THE TRIPLE DIVISION OF THE SLAVIC LANGUAGES:
A LINGUISTIC FINDING, A PRODUCT OF POLITICS, OR AN ACCIDENT?

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Abstract

The first and rather simple classificatory schemes of the Slavic languages appeared in the first half of the 19th century. The idea that languages develop from one another caught on when the heuristic diagram in the form of Stammbaum (genetic tree) was employed to portray this hypothesis in the second half of the 19th century. Quite unrealistically, the Stammbaum suggests that languages are discrete and self-contained entities, which rapidly branch out from their “parent languages,” as if they were actual “babies” born on a given day. On the other hand, it is well attested that the relatively “sharp” linguistic boundaries arise only between dialect continua, and even those can be bridged by creole continua. Within the dialect continuum language forms change gradually from village to village. The concept of “a language” requires that a segment of a dialect continuum (invariably connected to a power center, that is, a capital) be made into the basis of a written language, which is standardized by its widespread employment in administration, education and literature, and by the compilation of authoritative dictionaries and grammars as well.

With the rise of standard languages, the illusion of discrete languages emerged, and became the normative concept of thinking about languages in general. In Central Europe this paradigm of thinking about the linguistic feed backed with the legitimizing force of ethnic nationalisms, in emulation of the German and Italian models. As a consequence, the specifically Central European model of ethnolinguistic nationalism came into being, characterized by the following equation, language = nation = state. This formula became the normative political standard in Central Europe. In accordance with it, ethnolinguistic nation-states were founded in the region. The linguistic Stammbaum perfectly suited the political needs of these new ethnolinguistic nation-states, because, “in the scientific manner,” it emphasized the “inherent separateness” of their languages and nations, which, in turn, legitimized the existence of the corresponding states as separate polities. Afterward, the self-fulfilling prophecy of this ethnolinguistic norm was actualized by official and social stigmatization of dialects, promotion of standard national languages via the mass media and the educational system, forced and economically-driven mass population movements, and expulsions of the speakers of languages other than the national ones.

Inevitably, with the founding of the Central European nation-states the wealth of various classificatory schemes of the Slavic languages was “standardized” in line with the political reality to the still prevailing triple division of the Slavic languages, which apportions these languages between the Eastern, Southern, and Western “branches” of the Slavic “genetic tree.” This classification is presented as “scientific” and based on linguistic findings. But there are just two Slavic dialect continua, Northern and Southern, bisected by the West Germanic and East Romance dialect continua, and the remnant of the Finno-Ugric dialect continuum. Hence, it appears that the division between the Eastern Slavic languages, and the Western
ones hinges rather on religious, alphabetic, and political cleavages, that is, extralinguistic ones.

The normative force of the political equation language = nation = state that underlies the triple division of the Slavic languages is extremely strong to this day. German and Italian are shared as national languages by several nation-states and minority languages of stateless nations/ethnic groups (Sardinian, Frisian, Sorbian) are recognized in Italy and Germany, though sometimes grudgingly. On the contrary, not a single Slavic language is shared as a national language by nation-states. Thus, the breakup of Yugoslavia entailed the breakup of Serbo-Croatian into Bosnian, Croatian, Serbian, and, perhaps, Montenegrin. What is more, Poland withheld recognition to Kashubian as a language until the late 1990s, and still does not agree to recognize Silesian. Similarly, Bulgaria refuses to recognize Pomakian, Belarus Polesian, Ukraine Rusyn, and Croatia Bunjevcian as languages. It is so, because in the Central European paradigm of ethnolinguistic nationalism that would be tantamount to recognizing the speech communities of these languages as separate nations, ergo, their right to establish their own nation-states.

The triple classificatory scheme of the Slavic languages, though of such recent and rather unscientific (that is, not purely linguistic) origin, has become a dogma of Slavic studies, accepted worldwide. This shows how intimate are the links between politics and academia; how the political influences research results; and how, by chance and coincidence, a heuristic device (for instance, the Stammbaum) suits some current political needs, and can be proclaimed the “true reflection” of reality, while the political is busy shaping this reality so it becomes identical with what is proclaimed. The reinforcing normative relationship between the model and reality being so strong and politically motivated, outside observers tend to mistake the model for reality. This explains the widespread, popular and unwavering acceptance of the triple classificatory scheme of the Slavic languages outside the Slavophone countries.

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The author would be grateful for any suggestions and corrections which would help improve this work and facilitate its transformation into a full-fledged book. Please send comments to tomek672@poczta.onet.pl.
The Triple Division of the Slavic Languages: A linguistic finding, a product of politics, or an accident?¹

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¹ I would like to thank Dr Alexander Maxwell for our e-discussions, which inspired me to write this article. Obviously, I remain solely responsible for all the views presented and any infelicities.
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I. Introduction: The Slavic languages and nations

Nowadays when one opens a textbook, monograph or encyclopedic article on the Slavic languages, everything is obvious and clear. This Indo-European language family is presented as consisting from the three branches: Eastern, Southern and Western. The Eastern branch comprises Belarusian (Byelorussian, White Russian), Carpatho-Rusyn (Rusyn, Ruthenian, Lemkian), Russian and Ukrainian (Little Russian). Czech, Kashubian, Polish, Slovak and Sorbian (Lusatian, Wendish) make up the Western branch of the Slavic languages. Until recently only Bulgarian, Macedonian, Serbo-Croatian (Croato-Serbian) and Slovenian were included in the Southern branch apart from now extinct Church Slavonic. But the breakup of Yugoslavia was emulated in the sphere of languages too. Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian replaced former Serbo-Croatian, while Montenegrin is predicted to emerge as a separate language after Serbia and Montenegro may part ways in 2006. The sole controversy the reader may notice is that concerning the rise or reemergence of new languages in the post-Yugoslav states. But the orthodoxy of the triple division of the Slavic languages into the Eastern, Southern and Western branches holds fast not unlike the dogma of Holy Trinity so dear to the users of the Slavic languages, who predominantly profess Catholicism and Orthodox Christianity.

Although today the classification of the Slavic languages into three separate branches appears to be “timeless truth”, this was just one of numerous classificatory schemes that appeared throughout the 19th century. It won the day

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3 Carpatho-Rusyn is a relatively new addition to the Eastern branch of the Slavic languages that appeared in this scope during the 1990s.

4 Šafařík, P J. 1842. *Slovenský zeměvič* [map]. Prague. In the legend to this ethnolinguistic map the Slavs are represented as three distinctive groups of the East, South and West Slavs, but with a special affinity noted between the East and South Slavs united in Orthodoxy and Church Slavonic liturgy, as opposed to the “Latinate” West Slavs.
only at the beginning of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century. Even more interestingly, majority of the very entities classified in these schemes came into being as separate standard languages complete with their authoritative grammars and dictionaries from the 19\textsuperscript{th} century to 1944 when Macedonian was recognized as a separate language. In the 18\textsuperscript{th} century Polish and emerging Russian were the sole representatives of the standard Slavic languages. Among other Slavophone populations Arabic, Byzantine Greek, Church Slavonic, German, Latin, or Ottoman (Old Turkish)\textsuperscript{5} were used as official languages of state and regional administration, ecclesiastical administration, education and literate culture. The end of the 18\textsuperscript{th} century and the first half of the next century saw the establishment of Croatian, Czech, Bulgarian, Serbian and Slovenian as standard languages. In the second half of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century and through the first two decades of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century the standard languages of Belarusian, Slovak and Ukrainian came into being. At the same time Sorbian half-emerged and Bosnian made an appearance too, while the standardization of Bulgarian was completed, and Croatian and Serbian were made into Serbo-Croatian. After World War II Macedonian was shaped into a standard language, the continuous tradition of written Kashubian (commenced in the 1920s) persevered, and that of Sorbian was standardized in East Germany in the two varieties of Lower and Upper Sorbian. After the fall of communism, and the breakup of Yugoslavia Serbo-Croatian was divorced into Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian, the standardization of Kashubian was completed, and the state-enforced suppression of Belarusian commenced in Belarus. On top of that the 1990s saw the attempts at forging Montenegrin as a standard language, and the coalescence of the new standard Slavic language of Carpatho-Rusyn. One should add that in interwar Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia attempts were undertaken to produce Serbocroatoslovenian (Yugoslavian) and Czechoslovak (Czecho-Slovak) as the official languages of both these states, but to no avail. Neither the Slovenians in Yugoslavia nor the Slovaks in Czechoslovakia agreed to go along with these projects forced on them from above.

This study aims at presenting and analyzing the scope of the classificatory triple division of the Slavic languages. First, I glance at the emergence of the genetic classification as the accepted instrument of understanding affinity among standard languages. Second, I present an inventory of various classificatory schemes of the Slavic languages that appeared from the end of the 18\textsuperscript{th} century to the end of the next century prior to the popular espousal of the triple division of the Slavic languages that obtains to this day. Third, the question is asked about what are the explicit and implicit factors, which convince scholars and Slavic-speakers that the Slavic languages ought to be classified as belonging to three separate branches of equal taxonomic significance.

\textsuperscript{5} In Modern Turkish Ottoman is known as “Osmanlica”.

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My hypothesis is that this triple classificatory scheme as well as others previously proposed not so much reflect the linguistic reality but are conditioned by various extralinguistic interests be they political, religious or ethnic. This proves that the linguistic cannot be successfully separated from the rest of the social reality spun and constantly transformed by human beings. This transformation, of course, is mostly conducted via and with the use of language. 6

As of the 19th century all these above-enumerated strains of the social reality may be subsumed in the rubric of the national with the ideology of nationalism as the ultimate organizational principle. Between 1800 and the 1920s entire Western, Southeastern and Central Europe was divided among nation-states construed as inhabited by corresponding nations. After World War II the nation-state as the sole model of legitimate statehood spread to all the corners of the world in the wake of decolonization. This process was largely completed during the 1990s with the breakups of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. Each of the successor states defines itself as a nation-state though with some vacillation in the case of the multiethnic Russian Federation. Hence, the specific status of nationalism as the sole global ideology of statehood legitimization, was re-confirmed. 7

In a rough generalization one may say that the ethnic variety of nationalism predominates in Eurasia, while the civic model of this ideology is more popular elsewhere. 8 In civic nationalism the common denominator for membership in the nation is citizenship. Hence, it is easily attainable for those individuals who wish to be included in a civic nation. The situation is more onerous in ethnic nations where citizenship does not equal nationality. Ethnic nationalists require that an individual displays various culture-specific (ethnic) traits that “prove one’s correct nationality”. On this basis one qualifies for citizenship of a given ethnic nation-state. Necessarily this leads to the situation when a sizeable

8 Obviously civic and ethnic nationalisms are ideal categories useful for analytical purposes. But in all extant nation-states varying degrees of the ethnic and civic are present. For instance, such a staunchly civic nation-state as the United States denied full citizenship (that is, nationality) to Afro-Americans and Native Americans until the 1970s. On the contrary, the US’s ethnic antithesis – Germany does grudgingly extend German citizenship to the descendents of Turkish and Kurdish immigrants as of 2003.
percentage of such a state’s population is denied citizenship and/or commonality with the state’s ethnically defined nation. On the other hand, often significant populaces that display the appropriate ethnically construed nationality, find themselves stranded beyond the borders of “their” nation-state. The logic of ethnic nationalism requires that the state suppresses, assimilates or removes the “foreign” population within, and “regains” the territories without, which are inhabited by co-nationals of the nation to whom this state belongs. Invariably, this leads to relativization of the existing borders and to ethnically motivated conflicts with neighbor nation-states.  

The more ethnic (or culture-specific) elements are politicized into the ideological basis of a given nation-state the more difficult it is to actualize the goals of such an ethnic nationalism. In turn, the political frustration entails greater relativization of the borders and spawns more instability. In Central Europe it is justified to qualify nationalisms predominating in this region with the adjective “ethnolinguistic”, for standard languages defined as national and state languages were made into the very ideological foundation of the Central European nations and their nation-states. (The partial exception to this rule was Czechoslovakia, as Prague fully recognized this state as a house for two equal nations of the Czechs and Slovaks when it was federalized on the ethnolinguistic basis in 1968). If this is also true, but to a lesser degree, in relation to the ethnic nationalisms obtaining in South Eastern Europe (the Balkans) and Eastern Europe (the western section of the former Soviet Union). When nation-states were established in the Balkans during the 19th century religion (usually Orthodox Christianity as opposed to official Islam of the Ottoman Empire) and ecclesiastical divisions of the Orthodox Church mattered much more than languages. It could not be the other way round because these states came into being prior to the codification of standard languages in this region. Interestingly, only after World War II unitary Yugoslavia was transformed into a federation consisting from national (that is ethnolinguistic and ethnoreligious) republics. Orthodox Christianity constituted the ideological basis of the Russian Empire, while imposition of the Russian language on the empire’s entire population commenced quite late – during the last three decades of the 19th century. The Bolshevik Revolution replaced Orthodox Christianity with atheistic communism.

as the legitimizing ideology of the Soviet Union. The dynamics of social and political use of communism in this state remained curiously “religious” not unlike that of official Orthodox Christianity in imperial Russia. But the politicization of languages was introduced shortly as the foundation of the administrative divisions of the Soviet Union.  

One could infer that the 1990s breakups of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia not only reaffirmed the ideological paramountcy of ethnic nationalisms often denied during the communist times, but also coupled them with separate standard languages in emulation of Central Europe’s typical ethnolinguistic model. It may be so, but exceptions to this rule still exist. For instance, Belarusian waned to the point of insignificance in Russophone Belarus, while Ukrainian still competes with Russian in Ukraine with no eventual success ensured. The seemingly clearest situation obtains in the post-Yugoslav states where the gradual breakup of Yugoslavia was paralleled by the breakup of Serbo-Croatian. However, both these processes were again explained and legitimized through politicized religion. Although the Yugoslav society used to be thoroughly secular the unprecedented absolutization of the religious makes the Croats, Serbs and Bosnians separate because they are perceived to be Catholics, Orthodox Christians and Muslims, respectively, even if not practicing and utterly atheistic in the last several generations.

On top of that, it is interesting to note that the three almost simultaneous breakups of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia dramatically reshaped the political, social, economic and cultural reality of virtually all the Slavic-speakers. Even the Poles and Bulgarians participated in these momentous changes because their nation-states regained independence having reemerged from the unraveled framework of Moscow’s Soviet bloc. What is more, we cannot say if it is a pure coincidence or not that the three above-mentioned breakups seem as if apportioned by fate to the East Slavs (the Soviet Union), South Slavs (Yugoslavia) and West Slavs (Czechoslovakia). Or maybe these breakups were programmed through the unprecedentedly high degree of the ethnic in Slavic nationalisms that took the fore when the restraints of communism overlordship had disappeared?

13 Cf Kamusella, Tomasz. 2004. On the Similarity Between the Concepts of Nation and Language (pp 107-112). Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism. Vol 31. In this article the author argues that languages not unlike nations are arbitrary and ascriptive labels imposed on the social reality by human groups who define themselves as nations and agree that the media of their
II. On classification as the scientific method

Biology

The Swedish (or, rather more aptly, European) scholar Carolus Linneaus (1707-1778) was the product of the Enlightenment. Drawing on the thought of Aristotle, he believed in explaining the world in a non-religious manner divorced from the traditional explanatory paradigm offered by the Bible and its exegeses. Linneaus achieved this goal through description and meticulous classification of the natural phenomena. In his masterpiece *Systema Naturae Fundamenta Botanica* (1736) he introduced the binominal classification of flora. Linneaus’s system proved successful as it usually correctly noted (genetic) relationships among plants. Thereafter it was expanded, and, nowadays, is used for classifying all the living creatures. Linneaus offered the idea of synchronic classification of plants and animals based on implicitly presumed genetic closeness among them. Espousing this method Charles Darwin (1809-1882) came to the conclusion that a diachronic dimension could be added to this scheme. Already on his scientific trip at the Beagle (1831-1836) he sketched numerous drafts of a “tree of life” with its twigs representing emergence and proliferation of species through time, in a visible similarity to “genealogical trees” of royal and noble families. Eventually he propounded this theory in his famous *Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection* (1859). Working at the same time, in 1866, the cloister priest Gregor Mendel (1822-1884) from Brünn (Brno), Moravia, Austrian Empire (today, in the Czech Republic) published an article with an outline of the genetic theory of heredity. If proven this theory would give a material explanation to Darwin’s scheme of natural selection. But Mendel’s article was re-discovered only in 1900. Genes (that is, the DNA molecule) as the basic building blocks of the living matter were discovered in 1953, which finally marked the transition of biology from humanities to exact (natural) sciences.

Communication should be construed as languages. By definition nationalism cannot exist without politicization of the national. But if apart from nations as such, this politicization is extended to languages and, additionally, intertwined with the religious, the number of culture-specific elements incorporated to the national increases. Inevitably, this makes nationalisms of this type more arbitrary, increasingly exclusive and less predictable. As a result if left unchecked the influence of such nationalisms spawns high degrees of political instability precipitating dramatic political changes.

Whatever scientific merits of Darwin’s theory and controversies provoked by it, the metaphor offered by his insight into the living world turned out to be irresistible. A firm believer in evolution even before Darwin’s breakthrough, the British philosopher Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) applied its tenets to explaining social behavior, first, in his *Principles of Psychology* (1855). In *The Decent of Man* (1871) Darwin dared to apply his theory of natural selection in order to explain the origin of the Human species. This lent a seemingly scientific grounding for Spencer’s evolutionary vision of sociology propounded in *Descriptive Sociology* (1874-1881) and *The Principles of Sociology* (1880-1896). His theory, that came to be known as social darwinism, maintained that human societies evolve in the same way as animal species through the competition between individuals and their groups ensuring the survival of the fittest. \(^{15}\) This was enough to legitimize the theory of “scientific racism”, which Joseph Arthur de Gobineau (1816-1882) proposed in his work *Essai sur l’inégalité des races humaines* (1853-1855). The resultant scheme put the “White Man” as the pinnacle of creation predestined to dominate “justifiably” colonized “Orientals” and “primitive peoples”. “Orientals” were associated mainly with the literate cultures of Asia and with the “yellow” skin color. They were “worse” than “whites”, because they had no military technology that would match that of the West. “Primitive peoples” were ranked lower than “Orientals” because the former possessed no technology of writing. In the Eurocentric view most of these “primitives” lived in Africa, so they were associated with the “black” skin color. \(^{16}\)

In the United Kingdom, this seemingly scientific biologization of politics was enshrined in Thomas Huxley’s *The Struggle for Existence in Human Society* (1888) or in P Charles Michel’s “A Biological View of Our Foreign Policy” (1896). \(^{17}\) In the last three decades of the 19\(^{th}\) century these ideas spread rapidly throughout Europe, and legitimized the “national struggle for survival”. In the view of this specific “national social Darwinism” the “fittest” nation-states were to grow at the cost of their weaker, that is, “inferior”, neighbors. Similarly successful (that is, “fit”) stateless nations were destined to obtain their nation-states at the expense of the already existing polities. This national evolution was to preserve “the best developed” nations and nation-states, while to relegate the “inferior” to the heap of history. Significantly supporters of this theory


construed nations and nation-states as “national organisms”. The fullest application of this theory came with “scientific racism” (Rassenkunde) that, during World War II, brought about the national socialist Holocaust of Jews and Roma as well as destruction of nation-states and oppression of ethnonationally construed populaces. Likewise policies of ideologically motivated oppression and discrimination of ethnonationally variegated human groups were carried out in the Soviet Union, for instance, the deportations of “enemy nations”.

**Philology**

Similar methods of classification and Eurocentric evaluation worked out in the scope of social darwinism, were applied to languages too. It was Darwin himself who, in chapter 14 of his *On the Origin of Species*, explicitly proposed that his tree of life, mainly intended for illustrating and explaining the evolution of all the species, could be employed for the same purpose in regard of languages: “If we possessed a perfect pedigree of mankind, a genealogical arrangement of the races of man would afford the best classification of the various languages now

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Initially, Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) subscribed to the general Enlightenment belief in the nation as a contractual or a voluntary association. But as of the 1760s he assumed the givenness of nations. Later Abbé (Emmanuel Joseph Comte) Sieyès (1748-1836) opined that nations are natural phenomena. At the same time Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803) equated nation with language, which soon resulted in the Romantic nation of “Völkergeist”, or “spirit of the nation”. At the beginning of the 19th century Georg W F Hegel (1770-1831) reified the category of “Geist” as referring to the “spirit and destiny” of nation, state or historical epoch. These strains of thinking produced the typically Central European vision of nation simultaneously perceived as a phenomenon of nature, and a community of spirit and destiny. The former image makes nation into a living (bilological) body or organism, while the latter endows it with a soul. The concept of “dusza” (“soul” or “spirit” in Slavic languages) persists to this day in the discourse on the Russian nation or people. In this manner, the traditional Judeo-Christian body-soul dualism was transposed to national politics in Central and Eastern Europe in this seemingly secular age of separation of Church (religion) from state. (Greenfeld, Liah. 1992. *Nationalism: Five roads to modernity*. Cambridge MA and London: Harvard University Press, p 256; Smith, Anthony D. 1999. *The Nation in History: Historiographical debates about ethnicity and nationalism*. Hanover NH: University Press of New England, p 7, 9).
spoken throughout the world; and if all extinct languages, and all intermediate and slowly changing dialects, were to be included, such an arrangement would be the only possible one.”

Darwin’s suggestion was developed by his long-time friend and scientist Charles Lyell (1797-1875) into the theory of linguistic evolution in his book *Geological Evidences of the Antiquity of Man* (1863). Lyell summarized his idea saying that this specific evolution is governed through: “fixed laws in action, by which, in the general struggle for existence, some terms and dialects gain victory over others”.  

Darwin’s intuition on the parallel development of languages and human groups stemmed from earlier though more nebulous assessments to this end such as James Prichard’s *Researches into the Physical History of Man* (1813). At this early stage the Prussian philologist Franz Bopp (1791-1867), who showed the common origin of the Indo-European languages through his studies in comparative grammar, declared before 1838 that “the genealogy and antiquities of nations can be learned only from the sure testimony of languages themselves.”

These general ideas prompted the Thuringian philologist August Schleicher (1821-1868) to depict the origin and proliferation of the Indo-European languages in the form of the *Stammbaum* (genetic, genealogical, descent or stem-tree) in his works of 1853 and 1861. His friend Ernst Hackel (1834-1919) introduced Schleicher to Darwin’s *Origin of Species*. In this book Schleicher came across the only illustration – the very schematic and abstract “tree of life” without any real-life examples. It readily resembled his own *Stammbaume* and lent more scientific grounding to Schleicher’s method of diachronic classification of languages. In 1863, the same year when Lyell

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22 In agreement with the German-language use of that time Schleicher and other Germanophone scholars called the Indo-European languages with the Germanocentric term “Indo-Germanic” (*Indogermanisch*). This usage persisted until 1945.  
presented his theory of linguistic evolution in *Geological Evidences of the Antiquity of Man*, Schleicher published his *Die Darwinische Theorie und die Sprachwissenschaft* (in 1869 the English translation appeared titled *Darwinism Tested by the Science of Language.*). This combination of linguistic and natural evolutions as complementary was made even easier by Schleicher’s earlier espousal of Linneaus’s biological classification as a metaphor for classifying languages in his 1850 work *Die Sprachen Europas in systematischer Übersicht* (The Systematic Outline of the European Languages). He explicitly spoke of languages as “organisms” and described them with terms drawn from biology, for instance, “genus”, “species”, and “variety”. And in *Die Darwinische Theorie*... Schleicher stated: „The rules now, which Darwin lays down with regard to the species of animals and plants, are equally applicable to the organisms of languages [Sprachorganismen], that is to say, as far as the main features are concerned.”

The German- and English-language editions of his *Die Darwinische Theorie*... Schleicher came with the exemplary *Stammbaum* of the Indo-European languages. This device took on and F W Farrar (1831-1903) illustrated his *Families of Speech* (1870) with numerous *Stammbäume* to depict the branches and affinities of the Indo-European languages. Haeckel swiftly conflated Schleicher’s heuristic device of *Stammbaum* with Darwin’s “tree of life” and produced detailed *Stammbäume* of animal and plant species in his *Natürliche Schöpfungsgeschichte* (1868, English translation: *The History of Creation* [1868]), Über die Entstehung und den Stammbaum des Menschengeschlechtes (1868, On the Origin and the Genealogical Tree of the Humankind) and *Anthropogenie* (1874, English translation: *The Evolution of Man*, [1903]). The illustrations were done either in the shape of an elaborate and naturalistic bush or tree. Building on this method in *Natürliche Schöpfungsgeschichte* Haeckel included a *Stammbaum* of the Indo-European peoples, and in *Anthropogenie* of the Indo-European languages. This presumed isomorphism of peoples or nations with their languages presented as discrete entities agreed with the ethnolinguistic paradigm of Central European nationalisms, which maintains that language equates nation. On top of that in *Natürliche Schöpfungsgeschichte* Haeckel

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added a *Stammbaum* of the “twelve species of man”, easily interpreted as “races”.  

The normative urges of social darwinism that ranked humans (construed as consisting from different races) as “better” or “worse” were transposed onto languages too. In *Über die Bedeutung der Sprache für die Naturgeschichte des Menschen* (1865, On the Development of Language and Natural History of the Humankind) Schleicher characteristically claimed that the Indo-European and Semitic language groups were “the most advanced”. At that time the Eurocentric prejudice was clothed in the “scientific garb” of graphically appealing and convincing *Stammbäume* that propagated the idea of radical and ineradicable isomorphism of peoples, languages, races and civilizations. All that in the interest of the states dominating the world; and from these states the scholars came who proposed these schemes. The metaphor of *Stammbaum* as an accepted instrument of seemingly scientific analysis flourished from the end of the 19th century to the mid-20th century. In the 1960s and 1970s its appeal caused the revival of Baroque-like *Stammbäume* of human races in the Soviet Union, while this method dominates to this day worldwide when it comes to presenting affinities between languages.

However, even Schleicher hoping for the rise of “science of language” was acutely aware that philology was not an exact science despite some empirically attested regularities, not unlike biology prior to the discovery of DNA. He said: “What some call a language, others term a dialect, and vice versa. […] Thus many glossologists speak of the Slavonic dialects, others of the Slavonic languages.” But the sheer appeal of the *Stammbaum* as a genre of scholarship was so overwhelming that the apparent drawbacks of this metaphor were often overlooked. This relegated to obscurity other methods of classifying languages, especially the “wave theory”, which more truthfully pictures gradual change that as much separates as connects different languages. What is more, this theory does away with the idealistic separation of the linguistic and the non-linguistic acknowledging the decisive influence of political, social, economic, cultural, 

religious and historical factors on language change, unlike supporters of the *Stammbaum* metaphor who claim to research language(s) only.\(^{33}\) Probably independently two scholars, in contrast to the *Stammbaum*, proposed the metaphor of wave (*Welle*): the Thuringian linguist Hugo Schuhardt (1842-1927) in his work *Der Vokalismus des Vulgärlateins* (1868, Vocalism of Vulgar Latin) and the Prussian researcher Johannes Schmidt (1843-1901) in his *Der Verwandtschaftsverhältnisse der indogermanischen Sprachen* (1872, The Relationships Among the Indo-Germanic Languages). Instead of abrupt branching characteristic of the *Stammbaum*, they proposed that language change spreads in the form of waves. Hence spatially and/or temporally neighboring language varieties usually display similar traits in grammar, vocabulary and phonology; even if genetically they are very distant.\(^{34}\) Groups of such languages are called “leagues” (*Bund*). For instance the Balkan league comprises the Slavic languages of Bulgarian and Macedonian, the Romance languages of Moldovan and Romanian, the Indo-European isolates of Albanian and Greek, and the Turkic language of Turkish.\(^{35}\)

This type of areal classification of languages has never caught on. First, it is difficult to represent the findings of the wave model in a simple and appealing graphic form. Second, and even more significantly, units of this areal classification cross national borders unlike those of the genetic tree theory of *Stammbaum* where separate twigs usually represent different languages spoken in corresponding and similarly discrete nation-states. On an ethnolinguistic map this allows for almost perfect overlapping of the territories of nation-states with the areas where corresponding national languages are thought to be spoken. Clearly the wave theory went against the “politically correct” logic of the radical and normative isomorphism of nations, languages and nation-states. The *Stammbaum* metaphor more aptly “proved and justified” clear-cut borders between nation-states, and between nations who, construed as speaking radically different languages, inhabit their separate national polities. In the age of nationalism the wave theory was good for nothing because it clashed with the idea of radical ethnolinguistic isomorphism propagated by nationalists.

From the mid-19\(^{th}\) century through the 20\(^{th}\) century, if a linguistic theory did not contribute to this ethnonational view of politics and society it was usually discarded and marginalized, especially in Eurasia. For instance, in the wake of

the French defeat of 1870 at hands of Prussia, a French scholar asserted that “the
Prussian fights in the same way he criticizes a text, with the same precision and
method.”  
Philological “science” became just another weapon of fighting
national conflicts. Not surprisingly the French answer to German military-cum-
philological superiority was the establishment of 250 new chairs of literature
and history in 1876-1879 alone. The metaphor of Stammbaum allowed for
“scientific” chopping up of the gradations of Europe’s broad linguistic groups
into discrete standard languages spoken by different nations inhabiting their own
separate nation-states or national territories “destined” to become nation-states.37
Thanks to the genetic tree theory this radical ethnolinguistic and ethnonational
isomorphism could be anachronistically extended backward into the past. In the
1870s the common medieval Frankish literary tradition was split between the
German and French languages.38 This model of anachronistic historicization of
national separateness was followed time and again, notably among the Slav
national movements. For instance, there has been claimed and counter-claimed
the sole and unbroken continuity of development from Old Church Slavonic to
Bulgarian, Croatian, Macedonian, Serbian, Slovak or Slovenian. Actually
nationalistically minded philologists re-named Old Church Slavonic,
respectively, as: Old Bulgarian, Old Croatian, Old Macedonian, Old Serbian,
Old Slovak and Old Slovenian. This national competition for the tradition of Old
Church Slavonic literacy is still all the rage among Bulgarian and Macedonian
scholars.39 In the same vein since the end of the 19th century Balkan philologists
busied themselves with dividing the common (Old Church) Slavonic corpus of
texts between Bulgarian and Macedonian, Croatian and Serbian, while recently
Bosnian and Montenegrin linguists joined the competition. Similar divisive

Speculum. No 1, p 40.
University Press, p 30; Wolff, Philippe. 2003 [1971]. Western Languages AD
39 Cf Dzhukeski, Alexandar. 1981. The Macedonian Literary Language (pp 289-
298). Macedonian Review. No 3, p 296. For instance, in the 1950s there
commenced the publication of Old Church Slavonic texts labeled as “Old
Macedonian”.

Interestingly, in the case of the Romance languages philologists attempted
to establish the point of separation when French or Italian emerged from Latin
as different languages, rather than to claim Latin for French or Italian
nationalism in the garb of “Old French” or “Old Italian”. (Banniard, Michel.
1995. Geneza kultury europejskiej, V-VIII w. Warsaw: Volumen, pp 164, 185-
186, 188-190; Wolff. Western Languages, pp 109, 112, 132-134, 136, 140-145)
conflicts over old Bohemian and East Romance texts raged between Czech and Slovak philologists, and their Moldovan and Romanian counterparts, respectively. In the 20th century, even more absurdly, for national reasons only, Hungarian was identified with Sumerian, Scythian or Etruscan; Romanian with Dacian, Albanian with Illyrian; Serbian was declared the “oldest language of the Bible”; Lithuanian – the most direct and purest descendant of Latin; while some claim that Ukrainian dates back to 9th century BC and influenced the formation of Sanskrit.  

The US linguist Leonard Bloomfield (1887-1949) also contributed to fortifying the presumed “scientific” character of Schleicher’s genetic tree theory of languages. In his famous 1926 article “A Set of Postulates for the Science of Language”, he seemingly solved the confusion between languages and dialects, which Schleicher had decried. Bloomfield defined dialects as those language forms, which are mutually intelligible, and languages as mutually incomprehensible. Aspiring for making linguistics an exact science, Bloomfield erred here on two counts. First, he anachronistically allocated dialects to languages. The former oral in character and characteristic of the Homo sapiens sapiens since the species’ inception, always preceded the rise of languages, that is, dialects elevated to this status through writing and, later, through politically-motivated standardization. Second, the criterion of intelligibility is extremely subjective and related to the individual’s personal sociolinguistic experience. But Bloom’s attempted scientification of linguistics was accepted, and put the “scientific” stamp of approval on the statistical method of measuring the demographic extent of ethnically construed nations through asking in censuses the question about one’s language. This equating of one’s language with one’s nationality was worked out by the Prussian statistician Richard Böckh in his Die statistische Bedeutung der Volksprache als Kennzeichen der Nationalität (1866, The Statistical Significance of the People’s Language as the Indicator of Nationality) and endorsed, in 1872, by the International Statistical Congress in St Petersburg. This statistical method and

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Bloomfield’s definitions of a language and dialect fortified the *Stammbaum* vision of languages as discrete entities that rapidly branched out from one another.

The undisputed successes of this vision had direct bearing on the development of dialectology which emerged as a discipline during the 1870s in the German Empire. Even at that time, 60 years before Bloomfield’s article, dialects were already perceived as “belonging” to the German language. Between 1878 and 1952 *Deutscher Sprachatlas* (Dialectal Atlas of the German Language) was worked out and published drawing on various regional dictionaries of German dialects. 43 This approach tacitly assumed that dialects of a language are spoken by regional groups of a nation. Hence, the sum of these regions equals the “correct” territory of the nation’s nation-state. As a result, although the speakers of Dutch and the Low German dialect have no problems to understand each other, their language forms are classified as belonging to two different languages, Dutch and German. On the other, Low German-speakers and those who talk in the Alemanian dialect of Bavaria, Switzerland and western Austria, cannot successfully communicate. But they are defined as speakers of the same language, German, and prior to 1945 they were also defined as members of the single German nation. 44 These logical paradoxes would not arise if the wave theory of classifying languages/dialects were employed. However, the politically approved and encouraged norm of radical ethnonational and ethnolinguistic isomorphism overrode these reservations. The ideal European equation of nation = language = nation-state has ruled supreme in Eurasia to this day. Adolf Hitler’s “*Ein Volk, ein Reich, eine Sprache*” 45 (one nation, one state, one language) is a succinct example. This slogan directly stems from Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s (1770-1831) assertion that “*die wahre Heimat ist eigentlisch die Sprache*” (one’s true homeland [nation-state] is, obviously, one’s language [mother tongue]). 46 In 1797 the French diplomat and political philosopher Joseph de Maistre (1753-1821) opined “nation […] a wonderfully convenient

word, since one makes of it whatever one wishes”.\footnote{Quoted in: Perkins, Mary Anne. 1999. Nation and Word, 1770-1850: Religious and Metaphysical Language in European National Consciousness. Aldershot US, Brookfield US, Singapore and Sydney: Ashgate, p 325.} The same is true of the concept of a language, because for the last two centuries it has been understood mainly in the national normative manner, and unabashedly employed in service of nationalism.

*On scientificalness*

Over a century elapsed between Darwin’s theory of evolution and the discovery of the DNA molecule in the mid-20\textsuperscript{th} century. Only then biology came of age as a science fully conducted in an empirical manner. August Comte (1798-1857) who postulated the discipline of sociology, initially called it “social physics” and foresaw that soon it would join the ranks of exact sciences.\footnote{Giddens, Anthony. 1997. Sociology. Oxford: Polity, pp 7-8.} In a similar way but with far more wide-ranging effects marxism-leninism was baselessly announced to be a science and the scientific foundation of social, economic and political relations in the Soviet Union. Edward O Wilson’s *Sociobiology* (1975), which attempted to lend the newly-found scientificalness of biology to sociology did not mean any decisive breakthrough either. In 1981 L L Cavalli-Sforza and M W Feldman in their *Cultural Transmission and Evolution: A quantitative approach* mathematically proved that in the case of humans we have to speak of biological-cum-cultural co-evolution. In his *The Selfish Gene* (1976) Richard Dawkins drawing on Wilson’s ideas and the concept of co-evolution, reintroduced to the discourse the German evolutionary biologist Richard Semon’s (1859-1910) concept of meme proposed in his *Die Mnemische Empfindungen in ihren Beziehungen zu den Originalenempfindungen* (1904, English translation: *The Mneme* [1921]).\footnote{Flannery, Tom. 2004. Howling Monkeys (pp 3-4). *The Times Literary Supplement*. Nov 19, p 3; Segerstråle, Ullica. 2000. *Defenders of the Truth: The battle for science in the sociobiology debate*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p 72. It is unclear if Richard Dawkins coined the word “meme” independently or adopted it from Semon’s “mneme.” This term appears to be derived from the Greek word *mimnesekesthai*, or memory.} Accordingly while genes embodied in the DNA underlaid biological evolution, postulated memes should do the same for cultural evolution. By analogy to the gene, the meme was construed as a self-propagating unit of cultural evolution.
Although the concept of meme gave rise to the whole range of speculative and extremely inventive literature\textsuperscript{50}, the search for material basis of cultural evolution continues. No one has found yet some “cultural DNA” that would correspond to memes as the actual DNA helix corresponds to genes. On top of that there is no certainty that this analogy between genes and memes is anything more but wishful thinking. Assuming that material foundations of cultural evolution exist, one cannot hope to find them in the estimated 100,000 human genes. They are too few to account for the whole range of human individual and social behavior. Where hypothetical memes may be located is probably the brain with its roughly 100 trillion to 1,000 trillion connections (synapses) between more than a trillion nerve cells.\textsuperscript{51} Following this conclusion, at the beginning of the 1990s, R I M Dunbar published a series of articles on close correlations in primates between group size, the size of neocortex and the human use of language. Dunbar gathered these findings in his book *Grooming, Gossip, and the Evolution of Language* (1996). Finally during the 1980s, while mapping the history and geography of human genes, L L Cavalli-Sforza and his colleagues discovered close parallels between distribution of different genes, languages and archeological remains.\textsuperscript{52}

Despite these achievements the final breakthrough has not been attained yet. Hence, sociology and linguistics remain inexact “sciences”, and have more to do with humanities than physics or biology. Obviously, in the case of linguistics the sub-disciplines of phonology, phonetics, graphemics and morphology can be considered as scientific, but semantics and the study of syntax still do not fulfill the criteria of a science. And, above all, there is no single holistic theory of language that would be empirically provable. The Turing test still remains to be scaled – no machine has been constructed and programmed yet with which a human could converse in writing or speech without quickly discovering that the interlocutor is not a human.\textsuperscript{53} Even more significantly, there are no automatic translators from language to language – only a person is able to conduct a translation that would pass scrutiny.

\textsuperscript{52} Cavalli-Sforza et al. *The History and Geography of Human Genes*, pp 22-24, 99, 386.
L L Cavalli-Sforza and his colleagues found out that languages ranked in language families roughly correspond to human populations organized according to genetic distance among them. However, this is always true only of “traditional societies”, that is, immobile ethnic groups that stayed put in a village or a region (in the case of hunter-gatherers or transhumant pastoralists) for centuries. In the absence of mass literacy and standard languages, human groups kept their specific idioms as constitutive elements of their respective ethnicities. This made these language forms into “ethnolects” and allows to analyze the groups as “speech communities”.\(^5^4\) In the longue durée perspective, this easy correspondence ethnic group = ethnolect began to unravel after 1000 CE due to “modernization”, meaning: the proliferation of gradually larger human groups usually clothed in their own polities, and a general increase in spatial and social mobility.\(^5^5\) Various groups adopted ethnolects of usually dominant groups that were not ethnically (genetically) related to the former. Next largely de-ethnicized written languages emerged, the development of which became completely detached from its original ethnic basis, or this ethnic basis even disappeared as in the case of Latin. Currently the most significant of such de-ethnicized languages include Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Hindi, Indonesian, Russian or Spanish.

L L Cavalli-Sforza began his research using the *Stammbaum* of biologists and evolutionists as the heuristic instrument of interpreting and organizing data. The necessity to depict genetic distances among populations in time and space with additional data from linguistics, archeology and environmental geography, necessitated fine-tuning of this analytic instrument. Perhaps not surprisingly, the resultant maps depicting changes in genetic diversity and spread of genetic innovations indicate how language classification conducted with the use of the wave theory could be truthfully and successfully visualized.\(^5^6\) Significantly, Cavalli-Sforza’s maps reflect empirical findings and do not conform to Eurasian nationalism’s normative isomorphism of nation, state and language. His maps capture the dynamics of changes and obliterate the concept of a sharp linear border separating two radically different cultures and populations. Such a border is an ideological fixation of the national age with no counterpart in reality, unless an authoritarian regime demarcates a boundary with fences and guard towers, and succumbs to ordering wholesale expulsion and extermination of ethnically defined human groups. Even then, not longer then a few decades later borders become porous again and do not obstruct further intermingling of


human groups, as evidenced by the dismantling of the highly policed borders in the Soviet bloc following the fall of communism and the breakup of the Soviet Union. Having said that, nevertheless ethnolinguists prove time and again that human-made borders (especially if long-lasting) and natural obstructions to human movement and settlement (for instance, mountain ranges, deserts, rivers, oceans) function as hindrances to the spread of linguistic change.
III. Diachrony: A wealth of classificatory imagination

When Slavic peoples and their speech came to the attention of Western European scholars at the end of the 18\textsuperscript{th} century, the discourse concentrated on the question if these peoples were civilized or civlizeable. The meteoric rise of the Russian Empire at that time, and its struggle with Poland-Lithuania for supremacy in Central and Eastern Europe showed Western pundits that political developments in this part of Europe could not be disregarded. They influenced politics and economy of the entire continent. This statement rang even truer when the French Revolution replaced the divine legitimization of power with that given by people construed as a nation. Since that moment politics ceased to be the domain of the narrow stratum of aristocracy, and began to gradually pass into hands of the average man. The fledgling idea that a nation should speak one language and live in its own nation-state entailed politicization of ethnic difference enshrined in language, religion, customs and history. This politicization in the form of normative isomorphism of language, nation and state arrived in Central Europe in the first half of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century. In the second half of this century the Balkan nation-states decisively emerged, and this process was largely completed with the founding of numerous nation-states in Central Europe following the end of World War I.

During this one century and a half national movements were established, and decided what Slavic nations, their ethnonyms, nation-states and languages should be. It was the Germanophone scholar from East Prussia, Johann Gottfried Herder who introduced the Slavs to the scholarly discourse in Western Europe. In his influential work Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit (1784, Outlines of a Philosophy of the History of Man [1800]) he wrote: “[the Slavic peoples] were in possession of the vast territory extending from the Don to the Elbe, and from the Adriatic Sea to the Baltic”.\textsuperscript{57} Herder neither differentiated among these peoples nor their languages, because these differences as we know them today were largely absent at that time. Significantly, he noticed that most of the Slavic peoples were dominated by non-Slavic rulers and predicted that they would “awake from their long and heavy slumber, shake off the chains of slavery”.\textsuperscript{58} From this metaphor of “reawakening” of ethnically construed nations numerous Slavic and non-Slavic national movements have drawn inspiration.

\textsuperscript{58} Herder. Outlines, p 483.
Until the first two decades of the 19th century Western scholars emulated Herder’s descriptive approach to writing about the Slavs as a largely homogenous entity. Usually the regions of their abode served as the markers of the tentative distinctiveness of different Slavic groups. At that time there were only two standardized Slavic languages: Polish and Russian. But the use of Polish as an official language quickly declined after the final partition of Poland-Lithuania (1795), whereas the ruling elite in the Russian Empire preferred to employ German and French for state administration until the 1860s. To the outside observer the situation looked as if there were no Slavic languages but various dialects of the singular Slavic language that so far had failed to produce its standard form, which would match in excellence French, German or English.\(^{59}\) Until the mid-19th century the vast majority of these “Western outside observers” of the Slavs were Germanophone scholars stemming from the Austrian Empire or Prussia, since in these polities Germanophone and Slavophone inhabitants lived side by side.

The study of Slavic languages as a branch of philology emerged at the end of the 18th century and at the beginning of the 19th century most obviously represented by the works of the Bohemian scholar Josef Dobrovský (Dobrowsky) (1753-1829). He wrote exclusively in German but spoke in Czech and knew other Slavic languages. Between 1806 and 1822 he developed the dual classification of the Slavic languages. The first group comprised Russian, Old Church Slavonic, Illyrian (used in Bulgaria, Serbia, Bosnia and Dalmatia), Croatian and Windisch (Slovenian). In the second group Dobrovský included: Slovak, Czech, Upper Lusatian (Sorbian), Lower Lusatian (Sorbian) and Polish. Apparently the concept of Illyrian persisted in recognition of Napoleon’s short-lived province of Illyria (1809-1913) that extended from Carinthia to Ragusa (Dubrovnik) in easternmost Dalmatia. In absence of any standard languages there, Church Slavonic was used for administrative purposes, which prompted the assumption of linguistic unity of this province. Then this stereotype of linguistic homogeneity was projected onto the Slavophone areas under Ottoman control.

The Slovenian linguist in Austrian service Bartholomäus (Jernej) Kopitar (1780-1844) and the Russian slavicist Aleksandr Vostokov (1781-1864) disagreed with Dobrovský’s classification. The origin of the triple classification of the Slavic languages stem from Vostokov’s work Rassuzhdene o tserkevno-slavianskom iazyke (1820, An Essay on the Church Slavonic Language). He insisted that Russian did not belong to either of Dobrovský’s two groups of the Slavic languages, but that it constituted a transitory (though distinctive in its own right)

bridge between the West and Southeastern Slavic languages. He remarked too that anyway Russian was closer to the Southeastern Slavic languages that to the West Slavic languages. Perhaps the tradition of Church Slavonic literacy and the use of the Cyrillic common to the Southeastern Slavs and the Russians convinced him about this special closeness between these two groups and their languages. 

The Czech philologist of Slovak origin, Pavel Josef Šafařík (Šáfarik) (1795-1861), in his opus magnum Slowanské starožitnosti (1837, Slavic Antiquities) supported Dobrovský’s classification. In his scheme Russian, Bulgarian and Illyrian belonged to the Southeastern branch of the Slavic languages. Illyrian was composed from Serbian, Croatian and Slovenian construed as dialects. The Western branch comprised Lekhian, Czechoslovak and Polabian. “Lekhian” was the Rus-language ethnonym used for referring to the Poles. It survives to this day in Lithuanian (Lankas), Magyar (Lengyel) and colloquial Ukrainian (Lakh). In the late Middle Ages the Latinized form “Lechitae” functioned as a synonym for the Poles, and this term was used in Poland too. Through Latin it entered the Polish language as “Lechici”. It is a poetic designation for the Poles. According to Šafařík the Lekhian language, or rather sub-branch, included Polish, Silesian and Pomeranian dialects; the Czechoslovak sub-branch comprised Czech, Moravian and Slovak dialects; and the Polabian sub-branch Sorbian and other Slavic dialects east of the Oder River which had become extinct prior to the 19th century. Šafařík’s classification doubled as that of the Slavic peoples (ethnic groups/nations) in line with the ethnolinguistic isomorphism of language, nation and state, already made popular among German nationalists in the course of the Napoleonic Wars at the beginning of the 19th century.

František Palacký (1798-1876) created Czech national historiography and, later, became the first leader of the Czech national movement. When still known as Franz Palacky in 1836 he published the first volume of his opus magnum Geschichte von Böhmen (History of Bohemia). In this work he divided the Slavs and their languages into three groups. In the first he included Russian and Bulgarian seen as the direct descendents of Old Church Slavonic – the first written Slavic language. The second, or Southwestern comprised Serbian, Croatian and Carinthian (Slovenian); whereas in the third or Northwestern group Palacký placed Lekhian. At the same time Vostokov’s concept of the separate position of Russian among the Slavic languages became popular in Russia. In his Istoriia drevnei russkoi slovesnosti (1839, History of Early Russian Literature) and Nachatki russkoi filologii (1848, An Introduction to Russian

Philology) the Russian linguist Maksimovich proposed that Russian constituted a separate branch of the Slavic languages in its own right. The two other branches included the Southwestern and Northwestern Slavic languages not unlike in Palacký’s classification. Interestingly, Maksimovich distinguished two sub-branches in the Russian group: the South Russian (Ukrainian), and the Northeastern with Great Russian (Russian) and White Russian (Belarusian). At that time Russia’s imperial ideology was translated into the concept of the Great Russian language that stemmed directly from Old Church Slavonic and comprised Little/Southern Russian (Ukrainian) and White/Northeastern Russian (Belarusian) as its dialects. In 1843 and 1845 the Russian philologist Izmail Ivanovich Sreznevskii criticized Šafařík’s dual classification of the Slavic languages, and gave his own elaborated version of the triple division. In Sreznevskii’s scheme the Eastern group comprised Great Russian and Little Russian; the Southwestern: Church Slavonic, Bulgarian, Serbo-Croatian (or Serbian and Croatian as two literary varieties of a single language), Carinthian (Slovenian); and the Northwestern: Polish, Polabian, Lusatian (Sorbian), Czech and Slovak.

In 1858 August Schleicher forcefully entered the ongoing discussion on the classification of the Slavic languages (or dialects) with his article “Kurzer Abriß der Geschichte der slavischen Sprache” published in the journal Beiträge zur vergleichende Sprachforschung. He criticized the emerging triple division of the Slavic languages and settled for the dual worked out by Dobrovský. A qualitative leap occurred in 1863. In his work Die Darwinische Theorie und die Sprachwissenschaft Schleicher presented the Stammbaum of the Indo-Germanic (Indo-European) languages. To the typical ranking of languages governed by perceived closeness among them, Schleicher added the dimension of time. The idea of a language as self-contained entity separate from others of the same kind was projected into the past. The result was a genetic tree of rapidly branching out languages. In this vision, at a single moment, from previously common (parent) languages perfectly separate (different) offspring languages split in an inexplicable fashion. Darwin treated his highly schematic “trees of life” as a mental prop for illustrating the idea of speciation that occurs in the course of evolution. Quite on the contrary, in his book Schleicher appended branches and twigs of his Stammbaum of the Indo-Germanic languages with meticulous labels, and offered it as an exact picture and explanation of how the languages “evolved” through time. The pedigree of the Slavic languages commences with the splitting of the Indo-Germanic ur-language into the Slavo-German and Aryan-Greek-Italic-Celtic stock (basis) languages, or Grundsprache. Next the former branched out into the German and Slavo-Latvian (Lithuano-Slavic) stock

62 Ottův slovník naučný (vol 22), p 449.
languages. From the latter the Baltic (Lithuanian) and Slavic stock languages emerged.

Beyond that point Schleicher applied his genetic (diachronic) approach to the classification of the Slavic languages. At first he drew at Dobrovsky’s classification when he distinguished the two languages of West Slavic and Southeast Slavic as emerging from the common Slavic stock language. The West Slavic language spawned extinct Polabian, Sorbian, Polish and Czech. This branch closely corresponded to the second group of Slavic languages in Dobrovsky’s classification, to the Western group in Šafařík’s classification, and to the Northwestern group in Palacky’s, Maksimovich’s and Sreznevskii’s triple classifications. Schleicher decided that the Southeastern Slavic language bifurcated into Russian and the South Slavic language. Due to this subdivision he merged the insights of the dual and triple classifications of the Slavic languages. Schleicher also bowed to Vostokov’s and other Russian philologists’ insistence that Russian should be accorded a special place, at best, a separate classificatory category in its own right. Instead of bestowing the same classificatory rank on the remaining Slavic languages, as the proponents of the triple division did, Schleicher split the South Slavic language into the Serbo-Slovenian and Bulgarian languages, which amounted to the tentative introduction of the quadruple division of the Slavic languages. Bulgarian like Russian, constituted a group on its own, whereas Serbo-Slovenian, predictably, gave rise to Serbian and Slovenian. All the final-position languages were adorned with tiny tufts of hair-like twigs representing dialects belonging to these languages. Schleicher’s diachronic Stammbaum presentation of the Slavic languages gave the priority to the dual division, at a later (lower) level of classification espoused the triple division, and at a even later (lower) level proposed the quadruple division of these languages. In his 1871 work Laut- und Formenlehre der polabischen Sprache (The Sound and Morphological Structure of the Polabian Language), Schleicher subdivided the West Slavic languages. The West Slavic language gave the beginning to the Lekhian and Czech languages. Then the former split into Polish and extinct Polabian, while the latter into Czechoslovak and Sorbian. At the lowest classificatory level of Schleicher’s scheme it meant a quintuple division.63

Schleicher’s genetic tree of the Slavic languages inspired the Czech linguist Jan Gebauer to propose his own multilevel scheme for classifying the Slavic languages in 1870. However, he rejected Schleicher’s concept of Stammbaum with the entailed dimension of time (linguistic evolution), and returned to the idea of the synchronic multi-level classificatory scheme. For the basic level he

63 Alter. Darwinism, p 75; Ottův slovník naučný (vol 22), p 449; Schleicher. Darwinism Tested, diagram after p 69.
chose the dual division of the Slavic languages, also preferred by Schleicher. This level consisted from the Southeastern and Western groups. The latter comprised Czech, Polish, Sorbian and extinct Polabian, which corresponded to Schleicher’s view before he subdivided this group in 1871. In the case of the Southeastern group Gebauer flattened Schleicher’s further subdivisions into the three subgroups of equal rank: Russian, Bulgarian and Serbocroatoslovenian. The first subgroup included: the Great Russian (Russian) and Little Russian (Ukrainian) languages together with the White Russian (Belarusian) dialects; the second: Old Bulgarian (Old Church Slavonic) and Modern Bulgarian; whereas the third: Serbo-Croatian and Slovenian. Unlike Schleicher, Gebauer specified the dialects of all the above-mentioned languages with the exception of the category of the “White Russian dialects”, which was not subdivided. Significantly, Ukrainian’s Carpathian dialect, today, can be identified with the Rusyn and (Lemkian) language; Modern Bulgarian’s Macedonian dialect with the Macedonian language; Czech’s Hungarian-Slovak dialect with the Slovak language; and Polish’s Kashubian and Silesian dialects with the Kashubian language and the Silesian linguistic project, respectively. It is also interesting to see that among Slovenian’s dialects Gebauer distinguished Croatian-Slovenian as a transitory dialect between the Slovenian language and Serbo-Croatian. Having skipped one level of subdivision (Russian vs South Slavic) present in Schleicher’s scheme, Gebauer did not incorporate the triple division of the Slavic languages in his scheme, but directly went for Schleicher’s quadruple division.\footnote{Rieger, František. 1870. \\*Slovník naučný* (vol 8). Prague: I L Kober, p 645.}

The basic variety of dual, triple, quadruple and quintuple classifications of the Slavic languages offered by Dobrovský, Šafařík, Palacký, Maksimovich, Sreznevskii, Schleicher and Gebauer, became the basis for further variants ceaselessly worked out by slavicists to this day. In the late 1870s the Russian slavicist A Kochubinskii disagreed with this method of classifying the Slavic languages in his article “K voprosu o vzaimnykh otnosheniakh slavianskikh narechii” (1877-1878, On the Question of Mutual Relationships Among the Slavic Dialects) published in the journal *Zapiski novorossiiskogo universiteta*. He sanely noticed that depending on which linguistic features (be they syntactical, morphological, phonetic, lexical, or a mixture of them) one takes into consideration, an endless chain of differing classifications of the Slavic languages can be generated. Then acceptance of this or that classification was dictated by a personal whim or political expedience. But even Kochubinskii failed to disentangle himself from these temptations, which he criticized. He came to the conclusion that the proper task of slavicists was to decide which of the Slavic languages is the oldest. Not surprisingly, he accorded this distinction to his native Russian arguing that it is closest to the first written Slavic language.
First, like Kochubinskii, Schmidt argued that it does not make sense to come up with borders (based on selected linguistic criteria) to separate the Slavic languages from one another. This urge for establishing such borders amounts to the projection of the perceived or striven-for clear-cut boundaries among ethnically construed nations, and of the existing political borders on the linguistic reality. But this linguistic reality is continuous not discrete, so that the Slavic languages (construed as dialect chains) shade into one another. This intuition of Schmidt became the basis for the later development of the concept of dialect continuum, which is bounded by other sharply (genetically) different dialect continua. Second, having dealt with the synchronic plane, he criticized the diachronic dimension of the genetic tree division of the Slavic languages. He stated that languages were not born from some earlier languages that were extinguished in this process. The variety of languages which we can observe, arose through the internal differentiation of the Slavic dialect continuum due to historical and political processes such as state-formation, warfare, population movements, invasions and so on. Schmidt’s and Schuchardt’s insights underlay the Welle (wave) theory of representing relationships between languages. Facing the immense success of the graphic representations of the Stammbaum, Schmidt devised the circle diagram. The circle was divided into triangular pieces, whose tops met in the middle of the circle as in a pie. Each piece of such a “linguistic pie” represented a language construed as a segment of a dialect continuum prior the emergence of a standard language. Applied to the Slavic languages this diagram placed side by side: Sorbian – Polish – Russian – Bulgarian – Serbo-Croatian – Slovenian – Czech – Sorbian. 

Although the Welle theory emphasized the gradual change within the dialect continuum, Schmidt’s circle diagram partially defied this logic introducing boundaries among the “dialectal languages”. The Polish linguist Jan Baudoin de Courtenay in his book Uebersicht der slavischen Sprachenwelt (1884, An Overview of the World of the Slavic Languages) repeated that linguists should not aspire either to establishing or to identifying clearly delineated borders that would unambiguously separate Slavic languages from one another. The dialect territories popularly associated with standard languages are indistinguishable parts of the Slavic dialect continuum (continua) and gradually shade from one into another. Like Schmidt Baudoin de Courtenay also criticized Schleicher’s concept of the common (stock) languages of (Proto-)Slavic, Western Slavic and Southeastern Slavic from which all the existing Slavic languages are supposed

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65 Ottův slovník naučný (vol 22), pp 449-450.
to have branched out. There were not such languages. The rise and persistence of the concept of such ur-languages is the function of the astounding popularity of the genetic tree model for presenting classification of species, languages and human groups.\textsuperscript{66}

The attraction of the *Stammbaum* method of classification was both graphic and political. Presented as “scientific” elaborate genetic trees of ethnic groups, animals, plants and languages considerably improved sales of books and articles where such “trees” were included. One of the main tools for justifying continuation of a statehood or establishment of a new (renewed) statehood for a group of people construed as a nation, was provided by ancient pedigree. Those nations and states which were successfully presented as “older” acquired the “higher right” to existence than their rivals seen as “younger”. The Württemberg philosopher Georg W F Hegel coined this difference terming the older states or nations as “nations with history” and the younger as “nations without history”. Since the 1840s this distinction had became popular equally among nationalist thinkers and marxists.\textsuperscript{67} The graphic representation of the *Stammbaum* perfectly suited the propaganda aim of “proving” that one nation or state is older than the other. This device allowed one to conflate and project into the distant past a present-day language, ethnicity and statehood. Given this extraordinary political usefulness of the *Stammbaum* method of classification, it won the competition with the *Welle* method of classification hands down. First, the proponents of the *Welle*-based classification did not develop an appealing graphic representation for it. Second, this method of classification went against the nationalist logic of the radical isomorphism of state, nation and language. In the age of nationalism that commenced in the 19\textsuperscript{th} century and has lasted to this day, this condemned the *Welle* theory to obscurity.

*The today’s consensus*

In the 20\textsuperscript{th} century the genetic tree classification and presentation of the Slavic languages is the order of the day. In his *Families of Speech* (1870) F W Farrar simplified Schleicher’s 1863 classification of the languages included in *Die Darwinische Theorie und die Sprachwissenschaft*. Farrar distinguished the three “branches” of the Slavic languages: Western, Southern and Russian. The Western branch comprised: Czech, Polish and Sorbian; the Southern: Bulgarian, Slovenian, Serbian and Croatian, while the Russian: Great Russian (Russian), Little Russian (Ukranian) and White Russian (Belarusian). Much less distinctly

\textsuperscript{66} Ottův slovník naučný (vol 22), p 450.

than in Schleicher’s *Stammbaum*, the Southern and Russian branches were lumped together as the Southeastern branch. In his *Natürliche Schöpfungsgeschichte* (1868) Schleicher’s friend Ernst Haeckel produced the genetic tree of the Indo-Germanic peoples drawing heavily on Schleicher’s 1863 *Stammbaum* of the Indo-Germanic languages. In Haeckel’s presentation the line of the Slavs branched out into the two basic branches of the West Slavs and Southeastern Slavs. The former comprised the Czechs, Poles and Sorbs, whereas the latter the South Slavs and Russians. When Heackel drew the *Stammbaum* of the Indo-Germanic languages for his *Anthropogenie* (1874), curiously, he reproduced the genetic tree of the Indo-Germanic peoples from his *Natürliche Schöpfungsgeschichte* complete with the ethnonyms of the peoples (nations) not with the names of specific languages. This was a clear sign of the normative isomorphism of language and nation (ethnic group) expressed in full synonymy and exchangeability between ethnonyms and language names (linguonyms).  

The dual (sometimes genetic) classification borrowed from the level of the primary branching-out in Schleicher’s *Stammbaum* of the Slavic languages became dominant in Western Europe in the last decades of the 19th century and at the beginning of the 20th century. In 1889 the standard German encyclopedia *Meyers Konversations-Lexikon* distinguished the Western and Southeastern branches of the Slavic languages. The Western branch was composed from two sub-branches, one with Polish and Polabian, and the other with Czech, Slovak and Sorbian. In the Southeastern branch Ruthenian (Ukrainian) and Serbo-Croatian stood on their own, whereas Russian was grouped together with White Russian (Belarusian), and Bulgarian with Slovenian. In 1908 the Anglo-American lexical work *Chambers’s Encyclopaedia* offered a very similar classification derived from Schleicher’s scheme. The Southeastern branch included: Russian (with Little Russian and White Russian), Bulgarian, Serbo-Croatian and Slovenian; and the Western branch: Polish (with Kashubian), Bohemian (that is, Czech, with Slovak), Sorbian (with its two distinctive dialects) and extinct Polabian.  

The beginning of the 20th century also saw the spread of the triple classification of the Slavic languages especially in Russia, Serbia, Bulgaria, and among Slavic scholars in Austria-Hungary. In 1901 the authoritative multi-volume Czech-language encyclopedia *Ottův slovník naučný* proposed that the Slavic languages should be divided into the three branches: Southern, Eastern and Northwestern.

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The Southern branch included: Bulgarian, Serbo-Croatian and Slovenian; the Eastern: Great Russian (that is, Russian, with Belarusian) and Little Russian (Ukrainian); and the Northwestern: Czechoslovak (composed from Czech and Slovak), Polish, Kashubian, Polabian (extinct), Lower Sorbian and Upper Sorbian. This Czech classification is a little peculiar because it promotes the specific Czech national point of view in relation to Czech and Slovak, and the neighboring languages. Hence, Czech and Slovak are treated as a single Czechoslovak language, and Kashubian is recorded as a language on its own not a dialect of Polish. The registering of Upper and Lower Sorbian increased the number of languages in the Northwestern branch to six. Even after the politically motivated merger of Czech and Slovak into Czechoslovak, this branch seemed to enjoy twice as many languages as the Southern branch with three languages or the Eastern with two.

In 1909 the atlas of the world for Polish-language secondary schools in the Austro-Hungarian crownland of Galicia, *Kozenna Atlas szkolny*, registered the three branches of the Slavic languages named: Western, Eastern and Southern. Czech, Polish and Slovak made up the Western branch; Belarusian, Russian and Ruthenian (Ukrainian) the Eastern branch; and Bulgarian, Slovenian and Serbo-Croatian the Southern branch. This classification was repeated in the famous Polish slavist Tadeusz Lahr-Spławiński’s *Chrestomatia słowiańska* (1949, The Slavic Chrestomathy). Old Church Slavonic, Bulgarian, Macedonian, Serbo-Croatian and Slovenian constituted the Southern branch; Polish, Czech, Slovak, Upper Sorbian, Lower Sorbian and extinct Polabian the Western branch; and Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian the Eastern branch. Both the classifications separated by four decades, strike one as “entirely modern” because practically identical with the divisions of the Slavic languages reproduced in encyclopedias and textbooks to this day. I presume that this triple classification of the Slavic languages became the standard one in the interwar period, and it has thrived unchallenged to this day. The two recent English-language scholarly overviews of the Slavic languages follow this pattern with minor variations. In 1980 *The Slavic Literary Languages: Formation and development* included Bulgarian, Macedonian, Serbo-Croatian and Slovenian in the Southern branch; Belarusian, Russian and Ukrainian in the Eastern branch; and Czech, Kashubian, Polish, Slovak and Sorbian in the Western branch. Church Slavonic, the survey of which opened the book, was accorded a separate place outside the branches of the triple classification. Thirteen years later, the editors of *The Slavonic Languages* decided to add the liturgical language of Old Church Slavonic to the

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70 *Ottův slovník naučný* (vol 22), p 452.
72 Lehr-Spławiński. *Chrestomatia*. 

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Southern branch and extinct Polabian to the Western branch. They also gave priority to the West Slavic languages over the East Slavic presented at the end of this work.  

Scholars still produce variations on the genetic triple division of the Slavic languages, for instance, in 1992, the Polish slavicist Ewa Siatkowska presented one in her *Rodzina języków zachodniosłowiańskich* (The Family of the Western Slavic Languages). According to her the Proto-Slavic language spawned the Proto-Rus language, which gave the beginning to the Eastern group of the Slavic languages. With time the Proto-Ruthenian (Proto-Russian) emerged from Proto-Rus, and, later, developed into Belarusian, Great Ruthenian (Russian) and Little Ruthenian (Ukrainian). Interestingly, Siatkowska proposed that Bulgarian, Serbo-Croatian and Slovenian emerged directly from Proto-Slavic but form the Southern group of Slavic languages due to the maintained geographical proximity of the users of all these three languages. Further, Bulgarian spawned Macedonian, and Old Church Slavonic was made into an equidistant offshoot (predecessor or side-branch?) of Bulgarian and Macedonian. Last but not least, the languages of the Western group (Slovak, Czech, Upper Sorbian, Lower Sorbian, Polish and extinct Polabian) are presented as emerging from some common but not named proto-language.  

Such academic variations on the theme of the triple genetic division of the Slavic languages are not reflected in textbooks and reference works. The standard division holds its ground fast. It molds the imagination of new generations of slavicists and has already become the accepted “truth” among the intellectuals worldwide. Constantly repeated and reproduced in the age of mass education and mass communication, with each day the standard triple classification of the Slavic languages overshadows and condemns to forgetting its own ambiguous origin and the rival classifications that persisted into the beginning of the 20th century. This seems that this triple division, initially being a tentative consensus reached in the milieu of Russian and Central European Slavophone philologists, it solidified into a dogma. Unfortunately, this state of affairs discourages further scholarly probing into this issue, because dogmas require unthinking reverence and worship not critical scrutiny.

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IV. Synchrony: The only or received truth?

Background

The wealth of the above-mentioned classificatory schemes of Slavic languages is staggering. First, from the inception of Slavic studies at the end of the 18th century in Prague until the mid-19th century there was no agreement if there are Slavic languages or a singular Slavic language consisting from various dialects. This had much to do with the decline of Bohemian (Czech) as a written language in the second half of the 17th century, and with the removal of Poland-Lithuania from the political map of Europe at the close of the 18th century. The latter event undermined the status of Polish as a language of politics, administration and education. In the official ideology of the Polish-Lithuanian nobility who derived their origin from the Iranian Sarmatians, Polish was accordingly identified as the “Sarmatian language”. This made Polish into an emphatically non-Slavic language and left the title of the renowned written Slavic language solely to Old Church Slavonic, which also functioned as a language of administration in the Russian Empire until the end of the 18th century, and in the Balkan Orthodox Slavic states until the middle of the following century.

In the 19th century the Russian Empire was the only Slavophone polity of any significance. But the imperial ideology emphasized Orthodox Christianity, and avoided any national politicization of the Slavophone character of the majority of the population. Moscow deemed to be the “Third and last Rome”, tsars aspired to seizing the Ottoman capitol of Konstantiniyya (Istanbul) in order to make it back into Christian Constantinople. Under the Russian name of Tsargrad (Tsar City, Imperial City) it would have become the capital of Russia’s Pan-Slavic empire. Autonomous Montenegro (governed by its dynasty of Orthodox bishops) persisted in the Balkans because it performed useful trade functions for the Ottoman Empire, while Serbia won a measure of autonomy between 1817 and 1829. Greece gained full independence in 1830, but the two Slavic principalities of Montenegro and Serbia remained Ottoman vassal states until 1878. As in Russia Orthodox Christianity remained the main ideology of

statehood legitimization in the three Balkan states too, poised against the Muslim Other in the form of the Ottoman Empire.

Then in the second half of the 19th century the general agreement arose that the Slavic languages should be classified into three separate branches: Western, Eastern and Southern. Some other classificatory schemes still tended to appear but they were few and apart. The orthodoxy of the tripartite division of the Slavic languages solidified between the two World Wars. Interestingly, during the same period numerous new Slavic-speaking states emerged. In 1878 when Montenegro and Serbia became independent Bulgaria gained independence too. In the same year Austria-Hungary occupied Bosnia(-Herzegovina) that nominally remained part of the Ottoman Empire until 1908. In line with the Literary Agreement signed by Croatian and Serbian national activists in 1850, the two coalescing standard languages of Croatian and Serbian were merged into the Serbo-Croatian (Croato-Serbian) language. In the last four decades of the 19th century it entered official use in Montenegro, Serbia, Bosnia and Croatia, which, in 1868, gained a degree of autonomy in Austria-Hungary. In the two Orthodox polities of Montenegro and Serbia this language was noted in Cyrillic, while in Muslim Bosnia and Catholic Croatia in Latin characters. But in Bosnia few publications were printed in the Arabic script too.  

Standardization of Bulgarian lasted the entire second half of the 19th century, and it was not completed until 1899. Slovenian was standardized in the mid-19th century when the first elementary schools with this language as the medium of education sprang up too. After 1867 Slovenian began to be used to a limited degree in local administration and regional politics especially thanks to Vienna’s liberal politics in the Austrian half of Austria-Hungary. This liberalism of the Dual Monarchy also encouraged and facilitated standardization of other Slavic languages. Czech (Bohemian) shared with Slovenian the pattern of development – against the domination of official German. However, standardization of Czech commenced earlier – at the beginning of the 19th century and was largely completed by the 1840s. Moreover, in the 1880s, after an acrimonious and bitter political struggle, Czech was allowed the status of a co-official language in

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78 I use the terms „standard language” and „language standardization” to denote the process of the most recent codification that resulted in a given language that enjoys its lexical, syntactical, graphical, orthographic and orthophonic shape largely unchanged to this day. As the milestones of this process I consider the publication of a widely-used standard grammar and a multi-volume monolingual (or sometimes bilingual) authoritative dictionary of a language.

Bohemia and Moravia, alongside German (Slovenian never gained such an elevated status vis-à-vis official German). Quite on the contrary, the situation of Slovak was markedly worse, because its speakers lived in the Hungarian section of the Danubian Monarchy. Except in the case of autonomous Croatia in this half of the empire, Budapest single-mindedly enforced the use of Magyar at school, in administration and public life. Leaders of the Slovak national movement agreed what the Slovak language should be during the 1850s but standardization of this language continued well into the 1960s in the shadow of domineering Czech.\(^{80}\)

Polish continuously functioned as a language of politics, administration and culture in Poland-Lithuania from the 16th century until the partitioning of this commonwealth among Austria, Prussia and Russia between 1772 and 1795. In the Austrian and Prussian partition zones German replaced Polish in official functions, whereas Polish retained its role in the Russian partition zone until the 1830s and 1840s.\(^{81}\) Later the official use of Polish was limited to Russia’s autonomous Kingdom of Poland until it was abolished in the second half of the 1860s. Standardization of Russian written in Cyrillic\(^ {82}\) was largely achieved by the 1830s, and during the last four decades of the 19th century it was made into the sole official language of the Russian Empire (with the sole exception of the Grand Duchy of Finland where Swedish and Finnish, with the brief interval of 1900-1906, remained as co-official languages\(^ {83}\)). This change heralded the

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\(^{82}\) In the Orthodox regions of Wallachia and Moldavia (later, Romania), first, Cyrillic-based Church Slavonic was an official language before Wallachian (Romanian) also written in Cyrillic characters joined it. The Cyrillic as the script for writing Romanian survived until the early 1860s when the Latin alphabet replaced it definitively. Earlier the area where the Cyrillic was used for writing extended from the Russian Empire via Moldavia and Wallachia to these areas in the Ottoman-held Balkans, which were inhabited by Orthodox Slavs. Cf Vîrtosu, Emil. 1968. *Paleografia româno-chirilică*. Bucharest: Editura științifică.

incorporation of an ethnolinguistic component into the official Orthodox imperial ideology. In the name of this ethnolinguistic-cum-religious policy even printing in nascent Ukrainian (then known as Little or Southern Russian) and Belarusian (then known as White or Western Russian) was banned in 1863 and 1865, respectively. The unity of the empire’s Orthodox narod (people, nation) had to be reflected in language too. Thus, instead of speaking (let alone writing) in their dialects (suspiciously close to Catholic Polish), Little and White Russians were to master the “true language” of the empire then often labeled “Great Russian”.  

When Polish was phased out from official use in the Kingdom of Poland, the transformation of the Austrian Empire into decentralized Austria-Hungary (1867) resulted in making Polish the official language of Galicia, where it replaced German in this role. Also Ukrainian (then known as Ruthenian) was allowed into schools, local administration and politics in the eastern half of this region mainly inhabited by Greek Catholic population. The ethnoreligious identification of the Latin alphabet (then known as “Polish”) with the “Catholic” Polish language, and the Cyrillic (then known as the “Russian alphabet”) with the “Orthodox” Russian language triggered off the discussion if the Cyrillic of Ruthenian (Ukrainian) should not be replaced with the Latin script. The argument lasted from the 1830s to the Galician governor’s failed imposition of the Latin (Polish) letters on Ruthenian (Ukrainian) in 1859. In the wake of the liberalization in the Russian Empire following the 1905 revolution, teaching and printing was allowed in all languages spoken in the polity. In the case of Belarusian half of publications were published in the Latin alphabet and half in the Cyrillic.

Standardization of Ukrainian commenced during the 1860s in Galicia and after 1905 in Russia. As a result two divergent varieties arose, Ruthenian and Little Russian. Similar standardization of Belarusian (with an increasing use of the Cyrillic) started even later, after World War I when there was an attempt at founding a Belarusian nation-state. In 1915 German armies overran most of the Russian partition zone of Poland-Lithuania. The occupation administration immediately banned Russian and the Cyrillic (the Cyrillic for writing Serbo-


Croatian was also banned in Austria-Hungary\(^{87}\) then, but not for writing Ruthenian [Ukrainian]). German was introduced as the language of interethnic communication, while Polish regained its traditional status. Simultaneously, for the first time Lithuanian, Belarusian and Yiddish (written in Hebrew characters) were allowed into education, local administration and politics. The postwar Belarusian resignation from the Latin alphabet in favor of the Cyrillic was an answer to Warsaw’s attempts at extending Polish statehood eastward against the wishes of the Belarusian national movement. When in the interwar period Belarus was split between Poland and the Soviet Union, in the Polish section Jesuits still brought out Belarusian publications in the Latin script, but it remained a minor trend.\(^{88}\)

In the Austrian Empire the Slavic national movements of the Czechs, Croatians, Slovenes, Slovaks and Ukrainians decisively emerged in the mid-19th century, and grew into significant political forces between the founding of Austria-Hungary (1867) and its demise in 1918. In Galicia the local Poles actually received an ersatz nation-state, which was the base for the spread of the increasingly ethnolinguistic Polish national movement in the German Empire and Russia. The end of World War I brought about reorganization of Central Europe in accordance with the ethnonational principle. Czechoslovakia, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (Yugoslavia), and Poland were established as nation-states.

*The interwar period*

Despite various patchy and usually temporary linguistic concessions that Warsaw granted to national minorities which accounted for more than one-third of Poland’s population, the Polish language was the only official language in this state. Czechoslovakia was declared the nation-state of the Czechoslovaks, but this nation failed to emerge not unlike the state’s official language of Czechoslovak. The usual official interpretation was that this language existed in its two varieties: Czech and Slovak employed, respectively, in Bohemia and Moravia-Silesia, and in Slovakia. This so-called Czechoslovakism allowed for making 8.8 million Czechoslovaks (6.9 million Czechs and 1.9 million Slovaks) into the unquestionable national majority vis-à-vis 3.1 million Germans and 0.75 million Magyars (Hungarians). Both the minorities were allowed to use their

\(^{87}\) Šipka. *Standardni jezik*, p 65.
languages in education and local administration, but it was a far cry from the privileged position, which German and Magyar enjoyed in Austria-Hungary.

In addition, Czechoslovakia’s autonomous province of Subcarpathian Ruthenia was made into an ersatz nation-state of the Ruthenians (Rusnaks, Rusyny) numbering 0.46 million. Prague, however, carried out its 1918 pledge to institute Ruthenian autonomy only in 1938. The Ruthenian national movement and language had developed since the mid-19th century, but there was no agreement even among the concerned if they are a separate nation with their own language or part of the Ukrainian or even Russian nation, which would mean that Ruthenian would be a dialect either of Ukrainian or Russian. The vast majority of the Ruthenians confessed Greek Catholicism, while less than one-sixth Orthodox Christianity. The former usually identified themselves as Ruthenians and Ukrainians, while the latter as Russians. The Czechoslovak administration provided for the use of local (místní) or Subcarpathian Ruthenian (podkarpatoruský) language, often identified with Little Russian (Ukrainian). Symptomatically, in interwar Poland Warsaw refused to refer to the language of the Ukrainians as “Ukrainian” and stuck to the name “Ruthenian” (ruski, rusiński). This denotation was popular solely among Galician Ukrainians. The confusion set the foundation for the late 20th-century emergence of standard Rusyn. For the time being, it was certain that whatever the name of the language of Subcarpathia may be, one should write it in the Cyrillic.89

The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was founded as the unitary nation-state of the South Slavs. First, this ideology was apparent in the constitutional proclamation of Serbocroatoslovenian as the official language of the state and nation. Then, in the wake of the 1929 royal coup, the kingdom’s name was changed to Yugoslavia (that is, “the land of the South Slavs”), and thereafter one tended to dub the official language “Yugoslavian”. The Slovenians disagreed with this policy and the Serbocroatoslovenian language never came into being. But the unity of the Serbo-Croatian language proclaimed in 1850 continued and was translated into the efforts to create the ethnically homogenous Serbocroatian nation. This category lumped together the Croats, Macedonians, Montenegrins,

Slavophone Muslims (Bosniaks\textsuperscript{90}) and Serbs. The Yugoslav rhetoric failed to spawn any Yugoslav (Serbocroatian) nation, since non-Serbian leaders perceived it as the building of some Great Serbian nation at the cost of non-Serbian ethnic groups. What is more, the use of the Latin script separated the Croatian variety of Serbo-Croatian from the Serbian written in Cyrillic characters. The Croats shared Catholicism with the Slovenes and the ethnic boundary between them was emphasized through language and the ideological hinging of Croatian nationalism on the tradition of Slavic liturgy written in Glagolitic characters, which survived to the beginning of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century in northern Dalmatia. Islam separated the Bosniaks from the Orthodox Serbs as well as the tradition of Slavophone literacy in the Arabic alphabet, which survived in publications brought out in Bosnia until the early 1940s. Language distinguished the Macedonians from the rest of the Serbocroats. Belgrade referred to the Macedonians as “Southern Serbs”, while Sofia disagreed and named them “Western Bulgarians”. It was the tradition of long-established separate statehoods (now construed as national) that continued to keep the Serbo-Croatian-speaking and Orthodox Montenegrins from coalescing with the Serbs. All in all the everyday official and administrative use of Serbo-Croatian in its two different scriptural versions underwrote the unity of Yugoslavia as well as domination of this language, increasingly in the interest of Serbian nationalism, and at the cost of other languages employed by the Yugoslav population.\textsuperscript{91}

In the early 1920s the Soviet Union was organized on the national principle embodied in the form of the ethnonational administrative units. The Kremlin granted the Belarusians and Ukrainians with their own Soviet socialist republics. The policy of \textit{korenizatsia} (nativization) followed, aimed at doing away with the “Great Russian chauvinism” understood as characteristic of the Russian Empire. It entailed codification and development of other languages than Russian, so that they could replace Russian in ethnically non-Russian areas as languages of administration, education, management and culture. Simultaneously the Latin alphabet presented as “progressive” was opposed to the “reactionary” Cyrillic directly associated with “Great Russian chauvinism”. Hence, progress was equaled with the campaign of Latinization. By 1932 all the languages used in the Soviet Union were written in Latin characters. Earlier their written forms had been steeped either in the Cyrillic or the Arabic alphabet, or they had not had any written form at all. The only exception to this rule were Belarusian, Russian

\textsuperscript{90}“Bosniaks”, the ethnonym of the ethnic nation of Slavophone Muslims of Bosnia is sometimes rendered „Boshniaks”. Both versions are opposed to the term “Bosnians”, which denotes all the native inhabitants of Bosnia, namely, Bosniaks, Croats, Serbs and Roma.

\textsuperscript{91}Rothschild. \textit{East Central Europe}, pp 202, 239.
and Ukrainian, which retained the Cyrillic, and Armenian and Georgian with their own specific scripts. There were proposals to Latinize Russian but at the beginning of the 1930s it was announced that the chauvinistic and colonialist character of the Russian culture had been ameliorated, so there was no further need to make the Russian language progressive through Latinization.

On the other hand, in 1928 the writing system of the Turkish language as employed in Turkey switched from the Arabic to Latin alphabet. Moscow feared that this could facilitate the spread of the idea of Great Turkish homeland among the Turkic peoples in the south of the Soviet Union, from the Crimea to Central Asia. In the case of Belarusian and Ukrainian, the two republics directly faced enemy Poland, where the “Polish” (that is, Latin) alphabet ruled supreme. Switching to this script would have made the two languages more similar to Polish than Russian, while religion (Orthodox Christianity and Greek Catholicism as opposed to Catholicism associated with Polish culture) could not play its traditional differentiating role, because the communist authorities banned this “opium for masses”. Hence the proposal of representing some Ukrainian sounds with two Latin letters was not approved. Korenizatsia was over in 1932-1933 when the purges against Belarusian and Ukrainian “nationalists” commenced. Stalin’s tactical use of nationalism was to produce a homogenous classless communist state. Homogeneity required unity of language and script. In 1933 Belarusian and Ukrainian were changed to make them similar to Russian and Russification set in. By the late 1930s Russian replaced all other languages as the medium of administration and education, and the Latin writing systems of the languages employed in the Soviet Union were changed into variants of the Cyrillic.92

Significantly, the official Soviet use of the adjectives “Belarusian” and “Ukrainian” for denoting the two languages and nations lent legitimacy to the Belarusian and Ukrainian national minorities in Poland and the Ukrainian one in Czechoslovakia. Ukrainians considered Prague’s and Warsaw’s use of “Ruthenian” for denting them and their language as faulty if not openly repressive and anti-Ukrainian. Belarusian leaders, though less vociferously, denounced Warsaw’s decision to allow the category of “locals” (tutejsi) to be used in census returns in the overwhelmingly Belarusian areas. In the second half of the 1930s there followed the increasing wave of repressions directed against Poland’s Ukrainians and Belarusians. The concept of “ethnographic mass” (masa etnograficzna) entailed speedy dissolution of the still not nationally

conscious Ukrainians and Belarusians in the Polish and Russian nations. But unlike in the Soviet Union Warsaw refrained from meddling in the Belarusian and Ukrainian languages, which retained their traditional forms in Poland.\textsuperscript{93}

\textit{World War II and its aftermath}

In 1938 Germany seized the border areas of Czechoslovakia’s Bohemia and Moravia Silesia. Also Poland annexed a segment of Czech Silesia. Instantly German and Polish replaced Czech in these areas. Hungary seized the southern section of Slovakia and Subcarpathian Ruthenia, while Warsaw several islets of territory in northern Slovakia. In these areas Magyar and Polish replaced Slovak and Ruthenian. Next year the western half of rump Czechoslovakia\textsuperscript{94} was transformed into Germany’s Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, Slovakia gained independence, and the short-lived independence of Subcarpathian Ruthenia was terminated through incorporation of this land into Hungary. Berlin tolerated the Czech language in the protectorate though German re-gained its status of co-official language lost after 1918. In Slovakia the Slovak language was freed from the unofficial dominance of Czech, whereas Budapest continued to support the separateness of the Ruthenian language (now labeled “\textit{Uhro-Rusyn}”, or “Hungarian-Ruthenian”) in Subcarpathian Ruthenia so as to prevent its mergence with Ukrainian.

The Third Reich and the Soviet Union partitioned Poland in September 1939. In the western Polish areas directly incorporated to the Reich, German replaced Polish in all the spheres of public life. In central Poland made into Germany’s colony of Generalgouvernement Polish was retained as an auxiliary language at the lowest ranks of administration, and the Polish-language educational system was limited to simplified elementary and vocational education only. In the Soviet share of the Polish territories incorporated to the Belarusian and Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republics the position of Polish declined while that of Belarusian and Ukrainian (in their Soviet standards) improved. But as of 1940 Russian began to dominate in administration and education. In the region of Wilno (Vilnius) incorporated to Lithuania, the Lithuanian language gradually replaced Polish and Belarusian. Germany attacked the Soviet Union in 1941. The territories of Lithuania and Belarus were organized into the

\textsuperscript{93} Rothschild. \textit{East Central Europe}, p 37; Szybieka. \textit{Historia Białorusi}, p 294.

\textsuperscript{94} Following the forced cession of territory to Germany, Poland and Hungary at the end of 1938, Prague gave a nod to the autonomous status for Slovakia and Subcarpathian Ruthenia, which, on November 19\textsuperscript{th}, 1938 was reflected in the change of the name of Czechoslovakia to Czecho-Slovakia. (Tomaszewski, Jerzy. 1997. \textit{Czechosłowacja} (Ser: Historia Państw Świata w XX Wieku). Warsaw: Trio, p 273).
Reichskommissariat Ostland, and Ukraine into the Reichskommissariat Ukraine. German replaced Russian as the official language (with the exception of the southwestern sliver of Soviet Ukraine incorporated to Romania under the name of Transnistria. Romanian became the official language there). The national socialist administration also supported the development of Ukrainian- and Belarusian-language elementary education. Paradoxically what meant downgrading of the status of Polish equaled improvement in the status of Belarusian and Ukrainian free of pervasive Polonization and Russification.  

In 1941 the joint German-Italian invasion of Yugoslavia brought about the collapse of this state. Slovenia was partitioned between Italy, Germany and Hungary. Simultaneously German, Italian and Magyar replaced Slovenian and Serbo-Croatian in administration and education. Parts of Dalmatia were incorporated to Italy, which meant replacement of Serbo-Croatian written in Latin characters with Italian as the official language. Italian pushed the Cyrillic-based Serbo-Croatian to the status of auxiliary language in Montenegro and southeastern Serbia that were subjected to Italian administration. The northwestern fragment of Serbia was incorporated to Hungary and the northeastern one into Romania. Obviously, Magyar and Romanian replaced Cyrillic-based Serbo-Croatian as the official language there. Rump Serbia was made into Germany’s Gebiet des Militärbefehlhabers (District of the Military Commander). In the district’s northern region inhabited by the German minority German replaced Cyrillic-based Serbo-Croatian as the official language there. Rump Serbia was made into an auxiliary language, which was secondary to official German. Croatia and Bosnia were made into the independent Croatian nation-state allied with Germany not unlike Slovakia. The Cyrillic was banned in this Croatian state, and Latin-based Serbo-Croatian cleansed of elements perceived to be Serbian, now, known as the “pure Croatian language written in the Croatian alphabet” was made into the sole official language. As a German ally, Sofia gained southern Dobruja from Romania (this region had belonged to Bulgaria from 1913 to 1918) and Serbia’s share of Macedonia, while Bulgarian administration (without formal annexation) was extended over Greece’s western Thrace. In all these areas Bulgarian replaced, respectively, Romanian, Cyrillic-based Serbo-Croatian and Greek as the official language. 

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The partitioning and occupation of Yugoslavia as well as of the western Soviet Union was short-lived unlike the sociolinguistic consequences brought about these events. Already in 1944 the communist guerillas proclaimed the founding of Cyrillic-based Macedonian language so as to curb the Bulgarian ideological influence in Yugoslavia’s share of Macedonia. This allowed for the emergence of the Macedonian nation as equally distinctive from the Serbs and Bulgarians. Prewar Yugoslavia’s frontiers were reestablished and Italy’s prewar territorial footholds in Gorizia, Istria and Dalmatia ceded to communist Yugoslavia, which also meant banning Italian from these traditionally Italian-speaking areas. The constitutional concepts of the Serbocroatoslovenian language and of the Serbocroatian nation were dropped from the law books in communist Yugoslavia. The Serbo-Croatian language returned to its dominant position, but it was checked. First, in emulation of the Soviet model, Yugoslavia was made into the federation of six national republics and two national autonomous regions. In Slovenia, Macedonia and Serbia’s autonomous regions of Vojvodina and Kosovo the following languages gained the national status: Slovenian, Macedonian, Magyar and Albanian, respectively. Obviously, they were of secondary status when it came to federal-wide communication mediated through Serbo-Croatian. But, second, this bi-scriptural language became officially known as Latin-based Croato-Serbian in Croatia and Cyrillic-based Serbo-Croatian in Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia. In the case of the latter variety of Serbo-Croatian further sub-labels were developed during the 1970s for tagging different “literary languages” for Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia. This tendency was fortified by distinguishing in censuses the Muslims as Bosnia’s “titular nation” (not a religious group), and after the adoption of the 1974 Constitution that increased cultural autonomy in the republics. The politicization of language was emphasized by Sofia’s insistence that the Macedonian language did not exist, because it was nothing else but a western literary variant of Bulgarian.97

As the ideology of integral Yugoslavism was dead after 1945, the same fate met Czechoslovakism. After World War II the concepts of Czechoslovak nation and language were not reinstated. Czechoslovakia was reestablished in its pre-1938 borders less Subcarpathian Ruthenia ceded to Soviet Ukraine, where it became

known as “Transcarpathia”\(^{98}\). In 1946 it lost its autonomous status and was made into a regular administrative oblast (province) of Ukraine. The Ruthenians’ specific language and nascent national identity were thoroughly Ukrainianized, and Russian replaced Czech(slovak) as the official language. The postwar Czechoslovakia became a dual nation-state for the Czechs and Slovaks. Their national languages were accorded equal status in the Czech lands and Slovakia, respectively. In the Slovak eyes this meant the downgrading of Slovak, because with the liquidation of independent Slovakia the center of the state returned to Prague and, by default, Czech again became the dominant language in this state. During the 1950s the Soviet model of state centralization through the “struggle against bourgeois nationalists” was applied to do away with separate Slovak politics and institutions. A more equal status for the Slovak nation and language was gained only in the wake of the 1968 federalization of Czechoslovakia. Immediately after the war the Allies approved expulsion of Germans and Magyars from this state. As a result previously multiethnic Czechoslovakia was made into a bi-national state only with a considerable Magyar national minority remaining in Slovakia.\(^{99}\)

The same instrument of Allied-approved population expulsions was applied on an even grander scale in postwar Poland, which was totally overhauled in comparison to what the state was before 1939. Jews who had constituted one-tenth of Poland’s population perished in the national socialist Holocaust. The Soviet Union incorporated prewar Poland’s eastern lands (one-third of the state’s territory), which were overwhelmingly Ukrainian, Belarusian and Lithuanian. In exchange the Kremlin granted Poland with the German territories east of the Oder-Neisse line (except the northern half of East Prussia annexed by the Soviet Union). Germans inhabiting these territories as well as the German minority from central Poland were expelled to truncated Germany. Poles from the enlarged Soviet Union were exchanged for Ukrainian, Belarusian and Lithuanian populaces remaining within Poland’s post-1945 frontiers. In 1947 further 150,000 Ukrainians and Lemkos were dispersed in the former German territories. In breach with its previous history Poland became a virtually ethnically homogenous nation-states of the ethnic Poles who profess Catholicism. It is unlike any other Central or Eastern European state where national minorities constitute significant parts of the population. Hence, since

\(^{98}\) From the vantage of Moscow and Kyiv Ruthenia is beyond the Carpathians, while in interwar Czechoslovakia, looking from Prague, it was at the foot of the mountains. Nowadays, the proponents of Carpatho-Rusyn nationalism propose to refer to this region as “Carpathian Ruthenia”, though sometimes the meaning of this term is stretched to contain northeastern Slovakia and the southeastern corner of Poland. (Magocsi. 2004. \textit{Rusinskyi iazyk}, p 465)

the late 1940s Polish has not only been the official but practically the sole language of administration, education and public discourse in Poland.\textsuperscript{100}

The Soviet Union seized Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia in 1940, and this annexation was repeated in 1944. Unlike elsewhere in this state no policy of forced Cyrillicization was imposed on Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian. The national cultures and languages of these three Baltic republics were different from the Polish enough (even anti-Polish in the case of Lithuania) not to necessitate such a step. (The Soviet policy of Russification actually never dented the well established Baltic nationalisms unlike those in Belarus and Ukraine) The “Polish imperialist or nationalist danger” was largely over too thanks to the expulsion of ethnic Poles from the enlarged western republics of the Soviet Union. The position of Russian- and Cyrillic-based Soviet culture was ensured. With the annexation of Czechoslovakia’s Subcarpathian Ruthenia and the Polish eastern territories into the Soviet Union, no significant groups of Orthodox or Greek Catholic populations writing with the use of the Cyrillic remained in the states bordering on the Soviet Union. During the 1950s Belarusian and Ukrainian were made into non-obligatory school subjects in Belarus and Ukraine, respectively, and Russian became dominant in the educational system in both the republics. National opposition to Russification was much stronger among the Ukrainians, especially in western Ukraine fully incorporated to the Soviet Union only after 1945. This opposition continued through the 1980s.\textsuperscript{101}

In 1956 Russian was declared the language of inter-ethnic communication (\textit{iazyk mezhduntsionalnogo obscheniia}) in the Soviet Union, and the pre-1940 struggle with “bourgeois nationalism” was replaced with that against “mestnichestvo” (localism). In 1961 it was predicted that the merger (\textit{sliiane}) of the nations included within the frontiers of the Soviet Union would produce unity (\textit{edinstvo}) of the classless and communist Soviet people/nation (\textit{sovetskii narod}), which was made into the Kremlin’s main goals on “the road to communism” in 1971. Ten years later the achievement of this goal was announced, and, certainly, the unified Soviet nation was to speak in Russian only. At the same time Russian was imposed as the language of international communication in the Soviet bloc from East Germany and Poland to Romania and Bulgaria. This policy attempted to replace French, German and English which fulfilled this function in Central Europe prior to 1945. No significant success was achieved in this respect apart from the narrow group of inner

\textsuperscript{101} Dziuba, Ivan. 1998. \textit{Internasionalizm chy rusyfikatsiia}. Kyiv: Vydavnichyi dim „KM Akademia”.

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communist party members who actually were allowed to travel to the Soviet Union.

In Belarus and Ukraine as of the mid-1950s more publications were brought out in Russian than in Belarusian and Ukrainian, respectively. By 1984 the share of Belarusian and Ukrainian publications produced in the two republics sank to 12 per cent in Belarus and 24 per cent in Ukraine. These shares were lowest out of all the ethnically non-Russian republics. The genetic closeness between Belarusian, Ukrainian and Russian allowed Belarusian- and Ukrainian-speakers to acquire Russian much faster than the non-Slavophone speakers from other republics. Belarusian and Ukrainian became secondary to Russian in all the aspects of public life in Soviet Belarus and Soviet Ukraine. These two languages were considered “uncultured peasant talk”, while Russian reigned unobstructed in cities. Only through Russian social advancement was possible. This situation combined with growing population movements across the Soviet Union made eastern Ukraine and eastern Belarus into virtually monolingual areas where only Russian was spoken. Belarusian and Russian fared better in western Belarus and western Ukraine, which had belonged to Poland before 1939, and where the German occupation administration encouraged the development of Belarusian and Ukrainian literacy at the cost of Polish and Russian. During the postwar period Belarusian and Ukrainian in their prewar codifications (not made similar to Russian as those in the Soviet Union) survived in the Belarusian and Ukrainian diasporas in Northern America and Western Europe. Diaspora Ukrainian preserved certain letters liquidated in Soviet Ukrainian, while Belarusian émigré thinkers proposed that Belarusian was a language of three alphabets: Cyrillic, Latin and Arabic. The last one alluded to the 16th-century manuscripts written by Slavophone Tatar Muslims in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The duchy’s southern border with the Kingdom of Poland tends to overlap with the modern Belarusian-Ukrainian frontier.  

The renewed wave of nation- and language-building

The intensification of the Cold War during the 1980s contributed to the economic unraveling of the Soviet bloc and the Soviet Union. A similar process

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unfolded in Yugoslavia after the 1980 death of Josip Broz Tito who had ruled this country since 1945. The dictator had failed to devise a clear succession system that would have overridden the growing ethnonational tensions. The Slovaks were not satisfied with their secondary position in Czechoslovakia either. Mikhail Gorbachev who was installed at the helm of the Soviet Union also liberalized the official policy of the Soviet nation. He acknowledged that this aim had not been achieved yet and returned to the policy of sblizhene (coming closer together) of nations living in the Soviet Union. This did not help alleviate the Armenian-Azeri warfare in Nagorno-Karabakh that flared up in 1988. The following year the Soviet bloc collapsed together with the project of making Russian the language of international communication in Central Europe. Largely English replaced it in this role. In 1990 the period of ethnonational wars commenced in Yugoslavia before it was tentatively wrapped up with the war in Kosovo (1999) and the Albanian-Macedonian conflict in Macedonia (2003). All the national republics gained independence with the exception of Serbia and Montenegro which may part their ways in 2006. Overwhelmingly Albanian Kosovo and Bosnia inhabited by Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs remain under the international administration. In 1991 the Soviet Union broke up and its fifteen national republics emerged as independent nation-states, including Belarus and Ukraine. Increasingly more loosely federated Czecho-Slovakia was dissolved in 1993 and spawned the Czech Republic and Slovakia. 103

All these newly emerged nation-states never existed before apart from Serbia and Montenegro. Croatia and Slovakia enjoyed their national independence only for the few years of World War II, while in the territorial terms the Russian Federation differs considerably from what the Russian Empire used to be. Almost in all these new nation-states the process of nation-building followed the Central European norm of the radical isomorphism of state, nation and language.

The breakup of Yugoslavia not only meant the end of the special position of Serbo-Croatian as the official language of the federation. It broke up too. In 1991 the Croats abandoned their Croato-Serbian for the Croatian language. The use of the Cyrillic was thoroughly abandoned, purist neologisms were coined and “Croatian” archaisms revived. In 1995 Bosnian was made into a co-official language in Bosnia along with Croatian, Serbian and English. Bosnian is the national language of the Bosniaks whom Belgrade had made into a nation through targeting them as “Muslims” during the Bosnian War. Previously the thoroughly secularized Bosniaks abandoned the Cyrillic and turned to their Ottoman Muslim past. They emphasized their tradition of Slavic literacy in the Arabic script, but settled for the Latin alphabet as the Turks did. Arabic and Turkish loanwords and archaisms, and an additional phoneme distinguish

Bosnian from Croatian. By default the pre-1990 standard of Serbo-Croatian written in Cyrillic characters, now, functions as the Serbian language. The movement for a separate Montenegrin language commenced in the late 1990s. Its leaders endowed it with three additional letters that are not used in Serbian, and claim that Montenegrin is a language with two national alphabets: Cyrillic and Latin. So far Montenegrin has not been accepted as the official language in Montenegro, but this may take place if the Serbia-Montenegro confederation unravels in 2006 (then the current confederation agreement will expire). Moreover, Slovenian and Macedonian became the sole official languages in the respective nation-states for the first time in history. Previously they had been always secondary to Serbo-Croatian and other official languages. The unexpected elevation of Macedonian vexed Sofia. Bulgaria recognized Macedonia but not this language. On the other hand, Greece has nothing against the language but does not recognize the name of the nation-state that happens to be the name of a Greek northern province too. Athens keeps calling Macedonia the “Republic of Skopje”, and made NATO and the United Nations recognize this state under the torturous designation of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM).¹⁰⁴

Equally unexpectedly, in 1991 Belarusian and Ukrainian were made into the sole official languages of the new nation-states of Belarus and Ukraine, respectively. Much to the outcry of Russians and monolingual Russian-speakers. In Belarus the central administration failed to carry out the decision to switch administering from Russian to Belarusian. In 1995 the Belarusian project of nation-building was stopped and a simulacrum of the Soviet reality was recreated. In the same year Russian was granted the co-official status equal to that of Belarusian. In practice that provided for progressive marginalization of the Belarusian language completed with the forced closure of the last Belarusian-language secondary school and university in 2003 and 2004, respectively. In elementary education Russian dominates as the medium of education. In Ukraine the 1996 Constitution enshrined the position of Ukrainian as the official and national language in Ukraine. In 2003 Kyiv did not bow to Moscow’s pressure to make Russian a co-official language. Actually there are thousands of Russian-language schools in eastern and southern Ukraine while not a single Ukrainian-language school in Russia for four million+ Ukrainians who live there.¹⁰⁵ Unlike in Belarus Ukrainian successfully replaced Russian as


the language of politics, administration and culture in Kyiv and central Ukraine. But Russian still dominates in eastern and southern Ukraine, though politicians all over Ukraine do their best to speak in Ukrainian, otherwise they cannot count on advancing their careers.106

Following the breakup of the Soviet Union, the Kremlin worked out a new vision of the Russian security policy in the first half of the 1990s. All the Soviet republics which had gained independence, were construed as Russia’s “near abroad”, or the Moscow’s exclusive sphere of interests. All the republics (apart from Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) were included in the Commonwealth of Independent States controlled by Russia through the Russian military stationed in these areas, and through oil and gas supplies at prices lower than those in the world market. Only the three Baltic republics managed to escape Russia’s political, military and economic domination. Beginning in the second half of the 1990s Moscow aggressively began to propagate Russian culture and language in the near abroad. This was Russia’s reaction against de-Russification of the national cultures in the post-Soviet nation-states and the return of hundreds of thousands of Russian settlers and their descendants from the near abroad to Russia. In this manner, the Kremlin hopes to preserve the unique role of Russian as the international language in the near abroad. This is true even in the Baltic republics, where the Estonians and Latvians shun Russian, but the huge Russian-speaking minorities maintain the social and political significance of this language there. In Lithuania the backlash against Russian was never so strong as in Estonia and Latvia, so in the absence of a sizeable Russian-speaking minority, the knowledge of this language is widespread. The significance of Russian was recognized in Western Europe too. The EuroNews channel broadcasts also in Russian along English, French, German, Italian, Spanish and Portuguese. Interestingly, not a single one of the official Slavic languages employed in the four new members of the European Union: the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia, is used in the EuroNews.

The internal politics of the Russian Federation is also strongly connected to the Russian language. Some blamed the breakup of the Soviet Union on the fact that

In the Russian eyes Ukrainian is an “uncultured” peasant dialect of Russian, and Ukraine is still perceived as a mere province of Russia. In December 2004 during the Orange Revolution in Ukraine Russian President Vladimir Putin authoritatively stated that everybody speaks Russian in Ukraine. (Ash, Timothy Garton and Snyder, Timothy. 2005. The Orange Revolution. The New York Review of Books. No 7, Apr 28.

four distinctive alphabets were used in this state (Armenian, Cyrillic, Georgian and Latin). In post-Soviet Russia the Cyrillic remained the sole official script for writing languages spoken in the federation. In the 1990s and at the beginning of the 21st century the Latin script supplanted the Cyrillic in Azerbaijan, Moldova, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Especially the changes in the Turkicophone post-Soviet states the Kremlin perceived as threatening, because it could lead to the spread of Turkish influence in this region. Ankara resigned from its ambitions in this respect in the second half of the 1990s. This influence could be felt even within Russia due to the considerable presence of Turkic-speaking population in the federation. Tatarstan was to introduce Latin for its official Cyrillic-based Tatar language in 2011, but in 2002 the Russian Duma (parliament) decided that only the Cyrillic must be used for writing autochthonous languages spoken in Russia. Two years later elected presidents of the entities constituting the Russian Federation were replaced with governors nominated by the Kremlin. The ensuing centralization of Russia underwrites an increase in the significance of the Russian language and the Cyrillic at the cost of co-official regional languages. Ironically though, the preponderance of the Latin script in computer programming and the internet led to pragmatic and widespread Latinization of Russian and Ukrainian texts exchanged via email and posted on websites. Recently this even led to working out “standard transliteration Latin alphabets” for both languages. ¹⁰⁷

The dissolution of Czechoslovakia allowed for reemergence of Slovakia as a nation-state and, for the first time, produced the Czech nation-state known as the Czech Republic. The official role of Czech was limited to the Czech Republic, and this language does not endanger the official status of Slovak in Slovakia any more. Democratization convinced Bratislava grant wide-ranging language rights to 600,000 Magyars who live in southern Slovakia and constitute 11 per cent of Slovakia’s population. But similar rights were not granted to 260,000 Roma who make up 5 per cent of the population. Czech and Slovak being mutually comprehensible, until the mid-1990s Czech intellectuals decried dubbing of Czech films and translating of Czech books into Slovak. Now it is a standard procedure that surprises no one. Also Slovak films and books are dubbed and translated into Czech. However diminished the dominance of Czech culture and language over Slovak continues. One can easily purchase Czech-language

publications in Bratislava, but in Prague bookshops there is no reciprocation in regard of Slovak-language books.\textsuperscript{108}

Democratization did not change much in the use of languages in Poland and Bulgaria. The postwar ethnic cleansing of Germans from Poland and Warsaw’s application of state-enforced assimilation practically did away with all other languages than Polish. The overwhelming majority of the 150,000 to 300,000-strong German minority concentrated in southern Poland do not speak in German. Knowledge of this language used to be a serious social liability in communist Poland especially if coupled with poor command of official Polish. Ukrainian and Belarusian quite close to Polish, the members of these two minorities forcefully dispersed and subjected to Polonization, most of them speak in Polish and retain passive knowledge of Ukrainian and Belarusian. 800,000 Turks accounted for 12 per cent of Bulgaria’s population. In 1988 most of them were rounded up and sent to Turkey. At least half of them returned after the end of communism and are allowed a modicum of language rights. As mentioned above Sofia keeps dubbing Macedonian a “second literary variety” of the Bulgarian language.\textsuperscript{109}

\textit{Slavic languages in numbers}

It is safe to say that, generally speaking, the populations of Poland and the Czech Republic equal the numbers of Polish- and Czech-speakers, respectively. It sounds even more truthful, when one remembers that Poland’s German minority of some 150,000 to 300,000 persons, in their overwhelming majority, speak Polish only with the exception of those aged 70 and more, because only they had had a chance to attend several grades of German elementary school during World War II. Hence, there are 38 million people speaking Polish and 10 million Czech. From Slovakia’s population of 5 million one must subtract half of Slovakia’s 600-thousand-strong Magyar minority and even more from the Roma minority of half a million who have a poor command of Slovak. Thus the number of Slovak-speakers residing in Slovakia is 4.5 million. Belarusians account for 80 per cent of the Belarusian population, but only a tiny group (some say 10,000) speak standard Belarusian, while the rest use Russian (and sometimes local dialects) in everyday life. Out of the Ukrainian population of 49 million 17 million are monoglot Russian-speakers (including 11 million ethnic Russians\textsuperscript{110}), while more than half of the ethnic Ukrainians speak Russian. Thus, in everyday communication 18 million of Ukraine’s inhabitants use Russian, 19

\textsuperscript{108} Kováč. \textit{Dějiny Slovenska}, pp 328-329

\textsuperscript{109} Magocsi. \textit{Historical Atlas}, pp 199-201.

million Ukrainian, and 12 million Russian and Ukrainian. Although the population of the Russian Federation at 148 million is composed from various ethnic and ethnonational groups, the Russians constitute the overwhelming majority (83 per cent), and actually all the citizens know Russian. The ethnic Slavic minorities of Ukrainians, Belarusians and Poles account for four million, one million, and 90,000, respectively. Slovenia’s population of 1.9 million is practically composed from Slovene-speakers. After the ethnic cleansing of Serbs conducted in the mid-1990s, Croatian-speakers also overlap with Croatia’s population of 4.5 million. Serbs and Montenegrins living in Serbia-Montenegro account for 7 million and 0.6 million, respectively. 0.4 million Magyars and 1.7 million Albanians constitute the rest of the state’s population, but they tend to know Serbian/Serbo-Croatian. In Bosnia two million Bosniaks, 0.8 million Croats and 1.4 million Serbs live. In the past all of them agreed that they spoke Serbo-Croatian. Now all of them claim their own separate languages, Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian, but have no problem to communicate with one another. Macedonians constitute two-thirds of Macedonia’s population of two million, Albanians constitute the rest and most of them use Serbian/Serbo-Croatian not Macedonian. In addition to seven million Bulgarians some 0.7 million Turks and Roma populate Bulgaria but usually all of them can speak Bulgarian.

Russians and Russian-speakers (usually of Ukrainian, Belarusian and, sometimes, Polish ethnic origin) constitute close to half the population in Latvia, one-third of the inhabitants of Estonia, nine per cent in Lithuania and 13 per cent in Moldova. Ethnically non-Belarusian Russian-speakers account for 12 per cent of the population in Belarus, and ethnically non-Ukrainian Russian-speakers for almost one-third of the inhabitants in Ukraine. In the 1990s hundreds of thousands of Russians and Russian-speakers left the post-Soviet Caucasus and Central Asia and there are not reliable statistics on these areas. Notably, only at the end of the 1990s the number of Kazak-speakers in Kazakhstan surpassed the mark of 50 per cent. Previously Russians and Russian-speakers accounted for more than half of Kazakhstan’s population. The Ukrainian diaspora in Europe and post-Soviet states includes four to five million Ukrainians in Russia, 0.87 million in Kazakhstan, 0.6 million in Moldova, 0.3 million in Belarus, 0.3 million in Poland, 0.19 million in Uzbekistan, 0.12 million in Kirgizstan, 92,000 in Latvia, 65,000 in Romania, 60,000 in Lithuania, 48,000 in Estonia, 48,000 in

111 The last Soviet census, conducted in 1989, recorded 11.3 million ethnic Russians in Ukraine, 6.2 million in Kazakhstan, 1.65 million in Uzbekistan, 1.34 in Belarus, 0.9 million in Kirgizstan, 0.9 million in Latvia, 0.56 million in Moldova, 0.47 million in Estonia, 0.4 million in Azerbaijan, 0.39 million in Tajikistan, 0.34 million in Lithuania, 0.34 million in Georgia, 0.33 million in Turkmenistan and 50,000 in Armenia. (Maryański, Andrzej. 1994. Narodowości świata. Warsaw: PWN, p 61)
Tajikistan, and 44,000 in Turkmenistan. But most of them, who reside in post-Soviet states, speak in Russian. The largest Belarusian national minorities reside in Russia (1.2 million), Poland (0.2 million), Kazakhstan (0.18 million), Ukraine (0.12 million), Latvia (0.12 million) and Lithuania (65,000). Those living in Poland increasingly speak in Polish, while those in Ukraine and other post-Soviet states almost solely in Russian. 0.4 million Poles live in Belarus, 0.22 million in Ukraine, 0.25 million in Lithuania, 90,000 in Russia, 60,000 in Latvia, 60,000 in the Czech Republic and 60,000 in Kazakhstan. Due to the closeness of the Slavic languages most of them speak either Polish influenced by Slavic languages used in these states, or the very languages (mostly Russian in the case of the post-Soviet states) with some Polish syntactical and vocabulary elements. Obviously with the exception of Lithuania, where local Poles tend to opt for Russian. The sole sizeable Czech minority reside in Slovakia – 56,000, whereas 0.3 million Slovaks in the Czech Republic. Due to the closeness of their languages and the Czechoslovak legacy of official bilingualism all of them speak Czech and Slovak with equal facility. There are also 0.1 million Slovaks living in Hungary and 67,000 in Serbia’s province of Vojvodina. A sizeable Slovenian minority of 96,000 resides in Italy’s province of Friuli-Venezia Giulia adjacent to Slovenia. Croat minorities reside in Bosnia (0.75 million), Vojvodina (0.1 million), Hungary (85,000), Austria (60,000) and Slovenia (54,000). The largest Serbian minority of 1.4 million live in Bosnia, while due to ethnic cleansing in the mid-1990s few of Croatia’s former Serbian minority of 0.58 million remain in this state. 0.26 million Bosniaks and 50,000 Macedonians live in Serbia-Montenegro, and 0.14 million Montenegrins in Serbia. Skopje claims that quarter of a million Macedonians reside in Bulgaria, but Sofia treats them as Bulgarians. There is hardly any linguistic difference between Macedonians and Bulgarians in their everyday language use not unlike between Bosnians, Croats, Montenegrins and Serbs. Sizeable Bulgarian minorities one can find in Ukraine (0.17 million) and Moldova (80,000). Bosniaks came into being as a nation because the project of the Serbocroatian nation was never fulfilled and Serbian ethnonationalists did not want any Muslims in their Orthodox nation even if Serbian-speaking. A similar situation is observed in the case of Bulgaria’s 0.3 million Slavophone Muslims disparagingly called Pomaks.

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112 I usually take a note of national minorities counting 50,000 members or more. The statistics on national minorities in post-Soviet states usually dates to the last Soviet census of 1989 in the case of the non-European countries.

113 In the last decade the number of ethnic Poles residing in Kazakhstan plummeted due to their emigration to Poland.

The Sorbs (Wends, Lusatians, Lusatian Sorbs) are a small Slavophone ethnic group separated by German-speakers from the continuous Central and Eastern European area inhabited by Slavic-speakers. The first stirrings of Sorbian nationalism came in the mid-19th century under the influence of Pan-Slavism stemming from nearby Prague. Since 1815 their land was divided between Prussia and the Kingdom of Saxony with Cottbus and Bautzen, respectively as the two main urban centers of Sorbian culture. The political frontier coincided with the religious one – Prussia’s Sorbs mainly confessed Protestantism, while Saxony’s Catholicism. This brought about the emergence of written Lower Sorbian for Protestant Sorbs, and of written Upper Sorbian for Catholic Sorbs. Some consider them to be two literary varieties of the Sorbian language, while others treat them as two separate languages. With Prague’s support Sorbian nationalism was rekindled at the end of World War I. This was the function of Czechoslovak-German enmity played out on the international plane. The Sorbian question made it even to the peace conference, but they were not granted the status of a national minority in the Treaty of Versailles, which did not mention this group. Thanks to Prague’s unwavering support, however, the Sorbs were generally recognized as another Slavic nation. Elementary education and culture in Sorbian developed in Germany until the National Socialists took over. Practically the Sorbian language and culture were banned between 1937 and 1945.

Following the end of World War II the Kremlin opposed Prague’s maneuvers to incorporate the Sorbs’ homeland of Lusatia to Czechoslovakia in exchange for Czechoslovakia’s Subcarpathian Ruthenia annexed to Soviet Ukraine. In 1945 Poland gained its western border on the Oder-Neisse line which was in proximity of Cottbus and Bautzen. This prompted Warsaw to demand incorporation of Lusatia to Poland, and constituted part of the Polish-Czechoslovak bickering over the new stretch of their common border. The

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Kremlin did not budge in this case either. In East Germany the Sorbs were granted the rights of a national minority and Sorbian was guaranteed the status of a co-official language in the counties inhabited by Sorbs. The 1990 unification of Germany brought about the renewed administrative division of the Sorbs between Brandenburg and Saxony. What is more, their minority rights and the status of their language are not guaranteed by the state any more but separately by these two Länder. Standardization of Lower and Upper Sorbian gained momentum in East Germany but has not been completed. Today there are 60,000 Sorbs who can speak their language(s). All of them are bilingual with German gradually but steadily taking the upper hand. Some 20,000 Catholic Sorbs stick to Lower Sorbian, and 40,000 Protestant Sorbs to Upper Sorbian. The minuscule number of the Sorbs, the division of their still not fully standardized language into two different literary varieties (languages), the dominance and irresistible attraction of German culture and language, perhaps, mean that Sorbian will become a socially restricted ethnolect or a moribund language evoked by Sorbs for symbolic reasons.\footnote{Cygański, Mirosław and Leszczyński, Rafał. 1997. \textit{Zarys dziejów narodowościowych Łużycan}. Opole: Instytut Śląski, pp 9-10, 25-26, 65; Polański, Kazimierz. 1980. Sorbian (Lusatian) (pp 229-246). In Schenker, Alexander M and Stankiewicz, Edward, eds. \textit{The Slavic Literary Languages: Formation and development} (Ser.: Yale Russian and East European Publications, no 1). New Haven: Yale Concilium on International and Area Studies, 231-236; Price. \textit{Encyclopedia}, pp 447-448.}

Kashubian is the Slavic ethnolect of the overwhelmingly Catholic ethnic group of Kashubs living around the city of Gdańsk (Danzig). Their language was noted as “Kaschubian” in Prussian and German censuses since the second half of the 19th century. The Kashubian national movement emerged at the beginning of the 20th century but was short-lived. After 1918 the areas inhabited by the Kashubs were divided between Poland and the Free City of Danzig. In line with the idea of ethnically homogenous nation-state Warsaw claimed Kashubian to be a dialect of the Polish language and the Kashubs a regional group of the Polish nation. During World War II the areas where the Kashubs lived were incorporated to Germany. Although Berlin recognized Kashubian as a language separate from Polish, the use of both these languages was banned, and (not unlike the Sorbs) the Kashubs were to be made into an indistinguishable part of the German nation. After 1945 Warsaw returned to its interwar approach to the Kashubs and their language. Since the second half of the 19th century there had been some attempts at standardizing Kashubian but none successful. The serious process of standardizing Kashubian commenced only after the fall of communism (1989). Despite Warsaw’s tacit opposition, in the second half of the 1990s and at the beginning of the 21st century this led to the establishment of the.
modest network of Kashubian-language elementary and secondary education attended by several thousand students. Also some fortnightly radio and TV programs are broadcast in Kashubian, masses are celebrated in this language in a handful of Catholic churches, and the Chair in the Kashubian Language was established at the University of Gdańsk. Nowadays hardly any Polish politician or scholar claims Kashubian to be a Polish dialect. But neither Kashubian or any other minority language in Poland has been granted the co-official status with Polish even at the lowest ranks of administration. The Kashubian-speaking population counts 150,000 persons. In the 2002 census only 6,000 of them declared themselves to be members of the Kashubian nation. The overwhelming majority of Kashubs feel to be part of the Polish nation despite the fact that they consider Kashubian to be a language on its own.\footnote{Price. \textit{Encyclopedia} pp 49-50; Topolińska, Zuzanna. 1980. Kashubian (pp 183-194). In Schenker, Alexander M and Stankiewicz, Edward, eds. \textit{The Slavic Literary Languages: Formation and development} (Ser: Yale Russian and East European Publications, no 1). New Haven: Yale Concilium on International and Area Studies.}

Rusyn (Carpatho-Rusyn, Ruthenian, Lemkian) is a newly standardized language, which was not mentioned in reference works on the Slavic languages before 1989. It draws on the tradition of Ruthenian literacy (in the Cyrillic) and nationalism that flared up in eastern Upper Hungary (Subcarpathian Ruthenia) in the mid-19th century and in interwar Czechoslovakia’s province of Subcarpathian Ruthenia. Heavy emigration of Rusyns to Northern America led to the development of their national moment there and literary tradition in the Cyrillic and Latin scripts. In 1974 Rusyn became a co-official language in Yugoslavia’s Vojvodina (along with Serbo-Croatian, Magyar and Slovak). Rusyns and Slovaks had migrated from eastern Upper Hungary to then southern Hungary before 1918. This official recognition led to standardization of Vojvodina Rusyn and its widespread use in publications, education and administration. During the 1970s and 1980s the Canadian scholar Paul Robert Magocsi inspired and led the Rusyn national revival in Northern America. Since the fall of communism congresses of the Rusyn national movement and those devoted to standardization of Rusyn have been regularly organized in Slovakia, Poland, Hungary and Ukraine. In 1995 standardization of Rusyn used in Slovakia commenced and in the second half of the 1990s this process was extended to the Lemkian language used in Poland, and to Ruthenian as spoken in Ukraine’s Transcarpathia. In 1992 it was decided that the Rusyn language comprises four variants/standards employed in eastern Slovakia, southeastern Poland, Ukraine’s Transcarpathia and Vojvodina, and that the fifth standard based on all these four (supradialectal koiné) should be developed. Moreover, it was decided that Rusyn ought to be Cyrillic-based.
Through the interwar period among those five populations claimed for the Rusyn (Carpatho-Rusyn) nation the following identificational tendencies persisted: local, Ruthenian (Rusyn), Russian and Ukrainian. The Russian option that contributed to spread of Orthodox Christianity among the predominantly Greek Catholic Rusyns, disappeared after 1945 when it became clear that Soviet Ukraine would permanently separate the Rusyns from Russia. Ethnic homogenization of Soviet satellites largely severed the tradition of local identification. Today the Rusyn (ethnic/national) and Ukrainian options remain opened to Rusyns apart from assimilation with the dominant nation in a given state. In addition to that, the Lemko (ethnic/national) option persists in Poland. Hungary, Poland, Serbia-Montenegro and Slovakia recognize Rusyns as a national minority. But out of estimated 950,000 Rusyns 720,000 live in Ukraine where they are considered to be a regional group of the Ukrainian nation not unlike the Kashubs in relation to the Polish nation. Nowadays the Rusyn national and language movement is concentrated in eastern Slovakia where the Institute of Rusyn Language and Literature was established at Šafárik University in Prešov.\(^\text{118}\)

The three Slavic micro-languages have had no chance to develop into full-fledged official and standard languages. First, no autonomous regions arose where they could play such a role, and administrative, ecclesiastical and even political borders have tended to crisscross the homelands of the Sorbs, Kashubs and Rusyns. Second, all the nation-states where the populations speaking these languages reside, still aspire to the ideal of ethnically homogeneity, which assumes the normative isomorphism of language, nation and state. Third, no states emerged which could be molded into a Sorbian, Kashubian or Rusyn nation-state. Fourth, the demographic size of the Sorbs, Kashubs and Rusyns is miniscule in comparison to the state-endowed nations in Central Europe. Fifth, with the rapid increase in social and spatial mobility a growing number of these three groups’ members live in diasporas.

The above-mentioned factors, probably, will not allow for the spread of further Slavic languages even if they are successfully standardized. The four recent standardization projects include Polesian, Silesian, Goralian (Podhalanian) and Pomakian. The potential users of the Polesian language, numbering 3 million, live in the border region of western Polesia that occupies the southwestern corner of Belarus, the northwestern corner of Ukraine and the adjacent Polish areas. The dialect of the inhabitants of this region is equally distant from standard Belarusian, standard Ukrainian, standard Polish and standard Russian. The attempts of Kyiv and Minsk to make the Polesians into Ukrainians and Belarusians, without improving their economic and social situation, caused the emergence of the Polesian national movement in the mid-1980s. This movement concentrated in Belarus and its main project was standardization of the Polesian language. But without support of any state or international organization for this movement, this impoverished rural region could not sustain this national project, and standardization of Polesian was abandoned in the mid-1990s. Interestingly, at the beginning of the 1990s Polesian written in Cyrillic characters obtained a Latin alphabet-based script not unlike Belarusian a century earlier.¹¹⁹

The project of standardizing the Silesian language is connected to the Slavic-Germanic ethnic group from the region of Upper Silesia. The Silesians live between the Polish cities of Opole and Katowice in the north and the two Czech cities of Ostrava and Těšín in the south. The dialect spoken by the Silesians is as distant from standard Polish as from standard Czech. The Polish share of the region belonged to Germany before 1918. Poland received its eastern sliver in 1922, and the rest in 1945. The Czech segment of Upper Silesia was part of Germanophone Austrian Silesia in Austria-Hungary before 1918. Then it was included in Czechoslovakia. During World War II entire Upper Silesia was incorporated to Germany, before the current borders were established in 1945. This explains the strong influence of German culture and language often perceived by Silesians as “superior” to Czech and Polish cultures and languages. The Silesian national movement appeared periodically since the mid-19th century. It resurfaced in the first half of the 1990s in the Czech Republic, but the economic, political and social success of the Czech nation-state proved enough to erase Silesian nationalism as an alternative to Czechness. In Poland’s Upper Silesia the recognized German minority of 300,000 persons emerged in the western half of this region during the first half of the 1990s. After the mid-1990s in the heavily industrialized eastern section of Upper Silesia the previously well-

to-do population suffered unemployment and they could not obtain German passports as easily as Silesians in the west of Upper Silesia. This situation brought about the feeling of distance toward the Polish and German nations, and rekindling of Silesian nationalism. Along with this the project of standardizing the Silesian language became popular at the end of the 1990s. Unlike the Kashubs (who see themselves as an ethnoregional group of the Polish nation), at least 170,000 Silesians consider themselves to be members of the Silesian nation. In 2004 the Polish branch of the European Union’s Bureau for Lesser Used Languages recognized Silesian as a minority language spoken in Poland. Several bilingual dictionaries of Silesian have already been published. So Silesian stands a good chance of being standardized, but, perhaps, its use will remain restricted to largely symbolical functions.\footnote{Kamusella, Tomasz. 2003. The Szlonzoks and Their Language: Between Germany, Poland and Szlonzokian Nationalism (Ser: EUI Working Papers, vol HEC 2003/1). San Domenico di Fiesole: European University Institute.}

The Goralian, or Podhalanian language derives its two names from the Gorals (Górale), literally “Highlanders” who live in the Podhale, or the region at the northern feet of the Tatra Mountains. The Gorals numbering more than 100,000 live in the area from Zakopane to Nowy Targ. At the end of the 19th century Zakopane became a popular mountain resort frequented by the Polish-speaking intelligentsia and bourgeois of Cracow. The poet Kazimierz Przerwa-Tetmajer wrote a popular cycle of folklore-inspired stories on Goralian life titled Na skalnym Podhalu (1903-1910, In the Rocky Podhale). He wrote the book in the Goralian speech with the use of the Polish version of the Latin alphabet. Since that time Goralian has been hailed as one of the most poetic dialects of Polish though it is as much different from standard Polish as Kashubian. Poems and stories written by Polish authors in Goralian have been published to this day. National socialist Germany strove to use the ethnolinguistic difference between the Gorals and the Poles for founding the Goralian nation (Goralenvolk) during World War II. The project failed and Gorals define themselves a regional group of the Polish nation. Yet, this did not prevent the emergence of the specific written Goralian language after the end of communism. In the late 1990s the famous Polish theologian and philosopher Father Józef Tischner published a book on philosophy in Goralian, and in 2002-2004 the Goralian translation of the New Testament, approved by the Polish Catholic Church, was published.\footnote{Cf Ewangelie w przekładzie Marii Matejowej Torbierz na gwarę Góralskalnopodhalańskich z Zakopanego. 2002. Poznań: Wydawnictwo Pallottinum and Zakopane-Krzeptówki: Sanktuarium Matki Bożej Fatimskiej.} But neither Gorals nor Poles refer to Goralian as a separate language, and usually subsume it as a dialect (gwara) into the fold of the Polish language.
The Pomaks are Slavophone Muslims who reside in southern Bulgaria (0.25 million) and in Greece’s share of western Thrace (40,000). In Bulgaria their situation is similar to that of the Bosnian Muslims whose religion was used to exclude them from the commonality with the Yugoslav (Serbo-Croatian), Serbian or Croatian nation, so that they had no choice but form their own Bosniak nation. Since the end of World War II Sofia has Bulgarized Pomaks pressuring them to change Islamic names to Slavic, and to renounce Islam. Those who persisted in their “un-Bulgarian ways” have been denied commonality with the Bulgarian nation. The end of communism and democratization of Bulgaria after 1989 made Sofia grudgingly accept that Bulgaria is not an ethnically homogenous nation-state. It was easier in the case of the Turkish minority who speak Turkish and profess Islam. When it comes to granting minority rights Sofia prefers to consider the Pomaks a regional group of the Bulgarian nation. A similar attitude Warsaw displays toward Poland’s Kashubs. In reaction to this treatment the fledgling Pomak national movement came into being. This brought about three tentative codifications of the Pomakian language published in 1996 and 1997. The proposed standards use the Greek and Latin alphabets, and the Greek alphabet with diacritics. The Bosniaks avoided the Cyrillic in an attempt to distance themselves from the Orthodox Serbs. Similarly, the choice of alphabets for Pomakian emphasizes the shunning of the Cyrillic employed by the Orthodox Bulgarians. However, the choice of the Greek script and publication of the codifying grammars of Pomakian in Greece, indicate that it may be Athens’s ploy to further the Greek national myth that only Greeks live in Greece. Ergo, Pomaks of Greece could be defined as “Slavophone Greeks” united with the Greek nation through common culture and script if not religion. It is unlikely that this or that standard of Pomakian will become a significant language for the Pomaks, because of their insistence that Turkish be used as the medium of education in Pomak schools in Bulgaria. This shows that the Islamic commonality or assimilation with the Turkish nation is a more appealing option for the Pomaks than establishing their own Slavophone-Islamic nation.122

Other Slavic micro-languages are tiny and not associated with any serious nation-making or political projects. They include Molisian, Resian, Burgenland Croatian and Banat Bulgarian. All these languages, except Resian, were brought to the regions where they are spoken nowadays, by Slavophone Christian refugees from the Balkans when the Ottoman armies seized their original homelands. Molisian (Molise Croatian, Italo-Croatian) is spoken by some 2,000 persons in the Italian region of Molise, east of Rome. A dictionary of this nearly extinct language was published in 2000. Also around 2,000 people speak Resian in the Resia Valley located next to the Slovenian border in the Northeastern

Italian region of Friuli-Venezia Giulia. Since the 19th century this language has been written in the Slovenian type of the Latin script. Despite a flurry of publishing activity devoted to Resian, like Molisian, it remains of more interest to slavicists than to its actual users. On the contrary, Burgenland Croatian and Banat Bulgarian are established media of local print-cultures. 50,000 persons speak the former language in Austria’s eastern province of Burgenland that borders on Hungary. They identify themselves as Catholic Croats, which emphasizes their commonality with the Croatian nation, and precludes using their language for any national project. The New Testament was translated into Burgenland Croatian (1952), and bilingual dictionaries that pair this language with German were published too (1982, 1992). Unlike in standard Croatian, in Burgenland Croatian there are not any Turkic loans, but it absorbed more Germanisms, Magyarisms and Italianisms than standard Croatian. Banat Bulgarian is used by 10,000 people in Romania’s region of Banat (that is, in the vicinity of Timișoara). Initially, it was standardized in the mid-19th century with the use of the Latin script, which makes this language different from Cyrillic-based standard Bulgarian. Greek and Turkic loans largely removed from Bulgarian, they remain in Banat Bulgarian in addition to numerous Romanian, Serbian, Magyar and German loans. The Banat Bulgarians are Catholics and tend to refer to themselves as “Paulicians”, and to their language as “Paulician”. This indicates that their ancestors were the members of the 11th-century heretic sect of Paulicians that after being moved (within the Byzantine Empire) from Armenia to the Balkans became known as Bogomils (akin in their doctrine to Cathars). In the 17th century before their trek to the Habsburg-held Banat, Franciscans converted them to Catholicism. The revival of Banat Bulgarian and publications in this language commenced with the fall of communism in 1989. The New Testament was translated into Latin-based Banat Bulgarian in 1998. Proponents of the Bulgarian option use the Cyrillic and call Banat Bulgarian the “second Bulgarian language”. Their opponents strive for fortifying their “Paulician” identity and the “pure Paulician language”.¹²³

Practically, there are no monoglot speakers of the eleven micro-Slavic languages. With the partial exception of Sorbian, none of these languages have achieved the status of co-official language in the region or locality where it is spoken. The dominant language used by the speakers of these micro-Slavic languages is a Slavic language in the case of Kashubian, Rusyn, Polesian, Silesian, Goralian and Pomakian; as well as Italian in the case of Molisian and

Resian, German in the case of Sorbian and Burgenland Croatian, and Romanian in the case of Banat Bulgarian. Sorbian, Kashubian, Rusyn, Polesian, Silesian. Goralian and Pomakian are associated with ethnonational or ethnoregional projects, but only Sorbian and (sometimes) Kashubian are included in classifications of the Slavic languages. Both of them are subsumed in the Western branch of the Slavic languages. The projects associated with the other languages are not recognized, or are largely unknown, but should one wish Silesian and Goralian could be included in the Western branch, Rusyn and Polesian in the Eastern branch of the Slavic languages, and Pomakian in the Southern branch. The four remaining micro-Slavic languages of Molisian, Resian, Burgenland Croatian and Banat Bulgarian one would apportion to the Southern branch too.

Between dialects and the standard language

The question about what is a language and what is a dialect, is not about linguistic reality as one may be inclined to think. It is a strictly political question especially in Central Europe where the normative isomorphism of language, nation and state is the guiding principle of politics. If a language is recognized this gives the ethnic group speaking it the right to reinvent itself as a nation. This was the line followed, for instance, by Slovak and Sorbian nationalisms. But an ethnic group with its recognized language may shirk the possibility of embarking on its own national project as in the case of the Kashubs. On the other hand, if an ethnic group decides to become a nation it is not enough to obtain recognition in this capacity only, even if confirmed by the group’s own nation-state. Such a nation requires its own language. Hence, the Bosniaks excluded by Serbian nationalists from the commonality with the Serbocroatian/Serbian nation, and endowed by the international community with their own nation-state, nevertheless had to round up their newly gained (or imposed on them) nationhood with their own Bosnian language.

Hence, when speech of a group is considered a language or dialect this act gives the group either the right to national self-determination or not. Deciding that a group’s speech is a dialect usually entails subjecting this dialect to an already recognized language. This procedure is utterly anachronistic, because dialects are oral in character while languages written and standardized. Modern Slavic languages acquired their written form beginning in the 15th century, but all of them were standardized into the languages as we know them in the 19th and 20th century. This process of standardization still continues in the case of the post-Serbo-Croatian languages and Slavic micro-languages.

The political motivation in the subjection of dialects to languages is very well visible in the case of the Serbo-Croatian language. This standard was to serve the population living in what today is Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. The population’s variegated dialects were assumed to be the dialects of the Serbo-Croatian language. Sofia disagreed and considered the southern Serbian/Serbo-Croatian dialect of Macedonia the Bulgarian language’s western dialect. In 1944 Belgrade allowed for elevating this dialect to the rank of the Macedonian language and ascribed dialects spoken on the territory of Macedonia to this newly formed language. During the 1990s this process was repeated in the wake of the breakup of Yugoslavia. Erstwhile dialects of Serbo-Croatian were made into languages: Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian. The Serbo-Croatian language disappeared, and dialects used in Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia were subjected to these three new languages. The process may be not over yet, because should Montenegrin emerge as a language the dialects used in Montenegro would be ascribed to this language, and the dialectal territory of the Serbian language would be limited to Serbia proper.

The case of Czechoslovak in interwar Czechoslovakia was similar. However, there was really no single Czechoslovak language. Czech and Slovak constituted its two varieties. Actually it was Czech that tended to fulfill the role of the Czechoslovak language throughout the Czechoslovak state. Scholars rarely claimed the Slovak dialects for the Czech language unless they construed Czech to be Czechoslovak and Slovak a dialect of Czech/Czechoslovak. This made the Slovak dialects into Czech’s subdialects of the Slovak dialectal group. Peering further into the past, back to the times before the 1905 Revolution in the Russian Empire, in the second half of the 19th century St Petersburg accepted the concept of the Great Russian language. In this scheme Russian renamed as imperial “Great Russian” was presented to be the direct descendent of Church Slavonic, and Ukrainian and Belarusian (known as Little Russian and White Russian, respectively) as Great Russian’s dialects. A reflection of the same ethnolinguistic national ideology is visible in Warsaw’s reluctance to concede that Kashubian is a language on its own rather than a dialect of Polish. In the Kashubian case the position changed during the 1990s, but the nascent emergence of the Silesian language the Polish government perceives as a danger and declines to grant recognition to this language claiming it a Polish dialect against the wishes of the Silesians to the contrary. On the other hand, there is hardly any controversy when Warsaw seems to recognize Lemkian as a language. This plays into Warsaw’s insistence that Poland is an ethnically homogenous nation-state. If Lemkian is a language it cannot be a dialect of Ukrainian or Rusyn. Hence, instead of the unified (and, by the same token, numerically larger) Ukrainian or Rusyn national minority in Poland, there are
three much smaller Lemkian, Rusyn and Ukrainian minorities slated for the rubric “Others” in statistics.\textsuperscript{125}

There is no “natural” link between languages and dialects, as one is led to believe by school and mass media. They are two different phenomena. By definition dialects are oral and emerged spontaneously as ethnolects connected to human groups variously organized in the form of villages, parishes, regions, states, ethnic groups, ethnoreligious diasporas or nomadic hordes. Written languages are much later connected to power centers where the technology of writing was mastered and put to use. Written languages usually emerged on the basis of the dialect spoken in the power center or by the governing elite if their speech was originally foreign to the power center. Often when a written language came into being several centuries ago, the traces of its initial dialectal basis may have vanished as in the case of Polish. Scholars continue arguing that Polish emerged either from the Wielkopolska or Małopolska dialect.

Standard languages are much more recent than written languages. They usually were constructed by officials, philologists, lexicographers, publishers and textbook writers during the last two centuries. The rise of standard languages is connected to the idea of popular literacy necessitated by the emergence of the modern state organized as a nation-state. On the ideological plane, all the citizens or all the members of the nation are equal. They should enjoy the same rights and opportunities. These ideals of democracy and nationalism did away with the traditional social cleavage gaping between the narrow highly mobile ruling stratum and the immobile rest subjected to the elite’s power and exploitation. In Europe policing of the borders and the development of the institution of the passport limited mobility of the elite to the confines of the nation-state. At the same time the reforms allowed for increasing mobility of the peasantry and urban poor beyond their localities to the space enclosed within the nation-state’s frontiers. The main instrument for forging this lowest common denominator for all the members of the nation was and still is popular elementary education conducted through the medium of national (standard) language.

Standard language is usually twice removed from dialect. First, a dialect associated with a power center became the basis for the emergence of a written language. In the case of Slavic languages this process took place between the 15\textsuperscript{th} and 18\textsuperscript{th} centuries. Second, this written language often was overhauled into a standard language usually construed as a national language. In Central Europe this has proceeded from the early 19\textsuperscript{th} century to this day. As a corollary of this

ethnolinguistic national project, dialects and written languages (known as “written dialects”, “dialectal written languages”) that happened to be enclosed within the nation-states borders were declared the dialects of the national (standard) language. This subjection has *not* been extended to:
- the speech of well-established national minorities, for instance, German-speakers and Magyars in Central Europe;
- dialects genetically distant from the standard language. In the case of Slavic languages, that means, non-Slavic dialects: Germanic, Turkic, Finno-Ugric;
- even the genetically close speech of groups excluded from assimilation with the nation. The ethnoreligious and script cleavages prevented scholars and politicians from espousing the Slavic speech of Orthodox Christians and Greek Catholics from western Belarus and western Ukraine as dialects of Polish. To the contrary, Roman Catholics living among these populations have been considered Polish, and their speech indistinctive from that of their Orthodox and Greek Catholic neighbors is classified as “eastern dialects of Polish”.

The popularly accepted “scientific” distinction between dialect and language dates back to 1926. Then the US linguist Leonard Bloomfield published his famous article “A Set of Postulates for the Science of Language” in the prestigious journal *Language*. His desire for scientificalness in linguistics was as deep as that of August Schleicher. Bloomfield proposed that dialects are mutually intelligible. Hence their clusters should constitute separate languages that would be mutually unintelligible. This theory fitted well the *Stammbaum* scheme of rapidly branching out languages. The problem is that intelligibility is subjective. Moreover, although long-lasting political, ecclesiastical and administrative borders tend to make dialects less mutually intelligible, these frontiers practically never seriously disturb the dialect continuum. The concept of dialect continuum stems from the *Welle* (wave) theory of classifying languages. Within a language family dialects change gradually from village to village, from parish to parish, from region to region without any clear-cut discontinuity, which would “naturally” separate them into chunks subjected to standard languages. The North Slavic dialect continuum extends from Poland and the Czech Republic in the west via Slovakia, Belarus and Ukraine into the

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Russian Federation. The 10th century arrival of Finno-Ugric Magyars destroyed the single Slavic dialect continuum splitting it into the North Slavic dialect continuum and the South Slavic one. The latter extends from Slovenia to Bulgaria.  

The intuition that a language is a political phenomenon whose creation is connected to the state has long been around. But in the context of nationalism efficacy of symbols is stronger when they are presented as unchanging and of extremely old age if not eternal. That is why, in popular thinking, often present in school textbooks, the pedigree of Slavic languages is usually associated, at least, with the accepted (often mythical) beginning of this or that Slavic nation-state. For most of the Slavic languages (as for the corresponding nation-states) national scholars claim the age of one millennium and more. Hardly does anybody remember Enriquez George Puttenham’s straightforward definition of a language. In his book The Art of English Poesie (1589), he wrote: “After a speech is fully fashioned to the common understanding, and accepted by consent of a whole country and nation [that is, state], it is called a language.”  

The US linguist Edward Sapir explained that this modern forgetfulness when it comes to the social and political nature of a language is required by the needs of the national project: “[National languages] are all huge systems of vested interests, which sullenly resist critical inquiry.” To this day, in these regions of the world where languages have been strongly politicized in the interest of nation-and nation-state-building, dialects considered to be “uncultured” and “uncivilized” are associated with rural population. That shows in branding Belarusian and Ukrainian – “peasant talk” by Russian-speakers. The Polish-speaking intelligentsia treated these two languages in the same disparaging manner before World War II. Similarly, before Czech was standardized and gained some official recognition in the second half of the 19th century, earlier, German-speakers tended to call it “Küchelböömisch”, or “kitchen Czech”, suitable solely for communicating with servants and serfs. The 19th-century English writer Charles Dickens succinctly commented on this attitude: “Dialect words – those terrible marks of the beast to the truly genteel.”  

Today, the comprehension of the political nature of a language is widespread at its fullest among sociolinguists. Not surprisingly then, the popular but apt saying
“A language – a dialect with an army and navy” is attributed to the US linguist Max Weinreich. He taught the famous US sociolinguist Joshua Fishman who devoted a lifetime of scholarship to unraveling the question of language and nationalism. It is the power center (usually the capital) of the state that controls what a language should be. First, knowledge of a standard language spreads among the ruling elite usually concentrated in urban areas. In overwhelmingly rural Central Europe, the elite comprised the stratum of noble landowners. With the spread of nationalism, in the ethnolinguistic nation-states of Central Europe, the most important aim of popular elementary education was to teach peasantry how to “properly” speak and write in the national (standard, official) language. Only then peasants would be made into full members of the nation. That meant that the ethnolinguistic strain of nationalism specific to Central Europe, required doing away with “peasant talk”, or dialects. The complicated dynamics of this process of replacing dialects with the national (standard) language, J Clifford briefly summarized by saying “[a] ‘language’ is the interplay and struggle of regional dialects, professional jargons, generic commonplaces, the speech of different age groups, individuals, and so forth.” He points out to other planes of ideological struggle for the “correct, appropriate, required” shape of the standard language. This struggle does continue, because age and professional groups, and individuals are constantly reproduced. The nation-state only wished to do away with dialects as the potential socio-ideological springboard for new standard languages and new national projects.

Ethnolinguistically motivated national projects have been a legion in Central Europe. In the context of changing frontiers and border wars, there were myriads of claims and counterclaims to a territory justified by the “fact” that its inhabitants spoke a dialect “rightfully” belonging to the national (standard) language of this or that party involved in the conflict. The renowned student of nationalism Ernest Gellner commented on such politicized use of the concepts of a language and dialect: “nationalist ethnography was concerned not merely with codifying peasant custom, linguistic and other, so as to use it as the base for a new national culture which was in the process of construction, but also to establish that a given dialect really was a version of Ruritanian, and not, as was shamefully and meretriciously claimed by jealous and unscrupulous Braggadocian politicians and intellectuals (whose opportunist scholarship was matched only by their lack of political conscience), a dialect of Middle

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Braggadocian.”¹³⁴ This reflection sheds much light on the ongoing squabble between Skopje which considers Macedonian a language on its own, and Sofia which maintains that it is nothing else but, at best, a western literary variant of Bulgarian. This ethnolinguistic base permeating Central European nationalisms transformed philologists and linguists active in this region into nation-builders par excellence. Kazimierz Nitsch (1874-1958) was a Polish linguist, who, at the beginning of the 20th century, produced the first complete survey of the Polish dialects. For him it was obvious that the frontiers of the Polish nation-state should overlap with the territorial extent of the Polish language. By saying “the Polish language” he meant the standard together with the dialects, which he classified as “Polish”, even if linguists from neighbor states and nations-in-making chose to disagree. He presented his thinking in regard of the boundaries of the Polish state and language in his 1920 article “The Borders of the [Polish] State and the Borders of the Polish Language”. Nitsch’s call for linguistically and culturally justified Polish irredentism was overpowering: “During some moments the state must resign itself to fate as, for political reasons, it has to resign from some part [that is, a territory] that should rightly belong to it; but this resignation does not oblige the society [that is, the nation] whose responsibility it is to remember about their brothers abroad, and to maintain continuous cultural contact with them.”¹³⁵

Knowledge of standard languages was confined to a narrow mobile elite prior to the rise of nation-state where everybody, as a member of the nation, has the right to and, simultaneously, is required to acquire the standard language construed either as official or national. What we call the “French language” used to be the dialect of Paris and its vicinity. In 1789 more than half of the population of France had no slightest knowledge of this language, and only 12 to 13 per cent (2 million) could actually speak in this standard. At the beginning of the 19th century, in the Holy Roman Empire there were 300,000 to half a million readers of books in standard German, or less than 2 per cent of the population. When Italy was united in 1860, Tuscanian was elevated to the rank of the Italian language. At that time 2.5 per cent of Italy’s inhabitants, or half a million, had a sound command of this language.¹³⁶ Spread of the standard (national) language is connected to the spread of popular elementary education. In turn, the success of elementary education is usually measured with what percentage of a given

population is literate, or can read and manage simple writing tasks. Elementary education gives one passive access to the standard language through the skill of reading, but to become an active user of this language (unless one was brought up in the region whose dialect constituted the basis of this standard language) one, at least, has to finish a secondary school.

In Central Europe the ideal of full literacy was achieved by the last quarter of the 19th century in the German Empire and the western half of Austria-Hungary. Thus, the Czechs, the Slovenes and (partially) the Croats were the first Slavic nations that crossed the threshold of full literacy at that time. That had to do with the relative prosperity of their regions and Vienna’s liberal policy toward non-German-speaking populations. In the German Empire, elementary education was exclusively in German, which meant that non-German-speakers never attained facility in this language, and, through the lack of training, they could not apply the skill of writing to their own languages. In this situation their literacy often remained stunted. In the case of Slavic nations a dramatic increase in literacy in Slavic languages took place after 1918 in the wake of the establishment of numerous Slavic nation-states, and following the introduction of the administrative division of the Soviet Union in line with the national principle.

In 1919 only 44 per cent of ethnic Poles were literate in Poland. The situation was even worse among Poland’s Belarusians and Ukrainians. But in the 1930s at least 96 per cent of the school-age generation attended elementary schools. Illiteracy remained a structural problem in eastern Poland and especially among the national minorities there. The divide in this respect remained wide between cities and the rural areas; over 60 per cent of the population lived in the countryside. Obviously illiteracy was close to nil among Poland’s Germans, who, before 1918, had belonged to the dominant ethnic group in the German Empire. In Czechoslovakia the same pattern was repeated. In 1930 in the Czech lands of Bohemia and Moravia-Silesia illiteracy stood at 1.24 per cent and 1.49 per cent. In Slovakia it dropped from 14.71 per cent in 1921 to 8.16 per cent in 1930, and in Subcarpathian Ruthenia from 50 to 39 per cent. In the terms of entire Czechoslovakia illiteracy was 4 per cent in 1930. In Yugoslavia the overall level of illiteracy amounted to 51.5 per cent in 1921. It was at its lowest in Slovenia: 8.8 per cent and at its highest in Macedonia: 83.8 per cent. In Yugoslavia’s other regions illiteracy amounted to: 23.3 per cent in Vojvodina, 32.2 in Croatia, 49.5 in Dalmatia, 65.4 in Serbia, 67 in Montenegro, and 80.5 in

In 1940 40 per cent of Yugoslavia’s inhabitants could not read and write. In 1934 80 per cent of Bulgaria’s males were literate as opposed to 57 per cent females. This dichotomy was symptomatic for entire Central Europe where women were traditionally excluded from public and political life. During the late 1930s illiteracy among Bulgaria’s military recruits plummeted to the respectable low of 3 per cent. In the Soviet Union one of the Kremlin’s main aims along industrialization, was eradication of illiteracy that was rampant in the Russian Empire. It amounted to 55 per cent among the Russians, 58.7 among the Ukrainians, and 62.7 among the Belarusians.\textsuperscript{138}

In the Slavic nation-states and the Soviet Union’s Slavic national republics illiteracy finally disappeared in the first two decades after the end of World War II. This achievement was brought about not only by modernization connected to industrialization, but perhaps even more significantly thanks to communist social engineering and propaganda. The authorities would not have been able to control and shape actions and believes of the population at large without ensuring full literacy. In Poland illiteracy was less than 3 per cent in 1960.\textsuperscript{139}

But does it mean that almost everybody had already spoken and written then in standard Polish? In the late 1930s only 10 per cent of the population, or 3.5 million, had a reasonable command of this standard language. This group was spearheaded by the intelligentsia, or people who graduated from universities. They numbered around 80,000 in 1939 and actively shaped standard Polish as well as the canon of culture based on this language. Those who obtained secondary education consumed cultural products offered in standard languages by the intelligentsia. Both these groups and their families constituted the above-said one-tenth of Poland’s inhabitants, and the overwhelming majority of them lived in cities and towns.

The intelligentsia as Poland’s elevated elite was halved during World War II through loss of life in warfare and emigration, to 40,000. Then the communist takeover led to the marginalization of this group as “reactionary”. Simultaneously Poland’s borders were shifted 200 kilometers westward. Germans living in the former German territories granted to Poland, were expelled to postwar Germany. A similar fate befell Poles who found themselves there.


\textsuperscript{139} To this day illiteracy remains rampant among the Romas who are the most marginalized and stigmatized group in Central Europe, with no education provided in their language. Cf \textit{A Special Remedy: Roma and schools for the mentally handicapped in the Czech Republic}. 1999. Budapest: European Roma Rights Center, p 12.
in the “enlarged” Soviet Union. Many a Ukrainian, Belarusian and Lithuanian living within postwar Poland’s borders was expelled to the Soviet Union too. In this ethnically cleansed new Poland Polish expellees and settlers from central Poland populated the former German territories, where homogenous Polish society was created, devoid of regional and dialectal differences. Such total social engineering was not possible at the same quick pace in central Poland that did not undergo comparable sweeping population movements. The paramount goal of all these changes was to create a centralized and ethnically homogenous Polish nation-state. To this end power and culture were centralized in the capital; career in administration, secondary and university education were made accessible to peasants and workers, while the prewar intelligentsia was largely barred from partaking in these social advancement opportunities. Rapid industrialization also required “productivization” of women who entered the work market en masse.

In Poland the number of university graduates (in their overwhelming majority of peasant and worker origin) grew to 0.415 million in 1960 and to 0.65 million a decade later. The number of persons with secondary education increased at a similar pace to 6 million. In 1960 1 million students attended secondary schools. Cities and towns are centers of culture in the standard language. Migrants leaving the countryside for them, also take a leave of their regionalisms and dialects in exchange for the standard language. In 1965 half of Poland’s inhabitants resided in cities and towns. The percentage of urbanization grew to 61 in 1989. But even the speech of those who remained in their villages began to inch toward standard Polish due to the growing influence of the mass media. Subsidized books and newspapers produced in mass runs had become available to everybody already in the 1950s. In 1950 a quarter of households had radios. Television broadcasting commenced in the second half of the 1950s. In 1960 TV sets were present in less than 8 per cent of households, but the number grew to 50 per cent in 1970 and virtually 100 per cent ten years later. At that time the radio also became an everyday household object.\footnote{Bajerowa. \textit{Zarys historii}, pp 13, 21, 24, 31-33, 47-48.}

This Soviet (communist) model of modernization and homogenization through social engineering based on full literacy in a standard (national) language was repeated in all the Slavic nation-states. The penetration of society through such a language was less impressive where mass population movements did not occur. This preserved conservative rural and urban populations: the former retained their regional and dialect differences, while the latter stuck to their elevated role of the intelligentsia far removed from the “common folk”. This was especially true of Yugoslavia, but the post-Yugoslav wars during the 1990s dramatically changed this situation. Bi- and multilingualism with the domination of one
language (Russian in the Soviet Union, Serbo-Croatian in Yugoslavia, and Czech in Czechoslovakia) stunted the spread of non-dominant standard languages (Belarusian and Ukrainian in the Soviet Union, Slovenian and Macedonian in Yugoslavia, and Slovak in Czechoslovakia). Emergence of new standard languages requires repeating the entire process of spreading the knowledge of this new language through education, administration and mass media. However, in this case, not only unlearning of dialects is demanded, but also forgetting the previously dominant standard language. This process took place in Yugoslavia’s Macedonia after Macedonian had been made into a standard language in 1944 (and was completed when Macedonia gained independence in 1991), in Slovakia when Slovak was elevated to the rank of the sole official language following the breakup of Czecho-Slovakia 141 (1993). The similar elevation of Slovenian and Ukrainian happened, respectively, when Slovenia gained independence in 1990 and the Soviet Union unraveled a year later. The 1991 introduction of Belarusian as the official language of post-Soviet Belarus was cut short in 1995 when Russian was reintroduced in this role. Last, but most significantly, the breakup of Yugoslavia entailed the partition of the Serbo-Croatian language into Bosnian, Croatian, (perhaps) Montenegrin, and Serbian. Now elites of all these four nations are at pains to make their four new languages dissimilar to one another before new standards are inculcated among the Bosnians, Croats, Montenegrins, and Serbs so as to make them distinctive vis-à-vis one another on the linguistic plane too.

Liquidation of dialects and inculcation of standard languages in all the members of the respective Slavic nations do away with the Northern and Southern Slavic dialect continua. There are no dialects left to gradually shade from one into another. Increasingly homogenous speech communities of the Slavic nations employ standard languages. Usually these languages, even if spoken in neighbor states, differ much more vis-à-vis one another, than neighboring dialects used to. As a consequence, political borders begin to overlap with sharp linguistic borders. One’s grandfathers living on both the sides of a border, perhaps, spoke in the same dialect or very close dialects that differed much more from official (standard) languages employed in the two nation-states. Now their grandchildren had no chance to acquire the dialects, and speak in the official (standard) languages. Grandfathers easily communicated with one another, but had hard time to follow textbooks produced in the capitals, and to understand official announcements. Grandchildren face no difficulties of this kind anymore, but

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141 After the fall of communism, in 1990 the name of Czechoslovakia was changed to Czecho-Slovakia (the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic) in recognition of the growing desire for political autonomy and separateness among the Slovaks. (Tomaszewski. Czechosłowacja, p 281)
their communication with one another across the novel state-cum-linguistic border became increasingly difficult if not impossible.

Poland is most perfectly surrounded by such political-cum-linguistic borders, which (in the case of Slavic languages) shield the Polish language from influence of Russian, Belarusian/Russian, Ukrainian, Slovak and Czech. The patches of dialect chains that haven not been erased by the onslaught of standard Polish include those around Gdańsk and in the northern Tara Mountains, and those in eastern Upper Silesia that even cross the state border into the Czech Republic. The two former chains of dialects became the ground for standardization of the Kashubian language and the rise of the written Goralian language, while the latter chain may be used for creating a Silesian language. The same is true of the Sorbian language that depends on the Slavic dialect chain completely surrounded by German-speakers. But the existence of none of these four micro-languages stands a chance to be boosted through overlapping the linguistic boundary with a political or even administrative one.

Due to the practical phasing out of Belarusian form public life in Belarus, there is no linguistic boundary that could overlap with the Belarusian-Russian border. This official shunning of standard Belarusian leads to preservation of dialects, and they straddle the Belarusian-Ukrainian border. On the other side of the frontier the recently renewed spread of standard Ukrainian still has not done away with the dialects yet. This domination of dialects over the two standards engaged in a national-linguistic struggle with Russian, opened the window of opportunity for the rise of the Polesian language. Similarly, the border that separates Ukraine and Slovakia is straddled by Rusyn (Ruthenian) dialects that became the springboard for the Rusyn national and linguistic project.

In the Balkans the unambiguous political-cum-linguistic borders separate only Slovenian from Croatian, and Macedonian from Serbian. The newly founded linguistic boundaries among Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian straddle the political borders and meet inside Bosnia. There is a chance that the incipient linguistic boundary between Montenegrin and Serbian may emerge especially should Montenegro and Serbia part ways in 2006 and, thus, give rise to the political Montenegrin-Serbian border, which could overlap with this linguistic boundary. Skopje insists that the Macedonian-Bulgarian political border overlaps with the Macedonian-Bulgarian linguistic boundary. Sofia disagrees and maintains that it is a simple political border because the Bulgarian language is spoken in Bulgaria and Macedonia.

This general (though sometimes contested) “hardening” of linguistic borders shaped to coincide with political borders validates the genetic-tree (Stammbaum) model of presenting related languages as rapidly branching out from ancestor
languages into separate and fully self-contained entities. With time this model more aptly reflects the linguistic reality, because the political continues to overhaul this linguistic reality in line with the normative principle of radical isomorphism of state, language and nation. Once the ideal of separate Slavic languages spoken by different Slavic nations living in their own nation-states was visualized in the form of the Stammbaum of the Slavic languages. Now this ideal has almost become true. The critique of the proponents of the wave (Welle) model of presenting relations between related languages starts ringing hollow. The number of dialect chains (shading into one another) rapidly decreases. For all practical reasons, the two (Northern and Southern) Slavic dialect continua have been divided among the standard Slavic languages, and largely disappeared. This process took less than a century if one considers 1918 as the most crucial date for the emergence of full-fledged Slavic nations and their nation-states.

Linguistic and extralinguistic factors: An overview

Above I presented the sociolinguistic situation of the Slavic languages and how they have been used for nation-, nation-state-building an other political projects. I also noted the changing political status of these languages, meaning if they have functioned as state (national) or co-official languages, or as media of education, broadcasting and publishing. This information I contextualized against the rise and development of Slavic philology. Since the 1820s slavicists and linguists have produced a plethora of various classificatory schemes for the Slavic languages. These schemes rather than reflecting the linguistic reality, they co-shaped it in accordance with the interests of this or that national project. In the classifications produced prior to World War I separate twigs tended to be reserved for Slavic languages functioning as state or regional co-official languages (Bulgarian, Czech, Serbo-Croatian, Polish, Russian) or as languages of internationally recognized stateless nations (Slovak, Slovenian, Ukrainian and, sometimes, Sorbian and Belarusian). After 1918 Czech, Polish and Slovak attained the status of state languages, and joined Bulgarian, Serbo-Croatian and Russian, which had already enjoyed this status. The Kremlin also granted the status of titular state (republican) languages to Belarusian and Ukrainian, and the national status of Sorbian (existing in its two distinct varieties) was internationally reaffirmed, at Czechoslovakia’s insistence, during the interwar period. Classifications reflected these changes accordingly.

In 1944 Macedonian was proclaimed a language in its own right separate from Serbo-Croatian (Serbian) and Bulgarian. Afterward the repertory of languages represented in the standard triple classification of the Slavic languages has remained stable. After 1945 slavicists also came to the conclusion that Kashubian should be classified as a separate language, only their Polish
colleagues continued to disagree. The consensus on the separate existence of Kashubian as a language on its own, was largely achieved during the 1990s with the revival of this language in postcommunist Poland.\footnote{Breza, Edward, eds. 2001. \textit{Kaszubszyzna / Kaszëbizna} (Ser: Najnowsze Dzieje Języków Słowiańskich). Opole: Uniwersytet Opolski – Instytut Filologii Polskiej.} The 1991 breakup of the Soviet Union conferred the full status of state language on Belarusian and Ukrainian. When the Czechs and Slovak parted ways in 1993, the same full status of state language was accorded to Czech and Slovak. Since 1974 Macedonian and Slovenian had enjoyed improved official status in federal Yugoslavia’s republics of Macedonia and Slovenia vis-à-vis the dominant federal language of Serbo-Croatian. The protracted breakup of this federal state that commenced in 1990 (and, perhaps, has not been completed yet) extended the full status of state language to Macedonian and Slovenian. The destruction of Yugoslavia also led to the disappearance of Serbo-Croatian, which, by 1995, was replaced with the new state (national) languages of Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian.

Classifications of the Slavic languages have not yet reflected the recent linguistic-cum-political changes that followed in the wake of disappeared Yugoslavia. The dogma of received knowledge holds fast. Anyway the situation remains volatile, as in 2006 Montenegro and Serbia may part ways, which could lead to the elevation of Montenegrin to the status of a separate state language.\footnote{Brborich, Branislav. 2003. Perspektive “novog idioma” u Crnoj Gori (pp 1-8). \textit{Jezik danas}. Vol 7, no 18.} Nowadays the task of writing compendia and textbooks on the Slavic languages is riddled with dangers. Apart from the usual research challenge one has to deal with the political minefield. The situation is in unpredictable flux. That is why no sweeping overviews of the Slavic languages are published. The traditional standard classificatory scheme of these languages is still reproduced, because proposing new ones could anger politicians and established slavicists in whose interest it is to guard the dogma of the triple division of the Slavic languages, on the researching and “proving” of which they have built their careers. This tacit alliance of politicians and scholars preserves the normative isomorphism of language, nation and state, clearly visible in continued exclusion of the newly standardized Slavic languages from the standard classificatory scheme. It is so because these new standard languages are often connected to national or ethnoregional projects that encroach, or are perceived as encroaching, on the ideological terrains of the internationally recognized national projects of longer standing. The most significant upstart Slavic languages of this kind include: Polesian, Pomakian, Rusyn, Silesian and Goralian.
So far no one has effectively challenged the triple character of the standard division of the Slavic languages either. This classificatory grouping of the Slavic languages seems to be politically motivated. The speakers of the East Slavic languages have traditionally professed Orthodox Christianity and Greek Catholicism, and write with the use of the Cyrillic. The areas where they live were included in the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union during the last two centuries. The speakers of the West Slavic languages are either Catholics or Protestants. They write in the Latin script. Until 1918 their lands were split between Austria-Hungary and the Russian Empire, and later included in the separate nation-states of Czechoslovakia and Poland, except for the Sorbs living within the political and ethnic borders of Germany. Neither religion, common culture, past or statehood unites the speakers of the South Slavic languages. They profess Catholicism, Orthodox Christianity, Protestantism and Islam, and write in Cyrillic and Latin characters. In the past most of their lands were included in the Ottoman Empire. In the 19th century they were more equally split between this empire, Austria-Hungary and the increasingly independent nation-states of Bulgaria, Montenegro and Serbia. From 1918 to 1990 the South Slavic-speakers were housed in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. Following the breakup of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, now they live in the five post-Yugoslav states and Bulgaria. Hence, the main criterion for distinguishing the Southern branch of the Slavic languages, seems to be the fact that the speakers of these languages cannot be easily lumped either with those of the West Slavic languages or with those of the East Slavic languages.

**Linguistic factors**

**Dialect continuum**

The concept of dialect continuum is used to map the pre-literate differentiation of linguistic reality. Two centuries ago in Europe, if a standard (written) language existed, the percentage of population speaking in it was miniscule. Hence, it could not change the linguistic reality in line with the normative isomorphism of language and state (I do not mention “nation”, because it had not entered the arena of politics yet), as it happens today. Dialect continua consist from geographically contiguous dialect chains, meaning dialects that gradually shade from one into another. A given dialect continuum tends to be bounded by other dialect continua, and the border between them was the only sharp linguistic cleavage that existed before the rise of popular literacy and standard languages. These linguistic boundaries separating different dialect continua entailed preponderance of endogamy within the continua, which is
reflected in sharp gradients of genetic change in European populations that were not forcefully resettled in their entirety during the 20th century.\(^{144}\)

In the 10th century when the Magyars made home in the Danubian basin the original single Slavic dialect continuum was cut into two. The situation has not changed to this day. The North Slavic dialect continuum is coterminous with the area where the West and East Slavic languages of the triple division of the Slavic languages are spoken. In the west the continuum is limited by the West Germanic dialect continuum (German), in the south by the remnants of the Finno-Ugric and Romance dialect continua (Magyar and Romanian), in the northwest by the Baltic dialect continuum (Lithuanian, Latvian) and the remnants of the Finno-Ugric continuum (Estonian, Finnish, Karel, Saami). Due to the territorial expansion of the Russian Empire up to the Pacific one could say that the North Slavic dialect continuum extends down to Vladivostok. But Asian Russia is sparsely populated and, in reality, one can speak only of population islands in Siberia. In the north of European Russia the remaining islands of the Finno-Ugric dialect continuum spot the North Slavic continuum, which in the south is bounded by the Black Sea and the Turkic dialect continuum (Azeri, Tatar, Kazakh). The linguistic situation is even more complicated in the Caucasus where numerous Indo-European and still not properly classified Caucasian isolate languages survive. This, however, does not belong to the main purview of the work.

The other continuum, that is, the South Slavic dialect continuum stretches from the West Germanic and Romance continua (German, Italian) as well as from the Adriatic in the west to the Black Sea in the east. In the north the Finno-Ugric and Romance continua (Magyar, Romanian) separate the South Slavic continuum from the North Slavic continuum. In the south the South Slavic dialect continuum is limited by the dialect areas of the two Indo-European isolate languages of Albanian and Greek, and also by the Turkic dialect continuum (Turkish).

Taking both these Slavic dialect continua as a basis for the classification of the Slavic languages, the dual classification seems to be more obvious. That was Dobrovský’s choice, however, he lumped together the East and South Slavic languages of the triple classification as opposed to the West Slavic ones (perhaps the tradition of Orthodox literacy in Old Church Slavonic was of more

import for his purpose). In the process he disregarded the divide of the Finno-Ugric and Romance dialect continua that separate both the Slavic dialect continua. Should one choose to follow these two Slavic continua as the classificatory guideline, the Slavic languages would be divided into the Northern and Southern groups. The former would include Belarusian, Czech, Polish, Slovak, Russian and Ukrainian, while the latter Bosnian, Bulgarian, Croatian, Macedonian, Slovenian and Serbian.\(^{145}\)

**Script**

It is arguable if script is a linguistic factor at all. Script is an arbitrary (though systematic) technology of writing messages expressed in a language. Language is a natural phenomenon stemming from the human genetic makeup. In the overwhelming number of cases it is oral, though singing language developed among the deaf. Unlike language the skill of writing is not part of nature, it belongs to the sphere of culture. Nowadays one tends to consider writing an inherent part of language to the point of conflating writing and language so much that, in popular thinking, writing is equated with language, or even paradoxically appears to be primary vis-à-vis language. It is so because the inhabitants of Europe live in the age of full literacy. The success of this technology is such that in the second half of the 20\(^{th}\) century it led to the breakup of the Slavic dialectal continua when standard Slavic languages almost entirely replaced the dialects. The vast majority of the Slavic-speakers speak in standard languages the occurrence of which quite well coincides with the borders of the nation-states in accordance with the normative isomorphism of language, nation and state.

There are no Slavic dialect continua any more, dialect chains having been largely severed and obliterated. Writing and popular literacy won the day. Then one may say that it is only suiting to classify the Slavic languages in line with salient differences present in the technology of writing. The basis for such classification could be script. Albeit various scripts were used for writing in Slavic languages (Arabic, Glagolitic, Greek, Hebrew) today only the Latin and Cyrillic alphabets remain in use among the Slavic-speakers. The line of division between these two scripts crisscrosses the two Slavic dialect continua from north to south. The speakers of the West Slavic languages of the triple classification use the Latin alphabet, whereas those writing in the East Slavic languages – the Cyrillic. The use of these two alphabets splits the South Slavic languages. Bosnian, Croatian and Slovenian are written in Latin characters, while Bulgarian, Macedonian and Serbian in Cyrillic. But if one peers back into the

\(^{145}\) For the clarity of argument I do not mention here Slavic languages that do not function as official state languages.
recent past Serbo-Croatian written simultaneously in two scripts between 1850 and 1990, constituted a special group with itself as the group’s single representative. The special character of Serbo-Croatian is even more pronounced when one remembers that Muslims of Bosnia tended to write in this language with the use of Arabic characters from 1878 to 1941.

The Latin-Cyrillic cleavage is a bit blurry in the case of Belarus. The pro-Western intellectuals and the Belarusian diaspora in Western Europe and North America claim that Belarusian has two national scripts of equal rank: the Cyrillic and Latin. This decision stems from the 18th-century tradition when scholars and folklorists used the Latin alphabet for writing in the dialects, which today are defined as “Belarusian”. This tradition continued throughout the 19th century, but especially in its first half, when Belarusian (known as ‘White or Polish Ruthenian’) was popularly classified as a dialect of the Polish language, even though all the Belarusian territories were contained within the boundaries of the Russian Empire. The situation changed in the wake of the 1831-1832 and 1864 anti-Russian uprisings of the Polish nobility and intelligentsia. The fledgling Belarusian and Ukrainian languages were deemed a “Polish intrigue”. First, they were re-defined as dialects or sub-languages of the Great Russian language. Second, the Cyrillic decisively replaced the Latin script for any written purposes in Belarusian. Third, publishing in Ukrainian and Belarusian was prohibited until 1905. When the ban was lifted Belarusian publications were brought out in the Latin and Cyrillic scripts, while Ukrainian exclusively in the latter. Between 1915 and 1918 Belarus was part of the German occupation unit of Land Ober-Ost. German superseded Russian as the ultimate language of administration and the Cyrillic was banned, so all Belarusian publications appeared in Latin characters. Subsequently Belarus was divided between Poland and the Soviet Union. In the Soviet part the Cyrillic dominated for writing in Belarusian, and the Latin alphabet was decisively phased out in the latter half of the 1930s. The two alphabets co-existed in Poland’s section of Belarus until it became part of the Soviet Union in 1941/1944.  

Initially it was not obvious that Ukrainian would be written in Cyrillic characters either. In Russia’s share of Ukraine the state-supported Cyrillic won the day. But Vienna controlled Galicia, the eastern half of which would become western Ukraine. After the Napoleonic Wars the Habsburgs were weary of the similarities in religion, language and alphabet between Galicia’s Ruthenians (Ukrainians) and the Russians. In 1816 Vienna called for Polonization of  

Galicia’s Ruthenians, also meaning the imposition of the Latin alphabet. In the 1820s and 1830s the hierarchy of the Greek Catholic Church replied with the argument that Ruthenian (Ukrainian) was a language in its own right fundamentally different from Russian. Ruthenian (Ukrainian) prints appeared in Cyrillic and also in Latin characters. The Galician administration and the ethnically Polish Catholic Church supported the latter option, which led to the “alphabet war”. In 1859 the governor of Galicia even banned the Cyrillic and replaced it with the Latin script for Ruthenian-language publications. The campaign of civil disobedience among the Ruthenians made him revert his decision, and since the late 1850s it was clear that Ruthenian publications would utilize the Cyrillic. In 1894 the Hungarian authorities of Austria-Hungary, in the wake of the Budapest’s Magyarization campaign, proposed introduction of the Latin alphabet using Magyar orthography for writing Ruthenian (nowadays identified as Ukrainian or Rusyn) in modern-day eastern Slovakia and Ukraine’s Transcarpathia. Under this pressure, in 1916, Hungary’s most popular newspaper Nedilia began to appear in Latin characters as Negyilia.

As in the case of Belarusian Montenegrin nationalists maintain that their Montenegrin language enjoys two national scripts: Latin and Cyrillic. But their voice will not be well heard unless Serbia-Montenegro breaks up into two separate nation-states, perhaps, in 2006. Although the Cyrillic dominates in Serbia, in the past the Serbian capital of Belgrade functioned as the capital of bi-graphic (Latin-Cyrillic) Yugoslavia with its official bi-graphic language of Serbo-Croatian. This necessitated the presence of both the scripts in the capital. Now, be default, the Latin script is still present in Serbia, while the Cyrillic was thoroughly cleansed from neighboring Croatia. Bosnia constitutes another transitional zone between these two scripts, as the state’s official languages are Latin-based Bosnian, Croatian and English along Cyrillic-based Serbian. But the use of Serbian and the Cyrillic is largely limited to the Serbian Republic located in northern Bosnia. Interestingly, as in Germany’s Land Ober Ost, in 1915 the Cyrillic was banned in Austria-Hungary’s Bosnia. Serbo-Croatian could be written in Cyrillic characters solely for Orthodox religious purposes. In Yugoslavia both the scripts were welcome in Bosnia as elsewhere in the state. The Cyrillic was banned again between 1941 and 1945 when Bosnia was made into part of independent Croatia. Then also the name of the language was

149 Brborich. Perspektive.
changed from Serbo-Croatian to Croatian. In postwar Yugoslavia both the scripts were allowed again.\textsuperscript{150}

The Rusyns use the Cyrillic for writing their language, but in the past Rusyn emigrants in the United States had to resort to printing their publications in Latin fonts when there were no Cyrillic fonts to be had there at the beginning of the 20th century.\textsuperscript{151} This non-standard practice continues especially so because word-processors and the Internet still favor the use of the Latin script over any other. This makes numerous users of Cyrillic-based Slavic languages to write in them with the use of Latin characters while communicating via email or the Internet.

All these complications apart, the Cyrillic-Latin division could provide for the dual classification of the Slavic languages. The Cyrillic group would include: Belarusian, Bulgarian, Macedonian, Russian, Rusyn, Serbian and Ukrainian, whereas the Latin: Bosnian, Croatian, Czech, Kashubian, Polish, Slovak, Slovenian and Sorbian. This classification even better than the previous one dwelling on the Slavic dialect continua, reflects Dobrovský’s dual classification of the Slavic languages. It is so because prior to the age of nationalism religion was the main source of large-scale cultural difference and power legitimization. The cleavage between the Latin and Cyrillic scripts marked the divide between Western (Catholic and Protestant) and Eastern (Orthodox and Greek Catholic) Christian traditions. Modern-age nationalisms took over this alphabet-based differentiation in the process of standardizing Slavic national languages. Dobrovský seems to have drawn on the religious cleavage when imagining his classification of the Slavic languages, but the contemporary nationalists’ espousal of ethno-religious tradition vindicates his insight.

That said, recently an ideological complication emerged in regard of this script-based classification of the Slavic languages. Some diaspora Belarusian nationalists like to emphasize that Belarusian is a “language of three alphabets”, Cyrillic, Latin and Arabic. In the 16th century several thousand Muslim Tatars entered the Polish-Lithuanian army and settled in what today is Belarus. Through intermarriage soon they lost their Tatar language and started speaking in local Slavic dialects. However, being Muslims they wrote exclusively in Arabic characters not unlike Catholics in Latin letters and Orthodox Christians in the Cyrillic. These Slavophone Muslim Tatars left some ten manuscripts (known as “kitabs”, or “books” in Arabic) in Slavic written in the Arabic script. Information about them was popularized in the 1950s among the Belarusian

\textsuperscript{150} Šipka. \textit{Standardni jezik}, pp 65, 92.

diaspora in the West, because this allowed for deeper differentiation of the Belarusian nation and its language vis-à-vis the Russians, Poles and Ukrainians. None of the three neighboring nation claimed the Arabic script as part of its national heritage. However, with the recent suppression of the Belarusian language in Belarus itself, neither the Latin nor Arabic script play any ideological role in the politics of this state.

It is a different story in the case of the Muslim Bosniaks. The oldest aljamijado (from Arabic ‘al’agamiya’, non-Arabic, foreign) Arabic-script text in Slavic from Bosnia dates back to 1588. The tradition of Slavic literacy in Arabic characters bloomed in Austria-Hungary’s Bosnia (1878-1918) when books, four periodicals and other prints of this kind were published. Altogether more than 40 Slavophone Arabic-script books appeared and the last one was published in 1941. In communist Yugoslavia this Arabic-script-based literacy was not revived. After the breakup of Yugoslavia the Bosnian language claims the tradition of aljamijado Slavic literacy as its origin. The current standardization project of the Bosnian language also draws on some specific Arabic/Turkic phonemes that do not occur either in Serbian or Croatian. There was, however, no movement for introduction of the Arabic script to write in Bosnian. Instead Bosniak nationalists reacted to the Belgrade-instigated war in Bosnia with the rejection of the Cyrillic and acceptance of the Latin script on the ground that it is also used for writing Turkish. This choice shows that predominantly non-religious Bosniaks prefer the secular model of Turkish nation-state to the religious-driven of Iran or Saudi Arabia.

Also some Pomak activists emphasize the historical and cultural importance of the Arabic script for their Muslim ethnic group (nation) and their language. The Pomaks constitute an intermediate case between the Belarusians and the Bosniaks when it comes to the degree of politicization of the tradition of the Arabic-script Slavophone literacy for the sake of their political (national) movement. As a caveat, on the basis of this ideological use of the tradition for political ends, one could distinguish a tentative third group of Slavic languages in the script-based classification, namely, Belarusian, Bosnian and Pomakian with their symbolic attachment to the Arabic script. This would replace the

unique bi-scriptural (Latin-Cyrillic) group of Serbo-Croatian that disappeared with the breakup of Yugoslavia.

**Extralinguistic factors**

**Religion**

In the pre-modern past religion played the main role in legitimizing statehood and political choices. Not surprisingly this factor accounted for the earliest divisions among the Slavs and languages employed by them. The basic religious cleavage dates back to very Christianization of the Slavic groups, which commenced in earnest in the 9th century. They could accept Christianity either from Rome or Constantinople. Western Christianity (future Catholicism) was steeped in the linguistic unity of the Latin language and its Latin script, whereas Eastern (future Orthodox) Christianity allowed for the use of various languages in liturgy and for translating the Bible (for instance, in Syriac, Armenian, Georgian, Gothic) though Byzantine Greek remained dominant. All these languages used for religious purposes by Eastern Christians were written in their own specific scripts. Not surprisingly, Slavic rulers who received Christianity from Constantinople were allowed to use their language, Old Church Slavonic, in liturgy and for translating the Bible. The first script for writing Old Church Slavonic was the Glagolitic, but soon the Cyrillic replaced it.

154 The first recorded conversion to Christianity of a Slavophone ruler dates back to the 740s when a son of the prince of Carinthia (today in Austria and Slovenia) was baptized. (Urbańczuk, Przemysław. 2000. Władza i polityka we wczesnym średniowieczu (Ser.: Monografie FNPJ). Wrocław: Funna and Fundacja na Rzecz Nauki Polskiej, p 143)

155 Interestingly, Latin as the official language of the Roman Empire it also remained the official language of administration and the Church in Byzantium until the 7th century when Byzantine Greek replaced it. Already in the following century this change led to official Byzantine enmity to Latin. The Byzantines and their Greek-speaking descendants, however, continued to refer to themselves as “Romanoi”, or “Romans” until the founding of the Greek nation-state in the 1830s. Only then the preferred ethnonym “Hellenes” began to replace that of the “Romans”. (Cf Rahner, Hugo. 1986. Kościół i państwo we wczesnym Chrześcijaństwie. Warsaw: Pax, pp 283-284.)

156 In the 1820s Bartholomäus (Jernej) Kopitar, a Slovenian philologist in the Habsburg service at Vienna, introduced the modern scholarly name of “Old Church Slavonic” for denoting the first written Slavic language, whose users referred to it as “Slavic” or “our language”. (Picchio, Riccardo. 1980. Church Slavonic (pp 1-33). In Schenker, Alexander M and Stankiewicz, Edward, eds. The Slavic Literary Languages: Formation and development (Ser.: Yale Russian
The relative comprehensibility of Old Church Slavonic allowed for its parallel use in liturgy and administration among the Rus Slavs (Ruthenians)\textsuperscript{157} and the Slavs of the eastern Balkans until the 18\textsuperscript{th} century. On the other hand, the insurmountable difficulty which Latin posed to Slavic-speakers in understanding the Holy Writ was one of the main criticisms, which Protestant leaders directed against Rome. In the 16\textsuperscript{th} century Protestantism hastened the development of Bohemian (Czech) and Polish as written languages and encouraged the use of Croatian, Kashubian, Slovenian and Sorbian for written purposes. This breach with the Latin language did not extend to the script. All the new languages continued to employ Latin characters in writing. At the same time the stabilization of the Ottoman rule in the Balkans produced extensive Slavophone communities of Muslims in Bosnia and Bulgaria. In their case Arabic was used for religious purposes, Ottoman (Old Turkish) for administration and Persian for literature. However, in vernacular use they also employed the Arabic script for writing in Slavic.

Among the Catholic and Protestant Slavs only Polish survived as the language of politics and administration in Poland-Lithuania. Elsewhere either in Prussia (Kashubian, Sorbian) or in the Habsburg lands (Bohemian, Croatian, Slovenian) German replaced the Slavic languages in this role, or barred them from being used for administrative and political purposes. These Slavic languages emerged as standardized languages in the 19\textsuperscript{th} century. The first secular Slavic language of the Orthodox Slavs was Ruthenian (ruski), the language of administration in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. It survived in this capacity by the end of the 17\textsuperscript{th} century. Belarusian and Ukrainian nationalists claim Ruthenian as the origin of their modern languages. Russian as a standard language emerged in the mid-18\textsuperscript{th} century, and in the next century was followed by Bulgarian. Serbo-Croatian constituted the unique case of a standard language earmarked for bi-religious use of the Catholic Croats and Orthodox Serbs. The confessional difference was marked by the telltale alphabet: Latin for the former and Cyrillic for the latter. In the second half of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century Slovak was added to the “Western Christian” Latin-script-based languages. At the end of this century and at the beginning of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century Ukrainian and Belarusian emerged from the dual cultural-cum-political domination of the Russian and Polish languages. Instrumental to this end was the tradition of Greek Catholicism, which let Belarusian and Ukrainian

\textsuperscript{157} At that time this ethnonym referred to the inhabitants of Kievan Rus, roughly speaking, ancestors of the modern-day Belarusian, Russians, Rusyns and Ukrainians.
nationalists claim allegiance with Western culture without denouncing Eastern Christianity complete with the Cyrillic.

In the 20th century Macedonian and Rusyn joined the group of “Eastern Christian languages”, while the breakup of Yugoslavia apportioned the Serbian half of erstwhile Serbo-Croatian to this group and its Croatian counterpart to the “Western Christian languages”. Despite its claim to the two alphabets, like Belarusian, the potential Macedonian language would belong to the Eastern Christian group because its users uniformly profess Orthodox Christianity as Belarusians do. Not unlike in the script-based classification Bosnian and Pomakian would constitute a special group. Their users are Muslim, Bosnian is written in Latin characters, whereas Pomakian in the Latin and Greek scripts. This “Islamic group of Slavic languages” could partially replace the special case of Serbo-Croatian whose users confessed Catholicism, Orthodox Christianity and Islam.

History and politics (borders)

It is undeniable that polities shaped or even co-determined the emergence of Slavic languages throughout centuries. Obviously there was no clear ideological plan on the part of rulers to transform the linguistic reality in a total manner as it has been the norm during the age of nationalism in Central and Eastern Europe where since the 19th century the isomorphism of language, nation and state has reigned supreme.

The proponents of the triple division of the Slavic languages like to start their story in the second half of the 9th century. At that time the Frankish Kingdom dominated Western Europe, and Byzantium the Balkans and Asia Minor. The Turkic Bulgars (sometimes called “Proto-Bulgarians”) constantly struggling with the Byzantines organized their increasingly Slavophone state (khanate) in the 7th century. In 864–865 Khan Boris was baptized and accepted Christianity for his state from Byzantium. His polity is known as the Bulgarian Empire because it extended from the Black Sea to Pannonia (modern Hungary) and from the northern Carpathians to the Aegean Sea. In the Balkans this empire bordered on Byzantium and in Pannonia on Greater Moravia, which extended from the Drava river to what today is southern Poland and from Lusatia (now in eastern Germany) to today’s Slovakia. On the invitation of Mojmir (Moimarus) in the 860s the Byzantine missionaries Constantine (Cyril) and Methodius christianized Greater Moravia and developed Glagolitic-based Slavic literacy. But the polity bordering directly on the Frankish Kingdom, the ecclesiastical influence of Rome was quickly effected. After the death of Methodius in 885 his pupils were expelled from Greater Moravia, and a year later resumed missionary activity in Bulgaria where, at that time, Slavic literacy replaced its Greek
counterpart in this state. Thereafter the Cyrillic gradually superseded the Glagolitic alphabet.\textsuperscript{158} Between the 860s and 880s the Scandinavian Varangians (from modern-day Sweden) built the Kievan Rus which extended from the Lakes Ladoga and Onega to the stretch of the Black Sea coast squeezed between Bulgaria and the Khazar Khanate (later the foothold was enlarged at the cost of the Turkic Khazars whose polity disintegrated at the end of the 10\textsuperscript{th} century). In the east Rus was bounded by the Volga and in the west it reached the areas between the rivers Bur and Pripet. The Grand Prince Volodymyr the Great accepted Christianity from Byzantium between 987 and 989.

Usually the Bulgarian Empire is identified as the ur-polity of the South Slavs, Greater Moravia as the ur-polity of the West Slavs and Kievan Rus as the ur-polity of the East Slavs. Obviously this ideologized perception of the polities emerged at the end of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century when research (supported by Russia and the Slavic national movements) into the past of these three states developed. The tradition of Slavic literacy having originated in Greater Moravia was banished to Bulgaria. From there it spread to the Rus lands where Old Church Slavonic was made into the official language in 1037.\textsuperscript{159} Depending on interpretation the story can account for the dual or triple division of the Slavic languages. The existence of the three “Slavic” polities can be seen as a “proof” of the latter theory. On the other hand, the limiting of the politically espousal of Cyrillic-based Slavonic literacy to Bulgaria and Rus pits them against Greater Moravia and fits the scheme of the dual division.

The constellation of the three Slavic polities quickly unraveled. At the beginning of the 10\textsuperscript{th} century the non-Christian Magyars destroyed Greater Moravia. Byzantium absorbed Bulgaria in 1014-1018. After 1132 Rus disintegrated into a myriad of statelets. In the Balkans Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia emerged as polities in the power vacuum between Byzantium and the Holy Roman Empire (successor to the Eastern Frankish Kingdom), but by the end of the 11\textsuperscript{th} century Hungary (the Magyars’ state) had absorbed Croatia and Bosnia. The Ottomans conquered Bulgaria (renewed in 1185) by 1393 and Serbia by 1459. At the beginning of the 9\textsuperscript{th} century Hungary incorporated the southeastern half of Greater Moravia, and the polity was effectively erased from memory until historians rediscovered it in the late 19\textsuperscript{th} century. The western half of Greater Moravia spawned Bohemia (and Moravia largely subjugated to Bohemia), in 929, incorporated to the Holy Roman Empire. The northeastern corner of


Greater Moravia was incorporated to nascent Poland that came into being at the end of the 10th century in the space between the empire and Rus bounded by the Baltic in the north. In 1138 Poland disintegrated into a plethora of duchies not unlike Rus. The Mongol invasion of 1240 dealt the final blow to Rus, subsequently incorporated to the Mongols’ Golden Horde. When the Horde weakened, in the second half of the 14th century Poland (reconstituted in the early 14th century) seized the westernmost Rus Duchy of Galicia, and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania the lion share of the Rus lands. Muscovy joined the race to ‘gather the Rus lands’ in one polity at the end of the 15th century. In 1386 Poland and Lithuania formed the dynastic union and continued to expand eastward. Following the capture of Constantinople in 1453, the Ottoman Empire vigorously expanded northward conquering almost all of Hungary by the beginning of the 17th century. The westernmost sliver of this state was controlled by the Habsburgs who also ruled the Holy Roman Empire.

At the beginning of the 17th century the Slavic lands were divided between three polities again. Poland-Lithuania contained the lands of Rus and Greater Moravia, the Habsburg realms/Holy Roman Empire those of Greater Moravia, and the Ottoman Empire Bulgaria, including parts of Greater Moravia and Rus. At the end of the 17th century the Habsburgs regained most of Hungary from the Ottomans. In 1721 Muscovy renamed as the Russian Empire entered the scene in force seizing piecemeal Rus lands from Poland-Lithuania. By 1795 Poland-Lithuania had been wiped out from the political map if Europe, its lands divided between Russia, the Habsburgs and the new upstart power of Prussia. Two years before Napoleon dissolved the Holy Roman Empire in 1806, the Habsburg realms had been organized as the Austrian Empire. At the beginning of the 19th century all the Rus lands (with the exception of Austria’s Galicia) were contained within the Russian borders. The Austrian Empire controlled almost all the lands of erstwhile Greater Moravia, while the Ottomans almost the entire territory of medieval Bulgaria inhabited by Slavic-speaking Orthodox Christians and Slavophone Muslims. Prussia incorporated western Poland and a fragment of Greater Moravia (that is, Silesia and Lower Lusatia), and from 1815 to 1866 Prussia was bounded with the Austrian Empire in the confines of the German Confederation.

That was the political situation of the lands inhabited by Slavic-speaking populations prior to the commencement of nation-forming processes in this area. Should one take cues from the above-presented political divisions for classification of the Slavic languages, one could end up with several schemes. The early modern political configuration of Central and Eastern Europe with the Holy Roman Empire/the Habsburg realms (including Royal Hungary), Poland-Lithuania, the Russian Empire (Muscovy) and Ottoman Empire featuring, could provide for a quadruple classification of the Slavic languages. The first from the
four groups (corresponding to the enumerated polities) would include: Czech, Sorbian, Slovenian and Croatian; the second: Polish, Kashubian, Belarusian and Ukrainian; the third: Russian; and the fourth: Bulgarian, Serbian, Bosnian and Macedonian. Certainly this scheme is entirely anachronistic, because the political configuration is used for classifying standard languages most of which did not even exist in their non-standard forms at that time. The exceptions were Polish and Russian. In the Ottoman Empire’s Orthodox millet (autonomous administrative, but not territorially based unit for Orthodox Christians) Church Slavonic was used for ecclesiastical and administrative purposes along Byzantine Greek, but this Church Slavonic language was not transformed into any modern standard Slavic languages. However, all the Cyrillic-based standard Slavic languages claim Church Slavonic as their direct ancestor or origin. The same claim to the heritage of Church Slavonic literacy is laid by Croatian, while weaker claims used to be forwarded by Slovenian and Slovak.

Interestingly, none of the major classifications put together the four languages of the first group. But there was a feeling present that Slovenian and Croatian form a group of languages separate from Bulgarian and Serbian. That was the basis of Šafařík’s Illyrian (1837) and Palacky’s Southwestern group (1839) though they included Serbian in it too, perhaps, because Serbia at that time was already a semi-independent state and a significant adjacent territory with Serbian-speakers (modern Vojvodina) formed part of the Austrian Empire. Within the Austrian Empire numerous Czech scholars (for instance, Šafařík) worked in Vienna’s share of the Slavophone Balkans. Significantly, the writing systems of Slovenian and Croatian drew on the Czech version of the Latin alphabet. Croatian, Slovenian and Sorbian students and scholars also sought education in Bohemia and support from the Czech national movement. These amply vindicate a tentative connection between Czech on the one hand, and Croatian, Slovenian and Sorbian on the other.

Also none of the classificatory schemes put together Polish, Kashubian, Belarusian and Ukrainian. However, Šafařík’s Lekhian group consisting of Polish, Silesian and Pomerianian (Kashubian) (1837) was a good approximation, whereas even in Russia until the 1860s the general feeling was that Bealrusian and Ukrainian were dialects of Polish. In 1839 Vostokov proposed a separate group for Russian itself. There is no scheme that would lump together Serbian, Bulgarian, Bosnian and Macedonian, though nowadays these languages labeled as “Southeastern” sometimes are opposed to “Southwestern” Croatian and Slovenian within the Southern branch of the Slavic languages in the triple division. Schleicher indicated a certain intimation of this in his Stammbaum (1858) treating Serbo-Slovenian and Bulgarian as separate but closely related branches. At that time there was no Macedonian or Bosnian language. But the former could clearly be included in the Bulgarian branch. The use of the Cyrillic
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justifies grouping of Serbian with Bulgarian too. This could be also true for Bosnian let alone the late-20th-century rejection of the Cyrillic.

In the period 1815-1914 the lands of the Slavic-speakers were divided between the German Confederation (that is, the Austrian Empire together with Prussia plus other German-speaking states), the Russian Empire and Ottoman Empire. In 1817, at the cost of the latter empire, Serbia gained autonomy, whereas in 1829 the provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia were transformed into Russia’s protectorates. In 1862 the two provinces were made into Romania. In 1878 Austria-Hungary extended its administration over Bosnia, autonomous Bulgaria came into being, and independence was granted to Serbia and Romania, which also fortified the position of Montenegro which had survived as an autonomous principality since the Middle Ages. With the conflicting support of Western European powers and Russia Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, Romania and Serbia constantly annexed Ottoman territory. In 1908 Vienna annexed Bosnia and Bulgaria became independent. In 1913 Albania was founded and by that time the Ottomans’ lands in Europe shrank to a small foothold around the city of Edirne.

This political division could be translated into the following scheme. The first group corresponding to the German Confederation (mainly the Austrian Empire and Prussia\textsuperscript{160}) would include Czech, Slovak, Sorbian, Kashubian, Polish, Slovenian and Croatian. After the imposition of the Austro-Hungarian administration in Bosnia (1878) one could also add Bosnian to this group. The second group related to the Russian Empire would comprise Russian, Belarusian, Ukrainian and Polish. This would mean splitting Polish between the first and second group. However, an autonomous Kingdom of Poland survived in Russia until the mid-1860s, and St Petersburg never attempted to force the Cyrillic on the Polish language. Ergo, the Russian government accepted that Polish was somewhat “foreign” to the empire, which supports the inclusion of Polish in the first group. Bulgarian, Serbian, Macedonian and Bosnian (until 1878) would constitute the third group that corresponds to the Ottoman Empire and the successor states.

The second group perfectly coincides with the Eastern branch of the Slavic languages of the triple division. The first group almost overlaps with the

\textsuperscript{160} After 1866 the German Confederation unraveled. The following year the Austrian Empire was transformed into Austria-Hungary. Prussia organized the rest of the German-speaking states (except Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden and the Palatinate) into the North German Confederation. In 1871 this confederation together with the previously abstaining states plus Alsace-Lorraine (won from France) was made into the German Empire.
Western branch of this division less Slovenian, Croatian and (after 1878) Bosnian. However, when one takes script as the guideline for classification, the first group would comprise all the standard Slavic languages that today are written in Latin alphabet. Hence, the third group with Bulgarian, Serbian, Macedonian and Bosnian (before 1878), too, *almost* coincides with the classificatory range of the Southern branch of the Slavic languages in the triple division. The main arbiter of the difference could be script again. Nowadays all the languages (except Bosnian) are written in Cyrillic characters.

In the wake of World War I the process of building ethnolinguistically based nation-states spread from the Balkans to Central and Eastern Europe. Poland and Czechoslovakia were founded. Polish and Czechoslovak (actually: Czech and Slovak) were made into the official languages of these two nation-states respectively. The territory of the Kashubian-speakers was largely included in Poland. The homeland of the Sorbian-speakers remained in Germany, but Prague coaxed the international community to recognize the Sorbs as a nation. This political configuration almost perfectly fit into the Western branch of the Slavic languages in Šafařík’s dual classification. His Lekhian subgroup lumped together: Polish, Pomeranian (Kashubian) and Silesian; the Czechoslovak subgroup: Czech, Moravian and Slovak; and the Polabian subgroup: Sorbian and other extinct Slavic languages. The three sub-branches clearly correspond to interwar Poland, Czechoslovakia and Germany. The exceptions to this perfect fit were the inclusion of western Belarus and western Ukraine in Poland and of the Subcarpathian Ruthenia in Czechoslovakia. But the barrier of script rather pushed these areas toward the East Slavic languages of the triple division, not unlike the same barrier separated Polish from Russian, Belarusian and Ukrainian in the Russian Empire prior to 1914. The possibility of closer political-linguistic correspondence between the Western branch of the Slavic languages and some polity appeared during World War II. Czechoslovak and Polish émigré politicians proposed to establish a Central European federation, the core of which would be composed of Czechoslovakia and Poland.161

In the Soviet Union where Russian dominated as the language of state-wide communication from the early 1920s and the Cyrillic (for writing the overwhelming majority of languages used in this state) since the late 1930s, separate Socialist Soviet Republics were established for the Belarusians and Ukrainians. This event confirmed the separate existence of Belarusian and Ukrainian vis-à-vis the Russian language, whereas the Soviet Union lumped all

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these three languages together even more perfectly than the Russian Empire, which had included extensive lands inhabited by Polish-speakers. Such a grouping perfectly corresponds to the Eastern branch of the Slavic languages in the triple classification.

The founding of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (since 1929 Yugoslavia) vindicated the Southern branch of the Slavic languages of the triple division. The state’s name Yugoslavia (the Homeland of the South Slavs) clearly indicated the conflation of the political with the ethnolinguistic. Bulgaria remained without this Southern Slavic political union, but Sofia never protested against including Bulgarian in the Southern branch. The complication was that Belgrade announced Serbocroatoslovenian (Yugoslavian) as the state’s official language much to the dismay of the Slovenes. In practice Slovenian remained a separate language vis-à-vis Serbo-Croatian.

In Central and Eastern Europe during the 19th century the national normative ideal of the isomorphism of language, nation and state emerged. The various classificatory schemes of the Slavic languages gave way to the standard triple division in the interwar period. This scheme began to function as the accepted “scientific” guideline and as a self-fulfilling prophecy. Acting on the perceived scientificness of the triple classification of the Slavic languages national activists influenced the thinking of the public opinion and the leaders of the world powers with regard to how nation-states of Central and Eastern Europe should be organized. The first principle said that the territories of these nation-states should coincide with the lands inhabited by speakers of given languages considered to be “national”. The second principle provided for ethnic cleansing of such ethnolinguistically based nation-states from speakers of languages perceived as different from the national languages.

Not surprisingly border and other changes that took place after World War II closely followed these two principles placed within the broader standard (and then already normative) triple division of the Slavic languages. Poland’s eastern lands overwhelmingly inhabited by Belarusian- and Ukrainian-speakers were incorporated to the Soviet Union’s Socialist Soviet Republics of Belarus and Ukraine (a fragment of these lands was also included in the Soviet Socialist Republic of Lithuania, but this event does not fall into this work’s purview). Populations perceived as Ukrainians and Belarusians remaining west of the new border were expelled to the Soviet Union, and populations considered to be Polish from the Soviet Union to postwar Poland. Ironically all of them speaking the same or similar North Slavic dialects, religion and script were decisive for differentiating between Poles (Catholics, the Latin script), and Belarusian and Ukrainians (Orthodox Christians and Greek Catholics, and the Cyrillic). The German territories east of the Oder-Neisse line granted to Poland were denuded
of Germans through the Allied-approved expulsions. Russian-speakers re-
populated the northern half of East Prussia (today, the Kaliningrad Oblast),
while ethnic Poles the rest of the German lands east of the Oder-Neisse line
(today western and northern Poland). Understandably, Polish scholars classified
Kashubian as a Polish dialect to preclude the possibility of any
ethnolinguistically defined Kashubian nation-state. For the same reason, at the
beginning of the 21st century Warsaw continues denying the existence of the
Silesian nation and language despite the resounding results of the 2002 census to
the contrary. According to the census the Silesians at 173,000 form the largest
national minority in contemporary Poland, and 50,000 of them declared Silesian
as the language of their everyday communication with family members.

Moscow seized Subcarpathian Ruthenia from postwar Czechoslovakia, and it
was incorporated to the Soviet Socialist Republic of Ukraine. In this manner the
development of Rusyn as a fourth East Slavic language was precluded until the
1990s, while this population perceived as “non-West Slavic” was excluded from
Czechoslovakia. Drawing on the Polish example Prague demanded from the
Kremlin Germany’s Lusatia in return for Subcarpathian Ruthenia. This would
have assured the preservation of the Sorbs as the third constitutive nation of
Czechoslovakia. Warsaw objected and appealed Moscow for incorporating
Lusatia into Poland. Perhaps that would have meant re-classification of Sorbian
as a Polish dialect as it happened in the case of Kashubian. Thereafter
administrative efforts would have been undertaken to assimilate the Sorbs into
the Polish nation. Moscow objected to Polish and Czechoslovak demands.
Lusatia remained in East Germany where the Sorbs enjoyed wide cultural
autonomy. This allowed for preserving them as a nation in its own right, but did
not save the Sorbian language from gradual disappearance in favor of German.

As in Poland, Germans were expelled from Czechoslovakia, in addition to a
considerable number of Magyars. The normative isomorphism of language,
nation and state so strong, in 1968 unitary Czechoslovakia was transformed into
the federation of the Czech and Slovak Socialist Republics. If Lusatia had been
incorporated to Czechoslovakia in 1945, probably, the Sorbs would have formed
a third socialist republic of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Eventually, after the fall of
communism (1989) federal Czechoslovakia split into the two nation-states of the
Czechs and Slovaks in 1993. On the basis of the 1991 census the two national
movements of Moravians and Silesians entered Czech politics representing 1.36
million Moravians and 44,000 Silesians, respectively.162 The languages of both
nations featured in Šafařík’s classification. He lumped Moravian together with
Czech and Slovak in the Czechoslovak branch, but Silesian with Polish and

Kashubian in the Lekhian branch. The Moravians and Silesians demanded the transformation of the Czech Republic into the federation of Bohemia and Moravia-Silesia. They, however, failed to support this project through standardizing their separate languages. Then, perhaps, due to the social and economic success of the Czech Republic the 2003 census showed that the number of people identifying as Moravians and Silesians dropped radically to 130,000 and 11,000. A similar ethnolinguistically based national movement of the Rusyns unfolded in Slovakia during the 1990s. But, without much success, its thrust is aimed at Ukraine’s Transcarpathia. Perhaps the new national-cum-linguistic projects of the Moravians, Rusyns, Poleshuks (see above on the Polesian language) and Silesians stand little chance to bear fruit in the form of new separate standard languages and nations in the nation-states that are reasonably stable and successful in the sphere of politics, economy and social security. Moreover, the message of the already established and recognized nationalisms steeped in their specific languages have been thoroughly instilled in the respective nation-states through the educational system, mass media and centralized national politics.

The prewar imposition of the Yugoslav language (Serbocroatoslovenian) on the entire population of Yugoslavia became socially and politically unacceptable after 1945. Yugoslavia was reestablished as a federal state of the five ethnolinguistically defined nations: the Croats, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Muslims (Bosniaks) and Serbs. The administrative language of Serbo-Croatian united the state as well as functioned as the single national language for the Bosniaks, Croats, Montenegrins and Serbs. When Yugoslavia disintegrated in the 1990s the logic of the normative isomorphism of language, nation and state allowed for the largely unambiguous emergence of Slovenia and Macedonia as separate nation-states. But the founding of Croatia and Bosnia as nation-states required the (re-)emergence of Croatian and Bosnian as separate languages. This entailed disappearance of Serbo-Croatian. The Serbs and Montenegrins had no choice but to start calling their language “Serbian”. Then waves of mutual ethnic cleansing followed. As in the Polish-Belarusian-Ukrainian case language was not decisive in separating members of the nations. All of them spoke the same or closely-related dialects until very recently united in the common fold of Serbo-Croatian. The most usual yardstick used for deciding who “really is” a Bosniak, Croat, or Serb/Montenegrin was religion: Islam, Catholicism and Orthodox Christianity, respectively. The difference in script allowed for differentiating between the Croats writing in Latin character and the Serbs/Montenegrins writing in the Cyrillic. But this scriptural difference was of no significance for distinguishing the Bosniaks who usually wrote in the Latin alphabet but sometimes in the Cyrillic too.
In 2003 rump Yugoslavia was transformed into confederal Serbia-Montenegro. For the first time since 1918 “Serbia” and “Montenegro” feature in the name of a state. The confederation consists from the two former Yugoslav republics of Serbia and Montenegro now functioning as two separate states grudgingly united for three years in a lose confederation. Most probably this confederation will not be renewed in 2006. Already in the 1990s Montenegrin nationalists began to prepare for this event through standardizing their own Montenegrin language. If their nation-state comes into being in 2006 it will be complete with its own national language.

Even though numerous nation-states and corresponding languages emerged on the territory of former Yugoslavia, these projects have not attempted to breach the well established consensus on the unity of the Southern branch of the Slavic languages entailed by the standard triple classification. The same is true of the Pomakian language project. Unlike Bosnian Pomakian stands little chance of being elevated to the rank of national or, let alone, state language. Today the Bulgarian nation-state seems to be at least as successful as Ukraine or Slovakia. The Pomaks do not demand to be recognized as a separate nation, and prefer using Turkish in education and standard Bulgarian in office to their native Pomakian. Probably, like the Rusyns or Poloshuks, they will not succeed in popularizing the widespread use of their language, and like the Kashubs or Moravians, the Pomaks will not form a permanent national movement. To shape them into a separate nation, Bulgaria would have to ethnically cleanse the Pomaks through expulsion and mass killings, as the Serbian forces did in the case of the Bosniaks. This seems unlikely.

Last but not least, the breakup of the Soviet Union spawned the three Slavic states of Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine. In the case of Belarus and Ukraine this event reasserted the separate existence of the two nations and their languages which were successfully Russified in the postwar Soviet Union on its way to producing the classless Soviet multiethnic communist nation united through the use of the Russian language. The impetus of Belarusian and Ukrainian nationalism was preserved in interwar Poland and in diaspora. The ethnolinguistic dimension of Ukrainian nationalism re-emerged in independent Ukraine. This dimension, however, was lost in independent Belarus where Russian functions as the language of cultured discourse and Belarusian as a “peasant dialect”, at best to be avoided in public. Belarus is the only Slavic nation-state where the normative isomorphism of language, nation and state is not acted upon. It does not mean that the Belarusian nation or nation-state will disappear in near future. After all sharing the same German language has not led to the merger or disappearance of the Austrian, German, Liechtenstein,
Luxembourg, or Swiss nations. Although the Russian Federation is not an ethnolinguistic nation-state of the Russians, they form the obvious majority of the population (83 per cent) and the Russian language dominates throughout the federation. In addition, in 2002, the Cyrillic was decreed as the sole legal writing system for all the native languages used by nations and ethnic groups enjoying their autonomous republics or districts in the federation. These changes only underscore the unity of the Eastern branch of the Slavic languages of the triple division emphasized by the consistent use of the Cyrillic.

**Domination of the official language**

One can question including the phenomenon of domination of one language over another in the catalog of “extralinguistic features” that can be employed to classify the Slavic languages. Domination of this kind assumes the existence of self-contained units known as languages. The standard shape of these units forged by linguists, users and politicians is to be found in dictionaries, grammars, school textbooks, as well as in newspapers and books published in these languages. Politicians and lawgivers decide which language should be official and to which languages used in a state such a status would be denied. Predominantly they are not interested in the linguistic reality (that is, inner workings) of these languages. To them languages appear as units, which ought to be put in some order. The basic order of the power pyramid claims that there can be only one. That is why in the course of modernization from above instituted in the Habsburg lands and the Russian Empire German and Russian, respectively, were made into the sole languages of administration. German in 1784 and Russian in the last four decades of the 19th century. Obviously, both the empires quite straggling many exceptions to the state language obtained. For instance, Magyar, Croatian, Polish or Czech in Austria-Hungary or German, Swedish and Finnish in Russia. With the rise of nationalism the pyramidal model of power and language use regulation in empires was replaced with the normative isomorphism of language, nation and state. In the case of the Slavic languages this national principle was enforced mainly during the 20th century. The intermediate case between empires and nation-states was that of federations.

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163 The Czech-Austrian Germanophone writer Karl Kraus (1874-1936) famously observed that “what distinguishes the Austrians from the Germans is their common language”. (Jusserand, Nicole, ed. 1999. Wiedeń (Ser: Przewodniki Pascala). Bielsko-Biała: Pascal, p 45). This aptly summarizes the pronounced absence of the national principle of the isomorphism of language, nation and state among ideologues and decision-makers of the German-speaking nations, though dialectal differences among these nations are even bigger than those which gave the beginning to the still growing variety of standard Slavic languages.
The Soviet Union (since the early 1920s), Yugoslavia (after 1945) and Czechoslovakia (since 1968) were composed from ethnolinguistically defined national republics. In the 1990s all the republics were transformed into independent nation-states.

Nowadays majority of the standard Slavic languages function as (usually) sole official languages in corresponding nation-states. With the exceptions of Bulgarian, Russian and Serbo-Croatian this was not so prior to World War I. During the interwar period Czechoslovak (that is, Czech and Slovak), and Polish gained this status. Then in the 1990s the next wave of nation-state-formation accorded this elevated status to Belarusian, Slovenian, Ukrainian and Macedonian. The 1993 breakup of Czechoslovakia reaffirmed the separate existence of Czech and Slovak made into official languages in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, respectively. The disintegration of Yugoslavia also replaced Serbo-Croatian with the separate languages of Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian used in three different though neighboring nation-states. The only Slavic languages that do not enjoy the status of official state language are Kashubian, Pomakian, Rusyn and Sorbian. Montenegrin may cross this threshold in 2006 if Montenegro chooses independence. On the other hand, despite the official rhetoric of two state languages in Belarus Belarusian is completely dominated by Russian.

When the lands inhabited by the Slavic-speakers were divided among the Bulgarian Empire, Greater Moravia and Kievan Rus, Old Church Slavonic replaced Byzantine Greek in Bulgaria and dominated in all the three polities. But Latin gradually replaced it in Greater Moravia. On this basis the Slavic languages could be divided into two groups. The first one corresponding to Bulgaria and Rus would comprise the Slavic languages from the Eastern and Southern branches of the triple division. The other group related to Greater Moravia would comprise the Slavic languages of the Western branch. This classification perfectly reflects Dobrovský’s dual classification of the Slavic languages (1822).

In the 17th century the Slavophone lands were divided among the Holy Roman Empire/Habsburg realms, Poland-Lithuania, the Russian Empire and Ottoman Empire. Latin as the official language dominated in the Holy Roman Empire/Habsburg realms along several varieties of chancery German, and in Poland-Lithuania along chancery Polish and Ruthenian. In the Russian Empire Church Slavonic was retained as the language of administration. In the Ottoman Empire the Ottoman language (Old Turkish) functioned as the language of administration, Arabic was the language of religion and Persian of literature. This empire’s population divided along religious lines into non-territorial millets most Slavic-speakers were contained in the Orthodox millet. The dominant
language of this millet was Byzantine Greek, though Church Slavonic tended to be used by lower clergy in Slavophone areas.

On the basis of this configuration of the official languages, Latin would allow for putting together the Slavic languages of the Western branch along with Slovenian, Croatian, Belarusian and Ukrainian. Russian would have to be made into a separate branch for itself, unless one accepts the tentative dominance of Church Slavonic in everyday life among the Slavic-speakers in the Orthodox millet. Then Russian could be lumped together with Bosnian, Bulgarian, Macedonian and Serbian. This dual classification largely overlaps with the division of the Slavic languages into those that employ either the Latin or Cyrillic script. The exceptions are Belarusian, Bosnian and Ukrainian. Until the early 20th century Belarusian and Bosnian were located in the border zone between the two scripts, which in the 17th century was emphasized by the official use of Cyrillic-based Ruthenian in the eastern half of Poland-Lithuania. Bosnian, today written in Latin characters, in the 17th century Slavophone Muslims employed the Arabic script for writing in Slavic whereas Arabic-script-based Arabic and Ottoman dominated in their religious and official life, respectively.

In the 19th century German was the official language of Prussia and the western half of the Austrian Empire united in the German Confederation. In the eastern half of the Austrian Empire, or Hungary, Latin was retained in the function of the official language, though decisively replaced with Magyar in the 1840s. The official elevation of Magyar to the rank of official language in Hungary took place in 1867 when the Austrian Empire was transformed into the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary. The rise of national movements convinced Vienna to replace German with Polish as the official language in Galicia (1869) and Budapest to allow for the official status of Croatian in Croatia (1868). The transformation of Prussia and the other members of the North German Confederation into the German Empire consolidated the official position of German in this polity. In the Dual Monarchy it was altogether a different story. After Austria-Hungary extended its administration to Bosnia Serbo-Croatian written in Latin, Cyrillic and Arabic characters was made into a co-official language along German. Thereafter, in the 1880s Czech was granted the status of co-official language (along German) in Bohemia and Moravia.

Although in the Russian Empire the Russian language began to replace Church Slavonic as the language of secular life from the beginning of the 18th century, its dominance was not ensured. First, the nobility being often of Western European origin they used French and German, also for administrative purposes. Second, the ideology of imperial policy overwhelmingly was steeped in Orthodox Christianity not a language. Anyway the holy language of this faith
was Church Slavonic earlier excluded from secular use. On the other hand, the Orthodox Church did not accept Russian as its administrative, let alone, liturgical language. In the autonomous Kingdom of Poland St Petersburg accepted the use of Polish as the official language until the mid-1860s. The same status German retained in the Baltic provinces (today, Latvia and Estonia) until the 1880s, and Swedish and Finnish (with the exception of the years 1900-1906 when Russian functioned as the official language) survived in this capacity in Russia’s Grand Duchy of Finland until it became an independent nation-state in 1917. The process of linguistic homogenization of the Russian Empire commenced in the 1860s, speeded up in the 1880s, and was put on hold after the 1905 revolution.

In the Ottoman Empire the linguistic configuration basically remained the same as during the 17th century. Obviously the founding of independent Greece (1830) and of autonomous Serbia (1817) along with the continued existence of autonomous Montenegro reaffirmed the official status of Byzantine Greek and Church Slavonic, respectively, in these polities. Cooperation of Croatian and Serbian nationalists brought about the formation of the Serbo-Croatian language. It was accepted for official purposes in Bosnia (after 1878), and gradually replaced Church Slavonic in its capacity of the official language in Serbia and Montenegro. When Bulgaria gained autonomy (1878) standard Bulgarian gradually superseded Church Slavonic by 1899. Greek nationalists perceived the Orthodox millet as the potential Greek nation to be freed from the “Turkish yoke”. On one hand the territorial expansion of Greece at the cost of the Ottoman Empire served this goal, while, on the other, the Orthodox Patriarch of Costantinople and most of the Orthodox hierarchy, usually Greek-speaking, gradually began to identify with the aims of Greek nationalism. This triggered forced Hellenization of Slavophone Orthodox Christians belonging to the Orthodox millet. The Ottoman administration sought to offset this ethnolinguistic onslaught of Greek nationalism tolerating or even encouraging disobedience of the Slavophone clergy vis-à-vis their Greek superiors. Partly this stemmed the spread of Greek nationalism but did not stop Slavic nationalisms, which with encouragement from Russia and Western European powers turned against the Ottoman Empire. This process, however, did not produce any more new standard Slavic languages. In 1913 when Albania was founded, Albanian was elevated to the status of official language in this new nation-state.

This picture of the dynamic political and ideologized linguistic changes does not easily lend itself to clean-cut categorizations. One can try to work out such a classification through taking into consideration the official status of the Slavic languages as the yardstick. The group of official state languages included Bulgarian, Russian, and Serbo-Croatian. Languages which were co-official or
official in sub-state regions were represented by Czech, Polish and Serbo-Croatian. The group of not recognized languages sometimes used in education or publications was comprised of Kashubian, Slovak, Slovenian and Sorbian which were joined by Belarusian and Ukrainian when the ban on the use of these languages was lifted in the Russian Empire after 1905. Other Slavic languages are not featured in this classification, because they did not exist at that time (at least in their standard forms).

When the number of Slavic languages complete with official status proliferated in the 20th century due to the founding of numerous Slavic nation-states, the structure of dominating languages also changed in regard of these Slavic languages that remained unrecognized or suppressed. Prior to World War I none of the dominating languages in the Slavophone lands was Slavic apart from Russian. Polish in this capacity disappeared after the final partition of Poland-Lithuania in 1795. After 1918 the situation changed dramatically. Russian continued to dominate over Belarusian and Ukrainian in the Soviet Union. In Poland the Polish language dominated over Belarusian, Kashubian and Ukrainian. In Czechoslovakia Czech in the guise of the Czechoslovak language dominated over Slovak and Ruthenian (Rusyn). In Yugoslavia Serbo-Croatian construed as Serbocroatoslovenian towered over Slovenian. The sole Slavic language that remained to be dominated by a non-Slavic language was Sorbian (and, partially, Kashubian) the speakers of which lived in Germany.

After 1945 the situation hardly changed. With the transfer of Subcarpathian Ruthenia from Czechoslovakia to the Soviet Union, the domination of Russian was extended over Ruthenian (Rusyn). The radical transformation of Poland’s territory largely terminated the domination of Polish over Belarusian and Ukrainian, while all the speakers of Kashubian found themselves residing in postwar Poland. Without Subcarpathian Ruthenia Czech dominated only over Slovak in Czechoslovakia. The federalization of Yugoslavia subjected to the domination of Serbo-Croatian the newly standardized language of Macedonian. Beginning in the 1960s numerous Croatian intellectuals began to perceive Serbo-Croatian as an instrument of Serbian domination over the Croats and the Croatian language. One can attempt explaining this configuration through the lenses of the standard triple division. The Eastern branch was dominated by Russian as the situation has been since the 19th century. Serbo-Croatian (Serbian) dominated over the Southern branch with the exception of Bulgarian unless one subscribes to the view that Macedonian is part of the Bulgarian language. Then as a consequence the dominance of Serbo-Croatian could be interpreted as encroaching on the Bulgarian language too. No single Slavic or

164 Due to this work’s focus, I pay no attention to the domination of official Slavic languages over non-Slavic languages in Slavic nation-states.
non-Slavic language dominated over the Slavic languages grouped in the Western branch. In this group of Slavic languages one can speak of dual Czech-Polish domination over all other West Slavic languages except Sorbian dominated by German.

Following the breakup of the Soviet Union, the domination of Russian over Ukrainian was terminated in independent Ukraine. The process also unfolded in regard of Belarusian in post-Soviet Belarus, but was decisively reverted in favor of Russian after the mid-1990s. Ukrainian (together with Polish and Slovak) continues to dominate over Rusyn. If Polesian is ever standardized Ukrainian (along with Belarusian and/or Russian) would dominate over it. In the wake of the disintegration of Yugoslavia, during the first half of the 1990s, Belgrade radically excluded the Slavophone Muslims of Bosnia from the political, social and ethnic commonality with the Serbs. This led to the formation of the Bosniak nation complete with the Bosnian language. The disappearance of Serbo-Croatian ended the domination of this language (increasingly equated with the Serbian language) over Bosnian, Croatian, Macedonian and Slovenian. In Serbia-Montenegro Serbian still dominates over Montenegrin, at least, this is a view popular among Montenegrin national leaders. After the founding of Macedonia, Bulgaria refused to recognize Macedonian as a language in its own right. This extends the attempted domination of Bulgarian over Macedonian across the Bulgarian-Macedonian border. Skopje accuses Sofia Bulgarizing Macedonian-speakers who reside in Bulgaria. The anti-Muslim thrust of Bulgarian politics in the 1980s produced the Pomakian language in the next decade. Bulgarian also dominates over it. Numerous Macedonian- and Pomakian-speakers live in northern Greece, which means the domination of Greek over their languages. Should Silesian be successfully standardized the domination of Polish (currently over Kashubian) would be extended over this language too. Last but not least, the traditional domination of German over Sorbian continues. To wrap up the picture, Romanian dominates over Banat Bulgarian, and German over Burgenland Croatian.

After 1918 usually Slavic languages in the capacity of the official languages of the Slavic-nation states dominate over other Slavic languages. Domination of non-Slavic languages over Slavic languages was radically limited in the course of the 20th century when, in line with the normative isomorphism of language, nation and state, numerous Slavic nation-states were founded. Probably the national process of “emancipating” dominated Slavic languages through making them into official languages of new nation-states is over or will be over after the probable 2006 breakup of Serbia-Montenegro. Currently there is no social or political consensus for creating any more new Slavic nation-states. The trend seems to be (re-)integration of European nation-states in the European Union (EU). The granting of the status of EU official language to every official
language of each member state, on the one hand, conserves and even fortifies the position of the current official Slavic languages. However, the practical dynamic of day-to-day language use in the EU institutions has made English into the Union’s de facto lingua franca. French and German may challenge this unique status of English, but none of the EU’s official Slavic languages stands a chance of doing so.

**The moment of origin and standardization**

Ethnic nationalists often see their languages as being as old as the imagined history of their nations and nation-states. This approach spawns politically useful myths, but disregards numerous features which allow for identifying the beginning of a given chancery (written) language or the period when it was finally standardized. These socio-political (thus, non-linguistic) dimension of the creation of written and standard languages constitutes the basis for another classification scheme.

Old Church Slavonic (with its numerous local varieties later to be known as “redactions” of Church Slavonic) was the earliest written Slavic language, which came into being in the 860s. Practically all the Eastern and Southern Slavic languages (with the exception of Bosnian, which ideologically is anchored in the Islamic and Western traditions not in Orthodox Christianity) claim to be sole and direct continuations of Old Church Slavonic. In the early 20th century some Slovak linguists claimed this distinction for the Slovak language as well, drawing on the tradition of Greater Moravia imagined as the origin of present-day Slovakia. Certainly, all these modern languages even if grafted on Church Slavonic vocabulary or syntax, came into being due to the conscious rejection of Church Slavonic tradition of literacy. Due to the influence of the Western European model of language formation in the scope of which Latin was discarded in favor of vernaculars made into chancery and standard languages, Church Slavonic was perceived as antithetical vis-à-vis the needs of the modern world. Quite on the contrary Arab nationalists did not see their classical Arabic of the Koran as opposed to modernization. Hence, it remains the official language of all the Arabic-speaking nation-states, while dialects used for everyday communication have not been elevated to the status.

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165 Babič, Vanda. 2002. Stara cerkevna slovanščina in prepletenost slovanskih jezikovnih vezi (pp 319-331). *Slavistična revija.* No 3. Throughout the ages all the redactions of Church Slavonic went defunct with the exception of the Russian redaction. In the 18th and 19th centuries it served as the basis for the revival of Church Slavonic among the Orthodox Slavic-speakers in the Balkans.
of written or standard languages. In the South and East Slavic nation-states exactly such dialects made into standard (national) languages sealed the end of Church Slavonic as an official language of secular administration.

Bohemian (Czech) emerged as a chancery language in the 14th century. It was the period of the unprecedented territorial expansion for the Kingdom of Bohemia. It extended from Brandenburg (just south of Berlin) to modern Slovenia and from Tyrol to modern southern Poland (just west of Cracow). Kings of Bohemia often were crowned as Emperors of the Holy Roman Empire. In the 15th century this secured the status of lingua franca for Bohemian in the Slavophone areas from Danzig (Gdańsk) to Constantinople. The Hussitic Wars and continued religious discord radically downgraded the position of Bohemia and its chancery language. After the victory of Catholics in 1620, chancery German replaced Bohemian as the kingdom’s official language (along Latin) in the 1620s. At that time chancery Polish, which had emerged in the 16th century, replaced Bohemian in its role of lingua franca. That was the function of the political power of Poland-Lithuania, which extended from the Baltic to the Black Sea, and from what today is western Poland to the areas just west of Moscow. At that time Ruthenian was used as a co-official chancery language in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania until Polish replaced it at the end of the 17th century. The power struggle between Poland-Lithuania and Muscovy/the Russian Empire ended in the complete partition of the former polity at the end of the 18th century. But at the beginning of this century the conflict also brought about the radical limiting of Church Slavonic to the ecclesiastical sphere, and the introduction of vernacular Russian (modeled on Ruthenian) which was standardized in the second half of the 18th century.

The model of language standardization, which entailed shaping a language though an authoritative grammar and extensive dictionary developed in Western Europe between the 16th and 18th century. Polish was standardized at the end of the 18th century and at the beginning of the next century. Hence, in the early 19th century Russian and Polish were the sole standardized Slavic languages. Other Slavic languages attained the status of written (if not widespread chancery) languages thanks to Protestantism which encouraged translating the Catechism and/or Bible into local languages. Such translations were made into Croatian, Kashubian, Slovenian and Sorbian. But standardization of Slavic languages commenced in earnest during the 19th century and continues to this day.

Czech (drawing on the rich tradition of Bohemian) was standardized in the 1830s. The standardization processes of Serbian and Croatian that unfolded in

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the first half of the 19th century ended in the 1850 with the founding of the Serbo-Croatian language. Standardization of Bulgarian commenced in the 1830s was completed at the end of the 19th century. Slovak began to be standardized in the 1840s but the process arrived at its completion in the 1960s. The end of the 19th century saw the commencement of the standardization of Slovenian, which has not been completed by the 1980s. Sorbian began to be standardized at the end of the 19th century. Standardizing of this language in its two varieties, though largely achieved by the 1960s, has not been finished yet, and probably will never be completed due to the dearth of native speakers of Sorbian. The end of the 19th century marked the beginning of the standardization of Ukrainian and Belarusian. The process was retarded by the ban on these two languages in Russia, which remained in force until 1905. Standardization of both these languages was completed in the 1930s. Thereafter Russification of both standards set in. Some elements in standard Belarusian and Ukrainian were overhauled (often following émigré usages) after the breakup of the Soviet Union in order to make the languages more distinctive vis-à-vis Russian. Macedonian was declared a language in its own right in 1944 and its standardization was largely completed by the 1960s. The breakup of Yugoslavia heralded the end of Serbo-Croatian and the commencement of the standardization of Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian. It is the work in progress, as is the standardization of Kashubian, Pomakian and Rusyn. Although elements of standardization in regard of Banat Bulgarian and Burgenland Croatian were carried out in the 1860s and 1950s, respectively, there is no social and political force which could push these two projects toward completion. So far there is not even a force, which could edge the standardization projects of Silesian and Polesian beyond the sphere of plans.

The moment of completion or near-completion of standardization as the yardstick of classification yields four “temporal” groups of the Slavic languages. The first comprises Russian and Polish standardized by the early 19th century. Czech, Serbo-Croatian and Bulgarian standardized during the 19th century constitute the second group. Interestingly, so far, Serbo-Croatian is the sole standard Slavic language that went defunct (in the 1990s), unless one considers the instances of Serbocroatoslovenian and Czechoslovak. But these two were politico-ideological declarative concepts that were never embodied in the form of standard languages. The third group comprises these Slavic languages which were standardized in the 20th century prior to the fall of communism (1989), namely, Belarusian, Macedonian, Slovak, Slovenian, Sorbian and Ukrainian. New or renewed standardization projects that commenced in earnest during the 1990s allow for distinguishing the fourth group, which includes: Bosnian, Croatian, Kashubian, Montenegrin, Pomakian, Rusyn and Serbian. In all the cases it is a work in progress, because standardization of none of these languages has been completed yet. In addition to these four groups, one can
distinguish two further groups that are not temporal in character, but amount to a comment on the current status of a given standardization project. One group is comprised of abandoned standardization projects (Banat Bulgarian and Burgenland Croatian) and the other of planned projects that have not been carried out (Goralian, Silesian and Polesian).

The four temporal groups do not match the triple division of the Slavic languages. The first group corresponds to early modern polities that were not nation-states. The second reflects the rise of national movements and the founding of Balkan nation-states during the 19th century, which heralded the coming of the age of nationalism. The third group is a comment on the rise of Slavic nation-states and sub-state national republics in federal states. The fourth group reflects the founding of new Slavic nation-states in the wake of the breakups of the federations, as well as the rise of new Slavic national movements. The additional two groups also offer similar insights. The group of abandoned standardization projects indicates which ethnopolitical movements failed to transform themselves into full-fledged national movements. The last group of planned standardization projects that await being carried out places a question mark on if the ethnopolitical movements will spawn national movements or not. As a caveat, I should say that these new national movements may transcend the Central and Eastern European normative isomorphism of language, nation and state. This would mean that such national movements would unfold without any need to go on with the standardization of their own specific languages.

An alternative classification

The tradition of classifying Slavic languages, presumably on linguistic and genetic principles, was enshrined in the dogma of the triple division of these languages that has predominated in scholarly and popular discourse since the interwar period. The graphic and intellectual attractiveness of the Stammbaum won the day, because it so well merges with the ideological needs of Central and Eastern European nationalisms summarized in the principle of the normative isomorphism of language, nation and state. However, the tradition of the Welle theory as developed by Schuchardt and Schmidt survives among linguists. Structuralists took up this tradition in the 1920s. They concentrated on the synchronic relations among languages construed as systems (structures), and disregarded the search for presumed genetic relations among languages. They clearly understood that languages as we see them are modern. First, written languages were only recently standardized beginning in the 16th century in Western Europe and during the 18th and later centuries in Central and Eastern Europe. Second, standardization necessarily and swiftly distances the standard language from its dialectal base. Third, a dialect or dialects claimed to be such a
dialectal base of a standard language, continue changing from generation to
generation. The written form preserves the standard language, while the dialects
of the presumed dialectal base of the standard language, are quite different from
what they used to be when the language was standardized on their basis. Fourth,
standard languages being so recent vis-à-vis their dialectal bases, it is a fallacy
to seek diachronic genetic links among standard languages. Fifth, it would be
more appropriate to look for such links among dialect continua, but genetic
relations are often distorted and obfuscated by equally frequent contacts among
genetically not related dialect continua. People and groups of people come into
contact irrespective of any linguistic differences that may be perceived as
dividing them.

These insights inspired the two Russian émigré linguists Nikolai S Trubetzkoy
(1890-1938) and Roman Jakobson (1896-1982), working in Prague, to propose
the concept of Sprachbund or iazykovy soiuz in Russian. This idea remained
limited to Central and Eastern European scholarship, hence there is no accepted
English counterpart of this term, which can be rendered as “language union” or
“language league”. Jakobson used this concept in one of his most significant
works K kharakteristike ievraziiskogo iazykovogo soiuza (1931, On the Eurasian
Language League). To this concept the German linguist H Becker devoted his
1948 monograph Der Sprachbund (Language League), and the German scholar
E Lewy attempted to classify the languages of Europe with the use of this
instrument in his Der Bau der europäischen Sprachen (1964, The Structure of
the European Languages). The notion of language league was not the focus of
the research conducted by the US linguist Benjamin Lee Whorf, but in 1939 he
proposed the category of Standard Average European (SAE) for lumping
together the Romance and Germanic languages. He argued that in vocabulary,
syntax and conceptualization of reality there were more similarities among these
languages than differences.¹⁶⁷

The logic of grouping the genetically distinctive Romance and Germanic
languages, as proposed by Whorf in his SAE, was that of a language league.
After 1945 scholars modified his concept limiting SAE to the “large” European
languages, namely, English, German, French, Italian and Russian. The last
addition was new to Whorf’s SAE, because he had doubted if Slavic or Baltic
(let alone non-Indo European) languages could be subsumed in this category at
all. The present-day threshold for including a European language in SAE is that
it should enjoy more than 50 million speakers, and ought to function as a
regional, continent- or even world-wide lingua franca. This ensures the constant

Language, Thought and Reality (edited by John B Carroll). Cambridge MA: The
flow of tremendous volume of information via the media of these languages. All of them entrenched in the Western cultural tradition, they thrive on mutual contacts and exchanges with one another, which contributes to the ever increasing degree of structural similarity among these languages.

The Magyar (Hungarian) scholar Gyula Décsy in his 1973 work *Die linguistische Struktur Europas* (The Linguistic Structure of Europe) offered the sole full classification of the European languages in line with the concept of language league. I will briefly concentrate on these leagues that comprise Slavic languages. For him the most significant is the league of the large languages, or the SAE league (described above) with Russian included in it. The “most Slavic” of Décsy’s language leagues are the Rokytno and Danube leagues that comprise only single non-Slavic language each. The Rokytno league groups Belarusian, Kashubian, Polish, Ukrainian and the Baltic language of Lithuanian. The name of this league is derived from the Ukrainian village of Rokytno located not far from the borders of Poland and Belarus. “Rokyta” is Ukrainian for “willow”, and the word in slightly changed forms occurs in other languages belonging to this league. The territorial extent of this league coincides with the territory of Poland-Lithuania. The speakers of all these five languages lived in this polity, which existed for more than four centuries from 1386 to 1795. Later the domination of the Polish language on these territories continued in a helter skelter manner in this area during the 19th century before it was reaffirmed in independent Poland after 1918. More than half a millennium of the coexistence was terminated after 1945 when the territory of the Polish state was radically moved westward. What remains are similarities in syntax, vocabulary and conceptualization shared by these five languages.

The same is true of the Danube league that comprises Czech, Slovak, Slovenian, Serbo-Croatian and the Finno-Ugric language of Magyar (Hungarian). In this case the commonality shared by these five languages stems from the fact that most of their speakers lived in the Habsburg realms from 1526 to 1918, almost half a millennium. But the Balkan league constitutes a par excellence example of *Sprachbund*. Its seven members are extremely varied from the genetic point of view. Bulgarian and Macedonian are Slavic languages, Romanian and Molodovan belong to the Romance family of languages, Albanian and Greek are Indo-European isolates, and Turkish is a Turkic language. Seemingly they should not have any common features. But already in 1862 the Austrian slavicist of Slovenian origin Franz Miklosisch (Fran Miklošič) noted eight features shared by these languages. Then more features of this kind were identified. It is not so surprising if one remembers that the speakers of all these languages (with the exception of Turkish), first, were united in Byzantium and the Bulgarian Empire, and then (including Turkish) in the Ottoman Empire from the late 14th
century to the early 20th century. That is at least one millennium and a half of common history.

Décsy placed Sorbian in the league of “island-languages” (Insel-Sprachen) that also includes the Turkic language of Gagausian spoken in Moldova, the Romance language of Rheto-Romance which enjoys the status of co-official language in Switzerland, and the Germanic language of Lëtzeburgesch functioning as the national language of Luxembourg. They do not fit in any of the leagues that group territorially adjacent languages, and these island languages are spoken by small groups of native-speakers. These sociolinguistic features rather than linguistic, geographic and geopolitical constitute the basis for distinguishing this league of island-languages.  

Décsy’s classification has not become popular on two counts. First of all, it does not conform with the national principle of the normative isomorphism of language, nation and state. Second, it defies the logic of the genetic classification of languages, which was one of the reasons for the rise of the “Panmovements” of Pan-Slavism, Pan-Germanism, Pan-Scandinavianism, Pan-Turkism or Pan-Turanism (lumped together speakers of Turkic and Finno-Ugric languages) in the second half of the 19th century and in the first half of the 20th century. On the other hand, Décsy’s classification is not free from ideological assumptions either. For instance, his Danube league emphasizes the cultural, historical and linguistic unity of the lands that constituted historical Hungary prior to the breakup of Austria-Hungary and the serious curtailing of the Hungarian territory in 1918. Of course, inclusion of Czech and Slovenian in this league obfuscates this message though does not render it meaningless. This broader frame pitted non-German speaking peoples of Austria-Hungary against the German-speakers of this Dual Monarchy. A similar ideological ploy cloaking the desire for recreating this “real Hungary” was behind András Rónai’s extensive Atlas of Central Europe. It was published in Budapest in March 1945 in preparation for a postwar peace conference, which would reestablish Hungary’s pre-1918 borders. Similarly Décsy’s Rokytno and Balkan leagues one could interpret as underscoring of certain sympathy for Poland-Lithuania and the Ottoman Empire as historical bases for political

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169 Cf Snyder, Louis L. 1990. Encyclopedia of Nationalism. New York: Paragon House, pp 266-318. Not all of the Panmovements are linguistically based. For instance, the ideologues of Pan-Africanism, the Pan-Europa movement and Pan-Ottomanism clearly have striven to transcend the constraints of linguistic affinities.
integration in these two regions of Europe that had fragmented into a plethora of ethnolinguistic nation-states.
V. Conclusion

The triple division of the Slavic languages maps something else than the linguistic reality. This reality rather provides for classifying these languages into the two branches, Northern and Southern, that would correspond to the Northern and Southern Slavic dialect continua, respectively. There is no clear linguistic border between the Western and Eastern Slavic languages of the triple classification. Script and religion seem to function as the instruments that engender the border between these two groups of languages. But religion and script being of extralinguistic quality, they should not be taken into consideration, while attempting to arrive at a linguistically based classification of the Slavic languages. From the vantage of areal linguistics only the Southern branch of the triple classification seems to hinge on the linguistic reality. However, inner divisions of this branch tend to follow the cleavages of script and religion too. Hence, the triple classification of the Slavic languages is curiously steeped in a mixture of linguistic and extralinguistic markers that serve as the basis for this specific classificatory division.

The triple classification of the Slavic languages grew by trial and error of which the creators of this classification had hardly ever been fully aware. This was so because this classification emerged at the same time when there coalesced the ideal of the normative isomorphism of language, nation and state during the second half of the 19th century. During this period and later philologists oftentimes doubled as national politicians and vice versa. This extremely close alliance between linguistics and ethnonational politics brought about the transformation of the lands inhabited by Slavic-speakers into homogenous ethnolinguistic nation-states. Nation-states of this sort mostly replaced the European section of the Ottoman Empire before World War I. After 1918 this process was repeated in Central Europe where new ethnolinguistic nation-states grew up from the rubble of disappeared Austria-Hungary and the lands detached from the German and Russian Empires. This process of the formation of Slavic ethnolinguistic nations was largely completed in the 1990s with the almost simultaneous breakups of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. The only two new Slavic nation-states that loom on the horizon are Montenegro and Serbia should they decide not to renew their dual confederacy in 2006.

The litmus test of how strong the political pull of the normative isomorphism of language, nation and state is among Slavic-speakers, is the fact that none of the extant Slavic nation states shares its national language with another (even in Belarus where Russian has dominated since the mid-1990s, politicians and legislation maintain that Belarusian is the national language of this nation-state). It is quite to the contrary with the political experience of Romance- and
Germanic-speakers. French is shared as a national language by Belgium, France and Switzerland; while German by Austria, Germany, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg and Switzerland; and Netherlandish (Dutch) by Belgium and Holland. Italy and Switzerland also share Italian in the capacity of national language and the same is true of English in Europe in the cases of Ireland and the United Kingdom, while English is also widely used in Cyprus and Malta. What is more, the United Kingdom shares its national language with a plethora of nation-states all around the world not unlike France, Spain and Portugal in the cases of French, Spanish and Portuguese, respectively. This phenomenon is even more clearly visible just across the Mediterranean. On the southern shores of this sea, from the Atlantic to the Middle East, there are over twenty territorially adjacent nation-states that share Arabic as their national language.

Clearly, in the case of Slavic peoples the political imagination that has governed nation- and nation-state-building based on different precepts, and developed very differently from political imaginations that were implemented so as to construct nations and nation-states elsewhere in the world. The other side of the same coin is that founding of a Slavic nation-state complete with its distinctive national language entails ethnic homogenization of the population contained within the state’s borders. It is never easy to carry out, and resultant ethnic cleansing is always viciously harmful for political stability, economy, culture and social relations. These nation-states have been most successful at ethnic cleansing where there were no third parties interested in stopping this process and the international community actually actively condoned it as in the case of Poland and Czechoslovakia after 1945.

The normative principle of radical isomorphism of language, nation and state, by no means, is limited to the Slavic nation-states. Similar ethnolinguistic differentiating processes took place in Albania, Greece and Turkey in the Balkans; in Hungary, Moldova and Romania in Central Europe; in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania on the southern shores of the Baltic; as well as in the Scandinavian states of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. The similarity to the Slavic nation-states is especially striking in the case of the Scandinavian nation-states. Actually there is hardly any significant difference between Danish and Norwegian (Bokmål) but they are maintained as two separate languages not unlike Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian following the breakup of Yugoslavia. The separate history of Norwegian commenced in earnest only when Norway gained independence from Denmark in 1907. Differences separating Swedish, Norwegian and Icelandic are not greater than those that keep apart kindred Czech and Slovak. Last but not least, after the breakup of the Soviet Union Moldova replaced the Cyrillic with the Romanian-style Latin alphabet for writing in the Moldovan language. For all practical
reasons Moldovan and Romanian are identical. What keeps them separate is politics steeped in the radical isomorphism of language, nation and state.

However, the Slavic languages are unique in their close link with the processes of nation- and nation-state-building carried out in accordance with the logic of the isomorphism of language, nation and state. Out of the Germanic languages only the Scandinavian ones tend to follow the same pattern, while the same is true only of Moldovan and Romanian in the case of the Romance languages. The ideal of the isomorphism of language, nation and state was almost implemented in the nation-states with Finno-Ugric national languages, that is, in Estonia and Hungary. But Finland remains a notable exception with two national languages, Finnish and Swedish.

The fine-tuning of the triple division of the Slavic languages took place prior to 1918. This was strongly connected to the nation-state-building aspirations of various Slavic national movements in Austria-Hungary. Then during World War I the development of Belarusian and Ukrainian national movements and languages was encouraged by German and Austro-Hungarian occupation administrations. These policies brought about the founding of the Polish nation-states, as well as of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union where nations were granted either their own ethnolinguistic republics or broad ethnolinguistic cultural autonomy. The interwar period saw the making of the triple division into the standard classification of the Slavic languages. First of all, it ensured conceptual separation of the “East Slavic languages” (Belarusian, Russian and Ukrainian) mostly contained in the Soviet Union from the national projects of the Poles and Czechoslovaks. This classification also legitimized the founding of Yugoslavia – the nation-state of the South Slavs. Second, the rise of the triple classification as the standard one was also possible due to the codification and final recognition of Belarusian, Slovak, Slovenian and Ukrainian as separate languages in their own right. This made obsolete the earlier classifications that had subsumed Belarusian and Ukrainian in Russian or Slovak in Czech. The results of World War II only reaffirmed this pattern with huge ethnic cleansings and border shifts which led to spectacular homogenization of the existing Slavic nation-states and sub-state national republics. Belgrade and Prague resigned from the rhetoric of the Serbocroatoslovenian and Czechoslovak languages, respectively. This confirmed the existence of Slovenian and Slovak as separate entities. Fearing Bulgarian irredentism the Yugoslavian authorities also encouraged the rise of the Macedonian language.

In 1945 there already existed all the Slavic languages of the triple classification. This standard classification was complete and seemed as much unchanging and indestructible as the Iron Curtain and the Berlin Wall. Even more so, because
not only researchers from Slavic nation-states subscribed to this dogma, but also their Western colleagues. Significantly, after World War II all the Slavic nation-states and sub-state national republics found themselves in the Soviet bloc. Yugoslavia was a tentative exception to this rule, but although Belgrade broke with Moscow, it continued to pursue communism as its ideological goal. I wonder if the common experience of communism was not the catalyst that finally imprinted the normative isomorphism of language, nation and state on Slavic nation-states, sub-state national republics and national movements as the only way to independence and freedom from communism and Soviet paramountcy. In his 1913 essay “Marxism and the National Question” Joseph Stalin proposed to utilize the sociopolitical force of nationalism in a tactical manner on the way to communism. In line with this thinking, in the early 1920s the Soviet Union was administratively divided into ethnolinguistically defined national republics. After World War II this model was emulated in Yugoslavia and in 1968 in Czechoslovakia. But this move proved tactically erroneous. Nationalism did not wane as predicted but grew from strength to strength, and emerged in force where it had not existed before (for instance, in Soviet Central Asia). In the postwar period this required official acceptance of “national communism” throughout the Soviet bloc and in Yugoslavia. Finally, after the sudden demise of the communist ideology at the end of the 1980s, the second element of this compound phrase went defunct. To the surprise of marxist-leninists and Western observers (sovietologists) nationalism won the ideological competition with communism.

The current proliferation of Slavic languages in the aftermath of the breakup of Yugoslavia has not made it to the triple classification yet. A dogma is a dogma only when it is unchanging, carved in stone to last forever. The sudden ethnolinguistic and political change shook the stability of this standard division of the Slavic languages. On the one hand, it remains resilient and refuses to espouse the recent changes. There are no Stammbäume of the Slavic languages with Bosnian, Croatian, Montenegrin or Serbian featured to be seen in textbooks. On the other hand, proponents of the standard triple classification may be waiting to see if the newcomer languages will not disappear rather than to correct their accepted pet triple classification of the Slavic languages. Such a waiting period for Macedonian declared and recognized by Belgrade in 1944 was less than five years before it was welcome to the fold of this classification. It was easy, Bulgaria was a member of the defeated Axis camp. Equally, the West and the Soviet bloc threw its support behind “progressive and


172 Cf Lehr-Splawiński. Chrestomatia, pp 44-63.
anti-fascist” Yugoslavia’s decision to make Macedonian into a separate language.

The breakup of Yugoslavia was neither in the interest of the West nor in the interest of the post-Soviet and postcommunist states. This keeps the outside actors from officially recognizing (or not) the recent linguistic transformation that took place in the post-Yugoslav states, though 15 years have already elapsed from the moment when Yugoslavia started to break up. This and previous examples clearly indicate that the triple division of the Slavic languages is a hostage of politics. In this capacity, it is also a useful tool of instilling national feeling, legitimizing nationhood and national statehood as well as Pan-Slavic and regional Slavic projects.

The inclusion of a language in this classification equals instantaneous recognition of it as a separate entity on its own. In line with the normative isomorphism of language, nation, and state, this also means that the speakers of such a language form a nation and, ideally, have the right to found their own nation-state. However recent a codification of such a standard language may be, national scholarship anachronistically projects this standard language a millennium or even more into the past in the case of Slavic languages. If a Slavic nation-state can credibly claim a medieval tradition of statehood, the imagined (invented) history of a corresponding language is pegged onto it. Otherwise when early statehood is too tentative, it is a standard language that is made to function as an ersatz for the absence of statehood tradition. Not surprisingly any history of a Slavic language or statehood, or both tends to commence in the 10th century or earlier even back in the 6th century. This largely imagined pedigree of old age legitimizes Slavic nations in the eyes of their own members, and in the eyes of the outside world, especially the West. This second role was of utmost importance prior to World War I. At that time in Europe a national movement could legitimately seek founding of its own nation-state only when the corresponding nation (for which such a nation-state was earmarked) was recognized as “historical”. “Non-historical” nations, by default, had no right to their own nation-states. This Western European doctrine of national statehood defined “historicalness” as the tradition of continuous statehood from the Middle Ages to modernity. Hence, out of the Slavic national movements only Russia was given this distinction. Sometimes it was extended to Poland but critics pointed out that Poland(-Lithuania) disappeared from the political map of Europe before it had a chance to transform itself into a modern state. Moreover, reemergence of Poland as a nation-state could shake Russia which, in the 19th century, grew into a significant pillar of the European power system.173

173 Herod. The Nation in the History.
Prior to 1918 the Russian Empire was the sole significant Slavic state. The triple classifications of the Slavic languages of that time tended to give the Russian language preferential treatment in the form of the separate Eastern branch earmarked exclusively for this language. This was prior to the fully recognized emergence of Belarusian and Ukrainian as separate languages in the early 1920s. This elevated position of Russia among the Slavic peoples, and of Russian among the Slavic languages constituted the platform for the rise of the Pan-Slavic ideology. It claimed that all the Slavic peoples/nations should be united in the Pan-Slavic fold of Greater Russia with its capital in Tsargorod (City of the Emperor), or Constantinople (Istanbul). What “scientifically” defined the Slavic peoples/nations intended for such unification was the presumed “genetic” affinity of the Slavic languages presented in various classification schemes and Stammbäume.\(^{174}\)

After the collapse of the Russian Empire in 1917, the Pan-Slavic idea waned, but the triple classification of the Slavic languages became the dominant standard and thrived on the political plane. The Southern branch was interpreted as the legitimizing basis for Yugoslavia, the nation-state of the South Slavs, much to the quiet apprehension of Bulgaria. Sofia stuck to its myth of the direct descent of the Bulgarian language from Old Church Slavonic in order to legitimize the Bulgarian statehood against any attempts at absorbing it into some “Greater Yugoslavia” in future. The Eastern branch lent itself to similar interpretation. After the founding of the Soviet Union there was no question about establishing some East Slavic nation-state. However, there survived the imperial ideology of the Greater Russian language and nation as composed from the Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian languages and nations. These three ethnolinguistic elements were molded into the hard core of the Soviet Union. The Eastern branch of the Slavic languages “scientifically” emphasized this “common fate”.

Political imagination, rather than the linguistic reality, informed and inspired the triple classification of the Slavic languages. Since the end of the 19\(^{th}\) century it proved itself a useful ideological instrument for legitimizing proposed Slavic nationhoods and national statehoods. This classification’s emotional charm married with the presumed scientificalness of Schleicher’s Stammbaum proved hard to resist. Between 1878 and 1995 all the lands inhabited by considerable Slavic populations were divided among nation-states. The triple classification of the Slavic languages easily explained the “predestined necessity” of this change, and “scientifically” legitimized the application of the normative isomorphism of language, nation and state. Now when the vast majority of the goals of Slavic nation- and nation-state-building have been reached, the standard of the triple

division of the Slavic languages is used to perpetuate the current lattice of the Slavic nation-states. Perhaps, this also accounts for the considerable unwillingness to welcome the newly emerged Slavic languages of Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian to the common fold of this classification turned political and “scientific” dogma.

Such a concession would amount to a political statement, but there is no choice, for this time political developments overtook the rich classificatory imagination of slavicists. More often than not it is politicians who nowadays dictate the rules and decisions not philologists.Maybe the utility of creating more standard Slavic languages for ever smaller communities of speakers is not such a “hot” issue as it was two centuries ago, when most Slavic-speakers could receive education and progress in life only via the media of the German, Latin, Magyar, Church Slavonic and Ottoman languages. All of them were distanced from Slavic idioms of everyday speech, which made the world somehow “foreign” to Slavic-speakers and convinced them to enter the geopolitical fray on the dual ticket of national philologists and national activists.

The political and “scientific” momentum of the construct of the triple classification is considerable. Hence, this standard division will retain its elevated position in near future. The paramountcy of this classification may eventually crumble on several counts. First, linguists may throw their weight behind the dual division of the Slavic languages hinged on the two Slavic dialect continua. Second, should Serbia-Montenegro split in 2006 it may also happen that Montenegro, instead of developing its own national language, would stick to Serbian. This would amount to the first serious breach in the normative isomorphism of language, nation and state so far perfectly applied in the Slavic nation-states. Third, Ukraine may choose integration with the West Slavic nation-states within the broader framework of the enlarging European Union, whereas Belarus may continue seeking an ever closer union with Russia. Such developments would nullify the current overlapping of the political border with the linguistic one (of the triple division) between the East and West Slavic nation-states and languages.

What awaits us in store remains to be seen in the future. Perhaps the increasing detachment of the ethnic from the political observed in the European Union will unravel the close relationship between linguists and politicians equally interested in sustaining the close correspondence between the triple division of the Slavic languages and the national principle of the normative isomorphism of language, nation, and state. It is a mere speculation. Reality will test it sooner or later. Significantly, the history of the Slavic languages and nationalisms deftly shows how quickly and deeply constructs of human imagination replace reality.
if these constructs popularly deemed “scientific” and “true, are time and again inculcated in the successive generations of schoolchildren.

Czissowa

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VI. Literature


