational and as predominantly political in their objectives and organization. So for Samuel Cohn, jr. the impetus for rebellions after the Black Death was political liberty, while John Watts and Patrick Lantschner have shown that much of what we might now view as abnormal and disorderly behaviour against authority can actually be reimagined as continuations of normal political processes by people who were not so much opposed to the state as critical of its weaknesses or hungry for a piece of the action. This tight focus on the political dimension may ultimately have to be broadened, particularly as the negotiation of
power in the Middle Ages encompassed realms of activity and thought habitually excluded from modern politics. Still, these reassessments have produced a robust and profound reorientation of scholarly interpretation: Rather than assume we know what a revolt is based on our own (or at any rate more modern) experiences of authority and dissent, we must actively interrogate the meaning that contemporaries ascribed to their actions.

That the Jacquerie has not benefited from this kind of methodological and conceptual reassessment partly stems from the vividness of the received picture of it as a bloody, spontaneous uprising that needs no explanation: i.e. a jacquerie. The problem is also empirical: the disposition of the sources and the complex historical circumstances surrounding the uprising have meant that scholarship has been almost exclusively dedicated to the basic problem of figuring out what happened. The sources mainly consist of five chronicle groups, all available in modern editions, and around 200 letters of royal pardon (lettres de rémission) for participants in the revolt, most of which are only available in manuscript at the Archives nationales de France. The narratives sources offer an aggregated overview of the event, but they do not always accord with one another or even with themselves, as I will discuss below. The remissions, on the other hand, frequently contain a narrative portion detailing the recipient’s crimes, which gives a granular picture of the revolt but which also requires extensive geographical and prosopographical work in order to make sense of the narrative. Still, these difficulties would hardly present an intractable problem, were it not for the fact that the Jacquerie came at a particularly confused moment in French history.

Two years earlier, the English had defeated the French army at the Battle of Poitiers and captured King John II. As a result, a power vacuum arose in the capital, which the young Dauphin Charles mishandled. The government of the realm fell to the assemblies of the three
estates (the clergy, the nobles, and the burghers) known as the Estates General (États généraux), which were dominated by the Parisian merchant, Étienne Marcel, and the bishop of Laon, Robert le Coq. King Charles II of Navarre’s presence in and around Paris further complicated the situation. Possessing a large army, a reasonable claim to the French throne, and a sizeable grudge against King John, he was a valuable ally to the Parisian rebels but a dangerous entity in his own right. On the 22nd of February 1358, Marcel led a mob to the Dauphin’s private chambers, where they killed two of the Dauphin’s marshals, and by the late spring of 1358, the Prince, now allied with the northern French nobility, had mobilized to retake Paris by force. He garrisoned fortresses at Meaux on the Marne River and Montereau on the Seine, which cut off Paris’s supply lines, and he began recruiting an army. It was at this point that the Jacquerie broke out. Scholarship on it has thus always been divided between two camps: one that sees it as the result of collusion between the Jacques and the Parisians and one that holds that the Jacques acted independently.

These empirical problems have hampered more methodologically sophisticated investigations, but, ironically, they are essentially insoluble without the kind of methodological reassessment of the meaning of revolt that recent historiography offers. Past interpretations of the Jacquerie have all started from the assumption that the revolt had a meaning that we can excavate from the documentation, assume from the social position of the perpetrators, and/or infer from the historical context. But as social scientists and our own experiences tell us, the motivations and perceptions of those involved in any large-scale collective action are multiple and mutable.10 The Jacquerie was an event experienced and shaped by tens of thousands of people; its interpretation necessarily differed from person to person and from community to community. Nor were these interpretations fixed, but rather developed and changed during the rebellion and through the acts of repression and memory and forgetting that followed.11 But this does not mean that those meanings were limitless or that they are impossible to
investigate. The language of the sources, the organization and objectives of the rebellion, and the violence itself all offer clues to the significance that contemporaries ascribed to the revolt. These windows onto the Jacquerie roughly correspond to the perspectives of the social classes in play: the nobles, the townspeople, and the Jacques themselves. None of them necessarily tells us the ‘truth’ about the Jacquerie. Rather they illustrate the multiplicity of meanings that the Jacquerie could have had and the dangers of sublimating those meanings to a single explanation.

**Language and Narrative: After the Fact**

The search for meaning ought naturally to begin with language, but it is important to recognize that in a sense language is where the Jacquerie itself ended, for we only get sources after the revolt had been put down. We have no documents from the Jacquerie itself: no letters of the type Steven Justice analysed for the English Rising of 1381, no songs or poems of the kind we have for the Hussites.¹² In fact, almost everything dates from after the Dauphin retook Paris in August 1358, that is to say, almost a month after the end of the Jacquerie, and many sources, particularly the narrative ones, were written years or decades later than that. Only the chronicle of Jean le Bel may be contemporaneous, but it is still the product of some distance and reflection. Produced after the fact, the documents are nearly unanimous in describing the Jacquerie in emotional and social terms as a disorganized terror unleashed against the nobility by countrydwellers.

Let us begin with the remissions, these letters of pardon issued by the crown for participants in the revolt and its suppression. The words chosen to label the Jacquerie suggest that the royal chancery perceived and presented the Jacquerie as an event whose import was more
affective than political. The word *Jacquerie* turns up very early, noting the contents of a letter of remission (*Chartre de Jacquerie*) in a royal register from 1360, but the example is unique to my knowledge.  

Jacques, used for the participants, comes up somewhat more frequently and earlier, in a remission from October 1358 (*pluseurs des Jaques de la dite ville*). In neither of these cases is the word defined, though a remission of December 1358 says that the Jacques were people from the countryside (*les gens du plat pais nommez Jaques*). Words with political connotations, like rebellion and esmeute, do appear occasionally (in 7 and 4 per cent of documents, respectively), but in the overwhelming preponderance of cases, the chancery preferred either commotions or effroiz. 37% of the remissions use the word commotions, 53% use effroiz, and 13% employ both words, often together with other terms like monopolies, conspirations, or assemblees.

These words were both relatively rare in normal chancery usage, and both had strong emotional valences. *Commotions* means violent physical shocks, and its Latin root commotio was used not only for uprisings but also for earthquakes. The word effroiz means fears or terrors. In Middle French, the word had connotations of noise and disarray, as well as military associations similar to its English relative ‘affray’. *Le Robert dictionnaire historique* identifies its Latin root as exfridare, to exit from peace, though DuCange thought it came from efférerare, meaning to make savage or brutal. The apolitical, social, and emotional nature of the Jacquerie that is apparent from word-choice is also emphasized in the formula that is employed in about a third of the remissions: The first part of this formula describes the supplicant’s crime as that of ‘having been with others of the neighbouring countryside in the terrors which were recently committed by the people of the countryside against the nobles of the realm’ (*aient este avec plusieurs autres du pais danviron aus effroiz qui derrainement & nagaires ont este faiz par les diz genz du dit plait pais contre les nobles du dit Royaume*).
The affective language used for the Jacquerie stands in contrast to that used for the Parisian rebellion led by Marcel and le Coq against the Dauphin. Letters of remission issued to their partisans portray their activities exclusively in political terms as treason, lèse-majesté, and an attack on the crown. The formula often employed in remissions for Parisian partisans states that the supplicant was implicated in the ‘great treasons, rebellions, conspiracies, armies, cavalcades, attacks and disobediences … by committing public force and the crime of lèse-majesté against our lord (King John II), us (the Dauphin), and the crown of France’ (grans traisons, rebellions, conspirations, armees, chevauchees, invasions & dessobeissances ... en commettant force publique & crime de leze mageste envers & contre nostre dit seigneur nous & la couronne de France). Those remissions do sometimes use emotional language, but they do so in order to describe the interior political state of the supplicant, who had always been ‘a good Frenchman’ (bon & loyal francois) in his ‘heart and mind’ (en cuer et en pensee) despite his misdeeds, rather than to evoke the project’s madness or its victims’ terror.

Chronicle accounts, our other main source for the Jacquerie, echo the emotional tone adopted by remissions for the Jacques. The chronicles are broadly in agreement: The Jacques acted cruelly and irrationally against their target, the nobles, who were terrified. The most famous narrative accounts, those of the chivalric chroniclers Froissart and his source, Jean le Bel, describe the nobles fleeing the Jacques in terror, dressed only in their shirts and carrying their children piggyback, the women in Froissart’s tale being particularly overcome with fear (moult ... effraées). The emotional language is amplified by their reportage that the Jacques had no prior organization or leadership (they were san chief) and their account of the Jacques’s deeds, which in their telling include killing children, gang-rapeing women, and roasting a knight on a spit. The English Anonimalle chronicler took this theme yet farther, accusing ‘Jak Bonehomme’ of revelling in the blood of foetuses torn from their mothers’
wombs and so forth. But even less overwrought writers, such as the stolid Norman chronicler, emphasized that the Jacques acted cruelly and without mercy (*moult cruelement, sanz pitié*). The Picard peasant turned monk usually identified as Jean de Venette, often considered the Jacques’ most sympathetic reporter, nevertheless characterised the rising as a monstrous business, an unheard of thing, and vile and evil doing (*negotium monstruosum, casus inauditus, opera vilia et nefanda*). The chroniclers attribute the rising to the Jacques’ wickedness or insanity: Jean le Bel and Froissart blamed insanity (*rage or forsenerie*), while the royal chronicler attributed the Jacquerie to demonic inspiration (*mauvais esprit*). Again, these are interior, affective explanations, rather than political or circumstantial ones.

It is an obvious point but an important one that the chronicles’ language is at least as indicative of their contexts of composition and the perceptions of literate elites as it is of the realities of the Jacquerie. Marie-Thérèse de Medeiros argued that Jean le Bel and especially Froissart’s stories about the Jacques were strongly influenced by their chivalric ethos, not to mention their aesthetic objectives. Less widely noted but no less critical to interpretation is the way that Jean de Venette fitted the Jacquerie’s inversion of social order into an overarching narrative of miracles, wonders, and portents; the entry for 1358, for example, begins ‘new marvels (*mirabilia*) were piled atop old’. Nor are the archival sources necessarily any more transparent. The lawyers and the chancery clerks who produced the remissions did not have the kind of elaborately considered narrative programs of the chroniclers, but they did have their own compositional conventions. And as Natalie Davis has shown, those who came before the crown to beg for remission were just as interested as Froissart in story-telling, perhaps all the more so when their lives and goods hung in the balance.
In both the chronicles and the remissions, though, there are places where the stories break down. If we look at that handful of royal documents related to the Jacquerie that were issued before the Dauphin retook Paris at the beginning of August and started granting remissions in large number, we do not seem to be dealing with quite the same event as the noisy Terror against the nobles (effroiz contre les nobles) familiar from later on. There are two remissions issued in July, both for noblemen involved in suppressing the Jacques. One, issued for the lords of Grancy and Saint-Dizier alleges that the ‘communes’ of the Perthois and Champagne had conspired to kill them, as well as other noblemen and their wives and children, but non-nobles, as well as nobles are said to have gotten together to put down this conspiracy; the letter mentions the non-nobles’ participation several times.32 The second remission, for two squires in Picardy, presents the crown as a target of the revolt alongside the nobles, characterizing the people of the countryside who had attacked nobles as ‘enemies and rebels of our lord [king] and us’ (ennemis et rebelles de nostre dit seigneur et de nous).33 In addition to these remissions, in June and July the Dauphin issued two donations of Jacques’ property to noblemen serving in his army and granted a market franchise to a knight who had been victimized by the revolt. These grants also identify the crown as a target of the Jacques, and they speak of the uprising in terms similar to those used for the Parisian rebellion, as an attack on and even a war (guerra) against the royal majesty.34

But once the Dauphin retook Paris, the language changed. Possibly this happened because better information became available, or possibly the Dauphin and/or the chancery made a decision to portray the Jacquerie’s relation to the crown and the nobles differently.35 Once victorious, the Dauphin issued a general remission for all the crimes committed in Paris, during the Jacquerie, and during the wave of noble vengeance that had followed.36 In individual remissions issued from August onward the crown is represented as an arbiter between the nobles and the Jacques, attempting to reconcile them after their discord. The
formula which follows the description of the Jacquerie as *effroiz contre les nobles* states that the nobles now hated the countrydwellers and wanted to hurt them, and that the Dauphin, having returned to Paris and remitted the crimes on both sides, requires them to forgive one another (*avons ordenne que touz les diz nobles remettent & pardonnt aus diz genz du plait pais, et aussi les dites genz aus diz nobles*). The crown thus removed itself from the conflict, which was thenceforth portrayed as a binary confrontation between the countrydwellers (*les gens du plat pays*) and the nobles. The documents that precede that effort, though, suggest that there was a time when other narratives were possible, when the crown might have understood the Jacquerie as something other than a terror against the nobility and might have seen itself as equally targeted.

We can also see change in meaning over time in the chronicles of Jean le Bel and Froissart. As is well known, Froissart incorporated much of Jean le Bel’s chronicle into his work, but there is a significant gap between their compositions. Jean le Bel was writing more or less contemporaneously with events in 1358, while Froissart probably produced this part of his chronicle at least 30 years later. Their accounts of the Jacquerie are very similar, in some places word for word, but there are places where they differ. Both writers portrayed the Jacques as a leaderless, frenetic mob, but toward the end of his account, Jean le Bel offers several attempts at explanation that are at odds with this picture, explanations which Froissart decided to omit. Having narrated the Jacques’ atrocities at some length, Jean le Bel says ‘It is hard to see how these horrid people in far-flung places came to act together at the same time’ (*On se doit bien esmerveillier dont ce courage vint à ces meschans gens en divers pays loing l’ung de l’autre et tout en ung mesme temps*). He speculates that perhaps it was the fault of tax collectors who were frustrated that peace with England meant they were out of a job, though he also says that people suspected that Étienne Marcel, Robert le Coq, and Charles of Navarre were behind it. He then goes on to talk about the revenge the nobles took
against the Jacques, but at the very end of the chapter he returns to the problem of organization in a passage whose multiple changes of direction makes it difficult to translate:

One can hardly believe that such people would have dared to undertake such devilry without the help of some others, especially in the kingdom of France. In the same manner [as nobles discussed in the previous passage] the Lord of Coucy summoned people from wherever he could get them; thus he attacked his neighbours and destroyed them and hanged and killed them in such a horrible way as it would be terrible to remember; and these bad people had a captain called Jacques Bonhomme, who was a complete hick (parfait vilain) and who tried to claim that the bishop of Laon had urged him to do this, for he was one of his men. The Lord of Coucy also did not like that bishop.  

Gerald Nachtwey has argued that Froissart’s omission of these passages stems from his efforts to explain the Jacquerie a symptom of a systematic social malaise, a challenge to chivalry in which the aristocrats eventually triumph. This seems self-evidently true, but his explanation for Jean le Bel’s original inclusion of these passages is less convincing. Nachtwey argues that being closer to the terrifying events of the Jacquerie, Jean le Bel needed someone to blame and structured his narrative to point the finger at particular individuals, but the passages do not read as if they are part of a considered narrative framework. Rather, they appear more like afterthoughts or interruptions where the chronicler realized he had something he did not fully understand, but being committed to the truth he had to include anyway. The first passage is sandwiched between his accounts of the Jacquerie’s outbreak and the nobles’ revenge, and the second is simply tacked on to the end of the chapter and moves back and forth in a few lines between different topics, first talking about organization, then describing the response of the Lord of Coucy, then suddenly mentioning this captain Jacques Bonhomme who was connected to Robert le Coq. There is a half-realized effort to link this in narratively by saying that there was also no love lost between Robert le Coq and Coucy, but the transition is very rough. The confusion of this
passage suggests that this is another moment in the creation of a narrative, similar to that of the early remissions and grants, in which the story is not yet fixed. Despite the affecting depiction of noble terror and rural insanity in Jean le Bel and the uses that Froissart will put that to in his far more influential work, the earlier chronicle – again, this is the earliest chronicle – suggests that the Jacquerie might once have meant something other than, or perhaps something as well as, an emotional and social commotion.

**Organization and Objectives**

Many historians have, of course, agreed with Jean le Bel that ‘it’s hard to believe that such people would dare undertake such actions without help’. The geographic extent of Jacquerie alone makes it clear that the Jacques could not have risen as a spontaneous mob, but rather must have made prior arrangements. Over 150 localities, most of them villages, were implicated in the uprising (figure 1). It is possible that they did not all rise quite simultaneously, but even if not, the timing was very close. The first incidents took place on the 28th of May, and by Corpus Christi on the 31st, the whole countryside north and east of Paris was up in arms. Siméon Luce noted many incidents of communication and coordination among the Jacques and between the Jacques and Paris in his book, and more recently, Samuel Cohn, jr. has shown that there is copious evidence of planning and long-distance coordination in many large-scale revolts, including the Jacquerie as well as the Ciompi, and the English Rising. Indeed, if we set aside, at least temporarily, the idea of the Jacquerie as a shapeless social terror, it is easily possible to build up a picture of it that bears less resemblance to a jacquerie than to a planned military venture with political aims similar to acts of war under state authority.
Some observers clearly thought the thing had a distinctly military air. One remission speaks of the Jacques as a host or battalion (*ost & bataille*), and there are at least two references to the Jacquerie as war (*guerra*). The redaction of Froissart’s chronicle now housed at Chicago’s Newberry Library also speaks of the Jacques as a *hoost* and of their *logeis*, or military encampments. The Norman chronicler, who was probably a military man himself, reported that they arranged themselves ‘in good military order’ (*en belle ordonnance*) before combat with the nobles near Poix. The *Chronique des quatres premiers Valois* gives this more flesh, noting that before their battle with the King of Navarre outside Clermont the Jacques formed two battalions of 2,000 men on foot, with the archers in front and the baggage forming a barrier before them, and another battalion of 600 men on horse. He goes
on to say that the Jacques faced off against the nobles ‘in formation, blowing horns and trumpets and loudly crying Mont Joye and bearing many flags painted with the fleur-de-lys’. The detail about the flag is important, for raised banners were a legal indication of warfare in the fourteenth century, and other sources corroborate the presence of flags (vexilla or bannières) among the Jacques.

Organizationally, the Jacques also look more like an army than a mob. Details gleaned from remissions show that they had a hierarchical command structure governed by captains. At the apex of command was the ‘general captain of the countryside’ or ‘great captain of the non-nobles’ mentioned in several remissions, and identified in two of them as the famous Guillaume Calle. Calle is also named as the leader of the Jacquerie in several chronicles, though some remissions speak of him in more limited terms as the leader of the Jacques in the Beauvaisis. Several remissions mention the captains (plural) of the countryside who forced the recipients’ participation, and one remission speaks of these captains as being ‘sovereign’ over the lesser captains in command of villages. The great captain had at least one lieutenant, mentioned without a name in a remission from 1363. This lieutenant may be identified with Germain de Révillon, who commanded the Jacques whilst Calle was besieging Ermenonville, or with Archat of Bulles, styled in one remission as the ‘then (lors) captain of the people of the countryside of Beauvais’, who may have served in Calle’s absence or after his execution on 10 June. The Chronique des ... Valois also mentions a certain hospitaller as Calle’s co-commander, but he has never been identified.

Below this top layer of command, there were individual captains at the village level. We know of nearly twenty individuals serving in this capacity. At least some of them had sub-officers and coherent companies under their orders. The captain of Jaux, for example, had a lieutenant and at least one dizanier (probably in charge of a contingent of ten men), while the
captain of Bessencourt had a counsellor, and the captain of Chambly commanded a company
of eight men on horse and 16 on foot. There were also captains in charge of several villages
or areas, and at least one who commanded a company entrusted with a specific, long-distance
mission. This suggests that there was a middle layer between the great captain or sovereign
captains and those in charge of individual communities. And while the evidence for the
highest level of command is restricted to the Beauvaisis, the evidence for the middle and
communal layers comes from almost every area implicated in the uprising.

Thinking about the Jacquerie as a military undertaking, begs the question in the service of
what or whom? This returns us to the empirical problem that has bedevilled the scholarship:
Why did the Jacquerie occur and what was the relationship between it and the rebellion in
Paris? The preponderance of evidence is on the side of collaboration between the Parisians
and the Jacques. In separate instances, both Pope Innocent IV and the Dauphin himself
claimed that the Parisians had orchestrated the Jacquerie. Many remissions also indicate
collusion: some issued to Parisians state that Marcel had usurped the government not just of
Paris, but of the countryside around it, and that he ‘had given people to believe that the
Dauphin intended to allow the cities and the countryside to be pillaged by soldiers’ (audit
peuple donnent entendre que nous les voulions destruire & faire pillier par noz genz
d’armes). Some for individual Jacques speak of orders from Marcel to destroy all fortresses
and houses prejudicial to the town of Paris and the countryside and to assemble together in
arms and follow the commands of his commissioners. There is evidence of combined
Parisian and Jacques forces in attacks at Ermenonville, Gonesse, and Meaux, and possibly
also at Montépilloy and Palaiseau. Marcel himself, of course, denied that the uprising had
begun with his knowledge and consent in letters he wrote in July, after the Jacquerie had
ended, but his denial was couched in narrow terms, and even there he admitted having
authority over the Jacques, claiming he told them not to kill women and children, at least, so long as they were not enemies of Paris.\textsuperscript{66}

There is substantial support for Raymond Cazelles’s speculation that the Jacquerie was not just used by the Parisians after it had broken out ‘spontaneously’ but had been planned in advance by Marcel and le Coq in cooperation with the revolts’ leaders as a response to the Dauphin’s military efforts against Paris.\textsuperscript{67} We could certainly read the Jacques’ attack on \textit{les nobles} not as (or not just as) an attack on a social group but rather on a party allied with the Dauphin against the reform party that orchestrated the revolt.\textsuperscript{68} In the spring of 1358, \textit{les nobles}, that is, the second estate, had withdrawn from the Estates General, where Marcel held sway, and opposed his reform program. It was \textit{les nobles}, particularly those of Champagne, who had been mostly deeply offended by the murder of the marshals and who used that incident to turn the Dauphin against the Parisians. According to the royal chronicler, the Dauphin had initially accepted Marcel’s explanation for the murders, pardoned the murderers and expressed his wish to be good friends with the Parisians.\textsuperscript{69} The break only came when the Dauphin went to Champagne in April and was taken aside by some noblemen who questioned him about his acquiescence. He admitted some doubts about the men’s guilt and promised to stand with the \textit{champenois} nobility.\textsuperscript{70} On the morrow of this encounter, he headed to the fortress of Montereau and then sent a garrison to Meaux, blockading the river traffic to Paris on the Seine and the Marne, and he began to recruit his army – mostly made up of the regional nobility – to take back the capital.\textsuperscript{71} An attack on the nobility was thus an attack on the Dauphin’s allies.

The Parisian’s concerns are clearly reflected in the first identifiable episode in the Jacquerie, the murder of a nobleman named Raoul de Clermont-Nesle and eight others at the village of Saint-Leu d’Esserent on the 28\textsuperscript{th} of May, an event attested in several chronicles and two
letters of remission. The village, as Cazelles observed, was vital to the Dauphin’s blockade of Paris because it had an important bridge over the Oise River, the only river still open after his occupation of Meaux and Montereau. Saint-Leu was also a quarry town that produced high quality building stone, again key to royal efforts to dominate the countryside by re-fortifying the castles. The control of rivers and building seems to have been a central objective for the Jacquerie as a whole, especially in the Beauvaisis. A line of villages implicated in the revolt runs along the Oise and its tributary the Thérain (see fig. 1), while the other three villages identified by some chronicles as cradles of the Jacquerie were also quarry towns. These foci dovetail neatly with events in Paris, where the day after the violence at Saint-Leu, the townsmen executed the crown’s master carpenter and its master of the bridge, who was responsible for traffic on the Seine.

The events in Saint-Leu were freighted with political as well as military significance for the conflict between Paris and the Dauphin and his noble allies. The murder of Raoul de Clermont-Nesle and his company was not an irrelevant coincidence, but rather a calculated shot across the Dauphin’s bow. Raoul was the nephew of Robert de Clermont, who was one of the marshals murdered by Marcel’s mob in the Dauphin’s presence in February, the act that irrevocably alienated the nobility and eventually the Dauphin from the Parisians and thus set in motion the military confrontation now coming to a head. The symbolic impact of Raoul’s death at the hands of commoners could hardly have been greater, perhaps all the more so as he was the great-nephew and namesake of King Philip the Fair’s constable Raoul de Clermont, who had also been killed by commoners at that great defeat of the French nobility, the Battle of Courtrai in 1302. The remission that describes these events in most detail notes Raoul’s relationship to the murdered marshal, as well as the family’s long history of service to the French crown. Raoul’s death was no accident. Everybody knew what it meant.
Violence and the Social Order

Or did they? For if we can deduce clerics’ and aristocrats’ interpretations of the Jacquerie from their words and those of the Parisians from its aims and organization, understanding how the gens du plat pays themselves thought about things is much more difficult. I have elsewhere concurred with Luce and Cazelles that many of them may have understood the Jacquerie as a defensive measure against predatory soldiers, and that this move might even have been legally defensible given promulgations issued by the Estates General in the king’s name that authorized communal violence against such depredations.⁸⁰ There are indications that the Jacquerie’s leadership may have fostered this impression that the violence was licensed. One of the captains who had been a royal sergeant, for example, was allegedly forced to give commands as if they were from the King or the Dauphin (de par nostre dit seigneur & de par nous).⁸¹ But not all Jacques necessarily participated in this understanding (however valid it might have been). If we look at the Jacques’ violence itself, which Bettina Bommersbach has characterized as their ‘means of communication’, there is much about their actions that cannot be explained solely by military or narrowly political circumstances, but which reflects and was perhaps even productive of a social and emotional aspect of the uprising for the participants themselves.⁸²

The Jacques’ reputation for violence is fearsome, but their actual deeds seem to have been far less extreme than the term jacquerie now suggests or as Jean le Bel and Froissart claimed. There was certainly some interpersonal violence. About half of the remissions say that noblemen were killed, and seven also report interpersonal violence against noblewomen or noble children.⁸³ In addition to Raoul de Clermont-Nesle, we know of at least 12 named noblemen and one woman whom the Jacques killed, and there are also some unnamed victims.⁸⁴ Still, we are very far here from a mindless massacre of gentlemen, let alone of their
dependents. There is even less documentary evidence of sexual violence. Several chronicles report rape, but there is only a single remission that records an accusation of what was probably rape (raptus). None of the few specific noblewomen reportedly victimized by the Jacques was raped, and the only archival document I know of that mentions both the Jacquerie and the rape of a specific noblewomen presents the rape and the revolt as separate, unrelated incidents. Even in Froissart’s chronicle, the non-specificity of the sexual violence is striking. He says that women were raped, but when we get to specific women, it is the fear of rape that we hear about, rather than its actuality.

This is not to say that dastardly deeds did not take place – Luce found some corroborating evidence for the famous story in Jean le Bel that the Jacques roasted a nobleman, for instance – but the bulk of the Jacques’ violence was not directed against nobles’ bodies. Rather, it was focused on the destruction of their fortresses, homes, and goods. Jean le Bel/Froissart reported that the Jacques destroyed more than 140 houses and castles. From other sources, we can identify over 30 castles, fortresses, or towers and 20 houses attacked or destroyed, as well as more than two dozen other places in which the type of building is not specified. These attacks were intended to destroy the buildings; the verb most often used is abattre, to tear down, closely followed by ardoir, to burn. The Jacques were also keen to destroy what was in these buildings. Dissiper leurs biens (to destroy their goods) is how the remissions’ formula puts it. Again mostly they did this by burning. There was also a fair amount of looting. Lawsuits over the property lost or damaged in this way continued well into the 1370s.

What did this violence mean? Attacking castles obviously had a strategic aim consonant with the Parisians’ needs. The Dauphin’s control of the rivers was complemented by his control of the castles, which were in the hands of his allies, les nobles, and the demolition of their
domiciles served as a diversionary tactic, pulling them away from the prince’s planned assault on Paris. There may also have been a judicial element, as the destruction of noxious individuals’ houses or castles was a common punishment. But the Jacques’ attacks on castles can also be read in social rather than or even as well as military (or judicial) terms, for the Jacques seem to have had an antipathy toward castles *per se*. With the possible exception of the great castle at Creil, there is not a single example of a fortress that the Jacques occupied rather than attacked. This may be because fourteenth-century castles’ military uses were inherently odious to the *gens du plat pays*. Castles’ offensive use as strong points from which to raid the surrounding countryside was obviously upsetting to the countryfolk: it was they who were raped and ransomed, their livestock and grain that was taken, and their houses and fields that were burned. But castles’ defensive use as refuges was – perhaps surprisingly – not that much more popular, primarily because it was expensive and inconvenient. In many ways, the local fortress was just another place in which countryfolk paid seigneurial exactions.

Of course, the social meaning of castles, fortresses, and manor houses went beyond their military value and their fiscal burden. Many of these places, at least according to their owners, were beautiful (*pulchra*) and must have been quite different to most of the dwellings of their common-born neighbours (fig. 2 and 3). The nobles’ things were also nicer. We get some sense of this aesthetic difference from a remark in Jean de Venette’s chronicle that is usually translated to mean that the Jacques and their wives got dressed up in the nobles’ clothing and paraded around in their finery. This is not to say, of course, that there was always an insuperable social and economic distance between the nobles and the non-nobles: Nobles and non-nobles intermarried, their children played together, and there were non-nobles who held fortresses and fiefs. But the distinction does seem to have been important to the Jacques: A non-noble whose wife was noble was attacked by the Jacques for that reason; a youths’ rough
game turned actually violent when a commoner teased his noble playmate about the Jacques’ exploits; and a commoner’s châteaux et heritages did not keep him from joining those who ‘made themselves adversaries of the realm’s nobles’.  

The link between this social meaning of nobility and its political/fiscal and in turn military implications is inextricable. The reason nobles lived in fortresses was because they could physically coerce the peasants into handing over their surplus (whilst they themselves remained often exempt from royal taxation), and the reason they could do that was because they were a warrior aristocracy who lived in fortresses. This is an oversimplification of the complex and changing situation of the late medieval French nobility, but this nexus of economic, political and military privilege inherent in noblesse seems nonetheless to have been at the heart of the Jacquerie for its rank and file participants. Their attack on the nobles was not about the weight of local lordship per se, but about the entire system of social
difference based on violence (real or threatened) against commoners’ bodies and their property. The Jacques did not primarily attack their own lords. The sources describe their targets in the aggregate as ‘the nobles’ (les nobles), not ‘the lords’ (les seigneurs), and it is notable that ecclesiastical lordships were left untouched. The importance of nobility to ordinary Jacques, whatever their commanders’ orders, can be seen in the inhabitants of Gonesse’s objection to the attack on Pierre d’Orgemont’s property that ‘Pierre was not a noble’ (Petrum non esse nobilem) and the mercy shown by other Jacques to Robert de Lorris when he renounced his nobility (regnia gentilesse).

There are cases in which we know that Jacques attacked targets in their own villages, including their own lords. But many Jacques travelled, first assembling elsewhere and then attacking in combination with other villages, sometimes in concert with local inhabitants, as happened in Saint-Leu. Under 15% of the localities from which Jacques originated also experienced attacks from them, and GIS analysis shows that the geographic centre of Jacquerie hometowns was over 26 km away from the geographic centre of attacks. Far from taking vengeance against their subjects, a number of lords intervened on their behalf after the Jacquerie, petitioning the king for their remission and complaining about their victimization by other nobles or royal commissioners. Nor were local inhabitants always entirely enthusiastic about the revolt. The villagers of Épieds, for example, claimed that they only participated in the attack on a local knight’s manors because ‘a great number of countrydwellers came to the village and forced them to do it … which displeased them’ (grant nombre des genz du plat pays vinrent en la dite ville & par contrainte furent avec eulz a faire les diz malefices … dont il leur desplaisoit forment). Obviously their testimony was self-serving, but it does give a sense, confirmed by other indications, that local, individual relationships were not always as key to mobilizing violence as opposition to more generalized social relations.
But was this attack on the social system always the or at least a fundamental meaning of the uprising for its participants? Most historians of the Jacques are certain that it was, that whatever the spark that ignited the Jacquerie, it landed upon the driest of tinder. For some, that hatred was the product of centuries, finally bursting forth at this moment.\(^{106}\) Others point to more recent complaints about the nobility’s failure to protect first the King at Poitiers and then the countrydwellers afterward.\(^{107}\) We can find elements of this sort of moral economy argument in most of the chronicles, even in Froissart/le Bel where the Jacquerie begins with the Jacques’ accusation that the nobles had shamed and pillaged the realm (\textit{les nobles ... honissoient et gastoient le royaume}), and there are echoes of it in some remissions.\(^{108}\) Nor is this moral economy argument necessarily incompatible with the strategic military explanation: As the Norman chronicler explains, the Dauphin had allowed the nobles to pillage their own people so that they could victual the castles enabling them to blockade Paris, which led the peasants to say that ‘the knights who ought to have protected them had colluded to take all their goods’. He adds, ‘For this reason, they revolted’ (\textit{Pour ce fait s’esmeurent}).\(^{109}\)

It is also possible, though, that the social aspect of the revolt might have developed or become sharpened during the course of the rebellion. The non-nobles’ experience of committing violence against nobles, the very act of challenging the military aspect of their dominance, may have led them inevitably to question the social structure. In a parallel case from the twelfth-century Auvergne, John Arnold has argued that the movement of the \textit{capuciati}, which began as a peace-keeping association against mercenaries, underwent a transformation, becoming an anti-noble movement not only for their terrified elite observers but possibly also for the \textit{capuciati} themselves who ‘having usurped the lords’ ability to command the battlefield’ may also have found ‘the necessary confidence to express a radical challenge to the existing hierarchy’.\(^{110}\) The brevity of the Jacquerie in comparison to that
movement, which lasted several years, and the *post facto* nature of the Jacquerie documentation, makes it harder to isolate that development here, but Jean de Venette’s chronicle does offer us a glimmer of this hypothetical process. Explaining the origin of the name *Jacques Bonhomme*, he says it began as a derisive term that the nobles gave to the countryfolk (the *rustici*), but he says ‘in the year that the countryfolk ‘rustically’ carried their arms into battle they took up this name for themselves (*nomen … acceperunt*) and abandoned the name *rustici*. Jean de Venette’s story relates to peasants who went to war in 1356 against the English, not to the Jacquerie itself, but it does intimate that the act of taking up arms transformed the rustics and enabled them to appropriate their nickname, transforming it from one of ridicule to one of threat. The Jacquerie may not have been originally planned as a social rebellion, but when the countryfolk marched across the countryside in their battalions, under their banners, burning down the infrastructure of noble domination, they may have started to think about themselves and their relationship to the nobility differently than they had before.

**Conclusion**

What the Jacquerie meant to its participants and observers was varied and fluid. Recovering those meanings from the sources requires thinking about how and why people made their interpretative moves, as well as how their interpretations might change over time. As John Arnold observes, ‘The successful motivation of large groups to collective action both requires and inspires acts of imagination; to ask which comes first is perhaps to miss the messy, partly aleatory, nature of such events’. There were many acts of imagination that made the Jacquerie mean something – or some things – for its contemporaries. Penetrating that thicket of beliefs, hopes, intentions, fears, and lies presents difficulties, but we can
penetrate it. We do not need to pare it back to a single, immutable interpretation. We can unpack the sources’ language of social and emotional chaos that obscures the Jacquerie’s connection the Parisian rebellion, but we need not reduce the revolt to its leaders’ strategic objectives any more than we should define it by the chancery’s talk of terror. As much in the eyes of its protagonists as of its victims, the Jacquerie was also a war of non-nobles against nobles and an inherent challenge to the social order. These interpretations are not contradictory, nor even necessarily complementary. The Jacquerie simply meant different things to different people at different times.

It is tempting to generalize this insight to revolts at large, especially as similarities can be found elsewhere in this volume in discussions of the English Rising of 1381 and the sixteenth-century War of the Communities of Castile. I would urge some caution, though, at least in degree. All large-scale, collective actions must have some ‘fuzzy edges’, but this indefinite quality may be especially pronounced in these kinds of very big revolts with major rural components, which though famous, were relatively rare.113 By contrast with their rustic counterparts, urban rebels had long traditions of ‘contentious politics’ and very complex systems of internal governance and social differentiation. They could employ pre-existing infrastructure and rhetoric, as well as an established repertoire of provocative acts, including the production of documents, for staking their claims.114 Rural rebels, of course, were not without socio-political infrastructure or traditions stemming from practices as diverse as cooperative agriculture, the maintenance of the parish church, or collective legal action.115 The Jacques clearly employed existing village organization, and they might well have remembered earlier uprisings, such as a revolt outside Laon in 1338, the great Flemish Maritime Revolt of 1323–28 and its antecedents, or a number of thirteenth-century fiscal uprisings south of Paris about which we know too little.116 The Jacquerie had echoes in later rural rebellions, even far away or long in the future.117 But neither the Jacques themselves nor
their immediate ancestors had ever really done this before. What it meant was open to interpretation.

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8 Luce, *Histoire*, published excerpts from the chronicles and several dozen of the remissions. S. K. Cohn, jr. translated much of this material: *Popular Protest in Late Medieval Europe: Italy, France, and Flanders*, Manchester: Manchester, 2004, pt. 3. I have also located several dozen previously unknown or unexploited documents from civil cases in the Parlement court (AN X1a series) and in the records of settlements between parties (AN X1c).


AN JJ 88, no. 43, fol. 29v. The registry entry only mentions the letter without transcribing it.

AN JJ 86, no. 430, fol. 151r. About a dozen other instances including, AN JJ 88, no. 9, fol. 7r; AN JJ 89, no. 377, fol. 159; AN JJ 90, no. 354, fol. 182, ed. Luce, *Histoire*, no. 49; AN JJ 90, no. 488, fol. 244r, ed. Luce, *Histoire*, no. 50; AN JJ 145, no. 498, fol. 229v-30r; next note.

AN JJ 87, no. 117, fol. 80v–1r.

The use of *effroiz* is almost entirely restricted to remissions. In contrast, Parlement documents almost exclusively employ *comotions*.


<http://www.atilf.fr/dmf/definition/effrayer>.


AN JJ 86, no. 205, fol. 67r, granted in August 1358, appears to be the earliest letter with this formula.

E.g. AN JJ 86, no. 289, fol. 96v–7r. On the contrast with the Jacquerie remissions, see Aiton, ““Shame””, pp. 38–40.
22 AN JJ 86, no. 216, 70v-71r; AN JJ 86, no. 220, fol. 72v; AN JJ 86, no. 271, fol. 91r, among others.


33 AN JJ 86, no. 165, fol. 54v, ed. Luce, *Histoire*, no. 20.

34 ‘pluribus habitatoribus patrie Belvacensis & nonullorum aliorum qui guerram, controversiam seu monopolium contra regis maiestatem, nobiles & fideles dicti Regni machinaverant’ (AN JJ 86, no. 152, fol. 51v); ‘genz du plat pays de Beauvoisis & d’ailleurs qui nagueieres soy rendoient adversaires des nobles du dit Royaume et Rebelles de la coronne de france, de monsire & de nous’ (AN JJ 86, no. 153, fol. 51v); ‘par les communes & habitanz d’environ leur pais Rebelles a nostre dit seigneur & a nous & ennemis de touz nobles du dit Royaume’ (AN JJ 86, no. 173, fol. 56r).


36 AN JJ 86, no. 241, fol. 80, ed. Luce, *Histoire*, no. 23.

37 e.g. AN JJ 86, no. 205, fol. 67r.


40 ‘Comment eust on poeu penser que telles gens eussent osé encommencier celle dyablerie, sans le confort d’aucuns aultres certainement, il est à croire mesmement ou royaume de France. Par semblable maniere manda le sire de Coussy gens partout où il le poeu avoir; si


44 Flammermont, ‘La Jacquerie’, 130, n. 2; ‘la feste du saint Sacrement l’an mil ccc lvii ou environ que ladite commotion commenca’ (AN JJ 100, no. 478, fol. 148r). See also AN JJ 86, no. 387, fol. 133v–4r, ed. Luce, Histoire, no. 37; AN JJ 90, no. 148, fol. 79v–80r; AN X1c 32, no. 31.

46 AN JJ 89, no. 377, fol. 159; Guerra: AN JJ 86, no. 152, fol. 51v; AN X2a 7, fol. 213r.

47 Chicago, Newberry Library, MS F.37, fol. 168v; see n. 38, above. A transcription is available from the online Froissart <http://www.hrionline.ac.uk/onlinefroissart>.

48 Chronique normande, ed. Molinier and Molinier, p. 129.

49 Chronique des quatre premiers Valois (1327-1393), ed. S. Luce, Paris: Mme V e Jules Renouard, 1862, p. 73.


Aiton, “‘Shame’”, pp. 217–45 discusses the importance of captains, while denying hierarchy.

‘Guillaume Cale, soi portant general capitaine dudit plat païs’ (AN JJ 86, no. 365, fol. 124v–5r, ed. Luce, Histoire, no. 35); ‘Guillaume Calle, lors capitaine de dictes gens du plat pays’ (AN JJ 98, no. 252, fol. 80, ed. Luce, Histoire, no. 63); ‘magno capitaneo dictorum innobilium’ (AN JJ 94, no. 4, fol. 3v, ed. Luce, Histoire, no. 61); ‘ex parte Capitani plane seu plate patrie tunc electi vel deputati’ (AN JJ 86, no. 606, fol. 223v–4r).


‘les Capitaines du dit païs contraindrent’ (AN JJ 90, no. 148, fol. 79v–80r); ‘par la contrainte et enortement des capitaines du dit plat païs’ (AN JJ 86, no. 345, fol. 117); ‘du mandement de plusieurs capitaines du plat païs’ (AN JJ 86, no. 437, fol. 154, ed. V. de Beauvillé, Histoire de la ville de Montdidier, 2nd edn, 3 vols, Paris: Imprimerie de J. Claye, 1875, 1: 112–14); ‘ait este Capitaine subget des souverains capitaines du plat païs’ (AN JJ 86, no. 344, fol. 116v–17r).

AN JJ 94, no. 4, fol. 3v ed. Luce, Histoire, no. 61.

Chronique des ... Valois, ed. Luce, p. 71.

Jaux: AN JJ 86, no. 361–2, fol. 123–24r; Bessancourt: AN X1a 19, fol. 348v-50r; Chambly: AN JJ 90, no. 354, fol. 182 (ed. Luce, Histoire, no. 49).

Philippe Poignant (royal sergeant and guardian of the bishop of Beauvais and the monks of St-Denis) was captain of 4 towns between the Oise and the Thérain Rivers (AN JJ 90, no. 148, fol. 79v–80r); Simon Doublet, captain of 3 towns in Picardy (AN JJ 86, no. 392, fol. 136); Jean Flagelot, captain of several towns in the Perthois (AN JJ 90, no. 292, fol. 149v–50r, ed. Luce, Histoire, no. 46), and Jaquin de Chenevières, captain of the lands of Montmorency (AN JJ 86, no. 207, fol. 67v, ed. Luce, Histoire, no. 25). Particular mission: AN JJ 90, no. 294, fol. 150, ed. Luce, Histoire, no. 48.

The possible exception is the region south of Paris, where we have only Jean Charroit, named individually in a communal remission for the villages of Boissy and Egly, which may indicate he had a leadership role (AN JJ 86, no. 215, fol. 70).


63 AN JJ 86, no. 282, fol. 94 among others. This language was borrowed from the general letter of remission issued for the Parisians on 10 August 1358 (AN JJ 86, no. 240, fol. 79–80r, ed. in E. de Laurière, D.-F. Secousse, et al. (eds), *Les ordonnances des rois de la troisième race...,* 21 vols, Paris: Imprimerie royale and others, 1723–1849, 4: 346–8).


69 *Chronique des règnes*, ed. Delachenal, 1: 151

70 ibid., 1: 165–7.


74 Durvin, ‘Les origines’.

75 See also AN JJ 90, no. 148, fol. 79v-80r and AN JJ 86, no. 207, fol. 67v, ed. Luce, *Histoire*, no. 25 for rivers.


77 Luce, *Histoire*, pp. 69–70.


80 Firnhaber-Baker, ‘À son de cloche’.

81 He claims to have refused (AN JJ 90, no. 148, fol. 79v–80r). See also AN X1a 19, fol. 476-77, ed. Luce, *Histoire*, no. 57 at p. 318; Cazelles, ‘La Jacquerie’, pp. 657, 662.

83 AN JJ 86, no. 142, fol. 49, ed. Luce, *Histoire*, no. 21; AN JJ 86, no. 207, fol. 67v, ed. Luce, *Histoire*, no. 25; AN JJ 86, no. 241, fol. 80, ed. Luce, *Histoire*, no. 23; AN JJ 88, no. 1, fol. 1–2; AN JJ 90, no. 425, fol. 212v–13r; AN JJ 90, no. 556, fol. 275v–6r (the only one to report actual violence – drowning – against a specific, named woman); and AN JJ 108, no. 86, fol. 55.

84 E.g. the eight noblemen who accompanied Raoul de Clermont-Nesle at St-Leu; ‘plusieurs autres’ who fell in a battle in Ponthieu (AN JJ 89, no. 377, fol. 159); an unidentified squire killed near Compiègne (AN JJ 86, no. 444, fol. 156, ed. Luce, *Histoire*, no. 39); and an unnamed nobleman killed near Pontpoint when it was discovered that he was a spy (AN JJ 96, no. 425, fol. 145; ed. Luce, *Histoire*, no. 62).

The most illuminating story in this regard is that of Mahieu de Roye’s family, which appears only in Chicago, Newberry Library, MS F.37, vol. 2, fol. 168–9r (transcribed at <http://www.hrionline.ac.uk/onlinefroissart>). I am grateful to Godfried Croenen for drawing my attention to this story. For Froissart’s narrative use of rape see de Medeiros, *Jacques et chroniqueurs*, ch. 2.

Dijon, AD de la Côte-d’Or B 1451, fol. 85v (recording a donation of 1 franc made in 1377 by the Duke of Burgundy to ‘une povre dame de Peronne qui eust son filz Rosti par les Jaques’). I am grateful to the AD Côte-d’or for providing me with an image of the document.

E.g. In 1364, a squire sued a Jacques for damages of 300 écus incurred during the ‘commotio gentium de plana patria’ when he and other ‘nonnobles’ burned the squire’s house (hospicius) and stole his goods (AN X1a 18, fol. 204r).

A droit d’arsin authorized Flemish communities to destroy the homes and castles of publicly offensive individuals: A. Delcourt, *La vengeance de la commune: l’arsin et l’abattis de maison en Flandre et en Hainaut*, Lille: É. Raoust, 1930. Many northern French communities also had this right (*ibid.*, pp. 20–3), and French royal courts sometimes meted out this punishment to violent nobles, e.g. AN X1a 12, fol. 239v–40r. J. Dumolyn sees this as a keystone of communal mobilization in Flemish rebellions: ‘The vengeance of the commune: sign systems of popular politics in medieval Bruges’, in Oliva Herrer et al. (eds), *La comunidad*, pp. 251–89. See also Challet’s chapter in this volume.

J. le Bel, *Chronique*, ed. Viard and Déprez, 2: 259 reports that the nobles went to Creil because they thought the Jacques were based there. He does not say whether they were right. One Jacques repaired to the fortress of Cramoisy, but this was after (depuis) the revolt (AN JJ 90, no. 378, fol. 239).


100 Three remissions for villages in Champagne say that the Jacquerie was directed against both clerics and nobles, but this was not a general feature of the revolt (AN JJ 86, no. 357, fol. 122, ed. Luce, *Histoire*, no. 31, confirmed at AN JJ 95, no. 19, fol. 9v–10r; AN JJ 90, no. 271, fol. 139v–140r; and AN JJ 95, no. 22, fol. 10v–11r). On clerical participation, see Luce, *Histoire*, pp. 64–5.


102 E.g. AN X1c 32a, no. 30–31, an accord between the lord of Vez and his subjects.

103 My thanks to H. Ward for analyzing my data as part of module SG4228 at the University of St Andrews.

104 AN JJ 86, no. 346, fol. 117v–18r; AN JJ 86, no. 357, fol. 122, ed. Luce, no. 31; AN JJ 86, no. 377–9, fol. 129–30r; AN JJ 90, no. 564, fol. 279r; AN JJ 95, no. 22, fol. 10v–11r; AN JJ 107, no. 185, fol. 87.

105 AN X1c 11, no. 61–2.
106 Flammermont, ‘La Jacquerie’ 129.

Bommersbach, ‘Gewalt’, 50–62; Firnhaber-Baker, ‘À son de cloche’; but cf. idem, ‘Soldiers,
villagers, and politics’ for lack of pillage in the Jacquerie heartlands.

108 e.g. AN JJ 86, no. 585, fol. 212 and AN JJ 86, no. 267, fol. 89v-90r, ed. Luce, *Histoire*, no. 36.


112 Arnold, ‘Religion and popular rebellion’, p. 159.

113 Cohn, *Lust for Liberty*, ch. 2.


