GOD, HUMANITY, AND THE FORM OF THE PERSONAL:
THE PHILOSOPHICAL CONTRIBUTION OF JOHN MACMURRAY WITH
PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY THEOLOGY

A Thesis Submitted to
the Faculty of Divinity
in Candidacy for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

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St Andrews, Scotland
1 August 2001
ABSTRACT

Recent trends in theology have created an environment where the thought of John Macmurray, a twentieth-century Scottish thinker and Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh, is increasingly relevant. In particular, the reemergence of a robust trinitarianism has raised issues surrounding relational concepts of person and the nature of the relationship between human and divine persons. Macmurray's philosophy is cited as a contemporary example of persons in relation which parallels certain Cappadocian and Athanasian notions of the Trinity.

The relationship between Macmurray's anthropology and his theology, however, is largely unexplored, due in part to confusion over the exact nature of his doctrine of God as well as the lack of a thorough exposition of his thought as a whole. Because of the highly integrated nature of Macmurray's work, one cannot properly understand the philosophical, anthropological, or theological dimensions in isolation from each other. Therefore, this thesis considers these three dimensions of Macmurray's thought, providing a systematization and clarification of his philosophy, anthropology, and theology.

Through the interaction between the philosophical, anthropological, and theological aspects of Macmurray's thought, the ontological and epistemological relationship between God and humanity surfaces. Ontologically, Macmurray clearly differentiates between God and humanity. Yet epistemologically, there is a necessary relation because all human knowing and reflection is conditioned and limited by human reality. Since Macmurray believes humans experience God, he believes all human knowledge of God must be expressed within the terms of human reality. This does not necessarily lead to anthropomorphism as long as one realizes one is speaking in a limited and theoretical fashion about God who is at least personal. Macmurray's thought is then used to critically engage the theology of Moltmann, Gunton, Torrance, Cunningham, and Lampe particularly with respect to their understandings of the divine-human relationship.
DECLARATIONS

(i) I, Jack Wisemore, hereby certify that this thesis, which is approximately 100,000 words in length, has been written by me, that it is the record of work carried out by me and that it has not been submitted in any previous application for a higher degree.

1 August 2001  
Date Signature of Candidate

(ii) I was admitted as a research student in October 1998 and as a candidate for the degree of Philosophiae Doctor in May 1999; the higher study for which this is a record was carried out in the University of St Andrews between 1998 and 2001.

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(iii) I hereby certify that the candidate has fulfilled the conditions of the Resolution and Regulations appropriate for the degree of Philosophiae Doctor in the University of St Andrews and that the candidate is qualified to submit this thesis in application for that degree.

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To Jennifer
Ian Andrew & "Winnie"
## CONTENTS

Abstract ..................................................................................................................................... iii  
Declarations .............................................................................................................................. iv  
Table of Contents ..................................................................................................................... vii  
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................ xii  
List of Illustrations ................................................................................................................ xiii  
List of Abbreviations ............................................................................................................... xiv  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>John Macmurray: An Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>Biographical Sketch</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>John Macmurray and Contemporary Theology</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>The Philosophical Dimension: The Form of the Personal</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>Nature, Tasks, and Methods of a Personal Philosophy</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.1</td>
<td>Philosophy and Its Tasks</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.2</td>
<td>The Legacy of Modern Philosophy</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.2.1</td>
<td>Parallel of Scientific and Philosophical Phases</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.2.2</td>
<td>Kant as the Crux of Modern Philosophy</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.2.3</td>
<td>Transcending Kant and the Critical Philosophy</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.3</td>
<td>Personal Logic</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.4</td>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>Epistemology from the Standpoint of the Agent</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.1</td>
<td>Experience</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.1.1</td>
<td>Personal Knowledge-in-Action</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.1.2</td>
<td>Personal Movement-in-Action: Action and Event</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.2.2 Christianity: The Historical Nature of the Religion

4.2.3 The Limits of Natural Christology

4.2.3.1 Scripture and Historical Method

4.2.3.2 Historical and Religious Experience: A New Dualism?

4.2.3.3 History and the Deity of Jesus: The Missing Link

4.2.4 Summary

4.3 Natural Pneumatology: God as Interactive Other—God as Spirit

4.3.1 The Dynamic Pneumatological Model: Relational Pattern

4.3.1.1 Spirit Relates to Particular Humans

4.3.1.2 Spirit Involved Pervasively in the Human Person

4.3.1.3 Spirit's Identification with Humanity

4.3.1.4 Human to Human Relations

4.3.1.5 Spirit as Prevenient

4.3.1.6 Relating Humans to Nature

4.3.1.7 Terms Spirit and Person Applied to God

4.3.2 Limits of Natural Pneumatology

4.3.3 Limits of Natural Christology

4.4 Conclusion
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Critical Theological Engagement: Some Contemporary Issues</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>Geoffrey W.H. Lampe: God as Subjective Spirit</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.1.1 Person as Subject</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.1.2 Mutuality and Unitarianism</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>David S. Cunningham: Rhetorical Augustinianism</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.2.1 Logical Form</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.2.2 Substantial Ontology</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.2.3 Natural Theology</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>Thomas F. Torrance: Christological and Perichoretic Epistemology</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.3.1 Epistemology</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.3.2 Pneumatological Subordination</td>
<td>238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>Colin E. Gunton: Trinitarian Relational Being</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.4.1 Anthropological Dependence</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.4.2 Trinitarian Ontology</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>Jürgen Moltmann: Contemplative Trinitarian Theology</td>
<td>251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.5.1 Institutions</td>
<td>254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.5.2 Science and Theology</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.5.3 Contemplation and Action</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.5.4 Perichoresis and Space</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>Summary Conclusion</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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St Mary’s College
1 August 2001
ILLUSTRATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>Positive &amp; Negative in Personal Logic</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>Dialectical Forms</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>Personal Logic and Dialectical Forms</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>Personal Knowledge-in-Action</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>Relations and Apperceptions</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>Religion, History, Philosophy</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>Factual, Valuational, and Communal Modes</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>The Form of the Personal</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>Principal Axes</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>Morality</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>Religion as Communion, Ritual, and Doctrine</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.12</td>
<td>Religion as Mutuality, Freedom, and Equality</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>Lauritzen's Taxonomy of the Self</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>Technical and Moral Relativities of Freedom</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>Increase in Technology is Increase of Freedom</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>Decrease in Moral Dimension is Increase in Freedom</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>Communion, Ritual, Doctrine</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BS</td>
<td>Boundaries of Science</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDP</td>
<td>Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CF</td>
<td>Conditions of Freedom</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH</td>
<td>Clue to History</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CS</td>
<td>Creative Society</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMW</td>
<td>Freedom in the Modern World</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IU</td>
<td>Interpreting the Universe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDT</td>
<td>New Dictionary of Theology</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIV</td>
<td>New International Version of the Bible</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCP</td>
<td>Oxford Companion to Philosophy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>Philosophy of Communism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PR</td>
<td>Persons in Relation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAS</td>
<td>Religion, Art, and Science</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RE</td>
<td>Reason and Emotion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSV</td>
<td>Revised Standard Version of the Bible</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA</td>
<td>Self as Agent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRE</td>
<td>Structure of Religious Experience</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRR</td>
<td>Search for Reality in Religion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
John Macmurray is the quiet giant of modern philosophy, the most original and creative of savants and social thinkers in the English speaking world. If his thought is revolutionary, as it certainly is, the kind of revolution he has in view is not revolt but the reconstruction of the foundations of life and knowledge with a view to a genuinely open and creative society of the future. His impact has not been as spectacular as that of Ayer or Popper, but it is incomparably greater for it soaks into philosophical, social and religious thought like sunlight upon the earth, with a similar result in living fruit. In what he has done through this teaching and writing there is a longer period between germination and harvest, for his thought penetrates deeply and pervasively into the foundations of human existence; if, then, he has not yet been appreciated as he ought to be, it is because he is something like fifty years ahead of the rest of us.

--Thomas F. Torrance

Thomas F. Torrance attests to the paradox of John Macmurray: original, revolutionary, penetrating, and yet strangely unsung. Macmurray’s thought is radical, not in the sense of primarily being novel, but in going to the root or core of the cultural assumptions of modernity. It is his conviction that many contemporary social, political, and religious problems can be tied directly to modernity’s underlying philosophy and its inadequate egocentric understanding of the person. Thus the pressing question for philosophy is the correct understanding of the person and the need to discover a logical form appropriate to the expression of this concept. In order to overcome the inadequacies of modern philosophy he makes two key substitutions at the foundation of philosophy. He replaces the Cartesian *cogito ergo sum* (“I think therefore I am”) with *ago ergo sum* (“I act therefore I am”) and exchanges the egocentric *I* with the heterocentric and mutually


1 SA, 31.
2 SA, 21.
constituting You and I. These modifications create a definition of person as the self-as-agent-in-relation-to-Other, or persons in relation, forming the primary core of his thought where “All meaningful knowledge is for the sake of action, and all meaningful action for the sake of friendship.”

1.1 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

John Macmurray (1891-1976) was raised in a deeply religious Scottish family. His father, originally a member of the Church of Scotland, was deeply influenced by the evangelical movement leading to an exodus from the Church of Scotland, first to Baptist congregations and finally to the Plymouth Brethren. Macmurray saw this not as a rejection of his father’s Calvinism but rather as an emotional augmentation. The young Macmurray was an enthusiastic Christian participating in teaching and even preaching. At both Glasgow University and Oxford Macmurray was an active member of the Student Christian Movement and served as the president of the Oxford Branch. He was also a member of the Student Volunteer Missionary Union, as he originally planned to be a

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4 “All this may be summed up by saying that the unit of personal existence is not the individual, but two persons in personal relation; and that we are persons not by individual right, but in virtue of our relation to one another. The personal is constituted by personal relatedness. The unit of the personal is not the ‘I’, but the ‘You and I’.” PR, 61; see also SA, 38. Similar to Martin Buber’s “I-Thou”, Macmurray’s position was developed independently from Buber. “In a personal letter to the author [Berry] Macmurray admits being influenced by the existentialists, especially Buber, but only as confirming a position he had already reached independently.” Cornelius Oliver Berry, “The Concept of the Self in John Dewey and John Macmurray: A Summary Critique,” (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1971), 217. When Buber was asked about Macmurray’s work in comparison to his own he commented that Macmurray’s was more philosophical while his own was more poetic. A.R.C. Duncan, On the Nature of Persons (New York: Peter Lang, 1990), 78. For a more detailed discussion of the relation of Macmurray to Buber, see Thomas Patrick McGloin, “The Personalism of John Macmurray: A Study of the Implications of John Macmurray’s Personalism for an Appreciation of the ‘Dialogical Principle’ of Martin Buber,” (Ph.D. diss., New York University, 1975). Although McGloin wrongly attributes the dependence of Macmurray upon Buber, his conclusion is still valid: “One may go so far as to say that Macmurray’s careful, cautious, personalistic prose is the philosophical explication of Buber’s profoundly magnificent poetry of the personal.” McGloin, 251-52.

5 Macmurray capitalized the “o” in Other in order to emphasize and strengthen the personal (rather than the objective) dimension of the other. This practice is followed by this author.

6 SA, 15.

7 The following biographical sketch is drawn principally from two sources, the autobiographical material found in Macmurray’s last work, SRR, and the excellent biographical article by Jack Costello, “The Life and Thought of John Macmurray,” in The Life and Work of John Macmurray Conference Proceedings, (University of Aberdeen, March 1998, photocopied).
missionary, acting as a substitute for his own father’s unrealized call to China, but poor health prevented him from going.

Macmurray later came to believe that his early evangelistic activity was not based upon his own religious experience. Yet he simultaneously held to the reality of his parent’s religious experience. The reality of religious experience and the absence of it in his early life led him later to reflect that the religious question was not one of passion or sincerity, nor was it primarily about truthfulness or satisfaction, but ultimately a question of reality and unreality.

From this I learned, in the end, how easy it is for religious conviction, in spite of the sincerity and passion with which they are entertained and expressed, to be imitative and imaginary, the products of a romantic sentimentality, or the symbols of pressures in oneself which are not themselves religious.... The dichotomy which governs religious experience is one between real and unreal. This is not identical with the intellectual distinction between true and false; nor with the aesthetic distinction between what satisfies or does not satisfy our emotions, even if it is related to these. For it is possible for us to have a real religious experience coupled with religious beliefs and practices which are fallacious and undesirable; or to hold sincerely and convincedly to religious beliefs and practices with no reality to sustain them.\(^8\)

In addition to the crucial formative influence of Christianity in Macmurray’s life and thought one must also draw attention to his interest in science and the scientific method. Although his headmaster and director of studies at Glasgow University insisted on a course in classics, he managed to wrangle an extra subject in science—chemistry (in school) and geology (at University), interests he maintained throughout his life. Of critical importance to Macmurray’s developing thought was the realization that the method of self-criticism employed in science is applicable to religion. “In the scientific field, I thought, one does not throw science overboard because a favourite theory has been shown to be invalid. Why should it be different in religion?”\(^9\) This provided Macmurray with the means to critically engage his faith without losing it as so many of his

\(^8\) SRR, 9.
\(^9\) SRR, 14.
contemporaries did. In Costello’s words: “But even as faith in Christ remained a fixed and indubitable star in his firmament, it became clear to him that its formulations and interpretations can and must develop.” According to the words penned in his diary when he was 21 years old, Macmurray believed “It is my duty to find the faith which satisfies the [human] need.”

In recounting the early influences in Macmurray’s life one must certainly include the impact of his falling in love (1911) and eventually marrying (1916) his wife Elizabeth Hyde Campbell, or as the young John Macmurray called her “Hydie.” Elizabeth was an artist and no doubt inspired, or at least contributed to, Macmurray’s interest in art and the emotional aspects of personal reality.

Costello argues that the roots of Macmurray’s thinking are observable taking form during his university years.

I am suggesting that these three features of acting, feeling and thinking—and their integral relationship to one another in John Macmurray’s later philosophy—have their roots formed and firmly intertwined in the young man’s three-fold transformation during his university years: his intellectual conversion to the primacy of scientific method and its capacity to be fully reconciled with genuine faith, his falling in love with [Elizabeth] Hydie Campbell and the conversion in sensibility and perspective that being in love gave him with regard to the foundational place of love in personal-judgment and action, and his transformed sense of mission and his call as a missionary, wherein he saw that action was the heart of the matter, but it must be constructive action for the building of the world. And at its heart, is his faith in Jesus who leads him in his thinking, feeling and acting. Jesus was the source and goal of his vision of a world community. Jesus was the fire of love by which this community could be realized. And Jesus was the gyroscope for discernment by which he formed his judgments and convictions about what it means for human beings to be real.

The second phase of Macmurray’s life may be seen as the period of World War I. As with so many the experience of that war would hold special significance to Macmurray, coloring his perceptions and attitudes towards life, European civilization, and Christianity. Macmurray first enlisted in the Royal Army Medical Corps due to

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10 Costello, 4.
11 Costello, 7.
pacifist concerns but later accepted a commission in the Cameron Highlanders. Due to constant exposure to death he came to lose his fear of death and in so doing felt he had somehow come in better contact with reality. The fear of death functioned as a symbol to him of all fear so that he deduced that fear somehow stands between the person and reality. “Without this knowledge of death, I came to believe, there can be no real knowledge of life and so no discovery of the reality of religion.”

The war also led Macmurray to become suspicious of modern European civilization and traditional politics. Macmurray and men like him were shocked not only by the fact that Europe could produce such an event but also by the general malice borne by the civilian populace towards the enemy—a malice which he did not find in the trenches. This was reflected infamously in the attitude he found in the churches. While on sick-leave in London he was asked to preach, in uniform, at a local church service. He chose to preach about the need to extend fair terms to Germany and to reach out in reconciliation towards the Germans once the war was over. After the service no one would speak to him. As a result of this experience he refused to officially join any institutional Christian church seeing them as being merely national religions. He still thought of himself as a Christian, still preached in churches, and defended Christianity; but he remained without formal membership in any church until after he retired from the University of Edinburgh and joined the Society of Friends (Quakers) in 1959.

Following the war Macmurray returned to finish at Oxford and launch his professional career. Macmurray’s academic career included appointments at Oxford (John Locke lecturer in Mental Philosophy, 1919), University of Manchester (lecturer, 1919), University of Witswatersrand (professor, 1921), Balliol College, Oxford (Fellow of Balliol College, 1923), University of London (Grote Professor of Mind and Logic, 1928),

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12 While attempting to lead his company to safety at Arras, Macmurray was seriously wounded by shrapnel. He later received the Military Cross. Costello, 9.
and the University of Edinburgh (Chair of Moral Philosophy, 1944). He retired from Edinburgh University in 1958 after having served the last two years as both the Professor of Moral Philosophy and as Dean of the Faculty of Arts.¹⁴

Throughout his life Macmurray was actively involved in social issues. While in South Africa he was involved both in the successful defeat of a poll tax and in securing adequate housing for blacks. He had a great interest in education and was a member of the Inter-University Council for Higher Education in the Colonies, helped establish Newbattle Abbey College, and was a board member of an experimental secondary school, Wennington. He also served as a board member and fundraiser for the New Iona Community. Perhaps his most visible activism was in what was known as the Christian Left. Macmurray was adamant in his opposition to fascism, yet was always one to chart his own course. He appreciated certain aspects of Marxist thought but never was a communist (and therefore seen by some on the Left to lack commitment). Nevertheless he was considered too left wing for many others. He also distinguished himself by constantly championing the importance of religion over politics, a very unpopular position in a time when totalitarian politics were everywhere on both the Left and the Right.

Despite Macmurray’s numerous successes (such as his popular BBC broadcasts on philosophy and religion, the Gifford lectures, numerous books, articles, pamphlets, and his popularity with students as a lecturer) his philosophical ideas were engulfed by the tidal wave of analytic philosophy that swept over the border from England. In later years he found he had more in common with the theologians of New College than with the analytic philosophers in his own department.

¹³ SRR, 18.
1.2 JOHN MACMURRAY AND CONTEMPORARY THEOLOGY

In John Macmurray’s own lifetime his concerns and thoughts were clearly on the margins of mainstream philosophy and found more acceptance among theologians and psychologists. In the contemporary context, however, one finds a number of Macmurray’s themes featuring prominently in philosophical and theological discussion. One may simply appeal to the near ubiquity of the term postmodern in order to justify the contemporary relevance of Macmurray’s thought with its critique of modern philosophy and his proposal for the remaking of philosophy on a personal foundation. It is not surprising then that Macmurray’s name is once again emerging in the midst of key theological discussions.

Broadly speaking one may classify recent literature regarding Macmurray within three non-exclusive categories. These categories are not exclusive because of the inherent integral nature of Macmurray’s thought which makes easy delimiting of topics nearly impossible. The first category are those treatments of Macmurray which are primarily concerned with his philosophy and overall thought. Codron’s comparison of Macmurray and Lonergan and Fairley’s comparison of Macmurray and Wittgenstein both fall within this category, as do more general introductions such as the works of Fergusson and Warren.

The second category are those which are particularly concerned with Macmurray’s anthropology and its applications. Shutte’s and Aves’ presentations are both

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13 Although this is not to deny similarities found in work of others such as Heidegger, Wittgenstein, and Ryle.
broadly anthropological in their focus, while narrower anthropological considerations are
demonstrated by the focus upon the emotions in both McIntosh and Morissey.18

The third category is centered upon theological and religious aspects of
Macmurray's thought. Zuber's analysis of religious education, Creamer's discussion of
spiritual development, and Largo's liturgical application of Macmurray all exhibit this
theological perspective.19

The most prominent references to Macmurray in recent literature come from
various trinitarian theologians who seek a non-individualistic, relational concept of
persons for use within their trinitarian formulations of the doctrine of the Trinity.
Typically this amounts to a description of Macmurray's anthropological definition of
persons in relation which is then used as a springboard to the relational discussions of
God found in Athanasius or the Cappadocian Fathers.20 The use of Macmurray in this
fashion raises an interesting question: what is the relation of anthropology to theology?
The fact that these trinitarian theologians do not immediately move from Macmurray to a
description of God implies that they are wishing to avoid the perception that anthropology
in some way determines theology—defusing the common charge that theology is guilty of
anthropomorphic projection. Yet for one reason or another he is still introduced into the

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"Persons in Relation: John Macmurray," in Persons, Divine and Human. Kings College Essays in
Theological Anthropology, ed. Christoph Schwöbel and Colin E. Gunton, 120-37 (Edinburgh: T&T Clark,
1991); Esther McIntosh, "Educating the Emotions," in The Life and Work of John Macmurray Conference
Proceedings, (University of Aberdeen, March 1998, photocopied); Michael P. Morissey, "Reason and
in Pluralistic Educational Institutions," Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1984; David G. Creamer, Guides
for the Journey: John Macmurray, Bernard Lonergan, James Fowler (Lanham: University Press of
America, 1996); Gerald Andrew Largo, "The Concept of Community in the Writings of John Macmurray:
A Study of the Implications of John Macmurray's Concept of Community for Roman Catholic Liturgy,
Council of Churches Study Commission on Trinitarian Doctrine Today (London: British Council of
Churches, 1989), 19; Catharine Mowry LaCugna, God for Us: The Trinity and Christian Life (San
discussion and must therefore provide some benefit to the discussion of the Trinity which a direct entry into Athanasius and the Cappadocians does not provide. Even while wishing to deny an anthropological determinism of theology the inextricable linkage between one’s understanding of God and one’s understanding of humanity is reaffirmed by the presence of Macmurray’s anthropology. The nature of this linkage is the unresolved question.

In addition to the odd deployment of Macmurray’s anthropology one finds only one sustained attempt at directly applying Macmurray’s anthropology to the doctrine of the Trinity—Mooney’s application of Macmurray’s understanding of love to Rahner’s doctrine of the Trinity. So, in actuality, one has virtually no critical engagement between Macmurray and trinitarian theology. Why is this so? What is it about Macmurray’s thought which makes it attractive, and yet simultaneously repulsive, to trinitarian theologians? The answer appears to be Macmurray’s doctrine of God, for while there is broad agreement on the general outlines of Macmurray’s anthropology, his doctrine of God resembles a theological Rorschach test which tells one almost as much about the interpreter as it does about Macmurray’s theology.

On the one hand there are those such as Mooney who appear to interpret Macmurray as a trinitarian; on the other hand there are those, such as Kirkpatrick, who clearly portray Macmurray as unitarian. There also exists a third group comprised of those who believe he did not care about the theological question. This signals a primary lacuna in current Macmurray studies regarding the actual shape of Macmurray’s doctrine of God.

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In order to understand the relation between anthropology and theology in Macmurray’s thought it is necessary to have a firm grasp upon his concept of God. Yet the plurality of opinions regarding his theology causes one to doubt if his anthropology is being comprehended properly. Macmurray’s thought is so highly integrated that if there is a misunderstanding or confusion in a major area such as his theology then it raises suspicions about the overall assessment of his thinking. To arrive at a correct interpretation of both the anthropological and theological dimensions of his thought one must have a good grasp on the philosophical dimension as well. None of these dimensions are understandable in isolation from the others.

In the search to discover how Macmurray’s anthropology relates to his theology one must not only understand his anthropology and theology, one must understand his philosophy as well. While the integrated nature of Macmurray’s thinking has often been acknowledged the consequences for understanding Macmurray have not been widely incorporated into the philosophical, anthropological, and theological treatments of his work. Therefore this thesis will undertake the task of providing a systematic and integrated understanding of the philosophical, anthropological, and theological dimensions of Macmurray’s thought. From the understanding of the relationships gained in this process one may critically engage various theologians particularly regarding the relation of theology and anthropology.

Towards this end Chapter 2 will be an extensive and careful exposition of the philosophical dimension of Macmurray’s thought. This is necessitated by the exploratory nature of his reflection and the need to clarify it in the face of misinterpretations. What will be offered is a coherent and systematic exposition which is not only faithful to Macmurray’s intention, but is also of heuristic value. In this major effort at systematizing

Footnote:
Macmurray's approach to philosophy and the philosophical tradition will be detailed and in so doing the importance of Macmurray's Personal logic will become apparent. It is Personal logic which allows him to speak of both unity and particularity simultaneously. Also shown in this chapter is his careful differentiation of knowledge and reflection so that one cannot know what one has not experienced, and one cannot think about what one does not know. Finally the importance of the communal, contemplative, and pragmatic apperceptions will be demonstrated as the heuristic and structural backbone of Macmurray's entire philosophy. The recognition of the significance of the apperceptions enables one to create a graphic representation of Macmurray's philosophy which is unique and heuristically valuable.

Chapter 3 will be an exploration of the anthropological dimension of Macmurray's thought. Utilizing the insights gained in Chapter 2 the discussion revolves around the loci of equality, freedom, and mutuality as means of clarifying his general understanding of persons in relation. Equality stresses the essential commonality of persons without ignoring the vital differences of particular individuals. Freedom is defined as the capacity to act through the integration of power and desire. Mutuality emphasizes knowledge, love, and communion with respect toward other persons. Of particular importance in this chapter are the clarifications, based in the preliminary philosophical work of Chapter 2, regarding the concepts of personal and impersonal relations and Macmurray's concept of religion.

Chapter 4 will investigate the theological dimension of Macmurray's thought through a consideration of his idea of God, his approach to the person of Jesus, and in the present interaction between God and humanity. Although this seems to have a trinitarian structure (theology proper, christology, pneumatology) it is not trinitarian in content. This

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See LaCugna, 259, for an example of this approach.
chapter will demonstrate that Macmurray does not believe human beings may have knowledge of God \textit{ad intra}, and therefore does not project his anthropology into his theology. Yet he does see the necessary conceptual link between one’s ideas of God and one’s ideas of human persons because the human person is the fullest conceptuality available to humanity. This chapter will question Macmurray’s failure to exploit the incarnation more fully—in a manner called for by Macmurray himself, and will ultimately classify his theology as a type of natural pneumatology.

Chapter 5 will consist of a series of studies of recent theologians viewed critically from a Macmurrian perspective. Each theologian holds a relational understanding of God, yet each one understands the relationality in a different way. The theologians engaged are G.W.H. Lampe, David S. Cunningham, Thomas F. Torrance, Colin E. Gunton, and Jürgen Moltmann. This chapter will demonstrate the theological relevance and applicability of Macmurray’s thought to contemporary theology, particularly in the discerning of the relation of anthropology and theology in the various theologians considered.
CHAPTER 2

THE PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSION:
THE FORM OF THE PERSONAL

Existentialism has discovered, with sensitiveness of feeling, that the philosophical problem of the present lies in a crisis of the personal: logical empiricism recognizes it as a crisis of logical form and method. Both are correct, and both are one-sided. The cultural crisis of the present is indeed a crisis of the personal. But the problem it presents to philosophy is a formal one. It is to discover or to construct the intellectual form of the personal.¹

The metaphor of discovery serves one well in considering Macmurray's philosophy, the Form of the Personal, for it captures the exploratory and probing nature of his method as well as his desire to map new terrain and blaze new trails in philosophy. It also alerts all who accompany Macmurray on this journey to the fact one must be open not only to the new and novel but also to new ways of thinking about the old and familiar.

This chapter is comprised primarily of a detailed exposition of Macmurray's philosophy, for while simple in its broad outlines (such as provided in the introduction), it is easily misunderstood in its particulars. The rationale for this rather comprehensive overview of the Form of the Personal is two-fold: immersion and systemization.

When one is immersed into a new culture one comes to understand it in a way that is not possible when one views it from the relative cognitive safety of one's familiar environs. Moreover, in the process of immersion one becomes acutely aware of the assumptions and habits of one's own culture in the contrast between old and new. The same is broadly true for radically different philosophical frameworks. The habits and assumptions of doing philosophy from the theoretical standpoint of the cogito are deeply

¹ SA, 29.
ingrained in Western philosophy and so it is vitally important that one become quickly acculturated to the strange new ways of thinking encountered when one does philosophy from the practical standpoint of the agent and persons in relation. Macmurray was quite aware of the difficulty of escaping the confines of the modern Western tradition and was concerned about slipping back into old patterns himself. This extensive survey of the Form of the Personal will foster quick acclimation to this new philosophical perspective and enable the reader better to discern between the experience of intellectual culture shock and bad philosophy.

Preexisting categorizations of schools of philosophy are among the most potentially insidious imports the reader may bring to the study of Macmurray's thought. Categorizations are not inherently insidious; they are often helpful. They become destructive when they function to obscure rather than to enlighten. Even a cursory survey of the literature shows that Macmurray is categorized in terms of—or at least believed to share major affinities with—pragmatism, empiricism, idealism, realism, existentialism, and phenomenology. One may view this as testimony to the unique, not easily classifiable nature of his work. To classify him as a philosopher is not wholly without difficulty, for by some estimations his concerns and methods lie outside the proper confines of

2 "My confidence, however, is severely qualified by a knowledge of the inherent difficulty of the task. It is one thing to discover the presuppositions underlying a historic tradition, and to recognize that they are no longer tenable. It is quite another, if that tradition is one's own, to track down all the effects of those presuppositions upon the body of belief and opinion which one has inherited. The influence of the old assumptions is pervasive and unformulated. It is not possible, even if it were desirable, to empty one's mind completely and start afresh in a condition of intellectual innocence. It is only to be expected, therefore, that I have carried over much from the old order that should have been left behind, and that my tentative theorizing will be found liable, at many points, to the objection that it still presupposes what it purports to reject." SA, 15 (US edition; British, 14).

3 For reasons of clarity, this thesis will refer to Macmurray's philosophy as the "Form of the Personal," while the form, or logical grammar, of his philosophy will be designated as "Personal logic." Macmurray uses the nomenclature "form of the personal" for both.

4 Note here also Macmurray's plea in "Some Reflections on the Analysis of Language" Philosophical Quarterly 1, no. 4 (July 1951): 319. "The originality of the pioneer consists in discovering and questioning the unconscious assumptions of current philosophy. He shakes himself free from habits of thought in which his contemporaries are bound. Yet he must use the same language as they, and lay himself open to inevitable misunderstanding. He is apt to find comprehension and support first among contemporary pioneers in other fields. To contemporary students of philosophy he is more likely to seem guilty of abusing
philosophy. John McIntyre refers to him variously as theologian, thinker, and only indirectly as a philosopher. In addition to his wide range of academic interests and his philosophical eclecticism, Macmurray is also difficult to categorize because he does not provide a scholarly paper trail. His writing style reflects an older scholarly tradition which rarely cites sources and influences, or provides bibliographies.

If forced to categorize Macmurray, the most appropriate category would be personalism. Coates, writing in 1949, describes Macmurray as the exemplar of "essential Christianity," one of four different streams of British personalism. Macquarrie places Macmurray under the category of Philosophers of Personal Being together with such thinkers as Buber, Heim, de Unamuno, Ortega y Gasset, Berdyaev, and Bulgakov. One writer acclaims Macmurray as one of the "pioneers of the personalistic movement in philosophy." Beveridge and Turnbull see Macmurray as the leading figure in what they refer to as the "Scottish Personalist School" which they believe was in step with language and defying logic. This is one of the reasons for the extensive citation in this thesis. To simply use Macmurray's terminology outside of its context inevitably leads to misunderstanding.

5 John McIntyre, The Shape of Christology (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1966), 131. The thinker designation is found in John McIntyre, The Shape of Pneumatology (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1997), 27 and 169; and he is mentioned as a philosopher only indirectly when he is mentioned as one having a personalist philosophy, 208.

6 The term eclectic is meant here in a positive fashion. However the charge of eclecticism (taken negatively) is denied by Kirkpatrick. "He was not, for all that, an eclectic thinker. Rather, in Duncan's phrase, he was a thinker of 'strikingly originality'." Frank G. Kirkpatrick, foreword to On the Nature of Persons, by A.R.C. Duncan (New York: Peter Lang, 1990), vii.


9 Yet Macquarrie also recognizes this is not an exact fit for "whereas some of the writers expounded above might be best described as prophets, Macmurray is determined to remain a philosopher." John Macquarrie, Twentieth-Century Religious Thought (London: SCM Press, 1963), 206.

It is interesting to note that when Moltmann lists various attempts to consider God as passionate (theopacy) he considers Berdyaev, Unamuno, a Jewish selection including Heshel and Rosenzweig, and Anglican sources. Jürgen Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom: The Doctrine of God, trans. Margaret Kohl (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1981), 25-47. Macquarrie's section on the "Philosophies of Personal Being" (193-209) is comprised of 4 sub-sections. The Russian subsection includes Berdyaev. The Spanish deals with Unamuno. While there is no mention of Heshel or Rosenzweig, Macquarries interacts with Buber and Buber which are often categorized with Rosenzweig. Macquarrie also does not have an Anglican section, but he does include, instead, John Macmurray. This leads one to believe that there might be a natural affinity between Moltmann and Macmurray at least in this area of theopacy.
continental philosophical trends, but out of step with the emerging British Analytical School.\textsuperscript{11} The Scottish dynamic demonstrated here is important. First, Scotland has historically been more open to the Continent than England. Second, philosophy in ancient Scottish universities was inclusive of four areas: logic, psychology (called pneumatology), moral philosophy, and physical science (natural philosophy).\textsuperscript{12} This ancient stream is more interdisciplinary and more conducive to a broadly conceived personalism.

However, even with the term personalism one must proceed with care, for personalism is often equated with the idealistic personalism of the Boston school.\textsuperscript{13} One cannot help but wonder whether some who label Macmurray as an idealist are reading him with a preconceived notion of personalism as inherently idealistic.\textsuperscript{14} Personalism, broadly construed, is philosophy which gives priority to the person and personal categories.

Personalism is a philosophy predicated upon the irreducibility and primacy of personal categories, that is, the kind of categories that govern the meaningful interaction among personal beings—categories of meaning rather than cause, of respect rather than force, of moral value rather than efficacy, of understanding rather than explanation. While we recognize the legitimacy of materialistic

\textsuperscript{10} McGloin, 12.

\textsuperscript{11} See Craig Beveridge & Ronald Turnbull, \textit{The Eclipse of Scottish Culture: Inferiorism and the Intellectuals} (Edinburgh: Polygon, 1989), 96. See also 75, 79, 110.

\textsuperscript{12} See Vincent Hope, "Scottish Philosophy" in OCP, 815-16.

\textsuperscript{13} See Rufus Burrow, \textit{Personalism: A Critical Introduction} (St Louis: Chalice Press, 1999) for a very recent introduction to personalism, which is almost exclusively focused upon the North American idealistic personalism of the Boston and USC schools. It argues the Bowne-ian form of personalism is both the fount and the most typical form, but cites the varieties which exist within the North American scene. All but one of the thinkers he considers are idealists of one form or another. Georgia Harkness is the only realist, and her move away from idealism to realism (under the influence of Hocking and Whitehead at Harvard) is described in terms of dualism—she is presented as a major anomaly in personalism (66-72). See also John H. Lavely, "What is Personalism?" \textit{Personalist Forum} 7, no. 2 (1991): 1-33, which is quite dismissive of non-idealistic forms of personalism.

\textsuperscript{14} For example, if one's primary exposure to personalism is from Copleston then one might assume that personalism is idealistic. Frederick Copleston, \textit{History of Philosophy}, vol. VIII Bentham to Russell (London: Burns and Oates, 1966) chapter XIII "Personal Idealism and Other Tendencies" (289-303). Also note that the index entry for "personalism" also has a cross reference to "idealism, personal" (568). There is no entry for "realism, personal." If one inspects the list of secondary literature in the thesis by Roy, one notices that those citations that deal with personalism are drawn from the North American personalist stream, i.e., idealists. With the exception of Buber, there are no citations of the continental personalists, such as Mounier. Louis P. Roy, ""The Form of the Personal": A Study of the Philosophy of John Macmurray with Particular Reference to his Critique of Religious 'Idealism'" (Ph.D. diss., Cambridge, 1984).
categories derived from the metaphor of need and satisfaction for certain purposes, we regard them as derivative, special case theories legitimate within the basic framework of personal categories.\(^\text{15}\)

Among the variants of personalism, Macmurray is closest akin to realistic personalism which is often seen to include Emmanuel Mounier, Jacques Maritain, Nicholas Berdyaev, and Georgia Harkness.\(^\text{16}\)

Instead of attempting to classify Macmurray's philosophy within existing paradigms and preconceived categories it is better to immerse oneself in the Form of the Personal and to develop an understanding of it from within. It is recognized that one can never completely disentangle oneself from one's own milieu, however a concerted effort can be made to minimize imposing foreign conceptual grids.

The second rationale for the detailed overview presented in this chapter is to provide a systematization of Macmurray's philosophy. This is not, however, a philosophical thesis, and therefore the thrust of this systematization will not be to answer fundamental philosophical challenges to Macmurray, but rather to clarify the Form of the Personal through an exposition of its own internal logic. Furthermore, this systematization should not be viewed in an analytic fashion for to do so would destroy the very nature of Macmurray's philosophy. It is a systematization of orderly presentation and correction of misrepresentations and misunderstandings of his thought. This systematization, as well as the immersion, also necessitates extensive quotation of Macmurray in the footnotes—demonstrating the basis of the presentation in Macmurray's writings.


It is absolutely critical to understand the exploratory nature of Macmurray’s philosophy. While there is amazing continuity in his work, there are developments as well. Moreover, anyone expecting a system of Hegelian proportions and structure will be sorely disappointed. Macmurray fully recognized this when he wrote at the end of *The Self as Agent*:

No attempt has been made to achieve a systematic comprehensiveness. The design has been to justify, as the philosophical need of the present time, the substitution of a practical for a theoretical point of view; and, thereafter, to indicate, in regard to a few selected issues, the modification of theory which seems to be required. None of these issues has been considered with the methodological thoroughness which their separate importance demands, nor has there been any pretensions to anticipate and answer the many objections to which such conclusions as have been reached are certainly open. Anyone who looks for a philosophical system, or demands a detailed and scholarly demonstration will be disappointed. Systematic scholarship is of the highest importance in philosophy; but it belongs to a later stage of the process which is here only initiated.

Macmurray often paints with a very broad brush. Being true to Macmurray’s own presentation, one will no doubt find oneself in the course of the following exposition wishing for more detail, qualification of a generalization, further development of a novel idea, raising objections, or questioning a definition. As will become quickly apparent there is simply insufficient room in one thesis to cover all the potential areas of scholarly interaction. This systematization will serve a theological purpose, for it provides the fundamental understanding of Macmurray necessary for the consideration of his anthropology (including religion), his doctrine of God, and for the critical engagement with contemporary theology.

First, this chapter will consider philosophy as Macmurray envisions it. Here questions about the nature of philosophy, its tasks, the relation of philosophical traditions,

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17 For example in the early epistemology of IU, Macmurray focuses primarily on the ontological orientation of the substantial, organic, and personal. By the time of the Gifford lectures the apperceptions, which are able to account for the insights of IU, are the primary heuristic tool. Most of this chapter is based upon the mature thought found in the Gifford lectures and RAS supplemented by appropriate earlier works, particularly IU, with an eye to possible development in his philosophy.

18 SA, 203. See also SA 13-14.
and formal expression shall be raised. Next Macmurray’s understanding of the epistemological process, comprised of experience, reflection, and verification will be pursued. Finally religion, art, and science as various ways of encountering reality will be discussed. This will conclude with a general schematic presentation of the Form of the Personal.

2.1 **NATURE, TASKS, **AND METHODS OF A **PERSONAL PHILOSOPHY**

The pressing question of contemporary philosophy, according to Macmurray, is the question of the personal. This question is simultaneously a single large question and simultaneously a series of smaller interlocking questions about philosophy itself: questions regarding the nature of philosophy and its tasks; questions pertaining to the relationship between contemporary philosophy and the philosophical tradition; questions about means for expressing the subject matter of philosophy. All these questions exist within the larger question and are oriented towards it.

2.1.1 **PHILOSOPHY AND ITS TASKS**

Due to the radical nature of Macmurray’s philosophy one cannot simply assume a definition of philosophy and apply it to his thought without risking extensive misunderstanding. Rather than presuming one must therefore enquire, what does Macmurray mean by *philosophy*?

Philosophy, according to Macmurray, is the attempt to express the reflective understanding of reality in its entirety. In short, philosophy is interpreting the

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"Philosophy, then, is the attempt to express the infinite in immediate experience through reflection. It would be equally correct to say that it is the attempt to express reality. For reality is essentially the concrete wholeness which characterizes immediate experience. Whatever is abstract, whatever is isolated and separated out from the infinite in which it has its being, become to that extent unreal. This, I think, is what Spinoza means when he talks of the unreality of the finite in so far as it is finite. To isolate anything from the whole in which it has its being is to destroy its reality by depriving it of the possibility of completeness. It becomes essentially incomplete and meaningless when torn from its setting. Reality, therefore, is bound up with the unity and completeness of the world in immediate experience of it. When any element in that
universe. As such, philosophy is an inclusive discipline which attempts to make generalizations about reality in its totality. Furthermore, since the universe is experienced as a unity Macmurray believes that philosophy must likewise strive for unity. Therefore, rather than disparate philosophies, only various attempts at expressing the one philosophy or particular aspects of that one philosophy exist. Since philosophy is tied directly to reality, Macmurray sees the ideal of philosophy to be a complete objectivity or rationality. This is not, however, to be equated with a sterile rationalism or passionless-objectivism, but with self-transcendence.

Philosophy is not created ex nihilo, but develops within a specific historical context as a response to problems encountered in life. Accurate reflection requires a proper understanding of the difficulty; therefore, the right question is paramount for philosophical reflection. The selection of the right question provides an excellent test case to demonstrate the difference between the theoretical standpoint of the cogito and the practical standpoint of the agent. In light of Macmurray's definition of philosophy as
interpreting the universe, one might suggest that the question of philosophy should be

"How shall we interpret the universe?" This question, however, is based upon the

primacy of the thinker—the question revolves around the theoretical activity of

interpretation or thinking—not the action of the agent. It is a completely mental exercise

which has no necessary connection to any reality outside the realm of ideas. Instead of the

purely theoretical question of how to think about (or interpret) the universe, Macmurray

begins with the practical question, "How can we know what we should do?" Parsing

this question reveals the existence of the epistemological dimension (thinking or

interpreting the universe) while simultaneously relativizing it within the larger

framework of ethics and action. In Macmurray's frequently quoted phrase, "All

meaningful knowledge is for the sake of action, and all meaningful action for the sake of

friendship."

Action is always particular and therefore always historical. Disregarding the

historical dimension leads to misunderstanding earlier philosophy and cripples any

attempt at constructing contemporary philosophy. Reciprocally, one may look to

philosophy in order to best understand the tenor of a particular historical period, including

one's own. Macmurray believes he lives in a transitional age for he discerns in

It is important to recognize that when Macmurray refers to action it is inextricably linked with the agent. There is no action apart from a person. For a devastating critique of theories of action (abstracted from the agent) see Paul Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, trans. Kathleen Blamey (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 56-88. See esp. §2.2.2.3 below for a much expanded discussion of the difference between theoretical activity and practical action.

It is important to note his second manuscript was primarily concerned with epistemology, IU. His first was actually a collection of radio broadcasts so it may be argued that Macmurray's first scholarly monograph was his epistemology.


SA, 24-25.

Macmurray believes that "The philosophy of any historical period reflects the life of the period even more evidently than does its art." SA, 25. The expression of social tradition is the raw material of philosophy; a way of life implies a philosophy. Philosophers spend much of their time making the implicit
phenomenology, logical empiricism, and existentialism harbingers of a new period of
history.\textsuperscript{35}

His final judgment of phenomenology, logical empiricism, and existentialism,
however, is that they are all inadequate to the philosophical task ahead.

Phenomenology’s\textsuperscript{36} retreat to the original Cartesian program with its goal of an innocent
immediate vision of the object\textsuperscript{37} is able to make contributions to the philosophical
enterprise, but is ultimately doomed to failure as a philosophical program.\textsuperscript{38} Logical
empiricism rejects all previous philosophy and metaphysics in favor of focusing narrowly
upon the question of language.\textsuperscript{39} By contrast, existentialism chooses to broaden the
questions of modern philosophy and abandons philosophical method.\textsuperscript{40} In spite of the
obvious differences between logical empiricism and existentialism, Macmurray discerns
both as opposite reactions to the breakdown of modernity:

both rest upon the decision that the traditional method of philosophy is incapable
of solving its traditional problems. But whereas the logical empiricists discard the
problems in order to maintain the method, the existentialists relinquish the method

\textsuperscript{35} For an account of Macmurray’s philosophical milieu see Roy, Form of the Personal, 7-17.

\textsuperscript{36} CDP notes that phenomenology is not so much system or school as it is a methodological conception, a
manner or style of thinking. As with all the philosophical categorizations in this thesis, one would wish to
emphasize the family resemblances of the particular categories and not insist on clearly demarcated borders.
The basic themes of phenomenology include: (1) the difference between natural and philosophical attitude
and hence science and philosophy; (2) the complex relation between science and philosophy, where
philosophy is foundational and science provides most of the problematics; (3) the turn from things to their
meaning; (4) intentionality (variably understood); (5) the basic question is the meaning and being of
beings—constitutorially as opposed to causally understood; (6) intuitionism. Thinkers who would be
considered within the phenomenologist camp (broadly construed) include Husserl, Scheler, N. Hartmann,

\textsuperscript{37} SA, 27. Grossman states that the phenomenological reflection includes looking at things without
prejudice. Reinhardt Grossman, “Phenomenology”, OCP, 658-60. It is this dimension of phenomenology in
particular that Macmurray focuses upon in his evaluation of phenomenology.

\textsuperscript{38} “Phenomenological analysis is a useful device. We can be grateful for it, and use it when we find it
helpful. But if it is taken as more than this; if it means that we go back to Descartes and the modern
starting-point and do properly what we have so far done poorly, we must answer that there is no going
back.” SA, 28.

\textsuperscript{39} SA, 27. Logical positivism, logical empiricism and analytic philosophy share a certain family
resemblance and one may see connections to ordinary language philosophy. Representatives of Logical
empiricism would include members of the Vienna Circle (Schlick, Bergman, Carnap, etc.) as well as A. J.

\textsuperscript{40} SA, 27.
in wrestling with the problems. So the latter achieve a minimum of form; the former a minimum of substance.\(^{41}\)

Rather than embracing one school of thought and rejecting the other, Macmurray characteristically opts to acknowledge the insights of each while attempting to move past them with the development of a new philosophy—the Form of the Personal.

Existentialism has discovered, with sensitiveness of feeling, that the philosophical problem of the present lies in a crisis of the personal: logical empiricism recognizes it as a crisis of logical form and method. Both are correct, and both are one-sided. The cultural crisis of the present is indeed a crisis of the personal. But the problem it presents to philosophy is a formal one. It is to discover or to construct the intellectual form of the personal.\(^{42}\)

2.1.2 THE LEGACY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY

Macmurray's emphasis upon the inclusive and historical character of philosophy renders his reading of modern philosophy crucial to the construction and understanding of the Form of the Personal.\(^{43}\) According to Macmurray, modern philosophy has two phases. The first, beginning with Descartes and extending to Hume, Macmurray characterizes as substantial.\(^{44}\) The second organic phase begins with Rousseau and extends through Hegel into the present.\(^{45}\) Crucial to Macmurray's reading is the placing of Kant ambiguously within this schema "stretching out a hand to both."\(^{46}\) In light of this Macmurray analyzes the parallel developments of science and philosophy, as well as specifically focusing

\(^{41}\) SA, 27.

\(^{42}\) SA, 29. Macmurray points out modern philosophy's contribution to the decline of religion and the apotheosis of the state as further proof of the contemporary crisis of the personal. SA, 29-31.

\(^{43}\) Macmurray uses the term modern philosophy for any post-Cartesian philosophy until the advent of existentialism and logical empiricism. For Macmurray the common denominator in all modern philosophy is its starting place in the cogito.

\(^{44}\) Macmurray also uses several other terms alongside substantial, such as material, Cartesian, formal, and analytic.

\(^{45}\) Again Macmurray uses various terms in parallel with organic, e.g., biological, idealist, and dialectic.

\(^{46}\) SA, 32. Roy places Kant and Descartes (and Macmurray) within the idealist camp. However, it is clear that Macmurray does not consider Descartes to be an idealist, and certainly does not consider himself to be an idealist (a charge that Roy levels at Macmurray). See Roy, Form of the Personal, 25. D. W. Hamlyn defines an idealism as the belief that "what is real is in some way confined to, or at least related to, the contents of our own minds" and states explicitly that Descartes is outside this boundary. D. W. Hamlyn, "idealism, philosophical" OCP, 386-88. Roy claims that his definition of idealism is derived from Macmurray and that it lies in "the practical, the emotional and the ethical aspects." Roy, Form of the Personal, 31. His argument seems forced at best. It certainly is not a definition of idealism that Macmurray would recognize.
upon Kant as the crux of modern philosophy in order to provide insight into the construction of the Form of the Personal.

2.1.2.1 Parallel of Scientific and Philosophical Phases

If science moves from an established physics to the foundation of scientific biology, we find that philosophy moves from a mathematical to an organic form. We should expect, then, that the emergence of a scientific psychology would be paralleled by a transition from an organic to a personal philosophy. The form of the personal will be the emergent problem.\(^4^7\)

The relationship between science and philosophy is, for Macmurray, a reciprocal one, each mutually informing and benefiting from the other.\(^4^8\) The substantial first phase is commensurate with advances in the physical sciences and the study of the material world. However, the limitations of this philosophical form are manifest when one attempts to go beyond the simply material and deal with the biological. From this Macmurray posits that the mathematical nature of analytic grammar undergirding the substantial philosophy is adequate for the determination of the material world, but not the biological world.\(^4^9\)

The second phase of modern scientific discovery can be characterized by the rise of the biological sciences and corresponds with organic philosophy.\(^5^0\)

Its key-concept is not substance, but organism, and its problem is the form of the organic. In contrast to the mathematical form, which is a combination of identical units, the organism is conceived as a harmonious balancing of differences, and in its pure form, a tension of opposites; and since the time factor—as growth, development or becoming—is the essence of life, the full form of the organic is

\(^{4^7}\) SA, 37.
\(^{4^8}\) "Now the outstanding feature of the modern development of knowledge has been the creation of the positive sciences, and this has meant that there has been a determining relation between philosophy and science throughout. The relationship has not been one-sided, but reciprocal. It has been the task of philosophy to create the conceptual forms and systems of categories which provide the logical structure, and so determine the general attitude of mind favourable to the production of and the reception of scientific knowledge." SA, 31-32. This is a similar position as is often found in Husserl-type phenomenology.
\(^{4^9}\) SA, 32-33.
\(^{5^0}\) It is interesting to note the relative historical relation of Hegel (d. 1831) and Darwin (d. 1882).
represented as a dynamic equilibrium of functions maintained though a progressive differentiation of elements within the whole.\textsuperscript{51}

Although one immediately thinks of the Hegelian dialectic, Macmurray’s understanding of this phase encompasses all philosophy based upon an organic analogy, including process philosophy.\textsuperscript{52} To Macmurray’s mind a critical lesson from the organic phase is that the rise of biology did not spell the end of the physical sciences, but rather their incorporation into a larger framework.\textsuperscript{53}

Yet, in Macmurray’s estimation, just as the substantial phase was superseded by the organic phase, now a new phase must emerge to supersede the organic. As justification for the emergence of this new phase Macmurray points to philosophical and scientific developments. Philosophically, the limits of the organic phase have been discovered in its inability to account for human persons in their individuality (Kierkegaard) or their sociality (Comte).\textsuperscript{54} Scientifically, Macmurray points to the rise of

\textsuperscript{51} SA, 33.
\textsuperscript{52} Although early in his career Macmurray stated that this logical form was expressed successfully by Hegel (IU, 115), it would appear that by the time of the Gifford Lectures he wanted to insure that it was understood more broadly: “It is the dominance of the biological analogy in philosophy which is decisive, and this clearly will cover all organic and evolutionary types of philosophy down to those of Alexander and Whitehead, not to speak of dialectical materialism.” SA, 34. For an extended critique of the organic model’s trajectory into skepticism see SA, 34-36. For an examination of the superiority of Macmurray’s philosophy compared to process philosophy for theological usage see, R.J. Blaikie, “Being, Process, and Action in Modern Philosophy and Theology,” Scottish Journal of Theology 25 (May 1972): 129-54; and Culbert G. Rutenber, “Macmurray’s Metaphysics of Action: An Alternative to Process Thinking,” in From Faith to Faith, ed. Dikran Y. Hadidian. Pittsburgh Theological Monograph Series, no. 31, 403-17, Pittsburgh: Pickwick, 1979. For an outstanding example of how Macmurray’s Form of the Personal can be used to critique a particular organic system see Amy Limpitlaw, “The Kingdom of God as a Unity of Persons: Pierre Teilhard de Chardin’s Organic Model and John Macmurray’s Form of the Personal,” (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 2000).
\textsuperscript{53} It is crucial to note here that biology remains a science and is therefore not a part of the organic unity-pattern. Macmurray notes that in the competition between the vitalists and the biochemists, it was the chemists—reacting critically and using the methodology of the physical sciences who carried the day, but that by placing these within an evolutionary framework the mathematical nature was transformed. Therefore, biology is a science and not an art because it maintains scientific methodology. SA, 34-35. Paralleling this in philosophy was the reaction of realism to idealism (which Macmurray sees as a form of organic philosophy) which denied the adequacy of the dialectical to describe all of reality: “Whitehead and Russell collaborated in Principia Mathematica; but while the latter interprets their joint achievement as a refutation of the organic idea, the former interprets it as leading to a realistic philosophy of organisms. However firmly realists may reject Hegelianism and its offshoots, and go back behind Kant to link up with the earlier mathematical period, the result is not to reinstate the concept of substance on its throne.” SA, 35-36.
\textsuperscript{54} SA, 36-37. The connection of Kierkegaard to existentialism is common knowledge, but one should also be aware of the connection of Comte to positivism. See Michael Ruse, “Comte, Auguste” OCP, 145.
the psychological sciences as an indicator of the rise of a concomitant third phase in philosophy.\textsuperscript{55}

Since philosophy must include the personal in its field of inquiry, this can only mean that we must abandon the organic form as inadequate for the philosophical purpose, and initiate a search for the form of the personal.\textsuperscript{56}

### 2.1.2.2 Kant as the Crux of Modern Philosophy

Kant is unique in the comprehensive unity of his thought. He does full justice to the first, Cartesian phase of modern philosophy. As to the second, it has been said with truth that all subsequent philosophies have been built out of the ruins of the Critical philosophy. I should prefer to say that until we come to those new tendencies which have been generated by the breakdown of tradition in our own time, every significant movement in philosophy since Kant can be derived from the Critical philosophy by rejecting parts of it; and by reasserting what any of them has rejected, the premisses for its refutation can also be found.\textsuperscript{57}

Macmurray sees Kant’s Critical philosophy as the crux of modern philosophy, for it shows a clear break in the tradition (Kant’s so-called Copernican Revolution) and is, by Macmurray’s reckoning, the most adequate of modern philosophies: “so that in discussing Kant we discuss, in principle, all modern philosophy.”\textsuperscript{58} Furthermore, not only is it the crux of modern philosophy, but in concluding reason is primarily practical, it points the way forward.\textsuperscript{59}

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Nephew notes that Macmurray’s project has certain similarities with Kierkegaard, yet arrived at independently and with an interpersonal rather than the individualistic emphasis found in Kierkegaard. Albert Henry Nephew, II. “Philosophy is Theology; The Nature and Function of Philosophy According to John Macmurray” (Ph.D. diss., Marquette University, 1970), 7-8. Macmurray also notes the similarities and claims to have arrived at the insights independently. SRR, 24.

Macmurray was acutely interested in psychology and the challenges it posed for science and philosophy. His book length treatment of this is BS. Included in Macmurray’s usage of the term psychological sciences one should probably include the social and behavioral sciences.

\textsuperscript{55} SA, 37.

\textsuperscript{56} SA, 39.

\textsuperscript{57} SA, 39.

\textsuperscript{58} SA, 39. “The organized wealth of original and profound conceptions and of subtle analyses which is the Critique of Pure Reason contains, of course, the seeds of many modern philosophies. Concentration on the positive doctrine of the Dialectic to the exclusion of most other theses of the Kantian system leads, as we have seen, to pragmatism. Concentration on the doctrine of the Transcendental Logic as a whole to the exclusion of Kant’s ethical works leads to a non-phenomenalist (non-Berkeleian) empiricism or positivism—provided the table of the Categories is not taken too literally. Twisting the Dialectic into a logic of truth leads to metaphysical systems of the Hegelian type. Even phenomenology and existentialism contain many recognizably Kantian elements. They certainly at least abound with Kantian terms.” S. Körner, Kant (Hammondsworth, UK: Penguin Books, 1977), 125-26.

\textsuperscript{59} See Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason, 5:119-22. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. and ed. Mary Gregor, with an introduction by Andrews Reath (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
The immediate context of the Critical philosophy is, according to Macmurray, the Romantic Movement, which preceded Kant and to which Kant may be seen as a sympathetically critical. The primary distinction between Romantic and Cartesian philosophy revolves around the function of imagination in knowledge. In sympathy with the Romantics, Kant holds that the imagination undergirds all cognition and that perceptual experience presupposes a transcendental synthesis. Yet it is this very fact that creates the huge dilemma for Kant:

The discovery that the productive synthesis of the imagination is the root of all knowledge makes knowledge itself problematical. For it means that we invent our knowledge; that knowledge, in some sense, is fictional.

In order to resolve this enigma, Kant developed his Critical philosophy and its central doctrine of transcendental idealism with its dualism of the world of apprehension (phenomena) and the world of the thing-in-itself (noumena). Kant denies human knowledge of the thing-in-itself. Knowledge is the determination of an object by means of concepts, which are rules for manipulating elements of sensory perceptions. Concepts may be either empirical or pure. The pure concepts—also known as categories of the understanding—form an interlocking pattern forming the laws governing thought and

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1997). "The effect of seeing Kant through Hegelian spectacles is to shift the centre of gravity of Kant's thinking so that it falls within the Analytic of the Critique of Pure Reason. For Kant himself it falls within the Critique of Practical Reason: while the most important section of the first Critique is the Dialectic. Indeed the vial conclusion of the Critical philosophy as a whole—and it is one which points beyond Kant's own achievement—is that reason is primarily practical." SA, 40. For the importance of this conclusion see also Henry E. Allison, "Kant, Immanuel" OCP, 437.

60 Hamann, a romantic and proponent of Faith Philosophy lived contemporaneously with Kant in Königsberg and it was Hamann and Herder who first used Hume against Kant, thus wakening Kant from his dogmatic slumber. SA, 41.

61 SA, 43. Macmurray points out that because the Romantics were younger the chronological relationship is often misunderstood.

62 SA, 44.

63 SA, 44-45.


65 SA, 46.

66 SA, 49.

67 SA, 49.
make the empirical concepts possible. The cogito is the transcendental unity of apperception—an objective unity so that “To know is to apprehend an object. Truth is objectivity.” But the inherent dualism in Kant’s thought between the thing-as-known (phenomenal) and the thing-in-itself ( noumenal) is unacceptable to many, for example causing the Romantics to reject Kant and leading to Hegel’s development of dialectical idealism.

Kant’s investigation into the nature of reason and its conclusion that practical reason has primacy over pure (or theoretical) reason is of the utmost significance to Macmurray. Reason is constituted by unconditioned ideas concerning the ultimate nature of things, while understanding determines objects by discovery of their conditions. The metaphysical temptation is to use ideas from reason, which are purely formal concepts, to provide knowledge of that which is beyond conditioned existence. Reason simply acts as a guide to the understanding in the production of knowledge and is thus primarily practical, not theoretical:

It is only when we turn to consider our practical experience as agents, and not our theoretical experience as thinkers, that we discover the true character of reason. This is the final and quite revolutionary conclusion of the Critical philosophy. Reason is primarily practical. It is not a faculty of cognition, but a faculty of rules. If it has a secondary, theoretical function that is because thinking is something that we do; so that Reason is necessary to provide the rules that

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68 SA, 50.
69 For a general discussion of Kant’s formulation of apperception, see Körner, 61-67. “If we tried to express Kant’s distinctions roughly in more ordinary terms we might say that a manifold of presentations may or may not be an it which can carry the burden of properties and relations.... There can be no it unless there is an I which could be aware of it and thereby of itself. (The possibility of this relation between I and it is the pure or original apperception.)” Körner, 62.
70 SA, 51. The roots of Macmurray’s philosophy in Kant are apparent here, in that Macmurray uses the nomenclature of apperceptions and holds strongly to the idea of objectivity. Apperception is not so much what is thought as a way of thinking. SRR, 56.
71 SA, 52.
73 SA, 53.
guide our search for knowledge. The understanding, which is theoretical, is, as it were, the viceroy of reason in the theoretical field. Reason itself is the ultimate legislator. This is the dignity of reason. For Kant—and as a philosopher—action is more important than knowledge. If it was important to distinguish science from art, it is much more important to distinguish morality from art. The major danger which Kant saw was this confusion—the danger of substituting aesthetic for moral standards in the determination of conduct. Indeed science itself, as a human activity, depends upon practical rationality.\textsuperscript{74}

Even so, the fundamental problem of practical reason remains; knowledge is unable to tell someone what he or she should do.\textsuperscript{75}

Kant’s third critique, \textit{The Critique of (Aesthetic) Judgment}, was directly aimed at the Romantic philosophy. One of Kant’s targets is the organic determination of truth, for “The fatal error is the assumption that truth is what satisfies the mind. Truth is what is determined in accordance with a law, and can be guaranteed only by reference to the law.”\textsuperscript{76} Another target is the Romantic’s confusion of teleology and purpose; purpose denotes conscious awareness or intention whereas teleology simply denotes a description of final form.\textsuperscript{77} Finally, Kant notes the difficulty of applying a finite concept (organism) to an infinite object (Nature).\textsuperscript{78} Macmurray summarizes Kant’s response to the Romantics: “All knowledge of Nature is empirical; and all empirical knowledge must be verifiable. If it is not verifiable it is illusory.”\textsuperscript{79}

\textsuperscript{74} SA, 54.
\textsuperscript{75} SA, 56. Kant distinguishes between three types of beliefs: necessary, reasonable, unreasonable. SA, 57. According to Kant we cannot know that we are free, but it is a necessary belief; and stemming from this necessary belief are two reasonable beliefs, God and immortality.
\textsuperscript{76} SA, 59.
\textsuperscript{77} See Körner, 181-82.
\textsuperscript{78} SA, 59-61.
\textsuperscript{79} SA, 61.
Transcending Kant and the Critical Philosophy

Most personalists have tried to get beyond the Kantian compromise by repudiating the separation between the phenomenal and the noumenal. Most personalists, however, have not been very good at showing how they have this right to go beyond Kant in this respect. In Macmurray’s opinion, the truly astounding accomplishment of the Critical philosophy is its ability to hold together science, aesthetics, and morality—in short, its adequacy. This adequacy is built upon the foundation of the doctrine of the thing-in-itself (transcendental idealism) without which science and morality fragment. However, Macmurray believes if one wishes to move beyond the Kantian impasse of modern philosophy, one must find a replacement for the thing-in-itself. When Macmurray analyzes the Critical philosophy he discovers two areas of incoherence and one area of inadequacy which suggests to him a way beyond the transcendental idealism of the Critical philosophy.

The first incoherence in the Critical philosophy revolves around the question of how one can understand morality in light of the dualism inherent in transcendental idealism’s separation of the noumenal and phenomenal worlds. In short, Kant creates a breach between reality (the noumenal or the thing-in-itself) and one’s perception of it (the phenomenal or the thing-as-known). Yet if one is even to consider the question of correct action (morality or practical reason) then one must not only view the Other as real but also one’s perception of the Other as real; ontology and epistemology must be united.

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51 SA, 62-63.
52 “We can think their unity only by taking the noumenal world as the real world, and the phenomenal as its appearance to us in the guise that our spatio-temporal form of intuition imposes upon it. Such language is necessarily analogical, for the relation between the known and the unknown cannot be formulated otherwise.” SA, 64.
If the moral struggle is to be real, the opponents, sensibility and the rational will, must be equally real. If one belongs to the world of appearance and the other to the world of reality then the contest is between a man and his shadow.  

Macmurray believes this is a formal error in Kant's system created by the doctrine of the thing-in-itself, which must therefore be eliminated. Yet this move will destroy the adequacy of the Critical philosophy requiring another means of uniting science and morality.  

The second incoherence Macmurray finds in Kant is the manner in which he relates theory and practice. For while Kant's starting premise is the transcendental unity of apperception—I think—the conclusion of the Critical philosophy is that reason is primarily practical, thus the conclusion contradicts its major premise. The determination of the primacy of the practical over the theoretical indicates a way beyond the Critical philosophy suggesting to Macmurray that the starting point of philosophical reflection should be practical rather than theoretical. Moreover, the dialectic methodology employed by Kant reveals that the theoretical must somehow be incorporated within the practical by means of a cumulative synthesis.

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83 SA, 66. Emphasis in the original.
84 "If Kant's solution fails, then another solution must be found if philosophical adequacy is to be achieved. For it is essential to philosophy that a means should be discovered of thinking coherently the unity of experience as a whole." SA, 66.
85 SA, 67. Macmurray also notes that Fichte, who starts with "the act" in reality begins with a theoretical act, not a practical one.
86 SA, 68-69. The idea of a cumulative synthesis is demonstrated specifically by Macmurray in his discussion of Kant's differing accounts of time in the Analytic and Aesthetic: "But Kant does not rewrite the aesthetic in the light of the analytic, nor the analytic in the light of the dialectic. He proceeds from stage to stage by including elements of experience which have so far been left out of consideration; and consequently at each stage a more comprehensive synthesis is made possible, in which the contents of the earlier stages appear as elements. Yet the modification which they must undergo when so qualified by new considerations is left to the reader." SA, 69.

Furthermore, it should be acknowledged that Macmurray was aware that Kant's Critical Philosophy disallowed a move to the practical: "Nevertheless, the Critical Philosophy points the way, even if it forbids the attempt, to a formal reconstruction which would start from the primacy of the practical, and take up into itself the theoretical as an element within the practical." SA, 69.

The influence of Kant upon Macmurray cannot be doubted. Marx, however, also plays an important function within Macmurray's philosophical development, although it followed the earlier foundational role of Kant. See e.g., CS, PC, and Macmurray's article "New Materialism," in Marxism, by John Middleton Murry, et al. (London: Chapman & Hall, 1935), 43-58, for Macmurray's work on Marx. It is interesting to note that there is only one significant reference to Marx in SA and that deals with the emphasis upon praxis (97). See also Lam who seriously questions Macmurray's interpretation of Marx, or
Macmurray’s third major criticism of the Critical philosophy is the inadequacy of its treatment of religion. He notes that *Religion within the Bounds of Mere Reason* is not an integral part of the Critical philosophy but only an addendum to the *Critique of Practical Reason*. In Kant’s thought, religion is not a unique aspect of experience but only a pragmatically helpful mythology, a mere by-product of morality. This understanding of religion, says Macmurray, is one which no religious teacher would recognize. Macmurray believes this unrecognizable understanding of religion stems from the formal starting point in the cogito which commits one to logical individualism. An egocentric philosophy cannot adequately address religion or even morality because it cannot deal directly with the question of interpersonal knowledge, which is the essence of religion and ethics.

We may then reformulate our criticism of the inadequacy of the Critical philosophy by saying that it fails to do justice to, and even to allow for the possibility of our knowledge of one another; and this failure arises because its formal conception of knowledge excludes this possibility by postulating the ‘I think’ as the primary presupposition of all experience.

Is there a common link between the dualism of the noumenal and phenomenal worlds, the contradictory relationship between pure and practical reason, and the question of religion? Macmurray believes all three errors flow from the incorrect starting point in at least the totality of that understanding. 

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87 SA, 70. Macmurray was definitely influenced by the Marxist attack on idealism and the importance of the unity of thought and practice. For additional discussion of Marx’s influence on Macmurray see the historical discussion in Costello, 15-16, 25. Also Nephew, 48-85. Berry holds that Macmurray’s philosophy is essentially Scottish realism “modified by his acceptance of Marx’s principle of the unity of thought and practice” as well as some Kantian modifications. Berry, 157.

88 SA, 70. Macmurray cites St. Paul as being the closest to Kant but Paul’s conclusion is the polar opposite of Kant: Law can only judge persons not set them free. SA, 70-71. It is somewhat ironic that Langford accuses Macmurray of the same error: creating a definition of religion which the religious would not recognize due to his minimal discussion of worship, doctrine, and God. Thomas A. Langford, “The Natural Theology of John Macmurray,” *Canadian Journal of Theology* 12, no. 1 (Jan. 1965): 18.

89 SA, 71.

90 SA, 72-73. “We may restate our criticism by saying, therefore, that any philosophy which takes the ‘I think’ as its first principle, must remain formally a philosophy without a second person; a philosophy which is debarred from thinking the ‘You and I’.” SA, 72. Furthermore, Macmurray notes that the cogito replaces the second person *You* when addressing the question of God with an object of thought—which is the best that it is able to do. SA, 72. Finally Macmurray states his understanding of the realization of religion in human experience: “What is generalized, legitimately or not, in the religious use of the term God, is a matter of empirical experience. It is our experience of personal relationship with one another.” SA, 72.

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cogito ergo sum, which he traces back to its source in Descartes.\textsuperscript{92} Macmurray refutes the necessity of Cartesian radical skepticism,\textsuperscript{93} its equation of knowledge and thought,\textsuperscript{94} and its conclusion, “I think therefore I am.”\textsuperscript{95}

Macmurray’s interpretation of modern philosophy views Hegel’s dialectic springing from Hume’s criticism of analytic-formal logic\textsuperscript{96} and expects a new logic to supercede Hegel’s Synthetic dialectic in light of Kierkegaard’s critique of Hegel.\textsuperscript{97} What follows should be a third and final phase of philosophy, the form of the personal, with a new logical form and its starting point in the I do not the I think. Macmurray has no illusions about the difficulty of switching orientations from the self that thinks (the Self-as-subject) to the self that acts (the Self-as-agent).\textsuperscript{98} He is adamant that he is not replacing a theoretical philosophy with a practical philosophy, for philosophy is inherently theoretical. Yet this does not require that one must theorize from the standpoint of the

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{91} SA, 73.
\textsuperscript{92} “These two criticisms of Kant’s philosophy—of its formal coherence and its formal adequacy—have a common root. It is that any philosophy which takes the ‘Cogito’ as its starting point and centre of reference institutes a formal dualism of theory and practice ....” SA, 73. Macmurray sees confirmation of his suspicions about the cogito within logical positivism’s and existentialism’s focus upon the second person. Within logical empiricism this is seen in the substitution of I say for I think which necessitates the second person. Existentialism focuses on this personal other with the slogan: “God or Nothing”. SA, 74.
\textsuperscript{93} “The method of doubt rests upon an assumption, which should be made explicit, that a reason is required for believing but none for doubting. The negative, however, must always be grounded in the positive; doubt is only possible through belief.” SA, 76.
\textsuperscript{94} “Knowledge, in this [the modern-Cartesian] strict sense of the term, is the product of thought and lies at the end of a process which begins in doubt.” SA, 78. “Belief—not theoretical assent—is a necessary element in knowledge. A logical system of true propositions does not of itself constitute a body of knowledge. To constitute knowledge it must also be believed by someone. For knowledge cannot exist in the void; it must be somebody’s knowledge. A proposition may be true even though no one believes it; but it cannot; until it is believed, be an element in knowledge.” SA, 78.
\textsuperscript{95} Macmurray’s basic criticism is that it cannot account for action or even for the existence of others. SA, 80-81.
\textsuperscript{96} “The answer to Hume’s skepticism of the form of the material was the construction of the form of the organic. To the contemporary skepticism of the organic, the answer will be, if we can achieve it, the construction of the form of the personal. Such an instrument of thought would have a finality denied to the other two, for we should no longer be attempting to understand our human experience on the analogy of our knowledge of organisms or of physical substances, but directly, in terms of the personal character which is its own unique distinction.” SA, 82-83.
\textsuperscript{97} Macmurray follows Kierkegaard’s criticism of Hegel that “the dialect of the personal life ... is a dialectic without synthesis” and inevitably produces a philosophical dualism of either idealism or materialism. SA, 97; see also 36. Macmurray sees this basic reliance upon the organic analogy as extending into our present period and believes that the inadequacies of Hegel’s dialectic applies to all “organic and evolutionary types of philosophy.” SA, 34. For an extended critique of the organic model’s trajectory into skepticism see SA, 34-36.
\end{footnotesize}
theoretical. Instead Macmurray is suggesting theorizing from the perspective of the practical. Analytical and dialectical logic simply will not suffice for the expression of the unity of the personal. Therefore, Macmurray develops his own unique logic—a Personal logic—for the Form of the Personal.

2.1.3 PERSONAL LOGIC

The challenge facing Macmurray is as follows. He must find a way to describe the experiences of persons, functioning at the personal level, including a way of accounting for the unity of experience of the Self as both agent and subject, without undermining the appropriate advances of the previous phases of philosophy. He must find a Personal logic for personal reality that works as well as the dialectic does for organic reality and the analytic does for substantial reality. Because of his commitment to reality (in the face of idealism) he cannot simply hypothesize an idea. He must instead consider the concrete problem of the experience of the agent and subject (two realities which every person experiences and which every person intuitively integrates), hypothesize a working solution, and then proceed to test and refine this against the very reality which spawned the question in the first place—the integrated experience of the self as both agent and subject.

Macmurray's initial observation about the integration of the Self-as-agent and the Self-as-subject is to observe that the self who acts is the same self who thinks; there is in

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99 SA, 85-86. The self-as-subject and self-as-agent terminology is formalized on SA, 90.
100 SA, 85.
101 SA, 92. Köhler notes how Kant understands the relationship of logical forms and understanding in Kant: “The thesis that to each of the different logical forms there corresponds one Category, and conversely, to every different Category one logical form, is in the words of Kant, ‘the clue for the discovery of all pure concepts of the understanding.” Köhler, 49-50. This same basic idea is present within Macmurray’s system.
102 Again, let us point out that we are making a distinction simply for sake of clarity of exposition, between the Form of the Personal, as the name used for Macmurray’s philosophy and Personal logic which is the designation for the formal nature of that philosophy. In Macmurray’s usage both meanings are found in the terminology of the form of the personal.
103 While it would have been possible to simply provide a conclusive summary statement of Personal logic, its development is being detailed in order to show why Macmurray cannot be accused of idealism. He begins with experience and everything flows from that, not from ideas.
fact a unity of the experience of the Self. Second, in action the entirety of the Self is employed, including thought. This is very important, for when one says someone acted without thinking, he or she is drawing attention to the fact that it is the norm for people to combine thought with action. Yet, there is no such expectation when it comes to thought. There is no apparent degradation of thought in the absence of action.

‘Acting’ and ‘thinking’ then, are, in abstract conception, exclusive contraries. In actuality they are ideal limits of personal experience; and ‘acting’ is the positive, while ‘thinking’ is the negative limit.

In this quotation, Macmurray uses several words which for him are programmatic and function as technical terms. In the Form of the Personal, the term positive connotes a vector toward wholeness and comprehensiveness, while negative implies a relative reduction and incompleteness. Action is the sole purview of persons—only persons act. Action is primary, holistic, and concrete while thought is “secondary, abstract and derivative.” From the orientation of the agent, epistemology is contained within agency, for the world in which the agent acts is the same world which the subject knows—thus overcoming the inherent dualism of Kant’s phenomenal and noumenal

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For a more detailed exposition of Macmurray’s epistemological process see below §2.2.

103 “Action, then, is a full concrete activity of the self in which all our capacities are employed; while thought is constituted by the exclusion of some of our powers and a withdrawal into an activity which is less concrete and less complete.” SA, 86.

104 SA, 87-88.

105 SA, 87. Macmurray is careful to clarify that these are abstractions which in reality do not exist in their pure forms: “Indeed, when we consider the contrast in this fashion, it tends to present itself as an abstract duality; in which action and thought are positive and negative poles of a personal experience, which moves, in its actuality, between them.” SA, 86-87. As thought is an exclusive and negative concept at its ideal limit it is actually contentless and merely formal: SA, 88.

106 Macmurray makes a distinction between action and activity (the more generic term): “We are concerned with personal activities, with the agency of the Self. In this context, action and thought both imply rationality. We may, however, use the term ‘activity’ without this implication, as a generic term with a wider significance, so that we can distinguish both thought and action as modes of rational activity. As a further aid to definition we may add that action is activity in terms of the distinction between ‘right’ and ‘wrong’, and that thought is activity in terms of the distinction between ‘true’ and ‘false.’” SA, 89.

107 SA, 89.

108 “In other words, a theory of knowledge presupposes and must be derived from, and included within a theory of action.” SA, 89.
worlds. Similarly, knowledge is not prior to action, for knowing and doing are two aspects of the same experience. ¹⁰⁹

When attempting to describe the exact relation between the Self-as-agent and the Self-as-subject Macmurray uses his technical terms to define the agent as the positive-self (or self-affirmation, for it is more holistic) and the thinker as the negative-self (or self-negation, due to the reduction of the self through exclusion). He believes that if one was able to reach the absolute minimal limit of this self-negation of the Self-as-subject, one would cease to exist. To act requires engagement with the world, while thought requires disengagement from the world. To completely disengage oneself from the world is to no longer exist.¹¹⁰

What is particularly interesting at this point is the fact that something may cease to think (either permanently or temporarily) and still exist (e.g., organic life) and something may not live and still exist (substance).¹¹¹ Yet there is nothing within human experience which lives without substance or thinks without life and substance. The existence of organic and substantial reality, each with its own corresponding logical grammar or form (dialectic and analytic, respectively) indicates to Macmurray that one is dealing with three basic experiential strata of reality: substance, organism, and person.¹¹² A logical grammar or logical form is a synthetic, theoretical, and formal expression of the proper relationships unifying various experiential elements within conceptual schemes or unity-

¹⁰⁹ SA, 90.
¹¹⁰ To act implies being in the world; Subject is over-against world: “But to be part of the world is to exist, while to be excluded from the world is to be non-existent. It follows that the Self exists as agent but not as subject.” SA, 91. “As agent, therefore, the Self is the body. Conversely the Self, as subject, is the mind.” SA, 91.
¹¹¹ One should keep in mind here that substance, matter, may also be thought of as energy, following Einstein’s famous formula, E=mc². In other words, when one says substance, one does not necessarily imply visible, etc.
¹¹² The fact that substantial philosophy used a formal-realist logic and organic philosophy used a dialectical-idealist logic both to great advantage suggests to Macmurray that “If so, it must mean that idealist and formal logicians are studying the forms of different things.” SA, 93. According to Jeffko, unity-patterns and logical forms have a metaphysical function in the Form of the Personal. Walter G. Jeffko, “John Macmurray’s Logical Form of the Personal: A Critical Exposition,” (Ph.D. diss., Fordham University, 1970), 15.
patterns. It is created by abstracting the content from the unity-pattern so that one is left only with the logical relations. In this way it is clear that the logical form is dependent upon the knowledge of the unity-pattern.

If one employs Macmurray’s paradigmatic case of the unity of the agent and subject understood as positive-self and negative-self the inadequacies of applying the analytical and dialectical logical structures to human persons becomes apparent. If one employs the substantial analytic with its mathematical form the positive-self and the negative-self either cancel each other out or create a dualism. The organic dialectic requires development, yet the agent and the subject are simultaneous; therefore, the dialectic must focus upon one to the neglect of the other producing another dualism. Neither is able to express the unity of the agent and the subject without dualism or the annihilation of one of the aspects of the self: the agent, the subject, or both.

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113 A philosophical form is like a blank form where the contents are removed leaving only the relationships between the terms to generate meaning. See SA, 92. Also see John Corcoran, “logical form” CDP, 511, and Wilfred A. Hodges, “form, logical” OCP, 285. Macmurray prefers unity-pattern over various alternatives (systems of categories, forms of synthesis, schema of unity) because it carries fewer incorrect associations. SA, 94-95; IU, 61. Kant uses the term schemata, which Körner defines as “a rule for the synthesis of the imagination.” Körner, 70.

114 SA, 93-94. Macmurray notes that thought, based on logical forms cannot lead to the discovery of what is not, in some way, already known.

Since the logical form is derived from the unity pattern, and the unity pattern comes out of experience, one clearly cannot mistake what Macmurray is doing here in constructing Personal logic as evidence for idealism.

115 “The crux of the problem lies, as we have seen, in this, that formally the Self as subject is the negation of the Self as agent, and since it is by its own activity that the Self withdraws from action into reflection, its subjecthood is its self-negation. Thus the unity of the Self is a unity of self-affirmation and self-negation.” SA, 96.

116 SA, 96. If they are the same thing, A; then one is left with +A-A=0; if they are different things (A and B) then the terms do not cancel, but one is left with a dualism A/B.

117 If we represent action and thought as thesis and antithesis in a self-development, we must represent them as successive phases in the development of the Self. But then it must be impossible to represent the same Self as at one and the same time both Agent and Subject. For when it is Agent it will not be Subject; and if this were actually the case, then the Self could never know that it was Agent, nor could it ever act with knowledge. The positive and negative phases would still exclude one another, and no synthesis would be possible. This, we may recall, is precisely Kierkegaard’s criticism of the Hegelian philosophy. The dialectic of the personal life, he maintains, is a dialectic without a synthesis.” SA, 97.

118 The theoretical organic is clearly reflected in Hegel. Marx, to Macmurray’s mind, represents the practical: “He [Marx] did this by substituting the Self as ‘worker’ for the Self as ‘thinker’, without changing the organic unity-pattern. The result is a dialectic of the practical in place of the dialectic of the theoretical life.” SA, 97.
The requirements for the new logical form are clear: it must be capable of supporting the primacy of action (inherited from Kant), as well as incorporating Kierkegaard’s insight that the human “is a dialectic without synthesis.” In other words while the self is primarily agent it is also subject, which is the opposite of agent.

Macmurray concludes:

The unity of the Self is neither a material nor an organic, but a personal unity. The logical form of such a unity is one which represents a necessary unity of positive and negative modes. The Self is constituted by its capacity for self-negation. It must be represented as a positive which necessarily contains its own negative.

Macmurray uses Personal logic to express the paradigmatic case of the unity of the self and concludes: (1) The Self is agent and exists only as agent; (2) The Self is subject but cannot exist as subject. It can be subject only because it is agent; (3) The Self is subject in and for the Self as agent; (4) The Self can be agent only by being also subject.

Although Macmurray never provided a complete schematic of Personal logic it is possible to synthesize the basic grammar from what he states explicitly as well as from studying his usage. In a case study of 38 examples of Macmurray’s use of Personal logic in *The Self As Agent* a more comprehensive understanding of the grammar of this logical form surfaces.

119 SA, 97. Macmurray accepts Kierkegaard’s statement of the problem, but he rejects the paradoxical solution.
120 “The crux of the problem lies, as we have seen, in this, that formally the Self as subject is the negation of the Self as agent, and since it is by its own activity that the Self withdraws from action into reflection, its subjecthood is its self-negation. Thus the unity of the Self is a unity of self-affirmation and self-negation.” SA, 96.
121 SA, 98.
122 SA, 100-02. Haddox points out the controversial nature of Macmurray’s position, citing A. C. Ewing’s response to Macmurray that his distinction between agent and subject was inconsequential. “It is clear that what Ewing (and many others) does is tacitly to rely on the conceptual framework of the agent to make sense of and explicate the framework of the subject. This is why Macmurray’s argument is dismissed quite often as being presumptuous, yet this very meshing of incompatible conceptual frameworks produces the problems which many modern philosophers have been unwilling to solve. It is only by a radical analysis of our conceptual commitments, such as Macmurray acutely begins, that we can understand who we are as persons who are trying to understand who we are.” Michael Bruce Haddox, “Action and Religious Knowledge: The Person as Agent in the Thought of John Macmurray” (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1970), 125-26.
Figure 2.1 Positive & Negative in Personal Logic

First, negatives are derived from the positive through a process of excluding one or more aspects of the positive.\textsuperscript{123} Or to state it another way, the positive is more than the aggregate of its constitutive negatives.\textsuperscript{124} A number of implications stem from this important point. Taken in conjunction with the primacy of the practical, this points to the fact that the negative exists for the sake of the positive.\textsuperscript{125} Rather than the analytic view which emphasizes the importance of the most basic part, Personal logic favors an integrated relational whole. This also means that one cannot simply take the difference between the positive and the negative and designate it the positive—the positive is inclusive of the negative or it is not the positive in the sense meant by Macmurray. Using a graphic representation (see Figure 2.1), action is not the area a-b, but a-o. It is either inclusive or it is not action in the full sense of the term. Therefore the use of negative

\textsuperscript{123} "The included concepts [organism and material body] can be derived from the concept of 'a person' by abstractions; by excluding from attention those characteristics which belong to the higher category alone." SA, 117. This is a logical priority of the person and should not be interpreted as temporal priority. Macmurray does not believe human persons existed chronologically before animals or things.

\textsuperscript{124} While this sentence begs for a grammatical substantive similar to \textit{element} or \textit{part}, it is wise to avoid that terminology whenever possible for it adds an analytic feel to Personal logic. Aspect or dimension are better suited, but whenever possible positive and negative as substantives will be utilized.
implies not so much the opposite of the positive, but rather the exclusion, negation, or reduction, which constitutes or in some way gives shape to the positive. As an example, consider the case of belief and doubt. Belief is positive; doubt is negative. One cannot doubt until one has at least minimally entertained the existence of the possibility of the thing—belief. Doubt therefore cannot exist independently of belief. Yet belief cannot exist independently of doubt, for doubt gives shape to belief because belief without the possibility of doubt is something other than belief—it is fact or reality, not belief. In the form of the personal the connotation is more mathematical, functioning almost like a gradient with positive being in the direction of wholeness and completion while negative is movement towards reduction and fragmentation. The mathematical terminology should not, however, be taken as a merely quantitative difference, for it is not a question of merely more of the negative or adding various negatives together—the mistaken notion of Raphael. There exists a qualitative distinction which can only be

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125 This is implicit in the example above of Macmurray’s four-part explication of the relation of the agent and subject (SA, 100-02) and is stated explicitly numerous other times, e.g., PR, 34.

126 SA, 76.

127 Thus we see the definition of faith (belief) employed in Hebrews 11:1. Some may want to argue that this violates the injunction against being double minded in James 1:5-8. It can be argued that this is an injunction against dualism, or the primacy of doubt over faith, not the eradication of doubt or its proper subordination to belief.

128 Defending Macmurray’s mathematical usage, Duncan states: “Macmurray borrowed his terminology [positive and negative] from mathematics and it is surely no more barbarous than talk of neustics and phrastics or illocutionary or perlocutionary acts.” Duncan, 54.

Several of Macmurray’s commentators are unconvinced of the success of Personal logic. Thus Berry, “the dubious logic of a unity of a positive (intentional, personal action) which subordinates and is constituted by its own negative (motive consciousness)” (262-63) and “dubious logic of positive and negative” (312). “Also disturbing is the multiplicity of meanings given to ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ in Macmurray’s discussions. These words are given so many functions that they become radically equivocal.” Frederick Ferré, review of Persons in Relation, by John Macmurray, Theology Today 19 (1962): 287. See also D. D. Raphael, “Critical Study: Review of The Self as Agent, by John Macmurray” Philosophical Quarterly 9, no. 36 (July 1959): 275, who says: “All this talk about ‘positive’ and ‘negative’, and about a new logical form, seems to me unnecessarily mystifying and indeed confusing.” Even as sympathetic an observer as Limpitlaw states: “This language [positive and negative] runs the risk of suggesting the dualistic opposition which Macmurray wanted to move beyond.” Limpitlaw, 192.

129 Raphael, 275.
understood from the perspective of the positive. Positive and negative also should not be interpreted along moral or judgmental lines.

Second, a single positive may have more than one negative depending upon what has been excluded. Again, if one looks to Figure 2.1, both knowledge and consciousness are negatives of action. Each negative may also be constituted by its own negative. Figure 2.1 also shows this relationship, for while knowledge is the negative of action, relative to consciousness it is positive.

The third grammatical characteristic of Personal logic is that when the personal is actualized it exists in a continuum. Macmurray is not a dualist. This is a common misinterpretation of Macmurray, and one of which he was fully aware.

Action, then, is a full concrete activity of the self in which all our capacities are employed; while thought is constituted by the exclusion of some of our powers and a withdrawal into an activity which is less concrete and less complete. Indeed, when we consider the contrast in this fashion, it tends to present itself as an abstract duality; in which action and thought are the positive and negative poles of a personal experience, which moves, in its actuality, between them.


Although it can obtain ethical importance. Case in point: to evaluate a person in their entirety based solely on their productivity or beauty is immoral since it ignores the relational-personal level of morality. Macmurray uses upwards of eleven negatives for the positive of action alone in SA: Subject, 87; cognition, 113; Movement, 118; knowledge, 127; theorizing, 134; reflection, 137; happening, 147; teleology, 150; causation, 160; habit, 161; physics and psychology, 163. Some of these are probably intended to be synonyms, such as thinking and reflecting, still the point is made that there can be more than one negative for each positive depending upon what is to be excluded.

Raphael misses this aspect of Personal logic when he questions how consciousness (which exists in animals as well as human persons) can have a negative. If one excludes enough, the unconscious is simply the negative of cognition. Yet, since it is “more” negative (figuratively speaking) it is also the negative of the conscious. Raphael, 276.

Raphael reads Macmurray in a dualistic-idealistic manner so that Personal logic (which he typifies as a “binomial negative/positive”) results in a “logical absurdity”, yet he affirms the concomitant aspect he calls “binomial exclusive/inclusive.” Roy, *Form of the Personal*, 84. The proof of Roy’s misreading of Macmurray is his paraphrasing of the relationship between personal and impersonal attitudes as: “(1) Being acquainted with the other; (2) Not seeing the other as an object; (3) Respecting the other as free and equal; (4) Not treating the other as an object” Roy, *Form of the Personal*, 108-09. The correct understanding of Macmurray requires the modification of 2 and 4 by adding merely, a personal attitude does not see or treat the personal other as merely an object—but this does not eliminate the objective characteristics of the other.

SA, 86-87.
Fourth, the unity of a positive and a negative may be expressed either by the terminology of the positive pole or by a completely different term. Macmurray’s habit of doing this can cause a considerable amount of confusion. However, one must realize Macmurray is not writing from within the analytic tradition with its hypersensitivity to issues of definition. More importantly, the exploratory nature of the work encourages rich and varied expression to communicate the underlying ideas. To define too quickly and too narrowly may lead to the exclusion of important aspects of Macmurray’s thought, a risk which this exposition also poses.

Fifth and finally, in actuality it is possible for the negative pole to dominate the positive pole. A classic example of this is when habit (the negative) escapes intention (the positive) to become a compulsion. Macmurray describes these states as unreal.

Since Personal logic is so often confused with various forms of dialectical logic it is beneficial to contrast Personal logic with these dialectics in order to clarify the differences. Fox provides a useful schematic including the Synthetic, Decisional, Evaluative, and Paradoxical forms of dialectic, graphically represented in Figure 2.2.

The most famous dialectic is the Synthetic and it is commonly associated with Hegel and Marx. In the Synthetic dialectic the first element or pole (the thesis) combines through conflict with the second pole (the antithesis) creating a totally new pole (the synthesis). Both the thesis and the antithesis are lost in the creation of the synthesis.

The Decisional dialectic decides either for one pole or the other. This unity is not so much a union as it is a vanquishing of one element from the field of contest.

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136 See Macmurray, Analysis of Language, esp. 319 for discussion of this phenomenon. Roy warns of the danger of anachronism, while still bemoaning Macmurray’s lack of exacting definition. Roy, Form of the Personal, 19.

137 SA, 162.

138 For example RE, 226.


140 Often called “The Hegelian Dialectic”, but scholarly consensus is that it is not Hegel’s method, but rather a stylization or systemization of Hegel by others. Robert B. Pippin locates the association of the
Striking a middle ground between the Decisional and the Synthetic is the Evaluative dialectic. Like the Synthetic, a totally new pole is created which is neither of the original elements. However, more in keeping with the Decisional form, the resulting Evaluative dialectic owes more to one pole than to the other. A priority is granted to one of the elements over against the other in the creation of a new element.

The Paradoxical dialectic, typified by Kierkegaard, occurs when both poles are perceived as equally important but logically incompatible and therefore exist in a necessary unity of tension or paradox. Neither is lost; neither is isolated from the other; neither has priority over the other. In the Paradoxical dialectic two equal and separate elements are intrinsically linked together.

In Personal logic the positive is partially constituted by its negative. Unlike other dialectics Personal logic does not eliminate an element (Decisional), combine them into a totally new element (Synthetic and Evaluative), or see them as incompatible.
(Paradoxical). Personal logic is a hierarchical polar integration of a positive that is constituted by its own negative without extinguishing or modifying the negative, but where the negative exists only for the sake of the positive (see Figure 2.3).

![Synthetic](image)

![Decisional](image)

![Evaluative](image)

![Paradoxical](image)

![Personal](image)

Figure 2.3 Personal Logic and Dialectical Forms

A particularly theological example is appropriate to demonstrate the need for and the power of Personal logic. Consider Jewett’s criticism of Brunner:


141 PR, 34. This definition of Personal logic has certain similarities to Jeffko’s definition: “A positive which includes (or contains), subordinates, and is partially constituted by its own negative” (194). However, he sees this as an extension of Macmurray’s Personal logic, not as an accurate description of it in use by Macmurray, while our definition is based upon his usage. Fox provides an alternative definition of Personal logic as “a proposition about personal reality consists of a ‘positive’ element which contains and is structured by its own ‘negative’ pole.” Douglas A. Fox, “The Principle of Contra-Action,” Faith and Philosophy, 2, no. 2 (April 1985): 169. Haddox criticizes this constituting or structuring aspect of Personal logic (as interpreted by Fox) because, following Marcel, he sees the unity of the self as being achieved and not formally structured, with only the direction of unity being indicated. Haddox, 131-34. One finds Fox’s language geared too much to structure and form. Fox provides the following graphical model of Personal logic: “Let us imagine a wheel in which the two important elements are a rim and a hub. This presents little difficulty, but let us further imagine that the rim actually derives its shape from the hub, so that if the latter were to change its shape becoming oval, irregular or even (incredibly) square, the rim would follow suit. Now, from the perspective of the road, the rim is the truth being encountered, but that rim contains and is constituted by a hub. It can be distinguished from the hub, yet it would cease to exist if the hub were not
Paul King Jewett, who studied with Brunner in Zurich, has argued that Brunner's doctrine of revelation and Scripture is fundamentally incoherent... Jewett criticized Brunner's absolute distinction between 'it-truth' and 'Thou-truth' as impossible to maintain. If divine revelation is to serve as a norm for Christian doctrine, as Brunner intended, then it cannot be entirely devoid of propositional content. Otherwise there is no way from revelation to confession, from personal encounter to doctrine.\textsuperscript{142}

Brunner, influenced by Buber, yet following a paradoxical-existentialist dialectical form, was unable to integrate the factual and the personal. Grenz and Olson rightly conclude, Brunner should have maintained his valuable distinction between Thou-truth and it-truth while providing greater insight into their mutual interdependence, thereby doing greater justice to his own dialectical approach to theology.\textsuperscript{143}

Yet this is easier said than done, for if Brunner could have integrated the two while maintaining logical coherence, he would have.\textsuperscript{144} Macmurray's Personal logic provides the necessary logical tools to enable such a theological construct without it lapsing into irrationality.

2.1.4 Summary

What is the question of contemporary philosophy? For Macmurray it is the question of the personal. To answer this question, Macmurray defines philosophy as the interpretation of the universe and situates the philosophical task within a historically conditioned context. In light of his historical context he believes a new philosophical form is necessary—the form of the personal. This new form will subsume both the material and organic forms, thereby demonstrating both continuity and discontinuity with the tradition. Similarly, he builds upon while undermining Kant's Critical philosophy by altering the foundation of the cogito. By abandoning the egocentric, theoretical, and


\textsuperscript{143} Grenz & Olson, \textit{Twentieth-Century Theology}, 83.
isolated perspective of the Cartesian-self in favor of the Self-as-agent, one is allowed to re-conceptualize reality in terms of a Personal logic where the negative constitutes and exists for the sake of the positive. Just as logic is transformed by a change in philosophical viewpoint, so too is epistemology.

2.2 **EPISTEMOLOGY FROM THE STANDPOINT OF THE AGENT**

One of the results of Macmurray's jettisoning of the cogito as a point of departure for philosophy is his rejection of the equation of knowledge with thought.\(^{145}\)

Epistemology from the standpoint of the Agent is grounded in experience. In its primary form it is knowing-in-action and only secondarily knowing-in-reflection. Macmurray details a three-phased epistemological process\(^{146}\) beginning in *experience*.\(^{147}\) When a problem is encountered, experience is interrupted. Pausing, the agent enters the second phase, *reflection*. In reflection a solution is hypothesized which remains merely theoretical until the agent enters the third phase, *verification*, which tests the hypothesis in action.

2.2.1 **EXPERIENCE**

'Experience' is a practical concept, referring to whatever is apprehended in action, in distinction from what is thought in reflection.\(^{148}\)

How is one to understand the meaning of *experience*? Macmurray is fully aware of the difficulties surrounding the concept. In the *Self as Agent*, rather than expend vast


\(^{146}\) SA, 78. Largo sees Macmurray's position in keeping with Aquinas who says that there is no knowledge in the intellect unless it is first in the phantasm (immediate experience). Largo, 217, n. 1.

\(^{147}\) The basic structure of IU is built around this three stage process, which Macmurray assumes in PR, e.g., PR, 148-49, 151.

\(^{148}\) IU actually uses the term *immediate experience*, but with reservations (IU, 12). SA does not use the term *immediate* experience. Macmurray goes to great lengths to demarcate the difference between immediate experience and attempts to characterize immediate experience—which means it is no longer immediate, but mediated. IU, 12; see also Haddox, 45. Haddox notes the similar epistemological role of immediate experience in Merleau-Ponty, Marcel, and Polanyi (51).

\(^{115}\) SA, 115.
amounts of energy in correcting misunderstandings he builds a theory of knowledge-in-action from the ground up and only invokes the category of experience when he must. In doing so, Macmurray considers knowledge and movement from the perspective of the Agent and their unity as two dimensions of action.

As two dimensions of action, knowledge and movement are inseparable.

Knowledge does not cause movement nor movement knowledge. But to act is to move and to know: the I do in its two dimensions of I know and I move.

2.2.1.1 Personal Knowledge-in-Action

Macmurray wishes to come to grips with an epistemology which has its starting point in the practical realm, not the mental-theoretical realm. Yet he recognizes that there is a need for a way to understand the linkage between the empirical and the rational approaches to epistemology.

If we presuppose the 'Cogito', then knowledge, if it is to be truly knowledge, must start from concepts and proceed through concepts. But since Locke, or at least since Kant, it has been recognized that this is impossible. Yet the problem remains, so long as the primacy of the theoretical is assumed. Attempts to make sense-perception the basis of knowledge, as in some sense it clearly is, must either assimilate the material to the mental, or absorb the mental in the material.

For Macmurray, the question narrows down to how one understands the senses.

Instead of following the traditional pattern and considering vision as the archetypal

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149 "What is distinguishable theoretically is not necessarily separable in fact: for to distinguish elements in a whole theoretically is merely to limit attention to an aspect of what is presented. In order therefore to eliminate this tendency to misunderstand the definition I propose to call knowledge and movement dimensions of action." SA, 128. Haddox disagrees sharply with this move on Macmurray's part, seeing it as an inadequate model of action in so far as it does not represent the unity of action but merely asserts it, and hence is a refutation of the starting point in action—the integrative function versus the integration of two basic elements. He further sees it as falling into both physical reductionism and pragmatism. This does not overly concern him because the error was detected using Macmurray's own theory and method. Haddox, 102-05. This criticism is due in part to Haddox's tendency to read Macmurray too dualistically and idealistically.

150 "We might rephrase it thus: 'When there is an acting there is a moving and a knowing, and the indivisible unity of these constitutes the acting.'" SA, 128-29.

151 SA, 104. Macmurray cautions against an improper understanding of sense-perception: "Sense-perception is itself an abstract conception, and represents an ideal limit or zero of cognitional consciousness at which awareness remains, practical activity has ceased and no reflective activity begun. Such a conception,
sense, he focuses upon touch as the essential and cardinal sense of the Agent. The basic feature of tactile perception is resistance—“the direct and immediate apprehension of the Other-than-myself.” This perceptual experience, as a personal activity, is constituted by its own negative, that is the knowledge or awareness of the Self and the

however useful it may be for purposes of analysis, can represent no real experience. For whatever else is present in an experience, activity must be.” IU, 31.

Macmurray sees vision as a good model for the self as subject but not as agent. SA, 105-06. “In visual perception we do stand over against the object we see; it is set before us, and our seeing it has no causal effect upon it. Seeing is *prima facie* a pure receptivity; to exercise it attentively, we withdraw from action all together. We stop to look. In consequence, the visual model tends to instigate a strong contrast between knowing and acting, which in abstract theory passes easily into a conceptual dualism.” SA, 106.

Mark Johnson, whose work *The Body in the Mind* (Chicago: Chicago, 1987), argues for the bodily basis of all thought. (Thanks to Dr. Steven Guthrie for pointing out this interesting and important work.) Yet in Johnson’s discussion of the vision metaphor as the basis of our understanding of the intellect (108-09), he fails to notice that all the “vision” metaphors he employs are themselves all based in tactile experience. His point is still the same, that metaphors move from the concrete to the more abstract, but he himself does not go back far enough to see the basis of the visual in the tactile—thereby supporting Macmurray’s contention that touch has primacy over vision.

Raphael believes Macmurray overstates his case (269-72). Haddox is critical of this discussion of touch, seeing it as drawing away from the more important emphasis upon unity: “What Macmurray and those who make the same argument for the primacy of touch fail to see is that touch, like vision, cannot on its own credit, buy its way into the realm of personal action.” Indeed, the distinction between vision and touch is the wrong one to make at this point, not because it is an invalid one, but because both touch and vision are without meaning apart from the integrative intentionality of one’s body which is the whence and the where of all visual and tactual perceptions” (Haddox, 98). He continues, saying that Macmurray is “not radical enough in emphasizing personal action as the beginning point of all reflection.” On the one hand Haddox is correct, epistemology should focus on the holistic experience of the Agent, integrating intention, embodiment, and the rest. On the other hand, all these aspects are more apparent in the consideration of touch than in vision. One cannot always deal with the totality and it is often more helpful to deal with an aspect to provide a useful focus for the discussion.

Moltmann, on the other hand, believes there is too much contemporary focus upon touch. Jürgen Moltmann, *The Spirit of Life: A Universal Affirmation*, trans. Margaret Kohl (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992), 201. This is consistent with his preference for being over doing and his long running battle with Marxist activism. See Moltmann, *Spirit of Life*, 199-201. See also Jürgen Moltmann, *The Coming of God: Christian Eschatology*, trans. Margaret Kohl (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1996), 116. While he wishes to see a contemplatively informed practice, he does not see how this can be accomplished as long as being is not given preeminence. However, the question remains, how one moves from contemplation to action. Macmurray’s philosophy solves the latter problem, while simultaneously necessitating being within the doing.

Macmurray is emphatic that immediate experience not be confused with sense perception. He notes that the cognitive, while mainly perceptual, also involves the imagination so that, in point of fact, experience is the fusion of imagination and perception. IU, 30-31.
Resistance is absolutely necessary to action for to act is inherently to act upon something. Within this experience of perceiving resistance there is a negative tactual discrimination, a theoretical activity based upon concepts from the material world such as hard, soft, rough, or smooth.

The sense of touch meshes easily with an epistemology of agency, but how does vision function within this perspective? Vision, according to Macmurray, is the guide to action—“anticipatory perception”—a symbolic representation of future tactile contact between the Self and the Other which must be learned and coordinated with tactual experience.

In order to understand how these perceptual experiences are related to knowledge, it is necessary to discuss the larger context of sense-perception within consciousness and experience. Macmurray defines experience, in its primary sense, as that which is apprehended in action, as opposed to reflection—in short it is knowledge in its fullest sense. Consciousness is by contrast all sub-rational (or sub-cognitive) awareness.

"Visual perception is therefore symbolic. The sense-datum is a present experience which represents and refers to a future experience of a tactual order in which alone the Other is given." SA, 111-12. Furthermore, Macmurray notes the traditional view that images are derived from percepts (at least visually) is the reverse of the truth: "The capacity to form images is a prior condition of the possibility of visual perception." SA, 112. Macmurray uses an example from hunting, that one cannot see what one is looking for unless you have an image in your mind of what you are looking for. IU, 41.

This is similar to Langer’s understanding of symbolic transformation as the basis of all rationality. Susanne K. Langer, Philosophy in a New Key: A Study in the Symbolism of Reason, Rite, and Art (New York: Mentor Book, 1948). Additionally, Langer points out the difference between a sign (which announces the presence of an object) and a symbol (which leads to conception of the object in its absence). Langer, 49.

Conceptualizing knowledge primarily as knowledge-in-action is a controversial move. In an early Aristotelian Society discussion, A. C. Ewing responded to Macmurray: “Professor Macmurray, while certain that there are actions, denies that we can discover them in introspection. If so, then how do we discover them? Do we know? Is it only by inference from what we observe that we know when we act? Or does he mean that there is some peculiar mode of direct knowledge distinct from introspection by which we
There are methodological considerations in any discussion of the relation between consciousness and knowledge. First, is knowledge anthropomorphic and if so, what does this mean for human knowing? Macmurray believes knowledge is anthropomorphic, but in a heterocentric sense. Knowledge-in-action is primarily knowledge of the Other with knowledge of the Self as its negative. This may be understood as the experience of the Other creating a resistance to the Self and thereby knowledge of the Other. In this knowledge of the Other, one comes to recognize that which is also similar to the Other in the Self, thereby gaining self-knowledge.\(^{164}\) This self-knowledge, therefore is limited by

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\(^{163}\) 'Experience' is a practical concept, referring to whatever is apprehended in action, in distinction from what is thought in reflection. 'Consciousness' on the other hand is a general term for all sub-rational awareness, which may be conceived either as all that remains when we abstract from the rationality of our awareness, or as an actual form of awareness in sub-rational creatures, or in rational beings under abnormal conditions. 'Rational consciousness' means 'knowledge'. It is a legitimate term only because knowledge, being personal, contains, and is constituted by, its own negation. Since knowledge is the negative aspect of action, and action may in consequence be termed 'rational behaviour'; 'consciousness' is properly 'conscious behaviour' and as such it is a term which serves to isolate the subject matter of empirical psychology." SA, 115.

\(^{164}\) Ferré is very critical of Macmurray at this point. He claims to see an inconsistency and unresolved tension between what is said in SA "my knowledge of myself has priority over my knowledge of the Other" (SA, 116) and what is said in PR "the first knowledge ... is knowledge of the personal Other... The knowledge of the Other is the absolute presupposition of all knowledge, and as such is necessarily indemonstrable" (PR, 76-77). Ferré, 287. However, if Ferré had continued further down the page he would have found this statement by Macmurray: "We found in our first volume that the primary certainty was the 'I do'. But we were then talking abstractly, from the point of view of the solitary self withdrawn into itself in reflection. We now see how this must be completed in the concrete. The 'I do' is the correlate of the 'the Other does', and since knowledge is primarily 'of the Other', the 'I do' now appears as the negative which falls within the knowledge of the Other as agent, and is necessary to it." PR, 77. McFadyen also states that the understanding of the Other is primary and only then secondarily applied to the self. Alistair I. McFadyen, *The Call to Personhood: A Christian Theory of the Individual in Social Relationships* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 90.
the quality of a person’s experiences. Of course, the question then immediately arises, how does knowledge of that which is not personal come about?

For sub-personal (organic and substantial) existence one may arrive at knowledge of the other through a process of negation.

The concept of ‘a person’ is inclusive of the concept of ‘an organism’, as the concept of ‘an organism’ is inclusive of that of ‘a material body’. The included concepts can be derived from the concept of ‘a person’ by abstractions; by excluding from attention those characters which belong to the higher category alone.166

There is, however, an upper limit to one’s understanding. One cannot, except by analogy, understand what is beyond the personal. One may experience what is beyond the personal and therefore know it (in a limited and incomplete sense, including the knowledge that it is beyond the personal), but the understanding and expression is bounded by the human reality of the person who must therefore speak analogically.167

The upper limit of understanding actually applies to all encounters between a particular person and any another particular person who has had differing experiences. A child can only understand being an adult analogically, until that child becomes an adult. A male can never fully understand what it is like to give birth to a child. Therefore knowledge of God, while more difficult than knowledge of human persons, is of a similar character as knowledge of human persons—it is a matter of difference of degree versus difference of kind. Areas of commonality are more easily understood, areas of difference are analogically understood.168

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165 The cognitive element of immediate experience is particular to the individual and the constellation of factors at any given moment in the person’s life. What one knows depends and changes according to who one is. And who one is, particularly the emotional and intentional interests, affects what one knows. The manner in which intentions and feelings affect knowledge are: (1) Interest in it; (2) Desiring it; (3) Loving/hating it; (4) Interacting with it. IU, 22.
166 SA, 117.
167 Or in Macmurray’s usage, mythologically. SRR, 45 n. 1. The use of this term is unfortunate because of the negative connotations which many associate with it.
168 This is the conclusion of Haddox’s thesis: “Thus, religious knowledge is no more logically problematic than any other type of knowledge.” Haddox, iv.
A second methodological issue for Macmurray is the lingering echo of mind-body dualism and the desire to separate consciousness from movement when they should be integrated. Consciousness integrated with movement is behavior, that is to say reaction to a stimulus occurring at the organic level. Action, however, is more than the integration of consciousness and movement for it also includes knowledge. It is the result of intention—a reason, neither a cause nor a stimulus—and therefore by definition, occurs only at the level of the personal. At the level of the inorganic one is left with movement without the benefit of either knowledge or stimulus.

Third is Macmurray’s concern with the lingering effects of the faculty psychology.

The psychological analysis of consciousness into cognitive, affective and conative aspects is misleading even when a faculty psychology is repudiated and the unity of consciousness is stressed. It is itself the lingering ghost of the faculty psychology, and it is high time that it was laid. Consciousness, as such, has no cognitive element. Only persons know, in any proper sense of the term, and act with knowledge. And they know and develop their knowledge, as much through their capacity for feeling as by using their senses; perhaps even more so, since sense depends upon feeling in a manner in which feeling does not depend upon sense.

It is not until the distinction is made between the Self and the Other, whether within the field of the senses or feelings, that one enters into the fully personal realm of rational knowledge. Keeping these concerns in mind, it is now possible to consider Macmurray’s model of consciousness and its relation to knowledge-in-action.

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169 When I act, therefore, my consciousness—my seeing, hearing, remembering, thinking—does not accompany but is integrated with my bodily movements and is a part-determinant of them. The body-mind problem is therefore fictitious. That it exists merely proves that there is an error in our representation of mind or body or both.” SA, 118.
170 SA, 119.
171 SA, 119.
172 SA, 126. This seems to be a development in Macmurray’s thought. For example he was comfortable defining the basic elements of immediate experience as the integration of cognition, conation, and feeling in IU (22). Furthermore, his entire work Reason and Emotion would seem to also fit this earlier terminology which he later rejects. The closest that Macmurray approaches in the Gifford Lectures is the use of “emotional” and “intellectual” in referencing the modes of reflection and the types of knowledge associated with each.
173 SA, 124-25.
Consciousness, as the exclusion of the cognitive from knowing may be seen primarily as motive. In saying this, it must be reiterated that Macmurray does not equate thinking with knowledge. Cognition depends upon the awareness of the distinction between the Self and the Other. Consciousness functions at the organic level and must be considered in terms of teleological description.

Consciousness may be theoretically subdivided into a general hierarchical taxonomy which follows the basic layout of Personal logic where the lower levels constitute the higher levels. The lowest level of consciousness is the feeling or motive consciousness. At its lowest level it is the basic ability to distinguish pleasure and pain. It is not aware of anything but is merely aware of the feeling. Below this level any reaction is unconscious, but it is still a teleological reaction to a stimulus rather than a cause. This implies to Macmurray that there is a reciprocity between the organism and its environment which is below consciousness and which all consciousness presupposes. Sense consciousness exists at a higher level than the motive consciousness. Touch is the lower limit of sense consciousness and marks the lower limit of objective consciousness delineating it from a purely subjective consciousness. Sense is always accompanied by feeling, even if is not given attention. Dream consciousness, as reaction to external stimulus, is the highest form of organic consciousness. One must resist the temptation to confuse any form of consciousness with cognition. The consciousness, at whatever level: feeling, sense, or dream, is organic and sub-rational until it is taken up into

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174 SA, 120-21. For the use of feeling consciousness see PR, 57.
175 SA, 120. Macmurray points out that at its lowest limit, it is very difficult to distinguish between conscious and unconscious behavior (or some may prefer the term sub-conscious).
176 In other words, "conscious adaptation to environment presupposes unconscious adaptation." SA, 122.
177 SA, 122-24. Note Macmurray’s discussion that too much or too little stimulus results in feeling without sense (SA, 123). There appears to be an inconsistency within Macmurray’s construct as feelings appear to exist both below and above the subjective-objective line. The motives of love, fear, and hatred are all objective—having a referent outside the person yet they are feelings. Perhaps Macmurray is making a distinction between motive consciousness and emotions. Or, it is possible the cardinal or apperceptive emotions (to coin a term) of love, hate, and fear, are objective, while other feelings (pleasure, pain) are lower and thus subjective.
cognition. This rationalizing of the consciousness occurs at the point where
discrimination between the Self and the Other as Other-than-self is realized.\textsuperscript{179}

Within the logical form of the cogito it is impossible to distinguish between
motive and intention, but from the perspective of the agent it is possible, for intentions are
always conscious, while motives may be either conscious or unconscious.\textsuperscript{180} Every action
has a motive, but the motive does not determine the action, for it may be unconscious, or
if conscious, it may not be the focus of attention. Motive is contained within the intention
of action as its negative. Motive determines behavior (not action) and may be thought of
as a type of potential energy responding to stimulus.\textsuperscript{181} This exists within the life of the
Agent as habit—a learned response to a particular stimulus lacking intention—and may
be either conscious or unconscious. Conscious behavior governs the expenditure of
energy including its own negation (inhibition of movement)\textsuperscript{182} so that all intentional
action contains a multitude of habitually motivated movements which are not attended to
but that function to serve the focus of the attention which contributes to the intention.\textsuperscript{183}

Figure 2.4 provides a graphic summary of personal knowledge-in-action.

Several aspects and implications should be noted about personal knowledge-in-
action. First, knowledge being personal is cognitive and intentional, and as such,
knowledge is always objective.

\textsuperscript{179} SA, 124-25.
\textsuperscript{179} SA, 124, 125.
\textsuperscript{180} SA, 195.
\textsuperscript{181} SA, 195.
\textsuperscript{182} SA, 196.
\textsuperscript{183} "In the case of agents, however, motives do not determine action. Nevertheless, all action contains
necessarily an element of reaction to stimulus, without which it would be impossible. We call this habit;
and the system of habits in an individual agent we call his character .... In so far then as an agent acts
habitually, he acts from a motive, but not with intention. But in normal action these motivated responses are
aspects of an activity which is intentional; and because attention is concentrated upon the objective, the
motives of these habitual aspects of action normally remain unconscious, unless they are brought into
consciousness by reflection." SA, 196.

Haddox, further clarifies Macmurray's understanding of intention when he writes: "Indeed, to be
precise, one does not 'have' an intention, one \textit{intends}, and to intend is to act in hope, not to determine
theoretically what one wants to do." Haddox, 112.
Knowledge is that in my action which makes it an action and not a blind activity. It is ‘objective’ awareness; or rather awareness of the Other and the Self in relation. It is not ‘knowing that’, neither is it ‘knowing how’; neither is it ‘knowledge by acquaintance’, for it is acquaintance. We use the term ‘know’ in this primary sense when we say that we know our friends and are known by them.\(^{184}\)

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<th>Unily-Pattern</th>
<th>Guidance</th>
<th>Impetus &amp; Movement</th>
<th>Consciousness</th>
<th>Behavior</th>
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<td>Organic</td>
<td>Teleology</td>
<td>Stimulus-Reaction</td>
<td>Dream-Conscious Sense-Conscious Motive-Conscious</td>
<td>Conscious-Behavior</td>
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<td>Material</td>
<td>Mechanical/ Determinism</td>
<td>Cause-Effect</td>
<td>Non-Conscious</td>
<td>Displacement/ Effect</td>
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Figure 2.4 Personal Knowledge-in-Action

Stemming from this familiarity is the fact that while reflective judgments are always hypothetical and hence uncertain, knowledge is always certain although it may be incomplete.\(^{185}\) This incompleteness is in part due to the fact that a person is only capable of focusing upon a limited aspect of reality. Macmurray calls this selectivity attention.\(^{186}\) Reacting to things outside of one's attention constitutes a habitual response which is

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Ricoeur makes similar connections between habit, character, and the close connections of these with idem-self, the more substantial understanding of personhood. Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, 118-22.

\(^{184}\) SA, 129.

\(^{185}\) "All reflective judgments are hypothetical and have an element of logical uncertainty in them; but if I say that I know someone I cannot be mistaken. If the statement is false then I am lying." SA, 129.

\(^{186}\) SA, 129-30.
conscious behavior in reaction to stimulus which must be learned. Knowledge, as cognitive consciousness, is constituted by its negative, the consciousness. Finally, and importantly for understanding Macmurray's epistemology, is the distinction he draws between primary knowledge which is gained in action and secondary knowledge which is theoretical or reflective. The importance of action necessitates addressing the topic of movement.

2.2.1.2 Personal Movement-in-Action: Action and Event

While few would question the validity of considering knowledge in a discussion of epistemology, the inclusion of movement may seem inappropriate. The mind-body duality which accompanied Descartes' cogito created an entire network of associated beliefs; this is one of them. However, from the standpoint of the Agent, one cannot separate knowledge from considerations of action and one cannot consider action without movement.

Personal movement, as one of the dimensions of action, has as its constitutive negative elements time and space. Space represents the possibility of movement, not its actuality. From the practical perspective, time has logical primacy over space for doing is more comprehensive than being. Time, therefore, is positive and space is negative.

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187 Macmurray notes that one often refers to being unconsciously aware of something which is outside one's attention. SA, 130. He also notes that habit, although developed consciously, can become automatic and unconscious. BS, 189-96.
188 We now see that knowledge—which is cognitive consciousness—depends for its possibility upon the inclusion within it of a non-cognitive or motive consciousness. This indeed is the basis of habit; and habit is a necessary constituent of any actual action. Habit is conscious behaviour, or response to stimulus which involves awareness. SA, 130.
189 'Knowledge' here refers to primary knowledge or knowledge in action; not to secondary or reflective knowledge. SA, 130, n.2. In IU, Macmurray draws a much stronger distinction between knowledge and reflection. However in SA there is an acknowledgement of this theoretical knowledge but its importance is relativized unless it is verified in action.
190 Haddox sees the inclusion of movement as a serious mistake on Macmurray's part—as being a throw back to the earlier dualism. However, this is because he sees it as a symptom of Macmurray's idealism and doesn't take seriously enough the conceptual aspects as opposed to their integration in reality. Haddox, 135-37, developed out of an earlier accusation of dualism, 102-05.
191 SA, 131-32.
We are now in a position to summarize these considerations by asserting that time is the form of action; while space is the form of reflection, and that time is prior to space because action is prior to reflection. The priority is that of the positive in respect of the negative which it includes. That time and space are mere forms, and in themselves nothing, needs no argument. They are negations of intuition; ideal lower limits of imaginal consciousness.  

Using distinctions in time between past, present, and future, Macmurray demarcates the past as the field of actuality, the future as the field of possibility, and the present as the point of action. In so doing one can say “to act is to determine the future.”

Because of its temporal nature, action is irreversible. For Macmurray action is choice, not the result of choice and thus the determination of right and wrong action has priority over theoretical questions of truth.

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192 SA, 132. This is the exact opposite conclusion as arrived at by Moltmann who privileges being over doing and space over time. For example, see Jürgen Moltmann, God in Creation: A New Theology of Creation and the Spirit of God, Gifford Lectures 1984-1985, trans. Margaret Kohl (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1985), 139, 286; Jürgen Moltmann, Experiences in Theology: Ways and Forms of Christian Theology, trans. Margaret Kohl (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2000), 314-20.; Moltmann, Spirit of Life, 198-208. The entire discussion of the relation of space-time has progressed since Macmurray was writing. Suffice it to say, that the concept of space and time as merely forms, stemming from the Kantian understanding of each, is probably in need of updating.

193 SA, 133.

194 SA, 134. This naturally raises the issue of the classic argument over freewill and determinism. Because of its basis in the agent, Macmurray’s Form of the Personal dissolves the dualism of freewill and determinism: “This analysis has certain important implication. The first concerns the conception traditionally termed ‘free-will’, and its negation, ‘determinism’. To possess free-will is simply to be able to determine the indeterminate, that is, the future. We can now see that this is implied in the very conception of action. The Agent is the determiner. To deny free-will is to deny the possibility of action. We have already established, as a negative criterion of truth, that any theory which denies the possibility of action is false. That I am free is an immediate implication of the ‘I do’; and to deny freedom is to assert that no one ever does anything, that no one is capable even of thinking or of observing.” SA, 134. “Knowledge, then, in its primary form, is the theoretical determination of the past in action. The freedom of the agent then, so far from being incompatible with the possibility of knowledge is the ground of that possibility. The Agent, in action, generates the determinate as the object of knowledge. The falseness of determinism lies simply in the dogma that the future is already determinate.” SA, 135. Note due to the limitations of the SA, that the relational aspects of freedom will be delayed until Macmurray’s anthropology is discussed.

195 SA, 135. Macmurray has an extended discussion about how some reflection upon time results in its “spatialization” in the space-time continuum which is not real-time, but past time. SA, 137-38. He goes on to distinguish between prediction as the theoretical determination of the future (if grounded in knowledge of the past) or as prophecy (if grounded on a hunch). “Time as a determinate sequence of events is necessarily past time; it is indeed the conception of the past, and the distinction of the past and the future in it is the relative distinction which arises by a theoretical selection of a point in time as the present. This is clearly possible only theoretically; and if it is taken otherwise it implies that the Self exists as subject, but not as agent. Theoretically I can select any point in time I please as the present, and call what came before it the past and what came after it the future. But as agent the present is determined for me. It is the ‘here-and-now’, my only point of action, for I can act neither in the past nor in the future. And even in reflection, I can only think here and now; and my ability to place myself in thought at any point in time I please depends on
Movement, in its aspects as time and space, has as its crucial implication the necessity for there to be an Other; for at the very least the Other is necessary as a point of reference in order to judge relative time and location, and therefore movement.\(^{198}\) Since the Other is the necessary correlate of the Self,\(^{199}\) if one conceives of the Other in subpersonal terms then one conceives the Self similarly. Doing so, one is unable to understand movement in terms of personal act and is limited to inorganic displacement and organic reaction and process.\(^{200}\)

the fact that all points in time are represented here and now, for my reflection, simultaneously. Now an order of simultaneity is spatial.... The physicist's time is not real time; it is time represented as past, without a future." SA, 138-39.

Moltmann makes some similar points in his discussion of time, its irreversibility and the qualitative difference between past and future, as well as his understanding of the past-future, future-past, and the present-future, etc. Moltmann, *God in Creation,* 124-39, also Moltmann, *Experiences in Theology,* 105-06.

\(^{196}\) "Action is thus the actualization of a possibility, and as such it is choice. It is important to notice that this means precisely what its says. It does not mean that an action is preceded by a choice; nor that a mysterious 'act of will' somehow connects a theoretical selection with a physical movement.... The actual choice is the doing of the action; and action is choice whether or not this preliminary reflection takes place. There can, undoubtedly, be no choosing apart from reflection; but this need only be that primary reflection which is in action, as one of its dimensions." SA, 139-40. Haddock comments: "Any other relation between acting and choosing falls into a dualistic conceptuality and usually conjures up some mediating force, such as the 'will' to negotiate the mind's desire into bodily achievement." Haddock, 116.

\(^{197}\) This has important consequences for the primary form of reflective activity is not about truth or beauty but about right and wrong action. "As an actual activity of the personal, thought, as a spontaneity of the Self, must include a negative aspect or receptivity, which we call sense-perception. But 'thinking' is an ambiguous term, often restricted to that form of reflective activity which intends knowledge, and so to the process of inference. There are other forms of reflective activity; that for instance which proceeds in terms of the distinction between the beautiful and ugly. Both of these are forms of secondary reflection. The primary reflection is the reflective element in action, which proceeds in terms of the distinction between right and wrong [not specifically moral, cf. n.1]." SA, 135-36. "Consequently, if we may say that a proposition is that which can be true or false, we may also say that an action is what can be right or wrong." SA, 140. "The discrimination of right and wrong in action must be prior to and not dependent upon the theoretical discrimination of the truth or falsity of a judgement." SA, 141.

\(^{198}\) "An action is that which can be right and wrong. This really signifies that without an other no action is possible. The scientific analogue of this is the relativity of motion. No movement in space can be determined, and therefore no position in space, except by reference to a fixed point independently determined. Our hypothetical agent in empty space could not discriminate possible directions of movement outside himself. Any one movement would then be identical with any other." SA, 143.

\(^{199}\) PR, 76-77; SA, 142.

\(^{200}\) "The resistance of the continuant is a negative resistance, and the support it provides is a negative support. It provides for the possibility of movement, but not of action. For though the resistance limits the possibilities for the agent it still provides no ground for discriminating between the possibilities which remain open.... He has the means of action, but no ground of action; for the material environment as such does not serve to discriminate between possible objectives." SA, 144. "If we say that natural teleology prescribes an objective, the preservation of his life and the avoidance of death, we are brought up short by the fact that the agent knows that this is an impossible objective. Death is unavoidable; consequently any choice of self-preservation as objective of action is inherently irrational. The biblical story of the Fall is quite correct in linking the knowledge of good and evil with the knowledge 'Thou shall surely die'. The solitary agent for whom the Other is an organic environment can only behave as an organism, responding to
Rather than viewing the primary elements in experience as material and mental objects as in modern philosophy, from the standpoint of the Agent, the primary distinction lies in change. All changes are either acts (doings with an accompanying reason) or events (happenings with a cause). This does not introduce another dualism in the place of the modernist mental/material dichotomy because in the form of the personal the positive practical includes and is constituted by the negative—what happens constitutes and gives form to the doing. Yet a conceptual or theoretical dualism arises by the absolute distinction between cause and reason.

Human reaction may be suggested as an apparent middle ground between action and event. However, if one considers the teleological nature of reaction it is possible to discern two types of teleology: one where the end is determined by a knowledge of the end (for example, an intentional habituation) and the other where knowledge has no part in determining the end. The first is intentional and therefore constitutes an act, while the second is not and therefore fits within the category of an event.

If one takes an action and removes knowledge one is left with an event. A person's movement may be either an action or it may be an event. It is an event, for


201 SA, 146-47.
202 SA, 147.
203 "For every event there is a cause; for every act there is a reason. And since the distinction of 'act' and 'event' is a principle of ultimate or metaphysical classification, and institutes a conceptual dualism, we must recognize that the distinction between 'reason' and 'cause' is an absolute distinction; so that no act can have a cause; and no event a reason." SA, 149.
204 SA, 149-51. "In principle, therefore, action in general cannot be defined teleologically, even if there is always a teleological element contained in it. It can be defined only as an activity informed by knowledge. Since time is the form of action this knowledge has a necessary reference to the future.... The reference to the future must be sufficient to determine a direction of advance; it need not determine an end. And since even the ends which we do determine in action are only relative, since they are also starting-points of further action, we always know to some extent, and never know with full finality, what we are doing." SA, 150-51.
205 "The idea of an event is the idea of an action, from which the element of knowledge has been excluded." SA, 151. Yet one should not view this as an aggregate or mathematical addition. Reason is always cognitive, but in saying this, one must not equate reason with intellecition.
example, when it is simply a reaction or an accident. An action may directly cause an event, but an event can never directly create an action because it lacks intention. Unless affected by actions or other events an event will continue indefinitely in time and is therefore fully determined. Actions, by contrast, depend upon sustained intention for continuation and consequently action may be seen as the intention to determine the future. Cause in isolation is problematic, but when it is considered within a personal integration as the negative of action the difficulties (such as the need for a first cause) are overcome.

This schema of action and event, however, does not only apply to the human person. Macmurray seeks to show that the entire universe is an action using an argument from the nature of history for a metaphysic of action. Macmurray’s understanding of the unity of experience forces one to consider the unity of the universe as either an event or an action. Since actions may cause events, but events cannot cause

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206 Both accidents and reactions have causes, but not intentions. (SA, 151-53)
207 An event may create a new situation in light of which a person may change or modify intentions but the event itself is not the direct cause.
208 SA, 155-64. An action may, however, create events which are continuous. For example: If one walks across the street the intention must be maintained for the duration of the action until the goal is reached otherwise one stops in the middle of the street. This is an action because the intention must be maintained. If, however, one begins to slide down the hill (whether begun intentionally or not), then this event will continue until interrupted by other events (such as the force of impact from a tree) or actions (such as reaching out and grabbing a passing tree stopping the slide).
209 SA, 134. The distinction between an event and an act is always circumstantial—it must be inferred (but not in a formal sense). SA, 152.
210 The concept of ‘cause’ is inherently self-contradictory. It is the conception of an agent that is not an agent, the negation of agency. The negative, we know, cannot exist independently, but only as the negative aspect of a positive in the form of the personal. Within action, which is a personal concept, there not merely can, but must be a negation of action; but this negation is in the last analysis self-negation. If the negative aspect is thought as existing independently of the positive, the result is a contradiction. In consequence, whatever we assign as the cause of an event is something which is not in itself capable of producing an effect, but only, as it were, of transmitting it. It is a means through which something else produces the occurrence. In other words, the ‘cause’ turns out to be merely another event which must be itself referred to another cause. An infinite regress of causes faces us in every case.” SA, 152-53. “So long as the use of the notion of cause falls within action and so has a practical reference, it is meaningful and indispensable.” SA, 153. Macmurray observes continuance at the natural level, biological level, and even in the personal level as habits which are intentionally learned but then become automata. SA, 154-63.
211 For what follows see SA, chapter 10 “The World as One Action”, 203-22.
212 SA, 204-14, especially 211-14.
213 Macmurray defends the verifiability of this metaphysic due to its basis in action and discounts Kant’s attack on metaphysics due to its formal relation to Cartesian dualism. SA, 214-18.
214 SA, 217-19. Accounts which rely on the idea of events also include process ideas.
actions, the only conclusion is to view the world as a singular action requiring the hypothesis of an absolute agent, a personal God.\textsuperscript{215}

It may, indeed, prove possible to think the process of the world as intentional without thinking a supreme Agent whose act the world is. But \textit{prima facie}, at least, it is not possible to do so. The conflict between religion and atheism turns, in large part at least, on the issue whether the process of the world is intentional or not. We noticed, in our first chapter, that contemporary existentialism, in its division into theist and atheist wings, poses the substantial problem of philosophy in our day in the alternatives, 'God or Nothing'. We may now add to this, as a pointer to the direction of a verification, that the theistic alternative issues in the hope of an ultimate unity of persons in fellowship, which gives meaning to human effort; while atheist existentialism finds human relationship an insoluble problem and all human projects doomed to frustration and ultimate meaninglessness. As Sartre says in \textit{Huis clos}, 'L'enfer, c'est les autres';\textsuperscript{216}

Ignoring for the time being the complexities of a fully relational understanding of persons in relation, action (as personal movement) is intention executed in time and in the freedom of space\textsuperscript{217} by persons to determine the future, leading to the logical conclusion of a personal God. However, the integration of knowledge and movement in action is not always successful, for in the course of interaction with the Other, one's intentions are not always realized, signaling the inadequacy of knowledge.\textsuperscript{218} In order to overcome this failure, the person must step back from practical action and engage in theoretical reflection.

2.2.2 Reflection

Reflection occurs when the Self-as-agent negates self in order to become the Self-as-subject. This retreat from the practical into the theoretical raises issues as to the relationship between knowledge and reflection, the nature of reflection, and the distinction made between theoretical and practical within Macmurray's philosophy.

\textsuperscript{215} PR, chapter 10, "The Personal Universe," 206-24, esp. 221. This is a classic example of Macmurray's method. Instead of asking the typical question, does God exist?, he asks, is what exists, personal?

\textsuperscript{216} SA, 222. These are the final words of SA.

\textsuperscript{217} SA, 134, 139.

2.2.2.1 The Presupposition of Knowledge for Reflection

The relationship between knowledge and reflection requires a thorough investigation of the objectivity and temporality of knowledge-in-action. When starting from the position of the agent rather than the subject, Macmurray replaces the I think with the I do. However, the I do is an incomplete statement for in reality it is I do this, which contains within it the notion of discrimination so that this statement becomes fully I do this and not that. When considered in its negative dimension as knowledge this becomes I know that I do this and not that. Knowledge, in its primary form as knowing-in-action, is the knowledge of what one is able to do in conjunction with the Other and thus it is primarily knowledge of the Other. The difference between action and behavior resides in the location of the initiative; in behavior the impetus lies with the stimulus, while in action it lies with the Agent who interacts with the Other objectively. An agent then, is one whose acts are “informed and directed by an awareness of the Other-than-self as other; and the ground of choice, that is the determination of the action, lies, therefore in the agent’s knowledge of the Other.” This knowledge in action has a certainty to it which is denied any theoretical constructs:

So long as we do not generalize, or anticipate, or in any way go beyond its immediacy, our knowledge of the Other in action has a certainty that no reflective

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219 SA, 165. Saying that, it is also possible that the particular knowledge of what one is doing may be more or less complete—the Agent may modify the course of the action at any point—but it is never complete until it is actualized, otherwise the action would cease to be an action and become a continuant, a process that continues on without change indefinitely. SA, 166.

220 The knowledge in action which makes action possible must therefore be a knowledge of what is practically possible, and of a ground of discrimination between alternative possibilities. In general, then, it must be a knowledge of the Other.” SA, 166. This does not preclude knowledge of self, but it is a knowledge of self in relation to Other.

221 “In any reaction, the initiative of behaviour lies with the stimulus. The reaction involves no choice on the part of the organism.... Then we may say that the reaction is produced by the stimulus in terms of the nature of the organism at the moment. In the case of action, however, the initiative lies with the agent, who determines his activity in terms of the nature of the Other.” SA, 167.

222 “It is thus the nature of an agent to act not in terms of his own nature but in terms of the nature of the object, that is, of the Other. However simple and immediate an action may be, so long as it is an action, and not merely a reaction to stimulus, then it is informed and directed by an awareness of the Other-than-self as other; and the ground of choice, that is, the determination of the action, lies therefore in the agent’s knowledge of the Other.” SA, 168.
knowledge can ever attain. Indeed, if we limit the term knowledge, as some philosophers would do, to that ‘logical certainty’ which is the result of theoretical demonstration, we should have to confess that there is not and cannot be knowledge, and so relapse into a complete scepticism.

Knowledge has a temporal aspect to it. Awareness of the past is memory; awareness of the future is anticipation. The difference being memory is an awareness of matter of fact (the past being fully determined) while anticipation is an awareness of intention (the desire and possibility to determine the future). Intention, being a personal activity, contains within it its own negative, attention. Practical intention, as the forward looking, anticipatory aspect of knowledge, looks to modify the reality of the Other, while practical attention, as the backward-looking, remembering aspect of knowledge, looks to what is already determined so that how it was determined may be revealed. Attention is a negative activity because the object is already determined, attending to what the object is, rather than what it will be. In action one intends to modify the Other, which necessitates a focusing of attention upon what is deemed relevant and ignoring what is either irrelevant or continuant. The continuant elements are left to habit.

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223 SA, 168. Macmurray notes that mathematics does not refute this because it is simply formal: a rule for counting which cannot be true or false.
224 Knowledge in action “participates in the temporal form.” To be aware of what I am doing implies a distinction between past and future. “Such knowledge is therefore, as awareness of the past, memory; and as awareness of the future, anticipation. This reference to the future however is not to matter of fact, but to matter of intention.” SA, 169. Again an interesting parallel can be seen here with Moltmann, if one understands anticipation as hope.
225 SA, 172.
226 “We intend a modification of the Other, to be determined by our agency. We attend to a mode of the other which is already determinate in order that it may reveal to us the structure of its determination. Thus ‘intention’ and ‘attention’ refer respectively to the forward-looking and the backward-looking aspects of knowledge in action, to anticipation and memory. In reflective activity there can be no intention, since negative activity determines nothing in reality.” SA, 171-72.
227 “Thinking is then something that I do, since without my attention nothing will follow; but it is a negative doing, because what follows when I attend is something that I do not determine. The idealist is right in saying that the idea develops itself in my mind: but this is conditional upon the attention which makes the thinking mine. Apart from this we have mere dreaming, in which the idea develops itself in my mind without any tension in me. Intention, on the other hand contains attention within itself as its negative aspect.” SA, 172.
228 SA, 173.
Failure in integrated action causes a person to step back and reflect in order to overcome the problem. This failure raises questions about one's knowledge—it creates doubt. The function of reflection, therefore, is to overcome doubt in order to resume action. Any reflection which does not ultimately lead to action is unreal, merely a daydream.

Since reflection arises from a failure in knowledge, it is clear that reflection presupposes knowledge and is not an element within thought. In other words, "you must know something before you can think about it." Macmurray sees this as a foundational and general epistemological principle: "All thought presupposes

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229 IU, 36-37.
230 IU, 37. Roy notes the similarity of this "problem orientation" in both Macmurray and the pragmatists. Also note Roy's preference for viewing persons as "questioners": "By contrast, we would argue that the idiom of question-raising, being more encompassing, could do fuller justice to human reflection. A question may be triggered off not only by a practical problem but also by a scientific or moral puzlelement or by a desire to look at things afresh. Question raising is a quest for understanding which integrates the organic level of problem-solving by situating it in a world of meaning and purpose. When somebody tries to solve a problem, he normally ascribes a meaning and a purpose to this activity, even when it is a matter of biological subsistence and of manual work. Macmurray does not deny the desire to understand which operates for instance in the scientist's mind. But he belittles it as a motive in comparison with the scientist's social function." Roy, Form of the Personal, 63-64. Unfortunately, this position moves one back into the territory of the Cartesian thinker, not the integrated "doer" encountering the other. Roy's examples are inadequate because he glosses over the "problematic" terminology with the language of emotion and desire. But if there is not a "problem" in these areas (a feeling of dissatisfaction, etc.) then there is no cause to reflect. One does not simply wake up, consult a chart, and decide that one must think things afresh. One feels in a rut (the problem) and then reflects on the situation.
231 IU, 38. This is similar to Dewey's pragmatic or "radical empirical" conception of the epistemological process. "Inquiry, he [Dewey] holds, starts from a 'problematic situation' and, if successful, ends with a situation that is so 'determinate' and 'unified' that hesitancy to act has been eliminated. Peter H. Hare, "Pragmatic Theory of Truth," OCP, 710. For concerns about the similarity of Macmurray's form of the personal and pragmatism see below §2.2.3.2.
232 IU, 12.
233 IU, 13. Even though one is able to reflect on immediate experience one should not confuse this reflection with immediate experience itself. IU, 15. Therefore, epistemology, as reflection on knowing, is part of philosophy but knowing itself is larger than philosophical reflection. This creates an interesting recursive aspect as one reflects on knowing and then reflects on reflection within the reflection on knowledge.
234 IU, 15.
Macmurray cites the example that one knows another person well before one understands him or her.\(^\text{237}\)

### 2.2.2.2 Reflection as Symbolic Representation and Manipulation

When the agent reflects, that is to say becomes the Self-as-subject through a process of self-negation, a theoretical intention creates a four-dimensional representation of the past as an object to know through theoretical attention.\(^\text{238}\) Since this representation is not a real object, but merely a symbolic re-creation and based upon memory it is necessarily fragmentary and incomplete. Reflection is the rational activity by which this symbolic knowledge of the past is extended and clarified\(^\text{239}\) yet it too is incomplete, abstract, and fragmentary.\(^\text{240}\)

\(^{236}\) IU, 15. Emphasis is in the original.

\(^{237}\) IU, 17-18. This type of knowledge in immediate experience has its own developmental process (not exclusively through refinements from reflection). "The tendency to think and the even simpler tendency to speak about what we have experienced is so early developed in us and becomes such an integral part of our consciousness, that it is hardly possible to be aware of anything or to engage in any activity without an element of reflection entering in. But this does not alter the fact that immediate experience and reflective experience are different in kind, and that in important respects their development is different and unrelated." IU, 20. He continues shortly thereafter to state "In the normal case the present range and depth and character of our immediate experience is largely determined by past reflection upon the things we know.... Immediate experience is not, therefore, primitive, raw experience, unaffected by thinking, nor is thinking the only instrument which we possess for the enrichment of our capacity to experience." IU, 21.

This resembles Polanyi's concept of *tacit knowledge* and his maxim that we know more than we can tell. Polanyi, *Tacit Dimension*, 4. Haddox provides an excellent discussion of how Polanyi and Macmurray are mutually instructive in this respect. Haddox, 180-205. See Mullins, "More on Macmurray and Polanyi," *Appraisal: A Journal of Constructive and Post-Critical Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Studies* 1, no. 4 (Oct. 1997): 202-03 for possible connections through Oldham. There is also the possibility of indirect contact through Michael's brother Karl Polanyi who participated in the Christian Left in Britain, of which Macmurray was a leading figure. See Costello, 15-16.

Furthermore, one should understand that what Macmurray is opposing with the term *immediate* is the idea that somehow the senses mediate experience to the person, because to do so raises the question, what are the senses mediating one's experiences to? The typical answer is something roughly akin to the mind, and hence one observes the cogito attempting reentry. Macmurray would want to emphasize that the senses are part and parcel of the integration that is the human person.

\(^{238}\) "The Agent constitutes himself subject by negating his own agency. He forms a theoretical intention. He is then in reflection, turned back upon his own past. This past then is presented in memory as the object of knowledge It appears as a four-dimensional system in which time is the fourth dimension." SA, 170. The intention is theoretical because it is directed at modifying the representation of the Other, not the actual modification of the Other. It would appear that just as there is a practical and theoretical intention, so too a practical and theoretical attention.

\(^{239}\) "The object of knowledge then is the past conceived as contingent, that is, as completely determinate and not to be modified by further action.... What is given for any particular agent in reflection is only the content of his own memory, which is necessarily fragmentary, and therefore, an indeterminate and very inadequate characterization of the past; or if you will, of what exists. The rational activities of reflection are
Attention (whether practical or theoretical) is selective and varies according to intensity (tension in the self) and concentration (limiting the complexity of what is attended to). The reflective, or theoretical, intention determines the methodological deployment of attention but it is still negative for it does not determine the end to be achieved. Successful reflection is largely dependent upon this methodological systematic ordering of attention, selected upon the basis of the theoretical intention's connection to the practical intention of the interrupted action.

Attention is always a form of abstraction and generalization—a taking away of what is considered irrelevant for the current purposes of the agent. What is known in reflection is always an abstraction, a mere idea or mental construct, which does not exist in reality and which must be verified in practice. Generalization focuses upon the repetitive aspects of these abstractions.

All reflective activity involves representations and is therefore symbolic, reaching completion only in its expression. Images are reductive abstractions which...
allow a certain economy of effort\textsuperscript{250} eventually leading to the generation of general abstract images or symbols.\textsuperscript{251} Language is "a particular form, and the most generally useful form, of imagery which has been reduced in such a way that it forms a set of symbols."\textsuperscript{252} The primary function of language is communication\textsuperscript{253} (itself an activity) and its use in reflection is derived from this primary communicative function.\textsuperscript{254} Language has a natural tendency towards stability which assists in clarity but impedes creativity.\textsuperscript{255} The particular application determines the symbol used so that different images or symbols may express the same idea.\textsuperscript{256}

Reflective activity is activity directed upon images. \textit{Thought} is often conceived as covering all reflective activity but Macmurray tends to define it more strictly as the description and manipulation of images.\textsuperscript{257} Description, or analysis, is the substitution, representing, or mapping\textsuperscript{258} of a pattern of symbols for reality.\textsuperscript{259} It is inherently fragmentary because the system is designed for a particular purpose which controls the types of abstractions and generalizations that are considered significant. The success of
the system depends on whether or not it meets the requirements of the purpose for which it was intended. Therefore ideas are not true or false, but rather adequate or inadequate.\textsuperscript{260}

Once analysis has created a symbolic pattern these symbols may be manipulated. Judgment and inference manipulate these symbols in an imaginative activity taking them beyond the data.\textsuperscript{261} Therefore, it is seen that supposai, or the imagination, is the fundamental process of thought.\textsuperscript{262} The uniting of premises is a creative activity and is not strictly rule governed.\textsuperscript{263} However, in order to economize effort, habits of manipulation are developed and these imaginative habits become enshrined in logic.\textsuperscript{264} This use of the imagination becomes so routine that the imaginative foundation of all thought is forgotten and only the non-habitual use of the imagination is apparent.\textsuperscript{265} Nevertheless, all thought is based in the imagination and upon the controlling conceptual unities (Macmurray's \textit{unity-patterns}) which the imagination constructs.\textsuperscript{266}

\textsuperscript{260} IU, 53-54.
\textsuperscript{261} IU, 55. From this fact, Macmurray notes that there is no absolute starting point for all thought. In this way he may be considered to be somewhat postmodern, although some would challenge this because of his concept of reality.
\textsuperscript{262} IU, 56. This agrees with the evaluation of Mark Johnson. "The conclusion ought to be, therefore, that imagination is absolutely central to human rationality, that is, to our rational capacity to find significant connections, to draw inferences, and to solve problems." Johnson, 168. "By taking imagination as central, I see its structure as a massive, embodied complex of meaning upon which conceptualization and propositional judgment depend. Meaning is broader and deeper than the mere surface of the entire experiential complex—a surface that we peel off (cognitively) as concepts and propositional contents." Johnson, 170. Johnson's theory of imagination includes the following components: categorization, schemata, metaphorical projection, metonymy (including synecdoche), narrative structure (171).
\textsuperscript{263} IU, 56.
\textsuperscript{264} IU, 57. Macmurray is quick to point out that these habits cannot lead to true discovery of what is not already in some way known.
\textsuperscript{265} IU, 58. Some will reject the presence of imagination in all thought because they equate imagination with fantasy. Macmurray says that there are legitimate limitations imposed by reality upon the proper use of the imagination in thought. IU, 58 However, "A supposai which destroys any essential characteristic of reality as we know it, would destroy the basis for any conclusion about the nature of reality so far as we know it. And a supposai which contradicted the structure of the analytic description of something in reality, which is the starting point of an activity of thought, could not yield a conclusion which we should have any justification for referring to the reality about which we are thinking. Even if, under such conditions, we could draw a conclusion at all, it would be a conclusion which contradicted its premisses. What is important here is to notice that what keeps the activity of the imagination within the limits of the necessary reference to reality is the retention throughout the process of thought of a structural basis which has itself been derived from reality by the process of analytic description. Within this fundamental structure we may suppose anything that seems useful, provided that the structure itself is not altered." IU, 59-60.
\textsuperscript{266} IU, 133. For a fuller explication of modes of reflection, unity-patterns, and rationality see below §2.3.
Because theoretical intention cannot determine the end it cannot determine a means to that end. Instead of an end, theoretical intention points to an ideal, and instead of a means it has a method of procedure. There are two primary methods, logically correlated and cognitively exclusive, for clarifying and extending knowledge in reflection: generalization and particularization.

Particularization fills in the details constituting a self-contained unity (the thing for its own sake) and its methodology is art. Generalization focuses not upon the object's uniqueness but its utility and is thus abstracted into a general idea that may be used in multiple contexts. Particularization and generalization are polar opposites and any representation is more or less conceptual (general) or more or less intuitive.

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267 "Truth, for example, is in this sense an ideal. An ideal might be defined as a negative end; as the bare form of an end. For it can be defined only negatively in relation to a starting-point. Truth, for instance, might be defined as the completely adequate determination of the object; yet what this might be we cannot tell; since if we could we should already possess it and reflective activity would be both unnecessary and impossible. The definition has, however, a negative relation to our present knowledge: that is to say it expresses a recognition of its inadequacy and so of our ignorance. In this way it defines a method of procedure from the inadequate given towards its fuller determination by thought." SA, 176. Haddox refers to Macmurray's conception of knowledge as dynamic and vectorial, moving from the known to the unknown (192).

268 SA, 176.

269 "There are, however, two directions in which a fuller determination of data can be sought. The relative indeterminateness of a representation can be made more adequate either by generalization or by particularization. The terms 'general' (or 'universal') and 'particular', it should be noted, are logical correlates. Neither the one or the other has any reference to existence. Both refer to representations, and so to the theoretical activities which concern the production of adequate representations of the existent. What exists is the concrete individual, from which both the universal and the particular are ideal abstractions." SA, 176. At least once, Macmurray protested against using the terms general and universal interchangeably (RE, 186), but apparently by the time of the Gifford Lectures this was no longer an issue for him.

270 SA, 176-77. "Such a representation can only be produced as an image of intuition; and its production is the work of artistry. This is, of course, the ideal of particularization; and we particularize a representation when we develop it in the direction of such an ideal." SA, 177.

271 SA, 177. "I can generalize all the elements which make up a representation in this way. I have merely to exclude from consideration their relation to one another. On the other hand I can eliminate the elements and attend only to their relations in the representation, and so produce a representation which is purely schematic. This 'form' or 'schema of relations' is also general in the sense that other elements could be arranged in these relations. The pattern can again be analysed into the elementary relations of which it is composed, and which could be recombined in different ways to provide other relational patterns. The ideal of this type of reflective process is a complete generality—the idea of an infinite multiplicity of unit elements which can be related in an infinite number of different ways. It is essential to this ideal that all the elements should be represented as identical, since only in this way can all necessary connexion between them, and so all particularization, be eliminated." SA, 177-78.
(particular). Scientific method seeks as its ideal complete generality and artistic complete particularization.\textsuperscript{272}

2.2.2.3 Distinguishing Theoretical and Practical Activity

A major distinction exists between Macmurray's philosophy and modern philosophy based upon the cogito which is highlighted by art and science. In the Form of the Personal the primary distinction is not between the mental and material, but rather between the practical and the theoretical:

A practical activity is one which intends a modification of the Other; a theoretical intention is one which intends a modification in the representation of the Other. In either case the means to the realization of the intention may involve a modification of the Other. The experiments that a scientist makes in his laboratory, and which involve the devising, erecting and manipulations of apparatus, are elements in a theoretical activity. The thinking out—the calculating and planning—which a builder undertakes before he starts to erect a factory are elements in a practical activity. Whether what I do involves moving things about or not is immaterial.\textsuperscript{273}

Therefore, science and art as ends in themselves are reflective activities—they are ideals which can only be completed in reference beyond themselves. However, when they are referenced beyond themselves, or caught up, into practical activity they exist also in an intermediate form of praxis—the practical application of science and art.\textsuperscript{274} Practical intention, being positive and inclusive, contains and is constituted by the theoretical,

\textsuperscript{272} SA, 178. Körner points out that for Kant, there are two uses for ideas, the theoretical and the practical (31).
\textsuperscript{273} SA, 178-79. Roy, in dissenting from Macmurray's understanding of science as visual and passive, appeals to the activity of experimental chemist, the use of data-gathering devices, and corrective mathematics. Roy, Form of the Personal, 67-68. He fails to understand that Macmurray is thinking in different categories seeing all these as theoretical activities (passive) as opposed to practical ones. Roy consistently wishes to revert to the cogito and its "man as questioner" motif. Roy, Form of the Personal, 63-64. Furthermore, the example he provides of the mathematical corrections simply contradict his own point—these corrections are introduced because of the inability of the scientist to be perfectly passive in observing the data.
\textsuperscript{274} "We must distinguish three modes of reflection. In their purest expression—by which I mean when they are determined by a purely reflective intention—they are religion, art and science. All of them, however, since they are necessarily derived from practical experience, and refer symbolically to action, have intermediate forms in which the reference to practical experience is more specific or more limited." SA, 187-88.
which is negative and exclusive and incomplete since it ends in an ideal, an ideal requiring a reference beyond it in order for it to achieve reality.\textsuperscript{275}

In actual practice the relation between knowledge and reflection follows a pattern which Macmurray terms the \textit{rhythm of withdrawal and return}—an oscillation between practical and theoretical activity. Reflection arises when in the course of action an unforeseen difficulty arises and the Self-as-agent withdraws from action into thought in order to solve the problem at hand so that the agent may return to action.\textsuperscript{276} In Macmurray’s understanding, grave consequences follow whenever the priority of the positive and negative elements is inverted: reflection exists for the sake of knowledge and knowledge for the sake of action.\textsuperscript{277}

\subsection{Summary}

Reflection does not produce knowledge, it presupposes it. It is an imaginative, symbolic activity of analysis and manipulation done within a larger conceptual construct designed to extend and clarify knowledge through generalization and particularization. Reflection, however, is only theoretical and must therefore be completed outside itself in practical activity—verification.

\subsection{Verification}

Verification is primarily a return from thought to action, in order to find in the immediate experience of concrete activity a justification for accepting the

\textsuperscript{275} SA, 179-80.
\textsuperscript{276} SA, 181.
\textsuperscript{277} This situation is particularly demonstrated by the inversion of means and ends. There is not a one-to-one correspondence between ends and means, for there are several means for any particular end and various ends may be served by the same means. When one means serves multiple ends it is conceived of in terms of power and it exists in numerous forms, including wealth and knowledge. This power may be accumulated and held in reserve without any particular end in view. Yet in the amassing of power it is possible to invert the proper subordination of the means to the end and view the stockpiling of power as an end in itself, thereby the means loses its referent and in so doing its meaning and ultimately becomes irrational. SA, 182-83. "But the important point in this is that just as the same end may be attained by various means, so the same means may serve the attainment of various ends. Because of this it is possible to accumulate power—that is, the means of attaining our ends—without deciding in advance between the alternative purposes to which the power shall be put when we have got it." SA, 182. "For in the absence of all reference to the practical reflection becomes phantastic, incapable of either truth or falsity." SA, 183. Also RAS, 21-23.
conclusions which have been reached through the manipulation of ideas in the thought-processes.278

Verification is the arena in which the imaginative reflective constructs are tested in the real world to see if they are true. This presupposes, however, that reflective constructs might not be true and that truthfulness is somehow dictated by reality.

Macmurray’s understanding of verification as the overcoming of error through testing its correspondence in action has certain affinities with pragmatism and these similarities will require clarification.

2.2.3.1 Truth, Error, and Correspondence

Macmurray sees concerns regarding truth as actually being concerns over the problem of error.279 Errors in the symbolic representation of reality may arise from poor description or through improper manipulation of the symbolic representation in reflection.280 Imagination on its own may create either rational or irrational conclusions.281

Overgeneralization is another source of error.282 All thought involves generalization, but generalization requires homogeneity within the class. Errors occur when the general symbol does not apply to all cases. Generalization is justified by the experience of the infinite in the finite and the relationship of the universal to the particular; nonetheless, it cannot justify any particular generalization. All similarity is from a particular viewpoint for a particular purpose283 and therefore thought alone cannot

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278 IU, 74.
279 IU, 65. See also SA 98-99 where Macmurray confronts the problems of self-negation, e.g., self-deception and morality.
280 IU, 66-67. It should be remembered that the descriptive/analytic function and the manipulative function interpenetrate one another. IU, 68. If reality is not referenced, then there is no criteria for choosing among the many possible manipulative procedures, and therefore the rules of logic may fail because the case exceeds the boundary conditions of the logical form. Macmurray uses as an example the algebraic “proof” that 1=2. Let x=a. Then x²=ax, x²-a²=ax-a², (x-a)(x+a)=a(x-a), x+a=a, 2a=a, 2=1. IU, 69, n. 1.
281 IU, 70. Macmurray defines rationality as objective.
282 IU, 71.
283 IU, 72.
stop overgeneralization. Thus, the truth of any theoretical conclusion cannot be certain.\textsuperscript{284}

Without an external referent a symbol can only be correct or incorrect, not true or false, and therefore it is seen that reflective knowledge is incomplete without the return to immediate experience for verification.\textsuperscript{285}

Macmurray spells out several implications of the need for verification of thought in experience. First, all conclusions must be considered as hypothetical.\textsuperscript{286} Second, practical activity is the only way to verify reflection.\textsuperscript{287} Third, failure in practical activity disproves thought but success does not prove its truthfulness for the conclusion is general and the experiment is particular.\textsuperscript{288} Fourth, reflective knowledge is not certain.\textsuperscript{289} Verification leads only to the development of more rational beliefs understood as a conviction that is reasonable to hold in light of the evidence.\textsuperscript{290}

In verification it is imperative that the correct symbol set is chosen. If the question is "what is in the glass?", at home the correct answer may be "water"; but in the laboratory the same answer is false, unless the substance is pure H\textsubscript{2}O.\textsuperscript{291} Intention acts as a guide to the level (set or unity-pattern) in which one is thinking and therefore acts as a

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\textsuperscript{284} IU, 73.
\textsuperscript{285} IU, 74. "Verification breaks the closed circle of thought and substitutes for it a circle of thought and action, but this circle is virtuous instead of vicious because it is founded in reality." Nephew, 32. Roy attempts to reassert the primacy of thought by asserting that verification occurs not in action, but in thought: "But in so far as a deliberate quest for knowledge constitutes the drive to experiment, we must say that it is thought which carries out the experiment. Consequently verification should be seen as an integral part of reflection and thus be recast to the second stage of Macmurray's basic triad [experience, reflection, verification]." Roy, Form of the Personal, 77. As before, this ignores Macmurray's distinction between theoretical and practical and Macmurray's critique of the scientific method as an inversion of the proper relation between thought and action IU, 80.
\textsuperscript{286} IU, 75. Yet, "... when believed any theory should be held provisionally on the theoretical level, even if it is held firmly on the practical level." Nephew, 131.
\textsuperscript{287} IU, 75. Macmurray is adamant that since action is different than sense-perception critiques of this position built around a Cartesian philosophy do not apply here, they are merely formal. See also SA, 215.
\textsuperscript{288} IU, 76-77. Macmurray claims that this lack of guarantee of truthfulness does not lead to skepticism because knowledge is not equated with thought. This is similar to fallibilism as held by C. S. Pierce and Popper. Nicholas Rescher, "Fallibilism," OCP, 287-88.
\textsuperscript{289} IU, 77.
\textsuperscript{290} IU, 78. Kirkpatrick makes a distinction between knowledge which is always direct and belief which may be based upon indirect experience. Kirkpatrick, Idea of God, 69-71.
\textsuperscript{291} Note the similarity to Wittgenstein's language games.
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guide to discerning adequacy. Once the level of intentionality is addressed (or to state it another way, once it is determined which language game is being played) then the question of correspondence with reality comes into play. The truthfulness of a statement is the correspondence of the symbolic representation, taken from the appropriate level of intention, to the object. Correct thinking is real thinking; incorrect thinking is unreal thinking. Real thinking is based upon the object one is thinking about and the context within which one is thinking.

### 2.2.3.2 Verification and Pragmatism

Because of the terminology of action in Macmurray's Form of the Personal, it is natural that some see connections between it and pragmatism. These similarities, however, also raise questions. Langford in his critique of Macmurray raises concerns that Macmurray adopts a pragmatic understanding of verification.

First, one must carefully evaluate the utilization of a pragmatic criterion of meaning and validation. If Macmurray is to resuscitate a pragmatic theory of

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292 Intention is the link between coherence (at the level of attention) and correspondence with external reality. Intention provides the selection of which system is to be tested against the external reality.

293 While there is correspondence in Macmurray’s epistemology this does not validate Roy’s judgment that Macmurray has a ‘crude correspondence theory of truth.’ Roy, Form of the Personal, 30.

294 Macmurray’s thought is similar to Critical Realism, in that he relates thought to an external independent reality, yet is appreciative of the person’s constructive role.

295 “To put the matter another way, I believe what I know to be true because I believe it truly bears on reality and whatever is true, in turn, bears directly on my quest for the real.” Haddox, 186.

296 Roy lists seven similarities between Macmurray and pragmatism: (1) philosophy as the reception and criticism of common sense beliefs; (2) instrumental view of reflection; (3) humanity as problem solver and actor as opposed to spectator; (4) refusal of primacy of theory; (5) verification as coming to terms with the resistance and support given by environment; (6) future orientation; (7) valid beliefs make a difference in the way people live. Roy, The Form of the Personal, 13.

It is important to note variations between strands of pragmatism, especially between Pierce, James, and Dewey. N. Rescher characterizes the differences broadly as Peirce’s “pragmatism of the right” as “scientifically elitist” and “objective”; James’s “pragmatism of the left” is “psychologically personalistic” and “subjective”; Dewey’s “social interpersonalism,” “straddles” the fence between the two, and is “democratically populist.” Nicholas Rescher, “Pragmatism,” OCP, 712. According to Rescher it is James who holds most dearly to the idea that truth is equated with usefulness (712).

Berry’s subject matter makes him more aware of these nuances and hence makes the following comparisons between Macmurray and Dewey: (1) anti-idealism and rejection of dualism; (2) philosophy guides action; (3) Marxist influence; (4) captivated by science and technology; (5) search for meaning and the character of the self; (6) optimistic regarding the possibilities of human relationships and progress. Berry, 149-52. Furthermore, Berry would note that Macmurray’s understanding of verification making a difference in life (Roy’s #7) is more like James’ than Dewey’s. Berry, 239; see also SA, 216.
meaning or a pragmatic theory of verification, then he must deal with the numerous objections that have been made since the time of James and Dewey.\footnote{Macmurray believes pragmatism rests on the Cartesian dualism of thought and action. See Macmurray, New Materialism, 54.}

Additionally, Langford disputes the priority given to acting over thinking: “Even if thought is in order to action [sic], does not the rational evaluation of action provide the criteria for the guidance of action? What is free activity if it is not rationally decided activity?”\footnote{Langford's statement (18) “That is, even if the agency of the self is temporally antecedent, is not the mental activity still valuationally prior?” In other words, Langford wishes for a return to the primacy of the theoretical approach to philosophy!} Unwilling to surrender the Cartesian priority of thought (note his equation of rationality and thought) he suggests considering the person as both thinker and doer instead of simply the doer.\footnote{Duncan points out that “Macmurray was not influenced by Dewey’s Gifford Lectures, ‘The Quest for Certainty’; his paper to the Aristotelian Society ‘The Function of Experiment in Society’ was given in 1927,}\footnote{Langford, Natural Theology, 17. The language here may hint at a desire to define rationality in narrowly intellectual terms. Also note that he still wants to see a decision—a choice—guiding action, rather than Macmurray’s position that action is choice. This also demonstrates that he does not completely grasp Personal logic.}

In response one must reply that Macmurray considers criticisms of pragmatism as being formal and therefore not necessarily applying to the Form of the Personal.\footnote{Langford, Natural Theology, 18.} Even discounting the formal argument, Macmurray is fully aware that pragmatism is in no position to guarantee truth based upon its method. Instead one must settle for probability.\footnote{Langford, Natural Theology, 17.} And Macmurray believes that this is best determined in action.
The truth which gave the victory to science and which justified its triumph lay not at all in the results of scientific enquiry but in the recognition that all knowledge is problematical; that all reflective representations of the world are hypothetical and require to be verified by reference to action. Science exchanged certainty for an increasing probability in knowledge guaranteed by practical achievement. Theology demanded certainty, and was prepared to guarantee certainty by authority. In this it revealed its own unreality.  

Macmurray is aware that an experimental appraisal of truth is not entirely appropriate for the more complex world of persons. In other words, a typical laboratory approach will not work with persons. For not only is it impossible to isolate all the variables and to know all the pertinent information (experiments with animals are problematic enough), but more importantly, it is because experiment is theoretical and Macmurray is operating from the standpoint of the practical.

Religious doctrines are as problematic as scientific theories and require like them a constant revision and a continual verification in action. Their verification differs in this, that it cannot be experimental, since they are not merely pragmatic; they can be verified only by persons who are prepared to commit themselves intentionally to the way of life which they prescribe.

Yet to Macmurray’s mind this is all that can be asked and all the guarantee that may be sought.

While Macmurray’s understanding of verification shows many similarities with certain pragmatic concepts it differs fundamentally in its starting point outside the cogito and in its differentiating between theoretical and practical activity and consequently between pragmatic, empirical, experimental understandings of verification and the

two years prior to Dewey.” Duncan, 11. For a discussion of probability in Locke see Diogenes Allen, Philosophy for Understanding Theology (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1985), 182.

PR, 216-17. See also SA, 23. Does this mean that theology must become natural theology? Or is it possible, instead, to consider theology as the second order reflection on the principal data of the experience of the church? i.e., it is one’s understanding of the experience that is held to be tentative and hypothetical until it is proven in action.


See above §2.2.2.3.

PR, 223.
verification of living a personal life.\textsuperscript{306} For Macmurray verification in the personal sphere
requires commitment in practice.\textsuperscript{307} Furthermore, Macmurray would say (more in keeping
with Pierce than with Dewey or James) that something works because it is true, and not it
is true because it works.\textsuperscript{308}

2.2.4 SUMMARY

Epistemology from the standpoint of the agent reflectively describes and analyzes
a process of experience, reflection, and verification. Experience, as knowledge-in-action,
when shown to be inadequate, is clarified and extended by reflective activities which
create, analyze, and manipulate symbolic representations of reality creating new
imaginative reconstructions of reality. This symbolic model's adequacy is then verified in
action: "For withdrawal into reflection is then for the sake of action and knowledge of
value or of fact is verified in action."\textsuperscript{309} The reflective knowledge of fact, value, and
persons is found in the modes of reflection: science, art, and religion.

2.3 MODES OF REFLECTION:
SCIENCE, ART, AND RELIGION

Science, art, and religion are ways of thinking about reality—what Macmurray
christens the modes of reflection. This section will begin with a fully relational account of

\textsuperscript{306} Jeffko claims the primary difference between the Form of the Personal and pragmatism is that
pragmatism is an epistemology, while the Form of the Personal is a metaphysic. Jeffko, 11, 15.
\textsuperscript{307} Macmurray suggested the failure of the Soviet Union falsified Marxism and Germany's failure falsified
much of German philosophy. Duncan, 12. According to Berry, this commitment in practice is more like
James than Dewey (239; see also SA, 216).
\textsuperscript{308} Thanks to Amos Yong for pointing out this difference between Pierce and other pragmatists. "Whereas
the pragmatist might argue that a belief in God is true if it makes the believer feel good, and false if it does
not, Macmurray's position is that any given belief is either true or false, and if true will eventually issue in
results commensurate with those intended by the original proposition; if false, the results will be
unintended. The pragmatist is willing to remain within the closed realm of the mind, but Macmurray
demands that thought be forced to stand up against reality in the belief that such a confrontation is
possible." Nephew, 35. This equation of truth as usefulness is most pronounced in James (Rescher,
pragmatism, 712).
\textsuperscript{309} RAS, 47.
the discovery or construction of the modes of reflection\textsuperscript{310} and the role that the apperceptions play in this formulation. This is followed by a further description of each mode of reflection. Finally a schematic overview of Macmurray's philosophy is provided which emphasizes the importance of the apperceptions for the Form of the Personal.

2.3.1 DERIVING THE MODES OF REFLECTION

Macmurray uses the mother-child relation as the fundamental and pervasive experience of human relational existence.\textsuperscript{311} From this he surmises that persons exist primarily in a field of personal relationship and not in an organic framework. Humans are persons first, animals second. He sees the organic model as the dominant philosophical understanding of humanity from the time of the Greeks down to present evolutionary understandings of humanity.\textsuperscript{312} He argues against an organic, teleological comprehension

\textsuperscript{310}Macmurray also achieved similar derivations beginning with unity-patterns (IU) and with a consideration of action (SA), but the fully relational provides the most cogent and complete way of understanding the modes of reflection as well as the relation of unity-patterns and rationality.

\textsuperscript{311}Mother here does not necessarily mean biological mother but rather primary care-giver(s). PR, 50. Limpitlaw makes an important observation about this non-biological qualification by Macmurray. It is essential that the connection be primarily a personal one, not a biological or organic one, otherwise the mother-child is simply a demonstration that the child exists in an organic field instead of a personal one. Limpitlaw, 213, n. 101.

\textsuperscript{312}PR, 45. This does not mean that Macmurray rejects evolutionary theory. He does not, as long as it is applied to the organic level of human existence and not to the personal level. Limpitlaw quotes a private letter from Macmurray to Reginald Sayers, and rightly concludes, "We see here how Macmurray rejected the idea that personal existence as a whole can be understood in evolutionary terms; however, he did allow that subordinate aspects of personal existence may yet follow an evolutionary pattern. Limpitlaw, 316, n. 80. For a recent attempt at an evolutionary explanation of persons from a biological perspective see John W. Dixon, Jr., "Toward a Trinitarian Anthropology." Anglican Theological Review, 80, no. 2 (1998), 169-85.
by referencing humanity’s lack of instinct and the fact that humans must instead learn and habituate. Armed essentially only with “the impulse to communicate” the child gains knowledge of the Other, which is primarily personal, with subsequent knowledge of organisms and things derived by a process of de-personalization or negation.

Macmurray further postulates that the mother’s pattern of responding and not responding to the child’s calls for attention creates a rhythm of withdrawal and return that is “the universal and necessary pattern of personal development.” Reaction to withdrawal and return produces one of three primary motivations: hatred, fear, or love. Each motivation triggers a particular behavior, either aggression, submission, or trust. Through the process of habituation, these behaviors lead to three resulting modes of

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313 Macmurray acknowledges the fact that in the higher animals instinct is an ambiguous term. PR, 48. This does not seem to concern him as the activity of depersonalization makes all subsequent properties of a thing as a reduction of the personal. PR, 79-85. Yet a recent BBC documentary on cheetahs graphically demonstrates instinct’s existence in higher animals. The cheetah has a instinctual reaction to an animal running away: it chases, trips, and bites to disable its prey. One portion of the documentary shows a cheetah revealing itself to a herd of gazelle, but the herd does not spook. Since there is no running there is no instinctual reaction and so the cheetah just walks among the herd without direction until it slinks off into the bush to start all over again.

314 “All purposive human behavior has to be learned” with the exception of our “capacity to express his feelings of comfort or discomfort”. PR, 48. This leads to the discussion of how in humans habit replaces instinct (PR, 52-56) and the basis of habit on intention which in turn is based upon knowledge which in turn is based upon reflection and the basis of reflection is the imagination (PR, 56) with the conclusion that “a motivating conscious must be present from the beginning” and this must be feeling. PR, 57. Also, “We postulate, therefore, an original feeling consciousness, with a discrimination between positive and negative phases.” PR, 57.

315 In the human infant ... the impulse to communication is his sole adaptation to the world into which he is born.” PR, 60. “He is, in fact, ‘adapted’, to speak paradoxically’ to being unadapted, ‘adapted’ to a complete dependence upon an adult human being. He is made to be cared for. He is born into a love relationship which is inherently personal.” PR, 48. “He cannot live at all by any initiative, whether personal or organic, of his own. He can live only through other people and in dynamic relation with them. In virtue of this fact he is a person, for the personal is constituted by the relation of persons. His rationality is already present, though only germinally, in the fact that he lives and can only live by communication.” PR, 51.

316 The “first knowledge” is “of the personal Other.” PR, 76. “What must occur for the consciousness to become self-conscious in the sense entailed by agency? The answer to this question is that the child must be present to another person. The reason given by Karl Rahner for this necessity is that only another person is sufficiently ‘other’ for the distinction between self and other to appear as an object for consciousness.” Augustine Shuttle, What Makes Us Persons?, 71, citing K. Rahner, *Hearers of the Word*, trans. Michael Richards (New York: Herder & Herder, 1969), 138.

317 PR, 79-85. “How then is it possible for the Other to be known as the non-personal? Only by a reduction of the concept of the Other which excludes part of its definition; only, that is to say, by a partial negation: only by down-grading the ‘You’ in the ‘You and I’ to the status of ‘It.’” PR, 80.

318 PR, 90. Notice that this was referenced earlier with regard to the way in which knowledge and reflection interact. This insight into rhythm of withdrawal and return proves fruitful for questions of spiritual development and formation.

319 PR, 95-101. Berry suggests that what Macmurray calls fear is something more akin to anxiety (233).
apperception—the pragmatic, the contemplative, and the communal. Any action implies a stance or orientation towards the Other: \(^{322}\) *It* (pragmatic), *I-It* (contemplative), or *I-You* (communal). See Figure 2.5.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I-Relation</th>
<th>Emotion</th>
<th>Behavior</th>
<th>Apperception</th>
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<tr>
<td>I-You</td>
<td>Love</td>
<td>Trust</td>
<td>Communal</td>
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<tr>
<td>I-It</td>
<td>Fear</td>
<td>Submission</td>
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<td>It</td>
<td>Hatred</td>
<td>Aggression</td>
<td>Pragmatic</td>
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Figure 2.5 Relations and Apperceptions

These three primary apperceptions lead to three corresponding modes of reflection: religion, art and science. \(^{323}\) Scientific reflection focuses as much as humanly possible on the nature of the object in isolation (the pragmatic *It*) while artistic reflection appraises the object in its relation to its environment and the observer (the contemplative *I-It*). Religious reflection focuses on the Other as integrating interpersonal relationship (the communal *I-You*). \(^{324}\) Following the normal pattern of Personal logic, religion, being the most holistic, is constituted by its negatives, art and science, and each may be derived

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\(^{320}\) PR, 102-05.

\(^{321}\) PR, 112. These apperceptions are also connected by Macmurray to types of morality and hence with corresponding social structures. The communal is the highest form of morality, where one acts for the sake of the Other and not for oneself. "Morally right action is an action which intends community." PR, 119.

\(^{322}\) SRR, 56. An apperception is not so much what is thought as a way of thinking. In the first place these apperceptions apply to other persons, and then by a process of negation (or depersonalization) to organic and substantial levels of reality.

\(^{323}\) SA, 188. Macmurray notes that in their purely theoretical form they are modes of reflection, they are derived from practical experience and therefore there are intermediate forms of practice which are religion, art, and science. "We must distinguish three modes of reflection. In their purest expression—by which I mean when they are determined by a purely reflective intention—they are religion, art and science. All of them, however, since they are necessarily derived from practical experience, and refer symbolically to action, have intermediate forms in which the reference to practical experience is more specific or more limited." SA, 187-88. Hoffman notes that Macmurray's practice leads to confusion stemming from the use of the same terminology for reflective and practical application. John C. Hoffman, "Religion and Religious Experience in the Thought of John Macmurray: A Critique," *Studies in Religion/Sciences Religieuses*, 4, no. 1 (1974-1975): 7. On the one hand, this ambiguity is disconcerting, creating the feeling that the author may be involved in a philosophical sleight of hand. On the other hand, it is reassuring in that it reinforces the inextricable linkage between thought and action within Macmurray's philosophy. In this section we are strictly dealing with the reflective, not the practical.

\(^{324}\) Note the absence of direct mention of God. Macmurray is convinced that religion is a human activity and he is concerned here with the human reflective activity of religion. Furthermore, since God is at least personal, God is involved in religious experience within Macmurray's system.
from religion through a process of limiting attention or negation. Each mode of reflection has an accompanying unity-pattern, logical form, and rationality which is unique to it. A few words of clarification regarding the terms unity-pattern, logical form, and rationality are in order here to help prevent misunderstandings later.

The term *unity-pattern* is unique to Macmurray, invented to avoid the importation of intellectual baggage from similar ideas, such as categories or schemas, developed under different philosophical forms. While all thought is based upon imagination there are certain universal fundamental patterns "dictated by the nature and function of thought in general, and by the nature of reality in general, which sets the problems with which thought has to deal." Unity-patterns are imaginative symbolic constructs providing a systemic unity guided by particular practical purposes. While imaginative, they are based on the experience of reality. These constructs may be more or less complete, which does not affect their truthfulness because the correct measure of these constructs is their adequacy.

*Logical forms,* as discussed above in section 2.1.3, are the purely formal relationships which remain when content is removed from the unity-pattern. It is difficult to draw a clear distinction between logical forms and modes of reflection. Science, as a mode of reflection, is reflection on reality, conceived of according to the substantial analogy and employing analytic logical form (or grammar) appropriate to the consideration of substances. Science is not, however, the only reflective activity which occurs at the substantial level, and therefore, is not the only reflection which utilizes the analytic logical form.

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325 IU, 62.
326 IU, 62. In the phrase "nature of reality in general" Macmurray is including the very real ontological aspect that the unity-patterns are reflecting. These are not ideas pulled out of thin air. The fact that substantial philosophy used a formal-realist logic and organic philosophy used a dialectical-idealist logic both to great advantage suggests to Macmurray that "If so, it must mean that idealist and formal logicians are studying the forms of different things." SA, 93.
While Macmurray uses the word *reason* in the traditional philosophical manner, at least as far as it is treated as the distinctive of persons, his understanding differs in that he does not equate reason with intellection, but rather with the capacity to objectify, to interact with the Other in terms of the Other.\(^{328}\) In short, to be rational in its fullest sense is to be self-transcendent.\(^{329}\) For Macmurray, the term *reality* means objectivity, while *real* primarily pertains to the significance of the Other for the person.\(^{330}\) In other words, something may have objective existence (reality) apart from the perceiving person but it does not become real for that person until attention is focused upon it, until its existence has significance. The air one breathes has objective reality but it does not become real to someone until there is a reason to focus upon it—such as the inability to breathe or the presence of air pollution. Something may be unreal for someone either if it lacks objective existence (reality) or if it has no significance for them. It is possible for persons to mistake the objectively unreal for the real, and thus the objectively unreal becomes real for them. But ultimately it is false because it does not correspond to the objective reality

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\(^{327}\) IU, 133.

\(^{328}\) IU, 127-28. Also RAS, 57-58; PR, 61. It is important to remember that Macmurray rejects the faculty psychology with its separation of the cognitive, affective, and conative. Rather he wants to see the intellect, emotion, and action all integrated and mutually interpenetrating.

\(^{329}\) RAS, 18. Rationality is the form or grammar of the relationship between objects within a given unity-pattern. Some (e.g., Langford) contend with Macmurray's application of transcendence to humanity, wishing to reserve the word solely for deity.

\(^{330}\) It is interesting to note an early definition of reality as it relates to deity. In CH Macmurray defines reality as that which operates by the intention of God (96) and furthermore defines God as ultimate reality (133).
of the Other. This aspect of Macmurray’s philosophy demonstrates a marked similarity with critical realism.

It should be clear from this discussion of modes of reflection, unity-patterns, logical forms, and rationality that there is a great deal of linkage and conceptual overlap between terms and one should avoid the temptation to be overly rigid and doctrinaire in separating one off from the other.

2.3.2 Science and the Substantial
Unity-Pattern: The World as Means

From the standpoint of the Agent, then, intellectual reflection is an activity which intends an improvement of our knowledge of the world as means to our ends. We may express this succinctly by saying that intellectual knowledge is knowledge of the World-as-means.

Science is the pragmatic mode of reflection focusing upon the Other, in as isolated a manner as is humanly possible, as the Alter—as matter of fact. The pragmatic nature of science is primarily concerned with the Other for instrumental purposes. Science is

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331 “Now this is a principle of far-reaching importance and I want you to consider it carefully. It is not what is real but what we think is real, not reality but what we take for reality, that directly determines our behaviour and so controls the current of our lives. We live by what we think is real, and if what we think is real isn’t real, then so much the worse for us.” FMW, 114. “We shall take this as our first conclusion then, and try to keep it clearly in our minds. Unreal things can be real for us, because we can think they are real; and if we do we behave as if they were real.” FMW, 115. “The first conclusion was that ‘unreal things can be real for us, because we can think they are real’. The second is more definite; it is this. ‘When we take something unreal to be real, we think that something is what it is not. There are lots of things which seem to be what they are not and which tend to deceive us.’ FMW, 118. “What do we mean when we say that something is ‘real’ We mean that it is a significant thing, that it means something to us. That we have to take account of it, that it is worth attending to.” FMW, 118-19.

332 Berry believes that Macmurray never rejected the basic tenets of Scottish Realism as described by Sidney Hook: (1) external world independent of perception; (2) self (distinct from organic body) is real entity; (3) necessary causal relations; (4) God exists; and simply modified it with Marxist and Kantian interpretations (Berry, 155). In large part one can agree with Berry’s assessment with two qualifications. The one revolves around how he (and Hook) understand the word distinct in the description of the Self as distinct from the organic body. If this is taken as one being able to distinguish a body (i.e., a dead body) from a person, then it is correct. Alternatively, if it means one can either separate the body and the self or distinguish the self from the body (i.e., a disembodied self), then Berry is incorrect. Given Berry’s questionable understanding of the integrating aspect of Personal logic, the latter is more likely the case. A second quibble is how one defines necessary causal relations. Macmurray sees these occurring at the substantial level of reality and in all events yet believes other relations beyond the purely causal also exist (action).

333 However, it is wrong to see them all as synonyms, as Nephew does (29).

334 SA, 193.

335 RAS, 16.
utilitarian, economic,\textsuperscript{336} and technical\textsuperscript{337} in its orientation, perceiving the World-as-means.\textsuperscript{338}

In limiting itself to the determination of fact, science is concerned with what has already been determined\textsuperscript{339} and hence with a search for patterns and constants.\textsuperscript{340} To achieve the determination of fact it is necessary to exclude emotional considerations.\textsuperscript{341} In

\textsuperscript{336} IU, 86.
\textsuperscript{337} RAS, 15.
\textsuperscript{338} RAS, 193. See also RAS, 21, IU, 87.
\textsuperscript{339} RAS, 19. Macmurray's understanding of science is perhaps the weakest link in his entire system. It appears to be based upon a very Kantian/Newtonian understanding of science which must be updated. From the viewpoint of a non-expert, it does not appear to be a modification which would completely destroy the system, however, attempting to do so is beyond the scope of this paper.

Berry states that Macmurray's understanding of science is essentially Newtonian/Kantian and contrasts that to Dewey's "more sophisticated understanding of science as a method of correlating patterns of change where absolute certainty gives way to degrees of probability characterizing an open and dynamic universe." Berry, 151. Macmurray does mention the role of probability in knowledge (PR, 216-17; SA, 22), but this would appear to do more with the certainty of knowledge, not dealing with the probability of facts.

Roy suggests Lonergan's solution as superior to Macmurray's: "Lonergan drives a wedge between the classical laws, which are abstract, and actuality, which is concrete. If the classical laws of science are abstract, he contends, they cannot 'determine' the concrete.... Hence the vision called mechanistic determinism, according to which the universe is a large-scale machine completely determinable by correlations that would be both abstract and concrete. The way out of this contradiction, according to Lonergan, is to stress the total abstractness of the laws of classical science and to acknowledge the epistemological role of statistics so as to distinguish three aspects under which reality is scientifically approached. Events are thus known as: possible series, which are abstract and indeterminate and which are expressed by classical laws; probable series, which are less abstract but still ideal and which are expressed by statistical laws; and actual series, which are concrete and determinate and which do not systematically diverge from the probable series." Roy, Form of the Personal, 128-29. On the one hand it would seem that Macmurray's concept of science deals with the actual series (determinate), but on the other his focus on generalization would seem to indicate a more classical law understanding.

However, one cannot ignore the endorsement provided by the philosopher of science, Karl Popper. "Scientific theories can be tested by their practical consequences. The scientist, in his own field, is responsible for what he says; you can know him by his fruits. And thus distinguish him from the false prophets. One of the few who have appreciated this aspect of science is the Christian philosopher J. Macmurray ...." Karl R. Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies, vol. 2, The Hide Tide of Prophecy: Hegel, Marx, and the Aftermath (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966), 243. This is not an endorsement of all aspects of Macmurray's philosophy of science, yet it keeps one from completely dismissing it out of hand.

\textsuperscript{340} "Perhaps the best way to express the aim of science is to say that it is the search for constants; that is to say, for patterns which repeat without change indefinitely.... One should add, for completeness sake, that a pattern of change may repeat with modifications, provided that the modifications take place according to a known pattern; as, for instance, in the case of gravitational acceleration." RAS, 13.

\textsuperscript{341} SA, 192; RAS, 25. The exclusion of practical valuation does not mean that there is no valuation within science, for it exists in the negative or theoretical sense in the choice of methodology. "If the intention is purely theoretical, that is to say, if the reference to action is indeterminate, then the ground of valuation must itself be negative. It must, that is to say, be the continuation of a direction of attention which was originally established in action; and which can be expressed in a methodological rule. It is a corollary of this that reflective activity of this type must issue, not in a single science of the given, but in a set of independent sciences, each constituted by the selectivity of its own direction of attention." SA, 191-92.
so doing, however, the distinction between means and ends disappears so that in science means are valued in themselves without reference to any particular end.\textsuperscript{342}

Therefore, the material unity-pattern is governed by the purpose of representing general causal properties so that technical knowledge may be extended. To accomplish this science generalizes rather than particularizes.\textsuperscript{343} Science is the most general and abstract of all the modes of reflection\textsuperscript{344} and its symbols are designed for the consideration of the general causal properties of substances, not particularities.\textsuperscript{345} The symbolic representation of science is the unit,\textsuperscript{346} resulting from the analytical process of breaking a complex entity into its most basic components.\textsuperscript{347} These units may then be repeated in various contexts and combined in various orders. The belief that an entity can be understood as an aggregate of its component units points to the mathematical nature of scientific logic; something is understood best by taking it apart.

Earlier while discussing the parallel phases of science and philosophy (§2.1.2.1), the existence of three phases of science were mentioned: physical, biological, and psychological. These factual modes represent an apperceptive analysis applied to science.\textsuperscript{348} Scientific rationality is intellectual in nature focusing upon the material aspects of reality.\textsuperscript{349} As such, it is limited; yet according to Macmurray, it is also universal, for

\textsuperscript{342} "The means is, of course, chosen in action, and this involves valuation. But because the intention passes beyond it and does not rest in it, its valuation is derivative from the end, and it has no value for the agent in itself." SA, 192. "Now in an intellectual mode of reflection, because there is a suppression of feeling and an abstraction from practical valuation, the distinction between means and end disappears, and only a succession of occurrences remains." SA, 193. "In other words, intellectual knowledge, as knowledge of matter of fact, becomes in action knowledge of the means of realizing a practical intention. For all that is known is in itself valueless; and in action it can be valued only negatively, as means to an end which it does not itself determine." SA, 193.

\textsuperscript{343} SA, 178; IU, 87.

\textsuperscript{344} IU, 85. Note that science is the most general of the modes of reflection (comprising religion, art, and science) not all forms of reflection (which also includes history and philosophy).

\textsuperscript{345} IU, 87.

\textsuperscript{346} IU, 90. This is created by the repetition of identities.

\textsuperscript{347} RAS, 33-34.

\textsuperscript{348} PR, 176.

\textsuperscript{349} "There is a great deal of truth to Bergson’s insistence that the function of the intellect is to deal with matter" IU, 101.
“Everything ... is at least material, however much more it may be.” If everything is at least material and if science is the mode of reflection concerned with matter, does it not follow that science should be equated with philosophy, the interpretation of the universe?

Attempting to equate science (or even the philosophy of science) with philosophy as a whole requires the reduction of the universe to only one of its dimensions—the material. Doing so results in materialism. Materialism is philosophically inadequate primarily because of difficulties which exist at its boundaries.

Consider the situation of the mathematical nature of the analytic logical form. It is clear that mathematics is designed primarily for finite entities and encounters great difficulties at its boundaries (such as zero or infinity). Mathematics also has trouble dealing with units as identities. If this concept is taken to its logical and necessary extreme it becomes nonsensical, for no two things can be perfectly identical else they would not be two things but the same thing. A material universe cannot account for the need for perspective in determining a functional identity for perspective is not inherent in the material nature of the object itself. There is also the related problem of dualism: Macmurray believes that all modern and scientific philosophies until Kant are essentially materialistic and result in an inappropriate mind-matter dualism.

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350 IU, 88. Roy criticizes Macmurray for being too physical and too common-sensical. Roy, Form of the Personal, 81. “Either God is natural or religion is nonsense. The idea of Nature which excludes God is itself the product of dualism. God is no more supernatural than Matter. Both are infinites, and lie beyond all their finite manifestations. God is infinite personality; and personality dissociated from matter in idea is purely ideal—that is to say, non-existent. God is real; and therefore he is the ultimate synthesis of matter and spirit, of Nature and Man.” John Macmurray, “Christianity and Communism: Towards a Synthesis,” in Christianity and the Social Revolution, ed. John Lewis, Karl Polanyi, Donald K. Kitchin (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1936), 526.

351 Science is reflection upon the substantial unity-pattern and therefore is factual reflection. It is comprised of numerous sciences all of which are fragmented by the nature of their particular objects of investigation and the development of the various methodologies necessary to investigate them. Philosophy of science is the generalization about the generalizations of fact. The history of science is the particularization of the generalizations of fact.

352 IU, 98.

353 IU, 99.

354 IU, 92.

355 IU, 99.

356 IU, 101.
Furthermore, Macmurray demonstrates that science as a holistic philosophy cannot account for causality.\textsuperscript{357} The problem with causality within the scientific mode is that matter is viewed as essentially passive and therefore nothing exists within the unity-pattern to account for the change.\textsuperscript{358} The source of the change is outside of the complex of relatively ordered elements and for that reason a deterministic mechanical understanding of change is required.\textsuperscript{359} This determinism in scientific thought thus requires an external referent in order to account for change and consequently it cannot be a proper symbolization for describing the universe.\textsuperscript{360} Materialism has need of, but no room for, non-passive biological and psychological entities.\textsuperscript{361}

Finally, the inability for materialism to determine values disqualifies it from consideration as a holistic philosophy. By eliminating ends and being concerned only with means, a purely scientific outlook is only able to ask the question: how can we do this? and can never ask, should we do this?\textsuperscript{362}

Macmurray concludes that the substantial unity-pattern, analytic logical form, and scientific mode of reflection is a valid representation of reality only in so far as it is material.\textsuperscript{363} In other words, science is reflective generalization on one aspect of the universe whereas philosophy is reflective generalization on the universe as a whole. One may have a philosophy of science but one may not equate science with philosophy.

Scientific reflection is, therefore, a search for a particular and limited extension of our knowledge. We call it\textit{ instrumental} knowledge; and by this we meant the kind of knowledge which can form the basis of a developing technology.\textsuperscript{364}

\textsuperscript{357}IU, 94-95.  
\textsuperscript{358}IU, 95.  
\textsuperscript{359}IU, 96.  
\textsuperscript{360}IU, 97.  
\textsuperscript{361}IU, 100. Macmurray makes a terminological modification when discussing action, distinguishing between an action (which requires an agent) and an event, which may merely have a cause. This is a later development in his thinking. Yet the lack of a causal agent within materialism still holds for if all matter is passive there must still be a first cause which is not.  
\textsuperscript{362}RAS, 23-25.  
\textsuperscript{363}IU, 102.  
\textsuperscript{364}RAS, 27-28.
2.3.3 **ART AND THE ORGANIC UNITY-PATTERN: THE WORLD AS ENDS**

Consequently we may say of the emotional mode of reflection that it seeks to determine the world as an end in itself, or rather as manifold of ends. As we called intellectual knowledge knowledge of the World-as-means, so we may describe emotional knowledge as knowledge of World-as-end.\textsuperscript{365}

Art is the contemplative mode of reflection which reflects upon the Other in terms of its environment as the *I-It*—as valuation. Where science pragmatically considers the Other merely as something to be used, the contemplative orientation of art sees the Other as having intrinsic value. Art perceives the World-as-ends.\textsuperscript{366}

Rather than analytically breaking down an entity into components, art reflects on the unity of the Other.

The technique by which this adequacy of the image is achieved is one of selection, modification and organization. The image, if it is to present the object in its individuality, must itself be self-contained. This is what is meant by saying that a work of art is an organic whole. The elements of which it is composed are not merely arranged; they are organized. They are functionally or purposively related to one another, so that they give the impression of necessity. What this secures is that the composition of the image is such that the elements refer us to one another, and so are seen as constituting a completed whole, which needs nothing beyond itself for its apprehension. Its formal characters, therefore, are rhythm, proportion, balance and harmony.\textsuperscript{367}

Art captures the holistic quality of the organic unity-pattern. The organic unity-pattern addresses one of the most glaring inadequacies of material thought: its inability to accurately represent organic life.\textsuperscript{368} Since all thought is necessarily anthropomorphic,\textsuperscript{369} one is aware of life before one is aware of matter—the knowledge of the organic is at a higher level than knowledge of the material and the former includes the latter within it.\textsuperscript{370}

\textsuperscript{365} SA, 194.
\textsuperscript{366} SA, 193. Note Macmurray is following Kant in *The Critique of Practical Reason*, 5:87, 131
\textsuperscript{367} RAS, 39-40.
\textsuperscript{368} IU, 103-04.
\textsuperscript{369} Yet due to the rational nature of persons, this understanding of the self is modified by the understanding of the Other in a feedback loop so that a reductionistic understanding of the Other may create a reductionistic understanding of the self.
\textsuperscript{370} IU, 104-06. Macmurray cites Schopenhauer’s entire philosophy as based on the distinction of feelings and ideas—which Macmurray sees as the difference between the organic (where unity is felt, not calculated, IU, 110) and the material.
Rather than an ontology of substance, the organic needs an understanding of process for

"In fact, life never is at any moment. It is always becoming."\textsuperscript{371}

Artistic reflection must not only be able to account for process but also the fact

that organic form is relative to function for the unity of an organism is the unity of its
functions and therefore the teleological form of the Other is necessary for the proper
apprehension of the Other.\textsuperscript{372} Teleology is not an explanation of growth; it is merely its
symbolic representation or description\textsuperscript{373} and should not be confused with conscious
purpose, for an organism is not necessarily aware of its final stage.\textsuperscript{374} Instead of purpose

guiding growth organisms have potentiality—the potential of each developmental stage to
advance into the next. Purpose involves explanation, while potentiality does not.\textsuperscript{375}

Macmurray summarizes the organic unity-pattern:

It is the conception of the organism as a whole, whose unity is maintained by the
harmony of differences, and in which the differences are finally differences of
functions in a unitary process in which the potentiality of the beginning is realized
in the end.\textsuperscript{376}

Organic unity is a dialectical unity of difference, not a mathematical summation as in
scientific thought, but a balance or harmony between differences.\textsuperscript{377} Organic unity is felt
not calculated; it is emotional.\textsuperscript{378} Macmurray-believes that the logical form of the organic
unity-pattern was laid out most clearly by Hegel and his later systematizers. The
continuing influence of this logical form is seen in that modern idealism, realism, and
even process thought rely upon this organic analogy and its dialectical logic.\textsuperscript{379}

\textsuperscript{371} IU, 109. Emphasis in the original.
\textsuperscript{372} IU, 110-12.
\textsuperscript{373} IU, 113.
\textsuperscript{374} IU, 113.
\textsuperscript{375} IU, 114.
\textsuperscript{376} IU, 114-15.
\textsuperscript{377} IU, 109-10. Langer sees art as being its own non-discursive symbolic activity (71-78) with music
functioning much like mathematics as the "symbolization of emotion" (82) and as the "logical expression of
feeling" (176).
\textsuperscript{378} "Since its activity upon the given is an activity of feeling, we may distinguish it from the other mode of
reflection by calling it the emotional mode." SA, 193. Also IU, 110.
\textsuperscript{379} IU, 115. SA, 34.
Just as science has three modes of the factual based on the three apperceptive stances (physics, biology, and psychology), so too there are three modes of valuation for art. The pragmatic mode is efficiency, the contemplative mode is aesthetics, and the communal mode is morality. As one might expect, these modes follow the standard interrelated form of the personal and therefore efficiency is the negative of aesthetics which is the negative of morality. All are essential and all are necessary. Because the vast majority of Macmurray's exposition deals with the various forms of morality and their corresponding social structures, efficiency and aesthetics are often overlooked in discussions of artistic reflection.

Morality, dealing as it does with fully personal interactions, may also be considered apperceptively. Legal morality is the pragmatic form and considers the Other in relative isolation and is technical in form. Contemplative morality is traditional and considers persons in their environment. Fraternal morality is the communal mode and is based in friendship.

Macmurray ties these modes of morality to various social structures. The state is governed by legal morality, society by tradition, and community by fraternity. Following Personal logic, one must see the various modes of morality and their corresponding social structures as inextricably linked. For as Macmurray plainly states:

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380 For terminology of valuation and factual see PR, 176.
381 PR, 113-14.
382 PR, 121.
383 PR, 125-26.
384 PR, 123-24.
385 PR, 147, 158. It is salient at this point to make a comment. Macmurray prefers to call these forms of morality according to their apperception. For sake of clarity legal, traditional, and fraternal have been used. All are actual terms Macmurray uses in his discussion of the various modes of morality.
386 PR, 132-51. Again, Macmurray's terminology has been modified for the sake of clarity. Macmurray actually posits a positive (community) and a negative (society) social structure. He then further delineates between the two negatives (pragmatic and contemplative) using various terms such as Hobbesian, Leviathan, and the State for the pragmatic and mystical and Rousseau-like for the contemplative. Here the common association of tradition and society has led to the designation of the contemplative social structure as society, while the pragmatic lends itself most easily to the name of state.
“But the reality of community implies society ... as necessary to it, in due subordination within it.”

In numerous places in Macmurray’s writings one finds him decrying the usurpation of Christian morality by stoicism. Because morality functions at the level of the organic, not the material, it is not concerned with following predetermined rules. Quite the contrary. Law is the death of true morality. Several commentators have noted that Macmurray fails to positively engage with the role of the Ten Commandments or Jesus’ statement that no portion of the law shall pass away. This oversight may lead some to interpret him as excluding rules from human life. To be fair to his critics some of Macmurray’s more extreme comments and the tendency to focus upon freedom can easily be read in this light. Yet in evaluating his statements one must consider Macmurray within his polemical context. He is fighting a very stoic form of Calvinism focused upon law and duty, thereby eliminating freedom and choking the very life-blood out of Christianity. Macmurray’s position is similar to Luther’s understanding of the third use of the law where the holy life is achieved spontaneously from the heart, while acknowledging the assistance the law may provide in identifying and dealing with sin.

For example, Macmurray states,

The prophetic tradition was one of inner vision and emotional response, not of the fixed plan of law and formal obedience. That prophetic tradition culminated and completed itself in Jesus, who insisted that the Sabbath was made for man, not man for the Sabbath, that legal rationalism must be the servant of personal freedom, that life should be based upon an emotional principle, not on an

PR, 176. Also, “Every community is then a society; but not every society is a community.” PR, 146.
PR, 138; SA, 192; CH, 125-26, 138-45; FMW 75-77; RE, 123-26.
For example see David A. S. Fergusson, John Macmurray, 12. “The Hebraic tradition, which elsewhere is richly praised by Macmurray, has at its centre the Ten Commandments which include the prohibition of adultery. Like the other commandments this rule is given for human well-being and for the ordering of society. Yet the validity of such rules in promoting personal fulfilment seems to be given little consideration by Macmurray in his moral philosophy.”
For example see RE, 125-26; PR, 161; FMW, 82, 209-10.
See W.R. Godfrey, “Law and Gospel.” New Dictionary of Theology, 379-80. However, T.F. Torrance in Scottish Theology points to the existence of the “older Scottish tradition” which is more in keeping with Calvin (as opposed to Calvinism) and is therefore not judicial but personalistic in its understanding. Scottish Theology (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996), 49-92.
intellectual one. Thus the morality of policy and plan, of will and obedience is the antithesis of the morality preached by Christ.\textsuperscript{392}

One further point must be made about Macmurray’s understanding of morality. Because of his presentation, which leads from communal morality (fraternity) through the communal social structure (community) to the celebration of communal relationships (religion), numerous commentators believe he is conflating the personal level of religion with morality. This is simply not the case.\textsuperscript{393}

Art (the valuational mode of reflection) is constituted by science (the factual mode of reflection)\textsuperscript{394} since valuation (emotional) necessarily refers to an object and the object must be determined as a matter of fact (intellectual).\textsuperscript{395} It is imperative to note that biology functions within the analytic form of the substantial unity-pattern and not at the valuational level of the organic. Biology is a science, not an art.\textsuperscript{396} It is also important to realize that the separation of knowledge into emotional and intellectual components is merely theoretical and cannot occur in reality.\textsuperscript{397} Both art and science as modes of

\textsuperscript{392} FMW, 77, citing Mark 2:27. The derivation of the modes according to the apperceptions marks an important development in Macmurray’s thinking. Earlier he had used the ontological analogy of substance, organism, and persons instead of the apperceptions. One still detects the echo of the earlier derivation, but in using the apperceptions Macmurray is able to place morality fully on the organic level. See FMW, 171-74, 191-98. Note the change: “That is not to say that there is no place for law in human life. It means simply that there is no place for law and obedience in morality. Human life has a material basis and a material aspect, and there is the place for law. But in the true personal life of human beings, in which alone they express their full nature as moral beings, there is no place for mechanism or obedience.” FMW, 188.

\textsuperscript{393} “Like Kant, Macmurray found the basis for religion in morality, not vice versa.” Berry, 242. “... It would seem that the form of the personal can be construed as the form of the moral.” Jeffko, 71.

\textsuperscript{394} “Now since action is primary, our primary knowledge of the world contains both of these moments—apprehension and valuation—in a unity. The world is known primarily as a system of possibilities of action; and without valuation action is impossible; and consequently, knowledge, which is its negative dimension, is also impossible. If now we withdraw from the activity of practical valuation. The world is then apprehended, in terms of this abstraction, as an existent manifold of events. This manifold constitutes the given for a mode of reflective activity which seeks to understand the world as a matter of fact, and this activity excludes any positive valuation.” SA, 191.

\textsuperscript{395} “The positive mode of reflection is an activity of reflective valuation. Since it is an activity of valuation, it is primarily an activity of feeling; but since feeling must be referred to an object, and the object must be determined as matter of fact, reflective valuation contains within it, as its negative aspect, a perceptual discrimination of fact.” SA, 193.

\textsuperscript{396} SA, 34-35.

\textsuperscript{397} “These two aspects of knowledge [intellectual and emotional] are of course not separable in fact, but only distinguishable by thought. The discrimination of the Other—as support for and resistance to action—is perception; the valuation of alternatives is matter of feeling.” SA, 197. Any emotional state tends to express itself in action unless controlled by intention. But the patterns of feelings which one experiences are a product of intentional experience and when these are habituated form a person’s character. “We must not
reflection are activities of knowing; yet scientific knowledge seeks to know the Other in general while artistic knowledge seeks to know the Other in particular.\textsuperscript{398} Macmurray goes to great length to argue that both are valid forms of reflection and both are rational in that they have external referents and therefore may be either rational or irrational based upon their objectivity.

In stressing that the organic unity-pattern is more comprehensive than the material unity-pattern the question arises regarding whether art might not be the most adequate manner of understanding reality—philosophy as an organic interpretation of the universe. Macmurray rejects an organic philosophy due to (1) the problems of finitude inherent in the organic analogy, and (2) the problems of individualistic understandings of the person.

First, Macmurray is critical of the organic model's need for finitude. Refuting idealists, Macmurray notes that if the universe is an organism then there can be no organic wholes within it, for different elements within an organism cannot themselves be

398 "Both these modes of reflection are activities of knowing. This will be accepted without question in the case of science; but not, perhaps, in the case of art. Yet, if one of the two is to be refused the title of knowledge ... it is art that has the better claim.... Intellectual reflection, as knowledge of the World-as-means, aims at knowing everything in general but nothing in particular. In this mode we come to know a great deal about things without knowing them. It is only when our interest, and so our valuation, comes to rest in something for itself, only when something becomes for us an end-in-itself, that we seek to know it for itself, instead of making generalizations from it." SA, 199-200. "No intellectual description of an object, however complete and scientific, can ever amount to, or take the place of a contemplative knowledge of the thing itself. The intellectual mode of reflection is derivative from the emotional, and is contained within it." SA, 200. "This discrimination of the object in contemplation is not intellectual. For it is not analytical, and it does not generalize. The elements discriminated remain essentially within the whole and there is no reference beyond the whole. They are not apprehended as instances of a concept. The process of contemplation is a discriminating valuation; a particularizing of the satisfactoriness of the object as a unity in itself, and for its own sake. It is, therefore, felt, and not analytically understood. The feeling, however, is objective, because the interest of the Subject is in the object itself, and in its particularity." SA, 200-01. See also RAS, 39.
organic wholes. While agreeing with certain groups of realists that the mathematical falls within the biological, Macmurray charges that they fail to acknowledge the necessity of the final form of an entity for its teleological apprehension—in other words, teleology requires finitude.

From the critiques of both the realists and idealists Macmurray surmises that artistic symbolism is limited to the interpretation of the finite. Yet, a finite organism requires an environment. The universe, by definition, has no environment and therefore philosophy cannot be based upon an inadequate biological analogy.

Second, Macmurray does not believe art and the organic unity-pattern can account for the fullness of human persons in their relational experience. Persons are more than biological entities in synchronization with their environment. Humans do not simply react to stimuli, they act. They do not simply exist in an ecological relationship with creation; persons are persons-in-relation, mutually interacting with each other.

In addition, because of its contemplative basis, art is inherently individualistic. And as individualistic, art cannot adequately describe the relational experience of persons.

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399 IU, 118.
400 IU, 118.
401 "Its use depends upon the representation of a stage at which growth is complete, and unless this stage is represented the process of life cannot be defined. The earlier stages are all relative to the stage of maturity. Now, our immediate apprehension of life is the apprehension of the infinity of life in finite individuals and, therefore, the process of life is known as an infinite process, that is to say, as a process which has no final stage. It follows from this that it is impossible to represent the unity of the world which is given in immediate experience in terms of the organic unity-pattern. Just as in the case of mechanical thought, this type of symbolism must be limited to the interpretation of the finite. It can represent the final life-process of individual organisms or of species or even of the whole process of evolution up to date, provided we take the appearance of rational consciousness in humanity as the final stage. Beyond this it cannot go, and yet in its very nature it demands that all stages shall be represented as transitions to a more highly developed stage." IU, 119-20.
402 IU, 120.
403 IU, 120. One might argue that God is the environment of the universe, but then one would have to argue that God does not exist, otherwise God would have to be part of the universe, the conclusion of certain forms of process theology.
404 IU, 121.
405 IU, 121.
Contemplation is inherently a solitary activity. It is the attitude of the spectator. One must stand aside to contemplate; one must not be personally [mutually and interactively] involved. But a personal involvement is the core of communion.

We have seen that the artistic attitude individualizes both the object and the subject. Each artist has his own individual vision; and each chooses his own object to suit his own way of feeling. For as in science, so in art, there can be no universal object. The artist must take a part of experience and represent it as a whole. Consequently, the extreme individualism of the artist and the extreme individualization of his object provide no basis for a personal togetherness. Artists qua artists cannot possibly co-operate; and a community of artists on the basis of artistic experience is unthinkable. The classical example of the attempt to think it is Plato’s Republic. For Plato’s ideal republic is an artist’s vision of the perfect society; and even to imagine it he had to exclude the artist, attack art and devise a system of education to eradicate the individualism of the artistic element in human nature. There was no room in Plato’s Republic for any artist but Plato ....

Because of the problems of finitude and due to its inherent individualism one cannot accept a completely artistic account of the universe. Therefore, another mode of reflection must be developed, in particular one which is able to account for the experience of human persons as persons.

2.3.4 RELIGION AND THE PERSONAL
UNITY-PATTERN: THE WORLD AS PERSONS

Religion is the communal mode of reflection focusing upon the Other as the I-You—as persons constituted by relations. The communal aspect of religion includes within it the factual determination of the Other (the it) and the valuation of the Other (the I-it) while surpassing them both by considering the constituting nature of relations. Religion perceives the World-as-persons.

Religion plays an essential and pervasive role in Macmurray’s thought impacting not only his thinking on philosophy but also his thinking on human beings and God. As

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406 RAS, 43. One may challenge this by noting the several art forms which are cooperative; such as a symphony. However, in so doing, one is confusing the expression of an aggregate of individual contemplations with a truly communal contemplation. Because art is emotional reflection, and groups do not have an emotional capacity—only individuals within the group can artistically value the object—a group cannot experience artistic reflection. Taken as a solitary object (the performance of the symphony) the artistic reflection is still by the individual listening to it, or performing their one small part. Besides, one can argue that even a symphony is ultimately the artistic expression of one individual, the conductor—reflected in the high acclaim given to conductors. Even Jazz, the most fluid of musical forms, always has a band leader setting the tone.
such religion will appear not only in this current section but also below in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4.

The personal unity-pattern is one which organizes and unifies the conception of persons and their relationality. It is commonly observed that humans are social beings. But according to Macmurray this must never be associated with some type of organic herd instinct, for persons singularly lack instinct; however, one's very nature is constructed socially through thoughts, ideas, culture, and beliefs. Without the Other there can be no self—no person—for, "we need one another in order to be ourselves." It is not that persons are merely in relation but that persons are constituted by their relationality. Personal knowledge of the Other (as material, biological, and personal) is united in finite personal experience, a finite experience of infinite person—God, the personal absolute.

Macmurray notes that the material unity-pattern is unable to deal with differences between the You and I, while the organic cannot maintain the individuality of particular persons who do not exist as complementary elements in a larger organism.

It would seem, therefore, that the unity-pattern of psychological thought must somehow succeed in combining the characteristics both of organic and of mathematical thought. It must express at once the independent reality of the

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407 For purposes of comparison, one may say that science is intellectual reflection, art emotional reflection, and religion is integral reflection. Or to put it another way, science is reflection in thought, art is reflection in feeling, and religion is reflection in personal interaction.

408 "The need to communicate, we should note, is itself a natural characteristic, not, like speech, something that we learn as we grow up. It is, indeed, our only original adaptation to the environment into which we are born. We have no true instincts. What may seem such are no more than physiological automatisms." RAS, 51. For the most detailed discussion of this lack of instinct see PR, 48-60.

409 RAS, 53; IU, 155.

410 RAS, 53. See also IU, 137; PR, 44-45. Persons are mutually constituted—hence the title of the second volume of the Gifford Lectures, Persons in Relation.

411 IU, 138.

412 IU, 138. If one maintains the epistemological principle that has been active throughout Macmurray's philosophy that the infinite is grasped in the finite and apply this to persons then one sees Macmurray's definition of God as the term symbolizing infinite person. Furthermore, Macmurray links this to the doctrine of the incarnation for the personal infinite can only come through an awareness of finite personality. IU, 124. See also Macmurray, "Objectivity in Religion," in Adventure: The Faith of Science and the Science of Faith, ed. Burnett H. Streeter, et al. (New York: Macmillan, 1928).

413 IU, 139-40. Since mathematics deals with identical units and dialectical moves toward a synthesis eliminating the individual elements which created the synthesis.
individual and the fact that this individuality is constituted by the relationship in which he stands to other independent persons who are different individuals. To put it in the familiar terms of modern controversy, mathematical relations are external to the term they relate. Organic relations are internal to their terms. But personal relations are at once internal and external.\textsuperscript{414}

The personal unity-pattern, as conceived by Macmurray, rejects the distinction between the natural and the supernatural. The concept of the supernatural is only necessary when one incorrectly conflates nature and organism. When one collapses nature and organism, one must supply a term to describe the super-organic aspect of human reality, hence, the coining of the word supernatural. But if one rejects the equation of the natural and the organic then the term supernatural is no longer needed.\textsuperscript{415}

By abandoning the bifurcation of the world into separate spheres of natural and supernatural, one is enabled to ascertain the empirical reality of the field of personal relationships.\textsuperscript{416} This reality involves the interaction of persons, including the problems and solutions necessary for interaction. In order to be an agent one must know the Other. Yet when knowledge of the Other fails, one is forced to reflect on the nature of the Self in

\textsuperscript{414} IU, 140 Note Macmurray's early use of \textit{psychological} for the personal unity-pattern. This paper has preferred the term \textit{personal} because psychological is often perceived in individualistic mental categories which subvert Macmurray's intention to think of this in terms of heterocentricity and agency. In addition, SA, 37, refers to scientific psychology and personal philosophy as parallel modes so it would appear that the Macmurray moved in this direction himself.

\textsuperscript{415} RAS, 48-49. This is similar to the conclusion of Oman who considers the term supernatural to cover the personal according to Thomas A. Langford, "The Theological Methodology of John Oman and H. H. Farmer." \textit{Religious Studies} 1 (April 1966): 233. John S. Morris notes the difficulty which Oman faces when he attempts to go from experience to metaphysics. This is because he is still working within the Kantian tradition which disallows such a move. Macmurray's philosophy provides the rationale for just such a move. John S. Morris, "Oman's Conception of the Personal God in The Natural and the Supernatural." \textit{Journal of Theological Studies} 13, no. 1 (April 1972): 89. Macmurray cites Barth's concept of God as \textit{wholly Other} as an example of the continuing effect of the distinction between natural and supernatural in contemporary theology. "In our own day this supernatural concept of religion has been uncompromisingly reaffirmed by Karl Barth. God is the wholly Other, completely incommensurate with human reason and only to be known at all by His own initiative in revealing Himself." RAS, 48.

\textsuperscript{416} RAS, 53. "Either God is natural or religion is nonsense. The idea of Nature which excludes God is itself the product of dualism. God is no more supernatural than Matter. Both are infinites, and lie beyond all their finite manifestations. God is infinite personality; and personality dissociated from matter in idea is purely ideal—that is to say, non-existent. God is real; and therefore he is the ultimate synthesis of matter and spirit, of Nature and Man." Macmurray, Christianity and Communism, 526.
order better to understand the Other. This creates a consciousness of mutuality which is
the essence of the personal—it is only known in concrete personal relations.

Practical rationality is simply an understanding of the Other as the Other-than-
self. To think irrationally is to analyze and describe an object differently than it is (e.g.,
to conceive of a granite block as though it were transparent). To feel irrationally is to
value an object differently than its actual value (e.g., fearing a mouse). To act irrationally
is to interact with an object differently than according to its nature (e.g., treating a
concrete block as if it were as fragile as an egg). Personal nature in its truest expression is
the person acting towards the Other, not in terms of the self, but in terms both of the
Other-in-relation-to-self and as the self-in-relation-to-Other.

If such a complete 'personal objectivity' were achieved, it would mean that in the
personal relation I am for you; that for me, I am nothing, and you are everything.
It would mean a complete self-devotion to the other; a perfect love which is a
complete fullness of rationality.

Religion does not require the suppression of valuation (as does science), nor the
suppression of mutuality (as does art), but involves the totality of the person. Complete
rationality is the experience of God. This total objectivity is difficult to attain for
rationality is falsified whenever subjective experience is mistaken for objective
experience.

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417 Since knowledge of the self is the negative of the knowledge of the Other (PR, 76-77; SA, 142).
418 RAS, 54-56; IU, 124-126; RE, 205, 222; PR, 169. Note the similarity with Ricoeur: "Oneself as Another
suggests from the outset that the selfhood of oneself implies otherness to such an intimate degree that one
cannot be thought without the other." Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, 3.
419 IU, 128-31. "Thus, an objective consciousness or a rational consciousness—the two phrases have the
same meaning—is a consciousness of what is recognized in the consciousness itself as an object
independent of the subject." IU, 131.
420 "Now, since religion has its empirical reference in the relation of persons, the object is always another
person, and self-transcendence must mean the capacity to have one's interest in another person." RAS, 57-58.
421 RAS, 58. The trinitarian implications of this are apparent, yet Macmurray makes no mention of this
application.
422 "For the religious reflection is total, involving every aspect of the person, intellectual, emotional and
practical; unconscious as well as conscious." RAS, 59.
423 "The experience of God is the experience of total self-transcendence and so of a total rationality, as
contrasted with the partial self-transcendence and rationality of art or of science." RAS, 59.
424 IU, 133.
It is important to remember, according to Macmurray, the rationality of religion does not negate that of science or art for it is possible to be partial, or limited, in one’s rationale without being in error. A rationality limited to the material leads to science, while a rationality limited to the organic results in art, and both are included within religion. Rationality, or objectivity, brought to bear upon persons leads to religion—symbolic action concerned with persons, community, and friendship. Since science deals with the least complex unity-pattern (matter) it is easiest to achieve rationality in scientific thought. Likewise, because religion deals with the most complex unity-pattern (persons) religious objectivity is the most difficult to attain.

Macmurray sees religion as essentially human symbolic reflective action intending to expand community. Because Macmurray sees it as empirical (not something ephemeral or supernatural) it can be described phenomenologically. Furthermore, religion is not simply one of several expressions of culture; religion is the matrix from which the rest of culture flows, including naturally the arts and sciences.
While religion contains art and science within it as constituting negatives, it also involves other negatives as well. Perhaps the most important of these include history and philosophy. Macmurray’s understanding of philosophy was detailed above in §2.1.1, so one may simply summarize the discussion there by stating that philosophy is the interpretation of the universe. History is concerned primarily with actions. Subsidiary attention is paid to events, but only to the extent that these events influence action. History, like philosophy, is an inclusive discipline seeking to understand the whole. Yet while philosophy generalizes, history particularizes. One may have a philosophy of science and a philosophy of art just as one may have a history of science and a history of art. History is like art in that it particularizes; it is like science in that it deals with matters of fact—although it does not seek recurrent patterns for prediction.


434 For example, just as the apprehensions can be applied to science (physical, biological, and psychological) and art (efficiency, aesthetics, morality), so the apprehensions can be applied to religion, resulting in magic (pragmatic), mysticism (contemplative), and integral (communal) forms. PR, 171. It is also possible to consider religion in terms of doctrine, ritual, and communion (PR, 173-75). Most discussions of Macmurray completely neglect the pragmatic form of religion—magical/technical. SA, 204, 207. For a manuscript-length treatment of the relation of history and religion see CH.

435 For the connection of action to history and narrative, see Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, 113, (116-38 for narrative in general; also Wallace, 10-15).

436 It is important to note that this definition of history de-legitimates a number of ways that history has been interpreted: it is not concerned to find replicating patterns (the generalizing deterministic tendency of the sciences) nor to discern the natural processes which supposedly govern it (the organic tendencies with their teleological form of determinism). For a very similar contemporary account of history see Wilfred M. McClay, “Clio’s Makeshift Laboratory,” First Things 111 (March 2001): 23-27, which is an adaptation of his book The Student’s Guide to U.S. History (Wilmington, DE: Intercollegiate Studies Institute, 2000).

437 For philosophy, like history, is one, and every new philosophy is a continuation of the one philosophy just as every new history of an age is a rewriting of the one history. The difference between the two is that while philosophical reflection generalizes, historical reflection particularizes.” SA, 207.

438 SA, 207. It also follows that one may have a philosophy of history (the generalization of the particularization of action) as well as a history of philosophy (the particularization of the generalization of action), although Macmurray never makes this extension.

439 SA, 207.
Further differentiating history from philosophy, art, and science, is the temporal quality of history. Philosophy, art, and science all attempt to abstract time outside of attention.\textsuperscript{442}

History reflects upon the remembrance of action, yet, memory is fragmentary, imaginative, and relative to the perspective of the particular agent.\textsuperscript{443}

History is, then, essentially personal; and it exhibits the form of the personal: for it concentrates upon practical activities and treats the reflective achievements of an epoch as secondary and derivative; as of interest in so far as they enter into and condition the practical doing of the time. And since history is concerned with the human past in its pastness, it makes no reference to the future; it does not seek to derive from the past anything that can be referred to the future.\textsuperscript{444}

Yet, because history is inclusive its goal or ideal is to express itself as the unity of all actions, which is difficult in light of the need to unify intentions across time and numerous contemporaneous agents.\textsuperscript{445} From this Macmurray builds a metaphysics of action ultimately leading to the idea of a personal universe.\textsuperscript{446}

It is helpful to realize that one may also have a philosophy of religion as well as a history of religion—the former focusing on the generalities of the symbolic acts of community and the latter on particular symbolic acts of community. In light of this it is possible to see why Macmurray states that philosophy as generalized reflection on the universe would have its most comprehensive subject matter as the personal, for it is a personal universe. Hence, philosophy would be the generalized reflection on persons—the general aspect of religious reflection and so philosophy is virtually synonymous with natural theology.\textsuperscript{447}

The relationship of philosophy, history and the modes of reflection are essential if one is not to simplistically and incorrectly interpret Macmurray. An instructive example of such a misunderstanding is demonstrated in Roy’s analysis of Macmurray’s

\textsuperscript{442} SA, 211. See also SA, 132.
\textsuperscript{443} SA, 207-09.
\textsuperscript{444} SA, 211.
\textsuperscript{445} SA, 213.
\textsuperscript{446} For metaphysics of action see SA, 214-22. For the idea of the personal universe, see PR, 206-24.
understanding of the relationship between generalized personal and impersonal knowledge as philosophy and science, respectively. Roy represents Macmurray’s taxonomy of personal attitudes, impersonal attitudes, philosophy, and (human) sciences thus:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experience</th>
<th>Reflection</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A Personal attitude</td>
<td>D Philosophy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B Impersonal attitude</td>
<td>C Human Sciences</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Roy suggests Macmurray’s understanding is wrong and instead argues it would be proper to understand the relationship thus:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experience</th>
<th>1st-level reflection</th>
<th>2nd-level reflection</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A Personal attitude</td>
<td>C Human Sciences</td>
<td>D Philosophy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B Impersonal attitude</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

So that “In this new diagram, the human sciences provide a reflection not only on B, but also on A; while philosophy outlines an account of A, B and C.” Furthermore, he argues that Macmurray cannot make this adjustment since for Macmurray science can never take into account the totality of full personal relations.

Roy’s conclusion stems from his inadequate understanding of the different forms of generalization present in the Form of the Personal. It does not take sufficient account of the relationship between religion, art, and science in conjunction with history and philosophy. A more accurate representation of these relationships within Macmurray’s thought, using Roy’s format and ignoring the place of history, would look so:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experience</th>
<th>1st-level reflection</th>
<th>2nd-level reflection</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A Personal attitude</td>
<td>E Religion</td>
<td>D Philosophy of Religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B Impersonal attitude</td>
<td>C Human Sciences</td>
<td>F Philosophy of Science</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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447 PR, 224. Nephew clearly traces the connection of philosophy and theology in Macmurray’s thought (12-15).
449 Roy, The Form of the Personal, 126.
450 Roy states that philosophy and scientific knowledge is separate in Macmurray’s thinking. Yet in the very section Roy cites Macmurray explicitly states that philosophy is inclusive of the scientific (PR, 38, 40).
For Macmurray, philosophy in its highest manifestation is synonymous with philosophy of religion, which because of the form of the personal is constituted by the philosophy of art and the philosophy of science. Religion, as the practical mode of reflection, is constituted by the generalization of philosophy (of religion) and the particularization of history (of religion) as well as the generalization of science and particularization of art.

In light of this example, it is clear that a more comprehensive and systematic picture of the Form of the Personal, one including history for example, would be most beneficial to the understanding of this unique philosophy.

2.3.5 THE FORM OF THE PERSONAL—
A SCHEMATIC SUMMARY

Macmurray never provided a schematic presentation of his philosophy. Using the exposition thus far, in particular the nature of unity-patterns, Personal logic, the particularizing and generalizing aspect of reflection, and the triadic grid of pragmatic, contemplative, and communal apperceptions it is possible to sketch out the general contours of Macmurray's Form of the Personal. The following is a greatly simplified and condensed overview. It is not meant to be exhaustive or encyclopedic, but should demonstrate both the comprehensive nature of the Form of the Personal as well as the key relationships which give it shape.

In presenting this sketch one is aware of the dangers of distortion, especially reductionism, present in any overly-systematic exposition of Macmurray. However there is a need for a proper understanding of the relation between various components of Macmurray's system. In addition to Roy's confusion over the relation of philosophy and science a number of common misunderstanding exists. History and biology are often placed within the organic unity-pattern. Biology is a science.\textsuperscript{451} History, Macmurray

\textsuperscript{451} SA, 34-35.
clearly states, exhibits the form of the personal and not the organic.\textsuperscript{452} Furthermore, the pervasive dualistic reading of Macmurray must be refuted. One may argue whether Macmurray was successful in completely overcoming his dualistic heritage, but that is something quite different than being a dualist.

In constructing this model certain single terms are used for the sake of clarity whereas Macmurray seems to revel in using various terms for the same idea, consistent with the exploratory nature of his writing. The guiding intention here is to capture the essence of what he was describing with these multiple terms without reductionism.

The apperceptions form the heuristic and interpretative backbone of the Form of the Personal. The apperceptions (pragmatic, contemplative, and communal) function as forms of abstraction, according to whether one is generalizing (pragmatic), particularizing (contemplative), or integrating (communal). In addition, one must realize that these abstractions are abstractions for a particular purpose. For instance, science is pragmatic reflection on the Other as an element in the substantial unity-pattern. Science makes factual generalizations about reality in keeping with the analytic logical form which gives priority to the units or parts of reality.\textsuperscript{453} Art is contemplative reflection on the Other as an element in the organic unity-pattern making valuational particularizations about reality in keeping with the dialectical emphasis on the wholeness of the Other in its environment as perceived by the Self. Religion is communal reflection on the Other as an element in the personal unity-pattern, following the integrating form of Personal logic. Religion, art, and science as modes of reflection are abstractions with reference to ontology.\textsuperscript{454}

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\textsuperscript{452} SA, 211. Although history is present at the organic level in the guise of the history of art.

\textsuperscript{453} Science is impersonal in so far as it must treat all others as determined units—according to a substantial analogy, and can therefore never adequately address a fully personal understanding of persons. See PR, 37-43.

\textsuperscript{454} Remembering that the substantial, organic, and personal unity-patterns have an ontological basis.

Jeffko claims that Macmurray has five levels of reality in his personal thought: supra-personal, personal, social, organic, and material (60-61). However, this is because he does not understand the various relations so that he has included a mode of morality (social) along with the other levels of reality. By including (correctly) the supra-personal and (incorrectly) the social levels of reality, Jeffko misses an
Similarly religion, history, and philosophy are abstractions according to the triadic apperceptive grid. Yet, instead of abstracting ontologically, this pattern is an abstraction with regard to action—a practical abstraction. Pragmatic reflection on action causes one to generalize action as philosophy. Contemplative particularization of action is history, and communal reflection is the integration of action in religion. The counter-check to this is the fact that when one considers particularization and generalization of action (history and philosophy) one sees that it is time which is being abstracted. Time, one will recall, is the form of action. History is a particularization of time, while philosophy attempts a generalize of time.

Since the ontological and practical patterns of reflection both appear to derive from religion, it should be possible to relate them to each other. Using a format similar to the one employed in the discussion above about the relationship between philosophy and science it is possible to demonstrate the relationships between these terms in Figure 2.6.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>History (of Religion)</th>
<th>Philosophy (of Religion)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Art</td>
<td>History of Art</td>
<td>Philosophy of Art</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science</td>
<td>History of Science</td>
<td>Philosophy of Science</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2.6 Religion, History, Philosophy

This represents the conceptuality of religion abstracted in its ontological and practical dimensions. However, history and philosophy are not the only forms of religious, artistic, and scientific reflection. In the discussion of the parallel phases of philosophy and science, Macmurray distinguishes between the physical sciences, biological science, and psychological sciences. One may question how the apperceptions important clue to the triadic structure of Macmurray’s thought. Later Jeffko claims Macmurray advocates four ontological categories: existence, being, reality, and possibility (80). Possibility is indeterminate being (i.e., personal), reality is significant or valutional being (i.e., organic), existence is factual, determined, actual being (i.e., substantial). Being is a state that applies equally to all. Yet in including being he ignores Macmurray’s personal word of warning to him about abstract being (n. 25). In so doing, there are four categories, instead of three, which once again causes Jeffko to fail to see the important connection to the triadic structure of the Form of the Personal.
apply to science, because, as mentioned above, science is always generalization. True, but as was demonstrated in Figure 2.6, there are at least two possible ways to generalize: science and philosophy. The apperceptive pattern is still integration, particularization, and generalization but the question remains—what is being generalized in the factual modes of science? There are numerous possibilities. To narrow the field of possibilities, one can take into account the additional data provided by the valuational modes of art. Here Macmurray considers efficiency (pragmatic-general), aesthetics (contemplative-particular), and morality (communal-integrative). When these are compared, the common abstraction becomes clear: the relational Other is being abstracted in various ways. In the pragmatic apperception any person will do. So if one is judging (valuing) a person solely on their efficiency, one does not care who the person is, it can be a generic anyone. But aesthetic judgment is concerned with the particularity of the Other. Who is vitally important to aesthetics and persons are not interchangeable. To test this consider the following parallels:

Facts of the Other in General = Physics
Facts of the Other in Particular = Biology
Facts of the Other in Integration = Psychology

Valuation of the Other in General = Efficiency
Valuation of the Other in Particular = Aesthetics
Valuation of the Other in Integration = Morality

Communion of the Other in General = Magic/Technical
Communion of the Other in Particular = Mysticism/Escapist
Communion of the Other in Integration = Integral

It is important to note that the factual, valuational, and communal modes follow the formal rules of the respective unity-pattern. Facts are always analytic (concerned with the parts), values are always dialectical (concerned with the whole), and communion is always personal (concerned with integration). Just as one is able to construct a grid of the
The basic axes of this cube (see Figure 2.9) are the ontological, the practical, and the relational (O, P, and R respectively). It is important that one recall the integrative nature of personal logic and the graphic representation of it (Figure 2.1) where the totality of the area was the positive and was constituted by the negative. The same concept is being applied here, but positive is in the direction of the intersection of the three axes. Therefore, any label closer to the point of intersection is more positive and therefore inclusive of what is more negative (that is, away from the intersection of the O, P, and R axes). So one may say religion, or one may say the integration of science and art in religion, or the integration of history and philosophy in religion. The result is always to talk about the totality of religion.

Figure 2.9 Principal Axes

455 These are not the only possible axes, however they are the most general of persons. Narrower attention (selectivity) fit best within this overall framework.
Macmurray provides several examples of further negatives within the cube (graphically pictured as boxes within the cube in Figure 2.10). For instance, there are three types of morality: legal, traditional, fraternal. Religion can also be conceived of in terms of communion, ritual, and doctrine. The question in each case, of course, is which axis provides the positive and negative? For morality, one can see that the abstraction is taking place along the relational axis (R) because the legal generalizes the Other (law is supposed to not care about who the person is), tradition particularizes the Other (how one acts depends upon who the Other is), and community integrates the Other (full freedom of interaction between the self and the Other). As can be seen in Figure 2.10, these modifications along the relational axis can be seen to continue along the length of the practical axis (P), yet do not interact in any way with aesthetics.\footnote{That is to say that there is no such thing as “legal aesthetics” like there is legal history and legal philosophy. It is not entirely clear whether Macmurray’s one-to-one correspondence between types of morality (legal, traditional, fraternal) and types of social structure (state, society, community) is demonstrated by the continuance along the P axis in historical consideration. It is certainly plausible.}
For communion the abstractions take place along the ontological axis (O).

Macmurray specifically states that doctrine has the form of science (i.e., the substantial form or analytic logic) and ritual the aesthetic form (i.e., the organic form or dialectic logic) without being either science or art. The forms (logical grammar or logical forms) are always expressive of the ontological dimension. Therefore one sees, as in Figure 2.11, the relationship arranged along the ontological axis. One sees the integration along the O axis affects all arrangement along both the R and P axes. In other words, all religions (magical, mystical, and integral) have doctrines, rituals, and communion, as well as the history and philosophy of doctrine, ritual, and communion. A further aspect of relationships along the ontological axis should be noted. A box from the personal level may be regarded with respect to all three forms (personal, dialectic, analytic). A box from the organic level may only have two ontological levels (dialectic and analytic). The substantial can only have the one form (analytic). See Figure 2.12 for an example of this. This last observation also reinforces the earlier decision regarding the orientation of the types of morality. Since there are three modes of morality and morality is on the organic level it cannot be stacked vertically along the ontological axis.

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457 PR, 174.
458 Again, as was the case with morality, it is unclear if the one-to-one correspondence of types of religion and the historical religions of Islam (Magical), Buddhism (Mystical), and Christianity (Integral) is a function of the historical dimension.
There is no pretense in this presentation that Macmurray ever conceived of the Form of the Personal graphically in the shape of a cube. However, as an initial systemization it clearly presents the major aspects of his philosophy, provides significant clarification, and is heuristically suggestive. The apperceptions function as a heuristic device but because there is an objective reality which is perceived there is a structure which emerges through their use.
2.4 SUMMARY

This chapter began with Macmurray's concept of the nature of philosophy, its subject matter and the problems of modern philosophy which Macmurray traces to Descartes. Through a careful exploration of Kant's philosophical system Macmurray then discerns a way past the Kantian impasse and begins to reformulate philosophy from the perspective of the agent. In so doing he determines the need for a new logical form which is appropriate for human persons—a grammar which provides the correct rules for talking about persons. The second section presented Macmurray's epistemology where knowledge is the presupposition of reflection and where the epistemological process involves experience (knowledge-in-action), reflection, and verification in action. So that reflection is for the sake of action and not an end in itself. The third section was a careful consideration of religion, art, and science as the three ways which persons reflect upon various levels of reality. Through considering the modes of reflection the importance of
the apperceptions was discovered. The apperceptions applied to various aspects of the
Other then create a cogent series of relations between a vast number of key concepts
within Macmurray’s thought. These relations were then represented graphically.

The intention of the chapter was two fold. It was designed as a means for quick
immersion into the radically different viewpoint of Macmurray’s philosophy and it was
intended to systematize and clarify the Form of the Personal. In the course of the chapter
a number of obstacles which often contribute to misreading of Macmurray have been
cleared. The schematic presentation, in particular, provides a convenient model of the
broad outlines, themes, and methods of the philosophical dimension of Macmurray’s
thought. The apperceptions will also drive the orderly examinations of the
anthropological and theological dimensions in a manner true to the methodology of
Macmurray.

Before turning the focus to these other dimensions several key points from the
chapter are worth stressing. One is the absolute necessity of Personal logic for one’s
understanding of Macmurray. If this is misunderstood then everything collapses for there
is then no integration which maintains particularity. Without Personal logic the
anthropological and theological dimensions will be misinterpreted.

Also crucial are the epistemological limitations of humanity. One is limited by
one’s particular experience and one’s ability to verify theoretical constructs of the
imagination. Therefore one’s comprehension is limited to the field of personal
experience. One is never able to completely verify all possible aspects of a theory so one
must settle for probability and not certainty. Thus all reflection ultimately rests on belief.

Finally, Macmurray demonstrates that different aspects of reality are approached
in different ways which are appropriate to their ontological level. Human persons—as the
most complete experiential reality available for human reflection—are the upper limit of
human rationality. Keeping the logical, epistemological, and ontological aspects of
Macmurray's philosophy in mind one is now properly equipped to accurately appraise the
anthropological and theological dimensions of his thought.
CHAPTER 3
THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL DIMENSION:
THE CELEBRATION OF COMMUNION

The thesis we have to expound and to sustain is that the Self is constituted by its relation to the Other; that it has its being in relationship; and that this relationship is necessarily personal.¹

Macmurray’s Form of the Personal is concerned, more than anything else, with a relational understanding of persons which does justice to the full experience of humanity. This chapter will expand upon the basic presentation of Macmurray’s personalistic anthropology presented in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 by first providing a brief glimpse into recent thought on persons in theological anthropology followed by a detailed examination of Macmurray’s anthropology.

3.1 WAYS OF THINKING ABOUT PERSONS

In order to better understand Macmurray’s anthropology it is helpful to situate him relative to several taxonomies describing various approaches to theological anthropology. Doing so not only clarifies Macmurray’s usage of key terms, but it also enables one to identify one’s own presuppositions regarding persons and thus encourages one to resist imposing preconceived ideas and definitions onto Macmurray’s anthropological dimension.

3.1.1 ONTIC AND QUALITATIVE DISTINCTIONS

In recent discussions of persons Bertocci and Harris, each in their own way, perceive a problem of category confusion in the usage and conflation of such terms as
person, personhood, personality, personal identity, self-image, and self-understanding.

Bertocci notes in particular how Paul Johnson conflates person in its ontological sense (i.e., personhood) with person in the qualitative sense (i.e., personality). Harris notes a similar collapse of meaning in the use of the term personal identity. In one sense personal identity is used of numerical identity with ontological significance, while in another it has a qualitative sense. Harris also notes a tendency in the writings of Charles Taylor, Vincent Brünnner, and Elaine L. Graham to confuse personal identity (in its ontic sense) with self-image or self understanding. She particularly sees confusion in a number of examples where social scientific accounts have been influential, for example McFadyen’s *The Call to Personhood*.

The underlying problem in all the relational accounts considered here [McFadyen, Graham, and Brünnner] is failure to attend to how notions of personal development which have been informed by social science should relate to notions of personhood what are intended to be normative or ontological.

In these approaches a person is the amalgamation or sedimentation of their personal relations. If personal development is not clearly delineated from personhood, human beings may be seen as becoming persons rather than being persons. Once this conceptual move is made it is possible to deny others the status of person for any number of reasons. Harris responds to this improper understanding of person by offering Macmurray as a counter-example.

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1 PR, 17.
3 Harriet A. Harris, “Should We Say that Personhood is Relational?” *Scottish Journal of Theology*, 51 (1998): 217. She sees personal identity as one and the same, while qualitative indicates two or more entities which are exactly similar. She prefers to use personal identity, or person, as the ontological meaning and refers to the qualitative sense as personality.
4 Harris, 219-20. She also adds that Brünnner suffers from the earlier problem of mistaking the ontic and the qualitative (220). To be fair to McFadyen, he does stipulate an ontological status to persons, yet this ontological aspect often seems submerged in the developmental sense. One is also able to see a certain terminological confusion in McFadyen’s uses of person, self, soul, and spirit. In most cases self and person are synonymous, however at one point he equates soul and self (in opposition to body) which then must be integrated in spirit and thus is person. McFadyen, 155, n. 2.
5 Harris, 223.
It is instructive to contrast the sedimentation metaphor with John Macmurray's analysis of the mother-child relationship as the basic form of human existence. The thrust of Macmurray's account is not that a being becomes a person through relations, but that humans are persons because relationality is central to human life. It is not that relations precede persons so much as that personal existence is created as relational, or 'personal relation ... is constitutive of personal existence' (p. 12).^6

Harris is certainly correct in her reading of Macmurray; a human being does not become a person, a human being is a person. Consider the two quotations below, the first is from Paul Johnson^7 and the second is from John Macmurray.^8 An initial appraisal will confirm the similarities in the two positions. However, a careful reading will confirm the very distinction of which Harris writes.

My own position is dynamic interpersonalism, holding that no person is truly a person in himself alone, but only as he enters into mutual relationship with other persons. ... But the unique person, as I see him attains significance and reality through his participation with other persons in the interactive relationships of our world.

—Paul Johnson

All this may be summed up by saying that the unit of personal existence is not the individual, but two persons in personal relation; and that we are persons not by individual right, but in our relation to one another. The personal is constituted by personal relatedness.

—John Macmurray

For Macmurray it is not the relationships which are the person but rather it is the state of being related—relationality or mutuality—which is the ontological essence of the personal. Macmurray is unequivocal about this point. Immediately preceding the quotation above he states:

In the human infant ... the impulse to communication is his sole adaptation to the world into which he is born.... For this reason the infant is born a person and not an animal.\(^9\)

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^6 Harris, 225-26, citing PR, 12.
^8 PR, 61.
^9 PR, 60.
Macmurray is aware that the quality of personal relationships do matter to the person. However, he separates this qualitative aspect into the non-ontological category of personal development, securing the ontological stability of the person in the face of all who would degrade another as sub-personal. In his Gifford lectures, Macmurray uses person and personhood in the ontological sense, personal identity (and occasionally individuality) to designate the uniqueness of the particular person and generally avoids the subject of self-understanding, unless one considers this as an aspect of self-knowledge. By the time of the Giffords, he eschews the term personality because of connotations involving it with incorrect notions of self, yet in earlier writings it is present.

Bertocci and Harris provide a valuable service by calling attention to the confusion created by collapsing terms and allowing the clarification of Macmurray’s use of person ontologically. However the ontological, qualitative, and self-image meanings of person do not exhaust the possible definitions of person.

3.1.2 **THICK AND THIN DESCRIPTIONS**

Adrian Thatcher provides a list of six common ways in which the term person is used in contemporary theological discussion: (1) the mystery of God as person; (2) ontologically as a person’s identity; (3) psychologically as a person’s character; (4) morally as persons being ends in themselves; (5) existentially as what persons make of themselves; and (6) socially as relational persons.

Bertocci and Harris were mostly concerned with privileging the ontological usage over the qualitative due to the inherent dangers of losing the ontological status of persons.

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10 PR, 66-78.
11 "His quality as a person is the quality of his personal relations." PR, 95.
12 PR, 25.
13 For example, IU, 124; RE, 45.
However, this does not mean one must settle for a thin description of person. In fact, as one considers Thatcher's list one sees that Macmurray addresses each of these meanings in various ways. Some meanings he places at the sub-personal level while others may be used as part of the thick description of person.

Macmurray recognizes the importance of character and the intrinsic value of persons. Yet both of these are not operating at the personal level for values and habits both belong to the organic level. Personal development, roughly akin to the existential category, is important to his understanding of persons but is obviously subsidiary to other aspects of his model. One immediately discards Macmurray's social construct of person, but it is not merely social in the way Thatcher portrays it, for it is a relational ontology. The category of mystery is one most would not include in Macmurray's thought, yet the concept is present even if the word is not. One could argue that the indeterminate nature of persons is a measure of mystery in Macmurray's conceptualization. Instead, Macmurray combines the ontological, relational, and mysterious conceptions of persons in a thick understanding of persons. With help from Bertocci, Harris, and now Thatcher, one is able to see that for Macmurray person is relational, ontological, and indeterminate.

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15 Character, as noted above, is a form of habituation.
16 Macmurray follows Kant in saying that persons are ends in themselves.
17 This aspect is missed by Thatcher, who describes Macmurray as an example of the social understanding of persons and contrasts it with the other five types, including ontological, as individualistic.
18 Macmurray does not typically use the word mystery, possibly due to its potential for being confused with mysticism, which he was fiercely opposed to. Other aspects of Macmurray's concept of person which may be seen as mysterious are that persons are always much more than the sum of their parts, one cannot fully understand another without revelation on the part of the Other, and that the person is not even entirely known to themselves. This is contra Haddox, who sees the constituting aspect of Personal logic as incompatible with Marcel's existential attainment model of persons—where personhood is achieved not structured. Haddox, 131-34. In part this is because Haddox is accepting Fox's overly structural understanding of Personal logic. There are a number of similarities between Marcel and Macmurray. See Sam Keen, Gabriel Marcel (London: Carey Kingsgate Press, 1966) where various aspects of Marcel's thought are laid out: persons as mystery (not problems), distrust of abstraction, and the use of the I- Thou are detailed.
3.1.3 LAURITZEN'S QUADRANTS

Lauritzen provides another useful paradigm of approaches to anthropology. Lauritzen evaluates the understanding of the self by Richard Rorty, Ernest Wallwork, Charles Taylor, and Paul Ricoeur according to two different axes. The first axis is a continuum between conceptions of the self which are centered or de-centered. The centered, or unified, self is one which is sovereign for “it defines itself through the ends it spontaneously chooses.” The de-centered, fragmented self is one without a center. He places Rorty and Freud (as read by Rorty) on the de-centered side while Wallwork, Taylor, and Ricoeur are all seen as understanding the self as a unity. The second axis opposes views of the self as engaged and as disengaged. The disengaged self is the egocentric self turned in on itself, while the engaged self is turned outwards to the world by its commitments to and identifications with others. Wallwork and Rorty would both fall within the disengaged category. Lauritzen sees the engaged self, as advocated by Taylor, as synonymous with the more developed concept of narrative identity found in Ricoeur’s work and thus Taylor and Ricoeur both are classified under engaged concepts of the self (see Figure 3.1). Lauritzen then extends the conversation further by noting that implicit within the idea of narrative is the concept of relationality. However this creates a problem. Recent French psychoanalysts of the interindividual school demonstrate the narrative self leading towards a de-centered conception of the self. Radical social constitution of the self leads to the possibility of violence between the self and other. To Lauritzen this suggests a “signal for future research for even a brief juxtaposition of

20 Lauritzen, 190.
21 Lauritzen, 191-93.
22 Lauritzen, 193-98.
23 Lauritzen, 206-08.
24 “Original identification with the other, if it is constitutive of the ego ..., is likewise radical violence with respect to the other—a devouring mouth clamped down on the alterity of others....” Lauritzen citing Borch-Jacobsen, 208. Ellipses in the original.
'interindividual' psychology with narrative views of the self suggests the connection among relationality, fragmentation, and individual moral responsibility.25

Figure 3.1. Lauritzen’s Taxonomy of the Self

Attempting to place Macmurray’s anthropology within Lauritzen’s four quadrants is most instructive for it clearly demonstrates how radically different Macmurray’s anthropology is compared to the conceptions of the self which are still fundamentally shaped by the cogito. In attempting to place Macmurray relative to the first axis, one immediately encounters difficulty. He clearly does not advocate a sovereign or centered self in the sense Lauritzen uses the term. Macmurray’s self focuses on the Other and is relational. Yet this does not mean the self is de-centered, fragmented, or schismatic. Macmurray defines the person as heterocentric—centered in the Other—so a person is centered but not on the self. The second axis provides similar difficulties. There is no question that Macmurray’s person is relational (the Self-as-agent is inherently relational),

25 Lauritzen, 208.
yet in the Form of the Personal the relationally engaged Self-as-agent is constituted by the
disengaged Self-as-subject. One might see Macmurray occupying all four quadrants of
Lauritzen’s model. But in another sense, his anthropology transcends the categorizations
since it does not begin with the Cartesian self as the subject.

While not exhaustive, this brief interaction with contemporary anthropology has
enable clarifications regarding Macmurray’s anthropology and given a rough placement
of his thought within (and without) the current anthropological climate.

3.1.4 APPEARCEPTIONS AND PERSONS

Methodologically the remainder of this chapter will follow Macmurray’s method
of applying the apperceptive triad to the consideration of persons-in-relation. This entails
a pragmatic analysis of persons as equal, a contemplative examination of persons as free,
and a communal reflection on persons as mutual. Pragmatically to analyze a person in
relation one must attempt to generalize the person in relation as the It. Furthermore,
because one is reflecting ontologically, this generalization must follow the analytic
logical form of the substantial unity-pattern. In so doing one arrives at the understanding
of persons as equal. Contemplative conceptualization of the person in relation requires a
particularization of the person as a whole within his or her immediate environment, the I-
It. Just as the pragmatic needed to follow the analytic form, here the dialectic of the
organic unity-pattern is required. The results of considering the fully relational person in
this manner is to understand persons as free. A communal stance towards persons is one
where persons in relation are not merely in contact with the Other, but by virtue of the
logical form of the personal unity-pattern, are actually mutually constituting. Thus
mutuality is the fullest conceptualization of a relational person, the I-You. 

26 It should be noted that once again one term is being used in place of a number of related terms used by
Macmurray. Mutuality will be used to designate the general concept included in such terms as relationality,
fellowship, friendship, as well as mutuality (all used by Macmurray interchangeably). Mutuality was
This apperceptive appraisal of persons in relation in terms of equality, freedom, and mutuality confirms the earlier conclusion based upon Thatcher’s article. Macmurray understands persons as relational (mutual), indeterminate (free), and ontological (equal). Equality, freedom, and mutuality stand in reciprocal relation to each other. Mutuality is the positive with freedom and equality as its negatives. Freedom is impossible without equality, and mutuality is inconceivable without both equality and freedom; yet both exist, according to the rules of Personal logic, for the sake of mutuality.

Such a positive unity of persons is the self-realization of the personal. For, firstly, they are then related as equals. This does not mean that they have, as matter of fact, equal abilities, equal rights, equal functions or any other kind of de facto equality. The equality is intentional: it is an aspect of the mutuality of the relation. If it were not an equal relation, the motivation would be negative; a relation in which one was using the other as a means to his own end. Secondly, they both realize their freedom as agents, since in the absence of the fear for the self there is no constraint on either, and each can be himself fully; neither is under obligation to act a part. Thus equality and freedom are constitutive of community; and the democratic slogan, ‘Liberty, equality, fraternity’, is an adequate definition of community—of the self-realization of person in relation.

3.2 EQUALITY

Any form of relation between persons which denies personal equality or which obstructs fellowship is irreligious and irrational. Indeed, in this field the two terms mean precisely the same thing. The irrationality is precisely what it is in any field, a failure to behave in terms of the real situation, in terms of the nature of the object.

It is no more rational for persons to believe they are toasters than it is for persons to believe they are not ontologically equal. Neither corresponds to reality and therefore both must be consigned to the category of the unreal. Persons, understood as such, are equal for all humans are born in a condition of relationality, or as Macmurray states in

specifically chosen because it has a more dynamic and interactive connotation than relationality, has fewer associations than fellowship (which in some circles is synonymous with a particular local institutional church body), and fits better with equality and freedom than friendship. Friendship, however, has an irreplaceable personal quality and will occasionally be used in the course of the exposition.

27 One equates ontological with equal because this is the primary way in which Thatcher understood ontological, as employing a substantial ontology.
28 PR, 158. See also CF, 72-74.
29 RE, 205.
one place “The ground of fellowship is common humanity.” This equality is necessary for if all persons are not created equal, then the possibility of freedom and true friendship is sheer fantasy. If persons are not equally personal then one is no more able to befriend another person than to befriend a toaster.

3.2.1 **Equality in Difference**

This equality does not mean all persons are identical—Macmurray does not deny the very real differences which exist among particular persons. Quite to the contrary, he believes one must pay attention in the differences of biology, culture, capability, and experience. Not only does this make the friendship more interesting, but it reinforces the fact that one is mutually related to another particular person—one is never a friend with persons in general. These very real differences, however, all exist at subsidiary ontological levels, not at the level which matters most, the personal level.

In this sense all persons are equal; and this is the first law of the personal life. It does not mean that there are not immense differences between one person and another; it means that these differences have no bearing upon the possibility of personal relationships and have nothing to do [sic] with the structure of the constitution of the personal life. On the other hand, it does not mean that these differences can be ignored or should be overlooked in the personal life. The differences remain, and become the basis of the infinite variety of experience which can be shared in the life of personal relationship.

Because all persons—as persons—are equal, friendship is possible between any two persons if they so intend. An excellent example of this equality-in-difference is

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30 CF, 84. Emphasis in the original.
32 RB, 104. Even the qualitative development of persons does not alter the ontological equality of the person as person.
33 The full realization of equality, freedom, and mutuality is never attained, but the intention towards it is crucial as an intention towards reality and overcoming unreality in the personal life. CF, 74. The possibility of friendship across great differences does not mean it will be easy: “The greater the fundamental differences between two persons are the more difficult it is to establish a fully personal relation between them, but also the more worth while the relation will be if it can be established and maintained.” RB, 105.
Macmurray’s treatment of gender. Macmurray notes the tendency to either
overemphasize equality or difference to such an extent that one becomes unreal.

We seem unable to regard sex as part and parcel of the normal personal life. We
are so afraid of it that we try to keep it apart. We do not wish to recognize it. So,
when a man and a woman meet, they either behave to one another as if the
difference of sex was non-existent, or else they are so aware of the difference that
other considerations are crowded out. The only solution is one which breaks down
this choice between two exclusive attitudes and enables us at once to accept and
rejoice in the difference, while recognizing it as only one element in the
relationship of two free and equal persons.  

Failing to recognize the equality-in-difference, one inevitably acts unethically
towards the Other—either idealizing them into something which can only be
contemplated or functionalizing them into something to be used.  

There is a close
connection in Macmurray’s thought between equality and justice. This connection may be
further understood by investigating the distinction in the Form of the Personal between
direct and indirect relationships, as well as, personal and impersonal relationships.

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34 RE, 113-14. Susan Parsons notes several areas of convergence between Macmurray’s philosophy and
feminist theology, particularly the emphasis upon mutuality and interdependence (2), the desire for a more
inclusive concept of the person from an experiential standpoint (3-4), and the union of action and passion
(7). She questions, however, the role of the mother in the explication of the mother-child relationship,
seeing the mother as depersonalized (8-13). She also accepts at face value the criticisms of Trosch’s
and Newbiggin regarding Macmurray’s definition of religion as too anthropocentric (14-15; see below §3.4.3).
She also has concerns about possible signs of lingering enlightenment thinking in Macmurray. She sees a
dualism exhibited in Macmurray’s distinction between the organic and the personal realms as well as a
feeling of the self in isolation in his discussion of touch. In the first case, one must state that Parsons is
simply wrong. The personal includes the organic, and the point that Macmurray makes is that humans are
born in the personal field and not in the organic is not to deny the organic but to see it as subordinate to the
personal. In the second case she is not taking into account the punctiliar nature of the self used in SA which
Macmurray then augments with the relational in PR. She finally is disturbed by the technical and
manipulative understanding of agency. There is some credence here, as long as one remembers the
instrumental exists within the fully communal. Susan Parsons, “The Relevance of John Macmurray for a
Feminist Theology of Action,” in The Life and Work of John Macmurray Conference Proceedings,
(University of Aberdeen, March 1998, photocopied).

35 PR, 158.

36 Here, again, Macmurray’s choice of terminology comes under fire. Several commentators prefer
functional to impersonal (e.g., Roy, Interpersonal Knowledge, 357), a term Macmurray uses from time to
time (e.g., RAS, 54). Yet even this modification is only a partial solution, for one is describing types of
relations between persons as either personal or functional, resulting in the awkward formulation of
personal-personal relations and functional-personal relations. To substitute relational does not provide
much benefit for one is then facing relational-personal relations and functional personal relations. In
addition, to change from impersonal to functional takes some of the sting out of the designation direct
impersonal-personal relation. Jeffko suggests three categories (1) primary personal, (2) secondary personal,
(3) absolute impersonal. Jeffko, 110-14. However this nomenclature obscures the fact that all relations
between persons are personal (even impersonal ones). Since there is no clear-cut advantage to any changes
3.2.2 **Types of Relationships**

A direct relationship is one in which two or more persons are in direct communication. An indirect relationship is one without direct contact between persons. A personal relationship exists when the functional aspects of the relation are subordinated to the mutual aspects. An impersonal relationship is one in which the function of the person is the dominant feature of the relationship. All indirect relationships are by definition impersonal since there is no direct personal encounter, and hence, no way for the personal to dominate the functional or impersonal. Direct relations may be either personal or impersonal depending on which aspect is dominant. It is crucial to note, following the normal form of personal logic, the existence of an impersonal (or functional) dimension to all personal relations, and it is only the order of subordination which determines whether the entire relationship is designated as personal or impersonal. Likewise, between two persons there is always a personal dimension. The classification of a relationship as personal or impersonal alone is not morally significant; it depends on the context of the relationship. It becomes morally significant only when an impersonal direct relationship exists. Any relationship becomes immoral, however, when the minimal demands of justice are unmet. Since all persons are equal, all persons—directly or indirectly—must be treated justly.\(^{37}\)

By way of clarification, it is helpful to consider three misunderstandings of Macmurray on this subject. These errors involve the question of exclusivity, uniformity, and differentiation.

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suggested, and since the majority of the literature uses Macmurray's categories of **personal** and **impersonal** these have been retained.

\(^{37}\) PR, 190. McFadyen states that spirit (personhood) disallows dealing with others solely on the basis of law, but the minimal requirement is justice. McFadyen, 255. Ricoeur similarly ties equality and justice to the institutions necessary for interaction between persons that are not face-to-face. Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, 194-97.
Emmet raises the issue of the nature and priority of friendship and its relation to roles, functions, and purpose. In direct reference to one of Macmurray's examples involving an hysterical student and a professor of psychology who must switch from a personal (friendly) attitude to an impersonal (functional) attitude in order to assist the student, she states:

But surely the relation of teacher to pupil is also a role relation, with some restraints as well as spontaneity appropriate to it. Personal and role relations are interwoven, and not always clearly separated. We cannot banish the persona from the person, even in some of our closest relations, any more than the person from the persona. So it is surely important to see how each can survive the other.

Fergusson concurs with Emmet, stating "A personal relationship is established not despite socially determined roles but in terms of them." Fergusson also enlists Alasdair MacIntyre's discussion of the social construction of roles to conclude "Friendship requires as a necessary condition some shared purpose which structures the relationship." Roy builds upon Emmet's critique of Macmurray with Toulmin's rejection of the dualism of person-talk/thing-talk to suggest a spectrum of personal relations.

In all the criticisms above there exists a common thread. Each believes Macmurray posits friendship to the exclusion of roles. This is not the case. Instead, using personal logic, he sees friendship (the personal positive) as being constituted by roles and functions (the impersonal negative). According to Macmurray it is impossible to completely separate the personal from the impersonal. It is primarily a question of

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38 For a role is nothing more than a collection and arrangement of certain functions for certain purposes.
39 PR, 29-37.
41 Fergusson, John Macmurray, 22-23. Roy, dependent upon Emmet, focuses on this as the problem of the "movement between the particular and the general." Roy, Interpersonal Knowledge, 354.
43 Roy, Interpersonal Knowledge, 350.
subordination which distinguishes a personal relationship from an impersonal relationship. Even in the case of the impersonal relationship of a slave owner and a slave, there is no way to remove the personal element. Slavery is wrong because it has subordinated the personal to the functional—creating a human tool. According to Macmurray the impersonal attitude is only justified when it is adopted for the sake of the personal. A truly personal relationship needs no justification, but an impersonal one always does. In the case of indirect relations, which are always impersonal, one must justify the impersonal attitude with regard to the larger personal context. Therefore one sees that Macmurray is not attempting to delineate a harsh separation between the two, but rather their proper integration.

A second misconception may be analyzed under the rubric of uniformity. One observes this in Aves' criticism of Macmurray.

It is quite clear that Macmurray has no explanation, for example, of relationships with the friendly milkman or postman. More seriously, it is difficult to see that he has much to contribute directly to the moral problems posed by economics and international affairs beyond suggesting they are to serve the personal.

It would appear that Aves views Macmurray as advocating a uniform connotation of personal and that this connotation is one of extreme intimacy. Contrary to his claim that Macmurray has no explanation for the "friendly milkman or postman," it is clear Macmurray does have an explanation. These are direct personal relations. A proper stance exists toward the delivery person in Macmurray's Form of the Personal. The choice is whether to interact with the delivery person as a person who also happens to deliver something (the personal) or as a delivery mechanism that happens to be a person (the

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44 PR, 34-35.  
45 PR, 35. McFadyen has a similar conception of personal and impersonal and refers to situations where the impersonal needs to dominate, temporarily for the sake of the personal, as asymmetry. McFadyen, 147. Yet he is reluctant to privilege direct personal relations over institutional arrangements, even though his argument would seem to move him logically in that direction. McFadyen, 257-58.  
46 Aves, 132.
The first is appropriate, the second is not. Aves seems to be assuming a necessarily deep level of intimacy for personal relations. Similarly, in the paradigmatic examples of indirect relations found in economics and international relations, Macmurray advocates justice as the minimal acceptable standard of behavior. True, justice is not the priority in direct relations, but it is the minimal core of all dealings between persons, which in direct relations is more fully realized in mutuality. Justice is a very powerful concept for change. Macmurray, nonetheless, would argue that it is not the most powerful concept and that the expansion of community is the primary hope. In addition, actions should be guided by the hope of maximizing equality, freedom, and mutuality even in the indirect relations—for there is an element of the personal in all relations. This means that efficiency is no longer the ultimate criterion for judgments about right and wrong action in the economic or international spheres.

From this one is able to see that Macmurray’s categories should not be interpreted as inflexible and invariant. There are acceptable and unacceptable ways in which to interact (directly and indirectly) with all persons and varying degrees of intensity within these acceptable interactions.

The third mistake in interpreting Macmurray’s categories of personal and impersonal is one regarding differentiation. In this error, one believes Macmurray’s position excludes difference in community. Roy is representative of this interpretation when he accuses Macmurray of not being able to incorporate the necessary role of leadership. In certain respects this error may be seen as incorporating the errors of exclusivity and uniformity while going beyond both of them. Because of the importance of this charge, it is necessary to cite Roy at length.

47 See also Macmurray illustration of a friendly stranger stopping to help as an example of personal relations. Cf, 71.
48 See Cf, 40-45 for an extended discussion of the international situation.
Macmurray's analysis lacks realism in not discussing the phenomena of leadership, authority and subtle manipulation that are discernible in such apparent nonfunctional activities as conversations and games. Moreover, he states that, in the domain of work, personal equality is stifled by any hierarchy of functions:

The alternative is a relation between an inferior and a superior; and such a relation excludes friendship. It is a relation of master and servant.

But if personal equality is incompatible with a functional relation during the time of work, how could they be compatible in leisure, given the fact that people cannot provisionally abandon the functional characteristics which define them in society (e.g., being a doctor, a student or a pensioner)? Again, if equality is incompatible with a functional relationship, is it reduced merely to alternate with this functional relationship, as in the case of people who fulfil different jobs in the same office but express their friendship only when work is over? In the fact of these questions, the distinction between the spheres of activity and emphases is relevant.\(^\text{49}\)

First, this must clearly be seen as Roy reading Macmurray dualistically. As seen above, Macmurray does not isolate the two spheres. Second, one must challenge Roy's characterization of the context of his citation of Macmurray. Adding a few preceding lines to the citation Roy offers provides the proper context:

Personal equality does not ignore the natural differences between individuals, nor their functional differences of capacity. It overrides them. It means that any two human beings, whatever their individual differences, can recognize and treat one another as equal, and so be friends. The alternative is a relation between an inferior and a superior; and such a relation excludes friendship. It is a relation of master and servant.\(^\text{50}\)

There is no hint in the quote above or elsewhere in the paragraph that the context of this statement is anything but friendship. In the context of friendship, and with the definitive acknowledgement of personal differences and functions, this citation is stating the exact opposite of what Roy claims—it is showing the integration of the functional into the personal. Third, the example of the non-functional activities misses the point that Macmurray would characterize these manipulations either as non-personal interactions (these are not two friends, but rather game-players), or, if functioning at the personal

\(^{49}\) Roy, Interpersonal Knowledge, 356. This argument is the same as is found in his thesis, Form of the Personal, 113.

\(^{50}\) CF, 73.
level they would be revealed as unreal acts, because they violate the heterocentric nature of personal relations. By manipulating the other person, one is placing oneself ahead of the Other and thus acting egocentrically.

Therefore, in Macmurray's use of personal, impersonal, direct, and indirect relations one must not interpret him as advocating separation, uniformity, or anything less than equality-in-difference for the person as person. Persons are equal. Yet, as Moltmann has noted, to conceive of equality in a non-relational context, one is forced to see the Other only as a limit upon one's own freedom, rather than as that which allows the expression of freedom.51

3.3 FREEDOM

The personal life is the field of freedom.... It means that without freedom there is and can be no personal life at all.52

One must not forget that the Form of the Personal was conceived and articulated in a world where three global conflicts, largely understood in terms of freedom and oppression, were waged. Macmurray is uncomfortable with all of the ideologies involved in these conflicts since he perceives that they all stem from sub-personal understandings of personal relations. He views the first World War as essentially a war over national economic freedom.53 Fascism exhibits a nationalistic and ethnic mysticism where freedom is only gained at the expense of the Other.54 Communism and liberal democracy both share the evolutionary analogy of progress. They differ primarily in communism's collective notion of freedom (at the expense of the individual) and liberal democracy's exaltation of individual freedom to the exclusion of the group.55 Freedom is not possible

51 Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom, 155.
52 RE, 105.
53 CF, 40.
54 CF, 57-62; CH, 217-29.
55 PR, 141-45, 152.
in these anthropologies because they are based in analogies taken from sub-personal levels of reality. Freedom functions on the personal level.\textsuperscript{56}

3.3.1 **Freedom: Action, Power, and Desire**

The capacity to act is freedom.\textsuperscript{57}

If to act is to be free,\textsuperscript{58} and to act necessitates being in relation with Other, then one must ask what the nature of the relationship is between the person and the Other. Macmurray rejects all understandings of freedom as either individualistic independence or passive dependence.\textsuperscript{59} Instead, Macmurray advocates a personal interdependence\textsuperscript{60} which views other persons and the world as a whole are natural and necessary allies in the expression of the self in action.\textsuperscript{61}

Freedom may be understood in a number of ways.\textsuperscript{62} One may consider freedom as the absence of consequences. This, for Macmurray, is tantamount to denying a person their adulthood; only children are excused from the consequences of their action. Denial of consequences is a denial of action itself. Freedom is not the rejection of responsibility,

\textsuperscript{56} As an example of going beyond mere equality, consider Macmurray's opinion that communism seeks freedom through justice alone and therefore subordinates freedom of fellowship to economics. CF, 68.

The fact that Macmurray rejects liberal democracy and communism because they have organic concepts of freedom would seem to indicate that for Macmurray this entire structure of equality, freedom, and mutuality is functioning at the personal level. In other words freedom is of the organic logical form (dialectic) but exists at the personal ontological level. Further adding to this conclusion is the fact that only humans are free because freedom is the capacity to act—action being the sole propriety of persons.

\textsuperscript{57} PR, 98.

\textsuperscript{58} PR, 98; CF, 16.

\textsuperscript{59} CF, 24-30; RE, 135; PR, 118-19, 190.

\textsuperscript{60} PR, 118-19; CF, 27.

\textsuperscript{61} "That my end should be good and my chosen means effective are then conditions of my freedom in action. But they are not sufficient conditions. For I am not alone in the world; there are other agents, and if they will not allow me to do what I desire to do I cannot do it. Moreover, there are few things which I can desire to do, and none that are of personal significance, which do not depend upon the active co-operation of other. We need one another to be ourselves." PR, 211. This last sentence is echoed by Ricoeur's statement: "In this way lack dwells at the heart of the most solid friendship." Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, 187. Emphasis in the original.

\textsuperscript{62} Wright faults Macmurray for using the term freedom in the singular preferring a plurality of freedoms. However, for Macmurray this primary meaning is the one which all other definitions must be tested against. David Wright, review of *Conditions of Freedom*, by John Macmurray, *Philosophical Quarterly* 1, no. 3 (April 1953): 286.
but its embrace. This is why freedom in the personal realm cannot be achieved through obedience to external rule, even if done freely and willingly, because to do so is an attempt to deflect responsibility for action onto someone or something else—it is hiding behind the rules.

Similarly, freedom is not the absence of discipline. Since action is movement integrated with knowledge, all truly free action is disciplined. This is not the discipline of an imposed or punitive authority but rather the guidance provided by experiential interaction with reality. It is a refining of action to its appropriate sphere so that restraint is no longer needed.

Discipline really involves not subordination but integration. It aims at coordinating all the elements in personality and creating a harmonious unity in which they all co-operate freely and without hindrance.

Moreover, this integration goes beyond the confines of the individual. It is also applicable to the coordination of the Self with the Other. And since to be in relation with Other is

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63 "Freedom and responsibility are, then; aspects of one fact." PR, 119. Brunner stresses responsibility in his theological anthropology: "The Christian faith is so utterly simple; it is nothing less than the renewed understanding of the meaning of responsibility." Emil Brunner, Man In Revolt: a Christian Anthropology, trans. Olive Wyon (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1947), 52.

64 "That is why morality cannot consist in obedience. To obey is to try to throw the responsibility for our action on someone else; and that is to deny our own humanity." FMW, 185. Obvious examples of this include the soldier who claims to just be following orders, or the person who refuses to participate in certain activities (smoking, drinking, etc.), not because it is wrong, but because it is against the rules.

65 "The free thought that has unravelled the mysteries of the natural world is not and cannot be undisciplined thought, which is never free. Scientific thought is thought set free to discover what is true and to believe the truth that it discovers, however much it may upset existing opinions. It is disciplined by the world with which it deals, by testing its conclusions against fact. The freedom of our emotional life is to be achieved only on the same conditions; that we set out to discover, through feeling, the real values of our world and of our life in the world. We shall have to submit to the discipline of our feelings, not by authority nor by tradition, but by life itself. It will not guarantee us security or pleasure or happiness or comfort: but it will give us what is more worth having, a slow gradual realization of the goodness of the world and of living in it." FMW, 49.

66 It should never be confused with punishment. RE, 80.

67 RE, 68.

68 RE, 72.

69 RE, 83.

70 "But we must remember that human activity is essentially a co-operation between individuals and that the discipline which will produce a human result must succeed not merely in integrating the various capacities of the individual but in integrating individuals themselves in a community of free co-operation. There are not two separate forms of discipline." RE, 84.
the definition of person, this is simply the desire to be true to our nature as persons.\textsuperscript{71}

Discipline, therefore, is not the opposite of freedom, but rather its skillful actualization.

Just as discipline is the proper incorporation of knowledge in freedom, the emotional aspect of action means that freedom is not an escape from the passions. Rather, the role of the emotions in perceiving value clearly negates the idea that freedom is capriciousness. An arbitrary or random understanding of freedom, where all choices are essentially equivalent, where all options are equally valid and good, ultimately functions to paralyze one's ability to act.\textsuperscript{72} One must believe that some courses of action are better than others for a properly comprehensive understanding of freedom to be developed.

Freedom is greater than mere taste, preference, or impulse.\textsuperscript{73}

In stating, "The free man is the man whose means are adequate to his ends,"\textsuperscript{74} Macmurray is focusing upon two variables in his understanding of freedom. First is the \textit{technical} dimension which is concerned with power and answers the question of capability. Second is the \textit{moral} dimension which focuses upon the desires and asks if it is appropriate or fitting.\textsuperscript{75} It is important to keep in mind that the use of the word moral in this context does not include the connotations of good and evil, for human persons are \textit{free} to act in ways that are both good and evil and this is not determined by the \textit{moral}

\textsuperscript{71} "The longing for discipline of this kind is simply the longing to fulfill one's own nature, the longing for skill and for joy in living." RB, 85. McGill, using Adler's classifications of freedom, places Macmurray within the 1. circumstantial self-realization understanding of freedom, as opposed to 2. self-perfection, 3. self-determination, 4. political liberty (sub-category of self-realization), or 5. collective freedom (sub-category of self-perfection). V. J. McGill, "Conflicting Theories of Freedom," \textit{Philosophy and Phenomenological Research} 20, no. 4 (June 1960): 440.

\textsuperscript{72} FMW, 23-24. This arbitrary model would ultimately require some external decision mechanism in order for any activity to occur, and in addition would require all action to be in response to external stimuli. This is not freedom.

\textsuperscript{73} "To be oneself freely and spontaneously, to realize oneself—that is to be a good man or woman. And if any young listeners think still that that is easy, that it is merely a matter of giving a free rein to your instincts and impulses, I must have expressed myself very badly." FMW, 205-06.

\textsuperscript{74} CF, 21.

\textsuperscript{75} "We can gain freedom by increasing our power while our ends remain constant, or by limiting our ends to the means at our disposal. Let us call these two limitation of freedom the technological and the moral relativities respectively." CF, 21.
relativity of freedom. Moral here is strictly relative to the relation between one's desire and one's capability: can I do what I want to do?

The technical relativity of freedom deals with the question of means; it is the realm of science and is primarily one of instrumentality. The technical aspect of freedom determines the maximum degree of freedom possible. To increase power is to increase freedom. There is no question that the modern era has witnessed an increase in the power available to the modern person, allowing for increased freedom in the realm of travel, communication, and additional areas too numerous to name. Macmurray is no Luddite. He gratefully acknowledges the advances made in the technical arena and the fact that this has increased human freedom. Yet, he also recognizes that science has no ability to adjudicate between competing uses of this increase in power. In other words, with so much power available how does one decide what to do and when? When one questions relative value in order to determine which acts are to be pursued, one must look to desire which is the moral relativity of freedom.

The crucial concept that one must grasp when considering the moral limitation of freedom is that there is no infringement upon freedom if one cannot do what one does not want to do. For example, the practice of restricting children to their room as punishment for misbehavior is very effective for children who desire to roam and socialize widely. But for children with no such desires, who naturally gravitate toward their rooms, it is no

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66 CF, 33.
77 This is possibly one reason for the increase of stress in modern life. As the technical dimension has increased there is a greater number of desires which are possible requiring the need to judge between competing goods—all with the realization that a choice for one means the neglect of a myriad of other possible goods. The moral dimension has not developed as quickly as the technical dimension.
76 “When we approach our question in this attitude, we notice that the relativity of our freedom depends, clearly, upon our power to do what we desire to do, so that an increase in our power will mean an increase in our freedom. But our freedom also depends upon what we want to do. For it is no limitation upon a man’s freedom that he has not the power to do something that he has no desire to do. We can increase our freedom, therefore, by limiting our desires, without any change in the means of action at our disposal.” CF, 21.
punishment whatsoever. Their freedom has not been impinged in the slightest because their desires have not been frustrated. To be able to do what one desires is freedom.

It may be helpful to think of freedom as a mapping function with the technical variable being found on the x-axis and the moral variable being on the y-axis. Thus for a certain capability x, there is a corresponding desire y determined by the function f(x)=y (Figure 3.2). The function is always of a positive slope (because an increase in power is always an increase in freedom) and freedom exists only along the line of the function. The function of freedom itself is determined by objective reality. It is reality which provides us with the knowledge of what is and is not possible.

Figure 3.2. Technical and Moral Relativities of Freedom

An increase of technology is an upward movement along the line and therefore a straightforward increase of freedom (Figure 3.3). Counter-intuitively, a decrease along the moral axis results in an increase in freedom if current desire is beyond one’s ability. Desire lacking adequate technology is fantasy; it is imaginary (that is, above the line of reality) and as imaginary has a value less than zero. By decreasing desire one returns to reality and consequently one experiences an increase in freedom (Figure 3.4). One’s knowledge of the Other (the objective reality) enables one to correctly discern the difference between fantasy and reality.
Since freedom is a function of power and desire, it is clear that the concept of freedom as the absence of boundaries is nonsensical. Freedom has limits and these limits are dictated by reality. As described in Chapter 2, reality is a complex and multifaceted term for Macmurray including both creation and ultimate Reality which is the personal God. Since freedom is bound by the limits of reality, it is only natural to question how reality interacts with freedom. In particular, if one focuses upon what is real, does this not imply determinism, either of a scientific or religious nature?

3.3.2 REALITY OF FREEDOM: DETERMINISM, FREEWILL, AND THE PERSONAL GOD

When we insist on the primacy of the practical, and adopt the standpoint of the Agent, rather than of the Subject, the antinomy between freedom and determinism vanishes.\(^8\)

\(^7\) CH, 133.
\(^8\) SA, 134.
Whether observed in the conflict between Calvinists and Arminians, the battle among psychologists of the behavioral and psychoanalytical camps, or the questions raised by investigation of the human genome, the question of freedom’s possibility is still unsettled. For Macmurray it is not whether freewill or determinism exists in the personal life, but rather understanding which is the proper purview of freewill and determinism. Macmurray acknowledges the existence of each and sees no basic incompatibility between freedom and determinism. Rather, he sees freedom as pertaining to the realm of the personal, while determinism applies to the world of objects. Macmurray believes that there are two types or levels of (generalized reflective) knowledge about persons—that of persons as persons which is philosophical in form and that of persons as objects which is scientific.

Starting from the definition of the person as relational agent instead of isolated thinker it becomes a logically formal necessity for freedom to exist within Macmurray’s system. Macmurray follows Kant in believing that freedom is a necessary belief and further demonstrates that it is self-defeating to even assert the lack of freedom. Yet

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81 "These tentative observation are sufficient for our immediate purpose, which is to distinguish, and in distinguishing to relate, the two types of knowledge we possess, and may seek systematically to extend, of the world of persons. The one is our knowledge of persons as persons; the other our knowledge of persons as objects.... In the first case, when the attitude is personal, this reflective activity will be philosophical. In the other it will be scientific. The first will yield a philosophy of the personal; the second a science of man, or in the wide sense of the term, an anthropology. We can no see that the question whether the personal conception of men as free agents or the scientific conception of man as a determined being is the correct one does not arise except though a misunderstanding. Both are correct; and this is possible because they do not refer to the same field." PR, 37-38. Keeping in mind that philosophy is the negative of religion in the personal unity-pattern.

82 "This analysis has certain important implications. The first concerns the conception traditionally termed 'free-will', and its negation, 'determinism'. To possess free-will is simply to be able to determine the indeterminate, that is, the future. We can now see that this is implied in the very conception of action. The Agent is the determiner. To deny free-will is to deny the possibility of action. We have already established, as a negative criterion of truth, that any theory which denies the possibility of action is false. That I am free is an immediate implication of the 'I do'; and to deny freedom is to assert that no one ever does anything, that no one is capable even of thinking or of observing." SA, 134.

83 SA, 57.

84 "Because the 'I do' is our primary certainty, it is impossible to think that all our actions are merely events which happened, and which must be ascribed to causes, not to intention. To think this would be to think that the world is a complex process of events in time, which is informed by no intention and is, therefore, completely meaningless. But this process includes ourselves and all our activities, and as parts of the process they too must be taken strictly: it must mean that we never act; that we cannot form an intention and
while the person as agent necessitates the existence of freedom, it equally requires the fact of a certain sort and level of determination.

If the self is an agent then the self functions as a determiner of the future.\textsuperscript{85} Therefore, once an action occurs in time it has been determined. The past is the field of the determined while the future is the field of freedom; it is only when determinism is moved from the past into the future, that it is false.\textsuperscript{86} As discussed above, science is concerned with the generalization of the determined—with facts. Therefore, one is able to see that scientific determinism does not negate personal freedom, although it might inform it.\textsuperscript{87}

While scientific determinism may be understood as functioning at a sub-personal level, one cannot assign God’s actions to a sub-personal level within the Form of the Personal. The full discussion of Macmurray’s concept of God is the focus of Chapter 4, however, it is important to consider certain aspects of it as it relates to human freedom. If Macmurray sees God as the ultimate or absolute person, how then does human freedom square with divine freedom, understood as ultimate or absolute freedom?

There can be nothing in the world which is capable of thwarting the purpose of the Creator. The will of God must prevail. This means that though man can set his will against God’s—since God has made him so—he cannot do it successfully. In

\footnotesize{seek to realize it; that nothing that we do or say or think is, or can be, meaningful. All our freedom, theoretical as well as practical, must be an illusion. In that case, we cannot know that the world is a process of events, for nothing that we say can be meaningful. And this is self-contradictory; for if it were true we could not know that it was true; indeed, we should be creatures who could not even provide an asylum for illusions.” PR, 222. “When we return to action we turn to the future, away from what exists, from what is determined, from what is unalterable. The future is the field of freedom, and when we act, we determine the future. For to act is to determine, and the agent is the determiner. To assert determination and deny freedom is to assert that we never act; that no man ever, in very truth, does anything; and the assertion that our actions are determined is itself an exercise of freedom which denies itself.” CF, 17.

\textsuperscript{85} SA, 134; PR, 166.
\textsuperscript{86} SA, 135; CF, 17.
\textsuperscript{87} This is contra Brunner’s more extreme existential position. “Indeed, we may say that to-day the denial of human freedom by a naturalistic determinism is far more characteristic of the present ‘spirit of the age’ than the humanistic theory of freedom. … To-day our slogan must be: No determinism, on any account! For it makes all understanding of man as man impossible.” Brunner, \textit{Man in Revolt}, 256-57. This is due, in part, to Brunner’s equation of the person with the subject (e.g., Brunner, \textit{Man in Revolt}, 411), which then forces the dualism of freedom and determinism. See SA, 134.}
the end he must capitulate to ‘that of God in him’, which is his inmost nature, his own reality demanding its realization.88

In recognizing that reality flows out of the nature of the object, the nature of the object that is the human person must be understood. It has already been noted in §2.3.4 that one of the elements of the nature of persons is to act in accordance with the nature of the Other. This is true for all persons, both human and divine. But human persons have an additional aspect to their nature: human beings are creatures—created by a personal God and are therefore dependent and limited.89 This dependence and limitation does not negate freedom, it enables it. As demonstrated earlier, humans can only act as they are interdependent with the world and other persons (the Other); therefore, persons can be interdependent without a loss of freedom. Consequently, humans can be dependent and yet still able to determine the future in harmony with God who, as the ultimate person, is the ultimate determiner.90 The goal of God is the realization of a personal community with humanity.91 Yet, there is a gap between the ideal of human nature and its actualization. This is Macmurray’s definition of sin—human intentions not in harmony with God and thus ultimately set against its own self-realization.92 God responds to sin

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88 SRR, 45.
89 “Until we recover our sense of proportion, until we recognize our creaturiness and our dependence, we shall continue to frustrate our freedom by desiring what we cannot attain, and by using our resources for our own destruction. Humility is the handmaid of freedom. It is the meek who inherit the earth.... Human freedom can be realized only as the freedom of individuals in relation; and the freedom of each of us is relative to that of the others. Man is dependent upon the world, of which he is a part; but every man is even more intimately dependent upon his fellows in the interrelation of men which constitutes human society.” CF, 24.
90 “There is, then, only one way in which we can think our relation to the world, and that is to think it as a personal relation, through the form of the personal. We must think that the world is one action, and that its impersonal aspect is the negative aspect of this unity of action, contained in it, subordinated within it, and necessary to its constitution. To conceive the world thus is to conceive it as the act of God, the Creator of the world, and ourselves as created agents, with a limited and dependent freedom to determine the future, which can be realized only on the condition that our intentions are in harmony with His intention, and which must frustrate itself if they are not.” PR, 222.
91 “The purpose of God is the establishing of a permanent co-operative fellowship between Man and Himself, which must be achieved with full human consent; and the corollary of this is the restoration of a universal community of mankind by doing away with the enmity between man and man.” SRR, 45-46.
92 “At once we face the problem of evil—not the problem of ignorance, as in the thought of Socrates or Plato. God made the world and saw that it was good. But it isn’t. How can this be? It can be because man, made in the image of God, has the freedom to create and seek to realize his one intention. These intentions may be incompatible with the divine intention in his creation. Evil then is sin and sin is a personal conflict
through ongoing activity in history to achieve his purposes interactively with creation in spite of and in conjunction with human resistance. One thinks of the interaction between a skillful and knowledgeable public speaker who is being heckled by a member of the audience. Despite the detractor’s best efforts to disrupt and despoil, the speaker co-opts the opponent’s words and actions in such a way as to create an even more convincing presentation without infringing on the heckler’s freedom.

One must also take into account the fact of personal equality-in-diversity when discussing human freedom. Among human persons a diversity of particular persons was acknowledged. This diversity does not necessarily, although it may, impinge on a person’s freedom. Yet among human persons there are those with greater knowledge and capability and are thus more able to determine the future than are those with less knowledge and capability. The one does not make the other any less free. God, being omniscient, has ultimate knowledge, and, being omnipotent has infinite skill; therefore he is the ultimate determiner. This does not violate human freedom but it does place it in a relative position. Just as human persons exist freely in an interdependent state with reality, so persons may exist in an interdependent state with Ultimate Reality, the personal God, and retain their freedom.

Freedom, then, is the capacity to determine the future by integrating power and desire in conformity to reality. In short, freedom is the possibility of participating with God in the realization of the universe.

of wills. Since religion is about community, a clash of wills between men and God must express itself in the breaking of community—as a clash of wills between men and man. Indeed since the purpose of God for man is man’s true nature, in being at enmity with God he is at odds with himself." SRR, 44-45. See also SRE, 49.

93 "The second part of the answer then is that the divine creation is continuing. It goes on. God did not become a sleeping partner with the creation of Man. If Man has set his will against God’s (as he clearly has) the purpose of God still stands and must be realized. In the recognition of the Fall there is already the promise of a redemption. And to see this is to discover history, as the Hebrews did, and with it a religious interpretation of history as the work of God for the salvation of the world, in spite of and even through the opposition of human wills." SRR, 46.

94 The question of God’s interdependence will be raised in Chapter 4.
3.4 MUTUALITY

The primary difference in the relation of persons to persons which distinguishes it *toto caelo* from the other types of relationship is mutuality.\(^5\)

Mutuality, that active reciprocating fellowship which exists between friends,\(^6\) occupies the center of Macmurray's concept of the person and acts as an integrating whole within which equality and freedom operate and find their meaning. It is the essential aspect of personhood. Because mutuality is a personal action, it may be analyzed in terms of Macmurray's apperceptive triad, resulting in knowing (pragmatic), loving (contemplative), and communing (communal).

3.4.1 PERSONAL KNOWING

All meaningful knowledge is for the sake of action, and all action is for the sake of friendship.\(^7\)

Personal knowledge focuses as much as humanly possible on the objective nature of the other person (the *I*) while minimizing the self (the *I*). As one attempts to analyze the other person, a realization is forced upon the observer. There is a limit to the ability of any person to know another person based solely upon observation. It requires revelation by the Other to flesh out the external observations. Even if one could distinguish between action and event through observation, one must still enquire regarding the rationale for the actions. This communication is necessary—itself an activity requiring mutuality—in order to even know that the Other is personal, in order to determine if the Other acts, and if so, why.\(^8\) Self-knowledge is also dependent upon the revelation of others.\(^9\) Therefore

\(^5\) RE, 205.
\(^6\) "Personality is essentially mutual. It is only in relationships between itself and another person that the self can exist at all." RE, 222. "To complete this exposition of first principles we must add that the essential condition for realizing fellowship is a mutual reciprocity. CF, 82.

For an extended discussion of friendship with several similarities to Macmurray's see Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, 182-94.

\(^7\) SA, 16 (US edition; SA, 15 British edition).

\(^8\) "All knowledge of persons is by revelation." PR, 169. "But a being who can pretend to be what he is not, to think what he does not think, and to feel what he does not feel, cannot be known by generalization from his observed behavior, but only as he genuinely reveals himself." PR, 169. "All that we mean by it ['revelation'] is that man does not learn without a word from another person. Man does not think himself
personal knowledge is always relational requiring mutuality in order for it to move
towards fruition. Knowledge is a function of community.

But knowledge is not a transcendental construct of the community, somehow
arbitrary and fantastic. For Macmurray, knowledge is always regulated by the reality of
the commonly perceived world and leads to a community of knowledge or community of
truth which codifies this knowledge into the symbolic language of the community. A
given community's knowledge of the world and themselves may be true or false, more or
less real. This of course reflects Macmurray's epistemology and his understanding of the
intentional stance towards the reality of the Other. Knowledge is always a particular
person's knowledge (otherwise it is merely information) and particular persons are
always in one or more communities. Thus personal knowledge is shaped by the
community, but each person has their own knowledge which is distinct, based upon their
unique experiences and understandings of those symbols.

Personal knowledge is essential to mutuality; without it there can be no
community. But it is the negative, pragmatic aspect of mutuality, the It of friendship. One

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100 Leland J. White, “John
Macmurray: Theology as Philosophy,” Scottish Journal of Theology 26 (Nov.

101 “For the knowledge of one another, and so of ourselves, can be realized only through mutual self-
revelation; and this is possible only when we love one another. If we fear one another we must defend and
hide ourselves.” PR, 212.

102 Without getting ahead of the argument, one sees here that revelation is necessary for personal
knowledge, yet this personal knowledge is not an end in itself for it serves the purposes of communion. See
Stephen N. Williams, Revelation and Reconciliation: A Window on Modernity, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1995) who argue modernity's obsession with revelation has missed the larger categorical
importance of reconciliation (i.e., the restoration of community).

103 “One other aspect of this self-transcendence in knowledge is important for our purpose. It is the fact that
if we are to think truly we have all to think the same thing. Knowledge is common. There is only one
common world, and the truth about it is valid for all alike. Though each of us must think his own thoughts
for himself, so far as we think truly we are bound in a community of knowledge, and there is one world for
all of us. Thought realizes itself in the community of truth.” CF, 77.

104 PR, 162.

105 Kirpatick comments that communitarians, such as MacIntyre, have difficulty in providing sufficient
distance between the individual and the community to allow for such things as critique. Frank G.
Kirpatick, “Public and Private: The Search for a Political Philosophy that does Justice to Both without
Excluding Love,” in The Life and Work of John Macmurray Conference Proceedings, (University of
must also consider the contemplative aspect of mutuality, love. “My knowledge of another person is a function of my love for him.”¹⁰⁴

3.4.2 PERSONAL LOVING

For the knowledge of one another, and so ourselves, can be realized only through a mutual self-revelation; and this is possible only when we love one another.¹⁰⁵

In order to discuss love, it is helpful to consider the general question of the emotions in the Form of the Personal. Where art is emotional reflection, the discussion here is concentrated upon the emotions themselves.

Emotions are the means by which one values the Other.¹⁰⁶ Emotions are neither merely sensory data nor physiological reactions, although they may have physiological effects. As previously mentioned in the discussion of withdrawal and return in the parent-child relationship, Macmurray discerns three foundational emotions: love, fear, and hate, which correspond with viewing the other person in terms of someone to be in relation with (I-You), someone who can affect me (I-It), or someone who I can use (It).¹⁰⁷ It is from this triad that all of the rest of the emotions may be considered, as well as valuations directed at other objects which exist solely at the biological or material level.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁴ PR, 170.
¹⁰⁵ PR, 212.
¹⁰⁶ The discussion of value highlights a pitfall to avoid in interpreting Macmurray. Because emotions are valuation, and the reflective activity of art is constituted by modes of valuation, there is great potential for confusion in this area because the connection is so intimate (see RE, 31, 36, 58-59). The primary topic is emotion, but since we are reflecting upon emotions we shall naturally be forced into considerations of art, which is reflection upon value, and the modes of valuation (morality, aesthetics, and efficiency). Several commentators have been confused by the seeming conflation of these areas. Also it should be noted again that, as is typical with Macmurray, he sees the primary issue as the valuation of persons and then by a system of reduction applies the valuation to the non-personal realms (organic and substantial).
¹⁰⁷ Earlier writings tended to distinguish between fear, as a motive (or emotion) and animal type reactions. CP, 79-80. However it is not clear that this distinction was maintained by Macmurray in his later writings. Berry is correct to understand fear as used by Macmurray to be roughly akin to anxiety. Berry, 233. See also Brunner, Man in Revolt, 195.
¹⁰⁸ These emotions change naturally when the self evaluates different objects at different levels of intention. Therefore it is possible to evaluate a person as beautiful (aesthetics) or useful (efficiency) but a person must not be evaluated ultimately from either the contemplative or pragmatic perspective. Macmurray never explicitly states the relation of the three primary emotions to the others, but it would be consistent with his modus operandi to see them functioning as negatives and positives. The question here hinges on the understanding of Macmurray’s schematic of consciousness. If one considers the labeling of touch as the minimum objective feeling/sensation then it would seem to imply that the emotions, which undergird the
Because emotions have referents any particular emotion may be categorized as either real or unreal.\textsuperscript{109} This directly conflicts with emotivist and projectionist theories which assert that feelings are mere creations or preferences of the individual as well as those hypotheses which regard emotions as uncontrollable impulses. Under normal circumstances, to be afraid of a mouse is an unreal fear—the emotion does not correspond to the actuality or reality of the situation.\textsuperscript{110} This is not to say that fear is inherently “wrong” or unreal—there may be incidents when fear is the most real emotion—only that it might be unreal in a given context.\textsuperscript{111} When, for instance, fear comes characteristically to dominate love as a person’s habitual stance toward Others it becomes unreal. Fear should exist only for the sake of the positive emotion of love, enabling the continued existence of the person so he or she may continue to love.\textsuperscript{112} Fear, hatred, and love may all be real or unreal depending upon the circumstances of the situation.

It should be noted that the priority Macmurray places on love and the importance of overcoming fear does not mean that he does not believe in the reality of suffering—that one should not fear because there is nothing to fear. Instead he holds that one must subsume fear, even legitimate fear, to the overall motive of love.

\textsuperscript{109} RAS, 35-36. Yet there is a difference between the subjective motive of \textit{I like} and the objective motive of \textit{it is good}: “My feeling must really be for the object, and the process must be an effort to know and enjoy the object and not to enjoy myself by means of the object. This is the essence of emotional self-transcendence, or, if you will, emotional ‘objectivity.’” RAS, 38. Also: “The dichotomy which governs religious experience is one between real and unreal. This is not identical with the intellectual distinction between true and false; nor with the aesthetic distinction between what satisfies or does not satisfy our emotions, even if it is related to these. For it is possible for us to have a real religious experience coupled with religious beliefs and practices which are fallacious and undesirable; or to hold sincerely and convinced to religious belief and practices with no reality to sustain them.” SRR, 9.

\textsuperscript{110} Although it must be acknowledged that there might be extraordinary circumstances when one should fear a mouse: if it is carrying either a highly infectious disease or a small nuclear device.

\textsuperscript{111} CF, 80. The existence of unreal fear is clearly seen in the diagnosis and treatment of phobias. If these fears were not unreal there would be no diagnosis; if they were unchangeable or uncontrollable there would be no successful treatment.

\textsuperscript{112} See Roy’s truly bewildering exposition of Macmurray’s position where he first claims Macmurray does not, then demonstrates that he does, in fact subordinate fear to love. Roy, Form of the Personal, 197-201.
All religion, as we have seen, is concerned to overcome fear. We can distinguish real religion from unreal by contrasting their formulae for dealing with negative motivation. The maxim of illusory religion runs: 'Fear not; trust in God and He will see that none of the things you fear will happen to you'; that of real religion, on the contrary, is ‘Fear not; the things that you are afraid of are quite likely to happen to you, but they are nothing to be afraid of.'

Although Macmurray does not directly speak to the issue of suffering as such, it is possible to see how suffering is contained within the broader construct of love and fear. A more explicit discussion of suffering would greatly increase the theological application of the Form of the Personal. However, there does not appear to be any impediment to augmenting him at this point with treatments such as those found in Ricoeur and Moltmann.114

Just as education is necessary in developing intellectual honesty (the correspondence of one’s factual representation of the Other), so too the need for cultivating emotional sincerity or chastity (the correspondence of one’s valuation of the Other).115 Educating the emotions is of vital importance to proper personal maturation, yet the academy is traditionally reluctant to address the emotions within the standard curriculum.116

Emotion is an essential aspect of all action. Actions are delimited by an agent’s feelings — emotions — of dissatisfaction (negative) and satisfaction (positive). This feeling provides the necessary motive for action because mere awareness provides no ground for

113 PR, 171. Notice the close conceptual parallels between this and Luke 12.4-5.
114 “Suffering reaches as far as love itself, and love grows through the suffering it experiences—that is the signpost that points to true life.” Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom, 52. See also Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom, 23-25, 47-52; Jürgen Moltmann, The Way of Jesus Christ: Christology in Messianic Dimensions, trans. Margaret Kohl (London: SCM, 1990), 172-78. Also see Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, 190-91.
115 For the general discussion see RE, 126-33. Macmurray also refers to emotional sincerity as chastity (which he contrasts to romantic sentimentalism) and sees two different ways that one can be emotionally insincere: either by expressing an emotion one does not feel or by failing to express an emotion that would be important to the Other (RE, 129).
116 Macmurray notes that art, which is the expression of value, when dealt with in an academic environment, typically devolves into facts about art, rather than the emotional development that he is talking about, e.g., RE, 74. See also McIntosh for an account of Macmurray’s understanding of the emotions integrated with Danil Goleman’s concept of Emotional Intelligence.
Feeling referred to an object is valuation and its most general discrimination is accepting or rejecting the possibility of any particular action. However, emotion or its reflective counter-part, art, cannot cause action:

Art is concerned, however, with the exhibition of values, and, therefore, in relation to action, with the choice of ends. It cannot, however, affect action by the provision of rules; if only because the choice of ends is a matter of intuition and feeling, not of discursive thought. If art is to function in the development and improvement of primary activity, it must be by its effects upon our capacity for sensuous and emotional discrimination. The practical function of art is, therefore, the refinement of sensibility.

Emotions, then, are absolutely essential to the person, although they are not the totality of the person, and the development of the emotions is a key aspect of personal development.

Love, according to Macmurray, is one of the three basic emotions along with fear and hatred and is "the name we give to the motive which creates and sustains friendship, and all the forms of human fellowship." Love is not sexuality (a category mistake of applying the biological instead of the personal) nor is it some "vague affection for some imaginary human totality."
Rather, love is heterocentric, "the complete affirmation of the other by the self."\(^\text{123}\)

Love is self-negation\(^\text{124}\) or self-transcendence\(^\text{125}\) for the sake of the concrete Other.\(^\text{126}\) It is being ourselves for the Other.\(^\text{127}\) Love carried to its ideal heterocentric limit would result in the "realization of the self through a complete self-transcendence."\(^\text{128}\)

Speidell raises a concern regarding the idea of self-negation found in Macmurray's notion of the heterocentric nature of personal relations. Quoting Macmurray as saying, "I am nothing and you are everything,"\(^\text{129}\) Speidell sees Macmurray encouraging a loss of self into some Buddhistic nothingness.\(^\text{130}\)

As is often the case, Speidell's misunderstanding stems from a dualistic understanding of Macmurray's philosophy. In Personal logic negation does not mean nothingness, but the negative which gives shape to the positive. There is no loss of personal identity in the Form of the Personal, for to lose the I eradicates the possibility of true heterocentric action towards the Other.

\(^{123}\) Cf, 82. While love is heterocentric, fear and hatred are egocentric. FMW, 55; PR, 122-23. McFadyen argues for a centered self, centered in its orientation towards others. McFadyen, 40.

\(^{124}\) "In ourselves we are nothing; and when we turn our eyes inward in search of ourselves we find a vacuum. Being nothing in ourselves, we have no value in ourselves, and are of no importance whatever, wholly without meaning or significance. It is only in relation to others that we exist as persons; we are invested with significance by others who have need of us; and borrow our reality from those who care for us. We live and move and have our being not in ourselves but in one another, and what rights or powers or freedom we possess are ours by the grace and favour of our fellows. Here is the basic fact of our human condition; which all of us can know if we stop pretending, and do know in moments when the veil of self-deception is stripped from us and we are forced to look upon our own nakedness." PR, 211. Again, compare with Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, 187.

\(^{125}\) SA, 96.

\(^{126}\) "Love, as the positive ground-motive of personal activity, can best be defined as the capacity for self-transcendence, or the capacity to care for the other. Love is for the other; fear is for the self. In actual experience, of course, both motives are operative together; and either may dominate the other. Where fear is dominant, the self becomes the centre of reference, and all commerce with the external world is for the sake of the self. Conversely, when love is dominant, the centre of reference lies outside the self, and the activities of the personal life are for the sake of the other." CF, 80.

\(^{127}\) FMW, 202-03. This resonates well with the distinction A. Torrance notes in Barth and Zizioulas between freedom with others (biological) and freedom for others (ecclesial in Zizioulas' terminology). Torrance, *Persons in Communion*, 184. Jeffko observes that Macmurray completely rejects the notion of self-love as the basis of love for others—self-love only exists as the negative, derivative, of positive love for others. Jeffko, 157-59.

\(^{128}\) Cf, 82.


\(^{130}\) "Christ alone has healed the sinful preoccupation with selfhood to liberate—not negate—the self for God and others." Speidell, 296-97.
The full realization of the moral intention can only be reached in a relation between two persons in which each cares wholly for the other, and for himself only for the sake of the other.... In the relation of the two agents, this means that each remains himself and differentiated from the other; there must be no self-identification of one with the other, or the reciprocity will be lost and the heterocentricity of the relation will be only apparent.\textsuperscript{131}

In short Macmurray's conception of the heterocentric person is an ontological status of relatedness which involves no loss of personal identity, but which is expressed and developed in and through actual relations—ideally a heterocentric reciprocating mutual love.\textsuperscript{132}

This personal loving is of greater importance than personal knowing, yet neither can exist independently of the other, for in order to love others one must know them. Love, following the standard form of Personal logic, is constituted by knowledge; and knowledge cannot exist apart from the emotions.

It is one of the traditions of philosophy that the differentia of human nature is Reason. We have discovered now that it is Love, as the capacity for self-transcendence, which is the defining character of the personal. What, then, is the relation between the two?... But the essential point, which belongs to the substance of the issue, is to realize that our capacity for knowledge is a particular and limited expression of our capacity for self-transcendence. The rationality of thought is its objectivity, and the motive which sustains this objectivity in our thinking is our interest in the object for its own sake, which alone can shape our ideas to the nature of the object instead of to the nature of our own desires. To seek the truth is, in fact, to care for the nature of the object, within the limits of our intention to know it.\textsuperscript{133}

\textsuperscript{131} PR, 189. Compare with Brunner, "God has created the self for self-existence in community, as a non-self-sufficient self, which ought not to exist for itself, and cannot exist for itself. This is why God gives us such individuality which forces us to depend upon one another that we may complement each other." Brunner, \textit{Man in Revolt}, 323.

\textsuperscript{132} Kirkpatrick states the following in response to this possible misunderstanding of Macmurray. "Some people are apt to read Macmurray as if he wants to merge persons into each other or at least to have them relate to each other as if individual differences are either to be overcome or subsumed in what he calls heterocentric love for the other. This can lead to a romantic reading of Macmurray, drawing upon images of love in which the beloved becomes one with the lover. Macmurray himself may have given rise to this misinterpretation of his own work: when he talks about the goal of personal community being one in which each cares for all the others and no one for himself he seems to be saying that one should literally sacrifice his 'self', his very 'person', to the Other. But this is, I think, a misreading and can be corrected only by a fuller exploration of how Macmurray understands our relationships not just at the deeply mutual level, but at the political, impersonal, or societal level as well, a level he never disparages even while attempting to relate it instrumentally to the deeper mutual level." Kirkpatrick, Public and Private, 5-6. Bakhtin's holds a similar belief that individuation is necessary within unity, cited in Dixon, 181-83.

\textsuperscript{133} CF, 81.
However, neither knowledge nor love is the apex, the full realization, of mutuality. Personal loving has as its positive the interactive dimension of integrated personal communing.

### 3.4.3 Personal Communing

The relationship between persons constitutes their individual personality, and this mutuality of the personal is the basic fact of religion. It is what is expressed by religion in the statement that ‘God is Love’. Personality is essentially friendship or the communion of persons.\(^\text{134}\)

In this statement one sees how love (and therefore knowledge) is caught up into the fully mutual field of communing between persons\(^\text{135}\) understood as religion. One of the great strengths of Macmurray’s entire project from the theological point of view is the prominence given to religion and the manner in which it is related to all aspects of human life.\(^\text{136}\) For Macmurray, religion is reflection on the consciousness of the community of persons,\(^\text{137}\) or the celebration of communion,\(^\text{138}\) and as such it is a human activity.\(^\text{139}\) The very language used in the definition indicates its \textit{a posteriori} relationship with personal experience in the pre-existing community.\(^\text{140}\)

\(^{134}\) RE, 222-23. Biblical reference is 1 John 4.16.

\(^{135}\) When Brunner uses the term \textit{love} he has in mind this active mutuality. "Love is the unity of willing, knowing and feeling, the sole total act of the person." Brunner, \textit{Man in Revolt}, 220. Furthermore, when Brunner discards friendship as a basis of community, in favor of love, he is discarding the Greek notion of friendship with its exclusivity and relative valuation of the Other. Brunner, \textit{Man in Revolt}, 290.

\(^{136}\) Hoffman believes that a strength of Macmurray is "the attempt to set religion within the total context of human experience." Hoffman, 2.

\(^{137}\) Macmurray includes four main observations within his general theory of religion: (1) universality of religion in human society; (2) no analogue of religion even in the highest form of animal life; (3) historically, religion is the matrix from which the rest of culture has crystallized; (4) its intention is inclusive, and depends on active co-operation to constitute it. PR, 156.

\(^{138}\) "Religion, we shall say, is the reflective activity which expresses the consciousness of community; or more tersely, religion is the celebration of communion." PR, 162. See also CF, 85-86.

\(^{139}\) "We are concerned, therefore, with religion as a form of reflective activity, and with its origin in the structure of universal human experience. We are not concerned with its particular expressions in this religion or that, but with religion as such, as something people do, as a human activity." PR, 151. Also "Religion in development is man in search of God throughout history, building into a fuller religious life the experience of the past. But religion is also the consciousness of life in God; that which we seek for is also there always and eternally in us. It is this eternal aspect of religion which is expressed in the religious recognition of equality in all human life at any stage of its development; in the knowledge that all distinctions; and that ultimately all persons and all personal experience are of equal, because of eternal or infinite, worth." RE, 231.

\(^{140}\) "Religion, as a mode of reflection, is concerned with the knowledge of the personal Other. The data for such reflection are our experiences of personal relationship." PR, 168. "All religion, I believe, rests on the
Fellowship, that is a community of persons related as persons, is the expression of human nature.\(^{141}\) Therefore the only way one can be real and true to what one is as a person is in friendship,\(^{142}\) which is a form of active self-transcendence. Community cannot be created by decree, force,\(^{143}\) or organization.\(^{144}\) It is not functionally related around a task although it can express itself through common tasks.\(^{145}\) It is not to be confused with sub-personal forms of association such as society or the State. Community cannot be achieved through politics but only by religion.\(^{146}\)

Communing, as the highest aspect of mutuality, exists at the fully personal level and therefore using the rules of Personal logic it may also be viewed by the various apperceptions.\(^{147}\) In Figure 3.5, one sees the apperceptions applied in two different ways. Along the top one sees the types or modes of communion—Magical/Technical representing the pragmatic form of communion, the Mystical/Escapist representing the experience of the presence of God. This experience manifests itself in feelings of awe and in self-abasement, but it does not reveal the nature of God, only his majesty and power. This is why there is such variety in the conception of God in different religions." SRR, 53.

\(^{141}\) "Man cannot be man 'by himself'; he can only be man in community. For love can only operate in community, and only in this operation of love is man human." Brunner, *Man in Revolt*, 106.

\(^{142}\) CF, 74.

\(^{143}\) The second constitutive principle of friendship is *freedom*. This means, in the first place that the unity between friends cannot be imposed. It can neither be established nor maintained by force. It is entirely, and throughout its whole duration, dependent upon the free activity of the persons concerned. It means, in the second place, that it provides for a complete self-expression and self-revelation which is mutual and unconstrained." CF, 73.

\(^{144}\) "It follows from this that a community cannot be brought into existence by organization. It is not functional. It is not organic. Its principle of unity is personal. It is constituted by the sharing of a common life." CF, 56.

\(^{145}\) "Thus, though the members [of a society] are persons, and the group is an association of persons, the members are not associated *as persons*, but only in virtue of the specific functions they perform in relation to the purpose which constitutes the group; and the society is an organic unity, not a personal one. This organic, functional, impersonal character remains even where the common purpose is necessary and permanent.... A community, on the other hand, rests upon a different principle of unity. It is not constituted by a common purpose. No doubt its members will share common purposes and co-operate for their realization. But these common purposes merely *express*, they do not *constitute* the unity of the association; for they can be changed freely without any effect upon the unity of the group. Indeed it is characteristic of communities that they create common purposes for the sake of co-operation instead of creating co-operation for the sake of common purposes." CF, 55.

\(^{146}\) "Freedom, equality and brotherhood are religious ends. To make them political objectives is to make sure of disillusion and disaster; The State is incapable of realizing them; its business is only with justice, so far as justice can be secured by law." SRR, 79.

\(^{147}\) Remembering the basic cube of the Form of the Personal it is unclear whether one should nest these various apperceptions within religion, or simply consider it to be a different abstraction of the same cube. One leans towards a nesting, however.
contemplative form of communion, and the Integral representing the communal-integrating form of communion. These, one will recall from the graphic of the Form of the Personal, are the modes of religion abstracted according to the R axis.

![Diagram of Religion Types]

**Figure 3.5. Communion, Ritual, Doctrine**

Macmurray also abstracts these ontologically and derives doctrine (the pragmatic, analytic form) and ritual (the contemplative, dialectic form)—both of which must be integrated in communal action.  

The technical, or magical, mode of religion focuses upon religion's instrumental aspect. It is a form of spiritual technology oriented towards control. It is pragmatic in orientation and therefore aggressive in stance. The mystical, or escapist, mode of religion is concerned with the **spiritual**, other-worldly aspects of religion. Since it is contemplative

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146 PR, 171-72.

149 "Religion, therefore, has two aspects, ritual and doctrine. The first is aesthetic in form, the second scientific. Of the two aspects, the aesthetic is the positive and primary, since it is valuational, and refers to the intention of action; the scientific is secondary and negative, since the means presupposes the end. These
in method it will tend towards idealism and withdrawal from the matters of this world.

Integral religion, alternatively, is the integration of these two in communal action.

The problematic of religion, then, is in terms of the distinction between reality and unreality in the relation of persons. For this reason the primary demand of religion is for a personal integrity. Integrity here is not a general term for moral goodness: it means specifically a way of life which is integral. In particular, an integration of the inner life with the outer, a unity of reflection and action, a coincidence of motive and intention. If this were complied with, the result would be action which is at once moral and spontaneous, and consequently, free.\[^{150}\]

While the magical and mystical are based on the negative emotions and resulting apperceptions and are therefore ultimately unreal, the integral religion is based on love and is therefore real. Real religion functions to enhance and expand community with universal intention.\[^{151}\] It cannot be limited by biology or geography. Because it is personal, based in action, its reality can only be verified in action, through its actualization, not through theoretical proofs or logical deductions.\[^{152}\]

There are three religions which are universal in intention and have proven their ability to create and sustain fellowship: Christianity, Islam, and Buddhism. Because of the communal nature and universal intention of each they are all more real than tribalistic or individualistic religions. Yet of the three only Christianity is motivated in its expansion by love rather than aggression or withdrawal and is therefore the most real of religions.\[^{153}\]

This is not to say that Christianity has not at times acted in either an aggressive or an

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\[^{150}\] PR, 172.

\[^{151}\] PR, 173-74.

\[^{152}\]PR, 174. Again, one should remember the term *form* refers to the logical form of a particular ontological unity-pattern.

\[^{153}\] “A mature religion, on the contrary, is universal.” SRR, 36. “... we may then define the function of religion as being to create, maintain and deepen the community of persons and to extend it without limit, by the transformation of negative motives and by eliminating the dominance of fear in human relations.” PR, 163.
escapist manner, but love exerts a corrective force which keeps Christianity moving towards the goal of a universal fellowship of love.\(^\text{154}\) Macmurray therefore rejects any suggestion of abandoning Christianity.\(^\text{155}\)

By defining religion as human reflective activity and demonstrating its relation to art, science, philosophy, and history, Macmurray places religion at the heart of his thought. By focusing on its communal motivation he places Christianity (or at least his interpretation of Christianity) at the pinnacle of his religious thinking. But is Macmurray’s understanding of religion appropriate? Is it comprehensive enough to include the varieties of religions practiced in the world and is it adequate to describe the particular aspects of religious activities that are commonly referred to when the word “religion” is used?

\(^\text{154}\) It is, of course, obvious enough that in its long history Christianity has failed to maintain the characteristic intention of its foundation. Fear gets the upper-hand and it falls into negation. But what is characteristic is that whether the failure tends, Buddhist fashion, to the escapism of a withdrawal from the world into a ‘pure spirituality’ or contrariwise, into the aggressive self-defence which, as in Islam, would use power to conquer the world, either of these aberrations is recognized, within the Christian fellowship itself, as a denial of its true nature, and produces a protest and a compensation. In the same way its tendency to become, in one or another of its branches, the religion of a limited group—a national religion, for example—is compensated for by a missionary movement which protests against exclusiveness. Its fundamental positiveness gives it a power of self-renewal which recalls it, after every aberration, to its original intention.” CF, 91-92.

\(^\text{155}\) This is not only from the early writings (e.g., CF, 97), but is reaffirmed in the Gifford lectures. “Christianity, in particular, is the exponent and the guardian of the personal, and the function of organized Christianity in our history has been to foster and maintain the personal life and to bear continuous witness, in symbol and doctrine, to the ultimacy of personal values. If this influence is removed or ceases to be effective, the awareness of personal issues will tend to be lost, in the pressure of functional preoccupations, by all except those who are by nature specially sensitive to them. The sense of personal dignity as well as of personal unworthiness will atrophy, with the decline in habits of self-examination. Ideals of sanctity or holiness will begin to seem incomprehensible or even comical. Success will tend to become the criterion of rightness, and there will spread through society a temper which is extraverted, pragmatic and merely objective, for which all problems are soluble by better organization. In such conditions the religious impulses of men will attach themselves to the persons who wield political power, and will invest them with a personal authority over the life of the community and of its members. The state is then compelled to perform the functions of a church (for which by its nature it is radically unfit) and its efforts to do so will produce, the more rapidly the more whole-hearted they are, a crisis of the personal. SA, 30-31.
3.4.3.1 Comprehensiveness:
Categories and Content

Is Macmurray’s definition of religion capable of handling the variety of religions encountered globally? Within his system Macmurray references Christianity and Judaism, Islam and Buddhism, Animism, Mysticism, and Pantheism. It also allows for religions which do not promote community or are otherwise unreal thereby including the plethora of individualistic religions of the Self. In formulating the religious triad of communal, idealist, and pragmatic religions Macmurray can account for both the tribal shamans, as well as, the great world religions. Essential for any theory of religions operating in a modern Western context, he claims it also accounts for the atheist. In spite of this impressive display, or perhaps because of it, Macmurray’s critics believe he modifies religion so that it is no longer religion as commonly understood. These detractors have identified at least three different ways in which Macmurray’s definition of religion may lack comprehensiveness: (1) the collapsing of religion into a type of morality, (2) the conflating of religion with biblical faith, and (3) the fundamental reduction achieved by defining religion as a human activity.

3.4.3.1.1 Religion and Morality

One manner in which to challenge Macmurray’s definition of religion is to accuse it of collapsing religion into morality, of using the two terms interchangeably, and in so

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150 RE, 228-29.
157 SRR, 38-40.
158 PR, 79.
159 PR, 218.
160 PR, 223.
161 Macmurray has several means at his disposal to account for atheism. “Any society of persons, united in a common life, has a religious aspect. Atheism, if it is in action, is an effort to suppress this aspect; if it is passive, it is a failure to recognize it. Both active and passive atheism are normally reactions against unreal religion, and even so they are accidental and unusual.” PR, 171. Taking a slightly different tack Macmurray also suggests that substitution may occur: “If, on the other hand, any religion falls into unreality by losing its reference to the real world, that is, the world of action, art or science or both must become substitutes for religion.” PR, 175.
doing, reducing the scope of religion to merely a particular type of morality. Hoffman provides an example of this line of thought:

Similar difficulties arise if one seeks to place morality within the structure of thought outlined by Macmurray. His basic reflective categories, we have already seen, are science, art, and religion. Thus when he writes in the Gifford Lectures, "From the point of view of the agent, the validity of his action—its reality in action—has three aspects," one would expect him to allude to science, art, and religion. In fact he offers a new triad, science, art, and morality: "The means chosen must be efficient, the end to be realized must be satisfactory, and the action as a whole must be moral, that is to say, compatible with the community of action as a whole. Of these aspects, the moral validity is primary." Religion and morality, it would appear, have become interchangeable. Indeed, a more detailed analysis of their relationship turns out to be most instructive.\(^{162}\)

Hoffman then gives a description of the threeapperceptions (pragmatic, contemplative, and communal). In the course of this description he states:

In light of this triadic form he recognizes three pure types of social organization, Hobbes’ Leviathan and Rousseau’s Social Contract corresponding to the pragmatic-hate and contemplative-fear apperceptions respectively, and over against these the higher morality of community or religion. It is in this context that Macmurray defines religion as the celebration of community.[*] Our basic forms of reflection then are actually science, art, and morality, while religion denotes a particular form of morality which is accepted as its highest expression, loving community. Once more it emerges as a general category, i.e., not as phenomenologically but as theologically characterized.\(^{163}\)

Hoffman in his footnote (its placement indicated by the asterisk in the above quote) adds to the indictment:

Thus he can write: “The positive morality of love contains and subordinates the two negative moralities of good form [the contemplative] and of self-control [the pragmatic].” Shortly following we find: “Religion ... intends the synthesis of art [contemplation] and science [the pragmatic].”\(^{164}\)

Clearly Hoffman is thoroughly convinced that Macmurray has confused religion and morality. Unfortunately his argument is based on two errors: a type of geographical fallacy and a general misunderstanding of Personal Logic.

\(^{162}\) Hoffman, 3, citing PR, 178.
\(^{163}\) Hoffman, 3–4.
\(^{164}\) Hoffman, 7, n. 15, citing PR, 176. Brackets and contents of brackets in the original.
In the footnote Hoffinan has fallen victim to what may be characterized as a geographical fallacy: proximity in the text does not guarantee continuity of subject matter. The paragraph from which the first quotation in the footnote comes is describing the constitutive nature of science and art for religion. In the midst of the paragraph, the text states, "The same principle holds in all fields of personal experience" and then provides a few examples of other fields where this applies, including social structures and morality, whence Hoffinan gets the first quotation. This quotation is the last sentence of the paragraph. Hoffinan's second quotation begins the next paragraph which returns again to the central question of the last paragraph which was about religion and the derivative nature of art and science from it. There is, therefore, no proof in this instance for the claim that Macmurray confuses morality and religion.

The remainder of Hoffinan's argument fails because of his lack of careful attention to terminology, his misunderstanding of Personal logic, and the relationship between the elements of the resulting triads. It is true that Macmurray has delineated the modes of reflection including religion, science, and art. However, Hoffinan makes two mistaken assumptions in interpreting Macmurray's statement:

The means chosen must be efficient, the end to be realized must be satisfactory, and the action as a whole must be moral, that is to say, compatible with the community of action as a whole. Of these aspects, the moral validity is primary.

The first assumption is efficient means science and satisfactory means art. The second is his belief that Macmurray is talking about modes of reflection. Hoffinan cites Macmurray at the beginning of the quote, "From the point of view of the agent, the validity of his action—its reality in action—has three aspects," which Hoffinan interprets with regard to reflection and not to valuation. Hoffinan, seems unaware of the presence of

165 "Consequently there is no reason why both science and art should not be integrated with religion, as the two ambivalent forms of the negative which is necessary to its constitution." PR, 175.
166 PR, 175.
167 Hoffinan, 3.
efficiency, aesthetics, and morality as *modes of valuation*, and therefore infers
Macmurray must be referring to the primary modes of reflection.

When one considers the fact that Kant is repeatedly charged with reducing
religion to morality,\(^{168}\) that Macmurray unashamedly looks to Kant for inspiration, and
the centrality of action to Macmurray’s argument, it is understandable why Hoffinan was
quick to assume that Macmurray was reducing religion to a form of morality. Religion
contains morality, the judgment of value, necessarily as its negative, but it is not the
totality of religion or action for Macmurray.

### 3.4.3.1.2 Religion and Biblical Christianity

Similar in nature to the belief that Macmurray is collapsing religion into morality
is the accusation he is conflating or confusing biblical faith with religion. We can again
look to Hoffinan for an example of this line of reasoning.

For example, Macmurray has claimed that “the primary religious assertion is that
all men are equal, and that fellowship is the only relation between persons which
is fully rational, or fully appropriate to their nature as persons. In this assertion the
whole nature of religion is bound up.” Thus religion, he continues, inevitably
asserts that reality is personal. Such a view surely restricts the field of religion in a
questionable manner. Specifically he associates religion with biblical faith and
community. The Hebrew people stand out as unique in human history because
they are “the only people whose history is religious through and through.”
Moreover Judaism reached its culmination in Jesus, who raised the profound
Hebrew sense of community and mutual responsibility to its universal dimension,
making explicit the divine purpose. Clearly Macmurray’s phenomenology is
theologically conditioned.\(^{169}\)

Hoffinan believes that instead of religion being a category, it is in fact, defined by
its content, namely biblical faith. In so doing he again demonstrates that he does not
understand Personal Logic and the resulting triadic structure of religion. It is not that
Macmurray sees religion as biblical faith, rather when one considers any personal action
in light of the apperceptions, the positive apperception is the better, and in the case of

\(^{168}\) For example, see Grenz and Olson, 29, or Stanley Hauerwas, “On Doctrine and Ethics,” in *Cambridge
religion, the integrated religion of the community looks a great deal like biblical faith. Further adding to Hoffman's confusion is Macmurray's use of the positive form of the category and the name of the category interchangeably. For example, to say religious reflection implies the integral understanding of it. It must be stated clearly that this is neither a conflation of the category of religion and Christianity nor an example of theological preconditioning at the level of religion. If one suspects theological influence, it exists not at this level, but back at the point of origin of Macmurray's Form of the Personal.

A strong argument exists for the position that Macmurray's philosophy is theologically preconditioned. It is observable to some extent in Macmurray's choice of the self-as-agent-in-relation and in the preference of the heterocentric self over the egocentric self. White argues persuasively for theological preconditioning in Macmurray's Form of the Personal. But whether it is dependent or correlative is open to debate. White concludes that Macmurray's philosophy is in fact a biblically informed understanding of humanity and God and argues for the theological nature of his starting point. The twin concepts of agency and heterocentricity create a situation which requires the evaluation of trust as the positive motive which then leads to the promotion of the communal apperception as the positive. It should not be presumed that the decision for heterocentricity is a self-evident given. It is quite possible to create a system where self-concern and self-protection are the paramount values.

Therefore, while the starting point may have been influenced by biblical faith and the result is an affirmation of (or at least one interpretation of) biblical faith, this does not mean that "religion" has been conflated with biblical Christianity. White concludes:

Macmurray would not, of course, wish to be understood as arguing from faith rather than from reason. He would undoubtedly deny that there might be a
conclusion theologically valid, philosophically invalid. Yet it remains valid to consider his philosophical position as fully understandable only if his theological assumptions are taken into consideration, if it is also realised that more than anything else his argument is against the possibility of a real distinction between the two realms.\footnote{White, 464.}

White is certainly correct. Macmurray would argue against a division between religion and philosophy. On this score, Hoffman is correct; Macmurray’s phenomenology is theologically preconditioned. Yet, according to Macmurray’s epistemology, all phenomenology has preconditions—one cannot step outside of oneself and consider something as completely new. One may have immediate experiences, but the understanding will be affected by previous experience, social conventions and the like. One would assume that Hoffman wishes to disqualify Macmurray’s definition of religion based upon this preconditioning. However, one must then ask what preconditions Hoffman would put in its place?

3.4.3.1.3 Immanence

The third area of criticism includes several different criticisms of Macmurray’s definition of religion which share a common concern that it is too anthropological, too immanent—not sufficiently concerned with God and the transcendent.

Langford is typical of those who are concerned with a reductionistic, anthropological definition of religion in Macmurray’s Form of the Personal.

As for the question of phenomenological adequacy, Macmurray’s definition of religion seems dubious. To put the issue sharply, Macmurray’s use of ‘religion’ to refer to the relationship of persons is most questionable because of its limitations. The basic definition of religion that he proposes is that religion is an attitude that takes the self-as-agent-in-relation as the primary category. Thus, in a manner again reminiscent of American pragmatism, he uses the adjective ‘religious’ to describe that dimension of experience which integrates and enriches man’s selfhood. But what of the multiple other ways in which religion has been understood and practiced?

... His adoption of a more limited definition is, of course, deliberate, for he intends to find a religion that is adequate for the modern scientific mind; but is he
talking about what has traditionally been described as religion? The answer must be negative. To say that a negative answer is requisite is not to deny that religion often includes the dimension of interpersonal relations, but it is to claim that the reduction of religion to this one area is to redefine its character inadequately.\footnote{Langford, Natural Theology, 18.}

John Burnaby scathingly attacks Macmurray for what he sees as the reduction of religion to empiricism.

There is a pathetic na""veté, perhaps something of the heretic's age-long deficiency in sense of humour, about Macmurray's ideal of an 'empirically-minded religion', 'leading the progressive movement with science as its technical advisor'...\footnote{John Burnaby, Amor Dei: A Study of the Religion of St. Augustine (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1938), 7.}

Newbigin, while agreeing with much of Macmurray's attack on legalism, nevertheless believes Macmurray would do better to understand religion as "the awareness of an absolute obligation", the absence of which reduces God to a sub-personal deity or even worse a mere concept.\footnote{Lesslie Newbigin, Christian Freedom in the Modern World (London: Student Christian Movement, 1937), 63, 64, 68. McFadyen makes a similar argument in positing the need for double contingency: where one obligates the self to the other: expecting the expectation and the expectation of the expectation of the other. McFadyen, 130-31.}

Trethowans admits to a certain confusion regarding Macmurray's definition of religion. He finds himself agreeing with Macmurray but then is unable to accept or understand Macmurray's frequent attacks on mysticism. This causes him to doubt Macmurray's entire religious construct.\footnote{Illyd Trethowan, Absolute Value: A Study in Christian Theism (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1970), 230-38.}

The common thread discernable in all these critiques is the troubling absence of God in Macmurray's discussion of religion. Ignoring the possible criticism of starting \textit{from below} rather than \textit{from above} (a distinction seen above to have limited basis in reality) one must still recognize Macmurray is attempting to play by the philosophical and theological rules of the day and presented his philosophy without recourse to divine revelation.\footnote{“If then human reason, unaided by revelation, can contribute anything to theology, it is through a philosophical analysis of the personal that we should expect this to be brought to light.” SA, 17. See below (§4.2.3) for the difficulty with this apologetic method.}

Since Chapter 4 will directly address Macmurray's doctrine of God, for now...
suffice it to say that since Macmurray sees God as at least personal, the talk of religion as communion of persons does not exclude God from religion as some seem to conclude.

The more fundamental issue, however, is the belief that Macmurray is creating a completely immanent religion without transcendence. This is particularly clear in the fact that his critics seem to rally to the defense of mysticism. It is the interpretation of mysticism and its relation to religion in general which forms the crux of the issue.

In all the discussions critical of Macmurray's definition of religion, no mention is made of the pragmatic mode of religion—the magical-technical mode. When one reads the attacks on Macmurray's definition what comes through clearly is the concern about religion being reduced to a form of this-worldly social activism. But this description fits better the depiction of the pragmatic mode of religion, the magical-technical.

That this third mode of religion is often overlooked is easily understood. First, most commentators have overlooked the importance of the triadic pattern in the Form of the Personal and so are not looking for a third mode. Second, Macmurray rarely spoke about it in any detail, since within his context the main threat to integral religion was the mystical idealistic mode so common in institutional Christianity.\(^{177}\) Integral religion does not deny the value of either magical or mystical religion, it merely recognizes that in isolation it is inadequate. Both must be integrated in a fully personal manner in integral religion.\(^{178}\)

\(^{177}\) One cannot help but wonder if Macmurray had been in another situation, contemporary Pentecostalism for example, if he would not have had more to say on the subject.

\(^{178}\) So in this way one sees agreement between Brunner and Macmurray. "Feeling accompanies but does not determine faith. It is true of course that faith is not only an act of understanding and will but that it is also a 'passion,' and love in particular cannot be thought of apart from feeling. But feeling is not the distinctive element, the dominant and determining factor; it merely accompanies faith. In mystical religion, on the other hand, feeling plays the decisive part." Brunner, *Man in Revolt*, 252. Limpitlaw, basing her argument on the analysis of Trethowan and others (and therefore ignorant of the magical and integral modes of religious communion) laments the lack of the divine in Macmurray and argues, based upon her understanding of his overall philosophy, that this is unnecessary (320-29). Her solution (329) is virtually identical to what Macmurray actually does with his three modes of religious communion.
3.4.3.2 Adequacy: Doctrine, Ritual, and Worship

Whereas the previous question was one of breadth, the ability to incorporate the many different notions of religion, the question here is one of adequacy: does Macmurray's definition of religion describe the actual practices of religion? Here Macmurray is vulnerable, for he barely engages those elements most commonly associated with religious practice: doctrine, ritual, and worship. In light of the fact that Macmurray claims to be basing his analysis upon religious experience this oversight must be explained.

Although Macmurray does not address the subjects of ritual and doctrine in great detail, it is an integral part of his argument that there cannot be a religion which does not attend to ritual and doctrine and by logical necessity the truthfulness and satisfactory nature of both. Both are required but it is a question of the proper subordination of doctrine to ritual, for doctrine gives form to ritual, and then ritual to the reality of religious activity. Religious reflection is not complete if it ends with the consideration of the facticity of its doctrines. Likewise, religious reflection does not end with satisfaction in ritual. Belief is not mere intellectual assent, but intellectual assent united with emotional satisfaction in creative action.

In Macmurray’s last book, written to a Quaker audience as a Quaker, he chides them for paying insufficient attention to both doctrine and ritual, the existence of each being obscured or denied in their own self-reflection. He praises the Quakers for avoiding

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179 Fergusson raises the issue that a functionalist approach to religion typically ignores the importance of truth claims in religion. Fergusson, *John Macmurray*, 9.
180 Langford is concerned that Macmurray’s definition of religion leaves out traditional forms of religious expression; rite, ritual, and worship of the wholly other. Langford, *Natural Theology*, 18.
181 “For we have now collected all the material necessary to enable us to understand the nature of religious experience, and so to define religion as a mode of personal experience. Until we understand what religion is we are in no position to ask whether it is valid or not, or how, if at all, its claims can be verified. We are concerned, therefore, with religion as a form of reflective activity, and with its origin in the structure of universal human experience. We are not concerned with its particular expressions in this religion or that, but with religion as such, as something people do, as a human activity.” PR, 151.
doctrinal conformity as a requirement of faith, but he faults them for not exploring doctrinal possibilities more adequately. And though not requiring adherence to any one system, he believes the Quakers should work very hard on several competing systems so that their thinking can mature through discussion and refinement of understanding. In addition he points out that the minimalist ritual which exists among the Quakers is still a ritual, and he encourages them to be more attentive in their approach, recognizing it for what it is and acting accordingly.  

While the description given of the place of ritual and doctrine in Macmurray’s philosophy is accurate, it would be misleading not to acknowledge that Macmurray gives relatively scant attention to the area of doctrine and ritual. There may be any number of mundane reasons why Macmurray failed to engage in a more thorough discussion of doctrine and ritual, although concern to counter tendencies within institutional Christianity towards idealism is the most likely reason. Whatever the reason, it cannot entirely erase the fact that this entire topic was given inadequate attention and raises cautions about defining religion as reflection on community.

If the inattention given to doctrine and ritual kindles suspicion, then the virtual absence of worship ignites the fires of skepticism.

Where is there any room in this account for worship? Is there any room for the category of the holy? While a type of transcendence is attributed to God, the same

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182 PR, 173-74.
183 SRR, 72-75. “I have expressed my conviction that the refusal of doctrinal definition is fundamental, not only to our Quaker faith, but also the recovery, by the Church, of the reality of the Christian religion. I should like to add that the same is not true of our rejection of ritual. In the first place, there is a confusion here. All religious activities in the narrow sense—all activities of corporate worship, that is to say—are ritual activities. For they are reflective activities, which symbolize and refer to something beyond themselves. The communion which they achieve refers to a common life in the everyday world.” SRR, 74.
184 “Any dualistic mode of thinking is incompatible with religion.” PR, 206. “All this [monastic withdrawal]—and I feel sure you will recognize it—is excellent Platonism. But it is not Christian at all. I have grave doubts, indeed, whether idealism, in any form, is compatible with religion.” SRR, 59. “Religion is concerned in its reality with two things—with action and with community. Idealism seeks to escape from action into meditation; and from the tensions of life in common into the solitariness of one's own spirit.” SRR, 59. “Macmurray is just as insistent as Marx that the overcoming of alienation and suffering, and the completion of human nature, is a this-worldly affair and can occur only within the conditions of the empirical world.” Frank G. Kirkpatrick, “Toward a Metaphysic of Community,” *Scottish Journal of Theology* 38, no. 4 (1985): 574.
transcendence of activity is found in man's capacity for self-reflection; thus the
distinguishing quality of God's transcendence, which is an apotheosis of the
capacity for reflection, is not at all clear. The problem is that the analogy between
man as agent and God as Agent is so tightly drawn that the distinctiveness of the
divine is not adequately indicated. Is the integrity of the other person to be
identified with the holiness of God? Is there any qualitative distinction between
the Agent who is God and the agent who is man? Such questions remain.
Consequently, while the argument may point to a theistic conclusion, it does not
point towards a worshipping conclusion.\(^{185}\)

Although White attempts to counter Langford's blistering critique by noting the
genetic connection to biblical faith, the God who is Other, and the fact that the
community of persons includes God who is person,\(^{186}\) his defense is ultimately unable to
explain Macmurray's negligence in accounting for this primary and pervasive religious
practice. Why has Macmurray failed to sufficiently discuss worship?

While there are scattered references to worship, especially in the earlier writings,
one intriguing reference to worship in Macmurray's corpus points to a possible solution
to this enigma. In his last book Macmurray states:

All religion, I believe, rests on the experience of the presence of God. This
experience manifests itself in feelings of awe and in self-abasement, but it does
not reveal the nature of God, only his majesty and power. This is why there is
such variety in the conception of God in different religions. For the Christian, in
his worship of God, there is, however, another experience, that of the presence of
Jesus Christ in and amongst the worshippers.\(^{187}\)

This may be interpreted in the following way. First, all religions stem from the
experience of God's presence which results in awe but contains no real content about
God, except that God is awesome. However, in addition to this religious experience of
God's presence, there is a different experience ("another experience"), worship, which

\(^{185}\) Langford, Natural Theology, 19. Hoffman, who applauds Macmurray's starting point agrees, saying "A
second query one might put to Macmurray concerns his failure to deal adequately with worship. Reference
is made to it on occasion, but worship is never given the place it deserves. For good reasons he has asserted
that his analysis must start with human experience and not with God, but to be adequate to the phenomena,
such description can hardly ignore the major role of worship." Hoffman, 3.
\(^{186}\) "It is doubtful whether Langford would find the definition [of religion to the social sphere] so limiting
had he placed it in the context of Macmurray's descriptive analysis of Hebrew and Christian Community in
his earlier works, for the whole range of social expression and communion are implied when Macmurray
speaks of persons in relation, along with the Personal Agent, whose intention they are." White, 450 n. 1,
referencing Langford, Natural Theology.
relies on Christ's presence in and among the worshippers, and it is Christ who provides the content of the worship. In other words, religion is a human activity (and therefore to be considered in philosophy or natural theology), but worship is an act of God in the life of the Christian (and therefore outside the boundaries of the discussion). If this is the correct reading of Macmurray's idea of worship (in distinction to religion) then there is a great deal of similarity between this concept of worship and that of James Torrance. At the very least, it does not exclude a trinitarian understanding of worship as described by Torrance.

On the one hand, Macmurray has a place in his philosophy for religion, his entire system appears theologically pre-conditioned and his definitions do not appear to stand blatantly opposed to Christian understandings of certain categories (even if there may be a need to expand them for theological purposes). On the other hand, even in light of his later statements, there is still a nagging concern regarding the place of worship and the divine. As Langford notes, there is a definite connection between concepts of God and worship. Is Macmurray's model based on too tight an analogy between human and divine persons thereby eliminating worship as Langford suggests? Was worship simply outside

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187 SRR, 53. It is possible to note some similarity between Macmurray's position and Romans 1.18-24. 188 This solution also has the added benefit of dealing with Macmurray's almost agnostic attitude towards the knowledge of God, as will be seen in Chapter 4. 189 Langford mentions the distinction that Farmer makes between natural theology and natural religion. The first is the hypothetical positing of God's existence, while the second is the universal experience of God. This is different than the position advanced to explain Macmurray's understanding of worship, but it speaks to the issue that Christian theology and religion can have different fields. Langford, Theological Method, 238. Gunton makes similar distinctions between theology of nature (a gift of biblical revelation), natural theology (attempts to prove existence of God through creation), and general revelation (revelation of God through the medium of created things requiring biblical enablement). Colin E. Gunton, A Brief Theology of Revelation, Warfield Lectures 1993 (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995), 40-63. 190 James Torrance, Worship, Community and the Triune God of Grace (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1996), 19-41. Torrance seems to group Macmurray with the existential-experience understanding of worship (29) which Torrance sees as ultimately unitarian because of its anthropocentric notion of worship as something humans do. However, if the above interpretation is correct, and Macmurray sees worship as an act of God in the believer, this places him in a position more open to the trinitarian view—although Macmurray himself does not articulate a trinitarian theology. In short, Macmurray's position would not contradict a trinitarian interpretation of worship. 191 For a novel alternative to the solution suggested here, see Hoffman who attempts to utilize Macmurray's philosophy and then to surpass it by positing a primal human act of worship which is based upon a
the parameters of the Gifford lectures and Macmurray’s general project as a philosopher and not as a theologian?

3.5 Conclusion

Thus equality and freedom are constitutive of community; and the democratic slogan, ‘Liberty, equality, fraternity’, is an adequate definition of community—of the self-realization of person in relation.¹⁹²

The relational definition of person as the self-as-agent-in-relation-to-Other employed by Macmurray creates an extensive and highly integrated anthropology. While being constituted ontologically by relationality, Macmurray recognizes that the development of the person is reliant upon the manifestation or realization of its constituent parts: mutuality, freedom, and equality. Equality stresses the essential commonality between persons without ignoring the vital differences of particular persons. Freedom is the capacity to act, the integration of power and desire in conformity to reality. Mutuality emphasizes knowledge, love, and communion with the Other. In their complete realization the fullness of relationship between persons is achieved. A person, in short, is one who, as an equal, freely knows, loves, and communes with God and Others, thus realizing the personal universe.

This discussion of the anthropological dimension of Macmurray’s thought also raises a number of issues. First, it is clear that Macmurray has not successfully communicated his understanding of Personal logic. The numerous dualistic readings stand as testimony to this fact. Second, and more important from a theological perspective, is the perplexing nature of worship within the general schema. Is worship left out of Macmurray’s account of religion because it is not a human activity? Is it simply ignored because of Macmurray’s discomfort with other-worldly and spiritual ideas of

¹⁹² PR, 158.
religion? Or does this reveal a basic inadequacy in the anthropology? The third issue is the general question of Macmurray’s doctrine of God. What is Macmurray’s understanding of the nature of the continuity between human and divine person(s) and between divine person(s) and the creation? To even begin to answer this question the focus must now turn towards Macmurray’s personalist natural theology.
CHAPTER 4
THE THEOLOGICAL DIMENSION:
THE PERSONAL GOD

Who then is the Other in relation to Whom all find themselves in a complete self-transcendence? The Other can only be an infinite person, who is at once the Father of men and the Creator of the world. For the Other must be personal—since he is one term in a personal relationship; He must be infinite and eternal—because he must be the same for all persons at all times—the same yesterday, today, and for ever; and since the ordinary experience of personal relation is necessarily a unity in co-operation, directed towards nature and upon nature, he must unify the natural with the personal.¹

What exactly does Macmurray mean when he states that God must be personal? How does Jesus fit within his overall concept of God? Is there a difference between human and divine persons, or is Macmurray's God merely a Feuerbachian anthropomorphic projection onto the clouds of heaven? In this chapter Macmurray's doctrine of God will be explored answering these questions. This natural theology² will follow the triadic heuristic pattern of the apperceptions reflecting on the Other in isolation (the I), in relation to its environment (the I-II), and finally in fully interactive mutuality (the I-You). When applied to reflection upon God this triad translates into the consideration of God as mental object or idea (theology proper), God as historical object (christology), and God as interactive Other (pneumatology).

Although the layout follows a somewhat traditional pattern (theology, christology, pneumatology) it is important to note at the outset that Macmurray's doctrine of God is not trinitarian in any recognizable sense of the word. Yet, as his position is unfolded it

¹ RAS, 59.
² In Macmurray's understanding, natural theology is essentially philosophy (PR, 224). In this section, however, natural theology is being used in a more narrow sense. Theology is here being used to refer to the
will become clear that Macmurray's theology is not antithetical to trinitarianism. One may characterize Macmurray's attitude towards the doctrine of the Trinity as one of agnosticism. As will be shown, this results in a number of questions being left unanswered and unnecessarily limits Macmurray's theology.

In light of the previous two chapters' insistence that religion is a human activity open to investigation, questions about the connection of religion and deity must be considered. It will be remembered that according to Macmurray, religion is reflection intending to reconcile and strengthen persons in community through symbolic action which is the celebration of communion. While this definition of religion seems to exclude God it does not, for religion is humanity's search for God, the consciousness of life in God, and the expression of the experience of God's power and majesty. The important point at this juncture is the affirmation of the connection of religion and God providing epistemological warrant for the consideration of God as an object of reflection because, at least in some form, God has been experienced by persons.

4.1 **NATURAL THEOLOGY PROPER: GOD AS MENTAL OBJECT—THE UNIVERSAL PERSONAL OTHER**

The argument which starts from the primacy of the practical moves steadily in the direction of a belief in God. To think the world in practical terms is ultimately to think the unity of the world as one action, and therefore as informed by a unifying intention. It may, indeed, prove possible to think the process of the world as intentional without thinking a supreme Agent whose act the world is. But prima facie, at least, it is not possible to do so.

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^3 In some respects Macmurray's view of religion is closer to that expressed by Barth and Brunner who both see religion as a human activity, yet he differs especially from Barth in seeing a positive value to religion while acknowledging its incompleteness and limitations. See K. G. Howkins, "Religion" in NDT, 575-76. It is interesting to note that Macmurray may be truer to biblical conceptions of religion than are many of his opponents who wish to see a greater divine dimension to religion (see Paul's discussion of the limitations of the pinnacle of human religions, Judaism, in Romans) or those who wish to discount it totally (James 1:26-27).

^4 SA, 221-22.
Macmurray's Gifford lectures may be seen as one extended argument for the reasonableness of the idea of God. He begins with empirical observations about the self as agent and persons in relation to arrive at the necessary idea of God as the supreme agent and absolute person. This treats God pragmatically as a functional idea, and hence fits into Macmurray's heuristic paradigm of the It. In this section, this necessary conception of God will be explored, followed by the posing of critical questions about revelation, ontological demarcation, and idealism for this theology.

4.1.1 GOD AS UNIVERSAL PERSONAL OTHER

It has already been seen in the previous discussions of Macmurray's philosophy that starting from the concept of the self as agent and the unity of history he builds an understanding of the universe as an action rather than as an event, which therefore necessitates an original, unlimited, and universal Agent to intend the universal action. Implicit within this understanding of the universe as the action of God, is the notion of God as creator. While Macmurray does not address the issue of creation ex nihilo, he clearly sees God as the solitary creator of the universe. God, as the supreme Agent or worker, is continually involved in creation in an ongoing manner, contrary to any deistic concepts of a clockwork universe. However, God is more than absolute agent—God is person-in-relation and one must therefore consider the relational nature of ultimate reality.

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5 This is similar to Kant's use of the idea of God as necessary for moral obligation to exist. Allen, 217-18.
6 For the phrase "original, unlimited, and universal agent" see SRR, 44.
7 See the final chapter of SA, "The World as One Action", 203-22, esp. 217, 222.
8 For example, PR, 222.
9 CH, 32-33; see also White, 453-54.
10 "The second part of the answer [to the question of evil] is that the divine creation is continuing. It goes on. God did not become a sleeping partner with the creation of Man. If Man has set his will against God's (as clearly he has) the purpose of God still stands and must be realized. In the recognition of the Fall there is already the promise of a redemption. And to see this is to discover history, as the Hebrews did, and with it a religious interpretation of history as the work of God for the salvation of the world, in spite of and even through the opposition of human wills." SRR, 46.
It is axiomatic for Macmurray that reflection begins with a problem. Therefore, just as the discussion of truth revolves around the problem of error, religious reflection engages the problem of broken relations. Sin and evil exist in human experience, destroying community and must therefore be overcome to reestablish fellowship.

There is, then, only one way in which we can think of our relation to the world, and that is to think it as a personal relation, through the form of the personal. We must think that the world is one action, and that its impersonal aspect is the negative aspect of this unity of actions, contained in it, subordinated within it, and necessary to its constitution. To conceive the world thus is to conceive it as the act of God, the Creator of the world, and ourselves as created agents, with a limited and dependent freedom to determine the future, which can be realized only on the condition that our intentions are in harmony with His intention, and which must frustrate itself if they are not.  

As supreme Agent, God's intention will be realized and any human intention which runs counter to God's is ultimately self-frustrating and self-defeating. This is not tyrannical on God's part for it is God's intention that humanity and all creation realize its nature as created by God. The divinely created human nature is to be self-transcendent, interacting with the Other in terms of the Other. For humanity this means living in a state of peaceful mutuality and communion. Failure to do so is sin—a sundering of relationship. Sin is a question of estrangement, not ignorance. It is caused by fear and

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11 PR, 222.
12 "The principle through which Jesus achieves this unification is fundamentally simple, though its application and expressions are manifold. It is that human intentions which are opposed to the intention of God for man are necessarily self-frustrating. When men set out to realize an intention which is contrary to the divine intention, they do not achieve it. They achieve something that they did not intend. If the intention is the opposite of the divine intention, then they necessarily achieve, not what they intended, but its opposite. This principle is not an 'act of faith': it is a discovery of reason. Its necessity is a logical necessity. There is no need for an 'intervention' of God to frustrate the purposes of men who are in opposition to him, since they cannot be in opposition to him without being in opposition to themselves. They themselves are, after all, God's act, and his intention is embodied in their nature. To act in defiance of the will of God is to intend the impossible. The resulting action cannot then achieve what we intend. It will be a failure, from our point of view. But that does not mean that we have achieved nothing. On the contrary, we have achieved something which we did not intend. The situation we have produced is not determined by our intention. It is determined by the nature of reality, by the nature of our own reality, which we are negating as much as by the nature of the reality on which we act. And what is Reality but that which operates by the intention of God. Thus, whether our intention conforms to the purpose of God or opposes it, we cannot achieve anything but the purpose of God." CH, 95-96.
13 "At once we face the problem of evil—not the problem of ignorance, as in the thought of Socrates or Plato... Evil then is sin and sin is a personal conflict of wills. Since religion is about community, a clash of will between men and God must express itself in the breaking of community—as a clash of wills between
hatred directed towards the Other.\textsuperscript{14} Rather than being real persons characterized by heterocentric love, egocentric fear and hatred become habituated, controlling persons and rendering them unreal.\textsuperscript{15} The presence of sin and evil signals the Fall of humanity\textsuperscript{16} and with it the need for reconciliation and redemption.\textsuperscript{17}

Because sin and evil are conflict with God’s universal intention, sin will always result in the breakdown of communion within the human dimension; sin is inherently social destroying human reciprocity and mutuality. The irony is that while reconciliation is needed between persons, it cannot be accomplished because the parties are estranged.\textsuperscript{18}

\begin{itemize}
\item man and man. Indeed since the purpose of God for man is man’s true nature, in being at enmity with God he is at odds with himself.” SRR, 44-45. See also CH, 68 for sin as estrangement.
\item “This mutuality of hatred as the motive of a negative relation of persons is clearly an evil. Hatred itself, as an original and necessary motive in the constitution of the personal, is perhaps what is referred to by theology as original sin. At any rate, the distinction we have just drawn between a positive and a negative relation of persons is the origin of the distinction between good and evil.” PR, 75.
\item PR, 105. Macmurray sees this happening either gradually or through dramatic conversion. Langford questions if this habituation of apperception as the expression of sin is strong enough to carry the reality of sin. Langford, Natural Theology, 20.
\item “Hence, the Fall of man merely describes the conditions under which God now works for the redemption of the world. And the inevitability of the redemption is an obvious corollary of the conception of God. The Fall of man becomes itself part of the process of the creation of the world, and history the process by which the intention of God for human life is being carried out. Where God is conceived as Agent the world is conceived as his act, and in that case ... the criterion of reality must be the continuity of intention. And this intention becomes, with the Fall, the intention of reconciliation, and therefore can only be achieved through an operation upon the will of man. By thus doing justice to the existence of evil and the goodness of God and his creation, the Hebrew consciousness escapes from dualism and retains an integral consciousness of the world. This integrity is its complete rationality. It enables it to think the whole of experience (and not merely the whole of reflective experience) as a unity, and a necessary unity. But the necessity is no mechanical determinism, which could not even allow for the reality of growth. Neither is it a necessary process of natural development, which would not account for the reality of evil; but the necessity of a cooperation between man and God for the realization, in actuality, of the true nature of man. ‘My father worketh hitherto, and I work.’” CH, 37-38.
\item “If this basic problem of personal life could be resolved, if the negative motive could finally and completely be subordinated to the positive, in all personal activity, the redemptive function of religion would be complete; and only its central activity would remain. Religion would then be simply the celebration of communion—of the fellowship of all things in God; Meanwhile, it sustains the intention to achieve this fellowship.” PR, 165.
\item “One aspect of this is of special importance. If a relation between two persons is broken in this way, the reflective activity which is concerned with its restoration ceases to be mutual. The individuals become separated and isolated in their conscious life. Each of them feels wronged by the other, the natural tendency of each in reflection is, therefore, to accuse the other, to fix the blame for the break upon the other, and so to increase his own isolation and to thwart tendencies to reconciliation. In that state of alienation reconciliation is impossible, and will remain impossible unless it is altered. The paradox of the situation is that the state of consciousness which needs the reconciliation, makes the reconciliation impossible. What is required is repentance; is that the state of consciousness should be radically altered. But how can a state of consciousness alter itself in opposition to its own nature. That is the source of the dilemma which expresses itself in the religious paradox that man is helpless to save himself from sin and yet that his salvation can only come about through his own free action. How can two isolated individuals act mutually? How can the isolation be overcome except by a mutual act? This problem must have a solution, because the thing
\end{itemize}
Therefore, what is needed is an Other who stands in identical relation with each member of the community who can function as the agent of reconciliation. The idea of this Other is the idea of God.\(^\text{19}\)

Various religions have various concepts of God based upon their experience of relationship: in some societies the community is based upon kinship—resulting in ancestor worship as an attempt to unite the tribe through time.\(^\text{20}\) For others, such as the cult of the Roman emperor, it is bound by a living political leader.\(^\text{21}\) In short, one can see that for Macmurray, while God creates humanity in his image, humanity also creates its conception of God in its image.\(^\text{22}\) This is especially true in its conception of society and human relations.\(^\text{23}\) Once one moves beyond narrow conceptions of community based upon kinship, geography, or politics and towards a broad conception intending the inclusion of all humanity, one requires an Other who (at least potentially) stands in relation to all humanity.\(^\text{24}\) Yet if this Other is to effect reconciliation and overcome fear and hatred, then he or she must not only stand in relation to all human persons in all places at all times, this Other must also overcome humanity's fear of (and hence estrangement from) nature and must also therefore stand in direct relation to all creation throughout the space-time continuum. Therefore, what is needed is a universal Other who happens again and again in our experience. Religion seeks to understand and to make available the means for its universal solution." SRE, 49-50.

\(^\text{19}\) It is unclear whether Macmurray considers God as one of the persons who is estranged by the sin, as one who stands outside of the division, or both at the same time (classical Christological understandings of Jesus as the Mediator who is both truly human and truly divine).
\(^\text{20}\) PR, 164.
\(^\text{21}\) CP, 64.
\(^\text{22}\) "For though it is truth of fact that God made Man in his own image, it is also true that man makes his conception of God in his, so that immature man has an immature conception of the Divine.... I should like to add one thing more to the analysis, which might possibly explain why this religious structure takes the form it does. My conjecture is that it is governed by the sense of an unseen presence, of something more in our experience which is somehow personal, which transcends our familiar experience of life in common, and yet which faces us when we reflect deeply upon our everyday activities. In our own terms it is the experience of the presence of God." SRR, 34; see also CH, 33. Here one observes the mutual informing aspect of Macmurray's epistemology. Community informs the idea of God, yet God informs the concept of community. It is thus not a linear but reciprocal model.
\(^\text{23}\) CH, 39-40.
\(^\text{24}\) SRE 49, 57.
stands in direct relation with all creation (human and non-human) at all times. This is the fullest development of the religious idea of God.\textsuperscript{25}

Macmurray’s contention that God is the completion or fulfillment of human relations is not without controversy. Langford, for example, is critical for he sees this line of reasoning leading towards divine dependence upon humanity.

It must be made clear that Macmurray intends by ‘religion’ the relationship between men in their common unity or community. Since his early essays he has insisted that ‘God,’ or the Personal Other, is known through relation with persons. Thus he quotes Blake with approval: ‘God only exists and is in existing beings or men.’ What he seems to understand by this assertion is that there is in the community of men a fulness, an esprit de corps, a more inclusive dimension of experience, which can only be described as ‘Other.’ God, consequently, is defined always in terms of the completeness of human relationships.\textsuperscript{26}

However, expressing Macmurray’s point in more traditional language serves to mitigate much of the problem. If community is love in action, then to know God means to love one another. Knowledge of God is therefore the completion of human relations.\textsuperscript{27}

John A. T. Robinson correctly makes this connection, but then accuses Macmurray of inverting God is love, to the theologically fallacious love is God.\textsuperscript{28} Yet, as Torrance notes, this is to misunderstand Macmurray’s notion of the rationality of the object.\textsuperscript{29} Just as God is love does not mean love is God, so too God is human community does not mean human community is God.

\subsection*{4.1.2 Limits of Natural Theology}

There are a number of advantages, especially from a Christian perspective, to Macmurray’s natural theology (proper). In its minimalism it affirms several key doctrines about God as well as being a helpful apologetic for the reasonableness of belief in God. However, there are a number of serious questions which must be asked of it. These may

\textsuperscript{25} RAS, 59. SA 72; PR, 164-69, 212-14.
\textsuperscript{26} Langford, Natural Theology, 15 citing RB, 210. See RB, 208-10.
\textsuperscript{27} See 1 John 4:7-8.
be considered under the rubrics of natural theology and the nature of revelation, ontological demarcation, and idealism.

4.1.2.1 Natural Theology and the Nature of Revelation

Natural theology, as it is commonly understood, is intimately connected with the topic of revelation. The most common distinction is to view natural theology as depending solely upon natural (or general) revelation which is available to all, while dogmatic theology rests upon special revelation—typically grounded in the authority of a person, an institution, or scripture.

There is, however, a certain ambiguity in Macmurray's use of the category of revelation which leads to an inconsistency, or at the very least an inadequacy, in his understanding of revelation and therefore functions reductionistically in informing his idea of God. Within his milieu, one can see a common distinction being drawn between natural and dogmatic theology. No less a theologian than Karl Barth can be heard to embrace this distinction and reject the validity of natural theology in favor of dogmatics. Macmurray has a strong apologetic concern and does not want to abandon the field of natural theology. Added to this apologetic concern one must admit that in general Macmurray is resistant to arguments from authority on sheer principle.

Science exchanged certainty for an increasing probability in knowledge, guaranteed by practical achievement. Theology demanded certainty, and was prepared to guarantee certainty by authority. In this it revealed its own unreality. For the demand for certainty is the reflective aspect of the demand for security; and the demand for security is the expression of fear, and betrays the dominance

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30 This is, no doubt, an oversimplification of Barth’s position, but in the main it is true—or at least commonly accepted, especially in light of the famous Barth-Brunner debate. For a more careful consideration of the totality of the debate see Trevor Hart, "The Capacity for Ambiguity: Revisiting the Barth-Brunner Debate" in Regarding Karl Barth (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 1999), 139-72. With regard to Barth’s Wholly-Other God, see RAS, 48.
of the negative in our motivation. As we have seen, a negatively motivated religion is unreal.\textsuperscript{31}

Forced to choose between a rational and apologetic natural theology or an authoritative and insular dogmatic theology, Macmurray opts for natural theology. In light of his overall philosophy, however, one is surprised that he does not see the dichotomy for what it is—yet another instance of modern dualism manifesting itself in theology. Besides the integrating nature of the Form of the Personal, the nature of personal revelation itself should have alerted him to the lacuna in his system. For he affirms that all personal knowledge is by revelation,\textsuperscript{32} and therefore knowledge of God, who is personal, requires God to reveal himself. But what exactly is the nature of the revelatory act? It is here where Macmurray’s thinking becomes imprecise, for on the one hand all true action (as opposed to event) is revelatory, but on the other hand the mere observation of action is insufficient to fully actualize revelation.

Macmurray recognizes the inherent difficulty of determining personal knowledge through observation alone, since the intention may not be apparent, deceit may be involved, or if it is an accident there may be no intention at all. Because of this, he sees the necessity that all revelation must be mutual between two parties, that it is simultaneously revelation to the Other and self-revelation, and ultimately revelation is communication. While all actions are potentially communicative, some types of action are clearly more able than others—and according to Macmurray “language is the major vehicle of human communication.”\textsuperscript{33} The wide variety of beliefs about God would seem to witness to the ambiguity of nature and natural revelation alone in providing one’s knowledge of God.\textsuperscript{34}

\textsuperscript{31} PR, 216-17.
\textsuperscript{32} See FR, 169-70 and RAS, 56.
\textsuperscript{33} PR, 12.
\textsuperscript{34} SRR, 53.
When one considers the obvious need for more specific forms of communicative action to alleviate the problems of misunderstanding (not that misunderstanding can ever be completely eliminated), it seems odd indeed that Macmurray limits himself to those actions with the least communicative clarity—natural revelation. It is possible to recognize the apologetic reasons for this move, but once the point about revelation has been made one would expect Macmurray to dispense with the pretense and interact more fully with special revelation. Instead of a holistic and integrated system where more overtly communicative acts and more ambiguously perceived actions are mutually informing, one is left with only one side of the revelatory continuum.

A further issue raised by Macmurray’s treatment of revelation has significance theologically. Revelation, as communication, is mutual (as opposed to the monological nature of expression). This assumes the desire of both parties to communicate. However, if one considers the effects of sin in human life then it is possible for a human to not engage in this communicative process. And if self-knowledge is dependent upon self-revelation what does this say regarding God’s dependence upon creation and sinful humanity for God’s self-knowledge? If God exists as Trinity, then God’s revelation and self-discovery are possible without dependence upon creation. If God is not triune, then God’s knowledge of self is solely dependent upon, and therefore may be frustrated by, creation. In particular, humanity’s possible rejection of relationship and communication of God would seem to jeopardize God’s self-knowledge and place his deity into question. Of course, it is also possible to picture God as triune and yet still deriving certain aspects of self-knowledge from risky interaction with creation.

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35 Fergusson underlines the inadequacy of revelation in Macmurray’s theology, particularly as it relates to the content (propositional) dimension. Fergusson, John Macmurray, 22.  
36 Colin Gunton makes an excellent argument for de-coupling natural theology and general revelation, seeing general revelation relying upon special revelation. Gunton, Brief Theology of Revelation, 55-61.
It should also be noted that Macmurray’s concept of revelation within the larger framework of community allows him to escape the criticisms of dialogical personalism which focuses too narrowly on linear communicative models and the narrowly subjective concerns of the enlightenment which often captured his theological contemporaries such as Barth and Brunner. Communion is ultimately of more theological significance than revelation, yet revelation is essential to communion.37

4.1.2.2 Ontological Demarcation

Macmurray’s use of relational terminology for God causes questions to arise about the distinction between God and creation in his thought, both in delineating human and divine persons as well as the general question of pantheism in his doctrine of God. One might, for instance, interpret the following passage as eradicating the ontological distinction between human and divine persons.

> It is only in relation to others that we exist as persons; we are invested with significance by others who have need of us; and borrow our reality from those who care for us. We live and move and have our being not in ourselves but in one another; and what rights or powers or freedom we possess are ours by the grace and favour of our fellows.38

By modifying the words of Acts 17:28 so that humans live in one another (instead of in God) it would seem that there is a collapsing of deity and humanity within Macmurray’s philosophy that is not commensurate with Christianity.

This obstacle may be overcome, at least in part, by considering Macmurray’s understanding of the role of the relationship between the finite and the infinite. Just as

37 For revelation existing within communal consideration, see A. Torrance, Persons in Communion, 364, and Williams, Revelation and Reconciliation. Gunton specifically ascribes Barth’s fixation on revelation as a consequence of the influence of the enlightenment. Colin E. Gunton, The Promise of Trinitarian Theology (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1991), 4-5. On criticisms of dialogical personalism see Wolfhart Pannenberg, Anthropology in Theological Perspective, trans. Matthew J. O’Connell (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1985), 180-83; Molmalm, Trinity and the Kingdom, 199; Michael Welker, God the Spirit, trans. John F. Hoffmeyer (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1994), 43-48, 154, n. 60. Because McFadyen bases his anthropology so clearly upon the dialogical and communicative aspects of the I-Thou as used by Buber and Barth, his work suffers from the basic flaws identified with dialogical personalism.

38 PR, 211.
scientists do not study matter as such, but only discrete finite occurrences of Matter, and truth is always a particular instance of Truth, so too finite persons are related to infinite Person. One begins to understand the infinite by experience and interaction with the finite. However, language of the finite in the infinite immediately births concerns regarding pantheism.

Macmurray flatly rejects pantheism, seeing it as an outgrowth of a sub-personal organic mode of reflection. He clearly believes in a distinction between God and creation. Yet, one wonders how, in light of his understanding of the human person, he can maintain this separation. The answer lies, once again, in his employment of Personal logic. Just as human persons are mutually constituting, yet distinct, so too God as personal is constituted by his relation to other persons—and by extension creation—and yet can be distinct from creation. God transcends creation, yet is immanent to it. Yet, Macmurray never explicitly states how God is both transcendent and immanent. This leaves his position open to a variety of solutions, including both panentheism and creation ex nihilo, depending upon how one understands Deus ad intra. Macmurray, himself, is agnostic here and does not speculate on the nature of God ad intra and so one is ultimately unable to determine his view, if any, on this issue. For, if one holds a more traditional trinitarian view, then the other persons of the Trinity function as the necessary Other and therefore creation may be understood not as necessary but as a free out-flowing of God’s love. If God is not triune, then creation becomes necessary for God’s personhood, for a person must have an Other, and that Other must also be personal. And since the negative which constitutes the positive is distinct, one is left with panentheism,

39 See for example, Macmurray, Objectivity in Religion, 193.
40 "The first is that the conception of God at which we have arrived is not pantheistic. Pantheism results from the attempt to give religious colour to an organic conception of the world. A personal conception alone is fully theistic and fully religious." PR, 223. See also Macmurray, Objectivity in Religion, 189.
41 Macmurray, Objectivity in Religion, 190.
42 PR, 223.
not pantheism. Naturally, it may be the case that one is trinitarian and still holds to panentheism, but the point here is that Macmurray's position is not antithetical to a trinitarian conception of God.

Even if one is convinced that Macmurray's theology is not pantheistic, one is still left with concerns that there may be too close an analogy between human and divine persons in Macmurray's conceptualization. Langford expresses particular concern that humans are described as capable of transcendence, a category he would reserve for God alone. Yet one must question Langford here, for it is undisputed that humans have an ability to transcend their situation—an ability to step back and look at things from a different perspective. What Langford should defend is God's ultimate and supreme transcendence, God's ability to interact objectively with all creation and God-self. This is precisely what Macmurray means when he refers to God as the unlimited rational being.

Humans, by contrast, are only able to be objective within the limits of creation and only imperfectly this side of the eschaton.

Moreover, Macmurray guards against too close an analogy between human and divine persons through at least three means. First he states categorically that God is beyond person:

Demythologizers and searchers for a 'modern image' of God may take exception to the language of these paragraphs. While welcoming the claim for freedom of thought in religion which they embody, I believe that there is a danger that they

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43 Macmurray is very comfortable, probably too comfortable, with a minimalist theology. RAS, 77.
44 Tillich, however, would dispute the distinction, saying that no one, in fact, believes in pantheism as commonly defined. What he describes as pantheism demonstrates marked similarity to panentheism as defined, for example, by Moltmann. Paul Tillich, Perspectives on 19th and 20th Century Protestant Theology, ed. Carl E. Braaten (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), 94-95. Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom, 108-14; Experiences in Theology, 310-12.
45 "While a type of transcendence is attributed to God, the same transcendence of activity is found in man's capacity for self-reflection; thus the distinguishing quality of God's transcendence, which is an apotheosis of the capacity for reflection, is not at all clear." Langford, Natural Theology, 19. In this Langford is at least being consistent, for his primary critique of Macmurray is that he should really see humanity as essentially a thinker.
46 "As an ideal limit of personal being [action and thinking], it is the concept of an unlimited rational being, in which all the capacities of the Self are in full and unrestricted employment. As limited and finite persons, such a fullness of positive being lies beyond our range." SA, 87. Recalling that Macmurray defines rationality as objectivity in a non-rationalistic sense.
should go too far. Science cannot provide canons for religious language. Probably all religious language, certainly all religious language about God, must contain a mythological element, since it must speak, in terms of our ordinary experience, of what lies beyond it. The highest, richest and rarest qualities in our experience of human personality, such as the creative spontaneity, provide the most adequate basis for our characterization of God. Even these, of course, are inadequate, and we have to use them mythologically. God is beyond the personal, of course; but it is the personal in our experience which points in the direction of God, and provides the most adequate language we possess for references to God.  

Second, the use of qualifying adjectives (such as ultimate, supreme, absolute, unlimited) provide a linguistic pointer to distance the normal use of the term person and the modified usage of person when applied to the divine. Third, Macmurray often uses the adjectival form, personal, thereby implying that God shares characteristics with persons without limiting God merely to the concept of person. Just as a human being is material without necessarily being limited to matter, God is personal without necessarily being limited to personhood.  

Kirkpatrick, however, is of the opinion that Macmurray places too much distance between human and divine persons in this and similar passages. He constructs an elaborate argument that he intends to utilize in order to justify speaking of God not just as personal but as a person. He affirms that one's idea of the universal personal Other cannot be less than personal, but attacks the idea that it can be beyond the personal.  

Our reply, which is based upon Macmurray's principles if not his explicit argument, would be that what is more than personal cannot be an object of thought (and hence we could not know if the Other were more than personal). If the person is himself not more than personal in any way, then he cannot categorize the Other as more than personal, since the Other is determined in mutually reciprocal categories.  

Kirkpatrick admits that God could be more than personal but that "Macmurray's epistemology limits us, however, to talking about and conceiving only what can be
experienced and thus known.® Therefore he views Macmurray’s statement as an example of an otherworldly supernaturalism which is inconsistent with the Form of the Personal and therefore a slip back into modern dualism.®

There are several errors within Kirkpatrick’s line of reasoning. The most important stems from his interpretation of Macmurray’s epistemology. This critical failure is in seeing that for Macmurray, knowledge is not to be equated with reflection or conceptualization. At least as far back as Interpreting the Universe Macmurray has held that there is knowledge which is pre-reflective and which reflection presupposes. Throughout his analysis Kirkpatrick slides back and forth between viewing knowledge as being reflective or conceptual and being equated with experience. Note carefully Kirkpatrick’s line of reasoning in the first quotation: if it cannot be thought, it cannot be known. This is a fundamental misunderstanding of Macmurray’s actual epistemology where one can have an experience (and thereby knowledge) which one cannot explain or does not understand.®

Furthermore, human experience is full of encounters between those who are greater or lesser in one way or another. While it is often difficult to understand someone who is one’s intellectual or moral superior and the resulting knowledge is often imprecise and vague, it is not difficult to recognize and understand that they are, in fact, beyond oneself. This adjectival modification of the primary category is not then nonsensical, it is

51 Kirkpatrick, Idea of God, 160. However, when Kirkpatrick established this point in his consideration of Macmurray’s epistemology, he conceded that Macmurray never argued this and that this is his own argument “based on my own understanding of the implications of Macmurray’s position with regard to this question and should not be construed as Macmurray’s own reply.” Kirkpatrick, Idea of God, 115, n. 18.
52 Kirkpatrick, Idea of God, 162-64. Kirkpatrick cites Macmurray’s own admission that he may slip unaware back into dualism from time to time (SA, 14).
53 This shows just how pervasive the Cartesian equation of thought and knowledge is. Kirkpatrick spends a considerable effort in laying out the relation of experience, knowledge, and thought, recognizing that thought presupposes knowledge. However a close reading leaves one questioning whether he truly recognizes the distinction between knowledge and thought—although he specifically cites Macmurray concerning pre-reflective knowledge. See Kirkpatrick, Idea of God, 48-57. The second citation by Kirkpatrick above is absolutely correct—one cannot talk about that which one has not experienced—but this is not a symmetrical relation.
simply a recognition of the limitations of conceptuality and language. It is, to use more common terms, applying metaphorical or analogical language—what Macmurray would call *mythological* language.\(^5^4\)

Nor is the idea of *beyond* inherently dualistic, for as Personal logic is able to integrate lower levels into higher levels in a non-dualistic manner, one may assume that which is *at least* personal would likewise be able to integrate various levels of reality.

The entire controversy about whether to refer to God as a person or to refer to God as *at least* personal is partly a reflection of the larger issue about trinitarianism and the applicability of Macmurray’s philosophy to trinitarian categories.\(^5^5\) If God is a person, then how can God be three persons? It would seem that Macmurray wants to avoid the entire debate about the nature of God *ad intra*. Note in the quotation above that talk about God, which is beyond our normal experience (i.e., not God for us, but God for God-self) is necessarily mythological.\(^5^6\) Macmurray instead focuses upon God’s interaction with humanity and therefore limits himself to the description of God *ad extra*. This results in a position akin to Pannenberg who, as summarized by Peters, holds: “When God confronts the world through personal relationship, it will be as Father, as Son, or as Spirit. It will

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\(^{54}\) Mark Johnson argues like Macmurray that all thought is at root imaginative and further Johnson convincingly demonstrates the basis of reflection upon embodied metaphor. Johnson’s description of the in-out and related containment schemata would be applicable to the concept of beyond. Mark Johnson, 30-40.

\(^{55}\) “Schleiermacher, who is sometimes called in Protestant circles the Father of Modern Theology, stated explicitly that as a philosopher he could not accept the personality of God, though the idea might be useful in religious experience, or even necessary to religious life. The result of this view is to concede that religion, in its specifically religious character, is subjective and that, therefore, any attempt to know reality in its objective nature must pass beyond religion and treat it as a phantasy of the child-life of humanity.” RE, 214-15.


\(^{56}\) Again, Kirkpatrick has an excellent passage on the theoretical basis for this in Macmurray’s thought (*Idea of God*, 86-87) but when he analyzes the passage on mythological language (SRR, 45, n. 1), he seems to forget this and attributes it to dualism.
not be in the form of an abstract unity. *God is personal only through one or another of the three hypostases, not as a single ineffable entity.*

One can see that Macmurray is consistent in holding to the knowledge of God as being beyond the personal, and also resists pressure either to limit God to being a singular person or to embrace the orthodoxy of triune persons based upon the limitations of human understandings of personhood.

### 4.1.2.3 Idealism and the Idea of God

Both Haddox and Roy accuse Macmurray of being an idealist. While there may be several reasons for this incorrect conclusion, the prominence and importance of the idea of God must surely be one of the most significant. This misperception is only exaggerated further if one focuses upon the Gifford lectures which arrive at a theoretical conclusion, the idea of God. Although cited above, it is helpful to review that portion of the conclusion of *Persons in Relation*:

> There is, then, only one way in which we can think our relation to the world, and that is to think it as a personal relation, through the form of the personal. We must think that the world is one action, and that its impersonal aspect is the negative aspect of this unity of actions, contained in it, subordinated within it, and necessary to its constitution. To conceive the world thus is to conceive it as the act of God, the Creator of the world, and ourselves as created agents, with a limited and dependent freedom to determine the future, which can be realized only on the condition that our intentions are in harmony with His intention, and which must frustrate itself if they are not.

In this passage the theoretical nature is clear: it is conceptual and to that extent ideal. However, Macmurray is quick to point out the need (and inherent difficulty) of verifying this religious construct and therefore the necessity of moving from thought to

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58 Among these are the fact that most personalists are idealists and that a non-standard conception of idealism is being used, a conception that would seem to designate all philosophy, at least all modern philosophy, as idealistic.

59 PR, 222. Emphasis added.
action.\textsuperscript{60} It is absolutely essential when considering Macmurray’s philosophy that one remember he is doing philosophy—a reflective task—which by its very nature is conceptual, yet the very thrust of this theoretical activity is the requirement of completing thought in action. Macmurray expresses this very point when he says,

The proposal to start from the primacy of the practical does not mean that we should aim at a practical rather than a theoretical philosophy. It may indeed have the effect of concentrating our attention upon action, as the primacy of the theoretical tends to concentrate attention on the problems of knowledge. What it does mean is that we should think \textit{from the standpoint of action}. Philosophy is necessarily theoretical, and must aim at a theoretical strictness. It does not follow that we must theorize from the standpoint of theory.\textsuperscript{61}

Any philosophy will rely on concepts and to that extent is idealistic or theoretical. The real definition of idealism, however, rests on the location of reality in the mind.

Macmurray is no idealist and ultimately it is not the idea of God which matters most to Macmurray, but the God who is encountered in action.\textsuperscript{62}

4.1.3 CONCLUSION: THE IDEA OF GOD AS THE POINT OF DEPARTURE

Macmurray’s treatment of God as mental object focuses upon the conceptual need for something to function both as the absolute Agent uniting the universe in one action and the universal personal Other reconciling and relating individuals to the rest of reality. Macmurray calls this idea God. God’s self-revelation occurs through God’s action, the universe, which is distinct from (yet in relation to) God. Macmurray recognizes that God is at least personal but resists speculating on the nature of God \textit{ad intra}. Instead he focuses upon the idea of God as experienced. The full force of Macmurray’s concept of revelation is muted by his seemingly self-imposed limitation to natural revelation. He

\textsuperscript{60} PR, 223-24.
\textsuperscript{61} SA, 85. Emphasis in original.
\textsuperscript{62} “And moreover, because religious reflection is not primarily expressed in thought but in action, God is not primarily apprehended as an idea, but in life which is centred in the intention of mutuality, as that personal infinite in which our finite human relationships have their ground and their being.” SRE, 54.
clearly believes a distinction exists between God and humanity. Finally it is recognized that Macmurray did not intend the idea of God to act as the final destination, but as the point of departure for human knowledge of God. For God is not apprehended primarily in thought but in life. In order to begin to see how God is apprehended in life, one must consider the historical dimension of Macmurray’s doctrine of God.

4.2 NATURAL CHRISTOLOGY: 
GOD AS HISTORICAL OBJECT—
JESUS AND CHRISTIANITY

The centrality of Jesus for Christianity is beyond question. Nevertheless, there are any number of interpretations of Jesus and Christianity and the relationship between the two. One cannot exist within the Western tradition without taking some position in this regard. For Macmurray the centrality of Jesus for Christianity is affirmed. In particular, Jesus functions in a dual capacity. First is his essential role in moving from an idea of God to the concrete realization of God within history through incarnation. Second there is the normative nature of the person and teachings of Jesus for real Christianity.

4.2.1 INCARNATION: 
THE HUMANITY OF JESUS

The idea of incarnation, which in one form or another appears in all immediate religions, merely expresses the fact that our awareness of the personal infinite comes to us, and can only come, in and through our awareness of finite personality.63

Early in Macmurray’s career, he explicitly addressed the incarnation and the necessity of it for any form of objectivity (or rationality) in religion. In order for any religion to be objective it must overcome both prophetic subjectivity and the intellectual reduction of God to merely a useful concept.

The discrepancy between the prophet’s personality and his conception of God must disappear, and at the same time the conception of God must recapture its

63 IU, 124.
footing in history and show itself able to unify and explain the world of fact. That is the need. How can it be met?  

The answer to this question is the incarnation. 

If God becomes incarnate in a human personality, both gulfs are bridged, and religion becomes objective at once. Here we should have a real person—no longer the idea of a person—rooted in the actuality of history, who would not merely create, but embody a conception of God, and in whom, therefore, the distance that separates the prophet's personality from his vision would have disappeared. 

It is important to notice that Macmurray views this as a hypothesis to be tested and not a dogma to be accepted. This hypothesis is first judged to be reasonable by noting Jesus' persistent conflation of his ministry and the character of God and then is tentatively verified by appealing to the universality of Jesus, for "all life and all nature can be understood in the light of his personality." For Macmurray, Jesus' universality is evident in his social significance, as the clue to history, and as the peak of both spiritual and natural evolution. 

One must be aware that in Macmurray's use of the incarnation the emphasis is primarily upon the humanity, and not the deity, of Jesus. This is consistent with his 

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64 Macmurray, Objectivity in Religion, 202. "This means that Jesus may be described as Saviour not because he introduces into the world some 'beautiful revelation', a 'sublime teaching' about the person, but 'because he realizes in history the very reality of the person and makes it the basis and 'hypostasis' of the person for every man.' Torrance, Persons in Communion, 299, citing John Zizioulas, Being in Communion (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1985), 54. 
65 Macmurray, Objectivity in Religion, 202. 
66 Macmurray, Objectivity in Religion, 203. 
67 Macmurray, Objectivity in Religion, 204-05. 
68 Macmurray, Objectivity in Religion, 207. He then lays out three areas of Jesus' universality. 1. Spiritually: "It must be shown that the various aspects of the spiritual activity of men, in art and science, in metaphysics and morality, in social organisation and political development, as well as religion are held, as it were, in solution in the personality of Jesus, and find their spiritual unity in his attitude to life." (207). 2. Historically: "The personality of Jesus must be taken as the focus of human history. Does it vivify and gather into unity the earlier stretches of the history of the race? Can Christ be regarded as the climax of evolution? Can He dominate the future? Does the impact of His personality upon Europe account for the fact that the character of its development to the present day? Can we trace back to the work of Jesus the gradual civilisation and unification of Europe, the creation of modern science, the development of democratic institutions and the other great movements of the Christian era? Was the spirit of Christ the solvent which enabled Christendom to melt into one living civilisation the one-sided achievements of Greece and of Rome?" (208-09). 3. Nature: "Does Jesus interpret nature as well as humanity, focusing them both so that they blend into a unity of meaning? Can His attitude to life make spiritual values consistent with our scientific knowledge of the material world?" (209). 
70 Macmurray, Objectivity in Religion, 211. Later the title of his book on history would be The Clue to History.
overall philosophical and theological concern to defeat idealism in religion. In christology
idealism is most typically manifest in an overemphasis upon Christ’s deity at the expense
of his humanity, resulting in an all too common functional docetism.

While Speidell’s accusation that Macmurray has a “Harnackian God” is an
overstatement, he does identify certain affinities between Harnack and Macmurray,
especially in the area of the historicity of Jesus. Macmurray stresses the historical aspects
of Jesus, Jesus’ self-proclaimed relation to God as Father (without entering into the
debate as to whether this is an inherent claim of divinity), the importance of love, and the
distortion of Jesus’ teaching by Greek metaphysics. What Speidell intends as a blanket
rebuke, Macmurray would treat as a partial commendation, for he sees the absolute
necessity of the historicity of Jesus for the reality of God. Downplaying the deity of
Jesus, Macmurray focuses attention upon Jesus as messiah, prophet, religious genius,
and teacher whose relation to God was so intimate he could refer to God as Father and
himself as Son. Even when titles such as mediator and Word are used of Jesus, one must
be careful to not automatically take it as a sign that Macmurray is attributing divinity to
Jesus, for taken in context they are applied generically to any religious genius or prophet:

Here lies the task of the religious genius. He is the individual in whom the
consciousness of the meaning of religion is achieved at any stage in human
development and thought whom it is mediated and made available to humanity as
a whole. He is indeed the mediator between God and man. He is the interpreter to
any society of men and the stage of community which they have achieved. He is
the Word that expresses, and so realizes in consciousness, for others as well as for
himself, the meaning of the religious impulse as it has expressed itself in the
creation of community. That consciousness, that expression in the world of the

71 Macmurray, Objectivity in Religion, 212.
72 Speidell, 287.
73 These were constants throughout Macmurray’s discourses on Jesus. See for example, SRR, 47-62. See F.
F. Bruce, “Harnack, Adolf” in NDT, 286-87.
74 Accusations that it was denied (which seems to be the thrust of Speidell’s reading of Macmurray) go too
far. The debate was rarely entered into. See below §4.2.3.
75 For example, CH, 43; SRR, 48; RE, 240. The similarity to Harnack has already been noted, yet here one
sees general similarities with the entire liberal tradition stemming from Schleiermacher. See Tillich, 90-114,
also Grenz and Olson, 49.
prophet, is the condition of any further advance in the achievement of community.\textsuperscript{76}

While Jesus may be the prophet \textit{par excellence} this does not necessarily make him divine. Langford clearly discerns this point when he suggests Macmurray's christological locus is the Humanity of God.\textsuperscript{77}

4.2.2 \textbf{CHRISTIANITY:}
\textbf{THE HISTORICAL NATURE OF THE RELIGION OF JESUS}

It was in Jesus that the development of Jewish culture was completed, and it was through Jesus that the whole development of Hebrew experience became a universal force in human history. Jesus is at once the culmination of Jewish prophecy and the source of Christianity.\textsuperscript{78}

Macmurray's relation to the institutional church was problematic, yet it is absolutely essential that one understand that he sees himself as advocating Christianity. It is a \textit{real} Christianity he seeks, but it is Christianity and none other.\textsuperscript{79} Real Christianity is religious reflection (symbolic action) in continuity with the intentional action of Jesus through history.\textsuperscript{80} It is not principally an institutional or organizational continuity, a mistake brought into the Church by acquiescence to the Roman worldview. Nor is it primarily a continuity of correct doctrine or opinion, the error of orthodoxy infecting the Church from Greek philosophy.\textsuperscript{81} Christianity is the flowering of Jewish religious consciousness as discovered and realized in its fullness by Jesus Christ.\textsuperscript{82}

Macmurray clearly sees Jesus as being a Jew, and goes to great lengths to emphasize this point in the face of European tendencies to recast Jesus as European or

\textsuperscript{76} RB, 240.
\textsuperscript{77} Langford, Natural Theology, 19. Although he laments the virtual absence of the development of this theme in Macmurray's later works. See also Karl Barth, \textit{The Humanity of God}, trans. T. Wieser and J.N. Thomas (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1960).
\textsuperscript{78} CH, 42.
\textsuperscript{79} For example, see FMW, 58-60, 64; RB, 121; SA, 30.
\textsuperscript{80} CH, 15; FMW, 76-77. It is important here to see that Macmurray is using the term 'history' in a slightly different sense than when he is referring to historical reflection, although there is obvious similarity. History here would seem to have a connotation of activity within the space-time continuum, as opposed to the particularizing reflection upon action which is historical reflection.
\textsuperscript{81} See in particular SRR, 57-58; CH, 152-54.
Western. This move helps to distance Jesus from the more Western model of the teacher as abstract philosopher and reinforces Macmurray's placement of him in continuity with the Old Testament tradition of the prophets with their emphasis upon the criticism of the concrete social practices of their day. Therefore the prophetic Jesus' teaching is seen as profoundly practical. Rather than portraying Jesus as a Greek philosopher or mystic whose only concern is with a heaven beyond history and this material world, Macmurray interprets Jesus as being concerned with "the universal significance of human history" the "significance of human life" and "the intention of God in human history." For Macmurray, then, Jesus' genius was to discover the true nature of God and humanity: both are personal, that is to say, characterized by love.

Dualism's effect upon the Church, however, has led to a fundamental misunderstanding of Jesus and his teaching. For example, since Jesus is concerned with this world, virtue is not its own abstract reward but shows how human intention should line up with God's intention and therefore result in completely realized action. Similarly, consider the interpretation of Christ's temptation. According to Macmurray the specific forms of temptation have everything to do with the reaffirmation of the reality of God at work in history and in the laws of nature—that Roman domination is in fact part

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82 CH, 42. See also FMW, 77.
83 This was particularly important in light of developments in Germany during the writing of The Clue to History. The last section of the work on current developments in Europe clearly shows an interest in the developments of both Fascism and Communism and the relation of each to Macmurray's understanding of Christianity (CH, 167-237).
84 CH, 44; RE 240.
85 SRR, 54. Macmurray attempts to diffuse the potential counter-argument that Jesus said that his kingdom was not of this world by pointing out that full text "otherwise my disciples would fight", which to Macmurray indicates that this refers to the world as the Roman system of unity through fear and violence, not a reference to the universe as a whole. SRR, 78.
86 CH, 55.
87 CH, 57.
of the work of God, violent revolution is not the solution, and that the material basis of life (gravity and hunger) are part of God's good creation.

Another example of dualism is the relation of Jesus' apocalypticism and his ethical teaching. Often these have been viewed as existing in tension, since apocalyptic is assumed to be the future disjunctive and violent in-breaking of God into the world while ethics deal with correct human behavior under current conditions. According to Macmurray apocalyptic is nothing more than the inevitability of God's intention being realized in history—and therefore it is the basis of Christ's ethical teaching, not its negation or disruption. In other words, Christ's morality is eschatological in nature.

The separation and perceived incompatibility is due to the encroachment of dualism, especially stoicism, into Christianity which has warped the nature of Christian morality and the understanding of the kingdom of heaven on earth.

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89 One should not assume that this makes Macmurray socially passive or conservative, neither of which characterizes Macmurray's life. The point here is that violent revolution is not the answer because the means are ultimately counter-productive to the desired ends.

90 CH, 46. Yet it is important to note that Macmurray does not deal at all with how to understand the various miracle stories in the Gospels.

91 "It is a religious understanding of the structure of reality which reveals the inevitable inter-connexion between the element of the process of history. The apocalyptic element in the teaching of Jesus is, indeed, the major premise [sic] upon which the whole of the teaching of Jesus rests...." CH, 53. There is a disruptive element because the fear and hatred are overcome and in that sense the world experiences a radical disruption, but at the same time since it is all part of history God's intentions are being realized even through the negative and counter-intentional sins of humanity in history.

92 The eschatological element is present in Macmurray's focus upon God's intention being inevitably realized. However, one would like to see it more clearly emphasized and developed. See Fergusson, John Macmurray, 22.

93 Macmurray clearly associates his idea of the positively motivated universal community of real religion with the kingdom of God. It is important to note the potential for ambiguity in Macmurray's conception of the kingdom. Certain passages seem to emphasize the human aspect of the creation of the kingdom. "Christ Jesus lives in us and in the world, manifesting the nature of the god we worship and working through us to create the fulness of the Kingdom of God on earth." SRR, 53. Other passages affirm the cooperative nature between God and humanity in the kingdom. "The task of the Church today, I believe, is what it always has been—to co-operate with God under the guidance of the Spirit of Christ in establishing on earth the Kingdom of Heaven." SRR, 76. One must agree, at least in part, with Limpitlaw's characterization: "in his account of Christianity ... he tends to emphasize the human almost at the expense of, rather than in conjunction with, the divine. Thus, for example, while he strongly stressed the need for human persons to act responsibly as co-workers with God in the furtherance of God creative purpose ... his account of what will create the Kingdom focuses almost exclusively on human action and does not directly address the issue of divine action. He appears to have assumed that human action alone is sufficient to the establishment of the Kingdom." Limpitlaw, 320-21. Limpitlaw's last sentence may go too far, but she does underline the fact that Macmurray is more concerned with the human dimension than the divine dimension. This is due, at least in part, to Macmurray's tendency to avoid any hints of escapism.
4.2.3 **The Limits of Natural Christology**

While the historical necessity of Jesus is essential for Macmurray to make the leap from a conceptual God to a real God, the employment of modern historical method fails him at precisely this point, for historical method cannot prove or disprove Jesus' divinity. The reductionistic nature of this methodology expresses itself in the manner in which Macmurray uses Christian scripture, his reluctance to deal with distinctly religious experience, and his failure to expound upon and exploit the divine aspects of the incarnation.

4.2.3.1 Scripture and Historical Method

One early essay provides a clue to Macmurray's approach to scripture with broad methodological ramifications for his later theology. While attempting to demonstrate the reasonableness of the hypothesis of the incarnation, Macmurray states:

We will, if you please, disregard all evidence of positive claims on His part to a unique relationship with God as suspect because possibly spurious, although the concession, to my mind, borders on the ludicrous.^[44]

The decision to limit discussion to those points dictated by the modern intellectual consensus of the time meant the adoption of the modern historical method. This capitulation was one repeated throughout his career. What initially can be seen as merely an apologetic strategy came to delineate the boundaries of much of Macmurray's writing. So much so that one must question whether he himself did not adopt it as his own, not recognizing the inherent limitations and potential for dualism inherent in scientific historical method.^[45] The influence of historical method is evidenced by Macmurray's

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^[45] See Martin Kahler, *The So-Called Historical Jesus and the Historic Biblical Christ* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1964). According to C. E. Braaten's introduction, Kahler opposed the "hidden ebionitism, the obscuration of the trans-human dimensions of the biblical Christ." (19) He clearly saw that for the Life of Jesus movement, "The 'historical Jesus' is not the earthly Jesus as such, but rather Jesus insofar as he can be made the object of historical-critical research." (20-21) This distorts the portrait of Jesus: "The historian too often begins by claiming that he conducts his research purely objectively, without presuppositions, and
Macmurray’s account of Jesus would seem to fit in Kahler’s category of positive historicism which focuses upon living Christianity and a moral Christ.\(^9\)

Even writing for a religious audience, Macmurray is still hesitant about invoking categories such as the resurrection in order to “keep strictly to the historical field.”\(^9\) The teachings of Jesus are acceptable.\(^9\) Yet they are mainly seen as the culmination of arguments, and rarely as their basis. Perhaps this is due to Macmurray’s resistance to arguments from authority. This anti-authoritarian stance applies not only to the contents of scripture, but also to its interpretation.

Within the fragments that were left [after the Renaissance and Reformation], within the separate States and churches, the reign of law, of organization and policy, the dominance of reason was re-established. The authority of the Bible took the place of the authority of the particular Church, and soon came to mean ends by surreptitiously introducing a set of presuppositions whose roots lie deeply in an anti-Christian Weltanschauung.” (22)

The critique of Macmurray’s historicism found here is different than the one advanced by Karl Popper (269-80). Here the focus is more specifically upon the problems of historical method while Popper denounces any pretense of a meaning to history—seeing history as an equation of power or success with truth, since the powerful write the history. He specifically mentions Macmurray’s Clue to History and interprets him pragmatically: “Such a clue to history implies the worship of success; it implies that the meek will be justified because they will be on the winning side.” Popper, 274. He resists any form of “prophecy” in history and demands instead action (280). There is a definite tendency in the Form of the Personal for epistemological progress, but Popper is pushing this too hard in Macmurray’s case. Popper is certainly correct to fight the deference to supposed historical fact, because historical facts have no meaning until they are given meaning by those who write the history. This criticism falls into the similar category as accusing Macmurray of being a pragmatist—truth is whatever works, while Macmurray’s position is it works because it is true.

Based upon the discussion above regarding Macmurray’s rejection of the distinction between the natural and the supernatural, some might see Macmurray rejecting the miraculous. However, it all depends upon how one conceives of the category of the miraculous. If it is God acting directly in creation, then the rejection of the supernatural does not necessarily include this. The miraculous may be conceived of either in terms of significance or unusualness of the type of action on God’s part.

Kähler categorizes three different forms of historicism applied to the life of Jesus: positive, focusing upon living Christianity and the moral Christ; negative, focusing upon the mythological dimension and producing a mystic Christ; and speculative, which adopted a philosophy of history resulting in an ideal Christ. Kähler, 22-23.

SRR, 52. This can be seen much earlier, for example RE, 263, where redemption (and therefore reconciliation) is effected by the death of Jesus, but there is no consideration of his resurrection.

Even this has become problematic as ever more radical historical methods have been applied to the Bible, resulting in discussions such as The Jesus Seminar.
the authority of the particular Church through its official interpretation of the Bible.\textsuperscript{100}

It is unclear here whether Macmurray sees the authority of the Bible (before it was recaptured by institutional interpretation) as a positive or a negative development. Yet, he biographically recalls the positive experience of attempting a re-pristined reading of \textit{Romans} utilizing tools from his study of classical literature which would “lay bare their meaning.”\textsuperscript{101} It would seem that Macmurray was extolling scripture when read properly without any imposed external authority.

The hermeneutical issue raised by Macmurray’s move involves the transfer of authority from the tradition of the Church to the canons of the contemporary scientific milieu of the reader. Macmurray appears completely unaware of the presuppositions accompanying the adoption of such modern historical tools. While rejecting the Church as the interpretive community, he essentially adopted a modified contemporary milieu as the interpretative community— including some of its inherent individualism, which elsewhere he so vigorously opposed. This pervasively individualistic hermeneutic is the most likely source of Macmurray’s spiritual isolation throughout most of his adult life.\textsuperscript{102} This hermeneutic, taken together with Macmurray’s reticence in challenging the boundaries of historicism, reinforces the earlier perception that what originally may have been a mere concession, became a reductionism within Macmurray’s philosophical practice. It is almost as if he confuses historical reflection with personal action within the historical space-time continuum. This dominance of the historical method makes it very

\textsuperscript{100}FMW, 80.
\textsuperscript{101}SRR, 13. For general discussion of his reading of Romans and its impact upon his theological development see SRR, 13-14.
\textsuperscript{102}Recognizing that Macmurray himself attributes this isolation to his rejection of the church as State religions. Yet this isolation goes beyond this simple act and the irony of this historical reality in Macmurray’s biography is of no small concern to anyone who takes Macmurray’s philosophy seriously. For some it is only his commitment to the Quakers at the end of his life that keeps from invalidating his entire philosophy as unreal.
easy to read Macmurray’s comments about historical and religious experience as a new dualism.

4.2.3.2 Historical and Religious Experience: A New Dualism?

Closely related to the foregoing discussion is the distinction Macmurray makes between historical and religious experience. This is clearly seen when he clusters together the resurrection, the presence of Jesus in Christian worship, the deity of Jesus, and the post-resurrection encounters between Christ and his disciples as religious experiences. These religious experiences have their own religious meanings and require the use of mythological language because they are expressions of the experience of God who is beyond the personal. By contrasting religious experience with historical experience and normal experience Macmurray appears to be establishing a fatal dualism at the heart of the Form of the Personal. If this dualism exists, then the entire foundation of the system crumbles because it is based upon the phenomenological accessibility of religion. If religious experience is out of bounds to investigation, then the integrating nature is lost.

While it is possible to interpret Macmurray this way, as Kirkpatrick does and so dismisses these statements as reversions to dualism on Macmurray’s part, it is also possible to understand them in a non-dualistic manner. First consider the opposition of religious experience and historical experience. Just as one is able to reflect upon personal experience (that is to say, religious experience) reductionistically as art and science, so too one may reflect on personal experience (religion) reductionistically as history and philosophy. Religious experience encompasses and surpasses historical experience. Furthermore, one cannot isolate the religious component from the historical, because without the historical aspect religious experience is no longer religious experience. It is either philosophy, or it is unreal. Religious experience, therefore, is not non-historical,
rather it is not limited "strictly to the historical field." Therefore one may know in religious experience, or express in religious reflection, something which is not entirely expressible within the categories and methods of historical reflection.

More perplexing is Macmurray's juxtaposing of religious and normal experience. It is very difficult to determine if he is equating normal with historical. If he is, then this would be a clear case of Macmurray slipping into dualism, most likely due to his adoption of the modern historical method discussed above. Yet this interpretation is not necessitated by Macmurray's words. Instead, one may look at the programmatic function of this statement within his argument. He states that religious talk in general and God-talk in particular is mythological. According to Macmurray there is no way but by metaphor to speak about God ad intra. Human knowledge of God can only be based upon our limited experience of God ad extra, and even here there is need for analogy or metaphor because the experience is with something which is, strictly speaking, beyond the merely personal. Therefore, mythological language and adjectival qualifiers are used to express what can be expressed in the experience. If all religious experience is to some extent the awareness of God, however inadequate or inaccurately understood, then all religious language will need to employ metaphor (mythological language) to express the divine aspects which are beyond the merely personal. One should see in this particular usage of normal and religious Macmurray's attempt to emphasize the distance between human and divine aspects in communal religious activity, most likely as an attempt to correct earlier misreadings which tended to interpret him as collapsing the human and divine.

In defending a non-dualistic interpretation of Macmurray, one must acknowledge that his choice of terms, especially mythological language, does very little to clarify the

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102 SRR, 52-53, 45 n. 1.
104 SRR, 52.
issue and in fact introduces substantial confusion. One questions the utility of myth in this context, for it tends to obscure the metaphorical nature of all language and reflection based as it is in the imagination; myth is simply a particular type of metaphor. It is a question of difference in degree rather than in kind. Metaphor is used in talk of God, religion, art, and even science.\textsuperscript{106}

4.2.3.3 History and the Deity of Jesus: The Missing Link

One of the great missed opportunities of Macmurray’s theology is the failure to programmatically expound and exploit the incarnation. One can only speculate as to the reasons for its virtual disappearance (along with christology in general) after the mid-1930s in Macmurray’s writings. Perhaps he felt it had been sufficiently covered by himself or others? Perhaps he found the Western mind so associated Jesus with deity that it was impossible to invoke Christ and not cause idealistic misperceptions? Perhaps he simple felt that the theoretical and more conspicuously philosophical issues required more attention? Nevertheless, one must conclude that, for whatever reasons, Macmurray failed to adequately develop and incorporate his christological understanding of the incarnation as the necessary bridge from God as a pragmatic theoretical construct to Emmanuel, God with us. Furthermore, he failed to exploit the solution the incarnation provides to the problem of the ambiguity of God’s self-revelation in nature. For in Jesus there is the full human embodiment of God, whose actions (including the narrowly linguistic communicative acts) reveal God to the human race. Just as Barth’s famous focus upon God as the “wholly other” was clarified in the writing of The Humanity of God, so too,

\textsuperscript{106} In a personal letter to Jeffko, Macmurray denies that the Form of the Personal may be legitimately applied to God’s nature and he believes that any attempt to conceptualize God will result in antinomies. Jeffko, 61, n. 150.

\textsuperscript{106} Once again one sees the important contribution of Mark Johnson’s Body in the Mind for its emphasis upon the embodied metaphor as the basis of all thought.
Macmurray’s focus upon Christ’s humanity should have been complemented by a work entitled *The Deity of Jesus*.

### 4.2.4 SUMMARY

In spite of his later lack of emphasis upon christology, Macmurray recognized the crucial nature of the incarnation for the reality of God. His focus upon the humanity of God, the historicity of Jesus, and his anti-idealistic and anti-docetic positions are all positive contributions.

One must nonetheless question why he chooses to accommodate the dualistic restrictions of modern historical method and thereby is denied the warrant to investigate the divine aspects of Jesus, including the resurrection and the miraculous. One cannot help but wonder if the habits of modernism were too much to overcome, resulting in the primary utilization of the narrowly historical to the detriment of the religious. The re-emergence of Jesus as a topic within the religious context of *The Search for Reality in Religion* inclines one to accept a strongly apologetic rationale for this methodology, but one is nonetheless haunted by the suspicion that in some ways Macmurray is enslaved by the apologetic tools he chooses.

In discussing the mythological aspects of religious discourse an important assumption lurks in the background. This is the contemporary experience of God in religion. The existence of the historical Jesus (regardless of his divine status) in Palestine approximately two millennia ago is insufficient alone to account for current interaction between God and human persons. When one speaks of God at work in the present world, one enters the field of pneumatology.
4.3 **Natural Pneumatology:**

**God as Interactive Other—**

**God as Spirit**

There is no place at all for spirit in a material universe; nor for matter in a spiritual universe. This can only mean that both matter and spirit are misconceptions.\(^{107}\)

*Spirit*, and its various cognates, are relatively absent from Macmurray’s writings.\(^{108}\) As happens so often with Macmurray, terms he finds too heavily burdened with incorrect associations and connotations he essentially discards from his vocabulary.\(^{109}\)\(^{\text{PR, 213.}}\)

*Spirit* is definitely a term he finds overwhelmed by misconceptions, yet when it is positively appropriated it is seen to be an integrating term, for “the spiritual is not other than the material, but inclusive of it. Spirit is not other than body but more than body.”\(^{110}\)

Ordinarily Macmurray overcomes dualism through integration in action by the person, so one would expect to see the integration of body and spirit in the personal. Remembering the rules of Personal logic outlined above, this may mean that either matter and spirit are both negative poles of *person* or it is also possible that the word *spirit* is interchangeable with *person*. The latter is the more likely of the two possibilities.\(^{\text{PR, 213 quoted above.}}\)

Therefore, by considering the various aspects of God as personal in comparison to the contemporary discussion of pneumatology one should be able to verify their functional equivalence.

Before proceeding it is necessary to make a comment or two regarding Macmurray’s doctrine of God and pneumatology. First is the distinction between Macmurray’s personalistic concept of God as being pneumatological and the use of Macmurray’s philosophical definition of person within a trinitarian doctrine of God. The latter, which McIntyre notes on three occasions, is how Macmurray’s understanding of

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\(^{107}\) PR, 213.

\(^{108}\) Often the word *spiritual* is used as a virtual synonym for the idealistic pole of various dualisms, e.g.: PR, 123, 171, 213; RAS, 46-47.

\(^{110}\) PR, 213 quoted above.
person is employed in the contemporary trinitarian discussion of the Father, Son, and Spirit as persons.\textsuperscript{111} What is being argued here, by contrast, is that Macmurray’s entire personalistic thought, insofar as it is concerned with God, may be seen as pneumatology.\textsuperscript{112}

Second, since Macmurray self-consciously limits himself to natural theology the discussion of pneumatology will focus upon those areas commonly associated with the way that humanity experiences the Spirit, the economic (or \textit{opera ad extra}) of pneumatology. The excellent exposition of pneumatology provided by John McIntyre’s \textit{The Shape of Pneumatology} will be used to expedite this pneumatological investigation.\textsuperscript{113} Within McIntyre’s pneumatology there are three major models: the definitional/biblical pluralistic model, the trinitarian model, and the dynamic model.

Within each model there exists sub-divisions, which McIntyre refers to as patterns. The dynamic model deals with the economic experience of the Spirit. There are two primary patterns within the dynamic model, the relational pattern and the ecclesial polarity pattern. Each of these shall be considered in turn and the correspondence with Macmurray’s doctrine of God will be demonstrated.

\textsuperscript{110} RE, 257. Also “God is real; and therefore he is the ultimate synthesis of matter and spirit, of Nature and Man.” Macmurray, Christianity and Communism, 526.

\textsuperscript{111} McIntyre, \textit{Shape of Pneumatology}, 27, 169, 208.

\textsuperscript{112} Not once does McIntyre directly relate Macmurray’s philosophy to pneumatology proper nor Macmurray’s understanding of the person as spirit. He does consider the impact of Buber’s personalism on pneumatology and discusses how God conceived of as personality is ultimately pneumatological. See below §4.3.1.7.

Furthermore, McIntyre makes a general comment about the obvious relation of these terms: “Perhaps the time has come to issue a warning, a recognition of the difficulties created by being, on the one hand, too precise in the definition of such concepts as spirit, soul, self, person; and on the other hand, of using them with a certain looseness, as if they were interchangeable.” McIntyre, \textit{Shape of Pneumatology}, 179.

\textsuperscript{113} Another excellent work on pneumatology from below is Michael Welker, \textit{God the Spirit}. However McIntyre’s presentation is more concise and lends itself more readily to this type of use.
4.3.1 **THE DYNAMIC PNEUMATOLOGICAL MODEL: RELATIONAL PATTERN**

McIntyre examines seven essential loci within the relational pattern of the dynamic model of pneumatology. For each loci, his definition will be quoted, followed by a short commentary on the definition. Based upon this synopsis various comparisons with Macmurray’s doctrine of God will be drawn.

4.3.1.1 **Spirit Relates to Particular Humans**

*The Holy Spirit is God himself relating himself to the specific details of human existence within the natural process and world history.*

The first aspect of the relational pattern of pneumatology McIntyre observes is the relationality of God to particular humans. According to McIntyre this point acknowledges that while “God stands in a general relationship to the totality of created existence as its originator, its sustainer and universal provider” the Spirit is also the “God [who] relates himself in an utterly loving, utterly humbling and utterly disturbing way to every jot and tittle of each person’s existence.” It is God relating not to humanity as a whole, in general, or in abstraction but to each as a particular person. Thus it resists the tendency toward some vague relationality. In addition, note that McIntyre is not speaking about a purely existential relation, but also includes natural process and history. In other words, there is an inherent connection to concrete reality in this relation. It is important to be clear here. McIntyre is not saying the Holy Spirit is the relationship between God and the individual, but rather God the Holy Spirit enters into this relationship with the human person.

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114 McIntyre, *Shape of Pneumatology*, 173.
115 McIntyre, *Shape of Pneumatology*, 173.
117 Individual will be used in this section as a convenient short-hand for a particular concrete human person. This should not be seen as a reversion into dualism.
118 "The Holy Spirit is not said to be the relation of God to the minutiae of human existence within its natural and historical occurrence. To adopt that view would be to revert to the hypostatizing or personalizing of a relationship, a logical understanding of the nature of a trinitarian person which we have
In reading McIntyre’s description of the Holy Spirit as God in relation to particular humans one cannot help but be reminded of Macmurray’s discussion of God as the universal Other who stands in relation to each individual.

4.3.1.2 Spirit Involved Pervasively in the Human Person

The Holy Spirit is God’s involving himself in human volition and action, thought and feeling, as they occur in natural and historical process.\(^{119}\)

The second element in the relational pattern is God’s involvement exhaustively and pervasively in all aspects of the individual human being. This point goes beyond the previous point by speaking of the penetration of the human person by the divine Spirit. “It seeks to show how God relates himself to the specific, by indicating that he does not remain external to that which is related, but becomes internally related to it.”\(^{120}\)

If Macmurray’s God is personal, and persons are heterocentric and mutually constituting, then one must recognize the penetration of the human person by the divine person. If our interpretation regarding Macmurray’s understanding of worship as an act of God is accurate, this would provide an excellent example of such an indwelling.\(^{121}\)

4.3.1.3 Spirit’s Identification with Humanity

The Holy Spirit is God identifying himself with human thoughts, feelings and action, the natural occasions referred to above.\(^{122}\)

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\(^{119}\) McIntyre, *Shape of Pneumatology*, 176.

\(^{120}\) McIntyre, *Shape of Pneumatology*, 177.

\(^{121}\) McIntyre, *Shape of Pneumatology*, 177.

\(^{122}\) McIntyre contends that this involvement by God would produce “no characteristics empirically observable (that is, by unbelievers) by which his dynamic presence may be detected” which is not open to misinterpretation or attribution to “natural” causes (*Shape of Pneumatology*, 177-78). Macmurray would agree with the possibility of misinterpretation, but would disagree with the emphasis in McIntyre’s statement because he would want to underline that there should be some change in behavior, etc., which nonetheless could be misunderstood.

It is an open question as to whether God is constituted by human persons or only by divine persons—again Macmurray’s silence on the Trinity provides us with no way to determine a definitive answer—however this is not the central thrust of this point by McIntyre who is focusing upon how the Spirit relates to humans.

\(^{122}\) McIntyre, *Shape of Pneumatology*, 181.
Macmurray’s third element of the relational pattern is God identifying with humanity in our particular condition. McIntyre’s conception of identification is the means by which one is able to fully relate to the Other without the loss of oneself.

Identification is a process of self-exteriorisation in which the agents involved project themselves into the condition or situation of other persons. In the process, the agents do not become the other persons; they are not absorbed into the situation, nor do they develop the condition.¹²³

McIntyre sees this identification exemplified in its ultimate form in the incarnation as Christ identifies with sinful humanity through the power and presence of the Holy Spirit.¹²⁴

McIntyre’s notion of identification resonates well with Macmurray’s philosophy in the maintenance of a boundary between persons so there is no loss of self in the heterocentricity (or to use McIntyre’s term self-exteriorisation) of the identification with and care for the Other. This is part of the essence of Macmurray’s Personal logic, that the constituting elements do not lose their distinctiveness. One can see Macmurray’s rejection of pantheism as maintaining the distinction between God and creation, while his affirmation of the finite in the infinite, especially in the incarnation,¹²⁵ would function as identification.

### 4.3.1.4 Human to Human Relations

*The Holy Spirit is God relating his people to one another in fellowship and communion.*¹²⁶

The fourth facet of relational pneumatology is the relating of the particular human person to other human persons. McIntyre builds on the polysemy found in the phrase “the communion of the Holy Spirit” (2 Co 13:14) which may be understood in at least three ways: (1) communion with the Holy Spirit; (2) the communion between humans created

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¹²³ McIntyre, *Shape of Pneumatology*, 181.
¹²⁴ McIntyre, *Shape of Pneumatology*, 182. Note carefully that Jesus does not identify with humanity—for he is human—but that he identifies with the plight of sinful humanity.
and maintained by the Spirit; and (3) the communion is the Holy Spirit. McIntyre elaborates on the possible combination of the three.

If we think in horizontal and vertical images, we may say that in this pattern of the dynamic model, the Holy Spirit is presented as God himself uniting his people in communion with one another (horizontally) in and through uniting them with himself through his identification with them (vertically). But both the horizontal and the vertical aspects of the communion of God with ourselves and of ourselves with one another are themselves ontologically grounded upon that communion which is the Holy Spirit.  

When one considers how Macmurray’s understanding of God as the universal Other not only functions to relate individuals to God but also thereby individuals to each other, one sees clearly the correspondence between McIntyre and Macmurray on this point. Macmurray’s position, summarized by Langford, is one where God is “the completeness of human relation.”

4.3.1.5 Spirit as Prevenient

The Holy Spirit is God himself preparing us beforehand for the creative, redemptive and sanctifying relationship with himself, which is his purpose for us in Jesus Christ.

The fifth aspect of the relational pattern is the prevenient and preparatory function of the Spirit. McIntyre, when speaking of prevenient grace, states it is

The response of the human heart to God, the thanksgiving of the whole community of believing people in response to the lovingkindness of God, the continuing discipleship of Christians—all are due to the prevenient presence of the Holy Spirit in the hearts of one and all, enabling in each case the appropriate response.

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124 IU, 124.
125 McIntyre, Shape of Pneumatology, 183.
126 McIntyre, Shape of Pneumatology, 184. This only seems to be rebutting his earlier distinction between the Holy Spirit entering relations with humans and being the relation between God and humanity. On closer inspection, however, one sees that what is being described in ruffled or ontological terms is the relation between humans, not the relation between the human and the divine. The Holy Spirit is the communion of humanity, not the communion of humanity and God.
127 Langford, Natural Theology, 15.
128 McIntyre, Shape of Pneumatology, 185.
129 McIntyre, Shape of Pneumatology, 185.
Here it is possible to see Macmurray's concept of the celebration of communion. The necessity of God first reconciling estranged persons and thus enabling communion, which when reflected upon results in celebration.

4.3.1.6 Relating Humans to Nature

*The Holy Spirit is God the Creator himself setting us in a right and responsible relation to the animal and natural order.*

The Spirit reconciling humanity to nature is the sixth element of the relational pattern. McIntyre acknowledges that this function of the Spirit has tended to be ignored or downplayed. He sees three related reasons for this oversight: (1) the tendency to tie the Holy Spirit narrowly to Christ in his redemption of humanity, ignoring the cosmic dimensions of Christ's work; (2) the *filioque* tends to link the Spirit to Christ the redeemer and not to God the creator; and (3) the lack of development in the doctrine of *creatio continua*.

This reconciliation with nature may be seen by some as connected to a sacramental view of creation as "bearing in, with and under itself the presence of God." But McIntyre is wary of the potential for sacramentalism to lead to the opinion that creation has an innate "capacity to arouse in us a sense of the presence of God" and so prefers the model of God relating humanity to creation directly through himself, pneumatically.

In Macmurray's argument for the characteristics of the universal Other, he notes humanity's fear and hatred of nature and therefore the need for reconciliation between humanity and the rest of creation. This requires that the Other not only stand in relation to

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131 McIntyre, *Shape of Pneumatology*, 190.
132 And when it is addressed it usually is dealt with under ethics as a part of stewardship. McIntyre, *Shape of Pneumatology*, 191.
133 McIntyre, *Shape of Pneumatology*, 192. It is important to note that all three are pneumatological inadequacies which can be tied to the traditional monarchical "direction" of theology from the Father, to the Son, and finally the Spirit. Moltmann, *Spirit of Life*, 290-95.
134 McIntyre, *Shape of Pneumatology*, 193.
all people but to all creation. Hence, Macmurray’s God as universal Other is the same as McIntyre’s Spirit relating humanity to nature.

4.3.1.7 Terms Spirit and Person Applied to God

The Holy Spirit is also the means by which the categories of personality and spirit are made applicable to God.\(^{135}\)

The seventh and final dimension of the relational pattern is that it is Spirit which allows particular human categories to be applied to God. These categories are God as personality and God as Spirit (but not the Holy Spirit). Personality as applied to God as a whole was a controversial development\(^{136}\) but with the rise of Buber’s I-Thou it has gained wider acceptance.

Now in that modern context [Buber’s understanding of the person as the I-Thou], we are coming to recognize that awareness of personality only emerges when the self comes to appreciate the boundaries laid down for it by another self, when it realises that beyond itself there is another self making challenging demands and marginalising the freedom which the self can enjoy, but also finds in that other self sources of assistance, inspiration, friendship and love. So God is for every self that omnipresent personality, at every point of human existence confronting human persons with the imperatives of his will and his commandments, at every point offering the almighty succour of his Gospel.\(^{137}\)

It is through the work of the Spirit and the Spirit’s capacity for self-transcendence and indwelling that the “personality of God is implemented, realised, consummated in the work of the Holy Spirit.”\(^{138}\) In other words, to speak of God as personal is to speak pneumatologically. This is precisely how Macmurray speaks of God—as personal—and without recourse to any trinitarian language or construct. Therefore, Macmurray’s entire theology may be seen as pneumatology, God as Spirit (but not necessarily the trinitarian Holy Spirit).\(^{139}\)

\(^{135}\) McIntyre, *Shape of Pneumatology*, 193.

\(^{136}\) McIntyre, *Shape of Pneumatology*, 194. McIntyre attributes this development to Paley. For a more extensive discussion of this issue see Ramsey, 55-71.

\(^{137}\) McIntyre, *Shape of Pneumatology*, 194.

\(^{138}\) McIntyre, *Shape of Pneumatology*, 195. See also 196.

\(^{139}\) One is able to discern McIntyre’s Athanasian sentiments here in his comfort in referring to God as person in the singular.
4.3.2 **The Dynamic Pneumatological Model: Ecclesial Polarities Pattern**

In considering the relational pattern of the dynamic model of pneumatology one is struck by the strong communal ethos. McIntyre addresses the issue of ecclesiology and the Spirit more explicitly within a second pattern for the dynamic pneumatological model, the ecclesial polarities pattern. It should not be surprising to find a similar concern for ecclesiology within Macmurray’s personalism. This aspect is so strong that one commentator has remarked that Macmurray’s entire concept of religion is essentially ecclesiology.\(^{140}\) This ecclesial dimension is somewhat complicated by Macmurray’s portrayal of Christianity as having universal intention. Therefore his definition of the Church is those whose actions are in keeping with the intention of God and are thereby in continuity with the actions of Jesus. Therefore, one should not expect Macmurray to dwell on issues such as ordination or the sacraments common to some forms of ecclesiology.\(^{141}\) Nonetheless, there is a strong ecclesial dimension to Macmurray’s understanding of God which is essentially pneumatological.

Before considering the particular contours of the ecclesial polarities pattern a word of introduction regarding the terminology and structure of *polarities* is called for. McIntyre describes polarities as being the ideal foci or opposite limits of a particular relation with the reality existing in the field somewhere between the two ideal extremes. Therefore, the two poles are not seen as contradictions but limits.

Theology has many such opposites— infinite and finite, all-righteous and sinful, elect and damned, forgiving and unforgiving, and so on. In the case of the polarity, while the pure forms of the two members of the antithesis seem to be opposed and negative to one another, in fact they form the foci of what in magnetics would constitute a ‘field’. So within this field will appear members

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\(^{140}\) *Moreover, however much his statement grapples with the nature of the ‘personal’, Macmurray’s reformulation [of religion] is profoundly social, and in a very fundamental sense, ecclesiological.* White, 450.

\(^{141}\) This is not to say that the sacraments are excluded by Macmurray, for the very phrase “celebration of communion” has an implicit sacramental overtone, as does the entire definition of religion as reflective action.
who veer more to the one pole than the other, showing characteristics which favour one pole somewhat more than the other but not exclusively so. What we are led to expect, therefore, is perhaps to begin from apparent diametric opposition, only to find later that there are other possibilities which fall between the poles but are not totally divergent from either.\textsuperscript{142}

He finds these polarities existing particularly here in the ecclesial pattern, yet if one inspects the relational pattern one is able to discern implicit polarities in each of the seven aspects discussed.\textsuperscript{143} The point here is polarities should not be viewed as existing only within the ecclesial polarities pattern. Further, one must remember that for Macmurray, these polarities do not exist in a paradoxical dialectic, but in the integrating hierarchical polarity of Personal logic. Therefore, one should expect Macmurray to be aware of the two poles, but giving more emphasis to one pole as the positive integrating pole which has priority.

### 4.3.2.1 Location of the Spirit Relative to the Church: In and Over-Against

The first pole of the discussion views the Holy Spirit as being indigenous to the Church, where "the Spirit is of the essential being of the Church" being administered sacramentally through the hierarchy.\textsuperscript{144} The second pole is one that views the Spirit standing over-against the Church, so that the Church is the instrument of the Spirit.

Macmurray's suspicion of authority might lead one to believe he would dismiss the first pole out of hand, he does recognize the tension expressed by McIntyre at this point. The religious communion is only enabled by the reconciliation of members—which means conforming human intention to the free divine intention and in that way God stands over-against the Church. Yet, he also recognizes that the communion only exists within an embodied community united through the Spirit. Macmurray would most likely

\textsuperscript{142} McIntyre, \textit{Shape of Pneumatology}, 211.
\textsuperscript{143} Such as general and particular, within and without, etc.
\textsuperscript{144} McIntyre, \textit{Shape of Pneumatology}, 213.
place the emphasis upon the Spirit over-against the Church which is constituted by the embodied gathering.

4.3.2.2 Expression of the Spirit: Community and Institution

This polarity is related to the previous one, but is of sufficient importance that McIntyre treats it on its own. The first pole sees the Spirit being expressed by

a group which has been constituted in its community-ness by the vertical descent of the Holy Spirit upon it, uniting the members one with another by his presence among them, directing them in their activity in the world and sustaining them in their worship of God.\(^\text{145}\)

This first pole stresses the freedom of the Spirit and therefore the flexibility of the structures. The second pole, by contrast, stresses consistency and continuity. It is "the concept of an institution with a very specific shape, with an internal structure which is not readily changeable because it is believed to be laid down by the Spirit himself."\(^\text{146}\) While McIntyre does not believe that either extreme exists in reality he sees the practical limits existing in the Quakers and some understandings of Catholicism.\(^\text{147}\)

Macmurray also sees a relationship between the freedom of God (who is absolute person) and the Church as an institution concerned with rituals, social cohesion, and purpose. The institutional operates at the level of the I-It and serves as the negative pole for true community. Community needs society (and hence institutions) but one must not invert the relationship or else one creates an unreal religion. Macmurray—who became a Quaker late in life—nonetheless chastises the Quakers for not recognizing the institutionalization and rituals which exist even within their church and through neglect have failed to develop or consider rituals sufficiently within their self-reflection.\(^\text{148}\) Still,

\(^\text{145}\) McIntyre, *Shape of Pneumatology*, 215.

\(^\text{146}\) McIntyre, *Shape of Pneumatology*, 215.

\(^\text{147}\) McIntyre believes that the Holy Spirit can be seen existing institutionally in baptism, laying on of hands, communion, proclamation, discipline, ministry, and the offices as related to the gifts. McIntyre, *Shape of Pneumatology*, 216-17.

\(^\text{148}\) SRR, 74-75.
the I-It of the institution must serve the I-You of the communion. Similarly, Macmurray distinguishes functions and abilities which people have and their status as persons. Macmurray simply does not want their function to overshadow the personal equality, freedom, and mutuality existing between persons. Therefore, Macmurray, again can be seen in general agreement with this understanding of the experience of the Spirit as existing, both within the freedom of the personal dimension, and through the rituals of the institution which inform the communion.

4.3.2.3 Location of the Spirit: Group or Individual

The question here asks, does the Spirit primarily reside in individuals (who then comprise a group) or does the Spirit reside in the group? Macmurray recognizes this in that he focuses upon the self-as-agent-in-relation-to-Other. One cannot ignore the particular but one must see oneself within the overall relational matrix made possible by God as the universal Other. Because God enters into personal relation with each individual, it can be said that the Spirit indwells the individual. Yet, the primary overarching context is God’s universal relation enabling the community. Macmurray, in citing 1 John 4:20, may be seen as giving priority to the group, while recognizing the essential relation of the particular person to God.

4.3.2.4 Speaking in Tongues and the Baptism of the Holy Spirit

With this polarity McIntyre is attempting to get at the role of the Spirit as it relates to salvation and Christian practice. He distinguishes between two levels of discourse. The first level deals primarily with biblical texts and posits a dialectic between Lukan pneumatology with its emphasis upon empowerment portraying believers as praying for

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the gift of the Spirit, and Pauline pneumatology's soteriological focus where faith and
prayer are subsequent to the gift of the Holy Spirit. Simply put, the dialectic between
Tongues and the Baptism is the polarization of empowerment and salvation. The second
level is more theological and it is here that McIntyre exerts most of his effort. McIntyre,
following Dunn, attributes the pentecostal emphasis upon the Spirit's free activity to a
reaction against the Western confinement of the Spirit: the Roman Catholic imprisonment
of the Spirit in the ritual of the sacraments, and the Protestant domestication of the Spirit
to doctrinal orthodoxy.

Now the Pentecostalists have reacted sharply to both of these positions, 'the
mechanical sacramentalism of extreme Catholicism; and 'the dead biblicist
orthodoxy of extreme Protestantism' ... and have concentrated upon the
experience of the Spirit.

This freeing of the Spirit is evidence of an attempt to overcome the mind-body dualism
through the "introduction to the pneumatological dimension."

Macmurray is certainly concerned to overcome the dualism which exists if one
only acknowledges the doctrinal or ritualistic levels of religion—without the integrating
experience of true communion. Reflecting upon how Macmurray might react to the first
polarity of the Pauline-Soteriology and Lukan-Empowerment dialectic, he would most
likely answer that one cannot act successfully (be empowered) without being in harmony
with the intention of God (salvation), but that it is the actualization in action which has

150 SRR, 72. "If any one says, 'I love God,' and hates his brother, he is a liar." 1 John 4:20 (RSV). It should
be pointed out that Macmurray explicitly rejects individualism in the citation of this verse.
151 McIntyre, Shape of Pneumatology, 220-21.
152 James D.G. Dunn, Baptism in the Holy Spirit: A Re-examination of the New Testament Teaching on the
typically rejected Dunn's work, especially his conversion-initiation thesis. One work which directly
Sheffield Academic Press, 1994). It should be noted that McIntyre does not entirely agree with Dunn,
especially in Dunn's over-systemization of the textual pattern (McIntyre, Shape of Pneumatology, 230).
Interestingly, one branch of Pentecostalism which agrees with Dunn are the anti-trinitarian Oneness
Pentecostals. One example of this, although it does not directly reference Dunn is J.L. Hall "A Oneness
Pentecostal Looks at Initial Evidence" in Initial Evidence: Historical and Biblical Perspectives on the
153 McIntyre, Shape of Pneumatology, 229. Citing Dunn, 225.
154 McIntyre, Shape of Pneumatology, 226.
primacy. Of course, this is merely speculation, but it is consistent with the Form of the Personal.

4.3.2.5 Holy Spirit in the Church: New Testament and Modern

This polarity is raised implicitly in the previous discussion—what is the relationship between the New Testament expectancy of the active presence of the Spirit in the assembled community and the relative lack of this in the modern church? Various traditions emphasize the active presence of the Spirit in various locations (the pastor’s study, the ritual of the sacraments, in the gathered community). Speaking from within the Reformed tradition, McIntyre would like to see as much expectation regarding the active presence of the Spirit in the communicative act of the sermon as in its preparation. Pentecostals often are heard to decry the lack of expectation in the study, and at least one priest has commented that while Roman Catholics believe in the miracle of the sacraments, if “something” actually happened during the sacraments they would tend to ignore it.

Since this point is closely linked with the previous point, Macmurray’s response is also similar. Macmurray would not want to see religious activity prematurely halted at the doctrinal or ritual levels yet he would not dismiss the importance of both doctrine and ritual for communion. One must not merely apprehend the idea of God or the beauty of God, but must also encounter God in life. However, in light of his discomfort with the miraculous one may assume that Macmurray would tend to restrict this presence of the Spirit to the activity of people within the congregation.

155 McIntyre, Shape of Pneumatology, 232.
156 “And moreover, because religious reflection is not primarily expressed in thought but in action, God is not primarily apprehended as an idea, but in life which is centred in the intention of mutuality, as that personal infinite in which our finite human relationships have their ground and their being.” SRE, 54.
From this comparison it should be clear that Macmurray’s concept of God is very consistent with the general categories of pneumatology from an economic perspective. Therefore one is justified in referring to Macmurray’s theology as essentially a natural pneumatology. For Macmurray, to experience the personal God is to experience God as spirit. Yet in saying this one must immediately qualify these statements for he unequivocally declares that all descriptive language of God is mythological, dealing with infinite person and absolute spirit. This mythological aspect which is beyond the merely human attributes of these words may be represented by capitalizing the words Person and Spirit. Therefore to experience the God who is Person is to experience God as Spirit.

4.3.3 LIMITS OF NATURAL PNEUMATOLOGY

Since pneumatology is the essence of Macmurray’s theology, all of the limitations cited in previous sections apply to the limitations of his natural pneumatology. There is, nonetheless, one principal limitation which comes to the fore particularly in considering pneumatology. This is the absence of any discussion of how God as Spirit acts directly. There is the argument at the macro level for the universe as the action of God and human beings as the acts of God. There is also the contention at the subjective level that God acts in humans who cooperate with God’s universal intention. Yet there is no discussion of a direct act by God in the vast gulf between these two levels, with the possible exception of the incarnation. To put the question bluntly, does God as Spirit act directly in the universe or not? And if not how can one understand God as absolute Agent and infinite Person? If God is unable to directly move this piece of paper, then any human has a superior capacity to act in comparison with the supposedly absolute Agent. This is not to say God must move this piece of paper or that God may not choose to act in and through human agents, but if God cannot directly act this becomes problematic.
Macmurray's favorable citation of Blake, "God only exists and is in existing beings or men," along with his reticence to discuss the resurrection and biblical miracles, leads one to question whether he in fact allows for direct divine action. If God as Spirit is not the absentee-landlord of the deists' clockwork universe and can effect reconciliation between people, then is God as Spirit not also able to act concretely? While all the indications point to Macmurray's discomfort with the miraculous and with direct divine intervention, which he sees as unnecessary, he does not appear to rule it out entirely. There may be any number of reasons for his reserve. He may be concerned about reintroducing the natural-supernatural dualism. He may be concerned that acknowledging the direct action or intervention of God will breed complacency, passivity, and escapism. He may think it will encourage magical forms of religion. It may be that he simply has not observed such a direct intervention and therefore does not believe himself to be empirically justified in taking a definitive position. Yet none of these are sufficient to warrant his virtual silence on this aspect of God as Spirit. If God as Spirit is mutual then God must be capable of direct action or God is not free; and if God is not free then he is not personal; and if God is not personal, God is not God.

4.4 CONCLUSION

In this chapter Macmurray's conception of God has been explored under the various apperceptions as the idea of God, the historical realization of God, and the mutually interactive and present God. This survey has clearly shown strengths and weaknesses to Macmurray's natural theology. In particular it has shown the limitations of natural theology when it is posited to the exclusion of special revelation. Furthermore one is able to observe the artificial nature of this self-imposed philosophical reductionism in his discussion of God.

One must be quite clear regarding what Macmurray is saying about human knowledge of God. Because humans experience God humans are able to know God. The fullest human knowledge of God comes in the fullest expression of God within human limitations—the incarnation of God in Jesus Christ. One may have a minimal knowledge of God or an extensive knowledge of God but the upper limit of this knowledge is Jesus Christ. Knowledge is different than understanding which is a reflective or theoretical activity whereby extensions and clarifications are attempted due to inadequate knowledge (that is not to say false knowledge, for one either knows or does not know). If one has complete and total knowledge of the Other then there is no need to reflect upon the Other. The theoretical understandings of God are imaginative constructs designed to fill in the holes of our knowledge and must be verified in active relationship. Therefore one may possess certain knowledge of God but one must always hold one's understanding (the theoretical extension of that knowledge) tentatively. Because the object of one's reflection is beyond the limits of human experience all talk about God is at least somewhat theoretical because it is inherently inadequate. However, this is not a great problem for all reflection is metaphorical to some extent.

Given this, one may differentiate between metaphorical talk about God and anthropomorphic projection onto God by distinguishing intentions. If one says God is a rock and intends by this God is in some way like a rock this is appropriate theological language. If one says God is a rock and intends by this that God in his very nature, \textit{ad intra}, is a rock, then this is projection. Projection occurs when one mistakes the model for the reality one is seeking to represent.

Jesus, who is fully God and fully human, is able to communicate the reality of God in its fullest human terms in the totality of his humanity. So in pointing to Christ one

\footnote{CH, 95.}
may say in the fullest human way this side of the eschaton this is what God is like and this is what God is. One notes the addition of the phrase "what God is like" for humans inevitably must reflect upon the person of Jesus and therefore must distinguish between their formulations about Jesus from their knowledge of him—just as one must distinguish between the reality of any particular person and one's thinking about that person.\footnote{159}

Projection is to mistake one's thinking about God with the reality of God. It is to confuse partial knowledge with complete knowledge. As the Apostle Paul states: "Now we see but a poor reflection as in a mirror; then we shall see face to face. Now I know in part; then I shall know fully, even as I am fully known."\footnote{180}

This is not to argue that knowledge of God is \textit{from below}, for Macmurray's epistemology negates any idea of \textit{from above} or \textit{from below}, for knowledge is always personal (that is to say someone's knowledge) and is always rational (that is, in terms of the nature of the Other) and therefore knowledge is a mutually reciprocating relation between the self and the objective Other. This is also not to argue that one cannot or should not theorize about God (although Macmurray himself tended in this direction) for the necessary gaps in knowledge are always filled out by some theoretical construct. The question is not should one reflect on God, the questions are, rather, (1) does one recognize that one's knowledge is inadequate and inherently theoretical, and (2) is one's theory more or less adequate based upon the experiential verification of those aspects which are open to corroboration?

\footnote{159}{The difference between knowledge of human and divine persons is that in principle it is possible (although highly improbable) for a human to completely know another human, while in the current dispensation it is impossible to completely know God.}

\footnote{180}{1 Corinthians 13:12, NIV.}
CHAPTER 5
CRITICAL THEOLOGICAL ENGAGEMENT:
SOME CONTEMPORARY ISSUES

For though it is truth of fact that God made Man in his own image, it is also true
that man makes his conception of God in his, so that immature man has an
immature conception of the Divine.¹

The original impetus for this study of Macmurray came from the question of how
Macmurray’s understanding of persons was being used in a trinitarian context to describe
the three persons of the Trinity and what this implied regarding the relationship between
human and divine persons. After a thorough examination of Macmurray’s thought it is
clear that while he sees a necessary correlation of how one conceives of both God and
humanity he draws a strong ontological distinction between the two which functions to
relativize the conceptual linkage. Furthermore there is no necessary one-to-one
correspondence, in either direction, between conceptions of God and conceptions of
persons, for Macmurray’s anthropology supports a variety of trinitarian and non-
trinitarian conceptions of God. Yet this anthropology certainly influences the boundaries
of acceptable models of God. How one thinks about humanity affects how one thinks
about God, but it is theoretical and therefore one is epistemologically engaged in a
constant reciprocal exchange between the theoretical reflection and the objective reality
of what is being reflected upon.

In this chapter Macmurray’s thought will critically engage a variety of theologians
who hold to a relational understanding of God. Each theologian, while having a relational
concept of God and humanity, differs in their respective understandings of Deus ad intra.

¹SRR, 34.
The various doctrines of God span the spectrum from thoroughly unitarian to virtually tritheistic. Not only does this selection of theologians indicate the wide variety of relational understandings of God and humanity it also serves to demonstrate the wide applicability of Macmurray's thought to the domain of theology. While a monograph-length treatment of each theologian in full dialogue with Macmurray would certainly be worthwhile, it is beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead a concise synopsis of a primary work by each theologian will be provided followed by a brief critique from the perspective of the Form of the Personal. These studies make no pretense to comprehensiveness but will focus on several key points illuminated by Macmurray's thought especially as it relates to the particular theologian's linkage of human and divine persons.

5.1 GEOFFREY W.H. LAMPE: GOD AS SUBJECTIVE SPIRIT

Lampe in his Bampton lectures, *God as Spirit*, calls for nothing less than the replacement of the root metaphor of the Christian doctrine of God. In place of the trinitarian language of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit Lampe seeks a less problematic formulation based on the idea of God as Spirit. His rationale centers upon the subjective experience of communion with God and the desire to understand this existential reality through a non-dualistic relational model. To Lampe's mind, the use of

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3 "Spirit", however, it must be repeated, seems to possess certain important advantages over the other models. As we have seen, it lends itself less readily to hypostatization... It stands for God himself experienced as Spirit: that is, in his personal activity, not a 'go-between' deity, but God himself, the Father and Creator, in his personal presence within his creatures. "Spirit", too, seems better able to express the truth that God's interaction with human persons, and the integration of human personality with God, takes place at every level, involving not only the intellect but the will, emotions, and the subconscious." Lampe, 116. See also, 13, 211.
4 Lampe interprets salvation as communion with God and repentance as openness to God (16). Relationality is a pervasive topic in Lampe, see 19, 44, 50, 143-44, 177, 187, 197. There is some confusion over the ontological status of persons. In certain passages it appears that humans are persons because of their creation in relation to God (e.g., Lampe, 187). In other passages a more qualitative model of persons is used (e.g., 143-44).
trinitarian formulations inadequately describes this experience and lack the capacity to communicate to the contemporary milieu. With the help of a Bultmannian process of demythologizing various biblical texts, beginning with the Gospel of John and proceeding through the Pauline and other biblical writings, he expounds his understanding of God as Spirit. God as Spirit interacts immanently within the subjective dimension of the human. This subjective, immanent experience of God as Spirit was most fully realized in the human life of Jesus of Nazareth. According to Lampe’s appraisal the advantage of his approach is that it eliminates the requirement of a pre-existent Logos or a post-existence ascension christology. In so doing he demythologizes the mediatorial nature of the Son as well as the resurrection in favor of a form of Spirit-christology. Lampe is extremely suspicious of the history of the interpretation of Jesus, seeing it as the unknowing projection of the interpreter’s milieu and presuppositions back into the texts which are then retrieved as divine christological revelation:

The Platonistically conceived Second Person of the Trinity in the classical formulations of the fourth and fifth centuries, the Imperial Christ of Byzantine art, the sacrificial victim of much eucharistic doctrine, Karl Barth’s Jesus Christ in whom the universe was created, Christ as humanistic ideal, Christ as Moltmann’s ‘crucified God’, are all read back into, and then out of, the New Testament by an often unconscious process of the assimilation of the ancient interpretation to the more modern.

Adopting a Spirit-christology allows Lampe to escape the trap of the historical Jesus.

By adopting the theological position of God as Spirit one is also freed from the historical particularities of scripture. Lampe is comfortable disagreeing not only with the

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5 Lampe believes there are any number of problem areas for trinitarian theology. See Lampe, 72, 158, 197-201.
6 Lampe, 45. Immanence is a key theme for Lampe’s theology.
7 Lampe, 20, 135, 33, 73, 145.
8 Lampe, 146-58. Lampe sees no need for a mediator between humanity and God (144) for God as Spirit is incarnate in every human being (45, 181, 187, 190); yet one cannot leave Jesus behind “altogether” (118). One of Lampe’s arguments for abandoning the resurrection is that the resurrection appears to make no difference to contemporary believers (145).
9 Lampe renders various terms as synonyms in order to facilitate this process. For example incarnation and inspiration (Lampe, 12); Christ, Spirit, Word, and Wisdom (Lampe, 6, 62, 37, 92).
10 Lampe, 108-09.
various authors of scripture, but even with Jesus himself. One must respect Lampe’s brutal honesty in this regard; he does not hide behind subterfuges or euphemisms. There is a definite methodological clarity to Lampe’s exegesis which stands in dramatic contrast to Macmurray’s handling of scripture.

There are any number of similarities between Lampe and Macmurray. Both are concerned to overcome dualism and are committed to relational and personal ideas of God. Both wish to understand the human experiential encounter with God and view theological investigation as necessarily a posteriori; each demonstrates a strong apologetic concern regarding the intelligibility of religious discussion. Each similarly perceives God present and at work in the human person, is concerned about the escapism inherent in certain ideas of heaven, is ambivalent towards miracles, views Jesus in continuity with the Jewish prophetic tradition, and conceives the resurrection accounts as visionary in nature. Each also perceives the experience of God as the experience of a single person. Yet for all these similarities there are a number of stark contrasts.

5.1.1 PERSON AS SUBJECT

Philosophically Lampe is clearly operating within a modern paradigm. This modernity is most markedly seen in his core understanding of the person as existential subject. Lampe defines his modern concept of the personal as “a union of mind and will

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11 Lampe affirms the prerogative not only to dispute particulars of the text, but also the interpretation of events provided. Lampe, 108.
14 In fact, without Macmurray’s Personal logic, one cannot help but ultimately collapse this presence of the Spirit into some form of immanence, a problem which Lampe battles with at several points. Lampe, 21, 45, 177, 197.
15 Lampe, 52, 97. Both also give the Gospel of John a foundational role in their understanding of Jesus. See CH, x.
16 Lampe, 146-48; see also 97-98. SRR, 52-53.
and feeling, a coming together of Spirit with spirit.”¹⁷ In fact it is this personal subjective understanding of Spirit which he finds so helpful in communicating his understanding of God to his contemporary audience.¹⁸ By adopting this modern subjective framework Lampe is then forced, much as Rahner and Barth before him, to reject the traditional trinitarian language of three Persons as tritheistic.²⁰ Because of the dualism inherent in modernity Lampe is logically forced to choose between the objective and the subjective. He chooses subjectivity.²¹

The extent of this existential subjectivity is revealed when Lampe discusses the union of God and humanity.

‘Spirit’, too, seems better able to express the truth that God’s interaction with human persons, and the integration of human personality with God, takes place at every level, involving not only the intellect but the will, emotions, and the subconscious.²²

Clearly for Lampe “every level” does not include objective or physical levels.²³ Therefore, while he is opposed to otherworldly eschatology,²⁴ he is not ultimately concerned with present objective reality but with present subjective existential experience. The distinction between Lampe and Macmurray is apparent in a comparison of their differing interpretations of Christ’s temptation. Lampe interprets it subjectively (and one might add egocentrically) as the temptation for Jesus to doubt or repudiate his sonship.²⁵ Macmurray construes it in terms of the temptation to deny the objectivity of reality and Jesus’ proper relationship towards it. Inherent within the notion of Jesus’

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¹⁷ Lampe, 24.
¹⁸ Lampe, 43-44.
¹⁹ It is not an individualistic subjectivity because while it focuses upon the individual subjective experience of God Lampe sees this happening primarily within human personal relationships. Lampe, 177.
²⁰ Lampe, 135-36, 227.
²¹ Lampe, 106, 156, 205.
²² Lampe, 116.
²³ This almost gnostic attitude towards objective reality is also witnessed by Lampe’s comments regarding how the death of Jesus allowed the Spirit to be “released from the particularity of the historical and cultural context of bodily existence and set free to be given to his followers ....” Lampe, 92.
²⁴ Lampe, 156, 171.
²⁵ Lampe, 128.
relationship with reality is found the subjective concerns of Lampe’s interpretation yet these subjective elements are caught up into the larger question of objective reality. Macmurray’s position includes and subordinates Lampe’s position and thereby surpasses it.

5.1.2 Mutuality and Unitarianism

Theologically Lampe’s subjectivity manifests itself in at least two ways. First, Lampe rejects attributing mutuality to God as mere anthropomorphism.\(^{26}\) God can only be manifested subjectively, not in an objective mutual relationship. The desire for mutuality results from a failure to sufficiently recognize the immanence of God in every human being.\(^{27}\) God’s actions, therefore, are strictly limited to influencing humans subjectively from within.\(^{28}\) As a result Lampe redefines, or demythologizes, particular notions of God’s direct action (such as the kingdom of God, Jesus’ bodily resurrection, and Christ’s parousia) in terms of manifestations of God’s will through human action brought into conformity with God’s purposes.\(^{29}\)

Macmurray’s philosophy necessarily includes mutuality in the characteristics of personhood and therefore God, who is beyond-the-personal, must also be at least mutual. Yet his actual discussion of God’s interaction (particularly in his discomfort with the direct intervention of God in the world) is hard to distinguish from Lampe’s and therefore must be challenged and brought into conformity with the rest of his philosophy.

The second theological repercussion of Lampe’s subjectivity is unitarianism. God is not only Spirit, God is a Spirit. If one accepts modern individual subjectivity as the definition of the person and assumes a non-dualistic, almost Hegelian, pneumatological model then unitarianism is the logical and foregone conclusion. God is experienced as a

\(^{26}\) Lampe, 139.
\(^{27}\) Lampe, 139.
\(^{28}\) Lampe, 205.
single subject and therefore as a single person—there cannot be three persons and only one subject.

Lampe’s unitarianism and subjective conceptuality allows him to seriously consider the actual shape and form of the most typical experiences of God—which are unitary and subjective. God is normally perceived as a single subject and is most commonly discerned in the actions of people. Bracketing off all considerations of trinity and direct objective action allows Lampe to fully consider these aspects of the daily experience of God which is often passed over by theologians.

Macmurray has been interpreted in a unitarian manner by Kirkpatrick. In order to do so, however, it required Kirkpatrick both to dismiss Macmurray’s comments about God being beyond the personal and to focus narrowly upon Macmurray’s idea of God. While not wishing to adopt Kirkpatrick’s reductionisms, one sees in it the ability of Macmurray’s Form of the Personal to incorporate the positive insights of subjective unitarian discussions of God, while relativizing these insights within the larger context of the interactive relational God. For Macmurray God is subject, but he is also more than subject—God is absolute Agent and infinite relational Person.

In conclusion one may say that Macmurray’s philosophy is able to incorporate the proper theological concerns of the subjective experience of the personal God conceived of in terms of God as Spirit while providing a framework which goes beyond this modern subjective reductionism. Just as Macmurray determined the conception of human persons as subject was necessary yet inadequate, so too a conception of God as subject is necessary yet inadequate. One sees in the example of Lampe a situation where one’s partial and inadequate model of the human person is directly applied to the model of God. This yields some important insights yet it is ultimately found to be lacking.

29 Lampe, 174, 156, 171.
5.2 DAVID S. CUNNINGHAM:
Rhetorical Augustinianism

David Cunningham’s recent work, *These Three are One: The Practice of Trinitarian Theology*, reflects a contemporary effort to rehabilitate the Augustinian-Thomistic doctrine of the Trinity and its attendant doctrine of the *vestigia trinitatis* using rhetorical strategies. His rhetorical method has several advantages which commend it. Historically it allows him a certain latitude in employing both Augustine and Aquinas; he does not feel constrained by their very words but attempts to convey what they were expressing given the restrictions of their time, place, and audience. Rhetorical theory also provides him with justification for modifying the root metaphors of trinitarian theology. He seeks to replace the traditional terms of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit with terms he believes will be heard by present-day audiences in a functionally similar way as these traditional terms were heard by their original audience. To achieve this effect he suggests *Source, Wellspring*, and *Living Water* as contemporary alternatives.

Furthermore, the rhetorical strategy may be seen as a way of incorporating elements of the Barthian discussion of revelation but expanding it from a monological model to a more complex model which acknowledges the important role of the listener in the communicative process.

Macmurray would certainly applaud Cunningham’s position that all theological formulations must be held tentatively and the correlation of action and belief.

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31 For the general discussion of the vestigia, see Cunningham, 90-107. Note Cunningham prefers the term *trinitarian marks* to *vestigia trinitatis*. Besides the numerous favorable citations of Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, one sees such evidence as the 1-2-3-4-5 pattern for the doctrine of God: one God, two processions, three subsistent relations, four real relations, five characteristics. See, for instance, Cunningham, 58-65. Cunningham defends Augustine and Aquinas against current theological attacks as mere “historical scapegoating” (Cunningham, 30-45).
32 Cunningham, 72.
33 Cunningham, 101, 108.
34 Cunningham, 11.
35 Cunningham, 44, 304.
Nevertheless, one’s attention is drawn to three major Macmurrian criticisms of Cunningham.

5.2.1 LOGICAL FORM

The first criticism involves Cunningham’s choice of logical forms. Cunningham, like Macmurray, recognizes the inadequacy of the common analytic form of logic for describing these more complex aspects of reality. Looking to Augustine’s *De Musica* and some comments by Bonhoeffer he suggests a musical logic of polyphony where numerous notes exist simultaneously, are distinct, yet united. Cunningham’s aim is similar to Macmurray’s: overcome individualism through a communal unity without losing particularity. While the metaphor of polyphony has much to commend it, especially over a merely analytic logical form, one must ultimately deem it inadequate for expressing personal reality. Intuitively one associates the idea of a musical logic with art which is contemplative reflection upon the organic unity-pattern. This leads one to suspect that a musical logic will be appropriate to organic reality, but because it is sub-personal it will prove inadequate to address the totality of personal life.

This tentative evaluation is confirmed when one realizes that Cunningham does not in fact claim an integration of the two notes but only claims an “apparent unity” of the notes. There is, in fact, no actual unity of the notes until one introduces an external listener—the one who unifies the sounds is external to the notes themselves. Yet when one introduces the listener one realizes that this model is none other than the contemplation of music—art. But why must one consider artistic contemplation as sub-personal? It is because there is no ability for interaction or mutuality between the notes. While the notes occupy the same aural space there is no interaction between the two notes. One note is not altered or changed in any significant way by the addition or

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26 Cunningham, 130, 133.
subtraction of any other note. What one has internal to the music itself is merely the juxtaposition of two discrete elements. As already noted, the unity is achieved in the hearing of the external listener. Here the particular arrangements of notes will tend to emphasize or diminish the perception of the notes, but this is an effect, not of the one note on the other note, but on the one perceiving the notes. And as anyone who has suffered through a child’s piano recital can attest, no amount of effort on the part of the listener can change a single note. To further illustrate this aspect of contemplation, consider the case of a person wearing a blue shirt that “bring outs” or draws attention to the person’s blue eyes. There is no actual modification of the eyes themselves merely a change in the perception of the eyes by the one appreciating them.

If one considers the actual nature of persons and their interactions there truly is a difference introduced by the presence or absence of various persons. When someone’s spouse dies, that person remains a person, yet the person is truly affected. This is attested to by the common statement that the person “just isn’t the same” since the bereavement. There is no way to account for this type of phenomenon in Cunningham’s musical logic yet there is within Macmurray’s Personal logic. In Personal logic the negative (in this case the constituting personal Other) gives shape to the positive (the particular person) without losing the distinction between the two. One therefore concludes musical logic is simply inadequate to fully express personal reality.

5.2.2 SUBSTANTIAL ONTOLOGY

A second Macmurray criticism of Cunningham is that he is employing a substantial ontology. This is particularly ironic in light of the fact that Cunningham clearly states his intention to overcome the limitations of substantial ontology and will not even deign to name the Trinity with substantives preferring instead the neologism,
The Three, for fear of succumbing to it. Although Cunningham seeks to escape its confines his thinking is so permeated by substantial ontology that he is unable to break free. This manifests itself in various ways.

One manifestation of the substantial ontology arises in Cunningham's discussion of relations. He is concerned to eliminate any notion of three agents in the Godhead and therefore rejects the phrase “persons in relation” in favor of “relations without remainder.” He is comfortable describing God as communal and mutually constituted, but resists using person because it is too individualistic. He is even skeptical of the term perichoresis for he is concerned it too readily evokes the idea of three agents in God and instead prefers the term coinherence. The reasoning behind the preference is most telling; he prefers coinherence because it has a “relatively static quality.” So when Cunningham says divine persons are relations, he means divine persons are substantial relations. Alone this example may not be sufficient to justify labeling Cunningham's ontology as substantial, but it contributes to the developing pattern.

Another manifestation of a substantial ontology arises from Cunningham's preference for the term participation. He hesitates to use the terms relationality and fellowship because of what he claims are negative associations; yet he does not indicate any awareness or concern that participation also carries particular connotations—especially those stemming from Greek philosophy which tend towards static and
substantial conceptions of participation.\textsuperscript{48} This static tendency is reinforced in the preference for the category of space (ostensibly because it focuses attention on relationship) over time (which he views as disjunctive and linear).\textsuperscript{49} However, while it is possible to map relations in space (and this is necessary) Macmurray would point out that there is no actual ability to actively relate or interact in space alone. According to Macmurray time is the integration of space and is therefore the form of action and fully interactive relationality.\textsuperscript{50} Space not integrated in time is static and merely substantial.

The third manifestation of a substantial ontology, and one of great significance, is the substantial orientation demonstrated in the choice of the new root metaphor for the Trinity: water. \textit{Source, Wellspring, and Living Water} are all sub-personal concepts. Granted water fits his desire for a more dynamic term, but it is still essentially substantial. One may possibly argue that is not purely substantial; that it is a hybrid dynamic-substance or mildly organic ("living") substance, but at its core it is substantial in nature. Cunningham’s illustrations of the Trinity only serve to highlight the sub-personal nature of his metaphor for he inevitably chooses personal illustrations (such as mother-child-placenta) which are actually more capable than his chosen root metaphor. While attempting to free the Trinity from inadequate individualistic terminology, such as \textit{person} which he views as insufficiently participatory,\textsuperscript{51} he substitutes something which cannot in any meaningful sense of the words think, feel, or interact.

Macmurray when he does affirm descriptive analogies for God, always insists that personal analogies are the most able metaphors. He would vehemently disagree with the

\textsuperscript{48} Cunningham, 25. Ultimately Cunningham uses participation synonymously with perichoresis, coinherence, koinonia, fellowship, and communion. Cunningham, 180, 182. Yet even in the use of these terms one still senses the presence of the more static understanding of participation stemming from the Greek methexis in comparison to the more interactive notion of koinonia. See Torrance, \textit{Being in Communion}, 256, 356, n. 104.
\textsuperscript{49} Cunningham, 158.
\textsuperscript{50} This is also seen in Cunningham’s appropriation of McFadyen’ definition of persons as sedimented along with the rhetorical definition of the person as a locutionary space (Cunningham, 158-201, 214). See also the prominence of the spatial metaphor in describing a person as the center of agency (Cunningham, 215).
utilization of sub-personal categories and view Cunningham’s suggestion of Source, Wellspring, and Living Water as retrograde.

This failure by Cunningham is particularly glaring because he is aware of the difficult nature of successfully changing the root metaphor, evidenced by his discussion of the failure of Creator, Redeemer, and Sanctifier. Yet he is dismissive towards those who alert him to the inherent dangers and assumes that he knows the crucial aspect of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit which must be restated and therefore he reinterprets the Trinity in a manner he confidently presumes is adequate. In so doing, he chooses a metaphor which cannot even adequately express the human Jesus, much less the divine triune God of the universe. His choice of metaphors is an example of his attempt to reinvigorate the doctrine of vestigia trinitatis; for he clearly sees Source, Wellspring, and Living Water as such a trinitarian mark. This leads one to be highly suspicious of his entire effort of rehabilitation and his approach to natural theology.

5.2.3 Natural Theology

The third Macmurrian critique of Cunningham is that his natural theology is insufficiently aware of its own tendency towards projection. In other words there is insufficient awareness of the distinction between the Creator and creation. The defense of natural theology in the face of the Barthian rejection is definitely a component of Cunningham’s rehabilitation of the vestigia trinitatis. He carefully places natural theology within the context of revealed theology and believes, along with Gunton, that there are serious disadvantages to simply attempting natural theology without first developing a doctrine of God which informs the imaginative construction of (or search
for) the trinitarian marks. While one may side with Cunningham vis-à-vis the need to situate natural theology within the context of revealed theology, one does not necessarily have to embrace the employment of trinitarian marks. As seen above, detecting the trinitarian marks is more problematic than Cunningham might think.

Cunningham’s discussion of Barth’s distinction between interpretation and illustration is instructive regarding the issue of analogy. Cunningham argues the differentiation is unsustainable in practice because the dichotomy cannot be maintained. He cites Barth who acknowledges the distinction is not a hard and fast one. However, it is one thing to argue that the boundaries between interpretation and illustration are not clearly delineated and quite another to eliminate all distinction between them as Cunningham does. If Cunningham had employed Source, Wellspring, and Living Water as an illustration of the Trinity it would raise only minor concern. However, since he is conceptually restating or reinterpreting the Trinity (warranted through the *anologia entis*) his solution must be deemed inadequate and inappropriate. While Cunningham believes he is approaching the doctrine of the Trinity theologically (from above), in actual fact his employment of the *vestigia trinitatis* is one where the earthly image (from below) is controlling the theological.

In evaluating Cunningham’s theology one respects the intention behind it while ultimately viewing its execution as deficient. In particular one finds Cunningham’s insight into the active participation of the person epistemologically to be a most important contribution. However, he decouples this insight from the objective nature of the reality he is considering. Reality provides the boundaries and limits of the imaginative constructive process and by failing to pay sufficient heed to that objective reality he comes to adopt a sub-personal logical form and a sub-personal ontology in his discussion.

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56 Cunningham, 83-86, 89, 106-07.
57 Cunningham, 102-04.
of God. Furthermore, through the presupposition of the *analogia entis* he inappropriately collapses the Creator-creation boundary in his natural theology. His basic understanding of God is the same as his basic understanding of human persons—they are both substantial and this is reflected in the choice of metaphor. His conception of person (as substantial being) is applied unconsciously to his concept of God and is then read back into his perception of reality in the trinitarian marks. Moreover, this conception is practically unitarian in its focus on the common substance or being of God.

### 5.3 THOMAS F. TORRANCE: CHRISTOLOGICAL AND PERICHORETIC EPISTEMOLOGY

In *The Christian Doctrine of God, One Being Three Persons* the Scottish Barthian Thomas F. Torrance argues for a re-appropriation of certain elements of Athanasius’ trinitarian theology. Unity and plurality are both attributed to the Godhead, yet the stress is clearly upon the unity of God, exemplified in the order found both in the title of the work and in the presentation of the topics—one being comes first, followed by the three persons. Torrance does not go as far as Rahner or Barth in suggesting the abandonment of the use of the term *person* for hypostasis. He does, however, detail the ambiguity found in the Greek terms *ousia* and *hypostasis* and tends to employ the Greek terms rather than the more familiar English or Latin translations—all of which combined suggests, if not a discomfort with the word *person*, at least an express desire to be properly understood when he uses *person* theologically. In this focus upon unity and the discomfort with the concept of person there is something of a remnant here of the Barthian notion of the singular subjectivity of God. There is within his christocentricity a remnant of the Barthian singular subject.

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5.3.1 EPistemology

No doubt due to the direct influence of Macmurray upon Torrance there is a marked similarity between their respective epistemologies. Both hold strongly to the objectivity of the Other and the a posteriori nature of knowledge. As a consequence Torrance, like Macmurray, holds to the differentiation of reflection and knowledge (usually addressed in terms of Polanyi’s oft quoted “one knows more than one can say”) and the need to verify thought. Most importantly this objectivity frees one methodologically to approach different objects in the manner appropriate to the particular object under consideration. Therefore science and theology having differing objects will also have differing methodologies. For both thinkers this creates an epistemic hierarchy or a hierarchy of knowledge. The lower levels of reflection are contained within the levels above. Torrance refers to this using Polanyi’s terminology of emergence and openness: the lower levels are open to the higher levels and can be explained by the higher levels, yet lower levels can never explain higher levels.

59 That Torrance was influenced by Macmurray is beyond doubt. Not only did Torrance study philosophy under Macmurray at the University of Edinburgh, but they both held teaching posts there in the 1950s. One only has to look at his commendation of Macmurray quoted in the Introduction (see above, 1) to see Torrance’s evaluation of Macmurray’s influence. Macmurray’s influence is not always visible on the surface, but tends to function at deep conceptual levels. Therefore it is not as obvious, say in comparison to the impact of M. Polanyi, yet when one comes across a reference to Macmurray one discerns the importance of the concepts involved and one often hears the echoes of Macmurray in various aspects of Torrance’s writings. See T.A. Noble, “Torrance, Thomas Forsyth,” in Dictionary of Scottish Church History and Theology, ed. Nigel M. de S. Cameron, et al. (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1993), 823-24. Theological Sciences (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), an early programmatic work by Torrance demonstrates the formative influence of Macmurray upon his basic understanding of such concepts as knowledge (11-12); theory and practice (3, 22, 30-31); science (35, 76, 123, 301); reality, truth, objectivity (121, 124, 174, 208). His major criticism of Macmurray here is that he believes that Macmurray separates faith and reason, although he perceives (correctly) that Macmurray’s philosophy actually holds them together.

60 Torrance, Christian Doctrine of God, 44.

61 Torrance, Christian Doctrine of God, 87. Torrance specifically cites Macmurray on this point in both God and Rationality, 81, 199-200; and Christian Frame of Mind (Edinburgh: Handsel Press, 1985), 34.

62 Torrance, Christian Doctrine of God, 82-83.

63 Torrance, Christian Doctrine of God, 86. One may be confused by Torrance’s statement about the pyramid shape of this knowledge. This refers to the number of salient facts and connections between elements so that as one rises ontologically one perceives the increasingly basic interconnections and conceptual categories so that an economy of concepts and relations develop. Torrance derives this from his understanding of the philosophy of science.

233
The differences between Torrance and Macmurray emerge when it come to the reflective levels appropriate to human conceptuality. Macmurray focuses upon scientific, artistic, and religious reflection which he intimately ties to material, organic, and personal ontological levels. He recognizes that there is a reality beyond the human personal unity-pattern which encompasses it and gives it meaning, but he believes reflection upon it is problematic because it is beyond the human limits of comprehension, it is literally beyond the personal. Torrance, by contrast, constructs a three leveled theological epistemology which begins where Macmurray’s ends.  

The first level of Torrance’s theological epistemology is the evangelical and doxological level of the human experience of worship and community. He describes this level as the level of incipient theology where empirical and theological (i.e., reflective) knowledge are fused together. Scripture and tradition are primary sources for this level. Torrance’s ground level is the highest level considered by Macmurray’s Form of the Personal—the religious experience of personal beings. The second epistemic level is the theological level which contemplates the economic Trinity in the interaction between humanity and deity. Key to this level are the concepts of homoousia and ousia, for in the union of the being and action of God present in these ideas there is the recognition that the Son and the Holy Spirit are God. The third level of Torrance’s epistemology is the higher theological level of the immanent Trinity. Here the concepts of hypostasis and perichoresis come into play as the conceptual tools necessary to unify and relate the

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72 Torrance, *Christian Doctrine of God*, 100.  
economic understandings of the Son and the Holy Spirit with the Father in a Communion of Persons.\textsuperscript{74}

The theological and higher theological levels are purely reflective levels and Torrance constantly reminds the reader that these theoretical levels must be tested against the experiential reality of the evangelical and doxological level.\textsuperscript{75} This experiential level is the ontological level of reality directly open to verification by human persons.

Having said this Macmurray might inquire exactly how the verification of these theoretical models takes place? Torrance says they must be grounded in the experiential level of the worshipping community.\textsuperscript{76} The problem, of course, is that there are different practices among various Christian communities and these practices, at least in part, are often derived from the very theoretical models which are submitted for examination. Torrance is aware that one must constantly be on guard against the usurpation of the purely human definition over the theological—and acknowledges the difficulty of doing so due to the theomorphic nature of humanity.\textsuperscript{77} His theological control, so to speak, is the incarnation.

Torrance argues that the warrant for reflecting upon these admittedly theoretical levels arises from the incarnation of the Son: the fullness of deity in full humanity, truly God with us. Thus Torrance seizes the epistemological significance of the incarnation in a manner similar to Macmurray's early suggestion, yet he expands upon it in a way in which Macmurray never did. It is due to the incarnation of God in Jesus Christ that one is able to reflect upon (with great humility and tentativeness) the nature of God \textit{ad extra} and \textit{ad intra}. It is only because of the grace of God in the incarnation that one is able to know

\textsuperscript{74} Torrance, \textit{Christian Doctrine of God}, 104.

\textsuperscript{75} This is not to say that the immanent and economic ontological levels are not real, but both are beyond human capacity to experience and therefore must remain theoretical for human beings.

\textsuperscript{76} Torrance, \textit{Christian Doctrine of God}, 109.

\textsuperscript{77} Torrance, \textit{Christian Doctrine of God}, 106-07.
the God who is beyond knowing and imagine the imageless.\(^78\) One must be absolutely clear on this point—Torrance is addressing ways of thinking, conceptualizing, and speaking about God. Thus he is not drawing ontological *conclusions* at these reflective levels, even when he uses ontological *terminology* within these discussions.\(^79\) To put it bluntly Torrance does not want to confuse human words about God with the reality of God; neither does he want to remain silent.

The appeal to the incarnation as the revelation of God with its *analogia relationis* ultimately differentiates Torrance's analysis of the apprehension of human words theologically from Cunningham's *analogia entis* with the accompanying understanding of *vestigia trinitatis*.\(^80\) Rather than basing theology and the doctrine of the Trinity on creaturely analogies Torrance sees the incarnation as the authentic revelation of the Trinity because the Son moves reciprocally between the various theological levels, acting as a epistemic bridge revealing what can be known about God in human terms.\(^81\) Yet while there is a reciprocity, there is still a priority given to knowledge from the higher theological levels since the lower may be understood in terms of the higher, but the higher levels cannot be understood in terms of the lower.\(^82\)

From a Macmurrian perspective the problem arises when Torrance asserts that these human concepts are caught up and transformed in their theological usage,\(^83\) so that an epistemological inversion occurs whereby the theological meaning becomes primary and the ordinary (creaturely) application is derived *mutatis mutandis* from the


\(^79\) Even though Torrance uses terms like onto-relations in his discussion of the Trinity, these are conceptual and a means of speaking about God and are not necessarily the objective reality of the immanent Trinity. Torrance, *Christian Doctrine of God*, 156-57.

\(^80\) Torrance, *Christian Doctrine of God*, 219-220. See also Alan Torrance's discussion of the differentiation of the various analogies in *Being as Communion*, 181, 185, 203-12.

\(^81\) Torrance, *Christian Doctrine of God*, 78, 93, 100, 107.

\(^82\) Torrance, *Christian Doctrine of God*, 87.

\(^83\) Torrance, *Christian Doctrine of God*, 103.
theological. Consider the example of perichoresis and Personal logic. Torrance defines perichoresis as a complete, dynamic, mutual coinherence (or co-indwelling) of the divine hypostases simultaneously maintaining unity and otherness. What can be said of one can be said of the other, except regarding enhypostatic relationality. This mutually constituting coinherence is virtually identical to the description Macmurray gives as the ideal limit of heterocentric and mutually constituting persons in the Form of the Personal, grammatically enabled by Personal logic. Perichoresis and Personal logic are clearly similar, yet Macmurray is adamant that Personal logic cannot be applied to divine Person(s). Torrance, alternatively, would see Personal logic as the creaturely applicable form of perichoresis, since he sees all theological concepts as having their proper divine and creaturely (limited) applications.

Yet one must ask what the difference is between the theological meaning of a term and its ideal abstraction? What is risked in Torrance’s epistemic inversion is the clear warning regarding the theoretical nature of God-talk. By baptizing certain concepts one moves precariously close to the reification of ideals. One understands the desire to preserve the special status of certain metaphors, which as Cunningham demonstrates are not easily translated, but at the same time one’s concern should rest not on the terminology but on the objective reality one is attempting to comprehend. If one is going

84 Torrance, Christian Doctrine of God, 105.
85 Torrance, Christian Doctrine of God, 102, 168-73. “... the Persons of the Holy Trinity reciprocally contain one another while remaining what they are in their otherness from one another.” Torrance, Christian Doctrine of God, 170.
86 RAS, 58.
87 Torrance discovers the roots of perichoresis firmly in the Gospel of John. Both Athanasius and Hilary conceptually tie perichoresis to John 14. Torrance, Christian Doctrine of God, 168-70. One cannot help but wonder if Macmurray’s understanding of the Form of the Personal and Personal logic does not stem, at least in part, from his affinity for the Gospel of John (CH, x). See Macmurray’s explicit grounding of friendship in words taken from the gospel of John (CH, 80) and the empirical grounding of religious experience in personal relations, citing John 14:9 (RE, 210). Again, this is not to say that Macmurray is confusing or collapsing philosophy into Christianity. Any number of sources and inspirations may be factored into the origin of a philosophical system. But the probable common source further solidifies one’s perception of their functional similarity.
to employ idealist conceptualities theologically then one needs to anchor these terms firmly in reality.

Macmurray’s is a very tight correlation between modes of reflection, ontological levels, and knowledge. One can only reflect upon what one knows and one can only know the reality one has experienced. Theory can only become knowledge when it is verified in action. Ultimately the practical epistemological differences between Torrance and Macmurray appear to revolve around the issue of authority and verification. In order to pursue Torrance’s method one must have a strong christology and a reasonably strong doctrine of scripture, as well as confidence in the practices and traditions of the church. Macmurray is certainly more epistemologically skeptical of the practices and traditions of the church, especially as they are manifested through ecclesial authority. Macmurray accepts the need for theoretical constructs, including theoretical constructs of God, however he is adamant that these theoretical images must not be imposed upon people by means of ecclesial authority. Furthermore one must realize that these constructs are theoretical and remain so except in those aspects which can be experienced and verified in human experience. Therefore Macmurray desires verification situated firmly in the life and practices of the church as a community rather than in its primarily institutional form.

5.3.2 PNEUMATOLOGICAL SUBORDINATION

A second Macmurrían criticism arises regarding Torrance’s subordination of pneumatology. In light of the perichoretic nature of Torrance’s trinitarian theology this may seem a strange accusation, for Torrance admirably refutes the more Cappadocian understanding of the Monarchy of the Father and asserts the co-equality of the three hypostases, including the Holy Spirit.90 Even so, he betrays a subtle subordinationism of

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90 This tendency is somewhat betrayed in Torrance’s penchant for the original Greek terms (ousia and hypostasis) rather than the contemporary equivalents.

90 Torrance, Christian Doctrine of God, 181-85.
the Holy Spirit in at least three ways. First, there is the stated preference for the baptismal formula of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit and the references to the first, second, and third Persons of the Trinity,\textsuperscript{91} even while acknowledging the various orders of presentation found in the New Testament.\textsuperscript{92} According to Macmurray, in a true community of persons there is no such thing as a first, second, or third person. All persons, as persons, are equal. There may be functional distinctions but these exist at sub-personal levels. To take any one order—even one as important as the Matthean baptismal formula—and to absolutize it betrays a sub-personal train of thought and implies lack of equality.

Second, when Torrance argues that the Spirit does not draw attention to itself but instead points to the Son and is therefore somehow transparent\textsuperscript{93} he reveals that he is again not thinking of the various hypostases as fully personal. All persons are heterocentric rather than egocentric. In Macmurray's definition of persons, each person of the Trinity should point to the others. In discussions regarding the filioque, the East has repeatedly pointed out that if one were to consistently maintain this position then Christ would likewise need to be transparent for, as Torrance himself notes, Jesus points to the Father. This assertion of the transparency of the Spirit is particularly surprising in Torrance's case because of his involvement with the Reformed-Orthodox dialogue. This tendency is further evidenced in Torrance's own discussion of the filioque.\textsuperscript{94} His argument is certainly valid and strongly emphasizes the perichoretic unity of God's actions. In spite of this he ultimately fails to make similar perichoretic remarks about the Spirit's role in the incarnation of the Son. He is quite content to speak of the Son as

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Torrance, \textit{Christian Doctrine of God}, 176.
\item Torrance, \textit{Christian Doctrine of God}, 72.
\item Torrance, \textit{Christian Doctrine of God}, 186-192.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
begotten of the Father alone.\footnote{Torrance, Christian Doctrine of God, 176.} Binitarian discussions of the Father and the Son without reference, or only marginal reference, to the Holy Spirit are not infrequent;\footnote{For instance: "The Father is not properly (\textcopyright) Father apart from the Son, and the Son is not properly Son apart from the Father, and the Holy Spirit is not properly the Holy Spirit apart from the Father and the Son." Torrance, Christian Doctrine of God, 174. See also 205, 213, 216.} but discussions of the Spirit always involve the Father and the Son.\footnote{This could be in part due to the historical nature of Torrance’s exposition—the question of the deity of the Holy Spirit and the \textit{filioque} only arose after the deity of the Son was secured.}

The third way Macmurray reveals a pneumatological subordination occurs in the parallel discussions of religious experience. Once one realizes that Macmurray’s theological orientation is pneumatological then one grasps the relative paucity of pneumatology in Torrance’s discussion of the evangelical and doxological level. There are several examples of christomonism but only one possible pneumatomonism.\footnote{This could be in part due to the historical nature of Torrance’s exposition—the question of the deity of the Holy Spirit and the \textit{filioque} only arose after the deity of the Son was secured.} If one is going to apply perichoresis or Personal logic to the Persons of the Trinity consistently then one must move towards a stronger pneumatological awareness, one consistently exhibiting a fully trinitarian discourse.

One clearly detects a great deal of correspondence between Macmurray and Torrance, especially epistemologically. Macmurray’s reservation regarding the mythological nature of God-talk are in great part assuaged by Torrance’s constant warnings as to the theoretical nature of the epistemic constructs and the need for verification in experience. However there are concerns about Torrance’s notion of epistemic inversion and the potential for reification that this creates.

In this study very little has been said regarding Torrance’s anthropology and its relation to his theology. One may observe the connection, nonetheless, in recognizing that the Athanasian-Barthian focus on the unity of God as singular subjectivity is mirrored in Torrance’s emphasis upon the subjective-theoretical activity by the human person. In other words, Torrance focuses so much upon mental activity because it is indicative of his

\footnote{Torrance, Christian Doctrine of God, 176.}
understanding of humanity. This understanding of humanity then resonates with an understanding of God’s unity as a single subjectivity.

5.4 COLIN E. GUNTON: TRINITARIAN RELATIONAL BEING

Gunton’s *The Promise of Trinitarian Theology* is a collection of essays centered in the quest for a trinitarian ontology which will unite soteriology and anthropology against the fragmentary forces of modernity which tear them apart. Gunton believes only an ontology based upon the Cappadocian trinitarian doctrine of God is able to accomplish this task.\(^9^9\) This program is carried over into the more integrated and systematic *The One, Three and the Many*.\(^10^0\) While the continuity of both is striking there is some development of Gunton’s thought which must be taken into account. Arguably one might dispense with *Promise of Trinitarian Theology* but for the purposes of this study it is important to include it because it contains direct interaction with Macmurray. His argument in both works, essentially, is that one’s doctrine of God has a determinative influence upon one’s ontology, and thus one must properly conceive of God in order to understand reality.

Gunton, therefore, traces modern individualistic notions of human personhood back to a theological cause—Augustine’s doctrine of the Trinity. Because Augustine’s doctrine of the Trinity places too much emphasis upon the unity of God to the exclusion of God’s plurality the natural trajectory of Western theology is unitarianism and Western anthropology tends toward individualism. The absence of relationality is accompanied by a doctrine of divine unknowability, which encourages atheism, for either God is unknowable and one must become a functional atheist, or one must reject this non-relational and unknowable God. Either way atheism is the result. To mildly overstate the case, Gunton believes Augustine is the cause of Western atheism.

The solution to modern individualism and atheism is to reassert the plurality and relationality of God by recovering the Cappadocian doctrine of the Trinity which emphasizes the three persons and, by necessity, the relationality among the Three. Once this relational model of divine persons is reestablished a relational ontology will be embraced and the relationality of all creation will become apparent. Human persons, then, will be understood not as the individualistic particles of modern conceptuality, but as free and mutual persons in relation.

5.4.1 **Anthropological Dependence**

Gunton’s anthropology resonates remarkably with Macmurray’s; yet this creates a methodological problem for Gunton. According to Gunton’s thesis, theology and anthropology exist in a type of causal or derivative relationship.

The point is that because we are established in our being in the Trinity, we are enabled to think from, and, with careful qualification, about, the triune being of God.... Theology, on this account, is a trinitarian process, from the being of God through whom we are, to the articulation of the manifold relationships in which we have our created and redeemed being.101

In order for Macmurray and Gunton to share a common anthropology they should share a common doctrine of God, but this is not the case. Whereas Gunton’s doctrine of God is trinitarian with a decidedly Cappadocian accent upon the three Persons of the Godhead, Macmurray is agnostic regarding the nature of God ad intra and only definitively asserts that God is beyond the personal. If Gunton’s argument is to survive he must show either that Macmurray’s anthropology is dissimilar to Cappadocian relationality or that Macmurray’s doctrine of God is somehow drawn from Cappadocian trinitarian sources. The first option is not available to Gunton, for he correctly discerns the Cappadocian doctrine of divine persons is essentially equivalent to Macmurray’s

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100 Gunton, Promise of Trinitarian Theology, vii-viii.
102 Gunton, Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 6.
conceptuality of human persons. This leaves only the option of demonstrating a Cappadocian dependence.

To accomplish this Gunton begins with the suggestion that a possible source for Macmurray’s thought comes from the Gospel of John. Then he introduces the theology of Richard of St. Victor and proposes a possible Scottish connection between Macmurray and Richard of St. Victor by way of Calvin and Sir William Hamilton (a nineteenth-century Scottish philosopher). Gunton then speculates:

Could it be that although there is no direct reference to a God conceived as triune in Macmurray’s work, in some way there is a measure of dependence; that in some way Macmurray’s thought about the human person derives from Christian thought about God?

Here one sees that Gunton is intent upon maintaining an epistemic and ontological priority for theology over anthropology. If one doubts this is Gunton’s purpose consider the following from the very next paragraph:

Towards the end of the previous section, I began to advance the second main thesis, that Macmurray’s view of the person appears to derive from Christian thought about God. If this is so, it casts doubt upon the modern thesis that theological doctrines are the projections of anthropological theories.... The way things have happened historically suggests that the dependence is otherwise: that anthropology stems from theology, and not the other way round.

Gunton’s argument is deserving of careful attention and to facilitate this a streamlined recapitulation of the line of reasoning is appropriate. He starts with the (probably correct) suggestion of biblical influence in Macmurray’s anthropology. He then introduces the very tenuous hypothesis of a Scottish historical connection between Macmurray and Richard of St. Victor. Taken together these are construed as possible evidence of the influence of Christian thought about God. Finally, this is offered as

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102 Gunton, Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 97.
103 Gunton, Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 91-92.
104 Gunton, Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 92.
105 Gunton, Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 92-93. Gunton later expresses reservations about Macmurray’s anthropology in One, Three and the Many, (169, n. 18). This is based upon the work of Aves. Aves’ principal criticisms are (philosophically) that Macmurray is dualistic and (theologically) that his hamartology and soteriology are weak.
historical proof of the dependent nature of anthropology upon theology. There are several logical anomalies in this argument. Consider the evidential chain. Gunton takes a suggestion, moves it into the realm of possibility, and then asserts it as historical proof without introducing any substantial warrant for these evidentiary moves. Furthermore, one notes the conceptual vagary involved. Observe how the Gospel of John becomes Christian thought about God which then becomes Cappadocian trinitarian theology. Gunton never explicitly states the last conceptual jump, but in order for his argument to have any coherence it must be understood that when he says Christian he means Cappadocian. If anthropology is dependent upon the doctrine of God then identical anthropologies must be derived from the same doctrine of God. Of course one only needs to consider the theology of Lampe (see above, §5.1) with its Johannine orientation to realize that many different doctrines of God are possible from reading the Gospel of John. Simply because Macmurray is probably influenced by the Gospel of John that does not make him Cappadocian. Simply because he is Scottish that does not make him Cappadocian. And, one must add, simply because Macmurray’s anthropology is relational that does not make him Cappadocian. Even through sheer force of numbers this argument is not successful.

Of course there is in actuality a third option open to Gunton to explain Macmurray’s anthropology; this is the influence, total or partial, of non-theological concepts upon Macmurray’s thought. Yet Gunton does not avail himself of this option, or apparently even consider it (in either its strong or weak form) in his interaction with Macmurray. This is even more puzzling given later statements in the book which appear to move in this direction. In the final chapter Gunton’s thesis is presented in a moderated form: “The way we think of God affects the way we think of that which he creates and

106 This is easily refuted by considering the Johannine basis of Lampe’s unitarianism discussed earlier in this chapter. See above §5.1.
redeems." One may argue that this is Gunton’s position all along; yet if this is the case then there is no need for the lengths he goes to in his radical defense of the Cappadocian origins of Macmurray’s anthropology.

The probable solution to this anomaly is found in the nature of the work itself, for it is a collection of essays written over a period of time. The final chapter, from which the moderated form of the thesis is taken, along with the chapter on cosmology were written well after the chapter where Gunton interacts directly with Macmurray. The final chapter in particular was written in an attempt to synthesize the collection of essays. One assumes that in writing the cosmology chapter Gunton found it much more difficult to find direct theological influences upon the scientists. In the final chapter he draws attention to the fact he did not attribute theological sources to scientific cosmology. Perhaps this assisted Gunton in qualifying his more deterministic tendencies in the earlier writings helping him realize it is unnecessary for his overall project.

5.4.2  Trinitarian Ontology

It is possible within Gunton’s theological framework to account for the correlation between these anthropologies through the objective nature of reality. Reality, according to Gunton, is open to limited aspects of investigation and within certain boundaries one may know ontological reality which is only fully known in its expression within a

107 Gunton, Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 165, emphasis added. A more moderate form is also found in One, Three and Many, “The logic of this claim is important for the general theme of this book, that the way in which we conceive human life in its fullness is closely bound up with the way we conceive its universal framework.” Gunton, One, Three and Many, 140.
108 See specifically Gunton’s statement to this effect, Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 173.
109 While this developmental interpretation is probably the best explanation, it is still troubling that Gunton was still dichotomizing his thinking as late as 1985, especially in light of his earlier christological work where he manages to overcome a similar christological bifurcation between christology from above and christology from below. Colin E. Gunton, Yesterday and Today: A Study of Continuities in Christology (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1983). See particularly Chapter 2, “Christology from Below,” 10-32, and Chapter 3 “Christology from Above,” 33-55. While the Promise of Trinitarian Theology chapter dealing with Macmurray was written in 1985 (viii-ix), this still falls after his Christological work published in 1983.
Cappadocian-type trinitarian theology. Gunton holds that the meaning of creation is not discernable independent of theology, that natural theology is dependent upon revealed theology, and, therefore, only narrow aspects of reality may be understood without recourse to theology.

Gunton, however, does not limit this knowledge narrowly to creation, for he states: "If God is God, he is the source of all being, meaning and truth. It would seem reasonable to suppose that all being, meaning and truth is, even as created and distinct from God, in some way marked by its relatedness to its creator." This sounds remarkably similar to Cunningham's notion of the trinitarian marks, yet differs in that the being is in its relation to the creator—not its derived (substantial) being. Gunton is attempting to create a new form of analogy, a trinitarian analogy of being.

In distinction from both of these paradigmatic theologians [Barth and Aquinas], my concern is to develop a trinitarian analogy of being (and becoming): a concept of the structure of the created world in the light of the dynamic of the being of the triune creator and redeemer. Hence, this is a similar enterprise to the Thomistic analogy, though with a form that is indebted to Barth. Put negatively, it can be said that the programme is unlike Aquinas' in being trinitarian in structure; it is unlike Barth's analogy of faith in being not just an approach to predicking qualities of God analogously, but to find a way of speaking of all being.

Gunton's epistemological method is very comparable to the one employed by Torrance similarly deriving knowledge of the immanent Trinity through the economic Trinity. The two diverge in that Torrance's analogia relationis is primarily epistemological while Gunton reifies the conclusions of this process attributing ontological status to the theoretical model created to explain the nature of God ad intra. Gunton believes he has escaped the criticism of the traditional analogia entis because he excludes ontological continuity between creator and creation; creation has its being in that

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110 This is similar to ideas about reality as expressed by Torrance. See Thomas F. Torrance, Transformation and Convergence in the Frame of Knowledge (Belfast: Christian Journals Limited, 1984).
111 See Gunton, Brief Theology of Revelation, 25-30, 36-37.
112 Gunton, One, Three and Many, 167.
113 Gunton, One, Three and Many, 140-41.
it is in relation to God.\textsuperscript{114} He replaces the traditional substantial understanding of being with relational being grounded in the Trinity itself and from this trinitarian basis discerns the manifestation of the marks of the Trinity in creation.\textsuperscript{115} Creation is marked by its relation to God. Gunton clearly sees these trinitarian marks or \textit{open transcendental}s as being different than the traditional \textit{vestigia trinitatis}.\textsuperscript{116} The open transcendental{s}, or universal marks of being,\textsuperscript{117} are perichoresis (christologically derived), substantiality (pneumatologically derived), and relationality (derived from the triune nature of the immanent Trinity).\textsuperscript{118}

One should be very clear on the procedure Gunton employs. First Gunton uses the christological and pneumatological experiences of God to arrive at the open transcendental{s} of perichoresis and substantiality. Then the consideration of the immanent Trinity generates the open transcendental of relationality. These open transcendental{s} are actually one step removed from their primary theological derivation, for Gunton actually finds spirit and sociality as the pneumatological and immanent trinitarian conceptions which are then generalized to accommodate all levels of reality—not just the personal levels.\textsuperscript{119} In other words, based on the revelation of God one is able to know the being of God \textit{ad extra} and \textit{ad intra}, and from this one may derive the open transcendental{s} which are the universal marks of being. These marks are not in creation because creation is derived from God’s being, but because creation has its being in relation to God.

This process is precisely the result Macmurray fears from a project like Torrance’s. For it is a very small step from Torrance’s epistemic inversion of certain

\textsuperscript{114} Gunton, \textit{One, Three and Many}, 228-29.
\textsuperscript{115} Gunton, \textit{One, Three and Many}, 229-30; see also 167, 217.
\textsuperscript{116} Gunton, \textit{One, Three and Many}, 144, n. 23.
\textsuperscript{117} Gunton, \textit{One, Three and Many}, 188.
\textsuperscript{118} Gunton, \textit{One, Three and Many}, 212-13.
\textsuperscript{119} Gunton, \textit{One, Three and Many}, 188-91; 227-29.
terms and the reification or ontologizing of these terms—the claim that one truly knows or has access to the very being of God ad intra.

A Macmuran critique of Gunton is three-fold. First there is a reduction in Gunton's epistemology. Macmurray agrees with Gunton that there is a close connection between epistemology and reality (this connection was somewhat loosened by Torrance). Knowledge, if it is real, must be knowledge of reality. So if one knows the nature of the Trinity ad intra then one must posit the ontological reality of the immanent Trinity one knows. Yet it is precisely here where Macmurray and Gunton part company for they do not share the same understanding of knowledge. Gunton states:

> By relationality I do not mean what is sometimes taught, that things can be known only in so far as they are related to us, but rather the realistic belief that particulars, of whatever kind, can be understood only in terms of their relatedness to each other and the whole.\(^\text{120}\)

Macmurray holds both understandings of epistemic relationality; knowledge must be rationally objective and knowledge is always someone's knowledge. Real knowledge is the personal experience of the Other, otherwise it is only theoretical or else it is false. Because Gunton's understanding is insufficiently personal he falls into the trap of believing he can know something of which he has no direct experience.

One may counter that in the experience of God ad extra one has this knowledge of God. The response to this is Macmurray's second critique: while one may appeal to revelation, revelation is still operating within the conceptual limitations of human experience. Jesus Christ as the full revelation of God was incarnated as a human and spoke in human ways. Even if one invokes the Holy Spirit in the life of Jesus and in the believer one is still faced with human limitations—unless one is willing to endorse some form of overly-realized eschatology. While it is true that in the experience of the Holy Spirit one potentially knows more about God, the understanding of this experience is still
limited by the boundaries of human conceptuality. The determination that the Son and the Holy Spirit are the very ousia of God is a human conceptual attempt to understand the experiences of Christ and the Holy Spirit. It may be true, but it is still conceptual. And while one may point to biblical sources for these concepts, they are nonetheless primarily conceptual for even in the early church many Christians arrived at different understandings (conceptualizations or theories) of the reality of their experience of Jesus and the Spirit. The existence of differing positions regarding the nature of God means either (1) some people have not authentically experienced God and therefore their knowledge is false, or (2) people have experiences of God yet the conceptual models they build to explain these experiences differ in their adequacy. Macmurray holds to the conceptual and theoretical explanation. It is important to note that Macmurray is not saying all theoretical constructs are equal. Some models are more adequate than others.

In reifying the theoretical model of the economic Trinity and the immanent Trinity Gunton is making an error similar to the one made by introductory level chemistry students who mistakenly believe that if one could actually see an atom it would look just like the “solar-system” model (with electrons orbiting the proton) shown to them in lecture. It is to confuse reality for one’s model of that reality. The model is only a visual aid and heuristic device which is helpful at their level of comprehension, but which will have to be abandoned if they do advanced studies of the atom because it is only a model. While Gunton makes occasional warnings about the danger of anthropomorphism, that is to mistake the model or image for the reality, this is clearly not uppermost in his mind, as it tends to be for Torrance. This leads to Macmurray’s third critique.

Third and finally, because it ignores the limitations of human conceptuality—as understood by Macmurray—there is a very real danger of anthropomorphic projection in Gunton’s approach. Some may argue this is safeguarded by the priority he places on the
theological over the anthropological. Gunton formulates his understanding of God before he discerns the open transcendentals. However, as Gunton himself has noted, the one implies the other; one cannot operate either purely from above or from below.

Furthermore one must ask how the primary understanding of God was determined in the first place. Cunningham was absolutely convinced that one must begin with the correct doctrine of God and then one would easily observe the *vestigia trinitatis*, just as Gunton is adamant about establishing his doctrine of God before he goes in search of his trinitarian marks. Nevertheless, one must ask the question, how does one determine the correct doctrine of God? Why does Gunton embrace the Cappadocian model of the Trinity and not another? Is it because it is theologically correct, and if so, how does he know it is correct? Or rather, is it not the case that contemporary relational thought in physics and anthropology triggers the re-appropriation of the Cappadocian doctrine? And if this is so, then how is this different than projection? Methodologically this is the same mistake that Gunton accuses Augustine of making: absolutizing a contemporary ontology. Gunton warns of the dangers of choosing the wrong transcendentals, but how does one know they are wrong? 121

How is it then possible to avoid anthropomorphic projection in human discussion of God? According to Macmurray it is by distinguishing between knowledge and reflection and recognizing that one is using reductionistic models in expressing the qualities of God which are beyond the personal. This does not require silence (although Macmurray himself, unfortunately, tended towards this) but it does require humility. One must not confuse one's model of absolute Agent and infinite Person for the reality of God. Without the constant reminder of the theoretical nature of all human ideas of God

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121 Gunton, *One, Three and Many*, 156-57.
and God's nature there are no safeguards against projecting one's understanding of human persons onto divine persons.

5.5 **JÜRGEN MOLTMANN:**

**CONTEMPLATIVE TRINITARIAN THEOLOGY**

*Experiences in Theology: Ways and Forms of Christian Theology,*\(^{122}\) is the final volume of Jürgen Moltmann's *Systematic Contributions to Theology.*\(^{123}\) Rather than having a theological prolegomena to the series Moltmann intends this as something of a *postlegomena* describing his theological method and concerns after the fact.

Those who are expecting a series of theoretical and analytic expositions are sure to come away disappointed, for while there are theoretical aspects it is in many ways more an introduction to a way of thinking through illustration and example. For instance, rather than giving a long theoretical discussion of dialog and its purposes, he uses the idea of dialog in his discussion of the theologian's context—who it is that the theologian is interacting with in various contexts.\(^{124}\) Moltmann's theology is exploratory in nature and one might even say opportunistic in that he appropriates ideas, methods, and models on an *ad hoc* basis. He has a certain fearlessness, or recklessness depending upon one's point of view, in feeling free to change his mind on issues and approaches. This makes him an exciting dialogue partner but a frustrating person to attempt to summarize. One must always carefully interact with Moltmann because of the developmental nature of his theology. There is always a danger when citing a particular passage that he may relativize or completely reject it at some later stage, even within the same work.

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\(^{123}\) This series includes *The Trinity and the Kingdom, God in Creation, The Way of Jesus Christ, The Spirit of Life, The Coming of God,* and *Experiences in Theology.* It is interesting to note that the explicitly pneumatological volume, *Spirit of Life,* was not originally part of the series.

\(^{124}\) Moltmann, *Experiences in Theology,* 3-9. In the preface he emphasizes the importance of dialog and biography for theology but this is not a highly theoretical account. *Experiences in Theology,* xvii-xviii.
One of the disadvantages of Moltmann's form of presentation is that major themes may be easily overlooked. Based solely upon reading *Experiences in Theology* one might be excused for thinking the theology of the cross is only a minor theme in Moltmann's theology. However, Richard Bauckham correctly identifies the controlling theological idea in Moltmann's theology as a "dialectical interpretation of the cross and resurrection ... subsumed into the particular form of trinitarianism...." He also identifies seven general characteristics of Moltmann's theology: "(1) christological, (2) integrative, (3) redemptive, (4) processive, (5) theocentric, (6) contextual, (7) politically and pastorally responsible." All these elements are demonstrated within *Experiences in Theology*, yet are only occasionally visible as foci of the discussion. In part this is due to the more methodological concerns of the work, but in part it is due to the style of the argument itself.

The work itself is organized into four sections with an epilogue. The first is an exploration into the nature of theology. Here Moltmann focuses upon the experiential particularity of the theologian and the importance of one's history and context. In addition to modeling the importance of dialog and biography an additional methodological feature of this chapter is demonstrated but not specifically addressed. This is Moltmann's method of discovery. Rather than beginning with a formal definition of theology he begins with an implied definition which is continuously refined through the course of further discussion. It is a very experiential and iterative process—tentative and exploratory—as Moltmann feels his way along, and invites the reader to join him in the journey.

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125 Richard Bauckham, *The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995), 4. The trinitarian component particularly includes within it an effort to overcome the subordination of pneumatology to christology (6).

The second section addresses hermeneutics in terms of promise, history, scripture, and epistemology. Promise is a key concept because it allows the reinterpretation of the past in light of the future which creates hope. This then affects one’s understanding of history and scripture. He also discusses various epistemological strategies culminating in sacramental language which is a true analogy indwelled by the Holy Spirit.

Dialogs with various forms of liberation theology comprise the third section of the work. Here Moltmann interacts with Black theology, Latin American liberation theology, Minjung theology, and Feminist theology. Programmatically these function as a means to expand Moltmann’s own particular theology making it more universal through the encounter with differing perspectives arising from differing experiences in differing contexts. Moltmann is not afraid to disagree with positions held by these other theologies or to state that they are wrong; he is not a pluralist in the relativistic sense of the word. Nonetheless he truly desires to listen and learn from diverse sources.

The Trinity is the focus of the fourth section. Moltmann holds to a social doctrine of the Trinity which is united perichoretically; or stated in a slightly different way the Trinity is a perichoretic unity. Panentheism is also a prominent element within his trinitarian doctrine of God.

The epilogue is a discussion of the difference between science and theology. Moltmann distinguishes between science as knowledge and theology as wisdom and warns of the dangers of knowledge without wisdom.

In many ways Moltmann and Macmurray may be seen as kindred spirits. Both men are comfortable going against prevailing opinion and charting their own course. Both

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127 See for example his rejection of the poor as the collective crucified Christ. *Experiences in Theology*, 296.
are working in non-analytic ways, accused of conceptual and methodological confusion, and dismissed by some as being less than scientific in their approaches. Their relational understanding of persons is, *prima facie*, very similar. Both believe in the contextual nature of human understanding and therefore hold particular theoretical formulations in a tentative manner. Moltmann, as Macmurray before him, was deeply influenced by interaction with Marxism and by his experience of war.

Nonetheless there is one major difference between these two and this difference has profound ramifications. Moltmann's theology appears limited to the contemplative apperception or conceptualities drawn from contemplative analogies. This is observable in the way that it forces Moltmann's hand in his understanding of the relation of persons to institutions, science and theology, contemplation and activism, space and time. While contending that he suffers from this reductionism one must also point out that he fights against these conceptual limitations; yet in the end Moltmann is not able to escape the contemplative tendencies of his thought.

5.5.1 INSTITUTIONS

Contemplative tendencies are visible in Moltmann's discussions of politics, economics, and the general place of institutions in human life. In revisiting the political theology of the 1960s his diagnosis of its failure is that it improperly tended to totalize the political; his prescription is the need to account for global economics in theology. 

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130 Moltmann, *Experiences in Theology*, 3-4. It is particularly interesting that both men see the liberation of the fear from death as being important to their personal development. *Experiences in Theology*, 338.
131 This is not simply an academic dispute over whether there should be two, three, or twelve terms in someone's philosophy. It is the limitations that it creates for Moltmann as he attempts to articulate his theology that is the ultimate concern.
132 Alternatively it is possible to argue that Moltmann intentionally collapses the personal and the organic so that the organic commonality between humanity and creation is stressed as well as the commonality between human and divine persons. Stated another way, Moltmann may want to collapse divinity into humanity and humanity into organism as part of his panentheism. This is less likely because of his conceptual struggle but it certainly is plausible.
Macmurray recognizes the importance of politics and economics, however he would argue that fixing either one of these is impossible, or at least ineffective, without the proper development of religious communities; hope lies primarily in friendship.

Institutions, economics, politics and all indirect relations exist for the sake of direct personal relations and should serve to foster community. Institutions are sub-personal, not supra-personal,\(^{134}\) existing for the sake of persons and not the other way around.

5.5.2 **SCIENCE AND THEOLOGY**

Another indicator of Moltmann's struggle with conceptual reductionism is found in his discussion of the differences between scientific knowledge and theological wisdom.\(^{135}\) According to Moltmann science is non-reflective and experiential and stems from a sense of wonder resulting in discovery.\(^{136}\) Theology, by contrast, is reflection upon knowledge (and belief).\(^{137}\) Wisdom is humble in recognizing its own limitations and respects and loves the object of its attention for its own sake. Wisdom does not seek to dominate the object as does science.\(^{138}\)

Like Moltmann, Macmurray believes that knowledge is non-reflective and experiential; yet he believes knowledge is available from all forms of experience including religious, artistic, and scientific experience and it is integrated in personal knowledge which is synonymous with religious knowledge. Macmurray agrees that theology (philosophy) is reflection on knowledge and belief. But he argues that there is

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\(^{134}\) A position Moltmann seems to hold. Moltmann, *Spirit of Life*, 139.


\(^{138}\) Moltmann, *Experiences in Theology*, 339-40. This is a very odd discussion in that Moltmann describes science in terms of wonder and intuition, only then to transition to an instrumentalist understanding. There is a leap here from wonder to instrumentalism. Furthermore, he dismisses the argument that only applied science contains the will to dominate because he disputes the distinction between pure research and applied science for there is no disinterested knowledge. Moltmann, *Experiences in Theology*, 342. Again there is an indicator here that Moltmann is functioning with only two levels to his thought, for his argument that there
also scientific reflection on scientific knowledge and belief—the philosophy of science. Furthermore one questions the absence of art from Moltmann’s taxonomy. Where does it fit within the dichotomy of knowledge and wisdom? From Moltmann’s descriptions one might assume that he would tend to view art as having more kinship with wisdom than with science, yet this collapses the emotional and the interactive aspects of art and religion. Of course, if one is forced to choose between a pragmatic approach to reality (science) and a contemplative approach (art) Macmurray would choose art—but neither has the proper interactive aspect which religion and the personal understanding of reality carries with it.

There are hints that Moltmann senses this limitation and includes relational terms such as harmony and peace in the discussion, but even here one has an overwhelming sense of distance, disengagement, and non-interference. The overall impression is that of an elderly couple sitting quietly across a kitchen table from each other. This is a warm and comforting image, but if this is the totality of their relationship then one of them could just as easily be replaced by a painting. A fully personal relation requires personal presence and mutuality; the person must be there and interacting (even if only in subtle ways). Replacing the image of the old couple across the table with an image of the same couple holding hands or talking together produces a picture closer to Macmurray’s model of personal community.

5.5.3 Contemplation and Action

The illustration of the elderly couple raises the issue of the relation between contemplation and action. Moltmann frames this discussion in terms of activism and contemplation. He is very concerned by the contemporary phenomenon of hyper-activity

is no disinterested research is not that all knowledge is emotional (valuation in terms of interest), but that all research is motivated by political and economic forces.

and busyness. He sees this as resulting from a pragmatic attitude which values praxis for praxis sake and which separates the contemplative from the active. He desires to integrate action in contemplation or participation. While there is talk here of action, one must recognize that Moltmann’s understanding of contemplation and participation are idealistic in form. Return for a moment to the example of the elderly couple across the table. Moltmann would specifically reject the counter-example of holding hands because he argues specifically for the priority of vision over touch and views recent moves towards emphasizing touch over sight as leading towards activism. He instead calls for a visual-contemplative model where there is no interaction between the one contemplating and the object of contemplation because he fears the possibility of domination. “The act of [visual] perception transforms the perceiver, not what is perceived. Perception confers communion. We know in order to participate, not in order to dominate.” So while calling for an integration of action in contemplation one sees this as a form of action which does not interact, participation which does not participate, and communion without community.

One does not want to misrepresent Moltmann on this point for he is not wanting to banish action outright, but rather wishes action to be controlled by an understanding of the intrinsic value of the other. He wants action grounded in contemplation. Yet he never explains how this integration or balance actually occurs. Furthermore, it is possible to interpret the activity of perceiving as his ideal of action as non-interactive activity, in which case this represents the complete opposite of Macmurray’s understanding of action.

Macmurray safeguards the dignity and freedom of the Other by insisting that all fully rational action is in terms of the nature of the Other. Rather than being forced to

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141 Moltmann, *Spirit of Life*, 201.  
choose between a pragmatic or contemplative integration of action (as Moltmann is forced to do by virtue of the contemplative reduction) Macmurray is able to integrate the pragmatic and the contemplative in the fully interactive personal. This contemplative understanding of participation and communion also effects Moltmann's use of these concepts applied theologically.

5.5.4 **PERICHORESIS AND SPACE**

Moltmann's doctrine of God is notoriously difficult to ascertain. It is possible to read him as a tritheist or as a type of process theologian (with its connotations of monism). The tritheistic tendency of his work is most readily apparent when Moltmann is discussing God in terms of the social Trinity. Talk of the three equal persons united in their common accord lends itself to caricature as a divine committee. The more monistic side of Moltmann's doctrine of God comes in his panentheism with its eschatological God as the all-in-all. In order to hold these two together without losing either particularity or unity he appeals to the concept of perichoresis. Moltmann, as one might expect, gives a slightly different spin to his interpretation of perichoresis compared with Gunton and Torrance. He places a greater emphasis upon the spatial aspect of

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143 Moltmann, *Trinity and the Kingdom*, 9; *Spirit of Life*, 201, where he calls for a balance between action and contemplation.
145 Moltmann, *Experiences in Theology*, 310. See Welker's criticism of the projection of particular social structures (particularly democratic political concepts) onto the Trinity. Michael Welker, "Spirit Topics: Trinity, Personhood, Mystery and Tongues," *Journal of Pentecostal Theology* 10 (April 1997): 30. It is of note that Moltmann expresses discomfort in using any formulaic description of God, even as three persons: "'The threefold God' has a modalistic sound, 'trinity' a tritheistic one. To talk about God 'one-in-three' is not very helpful, because it brings the one-ness numerically on the same level as the three-ness of the Persons. I would also prefer to avoid talking about a 'God in three Persons' because the word three is related to the one personal God, and suggests the figure of a body with three heads." Moltmann, *Experiences in Theology*, 309.

One will also remember that the contemplative social-structure within the Form of the Personal was *society* and it was distinguished from community by its unity in goal or purpose. To be fair to Moltmann, he talks a great deal about love in the social Trinity which tends to resist a narrowly social understanding (in the Macmurrory sense of social) yet there is still this sense, possibly due to the strong emphasis upon the economic Trinity, that the social Trinity is bound by purpose (creation?) rather than interactive love.
perichoresis as room for movement, so that perichoresis is both movement and rest. As a result of this, Moltmann actually calls for a revision of the traditional trinitarian formula. "Consequently we should not talk only about the three trinitarian Persons, but must at the same time speak of the three trinitarian spaces in which they mutually exist." This is highly significant for it raises the question of the relation of time and space.

Throughout Moltmann's discussion of God one sees a clear priority given to spatial conceptions. Panentheistic creation as space within God, the concept of God's Shekinah indwelling presence filling the whole world, the Sabbath as rest, and even the Trinity itself are all primarily conceived of in spatial terms. Moltmann regards time and space as assymetrical because one may experience various times in one space but not vice-versa. From this he concludes time must be integrated into space. This is consistent with Moltmann's understanding of participation as a non-interactive activity whereby one is related yet does not inter-relate and its accompanying preference for vision over touch. One should not take this to mean that Moltmann's concept of space-time causes his conception of participation or the reverse. Rather attention is being drawn to the fact that both of these points of view are consistent with a primarily contemplative apperception. In contemplation vision has priority over touch and time is subordinated to space. This contemplative tendency also explains Moltmann's defense of mysticism—contemplative religion.

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154 It is helpful at this point to briefly clarify the differences between Cunningham, Gunton, and Moltmann. Cunningham's *analogia entis* relies on a continuum of being and is essentially substantial. Gunton's trinitarian analogy of being does not situate the continuity in substance but in God's relationality, and then posits a correspondence of being based upon this relational continuity. Ultimately his methodology is barely distinguishable from Cunningham's except that his analogies (open transcendentals) are far superior. The nature of Moltmann's experiential trinitarian theology also privileges spatial categories over temporal ones just as Cunningham does. The difference is that Moltmann is integrating time into space whereas
Macmurray would reject this entire approach because fully personal relations must be mutual and reciprocally interactive and space must therefore be integrated into time in order for a fully personal understanding of the self-as-agent-in-relation-to-Other to exist. Additionally Macmurray argues personal analogies are the best analogies for talk of that which is beyond the personal.

One is rightly cautious about making generalizations about Moltmann's theology. However, in the examples provided above one sees the effects of a propensity for Moltmann to adopt a contemplative stance towards reality. One could also add to the evidence by noting the many dialectical descriptions he uses of reality—dialectic is the form of the organic. Alternatively, one could equally point out any number of examples where his thinking pushes against these conceptual limitations. Therefore one is hesitant to label him as a contemplative or an idealist. However, one might conclude by suggesting Macmurray's thought would serve as a powerful tool if Moltmann truly desires to break out of the limitations of the contemplative aspects of his underlying philosophy. Of course, Macmurray's philosophy also has limitations which Moltmann would face in attempting to speak theologically, yet one cannot help but think that it would contribute overall to his theology because personal language is the most complete and comprehensive language available to human persons.

It is unclear how Moltmann views the relationship between anthropology and theology because he intentionally avoids constructing a distinct anthropology and instead concentrates on anthropology within the doctrine of creation. Certain aspects of the human appear to directly reflect the divine, while other aspects appear to be organically understood. This does not seem to greatly concern Moltmann for one day God will

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Cunningham’s model is concerned primarily with substance and really has no integrating attitude towards time.

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156 Moltmann, *God in Creation*, xvi.
indwell creation in a divine way and creation will indwell God in a creaturely way. In this formulation to speak of the question of projection seem rather moot. However one may say that the presence of contemplative philosophy tends to create a dialectical model which is then resolved in unified synthesis.

5.6 SUMMARY CONCLUSION

In Chapter 1 an introduction to the life and thought of John Macmurray was provided. An investigation of the secondary literature revealed the need for a better understanding of Macmurray's concept of God in order to properly understand the relationship between human and divine persons within his thought. In order to do this, however, it was determined that a systematic exposition of Macmurray's thought was needed from a philosophical perspective.

Chapter 2 developed a systematic model of Macmurray's philosophy, the Form of the Personal, providing a crucial map of the key concepts and relationships within his complex and heavily integrated thought. The importance of the pragmatic, contemplative, and communal apperceptions was clearly demonstrated and was itself instrumental in the organization of the discussion of Macmurray's Form of the Personal.

An extensive examination of Macmurray's anthropology was the focus of Chapter 3. Again exploiting the apperceptive triad, human beings were considered in terms of equality, freedom, and mutuality. The topic of religion received extensive coverage in this chapter and numerous misunderstandings of Macmurray were corrected using the philosophical model developed in Chapter 2.

Chapter 4 consisted of an exploration of Macmurray's theology or understanding of God. This natural theology was approached through the apperceptive stances of the idea of God, the historicity of God, and the mutually interactive God. It became clear as

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this chapter unfolded that Macmurray was committed to neither a unitarian nor a trinitarian doctrine of God. Equally clear was the effort Macmurray exerted to emphasize the distinction between human and divine persons, that God was beyond the merely personal and was in no way sub-personal. Yet God may only be known by humans in human terms. Finally, it was determined that one could categorize Macmurray’s doctrine of God as functionally equivalent to pneumatology: perceiving God as Person is synonymous with describing God as Spirit.

Chapter 5 has been a critical investigation of Lampe, Cunningham, Torrance, Gunton, and Moltmann using Macmurray’s Form of the Personal. Through applying Macmurray’s thought to the particular theologians one discovered that a theologian’s underlying concept of human persons affected their conceptualization of God, and rightly so. According to Macmurray this is proper and to be expected and does not imply anthropomorphism unless one mistakes one’s theoretical model of God for the reality it is attempting to understand.
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