A STUDY IN THE DOCTRINE OF FORGIVENESS AND ATONEMENT

David Russell Scott

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A Study

In the Doctrine of Forgiveness and Atonement

A Thesis.

Presented to, -

The University of St. Andrews,

For the Degree of D. Litt.

Ph.D. awarded for a thesis of this title 1923.

Signed: D. Russell Scott

I, David Russell Scott, M.A. Edin., B.A. Oxon. Hon. in Theol., declare that this Thesis is my own composition. That it has not been presented for any other purpose than as stated above, and that it is a record of work done by myself, as a Research Student for six years in the University of St. Andrews.

(Signed) D. Russell Scott.
A STUDY in the DOCTRINE of FORGIVENESS and ATONEMENT.

CONTENTS

Introduction.

A. Biblical.

(i) The doctrine in the Old Testament.

B. Historical.

(i) The Sub-Apostolic Period.
(ii) The Greek Theology.
(iii) The Latin Theology.
(iv) Mediaeval Scholasticism.
(v) The Reformers.
(vi) The Socinian Criticism and the Reply of Grotius.
(vii) Schleiermacher.
(viii) Ritschl.
(ix) McLeod Campbell.

C. An attempt at constructive criticism.

(i) Sin.
(ii) Punishment.
(iii) Repentance.
(iv) /
(iv) Forgiveness.
(v) Personality and Salvation.
(vi) The Death of Christ as the Revelation of His Personality.
(vii) The Cross and Sin: "He bore our sins."
(viii) The Redeemer and the Redeemed; Final and Progressive Atonement.
(ix) The Metaphysic of Atonement.
INTRODUCTION.

This study consists of three parts, a Biblical, an historical and a constructive. In the Biblical part there are two sections, one dealing with the Old, the other with the New Testament material. The study of the Old Testament reveals, that there are no grounds in the Old Testament for the conception of substituted sacrifice or substituted penalty, as a necessity for the operation of the Divine Forgiveness. According to the Old Testament, God forgives because of His forgiving character on the one condition of Repentance. There is no necessity for a transaction, for a ritual of sacrifice, to make God a forgiving God. God forgives, atones, redeems, for His name's sake. This is not to say, that forgiveness in the Old Testament, is an easy thing with God. It demands patience and longsuffering, and the laying aside of wrath and condemnation. Forgiveness is a great moral reality to God, as it is no less, in the Old Testament, for man, for it implies moral purification; it is no mere acquittal from past offences.

In dealing with the New Testament in an exegetical manner there are certain dangers. The first is, to lose the obvious in exegetical detail. Whatever else is plain in the New Testament, it is plain, that, there, the divine forgiveness in the experience of men is a profounder reality than in the Old, that, through /
through Christ, forgiveness has been revealed with a richness of moral and spiritual meaning unknown in the older dispensation, and that this revelation has its source and centre in the Cross of Calvary. As the divine forgiveness is in itself a profounder reality, so it is profounder and more far-reaching in its results. These are amongst the obvious facts regarding forgiveness in the New Testament, and here, as always, we are in danger of missing the obvious. Another danger is, that, in exegetical and philological zeal, metaphors and symbols are strained, and words are interpreted with a philological nicety, of which the writers were perfectly innocent. A third danger is, that, in the interests of a preconceived theory or in the desire for definite and precise doctrine, we may search the pages of the New Testament for a theory or a definite doctrine, and so have the satisfaction of pronouncing it, the New Testament doctrine or theory. The writers of the New Testament, however, had no intention of imitating this satisfaction. They were not concerned with the setting forth of a theory or a doctrine: what they declare is a living experience, the vitality of which was their motive and compulsion. And so, while there was a unity in their experience, there was variety in its expression. For the understanding of this experience, exegesis, by itself, is inadequate. Indeed, any exegesis of the New Testament material leaves /
leaves the feeling, that we have missed attaining the truth, perhaps, indeed, veiled it. Here, if anywhere, it is the heart that makes the theologian.

The value of the New Testament for the doctrine of forgiveness lies in the fact, that in the brief period, which it covers, the experience of forgiveness and atonement burned in human hearts with a brightness and intensity, that have never been surpassed. The New Testament is the locus classicus of the forgiven life. Why this is so, we may not be able to explain; no doubt the nearness of the writers and of their fellow Christians to Christ Crucified and the wondrous newness and originality of the forgiven life have something to do with it; for deeper explanation, we would be driven to a doctrine of providence or to some philosophy of history. Whatever the reasons, the fact remains. When our own souls lose sense of the greatness of redeeming and forgiving love, when the Church loses its way in moralities and formalities, it is to the New Testament - to the experience enshrined in its pages - that return must be made for the recovery of life and reality. To share in that experience is to know the meaning of forgiveness and atonement. And, at the centre of this experience, its very heart and source, is Christ Crucified. Without Him the experience would be meaningless; indeed it never would have been at all.

The second part of the study, the historical - makes, of course, /
course, no claim to be complete or adequate. There are large
gaps and the narrative ends with Macleod Campbell. But suf-
ficient of the history has been dealt with to show the different
forms, which theorising and theory, upon the experience of the
forgiven and redeemed life, took. Some of the theorising was
false and is adjudged so at the bar of reason and conscience,
and the reason of the falseness is due to that divorce of theory
from reality, which seems inevitable, whenever we begin to
theorise our experience and to give it intellectual expression.

But no theory of forgiveness, without its elements of truth, for
the divorce was never absolute. We may read pages of forensic
argument or of hard intellectualism, we may come across ideas
grotesque and absurd, that have been used to interpret the
reality of Atonement, we may feel, that there is no truth and no
meaning in them, but suddenly, the truth will appear, peering
and piercing through a mass of waste sophistry, showing, that
amidst all the theorising, which seemed so useless and foreign,
the truth was not far away, living still in the experience, when
theory appeared to have blotted it out. The history is like
the New Testament in this, that it exhibits more than one form
of doctrine but under only the forms there is a unity of ex-
perience; the theologians know what the forgiven life is and
that Christ Crucified is its source. No exposition of recent
theories has been given. To do this with any adequacy, would
have required a book in itself. But it is questionable, whether
in /
in the most recent literature any new ideas have emerged: there are modifications, different emphases, new accommodations, but hardly a new and distinctive type of doctrine.

In the short considerations of Schleiermacher and Ritschl, the exposition has gone somewhat wider than the doctrine of forgiveness, for these two theologians attempted a unified system in theology, and the part is best seen and can only be judged in relation to the whole. In the case of MacLeod Campbell, an attempt has been made to give a free reproduction of his thought.

The third part, - an attempt at constructive criticism - must speak for itself. Sufficient to state here, that two principles may be regarded as guiding the attempt. The one is, that Atonement (not Incarnation) is the central and interpretative truth of the New Testament and of Christian religion, and, ought to be, in Christian theology, or, in other words, that the Cross is the interpretative fact for the Person of Christ, for the nature of God and for Christian experience. It is through action, that we interpret life and being, and it is through the action of the Cross, that we interpret the life and being of Christ and of God. And the second guiding principle has been to try to interpret the Cross in personal terms, for the Cross is, above all things, personal action, the revelation of Personality. And as the Cross is personal action and the revelation of personality in itself, so, in its results, it is personal, its results /
results are in personality.

A word as to nomenclature. Forgiveness, Atonement, Redemption and Salvation are used as practically synonymous. The terms all represent one concrete experience; they may each represent a different aspect of that experience, but theology has not precisely defined and delimited these terms to the different aspects, and, as has been said, they are used synonymously. Redemption, in spite of its negativeness and associations, is the favourite word of the writer: it emphasises the fact, that the forgiven and saved life is forgiven and saved at a great cost.
The TEACHING of the OLD TESTAMENT regarding ATONEMENT and FORGIVENESS.

In the Old Testament there is no technical definition, specifically expressed doctrine, of Forgiveness. In its literature, God's forgiveness is presented as a moral experience, the reality of which does not require proof or analysis. But while that is so, Forgiveness was in the history of Israel an experienced relation between God and man; as such, it had its divine sources and its human conditions, by an analysis of which, we can attain to what may be regarded as the Old Testament doctrine.

In the great prophetic period of Israel's life - the period of Amos, Hosea, Isaiah and Micah - the source of forgiveness is in God, especially in His righteous, long suffering and loving nature. The forgiveness, which has its source in the very nature of God was the inspiration of the prophet's word, the ground of his hope for Israel. Amos, the prophet of social righteousness, whose God is righteous, demanding, that "judgment shall roll down as waters and righteousness as a mighty stream," cries, 'Seek God and ye shall live, as Yahwe the God of hosts hath spoken.' The forgiveness which is life, (ye shall live) is due to the word of God. It has its source in the divine will.
will and ordinance. Even when Amos is the prophet of judgment and divine wrath, declaring that "the day of the Lord" (יָסוֹד לַORD) will bring judgment and doom to Israel and not to the foes of Israel alone, as the people blindly imagine, he does not lose sight of forgiveness, for, through the experiences of "the day of the Lord," a remnant will be forgiven and made righteous, a remnant by which the nation will be finally saved. The divine Judgment is a method of the divine forgiveness.

The position of Hosea, with his conception of a Loving God, is that, if the people only knew God, realised his true nature, they would turn to Him and receive His forgiveness with all its blessings. "As a true husband would yearn to forgive an erring wife, as a father yearns to forgive his prodigal child, so Yahwe yearns to forgive His ignorant and senseless children. Let them return (repent) and He will betroth them unto Himself for ever, yea He will betroth them unto Himself in righteousness and in judgment, in loving kindness and in mercy." He will not execute the fierceness of His anger, He will not destroy Ephraim; for He is God and not man, the Holy One in the midst of them. He will heal their backsliding; He will love them freely, for His anger is turned away from them. He will be as the dew unto Israel; and Israel shall blossom as the lily and cast forth his roots as Lebanon. God is God, the Holy One, loving men out of His own nature, revealing His love in /
in an infinite forgiveness.

To Isaiah, Holy, holy, holy is the Lord of Hosts, but it is from the altar of the Holy God, from the inmost presence of His life, that the hot stone is taken, that touches the lips, takes away the iniquity and forgives the sin. "And the Lord saith, come now and let us reason together, though your sins be as scarlet, they shall be as white as snow; though they be red like crimson, they shall be as wool, for the mouth of the Lord hath spoken it." God is, and has declared Himself to be, the Pardoner of Sin.

Micah has declared the same truth. "Who is a God like unto Thee, that pardoneth iniquity and passeth by the remnant of His heritage? He retaineth not His anger for ever, because He delighteth in mercy. He will turn again and have compassion upon us; He will tread our iniquities under foot and Thou wilt cast our sins into the depths of the sea. Thou wilt perform the truth to Jacob, which Thou hast sworn to our Fathers from the days of old." Because God delights in mercy, because the truth of His own being is what it is and what it has been revealed, He forgives sin. God is, by nature, a God of Pardon.

The validity of this conception of God was not considered by the prophets. They were not philosophers nor theologians. To them the conception was of the nature of a moral conviction, and had the validity of experience. But this conviction had the /
the authority of past history. Hosea never tires of recalling
the deeds done by Yahwe in the origins and making of Israel.
In the days of the birth of the nation Jacob overreached himself,
but he wept and supplicated Him, and at Bethel he found God, and
there God spake with us, Yahwe God of hosts, Yahwe is His name.
And again, when Israel was young, 'I came to love Him, out of
Egypt I called my son.' It was to the deliverance out of Egypt
that the prophets look back as the great proof of Yahwe's for­
giveness and love, and the whole history, from that act onwards,
was a testimony to the consistency of Yahwe's character. The
prophetic conception of Yahwe as a forgiving God did not arise
simply out of individual inspiration or intuition. Hosea drew
deep from the well of individual experience, but his conception
of God was not based on individual experience, but upon the past
experience of the nation and upon what Yahwe had revealed Himself
to be in that experience. Yahwe had in the past revealed His
name, that is, His character, as forgiving, and so we find, that
Forgiveness is sometimes represented as being for His name's
sake.

"Help us, O God, of our salvation,
In the glory of Thy name
Deliver us and purge away our sins
As thy name's sake.
Wherefore should the nations say
'Where is their God?'"

The conception had for the prophets the validity of their
own /
own moral experience and of the past history of the nation. And the conception had the validity of all moral experience; for forgiveness is a necessity of any moral experience at all. Moral experience, in the form of moral repentance, could not exist without the reality of forgiveness. Were there no forgiveness in the moral order, (whether such an order could be called moral is questionable), there could be no repentance, no turning from evil to good, no progress, no striving after higher ideals. Forgiveness is part of the moral order, it controls moral experience; without it there could be no moral order, and no moral experience. The prophetic conception of a divine forgiveness finds confirmation in all genuine moral experience; wherever that exists, the truth and reality of a forgiving God are not far distant.

We may approach this question of the validity of the conception of a forgiving God in another way. The argument is both 

\textit{opposition} and \textit{ad hominem}, but it is not without its force. If God is conceived as the ultimate ideal reality, then we are compelled to regard His character as forgiving and forgiveness as essential to His nature, for the ultimate reality would be deficient, did it not contain the moral element of forgiveness. A man utterly devoid of this characteristic would fall short of true manhood, so God would fall short of His Godhood, were He not essentially and perfectly forgiving. God would not be God unless He forgives.
To return to the prophetic doctrine. Repentance was to them the one and only condition of receiving the divine forgiveness. Repentance is the realisation of the divine forgiving love in man's experience. "Seek ye me, and ye shall live (Amos) "O Israel return, Yahwe, thy God", (Hosea 14:1.) "Take with you words and return unto the Lord." The people hoped to influence Yahwe and to win His favour by gifts and sacrifices, by all the outward tokens of penitence. Against all this easy method of winning the divine favour the prophets set their faces. "Will the Lord be pleased with thousands of rams, or with ten thousand rivers of oil? Shall I give my firstborn for my transgression, the fruit of my body for the sin of my soul?" By returning to obedience, by actual repentance would the people, according to the prophet's view, receive Yahwe's forgiving love and experience again all the tokens of His favour. The prophets assumed the fact of repentance in the same way, as they assumed that of forgiveness. It was to them a fact of moral experience unsophisticated by any psychological or metaphysical theories. To all easy and fictitious methods of obtaining the divine forgiveness and favour, they opposed one that was rational and moral.

The prophetic doctrine then is, in reality, simple and consistent. God forgives, just because He is what He is. The motives to forgiveness are in Himself, in His compassion and love, in His own nature and name. The condition of receiving this forgiveness /
forgiveness and obtaining the divine favour, life and salvation, is genuine moral repentance.

A word requires to be said as to the content of forgiveness. What did forgiveness concretely mean, when, by repentance, it was received by the nation? It meant the favour of God, shown in material blessings, in peace, security and national prosperity; it meant a return, on the part of the people, to the enjoyment of the covenant relation with God. Moral and spiritual as was the genius of the great prophets, they never completely dissociated forgiveness from deliverance and the possession of a fruit-land. "Do good, repent, receive the divine forgiveness and ye shall possess the land" was their message. The fruits of forgiveness were shown in the market place rather than in the soul. In estimating this point, we have to remember, that to the prophetic mind the subject of Forgiveness was the nation in its unity rather than the individual, and it is difficult to see how, with the nation as subject, the fruits of forgiveness could be presented in any other way.

The same fact has to be borne in mind in considering Repentance, the sole condition of receiving the divine Forgiveness. It was to the nation as a whole that the appeal was made. But this did not, in any way, diminish the ethical content of the act. Repentance (/archive) expresses a genuine στάνυος. To repent, with Amos, is to turn from evil to the morally good; More /
More deeply and more religiously with Hosea, from the worship of idols to the service of a loving God. There is a passage in Hosea where the need for reality in repentance is emphasised. The prophet represents the people as fondly saying,

"Come and let us return unto the Lord, that He may heal us, For He has smitten and He will bind us up, After two days He will revive us on the third day He will raise us up." But this was making too light of the moral situation, and the prophet sternly answers,

"O Ephraim what shall I do unto Thee? O Judah what shall I do unto Thee? For your goodness (-prof) is but as a morning cloud And as the dew that goeth away early."

A word requires to be said about the conception of the wrath of God. The prophets conceive God in no abstract, bloodless way. He can be angry; He can shew wrath against iniquity. But the wrath is rather an affection of the divine nature, than an essential element in the divine character, and as such is laid aside, when the sinful turn to goodness. The wrath of God is neither inconsistent with His justice nor His love. The anger is but love's hotter flame.

In the teaching then of the pre-exilic prophets, these simple moral principles regarding forgiveness and repentance, emerge.

I. God is gracious; because He is what He is and because of what He has revealed Himself to be in history, He forgives.
The Divine Wrath is no denial of God's graciousness. It is the emotional expression of His righteous hatred against sin, and is controlled by the principle of forgiveness and of repentance.

II. The one sole condition of receiving forgiveness is moral repentance. To repent is to be forgiven.

III. No material sacrifice is enacted, and none is requisite to secure the divine forgiveness.

The prophetic doctrine is quite simple and clear. In one respect, it may be regarded as deficient. It was not sufficiently individualistic. Its appeal was to the nation as a whole, rather than to the single conscience. This individualistic emphasis was supplied by the law, which, in prescribing the ritual observances in connection with forgiveness, takes account of the conditions and status of the individual. It is the doctrine of forgiveness then, as set forth in the Law, which we have now to consider.

One of the most significant words for the doctrine in the Law is ἔξοδος, to expiate or atone. The meaning of this word has /
haa De&ll un.alJ.7 sought in its etymology. It has been derived from the Arabic *Kafara* which means to cover (Ritschl); it has also been derived from the Syriac ḡāḏa in the Paal conjugation, meaning to wipe away, so, to wipe away sin. (Robertson Smith). But the most recent derivation is Assyrian. *Kuppurtā* (with its derivative *takpiytēn*) is known to occur in Assyrian texts. In these, it is used in a ritual and even magical sense. In Hebrew ḡāḏa is much more ethical. The applications however, in the two languages, are sufficiently alike to leave no doubt of some ultimate connection between them. In some way or other, the Hebrew and Assyrian applications of the word must have had a common origin.

The meaning of a word, however, is frequently not best found in its etymology and the usage of ḡāḏa in the Law (Ezekiel 40-48 and P.) is well defined by its context.

Thus Ezekiel 43-44:

> "Seven days shall They make atonement for the altar and purify it and consecrate it" (R.V.) "consecrate", that is, according to the Hebrew, make it fit for its functions.

Again Leviticus 12-7:

> And he (the priest) shall bring it before Yahweh and shall make atonement /
atone for her (R.V.).

Here רכז י is practically synonymous with רכז י to make clean, to purify.

In other passages the synonyms of רכז י are נָשַׁמַּה to unsin and מְנַחֵם to sanctify or make holy.

The function then in רכז י is cleansing, (רכז י) unsinning (רכז י) and sanctifying with the result, as is sometimes stated, that the sin is forgiven. (רכז י)

The kind of sins which can be atoned for, according to the Law, requires to be taken into account. They are the sins done inadvertently (רכז י), sins committed through human weakness, ignorance or passion, not sins which are done in open defiance against God. These latter are presumptuous sins, sins of the high hand, which deserve death, sins, as it were, against the Holy Ghost, for which the praxis of the Law has no means of pardon. The reason why the ritual of the Law makes no provision for heinous sins against the Moral Law, is obvious: these were sins of which the members of the covenanting community were free, or were assumed to be free; they could not, as members of Yahwe's holy community, be guilty of them, and it was as such members that the Law dealt with them. Guilty of a sin of the high hand, an Israelite was outside the holy community, and the benefits of the Law were not for him.

Another fact of significance is the object of the atonement. This /
This is a person or a thing. Yahwe is never the object of the atoning, or expiatory sacrifice. But it must not be said, that the ritual had no reference to God. The whole purpose of the system was to make man and keep man holy before God, to make them morally and ritually fit to come into His presence and hold communion with Him. The ritual system was elaborate and, no doubt, expressed several and various religious ideas and traditions. As Stade says, "The sacrificial worship of ancient Israel is a very complicated phenomenon, which has grown up out of different conceptions and customs and is, by no means, to be derived from a fundamental idea." In the earliest Hebrew codes, we find the command not to appear "empty" (נָ֥צָה) before Yahwe. (Exod. 23. 15.). The gift of piety pleased and gratified God. This simple idea prevailed into the ritual system, as is seen from the phrase (לָ֣כֶה יִצְלֹ֥הַ לְעֹ֔לָם) Lev. 1.4. "And he shall lay his hand upon the head of the whole offering, and it shall be accepted favourably for him." In the pre-exilic period, the typical sacrifice was the common meal, which followed the actual sacrifice. Robertson Smith sees in the partaking by Yahwe and His people of a sacred victim, an unconscious relic of the eating of their god by the members of the totem clan of prehistoric days. Serious difficulties have been brought against this idea, and it seems safer and more simple to regard the sacrificers as the guests of God, in the sanctuary /
sanctuary (מִנְחָה). "The Lord hath prepared a sacrifice, He hath sanctified His guests," Zeph. 1.7. Yahwe and His guests ate together and renewed the sacramental bond. It is possible that this idea was present in the ritual system. Older ideas may have continued in the later ritual, but the main idea was that of a divinely appointed means by which the relation of a Holy God with a holy people could be kept unimpaired. By making atonement (שֵׁר), by purifying (רַחַץ) by unsinning (תַּעַשֶּׁר) by sanctifying (טֵサポート) the people were made ceremonially fit for communion with a Holy God.

The atoning efficacy of the sacrifice is represented by the priestly writers as specially bound up with the blood of the victim. And the answer to the question, why the blood of the victim had this special efficacy, is answered in Leviticus 17.11. "For the life of the flesh is in the blood; and I have given it to you upon the altar to make atonement for your souls; for it is the blood that maketh Atonement by reason of the life, that is in it." But, according to the context, this verse really answers an entirely different question, namely, Why is blood taboo, as an article of food? Only incidentally does it answer the question regarding the efficacy of blood. And the answer is, "life is in it;" beyond this, the Old Testament offers no further explanation. It is possible that the idea of the efficacy of the blood may have been connected in the Jewish Church with the almost universal belief in some mysterious potency /
potency of blood, and of the association with the primeval systems of life and death. But the real virtue lay in the fact that in the blood was life.

The traditional idea, that the slain victim was a penal or substitutionary sacrifice, cannot be maintained. We have to remember, that the offences atoned for by the system were not such as involved the penalty of death, so that, there could be no question of a life for a life, or a death for a death. The laying on of hands upon the victim by the priest did not mean the transference of guilt from the offerer to the victim, but the withdrawal of the victim from the realm of common things. If it had meant the transference of guilt, the victim would have become unclean, and could not be eaten, as it was, by priest and people. The idea of substitution or penalty is further precluded by the fact of the admission for the $\frac{1}{\text{A}^2}$, which was the chief expiatory sacrifice, of a bloodless offering of flour.

In fine, as has already been said, the function of the system was to make the people holy, morally and ceremonially, to make them holy as God is holy. The system is not of the nature of an opus operatum; it does not form the objective ground of atonement and forgiveness. The people were forgiven, God's people, and it was through the ritual, that the relation between them and their God was expressed and maintained.

Two further points may be considered (i) the place of moral repentance /
repentance in the system and (ii) its permanent moral value if any.

The duty of Repentance is not expressed as explicitly as might be expected. The only place where confession of sin is enjoined is Leviticus 5.15, "And it shall be when he shall be guilty in one of these things, that he shall confess, wherein he hath sinned." But when we remember the insistence, with which the prophets preached the necessity of Repentance, if God's pardon and favour were to be received, we may reasonably suppose, that, at least, the more spiritual Israelites would consider these to be conditional on genuine repentance. In later Jewish ritual the duty of Repentance is insisted upon. The order is, יַַרְשָׁא (Repentance), then יַַרְשָׁא (Confession) and then יַַרְשָׁא (Atonement). The Mishna (Yoma viii, 8-9) is careful to teach explicitly that its ceremonies are ineffectual unless accompanied by Repentance. The truth of the situation seems to be, that Repentance was largely presupposed. The members of Yahwe's community were not guilty of the sin of the high hand; they had separated themselves from all open defiance of God; they were in the position of Church members, so to speak, pious, godfearing and regenerate. It was only the sin of the regenerate, with which they had to deal and through the ritual atone for. Repentance was shewn in the desire to offer, in the act of offering, the atoning sacrifice.

(iii) /
(iii) The permanent moral value of the ritual.

In the ritual system we seem to have left the moral simplicity of the prophets. The sacrifices, which the prophets condemned, come in to the forefront. Repentance is more implicit than explicit. But it must not be forgotten, that the offering of sacrifice was an act of obedience ordained of God, and as such, in its essence, an ethical act, and further, that the system, as a means of purification, came from God; it was of His appointing. No doubt there was a danger, as there still is with any ritual system, as also with all objective theories of Atonement and plans of salvation, to regard the forgiveness as functioned through the ritual or through the theory or plan, and as having its source, or foundation, or objective ground, in them. Because of the possibility of this danger, the law might be regarded as a mistake and a reaction. But the law did add certain moral elements to the prophetic teaching. It deepened the sense of sin. It brought Sin home to the individual conscience. It emphasised the necessity for that continual moral purification, which is needful for the regenerate, if they are to maintain their communion with God. It gave a more spiritual conception to the substance of forgiveness as consisting, not in the removal of material suffering and the conferring of material blessing, but in the renewal of the covenant relation between God and man. The law, at least, gives expression to the human need for /
for continual purifying, even though it did not adequately, as
the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews points out, satisfy
that need. The need is spiritual and can only be met by
spiritual means, not by carnal ordinances. The Law expressed
the necessity for continual regeneration, which is only met by
the continual action of the Holy Spirit of God and His Christ
upon the conscience and personality of man. As such, the Law
was truly a schoolmaster to bring man to Christ.

But the Law was not the only expression of post-exilic
Judaism. The mind of the nation, which returned out of exile
a Church, found expression not only in the ritual system but in
the Psalms and the Wisdom Literature. Even if some of the
Psalms could be given a pre-exilic date, the book, as a whole,
belongs to the Second Temple and is the expression of post-exilic
religious experience and belief. The relation of the Psalter
to the Law cannot be said to be perfectly consistent. In some
psalms, there is the expression of a deep love for the Temple
and its ritual worship. In others, (e.g. psalm 50) the ritual
system is considered of little or no value in the maintenance
of communion between God and man; sacrifice is not necessary to
forgiveness /
forsiveness. If we look at such psalms as the 32nd, the 51st, the 103rd, and 130th in which the need for forness is keenly felt, psalms which come out of the depths of the conscience, we find that the simple moral relation of forness and repentance found in the prophets, is maintained. The question, whether these psalms are the expression of national or individual is of no importance to the present consideration.

Thus Psalm 32.

"Blessed is he whose iniquity is forgiven
Covered is his sin;
To him Yahwe reckons not the guilt
In his spirit there is no guile."

(adopting Dohrn's emendation but not his and Bickell's striking out of the last line.)

In this psalm, the psalmist is ill. He regards his affliction in the orthodox way as due to his sin. So long as he was silent, (he says) in stiffened necked obduracy, his frame wore away and he was racked with great pain. But when he recognised his sin, then the iniquity of his sin was cancelled, cancelled not so much in his conscience as in his improved health. Simple confession brings forness, and the forness was shewn in the boon of healing and deliverance. The forness may not be spiritually conceived, but it comes simply from God to the penitent heart. The relation, Repentance - Forness, is not affected by the orthodox materialism; nor is it affected if the Psalm is national in character and not individual.
individual.

Psalm 51.

It has been said that this psalm contains the most psychologically correct conceptions of Forgiveness and Repentance. The psalm is most naturally conceived as national, but this does not affect its teaching on Repentance and Forgiveness and their relation.

The sources of forgiveness in this Psalm are the יִשְׂרָאֵל and יִשְׁתָּר of God, that is, they lie in the moral character of God. From this source the stream of forgiveness abundantly flows, when the wrongdoing is acknowledged, the sin confessed, the heart repentant. God atones, washes and cleanses the conscience that is faithful with itself. The only sacrifice that He requires is a broken spirit and a contrite heart.

Psalm 103.

Yahwe forgives, heals the disease, and renews health, strength and youth like the vultures. In character, Yahwe is compassionate and gracious as the past abundantly shows (He made known His ways unto Moses; to the sons of Israel His deeds). His anger is but a mood; it is not for ever. His forgiving love is essential to His very being, and from everlasting to everlasting His forgiveness is wonderful. It removes the rebellion as far east is from the west. All this blessing is to those /
those who keep His covenant, to those, that remember what He has appointed. Forgiveness is with Yahwe; it is shown for His kindness sake (LXX), or that He may be reverenced (M.T.). Israel has but to hope in Yahwe to find deliverance from all sin.

Forgiveness in these Psalms may be conceived in relation to the nation as a whole; it may be shown in material blessings, but the fountains from whence it flows are רַחֲמָן, חַנָּן, the love, the grace, the long-suffering of Yahwe, and it streams into the heart, that turns to Yahwe, that is repentant, that keeps His commandments. This is the doctrine of the prophets in the spiritual song of Israel.
WISDOM LITERATURE.

If the Psalms may be described as the expression of evangelical piety, the Wisdom Literature may be called that of the broad Church party, – of the Moralists.

In Job, the position of the friends is, that Job has only to confess his sins and God will forgive him and restore his former felicity. Job does not controvert the truth, he only denies, that it is applicable to his case. But when Job did repent, though not in the way his friends would have liked, he was forgiven and restored. The communion between God and himself was renewed. The friends are bidden to repent and to make a sacrifice, but the sacrifice can only be viewed as a symbol of the reality of their repentance.

Proverbs is not theological but there are at least two striking statements bearing upon forgiveness and atonement,

"He that covereth his sin shall not prosper,
But whoso confesseth and forsaketh them shall obtain mercy.

Prov. 20.13.

Again,

By יִקְרָא and יִקְרַע iniquity is atoned for (דַּעַת).

Prov. 16.6.

The whole moral position in the book is based upon the presumption that man has only to repent, to turn from Folly to Wisdom /
Wisdom, and he will live and be blessed of Heaven.

There is another set of passages, which requires to be considered, the set, namely, which deals with the Servant of Yahwe in Isaiah c.c. 40-55. These passages are more concerned with, and throw more light upon, the problem of suffering than upon that of forgiveness, but as they have been abundantly used in support of such conceptions of forgiveness as make it dependent upon vicarious suffering and vicarious penalty, in support, that is, of penal and substitutionary theories of Atonement, they call for consideration in the treatment of the subject of Forgiveness in the Old Testament.

As is well known, the Servant passages have been the subject, and are still, of critical and exegetical controversies. But it is immaterial for the present discussion, whether the Servant is regarded as the nation as a whole, or, as an ideal part, or, as an individual, who is the ideal representative of the people. The fundamental principle, that runs through all the passages, is that, "There is no God but Yahwe, and Israel is His prophet" (Wellhausen).

Israel is the prophet or servant of Yahwe. In the far off past Yahwe had laid hold of the nation and called it from the ends /
ends of the earth. From his birth Israel had been the object of a divine election. But the nation had not always been faithful to its vocation; it had been as unobservant of Yahwe's action as if it had been blind, as inattentive to His voice as if it had been deaf. For this the nation has had to suffer, especially the affliction of exile, described as a kind of national death. This suffering was due to the wrath of Yahwe; it was the result of His indignation and reaction against the sin of His people. "Behold, for your iniquities were ye sold and for your transgressions was your mother put away." For their sins they had to drink deep the cup of Yahwe's fury.

But the mercy of Yahwe prevails over His wrath, which is but an emotion, while His mercy is part of His fixed character. Out of the death of exile Yahwe restores Israel to life, gives back the inheritance and makes Israel His people again. In the suffering of exile the iron had entered the soul of Yahwe's people. Their sin had come home to them. They were confronted with the gods of the heathen, but, despite everything, they held to Yahwe their God. And Yahwe held to them. He never lost His love for Zion and Israel. Zion, in her spiritual agony, might say, "Yahwe has forgotten me." Israel might utter the hopeless lament, "My way is hid from the Lord and my judgment is passed away from my God." But Yahwe's love is steadfast. A mother may forget her child. He cannot forget Zion. She is graven on the palms of His hands and her walls are ever before Him.
Him. True to Himself and true to His Love for Israel, He will forgive and restore Israel from the dust, clothe her in beautiful array, establish her in righteousness and make her walls flash with precious stones. All this is in strict accordance with the principles that sin means the loss of Yahwe's favour, but repentance forgiveness and restoration. Sin had brought the exile with its suffering, but these, in their turn, had induced the broken spirit and the contrite heart.

But Israel's suffering was not for Israel alone. He was Yahwe's prophet to the heathen nations. Israel's experience and testimony affect them. The nations had despised Israel. He was but as a sapling before them, and as a root out of a dry ground. They regarded him not. But the restoration startles them; it awakens them to a new meaning in Israel and Israel's history. They are informed of the wondrous change and exaltation. They confess that they could not have believed it. "Who could have believed," they exclaim, "that which we have heard? But to whom was the arm of the Lord revealed?" They have to explain the wondrous experience of Israel. "It was our sickness that He bore, and our sins He carried them. The chastisement to win our peace was upon Him. And by His stripes was healing wrought for us." The nations confess how they had misconstrued the truth. They had gone astray in selfwill, in imperial ambitions, in cruelty; and Yahwe brought the consequences of their sin.
sin upon Israel.

Have we here the doctrine of penal substitution and the necessity of the innocent suffering for the guilty before forgiveness and restoration are granted? We must not forget that the author plainly states that Israel has suffered for his sin. He is not wholly guiltless and innocent. We have also to recognise the fact, that, if the nations are to receive blessing through Yahwe's servant and through his martyrdom, they too must repent, they must turn from their false gods, to Yahwe, the one and only true God. Through Israel's sufferings the heathen were to be brought to God, but not apart from their own turning and Repentance.

The only avenue then for sinful man and nations to the divine forgiveness and salvation is that of Repentance. Man and nations may be led into it in various ways, through their own sufferings and the remorse which these bring or through the vicarious sufferings of others, but however they may be led to it, they have to walk the avenue on their own feet, if they are to know the divine pardon. They may repent and yet their heart may be unable to forgive themselves, but God is greater than man's heart and forgives and cleanses from all unrighteousness. "For who is a God like unto Him that pardoneth iniquity and passeth by the transgression of the remnant of His inheritance? He retaineth not His anger for ever, because He delighteth in mercy."
mercy. He will turn again and have compassion upon us; He will tread our iniquities underfoot. He will cast all our sins unto the depths of the sea. He will perform the truth to Jacob and the mercy to Abraham which He has sworn unto our fathers from the days of old."

Amidst the various forms - in the true kernel of them - of prophecy and law, psalm and proverb, the Old Testament presents the truth, which Jesus declared, when He said, "But the publican, standing afar off, would not lift up so much as His eyes unto heaven, but smote His breast, saying, 'God be merciful to me a sinner. I say unto you, This man went down to His house justified rather than the other."
The TESTIMONY of JESUS.

What did Jesus teach about the forgiveness of God and its conditions? We may approach this question by considering what Jesus taught concerning human forgiveness - forgiveness between man and man. In the Sermon on the Mount, (Mtt. 5.44 ff.) He says, that men are to love their enemies, bless them that curse them and pray for those, who despitefully use them. This injunction in all its parts implies forgiveness; each obligation that is enjoined is an act of forgiveness. Human forgiveness is to be offered to all offenders, in all circumstances and without exception. He also enjoined that in prayer men should forgive if they have anything against any man (αὐτῷ ἐν στήνοις προσευχόμεθα, ἐφετε ἡ γῆ καὶ τίτις πλω). To Peter’s question, "How often shall my brother sin against me and I forgive him? Till seven times?" He answers, "Until seven times! Nay; unto seven times seven!!" Forgiveness is no question of arithmetic; it has no limits; it ought to be infinite and inexhaustible. (Mtt. 18.22.) The previous passage (τίς ἐν στήνοις ὑμῶν ὑπερεύθη τῷ Σωτῆρι), (Mtt.18.15-17) cannot be regarded as contradicting this character of forgiveness, for Mtt. 18.15-17 is plainly a piece of later Church ordinance, in the form of Christ’s word, rather than Christ’s word itself, and is based on the ordinance about witness bearing in Deut. 19.15. The unrepentant offender is simply to be let alone; he is to be
as those without, as the heathen and the publican. No further
pressure, moral or ecclesiastical, is to be brought upon him.
To be treated as the heathen and publican cannot mean, if Christ's
method and attitude in relation to the sinful has any authority,
that henceforth forgiveness is to be denied and is impossible.
Christ forgave publicans and sinners. Hence forgiveness,
according to Jesus, is to be limitless, and, in the Parable of
the Good Samaritan, it is implied that it is to be universal.
It is not to be confined within the limits of creed or race.
Men are to forgive all men without ceasing. That is the essen-
tial part of the Christian ethic.

It is almost needless to say, that this injunction to ab-
solute forgiveness, does not negate all punishment (See Mt. XI.
20-24.). It is quite possible to punish and forgive absolutely
and completely; it is also possible to punish and withhold
forgiveness. Punishment may be necessary to the complete
ethical character of forgiveness. The point is, that forgive-
ness, whether it involve punishment or complete immunity, - that
will depend upon circumstances - must be universal and inexhaus-
tible.

The motive to this injunction is the significant fact,
leading, as it does, to the answer to the initial question, 'What
did Jesus teach about the forgiveness of God.' Men are to
love their enemies..... for this end that they may become sons
of /
of their Father in Heaven, who makes His sun to rise upon the evil and good and sends His rain upon the just and unjust. (Mtt. 5.45). Men are to be perfect as their heavenly Father is perfect (Mtt. 5.48). Without forgiveness, as an essential part of the character, there can be no approach to that perfection of God, which is perfect love and perfect forgiveness towards all. A forgiving spirit is an approach to the absolute forgiveness of God Himself.

God's Forgiveness is perfect, That is Christ's teaching; and, it is in harmony with the great prophetic passage, "Who is a god like unto Thee, that pardoneth iniquity, and passeth by the transgression of the remnant of His heritage? He retaineth not his age for ever, because he delighteth in mercy. He will turn again, He will have compassion upon us; he will subdue our iniquities; and Thou wilt cast all their sins into the depth of the sea. Thou wilt perform the truth to Jacob, and the mercy to Abraham, which Thou hast sworn unto our fathers from the days of old."

This conception of the divine forgiveness is corroborated by the teaching of Jesus on the Kingdom of God or Kingdom of Heaven. It is not necessary here to consider or decide the much discussed question, whether the Kingdom is eschatological or ethical, whether present now or to a future age. It is almost impossible (after a consideration of relevant passages) not /
not to feel that Our Lord Himself did expect some kind of catastrophic judgment and visible establishment of the Kingdom of God, in the more or less near future and at the inauguration, He would take His place as the Messiah of God, as King in a new Israel. But the conception of the Kingdom as future could very easily pass into the idea of a present ethical Kingdom; its eschatology could easily become a transmuted eschatology. It would seem to be not very far from the truth, to say broadly, that the substance of the Kingdom was to Jesus ethical while its form was eschatological. Jesus seems to have regarded the Kingdom as future but one whose coming could be hastened by the moral and religious zeal of men. At times He could visualise the Kingdom as actually present so near and so sure was it.

But these questions are not of first importance in the present consideration. It is certain that the Kingdom, whatever were its blessings, present or future, contained and guaranteed the blessing of the forgiveness of sins. Because in the Kingdom of Heaven there is unlimited forgiveness, it can be likened unto a royal personage who takes reckoning with his servants. One is found a defaulter. At first, in the parable, the lord would have made him a bankrupt so serious were the defalcations, but when He asks for time and patience, the lord has mercy and forgives the debt. Such gracious, complete forgiveness is like the Kingdom and the forgiveness which it implies. This Kingdom /
Kingdom with its boon of pardon was freely offered to all.
It is the very heart of the mission of Jesus, even from the
start, to preach the possibility of entrance into the Kingdom,
to the spiritually disinherited in Israel to publicans, sinners
and outcasts. This Kingdom, which He offers, is God's Kingdom.
It comes from God. Its forgiveness is God's forgiveness.
Jesus offers it freely, because it is given and offered freely
by God Himself.

Further corroboration of this conception of Forgiveness
is found in the personal attitude of Our Lord towards the
sinful. The Jewish authorities of His day criticised the
attitude. "They murmured saying, 'This man welcomes sinners
and eats with them!'" Sinners themselves drew near to Him.
"Surely," says Mr Montefiore, "This is a new note, something
which we have not yet heard in the Old Testament or of its
heroes, something which we do not hear in The Talmud or of its
heroes. The virtues of Repentance are gloriously praised in
rabbinical literature, but this direct search for, and appeal
to the sinner, are new and moving notes of high import and
significance." Jesus surpasses all the moral optimism of the
past, in the daring, which almost amounts to importunity, of His
offer of forgiveness. But He has the highest authority for His
courage, the authority of God Himself, as the Parables of the
Lost Sheep, the Lost Coin and the Prodigal Son declare. This
predilection /
predilection of Jesus forgiveness is God's, and the religious authorities, instead of criticizing Him, should rejoice with Him (Luke XV.6-9).

God's forgiveness, interpreted through the mind and method of Jesus, is universal, offered to all men. There is no evidence in the Gospels that Jesus, during His earthly ministry, intended to try and convert the world to His Gospel, or to make the Gentiles into a world-wide Church. But that His vision and hopes extended beyond the confines of Judaism is shown by the conception of morality, which is not a question of meats and drinks (Mk. 7.1-22 and Lk. 11). It is based upon the law of love of God and one's neighbour. Such a morality has no confines of nation, creed or race. It is as broad as mankind. It is righteousness that exceeds that of the Scribe and Pharisee, righteousness that is more inward and of the heart, righteousness, simple, spontaneous and natural as a child's, that allows entrance into the Kingdom of Heaven and appropriation of its blessing of forgiveness. The scope of Christ's ethic was world-wide; we may say His religion was the same. There was one law, one ideal, universal for all mankind, the corollary is that His Gospel was the same.

Critics may question the authenticity of the saying, 'Many shall come from the East and the West and shall sit down with Abraham, Isaac and Jacob in the Kingdom of Heaven.' But the truth is implicit in the Story of the Good Samaritan. Jesus may have regarded His actual ministry as being for the lost sheep of /
of the House of Israel; but His vision crossed the borders of nation and race and He saw the world. And this vision was the Father's in Heaven, God's Fatherhood, Love and Forgiveness are for all men.

What is the content of God's Forgiveness according to the teaching of Jesus? The answer to this question will be affected by the view which is taken of Our Lord's conception of the Kingdom. If the view taken be that His conception was chiefly eschatological and largely corresponded to the ideas of Jewish eschatology, then the forgiveness will partake of the character of the eschatology. The forgiveness will be of a material and political order. But that the Kingdom is of this nature is contradicted by the conditions of entrance (Matt. 5:3, 18:3,4) and by the whole spirit of the Gospel. It is the poor in spirit, those that are persecuted for righteousness' sake, men and women who repent and have faith, and whose heart is that of a little child, that find abundant entrance. The conditions of entrance are moral and spiritual; the blessings of the Kingdom are of the same character. When Our Lord forgave the woman taken in sin, He said, "Neither do I condemn Thee, Go and sin no more," Forgiveness is the end of condemnation, it is the beginning of a new life. Pardon and New Life, that is the content of forgiveness according to Jesus.

God's /
God's forgiveness then is inexhaustible, universal and in its content, ethical and spiritual.

Two possible objections may be brought against this view, one based on Our Lord's Teaching concerning the judgment, the other on His saying about the Sin against the Holy Ghost.

The Judgment is connected with His ideas of the Messiahship, the Kingdom and the Parousia. The Son of Man - the Messiah - is to come with His Kingdom and in His glory. There is to be a great Assize, a great division and a great judgment. Whether the Messiah Himself is to be Judge is not quite certain. In Matt. 25.31 ff. the Son of Man sits on the throne of His glory: He makes the great division, but the King (ὁ βασιλεὺς) pronounces the sentence. But the sentence upon the guilty, whoever pronounces it, does not contradict the truth of a divine forgiveness inexhaustible, ethical and universal. For, if men refuse the offer of the Kingdom, if they remain obstinate in face of the Divine Love and Mercy they must take the consequences. But that is in simple accord with moral reality, for wilful obduracy (with its consequences) and forgiveness (with its consequences) are exclusive terms. An absolutely unconditioned forgiveness would be morally meaningless, and judgment - the obdurate heart in the outer darkness weeping and gnashing in remorse - is but the moral corollary of a forgiveness that is freely /
freely offered and ethical in its content.

The second objection is based upon a particular saying of Jesus, the saying namely, that there is a Sin against the Holy Spirit and this is unforgiveable. The saying is found in each of the Synoptic Gospels but in different form.


The question in criticism, whether there was in the original saying a reference to the Son of Man (as in Matthew and Luke) is difficult, if not impossible, to solve. If Matthew and Luke are right in retaining the words, then the unforgiveable sin is contrasted with the sin of speaking against the Messiahship. To speak against the Messiahship will be forgiven.
forgiven, but to speak against the Holy Ghost is unforgiveable. In Mark all sins are forgiven except that of blaspheming against the Holy Spirit. Whatever it may be contrasted with, the unforgiveable sin is one and the same, and can scarcely mean anything than persistent, obdurate sinfulness, the sinfulness that says, 'Evil be thou my good.' The difficult phrase in Mark's Gospel is, πάντα μη παρατατεί του τον άγιον άνεμον, but he shall be guilty of an agonian sin. Matthew says, "it shall not be forgiven him, neither in this age nor in the age to come." The Sin against the Holy Spirit cannot be forgiven in this age nor in the Messianic. This reads like an explanation or commentary on Mark's "He shall be guilty of an agonian sin." And so the meaning comes to be, that the moral conditions of the present prevail into the future. The psychological difficulty still remains, whether human nature can be so identified with sin that repentance and forgiveness become an eternal possibility, but do the words say as much as that? Do they say more than that sin persistent, unrepented of, whether now or in the Messianic age, cannot be forgiven? a perfectly intelligible conception. The sin against the Holy Spirit asserts, incidentally, the really ethical character of forgiveness and of the Kingdom. It states in a negative form the truth, that Repentance is the condition of Forgiveness.

As yet nothing has been said about the Death of Christ in relation /
relation to sin and its forgiveness. Did Our Lord teach the doctrine that sin can only be forgiven through the Atoning efficacy of His death? or, in other words, that, besides Repentance, His Death was necessary before sin could be forgiven?

From the time of the confession of Peter at Caesarea Philippi of the Messiahship, Jesus began to speak openly and definitely about His Death. Peter refused to associate the idea of Messiahship with a tragic end, but Jesus held that this was the way and purpose of God. 

The opposition of the authorities, the fate of God's messengers in the past, and especially of John the Baptist, were sufficient to assure Him that He was to be no exception to the law, that the service of God and man meant sacrifice. His Death was necessary, if the value of His previous work was not to go for nothing; necessary, if it was to be complete; necessary, historically, through the course that events were taking; necessary, morally, if His service as the Messiah of God were to be fulfilled. So far, the Death has this general relation to Sin; that it is the sin of moral blindness, political fanaticism and priestly ambition, that will be the instrument of His Death. But such a death has in it no other elements than those of the martyr or patriot who dies at the hands of selfishness for the good of his country and humanity. He has to drink a cup, and be baptised with a baptism.
baptism, but this cup his disciples James and John will drink
and with the same baptism be baptised. (Mark VIII. 39).

The passage in Mk. 10.45, (Matt. 20.28) καὶ ἕκαστος ὁ νίπτων
ἀνδρών ὅλην ἐκάθεν διοικήσει, ἐλεήσει διὰ κοινωνίας καὶ θυσίας
ἡν ψυχήν ἐκ τῶν λόγων ἐν ἑαυτῷ πολλῶν.

- has been the subject of much controversy and
on it has been based the theory of substitution. The first
question in dealing with the passage is that of its genuineness.
It is found in Matthew and Mark but not in Luke. But it is
contended that sometimes where Luke differs, (and an omission is
a difference) from the other two Synoptists, Luke preserves a more
original text. Luke's skill and care as an historian gives a
starting point in favour of the contention. Further, taking the
saying as it stands both in Matthew and Mark, it seems to intro­
duce a circle of ideas which seems inconsistent with those of
the context. L'idée de la vie donnée en rançon appartient à une
autre coutume que celle de la service (Loisy Swan. Syn. ii. 241).
The criticisms however are divided.

But assuming the words to be those of Jesus, we must, on
any sound method of exegesis, interpret them in the light of the
context. Jesus calls His Death "a cup" (Mk. 10.38), "a bap­
tism" (Mk. 10.38) and "a ransom" (Mk. 10.45). These three are
all metaphors, metaphors of the same moral reality, that of
service. To stress any of the metaphors, and, in particular,
the third and ask with regard to it, to whom - God or the Devil -
the ransom was to be paid, is to expand the metaphor beyond the
circle /
circle of ideas in which it stands, and beyond the reality it is trying to express - and that is to destroy the metaphor as metaphor by turning it into an expression of hard literal fact.

Ritschl has interpreted λόγον as an equivalent for γῆ, a protective covering. He interprets the passage as follows, - 'I am come to accomplish instead of those who would strive in vain to furnish it, the presentation, through the giving up of my life to God, of a valuable gift as a protection (Schutzmittel) against Death for themselves (the disciples) and for others; but I do it, instead of those only, who, through faith and self-denying imitation of my person, fulfil the conditions under which alone my action, in yielding up my life, can afford the expected protection.'

This interpretation seems over-weighted. But there are linguistic difficulties. If λόγον is here equivalent to γῆ and connected with γῆ, then the thought may be rather that of a purification, than that of a protection.

λόγον in the O.T. translates four Hebrew words, (1) הָגֹן Gen. 36.32, 36.33 (ii) הֶגָּמֹר Lev. 25.26,51, (iii) הָגָהִ ע Lev. 26.32, Ex. 21.20, (iv) הָגָהִ ע Isa. 45.13. From the different usages in the O.T. it is impossible to obtain any more definite meaning of λόγον than that of deliverance or the price of deliverance, and so the passage under consideration can mean no more than that 'The Son of Man (the Messiah) came not to be ministered/

\[ \text{Recht. Q. Vers. II. 85.} \]
ministered unto but to minister and to give His life for the deliverance of many." The ministry of the Son of Man and the deliverance this ministry will obtain, will cost Him His Life. If we ask what this deliverance precisely was, from what and to what, the context (cf. Mtt. 20.21, Mk. 10.37) seems to give us the probable answer, from the present age with its misery into the future Messianic age with its blessedness. The Son of Man will give His life for the Kingdom and its citizens.

The preposition ἐν, it may be said, implies the idea of substitution, or exchange, and ἐν very frequently in the N.T. implies this idea (Mtt. 5.38 ἐν.) but ἐν is also used occasionally in the N.T. in a weakened sense and equivalent to θάνατος of Mtt. 17.27 ἵκλην καὶ δολοὶ ἐν ὑμῖν καὶ ἔφω also ἐν ὑμῖν Lk. 1.20, 12, 3 19.44. Cf. also 1 Timothy 2.6 ο ἑαυτόν ἐν θανάτον ἔφω πάνω If we adhere to the meaning 'instead of,' to give His life a ransom in place of the lives of many, then the service is confined to this, — that the Son of Man dies and many (the disciples) escape death. His Death will satisfy the hate and jealousy of His enemies and the rest will be saved. But the whole passage seems to look beyond mere physical death. The choice is open of course to take ἐν in its strict sense or in its weakened sense of θάνατος — there is philological authority for both. The whole context is in favour of reading the /
the words in a simple and natural way. The Son of Man came not to be ministered unto but to minister and to give His life for the deliverance and saving of men. If Our Lord had meant to teach something more definite than this, if He desired to say, that His Death was a substituted penalty, or a price paid to the Devil, or a Sacrifice offered to God to secure the Divine forgiveness, it is inconceivable that He should have made so serious and important pronouncement depend upon the meaning of a preposition, or upon a word whose meaning and connections were not definitely fixed; and if He came to give His life, to die a substituted death, or pay a debt to the Devil, or make a necessary sacrifice to God - if this was His great purpose, it is strange at least that He did not in His teaching make constant and clear reference to it. And if this was the definite purpose of His Death, it is inconceivable that not long after He made this statement in the uncertain words of the Evangelists, He prayed that the cup might pass from Him, that is, that this ἀμήν, on which depended man's forgiveness and salvation, should not be paid. Either Jesus did not use these words, or, if He did, He meant that His Service for men in the establishment of the Kingdom, - His whole personal ministry - would cost Him His life. He would pay a price; He would make the great sacrifice for the deliverance of men.

There is another set of passages which require considera-
consideration, namely, the narratives of the Last Supper.

There are four accounts.

Καὶ τῇ Σαββάτῳ ἦν ὁ Ἰησοῦς ἐγερμένος πρὸς τὸ ἀνάλυμα, ἵνα ἂν ἐκάλεσαν τοὺς διάκονους τῆς πόλεως ἵνα ἑτοίμασαν τοῖς ἀσθενούσις, ἔθανεν τοῖς ἀσθενούσις ἑπεξεργάζοντας ὅσα οἱ λόγοι· καὶ ἔδιδεν Δαμασκόν. 

Δαμασκον. Σαββάτῳ ἦν ὁ Ἰησοῦς ἐγερμένος πρὸς τὸ ἀνάλυμα, ἵνα ἂν ἐκάλεσαν τοὺς διάκονους τῆς πόλεως ἵνα ἑτοίμασαν τοῖς ἀσθενούσις, ἔθανεν τοῖς ἀσθενούσις ἑπεξεργάζοντας ὅσα οἱ λόγοι· καὶ ἔδιδεν Δαμασκόν.
The four accounts naturally fall into 2 groups (i) Luke's and Paul's (ii) Matthew's and Mark's.

(i) Luke and Paul. Here (a) the Supper is definitely a memorial feast, Luke 22.19., 1 Cor. 11.24-25, (b) ἧμαρ χωρὶς takes the place of the vague ἑμαρ ταλασαν (προὶ Μtt).

(ii) Mtt. alone has any direct reference to sin, ἐν αὐτῷ ποιεῖται λόγος λαμπρά: by most these words are regarded as an explanatory gloss. The words, in (i), καὶ ἐν ἑκάστῳ τῆς δικαιοσύνης, with ἤμαρ χωρὶς seem due to later ideas and practice when the Supper has become a memorial feast in the Christian Church. There is a shortened form of Luke, verses 19b and 20 being omitted - they are bracketed by Westcott and Hort. If we are justified in regarding this shortened form of Luke's as the most original and most accurate account, then Jesus says, that this supper is the last, that He will take with His disciples before the Kingdom with its banquet shall come. This supper is anticipatory of the Banquet in the Kingdom. The words "this is my body" (the only words common to all four narratives) are symbolic, and as they stand seem to express a living unity between Master and disciples. Christ gives Himself to the Disciples, and they receive Him - His whole Personality, and spiritual Being into their nature and life.

If the reference to the blood (Mtt. 26.27 and 13·18) is original then there is another idea, which has to be taken account of. The cup is the blood of a new covenant, of a new relation /
relation between God and His children, such an one as is described in Jer. 31.31-34. And the meaning comes to be that through the gift of Himself—a gift absolute complete and unto Death—given to the uttermost in Death, to His disciples, Christ establishes a new and more spiritual relation between man and God, such as Jeremiah had depicted, a covenant, let it be remembered, which contained the free, divine forgiveness.

It can only be a forced exegesis that finds in the accounts of the institution of the Supper ideas of a substitutionary punishment or substitutionary sacrifice, conditioning the forgiveness of God.

But the divine forgiveness is not unconditioned; it has one condition that of Repentance. At the beginning of His ministry He preached, 'The time is fulfilled and the Kingdom of God is at hand. Repent and believe in the Gospel.' Repentance is one of the great notes of His preaching, and with Him it meant a genuine change of mind, and, according to the probable Aramaic derivation, a Return—perhaps to God or to the true way of life (cf. סרף, Mtt. 18.3, ἁπατᾷ φωσίν, Mk.4.12). Much the same message had been preached by the Baptist, the only difference being that the Repentance of Jesus went deeper than that of His forerunner. Belief in the Gospel means acceptance of the good news of the near approach of the Kingdom. It is a call to the moral hope and optimism, which start /
start and encourage repentance. Sometimes, it is true that Jesus seems to regard the acceptance of Himself, or of His Messiahship as the condition of entrance into the Kingdom and of the appropriation of forgiveness. "Everyone therefore who shall confess me before men, him will I also confess before my Father which is in Heaven." This saying seems to reflect the influence of later Christian belief, but if it is a true record of one of Christ's sayings, it must be interpreted in the light of such sayings as "Not every one that saith unto me, 'Lord, Lord' shall enter the Kingdom of Heaven, but he that doeth the will of my Father in Heaven," and, "Whosoever doeth the will of God, the same is my brother and sister and mother." To confess Christ is to do the will of God and to receive in the heart and in the practice of life, His teaching about God's will and gracious purpose. "Everyone therefore which heareth these words of mine and doeth them shall be likened unto a wise man, which built his house upon the rock; and the rain descended, and the floods came, and the winds blew and beat upon that house, and it fell not, for it was founded upon a rock."

Is the conclusion then, that, to Our Lord, His death had no reference to sin, and no meaning for the sinner as such? The answer to this question cannot be categorical. His Death as His Life did not create the divine forgiveness, but it was to Him /
Him an instrument of its efficaciousness. His Death induced Repentance. Without it His work in establishing the Kingdom and in creating its citizens would be not only incomplete but ineffective. Any analogy from human relations is imperfect, but an analogy may answer the question better than any more or less abstract statement. If the elder brother in the parable had had the mind of his father; if he, at the instance of his father, and of his own free will, and at the impulse of love, had gone into the far country to seek his lost brother; if to the work of recovery he gave his life, the sacrifice would have a great power over the erring brother; it might break any hardness of heart; it might waken hidden springs in the soul; it might produce repentance and a new spirit of devotion; it would be a revelation of love, of his own and that in the Father's heart; it would be the power of salvation. In some such way, creating such an effect in the sinner's heart, Our Lord may have regarded His Death. Whether or no Our Lord dwelt upon this effect of His Death, it has had this effect upon the hearts of men. He regarded His work as the calling of sinners to Repentance, and He assuredly saw and felt, for the perfect and complete fulfilment of this work, He had to die. His death was necessary, of supreme value for His purpose, which was God's purpose as well as His own, the purpose of human redemption.
The TRANSITION to LATER DOCTRINE.

The Gospel of Jesus fell upon Jewish soil and the soil affected the growth of the seed that was sown. There is a considerable difference between the moral simplicity of the teaching of Our Lord and the later ecclesiastical doctrine, that His death was a penal substitution necessary to the righteous bestowal of the divine forgiveness, - this difference was due in no small part to the soil in which the Gospel was planted. In Jewish theology and religion there were ideas which paved the way for, if they did not actually create the later doctrine. The conception of Salvation in the prophets and psalmists and in the later eschatological literature was that of Deliverance. The primary meaning of לֵוָ֣ו (LWW) is deliverance, and Yahweh is conceived as the Deliverer. It is very easy to see how this conception moving in a mythology which thought of a Kingdom of Evil presided over by the Devil, who held the unrighteous in his power, might develop into that doctrine of Atonement known as the ransom theory, which maintained itself in Christian theology and popular thought for about a thousand years. Then, though in the ritual system (P) the preeminent ideas were communion and cleansing, the idea of sacrifice as propitiatory substitutionary and the cause of forgiveness might easily arise. Further /
Further, in the "Several Passages" the truth of vicariousness has found expression and 'vicarious' can very easily be confounded with substitutionary. And again, there is in the Old Testament the idea of Mediatorship an idea which received very full treatment in Alexandrian Judaism. None of these Jewish ideas of Deliverance, Sacrifice, Vicariousness and Mediatorship nor all of them together, when applied to Christ’s work and Christian faith lead inevitably and logically to that doctrine which regards His work and especially His Death as the necessary objective ground of God’s forgiveness. We might still think of Christ as the Deliverer, as the Mediator between God and man, and of His Death as a vicarious sacrifice without being compelled logically to commit ourselves to any one of the later theories, - the ransom theory or the substitutionary or the penitential. All the same, these ideas, of the very marrow of Jewish divinity and religion, formed an excellent soil for the growth of these theories. And, as a matter of fact, the growth appears on the pages of the New Testament itself.

The growth appearing in the New Testament is frequently attributed to Jewish ideas working through the mind of the Apostle Paul. He has been regarded as the author of later theory, but, as a matter of fact, the soil had become to have its effect before Paul applied his mind to think out the meaning of Christ Crucified. He says himself "I delivered unto you first of all that which also I received how that Christ died for our sins according /
according to the Scriptures." 1 Cor. 15.5. There is no need to suppose a special, individual revelation. Paul is dealing with historical facts, the death, the burial and the resurrection on the third day. He had been informed of the facts, and of the first fact, the Death, that it was according to the Scriptures. This 'according to the Scriptures' is the earliest rationale of Christ's Death. It may be said to be derived from Christ Himself. It is found in the story of the Appearance to the two disciples on the road to Emmaus, "O fools and slow of heart to believe all that the prophets have spoken! Ought not Christ to have suffered these things and to enter into His glory?" (Luke 24.25). When Our Lord saw that death was inevitable to the fulfilment of His vocation, He found we may well suppose, the interpretation of His fate in the history and experience of God's servants in the past, and saw His own suffering depicted in the portrait of the Suffering Servant. (Dr E. F. Scott in The holds that the passage Mark 10.45 shows traces of the influence of Isa. 53). The theory is contained in the speech of Peter at Pentecost, "Him being delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, ye have taken, and by wicked hands have crucified and slain" (Act 2.23) and also in Stephen's speech, "Which of the prophets have not your fathers persecuted? and they have slain them which showed before of the coming of the Just One; of whom ye have been now the betrayers and murderers": (Acts 7.53). This theory might exist in two forms,
one, in which the Death of Christ was the fulfilment of the letter of Scripture, the other, in which the Death is in accordance with the ways of God with man, as the Scriptures had revealed them: Christ's Death is in accordance with the revealed purpose and method of God for the salvation of men. But this formal distinction scarcely existed for the first Christians. To them Christ died according to the Scriptures. The Scriptures showed the Death to be in accordance with the revealed Will of God. Perhaps there was no felt need in the earliest preaching to find any further necessity either in the nature of God or in the nature of Sin. In the earliest Christian preaching the relation of Christ's Death to Sin or to God's righteousness is not considered. The first preachers declared, that the Crucified was risen, that He is Lord and Christ and that apart from Him no salvation is possible to men. And this was according to the Scriptures and the Will of God.
Paul accepted the early tradition that Christ died for our sins according to the Scriptures. But he did not leave the theory of the Crucifixion in this form. In the Epistles to the Galatians and to the Romans, he relates the Death of Christ to Sin, to the Law and to the righteousness of God. In the opening chapters of the Epistle to the Romans he sets forth as a fact proved by Scripture and by human experience, the universality of sin - all have sinned both Jews and Gentiles. How far Paul regards this universal sin of mankind as due to the transgression of Adam is not of primary importance, though it is almost certain, if we are to read his words in Romans 5.21-23 in any natural sense, that Paul believed in inherited sin from Adam. Universal sin and death were the result of Adam's fall. The fact is, all men have sinned and as sinners have incurred the penalty of Death. They have all come under the curse of the law. They are doomed. "Therefore as by one man, sin entered into the world, and death by sin; and so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned (Romans 5.12 cf. 3.23). This then was the situation that faced the righteous God. In His mercy He had shown forbearance in the past and not carried out judgment upon the sinful world (Romans 3.25), but now, at the present season, to show forth His righteousness, He has set forth Jesus Christ to be /
be a propitiation, through faith, by His blood. This act of God is a righteous judgment, and proves Him to be righteous. Christ's Death is the justification of the righteousness of God. The Cross has paid the wages of Sin.

In the Epistle to the Galatians the argument is the same. The Scripture hath shut up all under sin (Gal. 3.22). The Law had made all men sinners "for cursed is everyone that continueth not in all things, which are written to do them, but it is evident, that no man is accounted righteous in the sight of God." The Scriptures declare this fact also when they say, that the just shall live by faith and not by works. But, even if the Scriptures did not state the fact, human experience does. Christ, however, has redeemed us from the Curse of the Law, from sin and its consequent death, for He has become a curse for us, for it is written, "Cursed is everyone that hangeth upon a tree." All men have sinned and deserved the curse of sin, the penalty prescribed by the Law, but Christ has died, endured the Curse and saved men from it.

The argument, though it may raise questions, is, as an argument, quite clear and definite. It may not be explicit. Paul does not say that God punished Christ or that God cursed Christ by the death of the Cross. But that is implicit in the argument, and later theologians, who have said these things explicitly, can find justification for their statements in Paul.
Paul may never use the word "punishment" nor say definitely that Christ is our substitute, but 'substitution' and 'substituted penalty' are implicit in his argument and not very far from its surface. Substitution and substituted penalty are also implied in his words, "He who knew no sin, He hath made to be sin for us."

Paul does not say specifically how Christ in His death was the righteousness of God, how He was made sin and became a curse. He regarded Christ as the Second Adam, a striking contrast to the first Adam, and the work of the second Adam is contrary in its effects to the work of the first Adam. By the first Adam came sin and death, by the second righteousness and life. The first man started an evil strain which was counteracted by the Second. Then the sinlessness of Christ was without doubt a sine qua non in effecting the travail of God. And further, Christ's death was voluntary. The idea that it was the moral value of Christ's Person that gave value to His Death is too modern (and incidentally too vague) but something like this idea seems to be in the mind of Paul when He thinks of Christ's sinlessness and of His contrast to the first Adam in relation to His redemptive work. There was, at any rate, no doubt in Paul's mind as to the sufficiency of Christ in His Person and Work to establish and to reveal the righteousness of God.

The righteousness of God that has been revealed in the Death of Christ is to Paul the primal cause of forgiveness and de-

 deliverance.
deliverance from Death. The condition of receiving the blessing is faith. And faith, in this connection, is largely intellectual belief. The illustration of Abraham's case is decisive on this point. Abraham believed, or had faith, in the divine promises, held them for true, and, in particular, that he would receive a son of old age. Faith then in connection with Paul's theory, is the accepting as true the revelation of the righteousness of God at the Death of Christ.

Faith may and does mean more than this to Paul, faith is a rational and voluntary asset to the revelation of God's righteousness in Christ. This voluntary assent secures for the individual the boon of the divine justification; the sinner enters into the divine favour; he enjoys the peace, which comes from being pronounced guiltless by God. What the law could not do, what was impossible to the sinner, in himself and through the instrumentality of any human means, has been accomplished by faith, by the simple acceptance as true and right of the ἰσχύς θεοῦ of God revealed in Jesus Christ.

Such is the theory of Paul. There is no doubt much more in Paul's religious thinking and experience than this, more that is personal and mystical, but 'this theory' is there, and, as it stands, is open to criticism. It conceives the relations of God to men in forensic terms and through the decrees of the law. One of the premises of his theory is that "the Wages of Sin is Death."
Death." In one sense this judgment is perfectly true. Sin brings moral atrophy; sin persisted in leads to moral and spiritual death. That is sin's penalty. But Paul means something more definite. Sin brings death, physical and spiritual. Its wages are the denial of all life. And this is true because the Law says it. He had no need to go further than to Ezekiel for his authority. In adopting this premiss as absolute, Paul was a good Jew. But Paul, the Christian held another view of the law, as temporary as conditional and as even meeting to sin. This modified view of the law was due to his Christian experience. And if Paul had allowed this modified view of the Law to react upon his theory of redemption, his whole theory would have broken down. The law, which says the Wages of Sin is Death and places every deviator under the doom of complete death, under the curse of the avenging wrath of God, is from the Christian point of view temporary, conditional and imperfect. When the full light of his Christian experience is turned upon this as the absolute, divinely authoritative, law, it becomes a thing of the past, a mere dead letter. It no longer has authority with Paul the Christian; it cannot have authority in regulating the dealings with men of that God who is the Father of Our Lord Jesus Christ. When Paul is a Christian; the Law is superseded. When he is a theologian he becomes, in this context at least a Jew again, and bases his Christian religious judgments upon a Jewish theological.
theological dogma.

Further, the wages of sin according to Paul's theory were paid by the death of Christ. But he does not define precisely what he means by death, the wages of sin. If by such death is meant absolute death, death physical and spiritual, complete annihilation, then his theory would seem to require that Our Lord endured such; some later theologians have maintained this but Paul did not, even though his theory seems to require it. If by death he means simply physical death, then his position will be at once challenged, first, on the ground that physical death is part of the natural order to which man is subjected, and is due to the possession of a material body and not to sinfulness, and then, on the ground that Christ has not in His physical death paid the price, for men still die. Again, Paul says, that by the death of one many are saved, but he nowhere says how it is possible for one to take the place of many. From the judicial point of view, (and the death is the result of a judicial act) one undeserved death might take the place of one deserved death, but some other principle must be introduced before it could take the place of many.

Again, as has already been said, the theory contains implicitly the idea of substituted penalty. Paul never actually says that Christ bore the penalty of our sins, but he says that he became a curse for us and the curse of the law is the penalty of
of death. He does not say, that God punished Him or that God laid His curse upon Him. Instinctively, he avoided such a statement. His logic led to that but his moral instinct was evidently stronger than his logic. Even if substituted penalty is an admissible idea at all, the great objection to it, in Christ's case is this, that if Christ bore our penalty, once and for all and completely, why is the process repeated in the case of every sinner?

As the theory stands (divorced from everything else in Paul's teaching,) it is justly liable to the charge of antinomianism. And Paul is only saved from this charge not by his theory, but by other elements in his religious thinking and faith. By belief, the acceptance of what may be called God's plan of salvation, apart from works, man are accounted righteous. The danger of such a position is self-evident. Paul repudiated the antinomianism, but the repudiation came out of his moral being, out of his passion for righteousness and devotion to Christ, it did not and could not come out of the logic of his argument.

There is another conception of the Death of Christ, namely, that of the Death as a Power, which liberates from sin and creates a new moral life. This conception finds expression in the words, "For the love of Christ constraineth us; because we thus judge that if one died for all then are you all dead; and in truth, He died for all in order that they who live, might henceforth /
henceforth not live for themselves, but for Him, who died for them and has risen. Therefore, if anyone is in Christ, he is a new creature; the old has passed away; behold all has become new." The love of Christ, in His vicarious death for all, in the death, which bears our curse, creates a gratitude, that keeps our life within certain prescribed limits, within the limits, which devotion to Him demands. It creates a new moral life, in which the old has passed away, in which selfishness and sin have died. Here we seem to have a simple moral influence theory of the Death of Christ; and, certainly, there is moral influence. Christ's Death is the moral cause of a moral dying in man's life and of a new life. But Paul's moral influence theory is based upon his theory of Christ's Death as an atoning and expiatory sacrifice, as something, which fulfils the righteousness of the Law and endures its penalty. It is the Love of Christ, as shewn in His Atoning and sacrificial and penal Death, that constrains us, brings death to sin and creates the new life. The obvious criticism to this is the question, Is it not possible to get the same moral result without interpreting the Love of Christ in Paul's legal and penal way. May not the love of Christ, as exhibited in His Life and completed in a devotion, that was unto Death, a Love that set its heart upon the highest and best for man and in the pursuit of them gave its life, - may not that love constrain us to live no longer for ourselves, but for /
for Him, who so lived and died for us, can not that love destroy the old man and create the new? Does love need to be the legal transaction which it is on Paul's theory? could it not express itself in a more personal and spiritual and still be absolute love?

In the Epistle to the Romans, the Death of Christ is presented as, in itself, a Death to Sin? "For in that He died, He died to sin once and for all, so do ye also reckon yourselves dead to sin, but living to righteousness." This idea is no doubt "the dogmatic precipitate" of the simple religious experience of dying with Christ, of dying to self and living again to the Christ, who died and rose again.

But the dogmatic idea is exceedingly difficult, for how could Christ in His Own Personal Death die to sin, cease to have relation with it, unless His nature had some connection with sin? An explanation may be found in Rms. 8.3, "That which was impossible to the law, because it was weakened by the flesh, that has God done, after He had sent His Son in the form of sinful flesh and for sin, He condemned sin in the flesh." God through and in the death of Jesus Christ passed a judicial sentence upon the flesh in which sin resides. This condemnation by Christ, who was in the form of sinful flesh, upon the flesh, separates Christ from the sin inherent in His fleshly nature. But we have here a dogmatic difficult of conception.
a dogmatic which was only possible to One, to whom Sin, Death and the Flesh were conceived as living entities and as real ideas, indeed almost as distinct personalities. The idea of Christ's dying in His Death to Sin is just the objectification of a simple religious experience; it is a simple dogmatic idea.

The criticism of Paul's 'forensic theory', as it has been here given, - indeed, any criticism of this theory, separated from other parts of Paul's expressed experience, is apt to be far from just to Paul and his theology. It is unjust because it takes the part for the whole. The conception of Christ's Death as an expiatory sacrifice may be a firm conviction in Paul's experience, and he may have held it to the very last. But no man lives always in his particular theological beliefs, and Paul with His conception of Himself as the 'servant of Jesus Christ' living in obedience to a heavenly vision, in bondage to the highest personal ideal, dying to live in Christ crucified is greater than his own theory and the logic with which he sets it forth: he himself appeals to and commands the soul, when his theory leaves one only cold and critical; and his doctrine of the Spirit, the Spirit which is the Spirit of the Lord Jesus, which brings freedom in place of legal bondage, sanity and health in place of emotional excess and worse, which is love and perfect obedience, expresses what is the essence and reality /
reality of Christiannity, and, literally, makes Jesus Christ, as Crucified, the same yesterday to-day and for ever, the Lord and the Saviour of the souls and lives of men. Paul's evangelic experience is really the type of all true Christian experience: it was really too big and intense a thing to be interpreted by the Judaistic categories which he brought to it: the new wine could not be put into the old skins, as Paul himself found, for he does not confine himself to these categories. Had he been able to interpret his own experience in its own light, we might have had, not only a Christian experience of forgiveness and of God's dealing with men, which can be universalised, which is moral and rational in the highest sense to-day, but also a philosophy of it of universal acceptation. The marvel is, that with his Jewish categories, He achieved so much in the way of a rational theology. He held to the essential that Christ's Death is, at its heart, a holy and redeeming infinite act of love, a revelation of that love as it is in, and as it comes from, the divine and eternal heart of God.
This is one of the texts in which Dr du Bose finds illustration and proof of his theory of Atonement. He holds that the New Testament does not give us a doctrine of Atonement but a true Soteriology. According to this soteriology Christ is a divine Person, He is the Logos as man. As such He is not only the cause of our Salvation only, but the res. He is our salvation not only causally but really. He is real human nature and took sin so far as in the nature but not in the Person.

(The Soteriology of the New Testament c. xvi), He took all that belongs to our fallen nature but the bias of nature is not itself sin till it becomes personally willed. Christ then personally condemned the sin of nature or the \( \sigma^\chi^\rho^\varsigma \), and as the \( \sigma^\chi^\rho^\varsigma \) with its sin was really our \( \sigma^\chi^\rho^\varsigma \) and our sin, He, in His Death, condemned the sin in the \( \sigma^\chi^\rho^\varsigma \), this condemnation of sin was also our condemnation. His victory is ours and leads to our full salvation which is physical, moral and religious.

The theory is that of Munkan and Edward Irving. It has affinities with the Greek Theology and Spanish Adoptianism, (Felis of Urgel and Elipandus (9th century)).

There are very serious objections to Dr du Bose's position. It makes Christ's flesh a universal, an inclusive \( \sigma^\chi^\rho^\varsigma \). It divides the Person separating the nature from the Person, it conceives sin rather as a material than a moral reality. Allowing that sin belongs to the \( \sigma^\chi^\rho^\varsigma \), it is difficult to see how the condemnation of sin in His \( \sigma^\chi^\rho^\varsigma \) is the cause and res of the condemnation /
condemnation of sin in mine. But is sin a thing of the υορα? Is it not rather in the Persona?

The theory is grouped with similar theories by the late Dr A. B. Bruce under the title "Redemption by Sample." 'Redemption by Sample' has not become a morally accepted theory and is confined to a few theologians with a neo-Hegelian type of thinking. To the writer, the idea is open to all the objections raised against the idea of substitution.
In the Epistle to the Hebrews, we get as near an approach to the doctrine of Atonement as is found in the New Testament. The author construes his subject through the sacrificial system of the Old Testament and through the Alexandrian philosophy, whose chief representative was Philo. Corresponding to these two forms of thought the work of Christ has two parts, one earthly and the other heavenly.

Christ to the author was genuinely human. He suffered and through suffering was disciplined and made perfect. He was, in all points, tempted like His brethren. He passed through the agony of Gethsemane, died upon the Cross, rose and passed into the invisible Holy of Holies. In His life Christ shewed the virtues of sympathy, obedience, humility, faithfulness and dependence upon God. He was a son, whose moral and spiritual glory are set forth in Philonian language as 'the effulgence of the divine glory and the very image of the divine substance.'

This life, divine and human, is interpreted and its work set forth in the terms, as has been said, of the Jewish sacrificial system and the Philonian philosophy.

In the Old Testament p\textsuperscript{axis} there were priest and sacrifice, and both are types of Christ and His Work. Christ is like the priest of the Old Testament, in that He is human and can be touched /
touched with a feeling for human weakness, and that He is called of God to His high office. But He differs from the Old Testament priest in certain points; - the priest was sinful and had to make offering for his own sin, before he makes it for the people, while Christ (being sinless) makes sacrifices solely for the sin of others. The priest made sacrifices every year, but Christ once for all: the priest exercised his functions in a Temple made with hands, but Christ made His, first in a body prepared for Him, and then in the invisible and Eternal. So different indeed is the priesthood of Christ from that of the Levitical praxis, that the true type of Christ's priesthood is found rather in Melchizedek, that strange personality, who makes a meteoric appearance in the pages of Israel's history, who is without father and mother, birth and death, whose name and habitation prefigure his character, as that of righteousness and peace, and to whom Abraham paid tithes. Christ's is an eternal priesthood, of which Melchizedek is the one example in Israel's history.

The priest is different, so also is the sacrifice. In the O.T. praxis the sacrifice is the blood of bulls and goats. Christ offers His own blood, Himself, His Will (X, 10), through an Eternal Spirit. The O.T. sacrifices were material; His is personal and spiritual. Christ, then, in His death was at once a Priest and Sacrifice, and for these great offices He had been prepared and perfected by the gift of a body and by the discipline of /
of suffering.

So far, the work of Christ has been historical and enacted in this world, but, as the High priest entered the Holy Place, so He, through His death, has entered an unseen Holy of Holies, into, in the language of Philo, a Κόσμος Ἡλιβόφα, where, as an Eternal High Priest, He makes an eternal intercession for the transgressors, a kind of heavenly mass exercised in the eternal and unseen. There are in Christ's work two parts, an earthly and an heavenly, a historical and an eternal which are not definitely related in the Author's thought, though, no doubt, he regarded them as two parts of one reality, two parts bound together by an Eternal Spirit, and by the personality of Jesus Christ, who is the same, yesterday, today and for ever.

How this priesthood and sacrifice achieve the forgiveness of sins the author does not say. As a matter of fact, apart from the quotation, "Their sins and their iniquities will I remember no more," there is no word exactly answering to forgiveness in the Epistle. The idea of forgiveness is largely merged in those of purifying (μαρτυρίας) sanctifying (ἀρίστη) and perfecting (τίλεψις). But the connection between the priesthood and sacrifice - the cause - and these moral and spiritual renewals - the effects - is not definitely stated. If we try to fill out the author's thought, we shall find the connecting link in his principle and conception of faith. Faith, with /
with him, is the spiritual realization of spiritual things; it proves invisible things; it believes in ideals and realizes them, and amongst the invisible spiritual and ideal things, the chiefest is Jesus Christ, the Eternal High Priest and sacrifice. It is said that in this Epistle, Faith is not directed to Jesus Christ but to God and the future, but he does exhort his readers to consider Jesus the Great High Priest, the Leader and Perfecter of faith, and in that spiritual consideration, in the directing of the moral and spiritual attention to that ideal, these moral results of purifying, sanctifying and perfecting would result.

The author does not raise the question, why the sacrifice of Christ was necessary for forgiveness and man's salvation. He says that almost all things are purified by blood according to the law, and apart from the shedding of blood, there is no remission. And as the types of heavenly things are purified, so is it necessary that the heavenly things themselves be purified with better sacrifices (9. 22, 23). But what this necessity is, he does not say. It was a necessity καὶ ἀρνοὶ τὸν νόμον. God had willed sacrifice, for the author that was the last necessity. There is no thought of Christ's death as a substituted penalty, or as a satisfaction to the law of righteousness, or as a means of propitiating the divine wrath. The word ἀρνοί is used once, but its object is not God but sins, and according to Old Testament analogy, its idea is rather that /
that of purifying from, a delivering from, than of making propitiation. He says also, that it became God (τὸ ὑποκάθισμα). He also says, that Christ tasted Death for every man and by dying removed the fear of death and destroyed him that is the Lord of Death, that is, the Devil. But nothing is said here about a ransom paid to the devil, or of the buying up of any rights that the Devil may have had in sinful men as in the later theory. All that the words dois to attribute efficacy to the death of Christ in overcoming the Devil and in delivering men from the fear of Death. Indeed the context, (particularly 2. 14, 17, 18) implies that the victory and atonement, which are accomplished, are due to the completeness of the incarnation as much as to the death.

The argument of the author creates the impression, that he is attempting to interpret certain great spiritual facts in terms of the Jewish sacrificial system and the Philonian philosophy, that in doing this, he is to a certain extent accommodating his argument to the thought and mental equipment of his readers, reconciling as it were his Gospel to their culture. But their culture is not ours; the fact, that the Levitical sacrifice is a type of Christ's, may not make any appeal to the modern mind, nor is the Philonian philosophy,
This is the only place in the Epistle where ἐλέημα is used. According to Biblical usage with ἐλέημα as objective, the meaning seems to be that of "unsinning" (cf. ἑξάλεημα, ἑλεημόρρια) and the author might as easily have written καὶ τὴν ἐλέησιν πρὸς Ἰησοῦν ἐλεημόρρια λήμνω πίστει. With its two worlds, one phenomenal and the other noumenal, one, with which we shall attempt to-day the interpretation of great spiritual realities. It is no easy matter to separate the form from the substance in the author's thought, what is popularly called his religion from his theology; but, if we make the attempt, we perhaps do no injustice to the author in saying, that in his religious experience, the great causal fact was the Personality of Jesus Christ, a personality that was manifested historically but is no merely historical manifestation, but is an Eternal Will and Spirit, whose moral wealth was revealed in the man Jesus but is the same yesterday, to-day and for ever. The sufferings and death were necessary for the revelation of this personality, perhaps necessary for the personality itself, for its complete realisation. The effect of the revelation of this personality is the spiritual redemption and religious salvation of men, and it is along the line of faith that the cause works its great effect. He conceives Christ's work as a sacrifice.
sacrifice, and his conception of sacrifice was derived from the Old Testament, but he does not leave it there, even though he may never explicitly say what sacrifice is, for Sacrifice is to him the life of Jesus Christ, in its sympathy, in its obedience absolute unto death itself. Such living, spiritual sacrifice, working along rational and moral lines upon the lives of men, is the means of moral redemption and salvation. Such sacrifice is to him eternal. It goes on in the heavenly places, in the κόσμος η η ῥής. We may reject the philosophy with its separation of the historical and the Eternal. Time and eternity may be for us more closely welded together than they were for the Christian philosopher, who wrote this epistle, but the truth of such eternal sacrifice and of its effects, experience may still verify and rational thought still justify, though, when we are driven to the ultimate question, why is such sacrifice necessary for the world's moral redemption, we may have no better answer than the author's, it is according to the law, ἀν δὲ τὸν τὸν δ' αὐτὸν — the law of God which is holy redeeming love. But is there a better answer or a higher necessity than this?
The First Epistle of Peter had for its purpose to comfort and strengthen the Christian communities during a time of severe persecution and trial. It is hortatory rather than doctrinal, and any dogmatic elements, which it contains, are incidental. Christ and the Christian find their ultimate origin according to the author in the Eternal foreknowledge and purpose of God (I, 1. 2, 20.). Christianity is also regarded as the realisation of the hope of Israel, the sufferings of Christ are the fulfilment of prophetic vision. The Christian life is described as a living hope, it is one of obedience and faith, it is a καλή ἀγάπη ἀγάπη, a loving and honouring of the brethren, loyalty unto the powers that be, and a living unto God. According to the Author, the Christian Life has been created and is maintained in its moral and religious quality by the Resurrection, by the sufferings and blood of Christ, by the Parousia and its accompanying judgment, and from these the author derives his material for exhortation and inspiration. Through the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead God has begotten the Christian to a living hope, that looks for an immortal and heavenly inheritance. At baptism, there comes not the washing away of the filth of the flesh but the interrogation of a good conscience towards God, through the resurrection of Jesus Christ (3. 21 cf. also 1. 21). The Parousia and the judgment are incentives to preserve an honourable /
honourable Christian life, for the end of all things is at hand. The writer has much to say of the Blood and sufferings of Christ and these are conceived in the sacrificial language of the Old Testament. Thus in the greeting, the readers are elect, through the foreknowledge of God the Father, into obedience and the sprinkling of the blood of Jesus Christ. There is no doubt an allusion, conscious or unconscious here, to Exodus 24.7-8, to the sprinkling, which concluded the Old Testament covenant. The Christians are elected to an obedience which is a covenant relation; they are sprinkled with the blood, which is symbolical of the life of Christ. "Knowing that ye were ransomed (ἐλυτρωθέντες) not with corruptible things, as silver and gold, from your vain manner of life handed down from your fathers; but with the precious blood of Christ as of a lamb without spot or blemish, being foreknown before the foundation of the world, but manifested at the end of the times for your sake, who, through him believe in God, who raised him from the dead and gave glory to him so that your faith and hope are towards God. In this passage the following points are to be noted. (i) The language is sacrificial, but there is no reference to any special sacrifice. The Lamb recalls Isaiah 53, and the language about redemption that of other prophets.

(ii) The Redemption or Deliverance is moral and spiritual as the words, 'From your vain manner of life to faith and hope in God,' plainly show. The Christians have been delivered from a /
a life of moral precept and routine to one of faith and hope.

(iii) This deliverance has been achieved at the cost only of the precious blood of Christ, and the thought of this cost is to act upon the Christians as a moral motive to spend their time in fear.

(iv) There is no word saying to whom the price was paid; nor is there any thought of substitution in the passage.

When we abstract from the sacrificial language the meaning of the passage is, that Christ has delivered the Christians from a traditional manner of life to one of faith and hope. This deliverance cost Christ His Life; it was effected by His precious blood. How Christ has brought about the deliverance; how His blood effects the ransom is not stated.

"For hereunto were ye called; because Christ also suffered for you, leaving you an example that ye should follow in His steps: who did no sin, neither was guile found in His mouth: who, when he was reviled, reviled not again; when he suffered, threatened not; but committed himself to Him, that judgeth righteously." So far, the passage is quite plain in its meaning. The sufferings of Christ for others, His whole non-retaliatory behaviour, His submission to the judgment of God made Him the true type of the suffering Saviour and an example and inspiration to the Christian. The passage continues "Who his own self offered on the altar our sins in his own body on the tree that we /"
we, having died unto sins, might live unto righteousness, by whose strips ye were healed."

Here the following points call for consideration:

(i) The meaning of the word ἐνήγματος. In the Synoptic Gospels this word is used in its literal sense of taking up. Elsewhere in the New Testament it is used of offering sacrifice; in this Epistle Christians are made a holy priesthood to offer spiritual sacrifices (ἀνεβαίνων προσώπων διψών): if this is the sense here, then the idea seems to be, that our sins were slain on the tree as the sacrificial victim was slain before the altar. The Death of Christ upon the Cross is the Death of our sins.

(ii) The meaning of the words "by whose stripes ye were healed." The words are an echo of Isa. 53.5f: if we take them here in conjunction with the words 'he that hath suffered in the flesh hath ceased from sin we find at once a simple and morally intelligible interpretation. 'He that suffereth in the flesh hath ceased from sin' states quite simply the truth of the purificatory power of righteous suffering. Suffering for the sake of righteousness destroys evil passion; it ennobles the whole nature, it effects the very death of sin. But it is not only our own suffering, that has such results; the suffering of another holy and good person, acting through influence and sympathy, destroys evil in us. So Christ's sufferings and His Death /

I.
Hebrews 7.27 (4s) 9.28, 13.15.
James 2.21. 1 Peter 2.5.
Death upon the Cross bring about the death of Christ, and so the words, He hath carried up (or offered) our own sins in his body on the Cross, where they are (at least potentially) slain, becomes intelligible.

So what this passage says is, that the Sufferings and Death of Christ destroy man's sin. The author does not enter into any discussion or theory, why it is so. For him it was probably sufficient to hold, that such dealing with sin was according to the eternal purpose of God, and God's messengers in the past had foretold this method of salvation.

In iii.17, "It is better, if the will of God be so, to suffer for well-doing rather than for evil doing, for Christ also suffered once for all (W.R.M.) in the matter of (προφέρων) sins, the just for the unjust, in order to lead you to God."

(i) Christ's suffering is an inspiration and motive to suffering for righteous sake.

(ii) The purpose is to lead men to God.

(iii) It is once for all (ἐν οἷς). The writer holds that the Death of Christ is unique, just as the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews does, and few would deny the fact. The Person of Christ and His work are, in a sense, more unique (if the comparative can be allowed) to-day than they were 2000 years ago. No Person, no life, no death have ever challenged thought and been its perpetual problem as Christ's have, none have had such stupendous /
stupendous moral effects. His Death is unique but the author
does not mean, that it stands utterly unrelated to all human
moral experience, or that it saves men from moral effort and
spiritual endeavour. To say, that Christ's Sufferings and Death
are unique, does not mean, that they cannot, in any mode or manner,
be repeated or shared. Indeed the author says that Christians
do share in the sufferings of Christ. "But as ye share
( Kοινωνία ) in the sufferings of Christ, rejoice", 4.13.

Consideration of the relevant passages leads to the con-
clusion, that, to the mind of the author of the Epistle, the suffer-
ings of Christ were a means of salvation, but that, no theory or
philosophy of this fact is offered to us. The reference to
these sufferings as an example might lead to the view, that Christ
saves men by inspiring them to be as He was and to do as He did,—
in a word, to the theory of moral influence, but the way, in which
he interprets Christ's work as the fulfilment of prophecy and as
a revelation of the eternal purpose of God and the way, in which
he correlates the Death of Christ with sin, lead us to feel, that
in his conception of Christ's work there was more than a mere
theory of moral influence could express.
The pseudonymous 2nd Epistle of Peter has one or two references to the saving work of Christ. Christ is called the Saviour (1.1) and the Lord, who bought us (πῶς ἐγορασάμεν). In one passage (2.3.4), Salvation is represented as due to the knowledge of God conveyed through Christ, especially the knowledge of His promises. The effect of receiving the promises is, that by them Christians escape the corruption produced within the world by lust and participate in the divine nature (Ἐὰν διὰ τὴν ἔνωσιν τῆς Μαχαθοῦ θεοῦ κοινωνοὶ θεόσεως 1.4). This may be the first appearance of the idea, so influential in the later Greek theology, of salvation by deification. The reference to Paul's letters is interesting. His writings contain "things hard to understand, which the ignorant and unsteadfast wrest, as they do also the other Scriptures to their own destruction." The reference is to those who used Paul's doctrine of faith apart from works as an excuse for libertinism. The author says, that the long-suffering of Our Lord is salvation; even as our beloved brother Paul also, according to the wisdom given to him, wrote unto you, as also in all his epistles." The author reverences Paul, but plainly he found him difficult to understand, and, if he regarded "the Long-suffering of Our Lord as salvation", as expressing the whole or the essence of Paul's doctrine, he was not very successful in interpretation.
The idea that runs through the 4th Gospel is that of redemption by means of revelation. This fact is exhibited in such passages as, 'For I have given you an example in order that, as I did to you, do ye also', 15.15; 'I manifested thy name to the men, whom Thou givest me from the world,' (17, 6); 'I made known to them thy name, and will make it known, in order that the love, with which Thou lovedst me, may be in them and I in them,' 17, 26; 'And this is life eternal to know Thee, the only true God and Jesus Christ, whom Thou hast sent,' 'He that hath seen me, hath seen the Father.' 'I am the way, the truth and the life.' The idea in these passages is, that Jesus saves the world by illuminating the world, by revealing to them the Father. As the bearer of the divine life to men, He banishes the darkness of ignorance from their minds and reveals to them the path of duty, truth and life.

But these are other passages, which are pervaded by a sense of some mysterious necessity and worth in the death of Christ: indeed, in no other Gospel are the references to the death so full and detailed. Thus, on the very threshold of this Gospel, the Baptism proclaims the Messiah as 'the Lamb of God which taketh away the sin of the world' (1.29). Two questions are raised by these/
these words, the first concerns their historicity, the second their meaning. In the Synoptics the Messiahship is only revealed at a comparatively late period in Our Lord's ministry, but, in the 4th Gospel, He is hailed as such at the threshold of His public career, and His sacrificial death is prophesied. It would seem most natural to suppose that an idea, which emerged much later in here carried forward. We must accept either this or that there is an irreconcilable difference between the Synoptics and the 4th Gospel in the construction of the course of events in Our Lord's life.

The second difficulty concerns the meaning of the words, 'The Lamb of God' contains no doubt an allusion to the lamblike servant of Yahweh of Isa. 53.7, and, probably, also to the offering of Paschal Lamb, which celebrated the deliverance from Egypt. Thus the phrase Lamb of God contains the idea of suffering, service and deliverance. (The sense of ραββαρίας 2 is, undoubtedly, to take away). By His suffering and service He delivers men from their sins.

The other significant passages are mainly from the lips of Jesus Himself. Thus to Nicodemus, quite early in His ministry, He speaks of the necessity that 'the Son of man must be lifted up /

1. For the phrase of Rev. 5.12, 13.18, 1 Pet. 1.18.
2. Cf. 1 John 3.5,
up, that whosoever believeth in Him may have eternal life."
(cf. 3.28, and 3.14). Later, He declares Himself to be 'the good
shepherd, that lays down His life freely for the sheep.' (10,11,18).
Caiaphas is made prophetically to declare the political ex-
pediency of the death of Jesus. In the last great discourse He
says, 'Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down
his life for his friends.' In all these passages there seems
to be an underlying sense of the ethical necessity of Christ's
death; through it, through the love that is revealed in it, 
that blessing will be brought to man.

Another group of passages are those, which gather round the
ideas of the eating of His flesh and drinking of His blood. These passages, read in connection with the idea of Bread of Life
and in the light of the whole context, suggest the thought of
spiritual and ethical appropriation. The figure of eating the
flesh and drinking the blood was quite common in the Jewish
schools in this sense. So Dr John Lightfoot interprets, 'To
partake of the Messiah truly is to partake of Himself, His pure
nature, His righteousness and His spirit.' The teaching of the
passage, in its whole context, is that true life comes from
spiritual appropriation of the life, teaching and words of Jesus.
- the words of eternal life. Any sacramental or sacrificial coloring

or idea, that may be in it, seems to come from later reflection, and, perhaps in their original form, these words of Jesus were simpler and more direct than they are in the 4th Gospel. Our Lord Himself has given the true interpretation in this very discourse, "He who eats my flesh and drinks my blood, abides in me, and I in him." Eating His flesh and drinking His blood constitute union with Christ. He has given His flesh and blood, - Himself, His Own life - that the disciples may appropriate them and live in them.

In more than one place Our Lord speaks of laying down His life (τινίκαυσην και τον ναόν και ναόν). "I am the good Shepherd," he says, "The good shepherd layeth down his life for the sheep" (10. 11, 15). "Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lays down his life on behalf of his friends." It seems perfectly arbitrary, indeed violent in exegesis, to read this phrase "to lay down his life" in any but its simple and natural sense. He lays down His life, as a true shepherd gives his life for the sheep. Further, Peter uses the same phrase of himself. "Peter saith unto Him, 'Lord why cannot I follow thee now? I will lay down my life for thee!' and, in 1 John 3.16, we have the words, "Hereby we know love, because He laid down His life for us; and we ought to lay down our lives for one another." To read these words as meaning to give one's life as a propitiatory sacrifice or as a penal substitution or as a ransom paid to the Devil, when /
when applied to Jesus, and, when applied to the disciples, in the simple natural sense, is utterly unjustifiable.

In what has been called 'the Great High-priestly prayer,' Jesus says, "Even as thou didst send me into the world, so also I send them into the world and for their sakes I sanctify (ἁγιάζω) myself in order that they also may be sanctified in truth. It is true that in two places of the Septuagint (Exod. 13.2, Deut. 15.19) ἁγιάζω has a sacrificial sense. "Sanctify unto me all the firstborn," and this has afforded some ground for interpreting the word here in some such sense. But in o. 10.36 the word is used of consecration to the Messianic office, and here in 17.17,19 the word is used of the disciples as well as ὁ Christ. It can scarcely be used in two senses in the same passage. The meaning of the words seems quite natural and clear. The Father consecrated Christ to His Mission, a consecration which He willingly accepts, in order that His disciples may experience a like consecration. His consecration involves death; the consecration of the disciples may involve death, but their is no hint that, in the former case, it was a propitiary, penal or substitutionary death.

In this whole discourse there is no direct reference to the Death, unless it be in this word ἁγιάζω. He describes His work as a giving of life eternal through a knowledge of God and Himself; 17.3,4: as a glorifying of God upon earth and a completing of the /
the work which had been given Him to do; of a giving to His disciples the divine words, which He had himself received 17.8,14, as a revealing of the divine name (17.8), as a guarding of His disciples from error and sin (17.12), and He prays the Father to keep them and to bind them to Himself and to one another in love, and complete the work, which He has done. (17.21,25.)

All this work was involved in His consecration, and His consecration would include all that this work of revelation, love and service might involve. It involved death: without death it would not have been complete; it would have fallen short of 'the greater love', which cannot be exceeded. But, of any substitutionary or expiating or penal value in this Death, the discourse shows no trace.

There is another passage (12, 24) to which a dogmatic interpretation has been given, "Verily, verily I say to you, unless a grain of wheat fall into the ground and die it abideth alone, but if it die, it bringeth forth much fruit." Our Lord is here thinking of His own death and He strengthens Himself for the great ordeal with the thought, that His death will bear much fruit. The interpretation of His thought lies in the following verse, "He that loveth His life loseth it, and he that hateth His life in this world shall keep it unto life eternal." And the truth that is here expressed is passed over to the disciples: "If any one serveth me, let him follow me" follow me in not saying his /
his life, but in giving it in self-sacrifice. For Christ, as for all men, to die is to live.

To sum up, the writer of the 4th Gospel feels a deep, mysterious necessity in the Death of Christ, the necessity, as it seems, of Love, but there is no word, which necessarily implies, that His death is a substitutionary offering or a satisfaction paid to the law of righteousness: Christ dies for men in the same way as a supreme benefactor dies for humanity, though, to the author, Christ as Crucified, is much more than a supreme benefactor. He is the Light of the World, the Bread of Life, the Good Shepherd, the True Vine, the Way, the Truth and the Life, in all these aspects He reveals the Father and brings light and life unto men. In these high redeeming qualities Our Lord stands alone.
The principal relevant passages in this Epistle are: -

(i) If we walk in the light, as He is in the light, we have fellowship with one another and the blood of Jesus His Son cleanseth us from all sin (1-7).

(ii) If any man sin, we have an Advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ the righteous; and he is the propitiation for our sins; and, not for ours only, but also for the whole world I, ii. 1, 2.

(iii) I write to you children, for your sins are forgiven you for His name's sake, I, ii. 12.

(iv) And ye know that He (ζυγινος) has manifested to take away sins, I, 3, 5.

(v) For this the Son of God was manifested that He may destroy (λογος) the works of the Devil. I, 3.8.

(vi) In this is love, not that we loved God, but that He loved us and sent His Son to be the propitiation (απολλος) for our sins. I, 4.10.

In the first of these passages, the blood of Jesus makes an actual cleansing from sin. The idea expressed closely resembles that which is common in the Epistle to the Hebrews (9.9, 9.26; 10.10, 14) and, according to which Christ cleanses the inner life by /
by His blood,

perfection the conscience and puts away sin. If the Christian walks in the light, two results will follow, he will have fellowship with his brethren and, by the blood of Jesus, will be purified from all sin. The reference is to a subjective moral cleansing. In the life of the genuine Christian the blood of Jesus is a spiritual power delivering from sin. Within the Christian community and life, the blood of Jesus has much the same function as the offerings in the Levitical system. The blood of Jesus, like the ritual sacrifices, un sins the believer. The difference is, as the Epistle to the Hebrews points out, that the material sacrifices only effect an outward purification, while the blood of Jesus cleanses the conscience and the life.

The second passage reminds us of the doctrine of the Eternal Priesthood in Hebrews. Jesus Christ, the righteous, is in the presence of the Father and He is the advocate of the sinner.

"Etymologically considered the word 'Advocate' means called to one's side, especially for the purposes of help, and in its technical usage, for advice in the case of judicial procedure with the further suggestion of endeavouring to enlist the sympathy of the Judge in favour of the accused. In Jn. 2.1 the last is generally taken to be the only sense; and the meaning evidently is, /
is, if any believer sin, Jesus Christ in person intercedes on his behalf, and representing the believer, carries on his cause in the courts of heaven. If this is the only interpretation, such questions at once arise as, Does the Father need an Advocate to make Him gracious to His Children? What does the Advocate plead, the ignorance and weakness of the believer or His own merits? Perhaps these questions ought not to be put, for they were not in the mind of the writer and were not meant to be for his readers, and the Christian should find comfort in the thought that when he sins and perhaps is too despondent to intercede and pray for himself, Our Lord prays for him. But we may still ask, is the technical usage with its legal suggestion of the word 'Advocate' the only possible sense here? May it not have the more general sense of 'Helper' as in the Christian Gospel and the meaning of the passage not be, that, if the believer sins he has a moral helper, who is in the presence of the Father and who will come to his present aid? It is difficult, perhaps impossible, to know all the writer's thought when he wrote the words, but the words, as they stand, do not justify us in reading in them a legal or substitutionary theory of Atonement. Apart from such theory, the Christian conscience does not find the words meaningless.

In this passage and in 1, 4.10 the word propitiation occurs. "He is the propitiation for our sins, and /

and not for ours only but also for the whole world." "Herein is love, not that we loved God, but that He loved us and sent His Son to be the propitiation for our sins" (I, 4.10).

The question is, Does Ἰλασωγος mean here a propitiatory sacrifice made to the righteousness of God, as Ἰλαστηρος in Romans 3.25 almost certainly does? Does it refer to a legal expiation of guilt or the satisfaction of the divine law? Or does it mean moral purification and is it similar in meaning to ἸλασκεΤευ in the Epistle to the Hebrews? Opinions differ, according to theological presupposition, but it is safe to say, that, from the New Testament usage of the word and its cognates, we are not compelled to interpret Ἰλασωγος as a propitiation offered to God or a satisfaction to His righteousness. It may mean, quite rightly, purification, moral cleansing. The real difficulty for us in accepting the meaning of satisfaction is the conception of God that such an idea entails. It makes the Love of God provide and present a propitiation to His righteousness. It breaks into two the moral unity of God and places His righteousness above His Love. It makes Love the servant, and Righteousness the Lord. We may note, that it is not the Death of Christ that is the Ἰλασωγος but Christ Himself.

The passage, "I write to you, children, because your sins have been forgiven for his name's sake" (Ἰκ πο όνωα στοι) has been thought to refer to the merits of Christ. Forgiveness is /
is due to righteousness and grace of Christ. "The name" in Hebrew is manifested character. Thanks to His manifested character, to His appearance among men, to His revelation of Himself, sin is forgiven. This states a fact of Christian experience rather than a specific theory. The words fall into line with the later words, "And ye know, that He was manifested to take away sins, 3.5, and with the words, "For this the Son of God was manifested, that He might destroy the works of Satan."
The name of Christ, His appearance, the whole revelation of His Personal life had as its purpose, as experience has proved, the doing away with sin and the works of the Devil. The writer does not say how this was affected. His words do not commit him to any theory.

In conclusion, while the writer in his references to the work of Christ uses ritual, and perhaps legal, language, he is not committed by such language to a specific theory of Atonement. In large because such language is symbolical and metaphorical, and true exegesis will hesitate to exact from such language definite theory and precise dogma. What is perfectly clear is the conviction of the writer that the Blood of Jesus, His appearance, His Name, Christ Himself, cleanses the conscience and destroys the works of the Devil, and that Our Lord's death is a revelation of perfect love charged with inspiration and creative power. "Hereby know ye the (perfect) love, /
love, because He laid down His life for us; and we ought to lay down our lives for the brethren."
The Pastoral Epistles, while they may contain Pauline elements, undoubtedly belong to a later age. They represent the period when the teaching of the Church was beginning to crystallize into definite credal form. These epistles were put forward in the name of Paul and we may suppose by those who valued his authority and his teaching, but they contain little, if any, of the distinctively Pauline explanation - Paul’s ‘theory’ - of the Death of Christ. There are traces of Pauline language, we have the traditional metaphors current in the Church, but there is no insistence upon the Death of Christ as propitiatory or as substitutionary. In I Timothy 3.16 “Great is the mystery of godliness: He who was manifested in the flesh, justified in the spirit, seen of angels, preached among the nations, believed on in the world, received up into glory,” which may well be regarded as the first appearance in the Church of a liturgical creed, there is no reference to the Death of Christ at all. We have in this Epistle the doctrinal statement, “For there is one God and one mediator (ο ἐσί θύρας) between God and man, himself man, Christ Jesus, who gave himself a ransom on behalf of all” ( γινομενος διαθέσας γιατί όμοιος) I Tim. 2.5. Here a literal exegesis may extract a substitutionary theory; we might deduce from the words the conception of a satisfaction paid /
paid to the righteousness of God, and, with equal right, the conception of a price paid to the Devil. But probably to read the words in a simple and general way - Christ the Redeemer of all - is the truest and most scientific exegesis. Does not the change of the word from Ἰουρίων of Mark and Matthew into Ἰουρίπων hint that the word had not a precise and dogmatic meaning? and the change of the preposition from ἦν to ὑπὲρ show that no fixed theory was intended? and the words do express the great fact of experience, that, through Jesus Christ, men are delivered from the life of selfishness and sin into a life of communion with God. In Titus 2:14 Christ Jesus is "our Saviour who gave Himself for us that He might deliver (λυτρώσας τὸν ἑαυτοῦ) from all iniquity, and purify unto Himself a people of His own possession, zealous to all honourable works." In Titus 2:5 God is our Saviour, who saved us "not by works done in righteousness, which we did, but according to His mercy, through the washing of regeneration and renewing of the Holy Spirit, with which He anointed us richly through Jesus Christ, our Saviour, in order that, being justified by His (Christ's) grace, we might become heirs through hope of eternal life." Here salvation is due to the love (ἀγάπης τοῦ Θεοῦ) of God, which has acted through Jesus Christ, conferring upon us a new spirit and creating the hope of immortality. The experience of the Church is Pauline, but the Church has not adopted the whole of /
of the Pauline theology, perhaps because it did not fully understand it, more probably because it did not feel so keenly, as one who had been a Pharisee of the Pharisees, the difficulty of a crucified Messiah.
Of the importance attributed to the Death of Christ in the Apocalypse there can be no question. The characteristic title for Christ in this writing is "the Lamb," used 29 times, a title which goes back to Isaiah 53. But while that is so, the Apocalypse has no definite theory of the Death of Christ. Christ loved us and loosed us from our sins by His blood (John 1:29) 1:5, but, whether by satisfying righteousness or propitiating God, or by the moral and spiritual power of His life and Death, the writer does not say. In the new song the Lamb is praised.

"Worthy art thou to take the Book, And to open the seals thereof For thou wast slain, And did purchase unto God with thy blood Men of every tribe and tongue and people and nation And madest them to be unto our God a Kingdom and priests And they reign upon earth." 5:9.

The blood of Christ, as a price paid for the salvation and moral victory of men, is a perfectly intelligible and true idea. No one would desire to depreciate the cost of man's salvation. But to formulate a theory, and fix to whom the price was paid, will only lead us to what is unintelligible and morally unthinkable. cf. also 14:3.

In 13:8 we have the phrase "the Lamb slain from the founda-
foundation of the World," which seems to mean, that the actual visible slaying is symbolic of something eternal and changeless, and so expresses the same thought as does the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews, in his idea of the Eternal Priesthood of Jesus Christ. In 12.11 the saints "conquered the Devil through the blood of the Lamb and through the word of their testimony and they loved not their life even unto death," of which the natural exegesis is, that the sacrifice of Jesus inspired them to faithfulness unto Death and so gave them the victory.
SUMMARY of RESULTS.

We may attempt to summarise very briefly the results of the foregoing study of New Testament Teaching.

I. Our Lord taught that God's forgiveness is given to all on the one condition of Repentance. In the latter part of His ministry He dwelt upon His Death and its necessity, but only on one occasion, at the institution of the Supper, did He directly relate (according to Matthew's version) His Death to the forgiveness of sins. In the same act of institution He represents His Death as the means of establishing a new covenant. By the sacrifice of His life unto death in love and obedience, He will bring men into such an intimate spiritual communion with God as Jeremiah had foretold. In another place He speaks of the sacrifice of His life as being a ransom for many, that is, His sacrifice will effect a deliverance from the present sin and misery into the freedom and blessedness of the Kingdom. His Death will induce repentance and establish the rule of God in the hearts of man. It is not enough to say, however, that Our Lord after Caesarea Philippi realised the necessity of His Death; He realised His Death as something of supreme value for His disciples, for Himself and for God.

II. Our Lord's Death on the Cross at once assumed a supreme place /
place in the life and thought of His disciples and in the early Christian churches. But in the face of Jewish ideas regarding the Messiah, the Cross, - a crucified Messiah - called for an explanation. The explanation was found in the Scriptures, especially in the conception of the Suffering servant of IInd Isaiah, and so the first disciples declared to their Jewish brethren, that the Messiah had died according to the Scriptures. But the supreme value of Christ's death did not lie in the fact that it was scriptural. The Death had, for the first disciples, a value and meaning of its own. The Crucified, as crucified, became almost at once for the disciples the Lord of life and salvation. To meet mental presupposition in themselves and in their fellow countrymen, resort was made to the Scriptural argument, which we may regard as the nature of an apologetic. Paul, to meet Pharisaic presuppositions (his own and those of his fellow countrymen), chiefly of a forensic nature, gave in his 'theory', another form of apologetic; the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews, again with an apologetic motive, interprets the death through the priesthood and sacrificial system. Indeed we may say, that all the material in the New Testament which deals with the death of Christ, has in it an apologetic element. The material is in terms which the men of the day could understand, and according to their spiritual and mental culture. It is a mistake to take this apologetic element with its analogies, symbols /
symbols and illustrations, and make it as real and universal, as
the experience which it sets forth, and to give to the Apologetic
the same value as the Cross itself, — as Christ crucified had
for its apologists. On the other hand, we may easily treat the
apologetic of the New Testament too disparaging, to say, for
instance, that its forms of thought were temporary and can have
little or no value to-day. It was a great apologetic. Through
its contemporary forms of thought the power of the Cross in the
lives of the disciples, — the supreme value of Christ crucified —
still shines forth. After all, the New Testament is still a
living book and in it Christ crucified lives for us as our supreme
reality.

III. Can we then be satisfied with the New Testament
apologetic of Christ’s death? The New Testament is the ex-
pression of a personal and spiritual experience created by Christ
and Him Crucified. This expression was in contemporary terms
and forms of thought, but in spite of this fact, it is marvellous
how simple and intelligible the New Testament is. The redeemed
soul finds himself at once at home in the New Testament,
though its ancient forms of thought he still reads of an ex-
perience similar to his own. He finds that his faith, though
he may not find its creed with all its accretions. But while
this is so, the forms of thought were contemporary and they make
no claim to exclude other forms of thought: the New Testament
does /
does not banish further thought and rational exposition of the
great reality of Christ Crucified. Indeed, by what may be called
a contemporary rational necessity, thought and exposition will
continue, for every age, for the necessity of its own intellec-
tual satisfaction, to express its experience in
its own terms and not in those of a past day, however perfect
these may be. Apologetics is never final, though the experience,
which it sets forth, may be ultimate and of eternal reality; and,
to attempt to express reality in new forms, in the thought of
our day, is to confirm and corroborate reality, it is to establish
the eternal word of God.

IV. The reality of Christ Crucified is in the New Testa-
ment, expressed in various ways and in different categories, and
the attempt is sometimes made to get at what is basal in the
various forms and different categories, at what is common to them
all. Thus it is said that the basal fact is expressed in
'Christ died for our sins according to the Scriptures.' Would,
every Gentile Christian in the early Church have said 'according
to the Scriptures?' But this attempt seems to be pursuing a
wrong method. Apologetic in the New Testament and always is a
growing, living thing. It arises from different minds and in
different environments and has all the variety, which such dif-
ference implies. What we want is not some formula, that is basal
in all the variety of the apologetic and which expresses the
common /
common element in all that is not really the basal thing. What is basal is the life and experience out of which the apologetic has arisen. If we can understand that, we shall understand the apologetic. And, in a word, we can say, that the basal experience, in the New Testament is Redemption through Christ as crucified, personal salvation with all its moral, social and religious implicates. The apologetic is the attempt, the spontaneous attempt we might say, to express this personal experience with all its implicates: it is varied and has different forms, but these do not find their unity in a formula, but in the one root of experience, from which all have come. The fundamental thing in the New Testament is personal redemption through Christ the crucified.
In the Epistle of the Roman Church to the Corinthians, there are echoes, not distinctively theological but rather practical, of Paulinism. In c. 32.3 we have the word 'justification,' and the distinction between salvation by faith and salvation by works, but the context shows that it is not set forth with the sharp distinction and the dogmatic significance that it has with Paul. The whole passage is an exhortation to humility and reminds us, that all that we have and are, are due to the Will of God. The assertion that we are saved by works (ἐγγίζειν ἰσχύσεως καὶ λόγος 32.3) is proof that for Clement no sharp dogmatic distinction between faith and works existed. Rahab is saved by prophecy and hospitality as well as by faith. Abraham is blessed for his righteousness and truth arising out of his faith.

The "blood of Christ," which is given to us (2.6) and which is redemption to all that believe and hope in God, is an expression, as co. 49 and 50 show, for Christ's Love. Love, Humility, Piety, and Reverence, inspired by Christ, are the saving powers or virtues. Christ, in a passage reminiscent of the Epistle to the Hebrews, is the High Priest of our offerings, our Guardian and Help in weakness. The blood of Christ is precious with the father /
Father, (C. 7.4) because poured forth for our salvation; it has brought to all the world the grace of Repentance. But the Blood of Christ is the Love of Christ, and, as such, is precious to God and inspires repentance in the heart of man.

There is no explicit doctrine of Atonement in Clement. His purpose was practical. Christ's Death was not isolated from the rest of His Life; it was not distinctly associated with the forgiveness of sins. As 36.2 shows, the whole Incarnation is a revelation of Eternal Truth.
This ancient homily is a practical exhortation without any specific doctrinal teaching. Christ is the Lord, who served us. He is the Saviour and Prince of Immortality, who has made manifest to us the truth and the Heavenly life. (cc. 9 and 10.)

DIDACHE.

In the 'Didache' salvation is not connected with the Death of Christ. Christ is the revelation of life and knowledge. He is the source of illumination and inspiration. (c. 9 in the Eucharist).

SHEPHERD of HERMAS.

The Shepherd of Hermas, like the Didache, does not connect redemption with the Death of Christ. The Son of God, having cleansed the sins of the people, showed them the paths of life, giving them the law, which He received from the Father. (Sim V, 6, 3.)
The Epistle of Barnabas deals with Christ's Death at considerable length, especially from the point of view of the correspondence of Christ's Death with Old Testament types, but the author attempts no rationale. According to him Christ's death fulfils the Old Testament Scriptures, (5.11) brings death to nought, prepares for the resurrection, completes the guilt of the Jews and creates a new people. Paul's doctrine of justification by faith finds no place in his Christian doctrine. Justification is in the future (4.1) and is by works (4.11). Indeed Barnabas does not hesitate even to exhort his reader to save his soul by preaching the word "or, by labouring with thy hands thou shalt work unto the ransom ( λύτρον ) of thy sins." The use of the word λύτρον here shows, that with one Christian writer, at least, it had a general and quite undogmatic sense.

We may note some other passages in Barnabas, that bear upon the work of Christ.

1. "For to this end Our Lord endured to deliver His flesh to corruption in order that by the forgiveness of sins, we might be sanctified, which sanctification is in the blood of His sprinkling," 5.1.

2. "He endured that He might destroy death and show forth the resurrection from the dead; that He might also redeem the
promise to the fathers and Himself by preparing for Himself the new people, may show while He was on earth that, Himself having made the resurrection, He will be judge," 5, 5.6.

3. "He Himself proposed to offer the vessel of the Spirit as a sacrifice for our sins, that the type of Isaac offered on the altar might be fulfilled. 7. 8.

4. After quoting from Isaiah 53, 5, 7, he goes on to say, we ought to be specially thankful unto the Lord, because He hath both revealed unto us the past and made us wise in the present and, as regards the future, we are not without understanding.

5. "If therefore the Son of God, being Lord, and being about to judge the living and the dead, suffered in order that his stroke (πήγη) may make us to live for the Son of God could not suffer save on our behalf (σωθήνει) 7. 3.

**EPISTLE to DIOGENETUS.**

In the Epistle to Diognetus Christ is sent by God in gentleness and meekness, as God, and as a man to men, that He might persuade men, call them and love them (7. 4). The most striking passage is the one reminiscent of 1 Peter 3.18, "He Himself gave up His only begotten Son as a ransom for us, the holy one for the unholy, the incorruptible for the corruptible, the immortal for the mortal. For what else could hide our sins but His righteousness? /
righteousness? In whom was it possible, possible for \( \omega \) lawlessness and impiousness to be justified, save in the Son of God alone? O the sweet exchange! O the inscrutable creation! O the unexpected benefits that the lawlessness of many should be hidden in the righteous, and that the righteousness of One should justify many lawless ones! Having then shown in the former period the incapacity of our nature to attain life, and having now revealed the Saviour able to save even creatures which are thus incapable, He willed that for both reasons we should believe in His goodness, and should regard Him as nurse, father, teacher, counsellor, physician, mind, light, honour, glory, strength and life."

This is a rhetorical passage; if we analyse its thoughts, the following ideas emerge:

(i) Love as the essential attribute of God is the cause of Atonement, in this Love Christ shares.

(ii) Sin with its consequent punishment created the necessity for the revelation of God in sending His Son. Man’s sin and helplessness gave to God His opportunity.

(iii) Christ is a ransom for us, but the phrase is unexplained and, when placed alongside the preceding phrase, in pity He Himself took our sins (ἐλθὼν ὁ θεὸς τὰς ἁμαρτίας ἐνυπηκόους ἔπεσαν καὶ ἔπεσαν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀνθρώπων ἄνωθεν) cannot have any distinct dogmatic import, and the effectiveness of the ransom, according to the /
the context, lies in the righteousness rather than in the suffer­
ing and death of Christ.

(iv) This was the only way by which man could be justified, but the author does not give any reasons for this position.

(v) The ideas of substitution and justification are pre­
sent, but they have a moral and practical meaning not a forensic.

IGNATIUS.

In the Ignatian epistles we find a somewhat more developed view of the work of Christ than in the literature of the Sub­apostolic already considered. The death of Christ, the blood of Christ and the Cross are presented in varied relations.

The Death is regarded as a necessary element in the In­
carnation and its reality is a proof against Docetism. It is an object of belief and, believing in it, men escape Death (Trull: ii). The angels and unseen powers must believe in it, otherwise judgment awaits them. The Death, or the Blood of Christ signi­fies the perfect love of Christ. This expression of love in­spires love in the Christian (Syn.: i). We may say that there are two sides to the thought and experience, the one, historical where he asserts the reality of the main historical events in the life of Christ, very much as they are set forth in the Roman Creed, the other, an experiential side, where Jesus Christ, - His whole /
whole Life, Death and Resurrection, - becomes a spiritual principle and is the inspiration, reality and end of the Christian life. Jesus Christ, His Life and His Death are a new spiritual charter creating a new humanity. This is an interesting fact for in it Ignatius seems to abandon the old literature and its authority, or, at least, to add to it and adopt a new authority - Christian experience, - though this new authority abides preeminently for him in the Bishop.

There are Pauline elements and developments from Paulinism. Christ is the Founder of a new humanity and, in a sense, that new humanity itself. He links himself with John in the conception that the Incarnation is a revelation coming out of the silence of God, revealing the \( \nu \omega \varsigma \) and the \( \nu \omega \sigma \varsigma \) of God. Ignatius believes in the vicarious nature of Christ's Life and Death; these are manifestations of Christ's Love to us, but there is nothing in Ignatius of the idea of justification by faith or of the idea of Christ as a penal substitute. How little he regarded Christ's Death as a unique propitiation is shown by the fact, that he regards his own approaching martyrdom as a sacrifice to God for his flock., Rom. 2.2. Ignatius, in his letters, combines the Pauline and Johnine tradition, but the tradition remains a tradition and is not developed into any distinctive doctrine. His devotion rather than His theology is his great testimony to the power of the Cross.
Polycarp says that Jesus Christ is our hope and the earnest of our righteousness, who took up our sins in His Own body to the tree who did no sin, neither was guile found in His mouth but for our sakes, in order that we may live in Him, He endured all things. Christ's sufferings are an example to us. He joins the Death and Resurrection together as vicarious acts.
By the Apologists the work of Christ is regarded as revelation and is related to the idea of revelation in general. The Logos or Reason of God is in every man. The prophets spoke by his inspiration and in Jesus Christ he became Incarnate, as such he confirms the revelation made from the beginning in man's reason, which has become beclouded by the demon and fallen into idolatry and become the slave of the sensual life. The prophets brought back this revelation to something of its pristine clearness. Jesus Christ guarantees its truth by repeating the prophetic revelation, which is the knowledge of God and His law and the promise of immortality, and by giving the final proof of this revelation in the historical events of his life. This is the main position of the early Apologists - Christianity is a revelation, or rather the confirmation and guarantee of the Revelation, which God makes to every man through the indwelling Logos. We have in them a simply moralistic type of Christianity. The only exception is Justin. His main view is essentially that of the Apologists in general. "According to the Apology and Dialogue of Justin, Christ accomplishes the conversion and restoration of humanity to its destination by His teaching as to the worship of the true God and a virtuous life in faith in the eternal reward of immortality, which He will bestow at His second coming."  

x Thommasius D.G. i p. 394 quoted by Franks.
coming." But besides this He speaks of the Death. "By His blood Christ cleanses those that believe in Him" (Ap. 1.32); Christ's Passion is the mystery of salvation, through which men are saved by God (Dial 74); through the Cross and the water of Baptism we are redeemed from our sins (Dial. 86). He refers more than once to the curse pronounced against hanging on a tree (Deut. 21.23), and he applies it to Christ, but it means for him simply that Christ endured a shameful death and he distinctly says that Christ was not cursed by God, (ἐγέρθη ἐκ θανάτου Χριστός κατά τὸν θάνατον τοῦ Χριστού Dial. 96). But while there are these soteriological elements in Justin, he does not seem to have made belief in them a necessity of faith and real Christianity, for he says we are called children of God and we are, we who keep the commandments of the Christ. (Dial. 123.)

THE Gnostics.

Gnosticism with its dualistic mythology, its physical conception of sin is of really no value for the doctrine of Christ's work. As has been said "it stands upon the page of history as a perpetual warning against all endeavours to substitute a physical or metaphysical for an ethical doctrine of sin and redemption." Even Marcion's conception of the Death of Christ as /
as the price, by which the God of Love purchased man from the Creator or Demiurgus of the world, is only of historical interest, as an early variation of the theory of purchase from the Devil.

This very brief survey of a period comprising about a century has shown that the Christian writings, which belong to it are not of great dogmatic value. They carry on the tradition of the New Testament; they repeat its language, and for the most part present a Christianity of a simple and practical type. The Death of Christ is presented as a necessary element in the Incarnation, as the fulfilment of prophecy, as a preparation for the Resurrection, as an example of patience and humility, as a revelation of the love of God and as a triumph over sin and the Devil. In no writer is there any serious attempt to grapple with the conception of the necessity of Our Lord's Death or to relate it to the nature of God. They found the justification of Christ's Death in the Scriptures and in its moral and spiritual effects. They call it a sacrifice and a ransom but the words are used in a general metaphorical and undogmatic way, and the death is not sharply isolated as a saving power from the whole of the Life.

The writers of this period are frequently, to their disadvantage, contrasted with the writers of the New Testament. They fall far beneath them in theological ability and constructive power. But they are on a line with them in their devotion to Christ and in the acknowledgment of the saving power of His Life and /
and Death. They confirm the reality of the spiritual experience of the earlier days. The Life and Death of Christ are to them a manifestation of God's Love and Christ's Love; they are full of creative power and, for them, the forms of thought of the New Testament are sufficient to express this love and power, experienced in their own lives.
Irenaeus has been called the first dogmatic theologian. He was led to this position no doubt by native impulse, but perhaps still more by the necessity laid upon the Church of answering the Gnostic heresies. The Gnostic theology was a theory of redemption that broke the unity of God and robbed Christ's life and death of any human reality. Such heresy demanded from the orthodox teachers of the Church a rival theology and an answer to the problems, which the Gnostics had raised.

The materials with which Irenaeus worked were the Apostles' Creed in its original form (AD 100-160), which, with regard to Jesus Christ, was a simple recital of the facts of His Incarnate Life, till the time of His ascension, concluding with the assertion of His exaltation and future judgment, the New Testament Scriptures, which by the time of Irenaeus were becoming an authority similar to what the Old Testament Scriptures had been, and tradition, as this existed in the Bishops of the Apostolic Churches. With these materials he frames a theology more or less systematic, which sums up the thought of the post Apostolic period and is typical of the future Greek theology.

There are in Irenaeus three main lines of thought.

(1) /
(i) Christ is presented after the manner of the Apologists as the Incarnate Logos, who brings to men the true knowledge of God and His Law and also the promise of immortality. Irenaeus has developed the doctrine of the Apologists by distinguishing stages in the revelation, through the Logos, of divine knowledge and immortality. The first stage or covenant was that of the original law of nature, which included love to God and our neighbour, the second was renewed and embodied in a positive form in the Decalogue to which the ceremonial law was added, and under which the Advent of Christ was prophesied, and, in the third stage or covenant, Christ renewed the original law of Love. This last covenant is related to the second as freedom is to bondage and as fulfilment is to prophecy. It adds to the old law a new law of belief in Christ. It not only confirmed an existing revelation, it brought a new revelation. But the main position is that Christ reveals God and communicates the divine and immortal life. "The word of God which dwelt in man and was made the Son of Man, that He might accustom man to perceive God and might accustom God to dwell in man according to the desire of the Father."

(ii) The main line in the thought of Irenaeus is that of Greek theology as a whole, namely, the conception of the destruction of death and the communication of immortality by the Incarnate Logos. "For in what way could we be partakers of the adoption /
adoption of Sons unless we had received from Him through the Son that fellowship, which refers to Himself, unless His word, having been made flesh, entered into communion with us? Wherefore He passed through every stage of life restoring to all communion with God. With this line of thought must be limited the doctrine of Recapitulation derived from Paul and distinctive of Irenaeus. "When He became incarnate and was made man He recapitulated in Himself the long roll of men presenting salvation to us in summary form." This conception is drawn from the idea of Christ as the second Adam, who not only destroys the consequences of Adam's fall but restores and completes humanity, bringing it into communion with God and conferring immortality upon it. According to this view, it is the Incarnation that effects Atonement restoring the original creation and bringing it to completion.

(iii) The third line in the thought of Irenaeus is the legal. He recognises a claim which must be met before man can be set free, and develops a doctrine of Redemption from the Devil. "For

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1. Verbum Dei quod habitavit in homine et Filius hominis factus est ut assuecseret hominem percipere Deum et assuecseret Deum habitare in homine secundum placitum Patris. Contra Haer III, 21.2. It is to be noted that the 2nd half of this quotation links up with another line of thought in the theology of Irenaeus, that of Christ deifying humanity.

2. Qua enim ratione filiorum adoptanis ejus participes esse poteramus nisi per Filium sìnum quae est ad ipsum recepissimus ab co communionem nisì Verbum sìm communis hæc nos sit caro factum, omnibus restituit quae est ad Deum communionem Adv. Haer. III, 187.

if man who had been created by God losing his life and injured by the Serpent, that had corrupted him, were no more to be restored to life but were to be abandoned wholly to Death, God would have been defeated and the iniquity of the Servant would have overcome the Will of God. But since God is unconquerable and magnanimous, He showed Himself indeed magnanimous with a view to the correction of man and reproof, all as we have before said: but through the Second Man he bound the strong man and snatched away His vessels and emptied death by giving life to that man, who had been made mortal. For Adam was first made a vessel for his, (the Devil's) possession, whom he was both holding under his power (that is to say unjustly bringing transgression upon him) and by means of the offer of immortality, bringing immortality upon him. Moreover promising that they would be gods, which is not in any way possible for him, he brought death upon them; while man who had been led captive was freed from the chains of condemnation." (Contra. Haer. III, 32.2.)

To quote again another passage dealing with this conception of ransom from the Devil. "The potent word of God and true man by his blood rationally redeeming us, gave Himself as a ransom price on behalf of those who were led into captivity. And since (the Devil) ruled over us by an apostasy, and while we were by nature belonging to Almighty God, He alienated us from our nature making us His own disciples, He, the word of God powerful in all things /
things and not lacking in His own justice, also justly turned against Apostasy itself, ransoming those which are his own from it (the Apostasy), not with force in as much as that Apostasy was lording it over us from the beginning, not seizing those things, which were His own, rapaciously, but by way of persuasion, as it became God, to get what He desired, by persuasion and not by imposition of force, so that justice should not be infringed, nor the ancient creation of God perish," Contr. Haer. V. 1, 1.

These two passages may be regarded as the loci classici in Irenaeus of the theory of redemption from the Devil. Its similarity to that of Marcion's is apparent; we have only to substitute the Devil for the Deuscirge and the two theories are practically the same. This theory prevailed for some 900 years in the thought of the Church, but with Irenaeus it lacks two elements which appeared in later thinkers. The dominion of the Devil is not regarded as just, as it was by some later thinkers, nor does God in this transaction use deception for the deliverance of men.

These three lines of thought are not so distinctly separated in Irenaeus as the division employed might suggest. The dominating thought, without doubt, is that of the Incarnation, by which God is revealed and man is delivered from death and corruption to Eternal Life. To Irenaeus, humanity is an organic whole and into /
into this humanity the Logos, by means of Incarnation as a re-
deeming and recreating and perfecting power. The Salvation, thus
procured, is of a semiphysical or metaphysical kind, it is this
rather than moral and spiritual, though these elements are not
lacking. He lays stress upon the obedience of Our Lord. Beside
the three strains of thought there are other elements of a
slightly different character. Thus he says, "Our Lord redeems
us by His Own Blood, and by giving His life on behalf of (ἐνέργον)
and His own flesh instead of (ἐνεργεία) our flesh." (Con. Haer.
V, 1.2.). He speaks also of Christ reconciling us to God by His
passion. The Incarnation is necessary for man's salvation, for
man had to overcome his own enemy. "He made man one with God.
For, if man had not overcome man's adversary, the enemy would not
have been justly conquered."

Irenaeus works with the Scriptures. The New Testament
is to him a source of his doctrine, but expiatory, substitutionary
and penal conceptions of Christ's work find no place in the ex-
position. His thought has both Pauline and Johanine elements.
It is from Paul that he derives his idea of Recapitulation, but it
is from John that the central idea of his thought comes, Salvation
through Incarnation, though his idea of Salvation, as a semiphysical
thing rather than moral and ethical, is due to his Greek environ-
ment. Much of his theorising is for us untenable.

His theory of Redemption from the Devil, even though there are
certain /
certain words in the New Testament which might suggest such a
ttheory is a piece of mythology which, since the time of A"selin,
has not imposed itself upon the thinking of the Christian church.
The theory of Recapitulatio has true moral elements in it.
Christ did create a new kind of man, or new creation, but clear
thinking will hesitate to accept the theory, if it has to be
interpreted as Moberly has interpreted it. "Christ is not an
infinitesimal part, but the consummating whole, of humanity and
that by consequence Christ's atoning acts were not so much acts
done by Him, instead of us, as acts, which, in His doing them, we
all did." No one man can be inclusive humanity. If the Incarnation is a reality and Jesus were made homo, as Irenaeus says,
then He must have the individuality with its separateness, that
belongs to each and every particular assumed under the universal
or inclusive humanity. Irenaeus is on more acceptable lines
when he regards as the Revealer of Life and Immortality, and not
only the Revealer but the Communicator of these, though we are
bound to part company with him, when the communication is physical
in its method and in its result. Spiritual things are
spiritually discerned and must be spiritually received. To sum
up the testimony of Irenaeus. It is through Christ the Incarnate Logos, through His Own Life of obedience unto Death
through His Resurrection, ascension and exaltation that man is
saved.
To Clement of Alexandria there were two stages in Christianity, a lower, that of Faith (πίστις), and a higher, that of Knowledge (σθένος). He repudiated Gnosticism but he remains, with this distinction of a common and an esoteric Christianity, a Gnostic in his own way. This lower stage is the sphere of the Incarnate Logos. In the higher stage, where faith has been left behind and knowledge attained, it is the pure Logos, the \[ \text{λόγος καθ' ἐσχής} \], that is the ideal, the object of contemplated knowledge and the true principle of salvation. Corresponding very largely to these two stages, there are in Clement two strains of thought, one, corresponding to the common tradition regarding Our Lord's work, the other, where the common tradition has been transcended into something more spiritual and more detached from historical fact, where Christ is known no longer after the flesh.

In the teaching corresponding to the lower stage, he makes occasionally quotations from Isaiah 53 and other prophets, and employs the language of the New Testament regarding the Death of Our Lord. This is specially prominent in his short treatise, 'quid res salvetur?', though not confined to that writing. Christ giving Himself as a ransom He obtains for us a new covenant. "I give my love to you." What is this and how much does it mean? For each of us He laid down the life the equivalent of the whole world. He demands this same sacrifice from us on behalf /
behalf of one another, (Q.D.S. 37) The traditional New Testament language is used in this passage, - the Death is a λύτρον and it establishes a new covenant - but no unique significance is given to the sacrifice of Our Lord, for the same sacrifice is demanded from the Christian. In another place quoting from I John II.2 he calls Our Lord's Death a propitiation. "And He is the propitiation (θαυμάσιος) for (προσήνομεν) our sins, as John says, who heals both our body and our soul (Paed. 3, 12.) In the brief comment 'who heals both our body and soul' the sense of θαυμάσιος for Clement is made apparent. The propitiation heals both body and soul, it is manumed in its effect. "Lamb of God" is the sacrificial title, which Clement applies to Christ and he says that we were ransomed by the precious blood of Christ as of a lamb blameless and crucified. He regards this sacrifice as the supreme martyrdom, making a moral appeal to Christ's disciples to suffer as He suffered. "Alone therefore the Lord, for the purification of those who conspired against Him and of the faithless, drank the cup; in imitation of whom the Apostles suffered for the Churches, which they had founded, that they might be in reality gnostics and perfect. The central point of his teaching is however that the Logos Incarnate brings the knowledge of /

1. 6ελπίδων... οὔπω σπάσει σε ἀλοιπόνατον κατ' ἄνθρωπον Χριστον Paed. III. 12 cf. I Peter I, 18.19.
2. Μετά τούτων ὁ κύριος ἐπὶ τοι τούτου εὐφημισμένων ἐκεῖνον ἁπάντως καὶ τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ἐν εὐφημίας καὶ ἁγίως ἀλληλελούων τοι ἐκεῖνον διὰ τοῦτο ἐπὶ τοι τούτου. Εὐφημίας αὐτοποιοῦντος καὶ ἀλληλελούοντος καὶ ἀλληλελούοντος μεταξύ αὐτῶν ἡ οἰκονομία τῆς ἐν εὐφημίας καὶ τῆς ἁγίως εὐφημίας, εἰς ταῦτα τοῖς ἐν εὐφημίας καὶ τοῖς ἐν ἁγίωσι κατὰ τὴν µᾶλλον σοφίαν καὶ στέρησιν. Ἡ ἁγία τῆς ἀληθείας Στίγμ. 49.
of God and eternal life as the reward of obedience to the Law. The word of God became man that thou mayest learn from man how man may become God."

On the higher stage the Incarnation with Clement ceases to have significance, in it the Logos reveals himself inwardly to the heart not as man but as God. "Love is no longer of Jesus but of the Logos, the Ideal. Clement could not bear to think that the rose of Sharon could blossom in common soil."

We may note that while Clement speaks in the traditional way of Christ's Death as a ransom, the theory of the ransom paid the Devil is not found, nor does He make any use of the Recapitulatio doctrine of Irenaeus. There was in his general thought more than a touch of Manichaeism, and in his Christology a tendency to docetism. Christ's Passion with Clement is a reality and it is to be noted, that the Passion includes all the sufferings of Christ and really begins with the Incarnation, but he calls Christ

( Psal. I, 2, 4.)

A consideration of Clement's two stages of Christianity will be made when we have dealt with Clement's pupil Origen.
ORIGEN.

Origen is regarded as the greatest thinker amongst the Greek theologians, and he was the first to attempt a systematic presentation of Christian truths. This he did in his De Principiis, from which, along with his commentaries and his reply to Celsus, his doctrine on the work of Christ is derived.

In the De Principiis Origen's doctrine on the work of Christ is confined to one or two passages.

'On this account Christ is proposed for us as an example to all believers, because, as He always, even before He knew evil at all, chose the good and loved righteousness, and hated iniquity, and therefore God anointed Him with the oil of gladness: so also must each one, after a lapse or error, cleanse himself from stains, in view of His example, and, taking Him as the guide of his journey, enter upon the steep way of virtue; that so perchance by this means, as far as possible, we may, by imitating Him, be made partakers of the Divine nature, IV, 31.

In this passage Christ's example is the means of moral purification and of participation in the Divine Life. But, following Clement, Origen has the conception of the two stages, and, on the lower stage, to imitate the human example is only to live under His shadow. Beyond this, there is a stage where the shadow is left behind and the reality is gained and the Incarnate One /
One gives place to the Pure Logos. The Cross itself, Our Lord's Death, belongs to the lower stage, and even there according to the De Principiis it is a condescension to human weakness, a comfort to those who can not follow the human example.

A fuller and more varied presentation of Christ's work is given in the Commentaries and Reply to Celsus.

Here again we have the general conception of Christ as a revealer and teacher and as an example of virtue, and as a transforming power. But, as in the De Principiis, there is the higher stage where the humanity is transcended. The Death itself of Jesus is presented in several ways.

(i) It shares with the Teaching in vanquishing the Demons. "It is probable" (rívós) says Origen, "that there is in the nature of things for certain mysterious reasons hard to be understood by the many, such a virtue (φύσις) that one righteous man, dying a voluntary death on behalf of the common weal, might be the means of removing wicked spirits which are the cause of plagues or distresses or shipwrecks or of any similar calamities." (Con. Celsum I, 31).

And again, "There is nothing out of place (τροπως) in a man having died and, in his death, being not only an example borne for the sake of piety, but also in its making a beginning and an advance in the destruction of that evil one with the Levil, who has obtained dominion over the whole world." (Con. Celsum VII, 17).

(ii) /
(ii) From this conception of Christ's Death as a victory over evil spirits the passage is short to the Ransom theory frequently set forth in the Commentaries.

"If then we were 'bought with a price,' as also Paul asserts we were doubtless bought from one whose servants we were, who also named what price he would for releasing from his power those whom he was holding. Now it was the Devil who was holding us, to whom we had been drawn away by our sins. He demanded, therefore, as our price the blood of Christ. But until the blood of Jesus was given, which was so precious that it alone was sufficient for the redemption of all, it was necessary that those who were established in the law, should each one give his own blood for himself, a kind of imitation as it were of the future redemption; and for our sakes on behalf of whom the price of the blood of Christ was completed it is not necessary that we have to offer a price on our own behalf, the price namely of the blood of circumcision." In Rom. II, 13; cf. In Rom. III, 7, IV, 11.

In another passage (In Matt. XVI, 8) Origen says that in the transaction there was an element of deceit, but he does not say, in this passage at least, that the deception was due to God. "But to whom did He give His soul as a ransom for many? Surely not to God. Could it then be to the evil one? For he had us in his power, until the ransom for us should be given to him, even /
even the life (ψυχή) of Jesus, since he, the evil one, had been led to suppose that he was capable of mastering that soul and he did not see that he could not bear the torture caused by holding it."

It is doubtful too whether in the following passage we can deduce the idea that God practised deceit. "For when we become conformed to the Death of Christ, no longer are we under the bonds of the Kings of the earth, as we have received, not even under the word of the leaders of this age, gathered together against the Lord. And for this cause the Father spared not His own Son, but He delivered Him up for us all, in order that those, (the Devil and his angels), who received Him and delivered Him into the hands of men, may be laughed at in the heavens and mocked by the Lord, having received the Son from the Father unto the destruction of their own rule and Kingdom, a thing which they did not expect" (προς ἀποκαταστάσεις). But this passage is plainly rhetorical, and, even at that, Origen does not say that God directly used deceit. It is well to state this for upon Origen has been laid the blame of some of the most offensive features of the Ransom theory.

(iii) Origen also conceives the Death of Christ in terms of sacrifice, employing at considerable length the Old Testament analogies. Thus he says, "But since sin entered into the world, and the necessity of sin demands a propitiation, and since pro-
Varium quoniam in hac peccatum in hinc mundum, peccatum autem recipit propitiationem reiundi. Et propitiationis non est nisi per hostiam, nec essentia hostiae est propitiationem. Hostiam post peccatum... Sed et in his omnibus ex his agnos qui hostias mundi potuit sumpsi peccatum, et idem ex se avenerant exterior hostiam: quia talis hostia fuerat hostia in una sola expiament pro tribus mundi salutem. Ceberi enim pecudum pecata, hic est hostia...
propitiation cannot be made except through a victim, it was
necessary that a victim for sin... should be provided..... But
amongst all these there is one Lamb who could carry away the sin
of the whole world, and therefore all other victims have ceased:
because this victim was of such character, that it availed for
the salvation of the whole world. For the rest, put away sins
by supplication, this one alone by power..... through whom let
the world hold spiritual festivals, not for the satisfying of the
flesh but for the benefit of the spirit, through spiritual
sacrifices offered with the purifying of the mind (In Num. XXIV, 1).
In this passage Origen says that sin demands a propitiation, but he
does not say that the propitiation is made to the righteousness
of God. What Origen meant by propitiation may be judged from
In. John I, 33, where he asks, "Would that propitiation be apart
from a power of God, which makes weakness disappear, which flows
upon the souls of believers and which is administered by Jesus
of which He is the first, the very power of God, thanks to whom
we could say "I can do all things through Christ that strengtheneth
me." But the propitiation has a relation to God. "This holy
spirit was indeed between the divinity of the Trinity and the
weakness of humanity. This then can be understood as a pro-
pitiation." (In Rom. III, 8) (The Logos could not be according
to Origen a propitiation, for it is eternal, but only the άννα
or υἱός of Christ.) And again in In. Rom. III, 8. "Now Paul
adds something more sublime and says, God sent forth his Son to
be /
(2) Origen held that the death of a martyr had power over the evil spirits.
be a propitiation, that is, by offering the victim of His body He might make God propitious to men, and Christ is the true priest, who with His own blood made God propitious and reconciles thee to the Father." Plainly there is some mysterious necessity in relation to God but at the same time the propitiation is regarded as a moral power in the lives of men. Consistently with the thought of the Epistle to the Hebrews, He also has the idea of an eternal priesthood and sacrifice.

Origen views the work of Christ from so many different ways and presents it in so many different aspects, that it is impossible to give anything approaching a complete and consistent statement of his theory (or theories). This variety and fullness are due in considerable measure to his conservatism. He repeats the thought and language of the past, and almost every previous aspect of the work of Christ is found in his writings. To reconcile these into a unity is impossible. But central to his thought is the conception of the Incarnate Logos, of Christ Himself as the communicator of truth, goodness and the immortal life. Christ is, to Origen, the Great Exemplar. When he views Our Lord's Death as a sacrifice, a propitiation, He is conscious of some mysterious necessity for such in relation to God but the propitiation is a moral power of cleansing and spiritual blessing. His statement of the Ransom theory may not be entirely without objectionable elements, it has at least the suggestion of stratagem on the part of

No quisque hoc intellectu voluit quod esset ensos quam non semper in Jerusalem effusa est unde altare... sed si quid supernum alium quod at incolis uti sol propter primi monumento, idem esse semper cognoverit.
of God, but none of his statements can be viewed as a popular rhetorical and dramatic, and, when stripped of the mythology in which they are set, they form simply a dramatic presentation of the contest between good and evil, and the theory can be reduced to this. Christ fought with the Devil (sometimes Origen substitutes Death for the Devil, Enmity (Manicitia) is evidently also another substitute) and slew Him. This conflict and victory cost Christ His Life; His blood was the price paid. There is moral truth in such a presentation, and it may be regarded as an imaginative but none the less real, statement of the contest of good and evil, and of that contest, as it took place, in the living and dying of Jesus. It is hard to escape the feeling that much of the traditional language which Origen uses and the presence of the ransom theory in his writings were due to a popular instinct, to a desire to accommodate that to the ordinary mind, an accommodation which would not be necessary to the mature Christian. If this is so, then the traditional modes of speech, and also perhaps in default of truer and better, and the ransom theory were not of the essence of Origen's thinking. And this leads one to say something of the Doctrine of the two stages which Clement and Origen maintain. In such a doctrine there are two obvious dangers. One is that it makes a class distinction amongst Christians, with two sets of ideals, and this danger led to an actual evil in the Christian Church. On the one hand, there was the /
the ordinary believer, on the other, the supposed higher type of mystical Christianity, which united itself with asceticism and produced many loveless lives. The other danger is that the higher stage may develop into a vague mysticism, in which the truths revealed in historical Christianity are lost and become devoid of living power. The Christian Gnostic might become a Neo-platonist and nothing more. These dangers are obvious, but none the less, there is an element of fact in the distinction, a distinction which is suggested by certain words in the New Testament itself. On the one hand, there is the Christian who accepts the historical facts, the traditional theories and the traditional morality of Christian living. They are accepted on authority and are a matter of belief. On the other hand, there is the Christian, to whom these things, or rather the realities, which are contained in these things and symbolised by others, have entered into the experience and become spiritually creative. The one type may be said to know Christ after the flesh; the other to know Him after the spirit. In this latter and more spiritual stage the Christian seems (to himself) to become independent of historical data and traditional interpretation. He may become impatient of these and doubt not merely their insufficiency but their worth at all. He has his own spiritual experience of Christ and that is sufficient. The distinction which Origen and Clement make may be described as the distinction between /
between life according to the letter and life according to the spirit. If this is so, then, may we not view the conception of the two stages in these two Christian writers, under whatever influences developed, as a kind of protest against some of the traditional letter in which the life of the spirit had tried to express itself? And one wonders what kind of a Christology Origen would have given, if he had allowed it to be formed under the principle of personal experience, if he had expressed it not after the flesh or the letter, but after the spirit alone. In such a Christology arising out of experience, it is hard to believe that the ransom theory would have found any place, and it is quite possible that much of the traditional language, which Origen uses, would have been omitted. This is not saying that Origen would have given a Christology would have been wholly independent of history and tradition. He knew too well the realities that lie behind the history and the truths which the language of the past had tried to express for them not to find a place in an expression of his own. But he would have expressed these perhaps more simply and without challenge or criticism from conscience or reason. He appreciated the past too well.

Appended Note on The Two Lives, next page.
The doctrine of "the Two Lives" was not new. It is in Philo, and corresponds to his difference between God and the Logos and to his two worlds, κόσμος ῥευτός and κόσμος λειόντης. Orig. (In Joh. 1.12, 1.30) differentiates the Εμμονής of Christ:—Those which He assumed as Redeemer are λειόντης with which μορφή is concerned. Christ Himself is thus both λειόντης and ῥευτός % Christians, who are ruled by Him as λειόντης know Him as man and are μαρτυροί; those who perceive Him as ῥευτός are governed by Christ, as God, and are ῥυστικοι. The doctrine is that of the Practical and Contemplative life of Plato and Aristotle, and of the Stoic difference between προκοπή and σφιξ. It had too, Scriptural authority in certain Pauline antitheses, e.g. milk and solid food, the letter and the spirit, the spirit of bondage and of adoption. Cf. Heb. Vl. 1.

Clement found the doctrine useful in two directions. It gave him a weapon with which to oppose Gnosticism; and it interpreted the marked personal differences in the members of the Alexandrine Church, which contained legal formalists and others who were of the Spirit.
ATHANASIUS ob. 373 A.D.

From Athanasius comes the first complete and systematic treatment of the work of Christ. In the De Incarnatione he starts with the statement that the world was created by the Logos, the Divine Word. Man was made in the same manner as the rest of creation, but to him was given a share in the Logos, conferring the possibility of incorruption. The retention of this privilege depended upon man's obedience, and, as a matter of fact, he lost his divine privilege. This resulted in a dilemma: by his disobedience man, according to the word of God spoken to Adam, should die and go to corruption, but this would have meant the failure of God's purpose in creating man - a monstrous eventuality. How then is this situation to be met? Repentance is unequal to solve the difficulty, for repentance would fail to guard the reasonable claims of God (διὸ ζηλωταὶ Ἰεροσολύμων ἢ πρὸς δεῖον); for God would not be true to His own word unless men who had disobeyed and become corrupt, did not die, and besides, could not get deep enough down to deal with the actual corruption. The only means then of dealing with the situation is by a fresh intervention of the Logos. The instrument of creation becomes the instrument of Redemption. This seems at least fitting. The Divine Logos engages on the new work of Redemption by taking to Himself a body, His own creation, born of a Virgin. This action /
action brings back incorruption and immortality to humanity. But this is not all. The body dies, and its death plays a distinct part. There was a debt due from man on account of his disobedience, the debt of corruption and death. This debt is paid in the death of the body, which the Logos had taken to Himself. 1 This death is an equivalent. Death is dethroned; Incorruptibility is reestablished in humanity.

One result of man's disobedience and consequent corruption was that he lost the Knowledge of God. He lost the rational power of discovering Deity. This loss defeated one of the ends of the creation of humanity, for man was made, for his own dignity and for God's satisfaction, to know God. So great was this loss of rational perception, that the works of Creation, the word of the prophets and the moral law alike, failed to bear witness in the mind of man of the reality of God. This loss could only be remedied by the appearance of the Logos in human form, from which appearance men might reason (λόγος ὁ φωνή) again and conclude that God and the Father are realities. "For by his becoming man the Saviour was to accomplish both works of Love; first, by putting away death from us and renewing us again; secondly, being unseen and invisible, in manifesting and making himself known by his works to be the Word of the Father and the Ruler and King of the Universe," XVI, 5.

2. ὠφθων ὁ δὲ φωνή ὁ λόγος εἶναι προσφέρει τῷ θεῷ ἀληθίνῳ.
The Death of Christ says Athanasius is the sum of our faith (τὸ καθεξῆς ἡ συνομολογία τῆς πίστεως ἡμῶν XIX, 4) and of this all men are sure. Its meaning and method, therefore, require further elucidation. As has already been said the Death was necessary to pay the debt that was owing from all, and so the Logos came amongst us, Our Lord Jesus Christ, and, after giving proof of His Godhead from His works, He next offered up His sacrifice on behalf of all, yielding the Temple of His body to Death in the stead of all, in order, first, to make man quit and free of their old trespass, and, further, to show Himself more powerful even than Death, displaying His own Body as first-fruits of the Resurrection of all (XX, 2). Accordingly men no longer die the death as before, agreeably to the warning given to Adam, for this condemnation has ceased and corruption is ended by the grace of the Resurrection. If objection is taken to the manner of Christ's Death, it may be said that it was unfitting for one who himself healed sickness to die of any natural disease; it was unfitting too, that He should die a death of His own choosing, for in that case, it might be said, that He was not lord of every kind of death; it was necessary that His Death should be public, so that its reality may be manifested and consequently the Resurrection a real triumph; nor would it be seemly for Him, who was the life to cause His own Death, it must be due to others. The body must not be divided, lest a divided body should supply arguments /
arguments for schismatics, who wished to divide the mystical body of Christ. In fulfilment of prophecy, He died upon the Cross (Deut. 21.23 cf. Galns. 3.13) with His arms stretched out to unite Jew and Gentile; in the air, to destroy the Prince of the Air and His evil kingdom.

The latter half of the De Incarnatione deals with the Resurrection which, for Athanasius, is the consummation of the Incarnation and Death, contains a Refutation of the Jews based on the Old Testament and one of the Gentiles based on the Logos doctrine.

There are two main parts to the argument of Athanasius. One part deals with the Incarnation, the other with the Death of Christ. But both Incarnation and Death share in the work of Redemption and each plays a specific part. According to the doctrine of the Incarnation, the Logos unites itself to a human body, and by such union that human body is ipso facto incorruptible, but in some way the union brings incorruptibility also to humanity in general. The Incarnation is Redemption. The recapitulation theory of Irenaeus it is said (Loc. D. G. 231) vanishes in Athanasius, but it seems to be at least implicit in the conception of the Redemption of Humanity through the Incarnation. The incorruptible Logos, when He takes to Himself the body of Jesus, communicates his incorruptibility to Humanity. Athanasius is, however, ambiguous or inconsistent in his view of /
of the Communication for the Incorruptibility is viewed as due to
the Logos present in humanity and also to the Grace of the Re-
surrection. But the oft quoted words no doubt give, broadly and
truly, the position of Athanasius. "For He (the Logos) became
man, that we might become Gods." ἀπὸ τοῦ λόγου γενόμενος αὐτὸς ἡμᾶς
τοὺς θεούς ἔγερσιν.

Now with regard to this principle,
the first criticism is its almost total lack of ethical content.
The ultimate motive no doubt - the goodness and kindness and
truth of God, - is ethical but the process and the result are
not. The Logos is an abstract principle and without meaning
and moral value, till it is filled with the life and character
of Jesus; the Logos, as ὁ λόγος, has no redemptive power or value.
There are ethical elements in Athanasius, the example and conduct
of Christ influence men and give them afresh the knowledge of
the Father. But, in the main, the process of Redemption is meta-
physical or semiphysical. Redemption is a metaphysical deliver-
ance from Death and Corruption rather than a moral salvation
from sin. The second point is that no rationale is given of
the Communication of the incorruptible Life which belongs to the
Incarnate, to the rest of humanity. To say that to Athanasius
Christ's humanity was an inclusive humanity is to be blind to
the distinctness of human personality. What is really wanted
is a much more ethical conception of the person of Christ, built
up through our knowledge of the Life of Jesus and a more ethical
conception /
conception of man's need.

It may be noted that Athanasius is not quite consistent to his idea of man's corruption, due to the Fall. This corruption is regarded as complete, it is beyond the power of Repentance to deal with it and it is universal. The prophets of Israel are represented as still possessing an knowledge of God, and as still teaching the truth which men could not receive, because they were too far gone in darkness. The prophets, at least, had not lost all contact with the Logos.

In the part which deals with the Death of Christ, the Death is conceived as a debt, but it is nowhere stated to whom the Debt is paid. It is an equivalent, but an equivalent for what? evidently for man's corruption and the death implicit in that corruption. But the body of Christ by its union with the Logos is incorruptible. Death does not really touch it, certainly not in the same way as Death touches corruptible humanity. There is no exact equivalence, for Christ dies a different death from that of corrupt humanity. We cannot from any human experience or knowledge equate the two. Further, it is the Logos that is according to Athanasius the principle of Redemption but the Logos does not really die. Indeed the Logos does not die at all, and the body, which he has assumed, can only die in a way different from sinful and corruptible humanity.

Athanasius further holds that the Death of Christ fulfils the /
God had pronounced the threat of Death and corruption on disobedient humanity, but the fulfilment of the threat would have been the defeat of the divine purpose, so the veracity is met by the Death of Christ. But by the Incarnation, incorruptibility in some way was restored to humanity, (τὸ ὑπ' ἐστὶν σωτηρίας ἡς καὶ διὰ τοῦ ὑπερῴην ἂν τὸς πάσης ἡμῶν ὑπερῴην.) That is, by the very incarnation, humanity became incorruptible and in such case God would not have been false to Himself in saving it from Death and corruption.

It is impossible to reconcile into a unity of thought the two sides of Athanasius' thinking. They come from different sources, and have their roots in two very different cultures. In his later work (Contra Arianos) the substitutionary view and the necessity of Christ's Death fall into the background, and conceptions of salvation and deification through the Incarnation become prominent, and, no doubt, this is the real substance of the thought of Athanasius regarding the work of Christ. The temptation is strong to attempt the modernity to substitute for the Incarnate Logos the moral personality of Christ, to view humanity more in its ethical than in its metaphysical need, to transmute the process of redemption from a metaphysical and almost magical one into one where the moral freedom and spiritual receptivity of man have free play, but this modernised doctrine would /
would not be that of Athanasius.

THE CAPPADOCTANS.

Gregory of Nyssa, Gregory of Nazianzus

In his "Great Catechism" Gregory establishes the doctrine of the divinity for the Greeks from common notions, and for the Jews, from Scripture. He then proceeds much in the same way as Athanasius to the creation of the world and especially man. God creates the world through the Logos and, in particular, man, as it would be unfitting that there should be none to behold the Invisible Light and to enjoy the Divine goodness. Man at his original creation was endowed, with Life, Reason, Wisdom, Immortality and Free Will. All this was included in the Divine Image. The trouble arose through the envy and deception of the Devil, to whom man in his freedom yielded and brought himself to sin, misery and death.

From this fallen state none but God could rescue man, and God does it by the method of the Incarnation, which is not incongruous to the nature of God and has been established as a fact through the works of Christ, - idolatry has been abolished, the Church has spread, martyrs have died. Indeed the Incarnation justifies itself by the revelation of God which it gives, for through it God's forgiveness, wisdom and justice are manifested. God's /
God's goodness is revealed in His pity for man in his fallen state; His wisdom in His knowledge of the right method of Redemption; His justice in paying a price to the Devil, for as man had given himself to Satan, of his own free will, a price was justly due.

In Christ's Death, His soul and body were separated, but each was still united to the Logos that they might be reunited again after the body was purged from the dross by Death. Christ had to die that He might touch human nature at all points; indeed He was born to die, to redeem humanity from Death and begin the Resurrection of mankind with His own Resurrection.

It is in dealing with the Devil that the justice of God is specially revealed. God did not exercise any arbitrary sway of force over him who had us in his power; He did not tear us away from His hold; He offered to the Devil something better and higher than He had by way of exchange, thus playing upon the Devil's pride and ambition, but this greater and better thing is veiled in flesh so that the Devil might not be afraid to grasp at the prize offered. The flesh is the bait upon the fish-hook. In this device the Wisdom of God was shown, and it is justifiable, for the Devil was only being paid in his own coin and it was for His ultimate good, (for Gregory following Origen even more decidedly holds to the salvability of the Devil).

In all this transaction then we see the goodness, the wisdom and justice of God.

1. Orat. Cat. Magna XXII, XXIII.
Redemption is through the Incarnation which brings the Logos into contact with humanity at all points.

"Now indeed (i.e. at the Creation) He who keeps nature in being was transfused into us, but then (i.e. at the Incarnation) He was mixed with our nature, in order that (our nature) by intermixture with the divine, might become divine, being delivered from Death and freed from the tyranny of the enemy. For his return from Death becomes to the mortal race the beginning of the return to the immortal life" (Great Cat. XXV).

In this view Gregory is following Athanasius though he has a much more moderate view of the fallen state of man. He introduces a new idea in mediating the benefits of the Incarnation through the Sacraments of Baptism and the Eucharist. But Baptism and the Eucharist are only beneficial in so far as they are accompanied by a real moral change. "It may be a bold thing to say yet I will say it and will not admit that in the cases (where there is no moral change) the water is anything but water, for the gift of the Holy Spirit in no way appears in him who is thus baptismally born."

To Gregory of Nyssa, The Incarnation, the Transaction with the Devil, and the Sacraments of Baptism and the Eucharist are the factors of Redemption. These originate from and reveal the goodness, the wisdom and the justice of God.

In Gregory there is practically no idea of substitution or of Christ's /
Christ's Death as a sacrifice, the main thought is of the Incarnation as an *actus medicinalis* that naturally affects the whole of mankind. The *media* of its operation are Baptism and the Eucharist, and its consequences to man are life and immortality. But the semiphysical character of the manner of Redemption is modified by the fact that to Gregory there is no real functioning of the Incarnation, no real benefit save where there is moral and spiritual result. He emphasizes man's pardon and man has a part to play in his own salvation; though Gregory may lay but little stress on the example of Christ and the effect of His teaching, he is far from losing all ethical interest in man's salvation. Redemption has to him a distinct moral element in it. But it is difficult to reconcile the quasi-magical influence which the Incarnation seems to have upon human nature with this moral element and with man's moral freedom.

The Devil theory is the external and popular side of Gregory's doctrine. A new point is added by him in the fact that it is through the humanity of Christ - the veil of flesh - that the Devil is deceived.

**GREGORY of NAZIANZUS - \( \text{\textcopyright} 390 \text{ A.D.} \)**

The doctrine of Gregory of Nazianzus follows the main lines of the *De Incarnatione* and the *Magna Catena*, but it does not receive /
receive the same complete and systematic treatment. It is through the Incarnation meeting human nature in all its properties that salvation is secured for man. Christ united all parts of human nature to himself, that all parts might be sanctified and deified. The Divine nature acts like leaven and leavens the whole lump. This is so on the principle, that what is not assumed cannot be cured: (το Ἰησοῦν ὑπέρτηθεν ἡμῖν), an argument which Gregory uses against the Apollinarian conception of Christ's person. At times Gregory uses very realistic language to express the identification of Christ with human nature. He speaks of Christ becoming a curse and sin for us, but he explains that Christ does this to produce humility in us, and, in another place, he says that Christ is not really a curse, and sin. What he may mean is that Christ entered into the conditions of the sinful and cursed.

"Just as He was called a curse for the sake of salvation, Who dissolves my curse; and was called sin, Who takes away the sin of the world and instead of the old Adam is made a new Adam, in the same degree, He makes my rebellion His own as head of the whole body. As long, therefore, as I am rebellious and seditious by the denial of God and by my passions, Christ is called disobedient, as far as I am concerned." (Ov. XXX, 5 cf. A. XXXVII, 1.)

Gregory Nazianzen follows Athanasius and Greek theology in general in stating as one reason for the Incarnation that the finite reason might know the infinite God. God became incarnate /
He repudiates the transaction with the Devil. There is a victory on the part of the Incarnate Christ over the tyrant, a victory in which deceit plays a part. - "the sophist himself who deceived us is himself deceived by the covering of flesh, that hurling himself, as he thinks upon Adam, he may rush against God" (Or. XXXIX, 13). There is however no payment of a ransom (φιλατρεύεται, ἐξεργασίως) to the Devil, nor is the ransom paid to God. If the Father accepts the blood of Christ, it is not because He demanded it or had need of it, but by reason of the economy of salvation, and because man needed to be sanctified by that which was human to God, in order that He might deliver us Himself, having triumphed over the tyrant by force, and might bring us back to Himself by the mediation of His Son, who has done all things for the glory of the Father, to whom He was seen in all things to yield" (Or. XXXIX, 13).

The Incarnation extending over all the properties of humanity, is God's method - God's economy - for the purification and salvation of men.

The later Greek theology adds little or nothing to preceding thought. Chrysostom, who represents the school of Antioch, resisted the mystical interpretation of Scripture for the literal. Consequently he uses the New Testament language of substitution, and /
and he adopts the theories implicit in the language of authority; he does not grapple with the difficulties such theories present, and has no solution of them. He also accepts the transaction with the Devil.

Cyril of Alexandria (b. A.D. 444) has the same doctrine of Salvation through the union of the Logos with humanity as is found in Athanasius and the two Gregories. He dwells upon the infinite worth of the passion of Christ, (a feature that is also found in Cyril of Jerusalem and Chrysostom). "When we were taken captive in many sins, and therefore, in debt to death and corruption, the Father gave His Son as a ransom for us (ΙΗΟΤΟΙΡΟΤΟΟΣ ΧΩΝΟΤΟΟΣ) one for all, for all is in Him and He outweighs all in value." He states the view that Christ's Death is an equivalent and more than equivalent (ΙΗΟΤΟΙΡΟΤΟΟΣ ΧΩΝΟΤΟΟΣ) for the death and curse of man. Christ's Death is this because of the Logos in Him, because He is divine. "The One would not have equalled all, if He had been simply man; but if He be reckoned as Incarnate God, suffering in His own flesh, the whole creation is small compared with Him, and what is required for the ransom of all that is under Heaven, is the death of this one flesh, for it belonged to the Logos begotten from God the Father."

John of Damascus (680-760 A.D.) sums up in a scholastic way the results of Greek theology since Athanasius. He recognises that the object of the Incarnation is to teach the right way of life /
life (Exp. Fid. Orth. IV, 45) but the way of salvation, life and immortality are secured chiefly through the union of the Logos with humanity, and through the victory of the Incarnate Christ over Death and the Devil. Like Gregory of Nazianzen, he rejects the idea of a ransom paid to the Devil, but like him also he holds that there was a contest between Christ and the Devil. "Death approaches, and, eagerly swallowing the bait, is transfixed by the hook of the Divinity; and so having tested that innocent and lifegiving body, itself is destroyed, vomiting up all those whom it had previously swallowed. For just as darkness is dispelled when light is introduced, so corruption is driven back before the assault of life, and life comes to all, but to the destroyer, destruction." John does not say that Christ's Death was a punishment; in accordance with tradition he holds that Christ offered Himself as a sacrifice to the Father for us. But this is not exactly substitution, for according to the idea prominent in the Greek theologians, somehow Christ's Passion and Death sublimate that of the believer. John states this theory at length and with scholastic precision.

John of Damascus sums up and closes the period of Greek theology. The ideas which have emerged in this theology may be succinctly stated as follows:

(i) The example of Christ's Life and conduct.

(ii)
(ii) The effect of the union of the Logos with Jesus upon all human nature and especially upon the believer; this union bestows incorruptibility and immortality.

(iii) In producing this effect the Sacraments of Baptism and the Eucharist come into play.

(iv) Salvation is secured through Christ's victory over the Devil: in this contest God's justice and wisdom are revealed.

(v) Christ's Death is a debt paid on behalf of man, it is an equivalent. It is also regarded as a sacrifice.

(vi) Through the Incarnation God is known and this knowledge is a part of man's salvation.

(vii) The idea of the Recapitulatio, with the corresponding idea (if it is not the same idea) that humanity is assumed in Christ. Men die in Him. That is, that Christ's Humanity is an inclusive humanity and His Death an inclusive Death.

CRITICISM.

We may pass criticism on these points briefly before attempting to reduce the Greek Theology to its main features and to make a moral evaluation of the Greek theology as a whole.

It will be seen at once that there are in Greek theology different /
different trains of thought, different ideas; to combine these into a system or to interpret them through a single conception is practically impossible.

With regard to (i), This is a common feature in the Apostolic Literature, and Christ's influence and example have always had their part in the formation of Christian life and character.

(ii) The effect of the Incarnate Logos is of a metaphysical or semiphysical character. The Logos in Christ is a ferment in humanity. This robs salvation of its complete moral and spiritual character. And the Greek position is not corroborated by fact. The Union of the Logos with humanity through Christ made humanity at least potentially incorruptible and the believer actually so. But after the incarnation humanity, even in the believer, remains corruptible. Death is still man's lot.

(iii) The operation of the sacraments hovers between an ethical and spiritual interpretation and a mechanical and materialistic view. Faith is required and even repentance. In practice, probably, the mechanical or magical view prevailed.

(iv) The transaction with the Devil is more or less in all the Greek theologians. The idea may find some justification in certain words of the New Testament, e.g. "I saw Satan descend from Heaven like lightning. The Prince of this world cometh and hath nothing in me," etc., though its actual source was probably elsewhere. "The general historical background of the devil doctrine /

1. Adeimantus is the one exception. Gregory Nazianzen repudiates the idea of a ransom paid to the Devil, but there is a contest with the Devil.
doctrine is formed by the heathen environment of the ancient Church" (Kaftan). Whatever criticism may be brought against this theory, its grotesqueness, its mythological character, the main criticism is the fact that the Devil, or what He stands for, was not destroyed. The myth of a personal Devil may have departed, but the evil which the myth would try to explain, of which he was the mythological, still continues. The Devil still lives.

(v) Whether Christ's Death is conceived by the Greek Fathers under expiatory or substitutionary forms, the difficulties are not grasped or solved. New Testament language is used, without realising the problem of its true interpretation. The distinction between literal fact and metaphor is not realised. What may be true as metaphor may be false as literal fact.

(vi) Through the Incarnation there came a new knowledge of God, but, as the Nicene symbol shows, this knowledge in Greek theology was to a great extent metaphysical. It had not the rich, moral reality of the New Testament.

(vii) With regard to the Doctrine of the Recapitulation and inclusive humanity and Death of Christ, John of Damascus says that "when one of the individuals suffers, all the essence ( \( \tilde{\gamma} \sigma / \alpha \) ) in respect of which the individual has suffered, being capable of suffering, is said to have suffered in one of its individuals: without however its being necessary that all the individuals of the same species should suffer too with the individual that does actually /
actually suffer." According to the principle then which John has set forth in scholastic form, the \( \nu \sigma \dot{\iota} \) of Christ has suffered and died. The \( \nu \sigma \dot{\iota} \) belongs to all individuals and therefore every individual pursuing the \( \nu \sigma \dot{\iota} \) has suffered and died. But Christ is not a universal \( \nu \sigma \dot{\iota} \). He is a particular or individual person. His Death is the Death of a particular person. It is not a universal. Mortality may belong to the essence of humanity; it is universal, but Christ's own death is particular and has an existence in itself from which every particular death is separated by its own particularity. 'Inclusive humanity', inclusive death' are abstractions and have no concrete reality. "All men die in Christ" or in Christ's Death is a rhetorical expression. It may be metaphorical and have a moral and spiritual meaning, but as such is prophecy rather than actual fact. A man only dies in Christ when he dies in some spiritual way.

MORAL EVALUATION of the GREEK THEOLOGY,
as a whole.

As has been said it is impossible to combine the various elements of the Greek Theology into a single system. We may distinguish however three main strata and attempt to estimate their religious value and their testimony to Christian truth.

(1) /
(i) Christianity is a revelation of God and of the true way of life. Christ is the Light. Man is free and can receive the light, walk in it and so receive the gift of salvation. This is the moral and rational strain that runs through Greek Christian thought.

(ii) But there is another strain, in which man's moral capacity does not rank so high, in which his freedom through disobedience has been largely lost. Man has become corrupt and corruptible, in a semiphysical sense. To meet this a redemptive power is introduced through the union of the Logos with humanity in Christ. Here man does not win redemption for himself. God gives it to him in the Incarnation. By the union of the Logos with Christ, human nature has been deified potentially at least. This is the central doctrine of the theology.

(iii) Man has not only lost freedom and become corrupt, by his disobedience he has come under the power of the Devil and his kingdom; he has become the property of the Devil, who has claims that must be recognised. This led to the Ransom theory.

These are the three distinctive strains, but a fourth, the Biblical, should be added. This strain was not prominent nor intensely formative in their religious experience and thought. "It was incidental and casual" (Denny). It was due to their reverence for authority and the Scriptures. "It came up when they had their Bibles in their hands or in their memories, but it had /
had not the native root in their minds which the other" (the more speculative strains) "had." But though this Biblical strain is "incidental and casual," it meant something, it had a moral and spiritual counterpart which should be taken into account in any attempt at a complete evaluation.

The description of the Greek theology as the Hellenisation of Christianity is familiar, and, as a general statement of its character, commonly accepted. The Greek theology is Christianity read and interpreted in terms of Greek thought. It may be even more than this. It may be viewed as a kind of antitype of the old Greek religion. In the old Greek religion there were three prevalent strata. The first was the Olympian stratum. This was the moral and rational element in Greek religion, and it was predominant in Greek literature from Homer onward. In it man is free. He can do what the gods will. If he does, he will be blessed; if not, he will suffer. A second stratum was the Dionysian. In this man has to do with the gods or demons of the underworld. He has to placate them, and to free himself from their evil powers. A third stratum was the Dionysian. Here the chief idea was that of deification. The worshippers, in the ecstasy of the Bacchic dance, believed that they became godlike. The Thracians, with whom this stratum had its origin, held that those, who were ecstatically united to Dionysus, would enter into immortality with him. The present ecstasy was a foretaste /
foretaste of the future blessedness. It will be at once seen, that there is a similarity between these three strata of old Greek religion and the three prominent strains of the Greek theology. The Olympic stratum finds what may be called its antitype in the moral scheme of the Greek theologians; the Eleian in the ransom theory and the Dionysian in the idea of deification through the Incarnate Logos. It is perfectly plain that both Greek religion and Greek thought of the Neoplatonic order had much to do in the shaping of the theology of the Greek Fathers, but it would be utterly false to the Greek Fathers to describe their theology as a Christian transmutation of Greek thought and religion. To them, Light and salvation were in Christ. He was the origin of their saved life, and what He had brought to them was new and different from all that the past had given. Thinkers like Clement and Origen may recognise that Jesus was not the only man with whose soul the Logos was joined. Jewish prophets and Greek sages had received inspiration from Him, but the incarnation of the Logos in Jesus was more complete and perfect. Jesus alone "was able to receive the highest participation in the very word and very wisdom and very righteousness" (Contr. Cels. V, 39). The Logos was the instrument of all creation, the Logos in Christ, Christ Himself, His Life, His Death and Resurrection; these were the formative factors of their religion and their experience. Besides their philosophy they had the New Testament. They may not /
not always have understood its terms. They may not have realised the difference between metaphor and literal fact, but they were heirs to the living tradition which finds its source in the experience which the New Testament reveals. That experience became theirs, modified, deprived of some of its ethical intensity, may be, by the culture which was native to them, but it was still essentially the same experience. In the expression of this experience the Greek theologians could do no other than use the categories of thought that were natural to them and prevalent in their environment, and to do so was to follow a sound principle in Apologetic.

It is not difficult to relate each of the three strains in Greek theology to Christian experience. In the first rational and moral strain, Christianity is revelation. Christ is the Light, in which men see God and the true way of life. In Christ the Greek Fathers saw God as a God of goodness and truth, and as a God who desires the salvation and immortality of men. In the imitation of Christ, too, they became like Him, partook of His divine life and found, in this way, peace and moral salvation. This was experiential with them and it is distinctively and genuinely Christian. In the second strain, Salvation is through the union in Christ of the Logos with humanity. This cannot be reckoned as an expression of experience. It is metaphysical and has the abstractness of metaphysics. It might be accepted intellectually (where the Logos doctrine prevailed), but it cannot be /
be morally experienced. But though this conception is not an expression of experience, there is something in Christian experience to which it formally corresponds, - there is in Christian experience a moral antitype of the metaphysical idea. Through the spiritual power of Christ's Life and Death a man does become a new creature. There is a complete change of a moral and spiritual kind in his personality. Nothing is more distinctive of Christian experience than this, and to it Paul has given classic expression, "It is no longer I that live but Christ liveth in me." While the idea of the union of the Logos may not express this change with the ethical reality and intensity of Paul and of all conscious Christian experience, while it may add a metaphysical element that is not in the experience at all, there was sufficient similarity to make the idea useful in the Greek Apologetic, for the expression of the new change that Christ creates, when His spirit becomes Lord and when man yields in faith to His Power. The Logos was the instrument of Creation in Greek thought; and the Greek Fathers, we may well believe, knew the Christ, who, to them, was the Logos Incarnate, as the morally creative instrument in their lives. In Christ they became new creations, and from Him they received the Life that was the life indeed. The Ransom theory was the third strain. This theory with its grotesque forms has ceased to have any place in Christian theology. It is due to a piece of heathen mythology and could only exist so long /
long as there was a belief in a personal Devil and his angels. It cannot be regarded as an expression of any moral, rational experience or of arising out of such. But the contest between good and evil and the power of Christ to give victory in that contest is native to Christian Life and experience. The Ransom theory can be interpreted as a forcible and dramatic expression of that experience. This is not saying that the Ransom theory meant nothing more to the Greek Fathers. To them the Devil and the World of Demons were realities (external to man) which had to be defeated if men were to be saved. But is it too much to say that in their statements of the Ransom theory there was at least a sub-conscious feeling of Christ's moral power and triumph? If Christ could conquer the Devil in His own domain, He could defeat Him in their hearts. Christ may not defeat the Devil in the way the Ransom theory sets forth, but He does conquer. A theory can scarcely live as a theory for 900 years and be accepted by the best minds of the period without some help from actual experience. It is perhaps not too much to say that such help was not altogether lacking to the Greek Fathers.

A word needs to be stated about the Biblical element in the Greek Fathers. They accepted the Christian Scriptures with reverence. They may not understand some of the categories of the New Testament; they may not feel the difficulties and make no attempt to solve them. They belonged to a different culture from /
from that of the writers of the New Testament. But they do feel that there is some divine necessity for Christ, for His Life and for His Death, God's truth must be maintained. His purpose in creation must be realised. There is something in God, which makes the salvation of man through Christ, becoming, necessarily right and consistent with His nature. God has His claims or purposes or desires and they must be satisfied. The Greek theologians may not have intensely realised that the ultimate necessity for Christ and His saving work lies in the love of God, that Christ in His Life and Death is a necessary but altogether morally free expression of that Love, as the writers of the New Testament did, and as Christian experience, that is one with the spirit of the New Testament, does. Experience and reality may have suffered, in their case, at the hands of an abstract philosophy. But they did relate Christ and His work to God. Within the terms of their speculation we are still dealing with the Christian God, to whom the saving work of Christ must be ultimately referred.

In fine we may say the taint of an alien philosophy and culture can be found abundantly in the Greek theology. It has affected its religious thinking; it has moulded its conceptions. Its thought and ideas may be open to much criticism. But the important thing is the reality that lies within and behind the thought and the ideas; and, when we try to penetrate within and behind, the reality is still there, perhaps not unaffected by alien thought.
thought and idea, but it is still reality and experience of God, the ultimate source of man's salvation, and of Christ apart from whose Life and Death there is no hope of salvation. The witness of the Greek theology, that Christ is the power of God unto salvation, is at one with that of the New Testament.
Tertullian, "the Father of Latin Theology," has formed his theology largely on that of his contemporary Irenaeus, but he lays much more stress on the Death of Christ, without however giving any rational interpretation of that Death. His chief importance for theology is his application of the ideas of 'merit' and 'satisfaction', taken over from Roman Law, to the discipline of the Christian Life. Tertullian was a lawyer and his conception of God and the ways of God with man is coloured, and more than coloured, by the legal mind. He legalises, through and through, Christian theology and the Christian religion.

He takes over the mystic realism of Irenaeus, - that the very constitution of the Person of Christ is Redemption - but with a difference. Thus he says that the son mingled in Himself man and God, that He was God in virtues, and a man in weaknesses that He might bestow on man as much as He draws away from God. In fact, the whole glory of my God amongst you is the assurance of human salvation. " But he continues, "God lived among us, that man might be taught to do the things of God."¹ As this passage shows /

shows, he has taken over the idea of Redemption through Incarnation, but he has given to the idea a rational interpretation, and made the method of Salvation through the Incarnate God one of teaching and example.

He has also taken over the idea of Recapitulation, and by it means the restoration of all things to that state in which they actually were before the Fall.\(^1\)

Tertullian lays great stress on the Death of Christ. It is to him the cardinal doctrine of Christianity.\(^2\) But he really has no definite rationale of the Death of Christ. The Incarnation and Death are linked together as a proof of Christ's love. Assuredly Christ loved that man formed in the womb amidst impurities. For his sake He demanded, for His sake He preached, He humbled Himself with every humility, even to Death and the Death of the Cross; assuredly whom He loved, He redeemed at a great price (De Carne Christi XI, 4). He says, and probably is the first theologian to do so, that the real purpose of the Incarnation is the Death of Christ. Christ came to die, and this was necessitated by the Fall. At other times, the Death fulfils prophecy. If there is any rationale at all of the Death, it is found in his statement of the Ransom theory. Man was laid hold of


2. Totum Christiani nominis et ductus mors Christi legatur \(\text{demid}\) i.e. by the Marcionites Adv. Marc. III, 8.
of at the beginning of things and seduced into disobedience. This infected the whole race with man's damnation. The Devil has thus acquired a natural (or just) power and possession in relation to sinners from which they, in the image and likeness of God, are rationally renewed by a rival operation (aemula operationes).

The real importance of Tertullian for the history of doctrine lies in his introduction of the ideas of merit and satisfaction, not into the work of Christ, but into the discipline of the Christian life. God is to Tertullian always Substantia, by creation He is Dominus, but through the Fall He is Judex, and it is this latter aspect that absorbs the practical mind of the aforetime Roman jurist. The Will of God, the Judex, must be obeyed; but man must obey not because this will is good, but because it is God's. By such obedience man wins merit, which is awarded on a perfectly regulated scale. In general, all service is meritorious, but in the stricter sense, only non-obligatory action is of the nature of true merit. Each man wins merit for himself; it is not transferred, "Let it suffice the martyr" he says, "to have cleansed his own sins". The chief "merits" are patience, virginity, fasting, martyrdom.

The relation of "merit" to "satisfaction," both terms derived from Roman, is a technical one. In Roman law satisfaction is /

1. De pud. 21.
is a form of merit. The legal principle was *solvitur amittendo*, according to which a claimant might receive something in lieu of the full and complete payment. Satisfaction, then, is in the Christian discipline a meritorious act, applied to pay off a debt. By disobedience man is in debt to God, and he satisfies God out of whatever store of merit he may have. This method of satisfying God was only applied to certain post-Baptismal sins. At Baptism Faith and Repentance were sufficient, but, for a second offence, Merit is necessary out of which satisfaction can be made. Whether this satisfaction was regarded as punishment or not is a debateable point. In Roman law it was not regarded as punishment. It was evidently a kind of indulgence, a taking of less on the part of the judge when more was due. But in the practice of the Christian Discipline, Satisfaction means suffering, it is painful and, as such, might be regarded as quasipenal. Satisfaction means asceticism and penance, and the more a Christian engages in these, the less will he have to suffer. "Just in proportion as thou shalt not have spared thyself, so, believe, God will spare thee" De Poen. IX.

The whole system is legal. On one side, there is God, a Judex, and a Recording Angel. On the other, there is man creating debt by disobedience and paying it off out of his store of merit. In this system there is no place for Christ and His work. The term satisfaction is never applied to the work of Christ. That work can /
can only apply to the first Repentance and in the act of Baptism. But though Tertullian never applies the word satisfaction to Christ, he planted the seed out of which the later theory of satisfaction arose. "In a moment, as twins born of the same idea", forensic theology and legal morality came to be. Tertullian adds nothing to the interpretation of Christ's work, but he introduces into Western theology the legalism, which affected Christian thought and life for generations.

HILARY (ob. A.D. 368) and AMBROSE (ob. A.D. 395).

In Hilary of Poictiers Eastern and Western tradition meet. He was the first Latin father to interpret Greek thought to the West, and he lays others on the Greek conception of salvation through the Incarnation of the Logos. He thinks the human nature which the Logos assumed as a universal; through this assumption there existed in Christ a purified body of the whole world (De Trin 2.24). But Hilary strikes a new and distinctively Western note, when he conceives Christ's Death as a satisfaction to some penal necessity; He also conceives it as a propitiation made to God (In Ps. 64.4), and as a sacrifice in which the guiltless pays the penalty of the sin of the guilty, (In. Ps. 68.18); and later in his commentary on this same Psalm, he introduces the idea of the Devil's

1. Naturam in se universae carnis assemplin. Tract in Ps. 51.16 officio ipso satisfactura poenali. In Ps. 53.12.
Devil's demands and defeats. Ambrose also unites the two traditions, but with him the Western prevails, and he lays even more stress than Hilary on the Cross. Though it men gain remission of sins, and for this end Christ came. Christ died to fulfill the sentence of Death and to satisfy justice, (De fuga saeculi 7.44). In his statement, that the person might be changed but not the sentence, he definitely admits the idea of substitution.

In his conception of grace, he is thoroughly Pauline. "This is my advantage that we are not justified by the works of the law; ....... I shall glory in Christ, I shall not glory in the fact that I am righteous but in the fact that I have been redeemed." None the less he has the idea of merit, and merit is transferable (differing from Tertullian), but it is grace that makes merit possible.

According to Ambrose the ransom scheme is a just reaction on the sin of the Devil or evil spirits in bringing about Christ's Death. "They (the evil spirits) themselves were made guilty, since they held the souls of the wicked by the authority that they had sinned, they themselves were found sinners to a greater extent since they slew Him that had conquered them by not sinning. And so they were righteously spoiled, as Paul has said publicly, that is, on the Cross." This is the form of the theory which was adopted /

1. Since the divine decrees cannot be dissolved, the person rather than the sentence might be changed. In Luc. 4.7. cf. at cessante lege solam fidei gratia Dei posceret ad salutum Cor. in Rom. 4.5 but cf. also Com. ad Gal. 5-6 fides charitate fraterna muniri ut perfictio sit credentis.
The student of doctrine approaches Augustine with high expectation. His training in philosophy, his profound moral experience, the largeness of his mind and nature are sufficient grounds for expecting great thoughts and true conclusions. Yet it has to be confessed that on the subject of Atonement, Augustine contributes nothing that is distinctly new. We have to remember that with Augustine, the authority of the Church was supreme. "I would not," he says, "believe the Gospel unless I were moved thereto by the Catholic Church." What we find in Augustine, then, is the mind of the Catholic Church, what the Church believed and held to be of the faith. This is not to be taken as meaning that Augustine was simply a repeater of Catholic doctrines. His own mind was too active and his experience too real for that. His conception of the relation of faith and reason may set forth his true attitude. Faith in the sense of belief comes first with him, it accepts, but there is a further stage, that of understanding and of intuition, in which the truth is not simply accepted on authority, but with reason and understanding; it is believed not simply because the Church says it, but believed for the truth's sake. First, belief; then, understanding; was the order; and, to the end of his life Augustine continued to hold that belief on /
on authority was not the highest form of faith. "If thou canst not understand, believe that thou mayest understand. Faith goes before, understanding follows." But there was little of Catholic doctrine that Augustine did not accept and pass through his understanding, and nothing that was accepted and passed through his reason and conscience failed to come forth without receiving the impress of his mind and heart.

The two fundamental doctrines in Augustine are Grace and the Fall. By the Fall of Adam all humanity had not only been involved in guilt and condemnation, but it was also infected with a complete inability to any good. Man was morally impotent, without a vestige of free determination. The power that has to deal with this direful situation is Grace, and to Augustine Grace is 'infused grace,' it is a divine power which acts on the soul or the will, and apart from which any good is an impossibility. Grace is the power of God unto man's moral salvation.

The question is how is this grace mediated to humanity? And the answer to this question is ambiguous. Grace works through justification, and justification with Augustine is the actual making righteous. 'Quid aliquid est enim justificati quam justi facti ab illo scilicet qui justificat impulum?' - and justification includes both forgiveness and sanctification. But it is only /

1. Serm. 118.1.
2. In the doctrine of grace two different conceptions are manifestly construed, namely, the thought of grace through (per propter) Christ, and that of grace emanating, independently of Christ, from the essential nature of God as the supreme good and the supreme being.
only with Grace, as the forgiveness of sins, that Augustine establishes connection of the work of Christ, through the thought of His sacrifice. The Grace that renews the impotent will is due directly to the Grace of God or to the divine Logos. There was no doubt a Neoplatonic strain in Augustine's Christian thinking, and it comes out in this direct method of the grace of God, acting apart from history. But in the main, Grace is mediated through Christ. The renewal of the will is the direct work of grace, but renewal takes its start from remission, and remission is only through the grace of the compassionate Saviour.¹

The Grace of God is bestowed through Christ in His capacity as Mediator (a favourite term with Augustine) and the gift of the Holy Spirit. The Mediator, being born from a Virgin, was without original sin, and at once God and man. The Incarnate Son is Himself an example and an extraordinary manifestation of grace, given for the purpose that "men may understand that they are justified from sin by the same grace,

¹ "Renovatio incipit a remisone; De Pecatorum Merit, II, 6, 9."
by which it was brought about that the man, Christ, could have no sin," Though Christ is God and man, it is as man that He is Mediator. "So far as He is man, so far He is the mediator." 

"Nor yet is He the Mediator on this account, that He is the Word,... but He is mediator in virtue of the fact that He is man." In emphasising the humanity of the Mediator, Augustine departs from the Eastern view of salvation through the divine Logos. This Mediator exempt from original and consequently from actual sin, on account of the likeness of the sinful flesh, in which He had come called sin, is Himself called sin, from having to be sacrificed to wash away sin; His being made sin means that He was a sacrifice for sin for our reconciliation. In what sense Augustine uses the word sacrifice it is difficult to determine. He seems to hesitate to accept the view that the sacrifice was a placation of the Divine wrath in sin. What is the meaning of the words, "Reconciled by the death of His Son," he asks (De Trin. 11, 15). "Is it that when God the Father was angry with us, He looked upon the death of His Son for us and was propitiated towards us?..... Unless the Father had been already propitiated toward us, would He, without sparing His Son, have given Him for us?" To obviate this difficulty He tends to find the necessity for the Death of Christ /

1. Conf. 10, 43.
God,

Christ not in the wrath of, but in the righteous claim of the Devil. Through Christ's Death this claim is anulled. In the De Civ. Dei 10, 6 he discusses the true meaning of sacrifice. The purpose of sacrifice is that man may come into holy fellowship with God. "A man who is consecrated in the name of God and vowed to God, in so far as he dies to the world and lives to God, is a sacrifice." In this spiritual sense Christ's Life and Death constitute a true sacrifice, by which He not only maintains fellowship with God, but can and does lead sinful men into a like blessedness. A little later in De. Civ. Dei 10, 22 he says, that the power of demons is overcome in His name who assumed man and lived without sin, that in Himself, priest and sacrifice, there might be made remission of sins, that is, through the mediator between God and man, the man, Christ Jesus: through Him, when He had made purgation of sins, we are reconciled to God." From this passage we might conjecture that implicit in Augustine's thought was the idea of Christ's Death as a sacrifice and victim, when it was related to the necessity of meeting the just claim of the Devil, but Christ is a priest, in so far as in His life and death He carries out that conception of spiritual sacrifice which maintains and creates true fellowship with God. And yet, Augustine does say a Mediator offered a unique sacrifice, of which all the previous sacrifices of the law and the prophets were shadows, to appease the wrath of /
Augustine does not apply the word satisfaction to the work of Christ, but he gives to the Death a penal significance. Man has two evils one is guilt (culpa) the other is punishment (poena). The guilt is that man is unrighteous, the punishment is that he is mortal. Christ assumes the punishment but not the guilt, and, by assuming the punishment, has blotted out both guilt and punishment. And Augustine also says that Christ made our sins His own that He might make His righteousness ours. It is easy and perhaps, for clear thinking, necessary to criticise such statements. We may ask if culpa, in the sense of responsibility, ever is or can be blotted out. The sins of the forgiven and renewed man still remain his own; we may ask too, whether punishment is really transferable, and whether in forgiveness it is necessarily repealed or blotted out. The grace of God through Christ can and does bring forgiveness and new life, and in this new and forgiven life, the sense of guilt and the feelings in regard to punishment are transformed. We have to remember that to Augustine the punishment of sin lay in the complete impotence of the will. This was destroyed by the grace of God in Christ, and new power was created. But, in face of his Confessions, we can not say that /

1. Enchir. 10. 2 Suscepiendo poenam et non suscepiendo culpam. et culpam delevit et poenam. Serm. 171, 3; cf. C. Fadstun Suscepit Christus sinistreatu nostrum supplicium, et inde solvent reatum nostrum et finiret etiam supplicium nostrum.
that the guilt and the sense of it were blotted out, and yet in
the grace a new righteousness was actually bestowed. What
Augustine then meant was probably that, through Christ, actual
sin was destroyed, and some of its worst consequences were arres-
ted: in place of sin that meant death, righteousness that means
eternal life is given. And Christ effected this by entering
into man's sinful condition, dying man's death, while He Himself
remained the altogether Righteous one.

An important feature in the thought of Augustine is the
relation of solidarity that exists between Christ and the Church.
"Christ is the head of a body which is one with Him, and it is
His body only for which His work avails." 1 Non justificat nisi
corpus sum quod est ecclesia. The word became flesh that He
might become head of the Church.1 This identification is with
Augustine of the closest kind. But it is not of the same meta-
physical nature as the union of the Logos in Greek theology.
It is a moral and spiritual identification. Its source is the
love of Christ for sinners. "He justifies only His body which
is the Church." Ep. 185, 40. "He who believes in Christ....
Christ enters into him, and he is made a member of His body."
Serm. 142, 2, 2. "Jesus Christ for no other reason came in the
flesh and...... was made obedient even to the death of the Cross
that

1. Denney Rec. p. 58. "The Word was made flesh that He might
become the head of the Church." In Ps. 148. 8.
that by this dispensation of most merciful grace He might quicken all those, to whom, established as if members in His body, He is the Head, that they might gain the Kingdom of God. "De. pecc. mea: 26-39. ] "It is," says Dr. Denney, "the ne plus ultra of love the utmost reach of its moral passion. And it is by something correspondingly intense and ethical that we become one with Him, and share in the benefits of His passion"...... "It is through this in the long run that we are reconciled and renewed."¹ Christian salvation is through the moral and spiritual union of the Christian with Christ.

The question arises in regard to the work of Christ in its relation to grace. Is the work of Christ with Augustine a condition of the operation of that grace or a manifestation of it? In spite of what Augustine says about the sacrifice of Christ appeasing God's wrath and winning our reconciliation, the latter view is probably true. The Incarnation itself is a work of grace. Grace is the ultimate cause of Redemption. Augustine felt the difficulty of reconciling the Love of God with the Divine wrath or hatred. "Far be it from God to love any one in time with a new love, which was not in Him before."² God's hatred is somehow not inconsistent with His love, and, when men are converted and cease to be under the wrath of God, then they are

¹ For the identification of Christ with the Church see Epistle 185, 40, Epist. 140, 4, In Joan Tract, 12, 8; 21, 8.
² De Trinit. 5, 16; 8, 923, 924.
are said to be begun to be loved by Him, really, they had been loved by Him eternally.

"God did not begin to love us when we were reconciled to Him by the blood of His Son; but He loved us before the creation of the world, that we might be His children, together with His only begotten Son, even before we had any existence. Therefore our reconciliation by the death of Christ must not be understood as if He reconciled us to God, that God might begin to love those whom he had before hated; but we are reconciled to Him who already loved us, and with whom we are at enmity on account of sin."

Quoted by Calvin, in his Institutes, from Aug. ['5'].

Almost every previous conception regarding the work of Christ finds its place in Augustine. Thus he repeats the Greek doctrine in such words as "He who was God became man to make gods those who were man," "for neither should we be made participators of His divinity unless He became a participator of our mortality."

But he departs from the Greek mode of thought and for what is more ethical in such words as "By loving God we are made gods."

For God wishes to make thee God, not by nature, but by His gift and adoption. It is by ethical action that man becomes like God and attains to the divine life. As Origen had said, "He who imitates Jesus participates in the divine nature which He bears."

Augustine further regards as an physician and medicine (cf. Gregory of Nan, 166.4).

2 De doctrina christiana 14
of Nyssa) and holds that the medicine of the divine wisdom was by His assumption of humanity adopted to our wounds curing some by their opposites and some by their similars. Thus man's pride, the real root of sin, is healed by Christ's humility; again, man was beguiled through a woman, through Christ born of a woman he is saved — an instance of healing by a similar.

Augustine lays great emphasis on the humility of Christ. It is the sun of Christ's teaching. It is the one Christian discipline and Christian doctrine.

The following words are interesting as they anticipate the Abelardian position. "What greater cause was there for the advent of the Lord than that God should show the Love that He has in our case strongly commanding it, because when we were yet enemies, Christ died for us. This, therefore, took place as the end of the precept and the fulfilment of the law is charity, that we should love Him in return, and just as He laid down His life for us, so we also should lay down our lives for the brethren, and if it were difficult for us to love God Himself, at least it should not be difficult for us to love Him in return, when He first loved us and spared not His only Son, but gave Him up for us all. For there is no greater invitation to love than to be first in loving." Here it is the revelation of divine love in Christ's Death that leads to salvation. Nor is the example of Christ lost sight of in the work of redemption. "He has crying out/

out by His words, deeds, death, life, descent, ascent, that we may return unto Him."

Two further facts require to be stated. Christ's work and the form which it took are not absolutely necessary. "We must show not indeed that no other mode was possible to God, to whose power all things are equally subject, but that there neither was nor need have been any other mode more appropriate for curing our misery." "They are fools who say the wisdom of God was not able to free man, unless he was assuming a man and was being born from a woman and was suffering all things at the hands of sinners."

Grace might have used some other mode of salvation but the Incarnation was the most appropriate. The second fact is that, while grace is ultimate, it is limited in the extent of its operations. The fall took place first in the angel and then in the man. God, in His grace, was pleased with a view to the order and harmony of the universe to fill up the number of the Eternal Jerusalem, depleted by the fall of the angels, by saving some (the elect) from the mass of sinful humanity. Both these ideas, the idea of contingency, an idea of a limited restoration, had great effect upon the theology of the doctrine of Atonement.

In concluding we may state the main distinctive features of Western Christianity.

(1) It has a more profound ethical spirit than is found in

1. De Agne 11.
Grace is Augustine's normative idea, but grace, in a world where there is no moral freedom, is of the nature of arbitrary power or will, in which there is no moral necessity.
the Greek theology. Salvation does not consist in the restoration of a corruptible humanity to an incorruptible state, but in deliverance from actual sin and moral impotence. Western theology is nearer to actual reality, and has a truer sympathy with the moral emphasis of the New Testament.

(i) It emphasises the real humanity of Christ, and finds in the real humanity rather than in the Logos the real instrument of salvation.

(iii) Western Christianity exhibits the rise and progress of disciplinary regulation for the forgiveness of post-baptismal sins. Augustine accepts the idea of merit, which is possible through the will renewed by grace. And the Catholic sacrament of penance with its three finally recognised ingredients - contrition, confession and satisfaction, is in in Tertullian.

(iv) Though the idea of grace is prominent and normative in Augustine, it is not in grace that he finds the ultimate necessity for the work of Christ. That necessity for Augustine is in the deep moral need of man and in certain rights divinely permitted of the Devil. The truth is while grace is Augustine's great normative idea, Grace in a world where there is no moral freedom or where moral freedom has been completely lost, comes to be a quasi-mechanical force or arbitrary will rather than a spiritual reality, and one cannot find ultimate moral necessity in what is arbitrary or mechanical. If God is conceived as pure omnipotent /
omnipotent Will, a subject of decrees, there is no necessity in Him, why He should forgive and save through Christ or, for that matter, why He should forgive and save at all.

(v) The conception of Christ's work is regarded by the Latin theologians as a sacrificial propitiation to the wrath of God; it has been said that the substitutionary view is central with Augustine and in Him stands forth "naked and unabashed." And this view is found prominent in Western Christianity, though other views are by no means excluded or treated casually or lightly. But the conception of Christ's work as a sacrificial and even penal substitution is simply stated, the difficulties may be felt as with Augustine, but they are not solved. There is a passage (Lib. Ap. Iur.) from Pope Gregory, in which he discusses the justice of God in the sacrifice of Christ who was innocent.

"But we must consider, how He can be just and can dispose all things justly, if He condemns Him who ought not to be punished. For our Mediator owed no punishment for Himself, since He wrought nothing that could infect Him with guilt. But if He had not undergone a death that was not His due, He would never have freed us from the death due to us. Therefore the Father is just, yet when He punishes the just, He orders all things justly; because through Him He justifies all things, in that on behalf of sinners, He condemns Him who is without sin, so that all the elect might rise up to the height of righteousness in Him in whom He, who is above /
above all others, endures the penalties of our unrighteousness. For the guilt of vice can only be purged by the fire of torment. And so He came without fault, freely to submit Himself to the torment, that the punishments due to our iniquity might lose their rightful victims, in that they unjustly held Him who was free from their power. (In those words we have perhaps the first clear statement of the penal theories which became prominent in the Churches of the Reformation.) But Gregory's statement carries us very little distance in the solution of the problem. He seems to say that the end justifies the means, a statement of very doubtful morality, and the last sentence seems to give away entirely the justice of the transaction.

The problem which Anselm set out to solve in his *Cur Deus Homo?* — was the rationality of the Incarnation, the one universally recognised doctrine of the Church, the sum and substance of its faith. His apologetic is to move on rational lines alone, to determine 'by what rational necessity a God-man was made, and as we believe and confess restored life to the world by His death' (1. 1). As rational, it will convince Jews and pagans, not believers only. The question with which he sets out is, Why a God-man? and the answer, put briefly, is that only by a God-man could sin be adequately dealt with, and God's purpose in the creation of man realised.

The rationale of Incarnation is found in Atonement. He begins by rejecting certain of the great theories of antiquity (1). The first theory to be rejected is the recapitulatory theory, as set forth in Augustine's ideas of salvation through similars - parallels between the method of the fall and the method of salvation, — which Boso, Anselm's interrogator, in the dialogue, holds are 'like pictures painted on air.' Anselm then enquires, if sufficient reason for the Incarnation cannot be found in the fact that human man would have perished and God's purpose would have been unrealised, unless he had been redeemed by the Creator Himself. To the objection of Boso that the instrument of Creation might have been some /
some other than God, say man or angel, Anselm replies, somewhat sophistically, that such a method would have brought man under the dominion of his deliverer. He then proceeds to deal with the redemption from the Devil, and says that the Devil had no rights except the right to be punished by God. The third theory to be rejected is that Christ died to show God's love to us, a theory that is rejected, because it lacks rational necessity. God loves the angels, but His love has not led Him to suffering and a Death. 

Bose—finally raises—the objections to the old theories are ingeniously put in the mouth of Bose, but they are really Anselm's, and they are a witness to the fact that, with Anselm and in the Church, the rights of reason and criticism were honoured. Antiquity and authority are by no means the sole tests of truth, and Anselm, at least, is a justification of the right of reason in dealing with the theology and doctrines of the Christian faith.

To come now to Anselm's own theory, his fundamental premiss is the honour of God. This honour has been robbed by man's sin, for 'sin is nothing else than not to render God His due' (1.11), and 'the man who does not render God this honour which is His due takes away from God what is His due and dishonours God.' (1.11). To this honour satisfaction must necessarily be made, either satisfaction or punishment. Anselm rules punishment out of court for some men must be saved, for (following Augustine's argument) the number of fallen angels must needs be restored from among /
among men. Punishment would not satisfy the honour of God, for the honour of God to be satisfied, God must receive back all that has been taken from Him and something more. If it be maintained that God is controlled by something outside Himself, that is, by His honour or His purpose in Creation, and therefore acts of compulsion and not of His own free will, the answer is; that the necessity of preserving God's honour is obviously nothing else than the immutability of His honour, which He has from Himself and not from another, and which is therefore improperly called necessity. The ultimate necessity of making Atonement is in God Himself (2. 5).

There is what may be called a secondary fundamental premiss. It does not become God to allow anything out of order in His Kingdom. And sin without punishment or satisfaction is something out of order. Justice demands the punishment of sin, and if this seems to limit God's omnipotence, the answer is that unless God is just, He is not God. Sin is not only related to the honour of God but also to the moral order. It is something inordinatum in that order, and cannot be endured.

Another fundamental premiss lies in the nature of sin. "Non dum considerasti quanti ponderis sit pecatum." 1.21. Sin, even one glance contrary to the will of God, is a matter of infinite magnitude, greater than the preservation of an infinite number of worlds with all that they contain.

"The /
"The maintenance of God's honour is the great necessity, but how is this to be met in the face of sin which has dishonoured that honour? The Sin must be punished or satisfaction must be made for it. Poena aut satisfactio is the only possibility. Paena is impossible, for it is inconceivable that God's purpose in creating man should be finally frustrated. Satisfaction is the only way. Bosco suggests that the satisfaction may be made by the poenitentia, which consisted in Ecclesiastical discipline—a contrite and humble heart, fastings, bodily toils of many kinds, mercy in giving and forgiving and obedience." (1.20). But all this is impossible. Man cannot make this required satisfaction. An infinite dishonour has been done, and it requires an infinite satisfaction which man, being finite, cannot render. And further man, through sin, is impotent, and this impotence itself is a sin. How then can the required satisfaction be made? It can only be made by One who is both man and God, man, that He may make satisfaction for man, and God, that His satisfaction shall be of infinite worth. The necessity for the Incarnation, for the God-man of the Creeds, perfect God, perfect man, of Adam's race but born of a virgin, sinless, one Person in two natures—is the maintenance of the Divine Honour, the securing of the Divine purpose by a perfect satisfaction. Only such an one could make that satisfaction; the Incarnate Christ is a necessity.

But /
But it is not Christ's Life that is the satisfaction for man's sin. He owed Himself the perfect obedience, and the perfect obedience of His Life availed only for Himself. But He does die, and His Death remains over, a meritorious work of super-erogation, and it is of infinite value. Anselm: "If that man were before you, and you knew who He was, and it were said to you unless you kill that man, your whole world and whatever is not God, shall perish: would you do this to save every other creature?" Boso - "I would not do it, even if an infinite number of worlds were set before me." (II.14). This Death is of an infinite value, it is retro-active and avails even for those who slew Christ, for they did it in ignorance. God then is given this infinite deed of merit. What then can God do more fitly (convenientius) than to bestow the fruit and reward of His Death upon those whom He made Himself man to save, to whom, by dying, He gave an example of dying for the sake of righteousness? for in vain shall they be imitators of Him, if they shall not be sharers in His merit?\footnote{\textit{Welt}, is a debateable point. The question which ever is one of historic interest, but whether way it is settled, it does /}
does not affect in any way the evaluation of Anselm's theory. The theory as it stands lies open to criticism of two kinds,—criticism of inner consistency in the argument and criticism of a more general character. With regard to the first, his theory starts with two premisses, the necessity of satisfaction to the honour of God, and the necessity of the maintenance of the moral law or order. Now the first necessity is not absolute, for the satisfaction is according to the pleasure of the offended person. The second, which is not so formative of Anselm's thought as the first, is absolute. But there is no reconciliation of these two necessities. A second inconsistency lies in his passing over from the idea of satisfaction to that of merit. If Christ's Death was a satisfaction, if it was all required for the forgiveness of sins how can it be used as an \textit{meritium} for restoring beatitude to others? Again his argument breaks down when he deals with the necessity of Christ's Death. Christ dies voluntarily? But is a voluntary act necessary? Yes, says Anselm, it has the necessity of own free will which is the will of God. But this did not satisfy Boso, who argued that if this is so, Christ might have chosen not to die. This drives Anselm to the conclusion that the Death of Christ had only "a sequent necessity" — the necessary is what is. The truth is a moral necessity cannot be stated in terms of mere will or of things that happen. Christ's Death was not due to mere will which is arbitrary, nor was it necessary /
necessary simply because it happened, it had behind it and in it necessity of much higher order. These defects in the argument may or may not be important, but they are signs that Anselm attempted an impossible task, when he tried to interpret Christ's work through logic, and to found its necessities on premises given by human reason alone. He begins with the idea of rational necessity; he ends with that of convenience and simplicity.

In the way of mere general criticism the theory has earned the title of commercial, and the title is not undeserved. He is dealing with great spiritual realities, but he conceives them in a quantitative way; even Christ's Death is left as a quantum, void of moral and spiritual contact. The only connection between Christ's Death and the sin of the world is quantitative, they are two infinities. He gives no clear account of the way in which the work of Christ comes and seems to benefit men, brings moral and spiritual benefit to men, and seems in the end to depend on the power of Christ's example; and He departs from the New Testament and from Christian experience in not finding the ultimate motive for Christ and His Work in the Love of God the Father. His conception of the person of Christ is mechanical; it is largely Nestorian, and does not only divide the Person, it divides the Life and excludes from saving power all the grace /
grace of Christ's life, everything in fact, but His Death. Anselm says that there were higher reasons for accepting Christ, and we may well believe that these were the sources of His undoubted piety rather than the arguments of the *Cur Deus Homo*.

But, in spite of defects, Anselm's theory marks an entirely new development in theology. The Greek Fathers had emphasised the Logos as the instrument of human salvation, but with Anselm the humanity of Christ is emphasised. He is *ille homo* who, in union with Deity secures redemption. The way for this emphasis had been prepared by the Latin theology, with its emphasis on the sacrifice of Christ and with the importance that Augustine laid on the humanity of the Mediator. Again, the method of salvation had been in the past conceived in a mystical way, but with Anselm the method is rational and intelligible. Christ makes a satisfaction, and in return for this, salvation is given to man. And this new development in theology had a great important, if not an immediate influence on theology, an influence which exists to the present day. No doubt there were certain historical conditions which helped the influence of the theory. Catholics could find it a justification for ecclesiastical penance. Notwithstanding the completeness of Christ's satisfaction, Anselm, as a good Churchman, does not wipe out the secondary penance for post-Baptismal sin, and it is easy to see how Christ's merit and satisfaction could take its place in the penitential system.
and give it high sanction. Protestants, on the other hand, might use the idea of Christ's satisfaction as complete and sufficient in itself, and employ it to negative ecclesiastical satisfaction and merit — these would imperil the all sufficing and completeness of Christ's satisfaction. But, hidden in the conception of satisfaction and obscured by the environment in which the conception lived, there is no doubt a true moral element.

To satisfy God may be and is an ethical ideal: a desire to present to God a life with which God is well pleased. Man feels that, in himself, he is morally unequal to render such a satisfaction. But the Son in whom the Father is well pleased has offered in His life of Sonship this satisfaction. And man by faith and in moral imagination presents to God the perfect satisfaction in Christ. This may be a true feeling and a genuine element in Christian experience, but it moves in a different sphere from the Anselmian transaction. With such a feeling a man is offering to God his ideal aspirations, his highest self embodied in Christ, believing that God will be completely satisfied with nothing less. Such a feeling has little or nothing to do with Anselm's theory, but this feeling of desire to give moral satisfaction in part explain the prevalence of Anselm's theory and of satisfaction theories in general.

But / 1

1. Father was doubtful about the term satisfaction. But the theory of Anselm, with modifications from Thomas Aquinas, found its way into the Confessions of the Protestant Churches and was developed to its logical limits by Protestant theologians of the 17th century. Protestants tended to emphasise the idea of penal satisfaction, not altogether absent in Anselm.
But, apart from any possible favouring conditions, Anselm has his own merits. He finds the necessity for Atonement and Salvation is something in God Himself, though He has confined it is true, that something too narrowly in God's honour.

He may conceive sin in an abstract way, but He does not treat it lightly, it is out of order in God's moral universe and a personal affront to God Himself. Finally, though he attempts to conduct his argument samo to Christo, it is in Christ that he finds man's salvation and in finding it there, is at one with all Christian experience.
Like Anselm, Abelard repudiates the ransom theory. He does so on three grounds, (1) Christ redeems only the elect, and the elect never were in the power of the Devil, (ii) the Devil gained by the seduction of man no power over man, for this seduction he only deserved punishment and (iii) the Devil could not give to man the immortality which He had promised, and again for this reason could have no rights over him. He denies too that the ransom was paid to God. "How cruel and just it appears that anyone should demand the blood of the innocent as a kind of ransom, or be in any way delighted with the death of the innocent, let alone that God should find the death of His Son so acceptable, that through it He should be reconciled to the world."

The purpose of the Incarnation was not to pay a ransom to the Devil, but to reveal divine love, which should awaken in man a responsive love, which constitutes both the forgiveness of sin and spiritual liberty. "It seems to us that we are justified by the blood of Christ and reconciled to God in this, that by the marvellous grace exhibited to us, in that His own Son took our nature and persevered in instructing us, He bound us the more to Himself by love, so that, fired as we are by so great a blessing of divine grace, true charity should no longer fear anything at all.... And so our redemption is that supreme love in us through the passion of Christ which not only frees from the bondage of sin,
sin, but acquires for us the true liberty of the sons of God; and accordingly, we fulfil all things not so much by fear as by the love of Him who showed to us a grace greater than can possibly be found, as He Himself has written, "Greater love can no man have than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends." Concerning this love, indeed, the Lord says elsewhere, "I have discovered a fire to send into the world, and what wish have I but that it burn?" Accordingly, He testifies that He came into the world to propagate this true love and liberty in the hearts of men. And to this the Apostle is giving careful attention, when he says in the following words, that "the Love of God is diffused in our hearts through the Holy Spirit which has been given to us." Again he says, "It is to be marked that the Apostle in this place plainly expresses the manner of our redemption through the death of Christ, namely, when he says that He died for us for no other purpose than to create true love and liberty in our hearts, ... And we shall be saved from wrath, from future wrath, that is, from the punishment of sins, through Christ dying, once for all, on our behalf and after praying and assiduously instructing us."

From these two passages from his Commentary on Romans the theory of Abelard stands out plain and clear. In Christ there is a supreme manifestation of Love, which creates in man a corresponding love that brings the negative freedom from bondage and the positive liberty of the sons of God, that is, of loving obedience.
obedience. The work of Christ is not by Abelard directly related to the forgiveness of sins which results from the kindling of love in the hearts of men. Sanctification precedes justification, in the strictly Pauline sense of accounting righteous. This way of viewing the relation brought Abelard into difficulties with the fact of Baptism which, in Church practice, was the symbol of the beginning of the new life and in which forgiveness of sins was received. Abelard got out of the difficulty by saying, that baptism follows the kindling of love, where true perseverance is not lacking. But, in the case of infants, baptism cannot be said to follow the kindling of love, in their case baptism precedes the kindling of love. Abelard's explanation is not very satisfactory. The difficulties arise, when forgiveness and the new life are regarded as separate entities and when baptism is conceived as conferring the former. When forgiveness and the new life are conceived rightly as one concrete moral whole and baptism as the expression that the concrete moral whole has been received, the difficulties disappear.

In certain passages Abelard speaks of Christ bearing the punishment of sin, of paying a price, and of delivering from the yoke of the Devil, but, while these conceptions are quite reconcilable with his main position that Christ's work is a revelation of love, it is doubtful, if, for Abelard they held their orthodox meaning. He says in Rom. 4, 25 that Christ died for our sins in two ways, first, because the sins for which He died were ours, and we committed the sins of which he bore the penalty; secondly, that by /
by dying He might remove our sins, i.e., might take away the penalty of our sins, introducing us into Paradise at the price of His own Death, and might by the display of such grace draw our minds away from the will to sin, and incline them to the fullest love of Himself. Probably, if Abelard had been asked what he meant by the penalty which Christ bore, his answer would have been the painful consequences of the sin that slew Him; and to the question, how Christ bears away one's penalty, the answer would have been by removing the sin which demanded punishment. But whatever might have been his answers, it is certain that these traditional ideas form no real part of his own reasoned conviction that our justification is the Divine Love and Liberty, created in our hearts by Christ's Love.

Again, in the following passage, he thinks of Christ's work as merit. "And so being made man, He is constrained by the law of the love of His neighbour, that He might redeem those who were under the law, and could not be saved by the law, and might supply from His own what was wanting in our merits, and just as He was singular in holiness, so also He might be singular in His usefulness in the matter of others' salvation. Otherwise, what great thing did His holiness merit, if it availed only for His own and not for others' salvation?" But here Christ's merit is not the superabundance of a satisfaction paid to God, but His service and His love for man. Christ's merit is simply His Love which is the /
the revelation of God's love.

Abelard's theory was not new, its two features the love of Christ and the power of that love, were and are in all theories; but the originality lies in the fact that he separated the love out of its previous contexts and made it supreme and legislative. No little of its virtue is its simplicity and intelligibility, but it has, as an explanation of the Atoning work of Christ, not escaped criticism. Fault has been found with it, because it ignores the question of necessity. The true answer to such criticism is that love requires no necessity but itself. Another criticism is that the Cross for Abelard is no more than "an exhibition", and its power is that of simple incentive. But with Abelard the Love in the Cross generates (propagare), it builds up (sedificare) and conforms (conformare) us to its own quality. It is rather dynamic than exhibition, a dynamic that enters into man's life for his salvation. How it enters in creating the new life of liberty, he does not say; perhaps, because he did not feel the need for explanation. We may say that his theory is incomplete, but this can be said of any and every theory, any theory that confines the redeeming love of God in Christ to a certain number called the elect, as Abelard's did, is incomplete on a most important side, but few will deny that he has gone to the heart of the matter, that he has set forth that element in the Cross in which has lain its power over the hearts of men.

In /
In its very simplicity the theory was revolutionary and brought Abelard under the papal condemnation. But Bertrand of Clairvaux, his opponent, was scarcely fair to Abelard. He blamed Abelard for reducing the whole of Christ's work to this "That He gave to man by living and teaching an example of life; whilst by suffering and dying He set before us the extreme limit of love. Did He therefore teach righteousness and not give it; did He manifest love and not infuse it; and did He, in these terms return to His Own concerns?" Christ according to Abelard generates the liberty of the sons of God. It would be hard to say how far such generation falls short of infusion. But, in spite of opposition and condemnation, Abelard's view had a more immediate influence than Anselm's. Peter Lombard, d. A.D. 1160, Master of Sentences, gathered together the various patristic opinions, and in such a sentence as the following he explicitly adopted the doctrine of Abelard: "So great a pledge of love having been given us, we too are moved and kindled to love God who did such great things for us; and by this we are justified, that is, being loosed from our sins, we are made just. The Death of Christ therefore justifies us, inasmuch as through it, charity is excited in our hearts."

However, after a short period of success, Abelard's single principle, as such, receded into the background to await its revival in modern moral influence theories of Atonement.
great Oxford theologian" explicitly adopted the Abelardian position. "Christ died not because the wrong must effect redemption in another way, but that by the payment of the price the might flow to us the benefits of His love and of our sin" (Tit. 4.13).

"Quidem, Melanchthon, propter quod eum Papal errores ac Celticia."
Thomas Aquinas was the greatest of the scholastic theologians and the founder of official Roman Catholic theology. It is as a systematiser of other men's thoughts rather than as the author of any new ideas that he takes his place in history. The following points are of importance in his system. (1) He holds that there is no absolute necessity for the Incarnation and the consequent Redemption with regard to Christ's Passion he says (Qu. 46. art. 1) that "it was not necessary as a matter of compulsion for Christ to suffer, neither as regards God, who ordained that Christ should suffer, nor yet as regards Christ, who suffered voluntarily: it was however necessary with a view to its end." "Anything can be called possible or impossible in two ways: in one way simply and absolutely, in another way hypothetically. Speaking therefore simply and absolutely, it was possible for God to redeem man in another way than by the passion of Christ: because no word is impossible with God. But from a certain supposition that had been made, it was impossible: for since it is impossible that God's foreknowledge should be deceived, and His Will or ordinance should be broken, granting the knowledge and foreordination of God concerning the passion of Christ, it was not at the same time possible for Christ not to suffer or for man to be delivered in any other way than by His passion." To the objection that God's justice necessarily demanded /
demanded Christ's passion Thomas answers by asserting the Roman principle, principiis legibus solutus est. God is not governed by the law of justice or of any law at all. It really amounts to this, that if we start with the will of God or the idea of foreordination, everything in history becomes contingent. Christ's may be necessary because God willed it or foreordained; but then God might have willed and foreordained otherwise. Thomas recognizes this and really abandons the necessity of Christ and His Work to assert its fitness. "Any mode," he says, "is the more fitting of an end, in proportion as through it more things combine, which are expedient to the end. And there are many things, besides deliverance from, that combine to make the passion of Christ the fittest mode of salvation. (a) It reveals God's love to man, and incites man to love God, the very perfection of salvation. (b) The passion contains an example of every grace and virtue. (c) Christ not only by His Passion delivered man from sin, but also merited for him justifying grace and the glory of beatitude. (d) As man has been bought by the blood of Christ, he has a motive for keeping himself free from sin. (e) Man's dignity has increased, in that as man had been conquered by the devil and merited death, so it was man who conquered the devil and, by dying, conquered death."

With Thomas satisfaction is of a penal character. Christ takes upon Himself a body subject to human infirmities to make satisfaction /
satisfaction for the sins of the human race, "and one satisfies for the sins of another, when he takes upon himself the penalty due for the sin of the other." (qu. 14 art. 1)¹ The alternative of satisfaction or punishment has been abandoned, and identity asserted. (Anselm) The Conception of merit in Thomas is different from that of Anselm. With Anselm it is the Death of Christ that becomes, somewhat illogically, a merit, but with Thomas, Christ begins to gather merit from the very beginning of His conception; but there were on our side certain obstacles which hindered the effect of His merits before the passion, these defects were moved by the passion itself. According to Thomas then, Christ's whole life had meritorious and saving value for others. This is truer to the conception of the Gospels than His life was for Himself and His Death alone of value for others. (Anselm). (Anselm) There is a mystical element in Thomas which emerges in his conception of Christ as Head of the Church. "When a sufficient satisfaction has been rendered, liability to punishment is removed; but the satisfaction of Christ takes effect in us only in so far as we become one body with Him, as members with their head. And the members ought to be conformed to /

1. Cf. also qu. 50 art. 1.

2. Anselm had stated the painfulness of satisfaction and satisfaction is with him quasi-penal.

3. Thomas holds that Christ gained in His death a superabundant merit, sufficient to outweigh all the demerit of original sin and all the actual sins of humanity.
to their head." "To Christ was given grace, not only as to a single person, but in so far as He is head of the Church, in order that from Him it might overflow to the members; and therefore, the works of Christ have the same relation both to Himself and to His members, as the works of another man established in grace have to himself. Now it is manifest, that whoever being established in grace suffered for righteousness' sake, by this very thing merits salvation; wherefore Christ by His passion merited salvation, not only for Himself, but also for His members." It is through Christ's unity with believers that His superabundant satisfaction avails for them. "The head and members are, as it were, one mystical person, and therefore the satisfaction of Christ belongs to all His members. So far as two men are one in charity, one can satisfy for the other: but the position is not the same as regards confession or contrition: because satisfaction consists in an external act, for which instruments can be adopted, amongst which friends also are counted." In this statement it is interesting to note that, while Thomas allows a vicarious satisfaction he does not allow a vicarious penitence, the latter is an individual thing; and, further, it is to be noted that he makes charity a condition of sharing in the benefit of the satisfaction. The satisfaction is not absolutely an open operation. There must be an ethical bond between Christ, who makes satisfaction and the person, who receives the benefit.

The /
The aim of Thomas was to systematize all the views of the past regarding the work of Christ. With him the principal efficient cause of human salvation is God; God communicates His Divinity to Christ, which divinity then uses the humanity of Christ as the instrument of salvation, and makes all His human acts saving acts. It is as man and through His union with men that Christ is Saviour. As to the mode of the saving operation, Christ in His passion saves per modum efficientiae, when the passion is related to His Divinity; per modum meriti, when related to His Will; per modum satisfactionis, when related to His corporality, for it is through the flesh that He suffers and bears the penal satisfaction; per modum redemptionis, in so far as we are delivered from the bondage of sin; and per modum sacrificii, so far as by it we are reconciled to God." In so far as Thomas deals with Christ's Divinity and makes that along with the Sacraments an instrument of Divine Grace he is following the line of earlier Greek thought; in so far as He emphasises the humanity of Christ, and views Christ's death under the categories of satisfaction and merit he is following Augustine and the earlier mediaeval theology.

Summary of main ideas in Scholasticism.

1. He has the Abelardian idea. Passio: Christi est propria causa remissionis peccatorum tripliciter (1) per modum provocantis ad charitatem and he retains the old theory of ransom without however its most objectionable features; the ransom with Thomas is paid to God.
Summary of main ideas in Scholasticism.

1. The main category with which the Schoolmen evaluated the work of Christ was that of Satisfaction. Christ satisfied God, a satisfaction which had to be supplemented by the satisfactions of ecclesiastical discipline for the full salvation of man. This satisfaction was the alternative for punishment, though satisfaction comes to have a penal character.

2. With Anselm the Incarnation is conceived as a rational necessity, but with the later schoolmen, absolute necessity is abandoned. With Duns Scotus everything in history depends on the Will of God and is arbitrary, and the Incarnation and Redemptive work of Christ might have been otherwise than they are or, for that matter, might never have been at all.

3. Faith that has saving value is formed faith, fides caritatis formata, it is really an ethical energy, but faith has its source in the grace of God which is communicated to the soul, it is gratia creat. We may say that the grace of God becomes the fides formata through Christ.

4. Through the influence of Aristotle the Augustinian conception of man's sinful nature was mitigated, and the freedom of man was emphasised.

5. The Sacraments with the Schoolmen played a large part in the work of salvation, communicating the merit of Christ in a semi-magical way. The chief sacrament was that of Penance, and the emphasis /
emphasis laid upon penance led to the belief that man could very largely save himself. The development of this sacrament led to the abuses which so roused the indignation of Luther. There were two real practical dangers, (1) the satisfaction and merit gained by penance might obliterate Christ Himself, and (ii) that penance becomes a substitute for true morality, and, in practice, these dangers became actual facts.
Luther is the principal though not the sole source of Protestant theology. His thought is very difficult to present for Luther was not a systematic theologian but a religious genius, and he expresses his religious experience with exaggerations and contradictions that seem at times to ignore moral distinctions. He despised philosophy and the power of reason. Aristotle was to him anathema. "the whole of Aristotle is to theology as darkness to light." What he particularly objected to in Aristotle was the support given by the latter to the doctrine of the freedom of the will, and the consequent mitigation of the Augustinian doctrine of original sin. It was not through philosophy that truth is gained but through the Cross and passions of Christ.  

His great doctrine, which contained for Luther all other doctrine and Christian truth, was of course, justification by Faith, but, before considering the meaning of this central and all interpretative doctrine, we shall deal with Luther's ideas of faith and grace. Faith, it is sometimes said, is with Luther merely /

1."He is worthily called a theologian who understands the visible and back parts of God through Christ's passion and Cross." Heid. Dis. pp. 20.
merely intellectual belief, acceptance of certain which
are not specifically stated, and it is true that there are pas-
sages which substantiate this view. But in such passages prob-
ably we have a Lutheran exaggeration due to the desire to make,
in the work of salvation, God, everything and man nothing. Faith
is with Luther an attitude of the soul in which the soul lays
claim to nothing, puts no confidence in itself, is rather indeed
filled with despair of self, but towards God and His grace has
confidence and trust. In the Schmalkald Articles (p. 3, 2. Luther distinguishes between true and false repentance, the
former is passive, the latter is active. Active repentance is too
much a work of the will and might by the repentant be taken for
righteousness. Passive repentance is true, for it is a despair
of self, leading to confidence in God and Christ. Such passive
repentance is the lower side of faith and is, like faith, the
standing attitude of the Christian life. Faith with Luther is
confidence, not in self (there is in faith an utter absence of
all self-confidence), but in God; faith is fiducia.

Grace in the Greek theology was the gift through the Logos
of the knowledge of God and of immortal life. With Augustine,
from Grace comes the forgiveness of sins but especially the in-
fused

1. "Fides est quaestam cognitio quaer nihil videt; in is-tis nubi-
bus sidet, nisi Christus apprehensus" In Gal. XVI, 16. The
Fides caritate formata he speaks of in his Commentary to Galatians as blasphemy.
infused gift of charity. With the School, grace was the same quality of the soul, a charisma, but with Luther God's grace belongs to God Himself, it is the attitude of the divine mind, which freely forgives sin and reckons men righteous for Christ's sake. Grace is God's unmerited favor shown to the sinner helpless through original and actual sin; it accounts him righteous and creates the condition or the status by which alone any righteousness of man can be attained.

In Justification by faith then, God justifies, i.e. declares and holds for righteous the sinner. He does this in His grace through Christ. But the sinner has to believe, but this belief, the justifying faith, is God's gift. Once the gift has been received, there is established that relation between God and the sinner in which God imputes the righteousness of Christ, a righteousness entirely alien, to the sinner. This imputed righteousness is the necessity for all further righteousness. In this process, on the one side, there is God with His free unmerited grace, on the other, there is the sinner with his faith created by the Holy Spirit, and as a middle term, there is Christ, His righteousness and His whole work, and the question arises, what is there in Christ? what is there in His work? that constitutes Him, as it were, the instrument of God's grace in the process of justification.

Now Luther's doctrine of justification can be stated in two ways /
ways. It may in a strictly forensic way, where justification means accounting righteous and nothing more; it may be stated in a much broader way, where justification includes not simply the accounting righteous, the imputation of a righteousness not yet existent, but an actual righteousness, that is, justification may be so stated as to include sanctification. And Luther states his doctrine in other ways. He speaks of duas partes justificationis, the first part gratia per Christum revelata, the second is the donatio spiritus sancti cum donis suis. Luther even in his central doctrine was not consistent. If we take the strict forensic idea of justification, then there can be no doubt that, in this scheme, the work of Christ is bearing the penalty of sin. "If now indeed out of pure grace our sins are not imputed by God, He has not willed to do this without first His Law and His righteousness receiving satisfaction before all things and supersubstantially. Such gracious imputation must first be bought and obtained for us from His righteousness. Therefore, since that was impossible for us, He has ordained one for us in our place, who should take upon Himself all punishments, which we had deserved, and fulfill the law for us, and thus turn them from us and reconcile God's wrath." (1)

The same idea is found in the Larger Catechism, (II. 2, 27, 28) though there it is not so definitely stated and is joined to other conceptions, "I believe that Jesus Christ, the true Son of God /
God, has become my Lord. What does this mean to become my Lord? It means that He has delivered me by His blood from sins, the devil, death and all destruction,.... For when now we had been created by God, and had received from the Father inestimable gifts of every kind, there came the Devil, envying our happiness and drawing us by his devices into open and rebellious disobedience to God, death and all dangers, so that we lay under His wrath, condemned to perpetual damnation, as we had merited by our guilt. Here there was no longer left any hope of regaining grace, or way of winning salvation, or aid to placate the Father, or way to forgive the sin, till that immortal Son of the immortal Father, pitying, in the depth of His kindness, our wretched misery and exile, descended from heaven to bring us help, and liberated us from all captivity of sin and death, and the devil, into the freedom of His adoption. Thus when the power of all these tyrants and exacters was disposed and overthrown, and into their place came Jesus Christ, the author of life and righteousness, salvation, justification and all goods: who delivered us poor wretched sinners from the jaws of hell, saved us and guaranteed us liberty; won the favour and grace of the angry Father by placating His wrath, and took us as His own possession under His care, to rule and govern us through His justice, wisdom, power /

1. A Sermon quoted from Thomasius' Christi Person und Werke by Franks.
power, life and beatitude." Here it is not actually said Christ bore punishment, but He placates the divine wrath, that wrath which means "perpetual damnation" to the guilty; the inference, in view of other statements, is that He placates this wrath by bearing its condemnation. This conception of Christ's work as substitutionary punishment is found in Hilary and Ambrose, who united in their theologies Greek and Latin thoughts, and in Augustine, and we have seen that with Thomas Aquinas satisfaction has taken a penal form, but it is with Luther and the theologians of the Reformation that penal theory finds precise and prominent expression. God is no longer a private person who can accept satisfaction in place of punishment; He is a Judge whose law demands the punishment of sin. The change may be due partly to change in political conditions, but still more to the literal interpretation of such passages in the New Testament as Romans III, 25, 26, Galn. III, 13 and 2 Cor. V, 21. In the process of justification by faith, considered in a strictly forensic sense, Christ bears the punishment of sin.

But, as has been said, Luther does not always construe justification by faith in this strictly forensic way. It is an ethical process and justification is not only reckoning righteous it is making righteous, it includes sanctification. Corresponding to this more ethical construction of justification we find conceptions of Christ's work which are not forensic but ethical. "As Christ came" /
came" He says in His Commentary on Galatians (II, 24) "once corporally at the time appointed, abrogated the whole law, so He comes to us spiritually without ceasing, and daily quenches and kills these things in us. These things I say that thou mayest know how to answer, when the objection is made: Christ came into the world and once for all took away all our sins, cleansing us by His own blood, what need therefore for us to hear the Gospel, what is the use of absolution and the sacraments? It is true in so far as thou lookest on Christ, the law and sin are in very fact abolished. But Christ is not yet come, or if He is come, yet there are still in thee the remains of sin, thou art not yet all leavened. For where there is concupiscence, heaviness of spirit, fear of death etc. there still is the law and sin, and Christ is not yet come, who, when He comes, drives out fear and heaviness, and brings peace and quietness of conscience." In this passage Christ is a spiritual presence purifying and leavening the moral life.

The two conceptions of Christ's work, as a substituted punishment /

1. Luther retained absolution which is the pronouncement of the forgiveness of sins in Confession. Since absolution and the power of the keys is a consolation and assistance against sin and an evil conscience, instituted in the Gospel by Christ Himself, confession and absolution are by no means to be abolished in the Church. Confession need not be in detail, it is enough to confess in general oneself as a miserable sinner. Schmalkald Art. III 8. 1, 2.

2. Luther retained the three sacraments, Baptism, Eucharist, and Penance. But it is the accompanying words rather than the rites themselves that avail in Baptism and the Eucharist, and true Penance is sorrow for sin. The Sacraments are with Luther additional ways in which the Gospel is set forth.
punishment and as a moral dynamic, are not separated in Luther's thought any more than the remission of sin is separated from life and salvation. "For where there is remission of sins, there is both life and salvation." (Schmal. Art. 6.6).

Christ's work may next be viewed in relation to the Law. Luther sharply distinguishes between the Law and the Gospel. The proper function of the Law is to reveal to man his original and actual sin; it is meant to strike terror into the conscience, and this function of the law continues under the new dispensation; it creates contrition and prepares the way for the mercy and forgiveness of the Gospel. Christ voluntarily subjected Himself to this law and fulfilled it. Luther represents Christ saying to the believers, "I could have overcome the law, for I am Lord of the law, and it therefore has no right over me. But I have made myself subject to the law for your sake, who were under the law, taking your flesh upon me: that is, I have, beyond all need, condescended to the same poison, tyranny and bondage of the law, under which you were bound captive; I have allowed the law to lord it over me, its Lord, to subject me, as it ought not, to sin, death and the wrath of God. Therefore, by a double right I have conquered, overthrown, slain the law; first, as Son of God, the Lord of the law; then, in your person, which is the same as if you yourselves had conquered the law, for my victory is yours."
There are two interesting facts in this statement. Christ has fulfilled the law for us, and, as Luther expressly says, it is no longer necessary for the Christian to keep the law. "This is the Gospel that the law has been fulfilled, so that it is not necessary to fulfil it, but only to adhere and to be conformed to Him who fulfils it." Luther does not mean by this, of course, that the Christian may be immoral, nor does he mean that the Christian freed from the moral and ceremonial law is subject to a new law and a new lawgiver, for Christ is not a law nor a law giver. He is "no Moses, no exacter or legislator but a giver of grace, saviour, and font of mercy." Christ is an inspiration and a new life, and the Christian lives not under a religion of precept, but under the religion of the spirit. But it is difficult to understand how Christ becomes the fountain of inspiration by a formal, voluntary fulfilment of the law. The Law to Luther is really a distinct entity, it has almost a concrete personality of its own, it holds man under its power and condemnation, and man has to be freed from the law before he can enter the Kingdom of Grace. The Law has to be defeated and destroyed, as the Devil has to be defeated in the ransom theory. This defeat, with its consequent redemption for man, is brought about by the voluntary fulfilment of the Law by Christ. The other interesting fact is that Christ, according to Luther, was under no necessity to fulfil the Law. He is above the Law, its Lord, ex-læx. There is no necessity /
necessity then in the Law and, in its Justice, none in the moral order, for Christ fulfilling the law and enduring its condemnation. Christ might have redeemed man by mere power or will. There was no absolute necessity then to bear the punishment of sin, sin's very damnation, and if this is so, then penal theory falls to the ground. The prima facie necessity which penal theory seems to have in the justice or law of God ceases to exist, when there is no absolute necessity for the justice to be met or the law to be fulfilled.

Christ to Luther was the revealer of God, and, in spite of all he says about an angry Father and the placation of His wrath, the God, whom Christ reveals, is to him a God of mercy and a God of love. "Luther has developed far beyond anything in Augustine or Abelard the thought of the revelation of God's love in Christ. Not from nature nor from reason is God, but in Christ and in Him, God is Grace."

Inconsistency and violent exaggeration are everywhere in Luther. His view of the Scriptures, the source to him of all doctrine, is inconsistent. Scripture has to be alien in its simple literal sense, but it is the Spirit that interprets it, and finds Christ to be its content. There is an antinomy in His conception of faith which is now fides informis and now fiducia. He urges faith as the one and only necessity, he despises all works yet no one urged men more than Luther to undertake duties of
of parenthood and citizenship. He calls God an angry Father and while Fatherhood and anger may not be morally inconsistent, a God who condemns man to a Fall which leaves man no opportunity of escape, no freedom, no power of will, which shuts him up to bitter damnation is hard to reconcile with a God of Grace, the God and Father of Our Lord Jesus Christ. God works through His law condemning men and bringing them to despair, this work Luther calls an alienum opus. He might have truly called the God who works this law a Deus alienus—a God alien to the God of our Lord Jesus Christ. At times too, it is hard to recognise the God of Love in that God who can impute righteousness where none exists, for, above all things, Love is true. The inconsistencies and exaggerations and irrationalities which lie in Luther's thought are no doubt due to that religious exuberance which runs into paradox and extremes. God is grace, in Christ He forgives the worst sinner and to the worst gives righteousness, sonship and beatitude. There is paradox in this, but the statements of the paradox may go beyond conscience and reason, and, may we say? beyond the judgments of Holy Spirit—Luther did go beyond, but the reality of his religion must be allowed; his work against the Church ecclesiastical abuses, which imperilled the sufficiency of Christ for salvation, was heroic and effective; no doubt, he laid the foundations of much moral and social progress, but, it is doubtful, whether, as a theologian, he contributed greatly/
greatly to the history of doctrine. By adopting Justification by faith as the one interpretation doctrine, as the doctrine in which all other doctrines are implicitly contained, he originated a new method, the method of interpreting the whole of doctrine from a single point of view and from the unity of experience, but Luther's justification by faith, not sufficiently consistent in itself, nor sufficiently comprehensive, to be made the great central principle by which the ways of God with men can be interpreted. A more consistent doctrine of God as Love and Grace, a nobler conception of man whom God had created, would have transformed his theology and taken from it those moral inconsistencies which cannot help but offend reason and conscience.
Zwingli, the author of the Swiss Reformation, differed from Luther in this that he approached his problem from the objective standpoint of the Scriptures rather than from that of subjective religious experience. Zwingli again was a systematic theologian which Luther was not. In his commentary on the true and false religion, he begins by treating of religion in general, and distinguishes Christian as the true religion, while superstition, especially that of the Romish Church, is false.

Zwingli admits that there were seeds of truth amongst the heathen, and that the heathen, some of them at least, will be found in heaven. "But since God has spoken to us through His Son and His Holy Spirit much more clearly than He did to the heathen, we must hold to the divine revelation of the Scripture." Man is sinful by nature (Lc: 4), and has no power of will. Christ is the God-man (Lc: 6), and is the certainty and pledge of the grace of God. Apart from Christ, man is without hope. But before God's mercy in Christ can become operative, the justice of God has to be satisfied. "His justice being sacrosanct must needs remain no less untouched and unshaken than His mercy, and man was, while in need of mercy, yet entirely guilty before the Divine justice, the Divine goodness found a way, whereby, justice was saved."

1. His Herculem, Theseum, Societatem Antigonum, Numam, Camillum, Catones, Scipiones... Dunicum non fuit vir bonus, non erit mensa sancta; non fidelis an imo, ab ipso mundi exordio usque ad ejus consum mationem quem non sis isthic cum Deo visurus. Fid. — Christ. Expositio OpwIV, p. 65.
was satisfied, God's heart of mercy might legitimately be freely opened without harm to justice. Not that in this matter He had to take precautions against our enemy, or that the Potter could not of the moistened clay make or refashion a vessel just as He pleased; but that by His example of justice He might take hesitation and sloth from us, and show Himself to us as He was, righteous, good and merciful." Again he says that God's justice must be completely satisfied, that His anger may be appeased. (p. 671) and again "For this was justice, that He by whom we had all been created, in whom there is no sin, from whom we had departed, should though innocent, bear those things which we had deserved by sinning, but should bear them for us." (p. 688). From these quotations, it will be seen that Zwingli held to a penal conception, there is with him need for the reconciliation of Divine justice, but while there is this need, the necessity is not absolute, for the Potter could do with the clay what He wills; the need lies in man, in the requirement for an example of the Divine justice, an idea which reminds us of the later Grobian theory; again, it is to be noted that Zwingli has the patristic idea, that the instrument of redemption and creation should be the same. The mode, by which Christ, the pledge and certainty of the Divine Grace, is that of contraries. In this he follows Augustine. Christ is our Righteousness.
While then it is true that there is a subjective aspect of the work of Christ,—seen distinctly in such a statement as that Adam's transgression brought men down to the level of beasts, Christ's obedience lifted us from the beasts to be sons of God, (an instance of the operation of contraries),—Zwingli's main doctrine is that of satisfaction through punishment, made to the righteousness of God and for the placation of the Divine Wrath.
Melancthon was the theologian of the Lutheran Church. Under the influence of Luther he drew up the "Augsburg Confession" (1530) and published his "Apology" for it (1534). In the final edition of his "Loci Theologici," he developed his theology more independently of Luther, allowing more scope to reason and philosophy in the work of theological construction and making more use of ecclesiastical tradition. But as far as the work of Christ is concerned, while the references to it in the Loci are of a general character, they are at one with the views of the Augsburg confession, and the Apology. The Augsburg Confession speaks of Christ as "having truly suffered, been crucified, dead and buried that He might reconcile the Father to us, and might be a victim not only for original sin, but also for all the actual sins of men." And this is the consistent view of Melancthon. "Christ's benefits are these" he says, "to bear guilt and eternal death, that is, to placate the mighty wrath of God," and "eternal death" is defined as the feeling of God's horrible and unutterable wrath." He says that in reality there is only one /

2. Christi beneficia sunt tollere culpam et mortem aeternam, id est, placare ingentem iram Dei. Loc. II, p. 603.
one propitiatory sacrifice in the world. Christ's passion or death, and a propitiatory sacrifice is "a work which merits for others remission of guilt and everlasting punishment, or a work reconciling God and placating the wrath of God on behalf of others, and a satisfaction on behalf of guilt and everlasting punishment." His construction of the Person of Christ follows Anselmic lines. "Since the human race had sinned, it befitted the order of justice that one of the human race should pay the penalty, which was the ransom for the rest. It is therefore clear enough why this sacrifice should be a man. The second reason, why he should be God, is the infinite evil of sin; that He might be a ransom of infinite goodness, this Mediator is also God." The God-man was necessary as a sacrifice for the infinite sin of man. He continues that no created power could be a Mediator, for "no created power could alone have borne the wrath of God, and in so great stress of pains have given true praise to Divine justice." Further, a created power could not overcome death and restore us to righteousness and life eternal, nor could such a power be the ever present guardian of the Church. The necessity for the God-man is, according to this passage /

2. Opus quod meretur alius remissionem culpa et poenae nostrae seu opus reconciliacionis Deum, et placans iram Dei pro alii, et satisfactorium pro culpa et poena aeterna (ib. p. 571).
passage, in the infinite nature of man's sin, in the greatness of the wrath of God, in the nature of the work to be accomplished—the overcoming of death and the restoration to righteousness and life, and in the moral necessities of the Church. But these necessities—not even the divine wrath—are not absolute for God—it only befitted the order of justice (consecutum ordini justitiae) that the Mediator is such as He is.

Melancthon confines the work of Christ in Justification (much more strictly than Luther) to the forgiveness of sins. Works and future obedience are guaranteed by the Holy Spirit, which is a gift to faith (fiducia); Christ justifies, the Holy Spirit regenerates and sanctifies. "Since therefore the Holy Spirit..... produces new activities and new life, this conversion is called regeneration, and a new obedience must of necessity follow" (Loc. Theol. p. 200). The works which the Holy Spirit creates are imperfect, but their infirmity is forgiven for the sake of Christ. "Thus for Christ's sake first the person is reconciled (justification) then the works also are accepted" (Loc. Theol. p. 215). In this way, both justification and regeneration are related to Christ.

The theology of Melancthon is substantially that of Luther. Grace is to him the favour of God shown in the forgiveness of sins through Christ, faith is fiducia and is sharply distinguished from works, and the work of Christ is that of a penal sacrifice /
sacrifice placating the wrath of God. He differs from Luther by a more analytic and logical method, his distinctions are drawn more clearly, but his religious intuitions have not the richness of the great Reformer. He may speak of the love of God, but it is the divine wrath that is the controlling idea, and the work of Christ is conceived strictly in a forensic way. Grace may be favour and mercy, it may be free, but he has failed to reconcile this free grace with the Divine Justice that has to be placated by the Death of the holy Son of God, before man's sin can be forgiven. The love of the Son stands out in bold opposition to the wrath of the Father. In Melancthon the penal theory comes to complete and consistent expression. With Luther the love of God is the ultimate and primary motive for redemption, God's wrath or penal justice is subordinate. There is in Luther a bold religious inconsistency, in Melancthon the inconsistency is removed. God's sovereignty and Justice are with Melancthon the ultimate motives. Luther, with his inconsistency, was nearer, however, to the mind of Christ.
In Melancthon the Lutheran theology was developed on purely forensic lines, to the neglect of the experiential side of Luther's thought. Osiander emphasises the experiential side as expressed in a passage of Luther's commentary to the Galatians (II, 124). In that passage, Luther maintains the necessity for a present Christ in the life of the believer to complete the work of justification. Osiander, accordingly, divides the work of Christ into two parts, Redemption and Justification. In Redemption Christ bore for us in His Passion the wrath of God and secured the forgiveness of sins. He also fulfilled the law for us, so that our imperfect fulfilment, even after we have been redeemed, may not be reckoned to us. Christ thus removed from the redeemed the condemnation of the law. This work of Redemption belongs to the historical Christ, was accomplished more than 1500 years ago and is valid for all members of the Church, apart from their subjective attitude. Redemption was accomplished once and for all, but Justification is continual through the indwelling of the Word. Redemption corresponds to Luther's justification, and justification in Osiander to Sanctification, but Luther makes the cause of the whole religious process Christ and Holy Spirit, while Osiander sharply distinguishes between the work of the historical Christ and /
and the **Eternal Word**. The scheme is a reinterpretation of
the Greek theology, and is interesting as a kind of protest
against the adequacy of the purely **Agaotic** form of the Lutheran
theology to express moral fullness of salvation through Christ.

The mystics Schwankfeld (1490-1561) and Weigel (1533-1585)
developed the idea of salvation through the indwelling word,
to the exclusion of the historical and objective elements, and
with Osiander they represent the protest of the spirit against
definite dogma.
In Calvin the penal conception of Christ's work was fundamental. The following passage from the Institutes, the masterpiece of Protestant theology, gives us the principal elements in his theory: "For God, who is the highest justice, cannot love the iniquity which he beholds in us all. Therefore we all have in us that which is worthy of God's hate. First, according to our corrupt nature, and then further in respect of wicked life, we are all really offensive to God, guilty in his sight and born for the damnation of Hell. But since the Lord does not wish to lose in us what is His own, He yet finds somewhat which He may love according to His kindness. For although we are sinners by our vice, we yet remain His creatures; although we had taken death to ourselves, He nevertheless had formed us for life. So by true and gracious love for us, He is moved to receive us into grace. But since there is a perpetual and irreconcileable discord between justice and iniquity, He cannot, so long as we remain sinners, receive us completely. And so, in order that matter of all enmity may be removed and that He may forthwith reconcile us to Himself, by the setting forth of an expiation in Christ's Death, He abolishes whatever is evil in us, that we, who before were unclean and impure in His sight, may appear just and holy in His sight. First, by His love God the /
the Father prevents and anticipates our reconciliation in Christ.
May, because He first loves us, afterwards He reconciles us to
Himself. But because in us, until Christ saves us by His
Death, iniquity remains which deserves the wrath of God and is
cursed and condemned before Him, we have no full and firm union
with God until Christ joins us to Him. And so, if we could be
assured of God appeased and propitious towards us, it is fitting
that we fix our eyes and minds on Christ alone, so that in truth
through Him alone we may obtain that sins be not imputed to us,
the imputation of which draws down with it the wrath of God."
Ins. II. 16.3). Later in this same chapter of the Institutes
Calvin says, "This is our absolution, that the guilt, which held
us liable to punishment, was transferred to the head of the Son
of God. For this compensation must be held first of all, so
that we be not afraid and anxious all our life, as though the
just vengeance of God still stood over us, which the Son of God
has transferred to Himself" (II. 16.5). In this passage the
principal elements of Calvin's theory of the work of Christ are
all present. God is love, but because of sin, God's Love cannot
express itself. God hates sin and His wrath and vengeance rest
upon the sinner. This wrath and vengeance are transferred to
Christ, and then God shows His love for the elect, saves them
and unites them to Himself. All the difficulties of the penal
substitutionary conception are love. It is morally incon-
ceivable /
inconceivable that Justice to say nothing of Love, should transfer the vengeance and hate, which it rightly has towards sin, to the sinless. Calvin himself felt the difficulty of God's hostility and wrath falling upon Christ. "We do not suggest," he says, "that God was even hostile to Him or angry with Him. For how could He be angry with the beloved Son in whom His soul was pleased? Or how could Christ placate by His intercession for others a Father who was hostile to Himself? But we say this, that He bore the weight of the divine severity, in that, being stricken and afflicted by God's hand, He experienced all the signs of an angry and punishing God" (II, 16.11). These words help us but little; they only reveal the greatness of the difficulty of the penal conception and the strait to which its defenders are put. As the words stand, they can only mean that God's punishment fell upon Christ in a different way from that which it ought to fall upon the sinner. In short, the sinner's real punishment did not fall upon Christ, and, in that view, the penal theory completely breaks down.

Another difficulty in the passage quoted, is the reconciliation of the love and wrath of God. Calvin felt this difficulty. "Before proceeding further," he says, "we must see, in passing, how it is consistent with God who prevents us in His pity, was hostile until He was reconciled to us by Christ. For how could He have given to us in His only begotten Son, a singular pledge of /
of His Love, unless He had already embraced us in gratuitous favour? He answers that phrases of this kind are an accommodation to our understanding, so that we may better understand, how wretched and calamitous is our condition apart from Christ. For unless it had been told us in clear words that the wrath and sentence of God and eternal death lay upon us, the less would we recognise how wretched we should be without the pity of God, and we would estimate the blessing of freedom at less value." (II. 16.2). Is the wrath of God only a threat? This is certainly not Calvin's view, though his words seem to imply it.

According to Calvin, the work of Christ in His Death is placating the divine wrath and bearing on behalf of the elect the just punishment of sin, and thus opening up for them the way to the divine favour and communion. This work of Christ has not merely a God-ward aspect, for Christ "abolishes whatever is evil in us, that we, who before were unclean and impure in God's sight, may appear just and holy in His sight." Christ's work has a moral effect upon us, but how this moral effect is produced, Calvin does not say. The difficulty is met by the imputation of the active obedience of Christ to the saved. "When it is asked how, in abolishing sin, Christ endured the dispute between us and God, and acquired righteousness which makes Him favourable and
and benevolent towards us, .... it can be answered that He procured this for us by the whole course of His obedience. So in His Baptism He asserted that He was fulfilling a part of righteousness, because He was obediently doing the Father's command. In short, from the time when He began to put on the person of a slave, He began for our redemption to pay the price of freedom. Yet Scripture, where it defines the method of salvation more definitely, ascribes this as it were in a peculiar and special manner, to the death of Christ" (II. 16.5).

"The righteousness which was found in Christ alone, being accepted, is transferred to us." (II. 17.5).

According to above passages, Christ's whose life of obedience is transferred to the elect believer, though, conformably to Scripture, in the work of salvation, the Death has a peculiar and special value.

Further Calvin has the conception of Christ as the Head of the Church, and of a mystical union between Christ and the believer.

"Therefore that conjunction of the head and the members, the dwelling of Christ in our hearts, in fine, the mystical union, (mysticus unus) is accounted by us of highest worth; so that Christ, having been made ours, makes us sharers in gifts with which He has been endowed. We therefore do not behold Him without us from afar, so that His justice is imputed to us, but because we have /
have put Himself on and are implanted into His body; in a word, He has deigned to make us one with Himself, therefore do we glory that we have fellowship in righteousness with Him", III, 11.6.

We find in Calvin very much what we find in St. Paul, a forensic interpretation and an interpretation that is personal, spiritual and mystical.

A noteworthy conception in Calvin's theology is that of the threefold office, according to which the title "Christ" is analysed into that of Prophet, Priest and King. (Origen of Caesarea seems to have originated this description of Christ's work, but Calvin was the first to employ it in dogmatics. As a practical summation of Christ's work the analysis has value, but it is doubtful if it is of any service for the understanding of Christ's work.

We may conclude this section on the Reformers by a brief summary of the most important elements in their statement of Christ's Work.

1. The ultimate source of Christ's saving work is the Love of God. "Because God first loves us, He reconciles us to Himself" (Calvin).

2. Christ's main work is the placating the wrath of God and bearing the punishment of sin: this work, according to Calvin, is for the elect alone.

3. /
3. While the Death of Christ removed the obstruction in the way of Divine forgiveness, both Luther and Calvin betray the feeling that something more is necessary for the abolition of sin. Luther emphasises the need for the spiritual presence of Christ, Calvin uses the principles of the imputation of the active obedience and of union with Christ.

4. The Reformers emphasise the total corruption of human nature and the impotence of man to effect, in any way, his own salvation.

5. The Reformed Theology finds the necessity of Christ's work in the corrupt and sinful nature of man. At first, a necessity for Christ's Death seems to lie in the Justice of God, and in the Law of Righteousness but God is above His Justice and His Law. He is ex lex, and He might have saved man by an act of volition.

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1. The Penal character of Christ's work is central, but the additions in Calvin and Luther show that even with the Reformers, the penal interpretation is insufficient to interpret the work of Christ.

2. While it is perfectly true that the Reformers cannot be accused of making light of sin, the conception of sin as the total corruption of human nature loses sight of one most important element in sin, namely man's responsibility for it. Sin is of a voluntary nature, and it is questionable whether a depravity, due to a fall conceived as taking place some 3 or 4 thousand years ago, can be regarded as personal sin.
THE SOCINIAN CRITICISM and the GROTIAN REPLY.

F. SOCINUS (1539-1604).

It was an impossibility for the orthodox theory of Atonement, whether as satisfaction or penal theory, to escape criticism; in later forms the doctrine is presented with logical inconsistencies, and with difficulties of a concrete character. Of such criticism the Socinian is historic; it was acute and complete, and there is scarcely an argument adduced to-day against the penal theory, which was not used by Socinus, and stated in the Raevonian Catechism (1605) the official account of Socinian doctrine. The criticism was both logical and exegetical; in exegesis Socinus had benefited from Erasmus, and, while, in places, his exegesis is arbitrary, in pointing out that much of the language of the time is metaphorical and symbolic and that a hard literalism and a narrow context are no true principles of interpretation, Socinus was on right lines and a precursor in the historic method of New Testament interpretation. The logical criticism may be briefly summarised.

1. Satisfaction and the Divine Pardon are incompatible. God cannot be regarded as munificent, if He require satisfaction from human nature in Christ. True liberality is shown in pardon /
1. Pardon without satisfaction.

This criticism holds, of course, whether Christ's work is regarded as a satisfaction to God or as the fulfilment of the just penalty.

2. Even if satisfaction were necessary, Christ's death is personal to Himself and is not transferable: and such transferability, even were it possible, would be unjust. It is neither just nor merciful for the innocent to bear the punishment of the guilty. Further, one death could not satisfy for many, nor could one man's obedience suffice for the obedience of many.

3. If eternal Death is the necessary satisfaction for sin, then Christ did not make the necessary satisfaction, for He did not die an eternal death. He rose from the death. Further, He suffered as man, so His sufferings are finite. Indeed infinite suffering is an impossibility for the Infinite is impossible. Christ could not suffer in his divine, that is, in his eternal and infinite nature. He could not make the necessary infinite satisfaction.

4. According to the orthodox view, satisfaction is paid to the divine nature. This is absurd, for one cannot satisfy oneself. The doctrine of the Trinity does not remove the difficulty.


difficulty, for if the Son satisfies the Father, who satisfies the Son? The Son can only give what is His Father's. 1.

5. A satisfaction so made can only lead to moral licence. If salvation is quite apart from man, why should not man do what he pleases, certain that God's grace will prevail? 2.

6. Socimus also shows that imputation and satisfaction are contradictory ideas, that imputation is impossible for moral qualities are personal and non-transferable, and were imputation possible, it would be immoral.

No summary brief or full can give a complete idea of the force and penetration of the criticism. It was so acute and logically perfect, that the surprise is that penal and substitutionary theory was not completely dislodged from Christian doctrine. Anselm closed the reign of the ransom theory in the theology of the Church; but Socimus, who has a keener logic, does not mark the close of penal and substitutionary doctrine. The reason for this, no doubt, is the fact that while the orthodox theory may contain many irrationalities which logic can quickly expose, the experience to which the theory tries to give expression, is really immune against merely logical criticism. It rests on other /

1. De Jesus Christo S. III, 4.
2. Rac. Cat. V. 8.
3. This is not to say that the Socinian criticism had little or no influence. It modified to a considerable extent the Calvinistic statement. Arminianism owed not a little to it. It gave the challenge to Grotius, who does no little of the armour of his foe.
other and surer foundations, and even the theory, which is attached to the experience, has a strength of persistence, which it could not and would not have separate and by itself. Logic and criticism cannot settle the ways of God with men nor the relations and interactions of sin and grace. Acute and penetrating as the criticism of Socinus is, there is an externality about it that makes us feel, that it has not got to the centre of the moral problem and of the spiritual realities which theology has attempted in the doctrine of Atonement to explain.

Further, the positive doctrine of Socinus is just as open to criticism as the system, which he so strenuously attacks. This may be stated briefly and summarily. The Christian religion is a religion of revelation, though it came a knowledge of God and of immortality. God is omnium Dominus, omnipotent Will, from which proceed effects all things and even Salvation. This is the Scotist conception of Deity. In his Anthropology Socinus discards the Calvinist doctrines of original sin and predestination. Man is a free moral agent, naturally mortal, but secures immortality as a reward for obedience. Sin is an offence against God, which can be blotted out by reformation (De J.C.S. III, XI.), and indeed by such reformation as man, in his freedom, is capable of. Repentance and right living bring the real forgiveness. Christ is preeminently the Revealer, "a mortal man, who has become immortal, yet no ordinary man, since He was from the first God's".
God's only begotten Son by the miraculous conception, and was sanctified by the Father and sent into the world, equipped with wisdom and power, and was finally raised to a power equal to God's own." Christ, at the beginning of His ministry, was taken up to Heaven and there received this unique revelation. Christ is Saviour, not because He procures salvation, which proceeds from the arbitrary will of God and is simply made known by Him. He makes it known, not merely by preaching and miracles, but by the shedding of His blood, which confirms both miracles and preaching, binds God to us in a covenant, and gives us a perfect example. Christ saves by being an example, which would lack a certain completeness without His Death, and by revealing the gift of immortal life. The Death is really not so important as the Resurrection, through which Christ passes into the presence of God, where His real work, of helping men and revealing to them their true salvation, begins.

It will be seen at once that the positive doctrine of F. Socinus is vulnerable at every point. His conception of God falls far below that of the New Testament, a God who is simply an omnipotent will, from whose righteousness proceeds justice and mercy belongs to the Sultanic order. Such a God in His righteousness /

righteousness might will to redeem, on the other hand, He might not, and He might conceivably change His mind. He is not a God, in whom man can have absolute moral assurance. There was no necessity why He should redeem; there is none why He should continue the work of Redemption. Further, man may be free and be said to possess the power of moral self-determination; that is a fact of consciousness but it is none the less a fact of consciousness that man, in some of his most serious moral situations, is not free, or, at least, he does not possess sufficient self-determination to redeem the situation. Again, while it is true, that sin may be regarded an offence against God, or man or even against the moral law itself, such a description does not adequately explain the consciousness of sin and guilt; sin means more, it is inherent in man's nature, it is diffused throughout and affects his whole personality. When a man has been guilty of sin, and has any deep feeling of moral sorrow, he does not but bemoan his sin merely by himself and says, "Oh wretched man that I am." There is an externality in the Socinian conception of sin, which amounts to superficiality. Failing, as it does, in its conception of God and in its anthropology, the Socinian doctrine no less falls short in its Christology, which is the simple 1 Adoptionism of the early Christian Church and the early Apologists.

Apologists, according to which the Incarnation has no rational ground in the nature of God and in the real unity of God and man. The Incarnation depends upon the arbitrary will of God. In His Death Christ reveals no special redeeming power; His death confirms His teaching, creates a kind of covenant between God and man, manifests the love of the Father (Themata 36) and His own for us, and specially prepares the way for the Resurrection and the reign in Heaven, where the real expiatory work begins "where He continually cleanses us from our sins by keeping us back, by His word and spirit, from the sins themselves and defending His own from all evils, so far as they are the real penalties of sin. The resurrection has really more religious value than the death, for, through it, we see how God delivers those who trust Him from cruel death and shows us Christ clothed with authority as from death.

If the same kind of criticism — the swift logic and the superficial commonsense — were applied to the Socinian Christology as F. Socinus himself applied to the Calvinistic doctrine of Atonement, it would prove as destructive as his criticism was, for a Virgin Birth, miracles and a translation to Heaven and return to earth can find little support either in logic or commonsense. The Socinian argument against penal and satisfactory explanations of Christ's sufferings and death can scarcely 1.

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1. The mata de Officio Christi (51).
scarcely be gainsaid. We may frankly admit it, but that is only saying, that these explanations are inadequate and even false. We must at times distinguish between moral fact and theory, however closely the two may seem to be bound together. As a matter of fact Socinus leaves no redeeming quality in Christ as Crucified; and if his were the last word on Atonement, then we would be bound to say that the problem had been created by the theologians and their speculations; and that the path for religion and theology henceforward to pursue must be much simpler and more ordinary. If Socinus were right and his story the whole truth, all Atonement, as man had experienced it, had been a simple delusion. Henceforward man should leave it severely alone. The natural man might have been glad to leave it there; for the Christian conscience such a course were impossible. Socinus had slain the logic (yet not altogether) but the reality out of which the logic came, still remained.
SIGNIFICANT PASSAGES from the RACOVIAN CATECHISM.

Ch. 8. How has the blood of Christ confirmed to us the will of God?

In two ways. First, because He did not suffer Himself to be deterred from inculcating His doctrine, even by the most painful death, but particularly because He ratified the New Covenant by His blood, and confirmed the New Testament by His Death, Heb. XIII, 20... Secondly, because through His Death, He was led to His resurrection, from which principally arises the confirmation of the divine will, and the most certain persuasion of our resurrection and the obtaining of eternal life.

But did not Christ die also, properly speaking, to purchase our salvation, and literally to pay the debt of our sins?

Although Christians at this time commonly so believe, yet this notion is false, erroneous and exceedingly pernicious; since they conceive that Christ suffered an equivalent punishment for our sins and by the price of His obedience exactly compensated disobedience. There is no doubt, however, but that Christ so satisfied God by His obedience, that He completely filled the whole of His will, and by His obedience, obtained, through the grace of God, for all of us, who believe in Him, the remission of our sins, and eternal salvation.

How /
How is this opinion repugnant to the Scriptures?

Because the Scriptures everywhere testify that God forgives men their sins freely, and especially under the New Covenant (2 Cor. 5, 19; Rom. 3, 24; Matt. 18, 23; etc.) But to a free forgiveness nothing is more opposite than such a satisfaction, as they contend for, and the payment of an equivalent price. For where a creditor is satisfied, either by the debtor himself, or by another person on the debtor’s behalf, it cannot with truth be said of him that he freely forgives the debt.

How is this repugnant to reason?

This is evident from hence: that it would follow that Christ, if He has satisfied God for our sins, has submitted to eternal death; since it appears that the penalty which men had incurred by their offences was eternal death; not to say that one death though it were eternal in duration - much less one so short - could not of itself be equal to innumerable eternal deaths. For if you say that the death of Christ, because He was a God infinite in nature, was equal to the infinite deaths of the infinite race of men, - besides that I have already refuted this opinion concerning the nature of Christ - it would follow that God’s infinite nature itself suffered death itself. But as death cannot any way belong to the infinity of the divine nature, so neither, literally speaking, (as must necessarily be done here, where we are treating of a real compensation and pay-ment) /
payment) can the infinity of the divine nature any way belong to death. In the next place, it would follow that there was no necessity that Christ should endure such sufferings, and so dreadful a death, and that God — be it spoken without offence — was unjust, who, when He might well have been contented with one drop (as they say) of the blood of Christ, would have Him so severely tormented. Lastly, it would follow that we were more obliged to Christ than to God, and owed Him more, indeed owed Him everything; since He, by this satisfaction, showed us much kindness; whereas God, by exacting his debt, showed us no kindness at all.

State in what manner this opinion is pernicious.

Because it opens a door to licentiousness, or at least, invites man to indolence in the practice of piety, in what way soever they urge the piety of their patron. For, if full payment has been made to God for all our sins, even those which are future, we are absolutely freed from all liability to punishment, and therefore no further condition can by right be exacted from us to deliver us from the penalties of sin. What necessity, then, would there be for living religiously? But the Scripture testifies (Tit. 2, 14; Gal. 1, 4; 1 Pet. 1, 19; Heb. 9, 14; 2 Cor. 5, 15; Eph. 5, 26) that Christ died for this end, among others, that He might "redeem us from all iniquity, and purify /
purify us unto Himself, a peculiar people, zealous of good works"; that He might deliver us from the present evil world; "might redeem us from our vain conversation, received by tradition from our fathers"; in order that, being "dead to sin", we might "live unto righteousness," that our consciences might be "purged from dead works to serve the living God."

Ch. 10, par. 6. "In this that He not only offered up prayer and supplication to God for Himself and for us, while He dwelt on earth, but also sanctified Himself, and gave Himself as an offering for us, shedding His own blood for our sins; and thus after being restored to life by God and made immortal, He has, by His own blood, entered the holy celestial place, and offered Himself to God, appearing for ever in His presence and interceding for us; by which one offering He has obtained for all, who believe in Him, eternal redemption and deliverance from their sins...... The expiation which Christ makes for us is a deliverance from the guilt of our sins, and from the penalties, both temporal and eternal, which follow them; and also from the sins themselves that we no longer serve them."
The challenge which the Socinian criticism threw out was taken up by Hugo Grotius, jurist and theologian. In his Defence of the Catholic faith concerning the Satisfaction of Christ against Faustus Socinus of Siena (1617), he examines the Socinian criticism, asserts the Catholic doctrine of Christ's death as a penal satisfaction for sin, and sets forth a theory of his own which is very different from the one which he had undertaken to defend. With regard to his criticism of the Socinian positions, Grotius makes corrections in the technicalities of Roman Law which Socinus had used; at places, he may correct the Socinian exegesis, though Grotius allows too little for the fact of metaphor and symbol in the New Testament, and has too much literalism in his interpretation. He meets the Socinian objection of injustice in the transference of punishment from the guilty to the innocent with a legal argument. Following Roman law, he adopts the division of law into natural and positive. There can be no relaxability of natural law; but positive law, which is the effect of the will of the Supreme Ruler may be relaxed, not lightly but for serious considerations, and that without injustice. Accordingly the positive law "Every sinner must bear the penalty of death" (Gen. 2, 17) may be relaxed. But it cannot be simply relaxed. That would amount to the abrogation /
abrogation of the law altogether, and it would lead to moral
disaster. There may be a transference of the punishment which
is justified by cases in the Old Testament, by Roman law and
heathen custom. Transference cannot be carried out by the
ordinary judge, who has to administer the positive law, as it
stands, without fear or favour, but only by the Supreme Governor
Himself, who, in the transference, exercises his regal preroga-
tive and, at the same time, shows his regard for simple justice
and right. Any apparent injustice is swept away by the ends for
which such transference is made. In the case of Our Lord's
punishment the ends are the maintenance of the moral order, the
revelation of divine justice, and the good of mankind. For, if
there had been no relaxation and "all sinners had been given over
to eternal death, two most beautiful things would have perished
altogether from the universe, on the part of men, piety towards
God, and, on the part of God, the manifestation of His chief
beneficence towards men." The ends justify the means. This
argument, as stated by Grotius or in any condensed form, may
satisfy jurists. It cannot satisfy reason and conscience.
The difficulties are not removed by the willingness of him to
whom the punishment is transferred to bear the punishment nor by
any peculiarity of relation between the innocent, who suffers,
and the guilty, who is let off. To punish the wrong man can
never /
never be just. The essence of just punishment is that it falls upon the guilty. Indeed it is only loose thinking that can admit the possibility of the transference of punishment at all. A steals £1000 and B refunds the money. That is not a transference of punishment. If A had refunded the money himself, no one would have called the refunding a punishment. Or A commits an offence and he is fined. A cannot pay the fine, and B pays it for him. What is B's action? It is a deed of generosity, a voluntary act of kindness, it may cost B £1000, it may mean certain deprivations, but it is not a punishment. Punishment is related to guilt, and so the punishment must fall upon the guilty person.

Socrates had contended that satisfaction really annuls forgiveness and its generosity. Where satisfaction has been made, there can be no forgiveness nor need for it. Grotius replies that satisfaction is not solution. Solution demands an equivalent punishment for the crime or an equivalent payment for the debt. Satisfaction is made, and then forgiveness comes in, on the part of the Governor, who is willing to accept the satisfaction, so made. Satisfaction is a condition of forgiveness, and a condition does not annul the forgiveness, as can be seen in the further condition of faith. Forgiveness has its conditions and remains according to Grotius what it is. But this forgiveness is not the free and gracious forgiveness of God. It is acceptatio /
acceptatio. Nor is the satisfaction that complete satisfaction
for which the Reformers contended. It is only an aliquid pretii.
And the faith which is a legal demand or condition, is not the
simple pure receptivity of grace of evangelical religion. In
arguing against Socinus, Grotius has abandoned the Reformers.

The core of the Socinian criticism was directed against the
equivalence of Christ's death for the punishment of sin. This
was the very essence of the Reformers' position; and, while Grotius
asserts it again and again, he abandons it and, in his own particu-
cular theory, substitutes something which is entirely different.
In that theory God is Rector, the supreme Governor, jealous for
the maintenance of the moral and social order. This order cannot
be maintained, unless sin is punished; were sin to be punished as
positive law demands, "two most beautiful things" would be lost.
So the punishment is transferred to a single Person - to Christ,
whose dignity and peculiar relation to man specially fit Him for
this office. Christ bears the penalty, God's righteousness is
preserved, and by a penal example the moral order is preserved.
Grotius has travelled far from the Reformers.

The weakness of such a theory is patent. Christ bears the
punishment of sin, Grotius explicitly states, and His punishment
is a penal example. But if Christ has borne the punishment of
sin, it is hard to see how his Death can be a penal example and
a moral deterrent. Indeed the action would be the other way.
The sinner might naturally say, Christ has borne the punishment of
sin,
sin, I need not be afraid. The Cross is made to say two things
(1) Christ, as a substitute, has borne the punishment of sin, and
(2) sin will be punished and the sinner will die. Two contra-
dictory things. It is impossible to reconcile Grotius and
Calvin.

But further part of the appeal at least of the Cross is on
the theory of Grotius to fear. Christ's death is an exhibition
to the sinner of the consequences of his sin: by fear it impels
to righteousness and salvation. Again, Christ suffers for the
sake of the moral order, conceived in a somewhat abstract and
external form. He dies for political expediency. "It is
good," said Caiaphas, "that one man die for the people." But
the real source of the weakness of the theory lies in the Con-
ception of God. He is a Rector righteous and concerned for
good government, with power to grant relaxation of positive
law; in the interests of good government He does relax it, but
it is impossible to reconcile such relaxation with the ideal of
Justice and Righteousness. The God of the theory is not the
God and Father of Our Lord Jesus Christ.

The theory of Grotius is an illustration of the truth that
you cannot explain God's action, by anything lower than God Him-
self. God's action in Christ cannot be interpreted through
Aristotle's conception of the state and of the duty of a magis-
trate, through Roman Law, and heathen customs, political analo-
gies and state laws; - the God whose action only rises to these
heights /
heights is not the holy and loving Father whom Jesus in His life and death revealed.

And yet this theory has its value. It shows how difficult - how impossible - the rigid penal theory is. Grotius would have been faithful to that position - he believed he was - but he simply could not be and give to reason and conscience their rights. And the theory has had great influence. It was practically accepted by Anglicans like Tillotson (1630-94) Samuel Clarke (1675-1728) by Richard Watson (1781-1833) the theologian of Methodism, and in America by the younger Edwards.
Schleiermacher is the father of modern theology in this, that he made the Christian consciousness or Christian experience the regulative principle of theology and also that he attempts to deduce his system from a single principle. Whatever intellectual and religious influences - Plato, Spinoza, Kant, the Aufklärung, Romanticism and Moravian piety - may have contributed to his making, there is no doubt that a new and original element appears in Schleiermacher's religious thinking. Theology is no longer a system of Biblically revealed truths, or of intellectual conceptions. It is a science of a part of reality that is human and living. Religion is a human reality; theology is its explanation and explication. No doubt this was very much the case with the Reformers: their religion was a living experience, which went very largely to the making of their theology, which did not however shake itself from the bondage of tradition and scholasticism. With Schleiermacher the bond is completely broken. This does not of course mean a breach with history, not even the kind of breach that Kant made. No such complete breach is possible. The past and the present are one continuum, they constitute one life and one living process. But with the forms of thought, in which the living process has expressed itself, a breach may be made; they may be regarded as inadequate, relative /
relative, ephemeral and even false. This was the breach that Schleiermacher made. The Creeds of the Church, the intellectualism of scholasticism and even the letter of Scripture itself are not the source and regulative principle of truth and religion; they are but the intellectual expression of these, and all intellectual expression is marked by relativity. The great change in Schleiermacher's method may be realised, when we remember that in the past Christ's work had been interpreted through the conceptions of satisfaction, merit, honour, justice, and the rights of evil, but with Schleiermacher it is interpreted through the Christian experience of moral and spiritual redemption.

The method needs no justification. It was adopted by Ritschl and his school. It has influenced all modern theological thinking. It is the method of science, and science only blunders, when it departs from this method and forms intellectual conceptions which it regards as absolute and real. It is the method which allows reality, through the mind which is a part of itself, to be its own interpreter. With the method itself no fault can be found, its application may be imperfect; it may not always distinguish between the real or abiding, and the relative, or temporary; it always is imperfect, that is due to the fact that there is a relativity of the individual, as well as a relativity of knowledge. The success of the method depends upon the character of the mind employing it. "Spiritual things are spiritually
spiritually discerned." Reality interprets reality.

Schleiermacher was profoundly real and spiritual. He had a rich Christian experience and a mind to interpret it, and so the method with him was rich in result. He was, as will be seen later, inadequate and, in parts, mistaken. He could not, any more than any other man, escape the relativity of individuality. Man sees through a glass darkly. He is man, capable through the divine image of apprehending a part of reality; he is not God that comprehends the whole.

In Schleiermacher's system of thought the different parts are so related to one another and so affect one another, that it is necessary for the understanding of one part, even of one so central as the work of Christ in the saving of men - to see it in relation to the whole. And so an attempt to summarise briefly his main positions is made, though brevity and summarising are an injustice to Schleiermacher, whose thought is so full and so closely related in all its parts.

First then, as regards his philosophy of religion, Schleiermacher contends that religion has in human nature a place of its own as distinct from knowledge and morality. "Religion neither seeks like metaphysics to explain the nature of the universe, nor like morals to advance and perfect the universe by the power of freedom and the divine will of man. It is neither thinking nor acting, but intuition and feeling. It will read the universe /
universe by this. It is reverent attention and submission in childlike passivity to be stirred, and filled by the universe's immediate influences." Religion is the feeling which is awakened by the influences of total reality acting through its parts on the receptive subject. It is the action of the not-self upon the self with the consequent reaction. The feeling thus created is one of absolute dependence. From this feeling all religious manifestations have their source. Religion is thus an emotional intuition of reality, of the infinite and eternal one. It is not a merely individual thing; the intuition has itself a social impulse, and without the realisation of this impulse it remains imperfect and incomplete in the life of the individual. Religion, or the religious intuition, spontaneously generates itself. "If there is religion at all, it must be social for that is the nature of man and it is quite peculiarly the nature of religion." This intuition at once individual and social expresses itself in, broadly speaking, two forms, the naturalistic and the positive or personal religions, though, to Schleiermacher, there may be as many religions or forms of religion as there are religious individuals. Of the two forms, the positive are superior, for a religion is native to man and is among the highest of his capacities, it attains to its more characteristic forms in those religions, which have their source in human nature and personality;


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and, in these religions the results are richer and more definite. Christianity is the chiefest of the positive religions, for it sets to itself the problem of reconciliation of man with God, of the finite with the infinite; and it affords the completest solution of the problem, creating, more completely than any other, the religious intuition in which man and God are one.

In this philosophy the three main points are, (1) that religion in its essence is an emotional intuition, (ii) that this emotional intuition takes the form of a feeling of absolute dependence and (iii) that religion is both individual and social. It is upon the two former points that criticism has been chiefly directed. But we have to remember that Schleiermacher writes with certain tendencies in view. There was the tendency of traditional orthodoxy and scholasticism, which resolved religion into a series of intellectual propositions, which the religious man believed or intellectually accepted; on the other hand, there was the tendency of rationalism to make religion in general, and Christianity in particular, a moral mode of life. Schleiermacher with the intense piety nourished in Moravian circles, feels that religion is much more than either, and is distinct from both; it is a more living, more vital and human thing, and, as distinct from the rationalistic positions, it has to do with the infinite and eternal. Scholasticism had for Schleiermacher too little of the living man in it; and rationalism too little of the living God.
God. He has been frequently called a Vermittler, but it was not a tendency to Vermittlung, to a *via media*, that led him to concentrate upon emotion as the substance of religion, but the strong feeling that religion is at once more and distinct than either scholasticism or rationalism had made it out to be.

Then again, we have to remember that religious feeling with Schleiermacher is not mere feeling, if such exist at all, but it is feeling into which the whole of human nature throws itself - it is man feeling, the whole ego in the state of emotional intuition. In such feeling, certainly in its higher and complete forms, the totality of human nature is excited and stirred. The highest term in which religion has ever been expressed is Love. "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, with all thy soul and with all thy mind and thy neighbour as thyself." And love is an emotion and the supreme emotional form of union between persons, between the finite and the Infinite. So Schleiermacher was not altogether misled in selecting emotion to describe the nature of religion.

Upon the description of the religious intuition as a feeling of absolute dependence, however, two criticisms may be made. First, there is an inner contradiction in the expression. A feeling of dependence implies a cognition; the subject is aware of being, which is mightier than the self, and upon which the self is dependent. Dependent, it may be, for its very existence.
All this is matter of cognition. Then this cognition will excite feeling, the nature of which will vary according to the character of the reality cognised; it may be the feeling of fear or of resignation, of worship or of love. The nature of the feeling depends upon the character of the subject who is in the presence of reality, and upon the elements of reality on which his mind is fixed. It may be, after analysis and investigation, proved to be actually the case, that the element of dependence is always present in the religious intuition, but it is never there alone and apart from other and quite as important elements. If the element of dependence were the sole and only element in the religious intuition and experience, then the only conception of God attainable would be that of power, that is we should never rise to a conception of God above, that of fate.

On the third point that religion is both individual and social, nothing requires to be said. It rests upon the fact that man is a social being, and religion, as a real part of man, shares in his nature of socialibility.

2. Doctrine of God. Schleiermacher does not reach his doctrine solely from the religious consciousness, but rather from the Christian consciousness. As has been already intimated from the religious consciousness, which, according to Schleiermacher, is a feeling of dependence, the only deducible conception of /
of God is one of power. And Schleiermacher makes the deduction, and conceives God as absolute causality. God is the ever present, ever creative energy in all things. He further defines God, from the standpoint of the religious consciousness, in the terms of current terminology. God is eternal, omnipresent, omnipotent, omniscient, and to these attributes are added those of simplicity and infinity, as the basal forms of all the divine attributes. But from the specifically Christian consciousness, with its experience of Redemption there comes a more ethical conception of the Wisdom and Love of God. The Christian consciousness reveals the eternal redemptive purpose of God, and, in this purpose, God is revealed as true and loving. The Love of God is the one attribute that we can equate with God's essence or being; and, while it may have been partially revealed in His general providence, the full complete revelation is given in the experience of redemption through Jesus Christ.

The criticism that is generally made is that Schleiermacher's conception of God is solely immanent, and pantheistic. His divine transcendence has no place. Schleiermacher holds that God, as transcendent, is beyond knowledge, but he seems to regard the fact of the divine transcendence as a legitimate inference from the consciousness of dependence. But such a legitimate inference, indeed any legitimate inference is within knowledge, and is known for what it is. In dealing with this criticism on the /
the pantheistic nature of Schleiermacher's conception of God, we have to remember that, while personality in God has been a characteristic of Christian thought since the third century of our era, the notion of the personality of God belongs to our own times, and has arisen with the idea that infinite personality is the true form of personality, and that finite personality is imperfect and derivative. If Schleiermacher shrank from the distinct assertion of God's personality, it was because the conception in his day was undeveloped and confined to finite forms. Schleiermacher preferred to speak of the living God rather than of a personal or impersonal God. It may be doubted whether the phrase "the living God" gives us that element of God's being which the word "transcendent" tries to express. As a living God, God may only be the totality of life. It is in the distinctly Christian conception of God as Love infinite and omnipotent, that we obtain both elements, the transcendent and the immanent, which are not antitheses, but complementary aspects of the One Perfect Love.

3. Anthropology. Schleiermacher holds to an original perfection of human nature, when man was in harmony with the world round him. In this state man was possessed of a God-consciousness and a sense-consciousness; he was spirit and flesh, partly god, partly beast. Disharmony and sin arise through the assertion of the flesh or the sense-consciousness. For this assertion /
assertion man is responsible. By his own act he places himself in a state of sin. In this state of sin, the God-consciousness is not entirely lost; otherwise, man would be incapable of redemption and his case hopeless. But this God-consciousness has not in itself the power of self-recovery; man cannot, once he has allowed the sense-consciousness to obtain the mastery, reassert the relation and make the God-consciousness supreme. For this the divine causality, acting through Christ, is necessary.

If we ask what is the act that has brought man into the state of sin, into that state, where sense is dominant, it is not the act of one man Adam, as in the Augustinian theology, nor is it the act of the individual alone, but of the individual as a member of a sinful race. Both the individual and the race are involved, and each acts and reacts upon the other in the maintenance of the sinful state.

If the question is put, are man and the race responsible and guilty, the answer seems to be, on Schleiermacher's philosophy, "No." Schleiermacher identifies sin with the consciousness of sin, and this consciousness of sin arises only when God through Christ begins to act graciously upon the sinner. Grace and sin are correlative, and when grace appears then sin appears. As to the state of evil existent before grace appears, it constitutes it into sin, this is due to the sense consciousness, which, in its turn, is due to the divine causality. For sin and evil, then God /
God is ultimately responsible. Schleiermacher may hesitate to accept, and even deny this position, but it is the position which seems necessitated by his thought, of God as the one divine causality. But it is a position the moral consciousness, and still more the Christian consciousness, denies. The truth is man is not made up simply of a sense-consciousness and a God-consciousness. These may reside in him, but he is more than both; he is self-determinative, has the power of choice and preference, and he can throw his total self into the lower or higher side of his nature. Schleiermacher had an inadequate conception of human freedom.

His conception of sin too, is inadequate. Sin is more than the assertion and dominance of the sense-consciousness. It is more than physicality, if the word may be used. Sin exists in a broad human control and has more than one relation. It can be related to law, and in such a relation sin is lawlessness; in relation to love it is lovelessness; in relation to the self which chooses, and determines, - to the man himself - it is then the assertion of self in a lawless, loveless and godless form; it can be related to God and is then the disobedience to a divine and perfect Will. Sin is due not to sense consciousness and the divine causality, but to man and his human causality and is related to everything to which man himself is related. The inconsistencies and inadequacies of Schleiermacher's anthropology are due /
due to his inadequate conception of human nature and specially of human freedom.

4. Person and Work of Christ. The conception of Christ's Person is developed from the redemptive experience of the Church or Christian community. The God-consciousness of human nature cannot be liberated and given its rightful place by man. This liberation is effected by Jesus, the archetypal man, in whom the God-consciousness, from first to last, is supreme. Jesus is a supernatural, sinless being, created out of nature by the divine causality: in one sense he transcends common humanity, in another sense, He is the true idea of humanity, its perfect realisation. He is a supernatural being, whose life is lived within the terms and limitations of natural and human existence. Jesus enters historically into humanity, into the common sense-ridden life, and by virtue of the communication of His sinless perfection in the historical community, the sense-consciousness—the flesh,—is overcome and the God-consciousness, the spirit—attains to its rightful supremacy. The argument is from a moral effect to the moral cause. Now in the Christian community there are only approximations to freedom and beatitude; in no case is the God-consciousness absolutely supreme, and the question arises, whether from an imperfect result we can demonstrate a perfect cause? In answer to this, Schleiermacher says that Christians /
Christians hold to the conception of the absolute perfection of Christ "as the original one and that which has been handed down from the primitive Church to our own, and as that which most definitely excludes all surreptitious self-satisfaction, and also is alone consistent with a more serious view of the common life in the state of sin" (Gleason 88, 1). That is to say, if we undervalue the Person of Christ as Redeemer, we undervalue His redemption, and so think lightly of sin.

When we come to the work of Christ, it is the perfect God-consciousness that is in Him, that is the morally creative and redemptive agency. It is the divine causality that has created Christ and this same divine causality, by means of Christ's God-consciousness, creates the redeemed and reconciled community.

There are two parts of Christ's work: in so far as He receives men into the power of His consciousness of God, He redeems (par. 100 Leitsatz), in so far as He receives believers into the fellowship of His undisturbed beatitude, He reconciles. Accordingly we have a doctrine of redemption and a doctrine of reconciliation.

According to the former, which has logical priority, the Redeemer communicates His God-consciousness, which gives back to the sense-ridden consciousness its freedom and recreates man a true personality. The end of this activity is not simply individual; it is social and racial; it is a continuation of the creative activity by which God created Christ, the final purpose of /
of which is that God shall be all in all - immanent in the whole of humanity. Schleiermacher distinguishes this view of redemption as mystical, distinctive from the magical and empirical views. According to the magical view, redemption is due to a personal operation of Christ, without however giving any psychological explanation of it, ascribing to it any natural channel. The empirical view regards Christ as increasing man's moral perfection by doctrine and example. The former is the view of the orthodoxy, the latter of the rationalism of Schleiermacher's day.

The Doctrine of Reconciliation. In Christ's divine and supernatural life there is exhibited a perfect beatitude which neither sufferings nor death can disturb. This beatitude is a form of His God-consciousness and is due to it. Accordingly, when Christ through the community in which He dwells and which He has created, redeems men into His God-consciousness, He communicates to them His beatitude, a beatitude which is undisturbed by evil, even by the evil which is the result of sin. In spite of evil, Christians maintain a divine felicity. In their case, the felicity may not be perfect, there may be recrudescences of the old nature which disturb the beatitude, but it is ever increasing on the way to perfection. The sufferings of Christ have more meaning for the reconciling work than for the redeeming, they reveal His sympathy for the sense ridden and the invincibility /
invincibility of His God consciousness, but they are not the first and last necessity for redemption; they are the necessary sphere, for His beatitude, the dark background from which the Light of His beatitude streams forth. "The activity of Christ in founding the new common life could only in reality be manifested in all its perfection — although faith in this perfection could be present even apart from this — if it yielded to no opposition, not even that which might bring about the destruction of the person. The perfection here is not to be found properly and immediately in the suffering itself, but only in the surrender to the same." But Christ's beatitude "was only manifested in its perfection in that it was not overcome by the pandect of His suffering." Never for one moment was this beatitude surrendered; it is a magical distortion of the truth of reconciliation to find the reconciling power in any voluntary abandonment of beatitude.

Schleiermacher accepts the Church doctrine of the threefold office with certain modifications. The prophetic office consists in the total manifestation of Christ's Person in word and deed. The miracles belong to this office; they confirmed the teaching to those who heard it; they have ceased to be of value and their place is taken by the spiritual activity of Christ in History. But he quotes approvingly Luther's words "Es könnten auch noch heftiges Tages dieselben Zeichen welche die Apostel thaten,"
thaten, billig geschehen, wann es von Nöthen wäre." The priestly office includes Christ's fulfilment of the Law or His active obedience, His reconciling death or His passive obedience, and the representation of believers before the Father (§104 Leitsatz). But the active and passive obedience were not really separated. They were united in every moment of His life. If we separate them in thought, the value of the active obedience, which is the expression of Christ's God-consciousness, lies in the fact that it is the basis of our God-consciousness and active obedience. The God-consciousness in action creates our obedience and righteousness; this is the real meaning of the much misunderstood expression "Christ our righteousness." The value of the passive obedience seems to be, that in it the God-consciousness of Christ reveals itself as beatitude and becomes the basis of our beatitude, reconciling us to evil, and the consequences of sin which are now in process of disappearance and are no longer regarded as punishment.

Schleiermacher does not accept the ideas of penalty, substitution or satisfaction. The only punishments of sin are the natural; he has no place for punishment as a special or arbitrary act of God, and, in the redeemed life, the consequences of evil are passing away; they less and less disturb the beatitude which Christ has communicated, they cease to be an individual's punishment for individual sin. Christ is not our substitute. He is what /
what He is and does what He does for us, for our advantage, but not in our stead. His work may be called vicarious, but His work is only vicariously effective in so far as it is the source and inspiration of the actually redeemed life. Christ's Person and work do not leave us with nothing to be and to do. And Christ does not make satisfaction to God in the orthodox sense. The phrase, which Schleiermacher is willing to admit, is that Christ is "our satisfactory vicar." He is that in the sense that He is for us and satisfies our need. And yet, in a sense, He satisfies God. His Life, and the life which He creates in the Christian community, are well pleasing to the Creator.

"The kingly office of Christ consists in this, that all which the community of believers requires for its welfare continually proceeds from Him" par. 105, Leits. Christ communicates His spiritual gifts to the members of the Christian community, who, with Him as Head, form the Kingdom of grace. Over the Kingdom of power or the Kingdom of the world Christ has no authority or influence, and is only related to it in so far as He draws from this kingdom members into His own special Kingdom of grace. In the kingdom of the world, God's general providence reigns; but this is distinct from the gracious reign of Christ. With regard to the traditional Kingdom of glory Schleiermacher finds no place for this. Christ is the form or pattern of the believer's future and ideal state, but such a relation cannot be described as a Kingdom.
The main position of Schleiermacher regarding the Person and work of Christ is that Christ, as a divinely created Person, in whom the God-consciousness is supreme, and, as Himself divine and sinless, is the Saviour of the Christian community. It is the impression made by the totality of His Person that breaks the dominance of the sense-consciousness, reaffirms the God-consciousness of humanity and so redeems humanity from its sinfulness and reconciles it to the world and its evil, and thus gives communion with God and beatitude. It is really the God-consciousness or divine immanence (for Schleiermacher identifies these) that is the saving instrument. We may question this position on two grounds. First historically, was it the impression of His total personality that made the first disciples Christians? These are not the terms which we can easily imagine a New Testament writer using. The conceptions of that personality, God-consciousness and a sinless Personality are all too vague and too static for the interpretation of the redemption and the new life which the first Christians experienced. The fourth Gospel may seem to have a certain affinity with this manner of thought, and this Gospel was the favourite source of Schleiermacher. But such phrases as "salvation in the fourth Gospel is through revelation," or "atonement in the fourth Gospel is through incarnation" are to be received only with modifications. To the writer of the 4th Gospel Jesus is the Lamb of God which taketh away the Sin of the World.
World. He is the Good Shepherd who, of His own will, gives His life for the sheep. By His Cross He draws men unto Himself, and the Cross itself, even in its details, is the fulfilment of Scripture, that is, of the Divine Purpose and Will. In the Death of Jesus there is, to the writer of the Fourth Gospel, a mysterious necessity and moral efficacy. There is moral power and action in His work which the terms 'revelation' and 'incarnation', as ordinarily used, do not imply. The truth is that the God-consciousness or the divine immensity has close affinity with the Logos of Greek theology and suggests a magical manner of salvation like that theology. The fact that Christ, according to Schleiermacher, only walks through the Christian community does not diminish at all the magical element of this method of salvation.

According to Schleiermacher's doctrine of reconciliation, men are taken up into the beatitude of Christ and are reconciled to the evil in the world. But this is not, as Hitzig has pointed out, the New Testament doctrine of Reconciliation. According to the New Testament, we are reconciled to God not to the evil in the world. The Christian is reconciled to the world through redemption, and the power of the new life; in redemption he is given a power greater than the sin and the evil of the world, a power which can conquer these, and it is in a victory over the world that he becomes reconciled to it. The Christian is never reconciled /
reconciled to the world as it is: the world like Himself needs to be reconciled to God.

The employment of the three-fold office seems to be with Schleiermacher a concession to popular and orthodox conceptions. It adds little or nothing to his own special doctrine, and the actual division with him is not very successful, for some of the functions of the kingly office might have been just as easily subsumed under those of the priestly.

4. The Christian Life. Following his discussion of the work of Christ Schleiermacher treats of the doctrine of Redemption from the subjective point of view in terms of faith and repentance, regeneration and sanctification. Regeneration comes through reception into the Christian community and involves a new relation to God, one that is based on something more positive than a consciousness of guilt, and also a new life in which the God-consciousness has obtained the mastery over the lower nature. Repentance is a reaction against the whole of the past life under dominion of the sensuous influences; it is the beginning of conversion and it leads to faith, which lays hold of the Redeemer. All this is the result of grace which has to be received; a grace which, while it becomes effective in conversion, has always existed, and created man as he is, partly divine and partly human, and is the source of his fitful pre-Christian desires after redemption. Sanctification is the growing power of the God-consciousness. In the regenerate, sin still appears, a recrudescence /
re Rudescence of the old natural life. The moral processes which regeneration, sanctification, faith and repentance describe, all take place within the Christian community created by the historical Jesus Christ, by the sinless divinity of His Personality.

The treatment of the doctrine of justification by Schleiermacher is striking in its divergence from the Pauline and generally accepted view. Justification, according to Schleiermacher, means that God forgives the sins of the converted man and regards him as His child; God does this in consequence of the man's true belief in Christ as Redeemer. Something has taken place in the life of the sinner and in consideration of this he is justified, forgiven and received as a child of God. "Justification presupposes something in consideration of which sin is justified; and, as in the Supreme Being no error is possible, it is assumed that something has occurred to the man between his past and his present, whereby the previous displeasure of God is taken away, and without which he could not be an object of divine complacency."

Conversion and justification are involved in each other. These are two sides of one spiritual act, the conversion in the human and justification in the divine.

Further, justification with Schleiermacher is not the repeated act of God in individuals. It depends upon the divine decrees. In Christ God has eternally justified the human race, and
and individual justification is the phenomenal side of something eternal and noumenal. Upon this Schleiermacher bases his belief on the universal salvation of the race.

This conception of Justification is not Pauline, it is not the conception of evangelical Christianity. Justification according to the New Testament and according to genuine, evangelical experience is God's sole act. Its very essence lies in this, that God qualifies or accounts as righteous, the sinner apart from any activity on his part. His grace is free. The commendation of God's Love is that while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us. It is compromising the freedom of grace, for which Paul fought, to say that conversion is necessary for justification or that the latter is a consequence of the former. Justification may be a forensic term, but it is an act of Love, whose only demand is, that it be received. The Prodigal has not to live the new or the recovered life of sonship; he has not even to begin to live their life before the order can be given, "Bring forth the best robe and put it on him."

Then to conceive justification as an eternal decree, to conceive it, in terms of predestination or foreknowledge, is to lose sight of it as a personal loving act of God. The conversion of the sinner, the gradual conversion of the human race, universal salvation may all be regarded as the fulfilment of God's eternal purpose for the individual and for the race, but these things /
things express and contain concrete spiritual experiences of God's Personal Love to the individual. Justification, as an eternal decree, hangs in the air of unreality. Justification which is really, God's personal act in relation to persons. How far Schleiermacher has travelled from evangelical experience may be perhaps measured by his statement that "sin is justified." Sin is never justified, the sinner in God's free grace is.

There is a mechanicalness about Schleiermacher's treatment of such things as faith, repentance, regeneration and sanctification, though he says much to which Christian experience will most willingly respond. His conception of redemption through the person of Christ creates the same feeling. A soteriology, which begins with the conceptions of the absolute causality of God and man's absolute dependence, conceptions which influence Schleiermacher's whole thinking, does justice neither to man nor to God; it has not probed the depths nor risen to the heights of personality in God or man. God is Love, acting and powerful in a man's highest interests through Christ; and man is free, free to respond to the love that so powerfully acts on his behalf, and because of this love and this freedom, his salvation is both possible and actual.
Albrecht Ritschl (1822-1889) is generally recognised as the most outstanding German theologian after Schleiermacher. He started a new movement in theology, and founded a school of great influence in his own country and, to a lesser extent, in Britain. The disciples of Ritschl differ considerably amongst themselves in their particular theological opinions, but are united in their emphasis on history and Christian experience, and claim in religion to be the spiritual descendants of Luther and the Reformation. Ritschl's own work was at once a protest and an attempt at theological reconstruction by the historical method. His work claims to be new in method and in results. He protested against the intellectualism - the logical dogmatism - which characterised both the Catholic and the Reformed theology. He desired to separate religion from metaphysics which he felt had a corrupting influence upon religion and theology. Allied to Ritschl's antagonism to metaphysics was his dislike of mysticism, between which and metaphysics "there exists so close a kinship that it is quite the same whether one attributes certain propositions to mysticism or to false metaphysics." In judging these protests of Ritschl, it has to be remembered, that the metaphysics and mysticism, which he condemns are the metaphysics and mysticism which he himself knew either in history or directly,

1. Theologis, p. 27, 28.
and which had, without doubt, a sceptical and harmful influence on religion. And further, that Ritschl, when he protests, did not escape the almost inevitable danger of protesting too much. His constructive effort was an attempt to frame a Christian theology on the basis of the historical in the Person and work of Jesus Christ, a revelation communicated to the faith of the Christian community. Simply put, his theology was based upon that common and communal religious experience which Jesus Christ created through his revelation of God and through his work in founding the Kingdom of God upon earth.

1. It is difficult to state the precise relation of Ritschl to philosophy for he himself was not consistent. Several of his statements justify the charge that his aim was to exclude metaphysics from theology; but, on the other hand, he is concerned that the theologian shall work with a valid epistemology; he argues against materialism and pantheism; he discusses the usual theistic arguments and shows their inadequacy; he deduces the idea of the Kingdom of God from the Love and Personality of God. If these speculative elements in Ritschl are not strictly metaphysical, they are very closely allied to metaphysics, and involve logical and abstract reasoning, the very things that Ritschl would have all Christian theologians discard. The truth seems to be that Ritschl prided himself on the fact that he was a scientific man, and had never abandoned scientific pretensions. But, /
But, apart from this idiosyncrasy in Kitschel's personality, if his aim was to exclude all metaphysics and philosophy from theology and religious thinking, he was engaged on the impossible. After all, religious experience finds its place in a rational consciousness, which naturally desires to interpret its contents rationally and in relation to the whole of being. Even in the simplest form of Christian experience, there is a metaphysical element, for to state the being of God is to state a metaphysical idea, which the theologian tries to interpret and to relate to the world and to experience. The simplest statement of religious experience contains some rational interpretation, and what theology and reason demand is an interpretation as complete as possible. Kitschel's protest against philosophy and metaphysics may have a practical justification, if it is confined, to a protest against intellectual formalism, the acceptance of beliefs and theoretic propositions in place of genuine religious experience. Formalism is always more or less of a danger in religion. But religion, if it is to command the authoritative, must be grounded in reason, and satisfy every rational demand. No doubt there is a wrong metaphysics or a wrong philosophy; these may be inadequate and antiquated; but an experience, which cannot rationally justify itself and which cannot be related to what is permanent, has little worth for, and no authority over the conscience and reason of man. Kitschel's protest against metaphysics can only be regarded as a temporary phase caused by the conditions in /
in which he lived.

2. The term "mysticism" is sometimes used in a vague way for direct and intense communion with God. In this sense Paul was a mystic, Augustine was the same, and indeed in all deeply religious personalities this element is present. In the piety of Herrmann, Ritschl's disciple, there is a strong vein of this mysticism. It was not against mysticism as a living communion with a living God that Ritschl was opposed but against mysticism in its historical Neoplatonic form and method, in which "the intention is to transcend the individuality of the spiritual life, which maintains itself in discursive knowledge and in moral activity, socially beneficent, and to retire to one's own real actual self. This is said to be reached when, either through theoretical speculation or through extinction of one's own will, one is dissolved in the universal Being, which is reckoned as God. The intellectual framework in which alone this task is intelligible is the Neoplatonic depreciation of all individual, definite Being and life in comparison with universal existence, according to the standard of judgment that the former is predominantly illusive and unreal, but the latter is the reality in the true sense." In this mysticism the noumenal soul communes with a noumenal God. Ritschl is no doubt right, when he protests against this kind of communion; for personality, both in God and man/

man, is revealed and lives in its functions and operations, though
here, as Pfleiderer has pointed out, Ritschl has emphasised
the functions and operations of personality to such an extent as
to lose sight of that permanent principle of unity, without which
personality could not exist. Perhaps the real condemnation of
this form of mysticism is that it loses a moral and personal God
in a universal existence, which also absorbs the moral freedom
and personality of man. It leads to an abyssmal and silent in-
finite, where there is neither living God nor living man. The
motive of this antagonism with Ritschl and with his disciples is
to give full place to the worth and authority of the historical
revelation in Jesus Christ, and with this motive it is impossible
not to feel the fullest sympathy. The piety that affects to
transcend history and even experience will find itself without
moral and spiritual content.

Ritschl's antagonism to mysticism has been criticised on the
ground that it leaves no room for direct communion between Christ
and God, between the Son and the Father. As a matter of fact,
Ritschl asserts that God has an eternal consciousness of Christ,
a metaphysical statement which should not find a place in Ritschl's
theology. But such criticism rests on a mistaken idea of the
meaning of direct communion. Our knowledge of Christ's comm-
union with God is based on what we know of Jesus Christ and His
relation, revealed in history, to the Father. Our Lord's com-
munion /

1. PfL. Die Ritschl'sche Theol.
(2).
communion with God was maintained in thinking God's thought and in doing the works of God, not through the retiral of self into its noumenal ego, but in the expression of the self, in love and thought and deed. And if we try to conceive this communion sub specie aeternitatis, we can only conceive it, as the mutual expression of the soul of the eternal Christ and the eternal God, of the action and interaction of personality in eternal forms.

What we mean by direct communion is not communion without mediation, for personal communion is not any more than physical perception without its media, but we mean that the communion is intimate and real. Christian communion with God, is communion with the God and Father, whom our Lord Jesus Christ has revealed and who is mediated by Him. There is a difference between our communion and His, but the difference is not that, in His case, the principle of mediation does not exist, but that ours is mediated through His consciousness and His through the same consciousness in its spiritual operations, a consciousness which was and is His own. His communion had an independence and spiritual self-sufficiency, which we approximately attain only through Him. This was Ritschl's position; for Christians, as members of the Kingdom of God, have a communion with God through Christ, who is Lord in the Kingdom and Himself maintains imperfection and absoluteness the communion with God shared by all.

It may be said of Ritschl's polemic against metaphysics and its /
its twin sister mysticism that in the main it had justification; but, in his zeal he pushed it too far; and, at times, made statements that laid him open to serious misunderstanding and severe criticism. But the polemic was only meant to clear the way for the constructive system, which, while it was affected by the positions, which Ritschel took up in his destructive criticism, and by the spirit which was the motive of the criticism, can be judged independently as regards its adequacy and truth, as an interpretation of Christian experience and the work of Christ.

3. In approaching the constructive system we begin with Ritschel's general conception of religion. "In every religion, he says, what is sought, with the help of the superhuman, spiritual power revered by man is a solution of the contradiction, in which man finds himself, as both a part of the world of nature and a spiritual personality claiming to dominate nature. For in the former role he is a part of nature, dependent upon her, subject to and confined by other things; but as spirit he is moved by the impulse to maintain his independence against them. In this juncture, religion springs up as faith in superhuman spiritual powers, by whose help the power which man possesses of himself is in some way supplemented, and elevated into a unity of its own kind which is a match for the pressure of the natural world." But such a description of religion he holds "makes no claim to be a /

a definition proper of the generic conception of religion, It is too definite for that." It is according to Ritschl a regulative not a constitutive conception. A description of religion setting forth the common element in all religion would be too neutral and indefinite for any practical worth and language is not capable - has not the indefinite terms - of expressing a truly generic conception of religion. The above description simply states a tendency or a motive in all religions. The different historic religions can be arranged not simply as species, but as stages in which this tendency comes to fulfilment, and the Christian religion is the highest because in it the tendency comes to its perfect realisation. "Christianity, by its completely rounded view of the world guarantees to believers that they shall be preserved unto Eternal Life in the Kingdom of God, which is God's revealed end in the world, and that, too, in the full sense that man is thus in the Kingdom of God set over the world as a whole in his own order." In the description of religion, it will be seen then that Ritschl does not attempt a general conception of religion nor religion in its ideal and most perfect form; for the latter would have required a description of the Christian religion, simply the most characteristic motive or tendency in all religion. But it may be questioned, whether this tendency is common to all religion, whether it is the motive that gives rise to religion in general, and whether this victory over the world, which /
which is an undisputed element in Christian experience, is not rather a result than a motive. The selection of this motive as generally characteristic of religion was no doubt due to that practical tendency in Ritschl's own thought and experience, a tendency which affects all his thinking. The value of Christianity is largely for Ritschl in the victory over the world and its conditions, which membership in the Kingdom of God guarantees. Both the validity and value of the revelation in Christ are proved by this victory. Religion in this view of it is related primarily to the world and the natural order; but, in the New Testament and in Christian experience, the primary relation is to God and the supernatural order. Ritschl criticised Schleiermacher's conception of reconciliation, on the ground that it is reconciliation with the world, and not with God, but his own way of thinking on this subject, which affected his whole theology, seems to be open to the same criticism.

4. Nature of Religious Knowledge. Ritschl held that "the historical religions claim service from all the functions of the spirit, knowledge for the doctrinal tradition, i.e. for a particular view of the world; will, for common worship; feeling, for the alternation of satisfaction and dissatisfaction, moods by which religious life is removed from the ordinary level of existence. No religion is correctly or completely conceived when an element /

element of this succession is regarded as more important or more fundamental than the others." When knowledge begins to function in religion, it expresses independent value judgments. All judgments partake of the nature of value-judgments, for purely disinterested judgment is impossible to human personality, but in religion the value of the judgment to the personality is the first and only consideration. So the distinction is made between concomitant value judgments which exist in scientific propositions, and independent value judgments which are those of religion. In science, things are judged in relation to their cause and to other things; in such theoretic judgments the interest of the person is active but not supreme, so there is concomitant value judgment; in religion and in the expression of religious truth, the interest of the person is supreme, and so the expression of religious truth is an independent value judgment. In simple words, in religion and religious knowledge the personal interest is at its maximum; in science and scientific knowledge the personal interest is at its minimum.

"Religious knowledge moves in independent value-judgments, which relate to man's attitude to the world and call forth feelings of pleasure or pain, in which man either enjoys the dominion over the world vouchsafed him by God, or feels grievously the lack of God's help to that end."

Much criticism has been given to these value-judgments and their /
their authority in religious knowledge. It may be sufficient to state that an independent value-judgment does not contain for Ritschl less truth or reality than a theoretic judgment. Ritschl says that Jesus has for the Christian the value of God; he means that Jesus is, at least, divine. The valuable is the true and the real. A value-judgment has nothing of the nature of delusive subjectivity about it. Again, the theory of value-judgments does not involve a dualism in knowledge, a dualism which involves two kinds of truth and knowledge. All that Ritschl and Ritschlians do, is to assert the fact that there are different modes of knowing and different interests involved according to the objects that are being dealt with. In art, morality, and supremely in religion, the personal interest, the human element, is important.

All the same, the distinction which Ritschl made and the discussion and criticism to which it has given rise, are of questionable worth. The end of all knowledge is truth, and there is an instinctive faith that the truth will be valuable. In religion the whole individuality is expressing itself, seeking the truth for itself and for its own salvation, seeking it as both true and valuable, for if it were not true it would have no value, and if the truth were not valuable, it would be a vain and empty thing.

5. Historical and objective character of revelation. While the value-judgments form the subjective side of religious knowledge, they do not move in the air, but are conditioned by revelation.
revelation. Ritschl admits that there is an element of Revelation in all religions, but the historical facts of the Christian religion, set forth in the New Testament, compose the revelation; and he accepts the New Testament as the source of Christian revelation, to which is added the Old Testament as an indispensable auxiliary for the understanding of the New. Not only are the words and actions of Jesus authoritative, but the historic faith of the apostolic community, and even the most developed structures of Pauline thought are of value and authority as sources of the Revelation. Revelation is contained in the whole historic movement which the New Testament covers. Ritschl was not a believer in verbal infallibility; his exegesis is free and arbitrary and, where his theory or thinking are not in accord with an Apostle's words or ideas, he has no hesitation in expressing his disagreement. If we ask what gave to this revelation its validity, the only answer seems to be that its validity is proved by its power. Through the historic movement, which the New Testament describes, the Kingdom of God was founded; that proves the movement to be of God, a revelation of His purpose and Will.

But it must be noted, that only those, who are members of the Kingdom founded by Christ, know the doctrine that it is true and of God.

6. Redemption and the Kingdom. "Christianity, so to speak, resembles /
resembles not a circle described from a single centre, but an ellipse which is determined by two foci." These two foci, for Ritschl, are the Kingdom of God and Redemption. In his Introduction of the third volume, he relates these two conceptions, which in the quotation above are co-ordinated and given equal place. But in the very passage from which the quotation is taken, he had already subordinated the idea of Redemption to that of the Kingdom, and he justifies the subordination by an appeal to Christ's own attitude. "Christ made the universal moral Kingdom of God His end, and thus He came to know and decide for that kind of redemption which He achieved through the maintenance of fidelity in His calling and of His blessed fellowship with God through suffering Ænto death." He also says that "a correct spiritual interpretation of redemption and justification through Christ tends to keep more decisively to the front the truth, that the kingdom of God is the final end." He complains that the Evangelical Confessions have been almost absolutely occupied with the idea of Redemption and have neglected that of the Kingdom. Western Catholicism has given expression to the idea of Redemption through the sacraments, to the idea of the Kingdom through the institution of the Church. The Reformers, Luther, Melanthon, Calvin, define the Kingdom as an inward union between Christ and the Believer. Kant he holds was the first to grasp the importance /

1. R.V. iii, p. 11, Eng. Trans.
importance of the idea of the Kingdom for Ethics; but it re-
mained for Schleiermacher first to employ the true conception
of the teleological nature of the Kingdom of God, to determine
the idea of Christianity. But even he did not grasp the idea
with firm hand, and it remained for Theremin to give to the idea
its proper importance for systematic theology as a whole. It
will be felt that there is in Ritschl's thought an uncertainty
as to the relation of the two ideas. He co-ordinates them and
also subordinates Redemption to the Kingdom. In a sen-
tence like this, "For the life and activity of the Founder of
Christianity issued at once in Redemption and the setting up
of the Kingdom of God, In his Unterricht in der Christlichen Religion
(1886) he seems finally to subordinate Redemption to the King-
dom. And, as a matter of fact, the Kingdom of God became the
regulative and interpretative idea in Ritschl's theology and has
affected his idea of every theological doctrine, even that of
God and, as will be seen, the person of Christ.

There are two criticisms which seem to be necessary: the
one deals with the relation of the two ideas, the other with the
conception of the Kingdom as held by Ritschl and its place in
his system. If the conception of Redemption is subordinated
to that of the Kingdom, it means that God in Christ redeems men
for the sake of the Kingdom. That is to say, man is a means
and God's work in redemption and almost God Himself is a means
for the Kingdom. But the Kingdom is a vague idea that has re-
ceived /
received many interpretations; there is an element of the abstract about it; it is akin to, though no doubt narrower than, that of humanity, and neither the personality of God nor the personality of man should be made subordinate to it. The Kingdom exists for man (and God too) and not man for the Kingdom.

Again, ought the idea of the Kingdom to be placed in the supreme position as the one interpretative idea? It has to be pointed that this is one of the ideas that New Testament exegesis has found most difficult to decide as to its meaning and place in the New Testament itself. The truth is, that probably there the Kingdom is not the definite idea that interpreters imagine. Our Lord certainly used it, but He never meant it to usurp the place of individual personality which for Him was supreme. It was one of the ideas of His day, which He seems to have used, as a frame for His thoughts of God and man. After His death it falls out of use and the living Lord Himself, according to what takes the place of the Kingdom in the faith and experience of the believers. What is true of the Kingdom in its religious sense as an ethical, ideal and spiritual idea? To return to the relation of the two ideas, if there is a higher and a lower, then redemption is the higher. In redemption, God is revealed in Christ as redeeming, saving, delivering; in the Kingdom, God in Christ rules. By every scale of the New Testament to redeem and save is greater than to rule and exercise Lordship. In a system /
system of Christian ethics the idea of Kingdom might be regarded as regulative and interpretative but even then its scientific and theological value as an idea is doubtful - for its proposition is too vague and indefinite: it is a religious ideal, it is a moral organisation, it is a spiritual state, it may be even a synonym for humanity itself. Its importance has affected all Ritschl's thinking and God becomes identified with His Kingdom, Christ with His Lordship over His special society, and the individual personality is lost in the Kingdom.

7. The Work of Christ. The work of Christ is twofold, it is to found the Kingdom of God in the world and to establish redemption. In his interpretation of the work of Christ, Ritschl employs the traditional formula of the three-fold office, but he introduces, to him necessary, modifications to the traditional doctrine. He prefers the word vocation to that of office; he holds that in the traditional doctrine Christ had been made too distinct from the Christian; he subordinates the prophetic and priestly offices to that of the Kingly; he holds, too, that the Kingly office (or vocation) is maintained during the state of humiliation as well as in the state of exaltation. The whole historical material of Christ's Life is assumed under the categories of the Kingly prophet-hood and Kingly priesthood. Throughout His Life Christ is always a King whose royal action is both prophetic and priestly. Another principle that Ritschl lays /
lays down is, that whatever Christ was and whatever He did, He was and did, in the first place, for Himself. "Every intelligent life moves within the lines of a personal self-end."

In the kingly, prophetic and kingly, priestly functions there are two aspects, the moral and the religious. His whole vocation is at once a moral duty and a religious service. Christ's vocation is to be the Bearer of God's moral lordship over men and the Founder of the Kingdom of God. In the fulfillment of this vocation Christ's whole life of obedience suffering and patience is employed. In all this He was simply loyal to His vocation, and with that alone was Christ concerned. That is the ethical aspect of the kingly prophethood; its religious aspect lies in this, that this loyalty was a service to God and given to God's own cause. Christ's vocation was at once moral and religious. In this vocation Christ obtained a victory over the world, over the natural limitations of human life. No suffering, not even death itself turned Him aside. Through patience, He endured and came forth perfectly victorious. God's Will in Christ, and Christ Himself, triumphed over the world. And that experience was communicated to His Disciples.

With regard to the kingly priesthood Ritschl holds that the orthodox doctrine requires a thorough remodelling. The orthodox doctrine has erred in its interpretation of the moral aspect of Christ's royal priesthood by relating it to the law of righteousness.
righteousness, basing it on the assumed contradiction of righteousness and grace, whereas Christ, in the exercise of this function, is fulfilling His own personal self-end. Christ, before He is a priest for others, is a priest for Himself. The religious aspect, almost neglected entirely by the orthodox doctrine, is that Christ in His priesthood maintains by prayer and by patience and willingness to suffer unto the utmost, a perfect communion with God the Father. This Christ does for Himself. This priesthood is not a merit which can be communicated to others or claimed by others, but it ministers to the salvation of others, to those who join themselves to Christ's community, and who, in faith, acknowledge Him as Lord. Through Christ they enter into communion with God. The religious aspect, then, lies in this, that Christ's communion and the communion which He creates in His own community is the fulfilment of God's gracious purpose, and so Christ's priesthood is not only the fulfilment of a vocation, it is a religious service offered to God.

Christ did not bear the punishment of sin (Reformed) nor did He carry out a vicarious penitence (Haering). Both are ruled out on the ground that Christ was innocent. He could not be punished nor could He repent for sin that was not His own. Punishment and Repentance are not transferable. What Christ did was, He maintained a perfect communion with God His Father which made Him victor over the World, and He founded a community, a Kingdom, in which He is King, and His disciples are subjects, and through /
through their subjection in faith and obedience, enjoy the same communion and the same victory over the world.

The object of Christ's work was not the individual, but the Church or the Kingdom. His vocation was to found a Kingdom and to redeem a society.

The criticism of Ritschl's interpretation of the work of Christ may be best postponed until his teaching on Sin is considered.

Ritschl refuses to discuss the question as to the purpose and origin of Sin. He denies original sin, and asserts that sin is no necessity and that guilt is a reality. He denies the wrath of God except in an eschatological sense, and practically denies the reality of divine punishment upon sin. We may take up these points seriatim.

Ritschl denies original sin, for original sin necessitating evil would determine the character, it would do away with moral responsibility, it would make education impossible and would make differences of character inexplicable. To Ritschl, following Kant, Sin has its origin in the individual will, though he admits that it is not an individual thing simply, for each individual will acts upon, and is reacted upon by, other individual wills, and so he conceives of a Kingdom of Sin. Sin is the assertion of the individual free will in opposition to law. Here no doubt Ritschl, in trying to correct one exaggeration is led into /
into another, for Sin is not a thing of will only, it is a thing of nature, there are tendencies to evil, material with which the will has to deal, and though these tendencies might be actually sinful, until the will consciously sides with them, they are, nevertheless, subsidiary causes to sin, the soil in which sin grows. The Will does not begin its moral operations in a perfectly cleared and clean soil. Sin is the abuse of freedom in opposition to law, but the law or standard, by which sin is judged to be sin, is not an a priori ideal righteousness, but it is the revealed Will of God as shown in His Kingdom. Sin is that which opposes the Kingdom and its interests. Sin rises out of the will but it is due, according to Ritschl, to ignorance. Ritschl in calling sin ignorance does not intend to minimise evil, but to emphasise the fact that sin is forgiveable, and there is some ground for pardoning the sinner.

Sin with Ritschl is the moral aspect; guilt is the religious aspect of the same thing. Guilt expresses a real contradiction between man and God, and the sense of guilt is the discomfort which that contradiction brings.

Ritschl's doctrine of sin is not so much false as inadequate. Sin is according to him a thing of knowledge and the will, but sin rises out of the whole nature, it is more than ignorance, it is more than volition, it is the expression of the nature and character - it is the man that sins. The denial of the wrath of God, /
God, except on those who finally set their wills against the kingdom, seems quite unjustifiable, for Ritschl denies the wrath of God on the ground that the Divine Will is to establish a kingdom of good. Wrath with such a will is inconsistent, but it would be inconsistent in the future just as much as in the present. And, if the wrath of God means a denial of all penal consequences, of all punishment from God, then the reactions of the moral order, which bring pain to those who have disregarded the Divine Will, are not God's actions; God does not intend them. If a man opposes the moral order, and for that opposition suffers, pays a penalty the suffering is a punishment and, if God is in His moral order then it is a punishment of God. It may be said that Ritschel does not deny punishment, the guilty suffer an actual penalty in separation from God and in the corresponding sense of discomfort, but when once he is forgiven any suffering ceases to be punishment, it is only disciplinary. Members of the community are exempt. This is at once doubtful and dangerous doctrine. The Christian is still within the moral order, and if, as a Christian, he breaks the moral order, he will pay the penalty which may be well regarded as divine punishment. Doubtless the penalty that comes to a forgiven man has a different meaning from the penalty that falls upon the unforgiven. It falls upon a different personality, and it is through the personality that experience takes its meaning. And punishment is not wholly an end itself /
itself, it has a disciplinary element in it, and we may believe that when the disciplinary element is no longer necessary, the punishment will cease. A father may forgive, and may continue or remit the punishment, - that depends upon circumstances and upon the character of the child whom he forgives. But suffering and punishment that are due to a breach of the moral order may, whatever be the character of the sufferer, be described as penalty and as divine punishment. According to Ritschl, the only real punishment falls upon those whose wills are finally and completely opposed to the will and purpose of God as revealed in the establishment of the Kingdom. God has only one feeling, that of love to all other wrongdoers. If the suffering that they endure is regarded as punishment, it is due to the subjective feeling of guilt - subjectively, it is punishment; objectively and really, it is only the discipline of love.

Two questions may now be put, (1) how is the work of Christ related to the redemption of the sinner and (ii) more specifically, how does the death of Christ affect the sinner in his sin?

(1) As a royal priest Christ maintains a perfect communion with God. He maintains this communion, in the first instance, for himself. But he maintains this personal self-end for others: He reveals this communion in all its contents to others: in Christ's communion they see a Father of perfect love, and this revelation is a call to faith, a call to come into that Kingdom where Christ the King is both prophet and priest, a call which is /
is answered by entering into the Kingdom and acknowledging Him as King. In that Kingdom the believer is given Christ's spiritual communion and the moral task of service for the ends of the Kingdom.

(2) Christ's death according to Ritschl is the most perfect expression of His maintenance of His communion with God and to maintain that communion He suffered unto death, and as it is through the maintenance of this communion that a feeling of guilt is removed and the sinner forgiven, then it can be said that Christ died for the sinner. But it must not be forgotten that the object of Christ's work was a community, not in the first instance, the individual. Men are only forgiven as members of the community. Through this idea of the community Ritschl tries to reconcile the particularistic (Calvin) and universalistic (Luther) positions. Christ saves a community out of sinful humanity: that community is composed of the redeemed, and the formation of that community was and is the Will and Purpose of God. Ritschl is far from being a universalist. His doctrine is that of the saved remnant.

To conclude with a brief criticism.

It is not necessary to deal with Ritschl's attitude to metaphysics and mysticism, nor with his method. It is his exposition of the work of Christ and the redemption of man with which we are concerned.

(1) /
(1) His modification of the traditional doctrine of the three-fold office is doubtful. There is a formalism about it and an intellectualism - things from which Ritschl would have escaped but has failed! Then, the chief category is that of the kingdom due to the dominance in his thought of the idea of the Kingdom. But though Our Lord admitted before Pilate that He was a king his Kingliness prevails in such a different spiritual order from all earthly Kingliness that it is doubtful, if the symbol helps us at all to the understanding of Christ and His Work. A King, who rules from the Cross is not of this world. His Death is an expression of His obedience and communion; but it is more than this and it is doubtful whether this element was the one that impressed the first disciples. It was not the maintenance of a priestly communion that captured their lives.

Ritschl leaves many questions of Our Lord's Work unanswered, e.g., Why was the Death necessary?

(ii) His treatment of sin and its forgiveness is inadequate in its psychology. He does not realise that sin is of nature, does not feel its power, that in most cases it is more powerful than the human will. And the way the sinner receives salvation is formal. He joins the Christian community and is loyal to it. But one may ask, which community? Catholic, Lutheran, Reformed, Anglican? Christians are not saved by joining any community. We join Christian communities, because we are saved and because we feel that /
that in the community the saved life can find its true development. Salvation in Christ is something deeper and more personal than Ritschl's exposition would lead us to think.

The community as the object of Christ's work is useful, with the New Testament before us a mistaken idea. It is with individual personality that Christ is concerned and God through Him. A community is an abstraction, the individual-personality is the real-concrete-unit. Again, the whole exposition gives the impression that salvation is of works, though to say that that is Ritschl's thought, is not true to Him. Faith may be obedience and loyalty but it is created by the revelation in Christ, a revelation that is due to the loving will of God. All is of grace nothing is of works.

Nota: While Ritschl seems to fall short of the New Testament and of evangelical experience, in his treatment of the death of Christ, so that he regards it death as the chief proof of the Lord's personal, fidelity, whereas in the New Testament and in Christian experience, it is the proof of His personal love for the sinful. "He saved others; he could not save himself. He was a priest for others, before He was a priest for himself, even though He could not be for others what He was not in Himself."
Atonement, which is fundamental to Christianity, can be considered in these main aspects, (i) in its reference, for whom was it made, for all or for an elect?, (ii) in its purposes are ends, which are the forgiveness of sins, and the gift of eternal life, and (iii) in its own nature, what it really is in itself. As atonement is a concrete whole, a consideration of any one of these aspects involves consideration, more or less, of the other two, but it is with the third aspect, Atonement as it is in itself, that we are now specially concerned, and we may approach this consideration in the hope and belief that our spiritual as well as our intellectual acceptance of Atonement will be quickened. In this great matter knowledge and faith are complementary.

Now, while it is true, that the Christian Atonement, seen in its own light, is its own best evidence, revealing, as it does, the love of God and the power of that Love to deal with the moral needs /

1. Principal Tulloch, in "Movements of Religious Thought in Britain during the 19th century" calls attention to the fact that Erskine's "The Brazen Serpent", a work which greatly influenced Frederick Denison Maurice, contained in many much the same thing which afterwards was developed by Macleod Campbell in his "The Nature of the Atonement." But Campbell's work is a great advance on Erskine both in system and power of treatment.
needs of men, there are certain subsidiary testimonies, which bear upon the moral necessity of Atonement for human life. These testimonies lie in human history and especially in the developed conscience. In all ages men have sought to atone for sin by sacrifice. But the argument that may seem to lie in the practical universality of ritual sacrifice among nations, civilised and uncivilised, ought not to be pressed, for while it is possible to argue — especially from the prevalence of the idea and practice of ritual of atoning sacrifice, that there was and is an element of truth in it, it is also possible to explain all ritual sacrifice as due to radical ignorance of God and of what God demands from man.

However, if we are to allow any evidence in favour of the idea of Atonement, from the history of religion, we should include the evidence, which comes from the history of Christianity. We cannot deny the fact, that the Church in all ages has contained those, who seemed to have attained to a high knowledge of God and to have entered into closest communion with Him, and who have confessed that all that they have of knowledge and grace has come through the Cross of Christ. We may refuse to found our religious conclusions on the testimony of others, but we cannot deny the fact of their testimony and, in estimating the value of the argument, account should be taken of the prevalence of the Christian testimony through 1900 years, amidst the most varied conditions, and /
and of the high character of those who gave it. But "no man will or should accept the doctrine of the Atonement, because it has commended itself to the consciences of others, while it does not as yet command itself to his own."

The testimony, which Conscience gives, is in its recognition of the two facts of sin and righteousness, - facts to which the New Testament bears witness by assuming. We have only to bring Conscience into the presence of the law "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God, with all thy heart, and with all thy soul and with all thy strength and with all thy mind, and thy neighbour as thyself," and, at once, in the light of that law, it realises the fact of sin, - the great distance in human life between what morally is and what morally ought to be. This recognition of sin cannot be explained, or explained away, as mere morbidness of feeling, or, as due to ignorance of any kind, for, the more conscience is educated and enlightened, the more are knowledge of sin and sensitiveness to its presence deepened. We may take the moral experience presented to us in the 7th chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, not only as typical of what a truly awakened conscience feels in the presence of the law, but as the complete and proper development of its testimony to sin in human experience. It is conscience, facing the moral law and in its light the fact of sin, that compels the utterance, "O wretched man that I am! who will deliver me from the body of this death?"

But /
But Conscience does not only bear testimony to sin and the life that is evil, it recognises a perfect righteousness, bears witness to an ideal and eternal life. Whenever Conscience hears the voice of the moral law, it is in the presence of the Eternal, for it is neither sufficient nor true to say that the moral law is the resultant of experience, and as such temporal, for it is the very condition of any and all ethical life, and without it and its compulsion, there never could have been any moral experience at all. There is something eternal in "Thou shalt," and conscience in recognising it, bears witness to an ideal and eternal life.

"Truth for truth, and good for good! The Good, the True, the Pure, the Just, - "Take the charm 'For ever' from them, and they crumble into Dust."

Conscience then recognises the moral conditions in which the necessity for an atonement arises. For were there no sin, there would be no necessity for atonement by which man can be delivered from it, and were there no ideal, eternal life, no necessity for atonement by which such life could be imparted. The deliverance from sin and the imparting of eternal life are the true ends of Atonement, and conscience, recognising the facts of sin and eternal life, sees, and bears witness to, the need for the realisation of these two ends. Not that conscience could have anticipated

Atonement /

1. The quotation here no doubt is an anachronism; but it brings out the point that the recognition of the moral law is the recognition of the Eternal. The point is well elucidated in the o. on "Immortality in Seth's "Ethical Principles."
Atonement, as an act of God, it only recognises the conditions which make such an act necessary; and yet, once such an atonement is given, conscience by its moral insight is capable of judging its divine fitness to accomplish the ends contemplated.

A belief conditional to belief in the divine Atonement is the belief in the forgiving love of God. Out of this love Atonement flows; for Atonement is not the cause of the forgiveness, that is with God, but its resulting effect. "God is Love," and because He is Love, "He hath sent His Son to be the propitiation for our sins and not for ours only but for the sins of the whole world."

To this fact of the Forgiveness with God, which is the source of Atonement, Conscience itself bears witness. For it is impossible for Conscience to conceive of God as righteous and loving without conceiving Him as desiring to forgive sin and to impart righteousness and eternal Life. It is Conscience bearing witness to God, that says,

"Who forgiveth all thine iniquities,  
Who healeth all thy diseases,  
Who redeemeth Thy Life from destruction,  
Who crowneth Thee with loving kindness  
and tender mercies."

There is a further testimony to the forgiveness with God which comes from the Conscience. Conscience recognises the fact of repentance. But forgiveness is the condition of repentance; it is organically necessary to repentance. In the concrete act of human repentance the divine forgiveness is always implied.
world without divine forgiveness would be a world without human repentance. And so Conscience, in recognising human repentance, implicitly at least, recognises and bears witness to the divine forgiveness.

The testimony of the Conscience to Atonement can be summed up:—it recognises the moral conditions which make Atonement, and so bears witness to the necessity of Atonement itself, and it recognises the Divine Forgiving Love which makes Atonement not only possible but inevitable.

But a question may arise, Could not "forgiveness, that is love to an enemy surviving his enmity, and which, notwithstanding his enmity, can act towards him for his good," have been simply intimated? proclaimed without an atoning act?

That there is a forgiveness with God is true, but to a conscience sensitive to its own sin and awake to the ideal righteousness, belief in the divine forgiveness is not always easy. The awakened and enlightened conscience sees the perfect righteousness; it sees its own sin; it sees the gulf between what is and what ought to be, and it feels the difficulty, the moral impossibility of bridging this gulf. A mere intimation of forgiveness is not enough; it needs some living actual proof, before it can receive forgiveness, enjoy its peace and feel that the gulf has been bridged. In favour of Christianity, it may be said, that this proof has been found by many a heart in the Atonement of Christ, which /
which has convinced it, in spite of its difficulties, of the depth and reality of the forgiving love of God. Though our heart condemns, the Atonement has shown that God is greater than our heart; and without it, many a heart might have remained simply in its own condemnation.

It may of course be said that before Christ died, men, of themselves, overcame their difficulties in believing in the divine forgiveness. We have to remember, however, that with Christ there came a new revelation of Righteousness, which exceeded that which came by Moses and the prophets, a law and an ideal, whose height and inwardness revealed, in deeper measure, the exceeding sinfulness of sin and its utter incompatibility with the divine righteousness. The loftiness and purity of the Christian ideal, by itself increasing the sensitiveness to sin and to its exceeding sinfulness, increases the difficulty of believing in the divine forgiveness and, consequently, the necessity of some living proof to convince the sinner of its reality.

However, we must not and we need not base the necessity for forgiveness taking the form of atonement, upon the difficulties and needs of the sinner alone. There is an inner necessity in forgiveness itself, which will not allow it to stop short with mere intimation or proclamation. Forgiveness, on any scale, whether human or divine, means more than that. It implies moral action of some sort; it implies the casting aside of resentment, that, /
that, at least, if such there be; it implies a certain positive moral attitude towards the one who has done wrong, and a certain positive moral treatment of him. Forgiveness cannot simply say 'I forgive' and leave alone. It must seal its own word in some form of deed. Even God Himself must justify in some way His own word of Forgiveness.

This leads us to the thought that the ultimate necessity for Atonement lies in God Himself as loving and righteousness. A not uncommon way of conceiving the Righteousness and the Love of God to the sinner is to regard the Righteousness as being against the sinner, while the Love is on the sinner's side. But, apart from such a view introducing a moral dichotomy into the very Being of God, it does not truly represent the relation between God and the sinner. If it is true of the righteousness of God that it is against the sinner, or, at least, against his sin, it is none the less true of the Love of God. Love is not less righteous than righteousness itself. Both Love and Righteousness are in opposition to sin. On the other hand, if it is true to say of God's Love that it is on the side of the sinner, the same is true of His Righteousness. The Righteousness of God is a form of His Love and partakes of its nature. Accordingly, both the Righteousness and the Love are in favour of the sinner. In a sense, then, the Personality of God is against the sinner, in the sense that being righteous and loving it is in opposition to his sin; /
in another sense, the whole moral Personality of God is in favour of the sinner - His Righteousness no less than His Love - for it is impossible to think of Righteousness and Love as desiring anything else but righteousness and love, where these do not exist. God, being what He is, cannot but desire to make men righteous and loving. He will use all His resources to accomplish this end. But in seeking this end - at the impulse of His Righteousness no less than of His Love - He will act consistently with His own character. He will not compromise with evil nor mitigate His opposition to sin. By the very necessities, then, of His own nature, God is driven to such action as will create righteousness and love where they are not, such action will be in accordance with His own character, with the moral order and with the preservation of the moral personality of those whom He seeks to make righteous and loving. This action, determined by the righteousness and love of God, by the righteousness no less than the love, is Atonement, which finds, accordingly, its ultimate source and its last necessity in the moral Personality of God.
The inadequacy of Calvinism to present the true nature of the Atonement.

The interpretation of the nature of the Atonement, which has prevailed largely in the Reformed Church is that penal conception according to which Christ bore the punishment of the sin of man. This penal conception, as maintained and defended by such theologians as John Owen the Puritan Divine and Jonathan Edwards the American Calvinist, leads to certain conclusions, which raise the question, whether their view of the Atonement, as the endurance of the punishment of man's sin, can, in the light of the Gospel and of experience, be maintained.

If we start with the conception, that the sufferings and death of Christ composed "a full, valuable compensation made to the justice of God for all the sins of all those for whom He made satisfaction, by undergoing that same punishment, which, by reason of the obligation that was upon them, they themselves were bound to undergo" and when by "same" is meant "the same in weight and pressure though not in all accidents of duration and the like" (Owen) the limitation of the benefit of this compensation to an elect is an inevitable logical conclusion, and Owen with rigid reasoning pressed the conclusion against all opponents. Christ underwent /
underwent the punishment for all the sins of those for whom he made satisfaction; there are some, as the facts of life show, who are, nevertheless, sinners, and who have to bear the punishment of their sins; it could not be for those that made satisfaction; therefore, He can only have done so for others, for the elect and specially chosen. Indeed, if we press the facts of life upon the conception of an equivalent punishment, the conclusion seems to be that Christ did not make a "full and valuable compensation" for any, not even for the elect, for even they, in some measure, and form, are not altogether without sin and have to pay the penalty, and Owen evidently would have accepted this conclusion - that Christ died for no one - as readily as that Christ died for all men. This conclusion, then raises the question whether the conception, which is its premise, can be true or adequate.

There are other difficulties to which this initial conception gives rise. One appears in practical Christianity, which offers to all men a salvation that is limited to some; and it seems scarcely fair, "to ask men to put their trust in that God, of whom we cannot tell whether He loves them or does not; in that Saviour, of whom we cannot tell whether He died for them or did not;"

Another difficulty is that an Atonement conceived as consisting in an equivalent punishment undergone, or as "a full, valuable satisfaction made to the justice of God" places those in whom /
whom it is effectual, that is, the elect, only in a legal position before God. The penalty is paid, or the satisfaction is given, and the criminal is right before the Judge and the Law. That is the case with the sinner:—Christ pays the full penalty. He makes adequate satisfaction and the sinner is right before the Divine Lawgiver and His Law. The whole situation is forensic. But such an Atonement fails to solve the problem of the Gospel, which is not, how wrongdoers may be justified before God and the Law, but how sinners, being morally and spiritually dead, may become spiritually alive, how prodigals, in a far country, may recover a true and living sonship. An Atonement, that simply gives a legal rightness, fails to accomplish the full spiritual purpose of the Gospel. It leaves men in a merely legal position towards God, from which the gospel would redeem them to a more gracious filial relation. Not that Owen and Edwards and Calvinists in general denied the grace of God, for it is due to His grace that Christ made satisfaction as He did, but His grace, embodied in their legal system, has not its full gracious effect in making men loving sons of the loving Father.

A third difficulty, — and this is the main objection to the initial premiss, — it does not reveal the Fatherhood of God. The election, which the premiss implies proceeds upon no reason, certainly upon no reason known to us. It is, to us, a sheer act of will and cannot, as such, reveal moral character. We may not be able /
able to say that it is unjust, but we cannot say that it is just and manifests justice. The elect, isolating their own experience, may say that God's intervention on their behalf is both just and gracious, and, by it, His love and justice are revealed. But what of His non-intervention in the case of the non-elect? Is that just and gracious? Does it reveal Love and Justice? From which part of the act of election, the intervention or the non-intervention, for it contains both, are we to judge the character of God. The two parts cancel one another and reveal an arbitrary act of choice without moral character.

Jesus said, "He that hath seen Me hath seen the Father." In His Life and Death the Father is revealed. But His Life and Death, one or the other or both, conceived as a compensation for all the sins of the elect and for them alone by undergoing their full punishment, does not reveal the divine paternity. Accordingly, such a conception of His Life and Death, such a presentation of His atoning work, if not false, must at least be an inadequate expression of that work, and calls for revision.
A revision of this conception of Atonement as presented by Owen and Edwards was undertaken by several later theologians, whose system is named "Modified Calvinism," though the modifications are such that it is doubtful whether it should be called Calvinism at all. The main changes are as follows:

(i) The system abandoned a limited Atonement for one, in which all men have an interest.

(ii) It found the necessity for an Atonement not in the demands of distributive justice, but in those of rectoral or public justice.

(iii) It gave up the idea that Christ's sufferings for sin were an equivalent punishment or "the same in amount and pressure" for the idea of a punishment which was sufficient to meet the demands of moral government, and to which, though it was not the same in amount as that due by the sinful, a virtue or special quality was given by the moral excellence of the Sufferer.

(iv) As regards the effect of the Atonement, it held that the Atonement does not of itself secure salvation for any but is only an adequate provision for all; to use Owen's phrase, it effected "mere salvability but not salvation."

This so-called "Modified Calvinism," on the face of it, pre-
presents certain advantages and seems to remove certain features held to be morally objectionable to the older forms. But, on examination, it is found to be open to criticism both moral as well as intellectual.

This system starts with the idea of rectoral justice. Christ by His sufferings and death has satisfied its demands. With this satisfaction paid to public justice as the base, it erected a universal Atonement, which gives to practical ChristianitY its desired warrant for offering salvation to all men. But this universal Atonement does not secure a universal salvation. It secures salvability for all, and salvation, for those who take advantage of the secured salvability. Those who do not take advantage of it continue in their sin and bear the penalty of it, and, the facts of life reveal such. Now, if the ends of public justice are met, if the moral government of the world is secured, it seems almost gratuitous for punishment to be exacted from those who remain in their sin. The exaction cannot be made on the grounds of public justice. Through rectoral justice one man receives salvation; another, through absolute justice, damnation and, of the two forms of justice, absolute is the higher, for rectoral justice, unless it be consistent with absolute justice loses its moral meaning. Whether the foundation be laid in absolute justice or in rectoral justice, Christ bears the penalty, in the former case the same or equivalent penalty, in the latter
a sufficient penalty. With either premiss, if any men are punished for their sin, the conclusion can scarcely be avoided that sin is twice punished, which is contrary to the idea of justice in any form.

In the consideration of the older system it was shown that by giving men only a legal standing, it was inadequate to the Gospel's purpose of making men sons of God. The same is true of this later system. On the ground of satisfaction made, to public justice, a man has the right — it matters little whether it be a moral or legal one — to salvation. But the full purpose of the Gospel is not the conferring of rights but the giving of sonship. And an Atonement, which only confers rights, falls short of the gracious ends, which the gospel proposes and claims to fulfil.

A further difficulty, which this "Modified Calvinism" contains is concerned with its conception of Faith. Faith, on this system, amounts to the acceptance of a right, of a right to salvation. Faith accepts the right, on the ground that the demands of the moral government of the world had been met in Christ. As such it loses its pure spiritual character; it ceases to be personal trust, and personal receiving, it becomes even a mighty work, for it is faith that changes the provided salvability into salvation. In such a transaction man seems to do as much, if not more than God. That ground for boasting, which Paul says is removed, still remains.

This /
This method of Atonement does not, any more than the older, reveal the Father. It reveals the moral Governor concerned for the government of his state and its moral preservation. And Jesus said, "He that hath seen Me hath seen the Father."
The true method of considering the Atonement is to interpret it in its own light. This method is scientific. It collects the facts and allows the facts to speak for themselves. The theories, which have been considered, have diverged from this method and the divergence has been the reason why they have proved unsatisfactory. They have read the Atonement through the idea of law, either in the strictly legal sense or in the governmental sense, with the result that the sufferings have been interpreted as the bearing of punishment.

Jonathan Edwards, for instance, who has dwelt at full length on the sufferings of Christ, has maintained that the intensity of the sufferings was due to the perfection of holiness and love that were in Christ. According to his way of putting it, God actually availed Himself of the holiness and love of Christ to intensify His sufferings to an infinite degree, and so to make them a fit penalty for the sin of the world. His elaborately preconceived legal system prevented him from seeing or surmising that the holiness and love might themselves be the real atoning elements and not, as he maintains, the sufferings. He was intellectually predetermined to find suffering and punishment and suffering as punishment. He had taken the Atonement into the law courts and the judgment upon it, could only be in accordance with /
As Edwards maintains, the sufferer suffers through his holiness, through seeing sin and sinners with God's eyes, and through his love, through sympathy for the sinners in their terrible condition. Can such suffering be regarded as punishment? It is certainly not the punishment of a criminal for his crime. Nor as suffering for others can it be regarded as punishment in any true sense. A man may suffer in holiness and love for the crimes of another; he may pay the fine or go to prison, but such suffering has not the moral nor legal content of punishment.

Suffering in holiness and love for others may be and is a sacrifice, an atoning sacrifice but it is different from penalty. Seen in its own full light, it is not punishment.

Nor is it legitimate to interpret the Atonement through the ritual practices of the Old Testament, (nor through ritual practices in general). Rather are they, as imperfect types, to be read through the perfect antitype, and so read, their incapacity to achieve the true end of Atonement, will be revealed.

This is the method, which the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews has adopted. The essence of his reasoning is in the words of (X 4-10). The key word in the subject of Atonement in this passage is contained in the words, "So I come to do Thy will, God." The context of the 40th Psalms shows what is meant by doing the will of God. It is declaring God's righteousness, faithfulness /
faithfulness, truth and salvation, a revelation of the Name of God. The Will of God is not to be conceived as a mere plan of redemption. So understood the words "I come to do Thy will, O God" would only declare intention; they would reveal nothing as to the nature of what was to be done, they would throw no light on the character of Atonement which is a revelation of the divine Name by a doing of the Divine Will.

We can understand what is meant by the doing of the Will of God through the two great commandments of the New Testament. The one calls for sonship and the other for brotherhood. By the fulfilment of these two commands, by so doing the Will of God, which, because of the moral situation in which He was placed entailed the greatest sufferings, Christ made Atonement. Such Atonement may be regarded as atoning sacrifice, it is not a punishment for sin.
V.

The Atonement can be considered both (i) in its retrospec-
tive aspect as it bears upon the forgiveness of sins and (ii) in its prospective aspect as it bears upon the gift of eternal life.

The Retrospective Aspect.

In this aspect we can distinguish in thought (i) Christ's dealing with man on the part of God and (ii) His dealing with God on behalf of man.

His dealing with man on the part of God. In dealing with man on behalf of God, Christ, by the perfection of His Sonship and of His Motherhood, reveals the Father. His Love reveals the Father's love, His sorrow for sin the Divine Sorrow and His condemnation the Divine condemnation. In every part of this revelation of the Father, Christ suffered. His very love to man, revealing the Father's love brought hate for its reward. And so, this revelation because of the suffering in it, can be called a sacrifice, and as it was suffering due to sin, the sacrifice can be called an atoning sacrifice. But the sacrifice did not contain elements of suffering only; it had elements of peace.

peace and joy, without which it would not of itself have been perfect as sacrifice, nor would it have revealed perfectly the heart of God, for that Heart knows the joy as well as the sorrow of sacrifice.

II. Christ's dealing with the Father on the part of man. Christ is man in a sinful world; but man revealing (because possessing) the divine mind regarding sin, revealing the Divine condemnation of sin in his humanity. In dealing with the Father, then, on behalf of men, such a divine condemnation in the heart of Christ would take the form of a perfect confession of man's sins; it would be "a perfect Amen in humanity to the judgment of God on the sin of man". "He who utters this Amen, He who makes this confession of the divine righteousness, who so responds to the divine wrath against sin, saying, Thou art righteous, O Lord, who judgest so, is necessarily receiving the full apprehension and realisation of that wrath, as well as of the sin, against which it comes forth into His soul and spirit, into the bosom of the divine humanity, and, so receiving it, He responds to it with a perfect response, - a response from the depths of that divine humanity, and in that perfect response, He absorbs it. For that response has all the elements of a perfect Repentance in humanity for all the sin of man, - a perfect sorrow - a perfect contrition - all the elements of such a repentance, all /
all - excepting the personal consciousness of sin; - and by that perfect response in Amen to the mind of God in relation to sin is the wrath of God rightly met, and that is accorded to divine justice which is its due and could alone satisfy it."

This Repentance, the expression of the feelings of the Divine mind regarding sin - feelings which in Christ were present in humanity and uttered themselves to God as a living voice from humanity, is the true Atonement for the sin of Humanity. It was made possible by the Incarnation, for such a Repentance is not within the power of sinful humanity; it was made also inevitable, for it was impossible in the very nature of things for the Divine mind to be brought into such close connection with sin, and not express the divine judgment upon it and feel the divine sorrow for it. In Luther's language, the divine eternal righteousness in Christ used Confession of the sinfulness of sin as the weapon of righteousness in its conflict with sin calling for judgment.

But this Repentance, which involved the divine confession of the sinfulness of sin, meant an intensity of suffering which can only be measured by the perfection of Christ's Love and Holiness and by the capacity for suffering in mortal flesh. The sufferings being those of Love and Holiness on account of sin, reveal the feelings of the Divine heart in this relation. God's Righteousness and condemnation of sin did not demand the sufferings; /
sufferings; they are actually present in them - the sufferings of the Divine Mind in humanity, and, as such, are purificatory and expiatory; they constitute the true Atonement for sin.

This confession of sin was followed up by the intercession of Christ, in which the appeal is to the Father's Love which is deeper than His wrath. Accordingly, in dealing with the Father, on behalf of men, Christ confesses the righteousness of the divine condemnation upon sin and intercedes with the divine Love. In Humanity He condemns sin with a divine judgment and in divine Love prays for its forgiveness.

Prospective Aspect of Atonement.

All theories admit that there is a prospective aspect of the Atonement. The theory that Christ bore an equivalent punishment has in prospect the Salvation of an elect, and the theory that His sufferings were adequate to the making of a provision for the salvation of all, has in prospect the blessedness of those who avail themselves of this provision. But the action of Christ in His Atoning work is much more immediate and direct. Thus, in dealing with man on behalf of God He reveals the Father, but this revelation being in a Son, involves the revelation of man's sonship and its purpose is to bring many sons to God. Christ gives to men His Own Divine Sonship which is Eternal Life; He makes man what he ought to be, reveals what man truly is according /
according to the Divine idea.

In His dealing with the Father, the final purpose of Christ is to bring men into that relation with God which He Himself manifests. In His divine Humanity He condemned sin with the divine condemnation, confessed its exceeding sinfulness, that men might similarly condemn it and make a like confession. He intercedes with God, that men might share in the intercession and have communion with the Father.

These results, this complete participation on the part of man in the Sonship of Christ, and in all the elements of His Sonship are possible through Christ's close connection with man, a connection that is not only according to the flesh but according to the Spirit. He is the Second Adam, a quickening spirit and the head of every man.

In conclusion the whole purpose of Christ's Work is to give to Men His Sonship, to make them sons of a loving and righteous Father. It is Sonship that the Father's heart demands. Nothing less will satisfy Him, and men are shut up to this great necessity, but in Christ, this great necessity is met and in Him we have a great Salvation.
CRITICISM.

There is no doubt as to the power and influence of MacLeod Campbell's work on the Atonement. His book is still living and its effects upon certain recent works on the subject are plainly evident. His criticism of penal theories is just about the last word and, were it not for certain conservative elements in theologians, would dispose once and for all, of this aspect of the subject. His principle of interpreting the Atonement in its own light is true and scientific, and his insistence upon the Divine Fatherhood as the ultimate source and inspiration of Atonement, cannot, even in these days, be too strongly emphasised. He had a most comprehensive mind and the heart which makes the true theologian. As we read his pages, we instinctively feel that we are in the presence of a great Master. But there are points in his presentation of the doctrine, which call for consideration and revision.

And first as to the element of Repentance in Our Lord's Work.

A vicarious repentance, or more strictly as it is with Campbell, a substituted Repentance is a moral impossibility. He is quite clear himself that neither sin and righteousness nor their effects are morally transferable; but repentance is just a form of righteousness and you can no more transfer it by imputation than you can transfer by the same method righteousness itself.

He /
He says that Christ's Repentance had all the elements of a perfect repentance with one exception, - the consciousness of sin - but does not that one exception, as Ritschl holds, rule out the possibility not merely of a perfect repentance but of any repentance at all.

We have two words which are akin, Penitence and Repentance and it would be an advantage if we could and did use them to express a needed distinction. Penitence in the sense of moral and spiritual sorrow, sorrow for sin and sinfulness in ourselves and others, and Repentance in the sense of moral action, of change of heart, mind and life. If we could so delimit the words we might justifiably call Christ the Great Penitent but never the Great Repentant.

Campbell holds that there is a strong testimony in the human heart that a full and complete repentance would expiate guilt, for the first human attempt in dealing with sin is an attempt at Repentance "an attempt" which he says, "becomes less and less hopeful the longer and more earnestly and more honestly it is persevered in, but this not because it comes to be felt that a true repentance would be rejected even if attained, but because its attainment is despaired of - all attempts at it being found when taken to the divine light - to be mere selfish attempts at something that promises safety - not evil indeed, in so far as they are instinctive efforts at self-preservation, but having nothing /
nothing in them of a true repentance or a godly sorrow for sin
or pure condemnation of it because of its own evil."

This is not fair to human repentance. We may admit that
human repentance falls short of absolute perfection in a given
case; as all moral action in man falls short of the ethical
ideal. But to say that there is no reality in it at all, or
that it is hopeless is denied by the moral facts of life. Any
genuine repentance has moral value; it leads to further repen-
tance and we learn that repentance, like every other true moral
function, is a process which is continually gaining more and more
moral control and reality.

If repentance were the morally hopeless thing, it is here
made out to be, it is difficult to see any reality in the first
word of Jesus in His public ministry, "Repent and believe in the
Gospel." His ministry is a continual call to Repentance and He
would not have made the appeal, if all response were hopeless.
That would have been moral mockery.

The real relation of Repentance to Atonement Campbell did
not properly consider. Christian repentance is the receiving of
the Atonement, the receiving of the Divine Forgiveness in some-
thing of the fulness which Christ in His work has revealed it to
be. In Christian experience they are two necessary parts of
one concrete reality, of one concrete reality that reveals and
contains the biggest thing in God and the realest thing in man.

The /
The New Testament works much with the moral category of Repentance: its writers knew what Repentance meant, and it is remarkable, if Christ's work was, as Campbell makes it out to be, a work of Repentance - if this element was a necessary part of His work - that not one of its writers ever said, Christ repented for our sins.

We may perhaps ask, how this idea of the Repentance of Christ, as forming the essential part of His redeeming work, came to the mind of McLeod Campbell and had such a hold upon it. He found the idea in Jonathan Edwards who presents the alternative, an equivalent punishment or an equivalent Repentance, that Edwards only presents the alternatives to brush the latter aside. The heart of Campbell, revolting from the views of the traditional theories, from the injustice such theories did to man, to the Eternal Father and to righteousness itself, seems to have leapt at once to the second alternative as a way of escape out of the intellectual falseness and moral repulsiveness of the penal theories. Anything rather than these! But the alternatives are not the only interpretations of the work of Christ. In adopting these alternatives as the only possible, Campbell has departed from his own principle of interpreting the Atonement in its own light. He has adopted a preconception from Jonathan Edwards.

Another point that calls for revision is Campbell's conception of sacrifice. He holds that Christ's work is an atoning or expiatory /
expiatory sacrifice. But he has not very lucidly interpreted the conception. There is sacrifice as a human experience and sacrifice as presented to God. Sacrifice as a human experience may be presented as Love suffering. When Love, driven by its own impulse, begins to suffer, it enters upon the region of sacrifice. But when love suffers and feels the suffering, love is not yet perfect in its sacrifice. When Love rejoices in the suffering, when it is a joyous submission, a glad surrender, to all the suffering that love demands, then is the sacrifice of love truly perfect, a perfect sacrifice.

But there is also sacrifice, as something offered to God, in the sense of propitiation, though propitiation is an unfortunate word through its associations. What is the sacrifice that is well-pleasing to God? It is Love perfected, perfected, as love can only be perfected, through suffering, Love that is perfect sacrifice, perfect submission, perfect sonship, perfect joy. This is the sacrifice that is a sweet smelling savour unto God. It is the sacrifice of Christ that calls from the divine heart the words, "This is my beloved Son in Whom I am well pleased."

A third point. The conception of Judgment is not satisfactory, Campbell says "Christ who so responds to the divine wrath against sin saying "Thou art righteous O Lord who judgest so" is necessarily receiving the full apprehension and realisation of the wrath, as well as of that sin against which it comes forth into /
into His soul and spirit, into the bosom of the divine humanity, and so receiving it, He responds to it with a perfect response, and in that perfect response He absorbs it" (i.e. the divine wrath). Again, the Holy One of God bearing the sins of all men on His spirit, and meeting the cry of these sins for judgment and the wrath due to man, absorbing and exhausting the divine wrath. He also speaks again and again of Christ meeting the demands of the divine righteousness.

Now there is a divine judgment and wrath of God, a divine reaction upon all sin. The facts of life abundantly reveal that. But what is this judgment as related to Christ? "This is the condemnation that light is come into the world and man loved darkness, rather than the light because their deeds were evil." The light is the judgment upon the darkness. Christ is the judgment upon our sins. It is the light of Christ that reveals our darkness and condemns us. The truth is even more forcibly put in these words "Verily, verily I say unto you, He that heareth my word and believeth in Him that sent me, hath everlasting life and shall not come unto condemnation. The judgment does not fall upon him that heareth and believeth on Christ; a fortiori it could not fall upon the Christ with whom God is well-pleased. Righteous judgment falls upon the guilty not upon the innocent.

The /
The truth almost seems to be that, in speaking of the judgment and the wrath of God as he does, McLeod Campbell reverts to a spiritualised or moralised form of penal theory. The consequences of man's sin fell upon Jesus. He suffered at their hands; but this is the condemnation of the sinner not of the Christ, their condemnation, His commendation.
The fragmentary sketch of the history of the idea of Atonement has, it may be hoped, revealed the fact that an authoritative doctrine, - a doctrine with the marks of finality and universality upon it - has never been attained. The history contains theories and conceptions which, so far from being complementary, are rather, broadly speaking, contradictory; the history is one of variations and contradictions. Many of the theories and ideas have not been only varied and contradictory, but such as both conscience and reason condemn. It is scarcely true to say, as Moberly does in his preface to his work on "Atonement and Personality", that "in their own time and in their own way they (the theories) are all true." Few would hold the ransom theory, for instance, to be at any time and in any way true; no doubt it had a relation to what was true, and to a reality in experience, but the theory in itself is and was a fiction. It is idle to deny the variedness, the instability and contradictoriness of the speculations of the theologians on forgiveness and atonement and, for that matter, idle to deny a large measure of intellectual inadequacy and even falseness. The student of the doctrine becomes lost in the speculative maze and at times despairs of any true doctrine; and, if he should be hoping to find truth and reality in the theories despairs even of his quest. He only receives /
receives hope and certainty, when he realises that the truth is not in the theories but in the experience which give rise to the theories and of which they are the imperfect and inadequate expression. He will probably recover patience with the theories, when he sees the theories in relation to the experience and recognises their temporary character and that, as temporary expressions of a great experience, they were of value in their own day, intellectual homes of rude and temporary structure where the abiding truth might dwell for a season. All truth for its life needs some home, it requires some intellectual expression for its very existence. We may pass judgment upon the intellectual expressions, but it is simple stupidity to scoff at them; the framers of the theories, like ourselves, could only build with the materials that lay to their hand.

But the theories, as sincere intellectual efforts to understand and illustrate the reality of Atonement, are not without value for us to-day. There was an intellectual freedom in speculating upon the great Christian truth of Atonement. Anselm was not afraid to oppose traditional doctrine. There was, further, amidst all the variedness and contradictoriness, a continuity in the speculation, which shows the reality and the vitality in the truth and experience which the theories sought to explain. If ever truth could be slain by theorising, (one feels, at least at times) that truth is atonement. But, in spite of all the /
the theorising, the truth lives, lives in experience and with the continual demand for expression. The inadequacy of the theories has been laid at the door of the materials, - the contemporary forms of thought with which the theologians worked; but the cause of the inadequacy was not simply the materials but also the nature of the experience itself. Atonement is a part of life, an essential and all pervading element in all moral and spiritual life. No intellectual forms can set it forth adequately. The Spirit is more than the body; the life is more than the raiment. And no intellectual forms are permanent, they change and pass away and the abiding truth claims a living and not a dead body. It is a commonplace to say that every age demands its own doctrine, demands that its truth shall be stated in its own terms and that by so doing it helps to keep the truth living for itself. It may not have been a conscious motive that has kept the Church from setting forth Atonement in dogmatic form; it is at any rate a fortunate circumstance. To have done so would have 'cribbed cabined and confined' both the living experience and the freedom of its illustration.

We have not hesitated to emphasise the differences and contradictions of the theologians: they differ, they hold conflicting views and views that have caused difficulties not only to theology but to religion. But in certain respects they were agreed. They were agreed as to the reality of forgiveness and redemption; /
redemption; their experience of these may have differed, differed according to the measure of their faith and character, but its texture was of one quality; it was a moral and spiritual experience, it brought man nearer to his true self and nearer to his God, it spelt freedom and blessedness: amidst all the contradictory theories and varied experience there was a deep qualitative unity in the redeemed and forgiven life. But there was another point of agreement. The blessings of forgiveness and redemption were mediated through and in Christ the Crucified. Here again the differences may seem to crowd in upon the unity. To one the virtue of Christ's mediation may lie in His Humanity, to another in His possession of the Logos, to a third in His fulfilment of a divine law, in meeting some claim of God, but beneath these differences the unity is steadfast. In Christ is the forgiveness of sins and the redeemed life. A third point of agreement is, that ultimately forgiveness and redemption find their source in the love of God. The theologians may introduce propositions, statements about the demands of God's righteousness in His wrath which are inconsistent with His Love, but they do not surrender Love as the ultimate cause of Atonement. Here Abelard and Calvin, MacLeod Campbell and Jonathan Edwards join hands.
Most of the confusion of thought and argument at cross purposes which have arisen, and that to no small extent, in the treatment of sin, are due to sin being regarded as a thing or entity by itself, when it is not a thing but a quality and has no meaning save in relation to the moral personality. Thus we read frequently of individual sin, of social sin and of racial sin, as though they were different species of one genus, and as though each existed in itself. Now, as a matter of fact, while these terms may be serviceable in the economy of language they are all abstractions, whose only existence is as logical concepts and are themselves without concrete reality. Individual sin is the sin of an individual personality and exists only in relation to that personality; the concrete reality is the individual sinner, apart from whom sin is only an abstract. Social sin has no existence in itself, it is identified with the sin of society, but society, as society, does not sin, society is an abstract, a concept of thought and social sin as the sin of society is only the sinning of the particular individual personalities assumed under the category of society. The Race as a race, Humanity as Humanity, does not and cannot sin. In this matter the individual personality is the true unit of reality, and sin only exists in relation to him. Especially in the relation of sin to forgiveness and to everything that we mean by Atonement, Redemption.
Redemption, Reconciliation, Regeneration, it is with the sinful personality as a concrete, that we have to deal. The sinful personality is our present subject.

Most of the treatment of sin, (or as we should prefer to say, the sinful personality) has been an attempt to explain sin by its origin. The method of Christian Theology has been to trace it back to the fall of Adam, a fall which infected the whole Race and involved it in sinfulness. Thus Adam's sin was the cause of sin as a fact and its universality, somehow or other, either through Adam being the whole Race, or the whole Race being in Adam, when he sinned the whole Race sinned or became sinful. For this position the main argument and authority were Biblical; as time went on, it gathered the authority of great names, of an Augustine and a Calvin; it was incorporated into the great confessions and became dogma with the authority of Divine Truth. But the dogma has been challenged; the weapons of attack have been first and foremost, that the dogma, in the form of a fall from a primitive state of innocence and sinlessness was not as Biblical as it was supposed to be, that, after the third chapter of Genesis there is little or nothing in the Bible about this fall, and the moral History of Israel which the Old Testament records, does not proceed on the supposition of a fallen race in Adam. The authority of Paul still remains, but his authority on this point was weakened, when it was shown that his doctrine was that of Jesiwa pseudepigraphists, and that he was stating a
a doctrine from Jewish thought rather than a position of the Old Testament. Further, exegesis reveals the fact that Genesis III gives us not so much an account of how sin originated but rather of how labour and sorrow came into the world. The Fall of Adam, granting its history, does not explain the origin of sin; we can still put the question, why did Adam sin and the answer is the Serpent was in the garden, evil was already present; to the question, whence came the serpent? there is no answer. Again, the passage in Paul (Rom V. 1) has been subjected to exegesis; and it is plain that Paul's reference to Adam, as the cause of sin and death is incidental and illustrative and not absolutely necessary to maintenance of his position that by one man Jesus Christ came righteousness and life.

But theology (to its credit) did not acknowledge defeat, when its dogmatic bulwarks had been attacked and broken; it could fall back, and did so on experience. It could still maintain original sin, even although its cause in Adam was doubtful. Does not the universality of sin presuppose a fallen race? Does not the manner in which sin actually appears demand "an original taint", "a root of evil", a radical iniquity in the heart of man? And is not this original taint the cause of all man's sinning? Science was brought in as an ally, for does not science acknowledge heredity, and heredity means the transmission of evil. But science has proved a doubtful ally, for science has grown uncertain about heredity and the possibility of transmission of moral
and immoral quality, to say nothing of the fact that a good many scientists turned philosophers, have denied the reality of sin, at any rate, in the theologian's sense. The scientific explanation of sin has often explained sin away. If theology attempts, without her ally, to deduce actual sin from original sin in human nature, it cannot be said that theology has proved her case. It is perfectly true that sin presupposes a sinful nature, or a sinful character or a sinful personality. It is almost tautologous to say so; simply saying, sin arises out of sin. It does not explain the whence or why. Even, if to sinful nature is added sinful environment, the origin has not been discovered, it is simply explaining one thing by itself, adding content to the fact but leaving the fact still inexplicable. Theology has failed to explain the origin of sin.

Philosophy has essayed the same task. Kant found the origin of sin in the noumenal will, which, outside experience, adopts evil maxims. But how the will can so act in vacuo, how it can adopt evil maxims and principles apart from an empiric and actual world where principles are formed, is a mystery; and why does the noumenal will adopt these evil principles and take sides with evil? Such a will lives in a motiveless world and really cannot act at all. Julius Müller adopted a similar view, the idea of prenatal sin, a sin of the pre-existent soul, which becomes incarnate and being evil from and before the beginning, empirically sins. Though both Kant and Müller hold, the one to a radical evil and the other to a root of evil in human nature, both /
both, in spite of their explanations, regarded sin as a great mystery: their explanations are only those of philosophical despair.

Hegel accounts for sin through the logical evolution of the Idea. Like everything else in the universe it is a moment in the movement of thesis, anti-thesis and synthesis. The thesis is the state of innocence, immoral in itself, immoral if it does not move to its antithesis, the state of sin, to become the synthesis, virtue and goodness. Sin is a moment in a necessary logical process, but this is the explanation that explains away. Sin is the moral progress of innocence or the result of that progress, and sin, in its turn, becomes a source of virtue. Again, the origin of sin is traced to the necessary development of consciousness: the ego to come to consciousness separates itself from the universal consciousness, comes to independent being, a being-for-itself, and it is in this being for-self that evil has its seat; "here is the source of evil". Sin is the consciousness of independent being, being for self, and sin thus becomes identified with knowledge. Man becomes conscious of his independent being, of his being-for-self, or selfishness, and this is his sin. Now, while there may be here a psychological hint that is worthy of attention, the hint that sin is a fact of consciousness and not a thing in itself, and without the consciousness the sin could not exist by itself there is much that runs counter to the judgment of ordinary conscience. Sin may be to
the common conscience defined as selfishness, but selfishness cannot be equated with independent being; indeed, when man ceases to be selfish, he does not lose independence of being, a growth in virtue can be truly described as a growth in moral independence and self-freedom. Nor can sin be equated with knowledge and reflection; knowledge reveals the quality of an action or state, but, in itself, is not the source either of good or evil. The truth is that when we enter into a necessary evolutionary system, whether materialistic or ideal, we enter into a world of thought where sin, as the conscience knows it and as the Christian has experienced it, does not exist; if, according to the Hegelian view, sin rises in the necessary moment of the consciousness, we have according to this view really no answer to the question of the whence and why of sin, for the question, what is it that moves the consciousness to evil? still remains. Why has the finite idea moved into this state that knowledge calls evil and sinful? To that no answer is given.

An attempt has been made to explain the origin and being of sin upon the basis of man's natural development. In his two works "Origin and Propagation of Sin" and the "Concept of Sin" Dr. Tennant with a skill of penetrative analysis, with knowledge of the idea of evolution and clear expositions essayed this task. Original sin is disproved, it is only a theological hypothesis to explain the universality of sin which can be explained on other grounds /
grounds which have existence in fact. Sin arises out of the course of man's development, a development which he did not choose but which was imposed upon him by His Creator. "Imposed upon" may not be quite the accurate term to use, but the development is not of man's ordering and making, it is of God. Man, to begin with, is a simple creature of impulse, but as self-consciousness arises and the distinction between self and not-self comes into being, the objects of his impulse can become objects of thought, desire and self-determination; to the impulsive stage there is first added then, the volitional stage of his development, when the primary motives (or some of them) that move man to action, become, so to speak, secondary; but there is a further stage when knowledge of a law comes in and collides with the primary and secondary motives which move man to action. This law comes into being and recognition along the lines of development, it is first, tribal law and custom and then, moral law: it is an ideal, a law, an obligation an "ought". Into consciousness there comes this ideal, non-selfish element, that runs counter to the impulsive self both in its primary and secondary modes. The order of human development is (i) the impulsive or natural stage (ii) the volitional and (iii) the cognitive with its recognition of a law or ideal higher than the self. This order can be seen in the growth of the race from its earliest beginnings in the history of the individual, from childhood upwards; in the one case, anthropology supplies the data; in the other, psychology. Of course /
course, the order of the three stages is not to be pressed, it is not definite and exact; the exact point when volition appears and knowledge appears, either in the race or in the individual, can not be determined. Broadly speaking, the idea is first the natural, and after the natural, the spiritual. But it is to be noted that in the primary impulses natural to man there is no sin; nor, when these impulses are made the object of desire and will, is there any sin, they are the fomes peccati, but at the same time they are the fomes boni; in themselves, they are natural and non-moral. It is only after the higher knowledge appears, "the knowledge of law, the cognition of an ideal" that there is the possibility of sin. Volition then, has two courses open, a higher and a lower; it can yield to the immediacy of impulse or it may restrain and control impulse at the bidding of the law. The issue lies with volition; the result may be sin or righteousness.

Now we may frankly admit the facts of anthropology, and its interpretation of the growth of consciousness in the race, we may admit what psychology says regarding the growth of consciousness in the individual, but neither the one nor the other explains why sin arises. There is no sin in the natural impulses; there is no sin in volition itself and the law is good and holy. What anthropology and psychology do is to construct the conditions in which sin has arisen; but why the will, confronted by its conditions, by a higher demand and a lower impulse, should sin, still remains a mystery. The difficulty is not diminished in any way, when /
when we remember that the law or the ideal, according to Dr. Tennant, is not the perfect law nor the absolute ideal. These are relative and subjective, - the law which man, or the particular man, has come to know, the ideal which he has seen. These may fall far short of the absolute. According to Dr. Tennant, sin arises because of the hardness of the task which man's development has imposed upon him; if his task is to avoid sin the difficulty amounts to a practical impossibility; it is so difficult that few, if any, have ever fulfilled their allotted task. Dr. Tennant denies the absolute necessity of sin, but with the conditions, in which man, sooner or later, finds himself, it seems empirically inevitable. Original sin, in the theological sense, is not a fact according to Dr. Tennant, it is the explanation on the part of theologians of sin in its universality; the natural impulses are not, in themselves, sinful, but they explain how sin has arisen. This "how" must not be interpreted as a why or whence, - this Dr. Tennant says expressly, if that is so, then the cause of sin has not been discovered for the cause is just the answer to "why"? and "whence"?

Dr. Tennant is too clear a thinker not to recognise the limits of his explanation and not to realise that a scientific explanation is inadequate and leads to a demand for something of the nature of a metaphysic. And this he attempts in his fourth lecture on "Theodicy - Presuppositions of the new (empiric) theory" On the basis of Lotze's and Martineau's philosophy of infinite personality /
personality, and its relation to finite personality, he constructs this theodicy. Infinite personality in the creation of finite personality has limited itself. But this self-limitation or self-abnegation is a form of self-assertion "and the only form in which it can reveal itself". We may put it in this way, that the moral universe, so conceived, is a monism which includes pluralism.

There is the free personality of God, there are the finite free personalities of men; the creation of the latter does not deny the infinity of God's personality; it is a form of its assertion, but there is limitation; there is sufficient separation in created personality to make it free and self-determinative, but the separation must not be so great as to involve the possibility of the free created personality subverting entirely the purpose and will of the Infinite; that would result in the complete destruction of the Infinite Will and Personality and bring about moral chaos in the world. This free created personality implies the possibility of sin as well as of virtue and righteousness; did it not, it would neither be free nor a personality. Accordingly, God is the cause of the possibility of sin; but not of its actuality, for the actuality, man is responsible: a responsibility that is, in the last resort, due to that act of self-limitation on the part of God which is really a form of self-assertion. What we get then is that man, as a free personality, is the cause of sin, or man's will, as the essence of personality is the cause of sin. This is probably as far as philosophy /
philosophy can take us. But philosophy has not answered the question, why man, or the free personality, or the will, has taken what is judged to be an evil course; nor has it saved God altogether from complicity with sin, for the possibility of maintaining virtue unimpaired is in the situation, so difficult that it ends in contradiction and becomes an impossibility.

Sin, in its actuality, is wholly due to the finite personality, it is not according to God's Will or Purpose neither is it God's doing; accordingly, it must be regarded as a kind of by-product in the world of God, positive and real enough; it is not part of that reality which has its source being and ground in the righteous will and holy purpose of God. Sin is not irrational in the sense that it cannot be explained, though it is irrational when viewed from the point of view of the will of God. Philosophy, we may repeat, can probably take us no further in finding the origin of sin or of interpreting its nature. And the lesson is that in trying to understand sin through its origin we are probably on the wrong path, for the origin is unknown.

In his "Concept of Sin" Dr. Tennant has defined very clearly what sin is, there can be no doubt as to the clearness of the definition. A sin must always possess the following four characteristics. Firstly, it must be a violation of moral law, an aberration from an ethical standard or ideal. Secondly, the law of which a given act, capable of being imputed as sin is an outward or objective transgression, must be known or be capable of
of being known, and known as. binding upon himself by the agent. Thirdly, until virtue be won, there may be two lines of conduct open to the actor, to each of which he is impelled by impulses of different intensity and moral value. And lastly, the activity must be the outcome of intention and of choice characterised by the freedom which the subject's will possesses.

These then are the conditions and they "may be summed in one word," - "accountability".

Dr. Tennant equates guilt with sin: only that that is sin, which is due to man's free will taking the wrong path in face of the light. Till man becomes free and has the light, he cannot sin; but if he loses his freedom by continually sinning, then the sinful state, the result of previous sin, may be regarded as guilty sin, but, the actual sins, which he cannot avoid through loss of freedom, are not sins. May we put the criticism of this position in this way? I am to blame for the waste which by sloth I have allowed my garden to become, but for the weeds which naturally spring up in the waste, I am not responsible. The waste is sinful but not the weeds. Dr. Tennant's concept may be strict and scientific, but the Christian consciousness will feel its inadequacy. His concept is not according to that consciousness; it is the concept rather of immoral action. The ideal which the act contravenes is an ideal which is the result of more, of the moral development of humanity, it is not sin in the Christian sense.

Now what has been written so far may truly be described as criticism, but it is criticism which has had in view of construction; it /
it has been the clearing away of what is alien and foreign, which has led to confusion, for the proposition which we would lay down is that sin is a Christian concept and has to be interpreted by the Christian consciousness.

**Sin is a Christian Concept.** That is a position which needs to be defended. It needs to be defended against the criticism of the pure logician, who will say that there are no Christian concepts, there are only concepts of the reason or of the intellect. The same purism would deny of course the Christian consciousness itself. There may be divine consciousness and human consciousness, but Christian consciousness is a misnomer. If answer is required to this criticism, it is sufficient to say that human consciousness is not all of the same quality; the mind of the unlettered peasant is of a different quality from the mind of the philosopher or the scientist, and the mind and character of the Christian have a quality and a content of their own, that make the phrases Christian consciousness and Christian concept perfectly intelligible.

Another criticism is, that sin exists outside or without the confines of Christianity and it existed before the birth of the Christian consciousness. With regard to the first half of this criticism, the meaning of the phrase "outside or without the confines of" requires to be carefully defined. For instance, a man who does not call himself a Christian commits a casual offence and he calls it sin. In the case of the man himself, he is either using the word sin in a vague and loose way and means no more by sin than
than some action which is socially condemned; sin is with him a synonym for immorality or crime; if the word has a deeper significance, then he is applying other standards and ideals. Christian standards and ideals, and while not professing Christianity, is in making the judgment within the Christian sphere of thought and discourse. He is not in the moment of his judgment "outside" Christianity. Again, the Christian pronounces many states and many actions that are "in the world" as sinful, but he does so in the light of Christian standards and from the point of view of his own consciousness. According to his Christian judgment, this or that is sin, though it may be outside Christianity "in the world". It may be said that we are here failing to distinguish between sin and the consciousness of sin, but it is just this distinction, or rather the way in which it is made that requires to be challenged. Sin and the consciousness of sin are spoken of as though they were two distinct entities, especially the former which, as a matter of fact, has no reality except in relation to consciousness and to that specific form of moral consciousness which is called Christian.

The strength of the criticism no doubt will be found to lie in the Old Testament. There it will be said is both sin and the consciousness of it. In answer to this we may leave out such argument as that in the prophetic literature the consciousness of sin is national rather than personal, that the sins which the law condemns are of a ceremonial and external character and that in general /
general, while there are profound expressions of the sinfulness of sin, especially in the Psalmists, the consciousness of sin in the Old Testament is imperfect—we can find the answer along another line. Sin in the Old Testament and in the New is a religious term and is only defined in relation to God. And the difference between the conception of sin in the Old Testament and in the New is to be measured by the difference of their respective conceptions of God. The difference between sin in the Old Testament and the New is measured by the difference between the God of the former and the God and Father of Our Lord Jesus Christ. What that difference is need not here be specified; it is sufficient, for the present purpose to recognize it as immense and profound.

We may take the Sermon on the Mount. Jesus changes there the concept of sin; he makes it something other than it has been in the past. The God whom He reveals there, is a God who makes His Sun to rise on the evil and the good and sends His rain upon the just and unjust. This revelation gives a new law and ideal, "Love your enemies, and pray for them that persecute you that ye may be sons of your Father which is in heaven." The ideal is the character and conduct of God, as Christ reveals Him. That ideal is present in the Christian consciousness, part of its living content and all conscious falling short of that ideal is sin. The ideal or the law, as apprehended by the subject, determines the character of the concept of sin, and the ideal of the Old Testament is /
is so far transcended by the ideal of the New, that it is not too much to say that the difference of the concept of sin in the New Testament differs from that in the Old not only in degree but in kind. The New Testament with its revelation in Christ creates a new consciousness with a new concept of sin. It is from the Christian consciousness that we learn the meaning of sin and build up the concept.

What is the Christian consciousness of sin? The Christian consciousness of sin is not created by a moral law, however high, or by an ideal of character; it is created by a Personal Life, by the whole personality of Jesus Christ as that is revealed in His life and death. The Christian has come into the presence of Christ, and, in the presence of Christ's personality, his own stands condemned. His consciousness is not that he has sinned but that he is a sinner, and the measure of his sinfulness between Christ's Personality and his own. Before Christ, perfect in obedience and perfect love, he himself falls short; his personality is revealed as one that has fallen away from its own law, as something diseased and broken. The Christian in the face of Christ's personality is always a sinner, for it is by a Personality infinite in its love and obedience, that he is made such; were he made sinful by a law or an ideal which he has fully apprehended, then there might be hope that he would rise to the law, fulfil the ideal and so cease to be sinful. But the light which makes him feel is infinite; if his personality rises in the scale of moral being, the /
the light only shines with a more burning brightness and, in
dispite of all moral attainments, he is a sinner still.

It may be said the Cross of Christ creates the consciousness
of sinful personality which we find in the New Testament, but it
is only the Cross, the expression of Christ's Personality, that
does this. Men look upon the Cross and they behold absolute
obedience and absolute love, personality perfected and they say
"Depart from me O Lord for I am a sinful man." It has to be re-
membered too that the Cross expresses other personality besides
that of Christ; it expresses the personalities of them who put
Him to death; in the light of His revealed Personality theirs
also stands revealed; the contrast is indescribable; it is the
contrast of moral and eternal opposites; the contrast of light
and darkness; love and hate; obedience and disobedience; He is
sinful; they are sinners. The Cross is, as it were, the meeting-
place of two kinds of personality, the Personality of Christ and
the personality of the sinner.

The consciousness of Sin is then the Consciousness of Sinful
Personality. What is Sinful Personality? It is all that Per-
sonality ought not to be; indeed Sinful Personality is a contra-
diction in terms, and it is almost true to say that Christ's Per-
sonality reveals that we are no longer personalities, we have sunk
to the level of material things: to say "I am a sinner" is almost
equivalent to saying I am not a personality. Personality is an
ultimate and impossible of definition, but in the highest form it
implies /
implies love and the moral freedom to fulfil love's law which is perfect and God's own law; it is love and obedience perfected in freedom, and a sinful personality is one that has lost or failed to gain its freedom, its love, and its obedience: it is a personality that has failed in its own being and to realise its own end. That is what we feel: we are in the presence of Christ and His Cross. And, because we feel that, we feel an utter inability. Personality that is realising itself may attain in part at least; it may realise its own being, but personality that has turned back upon itself, that has thwarted its own life, has lost its freedom and is impotent; and so, the consciousness of sinful personality is always, in the first instance, the consciousness of an utter despair. "Who shall deliver me from the body of this death"? The sinner is dead, a dead personality - and the dead cannot make to live. It is true that the Consciousness of Sinful Personality may seem to be occasioned by an episode, by some particular sin or defection from moral law or custom, that may be the occasion but not the real cause of the consciousness, and as soon as the particular episode is brought to the standard which Christ reveals, the Revelation inevitably leads to the sinfulness of the Personality from which episode came. It is because he is what he is, - a sinful personality, that he has sinned.

How far is the sinful personality as revealed by Christ guilty for his state? Guilt is a word which has been used with considerable /
considerable vagueness. It has been defined as liable to punishment; or it may mean simply, that the sinner has committed the offence. But, in the consciousness of the sinner, there may by the feeling of deserved condemnation, the feeling that the sinful personality is one with which God cannot be well pleased and upon which the Divine opposition must rest, but the sense that the sinful personality is due to the violation of the subject, and solely to him, is not prominent. The sinful personality does not say, I have done it and am, therefore, guilty, but I am sinful; it is a judgment upon the whole personality. What the sinner says is not so much "my action" but "myself", and, in that judgment, confesses that the sinful personality is his own; for he is responsible rather than guilty; for, whatever may be the cause or causes that have brought him to the judgment upon himself, the sinful personality is his own and none other's; whatever has brought him to the sinful state of personality is comparatively unimportant: the Personality is His, is His own and none other's; he alone is responsible for it. This is important for the needs of the sinful personality is not to be delivered from its sins but from itself.

"God, man would arise in me, "That the man I am would cease to be!"

It is true that guilt is used in Christian phraseology. We speak of the guilt of sin, but here guilt is used in a vague and loose way either to express the exceedingly sinfulness of the sin or /
or the felt shame of it; it is entirely a subjective feeling; but with guilt, in the strict sense, the sinful personality is as little concerned as it is with the origin of its own imperfect and sinful being. The sinner may be a determinist or a libertarian but this has little or no bearing on his judgement upon himself.

A sinful personality, conscious of its own sinfulness, it is impossible to give an adequate psychology of this personality. According to the New Testament, such a personality is lost, in slavery, dead, and condemned by God — the wrath of heaven rests upon it. We sometimes say God loves the sinner but hates his sin, but this is an inaccurate form of speech, the sin cannot be separated from the sinner and it is doubtful if hate, as the antithesis of love, can be used in reference to things or abstracts. The sinful Personality is lost to his true life and freedom, in bondage to that lower self which he has become; he is dead through trespasses and sins for freedom and love are his true life; and the Divine approval cannot be his, for God would not be God, if He were well pleased with and took delight in what is lost bound and dead. God is well pleased with his Beloved Son, and not till the son that was lost and was dead is found and is alive again, can the Father rejoice and command the feast of joy to be prepared.

To sum up, it is the sinful personality with which the New Testament and the Christian consciousness has to deal and do deal. Neither the New Testament nor Jesus has any meaning except on the basis /
basis of the reality of the sinful personality, and of his great moral and spiritual need. The questions of the origin of sin or of guilt, in the strict sense of the word, are unimportant. The sinner calls the sinful personality his own; however it has been created, it is judged to be his now, and, his and none other's, he is responsible for it. And this judgment, is made through Christ, in the light of his Revelation, and could not have been made without Him. Sin is essentially a Christian concept.
The Christian consciousness may not be keenly aware of the fact of moral freedom, in the form of freedom of choice. Indeed, freedom has by some Christian thinkers, e.g. Augustine been denied. This absence of consciousness of freedom and its denial are due to two psychological facts, (i) human freedom has been merged in the Grace of God and (ii) the Christian may have developed towards a moral position in which, non potest plecare becomes, to some extent, applicable. Certain moral immunities have been established, and he becomes more and more self determined to goodness and feels less and less the strain of ordinary temptations. On analysis, however, the Christian consciousness yields evidences of freedom as no other quality of consciousness does; for the Christian consciousness is one in which the self has acted and still acts upon itself and upon its character, in which the self through the character acts upon natural and social environment, and also upon that phase of reality which is the realm of ideals. Christian Personality exhibits, preeminently, the power of 'creative synthesis.' It may not be conscious of any particular form of freedom about which Theorists contend, for and against; but it is deeply conscious of moral responsibility and moral power, a consciousness that is strengthened by the experience of Redemption. "The ethical sense of responsibility, the energy for struggle and the discipline of the will was not paralysed or absorbed in Paul's case by his consciousness of redemption and his profound spiritual experiences." (J. Weiss 'Paul /
'Paul and Jesus').

To come directly to the question of freedom and sin. The personality that says "I am a sinner" is stating a judgment which implies moral responsibility and moral responsibility implies self-determination in some situation, which contained an element of contingency, and in which the self has to choose and determine for itself, i.e. it implies not a liberum arbitrium indifferentiae which, if it is not a contradiction in terms, certainly never actually exists, but a freedom for the self to choose for itself one particular line of conduct and being rather than another. Freedom is a postulate of all action and being of a moral kind; it is a postulate, if moral judgment has to have any meaning of its own. The Christian may not be conscious of the postulate, as postulate; but freedom is a condition of the Christian life and what is called the higher Christian freedom has for its basis the freedom that belongs to human nature and that is a necessity of morality and moral judgment.

Freedom or self determination implies that reality (nature, society and the realm of ideals) is a true vehicle for the personal self; that this implication is an actuality is proved in experience by finding in reality our true personal realisation. Freedom implies, too, that the nature of God, the divine will and action, are favourable to human freedom; they do not invade it nor /
nor destroy it; an implication that is proved an actuality by obedience to the Divine Will, and by communion with God. In that obedience and communion we are free indeed. The Sovereignty of God's sheer omnipotence destroys freedom not only in man but in God. Force is not free, power is not free, though they be absolute. The Sovereignty of God must be interpreted in terms of love for God Himself to be free, and in terms of a love to which human freedom is precious, for man to be free. Human freedom implies a God who is love.
Punishment is a word which is used in a vague and loose way; it is applied to different spheres of life, and varies in meaning according to the sphere in which it is used. A golf stroke is "punished", an investor who makes a bad investment "is punished"; a criminal is punished. In most cases, no strict use of language is intended, and the meaning of the word has to be interpreted by each concrete instance. When a golfer says a particular stroke "is punished", his use and meaning of the word have the very faintest connection, if connection at all, with its use and meaning, when we say, that sin is punished. The use of the word in general conversation may have certain connections with its use in the law courts, where we may presume the word has its strict and proper meaning, and we may proceed to examine the use and meaning there for the purpose of seeing if the legal meaning throws any light on the commonly accepted judgment that sin (or the sinner) is punished.

Punishment is suffering inflicted upon the person or belongings of a responsible agent, who has committed some offence against the society or against a member of the society in which he lives; he has diverged from the mores of the society which have been confirmed as binding laws. The pain is imposed upon the offender by a superior authority and, in civilised communities, is more or less proportionate to the gravity of the offence. The community /
community through its representative, the Judge, imposes on the criminal so much suffering; he deals out so much penalty. Here, the essential thing in the punishment is the suffering. All punishment is suffering (though all suffering may not be and is not punishment). If a judge imposed a sentence which involved no suffering, neither the judicial nor the ordinary mind would call the sentence penal; it would not be punishment. The penalties meted out by the judge are of a more or less fixed and arbitrary character; for this particular offence there is this particular punishment. If this fixedness is not maintained always with absolute strictness, it is because no two offences are absolutely alike, and the exact proportion of guilt with its exact proportionate punishment is not easily determined. So penalties are massed into classes, fines, imprisonment, the gallows - and offences are massed according to their judged degree of criminality, and one class of offence has one class of penalty and another, another. There is a code of crimes and a code of penalties. Punishment is suffering imposed by a judge, acting according to the prescribed code, upon an offender.

Punishment then, as has been said, consists in suffering imposed by a judge and borne by the offender. The suffering is the essential thing, and when the offender has suffered, the purpose of the punishment is attained. This position has been criticised and from opposite quarters, Mr. Bernard Bosanquet has maintained that "punishment is not the infliction of pain; it is the
the reinstatement of the social will". According to his view, a criminal act is the expression of a bad and antisocial will, and the community reacts against that bad will, by the imposition of punishment, which negates or annuls the evil act. Now, this negation or annulment of an evil act by the affliction of punishment is doubtful, very uncertain in actual experience, and if the meaning is that the punishment cancels the guilt, the position must be challenged. If Mr. Bosanquet's meaning is that society through some individual is guilty and then society, through its appointed authority, cancels the guilt, then society is either suffering from a delusion or is on the way to a most offensive Pharisaim, probably both. If he simply means that in the acts of punishment society maintains justice, upholds its code of justice, then that can be at once admitted. But the maintainence of justice or a code of justice is not punishment, and neither the judge nor the ordinary man confuses the two. In punishment justice may be maintained, but the punishment itself is the suffering of the offender and its central meaning is exhausted in that.

This position has been criticised from another side. The essential thing in punishment is not the pain, the punishment is not exhausted in that, but in the potency of pain to reform the bad will. In certain cases this may be one of the effects of punishment, but even where this effect is not realised, the punishment would not cease to be punishment. So long as the offender suffers, he is punished; and the essence of the punishment is /
is not in the contingent effect of his reformation. Again, the meaning of punishment is said to be found in its power of de-
terrence. If this, a possible aspect and effect of punishment, is made central, then, as Mr. Bosanquet rightly points out, it would lead, carried into action, to the very worst forms of cruelty. If punishment is meant first and foremost, as a deterrence to possible offenders, then the best punishment to inflict on a man who got drunk would be to subject him, first, to horrible torture and then, to hang him. Restoration and deterrence may be aspects which society may take into account; it may be the duty of society both to deter and to restore, but, when society punishes, it inflicts pain and pain upon the offender.

Is this the way that God punishes sin? Does God punish the sinner in this way at all? Does He inflict pain upon the sinner? The popular opinion no doubt is that He does. The only difference is that the human Judge imposes penalties on offences which society has determined to be justly punishable; But God, as Omniscient and as infinitely Just, takes account of all offences and punishes all. A human law court is a narrowed and confined reproduction of the Divine Assize; it may be viewed as a kind of lower court which takes cognisance of certain offences and leaves the rest to God who knows all; its defect is that it has not the sweep of the court of God. That is probably the popular view, not altogether unsupported by theology. But a consider-ation of fact brings immediate hesitation in the endorsement of I
of this view. Sin does not always bring pain to the sinner and without pain there can be no punishment. For instance, a man may abandon himself to certain forms of self indulgence; his health may suffer, but not necessarily so; he can maintain his health, he lives in the open air, tramps over grouse moors in autumn, goes to health resorts in winter, enjoys life to the full. But, he is punished, it may be said, in soul. He is not; for suffering of soul is unknown, alien to his whole being. He neither suffers in soul nor body for his selfishness and indulgence; he is not punished.

Again, when we take the idea of punishment and the whole procedure of punishment as that is exhibited in a court of law and try to find analogy between those and the ways of God to man as those have been revealed by Our Lord and set forth in the New Testament, the idea is out of place, and the analogy is false. God is not a Judge imposing penalties; He is a Father, and no father could make penal suffering the central purpose of any action. A father may inflict pain, he may do it in love; but the pain is not the main purpose of his action, it is not exhausted in that, and the terms within which a father acts are not, on the one side, a code of offences and, on the other, a code of penalties; if that is the universe in which he lives or lives chiefly, fatherhood, as men have learnt to know it, imperfectly in human fatherhood and perfectly in the Father of Our Lord Jesus Christ, is no longer an applicable attribute. The analogy of legal /
legal procedure is false. Only in one place does Our Lord use a legal term in reference to the sinner. The publican, afar off, who would not lift up his eyes to heaven and prayed only for mercy, was justified, but nothing could be more unlike the procedure in a law court, than the experience that is depicted.

There is one supposition which, if it were true, might support the idea that God punished sin, the supposition that punishment, as pain inflicted on the offender, cancels the sin and creates righteousness. If that were so then God might be conceived as using the instrument of pain in the interests of righteousness. 

But the evidence of the effect of inflicted pain is that it, as 

inflicted pain, is neutral: it may burden the sinner in his sin, it may turn him from sin to repentance. These opposite effects demand other factors than the pain of penalty to account for them: if the afflicted sinner becomes repentant, it is not the pain of punishment but some other factor that produces the result. This idea, that God does punish sin by way of imposed penalties and also, for that matter, rewards righteous acts by tokens of his favour, goes back beyond the Christian centuries; it existed in Christ's day and still lives in many quarters of religious thought. The Book of Job is against it, the word of Christ Himself, "neither did this man sin nor his parents that he was born blind" - is against it; nor will this view maintain itself when brought before the facts of human experience.

But has sin no evil consequences? no harvest of suffering?

The /
The testimony of living experience and of all literature that depicts man's life and moral history is unanimous, unhesitating, unambiguous. The tale of human woe is in large part the tale of human sin. But the misery and evil, that flow from wrongdoing, are not of the nature of imposed penalties, they rise out of the wrongdoing itself they are organically connected with it, they flow out of sin, - its consequences, being parts of the sin - with all the inevitableness of natural growth. What these consequences specifically are must be estimated in relation to personality. There is a loss of values of everything that is valuable to personality, as such. Personality through sin becomes de-personalised; love, moral freedom both in the sense of moral choice and of self-determination, communion with the good, - essentials of personality, - are lost. The sinner has fallen away from his true life. He has not only lost these values, but the sense of values; he becomes morally blind, choosing an evil which he thinks to be good. Nor is the evil result confined to the individual personality. He does not live by himself, but in a community of personalities where each acts upon all and all upon each. A bad will infects other wills, a sinful personality is a sinful influence. How one personality acts upon another personality may be difficult to know; "the solidarity" of the human race is not an explanation so much as an expression of the fact of action and interaction, but the fact is universally acknowledged that for good or evil a personality affects others: the evil /
evil with all its consequences somehow enters into others and depersonalises them. And so, the result of sin is loss and destruction of will and personality, the real and highest goods of the moral universe. But in all this there is not necessarily pain and suffering. The sinner may flourish like the green bay tree, while all the process of depersonalisation is going on. The devil is necessarily neither an unsuccessful nor an unhappy being. The pain begins when the sinner in the light of some ideal begins to realise the meaning of his sin; sees the awful consequences of his sin in his own personality. When he sees that his sinning has brought loss and suffering to others, it is then that he begins to suffer; but this has nothing in common with punishment inflicted upon an offender in a court of law: it is not imposed without, it springs up within; it is due to the coming of a new consciousness and a new knowledge into his personal life; it is the spiritual throes of an awakening soul. It is himself that he has been corrupting, degrading, dehumanising all the time, shutting himself out from his true life and from God; he sees that and curses his own being. But this pain is creative, it is the godly sorrow that makes for repentance and without which repentance could scarcely begin. It has a redeeming and recreative element in it and through it we can understand, in part at least, the meaning of atoning suffering, human and Divine. We may, if we like, call that suffering with its awful intensity the punishment of sin, but it has no analogy to punishment in the legal and ordinary /
ordinary sense; it is due to the appearing of a higher and nobler consciousness, it is really the Holy Spirit of God convincing of sin.

To sum-up then. The sinner is not punished by God after the manner of a criminal before a human judge; and the analogy of the law courts to explain the consequences of sin is irrelevant. But the consequences of sinning are tremendous, no less than the loss and destruction of personality itself. They are within the sphere of personality and are inevitable. The consequences occur, whether the sinful personality realises them or not; whether or not he has grasped their meaning and value. But the true realisation of the consequences brings pain and suffering, but this realisation can only be due to the appearance of a new element in the degraded personality. This new element is the Spirit of God that convives of sin and sorrow over it with the sorrow of the Divine heart.

Note on the subsidiary penal effects of sin. The real effect of sin is in the personality, but there are other effects of sin of a more external character. The wrongdoer may suffer in health and reputation. We may bring suffering to others, very frequently does, and upon those who are entirely innocent. But these are subsidiary and are not inevitable. They are not in their incidence according to legal justice, indeed their incidence which sometimes falls, most heavily upon the innocent may seem to be devoid /
devoid of any justice at all. The wrongdoer of Mephistophelean character may be of the vilest order of sinner, but his diabolical ingenuity may save him from many of the external effects of sin. In so far then, as these external effects of sin are not inevitable, they cannot be regarded as the real punishment of sin: they are not axiomatic as the real punishment of sin, in the form of debased personality, is. They depend for their coming or their not coming and for the manner of their coming, upon the context of the wrongdoer's history, on his environment and on his nature - but whatever the context of history, of environment or of nature in the case of the wrongdoer, may be, he cannot escape the destruction of his personality: all external consequences compared with this are comparatively small.
REPTANCE.

Repentance, both in Judaism and in Christianity, is regarded not simply as a preliminary step to a higher life, but as the permanent condition of all spiritual achievement. The New Testament idea links itself on to that of the prophets, who bring repentance into relation with the coming Judgment and the day of the Lord. Thus, John the Baptist preaches repentance, for the Kingdom of heaven is at hand and judgment is at the gate. Very similarly is Our Lord represented in beginning His ministry "The time is fulfilled; the kingdom of God is at hand; repent ye, and believe in the Gospel". Repentance is the great necessity.

When we pass on to Paul we find that he speaks little of Repentance; the great necessity now is for faith in Christ, resulting in a personal union with the Crucified and Risen Lord, a personal union which implies the creation of a new personality, "if any man be in Christ, he is a new creation, the old things have passed away; all has been renewed." The fourth Gospel has nothing to say about Repentance, the spiritual necessity there is for a new spiritual birth "Ye must be born again". The insistence on repentance, which marks the Synoptics, is not so marked in the other books of the New Testament. Now this might seem as if the Church had adapted a more profound and spiritual idea, but when we consider further, the Repentance that Jesus Our Lord demands is found to be just as radical and profound as anything Paul or the fourth Gospel has /
has to say on regeneration. With Our Lord repentance goes as deep, and is as radical, and as spiritually revolutionary, as the new birth. Our Lord demands that the roots of the tree shall be good. He says, Repent for the kingdom is at hand - repentance is a condition of entrance into the kingdom - but He also said, unless ye turn and become as little children ye shall in no wise enter the kingdom of heaven. Repentance is, for Him, spiritually equivalent to becoming as a little child; and perhaps, no figure could have emphasised more the radicalness of the spiritual change demanded. Our Lord, as the Synoptics represent Him, calls for something of the nature of a spiritual revolution in the individual; He demands a new nature, a new heart, a new personality.

Perhaps one reason why the word repentance falls into the background, is that the word \( \text{εἰρήνα} \), - in spite of all the moral content that could be put into it, in spite of the glory with which the prophets had surrounded the idea and in spite of all the beautiful things that later Jewish writers had written about \( \chiρός \), fell far below that moral change of nature and life, which Christ demanded and which the Christian had realised. The nomenclature was inadequate to the richer experience. Certainly, our word "Repentance" does not adequately represent what Our Lord meant by \( \text{εἰρήνα} \). We translate it Repentance, the mourning and lamenting for our sins and we translate it wrong. Of \( \text{εἰρήνα} \), as Jesus used the word, the lamenting one's sins was a small part; the main part was something far more active and /
and more fruitful, the setting up of an immense new inward movement for obtaining the rule of life. And μετάπτομαι, accordingly, is a change in the inner man. These words of Matthew Arnold are true and so far faithful to the teaching of the New Testament; their only fault is that they do not go far enough, and they suggest, perhaps unwittingly, that contrition, as distinguished from repentance, is a small thing, whereas there is nothing small, emotionally or ethically, in μετάπτομαι. But the words do not go far enough. Μετάφρασε in the New Testament is more than a lamenting over sins, it is more than even forsaking our sins; it goes deeper than reformation; it is more than the setting up of a new inward movement, more than a change in the inner man; μετάφρασε is the change of the man himself out of which new movements and new rules of life inevitably come. Nor is it sufficiently described as a change; the ethical and spiritual quality of the change needs to be specified, and perhaps the best way to do this, is to relate repentance to the sinner and his consciousness and then distinguish it from two movements with which it is sometimes identified, namely, remorse and reformation.

As has been seen, the Christian consciousness is one of sinful personality and a sinful personality is one which has fallen away from its own idea and life; it has broken its own law of love and obedience; it has lost its freedom and become enslaved to something lower than itself; it has lost living contact with the personality of God. Now, in repentance, all that is changed; the sinner /
sinner returns to himself, to his true life; he recovers his freedom; he regains his communion with the good and with God, the source of all goodness. It is not too much to say that he ceases to be a thing and becomes a Person. This change in its greatness is well described as a new birth and a new creation; in its quality, it can only be described as spiritual, human, personal and divine. The change goes right down to will and to being itself: it is a change of the very self, and reveals itself in the character, which has its unity and being in the self, and in every expression of character, in thought and action.

We may distinguish Repentance from Remorse. Remorse is an emotion; that of bitter regret for things we have done or not done and for what we have been or not been. It may play its part in the crucible of character, but it is not repentance, even though, like resentment, it may be called a change - a change from gay lightheartedness to sorrowful distress. Remorse may issue in anything or nothing of a moral kind; it may lead to something deeper and more radical: it may be the first movement in the process that leads to action; it may lead to a more headlong plunging into the very things which have brought it into being; it may end in a black sea of despair; repentance can only issue in one thing, in good character, in the expression of the true content of personality. Again, remorse has reference to the past, to a past perhaps the effects of which may be in the present making it what it is, but repentance has more meaning for the
the future than for the past; it is on repentance that the future quality of the personality depends: not that repentance has nothing to do with the past: it does not and cannot absolutely break our personal identity; it cannot cancel memory, it cannot wipe out a historical record and make being non-being; but repentance constitutes such a mighty spiritual change that the "I" of the present, is not, in any real personal sense, the "I" of the past, which committed the sin. Though remorse is so very much concerned with the past, it has not upon the past any recreative power; it does not separate us from the past; it does not repair the past; it only makes the past a present burden and a present despair.

Again, repentance is to be distinguished from reformation. A man may be engaging in practices of doubtful honesty, and he finds that these do not pay: he suffers some of the subsidiary and external punishments, recognises the disadvantages and resolves to pursue a stricter honesty. There is a change in his action and in his attitude; the change may be described as a reformation in his character. But the reformation does not, of necessity, imply repentance. His methods are changed; it may be even said, that his character is changed; but the self may, in its moral quality, still be the same, selfish and self-seeking. Reformation affects action and the empirical character; but repentance goes to the very root, it is change of being, which requires an analogy like the passing from death to life, or of a new /
new spiritual creation to represent it at all adequately.

So profound is the change that we may well ask with Nicodemus, "How can these things be?" A change of being, in a world where the law of cause and effect so largely prevails, seems an impossibility. Certainly, on a theory of mechanical determination, what Professor William James called "hard determinism", repentance seems an impossibility. On this theory, motives derived from nature and environment act and react upon one another with the result that the strongest motive or strongest combination of motives prevails; these acting and reacting motives form the self and they are all predetermined; they cannot change themselves or alter their character. Only in one way is a change conceivable, and that is, through some power stepping in ab extra and changing the motives; but the determinist, even if he allowed the coming in of this power ab extra, would only class it as another motive, which would act under the same law of causal necessity and, if it prevailed, it would only do so in virtue of its strength. But the change effected would not be repentance, for repentance is personal - when a man repents it is his repentance, which implies that, in some way, he is the cause of it. A repentance, which was not a man's own and in which he took no part in the act of origination, would not be repentance. A changed personality is a personality which itself and of itself has changed.

Nor again, would repentance seem to be any more possible on such a theory of self-determination as Professor James describes as /
as "soft determination". On this theory a man acts according to his character, and stable quality; even if it is a process of development, the development moves along lines of a more or less fixed nature, and a radical change is not to be expected. It might be conceived, as in the previous case, as taking place through a power ab extra, but this would rob character of that self-determination which advocates of this theory ascribe to it; and again, we may say, that a character changed ab extra does not imply personal repentance. It might imply a kind of repentance in the power that acts ab extra, if it had consciously delayed and then decided to act; that might be a kind of repentance, but it does not imply a repentance in the personal subject conceived to be changed ab extra.

On any theory, then, of determination, repentance is an impossibility. The conclusion is, so much the worse for such theory; repentance is a rock on which all such theory founders, for repentance is not a hazard which moralists have prepared for such a theory: they have not created the problem, the problem is created by experience and arises out of the hard bed rock of life.

But there is a difficulty which does not arise out of any theory, but it is one which is deeply realised by the Christian consciousness of sin. That consciousness is, as we have seen, a consciousness of sinful personality, its judgment is on a sinner, how then can a sinful personality repent? How can it /
it become other than it is? To repent is to ally the self with righteousness, and that is a supremely righteous act of which the sinful personality feels incapable. "How can golden conduct arise out of leaden instincts?" "The Evil tree cannot bring forth good fruit". This miracle can only become possible, if the light, which makes a man conscious of his sinfulness, is not simply light but love with redemptive power in it; if that is so, then in the sinful personality there is not only light revealing the darkness but power rich in recreative potentiality. But there is a further condition necessary, the sinner must not only be able to appropriate the light (he has already done that as the consciousness of his sinful personality abundantly shows) but also the power. The principle by which this appropriation is made is faith, for through faith, the vitality, the moral and spiritual quality,... another personality become ours. That is the action and the result of faith in another personality, an action and a result that are abundantly evidenced in the relations of personality with personality. The growing personality of a child has faith in its parent, with the result that the personal qualities of the parent communicate themselves to the child or (from the child's side) are appropriated by him. It is a similar experience that the sinful passes through when brought into the presence of that personality in which are both the Light and Power of righteousness; both are communicated, both are appropriated through faith. No law of personality is broken; the sinful becomes holy according
according to a process common to the action of all personality, though we may not always be conscious of the action simply because we are not giving attention to it.

We may still ask, but is such appropriating faith possible to a sinful personality? The answer is, that such faith is already actual in the sinful personality in spite of his own feeling of inability. The light of Righteousness is appropriated, for without such appropriation the sinful personality would not know himself as such. The Light, which makes him feel dark, is the brightness of an ideal he has received. Nor is it possible to appropriate the light without the power: they exist in organic unity in Christ, who is at once Light and Love. Faith and Repentance are really two aspects of one movement of personality; a movement that carries with it a profound moral and spiritual change, the movement in which the man himself has become new and the old things are passed away. Faith is this movement in its Godward aspect: Repentance is the movement in its manward.

There is another line of argument for the possibility of Repentance. Human experience may be viewed as a system of correspondences. For instance, there are the aesthetic tastes, they have their correspondence in a world of beauty; there is man's intellectual life which has its correspondence in a world of truth; there is man's physical life which has its correspondence in the satisfactions which nature provides. Every human /
human need has its correspondence and its opportunity for satisfaction. Faith and Repentance and the need for these are most urgent in man's life, without these and without their satisfaction man's whole moral life would cease to be; personality itself would have no progress and no completion; and, if all else is satisfied, if every need in man's life has its correspondence, then this deepest need for faith and repentance will have its correspondence too and find its satisfaction. This is not proof of the reality of repentance though we may claim it as of the nature of argument for its possibility: the real proof of Repentance is that "Once I was blind now I see; I was dead but now am alive again".
The forgiveness of sins has always been regarded as an integral and essential part of Christian faith and experience. It is confessed along with other realities in the Apostles' Creed "I believe in...the forgiveness of sins". The confession runs through the whole of Christian history, and whatever new aspects of the faith may have been brought to light, however Christian experience with its corresponding doctrine may have broadened out into larger spheres, the confession has never receded totally into the background; it thrusts itself forth in every revival of Christian experience, with new life in itself and with a power of revivification for the whole. Forgiveness by Christ may not be for all Christians and for every Christian community "the sum of all religion" as it was to Luther, but it would be difficult for any one to call himself Christian who did not subscribe to the confession "I believe in the forgiveness of Sins". He would be outside the stream of Christian life and experience.

But what do we mean by the forgiveness of sins? Very commonly, it is conceived as the remission of penalty. The difficulty with such a conception is that, while it seems to state the truth, it may altogether misconceive it. If by penalty is meant certain evil consequences that fall upon the sinner, like broken health, lost reputation, the reactions of nature and society /
society upon the wrongdoer, then forgiveness cannot be the re-
mission of the penalty, for the penalty is not necessarily re-
mitted to the forgiven man. To take an extreme instance. A
criminal may be forgiven, but he will have to pay the penalty of
his crime. In his case, forgiveness does not mean remission of
the penalty. Even where the case is not so extreme as to in-
volve legal penalty, the natural consequences, loss of health
or social condemnation, are not *ipso facto* remitted by the divine
forgiveness. A man may be forgiven, he may have received richly
of the grace of God's pardon, and yet have to bear consequences
of his wrong to his dying day. A man is not by the divine for-
giveness taken out of the moral order nor out of the natural and
social order in which he lives; in these orders there is some-
thing living and active, if he opposes them, runs counter to
them they react upon him with reactions, that do not cease when
he has heard for himself the divine voice of pardon. Generally
speaking, these reactions satisfy our sense of justice, the spirit
of justice is in them; their non-operation would strike us as a
greater injustice at least than their operation. If in any
particular individual case, these reactions ceased altogether, we
could only regard the favoured subject as a spoilt child, unfair-
ly treated in comparison with the treatment meted out to his
fellows. Remission of consequences would be an unjust act, and
forgiveness is an act of a righteous God and can make no com-
promise with lenient injustice. But we do not say that remission
of /
of penalty through forgiveness is a false conception in every sense. The very worst penalty that comes to the sinner is the separation from God, and if forgiveness means anything, it means the restoration of a broken personal relation; in forgiveness the broken communion is restored, but it is questionable whether that broken communion should be called a penalty, it is not a penalty in the legal sense, it is something deeper, more personal, more spiritual than legalism takes note of; and the restoration cannot in any way be described by the word remission. But this is to anticipate and here we say no more than that remission of penalty, as ordinarily or as legally conceived, does not necessarily form part of the content of Divine forgiveness and that there might be remission of penalty without any real experience of the divine forgiveness.

There is another popular conception of forgiveness which we may call "the clean slate theory". Here the idea is that the sinner has a record of sinfulness. Forgiveness in some way obliterates the record and allows the sinner to begin again with a clean sheet. This is a popular delusion supported by the Roman Catholic theory of penance but not entirely unknown in Protestant circles. But we cannot escape history: no recording angel can sever absolutely the past from the present nor can omnipotence change being into non-being. But this theory does not, when submitted to rational laws simply become unthinkable, it would become, if acted upon consistently and continuously, immoral.
immoral. If a man believed that his sinful acts could be blotted out completely, by a free act of forgiveness, by a cleaning of the page, he might go to the end of his days smearing every page and, when the page was covered with filth having it torn out, and a new page presented for the process to begin again. The clean slate theory requires a crude theory of penance, or crude thinking on the laws of personal life, or a crude conception of God's relation to man, perhaps all three, to maintain itself in the life of any man.

But it may be said, is not the very essence of forgiveness a blotting out of sins, and is not the conception Biblical? Our sins are no more remembered against us, they are cast into the depths of the sea. God does not remember, it is true, our sins against us; the father's action towards the prodigal assures us of that great truth once for all, but the father does not do this by simply wiping out the record in the far country, by putting the period of the far country out of existence; he does not blot the record out of the memory of the prodigal, it remains still a sorrowful history, part of the prodigal's life. The father does something infinitely greater than tearing out a page of history infinitely greater from the point of view of the prodigal himself, he clothes him in the robes of sonship, he changes his personality and the whole spiritual attitude of the prodigal towards the past, which, for the prodigal's welfare, is a greater thing than blotting out the record, probably a greater thing from any point of view, for /
for to tear out a page of history requires a kind of unconditional omnipotence, but to change a personality requires an almighty love working within the hardest conditions. We may illustrate the point in this way. A person brought up in a bad environment becomes bad. Through some beneficent person he is taken out of his bad environment. He is told that the past is finished and done with; it will never be spoken of again. He is given a new start; for him, moral history begins de novo. That would be a very practical application of the clean slate theory. But unfortunately, the past cannot be wiped out even in this practical way; it lives on in the man and in his memory; and, unless the past is to repeat itself or to grow its natural fruits, something more, something deeper - is required than a change of environment. Social reform has worked largely on the clean slate theory and has largely failed. But God does not work on this theory; environment and the past or the present are not the divine objective but the personality within environment and the history. If we may put it so, God is not concerned with sin but with sinners. He does something greater than change environment and history; He changes the personality, out of which the history comes and which largely makes its own environment. "Blot out" and "cast into the sea" are perfectly legitimate metaphors of the result of the divine forgiveness in the experience of the truly forgiven, but is not so much the sins that are blotted out and cast into the sea, it is our sinful selves that are blotted out, the sinner dies to his sin /
sin and to his sinful self. It is not the record that is the serious thing: the record can be thought of as the simple registering board of personality; we may think that we can throw a sheet over the register or can destroy the board altogether, but if the personality goes on registering the same character and conduct, the hiding of the record is of little avail. The clean slate theory, even if it were possible, is morally ineffective. It really changes nothing.

There is another conception which we may label "the no-condemnation theory": this is closely akin to the no-penalty theory, but is conceived in a slightly different way. When God forgives, He no longer condemns the sinner, and particularly He remits the condemnation of death. This theory is so far true to the New Testament. It is the negative side of justification, God does not condemn the sinner, when the sinner is forgiven and has entered into the grace of the divine pardon. "There is now no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus". But the theory becomes inadequate and false if the principle of condemnation is abandoned altogether: it may be so stated as if God did not condemn the sinner at all. Forgiveness is sometimes regarded as not so much the removal of the divine condemnation as the removal on man's part of a mistaken belief in such condemnation. God does condemn the sinner; He would be unrighteous if He did not. Nor does God make excuses for the sinner by arguing away his moral responsibility. That may seem kind and merciful, but it is really contemptuous of personality; it is treating personality, /
personality, as a thing. God is holy and God is love and neither love nor holiness can be anything else but condemn the sinner; condemnation does not exhaust the holiness or the love, but, in the face of sin, neither can exist without it. This "no-condemnation theory" may take a different form. God ceases to condemn when He forgives, and the cessation of the condemnation may be regarded as due to some fact or transaction outside the sinner's experience and personality or due to his acceptance of such fact or transaction. Such cessation of condemnation is not the divine forgiveness, which is righteous through and through, if only because it is God's, and to cease to condemn a sinful personality would be unrighteous. God only ceases to condemn when it is right to do so; to them that are in Christ Jesus, there is no condemnation. But even where the cessation is righteous, it is not the whole of forgiveness and it is really because forgiveness means more than condemnation that God can, in righteousness and in love, remove His condemnation of the sinner. So far from no condemnation being the whole truth of forgiveness, it is rather that, in the act of forgiveness, condemnation is increased. God condemns the sinfulness and the sinner joins with God in the condemnation; and it is not till the latter's condemnation is true, not till the sinner condemns his own sinfulness, is the weight of the divine condemnation lifted. When the act of forgiveness is consumated, when the sinner is no longer in himself but in Christ Jesus then the Divine condemnation can righteously /
righteously yield to the divine complacence. In the act of forgiveness, neither God nor man leave righteousness behind nor true judgment. The forgiven man does not excuse the man he has been; the more he enters into the grace of forgiveness the more he condemns what he was; and, if God is greater than our heart, the greatness does not consist in the fact that he hates and condemns our sin and sinfulness less than we do, but because He can make His hate and condemnation channels of His Redeeming grace and because, in spite of his abhorrence of sin, of the awful thing it is to Divine Holiness, He forgives and He redeems. In so far as we are now in Christ Jesus, God does not condemn us; but, in so far as we were sinners, in so far as sinfulness is still in us, His condemnation rests upon our sinfulness; for God to cease to condemn our sinfulness, would be for God to cease to love us; it would be for God to cease to forgive us.

The inadequacy of many popular theories of forgiveness is due to a loose abstract way of thinking; forgiveness is conceived as a thing in itself, whereas, it is an expression of personality, and describes the action of one personality in relation to another personality. We at once get nearer to an answer to the question, What is forgiveness? If we put it in a personal form and ask, what is a forgiving personality or, still more concretely, what does a person do when he forgives? And here the difficulty is that no two concrete acts of forgiveness are exactly alike.
alike. Most of our acts of so-called forgiving are scarcely worthy of the name; they rise little above condonation and make but a small charge upon our moral energies; and to understand the real meaning of forgiveness we must take some instance, where great wrong has been done on the one side and, where, on the other, there is righteousness and love. It is only such an instance that serves, however imperfectly, to interpret the forgiveness of God, who Himself is love and righteousness and to whom no sin is small. And as such an instance we may take the case of a parent and child, which has the advantage that it is the nearest human analogy to the relation in which God and man stand to one another; and the further advantage, that it was just this instance that our Lord took to present to the conscience and imagination of His day the forgiveness of the heavenly father. In such a case, the parent condemns the sinful child; as he is righteous, he cannot do otherwise; we may say, that the father was loving the prodigal all the time he was in the far country, but he would not have been loving him, if he were not condemning him: it would have been cruelty of the worst kind, a cruelty to the prodigal's soul, if the father had been complacent with the prodigal. Complacency and moral indifference to sin is the worst denial of love. But the prodigal returns and by the time he has returned, he has taken over into his life that necessary part of forgiveness which consists in condemnation. He has condemned himself, taken into himself the righteousness of his father. /
father. But condemnation is not the whole of the forgiving act. The father calls for the best robe and the ring, symbols that the father is reinstating the prodigal as a son, symbols that the father's holy love has recreated him in sure sonship, symbols of a real living sonship. The father's character, not only its righteousness but its love, has entered into the prodigal. To use a term of later controversy, the son is now communing with the father. Communion is restored, and a community of personal life binds them together. Is it too much to say, that the personality of the father, without his ceasing to be a father, has passed over to the son, without his ceasing to be a son. Forgiveness is a transference of personality at its noblest and best.

But it is the concrete psychology of this transference that is the difficult, nay, the impossible thing to describe. It is easy to write the words, but who can declare the thing itself? The pain of righteousness, the pain of condemnation passing over into the joy of communicating and recreating love, the throes of redeeming love coming to life in a redeemed personality. Not even the father could declare the cost of the whole experience, the spiritual agony and joy of it all. Scarcely less difficult to describe is the psychology of the son as he receives the new life and restoration, the shame and humiliation as he realises that the best robe and the ring were really always his, to realise that his father had always meant in love and righteousness to give him those things: we can well imagine that the first

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healthy impulse would be to refuse the robe and the ring, and to be no more than he had ever hoped to be, a hired servant; an impulse only overcome by the love of the father and by the surprising knowledge that to refuse the robe and ring, to remain a hired servant and not become a son, would add pain to pain in the father's heart.

The instance is a human one and on that plane words fail to plumb its depths. When we have said that forgiveness is the transference of personality, that, in love and righteousness, gives itself to personality that, in humility and loving obedience, receives, we seem to have said nothing. But when the case passes from earth to heaven, from man's forgiveness at its best to God's, we feel that there is something no man can say, something that surpasses all speech and knowledge. Not that the human analogy is false in any point, but there is a plus which human analogy cannot represent. That there is this plus is felt by the prodigal in the story. "I have sinned he says before heaven and before thee". Forgiveness is not a relation between one man and another, not even between one good man and one bad man: it is a relation between man and God. On the one side, it is the Divine personality perfect love and perfect righteousness, on the other, it is personality to which perfect love and righteousness can only be opposed, sinful personality that prevents personality from realising itself, that robs it of its very life, can we say? that is causing death in the very life of God. In a very real sense, it is /
is harder for God to forgive than for man. The path of human forgiveness is harder to tread the more righteous and the more loving the forgiver is, but when the forgiver is perfect in holiness, the difficulty, the pain, the cost become simply incomprehensible. Truly, no man can forgive sins but God, for none but God's perfect holiness and perfect love can pay the cost.

It is impossible to declare in words the meaning of forgiveness for God: God Himself could only declare that meaning through the Cross of His Own Son, but we can describe more correctly what forgiveness means to the forgiven. It means restored communion to the Divine life; it means a new personality; it means a recovered freedom; it means the joy of regaining the real values of personality. We are familiar with Paul's idea that the forgiven life is freedom from the law of routine precept, which incites to sinfulness but the forgiven life is freed from all mechanical laws, the laws of an inexorable causation from mechanism in every shape or form; it has received the freedom of love and righteousness, the freedom of God Himself. The forgiven man, it is true, is not taken out of the moral or the natural order, out of the sphere where causation presents itself, but he has received a life which, within that sphere, realises itself in righteousness and love; and the very fact of such free life within the natural order, within all the order to which mechanism may seem to apply, shows that mechanism is inadequate to the complete interpretation of reality. Nothing is so intractable to every evolutionary interpretation, /
interpretation, materialistic or idealistic, as free personality; it shatters the most skilfully elaborated system and dispels the moral despair that all such system creates. The forgiven man is freed from the law of sin, and from every law and from every science that tells him he is a slave. There is, for instance, what may be called the law of the irreparable past, the irreparable guilt, the sins that cannot be blotted out and their consequences. The sins of the past, it is true, cannot be obliterated from the record, but the significance of the whole record is changed; it is no longer the expression of the forgiven personality; in very truth, as he now is, the past is not his, it is alien to his personality. Whatever influence that record has now, it does not degrade his personality; its vulgarity becomes like a dark background to which the beauty of holiness becomes more radiant and attractive. The natural consequences of sin, which may abide in the forgiven life, become part of the stuff, in which the new personality expresses itself, in which its virtues of patience and long suffering are realised. The Divine condemnation of sinfulness is changed, it is no longer rebelled against or fled from, it is accepted in the personality, becomes the man's own condemnation; and with that, the Divine complacence begins; the voice of condemnation passes over into the voice of commendation, "My Son in whom I am well pleased". Further the forgiven life becomes the forgiving life, inevitably. The New Testament position is that where there is no human forgiveness there /
there can have been no Divine. God's forgiveness is living; it lives in us and one of the forms of its life is the spiritual inevitableness with which we forgive those who may have wronged us.

But forgiveness is not without its conditions and these are faith and repentance, the forgiven must of himself receive the new life; he must be willing and desirous to make the new life his own. The will and desire may be Divinely created, but they must be his own. Without these conditions it would be immoral to forgive. To impute righteousness to a personality where no desire and no will for righteousness exist, is fictional and God is in forgiveness, above all things, real. Nor can righteous life be diffused, it must be really received. Imputation dishonours God; diffusion dishonours man. But where the will and desire are, where there are faith and repentance, forgiveness begins, and, through the grace of God, these may arise in any personality that does not of itself say "Evil be Thou my Good." That is the unforgivable sin.

Forgiveness may seem an impossibility; it is an impossibility to any theory except that which allows room for a personal God of infinite love and righteousness. It is supernatural, but the evidence for the supernatural act is the reality of Christian experience; without forgiveness, repentance itself is impossible. Forgiveness is evidence of a living God, infinite in righteousness and in love.
The common phrase "I will forgive it but I cannot forget it" implies a distinction between forgiving and forgetting sin. Is this distinction valid? First, with regard to ourselves; we sometimes say "I can never forgive myself"; in a sense, we never do or can forgive ourselves. Forgiveness is from God alone, but we receive the Divine Forgiveness; the new life, and, in that sense, we forgive ourselves. We share in the act of Forgiveness by Repentance. What we mean by the phrase is, that we cannot excuse ourselves, but the truly forgiven life never does excuse itself. But, though we are forgiven and repentant, can we forget our sin and sinfulness? They are in the indelible record of memory. But we forget much of that record of memory; we are in experience constantly forgetting some things by attending to other and different things, i.e. by living in another sphere of thought and discourse. And, by living in the new life, we in a true and real sense forget the old life, which passes out of our living experience. Forgiven we remember the old life by a deliberate act of thought and, when we do, we remember it not simply as the old life but as life that is forgiven.

Secondly, with regard to others; "I will forgive but I cannot forget"—what this means in any particular case is impossible to say; generally, what it probably means is that we lay aside resentment and abjure retaliation, but this is not forgiveness, one element of which is that we do forget, not formally and mnemonic, but in a real practical living way. If we refuse to forget, when we are assured of real repentance, we do not forgive.

Thirdly, with regard to God.—Does God forget when He forgives? We may say, God is omniscient and eternal, and as such remembers all things for ever. But this is to argue from infinite categories to experience, and we cannot logically deduce experience in this way. Besides, to say that God is omniscient and therefore cannot forget is to limit God. Personality that can both remember and forget is less conditioned than an omniscient being that never forget. In forgiveness God is forgetting our sins. He is remembering them no more against us. He is removing them from Himself, as far as east is from the west.

mnemonically.
All who are at all conversant with the trend of philosophical and theological thinking in these days, know the importance, which such thinking has given to the conception and reality of personality. It is hailed almost as the master key, which is to unlock the door of all mysteries, which is to solve all the problems of religion and thought, which have hitherto baffled the mind of man. While we may not be able to share this optimism, and may feel that even with regard to many problems we shall still have to remain with a knowledge that is in part, we nevertheless feel that it is through personality, through understanding it, through attempting to apprehend it in something of the richness of its total reality - that we shall attain to the fullest measure of the truth regarding ourselves, regarding God, and the relations of man and God. We may hope that much, if only on the ground that personality is a category broad and rich in itself - and is the highest and fullest category available to man. It is a category that contains all the aspects and relations of which the human mind can be subject; if then only on the principle, that the larger the category, the more efficient the interpretation, we may expect much from the category of Personality.

The first question we would ask is, What is a Personality? For our present purpose it is not a technical analysis of personality that we so much need as an understanding of what we mean by /
by personality in our ordinary speaking and in our more reflective thoughts. What are the qualities of Personality which make it what it is? And we may begin with a definition which tradition has assigned, probably quite rightly, to Boethius:—*Persona est naturae rationabilis individua substantia*. This definition may not give us all that we require, there may be most necessary elements of personality which this definition does not cover; though, let it be said, that if the conception of personality can be put into a formula, this formula of Boethius in its explications and implicits, approximates as nearly to completeness as the limits of language will allow.

The definition says, that a person is an *individua substantia*. In these words we have, explicitly and implicitly, stated three accepted facts of personality,—its identity, its unity and its exclusiveness. These three facts are contained in the words *individua substantia*. *Substantia*, in general, translates the Greek word *ἐννενταος*. In Greek generally, *ἐννενταος* signifies the *substratum*, the underlying part, but in post-Aristotelian Greek philosophy, *ἐννενταος* came to be used of a concrete individual reality as distinguished from the universal in which the individuals are contained. So in the Greek theology the word *ἐννενταος* is used for the concrete realities of the Godhead, *ον* being reserved for the Divine totality in which the three *ἐννενταος* are contained. In all probability, we have then in the word *substantia* the two ideas of the underlying *substratum*, and /
and of concreteness, both of which the Greek word ἐνός τοῦς had implied in its history, the former in general and perhaps earlier usage, the latter in its theological usage. So Boethius in calling a Person a substantia is calling it a concrete reality which has an underlying identity. And it is an individua, that is, it has a unity in itself and is itself distinct from all other concrete realities. Unity, identity and exclusiveness or selfness are the features of Personality.

These features have been in the past questioned. The sensational school of psychology which turns the mind into a succession of feelings and states, has questioned the unity of consciousness; it is but a bundle of sensations; but what is denied is implied in the word "bundle", or in any word which attempts to describe the feelings and states of consciousness in their totality. Personal identity has been challenged on the ground of the imperfection of memory. I may say that "I am myself" in the specious present, and "I am myself" in those states and experiences which memory can apprehend, but I have no right to say that I was myself in those experiences which are not contained in the memory, but the continuum of experience implies an identical self, otherwise experience would be atomistic and without connection. Again, the exclusiveness of personality, that is, "I am myself and not another self", is lost on, say, a pantheistic system, in which the self is merged in a total self, but the rock of stumbling for such system, is that consciousness, which makes me say "I myself".

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We may assume with good grounds these features of personality unity, identity and exclusiveness. They are all asserted in the ultimate judgment "I am myself". But these qualities do not, of themselves, make up personality. We may assert these predicates of other realities than persons. For instance, a dog or a tree has all three. A tree has a unity, we can apprehend it as one individuum; it has identity, every time I look upon it, it is the same tree, it may have undergone change but through all the change, it remains that identical tree and not another. A tree is an individua substantia, it has unity, identity and exclusiveness; but we do not call a tree a person. And one reason is that the tree fails of one distinguishing feature of personality, it is not self-conscious, at any rate, we do not assume that it is, and we do not call it a Person. A person is self-conscious, has an awareness of himself and of some of his qualities. It is due to this awareness of self and its qualities that we say that a person has identity, unity and exclusiveness, he is aware of these things in himself and in other things, and this awareness is a feature of personality. This capacity for awareness is implied in the words of Boethius rationabilis naturae. But more than awareness or perception is contained in the word rationabilis naturae. Rationabilis implies mind that thinks and reasons, that makes out of its perceptions something that can be called a rational whole. Rationality is a feature of personality. But rationality is not sufficient to make personality. Mr Clement Webb /
Webb in his God and Personality takes an illustration to show that the rationality of a concrete individual, of an 
individua substantia, does not turn it into personality, the case of Mr. H.G. Wells's Martian. Mr. Wells's Martian is pictured as a rational and scientific animal capable of organising an invasion of this planet.

We may leave the question whether a rational animal, as a being in whom intellect and intellect alone prevails, cannot be called a person. Mr. Webb hesitates to do so; and probably, so would most of us. We sometimes say of a human being, he is not human he is an intellectual machine; no doubt the judgment is always an exaggeration, but whenever we make it, even in the exaggerated way, we are expressing the conviction that more than rationality is required to be a human personality. A person is not merely rationabilis naturae but moralis naturae. He shares in a moral nature, participates in a moral sphere. Morality is a feature of personality. Now morality implies a good or an ideal; it implies an imperative, it implies a certain freedom. A person is one who knows the meaning of duty, and the moral ideal and has some experience of fulfilling his duty and pursuing the ideal, has experienced freedom. But morality, added to all the features, would not make up a personality. If a man did his duty from the simple motive of the right, under the stress of the categorical imperative alone, we might call him a person, but we should feel he was a very undeveloped one. A moral being, on Kant's plan, is very much of a moral machine. He lacks love and the emotion that /
that love implies. Love is not an emotion alone, never is, but love is never without emotion. A being absolutely without love and absolutely without emotion, we should hesitate to call a Person.

We have still to make an advance for the complete comprehension of the conception of personality. That advance has been made implicitly in ascribing to personality the features of Morality and Love: the advance was made also implicitly in ascribing rationality to personality, but in the feature of morality the advance is clearer and more prominent. Morality implies an ideal, which transcends empiric reality, but which is yet in relation to personal reality,—something authoritative and attractive, a not-self which is higher than the self but with which the self has to come into relation to be truly its own self. In a word, personality, to be such, must be related to the Absolute or to God. This relation is expressed in the words faith, love, obedience, submission,—words that express religion. A person is related to God. Religion is a feature of personality.

The qualities distinctive of personality then are these, (leaving out those qualities of unity, identity and exclusiveness which, in some form, belong to existences other than persons,) rationality, morality with its implicates of ideality, duty and freedom and spirituality (the quality of religion). We are not to think of those qualities as existing as separate entities of personality. A rational person in a moral order would be a moral person and a moral person (as also a rational person) in a spiritual order would be a spiritual or religious person. These qualities /
qualities mingle and interpenetrate, the one with an other, in a personality. From these qualities, distinctive but not exhaustive of personality, we may attempt a construction of the conception of personality and here we may afford ourselves the benefit of the definition attributed to Boethius.

Personae naturae rationabilis atque moralis atque spiritualis individua substantia. A person is a concrete reality of a rational, moral and spiritual nature.

Objections may be brought against this definition of personality. It is an ideal, and a person is an actuality, and the true way to study a person is by studying what he is and not any ideal of him. To this objection we can reply, it is an ideal but reality must be studied not only in its empiric actuality but in its ideality, if it is to be well and truly known. In a true sense, the real is the ideal. The Psychology that confines itself to empiric actualities will never understand personality. If it remains purely a science and does not pass to philosophy, psychology will never understand personality, if it does not penetrate to that ideal real, which lies within the actual, it will not comprehend in any adequacy the meaning of personality. It is in its end, its realised ideal, that the meaning of any part of reality is best known. There is another objection which is scarcely necessary to mention, as an ideal conception the conception is a universal but a person is an individual and a particular, and so the description of the universal can never be /
be the description or definition of the individual - it will lack at least one feature of the individual, that is, its individuality. To this we may say that the individual is never merely an individual, it has universal reality in it, and the universal is never a mere universal - it would be empty, it contains its particulars. We may frankly admit that the conception is ideal. The actual persons that we know, the people we call persons are not, *persona*ae of a rational moral and spiritual nature. They are all more or less immoral, they are irreligious, unspiritual. But if you call a man irrational, immoral, irreligious you are at the same time, in a sense, calling him the exact opposite. You never would call a person irrational if he were not *natura*ae rationabilis, or immoral, if he were absolutely without conscience and the possibility of it, or irreligious, unless he had in him some capacity for God. The truth is we are not ideal persons; we have not the qualities of personality in their complete ideality, but we share in them and, because we share in them, because we are of them though not they themselves, we are persons. That is we are persons, and yet not perfect persons. That is, we are personalities in-the-becoming but, because we are in-the-becoming, we can truly say, we are persons. I am a synthesis of a person and a not person. Personality is the subject of the law of development. It advances from more to more; it advances to an ideal in its rationality, morality and religion. We are persons in-the-becoming, persons yet not persons.

Development /
Development then is a law of personality, which maintains itself only by development, a person remains a person by becoming more personal. The question which we have now to ask is, what are the conditions of a person developing personality and so remaining a person?

The conditions are a personal environment and a personal community. Personal communion, person with person, is the condition of the development of personality. This proposition will be found to be true, I believe the more that it is reflected upon. It may not seem to be true of the rational or intellectual development of personality. We develop in rational nature as we get into contact with factual existence. But let us suppose a keenly intellectual being, separate him from anything, to which the epithet "personal" can be applied, from all personal influences, place him before the material facts of the universe, what would he find, facts? yes, but he would find what the scientists call laws, order, connections, but what are laws, order, connections? they do not exist without mind, and if they are in nature, mind is in nature and it is through community with mind that this supreme intellect advances. The instance is an impossible one, impossible in itself for he was in community with mind before he began to advance, naturae rationabilis, a sharer in a rational nature before he began, and it is only through maintaining that community that he maintains or can develope the rational quality of his personality.

When /
When we think of the moral and spiritual development of personality, the condition will probably be at once accepted. We become better and we become more spiritual through personal communion with moral and spiritual persons. Now this condition of developing personality depends on a feature of personality which has not yet been noticed, but which we may call the law of personal reciprocity. A person is an individual concrete identity, it can not become another self, it may change but through the changes it remains itself and distinct from other persons and existences. But this distinctness is not to be carried to the point of absolute separation and isolation. A person cannot transfer itself, it cannot transfer its experiences to another by any kind of union or merging or being absorbed. But it can transfer its qualities (transfer may not be quite the right word) it can extend through its qualities its being or the modes of its being into another. If this were not so, such terms as personal influence, love, affection, reverence would have no meaning. Persons act and react upon another through their qualities, and it is because of this that personality develops in and through a personal environment. A personal community then is the condition of development for a personality.

We have now to lay down another proposition regarding the law of personal development, namely, that a personality never develops higher or further along the line of true personality than the height or completeness of its personal environment. A concrete instance /
instance may both state and elucidate the proposition. Saul of Tarsus would have remained a Pharisee of the Pharisees so long as he remained in a Pharisaic community: in that community he might have developed far along the line of personality, but never higher, never further than the community had attained. His rationality, his morality, his religion would have remained Pharisaic. It is impossible to transcend your personal community. That may seem to make all progress impossible. Is not progress due to the fact that some man in a community transcends the community and leads the way for others to follow? Was not that the way of Israel's progress, the emergence of a man transcending his community and leading the nation forward in truth and righteousness? Yes, but how does a man transcend his personal community, save by passing into a higher personal communion? Take the prophet of Israel, for instance, how does he transcend the personal community, in which he lives, by living in a higher, by personal communion with a more righteous God, by the personal influences of God. He transcends his day and generation, because his personal communion is not theirs.

We may say that a man develops by the persistent pursuit of ideals; true, but ideals are not abstractions they are personal qualities revealed through personality. A man does not invent or create his ideals: they are given, they are given through personality, and they act upon him through personality. We have come now to what may be called a corollary of the proposition that /
that personality develops through personality, and this is the corollary, namely, Personality develops along its true line, towards its ideal in the direction of perfect personality only in and through communion with perfect personality.

In the development of our thought we must now assert a fact about personality which has only been hinted at. We constructed a conception of ideal personality: empiric personality, as we know it, is not the ideal, at the best, it is only becoming so: but that is not the whole truth about actual personality, Actual personality has not always progressed: it has regressed. It develops, but, it also degenerates. It sins. This may seem like the introduction of something illogical or absurd, a disturbing element, an irrational surd; it is a fact. For a personality developing necessarily along its true line a personal community that was the ideal of righteousness might be enough to maintain and continue its true development. But a personality that has degenerated, needs something more and other than a perfect righteousness as the condition of its development. It requires a personality that is more than righteous, a personality that gives its quality to what is not righteous, to being which is the very opposite of itself. If the degenerate personality is to change, is to be regenerated into its true line of progress, it requires more than a perfectly righteous personality for its personal community. In a word it requires love which is righteousness communicating itself to its opposite, to existence hateful to itself. Personality that has turned, as it were, back upon its true self, that has degenerated,
degenerated, that has sinned, that is sinful, requires its return to development along the line of perfection, personal redeeming Love.

For the Christian, this perfect redeeming personality is Christ. We sometimes say that, if there were no Christ, we should have to invent one or create one for our salvation. But we cannot invent or create a Christ; Christ is the Christian ideal, but no more than any other ideal can He be created or invented. Like all ideals, He is a datum. Like all personal ideals, He is a gift given in and through personality.

Now this necessity for a perfect living and redeeming personality is not the necessity for an historical Christ. We do not need for our salvation an historical Christ, that is not the first religious necessity, not the necessity of personality facing in its empiric actuality its ideal task. What personality needs, is a revealed Christ. After all, the historical Christ is but the Christ that the historians give us, and it depends upon the personality of the historians what kind of Christ is given. A purely scientific historian could not give, could not give the Christ that man needs. It is a revealed Christ revealed to us personally, a Christ who has become our real personal community, that is the Christ that man out of his empiric actuality calls for.

But this revealed Christ is not a mere ideal. There are no more ideals. He is a personal Christ; and it would seem that an /
an historical appearance or manifestation were necessary, if His Personality were to have power corresponding to its worth. Personality tells most upon another personality, when it acts in its totality, when it is a consistent concrete whole, such as historical manifestation assures.

We can sum up in these words: There is no other name given under heaven whereby we can be saved. Through Christ, through that Personality, we are called back to the line of our true personal development; we enter truly into the law of progress, we are becoming personalities, not perfect personalities, but becoming personalities; that is, we ourselves are being saved, we are on the true line of our true perfection, but we are not yet saved, not completely. The New Testament does not regard salvation as a completed state, as a static final existence. We are "being saved"; we are becoming persons and there is no other name, in heaven above or in the earth beneath, by which we may be becoming persons, by which we may be, "being saved" than the One Perfect Redeeming Personality, whose personal glory shines upon His brethren so that they become persons indeed.
NOTE ON PERSONALITY: THE RELATION OF ONE TO ANOTHER

It is almost impossible in dealing with Personality and its relations to avoid falling into spatial terms. One personality of course, cannot be "transferred" to another personality; nor should we speak of transferring the qualities, for to do so is a hypostatising of the qualities which only exist in relation to the personality: They are not properties which can be conveyed from one person to another. While that is so, there is no doubt of the influence of one person upon another, of moral action and reaction. The explanation of this interaction is difficult, perhaps impossible. Such action and interaction imply an οὐσία, a common moral and spiritual substance in which the subjects of the action and reaction share, ἀνάμιγμα εἰς ἅπαν τὰ πάντα. Then in these interactions, each subject, both he that influences and he that is influenced, must be personally active. On the one side, he that influences is personally active in moral manifestation, he reveals something of the common οὐσία; on the other side, he that is influenced is active in receiving (?) what has been manifested, an activity which is only morally complete in moral manifestation. But, what he receives and what he manifests is really his own, his own, because it is a manifestation of the οὐσία in which he shares, and because he has personally manifested it. The person who influences, may we say? elicits, out of the influenced something which is his own and part of the common οὐσία, in which all
all share; and yet, the person who is influenced plays his part, an absolutely necessary part, in the eliciting process, so that what is elicited is really his own and not anothers.

(2) We have called Christ's personality a perfect personality and ours imperfect or in-the-becoming. The question may well be put, what is the meaning of perfect personality as applied to Christ? Wherein lies the difference between His and ours? Both the Redeemer and he who is being redeemed are ἐπεστρέφων; they are both finite-infinities; they are both of eternal reality. They are both, in some sense, pre-existent. If mere relation to the ὁσιότης is taken into account, this relation is common to both. Then, they both share in flesh and blood (Hebs. 11.14.). They are both subject to ἀπωθήσεσθαι (Hebs. 11. 18., 1IV. 15.). They are both tempted. They are both alike in their common origin, in their relation, as relation to reality; they are both alike in the finite conditions in which they reveal personality. Is then the difference in the fact that the Redeemer is ἰωπίγ ἡμῶν ἀποκλίνων. Does that constitute His personal perfection? However the words ἰωπίγ ἡμῶν ἀποκλίνων be taken in (Hebs. 4. 15.), whether they mean that Jesus was not subject to temptation that arises out of sin or simply He was sinless, they declare, although in negative form, His perfect moral purity. It is in this moral sphere that/
that His perfection resides, and, it is in this moral sphere that He is perfect and we are imperfect. But the words "moral perfection" are vague, and add little or nothing of meaning to the phrase "perfect personality". To the writer, the perfect personality or the moral perfection of Our Lord lies in His redemptive power and quality. It is in His holy, redemptive, love, in the power of it and in the quality of it, that He is personally supreme. His personality was, through and through, a redeeming personality, that completely, and, to the writer, that only. And the quality of Redeemer was supremely revealed in the Cross through which we interpret His perfect personality. In Him abode and abide the redemptive reality of God, in Him and in none other, in the same perfect quality and completeness. This is not given as a solution to the problem of the Person of Christ. It is only by way of, no doubt imperfect, answer to a possible and rightful question as to the meaning of a phrase. The problem is, to the writer, as insoluble as the Love of God. It cannot be solved; it is of ultimate reality. Why eternal redemptive quality appeared supremely and completely in this one, individual, personality, Jesus, we cannot say. It may be, as Hegel states in regard to the Incarnation, that the unitary individuality of the Idea requires this one individual personality for its concrete manifestations in history. So the one Eternal Redeeming God requires one concrete manifestation. The individuality of Appearance of Reality manifests itself in individuality of Appearance. That may be. It may be that some may find analogy in the appearance of genius. There may be analogy, but/
but it is not explanation. To the writer, Jesus is the revelation of Reality in its highest form of personal Redemption. He is the perfect Redeemer (and perfect Personality), because He perfectly redeems.
THE DEATH OF CHRIST AS THE REVELATION OF HIS PERSONALITY.

The Death of Christ is the supreme and central fact of the New Testament. It is the supreme expression of the personality of Christ and, as such expression, it is the supremely interpretative fact of Christ's life and work, of His total personality. Our present purpose is to attempt to express the relation between the Personality and the Death in such wise that each shall become interpretative of the other.

We begin with the statement, which the pages of the New Testament abundantly reveal, that the cause of Christ's Death was His love for the lost and sinful of the House of Israel. "This man receiveth sinners and eateth with them". That was the cause of His Death. It was not the prophetic call to repentance, not His enunciation of a higher code of morality, not the formal breaking of the Sabbath nor anything of the nature of Messianic claim that brought on the final disaster. It was His persistent identification with the sinful, the outcast and the lost. This identification alienated the ruling powers; it was their severe condemnation; it bred disappointment in the hearts of those, who hoped that He might be the political Messiah and who looked to Him for political redemption. Our Lord Himself recognised that this predilection for the sinful would bring about His Death. The Son of Man came not to call the righteous but sinners to Repentance; He came to seek and to save that which is lost; not to be ministered unto, but /
but to minister to the broken hearts and lives of the House of Israel - and because such was His purpose, He knew that He must give His Life a ransom for many.

To understand His Love certain things require to be said. And first, this Love had as its object the individual sinner. The parables in the fifteenth chapter of Luke are decisive on this point; but apart from these, Christ's whole ministry is concerned with individuals. The individual personality was His primary objective; upon him and for him He concentrated His spiritual energies and devoted His Life to his service. Exegesis and Christian theology, it seems to the writer, have gone somewhat astray in the emphasis, the most exclusive emphasis, which certain scholars have laid upon the idea of the Kingdom. No doubt this is a valuable idea in the sphere of Christian ethics and for the setting forth of what is called the social Gospel. Christianity may be quite truly represented as the pursuit of a realm of ends, a realm of persons spiritually and socially bound together in one life of faith and mutual service, but the emphasis with Our Lord was upon the ends rather than upon the realm. Personality with Him was ultimate and of supremest value. Whether or not the idea of the Kingdom was eschatological or spiritual, whether in His thought both conceptions were combined in co-ordination or sub-ordination - upon those points scholars may differ, but there is no doubt the kingdom, however conceived, was for the individual and not the individual for the kingdom, the latter was subordinate to /
to the former. His Love was personal; its end and object was
the concrete personality.

(ii) This Love in its nature was not a simple emotion, a kind of
overflowing pity for the sinful. It was supremely ethical and
purposive. It sought the redemption of the sinner through the
repentance which results in a radical moral change of the sinful
personality. The sinner, who was personally identified with
ever, must become identified with good, with no less good than
God's, for only so could He enter into that beatitude which per-
sonal Love desired for him. If we desire an easy going sympathy
with the sinner, a sympathy which bids him to treat his sin
lightly, it is not to Jesus that we must look. No one ever spoke
words of such biting severity for the sinner as Jesus. "Whosoever
shall offend one of those little ones which believe in me, it were
better that a millstone were hanged about his neck and that he was
drowned in the depth of the sea". He condemns the sinner, that
the sinner in the light of His condemnation, may condemn himself
and be redeemed from his sin unto righteousness. Christ's love
was righteous, it sought the righteousness of the sinner: it was
severe in its demands as all righteous love is; but, where those
demands are felt, where the sinner was turning from sin, it was
tender, gracious, but always, with the one end in view, the con-
version of the sinful personality into one that was righteous.

(iii) This holy love Our Lord conceived to be God's Love.
It was for Him no peculiar human enthusiasm for humanity, it was

not /
not an individual idiosyncracy: it was ultimate reality and truth; and the sinner in coming to terms with His Love was coming to terms with God Himself. Whatever were the contents of the God-consciousness of Jesus, this holy redeeming love was chief; in that love God and He were one, the Father and Son in perfect communion. It was this consciousness of unity with God that gave him His personal authority in presenting this love to sinful men. He did not explain it. He made no apologetic for it. It was God's love, possessing all the authority and right of God Himself.

(iv) This love was the expression of His Personality, was truly Himself, and as such was free. In this love He realised His own personality and was Himself free. He could do nothing else but love and save sinners, for anything else, that might have contradicted His Love, was not in His Personality. "He saved others, Himself He could not save". The highest freedom entails the highest ethical necessity, and because the necessity to love unto salvation was supreme, He attained in His Love to the highest personal moral freedom.

This love, personal, ethical, divine and free led to His Death, was the true cause of it. In the historical conditions in which He was placed, He could not cling to that love, live in it and for it, and not be crucified. He could only avoid the last tragedy by abandoning that love, by ceasing to be Himself. He could not deny His Own Soul and He was crucified.

But /
But the death upon the Cross did not destroy the Love of Christ. It could not. Love is stronger than death. Men say that by a spiritual instinct that is born of love itself, "We know that we have passed from death into life because we love the brethren." Love is of God and eternal as God Himself. And love is personality, it does not and cannot exist apart from a personality. The man who, through His Love, died upon the Cross, is from everlasting unto everlasting, an eternal, loving, Person.

So far was the death from being the destruction of Christ's Love that it gave to His Love its clearest expression and became its perfect revelation. Christ's death was not a natural one, (and here the true opposite of "natural" is not violent it was a violent death) it was supernatural. Its true, efficient cause lay in His Personality, in the realm of spirit not of nature; His death was due to Himself, it arose out of His Love. It is a superficial criticism to say, that such statements represent Our Lord as committing suicide; the real suicide would have been if He had not, freely of His Own will and at the impulse of His Own Love, died. Death, in such case, means the free abandonment of life, of life in the sense of natural existence and of everything considered of worth at that level. And so, Christ freely gave up life and everything on the level of natural existence; nay more, He of Himself became a crucified convict.

In this human world of ours love could find no higher expression; no higher expression is conceivable. "Greater love hath /
hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends". And yet, there was and is a greater love. He died not for his friends; He died for sinners, out of His love for them, the Just for the unjust, the Holy for the unholy. In this uttermost moral contradiction His love is revealed, transcendent and perfect; Himself and His love, His personality, is perfect, perfect in itself, perfect in its love, perfect with the perfection of God. As such, it is the response to man's deepest need for only through such personality can man truly realise his own personality and his own salvation. As a perfect personality He is the perfect Redeemer. Christ, through His death, is revealed as an eternal perfect redeeming Personality.

The position which we have attempted to maintain for the relation of Christ's death to His personality may be confirmed by the disciples' experience and interpretation of His Death.

The disciples were bound to Jesus by two bonds, (i) national prejudice and (ii) spiritual intuition. They hoped that He was the Messiah of Israel and, in this hope they clung to Him to the end, with the exception of Judas, whose keen political zeal showed him quite clearly that Jesus did not fit into his political scheme, and so Judas abandoned Jesus. The political bond in Judas was stronger than the personal. Peter's defection was temporary, and the personal bond with him was not finally and completely broken. To the end this political bond held them; to the last they hoped that it was He who should redeem Israel.

But /
But there remained the personal bond of His influence and moral power over them. In the days of His flesh He was continually revealing to them His Personality. They saw His love manifested to the sinful; they experienced that love and its power on their own lives. From the time of the episode at Caesarea Philippi onwards, He taught them plainly and insistently that His Love could only issue in His Death and only through death could His service be fulfilled. His mind and His heart were continually being revealed and communicated and they must have been slow of heart indeed if they received nothing of what was so revealed and communicated. The two bonds, the personal and political, acted like motives in their lives, unreconciled and irreconcilable in themselves, but each binding disciples to the Master. It was the moral irreconcilability of the two bonds or motives that was their weakness; it was the source of the misunderstanding doubt and suspicion in the minds of the disciples. They were, as the narrative shows, uncertain and doubleminded.

Jesus died. The question now is, how did His death act upon the motives, how did these motives react to His Death? The death ended their Messianic hope; it was the end of Jesus as a political Messiah. That gave free play to the personal motive which all along had been let and hindered by the political motive. Their vision was cleared; the impression which the Personality of Jesus had made upon them, the personality which they themselves, in spite of national prejudice and their own dullness of heart, had /
had received from Him, found freedom and expression and they declared, He is alive. He is the Lord at the right hand of God, God's true and real Christ, (so different from the Christ of Jewish expectation) He is the author of life and in His name is the remission of sins. By a spiritual intuition, the result and expression of the personality Christ had communicated to them, they declared these things. In Christ's light they saw the light. They saw in His Death the revelation of holy redeeming love. The Crucified became for them an eternal, divine, redeeming, personality.

Three objections can be at once raised against this interpretation of the disciples' experience, (i) that the spiritual intuition is an assumption, (ii) that a spiritual intuition is too slender a foundation on which to establish truth and reality, (iii) that it contravenes the traditional interpretation of the relation of the Cross to the Resurrection. An attempt must be made to meet these objections.

(i) The "spiritual intuition" of the disciples is an assumption. The conditions of such an intuition were, however, historically present. The disciples had been with Jesus, and as has been said already, the purpose and meaning of His Life could not have been altogether missed. His receiving and eating with sinners by its very startlingness must have struck their imagination, and its inward meaning must have touched their souls. And they themselves had been called to share in His mission to sinners; they had been sent to save the lost of the House of Israel.
Israel. He taught them plainly that His ministry involved death. True, they did not want to believe this; it struck right across their cherished opinions but the truth must have flashed in, time and again, like light piercing dark crevices. Then He did not die in silence. In the very hour and article of Death He prayed "Father forgive them, for they know not what they do". He prayed for His personal enemies, for the enemies of love and righteousness, for the enemies of God Himself. Out of His agony He spoke the word of deliverance to the penitent thief, and, at the last, in sure confidence, He commended His spirit to His Father. He died revealing the love and devotion, in which He had lived, the Spirit of Holy Service and obedience; died revealing His identification with God's purpose for sinful man, revealing the very Love, that had brought Him to His Death. It demands a spiritual obtuseness impossible to men who had been with Jesus, for the meaning of all this to remain hidden. The very fact of the death itself must have lent to their vision. No fact of life has greater power than death to still and disperse the selfish passions that blind our spiritual vision. Taught in the days of His flesh, taught in the very hour and article of His death, solemnised and quietened in their hot and selfish selves by the death itself, they received the vision of Perfect Redeeming Love, Christ's and God's.

(ii) A spiritual intuition is too slight a foundation for truth and reality.
A spiritual intuition is not apart from experience, reasoning and reason; it involves all processes by which we come to know truth and recognise reality, it is the expression of the personality purified and informed by the Spirit of God, which is the spirit of truth. It is the response of the Spirit of truth in us to the very truth of God. Of all kinds of judgments, it could be well contended that spiritual intuition is the most trustworthy, the surest guide to reality. It arises out of life and personality, it is not self-created, it is created by its object, which is truth and reality. When we say that spiritual things are spiritually discerned, we do mean that spiritual things will not stand the test of reason and understanding, we mean that truth and reality demand the highest and completest form of cognition - spiritual intuition.

(iii) It contravenes the traditional interpretation of the relation of the Cross to the Resurrection.

The traditional interpretation is something like this. Jesus died and the disciples were filled with hopeless despair: their whole spiritual experience was shipwrecked. This despair is usually emphasised in the interests of an apologetic, in which it is a large factor, but we may ask, did the Life of Jesus leave nothing behind in the hearts of His Disciples? That was a poor tribute to His personality. However, to continue the statement of the traditional view, the disciples were in blank despair, then something happened, an empty tomb, scenes in which He appeared /
appeared to them and declared His risen life. The miracle of the Resurrection turned despair into overflowing joy; it cancelled the shame of the Cross; it brought the Church into being. There seems, to the writer, something superficial and external in this manner of relating the events of the Crucifixion and the Resurrection. The psychology of the situation presented is difficult to understand. Could a physical resurrection or a resurrection of the Spirit or a combination of both have completely altered for the Disciples the meaning of His Messiahship, changed Him from a Jewish political Messiah into a personal, universal Messiah? And then, this interpretation changes the centre of the New Testament which is the Cross—that is the source of life in the New Testament; but with this interpretation the Resurrection becomes central, if it does not do that, it gives to Christianity two foci, the Cross and the Resurrection, and makes Christianity oscillate between the two. But the Cross is central for the New Testament, for the Church and for Christian experience. It is the constitutive fact of Christian experience, it is the one constitutive fact for Christian theology and, for what is supreme in that theology, the Person of Christ. Not that the Resurrection is denied, nor appearances doubted. On our construction, a personal resurrection with its manifestations is inevitable: the Holy One of God could not see corruption, the Personality, in whom the eternal Love of God was personally embodied, could not die. He shared and shares the very life of God nor could He live apart from /
from His brethren. And that life of God that was seen in Him was seen and personally received by His Disciples. They saw that life through the Cross. Through the Cross, through His Death, they saw the Eternal Redeeming Personal Love of God, incarnate, Jesus Christ the same yesterday today and for ever. He was alive and He was dead and, because He died and was dead, He is alive for evermore, the same loving Redeemer as He was yesterday in the flesh and today in the history and experience of man, the same in Himself, in His Personality, in His Love, from everlasting to everlasting.
In what sense can it be said that Christ bore our sins?

Two straightforward answers have been given by theology to this question (i) that He bore the punishment of them and (ii) that He bore our sins through and in Repentance. Criticism has already been made of those two theses, but in view of what has been said regarding Punishment and Repentance, a further word is perhaps necessary.

The inevitable Punishment of sin comes upon the sinning personality. He suffers loss in his person, sinks in the scale of personality, loses personal value. He may suffer other things, may be in the Physical order, but the inevitable punishment of sin is in himself. Others too may suffer through his wrongdoing, but their suffering is not punishment, for punishment strictly belongs to the offender and to the offender alone. With this view of punishment, it is impossible that Christ could suffer the inevitable punishment of sin: for that, He would Himself have to sin and the punishment would be the degrading of His Personality. Other arguments against this view are of course the injustice of the innocent being punished for the guilty, and the fact that punishment still falls inevitably upon the sinner, but the theory breaks down at once when we consider the true meaning of punishment.

Holders of this view, for example Dr. Dale, found support for their position in the cry of dereliction from the Cross, "My God."
God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" It is contended that there was a real alienation of God from Christ at the moment of this Cry; an utter complete separation of God from His Son; that such utter separation is the real and ultimate penalty of Sin and, that, in that moment, Christ bore the penalty of sin.

But in such an interpretation there are unwarrantable assumptions. The first assumption is, that this alienation is the last and completed penalty of Sin. God forsakes the sinner with an absolute forsaking. But is this true? The sinner loses communion with God; He is without the help, strength and joy of the Divine presence. But this is not due to the fact that God has forsaken him, but that He has forsaken God. The conception of God which Jesus has given to us is of a Father who is ever seeking His sinful children present with them in their sin, with them in the far country, though they know it not.

Again, it is an assumption, which the words do not warrant, to say that Our Lord suffered such alienation. He was in his death fulfilling the Will of God, He was obedient and loving; is it possible to think of God forsaking His righteous one in such situation? Further, He had entered into this great experience with the feeling that the Father was with Him, "I am not alone but the Father is with me". During the experience He prays to the Father. "Father forgive them" and at the close, to the Father He commends His Spirit. Again, if it was utter alienation of God, that is something which could not be experienced, to the Spirit utter /
utter alienation of God is nothingness - it could not be an experience of the penalty of sin: in such an experience Our Lord would not be "bearing" anything.

It is easier to criticise this dogmatic interpretation than to find an interpretation of which one is sure both of its adequacy and truth. There is a hidden depth of spiritual agony in this cry, which is beyond interpretation. We may remember that the words are a quotation, and that the Psalm, from which they are quoted, ends in confidence and assurance; and, it may be, that Our Lord began to repeat the Psalm for His comfort and strength. As such, it would not be the expression of a feeling of dereliction but of the assurance of the Divine presence. That is a possible interpretation.

It may be that the cry arose out of sheer physical weakness, which caused the triumph, which He had for a time hoped and expected would be the ultimate result of His Death, to be hidden momentarily from His vision. That may be. But that there was, even in such a moment of weakness, a feeling of utter dereliction is doubtful; the words "My God, My God" show that God was still present with Him.

There is another line of argument which calls for consideration. It starts with the judgment, that the wages of sin is death. Christ died, who knew no sin and received sin's wages, His death which was not his due is accordingly a substitute for ours. But there is no certainty that, if man had remained sinless, he /
he would not have died. Death is a feature of the physical order, and man, in so far as he belongs, is liable to death. The righteous die; no doubt, through Christ's death, the manner of their dying is different, they die in Christ. Christ crucified changes our values. But His death can be no strict substitute for ours. No doubt there is meaning in the judgment the wages of sin is death. Sin is moral and spiritual decay: it destroys freedom, love, true communion with God, and with our fellowmen—the very things in which personality lives and which are its true life. But Christ did not experience death in this moral and spiritual way. In His Death His personality rose to its fullest expression. Death was His hour and His glory.

The argument may take a different form. Christ died a criminal's death, and we sinners are criminals in God's sight. We deserve a criminal's death, from that we are delivered, because Christ bore the penalty of our crime. Christ certainly died the death of a criminal. He was pronounced guilty by the Sanhedrin and the Roman procurator allowed the verdict, and He was crucified. But that criminal verdict was not God's verdict; it was a false and sinful verdict, and a false and sinful verdict cannot be a substitute for God's true and righteous judgment. For the judgment of the Sanhedrin and Pilate upon Christ to be a strict substitute we should have to be liable to a similar judgment which, of course, is historically impossible.

Further along the line of the argument which has just been criticised /
criticised, it may be said that, as Christ died a criminal's death, He bore a penal judgment, in the sense, that the judgment was pronounced by the Court with legal sanction and involved suffering. We may grant, at once, that it was, in that sense, a penal judgment. But, if a court passes a penal sentence upon an innocent man, we say that there has been a miscarriage of justice, a miscarriage of punishment, it is not true punishment; to be that, it must fall upon the offender. If the suffering falls upon the innocent, whoever may impose it, it is not punishment, it is not felt as punishment by the innocent sufferer, it is affliction but not punishment. If God's punishment comes in, at all, in this operation, it falls upon those who have imposed the suffering wrongfully upon the innocent. God's judgment and punishment are inevitably upon them, whether they know it or not.

In no sense did Christ bear in his death the punishment of our sins.

Did he bear our sin in the action of Repentance?

This is the view Dr. Moberly following MacLeod Campbell though the idea was expressed much earlier by Rupert of Døntz. But Dr. Moberly's is the fullest modern exposition of this view. It is defended in the following premisses. A perfect Repentance would be a true Atonement, it would be a perfect atonement with Righteousness. But such Repentance is impossible to the sinner. Repentance is for him at once the great necessity and the great impossibility. Some form of vicarious repentance is a necessity not /
not as a substitute for the sinner's repentance, but to induce repentance in him. Vacarious repentance is not altogether unknown in human experience but it falls short of making true atonement for two reasons. (i) It is the repentance of the sinner for another and greater sinner, and (ii) one person cannot perfectly identify himself and his righteousness with another person. One personality may by sympathy and love enter to a large extent, but there is a limit. "I" can never become "thou". "I's" repentance can never become the repentance of "Thou". There is in the conditions of human personality a limit to the vicarious element. These two difficulties of human vicarious repentance, its moral imperfection and its strict limitedness, do not exist for Christ. As sinless, as altogether holy, a perfect Repentance, a complete identification with righteousness is His, and as "inclusive humanity" as man that includes in His personality all man, He can perfectly identify himself with men. In a sense, Christ is every man, and every man is in Christ. Christ in His Universal Personality repented and repents for all man's sin. He bears their sin in repentance.

Two criticisms must be passed upon this theory. First, its conception of Repentance is not of Repentance as we know it in moral experience. A perfect Repentance according to Moberly requires a perfect subject but, for such, Repentance is non-existent. There is in such a subject no terminus a quo and no terminus ad quem. Moberly has carried the conception to an infinity.
infinity, where it loses for us all reality. Again, the concept-
ion of Christ as universal inclusive humanity is difficult of
acceptation. It contradicts the concrete personality of Christ.
A personality is a self-identical subject. He is a "one" not an
"all". He is lost in universal inclusiveness. In merging His
self identity in the all, He loses His personal, concrete, identity.
In the days of His flesh Jesus was distinct from His disciples
and he treated them as distinct from Himself. He was Master and
they were disciples. And to Christian faith and experience
Christ remains a distinct personality, He is Lord, the believers
are subjects. He is always the Redeemer and they are the redeemed.
He is Himself, they are themselves. He stands at the door and
knocks and when He enters He remains Himself, and the heart into
which He enters remains itself. It is one thing to say that Christ's
vicariousness is for all, universal, in that sense; it is another
thing to say that He is all. An inclusive humanity is an abstract
idea and to call Christ such is to deny the reality of His person-
ality and of His own humanity.

The conception of Dr. Moberly is not that of the New Testa-
ment. There repentance is a real, concrete, personal, human experi-
ence. It takes place in the personality, and while it does not
destroy the continuity of personality, it is so radical, and so
morally evolutionary, that the moral structure of the personality
is changed so that it can be called a new creation. Such a rad-
ical change Our Lord did not experience in His personality. The
experience /
experience was alien to Him; it was unnecessary; it was impossible.

There is only one incident in the Gospel narrative that might appear to give support to the fact of repentance in the experience of Jesus - the incident of the Baptism. But the narrative shows plainly that the meaning of Our Lord's Baptism was not repentance. John's Baptism was a baptism unto repentance, and John recognised and declared that such baptism in the case of Jesus was unnecessary. Our Lord agreed with Him, but pleaded that it was becoming for Him to fulfil all righteousness; the symbol of baptism did not mean for Christ's personal repentance, but the fulfilment of all righteousness, of love for the sinful, of love taking sides, identifying itself with the sinful and making their cause its own. In the Baptism, Our Lord made Himself like unto His brethren.

Our Lord then did not bear in His sufferings and death the punishment of sins nor did He bear our sins in repentance. Both those theses testify to the feeling that Our Lord bore something; and in that feeling, they are at one with the New Testament. Is there any other sense then in which He could "bear" our sins? To this we answer "yes" and that He bore something greater than punishment, greater than repentance, something which cost Him more than either. But this requires substantiation.

(1) And first, Our Lord bore physical suffering which came upon Him through the moral blindness of others. The physical pain of the Crucifixion was the result of others' sin. This pain He /
He bore, and died under its awful stress.

(ii) Then Our Lord, all through His ministry, was bearing sin, in the sense, of bearing with it. The pain of this bearing was not physical but spiritual. To understand this pain at all, we have to keep in mind the character of His Personality. That personality was marked by its holy love, by its passion to have personality for its own sake and for God. Love was the highest and all prevailing element in His Personality. To a Personality inspired and informed by such a love, a sinful personality means spiritual pain, it calls forth deepest sorrow of the soul. This sorrow and pain Jesus experienced. "O Jerusalem Jerusalem, thou that killest the prophets and stonest them that are sent unto thee, how often would I have gathered thy children together even as a hen gathereth her chickens and ye would not!" This pain is impossible of analysis; it defies description. It arises out of the uttermost moral contradiction, Love meeting Hate, Holiness and Sin. It is the pain of love meeting what it cannot tolerate, what raises its whole opposition, something which it hates, something from which the whole soul of love recoils. In a holy and loving personality this pain becomes a veritable consuming fire. "How often would I ......... and ye would not!" express the sorrow of Holiness and Love. Our Lord bore it. And the sorrow was due to sin, and to "ye would not", and so it can be said, He bore our sins. He bore the contradiction of sinners.
It has been said that the cup which Our Lord had to drink was the knowledge that His Love had elicited the sins of others to the full. His Love made, as it were, sin to abound, and particularly was the cause of the sin of history.

The very love that would save was, as it were, in its result denying itself. This was the cause of His agony: this was the sinful burden of sin He had to bear. He felt the sin of those who betrayed and crucified, as though it were His own, as though He were the author of it. This interpretation seems psychologically doubtful. The sin was already there; His love had no part in its creation; it simply revealed it, in its exceeding sinfulness. The sin of the heart was to Jesus as sinful as the sin of outward action. And, indeed, murder is sometimes better out than in. Not till it is out can it be known for what it is, so blind is the heart to moral reality; and, not till it is out and known, can it be repented of. That Our Lord could feel morally responsible, in the sense of being the cause of the sin of those who slew Him, that this was the cup of bitterness which He had to drink, seems psychologically impossible. In His ministry He had no part with the Prince of this world and, certainly not now, at its close. He and the Prince of this world were enemies. Against the sin that finally slew Him, He fought and struggled to the last, fought in Holy Love and obedience to save his enemies. That fight against sin, a fight in which He gave His life, was His burden. "He bore our sin".

(iii) The /
(iii) The judgment, "He bore our sins", was the judgment of His Disciples, and it is from their point of view that we need to consider it. When Our Lord began to intimate the necessity of His sufferings and death they, the Disciples, failed to enter into His mind. Such a fate was not in accord either with their preconceived ideas or with the wishes of their hearts. But when His bearing with sin and the sinful was fulfilled in death and crucifixion, the truth broke in upon them. This suffering and death were for their sakes; it was a bearing of their sin. His Love for them had brought Him to the Cross. Doubtless, in coming to this judgment, in expressing their spiritual intuition, these Scriptures had helped them. The suffering Servant of Jehovah was now before them in flesh and blood. And the judgment which the nations had passed upon Israel of old, fell from their mouths. Once they had heard of Him with the hearing of the ear, but now their eyes beheld.

"Truly He was condemned for our transgressions. He hath borne our iniquities and by His stripes are we healed."

They knew that His Love had redeemed and saved them from sin. The cost of that Love was the Cross. He had not simply felt their sin, though to His Holy soul that was a bitter cup. He had died in saving them from their sin. In His sufferings and Death He bore their sin. That is He had borne the cost of their redemption from sin.

But "He bore our sins" was not only the judgment of the first disciples. The judgment is expressed in the perfect tense in /
in the New Testament, implying that the action is one whose results abide. He hath borne our sins is the judgment of every believer. The Christian does not think that His Lord's death, by itself, is the cause of His salvation or that there is any moral and spiritual in crucification. He is saved by Christ, by His Personal Love and obedience; by the receiving Christ's love and obedience into His personality. But that Love and obedience were expressed in their perfection through the Cross. It is in the Cross that He sees the Love that redeems him from his sin, and from the Cross by faith He receives that Love. It is because the Cross is the instrument by which the saving love is perfected and revealed, and because the Cross was a cross, a burden, a pain, a shame, something to be borne that he says, "He bore my sins on the Cross". To lose sense of the Cross is to lose sense of the perfection of the Love, it is to lose sense and hold of the Perfect Love by which redemption of personality is alone possible. It is to run the risk of losing our perfect salvation. When we say, that it is by the Cross our sins are forgiven, we mean that it is by the Holy Love which the Cross reveals and contains. Because that Love was revealed in a cross and could only be so revealed, we say, "He bore our sins."

Our Lord then bore (i) the consequences of the sin of others (ii) the sin of others, its awful contradiction and (iii) the cost of His own love in redemption. It is impossible to estimate all that is contained in this bearing. The physical sufferings were great, there was the shame of the cross itself, - its shame to /
to His heart— that men, His own countrymen, loved to do this thing, the awful loneliness. We simply cannot tell the griefs He had to bear. Here, if anywhere, His psychology is His Own. It is beyond us. Out of our own experience, through the bearing of our own Cross perhaps we get as near, as it is possible, to the meaning of what He bore for our sins. In repentance, we have a vision of our sinfulness, we see it in its simply vulgarity and we see it as hateful to God and with His holy and fatherly condemnation resting upon it. That vision of reality is not easy to bear. But that is not the whole of the moral process; if that vision has not to fade away, there is a battle to fight, there is a process of self-denial, of death unto self; that experience is not easy to bear; the bearing of our sins, by which we overcame them, the dying-to-live is entering in at a straight gate and walking in a straight path. This bearing of our sins is the result of the light and love that come to us in repentance, and the measure of our bearing is the measure in which this Light and Love have come to us, or rather, have been received in faith by us. But this Light and Love that we have received are Christ's Light and Love, rays from His Perfection. In His Light we see the reality and in His Love we bear our sins, we take up our Cross and die-to-live. Our bearing, our taking up the Cross, our dying are the results of His. There is a personal connection and we can, in a measure, interpret His through ours. But we do not bear through Christ only our own sins; we can bear one another's.
another's. We can see their sin, in His Light, in its reality; we can seek to give to the sinful that Light and Love through which we are being saved; we can know the contradiction of sinners; we can learn the cost of redemption. By taking up our Cross, by bearing sins our own and others that we and they may become righteous, we may become "saved" and enter into the inheritance of that personality, we may perhaps realise somewhat of the meaning of the truth that He bore our sins. In bearing our sins He passed through Gethsemane, He endured Calvary but Gethsemane and Calvary constitute a universe of moral experience, which we can only understand as we, through Christ, pass the same way and endure the same thing.

But there is another point of view from which the judgment "He bore our sins" may be considered. "Bore"(ἀναγόμενος) is in the New Testament a word with sacrificial relations. He bore our sins as a sacrifice to God. It is in its Godward aspect that we have to consider the meaning of Christ's bearing of sin, man's sin.

In this consideration we begin with the Christian conception of God. God is Personal. He is Love and Holiness. His desire is the holiness of His children. He desires that they share His Perfect Life. The chief end of God regarding man is that man may glorify Him and enjoy Him for ever. This loving and holy purpose of God is frustrated by man's sinfulness. Before God's purpose can be fulfilled, man has to be redeemed from
His sinfulness. This redemption is impossible to man, and so it becomes God's burden and responsibility. From two points of view this burden is God's (i) from the point of view of the Divine Personality itself as Holiness and Love; the personality of God cannot fulfil itself, God cannot rise to the heights of His Godhead without undertaking the burden of redemption, God would not be God unless He redeems, and (ii) from the point of view of man, God has to undertake this burden. Man is God's child, created by God, and, as such, man, in His need, has for God a claim upon Himself. If God is to be God and if His purpose for man is to be fulfilled, God must undertake the responsibility of redemption.

How can God fulfil His responsibility? We can imagine God as redeeming man by an act of Divine Will. But this would not be man's redemption. It would denude man of Freedom and true Personality. It would make man a moral automaton. Or God might give to man a moral law, in obedience to which man might realise his Personality. But the moral law, "Thou shalt", cannot redeem; it does not create personality in its full spirituality. Even if the moral law is fulfilled perfectly, man's personality would be defective on its spiritual side. The law in its highest and fullest expression is "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart and thy neighbour as thyself", if man were, of himself, to fulfil this law in this its highest form, he would not be saved. He would be independent of God and isolated.
isolated. His Personality would lack the highest element of spirituality, it would have no conscious sharing of the life of God. But man cannot love God without God. God must reveal Himself before man can love him, and He must reveal Himself as a Person, for it is only a Person not a law or an ideal that man can truly love. Nor can he love his neighbour without God, for in that love he is functioning the love and life of God who is Love. History is proof that man cannot redeem himself, nor can God redeem man by laws and ideals. If God is to redeem man He must enter into more personal relations with man than either laws or ideals allow. He must personally redeem man. He must enter into living personal relations with man, God's Personality must come into real contact with man. God has done this through Christ. Christ has undertaken God's burden of redemption. In His perfect personality, fulfilled upon the Cross, He has taken upon Himself God's burden. As a perfect Son, He is God's mediator of the Divine life to man. That divine life of Holiness and Love could only be perfectly mediated to man through a Personality in which they perfectly abode. Christ has done this for God. He has given to God a perfect satisfaction, the sacrifice of a holy loving perfect will. He has done God's will for God. He has effected God's great purpose for His sinful children. He has done this in His Life and in His Death and, in life and death He is the Son in whom the Father is well pleased. In bearing man's, He has borne God's own burden. In this bearing, the Father and
the Son are one, for it was only in the life of God, through God's Holiness and God's love, that Christ has borne the sins of men.

There are two questions which may be conveniently considered at this point (i) Was Christ's death necessary? (ii) Was it different from the death of the martyr, who dies for truth and righteousness?

(i) Was Christ's death necessary? History has answered this question in more ways than one. Christ's death was a penal necessity, necessary, if the righteousness of God, which demands the punishment of sin, was to be satisfied. Or it was necessary as a satisfaction to God's honour or it was a penitential act containing a perfect confession sufficient for the righteousness of God. Those views have been already dealt with and criticism of them is not again called for, and later in the chapter "The metaphysic of Atonement" the question of the divine necessity, of the necessity in God for Christ's death, will be considered. Here we may say that the real necessity of His Death lay in His Personality and the historical conditions in which His Personality found self-realisation. Our Lord could not have continued to be Himself and turned away from the Crucifixion. We can with truth say of Him Potuit non morti, allowing Him freedom of choice; but it is just as true, truer to His Personality, to say Non potuit non mori. The lower freedom Potuit non mori was really taken up into the highest freedom expressed in the Non potuit non mori - That highest freedom which is the highest expression /
expression of personality.

But suppose His Own had received Him, would His death have still been necessary? There is a certain futility in trying to solve imagined historical situations. But, with certain feelings of reservation in dealing with such questions, we may answer, "No". His death would not have been necessary, if His Own had received Him, the Revelation of Perfect redeeming love, into their hearts and life; they would not have put Him to death. The Romans might have done so, but who can construct imaginary history? If the Romans had received Him! The facts are,—His Own (the majority of them) put Him to death, and, being what they were and Pilate being what he was, they could do no other. Any historical event is necessary, when it has happened. It is the inevitable result of actual forces, if the forces were different then the event would be different, but, when it happens, it happens, because it is inevitable. We may say, Christ being what he was and his historical conditions being what they were, He had to die. May we go further and say that His death was necessary from the point of view of His Disciples and their need. It was only Death through the Cross, through all that it meant of Love and Holiness, that they could see the vision and receive Life and Salvation. Not till He died did they know Him; not till He died could they know Him. For His passion, the Death was necessary; for the understanding of His personal it was likewise necessary. Historical conditions do not create the /
the nature of reality (otherwise the Jews who slew Christ would be the authors of salvation) but they do condition its expression and revelation.

(11) Was Christ's Death a Martyr's death? Christian experience holds to the uniqueness of Christ's Death. The Crucified is the one and only Redeemer. But Christian experience has not always been quite clear on the difference between Christ's death and the Death of a man who dies for truth and righteousness. Sometimes, a vague phrase has satisfied the feeling that there is a difference. He was a martyr and more than a martyr. But how much is contained in the word "more"? does it express a difference in kind or only in degree? If the latter, then there is no real difference. Christ and the martyrs in their sacrifice are one. Sometimes, it is said, that the difference lies in the personality: this is true, but the way in which it is sometimes put, is very much like begging the question. "He was God", or "God was in Him" or "He was sinless", and this difference in moral person makes the difference in the death. "The infinite value of the Person constitutes the infinite value of the death" and makes it unique. Again, it has been said (Fairbairn P.C.R.) that the martyr's death is imposed from without, Christ's was not imposed from without but from within. Christ willed to die, the martyr dies, but not the result of his own will. Antithesis is not always a sure guide to truth. A martyr is willing to die: otherwise, he would recant. He does not recant he must be true /
true to Himself and, true to himself, he preserves his freedom; he dies.

We would state something simple.

Our Lord died like every other martyr, who has died for truth, for righteousness and for freedom. He died for those personal values in Himself and in others. But was He not the first to die through a pure, holy, redeeming love for sinful personality? The motive of Christ is different from the motives of all martyrs who went before Him. There was something national, parochial, particularistic in their sacrifice. They die for country, for an ideal, for truth. Christ died for the sinful personality. As such, His Death has no particularistic element. To say that He died for the sinful personality is to say that He died for all men - the former states the purpose of His Death qualitatively, in its connotation; the latter quantitatively, in its universal denotation. Dying in this way, He was the first born among many brethren. His Death has a spiritual distinction and a universality that belonged to no other. If others, after Him, have drunk of the same Cup, they have only drunk it because of Him. He stands alone. None can surpass Him for the Love revealed in the Cross was to the uttermost; if, through Him, others became like Him and are willing to undergo the same sacrifice, the glory of His Love shines forth exceeding and, to the end, He is Lord and they are disciples.
THE REDEEMER AND THE REDEEMED: FINAL AND PROGRESSIVE ATONEMENT.

So far, we have come to the conclusion that in the Cross, the Personality of Christ finds its highest expression and its fullest revelation: that in the holy love there revealed, in the giving up of life, with all that entails, for sinful man, we have revealed to us the very love of God Himself. His Personality, in the moral essence and content, is the revelation of the Personality of God: or, to use the old term, Christ's holy love is with the love of God. That Christ's love revealed upon the Cross is God's love may be of the nature of a value judgment; it is arrived at by what has been called a spiritual instinct. "Man must know the highest, when he sees it." It is further corroborated as God's love by its effects upon those who see it and receive it into their lives. It produces a new and divine personality in us. The judgment that Christ's personality is divine and produces a divine manner of life is made by man, on the ground that man has in him the Divine image and can know God, the fundamental ground of all religion. We have also seen that it is such a revelation of personality that man needs for his true personal development or moral salvation.

Certain questions now call for consideration. (i) Is the object of Christ's redeeming personality and work the community or the individual personality? (ii) How does the personality of Christ communicate itself and become of saving value? (iii) What is /
is the meaning of final and progressive atonement, and how are the two related?

(i) As is well known, Ritschl holds that the object of Christ's redemption is the community as a whole. He bases his position on the analogy of the Old Testament and on the exegesis of certain passages in the New. In the Passover, all the congregation of Israel take part, and in the ritual of the great Day of Atonement, the atonement is for all the sins of the people. In the New Testament the position is based upon such passages as Acts 20.28 τὰς ἰδιότητας τοῦ Θεοῦ ὑπὲρ σαμαίνεται λία τῷ δόξαν τοῦ Θεοῦ

also 1 John 2.2, 4.10, 1 Peter 3.18, Apoc 1.5, 5.9, and particularly in the Epistles of Paul. But against these can be placed certain other passages - Romans 3.26, διακονείται ἐν πάσῃ ἁμαρτίᾳ He ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ τοῦ Χριστοῦ λοι ὑπὲρ σαμαίνεται τοῦ Θεοῦ.

But, we may ask, while by no means depreciating true and careful exegesis, whether this is a question which is to be settled by the occurrence in certain passages of Scripture of a singular or a plural, whether it is not a question to be decided on the principles of psychology and clear thinking, and whether, with those principles, the distinction does not become unreal. The most pronounced individualist has no hesitation in subscribing to the words "the Church which He purchased with His Own Blood" or in saying, that Christ is the propitiation for our sins and not for ours only but also for all the world. But he would maintain that /
that Christ's immediate object was the individual personality, on the ground that His object was personality - human personality - which only exists as an *individua substantia*. One personality acts upon another personality, and if a personality acts upon a community, it is in and through the individual personalities. In a community, the individual personality is the true concrete unit.

But, as has been suggested, the distinction has an unreality about it. Christ does not redeem a personality into an isolation from all other personalities, but into true relations with all other personalities, and it is only in such social and personal relations that personality can develop and be saved. Again, a community, Church or Kingdom, has no existence apart from its concrete personalities and each of those terms is apt to become more or less an abstraction. If we say that Christ is the propitiation for the sins of the whole world, we mean that He is the propitiation for each and all of the personalities of the whole world, and only as those personalities, each in itself, is saved can the world be saved. It may be that the ultimate object of Christ's work is a saved world and a redeemed humanity, but in that *saved* and redeemed world, personality is the reality of value; and it is questionable, whether a scale of arithmetic, even that one saved personality is worth more than two, is at all in place, for this scale has no application in the realm of personal values. Wherever numbers or the communal idea becomes uppermost, there is lost something of Christ's appreciation of the absolute value /
(ii) How does the individual receive the new life in Christ. 
Salvation means, despite all formal logic, that A becomes not - A. 
A person becomes morally, spiritually and personally what he was not. The self becomes another self; the character becomes another character, the behaviour becomes another behaviour. 
Christ's personality enters into another without either losing distinct individuality. 
Now, at once it must be confessed that here is a mystery. We know that personality acts and reacts on personality. We see the effects of such action and reaction; we can formulate what we call laws of such action and reaction, but how the personal elements of one personality pass into another we do not know. We may say that on the one hand is Christ's life, His Motives and His Love, these are revealed, but revelation is more than intimation, it must be so to be spiritually effective; and, on the other side, there are personal faith and personal repentance. We may define faith (active through love and obedience) as the principle by which the qualities of one personality become the qualities of another personality, but we are simply giving names to, and describing, processes and fact, we are not explaining. The power of one personality over another is a fact, the effects of which meet us everywhere in the experience of life. 
Personality develops intellectually, morally and spiritually by receiving from other personality, God's Christ's and man's. The man of science receives the intellectual and creative elements in the /
the personality of God; he thinks God's thoughts after Him. The religious man receives the spiritual elements of God's personality. These become his and find practical expression in his life. The Christian receives the life of God, as revealed in Christ crucified; he receives the Holy and redeeming love and these become operative in him. To say that on one side is a revelation and on the other, there is faith, is probably the last word in the way of human explanation. And these, revelation and faith, are not to be conceived as two separate entities, they are complementary, each a necessary element in one living personal process. Nor, must we say that revelation is only "appearance": all appearance is appearance of reality and without appearance reality cannot appear, it cannot become faith, it cannot be revealed. Christ crucified then becomes Christ in us and the reality is testified to, by the Christian consciousness and by the moral and spiritual results of this union. The psychological process by which such union is affected may be described; but it shares in that mystery which is present in all personal communion.

In this process, the community plays its part. It is in and through a society that the individual personality experiences the saving effects of Christ crucified. It is through others that men come to know Christ; by others, in whom the redeemed life lives and operates, is the redeemed life communicated. We must distinguish in thought, however, the part which is played by the redeemed community and by the Redeemer Himself. In the redeemed community /
community, the life is historically derived; in the Redeemer, it is final and ultimate. The redeemed community is the channel; the Redeemer is the ultimate source. Both source and channel are necessary for the salvation of the individual personality. If it is said that the individual personality can attain to salvation apart from the community, that, through direct salvation with Christ say, he can experience the saving work of Christ, the answer is, that Christ only lives for us in an historical revelation and in personalities. It is only thus that He has been revealed and received into our world. A Christ outside history and outside personality, to which He has been revealed, is nonexistent. It might be said that an individual may come to the knowledge of Christ through the written word, through the New Testament, but we have to remember that the New Testament is just the permanent expression of the redeemed life in those personalities, which stand in closest historical connexion to the Redeemer. To receive Christ through the New Testament is to receive Him through the personal expression of a community of persons. Extra ecclesiam nulla salus is true when ecclesia comprehends all redeemed personality.

The community then is a necessity for the communication of Christ's personality to the individual: through the community the individual receives redemption, forgiveness and new life. It is not easy to define specifically the part which the community plays. The figure of a channel has been used; but the community, in /
in its redeeming activity is very far from being a mere channel, through which, as it were, the redeeming personality of Christ is communicated. The community can only be redemptive, in so far, as its personalities are redeemed, and are living the redeemed life, only, in so far, as Christ crucified is in them and they are in Christ Crucified; but personalities that have been redeemed in Christ are free personalities; there is a moral originality and spiritual spontaneity in their activities which the figure of a channel does not express, perhaps indeed hides. Freedom is an element of all human personality; but a redeemed personality has progressed in this element of freedom, and therefore cannot be likened unto a mere channel. The community in the work of redemption plays a free and personal part: It is only in such ways that personal qualities can be transmitted - (this is no doubt the wrong word but the right one is impossible to discover) - from one person or persons to another person or persons. They must be revealed, and the only way for personal qualities to be revealed is for them to be personally lived. The redeeming love and recreative qualities of Christ's personality revealed upon the Cross must be revealed in the personalities of the community; following in His steps they become recreative and redeeming. Here again, we meet the mystery of personal communication and personal influence - the mystery of how a person acts in a redemptive capacity towards another. There is, on the one side, a giving of love and in love, of holiness in holiness and, on the other /
other side, a receiving of these qualities. It is not a merging of one personality in another, for in the process of giving and receiving the personality on both sides is realised more completely; both the giver and receiver become more truly their true selves, and attain a fuller freedom and spiritual independence. Each becomes more truly a real person. In personal giving, personality is not diminished but increased; and in personal receiving of those personal qualities in which all personality realises itself, the receiver does not become the other from whom he receives, he becomes his true, independent, distinct self. No doubt, there is a deep underlying unity, without which there could be no giving and receiving between personalities; if every personality were, not only separate, but absolutely separated from every other, there could be no community of personalities and no personal communication; it is the personal unity in personalities that makes these things possible. "Pluralism" that has harmony in it, "a pluralism of spirit" involves unity. And this unity is no formal abstract principle, it is that unity in personality which the Christian calls unity in Christ. As each individual personality realises his true self, and becomes morally independent and truly free, he realises this unity. Redemption gives us our true selves and our true brotherhood. As we realise ourselves we realise the unity of personality, we become one in Christ.

It is of course possible to say that the community becomes effectively /
effectively redeeming and recreative through certain modes of its being, through acts and functions, through its sympathy and love for the sinner, through its prayer on his behalf, through that preaching which is the outward testimony of the redeemed life, and through its vicarious suffering on the sinner’s behalf, but how the reality of the redeemed life of which these modes and functions are the expression, becomes a reality in another it is impossible to say. A potential unity in personality, a revealing of true elements of personality in actual moral freedom and life, a receiving of these elements in faith and repentance, in newness of moral life, are conditions for the process of redemption; of these there is no further explanation, they are of the nature of ultimate reality.

The community plays a large part in the process of redemption but that part requires further definition. As has been said, the community is not a mere channel for personal things are personally communal. It is a community of saved personalities, and while a personality may be truly described as an end in itself, for it is of the nature of absolute value, no personality in the becoming and no community of becoming personalities is an end for other personalities. The only personality that can be an end of other personalities is a perfect personality, and the community is only redeeming and recreative, in so far as it is a personal means leading to the one end, the personality of Christ. As was stated in the chapter on Personality and Salvation /
Salvation, the condition of becoming saved is contact with a perfect personality; so, the Church's or the community's redeeming activity is mediatorial between the sinner and Christ, and its redeeming activity is enhanced and maintained, in so far as it subordinates itself to the one perfect personality, to the redeeming Christ. Ritschl gives great prominence to the conception of the community and the part which it plays and, the impression is sometimes created — though this was far from Ritschl's intention — that redemption is through adherence to the community, when it is really through adherence to the community's Lord, and the community can only be called mediately redemptive and, only that, when it is subordinate to, and a means of revealing the Crucified Christ. Imperfect personalities, though they may be saved, personalities realising themselves, are not the fundamental condition and source of salvation.

It may be pertinently asked here, if this conception of redemption through personality is any more than the theory of Atonement called Moral Influence. Now personality becomes redemptive through moral revelation and through faith: but revelation is more than intimation, it is more than moral influence, it is more morally authoritative and more personal, it is more of the nature of free personal action than influence, it is personal communication; and faith is more than imitation, it is more deeply personal and involves personal action and activity: moral influence may work unconsciously, but faith is always conscious of itself.
itself. Moral influence diminishes in its transference, as it passes from one to another and loses its original power and authority. The Redeemer is not an example that may grow dim with the passing of time; He is the revelation of eternal redeeming personality the same yesterday today and forever. The redeemed is not an imitator; he is a new creation. Redemption is more than Culture; Forgiveness is more than a law of life; Repentance is more than reformation, even more than obedience to an ideal. Moral influence is inadequate to explain personal revelation; its effects, inadequate to explain faith and repentance. Atonement involves both revelation and faith and moral influence is unequal to explain either reality.

To return to the part which the community plays in the process of redemption. It is a subordinate part, but a necessary part, in the history of redemption. This necessity affords an explanation of the fact that there are few that are saved. A perfect redemptive personality has been revealed and given to the world in Christ, but the whole world is not saved. Why is this man, to put the case concretely, not saved? Why is he living in spiritual bondage and self-destruction? It may be because he has not faith, because he has refused the possibility of new life; but, it may be that faith was impossible because the mediating instrument of redeemed personality has not functioned in his case. He may never have known the Love that redeems and lives in human form, the love that is tender to the sinner that pays for /
for his redemption and new life, the love that reveals the very love of the redeeming Christ. The vine-stock cannot bear fruit of itself: the branches are a necessity. Christ is a necessity for the community, but the community is a necessity for Christ, for the fulfilment of His redeeming work.

(iii) We now come to our third question, What is the meaning of Final Atonement and Progressive Atonement, and how are the two related? In the New Testament the work of Christ is represented as final (Rns. 6.10, Hebrews 7.27, 9.12, 10.10). It is once for all. On the other hand, this work is represented as being continued in the redeemed and by them (Col 1.24, 1 Peter passim). That is, in the New Testament redemption is presented as at once historically final and historically progressive.

Prima facie these terms, final and progressive, suggest contradictory: final suggests what is complete and finished "progressive" what increases in content and meaning. The ordinary Christian consciousness would probably accept Atonement as final: it is however doubtful, if it would accept the term progressive as just defined. In the Christian consciousness no increase of content or meaning is required or needed in Christ's atoning work. It cannot progress: it rather continues in its personal effects. Now here, there is manifestly some confusion of thought, which is due to our considering Atonement, now, under its historical aspect and, now, under its eternal aspect, and allowing the two aspects to cross into the logical sphere of each other. And /
And first, to regard Atonement sub specie temporis (historical), we may say of the Atonement of Christ as of every historical event that it is final in this sense, that it is never repeated. Every historical event and every historical personality is final and unique. It never arises twice with the same "appearance". And so, Christ's personality, the personality of the Redeemer and the personality of Christians or of the redeemed are, in this sense, each and all, final and unique. What we mean by progressive or continuous in this historical aspect is this that each and all of these "appearances" appear to us in succession, in an order of "before and after". In this order they appear distinct, though this order does not of itself constitute or exhaust their distinctness; they each and all reveal reality and each and all differ in the personal mode in which they reveal the same reality. Historically then, the Redeemer and the redeemed can be conceived as each final and each in a historical continuum: that is Atonement can be historically conceived as final and as progressive, though in the latter word there is more of import than the facts allow. But Atonement is not of the nature simply of historical appearance, it is part of reality, and as such is final and ultimate. To speak of Atonement when viewed as reality sub specie aeternitatis as progressive is then a contradiction in terms. To say that Atonement progresses to something greater or higher than itself is to say that it is not of the nature of ultimate reality. As ultimate reality, Atonement cannot "progress" to.
to something other than itself, even if that something other is in its own order of discourse. But while that is so, we do not regard Atonement as static; as reality, it is living and dynamic, and appears and is constantly appearing in every focus, situation or personality appropriate to its existence. As reality, it is like the living God, is indeed the living God Himself; and, as such, is ever appearing, ever being revealed.

Two questions suggest themselves at this point. The first is - What is the meaning of יְהוּדָּה יְהוֹשֻׁעַ, "once for all", as applied to Our Lord's Work upon the Cross. Plainly, the New Testament writers did not mean that when Christ fulfilled His vocation or realised His personality or completed His redeeming work upon the Cross, nothing further was required. We have still to work out our own salvation with fear and trembling, we have still to repent, we have to be born again and live in the newness of life. But it does mean, that in the Crucified there is a revelation of reality and of ultimate reality; we cannot get beyond or above it, it is of God. It is Love and Grace, it is Holiness and it is Redemption. And wherever this reality appears in the Redeemer or in the redeemed, the reality is יְהוּדָּה יְהוֹשֻׁעַ in this ultimate and real sense. But יְהוּדָּה יְהוֹשֻׁעַ means something else. It means that in the Crucified ultimate reality appeared in a unique way: in the mode in which it appeared in the Crucified, it cannot appear again; it means that holy, redeeming love, sacrificial unto death, the reality of realities, the very godliness of God, if we may say so, appeared, for the first time, in Christ Crucified. The Cross reveals a loving /
loving sacrificing God, there on Calvary, for the first time and for all time, that is, once and for all; and it is in this latter sense, of the Cross as a revelation in time and as revelation of reality for all time, that the writers of the New Testament seem to use the word.

The second question which arises is this - Is there one far off divine event to which the whole redemption moves? Is there a final consummation when all will be redeemed and the Redeemer's work will be fulfilled and ended? We may approach the answer to this question in the form "Is there one divine event to which the whole creation moves?" Now, of all ideas that of a beginning and that of an ending of creation are most difficult to conceive. We simply cannot think them. Being is eternal and to speak of a beginning and ending of eternal being is a logical contradiction. But we may imagine being or creation fulfilled or completed, for we may think of it as we think of a piece of mechanism, say a motor car or an aeroplane, which we sometimes call, on its completion, a perfect creation. Well; if the universe of being - total creation - were to be perfected and completed in that way, what next? The Creator has finished His creation, the creation in which He has lived and moved and had His being; - His creation has come to a complete perfect and static perfection. What then of the Creator? He must cease to create and, in ceasing to create, cease to exist. Creation, which was His very life is ended and with that His life too. And Redemption is but a form of
of Creation. It is creation in its personal, moral and spiritual aspect. And if Redemption, in which the Gracious redeeming personality of God lives moves and has its being, comes to an end, is consummated, final, complete and perfect, that is an end of the gracious Redeeming Personality, for it only lives in being gracious and in redeeming. The truth is creation is not a bit of mechanism, and a bit of mechanism is not creation or a creation. It is only by the importation of a false analogy that we ever imagine the universe of creation as being fulfilled and consummated in the same way as a bit of mechanism. Creation is a living experience, it is the expression of eternal being and as eternal as being itself. It is from everlasting unto everlasting. And Grace the divinest and real form of Creation is never fulfilled, it never becomes static. It holds within itself eternal energies and is the source, the ground and ratio of eternal redeeming activities.

We are perhaps nearer the truth when we say that creation creates itself or that the redemption redeems itself than when we talk of the beginning or the end of eternal life.

We may perhaps state what we have been trying to say in a simple and brief way. The good will eternally create its own problem; Love will create its own problem and eternally join issue with sin. Grace will create its own graciousness and be redeeming as it was in beginning, now and for ever more. Jesus Christ is the same, yesterday, today, and for ever.

Do we then never reach finality? Finality is nearer to us, nearer /
nearer to our reach and to our grasp, than we think, for finality
is not a far off divine event, it is the word of God, nigh thee
in thy very heart. It is the Cross of the Redeemer in our re-
deemed and ever living souls.

In conclusion, it may perhaps elucidate the problem with which
we have been dealing if we consider it in relation to Christ and
His Redeeming Personality. In Christ crucified, the reality of
God has been revealed once for all, the reality of holy redeeming
forgiving grace. It is once for all and ultimate, simply because
it is reality. But that reality, the personality of Christ, is
continually manifesting itself, appearing and realising itself in
the redeemed. It is this continual manifestation that is meant
when we speak of its progress or progressiveness. Progress is
the capture of the particular by the universal, or the sinner by
the grace of man by God. Progress is not a happy term but what
it truly means and finality are not, though they may appear to be
prima facie logical contradictions; they are complementary,
necessary to each other. For reality is never without its
necessary appearance. Love must reveal itself. And appearance
if it is not mere appearance, delusion or nothing, to be appear-
ance must be appearance of reality. Christ is the same, yesterday,
today, and for ever, because yesterday today and for ever. He is ever
appearing, ever revealing and ever redeeming. He is at once the
altogether lovely and the chiefest among ten thousand, the one
because He is the other, and the other because He is the one.
Note.

What we have written on the relation of finality and progress
by no means precludes the possibility of what is ordinarily meant
by 'moral progress' nor denies its reality, either in society or
in the individual. Redemption is the very basis, the prime
cause of all moral progress. Redemption has no final end, be­
cause it is an end in itself, and is of the nature of ultimate
reality; and, as such, never static, but eternally dynamic.

If the preclusion of a final static end of redemption makes
us feel a momentary hopelessness, we may remind ourselves of
Lessing's alternatives 'the truth' or the 'search for truth' and
of his choice. Browning illustrates the same feeling, as Lessing,
in his idea that to attain perfection is to fail; though he does
not apply the principle to the whole of existence, but only to
our mundane existence, as for example in 'The Grammarian's
Funeral.'
THE METAPHYSIC OF ATONEMENT.

We have attained to the position of a redeemed and redeeming community, a community in which holy love is operative, in which personality is recreated and in which it is ever advancing and realising itself: A community, in which there is one individual personality perfect in its redeeming love and holiness, and many other individuals imperfect in themselves, but in living contact, through faith and obedience, with the one individual perfect personality, the Crucified Christ, and, through that contact, each and all advancing along the true line of personality. In this community we have redemption as experience, a holy love with the inevitable pain of love in the denial of itself and with the pain that comes through its existence in a world out of harmony with itself. But, as it is in this denial of self, in self-sacrifice that love realises itself, as it is by dying that it lives, in this painful self denial is found the profoundest joy. We have this experience as an historic fact, and we pronounce this experience to be reality, for in it our personalities find their true and real selves. The Cross in Personality is for us the reality; personalities in whom the Cross lives and rules are real personalities.

The question now arises, does this experience, historic and real, presuppose or suggest anything beyond itself? We might remain content with this historic and real experience, content with /
with a redeemed and redeeming community. In that case, we should be holding a kind of "spiritual pluralism", we should be, in our refusal to advance to that beyond, which means metaphysics, consistently Ritschlian, (which few, if any, Ritschlians are) - in our relation to metaphysics. But such contentment is rationally and spiritually impossible. All experience involves metaphysics, and, in all our actual experience, we are consciously and unconsciously laying hold of that aspect of reality with which metaphysics deals. No experience is purely empiric; in all particulars there is something universal, and we are compelled in any actual attempt to account for experience to take into our consideration the universal and metaphysical element. Experience, no less than the Reason which asks, why and wherefore?, calls out for metaphysics. Still more is the advance to metaphysics felt to be impossible from the spiritual or religious point of view. A spiritual and religious experience without God as the ground and being of it all, is, to the religious man, an unthinkable absurdity. Without God, his experience would neither be spiritual nor religious. We are rationally and spiritually compelled to make the advance.

The experience of redemption in personalities leads, even in its more formal aspects, to the idea of One for whom the totality of such experience exists. It is an experience which contains harmony, each personality, while distinct, is also related to every other in the quality of the experience which all share: it further /
further, reveals purpose, for each personality contains a personal end that is common to all. This personal harmony and personal purpose suggests one who knows those relations and for whom they exist. But further, this experience is created. It is not self-originated. No doubt, some pluralistic philosophers (e.g. Dr. McTaggart) have seen no reason to advance from a universe of creative personality, potentially at least, omnipotent and omniscient, to one Creator, the ground and source of all, and are able to account for experience through a countless number of personal independent creators; but, apart from considerations of philosophic economy, those millions of independent eternal creators, do seem to require a One to maintain their harmony in a rational universe.

We may take it then, that a created experience purposeful and harmonious implies a Creator. And of the experience of redemption, in particular, the consciousness of its createdness is insistent. Our Lord said that He did nothing of Himself. He received all from the Father. The works that He did were the works of God. And it is of the very essence of religious experience that it is not of ourselves but of God. However much we maintain our moral and spiritual independence and our freedom, we maintain that that independence and freedom are due to our dependence upon Another. It is God that hath made us and not we ourselves.

We may conceive creation in many ways and form various theories of it, and of the relation of the Creator to the created. Of ultimate creation we have no experience; it is perhaps on the analogy /
analogy of genius and its so-called creations, that we approach nearest to the true idea of creation. The genius puts himself into his "creations": his creations are the expression of himself; in his creations, he creates himself. The analogy is far from perfect, for the genius and his creations are themselves ultimately created. But, in some such way, we can conceive ultimate creation. God creates Himself and only Himself, which is the positive way of stating, that creation is out of nothing. And in Redemption, in that form and process of Creation, He has created Himself. The Redeeming Love with all the sacrifice and pain, with its self-denial unto the uttermost, with too the joy of Love's realisation of itself, God's creation, that Creation, which is of Himself and part of Himself, is indeed God. The Redeeming Process, all the spiritual meaning and reality of the Cross is not mere appearance, a mere symbol of the word of God. It is the creation and revelation of God; It is God Himself creating and revealing. It is God Himself.

It may be objected to this way of stating the relation of God to the redeeming process that it is immanent and subjective, and that the transcendence of God and the objectivity of the divine redeeming work are ignored. But, let it be remembered, that in our view a redeeming loving God is the necessary ground and ratio of the redeeming process. Without a redeeming God, the redemptive process or the community of redeeming and redeemed personalities could not exist. And further, in the redeeming process itself, in /
in that process as it goes on, or, shall we say? as immanent in redeemed personalities, God is transcendent, in the sense, that He is redeeming those personalities according to His own ends and purposes of love. In the redeeming process God is immanent in us but, in becoming immanent in us through the revealing and communicating personality of Christ, He has not left behind, so to speak, the divine transcendence, the omnipotence of Love, the infinite and inexhaustible power of self-sacrifice, the eternal energy of self-giving. "Transcendent" and "immanent" express points of view which personal self-conscious beings may take up in regarding their own experience (or indeed in regarding any appearance of reality); we may think ourselves as agents apart from our activities or of our activities apart from an agency; in the former case, we are taking the transcendent point of view, in the latter, the immanent. God may do the same, His thought may now be turned upon Himself, now upon His creation or activities, though we would naturally hesitate to say, that the same necessity rests upon the ratiocination of God as rests upon ours; for, that we do so think, now, from the transcendent point of view, now, from the immanent, seems to be a condition of the form of finitude, in which our conscious being exists. But, when we turn those points of view into separate realities and divide reality into two parts, as it were, a transcendent and an immanent, each existing for itself, and in itself, the terms become unmeaning. All experience, even that of points of view, is both transcendent and immanent.
immanent, that is, it may be viewed from two different standpoints, it has different aspects. And God's experience, in this respect, is similar to ours. In His immanence, in His being in us - God is transcendent otherwise, His immanence would be of no worth, even if it could exist without His transcendence: and, in His transcendence, God is immanent, for transcendence to exist, necessitates some sphere of being, in which His transcendence is immanent.

In a simple experience, "the point of view" may be regarded as the subjective side, the aspect as the objective; and yet, from another point of view, the point of view might be regarded as transcendent and the aspect as immanent.

Perhaps this objection may be met by pointing out, that our way of stating the relation of the Redeeming God to His redeemed creation is not meant to equate the two. The redeeming and loving God is not simply and only the redeemed and redeeming community, as we know it, or as it has appeared in history. We do not identify God, the Redeemer, with the Church as it now exists, or as it ever will exist at some moment in the redemptive process. In a true sense, God, as the source ground and ratio of creation, is ever greater than the created; the Redeeming God is eternally more than His redemption. His redemption - the community of redeemed and redeeming personalities - worship Him as the source of their eternally redeemed and redeeming life, as One who has communicated to them His Life, which has become their own, and will eternally communicate it in greater abundance. In this sense, the Redeeming God /
God transcends His redemption.

A further objection may perhaps be raised, that this conception of God does not explicitly and definitely state the fact of His Personality. "The Creator", "The Redeemer",—Do these terms connote personality? Not, perhaps, in themselves. But when we remember that it is only through the energy of redeeming love that God can be the source and ground of Redemption, and that the purpose of that redeeming love is to communicate and to create personality; that it is only, as God possesses in Himself the true and highest attributes of personality, that He can communicate these, we shall not hesitate to state, explicitly and objectively, the personality of God. Any hesitation to do so is due to the fact that, in our ordinary thinking, personality implies identity of conditions, especially that of a particular bodily organism, which is not a necessary condition of personality but is of the nature of a temporary limitation. God, as the source and communication of personal life, is personal. To speak of Him as a stream, or a tendency, or a power making for redemption, is stating less than the facts justify. Out of the personal alone can the personal come.

We may say then, that the experience of the redeemed and redeeming community—that spiritual pluralism which the redeemed community is—implies and necessitates a One who is personal, One in whom and for whom the redeeming process exists. This One is the necessary ground and source of the Redeemed community. The experience of Redemption necessitates a redeeming God. This raises /
raises a further question. Is this redeeming God, this God of holiness and love, the absolute God? Is He not only the ground and source of redemption but of the whole universe, the one and only true God of all that is? in a word, is He the Absolute? The knowledge of God is of the nature of an inference from some part of experience. We come to know Him as Redeemer by an inference from the experience of Redemption. But personality has other experience beside that of redemption; for instance, through its perceptive and cognitive faculties, personality has experience of a material environment, of material facts and their relations, and, when we think out this experience, we find that it implies a mind for whom these facts and relations exist. The facts of the material world imply a Creator. Again, personality has a knowledge or experience of social and historical facts from which it infers an ordo ordinans (without such, there could be no real understanding of this class of facts) - that is, history implies a Providence. Every part of experience, every department of knowledge, suggests a one for whom the particular experience or particular knowledge exists, and whose experience makes (in some way unknown to us) the experience what it is. Are there then many ones - a Creator, a Providence, a Redeemer, each corresponding to the particular experience from which the one is inferred? Has each department of experience its own God? The unity of personality, the unity which pervades all personal experience and makes it into an actual, or, if not an actual, a potential whole, for there may be in personality experiences as yet unreconciled, but /
but which we always believe can be reconciled through further experience, - this unity of personal experience suggests, that the ground and source of this personal experience in all its variety are not many but one. Further, we find in our personal experience that it is through the higher values that the lower values are reconciled. Knowledge of the world may present to a personality irreconcilable experiences, but when to knowledge is added love, when knowledge is, as it were, subsumed under love, then, the experience that came through knowledge, becomes harmonised and finds unity. May we not pass from our experience, in this respect, to the divine and believe, that the creative and providential activities, that all workings in His whole universe, can be reconciled with redeeming activities and that these last give unity to the whole of the Divine experience? It is the highest and most real in our human life that gives meaning and unity to the whole; it is, as redeemed and redeeming, that we become truly persons; it is that experience, the most real that we can know, that gives unity and meaning to our personal life, that lights up our whole personality with a divine light. May we not say that it is that experience of God, - and, if there are degrees of working in God, - that highest and most real of His works which makes our experience of redemption possible, which gives unity and a glory of meaning to His whole life? Further, is it not through Redemption that Providence and Creatorship find their meaning? A God, who is only a Creator of the material world and of our selves, remains very /
Might it not be said, that it is through Redemption God finds the meaning and purpose of His whole life. That in Redemption He realises His personality? If that is so, Redemption becomes, in reality, the key to all personality, not only God's but ours, and the key to Creation and History.
very much of a mystery, a poor and incomplete explanation even of the material world and our created selves. A God, who is God ordo ordinans, does not explain the ordo ordinatus. In a word, it is only as we become redeemed and redeeming, ourselves the subjects of holy love that our personalities find meaning and unity: so is it with God's Personality, it is in the experience of Redeemer, as Redeemer of our souls that He becomes the One God of all our experience actual and potential, the God of all reality, the Absolute, the Eternal, the Infinite One.

But there is one part of experience which seems difficult to reconcile with a Holy Redeeming Personal God the One God of all reality, namely, sinful personality. Here we have, of course, the old everlasting problem of moral evil. The common theistic solution, that God does not sin; He cannot, being what He Himself is; but He has created free personalities with moral freedom which implies the possibility of sinning; He is not the author of sin but He permits it - this solution is supposed to save the absolute righteousness of God and it also maintains human responsibility. God then, is in no way responsible for man's sin. But it is doubtful if this solution gives perfect satisfaction to those who may use it; there is a feeling that we are still left with an enigma. God permits or allows sin, but this permission or allowance really involves some responsibility. Then again, it is not the whole truth to say that God has created free personalities; the personalities that God has created

"All that is real in the world is Personality, and God is the Absolute Personality."
created are imperfect and they have a limited moral freedom; in the situation in which they are placed, with the nature that is given to them, can they fail to sin? If we accept the universality of sin in the sense that all are sinful, not one is excepted, then the chance of freedom from sin seems to have been infinitely small. When these objections are felt, it is admitted, sometimes with a show of frankness, that God, in the last resort, is responsible for man's sin; but still, man is immediately responsible. How the responsibility is divided no attempt is made to say, perhaps wisely, nor what is meant by "in the last resort".

Can we find a better solution? It would be delusion to imagine that one person could completely and satisfactorily to every one, solve a problem that has baulked ages of thought, and the writer is under no delusion of that kind. The most that anyone can do, and that imperfectly, is to express the solution in which he finds most satisfaction, even with the confession, that the solution is far from perfect and not finally and completely satisfactory to him who makes it.

Now, with certain conceptions of God, the problem of moral evil is, to the writer, a hopeless enigma. If God is conceived, as so many conceive Him, as Omnipotent Benevolence, then moral evil, with all its pain and struggle, becomes to our thought a simply inexplicable, irrational fact. If God is Omnipotent Benevolence, why did He not create, why does He not create a world which is, in every part and parcel of it, "a felicific institution"? why, in His omnipotent /
omnipotent benevolence, did He not create us perfect creatures of pleasure, such as we might imagine the birds of the air to be? He cannot be perfect benevolence and have created this world of sin and sorrow this world of sinning and sorrowing men and women. Nor again, can we conceivé of God as simply Righteousness, absolutely and only Righteousness, consistently with the world as we know it. An absolutely and only righteous God could only create an absolutely and righteous world: He could not create an imperfectly moral personality: He could not be responsible for a sinful and a sinning world. A God of omnipotent benevolence, or a God of omnipotent righteousness, could not create such a world as ours with its sinful personalities. But could a God of grace have created another kind of moral world than ours, a world in which we learn by our failures and sins the Omnipotent Grace, the Holy Love that does not make us simply the denizens of a "felicific institution", satisfied with our environment, or the righteous creations of an omnipotent righteousness, that could lay no claim to independent moral being, but makes us to share in that Holy redeeming Love and ourselves to become loving and redeeming—a world in which forgiveness and repentance, recreation and redemption are the great realities? After all, this is the best of all possible worlds, a world whose source and ground is not the Omnipotence of Power, or Benevolence, or Righteousness but, of Redeeming Love. Can we imagine a better world? We can, and do by faith; but it is a world in which arises out /
out of this world and which has its being in the Love which has created this present world; but that is the best of all possible worlds, a world of eternal progress (we have dissented to the word progress but it is only to progress as popularly conceived in which time is conceived as the cause, as we see in such an expression as, "Time heals all things") a world, created for that purpose which is the eternal revelation of Redeeming Love, is the best world at every moment of its progress, for in it is God omnipotent in His redeeming Love.

God does not commit sin but He allows it, is not the best apology that can be made: we do not rid God altogether of the responsibility of sin. Is it not a better apology to say, that God does not desire to be free of this responsibility, to assert, that He has taken this responsibility upon Himself, and that He is equal to the responsibility; that, out of evil, He can win good, and, from the sinful personality, create a man in Christ? To say that God is in the world in gracious omnipotence bearing its sin and redeeming the sinful, paying all the cost of such bearing and redemption, able and willing to pay it unto the uttermost—when we have said that, we do not apologise, we begin to praise and worship. Shall we sin then that grace may abound? We cannot; to sin is to close the door upon grace; it is to limit grace, to destroy its manifestation. Grace reveals the sin, it makes us conscious of our sinful selves; it brings us to the truth, but grace is not only light, it is the power of love and redemption.
redemption. Grace abounds in our salvation not in our sin.
A God of grace, a world in which omnipotent grace reigns, need
no apologetic. This is the Christian's God and the Christian's world, revealed in Christ Crucified.